

# Encrypt or Decrypt? To Make a Single-Key Beyond Birthday Secure Nonce-Based MAC <sup>\*</sup>

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**Abstract.** At CRYPTO 2016, Cogliati and Seurin have proposed a highly secure nonce-based MAC called Encrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer (EWCDM) construction, as  $E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(N) \oplus N \oplus H_{K_h}(M))$  for a nonce  $N$  and a message  $M$ . This construction achieves roughly  $2^{2n/3}$  bit MAC security with the assumption that  $E$  is a PRP secure  $n$ -bit block cipher and  $H$  is an almost xor universal  $n$ -bit hash function. In this paper we propose Decrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer (DWCDM) construction, which is structurally very similar to its predecessor EWCDM except that the outer encryption call is replaced by decryption. The biggest advantage of DWCDM is that we can make a truly single key MAC: the two block cipher calls can use the same block cipher key  $K = K_1 = K_2$ . Moreover, we can derive the hash key as  $K_h = E_K(1)$ , as long as  $|K_h| = n$ . Whether we use encryption or decryption in the outer layer makes a huge difference; using the decryption instead enables us to apply an extended version of the mirror theory by Patarin to the security analysis of the construction. DWCDM is secure beyond the birthday bound, roughly up to  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries against nonce-respecting adversaries. DWCDM remains secure up to  $2^{n/2}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries against nonce-misusing adversaries.

**Keywords:** EDM, EWCDM, Mirror Theory, Extended Mirror Theory, H-Coefficient.

## 1 Introduction

Almost all symmetric-key cryptographic systems that use secret keys, including encryption, authentication and authenticated-encryption, are realized via Pseudo-Random Functions (PRFs). Therefore, the study of practical candidates of PRF is essential in providing solutions for the increasing use of cryptography in real-world applications. But unfortunately, very few PRFs are actually available in practice, and it is not easy to construct a sufficiently secure PRF.

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As a result, Pseudo-Random Permutations (PRPs) or block ciphers, which are available in plenty [16, 20, 11, 10], replace the PRF and are deployed as building blocks for almost every cryptographic systems.

Although various block ciphers [16, 20, 11, 10] are available and can be assumed to be PRFs, such an assumption comes at the cost of security degradation due to the PRF-PRP switch [6] which tells that a PRF can be replaced by a PRP up to quadratic degradation in security (often called “birthday bound security”). This loss of security is sometimes acceptable in practice if the block size of the cipher is large enough (e.g. AES-128). But with lightweight block ciphers with relatively small block sizes (e.g. 64-bit), whose number has grown tremendously in recent years (e.g. [10, 20, 11, 2, 1]), the quadratic security loss severely limits their applicability, and as a result it seems to be challenging to use these small ciphers in modern-day lightweight cryptography (e.g. Smart Card, RFID etc.).

In order to save these ciphers from obsolescence, various PRP-to-PRF constructions have been proposed in recent years that guarantee higher security than the usual birthday bound security. Such constructions are often called BBB (Beyond Birthday Bound)—i.e., security against more than  $2^{n/2}$  queries where  $n$  is the block size of the underlying cipher. A popular BBB construction is the XOR of permutations [7, 23, 3, 28].

XOR OF PERMUTATIONS. Bellare et al. [7] suggested a way to construct a PRF from PRPs by taking the xor (more generally sum) of two independent PRPs.

$$\text{XOR}_{E_{K_1}, E_{K_2}}(x) = E_{K_1}(x) \oplus E_{K_2}(x).$$

The construction was later analyzed by Lucks [23] and proved its security up to  $2^{2n/3}$  queries, where  $n$  is the block size of the underlying PRP. Single-keyed variant of this construction was first analyzed by Bellare and Impagliazzo [3] and showed its security upto  $O(nq/2^n)$  by using some advanced probability theory. However, their proof was sketchy and hard to verify. Subsequently, a lot of efforts have been invested towards improving the bound of XOR construction and its single-keyed variant (even proving upto  $n$ -bit security) by Patarin as evident in [28, 32, 31], but the proof contains serious gaps. Later in FSE 2014, the result was generalized to the xor of three or more independent PRPs [13]. However, a verifiable  $n$ -bit security proof of XOR construction is later provided by Dai et al. [17] using *chi-squared* method. Although, the original proof contained a glitch, which was pointed out by Bhattacharya and Nandi [8], was later fixed in the full version of [17].

The XOR construction provides a solution for encryption by combining itself with the counter (CTR) mode of encryption, as instantiated in CENC construction, a highly efficient nonce-based encryption mode proposed by Iwata [21]. It was shown [21] that CENC, as an encryption mode, achieves security upto  $O(2^{2n/3})$  queries against all nonce-respecting adversaries. Later, Iwata et al. [22] provided the optimal security bound of the construction based on mirror theory technique [32]. Recently, Bhattacharya and Nandi [9] have given an optimal se-

curity bound of CENC by analysing the PRF security bound of variable output length of xor of permutations using chi-squared method.

Though useful for encryption, the XOR construction does not seem to be directly usable for authentication. A problem for authentication is that we have to extend the domain size, so that the construction can authenticate long messages. This can be done by hashing the message, but with the XOR construction it seems that we need some subtle combination with a double-block hash function, as employed in PMAC\_Plus [33], 1K-PMAC\_Plus [18] and LightMAC\_Plus [26].

ENCRYPTED DAVIES-MEYER. The above problem with the XOR construction in authentication was solved by Cogliati and Seurin [14], who proposed a PRP-to-PRF conversion method, called Encrypted Davies-Meyer (EDM). The EDM construction is defined as follows:

$$\text{EDM}_{E_{K_1}, E_{K_2}}(x) = E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(x) \oplus x).$$

EDM uses two independent block-cipher keys and achieves  $O(q^3/2^{2n})$  security [14]. Soon after, Dai et al. [17] improved its bound to  $O(q^4/2^{3n})$  by applying chi-squared method. Concurrently, Mennink and Neves [24] proved its almost optimal security, i.e.  $O(2^n/67n)$ , using mirror theory technique.

As EDM requires two independent keys for the cipher calls, it would be interesting to see that whether BBB security holds for the single key setting of the construction, as mentioned by authors of [14]. Recently, Cogliati and Seurin answers the question in positive and proved its security upto  $O(q/2^{2n/3})$  [15], as originally conjectured by themselves [14].

ENCRYPTED WEGMAN-CARTER WITH DAVIES-MEYER. Following the construction of EDM, Cogliati and Seurin extended the idea to construct EWCDM, a nonce-based BBB secure MAC, which is defined as follows:

$$\text{EWCDM}_{E_{K_1}, E_{K_2}, H_{K_h}}(N, M) = E_{K_2}(E_{K_1}(N) \oplus N \oplus H_{K_h}(M)),$$

where  $N$  is the nonce and  $M$  is the message to be authenticated. Note that, EWCDM uses two independent block-cipher keys,  $K_1$  and  $K_2$ , and also another independent hash-key  $K_h$  for the AXU hash function.<sup>4</sup> In this way, EDM obviated the necessity of using double-block hash function that existed with the XOR construction. It has been proved that EWCDM is secure against all nonce-respecting MAC adversaries<sup>5</sup> that make at most  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries. Cogliati and Seurin also proved  $O(2^{n/2})$  security of the construction against nonce-misusing adversaries. Later, Mennink and Neves [24] proved its  $n$ -bit PRF security using mirror theory in the nonce respecting setting and mentioned that the analysis straightforwardly generalizes to the analysis for unforgeability or for the nonce-misusing setting of the construction. The trick

<sup>4</sup> An AXU hash function is a keyed hash function such that for any two distinct messages, the probability, over a random draw of a hash key, of the hash differential being equal to a specific output is small.

<sup>5</sup> adversaries who never repeat the same value of  $N$  in their MAC queries

involved in proving the optimal security of EWCDM is by replacing the last block cipher call with its inverse. This subtle change does not make any difference in the output distribution and as a bonus, it trivially allows one to express the output of the construction as a sum of two random permutations (or in general a bi-variate affine equation <sup>6</sup>). It is only this feature which is captured by the *mirror theory* to derive the security bound of the construction.

**MOTIVATION BEHIND THIS WORK.** Constructions with multiple secret keys necessarily requires larger storage space for storing them, which is sometimes infeasible for lightweight crypto devices like RFID, Smart Card etc. All popular MACs, including CMAC [27] and HMAC [4], require only a single secret key. But most of the time reducing the number of keys without compromising the security is not a trivial task.

As evident from the definition of the construction, EWCDM requires three keys; two block cipher keys  $K_1$  and  $K_2$  and one hash key  $K_h$ . Thus, it is natural to ask that whether one can achieve the similar security in the case of using less number of keys. Cogliati and Seurin [14] believed that BBB security should hold for single-keyed EWCDM (with  $K_1 = K_2$ ) but be likely cumbersome to prove. In fact, proving BBB security of single-keyed EDM, as mentioned earlier, is a highly complicated task as evident from [15] and it is not clear at all how to build on this result to prove the MAC security of EWCDM construction with  $K_1 = K_2$ . Moreover, Cogliati and Seurin, in their proof of single-keyed EDM [15], have also stated that

*“For now, we have been unable to extend the current (already cumbersome) counting used for the proof of the single-permutation EDM construction to the more complicated case of single-key EWCDM.”*

Thus, we expect that proving the MAC security of single-keyed EWCDM should be a notably hard task and very likely require heavy mathematical tools like *Sum Capture Lemma* as already used for single-keyed EDM. This motivates us to design an another single-keyed, nonce-based MAC built from block ciphers (and a hash function) with BBB security that can be proven by a simpler approach.

**Our Contribution.** Our contribution in this paper is fourfold which we outline as follows:

- **DWCDM: NEW NONCE-BASED MAC.** We propose *Decrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer*, in short DWCDM, a nonce-based BBB secure MAC. The design philosophy of DWCDM is inspired from the trick used in [24] while proving the optimal security of EWCDM. Recall that, in [24], authors replace the last block cipher call with its inverse so that the output of EWCDM can be expressed as a sum of *two independent* PRPs. But the same trick does not work at the time of using the same block cipher key in the construction.

<sup>6</sup> For two variables,  $P, Q$  and  $\lambda \in \text{GF}(2^n)$  we call an equation of the form  $P \oplus Q = \lambda$ , a bi-variate affine equation

This phenomenon triggers us to design a nonce based MAC, very similar to EWCDM, in which instead of using the encryption algorithm in the last block-cipher call, we use its **decryption** algorithm so that the output of the construction can be expressed as a sum of two *identical* PRPs and hence the name **Decrypted** Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer. The construction is *single-keyed* in the sense that the *same block cipher key* is used for the two cipher calls. Schematic diagram of DWCDM is shown in Fig.4.1 where the last  $n/3$  bits of the nonce  $N$  is zero, i.e.  $N = N^* || 0^{n/3}$ . We would like to mention here that one cannot use the full  $n$ -bit nonce in DWCDM as that would end up with a birthday bound MAC attack which is described in section 4.1. We show that DWCDM is secure up to  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries against nonce-respecting adversaries. We also show that DWCDM is secure up to  $2^{n/2}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries in the nonce-misuse setting, where the bound is tight. As a concrete example of DWCDM, we present an instantiation of DWCDM with the AXU hash function being realized via PolyHash [25]. We show that nPolyMAC achieves  $2^{2n/3}$ -bit MAC security in the nonce-respecting setting.

- **EXTENDED MIRROR THEORY.** Since, our study of interest is the MAC security of the construction, we require to analyze the number of solutions of a system of affine bi-variate equations along with *affine uni-variate and bi-variate non-equations*<sup>7</sup>. Such a general treatment of analysing system of affine equations with non-equations was only mentioned in [32] without giving any formal analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time we analyse such a generic system of equations with non-equations, which we regard to as *extended mirror theory* and our MAC security proofs of DWCDM and 1K-DWCDM are crucially based on this new result.
- **1K-DWCDM: “PURE” SINGLE-KEYED VARIANT OF DWCDM.** Moreover, we exhibit a truly single-keyed nonce-based MAC construction, 1K-DWCDM. Under the condition that the length of the hash key is equal to the block size as  $|K_h| = n$ , we can even derive the hash key as  $K_h = E_K(0^{n-1} || 1)$ , which results in the construction 1K-DWCDM. We prove that 1K-DWCDM is essentially as secure as DWCDM.
- **POTENTIALITY OF ACHIEVING HIGHER SECURITY.** Finally, we show how one can boost the security for DWCDM type constructions using extended generalized version of Mirror Theory.

**PROOF APPROACH.** Our MAC security proof of DWCDM and 1K-DWCDM is fundamentally relied on Patarin’s H-coefficient technique [29]. Similar to the technique of [14, 19], we cast the unforgeability game of MAC to an equivalent indistinguishability game, with some suitable choice of ideal world, that allows us to apply the H-coefficient technique for bounding the distinguishing advantage of the construction of our concern.

<sup>7</sup> For two variables,  $P, Q$  and  $\lambda \in \text{GF}(2^n) \setminus 0^n$  we call  $P \oplus Q \neq \lambda$ , an affine bi-variate non-equation and  $P \neq \lambda$  is an affine uni-variate non-equation.



For any binary string  $x$ ,  $|x|$  denotes the length i.e. the number of bits in  $x$ . For  $x, y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , we write  $z = x \oplus y$  to denote the modulo 2 addition of  $x$  and  $y$ . We write  $\mathbf{0}$  to denote the zero element of the field  $\{0, 1\}^n$  (i.e.  $0^n$ ) and  $\mathbf{1}$  to denote  $0^{n-1}\|1$ . For integers  $1 \leq b \leq a$ , we write  $(a)_b$  to denote  $a(a-1)\dots(a-b+1)$ , where  $(a)_0 = 1$  by convention.

## 2.1 Security Definitions

**PRF AND PRP AND SPRP.** A keyed function with key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , domain  $\mathcal{X}$  and range  $\mathcal{Y}$  is a function  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$  and we denote  $F(K, X)$  by  $F_K(X)$ . Similarly, a keyed permutation with key space  $\mathcal{K}$  and domain  $\mathcal{X}$  is a mapping  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$  such that for all key  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ ,  $X \mapsto E(K, X)$  is a permutation over  $\mathcal{X}$  and we denote  $E_K(X)$  for  $E(K, X)$ .

**PRF.** Given an oracle algorithm  $A$  with oracle access to a function from  $\mathcal{X}$  to  $\mathcal{Y}$ , making at most  $q$  queries, running time is at most  $t$  and outputting a single bit. We define prf-advantage of  $A$  against the family of keyed functions  $F$  as

$$\mathbf{Adv}_F^{\text{PRF}}(A) := |\Pr[K \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K} : A^{F_K} = 1] - \Pr[\text{RF} \leftarrow_s \text{Func}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}) : A^{\text{RF}} = 1]|.$$

We say that  $F$  is  $(q, t, \epsilon)$  secure PRF, if  $\mathbf{Adv}_F^{\text{PRF}}(q, t) := \max_A \mathbf{Adv}_F^{\text{PRF}}(A) \leq \epsilon$ , where the maximum is taken over all adversaries  $A$  that makes  $q$  many queries and running time is at most  $t$ .

**PRP.** Given an oracle algorithm  $A$  with oracle access to a permutation of  $\mathcal{X}$ , making at most  $q$  queries, running time is at most  $t$  and outputting a single bit. We define prp-advantage of  $A$  against the family of keyed permutations  $E$  as

$$\mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{PRP}}(A) := |\Pr[K \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K} : A^{E_K} = 1] - \Pr[\Pi \leftarrow_s \text{Perm}(\mathcal{X}) : A^\Pi = 1]|.$$

We say that  $E$  is  $(q, t, \epsilon)$  secure PRP, if  $\mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{PRP}}(q, t) := \max_A \mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{PRP}}(A) \leq \epsilon$ , where the maximum is taken over all adversaries  $A$  that makes  $q$  many queries and running time is at most  $t$ .

**SPRP.** Given an oracle algorithm  $A$  with oracle access to a permutation and its inverse over  $\mathcal{X}$ , making at most  $q^+$  queries to permutation and  $q^-$  queries to inverse permutation, running time is at most  $t$  and outputting a single bit. We define sprp-advantage of  $A$  against the family of keyed permutations  $E$  as

$$\mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(A) := |\Pr[K \leftarrow_s \mathcal{K} : A^{E_K, E_K^{-1}} = 1] - \Pr[\Pi \leftarrow_s \text{Perm}(\mathcal{X}) : A^{\Pi, \Pi^{-1}} = 1]|.$$

We say that  $E$  is  $(q, t, \epsilon)$  secure SPRP, if  $\mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(q, t) := \max_A \mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(A) \leq \epsilon$ , where the maximum is taken over all adversaries  $A$  that makes  $q$  many encryption and decryption queries altogether and running time is at most  $t$ .

**MACs.** Given four non-empty finite sets  $\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{T}$ , a nonce based keyed function with key space  $\mathcal{K}$ , nonce space  $\mathcal{N}$ , message space  $\mathcal{M}$  and range  $\mathcal{T}$  is a keyed function whose domain is  $\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{M}$  and range is  $\mathcal{T}$  and we write  $F(K, N, M)$  as  $F_K(N, M)$ .

**Definition 1 (Nonce Based MAC).** Let  $\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{N}, \mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{T}$  be four non-empty finite sets and  $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{T}$  be a nonce based keyed function. For  $K \in \mathcal{K}$ , let  $\text{Ver}_K$  be the verification oracle that takes as input  $(N, M, T) \in \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{T}$  and outputs 1 if  $F_K(N, M) = T$ , otherwise outputs 0. A  $(q_m, q_v, t)$  adversary against the MAC security of  $F$  is an adversary  $A$  with access to two oracles  $F_K$  and  $\text{Ver}_K$  for  $K \in \mathcal{K}$  such that it makes at most  $q_m$  many MAC queries to first oracle and  $q_v$  many verification queries to second oracle. We say that  $A$  forges  $F$  if any of its queries to  $\text{Ver}_K$  returns 1. The advantage of  $A$  against the MAC security of  $F$  is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_F^{\text{MAC}}(A) := \Pr[K \leftarrow \mathcal{K} : A^{F_K, \text{Ver}_K} \text{ forges }],$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of the underlying key and the random coin of adversary  $A$  (if any). We assume that  $A$  does not make any verification query  $(N, M, T)$  to  $\text{Ver}_K$  if  $T$  is obtained in previous MAC query with input  $(N, M)$  and it does not repeat any query. We call such an adversary as “non-trivial” adversary. The adversary is said to be “nonce respecting” if it does not repeat nonces in its queries to the MAC oracle <sup>8</sup>.

REGULAR AND AXU HASH FUNCTION. We will need the following definition of regular, almost xor-universal (AXU) and 3-way regular property of a hash function.

- (1)  $H$  is said to be an  $\epsilon$  regular hash function, if for any  $X \in \mathcal{X}$  and any  $Y \in \mathcal{Y}$ ,

$$\Pr[K_h \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_h : H_{K_h}(X) = Y] \leq \epsilon. \quad (1)$$

- (2)  $H$  is said to be an  $\epsilon$  almost xor universal (AXU) hash function if for any distinct  $X, X' \in \mathcal{X}$  and for any  $Y \in \mathcal{Y}$ ,

$$\Pr[K_h \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_h : H_{K_h}(X) \oplus H_{K_h}(X') = Y] \leq \epsilon. \quad (2)$$

- (3)  $H$  is said to be an  $\epsilon$  3-way regular hash function if for any distinct  $X_1, X_2, X_3 \in \mathcal{X}$  and for any non-zero  $Y \in \mathcal{Y}$ ,

$$\Pr[K_h \leftarrow \mathcal{K}_h : H_{K_h}(X_1) \oplus H_{K_h}(X_2) \oplus H_{K_h}(X_3) = Y] \leq \epsilon. \quad (3)$$

In the following, we state that PolyHash [25] is one of the examples of algebraic hash function which is  $\ell/2^n$  regular, AXU as well as 3-way regular hash function.

**Proposition 1.** Let  $\text{Poly} : \{0, 1\}^n \times (\{0, 1\}^n)^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a hash function defined as follows: For a fixed key  $K_h \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and for a fixed message  $M$ , we first apply an injective padding such as  $10^*$  i.e., pad 1 followed by minimum number of zeros so that the total number of bits in the padded message becomes

<sup>8</sup> Similar to nonce respecting adversary, we say that an adversary is nonce misusing if the adversary is not restricted to make queries to the MAC oracle with distinct nonces.



multiple of  $n$ . Let the padded message be  $M^* = M_1 \| M_2 \| \dots \| M_l$  where for each  $i$ ,  $|M_i| = n$ . Then we define

$$\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) = M_l \cdot K_h \oplus M_{l-1} \cdot K_h^2 \oplus \dots \oplus M_1 \cdot K_h^l, \quad (4)$$

where  $l$  is the number of  $n$ -bit blocks. Then,  $\text{Poly}$  is  $\ell/2^n$  regular, AXU and 3-way regular hash function, where  $\ell$  denotes the maximum number of message blocks of size  $n$ -bits.

**Proof.** For any three distinct messages  $M, M'$  and  $M''$ ,  $\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M') \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M'') \oplus Y$ , where  $Y \neq \mathbf{0}$ , is a polynomial of  $K_h$ . Now, if the polynomial  $\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M') \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M'')$  reduces to a zero polynomial, which is possible by certain choices of  $M, M'$  and  $M''$  (e.g.,  $M = M_1 \| M_2, M' = (M_1 \oplus M_2) \| M_3$  and  $M'' = M_2 \| (M_2 \oplus M_3)$ ), then we have,  $\epsilon_3 = 0$ . Otherwise,  $\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M') \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M'')$  is a non-zero polynomial and hence we have,  $\epsilon_3 = \ell/2^n$ , where  $\ell$  is the maximum number of message blocks among three messages. Similarly, it is easy to see that  $\text{Poly}$  is a  $\ell/2^n$  regular hash function as the maximum number of roots for the polynomial  $\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) \oplus Y$  is  $\ell$ . Moreover, for any two distinct messages  $M$  and  $M'$ ,  $\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) \oplus \text{Poly}_{K_h}(M') \oplus Y$  is a non-trivial polynomial of  $K_h$  with degree at most  $\ell$ , and hence the maximum number of roots this can polynomial can have is  $\ell$ . Therefore, the AXU advantage of  $\text{Poly}$  is  $\ell/2^n$ .  $\square$

### 3 Patarin's Mirror Theory

Mirror theory, as defined in [32] is the theory of evaluating the number of solutions of affine system of equalities and non-equalities in a finite group. Patarin, who coined this theory, has given a lower bound on the number of solutions of a finite system of affine bi-variate equations using an inductive proof when the variables in the equations are wor samples [30]. The proof is tractable upto the order of  $2^{2n/3}$  security bound, but the proof becomes highly complex and too difficult to verify in the case of deriving the optimal security bound. In specific, once the first-order recursion is considered, one needs to consider a second-order recursion, and so on, until the  $n$ -th recursion. For the  $i$ -th order recursion, there are  $O(2^i)$  many cases and Patarin's proof only addresses the first (and perhaps the second) order recursion by a tedious analysis, but the cases of the higher-order ones are quite different, and it's not at all clear how to bridge the gap, given an exponential number of cases that one has to consider. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, the proof did not consider any affine non-equation as well.

In this section we extend the Mirror theory in the context of our MAC security to incorporate the affine non-equations (that includes uni-variate and bi-variate non-equations) along with a system of affine bi-variate equations. In the following, we prove that when the number of affine bi-variate equations is  $q \leq 2^{2n/3}$  and the number of non-equations is  $v \leq 2^n$  ( $v$  is the total number of affine uni-variate and bi-variate non equations), then the number of solutions

becomes at least  $(2^n)_{3q/2}/2^{nq}$ . For the sake of presentation and interoperability with the results in the remainder of the paper, we use different parameterization and naming convention.

### 3.1 General Setting of Mirror Theory

Given a bi-variate affine equation  $P \oplus Q = \lambda$ , the associated linear equation of this affine equation is  $P \oplus Q = 0$ . Now, given  $\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_q \in \text{GF}(2^n) \setminus \mathbf{0}$  which we write as  $\Lambda = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_q)$ , let us consider a system of  $q$  many bi-variate affine equations over  $\text{GF}(2^n)$ :

$$\mathcal{E}_\Lambda = \{P_{n_1} \oplus P_{t_1} = \lambda_1, P_{n_2} \oplus P_{t_2} = \lambda_2, \dots, P_{n_q} \oplus P_{t_q} = \lambda_q\}.$$

Given a function  $\phi : \{n_1, t_1, \dots, n_q, t_q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$ , called *index mapping function*, we associate another system of bi-variate affine equations:

$$\mathcal{E}_{\Lambda, \phi} = \{P_{\phi(n_1)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_1)} = \lambda_1, P_{\phi(n_2)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_2)} = \lambda_2, \dots, P_{\phi(n_q)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_q)} = \lambda_q\}.$$

Let  $\alpha$  denotes the cardinality of the image set of  $\phi$ . Then,  $\mathcal{E}_{\Lambda, \phi}$  is a system of bi-variate affine equations over  $\alpha$  variables. In our paper, a specific choice of  $\mathcal{I}$  would be  $\{0, 1\}^n$ .

**Example.** Consider a system of equations:

$$\{P_1 \oplus P_2 = \lambda_1, P_1 \oplus P_3 = \lambda_2, P_2 \oplus P_4 = \lambda_3\}.$$

Then, the index mapping function for the above system of equations is  $\phi(n_1) = 1, \phi(t_1) = 2, \phi(n_2) = 1, \phi(t_2) = 3, \phi(n_3) = 2, \phi(t_3) = 4$ . For this system of equations  $\alpha = 4$ .

**EQUATION-DEPENDENT GRAPH.** For index mapping function  $\phi : \{n_1, t_1, \dots, n_q, t_q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$ , we associate a undirected graph  $G_\phi = ([q], \mathcal{S})$  where  $\{i, j\} \in \mathcal{S}$  if

$$|\{\phi(n_i), \phi(t_i)\} \cap \{\phi(n_j), \phi(t_j)\}| \geq 1$$

or if  $i = j$  and  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(t_i)$ . We call such an edge a *self-loop*. In other words, we introduce an edge between two equations (node represents the equation number) in the equation-dependent graph if the corresponding equations have at least one common unknown variable. Note that the set  $\{\phi(n_i), \phi(t_i)\}$  can be a multi-set.

For a subset  $\{i_1, \dots, i_c\} \subseteq [q]$ , let


$$\{P_{\phi(n_{i_1})} \oplus P_{\phi(t_{i_1})} = 0, P_{\phi(n_{i_2})} \oplus P_{\phi(t_{i_2})} = 0, \dots, P_{\phi(n_{i_c})} \oplus P_{\phi(t_{i_c})} = 0\}$$

be the sub-system of associated linear equations. We say this sub-system of associated linear equations is linearly dependent if  $\{i_1, \dots, i_c\}$  is the minimal set and all variables  $P_x$ , which appeared in the above sub-system, appears exactly twice. Depending on the value of  $c$  (for the minimal linearly dependent sub-system), we have the following three cases;

- (i)  $c = 1$ : SELF-LOOP. If there exists  $i$  such that  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(t_i)$ .
- (ii)  $c = 2$ : PARALLEL-EDGE. If there exists  $i \neq j$  such that either:
  - (a)  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(n_j)$  and  $\phi(t_i) = \phi(t_j)$  or (b)  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(t_j)$  and  $\phi(t_i) = \phi(n_j)$ .
- (iii)  $c \geq 3$ : ALTERNATING-CYCLE. If there exists distinct  $i_1, i_2, \dots, i_c$  such that for every  $j \in [c]$  either
  - $\phi(n_{i_j}) \in \{\phi(n_{i_{j+1}}), \phi(t_{i_{j+1}})\}$  and  $\phi(t_{i_j}) \in \{\phi(n_{i_{j-1}}), \phi(t_{i_{j-1}})\}$  or
  - $\phi(t_{i_j}) \in \{\phi(n_{i_{j+1}}), \phi(t_{i_{j+1}})\}$  and  $\phi(n_{i_j}) \in \{\phi(n_{i_{j-1}}), \phi(t_{i_{j-1}})\}$ .

When  $i = 1$ ,  $i - 1$  is considered as  $c$  and when  $i = c$ ,  $i + 1$  is considered as 1. We say that  $\phi$  is *dependent* if any one of the above condition holds. Otherwise, we call it *independent*. Given an independent  $\phi$ , the graph  $G_\phi$  becomes a simple graph and  $\mathcal{E}_{\Lambda, \phi}$  becomes linearly independent. In this case, the number of variables present in a connected component  $C = \{i_1, \dots, i_c\}$  of  $G_\phi$  (i.e., the size of the set  $\{\phi(n_{i_1}), \phi(t_{i_1}), \dots, \phi(n_{i_c}), \phi(t_{i_c})\}$ ) is exactly  $c + 1$ . We call the set  $\{\phi(n_{i_1}), \phi(t_{i_1}), \dots, \phi(n_{i_c}), \phi(t_{i_c})\}$  a *block*. The *block maximality*, denoted by  $\xi_{\max}$ , of an independent  $\phi$  is defined as  $\zeta_{\max} + 1$  where  $\zeta_{\max}$  is the size of the maximum connected components of  $G_\phi$  (Note that, a block with  $p$  many elements introduces  $p - 1$  many affine equations.).

**Example.** Suppose,  $\mathcal{E} = \{(1) P_1 \oplus P_2 = \lambda_1, (2) P_1 \oplus P_3 = \lambda_2, (3) P_2 \oplus P_4 = \lambda_3, (4) P_5 \oplus P_6 = \lambda_4\}$ , then we have two blocks  $\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$  and  $\{5, 6\}$  and  $\xi_{\max} = 4$ . Observe that, we also have two connected components  $\{1, 2, 3\}$  and  $\{4\}$  and the size of the maximum connected component  $\zeta_{\max} = 3$  as depicted in Fig. 3.1 and  $\xi_{\max} = \zeta_{\max} + 1 = 4$ .



**Fig. 3.1.** Equation dependent graph  $G[\mathcal{E}]$  comprised of two components; largest component size is 3.

### 3.2 Extended Mirror Theory

In this section, we introduce the extended Mirror theory technique by incorporating two types of non-equations with a finite number of bi-variate affine equations. We consider (i) uni-variate affine non-equation of the form  $X_i \neq c$  and (ii) bi-variate affine non-equation of the form  $X_i \oplus Y_i \neq c$ , where  $c$  is a non-zero constant. In particular, we lower bound the number of solutions of a

finite number of affine equations<sup>9</sup> and uni(bi-) variate affine non-equations. To begin with, let us investigate what happens when we introduce a single uni(bi-) variate affine non-equation with a finite number of affine equations.

Let  $\mathcal{E}^=$  be a system of  $q$  many affine equations of the form

$$\mathcal{E}^= = \{P_{n_1} \oplus P_{t_1} = \lambda_1, \dots, P_{n_q} \oplus P_{t_q} = \lambda_q\}. \quad (5)$$

Let  $\phi$  be an index mapping function that maps from  $\{n_1, t_1, \dots, n_q, t_q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$ . Let  $\Lambda_= = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_q)$ , where each  $\lambda_i \in \text{GF}(2^n) \setminus \mathbf{0}$ . Now, for an independent choice of  $\phi$ ,  $\mathcal{E}_{\phi, \Lambda_=}^=$  is a linearly independent set of  $q$  many affine equations. Let  $\mathcal{E}^{\neq}$  be a system of  $r$  many bi-variate affine non-equations and  $v - r$  many uni-variate affine non-equations of the form

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}^{\neq} = & \{P_{n_{q+1}} \oplus P_{t_{q+1}} \neq \lambda'_1, \dots, P_{n_{(q+r)}} \oplus P_{t_{(q+r)}} \neq \lambda'_r\} \\ & \cup \{P_{n_{q+r+1}} \neq \lambda'_{r+1}, \dots, P_{n_{(q+v)}} \neq \lambda'_v\}. \end{aligned}$$

We denote  $\Lambda_{\neq} = (\lambda'_1, \lambda'_2, \dots, \lambda'_v)$ , where each  $\lambda'_i \in \text{GF}(2^n) \setminus \mathbf{0}$ , and  $\Lambda' = (\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_q, \lambda'_1, \lambda'_2, \dots, \lambda'_v)$ . Now, for the system of affine equations and non-equations  $\mathcal{E} := \mathcal{E}^= \cup \mathcal{E}^{\neq}$ , we consider the index mapping function

$$\phi' : \{n_1, t_1, \dots, n_q, t_q, n_{q+1}, t_{q+1}, \dots, n_{q+v}, t_{q+v}\} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}.$$

Moreover, we denote  $\phi := \phi'|_q$  to be the index mapping function that maps  $\{n_1, t_1, \dots, n_q, t_q\} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$  and  $\Lambda_= := \Lambda'|_q$  to be  $(\lambda_1, \lambda_2, \dots, \lambda_q)$ .

CHARACTERIZING GOOD  $(\phi', \Lambda')$ . We say that a pair  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  is good if

- (C1)  $\phi$  is independent and for all  $x \neq y$ ,  $P_{\phi(x)} = P_{\phi(y)}$  cannot be generated from the system of equations  $\mathcal{E}_{\phi, \Lambda_=}^=$ .
- (C2) for all  $j \in [v]$  and  $i_1, \dots, i_c \in [q]$ ,  $c \geq 0$ , such that  $\{i_1, \dots, i_c, q + j\}$  is dependent system then  $\lambda_{i_1} \oplus \dots \oplus \lambda_{i_c} \oplus \lambda'_j \neq \mathbf{0}$ .

In words, a good  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  says that: (i) the system of equation  $\mathcal{E}_{\phi, \Lambda_=}$  is linearly independent system of equations and one cannot generate an equation of the form  $P_{\phi(x)} = P_{\phi(y)}$  by linearly combining the equation of  $\mathcal{E}_{\phi, \Lambda_=}$ . Moreover, (ii) by linearly combining the equation of  $\mathcal{E}_{\phi, \Lambda_=}$ , one cannot generate an equation of the form  $P_x \oplus P_y = \lambda_{x,y}$  such that  $P_x \oplus P_y \neq \lambda_{x,y}$  already exist in  $\mathcal{E}_{\phi', \Lambda'}^{\neq}$ .

Summarizing above, we state and prove the following main theorem, which we call as *Extended Mirror Theorem for  $\xi_{\max} = 3$* . For the notational simplicity we assume the index set  $\mathcal{I} = [\alpha]$ .

<sup>9</sup> when we consider affine equation, we actually refer to the bi-variate affine equation.

**Theorem 1.** Let  $(\mathcal{E}^= \cup \mathcal{E}^{\neq}, \phi', \Lambda')$  be a system of  $q$  many affine equations and  $v$  many uni(bi-) variate affine non-equations associated with index mapping function  $\phi'$  over  $\text{GF}(2^n)$  which are of the form

$$\begin{aligned} (a) & P_{\phi(n_i)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_i)} = \lambda_i (\neq \mathbf{0}), \quad \forall i \in [q] \\ (b) & P_{\phi(n_j)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_j)} \neq \lambda'_j (\neq \mathbf{0}), \quad \forall j \in [q+1, q+r] \\ (c) & P_{\phi(n_j)} \neq \lambda''_j (\neq \mathbf{0}), \quad \forall j \in [q+r+1, q+v] \end{aligned}$$

over the set of  $\alpha$  many unknown variables  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_\alpha\}$  such that  $P_a$  may be equals to some  $P_{\phi(n_i)}$  or  $P_{\phi(t_i)}$ , where  $a \in \{\phi(n_j), \phi(t_j)\}, j \in [q+1, q+v]$ . Now, if

- (i)  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  is good and
- (ii)  $\xi_{\max} = 3$

then the number of solutions for  $\mathcal{P}$ , denoted by  $h_{\frac{3q}{2}}$  such that  $P_i \neq P_j$  for all distinct  $i, j \in \{1, \dots, \alpha\}$  is

$$h_{\frac{3q}{2}} \geq \frac{(2^n)^{\frac{3q}{2}}}{2^{nq}} \left( 1 - \frac{5q^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{v}{2^n} \right). \quad (6)$$

**AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROOF.** We prove the result by induction on the number of blocks. Let us assume that we have exactly  $u$  many blocks with total number of equations  $2u$  and total number of variables  $3u$ . Let us also assume that we have  $\omega_{3u}$  many uni-variate and bi-variate affine non equations and  $h_{3u}$  be the total number of solutions of such a system of affine equations and non-equations. Now, we introduce one more block that adds two new equations and three new variables with the existing set of equations and variables. We also consider an affine bi-variate non-equation such that one of its variables comes from the existing  $3u$  many variables and the other one comes from the newly introduced three variables. Moreover, we also consider an affine uni-variate non-equation such that the variable comes from the newly introduced three variables. Given we have  $h_{3u}$  many solutions, we calculate the number of solutions for the newly introduced affine equations and non-equations such that the solution does not end up with any inconsistencies.

**Proof.** As mentioned, our proof is an inductive proof based on the number of blocks  $u$ . Our first observation is that as  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  is good,  $\phi$  is independent and thus  $\xi_{\max} = \zeta_{\max} + 1$  and hence, the maximum number of variables  $P_i$  that can reside in the same block is 3. For the simplicity of the proof, assume that we have exactly 3 variables at each blocks. Now, it is easy to see that Eqn. (6) holds when  $u = 1$ .

As the next step of the proof, let  $h_{3u}$  be the solutions for first  $2u$  many affine equations, which we denote as  $\mathcal{E}_{2u}^=$ . Now as soon as we add the  $(u+1)^{th}$  block, we consider the following bi-variate affine equations

$$P_{3u+1} \oplus P_{3u+2} = \lambda_{2u+1}, P_{3u+1} \oplus P_{3u+3} = \lambda_{2u+2}$$

and those bi-variate affine non-equations which are of the form

$$P_{\sigma_i} \oplus P_{\delta_i} \neq \lambda'_i, \text{ where } \sigma_i \in \{1, \dots, 3u+3\}, \delta_i \in \{3u+1, 3u+2, 3u+3\},$$

and also those uni-variate affine non-equations of the form

$$P_{\delta_i} \neq \lambda''_i, \text{ where } \delta_i \in \{3u+1, 3u+2, 3u+3\}.$$

Let  $v'$  and  $v''$  be the number of such bi-variate and uni-variate affine non-equations. Now, note that each such bi-variate affine non-equation of the form  $P_{\sigma_i} \oplus P_{\delta_i} \neq \lambda'_i$  where  $\sigma_i \in \{1, \dots, 3u+3\}, \delta_i \in \{3u+1, 3u+2, 3u+3\}$  can be written as  $P_{3u+1} \neq P_{\sigma_i} \oplus \lambda'_i$ , where  $\sigma_i \in \{1, \dots, 3u+3\}$  and  $\lambda'_i \in \{\lambda'_i, \lambda'_i \oplus \lambda_{2u+1}, \lambda'_i \oplus \lambda_{2u+2}\}$ . Moreover, each such uni-variate affine non-equation of the form  $P_{\delta_i} \neq \lambda''_i$  where  $\delta_i \in \{3u+1, 3u+2, 3u+3\}$  can be written as  $P_{3u+1} \neq \lambda_i^{**}$ , where  $\lambda_i^{**} \in \{\lambda''_i, \lambda''_i \oplus \lambda_{2u+1}, \lambda''_i \oplus \lambda_{2u+2}\}$ .

Now  $h_{3u+3}$  counts for the number of solutions to  $\{P_1, \dots, P_{3u}, P_{3u+1}, P_{3u+2}, P_{3u+3}\}$  such that

- $\{P_1, \dots, P_{3u}\}$  is a valid solution of  $\mathcal{E}_{2u}^-$ .
- $P_{3u+1} \oplus P_{3u+2} = \lambda_{2u+1}, P_{3u+1} \oplus P_{3u+3} = \lambda_{2u+2}$ .
- $P_{3u+1} \notin \{P_1, \dots, P_{3u}, P_1 \oplus \lambda_{2u+1}, \dots, P_{3u} \oplus \lambda_{2u+1}, P_1 \oplus \lambda_{2u+2}, \dots, P_{3u} \oplus \lambda_{2u+2}\}$ .
- $P_{3u+1} \notin \{P_{\sigma_1} \oplus \lambda_1^*, \dots, P_{\sigma_{v'}} \oplus \lambda_{v'}^*\}$ .
- $P_{3u+1} \notin \{\lambda_1^{**}, \dots, \lambda_{v''}^{**}\}$ .

Let  $V_1 = \{P_1, \dots, P_{3u}\}, V_2 = \{P_1 \oplus \lambda_{2u+1}, \dots, P_{3u} \oplus \lambda_{2u+1}\}, V_3 = \{P_1 \oplus \lambda_{2u+2}, \dots, P_{3u} \oplus \lambda_{2u+2}\}, V_4 = \{P_{\sigma_1} \oplus \lambda_1^*, \dots, P_{\sigma_{v'}} \oplus \lambda_{v'}^*\}$  and  $V_5 = \{\lambda_1^{**}, \dots, \lambda_{v''}^{**}\}$ . Note that,  $|V_i| = 3u, i = 1, 2, 3$  and  $|V_4| = v', |V_5| = v''$ . Therefore, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} h_{3u+3} &= h_{3u}(2^n - |V_1 \cup V_2 \cup V_3 \cup V_4 \cup V_5|) \geq h_{3u}(2^n - |V_1| - |V_2| - |V_3| - |V_4| - |V_5|) \\ &\geq h_{3u}(2^n - 9u - v' - v''). \end{aligned}$$

By applying repeated induction, we obtain

$$h_{\frac{3q}{2}} \geq \left(2^n - 9\left(\frac{q}{2} - 1\right) - v' - v''\right) h_{3\left(\frac{q}{2}-1\right)} \geq \dots \geq \prod_{u=0}^{q/2-1} (2^n - 9u - v' - v'')$$

for which we have,

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{h_{\frac{3q}{2}} 2^{nq}}{(2^n)_{\frac{3q}{2}}} &\geq \prod_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \frac{2^{2n}(2^n - 9u - v' - v'')}{(2^n - 3u)(2^n - 3u - 1)(2^n - 3u - 2)} \\
 &\geq \prod_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \frac{2^{2n}(2^n - 9u - v' - v'')}{2^{3n} - (9u + 3)2^{2n} + (27u^2 + 18u + 2)2^n} \\
 &\stackrel{[1]}{\geq} \prod_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \left( 1 + \frac{3}{2^n} - \frac{27u^2 + 18u + 2}{2^{2n}} - \frac{v' + v''}{2^n} \right) \\
 &\stackrel{[2]}{\geq} \prod_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \left( 1 - \frac{27u^2}{2^{2n}} - \frac{9u^2}{2^{2n}} - \frac{v' + v''}{2^n} \right) \geq \prod_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \left( 1 - \frac{36u^2}{2^{2n}} - \frac{v' + v''}{2^n} \right) \\
 &\geq \left( 1 - \sum_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \frac{36u^2}{2^{2n}} - \sum_{u=0}^{q/2-1} \frac{v' + v''}{2^n} \right) \stackrel{[3]}{\geq} \left( 1 - \frac{5q^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{v}{2^n} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

where [1] follows from the assumptions  $u \leq 2^n/9$ , [2] follows as  $\frac{9u^2}{2^{2n}} \geq \frac{(18u+3)}{2^{2n}} - \frac{3}{2^n}$  and [3] follows as  $\sum_{u=0}^{q/2-1} (v' + v'') \leq v$ .  $\square$

## 4 DWCDM and Its Security Result

In this section, we discuss our proposed construction DWCDM and state its security in nonce respecting and nonce misuse setting. Let us recall the DWCDM construction:


$$\text{DWCDM}[E, E^{-1}, H](N, M) := E_K^{-1}(E_K(N) \oplus N \oplus H_{K_h}(M))$$

where  $N = N^* || 0^{n/3}$ .  $E_K$  is a  $n$ -bit block cipher and  $H_{K_h}$  is an  $\epsilon_1$  regular,  $\epsilon_2$  AXU and  $\epsilon_3$  3-way regular  $n$ -bit keyed hash function. A schematic diagram of DWCDM is shown in Fig.4.1. Note that, DWCDM is structurally similar to EWCDM, but unlike EWCDM, our construction uses the same block cipher key and the last block cipher call of EWCDM is replaced by its decryption function. Moreover, DWCDM cannot exploit the full nonce space like EWCDM, otherwise its beyond birthday security will be compromised as explained below.

### 4.1 Why DWCDM Cannot Accommodate Full $n$ -bit Nonce

As mentioned above, for DWCDM we need to reduce the nonce space to  $2n/3$ -bits. If it uses the full nonce space then using a nonce respecting adversary  $A$  who set the tags as nonce repeatedly, can mount a birthday bound forging attack on DWCDM as follows:

Suppose, an adversary starts with query  $(N, M)$  and then makes a chain of queries of the form  $(T_{i-1}, M)$  where  $(T_{i-1}, M)$  is the  $i$ -th query and  $T_{i-1}$  is the



**Fig. 4.1.** Decrypted Wegman-Carter with Davies-Meyer Construction.

response of the previous  $(i - 1)$ -th query, until the first time collision occurs (i.e. a response matches with one of the previous responses). If the adversary makes upto  $q \approx 2^{n/2}$  queries, it gets a collision  $T_i = T_j$  with high probability. Interestingly, if  $(j - i)$ <sup>10</sup> is even (which holds with probability  $1/2$ ), then

$$T_j = T_i \text{ iff } (T_i + T_{i+1} + \dots + T_{j-1} = 0).$$

Now, this property can be easily used A to predict  $T_i = T_j$  if it finds  $T_i + T_{i+1} + \dots + T_{j-1} = 0$  for some  $i, j$  such that  $(j - i)$  is even. Thus, A can mount the following forging attack as shown in Figure 4.2.

---

MAC Adversary A

1. Take any arbitrary  $N$  and  $M$ ; set  $T_0 \leftarrow N$ .
2. **for**  $(j = 1; j \leq q; j++)$
3.      $T_j \leftarrow \text{DWCDM}(T_{j-1}, M)$ .
4.     **for**  $(i = j - 1; i \geq 0; i = i - 2)$
5.         **if**  $((T_i + \dots + T_j) = 0)$
6.             **forge**  $(T_j, M, T_i)$ .

**Fig. 4.2.** Birthday bound MAC attack against DWCDM if full nonce space is used.

However, if we restrict the nonce space to  $2n/3$  bits, then this attack doesn't work because now using the tag as a valid nonce is a probabilistic event. Probability that a tag is a valid nonce is  $2^{-n/3}$ . This restricts the adversary from forming a chain as used in the attack. In fact, if adversary makes  $2^{2n/3}$  many MAC queries then the expected number of tags whose last  $n/3$  bits are all zeros is  $2^{n/3}$ . Now, if adversary uses these  $2^{n/3}$  tags as the nonces, then the expected number of tags whose last  $n/3$  bits are zeros is 1 and then adversary cannot

<sup>10</sup> we assume  $j > i$ .



proceed further. This phenomenon effectively invalidates the above attack to happen.

## 4.2 Nonce Respecting Security of DWCDM

In this section, we state that DWCDM is secure up to  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries against nonce respecting adversaries. Formally, the following result bounds the MAC advantage of DWCDM against nonce respecting adversaries.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}$  and  $\mathcal{K}_h$  be finite and non-empty sets. Let  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher and  $H : \mathcal{K}_h \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be an  $\epsilon_1$  regular,  $\epsilon_2$  AXU and  $\epsilon_3$  3-way regular and hash function. Then, the MAC advantage for any  $(q_m, q_v, t)$  nonce respecting adversary against  $\text{DWCDM}[E, E^{-1}, H]$  is given by,*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}[E, E^{-1}, H]}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) &\leq \text{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + \frac{2q_m}{2^{2n/3}} + q_m\epsilon_1 + \frac{2q_m\epsilon_2}{2^{n/3}} \\ &\quad + \max\{q_v\epsilon_1, 2q_v\epsilon_2, 2q_v\epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}\} + \frac{(q_m + q_v)}{2^n} + \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $t' = O(t + (q_m + q_v)t_H)$ ,  $t_H$  be the time for computing the hash function. By assuming  $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \epsilon_3 \approx 2^{-n}$  and  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ , DWCDM is secured up to roughly  $q_m \approx 2^{2n/3}$  MAC queries and  $q_v \approx 2^n$  verification queries.

## 4.3 Nonce Misuse Security of DWCDM

Similar to EWCDM [14], one can prove that  $\text{DWCDM}[E, E^{-1}, H]$  is birthday bound secure MAC against nonce misuse adversaries. In particular, DWCDM is secure up to  $2^{n/2}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries against nonce misuse adversaries and that the security bound is essentially tight. More formally, we have the following MAC security result of DWCDM in nonce misuse setting.

**Theorem 3.** *Let  $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}$  and  $\mathcal{K}_h$  be finite and non-empty sets,  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher and  $H : \mathcal{K}_h \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be an  $\epsilon_1$  regular and  $\epsilon_2$  AXU hash function. Then, the MAC security of  $\text{DWCDM}[E, E^{-1}, H]$  in nonce misuse setting is given by*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) \leq \text{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + q_m^2\epsilon_2 + \frac{4q_m^2}{2^n} + q_m\epsilon_1 + \frac{(q_m + q_v)}{2^n},$$

where  $t' = O(t + q(q_m + q_v)t_H)$ ,  $t_H$  be the time for computing hash function.

By assuming  $\epsilon_1 \approx 2^{-n}$  and  $\epsilon_2 \approx 2^{-n}$ , DWCDM is secure up to roughly  $q_m \approx 2^{n/2}$  MAC queries and  $q_v \approx 2^n$  verification queries. For completeness of the paper, we present the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix A.

### Tightness of the Bound

We show that the above bound of DWCDM is tight by demonstrating a forging attack which shows that roughly  $2^{n/2}$  MAC queries are enough to break the MAC security of DWCDM when an adversary is allowed to repeat nonce only for once. The attack is as follows:

1. Adversary A makes  $q$  many MAC queries  $(N_i, M_i)$  with distinct nonces where a collision in the response, i.e.  $T_i = T_j$  for some  $i < j$  occurs.
2. Make a MAC query  $(N_j, M_i)$ . Let  $T_{q+1}$  be the response.
3. Forge with  $(N_i, M_j, T_{q+1})$ .

As  $\Pi(T_{q+1}) = \Pi(N_i) \oplus N_i \oplus H_{K_h}(M_j)$ ,  $(N_i, M_j, T_{q+1})$  is a valid forgery. If we make  $q = 2^{n/2}$  many queries, with very high probability, we will get a collision in step 1, and mount the attack. Note that, the attack does not exploit any specific properties of the hash function and a single time repetition of nonce makes the construction vulnerable above birthday bound security.

#### 4.4 nPolyMAC: An Instantiation of DWCDM

In this section, we propose nPolyMAC, an algebraic hash function based instantiation of DWCDM, as defined in Eqn. (4), as the underlying hash function of DWCDM construction.

PolyHash [25] is one of the popular examples of algebraic hash function. For a hash key  $K_h$  and a for a fixed message  $M$ , first we pad the message  $M$  with  $10^*$  such that the number of bits in it becomes multiple of  $n$ . Let the padded message be  $M^* = M_1 || M_2 || \dots || M_l$  where for each  $i$ ,  $|M_i| = n$ . Then we define

$$\text{Poly}_{K_h}(M) = M_l \cdot K_h \oplus M_{l-1} \cdot K_h^2 \oplus \dots \oplus M_1 \cdot K_h^l,$$

where  $l$  is the number of  $n$ -bit blocks.

It has already been shown in Proposition 1 that Poly is  $\ell/2^n$  3-way and 1-way regular hash function. Moreover, the AXU advantage of Poly is  $\ell/2^n$ . Following these results, we show in the following that nPolyMAC[Poly, E, E<sup>-1</sup>] is secure up to  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC and  $2^n$  verification queries against nonce respecting adversaries.

**Theorem 4.** *Let  $\mathcal{K}, \mathcal{K}_h$  and  $\mathcal{M}$  be three non-empty finite sets. Let  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher. Then, the MAC security of nPolyMAC in nonce respecting setting is given by*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{nPolyMAC}}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathbf{E}}^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + \frac{11q_m\ell}{2^{2n/3}} + \frac{3q_v\ell}{2^n},$$

where  $t' = O(t + (q_m + q_v)\ell)$ ,  $\ell$  be the maximum number of message blocks among all  $q$  queries.

The proof of the theorem directly follows from Proposition 1 and Theorem 2 with the assumption  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ .

## 5 Proof of Theorem 2

In this section, we prove Theorem 2. We would like to note that we will often refer to the construction  $\text{DWCDM}[\mathbf{E}, \mathbf{E}^{-1}, \mathbf{H}]$  as simply  $\text{DWCDM}$  where the underlying primitives are assumed to be understood.

As the first step of the proof, we replace  $\mathbf{E}_K$  and  $\mathbf{E}_K^{-1}$  with an  $n$ -bit uniform random permutation  $\Pi$  and its inverse  $\Pi^{-1}$  respectively both in the MAC and verification oracle of  $\text{DWCDM}$  and denote the construction as  $\text{DWCDM}^*[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}]$ . This conversion will add a term  $\text{Adv}_{\mathbf{E}}^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t')$  where  $t' = O(t + (q_m + q_v)t_H)$  and hence one simply has

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathbf{E}}^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + \underbrace{\text{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}^*}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t)}_{\delta^*}. \quad (7)$$

Now, our goal is to upper bound  $\delta^*$ . For doing this, we consider  $\text{TG}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}]$  be the tag generation and  $\text{VF}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}]$  be the verification oracle of  $\text{DWCDM}^*$  construction. We also consider that  $\text{Rand}$  be a perfect random oracle that on input  $(N, M) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \mathcal{M}$ , returns  $T$ , sampled uniformly at random from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , whereas  $\text{Rej}$  be an oracle with inputs  $(N, M, T)$ , returns always  $\perp$  (i.e. rejects). Now, due to [14, 19] we write

$$\delta^* := \max_{\mathbf{D}} \Pr[\mathbf{D}^{\text{TG}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}], \text{VF}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}]} = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{D}^{\text{Rand}, \text{Rej}} = 1],$$

where the maximum is taken over all non-trivial distinguishers  $\mathbf{D}$ . This formulation allows us to apply the H-Coefficient Technique [29], as we explain in more detail below, to prove

$$\delta^* \leq \frac{2q_m}{2^{2n/3}} + q_m \epsilon_1 + \frac{2q_m \epsilon_2}{2^{n/3}} + \max\{q_v \epsilon_1, 2q_v \epsilon_2, 2q_v \epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}\} + \frac{(q_m + q_v)}{2^n} + \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}}. \quad (8)$$

**H-COEFFICIENT TECHNIQUE.** From now on, we fix a non-trivial distinguisher  $\mathbf{D}$  that interacts with either (1) the real oracle ( $\text{TG}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}], \text{VF}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}]$ ) for a random permutation  $\Pi$ , its inverse  $\Pi^{-1}$  and a random hashing key  $K_h$  or (2) the ideal oracle ( $\text{Rand}, \text{Rej}$ ) making at most  $q_m$  queries to its left (MAC) oracle and at most  $q_v$  queries to its right (verification) oracle, and outputting a single bit. We let

$$\text{Adv}(\mathbf{D}) = \Pr[\mathbf{D}^{\text{TG}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}], \text{VF}[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \mathbf{H}_{K_h}]} = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{D}^{\text{Rand}, \text{Rej}} = 1].$$

We assume that  $\mathbf{D}$  is computationally unbounded and hence wlog deterministic and that it never repeats a query. Let

$$\tau_m := \{(N_1, M_1, T_1), (N_2, M_2, T_2), \dots, (N_{q_m}, M_{q_m}, T_{q_m})\}$$

be the list of MAC queries of  $\mathbf{D}$  and its corresponding responses. Note that, as  $\mathbf{D}$  is nonce respecting, there cannot be any repetition of triplet in  $\tau_m$ . Let also

$$\tau_v := \{(N'_1, M'_1, T'_1, b'_1), (N'_2, M'_2, T'_2, b'_2), \dots, (N'_{q_v}, M'_{q_v}, T'_{q_v}, b'_{q_v})\}$$

be the list of verification queries of  $D$  and its corresponding responses, where for all  $j$ ,  $b'_j \in \{\top, \perp\}$  denotes the accept ( $b'_j = \top$ ) or reject ( $b'_j = \perp$ ). The pair  $(\tau_m, \tau_v)$  constitutes the query transcript of the attack. For convenience, we slightly modify the experiment where we reveal to the distinguisher (after it made all its queries and obtains corresponding responses but before it output its decision) the hashing key  $K_h$ , if we are in the real world, or a uniformly random dummy key  $K_h$  if we are in the ideal world. All in all, the transcript of the attack is  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$  where  $\tau_m$  and  $\tau_v$  is the tuple of MAC and verification queries respectively. We will often simply name a tuple  $(N, M, T) \in \tau_m$  a *MAC query*, and a tuple  $(N', M', T', b) \in \tau_v$  a *verification query*.

A transcript  $\tau$  is said to be an *attainable* (with respect to  $D$ ) transcript if the probability to realize this transcript in ideal world is non-zero. For an attainable transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$ , any verification query  $(N'_i, M'_i, T'_i, b'_i) \in \tau_v$  is such that  $b'_i = \perp$ . We denote  $\Theta$  to be the set of all attainable transcripts and  $X_{\text{re}}$  and  $X_{\text{id}}$  denotes the probability distribution of transcript  $\tau$  induced by the real world and ideal world respectively. In the following we state the main lemma of the H-coefficient technique (see e.g. [12] for the proof).

**Lemma 1.** *Let  $D$  be a fixed deterministic distinguisher and  $\Theta = \Theta_g \sqcup \Theta_b$  (disjoint union) be some partition of the set of all attainable transcripts. Suppose there exists  $\epsilon_{\text{ratio}} \geq 0$  such that for any  $\tau \in \Theta_g$ ,*

$$\frac{\Pr[X_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[X_{\text{id}} = \tau]} \geq 1 - \epsilon_{\text{ratio}},$$

*and there exists  $\epsilon_{\text{bad}} \geq 0$  such that  $\Pr[X_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \epsilon_{\text{bad}}$ . Then,  $\mathbf{Adv}(D) \leq \epsilon_{\text{ratio}} + \epsilon_{\text{bad}}$ .*

The remaining of the proof of Theorem 2 is structured as follows: in section 5.1 we define the transcript graph; in section. 5.2 we define bad transcripts and upper bound their probability in the ideal world; in section 5.3, we analyze good transcripts and prove that they are almost as likely in the real and the ideal world. Theorem 2 follows easily by combining Lemma 1, Eqn. (7) and (8) above, and Lemmas 3 and 4 proven below.


## 5.1 Transcript Graph

Given a transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$ , we define the following two types of graphs: (a) MAC Graph and (b) Verification Graph.

**MAC GRAPH.** Given a transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$ , we define the *MAC graph*, denoted as  $G_\tau^m$  as follows:

$$G_\tau^m = ([q_m], E^m) \text{ where } E^m = \{(i, j) \in [q_m] \times [q_m] : N_i = T_j \vee N_j = T_i \vee T_i = T_j\}.$$

For the sake of convenience, we denote the edge  $(i, j)$  as a dotted line when  $T_i = T_j$ , else we denote it as a continuous line. Thus, the edge set of  $G_\tau^m$  consists



**Fig. 5.1.** Different types of edges of MAC and Verification Graphs. (a) :  $N_i = T_j/T_i = N_j$ , (b) :  $T_i = T_j$ , (c) :  $N_i = N_j$ .

of two different types of edges as depicted in Fig. 5.1 (a) and (b). Note that, for a MAC graph we cannot have edges of type (c).

Given such a MAC graph, we can partition the set of vertices in the following way: if vertex  $i$  and  $j$  are connected by an edge then they belong to the same partition. Each partition is called a component of the graph and the number of vertices in the component is called its size, which we denote as  $\zeta$ .

**VERIFICATION GRAPH.** Given a MAC graph  $G_\tau^m$ , we define *Verification graph*, denoted as  $G_\tau^v$ , by extending  $G_\tau^m$  with adding one more vertex and at most two edges for incorporating a verification query as follows: For convenience, we reorder the set of MAC queries and verification queries so that all verification queries appears after all MAC queries. Therefore, after such a reordering,  $j$ -th verification query becomes  $(q_m + j)$ -th verification query. Let  $(q_m + j)$ -th verification query be  $(N'_{q_m+j}, M'_{q_m+j}, T'_{q_m+j}, b'_{q_m+j}) \in \tau_v$  and  $G_\tau^m$  be the MAC graph corresponding to  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$ . Then we define  $G_\tau^v = ([q_m] \cup \{q_m + j\}, E^v)$  where  $E^v$  is defined as follows:

$$E^v = E^m \cup \{(q_m+j, r), (q_m+j, s) : r \neq s \in [q_m] \text{ such that either of (1)-(4) holds}\}.$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (1) N'_{q_m+j} = N_r \wedge T'_{q_m+j} = N_s \\ (2) N'_{q_m+j} = N_r \wedge T'_{q_m+j} = T_s \\ (3) N'_{q_m+j} = T_r \wedge T'_{q_m+j} = N_s \\ (4) N'_{q_m+j} = T_r \wedge T'_{q_m+j} = T_s \end{array} \right.$$

**Definition 2 (Valid Cycle).** A cycle  $C = (i_1, i_2, \dots, i_p)$  of length  $p$  in the MAC graph  $G_\tau^m$  is said to be valid if the imposed equality pattern of  $(N, T)$ , generated out of  $C$ , derives

$$\mathbf{0} = \bigoplus_{i \in C} \left( N_i \oplus H_{K_h}(M_i) \right)$$

equation from the given system of equations.

Similar to the definition of valid cycle of MAC graph, one can define the valid cycle for the Verification graph also. Note that, the definition of valid cycle in MAC graph or verification graph actually resembles to the alternating cycle as stated in section. 3.1. Now, we make an important observations about the MAC queries (in ideal oracle) as follows:

**Lemma 2.** For two MAC queries  $i, j$ , we have

$$(a) \text{ if } i < j, \Pr[T_j = N_i] = \frac{1}{2^n}; \quad (b) \text{ if } i > j, \Pr[T_j = N_i] = \frac{1}{2^{n/3}}.$$

**Proof.** Proof of the first result holds due to the randomness of  $T_j$ , i.e a randomly sampled value  $T_j$  is equal to a fixed nonce value  $N_i$  holds with probability  $2^{-n}$ . For the later one, condition  $i > j$  ensures that one can set the nonce value  $N_i$  to a previously sampled tag value  $T_j$ . But this would be valid only when the last  $n/3$  bits of  $T_i$  are all zero, probability of which is  $2^{-n/3}$ .  $\square$

## 5.2 Definition and Probability of Bad Transcripts

In this section, we define and bound the probability of bad transcript in ideal world. But, before that we first briefly justify the reason about our identified bad events and there after we define the bad transcript accordingly.

Let  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$  be an attainable transcript. Then, for all MAC queries  $(N_i, M_i, T_i)$  in real oracle, we have

$$i \in \{1, \dots, q_m\}, \Pi(N_i) \oplus \Pi(T_i) = N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i).$$

Moreover, for all verification queries  $(N'_a, M'_a, T'_a, b_a)$  in real oracle, we have

$$a \in \{1, \dots, q_v\}, \Pi(N'_a) \oplus \Pi(T'_a) \neq N'_a \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M'_a).$$

We refer to the system of equations as ‘‘MAC Equations’’ which involve only the MAC queries. Similarly, we refer to the system of non-equations as ‘‘Verification non-equations’’ which involve only the verification queries.

Therefore, from a given attainable transcript  $\tau$ , one can write exactly  $q_m$  many affine equations and  $q_v$  many non-equations. Now, as one needs to lower bound the number of solutions of this system of equations and non-equations (for analyzing the real interpolation probability), it essentially leads us to the model of extended Mirror theory where the equivalence of two set up is established as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \phi'(n_i) = N_i, \phi'(t_i) = T_i, \lambda_i = N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i), i \in \{1, \dots, q_m\} \\ \phi'(n_a) = N'_a, \phi'(t_a) = T'_a, \lambda'_a = N'_a \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M'_a), a \in \{1, \dots, q_v\} \end{cases}$$

Recall that,  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  where  $\Lambda' = (\lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_{q_m}, \lambda'_1, \dots, \lambda'_{q_v})$ , was characterized to be bad if either of the following holds:

- (i)  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(t_i)$ .
- (ii) -  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(n_j)$  and  $\phi(t_i) = \phi(t_j)$   
-  $\phi(n_i) = \phi(t_j)$  and  $\phi(t_i) = \phi(n_j)$  for  $i \neq j \in [q_m]$ .
- (iii) there is an alternating cycle.

(iv) for all  $j \in [q_v]$  and  $i_1, \dots, i_c \in [q_m]$ ,  $c \geq 0$ , such that  $\{i_1, \dots, i_c, q_m + j\}$  is dependent system then  $\lambda_{i_1} \oplus \dots \oplus \lambda_{i_c} \oplus \lambda'_j = \mathbf{0}$ .

where  $\phi = \phi'_{|q_m}$ . Therefore, with the help of equivalence of two set up as established above, we justify our identified bad events:

- (i)  $\Rightarrow N_i = T_i$
- (ii)  $\Rightarrow$  existence of a valid cycle in the MAC graph  $G_\tau^m$ .
- (iii)  $\Rightarrow N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j)$ ,  $T_i = T_j$  or  $N_i = T_j$ ,  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j)$  such that  $i \neq j \in [q_m]$ .

Moreover, recall that while considering the non-equation then we considered that any of  $q_v$  non-equations can be determined from a subset of  $q_m$  many affine equations with their corresponding sum of  $\lambda$  constant becomes zero, which is to say that

- the verification graph  $G_\tau^v$  contains any valid cycle.

Summarizing above, we now define the bad transcript.

**Definition 3.** A transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$  is said to be bad if the associated MAC graph  $G_\tau^m$  and the Verification graph  $G_\tau^v$  satisfies the either of the following properties:

- B0 :  $\exists i \in [q_m]$  such that  $T_i = \mathbf{0}$ .
- B1 :  $G_\tau^m$  has a component of size 3 or more.
- B2 :  $G_\tau^m$  contains a valid cycle of any arbitrary length that also includes the self loop (that implicitly takes care of the condition  $N_i = T_i$ ).
- B3 :  $G_\tau^v$  contains a valid cycle of any arbitrary length that involves the verification query.

Moreover,  $\tau$  is also said to be bad if

- B4 :  $\exists i \neq j \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j)$ ,  $T_i = T_j$ .
- B5 :  $\exists i \neq j \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i = T_j$ ,  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j)$ .
- B6 :  $\exists i \in [q_m]$  such that  $\mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_i$ .

Condition B1 actually imposes a restriction on the block maximality as we do not allow to have a larger component size for a good transcript. Condition B6 ensures that for a good transcript, all the elements of the tuple  $(N_1 \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_1), \dots, N_{q_m} \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_{q_m}))$  are non-zero. Note that, if we do not consider the condition B6, then for a good attainable transcript the real interpolation probability would become zero.

We denote  $\Theta_b \subseteq \Theta$  be the set of all attainable bad transcripts and the event B denotes  $\mathbf{B} := \mathbf{B0} \vee \mathbf{B1} \vee \mathbf{B2} \vee \mathbf{B3} \vee \mathbf{B4} \vee \mathbf{B5} \vee \mathbf{B6}$ , We bound the probability of event B in ideal world as follows:

**Lemma 3.** Let  $X_{\text{id}}$  and  $\Theta_b$  be defined as above. If  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$  and  $q_v \leq 2^n$ , then

$$\Pr[X_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \epsilon_{\text{bad}} = \frac{2q_m}{2^{2n/3}} + \frac{q_m}{2^n} + q_m \epsilon_1 + \frac{2q_m \epsilon_2}{2^{n/3}} + \max \left\{ q_v \epsilon_1, 2q_v \epsilon_2, 2q_v \epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}} \right\}.$$

Proof of this lemma is deferred to section 5.4.

### 5.3 Analysis of Good Transcripts

In this section, we show that for a good transcript  $\tau$ , realizing  $\tau$  is almost as likely in the real world as in the ideal world. Formally, we prove the following lemma.

**Lemma 4.** *Let  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$  be a good transcript. Then*

$$\frac{\mathbf{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\mathbf{p}_{\text{id}}(\tau)} := \frac{\Pr[X_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[X_{\text{id}} = \tau]} \geq (1 - \epsilon_{\text{ratio}}) = \left(1 - \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{q_v}{2^n}\right).$$

**Proof.** Consider the good transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$ . Since in the ideal world the MAC oracle is perfectly random and the verification always rejects, one simply has

$$\mathbf{p}_{\text{id}} := \Pr[X_{\text{id}} = \tau] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{nq_m}} \quad (9)$$

We must now lower bound the probability of getting  $\tau$  in real world. We say that a permutation  $\Pi$  is compatible with  $\tau_m$  if

$$\forall i \in [q_m], \Pi(N_i) \oplus \Pi(T_i) = \underbrace{N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i)}_{\lambda_i}$$

and we say that it is compatible with  $\tau_v$  if

$$\forall a \in [q_v], \Pi(N'_a) \oplus \Pi(T'_a) \neq \underbrace{N'_a \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M'_a)}_{\lambda'_a}.$$

We simply say that  $\Pi$  is compatible with  $\tau$  if it is compatible with  $\tau_m$  and  $\tau_v$ . We denote  $\text{Comp}(\tau)$  the set of permutations that are compatible with  $\tau$ . Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau) &= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \Pr[\Pi \leftarrow \text{Perm} : \Pi \in \text{Comp}(\tau)] \\ &= \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \underbrace{\Pr[\Pi(N_i) \oplus \Pi(T_i) = \lambda_i, \forall i \in [q_m], \Pi(N'_a) \oplus \Pi(T'_a) \neq \lambda'_a, \forall a \in [q_v]]}_{\mathbf{P}_{mv}} \end{aligned}$$

**LOWER BOUNDING  $\mathbf{P}_{mv}$ :** Observe that lower bounding  $\mathbf{P}_{mv}$  implies lower bounding the probability of the number of solutions to the following system of  $q_m$  many equations and  $q_v$  many non-equations:

$$(\mathcal{E}_m) = \begin{cases} \Pi(N_1) \oplus \Pi(T_1) = \lambda_1 \\ \Pi(N_2) \oplus \Pi(T_2) = \lambda_2 \\ \vdots \\ \Pi(N_{q_m}) \oplus \Pi(T_{q_m}) = \lambda_{q_m} \end{cases} \quad (\mathcal{E}_v) = \begin{cases} \Pi(N'_1) \oplus \Pi(T'_1) \neq \lambda'_1 \\ \Pi(N'_2) \oplus \Pi(T'_2) \neq \lambda'_2 \\ \vdots \\ \Pi(N'_{q_v}) \oplus \Pi(T'_{q_v}) = \lambda'_{q_v} \end{cases}$$

Let us assume the distinct number of random variables in the above set of equations is  $\alpha$ . As the transcript  $\tau$  is good, we have the following properties:



- (i) all  $\lambda_i$  values are non-zero (otherwise condition B6 is satisfied).
- (ii)  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  is good.
- (iii) Finally, block maximality  $\xi_{\max}$  is 3.

Above properties enable us directly to apply Theorem 1 to lower bound  $P_{mv}$  as follows:

$$P_{mv} \geq \frac{1}{2^{nq_m}} \left( 1 - \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{q_v}{2^n} \right) \quad (10)$$

Therefore, from Eqn. (10), we have

$$P_{\text{re}}(\tau) \geq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{nq_m}} \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{q_v}{2^n} \right) \quad (11)$$

Finally, taking the ratio of Eqn. (11) to Eqn. (9), the result follows.  $\square$

#### 5.4 Proof of Lemma 3

In order to bound  $\Pr[X_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b]$ , it is enough to bound  $\Pr[\mathbf{B}]$ . Therefore, we write

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B}] \leq \sum_{v \in \{0,1,4,5,6\}} \Pr[\mathbf{B}v] + \Pr[\mathbf{B}2 \mid \overline{\mathbf{B}1}] + \Pr[\mathbf{B}3 \mid \overline{\mathbf{B}0} \wedge \overline{\mathbf{B}1} \wedge \overline{\mathbf{B}2}] \quad (12)$$

In the following, we bound the probabilities of all the bad events individually.


**Bounding B0.** Event B0 occurs if there exists a MAC query whose response is all zero. For a fixed MAC query, the probability of this event in ideal world is  $2^{-n}$  as the responses are sampled uniformly and independently to all other sampled random variables. Now, varying over all such MAC queries we obtain the bound to be

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B}0] \leq \frac{q_m}{2^n} \quad (13)$$

**Bounding B1.** Event B1 occurs if there exists a component of size at least 3 in  $G_\tau^m$ . This essentially implies there is a chain of two edges. Depending on whether the edges are dotted (Dot) or continuous (Con), there are three possible choices of components: components with both the edges being dotted, components with one dotted and one continuous edge and component with both continuous edges. We analyze each of them one by one:

(Dot-Dot) COMPONENT.  $\exists i, j, k \in [q_m]$  such that  $T_i = T_j = T_k$ . For a fixed set of  $i, j, k \in [q_m]$ , this event is bounded by  $2^{-2n}$  as each  $T_i$  is sampled uniformly at random from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . Summing over all possible choices of  $i, j$  and  $k$ , we obtain the bound  $\frac{q_m^3}{6 \cdot 2^{2n}} \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$ , assuming  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ .

(Dot-Con) COMPONENT.  $\exists i, j, k \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i = T_j = T_k$ . For a fixed set of  $i, j$  and  $k$ ,  $T_j = T_k$  is bounded by  $2^{-n}$ . Now, we have the following two sub cases: (a) if  $j > i$  then from Lemma 2, probability of  $N_i = T_j$  is bounded by



**Fig. 5.2.** Different components of size of three. (a)  $T_i = T_j = T_k$ , (b)  $T_i = T_j = N_k$  or  $T_i = T_j, N_j = T_k$  and (c)  $N_i = T_j, N_j = T_k$  or  $T_i = N_j, T_j = N_k$ .

$2^{-n}$  and thus the overall probability becomes  $2^{-2n}$ . Summing over all possible choices of  $i, j, k$ , we obtain  $\frac{q_m^3}{6 \cdot 2^{2n}}$ . (b) if  $j < i$  then from Lemma 2, probability of  $N_i = T_j$  is bounded by  $2^{-n/3}$ . Hence the overall probability becomes  $2^{-4n/3}$ . In this case, choice of  $i$  is 1 and that of  $j$  and  $k$  is at most  $q_m$ . Therefore, summing over all possible choices of  $i, j, k$  we have  $\frac{q_m^2}{2 \cdot 2^{4n/3}} \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$ , assuming  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ .

(Con-Con) COMPONENT.  $\exists i, j, k \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i = T_j, N_j = T_k$ . We bound this event using different sub cases. (a) when  $i < j < k$ , then due to Lemma 2, we obtain  $2^{-2n}$  bound and varying over all possible choices of  $i, j, k$ , we obtain  $\frac{q_m^3}{2^{2n}}$  bound. (b) when  $i < j$  and  $j > k$ , then we obtain  $2^{-4n/3}$  bound, but there is exactly one choice of  $j$  and  $q_m$  many choices for  $i$  and  $k$ . Hence, by summing over all possible choices of  $i, j, k$  we obtain  $\frac{q_m^2}{2^{4n/3}} \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$  bound. (c)  $i > j, j < k$  is similar to case (b) and finally (d) when  $i > j > k$ , then due to Lemma 2, probability of the event is bounded by  $2^{2n/3}$  and there is exactly one choice of  $i$  and  $j$ , leaving  $q_m$  choices for  $k$  which eventually gives  $\frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$  bound.

For each of the above cases, we obtain the maximum bound to be  $\frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$  and therefore, we have

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B1}] \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}. \quad (14)$$

**Bounding B2**  $\overline{\mathbf{B1}}$ : Recall that event B2 holds if there exists any cycle in  $G_\tau^m$ . But, as we conditioned on  $\overline{\mathbf{B1}}$ , it is enough to bound the existence of a cycle of length one (self loop) and two (parallel edges).

SELF LOOP. A self loop or cycle of length 1 in  $G_\tau^m$  implies that  $\exists i \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i = T_i$ . For a fixed choice of  $i$ , probability of  $N_i = T_i$  is bounded by  $2^{-n}$  due to randomness of  $T_i$ . Summing over all choices of  $i$ , we obtain  $\frac{q_m}{2^n}$  bound.



**Fig. 5.3.** (a) Self Loop: when  $N_i = T_i$ , (b) Parallel Edges:  $N_i = T_j, N_j = T_i$ .

PARALLEL EDGES. A parallel edge or cycle of length 2 in  $G_\tau^m$  implies that  $\exists i \neq j \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i = T_j, N_j = T_i$ . For a fixed choice of  $i, j$  (without loss


of generality we assume  $i < j$ ), probability of  $N_i = T_j, N_j = T_i$  is bounded by  $2^{-4n/3}$ . This is because of Lemma 2, the probability of  $N_i = T_j$  is bounded by  $2^{-n}$  and the probability of  $N_j = T_i$  is bounded by  $2^{-n/3}$ . As there exists only one choice of  $j$  and  $q_m$  many choices of  $i$ , summing over all possible choices of  $i$  and  $j$ , we obtain  $\frac{q_m}{2^{4n/3}} \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$  bound.

From the above two cases, we obtain the maximum bound to be  $\frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$  and thus we write

$$\Pr[\text{B2} \mid \overline{\text{B1}}] \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}. \quad (15)$$

**Bounding B3** |  $\overline{\text{B0}} \wedge \overline{\text{B1}} \wedge \overline{\text{B2}}$ . Recall that event B3 holds if there exists any cycle in  $G_\tau^v$  and the sum of the corresponding  $N \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M)$  is zero. But, as we conditioned on  $\overline{\text{B0}} \wedge \overline{\text{B1}} \wedge \overline{\text{B2}}$ , it is enough to bound the existence of a cycle of length one two and three.

**SELF LOOP.** A self loop or cycle of length 1 in  $G_\tau^v$  implies that  $\exists a \in [q_v]$  such that  $N'_a = T'_a$  and  $\text{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = N'_a$ . Note that, for a fixed choice of  $a$ , the above event holds with probability at most  $\epsilon_1$  as we assume the hash function is  $\epsilon_1$  regular. Summing over all choices of  $a$ , we obtain  $q_v \epsilon_1$  bound.



**Fig. 5.4.** (a) Self Loop: when  $N'_a = T'_a$ , (b) Parallel Edges: (b.1)  $N'_a = N_i, T'_a = T_i$ , (b.2)  $N'_a = T_i, T'_a = N_i$ . Node with concentric circle denotes the verification query node.

**PARALLEL EDGES.** A parallel edge or cycle of length 2 in  $G_\tau^v$  implies that the edges would be (i) one dashed (Dash) and one dotted (Dot) or (ii) both continuous (Con-Con). Formally  $\exists i \in [q_m], a \in [q_v]$  :

$$\begin{cases} \text{(Dot-Dash)} : N_i = N'_a, T_i = T'_a, \text{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = N_i \oplus N'_a \\ \text{(Con-Con)} : N'_a = T_i, T'_a = N_i, \text{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = N_i \oplus N'_a \end{cases}$$

- **Bounding (Dot-Dash) Edges.** For a fixed choice of  $i$  and  $a$ , probability of  $N_i = N'_a, T_i = T'_a, \text{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = N_i \oplus N'_a$  is bounded by  $\epsilon_2$  due to the randomness of hash key  $K_h$  (note that  $M_i \neq M'_a$ , as we have assumed a non-trivial distinguisher). As there exists only one choice of  $i$  for which the above probability is bounded by  $\epsilon_2$ , summing over all possible choices of  $i$  and  $a$ , we obtain the bound  $q_v \epsilon_2$ .
- **Bounding (Con-Con) Edges.** Similarly, for a fixed choice of  $i, a$ , probability of  $N'_a = T_i, T'_a = N_i, \text{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = N_i \oplus N'_a$  is bounded by  $\epsilon_2$  due to the randomness of hash key  $K_h$ . Note that, in this case there exists only

two choices of  $i$  (as we have at most two collision of  $T$ ) for which the above probability is bounded by  $\epsilon_2$ . Summing over all possible choices of  $i$  and  $a$ , we obtain the bound  $2q_v\epsilon_2$ .


Thus, we see from the above two cases that the probability of forming a parallel edge is bounded by  $2q_v\epsilon_2$ .

**CLOSED TRIANGLE.** For the case of a closed triangle, it has the following restrictions on the edges: (a) maximum one edge can be dashed and if exist, it must contain the verification node  $a$ , (b) maximum one edge can be dotted (otherwise there exists a self loop or parallel edges). These restrictions impose the following properties on the closed triangle:

- if  $(i, j)$ -th edge is dotted, then the other edges must be one dashed and one continuous.
- if  $(i, j)$ -th edge is continuous, then there must be a dashed edge.

Hence, a closed triangle or cycle of length 3 in  $G_\tau^v$  implies that  $\exists i, j \in [q_m], a \in [q_v]$  such that either of the following holds:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{(Con-Dash-Dot)} : N_i = T_j, N'_a = N_j, T'_a = T_i \text{ and} \\ \quad H_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus H_{K_h}(M_j) \oplus H_{K_h}(M'_a) = T_j \\ \text{(Con-Con-Con)} : N_i = T_j, T'_a = N_j, N'_a = T_i \text{ and} \\ \quad H_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus H_{K_h}(M_j) \oplus H_{K_h}(M'_a) = T_i \oplus T_j \oplus T'_a. \\ \text{(Dot-Dash-Con)} : T_i = T_j, N'_a = N_j, T'_a = N_i \text{ and} \\ \quad H_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus H_{K_h}(M_j) \oplus H_{K_h}(M'_a) = T_i \end{array} \right.$$



**Fig. 5.5.** Cycles of length 3 including the verification query which is denoted by the concentric circle node.

We bound each of these events for a fixed choice of  $i, j$  and  $a$ .

- **Bounding (Con-Dash-Dot) Triangle.** For a fixed choice of  $i, j, a$ , probability of the event is bounded by  $\epsilon_3$  using the randomness of the hash key as we have assumed the hash function is  $\epsilon_3$  3-way regular (note that we have conditioned on  $\overline{B0}$  and therefore  $T_j \neq \mathbf{0}$ ). Note that, choice of  $j$  and  $i$  is one and two respectively. Hence, summing over all possible choices of indices, we obtain the bound to be  $2q_v\epsilon_3$ .

- **Bounding (Con-Con-Con) Triangle.** We analyze this case in two different subcases:
  - (a) For a fixed choice of  $i, j$  and  $a$ , if  $N_j \neq T_i \oplus T_j$ , then  $\mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) \neq \mathbf{0}$  and thus we can bound the event by  $\epsilon_3$ . In this case, choices of  $i$  and  $j$  is 2 an 1 respectively and hence we obtain the bound to be  $2q_v\epsilon_3$ .
  - (b) For a fixed choice of  $i, j$  and  $a$ , if  $N_j = T_i \oplus T_j$ , then  $\mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = \mathbf{0}$  and in that case we again consider two different sub cases: (i) if  $i < j$ , then  $T_j = N_i$  holds with probability  $2^{-n}$  and  $T_i$  is to be valid (i.e. last  $n/3$  bits of  $T_i$  has to be zero), which holds with probability  $2^{-n/3}$ . Moreover, number of choices of  $i$  and  $j$  in this case is  $q_m$  and thus we obtain the bound to be  $\frac{q_m^2}{2^{4n/3}} \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$ , assuming  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ . (ii) If  $i > j$ , then  $T_j = N_i$  holds with probability  $2^{-n}$  and  $T_i$  should be  $N_i \oplus N_j$  which holds with probability  $2^{-n}$ . In this case, number of choices of  $j$  is  $q_m$  and  $i$  in 1, resulting in probability of the event to be bounded by  $\frac{q_m}{2^{4n/3}} \leq \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}$ .
- **Bounding (Dot-Dash-Con) Triangle.** For a fixed choice of  $i, j$  and  $a$ , the probability of the event is bounded by  $\epsilon_3$  as  $\mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M'_a) = T_i$  holds with probability at most  $\epsilon_3$  (by the assumption that the hash function is  $\epsilon_3$  3-way regular). Note that, in this case choice of  $j$  and  $i$  is one. Hence, summing over all possible choices of indices, we obtain the bound to be  $q_v\epsilon_3$ .

Therefore, we see that for all the above cases, the maximum probability of forming a closed triangle in  $G_\tau^v$  is  $\max\{2q_v\epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}\}$ .

Therefore, we see from all of the above cases the maximum probability of forming a cycle in  $G_\tau^v$  is  $\max\{2q_v\epsilon_3, 2q_v\epsilon_2, q_v\epsilon_1, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}\}$ . Thus, we have

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B3} \mid \overline{\mathbf{B0}} \wedge \overline{\mathbf{B1}} \wedge \overline{\mathbf{B2}}] \leq \max\{2q_v\epsilon_3, 2q_v\epsilon_2, q_v\epsilon_1, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}\}. \quad (16)$$

**Bounding B4:** Recall that, the event **B4** holds if  $\exists i \neq j \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j), T_i = T_j$ . Since, in the ideal oracle the hash key is sampled independent to all previously sampled MAC responses  $T_i$ , we write

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B4}] \leq \sum_{i,j} \Pr[\mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j) = N_i \oplus N_j] \cdot \Pr[T_i = T_j] \leq \frac{q_m^2 \cdot \epsilon_2}{2^n} \stackrel{(1)}{\leq} \frac{q_m \epsilon_2}{2^{n/3}}, \quad (17)$$

where (1) follows due to the assumption  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ .

**Bounding B5:** Recall that, the event **B5** holds if  $\exists i \neq j \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j), N_i = T_j$ . Now, we consider two sub cases:

- (a) for fixed  $i$  and  $j$  if  $i < j$ , then  $N_i = T_j$  holds with probability  $2^{-n}$  (due to Lemma 2) and  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j)$  holds with probability  $\epsilon_2$ . Summing over all possible choices of  $i$  and  $j$  we obtain the bound to be  $\frac{q_m^2 \epsilon_2}{2^n}$ .

- (b) When  $i > j$ , then  $N_i = T_j$  holds with probability  $2^{-n/3}$  (due to Lemma 2) and as before  $N_i \oplus H_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus H_{K_h}(M_j)$  holds with probability  $\epsilon_2$ . In this case, possible choices of  $i$  and  $j$  is 1 and  $q_m$  respectively and therefore by summing over all possible choices of indices, we obtain the bound to be  $\frac{q_m \epsilon_2}{2^{n/3}}$ .

By assuming  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ , from each of the above cases we have

$$\Pr[\text{B5}] \leq \frac{q_m \epsilon_2}{2^{n/3}}. \quad (18)$$

**Bounding B6:** Recall that, the event B6 holds if  $\exists i \in [q_m]$  such that  $N_i = H_{K_h}(M_i)$ . For a fixed  $i \in [q_m]$ , the event holds with probability  $\epsilon_1$  due to the regular property of the hash function. Summing over all choices of  $i$ , we obtain the bound

$$\Pr[\text{B6}] \leq q_m \epsilon_1. \quad (19)$$

Finally, by assuming  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ , Lemma 3 follows from Eqn. (22)-(19).  $\square$

## 6 1K-DWCDM : A Single Keyed DWCDM

Recall that, our proposed construction DWCDM is instantiated with a hash function and a block cipher where the hash key is independent to block cipher keys, leading to have a two-keyed (counting hash key separately from block cipher keys) nonce based MAC. In this section, we transform the DWCDM construction to a purely single keyed construction by setting the underlying hash key  $K_h$  to the encryption of  $\mathbf{1}$  (i.e.  $K_h := E_K(\mathbf{1})$ ) and argue that the modified construction (that we call as 1K-DWCDM) is secure.

Now, we state and prove that 1K-DWCDM is secure up to  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC queries and  $2^n$  verification queries against all nonce respecting adversaries. We mainly focus on the nonce respecting security of the construction, as its nonce misuse security is very similar to that of DWCDM and hence we skip it.

**Theorem 5.** *Let  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{K}$  be finite and non-empty sets. Let  $E : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher and  $H : E_K(\mathbf{1}) \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be an  $\epsilon_1$  regular,  $\epsilon_2$  AXU and  $\epsilon_3$  3-way regular hash function. Then, the MAC advantage of 1K-DWCDM is given by:*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{1\text{K-DWCDM}[E, E^{-1}, H]}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) &\leq \text{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + \frac{3q_m}{2^{2n/3}} + \frac{q_m^2 \epsilon_2}{2^n} + \frac{q_v}{2^n - 1} \\ &\quad + \max\{q_v \epsilon_1, 2q_v \epsilon_2, 2q_v \epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}}\} + q_v \epsilon_1 + \frac{q_m}{2^n} + \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}}, \end{aligned}$$

where  $t' = O(t + (q_m + q_v)t_H)$ ,  $t_H$  being the time for computing hash function. Assuming  $\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2$  and  $\epsilon_3 \approx 2^{-n}$  and  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$ , 1K-DWCDM $[E, E^{-1}, H]$  construction is secured up to roughly  $2^{2n/3}$  MAC and  $2^n$  verification queries.

**Proof.** The proof approach is similar to the one used in Theorem 2. Using standard argument, we can replace  $E_K$  and  $E_K^{-1}$  with  $n$ -bit uniform random permutation  $\Pi$  and its inverse  $\Pi^{-1}$ , denote the construction as  $1K\text{-DWCDM}^*[\Pi, E^{-1}, H]$  and bound the following:

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{1K\text{-DWCDM}^*[\Pi, E^{-1}, H]}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + \underbrace{\mathbf{Adv}_{1K\text{-DWCDM}^*[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, H]}^{\text{MAC}}(\mathbf{A})}_{\delta^*}. \quad (20)$$

Now, our goal is to prove the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta^* &\leq \frac{3q_m}{2^{2n/3}} + \frac{q_m^2 \epsilon_2}{2^n} + \max \left\{ q_v \epsilon_1, 2q_v \epsilon_2, 2q_v \epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}} \right\} \\ &\quad + q_v \epsilon_1 + \frac{q_m}{2^n} + \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}} + \frac{q_v}{2^n - 1}, \end{aligned} \quad (21)$$

which we will do by applying H-Coefficient Technique in a similar way as we did in proving Theorem 2. For this, we first define the ideal oracle (Rand, Rej) which works as follows: for each MAC query  $(N, M)$ , it samples the response  $T$  from  $\{0, 1\}^n$  uniformly at random and returns it to the distinguisher and for each verification query it returns  $\perp$ . For convenience, we slightly modify the experiment where we reveal to the distinguisher (after it made all its queries and obtains corresponding responses but before it output its decision) the hashing key  $K_h$  which is  $E_K(\mathbf{1})$ , if we are in the real world, or a uniformly random dummy key  $K_h$ , sampled uniformly at random from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , if we are in the ideal world. All in all, the transcript of the attack is  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$  where  $\tau_m$  and  $\tau_v$  is the tuple of MAC and verification queries respectively.

**Bad Transcript.** The definition of bad transcript is similar to that of defined in section 5.2 and therefore, we have the following result:

Let  $X_{\text{id}}$  and  $\Theta_b$  be defined as above. If  $q_m \leq 2^{2n/3}$  and  $q_v \leq 2^n$ , then

$$\Pr[X_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \frac{3q_m}{2^{2n/3}} + \frac{q_m^2 \epsilon_2}{2^n} + \max \left\{ q_v \epsilon_1, 2q_v \epsilon_2, 2q_v \epsilon_3, \frac{q_m}{2^{2n/3}} \right\} + q_v \epsilon_1 + \frac{q_m}{2^n}. \quad (22)$$

**Analysis of Good Transcripts.** Similar to Lemma 4, we prove that for any good transcript  $\tau$ , realizing  $\tau$  is almost as likely as real and in the ideal world. As the transcript  $\tau$  is good, each sampled  $T_i$  value is non-zero. Since, in the ideal world the MAC oracle is perfectly random and the verification always rejects, one simply has

$$p_{\text{id}} := \Pr[X_{\text{id}} = \tau] = \frac{1}{2^n} \cdot \frac{1}{(2^n - 1)^{q_m}} \quad (23)$$

Now, for the real interpolation probability, we have

$$\Pr[\Pi(N_i) \oplus \Pi(T_i) = \lambda_i, \forall i \in [q_m] \text{ and } \Pi(N'_a) \oplus \Pi(T'_a) \neq \lambda'_a, \forall a \in [q_v]].$$

Additionally, if the adversary makes any verification query  $(N'_a, M'_a, T'_a)$  with tag  $T'_a$  set to  $\mathbf{1}$ , then we need to ensure that

$$\Pi(N'_a) \neq \underbrace{\Pi(\mathbf{1}) \oplus N'_a \oplus \mathbf{H}_{\Pi(\mathbf{1})}(M'_a)}_{\lambda'_a}, \forall a \in [q_v]. \quad (24)$$

Since, the hash key, i.e.  $\Pi(\mathbf{1})$ , is revealed to the adversary after the interaction is over, the right hand side of the non-Eqn. (24) becomes a constant, which makes it a uni-variate affine non-equation and then it is satisfied by condition (c) of Theorem 1. Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau) &= \frac{1}{2^n} \cdot \Pr[\Pi(N_i) \oplus \Pi(T_i) = \lambda_i, \forall i \in [q_m], \Pi(N'_a) \oplus \Pi(T'_a) \neq \lambda'_a, \\ &\quad \Pi(N'_a) \neq \lambda'_a, \forall a \in [q_v]] \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2^n} \cdot \frac{1}{(2^n - 1)^{q_m}} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{q_v}{2^n - 1}\right) \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

The last inequality follows using similar to the proof of Lemma 4 and Eqn. (10). Finally, from Eqn. (23) and Eqn. (25), we compute the ratio as follows:

$$\frac{\mathbf{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\mathbf{p}_{\text{id}}(\tau)} \geq \left(1 - \frac{5q_m^3}{2^{2n}} - \frac{q_v}{2^n - 1}\right). \quad (26)$$

Eqn. (21) follows from Eqn. (22) and Eqn. (26). Finally, Theorem 5 follows from Eqn. (20) and Eqn. (21).  $\square$

## 7 Towards Higher Security of DWCDM

In this section, we briefly describe how to boost the security of DWCDM upto  $(k-1)/k$ -bit for a general  $k$ . The underlying construction remains as it is, however the nonce space is increased to  $(k-1)n/k$ -bits i.e.  $\text{DWCDM.k}[\mathbf{E}, \mathbf{H}](N, M) := \mathbf{E}_K^{-1}(\mathbf{E}_K(N) \oplus N \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M))$  but here we consider  $N = N^* \parallel 0^{n/k}$  where  $N^*$  is a  $(k-1)n/k$  bit nonce. For this, we first state the following conjecture on Mirror theory, which is a generalized version of extended Mirror theorem as introduced in section. 3.2.

*Conjecture 1 (Extended Mirror Theorem for  $\xi_{\max} = k$ ).* Let  $(\mathcal{E} = \cup \mathcal{E}^\neq, \phi', \Lambda')$  be a system of  $q$  many affine equations and  $v$  many affine non-equations associated with index mapping function  $\phi'$  over  $\text{GF}(2^n)$  which are of the form  $P_{\phi(n_i)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_i)} = \lambda_i$  for  $i \in [q]$  and  $P_{\phi(n_j)} \oplus P_{\phi(t_j)} \neq \lambda'_j (\neq \mathbf{0})$  for  $j \in [q+1, q+v]$  over the set of  $\alpha$  many unknown variables  $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_\alpha\}$  such that  $P_a$  may be equals to some  $P_{\phi(n_i)}$  or  $P_{\phi(b_j)}$ , where  $a \in \{\phi(n_j), \phi(t_j)\}, j \in [q, q+v]$ . Now, if

- (i)  $(\phi', \Lambda')$  is good and
- (ii)  $\xi_{\max} = k$



then the number of solutions for  $\mathcal{P}$ , denoted by  $h_\beta$  (where  $\beta = \frac{kq}{k-1}$ ) such that  $P_i \neq P_j$  for all distinct  $i, j \in \{1, \dots, \alpha\}$  is

$$h_\beta \geq \frac{(2^n)^\beta}{2^{nq}} \left( 1 - O\left( \frac{q^k}{2^{(k-1)n}} + \frac{v}{2^n} \right) \right). \quad (27)$$

Assuming this conjecture holds, we have the following result on the MAC advantage of DWCDM<sub>k</sub>:

**Theorem 6.** *Let  $E$  be a block cipher and  $H$  be an  $\epsilon_1$  regular,  $\epsilon_2$  AXU and  $\epsilon_j$   $j$ -way regular hash function,<sup>11</sup> for all  $3 \leq j \leq k$  (e.g., PolyHash). Then, the MAC advantage for any  $(q_m, q_v, t)$  nonce-respecting adversary against DWCDM<sub>k</sub> is given by,*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}_k}^{\text{MAC}}(q_m, q_v, t) \leq \text{Adv}_E^{\text{SPRP}}(q_m + q_v, t') + O(q_m^k/2^{n(k-1)} + q_v \cdot \epsilon),$$

where  $\epsilon = \max\{\epsilon_1, \epsilon_2, \dots, \epsilon_k\}$  and  $t' = O(t + (q_m + q_v)t_H)$ .

The proof will be similar to the proof of Theorem 2. We first define the transcript, associated MAC and the verification graph as before.

Now, we call a transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, \tau_v, K_h)$  to be bad if the associated MAC graph  $G_\tau^m$  and the Verification graph  $G_\tau^v$  satisfies the either of the following properties:

- B1' :  $G_\tau^m$  has a component of size  $k$  or more.
- B2' :  $G_\tau^m$  contains a valid cycle of length less than  $k$ .
- B3' :  $G_\tau^v$  contains a valid cycle of length less than or equals to  $k$  that involves the verification query.

Moreover,  $\tau$  is also said to be bad if it satisfies B0, B4, B5, B6 (as defined in Definition 3).

Here we will mainly consider bounding B1', B2' and B3', as the remaining ones are already done. Here we provide a sketch for bounding each of this event:

**Bounding B1'.** Event B1' occurs if there exists a component of size at least  $k$  in  $G_\tau^m$ . This essentially implies there is a chain of  $(k-1)$  edges. Let there are  $c_1$  number of edges are of the form  $T_i = N_j$  with  $i < j$ . Here we claim that

$$\Pr[\text{B1}'] \leq q_m \cdot \left( \frac{q_m}{2^n} \right)^{k-c_1} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{2^{k/n}} \right)^{c_1}. \quad (28)$$

As  $k \geq 4$ , the above bound is  $O(q_m^k/2^{n(k-1)})$ .

**Bounding B2'.** Event B2' occurs if there exists a cycle of size less than  $k$  in  $G_\tau^m$ . Let us bound a cycle of length  $c < (k-1)$ . Again, assume there are  $c_1$  number of edges of the form  $T_i = N_j$  with  $i < j$ . Using similar argument as above,

$$\Pr[\text{B2}'] \leq \left( \frac{q_m}{2^n} \right)^{c-c_1} \cdot \left( \frac{1}{2^{k/n}} \right)^{c_1}. \quad (29)$$

<sup>11</sup> A Hash function  $H$  is said to be a  $\epsilon$   $j$ -way regular hash function if for all distinct  $(X_1, \dots, X_j)$  and for any non-zero  $Y$ ,  $\Pr[H(X_1) \oplus \dots \oplus H(X_j) = Y] \leq \epsilon$ .

It is easy to see that for any  $c$ , the above bound is  $O(q_m/2^n)$ .

**Bounding B3'.** Event B3' occurs if there exists a cycle of size less than or equals to  $k$  in  $G_r^v$ . Extending similar arguments used in lemma 3 to bound the event B3, one can show that if  $H$  is  $\epsilon$   $j$ -way regular for all  $j \leq k$  then

$$\Pr[\text{B3}'] \approx O\left(\frac{q_v \cdot \epsilon \cdot q_m^c}{2^{nc}}\right), \quad (30)$$

for some  $c \geq 0$ .

Combining everything together, we can bound

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{B}] &\leq \Pr[\text{B0}] + \Pr[\text{B1}'] + \Pr[\text{B2}'] + \Pr[\text{B3}'] + \Pr[\text{B4}] + \Pr[\text{B5}] + \Pr[\text{B6}] \\ &\approx O(q_m^k/2^{n(k-1)} + q_v \cdot \epsilon) \end{aligned}$$

Next, we fix a good transcript  $\tau$ . Now, to obtain the lower bound of the probability of getting  $\tau$  in real world, we need a lower bound on the probability of the number of solutions to a system of  $q_m$  many equations and  $q_v$  many non-equations. Again, we can do that using an extended Mirror theory result with maximal block size  $\xi_{\max} = k$ . From Conjecture 1, we have

$$\Pr_{\text{re}}(\tau) \geq \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{nq_m}} \cdot \left(1 - O\left(\frac{q_m^k}{2^{(k-1)n}} + \frac{q_v}{2^n}\right)\right), \quad (31)$$

The theorem follows by applying Patarin's H-Coefficient Technique.  $\square$

*Remark 2.* We would like to clarify that increasing the nonce space does not have any relation with the increase in security. We have restricted the nonce space of DWCDM to  $2n/3$ -bit (note that this is minimum as we must allow  $2^{2n/3}$  many MAC queries with distinct nonces) purely because of the simplicity of the extended mirror theory analysis. One can of course increase the nonce space to  $(k-1)n/k$ -bit for any  $k \leq n$ , but that increases the block maximality ( $\xi_{\max}$ ) to  $k$  and hence the analysis of the extended mirror theory would become tedious and involved..

## 8 Conclusion

In this paper we have proposed DWCDM, a single keyed nonce based MAC, which is structurally identical to EWCDM except that the outer encryption call is replaced by the decryption call and same key is used for both the block cipher calls. Using an extended mirror theory results, we have shown that DWCDM is secure roughly up to  $2n/3$ -bit against nonce-respecting adversaries and  $n/2$ -bit against nonce-misuse adversaries. We have also provided an intuition on how to boost the nonce-respecting security of DWCDM upto  $(k-1)/k$ -bit for a general  $k$ .

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## A Proof of Theorem 3

Proving the MAC security in nonce misuse setting, PRF security of the construction implies its MAC security and hence we view the construction as a

keyed function with domain  $\mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{M}$  and study the PRF security of it. Our main security result about  $\text{DWCDM}[\text{E}, \text{E}^{-1}, \text{H}]$  against nonce misuse adversary is as follows.

**Lemma 5.** *Let  $\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}$  and  $\mathcal{K}_h$  be finite and non-empty sets. Let  $\text{E} : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher and  $\text{H} : \mathcal{K}_h \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be an  $\epsilon_1$  regular and  $\epsilon_2$  AXU hash function. Then, the PRF advantage of  $\text{DWCDM}[\text{E}, \text{E}^{-1}, \text{H}]$  is given by,*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}[\text{E}, \text{E}^{-1}, \text{H}]}^{\text{PRF}}(q, t) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{E}}^{\text{SPRP}}(q, t') + q^2 \epsilon_2 + q \epsilon_1 + \frac{4q^2}{2^n} + \frac{q}{2^n},$$

where  $t' = O(t + qt_H)$ ,  $t_H$  be the time for computing hash function.

Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 5 and the folklore result that a secure PRF is a secure MAC due to Bellare et al. [5]:

### A.1 Proof of Lemma 5

As before, we fix a non-repeating query making  $(q, t)$  distinguisher  $\text{A}$  against the PRF security of  $\text{DWCDM}[\text{E}, \text{E}^{-1}, \text{H}]$ . As the first step of the proof, we replace  $\text{E}_K$  and  $\text{E}_K^{-1}$  with a  $n$ -bit uniform random permutation  $\Pi$  and its inverse  $\Pi^{-1}$  respectively at the cost of  $\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{E}}^{\text{SPRP}}(\text{A}')$  and denote the resulting construction as  $\text{DWCDM}^*[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \text{H}]$ , where  $\text{A}'$  is an adversary against the SPRP security of  $\text{E}$ , making at most  $q$  queries and running time is at most  $t + qt_H$  such that

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}[\text{E}, \text{E}^{-1}, \text{H}]}^{\text{PRF}}(\text{A}) \leq \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{E}}^{\text{SPRP}}(\text{A}') + \mathbf{Adv}_{\text{DWCDM}^*[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \text{H}]}^{\text{PRF}}(\text{A}) \quad (32)$$

It remains to upper bound the PRF advantage of  $\text{A}$  against  $\text{DWCDM}^*[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \text{H}]$ . For this we apply H-Coefficient Technique as follows: Adversary  $\text{A}$  interacts (a) either with the real oracle  $\text{DWCDM}^*[\Pi, \Pi^{-1}, \text{H}]$  for a random permutation  $\Pi$ , its inverse  $\Pi^{-1}$  and a random hashing key  $K_h$  or (b) with the ideal oracle in which it receives uniformly and independent responses against each distinct query it makes. Note that, the adversary is allowed to make distinct query with same nonce.

After the interaction is over (but before  $\text{A}$  output its decision bit), we release the actual hash key  $K_h$  to the adversary  $\text{A}$ , if  $\text{A}$  is in the real world, or a random dummy hash key  $K_h$  if  $\text{A}$  is in the ideal world.

**A.1.1 Attack Transcript and Transcript Graph.** Let the transcript of  $\text{A}$  be  $\tau = (\tau_m, K_h)$  where  $\tau_m := ((N_1, M_1, T_1), \dots, (N_q, M_q, T_q))$  be the list of queries and responses of  $\text{A}$ .  $\Theta$ ,  $X_{\text{re}}$  and  $X_{\text{id}}$  respectively denotes the set of all attainable transcripts, the probability distribution of transcript  $\tau$  induced by the real world and ideal world.

Similar to proof of Theorem 2, we define a transcript graph  $G_\tau$  corresponding to a transcript  $\tau$  as follows:

$$G_\tau = ([q], E) \text{ where } E = \{(i, j) \in [q] \times [q] : N_i = N_j \vee N_i = T_j \vee N_j = T_i \vee T_i = T_j\}.$$

For the sake of convenience of the proof, we denote the edge  $(i, j)$  as a dotted line when  $T_i = T_j$  and as a dashed line when  $N_i = N_j$ . Else, we denote it as a continuous line. Thus, the edge set of  $G_\tau$  consists of three different types of edges as depicted in Fig. 5.1 (a), (b) and (c).

### A.1.2 Definition and Probability of Bad Transcripts.

**Definition 4.** An attainable transcript  $\tau = (\tau_m, K_h)$  is bad if

- B1 : there exists two distinct queries  $(N_i, M_i, T_i)$  and  $(N_j, M_j, T_j)$  such that  $T_i = T_j$ .
- B2 : there exists two distinct queries  $(N_i, M_i, T_i)$  and  $(N_j, M_j, T_j)$  such that  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j), N_i = N_j$ .
- B3 :  $\exists i \in [q]$  such that  $\mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_i$ .
- B4 :  $\exists i \in [q]$  such that  $N_i = T_i$ .
- B5 : if there is a cycle of length at least 2 in  $G_\tau$ .

Let  $\Theta_b \subseteq \Theta$  denotes the set of all attainable bad transcripts. In the following lemma, we upper bound the probability of realizing a bad transcript in ideal world.

**Lemma 6.** Let  $X_{\text{id}}$  and  $\Theta_b$  be defined as above. Then we have,

$$\Pr[X_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b] \leq \epsilon_{\text{bad}} = q^2 \epsilon_2 + q \epsilon_1 + \frac{3q^2}{2^n} + \frac{q}{2^n}$$

**Proof.** Let us denote  $\mathbf{B} := \mathbf{B1} \vee \mathbf{B2} \vee \mathbf{B3} \vee \mathbf{B4} \vee \mathbf{B5}$ . In order to bound  $\Pr[X_{\text{id}} \in \Theta_b]$ , it is enough to bound  $\Pr[\mathbf{B}]$ . Therefore, we have

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B}] \leq \Pr[\mathbf{B1}] + \Pr[\mathbf{B2}] + \Pr[\mathbf{B3}] + \Pr[\mathbf{B4}] + \Pr[\mathbf{B5} \mid \overline{\mathbf{B1}}] \quad (33)$$

In the following, we bound the probabilities of all the bad events individually.

**Bounding B1:** Fix two distinct query indices  $i$  and  $j$  such that  $T_i = T_j$ . For two fixed distinct indices  $i, j \in [q]$ , the event holds with probability  $2^{-n}$  as  $T_i$ 's are sampled uniformly and independent to all previously sampled random variables in the ideal world. Summing over all possible choices of  $i$  and  $j$ , we obtain the bound

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B1}] \leq \frac{q^2}{2^n}. \quad (34)$$

**Bounding B2:** Fix two distinct query indices  $i$  and  $j$  such that  $N_i \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_i) = N_j \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_j), N_i = N_j$ . For two fixed distinct indices  $i, j \in [q]$ , the event holds with probability  $\epsilon_2$  due to the randomness of the hash key  $K_h$ . as the hash key is sampled uniformly and independent to all previously sampled random variables in the ideal world. Summing over all possible choices of  $i$  and  $j$ , we obtain the bound

$$\Pr[\mathbf{B2}] \leq q^2 \epsilon_2. \quad (35)$$

**Bounding B3 and B4:** Observe that, B3 and B4 have already been defined in Definition 3. Therefore, following Lemma 3, we have

$$\Pr[\text{B3}] \leq q\epsilon_1, \quad \Pr[\text{B4}] \leq \frac{q}{2^n} \quad (36)$$

where the probability of the former event is bounded by the regularity assumption on the hash function whereas the later one is bounded by the randomness of  $T_i$ .

**Bounding B5 |  $\overline{\text{B1}}$ :** We bound the probability of formation of a cycle in the transcript graph  $G_\tau$  when all  $T$ 's are distinct. Let us consider such a cycle of length  $p$  and we denote the corresponding event by  $\text{Cyl}_p$ . Note that, since  $T$ 's are all distinct, there cannot be any dotted edge in the cycle. Moreover, there cannot be any dashed edge in the cycle as that would lead to have an invalid cycle.

**Example.** Let us consider the following set of four equations:

$$\begin{cases} \Pi(N_1) \oplus \Pi(T_1) = N_1 \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M_1) \\ \Pi(N_2) \oplus \Pi(T_2) = N_2 \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M_2) \\ \Pi(N_3) \oplus \Pi(T_3) = N_3 \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M_3) \\ \Pi(N_4) \oplus \Pi(T_4) = N_4 \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M_4) \end{cases}$$

In the above set of equations all  $T$ 's are distinct. Now, consider a cycle  $C$  of length 4 where there is only one dashed edge (wlog of we assume the dashed edge is in between 1 and 2) and all remaining three edges are continuous. Then,  $C$  imposes the following equality pattern on  $(N, T)$ :

$$N_1 = N_2, N_2 = T_3, N_3 = T_4, N_4 = T_1.$$

These set of constraints eventually leads us to have  $\Pi(T_3) = \bigoplus_{i=1}^4 (N_i \oplus \text{H}_{K_h}(M_i))$ .

Hence the cycle is invalid. It is simple to observe that existence of any dashed edge in any cycle of  $G_\tau$  makes it invalid when all  $T$ 's are distinct. Hence, if the cycle has to be valid, then there must be only continuous edges in the cycle.

Let us consider such a valid cycle  $C = (i_1, i_2, \dots, i_p)$  of length  $p$ . Without loss of generality we may assume  $i_1 < i_2 < \dots < i_p$ . Therefore, from Lemma 2, the probability of each of the edges  $(i_k, i_{k+1})$  for all  $k = 1, \dots, p-1$  is  $2^{-n}$  and as  $i_p > i_1$ , probability of the edge  $(i_p, i_1)$  is  $2^{-n/3}$ . Therefore, for a fixed choice of indices  $i_1, \dots, i_p$ , the probability of the cycle becomes  $\frac{1}{2^{n(p-1)+n/3}}$ . Hence, by summing over all possible choices of  $i_1, \dots, i_p$ , we have

$$\Pr[\text{Cyl}_p] \leq \frac{q^p}{2^{n(p-1)+n/3}}.$$

Therefore,

$$\Pr[\text{B5} | \overline{\text{B1}}] \leq \sum_{p=2}^{\infty} \Pr[\text{Cyl}_p] = \frac{q^2}{2^{4n/3}} \left( 1 + \frac{q}{2^n} + \frac{q^2}{2^{2n}} + \dots \right) = \frac{q^2}{2^{4n/3}} \cdot \frac{1}{(1 - \frac{q}{2^n})}$$

As we assume,  $q \leq 2^n/2$ , we have

$$\Pr[\text{B5} \mid \overline{\text{B1}}] \leq \frac{2q^2}{2^{4n/3}} \leq \frac{2q^2}{2^n} \quad (37)$$

Finally, Lemma 6 follows from Eqn. (33), Eqn. (34), Eqn. (35), Eqn. (36) and Eqn. (37).  $\square$

**A.1.3 Analysis of Good Transcripts.** Now, we analyze good transcripts in the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.** *Let  $\tau = (\tau_m, K_h)$  be a good transcript. Then*

$$\frac{\mathfrak{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\mathfrak{p}_{\text{id}}(\tau)} := \frac{\Pr[X_{\text{re}} = \tau]}{\Pr[X_{\text{id}} = \tau]} \geq (1 - \epsilon_{\text{ratio}}) = (1 - \frac{q^2}{2^n}).$$

**Proof.** Let  $\tau = (\tau_m, K_h)$  be a good transcript. Then one has

$$\Pr[X_{\text{id}} = \tau] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{nq}} \quad (38)$$

as in the ideal world, the oracle is perfectly random and the hash key  $K_h$  is chosen uniformly at random and independently from the query transcript.

Since,  $\tau$  is good, the following set of equations

$$\mathcal{E} = \begin{cases} \Pi(N_1) \oplus \Pi(T_1) = N_1 \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_1) \\ \Pi(N_2) \oplus \Pi(T_2) = N_2 \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_2) \\ \vdots \\ \Pi(N_q) \oplus \Pi(T_q) = N_q \oplus \mathbf{H}_{K_h}(M_q) \end{cases}$$

is circle free and contains no collision in the solution within a same block. Let us assume that the maximal block size of  $\mathcal{E}$  is  $\xi_{\text{max}}$ . Then due to Theorem 3 of [30], which is known as “*Theorem  $P_i \oplus P_j$  when  $\xi_{\text{max}}\alpha \ll 2^n$ ”*”, we have

$$\Pr[X_{\text{re}} = \tau] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{K}_h|} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{nq}} (1 - \frac{q\xi_{\text{max}}}{2^n}) \quad (39)$$

Computing the ratio of Eqn. (39) and Eqn. (38), we have

$$\frac{\mathfrak{p}_{\text{re}}(\tau)}{\mathfrak{p}_{\text{id}}(\tau)} \geq (1 - \frac{q\xi_{\text{max}}}{2^n}) \geq (1 - \frac{q^2}{2^n}).$$

where the last inequality follows as  $\xi_{\text{max}} \leq q$ .  $\square$

Finally, Lemma 5 follows from Lemma 6, Lemma 7 and Lemma 1.