

NORTH KOREA'S EMULATION OF CHINESE POLITICS: AN
EXAMINATION OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

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


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OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S IDEOLOGICAL INFLUENCE

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ABSTRACT

North Korean leader, Kim Il-song has been known among western observers as a "faithful disciple of Stalin." Furthermore, Communist North Korea has been known to the western world as faithfully following the Soviet model. The central argument of my study is to refute this notion. One should note that there are similar revolutionary backgrounds between China and North Korea, similarities of social conditions, colonial or semi-colonial status, and a timing of revolution. The Chinese model would be a prototype for Asian communism. My study shows abundant evidences that North Korea should be included in the category of Asian communism rather than western communism, and Kim Il-song is a disciple of Mao Tse-tung rather than being Stalin's.

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INTRODUCTION

Western observers have seldom suggested any objection to the assertion that Kim Il-song, the president of North Korea, is a "faithful disciple of Stalin." Communist North Korea has been known in the western world as faithfully following the Soviet model. Western observers often write that the external integration pattern of North Korea has changed from one of a high degree of integration with imperial Japan, to virtually exclusive integration with the Soviet Union, and finally to various other patterns of integration with states within and outside the international communist system. Exclusive integration with the Soviet Union implies that North Korea has adopted the political, economic, and cultural model of the Soviet Union.¹ The assertion that communist North Korea faithfully has followed the Soviet model is based upon the fact that the

¹For this assertion, see among many, Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, Communism in Korea, Vol. I and II (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972). Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Peoples Democratic Republic (Stanford: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1966). Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959). U.S. Department of State, "North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Take-Over," Department of State Publication 7,118, Far Eastern Series 103, 1961.

North Korean communist party-state emerged out of the red army occupation which lasted until the establishment of a new regime in 1948.

To state that "Kim Il-song is a faithful disciple of Stalin," without examining the actual programs in North Korea is foolhardy. It may be true that North Korea was within the Soviet control system until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. However, to understand the function of a political system and to describe the characteristics thereof is not merely a matter of looking at certain features of the system during a limited time period. It is a matter of examining overall policy direction in both theory and practice. One should note that there are similar revolutionary backgrounds between China and North Korea, similarities of social conditions, colonial or semi-colonial status, and a timing of revolution. Considering these facts, Kim Il-song may be a disciple of Mao Tse-tung rather than Stalin. This study is concerned with North Korea's emulation of the Chinese model of modernization.

The examination of whether North Korea should be included in the category of Asian Communism rather than Western Communism centers on the following. The Chinese and North Korean experience during their transitional period and socialist construction is clearly a departure from Soviet experience. The Chinese claim that their experience is suitable to the conditions of underdeveloped,

colonial, or semi-colonial countries. The Chinese model is projected as a suitable prototype for Asian Communism. In an examination of modernization programs, we can see abundant similarities between the Chinese and Korean experiences.

Hence, a broad hypothetical proposition for this study is that North Korea has been faithfully following the Chinese footsteps in her overall modernization programs. To state it more succinctly, Kim Il-song is not Stalin's but Mao Tse-tung's disciple. The study will be divided into four parts. The first part will examine the historical development of Korean Communism. The second part will establish a theoretical framework of North Korean politics by examining modernization programs. The third part will present several empirical evidence which indicates that Chinese influence is predominant in North Korean politics. And the last part will deal with North Korea's foreign policy.

Korean Communism began in 1918 among Koreans living abroad who were not subject to the control of the Japanese who had ruled Korea since 1910. Those who participated in this early Communist movement were called "old Communists" and were unrelated to Kim Il-song's group which came to power in North Korea in 1945. The old Communists who joined early communist movement in Siberia, Manchuria and China often proclaimed two objectives: first, to expel Jananese imperialism from Korea, and second, to establish a

classless society in Korea. Although their major activities were carried out abroad, there were several attempts to establish Korean Communist Party in Korea proper. These efforts from abroad ended in defeat. The early Korean Communist movements essentially lacked effective leadership, unity, and a coherent program. In addition, they were characterized by intensive factional struggles and political immaturity. The early Korean Communist movements, whether in the homeland or abroad, was a total failure.

The Soviet Union did not patronize the Korean Communist movement. The Soviet Union, through the Comintern, undoubtedly directed the Korean Communist movement. Yet, the Soviet Union was not so much interested in establishing Communism in Korea as it was in encouraging a broad united front which could counter Japanese imperialism in the Far East. The Soviet Union used the Korean Communists' anti-Japanese movement to full advantage for its own national security. The Soviet Union's neglect and indifference was one of the reasons for the failure of the old Communists. Hence, the early Korean Communist movement was only perfunctorily affiliated with the Soviet Union. The notion of Korean Communists' integration with the Soviet Union is largely exaggerated.

The argument that North Korea was integrated with the Soviet Union has a limited historical basis. Kim Il-song's revolutionary background was almost entirely

connected with the Chinese Communists. A decade of his revolutionary life was spent with Chinese guerrilla forces. This was the most significant period because it was at this time that his Communist thinking was molded. His four-year retreat into the Soviet Union was relatively insignificant in comparison with his childhood education in Chinese schools and the decade of his revolutionary life in Manchuria. This study is concerned with Kim Il-song's revolutionary background within the ranks of Chinese Communist movement and its subsequent impact on his politics in North Korea.

There are certainly several similarities between Stalin's and Kim Il-song's strategies and tactics in their rise to power. To be specific, both used terror, the merger of rival groups, propaganda and purges. Kim has indeed imitated the Soviet dictator in his thoroughly Machiavelian methods of removing his colleagues during his drive to power. However, it is misleading to assume that Kim adopted Stalin's method in actual modernization programs in North Korea.

Following a historical study of Korean Communism, this investigation will examine the practice of "New Democracy" in North Korea. One of the most conspicuous features of Asian Communism is the politics of "New Democracy" during the transitional period to a complete socialist

economy.² For Asian Marxists the adoption of "New Democracy" was inevitable because of peculiar social conditions. The theory and practice of "New Democracy" originated from Mao Tse-tung's thought. Mao's theory of "New Democracy" includes in his concept of "people" all the social forces which he calls "non-antagonistic contradictions." In other words, while Mao excludes "bureaucratic capitalists" and landlords from the state structure, he includes proletarian, peasantry, intelligentsia, petty national bourgeoisie, national capitalists and rich peasants in the concept of "people."³ They are the elements of non-antagonistic contradiction. As long as they are anti-feudal and anti-colonial, they can be considered to possess revolutionary mentality. Consequently, the economic activities of national bourgeoisie should be allowed, and private property should be legalized during the transitional period. The gradual transformation through the cooperative economy into the socialist economy is characteristic of "New Democracy." The participation of liberal intellectuals and

²Robert A. Scalapino, "Communism in Asia: Toward a Comparative Analysis," Scalapino ed., Communist Revolution in Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 25-53, 3-4.

³For Mao Tse-tung's concept of "people" and theory of "New Democracy," see his "On New Democracy," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, pp. 347-352. For a contrast with the Soviet experience, see Arther A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 74-104.

national bourgeoisie in the state structure is certainly a departure from orthodox Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet experience and can be considered to be Mao's original contribution to Communist theory.

In North Korea, as well as in China, the core idea in all modernization programs has been based upon Mao Tse-tung's discovery of the method of substituting moral and psychological incentives for material incentives as a major stimulus for production. The economic laws of socialism and communism insist that higher levels of collectivization in the relations of production must await the construction of an advanced industrial economy.⁴ To be specific, tractors and other modern agricultural machinery are preconditions to the transition to Communism. Mao, on the other hand, downgraded the importance of the productive force before the relations of production. Mao considered the lack of the productive force, material-technical precondition for Communism to be an obstacle in China's ways of transition to Communism. Mao contended that the establishment of new relations of production, that is, people's commune, is possible prior to industrialization and mechanization. How? He argued that intense political consciousness can substitute for tractors and other modern

⁴Arther A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 171.

agricultural machinery. In North Korea, as in China, moral indoctrination and thought reform have been used to arouse the political consciousness of the masses of people.

The mass-line has been used in both China and North Korea as a technique to arouse and maintain political consciousness among the masses of people.⁵ It has been an organizational philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party since the Yen-an period (1938-45). It dictates that party cadres should be physically in touch with the masses of people. They are sent down to the front line of production in order to be physically in touch with the masses of people. This analysis will examine Mao's "mass-line" in economic management, economic planning, and agricultural management in North Korea.

Since the politics of "New Democracy" and "mass-line" have necessitated intensive political campaigns in North Korea, this study will examine the North Korean political culture. Almond and Powell define political culture as the psychological dimension or distribution of an individual's political orientation in a political system. They include all communist societies within the category of "ideological political culture."⁶ This study seeks to differentiate

⁵Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 111.

⁶Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), p.61.

between two types of political culture in Communist system: the "political culture of revolutionary struggle" and the "political culture of maturity."⁷

The tradition of the "culture of maturity" can be originated during the early period of collectivization in the Soviet Union. According to this tradition, higher levels of collectivization in the relations of production must await the attainment of an advanced industrial economy. Consequently, this tradition downplays political campaigns. It believes in material incentives as the major stimulus for production. According to this economic orientation, profit should be made the prime element in effective economic management and the economy should be run by specialists.

The "culture of revolutionary struggle," on the other hand, advocates substituting moral and psychological incentives for material incentives in order to stimulate production. This tradition downgrades the importance of the "productive force" such as tractors and other agricultural machinery, and emphasizes the relations of production as a prerequisite for collectivization. Hence, political campaigns, political indoctrination, thought reform, criticism, and self-criticism are methods of socialization used

⁷A full explanation of this concept is developed with the North Korean political culture in Chapter VI.

to develop this political culture. The Chinese model is a prototype of "the culture of revolutionary struggle."

This research will examine North Korean political culture with an intention of determining whether it follows either of the Communist political cultures described above. For this task we are confronted with serious drawbacks at the operational level. The access to data is extremely limited. The only data available at hand are the governmental publications, newspapers and political leaders' writings. Our study proceeds on the assumption that North Korean political culture is projected in the contents of these official documents. We apply content analysis to the North Korean political culture.

This investigation of the North Korean political culture is followed by an examination of Kim Il-song's role in the political socialization of the North Korean people. Political socialization is the process which provides the individual with his political self as he advances through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. In other words, through the process of socialization political culture is created, transformed, and maintained. In North Korea, the agents of socialization such as family, peer groups, schools, social groupings and mass media are tightly controlled and serve as transmission belts. These tightly controlled agents of socialization are directed by Kim Il-song who serves as a teacher for the regime. Kim

Il-song, like Mao Tse-tung in China, has profoundly shaped the political culture of North Korea. Kim Il-song's political writings will be examined to determine the extent to which they are similar to Mao Tse-tung's. This study will also examine the theoretical values of Kim Il-song's writings to determine if he has made any significant, original contributions to the development of orthodox Marxism-Leninism as his eulogists claim.

The final substantive chapter examines North Korea's foreign policy in light of the striking differences between the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and China. The foreign policies of these major communist powers differ in terms of style and purpose. Whereas the recent Soviet global strategy has been evolved into "peaceful coexistence" since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Chinese foreign policy has always expressed "revolutionary struggle." The dread of nuclear war forced the Soviet Union to renounce the "inevitability of war" with capitalism. Moscow accepted "peaceful coexistence" with the West. "Peaceful negotiation," which permits the application of the Soviet economic, political, and ideological strength, is a new strategy to "bury" the capitalist system. The new Soviet strategy is to avoid involvement in national liberation wars lest the United States intervene. The Soviet Union now advocates "the parliamentary road" to power in national liberation movements although national

interests at times result in policies which qualify rigid adherence to general policy.⁸

China, on the other hand, until its recent normalization of relations with the United States and its emphasis on modernization, emphasized the inevitability of war with capitalism. China fears that the Soviet Union is becoming more and more allied with the United States in a hegemonic manner, and is abandoning her protective role within the socialist camp. Concerning national liberation movements, China contends that colonialism, imperialism, and neo-colonialism compose the most serious political issues in the contemporary world. The Chinese strategy is to support wars of national liberation, because now is the most critical moment for those oppressed people to break the yoke of imperialism.⁹

The most important consideration for the foreign policy of North Korea focuses on Korean unification. At a cursory glance the reunification policies of North Korea, mainly based on Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron (the theory of independent national unification), seem to appeal to "peaceful negotiations" with the South. However,

⁸The Soviet policies toward Vietnam, Kampuchea, Afghanistan, Angola, and South Yeman were examples of this exception.

⁹Despite this general principle of the Chinese revolutionary doctrine, national interests at times had priority over ideology in Chinese foreign policy. For example, China supported Pakistan against the national liberation movement in Bangladesh in 1971.

a close examination of the same policy reveals that North Korea has been intensely committed to the revolutionary doctrine of Chinese strategy. If foreign policy is an expression of domestic politics, then it is another dimension with which to compare North Korea with China.

The research for this analysis of North Korea's emulation of Chinese politics is based primarily upon North Korean official documents, most of which are available at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Kim Il-song's own writings are available in his Kim Il-song sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Il-song) and various other publications of the North Korean government. A close examination will be given to Kim's own writings in comparison with Mao Tse-tung's in order to shape a framework of this study. The content analysis study of North Korean political culture is based upon Kim's own writings and editorials of Rodong Shinmun, a mouthpiece of Korean Workers' Party. The study of Mao Tse-tung's thought is based on his writings which are available in the English language version of Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung. Other official publications such as Peking Review and Jenmin jihpao from the Peking government are available at the Library of the University of Missouri-Columbia.

The bibliography of this study lists invaluable commentaries found in various books and articles concerning North Korean and Chinese politics. Most of the English

language publications are available at the University of Missouri-Columbia Library. Most of the Korean language publications were obtained from the Library of Congress. Several other important Korean language publications and some Japanese language sources were obtained from Professor Soon Sung Cho. The author is greatly indebted to Professor Cho for his translation and interpretation of the Japanese language sources. There are many other materials and periodicals listed in the bibliography which provide some additional information.

Finally, as far as the period of this study is concerned, the study begins from 1918, when the first Korean Communist movement was initiated and ends in December 1978. However, the recent liberalization of China after Mao Tse-tung's death on September 9, 1976, will not be treated in this study. The new leadership in China has certainly rejected Mao's method of "red and expert" in modernization. The contemporary new leadership in China, especially Teng Hsiao-ping and his followers, has apparently returned to Liu Shao-chi's line of modernization, which emphasizes technical development and material incentives prior to political indoctrination. Yet, the recent trend has not greatly changed Chinese revolutionary doctrine until January 1979 when the new trend began to be conspicuously visible.

PART I

A HISTORICAL STUDY OF KOREAN COMMUNISM

CHAPTER I

THE MAINSTREAM OF THE KOREAN COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

Although North Korean authorities today persistently claim they are the mainstream of the Korean Communist movement, there is little doubt that those who came to power in North Korea in 1945 are unrelated and alien to the mainstream of the Korean Communist revolution. It was the new group of Kim Il-song who came to power with Russian blessings in 1945. Those in the mainstream of the revolution are called "old Communists," and Kim's new group who came to power are referred to as the "new Communists." The old Communist had failed to come to power, despite their long and painstaking effort to Communize the Korean peninsula, mainly because of the occupation forces - the United States and the Soviet Union, the details of whose involvement will be examined in Chapter III. The mainstream of the Korean revolution virtually ended in 1946. This chapter will trace the history of the mainstream of the Korean revolution and how it ended.¹ The chapter will highlight the relationship between the old revolutionaries and the Soviet

¹The study of the mainstream of the Korean revolution has been done by many scholars. The following historical accounts are not too far-fetched from the major works done in this area. For an extensive and detailed study of

Union. In this treatment of the historical background of the mainstream of revolution, one can hypothesize that the early Korean revolution was rarely affiliated with the Comintern. The Comintern's neglect and indifference towards the old Korean revolutionaries was one of the reasons for the failure of the old Communists. The chapter will indicate that the notion of Korean Communists' integration with the Soviet Union has been largely exaggerated, even on the basis of various historical accounts.

The Korean Communist movement started early in 1918. It had to be first established outside Korea because Korea was under the Japanese occupation (1910-1945). The Korean Communist movement started in Siberia where there were about 200,000 Korean immigrants.² Inspired by the great upsurge of Bolshevism, Korean intellectuals started organizing a revolutionary movement in the Russian Maritime Province. There were two groups of Koreans in Siberia at that time. The first was the group of immigrants who volunteered to

Korean Communism, see Chun-yop Kim and Ch'ang-sun Kim, H'an guk Kong-sanjui Undongsa, Vol. I and II (Seoul: Institute of Asiatic Studies, 1967). For a major work in English, see Dae-sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement: 1918-1948 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967). Nevertheless, the author will highlight the relationship between old revolutionaries and the Soviet Union and its implication for later development by examining several original documents available.

²For the origin of Korean immigrants in Siberia, see Chun-yop and Ch'ang-sun Kim, op. cit., pp. 29-92.

become Russian citizens. The second was the group of Koreans who refused the offer of Russian citizenship.

One leader among the second group of Koreans was Yi Tong-hwi, known as the father of Korean Communism. He was originally a high-ranking military commander (the level of Major) of the royal army of Yi dynasty and was placed as a garrison commander in Andong, Kang-hwa, and Suwom. When his garrison command of Suwon was disarmed according to the Korea-Japan treaty of 1907 (the preliminary treaty leading to annexation of 1910), he was humiliated and embittered and became a strong anti-Japanese nationalist. He began his independence movement and was imprisoned for three years between 1911 and 1914. He escaped to Chientao in Manchuria in 1914 and organized the People's Council of Chientao (K'ando Kukmin-hoe) which became the center for the Korean independence movement in Manchuria. Feeling insecure even there because of the Japanese police, he entered Siberia in 1915 and began his more active anti-Japanese independence movement.³ As will be discussed shortly, he had no intention of becoming a Communist. He simply wanted to use Soviet assistance to achieve Korean

³Yi Sok-dae, ed., Sahoekwahak daesajon (Encyclopedia of Social Science), (Seoul: Muniun Sokwan, 1948), p. 493. Yi Sok-hun, Sunkuk hyongmyongka yoljon (Biographies of the Heroic Revolutionaries), (Seoul: Choson Chulpansa, 1947), p. 191. Hong Sang-pyo, "Pukkando," Shindonga (April, 1945), pp. 298-300.

independence. Among those who refused to accept Russian citizenship, Yi Tong-hwi organized the Korean Socialist Party (Hanin Sahoe-dang) in Khabarovsk on June 26, 1918.

During the same period, Russian-Koreans also formed a Korean section of the Irkutsk Communist Party and later renamed it the All-Russian Korean Communist Party (Ch'onro Hanin Kongsan-dang) on September 5, 1919. However, the Russian-Koreans, known as the Irkutsk group, had no autonomy under the direction of B. Z. Shumiatsky, then head of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat in Irkutsk.⁴ The confrontation between Yi Tong-hwi's group and the Irkutsk group was inevitable because of the party members' national identities. The Irkutsk group, subjected to the Comintern's direction under Shumiatsky, tended to direct the Korean revolution towards Russian interests, advocating international Communism; whereas Yi Tong-hwi's faction tried to draw Russian assistance for the Korean independence movement. These two groups are the main factions in the later development of the Korean Communist movement.

⁴For the genesis of the above-mentioned Korean Communist Parties, see Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, "The Origin of the Korean Communist Movement (I)," Journal of Asian Studies, XX, No. 1 (1960). The same story appears in their later book, Communism in Korea, Vol. I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), pp. 3-11. Dae-sook Suh presents much similar accounts. See Suh, op. cit., pp. 4-11.

One other faction involved in the factional struggle in vying for the Comintern's recognition was the Korean Provisional Government or KPG. The origin of the Korean Provisional Government is traced back to the March First Uprising of 1919. Inspired by President Woodrow Wilson's "Doctrine of Self-determination," Koreans expressed, on March 1, 1919, their resistance against Japanese rule for the first time since Korea was annexed by Japan.⁵ This nationalistic resistance movement was interpreted by many Koreans at home and abroad as a potential to perpetuate the Korean independence movement. In order to implement the independence movement, first, Koreans at home and abroad needed a center for communication. They felt that effective communication among Koreans at home and abroad was important for the independence movement. Secondly, Koreans needed an organization by the name of "Korean government" which could perform propaganda activities. They thought that such a movement which represented Korean people could appeal to international organizations and other nation-states for recognition.

⁵This uprising took the form of Mahatma Ghandi's style of a non-violent street demonstration. For the development of the March First Uprising, see Yi Pyong-hon, Samil undong pisa (Secret History of the March First Movement), (Seoul: Shisa shin bo-sa, 1959). The Korean Situation, Authentic Accounts of Recent Events by Eyewitness (New York: Federal Council of Churches in America, n.d.), pp. 1-125. For biased viewpoints from Koreans of that time, see, among others, Hugh H. W., The Rebirth of Korea (New York: Abingdon Press, 1920). H. Chung, The Case of Korea (New York: F. H. Revell Co., 1921).

Thirdly, they needed an organization to collect funds among Koreans abroad for the independence movement. With this enthusiasm among Koreans at home and abroad, the Korean Provisional Government was formed in Shanghai on April 9, 1919.⁶

In the beginning, the Korean Provisional Government was devoted to propaganda activities and to obtaining international recognition for its legitimacy. For example, the President of KPG, Syngman Rhee, appealed to the Washington Conference of 1921 and to the League of Nations in 1919 for the recognition of the Korean Provisional Government. In both cases, the Korean nationalists were ignored, and the word "Korea" was not even mentioned. After these two experiences, Korean nationalists in the KPG turned towards Moscow for assistance in their resistance against Japan.⁷ The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow on February 2, 1922 responded favorably to the representatives from the KPG. The Moscow Congress resolved to support the Korean national independence movement. The

⁶For an exceptional analysis of the effect of the March First Uprising, see Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 101-105.

⁷Competition between the Soviet Union and the United States for the support of Asian peoples can be dated from this time. See Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, "The Origin of the Korean Communist Movement (II)," Journal of Asian Studies, II, No. 2 (1961).

word "Korea" was specifically emphasized and the KPG was promised assistance by the Congress.⁸ Events up to that point will be discussed below.

Whereas the KPG was essentially a nationalist group, two other factions were both Communist and nationalist. Their distinctive characteristics warrant some examination. Yi's faction can be classified as national-Communists who were utilizing Communism as a means of attaining Korean independence from Japan. Even though the party declaration and platform condemned the Korean bourgeoisie and Japanese imperialism at the same time, much of Yi Tong-hwi's activities proved that he was essentially concerned with national liberation.

On the other hand, the Irkutsk faction was devoted to the international Communist movement. As noted earlier, this faction was under the control of B. Z. Shumiatsky, then head of the Comintern's Far Eastern Secretariat. The Irkutsk group sometimes tried to Bolshevize the Korean independence movement. Very often it frustrated the effort of Yi's faction to contact Moscow. It was reported that the representatives of Yi's faction did not travel through Siberia to reach Moscow, because members of the Irkutsk

⁸The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East in Moscow was the Soviet answer to the Washington Conference. See the official English-language record, The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, published by the Communist International, Petrograd, 1922.

faction tried to capture and "take care of" them.⁹ The Irkutsk faction often accused Yi Tong-hwi of being a national bourgeois striving to attain Korean independence through Communist assistance.

As indicated, the Comintern's relationship with Koreans included three factions of Korean revolutionaries: Yi Tong-Hwi faction, the Irkutsk faction, and the KPG. These three factions were vying with each other for the Comintern's recognition. The KPG, even though it was a purely nationalist organization, appealed to the Comintern's policy of the bourgeois-democratic revolution in the East Asian countries.¹⁰ The Irkutsk faction had strong support from B. Z. Shumiatsky. Yi Tong-hwi had close contacts with top Soviet leaders, and Lenin treated him very favorably because of Yi's high personal prestige among Koreans in the Russian Maritime Province and China.

The Comintern's reaction to these three factions was very ambiguous. The Comintern, at this time, appeared to have granted de facto recognition to all three of these organizations. The Comintern's seemingly ambiguous

⁹Chiang Kang-hu, Hsin O yu-chi (Travel Record of New Russia, English title: One Year in Soviet Russia) (Shanghai, 1923), pp. 61ff.

¹⁰To give full support to all nationalist revolutionary and bourgeois organizations was the decision of the Second Comintern Congress. This policy was reiterated at the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East. See The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

policies towards the Korean revolutionaries in the Far East in general should be analyzed in connection with the Japanese intervention in Siberia.

Late in 1917 the Russian Revolution created a power vacuum in Siberia and in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway in north-central Manchuria. Japanese intervention occurred earlier than that of other allied nations. Japanese troops landed at Vladivostok on April 5, 1918 as an alleged reprisal for the murder of two Japanese on the previous day.¹¹ From August until November in 1918, troops of the Allied Powers--British, Japanese, French, and American--landed at Vladivostok. The United States and Japan made an agreement limiting American and Japanese troops to some 7,000 each. However, Japanese troops were in excess of 72,000.¹²

Japan was interested in the Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways, the Maritime Province and Vladivostok. In the Russian railway zone at Harbin, there were two principal white Russian factions. One was headed by the anti-Bolshevik, Lt. General Dimitrii Horvath, the other by Petr Yakolivick Derber, whose "government" was composed of

¹¹For this early Japanese landing, see Edward Hallett Carr, A History of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923, Vol. III (London: MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1953), p. 79.

¹²United States, Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, p. 288.

center-left Social Revolutionaries.¹³ Japan quickly contacted Horvath as a major Russian ally. Furthermore, the Japanese operation in Siberia was facilitated considerably by the Sino-Japanese treaty of May 1918 providing for cooperation in military measures, and granting permission for Japanese troops to move in Chinese territory. Late in July 1918, Japan invoked this agreement with China and dispatched troops to the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway. These troops soon controlled the line and occupied most of the railway towns. Once established, the Japanese utilized their position to direct supplies to Horvath. The Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railways were the focus of the Allies' attention because whoever controlled these railways controlled Siberia. From these events it became clear that Japan was expanding its sphere of influence into North Manchuria and fostering puppet regimes in Siberia.¹⁴ Koreans in Siberia nervously watched this development.

It was only due to American pressure that an inter-Allied railway control board over the Siberian and Chinese

¹³The whole story of the Allied intervention will not be discussed here. Only Japan's intervention will be treated. For the inter-Allied intervention, see Clarence A. Manning, The Siberian Fiasco (New York: Library Publishers, 1952). George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relation, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958).

¹⁴For the Japanese operation in the zone of the Chinese Eastern Railway, see Clarence A. Manning, op. cit., pp. 98-130.

Eastern Railways was established with Japan's assent. On November 16, 1918, Secretary of State Robert Lansing stated flatly that Japan's monopoly of the railways was opposed by the United States, and he demanded that Japan demonstrate its intention to co-operate by turning over control of the railroads to an inter-Allied commission.¹⁵ With the Bolsheviks' successful military campaigns, the European Allies and the United States began to withdraw by 1920. For two years the Japanese stayed on, controlling a great circular area reaching from Vladivostok to Chita, an area traversed by the Chinese Eastern and the Amur Railways. The Japanese tried in vain to annex the Maritime Province with Vladivostok. The Japanese troops were massacred by the peasant partisans at Nikolaevsk near the mouth of the Amur River, opposite northern Sakhalin in 1920. The Japanese retaliated and attacked Knabarovsk, Nikolsk-Urrurisky, and Spasskoye.¹⁶

A major threat to Lenin's government, thus, was undoubtedly the Japanese militarism in Siberia. The policy of the Soviet government towards Koreans was designed to reconcile two warring Communist factions and to place them under a broad united front of Korean nationalists against Japanese expansion. Whether Koreans were Communists or

¹⁵Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, II, pp. 433-435.

¹⁶Clarence A. Manning, op. cit., pp. 176-194.

nationalists did not make too much difference to the Soviet government. Bolsheviks tried fully to use the Korean's anti-Japanese movement. Koreans, on the other hand, tried to use Bolsheviks to liberate their homeland. It appears that national security or independence being primary concern for both, Communism or socialism was only a secondary issue. Hence, the Irkutsk faction, which appeared to have been more devoted to the international Communist movement and to Bolshevizing the Korean independence movement, was not particularly in Comintern's favor and was often ignored by Lenin's government. This attitude of the Comintern towards the Irkutsk faction can be seen in its effort to form a united front among Koreans.

The Comintern's effort to form a broad united front became more significant when Yi Tong-hwi moved to Shanghai to join the KPG on August 30, 1919. The KPG was then dominated by Syngman Rhee's followers, who shared his belief that the KPG was the center of propaganda activities and the basis for legitimizing his diplomacy. Intoxicated by Wilson's "Doctrine of Self-determination," Rhee advocated that Korean independence was only achievable through international organizations such as the League of Nations. Therefore, he argued, to appeal to a great power like the United States was a short-cut to national independence.¹⁷

¹⁷For Syngman Rhee's beliefs and activities, see Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1954).

Rhee stayed in the United States, doing his propaganda work as the President of the KPG. On the other hand, Yi Tong-hwi, originally a military man, advocated that Korean independence was only achievable through persistent military resistance against the Japanese.¹⁸ He joined the KPG as a premier in order to turn the KPG into a base for military activities against the Japanese. Furthermore, he estimated that the Comintern might render more positive assistance to the KPG because he insisted that he was a Communist. This move has been known as a Korean version of a united front strategy.

Immediately after the Second Comintern Congress in 1920, the Comintern became engaged in the Korean independence movement. Most of its funds were channelled to the Korean Provisional Government right after the united front strategy was implemented with Yi Tong-hwi's joining it. According to Kim Ku and Yo Un-hyong, both then cabinet members of the KPG, Lenin ordered that two million rubles be given to the KPG. When he met one of the Korean representatives to the Second Comintern, he reportedly questioned if two million rubles were sufficient to counter Japan.¹⁹

¹⁸ Kim Ku, Kim Ku Chasojon, Paek Pom Ilji (The Autobiography of Kim Ku, Memoirs of Paek Pom) (Seoul: Tong Myong-sa), pp. 281-283.

¹⁹ For Yi Tong-hwi's beliefs and activities, see Yi Sok-hun, Sunkuk hyongmyongka yoljon (Biographies of the Heroic Revolutionaries), op. cit., p. 149. Kim Pyong-jo, Han kuk tongnip undong sa, op. cit., p. 202.

All this happened during the Second Comintern Congress between July 19 and August 7, 1920. Furthermore, a secret treaty was signed between Lenin's government and the KPG on July, 1920. The treaty stated:

1. The Soviet government shall assist the Korean independence movement.

2. The Korean government shall gradually adopt Communism.

3. The training and gathering of the Korean army in Siberia shall be permitted, and necessary military supplies shall be furnished by the Soviet government.

4. The Korean army in Siberia shall be placed under the command of Russian officers designated by the Soviet government.²⁰

Lenin's intention is clearly implied in this treaty. As noted earlier, Lenin tried to fully use the Korean's independence movement against the Japanese expansionism in Siberia at that time.

All of these arrangements apparently indicate a strong Soviet commitment to use the Korean independence movement as a means to resist Japanese expansion in Siberia. No doubt the Comintern's support given to the Korean

²⁰Kim Hong-il, "Jayusi sabyon jonhu" (Before and After the Free City Incident), Sasangkye, February 1965. Kim's testimony can be confirmed by Osaka Asahi, December 10, 1920. The only difference is the date signed. The latter reports the treaty was signed in December 1920.

national independence movement was in accordance with the decision made at the Second Comintern Congress which was to support a bourgeois democratic revolution.²¹ Yet, the decision advocated that none of the internal integrity of the Communist movement was to be sacrificed. In other words, Communists should consolidate their power during the united front alliance. In the Koreans' case, however, one can note that the Comintern distrusted and neglected the warring Korean Communist factions. One can also notice that "the real facts about socialism and Communism" were not a determinant factor in the Comintern's policymaking towards the Korean Communists. Spreading of Communism among Koreans was out of the question at that time. The Soviet Union's major concern was its national security against the Japanese militarism. This Comintern's effort to bring forth a broad united front against the Japanese militarism will be examined further when this study examines its effort to establish Communist parties in Korea proper.

The first abortive attempt to establish a Communist party was roughly between 1920 to 1931. There were four attempts to establish the Communist party within Korea during this period. All the efforts were originated and

²¹See the text in The Second Congress of the Communist International as Reported and Interpreted by the Official Newspapers of Soviet Russia (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920).

directed from individuals from abroad, namely, Yi Tong-hwi's group, the Irkutsk group, and the Korean Communists in Japan. Marxism-Leninism found its way into Korea immediately after the March First Uprising in 1919. The Korean Communists may have viewed this mass demonstration as evidence of a socioeconomic climate which was susceptible to Marxism-Leninism. Some Communist historians even claim that the March First Uprising had the feature of a proletarian revolution.²² This argument is based upon the belief that the masses of workers and peasants were suffering from economic exploitation by the Japanese. Korea was a war base for Japan. The Japanese imposed heavy taxes on the Korean peasants, and the wages for the workers were far below subsistence.²³ However, there is no evidence that this mass movement was inspired and influenced by the great October Revolution. It was a purely nationalistic resistance against the Japanese rule. Ironically, the origin of this mass demonstration for independence can be traced to a group of the religious leaders, who were inspired by Woodrow Wilson's principle of "self-determination."²⁴

²²For example, see Yamabe Kentaro, "Sanichi undo to sono gendaiteki igi, I, II" (The March First Movement and Its Modern Significance), Shiso, no. 372-73 (June and July 1955), pp. 70-82 and 82-100.

²³See Nym Wales, "Rebel Korea" in Pacific Affairs, XV, No. 1 (March, 1942), pp. 25-43.

²⁴See note 5.

At any rate, the March First Uprising failed to transform the Anti-Japanese sentiment and sacrifice of the people into any tangible political force within Korea proper. The Communists' attempt to establish the Korean Communist Party was the beginning of the formation of a tangible political force out of this mass movement.

At this time, after the March First Uprising, the Japanese relaxed their tight control over Koreans, which encouraged Communists abroad to believe they could infiltrate the peninsula. The Japanese began to permit a relative increase in freedom of association and press. Some of the Korean newspapers enjoyed a hitherto unknown freedom to propagate Marxism-Leninism and encouraged intellectuals to advocate new ideas. Labor organizations, youth groups, farmer's associations, student groups and intellectual study groups started to emerge. Labor strikes and tenant-farmers strikes were quite frequent as is reflected in the figures in Tables I-1, I-2, and I-3.

The Communists abroad appear to have concluded that the situation was ripe for infiltration, and they became quite active. The three groups which dispatched agents to infiltrate these organizations were the Irkutsk faction, Yi Tong-hwi's faction (known as the Shanghai faction), and the Korean Communists in Japan (known as Puk song hoe). Eventually, each faction from abroad succeeded in forming a coalition which established the Korean Communist Party. The

Table I-1

Korean Socio-Political Organizations, 1920-1930

Year	Type of Organization										Total
	Nationalist	Socialist	Labor	Farmer	Youth	Boys	Outcasts				
1920	--	11	33	--	251	1	--	--			296
1921	--	18	90	3	446	14	--	--			571
1922	--	19	81	23	488	25	--	--			636
1923	--	55	111	107	584	43	--	--			900
1924	1	86	91	112	742	81	83				1,196
1925	1	83	128	126	847	127	99				1,411
1926	2	38	182	119	1,092	203	130				1,766
1927	104	85	352	160	1,127	247	150				2,225
1928	182	75	432	307	1,320	293	153				2,762
1929	214	56	465	564	1,433	366	162				3,260
1930	246	56	561	943	1,509	461	165				3,941

Source: Korean Government-General, Police Affairs Bureau, Saikin ni okeru Chosen chian jokyo (Recent Conditions of Public Security in Korea), Seoul, 1934, pp. 168-169.

Table I-2

Frequency of Labor Strikes, 1921-1925

Province	1921		1922		1923		1924		1925	
	A*	B**	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Kyongki	11	742	25	554	42	2,073	21	1,924	22	2,145
Chungbuk	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1	35
Chungnam	2	159	2	46	--	--	2	39	--	--
Jonbuk	1	50	1	205	5	383	6	3,980	3	97
Jonnam	1	230	--	--	1	160	1	115	6	529
Kyongbuk	4	261	3	106	1	25	4	389	1	465
Kyongnam	7	1,069	6	421	3	1,960	3	302	3	334
Hwanghae	1	55	2	91	1	120	--	--	1	78
Pyongnam	2	102	1	40	6	680	1	150	6	1,049
Pyongbuk	2	320	--	--	1	69	1	46	4	369
Kangwon	--	--	2	96	4	60	2	140	4	314
Hamnam	1	200	3	232	5	361	2	580	2	205
Hambuk	4	233	1	18	3	150	2	86	2	80
Total	36	3,430	46	1,809	72	6,041	45	6,751	55	5,700

*A: Number of incidents

**B: People involved

Source: Korean Government-General, Police Affairs Bureau, Saikin ni okeru Chosen chian jokyo (Recent Conditions of Public Security in Korea), Seoul, 1938, pp. 85-86.

Table I-3

Frequency of Tenant-farmers Strikes, 1921-1925

Province	1921		1922		1923		1924		1925	
	A*	B**	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Kyongki	2	56	2	5	3	331	1	151	1	21
Chungbuk	1	14	2	2,455	10	2,422	2	98	--	--
Chungnam	2	84	4	143	2	78	8	226	--	--
Jonbuk	7	801	2	53	6	293	1	40	--	--
Jonnam	4	115	--	--	24	1,620	59	2,990	4	1,514
Kyongbuk	7	1,641	3	134	3	71	8	511	--	--
Kyongnam	3	247	4	168	103	3,104	63	536	1	70
Hwanghae	--	--	3	380	7	654	18	2,141	1	460
Pyongnam	--	--	1	32	12	278	2	174	--	--
Pyongbuk	--	--	--	--	4	10	--	--	2	214
Kangwon	1	9	--	--	2	199	2	62	1	50
Hamnam	--	--	3	169	--	--	--	--	1	317
Hambuk	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Total	27	2,967	24	3,539	176	9,060	164	6,924	11	2,646

*A: Number of incidents

**B: People involved

Source: Korean Government-General, Police Affairs Bureau, Saikin ni okeru Chosen chian jokyo (Recent Conditions of Public Security in Korea), Seoul, 1938, p. 97.

Irkutsk faction was represented by the name of the Tuesday Association or T.A. (Hwayo hoe). It comprised roughly ninety members and included such notorious Communists as Kim Chae-bong, Kim Ch'an, Pak Hon-yong, Kim Tan-a, Cho Bong-am, and Cho Tong-u.²⁵ The Shanghai faction was represented by Kim Chol-su (a disciple of Yi Tong-hwi), Yi Pong-su, and Yu Chin-hi. The Korean students from Japan were represented by the name of the North Wind Association or N.W.A. (Puk Pung hoe) whose members were about sixty and included Kim Yak-su and Chong Un-hae.²⁶ A fourth group, the indigenous Communist faction in Korea was represented by the name of the Seoul faction, whose members included Kim Sa-kuk, Yi Yong, and Kim Hang.²⁷ The Shanghai group and the Seoul group were well coordinated with each other until 1927 when Shinkan hoe was formed. (This will be discussed shortly.) Hence, these two groups were known as the Seoul-Shanghai faction.

The first of the foreign based efforts during the period of 1920's to establish a Korean Communist Party was the Kim Chae-bong's efforts. He was dispatched by the

²⁵A largest portion of the members of the T.A. was journalists. The name, "Tuesday" Association was commemorative of Marx's birthday. The programs and membership of the T.A., see Dong-a-ilbo, July 11, 1923.

²⁶Chosen Sotokufu Homu Kyoku, Chosen Dokuritzu Shiso Undo no Hensen (The Development of Korean Independence Movement) (Keijo, 1931), p. 48.

²⁷Ibid., p. 48.

Irkutsk faction through Korean Organization Bureau of the Comintern. After organizing the Tuesday Association he later succeeded in forming the first Korean Communist Party within Korea on April 17, 1925.²⁸ It was named the Korean Communist Party (Choson Kongsandang) and known as Kim Chae-bong Party. The first party, as noted earlier, was a coalition among three different factions under Kim Chae-bong as elected party chairman. The Seoul-Shanghai faction and the North Wind Association shared some of the posts in the Central Executive Committee. The distribution of the posts are shown as follows:²⁹

<u>Position</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Faction</u>
Secretary-General	Kim- Chae-bong	Tuesday Association
Organizational Section	Cho-Tong-u	Tuesday Association
Propaganda Section	Kim Ch'an	Tuesday Association
Personnel Section	Kim Yak-Su	North-Wind Association
Agricultural Section	Chong Un-hae	North-Wind Association

²⁸The Communist activities of Tuesday Association were mostly directed by the Korean Organization Bureau of the Comintern located in Vladivostok. After the failure of the Comintern's effort to form a broad united front of Korean revolutionaries, this organization was established within the Comintern in December 1922 in order to reestablish all-Korean Communist Party either among Koreans abroad or within Korea proper. Whether or not this new effort of the Comintern was a serious one will be discussed shortly.

²⁹Kim Chun-yo, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 292-296.

Investigation Section	Chu-Chong-kon	Seoul-Shanghai
Political and Economic Section	Yu Chin-hi	Seoul-Shanghai

Furthermore, a subsidiary youth organization of the Kim Chae-bong party was organized by Cho Bong-am and Pak Hon-yong³⁰ and named the Korean Communist Youth Association or KCYA (Koryo Kongsan Chongnyonhoe).

The KPC announced in its party program that the struggle to drive the Japanese out was only a short-range objective of the party. The party proclaimed that its ultimate goals were the triumph of the workers and peasants over the bourgeoisie-Koreans as well as foreigners and the realization of classless society in Korea.³¹ Notwithstanding the ambitious beginning of the KPC, the first Communist party ended in failure mainly because of the efficiency of the Japanese police. For the Korean Communists' part, there were weakness and immaturity in their revolutionary

³⁰ Pak Hon-yong was from Yesan, Ch'ungchongdo. His first Communist indoctrination was at An Pyong-chan's research center in Shanghai. He became an active member of the Irkutsk faction. When he returned home, he became a journalist while he was organizing various youth groups. He emerged as the first Communist leader in South Korea immediately after the liberation. For his later activities, see Chapter III.

³¹ The political programs of the first KCP are available in their original language, Lenin chuui, Vol. II, No. 1 (January 15, 1930), pp. 1-30. An English translation is available in Suh, Documents, op. cit., pp. 156-167.

strategy. The lack of training in tactics and strategy of underground operations made them an easy target for the Japanese police. For example, the hatred of the Japanese prompted members to precipitate emotional street demonstrations, which exposed them to the Japanese authorities.³²

One major noticeable achievement of the first party was the diplomatic activities of the KCYA which succeeded in gaining the Comintern's recognition of the KCYA in 1925 and establishing close ties with the Komsomol. (The Korean Communist Party was not recognized until June 1926. It was during the second KCP under Kang Tal-yong.) The Komsomol agreed that the KCYA would send Korean students to be educated at K.U.T.V. (Kommunisticheskii Universitet Trudiashchikhsia Vostoka).³³ The KCYA sent the first group of twenty-one students in October 1925. They later returned and actively engaged in unsuccessful Communist movement in Korea. This success of the KCYA can be attributed to Cho Bong-am and Pak Hon-yong.³⁴ Although the first party was a coalition among three factions, the T.A. had dominated the

³²The Red Flag Incident would be a good example of this type of emotional street demonstrations. For the details of this incident, see Dong-a-ilbo, April 22, May 3, June 9, 1925. A much similar incident took place at Shinuiju on November 22, 1925, see Dong-a-ilbo, September 13, 1927.

³³Dae-sook Suh, op. cit., p. 72.

³⁴Chun-yop Kim, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 321-324.

Party's activities. Kim Chae-bong, Cho Bong-am and Pak Hon-young were all members of the T.A.

The second KCP was begun in an effort to perpetuate the first party after the leader was arrested. Before Kim Chae-bong was arrested in December, 1925, he handed over the party to Kang Tal-yong, who became party chairman. Under his leadership the group became the second KCP. It is known as the Kang Tal-yong party. Kang Tal-yong was originally a nationalist who had been jailed for three years because of his activities during the March First Uprising. Kang became a journalist who headed a branch office of the Choson-ilbo in Chinju, Kyongsangnamdo Province as was Kim Chae-bong. He had no connection with any of those Communist factions at that time. He later became a member of the T.A. for unknown reasons. Kang's managerial skills, efficiency in organization works, and perseverance was recognized by Kim Chae-bong. Kang was able to maintain the coalition among different factions. The second KCP ended in failure because of another attempted emotional street demonstration known as the June Tenth Uprising,³⁶ in which

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 365-367.

³⁶ June 10, 1926 was the funeral day of the Yi Dynasty's last king, Sunjong. Instigating the sentiment of masses lamenting the death of king Sunjong, the KCP attempted and organized a mass demonstration. Whereas the March First Uprising was organized by the Korean nationalists and was basically a non-violent demonstration, the June Tenth Uprising urged violence with "rocks, sticks, and sickles" against the "cruel Japanese police." For the development of this incident, see "Banseki ui jungon-Yuk sip manse sakon," Choson-ilbo, April 26, 1964. "Yuksip manse wa chongnyon hakdo," June 10, 11, 1960.

Communists attempted to emulate the March First Uprising.

One major achievement of the Kang Tal-yong party was the establishment of bureaus of the KCP abroad in order to reactivate exiled party workers. Kang Tal-yong ordered Kim Ch'an and Kim Tan-a to organize an overseas bureau in Shanghai. The KCP Overseas Bureau (Choson Kongsandang Hae-oe-bu) was formed in January 1926. The members included Kim Ch'an, Kim Tan-a, Cho Bong-am, Yo Un-hyong, Nam Manchun, and Cho Tong-u. This Shanghai bureau coordinated with Voitinsky of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern.³⁷ Kang also ordered Kim Chong-kyu to organize a bureau in Japan. The KCP Liaison Bureau in Japan (Choson Kongsandang Ilbon Yonrakbu) was established in April 1926. After Kim was arrested in July 1926, the bureau disbanded automatically.³⁸

Kang Tal-yong dispatched an order dated April 6, 1926, to organize the Manchurian General Bureau or MGB (Man-ju Chongkuk) as a branch of the KCP in Manchuria. The order was addressed to Kim Ch'an, but Kim Ch'an appointed Cho Bong-am and Choe Won-t'aek to establish the bureau. The headquarters of the MGB was established at Ninguta, Ningan County, Kirin Province on May 16, 1926. It organized three sectional bureaus: the East Manchurian Sectional

³⁷Chun-yop Kim, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 399-404.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 409-412.

Bureau in Yongjong, the North Manchurian Sectional Bureau in Tungchisien, and the South Manchurian Sectional Bureau in Pansih. Leaders of the MGB often staged mass demonstrations. Most of them were arrested by the Chinese police by October 1927. Attempts to revitalize and reorganize the MGB were made by other groups of the Korean Communists such as the N.W.A., the M.L. group and the Seoul-Shanghai faction, even after the Kang Tal-yong party collapsed in June 1926 following the June Tenth Uprising.³⁹

After the failure of the first and second KCP, the Korean Communists accepted a united front strategy with the nationalists, out of which emerged a notorious Marxist-Leninist group which became the third Communist Party in Korea. This strategy was advocated by the Korean students back from Japan known as the January Association (Ilwol hoe). They proposed a "Change of Direction" to form a broad united front strategy with the nationalists, transcending the petty economic struggle and conducting a wide-open political struggle to reach the masses eventually. The "Change of Direction" was the result of the influence of Fukumotoism in Japan. Fukumoto Kazuo, a well-known

³⁹The M.L. group organized its MGB during the third and fourth parties of the KCP. The origin of the M.L. group will be discussed shortly. The stronghold of the M.L. group was southern Manchuria. Kim Il-song had a little contact with the M.L. group. For Kim Il-song's relationship with the M.L. group, see Chapter III.

Japanese Communist, advocated the united front strategy for Korean Communism.⁴⁰ Fukumoto was presumably influenced by the Chinese experience.

After the March First Uprising the Japanese administrators had adopted a lenient policy. The Korean nationalists at that time showed national reformist tendencies.⁴¹ In other words, the main target of the national reformists was to obtain a possible political autonomy for Korea under the supervision of the Japanese Governor-General. This reformist approach was advocated by such well-known nationalists as Kim Song-su, An Chae-hong, Yi Sang-jae, Shin Sok-u and Kwon Tong-jin. The national reformists welcomed the Communist proposal for a united front because the national reformists wanted to prepare a broad base for an appeal to the Japanese administrators. On January 14, 1927, Korean nationalists and Communists formed a united front organization called Shinkan hoe.

⁴⁰For the declaration of Ilwol hoe (the January Association) known as the Chongu hoe son on (the Declaration of Chongu hoe) advocating the "change of direction," see Kim Yong-jin, "Choson Kongsandang sakon ui chinsang" (The True Picture of the Korean Communist Party Incident), Shinmin, No. 30 (October 1927), pp. 24-25. No Chong-hwan, "Choson sahoe undong ui sajak koch'al" (Historical Consideration of the Korean Socialist Movement), Hyondae pyongron, I, No. 6 (July 1927), pp. 17-21.

⁴¹It is not intended here to spell out theoretical differences between revolutions and reform. For some theoretical differences, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 264-395.

However, there was a serious misunderstanding of the true nature of the united front strategy on the part of Korean Communists. Robert A. Scalapino aptly said that the Korean nationalists and Communists in this era were not two monolithic groups. The great proportion of old revolutionaries fell somewhere in a spectrum that ran from "pure traditional nationalist" to "pure international Communists."⁴² The ambiguous ideological conviction of the old revolutionaries often caused grave mistakes. The formation of Shinkan hoe as a united front strategy is proof of this. In many cases, Korean Communist leaders failed to properly and to fully understand their revolutionary tasks.

An intensive factional struggle took place among the Korean Communists over the issue of joining the united front. They could not agree on a coherent strategy and tactics with respect to joining the front. Moreover, they did not properly understand the true nature of the national reformists. The January Association, one of the key factions in this dispute did not attempt to understand the difference between national reformists and national revolutionaries. It advocated joining the united front, arguing that the Korean Communists were essentially engaged in

⁴² Scalapino and Lee, "The Origin of the Korean Communist Movement (I)," op. cit., p. 31. For a good example of a Korean revolutionary, see Nym Wales (Helen Foster Snow) and Kim San, Song of Ariran: A Korean Communist in the Chinese Revolution (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1941).

emotional activities and neglected to awaken the masses. According to the Association, emotional activities, such as street demonstrations and attacking the Japanese officials, had not achieved much in terms of spreading Communism among the workers and peasants. It advocated joining the front, regardless of whether the nationalists were reformists or revolutionaries. Whereas the reformists activities and proposal for home-rule were considered legal by the Governor-General at this time the Communist Party was illegal. The January Association contended that the Communists had no chance of reaching and awakening the masses without utilizing other organizations. By joining the united front, they hoped eventually to gain control of the organization.⁴³

The Seoul faction, which was more seriously studying the nature of the national reformists, opposed the united front with the national reformists. Yi Yong, the key leader, argued that to merge with the nationalist reformists was to subjugate the Communist movement to the national reformists - "a treacherous act of disloyalty to those comrades suffering in the dungeons of the Japanese jails."⁴⁴ This group argued that the compromise of principles with the

⁴³For the conditions of Korean society under the "lenient" Japanese rule, see Chong-sik Lee, Politics of Korean Nationalism, op. cit., pp. 237-256.

⁴⁴Suh, Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 87.

national reformists, who in turn subjugated themselves to the Governor-General, was tantamount to abandoning the Communist movement. With the attitude of compromise, taking over the united front in Communist terms was almost impossible.

The Seoul faction was split on the issue of a united front, which aided the leaders of the January Association. The younger members of the Seoul faction (Sojangpa) denounced Yi Yong for his stand on this issue. The January Association won their support by the spring of 1927. It also secured the backing of the old Shanghai faction represented by Kim Chol-su, a disciple of Yi Tong-hwi, who had returned to Seoul after a short exile in Manchuria. The January Association (succeeding the North Wind Association), the old Shanghai faction represented by Kim Chol-su, and the Sojangpa of the Seoul faction finally formed a coalition known as the Marxist-Leninist group. This organization formed the third Communist party in Seoul in February 1927, from which it sought to control the united front.⁴⁵

It is worth noting that the decision to join the united front with the national reformists was in compliance with the Comintern's order. It endorsed the January Association stand advocating a "Change of Direction." The Comintern insisted that the most important task of the Korean Communists was to unify the various factions and

⁴⁵Kim Sang-ki, "Choksaek koeroe ui chongche" (The True Picture of the Red Puppet), in Hankuk Chonran Ilyon ji, Seoul, 1955, pp. 98-114.

win hegemony in Shinkan hoe.⁴⁶ The Comintern's vacillating policy towards the national reformists will be examined shortly. Failing to make a clear distinction between the national reformers and national revolutionaries, the Korean Communists adopted the united front organization with the national reformists.

The fourth effort to establish a KCP occurred in 1928 as a result of the Communists weak position in Shinkan hoe. Unable to significantly influence the leadership and initiative of the united front, which was dominated by the national reformers, the Communists established another (fourth) KCP outside of Shinkan hoe on February 23, 1928. The newly established party tried to establish cells in the united front in order to influence its direction. However, Shinkan hoe gradually became impotent because of the Japanese administrators' increasing repression. In contrast to their earlier tolerance, the authorities would not even permit Shinkan hoe to hold a national convention. A resolution to dissolve Shinkan hoe was passed on May 16, 1931.

⁴⁶This was reported in "Chosen Kyosanto narabi Korai Kyosan seinen-kai jinken kenkyo no ken" (Concerning the Arrest of the Korean Communist Party and the Korean Communist Youth Association Incident), Report of November 28, 1928, cited in Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 96. This directive, in endorsing the stand of the united front, specifically mentioned the stand of the January Association against the Seoul faction on August 8 and November 14, 1926. And it should not be confused with the December theses which will be examined shortly.

A number of reasons account for the failure of the efforts to establish the Korean Communist Party in Korea proper. The main cause of failure was the efficiency and high quality of the Japanese police. The Governor-General in Korea was directly responsible to the Japanese emperor. He ruled Korea by his own decrees, statutes, and regulations without regard to the Japanese Cabinet or the Diet. Fearful of potential resistance by Koreans, the Governor-General was granted unlimited power in the use of the police force under his direct control. The security section of the police in Korea was concerned primarily with so-called "high police duties" or political affairs. The Japanese police responsible for security matters reached every corner of Korean society and were used to oppress resistance organizations.⁴⁷

The repressive activities of the Japanese police can be summarized as follows: (1) the police were empowered to search any home without warrant when they deemed it necessary, (2) Habeas Corpus was unknown to Koreans and police had the right to arrest without due process of law, (3) the right to counsel was denied to Koreans before police investigations, (4) the police were allowed to use threats, deception, and all forms of physical and mental torture to secure admissions of guilt, and (5) summary jurisdiction was

⁴⁷ For the power of the Japanese Governor-General in Korea, see Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: John Day, 1944), pp. 254-258.

exercised by the police. This was limited to three months of imprisonment and a fine of one hundred yen. The powers and oppressive actions of the police created an environment similar to martial law.⁴⁸

Under such tight Japanese control, it was extremely difficult to foster revolutionary sentiment and even more difficult to organize and perpetuate a revolutionary movement. The Communists needed high quality training in tactics and strategy to counter the efficiency of the Japanese police. Instead, the Communists tended to be engaged in emotional outbursts such as street demonstrations and attacking Japanese officials, often yelling "long live the Korean Communist Party!" In many cases, the Communists exposed themselves to the police.

Furthermore, another important factor that contributed to the failure of the KCP within Korea was the indifference and neglect of the Comintern which did little beyond recognizing the KCP. Its knowledge of the situation in Korea was only perfunctory. It sent only a few directives to the Korean Communists. The two most important directives were the so-called "December Theses" and "Kuusinen's Theses." The December Theses were issued to the Korean Communists on December 10, 1928, immediately

⁴⁸For the Japanese police system, see Hdnry Chung, The Case of Korea (New York: F. H. Revell Co., 1921), pp. 61-73. For a Japanese source, see Kondo Kinnichi, ed., Taiheiyo senkano Choseno-yobi Taiwan (Tokyo, 1940), pp. 14-16.

after the Sixth Congress of the Comintern. The Kuusinen's Theses were published as an article by Otto Kuusinen who became a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in 1931. The Comintern's concern about the development of Korean Communism within Korea, which is reflected in these theses, deserves special examination.

The December Theses describes the nature of Korean society and economic structure. They pointed out that Korea was an agrarian society and that the masses of people were composed of the peasant class. The Korean peasants, according to the Theses, were suppressed and downtrodden by the terroristic Japanese police regime, and they had no prospect of an improvement of their position without a revolution. The Theses contended that the Korean Communist had made a serious mistake by neglecting the peasants and their revolutionary struggle. They urged the Communist leaders to incite the peasants and to educate them to class consciousness. Pointing out that the ranks of the Korean Communist leaders were mainly composed of intellectuals and students with bourgeois mentality, the Theses urged that intellectuals and students should be replaced by peasants and proletarians.⁴⁹

This part of the December Theses reflected the Comintern's misunderstanding of Korean society. In

⁴⁹ Inprecorr, Vol. IX, No. 8 (February 15, 1929), pp. 130-133.

contrast to Chinese society, which was in a semi-colonial status, Korean society was in a complete colonial status under the tight control of the Japanese. Therefore, most of the revolutionary activities were directed from outside Korea as noted earlier. The Communist leaders dispatched from abroad could not stay long enough to educate the masses of Korean peasants. It was practically impossible to organize a revolutionary rural base area as occurred in China. Furthermore, even the Korean Communist leaders from abroad failed to understand fully their revolutionary tasks. As Scalapino aptly said, at this time these KCP leaders were ideologically somewhere along a spectrum that ran from pure nationalist to pure international Communist.⁵⁰ Under these conditions, replacement of intellectuals and students with peasants and proletarians was extremely difficult.

Kuusinen's Theses, published three years after the December Theses, pointed out that the Korean Communists reflected the underdeveloped state of education and class consciousness in Korea.⁵¹ Kuusinen elucidated some of the strategic problems facing the KCP. He argued that the

⁵⁰ See footnote 42 of this chapter. There were no Korean Communists similar to Mao Tse-tung's well-trained cadres at this time.

⁵¹ Otto Kuusinen, a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, is reported to have shown a great interest in the Korean Communists. "Kuusinen's Theses" were the Comintern's elaborate appraisals of the failures of the Korean Communists within Korea. He attributed the main

Koreans were blind to some of the theoretical problems of revolution because of the lack of class consciousness and very limited participation of the proletariat in the Communist movement. He pointed out the necessity of bourgeois-democratic revolution in Korea and in colonies similar to it, which later could and would develop into a socialist revolution. According to him, there were many deviations from Leninism which must be studied carefully in understanding the true nature of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. Most important, he expounded the difference between national reformist and national revolutionary tendencies. He argued that the failure to understand the basic national reformist trend of the national bourgeoisie was a grave mistake in the strategy and tactics of the Communist parties concerned. He insisted that a mass revolutionary organization is different from superficial organizations, that the national reformist organizations tend to be superficial organizations. Kuusinen clearly stated that superficial organizations were not recommended by the Comintern.

As noted earlier in examining the process of the formation of Shinkan hoe, the Comintern endorsed the stand

cause of the failure of the KCP to the factionalism among Koreans. This portion of the Theses is concerned with the issue of national reformists. See Otto Kuusinen, "On the Korean Communist Movement" in Revolyutsionnyi vostok, No. 11-12 (1931), pp. 91-116. An English translation is available in Suh, Documents, op. cit., pp. 257-282.

of the January Association which advocated joining the united front with the national reformists. The Comintern did not really care about the true nature of Korean nationalists in the united front. The Korean nationalists in the Shinkan hoe were not true national revolutionaries. They were striving for possible "home-rule" under the Governor-General and the subjugation of the independence movement to the Japanese authority, a far cry from genuine political independence. The Comintern was clearly primarily interested in establishing a broad united front, which could be turned into a political force in opposition to Japanese expansion in the Far East. Examining Kuusinen's Theses, it is obvious that it was not consistent with the Comintern's earlier policy. The Comintern clearly had not established a consistent policy towards the Korean Communists.

In conclusion, it is clear that the Comintern was rarely affiliated with the Korean Communists. The development of Korean Communism abroad or within Korea proper was not really the Comintern's concern. It advocated a united front strategy between Communists and nationalists without clearly understanding the nature of the nationalist groups. Even in the 1930's, after the collapse of the KCP in Korea proper and the failure of the Communist bureaus abroad, the Comintern sent several directives to urge the Korean Communists to joint foreign parties in an effort to counter the Japanese. For example, in March 1930, the Chinese

Communist Party was assigned the task of re-establishing the KCP Korean Communists were ordered to join the Chinese Communists in Manchuria.⁵² In February 1932, the Comintern issued the January directive urging all the anti-Japanese guerrilla soldiers in Manchuria to unite under the CCP.⁵³

Looking at all the Comintern's policies toward the Korean Communists, including the early Comintern's relationship with the Korean Provisional Government and two Communist factions (Yi's faction and the Irkutsk faction), and the Comintern's relationship with the Korean Communist parties in Korea proper, it is clear that the major policies of the Comintern towards the Korean Communists were not concerned with Korean Communism, but rather with Soviet national interests. The Comintern wanted to counter the expansion of Japanese imperialism in Siberia, China, and Manchuria which was threatening the Soviet Union.

Thus, the effort to establish the Korean Communist Party within Korea ended in defeat in 1929. Most of the

⁵²Chuo Keimu Tosei Iin-kai, Manshyu ni okeru kyosan undo no sui-i gaikyo (Condition of the Development of the Communist Movement in Manchuria) (n.p., 1937), p. 14. Most of the Korean Communists' activities under the Chinese Communist Party were putschism along the line of Li Li-san program. For all the putschist activities, see Ibid.

⁵³The January Directive is available in Ibid., pp. 20-22. At this time, the Korean guerrilla soldiers were under direct control of Manchurian Provincial Committee of the CCP. It was one of the Korean guerrilla soldier units where the new Korean Communists emerged. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

old revolutionaries marched to jail, and a few of them escaped abroad in order to gather strength to re-establish the KCP within Korea. However, without effective control over their activities abroad, all these attempts ended in failure. Consequently, as noted earlier, the Korean Communists were forced to merge with foreign parties. The period 1931-1945 was the era when the Korean Communists were under foreign parties. The Communists outside Korea joined foreign parties such as the Japanese Communist Party, the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the CCP, and the Chinese Communist Party in Yen-an.

The period 1931-1945 is significant because of the emergence of a new group which came to power in 1945. The new Communist began to form in Manchuria in 1935. When Korea was liberated in August 1945, the old Communists who were released from jail and the ones returning from abroad were the first to emerge as a political group; but they failed again because of the disastrous consequence of the division of Korea. These post-war developments will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.

CHAPTER II

KIM IL-SONG'S REVOLUTIONARY BACKGROUND

This chapter deals with Kim Il-song's personal revolutionary background which has been imprinted on the later development of North Korean politics. The official North Korean documents will be carefully examined as a framework for Kim's revolutionary background. Stripping off endless eulogistic nonsense, one can assemble important facts. An effort will be made to confirm the validity of these facts with several other sources in order to determine what was omitted in the official accounts and in what respects Kim Il-song was inflated in these accounts. In so doing, Kim's foreign affiliation will be carefully analyzed.

After the collapse of the mainstream of the Communist revolution in 1928 and the failure of several attempts to re-establish the KCP early in the 1930's, the Koreans abroad started to advocate "one party, one country."¹ The

¹It appears that the theory of "one party, one country" was pronounced on the occasion of the dissolution of the Manchurian General Bureau of the Korean Communist Party on March 20, 1930. The document advocating this theory is available in Utisumi Haru ichi, Manchu kyosan-to undo gaikan (Dairen, 1935). It is titled as "The Dissolution Declaration of the Manchurian General Bureau of the KCP." An English translation is available in Documents of Korean Communism, op. cit., pp. 385-389.

principle of "one party, one country" was a rationale for Koreans to dissolve their own Communist parties and join their respective foreign parties. As a result of this theory, Koreans joined the Chinese Communist Party, the Manchurian Provincial Committee or MPC of the CCP, and the Japanese Communist Party.

At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935, the Comintern expressed a grave concern over the threat of fascism. The Seventh Congress decided to postpone the seizure of power by the dictatorship of proletariats and to fight against fascism in Italy, Japan, and Germany as its immediate task. The Seventh Congress argued that the world-wide situation justified the decision to align with the less aggressive capitalist countries temporarily to fight the fascists. The Comintern advocated the creation of a broad, anti-fascist, popular movement.² This 1935 policy was not particularly new in the Soviet policy to the Far East, as we have examined in the previous chapter. However, the official pronouncement of the policy was adopted at the Seventh Congress and openly encouraged the creation

²This had been a persistent policy of the Comintern even before the Seventh Congress. The Seventh Congress went even further to permit alliances with less aggressive capitalist countries. See VII Congress of the Communist International: Stenographic Report of Proceedings (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1939), especially pp. 553-577.

of a broad, anti-fascist party in any country.³ In response to this policy, the Korean Communists in China and Manchuria coined a slogan, "one party, one country," encouraging fellow Korean Communists to join one large foreign Communist party in each country where they were located.

Nevertheless, Koreans did not set forth any clear objectives for their activities under the foreign parties. The ultimate purpose of their activities abroad was logically to advance the cause of Communism in Korea, according to their original party declarations and platforms, not merely to contribute to the programs of the foreign parties. Most of the party declarations proclaimed that the struggle to drive the Japanese out was only a short-range objective of the party. The ultimate goals were the triumph of the workers and peasants over the bourgeoisie-Koreans as well as over foreigners and the realization of classless society in Korea.⁴ It would seem, according to their original declarations, that the theory of one party, one country, could be justified only if Koreans wanted to join foreign parties temporarily for the anti-fascist struggle or to learn revolutionary tactics and strategies in preparation

³For a good analysis of the Comintern's policy, see Kermit E. McKenzie, Comintern and World Revolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 140-165.

⁴The party platforms of the KCP are available in Chun-yop Kim, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 300, Lenin Chuui, Vol. II, No. 1 (January 15, 1930), pp. 1-30.

for future independent Communist activities of Koreans. However, there is no evidence that Koreans had these objectives in mind. The theory of "one party, one country" is absurd and irrelevant in view of their original declarations. Dae-sook Suh aptly argues that with the hopelessness of their uncoordinated activities abroad, Koreans could not help dissolving the bureaus abroad and joining the foreign parties. He argues that the theory of "one party, one country" was only a rationale to alleviate their defeat and frustration of the 1920's.⁵ It is with this theory that Koreans joined foreign parties.

One group of the Korean Communists who joined the Chinese Communist Party in Yen-an has been called "the Yen-an group." The origin of this Yen-an group traces back as follows. After the last effort to re-establish the KCP within Korea late in the 1920's, Korean Communist activities in China were almost non-existent. But there were two nationalist parties. One was Hankuk Tongnipdang which inherited the Korean Provisional Government. The other one was the Korean National Revolutionary Party (Choson Minjok Hyongmyongdang), headed by Kim Won-bong, which had strong support from the Chinese Nationalist (KMT) government. Whereas the KPG was the extreme right-wing nationalist, the KNRP was known to Korean Communists as moderate leftist.

⁵Suh, The Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 249.

The KNRP had its own military corps, Korean Volunteer Corps (Choson Uiyongdae), which operated against the Japanese.⁶

It was this nationalist group under Kim Won-bong that the remaining Communists joined. During the mid-thirties Communist participation increased after the arrival of the Communists who were released from the Japanese jails upon serving their terms.

Kim Won-bong and the Communists disagreed about the military operations against the Japanese in 1937. Kim insisted on operations in the KMT-occupied zones in central China, whereas the Communists favored northern China near Yen-an. The Communists and those who were discontented with leadership of Kim Won-bong had made contact with the Eight Route Army of the CCP in north China. Finally, the Second Unit under Kim's command, which was mostly composed of the Communists, started moving to north China.⁷ This mass

⁶For the details of the KNRP and Kim Won-bong's revolutionary activities, see Pak Tae-won, Yaksan kwa Uiyoldan (Kim Won-bong and Yiyoldan), 1947. Also see Nym Wales, op. cit., pp. 337-338.

⁷For the details of this story, see Chong-sik Lee, "Korean Communist and Yen-an," China Quarterly, No. 9 (1962). There are two different stories about this movement. Chong-sik Lee tells a story that this mass migration was a response to Chou En-lai's initiative. See Ibid. Lee quotes Ssu Ma Lu, Tou cheng Shih pa nien (Eighteen Years of Struggle) (Hong Kong, 1952), pp. 173-180. Dae-sook Suh tells a different story--that it was Koreans' own voluntary action. He points out that those Koreans from the KNRP were not subjected to any concrete program of indoctrination by the Chinese Communists, and there were no Chinese advisors assigned to them. See Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 184.

migration of the Communists from the KNRP was welcomed by a Korean general named Mu Chong who was a member of the CCP and had attained a position of considerable importance.⁸ He established the Korean Revolutionary Youth Cadet School in Tungko, Shansi Province, to train the Communists from the KNRP. In August 1942, all those gathered in north China organized a large unified group called the North China Korean Independence League (Hwabuk Choson Tongnip Tongmaeng) or NCKIL.⁹ The military forces under the NCKIL were placed under the New Fourth Route Army of the CCP. This was the origin of the Yen-an group which participated in the new regime of North Korea after World War II.

Most of its members were the old Communists who remained from the mainstream of the Communist movement or the ones who were released from the Japanese jails. Hence, the Yen-an group's participation in the new regime of North Korea in 1948 will be examined in connection with the rise to power of Kim's group after 1935.

⁸He was known as the founder and the first commander of an artillery regiment of the Chinese Red Army and as a close friend of Chu Teh. Chong-sik Lee, "Korean Communists and Yen-an," op. cit., p. 184.

⁹Choi Chang-ik, Kim Tu-bong, and Mu Chong were all the members of the Central Executive Committee. These names are important and will show up again in the later chapters. They also carried this organization with them when they entered North Korea in 1945. See the next chapter.

Kim Il-song's rise to power is also related to the theory of "one party, one country," because the guerrilla forces he joined were under the direction of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the CCP.¹⁰ Although, as will be noted soon, Kim was slightly related with the mainstream of the Korean Communist movement, he insists that he was not related with the old Communists, and later he accused the old revolutionaries of being engaged in "nefarious sectarian factionalism."¹¹

According to the theory of "one party, one country," the old Korean Communists in Manchuria joined the MPC of the CCP early in the 1930's. Most of their activities at this time were putschism, according to the Li Li-san program of the CCP. However, putschism in Manchuria had become increasingly difficult because of the drastic infusion of the Japanese police after the establishment of Manchukuo puppet regime in 1932. Furthermore, the Comintern and the CCP

¹⁰ Scalapino and Lee speculate this connection. They state, "By Mid-1930, however, all Korean Communist organizations in this area had more or less voluntarily disbanded, and the Chinese Communist Party had given complete control over the movement. Thus, young Kim must have joined the Chinese Communist Party, and worked under Chinese Communist direction." See Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea (Part I), op. cit., p. 208.

¹¹ For the new Communists' denunciation of the old, see Democratic People's Republic of Korea (English edition), Pyong-yang, 1958, pp. 57ff.; and Yi Na-yong, Choson minjok haebang tujaengsa (History of the Korean People's Struggle for Emancipation), Pyongyang, 1958.

condemned Li Li-san for his putschism as being "irresponsible adventurism." The Communist activities in Manchuria under the MPC experienced setbacks similar to those in Korea. Many old Korean Communists left Manchuria and returned to the Russian Maritime Province, to China and to Korea. The Chinese Communists themselves had retreated to the area near Harbin mainly because of the Japanese police. However, a unique feature of the Communists and nationalists in Manchuria is that they prolonged guerrilla activities which came under the Chinese Communist leadership. There were various Manchurian guerrilla forces which successfully fought the Japanese until the beginning of World War II. Kim Il-song received his training and later advanced to leadership in one of these Chinese guerrilla forces. Before we investigate his guerrilla activities, let us turn to the question: "Who is Kim Il-song?"

Kim Il-song, as a person, is generally understood in the western world as being ruthless, brute, and Spartan. However, one can often find some descriptions of Kim Il-song which sound quite similar to Mao Tse-tung's eulogies. For example, Wilfred G. Burchett, the celebrated Australian correspondent, who has become a friend of Kim's, describes as follows:

I could visualize him sitting down with peasants under a tree, perhaps chewing on a bit of straw, getting them to open their hearts. He has the warm, human touch, the simplicity of the great, and down-to-earth manner, rare among men

in his position. Even dealing with such unromantic problems as heavy industry, there is always some little aside, to remind his listeners, especially if there are bureaucrats amongst them, that the end result of everything is to make life better and gayer for everyone. Machines are not being built for machines but to lighten and brighten the human lot.¹²

An examination of the few accounts of western journalists and the lavishly publicized North Korean eulogies suggests that Kim Il-song endeavored to erase his Machiavellian personality and to create a new image of a national father. Analyses of a line after line of the publications reveals striking similarities, at least, in descriptions, between Kim Il-song's and Mao Tse-tung's style of leadership. It appears that Kim not only imitated Mao's policies in general, but also his political behavior.

Kim Il-song was the oldest of three sons of a peasant named Kim Hyong-jik,¹³ in Chilgol, Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang, Korea. His original name was Kim Song-ju. He was born on April 15, 1912. We do not know when he started using the name "Kim Il-song." The name, "Kim Il-song" is well known in Korea. According to a legend, an admired and respected national hero named "Kim Il-song" fought

¹²Wilfred G. Burchett, Again Korea (New York: International Publishers, 1968), p. 102.

¹³Baik Bong reports that Kim Il-song's father was an anti-Japanese fighter. See Baik Bong, Minjok ui taiyang Kim Il-song ch'anggun (General Kim Il-song: The Sun of Nation) (Pyongyang: Inmunkwahaksa, 1970), pp. 1-6.

courageously against the Japanese sometime near the beginning of this century. There have been several attempts to identify this legendary hero, but the originator of this legend has never been identified.¹⁴ There have been many Korean revolutionaries, nationalist and Communist, who adopted this name. Kim Song-ju was one of them who contributed to the legend and in turn used the legend to build his image as a national hero.

It is important to look into Kim's educational background, because there is a connection between his education and his future. According to Baik Bong, the most recent biographer of Kim Il-song, Kim's formal education began at Pataokou Elementary School when his family moved to Pataokou of Ch'ang pai hsien allegedly because of Japanese police persecution of his father.¹⁵ He was eight years old at that time. He graduated from this four-year elementary school which was a Chinese medium school. On January 30, 1923, when he was twelve years old, he alone came back to Chilgol, Mangyongdae, Korea to stay with his grandparents

¹⁴These attempts can be found, among others, Yi Puk, Kim Il-song wijosa (The Counterfeit Record of Kim Il-song), pp. 39-52. Kim Sung-hak, ed., Hankuk tongnip undongsa (History of Korean Independence Movement) (Seoul, 1956), pp. 35-36. Kim Ch'ang-sun, Pukhan shiponyonsa (The Fifteen-year History of North Korea) (Seoul, 1961), pp. 55-56. All these writers talk about different persons, but all the heroes are anti-Japanese fighters.

¹⁵Baik Bong, op. cit., p. 28.

and to attend Ch'angdok Elementary School in Chilgol for only two years.¹⁶ When he was fourteen, he had to return to Pataokou after learning that his father was arrested by the Japanese police. He moved to Musong when he heard that his father had escaped the Japanese police and was staying there. In the spring of 1925, he registered at the First Senior Musong Elementary School which was a Chinese school.¹⁷ According to Dae-sook Suh's account, there were Korean schools in Musong at that time, but Kim chose to continue to attend a Chinese school.¹⁸ Suh's account was supported by Baik Bong's biography.¹⁹

When Kim graduated from the First Senior Musong Elementary School in 1926, he entered the Hwasong Middle School in Hwa-jon which was run by Korean nationalists. According to Baik Bong, Kim did not like the school curriculum which was predominantly preoccupied with Korean nationalism. Baik Bong implies that Kim preferred a Communist education.²⁰ He switched to the Chinese Ryuwen Middle School after he quit the Hwasong Middle School. The Ryuwen Middle School, however, did not follow a Communist

¹⁶Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 40. It was not known what grade he was in.

¹⁸Suh, The Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 263.

¹⁹Baik Bong, op. cit., p. 40.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 43-44.

curriculum.²¹ Kim's formal education lasted a total of ten years. All but the two years at Ch'angdok were in Chinese schools.²² This Chinese educational background certainly had an impact on Kim's future activities as will be discussed in the following chapters.

It is very difficult to trace Kim Il-song's activities during the period between his entry to the Hwasong Middle School in 1926 and his organization of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army (Hangil Yukyokdae) in 1932, because the North Korean version of Kim's life cannot be verified. According to Baik Bong's account, there is no one under whom Kim studied Communism or who had directed his thinking to Communism. Baik Bong tells the following story.

When Kim was fourteen and attended the Hwasong Middle School, he organized the Anti-Imperialist League (Tado Jekukjuui Dongmaeng). On October 17, 1926, he proposed to drive out the Japanese imperialists and to achieve Korean independence through the Marxist-Leninist thought and organization.²³ After that, he continued his organizational work among youth and organized another youth

²¹Baik Bong, Inryu haebang ui kusong Kim Il-song wonsu (General Kim Il-song: Liberator of Mankind) (Pyongyang: Rodongdang chulpansa, 1972), p. 27.

²²For confirmation of these schools as Chinese schools, see Zaiman nihon daishikan, Zaiman Chosenjin gaikyo (General Survey of Koreans in Manchuria) (n.p., 1935), p. 117.

²³Baik Bong, Inryu haebang ui kusun, op. cit., p. 17.

organization called the New Day's Youth League Saenal Sonyon Dongmaeng) in Musong on December 15, 1926 teaching its members about the necessity of Korean independence and Marxism-Leninism.²⁴

Later when Kim entered the Ryuwen Middle School on January 17, 1927, he expanded the Anti-Imperialist League and taught its members about Marxism-Leninism. During his first year in the Ryuwen Middle School, at the age of fifteen, his organizational work reached a peak. He organized Choson Kilim Sonyonhoe (the Korean Youth Association in Kirin) and Choson Kongsanjuui Chongnyon Dongmaeng (the Korean Communist Youth League) and expanded branch organizations into the neighboring villages.²⁵ Furthermore, he took over the leadership of a nationalist organization called Yukil Hakuho (the Kirin Student Friends Association) and transformed it into a Marxist-Leninist organization.²⁶ At the end of this year, he organized Baik-san Chongnyon Dongmaeng (the Baiksan Youth League). All of these were Marxist-Leninist organizations and the fifteen-year old Kim taught all the members about the necessity of national independence and Marxism-Leninism. Baik Bong did not reveal the size of membership in these youth organizations,

²⁴Ibid., p. 20.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 24-25.

²⁶Ibid., p. 25.

but he said these youth organizations reached a new stage of development under the leadership of Kim Il-song.

Because of his political organizations, he was imprisoned in October 1929 for seven months.

An attempt is made here mainly to identify some of these political organizations which Kim claims he formed at the age of fifteen. According to a report of the local Japanese Kirin Consul at that time, Kirin was a stronghold of the M.L. group. The ranking members and the leaders of the Korean youth group in Kirin were Pak Il-p'a, Kim In-ki and Kim Sun-ki. The chairman of the Korean Youth League (Hanin Chongnyon Dongmaeng) was O Hae-ch'u, the secretary of the KCYA of the M.L. group.²⁷ There was an Anti-Imperialist League (Tado Jekukjuui Dongmaeing) formed in Kirin by the various Communist factions, probably under the leadership of the M.L. group on December 31, 1929. The primary purpose of the league was to stage a mass demonstration in Manchuria in support of Kwangju Student Incident on November 3, 1929.²⁸ There was also a student organization called Yukil Hakuho (the Kirin Student Friends Association) in Kirin whose members were mainly Korean students above

²⁷"Zai Kirin soryoji-kan oyobi Tonka bunkan" (The Consulate-General in Kirin and the Subconsulate in T'unhua), cited in Suh, The Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 266.

²⁸For the details of this organization, see "Kakkoku ni okeru shakai shugi sonota kiken shugi kankei joho zassan," pp. 802-803, 1,083-90, cited in Ibid., p.153.

the level of middle school, including the Ryuwen Middle School. The leader of this organization was a student at Kirin Kollege named An Pyong-ki.²⁹ It seems that Kim claims these three organizations as his own. Dae-sook Suh suggests that Kim Song-ju (Kim Il-song) might have joined these three organizations, although it is doubtful that he attained any position of prominence at this time.³⁰

The first record of Kim Song-ju's participation, if not leadership, in any group activity can be found in the report of the Japanese Consul in Kirin on May 14, 1929. According to this account, a group of approximately ten Korean nationalists and Communists gathered at the home of a certain Korean in Taedongmun, Kirin, in early May 1929 and attempted to organize a Communist youth group. The initiator of the meeting and later leader of the group was Ho So, who was a member of the KCYA of the South Manchurian section of the MGB (M.L. group). Among those present was a student of Ryuwen Middle School named Kim Song-ju.³¹ He seems to have worked under Shin Yong-kun in organizing a local boy's group and also in recruiting student members. While Professor Dae-sook Suh denies any possibility of Kim's

²⁹"Zai Kirin soryojikan oyobi Tonka bunkan," pp. 10,043-45 cited in Ibid., p. 153.

³⁰Note the similarity between Hanin Chongnyon Dongmaeng and Choson Kongsanjuui Chongnyon Dongmaeng.

³¹"Zai Kirin soryojikan oyobi Tonka Bunkan," pp. 9,640-9,995, 10,040-48, 10,276-79, cited in Ibid., p. 267.

leadership in these groups, it seems possible that Kim Song-ju might have had his own peer groups or at least organized small groups while working under Shin Yong-kun. It may be possible that later in his glorified biographical accounts Kim used these names for his peer groups such as the New Day's Youth League (Saenal Sonyon Dongmaeng), the Korean Youth Association in Kirin (Choson Kilim Sonyonhoe) or the Baiksan Youth League (Baiksan Chongnyon Dongmaeng).

Immediately after Kim was released from the Kirin prison in the spring of 1930 he began to organize the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army (Hangil Yukyokdae). This organization became the basis of his achievement and retention of power in North Korea for three decades. The formation of the Anti-Japanese Army was proclaimed by Kim and his eighteen soldiers in Antu on April 25, 1932. There are conflicting facts and stories concerning Kim's life after the formation of this group. The best way to trace his political and military life is to carefully examine official North Korea's biographies and to compare and contrast them with some other available materials. There are several major themes running through his official biographies. They are: "Our great and beloved leader" had mastered Marxism-Leninism, he was an invincible military leader deeply committed to national liberation, and he was unmistakably wise in political matters likewise. Other than these eulogistic expressions, one can notice that North Korean

biographers often omit Kim Il-song's affiliation with foreign political parties or military organizations and grossly inflate his role to an all-Korean leader and commander. The official North Korean biographies will be used as a framework for the following account of his military and political activities. An effort will be made here to detect the facts omitted by the official biographers and to evaluate fairly his roles in various military units and political organizations.

According to Baik Bong, Kim-Il-song was the only pre-war leader who had properly conceived a strategy to liberate the country from Japanese rule. On December 16, 1931 he gave a famous speech at the Mingyuekou meeting in Yenchi county. He argued that the only way to drive out the Japanese aggressors and gain national independence was through a military struggle.³² No other means could possibly work in the anti-Japanese struggle, he argued. Furthermore, he proposed that the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army should be drawn from workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals and patriotic youth, and that they should be equipped with Marxism-Leninism and maintain a strong tie with the Korean masses.³³ He recruited his soldiers

³²Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., p. 45.

³³Kim Il-song, Kim Il-song jojaksonjip (Selected Works of Kim Il-song), 1968 ed., Vol. II, p. 65.

(18 men in the beginning) from his earlier organizations such as the Anti-Imperialist League and the Korean Communist Youth League. Immediately after he announced formation of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army, he expanded his guerrilla units into Wangching, Yenchi, Hunchun, and Holung in East Manchuria.

Kim Il-song had even conceived "revolutionary bases," according to Baik Bong, which his guerrilla units could rely on in terms of military supplies, training, recruitment and fortifications. These bases were created in "the liberated areas" such as Tawangching, Hsiawangching in Wangching county; Yentunglatzu in Hunchun county; Yulangtsun and Niufutung in Holung county; and around Chechangtzu in Antu county in East Manchuria.³⁴ With the expansion of his guerrilla forces and the base areas, in the spring of 1934 Kim changed the name of the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Army into the Korean Revolutionary Army. It was supposed to carry out the tasks of the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolution. Kim even established a people's revolutionary government based on "the worker-peasant alliance led by the working class, and relying on the united front of the broad anti-Japanese patriotic forces."³⁵

³⁴Baik Bong, A Political Biography Kim Il-song: Premier of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (New York: A Guardian Book, 1970), English ed., Vol. I, p. 174.

³⁵For the organization and structure of Kim's people's revolutionary government, see Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil (The Glorious Path Which Our Party has Walked on), (n.p., 1965), p. 24.

Baik Bong argues that by eliminating the old ruling system and launching various democratic reforms, Kim created "new societies" in these liberated areas. His guerrilla soldiers vigorously and successfully defended these revolutionary bases. A major battle was fought against the Kwantung Japanese Army and the Manchoukuo Army in defense of the Hsiaowangching base in the spring of 1933.³⁶ Kim had scored the first major victory against the Japanese soldiers.

Kim's guerrilla operations began with what was known as "the expedition to North Manchuria" in 1935. The expedition to North Manchuria was the result of the Yaoyingkou meeting in Wangching county, held towards the end of March 1935. Kim proposed a new military strategy of dissolving the guerrilla base areas and a "positive offensive" of deploying anti-Japanese guerrilla units in still broader areas. Baik Bong explains, this strategy was to strengthen contacts with "anti-Japanese guerrilla units" operating there and to "develop large scale joint operations" with them to deal heavier blows on the enemy.³⁷ He does not identify these "anti-Japanese guerrilla units" with whom

³⁶For the story of this battle, see Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., pp. 66-71.

³⁷Baik Bong, op. cit., English ed., p. 245. Baik Bong does not mention the necessity of joint operation in his Korean language version of Kim's biography. This statement shows up in his English language version of Kim's biography. His English version is not an exact translation from the Korean version. Stories in English version are quite different from the one in Korean language.

Kim developed "large scale joint operations." Undoubtedly they were guerrilla units under the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army (Tungpei Jenmin Komingchun).³⁸ Baik Bong deliberately omitted Kim's affiliation with the NEPRA which will be discussed shortly. According to Baik Bong, Kim's soldiers annihilated the "Chingsan army"³⁹ at the Laoheishan Battle in June 1935. Kim's unit successfully repelled the 800 troops of Japanese soldiers at Shantungun in Ningan county in July. Kim's man, Choi Hyun raided an enemy military train on the Hsienching-Tumen line, and Kim's units harassed enemies in various other minor battles. One major theme, Baik Bong insists, is that General Kim Il-song was the supreme commander of all these military operations of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. All the victories were won by "outstanding strategy developed by General Kim Il-song."

The next major development in the evolution of his political and military leadership was his organization of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland (Chokuk Kwangbokhoe) at the Tunggang meeting on May 5, 1936. North Koreans today claim that the ARF was the first broad mass organization of the anti-Japanese national united front. It rallied broad sections of anti-Japanese masses

³⁸ NEPRA was a Chinese Communist-controlled guerrilla army organized on September 18, 1933.

³⁹ The "Chingsan army" was a crack regular unit of the Manchukuo Army directly commanded by the Japanese officers.

including workers, peasants, intellectuals, students, petty bourgeoisie, and even religious people.⁴⁰ It declared a ten-point program, which was reportedly written by Kim Il-song himself. Today, "the great ten point program" is required reading for all the North Koreans.⁴¹

The ARF, according to various North Korean sources, contributed greatly to the national liberation movement in close cooperation with the Korean People's Revolutionary Army. It bound together all the Koreans in the Changpai guerrilla bases which Kim Il-song created again after his victory of the Fusung battle with Japanese soldiers in August 1936. The ARF expanded from there into Korea proper

⁴⁰All of the official North Korean accounts of Kim Il-song's military and political activities before the World War II are very similar. Here we have used Baik Bong's account as a major framework thus far. There are many other similar accounts on Kim's biography. See, for example, Choson Rodong-Ryoksa Kyojae (Pyongyang: Choson Rodongdang chulpansa, 1964), and Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil (n.p., 1965). For an earlier biography of Kim Il-song, see Han Sul-ya, Hero General Kim Il-song (Tokyo: Shoson Shinbosa, 1962). Also, there are various articles written on specific issues. For the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland, see Chang Mun-son, "Chokuk Kwangbokhoe ui ch'angkon kwa panil minjok haebang undong eso non yokhwal" (The Establishment and Its Role in the Anti-Japanese National Liberation Movement), Yoksa kwahak, No. 3 (May 1960), pp. 8-24. Also, see Kim Kyong-in, "Choson minjok haebang t'ujaeng eso Chokuk Kwangbokhoe ui hyongmyong-jok opjok" (The Revolutionary Role of the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland in the Struggle for the Korean People's Liberation), Kulloja, No. 174 (May 1960), pp. 28-35.

⁴¹The text is available in Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

in order to help Kim's home expeditions, such as the Pochunpo battle which will be discussed shortly. For example, Kim's men, like Pak Tal and Pak Kum-chol, had organized the Korean National Liberation League (Choson Minjok Haebang Tongmaeng) whose original name was the Kapsan Operational Committee (Kapsan Kongjak Wiwonhoe).⁴² The KNLL was a branch organization of the ARF which operated in Korea proper. The KNLL was extended into labor and peasant organizations in Korea. It supplied the Korean People's Revolutionary Army with food, clothes, and most importantly military intelligence.

Kim Il-song's most successful military operation against the Japanese, of which North Koreans today are most proud, was the Pochunpo battle on June 2, 1937. Kim led an expeditionary force of some 150 partisans from "the Sixth Division of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army" and destroyed the town of Pochunpo, Hamkyongnamdo, Korea. His soldiers killed the Japanese police officers and burned the Japanese police stations and homes of pro-Japanese Koreans.⁴³ The historical significance of this battle,

⁴²For the role of the Korean National Liberation League, see Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., pp. 45-50.

⁴³For the story of the Pochunpo battle, see Oh Baik-ryong, "The Ponchunpo Battle," Korea Today, no. 73 (June 1962), pp. 15-18. This story has been widely publicized in English language. Also, see Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., Han Sul-ya, op. cit., Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., and Choson Rodongdang Ryoksa Kyojae, op. cit.

quoting from Kim's own words, is not that Koreans killed several Japanese but that Koreans demonstrated that they were alive, that they could fight the Japanese, that they would get their independence eventually.⁴⁴ As noted earlier, Kim's adventure was well coordinated with the members of the ARF and the KNLL such as Pak Tal, Pak Kum-chol, and Chun Bong-soon. It was reported that Kim's victory was largely attributable to the secret intelligence services provided by these members.⁴⁵

According to the official document of the Korean Workers' Party (Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil), Kim Il-song left the Changpai guerrilla bases as part of an overall strategic change directed by "the All Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Command" toward the end of 1937.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, according to this party document, Kim was critical of "the left adventurism," by which he implied that "the All Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Command" was unable to survive the "big cleanup operation" by 200,000 troops of the Japanese army in South and North Manchuria. At the

⁴⁴Kim Il-song, Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. V (Pyongyang: Rodongdang Chulpansa, 1965), pp. 504-505.

⁴⁵Oh Baik-ryong, op. cit., p. 16.

⁴⁶Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., pp. 55-56. "All Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Command" apparently means the Chinese Communist-controlled NEAJUA. The party document is very hazy on this connection. It never clarified what is meant by "All Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Command."

Nanpaitzu meeting of November 1938, Kim was determined to personally lead his main force on a difficult march back to the Changpai bases. This hundred-day ordeal has been known as "the arduous march" among North Koreans. Kim's unit arrived at the Changpai bases in the spring of 1939. Immediately after his arrival at Changpai, he ventured again into Korea in April 1939. He won another major battle known as the Musan battle.⁴⁷

Although the official North Korean biographies and other documents never admitted that their leader, Kim Il-song, has ever been defeated in any battle, it appears that Kim suffered defeat in front of "the big cleanup operation" of the Japanese Kwangtung army in the early 1940's. It has been reported that Kim Il-song proposed small-unit operations at the Hsiaohaerhpaling meeting in Tunhua country in August 1940. His main rationale for this proposal was to prevent unnecessary sacrifices caused by "adventurism" and to save revolutionary strength for a final decisive confrontation with the Japanese.⁴⁸ The official documents and Kim's biographers report various small-unit operations between June 30, 1941 and August 9, 1945, but these reports were

⁴⁷For the story of "the arduous march" and the Musan battle, see Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., pp. 128-140.

⁴⁸Choson...yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., pp. 58-61. Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., pp. 128-140.

silent on Kim's own activities during this period.⁴⁹ On August 9, 1945, according to Baik Bong's account, Kim ordered the mobilization of all units under the Korean People's Revolutionary Army for the final decisive offensive against Japanese imperialism.⁵⁰ Whatever happened to Kim Il-song during this period will be discussed shortly. Let us now turn to several sources other than the North Korean official voices to find out what stories were omitted and in what respect Kim Il-song's activities were grossly inflated.

As noted earlier, after the establishment of Manchukuo in 1931, Chinese opposition to the Japanese advance almost collapsed early in the 1930's. The Chinese Communists had retreated to the area near Harbin. However, various small guerrilla forces continued their activities against the Japanese. The Comintern issued the January Directive in February 1932, urging all the anti-Japanese

⁴⁹ According to Dae-sook Suh's account, Kim claims that he stayed in Manchuria until August 1945. See Suh, The Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 289. Suh does not document this claim. Kim has never claimed that he stayed in Manchuria until August 1945. All the official North Korean documents are simply silent on this matter. Kim, as a matter of fact, indirectly admits that he stayed in the Soviet Union, see yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵⁰ Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., p. 160. In this Korean language version, Kim, as a supreme commander, alone ordered this mobilization. In Baik's English language version, however, Kim operated with the Soviet Army.

guerrilla forces to unite under the CCP.⁵¹ As a result of this directive, the small groups of anti-Japanese partisans were reorganized into the Tungpai Jenmin Komingchun (the Northeast People's Revolutionary Army: NEPRA) in September 1933.⁵² According to some Chinese and Japanese sources, it seems obvious that Kim Il-song affiliated this Chinese Communist-controlled NEPRA. The NEPRA was reorganized into Tungpai K'angjih Leinchun (the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army: NEAJUA) in January 1936.

A report on Kim Il-song's earliest military activities is found in a Japanese police record of May 1935. According to this report, Kim was in charge of the Third Detachment, the First Company, the Second Army of the NEPRA, operating primarily in the Chientao region.⁵³ There were many Koreans in all six armies of NEPRA whose chain of command and organizational structure is shown in Chart II-1. The Second Army was predominantly Korean, headed by a Korean commander, Chu Chin. Kim Il-song's "expedition to North Manchuria," which had begun in March 1935, coincides with the fact that Kim fought under the Second Army of the


⁵¹For the January Directive, see notes 53 and 54 in Chapter I, p.

⁵²Lei Ting, Tungpei iyungchun yuntung shihhua (The Historical Stories of the Northeast Volunteer Army Movement) (Shanghai: Tienma shutien, 1937), pp. 70-73.

⁵³Gunseibu, Komonbu, Manchukuo, Manshu kyosanhi no kenkyu (The Study of the Manchurian Communist Bandits), Vol. I (Shinkyō: Kao insatsu-kyōku, 1937), pp. 125-178.

CHART II-1

Chain of Command
NEPRA



Source: "Zai-Man han-Nichi butai no shinkeiko" (New Trend of Anti-Japanese Forces in Manchuria), Chugoku shiryō geppo, III, no. 2 (May 1936), pp. 45-49.

NEPRA. It is safe to assume that Kim's various battles, which he claims he won during his expedition to North Manchuria, were the occasions of a joint operation of the Second and Fifth Armies under the command of Chou Pao-chung.⁵⁴

Kang Sheng, the Chinese representative in the Seventh Congress of Comintern in 1935, dispatched a new group of agents headed by a Chinese named Han Shou-kuei. Han was instructed to reorganize the MPC and to form a new people's popular and united front.⁵⁵ After Han Shou-kuei's arrival at the MPC in January 1936, there was an important change in the NEPRA. With some additional small guerrilla forces such as the Northeast Volunteer Army and the Sanlin company, the NEPRA was reorganized into Tungpei K'angjih Leinchun (the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army). Yang Ching-yu became the commander-in-chief of the entire NEAJUA. Wang Teh-t'ai, who served under Chu Chin as a political commissar, succeeded Chu as the Second Army Commander, and another Chinese, Wei Chi-min, served as political commissar of the Second Army. The three divisions under Wang Teh-t'ai were commanded by a Korean and two Chinese. It

⁵⁴Baik Bong does not reveal the fact that Kim was affiliated with NEPRA, but he says that Kim developed "large-scale joint operations" with "anti-Japanese guerrilla units." See his English version, p. 245.

⁵⁵Hatano Kenichi, Chugoku kyosan-to shi, 1936 (History of the Chinese Communist Party, Vol. VI, 1936) (Tokyo: Gaimusho Johopu, 1937), pp. 743-755.

appears that Kim Il-song was promoted to the commander of the Third Division of the Second Army, probably due to his performance during the joint operation under Chou Pao-chung. The commander of the First Division was a Chinese named Chu Shu-tung, and the Second Division was commanded by a Chinese, Shih Chung-huan.⁵⁶ The chain of command of the NEAJUA is shown in Chart II-2.


The NEAJUA expanded during 1936, and there were some eleven armies under it. During Han Shou-kuei's leadership in the MPC, nine of these armies were organized into three "Route" Armies under the direction of the MPC. The First Route Army, under the South Manchurian Committee of the MPC, included the First and the Second Armies and was commanded by Yang Chin-yu. The Second Route Army, under the Kitung Committee of the MPC, was commanded by Chou Pao-ch'ung and included the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Armies. The Third Route Army, under the Northern Manchurian Committee of the MPC, was commanded by Chao Shang-chi and included the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Armies.⁵⁷ Under this reorganization, the Second Army, together with the First

⁵⁶Hatano Kenichi, ed., Chugoku kyosan-to 1937 nen shi (History of the CCP, 1937) (Tokyo, 1938), p. 819. "Tohoku konichi rengun dai shigun oyobi giyugun" (The Fourth Army of the NEAJUA and Voluntary Army), Gaiji keisatsu-ho, no. 182 (September 1937), p. 29.

⁵⁷Gaimu-sho, Toa-kyoku, Japan, Shina oyobi Manchu ni okeru kyosan undo (The Communist Movement in China and Manchuria) (n.p., 1938), p. 98.

CHART II-2

Chain of Command
NEAJUA



Source: Chi Yun-lung, Yang Ching-yu ho k'ang-kien ti-i lu-chun (Yang Ching-yu and the First Route Army of the NEAJUA) (n.p., Tungpai, 1946), pp. 22-23.


Army, became the First Route Army, and Kim Il-song became the Sixth Division commander of the First Route Army. Kim was specifically assigned to areas like Changpai, Musong, and Linchiang. The "famous" battle of Pochunpo was fought when Kim was the commander of the Sixth Division of the NEAJUA. According to Oh Baik-ryong's account, Kim was leading "the Sixth Division of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army." The new chain of command is shown in Chart II-3.

While North Koreans are silent on whatever happened to Kim Il-song and his guerrilla units during the period between August 1941 and August 9, 1945, there are various reports that he left Manchuria and joined the Russian Red Army.⁵⁸ Apparently the NEAJUA was falling, because Kim's superiors were gradually dying on the battle fields. Yang Ching-ui, commander-in-chief of the NEAJUA died on February 20, 1940, and Chao Shang-chih, the Third Route Army commander, died on February 22, 1942. Kim's immediate superior, Wang Teh-t'ai, commander of the Second Army, died in a battle in Menchiang county in 1936.⁵⁹ As Kim admits,

⁵⁸Chang-sun Kim, Yoksa ui chungin (The Eyewitness of History) (Seoul: Hankuk aseha pankong yonmaeng, 1956). Tsuboe Senji, Chosen minzoku dokuritsu undo hishi (Secret History of the Korean People's Independence Movement) (Tokyo: Nikkan rodo-sa, 1959), pp. 445-446. Asaoka Mitsumasa, "Chosen dokuritsu undo monogatari" (Story of the Korean Independence Movement), Mainichi joho, V (October 1950), pp. 110-117.

⁵⁹Gaimu-sho, Tao-kyoku, op. cit., p. 102.

CHART II-3



Source: Gaimu-sho, Toa-kuoku, Japan, Shina oyobi Manchuria ni okeru kyosan undo (The Communist Movement in China and Manchuria) (n.p., 1938), pp. 98-105. The new Route Armies incorporated old armies with *.

it seems inevitable that the NEAJUA would be divided into small guerrilla bands to carry out small unit operations, because of a special Japanese security operation to suppress the guerrilla forces in Manchuria.⁶⁰

According to one Japanese source, Kim Il-song had already established a liaison route with the Soviet Far Eastern Army and moved his stronghold to the Soviet Union by the spring of 1940. These small guerrilla bands, numbering about 300 men reportedly waged small-unit operations in various areas of Manchuria.⁶¹ According to the testimonies of two guerrillas, Yi Tong-paek and Kim Pon-mo who had fought under Kim Il-song and were arrested by the Japanese entering Manchuria from Khabarovsk, Kim Il-song and his forces had retreated to Khabarovsk in January 1941.⁶² Kim and his 300 guerrillas en masse enrolled at the Khabarovsk Military School. After receiving about two years military

⁶⁰Other than yongkwang suroun kil, Kim Il-song sonjip, V., pp. 308-349. Han Kyu-hun, "1940 nyondae Choson inmin hyongmyong gun ui sopudae hwaltong" (The Small Band Activities of the Korean People's Revolutionary Army in the 1940's), Kulloja, no. 180 (November 1960), pp. 56-60.

⁶¹Tsuboe Senji, Hoku-Sen no kaiho junen (Ten Years Since the Liberation of North Korea) (Tokyo: Nikkan rodo tsushin-sha, 1956), pp. 18-19.

⁶²"Yi Tong-paek no kanshobun" (Impression of a Returned Communist Bandit, Yi Tong-paek), Shiso geppo (Ministry of Justice), no. 78 (December 1940), pp. 317-319. "Kyohi Kin Nichisei hika shiso hanchu no kenkyo" (The Arrest of a Group Leader of the Thought Section under the Communist Bandit Kim Il-Song), Tokko gaiji geppo (February 1943), p. 82.

training there, it is rumored that Kim and his forces participated in the battle of Stalingrad in 1943. Kim Il-song reportedly received a Lenin's medal of honor for his exceptional performance at the European front. After that, Kim and his forces were assigned to the 28th Army Corps of the Soviet Red Army under General T. F. Shtykov.⁶³

With the Russian declaration of war against Japan on August 9, 1945, Kim Il-song, as a Major of the Red Army, was sent to North Korea through the town of Po Yom in Hamkyongbukdo province. He came as a battalion commander with about 500 soldiers--200 guerrillas of his own plus 300 Korean-Russian soldiers. No major battle was fought against the Japanese. All the members of Kim's battallion were engaged in special security operations in civilian clothes. All of these guerrillas subsequently became key leaders in the present-day government and military in North Korea.⁶⁴

One final effort is made to confirm Kim Il-song's claims about his political activities such as "people's revolutionary governments" in "the liberated areas" and the Association for the Restoration of the Fatherland. As to the people's revolutionary governments, there were several "soviet districts" in eastern Manchuria according to several Japanese sources. Several "soviet districts" were

⁶³Tsuboe Senji, Hoku-Sen, op. cit., p. 19.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 19

established in areas like Hsiawangching in Wangching county on November 2, 1932, Shihjenkoujenkou in Yenchi county on November 2, 1932, and Tahuangkou in Hunchun county on December 21, 1932. These districts coincide with those which North Koreans claim Kim Il-song established. However, there is no evidence which relates these soviet districts to those Kim Il-song created. According to Japanese sources, these soviet districts were created by Communists like Kim Song-do, Kim Tu-kuk, and Son Il,⁶⁵ but we do not know if these men were members of Kim Il-song's guerrilla units.

It appears that Kim Il-song's political background has been largely inflated, because it is extremely difficult to confirm his claims with sources other than the official North Korean accounts. One may suspect that the official accounts try to match Kim's "glorious" military past with his political activities. There was indeed an organization known as Chaeman Hanin Chokuk Kwangbokhoe (the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria: KFRAM). According to a Japanese source, the KFRAM was not Kim's organization but was heavily dominated by nationalists, with some Communist cooperation from the M.L. group. Its declaration is similar to Kim's "ten-point program" but

⁶⁵ Manchurian Communist Bandits, op. cit., pp. 76-85. See also Osaka Asahi Shinbun, October 24, November 13, 1933, and January 11, August 2, 1934.

was signed by O Song-yun, Om Su-myong and Yi Sang-jun.⁶⁶ Throughout its six-point declaration, the anti-Japanese theme is predominant, and the independence of Korea from Japan is the emphasis of the program. The program expounds the need for the liberation of the fatherland from Japan, and the necessity to unite with the Chinese to attain this goal. The declaration urges Koreans to confiscate the property of the Japanese and the pro-Japanese Koreans, to meet the expense of the anti-Japanese fight and to relieve unemployed Koreans. Kim's ten-point program has some additional advocacy of the laboring class.⁶⁷ There is only one branch organization of the KFRAM which coincides with one of Kim's ARF. It is Pak Tal and Pak Kum-chol's Kapsan Operational Committee (Kapsan Kongjak Wiwonhoe) whose name was changed into the Korean National Liberation League (Choson Minjok Haebang Tongmaeng). As noted earlier, the KNLL was connected with Kim Il-song and assisted his military expeditions into Korea such as the Pochunpo battle. The KNLL seems to be the basis for Kim Il-song to claim the KFRAM as his own ARF.

In conclusion, we have examined the official North Korean accounts as well as several other sources in order

⁶⁶The declaration of the Korean Fatherland Restoration Association in Manchuria is available in Japanese language, see Shiso iho, no. 14 (March 1938), pp. 60-64.

⁶⁷Baik Bong, wonsu, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

to find out the real facts about Kim Il-song's military and political background. It is clear by now that he was affiliated with the Chinese Communists, although we are less sure of his affiliation with the Russians. Dae-sook Suh argues that Kim Il-song is an alien who advanced through the ranks of the Chinese Communist revolutionaries in Manchuria and was educated and trained by the Chinese Communists as one of their own, not as a delegate or a representative of Korean Communists among the Chinese.⁶⁸ Chong-sik Lee, on the other hand, highlights Kim's affiliation with the Russians, especially the training and education which Kim had presumably received from the Russians. It is very difficult to determine to what extent Kim was the Chinese "man" or the Russians' "man," considering the fact that the situations did not allow him to operate independently. It is much more difficult to determine to what extent, as North Koreans claim, Kim was an all-Korean "hero." However, there is little doubt that Kim Il-song was operating, militarily or politically, under the direction and protection of the Chinese Communists, and that the official North Korean accounts have largely inflated his role in the Korean revolution. Since our interest in this study is to examine the Chinese influence upon Kim Il-song's political

⁶⁸Dae-sook Suh, op. cit., p. 293.

programs in later days, it is safe to assume that Kim's revolutionary past we have examined thus far is certainly a significant stage in forming his political thinking.

CHAPTER III

KIM IL-SONG'S RISE TO POWER: STALINISM IN THE EAST

We have challenged the notion in the introduction of Kim Il-song's being a disciple of Stalin because this notion has been wrongly applied to North Korea's overall socioeconomic programs. In other words, we proposed that Kim Il-song should be considered as Mao Tse-tung's disciple because, as will be discussed in the ensuing chapters, North Korea has faithfully followed the Chinese model in socioeconomic programs. However, we should admit that Kim Il-song did indeed imitate Stalin during his drive to power.

Robert C. Tucker sets forth a model for a "revolutionary movement regime." This model of a "revolutionary movement regime" includes all revolutionary regimes such as Communist, fascist, and nationalist single party regimes. Similarities among these regimes are as follows. (1) The movement regime not only displaces the pre-existing system but also maintains revolutionary momentum. This revolutionary momentum is called "post-revolutionary revolution." (2) The movement regime is characterized by the active participation of the masses of people. The mass movement is organized during the revolutionary struggle for power, and it continues even after the seizure of power.

(3) The movement regime is led by a "vanguard" party. Examples of vanguard parties include Communist parties, Nazist-fascist parties, KMT, Nasser's parties, Ayub Khan's, etc. (4) The movement regime takes on the authoritarian character of the founding organization. Although it insists that it is democratic, it does not allow effective popular control, but merely popular participation.¹

Tucker argues that the concept of totalitarianism should not be applied to all of the movement regimes. Totalitarianism can be used to equate Stalinism with fascism. But it is a grave mistake to equate Leninism with fascism under the same concept of totalitarianism. In other words, the concept of totalitarianism is more applicable to the Nazi-fascist style of movement regimes including Stalin's than to Lenin's style of movement regimes or those of Mao Tse-tung and Tito. Tucker suggests that Stalinism is Soviet totalitarianism, and it was Stalin who imposed totalitarian rule upon the Soviet regime. One common denominator for totalitarian regimes such as the Nazi-fascists' and Stalin's is "fuehrerism" infected with permanent pervasive terror. All the state apparatus, including the ruling party, are under the overall direction of the dominant personality which persistently resorts to

¹Robert C. Tucker, The Soviet Political Mind (New York, 1963), pp. 4-13.

violence and terror by relying on such devices as secret police.²

To what extent should Kim Il-song be included in Tucker's concept of totalitarianism? The notion of Kim Il-song's being "a faithful disciple of Stalin" originated because of several similarities in the strategy and tactics in their rise to power. Violence, the merger of rival groups, propaganda and purges were common to both Stalin and Kim Il-song. Kim has indeed imitated the Soviet dictator in his thoroughly Machiavellian methods of removing his colleagues during his drive to power. This chapter will examine his drive to power and highlight similarities between Stalin's and Kim's strategy and tactics. It will indicate that if we were to limit our study only to Kim's drive to power and ignore his crucial socioeconomic programs, he has indeed implanted Stalinism in the East.

The complexities of political development after the liberation of Korea can be traced to the very nature of the liberation of Korea itself. In analyzing politics in Korea after World War II, it should be remembered that the liberation was not won as a result of the Korean people's own revolution, but was granted by the liberators--the United States and the Soviet Union--as a result of the Japanese defeat in World War II. There was a significant difference

²Ibid., pp. 17-18.

in understanding the nature of the liberation between the liberated Koreans who expected a unified, free and independent Korea and the liberators who had their own plans far removed from Korean aspirations. Most Koreans did not understand the permanence and influence of the occupying forces.³ Hence, those who succeeded in the power struggle after the liberation, regardless of the North or the South, were the ones who successfully rode the influences of the occupying forces.

Four contending groups emerged in the struggle for power immediately after the liberation. They can be classified as the nationalists, the old Communists, the Yen-an faction, and the new Communists. The old Communists were represented by Pak Hon-yong in line of the Irkutsk faction and Tuesday Association. Pak's group will be called "the domestic faction" hereafter. The new Communists were represented by Kim Il-song who reportedly came with the Red Army. Kim's group will be called "the Kapsan faction" hereafter. The Yen-an faction was composed primarily of the old Communists who had begun their revolutionary activities in the 1920's. But because of its foreign affiliation, it should be separated from the domestic faction. Leaders of

³American policy vis-a-vis the Soviets' over Korea will not be discussed here. For an excellent analysis of the intents of two super powers in Korea, see Soon Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

the domestic faction were certainly affiliated with foreign parties, as we examined earlier, but they emerged as a domestic force. To rename the four contending factions, they are the nationalists, the domestic faction of old Communists, the Kapsan faction of new Communists, and the Yen-an faction.

Yo Un-hyong⁴ emerged as the most prominent nationalist leader immediately after the Japanese surrender. Along with well-known nationalists such as An Chae-hong and Song Chin-u, he assumed responsibility for the maintenance of order after the Japanese Civil Governor Endo Ryusaku delegated this duty to him. He quickly proceeded to make full use of this opportunity for his own political purposes. On August 15, 1945, following hasty consultations with a number of nationalists, he set up the Konkuk Chunbi Wiwonhoe (the Preparatory Committee for National Independence: PCNI), with its headquarters in Seoul and became its

⁴Yo was involved in the Communist movement (see Chapter I, p. 41). But he was a strong nationalist. It is more appropriate to classify him as Yi Tong-hwi-style of Communist. In other words, he became a Communist in order to utilize Russian assistance for the Korean independence movement. After 1945, he never became a KCP member. Many accused him of being an opportunist whose political values were ever changing. However, it appears that he earned that label of being an opportunist, because he was seriously concerned with coalition-making as will be discussed shortly. He was a graduate of Chin-lung University in Nanking. He became politically known for the dispatch of Kim Kyu-sik to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919. He often served as a delegate to various international conferences and was the Korean nationalist spokesman in Japan. He became the president of the Chungang Ilbo (Central Daily News) in 1933. For Yo Un-hyong's biography, see Yo Un-hong, Mongyang Yo Un-hyong (Seoul, 1967).

chairman. An Chae-hong became vice-chairman. The PCNI organized "People's Committees" throughout the country. By August 31, 1945, it had a total of 145 branches in both the south and north Korea. The PCNI moved fast and held its All-Nation People's Congress on September 6 and announced the establishment of "the Korean People's Republic."⁵ Although many argue that this government was Communist dominated, it was a coalition government which included old Communists. The Central Committee included Syngman Rhee, a prominent nationalist, as its chairman. Such well-known nationalists as Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sik, Shin Ik-hi, Kim Song-su, An Chae-hong and Cho Man-sik were also included in the central committee. Ho Hon, a Communist, was designated premier of the new republic.⁶

The PCNI represented the whole country. Cho Man-sik⁷

⁵For a detailed information on the All-Korean People's Congress, see Choson haebang nyonbo (Korean Liberation Yearbook), 1946 ed., 1946, pp. 85-92.

⁶For a complete list of the officers elected at this time, see Ibid., pp. 80-106. Syngman Rhee refused to accept the offer of the PCNI's chairmanship. It is possible that he waited in order to see the USAMIGK's (United States Army Military Government in Korea) attitude towards the Korean People's Republic. He was the only leader who had perceived Korea from a global point of view. One possible interpretation is that if he accepted this offer, the country would not have been divided.

⁷Cho was a graduate of Meiji University. With a long-time Christian background, he believed in non-violence and Gandhi's style of politics. He was known as the Korean Gandhi.

headed the South Pyongan branch of the PCNI and assumed responsibility for the maintenance of order in northern Korea on August 15, 1945. Ironically, Cho was the most respected Christian leader who was strongly committed to Korean nationalism. With another Christian leader, O Yunson, as vice-chairman, Cho fully accepted the authority of the PCNI in Seoul. Among the more than twenty initial committee members, nationalists dominated, with only two Communists. Hence, the PCNI was a de facto government throughout the country with every indication that it would efficiently perform the basic governmental function for a united independent nation.⁸ The comprehensive list of Korean revolutionaries and political leaders in the government indicated a fair, if not adequate, distribution between nationalists and Communists. It seems that a serious effort was made to create a workable coalition of all forces to form a government acceptable to the Communists as well as the nationalists. As will be discussed shortly, with the arrival of the Allied forces, changes rapidly took place until the demise of the PCNI and the Korean People's

⁸There are conflicting views on the nature of this government. Scalapino and Lee argue that it was a Communist government. See Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., Part I, pp. 236-241. For opposing views, see E. G. Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951), pp. 62-63. Also, see Hugh Borton, "Korea Under American and Soviet Occupation," in Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, the Far East, 1942-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 428-473.

Republic.⁹

While the PCNI was being transformed into a coalition government, Pak Hon-yong, an old Communist of the Tuesday Association and the Irkutsk faction who had worked abroad and participated in the first post-war KCP, emerged as an uncontested Communist leader. Pak gave rebirth to the KCP in Seoul and became Secretary General on September 14, 1945. The KCP accepted the authority of the PCNI. It declared that the Korean People's Republic represented the only legitimate political government, and all opponents of that government had to be smashed.¹⁰ Apparently none of the Korean leaders, whether nationalists or Communists, seemed to foresee the division of the country at this time. Pak had strong confidence in the departure of the occupation forces from Korea and decided that Seoul, rather than Pyongyang, should be the headquarters of the KCP. Both in the north and in the south, Seoul was considered the location of KCP headquarters, and as of mid-September, Pak was accepted as the Party's sole national leader.

In the north, the South Pyongan District branch of the KCP met on August 16, 1945, at which time Hyon Chun-hyok was elected leader of the branch. This became the key

⁹Soon Sung Cho blames the United States for the division of Korea. He argues that if the United States had worked with this government, the Korean peninsula may not have been divided. See his Korea in World Politics, op. cit.

¹⁰Haebang Ilbo, September 19, 1945, p. 1.

official Communist group in North Korea at this time. Another important Communist figure in South Hamkyong Province was O Ki-sop, and his influence extended into North Hamkyong as well. O, an old Communist of the Japanese era, was a supporter of Pak Hon-yong, as were the other key leaders of this province, Chong Tal-hon, Yi Pong-su, and Chu Nyong-ha. By late September, a liaison was established between the South Hamkyong group and Pak's Seoul Party headquarters.¹¹ All these northern Communist leaders, plus other regional Communists, later met on October 10, 1945 at the instigation of the South Pyongan District branch to organize a North Korean branch bureau of the KCP. This has been known as Odo Inmin Wiwonhoe Yonhaphoeui (the Five Province Conference). Kim Il-song participated in this conference, and he claimed that the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP was his proposal. At any rate, all these minor figures of the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP accepted the authority of Pak Hon-yong as the sole national leader of the KCP.

At the Five Province Conference, Kim Il-song, even according to his own account, praised Pak Hon-yong. He asserted that "Comrade Pak was demonstrating the accomplishment of the Korean Communist movement by repelling all

¹¹Cho'oe Pom-so, Pukhan ui chongchi sangse (Political Conditions in North Korea) (Seoul: Haebang Chongnyon Tongmaeng, 1945), pp. 3-5.

liberalistic groups." He continued: "Because our young Party in Korea is not well armed with theory, and because it possesses little experience in struggle, we will face many obstacles. All immediate problems must be discussed under the instructions of Comrade Pak."¹² Hence, it seems that Kim Il-song fully accepted the central authority of Pak Hon-yong in Seoul. Further evidence is shown on the KCP's records. The structure of authority of the KCP was as follows:

Secretary General:	Pak Hon-yong
Political Bureau:	Pak Hon-yong, Kim Il-song, Yi Tan-a, My Chong, Kang Jin, Choe Chang-ik, Yi Sung-yop, Kwon O-ik
Organizational Bureau:	Pak Hon-yong, Yi Hyon-sang, Kim Sam-yong, Kim Hyong-son
Secretariat Bureau:	Yi Tan-a, Ho Song-tak, Kim Tae-jun, Yi Ku-hun, Yi Soon-kum, Kang Mun-sok ¹³

At this point, we should look at the occupying forces. The American forces arrived in Korea on September 9, 1945. To the dismay and frustration of the old

¹²Choson Sanop Rodong Chosaso (Research Center for Korean Industry and Labor), eds., Ol un roson (The Correct Line), Seoul, 1945 (Reprinted by Minjung Shinmunsa, Tokyo, 1946). For the later publication, see Kim Il-song sonjip, 1963 ed., Vol. I, pp. 3-10. This quotation does not show in the 1963 edition.

¹³Chang Bok-song, Choson kongsandang pajaengsa (Seoul, 1949), p. 54.

revolutionaries--nationalists and Communists, General John R. Hodge, the U.S. Military Commander of the southern half of Korea, declared the existence of any government in Korea to be illegal. The United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) began to function in South Korea with Major General A. V. Arnold as Military Governor of Korea. General Arnold declared that USAMGIK was the only government in South Korea and called upon the people to put an end to the pronouncements of what he termed "irresponsible political groups."¹⁴ At the same time, General Hodge covertly and overtly helped the moderate right wing parties to obtain public support. The old revolutionaries, whether nationalists or Communists, who symbolized die-hard resistance to Japan, were not respected. Even the Koreans' public antagonism against Japanese authorities was completely disdained, and the Americans protected the Japanese residents and their property in South Korea. The Americans encouraged a compromising and moderate policy which Koreans called "western rationalism."¹⁵

¹⁴"The Official Publication of American Military Government," Chukan Digest, No. 8 (December 8, 1945). This official statement was issued by the name of General John R. Hodge. For Arnold's press interview, see Seoul Shinmun, October 11, 1945.

¹⁵"The American Impact upon the Korean Politics: 1945-1948," The Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. X, No. 2 (Seoul, 1967), p. 172. For Korean politics immediately after World War II, see George M. McCune, Korea Today (New York, 1950), especially p. 46.

Looking at the recruitment process of the USAMGIK, the Americans showed a tendency to retain government employees who had served under the Japanese colonial regime. For instance, in the Metropolitan Police Department, ninety percent of the police chiefs remained, and some of them were even allowed to join political parties, mostly moderate right wing parties.¹⁶ The official language at this time was English. Most of the new government employees included those who were educated in the United States and who had had close contact with American Christian missionaries. They were still the same people who had enjoyed high class status under Japanese rule. The American officer who took charge of the employment of government officials was U.S. Naval Lieutenant-Commander George Williams who was a son of an American missionary family. Thus, the most conspicuous American policy in the southern half of Korea was the blockage of the old revolutionary efforts to seize power. The advent of USAMGIK signalled the fall of Yo Un-hyong and die-hard Korean nationalists. Concomitantly, the fact that the old Communists had gravitated to Seoul provided an excellent opportunity for the new Communists to consolidate power in the northern half. Syngman Rhee's successful exploitation of American influence in his rise to power will not be discussed here as we are only concerned with Kim Il-song's emergence as a key Communist leader.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 175.

In the north, in contrast to the Americans administered half of the peninsula, the Russian occupation forces arrived in Pyongyang on August 24, 1945. General Ivan Chistiakov, Commander of the Soviet 25th Army, was in charge of the Russian occupying forces. His opening political act was similar to that later followed by Americans. On August 25, General Chistiakov, just like General Hodge, announced that Japanese authorities would carry out necessary administrative functions as in the past and that order would be maintained jointly by Soviet and Japanese authorities. Those persecuting Japanese, moreover, would be severely punished.¹⁷ On the very next day, however, this first Russian order was rescinded. The Japanese army and police were disarmed, and authority was transferred to the South Pyongan branch of the Preparatory Committee for National independence headed by Cho Man-sik. Unlike the Americans in the south who established a direct military government (USAMGIK), the Russians attempted an indirect control over existing Korean organizations. Hence, the Russians legalized the South Pyongan branch of PCNI whose headquarters was located in Seoul. Nevertheless, the Russians soon started to reorganize existing organizations. For example, the South Pyongan branch of PCNI was transformed into "the People's Political Committee" which

¹⁷Yoshio Morita, Chosen shusen no kiroku (The Record of the End of the War in Korea) (Tokyo, 1964), p. 184.

contained an equal number of Communists and non-Communists. The key Soviet group conducting this indirect control over North Korea, commanded by General Romanenko, was located in downtown Pyongyang, in a building which used to be the Japanese Internal Revenue Office.¹⁸

There are conflicting views over the issue of how General Romanenko's group was related to Kim Il-song. Han Chae-dok, Kim Chang-sun, Scalapino, and Chong-sik Lee suggest that the Russian command chose Kim Il-song as their "man" in Korea from the beginning of its arrival, if not beforehand. According to these writers, Kim Il-song continued to receive full Soviet support. It was the Russians who practically placed him in the position of power.¹⁹ According to Dae-sook Suh, however, Soviet support given to Kim was not much more than "approval." Kim's rise to power was largely attributed to his own effort facilitated by the failures of the old Communists. Kim Il-song effectively used a band of armed guerrillas under his command, thus giving his takeover a military arm.²⁰ O Yong-jin suggests that Kim received Soviet support much later after

¹⁸Chang-sun, Kim Op. cit., p. 52. Although it was indirect control, the Sovietization of the political organizations and the administrative system started from this point.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 54. Also, Han Chae-dok, Kim Il-song ul kobal handa (Indictment of Kim Il-song) (Seoul, 1965), p. 58. Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., Part I, p. 325.

²⁰Suh, The Communist Movement, op. cit., p. 325.

Cho Mansik's house arrest over the issue of trusteeship which will be discussed shortly. O Yong-jin reports that General Romanenko implored Cho to support the Moscow Agreement of December 1945, asserting that if he did so, he would be made the first president of Korea. Had Cho accepted this offer, writes O, the political development in North Korea would have been very different.²¹

With a careful examination of these views, one tends to believe that if the Russians were seriously concerned with establishing "a friendly government" in Korea, it is most unlikely that they would have committed themselves to an immature young man of thirty-three years old so early without fully understanding the situation in Korea. It is also extremely unlikely that the Russians discounted the most respected national leader, Cho Man-sik, simply because he was a Christian. Cho was certainly a rallying point of public support at that time. Undoubtedly the Russians made full use of Russianized Koreans and the Kapsan faction in their early operations in North Korea. Han Chae-dok reports that Kim Il-song himself often went to Romanenko's office three or four times in a single day.²² The Soviet general and his staff operated primarily through a so-called forty-three-man team. This "team," composed of key

²¹O Yong-jin, Hana ui chongon (An Eyewitness Report) (Pusan, 1952), p. 185.

²²Han Chae-dok, op. cit., p. 53.

Russianized Koreans and Kapsan members, often assembled in Romanenko's office, where political issues were discussed, briefings were given, and "suggestions" and orders set forth. This was the nerve center of Soviet authority, the ultimate source of political power in North Korea.²³ Hence, as will be seen in ensuing discussions, it may be possible that Kim Il-song earned Soviet support by the end of December 1945 by fully using his experience in the Soviet Union for the past four years and "properly" handling the trusteeship issue.

Kim Il-song's first target was the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP. Kim was such a relatively young man of thirty-three years of age that very few Koreans believed in his revolutionary past. There was no way for him to take over the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP without using terror. Relatively minor figures of old Communists in northern Korea such as O Ki-sop, Chong Tal-hon, Yi Pong-su, and Chu Nyong-ha cooperated with key nationalists such as Cho Man-sik and prominent Communists such as Hyon Chun-hyok.²⁴ Hyon, as noted earlier, headed the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP. A native of Pyongan Province, he came to Pyongyang from Seoul a few days after his release from prison. His pre-war political

²³Chang-sun Kim, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁴For Hyon's short biography, see Nam Koon-woo, The North Korean Communist Leadership: 1945-1965 (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1974), p. 22.

life was typical: graduation from Keijo Imperial University like Pak Hon-yong; a position teaching at Taeku Normal School; organizer of a Marxist study society, followed by a three-year suspended prison sentence and the loss of his teaching position; return to the north, participation in cooperative organizational activities, and rearrest followed by a prison term. Hyon was mysteriously murdered in broad daylight in the heart of Pyongyang on September 28, 1945. The assassination is said to have been plotted by Kim Il-song and the Russian administrators.²⁵ Even after Hyon's elimination, Kim could not control the North Korean branch bureau. Kim Yong-bom was elected its head at a meeting on October 13, 1945. It was not until December 17, 1945, at the third enlarged committee meeting of the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP, reportedly surrounded by an armed guard of Kim's guerrilla band, that Kim Il-song replaced Kim Yong-bom as head of the branch of the KCP.²⁶ This stage of Kim's rise to power has often been quoted by Korean observers as Stalin's method of removing his rivals.

Since we have examined the fall of Yo Un-hyong and his nationalist colleagues in the South, a discussion of

²⁵For a detailed account of the Hyon assassination, see Chang-sun Kim, op. cit., pp. 66-68.

²⁶Bang In-hu, Pukhan rodongdang ui hyongsong kwa baljon (The Formation and Development of the North Korean Workers' Party in North Korea) (Seoul: Asiatic Research Institute in Korea University, 1967), p. 91.

what happened to Cho Man-sik and his followers in the north is in order. The Russians maintained their indirect control through Cho Man-sik. A North Korean Five Province Administrative Bureau was organized at the end of October. In effect, the embryonic administrative body of North Korea, the NKFPAB, was supposedly controlled by a People's Committee. It was a coalition administrative body including nationalists and Communists who were under the direction of the KCP in Seoul. Both were headed by Cho Man-sik as chairman. Cho's fall came with his violent opposition to the idea of a trusteeship. The idea of a trusteeship was a decision made at the Three Ministers' Conference in Moscow on December 27, 1945 to impose a trusteeship upon Korea for a period up to five years.²⁷ The whole nation was outraged at this news of the Moscow Agreement. Cho joined a nationwide campaign to fight trusteeship to the bitter end. Other than this issue, Cho was in constant disagreement with the Russians. He opposed land reform programs and Russian grain purchases from North Korea. Finally, the Russians put Cho under house arrest on February 5, 1946. This marked the fall of the nationalists in the North.

We will return to whatever happened to Pak Hon-yong in the South. At this point, however, we should examine the Communists' position towards the issue of trusteeship. The

²⁷For the full text of the Moscow Agreement, see U.S. Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945.

KCP was "absolutely" opposed to a trusteeship in the beginning. The Communists of the KCP even took the lead in organizing a Citizens' Rally Against Trusteeship and for the Acceleration of National Unification. The KCP's position was taken reversed to position 180 degrees. Pak Hon-yong reportedly made a hasty, secret trip to Pyongyang, returning to Seoul on January 2 and managed to pass a resolution supporting the Moscow decision at an enlarged central committee meeting of the KCP in Seoul.²⁸ The above-mentioned Citizens' Rally turned out to be a demonstration of support for the Moscow agreement.

In the North, on the other hand, Kim Il-song ardently supported the trusteeship. There is every indication that Kim had been vying Cho Man-sik and Pak Hon-yong for the Russians' support. The Moscow Agreement apparently underlined the Russian scheme to consolidate Communist forces strong enough to take over the whole country after the period of five years. Had the Moscow plan been actualized, Kim would have been in a disadvantageous position to compete with the formidable forces of the nationalists and Communists in the South. It would indicate a possible end to his political career. Yet, an urgent task for Kim was to demonstrate to the Russians that he was indeed the most

²⁸ Pak Il-won, Namrodang ch'ongpipan (General Criticism of the South Korean Workers' Party) (Seoul: Kuktong chongbosa, 1948), p. 42.

compatible leader among political leaders in the North. Kim accused Cho Man-sik of having become a reactionary. Cho persisted in opposing the Moscow Agreement in concert with "the reactionary strata of the United States" and other "anti-democratic elements." Kim then attacked the past performance of the People's Political Committee itself, alleging that "many rotten bureaucratic and reactionary elements" had crept into the Committee and "played a number of dirty tricks." As a result, the Committee failed its task, both as these related to the people's livelihood and to the development of democracy.²⁹ The Russians' endorsement of Kim Il-song as a compatible leader might have been confirmed at this time. No information is available, however. Kim Il-song's position in this matter has been often criticized by South Koreans.

With the Russians' endorsement of Kim Il-song as their "man," his drive to power moved fast. Kim became chairman of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee (Puk Choson Insi Inmin Wiwonhoe) which was formed at an Enlarged Conference of the North Korean Democratic Parties, Social Organizations, the NKFPAB, and the People's Political Committees on February 8, 1946. The NKPPC became a "central political institution" because the previous NKFPAB and the People's Political Committees were not sufficient to carry

²⁹ Kim Il-song, Kim Il-song sonjip, op. cit., Vol. I, 1963 ed., pp. 37-39.

out "the planned, unified development of North Korean politics, economic, and culture."³⁰ Having secured this new vehicle of the centralized power, Kim Il-song launched "democratic reforms," which, in theory and practice, were modeled after Mao Tse-tung's "new democracy."³¹ He further moved on consolidating his power base. Although his so-called Soviet-Kapsan faction dominated the North Korean Communist Party, some domestic faction leaders such as O Ki-sop, Chong Tal-hon, Choe Yong-dal, Yi Pong-su, and Yi Sun-gun still constituted a major obstacle, because they had been affiliated with Pak Hon-yong in the South. The elimination of these "suspicious elements" came with the merger of the North Korean Communist Party with the New People's Party (Shinmindang). The Puk Choson Rodongdang (North Korean Workers' Party) was formed at the end of August 1946. Kim's effective use of the merger to eliminate the domestic faction will be discussed below.

The New People's Party was the Yen-an faction's party. Whereas most of old Communists returned to the South, the Yen-an group, a part of the old Communists with

³⁰For the formation and policies of the North Korean Provisional People's Committee, see Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., pp. 86-96. For Kim Il-song's own speech, see Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. I, 1963 ed., pp. 40-48.

³¹"New democracy" in North Korea will be extensively discussed in the next chapter. The chapter will show North Korea's new democracy under the Soviet control.

Chinese Communist backgrounds (see Chapter II), came to Pyongyang. The original name of the Yen-an group was the Korean Independence League which had had its wartime headquarters in Yen-an. Under Mao Tse-tung's protection and Mu Chong's leadership, it had trained a substantial number of military and political cadres, sending them throughout Manchuria and into certain parts of northern China.³² What prompted this group to return to the North is not known. However, when this group of 2,000 soldiers were seeking permission to cross the Yalu, the Chief of Staff of the 25th Red Army, General Bankowsky, disarmed these soldiers in Shinuiju in the fall of 1945.³³ The Russian general allowed the Yen-an group to enter Korea, not as a military unit but as individuals. Nevertheless, the Yen-an group regrouped politically and developed a number of local strongholds, particularly in the North Pyongan and Hwanghae province. Its leaders, continuing to use the name "Korean Independence League," organized local branches. Men like Mu Chong, Kim Tu-bong, Choe Ch'ang-ik, and Han Pin were some of the most powerful figures in the North Korean political scene. Mu Chong was elected second secretary of the North Korean Bureau of the KCP in the aftermath of the Five Province

³²See Chapter I, p. 61.

³³Chang-sun Kim, op. cit., pp. 61-65.

Conference in Pyongyang on October 10, 1945.³⁴ Kim Tu-bong was elected vice-chairman of the Provisional People's Committee on February 8, 1946.³⁵ Hence, with several other minor figures always participating, the Yen-an faction was able to maintain a precarious equilibrium with the Soviet-Kapsan and domestic factions.

On February 16, 1946, the Yen-an group announced the formation of the New People's Party (Shinmindang).³⁶ In other words, the Korean Independence League was formally transformed into a political party. The new party immediately attracted a number of middle-class types, including a significant proportion of the better educated elements of North Korea, the so-called intelligentsia; whereas the North Korean Communist Party led by the Soviet-Kapsan faction claimed to represent a group of young guerrilla fighters, workers and peasants. In other words, the New People's Party represented petty bourgeoisie. One major reason that the latter attracted the petty bourgeoisie can be understood by examining its political platform. While its proposals did not differ greatly from those of the North Korean Communist Party, it tended to be couched in somewhat more moderate language and stressed nationalist

³⁴Ibid., p. 95. Kim Il-song was elected as first secretary. O Ki-sop jointly held the position of second secretary.

³⁵As noted earlier, Kim Il-song served as chairman.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 97-99.

over Marxist terminology. Although it called for the outright confiscation of properties belonging to the Japanese and to "national traitors," it emphasized the unity and cooperation of all classes in the building of a democratic republic marked by complete independence, social justice, and full political democracy.³⁷ According to Choson Rodongdang yoksa kyojae (Teaching Materials on the History of the Korean Workers' Party), the New People's Party had a membership of 90,000, while the North Korean Communist Party had 276,000 members by August 1946.³⁸

According to an official North Korean account, a conference to inaugurate the North Korean Workers' Party was held in Pyongyang for thirty days beginning on August 28, 1946.³⁹ In his major speech at the conference, Kim Il-song asserted that North Korea should be a "democratic base and main force for the independence of our fatherland." This task required the creation of a mass party, uniting workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. He also emphasized "a merciless struggle against all with opposing

³⁷ See "The Political Platform of the Korean Independence League," Sanop Rodong Shibo (Industrial Labor News), No. 1, January 1946, p. 80, and Democratic National Front, Secretariat, Choson haebang nyonbo, op. cit., p. 148-149.

³⁸ Choson Rodongdang yoksa kyojae, op. cit., p. 185.

³⁹ Theoretical basis for this merger will be discussed in Chapter IV.

inclinations." All "sectarian struggle" was to be exterminated.⁴⁰ The result of the election was as follows. Kim Tu-bong was elected chairman. Kim Il-song and Chu Nyong-ha were elected vice-chairmen.⁴¹ Five members of the Political Bureau were chosen: Kim Tu-bong, Kim Il-song, Chu Nyong-ha, Ho Ka-i, and Choe Ch'ang-ik. It is to be noted that two of these men were from the Soviet-Kapsan faction, two from the Yen-an faction, and the fifth, Chu, was an old domestic faction leader who had defected to Kim Il-song. The thirteen-man Presidium included the above five, together with Kim Ch'aek, Tae Song-su, Kim Kyo-yong, Pak Chong-ae, Pak Il-u, Kim Ch'ang-man, Pak Hyo-sam, and O Ki-sop. The Soviet-Kapsan faction barely managed a majority.⁴²

Since the merger with the New People's Party until the important Second Party Congress of March 1948, the Soviet-Kapsan faction successfully won over the Yen-an faction members within the same party. Kim Il-song skillfully drew the leaders of the Yen-an faction into political battles against the domestic faction leaders whom the official documents have often called "Pak Hon-yong's jolgaes (running

⁴⁰For the merger of the two parties in the official documents, see Yoksa kyojae and Yongkwang suro un kil, op. cit., pp. 101-107 and pp. 177-192. See Kim Il-song's own speech in Kim Il-song sonjip, op. cit., 1963 ed., pp. 167-214.

⁴¹Bang In-hu, op. cit., p. 101.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 101-102.

dogs)." A large scale purge of the rank and file started in 1947. "Suspicious elements" of 40,000 and 60,000 persons were purged from the Party.⁴³ At the central level, domestic faction leaders such as O Ki-sop, Chong Tal-hon, Choe Yong-dal, Yi Pong-su, and Yi Sun-gun were all purged because they were "engaging in faction-creating activities ...while they themselves, having no real involvement in the life of the party, continue to live like frogs in a well." They were all "Pak Hon-yong's jolgaes" engaging in "sectarianism, local separatism and individual heroism."⁴⁴ O Ki-sop, a former colleague of Pak Hon-yong and Hyon Chunhyok, a founder of the North Korean branch bureau of the KCP, a vice-chairman of the North Korean Communist Party, and still a member of the sixty-seven members of the Central Committee of the NKWP, was relegated to a position as a worker in a government-operated enterprise. All the other domestic faction leaders faced a similar fate.

Before we look at the second phase of the purge against Pak Hon-yong himself, let us examine what happened to him in the South. Even after the establishment of USAMGIK and the fall of the Korean People's Republic in October 1945, Pak Hon-yong's miscomprehension, midjudgement, and misinterpretation of the political situation of

⁴³U.S. Department of State: Techniques of Take-over, op., cit., p. 14.

⁴⁴Kim Il-song sonjip, op. cit., p. 545. Also, see Chang-sun Kim, op., cit., pp. 106.

liberated Korea continued. Pak still believed that once the occupying forces left Korea, he and the KCP in Seoul would be able to control most of the activities of Communists in both North and South Korea. Paying little attention to the occupying forces and to what he considered "insignificant" political developments in the North, Pak concentrated on his organizational and propaganda works in the South. Although there was some factional struggle within the KCP, as usual, he managed to get a tentative agreement among the Communist leaders and gained control of the party as its sole national leader.⁴⁵

The size of the party had been increasing until its activities went underground in 1948. In early September 1945, shortly after their arrival, American occupation authorities estimated that the KCP had approximately 3,000 members in the area south of the 38th parallel. As of January 1946, the estimated figure had risen to between 20,000 and 30,000, and shortly thereafter, the number rapidly increased to 40,000 to 60,000. A year later, in September 1947, party membership was estimated by the Military Government as "probably" between 30,000 and

⁴⁵The old M.L. and Seoul factions, including leaders like Yi Yong and Choe Ik-han, formed the so-called Changan faction. Pak himself originated from the Tuesday Association. Pak's group was called the Reconstruction faction. The factional struggle was over who should lead the KCP. Yi Yong and Choe Ik-han had contacted the Russian authorities in Pyongyang but failed to gain Soviet support. Hyongmyong Shinmun, October 31, 1945.

40,000, and the Party's fortunes were soon to decline.⁴⁶ The KCP extended its control over South Korean organized labor and peasants' unions. It held control over the National Council of Korean Labor Unions with a membership of 574,275, the National Federation of Farmers' Union with 3,323,197, the Korean Student Corps (Choson Hakdodae), the Korean Democratic Youth League (Choson Minju Chongnyon Tongmaeng), and the General League of Korean Women with a membership of 800,000.⁴⁷ If the KCP had indeed mobilized the members of these mass organizations, the number is enormous, compared with the number of people the North Korean Communist Party was able to mobilize in the North with extensive Russian assistance.⁴⁸ No wonder Pak naively persisted staying in Seoul without realizing the influence of the occupying forces. Although Pak lacked charisma, which most of the emerging Communist leaders often possessed, he was the only widely accepted Communist leader in the South.

⁴⁶ Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., Part I, p. 257.

⁴⁷ For a membership of the NCKLU and the NFFU, see tables in Choson haebang nyonbo (Korean Liberation Yearbook), 1946 ed., Seoul, 1946, p. 158 and 167. Memberships of other organizations were not known.

⁴⁸ North Korea had comparable numbers of mass organizations with comparable membership strength. But the Communists' ability to mobilize these organizations did not exist until the North Korean Workers' Party was inaugurated on September 5, 1946. As of December 1945, when the KCP was inaugurated in the South, the KCP was superior to the North Korean Communists in terms of its ability to mobilize the mass organizations. See Bang In-hu, op. cit., p. 126.

With this organizational strength, the KCP in fact engaged in a political battle with the USAMGIK. By this time, the Korean People's Republic had become an instrument of the KCP after most of the nationalists left the defunct government. On November 15, 1945, the USAMGIK formally outlawed the Korean People's Republic. It demanded that the latter accept a status of a political party. Meantime, as the aftermath of the US-USSR Joint Commission's deadlock over the issue of consultation with the South Korean political parties, it encouraged a broad right wing coalition of a Korean Representative Democratic Council which, as noted earlier, included compromising and moderate right wing parties.⁴⁹ In response to this USAMGIK effort, the KCP formed a broad left wing coalition called the Democratic National Front (Minchuchui Minjok Chonson) on February 16, 1946. However, this was not an organic unity, but rather a political front to oppose the USAMGIK's effort. With the pressure from the North, where the North Korean Worker's Party had already been formed on August 28, 1946, the KCP began to work on the formation of the so-called Nam Choson

⁴⁹The Russians insisted that all the political groups which opposed the Moscow Agreement should be excluded from consultation, whereas the Americans charged the Russians for depriving Koreans of freedom of speech. For this development, see the letters exchanged between General Hodge and General Chistiakov, Chistiakov to Hodge on November 26, Hodge to Chistiakov on December 24, 1946, Department of State: Korea's Independence, Far Eastern Series 18. Publication No. 2933. Released October, 1947, pp. 23-32.

Rodongdang (South Korean Workers' Party: SKWP). The formation of the SKWP was a painful task in itself. Within the KCP, Pak Hon-yong led the majority who were in favor of the formation of the SKWP as a coalition with Inmindang and Shinmindang,⁵⁰ but this was challenged by the so-called Pankanpu (anti-staff) faction led by Kang Chin, Suh Chong-sok and others who feared the subordination of South Korean Communists to the North if the pattern of the North was followed in establishing a SKWP similar to that in the North. Nevertheless, Pak pushed through the formation of the SKWP on October 16, 1946.

However, suppression of the Communists in the South began in early 1946. After the so-called Chongp'ansa Incident, the USAMGIK adopted even harsher measures. Chongp'ansa was a publishing company which published the Haebang Ilbo (Liberation Daily), an organ of the KCP, headed by Paek Nak-chong. On May 4, 1946, the police seized seven plates and some three million yen of counterfeit currency, reportedly printed for the purpose of financing the activities of the KCP. Paek Nak-chong and twelve others were

⁵⁰The Inmindang (People's Party) was Yo Un-hyong's party which he formed after he resigned from the People's Republic. Yo, himself, opposed the formation of the SKWP with the KCP. The Shinmindang (New People's Party) was headed by Paek Nam-hun. It was affiliated with North Korea's Shinmindang. Paek opposed the union and formed the Sahoe Rodongdang (Social Workers' Party) with Yo Un-hyong. For this development, see Bang In-hu, op. cit., pp. 128-134.

immediately arrested and the police later announced that a total of twenty-six men were jailed, including two KCP officers.⁵¹ Subsequently, three leftist newspapers, Inmin-Ilbo, Chungang-Ilbo, and Haebang-Ilbo, were closed. On September 6, 1946, the USAMGIK ordered the arrest of Pak Hon-yong, Yi Chu-ha, Yi Kang-kuk, and other Communist leaders.⁵² Large-scale underground terrorism followed in October 1946. There were strikes by railroad workers, and a riot took place in Taeku, in which some sixty persons were killed and over a hundred policemen injured. Martial law was soon proclaimed.

The old Communists in the South began to migrate to a seemingly more secure base in the North. Their migration began in late 1946 and more or less ended in April 1948. Pak Hon-yong, Yi Kang-kuk, Ho Hon, Yi Chu-ha all were accommodated in the North. Pak received a position of vice-premiers and Ho Hon became the chairman of the Supreme People's Assembly. These old Communists from the South remained the domestic faction with the North Korean Workers' Party until they were systematically eliminated by Kim Il-song in 1953. Pak and his followers in the North, however,

⁵¹For this development, see Choson haebang nyonbo, 1946, pp. 242-244. See also O Che-do, Bulgun gunsang, che iljip (The Red Multitude, the First Series) (Pusan: Namkwang munhwasa, 1951).

⁵²Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Korea, No. 16 (January 1947), pp. 11-25.

were not united and did not pose a threat to Kim Il-song. Kim exploited the weaknesses and mistakes of the old Communists to full advantage. The key vehicle for Kim's power struggle was the Korean Workers' Party (Choson Rodongdang) which was formed in June 1949 with the union of the KNWP and SKWP. It has been led by Kim since the formation. In August 1953, immediately after the Korean War, and again in April 1956, during the Third Congress of the KWP, Kim Il-song completely purged the domestic faction from the South led by Pak Hon-yong. The elimination of this faction was supported by the Yen-an faction leaders such as Kim Tu-bong, Choe Ch'ang-ik, and others. When Kim was in a strategic position of full control over the party, bureaucracy and army, he removed the Yen-an faction from the North in 1958. The process of these mergers and power struggles involved some significant political issues. We will return to these topics in Chapter VII. Kim's drive to power, thus far, clearly fits Tucker's concept of totalitarianism. Kim Il-song had indeed implanted Stalinism in the East.

PART II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF NORTH KOREAN POLITICS

CHAPTER IV

"NEW DEMOCRACY" IN NORTH KOREA: 1945-1956

Asian Communism, being different from Western Communism, has espoused different ideologies and policies during the transitional period before the socialist construction. Chinese Communism has been a prototype of Asian Communism, and in fact most Asian Marxists have faithfully followed the Chinese revolutionary model.¹ In this chapter the transitional period of North Korea will be examined in an effort to determine whether or not Korean Marxists should be included in the category of Asian Communism. One of the most conspicuous features of Asian Communism is the politics of "New Democracy" during the transitional period.² For Asian Marxists, the adoption of "New Democracy" has been inevitable because of peculiar social conditions.

The theory and practice of "New Democracy" was originated by Mao Tse-tung. In discussing Mao's "New Democracy," his concept of "people" should be defined first.

¹Robert A. Scalapino, "Communism in Asia: Toward a Comparative Analysis," in Communist Revolution in Asia, op. cit., pp. 25-53.

²Ibid., pp. 3-4.

Mao's concept of "people," of course, excludes "bureaucratic capitalists" and "landlords."³ They are components of the exploiting class. In the Chinese historical context, they had cooperated with imperialists in order to maintain and consolidate their power against the Chinese masses whom they exploited. They were "enemies" of people and "reactionaries." According to Mao's dialectical terms, they are an "antagonistic" contradiction which should be smashed and eliminated.⁴

However, Mao's concept of "people" includes not only the proletariat and peasantry but also the petty national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals. As long as all these classes were anti-feudal and anti-colonial, they were included in the Chinese revolutionary forces. Mao's "New Democracy" was to unite all these classes against feudal and colonial forces during the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution. Hence, all the classes which were anti-feudal and anti-colonial and loyal to or at least sympathetic with the

³For Mao's concept of "people," see his "On New Democracy," in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, pp. 347-352.

⁴Mao's theory of "contradiction" is largely a repetition of materialist dialectics. Things in universe are composed of two opposite forces. Internal qualitative change of a thing is a result of struggle of two opposites. This is antagonistic contradiction. Mao also discovered "nonantagonistic" contradictions. One can win over these nonantagonistic contradictions to his side by persuasion or education. See Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1950), Vol. I.

Chinese revolution were included in Mao's "people."⁵ It means that all these classes had legitimate claim to participate in the post-revolutionary state structure. Mao declared, on July 1, 1949, that the national bourgeoisie--small, native capitalists--would definitely have a formal place and formal rights in the Chinese people's republic.⁶

A basic difference between Chinese and Soviet Marxism-Leninism is that the Soviets considered the petty national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals to be antagonistic, whereas the Chinese consider them to be nonantagonistic. Therefore, the Soviets, while admitting that a temporary compromise among these classes may be necessary during the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution, insist that any sections of bourgeoisie or liberal intellectuals should be excluded from the state structure.⁷ These classes have no formal rights in the Soviet state structure. In other words, whereas the Chinese peoples' republic is "the

⁵Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking, 1950), Vol. II, pp. 347-352. For some exceptional commentaries on Mao's thoughts, see Arther A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., especially pp. 74-104 for New Democracy.

⁶Mao said: "Who are the people? At the present stage in China, they are the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie... The latter at the present stage is of great importance." Mao, Selected Works, Vol. IV (1961), p. 480.

⁷Quoted in David Shub, Lenin (special abridged edition; New York: New American Library of World Literature, 1959), p. 136.

people's democratic dictatorship," the Soviet Republic is "the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Participation of the national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals in the Chinese state structure is certainly a departure from the orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The embrace of the national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals in "people" is Mao Tse-tung's innovation of the classical Marxism-Leninism.

Nevertheless, one cannot think of Mao's innovations or contributions to the orthodox Marxism-Leninism without considering the Chinese socioeconomic conditions. Mao's idea of "New Democracy" simply rationalizes and justifies the adaptation of the Marxism-Leninism for the Chinese reality. As for the Soviet case, Russia was not a semi-colonial or semi-feudal society; hence, the national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals had not contributed much to the Bolshevik revolution. Therefore, the national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals had no claim for a formal place and rights in the post-revolutionary state structure. Furthermore, Russia was a fairly advanced industrial society even before 1917. Hence, it was possible for Bolsheviks to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat as Marx prescribed.⁸ However, as for the Chinese case, the Chinese

⁸For the social conditions before 1917, see Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 1855-1914 (London: Methuen and Co., 1952). Industrialization is a precondition for a dictatorship of the proletariat. The

liberal intellectuals and national bourgeoisie in fact had contributed to the anti-imperial and anti-feudal revolution to such an extent that they could claim a legitimate place and rights in the post-revolutionary state structure.⁹ Concomitantly, it was impossible to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat, because China was not an industrialized capitalist society.

Since the theoretical basis for Mao's "New Democracy" was to embrace the above mentioned four classes, the policies and actual socioeconomic programs during the period of transition to socialism (1949-1956) largely deviated from the orthodox Marxism-Leninism. The practice of "New Democracy" in China as a prototype of Asian Communism will be examined in the following pages. "New Democracy" in China had continued during the period of transition to socialism. Examination of the actual programs during this period reveals how New Democracy rationalized China's actual programs during this time. Or to argue the other way around, one can see how China applied the policies of New Democracy to

main force of the Bolshevik revolution was composed of the proletariat. The peasantry had contributed to the revolution. But it was led by the proletariat. See Lenin, Selected Works, III (New York: International Publishers, n.d.).

⁹For the contributions of the Chinese liberal intellectuals and national bourgeoisie, see Jerom Ch'en, the chapter of the united front strategy, in Mao and the Chinese Revolution (New York, 1965), pp. 88-126 and Mao's "On New Democracy," op. cit., p. 115.

her actual programs.¹⁰

Politically, all the revolutionary classes included in the concept of "people" had a formal place and designated rights in the post-revolutionary state structure. Both the petty national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals were represented in both Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and People's Congress.¹¹ Yet, the regime was preoccupied with establishing an effective central control over these classes. According to New Democracy, the democratic people's dictatorship should be "headed" by the Chinese Communist Party. For this purpose of consolidating the leadership of the CCP, Mao proposed "democratic centralism," through which the Party provided the central policy guidelines.¹²

¹⁰For the policies of "New Democracy" in practice, see Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism (Harvard University Press, 1969). It is assumed in this study that the policies of CCP applied to Canton area would be the same as or at least similar to the policy applied to elsewhere during this period.

¹¹Doak A. Barnett, "Establishment of the New Regime," Communist China: The Early Years (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1964), pp. 3-26.

¹²"Democratic centralism" sounds as if popular initiatives and participation were allowed. Theoretically, "democratic centralism" was to allow local and popular initiatives within the guidelines provided by the regime. In practice, however, it was intended to establish an effective central control. For a good analysis of "democratic centralism," see Jack Gray and Patrick Cavendish, Chinese Communism in Crisis, Maoism and the Cultural Revolution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), pp. 60-62.

While antagonistic classes or reactionaries were executed and eliminated, the regime adopted intensive political campaigns to educate nonantagonistic social classes such as the petty national bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals. Various mass political organizations were used to consolidate the control of the central government. The regime also used propaganda through controlled mass media, inculcating socialist ethics among the masses of people. The new rulers used such devices as criticism and self-criticism. People discussed "failures, errors, deviations, crimes and shortcomings" among themselves and corrected each other. People often went to study groups and meetings led by party cadres in order to learn the Party's policies.

The idea of New Democracy was applied to the Chinese industry during this transitional period. The economy became known as "New Democratic Economy." It was to be a gradual transformation into a socialist economy. Even though private properties of the bureaucratic capitalists were confiscated, the state did not immediately take over private properties of the national bourgeoisie. In contrast, the early Soviet economy known as "war communism" during the period from the Bolshevik seizure of power until the promulgation of NEP was characterized by an outright nationalization. Seizure of the Soviet industry began with the establishment of the Supreme Council of National Economy known as VSNKH (or Vesenkha) which was

guaranteed the power of the working people over the exploiters and was one of the first steps toward the complete conversion of the factories, mines, railways and other means of production and transport into the property of the workers' and peasants' state. VSNKH was given the right of confiscation, requisition, sequestration, compulsory syndication of the various branches of industry, trade and other measures in the area of production, distribution and state finance.¹³ Following the successful Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet authorities immediately established a socialist economy with total nationalization. The petty bourgeoisie were not allowed to play any role in the new socialist economy.

There is a significant difference between the New Economic Policy or NEP adopted by the Soviet Union in 1925 and China's subsequent New Democratic Economy. According to Stalin, the NEP was "an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution." It was to be tolerated for only a short period of time in order to encircle the bourgeoisie and to destroy the capitalists as a class. The NEP was short-lived.

¹³Alec Nove, An Economic History of the U.S.S.R. (Allen Lane: The Penguin Press, 1969), pp. 50-56. This study provides an excellent analysis of historical development of Soviet Economy which will not be examined here.

Remaining capitalists were liquidated outright.¹⁴ In contrast, in China the New Democratic Economy sought to "buy off" national bourgeoisie with "fixed interest." The "buying off" policy was Mao's invention. Seeking step-by-step nationalization, the regime allowed the national capitalists to possess private entrepreneurs, and it gradually bought off private entrepreneurs. "Joint State-Private Enterprises" were common practices. In the meantime, the central control and supervising had not been neglected. The Joint State-Private Enterprises were effectively utilized to carry out the economic policy of the central government. CCP cadres were assigned to the managerial level of each Joint State-Private Enterprise. These cadres transmitted the directives from the central government.¹⁵ This gradual transformation into socialist economy has been called "state capitalism." In short, the New Democratic Economy was characterized by "state capitalism."

¹⁴For the Soviet economy of NEP, see Ibid., pp. 83-159. Also, Stalin, "Report to the 14th Congress of the C.P.S.U. (B) (December, 1925)," Selected Works, VII, p. 374. Attacking Zinoviev's moderate view of the NEP, Stalin in Problems of Leninism (January, 1926) emphasized the aspect of struggle: "NEP is the party policy which admits the struggle between the socialist and capitalist elements."

¹⁵For the policies of "New Democratic Economy," see Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism, op. cit., pp. 41-177.

The contrast between Soviet and Chinese post-revolution land policies is equally striking. In the Soviet Union, land was nationalized by the land decree of November 8, 1917. The right to use it belonged to the peasants. No one was allowed to have more than he alone could cultivate. On February 15, 1918, Lenin declared a "ruthless war against the kulaks (the better-off peasants)."¹⁶ The Soviet land nationalization was accompanied by many acts of senseless violence: the landlords' cattle were sometimes slaughtered, the landlords' houses, barns or stables destroyed. Except during the brief period of the NEP, the Soviet farmers were rapidly incorporated into Kolkhozes after Lenin's declaration of 1917. The Soviet collectivization program was virtually completed by the end of 1933.¹⁷

Land reform in China, in contrast, was obviously designed to confiscate the lands of landlords and to distribute them to the poor peasants. However, rich peasants were allowed to possess land. The collectivization was not carried out immediately. The opening phase of cooperativization was the development of "mutual-aid teams." The next step was experiments with "agricultural producers' cooperatives." These cooperatives were the agricultural equivalents of Joint State-Private Enterprises. The agricultural

¹⁶Selected Works of Lenin, Vol. 26, p. 519.

¹⁷For the Soviet collectivization of agriculture, see Alec Nove, op. cit., pp. 160-186.

counterparts of "fixed interest" were the production shares in the agricultural producer's cooperatives. These were allocated according to the contributions which the peasants gave. Just as in the industrial sector, the control and supervision of the central government were emphasized in overall agricultural policies. The CCP cadres were assigned to the mutual-aid teams and agricultural cooperatives.¹⁸

Another important social movement which characterized this gradual transformation period was intensive political campaigns. These were designed to facilitate transition to a socialist economy. The regime was well aware of the Soviet experience and was well aware of widespread fear of nationalization or collectivization. The central government sponsored meetings to help prepare the peasants and private businessmen for the arrival of socialism.

In summarizing all the policies of the New Democracy, one should note that these policies were based upon a realistic assessment of the prevailing socioeconomic conditions. The national economy in 1949 was devastated in the aftermath of war. The general effort to expand the industrial and commercial sectors was urgent. Even though Mao downgraded the role of intellectuals in his later policies, he certainly realized that the national

¹⁸For a good case study of the Chinese agriculture during this period, see Ezra Vogel, op. cit., pp. 41-177.

bourgeoisie and liberal intellectuals had a great deal to contribute to the national economy in the beginning of the regime.¹⁹ Rich peasants were allowed to possess private lands so that they could have increased crop productions. Mao and his regime did not want to pay costs precipitated by the sudden collectivization in the Soviet Union as of two decades earlier. It seems clear that Mao's New Democratic Economy was basically concerned with the possible contributions which all the groups in "the people" could make to the weak national economy of the new regime.

The Chinese New Democracy provides a model against which the North Korean policies of "New Democracy" can be examined and such terms as "Soviet emulation" or "Chinese emulation" in North Korea can be clarified. Glen D. Paige has observed that Russian emulation predominated in North Korea during the period of 1945-1958. Paige pointed out that even though the Korean Communists during this period bore striking resemblances to Chinese politics after 1949, the Korean similarities to the Chinese were more indicative of the adaptability of Soviet model than of the emulation of Chinese experience. He argues that the North Koreans sought to emulate the Soviet model of development but were forced to adopt aspects of the Chinese practice because the

¹⁹ Mao's later policy of "red and expert" and his stress on political indoctrination does not mean that he rejected the possible contributions of intellectuals in the beginning of the regime.

socioeconomic conditions in North Korea were much closer to those in China than to those in the Soviet Union after World War I. He does admit, however, that the period of 1958-1959 had been characterized by emulation of the Chinese experience.²⁰

A close examination of the transitional period (1945-1956) of North Korea, however, afford a different interpretation. First of all, we should distinguish between the terms, "policy emulation" and "political control." North Korea in the beginning of the regime was undoubtedly under the Soviet control.²¹ However, this ended in October 1950 when the Chinese crossed the Yalu River. Initial Soviet control did not necessarily mean that North Korea emulated the Soviet model in actual programs. It is possible to say that North Korea, while dominated by the Soviet Union, may have emulated Chinese economic policies because of the greater similarity of their pattern of socioeconomic development. The distinction between "policy emulation"

²⁰Glen D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," A. Doak Barnett, ed., Communism Strategies in Asia (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 236-242.

²¹For a good summary of the function of the Soviet control system, see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford: Hoover Institution on World, Revolution and Peace, 1966). See also, John N. Washburn, "Russia Looks at Northern Korea," in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 20, 1947. Also, for a most recent study, see Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., Vol. I and II.

and "political control" will be clarified in the process of examining North Korean politics during this transitional period. The era of the external integration since 1945 will be examined in terms of four periods reflecting differences in external influence on North Korean politics (see Table IV-1).

Before we examine "New Democracy" in North Korea, let us look at the Soviet control system (1945-1950) in the beginning of the regime and how it diminished. The Soviet domination at this stage of the regime and Kim Il-song's strategy and tactics in his rise to power which we examined in the previous chapter have been imprinted on the mind of most Korean observers to the extent that they persistently have used such terms as "Stalinism in the East," and "Stalin's disciple in the East" even in the mid-1960's and the present time.²² The Soviet control system in North Korea was established with the arrival of the Red Army. Korean emulation of the Soviet Union at this time took the following patterns: Korean administrative organizations known as the People's Political Committee were under indirect control of the Soviet military authorities under General Romanenko, the Sovietization of the administrative

²²Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," Scalapino ed., Communist Revolution in Asia, op. cit., p. 120. See their Communism in Korea, op., cit. and many other literature on North Korea.

TABLE IV-1

The Soviet and Chinese Emulation by North Korea

1945-1948:	The period of Soviet control
	Red Army occupied North Korea before the establishment of the regime
	Soviet Emulation-strong
	Chinese Emulation-tolerated

1948-1950:	The period of Soviet control
	The establishment of the new regime
	Soviet Emulation-declining
	Chinese Emulation-tolerated

1950-1958:	The period of autonomy
	Chinese Volunteer Army stationed in North Korea
	Soviet Emulation-weak
	Chinese Emulation-strong

1958- present:	The period of complete autonomy
	No foreign troops stationed in North Korea
	Soviet Emulation-rare
	Chinese Emulation-continues

system in North Korea was basically completed by 1947,²³ and the Russians put many Soviet-Koreans in the powerful posts in the party and administrative organs.²⁴ Economically, Soviet technicians, engineers, and administrators took over key managerial and technical positions, from which they directed and supervised the efforts to revive North Korea's industry. Almost every major North Korean industry had its Russian advisors. It was planned that by 1950 more than three-quarters of North Korea's total foreign trade would be with Russia. The Soviet Union's primary interest in North Korea was iron, steel, minerals and other metals.²⁵

²³For the formation of people's committees, Soviet war correspondent B. Runin's article, "V Strane Utrennei Svezhesti" (In the Country of the Morning Freshness), Novi Mir (New World), No. 4-5, Moscow, 1945, pp. 124-144, cited in Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), p. 23. For a good summary of the Soviet control system, see Paige, op. cit. All these Soviet-modeled administrative organs were restructured in accordance with drastic socioeconomic programs. In other words, North Korea adopted Chinese model in restructuring administrative and managerial organizations. This will be discussed in the next chapter.

²⁴One example of this strategy is that the Soviet-Korean Ho Kai, a member of the CPSU took the post of head of the party organizational bureau. See p. 118 of the previous chapter. These administrative organs are the North Korean Five Province Administrative Bureau and the North Korean Provisional People's Committee. See p. 111 and 113 in the previous chapter. For this strategy, Paige, op. cit., p. 29. See also Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan O, "The Russian Faction in North Korea," Asian Survey, April 1968, pp. 270-288.

²⁵For all these trades and exchanges, see Paige, op. cit., pp. 25-34.

Culturally, the flower-bordered portraits of Stalin and Kim were often seen on the street.²⁶ One main thoroughfare in the capital was named "Stalin Street."²⁷ Pictures of Russian heroes were installed in the Korean schools. The Soviet educational advisors were assigned to teachers' college to train teaching cadres. By the end of 1949, 620 college students had been sent to the Soviet Union for higher education.²⁸ Russian science, technology, language, literature, and art flushed into North Korean society. Other Russian cultural influences were seen in translations, art, dance, the theater, movies, press, and radio. With the creation of the North Korean People's Army, at least 10,000 men were sent to Siberia mainly for military and technical training in Khabarovsk and the Chita Far East Military Academy.²⁹ This is the general pattern of North Korean integration with Soviet Union which led State Department analysts, who studied the Soviet system of control in North Korea, to conclude that "Korea was already well advanced toward becoming a Republic of U.S.S.R."³⁰

²⁶V. Perlin, "A Visit to North Korea," New Times, January 7, 1948, p. 16.

²⁷Newsweek, December 6, 1965, p. 54.

²⁸Key P. Yang and Chang-boh Chee, "North Korean Educational System: 1945-Present," Scalapino ed., North Korea, op. cit., p. 127.

²⁹Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," North Korea Today, op. cit., p. 107.

³⁰North Korea: A Case Study, U.S. Department of State, op. cit., p. 120.

The North Korean emulation of the Chinese model, as will be discussed below, is clearly observable after the Chinese crossed the Yalu during the Korean War in October, 1950. To be specific, the North Korean emulation of the Chinese "New Democracy" can be seen more ostensibly in her nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture after 1953. (It also includes the Chinese war strategy during the war.) However, it may be argued that the North Korean emulation of the Chinese might have started early around the time of the advent of the new Chinese regime (1945-1949) within the framework of tolerance under the Soviet control system, mainly because of the similarities of social conditions.³¹ Even though it may not be convincingly argued that Koreans had intentionally emulated the Chinese practice before 1950, it is obvious that Koreans had been pursuing policies of "New Democracy" during the period of 1945-1950.³² It may be more appropriate to

³¹As will be noted below in Paige's observation, one may argue that it is impossible for the North Koreans to emulate the Chinese experience because People's Republic of China was not established until 1949, whereas de facto North Korean government was operated since 1945. One should note that Mao's "New Democracy" was practiced in "the liberated areas" of China such as Yen-an during the period of 1938-1945. For the New Democracy in Yen-an, see Tuan-sheng Ch'ien, The government and Politics of China, 1912-1949 (Mass.: Harvard, 1950)

³²Any clear evidence such as official statements or documents to prove that Koreans intentionally imitated the Chinese practice was not available. But some of the identical policies should be explained in terms of "New Democracy."

say that it was inevitable for North Koreans to adopt the policies of "New Democracy" because of the social conditions right after the liberation. In looking at some of the identical policies of China and North Korea, Paige suggests that it was quite possible for the Chinese to have learned from Korean experience via the Russians.³³

Politically, during the period of 1945-1950, all the revolutionary classes in North Korea were included in the formation of a new regime as in the case of China. To be specific, all the revolutionary classes including intellectuals and petty national bourgeoisie had representatives in the Puk-Choson Minju Chuui Minjok T'ongil Chonson (North Korea Democratic National United Front) created on June 22, 1946, which was a united front structure embracing a number of mass organizations and which should be considered as the Korean equivalent of the Chinese People's United Democratic Front.³⁴ The Front totally dominated the people's committees. In the November 3, 1946 elections, it won 97 per cent of the seats at the provincial level, 96.6 per cent at the county level, and 95.4 per cent at the municipal level. The socioeconomic breakdown of the elected

³³ Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," op. cit., p. 231. This observation of Paige's is totally irrelevant in this author's view.

³⁴ For the speech of Kim Il-song on the occasion of the establishment of the United Front, see Choguk ui tongil tongnip kwa minjuhwa rul wihayo (Pyongyang, 1949), Vol. I, pp. 89-98.

representatives of the People's Committees was as follows:

	<u>Percent of Total</u>
Workers	14.5
Peasants	36.4
Office Workers	30.6
Intelligentsia	9.1
Merchants	4.3
Entrepreneurs	2.1
Clergymen	2.7
Former Landowners	0.4

Source: Choson tongsa (Kwahak-won, 1958),
Vol. III, pp. 30-31.

All those who had not been pro-Japanese, dependent capitalists, landlords, or national traitors had formal rights and places in the new regime. Because of the thirty-five year gap in political activity caused by Japanese suppression, the North Korean Democratic National United Front was designed specifically to attract wide popular support. North Koreans were extremely cautious in using socialist slogans during this period, because such slogans might have frightened the people. The components of NKDNUF were the Chondokyo Party, the Choson Democratic Party, and the Korean Workers' Party. One should note that the Chondokyo, or Heavenly Way Religion, was an ethnic culture group, which opposed Western cultural penetration into Korea, and it philosophically embraced the elements of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The Chondokyo as such was philosophically far removed from Marxism-Leninism. However, it enjoyed a good reputation because of its past independence

movements.³⁵ To be specific, during Kim Il-song's Samsu and Kapsan operation, it had cooperated with Him in his guerrilla fight against the Japanese.³⁶ Thus, as we have seen, one may conclude that Mao's concept of "people" is equally applicable to North Korea as well as to China.

During the process of the creation of Korean Workers' Party,³⁷ the slogan of "firmly uniting the broad popular masses of North and South Korea" was constantly reiterated.³⁸ The broad popular masses in South Korea were obviously the concern of Korean Workers' Party. Looking at the merger between New People's Party and North Korean Workers' Party, it should be recalled that New People's Party was mostly composed of office workers, petty bourgeoisie, and the intelligentsia.³⁹ Korean society, following the departure

³⁵Wilbert B. Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, 1950, p.386.

³⁶The Chondokyo group had participated in the Association for Restoration of Fatherland and cooperated with Kapsan Operational Committee. See Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang su roun kil, op. cit., p. 39.

³⁷As noted in the previous chapter, it was created by going through two mergers, first, the merger between the Yen-an faction's New People's Party and the North Korean Workers' Party, and the merger between the North and South Korean Workers' Party. See Chapter III.

³⁸Kim Il-song, Kim Il-song jojak sonjip (Pyongyang: Choson Rodong Chulpansa, 1967), pp. 74-76.

³⁹This point was noted in the previous chapter. Here we analyze theoretical basis for the merger. The merger was suggested by Kim. See his speech, Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. I, 1963 ed., op. cit., pp. 76-80. According to Kim Ch'ang-sun, many Korean bureaucrats were seeking "political security" in the New People's Party. See Kim Ch'ang-sun, op. cit., p. 98.

of the Japanese, suffered from an acute shortage of administrators and technicians. The intellectual suppression of the Korean people under Japanese rule had been carried out systematically. The Japanese had sought to keep the Koreans as ignorant as possible. Education was designed to give meager technical training for hewers of wood and drawers of water, and to provide administrative skill for minor clerical posts. However, Koreans were far removed from any responsible administrative posts or highly skilled technical and managerial posts.⁴⁰ Thus, after the liberation the KWP needed the participation of the intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie in the formation of the government.⁴¹

The policies of "New Democracy" in North Korea during the period of 1945-1950 is clearly illuminated in Kim Il-song's own words:

In the early years following Liberation we were very short of national cadres, technicians in particular, and this was one of the biggest obstacles in state administration and economic and cultural construction. The question of

⁴⁰Henry Chung, The Case of Korea (New York: F. H. Revell Co., 1921), pp. 125-144.

⁴¹See this chapter, p. 129. This is not acceptable to the early Soviet formula. The shortage of administrators and technicians was a serious problem in South Korea, too. This problem was solved by the Americans' using the Japanese administrators to remain in office temporarily despite the angry responses from Koreans. See George M. McCune, "Post-War Government and Politics of Korea," Journal of Politics, Vol. 9, 1947, pp. 605-623.

national cadres, therefore, was an acute problem for us.

The problem of the old intellectuals is of great importance in building up the ranks of national technical cadres. Whether or not old intellectuals are drawn into the construction of a new society greatly affects the economic and cultural development of the country and this is particularly the case during the early stage of revolution.

As a matter of course, the old intellectuals of our country come mostly from the propertied classes. They served the imperialists and exploiting classes in the past. However, as intellectuals of a colonial country, they were subjected to oppression and national discrimination by foreign imperialists and as a result they had a revolutionary spirit.

Taking into full account the important role played by the intellectuals in the construction of a new society and the characteristics of our intellectuals, our party since the early days of Liberation has pursued the policy of accepting them and remolding them into intellectuals serving the working people. Inspired by the Party's policy, the majority of the old intellectuals came over to the side of people after Liberation. They have taken an active part in the revolutionary struggle and in construction. Thus, they have made a valuable contribution, and continue to make one, to economic and cultural construction.⁴²

Industry in North Korea in 1945 had a fairly well developed infrastructure as the legacy of the Japanese war-industry. The Japanese war industry in Korea was designed: (1) to provide a source of raw materials for her own manufacturing and (2) to be used as a dumping ground for her

⁴²Kim Il-song, Revolution and Socialist Construction In Korea: Selected Writings of Kim Il-song (New York: 1971), p. 85.

surplus industrial products.⁴³ Consequently, mining was expanded, so was the metallurgical industry; chemicals began to be produced, and a shipbuilding industry was started. The fertilizer industry was especially well developed in order to maximize Korean rice exports to Japan. Most of the industrial enterprises belonged to the Japanese. Thus, the industrial growth under the Japanese rule did not mean any advantages to Koreans.⁴⁴ Tables IV-2, IV-3, and IV-4 show the predominant Japanese ownership of the industrial enterprises at the end of 1940. Korean capital played an extremely small part in the economic life of the country under Japanese rule. Table IV-2 indicates that the Korean corporations constituted only about five or six per cent of the capital of all corporations.

With the exodus of the Japanese entrepreneurs and a handful of "comprador" capitalists in 1945, the nationalization of industry in North Korea was fairly easy. The gross output of state-owned and cooperative industry constituted 90.7 in 1949 (see Table IV-10).⁴⁵ The economy of

⁴³Robert T. Oliver, Korea Forgotten Nation (Washington, 1944), pp. 77-86.

⁴⁴Andrew J. Grajdanzev, Modern Korea (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944), pp. 148-184.

⁴⁵Kim Il-song, Choson Rodongdang Chesamcha-daehoe eso jinsulhan Chungangwiwonhoe saopchongkyol boko (Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party: Document and Materials) (Pyongyang: Choson Rodongdang chulpansa, 1956), p. 50. For an analysis, see Theodore Shabad, "North Korea's Post-War Recovery," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 25, June, 1956, p. 82.

TABLE IV-2

The Capital of Industrial Corporations
by Nationality (1940)

	Korean		Japanese	
	Paid-Up Capital 1,000 yen	%	Paid-Up Capital 1,000 yen	%
Metal	6,100	2	373,000	98
Machine	61,500	42	85,050	58
Chemical	1,000	0	276,250	100
Textile	14,000	15	76,600	85
Ceramic	--	0	53,245	100
Wooden	5,500	10	47,000	90
Printing	1,500	43	2,000	57
Food	5,250	7	73,800	93
Gas & Electric	--	0	553,030	100
Others	<u>7,000</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>83,500</u>	<u>92</u>
Total	101,850	6	1,523,475	94

Source: Ch'osen Ginkgo Ch'osabu, Ch'osen Keizai Nempo (Korea's Economic Annual), 1948 quoted in Ch'oe, Ho-jin, Han'guk Kyongjesa: wonsi sahoeropu'to 1945 nyon kkaji (History of Korean Economy: From the Primitive Age to 1945) (Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1971), pp. 297-298.

TABLE IV-3

The Number of Industrial Corporations and the Capital Invested
by Nationality (1938)

	Number of Corporations			Capital Invested (1,000 yen)		
	Korean	Japanese	Total	Korean	Japanese	Total
Total	740	804	1,544	30,198	214,705	244,903
Textile	37	39	76	6,075	23,103	29,178
Machine	58	95	153	1,852	23,654	25,506
Brewing	321	128	449	12,054	13,722	25,826
Pharmacy	33	25	58	1,676	934	2,610
Ceramic	12	40	52	432	15,791	16,223
Milling	94	70	164	2,526	9,860	12,386
Food	17	75	92	217	9,621	9,838
Lumber	19	82	101	594	10,553	11,147
Printing	44	42	86	62	51,461	2,086
Chemistry	37	75	112	2,954	100,736	103,690
Others	68	113	201	1,193	5,220	6,413

Source: Ch'osen Keizai Zuhyo, p. 330, quoted in Ibid., pp. 297-298.

TABLE IV-4

The Percentage Calculated from TABLE IV-3

	Number of Corporations			Capital Invested		
	Korean	Japanese	Total	Korean	Japanese	Total
Total	47.9	52.1	100.0	12.3	82.7	100.0
Textile	48.7	41.3	100.0	20.8	79.2	100.0
Machine	37.9	62.1	100.0	7.3	92.7	100.0
Brewing	71.5	28.5	100.0	46.7	53.3	100.0
Pharmacy	56.8	43.1	100.0	64.2	35.8	100.0
Ceramic	23.1	76.9	100.0	2.7	97.3	100.0
Milling	57.3	42.7	100.0	20.4	79.6	100.0
Food	18.5	81.5	100.0	2.2	97.8	100.0
Lumber	18.8	81.2	100.0	5.3	94.7	100.0
Printing	51.2	48.8	100.0	30.0	70.0	100.0
Chemistry	33.0	67.0	100.0	2.8	97.2	100.0
Others	33.8	66.2	100.0	18.6	81.4	100.0

Source: Ch'osen Keizai Zuhyo, p. 330, quoted in Ibid., pp. 297-298.

national capitalists was almost negligible at this time. This fairly easy nationalization of North Korean industry in 1945 has been interpreted by some scholars as evidence that North Korea adopted the Soviet steps of complete nationalization of industry under the Soviet control system. However, the slogan "to preserve the principle of private property" has been repeatedly used in official North Korean documents and in Kim Il-song speeches.⁴⁶

Although North Korea punished and banned "comprador capitalists" from the national economy of early days, the "national bourgeoisie" have been accepted by the regime.⁴⁷ Kim Il-song admits that the North Korean national bourgeoisie participated in the anti-imperial and anti-feudal democratic revolution before 1945, that they suffered politically and economically under the Japanese, and that they failed to establish connections with foreign capitalists. While they did not establish rapport with the proletariat because of their basic mentality, they have still accepted the regime's economic policy of socialist transformation.

As in China, a mixed socialist and private economy has been adopted in North Korea. The scale of private economy, in contrast to the Chinese case, was relatively

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 50. The same speech in English edition, p. 42. Kim Il-song, Socialist Construction in Korea, op. cit., p. 38. Kim Il-song jojak sonjip, Vol. III, 1968 ed., p. 71.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 70-71.

small. However, Kim Il-song reiterated the necessity to utilize the positive effect of the private sector and to restrict its negative effects.⁴⁸ North Korean economists claim that the private sector of industry contributed somewhat to North Korea's economy during its transitional period to socialist economy. As can be seen in Table IV-5, in 1946 the socialist sector performed much better than the private sector or small commodity sector in gross industrial output. In contrast, the small commodity sector and private sector dominated in gross agricultural output. Furthermore, agriculture produced 63% of the total GNP whereas industry produced only 16.8%.⁴⁹ These figures indicate that the private sector was superior to the socialist sector. One can also easily notice a wide gap in the extent of socialist transformation between industry and agriculture.

A North Korean economist, Nam Ch'un-hwa, argues that the private sector of industry contributed to North Korea's national economy by balancing the socialist industrial sector against the private agricultural sector.⁵⁰ To be specific, the nationalized industry which had served the Japanese economy rather than the Korean had neglected

⁴⁸Kim Il-song, Socialist Construction, op. cit., p. 37.

⁴⁹Nam Ch'un-hwa, "Kaiin sangkongop ui sahoejujokkaejo," 8.15 Haebang 15 junyonkinyom kyongje ronmun jip (Essays in Economics in commemorating 15th anniversary of 8.15 independence) (Pyongyang: Kwahakwonchulpansa, 1960), p. 101.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 99.

TABLE IV-5

Structure of Gross National Output Value
According to Economic Sectors

<u>A. Structure of Gross Industrial Output Value According to Economic Sectors (%)</u>	
	<u>1946</u>
Entire Industry	100
Socialist Economic Sector	72.4
Small Commodity Economic Sector	4.4
Private Capitalist Sector	23.2
<u>B. Structure of Gross Agricultural Output Value According to Economic Sectors (%)</u>	
	<u>1946</u>
Entire Agriculture	100
Socialist Economic Sector	--
Small Commodity Economic Sector	94.4
Private Capitalist Sector	5.6
<u>C. Structure of Gross Value of Retail Commerce According to Economic Sectors (%)</u>	
	<u>1946</u>
Gross Value Retail Products	100
Consumers' Cooperatives	3.5
Private Commerce	96.5

TABLE IV-5 (cont.)

D. Structure of Gross National Product Value According to Economic Sectors (%)

	<u>1946</u>
GNP	100
Socialist Economic Sector	14.8
Small Commodity Economic Sector	64.2
Private Capitalist Sector	21.0

Source: 8.15 Haebang Sipojunyon Kinyom Kyongjeronmunjip (Essays on Economics written for the 15th Anniversary of 8.15 National Independence) (Pyongyang: Kwahakchulpansa, 1960), pp. 99-100.

machine-building and light industry. The private sector of industry turned to light industry and was able to produce daily necessities for peasants and to respond according to the supply and demand mechanism. Nam Ch'un-hwa contends that in a broad sense the private sector of industry along with that of commerce facilitated an alliance between workers and peasants during the early years of the regime.⁵¹

It appears that Kim Il-song and his regime had been seriously concerned about some negative effects of the private industrial sector such as the exploitation of workers. In order to restrict these negative effects, the central government sought to control the private economy by setting prices and labor hours, establishing a tax system, and controlling demands and supports. The directives from the Party were strictly adhered to. Furthermore, the regime often suggested kinds and types of industry which it deemed necessary for the overall national economy. The government helped those who were willing to engage in the kinds and types of industry which it had suggested by giving advantages such as cutting taxes, removing price limits, etc. North Korean economists claim that all these methods of utilizing and restricting the private sector of the economy during the transitional period were based on their "great and beloved leader," Kim Il-song's innovation of Marxism-Leninism.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 102.

North Korea's agricultural policy between 1945-1950 reflected the regime's New Democracy policy. Under the Japanese there had been little basic change in the character of Korean agriculture. The Japanese procured most of their raw materials from China and Manchuria. Korea was viewed as a granary to meet the rice shortage in Japan. However, this exploitation did not necessitate much change in the primitive condition of agriculture. After the Japanese came, the irrigated area was slightly increased. As Table IV-6 indicates, irrigated paddy fields in 1951 totalled 1,769,572 Chongbo in comparison with 1,547,804 Chongbo in 1920. The Korean Governor-General tried to replace the primitive agricultural implements with modern agricultural machinery, but the result was not spectacular. The only noticeable change in agriculture was in the use of fertilizers. The Japanese recognized the importance of fertilizers, especially in a country like Korea where the soil has been cultivated for several thousand years. The Japanese program to concentrate on production of rice in Korea, especially under the pressure of war, resulted in a significant increase in the production of fertilizers. The use of commercial fertilizers rose from 48,100 tons in 1919 to 473,666 tons in 1941.⁵² While the increased use of fertilizers meant the development of industry, it did not

⁵²Chosen Sotokufu Shi Sei Nen Po (Chosen Sotokufu, 1941), pp. 216.

TABLE IV-6

The Irrigated Farm Land (in Chongbo)

Year	Paddy Land	Dry Field	Total
1910	847,668	1,617,237	2,464,905
1915	1,177,531	1,993,079	3,170,610
1920	1,547,804	2,819,610	4,495,478
1925	1,575,186	2,843,069	4,571,547
1926	1,585,704	2,864,033	4,602,497
1927	1,603,020	2,851,215	4,607,916
1928	1,614,726	2,841,770	4,607,632
1929	1,625,486	2,829,986	4,632,234
1930	1,643,754	2,822,383	4,646,860
1931	1,653,073	2,802,203	4,658,431
1932	1,669,598	2,790,754	4,662,510
1933	1,681,805	2,807,407	4,855,782
1934	1,692,733	2,812,748	4,928,105
1935	1,703,279	2,796,891	4,917,942
1935	1,718,486	2,785,368	4,941,584
1937	1,736,368	2,769,876	4,943,370
1938	1,750,844	2,764,832	4,957,721
1939	1,762,774	2,763,983	4,958,507
1940	1,770,395	2,740,762	4,934,230
1941	1,769,572	2,719,965	4,888,550

Source: Chosen Sotokfu Shi Sei Nen Po (Chosen Sotokfu, 1941), pp. 229-230.

significantly affect the modernization of agricultural methods. In short, the legacy of Japanese rule in agriculture was decidedly backward.

The Japanese government encouraged migration of the Japanese into Korea. But the Japanese farmers showed little interest in Korea except for a few landlords and speculators. The Japanese government encouraged tenancy system, because it, together with the taxation system, was an important instrument for draining rice out of Korea.⁵³ Despite the efforts of the authorities, Japanese ownership of the agricultural land constituted approximately 10 per cent of the total cultivated land in North Korea.⁵⁴ As Tables IV-7 and IV-8 indicate, with the exodus of the Japanese landlords, only 10 per cent of the arable land, at most, was available for possible state ownership in 1945. Most of the tilled land belonged to the Korean landlords who escaped to the South after the outbreak of the Korean War.

According to Kim Il-song's report of 1947, 6.8 per cent of the farmers including the Japanese landlords held 54 per cent of the tilled land in North Korea, while 56.7 per cent were classified as "poor farmers" and held only

⁵³ Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 63.

⁵⁴ Choson Tongsa, Vol. III, p. 34. The Japanese ownership of the tilled land does not represent the amount of the rice exported to Japan. The taxation system and purchasing from the Korean landlords were the effective method of pumping rice out of Korea.

TABLE IV-7

Land Reform in the Northern Part of the Republic
(one jungbo = one hectare)

	Area in jungbo	Including		
		Arable Land in jungbo	Orchards in jungbo	Number of Households
Land confiscated	1,000,325	983,954	2,692	422,646
Including				
Land owned by the Japanese govern- ment & nationals	112,623	111,561	900	12,919
Land owned by national traitors and deserters	13,272	12,518	127	1,366
Land excessive of 5 jungbo owned by landlords	237,746	231,716	984	29,683
Land cultivated entirely by tenant farmers	263,436	259,150	292	145,688
Land for permanent tenancy	358,053	354,093	381	228,866
Land owned by churches, temples and religious organs	15,195	14,916	8	4,124
Land distributed	981,390	965,069	--	724,522
Including				
To hired farm-hands	22,387	21,960	--	17,137
To landless peasants	603,407	589,377	--	442,973
To peasants with a little land	345,974	344,134	--	260,501
To landlords moved to other areas	9,622	9,598	--	3,911
To people's Committees	18,935	18,885	2,692	--

TABLE IV-7 (cont.)

Source: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Kukka Hyehoek
Winwonhoe, Chungang Tonggyeguk, Choson Inmin Konghwa kuk
Inmin Kyongje Baljon Tongkyejip (Statistics on Economic
Development in Democratic People's Republic of Korea)
(Pyongyang, 1961), edited by Library of Congress (MC 4587)
(Washington, 1963), p. 59.

TABLE IV-8

Land Confiscated and Distributed Under the
Land Reform (in %)

	Area	Including		Number of households
		Arable land	Of which Orchards	
Land confiscated	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including				
Land owned by the Japanese & nationals	11.3	11.3	33.4	3.1
Land owned by national traitors and deserters	1.3	1.3	4.7	0.3
Land excessive of 5 jungbo owned by landlords	23.8	23.6	36.6	7.0
Land cultivated exclusively by tenant farmers	26.3	26.3	10.8	34.5
Land for permanent tenancy	35.8	36.0	14.2	54.1
Land owned by churches, temples and other religious organs	1.5	1.5	0.3	1.0
Land distributed	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Including				
To hired farm-hands	2.0	2.2	--	2.4
To landless peasants	60.3	59.9	--	61.1
To peasants with a little land	34.6	35.0	--	36.0
To landlords moved to other areas	1.0	1.0	--	0.5
To People's committees	1.9	1.9	100.0	--

Source: Ibid., p. 60.

5.4 per cent of the land.⁵⁵ Except for approximately 20 per cent, who were self-employed, the North Korean farmers belonged either to "pure" tenant-farmer category and had no land of their own or to the "poor" farmer category and worked their own small plots with the land held by wealthier landlords. Whereas the North Korean Provisional People's Committee was able to nationalize extensive industries belonging to the Japanese, only 10 per cent of the tilled land was readily available for government disposal. The only answer to the agrarian problem was not outright collectivization, but land reform programs. Unlike the early Bolshevik land nationalization program, the North Koreans adopted the slogan, "land to the tiller!" which was in fact the Chinese slogan. The principle of "private ownership" was strictly adhered to. The land confiscated and distributed under the land reform is depicted in Tables IV-7 and IV-8. According to North Korean statistics, after the land reform of 1946 "rich peasants" made up 2 to 3 per cent of total farm households and their share of arable land was 3.2 per cent.⁵⁶

⁵⁵Kim Il-song, Chokuk ui tongil dokrip kwa minju haw rul wihayo (For the Unification, Independence, and Democratization of the Fatherland), Vol. I (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1949), p. 340.

⁵⁶Chong-sik Lee, "The 'Socialist Revolution' in the North Korean Countryside," in Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 8, October 1962, p. 13.

The Soviet control system in Korea started to diminish with the arrival of Chinese People's Volunteers during the Korean War in October, 1950. The story of the Korean War will not be dealt with in this study. However, it should be noted that after the outbreak of the Korean War the Soviet control system expired its influence in North Korea. The Chinese orientation of the Korean leadership started to increase at this time. Allen S. Whiting points out that during the war Mao Tse-tung's classic study, "On the Protracted War," was applied to the CPV's engagement with the U.N. troops. There were a total of 248,100 troops committed to the Korean War. More than 180,000 "volunteers" came by November, and at least 90,000 more were scheduled to join them within three weeks.⁵⁷ Despite these impressive forces, Peking avoided committing major engagement with the U.N. forces. Most of the battles were surprise attacks, ambush, and "melting back into the hills whence they came."⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Walter G. Hermes, U.S. Army in the Korean War: Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 1966), p. 77. Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960), pp. 130-132.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 131. The Korean War was a limited conventional war. Although major conventional battles were fought, this type of guerrilla warfare were frequent. The battle with the U.S. First Cavalry Division and another one with Sixth ROK Division at Chosan were good examples. For the strategy and tactics of "protracted war," see Mao Tse-tung, "On the Protracted War," in his Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1963). For an overall official account of the Korean War, see Roy E. Appleman, U.S. Army in the Korean War: South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, C.D.: United States Army, 1961).

Other evidence of diminishing Soviet control system was the suicide of the powerful Soviet-Korean, Ho Kai who had been a member of Central Committee of Korean Workers' Party. He was accused of defective organizational work during the war.⁵⁹

While North Korea adopted "New Democratic Economy" or "state capitalism" during the transitional period, the impact of Chinese Communism is even more clearly observable after the end of the Korean War. Looking at the process of socialist transformation after the Korean War, it should be noted that the Korean War contributed to the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture. The war had in fact speeded up the socialist transformation. A ravaging war forced every man, woman, and child to cooperate in a manner never seen before, simply in order to survive. This war effort must have developed a high degree of loyalty to the party, and the party expounded the necessity of cooperation and the dignity of labor. In practical matters, most importantly, the regime was faced with a very acute labor shortage. A large portion of the population was drafted to the army; many were killed or wounded. It was reported that 254,000 North Korean soldiers were killed,

⁵⁹Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation," op. cit., p. 253.

186,400 were captured, and 93,000 civilians were killed.⁶⁰ Effective use of manpower after the war necessitated the nationalization of industry and the collectivization of agriculture.⁶¹

A shortage of labor has been so closely related with the socialist transformation of North Korea that the effort of the regime to procure manpower is worth noting. This policy also reflects the rapid industrialization of the country which demanded more and more labor force. The North Korean target was the Korean minority in Japan which had long been a troubling problem for Japanese policy-makers and also the Japanese public. Impoverished and suffering from social and economic discrimination, the Koreans had a high crime rate and had become a heavy burden on Japanese government.⁶² The North Koreans proposed that the Japanese government repatriate the Korean minority to North Korea in August 1954. Richard H. Mitchell suggests that the manpower shortage was a major concern of North Korean policy towards the Korean minority in Japan. Although the North

⁶⁰Dae Han Nyonkam (Pusan: Dae Han Nyonkam-sa, 1953), p. 78. The total North Korean population of ages between 20 and 29 was 2,198,000, and that of between 30 and 64 was 3,630,000. See Area Handbook for North Korea, DA pam No. 550-81 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 64.

⁶¹For Kim Il-song's speech in this matter, see Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. III, 63 ed., p. 64.

⁶²For the origin and status of the Korean minority in Japan, see Edward W. Wagner, The Korean Minority in Japan (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1951), pp.83-91.

Korean proposal for repatriation was announced in August 1954, an intensive door-to-door campaign by Choren (the General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan; a North Korean organization) started right after the Korean War. As of 1964, a total of 117 shipments had been made, and a total number of 81,683 Korean residents in Japan had been repatriated to North Korea.⁶³ These are some of the dynamic forces which hastened the socialist transformation in North Korea.

During the three-year plan (1954-1956) the role of the private sector of industry was only negligible. The plan was designed to restore 1949 production levels in most sectors of the economy. The regime was able to easily enlist the capitalist industrialists in the socialist sector. In the period after the Korean War, the problem of socialist transformation of capitalist industry matured. Kim Il-song reports that because of serious damage caused by the war, a considerable number of private entrepreneurs were ruined, while the remaining ones were reduced mostly to the status of handicraftsmen. Under this circumstance, according to Kim, the capitalist industrialists found it impossible to restore their ruined enterprises unless they

⁶³ Kim Il-song reports this policy to the Third Congress of the Korean Workers' Party in 1956. See The Document of the Third Congress of Korean Workers' Party, op. cit., p. 74. For the process of repatriation, Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 83-91. Also Toitsu Chosen Nen Kan (One Korea Year Book) (Toitsu Chosen Shinbun Sha, 1964), p. 539.

relied on the assistance of the state and socialist economy and unless they pooled their means of production, funds and efforts. Moreover, Kim Il-song reports, as agriculture and handicrafts, as will be discussed shortly, were being transformed along cooperative lines, they could no longer obtain raw and other materials on the private market.⁶⁴

In contrast to the Chinese experience, it was fairly easy for the North Koreans to transform the private sector into cooperative enterprises. The stage of "buying off" was easy also. Under conditions in which the socialist economic sector dominated all spheres of the national economy, it was impossible for a small number of private entrepreneurs to maintain their private economy. It should be recalled, however, that "the voluntary principle" was strictly adhered to during the transformation. Kim Il-song reiterated "the voluntary principle" in his major speeches. Kim also reports that the party did not neglect the work of remolding of the capitalists.⁶⁵ One Soviet commentator indicates that in pursuing this policy of "voluntary base," North Korea was utilizing the experience of China.⁶⁶ As Table IV-10 shows, by 1956 state and cooperative

⁶⁴Kim Il-song, Socialist Construction in Korea, op. cit., p. 37.

⁶⁵Ibid, p. 38.

⁶⁶V. F. Kotok, Gosudarstvennoe pravo zarubezhnykh sotsialisticheskikh stran (Moscow, 1957), p. 425 quoted in Rudolph, North Korea's Structure, op. cit., p. 57.

TABLE IV-9

Growth of Total Industrial Output Value (in %)

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1959	1960	1960 1949	1960 1953	1960 1956
Total industrial output value	100	337	216	615	19 times	21 times	635	990	348
Including State and cooperative industries	100	422	287	833	26 times	29 times	699	10 times	354
Of which State Industry	100	398	257	765	23 times	26 times	662	10 times	345
Central Industry	100	363	230	722	17 times	18 times	486	767	244
Local Industry		100	96	187	13 times	17 times	--	17 times	897

Source: Central Statistical Board Under the State Planning Commission of the D.P.R.K. Statistical Returns of National Economy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (1946-1960) (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1961), p. 36.

TABLE IV-10

Structure of Gross Industrial Output Value According to Economic Sectors (in %)

	1946	1949	1953	1956	1958	1959	1960
Entire Industry	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Socialistic economic sector	72.4	90.7	96.1	98.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
Of which							
State Industry	72.4	85.5	86.2	89.9	87.7	89.5	89.7
Cooperative Industry	--	5.2	9.9	8.1	12.2	10.5	10.3
Small commodity economic sector	4.4	1.5	1.0	0.7	0.1	--	--
Private Capitalist sector	23.2	7.8	2.9	1.3	--	--	--

Source: Ibid., p. 38.

enterprises accounted for 98.0 per cent of the total industrial output, leaving only 1.3 per cent as the private share of production.⁶⁷ Tables IV-9 and IV-10 indicate the growth of gross industrial output by economic sectors during 1946-1960. Even the items belonging to private production were mainly handicraft daily necessities, and the private enterprises consisted mostly of small-scale rice mills, cotton-carding mills, small factories for building materials and the like. With the successful fulfillment of the production target of the Third Year Plan and the completion of the socialist transformation of industry in April 1956, the Third Workers' Party Congress announced that North Korea officially had entered the period of the "construction of socialism."⁶⁸

The process of the collectivization of agriculture in North Korea after 1953 was an exact copy of the Chinese experience in terms of timing and types of farms. In 1953 North Korea was a land of small individual farms, only 0.6 per cent of the arable land in collectives.⁶⁹ There were a

⁶⁷Third Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea, op. cit., p. 4. For a good analysis of this development, see Theodore Shabad, "North Korea's Postwar Recovery," in Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 25, p. 82.

⁶⁸One should note that timing of the end of "New Democratic Economy" was punctual to the Chinese case.

⁶⁹Postwar Rehabilitation and Development of the National Economy in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 39.

number of clear motives for the collectivization program. First, as mentioned elsewhere, the shortage of manpower was more acute in agriculture than industry since the Korean War. As in the case of the Soviet Union and China, the priority was given to the heavy industry during her Three Year Plan. The rapid expansion of industry demanded more and more manpower; hence, the farms had to supply the urban workers. With the exodus of farmers to the urban areas, an effective use of manpower in rural areas necessitated the collectivization. Second, the food shortage resulting from the war was severe. To feed the increasing number of urban workers was an urgent problem for the regime. Collectivization was the only way to produce more food.⁷⁰ Third, primitive farming methods had to be replaced by modern agricultural machines. Most of the draft animals and tools were destroyed during the Korean War. The effective use of modern agricultural machines, which were insufficient to meet the demand, necessitated collectivization. Furthermore, the irrigation works could be more rationally organized under collectivization. Fourth, the perceived need for ideological indoctrination promoted collectivization. The Party contended that the farmers lacked "revolutionary consciousness," and that they still had petty bourgeoisie

⁷⁰For the same motive for the Chinese collectivization, see Kenneth R. Walker, Planning in Chinese Agriculture (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1956), p. 8.

mentality. Kim Il-song reports that some of the peasants had joined the enemy during the war. The Party concluded that the collectivization was the most effective means to educate the peasants for socialist construction. Fifth, because of the peasants' petty bourgeois mentality they tended to hide actual production when the government tried to collect taxes. Collectivization would facilitate the collection of taxes in the rural areas. The regime had to pump the agricultural produce from rural to urban areas. Collectivization was the answer to prevent the peasants from hiding their production.

The types of cooperatives were based upon those of the Chinese model.⁷¹ The first type was "pumasi" (the mutual aid team), the most primitive form of rural socialism. The members preserved their private ownership of land, draft animals, and agricultural implements. The income was not shared but belonged to each individual landowner. However, cattle and agricultural equipment were used to collectively work on the fields. The second type was Nongop Hyopdong Chohap Che I Hyongtae (a semi-socialistic form). Land still belonged to the private property of the peasant. His land was given to the cooperative as a kind of share. The

⁷¹For the typology of collectivization, see Walker, Planning in Chinese Agriculture, *op. cit.*, and for Korean counterparts, see Chong-sik Lee, "The 'Socialist Revolution' in the North Korean Countryside," in Asian Survey, Vol. 2, No. 8, p. 11.

draft animals and agricultural implements were private property but used under planned cooperative management. Work was performed in common under the direction of the cooperative management. The income, after payment of the tax-in-kind, was divided on the basis of 20 per cent for the land and 80 per cent for labor. The third type was Nongop Hyopdong Chohap Che Sam Hyongtae (cooperative). Under this system, land, draft animals, and major farm implements of farmers were turned over to cooperative ownership. Farmers no longer received any credit for the land they contributed. They were paid solely on the basis of the number of days worked.⁷²

A North Korean economist, Pak In-ha, has pointed out several factors which had facilitated the collectivization process. He claimed that the state had already operated the Farm Appliance Stations which were similar to the Soviets' Machine Tractor Stations. Also, the Stations rented farm tools to private farms and the first type cooperatives. Moreover, the Stations had demonstrated some advantages of collectivization, because most of the "modern" farm appliances required collective works. The North Korean farmers became aware of the efficiency of

⁷²For the collectivization process, see Pak In-ha, "Uri nara eso ui nongop hyopdong kyongri ui palsang paljon kwa ku uwolsong," Kulloja, No. 10, November 25, 1954 (Pyongyang: Rodong Shinmun-sa, 1954), pp. 92-112.

modern farm appliances. Furthermore, the regime helped create "peasant banks" and "consumers' cooperatives." Government loans and subsidies were available to private farms or the first type of cooperatives through peasant banks. Farmers were supplied through consumers' cooperatives daily necessities from cities, and they sold their farm products through consumers' cooperatives to workers in the urban areas. By so doing, peasant banks and consumers' cooperatives demonstrated the superiority of collective management and encouraged collectivization. Peasants learned some advantages of collectivization.⁷³ Despite the development of these three types of cooperatives, private garden plots were allowed in North Korean countryside. Furthermore, the agricultural produces in these private gardens could be sold in so-called "peasant markets" in North Korea. (This will be examined in Chapter VII.)

The development of collectivization should be examined in connection with the expansion of industry. The rapid development of industry, as noted earlier (see Table IV-9), should be interpreted as leverage for the collectivization of agriculture. The rapid rise in industry compelled farmers to supply more and more manpower to the industrial sector. With the decreasing number of laborers in the rural areas, farms had to be transformed into the

⁷³Ibid., pp. 95-96.

more regimented type of collective. The remarkable progress in the postwar recovery of industry is shown in Tables IV-9 and IV-10. On the other hand, a lagging agricultural produce also means leverage for the collectivization. The performance of agriculture in the postwar period is illustrated in Table IV-11. The progress of collectivization is shown in Table IV-12. One can notice the decreasing number of the second type of cooperatives and the increasing number of the third type of cooperatives in the North Korean countryside. The adoption of the third type of cooperative by 92.2 per cent by the end of 1955 indicates that the socialist transformation of the North Korean countryside was almost completed on the eve of the "construction of socialism" in 1956. It possibly means the end of "New Democracy" in North Korea.

In sum, we have examined the policy of "New Democracy" in North Korea. During the period between 1945 and 1950, even though North Korea was under the Soviet control system, we have seen a broad policy direction similar to the "New Democracy" which was set forth by Mao Tse-tung. It is difficult for us to say that North Koreans intentionally emulated the Chinese practice, it may be argued that the policy of "New Democracy" during this period was the adaptability within the tolerance of the Soviet control system. The point of the matter is that the politics in this period should be looked at in terms of "New Democracy"

TABLE IV-11

Total Grain Output (1,000 tons)

Year	Grain Output	Year	Grain Output
1946	1,898	1958	3,700
1947	2,067	1959	3,400
1948	2,668	1960	3,803
1949	2,654	1961	4,830
1950	--	1962	5,000
1951	2,260	1963	--
1952	2,450	1964	--
1953	2,327	1965	4,526
1954	2,230	1966	--
1955	2,340	1967	--
1956	2,873	1968	--
1957	3,210	1970	6,000*

Source: Pukhan Ch'onggam 1945-1946 (North Korea Annual) (Seoul: Longsan Munje Yonkuso, 1968), p. 349; these figures were confirmed by the reports in individual Ch'osen Ch'ungang Yongam published in these years. The figure of 1970 was an estimated and planned figure. The real output was not known.

TABLE IV-12

Collectivization in North Korea

Year	Total Number of Cooperative	Second Type (percentage of total)	Third Type (percentage of total)
1953	806	21.5	
1954	10,098	7.8	78.5
1955	12,132	2.5	92.2
1956	15,825	2.5	97.5
1957	16,032	1.2	98.8
1958	13,309	0	100

Source: Kim Sung-joon, Urinara eso ui nongchon munje haegyol ryoksajok kyonghom (Pyongyang: Rodongchulpansa, 1965), p. 174.

because of the social conditions during this period. The North Korean emulation of the Chinese experience can be seen more ostensibly since 1950. We have examined the socialist transformation on North Korea in the light of the model given by the Chinese experience. If we distinguish the concept "political emulation" from "political control," we may say that North Korea had faithfully followed the Chinese model during her transitional period.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICS OF "MASS-LINE" IN NORTH

KOREA: 1956-PRESENT

There are other things, however, that make visitors--especially non-Communist visitors--feel more uncomfortable. There is, for example, a Chinese-style regimentation and drabness in the day-to-day life of the North Korean society.¹

A Newsweek report on North Korea in December 1965 described the similarities between North Korean and Chinese society. The social atmosphere in the day-to-day life of North Korea, which bore striking resemblance to Chinese society, was created in the mid-1950's. In keeping with Kim Il-song's emphasis on the decisive role played by human consciousness in developing the productive forces, political indoctrination designed to mobilize the masses continued to receive priority in all phases of North Korea's development program beginning from launching the "socialist construction" in 1956. The discovery of the decisive role played by human consciousness is attributed to Mao Tse-tung's thought which will be examined shortly. As a matter of fact, in major speeches delivered to Chinese people as quoted below, Kim Il-song revealed that Chollima program and Ri unit organization, the Korean counterpart of

¹Newsweek, December 6, 1965, p. 54.

the Great Leap Forward and the Chinese commune, had been inspired by the Chinese Communist model.² Beginning from November 28, 1958, Kim Il-song spent three weeks in an extended tour of Communist China. Amid enthusiastic welcoming demonstrations, Kim responded with an endorsement of the Chinese programs which by then had been largely adopted by his own country. He said:

We are very much interested in the communization movement... As a result of setting up public mess-halls, nurseries, etc., you have achieved collectivization not only of production but also of livelihood; this means that...you have advanced a step towards Communism... We will certainly pass on to our peasants the great results you have achieved from your commune movement. Also we will strive hereafter...to strengthen our mutual cooperation in building Socialism and Communism.³

In his later speech on October 1, 1959, celebrating Communist China's tenth anniversary, he declared:

New and greater achievement in the greap leap forward and people's commune is a great contribution to further developing Marxist-Leninist theory and enriching the experience of the international Communist movement...our countrymen always learn from your achievements, and no force can break the friendship of the Korean and Chinese peoples based on common ideas and aims.⁴

²Pyongyang radio broadcast, North Korean Home Service, December 9, 1958, quoted in John Bradbury, "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea," The China Quarterly, 6 (April-June, 1961), p. 18. Kim Il-song has never admitted to his people that his ideas in these programs were inspired by the Chinese model. For his overall ideas in these matters, see Kim Il-song, Chollima undong kwa sahoejuui konsol ui daekojoe daehayo (Chollima Movement and Socialist Construction) (Pyongyang: Choson rodong chulpansa, 1970).

³Jen min Jih pao, November 28, 1958, p. 19.

⁴Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), August 14, 1960.

It is evident that during the period of "socialist construction" the Pyongyang regime embraced a whole series of Chinese Communist policies and programs. It also should be noted that China's foreign aid to Pyongyang after the end of the Korean war exceeded that of the Soviet Union.⁵ Most important, the core idea of all the North Korean modernization programs since the mid-1950's have been based upon Mao Tse-tung's discovery of the method of substituting moral and psychological incentives for material incentives as the major stimulus for production.

The idea of "people's communes" originated from the thought of Mao Tse-tung. The economic law of the classical Marxism-Leninism prescribes that higher levels of collectivization must await an advanced industry.⁶ To be specific, tractors and other modern farm machineries are preconditions for collectivization. However, Mao Tse-tung downgraded the importance of an industrial development before launching collectivization. He considered the lack of industrial force to be an obstacle in China's way of transition to Communism. Mao contended that the establishment of higher levels of collectivization such as people's commune is possible prior to industrialization and mechanization.

⁵The Soviet grant was \$250 million, whereas Chinese grant was \$324 million. Paige, "North Korean and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 238.

⁶Arther A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung (Chicago, 1964), p. 171.

He argued that intensive political consciousness can substitute for productive force such as tractors and other farm machineries. Such methods as "moral indoctrination" and thought reform have been used to arouse political consciousness among the masses.⁷

Mao Tse-tung relied heavily upon politically conscious manpower in overall modernization programs and tried to achieve the transition to Communism without well developed productive force. This is truly a unique feature of Chinese politics. This approach to the transition to Communism based upon the intense political consciousness has been criticized frequently. For example, Western economists such as Richard Harris have often charged that: "Mao Tse-tung has no interest in problems of economic development."⁸ Khrushchev once criticized Mao Tse-tung's idea of "people's commune" as "foodless Communism." There is little doubt that Mao's approach has deviated from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist economic law and the Soviet experience. Nevertheless, Mao argued that rapid economic development should be based on efficient, productive human beings, that is, "Communist men" who knew how to sacrifice,

⁷It appears that "moral indoctrination" is slightly different from "thought reform." Criticism and self-criticism may be considered as a method of "thought reform," whereas learning from the writings of Mao Tse-tung can be considered as "moral indoctrination."

⁸Quoted in Jack Gray, Chinese Communism in Crisis, op. cit., p. 62.

how to be selfless, and how to cooperate for the ideal of Communism. Mao sought rapid economic development "within the context of people themselves."⁹ It is people themselves, he argued, who must achieve the self-reliant society. This is a key to Mao Tse-tung's economics.

The embodiment of Mao Tse-tung's idea of modernization are the Great Leap Forward campaign. The New Democracy ended in 1956. The socialist economy started with the Second Five Year Plan (1957-1962). It aimed at rapid socialist economic development. Recognizing that technical infrastructure and capital were still lacking, the regime had to rely on manpower. Since effective use of manpower was easier in the agricultural than industrial sector, the Second Five Year Plan had shifted emphasis to agriculture as a backbone of industry. The regime had to heavily rely upon regimented manpower. Concomitantly, it was necessary to arouse enthusiasm among the masses in order to successfully carry out the Plan. Whereas the Second Five Year Plan was an economic plan, the Great Leap was a political campaign to arouse enthusiasm among the masses to achieve the production quotas. Ezra Vogel perceives the Great Leap as "a program devised by determined have-nots who envisioned a shortcut on the path to modernity and fought tenaciously

⁹John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," Monthly Review, 22 (February, 1971), pp. 15-35.

to achieve what was beyond their grasp."¹⁰ He implies that the Great Leap was a failure as an economic plan. Yet, Mao Tse-tung insisted that it was a success as a political campaign to mobilize the masses. Furthermore, the Great Leap demonstrated that human consciousness can be a substitute for the material and technical preconditions for Communism. It laid the road to the establishment of the "people's commune."

As opposed to capitalist economy, Mao Tse-tung insisted that the major stimulus for production was not material incentives but self-sacrificing human consciousness. He argued that material incentives were evils in Chinese society and gave rise to bureaucratism. Since he gave a priority to political indoctrination, he did not give due respects to the role of intellectuals and specialists for economic development. He proposed that not only party cadres but also technicians and specialists must be politically indoctrinated.¹¹ To achieve this, Mao Tse-tung set forth a "mass-line" philosophy. To be specific,

¹⁰ Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 268. This is the study of Chinese modernization programs and politics.

¹¹ The "red and expert" approach was a good example to politically indoctrinate technicians and specialists. This approach demanded that party cadres, technicians and workers work together as a single team. It was a "mass-line" technique. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), p. 75.

the mass-line demands that party cadres should be physically in touch with the masses. In order to mingle in the masses, the cadres should go down to the front line of production. Hsiafang is a practice of the mass-line philosophy in a broader term. It includes intellectuals, managerial personnel, administrative staff, students, city dwellers and the like.¹²

To explore this mass-line philosophy further, it is necessary to examine the Chinese concepts of state, society, and party. A brief summary will establish a theoretical framework for understanding Chinese politics. Chinese theory of state, society, and party is as follows. The Chinese Communist Party, at least in theory, is the expression of the will of people. Society is the masses of people. State is an instrument of society as a necessary evil. State is a superstructure, and society is the base. State as a superstructure, as an instrument of society, will be withering away when society does not need the function of state. However, society should control state during the period when society needs the function of state as an instrument. In order for society to actualize the control over state, society needs an organization which has its roots in society. This organization is the Chinese Communist Party. The Party as an expression of the

¹²Ibid., pp. 111, 584, and 587-590.

will of people controls state as a superstructure.¹³

State, which is superstructure, that is, bureaucracy, tends to alienate itself from society by nature. In other words, state as bureaucracy tends to alienate itself from the masses of people when it is professionalized and remains in the routinized function. Once professionalized and routinized, the bureaucracy may not function according to the wishes of society. Here the question of freedom is raised. Hannah Arendt defines freedom as participation in public affairs, or admission to public realm.¹⁴ If state alienates itself from the masses of people and the Chinese Communist Party remains in the routinized function and is removed from the will of the masses, the Chinese believe that they cannot actualize freedom. If the Party which controls the state is victimized by bureaucratism, there is no way for the Chinese to channel the will of people into the public realm. The answer to how the Chinese prevent bureaucratism from interfering between the will of the masses on the one hand and the Party and state on the other is the "mass-line" philosophy.

Mass-line philosophy is the most effective means to keep the party's roots in the masses of people and to link

¹³For an exceptional analysis of Chinese concepts of state, society, and the party, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., see especially pp. 105-114.

¹⁴This concept seems to be applied to Communist thinking, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking Press, 1962).

the party and the masses of people. To be physically in touch with the masses is not merely collecting public opinion. The party should listen to and experience the problems of the masses. The interests, problems and opinions of the masses should be thoroughly articulated and aggregated to the decision-making realm. In this way, the masses of people can initiate policy and participate in the public realm. The mass-line is the philosophy for the Chinese to actualize freedom.

In the light of the Chinese model of modernization and collectivization above, North Korean programs will be examined in the following pages. The Chollima movement is the Korean counterpart of the Great Leap. According to an ancient Korean legend, Chollima is a winged horse capable of flying at the speed of a thousand miles a day toward the "land of happiness." Socialist construction in North Korea started with the Five Year Plan (1957-1961). Just like the Great Leap, the Chollima movement was a political campaign to arouse enthusiasm among the masses of people in order to successfully carry out the Five Year Plan. The Chollima movement was launched in the summer of 1958 following the Great Leap.

An examination of Kim Il-song's major speeches during the Chollima movement clearly reveals that some of the ideas in this movement were derived from the thought of Mao Tse-tung. Kim, reflecting Mao's ideas, argues that

under exploitation and oppression the masses of Korean people had been victims of "passivism, conservatism and mystification of technique."¹⁵ The inexhaustible creative power and talent of the masses, according to Kim, had been suppressed by the passivists and conservatives who distrusted the might of the heroic working people. Therefore, Kim contends that in socialist construction it is most important to arouse the creative power of the masses to the utmost and to bring their enthusiasm, initiative and talent into full play.

Science and technique, Kim continues, is significant in socialist construction. But it is wrong to think that science and technique are mysteries belonging to a certain category of people, Kim says. The development of science and technical innovations, he contends, are impossible unless they are based on the creative proposals and initiatives of the workers and peasants. To shatter "passivism, conservatism and mystification of technique" is the urgent task in socialist construction. He urges that all the wisdom, talent, enthusiasm and creative power of the masses

¹⁵Kim Il-song, "Chollima undong, Choson Rodongdang je samcha daehoe eso han Chongang Wiwonhoe Saopchonghwa boko" (The Central Committee's Report to the Third Congress of the Korean Workers Party), Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. III (Pyongyang, 1968), pp. 92-102. This quotation from p. 96.

should emerge into full flowering in the Chollima movement.¹⁶

Furthermore, the Party should play the leading role in arousing and channelling all these forces of the masses. The Party has to make tireless effort to get all the functionaries to acquire the revolutionary method of work, going deep among the masses, consulting with them, studying the actual conditions among the masses, solving the problems of the masses, learning from the masses, and most important, arousing the revolutionary consciousness of the masses.¹⁷ In a nutshell, Kim Il-song proposes the "mass-line" technique. It can be said that the politics in North Korea since 1956 has been the politics of "mass-line." Most of the successes of North Korea's modernization programs are due to the effective use of the "mass-line" technique reaching every tentacle of North Korean society. Various speeches of Kim Il-song remind us of the famous Chinese slogan: "From Within the Masses--Back Into the Masses."

¹⁶For Kim's major speeches on the Chollima movement, see Kim Il-song, "Juche rul tuntunhi seumyo kunjungroson ul kwancholhanun munje e daehayo," Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. 4, pp. 218-229, Vol. 3, pp. 92-102. Also see Ha Angchon, "The Chollima Movement is the General Line of the Korean Workers' Party in the Socialist Construction," Kyono Chosen (Korea Today), Japanese language article, No. 55 (May, 1961).

¹⁷Kim Il-song sonjip, op. cit., Vol. 4, p. 228. English language version, Revolution and Construction, op. cit., p. 97. See his original speech in Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. 4, p. 228.

The politics of "mass-line" in North Korea has been put into practice in the name of Chongsan-ri spirit. The Chongsan-ri spirit derived its name from the fact that Kim Il-song personally had demonstrated the practice of the mass-line at the collective farm of Chongsan-ri, Kangso county, South Pyongan Province, in February, 1960. Kim often visits the front line of production. His visits are called "on-the-spot-guidance." Some Western journalists who have had a chance to observe him closely report that he often visits a factory, a poultry farm, or a collective. He often stays with workers and peasants for a couple of weeks and demonstrates the "revolutionary style of work" which is in essence the implementation of the mass-line.¹⁸ It appears that he has been trying to create an image of a benevolent "national father" and a hard working student on all matters among the Korean people.

A close look at Kim's numerous speeches on the Chongsan-ri spirit clearly reveals the same political philosophies underlying Mao Tse-tung's mass-line in China. First, the Chongsan-ri spirit is designed to promote political indoctrination and mobilization. The party cadres should bring general party policies and principles down to the front line of production. Simply to explain general

¹⁸For this sort of journalistic report and description of Kim Il-song, see Wilfred G. Burchett, Again Korea, *op. cit.* Also see Chong-sik Lee, "Kim Il-song of North Korea," Asian Survey, VII 6 (June, 1967), p. 380.

party policies to the masses is not enough. Kim Il-song urges the party cadres to study the actual needs and specific conditions of the working masses. Once they become familiar with the specific conditions of the masses, they should adapt general party policies to specific conditions of the masses. The party cadres need to combine "general with specific" guidance for educating and rousing the masses of people.¹⁹

Secondly, the Chongsan-ri spirit is intended to fight bureaucratism. Kim condemns the work-style of the party cadres which had a tendency to use "directive or police methods, threatening, and intimidation." He points out that this tendency is due to the legacy of Japanese administration. He urges efforts to smash the cadres' mentality left over by the feudal and Japanese occupation days. He admonishes party cadres to be servants of people, applying Chongsan-ri spirit.²⁰

Thirdly, the Chongsan-ri spirit is expected to help the masses to learn the collectivist and Communist way of

¹⁹ Kim Il-song, Selected Works, Vol. I (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p. 18.

²⁰ Kim Il-song, "On Eliminating Bureaucracy," speech delivered to a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers' Party, on April 1, 1955, in his Selected Works, Vol. I (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p. 15. See also Kim Il-song's report to the Second Congress of the North Korean Workers' Party, March 28, 1948, Kim Il-song Son Jip (The Selected Works of Kim Il-song), Korean version (Pyongyang, 1960), I, p. 111. See also Kim Il-song's report to the Fourth Party Congress, September 11, 1961, in Ibid., III, pp. 57-204.

life. The party cadres are to demonstrate how to accommodate and to cooperate among the masses. The Chongsan-ri spirit is to help "work, study, and live in the spirit of Communism."²¹

Fourthly, the Chongsan-ri spirit concerns fair distribution of income according to the work performed. Kim urges that the socialist principle of distribution should be correctly carried through. A fair distribution of income is possible only if the party functionaries fairly assess the work performed by the people. An honest assessment of the work can be obtained when the party functionaries reach the masses and practice the Chongsan-ri spirit.²²

These are the key components of the mass-line philosophy of North Korea. One can easily notice that Kim Il-song has been repeating, in essence, what Mao Tse-tung has said to his people. Yet, to what extent Kim's ideals are applied and practiced is not known. Chong-sik Lee asserts that there is a fundamental difference between the Chongsan-ri and Hsiafang in China. He perceives that whereas the Chinese are stressing "learning" from the

²¹The Chollima Workteam Movement in the Socialist Construction of Korea (KWP Publishing House, 1961), p. 21.

²²Kim Il-song, Kim Il-song sonjip, Vol. IV, op. cit., pp. 218-229. For an English edition, see Revolution and Construction, op. cit., pp. 93-98. Also, Kim Byong-sik, Modern Korea (New York, 1970), p. 118.

masses, the North Koreans' major concern is to "teach" the masses. His perception of this difference is quite correct if we review the history of Korean revolutions, whether nationalist or Communist. The Chinese peasant masses were politically conscious from the beginning of the Chinese revolution. Concomitantly, Mao and the other Chinese leaders had succeeded in awakening the masses. In contrast, as we have noted in the first chapter, the Korean revolution had been led by intellectuals. Moreover, these intellectuals failed to awaken the Korean masses, undoubtedly because Korea was a colony under the tight Japanese control. At any rate, the Korean masses were not politically conscious. Kim Il-song had certainly recognized this lagging political consciousness among his people. This is why he emphasizes "teaching" the masses by means of Communist cadres. Scalapino and Lee even assert that the Chongsan-ri method is nothing but a device to coerce the people in implementing all policies.²³ There is little doubt that the Chongsan-ri spirit is full of allegations and ideals. Yet to what extent the method of Chongsan-ri is a sheer device for coercion has never been known. It is unfair to consider the Chongsan-ri to be a method for coercion simply because of Kim Il-song's image of being a little "stalin" in the East. At any rate, our concern here

²³For this view, see Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Korea, op. cit., pp. 561-566.

is to shape a theoretical framework of North Korean politics. For this purpose the specific applications of the Chongsan-ri method to the socialist economic management in factories and farms are in order.

Before we examine North Korea's industrial management known as the so-called Dae-an Work System, let us compare and contrast the Soviet with the Chinese industrial management. The economy in the Soviet Union is run by specialists, even though the party provides overall administrative guidance. The practice of one-man management has been the Soviet practice ever since Lenin declared: "Any large-scale industry...must have a rigorous unified will... But how can the rigorous unity of wills be assured? Only by the wills of the thousands and millions submitting to the will of a single individual (a plant manager)."²⁴ The proper role of the party was to exercise ideological leadership over management. It is a plant manager who makes decisions, is in charge of the whole enterprise. The advantage of this one-man management is to establish a good chain of command; hence, it is regarded as "building blocks" of the planning system.²⁵ Furthermore, complexity of modern large-scale industry demands a concentrated management, according to the Russians. However, because of the

²⁴ Lenin, Selected Works (Moscow, 1952), II, p. 398.

²⁵ For the practice of one-man management, see Peter Wiles, The Political Economy of Communism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), pp. 43-46.

absolute authority for decision-making given to the plant manager and the technical unawareness of the intricacies of management on the side of the party, the inevitable result of this one-man management is the emergence of bureaucratism. Stalin's answer to this problem was the constant purge, that is, the replacement of old managers with new young managers imbued with the fresh Communist ideology.²⁶

The authority of a plant manager in the Soviet Union has been increasing since Stalin's death. Since 1953, the central planning (Gosplan) has been confined to setting fewer detailed control figures, delegating minor tasks to subordinate planning organizations. Furthermore, since the Liberman proposal, the regime has transferred much more authority for decision-making to a plant manager to stimulate the enterprise to better performance by increasing material incentives. Evsei Liberman urges that profit be made the prime element, asserting that "the higher the profit, the greater the incentive" to quality and efficiency. "What is good for the factory is good for the society."²⁷ Several features of the Soviet economy since the Liberman proposal are: "the use of profits on invested capital as the single best indicator of factory

²⁶Richard C. Gripp, Pattern of Soviet Politics (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 81-85.

²⁷For direct quotations, see Time, February 12, 1965, p. 25. Also see Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1977), pp. 308-309.

performance, flexible prices responding to the market forces of supply and demand, and contracts between enterprises and the government."²⁸ In a nutshell, material incentives are the moving force of the recent Soviet economy.

In connection with the Liberman proposal in the Soviet Union, it should be noted that the Eastern European countries are ahead of the Soviet Union in their decentralizing economy. Similar to the Liberman proposal, Ota Sik in Czechoslovakia had drawn up a massive decentralization program.²⁹ The trend of the East European countries which were created by the Red Army occupation will be contrasted with that of North Korean economy.

China had also adopted one-man management in the beginning of the regime until about the mid-1950's. It was inevitable for the Chinese to adopt one-man management because much of her industry was run by the Russian advisors. The Russians needed a chain of command, especially a direct control of a Chinese manager under a Russian technician. However, the Chinese were extremely nervous about the one-man management, because bureaucratism had been a cardinal evil in Chinese society. Even under the one-man management, one could often see statements similar to the following in the Chinese newspapers:

²⁸For a Western report on Evsei Liberman, see Time, op. cit., pp. 23-29.

²⁹Ibid., p. 23.

The system of sole responsibility by management is not one of an individual "arbitrarily deciding and arbitrarily acting." To carry out good management, there must be reliance on the working masses. The working masses must be drawn in to discuss important work problems, collective discussion must be carried out. Though one man be responsible, he must open-mindedly listen to the opinions of the masses. This not only will arouse the creativity and positivism of the masses and aid management, but will increase the respect of the masses for management leaders and help strengthen the system of sole responsibility by management.³⁰

During the period of one-man management, the question of democracy had often been raised, and criticism had often been heard. Most complaints were in such language as is often seen in the Chinese literature, terms such as "subjectivism," "commandism," and "bureaucratism." In other words, there had been constant contradictions between professionally trained managers and politically trained cadres. The political event associated with the issue of economic management is the contradiction between Kao Kang and the Central Committee of the CCP (possibly Mao Tse-tung's line). Kao Kang, as chairman of the State Planning Commission since 1950, had become identified with a program of rapid industrialization concentrated in Manchuria and relying heavily on Soviet aid. His organizational policy for Chinese industry was one-man management.³¹ This

³⁰ Takungpao article, quoted in Schurman, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., p. 255.

³¹ For a story of Kao Kang and the issue of one-man management, see Ibid., pp. 267-272.

contradiction ended with Kao Kang's suicide; one-man management in China began to diminish.

China adopted collective management in the mid-1950's as an answer to one-man management. This gives emphasis to collective discussion and decision-making. In other words, a collective body replaces an individual authority for decision-making. The essence of this collective management is the "mass-line" approach. Collective management is to be carried out by the party committee. The idea is that if a plant manager be controlled by the party, "arbitrary control, subjective discretion, and other bureaucratic methods" would not flourish. In this collective management, a plant manager retains his position and becomes a member of the party committee in industrial enterprise. The party members are composed of representatives of all branches of the enterprise, most important, including some 60 per cent worker membership. The party committee is the decision-making body which determines such things as production policy, planning, and enterprise organization. Decisions are made through discussions among members. Unlike the system of one-man management which gives a plant manager a fairly broad decision-making power, the party committee under the collective management simply delegates authority to him to carry out its decisions.³²

³²For Chinese management system, see Stephen Andors, China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning, and Management, 1949 to the Present (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

A review of various official publications on the collective management in China³³ clearly reveals the ideals of the "mass-line." One can summarize the mass-line philosophy as follows. First, by participating in decision-making process, that is, managing their economy themselves, workers become masters of their country and their future. Ideally, they actualize their "freedom" by participating in the public life. Second, production will be improved, because under this system one's level of political consciousness plays a decisive role in production, and the creative and innovative talents of the masses are channelled into decision-making. Third, since managers are under the control of the party committees, bureaucratism will be eliminated. The capitalist elements such as "subjectivism, parochialism, and selfishness" can be effectively combatted. Fourth, through promoting accommodation and close cooperation among workers and producing units, the collectivist and Communist life will be enhanced. Fifth, an integrated way in overall management in production process will be much more effective than one-man management, because the problems of every producing unit can be thoroughly channelled through. Sixth, the collective management makes planning well-balanced and effective. These are the theories and ideals of the collective management. An

³³ See, for example, Shenyang jihpao, October 12, 1959, Jenmin jihpao, June 7, 1964, and Liaoning jihpao, April 24, 1957.

assessment of to what extent these theories and ideals are actualized in the Chinese society is not attempted here. As stated earlier, we are trying to set forth a theoretical framework of North Korea in the light of the Chinese model.

The application of the Chongsan-ri spirit to socialist industrial management in North Korea is referred to as the Daean Work System. It was officially initiated with Kim Il-song's "on-the-spot-guidance" at the Daean Electric Machine Factory in December, 1961. This method of management has been widely propagated through news media as "a creative Marxist-Leninist system of industrial management" invented by the premier.³⁴ The essence of the Daean Work System was to abolish one-man management and to establish a collective management under the Party Committee. As in the Chinese case, one-man management was criticized as bureaucratic. In short, the Daean Work System is not a Korean invention but an imitation of the Chinese collective management system.

It appears that the main motive for initiating the Daean Work System was the deficiency of planning which the North Korean regime recognized following the Five Year Plan (1957-1961). The Plan had been formulated under one-man

³⁴For this sort of eulogy, see Kim Byong Sik, Modern Korea, op. cit., this direct quotation, p. 131. Kim Il-song's official job title is no longer Premier. He is the President of DPRK since 1972.

management system. It was based upon estimates by each plant manager of his productive capacity, total estimates submitted by the ministries, consideration of resources available, overall budget expenditures, political consideration, and innumerable other factors. Furthermore, the Plan also was influenced by a few top policy makers of the Korean Workers' Party. After approval, it was turned over to the ministries to be carried out by the factories. Each factory and each manager were then given a production quota.³⁵

Aroused by the Chollima movement, by the end of 1959 the enthusiasm of the workers had resulted in over-production. The regime claimed that the Five Year Plan was fulfilled in two and one-half years. Over-production in one sector required over-production in another to supply it. There was no limitation to check enthusiasm of workers who were inspired by the Chollima movement. By the end of 1959 the delicate balance between sectors broke down. Heavy industry was generally ahead, and mining was behind.³⁶ The year of 1960 was the "Buffer Year" to adjust the imbalance

³⁵For the planning process of the Five Year Plan, see Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea: The Five and Seven Year Plans," Asian Survey, No. 5 (May, 1965), pp. 257-258. For Kim Il-song's criticism on this planning process, his Sahoejuui kyongje munje e daeha yo (On Socialist Economy), Vol. III (Pyongyang: Choson rodong chulpansa, 1970), pp. 582-606.

³⁶For the problem of over-production, see Joungwon Kim, op. cit., p. 258. This article is an excellent analysis. Yet, Kim failed to observe the structural change of North Korea's management system.

of the economy caused by over-production. During this "Buffer Year," Kim initiated the Daean Work System. He said:

The Standing Committee of our Party's Central Committee has adopted a policy to further strengthen Party leadership. People's committees at the provincial, city, and county level will perform their duties under the control of their respective Party executive committees, and all activities within factories will be conducted under the leadership of factory Party committees.

The highest organ within a factory is not the factory director but the factory Party committee. The factory director and the Party chairman will act under that committee. The factory Party committee will discuss both economic and Party matters, and the factory director and Party chairman will carry out its decisions.³⁷

The Daean Work System was officially implemented a year later in December 1961. The significance of the Daean ui Saop Chekye (Daean Work System) was that it called for a "unified and detailed economic planning." Kim Il-song called the planning under the Daean Work System "the mass-line in planning."³⁸ A "unified system" of planning stresses the balance between accumulation and consumption, between industry and agriculture, between heavy and light

³⁷ Kim Il-song, Selected Works (English language version), Vol. 6 (1960), p. 528. It appears that Kim's adoption of the Great Leap was not accompanied with the Chinese practice of collective management.

³⁸ See Kim Il-song, Sahoejuui kyongje munje e daeha yo, op. cit. Also, see Widaehan Suryong Kim Il-song dongji ggeso changjo hasin Daean ui Saop Chekye (The Daean Work System created by the great leader Kim Il-song) (Pyongyang: Choson rodongdang chulpansa, 1975).

industry, between ore extraction and raw materials. A "unified system" of planning, of course, necessitates a centralized planning mechanism. In other words, the State Planning Committee should embrace "the planning departments and sections of the ministries, central organs, provincial people's committee, provincial rural economy committees and other enterprises" as "hands and feet."

"Detailed planning," as Kim Byong-sik has observed, means "drawing up of concrete and precise plans covering all facets of the branches and enterprises of the economy on the basis of strict scientific calculations and a good grasp of the objective conditions."³⁹ North Koreans insist that the planning under the one-man management system reflected "bureaucratism and subjectivism," because the planners assigned maximum production tasks while guaranteeing minimum supplies, and producers tried to get by with minimum output tasks while obtaining maximum guarantees of supplies. They argued that another serious problem arose because, although state planners had a fairly good knowledge of the general economic conditions and the prospect for production, they had no concrete knowledge of actual conditions and production reserves.⁴⁰ The answer to the problems of the old planning system was for the workers to participate in the planning process. This was embodied in

³⁹ Kim Byong-sik, Modern Korea, op. cit., p. 152.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 152.

the Daean Work System. According to Kim Il-song only the workers have sufficient knowledge for detailed planning of non-fund materials such as "screws, valves and bearings." One writer calls this planning "micro-economic planning" in contrast to "macro-economic planning."⁴¹ Furthermore, the conditions of labor, such as health, ideological level, and competence should be considered independent variables for "detailed planning." This concern was apparently due to the over-production during the Five Year Plan.

The planning process of the Daean Work System is, in essence, the application of the "mass-line" philosophy. The aim is that industrial management should be based on the discussion with the masses of workers, because the working masses have the best knowledge of the specific conditions of their factory. A plant manager can acquire the knowledge of the actual conditions only when they draw advice from the workers who are directly engaged in production. Concomitantly, the System will eliminate "bureaucratism." Industry under this system will be more productive than under one-man because the working masses are politically conscious.

⁴¹Ben Page, "North Korea: Sitting on Its Own Chair," Monthly Review, January 1969, p. 24. Ben Page was the first U.S. citizen who visited North Korea after the war. This journal sounds extremely leftist. Yet, it is often worth quoting to know Communist utopianism.

North Korea has also imitated China in the application of the mass-line to agriculture. The Chollima movement accelerated collectivization, and by the end of 1958 all the North Korean farms had been transformed into the third type of collective.⁴² With the expansion of industry and progress in collectivization, by 1960 only 44.4 per cent of the North Korean population were engaged in agriculture.⁴³ The next phase was to convert the collectives into Ri unit farms, North Korean counterpart of Chinese people's commune. The Ri unit farms are an obvious emulation of the Chinese commune. However, some variations were inevitable because of the difference in economic significance. Whereas agriculture is predominant in China, industry is the leading sector in North Korea.

The Chinese commune should be briefly described in order to discuss what the Koreans adopted and what aspects they rejected. The commune was based upon a new concept of work organization involving a division of labor and more rational use of manpower in agriculture. Adoption of the commune destroyed the traditional work style.⁴⁴ In the

⁴²Agricultural Cooperativization in DPRK (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1958), pp. 29, 64.

⁴³Facts About Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961), p. 9. For the third type of coops, see p. 176.

⁴⁴In particular, in the previous cooperatives, a peasant was working on his own land even though he had to give up some of his property. Even though his share of

people's commune every peasant is recruited into a rationally designed work team leading to the regimentation and militarization of the peasantry. Peasants are effectively mobilized wherever their help is needed. They are moved like workers in a factory and/or soldiers in a military unit. The commune is a self-sustaining unit, supplementary industrial, commercial, and educational functions are carried out by these regimented peasants. In other words, the Chinese people's commune is a self-sustaining socio-economic unit which has integrated agriculture, industry, commerce, education, administration, and military functions.

The North Korean Ri unit cooperatives were modeled after the Chinese commune. They have effectively developed a division of labor and rational use of manpower within the boundary of the Ri unit. It appears that the regimentation and militarization of the peasantry have been fairly well developed. There are reportedly nurseries, kindergartens, public dining halls, clinics, libraries and other welfare facilities in the Ri unit villages. A Japanese journalist reports:

crop was a little different from what it used to be before cooperativization, his working routine was not much changed from what it had always been. For a good analysis of the commune structure, see Schurmann, Ideology and Organization, op. cit., pp. 464-500. Also, see Audrey Donnithorne, China's Economic System (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), pp. 88-92.

(Member of the cooperative) gather on the farm (or in the work-shops) around 8.30 in the morning at the signal of a bell from the co-operative. Each member receives instructions from his group leader regarding the day's work. At noon, the bell ring again and members can go either to the public dining hall or their own homes for lunch. There are circle meetings for drama, music and dancing during the lunch hour. Peasants rest ten to twenty minutes after fifty minutes of work. During the breaks, there are 'news reading meetings' when newspapers or magazines will be read aloud.⁴⁵

There are, however, differences between the people's commune and the Ri unit farm. First of all, one can compare in terms of sheer size. Initially several cooperatives with an average size of 300 households were amalgamated into a Chinese commune (Hsien) with an average size of 8,000 households.⁴⁶ In North Korea, on the other hand, several small size cooperatives with an average size of 80 households were amalgamated into a Ri unit cooperative with an average size of 300 households.⁴⁷ This difference of size may indicate another important variation of the North Korean version. In contrast to the Chinese people's commune, the Ri units are basically only engaged in agricultural production. Industrial, commercial, and educational

⁴⁵Ha-cho Kishadan (Reporter's Group visiting Korea), *Kita-chosen no Kiroku* (Record of North Korea) (Tokyo: Shin Dokusho-sha, 1960), pp. 200-201.

⁴⁶Jenmin jihpao, August 18, 1958. This figure increased to an average size of 24,000. See *Economic Research (Jingji Yanjiu)*, No. 11, November 1959, p. 34. This figure of 1959 has been quite stabilized since then.

⁴⁷Kin Byong Sik, Modern Korea, op. cit., p. 135.

functions are the responsibility of the county (Kun). The Kun is the center of the agricultural management in North Korea. Whereas the commune is the basic self-sustaining socioeconomic unit which had integrated agricultural, educational, industrial, commercial, and military functions, the Ri is the basic unit of agriculture, much of whose management is directed by the Kun in connection with industry, education, and commerce. The Kun is responsible for education, industry, and commerce for several Ri units.⁴⁸ Schools, hospitals, cinema houses and bookshops are located in the Kun seats.

Unlike their Chinese counterparts, the North Korean peasants, according to Kim Il-song, are not the main force of revolutionary war and accordingly, not the main force of socialist construction. Kim Il-song adheres to Lenin's view of the peasants. Lenin designated the peasants as "petty bourgeois because their habitual attachment to the private land." According to him, the peasants are only useful to consummate a revolutionary seizure of power. Because of this petty bourgeois mentality, Lenin emphasized the leadership of the proletariat. After the revolution has been accomplished, the peasants as petty bourgeois

⁴⁸ Kim Il-song, "Theses on the Socialist Rural Question in Our Country," Li Yuk-Sa (ed.), Juche! The Speeches and Writings of Kim Il-song (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1972), pp. 94-103.

will be transformed into "rural proletariat."⁴⁹ Kim Il-song points out that the peasants lag far behind the workers in terms of political consciousness, technological know-how, and cultural level. Accordingly, agriculture lags behind industry. There are distinctions between agriculture and industry, the class distinction between the working class and the peasantry, and distinctions between town and countryside.⁵⁰ Kim urges efforts to remove these distinctions during socialist construction. An alliance between workers and peasants, the assistance of the state to the peasants, and the assistance of town to countryside are the answers to removing these distinctions.

The Kuns are the centers of agricultural management. At this level the state provides assistance to the peasantry. The towns aid the countryside, and the workers and peasants are connected in an alliance. The Kun Cooperative Farm Management Committee is the organ which manages North Korean agriculture. It exercises unified control over agrotechnicians and over such state enterprises in the service of agriculture as farm machine stations, farm appliance factories, and irrigation control offices. The Kun Cooperative Farm Management Committee functions as follows: (1) to assign agricultural specialists and

⁴⁹ Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 84.

⁵⁰ Kim Il-song, "Theses on Rural Questions...", Juche!, op. cit., p. 68.

engineers to the Ri unit farms; (2) to assign farm machinery and equipment, especially tractors, to the Ri unit farms; (3) to improve seeds and supply chemical fertilizers; (4) to conduct the administration of farm labor; (5) to supply raw materials produced on the Ri unit farms to local industry; (6) to supply food stuff to the industrial workers; (7) to supply manufactured goods purchased from industry to the peasants on the Ri unit farms; and (8) to educate and train farmers to be agrotechnicians.⁵¹

North Koreans claim that the industrial method of management is applied to agriculture. By applying industrial technology to agriculture, workers help peasants in removing distinctions between industry and agriculture. Being a supply center, the Kun enhances the living standard of peasants and removes distinction between town and countryside. The ideological education of peasants is conducted at this level in an effort to eradicate the class distinction. Kim Il-song urges the members of the Kun Cooperative Farm Management Committee and the party cadres to go out to the production sites, to give priority to work with people, to acquaint themselves profoundly with actual conditions, to personally organize all activities on the

⁵¹Kim Byong Sik, "A New System of Agricultural Guidance," Modern Korea, op. cit., pp. 135-149.

farms, and to give them concrete assistance.⁵² In other words, Kim urges that the Chongsan-ri spirit should be disseminated to all North Korean farms.

In summary, we have examined the politics of "mass-line" in North Korean modernization. In the name of the Chongsan-ri spirit, the "mass-line" approach has reached every element of North Korean society. North Koreans claim that this spirit has become a driving force in all modernization programs. The "mass-line" approach has been applied to industrial management, planning, and agriculture. In short, every individual in the society has been effectively mobilized with this force.

The "mass-line" approach was originally designed to arouse political consciousness. Besides abstract justifications to actualize "freedom" of the masses of people, it was designed to mobilize them. The "mass-line," as noted earlier, was originally developed by the Chinese Communists during the early years of the Yen-an period. In the mid-1950's, Mao rejected the role of material incentives in overall modernization programs in China. He has emphasized the decisive role played by human consciousness in developing productive forces. As Kim Il-song admitted, the North

⁵²Kim Il-song, Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 582-583. Chong-sik Lee and Scalapino suggest that the Kun Cooperative Farm Management Committee is an excellent device to coerce the peasantry. This author intends to avoid this sort of assessment.

Korean modernization programs are indebted to Mao Tse-tung's discovery of political consciousness as a driving force. A comparison of the North Korean economic development practices with those of Chinese and Soviets clearly indicates that the social atmosphere in day-to-day life of North Korea, while strikingly similar to Chinese society, was created early in the mid-1950's and more closely resembles the Chinese practice than that of the Soviets. The predominant outside influence on North Korean economic development is clearly Chinese as opposed to Soviet.

PART III

POLITICAL CULTURE AND SOCIALIZATION

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL CULTURE OF NORTH KOREA

As we have examined thus far, the politics of "New Democracy," the Chollima movement and the Chongsan-ri spirit have necessitated intensive political campaigns in North Korea. Our assumption in examining the North Korean political culture is that these political campaigns might have significantly affected ideological thinking of North Korean people. By defining political culture as psychological dimension or distribution of an individual's political orientation in a political system, Almond and Powell include all Communist societies within the category of "ideological political culture."¹ They provide this category encompassing all totalitarian regimes, because the individual has no choice but to develop a specific set of political orientations in these societies.

This chapter, however, attempts to utilize the concept of political culture as an analytic instrument for a further ramification of the Communist political cultures. The ideological political culture can be divided into a "political culture of revolutionary struggle" and a

¹Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics: Developmental Approach (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), p.61.

"political culture of maturity." As the previous chapters may suggest, the contemporary Chinese political culture typifies the culture of revolutionary struggle, whereas that of the Soviet Union illustrates the culture of maturity.² Here we shall examine the North Korean political culture in order to determine which genera of the Communist political cultures it reflects.

On the basis of the theoretical frameworks set forth in the previous chapters, let us summarize the "culture of maturity." The tradition of the "culture of maturity," as represented by the Soviet Union, began in the early period of collectivization. According to this tradition, higher levels of collectivization in the relations of production must await the construction of an advanced industrial economy.³ To be specific, tractors and other modern agricultural machines are preconditions to collectivization. Consequently, this tradition

²Political change after Mao Tse-tung's death on September 9, 1976 is not treated in this paper. New leadership in China has certainly rejected Mao's method of "red and expert" in modernization. The contemporary new leadership, especially Teng Hsiao-ping and his followers, has apparently returned to Liu Shao-chi's line of modernization, which emphasizes technical development and material incentives prior to political indoctrination. Nevertheless, one may not be able to say that the recent trend has greatly changed the revolutionary culture of China.

³See Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966). Also, see Chapter V.

downplays political campaigns. The "culture of maturity" believes in material incentives as the major stimulus for production.⁴ Profit should be made prime element in effective economic management, and the economy should be run by specialists.

On the other hand, the "culture of revolutionary struggle" is based upon the tradition of substituting moral and psychological incentives for material incentives as major stimulus for production. This tradition downgrades the importance of the "productive force," such as tractors and other agricultural machinery and emphasizes the relations of production as a prerequisite for collectivization. The "culture of revolutionary struggle," stressing intensive political campaign, envisions a shortcut on the path of modernity. According to this orientation, the operation of political system heavily relies on politically conscious manpower, and the political socialization process is totally devoted to arousing the political consciousness of the masses. To be specific, this approach as was examined earlier, believes that rapid economic development should be based on efficient, productive human beings; that is, the "Communist man" who knows how to sacrifice, how to be selfless, and how to cooperate for the ideal of Communism. It seeks rapid economic development "within the

⁴See Chapter V. Also, see Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System, op. cit., pp. 308-309. Time, February 12, 1965, p. 25.

context of people themselves."⁵ For the purpose of socializing individuals in this culture, political indoctrination, thought reform, criticism, and self-criticism are common practices.

In examining the North Korean political culture in the light of the one or the other genus of the above-described ideological political culture, we are confronted with serious drawbacks at the operational level. The political culture as an analytic instrument has often been operationalized by means of survey research, mostly in Europe and North America. Most of these studies present the quantitative distributions of political orientations, usually modeled after Almond and Verba's study of Civic Culture. Our problem in approaching the North Korean political culture is the official prohibition against survey research. The only data available at hand are the governmental publications, newspapers and political leaders' speeches and writings. Our study proceeds on the assumption that the North Korean political culture is projected in the contents of these official documents. We apply content analysis in ascertaining the North Korean political culture. Our scheme is not too far-fetched from an empirical observation if we review the regime's process of intensive socialization.

⁵See John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," Monthly Review, 22 (February, 1971), pp. 15-35.

Kim Il-song's writings have been used for content analysis. Our inference is that the North Korean political culture is projected in his speeches. We are looking into the speeches of the most important agent of political socialization in this political system. Political socialization is the process which provides the individuals with their individual selves as they advance through childhood, adolescence, and adulthood. In other words, by the process of socialization, political culture is created, transformed, and maintained.⁶ In North Korea, agents of socialization such as family, peer groups, schools, social groupings and mass media are tightly controlled and serve as a transmission belt. Furthermore, the methods of socialization are the direct, intended forms of socialization, that is, political indoctrination. Directing all these tightly controlled agents of socialization, Kim Il-song serves as a teacher of the regime and shapes North Korea's political culture. Hence, by examining what and how Kim Il-song teaches his people, we may infer the North Korean political culture. There are several important themes which run through his messages to this people. We are analyzing these themes in order to ascertain their effect upon the masses. An examination of these themes will tell us whether the North Korean political culture

⁶Dawson and Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1969), pp. 25-36.

should be considered as an example of the culture of revolutionary struggle or the culture of maturity. In brief, we are trying to visualize the North Korean political culture which is projected in the contents of messages from the most powerful socializing agent.

METHODOLOGY

One can find major speeches of Kim Il-song during the period of 1945-1974 in his six volumes of Selected Works of Kim Il-song and two volumes of On Juche in Our Revolution. There are about seven hundred speeches in these eight volumes. Samples were randomly chosen among the speeches for ten years period of 1961-1970. Five samples were randomly chosen from every year; thus we are examining fifty speeches. (The randomly chosen speeches of Kim Il-song are listed in the Appendix of this study.) Five entries of each year were chosen every two-month period. If the chosen entries happened to be a speech concerning foreign policies, we extended another two months to have a substitute. Since Kim Il-song's speeches are not available for the period after 1974, we have randomly chosen editorials of Rodong Shinmun between 1974 and 1977 in order to see the recent trend of the North Korean political culture. Rodong Shinmun is a mouthpiece of the Central Committee of Korean Workers' Party. Its editorials often carry quotations from Kim Il-song's speeches; hence,

they often transmit Kim's socializing efforts. However, our measurement of intensity of these editorials will be treated separately from Kim's own speeches, because samples and coders are different.⁷

There are four major themes which run through Kim Il-song's speeches. Every one of his speeches may be categorized into one of these four themes unless it is simply a descriptive report. These themes are as follows.

(1) Chollima Theme

This theme reflects strong revolutionary fever. Using this theme, Kim Il-song attempts to arouse revolutionary consciousness of the masses of people. This theme is often expressed with such symbols as "revolution," "class struggle," "ideological revolution," "cultural revolution," etc. The Chinese counterpart of this theme is the Great Leap Forward. Naturally, this theme shapes and reflects the "culture of revolutionary struggle" which was discussed earlier in Chapter V.

(2) Chongsan-ri Theme

This theme represents a public philosophy in North Korea. Theoretically, political leaders and party members should go down to the front line of production and

⁷Eight volumes of Kim's speeches are the English language versions. Coders for these speeches did not have to read Korean language. However, coders for editorials had to read Korean language to judge on intensity.

physically be in touch with the masses of people in order to prevent alienation between bureaucrats and the masses. This theme reflects Kim's effort to "working-classize" his people. It is often expressed with such symbols as "working-classization," "mass-line," "learning from the masses," "spirit of the masses," "struggle against bureaucratism," etc. This theme shapes and reflects the "culture of revolutionary struggle."

(3) Liberian Theme

As opposed to the above-mentioned two themes, this theme embraces material incentive as a major stimulus for production. Profit should be made the prime element in effective economic management, and the economy should be run by specialists. This theme reflects a highly developed socialist economy. It reflects the "culture of maturity."

(4) Technological Theme

This theme reflects importance of technology in economic development. Technology should be developed prior to collectivization. This theme will downplay political campaigns. It emphasizes the role of scientists and technicians and administrators. It reflects the "culture of maturity."⁸

⁸ If a speech expounds the importance of technological revolution, but if it finishes by saying that ideological revolution is more important, the coder should assign the theme to Chongsan-ri theme.

Four coders were chosen in order to identify these themes in Kim Il-song's speeches and to measure their intensity.⁹ Another group of four coders were chosen for the editorials of Rodong Shinmun.¹⁰ Our coders were given the sample speeches and editorials. They were instructed by this author how to identify the theme and how to measure its intensity. Each coder was given a CODING RECORD OF INTENSITY MEASUREMENT. Each coder was directed to record the speech number or the editorial number, the theme identified by using the theme number, and the intensity of each theme. For the measurement of intensity, a scale value of 03, 02, -1, 0, +1, +2, +3 was given to each theme according to the intensity measured by the coder: very strong (+3); strong (+2); mildly strong (+1); neutral (0); mildly weak (-1); weak (-2), very weak (-3). When actually recorded for the author's purpose, the scale value of -3 and +3 was converted to the point of 1 to 7.

⁹Our coders are Constantine Danopoulos (a Political Science major), Kim Chung-hyon (Journalism), Motoko Tsuchida (Political Science), and Park Hung-soon (Engineering). All of the coders are Ph.D. candidates at the University of Missouri-Columbia.

¹⁰Our coders for the editorials are Kim Chung-hyon, Lee Young-kwang (Engineering), Park Hung-soon, and this author.

CODING RECORD OF INTENSITY MEASUREMENT

Coder's Name: _____

Major: _____

Year (Rank): _____

Date of Coding: _____

a. Themes in Speeches and Editorials

- (1) Chollima theme
- (2) Chongsan-ri theme
- (3) Liberman theme
- (4) Technological theme
- (5) Simply descriptive
- (6) Others (impossible to identify)

b. Intensity Categories

Very weak (-3), Weaker (-2), Weak (-1), Neutral (0),
Strong (+1), Stronger (+2), Very Strong (+3)

c. Examples

We may find it necessary to disagree with Khrushchev's
politics (+1)

We will soon begin denouncing Khrushchev's policies (+2)

We must bitterly denounce Khrushchev's policies (+3)

RESULTS

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

Speech Number	Coders ¹¹			
	A t.i. in.	B	C	D
1	3 6	3 5	3 5	3 7
2	1 6	1 6	1 6	1 6
3	1 7	1 6	1 6	1 7
4	1 7	1 7	1 7	1 7
5	2 6	2 7	2 6	2 6
6	1 6	1 6	1 6	2 5
7	1 6	1 7	1 6	1 7
8	2 7	2 6	2 6	2 7
9	4 6	4 6	4 6	4 6
10	2 6	2 5	1 5	2 5
11	4 5	4 5	4 5	4 5
12	4 5	4 5	4 5	4 5
13	3 5	4 6	1 6	3 6
14	1 7	1 7	1 7	1 6
15	1 5	1 5	1 5	1 5
16	3 6	2 6	2 6	2 5
17	4 6	4 6	4 6	4 5

¹¹Coder A-Constantine Danopoulos, Coder B-Kim Chung-hyon, Coder C-Motoko Tsuchida, and Coder D-Park Hung-soon. t.i. stands for theme identified. in. stands for scale of intensity.

Speech
Number

Coders

	A t.i. in.	B	C	D
18	1 7	1 6	1 7	1 7
19	2 6	2 5	2 5	2 5
20	2 7	2 7	2 6	2 5
21	4 5	4 6	4 6	4 5
22	1 5	2 6	1 6	2 5
23	2 6	2 6	2 7	2 5
24	1 7	1 7	1 6	1 6
25	4 5	4 6	1 6	1 6
26	1 7	1 6	1 7	1 7
27	1 6	1 6	1 6	1 6
28	1 7	1 6	1 6	1 6
29	2 6	2 7	2 6	2 5
30	1 5	1 5	1 5	1 5
31	1 7	1 6	1 6	1 6
32	2 6	2 7	2 6	2 7
33	3 6	1 6	1 6	1 6
34	1 7	1 7	1 7	1 7
35	1 7	1 7	1 7	1 6
36	1 7	1 7	1 7	1 7
37	4 6	1 6	1 6	4 6
38	1 7	1 7	1 7	1 6
39	1 7	1 6	1 7	1 6
40	4 6	4 7	4 6	4 5

Speech Number	Coders							
	A		B		C		D	
	t.	i.	t.	i.	t.	i.	t.	i.
41	1	7	1	6	1	6	1	6
42	3	5	3	5	3	5	3	5
43	3	6	3	6	1	6	3	6
44	1	6	1	5	1	7	1	7
45	3	5	3	5	1	5	3	5
46	4	6	4	6	4	6	4	6
47	1	5	1	5	1	5	1	5
48	4	6	4	5	4	6	4	6
49	1	6	1	6	1	6	1	6
50	1	7	1	7	2	6	1	7

(b) Editorials of the Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

Editorial Number	Coders ¹²							
	t.	i.	t.	i.	t.	i.	t.	i.
51	4	6	4	6	4	6	4	6
52	1	7	1	6	1	7	1	5
53	4	5	4	5	4	6	4	5
54	1	7	1	6	1	7	1	6
55	2	6	2	6	2	6	2	7
56	4	5	4	5	4	5	4	5
57	1	6	1	6	1	6	1	6
58	1	7	1	7	1	7	1	7

¹²Coder A-the author, Coder B-Kim Chung-hyong, Coder C-Lee Young-kwang, and Coder D-Park Hungsoon.

Editorial Number	Coders							
	A		B		C		D	
	t.	i. in.						
59	1	6	1	5	1	6	1	5
60	1	6	1	5	1	7	1	5
61	2	7	2	5	2	6	2	6
62	2	5	2	5	2	5	2	5
63	2	5	6	4	6	4	6	4
64	2	5	2	5	2	6	2	6
65	4	5	4	6	4	6	4	5
66	1	6	1	6	1	6	1	6
67	2	5	1	5	1	5	2	5
68	3	5	4	6	4	5	4	5
69	2	5	6	4	6	4	6	4
70	1	6	1	6	1	6	1	7

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY

Validity is usually defined as the extent to which an instrument is measuring what is intended to measure.¹³ Our question here is: are we measuring the intensity of the theme which we are intended to measure? If all four coders are measuring the intensity of the Chollima theme on the same speech, there will be no validity problem.

¹³Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1969), p. 142.

However, suppose Coder A and B are measuring the intensity of the Liberman theme on, say, Speech No. 21, and Coder C and D are measuring the intensity of the Chollima theme on the same speech. The measurement is in a serious validity problem. In other words, we are not measuring what we are intended to measure. In order to make the measurement of intensity valid, the coders should be able to properly identify the theme. To what extent do the coders agree on identifying the themes? We should test to what extent all the coders agree on identifying the themes. We applied Pearson's Correlation Coefficient test between Coder A and B, B and C, C and D, A and D, and B and D. Calculations show as follows.

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

$$r_{AB}(\text{theme}) = .88$$

$$r_{BC}(\text{theme}) = .79$$

$$r_{CD}(\text{theme}) = .82$$

$$r_{AC}(\text{theme}) = .76$$

$$r_{AD}(\text{theme}) = .88$$

$$r_{BD}(\text{theme}) = .85$$

(b) Editorials of the Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

$$r_{AB}(\text{theme}) = .67$$

$$r_{BC}(\text{theme}) = 1.00$$

$$r_{CD}(\text{theme}) = .99$$

$$r_{AC}(\text{theme}) = .67$$

$$r_{AD}(\text{theme}) = .74$$

$$r_{BD}(\text{theme}) = .99$$

There are high correlations between all the coders. However, to be on the safe side, we gave significant tests as follows. We applied the following formula:¹⁴

$$F = \frac{r^2(N-2)}{1-r^2}$$

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

Between Coder A and B,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and B in identifying the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 164.76$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and C in identifying the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 79.75$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.17(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder C and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder C and D in identifying the themes.

¹⁴Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 494.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 98.50$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and C in identifying the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 65.63$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and D in identifying the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 164.76$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and D in identifying the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 124.97$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

(b) Editorials of the Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

Between Coder A and B,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and B in identifying the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 14.66$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 8.29(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and C,

$r = 1.00$ There is a perfect positive correlation in identifying the themes.

Between Coder C and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder C and D in identifying the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 882$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 8.29(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and C in identifying the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 14.69$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 8.29(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and D in identifying the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 21.88$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 8.29(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and D in identifying the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 882$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 8.29(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

In brief, according to our significant tests, the relationship between all the coders is statistically significant and all the coders agree on identifying the themes.

If a research is to satisfy the requirement of objectivity, measures and procedures must be reliable, i.e., repeated measures with the same instrument on a given sample of data should yield similar results.¹⁵ For our purpose, if the coders were properly instructed on the

¹⁵Ole R. Holsti, op. cit., p. 135.

coding procedures and measurement, they should yield similar results on a given sample of data. We should test to what extent all the coders agree on the scale value they assigned in measuring the intensity of the themes. Again we applied Pearson's correlation coefficient tests between all the coders. Our calculations show as follows.

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

$$\begin{aligned} r_{AB}(\text{intensity}) &= .59 \\ r_{BC}(\text{intensity}) &= .64 \\ r_{CD}(\text{intensity}) &= .56 \\ r_{AC}(\text{intensity}) &= .66 \\ r_{AD}(\text{intensity}) &= .59 \\ r_{BD}(\text{intensity}) &= .37 \end{aligned}$$

(b) Editorials of the Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

$$\begin{aligned} r_{AB}(\text{intensity}) &= .57 \\ r_{BC}(\text{intensity}) &= .77 \\ r_{CD}(\text{intensity}) &= .59 \\ r_{AC}(\text{intensity}) &= .75 \\ r_{AD}(\text{intensity}) &= .55 \\ r_{BD}(\text{intensity}) &= .70 \end{aligned}$$

Apparently, the correlations are not as high as the theme identification. We certainly need significant tests. We applied the same formula:

$$F = \frac{r^2(N-2)}{1-r^2}$$

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

Between Coder A and B,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and B
in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 25.63$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically
significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and C
in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 33.3$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically
significant at .01 level.

Between Coder C and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder C and D
in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 21.93$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically
significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and C
in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 85.81$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and D in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 25.63$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and D in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 7.61$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,48} = \begin{matrix} 4.04(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

(b) Editorials of the Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

Between Coder A and B,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and B in measuring intensity of themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 68.5$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder B and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and C in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 26.12$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder C and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder C and D in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 9.61$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant.

Between Coder A and C,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and C in measuring intensity of the themes.

F value is calculated as

$$F = 23.14$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically significant at .01 level.

Between Coder A and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder A and D
in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 7.8$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically
significant at .05 level.

Between B and D,

H_0 : There is no relationship between Coder B and D
in measuring intensity of the themes

F value is calculated as

$$F = 17.29$$

$$F_{d.f.=1,18} = \begin{matrix} 4.41(.05) \\ 7.19(.01) \end{matrix}$$

Reject H_0 , and the relationship is statistically
significant at .01 level.

In sum, according to our significance tests, the relationships between all the coders are statistically significant, and all the coders agree to a significant extent on measuring intensity of the themes. In other words, the coders' measurements are relatively reliable.

FINDINGS AND GENERALIZATION

The purpose of our identifying, and measuring intensity of, the themes of Kim Il-song's speeches and the editorials of the Rodong Shinmun was to see how these themes do indeed shape the distribution of individual orientations

in the North Korean political culture and to see how intensively these themes would indoctrinate the people. First of all, frequency of the themes would certainly indicate the directions of Kim Il-song's teaching. In other words, if the Chollima theme and the Chongsan-ri theme prevail over the Liberman theme and the Technological theme in terms of frequency, we may be able to say that Kim Il-song has been trying to make his people revolutionary zealots. On the other hand, if the latter themes prevail over the former themes, we should be able to say that Kim Il-song has been trying to make his people calm, tranquilized and restrained citizens. Our calculation proceeds as follows. Fifty speeches were identified four times. There were two hundred identifications for Kim Il-song's speeches. Twenty editorials were identified four times. There were eighty identifications for the editorials. The frequency shows as follows.

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
(1) Chollima theme	107	53.5
(2) Chongsan-ri theme	39	19
(3) Liberman theme	18	9
(4) Technological theme	37	18.5
(5) Simply descriptive	0	0
(6) Others (impossible to identify)	0	0
<u>Total</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>100</u>

(b) Editorials of the Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
(1) Chollima theme	34	42.5
(2) Chongsan-ri theme	20	25
(3) Liberman theme	1	1.25
(4) Technological theme	19	23.75
(5) Simply descriptive	0	0
(6) Others (impossible to identify)	6	7.5
Total	80	100

Our calculation of frequency clearly indicates that the Chollima theme and Chongsan-ri theme prevail over the Liberman theme and Technological theme. Frequency alone clearly indicates that the North Korean political culture should be categorized as belonging to the "culture of revolutionary struggle."

The next step we have taken is to ascertain the meaning of the intensity measured. If anyone has ever taken a glance at a page of Kim Il-song's Selected Works or the Rodong Shinmun, he will immediately admit that Kim's speeches or the editorials are very intensive regardless of whether they have a revolutionary theme or a technological theme. Even a technological theme is very assertive. It appears that our coders have given high scale values to the Liberman theme and the technological theme, because Kim's speeches and the editorials are very assertive and intensive even in these speeches. At any rate, we should compare

the Chollima theme and the Chongsan-ri theme on the one hand and the Liberman theme and the Technological theme on the other in terms of intensity. We have tested whether there is any significant difference between the mean intensity of the former and the mean intensity of the latter. We applied t-Test. We used the following formula:¹⁶

$$t = \frac{\bar{X}_1 - \bar{X}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{2}{n_1} + \frac{2}{n_2}}}$$

Our null hypothesis reads:

H₀: There is no statistically significant difference between the mean intensity of the revolutionary themes (the Chollima theme and the Chongsan-ri theme) and the mean intensity of the technological themes (the Liberman theme and the Technological theme).

The mean intensities we calculated as follows:

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

\bar{X}_1 (the revolutionary themes) = 6.205

\bar{X}_2 (the technological themes) = 5.647

(b) Editorials of Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

\bar{X}_1 (the revolutionary themes) = 9.15

\bar{X}_2 (the technological themes) = 5.4

We calculated t values:

(a) Kim Il-song's Speeches (1961-1970)

t = 6.085

¹⁶Frederick E. Croxton, Dudley J. Cowden, Sidney Klein, Applied General Statistics (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), pp. 560-562.

(b) Editorials of Rodong Shinmun (1974-1977)

$$t = 96.8$$

d.f. = $68+132-2=198$ (Kim Il-song's speeches)

d.f.= $20+54-2=72$ (Editorials)

Critical values of t distribution in t Table

$$\begin{array}{l} t_{.05} = 1.699 \\ \text{d.f.}=29 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{l} t_{.01} = 2.462 \\ \text{d.f.}=29 \end{array}$$

Both of our t values reject H_0 , and the difference is statistically significant at .01 level.

Thus, we found that the mean intensity of the revolutionary themes was higher than the technological themes, and the difference is statistically significant. In other words, the themes through which Kim Il-song and the editorials teach revolutionary ideas are significantly more intensive than the themes through which he tries to make specialists and experts. According to our findings we should be able to say that the North Korean political culture is characterized by politically conscious revolutionary zealots.

In conclusion, all of our findings, thus, far, enable us to infer that the North Korean political culture should be assigned to the "culture of revolutionary struggle" which is fundamentally similar to the political culture of China. And on the basis of these findings in conjunction with the model of the "culture of revolutionary struggle" given in the beginning of this chapter, we attempt to generalize the North Korean political culture.

Political socialization in North Korea is characterized by continuous and painstaking political campaigns. Individual political self is politically conscious to a high degree due to this intensive political indoctrination. "Criticism," "self-criticism," and "thought reform" are common practices to imbue the people with the "thought of Kim Il-song." The method of modernization heavily relies on moral and psychological incentives rather than material incentives as major stimulus for production. Furthermore, it appears that not only the method of modernization but also various operations of political system rely on politically conscious manpower. The promotion of specialists and expertise appears to be a secondary problem. The "thought of Kim Il-song" appears to solve everyday problems.

With respect to the personality cult of Kim Il-song, the masses of people refer to him in terms very similar to those used about Mao Tse-tung in China. Rodong Shinmun often calls him "a brilliant Marxist-Leninist" or "a great Marxist-Leninist of our time." Kim is often described as "a revolutionary strategist of genius," one who has made "a priceless contribution to the treasure-house of Marxism-Leninism," a leader who has "pointed out the road for the people of the world to follow," and a person who has made "an outstanding contribution to the international Communist movement and the development of the world revolution." Hence, Kim practically teaches his people. An analogy of

the North Korean political culture would be a small classroom where Kim teaches his pupils. We may be able to conclude this chapter by saying that Kim Il-song practically makes and shapes the political culture of North Korea.

CHAPTER VII

THE AGENT OF SOCIALIZATION: KIM IL-SONG'S VS. MAO TSE-TUNG'S THEORETICAL WRITINGS

We have inferred the political culture of North Korea by content-analyzing Kim Il-song's writings. We have insisted that our inference is valid because we have treated Kim Il-song as the most important and effective agent of political socialization in this political system. In other words, we have examined what and how Kim Il-song has taught his people on the assumption that Kim Il-song as a teacher has been able to mold the North Korean political culture. If this is the case, it is worth examining the theoretical values of his writings. To what extent has Kim made any significant, original contributions to the orthodox Marxism-Leninism? The North Korean eulogies of Kim insist that he has "newly created the Marxist-Leninist theory of our time."¹ This chapter will examine whether or not Kim Il-song has developed any original thoughts in Communist thinking. If not, what is the origin of his thoughts?

¹For Kim Il-song's eulogies, see among many "The Revolutionary Task of Our People Under the Wise Leadership of the Great Leader, Comrad Kim Il-song, Is Invincible," Kulloja, April 15, 1969, pp. 2-11. Also see Kim Kuk-chin, "Comrade Kim Il-song's Theory is the Party's Guiding Policy," Ibid., October 5, 1969, pp. 48-57.

The so-called Juche idea of Kim Il-song has become fairly widely spread in the Western world. It has become the basis for Kim to be "a foremost creative theorist" according to his eulogists. The language, Juche itself, has been variously translated such as "independence,"² "autonomy,"³ "subjective entity,"⁴ and "theme."⁵ Juche was originally a Chinese word written as "主體." "主" means "one's own," and "體" means "body." It should be literally translated as "one's own body." However, the word has been used more often as a philosophical term meaning "to find one's own self distinctive from others." Hence, the exact translation should be "self-identity." "Juche" has been a catch-word or another driving force, alongside the Chongsan-ri spirit, for North Korean modernization.

The Juche principle means, to quote Kim's own definition, "holding fast to the principle of solving for oneself all the problems of the revolution and construction in

²Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation...", op. cit., p. 260, note 40.

³Glenn D. Page and Dong-jun Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), North Korea Today, op. cit., p. 25.

⁴Translations of Political and Sociological Information on North Korea, No. 119, February 28, 1966 (Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, Joint Publications Research Service, 1966), p. 8.

⁵Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East: Communism in North Korea," Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Communist Revolution in Asia, op. cit., p. 87.

conformity with the actual conditions at home, and mainly by one's own effort."⁶ In other words, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism should be applied in conformity with one country's historical conditions, national peculiarities, and realities. Accordingly, Kim further develops his idea that a Marxist-Leninist should live so that he is not subjugated to the world around him but controlling it according to his wishes. He boasts of his ideas by saying: "By scientifically enunciating the position and role of man in the world, the Juche idea provides one with the only correct outlook on nature and society and with a powerful weapon to cognize and transform the world."⁷ Hence, he claims that his idea is a philosophical theory that "man, a social being that is independent and creative, is master of everything and decides everything."⁸ Kim's Juche idea has become an ideological weapon to inspire the spirit of nationalism among the popular masses. It means self-sufficiency and self-reliance in the economy, things "Korean" in culture, one's own strength in defense, and independence in foreign policy.

⁶Kim Il-song, Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea (English ed.), op. cit., p. 87.

⁷Kim Il-song, The Non-Alignment Movement is a Mighty Anti-Imperialist Revolutionary Force of Our Times, Eng. ed., (Pyongyang: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1978), p. 284.

⁸Ibid, p. 284.

This principle has become quite a controversy among not only North and South Korean scholars but also among a significant number of Western observers. Dispute focuses on whether or not Kim's Juche idea has really developed and contributed to the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism. A North Korean scholar, Hwang Jang-yop, among many North Korean eulogists of Kim Il-song, argues that "the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song was the first in history to give a scientific account of the position and role of man in the world and created a Juche-based scientific, revolutionary world outlook regarding man as the central-factor."⁹

Hwang stressed that the former dialectical materialism certainly contributed in a great measure to demonstrating the impropriety of theism and idealism, and metaphysics and fatalism, and to developing a scientific world view, but that it still failed to fully clarify man's proprietary position and his role in the world.¹⁰

⁹ Hwang is the President of Kim Il-song University in Pyongyang and Director of the Board of the International Institute of the Juche Idea in Tokyo.

¹⁰ For Hwang's discussion, see "The Juche Idea--a Scientific, Revolutionary World Outlook Regarding Man as the Central Factor," Study of the Juche Idea, Vol. I, No. 3, October, 1978 (International Institute of the Juche Idea, Tokyo, 1978), pp. 30-38. In praising Kim Il-song's Juche idea, all North Korean scholars sound similar, see for example Widaehan Suryong Kim Il-song tongji ui Juche sasang (The Great Leader Kim Il-song's Juche Thought) (Pyongyang: Sahoekwahak chulpansa, 1975), and Hyokmyongkwa konsole kwanhan Kim Il-song tongji ui sasangkwa ku widaehan sanghwalryok (Comrad Kim Il-song's great thoughts and practice for revolution and construction) (Pyongyang: Sahoekwahak chulpansa, 1975), pp. 273-321.

In other words, Hwang argues that the dialectical materialism of earlier Marxist philosophers failed to note that man plays the decisive role in shaping his destiny. This role follows directly from the dialectics which simply clarifies that everything in the world including man changes and develops. Accordingly, the North Korean scholar concludes that Kim Il-song is the first Communist theorist who set forth a man-centered world view which explains what position man holds within the material world and what role he plays in the change and development of the material world.

South Korean scholars,¹¹ on the other hand, argue that Kim Il-song's Juche idea basically lacks content, because its practices in reality is limited to one person, Kim Il-song himself. According to these writers, Communist theories, in general, inevitably were destined to flow from practice and vice versa. Creativity of a Communist theory stemmed from concrete policy decisions, with "validity" or "truth" increasingly related to actual results. The South Korean scholars argue that "independent" and "creative"

¹¹South Korean criticisms on Kim Il-song's Juche idea sound very similar. See among many Kim Kap-chol, A Study on North Korea's Juche Thought (Pukhan Juche sasang e kwanhan yonku) (Seoul: University of Foreign Language, 1976), pp. 179-182. Also, see Yang Ho-min, "Juche sasang kwa jongchi kyohwa" (The Juche Thought and Political Indoctrination) (Seoul: Institute of the Far Eastern Studies, 1976), pp. 295-367 and Pak Chae-kyu, Pukhan Pyongron (A Study on North Korea) (Masan: Kyongnam University Press, 1975), pp. 29-48.

thinking of the North Koreans has never been allowed while Kim Il-song himself may have a Juche-based world outlook, and may attempt to transform the world, they contend that the popular masses of North Korea have never been allowed to be independent and creative to the extent of possessing the so-called Juche-based world outlook. Hence, the Juche principle is meaningless to the North Korean people and only serves as a rationale to justify Kim Il-song's dictatorial policies.

Scholars in the West, such as Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, argue that Kim Il-song cannot be considered even a theorist in any sense, let alone "a foremost creative theorist." According to them, Kim has advanced no new theoretical constructs. He has not even made any significant additions to the body of Marxist-Leninist theory that he inherited and to which he subscribes. Their major argument focuses on the fact that the Juche idea is simply "a straightforward, orthodox form of nationalism, wholly unoriginal." They contend that the Juche as preached and practiced in North Korea could easily be regarded as "the antithesis of Marxism; and in any case, it is a scarcely a theoretical innovation." Furthermore, Kim's writings, according to Scalapino and Lee, are characterized by a low level of conceptualization and the endless repetition of a few simple, central themes typical of modern Communist

writings in general.¹²

A well-known English economist, Joan Robinson,¹³ on the other hand, wrote "Korean Miracle," a favorable article on Kim Il-song's Juche idea, in Monthly Review in January 1965. This article has been fairly widely publicized in the western world. She reports that "there was not one stone standing upon another" in Pyongyang right after the Korean War.¹⁴ She calls the economic development of North Korea "a miracle," by insisting that Pyongyang has become a city without slums when she visited there in October 1964, and the country has become a nation without poverty. In her concluding remarks, she argues that the ingredients of North Korea's success formula are "well conceived economic strategy" and "patriotic rage and devotion expressing itself in enthusiasm for hard work." She sums up her article by saying that the North Korean economic miracle has been based on Juche principle--"applying Marxism-Leninism to our own problems in our own way."

Those who claim to be eye-witnesses have not failed to mention Juche principle as a basis for North Korean

¹²Scalapino and Lee, op. cit., pp. 865-868.

¹³Joan Robinson is a well-known British economist and was a professor in Economics at Cambridge University. She retired in 1973. She was interested in Asian affairs and published The Cultural Revolution in China in 1969. She published many books and articles in economics.

¹⁴Joan Robinson, "Korean Miracle," in Monthly Review, January, 1965, pp. 541-544.

economic development. Wilfred G. Burchett points out that Juche is the spirit which eminently fits the Korean psychology.¹⁵ He suggests that the all-Korean nature of the economy, from consumer goods to heavy industry, and the "fantastic speed" with which evrything has been accomplished, is the best proof of this.¹⁶ Ellen Brun¹⁷ says that the foreign visitors could not help being surprised when meeting for the first time "the well-dressed, well-fed, and well-educated population, enjoying a happy life."¹⁸ In Brun's words, the driving slogan in the construction period has been "reliance on our own forces" or the Juche principle. Ben Page,¹⁹ in his article "North Korea: Sitting on its own Chair," insists that alongside the Chongsan-ri

¹⁵Wilfred G. Burchett is an Australian journalist who often writes on Asian affairs. He is a leftist. He published Vietnam: Inside Story of the Guerrilla War (1965), Vietnam North (1966), Again Korea? (1968), Vietnam Will Win (1968).

¹⁶Burchett, Again Korea?, op., cit., p. 149.

¹⁷Ellen Brun is a Danish writer and activist who visited North Korea with an invited Danish delegation in 1970.

¹⁸Ellen Brun, "North Korea: A Case of Real Development," Monthly Review, June, 1970, p. 28.

¹⁹Ben Page was a student at Charles University in Prague during the years 1964-1967. There he became a friend of the North Korean Embassy staff and this led to an invitation to visit North Korea. He spent five weeks in and around Pyongyang in the summer of 1968, perhaps the first United States citizen to visit North Korea since the Korean War. He was a graduate student in social philosophy at Florida State University when he wrote this article. His whereabouts since then are not known.

spirit it is on the basis of this guiding principle - Juche that North Korea has accomplished what she has today.²⁰

None of these Western writers has ever evaluated the Juche principle in terms of its theoretical values, but all of them insist that it is Kim's own invention. Before we examine theoretical values of this principle, let us review how it has rationalized and justified Kim Il-song's policies and programs.

There is no doubt that the Juche principle has inspired "nationalism" according to Kim's own definition among the North Korean masses. He perceives that the Koreans have suffered from sadaejujui which refers to a kind of sycophancy before powerful individuals, because historically Korea has been a victim of great power rivalry among Japan, China, and Russia. Especially, the Japanese imperialists, he argues, "trampled on the national pride of the Korean people and inculcated a colonial mentality among the Korean youth."²¹ His Juche principle is designed to wipe out the sadaejujui syndrome from Koreans' mind and to imbue them with national pride. He recognizes the importance of self-reliance and self sufficiency in the national economy in connection with political independence.

²⁰ Ben Page, "North Korea: Sitting on its Own Chair," Monthly Review, January 1969, p. 27.

²¹ Kim Il-song sonjip (Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Korean language version), Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 11-14.

During formulating the Three-year Plan of economic development (1954-1956) an important economic issue was raised. Kim proposed to place the greatest emphasis on the development of heavy industry with little concern with light industry and agriculture.²² There were others, however, who insisted that North Korea should concentrate on light industry, agriculture, consumer goods, and housing, developing these as rapidly as possible in order to better serve the immediate needs of people. They insisted that the Soviet Union or China could be counted on to supply long-term low interest credit for the purchase of needed products of heavy industry. Kim Il-song quickly identified himself and his followers with the Juche line and his opponents with the non-Juche line.

During the policy dispute, Kim Il-song eloquently advocated his Juche principle to rationalize his policy. He argued as follows: First, international division of labor may bring forth a big power chauvinist tendency. Under international division of labor, a big power may economically control small states and may prevent an independent and comprehensive development of the economy of

²²Glenn D. Paige observes that the priority given to heavy industry in North Korea is emulation of the Soviet economy (see his "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in Communist Strategies in Asia, op. cit., p. 238). However, it is rather a matter of the tradition of socialist economy, because China too had given priority to heavy industry until the Great Leap when emphasis shifted to agriculture.

small states. Second, psychologically, imported equipment with imported technological know-how may inspire the sadaejuui syndrome. Third, economic cooperation among states is necessary, not as foreign aid but as foreign trades based upon "the principle of complete equality and mutual benefit." Consequently, Kim proposed that priority be given to the development of heavy industry as a shortcut to achieve "an independent and comprehensive development of the economy" relying on "our own effort" and using domestic resources to the full.²³

Despite these eloquent justifications and rationalizations, the real politics was to eliminate his "non-Juche" rivals represented by Pak Hon-yong, then vice premier and foreign minister of North Korea, and his followers. As noted in the third chapter, Pak Hon-yong's power base was South Korea. Pak was then much better known among the South Koreans than Kim Il-song. No wonder most of his policy proposals had been oriented toward the South. He must have believed that he could prevail over his political rival, Kim, if the country should be unified. He advocated that socialist construction be carried out under a unified single socialist Korean regime. A radical program, Pak worried, might have scared off the South Koreans. Earlier when he was in the South as the chairman of the South

²³Kim Il-song, Revolution and Construction, op. cit., pp. 91-93.

Korean Workers' Party, he had opposed the land reform program undertaken in North Korea. He opposed the priority development of heavy industry and agricultural collectivization when formulating the Three-year Plan. Believing that the regime should immediately seek to raise the living conditions of the people, he advocated production of consumer goods and grain. This he felt would demonstrate that the regime was a good government and would enhance its support among the South Korean people. This power struggle ended with the purge of Pak and his followers.²⁴

The Juche dispute flared up again at the Third KWP Congress in April 1956. When formulating the first Five-Year Plan (1956-1961) at the Congress, Kim Il-song insisted on continuing the priority development of heavy industry according to his Juche principle. He argued as usual that

²⁴His political followers were those who had fled from the South during the war, such as Yi Sung-yop, Lim Hwa, Yi Won-cho, Yun Sun-tal, Sol Chong-sik, and others. See Puk Han Sipo Nyon Sa (Fifteen Years' History of North Korea), op. cit., pp. 135-150. This dispute was implied in Kim Il-song's speech of April 4, 1955, delivered at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the KWP. See Selected Works of Kim Il-song (Foreign Language Publishing House, Pyongyang, 1971), English language version, Vol. I, pp. 562-569. Furthermore, Pak and his followers were identified with the "war-hawk faction" during the war and widely suspected to have insisted on continuing the war and opposed the cease-fire agreement with the United Nations because of his ambition to recover his power base in the south. He has become reportedly "an American spy" in the North and "a war scapegoat" in the South. For an excellent discussion of this development, see Soon Sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies: 1950-1965," World Politics, Vol. 19 (1966-1967), pp. 220-221.

an independent, self-supporting national economy is achievable only by pushing the development of heavy industry. However, discontent among the people this time reached the "boiling point." Since the Third-Year Plan was originally designed to reconstruct basic industry with the priority emphasis on heavy industry, the living conditions of the people were scarcely improved. The people cried for better living conditions and were demanding production of more consumer goods and grain. The "non-Juche" line, mainly represented at this time by the Yen-an group, had quickly recognized this popular discontent and challenged Kim's leadership. It urged a shift of emphasis to light industry and to develop the agricultural sector of the economy by reducing the emphasis on heavy industry.²⁵

The Yen-an faction also raised the issue of "the personality cult," which was obviously influenced by the de-Stalinization movement at the Twentieth Congress of CPSU. Choe Chang-Ik, then vice-premier and an important leader of the Yen-an faction and Pak Chang-Ok, another vice-premier and the leader of the pro-Soviet faction, attacked Kim Il-song openly on August 30, 1956 at the KWP Central Committee

²⁵ Kim Il-song, Choson Rodongdang Chungang wiwonhoe 1956-nyon 12-wol Chonwon Hoe-i Kyolchong Silhaeng Chongwarul wihan Kyongkongop-song Yolsongch Hoeiesohan Yonsol (Speech at the meeting of the Ministry of Light Industry in order to evaluate the decision made at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party in December 1956) (Pyongyang, 1958), pp. 3-5. Also, see Choson Rodongdang i kolo on yongkwang suroun kil, op. cit., pp. 182-185.

for his "dictatorial leadership" and his negligence of the living conditions of the people. They demanded withdrawal of excessive emphasis on heavy industry and formation of collective leadership on the Party. Kim's faction prevailed over the Yen-an faction by superior numbers and labelled the latter as "anti-party and reactionary elements" in the party. After this showdown, all the members of the Yen-an faction were systematically eliminated from the North Korean political scene. The purge lasted until 1958. After this purge, the so-called Juche principle has rationalized and justified whatever the policies Kim Il-song proposed.²⁶

The Juche in politics of North Korea's unification policies will be further explored in the next chapter. This chapter is focused on the following question: Is the Juche principle Kim's theoretical invention? If it is not even a theory, what is the origin of Juche? Now we turn to evaluation of Kim Il-song's Juche principle.

The necessity of "applying the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism in conformity with one country's historical conditions, national peculiarities and realities" has been expressed by Mao Tse-tung in various ways. The originality of this formula is attributed to Mao Tse-tung.

²⁶The Juche principle has even rationalized and justified Kim Il-song's national liberation war against the South which advocates violent revolutionary struggle. See the next chapter for this discussion.

He has stated in various ways that Marxism-Leninism without considering Chinese history, Chinese conditions, and Chinese realities is only an abstract theory. The basis of this formula can be found in his "On Practice." According to Mao, man's knowledge is the result of practice. Knowledge can be developed by man's participating in practical social life. Man has to apply his thoughts and ideas to the objective world in order to systematize his thoughts and ideas into theories. The theories in turn should be applied to practice. Therefore, theory and practice are interrelated. However, Mao points out that a theory may not bring forth the anticipated results, because the objective world has changed. Consequently, the truth of many theories is incomplete because of the rapidly changing objective world. This incompleteness can only be remedied by applying theories again to practice.²⁷

Marxist-Leninist theory, Mao continued, is an important revolutionary theory. Without Marxist-Leninist theory there can be no revolutionary movement. However, the importance of the Marxist-Leninist theory, Mao further argues, is that it has to guide action. He points out that the objective conditions in society are rapidly changing. Therefore, revolutionary ideas, theories, plans or programs have to be changed accordingly.²⁸ What Mao has suggested

²⁷ See Mao Tse-tung, "On Practice," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. I, pp. 282-293.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 294.

in his "On Practice" is that the revolutionary ideas, theories, plans or programs of Marxism-Leninism have to be changed according to Chinese history, Chinese conditions, and Chinese realities. His application of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism to Chinese historical conditions can be seen in his theory of "New Democracy," in which he says:

...in applying Marxism to China, Chinese Communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, or in other words, the universal truth of Marxism must be combined with specific national characteristics and acquire a definite national form if it is to be useful, and in no circumstances can it be applied subjectively as a mere formula. Marxists who make a fetish of formulas are simply playing the fool with Marxism and the Chinese revolution, and there is no room²⁹ for them in the ranks of the Chinese revolution.

We have thus far found out that the Juche principle of Kim Il-song was a derivative of Mao Tse-tung's thoughts expressed in "On Practice" and "On New Democracy." If there is any difference between Mao's thought and the Juche principle, it could be Kim's emphasis given to "one's own efforts" in applying Marxism-Leninism to the Korean national conditions as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. By stressing "one's own efforts," he has directed his Juche principle toward obtaining political independence. In accordance with the Juche principle of North Korea and "On

²⁹Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy," Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II, p. 381.

Practice" of China, the policy of "New Democracy" was applied to the North Korean and Chinese historical conditions respectively. We have seen the practice of "New Democracy" in China and North Korea in Chapter IV. In the following pages, the theoretical bases of "New Democracy" will be examined. It is necessary, because most of Kim Il-song's writings can be regarded as an extension of Mao's "New Democracy."

The central idea of the thought of Mao Tse-tung is the theory of contradiction. His theory of contradiction is largely based on the original materialist dialectics. As opposed to the metaphysical conception, the dialectical conception holds that the development of a thing is not a quantitative but a qualitative change. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is internal qualitative change within a thing. The external cause of the development of a thing is only secondary and affects quantitative change. The qualitative change within a thing is due to contradiction. There is nothing that does not contain a contradiction. This is "the law of the unity of opposites."³⁰ Mao's idea of contradiction is simply the repetition of this materialist dialectic which Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin had already discussed. Marx mentioned this dialectical

³⁰ Mao Tse-tung, "On Contradiction," Selected Works, Vol. I, pp. 311-347.

conception in his idea of "necessary self-movement" of a thing.³¹ Concerning unity and struggle of opposites, Lenin said: "...not only unity of opposites, but transformation of every degree, quality, feature, aspect, trait into every other."³² Therefore, Mao's idea of "struggle of opposites" is only a logical deduction from Lenin's idea of transformation.

According to Mao Tse-tung, there are two kinds of contradictions--"antagonistic and non-antagonistic." The former is characterized by "struggle" between the two opposites to win the dominant position. The latter is characterized by "harmony" between the opposites. This non-antagonistic contradictions, which Mao calls "contradiction among people," appears to be only a portion of Mao's "contradiction" which he originated. Although Soviet theorists implied non-antagonistic contradictions in a socialist society, the Soviet notion of non-antagonistic contradictions rejects applying to the concept of people (see Chapter IV, p. 129). To be specific, Lenin mentioned "antagonism and contradiction." When he said: "If in developed socialism there were no contradictions--contradictions between productive forces and relations of

³¹For this analysis, see Arthur A. Cohen, The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit.

³²Quoted in M. Shirokov, Textbook of Marxist Philosophy (Leningrad Institute of Philosophy), revised and edited translation by John Lewis (London: Gollancz, Co., 1935), p. 175.

production, between production and demand, no contradictions in the development of technique, etc.--then the development of socialism would be impossible."³³ In this statement, contradiction as opposed to antagonism implies non-antagonistic contradictions. Stalin also implied non-antagonistic contradictions between working class and the working peasantry.³⁴ However, the Soviet notion of non-antagonistic contradictions does not apply beyond the "working class," that is, the proletariat.

Mao's notion of non-antagonistic contradictions was applied to his concept of people as was discussed earlier in Chapter IV. He argues that contradictions among proletariat, peasantry, intellectuals, and national bourgeoisie are non-antagonistic. This idea of "non-antagonistic contradiction," or "contradiction among the people" became the basis of his theory of "New Democracy." These two theories can be explained in Chinese historical context.

From the beginning of the May Fourth Movement in 1919, which Mao calls the "new bourgeois-democratic" revolution, there have been certain points in which Communists, intellectuals, and national bourgeoisie have agreed. The Chinese revolution has been directed not only against

³³ Ibid., p. 175.

³⁴ Stalin, "Results of the Work of the 14th Party Conference (1925), Selected Works (Moscow, 1946-1951), VII, 90 ff.

feudal force but also against imperialist aggression. Mao has admitted that the Chinese intellectuals and national bourgeoisie had revolutionary spirit even though they were "flabby." The Chinese Communists, intellectuals, national bourgeoisie had agreed on the need to change China's semi-colonial, feudal society into an independent, democratic society. Since the Chinese revolution had been directed against imperialism and feudalism, it was inevitable that all these anti-imperialist and anti-feudal forces would form an alliance. The Chinese Communists recognized the utility of revolutionary spirit of intellectuals and national bourgeoisie throughout the "bourgeoisie-democratic" as well as the socialist revolutions.³⁵ Therefore, an alliance with intellectuals and national bourgeoisie was inevitable for the Chinese Communists. Here we see the origin of Mao's theories of "contradiction among the people" and "New Democracy." One may argue "contradiction among the people" is simply a rationalization of the inevitable alliance with two other classes, namely, intellectuals and national bourgeoisie.

To summarize the practice of "New Democracy" in China and North Korea for the purpose of this chapter, the most conspicuous feature is that all the classes which were

³⁵For this historical development, see Jerome Chen, Mao and Chinese Revolution (New York, 1965), pp. 88-126. Also for Mao's own writings, see Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 347-352.

anti-colonial, anti-feudal forces and loyal to or at least sympathetic with the Chinese and the North Korean Communists were included in the concept of people and participated in the post-revolutionary state structure. Consequently, the economic activities of national bourgeoisie were allowed, and private properties were legalized in economic life during the "New Democracy."

The New Democratic Economy was characterized by gradual transformation into socialist economy. During the transitional period, private properties were to be incorporated into the cooperatives which later were to be transformed into public property. Hence, the properties of the cooperatives were in theory and practice different from public properties. For example, the cooperative farms were different from the state farms. This applies to the industry likewise (see Chapter IV). Furthermore, in agriculture, rich peasants were allowed to possess their private lands alongside cooperative farms. Even when collectivization was achieved to a significant extent, small-sized private plots were allowed. Most important, all the processes of transformation into socialist economy were based on the voluntary principle.

In view of the above-mentioned theory of Mao Tse-tung's "New Democracy," we will now examine some of Kim Il-song's theoretical writings. His most widely publicized theoretical works may be his Sahoejuui kyongje ui myotkaji

riron munje e daehayo (On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy). In these, he presents his views on "problems of the means of production in the form of commodity and the use of the law of value in socialist society" and "the relation between the scale of the economy and the rate of production growth in a developed socialist economy." Many of his eulogists think that his views on these problems are creative innovations and contributions to classical Communist doctrine.³⁶ All the ideas on these questions appear to be Kim Il-song's original thinking. However, a close examination of his writings reveals that his views on these problems are largely derivative of Mao Tse-tung's thinking. In other words, Mao has provided a groundwork for Kim's thoughts.

In discussing the questions of whether or not the means of production, such as tractors, is a commodity in socialist economy and whether or not the law of value operated in the domain of its production and circulation, Kim Il-song argues that the means of production is a commodity when it belongs to the private property or the cooperative, and the law of value operates when it is exchanged between these ownerships. He defines a commodity as a product in exchange on the condition that there is the social

³⁶ See among many, Kim Byong Sik, Modern Korea, op. cit., p. 162. Also Li Yuk-Sa, Juche!, op. cit. See the introduction chapter.

division of labor and the differentiation of ownership of the product. Therefore, according to Kim, when a means of production created in the state sector of ownership is transferred to cooperative ownership or vice versa, it is a commodity in either case and therefore, the law of value operates here. When a means of production is in exchange between cooperative owners--between cooperative farms, between producers' cooperatives or between the former and the latter--it is equally commodity and here, too, the law of value operates. When a means of production is in exchange between private ownerships, naturally it is a commodity. When a means of production is in exchange between a private ownership and a cooperative ownership, it is also a commodity, and the law of value operates here. When a means of production in exchange between socialist states, that is, international trade, it is a commodity. However, the means of production, Kim concludes, is not a commodity when it belongs to the ownership of the entire people, and the law of value does not operate in exchange between the state ownership.³⁷

By defining a commodity in a socialist state as such, Kim admits that there are commodity-money relations and the law of value operates, to a significant extent, in the North

³⁷Kim Il-song, "On Some Theoretical Problems of the Socialist Economy," Revolution and Construction, *op. cit.*, pp. 167-170. Also, see his Selected Works, Vol. V, English language version, pp. 305-306.

Korean society. However, what he emphasizes is that the law of value does not operate blindly but in a controlled manner. He argues that it is legitimate in a socialist economy to fix the prices of commodities properly in a socialist society. For instance, the prices of mass consumption goods have to be low and luxury goods have to be highly priced. Therefore, the law of value does operate in a socialist society but not like a capitalist society.³⁸

Furthermore, he questions what the means of production in exchange between state ownerships shall be called, if not commodity. Kim answers that such means of production are not commodities in the proper sense of the word, but merely assume the form of commodity, and accordingly, what is made use of here is not the operation of the law of value in the proper sense of the word, but the law of value in form; and in the case of the production and exchange of the means of production, the form of value is made use of simply as an instrument of economic accounting, and does not represent the value itself.³⁹ Even here, the law of value does not represent any form of supply and demand mechanism like in a capitalist society. The law of value in form in a socialist society operates within the framework of the central planning. The trade between state

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 312-314.

³⁹ Kim Il-song, Revolution and Construction, op. cit., pp. 167-170.

enterprises is necessary, and the state enterprises have to be particular about things of their own and of others. This is the only way to prevent the waste of machines, equipment, and materials and to use them in a rational way.⁴⁰

Kim Il-song's views about the question of means of production are quite different from Marx and Engels'. Under socialism the land, an important means of production, according to Marx and Engels, cannot be sold or bought at all, hence it is no longer a commodity. Nor can labour-power become a commodity in socialist economy. The working people, who collectively own the means of production, obviously cannot sell their labour-power to themselves. However, all the rest--the means of production and consumer goods manufactured in state enterprises, agricultural produce and raw materials, whether supplied by the cooperative sector to the state or sold by the cooperatives and their members on the collective farm market--consists of commodities, which have value, i.e., the socially necessary labour that has been embodied in them. The price of a commodity expresses its value in monetary forms.⁴¹ This difference between Kim's view on the one hand and Marx and Engels' on the other will be discussed shortly.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 173.

⁴¹ Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, Manual (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), English language version, p. 576.

As to the question of the law of value, Kim's prescription is simply a recitation of Marx and Engels. Since there is commodity production in socialist economy, according to Marx and Engels, the law of value also continues to operate. Under socialism commodity-money relations and the law of value do not serve as a spontaneous regulator of the distribution of labour and means of production as under capitalism. But the law of value does function as "measure" of labour expenditure, as a "stimulus" to economize social labour, and as a means to help to reduce the material costs of production.⁴² Furthermore, Marx and Engels prescribe that under socialism the effect of the law of value should be taken into account by the state in the "planned fixing of prices." Hence the economic activity of socialist (industrial and agricultural) enterprises rests on "cost accounting."

We found that Kim Il-song's views on these questions are simply a recitation of Marx and Engels', except for his definitions of the means of production in the form of commodity in socialist economy. Kim's definitions with regard to means of production presupposes the "durable" existence of the state ownership alongside the cooperative and private ownerships. The nature of the means of production in

⁴²K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), p. 186. And Engels' views in Fundamentals, op. cit., p. 577.

exchange between these differentiated ownerships, which Kim defines, is virtually defined by differentiated ownerships. If one knows how to define a commodity,⁴³ it is not too difficult to see the nature of the means of production in exchange between these differentiated ownerships. It appears that the Soviet theorists were not seriously concerned with differentiated ownerships because of the rapid transformation of the cooperative and private ownerships into the state ownership. Since the existence of differentiated ownerships was not durable in the Soviet case, the Soviet theorists simply accepted Marx and Engels' views on these matters; that is, the land and labour-power are not commodities, but all the rest--means of production and consumer goods--are commodities. Hence, there was no effort by the Soviet writers to theorize about the nature of the means of production in exchange between differentiated ownerships. The most important question in Kim's view is not to define the nature of the means of production in exchange between differentiated ownerships but to recognize the "durable" existence of differentiated ownerships during the transitional period of socialist economy. The "durable" existence of differentiated ownerships in a socialist

⁴³ Kim's definition of a commodity is a recitation of Marx's. See Kim's definition on page 269 of this chapter. For Marx's definition, see Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Vol. I (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1926), pp. 41-48.

society--the state ownership, the cooperative ownership, and the private ownership--has been prescribed in Mao's theory of "New Democracy" and his "Our Economic Policy."⁴⁴ In brief, Kim Il-song's theoretical writings on problems of the means of production in the form of commodity and the use of the law of value in socialist economy are not original. With regard to the question of the law of value, Kim's thought is simply a recitation of Marx and Engels' views. And as to the question of the means of production in the form of commodity, Mao Tse-tung's theory of "New Democracy" has provided a groundwork for Kim's view. One may further argue that Kim's ideas are largely extension of Mao's thinking.

Finally, in examining his view on "the possibility of a high rate of growth in a developed socialist economy," Kim presents some of the reasons why a socialist economy grows uninterruptedly. He is answering a question: What if socialist economy may not be able to maintain a high rate of growth at a certain stage of development, mainly because the reserves for production growth diminishes? He argues that a socialist society has unlimited potentialities to develop economy without interruption at a high rate which is inconceivable in capitalist society, and that

⁴⁴For differentiated ownerships, see Mao Tse-tung, "New Democracy," *op. cit.*, and "Our Economic Policy," *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 144.

the further socialist construction advances and the stronger the economic base grows the greater these potentials become.⁴⁵ He presents some of the reasons for this. First, the planning in socialist economy can maintain a high rate of growth. Kim contends, all the labor resources and natural wealth of the country can be utilized most reasonably to plan. There is no such thing as the waste of labor owing to crises of overproduction as in a capitalist society. Since production, distribution, accumulation and consumption are realized according to plan, the socialist state can determine the scale of investment and maintain the rate and speed of the economic growth.⁴⁶

Secondly, Kim argues that there has to be a factor which guarantees fulfillment of the state plan - the people's high revolutionary zeal. He emphasizes his Juche-based revolutionary world outlook by which man plays the decisive role in shaping and transforming the world. He expresses the importance of the human factor in a socialist economy as follows:

The essential excellence of the socialist system lies in the fact that the working people, freed from exploitation and oppression, work with conscious enthusiasm and creative initiative for the country and the people, for society and the collective, as well as their own welfare.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Kim Il-song, Revolution and Construction, op. cit., p. 159.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 160.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 161.

Kim proposes that the party and state have to strengthen the "ideological revolution" among the working people and gradually have to eliminate the survivals of old ideologies from their minds. Kim calls this process "working-classization."⁴⁸ He proposes that the party and state constantly "working-classize" the entire people during the socialist construction. This is Kim Il-song's Juche idea which sets forth a man-centered world view which explains what position man holds within the material world and what role he plays in the change and development of the material world. Kim believes that man, through "working-classization," can change and transform the world. This is the Juche principle in economy.

The importance of the human factor and remolding man's mind in economic development has been expressed by Mao Tse-tung in various ways in the Chinese literature. John Gurley summarizes Maoist economy as "emphasis on man" rather than on things. Maoists reject material incentives as the driving forces of the economy. Man with the right ideas is the core force of the economy. Rapid economic development, according to Mao, should be based on efficient, productive human-beings--that is, "Communist man" who knows how to sacrifice, how to be selfless, and how to cooperate

⁴⁸Kim Il-song, "On Eliminating Bureaucracy," op. cit., p. 18. As will be discussed shortly, if ideas are not his discovery, this particular term in quotation marks is his invention.

for the ideal of Communism.⁴⁹ It is people themselves who must achieve the self-reliant society. Therefore, transformation of man's ideas are the most important factor in economic development. These are the core of Mao's economics.

One can find "emphasis on man" not only in economics but largely in all aspects of Chinese culture. One may wish to call this emphasis on man "human-centrality." It is not exclusively a Marxist-Leninist concept; it is rather a traditional Chinese value. Whereas Western culture is predominantly dominated by science, Chinese culture has been essentially a humanistic culture. The Chinese have paid much more attention to human relations than to conquering nature. John K. Fairbank notes: "There is also a deep current of ethnocentrism underlying Maoism which provides it with a distinctive Chinese cultural nature."⁵⁰ He implies that Mao tends to preserve "human-centrality" in a Marxist industrial society.

By examining various contemporary Chinese writings, one should be able to add that Mao's concept of "human-centrality" is characterized by dynamic humanism. It is achieved through struggle. Man becomes selfless only through struggle. Without it, there is no way to channel

⁴⁹ See Chapter V. For original analysis, see John G. Gurley, "Capitalist and Maoist Economic Development," Monthly Review (February, 1971), pp. 17-19.

⁵⁰ John K. Fairbank quoted in Cohen's The Communism of Mao Tse-tung, op. cit., p. 193.

the huge reservoir of "enthusiasm, energy, and creativeness." "Selflessness, unity of purpose, and unity of will" can be achieved only through "incessant class struggle." Dynamic humanism also comes through active participation. Active participation makes Mao's concept of "human-centrality" different from the traditional concept. His notion of "human-centrality" rejects making narrow-minded specialist without a world view (Weltanschauung). Labor specialization may create a efficient specialist. But he may lose something in terms of the general intelligence and understanding. Mao's "human-centrality" is more interested in making a "universal man."⁵¹ In order for man to be a "universal man," he should actively participate in decision-making. By actively participating in decision-making, man can obtain the world view. Mao believes that the process of obtaining knowledge is essentially the process of participating. The process of obtaining knowledge starts from perceptual knowledge. With participation and analysis of situation, perceptual knowledge develops into rational knowledge. Again with rational knowledge one has to go out into the world of revolutionary practice to test the knowledge.⁵² In brief, as opposed to the traditional Chinese concept of "human-centrality," Mao Tse-tung's "human-centrality" is

⁵¹This ideal does not necessarily mean the reality. Here we are examining Mao's theories and ideals.

⁵²Mao, "On Practice," op. cit., pp. 282-292.

dynamic humanism activated by "struggle" and "active participation." Kim Il-song's concept of "man-centered world view" known as the Juche principle is nothing but a primitive imitation of Mao's philosophy.

"Human-centrality" in the Marxist-Leninist era is found throughout contemporary Chinese literature. The following expressions illustrate this concept. In "The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," Mao observed:

Of all things in the world, people are the most precious. Under the leadership of the Communist Party, as long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be performed.⁵³

In "On Protracted War," Mao said:

Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things that are decisive.⁵⁴

Mao was quoted in "Study 'the Foolish Old Man Removed the Mountains'" in Peking Review.

The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world history.⁵⁵

As long as we rely on the people, believe firmly in the inexhaustible creative power of the masses and hence trust and identify ourselves with them, no enemy can crush us while we can crush every enemy and overcome every difficulty.⁵⁶

⁵³Mao, Selected Works, Vol. V, p. 454.

⁵⁴Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 143-144.

⁵⁵Peking Review, Vol. 12, March 17, 1967, p. 13.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 13.

Lin Piao was quoted in the same article:

For our armed forces, the best weapon is not aircraft, heavy artillery, tanks or the atom bomb. It is Mao Tse-tung's thought. The greatest fighting power is the men who are armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought.⁵⁷

The phrases like the following quotations are frequently found in Peking Review.

Whatever we do, we give prominence to the factor of man and put man at the center.⁵⁸

Chairman Mao's teaching to 'be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty to win victory' means, in the last analysis to give emphasis to the human factor.⁵⁹

We have examined some of Kim Il-song's theoretical writings. We found that some of his proposals have become very effective ideological weapons in achieving "a self-supporting independent nation-state." However, our close examination of his theoretical writings revealed that much of his writings and assertions were in fact derivative of Mao Tse-tung's theories. Especially, Kim Il-song's Juche idea, which North Koreans believe is "a profound philosophical theory, a newly created Marxist-Leninist theory of our time," is simply a recitation of Mao's "On Practice," "On New Democracy," and his discovery of "human-centrality." Anyone who reads Mao Tse-tung's philosophies cannot fail to find

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

⁵⁸ "More on Promoting the Concept of 'Public'," in Peking Review, Vol. 46, November 11, 1966, p. 20.

⁵⁹ Peking Review, Vol. 12, March 17, 1967, p. 12.

that Kim Il-song's thinking is largely a recitation of Mao's thoughts. One other point that has to be made is that because of the cultural affiliation, the similarities of social conditions, and the timing of revolution between two countries, North Korea has been very susceptible to Mao's theories. Going back to our original assumption that North Korea's political culture may be projected in the speeches of the most powerful socialization agent, North Korea's political culture cannot be too different from China's as long as two most influential agents of socialization are teaching the same doctrines.

PART IV

NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER VIII

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF NORTH KOREA: POLITICS OF NORTH KOREA'S UNIFICATION POLICIES (1945-PRESENT)

The foremost foreign policy concerning North Korea is the reunification of Korea. At a cursory glance the reunification policies seem to appeal to "peaceful negotiations." However, a close examination of the same policies reveals that North Korea has been strongly committed to the strategy of "revolutionary struggle." In other words, even though its reunification policies appear to be oriented towards a "peaceful reunification," they are intensely committed to the revolutionary doctrines of Communist China. Before we set forth a specific hypothesis in analyzing North Korea's reunification policies, let us contrast the global strategies of Communist China with those of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the Western world.

Whereas Chinese foreign policy has expressed "revolutionary struggle," the recent Soviet global strategy has been changed into "peaceful coexistence" since the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. With the advent of the Soviet possession of nuclear capability and the successful deployment of the Soviet missiles in 1957, the balance of terror was established between the Soviet Union and the United States. Instead of using her nuclear capability, which the

Chinese claimed was superior to that of America, as a threat toward the United States, Khrushchev had become more responsive and accommodative toward the United States. According to Khrushchev's major doctrinal innovations, "inevitability of war" is no longer valid in the Communist doctrine. Using Lenin's suggestion of "compromise," Khrushchev argued that "peaceful coexistence" was a time-honored Leninist principle.¹

Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations originally were concerned with the dread of the nuclear war. According to him, Communism may not survive a world-wide nuclear war. A nuclear war means not only destruction of imperialism but collapse of the whole socialist civilization. Therefore, Khrushchev's new global strategy was to compel the imperialists to renounce war, by using the Soviet nuclear capability. Competition with the capitalist world is no longer through war. The Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence" was based on the assumption that the Soviets can deter capitalism by non-military means. The assumption goes on, advocating that the Soviet economic, political, and ideological strength will eventually bury the capitalist system, and the idea of the inevitability of war is an obsolete idea.²

¹For overall analysis of Sino-Soviet dispute, see Donald X. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1964). Also see "Statement of the Soviet Government," Peking Review, VI, No. 33, August 16, 1963.

²Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, op. cit., pp. 225-244.

Khrushchev's doctrinal innovation has been applied to national liberation movements. The so-called "people's war" poses the danger of being expanded into a local war, which in turn may be changed into a global nuclear war. The Soviet strategy is to avoid intervening in national liberation wars lest the United States also intervene. What was important to Khrushchev was to demonstrate to the world that the Soviet economic, political, and ideological strength is far superior to the Western world and that the final stage of world history is the fulfillment of the Marxist synthesis, that is, the Communist world. Consequently, the method of turning the trend of the present world is effective diplomacy and negotiation. To Khrushchev, the national liberation war is not absolutely inevitable. He believed in the parliamentary road to power in the national liberation movements. This is the Khrushchev's concept of "peaceful coexistence."³ Furthermore, one can see doctrinal continuity in Soviet foreign policy in the post-Khrushchev era up to the present time. One can expect the peaceful coexistence policy to continue. The Soviet-American relationship nowadays should be described as an "adversarial partnership" cemented by their nuclear parity and economic interdependence.⁴

³Ibid., pp. 245-276.

⁴For the post-Khrushchev foreign policy of the Soviet Union, see Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: 1962-1973 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975).

China, on the other hand, contended that the policy of "peaceful coexistence" was Soviet revisionism. She argued that peaceful coexistence was a deviation from the international Communist movement and a betrayal of the other socialist states which were involved in the fierce struggle against imperialism. China insisted that the Soviet Union had become more and more cooperative with the United States. Moreover, the changed trend of the Soviet policy was an abandonment of her protective role within the socialist camp.⁵ China still believed in the inevitability of war. She considered the successful deployment of the Soviet missiles to have tipped the balance of power favorably toward the socialist camp. Since it was the United States which intended to initiate a nuclear war, the Soviet nuclear superiority had to be effectively utilized to deter the imperialist aggressive design. In other words, the Soviet nuclear superiority had to be a means of threat instead of being that of accomodation toward the imperialists. In particular, China expected the Soviets to counter the United States as she pursued her national objective of liberating Taiwan. China expected the Soviets to use their nuclear superiority to push America out of Asia. In all these events, the Soviet Union disappointed China because the

⁵See "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," Peking Review, VI, No. 33 (August 16, 1963).

former's policy of "peaceful coexistence."⁶

Concerning the national liberation movement, China contends that colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism compose the most serious political issue in the contemporary world, particularly for the people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Peking believes that all countries and people subjected to oppression and aggression are now engaged in earth-shaking struggle against imperialism and old and new colonialism headed by the United States. China contends that now is the most critical moment for those oppressed people to break the yoke of imperialism. For this national liberation struggle, the Soviet Union has to protect the oppressed people in conducting their national liberation wars by using her superior nuclear capability.⁷ China argues that the Soviet Union should not fear a nuclear war because Communism will survive a nuclear war. Being fearful of the nuclear catastrophe, the Soviet Union has betrayed those oppressed people engaging in earth-shaking struggle against imperialism and has given up the international Communist movement. China believes that the temporary Soviet effort to seek international relaxation is a phony phenomenon and that this is not peaceful coexistence but capitulationist coexistence. She contends that the

⁶For the overall Chinese global strategy, see David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963) and also Zagoria, op. cit.

⁷See Ibid.

"parliamentary road to power" and "gradual realization of Marxist synthesis" are betrayals of Marxism-Leninism.⁸

In the light of the preceding analysis of the Sino-Soviet dispute, one can easily identify Soviet foreign policy with a "peaceful coexistence" or "peaceful negotiations" and Chinese policy with a "revolutionary struggle." Hence, our hypothesis for this chapter should read as follows: Even though North Korea's reunification policies, mainly based on the so-called Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron (the theory of independent national unification), seems to appeal to "peaceful negotiations," they were designed to stimulate a national liberation war in South Korea. In other words, the most important aspect of North Korea's reunification policies is not oriented, though appears to be, toward a "peaceful settlement and negotiation" but is intensely committed to the Chinese strategy of revolution. In order to fully understand the policies of North Korea's reunification policies, we should examine South Korea's reunification policies in contrast with North Korea's.

SOUTH KOREA'S REUNIFICATION POLICIES

Amitai Etzioni, a theorist of international integration of political communities, has set forth a model which

⁸See Ibid. and also "Statement of the Spokesman of the Chinese Government," Peking Review, op. cit.

is well applicable to the Korean case. It provides us with a convenient frame to look into the issue of Korean reunification. Etzioni calls "elitism" the process of integration in which one dominant unit coerces the others to unify and then imposes its own system. He calls "egalitarianism" the process of integration in which participation, contribution, and power are almost evenly distributed among participants. Etzioni further prescribes that the implementation of "egalitarianism" should use "normative means" such as appeal to common sentiments, tradition, and symbols.⁹

South Korea's reunification policies toward the North rely totally on "elitism." Until July 4, 1972 South Korea claimed that the country should be reunified under the authority of the United Nations.¹⁰ The origin of this claim traces back to the Cairo Conference during World War II. The question of Korean independence from Japan was first discussed at the Cairo Conference by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In their joint declaration, released on December 1, 1943, the Allies in the Pacific War stated:

⁹Amitai Etzioni, "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policies (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 349.

¹⁰Until July 4, 1972, South Korea proposed all-Korea elections to be held in both the North and the South on the principle of proportional representation under the supervision of the United Nations. South Korea dropped this proposal on July 4, 1972. South Korea's new approach will be discussed shortly.

The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.¹¹

The Cairo Declaration was reaffirmed at the Postdam Conference of July 1945 by the three powers--the United States, Great Britain, and Nationalist China. The Soviet Union had not joined the Allies in the Pacific War until August 8, 1945. The Soviet Union declared war against Japan only seven days before Japan surrendered. The Soviet Union also announced its adherence to the Cairo and Potsdam Declaration. Pursuant to a Potsdam decision it was decided that Soviet troops would accept the Japanese surrender north of the 38th parallel and that American troops would accept the surrender south of it. With this pretext of de-Japanization, the Soviet Union secured a foothold in Korean peninsula.

Kim Il-song came with the Red Army and obtained Soviet support. Soviet endorsement of Kim was confirmed after the collapse of the Moscow Plan. The foreign ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and China in their meeting at Moscow (known as the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow of December, 1945) concluded an agreement to govern the future development of a unified and independent Korean state. The agreement

¹¹George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 42.

stipulated that "following consultations with the Provisional Korean Government, the Joint Commission of the United States and the Soviet Union work out an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years."¹²

The Joint Conference held twice in Seoul ended in failure because the United States and the Soviet Union disagreed on the matter of choosing the consultative groups of Koreans. Whereas the Communists agreed with the Moscow Plan, the plan aroused an angry response from the nationalists. The Russians tried to exclude all the nationalist groups who opposed the Moscow Plan from consultation. The Americans insisted that the Russians denied the right of free speech.¹³ After the breakdown of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations, America proposed a new plan to hold a general election in Korea under the guidance of the United Nations. This new plan was accepted by the United Nations but rejected by the Soviet Union. With the Soviet refusal, the new plan of the United States was applied only to South Korea. The 38 degree north latitude hardened all phases of life into two Koreas. Meantime, Kim Il-song was busy

¹²Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1030.

¹³McCune, Korea Today, op. cit., pp. 61-71. See also McCune's "Korea: The First Year of Liberation," in Pacific Affairs, March, 1947, pp. 3-17, "Post-War Government and Politics of Korea," in the Journal of Politics, November, 1947, pp. 605-623.

consolidating his power in the North.¹⁴

As a legitimate child of the United Nations as such, South Korea could not morally separate her reunification policies from the United Nations. The main themes which had run through every proposal of South Korea's reunification policies before July 4, 1972 can be summarized as follows: (1) to accept the authority of the United Nations to settle the questions of national reunification; (2) a U.N.-supervised general election; (3) "proportional representation;" and (4) freedom of speech and movement, universal suffrage, and secret ballot.¹⁵ In order to implement this strongly anti-Communist formula, President Syngman Rhee had adopted the "March-North" policy and insisted that South Korea, with help from the United Nations, should force North Korea to accept the authority of the United Nations.

Because of the emphasis on his March-North policy, President Rhee had neglected national economy. He insisted that the national economic effort should be directed toward (1) maintaining strong military strength that may be used to "march" to the North, and (2) improving private consumption

¹⁴For Kim's rise to power, see Chapter II.

¹⁵Shin Tai Whan, "Prospect for Territorial Unification, I and II," D.R.P. Bulletin, January and February, 1970, pp. 6-7 and pp. 9-10. Shin was Minister of National Unification when he wrote the article. The story of the Korean War will not be discussed in this paper. However, this formula was applied during the Korean War (1950-1953). President Syngman Rhee strongly opposed the cease fire so that he could apply this formula to the unified Korea.

level within the limits of domestic production and available foreign assistance.¹⁶ Consequently, President Rhee neglected investment and production and encouraged the maximization of foreign assistance. During the period of 1957-1961, the total amount of American assistance amounted to \$1,161 million. Out of this amount, \$917.6 million was used for commodity imports. Only \$213.9 million was used for project assistance. Furthermore, the foodstuffs provided by the U.S. Public Law 480 amounted to \$257.1 million. In brief, President Rhee had no interest in economic development to establish a self-sufficient national economy.

A more realistic policy was begun by the government of President Park Chung Hee in the 1960's. Even though the above formula of national reunification had remained essentially intact until July 4, 1972, President Park dropped the slogan of "March-North" and switched to a policy of what we may call "Win the North." He argued that without a substantially superior economy there was no way to achieve unification. Therefore, in his view, the goal of national reunification should be shelved until the goal of economic

¹⁶Yet, the military preparedness of South Korea was much inferior to North Korea before the outbreak of the Korean War. It appears that President Rhee was completely not aware that national economy was an important element of national power. One should compare President Rhee's with President Park Chung Hee's economic policy. This will be discussed shortly. For President Rhee's policy in the 1950's, see W. D. Reeve, The Republic of Korea: A Political and Economic Study (New York:

development has been achieved.¹⁷ In other words, he insisted that his country should built its national strength so that "our economy, our freedom, and our democracy will overflow into North Korea, thus paving the path to unification."¹⁸ Accordingly, throughout the 1960's, South Korea was primarily preoccupied with economic development. President Park simply challenged North Korea to a "well-meaning competition; that is, a competition in development, construction, and creation in which to prove which of the two systems, democracy or Communism, can bring about higher living standards to the people...?"¹⁹ According to the Park regime's schedule of foreign policy initiatives, a practical probe into a realistic approach to national reunification would begin by 1976 and the regime had completed the Third Five Year Economic Plan.

This initiative, which President Park Chung Hee had originally scheduled to begin after 1976, came much earlier on July 4, 1972. This sudden change of plans was primarily due to the change in the general Asian political situation

¹⁷ See the table in examination of Economic and Technical Assistance Program for Korea, International Cooperation Administration, Department of State: Fiscal Years 1957-1961 by the Comptroller General of the United States, September 1962, Report to the Congress of the United States, p.93.

¹⁸ Taetongnyong yondu kyoso haesol, 1967 (Commentaries on the President's New Year Message, 1967) (Seoul, 1967), p. 220.

¹⁹ For the text of speech, see Dong-a Ilbo, August 15, 1970.

produced by President Nixon's visit to Peking. South Korea began to fear that she would be left as a deserted child.²⁰ More important, by now South Korea had begun to feel a certain confidence in her national strength. According to reports of the U.S. General Accounting Office, the South Korean economy in the 1960's was the third fastest-growing economy in the post-war period after Israel and Japan.²¹ While the United Nations set a target for economic growth of developing nations at an annual rate of 5% in the 1960's, South Korea achieved an average growth rate of 8.3% during its First Plan (1962-1966), 11.4% during the Second Plan (1966-1971) and 8.6% during the Third Plan (1972-1976), in contrast to 3.3% during President Rhee's regime. The GNP grew about four times from \$2,300 million in 1960, \$9,500 million in 1973 to \$24,811 million in 1976. Per capita national income rose a multiple of 3.5 from \$90 in 1960 to \$320 in 1973 and \$692 in 1976.²² Exports during the 1962-1972 period rose at an annual average rate of 40%. And

²⁰For the new Asian political situation and the Korean problems, see Soon Sung Cho, "The Changing Pattern of Asian International Relations: Prospects for the Unification of Korea," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1973.

²¹Report to the Congress, U.S. Assistance for the Economic Development of the Republic of Korea, by the Comptroller General of the United States, No. 31384, p. 8.

²²Korea Annual (Seoul, 1972) and ROK Economic Planning Board, Handbook of Korean Economy, 1977 (Seoul, 1977); Dong-a Ilbo, November 9, 1977.

this rate jumped to 80% in 1973 and 190% in 1976, raising exports to an estimated \$3,100 million and \$7,815 million respectively, compared with the 1961 base of \$41 million. The South Korean achievements prompted a consensus among Western economic experts that Korea's economic development was an "economic miracle." With this national strength South Korea began to feel that it is ready to meet a test of its cohesion of its social and political system, and of its ability to maintain unity and stability. The Park regime, expressing confidence in the existing government, systems, and institutions, had concluded that it must meet the challenge from the North in terms of political, economic, and ideological power. In other words, South Korea felt that she was ready to achieve unification with the North on its terms.

As the architect of the above-mentioned economic development, President Park Chung Hee must have had confidence in handling militant North Korean leaders. He began secret, high-level political contacts with Pyongyang, which led to adoption of the July 4th Joint Communique of 1972 embodying the three principles of national reunification: (1) an independent solution of the reunification problem free from interference by "outside force," (2) a peaceful approach to the problem, and (3) the transcending of differences in ideas, ideologies and systems in order to

achieve a national unity.²³ The July 4th Joint Communique was followed by creation of several structural devices. Both governments agreed to install a direct "hot line" linking the two capitals. The two states decided to allow their respective Red Cross organizations to begin talks to facilitate reunions of divided families. The implementation of these agreements and other related matters was to be entrusted to a new North-South Coordinating Committee co-chaired by two high-ranking officials of each side. The development of this "dialogue" will be discussed shortly.

President Park's peace offensive has continued ever since then.²⁴ On June 23, 1973, he proposed that South Korea and North Korea both be admitted to the United Nations. He argued that if the South and the North are

²³For an English text of the Communique, see Confrontation With Dialogue: ROK Initiates Easing Korean Tensions (Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, July 1972, Policy Series No. 5), pp. 4-6.

²⁴One important political development in connection with "the south-north dialogue" is that on November 21, 1972, President Park overthrew the Western style of democracy and restructured the whole governmental process in order to "revitalize Korean democracy and broaden the way to peaceful unification." The Revitalizing Reforms gave overwhelming power to the executive and removed any restrictions on President Park's tenure. It appears that the President needed a regimented bureaucracy and a moral consensus to cope with the needs of the newly developing confrontation with the North. Most criticisms, however, especially in the Western World, were that the President were trying to prolong his power. See the complete text and speech in Dong-a Ilbo, October 27, 1972.

admitted together, it would not only "contribute to easing tensions on the Korean peninsula and restoring trust as one nation, but also served to promote world peace."²⁵ On January 18, 1974, President Park proposed a South-North Non-Aggression Agreement, through which he expressed his belief that "peace is prerequisite to national unification."²⁶ On June 23, 1978, he called for a North-South Coordinating Council for Economic Cooperation in which civilian representatives from both sides would discuss economic exchanges and technical cooperation.²⁷

There is little doubt that South Korea's new reunification policies are oriented toward peaceful means. In the July 4th Joint Communique, South Korea gave up her long-standing policy that Korean reunification should be achieved through a general election under the supervision of the United Nations. She decided to cope with North Korea without "external imposition or interference." Yet, one cannot fail to notice that Seoul's new unification policy is a continuation of "elitism" according to Etzioni's model. The reasons for this policy of "elitism will be discussed below.

South Korea insists that the country should be

²⁵ Park Chung Hee, Toward Peaceful Unification: Selected Speeches by President Park Chung Hee, English version (Seoul, 1976), p. 83.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 97.

²⁷ Dong-a Ilbo, June 24, 1978.

reunified on its own terms. At the negotiating tables of the "South-North Coordinating Committee" and the "Red Cross talks," South Korea has applied the so-called "spill-over" methods formulated by David Mitrany.²⁸ Contrary to North Korea's radical approach (which will be discussed shortly), South Korea has adhered to "the principle of finding practical solutions to easy non-political problems first and then proceed to more complex and politically involved questions in a step-by-step fashion as mutual trust and confidence were built between the two sides."²⁹ South Korea has tried to open up North Korea's closed society in the hope of undermining the rigid discipline of the Communist rule in North Korea.

In analyzing South Korea's unification policy from a sociological perspective, it is clear that South Korea has been using several structural devices developed by the Joint Communique of 1972, such as the "South-North Coordinating Committee," the "hot line" and the "Red Cross talks" as agencies of political socialization. South Korea has been trying to extend her methods of indirect socialization to the people in a closed society. The South Koreans believe that the North Koreans are completely shut off from the reality of the world and live in a state of false consciousness.

²⁸David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organization," International Affairs, XXIV (July, 1948), p. 359.

²⁹Korea Times, June 24, 1973.

They believe that North Korea should be admitted to the United Nations along with South Korea, and that Pyongyang should grasp the reality of the world and learn how to behave in international community. South Korea has been trying to appeal to the human instinct, which is essentially inclined toward freedom, material abundance, individualism, and human dignity. Seoul has no intention of weakening her anti-communist posture despite her responsive and accommodative attitude. It is clear by now that South Korea has been trying to flush her power of freedom, material abundance, and democracy into North Korean society. Seoul has been trying to create a discontinuity in the North Korean political culture. She might have estimated that the North Korean value system will be undermined when the populace realizes that what they learned from the regime is incongruent with reality. In short, the Park regime believes that the initial, weak integrated structures are an excellent means for socializing the North Korean populace. One can clearly see South Korea's "elitism" in her efforts to unify the two Koreas.

NORTH KOREA'S REUNIFICATION POLICIES

Applying Etzioni's model again, North Korea may appear to appeal to "egalitarianism." But a close examination of Kim Il-song's so-called Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron (the theory of independent national unification) will reveal

that North Korea also relies on "elitism." Kim's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron was formulated in a speech of August 15, 1960, commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of Korean independence from Japanese rule. The new unification proposal was different from the previous unification policies in many respects. In order to properly understand Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron, it is necessary to review the previous unification policies and contrast with each other.

In the beginning of the regime, until the end of the Korean war in 1953, North Korea adopted military campaign. North Korea endorsed military aggression as a means to unify the country. While the Korean War will not be examined in this study, North Korea's military campaign should be considered as a counterpart to Syngman Rhee's March-North policy in terms of purpose and style. Upon failure of military campaign, Pyongyang switched to "peaceful unification through neutral nations' supervision." She refused to accept the moral authority and competence of the United Nations to peacefully deal with Korean unification, because the latter was a belligerent party in the Korean War. This second phase of North Korea's unification policies covers the period between 1953 and 1960. The major content and method of the second phase can be summarized as follows. North Korea proposed (1) general

elections for a unified All-Korean National Assembly under the supervision by "a neutral nations' commission," (2) the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korea, and (3) the organization of an All-Korean Commission, composed of an "equal" number of representatives from North and South Korea to make the necessary preparations for these elections.³⁰

The third and current phase of North Korea's unification policies (1960-present) is characterized by the so-called "Confederation Plan." Based mainly on Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron, it contains several important changes from his previous "peaceful unification plan." Dropping the idea of inviting "neutral nations' committee" to supervise general elections, he proposed that the question of national unification should be an internal affair of Korean people, in which no outside force was permitted to interfere. He argued that the Korean question must be settled by Koreans themselves, and that foreigners should have nothing to do with the internal affairs of the country. Since 1960, North Korea has rejected not only the authority of the United Nations but also any other international organizations that might work to settle the question of the unification of Korea. Most important, this new plan has called for the establishment of a "confederated government"

³⁰ U.S. Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification 1943-1960 (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 158-159.

by combining the existing North and South Korean governments.³¹ Unlike a coalition government, under this confederation the existing political systems in the North and South would maintain autonomous and independent functions, while the "confederated government" would handle such common state functions as foreign relations, currency, postal service, and cultural affairs. In other words, neither member of the "confederated government" could impose its own system upon the other. The theme which runs through this new plan can be summarized as follows: (1) withdrawal of all the foreign troops from the Korean peninsula, (2) gradual reduction of the armed forces in both sides and to renounce the means of war in achieving national unification, (3) establishment of a North-South Confederate, a Supreme National Committee, which would be organized by "an equal number" of representatives from each side and would deal with various common problems, and (4) eventually, free democratic North-South general elections. Later Kim Il-song proposed a new name for the reunified country, the "Confederate Republic of Koryo."³² Moreover, in proposing this new

³¹For the complete text of Kim Il-song's unification policy, see Kim Il-song, "On the Unification of Korea" in Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea, English edition (New York, 1971), p. 66.

³²Nodong Shinmun, June 24, 1973 or The People's Korea, June 27, 1973. Kim Il-song coined this name as a counter-proposal to President Park's proposal of June 23, 1973 for the simultaneous admission of North and South Korea to the United Nations. He said that North and South Korea should enter the world body not as two separate entities but as "one state under the name of the Confederate Republic of Koryo."

plan, he stressed economic and cultural exchanges between the North and the South under the confederated government. He called for the exchange of scientific, artistic, athletic, cultural, and other non-political groups. This is Kim's so-called Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron. It embodies the Juche principle.

At a cursory glance, one may argue that Kim's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron is appealing to the "egalitarianism" of Etzioni's model and sounds reasonable and workable for the reunification of Korea. He may further contend that Pyongyang is seriously interested in "peaceful negotiation" with Seoul. It may even be argued that North Korea is oriented toward "peaceful coexistence" or "peaceful settlement" of international disputes in accordance with Soviet foreign policy. However, a close examination of Kim's new plan will show that his real intentions are oriented toward "elitism." His Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron is designed to arouse national liberation war in South Korea in order to unify the whole peninsula under Communist rule.

Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron has been used as a major instrument in his propaganda campaign rather than as a serious plan for national reunification. Certainly the words "Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron" (national independent reunification) have greater appeal to the minds of the South Korean students, intellectuals, and other social groups than "unification under supervision." Kim

might have coined these words immediately after the April 1960 student-led revolution in South Korea.³³ Since then, he has recognized that students and intellectuals are the most futile grounds for a South Korean revolution. Needing an emotional appeal to exploit the nationalist spirit of South Korean students and intellectuals, he might have estimated that since "U.S. imperialism is the most hostile foreign enemy blocking national reunification," the words Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron would arouse animosity among students and intellectuals toward American troops in South Korea. Indeed, many South Korean students were intoxicated with this slogan after the April revolution and organized National Independent Unification Association in 1960. Popular support for independent and peaceful reunification increased rapidly until the military coup of May 16, 1961.

Secondly, one should note that when Kim Il-song presented his formula of the Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron as summarized above, he was silent on the matter of the procedure for "democratic" general elections. "Democratic" logically means "one man, one vote" in general elections. However, the population of the North is only one-half that of the South. Rather than propose proportional representation, Kim advocated that a Supreme National Committee should be organized with "an equal number" of representatives from

³³ Kim gave his speech on Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron on August 15, 1960.

each side and that it would deal with various problems. He implied that the procedure of unification as well as election laws for general elections would first be discussed in this committee. In that case, North Korea can keep its veto power intact.³⁴ It means that the only method of unification, reasonable and workable to Kim Il-song, is one which would guarantee the existing Communist system in the North.

Viewed from sociological perspective, it is evident that North Korea has been trying to extend direct influence on the socialization of students and intellectuals in South Korea.³⁵ Kim's regime has been trying to apply a more radical method of political indoctrination to the South Korean people, a method based upon ideological appeal. In other words, Pyongyang is not so much interested in negotiation or compromise with Seoul as in stimulating a national liberation movement in the South. No wonder North Korea welcomed the July 4th Joint Communiqué of 1972.

The Northern leaders, just like their counterparts in the South, perceived several structural devices developed by the Joint Communiqué, such as the "South-North

³⁴For an exceptionally good insight into this matter, see Soon Sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, No. 19 (1966-1967). Whereas Professor Cho has already identified Kim Il-song's real intentions with a national liberation movement, this author looks at Kim's policy in terms of Chinese revolutionary doctrine.

³⁵See Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization (Boston: Little-Brown, 1969).

Coordinating Committee," the "hot line" and the "Red Cross talks," as excellent vehicles of political socialization. Kim's lieutenants revealed their true intentions during the process of the Red Cross talks and the "South-North Coordinating Committee" meetings. Despite the fact that the Red Cross talks were supposedly devoted to strictly humanitarian issues such as the family reunion project, exchange of visits between separate families, and exchange of mail, the North Korean chief delegate, in the meeting held at Seoul on September 13, 1972, proposed that "the objectives of the conference should not only be humanitarian ones but also directly linked with the great task of facilitating the unification of the nation."³⁶ In a series of meetings, North Koreans often publically extolled the leadership of Kim Il-song and his philosophy of Juche.³⁷ North Koreans insisted that observers from "various social organizations" of both Koreas be invited to the Red Cross meeting³⁸ and that the two sides exchange "explanation and propaganda personnel" to carry out the projected family contacts. Most important, at the meeting of Red Cross talks held in Pyongyang on July 11, 1973, North Koreans demanded that South Korea must discard its anti-Communist laws "to

³⁶The New York Times, September 13, 1973.

³⁷Ibid., August 4, 13, 1972.

³⁸Ibid., July 27, 1972.

guarantee political freedom to the people of all strata in North and South."³⁹

During the process of the "South-North Coordinating Committee," whereas South Korea suggested that two sides establish mutual trust by settling non-political problems such as social, cultural, and economic exchanges, North Korea wanted South Korea to sign a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, which ended in a truce twenty years ago. North Korea's peace treaty is a counter-proposal to President Park's non-aggression pact of January 18, 1974. One major difference between the two is that the former clearly includes a provision for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea. North Korea demanded that the U.S. troops in South Korea withdraw and that both North and South Korea reduce armed forces.⁴⁰ Most important, North Korea urged a "wide-ranging political exchange between political parties, social organizations and individual persons of the North and South" and an arrangement of "economic, cultural and social exchanges and joint cooperative projects."⁴¹ One can clearly see North Korea's true intentions during these dialogues. Pyongyang has been trying to flush her economic, political and ideological

³⁹ Ibid., October 24, 1972. Pyongyang, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in English, July 12, 1973.

⁴⁰ The New York Times, June 13, 1973.

⁴¹ Ibid., November 4, 1972.

power into the South and to stimulate a national liberation uprising. Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron should be considered as part of the strategy and tactic of "revolutionary struggle." In short, North Korea has perceived the new and weak integrated structures as excellent vehicles for socializing the South Korean people.

The South-North "dialogue" virtually ended in August 1973, although the symbolic vice-chairmen's meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee continued to meet intermittently until March 1975 and the symbolic "working-level meetings" of the Red Cross talks lasted until December 1976. There is little doubt that North Korea unilaterally suspended the "dialogue." Pyongyang insisted on several preconditions for resuming the "dialogue" which were totally unacceptable to Seoul. They are: (1) South Korea should renounce its foreign policy of June 23, 1973 (see p.298), (2) South Korea should discard her anti-Communist law and release all the prisoners jailed for violations of the same law; and (3) American troops should withdraw from South Korea. Pyongyang certainly knows that Seoul will never accept these terms. Clearly, North Korea is not interested in the continuation of the dialogue. North Korea must realize that Kim's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron has little appeal to South Koreans because of their prospects, stability, and democracy. One cannot help but wonder what future strategy and tactics Kim will favor in

order to promote revolution in the South.

In summary, this chapter has demonstrated that North Korea's foreign policy has been intensely committed to the revolutionary doctrines of Communist China. We have compared the revolutionary doctrines of Communist China with the Soviet policy of "peaceful coexistence." We have examined North Korea's reunification efforts, her important foreign policy. At a glance, Pyongyang appeared to be oriented toward the Soviet foreign policy. However, our close examination revealed that North Korea's true intentions were to arouse national liberation war in the South. Kim Il-song has constantly reiterated that North Korea should be constructed as a solid democratic base for a South Korean revolution. He has urged the North to aid the South Korean people to force the withdrawal of American imperialism by fomenting social revolution within the South until the North can unify the country by liberating South Korea.⁴² Kim Il-song's Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron was designed to serve this strategy, not to negotiate a peaceful unification.

North Korea revealed its intentions regarding unification during the South-North dialogue between 1972 and

⁴²For Kim Il-song's policies of national unification, see Kim Il-song, Nam Choson hyokmyong kwa chokuk tongil e daehayo (On Revolution in South Korea and National Unification) (Pyongyang: Choson rodongdang chulpansa, 1969), pp. 391-409.

1976. Pyongyang's unification policy remains strongly committed to the strategy of "revolutionary struggle." In short, North Korea's foreign policy is largely oriented toward the Chinese style and purpose.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, we have traced the historical background of the early Korean Communist movement and its affiliation with the Soviet Union. Despite the image of North Korea as being a "Soviet Satellite" created in the beginning of the regime and hence the imagined connection between the early Korean Communists and the Soviet Union via the Comintern, we found out that the neglect and indifference of the Soviet Union towards the early Korean Communists contributed to the latter's failure. The Soviet Union was primarily interested in the early Korean Communist movement as an anti-Japanese force which could be used to further her own national security, and thus, her ties with the early Communists were designed to encourage a broad united front among Koreans to counter Japanese imperialism in the Far East. The early Korean Communist movement was rarely affiliated with the Soviet Union. The notion of the Korean Communists' integration with the Soviet Union is grossly exaggerated.

In contrast to many Western accounts, this study has demonstrated that Kim Il-song's own revolutionary background was conspicuously linked with the Chinese Communists. His thinking was molded and hardened during his

revolutionary life in Manchuria. His affiliation with the Soviet Union at the beginning of the regime has been unduly highlighted ever since then. Kim has been known in the western world as a Soviet-trained dictator and a faithful disciple of Stalin. As we have explained, however, Kim's affiliation with the Soviet Union was relatively insignificant in comparison with a decade of his revolutionary life in Manchuria under the overall direction of the Chinese Communist Party. There are undoubtedly several similarities between Stalin's and Kim Il-song's strategy and tactics in their drive to power. Yet, it is misleading to assume that Kim adopted Stalin's method in every socioeconomic program in North Korea simply because of his image of Stalin during his power struggle.

The North Korean steps during the transitional period followed the Chinese steps even though the regime was under the Soviet control system during its initial years. In particular, North Korea adopted the politics of "New Democracy" in its overall transitional phases to socialist construction. The most important factor that explains adoption of the "New Democracy" is the similarity of Korean social conditions to those of the Chinese.

To be specific, we have examined the process of formation of the party and government structure in North Korea which allowed the participation of petty-bourgeois capitalists and intellectuals. The national bourgeoisie economic

activities were allowed, and private property was legalized during the transitional period. Once the petty-bourgeois classes had participated in the political life they were gradually educated and molded to support the proletarian classes. Economically, the gradual transformation through the cooperative economy into the socialist economy was adopted during the transitional period of North Korea. The immaturity of class-consciousness among people and the lack of infrastructure in economic life, which were inherited from colonial status, explains and rationalizes the politics of "New Democracy." As we have examined, all these practices were far removed from early Soviet practices.

Since socialist construction began in 1956, North Korean modernization, just as the Chinese, has been characterized by the decisive role played by human consciousness. Because of the lack of technical infrastructure and capital, North Korea, as in China, needed "a program devised by determined have-nots who envisioned a shortcut on the path to modernity." In other words, since the regime had to rely heavily on regimented manpower, priority was given to the relations of production over productive forces. Consequently, emphasis was given to intensive political campaigns to arouse enthusiasm among the people. In particular, Pyongyang regime has used the method of "mass-line" in economic management, economic planning, and agricultural management. The "mass-line" has reached every element of the society.

The politics of "New Democracy" and "mass-line" have necessitated intensive political campaigns, which have significantly affected the ideological thinking of North Koreans. Our content analysis found that the North Korean political culture should be categorized as the "culture of revolutionary struggle" which is similar to the political culture of China. In other words, the North Korean political culture is molded by continuous, painstaking political campaigns. The individual political self is politically conscious to a high degree due to intensive political socialization. "Criticism," "self-criticism," and "thought reform" are common practices of the regime's efforts to imbue the people with the "thought of Kim Il-song." The method of modernization heavily relies on moral and psychological incentives rather than material incentives as the major stimulus for production. Furthermore, it appears that not only the method of modernization but also various operations of political system relies on politically conscious manpower. The promotion of specialties and expertise appears to be a secondary problem. The "thought of Kim Il-song" allegedly solves all problems.

The "thought of Kim Il-song" practically makes and shapes North Korean political culture. North Koreans claim that Kim Il-song's Juche idea is the "newly created Marxist-Leninist theory of our time." To quote Hwang Jang-yop's statement again, "the great leader Comrade Kim Il-song

was the first in history to give a scientific account of the position and role of man in the world and created a Juche-based scientific, revolutionary world outlook regarding man as the central-factor." A careful analysis of Kim Il-song's Juche principle in contrast with Mao Tse-tung's writings clearly reveals that the Juche idea is simply a recitation of Mao's ideas presented in his "On Practice," "On New Democracy," and his discovery of "human-centrality." Kim Il-song's thoughts are largely based upon those of Mao Tse-tung. In short, Kim's innovation or contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory is simply non-existent.

Finally, North Korea's foreign policy also reflects Pyongyang's imitation of Peking's thinking and policies. Whereas the Soviet Union believes in "peaceful coexistence" with the West, Chinese foreign policy has always expressed "revolutionary struggle." The most important foreign policy of North Korea is the Korean unification policies, mainly based upon Kim Il-song's so-called Min-jok-ja-ju-tong-il-ron. Although it seems to appeal to "peaceful negotiations," it was designed to stimulate a national liberation war in South Korea. While it appears to support "peaceful settlement and negotiation," it is in fact intensely committed to China's revolutionary doctrine.

In examining the historical development of Korean Communism and North Korean politics since the establishment of the new regime, we have raised the question of whether

to consider North Korea as typifying Asian Communism or Western Communism. We have used the theoretical framework of the actual programs as the major denominator in this study. The style of leadership, political socialization, and political culture have been examined. With respect to the style of leadership, it appears that a metamorphosis may have taken place in Kim Il-song's style of leadership since 1950. In view of the actual modernization programs, we may conclude that North Korea belongs to Asian Communism instead of Western Communism. We may possibly say that North Korea has been following the Chinese steps, and Kim Il-song can be considered as a disciple of Mao Tse-tung.

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APPENDIX A

THE SELECTED SPEECHES OF KIM IL-SONG
FOR CONTENT-ANALYSIS

APPENDIX A

THE SELECTED SPEECHES OF KIM IL-SONG
FOR CONTENT-ANALYSIS

<u>Speech Number</u>	<u>Speech</u>
1	THE MAIN THING IN PARTY WORK IS TO EDUCATE, REMOULD AND UNITE ALL PEOPLE (Speech Delivered at the General Membership Meeting of the Party Organization of Rihyon-ri, Sungho District, Pyongyang City, January 23, 1961), <u>Selected Works of Kim Il-song</u> , Vol. 3, p. 1.
2	ON THE DUTY OF EDUCATIONAL WORKERS IN THE RAISING OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE (Speech Delibered at a National Conference of Active Educational Workers, April 25, 1961), <u>Selected Works of Kim Il-song</u> , Vol. 3, p. 39.
3	REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE FOURTH CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA: CONSOLIDATION OF THE STATE AND SOCIAL SYSTEM (September 11, 1961), <u>Selected Works of Kim Il-song</u> , Vol. 3, p. 100.
4	DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE AND CULTURE (September 11, 1961), <u>Selected Works of Kim Il-song</u> , Vol. 3, p. 125.
5	FOR THE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF THE COAL INDUSTRY: ON THOROUGHLY ESTABLISHING STRICT DISCIPLINE AND ORDER (Concluding Speech at a Meeting with the Party Nuclei of the Anju Coal Mine, December 23, 1961), <u>Selected Works of Kim Il-song</u> , Vol. 3, p. 245.
6	FUNCTIONARIES IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE SHOULD ACQUIRE THE TRAITS OF A REVOLUTIONARY AND IMPROVE THEIR GUIDANCE OF THE RURAL ECONOMY: ON ACQUIRING THE COMMUNIST TRAITS OF A REVOLUTIONARY (Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Management Personnel of Agricultural Co-operatives in the Haeju Area of South Hwanghae Province, February 1, 1962), <u>Selected Works of Kim Il-song</u> , Vol. 3, p. 256.

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- 7 ON IMPROVING AND STRENGTHENING ORGANIZATIONAL AND IDEOLOGICAL WORK OF THE PARTY: ON THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN THE COUNTRYSIDE (Concluding Speech at the Third Enlarged Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, March 8, 1962), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 3, p. 311.
- 8 LET US RADICALLY IMPROVE THE PEOPLE'S LIVING STANDARDS BY STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE COUNTY AND FURTHER DEVELOPING LOCAL INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE: ON STRENGTHENING PARTY WORK (Concluding Speech at the Changsong Joint Conference of Local Party and Economic Functionaries, August 8, 1962), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 3, p. 363.
- 9 ON FURTHER DEVELOPING THE TAEAN WORK SYSTEM (Speech at the Enlarged Meeting of the Party Committee of the Taean Electrical Machinery Plant, November 9, 1962), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 3, p. 423.
- 10 ON FURTHER STRENGTHENING AND DEVELOPING THE COUNTY CO-OPERATIVE FARM MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES (Speech Delivered at a Consultative Meeting of Party Functionaries and Agricultural Workers of South Pyongan Province, November 13, 1962), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 3, p. 441.
- 11 ON IMPROVING INSTRUCTION AND EDUCATION AT UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (EXCERPT) (Concluding Speech at the Meeting of the Heads of Departments on the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, April 18, 1963), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 345.
- 12 ON STRENGTHENING EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION AT UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (April 18, 1963), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 347.
- 13 TASKS OF THE PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN RYANGGANG PROVINCE: ON AGRICULTURE (Concluding Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Ryanggang Provincial Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, August 16, 1963), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 3, p. 554.
- 14 ON PARTY WORK (August 16, 1963), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 3, p. 590.

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- 15 ON ENHANCING THE ROLE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES TO MEET THE PRESENT DEMANDS OF OUR REVOLUTION (Talk with the Department of Science and Education of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, December 30, 1963), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 378.
- 16 ON GIVING PRIORITY TO POLITICAL WORK AND FOLLOWING THE MASS LINE IN THE FIELD OF TRANSPORT (Speech Delivered at a Consultative Meeting of Functionaries in the Field of Transport, January 22, 1964), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 14.
- 17 THESES ON THE SOCIALIST RURAL QUESTION IN OUR COUNTRY: THE TECHNICAL, CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE (Adopted at the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, February 25, 1964), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 36.
- 18 ON THE TASKS OF THE LEAGUE OF SOCIALIST WORKING YOUTH (Speech Delivered at the Fifth Congress of the Democratic Youth League of Korea, May 15, 1964), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 104.
- 19 ON IMPROVING AND STRENGTHENING THE WORK OF THE WORKING PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATIONS: ON THE TASKS OF THE UNION OF AGRICULTURAL WORKING PEOPLE (Concluding Speech Delivered at the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, June 26, 1964), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 133.
- 20 ON ENHANCING THE PARTY SPIRIT, CLASS SPIRIT AND POPULAR SPIRIT OF LEADING FUNCTIONARIES AND IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: ON FURTHER TEMPERING THE PARTY SPIRIT OF LEADING ECONOMIC WORKERS AND IMPROVING THEIR METHOD OF WORK (Concluding Speech Delivered at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, December 19, 1964), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 163.
- 21 ON IMPROVING HIGHER EDUCATION (EXCERPT): ON FIRMLY ESTABLISHING JUCHE IN EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHES (Speech at the General Membership Meeting of the Party Organization of the Ministry of Higher Education, February 23, 1965), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 459.

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- 22 ON IMPROVING THE TRAINING OF CADRES (February 23, 1965), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 472.
- 23 TO GIVE FULL PLAY TO THE GREAT VITALITY OF THE UNIFIED AND DETAILED PLANNING OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY: ON THE ORIENTATION FOR DRAWING UP THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAN FOR NEXT YEAR (Speech Delivered at a General Meeting of the Party Organization of the State Planning Commission, September 23, 1965), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 289.
- 24 ON SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE SOUTH KOREAN REVOLUTION (EXCERPT): ON THE QUESTIONS OF FIRMLY ESTABLISHING JUCHE AND IMPLEMENTING THE MASS LINE (Lecture at the "Ali Archam" Academy of Social Sciences of Indonesia, April 14, 1965), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 483.
- 25 CONCLUDING SPEECH AT THE 11TH PLENARY MEETING OF THE FOURTH CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA (EXCERPT): ON IMPROVING HIGHER EDUCATION AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH WORK (July 1, 1965), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 496.
- 26 THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF OUR PARTY (EXCERPT): ON THE ACCELERATION OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION AND THE STRENGTHENING OF OUR REVOLUTIONARY BASE (Report to the Conference of the Workers' Party of Korea, October 5, 1966), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 567.
- 27 LET US DEVELOP REVOLUTIONARY FINE ARTS: NATIONAL IN FORM AND SOCIALIST IN CONTENT (Talk with Workers in the Fine Arts on the Occasion of the Ninth National Art Exhibition, October 16, 1966), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 1, p. 602.
- 28 ON THE ELIMINATION OF FORMALISM AND BUREAUCRACY IN PARTY WORK AND THE REVOLUTIONIZATION OF FUNCTIONARIES: ON INTENSIFYING THE IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION AND REVOLUTIONIZING FUNCTIONARIES (Speech to Functionaries of the Departments of Organizational Leadership and Propaganda and Agitation, Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, October 18, 1966), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 433.

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- 29 ON SOME PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE FORMALISM AND BUREAUCRACY IN PARTY WORK AND REVOLUTIONIZE THE FUNCTIONARIES (October 18, 1966), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 442.
- 30 THE COMMUNIST EDUCATION AND UPBRINGING OF CHILDREN IS AN HONOURABLE REVOLUTIONARY DUTY OF NURSERY SCHOOL AND KINDERGARTEN TEACHERS (Address to the National Congress of Nursery School and Kindergarten Teachers, October 20, 1966), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 459.
- 31 ON REVOLUTIONIZING THE PEASANTS AND CARRYING THROUGH THE PARTY CONFERENCE DECISIONS IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE: ON REVOLUTIONIZING AND WORKING-CLASSIZING THE PEASANTS (Speech Delibered at a National Congress of Agricultural Functionaries, February 2, 1967), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 473.
- 32 ON THE 10-POINT TASKS FOR GUIDING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND FOR MANAGING THE CO-OPERATIVE FARMS (February 2, 1967), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 487.
- 33 FOR A GREAT REVOLUTIONARY UPSURGE IN THE PRESENT ECONOMIC WORK AND FOR THE IMPROVEMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF LABOUR ADMINISTRATION: ON IMPROVING AND STRENGTHENING LABOUR ADMINISTRATION (Concluding Speech Delivered at the 16th Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, July 3, 1967), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 510.
- 34 LET US EMBODY THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT OF INDEPENDENCE, SELF-SUSTENANCE AND SELF-DEFENCE MORE THOROUGHLY IN ALL FIELDS OF STATE ACTIVITY (Political Programme of the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Announced at the First Session of the Fourth Supreme People's Assembly of the D.P.R.K., December 16, 1967), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 4, p. 546.
- 35 ON THE QUESTION OF THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT (Speech Delivered to Party Ideological Workers, May 25, 1967), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 1.

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- 36 LET US DEVELOP THE CHOLLIMA WORKTEAM MOVEMENT IN DEPTH, A GREAT IMPETUS TO SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION (Speech Delibered at the Second National Meeting of the Vanguarders in the Chollima Workteam Movement, May 11, 1968), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 101.
- 37 ON CORRECTLY IMPLEMENTING OUR PARTY'S POLICY TOWARDS INTELLECTUALS (EXCERPT): ON SOME REVOLUTIONARY TASKS FACING OUR INTELLECTUALS (Speech to Intellectuals in North Hamgyong Province, June 14, 1968), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 133.
- 38 YOUTH MUST BECOME THE VANGUARD ON ALL FRONTS OF ECONOMIC AND DEFENCE CONSTRUCTION TO BRING OUR REVOLUTION TO FINAL VICTORY (Speech to the National Youth Meeting for General Mobilization, April 13, 1968), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 5, p. 11.
- 39 THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS THE BANNER OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE FOR OUR PEOPLE AND A POWERFUL WEAPON FOR BUILDING SOCIALISM AND COMMUNISM (EXCERPT): ON FURTHER CONSOLIDATING AND DEVELOPING THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA (Report at the 20th Anniversary Celebration of the Founding of the DPRK, September 7, 1968), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 154.
- 40 LET US STRENGTHEN THE TRAINING OF TECHNICAL PERSONNEL TO MEET THE NEW REQUIREMENTS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION (Speech to the Faculty and Students of the Kim Chaek Polytechnical Institute, October 2, 1968), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 179.
- 41 ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY ABDEL HAMID AHMED HAMROUCHE, GENERAL MANAGER OF DAR-EL-TAHRIR FOR PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (July 1, 1969), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 195.
- 42 ON SOME THEORETICAL PROBLEMS OF THE SOCIALIST ECONOMY: THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SCALE OF THE ECONOMY AND THE RATE OF PRODUCTION GROWTH IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY (Answers to the Questions Raised by Scientific and Educational Workers, March 1, 1969), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 209.

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- 43 PROBLEMS OF THE PEASANT MARKET IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY AND OF THE WAY TO ABOLISH IT (March 1, 1969), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 231.
- 44 ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY ALI BALOUT, CORRESPONDENT OF THE LEBANESE NEWSPAPER AL ANWAR (November 22, 1969), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 237.
- 45 ON SOME EXPERIENCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC AND SOCIALIST REVOLUTIONS IN OUR COUNTRY: ON THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF PRIVATE TRADE AND INDUSTRY (Lecture to Cadres of Party and State Organizations, October 11, 1969), Selected Works of Kim Il-song, Vol. 5, p. 354.
- 46 REPORT TO THE FIFTH CONGRESS OF THE WORKERS' PARTY OF KOREA ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (EXCERPT): CONVERSION OF OUR COUNTRY INTO A SOCIALIST INDUSTRIAL STATE (November 2, 1970), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 253.
- 47 ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (November 2, 1970), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 263.
- 48 CENTRAL TASKS OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION (November 2, 1970), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 285.
- 49 THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALIST CULTURE (November 2, 1970), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 297.
- 50 IDEOLOGICAL REVOLUTION, REVOLUTIONIZATION AND WORKING-CLASSIZATION OF THE ENTIRE SOCIETY (November 2, 1970), On Juche in Our Revolution, Vol. 2, p. 304.

APPENDIX B

THE SELECTED EDITORIALS OF THE RODONG SHINMUN
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<u>Editorial Number</u>	<u>Date of the Issue</u>
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58	No. 55 February 24, 1975
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60	No. 240 August 28, 1975
61	No. 36 February 5, 1976
62	No. 96 April 5, 1976
63	No. 126 May 5, 1976
64	No. 218 August 5, 1976
65	No. 279 October 5, 1976
66	No. 36 February 5, 1977
67	No. 157 June 6, 1977
68	No. 217 August 5, 1977
69	No. 277 October 4, 1977
70	No. 339 December 5, 1977

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