12-30-2022

The Gift of Giving: Recognizing Donors and Revealing Donation Amounts

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THE GIFT OF GIVING: RECOGNIZING DONORS AND REVEALING DONATION AMOUNTS

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Abstract. Publicly announcing how much individuals donate on behalf of themselves is a common fundraising strategy. For tribute gifts made on behalf of others, however, charities only reveal donor identities to the honoree with few revealing the size of their contributions. This paper examines the fundraising consequences of recognizing donors with and without information about donation amounts when notifying honorees of gifts made on their behalf. I find that revealing contribution amounts in addition to recognizing donors benefits fundraisers. I find that both the likelihood of giving on behalf of others and contribution amounts increase when honorees learn how much donors give. The results either suggest that fundraisers are leaving tribute donations on the table, or that announcing the size of these gifts may be repugnant and constrains what practices fundraisers can implement.

1. Introduction

It is common practice for charities to recognize their donors publicly to thank them for their generosity. For example, organizations send honor-roll letters to their supporters that include donor names. Honor-roll letters also reveal information about how much individuals give, whether in specific donation amounts or in giving levels. These forms of communications have become a staple in the "best practices" of donor relations professionals (ADRP, 2021).

While practitioners note that these methods are a valuable means of reciprocating supporter engagement with their organization, donor recognition also has fundraising benefits. The practice of revealing donor names and their contribution amounts has been shown to be an effective tool in generating greater giving in the laboratory and in the field (e.g., Andreoni and Petrie, 2004; Rege and Telle, 2004; Karlan and McConnell, 2014; Samek and Sheremeta, 2017). Disclosing this information can motivate individuals who are concerned with their social image, prestige, or shame to increase their donations (Harbaugh, 1998; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Samek and Sheremeta, 2014).

Date: December 30, 2022.

*Smith College, Department of Economics, kwinichakul@smith.edu. I am extremely grateful to Lise Vesterlund for careful advising and guidance throughout this project. I would like to thank Michael Coury, David Danz, David Huffman, Marissa Lepper, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Neil Silveus, Stephanie Wang, Alistair Wilson, Ning Zhang, and participants at the 2021 ESA Global Meeting and University of Pittsburgh Experimental Brown Bag for helpful comments and suggestions. Raymond Happy at CCS Fundraising, Jodi Weisfield at the Katz Graduate School of Business, and numerous individuals at the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy also provided invaluable insights for this project. I would also like to thank the Harvey S. Cohen Fellows at the University of Pittsburgh for their research assistance. Finally, I would like to thank Tricia Panos and Tessa Hollinger at Animal Friends, Amber Deemer, Maria Montaro, Jamie Burrows, and Juliana Gabany at the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank, and Susannah Hilliard, Kristin Brown, and Jordie O'Malley at the Women's Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh for their help in making this research possible.

Donor recognition is not only a practice implemented for contributions made on behalf of oneself but also for tribute donations made on behalf of others. Tribute donations are given to honor or celebrate joyous occasions, as well as to memorialize those who have recently passed. In lieu of traditional gifts, couples may request that wedding attendees give to their favorite charity; as an alternative to sending flowers, families may request contributions for a cause that was important to the deceased. To recognize individuals who make tribute donations, organizations notify honorees and stewards of memorial funds of tribute donations made on their behalf.[1]

Though donor recognition is an important practice irrespective of whether donations are made on behalf of oneself or others, charities approach donor recognition differently depending on the type of gift. For gifts made on behalf of oneself, it is common to see information revealed about the size of donations. In contrast, for tribute giving most organizations follow the "best practice that donation amounts are never disclosed unless otherwise specified by the donor" (Ibrisevic, 2019).

If publicly revealing donation amounts yields fundraising benefits for contributions made on behalf of oneself, one might posit that it would also benefit fundraising efforts when considering donations made to honor others. When only recognizing that a donation is made, individual donors may receive similar recognition independent of gift size. Donors know that honorees will be notified of contributions made on their behalf without ever knowing how much donors give. As a result, they may give less than they would have had the size of their donation been revealed. However, only recognizing donors without revealing donation amounts may also increase the number of people who give. Absent other explanations, if the expected returns from larger-sized donations when revealing amounts outweigh the potential extensive margin benefits when only recognizing donors, it may suggest that charities are leaving money on the table by not disclosing tribute donation amounts.

Yet if we think about the broader context in which tribute donations are made, there may be more to consider when assessing how to recognize tribute gifts. Practitioners note that individuals who make tribute donations may be less familiar with the organizations receiving their support. It could be that fundraisers are more concerned with drawing in new donors who they can subsequently approach for future financial support, even if it means accepting smaller-sized contributions in the short-term. Only revealing that an individual donates, without revealing how much they donate, may provide organizations the best chance of achieving this objective.

In this paper, I explore the fundraising consequences of revealing contribution amounts in addition to recognizing donors in the novel domain of tribute giving. When only recognizing donors, I evaluate overall giving, the likelihood that individuals will give to charity, and the size of gifts among donors. In complement, I document whether revealing donation amounts in addition to recognizing donors affects overall giving, whether they are more or less likely to give to charity, and the size of gifts among donors.

To the best of my knowledge this paper is the first to study tribute donations, which are fairly common in practice but remain an unexplored topic in the literature. According to the *2018 Global Trends in Giving Report*, one third of surveyed donors worldwide had made a tribute donation

[1]I use the term "honoree" to represent both an honored person who is still living, and the stewards of memorial funds for honorees who are deceased.

on behalf of others, with over 40% doing so in the United States. A systematic examination of tribute giving is therefore a beneficial undertaking for multiple reasons. First, this paper documents the overall fundraising value of tribute donations. Second, this study offers evidence to evaluate whether existing donor recognition practices for tribute gifts generate the greatest fundraising benefit. Third, beyond donor recognition the results broaden our understanding of interpersonal factors in the charitable giving marketplace. Tribute donations are a unique form of giving that are influenced by distinct personal and social dynamics. This paper offers insights into the factors which shape the choice to give on behalf of others.

To study this question, I run a between-subject laboratory experiment where participants can donate to charity on behalf of others. When making a donation on behalf of others, participants mail acknowledgment cards to individuals who they honor with their donations. Treatments vary along three information dimensions that reveal different details about participant donations to honorees. These treatments are named *ID*, *ID&Amount*, and *Choose Info*. In the *ID* treatment, participants who make a tribute donation mail cards to honorees that acknowledge their tribute gifts but do not include how much they donate. This treatment mirrors what honorees typically learn about tribute donations. In contrast in a *ID&Amount* treatment, participants who make a tribute donation also mail cards to honorees, but the cards now include contribution amounts. Finally in a *Choose Info* treatment, I gauge whether, conditional on donating on behalf of others, participants prefer to only reveal that they donate or if they also want to reveal how much they donate to honorees in the mailed cards. Across all treatments, individuals who decline to make tribute gifts can make donations on behalf of themselves or choose not to give at all. All treatments conclude with a scheduled future donation, a novel assessment to evaluate whether recognition policies affect later financial support for the charity.[2]

The results illustrate that revealing the size of donations made on behalf of others is advantageous for the fundraiser. Overall giving is approximately 11% larger when contribution amounts and donors are revealed. While the overall likelihood of donating is not affected by revealing tribute contribution amounts relative to only recognizing donors, doing so increases the likelihood that individuals give on behalf of others by approximately 15 percentage points. The results also show that individual gifts are larger when they are told how much they donate in tribute will be revealed to honorees. Conditional on giving in tribute, participant donations are over 20% larger when donation amounts are revealed compared to when they are not. The effect on tribute donations appears to drive the difference in the average size of donations across treatments. This is what we would expect, given that tribute donations are the targeted type of giving.[3] Finally, revealing donation amounts above recognizing donors neither affects the likelihood, nor how much, individuals give in the future.

[2]I also run treatments where participants make donations on behalf of themselves (and cannot give on behalf of others). In these "Self" treatments, I also vary information that is revealed about donations across three between subject treatments, but to other participants in the same experimental session rather than to honorees. Given the focus of this paper on tribute donations, details on the Self treatments are provided in Appendix Section D.

[3]The study was also run in an online setting following procedures outlined in Danz et al. (2021). In online sessions I did not find any impact of revealing tribute contribution amounts on giving behavior, relative to only recognizing donors. However I was unable to mail tribute donation acknowledgment cards to honorees in the online sessions, unlike in-person sessions. I believe the inability to enforce notifying honorees of tribute gifts led to this result.

Altogether, the findings suggest that fundraisers could benefit from changing donor recognition methods for tribute gifts. However, the discordance between the study results and current fundraising practices invites a larger discussion about whether the choice to reveal tribute gift amounts involves a more complex set of factors. For example, suppose someone buys a present for a family member – should they leave the price tag on their gift? Many of us might be inclined to say "no," as doing so would be inappropriate. Perhaps it is because we are concerned that the gift-giver will be embarrassed if they do not spend a lot of money on the present. This embarrassment could apply to revealing tribute donation amounts. When given the option, 53% of participants in this study choose not to reveal how much they give to honorees when making a tribute donation. Our reluctance to reveal tribute gift amounts, in part due to the potential for embarrassment, may more generally be because we are accustomed to following a set of gift-giving social norms. Tribute donations may be seen as a form of in-kind gift, and it is typically an unacceptable practice to leave the price tag on a present. If social conventions of this kind are both widespread and widely-accepted among honorees and donors, revealing the size of tribute donations could be seen as repugnant even when engaging in this practice would otherwise be beneficial for fundraisers (Roth, 2007).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes prior work and discusses the unique characteristics present with tribute giving. Section 3 describes the experimental design, and Section 4 reviews the study findings. Section 5 discusses the implications of the study results, and Section 6 concludes.

2. Background

2.1. **Prior Work on Donations Made on Behalf of Oneself.** While there is no literature on tribute donations, I begin by considering what prior work has shown about donor recognition for contributions made on behalf of oneself. First, individuals can signal desirable traits when donor identities and donation amounts are publicized. Charitable giving can highlight an individual's wealth, prestige, or generosity.[4] Donors who are concerned with their social image have been shown to take advantage of the opportunity to communicate their generosity. Laboratory studies have documented that revealing donor identities and contribution amounts can lead to greater giving.[5] In the field, similar fundraising benefits have been found from recognizing donors and the size of their donations.[6] In return, others have been shown to reward donors for their generosity.[7]

[4]See for example, Glazer and Konrad (1996), Harbaugh (1998), Benabou and Tirole (2006), and Vesterlund (2016).
[5]Studies illustrating these effects include, for example, Andreoni and Petrie (2004), Rege and Telle (2004), Ariely et al. (2009), Duffy and Kornienko (2010), Kumru and Vesterlund (2010), Samek and Sheremeta (2014), and Kessler et al. (2021). Information about peers' generosity can also affect one's contributions (see, e.g., Shang and Croson, 2009; Smith et al., 2015; Gee and Schreck, 2018; Kessler et al., 2021).
[6]Example field studies include Karlan and McConnell (2014) and Samek and Sheremeta (2017). Past work has also shown the benefits of publicizing other forms of donations, such as participation in blood drives (Lacetera and Macis, 2010).
[7]Elfenbein et al. (2012) note that eBay sellers, particularly newer or inexperienced ones, are rewarded from donating part of their proceeds to charity. Fehrler and Przepiorka (2016) document that donors are more likely to be selected as a partner in a trust game than non-donors. Recent work has highlighted additional complexity behind what the size of donations may signal, particularly when there is knowledge of the donor's income, past familiarity with the donor, or information about the type of solicitation that is used (Bracha and Vesterlund, 2017; Berman et al., 2015; Winichakul, 2021).

Across existing work for giving on behalf of oneself, two pieces of information are typically revealed together when donation information is publicized. That is, most studies reveal both who gives and how much they give.[8] However, fundraisers could instead choose to only recognize donors without revealing how much they give. Relative to when donation amounts are revealed, more individuals may be willing to give if they can make a smaller-sized donation and still have the opportunity to signal the same desired "generous" traits, or avoid shame, when only the act of giving is disclosed.

In short, only revealing whether an agent gives may lead to *higher donation rates* compared to when gift amounts are also revealed. While there may be an extensive margin benefit to only recognizing donors (or put differently, an extensive margin cost to revealing donation amounts in addition to recognizing donors), there may be an intensive margin benefit to revealing donation amounts above only recognizing donors. In particular, revealing how much people give in addition to who gives may lead to *larger average contributions* among donors.

2.2. **Why Might Tribute Donations Be Different?** Presented with the tradeoffs outlined above, it could be that the benefits of larger-sized gifts when also revealing donation amounts dominate the extensive margin benefits of greater participation rates when only revealing whether someone donates, for donations made on behalf of oneself. Consistent with that expectation, most charities reveal both who donates and how much they give. What might then lead to the contrasting charity approach to donor recognition for tribute donations, where donors are recognized but how much they give is typically not revealed?

For one, it may be that charities are more concerned with the extensive margin benefits that tribute donations could generate. That is, the extensive margin benefit is either large enough to compensate for a lack of benefit on the intensive margin, or this margin could matter more for other reasons. When deciding to give on behalf of others, individuals may be learning about an organization for the first time. Given the opportunity, charities may place additional emphasis on moving individuals from a "cold" to "warm" contributor list (Mixer, 1993; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Landry et al., 2010; Karlan et al., 2011; Vesterlund, 2016). And to ensure that they acquire the donor, they may be willing to incur potential costs in the form of smaller-sized gifts in the short-term if it means that the individual is more likely to be involved with the charity and donate in the future.

Donors also face a unique set of factors when deciding whether, and how much, to give on behalf of others. Because tribute donations may be a form of personal, in-kind gift, they could be governed by a set of social customs.[9] Norms regarding gift-giving would suggest that leaving the price-tag

[8]In Andreoni and Petrie (2004) the researchers employ one treatment where amounts are revealed *without* revealing who the contributors are. Duffy and Kornienko (2010) implicitly reveal dictator transfers amounts through rankings. Their control treatment reveals *all* dictator identities irrespective of whether anything is transferred.

[9]Some literature has debated the efficiency implications of gifting in-kind presents instead of gifting the comparable value in cash (Waldfogel, 1993; Solnick and Hemeway, 1996; List and Shogren, 1998; Prendergast and Stole, 2001; Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2011). In marketing research, Samper et al. (2017) note that individuals who make a donation as a wedding gift contribute less than they would have otherwise spent on a traditional wedding present. Cavanaugh et al. (2015) also suggest that charitable donations are a more attractive choice for individuals who gift-givers are not close with.

on a gift would be improper (Tugend, 2005; ASP, 2014).[10] In situations with particularly somber conditions, there also may not be many types of acceptable gifts. Offering gifts in these contexts requires additional sensitivity with how they are presented.

These social conditions would necessitate that fundraisers consider how tribute donations may be viewed by honorees. Strong norms would also compel fundraisers to consider how donors feel about having the size of their tribute gifts revealed; and in cases where honorees can choose whether to learn individual contribution amounts, how donors perceive this choice. At a local level, revealing tribute donation amounts could be seen as a tacky and inelegant decision that donors and honorees both find inappropriate. At a larger scale, it may be that revealing the size of tribute donations is a strictly forbidden practice in a culture or community. Ultimately across many circumstances, revealing donation amounts may be a violation of unwritten rules. It could represent a repugnant transaction that practitioners cannot implement irrespective of the potential fundraising benefits (Roth, 2007).[11]

This paper tests the directional hypotheses associated with the extensive margin-intensive margin tradeoff that fundraisers may face when deciding whether to reveal donation amounts in addition to recognizing donors. By examining this question in the novel context of tribute giving, this study also sheds light on the unique social dynamics that may influence donations made on behalf of others but that are not present for donations made on behalf of oneself.

3. Experimental Design

Participants are randomly assigned to one of three treatments: *ID*, *ID&Amount*, or *Choose Info*. The treatments vary the donation information that is revealed to honorees, for those who choose to donate on behalf of others. In *ID*, donors are identified by whether they donate, but the size of their donation is not revealed, common conditions for donations made on behalf of others. In *ID&Amount*, donors and the size of their donations is revealed. Finally in *Choose Info*, individuals choose whether they would like to reveal how much they donate to honorees.

Table 1 summarizes the common design features across treatments. Instructions for the three parts are provided sequentially throughout the experiment. Example instructions are included in Appendix Section A. I discuss how donation information is revealed in each treatment in further detail below.[12]

At the beginning of each experimental session, participants are seated at individual computer stations. Once participants are seated, they begin Part A of the experiment which involves a work task. In the task participants are asked to correctly calculate the sum of a series of six one-digit numbers. Once they correctly solve ten problems, the work task ends and participants earn $18 that they can use later in the experiment for their charitable giving decisions.

[10]Multidisciplinary work on gift-giving further documents how price considerations can make the gift-giving process more difficult (Belk, 2005; Roth, 2007; Flynn and Adams, 2009)

[11]If "repugnance" is too strong of a designation for this setting, Roth (2007) notes that milder concepts such as *inappropriateness* or *unseemliness* may be more apt but still constitute real constraints on markets.

[12]A summary of the treatment differences between *ID*, *ID&Amount* and *Choose Info* is provided in Appendix Section B.1.

TABLE 1. Experimental Design – *Other*

Part	**Tasks**
A: Work	Summation Problems
B: Charitable Giving	Private Donation (D1)
	Name Honorees
	Choose Donation Type
	Public Donation (D2)
C: Continuing Support	Future Donation

Notes: Participants are randomly assigned to either *ID*, *ID&Amount*, or *Choose Info* treatments. *ID*, *ID&Amount*, and *Choose Info* vary the information that is revealed to honorees who participants may donate on behalf of for their Public Donation (D2). For the Public Donation, no donation information is revealed if participants do not donate on behalf of others, or if their Private Donation (D1) is randomly selected to be implemented.

Participants then move to Part B of the experiment. In this part they are told that they will have the opportunity to donate to a local charity using the $18 they earned from the work task. Participants face two giving tasks in Part B. Each task involves three donation decisions, one to each of three different charities. Participants are told that one of the three charities will be randomly selected to receive donations at the end of their session. Half of participants will have their task-1 donation implemented, while the other half will have their task-2 donation implemented to the charity. Therefore participants know that only one of their six decisions will be randomly chosen to be implemented. Participants are told that they should make each decision considering the full $18 they earned from the work task, as only one decision is implemented. All donation decisions are made in $2 increments. To present a unique giving opportunity, donations are matched one-for-one by University of Pittsburgh research foundation funds.

Task 1 begins with information about the three charities and their missions.[13] Local charities are selected to generate a greater sense of connection between participants and the organizations. The three charities are also selected to support different causes. Participants are then asked to make their task-1 donation decisions, which they are told will remain private. Task-1 decisions are denoted as "Donation 1" or "D1." Because D1 are kept private, these decisions are intended to capture underlying differences in participant generosity and preferences toward the three charities.

At the end of task 1 of Part B participants are asked to think of a family member or friend who they believe would be most likely to support each of the three charities. They are told they will have an opportunity to give on behalf of those individuals in task 2. Once participants have decided on these individuals, participants submit the name of a family member or friend for each charity.[14]

In task 2, participants are again asked to donate to each of the three charities as they did in task 1. For their task-2 decisions participants have the opportunity to make tribute donations on behalf of the family members and friends they name. If they choose to make a tribute donation and the donation is implemented, participants are told that the researchers will mail an acknowledgment

[13]The charities are Animal Friends, the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank, and the Women's Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh.

[14]Names are limited to first names to preserve participant anonymity.

card to the honoree. Participants are provided an example of the card, and are told they will receive an envelope (with postage) at the end of the experiment to address to their honorees and place the card in. The researchers will then take the cards to the post office to mail. If participants decide not to make a tribute donation they can still donate on behalf of themselves or not donate at all; in which case, a card will not be mailed to honorees on their behalf.

In all treatments individuals learn that the cards will note that participants made donations on the honoree's behalf and include charity information. Additional details that are included in the mailed cards depend on whether participants are in *ID*, *ID&Amount*, or *Choose Info*. In *ID*, individuals are told that the honoree learns that a donation was made but does not learn the size of the donation.[15] In contrast in *ID&Amount*, participants learn the donation amount *will* be included in the card. Specifically, the card will list the amount that participants contribute out of their $18 and highlight the total amount the charity receives after the one-for-one research foundation match.[16] Finally in *Choose Info*, participants can choose whether to only inform the honoree that a donation was made on their behalf, or also to reveal the amount donated. That is, participants choose whether or not they want to mail the *ID* or *ID&Amount* card, if they make a tribute donation.

3.1. **Part C.** Participants are asked a series of additional questions. First they are asked to state how likely they are to donate to each of the charities in the future. Responses are recorded on a five-point scale, with responses ranging from "Very Unlikely" to "Very Likely." Participants are then asked whether they would like to learn more about the organization. If they answer "Yes" to this question, participants submit their email address to be added to the charity's mailing list.

Participants then learn which of their decisions is implemented. Finally to assess the potential impact on future giving, after all participants receive information about the implemented decision they have an opportunity to make one additional donation. In a novel experimental design, for this decision participants are told that they can choose to schedule a future donation to the selected charity in one-month's time. They are given an additional $18 to make this decision, and told there is a 10% chance the decision will be implemented. If their future donation is implemented, the researchers make a subsequent donation to the selected charity. Individuals schedule a time to return to the laboratory in the future to receive payment for any amount they do not donate out of the additional $18 provided.

After the future donation decision, participants complete a set of supplementary questions that are drawn from the psychology literature, namely from the Interpersonal Relativity Index (Davis, 1983). Participants are asked two questions each from the, "Principle of Care," " Empathic Concern," and "Perspective Taking" domains. Prior work has used similar questions to explore the associations between psychological concepts and constructs more commonly used in economics when describing motives behind charitable giving. This research has shown that greater Principle

[15]An example of the *ID* card is included in Appendix Section B using The Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank as the example charity.

[16]An example of this card is included in Appendix Section B next to the *ID* card. The example *ID&Amount* card includes a placeholder for where the out-of-pocket donation amount is listed and for where the total donation is listed.

of Care scores are correlated with warm-glow motives, while greater Empathic Concern scores are correlated with individual estimates of altruism (Ottoni-Wilhelm and Vesterlund, 2020).

Following the supplementary questions and a demographic survey, participants receive a summary of experimental results.[17] The results include a reminder about the implemented donation, and whether their future donation is randomly chosen to be implemented. Participants also receive summary information about their earnings from the experiment. Final earnings consist of a $6 show-up fee, the money that participants do not donate out of the $18 they received from Part A, and the money they do not donate out of the additional $18 they are provided for their future donation, if it is implemented.

4. Results

The experiment was programmed in oTree and run at the Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Laboratory (PEEL).[18] A total of 201 participants completed the study across the three treatments, and participants earned an average of $16.83 in sessions that lasted approximately one hour.[19]

For the main analysis, I focus on results from the two donation environments of interest, when only donors are recognized (*ID*) and where donors *and* donation amounts (*ID&Amount*) are revealed. Before analyzing the primary charitable giving outcomes of interest, I report descriptive statistics on participant demographics across treatments. As shown in Table 2, participant demographics are balanced across the two primary donation environments of interest.[20]

To begin, I evaluate the effect of revealing amounts above only recognizing donors on overall giving in Figure 1. Figure 1 plots the cumulative distribution functions for D1 (dashed blue line) and D2 (solid red line). Recall that D2 is the primary decision of interest, when participants have the opportunity to give on behalf of others. However, it is important to account for D1 as it is a private decision that reflects underlying differences in private generosity. Therefore, the *difference* between the decisions, D2-D1, is one way to compare overall giving across treatments while also accounting for differences in underlying individual generosity. In *ID&Amount* the distribution of D2 (when tribute donation amounts are revealed to honorees) is shifted rightward relative to D1 (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.08). In contrast, there is little difference between D2 (when

[17]The demographic survey includes questions about age, year in school, gender, existing prosocial tendencies, political ideology, and religiosity. Participant prosocial tendencies are defined across two variables, labeled as "Volunteer" and "ExistingCharity." Each of these variables is defined across five categorical intervals. For the Volunteer variable, participants are asked, "On average, how often do you volunteer for a good cause?" Participants choose from one of the following categories: "Never," "Once a year," "Once a month," "Every week," "Several times a week." For the ExistingCharity variable, participants are asked, "On average, how much do you donate to charitable organizations per year?" Participants choose from one of the following categories: "$0-$20," "$20-$50," "$50-$100," "$100-$500," and "Over $500." For the political ideology variable, participants choose from one of five categories, ranging from "Very Liberal" to "Very Conservative." Finally for the religiosity variable, participants respond to the question, "On average, how often do you attend religious service?" They choose from one of the following five categories: "Never," "Once a year," "Once a month," "Every week," and "Several times a week."

[18]For a review of the oTree platform and its features, see Chen et al. (2016).

[19]Due to a coding error, one participant made a donation decision in a non-$2 increment. As a result, this participant is dropped from the analysis. An additional 193 participants completed the study for treatments where donations were made on behalf of oneself, as described previously. A full summary of participants and sessions where donations were made on behalf of oneself is provided in Appendix Table D.1. The study raised a total of $5,648 for the three charities.

[20]A full balance table with the addition of the *Choose Info* treatment is provided in Appendix Table C.1.

TABLE 2. Participant Characteristics, *ID* vs. *ID&Amount*

	Full Sample	ID	ID&Amount	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Age	19.07	18.99	19.15	0.46
Grade	1.90	1.90	1.91	0.96
Pct. Female	61	64	58	0.43
Current Charitable Giving	0.71	0.71	0.70	0.92
Volunteering	1.87	1.80	1.94	0.41
Religiosity	1.04	1.03	1.06	0.88
Political Ideology	1.32	1.29	1.35	0.64
No. of Participants	136	70	66	—

Notes: Reported numbers are means for the specified sample in each column. For the Grade measure, values are coded from 1-5 and correspond to the following categories: "Freshman," "Sophomore," "Junior," and "Senior." For the Current Charitable Giving measure, participants are asked, "On average, how much do you donate to charitable organizations per year?" Participants choose from one of the following categories, which are coded with values ranging from 0-4: "$0-$20," "$20-$50," "$50-$100," "$100-$500," and "Over $500." For the Volunteer variable, participants are asked, "On average, how often do you volunteer for a good cause?" Participants choose from one of the following categories, which are coded with values ranging from 0-4: "Never," "Once a year," "Once a month," "Every week," "Several times a week." For the political ideology variable, participants choose from one of five categories, also coded from 0-4, and range from "Very Liberal" to "Very Conservative." Finally for the religiosity variable, participants respond to the question, "On average, how often do you attend religious service?" They choose from one of the following five categories (coded 0-4): "Never," "Once a year," "Once a month," "Every week," and "Several times a week." The p-values in column 4 are reported from t-tests comparing mean differences across *ID* and *ID&Amount*.

only donor identities are revealed to honorees) and D1 in *ID* (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p=0.58). On average, participants in *ID* give an average of $0.60 more per D2 decision compared to D1, while participants in *ID&Amount* give an average of $1.41 more per D2 decision compared to D1 (p=0.07).[21] The $0.81 difference-in-difference is equivalent to an 11.1% increase over the average donation (D2) in *ID*, suggesting that revealing tribute donation amounts to honorees may lead to greater overall giving relative to only recognizing donors.

Next, I explore the factors that lead to the observed differences in overall giving across donor recognition practices. I start by evaluating the potential extensive margin differences across treatments. In Figure 2 I compare overall donation (D2) rates across treatments, and also examine differences in the likelihood of making a tribute donation. The left cluster of Figure 2 describes the donation rate for all gifts, while the right cluster shows the donation rate for tribute gifts. The left dark bars represent the respective donation rate for *ID*, while the right gray bars represents the same outcome but for *ID&Amount*.

Figure 2 shows no difference in the overall likelihood of giving. Participants are no less likely to make a donation of any type when tribute donation amounts are revealed than participants who do not have tribute donation amount information revealed to honorees (84% vs. 81%, p=0.43). While overall donation rates are not affected by revealing tribute contribution amounts, the likelihood of donating on behalf of someone else changes. In particular, tribute donations are far *more likely* to

[21] I report average D1, D2, and D2-D1 values in Appendix Table C.2 by treatment.



FIGURE 1. CDFs for Donations, by Treatment



FIGURE 2. Donation Rates, by Treatment

occur when the cards not only reveal that a donation is made but also how much is given. Those who are told that tribute gift amounts will be disclosed to their honorees are 15 percentage points more likely to make a tribute donation ($p<0.01$).

In Table 3, I evaluate whether revealing tribute contribution amounts affects donation rates (D2) using a series of regression models. Table 3 considers the same two extensive margin outcomes illustrated in Figure 2: the likelihood of making any donation when tribute donations are feasible

(columns 1-3), and the likelihood of making a tribute donation (columns 4-6). In these regressions I control for private giving decisions (D1) as well as demographic and charity controls. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level in all subsequent regression specifications.

TABLE 3. Effect of Revealing Amount on Donation Rates

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Probit
Dep. Var.:	$\mathbb{1}$(*Donation 2)*			*Make Tribute Donation*		
$\mathbb{1}$(Donation 1)	0.607***	0.600***	0.353***	0.455***	0.448***	0.465***
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.043)	(0.069)	(0.079)	(0.089)
ID&Amount	-0.025	-0.020	-0.024	0.154***	0.151***	0.152****
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Observations	408	408	408	408	408	408
R-squared	0.293	0.314		0.119	0.148	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Columns 1-3 report estimates using an indicator variable for whether participants make any donation (D2) as the dependent variable. Columns 4-6 report estimates using an indicator variable for whether participants make a tribute donation as the dependent variable. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. All specifications control for whether participants donate in private (D1). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. Given the directional hypothesis for the extensive margin (i.e., lower donation rate when amounts are revealed), the tests are one-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in Table 3 reflect the visual comparisons in Figure 2. First, revealing tribute donation amounts does not affect the overall likelihood that individuals give to charity. While revealing tribute donation amounts has no effect on overall donation rates, it does affect the willingness of participants to make tribute donations. Columns 4-6 of Table 3 show that revealing how much people give on behalf of others increases the likelihood that individuals make a tribute donation by approximately 15 percentage points (p=0.01).

Therefore while revealing tribute donation amounts does not appear to attract more donations, it does affect what kind of donation individuals make. This result does not align with the hypothesized extensive margin effects of the different donor recognition practices noted in Section 2. I will return to discuss the implication of this result at the end of Section 4.

Beyond looking at the likelihood of making a donation, I also examine potential effects on the intensive margin, i.e., how revealing the size of tribute donations in addition to recognizing donors to honorees affects the average contribution amount among donors. That is, the subsequent results explore whether participants change how much they give, knowing that tribute donation amounts are revealed to their loved ones.

In Figure 3, I plot the distribution of donation amounts ranging from the smallest possible donation ($2) to the maximum possible out-of-pocket contribution ($18). I plot the distributions separately for *ID* and *ID&Amount* in order to make comparisons regarding the relative frequency of different-sized donations within each treatment. The share of *ID* donations are represented by the left dark bars, and *ID&Amount* donations are represented by the right gray bars.



FIGURE 3. Distributions of Donation Amounts

Figure 3 shows that there is a relatively larger frequency of $2 donations, i.e., the smallest possible donation amount when only the identity of who makes a tribute donation is revealed to honorees. This implies that participants are minimizing the out-of-pocket cost of making a donation and taking advantage of the opportunity to show honorees that they donated. Further, there is a substantially larger share of maximum out-of-pocket contributions when amounts are revealed to honorees. This suggests that participants are taking the opportunity to show their honoree that they are being as generous as possible given their earnings from the work task.

With the observed differences in the distribution of donation amounts, I next analyze whether the average size of individual donations differ depending on whether tribute contribution amounts are or are not revealed. Table 4 reports results from this analysis where I regress donation amounts (D2) on a treatment indicator for *ID&Amount*.[22]

The results in Table 4 highlight how revealing tribute donation amounts increases the size of individual gifts. Model estimates reported in columns (1)-(3) show that average giving is roughly $0.92 to $1.13 larger when tribute donation amounts are revealed. This suggests that charities can raise giving by 12.6%-15.6% if they reveal tribute donation amounts in addition to recognizing donors (p=0.08).[23] When further exploring *who* is giving more, I find that the effect appears to come from tribute donors who have how much they give revealed to their honoree. The interaction term reported in columns (4)-(5) in Table 4 show that tribute donations are even larger when amounts are revealed in comparison to only recognizing donor identities (p=0.03). The coefficient estimate of 2.197 is equivalent to a 23% increase over the average amount given in tribute when only donor identities are revealed. This mechanism is consistent with what we would expect, as

[22]Model specifications include controls for private giving decisions (D1), demographics and charity fixed effects. As noted before, all specifications cluster standard errors at the individual level.

[23]Percentages are calculated relative to the average D2 amount in the *ID* treatment.

TABLE 4. Effect of Revealing Amount on Donation Size, Among Donors

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Tobit	(4) OLS	(5) Tobit
Dep. Var.:	*Donation 2 Amount*				
Donation 1	0.807***	0.810***	0.988***	0.814***	0.990***
	(0.042)	(0.044)	(0.065)	(0.046)	(0.066)
ID&Amount	0.927*	0.922*	1.130*	-0.893	-0.912
	(0.668)	(0.681)	(0.811)	(0.902)	(1.024)
Tribute				0.528	0.676
				(0.861)	(0.942)
ID&Amount X Tribute				2.197**	2.463**
				(1.138)	(1.328)
Observations	336	336	336	336	336
R-squared	0.543	0.563		0.580	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Columns 1-2, and 4 report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates with the donation amount (D2) as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 5 report estimates from a tobit regression accounting for censored observations of the dependent variable. Observations are restricted to participants who donate a positive amount. Donations are out-of-pocket amounts. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. Given the directional hypothesis for the intensive margin (i.e., larger donations when amounts are revealed), the tests are one-tailed. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

this is the population directly affected by the tribute donor recognition practices. This intensive margin result also aligns with the hypothesized effect noted in Section 2.

Altogether, the findings suggest that revealing tribute donation amounts can benefit charity fundraising efforts in the short-term, as overall giving is larger compared to when only donor identities are disclosed. Yet in contrast to the arguments discussed in Section 2, not revealing the size of gifts does not appear to generate the predicted benefits on the extensive margin for tribute donations. That is, the overall donation rate is not higher when the size of tribute donations are revealed compared to when only donors are recognized. Instead, a greater share of individuals choose to make a tribute donation when they know how much they give will be disclosed to their honorees. Further, and consistent with expected benefits on the intensive margin, tribute donations are larger in size when amounts are revealed. Taken together, the fundraising returns to revealing tribute donation amounts in the short-term found in this study result from a greater number of larger-sized donations.

4.1. **Revealing Donation Amounts and Future Support.** Beyond immediate giving, practitioners emphasize that tribute donations offer a unique opportunity to generate subsequent support from individuals who were previously less familiar with their organization. Though I do not observe the predicted extensive margin response in short-term giving, nevertheless I explore whether only recognizing donors and not how much they give impacts future giving. It is important to observe whether the implemented methods are more or less effective in generating continuing support

from individuals, in order to understand the full fundraising impact of tribute donation recognition practices.

Table 5 reports the results of this analysis. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is whether participants make any future donation, while the dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the future donation amount, among donors. Unlike the regression analyses for the likelihood and size of short-term donations, I do not include charity fixed effects in these specifications as participants make only one future donation decision and only one charity is selected per session. I continue to control for private donations (D1) in order to account for individual differences in preferences toward the selected charities.

TABLE 5. Effect of Revealing Amount on Future Giving

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Tobit
Dep. Var.:	*Any Future Donation*			*Donation Amount*		
Donation 1	0.250**	0.233*	0.154**	0.653***	0.642***	0.743***
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.062)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.095)
ID&Amount	-0.033	-0.037	-0.047	-0.079	0.037	0.068
	(0.049)	(0.052)	(0.045)	(0.782)	(0.880)	(0.993)
Observations	136	136	136	123	123	123
R-squared	0.076	0.135		0.393	0.416	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is whether participants make any future donation (extensive margin), while the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the donation amount, among donors. Columns 1-2 and columns 4-5 report OLS estimates. Columns 3 and 6 report results using a probit and tobit specification, respectively. In columns 1-3, the explanatory variable "Donation 1" is an indicator variable for whether participants make any private donation, while in columns 4-6 it is reported as the amount donated in private. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Absent directional hypothesis for future giving, all tests are two-tailed. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in Table 5 show that neither the probability of making a future donation, nor the average size of future donations, are affected by whether short-term tribute donation amounts are revealed.[24] However, private giving (D1) during the experiment predicts the size and likelihood of future donations. Making a donation in private during the experiment is predicted to increase the probability of making a future donation by 15.4-25.0 percentage points ($0.01<p<0.05$); similarly, every additional private dollar given predicts an increase in the size of future donations of approximately \$0.62-\$0.81 ($p<0.01$).

In total, the results suggest that revealing how much individuals give in addition to recognizing donors has important fundraising benefits. Compared to only recognizing donors, overall giving is greater when donors and donation amounts are disclosed. When looking at where the benefits come

[24]The results are still insignificant if I further restrict the sample to those who have their task-2 decision implemented. In the Appendix, I also explore whether revealing tribute donation amounts affects participants' likelihood of adding their email address to charity mailing lists in order to receive updates from the organizations. In Table C.3 in the Appendix, I find no impact of revealing donation amounts on this outcome.

from, revealing how much individuals give on behalf of others does not increase overall donation rates, but doing so improves the chances that individuals make tribute donations. Increasing the rate of tribute giving increases overall giving as these donations tend to be larger in size, especially when donation amounts are revealed to honorees. Finally, revealing the size of contributions does not appear to impact future financial support.

The importance of the intensive margin relative to the extensive margin when explaining the overall fundraising benefits may be due in part to the social dynamics involved with tribute donations. For donations made on behalf of others, the primary recipient of the gift information is the honoree. Honorees have established relationships with donors. Individuals who would not have otherwise given do not need to "introduce" themselves, nor their generosity, to honorees by making a donation. However, among those already intending to donate, the opportunity to reveal the magnitude of their generosity by how much they donate could boost their current status with a loved one.

5. Discussion

The study results point to a potential opportunity for organizations to improve their fundraising efficacy by revealing tribute gift amounts, contradicting the current practices of most charities today. Yet, the fact that many charities do not reveal tribute contribution amounts in their current practices warrants additional review and discussion of factors that could shape this choice. In Section 2.2, I summarized other reasons why tribute giving may differ from giving on behalf of oneself, and thus lead fundraisers to not reveal the size of tribute contributions. I return to these arguments and discuss whether gifts made on behalf of others may be subject to different constraints than those placed on gifts made on behalf of oneself. This discussion has greatly benefited from conversations with practitioners and other philanthropy experts.

5.1. **Is Revealing Tribute Donation Amounts Repugnant?** Practitioners may avoid disclosing tribute donation amounts not because they believe it will yield the greatest fundraising benefit, but rather because doing so would be repugnant (Roth, 2007). Since tribute donations can be seen as a form of in-kind gift, it could be that gift-giving norms dictate acceptable practices regarding donations made on behalf of others. For example, it is widely-accepted that the price tag should be removed from any in-kind gift before it is presented to the recipient (Tugend, 2005; ASP, 2014). Revealing how much is given in tribute could be see as analogous to leaving the price tag on the donation, which could objectify an otherwise personal gift (Roth, 2007). Repugnance could then arise from both the gift-givers' (donors) and gift-recipients' (honorees) perspectives. Donors may not feel comfortable revealing how much they give. This may be especially true of donors who give small amounts. In complement, honorees may not feel comfortable with having tribute donation amounts revealed, either because they do not want to embarrass donors or because of the potential gap between the degree of support they receive from donors and the gravity of the cause.

To begin, some donors may be embarrassed when their tribute donation amounts are revealed to family or friends, especially if they only planned to give a small amount. If donors are embarrassed, we might expect to see this expressed in participant preferences toward revealing or not revealing contribution amounts in the *Choose Info* treatment. The results shown in Table 6 suggest that a

significant portion of participants do not feel comfortable revealing how much they give; of the 116 tribute donations in *Choose Info*, participants choose not to reveal the amount for 53.4% of these gifts. However, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that an equal proportion of participants prefer revealing to not revealing tribute donation amounts (p=0.46).

TABLE 6. Donor Preferences toward Revealing Tribute Donation Amounts

Prefer to Reveal	54
Prefer not to Reveal	62
Total	116
p-val: Reveal=Not Reveal	0.46

Notes: This table reports the proportion of individuals who prefer to reveal their tribute contribution amounts. Sample is restricted to those in *Choose Info* who choose to make a tribute donation. The reported p-values are from a χ^2-test of whether aggregate participants preferences differ from an equivalent number of participants preferring to reveal and not reveal amounts.

At the same time, individuals who we might expect to be more embarrassed to reveal how much they give are more likely to choose to keep donation amount information concealed. In Appendix Table C.4, I show that the choice to not reveal tribute donation amounts is associated with smaller-sized gifts.[25] Therefore, while the aggregate preferences of individuals appear to be mixed, the decision to not reveal donation amounts likely satisfies donors who may be most embarrassed by the size of their gifts. But in complement, by not revealing amounts practitioners are not appealing to the portion of their supporter base that typically gives more and prefers to reveal tribute donation amounts.

Beyond donors, it could be that honorees or stewards of a memorial fund prefer that contribution amounts are not revealed to them. For instance, honorees may not want to embarrass low contributors nor be seen as rewarding high contributors. This suggests that part of the repugnance underlying the transaction may be a consequence of the fundraising benefit that revealing donation amounts could offer. In other words, the offensive characteristics of revealing the size of tribute gifts may be strongest among individuals who prefer to reveal how much they give *and* who typically give larger amounts. The donor preference to reveal donation amounts may be associated with their desire to self-promote their generosity, even when the gifts are supposedly made to honor others.

Honorees may also be dissatisfied with the potential gap between the degree of donor support and the gravity of the charitable cause. Nonprofit missions are often large in scale, both in terms

[25]In Appendix Section C, I document additional associations between the choice to reveal contribution amounts and donation characteristics, demographics, and participant motives (as measured by responses to Interpersonal Relativity Index questions (Davis, 1983)). These correlations are summarized in Appendix Table C.4 and are only intended to be descriptive and exploratory. I also provide further analysis of the giving behavior of individuals who can choose whether they would like to reveal how much they give to honorees. Overall donation rates (D2) in *Choose Info* are comparable to the other treatments. However, tribute donation rates in *Choose Info* are higher compared to *ID* and comparable to rates found in *ID&Amount*. See Appendix Table C.5 and Appendix Figure C.1. Further, the average size of donations is larger in *Choose Info* but not significantly different than *ID*. See Appendix Table C.6. Combining these two outcomes, the results suggest that while *Choose Info* may lead to greater tribute giving rates, these benefits are not coupled with larger contribution amounts. Finally, the likelihood of making a future donation and future donation amounts are not significantly larger when individuals can choose to reveal donation amounts, relative to when only donors are revealed in the study. See Appendix Table C.7.

of geography and importance. If honorees consider the magnitude of the charitable mission, the size of tribute donations may feel underwhelming in comparison. For example, learning someone contributes $5 to support those struggling with food insecurity, or contributing a similar amount to support a refugee family who has been resettled due to war and conflict, may leave honorees disheartened. Honorees may want to instead focus on learning *who* is willing to provide support, regardless of how much, toward a cause that is important to them. Each of these sources of potential repugnance can create constraints on acceptable donor recognition practices, and in consequence the availability of effective fundraising tools for this type of giving.

5.2. **When Could Revealing Tribute Donation Amounts be Less Repugnant?** While most organizations do not reveal tribute donation amounts to honorees, there are certain contexts where repugnance may not be a market constraint and it may be acceptable to reveal information about the size of gifts. For instance, it may admissible to reveal the size of tribute donations for particular types of tribute gifts or for giving in response to specific events. Certain in-kind tribute donations made during the holidays may fall into this category. Heifer International, for example, allows donors to give animals such as a goat to support farmers in developing countries (Heifer, 2021). The value of donating a goat is easy to find online; at the same time, donating a goat on behalf of someone else is likely to be saved for more cheerful occasions such as the holidays.

Generally, revealing donation amounts could be more agreeable in circumstances that are more celebratory in nature. One setting that may be informative for our understanding of when the size of tribute donations could be disclosed are wedding registries. Couples add items to these lists that they would like invited guests to purchase. Items include material presents, but can also include "experiences" that the couple is planning for their honeymoon. It is clear from the registry how much each wedding present costs, to both the honorees requesting the gifts and the wedding invitees purchasing the gifts. Tribute donations made in response to congratulatory events could be seen in a similar regard as these wedding presents where contribution amounts are easily discernible.

Additional evidence from Facebook supports the argument that revealing tribute donation amounts may be more acceptable in response to joyous occasions. Facebook has a feature where its users can set up birthday fundraisers on their page to raise money for a charity. The company states that donation amounts collected from birthday fundraisers are revealed to the fundraiser creator (Facebook, 2021).[26] The widespread use of this feature suggests that this practice is tolerable to both the fundraiser creator and Facebook users who donate through this feature.

5.3. **Other Considerations.** When honorees receive information about donors who have given on their behalf, they may have expectations about how much family and friends will give to their cause. Honorees could be left dissatisfied in cases where loved ones do not give as much as they had anticipated, and they do not raise as much money for the cause as they had planned. Practitioners may prefer to avoid the possibility of letting honorees down if they are not as successful at fundraising as they would like. Avoiding this information could also allow honorees to approach each individual supporter with equal appreciation. Introducing information about the size of tribute contributions would lift the veil over the degree of support that each family member or friend

[26]Donors can also specify if they want to reveal the amount they give to other users.

provides, and make it more difficult to see each supporter with equal regard. This type of behavior would be similar to bequest gifts where estates are often equally divided among children (Bernheim and Severinov, 2003).

The above factors are important to consider when determining why many organizations currently do not reveal the amounts donated on behalf of others. They may also be important to review when thinking about *when* it may be acceptable to reveal the size of tribute gifts. Ultimately, the results from this study offer initial evidence to open the discussion of whether there may be potential fundraising benefits from implementing this practice. Beginning this dialogue can also move the conversation beyond any "initial yuck factor" that may exist when considering the practice of revealing tribute donation amounts (Roth, 2007). Additional exploration of the social dynamics present with tribute giving can illustrate when, where, and why revealing tribute donation amounts could be worthwhile.

6. Conclusion

Recognizing donors and how much they give is a standard practice for gifts made on behalf of oneself. This practice is further supported by research that demonstrates the fundraising benefits from doing so for this type of giving. Yet, organizations follow a contrasting practice for tribute giving where donations are made on behalf of others. For tribute giving, those who are honored receive acknowledgments of who donated on their behalf but not of how much they donated.

In this paper I explore how revealing contribution amounts in addition to recognizing donors affects tribute giving decisions. To study this question, I use a laboratory experiment where individuals are randomly assigned to between-subject treatments that vary the information that is revealed to others. Before making a donation, participants in a *ID* treatment are told that only their identities will be revealed to others, and not how much they give. In contrast, individuals in a *ID&Amount* treatment know that how much they give will be revealed to others, in addition to who they are. The *ID* treatment reflects the common practice used for tribute donations, while *ID&Amount* is intended to capture the conditions most commonly observed for donations made on behalf of oneself. Finally in a *Choose Info* treatment, individuals can select whether or not to reveal how much they give to others, in addition to who they are.

The results suggest that there are benefits to revealing contribution amounts for gifts made on behalf of others, contrary to the predominant practice followed by fundraisers today. Total giving increases, but not because individuals are more likely to donate. Instead, revealing tribute donation amounts in addition to recognizing donors shifts individuals toward making tribute donations. The greater share of tribute donations benefits fundraisers, as these contributions are larger in size when honorees learn how much is given on their behalf.

Altogether for giving on behalf of others, the study opens an important conversation about the best practices regarding donor recognition of tribute gifts. The findings suggest that there could be an opportunity for fundraisers to increase revenue if tribute gift amounts are revealed, which would contrast how the majority of organizations treat these donations today. Yet, revealing how much individuals give on behalf of others could come with different constraints than those applied to gifts made on behalf of oneself. Revealing tribute donation amounts could be viewed as a

repugnant transaction, if it violates well-established and widely-accepted gift-giving social norms. It is important moving forward to assess the accuracy of these perceptions of repugnance and the accompanying constraints, in order to clarify the recommendations for when to reveal donation amounts and when to avoid disclosing this information.

More broadly, this paper provides a foundation to build upon and expand our insights into tribute giving, a common type of donation in practice but one that has not been studied previously. The experimental laboratory offers a controlled environment to isolate the impact of different types of donor recognition on tribute giving behavior. Subsequent research can further our understanding of tribute donations and the interesting features that are present with this form of contribution, beyond questions about donor recognition. These future insights can deepen our knowledge of tribute giving characteristics, to the benefit of practitioners and academics alike.

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Appendix A. Experiment Instructions

Welcome to the Experiment

Thank you for participating in our study! This is an experiment about decision-making. The other people in today's session are also participating in the experiment. You must not talk to or communicate with them in any way. If you have a question, please raise your hand and a researcher will answer your question in private.

This experiment will consist of two parts, Part A and Part B. Instructions will be provided before each part. All participants will receive a $6 show-up fee. You can earn additional amounts depending on the decisions you make in the experiment and luck.

At the top of your station you will see a card holder with a number. This number is your Participant Number. Your Participant Number will be used to pay you at the end of this session.

[*break*]

Part A Instructions

In Part A of the experiment, you will be asked to calculate the sum of 6 randomly chosen one-digit numbers. You will be asked to complete 10 of these problems. You should find the sums without using a calculator. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer, the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. For completing this task, you will earn $18 that you may use during the rest of the experiment. When you correctly solve 10 of these problems, you will automatically proceed to the next stage of the experiment.

[*break*]

Part B Instructions

In Part B you will have the opportunity to use your $18 from Part A to donate to charity. Part B will consist of two rounds. In each round, you will make three donation decisions, one to each of three different charities. For each decision, you will decide how much of your $18 to donate to that charity and how much to keep. We will implement only one of your decisions.

At the end of the experiment we will randomly decide which of the three charities will receive donations from today's session. Half of the participants in today's session will be randomly selected to have their Round-1 decision implemented for the selected charity. The other half of participants will have their Round-2 decision implemented for the selected charity. You will keep what remains of your $18 after we implement your selected decision.

Round 1

On the next page you will learn about three local charities and their missions. The charities are, in alphabetical order: Animal Friends, the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank, and the Women's Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh. The three charities are providing critical resources to the Pittsburgh community during these challenging times. After you have read about each charity, you will be asked to make your decisions. For each charity, you will be asked how much of your $18 from Part A you wish to keep and how much you wish to donate. If one of your Round-1 decisions is randomly selected to be implemented, your decision will be kept private. It will not be shown to any other participant in today's session. Since donations to any charity may be selected to count for payment, you should treat each decision as if it is the one that will be implemented. You can use your full $18 on any given decision since only one counts for payment.

Donations must be made in increments of $2. Every donation will be matched "one-for-one" by a research foundation, i.e., a $2 donation will be matched with an additional $2 to make a $4 donation. If you would like to see a receipt of the total donation made to the three charities, you may email the researcher at kpw18@pitt.edu. If you would like an individual receipt for your donation, we will provide instructions on how to do so at the end of the session.

[*break*]

End of Part B, Round 1

Before we begin round 2, we would like you to think of three individuals in your life who you believe would be most likely to support each of the three charities you learned about in round 1. On the next page, once you have thought of those three individuals, you will be asked to enter their names in a table next to each charity. Please only write their first name in order to preserve your anonymity during the experiment. In round 2, you may have the opportunity to donate on behalf of the people you name.

[*break*]

Round 2

In round 2, you will again make donation decisions to the three charities you learned about in round 1. As mentioned before, at the end of the experiment we will randomly select one charity to receive donations made during this session and will implement one of your decisions made to that charity. Half of the participants in today's session will have their Round-1 decision implemented while the other half will have their Round-2 decision implemented to that charity.

For each charity, you will again decide how much of your $18 from Part A you wish to keep and how much you wish to donate. Donations must be made in increments of $2, and you can use up to the full $18 for each decision. Donations will again be matched "one-for-one" by a research

foundation. Because each decision is equally likely to be selected, you should treat each decision as if it is the one that will be implemented.

For your Round-2 decisions, for each charity you may choose to make a donation on behalf of the person you named earlier as most likely to support the organization. If you choose to do so and your Round-2 decision is implemented, the researcher will provide you a card that you will mail to notify them about your donation. The card will tell them that you donated on their behalf, describe the charity that you donated to, and include researcher contact information.

[*Subsequent text depends on experimental treatment*]

[*ID*:] The card will not include how much you donated.

[*ID&Amount*:] The card will also include how much you donated, and that the donation was made out of $18 from Part A. Finally the card will include the total amount the charity receives after the "one-for-one" match by a research foundation.

[*Choose Info*:] You may also choose whether the card will include how much you donated. If you choose to include how much you donated, the card will state that the donation was made out of $18 from Part A and include the total amount the charity receives after the "one-for-one" match by a research foundation.

[*Instructions return to standard language across treatments.*]

The researchers will provide the card at the end of the experiment, along with an envelope with postage that you will place the card in and address to the person you named. The researchers will then take the envelopes to the post office. No card is mailed if you do not make a positive donation or if you decide not to donate on behalf of the person you named.

An example of the card that will be sent to the person you donate on behalf of is provided below. In the example card, the randomly selected charity is the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank. The example card includes a placeholder for where you can personalize the card by including the person's name.

[*Subsequent text depends on experimental treatment*]

[*ID*:] An example of the card that will be sent to the person you donate on behalf of is provided below. In the example card, the randomly selected charity is the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank. The example card includes a placeholder for where you can personalize the card by including the person's name.

[*ID&Amount*:] An example of the card that will be sent to the person you donate on behalf of is provided below. In the example card, the randomly selected charity is the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank. The example card includes a placeholder for where you can personalize the card by including the person's name. The example card also marks where the out-of-pocket donation amount will be listed, and where the total donation amount after the one-for-one match will be listed.

[*Choose Info*:] Examples of the cards that will be sent to the person you donate on behalf of are provided below. The first is an example of the card that will be sent if you choose not to include how much you donated. The second is an example of the card that will be sent if you choose to include how much you donated. In the example cards, the randomly selected charity is the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank. The example cards include a placeholder for where you can personalize the card by including the person's name. The second example also marks where the out-of-pocket donation amount will be listed, and where the total donation amount after the one-for-one match will be listed, if you choose to include how much you donated.

[*Example cards shown*]

[*Instructions return to standard language across treatments.*]

You will not mail a card to someone if your Round-1 decision is implemented, or if in Round 2 you opted not to donate on behalf of someone else.

Appendix B. Experiment Design & Materials

Table B.1. Summary of Experimental Treatments

Treatment	Participants	Features
ID	70	Do Not Reveal Donation Amount (D2)
ID&Amount	67	Reveal Donation Amount (D2)
Choose Info	64	Choice to Reveal Donation Amount (D2)
Total	201	

Notes: As noted in the main text, one participant in *ID&Amount* made a donation decision in a non-$2 increment. As a result, this participant is dropped from the analysis. Finally as mentioned previously, an additional 193 participants completed the study for treatments where donations were made on behalf of oneself. This information is summarized in Appendix Table D.1.

[NAME], I DONATED IN YOUR HONOR TO THE GREATER PITTSBURGH COMMUNITY FOOD BANK!

I GAVE OUT OF MY EARNINGS FROM A UNIVERSITY RESEARCH STUDY.

The Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank feeds people in need and mobilizes our community to eliminate hunger. This donation helps provide nutritious meals to our neighbors who struggle to put food on their tables each day.

NO PERSONAL INFORMATION WAS SHARED WITH THE ORGANIZATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS DONATION, PLEASE CONTACT KANATIP WINICHAKUL AT KPW18@PITT.EDU

FIGURE B.1. Example ID Treatment Card

[NAME], I DONATED IN YOUR HONOR TO THE GREATER PITTSBURGH COMMUNITY FOOD BANK!

I GAVE $[AMOUNT] OUT OF $18 I EARNED FROM A UNIVERSITY RESEARCH STUDY. MY DONATION WAS MATCHED FOR A TOTAL DONATION OF $[AMOUNT].

The Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank feeds people in need and mobilizes our community to eliminate hunger. This donation helps provide nutritious meals to our neighbors who struggle to put food on their tables each day.

NO PERSONAL INFORMATION WAS SHARED WITH THE ORGANIZATION. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS DONATION, PLEASE CONTACT KANATIP WINICHAKUL AT KPW18@PITT.EDU

FIGURE B.2. Example ID&Amount Treatment Card

TABLE C.1. Participant Characteristics, All Treatments

	Full Sample	ID	ID&Amount	Choose Info	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Age	19.07	18.99	19.15	19.08	0.74
Grade	1.91	1.90	1.91	1.91	1.00
Pct. Female	60	64	58	59	0.71
Current Charitable Giving	0.67	0.71	0.70	0.59	0.74
Volunteering	1.76	1.80	1.94	1.53	0.04
Religiosity	1.15	1.03	1.06	1.36	0.24
Political Ideology	1.35	1.29	1.35	1.44	0.58
Observations	200	70	66	64	—

Notes: Reported numbers are means for the specified sample in each column. Summary statistics are for all participants. For the Grade measure, values are coded from 1-4 and correspond to the following categories: "Freshman," "Sophomore," "Junior," and "Senior." For the Current Charitable Giving measure, participants are asked, "On average, how much do you donate to charitable organizations per year?" Participants choose from one of the following categories, which are coded with values ranging from 0-4: "$0-$20," "$20-$50," "$50-$100," "$100-$500," and "Over $500." For the Volunteer variable, participants are asked, "On average, how often do you volunteer for a good cause?" Participants choose from one of the following categories, which are coded with values ranging from 0-4: "Never," "Once a year," "Once a month," "Every week," "Several times a week." For the political ideology variable, participants choose from one of five categories, also coded from 0-4, and range from "Very Liberal" to "Very Conservative." Finally for the religiosity variable, participants respond to the question, "On average, how often do you attend religious service?" They choose from one of the following five categories (coded 0-4): "Never," "Once a year," "Once a month," "Every week," and "Several times a week." The p-values in column 5 are reported from F-tests comparing against the null of no differences across *ID*, *ID&Amount*, and *Choose Info*.

APPENDIX C. ADDITIONAL RESULTS

TABLE C.2. Average Dollars Contributed Per Decision, by Treatment

	Full Sample	ID	ID&Amount	p-value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Donation 1 (D1)	6.50	6.67	6.33	0.55
Donation 2 (D2)	7.50	7.27	7.75	0.45
D2-D1	1.00	0.60	1.41	0.07
Observations	408	210	198	

Notes: Reported numbers are means for the specified sample in each column. The p-values are reported from two-tailed t-tests comparing means of respective measures in *ID* and *ID&Amount* treatments

TABLE C.3. Effect of Revealing Amount on Receiving Charity News

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) OLS	(5) Probit
Dep. Var.:	*Subscribe to Charity Emails*				
𝟙(Donation 1)	0.202***	0.136***	0.219***	0.121**	0.206**
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.080)	(0.052)	(0.082)
ID&Amount	0.054	0.066	0.063	0.025	0.013
	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.075)	(0.085)
Tribute				0.003	0.002
				(0.074)	(0.073)
ID&Amount X Tribute				0.065	0.072
				(0.100)	(0.100)
Observations	408	408	408	408	408
R-squared	0.030	0.083		0.086	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Notes: Columns 1-2 and 4 report OLS estimates using an indicator for whether participants add their email to the charity's mailing list as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 5 report the marginal effects from a probit specification. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.4. Correlates with Choice-to-Reveal

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) OLS
Dep. Var.:	$\mathbb{1}$(*Choose to Reveal Contribution Amount*)		
Donation 1	-0.031**	-0.027**	-0.028**
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Donation 2	0.032***	0.029**	0.032***
	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)
Age		-0.004	
		(0.242)	
Grade		0.035	
		(0.257)	
Female		-0.275*	
		(0.151)	
Current Charitable Giving		0.004	
		(0.079)	
Volunteering		0.046	
		(0.120)	
Religiosity		0.060	
		(0.061)	
Political Ideology		0.036	
		(0.073)	
Principle of Care			0.034
			(0.067)
Empathic Concern			-0.086
			(0.070)
Observations	116	116	116
R-squared	0.082	0.220	0.101

Notes: Columns 1-3 report associations between the choice-to-reveal contribution amounts and other participant characteristics. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.5. Effect of Option to Reveal on Donation Rates

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Probit
Dep. Var.:	$\mathbb{1}(Donation\ 2 > 0)$			*Make Tribute Donation*		
$\mathbb{1}$(Donation 1)	0.624***	0.624***	0.363***	0.439***	0.437***	0.431***
	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.033)	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.063)
ID&Amount	-0.025	-0.019	-0.023	0.154***	0.159***	0.155***
	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Choose Info	-0.006	-0.004	-0.007	0.140***	0.152***	0.151***
	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.058)
Observations	600	600	600	600	600	600
R-squared	0.326	0.336		0.116	0.137	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
p-val.: *ID&Amount=Choose Info*	0.66	0.75	0.71	0.81	0.91	0.95

Notes: Columns 1-3 report estimates using an indicator variable for whether participants make any donation (D2) as the dependent variable. Columns 4-6 report estimates using an indicator variable for whether participants make a tribute donation as the dependent variable. Columns 1-2 and 4-5 report OLS estimates using an indicator for whether participants add their email to the charity's mailing list as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 6 report the marginal effects from a probit specification. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. All specifications control for whether participants donate in private (D1). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. Given the directional hypothesis for the extensive margin (i.e., lower donation rate when amounts are revealed), the tests are one-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE C.6. Effect of Option to Reveal on Donation Size, Among Donors

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Tobit	(4) OLS	(5) Tobit
Dep. Var.:	*Donation 2 Amount*				
Donation 1	0.803***	0.815***	1.016***	0.811***	1.011***
	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.056)
ID&Amount	0.927*	0.949*	1.184*	-0.871	-0.918
	(0.667)	(0.687)	(0.814)	(0.922)	(1.056)
Choose Info	0.779	0.918	1.265*	0.127	0.250
	(0.719)	(0.720)	(0.853)	(1.203)	(1.267)
Tribute				0.590	0.704
				(0.885)	(0.980)
ID&Amount X Tribute				2.170**	2.505**
				(1.170)	(1.371)
Choose Info X Tribute				0.908	1.218
				(1.413)	(1.522)
Observations	490	490	490	490	490
R-squared	0.530	0.542		0.558	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
p-val.: *ID&Amount=Choose Info*	0.83	0.97	0.93		
I&AX Trib.=CI X *Trib.*				0.35	0.39

Notes: Columns 1-2, and 4 report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates with the donation amount (D2) as the dependent variable. Columns 3 and 5 report estimates from a tobit regression accounting for censored observations of the dependent variable. Observations are restricted to participants who donate a positive amount. Donations are out-of-pocket amounts. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. Given the directional hypothesis for the intensive margin for *ID&Amount* (i.e., larger donations when amounts are revealed), the tests are one-tailed. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE C.7. Effect of Option on Future Giving

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Tobit
Dep. Var.:	*Any Future Donation*			*Donation Amount*		
Donation 1	0.234**	0.230**	0.148***	0.667***	0.676***	0.803***
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.052)	(0.072)
ID&Amount	-0.032	-0.037	-0.039	-0.075	0.062	0.138
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.779)	(0.856)	(0.969)
Choose Info	0.038	0.037	0.034	-0.211	0.117	0.412
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.784)	(0.787)	(0.893)
Observations	200	200	200	184	184	184
R-squared	0.089	0.121		0.412	0.445	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
p-val.: *ID&Amount=Choose Info*	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.86	0.95	0.76

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is whether participants make any future donation (extensive margin), while the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the donation amount, among donors. Columns 1-2 and columns 4-5 report OLS estimates. Columns 3 and 6 report results using a probit and tobit specification, respectively. In columns 1-3, the explanatory variable "Donation 1" is an indicator variable for whether participants make any private donation, while in columns 4-6 it is reported as the amount donated in private. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Absent directional hypothesis for future giving, all tests are two-tailed. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



FIGURE C.1. Donation Rates, *ID* vs. *Choose Info*

APPENDIX D. SESSIONS WHERE DONATIONS ARE MADE ON BEHALF OF ONESELF (*Self*)

D.1. **Instructions.**

Welcome to the Experiment

Thank you for participating in our study! This is an experiment about decision-making. The other people in today's session are also participating in the experiment. You must not talk to or communicate with them in any way. If you have a question, please raise your hand and a researcher will answer your question in private.

This experiment will consist of two parts, Part A and Part B. Instructions will be provided before each part. All participants will receive a $6 show-up fee. You can earn additional amounts depending on the decisions you make in the experiment and luck.

At the top of your station you will see a card holder with a number. This number is your Participant Number. Your Participant Number will be used to pay you at the end of this session.

We may use your Participant Number to reveal some of your decisions to others in today's session. Prior to making a decision, you will be informed whether you and your decision will be revealed and, if so, to whom.

[*break*]

Part A Instructions

In Part A of the experiment, you will be asked to calculate the sum of 6 randomly chosen one-digit numbers. You will be asked to complete 10 of these problems. You should find the sums without using a calculator. You submit an answer by clicking the submit button with your mouse. When you enter an answer, the computer will immediately tell you whether your answer is correct or not. For completing this task, you will earn $18 that you may use during the rest of the experiment. When you correctly solve 10 of these problems, you will automatically proceed to the next stage of the experiment.

[*break*]

Part B Instructions

In Part B you will have the opportunity to use your $18 from Part A to donate to charity. Part B will consist of two rounds. In each round, you will make three donation decisions, one to each of three different charities. For each decision, you will decide how much of your $18 to donate to that charity and how much to keep. We will implement only one of your decisions.

At the end of the experiment we will randomly decide which of the three charities will receive donations from today's session. Half of the participants in today's session will be randomly selected to have their Round-1 decision implemented for the selected charity. The other half of participants will have their Round-2 decision implemented for the selected charity. You will keep what remains of your $18 after we implement your selected decision.

Round 1

On the next page you will learn about three local charities and their missions. The charities are, in alphabetical order: Animal Friends, the Greater Pittsburgh Community Food Bank, and the Women's Center and Shelter of Greater Pittsburgh. The three charities are providing critical resources to the Pittsburgh community during these challenging times. After you have read about each charity, you will be asked to make your decisions. For each charity, you will be asked how much of your $18 from Part A you wish to keep and how much you wish to donate. If one of your Round-1 decisions is randomly selected to be implemented, your decision will be kept private. It will not be shown to any other participant in today's session. Since donations to any charity may be selected to count for payment, you should treat each decision as if it is the one that will be implemented. You can use your full $18 on any given decision since only one counts for payment.

Donations must be made in increments of $2. Every donation will be matched "one-for-one" by a research foundation, i.e., a $2 donation will be matched with an additional $2 to make a $4 donation. If you would like to see a receipt of the total donation made to the three charities, you may email the researcher at kpw18@pitt.edu. If you would like an individual receipt for your

donation, we will provide instructions on how to do so at the end of the session.

[*break*]

Round 2

In round 2, you will again make donation decisions to the three charities you learned about in round 1. As mentioned before, at the end of the experiment we will randomly select one charity to receive donations made during this session and will implement one of your decisions made to that charity. Half of the participants in today's session will have their Round-1 decision implemented while the other half will have their Round-2 decision implemented to that charity.

For each charity, you will again decide how much of your $18 from Part A you wish to keep and how much you wish to donate. Donations must be made in increments of $2, and you can use up to the full $18 for each decision. Donations will again be matched "one-for-one" by a research foundation. Because each decision is equally likely to be selected, you should treat each decision as if it is the one that will be implemented.

If your Round-2 decision is implemented, you will learn who donated in Round 2.

[*Subsequent text depends on experimental treatment*]

That is, you will see the Participant Numbers of those who donated *[*ID*: but not how much they donated.] [*ID&Amount*: and how much they donated.] [*Choose Info*: If you make a donation in Round 2 that is implemented, you may also choose whether others will learn how much you donated in Round 2. That is, you may also see the amount that others donated if they choose to reveal this information.]* Similarly, other participants who had their Round-2 decision implemented *[*ID*: will learn if you donated but not how much you donated.] [*Reveal*: will learn if you donated and how much you donated.] [*Choose Info*: may also learn the amount you donated if you choose to reveal this information.]* We will do this by showing a list of the Participant Numbers *[*ID&Amount*: along with donation amounts] [*Choose Info*: (and donation amounts for those who choose to reveal this information)]* for participants who made a donation in Round 2 to all participants who had their Round-2 decision implemented.

If you did not donate in Round 2 or if your Round-2 decision was not implemented, then your Participant Number *[*ID&Amount*: and donation amounts]* will not be revealed to others.

An example of the donor information that will be shown is provided below. This information will be shown at the end of the session to the participants who had their Round-2 decision implemented. The leftmost column lists Participant Numbers, which match the numbers on the cards on top of

your computer stations. *[*ID&Amount*: The middle column shows donation amounts before the one-for-one research foundation match. The rightmost column shows the total donation amount after the one-for-one match.] [*Choose Info*: The middle column shows donation amounts before the one-for-one research foundation match (if participants chose to reveal the amount). The rightmost column shows the total donation amount after the one-for-one match (if participants chose to reveal the amount).* The participants included in this table are those who had their Round-2 decision implemented and donated a positive amount to the selected charity.

[*Example table shown*]

[*Instructions return to standard language across treatments.*]

The Participant Numbers *[*ID&Amount*: and donation amounts]* of those who did not donate in Round 2 or who had their Round-1 decision implemented are not included in this table.

TABLE D.1. Summary of Experimental Treatments (*Self*)

Treatment	Participants	Features
ID	63	Do Not Reveal Donation Amount (D2)
ID&Amount	65	Reveal Donation Amount (D2)
Choose Info	65	Choice to Reveal Donation Amount (D2)
Total	193	

Notes: This table summarizes treatments where participants made donations made on behalf of oneself. The *ID*, *ID&Amount*, and *Choose Info* treatment mirrored those described in the main text; however whenever applicable, information was revealed to other participants in the session, rather than in cards to honorees who had donations made on their behalf.

TABLE D.2. Effect of Revealing Amount, Option-to-Reveal on Donation Rates (*Self*)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit
Dep. Var.:	$\mathbb{1}(Donation\ 2 > 0)$		
$\mathbb{1}$(Donation 1)	0.732***	0.717***	0.360***
	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.030)
ID&Amount	0.003	-0.016	-0.013
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.040)
Choose Info	0.025	0.005	0.006
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.041)
Observations	579	579	579
R-squared	0.487	0.510	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
p-val.: *ID&Amount=Choose Info*	0.56	0.59	0.63

Notes: Columns 1-3 report estimates using an indicator variable for whether participants make any donation (D2) as the dependent variable. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. All specifications control for whether participants donate in private (D1). Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. Given the directional hypothesis for the extensive margin (i.e., lower donation rate when amounts are revealed), the tests are one-tailed. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D.2. **Additional Results.**

TABLE D.3. Effect of Revealing Amount, Option-to-Reveal on Donation Size, Among Donors (*Self*)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Tobit
Dep. Var.:	*Donation 2 Amount*		
Donation 1	0.795***	0.790***	0.891***
	(0.052)	(0.054)	(0.067)
ID&Amount	0.432	0.257	0.077
	(0.655)	(0.644)	(0.683)
Choose Info	-0.696	-0.795*	-1.169**
	(0.611)	(0.603)	(0.667)
Observations	463	463	463
R-squared	0.589	0.645	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes
p-val.: *ID&Amount=Choose Info*	0.03	0.04	0.02

Notes: Columns 1-2 report ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates with the donation amount (D2) as the dependent variable. Column 3 reports estimates from a tobit regression accounting for censored observations of the dependent variable. Observations are restricted to participants who donate a positive amount. Donations are out-of-pocket amounts. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. Given the directional hypothesis for the intensive margin for *ID&Amount* (i.e., larger donations when amounts are revealed), the tests are one-tailed. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

TABLE D.4. Effect of Revealing Amount, Option-to-Reveal on Future Giving (*Self*)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit	(4) OLS	(5) OLS	(6) Tobit
Dep. Var.:	*Any Future Donation*			*Donation Amount*		
Donation 1	0.558***	0.556***	0.269***	0.745***	0.721***	0.897***
	(0.092)	(0.091)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.047)	(0.074)
ID&Amount	-0.006	-0.013	-0.015	-0.169	-0.295	-0.247
	(0.049)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.773)	(0.768)	(0.868)
Choose Info	-0.018	-0.027	-0.022	-1.144	-1.199	-1.505*
	(0.048)	(0.046)	(0.039)	(0.743)	(0.747)	(0.834)
Observations	193	193	193	168	168	168
R-squared	0.362	0.388		0.493	0.518	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
p-val.: *ID&Amount=Choose Info*	0.80	0.76	0.88	0.13	0.18	0.09

Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1-3 is whether participants make any future donation (extensive margin), while the dependent variable in columns 4-6 is the donation amount, among donors. Columns 1-2 and columns 4-5 report OLS estimates. Columns 3 and 6 report results using a probit and tobit specification, respectively. In columns 1-3, the explanatory variable "Donation 1" is an indicator variable for whether participants make any private donation, while in columns 4-6 it is reported as the amount donated in private. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Absent directional hypothesis for future giving, all tests are two-tailed. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

TABLE D.5. Effect of Revealing Amount on Receiving Charity News (*Self*)

	(1) OLS	(2) OLS	(3) Probit
Dep. Var.:	*Subscribe to Charity Emails*		
𝟙(Donation 1)	0.186***	0.176***	0.230***
	(0.063)	(0.058)	(0.082)
ID&Amount	0.075	0.068	0.065
	(0.062)	(0.058)	(0.057)
Observations	384	384	384
R-squared	0.037	0.114	
Controls	No	Yes	Yes

Notes: Columns 1-2 report OLS estimates using an indicator for whether participants add their email to the charity's mailing list as the dependent variable. Column 3 reports the marginal effects from a probit specification. Control variables are: gender, age, year in school, self-reported volunteering frequency, self-reported average charitable donations per year, political ideology, and religiosity. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level and are reported in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1



FIGURE D.1. Donation Rates, *ID* vs. *ID&Amount* (*Self*)



FIGURE D.2. Donation Rates, *ID* vs. *Choose Info* (*Self*)