Notes On GGH13 Without The Presence Of Ideals

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Abstract. We investigate the merits of altering the Garg, Gentry and Halevi (GGH13) graded encoding scheme to remove the presence of the ideal $\langle g \rangle$. In particular, we show that we can alter the form of encodings so that effectively a new g_i is used for each source group $\mathbb{G}_i$, while retaining correctness. This would appear to prevent all known attacks on indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) candidates instantiated using GGH13. However, when analysing security in simplified branching program and obfuscation security models, we present branching program (and thus IO) distinguishing attacks that do not use knowledge of $\langle g \rangle$. This result opens a counterpoint with the work of Halevi (EPRINT 2015) which stated that the core computational hardness problem underpinning GGH13 is computing a basis of this ideal. Our attempts seem to suggest that there is a structural vulnerability in the way that GGH13 encodings are constructed that lies deeper than the presence of $\langle g \rangle$.

1 Introduction

The work of Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a] initiated the study of candidate *multilinear maps* (MMAPs). In short, a multilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathbb{G}_\kappa \mapsto \mathbb{G}_T$ maps κ elements $g_i \in \mathbb{G}_i$ to a single target element $g_T \in \mathbb{G}_T$ in target group $\mathbb{G}_T$.[1] More accurately, [GGH13a] constructed a *graded encoding scheme* (GES), informally defining intermediate bilinear maps between the source groups and thus allowing group operations on intermediate 'levels'. The actual construction provides 'noisy' approximations to the functionality of MMAPs and subsequent candidates [CLT13, GGH15] follow in the same vein. In fact, the common interface that we assume of a GES is similar to that of a levelled FHE scheme except that decryption is replaced with a public 'zero-testing' procedure. This allows the evaluator to learn whether a particular computation over encodings is equal to zero or not provided that the result is encoded at the top level of a computation hierarchy (e.g. after κ multiplications).

The importance of these constructions for theoretical cryptography has solidified with applications including semantically-secure, order-revealing encryption [BLR$^+$15], attribute-based encryption for circuits [GGH$^+$13c] and low-overhead broadcast encryption [BWZ14] to name a few. Although, perhaps the most important application is that of constructing candidates for indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) [GGH$^+$13b, BGK$^+$14, GMM$^+$16]. All-known constructions of IO obfuscators require usage of a GES or MMAP, and analyse security in generic graded encoding models.

Unfortunately, the three candidates of GES [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15] (from now on denoted as GGH13, CLT13 and GGH15 respectively) have been shown to be vulnerable to a wide-range of attacks; e.g. 'zeroizing' attacks [HJ16, CLR15, CLLT16, CLT14, CLLT17], attacks on the 'overstretched' NTRU assumption [ABD16, CJL16, KF17] and algebraic dependency attacks [MSZ16a, ADGM16, CGH17]. Zeroizing attacks are largely avoided in the realm of IO since they rely on lower-level encodings of zero being made available [HJ16, CLR15, CLLT16] or highly structured branching program constructions [CLLT17]. Attacks on 'overstretched' NTRU assumptions only affect GGH13, but can be avoided

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[1] Here we describe an asymmetric MMAP, we can equally describe a symmetric variant where $\mathbb{G}_1 = \cdots = \mathbb{G}_\kappa = \mathbb{G}$.

by increasing parameters. Finally, algebraic dependency attacks affect specific 'BGK-style' IO candidates (e.g. [AGIS14, BGK+14, BMSZ15, MSW14, PST14]) instantiated with the GGH13 GES and rely on circuits outputting a sufficient number of zeroes. In short, the presence of a common generator g in all GGH13 encodings allows an adversary in an IO security game to create a basis for the ideal $\langle g \rangle$. This basis is then used in a distinguishing attack on the obfuscated circuit.

There have been attempts to develop 'immunised' IO constructions such as [GMM+16] (a combination of original proposals [GMS16, MSZ16b]). These immunisations construct branching programs that make finding algebraic dependences on zero-tested encodings (as described by [MSZ16a, ADGM16]) much more difficult, and analyse security in a weakened graded encoding model.[2] However, the cryptanalysis of Chen et al. [CGH17] seems to offer attacks that are still effective, even for these immunisations.[3]

This work. Our analysis is motivated by the cryptanalysis of Chen et al. [CGH17] and its applicability against 'immunised' IO candidates. We focus on algebraic dependency (or annihilation) attacks on IO candidates instantiated with GGH13, and their propensity to find representatives of the ideal $\langle g \rangle$. We investigate the possibility of making changes at the GES level to avoid the attacks described previously, rather than using ad-hoc fixes to IO constructions. In particular, we derive a variant of GGH13 where the common generator g is removed such that encodings on different levels i are cosets of the form $\alpha + I_i$ for κ ideals I_i. Concretely, we replace the usage of the short g in GGH13 with larger elements β_i that also depends on the level that the encoding is associated with (See Section 4 for more details). The correctness of zero-testing is achieved since the magnitude of the result is completely determined by the presence of the β_i's — the number of which differ in zero and non-zero encodings. The result is a GES that has no structural ideals that can easily be computed by a PPT adversary.

At first sight, this immediately prevents all known attacks that require an annihilation phase. On the other hand, it should be noted that, similarly to GGH13, our variant is trivially susceptible to zeroizing attacks and thus is immediately short of providing full MMAP functionality. As such, our alteration would only be a plausible candidate in situations where *multilinear jigsaw puzzle* (MJP) functionality is sufficient (e.g. IO [GGH+13b], order-revealing encryption [BLR+15]).

However, we find that the GES that we have derived is still vulnerable, in a simplified IO security game, to a variation of the annihilation attack given in [MSZ16a]. While we remove the ability of an adversary to learn ideals from our MJP scheme, we detail an attack that side-steps these measures and distinguishes based on the magnitude of zero-tested encodings. We interpret this result as a counterpoint to the work of Halevi [Hal15] where it is stated that the core computational hardness problem underpinning GGH13 is to establish a basis of $\langle g \rangle$. Given the similarity between our encodings and those of GGH13, our attack seems to highlight a structural fault that is exploitable even if the ideal testing capability of adversaries is removed. However, we stress that the attack is only possible because of distribution of our elements β_i that we use to replace g.

Finally, the added machinery used in candidate obfuscators (such as 'multiplicative bundling' scalars and Kilian randomisation) also does nothing to prevent similar attacks. In particular, we show that an attack can be leveraged in a new model aiming to specifically characterise 'BGK-style' obfuscation families. The attack requires top-level encodings of zero to be evaluated from the branching program and makes use of inputs that essentially render the use of the input scalars independent of the inputs that are chosen. This technique is similar in vein to the attacks of [MSZ16a, ADGM16] and is adapted from the attack explained above.

[2] This model allows all the same operations as the generic graded encoding model along with an additional step where the adversary is allowed to submit certain polynomial evaluations on the results of zero-testing.

[3] They are thwarted only by the usage of dual-input branching programs which are external to the security model considered. In fact, they note that parts of their attack take place externally to the WGEM and thus suggest that the model is incomplete.

Clearly the scheme that we present here is as vulnerable as GGH13 in settings where attacks are possible. Tangentially, it may be worthwhile investigating the usage of our variant in security models incorporating characteristics of obfuscators that can be instantiated (without known cryptanalysis) by the GGH13 MMAP (such as [GMM+16]). These obfuscators are built so that finding a representative of the ideal $\langle g \rangle$ is difficult. However, it is shown in CGH17 [CGH17] that attacks are still possible when only considering single-input branching programs. In particular, the obfuscator of [GMM+16] is proven secure in the weakened graded encoding model (as a dual-input scheme) but the CGH17 attack breaks the single-input version. It would be interesting to see if analogous attacks could be found against the scheme described in this work (where usage of the ideal is no longer possible) when instantiating this obfuscator.

Layout. Section 2 details the notation that we will use and a recap of rings, multilinear jigsaw puzzles, branching programs and definitions on algebraic dependence. In Section 3 we provide a brief overview of the GGH13 GES and the algebraic dependence attacks mentioned previously. In Section 4 we describe the changes we can make to GGH13 to remove the dependency on the ideal $\langle g \rangle$. In Section 5 we provide an analysis of the security of this variant when applied in differing IO security settings. In Section 6 we provide a final discussion of our results and possible future avenues for research.

2 Background and preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We may denote sets of the form $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ by $[n]$. For matrices M, we refer to the entry in row i and column j as $M[i, j]$. For ring elements x we also use the square-bracket notation $[x]_{\mathcal{S}}$ to represent an encoding of x with respect to some index set $\mathcal{S}$. For an algorithm A, we use the notation $w \leftarrow A(x, y, z)$ to denote that A outputs w on inputs x, y, z. For a set $\mathcal{X}$ we use the notation $x \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathcal{X}$ to indicate that x is sampled from $\mathcal{X}$ using the uniform distribution. For elements $y \in R_q$ for some polynomial ring R_q, when referring to the *'magnitude'* of y we will mean $\|y\|_\infty$. For some distribution Y, we write $\mathsf{poly}(Y^n)$ to denote sampling a degree n polynomial with coefficients sampled from Y

2.2 Rings

We will be working over rings $R \coloneqq \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle \phi(x) \rangle$ and $R_q \coloneqq R/qR$ for some degree $n = n(\lambda)$ integer polynomial $\phi(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ and a prime integer $q = q(\lambda) \in \mathbb{Z}$ — notably R_q is isomorphic to the ring $\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/\langle \phi(x) \rangle$. We perform addition in these rings component-wise in the coefficients of the polynomial elements and multiplication is performed via polynomial multiplication modulo $\phi(x)$ and, if applicable, q. An element in R (respectively R_q) can be viewed as a degree $(n-1)$ polynomial over $\mathbb{Z}$ (respectively $\mathbb{Z}_q$). We can represent such an element using the vector of its n coefficients (where these will be in the range $\{-\lfloor q/2 \rfloor, \ldots, \lfloor q/2 \rfloor\}$ for elements in R_q). We work with the polynomial $\phi(x) = x^N + 1$ with N a power of two. In particular, $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle \phi(x) \rangle$ is isomorphic to the ring of integers of the $2N$-th cyclotomic field.

Canonical embeddings. Let ζ_m denote a primitive m-th root of unity. The m-th cyclotomic number field $K = \mathbb{Q}(\zeta_m)$ is the field extension of $\mathbb{Q}$ obtained by adjoining ζ_m. Let n be the degree of K over $\mathbb{Q}$, then there are n embeddings σ_i of $K \to \mathbb{C}$. These n embeddings correspond precisely to evaluation in each of the n distinct roots α_i of $\phi(x)$. In our case, $\psi(x)$ has $2 \cdot s_2 = n$ complex conjugate roots. Order the roots such that $\overline{\alpha_k} = \alpha_{s_2+k}$ for $k = 1, \ldots, s_2$. The *canonical embedding* $\sigma : K \to \mathbb{C}^n$ is defined as

$$a \mapsto (\sigma_1(a), \ldots, \sigma_{s_s}(a), \overline{\sigma_1}(a), \ldots, \overline{\sigma_{s_2}}(a)) .$$

The canonical embedding maps into a space $H \subset \mathbb{C}^n$ given by

$$H = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{C}^n : \overline{x_j} = x_{s_2+j}, \forall 1 \leq j \leq s_2\}$$

which is isomorphic to $\mathbb{R}^n$ and we can represent the coordinates of $\sigma(a)$ by a real vector [CIV16]

$$(\tilde{a}_1, \ldots, \tilde{a}_n) \propto (\Re(\sigma_1(a)), \ldots, \Re(\sigma_{s_2}(a)), \Im(\sigma_1(a)), \ldots, \Im(\sigma_{s_2}(a))).$$

This naturally induces a geometry on K with ℓ_2-norm $\|\cdot\|_2$ and ℓ_∞-norm $\|\cdot\|_\infty$:

$$\|a\|_2 = \|\sigma(a)\|_2 = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} |\tilde{a}_i|^2\right)^{1/2} \text{ and}$$
$$\|a\|_\infty = \|\sigma(a)\|_\infty = \max_i |\tilde{a}_i|.$$

Bounded distributions. When sampling our encodings we are required to define a B-bounded distribution, where all elements sampled from this distribution have an l_∞ norm that is bounded by B. In this section we will formally define such a distribution.

Definition 1. *(B-bounded element) An element $p \in R$ is called* B-bounded *if $\|p\|_\infty \leq B$.*

Definition 2. *(B-bounded distribution) A distribution ensemble $\{\chi_\lambda\}_{\lambda\in\mathbb{N}}$, supported over R, is called* B-bounded *(for $B = B(\lambda)$) if for all p in the support of χ_λ, we have $\|p\|_\infty < B$. In other words, a B-bounded distribution over R outputs a B-bounded polynomial.*

Lemma 1. ([LTV12]) *Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $\phi(x) = x^n + 1$ and let $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle\phi(x)\rangle$. For any $s, t \in R$,*

$$\|s \cdot t\| \leq \sqrt{n} \cdot \|s\| \cdot \|t\| \qquad \text{and} \qquad \|s \cdot t\|_\infty \leq n \cdot \|s\|_\infty \cdot \|t\|_\infty$$

Corollary 1. ([LTV12]) *Take $n, \phi(x), R$ as before. Let $s_1, \ldots, s_k \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \chi$ where χ is a B-bounded distribution over the ring R. Then*

$$s \coloneqq \prod_{i=1}^{k} s_i$$

is $(n^{k-1}B^k)$-bounded.

Gaussian sampling. For any real $r > 0$ the *Gaussian function* on $\mathbb{R}^n$ centred at $\mathbf{c}$ with parameter r is defined as:

$$\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^n \quad : \quad \rho_{r,c}(\mathbf{x}) \coloneqq e^{-\pi||\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c}||^2/r^2}$$

Definition 3. *For any $n \in N$ and for any $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ and real $r > 0$, the Discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^n$ with standard deviation r and centred at $\mathbf{c}$ is defined as:*

$$\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z} : D_{\mathbb{Z}^n,r,\mathbf{c}} \coloneqq \frac{\rho_{r,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})}{\rho_{r,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbb{Z}^n)}$$

where $\rho_{r,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbb{Z}^n) \coloneqq \sum_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbb{Z}^n} \rho_{r,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})$ is a normalisation factor.

The work of [MR04] showed that the discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbb{Z}^n$ with standard deviation r outputs elements that are $(r\sqrt{n})$-bounded with high probability ($\geq 1 - 1/2^{-n+1}$). We can then define the *truncated* Gaussian distribution that is $(r\sqrt{n})$-bounded and is statistically close to the discrete Gaussian.

The truncated Gaussian with standard deviation r and centred at $\mathbf{c}$ will be denoted by $\bar{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n,r,\mathbf{c}}$ and can be defined by sampling polynomials according to the discrete Gaussian ($D_{\mathbb{Z}^n,r,\mathbf{c}}$) and repeating any samples that are not $(r\sqrt{n})$-bounded. We note that this distribution is statistically close to $D_{\mathbb{Z}^n,r,\mathbf{c}}$ as shown in [LTV12]. For the case where $\mathbf{c} = 0$ we will simply write $\bar{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n,r}$.

Our GES (Section 4) relies on distinguishing between products of $\kappa - 1$ and κ elements. For this, we sample real vectors $(\tilde{a}_1, \ldots, \tilde{a}_n)$ with each coordinate sampled from a Gaussian distribution conditioned on a minimum size through rejection sampling. Mapping these real vectors to elements in K produces the desired distribution in K. We then discretise, i.e. randomised round each coordinate to an integer to obtain elements in $\mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle\phi(x)\rangle$ as usual.

Thus, we may infer the magnitude of elements that are sampled from certain distributions and latterly what the magnitude of such an element is expected to be after multiplying any number of these elements is. We can use this information to make statements on the size of encodings that are made up of elements sampled from such B-bounded distributions.

2.3 Multilinear jigsaw puzzles

In the introduction we referred to IO candidates instantiated from graded encoding schemes. In fact, we instantiate IO from multilinear jigsaw puzzles (MJPs) — a restricted variant of a GES where lower-level encodings of zero are not permitted and only certain types of multilinear form can be computed. From now on we will use the following MJP formalisation when referring to the functionality required for constructing IO rather than the wider GES framework.

Definition 4 (MJP Scheme). *A multilinear jigsaw puzzle consists of two algorithms* $(\mathsf{JGen}, \mathsf{JVer})$ *that generate the puzzle and verify a solution to the puzzle, respectively. We explain the algorithms in detail.*

Puzzle generation: *Algorithm* JGen *comprises the triple of sub-algorithms* $(\mathsf{JInstGen}, \mathsf{JEnc}, \mathsf{JGenPuzz})$ *described as such:*

- $\mathsf{JInstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa)$: *On input the security parameter λ and multilinearity κ, this algorithm outputs a set of private parameters* sk *needed to encode ring elements, and a set of public parameters* $\mathsf{pp} = (\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk}, \mathsf{ztk})$. *The last two components of the public tuple are necessary to perform algebraic operations over the encodings, and for zero-testing, respectively. The system-wide parameters* prms *include a prime q defining the working ring, a set universe $\mathcal{U}$, and a partition $\{\mathcal{S}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{S}_\kappa\}$ of $\mathcal{U}$.*
- $\mathsf{JEnc}(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{sk}, \mathcal{S}, a)$: *On input* sk*, a set $\mathcal{S} \subset \mathcal{U}$ and $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, this algorithm outputs an encoding v relative to the set $\mathcal{S}$.*
- $\mathsf{JGenPuzz}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa, l, A)$: *Takes as input the security and multilinearity parameters, $l \in \mathbb{N}$ and a set $A = (A_1, \ldots, A_l)$, where A_i is a set of values $\{a_j\}_{j\in[m_i]}$ that will be encoded with respect to index set $\mathcal{S}_i$. First it runs* $\mathsf{JInstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa)$ *to receive system parameters* $(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{pp} = (\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk}, \mathsf{ztk}))$. *It then runs* JEnc *on inputs* $(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{sk})$ *and each element $(\mathcal{S}_i, a_j) \in A_i$ to receive encodings $(\mathcal{S}_i, v_j) \in C_i$.*

Let $\mathsf{puzzle} = (C_1, \ldots, C_l)$ *and let $X = ((\mathcal{S}_1, v_1), \ldots, (\mathcal{S}_l, v_l))$, then we define (X, puzzle) as the output of* JGen *where X is kept secret and* puzzle *is the public output.*

Puzzle verification: *Algorithm* JVer *takes as input the public parameters* $\mathsf{pp} = (\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk}, \mathsf{ztk})$*, the public output* puzzle *of* JGen *and some multilinear form* F *(the solution to the puzzle). It outputs either acceptance or rejection. More formally, following [MSZ16a], we split the verification into three sub-algorithms* $\mathsf{JVer} = (\mathsf{JCompute}, \mathsf{JZTParam}, \mathsf{JTest})$*. This helps in capturing the weakened grading encoding security model [MSZ16a, GMM+16].*

- $\mathsf{JCompute}(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk}, \mathsf{puzzle}, F)$: *On input the encodings in* puzzle *and some* valid *multilinear form* F*, this outputs the encoding* $(\mathcal{S}, v) = F(\mathsf{puzzle})$ *for* $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$*. We will sometimes abuse notation and simply write the output of the algorithm as* $F(\mathsf{puzzle})$*.*
- $\mathsf{JZTParam}(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{ztk}, (\mathcal{S}, v))$: *On input encoding* $(\mathcal{S}, v)$ *it first checks if* $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{U}$ *and if not aborts. If true, it outputs the ring element* δ*. In an honest execution we have that* $(\mathcal{S}, v) \leftarrow \mathsf{JCompute}(\mathsf{puzzle}, F)$*.*
- $\mathsf{JTest}(\mathsf{prms}, \delta)$: *On input ring element* δ *it returns* 1 *or* 0*. In an honest execution we have that* $\delta \leftarrow \mathsf{JZTParam}(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{ztk}, (\mathcal{U}, v))$*.*

In the above definition, by *valid* multilinear form, we mean some sort of computation that respects the computation laws of a graded encoding scheme and outputs a top-level encoding [GGH+13b]. For instance, for any encodings $(\mathcal{S}_1, v_1), (\mathcal{S}_2, v_2)$ we have an addition operation that is defined when $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_1 = \mathcal{S}_2$ and outputs the encoding $(\mathcal{S}, v_1 + v_2)$. We also have multiplication that is defined when $\mathcal{S}_1 \cap \mathcal{S}_2 = \emptyset$ and results in an encoding $(\mathcal{S}, v_1 \cdot v_2)$ for $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_1 \cup \mathcal{S}_2$. The output of these operations is said to be a top-level encoding when $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{U}$.

Definition 5 (MJP Correctness). *A jigsaw verifier* JVer *is* correct *with respect to* $(\mathsf{pp}, (X, \mathsf{puzzle}), F)$ *if either* $F(X) = (\mathcal{U}, 0)$ *and* $\mathsf{JVer}(\mathsf{puzzle}, F) = 1$ *or* $F(X) \neq (\mathcal{U}, 0)$ *and* $\mathsf{JVer}(\mathsf{puzzle}, F) = 0$*. Otherwise it is* incorrect *on* F*.*

We specifically require that JVer is correct on all but negligibly many forms (see [GGH+13b] for an explanation of the requirement).

Security. Characterising the security that should be offered by a MJP is one of the difficulties confronted by constructions of IO. In short, constructions of IO are proven secure in a generic model where encodings are treated as random handles and all operations that can be performed are interacted with via oracle calls. Yet, as discussed above, current MJP constructions do not justify the use of such a model, i.e. they are broken by attacks which fall our side of this model. See [MSZ16a, GMM+16] for more details.

2.4 Branching programs

Let $L = L(\lambda)$, $\nu = \nu(\lambda)$ and $d = d(\lambda)$ be parameters dependent on the security parameter λ. Let $\mathsf{inp} : [L] \mapsto [\nu]^d$ be some 'input' function. Let $\{M_{(b_1,\ldots,b_d),l}\}$ be a set of matrices individually sampled from $\mathbb{Z}_q^{5\times 5}$ for $b_1, \ldots, b_d \in \{0,1\}$ and $l \in [L]$. Let $M_0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{5\times 1}$, $M_{L+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1\times 5}$ be two vectors, these are known as 'bookends' and are used for guaranteeing a single element output. Define

$$\mathcal{M} := (L, \nu, d, \mathsf{inp}, \{M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\}_{l\in[L]}, M_0, M_{L+1}) \tag{1}$$

to be a matrix branching program (MBP) of length L, input width ν and arity d. We can evaluate $\mathcal{M}$ on inputs $x \in 2^\nu$ where $x_s = x[s]$ and we denote such an evaluation by $\mathcal{M}(x)$.[4] The input function inp chooses the bits in the input x that are examined at each layer l of the branching program. Clearly $|\mathsf{inp}(i)| = d$ where $\mathsf{inp}(i)[y]$ is equal to the y^{th} component of $\mathsf{inp}(i)$. In total, we have that the branching

[4] We use 5×5 matrices as these are sufficient for Barrington's theorem [Bar89].

program contains $2^d L + 2$ matrices. Let $x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)} = (x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)[1]}, \ldots, x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)[d]})$, we evaluate the branching program on an input x by computing

$$\mathcal{M}(x) \coloneqq M_0 \cdot \left(\prod_{l=1}^{L} M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} \right) \cdot M_{L+1}. \tag{2}$$

Using Barrington's theorem we can associate a circuit C with a branching program $\mathcal{M}_C$. We have that the branching program (without bookend vectors) evaluates to the identity matrix on an input x if and only if $C(x) = 0$. Since this theorem is commonly used in the construction of IO candidates this formulation of correctness applies to our situation. It is common to structure a branching program $\mathcal{M}_C$ such that $\mathcal{M}(x) = 0$ when $C(x) = 0$. To ensure this, we can construct a dummy branching program that contains only identity matrices with the same bookend vectors as in the functional branching program. We then compute the dummy branch on the same input as the functional branch and subtract the dummy output from the functional output. All current obfuscators only consider branching programs that take either single [GGH$^+$13b] or dual [BGK$^+$14] inputs i.e. cases where $d = 1$ or $d = 2$.

Definition 6. (Functional equivalence) *Let $\mathcal{X}$ be the set of valid inputs for two branching programs $\mathcal{M}_0, \mathcal{M}_1$ of length L, input length ν and arity d. We say that $\mathcal{M}_0, \mathcal{M}_1$ are* functionally equivalent *(or $\mathcal{M}_0 \equiv \mathcal{M}_1$) if, for any input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ then:*

$$\mathcal{M}_0(x) = 0 \text{ if and only if } \mathcal{M}_1(x) = 0.$$

As above, we can alter the branching program computation to ensure that only a single value is output rather than matrices.

Remark 1. Note that we can pad the length of the branching program to any required length by simply appending the required number of identity matrices to the end of the branching program. These matrices clearly do not alter the result of the program evaluation.

2.5 IO from branching programs

The majority of current IO candidates make use of branching programs when constructing an obfuscated version of a circuit $C(\cdot)$. This generalised approach is developed from the randomised branching program model used by [MSZ16a] — using Barrington's theorem to convert a fan-in 2 circuit, C, of depth D into a branching program $\mathcal{M}$ of the form above with length $L = O(4^D)$. The construction we detail here is heavily generalised but follows the BGK-style obfuscation candidates of [AGIS14, BGK$^+$14, BMSZ15, MSW14, PST14]. Obfuscators such as [GGH$^+$13b, GMM$^+$16] use more complicated randomisation procedures.

To obfuscate the program, we first apply Kilian's randomisation technique [Kil88] by randomly sampling invertible matrices $\mathcal{R}_0, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_{L+1}$, sampling $2L$ random non-zero scalars $\epsilon_{b,l} \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathbb{Z}_q$ and then constructing randomised matrices

$$\widetilde{M}_{b,l} = \epsilon_{b,l} \cdot \mathcal{R}_{l-1}^{-1} M_{b,l} \mathcal{R}_l$$

along with bookend vectors

$$\widetilde{M}_0 = \epsilon_0 \cdot M_0 \mathcal{R}_0, \quad \text{and} \quad \widetilde{M}_{L+1} = \epsilon_{L+1} \cdot \mathcal{R}_{L+1}^{-1} M_{L+1}.$$

Notice that the following holds:

$$\widetilde{M}_0 \cdot \left(\prod_{l=1}^{L} \widetilde{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} \right) \cdot \widetilde{M}_{L+1} = \tilde{\epsilon} \cdot M_0 \cdot \left(\prod_{l=1}^{L} M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} \right) \cdot M_{L+1}$$

for the multiplicative bundling scalar $\tilde{\epsilon} = \epsilon_0 \epsilon_{L+1} \prod_{i=1}^{L} \epsilon_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(i)},i}$. This means that, if we replace the matrices in the branching program with the randomised matrices then we still compute the same function. These randomisations procedures help prevent partial evaluation and input mixing attacks on obfuscated programs. Similarly to the work of [BGK+14] we could make use of a straddling set structure when encoding elements to prevent further algebraic attacks. This is tangential to the security model that we consider and so we do not describe this procedure here.

Finally the entries of each matrix $\widetilde{M}_{b,l}$ are encoded using an MJP scheme with respect to a source index set $\mathcal{S}_{b,l}$. This allows the security of the construction to be analysed in the generic graded encoding model (to be consistent with previous work), essentially limiting an adversary to computing multilinear operations and zero-testing on top-level encodings. We denote the encoded matrices by $\widehat{M}_{b,l}$, the bookend vectors by $\widehat{M}_0, \widehat{M}_{L+1}$ and the obfuscated branching program by $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}$. The index sets are define such that the output of $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}$ is an encoding with respect to a top-level set $\mathcal{U}$.

Evaluation. When evaluating the branching program on an input x the bookend vectors and a dummy program execution ensure that a single element is propagated from the computation. Using the randomised branching program

$$\widehat{\mathcal{M}} \coloneqq (L, \nu, d, \mathsf{inp}, \{\widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\}_{l\in[L]}, \widehat{M}_0, \widehat{M}_{L+1})$$

we learn a top-level encoded element where the encoded value is 0 if and only if the circuit that was obfuscated also evaluates to 0 on x.[5] That is, $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_C(x) = [0]_{\mathcal{U}}$ iff $C(x) = 0$ and, since $[0]_{\mathcal{U}}$ is a top-level encoding, we can use the zero-test procedure to learn the output of the obfuscated circuit.

2.6 Algebraic dependence

Here, we list definitions and key results taken from the work of [Kay09] that we use in the security analysis of our MJP scheme. In short, we articulate the formalisation of expressing algebraic dependencies for a set of polynomials sampled from a particular field.

Definition 7. *Let $f = (f_1, \ldots, f_k)$ be a vector of k polynomials of degree $\leq d$, where each $f_i \in \mathbb{F}[y_1, \ldots, y_n]$ is an n-variate polynomial over $\mathbb{F}$. A non-zero polynomial $A(t_1, \ldots, t_k) \in \mathbb{F}[t_1, \ldots, t_k]$ is said to be an* annihilating polynomial *for f if $A(f_1, \ldots, f_k) = 0$. The polynomials $f_1, \ldots, f_k$ are said to be* algebraically dependent *if such an annihilating polynomial exists.*

Definition 8. *Let $f = (f_1, \ldots, f_k)$ be a vector of k polynomials as above where f' represents some subset of algebraically independent polynomials of maximal size k (i.e. for any $f_{k+1} \in \mathbb{F}[y_1, \ldots, y_n]$ then the set $f' \cup f_{k+1}$ is algebraically dependent). Then the* algebraic rank *of the set of polynomials f is k.*

Theorem 1 (Theorem 2 [Kay09]). *Let $f_1, \ldots, f_k \in \mathbb{F}[x_1, \ldots, x_n]$ be a set of k polynomials in n variables over the field $\mathbb{F}$. Then this set of polynomials has algebraic rank k if and only if the Jacobian matrix, $Jf(x)$, has rank k.*

Corollary 2 ([Kay09, BS83]). *There exists a randomized polynomial time algorithm that on input a set of k arithmetic circuits over a field $\mathbb{F}$, determines if the polynomials computed by these arithmetic circuits are algebraically dependent or not.*

[5] The use of the bundling scalars ensure that any input x such that $C(x) = 1$ satisfies $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_C(x) \neq [0]_{\mathcal{U}}$

Remark 2. The algorithm mentioned by Corollary 2 essentially requires submitting random values in place of the variables in the Jacobian matrix $Jf(x)$. By the Schwarz-Zippel lemma, the rank of the symbolic matrix is likely to be the same as the rank of the matrix evaluated on random inputs with high probability. As such we can calculate the algebraic rank for a given system of polynomials.

3 GGH13 and annihilation attacks

3.1 GGH13 overview

The space for GGH13 encodings is $R_q = R/qR$ where q is some big integer and $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^m + 1)$ for $m \in \mathbb{N}$. The plaintext ring is defined by $R_g = R/gR$ where g is a small element in the ring. A GGH13 encoding takes the form $v = (\alpha + rg)/z \mod q$ where z is some uniformly random value — z and g are secret — α is the encoded plaintext value and r is some small random value, all these values are sampled from some error distribution, χ, over R_q.

The denominators z enforce the levels of the GES, where we can sample one global z for the symmetric case and $z_1, \ldots, z_\kappa$ in the asymmetric case, we will consider the asymmetric case unless otherwise stated. Where an encoding v has a denominator z_i we will say that v is encoded at level $\mathcal{S}_i$ where there are κ such index sets. Additions and multiplications are carried out by simply adding and multiplying encodings directly. Clearly, additions of encodings indexed at the same level results in another encoding at that level. Multiplying two encodings, indexed by z_1 and z_2 respectively, results in an encoding at level $\mathcal{S}_1 \cup \mathcal{S}_2$.

Finally, there is a public zero-test parameter

$$p_{zt} = \frac{h \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} z_i}{g}$$

for some 'smallish' $h \in R_q$.[6] We can learn whether an encoding $(\mathcal{U}, v)$ (e.g. top-level with denominator $z_1 \cdot \cdots \cdot z_\kappa$) encodes zero or not by computing $p_{zt} \cdot v$ and seeing if the result is small.

The functionality described can be adapted to construct a correct MJP scheme [GGH+13b].

3.2 Annihilation attacks on GGH13

Let $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}$ be a randomised branching program that has entries encoded as GGH13 elements and each pair of matrices $\widehat{M}_{b,l}$ and bookends $\widehat{M}_0, \widehat{M}_{L+1}$ are encoded with respect to the levels $l \in \{0, \ldots, L+1\}$. Let $x \in \mathcal{X}$ be some valid input for $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}$ and let $\mu_x \leftarrow \widehat{\mathcal{M}}(x)$ be the output. Finally denote $\delta_x = p_{zt} \cdot \mu_x = \mathsf{JZTParam}(\mu_x)$ as the zero-tested output.

A top-level GGH13 encoding will have the following form:

$$\delta_x = \widetilde{\alpha}_x \cdot g^{-1} + \gamma_{1,x} + \gamma_{2,x} \cdot g + \ldots + \gamma_{\kappa,x} \cdot g^{\kappa-1} \tag{3}$$

after zero-testing has occurred. The target of the annihilation attacks is the polynomial $\gamma_{1,x}(\alpha, r)$ which is linear in the unknown sampled elements r_j from each encoding v_j. Using a change of variables in the branching program it is possible to assume that the adversary has knowledge of the values α_j that are encoded in each of the matrices [MSZ16a] (see Section 5.3 for more details). By choosing enough inputs x such that $\alpha_x = 0$, the adversary is able to guarantee that there exists an annihilating polynomial Q

[6] The exact magnitude is not important for the attack in [MSZ16a] as long as $h \ll q$.

for the set of $\gamma_{1,x}$ polynomials. In fact, the work of [MSZ16a] explicitly gives a description of Q for a given single-input branching program $\mathcal{M}$.

Consequently, the result $\rho_x \leftarrow Q(\{\delta_x\}_x)$ results in some output where the $\gamma_{1,x}$ polynomials are eliminated. In particular, this means that $\rho_x \in \langle g \rangle$. By computing enough outputs, an adversary can heuristically construct a basis of $\langle g \rangle$. The attack concludes by specifying a functionally equivalent $\mathcal{M}'$ where the set of polynomials $\gamma'_{1,x}$ are not annihilated by Q. The work of [MSZ16a] show that it is possible to construct $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{M}'$ such that a PPT adversary with obfuscated access to either of the circuits can first construct a basis of $\langle g \rangle$[7] and then secondly distinguish between the circuits. Distinguishing is possible since $\rho'_x \leftarrow \widehat{\mathcal{M}'}(x)$ is not in $\langle g \rangle$ and so they are able to distinguish using the basis computed in the first step.

4 GGH13 without ideals

The main component of this note is our analysis of the security of IO candidates when instantiated with a variant of GGH13 where ideals cannot be efficiently found. In the following, we give an overview of our scheme, in Appendix A, we give a formal MJP realisation.

4.1 Overview of encodings

Let $R = \mathbb{Z}[x]/\langle \phi(x) \rangle$ be a ring and $R_q = R/qR$ be the quotient ring for a large prime q, with an accompanying error distribution $\chi = \bar{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^n,\sigma}$ for parameter σ. The ring R_q will define the space of encodings and all operations take place there.

Let $\alpha \in R_q$ be some non-zero polynomial with small coefficients. Sample a polynomial $r \leftarrow\!\!\$\, \mathsf{poly}(\chi)$ with small coefficients and sample z_i uniformly from R_q for $1 \leq i \leq \kappa$. Finally, sample β_i such that $\sqrt[\kappa+1]{q} < \|\beta_i\|_\infty < \sqrt[\kappa]{q}$. We refer the reader to Section 2.2 for more details on how to sample the β_i.

A level 1 encoding of α with respect to some set $\mathcal{S}_i$ takes the form:

$$[v]_q = \frac{\alpha + r/\beta_i}{z_i} \mod q \tag{4}$$

where the values z_i, β_i enforce the leveled structure that we require from the specification of an MJP scheme. It is easy to see that β_i^{-1} corresponds to using a different g_i in GGH13. We reiterate that β_i has to be sampled in a different way (e.g. no longer as small elements) to ensure correctness for zero-testing.

Remark 3. It is possible to sample higher-level encodings by encoding with respect to $\prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} z_i$ and $\prod_{i \in \mathcal{S}} \beta_i$ for some index set $\mathcal{S}$. We do not require this functionality for a MJP scheme.

4.2 Operations

Let $\mathcal{U}$ refer to the top-level index where zero-testing can take place.

Addition of encodings. Let v_1, v_2 be encodings with respect to the same index set $\mathcal{S} \subseteq \mathcal{U}$. Then we can compute additions of these encodings by simply computing $v = v_1 + v_2$, the result is an encoding of the form

$$[v]_q = \frac{\alpha_1 + \alpha_2 + (r_1 + r_2)/\beta_{\mathcal{S}}}{z_{\mathcal{S}}} \mod q$$

[7] It is possible to find inputs for both circuits that allow the adversary to construct a basis of $\langle g \rangle$.

Multiplication of encodings. Let v_1, v_2 be encodings with respective index sets $\mathcal{S}_i$ and $\mathcal{S}_j$ such that $\mathcal{S}_i \cup \mathcal{S}_j \subseteq \mathcal{U}$. A multiplication of these encodings is calculated by multiplying the encodings directly, i.e. $v = v_1 \cdot v_2$ which creates an encoding of the form

$$[v]_q = \frac{\alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2 + \tilde{r}/(\beta_i \cdot \beta_j)}{z_i \cdot z_j} \mod q \tag{5}$$

where $\tilde{r} = \alpha_1 \cdot r_2 \cdot \beta_j + \alpha_2 \cdot r_1 \cdot \beta_i + (r_1 \cdot r_2)$.

As with GGH13, operations can only take place while the noise stays smaller than a set upper bound (in this case $\sqrt[\kappa]{q}$). We choose parameters such that κ multiplications can be computed without overflowing this boundary.

Zero-testing. To enable zero-testing on encodings $v_{\mathcal{U}}$ that are indexed at the top-level we follow procedures set in previous GE schemes and publish a zero-testing parameter p_{zt}. We consider top-level encodings that are constructed via a sequence of multiplications of encodings indexed with each of the sets $\mathcal{S}_i$ and thus they take the form:

$$[v_{\mathcal{U}}]_q = \frac{\tilde{\alpha} + \tilde{r}/\beta_{\mathcal{U}}}{z_{\mathcal{U}}}$$

where $\beta_{\mathcal{U}} = \prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i$, $z_{\mathcal{U}} = \prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} z_i$ and $\tilde{\alpha}$ is a polynomial of underlying α values. Finally, $\tilde{r}$ is a polynomial taking the form $\hat{r} + \beta^{(1)} + \beta^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta^{(\kappa-1)}$ where we stratify the polynomial into the components $\beta^{(h)}$, containing all monomials of degree h in the β_i elements, and $\hat{r}$ representing a polynomial in the r_j values from each of the underlying encodings v_j. Notice that the polynomial structure of $\hat{r}$ exactly mirrors the polynomial that has been calculated over the encodings as a whole. The zero-test parameter is defined as

$$p_{zt} = \prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i \cdot z_i$$

and an encoding $v_{\mathcal{U}}$ is zero-tested by first computing $\delta = p_{zt} \cdot v_{\mathcal{U}} \mod q$ and then we state that $v_{\mathcal{U}}$ encodes the value '0' if δ is 'small' and encodes a non-zero value if δ is 'big'.

Notice that

$$\delta_1 = \prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i \cdot \tilde{\alpha} + \hat{r} + \beta^{(1)} + \beta^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta^{(\kappa-1)} \tag{6}$$

for non-zero encodings ($\tilde{\alpha} \neq 0$) and so for an encoding of zero ($\tilde{\alpha} \neq 0$) we have that

$$\delta_0 = \hat{r} + \beta^{(1)} + \beta^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta^{(\kappa-1)}. \tag{7}$$

The difference between Equations (6) and (7) is the loss of a factor of $\prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i$, in Equation (7) we have monomials in the β_i of maximum degree $\kappa - 1$.

Observe that the value of the encoding is now stored in the MSB of the final output — in GGH13 the value is stored in the LSB. Therefore, zero-testing requires more involved distinguishing in our case than in GGH13. We discuss this in detail below.

Correctness. Correctness of zero-testing follows providing that

$$q^{\kappa-2/\kappa} < \|\delta_0\|_\infty < q \text{ and } \|\delta_1\|_\infty > q \text{ (before modular reduction).}$$

For δ_0, $\beta^{(1)} + \beta^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta^{(\kappa-1)}$ is a sum of monomials dominated by the term $\beta^{(\kappa-1)}$. In this particular term, we have a sum of monomials of degree $\kappa - 1$ over variables β_i, sampled such that $\|\beta_i\|_\infty < \sqrt[\kappa]{q}$. The coefficients of these monomials are made up of polynomials in the α, r elements from underlying encodings and are thus small, but may be enough to push the infinity norm of $\beta^{(\kappa-1)} > q^{(\kappa-1)/\kappa}$.

Providing that $\|\alpha, r\|_\infty \ll \beta_i$ (for all i), we have that $q^{\kappa-2/\kappa} < \|\beta^{\kappa-1}\|_\infty < q$. As a result, by appropriate choice of q, κ and since all remaining terms are comparatively small, we have that

$$q^{\kappa-2/\kappa} < \|\beta^{(1)} + \beta^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta^{(\kappa-1)}\|_\infty < q.$$

Secondly, since δ_1 contains a product of all β_i values then $q^{\kappa-1/\kappa} \leq \|\delta_1\|_\infty$. Now, the coefficient of the product $\prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i$ will, with overwhelming probability, force $\|\delta_1\|_\infty > q$. Therefore, modular reduction (mod q) will occur after zero-testing on non-zero encoded values.

We could set out tighter bounds for correctness but we are more concerned with the analysis of this scheme in the IO setting. As a consequence we merely state that it is possible to choose parameters such that distinguishing non-zero and zero encodings is possible, given how we sample each β_i. Moreover, due to the modular reduction that occurs for any δ_1, we assume that all algebraic structure is lost when zero-testing non-zero encodings.

5 Security analysis in IO setting

In this Section we demonstrate flaws in the encoding scheme from Section 4 via an annihilation attack in two simplified security models. These simplified security models aim to capture characteristics of BGK-style obfuscators and our attacks do not depend on finding representations of any ideals.

5.1 Simplified security model

In the attacks that we propose we prefer to talk explicitly in a game-based representation of the IO game. In particular, the scope of the weakened graded encoding model is unnecessarily wide since our attacks only occur during the post-zero-testing query phase. As a result we propose two interactive distinguishing security games. In the first, **IND-$\mathcal{M}$**, the adversary chooses functionally equivalent (Definition 6) branching programs to be encoded and then has oracle access for querying inputs on the branching program and receiving zero-tested outputs. In the second, **IND-OBF**, the branching programs are also randomised using the techniques (Kilian randomisation and multiplicative bundling scalars) discussed in Section 2.5 before encoding takes place — nothing else is changed. In the weakened graded encoding model, the adversary is able to interact with random handles that represent encodings after operations have taken place.

Let

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\textbf{IND-}\mathcal{M}}(\lambda) = \left|\Pr\left[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\lambda, \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_0)\right] - \Pr\left[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\lambda, \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_1)\right]\right|$$

be the advantage of the adversary in **IND-$\mathcal{M}$**. Then the security game is satisfied if $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\textbf{IND-}\mathcal{M}}(\lambda) = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We give a formal description of the game in Figure 1.

Game **IND-$\mathcal{M}^{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$**:	Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{zt}}(x)$:
1. $(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk}, \mathsf{ztk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{JInstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa)$	1. **if** init, $q \leftarrow 0$; **else**, $q \leftarrow q + 1$
2. $(st, \mathcal{M}_0, \mathcal{M}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(l, \mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk})$	2. **if** $q > \mathcal{Q}$, $\delta \leftarrow \perp$
3. $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$	3. **else**:
4. $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b \leftarrow \mathsf{JEnc}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{prms}, \{\mathcal{S}_i\}_{i\in[\kappa]}, \mathcal{M}_b)$	4. $(\mathcal{U}, \mu_x) \leftarrow \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b(x)$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{zt}}}(st)$	5. $\delta_x \leftarrow \mathsf{JZTParam}(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{ztk}, (\mathcal{U}, \mu_x))$
6. output $(b' = b)$	6. return δ_x

Fig. 1. Left: The **IND-$\mathcal{M}$** game. An adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ is legitimate if $\mathcal{A}_0$ outputs two branching programs $(\mathcal{M}_0, \mathcal{M}_1)$ of the same size that compute functionally equivalent circuits. We abuse notation and write $\mathsf{JEnc}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{prms}, \{\mathcal{S}_i\}_{i\in[\kappa]}, \mathcal{M}_b)$ to denote the encoding of the i^{th} level of matrices in $\mathcal{M}_b$ with respect to the index set $\mathcal{S}_i$. **Right**: Oracle for computing inputs on the encoded branching program $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b$ and outputting zero-tested results.

Let

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{IND\text{-}OBF}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \left|\Pr\left[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\lambda, \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_0)\right] - \Pr\left[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\lambda, \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_1)\right]\right|$$

be the advantage of the adversary in **IND-OBF**, the security game is satisfied if $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathbf{IND\text{-}OBF}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We give a formal description of the game in Figure 2; we use iO to denote the oracle that the challenger uses for performing the BGK-style obfuscation of a branching program.

Game $\mathbf{IND\text{-}OBF}^{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$:	Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{zt}}(x)$:
1. $(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk}, \mathsf{ztk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{JInstGen}(1^\lambda, 1^\kappa)$	1. **if** init, $q \leftarrow 0$; **else**, $q \leftarrow q+1$
2. $(st, \mathcal{M}_0, \mathcal{M}_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(l, \mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{evk})$	2. **if** $q > \mathcal{Q}$, $\delta \leftarrow \perp$
3. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$	3. **else**:
4. $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b \leftarrow \mathsf{iO}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{prms}, \{\mathcal{S}_i\}_{i\in[\kappa]}, \mathcal{M}_b)$	4. $\quad(\mathcal{U}, \mu_x) \leftarrow \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b(x)$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{zt}}}(st)$	5. $\quad\delta_x \leftarrow \mathsf{JZTParam}(\mathsf{prms}, \mathsf{ztk}, (\mathcal{U}, \mu_x))$
6. output $(b' = b)$	6. return δ_x

Fig. 2. Left: The **IND-OBF** game. Same as above, except that the oracle iO takes a branching program as input and outputs an obfuscation of the branching program, as defined in Section 2.5. The i^{th} level of matrices is still encoded with respect to $\mathcal{S}_i$. **Right**: Oracle for computing inputs on the encoded branching program $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b$ and outputting zero-tested results.

An interesting question is whether we can instantiate this game-based model using any IO candidate and achieve meaningful security guarantees. This would be particularly useful for comparison with the weakened graded encoding security model. For example, instantiating **IND-OBF** with the obfuscator from [GMM+16] provides the adversary with the exact access that an adversary can expect with respect to the MJP scheme that is used. We regard this as interesting future work, see Section 6.

5.2 Analysis of (in)security in IND-$\mathcal{M}$ game

Let $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b$ be the encoded branching program that $\mathcal{A}_1$ receives in the **IND-$\mathcal{M}$** security game. Then let $\mathcal{X} = \{0,1\}^L$ be the set of valid inputs to $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b$ and let $\kappa = L + 2$ be the total degree of multilinearity (due to encoding of bookends as well). Let $\mu_x = \widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b(x)$ be the output of $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b$ on some input $x \in \{0,1\}^L$ and let $\delta_x = \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{zt}}(\mu_x)$. Assuming that μ_x is honestly computed then δ_x should be meaningful.

Here we show that if μ_x is generated honestly and that if $\mathsf{JTest}(\delta_x) = 1$ then it is possible to distinguish which branching program has been encoded. Our analysis uses an annihilation attack that is very similar in spirit to the original given in [MSZ16a]. Let $\widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$ be a matrix at level l in $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b$. Let $\alpha^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l} = M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}[i][j]$ in the original branching program $\mathcal{M}_b$. Recall that the corresponding entry $\widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}[i][j]$ after encoding has taken place takes the form:

$$v^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l} = (\alpha^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l} + r^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}/\beta_l)/z_l.$$

In the attack we treat the variables $r^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}$ as formal variables and show that, for enough inputs x, we can compute a polynomial Q that annihilates these variables. Let r^x denote the set of all variables $r^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}$ that are used in computing $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b(x)$.

Firstly notice that the form of δ_x is the following:

$$\delta_x = \hat{r}_x + \beta^{(1)} + \beta^{(2)} + \ldots + \beta^{(\kappa-1)}$$

recalling that $\hat{r}_x$ is a polynomial dependent only on r_j values from encodings and $\beta^{(\ell)}$ is the sum of all monomials in the terms $\{\beta_i\}_{i\in[\kappa]}$ of degree ℓ. In this analysis we focus on the term $\beta^{(\kappa-1)}$, which has coefficients in the $\alpha^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}, r^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}$ terms. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ knows the values $\alpha^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}$ as they are the entries from one of the original branching programs. The values β_i are the same in both branching programs so we can view $\beta^{(\kappa-1)}$ as a linear polynomial in the set of variables $r^{(x)}$.

Now, consider two bit strings x, x' where there is only a single bit difference between the two at position $t \neq 1$. Let $x_l = x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)} = x'_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}$ and consider the monomials in the matrix entries $r_{i,j,1}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(1)}}$. Notice that the coefficients will only change in the values $\alpha_{i,j,t}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(t)}}$ — since the β_l variables are fixed at level l. Let $c_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$, $c'^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}$ denote the coefficients of $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$ for some l, after computing $\delta_x \leftarrow \mathsf{JZTParam}(\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b(x))$ and $\delta_{x'} \leftarrow \mathsf{JZTParam}(\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_b(x'))$, respectively. Then, as long as $\mathsf{JTest}(\delta_x) = \mathsf{JTest}(\delta_{x'}) = 1$, notice that — for any given i, j, l — if we compute

$$c'^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}_{i,j,l}\delta_x - c_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}\delta_{x'} = \tilde{\delta}.$$

then we remove the monomial in the variable $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$. To see this, note that by multiplying through the coefficient of $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$ with the coefficient from the opposing output gives equal monomials in both expressions. Subtracting the two scaled outputs removes this monomial entirely, all other monomials are scaled by the coefficient that is multiplied through.

The power of this attack is that it only requires four inputs to remove all monomials that are linear in some $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$ for any program length L. That is, we iterate over the possible four choices for the first two input bits and fix the remaining $L-2$ input bits. Recall, that we are only interested in annihilating the monomials that are linear in the variables $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$. Moreover, the annihilation is performed on the polynomial evaluations that arise after computing the branching program on these four different inputs. Let $x \in \{00, 01, 10, 11\}$ describe the four varying inputs and notice that, for any $r_{i,j,l'}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l')}}$ for $l' \notin \{1, 2\}$, then the coefficient of the monomial in δ_x changes only in the values of $\alpha_{i,j,l_x}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l_x)}}$ for $l_x \in \{1, 2\}$ — which are known the adversary. Moreover, for the monomials in entries $r_{i,j,l_x}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l_x)}}$, precisely two of the polynomial evaluations contain monomials with differing coefficients. Therefore, we have at least two polynomials containing each variable $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$; thus the problem essentially becomes solving a set of linear simultaneous equations of rank less than four. By performing operations over these polynomial evaluations to reduce the rank of the system from four to three then we create a polynomial where all monomials $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$ are annihilated. There are $25(L+2)+10$ variables that need to be annihilated which is linear in the length of the branching program — the attack needs to be applied this many times but this is clearly efficient.[8]

Thus, once an equation is solved a distinguishing attack in the **IND-$\mathcal{M}$** game can be launched. The final result is a term δ that is noticeably smaller than all previous outputs δ_x since the only monomials that are left have degree $\leq \kappa - 2$ in the variables β_i. The β_i variables are the largest components of δ_x and so the magnitude noticeably decreases. Notice, that the attack only works for the choice of one branching program, i.e. the attack works in the case where $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_0$ is encoded rather than $\widehat{\mathcal{M}}_1$ (without loss of generality). Therefore, if the attack fails (i.e. the magnitude of δ is no smaller) then $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $b' = 1$; if it does work they output $b' = 0$. The attack works with probability 1 and so we have no security when analysing our MJP scheme in the **IND-$\mathcal{M}$** game.

5.3 Analysis of (in)security in IND-OBF game

Recall that the **IND-OBF** game adds extra randomisation details to the branching program that are commonplace in most IO constructions. Importantly, it mimics the structure of BGK-style obfuscated branching programs. In this setting, instantiating an obfuscator using GGH13 is shown to be insecure based on the attacks of [CGH17, MSZ16a, ADGM16] and as such these attacks also work in our simplified model. We show that even when instantiating the **IND-OBF** model with our MJP scheme without ideals and a BGK-style IO candidate, the attack from Section 5.2 can be adapted successfully.

Concretely, the adversary in **IND-OBF** receives the matrices $\widehat{M}_0, \widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}, \widehat{M}_{L+1}$ that are, respectively, encodings of the following matrices:

[8] After each iteration the output is also scaled by the coefficients used previously so these need to be taken account for in further operations.

– $\epsilon_0 M_0 \cdot \mathcal{R}_0$;
– $\epsilon_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\mathcal{R}_{l-1}^{-1} \cdot M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} \cdot \mathcal{R}_l$;
– $\epsilon_{L+1}\mathcal{R}_L^{-1} \cdot M_{L+1}$.

Recall, $\mathcal{R}_0, \ldots, \mathcal{R}_L$ are randomly sampled invertible matrices used to implement Kilian's randomisation technique and $\epsilon_0, \{\epsilon_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\}_{l\in[L]}, \epsilon_{L+1}$ are random multiplicative bundling scalars taken from R_q. There are other techniques that are used for protecting constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation (such as encoding with respect to a straddling sets structure), but for simplicity we only consider these randomisation measures.

Indeed it appears that the randomisation matrices render the encoded values obscure to the adversary. However we can write each encoded matrix at level l in the form:

$$\widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} = \epsilon_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\mathcal{R}_{l-1}^{-1} \cdot M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} \cdot \mathcal{R}_l + E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}/\beta_l$$

where $E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$ is a matrix containing the entries $r_{i,j,l}^{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)}}$.[9] However, a change of variables transformation allows us to rewrite the encodings as

$$\widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} = \epsilon_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\mathcal{R}_{l-1}^{-1} \cdot (M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} + E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}/\beta_l) \cdot \mathcal{R}_l$$

which lets us assume that the adversary still has knowledge of the encoded values. This technique was first used by Miles et al. [MSZ16a] in justifying their annihilation attack scenario. Thus, while Kilian randomisation procedures are still regarded as an important facet of IO candidates, it would appear that they do very little to prevent known attacks.[10] Using this technique, we see that the only difference between the **IND-OBF** game and the **IND-$\mathcal{M}$** game is the presence of the multiplicative bundling scalars. We will show in the following how we can adapt the annihilating attack against the **IND-$\mathcal{M}$** game to handle the presence of these bundling scalars.

Annihilating attack in the IND-OBF game. We assume in this section that the obfuscated branching program is single input, that is $d = 1$. Let $x \in \{0,1\}^\nu$ be some input, we define $\bar{x}$ to be the input where all bits of x are flipped. Let $\epsilon_x = \epsilon_0\epsilon_{L+1}\prod_{i=1}^{L}\epsilon_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(i)},i}$. Because the branching program is single input, we have that for all possible input $x \in \{0,1\}^\nu$, $\epsilon_x \cdot \epsilon_{\bar{x}} = \epsilon^*$, where $\epsilon^* = (\epsilon_0\epsilon_{L+1})^2\prod_{l=1}^{L}\epsilon_{0,l}\epsilon_{1,l}$ is independent of the input x. Now, let us consider an input x on which the branching program evaluates to zero and look at the value $\delta_x = \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{zt}}(x)$ obtained after evaluating the obfuscated branching program en input x. By definition, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}\delta_x &= \prod_{l=0}^{L+1}\beta_l \cdot \widehat{M_0} \cdot \left(\prod_{l=1}^{L}\widehat{M}_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}\right) \cdot \widehat{M_{L+1}} \\ &= \epsilon_x \cdot \prod_{l=0}^{L+1}(\beta_l M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} + E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}),\end{aligned}$$

where for simplification we included the bookend vectors in the product (meaning that $M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} = M_l$ and $E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} = E_l$ when $l = 0$ or $l = N+1$). By developing the product above, and using the fact that the branching program evaluates to zero on input x, we can rewrite δ_x in the following way.

$$\delta_x = \epsilon_x\left(\sum_{j=0}^{L+1}(\prod_{l\neq j}\beta_l) \cdot \prod_{l<j} M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} \cdot E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(j)},j} \cdot \prod_{j>l} M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} + \beta^{(L-1)} + \cdots + \beta^{(1)} + r_x\right),$$

where, as previously, $\beta^{(h)}$ contains all monomials of degree h in the β_l. There is no component $\beta^{(L+1)}$ in this equation because the branching program evaluates to zero on input x, meaning that

[9] We ignore the usage of each z_l in the encodings for now as these are removed after zero-testing.
[10] It may be wise to no longer think of these random invertible matrices as offering any security when analysing IO candidates.

$\prod_{l=0}^{L+1} M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} = 0$. We detailed only the component $\beta^{(L)}$ in the formula above, because this is the largest one, and the one we will try to annihilate in the following.

Recall that we know the matrices $M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$ but we do not know ϵ_x, nor the β_l and the $E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$. To annihilate the $\beta^{(L)}$ component of δ_x, we would like to make it linear in a polynomial number of unknowns. First, let β^* denote the product of all the β_l and $E'_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l} = \beta^*/\beta_l \cdot E_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$. Then, $\beta^{(L)}$ is linear in the $\delta_x \cdot E'_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$. However, even if we have a polynomial number of matrices $E'_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$ (we have $2(L+1)$ such matrices), there is an exponential number of possible scalars ϵ_x, which prevents us from applying the annihilation attack directly. But as noticed above, we know that $\epsilon_x \epsilon_{\bar{x}} = \epsilon^*$ for any input x. So instead of looking at δ_x, we will try to annihilate the largest component of $\delta_x \cdot \delta_{\bar{x}}$. Denote by $r'^b_{i,j,l}$ the (i,j)'s coefficient of matrix $E'^b_{i,j,l}$, where $b \in \{0,1\}$. Because we took the product $\delta_x \cdot \delta_{\bar{x}}$, the largest component is now quadratic in the $r'^b_{i,j,l}$. However, by linearising the equations, we can still see the largest component as a linear combination of unknowns, where we squared the number of unknowns (but this remains polynomial). More precisely, we have

$$\delta_x \cdot \delta_{\bar{x}} = \epsilon^* \cdot \ell_x(\{r'^b_{i,j,l} \cdot r'^{b'}_{i',j',l'}\}) + \text{ smaller terms},$$

where ℓ_x is a known linear function, depending on the input x and the known matrices $M_{x_{\mathsf{inp}(l)},l}$. This means that we can express the largest component of each $\delta_x \cdot \delta_{\bar{x}}$ as a (known) linear combination of $(50L+10)^2$ unknowns. If we have more linear functions ℓ_x than unknowns, we can then efficiently find an annihilating polynomial for the ℓ_x. This will simply be a linear relation between the ℓ_x, which can be obtained by computing the left-kernel of the matrix whose lines contain the coefficients of the linear forms ℓ_x.

To conclude, in the case where the branching programs are single input, we are able to compute an annihilating polynomial in the **IND-OBF** game in polynomial time. This seems to show that there is a structural fault in the GGH13 map, even when the ideal $\langle g \rangle$ is removed.

6 Discussion of findings

Finally, we summarise and address the key points arising from our analysis and give points that may warrant further attention.

Structural faults in GGH13. Our main focus is to highlight that the GGH13 GES bears structural faults that are vulnerable even when a natural variant where the ideals are removed is constructed. All previous attacks exploit the presence of the generator g in each encoding to learn a basis of the ideal $\langle g \rangle$. We show that removing the capability to learn this ideal does not prevent attacks that are able to distinguish between encoded branching programs in a simplified model. In particular, in simplified models that mirror the characteristics of 'BGK-style' obfuscators, we are still able to launch attacks that use variants of the annihilation attacks of [MSZ16a] to distinguish obfuscated circuits.

In the attacks shown here, we use the fact that zero-testing reveals encodings that can be manipulated to reveal differences in size; rather than gaining access to $\langle g \rangle$.

CGH attacks. The attacks of Chen, Gentry and Halevi (CGH17) [CGH17] use a variant of an annihilation attack, along with knowledge of the ratios of input mixing scalars to launch powerful attacks on various IO candidates (including recent immunisations). These attacks can be prevented using input authentication methods [FRS16], however these prevention methods lie outside scope of the weakened graded encoding model.

It is not completely clear whether a variant of the CGH attack can be leveraged on an IO candidate using our MJP scheme. This is because it explicitly launches a distinguishing attack based on the ideal

$\langle g \rangle$. It would be valuable to investigate whether a variant of their attack can be used to break our MJP scheme as well. Such a result would add weight to the fact that structural faults in 'GGH-like' encodings are to be blamed rather than the presence of g explicitly.

Investigating this question is motivated by the fact that single-input and dual-input branching programs are not explicitly considered in the weakened grading encoding model. This implies that variants of obfuscators such as [GMM+16] are insecure in the weakened graded encoding model when using single-input branching programs (the actual construction only considers the dual-input case). Adapting the CGH attack to the scheme in this work would further reinforce the connection between our scheme and the GGH13 graded encoding scheme. Furthermore, it may also help to illuminate how the branching program structure of obfuscators is implicitly encoded in the security models that are currently used.

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A MJP from our encoding scheme

Using the encodings that we describe in Section 4.1 we can now construct an MJP scheme. Note that we refer to jigsaw generation and verification as both algorithms and as specific roles within a computation interchangeably.

A.1 Setup

Instance generation. ($\mathsf{JInstGen}$): On input the security parameter 1^λ, and perceived multilinearity κ the algorithm does the following:

– Samples the prime integer q

– Samples κ uniform polynomials z_i from the ring R_q
– Samples κ polynomials β_i fulfilling the requirements set out in Section 4
– Outputs $(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{pp}) = ((\beta_i, z_i), (\{\mathcal{S}_i\}_{i\in[\kappa]}, q))$

Encoding. (JEnc): This algorithm takes as input some value α, an index set $\mathcal{S}_i$ and a pair $(\beta_i, z_i) = \mathsf{sk}$ sampled from JInstGen and:

– Samples a small element r uniformly from the error distribution χ
– Computes $v = \frac{\alpha + r/\beta_i}{z_i}$ as an encoding of the value α

Jigsaw generation. (JGen): Takes as input an index set $\mathcal{S}_i$, the pair (β_i, z_i) for $i \in [\kappa]$ and associated encoded values $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{m_i})$ for each of these pairs, where m_i is the number of values to be encoded with respect to $\mathcal{S}_i$. Then this algorithm performs the following:

– Inputs each tuple $(\mathcal{S}_i, \alpha_j)$ for $j \in [m_i]$ to the encode algorithm JEnc and receives back the κ sets C_i where C_i consists of all pairs $(\mathcal{S}_i, v_j)$ for $1 \leq j \leq m_i$.
– Generates the zero-testing parameter p_{zt} by computing

$$p_{zt} = \prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i \cdot z_i$$

.
– Creates

$$\mathsf{puzzle} = (q, \{C_1, \ldots, C_\kappa\}, p_{zt}) \tag{8}$$

as the public output. Let $\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{(i)}$ be the set of values $\{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{m_i}\}$ that are encoded with respect to $\mathcal{S}_i$ — then the private output is defined as

$$X = (\boldsymbol{\alpha}^{(1)}, \ldots, \boldsymbol{\alpha}^{(\kappa)}).$$

Note that the values r, β and z are all kept secret in order to preserve the secrecy of the encoded values. Public access to each β_i and z_i is granted in the form of the zero-test parameter p_{zt}, though it should be impossible to decompose this into the individual factors.

A.2 Jigsaw verification

As before, we note that the zero-test procedure is split into three separate algorithms to accurately model the security setting that we consider. These three algorithms are defined as the following:

Computation. (JCompute): Takes as input the encodings $v_j^{(i)}$ with respect to each index set $\mathcal{S}_i$ and a multilinear form, F, and outputs

$$v^* = F(v_1^{(1)}, \ldots, v_{m_1}^{(1)}, \ldots, v_1^{(\kappa)}, \ldots, v_{m_\kappa}^{(\kappa)})$$

where v^* is a top-level encoding as shown in Equation (5).

Zero-testing. (JZTParam): Takes as input an encoding v^* resulting from the JCompute algorithm and p_{zt} from puzzle and output $\delta = p_{zt} \cdot v^*$

Zero-test output. (JTest): Takes δ as an output from the JZTParam algorithm and checks the magnitude of the element. If it has magnitude greater than $\prod_{i=1}^{\kappa} \beta_i$ then output 1 (encoded value is zero). Otherwise output 0 (encoded value is non-zero).

Finally the overarching JVer algorithm defined previously simply runs these three algorithms in sequence and outputs the result of JTest.

A.3 Correctness of construction

The homomorphic properties of our encodings as shown in the previous section enable us to evaluate the multilinear forms that are input to the JCompute algorithm. Correctness is lost post-zero-testing if wrap-around modulo q occurs for a top-level encoding, or if an encoding of zero exceeds $q^{\frac{\kappa-1}{\kappa}}$. Since we specifically sample the β_i elements from R_q such that we satisfy these requirements and since each of the sampled elements are small.