

# Improved Delegation of Computation using Fully Homomorphic Encryption

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## Abstract

Following Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno (Cryptology ePrint Archive 2009/547), we use fully homomorphic encryption to design improved schemes for delegating computation. In such schemes, a *delegator* outsources the computation of a function  $F$  on many, dynamically chosen inputs  $x_i$  to a *worker* in such a way that it is infeasible for the worker to make the delegator accept a result other than  $F(x_i)$ . The “online stage” of the Gennaro et al. scheme is very efficient: the parties exchange two messages, the delegator runs in time  $\text{poly}(\log T)$ , and the worker runs in time  $\text{poly}(T)$ , where  $T$  is the time complexity of  $F$ . However, the “offline stage” (which depends on the function  $F$  but not the inputs to be delegated) is inefficient: the delegator runs in time  $\text{poly}(T)$  and generates a public key of length  $\text{poly}(T)$  that needs to be accessed by the worker during the online stage.

Our first construction eliminates the large public key from the Gennaro et al. scheme. The delegator still invests  $\text{poly}(T)$  time in the offline stage, but does not need to communicate or publish anything. Our second construction reduces the work of the delegator in the offline stage to  $\text{poly}(\log T)$  at the price of a 4-message (offline) interaction with a  $\text{poly}(T)$ -time worker (which need not be the same as the workers used in the online stage). Finally, we describe a “pipelined” implementation of the second construction that avoids the need to re-run the offline construction after errors are detected (assuming errors are not too frequent).

**Keywords:** verifiable computation, outsourcing computation, worst-case/average-case reductions, computationally sound proofs, universal argument systems

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# 1 Introduction

The problem of delegating computation considers a scenario where one party, the *delegator*, wishes to delegate the computation of a function  $f$  to another party, the *worker*. The challenge is that the delegator may not trust the worker, and thus it is desirable to have the worker “prove” that the computation was done correctly. Obviously, we want verifying this proof to be easier than doing the computation.

This concept of “outsourcing” computation is relevant in several real world scenarios, as illustrated by the following three examples (taken from [GGP09, GKR08]):

1. **Volunteer computing.** The idea of volunteer computing is for a server to split large computations into small units, send these units to volunteers for processing, and reassemble the results (via a much easier computation). The Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network Computing (BOINC) [And03, And04] is an example of such a platform. Some famous projects using the BOINC platform are SETI@home, and the Great Internet Mersenne Prime Search [Mer07]. We refer the reader to [GKR08] for more details on these projects.
2. **Cloud computing.** In the setting of cloud computing, businesses buy computing time from a service, rather than purchasing their own computing resources.
3. **Weak mobile devices.** Mobile devices, such as cell-phones, security access-cards, music players, and sensors, are typically very weak computationally, and thus need the help of remote computers to run costly computations.

A fundamental question about such settings is: *what if the workers are dishonest?* For example, in the volunteer computing setting, an adversarial volunteer may introduce errors into the computation. In the cloud computing example, the cloud (i.e., the business providing the computing services) may have a strong financial incentive to return incorrect answers, if such answers require less work and are unlikely to be detected by the client. Moreover, in some cases, the applications outsourced to the cloud may be so critical that the delegator wishes to rule out accidental errors during the computation. As for weak mobile devices, the communication channel between the device and the remote computer may be corrupted by an adversary.

In practice, many projects cope with such fraud by redundancy; the same work unit is sent to several workers and the results are compared for consistency. However, this requires the use of several workers and provides little defense against colluding workers.

Instead, we would like the worker to *prove* to the delegator that the computation was performed correctly. Of course, it is essential that the time it takes to verify the proof is significantly smaller than the time needed to actually run the computation. At the same time, the running time of the worker carrying out the proof should also be reasonable — comparable to the time it takes to do the computation. For example, when delegating the computation of a function  $f$  that takes time  $T$  and has inputs and outputs of length  $n$ , we would like the delegator to run in time  $\text{poly}(n, \log T)$  and the worker to run in time  $\text{poly}(T)$ .

## 1.1 Previous Work

The large body of work on probabilistic proof systems, starting with [Bab85, GMR89], is very relevant to secure delegation. Indeed, after computing the delegated function  $f$  on input  $x$  and sending the result  $y$ , the worker can use various types of proof systems to convince the delegator of the statement “ $f(x) = y$ ”.

**Interactive Proofs.** The IP=PSPACE Theorem [LFKN92, Sha92] yields interactive proofs for any function  $f$  computable in polynomial space, with a verifier (delegator) running in polynomial time. However, the complexity of the prover (worker) is also only bounded by polynomial space (and hence exponential time). This theorem was refined and scaled down in [FL93] to give verifier complexity  $\text{poly}(n, s)$  and prover complexity  $2^{\text{poly}(s)}$  for functions  $f$  computable in time  $T$  and space  $s$ , on inputs of length  $n$ . Note that the prover complexity is still superpolynomial in  $T$ , even for computations that run in the smallest possible space, namely  $s = O(\log T)$ . However, the prover complexity was recently improved by Goldwasser et al. [GKR08] to  $\text{poly}(T, 2^s)$ , which is  $\text{poly}(T)$  when  $s = O(\log T)$ . More generally, Goldwasser et al. [GKR08] give interactive proofs for computations of small *depth*  $d$  (i.e. parallel time). For these, they achieve prover complexity  $\text{poly}(T)$  and verifier complexity  $\text{poly}(n, d, \log T)$ . (This implies the result for space-bounded computation because an algorithm that runs in time  $T$  and space  $s$  can be converted into one that runs in time  $\text{poly}(T, 2^s)$  and depth  $d = O(s^2)$ .) However, if we do not restrict to computations of small space or depth, then we cannot use interactive proofs. Indeed, any language that has an interactive proof with verifier running time (and hence communication)  $T_V$  can be decided in space  $\text{poly}(n, T_V)$ .

**PCPs and MIPs.** The MIP=NEXP Theorem [BFL91] and its scaled-down version by Babai et al. [BFLS91] yield multiprover interactive proofs and probabilistically checkable proofs for time  $T$  computations with a prover running in time  $\text{poly}(T)$  and a verifier running in time  $\text{poly}(n, \log T)$ , exactly as we want. However, using these for delegation require specialized communication models — either 2 noncommunicating provers, or a mechanism for the prover to give the verifier random access to a long PCP (of length  $\text{poly}(T)$ ) that cannot be changed by the prover during the verification.

**Interactive Arguments.** Instead of changing the communication model, interactive arguments [BCC88] (aka computationally sound proofs [Mic94]) relax the soundness condition to be computational. That is, instead of requiring that no prover strategy whatsoever can convince the verifier of a false statement, we instead require that no computationally feasible prover strategy can convince the verifier of a false statement. In this model, Kilian [Kil92] and Micali [Mic94] gave constant-round protocols with prover complexity  $\text{poly}(T, k)$  and verifier complexity  $\text{poly}(n, k, \log T)$  (where  $k$  is the security parameter), assuming the existence of collision-resistant functions. Under a subexponential hardness assumption, the security parameter can be taken as small as  $\text{polylog}(T)$ ; this also holds for the schemes described below.

**Towards Non-interactive Solutions.** In this work, we are interested in getting closer to non-interactive solutions (with computational soundness). Ideally, the worker/prover should be able to send a proof to the delegator/verifier in the same message that it sends the result of the computation.

This possibility of efficient non-interactive arguments was suggested by Micali [Mic94], who showed that non-interactive arguments with prover complexity  $\text{poly}(T, k)$  and verifier complexity  $\text{poly}(n, k, \log T)$  are possible in the Random Oracle Model (the oracle is used to eliminate interaction a la Fiat–Shamir [FS86]). Heuristically, one might hope that by instantiating the random oracle with an appropriate family of hash functions, we could obtain a non-interactive solution to delegating computation: in an offline stage, the verifier/delegator (or a trusted third party) chooses and publishes a random hash function from the family, and in the online stage, the proofs are completely non-interactive (just one message from the prover to the verifier). However, the Random Oracle Heuristic is known to be unsound in general [CGH04] and even in the context of

Fiat–Shamir [Bar01, GK03]. Thus, despite extensive effort, the existence of efficient non-interactive arguments remains a significant open problem in complexity and cryptography.

There has been some recent progress in reducing the amount of interaction needed. Using a transformation of Kalai and Raz [KR09], Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum [GKR08] showed how to convert their interactive proofs for small-depth computations into non-interactive arguments in a “public key” model (assuming the existence of single-server private-information retrieval (PIR) schemes): in an offline stage, the verifier/delegator generates a public/secret key pair, publishes the public key and stores the secret key. Then, in the online stage, the prover/worker retrieves the public key and can construct a proof to send along with the result of the computation. However, like the interactive proofs of [GKR08], this solution applies only to small-depth computations, as the verifier’s complexity grows linearly with the depth.

Very recently, Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno [GGP09] showed how to delegate arbitrary computations by increasing the verifier’s offline complexity and public-key size, and using a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme (as recently constructed by Gentry [Gen09]). In their construction, the delegator invests  $\text{poly}(T, k)$  work in the offline stage to construct a public key of size  $\text{poly}(T, k)$  and a secret key of size  $\text{poly}(k)$  (for delegating a function  $f$  that is computable in time  $T$ ). In the online stage, the delegator’s running time is reduced to  $\text{poly}(n, k, \log T)$  for an input of length  $n$ , and the worker’s complexity is  $\text{poly}(T, k)$ . Thus, the delegator’s large investment in the offline stage can be amortized over many executions of the online stage to delegate the computation of  $f$  on many inputs. Their online stage is not completely non-interactive, but consists of two messages. However, in many applications, two messages will be necessary anyway, as the delegator may need to communicate the input  $x$  to the worker.

We remark that in the schemes where the delegator has a secret key (namely [GKR08] and [GGP09], as well as two of our constructions below), soundness is only guaranteed as long as the adversarial worker does not learn that the delegator has rejected a proof. Thus, either the accept/reject decision should be kept secret, or the (possibly expensive) offline stage should be re-run after rejection.

## 1.2 Our Results

In this work, we provide the following protocols that improve over the work of Gennaro et al. [GGP09]:

- Our first protocol eliminates the large public key of the Gennaro et al. scheme. That is, the delegator still performs  $\text{poly}(T, k)$  work in the offline stage, but the result of this computation is just a secret key of length  $\text{poly}(n, k, \log T)$ ; there is no need for any interaction with the worker(s) in advance of the online stage (not even to transmit a public key).
- Our second protocol reduces the work of the delegator in the offline stage to  $\text{poly}(n, k, \log T)$ , at the price of a constant-round interaction with a worker that runs in time  $\text{poly}(T, k)$ . With this protocol, re-running the offline stage after a rejected proof becomes more reasonable, and thus there is no reason to keep the accept/reject decisions secret.
- Finally, we describe a “pipelined” implementation of our second protocol that avoids the latency of re-running the offline stage, while maintaining soundness even if the accept/reject decisions are revealed. This solution requires both parties to maintain state, and completeness holds provided that faults do not occur too often. Thus, this solution is most suitable for cases where the delegator is using a single worker many times and there are random faults (in communication or computation) that may cause the delegator to reject occasionally.

Like [GGP09], all of our protocols require the use of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and have a 2-message online stage.

A full comparison of our model and results with previous work is given in Table 1.

## 2 Outline of Our Constructions

Inspired by the recent work of Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno [GGP09] on secure delegation, our constructions rely on the use of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

**Fully Homomorphic Encryption.** A public-key encryption scheme  $E = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  is said to be *fully homomorphic* if it is associated with an additional polynomial-time algorithm  $\text{Eval}$ , that takes as input a public key  $\text{pk}$ , a ciphertext  $\hat{x} = \text{Enc}(x)$  and a circuit  $C$ , and outputs, a new ciphertext  $c = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{x}, C)$ , such that  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(c) = C(x)$ , where  $\text{sk}$  is the secret key corresponding to the public key  $\text{pk}$ . It is required that the size of  $c = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x), C)$  depends polynomially on the security parameter and the length of  $C(x)$ , but is otherwise independent of the size of the circuit  $C$ . We also require that  $\text{Eval}$  is deterministic, and the scheme has perfect correctness (i.e. it always holds that  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)) = x$  and that  $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x), C)) = C(x)$ ). For security, we simply require that  $E$  is semantically secure.

In a recent breakthrough, Gentry [Gen09] proposed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on ideal lattices. In his basic scheme, the complexity of the algorithms  $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$  depends linearly on the *depth* of the circuit  $C$ , where  $d$  is an upper bound on the depth of the circuit  $C$  that are allowed as inputs to  $\text{Eval}$ . However, under the additional assumption that his scheme is circular secure (i.e., it remains secure even given an encryption of the secret key), the complexity of these algorithms are independent of  $C$ . Furthermore, Gentry’s construction satisfies the perfect correctness and the  $\text{Eval}$  of his scheme can be made deterministic. We refer the reader to [Gen09] for details.

An interesting aspect of the [GGP09] construction is how they use the *secrecy* property of fully homomorphic encryption schemes into order to achieve a *soundness* property in their delegation scheme; this phenomenon also recurs several times in our work.

**Our Constructions.** We now informally explain our delegation schemes, by starting with a simple scheme  $\text{Del}_1$  that achieves rather weak properties, and strengthen it through a series of steps leading to our main delegation schemes  $\text{Del}_4$  and  $\text{Del}_5$ . We make use of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme in several steps, to achieve different properties. Thus, the final schemes  $\text{Del}_4$  and  $\text{Del}_5$ , use several layers of fully homomorphic encryption.

Formal descriptions and analyses for all of the protocols can be found in Sections 5–9.

- **Protocol  $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$ : one-time delegation scheme for a random input with soundness error  $1/2$ .** This simple scheme handles the case of delegating the evaluation of a function  $F$  on a *single* and *random* input  $x$ , that will be drawn from a known, efficiently samplable distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  and given to the delegator in the online stage.

In the offline stage, the delegator  $D_1$  samples a random input  $r \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$  and precomputes  $F(r)$ . In the online stage,  $D_1$  receives  $x$  (which is drawn from the same distribution as  $r$ ), sends both  $x$  and  $r$  to  $W_1$  in a random order, and asks  $W_1$  to compute both  $F(x)$  and  $F(r)$ . Upon receiving the answers from  $W_1$ , the delegator  $D_1$  checks the correctness of the returned value  $F(r)$ ; if it is correct then he accepts the returned  $F(x)$ , and otherwise he rejects. Thus, a

Ref	Assumption	Soundness	offline			keys			online		
			# msgs	$D$ complexity	$ PK $	$ SK $	# msgs	$D$ complexity	$W$ complexity		
[GKR08]	none	stat	0	0	0	0	0	$\text{poly}(d, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(n, d, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(T)$	
[BFL91, BFLS91]	none	MIP/PCP	0	0	0	0	0	1	$\text{poly}(n, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(T)$	
[Kil92, Mic00]	CRH	comp	0	0	0	0	0	4	$\text{poly}(k, n, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	
[Kil92, Mic00]	RO-Heur	comp	1	$\text{poly}(k)$	$\text{poly}(k)$	$\text{poly}(k)$	0	1	$\text{poly}(k, n, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	
[GKR08, KR09]	PIR	comp	1	$\text{poly}(k)$	$\text{poly}(k, d, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, d, \log T)$	0	1	$\text{poly}(k, n, d, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	
[GGP09]	FHE	comp	1	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	$\text{poly}(k, n)$	$\text{poly}(k, n)$	2	$\text{poly}(k, n, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	
Thm. 5	FHE	comp	0	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	0	$\text{poly}(k, n)$	$\text{poly}(k, n)$	2	$\text{poly}(k, n, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	
Thm. 6	FHE	comp	4	$\text{poly}(k, n, \log T)$	0	$\text{poly}(k, n)$	$\text{poly}(k, n)$	2	$\text{poly}(k, n, \log T)$	$\text{poly}(k, T)$	

Table 1: Results on Delegating Computation.  $D$  = delegator/verifier,  $PK$  = worker/prover,  $SK$  =  $D$ 's secret key,  $k$  = security parameter. Parameters of computation  $f$  being delegated:  $n$  = input length,  $T$  = time,  $d$  = depth/parallel time (we assume  $n \leq T \leq 2^d$ )

malicious worker  $W^*$  can convince  $D_1$  with a wrong answer iff  $W^*$  can guess which input is the delegator’s real input. Since  $x$  and  $r$  are independent and identically distributed, no malicious prover can guess the real input  $x$  and cheat successfully with probability greater than  $1/2$ .

- **Protocol  $\text{Del}_2 = \langle D_2, W_2 \rangle$ : one-time delegation scheme for an arbitrary input with soundness error  $1/2$ .** In the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$  above, it was essential that the input  $x$  is hidden from the worker in the online stage to guarantee the soundness. If the worker knew  $x$ , he could discriminate between  $r$  and  $x$ , and cheat by answering correctly on  $r$  and incorrectly on  $x$ . We eliminate this strong limitation by using a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme to “*computationally randomize*” the input: Instead of giving the worker  $x$  in the clear, the delegator will encrypt the input  $x$  to obtain  $\hat{x} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$ . Then the delegator will ask the worker to compute the *deterministic* homomorphic evaluation  $\hat{F}(\hat{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{x}, F)$  of  $F$  on the encrypted value  $\hat{x}$ , from which he can decrypt to obtain the desired answer  $F(x)$ .<sup>1</sup> Notice that even if  $x$  is fixed, the distribution of  $\hat{x} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$ , which is efficiently samplable and independent of  $x$ . Thus, in the offline stage, the delegator can precompute an encryption  $\hat{r} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  together with  $\hat{F}(\hat{r}) = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{r}, F)$ , and use the pair  $(\hat{r}, \hat{F}(\hat{r}))$  to verify the worker’s answer in the online stage as before. This computational randomization technique extends the random-input delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1$  to a (standard) delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_2$  with one-time soundness error  $1/2$ .

We note that the computational randomization technique also yields a worst-case/average-case connection for functions in deterministic time classes: given a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  that is computable in deterministic time  $T(n)$  but is worst-case hard for probabilistic algorithms running in some time  $S(n) < T(n)$ , we obtain a function  $\hat{F} : \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(n)}$  that is computable in deterministic time  $\text{poly}(T(n))$  but is *average-case* hard for probabilistic algorithms running in time  $S(n)/\text{poly}(n)$ , under a fixed  $\text{poly}(n)$ -time samplable distribution (namely, random encryptions of 0).<sup>2</sup> This is all under the assumption that we have a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is secure against algorithms running in time  $\text{poly}(T(n))$ , on security parameter  $k = n$ .

- **Protocol  $\text{Del}_3 = \langle D_3, W_3 \rangle$ : one-time delegation scheme for an arbitrary input with negligible soundness error.** Here we employ a standard amplification technique to improve the soundness. The delegator  $D_3$  asks the worker to compute  $\hat{F}$  on multiple independent rerandomized inputs  $\hat{x}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  together with multiple  $\hat{r}_i$ ’s (sent in a random order), as opposed to a single  $\hat{x}$  and a single  $\hat{r}$ . Upon receiving the worker’s answers, the delegator  $D$  checks whether (i) the returned value for  $\hat{r}_i$  is equal to  $\hat{F}(\hat{r}_i)$  for every  $\hat{r}_i$ , and (ii) the decryption of the returned values for  $\hat{x}_i$  are consistent, and accepts the consistent value if the worker’s answers pass these two tests. Observe that for a malicious worker to cheat, he needs to simultaneously cheat on all the  $\hat{x}_i$ ’s while provide correct answers on all the  $\hat{r}_i$ ’s. Since the  $\hat{x}_i$ ’s and the  $\hat{r}_i$ ’s are computationally indistinguishable, the probability of cheating is exponentially small in the number of repetitions (i.e., the number of  $\hat{x}_i$ ).

<sup>1</sup>We note that in order to compute  $\text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{x}, F)$ , the Turing machine  $F$  needs to be turned into a circuit. This can be done via a standard simulation of Turing machines by circuits.

<sup>2</sup>For the worst-case/average-case connection, the public key should be included as an input to  $\hat{F}$  and the samplable distribution on inputs should include choosing a random public key.

- **Protocol  $\text{Del}_4 = \langle D_4, W_4 \rangle$ : *many-time* delegation scheme for arbitrary inputs with negligible soundness error.** Now we give an overview of our first *reusable* delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4$ . However, let us first take a closer look at why the previous delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3$  is not reusable. The reason  $\text{Del}_3$  is not reusable is that it is essential for the worker to not know the  $\hat{r}_i$ 's: Once a malicious worker  $W^*$  learns the values of the  $\hat{r}_i$ 's, he can cheat easily by answering correctly only on those  $\hat{r}_i$ 's. In other words, each precomputed pair  $(\hat{r}_i, \hat{F}(\hat{r}_i))$  can be used only once. Hence,  $\text{Del}_3$  is only one-time secure. Phrased in a more abstract way, the soundness of the protocol  $\text{Del}_3$  relies on the assumption that the secret key of the delegator  $D_3$  (i.e., the pairs  $(\hat{r}_i, \hat{F}(\hat{r}_i))$ 's) remains secret, and yet this key is revealed after delegating a single input.

To make the protocol reusable, we use an idea of Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno [GGP09], and run the protocol under a fully homomorphic encryption scheme using the delegator's keys. This hides the delegator's message (which contains the information of the delegator's secret state) from the worker, while still allowing the worker to do the computation for the delegator. Therefore, information about the delegator's secret state is not leaked, and thus the delegator can reuse the secret state to delegate multiple inputs.

In Sections 8, we abstract [GGP09], and present a generic transformation that converts any delegation scheme with one-time soundness to a *reusable* delegation scheme. Applying this transformation to the previous delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3$ , we obtain our first main delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4$ . Note that the messages exchanged in the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4$  are doubly encrypted: Each  $\hat{x}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  and  $\hat{r}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  are encrypted using one public key  $\text{pk}$ . Then, the entire message  $(pk, \{\hat{x}_i\}, \{\hat{r}_i\})$  is encrypted using another (independent) public key.

- **Protocol  $\text{Del}_5 = \langle D_5, W_5 \rangle$ : *many-time* delegation scheme for arbitrary inputs with negligible soundness error, with *efficient* (but interactive) offline stage.** We note that in all the delegation schemes above, the delegator needs to run heavy computations in the offline stage. For example, in the offline stage of  $\text{Del}_4$ , the delegator needs to compute pairs of the form  $(\hat{r}_i, \hat{F}(\hat{r}_i))$ , where each  $\hat{r}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$ , and therefore runs in time comparable to the runtime of  $F$ . The idea is to make the offline stage efficient by delegating its computation as well. However, since we do not know how to do non-interactive delegation (this is the problem we started with!), this will come at the price of making the offline stage interactive. In particular, we use *universal arguments*, developed by [Mic94, Kil92, BG02], and which yield a 4-message delegation scheme. However, we cannot apply universal arguments directly, as they allow the worker to learn the result of the computation, which in our case is supposed to be the secret key of the delegator. To solve this problem, we use yet another layer of fully homomorphic encryption. If  $g$  is the function that takes  $D_4$ 's coin tosses  $r$  in the offline stage to its secret state  $g(r)$ , then  $D_5$  sends  $\hat{r} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(r)$  to the worker, uses the universal argument to delegate the computation of  $\hat{g} = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\cdot, g)$  on  $\hat{r}$ , and decrypts the result. (The efficiency of the universal argument relies on the fact that the result of the offline stage is short, and thus this technique cannot be applied directly to the [GGP09] protocol.)

We note that the worker that participates in the offline stage does not need to be the same worker that participates in the online stage (and these workers do not even need to know of the existence of the other).

- **Pipelined Implementation of  $\text{Del}_5$ : maintaining soundness after errors.** As mentioned in the introduction, the soundness of our main schemes  $\text{Del}_4$  and  $\text{Del}_5$  is only guaranteed as long as the adversarial worker does not learn that the delegator has rejected a proof, as



this may leak information about the delegator’s secret key. Hence, the delegator needs to re-run the offline stage after rejection.

Our “pipelined” scheme avoids this issue by having the delegator keep  $c$  secret keys (for a constant  $c$ ) and continually refresh them during the online stage. Recall that  $\text{Del}_5$  has an efficient but 4-message offline stage where the delegator delegates the computation of his secret key to a worker. The idea is that, in each execution of the 2-message online stage, the delegator and the worker shall simultaneously run  $2c$  copies of offline stages in the background. These are run in a pipelined fashion so that with each online stage,  $c$  copies of the offline stage are finished and can be used to refresh secret keys that are expired. We consider a secret key to be expired when it has been used in an online stage of  $\text{Del}_5$  in which the delegator has rejected. Thus, the delegator will always have a fresh secret key available provided that for every  $c$  online stages in which there is an error (i.e. rejection), there are at least 2 consecutive errorless stages. We note that this implementation requires the worker and delegator to maintain state, and thus is most useful for settings in which the delegator is interacting with a single worker for many executions and wishes to avoid disruption from benign faults. (If the worker were truly cheating, then it seems prudent to halt the interaction and restart with a different worker...)

### 3 The Model

In this section, we formally define a model that captures the delegating computation scenario we are interested in.

**Definition 1 (Delegation Scheme)** *A delegation scheme is an interactive protocol  $\text{Del} = \langle \text{D}, \text{W} \rangle$  between a delegator  $\text{D}$  and a worker  $\text{W}$  with the following structure:*

1. *The scheme  $\text{Del}$  consists of two stages: an offline/preprocessing stage and an online stage. The offline stage is executed once before the online stage, whereas the online stage can be executed many times.*
2. *In the offline stage, both the delegator  $\text{D}$  and the worker  $\text{W}$  receive a security parameter  $k$  and a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ , represented by a Turing machine  $M$  and a time bound  $T$  for  $M$ . At the end of the interaction, the delegator  $\text{D}$  decides whether to accept or reject. If  $\text{D}$  accepts, then  $\text{D}$  outputs a secret key  $\sigma_{\text{D}}$  and a public key  $\sigma_{\text{W}}$ . We will denote this by  $(\sigma_{\text{D}}, \sigma_{\text{W}}) = \langle \text{D}, \text{W} \rangle(F, 1^k)$ . We will use the notation  $M$ ,  $n$ ,  $m$ , and  $T$  as the Turing machine and parameters associated with  $F$  throughout the paper, and we will often omit the security parameter from the notation.*
3. *In the online stage, both parties receive  $F$ ,  $1^k$ , and an input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , and execute a one round communication protocol. Namely,  $\text{D}$  sends  $q = \text{D}(F, x, \sigma_{\text{D}})$  to  $\text{W}$ , and then  $\text{W}$  sends  $a = \text{W}(F, x, \sigma_{\text{W}}, q)$  to  $\text{D}$ . Then the delegator  $\text{D}$  either accepts or rejects. If  $\text{D}$  accepts, then  $\text{D}$  also generates a private output  $y = \text{D}(F, x, \sigma_{\text{D}}, q, a) \in \{0, 1\}^m$ , which is supposed to be  $F(x)$ . For simplicity, we will omit the function  $F$  and the security parameter from the input of the online stage.*

We also define the following properties of delegation schemes.

- *A delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  has an **efficient** delegator in the online (resp., offline) stage if the computational complexity of  $\text{D}$  in the online (resp., offline) stage is  $\text{poly}(k, n, m, |M|, \log T)$ .*

- A delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  has an **efficient** worker if the computational complexity of  $W$  is  $\text{poly}(k, |M|, T)$ .
- A delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  has a **non-interactive** offline stage if  $D$  and  $W$  do not interact at all during the offline stage, and only  $D$  does some computation. Note that if  $\text{Del}$  has a non-interactive offline stage, then we can assume w.l.o.g. that  $D$  always accepts in the offline stage.

For a delegation scheme to be meaningful, it needs to have completeness and soundness properties. Informally, the completeness property says that the delegator  $D$  always learns the desired value  $F(x)$ , assuming both parties follow the prescribed protocol. The soundness property says that the delegator  $D$  mistakenly accepts a wrong value  $y \neq F(x)$  from a malicious worker with only negligible probability.

**Definition 2 (Completeness)** A delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  has perfect completeness if for all parameters  $n, m, T, k$ , for every function  $F$  and every  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , the following holds with probability 1: When  $D$  and  $W$  run the offline stage protocol with input  $F$ , and then run the online stage protocol with input  $x$ , the delegator  $D$  accepts in both the offline and the online stage, and outputs  $y = F(x)$  in the online stage.

In order to define the soundness, we introduce the following security game.

**Definition 3 (Security Game for Delegation Schemes)** Let  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a delegation scheme and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be the security parameter. The security game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  for  $\text{Del}$  is the following game played by a worker strategy  $W^*$ .

- The game starts with the offline stage of  $\text{Del}$ , and is followed by many rounds of the online stage.
- $W^*(1^k)$  first chooses the delegated function  $F$  and then  $D$  and  $W^*$  interact in the offline stage of  $\text{Del}$  with input  $F$ .
- At the beginning of each round of the online stage (indexed by  $\ell$ ),  $W^*$  can either terminate the game or choose an input  $x_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . If the game is not terminated,  $D$  and  $W^*$  interact in the online stage of  $\text{Del}$  on input  $x_\ell$ .
- Whenever the delegator  $D$  rejects, the game terminates.

$W^*$  succeeds in the game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  if there exists a round  $\ell$  of the online stage such that  $D$  accepts and outputs a wrong value  $y_\ell \neq F(x_\ell)$ , where  $x_\ell$  is the delegated input chosen by  $W^*$ .

**Definition 4 (Soundness)** Let  $\varepsilon : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  be an efficiently computable functions. A delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  has **soundness error**  $\varepsilon$  if for every PPT worker strategy  $W^*$ , who chooses a polynomial-time delegated function, and for every  $k$ ,

$$\Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \leq \varepsilon(k),$$

where  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  is the corresponding security game for  $\text{Del}$ . We say that  $\text{Del}$  has **negligible soundness error** if  $\text{Del}$  has soundness error  $1/k^c$  for every constant  $c$ .

Note that the above definition does not guarantee soundness for delegating functions of complexity superpolynomial in  $k$ . However, we have soundness for functions of complexity that is an arbitrarily large polynomial in  $k$ , whereas an efficient delegator would run in time that is a fixed polynomial in  $k$ ; so the delegation is still quite useful. This quantitative relationship stems from the standard asymptotic formulation of security as being with respect to polynomial-time adversaries. If we use a fully homomorphic encryption scheme that is secure against adversaries running time subexponential in  $k$ , then we would obtain soundness for delegating functions of subexponential complexity (while the delegator still runs in fixed polynomial time).

In terms of concrete security, the security parameter  $k$  should be chosen by the delegator so that breaking the encryption scheme requires an infeasible amount  $R$  of resources for the worker, and thus the delegator should only be delegating functions that require significantly less resources than  $R$ .

Note that in the security game  $\mathcal{G}$ , the delegator  $D$  rejects and terminates the game, whenever he catches the worker cheating. Thus, the soundness is only guaranteed until the worker cheats. In other words, once the worker cheats, the delegator  $D$  can catch this mistake with overwhelming probability, but the delegation scheme no longer guarantees soundness for the next delegated inputs. Therefore,  $D$  should restart the delegation scheme from the offline stage to ensure the soundness of future delegated inputs.

The model of [GGP09] takes a different approach. Rather than halting the game after a rejection, they instead consider a game where the delegator's accept/reject decisions are kept secret from the worker. Our protocols also satisfy their definition; indeed, the two definitions are equivalent for schemes where the delegator has no state (other than the secret key).

## 4 Our Results

Now we can formally state the properties of our two main delegation schemes,  $\text{Del}_4$  and  $\text{Del}_5$  sketched in Section 2. We begin with  $\text{Del}_4$ , which has non-interactive offline stage in which the delegator does a lot of work, but does not need to produce any public key.

**Theorem 5** *Assume that there exists a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Then there is a secure delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  with the following properties, for delegating the computation of a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  computable by a Turing machine  $M$  that runs in time  $T \geq \max\{n, m\}$ , on security parameter  $k$ :*

- *Perfect completeness and negligible soundness error.*
- *Non-interactive offline stage, with  $D$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$  and generating a secret key of length  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$ , but not creating any public key.*
- *2-message online stage, with  $D$  running in time  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$  and  $W$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$ . That is, both  $D$  and  $W$  are efficient in the online stage.*

The next theorem describes  $\text{Del}_5$ , which makes the delegator efficient in the offline stage, at the price of some interaction with a worker.

**Theorem 6** *Assume that there exists a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Then there is a secure delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  with the following properties, for delegating the computation of a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  computable by a Turing machine  $M$  that runs in time  $T \geq \max\{n, m\}$ , on security parameter  $k$ :*

- Perfect completeness and negligible soundness error.
- 4-message offline stage, with  $D$  running in time  $\text{poly}(n, m, k, |M|, \log T)$  and  $W$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$ .
- Secret key of length  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$  for  $D$ , and no public key.
- 2-message online stage, with  $D$  running in time  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$  and  $W$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$ .

Thus,  $D$  and  $W$  are efficient in both stages.

As mentioned in Section 2,  $\text{Del}_5$  can be implemented in a pipelined fashion so as to avoid the need to re-run the offline stage after rejection (provided that errors do not occur too often).

## 5 $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$ : One-time, Random-Input Delegation Scheme

In this section, we present our first warmup delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$  for the following one-time and random-input scenario.

**Scenario:** Suppose the delegator  $D$  knows that at some point in the future, he will receive a *random* input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  drawn from a certain (samplable) distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  and he will want to learn the value  $F(x)$  quickly. Thus,  $D$  decides to delegate the computation of  $F(x)$  to an untrusted worker  $W$  (who does *not* know the random  $x$ ), and  $D$  wants to be able to verify the answer from  $W$ . In this scenario,  $D$  is willing to spend a lot of effort during an offline stage (say, is willing to run in time proportional to  $T$ , which is the time it takes to run  $F$ ), but during the online stage, once he receives  $x$ ,  $D$  wants to be able to delegate the computation of  $F(x)$  and verify the answer very efficiently.

As outlined in Section 2, the idea is very simple: In the offline stage, the delegator  $D_1$  samples a random input  $r \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$  and precomputes  $F(r)$ . In the online stage,  $D_1$  sends both  $x$  and  $r$  to  $W_1$  in a random order, and asks  $W_1$  to compute both  $F(x)$  and  $F(r)$ . Upon receiving the answers from  $W_1$ , the delegator  $D_1$  checks the correctness of the returned value  $F(r)$ ; if it is correct then he accepts the returned  $F(x)$ , and otherwise he rejects. Thus, a malicious worker  $W^*$  can convince  $D_1$  with a wrong answer iff  $W^*$  can guess which input is the delegator's real input. Since  $x$  and  $r$  are independent and identically distributed, no malicious prover can guess the real input  $x$  and cheat successfully with probability greater than  $1/2$ .

To formalize the above argument, we modify the definition of a delegation scheme, and modify the soundness definition, as follows.

**Definition 7 (Random-input Delegation Scheme)** A random-input delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  is a delegation scheme with the following modifications:

1. In the offline stage, in addition to  $F$ , both the delegator  $D$  and the worker  $W$  receive a sampling circuit  $\mathcal{D} : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ .
2. In the online stage, only the delegator receives  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ .

A formal description of our random-input delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$  can be found in Figure 1.

Clearly,  $\text{Del}_1$  has perfect completeness. In order to analyze its soundness, we need to define the notion of one-time soundness.

- **Inputs.** Security parameter  $1^k$  and function  $F : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ , specified by a Turing machine  $M$ , and a time bound  $T$ .
- **Offline Stage.** Both  $D_1$  and  $W_1$  receive input  $(F, \mathcal{D})$ 
  1.  $D_1$  samples a random input  $r \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$ , computes  $w = F(r)$ , and stores the pair  $(r, w)$  as his secret state.
- **Online Stage.**  $D_1$  receives  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  (where  $x$  is expected to distribute according to  $\mathcal{D}$ ), and  $W_1$  does not receive any input.
  1.  $D_1$  sets  $r_0 = r$  and  $r_1 = x$ . It then samples a random bit  $b \in_R \{0,1\}$ , and sends  $(z_0, z_1) = (r_b, r_{1-b})$  to  $W_1$ .
  2.  $W_1$  computes and sends  $(y_0, y_1) = (F(z_0), F(z_1))$  to  $D_1$ .
  3.  $D_1$  accepts and outputs the answer  $y_{1-b}$  iff  $w = y_b$ .

Figure 1: Delegation Scheme  $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$

**Definition 8 (One-time Soundness for Random-input Delegation Schemes)** *Let  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a random-input delegation scheme, and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be a security parameter. The **one-time security game**  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  for  $\text{Del}$  is the following game played by a worker strategy  $W^*$ .*

- $W^*(1^k)$  first chooses an input  $(F, \mathcal{D})$ , and then  $D$  and  $W^*$  interact in the offline stage of  $\text{Del}$  on input  $(F, \mathcal{D})$ .
- An input  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$  is generated, and then  $D$  and  $W^*$  interact in the online stage, where only  $D$  gets the input  $x$ .

$W^*$  succeeds in the game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  if  $D$  accepts in both the offline and online stages and outputs a wrong value  $y \neq F(x)$ . We say that  $\text{Del}$  has **one-time soundness error**  $\varepsilon$  if for every PPT worker strategy  $W^*$  who chooses a polynomial-time delegated function, and for every  $k$ ,  $\Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \leq \varepsilon(k)$ .

**Lemma 9** *The random-input delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1$  has one-time soundness error  $1/2$ .*

**Proof.** In fact, we will show that  $\text{Del}_1$  has one-time soundness error  $1/2$  even against computationally unbounded cheating workers.

Fix an arbitrary security parameter  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and an arbitrary (cheating) worker  $W^*$ , and consider the corresponding security game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ . By definition, in the security game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ , the worker  $W^*(1^k)$  first generates  $(F, \mathcal{D})$ , and then receives from  $D_1$  the pair  $(z_0, z_1)$ , which is a random ordering of the real input  $x$  and a random input  $r$ . Then  $W^*$  sends  $(y_0, y_1)$  to  $D_1$ . At the end of the game,  $W^*$  succeeding implies that  $W^*$  cheats only on  $x$ . Namely,  $W^*$  sends a correct answer  $F(r)$  to  $r$ , and an incorrect answer to  $x$ . Note that  $x$  and  $r$  are independent and identically distributed, and  $W^*$  does not know the bit  $b$ . Therefore,

$$\Pr[ W^* \text{ cheats only on } x ] = \Pr[ W^* \text{ cheats only on } r ],$$

which implies that both the probabilities are at most  $1/2$ . Thus,

$$\Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] = \Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } x] \leq 1/2.$$

■

## 6 $\text{Del}_2 = \langle D_2, W_2 \rangle$ : One-time, Arbitrary-input Delegation Scheme

Recall that in the random-input delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1 = \langle D_1, W_1 \rangle$ , it was essential that the input  $x$  is hidden from the worker in the online stage to guarantee the soundness. If the worker knew  $x$ , he could discriminate between  $r$  and  $x$ , and cheat by answering correctly on  $r$  and incorrectly on  $x$ .

As outlined in Section 2, we eliminate this strong limitation by using a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme to “*computationally randomize*” the input: Instead of sending  $x$  in the clear, the delegator will encrypt the input  $x$  to obtain  $\hat{x} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$ . Then the delegator will ask the worker to compute the *deterministic* homomorphic evaluation  $\hat{F}(\hat{x}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{x}, F)$  of  $F$  on the encrypted value  $\hat{x}$ , from which he can decrypt to obtain the desired answer  $F(x)$ .<sup>3</sup> Notice that even if  $x$  is fixed, the distribution of  $\hat{x} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$ , which is efficiently samplable and independent of  $x$ . Thus, the delegator can precompute an encryption  $\hat{r} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  together with  $\hat{F}(\hat{r}) = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{r}, F)$ , and use the pair  $(\hat{r}, \hat{F}(\hat{r}))$  to verify the worker’s answer as before.

The above computational randomization technique extends the random-input delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_1$  to a (standard) delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_2$  with one-time soundness error  $1/2$ . We formally describe the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_2 = \langle D_2, W_2 \rangle$  in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2: Delegation Scheme  $\text{Del}_2 = \langle D_2, W_2 \rangle$

<sup>3</sup>We note that in order to compute  $\text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{x}, F)$ , the Turing machine  $F$  needs to be turned into a circuit. This can be done via a standard simulation of Turing machines by circuits.

It is straightforward to check that if the fully homomorphic encryption scheme has perfect correctness, then  $\text{Del}_2$  has the perfect completeness. As in the previous section, before arguing that the scheme has sound error  $1/2$ , we first give the definition of one-time soundness.

**Definition 10 (One-time Soundness for Delegation Schemes)** *Let  $\text{Del} = \langle \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{W} \rangle$  be a delegation scheme and  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  be a security parameter. The **one-time security game**  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  for  $\text{Del}$  is the same as security game for  $\text{Del}$  defined in Definition 3 excepts that it only allows one round in the on-line stage. We say that  $\text{Del}$  has **one-time soundness error**  $\varepsilon$  if for every PPT worker strategy  $W^*$  who chooses a polynomial-time delegated function, and for every  $k$ ,  $\Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \leq \varepsilon(k)$ .*

The following lemma analyzes the one-time soundness of  $\text{Del}_2$ .

**Lemma 11** *Assume that the fully homomorphic encryption is semantically secure. Then the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_2$  has one-time soundness error  $1/2 + \text{ngl}(k)$ .*

**Proof.** Fix any security parameter  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and any efficient (cheating) worker  $W^*$ . By definition of the security game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ , the worker  $W^*(1^k)$  first generates  $F$ , and then receives from  $\mathcal{D}_2$  a public key  $\text{pk}$  and  $(\hat{z}_0, \hat{z}_1)$ , which are encryptions  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  and  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  in a random order. Then  $W^*$  replies with answers  $(\hat{y}_0, \hat{y}_1)$  to  $\mathcal{D}_2$ . At the end of the game, if  $W^*$  succeeded in cheating, it must have sent a correct answer  $\hat{F}(\hat{r})$  to  $\hat{r}$ , and an incorrect answer to  $\hat{x}$  — by which we mean a value other than  $\hat{F}(\hat{x})$  (even if it still decrypts to  $F(x)$ ). We say that  $W^*$  *cheats* on  $\hat{x}$  (resp.,  $\hat{r}$ ) if  $W^*$  sends an incorrect answer to  $\hat{x}$  (resp.,  $\hat{r}$ ).

We next upper bound the probability that  $W^*$  cheats only on  $\hat{x}$ . By the security of a fully homomorphic encryption scheme,  $(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}), \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x))$  and  $(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}), \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}))$  are computationally indistinguishable to  $W^*$ . Hence, let us consider a modified game  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$  where  $\mathcal{D}_2$  generates  $\hat{x} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  instead of  $\hat{x} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$ . Since in  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  it holds that  $(\text{pk}, \hat{r}, \hat{x}) \equiv (\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}), \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x))$ , and in  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$  it holds that  $(\text{pk}, \hat{r}, \hat{x}) \equiv (\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}), \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}))$ , by the indistinguishability, we have

$$\Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } \hat{x} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \leq \Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } \hat{x} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)] + \text{ngl}(k).$$

**Remark.** In order to obtain the above inequality, we relied on the fact that given  $\text{pk}, \hat{x}, \hat{r}$ , one can check whether  $W^*$  cheats only on  $\hat{x}$  by applying  $\hat{F}$ . Hence, if  $W^*$  behaves differently in  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  and in  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$ , then we can use  $W^*$  to break the underlying fully homomorphic encryption scheme in time polynomial in the running time of  $W^*$  and the running time of the delegated function chosen by  $W^*$ ; this is why we restrict  $W^*$  to choose polynomial-time delegated functions in Definition 4.

Now, in the modified game  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$ , both  $\hat{x}$  and  $\hat{r}$  are independent and identically distributed, and  $W^*$  does not know the bit  $b$ . Therefore,

$$\Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } \hat{x} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)] = \Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } \hat{r} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)],$$

and thus both the probabilities are at most  $1/2$ . Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \\ & \leq \Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } \hat{x} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \\ & \leq \Pr[W^* \text{ cheats only on } \hat{x} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)] + \text{ngl}(k) \\ & \leq 1/2 + \text{ngl}(k), \end{aligned}$$

which proves the lemma. ■

## 7 $\text{Del}_3 = \langle \text{D}_3, \text{W}_3 \rangle$ : One-time, Arbitrary-input Delegation Scheme with Negligible Soundness

In this section, we exploit the above computational randomization technique to improve the soundness. As outlined in Section 2, the idea is simple: The delegator  $\text{D}$  asks the worker to compute  $\hat{F}$  on multiple independent rerandomized inputs  $\hat{x}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  together with multiple  $\hat{r}_i$ 's (sent in a random order), as opposed to a single  $\hat{x}$  and a single  $\hat{r}$ . Upon receiving the worker's answers, the delegator  $\text{D}$  checks whether (i) the returned value for  $\hat{r}_i$  is equal to  $\hat{F}(\hat{r}_i)$  for every  $\hat{r}_i$ , and (ii) the decryption of the returned values for  $\hat{x}_i$  are consistent, and accepts the consistent value if the worker's answers pass these two tests. Observe that for a malicious worker to cheat, he needs to simultaneously cheat on all the  $\hat{x}_i$ 's while providing correct answers on all the  $\hat{r}_i$ 's. The formal description of the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3 = \langle \text{D}_3, \text{W}_3 \rangle$  appears in Figure 3.




Figure 3: Delegation Scheme  $\text{Del}_3 = \langle \text{D}_3, \text{W}_3 \rangle$

In the following lemma, we argue that since the  $\hat{x}_i$ 's and the  $\hat{r}_i$ 's are computationally indistinguishable, the probability of cheating is exponentially small in  $t$  (which is the number of  $\hat{x}_i$ 's). Thus, by setting  $t = \omega(\log k)$ , the protocol  $\langle \text{D}_3, \text{W}_3 \rangle$  achieves negligible soundness error.

**Lemma 12** *Assume that the fully homomorphic encryption is semantically secure. Then the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3$  has one-time soundness error  $\binom{2t}{t}^{-1} + \text{ngl}(k)$ .*

**Proof.** Fix any security parameter  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  and an efficient (cheating) worker  $\text{W}^*$ . By definition, in the security game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ , the worker  $\text{W}^*(1^k)$  first generates  $F$ , and then receives from  $\text{D}_3$  a public key  $\text{pk}$  and  $(\hat{z}_1, \dots, \hat{z}_{2t})$ , which are  $t$  independent copies  $(\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t)$  of  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  and  $t$  independent



copies  $(\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t})$  of  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  in a random order. Then  $W^*$  sends answers  $(\hat{y}_1, \dots, \hat{y}_{2t})$  to  $D_3$ . At the end of the game, if  $W^*$  succeeded in cheating, then it must have sent correct answers  $\hat{F}(\hat{r}_i)$  to  $\hat{r}_i$  for all  $i \in [t]$ , and incorrect answers to the remaining  $\hat{r}_i$  for  $i \in \{t+1, \dots, 2t\}$  (in a consistent way). Again, we say that  $W^*$  *cheats* on  $\hat{x}_i$  (resp.,  $\hat{r}_i$ ) if  $W^*$  sends an answer different than  $\hat{F}(\hat{x}_i)$  (resp.,  $\hat{F}(\hat{r}_i)$ ).

Our goal is to upper bound the probability that  $W^*$  answers correctly on  $(\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t)$  and incorrectly on  $(\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t})$ . Note that in game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ ,  $D_3$  generates

$$(\text{pk}, \hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \equiv (\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})^t, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)^t),$$

which is computationally indistinguishable from  $(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})^{2t})$ , where the notation  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})^t$  denotes  $t$  independent copies of  $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$ . Hence, let us consider a modified game  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$  where  $D_3$  generates  $\hat{r}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})$  instead of  $\hat{r}_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(x)$  for  $i \in \{t+1, \dots, 2t\}$ . In the modified game  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$ ,  $(\text{pk}, \hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \equiv (\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0})^{2t})$ , and thus, by the indistinguishability, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[W^* \text{ correct on } (\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t) \text{ and incorrect on } (\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \\ & \leq \Pr[W^* \text{ correct on } (\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t) \text{ and incorrect on } (\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)] + \text{ngl}(k) \end{aligned}$$

As in the proof of Lemma 11, to obtain the above equation, we relied on the fact that given  $(pk, \hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t})$  one can check in time  $\text{poly}(T, t, k)$ , whether  $W^*$  cheats only on  $(\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t})$ . Hence, if  $W^*$  behaves differently in  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  and in  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$ , then we can use  $W^*$  to break the semantic security of the underlying fully homomorphic encryption scheme in time  $\text{poly}(T, t, k)$  (thus we need our encryption scheme to be semantic secure against adversaries running in time  $\text{poly}(T, t, k)$ ).

We proceed to upper bound the right-hand side probability. In the modified game  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$ , for every  $i \in [2t]$ :

- Let  $X_i$  be an indicator random variable that indicates whether  $W^*$  returns an incorrect answer to  $\hat{r}_i$ . Namely,  $X_i = 1$  iff  $\hat{y}_{\pi(i)} \neq \hat{F}(\hat{r}_i)$ .
- Let  $Y_i$  be an indicator random variable that indicates whether  $W^*$  returns an incorrect answer to  $\hat{z}_i$ . Namely,  $Y_i = 1$  iff  $\hat{y}_i \neq \hat{F}(\hat{z}_i)$ .

Note that by definition,  $X_i = Y_{\pi(i)}$ . Moreover, for every  $i \in [2t]$ , the random variables  $\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}$  are independent and identically distributed in  $\mathcal{G}'(k)$ , and  $W^*$  does not know the permutation  $\pi$ . Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[W^* \text{ answers correctly on } (\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t) \text{ and incorrectly on } (\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)] \\ & = \Pr[(X_1 = \dots = X_t = 0) \wedge (X_{t+1} = \dots = X_{2t} = 1)] \\ & = \Pr[(Y_{\pi(1)} = \dots = Y_{\pi(t)} = 0) \wedge (Y_{\pi(t+1)} = \dots = Y_{\pi(2t)} = 1)] \\ & \leq \Pr \left[ (Y_{\pi(1)} = \dots = Y_{\pi(t)} = 0) \wedge (Y_{\pi(t+1)} = \dots = Y_{\pi(2t)} = 1) \left| \sum_{i=1}^{2t} Y_i = t \right. \right] \\ & = \frac{1}{\binom{2t}{t}}, \end{aligned}$$

where the last equality holds because  $(Y_1, \dots, Y_{2t})$  is independent of  $\pi$  (i.e., the random variables

$\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}$  are i.i.d. and  $W^*$  receives them in a random order). Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
& \Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \\
& \leq \Pr[W^* \text{ correct on } (\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t) \text{ and incorrect on } (\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \\
& \leq \Pr[W^* \text{ correct on } (\hat{r}_1, \dots, \hat{r}_t) \text{ and incorrect on } (\hat{r}_{t+1}, \dots, \hat{r}_{2t}) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}'(k)] + \text{ngl}(k) \\
& \leq \frac{1}{\binom{2t}{t}} + \text{ngl}(k),
\end{aligned}$$

which proves the lemma. ■

## 8 The First Main Delegation Schemes $\text{Del}_4$

All the delegation schemes presented in Section 5 – 7 had only *one-time* soundness. Namely, the delegator could delegate the computation of only one input  $x$ . In this section, we present *reusable* delegation schemes, which satisfy the (standard) soundness property of Definition 4. To this end, we abstract the idea of Gennaro, Gentry, and Parno [GGP09] and present a generic transformation that converts any delegation scheme with one-time soundness to a reusable delegation scheme (i.e., one which satisfies the soundness property of Definition 4). Applying the transformation to the previous delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3$ , we obtain our first main delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4$ .

For intuition, let us take a closer look at why the previous delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3 = \langle D_3, W_3 \rangle$  is not reusable. Recall that in that scheme it is essential for the worker to not know the  $\hat{r}_i$ 's: Once a malicious worker  $W^*$  learns the values of the  $\hat{r}_i$ 's, he can easily cheat by answering correctly only on those  $\hat{r}_i$ 's. Therefore, each precomputed pair  $(\hat{r}_i, \hat{C}(\hat{r}_i))$  can be used only once. Phrased more abstractly, the security of the protocol  $\langle D_3, W_3 \rangle$  relies on assumption that the secret key of the delegator  $D_3$  (i.e., the pairs  $(\hat{r}_i, \hat{C}(\hat{r}_i))$ ), remains secret. However, in that protocol, this secret key is revealed after delegating one input.

To make the protocol reusable, we use the idea of [GGP09], of running the protocol under a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme. Namely, our transformation takes any delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  which has only one-time soundness, and converts it into a new delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}} = \langle \tilde{D}, \tilde{W} \rangle$  with (standard) soundness, as follows: The delegator  $\tilde{D}$ , instead of sending the message of  $D$  in the clear (which may reveal information about his secret key), will send a public key  $\text{pk}$  corresponding to a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, and will send the message of  $D$  encrypted under the public key  $\text{pk}$ . The worker  $\tilde{W}$  will then use the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme, to compute an encrypted reply of  $W$ . This enables the delegator  $\tilde{D}$  to hide its message (which contains the information about the delegator's secret key) from the worker  $\tilde{W}$ , while still allowing the worker to do the computation for the delegator. A formal description of the transformation can be found in Figure 4.

We next analyze the properties of the resulting (reusable) delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$ .

- If the one-time delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  has a non-interactive off-line stage, then so does  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$ , since the offline stage remains unchanged.
- If the one-time delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  has an efficient worker  $W$ , then the resulting (reusable) delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  also has an efficient worker  $\tilde{W}$ , since  $\tilde{W}$  does the same computation as  $W$ , but in an encrypted manner.

**The transformation.** Let  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a *one-time* delegation scheme. We define a transformed delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}} = \langle \tilde{D}, \tilde{W} \rangle$  from  $\text{Del}$  as follows.

- **Inputs.** Security parameter  $1^k$  and function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ , specified by a Turing machine  $M$  and a time bound  $T$ .
- **Offline Stage.**  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  has exactly the same offline stage as  $\text{Del}$ .  
(Recall that in this stage both players receive a function  $F$ .)
- **Online Stage.** both  $\tilde{D}$  and  $\tilde{W}$  receive input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .
  1.  $\tilde{D}$  generates a fresh pair of keys  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k)$  of a fully-homomorphic encryption scheme, computes  $D$ 's message  $q = D(F, x, \sigma_D)$  and its encryption  $\hat{q} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(q)$ , and sends  $\text{pk}$  and  $\hat{q}$  to  $\tilde{W}$ .
  2.  $\tilde{W}$  homomorphically computes an encrypted version of  $W$ 's message  $\hat{a} = \text{Eval}(\hat{q}, W(F, x, \sigma_W, \cdot))$ , and sends  $\hat{a}$  to  $\tilde{D}$ .
  3.  $\tilde{D}$  decrypts  $\hat{a}$  to obtain  $a = W(F, x, \sigma_W, q)$ , and computes his decision and his output according to  $D$ .

Figure 4: Transforming *one-time* delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  into a *reusable* delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$

- The fact that the complexity of the algorithms ( $\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ ) are independent of the runtime of  $F$ , implies that if the one-time delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  has an efficient delegator  $D$  then the delegator  $\tilde{D}$  in the resulting (reusable) delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  is also efficient.
- The completeness of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme implies that if the one-time delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  is complete then the resulting (reusable) delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  is also complete.

Thus, it remains to analyze the soundness of the resulting delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$ . In the following, to prevent confusion between the secret key  $\sigma_D$  of the delegator and the secret key  $\text{sk}$  of a homomorphic encryption scheme, we refer to the secret key  $\sigma_D$  of the delegator as his *secret state*. Intuitively, if information about the delegator's secret state is not leaked, the delegator can reuse the secret state to delegate the computation on multiple inputs. However, note that not only the delegator's message, but also the delegator's decision bit can leak information about the delegator's secret state, since the delegator's decision depends on his secret state. Hence, in the security game (see Definition 3), the delegator terminates the scheme once he rejects to ensure the delegator's secret state is not leaked. (As discussed in Section 3, an alternative option is to assume that the worker does not learn the decision of the delegator, and our scheme is also sound in this model.)

**Lemma 13** *Assume that the fully homomorphic encryption is semantically secure. Let  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a delegation scheme with negligible one-time soundness error, and let  $\tilde{\text{Del}} = \langle \tilde{D}, \tilde{W} \rangle$  be the delegation scheme obtained by applying to  $\text{Del}$  the transformation described in Figure 4. Then  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  also has negligible soundness error.*

**Proof.** Let  $\mathcal{G}$  and  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}$  be the security games corresponding to  $\text{Del}$  and  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$ , respectively. We refer to  $\mathcal{G}$  as the one-time game, and to  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}$  as the repeated game. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that

there exists a PPT worker strategy  $\tilde{W}^*$  (for the repeated game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}$ ) and a non-negligible function  $\tilde{\epsilon}$  such that

$$\Pr[\tilde{W}^* \text{ succeeds in } \tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)] \geq \tilde{\epsilon}(k). \quad (1)$$

We construct a PPT worker strategy  $W^*$  (for the one-time game  $\mathcal{G}$ ), and prove that there exists a non-negligible function  $\epsilon$  such that ,

$$\Pr[W^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] \geq \epsilon(k).$$

Recall that  $\tilde{W}^*$  cheats in the repeated game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}$ , whereas  $W^*$  needs to cheat in the one-time game  $\mathcal{G}$ . Let  $L$  be an upper bound on the number of times that  $\tilde{W}^*$  repeats the online stage in  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$  (e.g., we can take  $L$  to be an upper bound on the runtime of  $\tilde{W}^*$ ). Loosely speaking, our worker  $W^*$  plays the one-time game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  by simulating the worker  $\tilde{W}^*$  playing the repeated game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$ , while embedding his single online stage in a random round  $\ell^* \in [L]$  of the online stage of  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$  and simulating the messages of  $\tilde{D}$  in the other rounds by encryptions of the all-zeroes message (which are indistinguishable from actual messages of  $\tilde{D}$ ). Formally, we define the PPT worker  $W^*$ , as follows.

- In the offline stage of  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ , the worker  $W^*$  plays exactly as  $\tilde{W}^*$  does. In other words,  $W^*$  simulates  $\tilde{W}^*$  in the offline stage.

Recall that in our transformation (from one-time delegation to reusable delegation) the offline stage remains unchanged.

- $W^*$  chooses a random  $\ell^* \in_R [L]$ , and simulates the interaction of  $\tilde{W}^*$  and  $\tilde{D}$  in the first  $\ell^* - 1$  rounds of the online stage of  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$ . In the simulation, the query of  $\tilde{D}$  is replaced by  $(\text{pk}_{\ell}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\ell}}(\bar{0}))$  for every round  $\ell \in [\ell^* - 1]$ , for a fresh, randomly chosen public key  $\text{pk}_{\ell}$ . Also, in the simulation,  $\tilde{D}$  never rejects.
- If  $\tilde{W}^*$  terminates the game before the  $\ell^*$ th round, then  $W^*$  gives up; otherwise, in the online stage of  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ , the worker  $W^*$  plays the following strategy.
  - $W^*$  simulates  $\tilde{W}^*$  to generate a delegated input  $x_{\ell^*}$  in the game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$ , and uses  $x_{\ell^*}$  as his delegated input in the game  $\mathcal{G}(k)$ .
  - Upon receiving a query  $q$  from  $D$ , the worker  $W^*$  generates a fresh pair of keys  $(\text{pk}_{\ell^*}, \text{sk}_{\ell^*}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k)$ , computes  $\hat{q} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\ell^*}}(q)$ , and sends  $(\text{pk}_{\ell^*}, \hat{q})$  to  $\tilde{W}^*$ .
  - $W^*$  simulates  $\tilde{W}^*$  to generate  $\hat{a}$ , decrypts  $\hat{a}$  to obtain  $a$ , and sends  $a$  to  $D$ .

Note that  $W^*$  plays  $\mathcal{G}(k)$  by simulating the game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$  played by  $\tilde{W}^*$ , with the following modifications:

1. The simulated  $\tilde{D}$  sends  $(\text{pk}_{\ell}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\ell}}(\bar{0}))$  instead of  $(\text{pk}_{\ell}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\ell}}(q_{\ell}))$ , up until a random  $\ell^*$ th round of the online stage.
2. The simulated  $\tilde{D}$  never rejects before the  $\ell^*$ th round of the online stage.
3. The simulated game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$  ends after the  $\ell^*$ th round of the online stage.

For notational convenience, let us refer to this modified (simulated) game by  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}'(k)$ , and to the modified (simulated) delegator by  $\tilde{D}'$ . It follows that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{W}^* \text{ succeeds in } \mathcal{G}(k)] = \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ convinces } \tilde{D}' \text{ to accept a wrong answer in } \ell^* \text{th round in } \tilde{\mathcal{G}}'(k)],$$

where  $\ell^*$  is chosen uniformly at random. In the remainder of the proof we focus on proving that

$$\Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ convinces } \tilde{D}' \text{ to accept a wrong answer in the } \ell^* \text{th round in } \tilde{\mathcal{G}}'(k)] \geq \tilde{\epsilon}(k)/L - \text{ngl}(k).$$

Note that according to our contradiction assumption in Equation (1), it suffice to prove that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ convinces } \tilde{D}' \text{ to accept a wrong answer in the } \ell^* \text{th round of } \tilde{\mathcal{G}}'(k)] & (2) \\ & \geq \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ convinces } \tilde{D} \text{ to accept a wrong answer in the } \ell^* \text{th round of } \tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)] - \text{ngl}(k), \end{aligned}$$

We will actually prove the equation above, while assuming that the delegator  $\tilde{D}$  in the game  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$  never rejects before the  $\ell^*$ th round of the online stage. Note that this is obviously enough, since this only increases the success probability of  $\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^*$  in convincing  $\tilde{D}$  to accept a wrong answer in the  $\ell^*$ th round of  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$ . To prove Equation (2) above, we rely on the security of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme and use a standard hybrid argument, as we sketch below.

For every  $j = 0, 1, \dots, L$ , we define the hybrid game  $H_j(k)$ , where  $H_j(k)$  is the same as  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}(k)$  for the first  $j$  rounds of the online stage, and the same as  $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}'(k)$  for the remaining rounds. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that Equation (2) does not hold. Then a standard hybrid argument implies that there exists  $j \in [L]$  and a polynomial  $p$  such that for infinitely many  $k$ 's

$$\left| \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ succeeds in cheating in the } \ell^* \text{th round of } H_j(k)] - \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ succeeds in cheating in the } \ell^* \text{th round of } H_{j-1}(k)] \right| \geq \frac{1}{p(k)}$$

Assume without loss of generality that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ succeeds in cheating in the } \ell^* \text{th round of } H_j(k)] \geq & (3) \\ & \Pr[\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^* \text{ succeeds in cheating in the } \ell^* \text{th round of } H_{j-1}(k)] + \frac{1}{p(k)} \end{aligned}$$

We next show that this implies the existence of a PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that breaks the semantic security of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

Note that Equation (3) above implies that for every  $k \in \mathbb{N}$  there exists a secret state  $\sigma(k)$  (generated by the delegator during the offline stage) such that the equation above holds when the delegator in the hybrid games  $H_{j-1}(k)$  and  $H_j(k)$  use  $\sigma(k)$  as their secret state. Now, consider the (non-uniform) PPT adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  that for every security parameter  $k$ , has the secret state  $\sigma(k)$  hardwired into it, and distinguishes between  $(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\bar{0}))$  and  $(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(q))$  with non-negligible probability, where  $q \leftarrow \mathcal{D}(F_j, x_j, \sigma)$ , where  $F_j$  is the function chosen by the worker  $\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^*$  in the  $j$  round of the online stage, and  $x_j$  is the input chosen by  $\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^*$  in the  $j$  round of the online stage. We note that the distribution of  $q$  is efficiently sampleable, and thus the existence of such an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  indeed breaks the semantic security of the underlying fully homomorphic encryption scheme.

The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  uses its input pair to simulate either the hybrid game  $H_{j-1}(k)$  or the hybrid game  $H_j(k)$ , by running internally both the worker  $\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^*$  and the delegator in each of these hybrid games, and by placing its input as the delegator's message in the  $j$ 'th round of the online stage. It then continues the simulation, and checks whether the worker  $\tilde{\mathcal{W}}^*$  indeed cheated in the  $\ell^*$ th round.

If  $\tilde{W}^*$  cheated in the  $\ell^*$ th round, then  $\mathcal{A}$  guesses that he received an encryption of  $q$ . Otherwise,  $\mathcal{A}$  guesses that he received an encryption of the zero vector. Equation (3) immediately implies that the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  distinguishes between his two input distributions with non-negligible probability.  $\blacksquare$

Applying the above transformation to the previous delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_3$ , we obtain our main delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4$ . (A formal description of the resulting scheme  $\text{Del}_4$  appears in Figure 5.)




Figure 5: Main Delegation Scheme  $\text{Del}_4 = \langle D_4, W_4 \rangle$

We summarize the properties of  $\text{Del}_4$  in the following theorem.

**Theorem 14 (Theorem 5 restated)** *Assume that the fully homomorphic encryption scheme is semantically secure. Then the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4 = \langle D_4, W_4 \rangle$  has the following properties, for delegating the computation of a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  computable by a Turing machine  $M$  that runs in time  $T \geq \max\{n, m\}$ , on security parameter  $k$ :*

- *Perfect completeness and negligible soundness error.*
- *Non-interactive offline stage, with  $D_4$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$  and generating a secret key of length  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$ , but not creating any public key.*
- *2-message online stage, with  $D_4$  running in time  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$  and  $W_4$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$ . That is, both  $D_4$  and  $W_4$  are efficient in the online stage.*

## 9 The Second Main Delegation Scheme Del<sub>5</sub>

We note that in all the delegation schemes presented in Section 5 – 8, the delegator needs to run heavy computations in the offline stage. For example, in the offline stage of Del<sub>4</sub>, the delegator needs to compute pairs of the form  $(\hat{r}_i, \hat{F}(\hat{r}_i))$ , where each  $\hat{r}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(0)$ , and therefore runs in time comparable to the runtime of  $F$ .

In this section, we show how to make the offline stage efficient by delegating its computation as well. However, since we do not know how to do non-interactive delegation (this is the problem we started with!), this will come at the price of making the offline stage interactive. In particular, we will use *universal arguments*, a notion developed by [Mic94, Kil92, BG02], and which yields a 4-message delegation scheme. However, we cannot apply universal arguments directly, as they allow the worker to learn the result of the computation, which in our case is supposed to be the secret state of the delegator. To solve this problem, we use yet another layer of fully homomorphic encryption, and use the universal argument to delegate an encrypted form of the computation.

In Section 9.1, we describe the notion of universal arguments. Then, in Section 9.2, we describe how to use universal arguments (together with a fully homomorphic encryption) to modify *any* delegation scheme Del with a non-interactive offline stage into a new delegation scheme Del, where in Del the delegator is efficient even in the offline stage, but the offline stage is interactive (consists of 4 messages). By applying this transformation to the delegation scheme Del<sub>4</sub> we get our new delegation scheme Del<sub>5</sub>, in which the delegator is efficient in both the offline and the online stages, but the offline stage is interactive and consists of 4 messages.

### 9.1 Universal Arguments

Consider the language

$$L_{\text{uni}} \triangleq \{(M, x, y, t) : M \text{ is a Turing machine that on input } x \text{ outputs } y \text{ after at most } t \text{ steps}\}$$

**Definition 15 (Universal Arguments [BG02])** *A universal argument system is a pair of interactive Turing machines, denoted by  $(P, V)$ , that satisfy the following properties.*

- **Efficient verification.** *There exists a polynomial  $p$  such that for any  $z = (M, x, y, t)$  the total runtime of  $V$ , on common input  $z$ , is at most  $p(|z|)$ . In particular, all the messages exchanged in the protocol have length smaller than  $p(|z|)$ .*
- **Completeness via a relatively-efficient prover.** *For every  $(M, x, y, t) \in L_{\text{uni}}$ ,*

$$\Pr[(P, V)(M, x, y, t) = 1] = 1.$$

*Furthermore, there exists a polynomial  $p$  such that for every  $(M, x, y, t) \in L_{\text{uni}}$ , the total runtime of  $P$  on input  $z = (M, x, y, t)$  is at most  $p(|M|, t)$ .*

- **Computational soundness.** *For every polynomial-size circuit family  $P^* = \{P_n^*\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that for every  $(M, x, y, t) \in \{0, 1\}^n \setminus L_{\text{uni}}$ ,*

$$\Pr[(P_n^*, V)(M, x, y, t) = 1] \leq \mu(n).$$

**Remark.** We note that Barak and Goldreich [BG02] consider a more general language  $L$ , where they allow the Turing machine  $M$  to be non-deterministic. Moreover, they require an additional proof-of-knowledge type property. In this work, we are only interested in deterministic Turing machines, and only focus on the properties that we need.

**Theorem 16 ([Kil92, Mic94, BG02])** *Assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions, there exists a 4-message (2-round) universal argument system.*

We remark that the existence of fully homomorphic encryption schemes implies the existence of collision-resistant hash functions [IKO05].

## 9.2 Our New Delegation Scheme $\text{Del}_5$

We now show how to use a universal argument  $(P, V)$ , together with a fully homomorphic encryption scheme  $\mathbb{E} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ , to convert any delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = (\mathbb{D}, \mathbb{W})$  with a non-interactive offline stage into a delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}} = (\tilde{\mathbb{D}}, \tilde{\mathbb{W}})$ , such that the online stage remains unchanged, but the offline stage of  $\text{Del}$  is now interactive (consists of 4 messages) and the delegator  $\tilde{\mathbb{D}}$  is *efficient* in the offline stage.

Instead of having the delegator carry out its computations on its own in the offline stage, it will use a worker to do it for him. However, as previously noted, there is a subtle issue here: the result of the computation done by the delegator in the offline stage should remain secret for soundness to hold. Therefore, we cannot simply delegate this computation. Instead, we will delegate this computation in a secret manner; namely, we will do a universal argument over encrypted data, as follows.

Suppose without loss of generality, that in the offline stage the delegator  $\mathbb{D}$  chooses some randomness  $r \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$  for  $\ell = \text{poly}(k)$ <sup>4</sup> computes a function  $g(r)$ , where  $g$  may depend on both the delegated function  $F$  and the security parameter  $k$ . The delegator  $\mathbb{D}$  can delegate this computation, in a secret manner, by giving the worker an encryption of  $r$  (rather than  $r$  in the clear); i.e., giving the worker a pair  $(\text{pk}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(r))$ , and delegating the computation of the function  $\text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(r), g)$  to the worker, by running a universal argument protocol. Then all the delegator needs to do is to decrypt the message he gets from the worker. A formal description of this transformation can be found in Figure 6.

We next analyze the properties of the resulting (efficient) delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$ .

- The completeness condition of the universal argument and the completeness condition of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme imply that if the original delegation is complete then the resulting delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  is also complete.
- The soundness condition of the universal argument and the semantic security of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme imply that if the original delegation is sound (i.e., has negligible soundness error) then the resulting delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  is also sound.
- The “completeness via a relatively-efficient prover” condition of the universal argument and the efficiency of the Eval algorithm of the fully homomorphic encryption scheme imply that the complexity of new worker  $\tilde{\mathbb{W}}$  in the offline stage is polynomially related to the complexity of the original delegator  $\mathbb{D}$  in the offline stage (and  $k$  and  $|F|$ ).

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<sup>4</sup>The randomness of  $\mathbb{D}$  can always be reduced to  $\text{poly}(k)$  by use of a pseudorandom generator if needed.



**The transformation.** Let  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  be a delegation scheme with a non-interactive offline stage. We define a transformed delegation scheme  $\tilde{\text{Del}} = \langle \tilde{D}, \tilde{W} \rangle$  from  $\text{Del}$  as follows.

- **Inputs.** Security parameter  $1^k$  and function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ , specified by a Turing machine  $M$  and a time bound  $T$ .
- **Offline Stage.** Both  $\tilde{D}$  and  $\tilde{W}$  receive as input the function  $F$ .

Suppose that in the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$ , the delegator  $D$  chooses a random  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$  (where  $\ell = \text{poly}(k)$ ) and computes  $\sigma_D = D(1^k, F; r)$ . We denote by  $g(\cdot) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} D(1^k, F; \cdot)$ . The offline stage of  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  proceeds as follows.

1. The delegator  $\tilde{D}$  chooses a random  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ ; chooses a random key pair  $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^k)$ ; computes  $\hat{r} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(r)$ ; and sends the pair  $(\text{pk}, \hat{r})$  to the worker  $\tilde{W}$ .
2. The worker  $\tilde{W}$  computes  $c = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{r}, g)$  and sends  $c$  to the delegator.
3. Then the worker  $\tilde{W}$  and the delegator  $\tilde{D}$  engage in a universal argument, where the worker proves to the delegator that indeed  $c = \text{Eval}_{\text{pk}}(\hat{r}, g)$ .
4. If the delegator  $\tilde{D}$  accepts the universal argument, then he decrypts the ciphertext  $c$  and outputs  $\sigma_D \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(c)$ .

- **Online Stage.** The online stage of  $\tilde{\text{Del}}$  is identical to the online stage of  $\text{Del}$ .

Figure 6: Transforming delegation scheme  $\text{Del}$  with non-interactive but inefficient offline stage into  $\text{Del}$  with an *efficient* but interactive offline stage

- The “efficient verification” condition of the universal argument and the fact that complexity of the algorithms ( $\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}$ ) are  $\text{poly}(k)$ , imply that the complexity of the new delegator  $\tilde{D}$  in the offline stage is polynomially related to  $k$ ,  $|F|$ , and the *logarithm* of the running time of the original delegator  $D$  in the offline stage.
- The fact that the online stage remains unchanged implies that the efficiency of the delegator  $\tilde{D}$  and the worker  $\tilde{W}$  in the online stage remains unchanged.
- The offline stage defined in Figure 6 consists of six messages – two messages from Step 1 and 2, and four messages from the universal argument. However, the number of messages can be reduced to four by parallelizing the two messages in Step 1 and 2, and the first two messages of the universal argument, if we use the universal argument system of Barak and Goldreich [BG02]. The reason is that the verifier’s first message in [BG02] is independent of the input to the universal argument so that the verifier’s first message can be sent before the input is determined (by messages in Step 1 and 2). Therefore, we have a 4-message (2-round) offline stage.

Thus, applying the transformation above to the delegation scheme  $\text{Del}_4$ , and relying on Theorem 14, we get the following theorem.

**Theorem 17 (Theorem 6 restated)** *Assume that there exists a fully homomorphic encryption scheme. Then there is a secure delegation scheme  $\text{Del} = \langle D, W \rangle$  with the following properties, for*

delegating the computation of a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$  computable by a Turing machine  $M$  that runs in time  $T \geq \max\{n, m\}$ , on security parameter  $k$ :

- Del has perfect completeness and negligible soundness error.
- The offline stage consists of 4 messages, with  $D$  running in time  $\text{poly}(n, m, k, |M|, \log T)$  and  $W$  running in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$ .
- The offline stage produces a secret key of length  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$  for  $D$ , and no public key.
- In the (2-message) online stage,  $D$  runs in time  $\text{poly}(n, m, k)$  and  $W$  runs in time  $\text{poly}(T, |M|, k)$ .

Thus,  $D$  and  $W$  are efficient in both stages.

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