# (Mis)Management of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon:

## Legal Informality and

## The Case Study of Jnah

*Youssef Zeineddine*

*1/8/2019*

**Supervisor:**
Dr. Synnøve Bendixsen
UiS/IMER Bergen

**Second Examiner:**
Dr. Jure Gombač
UNG

European Master in Migration and Intercultural Relations

They gagged his mouth,
Bound his hands to the rock of the dead
And said: Murderer!

They took his food, clothes and banners,
Cast him into the condemned cell
And said: Thief!
They drove him away from every port,
Took his young sweetheart,
Then said: Refugee!

O you with bloodshot eyes and bloody hands,
Night is short-lived,
The detention room lasts not forever,
Nor yet the links of chains.
Nero died, Rome did not:
With her very eyes she fights.
And seeds from a withered ear
With wheat shall fill the valley.
**On Man – Palestinian Poet Mahmoud Darwish**

وضعوا على فمه السلاسل
ربطوا يديه بصخرة الموتى ،
وقالوا : أنت قاتل!
* * *
أخذوا طعامه والملابس والبيارق
ورموه في زنزانة الموتى ،
وقالوا : أنت سارق!
طردوه من كل المرافيء
أخذوا حبيبته الصغيرة ،
ثم قالوا : أنت لاجيء!
* * *
يا دامي العينين والكفين!
إن الليل زائل
لا غرفة التوقيف باقية
ولا زرد السلاسل!
نيرون مات ، ولم تمت روما...
بعينها تقاتل!
وحبوب سنبلة تجف
ستملأ الوادي سنابل ..!

**عن انسان ــ محمود درويش**

Translation by PoemHunter:
https://bit.ly/2Zqytva

Listen to the poem performed by Kamilya
Jubran: https://bit.ly/2K8NQTO

# Table of Contents

## List of figures

## List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| WFP | World Food Program |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNRWA | United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |

| | |
|---|---|
| GSO | General Security Office or The General Directorate of General Security |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| MOU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MoSA | Ministry of Social Affairs |
| IDP | Internally Displaced Person |

# Acknowledgments

At first, I would like to thank the first migrants I have ever got to know: My parents. Everything that you have done so far has made me the man that I am today. I will always be grateful for your love, and trust. Dana and Bassem, my love for you is endless.

I want to thank all the participants in my study for giving me their time. Thanks to the NGO workers that I interviewed for working on helping those in need. Thanks to the refugees that I interviewed for sharing their stories with me. Without your collaboration, I could not have written this thesis. And a special thank you to Marwa Hassan for helping me find this case study of Jnah, and for her help in the field.

I want to thank all of my friends from back home who always made me feel like home was not so far away in these two years. Thank you for all the phone calls, zero-one's, messages, emails, letters, and the help with the thesis. And thanks to all the new friends I made throughout these two years, who always kept me feeling at home. I am truly blessed to have known you. When I will remember EMMIR as a 50-year-old man one day (if we are still alive because of climate crisis), you will be a big part of these memories. Love and productivity.

There could be a 100 people in the room, and 99 of them don't believe in you, but only one of them does. And that person is enough to make you go on and persevere! Maissam Nimer, thank you for being that person. I will always be grateful for everything you have done to me from 2011 onwards. Your encouragement and support are so valuable to me, and I wish to never lose your friendship.

With these hard times passing in Lebanon, where xenophobia and racism are the norm of political rhetoric, I want to thank all grassroots and solidarity movements working on the ground to try and get refugees in this country the rights and dignity they deserve.

Last but not least, I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Synnøve Bendixsen for being very patient with me, and for giving me all the constructive feedback. I am glad to have worked with you.

# Abstract

This thesis explores the management of Syrian refugees in Lebanon through the main lens of informality. The thesis is divided into two parts:

1. A policy analysis of the legal informality of Syrian refugees in Lebanon
2. An ethnographic study of the area of Jnah in Lebanon, where squatting Lebanese IDP's live along with Syrian refugees

# Chapter 1: Introduction

## 1.1 Prologue

On the night of Friday 13th of July 2018, a group of Syrian refugees living in the Lebanese town Kahhaleh, in the Mount Lebanon Governorate were raided by the municipality police. According to a report by Al-Jadeed TV, at 2 am, a group of personnel from the Kahhaleh municipality knocked on the door of a house of a group of Syrian refugees asking them to evict the house and leave the town. The municipality police were reportedly carrying guns and started to beat and curse at the refugees. All of that was because the refugees - who have legal residence permits in Lebanon – did not have Lebanese sponsors from Kahhaleh. The Municipality commented saying that the refugees were not evicted under force and that they still welcome refugees whose sponsors are from the town (Chamseddine, 2018).

The significance of this anecdote is to show how in Lebanon, Syrian refugees are sometimes treated like run-away criminals for the simple reason of presence in the wrong geographical area. The reasons that the municipality of Kahhaleh wanted to evict these Syrians from the village are not only ambiguous, but also illegal. Ghida Frangieh, a lawyer that I have interviewed as part of my research, explained that "eviction from an area is a sanction that needs to be issued by a judge. It can't be done by an administrative power, [such as] a local authority" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).

This ambiguity in refugee management in Lebanon is the main focus of the study. How and why does the Lebanese state and its different bodies keep treating refugees in that manner of irregularity?

## 1.2 Background

Lebanon is a small country on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean with the area of 10,452 km$^2$. The last time a population census was conducted in Lebanon was in 1932, and so all the numbers of population are mere estimates. According to the CIA factbook, the population of Lebanon is estimated to be 6,100,075 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2018). However another study from a local statistics company (Information International sal, 2019) estimated the Lebanese population to be 5,508,692 by the end of 2018, not including foreigners.

Geographically, the Republic of Lebanon borders Occupied Palestine/Israel from the South, the Mediterranean from the West, and shares its longest land border with the Syrian Arab Republic from the East and North. Beirut is the capital of Lebanon



*Figure 1Lebanon's location in the Middle East. Source: Google Maps*

The Lebanese Republic is a "parliamentary democratic republic" according to the Lebanese constitution[1]. Moreover, "Lebanon is a multi-confessional republic […]. It is characterized by a sectarian power-sharing structure that arose as a result of its history, which is filled with sectarian and communal power struggles" (Tabar, 2010). In Lebanon, there is a sectarian power sharing between religions. Half of the seats of the parliament are reserved for Christians, and the other half is reserved for Muslims, however the speaker of the house should be Shia Muslim. The Council of Ministers – which is the executive arm of the state – has a similar division of seats between Muslims and Christians, however the Prime Minister should be Sunni Muslim. The President of the republic needs to be a Maronite Christian (Makdisi, 2000).

Lebanon hosted many refugee populations throughout its history, such as: The Armenians who fled the Ottoman genocide in the beginning 20th century, who were later nationalized (Tabar, 2010); Palestinian refugees who fled to Lebanon through the Nakba (or catastrophe in Arabic) which was the process of uprooting of around 750,000 Palestinians from their homeland between 1947 and 1949, and their displacement into neighboring countries, of which 100,000 fled to Lebanon (Restan, 2010); and the Iraqis who reached 50,000 in 2010 and fled the civil unrest in Iraq after the American invasion in 2003 (Tabar, 2010).

One of the most important stages in Lebanese modern history in the 20th century was the Lebanese Civil war that occurred between 1975 and 1990. On April 13th, 1975, after the divide between the Christians and the Palestinians, militants from the started shooting on a bus transporting Palestinians in the Christian-concentrated Ain el Remmene suburb of Beirut and killed all the passengers. Until this day, there is no official story regarding

---

[1] Constitution of Lebanon, Preamble§C

who shot on the bus, but that incident was the one that sparked 15 years of the "Lebanese Civil War" (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2013).

Ever since the start of the Syrian conflict, Lebanon has been one of the biggest refugee-hosting countries in the region after taking around 1.5 Million Syrian refugees, making a quarter of the country's population made up of refugees (Jagarnathsingh, 2016). Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention, nor its later protocols. That left Syrians in Lebanon without a refugee status, and no special rights/protection. The Lebanese government does not call the Syrian refugees in the country as refugees, but as "displaced" [naziḥin], to imply their supposed temporary stay in Lebanon. However, Syrian refugees were able to get registered with UNHCR under a "UN refugee status" that enables them to get different humanitarian and protection services (Mahdi, 2017).

In trying to manage the refugee influx, the first "Lebanese Crisis Response Plan" was published in 2014 by the Lebanese Government and the UN to respond to the Syrian influx to Lebanon. It focused on the areas of: strengthening humanitarian protection of Syrians and poorest Lebanese; filling gaps in services in most vulnerable societies; and improving the fragile economic, social, environmental, and institutional systems (Government of Lebanon & United Nations, 2014). However, the policy paper on refugees approved by the Lebanese Cabinet of Ministers in October of the same year did not include these priorities. Nevertheless, one of its three sections was dedicated to "provision of security" through the empowering municipal police personnel in Lebanese towns and villages (Lebanese Council of Ministers, 2014). In the beginning of 2015, The General Directorate of General Security, the main state security body responsible of managing foreigners in Lebanon, issued a regulation restricting entry of Syrians, and demanded residency fees from Syrian refugees (Janmyr, 2016). The repercussions of this regulation are closely studied in the chapter titled "Manufacturing of Informality".

## 1.3 Literature review

### 1.3.1 Informality

Syrian refugees in Lebanon are a highly studied population, and the body of literature written around them is very big. As informality seems to be a feature of Syrian displacement in Lebanon, this topic has been covered – either partially of fully – by several researches.

Many papers only mention aspects of informality without the topic of refugee informality being the sole focus of their papers. For example, Jagarnathsingh mainly mentions informality in work and the fact that most refugees do not have legal residency (Lebanon Support & Jagarnathsingh, 2018). Clarke discusses the informality in shelter and social hierarchies in informal tented settlements in Lebanon (2017). Turner does something similar as well; He discussed the informality in the labor market in relation to the informal settlement of Syrian refugees (Turner, 2015). On the other hand, Sanyal looks at how informal settlements of Syrian refugees are blurring the lines between formal and informal sectors in Lebanon (Sanyal, 2017).

Other studies delve directly into the informality aspect of Syrian refugees' presence in Lebanon. Jagarnathsingh did that in 2016 by looking at legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and how it affected their lives, specifically their livelihoods and security situations (Jagarnathsingh, 2016). This study gives a good insight into the informality in the lives of Syrian refugees. However, this study became outdated with the new updates to residency laws in 2017, and the more recent events happening in the field[2]. Another perspective on informality is that of (Fawaz, 2017), where she uses "informality as a

---

[2] All of these updates will be explained in Chapter 4

framework" to study refugee housing in Beirut. Informality in her case is that of the housing market, which is different from the matter at hand. Nassar and Stel discuss informality as a result of state ambiguity, however, in my research I look at informality as a result of policies of the state (Nassar & Stel, 2019).

### 1.3.2 Jnah

Unfortunately, although Jnah is a very peculiar area, it is very understudied. I was only able to find four studies on the area. The earliest one I found was by Halabi, who studied how the land conflicts in the area of Beirut's southern suburbs developed over time (Halabi, 1988). The next one was by Fawaz and Peillen who studied the economic, social, and legal development of slums around Beirut, including Jnah (Fawaz & Peillen, 2002). The third one was a sociological study commissioned by the Council for Development and Reconstruction. The study covered all the slums and poor neighborhoods in the Greater Beirut area. It provided important information, though old, about the area (Alrifai, 2005). And the last study I found was by Jähnigen (2012), who analyzed the situations in the coastal settlements of Ouzaii and Jnah and the proposed development projects. Jähnigen did a mapping of the area which was very helpful in the study. Because these studies are all took place before the settlement of Syrian refugees in Jnah, they do not include that element. The gap I fill with my research is the analysis of the presence of Syrians, along with Lebanese IDP's in Jnah.

## 1.4 Research Question

The main research question of this thesis is: **How does the Lebanese state manage the presence of Syrian refugees?**

The main hypothesis of the thesis is that the Lebanese state and its different bodies is forcing Syrian refugees into informality.

This main question is answered through looking at two aspects of refugee management in Lebanon: Firstly, how does Lebanon legally manage Syrian refugees? That is answered through a chapter about informality and the role of state bodies and their policies (mainly the General Directorate of General Security). First, the chapter "Manufacturing of Informality" exhibits how legal informality of Syrian refugees exists in Lebanon. The hypothesis of this chapter is that Lebanon is forcing refugees to be in an informality limbo and making their situation more precarious.

And secondly, I take the case study of Jnah neighborhood in the south of Beirut, where Syrian refugees live along Lebanese IDP's who were displaced in the civil war. The special thing about Jnah is that the land is squatted and so the residents live there in an irregular informal manner. Through this case I look at the dynamics of the two populations: Syrian refugees and Lebanese IDP's.

# Chapter 2: Methodology

The methodology I use in this research is grounded theory. I conducted several semi structured interviews in the period of February and March of 2019[3]. In the process of analyzing the interviews, I have developed codes that lead to the formation of conceptual frameworks to understand the management of refugees in Lebanon.

## 2.1 Research progress

At the beginning of the planning process for the thesis, my goal was to look at the state and non-state actors that affect refugees in Lebanon, and their interactions. The question was too broad and hard to focus, especially with Lebanon having over a million and a half Syrian refugees scattered all around the country in urban settlements (living in apartments among Lebanese citizens) and makeshift informal tented settlements. Afterwards, I decided to narrow my focus and ask the question: how do municipalities affect Syrian refugees and in return, how do refugees affect municipal work in Lebanon. However, that question was still very hard to answer because Lebanon (a country with an area smaller than the American state Connecticut) has over 1000 municipalities varying in size, refugee population, and political influences. Also, I had to decide, should I look at refugees in an urban or a rural situation.

I first contacted Ghida Frangieh who is a lawyer, the president of Legal Agenda, and Secretary of Frontiers Ruwad, to have an interview. The interview was just to get background on the development of refugee law in Lebanon. The interview turned out to be one of the main pillars of the fourth chapter, The Manufacturing of Informality.

---

[3] For the thesis fieldwork, I interviewed: 2 Syrian refugees who reside in Jnah, 4 NGO workers that work in Jnah, 1 Senior refugee aid worker that works in South Lebanon but has experience working along with Lebanese municipalities, 1 urban planner researcher who worked closely on projects with municipalities on refugee issues, The mayor of the Qaroun municipality in Bekaa, in order to compare the two municipalities, and 1 lawyer and expert in refugee rights in Lebanon

I then contacted one of my friends (Marwa who I later interviewed for this thesis) who works at an NGO and was able to take me with her to the field. She was working in two areas in the suburbs of Beirut: Sabra and Jnah, and I visited both areas with her. Later, I decided not to look into Sabra because it is also a Palestine refugee camp, and trying to analyze the situation there, keeping in mind that it is a Palestine refugee camp would diverge the focus of the thesis and complicate the matter. Therefore, I decided to look into Jnah neighborhood, south of Beirut. Keeping municipalities as my main focus of the research, I tried contacting the municipality in which Jnah is located in: Ghobeiry. Consequently, I started planning to interview the municipality of Ghobeiry. Through connections, I was able to someone in the Internal Security Forces (ISF) in Ghobeiry[4] who contacted the municipality on my behalf in order to get me an interview. I visited the Ghobeiry municipality in order to meet Youssef Arabi, who works at the municipality administration. When I mentioned my topic to him, his answer was that the municipality does not deal with refugees and I should look for another municipality. I then insisted on an interview and he asked me to send my credentials and interview questions by email, so that the mayor decides if he will meet me or not. In a few days, I emailed the municipality with their requirements, and then I didn't hear back from the municipality. I tried following up and got the same answer that they do not deal with refugees.

As my focus was on municipalities, I was planning that the interview with the mayor would be central in the analysis of the situation. However, I was able to get information about the municipality's intervention (or lack thereof) from other actors in the field. After visiting the field, and seeing all the other actors on the ground (local vigilantes, political

---

[4] Police

parties, and NGO's) I decided to shift my focus from the municipality alone, and towards how are Syrian refugees[5] organized in Jnah on several levels.

## 2.2 Data collection

The sampling technique that I used to choose my interviewees was purposive expert sampling. Purposive sampling is a technique that does not require a certain theoretical framework or a set number of participants. Instead, the participants are chosen based on the information they can provide which works well with grounded theory (Etikan, Musa, & Alkassim, 2016). Expert sampling, as its name says, uses experts to get certain information in the field, and it is useful where there is "a lack of observational evidence." (ibid) That was the case in my research since I was not able  I chose these interviewees mostly because of easy accessibility and lack of time/resources to interview more people[6]. I was able to access most of my interviewees through my acquaintances and professional connections. Had I used random sampling, I would have had to contact people and organizations that I had no contacts with and probably would get many negative answers (or no answers) to participate in the interviews. This actually happened to me when I tried contacting NGO's that work in Jnah without having contacts there.

After transcribing the interviews, I coded the interviews. According to Kathy Charmaz, coding is "the process of defining what the data is about […] The coding process may take the researcher to unforeseen areas and research questions. Grounded theory proponents

---

[5] The terms "refugees" or "Syrian refugees" in this thesis refer to Syrian refugees residing in Lebanon and  does not include Palestinian Refugees from Syria who fled to Lebanon during the conflict. The inclusion of the said category in the research would add another layer of complexity to the issue at hand.

[6] I tried contacting Ghobeiry municipality several times in order to get an interview with them, but they always said that they do not work with refugees and so they cannot give me an interview. After some persistence from my side, they asked me to send them my questions and documents proving my studies. However, they never gave me an answer if I can have an interview with them. Even after several follow-up calls from my side, their answer was always that they were waiting for the Mayor's approval.

follow such leads; they do not pursue previously designed research problems that lead to dead- ends" (Charmaz, 2006).

The discussion part of this thesis is divided into two chapters. the first part is Manufacturing of informality. It is a policy analysis of Lebanon's refugee law from 1962 until July 2019. For this chapter I used: 1) policy documents such as international treaties and agreements signed by Lebanon, decisions and regulations by Lebanese governmental and security bodies (namely the General Security and Ministry of Labor), and a State Council ruling, among many others. 2) Other policy studies done on refugee law in Lebanon, especially (Frangieh & Saghieh, 2018; Janmyr, 2017; Skordas, 2016). 3) News reports on recent refugee issues in Lebanon from 2019. 4) An expert interview with Ghida Frangieh who is a lawyer, the president of Legal Agenda, and Secretary of Frontiers Ruwad that has been working on refugee issues in Lebanon since 2006. 5) NGO and UN reports for data on the refugee situation in Lebanon.

The second part is a mixed method chapter where I discuss the case study of Jnah. I used ethnographic methods such as semi-structured interviews, and field observations (primary sources), as well as policy documents and historical studies (secondary sources). I first write a historical background of the area, and try to include the different legal, political, and social aspects of the areas history. I do so using the four studies mentioned in the literature review (Alrifai, 2005; Fawaz & Peillen, 2002; Halabi, 1988; Jähnigen, 2012). With regards to primary data, I use four semi-structured interviews to analyze the current situation in the area:

1.  Zeina[7]: She is a Syrian refugee who had been living in the area for over a year at the time of the interview.

---

[7] Pseudonym

2. Basma[8] and Marwa Hassan: They both work at a health organization on the topic of vaccination. One of their work areas is Jnah. Basma was born in Jnah, and she lived there until two years ago when she got married and moved to another area. They are both Lebanese nationals.

3. Abdel Rahman Matar: He is a originally from Beirut, but was displaced during the civil war and lived in Jnah. He has been living there since then. He is also the president of a local NGO in Jnah called "Locals' Charity Committee".

4. Sawsan Saad: an urban planner and researcher who has experience working with municipalities on refugee issues with UN Habitat. She plays the role of an expert.

## 2.3 Positionality and ethical considerations

For me, as a researcher, I like to study policy, which is usually an analysis of something on a meta-level, that most of us have no say in, yet it affects almost all of us. When a policy, or a political statement, target Syrians in Lebanon, it means 1.5 million people. And the human brain is limited that it cannot fathom what 1.5 million people mean. And so this is kind of an unfair game that our system plays, to affect the lives of 1.5 million people without understanding what 1.5 million means. I myself cannot fathom the size either, but living in Lebanon, where the population pre-2011 was six million people, it is very hard to escape seeing the 1.5 million people, but somehow, it is easy to demonize them. And I cannot stay shut about that, about the systematic racism that the Lebanese state exhibits against Syrians, and all the violations of basic human dignity.

What made me think of doing this thesis about Syrians in Lebanon was it being the meeting point of my familiarity with the topic and context, and the importance of the topic. That is especially with recent developments in the field like "Storm Norma" in

---

[8] Psuedonym

January 2019 that destroyed and flooded many tents of Syrian refugees around the country, and the more recent xenophobic attacks and political statements.

Being a Lebanese citizen who have lived in Lebanon since 1998, and born in 1994, I realize that the events that I will discuss during the Lebanese civil war period, have affected people that I know, and people who are dear to me. To me, and to my subjects, these are more than historical events; they are collective lived experiences of a country that have deeply altered (and ended) the courses of the life of thousands of my people. At the same time, Syrians are currently living their civil war, and so I should take their accounts with utmost care as well.

As a Lebanese researcher, it is my duty to treat the events that I will discuss while keeping in mind the thousands of people who have lived through them.

Since I am using some ethnographic methods, storytelling plays the role of the medium in many of the interviews that I am doing. Listening to my family retell stories of life during the Lebanese civil war, I cannot but wonder how will the Syrians who are currently taking refuge in Lebanon retell the story of their lives in Lebanon in 30 or 40 years. With this demographic of Syrian refugees in Lebanon being a highly studied one (Nimer, 2019), will they retell the stories when researchers came to ask them intrusive questions about their lives. Will they retell stories of patronizing visits from officials and high-profile journalists? And most importantly, if they remember us, will they say we used them for an interview and then forgot them?

As an EMMIR professor once told me that writing a master's thesis is a selfish act. As a master's student, I have to use the most resources I can find in the field in a limited time frame in order to finish a school assignment. That means going to the field and listening to Syrian refugees talk about how their lack of legal status affects their lives hugely[9], while

---

[9] This will be discussed more deeply in the thesis

knowing, as a Lebanese citizen, this would never happen to me – I have the privilege to never be arrested at a checkpoint for just moving from one place to another within Lebanon. At some point in an interview, I had to stop the interview to call a legal aid organization in order to help the Syrian lady I was interviewing find her detained husband. I remember in one of my classes, my professor told me that our job in the field is to be researchers, not social workers. I felt at that moment that if I decided to be "just a researcher" – if I just continued the interview knowing I could help the lady and choosing not to – I would be nothing more than a leech using this lady – a human – to finish a school assignment. Moreover, many Syrian refugees in Lebanon are sufferings from daily acts of xenophobia and bullying from Lebanese nationals like me. I hope that during my interviews with Syrian refugees in the field, I was able to show kindness and openness.

In my thesis I will critique the policies and regulations taken by the Lebanese state and its apparatuses that oppress Syrian refugees, restricts their freedom, and strip away their right of legal protection. Knowing that these policies are approved (even if passively) by my representatives, as Lebanon is by constitution a parliamentary democracy, I feel like it is my duty to oppose and critique them. I am not a Syrian refugee, but I do not need to be one to stand up for their rights.

## 2.4 Limitations

While working in Jnah, and because of the control of the Amal Movement there, I could not be very visible because I did not have an official status. If I would be caught in the area interviewing Syrian refugees as merely a researcher, I could be in trouble. However, I was very careful, and that meant that I could not go to the area more often, and thus I was not able to conduct as many interviews as I was hoping to do. Another limitation was that some of the interviews were useless because the refugees kept on going off-topic, complaining about their problems, thinking that I was there to help them.

Another limitation was the lack of data available publicly on the area. I was hoping to do a more thorough study of the area as its legal status is very ambiguous (Halabi, 1988). For example, the legal and historical sources that I found did not specify which parts of the area were owned by the municipality, which ones where owned by the state, and which ones were public land.

In the chapter "manufacturing of informality", I first wanted to take a different perspective on the structure of the Lebanese state. In my thesis, I look at the Lebanese state as a monolith, acting as one body, with a certain vision towards the Syrian refugee management issue. However, the situation in reality is different than that as different political parties have big disagreements on how to manage the refugee dossier, according to Frangieh (interview, 18/2/2019). Yet I was not able to add the layer of political disagreement in the Lebanese because if the lack of time, and the space in this thesis would not allow it.

# Chapter 3: Conceptual Frameworks

Since this study uses grounded theory methodology, the goal of the study is to come up with conceptual frameworks to theorize the phenomena observed in the research.

In chapter four, the manufacturing on informality, thanks to the input of Ghida Frangieh, I found the concept of "Regime of Tolerance". A regime of tolerance is when the state makes the presence of refugees' illegal, yet it tolerates their presence. When the refugees start to bother or descent, their illegal status can be used to threaten them. This is a strategy to keep control of refugees by keeping them in an informal situation.

In chapter five, I developed the conceptual framework of "double displacement". This phenomenon takes place cases where there are two different displaced populations living in the same space. The concept suggests that since both populations have needs, the first population to inhabit the space will try to exploit the second population. A requirement for this to happen is the presence of informality. The first population has more know-how, and relations than the second population, and that is why it is able to do it.

# Chapter 4: The Manufacturing of Informality

In this chapter I first look at the main state body dealing with refugees in Lebanon: The General Directorate of General security. Then I look at the history of refugee policy in Lebanon from the 1960's until 2015 and move on to discuss the latest policy changes in the last 4 years and their implications on Syrian refugees - focusing on informality. In this chapter I make use of data from the following sources; policy documents, and studies about them, especially the 2015 entry and residence regulations, reports and studies from the ground by NGO's (ALEF, Sawa, Lebanon Support, etc…) and UN agencies (UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF), and an expert interview I did with Ghida Frangieh, who is a lawyer, president of Legal Agenda (NGO), and secretary of Frontiers Ruwad (NGO working on legal issues of migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and undocumented people in Lebanon).

## 4.1 The General Directorates of General Security as a main actor

> *"Despite the fact that most of the Syrian displaced are victims of violence in their country, and we cannot tackle their situation from a pure security-military perspective, however, their camps and gatherings have been an extension of their contact with terrorists and thus have created a huge security burden and an exhaustion of effort and capabilities around the clock and at all levels. This has facilitated the length of the border between Lebanon and Syria and the exploitation by terrorist organizations of the nature and terrain of these borders to illegally enter and hide in Lebanese territory." (El Deek, 2017)*

> - Colonel Elie El-Deek, in a speech representing the General Directorate of General Security

The General Directorate of General Security is one of the major security agencies in the country, and one of the main players when it comes to refugees in Lebanon according to Frangieh (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019). The main General Security departments

that deal with refugees are the "Foreigners Department" and the "Residence Control Department"[10]. According to the decree that formed the General Security,

> *"The Foreigners Department shall: supervise foreigners in all matters pertaining to their entry into Lebanon, their stay, and their departure therefrom - investigate the applications of foreigners before issuing visas on their passports, temporary or permanent residence permits and their departure from the country, and organize identity cards for them - monitor their movements and the business the partake - monitor political refugees and foreign displaced persons - grant of transit passports - organize permits for groups under special conditions for movement in Lebanon and abroad."[11]*

This law sets the General Security as the main agency to deal with foreigners in the Lebanese system (including refugees). According to Frangieh, Lebanon has issued its migration regulations in the 1960's, and they are now outdated now as they are not adequate to the large numbers of migrants in Lebanon. In addition, there are no laws that state how do deal with foreigners, and so the General Security took it upon itself to develop such regulations, whereas the legislative arm of the government is the entity that is supposed to issue laws in regards to foreigners (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).

## 4.2 UNHCR and the General Security – a history

As mentioned above, Lebanon only issued its laws regarding migration in early 1960ies. Before that, Lebanon was hosting Palestine refugees who were under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). The rest of the refugees that came to Lebanon are under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

---

[10] All translations in this section are done by the author and are not official.

[11] Article 6, Decree #2873, publish in the official gazette issue 71, on 31/12/1959, p. 2306-2296. url: http://www.legallaw.ul.edu.lb/LawView.aspx?opt=view&LawID=244950

(UNHCR) which were mostly Arab oppositions fleeing dictatorship regimes in neighboring countries (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019). The main difference between the two agencies is that UNRWA is not mandated by finding a durable solution for its refugees, while UNHCR has that mandate in the Lebanese context (ibid). Lebanon is not a signatory party of the 1951 Geneva convention relating to the Status of Refugees or the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. In 1963, Lebanon entered the executive committee of UNHCR, and Lebanon had an unwritten "gentlemen's agreement" with UNHCR (Kagan, 2011; UNHCR). That agreement said that "some refugees would not be deported, yet they were held in detention", however that all changed when Jamil El Sayyed became the general director of the General security in December 1998 (Frangieh, 2019; General Directorate of General Security). Frangieh continues "the policy on refugees changed and a lot of people were being deported or detained for a very long period of time, which forced UNHCR to go into an agreement" (ibid). That agreement is a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that was signed between the General Security and UNHCR in September 2003[12]. The MOU reiterated Lebanon's stand that it is a transit country and not a country of asylum by stating that even asylum seekers in Lebanon are not seeking asylum in Lebanon, but in other countries[13]. The goal of the MOU was to create an administrative mechanism on how to deal with asylum seekers.

> "They had to first register [with UNHCR] and then they would have a full interview where they were asked why they fled their country and why they could not go back. Based on that interview they would be given a decision, either to be recognized or to be rejected. If they were rejected they had the chance to appeal. And if they were rejected again their file would be closed and they couldn't do anything anymore…

---

[12] General Directorate of General Security & UNHCR (2003), "Memorandum of Understanding between the General Directorate of General Security and the Regional Office of the United Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees on asylum seekers at UNHCR's office in Lebanon", retrieved from: http://www.legiliban.ul.edu.lb/Law.aspx?lawId=8774

[13] ibid

*they'd give them an asylum seeker certificate and then they would give them a refugee certificate once they were recognized." (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019)*

These certificates, however, did not protect asylum seekers or refugees from arrest, but they froze their deportations until UNHCR was able to resettle the refugees or not.

One of the main criticisms of the MOU was that it did not mention the principle of "non-refoulement" which is "the foundation of international refugee protection" according to the Lebanese NGO Frontiers in a statement they have issued on the MOU back then (2003). The statement continues to criticize the definition of asylum seekers and refugees in the MOU as those "residing illegally in Lebanon and submitting asylum applications at UNHCR" instead of abiding by international definitions such as "people facing dangers of persecution" (ibid). What the General Security was doing was arresting refugees in order to pressure UNHCR to find a resettlement solution for them (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).

After the MOU, Lebanon gave a big load of the refugee issue for UNHCR to manage, especially administratively.

*When refugees first come "[t]hey would have to register first with UNHCR. They had to first register and then they would have a full interview where they were asked why they fled their country and why they could not go back. Based on that interview they would be given a decision, either to be recognized or to be rejected. If they were rejected they had the chance to appeal. And if they were rejected again their file would be closed and they couldn't do anything anymore." (ibid).*

This MOU was written when the number of refugees and asylum seekers in Lebanon was small in order to deal with individual cases, around 3000 according to Frangieh's estimation (ibid). However, the flaws of the MOU started to show when a larger number of refugees entered Lebanon; at the end of 2006, Lebanon had 20,164 refugees and 2,579

asylum seekers (UNHCR, 2006). In that year, Iraqi refugees fleeing generalized violence entered Lebanon, and got a prima facie refugee status.

> *"When we started having generalized-mass influx from Iraq, a bit from Darfur also, we had a big Darfuri community, and then later on the Syrians. This is where the real problem happened with this transition, with the idea of Lebanon not being a country of asylum. I have people here, they can't be resettled, because they are fleeing generalized violence and resettlement countries will not take them, but I can't deport them, so what do I do?" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).*

When it comes to Iraqis, Lebanon had around 50,000 Iraqi refugees in 2008. UNHCR registered "10,682 Iraqi refugees and 584 Iraqi asylum seekers", which means around 40,000 Iraqi refugees in Lebanon had no status (Tabar, 2010). Because of their irregular status and their irregular entry, Iraqi refugees got detained in Lebanon by the General Security. In 2007, there was an estimated 500 Iraqis detained in Lebanese prisons. In order to have a legal status, Iraqis had to issue a work permit which costed US$2000 (O'Donnell & Newland, 2008). Frangieh estimated that in 2009 there was around 1,200 refugees in detention in Lebanon with 700 to 800 Iraqis among them.

> *"They could not be deported, the General security refused to release them, and UNHCR could not resettle them, and it created a big problem. They started a program of returning people from prison […] The Iraqi embassy would go to prison. 'Who wants to go to Iraq?', 'You have to go, you have to go', pressuring people, issuing documents for them, returning them from prisons immediately" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).*

In 2010, Frangieh's organization, Frontiers Ruwad, claimed in a press release that Lebanon had deported 14 refugees by the beginning of the year (Fronteirs Ruwad, 2010).

## 4.3 Lebanon's obligation to international refugee law

As mentioned before, Lebanon is neither a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, nor the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. However, since Lebanon is part of other international treaties, it still has obligations towards international refugee law. Firstly, Lebanon is a drafting and a signatory country of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and therefore it is liable to the Art. 14 of the Declaration that states:

1. *"Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.*

2. *This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." (UN General Assembly, 1948)*

However, "[t]his article does not contain a guarantee of permanent residence in the receiving State" (Janmyr, 2018). Moreover, as mentioned before, Lebanon does not have the legal instruments in the field of asylum. Secondly, an important part of international refugee law is the concept of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement means "not return refugees 'to the frontiers of territories' where their lives or freedom would be at threat." And even if Lebanon is not a signatory of the 1951 Geneva Convention, Lebanon is still obliged to abide the principle of non-refoulement because it is international customary law (Skordas, 2016). Moreover, Lebanon has ratified the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in the year 2000, and so according to Art. 3§1: "No State Party shall expel, return ('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture" (UN General Assembly, 1984). This convention has higher authority in Lebanon than the 1951 Geneva convention (Frontiers Ruwad, 2006).

*"Refoulement is also prohibited by the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (Art. 45, para. 4), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7), the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Article 8), and the Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions (Principle 5)." (ibid)*

## 4.4 The General Security residency regulations (2015 onwards)

As a fundamental actor in the policy regarding Syrian refugees, the General Security's most impactful action regarding refugees' lives and security would be the issuing of the 2015 entry and residency regulations (Janmyr, 2016b). Up until the end of 2014 the borders between Syria and Lebanon were open and Syrian refugees were able to enter Lebanon according to the bilateral agreement between Lebanon and Syria called "Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation and Coordination" (Dionigi, 2016). In October 2014, the Lebanese Government adapted a policy aiming to decrease the number of incoming Syrian refugees. Later in December of the same year, the General Security issued new entry requirements for Syria nationals into Lebanon, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked UNHCR to stop registering refugees as of 6th of May, 2015 (Human Rights Watch, 2016) (Janmyr, 2016a). These requirements started being implemented on January 5th, 2015. Up until then, Syrian nationals residing in Lebanon were required to renew their residence permit after one year of staying in Lebanon with the cost of US$200. The new regulation still maintained that Syrians ought to pay the US$200 annual fee (for every individual older than fifteen) and practically divided refugees into two categories: 1) those with the UNHCR registration, and; 2) those without it. The difference was that those registered with UNHCR should "additionally provide a pledge not to work, signed in the presence of a notary, which states that they will not work in Lebanon; UNHCR registration certificate; and proof of their financial means such as bank statements, documents showing money transfers or proof of charitable or UN support" (ibid).

According to Frangieh (2019), the new thing that came with the 2015 residency regulation was that the residency status for Syrian refugees in Lebanon became dependent on the UNHCR certificate (refugee status), which was not the case before, yet it did not stop the Lebanese authorities from arresting refugees. However, this regulation was not as good in reality, because the General Security still found ways to block many Syrians from obtaining or renewing their residency permits. "They put a cap on applications per day already when they started taking it, and whenever someone would go and say 'I'm a refugee', they say 'no, no, no, you look like you are a working person, move along'" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).

At the same time, when refugees need to renew their residence permit, it is required that they visit one of the centers of the General Security in their respective areas, as they are the ones responsible for the implementation of refugee policy (Nassar & Stel, 2019). There, refugees usually get "ambiguous" answers. These answers can also vary in the different branches of General Security across the country (UNHCR, WFP, & UNICEF 2018). That might be a reason behind the difference in the numbers of refugees with legal residence permits across areas (14 per cent in Akkar and 54 per cent in South Lebanon) (Government of Lebanon & United Nations, 2019). Another reason is that the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) explains that this discrepancy happens in ratios of refugees with legal residence permits, since different General Security offices implements different policies, or are not aware of the procedural changes (ibid). Additionally, according to a survey conducted in 2018 by several UN agencies, 76 percent of refugees claimed that they were not able to renew their residence permits because they were not able to afford the US$200 yearly fee for renewal ((UNHCR), (UNICEF), & (WFP), 2018).

These regulations by the General Security have led to 73 percent of Syrian refugees older than 15 into being without valid residence permits in the country because of the complexity and the relatively high cost of renewing residence permits (ibid). This has left

Syrians living in the continuous danger of being arrested while passing an army checkpoint which are usually situated between villages and areas (Janmyr, 2016a).

In February 2017, the General Security decided to waive residency fees for Syrian refugees but with certain conditions: firstly, their UNHCR registration should be before January 1, 2015, and secondly, they should not have renewed their residence permits in 2015 or 2016 (ALEF, 2018). With the new policy, "[e]ligible refugees receive a six-month extension of their residency free-of-charge, renewable several times" (ibid). While this new waiver was beneficial to many Syrian refugees, it was criticized by human rights organizations for excluding Syrian refugees who could not register with UNHCR after it was ordered to stop registering Syrian refugees entering Lebanon. Additionally, according to Human Rights Watch, this new policy "excludes anyone who has used a Lebanese sponsor to maintain legal residency, even though Lebanese General Security officers have required many Syrians to secure sponsors – in contravention of official policies" (Khawaja, 2017).

Frangieh's analysis of the transition of the policy came as follows:

> "in the beginning, they were pushing everyone into the work sponsorship, and by the time they actually started implementing the refugee residency, everyone had already obtained work residency, because, for 2 years, you couldn't get a refugee residency. and they said anyone who got a work residency during these two years, cannot become a refugee, so they wanted to divide people by either 'you're a worker, or a refugee', but also they pushed everyone into labeling themselves as workers. Why? and now that they've waived the fees and everything, that's a very small community of people actually who can be eligible to get that. And still now if you are a young man and you look like you are working, they won't give it to you, so it is mainly for the elderly, the children, the single women" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).

## 4.5 Lack of accountability for the General Security

The problem with having this system where the General Security is the one that decides on its own regulations regarding foreigners' affairs, is the lack of over watch and accountability from the ministry of interior that is not practicing its role. This role includes holding the GS accountable, and issuing the regulations (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019). The biggest example of this is the State Council ruling in 2018 regarding the role of the General Directorate of General Security in organizing the entry and residency of Syrians in Lebanon. The ruling came as a result of a case filed in 2015 by an anonymous Syrian refugee, Legal Agenda, and Frontiers regarding the General Security's 2015 entry and residency policies for Syrians (Frangieh & Saghieh, 2018). The most significant points in the ruling were:

- The General Directorate for General Security is not the competent body to issue entry and residency rules for foreigners – its role is just to implement said rules;

- The Council of Ministers is the competent body issue and amend such rules and regulations;

- The Council of Ministers does not have a legal reasoning not to play its role of being responsible for entry and residency policy, and there were no exceptional circumstances that allowed bypassing its power;

- The residency and entry rules should meet international agreements between Lebanon and Syria that allow Syrians to enter Lebanon freely and have legal residency for no fees (ibid).

Frangieh further analyzed the ruling, arguing:

> "this is very indicative of the whole way that Lebanon was dealing with the Syrian crisis and because the government did nothing to actually establish a clear policy

*because they disagreed. And when they disagreed they just didn't know what to do. They agreed on some red lines were: okay, no resettlement, no residences, no somethings. But they weren't able to clearly take decisions. So General Security did it on its own. They decided to change the regulations as they see fit. So the court said it was a question of competence, but it also implicitly said that we couldn't change them and the way the general security did. We couldn't impose fees for example for the residences and all these things because these are laws." (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).*

With this ruling in 2018, the highest administrative court in Lebanon – the State Council – has annulled the 2015 entry and residency regulations set by the General Security. However, on the ground, nothing has changed – except for the mentioned fees waiver in 2017. Frangieh's explanation for that was:

*"the one who should implement [the ruling] is the Ministry of Interior. Ministry of Interior should tell the General Security to stop working on regulations that they've issued and should request from the government to review the legal framework for the status of Syrians in Lebanon. But they don't want to do that. Of course, as soon as a decision was issued then just a couple of months later the government became a caretaker government so now we're hoping with this new government will going to relaunch this debate now. But this goes back to the rule of law in Lebanon and to the independence of the judiciary where a lot of decisions are not implemented." (ibid)[14]*

---

[14] It should be noted that the previous government (or Council of Ministers) became a caretaker government with the parliamentary elections in May 2018. The newest council of minister was formed on the 31st of January 2019, 18 days before the interview was conducted with Ghida Frangieh.

With that being said, the Lebanese government seems to be willing to continue having the illegal regulations that the General Security has created. Moreover, it does not seem that the government will want to oversee the work of the General Security, with the growing political influence of the General Director of the General Security, Abbas Ibrahim (Abbas, 2017; Bou Nader, 2017), and the increasing pressure that the government is putting on the Syrian population in Lebanon (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2019).

## 4.6 Other forms of informality

While this chapter mainly focuses on informality, from the perspective of legal residency and status, other forms of informality that Syrian refugees face in Lebanon are also important to mention. Labor and livelihoods are fields with a high informality rate in Lebanon because the Ministry of Labor set three sectors where Syrian refugees can work: Agriculture, construction, and environmental services (e.g.: cleaning, garbage pick-up, etc..) (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019).

> *"In theory, they require work permits to work in Lebanon, but practically, the vast majority of working refugees work in unskilled jobs in the informal sector, such as agriculture, construction, street trades, domestic and personal services, and small, unlicensed businesses. 92% of these workers have no work contracts, 56% work on a seasonal, weekly or daily basis, and only 23% work for monthly wages" (Gohlke-Rouhayem, Melki, & Weinmann, 2016).*

Recently, the Ministry of Labor started a campaign against "illegal foreign labor in Lebanon", and many Syrian refugees reported being kicked out of their jobs because of the campaign (Chulov, Carrie, & Al Omar, 2019). As a part of that campaign, the ministry issued the Decision 84/1 regarding work permit fees from Syrian nationals in Lebanon. In this published decision the ministry claims that it wants to "organize the Syrian labor force" and preserve public money through asking the Syrian refugees to validate their

work permits in Lebanon and paying for the validation fees of the two previous years in case they had no valid work permit previously, and they entered Lebanon before two years (Abou Sleiman, 2019). The decision also mentions that the work permits will only be given in the three fields that the Syrian refugees are allowed to work in Lebanon (ibid). As this Decision was only published on July 12th, its consequence on Syrian refugees, financially and legally, are yet to be seen. Yet, from the news reports, it seems that the Ministry of Labor is sending its inspectors to several Lebanese areas to check if the workers at Lebanese businesses have valid work permits and Syrian refugees are being fired of their work (Associated Press, 2019; Chulov et al., 2019; LBC International, 2019).

*Figure 2 Billboard by the Ministry of Labor saying "Only Your Countrymen Can Help You Stimulate Your Business". Photo by: Youssef Zeineddine on 18/7/2019*

## 4.7 Consequences of informality

The consequences of informality are several. Firstly, with the cessation of UNHCR registration of Syrian refugees, there is an expressive number of Syrian refugees which are not registered. The number of refugees registered with UNHCR was 929,624 by the end of June 2019 (UNHCR, 2019b). By October 2018, the Government of Lebanon estimated that Lebanon is hosting around 1.5 million Syrian refugees (Government of Lebanon & United Nations, 2019). This makes the number of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon without a UNHCR registration between 500,000 and 600,000 - or around a third

of the total number of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon. According to the Lebanese NGO ALEF, "[u]nregistered refugees are the most vulnerable and marginalized, and lack access to basic services" (ALEF, 2018).

Moreover, a 2018 survey done by several UN agencies working in Lebanon estimated that 73 percent of Syrian refugees in Lebanon lack legal residency (UNHCR et al., 2018). Of those Syrian refugees with no legal residency, 76 percent of them claimed that the reason that did not allow them to renew their residence permits was that they were not able to afford it. This comes as no surprise with 68.5 percent of Syrian households in Lebanon being under the poverty line (ibid). According to the same report:

> *"Lack of legal residency puts individuals and families at increased risk of detention and harassment. In addition, refugees without legal residency have limited freedom to travel within the country and may be less likely to access essential services including schooling, health and medical services among others." (UNHCR et al., 2018)*

Moreover, the lack of a legal residence permit limits the freedom of movement of Syrian refugees, as they are afraid of getting arrested and detained at Lebanese army checkpoints (ibid).

With the borders between Lebanon and Syria being closed for refugees, except for "humanitarian cases", some Syrians decided to enter Lebanon through informal "smuggling" border crossings (Lebanon Support, 2016). In January 2018, 15 Syrians died while trying to cross to Lebanon through informal border entries because the Lebanese government decided not to respect its obligations of taking asylum seekers from Syria who are still suffering from ongoing fighting (UNHCR, 2018).

When it comes to informality at work, which was only briefly discussed, many bad consequences can be found affecting Syrian refugees. Firstly, the attachment of the

residence permits to a Lebanese sponsor exposed many refugees to the exploitation from the sponsor. According to Frangieh "a lot of people are forced into abusive working conditions. Very often they're unable to object to that, either because they have no legal status or because their legal status is attached to the employers who are the sponsor" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019). Additionally, with 77 percent of working Syrian refugees not having a monthly wage (Gohlke-Rouhayem et al., 2016), Syrian refugee families live in a precarious financial situation with 68.5 percent of them being under the poverty line ((UNHCR) et al., 2018). This percentage is expected to increase with the recent crackdown on Syrian refugees' livelihoods.

## 4.8 Return/Repatriation/Deportation

According to UNHCR, as of the 30th of June 2019, 40,230 Syrian refugees have "spontaneously" returned from Lebanon to Syria – meaning these refugees returned by their own will (UNHCR, 2019a). The Lebanese President Michel and the Foreign Minister Gibran Bassil, from the Syrian regime allied political party Free Patriotic Movement, have been calling for mass Syrian refugees return to Syria for many years now (National News Agency, 2016). Recently, "all political forces they agreed that Syrians should return, but the question is how okay? They have divergent opinions between what the call 'voluntary' or 'safe' or 'dignified' return" (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019). The political consensus is that there should be no coercive return for Syrians (ibid), and that's why the General Security always titles its updates on refugee returns as "voluntary returns" (General Directorate for General Security, 2019). Moreover, the Minister of Refugees Affairs Saleh El-Gharib - who is aligned with Syria regime ally Lebanese Democratic Party – visited Syrian president Bashar El-Assad in February 2019 to discuss the process of Syrian refugee return to Syria (The Daily Star, 2019). El-Gharib said "given the economic, financial and security pressure that it has on the whole nation. ... We hope that for once, the Lebanese people can come together on this delicate national issue" (ibid).

Another active actor in refugee return is Hezbollah, a strong Assad ally fighting alongside the regime forces in Syria. I saw at one fence in the city this banner (see picture below) by Hezbollah asking Syrians who want to register at Hezbollah. Additionally, when I asked a senior NGO worker in the south about returns, she mentioned that the General Security enrolled an assessment in the South of Lebanon, which is an area with strong presence of Hezbollah, for Syrian refugee households to fill if they want to return. When I asked her about what she knows about areas of Lebanon she said:

> *"from what I know from my colleagues in the field it's, for example, when the assessment of the GSO was widely enrolled in the south, nothing was happening in the North or Beqaa, for example. So it shows a different level of fishing for returns and here I want to open about a bracket that also mentioned that for example in the south there are centers that are managed by Hezbollah for returns of Syrian Refugees"* Layla (2019)[15]



While the main Lebanese political discourse is saying that refugee return to Syria is possible now, humanitarian organizations in Lebanon think otherwise. Sawa for Development and Aid is local Lebanese NGO that works with Syrian refugees documented several post-return risks

[15] Layla is a pseudonym

for repatriated Syrian refugees. Firstly, conscription of males into the Syrian army as men in Syria between the ages of 18 and 42 are obliged to join the army; secondly, detention and forced disappearances by Syrian regime forces as the Syrian Observatory of Human Rights claimed "that at least 700 returnees have been arrested between the beginning of October and mid-November 2018"; Thirdly, housing in Syria as 65 percent of interviewed Syrian refugees said that their house has been destroyed or occupied; and fourthly, the lack of economic prospects in Syria as the unemployment rate reached 53 percent there in 2017 (Mhaissen & Hodges, 2019). Of course, this is not a full list of the reasons stopping Syrian refugees from returning, yet they do not affect all Syrians equally, as some Syrians are able to return and have returned safely. The reason why refugees want to go back is the worsening of their situation in Lebanon. As one refugee in the mentioned study said "I don't see our situation getting better, since we don't have the money required to live in dignity. If it was safe to go back, we wouldn't stay a day longer... No one wants to live like this" (ibid).

The UN also stated that Syria is not safe yet for refugee return. The UN resident coordinator for Lebanon, Philippe Lazzarini, said in January that a large scale UN-supported return to Syria will not happen until the UN considers Syria as safe (Schlein, 2019).

## 4.9 "Regime of tolerance"

A conceptual framework that I discovered through my research, specifically in my interview with Ghida Frangieh, to explain the behavior of the Lebanese government with refugees is the "regime of tolerance". The regime of tolerance means that the government tolerates the physical existence of certain migrants, asylum seekers, and refugees on its territory, yet, at the same time, it strips them of a legal and regularized presence in order to keep them living in a precarious situation (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019). Living in precarity manifests through: refugees not having a regular job, not leaving the house unless they need to because they are afraid of arrest, and living in poverty because their sources of income are being shut under the pretext of "organizing labor" (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2019). Moreover, the state makes the conditions for legalizing of the presence of refugees very hard for most of the population,

and practically leaving refugees in a limbo. As mentioned before, 76 percent of refugees could not renew their residence permits because it was too expensive for them ((UNHCR) et al., 2018).

According to Frangieh, this "regime of tolerance" "is used as a push factor as well, to push people to leave as much as possible. And this goes is also in the whole policy of the country of: […] maintaining populations and informality." (Frangieh, G. Interview. 18/2/2019)

However, since very recently, the Lebanese state got more aggressive with Syrian refugees - meaning that unlike before, the state does not wait for refugees to do something wrong to punish them - it goes to the refugees directly to do so. Tolerance is a more passive state of refugee management where state bodies wait for refugees to pass by checkpoints to inspect their paperwork, or for the Lebanese neighbor to call and complain about his Syrian neighbor. Since only recently (June 2019) the state started sending inspectors to Lebanese businesses to check if their employers have work permits and fine them (LBC International, 2019). This shows a shift of refugee management in Lebanon from tolerance (passiveness) to a more proactive approach. As the results of this policy and its intentions are yet to unfold in the upcoming months, it can be studied and theorized in the near future.

## 4.10 Conclusion

Making migrants stay in precarious situations and prisons, and then asking them if they "want" to be repatriated back or stay imprisoned is what the Lebanese state was doing for years before the Syrian refugees came. But currently with Syrian refugees, it is making them live in near open air prison (Lebanese-territory), where their existence is made to be precarious and illegal, and where they always fear detention. More recently, the government has been asking Syrian refugees if they want to return while calling it a "voluntary" return – and without "wait[ing] for a political solution to the Syrian crisis as it may take long" according to Lebanese President Michel Aoun (Houssari, 2019). However, voluntary return doesn't come after mistreatment, but through dignity. It is getting clearer that the state has been

using informality as a push factor for refugees, and now it is advocating even more for that push with the president and foreign minister always mentioning Syrian refugees' return, and the General Security technically helping with the returns.

# Chapter 5: Case study: Jnah

## 5.1 Introduction

Jnah is an area of informal settlement south of Beirut with residents living irregularly. As I will show in this chapter, the area has been neglected for several years, and I will argue that the neglect of the area is related can be understood through three main reasons: The registration of Lebanese IDP's outside Ghobeiry municipality, Jnah being at border area between Beirut and Ghobeiry municipalities, and the legal status of the land.

This chapter draws from four interviews conducted by the author in February 2019, as further explained in the methodology chapter.

## 5.2 Background: the district of Jnah

Jnah (pronounced Jnāħ) is a district of the Ghobeiry municipality in the southern suburb of Beirut. Geographically, Jnah is a coastal area located just outside of the southern border of administrative Beirut. To the West of Jnah is the Mediterranean Sea. In its south, the other informal coastal settlement of Ouzaii can be found. Jnah does not have official street names or neighborhoods. The sub-areas are named according the old block names of swimming pools and beaches in Jnah[16] (Alrifai, 2005). Jnah is in the Chiyah cadastral registry[17] which according to the UNHCR, hosts 37,653 registered Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2019b). Since the UNHCR number of refugees only includes registered

---

[16] Main block names are: Côte d'Azur, Saint Simone, Saint Michelle, Riviera, Sands, Abou Daoud, and Acapulco (Alrifai, 2005)

[17] According to the Lebanese Municipal Act "The delimitation of the municipal area is an administrative measure having no relation whatsoever with the entries in the cadastral register." And so Jnah does not fall under Chiyah municipality (Decree-law no. 118, Title 1, Article 6)

refugees, and registration of new refugees was stopped in the beginning of 2015, the real number of refugees in the Chiyah cadaster cannot be known.



*Figure 3: Map of the Jnah district, in the Ghobeiry municipality, southern suburbs of Beirut.The part in Blue is seaside Jnah, while the part in Yellow is Bir Hassan-Jnah. Source: Google Maps*

The reason behind the peculiarity of the area of Jnah is the factor that, before hosting Syrian refugees, the area was squatted by Lebanese IDP's (Internally Displaced People) or "Muhajjarin" in Arabic. These IDP's fled from Beirut and many areas of Lebanon during the civil war (1975-1990) (Jähnigen, 2012). In my research, I will focus on the seaside area of Jnah, because that area where I conducted my field research. It should be noted that only by looking at the sea-side area of Jnah, and the uphill area (also known as Jnah-Bir Hasan), differences in the economic situation can be noticed. The sea-side area is formed of small houses that are attached to each other, while Jnah-Bir Hassan is formed of high

uniform apartment buildings. The difference can be even noticed by looking at satellite photos of the area.




*Figure 4 Jnah-seaside. Source: Youssef Zeineddine*



*Figure 5 Jnah-Bir Hassan, which is a wealthier adjenct district. Source: Youssef Zeineddine*

*Figure 6 Map of the Elyssar Project showing borders of different areas in Beirut's Southern suburbs.*

## 5.3 Historic chronology of settlement in Jnah

During the 1940's, the southern suburbs of Beirut were rural areas where farmers lived and grew the land (Jähnigen, 2012). However later in the 1950's, Jnah, along with neighboring Ouzaii, were planned to be a luxurious area after the building of the golf club and the city sports complex on the outskirts of Beirut. Since the Eastern suburbs of the city were viewed as more industrial and had an increasing refugee population, the Southern suburbs were envisioned to be the newly urbanized areas of the city (Halabi, 1988).

Irregular settlement started in Jnah during the 1958 "Lebanon Crisis", which was also considered to be Lebanon's first civil war. Displaced Christians moved to Jnah and built twenty houses around the Our Lady of Jnah church (Jähnigen, 2012) (Russell, 1985). These houses were later regularized by the municipality of Ghobeiry and started receiving public

services (such as water, electricity, and phone lines) in 1962 (Jähnigen, 2012). Later on, with the start of the 15-year civil war in Lebanon (1975-1990), more waves of displaced Lebanese started moving to Jnah and settling there irregularly. During the civil war Greater Beirut was divided by a demarcation line into two sides: An Eastern Christian side and a Western Muslim side, with Jnah being included in West Beirut (Charafeddine, 1987). In the first year of the war (1975), IDP's came from Bekaa region, east of Lebanon, and South Lebanon and settled in Jnah, after buying land from fake land brokers (Jähnigen, 2012).

In 1975, the High Shia Council received as donation a 15,200m$^2$ piece of land by Ghobeiry municipality in order to build the Al-Zahraa hospital for the underprivileged Shia population. The construction project attracted labor and businesses of mainly Lebanese internal migrants. These migrants later transformed their shacks into more permanent structures (Halabi, 1988).

As mentioned before, the area of the Beirut Southern suburbs was planned to become a serviced area of leisure activities, and being by the sea, Jnah was an area with chalets and beaches. In 1976, around 7,000 IDP's from East Beirut came and squatted the sea-side chalets with the help of local militias at the time. Half of these squatters were Kurds, and the other half were Palestinians and Syrians (Jähnigen, 2012). In a later stage, these IDP's started transgressing by either adding additional floors to the squatted buildings, or squatting on state-owned plots of land that have been invested by private persons (Alrifai, 2005).

Later during the civil war, Israel started conducting military operations in South Lebanon, causing more people to be displaced from their villages towards Beirut. During the 1978 Israeli operations, around 250,000 Shia's were displaced from the south, with around 180,000 of these IDP's resettling in Greater Beirut (Halabi, 1988). "At the beginning the [IDP's] were scattered in and around West Beirut and were divided into three groups: the

first occupied dilapidated structures near the demarcation lines or invaded vacant units in the city, the second stayed temporarily with relatives in the southern suburb until the end of the operations, and the third received tents from social welfare organizations and were temporarily allowed to camp on municipal land in the Ouzai corridor[18]" (ibid). As the Israeli operation ended in the South during that year, the Ministry of Interior tried repatriating the IDP's back to their villages in the South. However, only 3,500 families, out of the 32,000 initially displaced families, repatriated to their villages. The lower number happened despite the Ministry's efforts of sponsoring the repatriation. Due to tensions going on at the time, the IDP's decided to occupy vacant municipality land. However, they did not perceive that their occupation of land was illegitimate because, in the rural areas, municipal land was considered public land that could be used by the villagers. The situation was rather different in the Beirut area where municipalities restricted people's access to municipal land (ibid).

During the 1982 Israeli invasion of Beirut, and the massacres of neighboring Sabra and Shatila camps for Palestine refugees, the IDP's returned to their villages in the south. As they wanted to return back to Jnah, the country was under the rule of the right-wing president Bashir Gemayel who had a plan to clear the slums surrounding Beirut. Consequently, an important Shia sheikh announced in a Friday prayer that the settlers have the right to stay in the land and should not be evicted by the state. The logic behind these claims was also the confusion around the role of the state and the municipality giving access to land for the poor (Halabi, 1988).

---

[18] The Ouzai corridor is the area from the airport to the Southern borders of Beirut. It includes both the neighboring areas of Jnah and Ouzai.

*Figure 7 Complied estimations of the population of Jnah over the years. Graph made by author. The data of 1991 includes the neighboring Hay Al Zahraa. Sources: 1984, 1991 (Fawaz and Peillen 2002); 1987 (Charafeddine 1987); 2000, 2005 (Alrifai 2005); 1996, 2012 (Janingen 2012)*

## 5.4 Current situation: neglect of the area

Throughout these developments happening in Jnah, the area became an area of informal settlement with residents living illegally on land. The area is being largely ignored by the Ghobeiry municipality. The only services  A 2005 study of the Beirut suburbs by the Council of Development and Reconstruction stated that the infrastructure situation of the area was underdeveloped in all aspects (roads, water, phone, and sewage). However, the sewage management was in the worse conditions (Alrifai, 2005). When I visited the neighborhood February 2019, the sewage problem was still there (Figure 4). The smell of sewage water was very strong. Additionally, water supply is unsatisfactory in most of the blocks of Jnah. The same 2005 study mentioned that 90% of the houses of the blocks Côte d'Azur, Saint Simone, and Saint Michelle used to get water from the Beirut water network,

whereas the rest of the houses and blocks were not connected to the network. This is due to construction works which took place in 1994 and 1995 to build the Marriot bridgewhich disconnected these blocks from the Beirut water network (ibid). Consequently, the residents dug up their own wells in order to have access to water. However, it is salty and polluted (Jähnigen, 2012). The water situation now seems to have worsened with the population increase, partly due to the arrival of Syrian refugees. According to Basma, who was a resident of the area until two years ago, after the Syrian refugees came to the area, the Lebanese IDP's built more houses in the area in order to rent them. Because of that, the water supply became fewer in the houses connected to the water network (Hassan & Basma, 2019).

## 5.5 Reasons of neglect

The neglect of the area, I argue, can be attributed to three main reasons. First, the IDP residents of Jnah are still registered in their municipalities of origin, in the South, Bekaa, and Beirut. While comparing other districts of Ghobeiry municipality with Jnah, a Lebanese resident of Jnah who has been living there since the civil war said:

> "there, they're legal, but here we're not legal. We are living here, as squatters. A circumstance made us come here, and it worked out. Before you were born, a circumstance made us come here, and we are still here. We are the original displaced. You can find people who come from the South" (Matar, 2019).

Mr. Matar said that he is registered in Beirut and other residents are registered in other areas. Therefore, they do not have the right to vote in the municipality of Ghobeiry, where they are living, and cannot influence the municipality election results, and therefore its policy (Saad, 2019).

The second reason behind the ignorance policy towards the area is that Jnah is right on the border area between Beirut Municipality and Ghobeiry municipality, yet it belongs to

Ghobeiry. According to the urban researcher Sawsan Saad that I interviewed, "there's […] a fine line and an invisible line between these two municipalities. So the area in-between is kept, let's say, without any services because it's not being taken by the municipality of Beirut nor Ghobeiry" (Saad, 2019). Abdel Rahman Matar who is a resident of the area, and who is also displaced adds that "You go to the Ghobeiry municipality, they would tell you we are in Beirut. You go to Beirut municipality; they tell you they don't want to transgress municipality of Ghobeiry" (Matar, 2019).

The third reason is the legal hurdle of the land is publicly owned, and "it's not legal for any municipality to respond and to make infrastructure connection to public land even though it's used for residential purpose" (Saad, 2019). This makes the responsibility of resolving the issues of the residents of Jnah not fall only on the shoulders of Ghobeiry municipality, but also the Lebanese state, as it is the owner and manager of the land.

According to Halabi land disputes in the Ouzaii Corridor, which go back to the 1950's, still affect the residents until this day (Halabi, 1988). Moreover, the complications added to the issue during the war does not make the question any easier to solve now. For example, in the interview I conducted with Abdel Rahman Matar, he claims that the Lebanese Army currently occupies his land in Karantina and thus he could not return to his land after the war (interview, 22/2/2019). He also claims that there are 460 Lebanese displaced families that live in Jnah that could not return to their houses in Beirut after the war. However, he did not explain how these families were not able to return to their houses.

## 5.6 Development of self-administration, and possible abuse

One of the consequences of this neglect and historical situation of the region is that a form of self-administration emerged in the area because of the lack of formal representation in the local government, as well as the neglect of the area from the local

authority (Ghobeiry municipality). Jnah has its own committees that manage the services in the area, yet there is no formal manner for choosing representatives by the residents, and these committees are supported by the local political parties in the area (Amal movement and Hezbollah) (Jähnigen, 2012). And while these two parties are both present in Jnah, the Amal movement seems to be more present and influential in Jnah (Saad, 2019) and while walking in the area, I saw more Amal movement flags than Hezbollah flags situated on buildings

I asked Abdel Rahman Matar about who is responsible for the area Abdel, and he replied "how I understand it is that the one that is taking care of the area is the one responsible for the area. For example, you see an office like this [Nonprofit office] open in the area, then you know who is responsible for the area" (Matar, 2019). Abdel Rahman is the president of a local NGO in Jnah called the Locals' Charity Committee that got its notice of recognition from the ministry of interior on January 17th, 2007. With time these local committees turned into local non-profits (Matar, 2019). In addition to Abdel Rahman's non-profit – I found another local non-profit in Jnah whose aims are local development while searching the non-profit registry in Mount Lebanon (MoSA, 2009). The other non-profit organization, the Development Association of People of Karantina in Jnah, received its notice of recognition from the ministry of interior on October 12th, 2006, before the Locals' Charity Committee. According to the notices of recognition, the aims of the Development Association of People of Karantina in Jnah Include "providing social aid for the displaced in Jnah area" and "work on the development and awareness for the displaced in the area"[19] which makes this non-profit organization highly focused on the IDP's in the area. Furthermore, the goals of the Locals' Charity Committee are to "do charity work for the needy in Jnah-Saint Simone without any discrimination" and "work with specialized authorities on the betterment of the situation of the residents of Jnah

---

[19] Notice of recognition #503/AD, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, 12/10/2006, Art. 1

and provide them with financial, food, and in fine aid"[20] which makes the non-profit organization seem to be working for all the residents of Jnah, including foreign migrants. Even Abdel Rahman said that "everyone that lives in the area, we help them. Be it a refugee, Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian, everyone gets help. And from all religious denominations" (Matar, 2019).

However, when I visited Jnah in February 2019, the only local non-profit organization that was mentioned to me by the refugees was Abdel Rahman's Locals' Charity Committee. Moreover, even then, a refugee who I interviewed (Zeina) claimed that Abdel Rahman is exploiting Syrian refugees and profiting off of them (Zeina, 2019). Zeina said that "they would take copies of our ID's and claim we will get aid on that basis […] and then he says that there is nothing, he didn't receive anything […] he would only give us, for example, an oil bottle or symbolic things". Abdel Rahman confirmed that he gives Syrians items that the Lebanese would not take. He stated:

> "*I got around 400 blankets from aid, blankets like those of the army. Different from the ones that come in bags, we distributed them to Syrians. The Lebanese didn't take them. Do you know? Who would take them? If you give them to me for free, I wouldn't take them […] they ran towards them" (Matar, 2019).*

When I asked Abdel Rahman about his sources of funding for the Locals' Charity Committee, he was not able to provide a straight-forward answer. He mentioned that he is an NGO, "I go everywhere and talk to everyone" and that "with my work, my activity, parliamentarians, municipalities, mukhtars, they all come to me" claiming that he is the main focal point for aid in the area. He gave an example that "when the [Norma] storm came, someone sent 600 blankets" (ibid). According to him, thus he has connections that help his non-profit organization. However, he was very adamant several times on

---

[20] Notice of recognition #6/AD, Ministry of Interior and Municipalities, 17/1/2017, Art. 1

mentioning that his non-profit organization has "no political background at all". In the Lebanese context, that statement means that his organization is not affiliated with any political party, although the Amal Movement seemed to have a strong presence in the area.

In the interview with Zeina, she reported an incident of Abdel Rahman allegedly scamming refugees by telling them he will get them medical operations for free, supposedly for all kinds of diseases, except plastic surgery. Basma, who works with Marwa, and is a Lebanese resident of the area, said that Abdel Rahman was telling people that he would take them to the American University of Beirut Medical Center[21] to get free operation surgeries. She added "not only people of Jnah were coming, but also Ouzaii and Bir Hassan. They came here from many areas", said Zeina in her interview. Zeina said that Abdel Rahman was asking people for their ID's in order to give them coupons to use in the hospital (figure 8 above).



*Figure 8Coupon distributed by Abdel Rahman to Syrian refugees, allegedly to provide access to medical care Source: captured by the author in February 2019*

---

[21] One of the most popular hospitals in Lebanon and the region

The coupons only have the stamp of the Local's Charity Committee, the name of beneficiary (erased for privacy), and number of beneficiaries. It did not include the hospital's name, type of operation, or cost of operation as one would assume a coupon of such kind would have. When the people reached the hospital "They took us to a basement downstairs. A nurse came to us, we gave her the numbers, and then she gave us each a small wrapper with vitamins. Those with heart problems, blood pressure, diabetes, teeth problems, or anything all got vitamins" (Zeina, interview, 22/2/2019). According to the accounts of Zeina and Basma, it seems like Abdel Rahman is always interested in getting ID copies from refugees in order to give them aid, if he gives them any ~~(ibid).~~ Matar additionally admitted in the interview I conducted with him that "on my system, I have numbers of Syrians. On my system, I have numbers of Palestinians. Of course, to protect your area" (Matar, A. Interview. 22/2/2019)

One might wonder whether Abdel Rahman is telling Syrian refugees to give him their ID's to collect their data rather than giving them aid as he tells them. One can ask whether there are other motives (other than safety) for him to collect refugees' ID's? Zeina adds in her interview that Abdel Rahman is a "harmful" person and that is why no one is trying to stop him. For example, she affirms that if someone would accuse him of being a fraud "he would say 'you are a liar' and 'the other day I gave you something, why are you lying?' This is how he would talk" (Zeina, 2019). Personally, during the interview with Abdel Rahman, I felt threatened. When I asked him about the data he stores about resident of the area, he replied "you need to be careful when you talk to me, please" (Matar, 2019). That is why I was not probing and tried to make myself seem as neutral as possible. Marwa told me that she felt that Abdel Rahman was patronizing her when Matar said to her "Why are you silent? […] It is nice when you speak". When I asked Zeina on why do people still take give copies of their ID's to Abdel Rahman to get aid although he does not give them what he usually promises, she said "it is like bait. He said he is distributing blankets, we all ran to see the blankets, you know how us Syrians

live in a poor situation. Look at this blanket" (Zeina, 2019). the blankets were the same ones that Abdel Rahman would not take even "if you give them to [him] for free" (Matar, 2019). Zeina added that "He gets lots of aid, lots of aid, and that's why people believe him when we see trucks going to him" (Zeina, 2019). Although I cannot state with certainty, I suggest that Abdel Rahman always asks for ID copies from refugees, when telling refugees that he will give them aid, in order to have a proof to his donors that the refugees did get the aid items – regardless of whether they got it or not.

If these claims are true, then the actions of Abdel Rahman and his NGO account to exploiting and controlling the Syrian refugees in the area. I developed this graph to illustrate more clearly how exploitation of refugees would happen in this case.



*Figure 9  Illustrative graph of the suspected exploitation of the refugees in the studied scenario. Source: illustrated by the author*

## 5.6 Other forms of exploitation

The second case of exploitation of Syrian refugees that I discovered in the area was in the housing sector. The houses that I visited lacked building standards. They are dark, humid, and unventilated. Additionally, the bad situation of these houses was exacerbated by record precipitation levels in Lebanon this year and the Norma Storm that hit the country, and Jnah was considered one of the "most affected areas" by UNHCR (UNHCR, 2019a). This led to many houses of refugees being flooded, and the walls getting mold (figure below), which is very unhealthy for children's respiratory systems (Kilpeläinen, Terho, Helenius, & Koskenvuo, 2001). Zeina told me the story of a family that found itself homeless because of the bad quality of the house that could not stand the Norma Storm:

> *"In the winter there were [a family of] 20 people. The man is married twice. He tried to go everywhere to rent a house. No one would rent him because he has 20 people. So he lived in the house of Abou Nabil for 300$. It is not a house, it is basically false walls, they only look like walls. And from outside it was zinc. The poor family lived there because no one would rent them as a big family [...] The day [the wife] gave birth, the storm came. The storm lasted for 3 minutes. What did the storm do? It removed the house from its roots. Nothing stayed there, it was all on the street. Her newborn was on the edge of the roof. The children survived miraculously. There was nothing left." (Zeina, 2019)*

And after the house was fully destroyed by the storm, the landlord "didn't do anything for [the family]", said Zeina in her interview.  Keeping in mind that the "landlord" does not own the land, he didn't have any substantial costs building the house that would get destroyed in a matter of minutes on the head of its inhabitants. He exploited the family's need for a house, and their financial situation and rented them a "house" that was not going to stand the storm. Moreover, one year after year, Jnah residents suffered from

storms inflicting damage to their property, especially that the area is right by the sea (El-Ghoul, 2004) (Naharnet, 2015) (Al-Modon, 2018).

According to Basma, when the Lebanese residents "saw the situation and they took advantage of it. They saw that Syrians are coming, so they started building" (Hassan & Basma, 2019). However, since the land is already squatted, and there is no legitimate ownership of land by the displaced Lebanese residents, the building of new houses for Syrian refugees was very informal.

## 5.8 Theorizing the above

The situation which I have elaborated upon here can be understood through conceptual framework that I developed: "double displacement". That refers to the cohabitation of two displaced populations in the same space, the first one which are the Lebanese IDP's, and the second are the Syrian refugees. While both of these populations face a problem of informality, the informality of the Syrians is different than that from the Lebanese IDP's due to different reasons that were mentioned in the previous chapter. The case I have discussed in this chapter suggests that in a situation where two displaced populations share the same space, the older displaced population come to act as a host to the newer population. Because the older displaced population is in financial need, and because of informality, the older displaced population potentially can try to exploit the newer population. One way in which this works, as in this case, is that the older displaced population has more social capital, and is more knowledgeable in navigating and "tricking" the legal structures in the area since they have more experience.

# Chapter 6: Conclusion

This thesis looked at the issue of refugee informality in Lebanon from different aspects. At first, I explored the legal aspect of refugee informality in Lebanon. This issue seemed to be an old one that only got exacerbated with the incoming big number of Syrian refugees since the start of the conflict in Syria. Since Lebanon's immigration laws are outdated and the current context of global migration is very different from what we had in the 1960ies's when these laws were issued, a chaos in migration management in Lebanon was inevitable – at least when it comes to the rights and living conditions of refugees. Add to that Lebanon not being a part of the main international instruments in refugee protection: the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, which left the definition and rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Lebanon (except for Palestine refugees). In the chapter "the Manufacturing of Informality", I exhibited the different changes that happened with the refugee management in Lebanon through the exploration of the relationship of the UNHCR and the General Security over time. The most important stages of this relationship were the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between these two parties in 2003, where the General Security practically waived the burden of refugee management off its shoulders to give it to UNHCR. However, this MOU did not expect the big incoming numbers of Iraqi refugees to Lebanon who reached 50,000 at some point (Tabar, 2010). The Iraqi crisis led to thousands of Iraqi refugees in prison because of lack of legal status. Later on when the Syrians came to Lebanon starting 2011, the Lebanese government did not issue any major policies regarding the management of said refugees, until 3 years into the conflict when the number of refugees was over 1.1 Million (UNHCR, 2019). The Lebanese Council of Ministers issued a policy paper aiming to decrease the number of refugees in October 2014 (Lebanese Council of Ministers, 2014). A few months later, the General Security issued new entry and residence regulations for Syrian nationals, which lead 73 percent of

Syrian refugees older than 15 to have invalid residence permit in 2018 (UNHCR, UNICEF, & WFP, 2018). The chapter then explains what the resulting consequences of living in informality are. At the end of the chapter I explain the concept of the regime of tolerance in Lebanon, where the state keeps refugees in a precarious state, where their mere presence is precarious and can lead them to be arrested. However, the state tolerates the presence of these refugees and keeps them living in this limbo as a way of refugee management, making the manufacturing of informality as its main refugee management strategy.

However, further should be done on this topic, taking into consideration that the Lebanese state is not one uniform body, it has different disagreeing parties on many issues that pertain to refugees. These different voices inside the Lebanese government are interesting to study, and to see if the Lebanese government really has a "strategy" to manage refugees, or is this "strategy" just the result of compromises, lack of management, and – possibly – corruption.

The other way that the Lebanese state manages Syrian is through "turning the blind eye." In the area of Jnah, the "government does not come except if they want to get the electricity bills" as Basma from the area told me (interview, 22/2/2019). Jnah is an area south of Beirut that has been squatted by Lebanese IDP's during the civil war. The area used to be a touristic area as it is by the beach, but now it is considered to be a slum. The Lebanese residents of Jnah are living irregularly in their houses there, and poverty was rampant (Alrifai, 2005). When Syrian refugees came to the area, the Lebanese residents built extra houses to rent them to Syrians, on houses that is not theirs, with bad building standards. Moreover, I discovered throughout my research an alleged case of fraud in a local NGO in the area that takes copies of refugees' ID's, promising to get them aid, however they get them really little aid items of bad quality usually. The feature of having IDP's that became refugee hosts is very interesting in Jnah. In order to better understand I developed a conceptual framework of "double displacement" where the older displaced population (IDP's) exploits the newer displaced population (Syrian refugees). Such model would only work in the presence of

informality, because the presence of law enforcement is supposed to deter people from exploiting refugees.

Drawing from the above, we can see that the Lebanese state's lack of management of the refugee dossier has lead Syrian refugees to suffer a lot. Many decisions could have been taken to ensure that Syrian refugees lived in dignity, instead of having a situation today where no one even knows the number of refugees we have. Yet to be fair, Lebanon's refugee dossier is proportionally the biggest in the world, however, consecutive governments that were not able to even provide the basic needs for the Lebanese population are not helping either.

In the end, I invite researchers who are interested to delve more into the field of informality, because I learnt how to be able to make sense of situations that do not make sense, and such situations are too common.

# Sources

## Interviews

Frangieh, Ghida. [Interview]. Beirut, Lebanon. 18/2/2019

Hassan, Marwa & Basma. [Interview]. Jnah, Lebanon. 22/2/2019

Layla. [Interview]. Via Skype. 19/3/2019

Matar, Abdel Rahman. [Interview]. Jnah, Lebanon. 22/2/2019

Saad, Sawsan. [Interview]. Via Skype. 18/3/2019

Zeina. [Interview]. Jnah, Lebanon. 22/2/2019

## Secondary Sources & Bibliography

Abbas, T. (2017, 9/9/2017). Abbas Ibrahim … The Eyes and Ears of the Lebanese State. Retrieved from https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1019646/abbas-ibrahim-%E2%80%A6-eyes-and-ears-lebanese-state


ALEF. (2018). *Annual Report 2017*. Retrieved from https://alefliban.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/annual_report_2017_v03_-2.pdf

Al-Modon. (2018). Garbage on the beaches is a little of what is in the sea [ النفايات على الشواطئ قليل مما في البحر]. Retrieved from https://www.almodon.com/politics/2018/1/29/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%86%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%84%D9%89-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%B7%D9%8A-%D9%82%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%84-%D9%85%D9%85%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A8%D8%AD%D8%B1

Alrifai, D. (2005). *Rapid Social Assesment: Beirut and its suburbs*. Retrieved from Beirut: http://www.cdr.gov.lb/study/CDP_RSA/Beirut.pdf

Asharq Al-Awsat. (2019, 26/7/2019). Lebanese Labor Ministry Ups Pressure on Syrians. *Asharq Al-Awsat.* Retrieved from

https://aawsat.com/english/home/article/1830136/lebanese-labor-ministry-ups-pressure-syrians

Associated Press. (2019, 20/7/2019). In Lebanon, Syrian refugees face new pressure to go home. Retrieved from https://en.annahar.com/article/987004-in-lebanon-syrian-refugees-face-new-pressure-to-go-home

Bou Aoun, C. (2018). Framing the Lebanese Seashore: Crowding Out Public Interest. Retrieved from http://legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=4372

Bou Nader, P. (2017). LEBANON: ONE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO RULE THEM ALL. Retrieved from http://www.afri-ct.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Lebanon_One-intelligence-agency-to-rule-them-all-Philippe-Bou-Nader.pdf

Bryant, A. (2017). *Grounded theory and grounded theorizing: Pragmatism in research practice*: Oxford University Press.

Central Intelligence Agency. (2018, July 2018). Lebanon. *The World Factbook.* Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/LIBRARY/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html

Chamseddine, A. (Producer). (2018). بلدة الكحالة تطرد نازحين سوريين في جنح الظلام! [Kahhaleh Kicks out Syrian Displaced at Night]. [News Report]

Charafeddine, W. (1987). *La Banlieue sud de Beyrouth: structure urbaine et économique.* (PhD), Paris 4,

Charmaz, K. (2006). *Constructing grounded theory : a practical guide through qualitative analysis*. London ; Thousand Oaks: SAGE.

Chulov, M., Carrie, S., & Al Omar, A. (2019, 29/7/2019). Syrian refugees in Beirut and Istanbul detained and deported. *Syria.* Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/29/syrian-refugees-in-beirut-and-istanbul-detained-and-deported

Clarke, K. (2017). Protest and Informal Leadership in Syrian Refugee Camps. *Refugees and Migration Movements in the Middle East*, 16.

Clerc, V. (2008). *Negotiations of space, perceptions and strategies in the urban projects*

*of Beirut's Southern Suburbs reconstruction*. Paper presented at the Negociation of Space: The Politics and Planning of Destruction and Reconstruction in Lebanon, Oxford, United Kingdom. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00367068

De Genova, N. (2013). Spectacles of migrant 'illegality': the scene of exclusion, the obscene of inclusion. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36*(7), 1180-1198. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2013.783710. doi:10.1080/01419870.2013.783710

Dionigi, F. (2016). *THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS IN LEBANON: STATE FRAGILITY AND SOCIAL RESILIENCE*. Retrieved from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/65565/1/Dionigi_Syrian_Refugees%20in%20Lebanon_Author_2016.pdf

El Deek, E. (2017, 17-10-2017). *Speech on the behalf of the General Directorate of General Security.* Paper presented at the Lebanon and Syrian Displacement: Burdens and the priority of return, Yarzeh.

El-Ghoul, A. (2004). Jnah squatters hold protest to demand compensation. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2004/Jan-29/912-jnah-squatters-hold-protest-to-demand-compensation.ashx

Etikan, I., Musa, S. A., & Alkassim, R. S. (2016). Comparison of convenience sampling and purposive sampling. *American journal of theoretical and applied statistics, 5*(1), 1-4.

European Civil Protection Humanitarian Aid Operations. (2019). Lebanon. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/middle-east/lebanon_en

Fakhoury, T., & Raad, L. A. (2018). Refugees as Minorities: Displaced Syrians as a "New Minority" in Lebanon's Sectarian Power-Sharing System. *Maghreb-Machrek*(2), 43-53.

Fawaz, M. (2017). Planning and the refugee crisis: Informality as a framework of analysis and reflection. *Planning Theory, 16*(1), 99-115.

Fawaz, M., & Peillen, I. (2002). *The Slums of Beirut: History and Development 1930–2002*. Paper presented at the United Nations Center for Human Settlements.

Frangieh, G., & Saghieh, N. (2018, 26/3/2018). Regulating Entry and Residence Conditions for Syrians: A Legal Victory in Lebanon. *Legal Agenda.* Retrieved from http://legal-agenda.com/en/article.php?id=4286

Fronteirs Ruwad. (2003). Lebanon-UNHCR Memorandum of Understanding [Press release]

Fronteirs Ruwad. (2010). Refugee deportation crisis... Until when? [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.frontiersruwad.org/pdf/ADV_Press%20Release_Press%20Conference_FR_Ar.pdf

Frontiers Ruwad. (2006). Legality vs Legitimacy: Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Lebanon. Retrieved from http://www.frontiersruwad.org/pdf/FR_Report_Legality%20vs.%20Legitimacy_Eng_2006.pdf

Garcea, J. (2016). The resettlement of Syrian refugees: The positions and roles of the federation of Canadian municipalities and its members. *Canadian Ethnic Studies, 48*(3), 149-173.

General Directorate for General Security. Conditions of Entry of Syrian Nationals to Lebanese Territory [شروط دخول الرعايا السوريين الى الأراضي اللبنانية]. In G. D. f. G. Security (Ed.). Lebanon.

General Directorate for General Security. (2019, 1/6/2019). Voluntary Return of Syrian Displaced on 1/6/2019. *Directorate Activities.* Retrieved from http://www.general-security.gov.lb/ar/activities/details/directorate/496

General Directorate of General Security. Functions of the general security. Retrieved from http://www.general-security.gov.lb/en/posts/3

General Directorate of General Security. General Directors. Retrieved from http://www.general-security.gov.lb/en/about/directors

Gohlke-Rouhayem, J., Melki, N., & Weinmann, C. D. (2016). *Employment and Labour Market Analysis (ELMA) Lebanon*. Retrieved from Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ): https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/43215

Government of Lebanon, & United Nations. (2014). *Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016*. Retrieved from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/42701

Government of Lebanon, & United Nations. (2019). *LEBANON CRISIS RESPONSE PLAN 2017-2020 (2019 UPDATE)*. Retrieved from http://www.LCRP.gov.lb

Hägerdal, N. (2018). Lebanon's Hostility to Syrian Refugees. *Middle East Brief, 116*.

Halabi, M.-B. (1988). *Illegitimate settlements in West Beirut: a manipulation of tenure policies and class struggle over land.* (Masters Thesis), Massachusetts Institute of Technology,

Halabi, Z. (2004). Exclusion and identity in Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps: a story of sustained conflict. *Environment and Urbanization, 16*(2), 39-48.

Hourani, G. (2011). The Kurds of Lebanon: Socioeconomic Mobility and Political Participation via Naturalization. *LERC Research Paper Series, 1*.

Houssari, N. (2019). Lebanese president pledges safe return of Syrian refugees. *Arab News.* Retrieved from http://www.arabnews.com/node/1458601/middle-east

Human Rights Watch. (2016). *I Just Wanted to Be Treated like a Person': How Lebanon's Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees*. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facilitate-abuse

Information International sal. (2019, 27/7/2019). Lebanese people: 5.5 Million. *The Monthly Magazine.* Retrieved from https://monthlymagazine.com/ar-article-desc_4858_اللبنانيون-55-مليون-نسمة

International Center for Transitional Justice. (2013). *Lebanon's Legacy of Political Violence: A Mapping of Serious Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Lebanon, 1975-2008*. Retrieved from Beirut: https://www.ictj.org/publication/lebanon-legacy-political-violence

Jagarnathsingh, A. (2016). *Formal Informality, Brokering Mechanisms, and Illegality. The Impact of the Lebanese State's Policies on Syrian Refugees' Daily Lives.* Retrieved from Beirut:

Jähnigen, F. (2012). The Coastal Settlements of Ouzaii and Jnah Analysis of an Upgrading Project in Beirut. In M. Ababsa, B. Dupret, & E. Denis (Eds.), *Popular Housing and Urban Land Tenure in the Middle East* (pp. 321-348): American University in Cairo Press.

Janmyr, M. (2016). The legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. *Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs*(33).

Janmyr, M. (2016). Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon. *Refugee Survey Quarterly, 35*(4), 58-78. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdw016. doi:10.1093/rsq/hdw016

Janmyr, M. (2017). No Country of asylum:'Legitimizing'Lebanon's rejection of the 1951 refugee convention. *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 29(3), 438-465.

Janmyr, M. (2018). UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon. *The International Journal of Human Rights, 22*(3), 393-419. Retrieved from https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140. doi:10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140

Kagan, M. (2011). 'We Live in a Country of UNHCR': The UN Surrogate State and Refugee Policy in the Middle East. *The UN Refugee Agency: Policy Development & Evaluation Service Research Paper*(201).

Keith, A., & Shawaf, N. (2017). *Still looking for safety: Voices of refugees from Syria on solutions for the present and future*. Retrieved from https://oxf.am/2FM0Dr6

Khawaja, B. (2017, 14/3/2017). Lebanon Policy Leaves 'Second-Class' Syrians Vulnerable to Return: HRW. *Refugees Deeply.* Retrieved from https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/community/2017/03/14/lebanon-policy-leaves-second-class-syrians-vulnerable-to-return-hrw

Kikano, F. (2018). Informal Settlements as Social Places of Life. In M. Fawaz, A. Gharbieh, M. Harb, & D. Salamé (Eds.), *Refugess as City-Makers* (pp. 144-150). Beirut: Social Justice and the City Program at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs, American University of Beirut.

Kilpeläinen, M., Terho, E. O., Helenius, H., & Koskenvuo, M. (2001). Home dampness, current allergic diseases, and respiratory infections among young adults. *Thorax, 56*(6), 462-467. Retrieved from

https://thorax.bmj.com/content/thoraxjnl/56/6/462.full.pdf.
doi:10.1136/thorax.56.6.462

Knudsen, A. (2005). Islamism in the Diaspora: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. *Journal of Refugee Studies, 18*(2), 216-234. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1093/refuge/fei022. doi:10.1093/refuge/fei022

LBC International. (2019, 22/7/2019). Here is the result of the inspection of the Ministry of Labor on Monday. *Lebanon News.* Retrieved from https://www.lbcgroup.tv/news/d/lebanon/458306/%D8%A5%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%83%D9%85-%D8%AD%D8%B5%D9%8A%D9%84%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%AA%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%88%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D9%85%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AB%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86/ar

Lebanese Council of Ministers (Producer). (2014). Session of 23rd of October, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.pcm.gov.lb/arabic/subpg.aspx?pageid=6118

Lebanon Support, & Jagarnathsingh, A. (2018). *Lebanon - Country Report: Legal & Policy Framework of Migration Governance*. Retrieved from Beirut: https://civilsociety-centre.org/resource/legal-and-policy-framework-migration-governance

Long, T., & Hanafi, S. (2010). Human (in)security: Palestinian perceptions of security in and around the refugee camps in Lebanon. *Conflict, Security & Development, 10*(5), 673-692. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2010.511510. doi:10.1080/14678802.2010.511510

Mahdi, D. (2017). *Understanding Refugee Politics in Lebanon and Calls for Repatriation*. Retrieved from http://lcps-lebanon.org/publication.php?id=314

Makdisi, U. (2000). *The culture of sectarianism: community, history, and violence in nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon*: Univ of California Press.

Matar, A. (2019) */Interviewer: Y. Zeineddine*. EMMIR, Jnah, Lebanon.

Mhaissen, R., & Hodges, E. (2019). *Unpacking Return: Syrian Refugees' Conditions and Concerns*. Retrieved from Sawa for Development and Aid:

https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/unpacking-return-syrian-refugees-conditions-and-concerns-enar

Ministry of Social Affairs. (2009). List of Non-profit Organizations - Mount Lebanon Governerate from Ministry of Social Affairs http://socialaffairs.gov.lb/admin/Uploads/112_2.pdf

Naharnet. (2015). Storm Wreaks Havoc across Lebanon, Forcing Suspension of Flights, Classes. Retrieved from http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/161894

Nassar, J., & Stel, N. (2019). Lebanon's response to the Syrian Refugee crisis–Institutional ambiguity as a governance strategy. *Political Geography, 70*, 44-54.

National News Agency. (2016, 15/2/2016). BASSIL: TO ADHERE TO LEBANESE FORMULA. *Politics.* Retrieved from http://nna-leb.gov.lb/en/show-news/56822/nna-leb.gov.lb/nna-leb.gov.lb%3E

Nimer, M. (2019). Reflections on the Political Economy in Forced Migration Research from a 'Global South' Perspective. Retrieved from https://www.thesociologicalreview.com/reflections-on-the-political-economy-in-forced-migration-research-from-a-global-south-perspective/

O'Donnell, K., & Newland, K. (2008). The Iraqi Refugee Crisis: the need for action. *Migration Policy Institute*, 1-24.

Peteet, J. (1996). From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon. *Middle East Report*(200), 27-30. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3013265. doi:10.2307/3013265

Restan, L. (2010). *Beyond Borders: Palestinian Children's Perspectives on their Everyday Life and Future. Ein el Helwe Refugee Camp, Southern Lebanon.* Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Fakultet for …,

Russell, T. (1985). A Lebanon Primer. *MERIP Reports*(133), 17-19. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3010813. doi:10.2307/3010813

Sanyal, R. (2017). A no-camp policy: Interrogating informal settlements in Lebanon. *Geoforum, 84*, 117-125.

Schlein, L. (2019, 10/1/2019). UN Warns Against Mass Return of Syrian Refugees From

Lebanon. *Middle East.* Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/middle-east/un-warns-against-mass-return-syrian-refugees-lebanon

Skordas, A. (2016). *The Obligations Of States Towards Refugees Under International Law: Some Reflections On The Situation In Lebanon*. Retrieved from Lebanon: https://www.nrc.no/resources/briefing-notes/syrian-refugees-right-to-legal-identity-implications-for-return/

Slaughter, A., & Crisp, J. (2009). *A Surrogate State?: The Role of UNHR in Protracted Refugee Situations*: UNHCR, Policy Development and Evaluation Service.

Suleiman, J. (1999). The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies, 29*(1), 66. Retrieved from http://jps.ucpress.edu/content/29/1/66.abstract. doi:10.2307/2676432

Tabar, P. (2010). Lebanon: A country of Emigration and Immigration. *Institute for Migration Studies, 7*.

The Daily Star. (2019, 19/2/2019). Refugee affairs minister briefs Aoun, Hariri on Syria trip. *Lebanon News.* Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2019/Feb-19/476956-refugee-affairs-minister-briefs-aoun-on-syria-trip.ashx

Tınas, M. (2017). Syrian refugees in Lebanon: Economic, political and sectarian challenges in the absence of a governmental strategy. *ORSAM Review of Regional Affairs, 62*, 9.

Trombetta, L. (2017). "Willy-Nilly We Have to Live Side by Side": Relationships Between Locals and Newcomers at the Syria–Lebanon Border. In *Lebanon Facing The Arab Uprisings* (pp. 15-34): Springer.

Turner, L. (2015). Explaining the (Non-)Encampment of Syrian Refugees: Security, Class and the Labour Market in Lebanon and Jordan. *https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125*. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/citedby/10.1080/13629395.2015.1078125?scroll=top&needAccess=true. doi:1078125

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly  (1948).

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, UN General Assembly (1984).

UNHCR (Producer). Executive Committee's membership by year of admission of
members. Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/40112e984.pdf

UNHCR. (2006). Population Statistics. Retrieved from
http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.53512429.436230009.156404915
2-398069732.1552924421

UNHCR. (2018). Statement on the death of 15 Syrians during an overnight storm while
they were attempting to enter Lebanese territory [Press release]. Retrieved from
https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2018/1/5a64875d4/statement-death-15-
syrians-during-overnight-storm-attempting-enter-lebanese.html

UNHCR, WFP, & UNICEF. (2018). VASyR 2018: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian
Refugees in Lebanon. Retrieved from:
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/67380

UNHCR. (2019). *NORMA STORM: Situation Report*. Retrieved from
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67551

UNHCR. (2019, 30/6/2019). Syria Regional Refugee Response: Durable Solutions.
Retrieved from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria_durable_solutions

UNHCR (Cartographer). (2019). Syrian Refugee Response, Lebanon, Beirut and Mount
Lebanon: Distribution of the Registered Syrian Refugees at the Cadastral Level.
Retrieved from https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/69592

UNHCR. (2019, 30/6/2019). Total Registered Refugees. *Operational Portal Refugee
Situations.* Retrieved from
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71

UNRWA. (2014). Lebanon | UNRWA. Retrieved from https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-
work/lebanon.

UNRWA. (2019). PRS in Lebanon. Retrieved from https://www.unrwa.org/prs-lebanon

Walmer, D. (2018, 21-12-2018). 2018 washes away Lebanon rainfall records: Will this

winter also be wet? Retrieved from
https://www.ldnews.com/story/news/local/2018/12/21/2018-washes-away-lebanon-rainfall-records-winter-wet-christmas-forecast-weather/2376616002/

Working Group for Persons Affected by the Syrian Displacement Crisis in Lebanon. (2017). *Right to a Future: Threats to Legal and Physical Safety*.

Yassin, N., & Chamaa, Y. (2016). The informal adaptive mechanisms among Syrian Refugees and marginalised host communities in Lebanon. *Middle East Centre Blog*.

# Declaration of authenticity

I hereby declare that the dissertation submitted is my own and that all passages and ideas that are not mine have been fully and properly acknowledged. I am aware that I will fail the entire dissertation should I include passages and ideas from other sources and present them as if they were my own.

Name: Youssef Nabih Zeineddine

Date and Place: 1/8/2019, Lebanon

Signature: