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“Long have I wished to see the king:” Indigenous Transatlantic Diplomacy in the 18th Century North American Southeast

Riley C. Bowers

A Thesis submitted
to the Eberly College of Arts and Sciences
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in History

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ABSTRACT

"Long Have I wished to see the king:" Indigenous Transatlantic Diplomacy in the 18th Century North American Southeast

Riley C. Bowers

This thesis situates three examples of transatlantic diplomacy practiced by Cherokee and Yamacraw diplomats in the eighteenth century within their Indigenous contexts. Utilizing treaty negotiations, transcripts from diplomatic summits, official correspondence, published journals, and newspapers, this study aims to situate these delegations within an Indigenous and transatlantic sociopolitical context. The aim of this work is to address questions regarding the objectives of the people involved, and to trace the outcomes of their policies. The answers to these questions explain one of many southeastern Indigenous political strategies of the eighteenth century, one that highlights the imperial center as a crucial setting in which Indigenous diplomatic policy was directed. The primary focus of this study, however, remains the North American interior, for the transatlantic diplomats prioritized their homes above all else. This thesis finds that the Cherokee and Yamacraw diplomats both effectuated several of their desired outcomes in the short term, as well as influenced the course taken by successive generations of Indigenous leaders who learned from their triumphs and their failures.

For my family, whose support has been an invaluable pillar in my life

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"Long have I wished to see the king:" Indigenous Transatlantic Diplomacy in the 18th Century North American Southeast

Throughout the eighteenth century, several delegations of southeastern Indigenous leaders ventured across the Atlantic Ocean with the intent of affirming good relations between their own peoples and the British. The most notable of these journeys were two undertaken by Cherokee diplomats in 1730 and 1762, and one by the Yamacraw, a Mvskoke village, in 1734. Conducted with the intent of negotiating trade agreements, military alliances, as well as familiarizing Indigenous leaders with the opulence of the British monarch, these embassies and their outcomes were in many ways characterized by the regional interests of the diplomats involved. By centering the Indigenous perspective on these delegations and their significance, this thesis argues that their transatlantic diplomacy was much more dominated by Indigenous objectives of incorporating the British Empire into their own networks than the inverse. Recognizing the utility of siding with Britain's colonies (when convenient), Indigenous objectives and local interests held greater influence over the maintenance of these alliances than some imperial agents were willing to acknowledge.[1]

This thesis seeks to explore the significance of this diplomacy within its Indigenous contexts. Far from prospective subjects eagerly joining the British Empire, the Cherokee and Yamacraw diplomats made the Atlantic crossing with their own personal objectives in mind. In the diverse sociopolitical environment of the North American Southeast, Indigenous leaders navigated through a multitude of European and African newcomers, adding to the already complex network of relations among Indigenous neighbors. Warfare and commerce significantly molded the landscape of the eighteenth century Southeast. Enticing commercial and diplomatic

[1] Coll Thrush, *Indigenous London: Native Travelers at the Heart of Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 70-71.

opportunities with these newcomers was one possibility, but so was the threat of enslavement and devastating violence. Careful consideration of how to proceed through this period was an absolute necessity.

Better acquainted with the volatility of this environment than anyone else, Indigenous transatlantic diplomats sought to incorporate the British Empire and its colonies into their own system of alliances. Engaged in a protracted and complicated war with one another for much of the eighteenth century, the Mvskoke, represented by the Yamacraw delegation, and the Cherokees had several reasons to entertain the idea of making allies of the British. Prioritizing regional interests, such as the desire of a profitable trade and concerns regarding conflict with neighbors, the Indigenous diplomats endeavored to obligate the British and themselves to one another, thereby securing a commercial partner and a powerful ally. These delegations and the memory of them were significant in the Southeast, as leaders looked back on them to legitimize their positions and call upon their counterparts to be faithful to the agreements they made abroad. By establishing personal relationships with the king and formally codifying their alliance, a generation of diplomats worked to lay the foundations for how their peoples would successfully cooperate with one another. Through negotiating systems of commercial exchange and military cooperation, these individuals hoped to usher in a lasting prosperity for the peoples they represented.[2]

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[2] Tyler Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among Eighteenth-Century Cherokees* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2011), 57-58. For estimations on the population of the North American Southeast from the late seventeenth into the late nineteenth centuries, see Peter H. Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region," in *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast, Revised and Expanded edition,* ed. Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom Hatley (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 60-61. See also Aaron Fogelman, "Migrations to the Thirteen British North American Colonies, 1700-1775: New Estimates," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 22,* no. 4 (Spring 1995): 698-699. For Indigenous incorporation of transatlantic commerce into traditional commodity production, see Jessica Yirush Stern, *The Lives in Objects: Native Americans, British Colonists, and Cultures of Labor and Exchange in the Southeast* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 4-5. For impact of war and trade

Balance was the name of the game, as Indigenous and European groups endeavored to make the most of the situation, while guarding themselves against the worst. As one historian has demonstrated of seventeenth century New England, the contest for authority between Indigenous groups and European colonies was characterized by individual actors who sought to take advantage of moments of conflict and cooperation. Working within the confines necessary to maintain balance when its benefits appeared easier to obtain, these actors also challenged the parameters in a myriad of ways when necessary. The same was true of the eighteenth century Southeast, exemplified by the Cherokee and Yamacraw diplomats, whose efforts were undertaken to enhance their positions in relation to both friends and foes. In both cases, the efforts to maintain this balance, though ultimately futile, ushered in drastic changes after several decades of trying.[3]

Imperial efforts to maintain positive relations between colonial outposts and their Indigenous neighbors were twofold: profitable trade with Indigenous peoples, such as the deerskin trade in South Carolina, and military alliance. Spurred by competition with France and

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on Indigenous societies, see R. Brian Ferguson and Neil L. Whitehead, eds., *War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States and Indigenous Warfare* (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1992), 14-15. See also Ned Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 1-3. For the complex network of Indigenous-European alliances in the eighteenth century, see Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of North America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 154-155. For the importance widely connected diplomats to southeastern Indigenous groups, see Jack P. Greene, "Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and American Worlds," *The Journal of Southern History 73,* no. 3 (August 2007): 526-529. For early interactions and exchanges between African and Indigenous peoples in the Southeast, see Tiya Miles, "Native Americans and African Americans," in *The New Encyclopedia of Southern Culture: Volume 24: Race,* ed. Charles Reagan Wilson, Thomas C. Holt, and Laurie B. Green (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013). For the Indian slave trade, see Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 7-9. For a study challenging teleological interpretations of the inevitable conquest and colonization of North America, see Pekka Hämäläinen's *Indigenous Continent: The Epic Contest for North America* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2022), ix-xi. For discourse on asking the same questions of different historical actors, see Nancy Shoemaker, "2019 Presidential Address: Sameness and Difference in Ethnohistory," *Ethnohistory 60,* no. 4 (2020): 545.

[3] Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest for Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 5-6.

Spain, as well as with other Indigenous peoples, Britain's southeastern colonies were eager to create alliances with groups like the Cherokee and the Yamacraw to secure their frontiers. These relationships served to underscore, at least in theory, Britain's absolute authority over its Indigenous allies (or subjects), who were thus conceptualized as suzerainties expected to serve dutifully and cheaply. But this perspective only tells part of the story.[4]

This study aims to situate these delegations within an Indigenous and transatlantic sociopolitical context, addressing questions regarding the objectives of the people involved, and how the outcomes of their policies influenced their own time as well as successive generations of Indigenous leaders. The answers to these questions will explain one of many southeastern Indigenous political strategies of the eighteenth century, one that highlights the imperial center as a crucial setting in which Indigenous diplomatic policy was directed. The focus of this study, however, remains the North American interior, for the transatlantic diplomats prioritized their homes above all else.[5]

Historiography

Diplomacy provides one of the principal avenues of inquiry into Atlantic history. Rather than centering intercultural violence, studies of diplomacy and commerce emphasize the interconnectedness of the Atlantic world as diverse peoples came into frequent contact with one another. As crucial as the mutually constructed process of navigating this increasingly expanding world is to the overall narrative, of equal importance are the ways in which individual peoples

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[4] Gregory Evans Dowd, "'Insidious Friends": Gift Giving and the Cherokee-British Alliance in the Seven Years' War," in *Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi, 1750-1830,* ed. Andrew R.L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 137-138; Kathryn Holland Braund, *Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 61.
[5] Steven C. Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 7; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 10.

and societies came to rationalize and utilize this interconnectedness within their own cultural parameters and objectives. Some historians, such as Richard White in his 1991 *Middle Ground,* and more recently with Michael Witgen's 2011 *An Infinity of Nations,* have explored how these processes unfolded in North America between Indigenous societies and European colonizing powers in the Great Lakes Country. Just as the Anishinaabe and New France constructed their own diplomatic systems based on familiar and foreign concepts, so too did the Cherokees and the Yamacraw endeavor to accommodate the British into their understandings of alliance, while adopting new methods, like incorporating forms of their counterparts' concepts of legal justice. Metropolitan cities like London, especially by the eighteenth century, came into increasing contact with foreign peoples from faraway lands, who ventured to these spaces for a multitude of reasons. This interconnectedness made London an important site for intercultural interactions, not unlike a frontier.[6]

As other scholars have demonstrated, intercultural violence and exchange were not mutually exclusive, and indeed often occurred simultaneously as part of the same processes. Examining the captive exchange of women and children in the colonial North American Southwest in his 2002 book *Captives & Cousins: Slavery Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands,* James F. Brooks highlighted the mutually constructed nature of the violent interdependence centered on captive taking. Drawing connections between cultures that pedestalize masculine honor, such as the Spanish and nomadic southwestern Indigenous societies, Brooks argues that both recognized control over captives, particularly women, as

[6] Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), xxv-xxvi; Michael Witgen, *An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 26. For scholarship on American continuation of diplomacy through commerce with Indigenous groups, see David Andrew Nichols, *Engines of Diplomacy: Indian Trading Factories and the Negotiation of American Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2016).

designations of power. This system of violent exchange both challenged their societies as well as drew them closer in terms of their interdependency on this system. Ned Blackhawk's 2006 book *Violence Over the Land: Indians and Empires in the Early American West* centers the processes of colonization in the forms of violence, adaptation, and epidemic disease. Blackhawk incorporates analysis of the transformative nature of violence into existing discussions of transformation within Indigenous societies that stress changes to local economies, environments, and demographics.[7]

By centering Indigenous voices in eighteenth century histories, historians like Daniel K. Richter and Francois Furstenberg have emphasized the significance of viewing historical events through different lenses. Richter's 2003 book *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* challenges narratives that situate Indigenous America as the periphery of a European center. Richter argues that more is revealed about American history when one relocates the focal point to the interior of North America, facing outward toward the coastal and Atlantic peripheries. Furstenberg echoes Richter's argument for the utility of this perspective in his 2008 article "The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History." Furstenberg suggests that, when emphasizing Indigenous perspectives on watershed events from the middle eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, such as the Seven Years' War (1754-1763) to the War of 1812 (1812-1815), these incidents can be seen not as separate conflicts but as one long continuous contest for lands west of the Appalachian Mountains. Through reorienting the lens of the narrative, Indigenous experiences during and responses to these periods are better explained.[8]

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[7] James F. Brooks, *Captives & Cousins: Slavery Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 39-40; Blackhawk, *Violence Over the Land,* 3-6.
[8] Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country,* 8; Francois Furstenberg, "The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History," *The American Historical Review 113,* no. 3 (June 2008): 650. For scholarship on Indigenous experiences and responses to epidemic disease in the Southeast, see Paul Kelton, *Cherokee Medicine,*

Interest in the subject of Indigenous history within the Atlantic World has increased over the past two decades as scholars have paid closer attention to intercultural encounters that occurred outside of conventionally examined spaces like the borderlands. The relative lack of attention given to Indigenous peoples in the field of Atlantic history was addressed by Paul Cohen in his 2008 article "Was there an Amerindian Atlantic? Reflections on the limits of a historiographical concept." Cohen called attention to the lack of focus within the field placed on Indigenous contributions to the formation of the Atlantic world. Cohen argues that incorporation of Indigenous histories and contributions is a necessary step toward effectively communicating the interconnectedness examined by the field of Atlantic history. Stressing connectedness, not encompassment, Cohen concludes that the Atlantic world must remain one of many worlds with which Indigenous histories are involved, not the overarching paradigm within which these histories exist.[9]

Since Cohen posed this question, scholars like Jace Weaver and Caroline Dodds Pennock have demonstrated that there was, in fact, an Indigenous Atlantic, or what Weaver has termed the "Red Atlantic" in his 2014 book *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000-1927.* Weaver's aim is to highlight the active participation of Indigenous peoples in the Atlantic world, which was constituted by more than instances of their travel across the ocean itself and includes material contributions such as produce and technological

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Colonial Germs: An Indigenous Nation's Fight against Smallpox, 1518-1824 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2015), 19-20. For scholarship on go-betweens and negotiators within narratives of intercultural exchanges, see James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), 26-28. For work on the influence and control of Indigenous customs over intercultural exchanges with Europeans, see Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 4-5. For a study of information pathways of the colonial North American South, see Alejandra Dubcovsky, *Informed Power: Communication in the Early American South* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 4-6.

[9] Paul Cohen, "Was there an Amerindian Atlantic? Reflections on the limits of a historiographical concept," *History of European Ideas* 34, no. 4 (2008): 408-409.

advancements. Weaver's comprehensive approach, which includes discussion of delegations to Europe, is intended primarily to contend that there was a Red Atlantic, which he hopes will "restore Indians and Inuit to the Atlantic world and demonstrate their centrality to that world." Regarding the question of the existence of a 'Red' or 'Indigenous' Atlantic, Caroline Dodds Pennock argues in her 2020 article "Aztecs Abroad? Uncovering the Early Indigenous Atlantic," that there were in fact many "Indigenous Atlantics," in which Indigenous peoples exercised purposeful and transformative agency. Rather than simply locating histories of Indigenous peoples crossing the Atlantic, Pennock argues that a meaningful approach to an Indigenous Atlantic must situate the Atlantic Ocean within an Indigenous perspective, with respect to Indigenous understandings of the ocean itself as well as how it was utilized.[10]

Several historians have examined Indigenous crossings of the Atlantic from the perspective of the metropole. Eric Hinderaker's 1996 article ""Four Indian Kings" and the Imaginative Construction of the First British Empire" focuses on the 1710 delegation of three Mohawks and a Mahican, arguing that as the first explicitly diplomatic venture to London undertaken by Indigenous leaders, this group is the most important of the eighteenth century Indigenous diplomatic missions across the Atlantic. Published prior to Cohen's evaluation of Atlantic history's relative omission of Indigenous components to the narrative, Hinderaker's perspective on this history is confined to the boundaries of the metropole, situating the Indigenous diplomats as "vessels" who personified the "implications" associated with the expansion of the British Empire. Kate Fullagar's 2012 book *The Savage Visit: New World People*

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[10] Jace Weaver, *The Red Atlantic: American Indigenes and the Making of the Modern World, 1000-1927* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014), 24-29, x; Caroline Dodds Pennock, "Aztecs Abroad? Uncovering the Early Indigenous Atlantic," *American Historical Review* 125, no. 3 (June 2020): 790, 814; For scholarship centering African diplomats' perspectives and travels in Britain in the late nineteenth century, see Neil Parsons, *King Khama, Emperor Joe, and the Great White Queen: Victorian Britain through African Eyes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

and Popular Imperial Culture in Britain, 1710-1795 is somewhat consistent with Hinderaker's primary conclusions regarding the significance of these delegations. Fullagar's work, a synthesis of a multitude of representatives from the Americas as well as the Pacific Islands, centers the metropolitan discourse sparked by these foreign visitors. As diverse peoples came to the center of empire, Britons became increasingly conscious of and engaged with the topic of imperial expansion. Fullagar's study communicates the significance of these events from the perspective of the metropolitan public, whose reception of these foreign visitors diminished in the scale of their excitement over the century as the meaning of imperial expansion came to be better understood by Britons.[11]

Analysis of material and popular culture has been one method employed by historians more recently to demonstrate the British public's reaction to these emissaries. Monica Anke Hahn's 2021 article entitled "Pantomime Indian: Performing the Encounter in Robert Sayer's Harlequin Cherokee," examines a particular piece of material culture produced during the 1762 Cherokee visit. In the form of a turn-up book, a version of the tale of the three Cherokees' journey is depicted, which illustrates the Cherokees as harlequins, or comedic stock characters. Hahn's emphasis on this particular work is employed to make broader statements about popular portrayal of Indigenous peoples, suggesting that the very act of casting these Cherokee diplomats as harlequins exemplifies the "duality of the colonial gaze and the mutability of perception in the encounter." Hinderaker, Fullagar, and Hahn draw meaningful conclusions from these occurrences as they relate to the British imperial zeitgeist, however in so doing they omit asking similar questions of the significance of these journeys as perceived by those who undertook them and

[11] Eric Hinderaker, ""Four Indian Kings" and the Imaginative Construction of the First British Empire," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (July 1996): 526; Kate Fullagar, *The Savage Visit: New World People and Popular Imperial Culture in Britain, 1710-1795* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 20.

whom those individuals were understood to represent. This perspective is helpful in explaining the wider significance of these journeys, but as a result of its focus on the public reactions of Britain the meanings of these political journeys for the Indigenous peoples who organized them are left in the background despite their central role within the narrative.[12]

In recent decades historians have questioned the general propensity of other scholars to include Indigenous persons not as primary characters but as foils within Anglocentric historical narratives, or to ignore Indigenous peoples altogether. Rather than focusing on settler or imperial perceptions within such narratives, some historians have shifted their attention toward the Indigenous experiences of these events. One such example is Alden T. Vaughn's 2006 *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500–1776,* whose survey compiles a list of documented instances in which Indigenous peoples crossed the Atlantic. Though rooted wherever possible in historical context and aftermath, Vaughn's primary focus is on these peoples' experiences while in Britain, seeking to trace the events of their stays. In this way, Vaughan prioritizes these visitors' own stories within London. Drawing on much of the same source material as Vaughan, Coll Thrush has more recently emphasized the intersection of Indigenous history and the history of London, and how this intersection contributed to London's history overall. Thrush's 2016 *Indigenous London: Native Travelers at the Heart of Empire* underscores the active engagement on the part of Indigenous peoples in the creation of the 'modern world' and urban centers, like London. Drawing on the work of these historians, this thesis furthers the discussion of these delegations beyond their departure from Britain,

[12] Monica Anke Hahn, "Pantomime Indian: Performing the Encounter in Robert Sayer's *Harlequin Cherokee,*" *The William and Mary Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (January 2021): 146.

connecting their diplomatic endeavors to a longer trajectory of political developments that occurred in the wake of their undertaking.[13]

Outline

Organized into three chapters, this thesis will chart the course of transatlantic diplomacy as a political strategy practiced by southeastern Indigenous political leaders through the middle third of the eighteenth century. The first chapter centers on the seven individuals sent by the Cherokees in 1730. Beginning with a section that explains the decentralized nature of eighteenth century Cherokee sociopolitical organization, this chapter charts the course of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance from the early period of the century, through the Yamasee War (1715-1718), the 1730 embassy to Britain, and the first two decades following. Setting the stage for the course of much of the rest of the century regarding Anglo-Cherokee relations, it will outline the desired outcomes of their alliance from both sides, paying specific attention to Cherokee objectives in securing profitable trade and a reliable military ally against their Mvskoke and French enemies. From 1730 through to the start of the Seven Years' War in 1754, Anglo-Cherokee negotiations were predicated on their 1730 treaty signed in Britain, entitled the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, and were increasingly dominated by those with a strong connection to the 1730 delegation. Featured in this chapter is Attakullakulla, an Overhill Cherokee headman, whose prominence as a leader can be traced back to his involvement with the 1730 delegation.

The second chapter addresses the Yamacraw diplomats of 1734. Rooted in the context of Mvskoke ethnogenesis and early eighteenth-century conflicts, this chapter situates the Yamacraw

[13] Alden T. Vaughn, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xvi; Thrush, *Indigenous London,* 14-15. For a study on the metropolitan public's interest in commercial depictions of Indigenous peoples and their attitudes toward them, see Timothy J. Shannon, *Indian Captive, Indian King: Peter Williamson in America and Britain* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 7-8.

as a people with diasporic origins tracing back to conflict with the Cherokees and the British in the Yamasee War. Attention then shifts to the Yamacraw mission to London, including how it was organized and the objectives of the parties involved, specifically the Yamacraw's desires to reintegrate themselves into the Mvskoke Confederacy and defend themselves against adversaries like the Cherokees and the Spanish. This chapter continues with the remainder of the life of Tomochichi, who led the delegation, and was a principal figure in the early history of the colony of Georgia as he advocated for a policy of friendship with the British. Concluding with an evaluation of Tooanahowi, Tomochichi's nephew and chosen successor who accompanied him to Britain, this chapter explains the rise and fall of the Yamacraw as a distinct member of the Mvskoke Confederacy, intrinsically linked to their transatlantic connections with Britain.

The third and final chapter refocuses the Cherokees, who in the aftermath of the Anglo-Cherokee War sent three diplomats to London in 1762 to reaffirm their peace with the British. It begins with a survey of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance from the 1750s to the aftermath of the Seven Years' War, which saw the eventual breakdown of relations and eventually open conflict between colonists and the Cherokees between 1758 and 1761. This context served as the impetus for the 1762 journey to London, intended as a reconciliatory mission as well as an opportunity for its participants to verify or refute what other Cherokees told them of what they saw in Britain over thirty years prior. Commentary on Anglo-Cherokee relations following the Cherokees' return home and the negotiations over land that followed in the succeeding years constitutes the last section of this chapter. Concluding by the time of the American Revolution, the aftermath of the 1762 delegation signaled the end of the period of transatlantic diplomacy and accommodationist strategies as desirable, if even possible, diplomatic practices of the Cherokees. Attakullakulla and his contemporary, Ostenaco, who headed the 1762 delegation, factor

prominently in the narrative of this chapter as influential figures in Cherokee foreign policy during this period.

Methodology

Treaty negotiations, transcripts from diplomatic summits, official correspondence, published journals, and newspapers constitute a large base of the primary source material, much of the latter coming out of London. The former four categories enable analysis of Indigenous political maneuverings, identifying objectives for and perspectives on their alliances. Articles published in London's newspapers provide not only a paper trail of the delegations in London but also serve as mouthpieces for public opinion surrounding them. That these visitors were so widely discussed in contemporary print media is indicative of their perceived importance and the spectacle that accompanied them, but within these sources one also gets a sense of personal observations, even social critiques, offered by the British authors and editors who published them.

This thesis is focused in large part on the actions of particular Indigenous diplomats who did not record their own thoughts in writing. Reconstructing the motives of these individuals thus poses a challenge, though not an insurmountable one. Reading through the actions of these people, as well as between the lines of what others have written about them, enables an understanding of how these Indigenous diplomats sought to make use of transatlantic diplomatic pathways. Paying close attention to stated objectives and patterns in their negotiations with Anglo-Americans, and in how they conducted themselves as leaders throughout this period,

suggests key concerns of strengthening their own communities through diplomatic relationships.[14]

Crucially, the responses of the people whom these delegations were understood to represent constitute another significant gauge for evaluating the political significance of these journeys. That Tomochichi, Attakullakulla, and Ostenaco, to name a few, were influential advocates for pro-British policies back home following their diplomatic missions is suggestive of the political sway that these delegations yielded. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, however, the failures of the older generations' transatlantic politicking convinced younger generations that it was time for a change. Transatlantic diplomacy was but one of many options for Indigenous leaders during the middle third of the century, and several of them utilized this pathway to varying degrees of success. Their accomplishments abroad translated into tangible developments at home. These achievements had significant implications for the North American Southeast, as they informed diplomatic policy for several decades that ultimately influenced watershed moments in the region's history.

[14] Inspired by scholarship such as Richard White's *The Middle Ground*, Kathleen DuVal's *The Native Ground*, and Michael Witgen's *An Infinity of Nations*, the methodology of this thesis attempts to produce Indigenous-centered histories with source material produced by Europeans. These sources require as much vetting of biases as possible, as well as cross-referencing information with other materials. Some of the most crucial sources to this study are conversations between Indigenous and European diplomats, recorded by the latter. As explained by White in *The Middle Ground* (xxiv), this thesis assumes that these sources "must be a product of, and thus a preservation of, some degree of reliable communication between past actors." This information cannot be considered wholly accurate, but when supplemented by other materials, the result can be used to piece together an accurate narrative. This work is also inspired by Daniel K. Richter's *Facing East From Indian Country,* in that it seeks to refocus North America as the center and Europe as the periphery of this history. Nancy Shoemaker's appeal in her 2019 Presidential Address to the American Society for Ethnohistory to question sameness and difference in diverse historical actors and to ask the same questions of them has also influenced this thesis.

Forging the Chain of Friendship: The Cherokee Delegation of 1730 and the Anglo-Cherokee Alliance

By 1755, Attakullakulla was the only Cherokee alive who had been to Britain and met with King George II. He was proud of this fact, as anyone familiar with his oratory prowess could attest. Often referencing his involvement in the 1730 delegation of Cherokees to Britain, the headman was a prominent voice in the Cherokee political scene for decades following his diplomatic exploits as a youth. But his journey to Britain, though opportunistic in origin, produced effects far more consequential than personal advancement or bragging rights. Attakullakulla of all people was most aware of this. His diplomatic envoy to Britain in 1730 simultaneously produced the foundational treaty of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance and brought his home region of the Overhill Cherokee settlements into wider prominence. Incorporating Britain into their alliance network via South Carolina, Attakullakulla and the other six Cherokee diplomats secured a lucrative trading partner and a powerful military ally. Within the turbulent context of the eighteenth century North American Southeast, such achievements paid in dividends.[1]

Other parties came away from this diplomatic event with an entirely different understanding, however. One interpretation of the Cherokees delegates' journey in 1730, proliferated by their escort, contended that their treaty subjugated all of the Cherokee peoples beneath British sovereignty. Despite such incongruous takeaways from their codified agreement, it was the Cherokees' understanding of these events and their outcomes that dictated the

[1] "Conversation between Governor Glen and Little Carpenter," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 300-302. For discourse on complicated alliance systems of the period, see Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 1-2.

significance of what followed. Their comprehension of the embassy to London and the treaty it produced, on a broader as well as an individual scale, contributed much more directly to the course of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance through the eighteenth century than any who stylized the Cherokee as some sort of suzerainty. In practice, the Anglo-Cherokee alliance constituted a trade and military partnership, just as the Cherokee diplomats in London understood it. The diplomats incorporated Britain into the Cherokees' network of cooperation, and leaders looked back to these triumphs to inform their policy toward the British well into the final third of the eighteenth century.[2]

Opportunity for the Overhill Cherokees: Origins of the 1730 Delegation

The Cherokees of the eighteenth century were at a crossroads. As coastal European colonies and Indigenous groups of the interior of the continent came into more frequent contact with one another, Cherokee towns enjoyed the benefits of becoming more directly involved with Euro-American trade markets. With these benefits came potential risks, however. Competition and conflict with enemy Indigenous groups, such as the nearby Mvskoke, became ensconced within the increasingly complicated network of European-Indigenous alliance systems, as evidenced by the Yamasee War (1715-1718). These alliance systems were almost never guided by monolithic official policy. Rather, they were crafted and broken by the actions of individuals, whose endeavors could at different times be considered more or less aligned with the interests of the larger body of people whom they represented. Participation in the maintenance of these alliances as a leader, if done well, could yield the reciprocal benefit of increasing one's

[2] "Memorial of Sir Alexander Cuming to the Duke of Newcastle, 1730," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 133.

individual influence at home, thereby further justifying their status. Cherokee headmen had their options open for how to navigate this potentially profitable but volatile environment.[3]

Attakullakulla, as he would come to be known in later years, became the most influential person connected to the 1730 delegation. Likely born in the Overhill settlements sometime in the early eighteenth century, Attakullakulla was the maternal nephew of Connecorte, or Old Hop. Hailing from an influential clan, he was likely raised to be a leader and a politician. Eventually becoming a warrior, Attakullakulla's responsibilities rested outside of the village, primarily involving relations with non-Cherokees. Based on his early career as a diplomat in the Southeast, he understood his experiences in London to be instrumental in developing and maintaining his influence. The Cherokee headman's understanding of his agreement with King George II and the British shaped his diplomatic endeavors in the decades following his 1730 journey. A lengthy stint as a captive in French Canada facilitated a temporary but critical shift of his allegiance away from the British. Though he kept his options open for part of his time as a leader, following his reconciliation with the British he continued his advocacy for pro-British diplomacy up until his death. Attakullakulla had not made the first step in establishing this embassy to London, but he certainly took advantage of it when the opportunity presented itself, and never forgot what he had seen and heard there. More importantly, the treaty he helped negotiate in London, and the messages he spread back home along with his fellow diplomats in the immediate years following

[3] The Yamasee War (1715-1718) was a watershed moment in the history of the Southeast. A bloody and wide conflict, this war prompted many Indigenous survivors to relocate, and initiated a diplomatic revolution that, among other things, pushed the Cherokees and South Carolina closer to one another, see William L. Ramsey, *The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 2-4; Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians Through the Era of Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), xii; Jack P. Greene, "Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and American Worlds," *The Journal of Southern History 73,* no. 3 (August 2007): 526-529.

their transatlantic voyage had lasting impacts on the Cherokee as a whole, whose recognition of these feats would prove salient.[4]

Growing up in the early part of the century, Attakullakulla was relatively young at the time of the Yamasee War. While he may have been too young himself to have participated as a warrior, Attakullakulla would have grown up fully aware of the ongoing conflict with the Mvskoke, which would only escalate as he grew older and became an influential headman. His own actions in the solidification of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance can be interpreted, at least in part, as a means to buttress Cherokee strength vis-à-vis their Mvskoke enemies. As he aged, conflict with the Mvskoke would have more explicit implications on Attakullakulla's political maneuverings, but his early efforts to make allies of the British would certainly have been pursued with the Mvskoke in mind. Indeed, in his own recollections of the time he spent in Britain and of the talks he had with King George II, war with Indigenous enemies seemed to be the one of the most prominent subjects that had been discussed.[5]

Endeavors to attach the Carolinas to themselves via military alliance against other Indigenous groups came to define Cherokee foreign policy in the years preceding the delegation. Far from strangers by 1730, the Cherokee and the British were already well-acquainted. Their dealings with one another date back to the seventeenth century, with military assistance and trade coming to the forefront of their relations. Cherokee headmen turned to Carolina in 1693 for assistance in their ongoing conflict with the Shawnee. During a conference, the governor assured

[4] James C. Kelly, "Notable Persons in Cherokee History: Attakullakulla," *Journal of Cherokee Studies* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 2-3.
[5] Tyler Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among Eighteenth-Century Cherokees* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2011), 72-74; James Glen, "Wednesday, A.M., the 4th Day of July, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* ed. William L. McDowell Jr. (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958), 433-434.

the Cherokees that peace and friendship with the latter was of paramount importance for him, and that he would actively pursue means to help them defend against Shawnee attacks. The two would rely on one another's military strength once again in the 1710s during the Yamasee War. Seizing the opportunity to go to war with the Yamasee, comprised of many Mvskoke, or Creek peoples, the Cherokees both offered and were asked to assist the colonists in their war. This conflict both solidified an alliance between the Cherokees and the British but also reinvigorated an old conflict between the Cherokees and the Mvskoke that would last into the latter half of the eighteenth century.[6]

The Anglo-Cherokee alliance focused heavily on the pelt trade. Exchanging deerskins for British manufactured goods, the Cherokees and South Carolina came to depend on one another in their mutually beneficial trade. Some historians have emphasized the Cherokees' increasing dependence on European goods as instrumental in charting Cherokee political objectives in the eighteenth century. Of equal, if not more, importance were the shifting dynamics within the Cherokees' country. Trade with the British colonies ushered in significant albeit somewhat contradictory changes for Cherokee towns during this period. One development involved the strengthening of intertown and interregional relations within Cherokee society through dealing with their common ally, the British. The second concerned the underscoring of distinct identities among the Cherokee, who increasingly sought to secure a better trade for their own regions and exercised factionalism along regional lines, including when it came to relations with outsiders like the Mvskoke and the French. The Overhill towns responded to the confluence of these

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[6] Thomas Smith, "Conference with Twenty Cherokee Chiefs in Charles Town," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 89; "Alliance of Cherokees with South Carolina against the Creeks," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 94-98; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 32; Steven C. Hahn, "The Long Yamasee War: Reflections on Yamasee Conflict in the Eighteenth Century," in *The Yamasee Indians: From Florida to South Carolina,* ed. Denise I. Bossy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018), 194-195.

developments, given their relative distance from Charles Town and proximity to the French. That the individuals who would eventually comprise the delegation to London were from the Overhill settlements is likely indicative of either their escort to Britain's awareness of their tenuous relations, the Overhill Cherokees' own aspirations to strengthen ties with the British, or perhaps even both.[7]

It was probably the fear of French movements in Cherokee country that motivated Sir Alexander Cuming, in part, to venture there himself. Early entries in his travel journal from his indicate a sort of survey of the land for resources such as iron ore and medicinal roots. Two separate accounts, including that produced by Attakullakulla, suggest in their recollections that Cuming simply wished to see the Cherokee country before he returned to Britain. One final explanation for Cuming's excursion was offered in a historical account of this series of events in 1757, which stated that Cuming had taken it upon himself to visit the Cherokees and endear them to the British once he had heard of their intentions of joining the French in an alliance. Importantly, his own account references Lower Mvskoke attempts to convince the Cherokees to join them in their alliance with the French, suggesting yet another faction making efforts to win the friendship of the Cherokees. Whether or not his anti-French inclinations motivated him to go in the first place, Cuming himself certainly worked to convince his superiors that his efforts were done in the British interest. Whatever the case may be, Cuming's time in Cherokee country was a busy one.[8]

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[7] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 32-34; Daniel J. Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists, and Slaves in the American Southeast, 1756-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 15-17.
[8] Alexander Cuming, "Journal of Sir Alexander Cuming," in *Early Travels in the Tennessee Country,* ed. Samuel Cole Williams (Johnson City: The Watauga Press, 1928), 126-132; Ludovick Grant, "Historical Relation of Facts Delivered by Ludovick Grant, Indian Trader, to His Excellency the Governor of South Carolina," *The South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 10, no. 1 (January 1909): 54-55; "Conversation Between Governor Glen and Little Carpenter," 300-301; "Account of the British Plantations in America," *The London Magazine, or,*

Cuming did not hide the fact that he was unsanctioned diplomatic agent working in the interest of the British Empire. Passing through several Cherokee towns, he made the same speech to all who listened, acknowledging that he had not been sent there by the king, nor anyone else for that matter, but he requested that all those in attendance for his talks drink to the king's health. Cuming followed a formula of moving from town to town rather quickly, marking the names of the Cherokees whom he met, even if only in passing, and listing them as friends of the British. Asking the Cherokees to join him celebrating the king's health, he took their polite compliance as their absolute submission to the authority of the British crown. He made known to his hosts his desire that as many headmen as could come would meet with him, where he would communicate his objectives. Headmen from several Cherokee towns acquiesced to this request and met with Cuming at Nikwasi in early April 1730.[9]

It was at the grand meeting of Cherokee headmen at Nikwasi that Cuming expressed his hopes for several of his hosts to accompany him to Britain. Reflecting on the events at Nikwasi several years afterward, Attakullakulla recalled that the headmen gathered that day could not be bothered to weather the long journey. Attakullakulla's account notes that he himself finally agreed to make the trip after some convincing by the interpreter. Cuming promised the Cherokee warrior "a particular Favor," and after assurances that the anticipated length of the venture was grossly overestimated, the young man agreed to go. It was only after Attakullakulla decided to venture Britain himself that five other Cherokees who felt that he "should not go alone," attached themselves to the delegation. The last individual to join their embassy was a leader returning from the Catawba, with whom they crossed paths on their way to Charles Town, who upon

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The Gentleman's Monthly Intelligencer XXVI, 1757, 282-281; "Memorial of Alexander Cuming to the Duke of Newcastle," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 133.

[9] Grant, "Historical Relation of Facts," 56-57; "Conversation Between Governor Glen and Little Carpenter," 300; Cuming, "Journal," 135-136.

hearing of their purpose expressed his desire to see Britain for himself, and subsequently fell in with their party. Compared to Cuming's account, which holds that the result of the conference at Nikwasi was the Cherokees' absolute submission to him and the granting of all their lands to Britain, Attakullakulla's reflections deny that the surrender of lands was ever discussed at Nikwasi. Indeed, this lack of submission to British sovereignty is corroborated by the testimony of one of Cuming's travel companions during his time in the Cherokee country.[10]

Regardless of whatever account may be the most accurate recording of this series of events, the Cherokees effectively made no surrender of sovereignty or lands that day. Cuming was regarded even in his own time as an unreliable narrator. Governor Glen's request that Ludovick Grant provide his own testimony on what had occurred in the negotiations of that day suggests a mistrust on their part of Cuming's relation of the incident, particularly regarding his claims surrounding the surrender of lands. More importantly, the Cherokee themselves, especially Attakullakulla, made it abundantly clear that Cuming's account did not represent their own impressions of what occurred at Nikwasi.

It is likely that Attakullakulla's recollection of the meeting at Nikwasi is the most accurate, and so the Cherokee delegates who elected to make the transatlantic journey were doing so for opportunistic reasons. Attakullakulla was a young man, not yet the influential leader that he would be recognized as in years to come, and so he still had much to prove. While the ages of the other delegates are unknown, it stands to reason that they would have weighed the potential benefits that they might enjoy if they conducted a successful diplomatic mission. The

[10] "Conversation Between Glen and Little Carpenter," 301; Cuming, "Journal," 136; Grant, "Historical Relation," 57.

formation of the embassy was approved by the Cherokees present at Nikwasi, and the seven Cherokee delegates took advantage of Cuming's expressed willingness to escort them.

The Cherokee delegates' decision to embark on this journey is more suggestive of the authority that individuals like Attakullakulla hoped to wield than it is indicative of what they actually possessed. Despite any claims that these seven delegates could speak for the whole of the Cherokee nation, eighteenth-century Cherokee political organization was decentralized. Political affiliations concentrated on towns and, more broadly, regions. While certain leaders could claim influence in several towns or even regions at once, they could not speak for the whole of the nation without a consensus from other leaders. The status of these leaders depended on several factors, many of which were contingent upon the satisfaction of the people whom they represented. Rising through the ranks as warriors or councilors, male Cherokee leaders earned their place through merit and the approval of their peers. Representing the interests of the people who appointed them in diplomatic talks, Cherokee headmen were careful not to overstep the authority that had been vested in them, conscious of the consequences that might follow suit if they failed to do so. Influence among Europeans in diplomatic procedures could yield merit to function as a leader within Cherokee society, which might in turn further justify their position as negotiators. Attakullakulla and his cohort understood these dynamics, and in their dealings in London they were careful to deliberate only in accordance with what they understood their own limited authority to be.[11]

"His people and ours shall be always one:" Incorporating Britain into the Cherokee Fold

[11] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 11-14, 46.

The Cherokee arrived in Charles Town by late April 1730, having been left to travel "at their leisure," by Cuming, who went ahead of them. Departing from South Carolina in early May aboard the *Fox*, the seven Cherokee delegates, along with Cuming and an interpreter, arrived in Dover by June 5. Here again, Cuming traveled ahead of the Cherokees, this time bringing with him the crown he had been gifted. Leaving the Cherokees behind to continue their journey aboard the ship, Cuming briefed the secretary of state on his designs and his assumed authority over the Cherokees, as represented by the crown he intended to lay before the feet of the king. As such, by the time the Cherokees reached London on June 12, newspapers were reporting that the seven diplomats had come to "pay their Duty to his Majesty, and assure him of their attachment to his Person and Government." As per Cuming's account, the Cherokees who had accompanied him were brought over to serve as evidence of his authority to submit them to the sovereignty of King George II.[12]

It is not likely that the Cherokees themselves were aware of this arrangement, for the delegates were not in London to conduct such business. As corroborated by the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, the foundational treaty of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance, as well as Attakullakulla's recollection of the 1730 embassy, military assistance and trade were the subjects at hand. Through contemporary British sources, the narrative of Cherokee submission to British hegemony is prevalent, however. It is evident that British sources were convinced, or at least trying to convince themselves, of this fantasy. At best, discourse both involving and regarding the Cherokees during their time in Britain was clouded by misunderstandings of the purpose of

[12] Cuming, "Journal," 128-129, 137-138; "London," *Daily Journal,* June 12, 1730; Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 137.

their visit. These claims, whether disingenuous or misinformed, did not reflect the reality of Anglo-Cherokee relations then, nor in the decades to come.[13]

The Cherokee's first audience with the king coincided with a ceremony commemorating his ascension to the throne a few years prior, and conveniently conformed to the hosts' agenda for acquainting the Cherokees with royal opulence. Attended by the court elite, this ceremony in late June was said to have not only exceeded expectations but was also spared from the "Throng of Spectators" that usually accompanies such events. Donning their "Country Habits" and carrying bows and muskets, surrounded by several British persons of status, the Cherokees stood remarkably close to the king during the dinner that evening. Sometime during the proceedings, the Cherokees presented the king with belts of wampum, and newspapers gushed over the respectful kneeling that the delegates accorded to the monarch as he passed by them. Reportedly surprised by all they had seen that day, the Cherokees were "splendidly entertained," at dinner.[14]

Most of the delegates met with the royal family in the "habits" of their own country, following the standard diplomatic protocols accorded to any matter of similar import back home. Carrying their paints and other necessary items across the Atlantic, it was important that they dressed for the occasion. Painting their faces and torsos, adorning their heads with painted feathers, and wearing an apron about their midsection, the Cherokee delegates were a curious sight for their hosts. If they were at any point asked to dress differently, it must not have been a particularly convincing request, nor a requirement, for only the individual misidentified as the king of the Cherokees elected to wear a regal scarlet jacket. Perhaps King George II or some other court attendees found their appearance to be inappropriate for their meetings, for when a

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[13] Cuming, Journal," 129; "Conversation Between Glen and Little Carpenter," 301-302.
[14] "London," *Daily Journal,* June 18, 1730; Cuming, "Journal," 129.

Mvskoke group called the Yamacraw visited London only four years later and similarly intended to go about in their own attire, they were implored to accommodate their dress to be more appropriate for their royal audience. In any case, at no point did their appearance bar them from any of the activities to which they were invited, and they would go on to meet with the king four times during their visit.[15]

The hosts were doubtless eager to impress an idea of British might upon the Cherokees as well. Specifics regarding the Cherokees' impressions of these sights were seldom recorded, but the diplomats appear in the record to be appreciative of their generous treatment and entertained by the things they saw. Dinners of mutton and venison, abodes that fit the British standard of comfort (that went largely underused; most of the Cherokees preferring to sleep on the ground), and the opportunity to see the royal family in all its glory were partially instrumental toward that effect, but martial demonstrations constituted the other crucial element in entertaining the visitors. The Cherokees were taken to see cavalry regiments, militia performances, as well as the Tower of London. Examples of soft power, too, were showcased to the Cherokees, including a psychiatric hospital, some schools, plays, and a collection of "rarities." This latter attraction was reported to have stirred the most excitement amonng the Cherokee diplomats, for they saw there "several Things of their own Country," perhaps feeling homesick after several weeks abroad. Given that a military and trade alliance was of paramount importance for the Cherokee diplomats, they must have appreciated the chance to evaluate both Britain's strength and its

[15] Donald Sizemore, *How to Make Cherokee Clothing* (Cherokee: Cherokee Publications, 1995), 239-240; "London," *Grub Street Journal,* July 2, 1730; Kate Fullagar, *The Savage Visit: New World People and Popular Imperial Culture in Britain, 1710-1795* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 69.

wealth. Such displays might prove to the Cherokees that their diplomatic suitors could be relied upon.[16]

The pomp and circumstance surrounding the Cherokees' initial meeting with Britain's elite was also conducive to Cuming's interests. Drawing upon the precedence of a Mohawk delegation in 1710, one of his principal objectives was to woo London's exotic emissaries with the elegance of courtly rituals. In showing the visitors the center of the empire, Cuming hoped that the Cherokees would be endeared to Britain and spread their newfound appreciation throughout Cherokee country. Seeing the wealth of Britain firsthand, perhaps the Cherokees would cease any friendly relations they might have had with the French.[17]

Figuring that they also had something to prove, the Cherokee visitors sought to flatter and impress. In their second meeting with the king, the diplomats showed all the qualities of gracious guests. Answering questions asked of them with pleasure and expressing appreciation at how they had been treated since their arrival in Britain, they kissed the king's hand several times. By way of interpreter, they communicated to the king that they would extend their gratitude toward the king's subjects in North America, indicating their understanding of the king as an authority representative of all British subjects, an idea that would prove crucial in years to come. Before the end of their talks that day, one of the delegates aimed to showcase his own abilities, perhaps to convince his hosts of the Cherokees' viability as allies. Asking permission to demonstrate his prowess with a bow and arrow, the diplomat desired to use it to hunt one of the king's elk. Though he was denied permission to do so, his offer was understood as an endeavor to perform a feat of "dexterity" for his hosts. Knowing the importance of the pelt trade to the workings of the

[16] "London," *Universal Spectator and Weekly Journal,* June 27, 1730; "Observable Domestick Occurrences," *Monthly Chronicle,* August 1730; Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters,* 143.
[17] Fullagar, *The Savage Visit,* 67.

Anglo-Cherokee alliance, his suggestion to put on a hunting display was likely done with this trade in mind.[18]

All the sightseeing and entertainment may have delighted the Cherokees as the newspapers seemed happy to report, but the diplomats were in Britain for important political reasons. Though the delegation itself had arisen from largely opportunistic impulses, the occasion for bolstering the Anglo-Cherokee alliance was not lost on either party. Both the Cherokee and the British were conscious of French maneuverings in the Mississippi Valley. It was decided that a treaty should be documented as a means to legitimize their commitment to an alliance. The Cherokee diplomats must have pressed their hosts to engage in treaty negotiations, for the Board of Trade felt as though the Cherokees came to "expect" a treaty from them. Fearing that by refusing the Cherokees this treaty their diplomatic relations might sour, the Board of Trade also saw the benefits in engaging in a treaty for themselves. British interests in the maintenance of this alliance remained consistent with its other foreign policy stances vis-à-vis Indigenous groups—the Cherokees represented an important barrier between Britain's colonial holdings and those of the French and Spanish. Citing New York, and thus Britain's standing with the Haudenosaunee, one British official suggested putting the Cherokees "upon the same footing," or to act as the guards of their southern colonial frontier. A more duplicitous motivation for signing such a treaty also undergirded Britain's interests, being to safeguard future aspirations for land acquisition. As the same British official suggested, "words may be easily inserted acknowledging [the Cherokees'] Dependence upon the Crown of Great Britain." Such a clause, this individual argued, would better secure their current, and aspiring, land claims against

[18] "London," *London Evening Post,* June 20-23, 1730.

those of other European powers, like the French. The issue of land would soon become a major point of contention for the alliance.[19]

Weighing their options, the Cherokee delegates were also likely thinking of the French at some point during their visit. Fears surrounding the fostering of a strong Franco-Cherokee alliance were, of course, a primary impetus for Cuming's organization of this journey. The Cherokees were aware of this and were privy to the concept that strengthening their ties with the British was a step in the opposite direction with the French and their Indigenous allies, especially the Choctaw. If the delegates were satisfied with what they had seen and heard during their time abroad, such information could help guide their foreign policy once they returned home, not to mention the individual merit they might hope to enjoy for their efforts. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the delegates themselves were from the Overhill region. The Overhill settlements' relative distance from British colonies like South Carolina in the Southeast, as compared with the Middle and Lower Cherokee settlements, initially rendered them less prominent in trade and relations with the British colonies. If successful, the Cherokee visitors might be able to leverage their positions as distinguished diplomats abroad in their dealings with the British back home. The delegation thus served as a way for the Overhill Cherokees to familiarize themselves with their British allies, as well as to hopefully better integrate themselves into the trade networks of the Anglo-alliance. The Cherokee delegates had much to ponder during their visit in London.[20]

Perhaps it was as a result of internal deliberations over these matters that the Cherokees "fell out a Mungst them selves," in their lodgings one evening in mid-July. According to the

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[19] "Board of Trade to the Duke of Newcastle about Authorization for a Cherokee Treaty," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 134-135.
[20] Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 3; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 34.

owner of the building in which they stayed, two of the delegates fought one another, evidently so intensely that he wished for them to be removed from his property and that their bill be paid for immediately. Newspapers reported on this incident, as the public eye remained carefully trained on the Cherokees throughout their stay in Britain. Within a week, however, the story was retracted and labeled unfounded. Though the true cause of their dispute, if it did occur, is unknown, it is important to note that this would not be the only time during the Cherokees' visit that heated debate could turn to violence or strong words. The diplomats were cognizant that their agreements abroad would have consequences at home, and this pressure weighed heavily upon them.[21]

By early September 1730, the necessary permissions had been acquired, and the Board of Trade initiated the process of concluding a treaty with the Cherokees. The "Articles of Friendship and Commerce," as it was called, was understood by the British and the Cherokees to be two very different agreements. The British negotiators aimed to situate the seven Cherokees as representative of their whole nation, and all Cherokees as subjects to the king of Great Britain. The general message of the document is that the Cherokees and the British will be united as a family under their father, the king. The proposed articles included that the Cherokees agree to only trade with and allow nearby settlement by the British and no other Europeans, while simultaneously requesting that the Cherokees refrain from attacking their own enemies should they be on the trading path with British persons. Other items of business included policy regarding the Cherokees' cooperation in the return of escaped enslaved persons, and their deferral to British authority to mediate any violence that might break out between a British

[21] "James Crowe to Cuming about Cherokee Fight," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 134; "News," *London Evening Post,* July 23-25, 1730; "News," *Daily Courant,* August 1, 1730; Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters,* 141-142.

colonist and a Cherokee. Following each of their proposals, the board presented the Cherokees with various gifts, including cloth, guns, bullets, and, lastly, wampum. The Cherokee delegates were asked to give their answer after two days of deliberation.[22]

Three aspects of this treaty proved significant to the maintenance of Anglo-Cherokee relations for decades to come. The first, concerning the issue of land, was almost immediately disastrous. Following the Cherokees' initial meeting with the board, where the proposed treaty was first communicated to them, the Cherokees requested that their translator recount what had been said that day once they were in the privacy of their temporary abode. The Cherokee delegates were horrified to hear that the king claimed ownership over their lands, as well as the lands of neighboring nations. To make matters worse, their appointed speaker had used the Cherokee phrase *to e u hah,* a solemn affirmation not to be taken lightly, in response to these claims. The delegates were so distraught by this that they contemplated killing both their appointed speaker and their translator in an act of rejection to this claim. The Cherokee diplomats eventually resolved to agree to the treaty for the time being and defer the matter of land to their elders at home. Conscious of their own limited authority to begin with, the diplomats felt comfortable in their self-assurances that these articles could not be in any way binding since their elders had not authorized them to agree to such terms.[23]

The second part of this treaty of which the Cherokees took particular note was the declaration that they and the British subjects of the king would be henceforth considered brethren. Fastening the chain of friendship on either side of the Atlantic, the Cherokees and the

[22] "Proposal of the Board of Trade for the Cherokee Treaty," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 136-138.
[23] James Adair, *The History of the American Indians*, ed. Kathryn E. Holland Braun (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005 [1775]), 103-14; Kelly, "Attakullakulla, 4.

British were to be joined as allies, to share the same enemies, and to continue good trade with one another. While the issue of land and frontier defense via the use of Indigenous subjects may have been the most important items of business for the British, the Cherokees came away from the negotiating table that day thinking of mutual commitment. The memory of this treaty and the alliance that stemmed from it, however different the understanding on either side may have been, would serve as the spine of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance for the next several decades.[24]

Third, and in many respects most importantly, the Cherokees understood this alliance to be centered on trade. By including treaty stipulations that required the Cherokee towns to solely conduct trade with the British colonies and ignore the advances of other European powers, the document also obligated Britain to "furnish [the Cherokees] with all manner of goods that they want." These stipulations proved to be rather consequential, as the Cherokees took this agreement very seriously. As later negotiations between Cherokee headmen and colonial officials during the 1750s onward show, the issue trade would be a point of contention. Attakullakulla would prove instrumental at such moments, for his constant citation of this solemn agreement was the crux of his rhetoric in many situations. For the Cherokees, trade was of the utmost importance.[25]

Delivering their response on September 9, 1730, the Cherokee diplomats emphasized their assent to several, but not all, of the proposed articles of their treaty. Stressing the wealth and generosity of King George II and alluding to his having bestowed many gifts upon them, the Cherokees assured their hosts that they would never break the "chain of friendship" between them. They made frequent references to the fact that the Cherokees and the British had been

[24] "Proposal of the Board of Trade for the Cherokee Treaty," 136-138.
[25] Ibid; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 48-49; Tom Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Revolutionary Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), xiv-xv.

joined as children under the king, that his enemies would be their enemies, and that they would live and die with his subjects as one people. Remarking that they would acquaint all their people with what they had seen during their time abroad, they promised that their words would be remembered for generations. They concluded their talk by presenting feathers to the board, which they likened to the board's written accounts, serving as confirmation of what had been said that day.[26]

Their business in Britain concluded, the next several weeks were spent anticipating their continuously delayed departure. As a testimony to the importance of trade to this newly reaffirmed alliance, one of the last entertainments enjoyed by the Cherokee diplomats was a dinner held with several of the London merchants who did business in South Carolina. During this dinner they reiterated their good intentions to preserve peace and "good Neighborhood" with Britain's colonies. The Cherokees set sail for South Carolina on October 7, 1730, aboard the same vessel upon which they traveled Britan. Remembering Attakullakulla's departure that day over thirty years later, while a second delegation of Cherokees was in Britain, a London newspaper article recounted his gratitude for the kind reception he received abroad to the crowd of onlookers who had come to see him and his fellow diplomats off. Displaying familiarity with his audience and comfortability speaking in front of a crowd, Attakullakulla made a point of showing his appreciation using some English he had learned while in Britain, proclaiming with tears in his eyes to those gathered around him "I tank you, I tank you, I tank you all."[27]

<u>Holding the Chain of Friendship: Anglo-Cherokee Relations 1730-1748</u>

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[26] "Answer of the Cherokees to the Proposed Treaty," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 138-139.

[27] "News," *The Daily Post,* September 29, 1730; "News," *London Evening Post,* September 26-29, 1730; "News," *Universal Spectator and Weekly Journal,* October 17, 1730; "The Printer of the St. James's Chronicle," *St. James's Chronicle or the British Evening Post,* August 7-10, 1762.

Issues with the Mvskoke took immediate precedence upon the Cherokees' return to North America in December of 1730. Meeting with the newly reappointed governor of South Carolina, questions concerning the safe passage of the Cherokees back to their towns were addressed. Relations with the Mvskoke were in poor condition, and both the Cherokee diplomats and the governor were nervous that the former might be attacked on their journey home. Not wishing to endanger any of their own people by asking them to come down to Charles Town, the Cherokees accepted the governor's offer to send along several of his own men to accompany them in their travels, as well as packhorses to carry all the gifts they had received to disburse to their peoples. Given the choice, the seven Cherokees elected to carry these gifts, as well as a copy of their treaty, back home, instead of sending these items ahead of themselves with others. Anticipating that if they returned home without them, their people would be unhappy with them, they were comfortable only with sending someone ahead to announce that they would soon arrive. This decision is indicative that the Cherokee delegates wished to ensure that they themselves were accredited with what they accomplished abroad and were also worried that without such evidence of their triumphs, they might meet with reprimand back home.[28]

It did not take long for the chain of friendship between the Cherokees and the British colonies to be tested. Within the first couple years following their embassy to Britain, Cherokee traders were being reprimanded for venturing to do trade in Charles Town without warrant, for the authorities there preferred that the Cherokees conduct their business with the traders stationed in their towns. These minor violations of their trade agreements aside, larger issues loomed. In February 1734, reports were coming into Charles Town that relations between the

[28] "Plan for Sending the Cherokees Home from Carolina with the Cherokee Treaty," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 141-143.

Cherokees and the traders stationed in their towns had grown turbulent. On multiple occasions, Cherokees seized the goods kept in traders' storehouses. One particular incident reportedly involved "those Indians that Sr. Alexander Cummings carried over lately to England," and roughly one hundred others, who threatened violence if the trader retaliated. Citing their agreement with King George II, the Cherokees reportedly told the traders that the goods sent there were gifts given to Cherokees by the king, and that it would be unjust to be charged for them. Just as colonial officials sought to use the act of gift giving to situate Indigenous allies as dependents, so too did these allies hold their British benefactors accountable for providing expected goods. This act of taking goods, or gifts, justified by their treaty of alliance, is indicative of the Cherokees' understanding of their allies' obligations to them. That the Cherokees demanded these items was not a corruption or a betrayal of their alliance with Britain, but rather an act informed by their notions of the things to which their alliance entitled them.[29]

South Carolina moved to withdraw their traders from the Cherokee towns in retaliation for this treaty violation, which prompted Cherokee traders to turn to Virginia instead. Receiving word of this, South Carolina officials sent people to intercept them. The Cherokees were thus compelled to make amends with South Carolina by the end of the year, reopening their trade and selling a tract of land to them in the process. Though the matter was resolved for the time being, this would not be the first time in which issues arose between the Cherokees and South Carolina regarding what had been agreed to between the seven Cherokee delegates and King George II in 1730. Evidently interpreting their treaty differently from their counterparts, this dispute was the first of many. The Cherokees held their interpretation of their agreement with the king in higher

[29] "Extract of a Letter from South Carolina dated 26th February 1733/4," Letters from Georgia, v. 14200, 1732-1735 June, Digital Library of Georgia, accessed May 25, 2023; Jessica Yirush Stern, *The Lives in Objects: Native Americans, British Colonists, and Cultures of Labor and Exchange in the Southeast* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 111-112.

esteem than their relationship vis-à-vis individual colonies. Attakullakulla frequently made a point of citing both the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, as well as his personal experiences in Britain, in his later years as a head warrior and diplomat. His time would have to wait, however, for Attakullakulla was taken prisoner by the French-allied Ottawas sometime in the late 1730s, who then brought him to Canada and held him captive there until 1748.[30]

In the meantime, the Anglo-Cherokee alliance continued to develop more closely along the Cherokees' interpretation of their treaty than that of the British. After the initial period of tumult, relations between the Cherokees and South Carolina stabilized. Trade, comprising one of the two key components of this alliance, was shifting in favor of Cherokee interests. In the wake of the Yamasee War, prompted by the planters' heightened anxieties about proximity to Indigenous neighbors, South Carolina hoped to keep Cherokee traders confined to conducting their business in specific locations, or factories. Aimed at ending the practice of private traders going into Cherokee towns and conducting trade there, it was hoped that centralization of the trade would require Cherokee trade partners to venture into the colony instead. The factory system was intended by colonial authorities to better regulate the trade according to their preferences and assuage Euro-American settler fears. What came of this instead was a decline in profits and increased competition with Virginia traders as many Cherokees, particularly those from towns further from South Carolina, started looking for other options. The subsequent decline in profits induced many merchants to venture out into Cherokee towns, simultaneously

[30] "Resolution for Stopping Trade with the Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 154-155; Grant, "Historical Relation," 58; "Cherokee Grant of Land to the King of England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 159-160; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 6.

making trade more convenient for the Cherokees, and circumventing South Carolina's efforts to dominate its conduct.[31]

The South Carolina assembly was aware of the importance of catering to the Cherokees, especially regarding trade. Though financial incentives played a part in the colonial government's endorsement of trade relations with Indigenous allies generally, of equal if not more importance was the necessity of keeping these allies happy. An ordinance passed in 1736 reflected the shifting nature of this trade relationship. Requiring traders who venture out into Indigenous towns to obtain licenses beforehand, the ordinance explicitly cited the upkeep of a good trade relationship with groups like the Cherokee as vital to the maintenance of their alliances. Failing to meet their demands, the assembly feared, would occasion them to turn to other European powers to establish trade relationships, which would then render the colony more vulnerable to enemy offensives. Though this act was passed in an attempt to create colonial control over the increasingly decentralized trade, it only came about through South Carolina's dependence on Cherokee and other Indigenous groups' friendship for protection. By refusing to operate by South Carolina's rules, the colony's allies effectively forced South Carolina to acquiesce to Cherokee trading preferences. Despite interpretations of the Articles of Friendship and Commerce as a document confirming Cherokee subjecthood to Britain, the Anglo-Cherokee alliance functioned as a partnership.[32]

Relations with common enemies exemplifies the mutually constructed nature of this partnership and of the importance of its foundational document to its protocol. By the late 1730s, South Carolina again found itself warding off the corruption of its alliance with the Cherokees by

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[31] Hatley, *The Dividing Paths,* 35; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 49.
[32] "An Ordinance," in *Acts Passed by the General Assembly of South Carolina* (Charles Town: Lewis Timothy, 1736), 58-60.

the French. Moytoy of Tellico, the dubiously elected "emperor" of the Cherokees, along with many other headmen and warriors, visited Charles Town in March of 1738, and during their time there the governor arranged for a talk to be given to them. This talk drew heavily upon their supposedly mutual reverence for the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, as well as the personal experiences of the members of the 1730 delegation. Noting that some of the Cherokees then present were several of those very diplomats, the speaker representing South Carolina called on the Cherokees to remember what they had seen in Britain, namely their strength and their numbers. Frequently alluding to the king's "Great Talk," the speaker reminded the Cherokees of their commitment to one another and of the superiority of the British as trade partners vis-à-vis the French, telling the Cherokees that "the French have been your Enemies and have killed your People." Implicitly threatening that if any Cherokees continued to conduct business with the French, the speaker suggested that the British would be obligated to withdraw their traders, and perhaps do worse.[33]

The Cherokees also called on their allies when their own concerns regarding conflict with the French came to fruition. A delegation of Cherokees arrived in Charles Town in May of 1742 with intelligence on French designs to attack them or their Chickasaw allies. Remembering their British allies' opposition to French expansion in the region, the Cherokees easily convinced their counterparts in Charles Town of the pertinence of supplying them with all the necessities to defend against such an attack. Providing their guests with several hundred pounds of gunpowder, bullets, and other like items, Charles Town's officials were happy to oblige the Cherokees, understanding that the success of their allies meant their own continued safety from the French.

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[33] "Talk to Moytoy and other Cherokee Leaders in Charles Town," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 163-165.

So long as the Cherokees refrained from dealing with the French, and as the British followed through on their promises to adequately furnish the Cherokees, the Anglo-Cherokee alliance functioned rather smoothly.[34]

As conflict with other European colonial powers escalated throughout the 1740s, the Cherokees felt that it was necessary to reaffirm their treaty with the British. Venturing in May of 1745 to meet with South Carolina's governor, James Glen, the Cherokee delegation hearkened back to their predecessors from the previous decade. The first to speak was the young "emperor" of the Cherokees, Ammonscosittee, son of the late Moytoy, who had clearly grown up with tales of the formation of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance. Speaking first albeit briefly, the young man's words and actions strongly echoed the solemn agreement his father had played a role in making fifteen years prior. Revealing a copy of the Articles of Friendship and Commerce before the governor, Ammonscossittee declared that he would "remember the Words contained in this Paper," going on to say that, should he have children, that they would take care of it the same way. Laying a similar crown to that presented by his own father at the feet of the governor, he stated his wish that it be sent to King George II, concluding that "[the king's] Enemies shall be my Enemies." Other speakers who followed Ammonscossittee referenced this agreement, making sure to stress the king's promises of furnishing the Cherokees with what they desired "for as long as the Sun moves in the Heavens." The governor was happy to receive their talks and responded in kind, asking that the Cherokees be ready to be called upon against the French or the Spaniards should the need arise. The Cherokees left the conference in South Carolina with

[34] "Conferences with the Creeks and Upper Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 174-175; "Approval of Arms and Ammunition for the Cherokees for Protection against the French," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 175-176.

gifts and reaffirmations of their allies' good faith, predicated on an agreement established by a previous generation of diplomats.[35]

Two Decades of Alliance in Review

Forged across the Atlantic in Britain, the chain of friendship between the Cherokees and the British weathered more than its oceanic voyages in the two decades following the embassy of 1730. Disputes surrounding the issue of trade troubled the Anglo-Cherokee alliance in its early years, as differing interpretations of their foundational treaty yielded complications. Concerns regarding outside interference, specifically efforts by the French to make allies of the Cherokees, produced anxiety among South Carolina colonists, who feared that their defensive barrier might be won away from them. But despite these troubles, the Anglo-Cherokee alliance stood upon solid foundations. What began as an equally spontaneous and opportunistic diplomatic journey culminated in a mutually respected agreement that obligated Cherokee towns and British colonies to one another. Misunderstandings of this agreement aside, each party held the treaty in high esteem, and their continued reference to this document and the embassy that produced it underscores this fact.

The Cherokee delegation of 1730 set the stage for several decades of Anglo-Cherokee relations, as officials on either side called upon its memory both when relations broke down and when cooperation was smooth. Importantly, it was the Cherokees' interpretation of this treaty that most effectively dictated the proceedings of this alliance. Trade and military assistance were the key components to their relationship, as prioritized by Cherokee negotiators in London and

[35] "Conference of Cherokees with Governor Glen," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 184-186; "Governor Glen's Talk to the Cherokees and Catawbas," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 187-189.

exercised by its adherents at home. Claims of the Cherokees' submission to British authority proved to be as unfounded as the claims of their surrendering all their lands. Recognizing the economic and strategic viability of maintaining a positive relationship with Britain's colonies, the Cherokees utilized this treaty as a way to legitimize their relations. For their own part, South Carolina relied on this partnership with the Cherokees for protection and financial gain and were eager to reaffirm their peace whenever relations turned sour.

Alliance Making in the Southeast

Friendly cooperation between the Cherokees and the British was soon burdened, however, by an unlikely "Disturber of the Peace." Returning from captivity among the French-allied Ottawas in Canada sometime around 1748, Attakullakulla had acquainted himself well with his neighbors to the north. His years-long residency in Canada must have contributed to his development of a more critical attitude toward the British, for following his homecoming, "bad Talks" were spread through Cherokee towns regarding the British. Attakullakulla kept correspondence with groups like the Shawnee and the Seneca, who maintained ties with the French. After visiting among these groups, Attakullakulla informed the Cherokees of concerning rumors he had heard, being that South Carolina, in league with Virginia and New York, planned to join the Haudenosaunee, or Iroquois League, and the Mvskoke, in a war against the Cherokees. Whether or not Attakullakulla believed these rumors, his reference to a British alliance with the Mvskoke was both realistic and a cause for concern among many Cherokees. Attakullakulla weighed his diplomatic options for a few more years before he was ready to renew his allegiance to the Anglo-Cherokee alliance. When he did so, as Chapter 3 explores, his

personal experiences dealing with King George II, and his opposition to the Mvskoke, took center stage.[36]

Relations with the Mvskoke proved to be a crucial discordance that existed between the Cherokees and the British. The ongoing conflict between the Cherokees and the Mvskoke was a serious predicament for Britain's colonies, namely South Carolina and Georgia, who had endeavored to make allies of both peoples. Years of hostilities between the Cherokee and Mvskoke since the Yamasee War were exacerbated by the former permitting more northern Indigenous groups to pass through their own territory to conduct raids against the Mvskoke. By the end of the 1740s and into the 1750s, brokering a peace between these two groups was a top priority for Governor Glen. Despite good intentions from individuals on every side, not all were keen to move on without retribution. Efforts by the British to create separate alliances with these groups had not translated into a lasting peace between all three parties. The Anglo-Cherokee alliance ran deep by the 1750s, with its origins dating back to the delegation of 1730, however the Cherokees were not the only regional power with diplomatic ties to the king of Britain. Only four years following the Cherokees' transatlantic mission, the Yamacraw, representing the Mvskoke, embarked on their own envoy to London, with designs to incorporate Britain within their own alliance network.[37]

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[36] "Governor Glen's Talk to the Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 237-240; "Affidavit of Robert Gandey," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 71-72; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 6.
[37] "William Sludder and Thomas Devall to Governor Glen from Upper Creeks," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 19.

"For the Good of the Children:" Diasporic Community Building and the 1734 Yamacraw Delegation to London

Tomochichi and his wife Senauki, along with the other remaining members of the Yamacraw embassy to London, returned to their lodgings at the Georgia Office after having spent some time at the estate of James Edward Oglethorpe. The Yamacraw were in mourning—one of their companions, Hinguithi, likely the brother of Senauki, had died a few days prior on the night of August 2-3, 1734. Only the day before he accompanied his fellow diplomats to the court of King George II, where they exchanged polite words with the British monarch. Upon the death of Hinguithi, the Yamacraw were taken to Oglethorpe's estate in Godalming, a town in Surrey outside of London, to mourn and to "divert themselves from the great Grief they appeared in for the Loss of one of their Companions." Their stay there must not have been entirely relaxing, for it was reported that "during the Time they were there, a great Number of the Country People round about flock'd in to see them, such a Sight having never been seen before in those Parts." They were still greatly distraught upon returning to their apartment in London. A reminder of the potential dangers of transatlantic voyages, their grief over the loss of Hinguithi affected them for the remainder of their trip.[1]

The Yamacraw delegates were in London on important business. Cognizant of European forays into North America's Southeast, Tomochichi and his companions recognized the potential benefits, as well as the pitfalls, of establishing cooperative relationships with these foreign powers. Indeed, it was disagreements with other Lower Mvskoke leaders regarding these relationships that had put Tomochichi in this position in the first place. Personal vendettas, too, may have played a significant role in motivating the Yamacraw to undertake this journey, for

[1] "News," *Daily Journal,* August 8, 1734; "News," *Corn Cutter's Journal,* August 6, 1734.

histories of enmity toward the French and the Spanish can be traced to both Tomochichi and his nephew Tooanahowi. Utilizing his position as a mico, or Mvskoke headman, Tomochichi had come all this way to negotiate an advantageous future for his fellow Yamacraw back in North America, as well as for the larger body of Lower Mvskoke.

From the beginning, Tomochichi fostered good standing between the Yamacraw and the British. His actions during the London embassy and the relations established as a consequence of it, as well as those of his nephew and successor Tooanahowi, provide insight into the importance of transatlantic diplomacy to the local politics of North America. Compelled by the existential crises of conflict with the Cherokees and ostracization from the Mvskoke, Tomochichi utilized transatlantic diplomatic pathways to buttress his position as the mico of a diasporic community and strengthen the Yamacraw collectively as a regional power. Understanding his role as an aged mediator, Tomochichi looked ahead to the future of both his smaller and wider communities, having traveled far "for the Good of the Children of all the Nations of the Upper and of the Lower Creeks, that they may be instructed in the Knowledge of the English." Of key importance for him was raising Tooanahowi to continue in his footsteps. Though ultimately unsuccessful in securing the Yamacraw's status within the Southeast for the long term, Tomochichi's diplomatic strategies exemplified efforts to incorporate Britain into Indigenous alliance networks to guard regional interests centered on trade and defense. Yamacraw leaders recognized the potential of making an ally of Britain and went to great lengths to do this.[2]

Friends, New and Old: Forming Yamacraw Community through Networks

[2] "Tomochichi's Audience with King George II and Queen Caroline," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* ed. Alden T. Vaughan and John T. Juricek (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1989), 21-22. For the importance of trade to the maintenance of this alliance, see Kathryn Holland Braund, *Deerskins & Duffels: The Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 61.

The expansion of Britain's imperial networks into southeastern North America was one of the catalysts for Tomochichi's transatlantic journey. Oglethorpe, a Member of Parliament and founding member of the Georgia Trustees, ventured to this region with the intention of establishing a new colony. The trustees hoped that the new colony of Georgia would assuage the growing issues of criminal debtors back in England by providing a place for them to go. Oglethorpe traveled with 114 colonists to a region nestled between Britain, France, and Spain's colonial possessions, nearby the Lower Mvskoke (Creek) Nation. Establishing the Settlement of Savannah in February of 1733, one of Oglethorpe's first orders of business was to extend peaceful relations to nearby Indigenous groups.[3]

Located a quarter mile upriver from the new settlement at Savannah were the Yamacraw, a group comprised of Lower Mvskoke and some refugees from the Yamasee War (1715-1718). The origin of the Yamacraw and how they became distinct from the larger body of Lower Mvskokes is not entirely known, but evidence suggests that they were a diasporic group. A history of the colony of Georgia, first published in 1741, described the Yamacraw as "a parcel of fugitive Indians, who had been formerly banished [from] their own nation for some crimes and misdemeanors they had committed," noting that they were permitted by the governor of South Carolina to settle on the Savannah River following this expulsion from the Lower Creeks. This narrative goes on to criticize the policy that had been taken toward the Yamacraw, suggesting that they were "maintained at the publick charge, at vast expense." This assessment falls in line with an attitude of superiority and displeasure toward Britain's Indigenous allies throughout the

[3] Kate Fullagar, *The Savage Visit: New World People and Popular Imperial Culture in Britain, 1710-1795* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 77.

eighteenth century, which considered the maintenance of alliances with groups like the Yamacraw to be too financially burdensome to justify.[4]

An annotated copy of this history, annotated by John Percival, Earl of Egmont, an associate of Oglethorpe and a Georgia Trustee, offers further detail and an alternate take on this narrative. Egmont's account of the Yamacraw is much more favorable, elaborating that the 'crimes and misdemeanors' attributed to them were the "cutting down [of] a Popish Chappel," that the French were erecting among the Lower Mvskoke. Egmont goes on to state that the Yamacraw were the "proprietors" of the land settled by Oglethorpe, and that the latter settled there with their permission. Once established, Egmont was convinced of the import of the Yamacraw alliance, which he asserted was instrumental in maintaining the peace between the infant colony and other nearby Indigenous groups. One historian has suggested that, assuming the veracity of the Yamacraw's open opposition to French, it is more likely that the Yamacraw elected to remove to a different location themselves than to have been exiled by force. In any case, the Yamacraw's central position in wider Indigenous-settler diplomacy through the region is indicative that their standing vis-à-vis neighboring peoples was not entirely tarnished, if at all.[5]

Despite the possibility that the Yamacraw were still on good terms with the Lower Mvskoke towns, the recently detached people would have been eager to make friends for other reasons too. Tomochichi, the mico of the Yamacraw, had recently led his followers to their current location from the town of Apalachicola, and was evidently desirous of peace with the

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[4] Pat Tailfer, et al., *A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia, With Comments by the Earl of Egmont* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1960 [1741]), 44-46. For Indigenous displacement following the Yamasee War, see William L. Ramsey, *The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 2-3.
[5] Ibid; Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 151.

newcomers. In a letter addressed to the other Trustees back in Britain, Oglethorpe mentioned having contacted "a little Indian nation the only one within fifty miles," who were apparently "not only at amity" but wishing "to be subject to the Trustees to have land given them and to breed their Children at our Schools," as well as to be instructed in Christianity. However accurate Oglethorpe's impression of this initial interaction may have been, it is important to note that, from the very beginning, Oglethorpe and Georgia's relationship with the Yamacraw was nothing short of friendly, in large part due to Tomochichi's endeavors to make fast and sure allies of them.[6]

In fact, it was the Yamacraw who made the first moves in establishing a friendship with the newcomers. Highlighting Tomochichi's clear initiation of peaceful correspondence, one account tells of the Yamacraw having come to meet the Georgia colonists following their arrival in the area. A dancer greeted the settlers ahead of Tomochichi. This individual, adorned with bells and carrying fans made of feathers, recounted oral histories, or the "Acts of their Chief Warriours," at times touching Oglethorpe with the feathered fans. All of the men, and then all of the women, came to shake Oglethorpe's hand following this, and the next day Oglethorpe gifted them articles of clothing. Afterward, several of the Georgians ventured to the Yamacraws' town to stay for the night at the house of the traders stationed there, the Musgrove family, where they were entertained for the evening by a Yamacraw dance. Tomochichi and Senauki attended church service with Oglethorpe the following Sunday.[7]

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[6] Oglethorpe, "From the Camp near Savannah Feby. 10th 1932/3," Letters from Georgia, v. 14200, 1732-1735 June, Digital Library of Georgia, accessed April 24, 2023.

[7] "Copy of a Letter from Mr. Thomas Causton at Savannah to his Wife dated 12th March 1732/3," Letters from Georgia, v. 14200, 1732-1735 June, Digital Library of Georgia, accessed March 2, 2023; Peter Gordon, "Peter Gordon's Account of Early Contacts, [February 1-March 7, 1733]," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 8.

This initial encounter between the Yamacraw and the Georgia colonists was more than a welcoming party for the latter and was indicative of an early Yamacraw endeavor to integrate the newcomers into their own network of diplomacy and kinship. Presenting the trustee with a buffalo skin painted with the head and feathers of an eagle, the mico commented on the swiftness and strength exuded by the British. But Tomochichi's gifts to Oglethorpe constituted more than flattery. The mico elaborated that these items also symbolized love and protection, and expressed his desire that the newcomers would "love and protect" the Yamacraw. This kind of diplomacy was intended to obligate the British to the Yamacraw and legitimized their formal encounter within Yamacraw understandings of diplomatic protocol. Tomochichi's proactive diplomatic pursuits initiated a series of peaceful talks that culminated in formal treaties and, eventually, the delegation to London.[8]

Another conference was held just over a month following the first formal interaction between Tomochichi and Oglethorpe, which underscored the Yamacraw's commitment to fostering peace with the newcomers. In March of 1733, Tomochichi and other Yamacraw leaders requested an audience with Oglethorpe. Following customary songs, recounting of histories, and the smoking of tobacco, Tomochichi spoke first. Through an interpreter, Tomochichi bid welcome to the newcomers, and stated his satisfaction that they arrived safely. During this conference, Tomochichi rather cryptically related to Oglethorpe that he "was not a stranger to the English, for that his father and grand father had been very well known to them." This personal

[8] Steven C. Hahn, *The Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670-1763* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 155-156; Oglethorpe, "A Curious Account of the Indians," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 10.

history with English settlers may help explain Tomochichi's eagerness to befriend the new Georgia colonists, as well as his separation of sorts from the Lower Mvskoke.[9]

These initial expressions of goodwill and friendship set the tone for the developments that followed, as they would be the start of a mutually beneficial relationship between the Yamacraw and Georgia, as well as a personal friendship between Tomochichi and Oglethorpe. Soon after their first encounter, a trader was stationed at the Yamacraw's town and Yamacraw hunters frequently brought in venison to trade with the settlers. They also asked that Oglethorpe send to the Trustees a "cask of Seeds which was a present from the Indians." Even prior to their voyage across the Atlantic, the Yamacraw sought to extend their good will across the ocean.[10]

The potential for these relationships to produce meaningful political developments was demonstrated at a larger conference held at Savannah in May 1733. Headmen from eight Lower Mvskoke towns, as well as Tomochichi, convened with Oglethorpe in a discussion that would culminate in the ratification of a treaty between the trustees and the Lower Mvskoke. The events of this conference reveal much about the dynamic between Tomochichi, the Yamacraw, and the larger body of Lower Mvskoke. The first speaker at this conference was Oueekachumpa, a headman from the town of Oconas. Beginning his speech with land claims and then shifting to appeals of wishing to be instructed in Christianity, Oueekachumpa addressed Tomochichi, acknowledging him as a relative. Despite the fact that Tomochichi had been "banished from his Nation," he was a "good Man, and had been a great Warrior." After Oglethorpe's response, Tomochichi was next to speak, addressing his dire situation when he first came to this area "a

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[9] "Peter Gordon's Account of Early Contacts," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 7-9.
[10] "Thomas Causton to his Wife," Letters from Georgia; "This Letter from James Oglethorpe Esqr. to the Honble. Trustees. Charles Town May 14 1733," Letters from Georgia, v. 14200, 1732-1735 June, Digital Library of Georgia, accessed March 2, 2023.

banished Man… poor, and helpless…" Tomochichi expressed gratitude on behalf of the Yamacraw and the rest of the Lower Mvskoke for the peaceful relations they enjoyed with Georgia. Importantly for Tomochichi, Oglethorpe provided food for the Yamacraw and education for the children.[11]

The speech of Yahou-Lakee, mico of Coweta, demonstrates most explicitly the importance of Tomochichi's relationship with Georgia. Lamenting recent wars and population loss, the mico of Coweta made known his approval of being reunited with the Yamacraw, as their reconciliation would entail the strengthening of the Lower Mvskoke as a whole. As a show of good faith, Yahou-Lakee then encouraged Tomochichi and the other Yamacraw representatives to "call the Kindred that love them, out of each of the Creek Towns… to recal the Yamasees, that they may be buried in Peace amongst their Ancestors… and then our Nation shall be restored again to its ten Towns." Tomochichi then invited the visiting Lower Mvskokes to his town, where they "passed the Night in feasting and dancing." Aside from the treaty that was ratified following this conference, of great significance was the reconciliation between the Yamacraw and the Lower Mvskoke. However friendly their relations may have been following his banishment, this conference solidified Tomochichi's place within the Lower Mvskoke as an influential headman, and further demonstrated to the settlers his viability as an ally.[12]

On the following day, a cooperative treaty was signed by the headmen present and Oglethorpe, on behalf of the Trustees. Mimicking the Cherokees' 1730 Articles of Friendship and Commerce treaty with Britain in its official name and language, the articles agreed to set the grounds for the working trade relationship between the Lower Mvskoke and the British settlers.

[11] "The First Conference with the Lower Creeks [*S.C. Gazette*, June 2, 1733]," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 12-13.
[12] Ibid, 13-14.

Their relationship was described as a "Chain of Friendship" between the Mvskoke and their "Brothers the English," establishing their commitment to be friendly with one another, as well as fixed rates for goods. The Lower Mvskoke and Oglethorpe both agreed to hold bad actors on either side accountable for whatever offenses they may commit, according to English or Mvskoke laws, depending on the circumstances. This treaty served primarily to secure the Lower Mvskoke and the British colonists to one another diplomatically and financially through the deerskin trade.[13]

On paper, this treaty was in many ways a significant pause, if not a break, from Lower Mvskoke policy that had been established in the wake of the Yamasee War. Informed in part by their experiences in this conflict, Lower Mvskoke towns largely elected to refrain from aligning themselves too closely to one European power or the other. Seeking to maintain a more neutral position so as to benefit from maintaining relationships with British, Spanish, and French settlers, Lower Mvskoke towns endeavored to maintain this neutrality by pitting European powers against one another diplomatically. Such a balancing act required that the Lower Mvskokes keep European powers at a varied and friendly arm's length to reinforce the idea that they had their options open.[14]

The treaty agreed to between the Lower Mvskoke and the colony of Georgia formalized the diplomacy and financial relationships between these groups and helped to reintegrate the Yamacraw into the larger body of Lower Mvskoke as a distinct *talwa,* or town. Following these developments, relations between Georgia's settlers and the Yamacraw, as well as the Lower Mvskoke as a whole, continued on for quite some time without issue. Concerns regarding

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[13] "Oglethorpe's First Treaty with the Lower Creeks at Savannah [May 21, 1733]," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 15-17.
[14] Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation,* 118-120.

Spanish enemies loomed on the horizon, however. Oglethorpe related in a letter to the Trustees penned in December 1733 that their Mvskoke allies to the south repulsed a Spanish vessel "full of armed men" from the passages between the islands 40 miles from the settlement at Savannah. Opposition toward the Spanish colony of Florida came to be a defining characteristic of Anglo-Mvskoke relations during this period.[15]

"Over the great Seas": the Yamacraw Delegation to London

Considering the impact of the 1733 treaty and the negotiations that preceded them, the question remains as to why the delegation to London in 1734 was considered necessary. Tomochichi stated his impetus for venturing to London during an audience held with the trustees while his embassy was in the city. In a speech to the trustees, Tomochichi expressed his interest in having the English live with him "as good neighbors," which he stated was his purpose in coming all this way, for he was fully aware of his old age and wished "to See his nation Settled before he died," hoping to have their affairs in order upon his passing. He acknowledged Oglethorpe for being trustworthy and kind, for without his assurances the Yamacraw would not have come to Britain. Thanking the Great Spirit for safely bringing him across the ocean, and hoping he will enjoy a safe return home, Tomochichi concluded his speech. Though a short and translated account, several of Tomochichi's motivations for this mission are quite clear: endeavoring to secure the safety and longevity of the people he represented, he was confident that peaceful relations with the British would be the surest guarantee to this effect. For Oglethorpe's part, he also saw the benefit in sponsoring a Yamacraw delegation to London, conscious of its predecessors such as that of the Cherokees in 1730. Convinced of Georgia's

[15] "Copy of a Letter from Mr. Oglethorpe from Savannah to the Trustees dated 15th Novr, 1733," Letters from Georgia.

need for this alliance due to their precarious position, he hoped this delegation would solidify their bonds.[16]

By March of 1734 it was decided that a Yamacraw embassy would make the journey to London, and by the end of the month the representatives and Oglethorpe had made it Charles Town, South Carolina. The delegates numbered nine in total, eight of them being Yamacraw. Several of Tomochichi's close relations comprised the party of diplomats, namely Senauki, his nephew Tooanahowi (only around thirteen years of age at the time), his brother Hillispilli, and Hinguithi. Apokutchi, Santachi, and Stimaletchi constituted the remainder of the Yamacraw members of the party, with Umphichi, a mico, being the sole member from Apalachicola.[17]

The Yamacraw's embarking on this transatlantic diplomatic mission in the first half of 1734 coincided with a temporary breakdown of relations between the Cherokees and South Carolina, who had themselves ventured to Britain four years prior on a similar errand. Disagreements over the interpretation of a treaty that formally established the Anglo-Cherokee alliance resulted in the Cherokees' seizure of goods from traders stationed in their towns, understanding these goods to be gifts to the Cherokees from King George II himself. South Carolina countered by withdrawing all of their traders from the Cherokee towns, which led to anxieties over the potential outbreak of war. Though these grievances were between South Carolina and the Cherokees, the Yamacraw and the infant Georgia colony might have been

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[16] John Percival, *The Journal of the Earl of Egmont: Abstract of the Trustees Proceedings for Establishing the Colony of Georgia, 1732-1738,* ed. Robert G. McPherson (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2021), 58; James Oglethorpe, *A New and Accurate Account of the Provinces of South-Carolina and Georgia* (London: 1733), 27-28.
[17] Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters,* 153.

implicated in such a conflict. It is perhaps no accident that Oglethorpe and the Yamacraw began their journey when they did, anticipating an increased need for dependable allies.[18]

Tomochichi hoped that this journey would further obligate the British and the Yamacraw to one another and cement his position as a mediator representing the Mvskoke. After waiting several weeks in Charles Town, the embassy was finally able to begin their voyage across the Atlantic Ocean to Britain. The delegates, along with their interpreter John Musgrove and Oglethorpe, departed from Charles Town aboard the *HMS Aldborough* on May 7, 1734. Roughly six weeks later, by June 20, they were in London. Upon their arrival, and throughout the entirety of their stay, they were followed intensely by London's public and its print media. Such excitement followed them wherever they went, including to and from their diplomatic talks with the royal family and the Trustees.[19]

After staying in London for several days, the diplomats attended what would be the first of several official meetings with the Georgia Board of in early July. It was here that Tomochichi expressed to his hosts the purpose of his journey. His stated desire to live with English neighbors and his thanks to the Great Spirit for his safe passage to Britain was received well by the Trustees. Egmont responded with commentary on sharing the same God, as well as the goodness of King George II, and expressing the friendship of both Britain and the trustees toward their Yamacraw allies. Concluding this formal introductory meeting, the Yamacraw and the trustees shook hands, and ended the night with tobacco and wine.[20]

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[18] "Extract of a Letter from South Carolina dated 26th February 1733/4," Letters from Georgia, v. 14200, 1732-1735 June, Digital Library of Georgia, accessed May 25, 2023; "Resolution for Stopping Trade with the Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 154-155.
[19] "Charlestown May 11," *The South-Carolina Gazette,* May 11, 1734; John Percival, *Diary of the First Earl of Egmont (Viscount Percival), Vol. II 1734-1738* (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1923), 112; "London," *Daily Journal,* June 20, 1734; Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters,* 153; Percival, *Egmont's Diary,* 113.
[20] Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 58.

A second crucial objective of the delegation was to hold a formal audience with the king and other members of the nobility. As was the case with earlier Indigenous delegations, such as that of the Cherokee, organizers for the Yamacraw embassy to London were convinced of the efficacy of familiarizing their Indigenous guests with the reigning monarch, so as to ensure a lasting peace and cooperation between the two peoples. For Indigenous visitors and their hosts, royal audiences provided another opportunity for both sides to formalize their commitment to one another as allies. These moments demonstrated a legitimation of these alliances along both Indigenous and British diplomatic protocols, manifested in a confluence of rites and rituals that served, in theory, to underscore their mutual assurance to one another. But before the diplomats could hold their meeting with the king, they first had to change their dress to be more appropriate.[21]

Though worries regarding appropriate attire kept the Yamacraw from dressing in their usual manner, as had the Cherokees before them, their augmentation was in appearance only, for they legitimized their negotiations according to their own customs. The Yamacraw were not easily convinced to alter their appearance for the satisfaction of their hosts, however. Egmont commented in his diary that the diplomats were not keen to adopt their style after that of the English fashion, namely, to put on breeches or shirts. Evidently more convinced by the implorations of their friend than by a willingness to defer to the standards of their hosts, the Yamacraw agreed to augment their dress. According to a monthly periodical published during their stay, the Yamacraw "were very importunate to appear at Court in the Manner they go in their own Country," noting that it was only Oglethorpe's objections to such a prospect that they agreed to dress differently. That the Cherokee delegation which preceded them was not asked to

[21] Oglethorpe, *A New and Accurate Account,* 27-28.

change their dress for their royal audience suggests discomfort from either the court regarding its prior experience or the Yamacraw's escorts regarding the appearance of their guests. In the end, the Yamacraw politely cooperated.[22]

The new garments made for them could be described as an admixture of both foreign and familiar. Tomochichi and Senauki were clad in gold-trimmed scarlet, while the rest of their cohort donned vests of blue or yellow. Senauki and Tooanahowi were described by one observer to be the most English-looking in their apparel, with the young Tooanahowi leaving a considerable impression on this commentator, as he would many others. The rest of the Yamacraw decorated their faces with black and red paint, "according to their different fancies," the sight of which the same author, so complimentary of Tooanahowi, found to be off-putting. That the Yamacraw relented to their hosts' insistence on a wardrobe change is indicative of their willingness to compromise and observe British notions of appropriate dress. However, their decision to paint their faces was an assertion of their own identity and customs, albeit augmented to conform to the requests of their friends, which were not to be entirely forgotten or relegated in favor of British practices. Indeed, as accounts of their royal audience corroborate, Yamacraw customs took center stage.[23]

On the first day of August in 1734, the Yamacraw delegation held a longer and more formal audience with King George II, Queen Caroline, and other members of the nobility, in which they ceremoniously joined their people together. An enthusiastic public speaker,

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[22] Percival, *Egmont's Diary,* 114; Edward Cave, *The Gentleman's Magazine or, Monthly Intelligencer. For the Year 1734.* (London: 1734), 459; "London," *Daily Journal,* July 16, 1734; Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters,* 155-156; Fullagar, *The Savage Visit,* 69-70.

[23] "London," *London Journal,* August 3, 1734; "Alured Clarke's Account of the Royal Audiences," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 22-23. For commentary on the significance of the simultaneously modest and savage attire in the contemporary British zeitgeist, see Fullagar, *The Savage Visit,* 85.

Tomochichi spoke first to the audience at Kensington Palace that day. Tomochichi's subject matter was peace with the British, and he acknowledged in his speech the crucial role he played as a mediator to the king. He had not come all this way for selfish purposes, for he was far too old to live to see any of the benefits that he aimed to secure. Instead, he had come "for the Good of the Children of all the Nations of the Upper and of the Lower Creeks, that they may be instructed in the Knowledge of the English." Perceiving the advantages of lasting peace and cooperation with the English for all Mvskoke peoples, the Yamacraw mico assured his audience that he would communicate what transpired in their talks during their stay in London to all Mvskoke headmen. As a sign of his vested authority to carry and return these messages for peoples other than just the Yamacraw, Tomochichi presented King George II with eagle feathers that had been carried to several Mvskoke towns, which he meant to leave in the care of the king to signify their continued peace. He placed these feathers, fixed to sticks, upon two skins that he also laid down during his speech. In his address to Queen Caroline, he referenced the symbolic joining of their peoples as a family, expressing his desire that the queen adopt the role of "common Mother and Protectress" to the Mvskoke as she was to the British. In these ways, Tomochichi was able to affirm the peace he had traveled so far to procure along Mvskoke diplomatic practices, albeit in a limited capacity. According to Egmont, Tomochichi was disappointed that he and his cohort were unable to perform a ceremonial dance during the proceedings, though he was ultimately satisfied with the proceedings of the day's business.[24]

King George II responded with similar affirmations of peace between their peoples. Greatly pleased with Tomochichi's words and promises, the king was happy to accept the gifts of

[24] "Tomochichi's Audience with King George II and Queen Caroline," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 21-22; "Alured Clarke's Account of the Royal Audiences," *Early American Indian Documents, XI*, 22-23; Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 60-61.

eagle feathers and animal skins as a token of the mico's sincerity and positive will toward the English. In his assurances to the Yamacraw, the king underscored his own responsibility as a mediator between the peoples he represented and the allies of his own nation, noting that he will be happy to foster these relations and to demonstrate his friendship to his allies.[25]

Positive advancements in diplomatic and personal relationships between the Yamacraw and the British aside, not all that occurred during the embassy's stay in London was on such a high note. On the day immediately following their meeting with King George II, Hinguithi died of smallpox at the trustees' office. The Yamacraw "Sat up all night bewayling his loss," and Tomochichi was said to have offered some of his thoughts on the matter, stating that Hinguithi had "gone to the Great Spirit," and would therefore no longer be with them. Cognizant of his old age, Tomochichi remarked that he should be the first to see him again. Hinguithi was laid to rest in the cemetery of St. John the Evangelist in Westminster, where he was wrapped in blankets and interred along with his clothing, some beadwork, and silver. It was following this when Oglethorpe arranged to bring his Yamacraw companions to his estate in Godalming in an attempt to take their mind off of their grief, with seemingly no effect.[26]

The Yamacraw were disturbed by the loss of Hinguithi. Nearly two weeks following his passing, the Yamacraw met with the aged Archbishop of Canterbury, who hoped to engage with them in a theological discussion. The archbishop planned to ask them questions regarding their beliefs, however the Yamacraw did not feel comfortable doing so. The Yamacraw contended that bad things followed if they shared their beliefs and attributed the death of Hinguithi to their

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[25] "Tomochichi's Audience with King George II and Queen Caroline," *in Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 21-22; Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 60-61.
[26] Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 59; "London," *London Evening Post,* August 6, 1734; "London," *Daily Journal,* August 8, 1734.

having spoken too much on this matter since their arrival in London. Their meeting with the archbishop was nonetheless productive for Tomochichi, who came away further convinced that his British allies would satisfy his requests for an individual to be sent to teach his own people.[27]

The importance of religious practices, education, and trade to Tomochichi's objectives and motivations are reflected in his dealings with Egmont and the Georgia Trustees. In a meeting with several of the Georgia Trustees, Tomochichi addressed his primary desires from his hosts, the first concerning religious instruction, and the second concerning trade. Tomochichi requested that someone be sent to instruct the Yamacraw youth in Christianity. According to Egmont, the emphasis on the youth's instruction, and not the whole of the Yamacraw, was due to the grown men of the Yamacraw having killed before, for which they felt disqualified them from such education. Tomochichi suggested that a tutor be sent to instruct Tooanahowi specifically, whom he expected would serve as an example for the others.[28]

This request, as well as Tooanahowi's English lessons taken during his stay in London, demonstrate that one of Tomochichi's principal concerns was the future of his nephew and successor, Tooanahowi. The Yamacraw mico clearly expressed his intentions to set up his people for future prosperity, which he knew his old age would prevent him from seeing all the way through. Thus, the young Tooanahowi's presence on the delegation can be seen as a crucially formative experience in his life, as intended by his relative Tomochichi. Familiarizing his successor with their newfound allies would better secure the longevity of the Yamacraw vis-à-vis their enemies back in North America. Though not explicitly stated in any of the official documents pertaining to their negotiations in London, the issue of the Yamacraw's enmity

[27] Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 61; Percival, *Egmont's Diary,* 121-122.
[28] Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 62.

toward the French and Spanish shine through some of the recordings of their stay in the city. On the topic of Christianity, the Yamacraw are reported to have noted their disagreement with the French and Spanish practices of praying to images, such as the cross, which they considered to be a "bad spirit." This stated opposition to Catholic practices is corroborated by Tomochichi's original separation from the Lower Mvskoke due to similar disagreements regarding their reception of French missionaries.[29]

Tooanahowi himself may have also had personal reasons to oppose the Spanish in Florida. Egmont recorded in his diary his having learned that Tooanahowi's father was taken by Spaniards and burned for his refusal to convert to their religion, which provides context into how Tooanahowi might have conceptualized the utility of making friends of the British. The youngest delegate played more than an observatory role during his time in London. During a meeting with a handful of Trustees in mid-September 1734, Tooanahowi made a request of six guns to be given to his brothers back in North America. Then, seizing the opportunity to demonstrate his intelligence and recent learnings to his hosts, Tooanahowi picked up a book that happened to be lying on a nearby table. He read aloud some passages to the room, then proceeded to recite from memory the Lord's Prayer and the Apostles' Creed. These actions can be understood as Tooanahowi's efforts to exercise his own negotiatory authority as well as an attempt to impress his allies, for he would have noticed the fact that individuals such as Queen Caroline and Egmont were greatly impressed by the strides he was taking in his study of the English language. As will be seen later in this chapter, Tooanahowi would prove to be a dedicated friend to his European allies.[30]

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[29] Percival, *Egmont's Journal*, 62; Percival, *Egmont's Diary,* 123.
[30] Percival, *Egmont's Diary,* 122; Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 63-64.

Apart from religious instruction and Tooanahowi's development as a leader, another principal objective of Tomochichi was to secure a fair and advantageous trade for the Yamacraw. Trade was the subject of discussion for many of the meetings between the Trustees and the Yamacraw delegation, and Tomochichi had come to London with gripes regarding this matter. He pressed his European counterparts to ensure that their own people use equal weights in their trade, and also requested that they forbid the sale of rum among their traders. Tomochichi not only asked that his people be furnished with all sorts of goods at fair prices, but also that they be given better deals than any other people that the colony of Georgia may trade with. After further deliberation from both sides on these same issues, Tomochichi made further requests and suggestions for how to address their concerns, desiring that each town only have a single trader, who was to be licensed, so that in the event of any trade issues, they could easily seek redress. Tomochichi endeavored to negotiate a system to maintain the balance of trade, so as to prevent disorganization and any abuses that might follow suit, such as unfair prices for goods. Tomochichi indicated good faith on his part of this deal, suggesting that the traders stationed by the colony in Mvskoke towns would need not charge such high amounts for their goods, for they would be well taken care of by their hosts during their time there. The mico explained that, while the British made every exchange into a financial transaction, the Yamacraw would give away one "if they had but two mouthfulls." Tomochichi hoped that this guarantee of taking good care of their resident traders would convince them to lower their prices.[31]

Unfortunately for the Yamacraw delegates, these trade negotiations were confounded by several issues. The first issue concerned the trustees' weariness at fixing prices considering the vast network of persons involved in trade, "each of whom must be gainers." These concerns

[31] Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 62-64.

were assuaged, however, upon their inquiry into Tomochichi's complaints, which they found to be wholly justified, agreeing that their traders were, indeed, imposing far too high a price for their goods. The trustees agreed that the traders could still make a healthy profit even after significantly lowering their prices. Despite this consensus, however, a second issue proved insurmountable in the negotiating process. The key issue that pervaded several meetings was the propensity of Musgrove, their interpreter, for drunkenness. Largely unreliable in his position as interpreter due to his frequent intoxication, Musgrove's inability to serve his duty on multiple occasions stymied talks between the Yamacraw and the trustees. As a result of this difficult circumstance, the negotiating parties were unable to formally settle the issue of trade that Tomochichi wished to address while in London. The eight surviving Yamacraw set sail for home two weeks later, on October 31, 1734, without Oglethorpe.[32]

"With them we will live and die": Commitment to Alliance and the End of the Yamacraw

Though the Yamacraw delegates had not succeeded in achieving all of their objectives they had set out to accomplish, by December 1734 they nonetheless returned home triumphantly on many fronts. The transatlantic journey itself was no small feat, and indeed could prove rather dangerous. Both the death of Hinguithi from illness in London, as well as Tooanahowi's poor health during the final leg of the journey, exemplified the perils that surrounded such a task. The delegates must have felt some relief to have returned home safely, and especially upon the recovery of Tooanahowi, whose education and status as chosen successor to be a leader of the Yamacraw was imperative to Tomochichi's mission in the first place. The inhabitants of Savannah were very enthused by the safe arrival of Tomochichi and his cohort, and the delegates

[32] Percival, *Egmont's Journal,* 62-68.

themselves were reportedly happy to be home. A great spectacle was made of the occasion of their return, with the delegates enjoying a thirteen-cannon salute upon their reception, per the orders of Thomas Causton. The fanfare accompanying their safe return reflected the understood importance of their accomplishments, at least by the Georgia settlers, but to be determined was how the delegates would leverage their experiences abroad for advantages at home, and what the Mvskoke would make of the Yamacraw's journey.[33]

Soon after his return home, Tomochichi continued his efforts at growing his own community, and took measures to underscore his increasing influence within the Mvskoke as a whole. Tomochichi sent notice of his return to both the Upper and Lower Mvskoke, asking them to travel to him so that he could disburse the gifts he received and brief them on all he had seen and heard. In the meantime, the Yamacraw mico integrated another group, seemingly refugees, into the Yamacraw's town, and had a letter accompanied with animal skins delivered to the trustees in London as a token of this new group's "gratitude and love." Tomochichi's efforts to consolidate more peoples into his diasporic community demonstrate a continuity of the Yamacraw's formation as a distinct people, while also showing his accommodation for the newly reinforced alliance with the colony of Georgia. Seeking to legitimate these refugees' cohabitation with the Yamacraw in part by acquainting them to the trustees, Tomochichi further demonstrated his adeptness as a middleman diplomat, reinforcing his influential status to both the colony of Georgia and to his own community.[34]

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[33] "George Dunbar to the Trustees, on board the Prince of Wales, November 5, 1734," in *Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 20,* ed. Kenneth Coleman and Milton Ready (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982), 100; "Joseph Fitzwater to James Oglethorpe, Jan. 16, 1734/5," in *Colonial Records, 20*, 163.

[34] "John Musgrove to James Oglethorpe, Jan. 24, 1734/5," in *Colonial Record, 20,* 197-198; "Tomo-chi-chi to the Trustees, Feb. 24, 1734/5," in *Colonial Records, 20,* 236-237.

Seeking to take control of the disbursement of gifts himself, Tomochichi was certainly aware of the importance of such a role, as well as to acquaint the visiting Mvskokes with the talks he had in London. Tomochichi sought to hand-pick the persons to whom he intended to bestow the gifts he had procured in London. Some Georgia officials were not keen on this idea however, with one officer complaining that Tomochichi intended only to invite his own "private friends," and not the headmen on whom the colony wished to make a good impression. His superior, however, approved of Tomochichi's judgement, and provided the obstinate officer with a list of individuals whom Tomochichi wished to invite to receive gifts. Despite some attempts, the authority of the Yamacraw mico in this matter was not undermined. Tomochichi was determined to play a significant role in the strengthening of the ties of peace.[35]

Preparation for conflict, too, was a top priority for Tomochichi. Concerns surrounding the nearby Spanish colonies in Florida were heavy on the minds of the recently returned Yamacraw, who held similar opinions with the colony of Georgia regarding the potential threat the Spanish and their Indigenous allies posed. Several Yamacraw were killed by a Spanish-allied Indigenous group during the delegation's absence, and considering the account that Tooanahowi's own father was killed by the Spanish, these threats were very real and even personal. Agreeing with some advice from the same obstinate officer about this looming danger and awaiting the arrival of the Upper and Lower Mvskokes whom Tomochichi invited to Savannah for the disbursal of gifts, the Yamacraw mico elected to lead a scouting party southward in the spring of 1735. Bringing Tooanahowi with him, this scouting mission served both its intrinsic purpose of reconnaissance as well as more exposure in the roles of a leader for the young prodigy, whose

[35] Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters,* 161; "Patrick Mackay to [Thomas Causton], March 27, 1735," in *Colonial Records, 20,* 290; "Thomas Causton to the Trustees, April 2, 1735," in *Colonial Records, 20,* 306; "Thomas Causton to Patrick Mackay," April 10, 1735," in *Colonial Records, 20,* 316-318.

experience and training was of paramount importance for Tomochichi and the rest of the Yamacraw.[36]

Tomochichi's endeavors to leverage his achievements and items procured from his embassy to London was a point of contention for some living among the Yamacraw, who were weary of his growing influence and his words. Some charged Tomochichi with selling his people to the British for the gifts he received and mistrusted his accounts of what he had observed during his time abroad. These individuals contended that the mico was spreading lies to them so as "to keep them in awe." Though these concerns did not reflect the whole of the Yamacraw or the Mvskoke's reception of Tomochichi, who largely celebrated his achievements, they nonetheless signify an uncertainty about Tomochichi's rise and influence. That the majority seemed to trust him and his accounts, however, suggest the understood significance of his accomplishments, as well as a positive judgment of the Yamacraw mico's character.[37]

When the time came for the presents to be disbursed in June of 1735, much was made of the occasion by the Georgia settlers who hoped to remind their Indigenous allies of Britain's importance to the whole matter. The business of the day was attended by the parading of armed British settlers, the beat of marching drums, and the disbursement was conducted under Britain's union flag outside of their interpreter's house. Whatever the Mvskoke visitors thought of Britain's imperial imagery, the proceedings of the day's events hinged on Tomochichi. Despite concerns over how Tomochichi would elect to distribute the gifts, the ultimate decision was up to him. The Yamacraw mico decided that the gifts were to be split evenly, with one half going to

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[36] Patrick Mackay to [Thomas Causton], March 27, 1735," *Colonial Records, 20,* 291; "Thomas Causton to the Trustees, April 2, 1735," *Colonial Records 20,* 306.

[37] "Copy of a Letter from Mr. Thomas Christie to the Trustees dated at Savannah. 19th March 1734/5," Letters from Georgia, v. 14200, 1732-1735 June, Digital Library of Georgia, accessed March 2, 2023.

the Upper Mvkoke, and the other half to the Lower Mvskoke. Assuaging the concerns of some of his critics, and demonstrating his even-handedness, Tomochichi impressed his observers that day.[38]

Several Mvskoke headmen formally recognized the achievements of Tomochichi, Senauki, and Tooanahowi, considering it good for the whole of the Mvskoke. Immediately following the distribution of the gifts, a talk was held between headmen and representatives from both the Lower Mvskoke and several from Georgia, in which the headmen recounted a history of their origins as a people, situating the Yamacraw's efforts toward peace within the concept of white (peace) and red (war) pathways. The gathered headmen declared Tomochichi and Senauki as father and mother to them all and acknowledged Tooanahowi's status as chosen successor to Tomochichi. Before the talk closed, however, a headman of Cusseta named Chigelli made sure to underscore his status as a headman from one of the Mvskoke mother towns. Chigelli reminded those present of his own authority to ensure that all the towns comply with the resolutions that came from Tomochichi's negotiations abroad. This public tempering of Tomochichi's status further suggests the uneasiness of some with Tomochichi's gaining influence and his legacy through Tooanahowi, but as a whole the sentiments were favorable of the delegation's accomplishments on behalf of the larger body of Mvskoke. Tomochichi had not only reintegrated his diasporic community back into the Lower Mvskoke but became one of its most prominent figures.[39]

Aside from his work to strengthen the Yamacraw community through peace with the British and reintegration with the Lower Mvskoke, Tomochichi also directed his attention toward

[38] Thomas Causton to the Trustees, June 20, 1735," *Colonial Records, 20,* 398-403.
[39] "Talk of Creek leaders, June 11, 1735," *Colonial Records, 20,* 281-287.

war with the Spanish. Upon returning to Georgia in 1736, Oglethorpe discovered a hostile state of relations between the Lower Mvskoke as a whole and the Spanish in Florida with their Indigenous allies. Some headmen and their warriors, including Tomochichi and his own, had assembled with the intent to go to war against the Spanish, embittered by the latter having recently slain several Mvskoke. Joining his own ship in their excursion, Oglethorpe counted himself lucky that he had encountered the Spanish first, who were sailing under a flag of truce, for he believed that the Mvskoke would have engaged their enemy otherwise. In the following conference with the Spanish, which almost certainly involved Tomochichi, the Mvskoke headmen demanded that action be taken to make amends. The Spanish representative assured that he would take action by putting to death the offending leader of the attacks, or at the very least discontinue supplying goods to the Indigenous town that carried it out. Satisfied with this answer for the time being, the Mvskoke reminded the Spanish that they would take matters into their own hands if necessary.[40]

Relations with European powers continued to characterize the obligations of the aging Yamacraw mico, who remained a steadfast friend to Oglethorpe and the British. Spanish attempts to win over the Mvskoke had increased in the years preceding 1739, and while the Yamacraw could be counted on as allies, both Tomochichi and Oglethorpe thought it necessary for the latter to attend a conference to be held in July of 1739 with several Lower Mvskoke headmen to ensure that the Spanish enticements did not work to their intended effect. Neither Tomochichi nor Tooanahowi attended this meeting, which culminated in a treaty reaffirming the alliance between the Lower Mvskoke and the British. Tomochichi was by this point ill and in no condition to travel, and Tooanahowi likely wished to stay by his side during this time. Given the

[40] "Oglethorpe to the Trustees, June 1736," *Early American Indian Documents, XI,* 66-68.

reliably amicable relationship between the Yamacraw and Georgia, it is also possible that it was not considered necessary to reaffirm their alliance. In any case, Tomochichi urged Oglethorpe to go to this assembly and prevent the Mvskoke from siding with the Spanish.[41]

Convinced of the necessity of this mission, Oglethorpe left Tomochichi and proceeded to the Lower Mvskoke town of Coweta. During the assembly, the Mvskoke renewed their alliance with the British in a treaty agreed to in August of 1739, part of which was centered on their mutual opposition to Spanish encroachment in the area. Successful in his objectives, Oglethorpe returned in early October to find that Tomochichi had passed away during his absence. It was not long after the funeral of the accomplished Yamacraw mico that war was declared between Britain and Spain, and so too were the Yamacraw presented with the opportunity to go to war against a common enemy with their allies, for the British would not stand in their way as mediators.[42]

Tooanahowi took the initiative almost instantly. For years he had been raised as the chosen successor to Tomochichi, and now that his mentor and relative had passed away, it was time for Tooanahowi to demonstrate his own capability as a leader. The young Yamacraw, now around the age of twenty, was committed in his opposition to the Spanish and in his alliance with the British. Wasting no time, the young man mobilized a force of two hundred warriors against the Spanish. For the next several years, Tooanahowi led several expeditions against the Spanish, distinguishing himself in battle from time to time. On one such occasion, Tooanahowi led his contingent of warriors into battle along with Oglethorpe and several other British officers in a

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[41] "Oglethorpe to the Earl of Egmont, June 13, 1739," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 92; "Oglethorpe to Verlest, June 15, 1739," *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 92-93.
[42] Julie Ann Sweet, "Tooanahowi: The Maturation of the Next Yamacraw Leader," *Native South* 8 (2015): 103.

defensive assault against the Spanish on St. Simons Island in July of 1742. During this engagement, Tooanahowi was shot through the right arm by a Spanish officer. Continuing despite his wound, Tooanahowi drew a pistol with his left hand and shot his assailant through the head. Demonstrating his bravery on this victorious day, Tooanahowi's commitment to the cause against the Spanish and their Indigenous allies never waned.[43]

Indeed, it was Tooanahowi's active engagement in this conflict, and his devotion to his alliance with the British, that would eventually bring about his death. Following a Yamasee raid on a British encampment on St. Simons in early 1744, during which five British soldiers were taken captive, Tooanahowi led a party as part of the forces that set out to rescue the soldiers. In the ensuing skirmish, Tooanahowi was shot through the breast and killed. His body was buried on Cumberland Island, which he himself had named in honor of the Duke of Cumberland, who had gifted him a second gold watch during his time in London. Tooanahowi always remembered the kindness with which he had been treated by his British allies, and he gave his young life defending them.[44]

The death of Tooanahowi signaled a period of decline for the Yamacraw. Within only a few years the remaining Yamacraw, including the 1734 delegates Senauki and Santachi, found themselves embroiled in a dispute with the colony of Georgia over their lands, as well as those of the whole of the Mvskoke Nation. Without the cooperative dynamic of Tomochichi and Oglethorpe, the Yamacraw found it increasingly difficult to coexist with the Georgia settlers, and indeed their status as mediators between the Mvskoke and the colony had been eclipsed by individuals like Chigelli and others, who by the mid-1740s found themselves intervening on the

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[43] "Frederica in Georgia, July 9," *The South-Carolina Gazette,* July 19, 1742; Sweet, "Tooanahowi," 104-105.
[44] "Charlestown," *The South-Carolina Gazette,* February 13, 1744; "Frederica in Georgia, the 12th of April, 1736," *The South-Carolina Gazette,* May 1, 1736; Sweet, "Tooanahowi," 100.

issue of land after Senauki and Santachi had failed to make gains. These rapid developments suggest the importance of personal relationships between negotiating parties and the volatility of Indigenous-colonial relations when variables are only slightly altered. Tomochichi's rapport with Oglethorpe and Georgia had gained him and his people much, and if Tooanahowi had lived long enough to lead in a time of peace, perhaps the successor would have boasted similar accomplishments. Instead, the surviving Yamacraw did not inherit Tomochichi's conciliatory position, and their status as a distinct political entity was jeopardized.[45]

Risks and Rewards

Within the span of only a few years, the Yamacraw had transformed from a diasporic community of refugees and exiles into a distinct *talwa* of the Lower Mvskoke. Much of this was accomplished only through the diplomatic endeavors of Tomochichi, their aged mico. Establishing his position as a middleman between the new colony of Georgia and the larger body of Lower Mvskoke, Tomochichi leveraged advantages from both sides for his people. Utilizing his position as mediator, the Yamacraw mico reintegrated his people into the strong network of the Lower Mvskoke and achieved influential, albeit limited, status within it. Through these very same actions, Tomochichi also negotiated for the Yamacraw a comfortable position for his people vis-à-vis the Georgia settlers, who relied on his connections to other Mvskoke towns in their own diplomatic proceedings. Without Tomochichi, perhaps another individual would have adopted a similar role as a conciliator, but Tomochichi had gone to great lengths to ensure that he, and eventually his successor, would carry this responsibility.

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[45] "Chigelli's Talk to Horton," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 132-134.

Following the deaths of both Tomochichi and Tooanahowi, these advantages fell away, and the Yamacraw enjoyed fewer and fewer of the gains that they had so recently obtained. Despite Tomochichi's best efforts to secure longevity for the Yamacraw's position in between worlds, without the personal relationships established between the delegates and individuals like Oglethorpe, relations between the Yamacraw and Georgia soured. The untimely death of the mico's prodigy left the Yamacraw without a clear successor, after so much effort had been invested in the rearing of the devoted Tooanahowi for leadership, and so their position as a *talwa*, too, became tenuous.

The importance of the Yamacraw delegation of 1734 and the accomplishments of its constituents can hardly be overstated. Despite failures in the long-term to secure prosperity for the Yamacraw, the impact of Tomochichi and the other delegates' mission to London and their other diplomatic ventures stretched far and wide. The Yamacraw were instrumental in the establishment of the colony of Georgia and in facilitating the connection of this colony with the wider network of Indigenous politics within the region. Tomochichi's immediate inclinations toward peace with the British set the tone for Anglo-Mvskoke relations for years to come, in a time when multiple European powers were vying for the friendship of the Mvskoke and other Indigenous groups. Tomochichi and his cohort ventured to London with clear objectives in mind, and it is through these objectives and the developments that followed suit that the significance of transatlantic diplomacy within Indigenous politics of southeastern North America becomes evident.

The Importance of Personal Experiences to Transatlantic Diplomacy

There were no Yamacraw or Mvskoke delegations to London following 1734. Both Tomochichi and Tooanahowi died within a decade of its undertaking, before which time it could

have been seen as too soon to request a second journey. The fact that there is no extant record of a subsequent Mvskoke envoy to Britain is suggestive. It is possible that, even if any of the more influential delegates were still alive for years to come, other Mvskoke leaders would not have seen the point. But were Tomochichi and Tooanahowi present to tell tales of their exploits abroad and remind others of the importance of what they accomplished there, there is a chance that they, or other Mvskoke diplomats, might have seen potential in making another trip.

Cherokee leaders certainly remembered their 1730 delegation—Attakullakulla made sure no one forgot. Utilizing his status as a transatlantic diplomat and upholding the Articles of Friendship and Commerce he negotiated in Britain when he needed to, his journey remained in the minds of Cherokees for decades afterward. The legacy of this event became even more prominent as Attakullakulla returned to prominence Cherokee political scene in the 1750s, as his diplomacy through the Seven Years' War inspired a second delegation in 1762 and a wave of accommodationist policy among elder Cherokee leaders. Attakullakulla was the link that held the chain of friendship together, and his exploits later in life demonstrate the significance of the legacy of Indigenous transatlantic diplomacy.[46]

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[46] Fullagar, *The Savage Visit,* 91.

"To live and die together:" The Unraveling of the Anglo-Cherokee Alliance 1748-1776

The chain of friendship between the Cherokees and the British strained, but had not broken, by the mid-eighteenth century. Enduring through occasional breaches of the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, the two peoples strove to cooperate in trade and in times of war. Beginning in 1730, this cooperation remained relatively constant between the Cherokees and South Carolina for two decades. By the 1750s, however, the political climate had shifted. Emerging political figures, such as the recently returned Attakullakulla, complicated the situation by pursuing other options within the complex alliance network of the Southeast. The Seven Years' War only exacerbated these issues, and in 1758 the chain of friendship was worn away by unfulfilled promises and severed by the outbreak of war. Once peace was restored by 1762, both parties looked backward to the inception of their alliance to reconcile their relationship. The damage had been done, however, and the chain of friendship was never fully restored.[1]

Memories of the Cherokee diplomats' transatlantic voyage in 1730 remained potent ever since the conclusion of their mission. Over thirty years following the initial Cherokee embassy to Britain, leaders both familiar and new utilized its legacy as a means to their own political ends. Beginning in 1758 and concluded by the winter of 1761, the Anglo-Cherokee War convinced another Overhill Cherokee that a second delegation to Britain was necessary to guarantee lasting peace. Ultimately, however, this 1762 mission was a futile attempt at truly reinstating the Anglo-Cherokee alliance in the aftermath of its collapse, as allegiances all across eastern North America came to be called into question. Changing opinions within Cherokee country regarding the efficacy of such policies of engaged friendship with the British signaled the closing of the period

[1] Daniel J. Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis: Cherokees, Colonists, and Slaves in the American Southeast, 1756-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 1.

in which Indigenous transatlantic diplomacy was a viable option. By the American Revolution, the individuals who were most directly involved in the forging of the chain of friendship across the ocean, especially Attakullakulla and Ostenaco, proved to be some of the last defenders of the alliance.[2]

Despite these efforts, however, the conditions needed to sustain the desired cooperation between the Cherokees and the British were long gone. Competing interests between many of the parties prevented a lasting consensus. Land became the key issue by the latter half of the eighteenth century, as the conclusion of the Seven Years' War called into question the future of the territories once claimed by France and Spain to the east of the Mississippi River. Efforts taken to address these issues in the aftermath of the war seemed to only worsen the situation between Indigenous peoples and settlers ready to move westward. Accommodating foreign policy stances taken by Cherokee leaders like Attakullakulla and Ostenaco eventually fell out of fashion during the years immediately preceding the American Revolution, as Cherokee country became increasingly divided over the best course of action to secure their lands and prosperity.[3]

Attakullakulla Returns: Remembering the Articles of Friendship & Commerce 1730

As ever, Attakullakulla remained proactive in this turbulent environment. Arriving in Charles Town, South Carolina by early July 1753, Attakullakulla prepared to meet with Governor James Glen. The Cherokee headman had some explaining to do. Despite his role in the establishment of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance, he had spent the last several years offending the

[2] Gregory D. Smithers, *The Cherokee Diaspora: An Indigenous History of Migration, Resettlement, and Identity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015), 27-29.
[3] Tyler Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among Eighteenth-Century Cherokees* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2011), 131-132; William M. Fowler, Jr., *Empires at War: The French and Indian War and the Struggle for North America, 1754-1763* (New York: Walker & Company, 2005), 286-287; Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis,* 169.

colony through courting other potential allies, not only with Virginia, but also with the French, Britain's imperial rival. Attakullakulla had not come to Charles Town to beg for forgiveness, however. Instead, his business in Charles Town concerned the same subject as his conduct elsewhere: trade. Endeavoring to better accommodate his people among the Overhill Cherokee settlements in their acquisition of goods, Attakullakulla worked tirelessly to ensure the most desirable arrangements. Drawing upon his years-long experience in these matters, this day was no different.[4]

For nearly two years, Governor Glen had been requesting that the Cherokees send Attakullakulla to Charles Town to answer for his actions. Having returned from captivity among the French-allied Ottawas in 1748, Attakullakulla spent the years immediately following his arrival home sowing discord among the Cherokees regarding their relationship with the British colonies, including the proliferation of a rumor that the British colonies would join up with the Mvskoke to destroy the Cherokees. The anxieties he helped spread troubled officials in Charles Town. Already concerned by recent murders between Cherokees and British merchants, as well as by the Cherokees' allowing northern Indigenous groups to pass through their country to raid Britain's Mvskoke allies, this atmosphere of unrest prompted South Carolina to withdraw their merchants from Cherokee towns. Demanding that the Cherokees deliver all guilty persons for punishment, the governor thought it necessary to draft another treaty with the Cherokees. Several Cherokee headmen ventured to meet with Governor Glen in late 1ate 1751 to make amends for the recent occurrences and reopen the trade. Attakullakulla was notably absent.[5]

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[4] James C. Kelly, "Notable Persons in Cherokee History: Attakullakulla," *Journal of Cherokee Studies* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 6-8.

[5] "Governor Glen's Talk to the Cherokees [Document 6]," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 225-228; "Talk of the Cherokees to Governor Glen," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 229-237;

The treaty agreed to was not intended to replace or weaken the Articles of Friendship and Commerce of 1730, but instead to strengthen it, as it responded to many of the pressing concerns of the early 1750s. The primary function of this treaty was to reestablish a lasting peace and commerce by sending South Carolina's traders back into Cherokee towns. Newer articles reflected how the political milieu had shifted since that time, namely that the Cherokees agreed to make an attempt at peace with the Upper and Lower Mvskokes, and that they refrain from further dealing with "French and Norward Indians," who were thought to be driving a wedge between the Cherokees and South Carolina. The fourth article of this treaty was its most specific: the Cherokees must oblige Attakullakulla to come to Charles Town and "give an Account of his past Conduct." However obligated to comply with this article the present Cherokees may have felt, the absent instigator would not make his way to Charles Town until 1753.[6]

In the meantime, unsatisfied by the state of trade with South Carolina, Attakullakulla explored his options. Earlier in 1751, the Cherokee diplomat paid a visit to Williamsburg, hoping to establish a trade with Virginia, using the 1730 treaty as justification that the Cherokees were due fair trade, as promised. Unsuccessful in this mission, Attakullakulla pivoted northward again. In early 1752, contrary to unsubstantiated rumors that his business was with the French, it was reported that Attakullakulla was attempting to secure a trade with other British colonies to the north. He is said to have told other Cherokees that, if his efforts to procure a beneficial trade in the north proved ineffective, he would journey back across the Atlantic and meet with the king

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"Governor Glen's Talk to the Cherokees [Document 8]," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 237-240.

[6] "Cherokee Treaty," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 240-244; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 7.

again. Remembering the treaty as an agreement with the king and the British empire as a whole, Attakullakulla looked to extend the application of this treaty to other British colonies.[7]

When none of these alternatives produced his desired outcome of a better deerskin trade, Attakullakulla finally resolved to turn his attention back toward South Carolina. By attacking a party of Frenchmen and their Indigenous allies, killing eight and taking two prisoners, Attakullakulla hoped to make a statement of his commitment to the alliance with the colony. Reporting this victory to Glen in advance of their formal meeting, the Cherokee headman did not wish to linger on his recent history of slighting South Carolina. Arriving in Charles Town in early July 1753 with several other Cherokees, Attakullakulla met with Glen to mend their alliance. Their initial meeting was tense. The first order of business for the Cherokee headman concerned the Mvskoke. He recalled his treaty with King George II, which he claimed stipulated that the Cherokees would be supplied by their allies to "vindicate" themselves against their enemies. Responding to Glen's insistence that all of Britain's Indigenous allies be friendly with one another, Attakullakulla reminded Glen that, as per their treaty, they were to share the same enemies, and that the Mvskoke had spilled British blood, perhaps referring to the Yamasee War (1715-1717). Rebuffed again by the governor, Attakullakulla stated his desire to return to Britain and meet with the king once more, aiming to go over Glen's head to settle matters. The headman was informed that the time was not right for a journey to Britain considering the Cherokees' ongoing war, but this did not prevent him from utilizing his experience as leverage.[8]

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[7] "Talk of Tasitte of Euphassee and Others," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1958), 107-108; "Lud. Grant to Governor Glen," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 223; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 7.

[8] "28th Day of June, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 430; "Wednesday, A.M., the 4th Day of July, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 433-434.

Brewing conflict with neighboring tribes was a primary concern for Attakullakulla. The Overhill towns' proximity to and relations with French-allied Indigenous groups like the Shawnees contributed to the headman's insistence that South Carolina make good on its promises to supply them properly. The presence of several Shawnee prisoners alarmed the Cherokee diplomat, who demanded that they be released. Expressing the cause of his concerns to Glen, he explained that by offending them, the Shawnees would join with other French-allied Indigenous groups and attack both the Cherokees and the British merchants who visited them. Hoping to prevent conflict and secure his commercial interests, Attakullakulla stood firm that the Overhills would not consider peace with the Mvskoke while the Shawnee prisoners remained in Charles Town. A consensus was not reached on this subject that day, which would have consequences in the near future. Despite this setback, Attakullakulla achieved success on other fronts, particularly on the matter of trade.[9]

Attakullakulla made sure to remind Glen of their commercial ties, and of his own experience in Britain. The headman explained that the Overhill Cherokees were in want of goods, and South Carolina failed to uphold its end of the chain of friendship. Attakullakulla complained that the Overhill Cherokees had fewer merchants in their towns than before, and that the merchants they did have often cheated them by tampering with measurements. This compelled Attakullakulla to look elsewhere to procure the necessary goods, but he was happy that the governor promised to meet their demands moving forward. Citing his personal negotiations with the king, Attakullakulla aimed to hold Glen to the treaty he helped produce.[10]

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[9] "Thursday, A.M., the 5th day of July, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 445-446.
[10] "Thursday, A.M., the 5th day of July, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 439-442.

These early talks reveal much about Attakullakulla's objectives by 1753, which were in many ways a continuation of the same reasons that he ventured to London in 1730. Concerned by the possibility of war with the Mvskoke and the French, in conjunction with a lack of goods necessary to conduct this war, he exhausted several avenues to remedy this concern before reorienting himself toward South Carolina, and thus toward consolidating his role within the Anglo-Cherokee alliance. At no point did he mean to market his desperation for goods as a weakness, however, instead subtly charging his allies with failures to meet the Overhill Cherokees' needs. In these efforts, Attakullakulla was largely successful. Governor Glen agreed to send more traders to the Overhills, and to provide new tools for measuring goods to be kept by Cherokee headmen, promising to seek redress should one of his merchants meddle with it. One key issue, however, remained Glen's desire that the Overhills assent to peace with the Mvskoke, to which Attakullakilla would not agree. Though this point remained unsettled, the Cherokees diplomats in Charles Town that July left with many gifts and assurances that their commercial relationship would be improved. Despite Glen's distaste for his double-dealing, Attakullakulla managed to reintegrate himself within the Anglo-Cherokee alliance, and in doing so stood to procure advantageous outcomes for the Overhill Cherokees.[11]

This polishing of the chain of friendship did not come without its negative consequences, however. Attakullakulla was not merely bluffing when he voiced his reservations about unfriendly treatment of the Shawnees, for by early 1754 Attakullakulla's uncle, Connecorte, or Old Hop, complained to Governor Glen that the northward Indigenous groups had "deceived" him for a long time. While some pretended to be friends of the Cherokee, others attacked them.

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[11] "Thursday, A.M., the 5th day of July, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 442-445; "Saturday, A.M., the 7th Day of July, 1753," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 451-454; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 8.

Connecorte informed Glen that he had now taken measures to make peace with the Mvskokes and the Catwabas, requesting that South Carolina furnish the Cherokees for the conflict with the French-Algonquian alliance that was certain to ensue.[12]

Courting Allies

The Overhill headmen's disquiet regarding the impending war proved prudent, as by May of 1754 his Anglo-American allies from Virginia ignited the global conflict that has come to be known as the Seven Years' War. By September of that year, the Overhill Cherokees sent another request to Glen for supplies to withstand the French and their Indigenous allies. The Cherokee headmen, including Connecorte and Attakullakulla, reminded Glen that it was South Carolina's imprisonment of the Shawnees the year prior that had compelled them to join with the French against the Cherokees. As was often the case, the Cherokees found themselves at pains to hold their allies in South Carolina to their word, particularly regarding the proper conduct of furnishing the Cherokees with necessary goods. By reminding Glen of their loyalty to the Anglo-Cherokee alliance, as well as of South Carolina's own partial responsibility for implicating the Cherokees in the widening conflict, the Overhill leaders hoped that their counterparts in Charles Town would finally begin to fulfill the many agreements they had made.[13]

Perhaps unsurprisingly, they did not, but the Overhill Cherokees' want of defensive aid outweighed their disappointment. Recent bloodshed along their Ohio frontier persuaded the Cherokees to turn again toward South Carolina to procure assistance vis-à-vis their mutual enemies. At a conference held in the summer of 1755, at the top of Attakullakulla's agenda was

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[12] "Richard Smith and John Hatton to Governor Glen," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1750-1754 I,* 488-489; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 69.
[13] Fowler, *Empires at War,* 41-42; "James Beamer to Governor Glen," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1754-1765 II,* ed. William L. McDowell, Jr. (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department, 1970), 7-8.

to enlist Governor Glen's support. Citing the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, the headman appealed to the notions of brotherhood between the Cherokees and the British subjects under their mutual father, the king. Placing earth from a pouch at the governor's feet, Attakullakulla declared all of the Cherokees' lands to belong to the king. As the Cherokees and these lands were now in danger, Attakullakulla hoped that the king would take measures to assist them in their time of need, as had been assured by their treaty of 1730. Asking Governor Glen to communicate all he had said to the king, Attakullakulla reminded the latter of the Cherokees' own commitment to their alliance. The conference ended with Glen's promises that he would communicate the Cherokees' message and their belts of wampum confirming their words to the king.[14]

But the Cherokees were not contented by all that had occurred at the Saluda conference, for by December 1755 Attakullakulla paid a visit to Governor Glen in Charles Town to reiterate his message from the previous summer. The Overhills had been "well Informed" that the French intended to attack them soon, and that they "Expected to be protected by the White People whom they Looked upon to be their Brothers." Attakullakulla once again called upon his time in Britain and his talks with King George II to justify these statements. By adopting the king as their father and thereby the British as their brothers, the two peoples "ought to live and die together." Closing his opening remarks to Glen, Attakullakulla requested or South Carolina to build a fort among the Overhills and help defend against their mutual enemies.[15]

Making one final appeal to Glen for military aid in a conversation immediately following this conference, Attakullakulla invoked the memory of his hallowed agreement with King

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[14] "Conference with the Cherokees at Saluda," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 293-295. The Cherokees' cession of lands to the king of Britain at the Saluda conference proved inconsequential in the long run, for the Proclamation Line of 1763 effectively nullified the ambiguous declaration.
[15] "Conference of Governor Glen and the Council with Little Carpenter and the Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 296-298.

George II nearly three decades prior. The Cherokees had not surrendered any lands, he recalled, but they had entered an alliance with their British brothers on equal footing, “that we would be one with the white people in Warr, that is if they assisted us in our wars against our Enemies, we would assist them against their Enemies.” It was time for South Carolina to assist Attakullakulla and the Overhill Cherokees, for they were in danger. If Glen failed to follow through on his promise to build and garrison a fort among the Overhills, warned Attakullakulla, “we shall think you have forgot us, and we shall have our own Thoughts.” No doubt these thoughts were of other potential allies, and of South Carolina’s repeated disappointments. Increasingly frustrated by his counterparts’ failure to hold their end of the chain of friendship, Attakullakulla looked elsewhere to secure his aims.[16]

The indefatigable Attakullakulla could not be deterred in his efforts to secure the safety of the Overhill Cherokees and the aid of his British allies. As the promises of South Carolina continued to prove hollow, the headman looked again toward Virginia in 1756. Equally desirous of establishing a closer partnership, the colony of Virginia communicated to the Cherokees in the spring of that year that soldiers had been dispatched to their country to build a fort, which Lt. Governor Dinwiddie hoped would “brighten the Chain of Friendship so long subsisting between Your Brothers, the Engl., and Your Nation.” By August, the Virginians had accomplished what the South Carolinians had not, by completing the small “Virginia Fort” among the Cherokees. By solidifying their agreement in terms that channeled the treaty of 1730, the chain of friendship that bound Anglo-Cherokee alliance conformed to the size that Attakullakulla had always understood

[16] “Conversation Between Governor Glen and Little Carpenter,” in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 300-302; “Chucenanto to Governor Glen,” in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1754-1765 II,* 77-78.

it to be. But as the Cherokees would learn in years to come, common understandings of their mutual obligations within this alliance were few and far between.[17]

Breaking the Chain of Friendship: The Anglo-Cherokee War 1758-1761

By 1758, years of warring together against the French and their allied Indigenous groups inflicted serious strains on the Anglo-Cherokee alliance. A principal issue concerned the practice of gift giving in exchange for military service. Based on the 1730 Articles of Friendship and Commerce, the Cherokees expected to be properly furnished by their brothers, the British. Furthermore, the dispatch of Cherokee warriors on campaign against their common enemies could have negative implications for the Cherokees' economy, as warriors in the field meant fewer hunters at home to procure necessary skins for trading. Cherokee warriors consequently required that their allies compensate them for their exploits rendered during times of war. Failure to meet these demands catalyzed the increasing alienation of many Cherokees from the British, resulting in several instances of Cherokee war parties abandoning campaigns altogether. Unsatisfied Cherokee warriors returning home from these campaigns occasionally took it upon themselves to procure their own compensation by confiscating livestock from colonists. Their absence from home and its proceeding economic risks would not only have affected themselves but also their families and other dependents, and so returning home empty-handed could have rather detrimental consequences. Stealing horses from backcountry Virginia settlers became a commonplace activity practiced by Cherokees who felt they had been slighted by their allies.[18]

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[17] "Governor Dinwiddie to Cherokees about Building Fort and Aid from Warriors," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 223; "Captain Rayd. Demere to Governor Lyttleton," in *The Colonial Records of South Carolina: Documents Relating to Indian Affairs 1754-1765 II,* 161-162.

[18] Paul Kelton, "The British and Indian War: Cherokee Power and the Fate of Empire in North America," in *The William and Mary Quarterly 69,* no. 4 (October 2012): 767-769; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 99-101.

Murders committed by the backcountry Virginia settlers also constituted a significant factor in the destruction of the chain of friendship. Violence erupted as bounty-hungry settlers began attacking their Cherokee allies traveling throughout the backcountry. Aiming to take scalps and pass them off as though they had been taken from the Shawnees, these settlers attacked friend and foe alike. Leaders on both sides shakily addressed these early infractions, however the continuation of this violence on the Virginia frontier prompted the Cherokees to take action. Having suffered considerable losses to their clans, Cherokee women called on their male relatives to avenge the killed and the captured. These requests for retribution, in concert with the Anglo-Americans' unwillingness to compensate the Cherokees for their wartime contributions, culminated in more hostilities throughout 1758 and the formal declaration of war by October of 1759.[19]

In the middle of all of this was Attakullakulla. Years of experience entertaining a multitude of diplomatic options convinced the Cherokee headman that peace with Britain's colonies were the most conducive routes to achieve his ends. Attakullakulla's primary concerns were, as always, commerce and protection for the Overhill Cherokees. As murders and thefts continued before the declaration of war, the headman journeyed to Williamsburg to settle affairs. Taking an even-handed approach in his appeal to acting Governor Fauquier, Attakullakulla cited "Faults on both Sides" for having caused the souring of relations between the Cherokees and Virginia. True to form, the Cherokee diplomat wished that both sides could quickly move on and forget past transgressions, instead looking ahead to the establishment of "the Trade which had been promised them," and the proper garrison of the fort constructed by the Virginians three years prior. Expressions of goodwill and the desire that matters be resolved aside, the two leaders

[19] Tortora, *Carolina in Crisis,* 48-54; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 113.

found little common ground. Fauquier chastised Attakullakulla and the Cherokees for abandoning campaigns in the past, namely that against Fort Duquesne, and suggested that perhaps the Cherokees murdered by the backcountry settlers deserved their fate on account of the thefts committed by other Cherokees. Attakullakulla left Williamsburg with assurances that should the Cherokees cease hostilities on the frontier and assist in campaigns against the French, they could expect a proper restoration of the chain of friendship.[20]

Attakullakulla's efforts to prevent the outbreak of war amounted to little, however, for by September of 1759 relations had only worsened between the Cherokees and Virginia. According to intelligence received from South Carolina, stories circulated in Virginia that told of murders committed by Cherokees, as well as a plot by the French and Mvskokes to convince the Cherokees to join in their alliance. Considering the gravity of the situation, and that matters had not been resolved despite the best efforts of conciliators like Attakullakulla, trade with the Cherokees was suspended by both Virginia and South Carolina. A delegation of Cherokees traveled to Charles Town to appeal for the reopening of this trade, but despite their peaceful overtures the diplomats were taken captive and brought to Fort Prince George. Attakullakulla negotiated for the release of a handful of these captives, but the remainder were refused the option to atone for their own crimes by fighting the French. These offenses were the breaking point for many Cherokees, who enacted a plan to lure out the fort's commander under peaceful pretenses and subsequently killed him. The remainder of the hostages were then executed, and peace was no longer an option.[21]

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[20] "Conference with Cherokees about Recent Quarrels and Renewal of Peace," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 235-238.
[21] "Cherokee Hostility to English and Suspension of Trade," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 239-240; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 19.

Attakullakulla's continued advocacy for making amends with the British remained steadfast despite the increasing unpopularity of his position. His commitment to this end endangered both his reputation and his life. During a Cherokee siege against Fort Loudon in the summer of 1760, Attakullakulla secretly supplied the besieged British garrison before its eventual capitulation. Following this, the Cherokee diplomat ransomed the captive John Stuart, who would soon become the Southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs, and safely conveyed him back to South Carolina. His efforts to not only keep the peace but to indeed aid the Cherokees' present enemies did not go unnoticed by his peers, both at home and among the colonies. Sacrificing his influence and his position within the Cherokee council, Attakullakulla buttressed his standing among his British brothers.[22]

Successful colonial campaigns against many Lower and Middle towns had taken considerable tolls on the Cherokees by 1761, and many of those who formerly advocated for war were ready for peace. Attakullakulla's good standing with the British made him a perfect candidate to negotiate an end to the war, which facilitated a return to influence among the Cherokees for the unrelenting conciliator. Deputed by the Cherokees to lead an envoy to Charles Town, Attakullakulla was instrumental in concluding the conflict on amicable terms. Suing for peace on behalf of all the Cherokees, his request was granted, owing in no small part to his conduct throughout the course of the war. With peace officially restored by January 1762, trade could be resumed.[23]

[22] "Charles-Town, October 4," *The South-Carolina Gazette,* October 4, 1760; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 20; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 121-122.
[23] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 125-127; Henry Timberlake, *Liet. Henry Timberlake's Memoirs 1756-1765,* ed. Samuel Cole Williams (Marietta: Continental Book Company, 1948), 36-37, footnote 15; "Instructions to Commissioners to Redeem Prisoners from Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 245-246.

“Long have I wished to see the king:” The 1762 Cherokee Delegation

Following successful negotiations to end the war, Cherokee leaders, including Attakullakulla, thought it necessary for a British officer to visit several Cherokee towns to further solidify the restored peace. They acquainted this desire to a British encampment of soldiers in November of 1761, expressing that such an act would convince the whole of the Cherokees of the “sincerity” of the British. Agreeing with the Cherokees that their idea was sound, anxieties were still high regarding the safety of such a mission. Volunteering himself for this task, Lieutenant Henry Timberlake spared his commanding officer from the uncomfortable position of having to order a subordinate “on so dangerous a journey.” Timberlake proceeded into the Cherokees’ country without delay.[24]

Ostenaco, an Overhill headman of Tomotley, took a keen interest in Timberlake when he arrived there in December of 1761. Contemporaries and historians alike have noted the rivalry between Ostenaco and Attakullakulla and have stressed their mutual opposition in explaining Ostenaco’s own diplomatic efforts. Roughly the same age and both hailing from the Overhill towns, the two men certainly knew each other well. By the time of Timberlake’s visit to their region, they were noted to be the leaders of opposing factions. Their supposed animosity did not run so deep, however, that it prevented them from cooperating toward similar ends, nor did their political disagreements prevent Ostenaco from worrying over Attakullakulla’s delayed return home from negotiations in South Carolina. It is possible that their opposition stemmed from the Anglo-Cherokee War, when the noted warrior Ostenaco led war parties against the British

[24] Timberlake, *Memoirs,* 38-40.

following his initial efforts to restore peace. Whatever the case may be, following the conclusion of this war, Ostenaco took measures to keep this peace and brighten the chain of friendship.[25]

From their initial encounter, Ostenaco made sure to accompany Timberlake throughout his journey. Showing Timberlake appropriate hospitality, Ostenaco hosted the British officer in his own home before accompanying him to the Overhill town of Chota. During a ceremony to affirm their peace, Ostenaco reminded the other Cherokees present to be good to the British, lest another war break out between them. He concluded his talk by requesting that the Cherokees treat Timberlake with respect. Retiring himself from the ceremonies that evening, he was approached by Ostenaco some hours later with an invitation to another town for a similar reconciliation ceremony. Ostenaco's efforts to include Timberlake in these ceremonies and to remind his peers to treat him well indicates a lingering bitterness toward the Anglo-Americans, and perhaps even Ostenaco's concern that other Cherokees might not heed his requests. Convinced by this point of the necessity of peace, Ostenaco guarded Timberlake under his wing.[26]

Within a few weeks, Ostenaco had not only attached himself to Timberlake's party but had essentially come to dictate his travel itinerary altogether. Receiving word that some Cherokees had been killed by a war party from the north, and that they may have been instigated to do so by the British, Ostenaco kept the lieutenant close by. Unwilling to allow Timberlake to leave until the matter was settled, Ostenaco made excuse after excuse as to why his party could not yet depart, dismaying the increasingly anxious lieutenant. Following a report from the

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[25] Ibid, 95-96, 109; Kate Fullagar, *The Warrior, The Voyager, and the Artist: Three Lives in an Age of Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 79; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 22. Ostenaco was originally slated to accompany the ill-fated Cherokee peace envoy at the start of the Anglo-Cherokee war, but turned back for unknown reasons, see Fullagar, *The Warrior,* 35.
[26] Ibid, 58-62.

recently returned Attakullakulla, who deemed the story false, Ostenaco was finally content to acquiesce to Timberlake's requests to return to Virginia. Resolving to join him on this journey, along with a large contingent of other Cherokees, the party set out from Chota, where Attakullakulla served as headman, by March of 1762. Before their departure, Ostenaco was reminded by the headmen gathered there to press the governor of Virginia to open a trade with them and to be good to the Virginians, "as that was the only way to keep the chain of friendship bright."[27]

Arriving in Williamsburg in early April, Governor Fauquier was annoyed by the number of Cherokees who had come to visit, roughly seventy in total. Nevertheless, he assented to their being hosted by the town, as well as to hold an audience with them. Mindful of the peace that had so recently been concluded between their peoples, the governor inquired about the purpose of their visit. In a conference held in late April, Ostenaco remembered the advice had been given by his peers back in the Overhills country. Reminding the governor of the Cherokees' good intentions, and of the measures that were taken to secure their peace, Ostenaco "hoped now all obstacles are removed they should enjoy a Trade from hence." Expressing his own goodwill, Fauquier assured Ostenaco that he would encourage Virginia's merchants to conduct business with the Cherokees, and prepared a wampum belt, along with a letter, to be returned with the Cherokees. His official business concluded, Ostenaco was set to return home in a few days with a number of gifts for himself and his countrymen.[28]

[27] Ibid, 105-117.

[28] Ibid, 129-130; "Governor Fauquier to Board of Trade about 'Visit of Peace' by Cherokee Leader," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 253; "Governor and Council Confer with Cherokee Leaders," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 254-256.

Ostenaco kept his crucial objective concealed up to this point. At a dinner with Timberlake and others at the College of William and Mary, Ostenaco intimated his desire to venture to London to meet the king himself. Pondering a portrait of King George III, Ostenaco remarked that "Long have I wished to see the king my father… I am determined to see him myself." The headman was obstinate that he would not leave Williamsburg until he had achieved this end. Made privy to Ostenaco's request before being formally asked, the governor was advised to deter him with warnings of the perils of the journey, the potential of illness, and the detrimental effects Ostenaco's demise might bring upon the Cherokees. The headman retorted that he did not fear the ocean, nor any illness for that matter. Attakullakulla had made the journey before and returned healthy, perhaps Ostenaco was contented by this fact. If he did fear for his life, he must have thought his mission worthy of the risk. He assured his hosts that, should anything happen to him, the Cherokees would have only him to blame, given that the journey was his idea alone and was not sanctioned by the Cherokees as a whole.[29]

The headman's true motives for making such a risky journey were almost certainly multifaceted. Ostenaco's political rivalry with Attakullakulla appears to have been one motivation for his desire to see the king himself. Ostenaco would have been acquainted with Attakullakulla's propensity to predicate his talks with an acknowledgement of his being "the only Cherokee now alive who was in England or that saw the Great King George." After all, his contemporary often attempted to use this status and his experience in Britain for political leverage. Citing his political rival as a particular impetus for his desire to go himself, Ostenaco solicited "permission to go to England to see the great King his Father, and judge whether the

[29] Timberlake, *Memoirs,* 130; "Governor and Council Confer with Cherokee Leaders," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 256-257.

Little Carpenter had not told [the Cherokees] lies." Having heard Attakullakulla's testimonies about his time in Britain for years by this point, Ostenaco probably did harbor some curiosities, and doubts, about what had been reported to him.[30]

Ostenaco would have also been properly familiar with the positive effects that resulted from the Cherokee delegation that preceded his own. The diplomats of 1730 had returned with the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, and though breaches of that treaty had been committed by both sides, the signatory parties had taken serious care to adhere to their own interpretations of the agreement. In times of war, the British proved to be dangerous enemies, but if kept as friends, their alliance could yield defensive and commercial advantages for the Cherokees. Most importantly, the recent war with the British colonies inflicted a serious toll on the Cherokees, and considering this it is not unreasonable to think that Ostenaco was also motivated by the earnest desire to restore their friendship. After several years of destructive conflict, peace was desirable to leaders who wished to focus on rebuilding. As Ostenaco's message to King George III, as well as his actions following his envoy suggest, it was time to look inward, toward Cherokee country, rather than outward. Lasting peace was his major objective.[31]

Ostenaco's request was granted, but unfortunately fate stymied any possibility for meaningful discussion between the Cherokee delegates and their hosts. Departing from Williamsburg in May of 1762, the envoy consisted of Ostenaco and two other Cherokees he selected to join him. The headman prepared and rehearsed the speech he intended to deliver to the king, communicating its contents to their appointed interpreter in advance of their meeting in

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[30] "Conversation Between Governor Glen and Little Carpenter," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII,* 300; "Governor Fauquier to Board of Trade about Ostenaco's Plans to Visit England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 254-256.
[31] Duane H. King, ed., *The Memoirs of Lt. Henry Timberlake: The Story of a Soldier, Adventurer, and Emissary to the Cherokees, 1756-1765* (Cherokee, North Carolina: Museum of the Cherokee Indian Press, 2007), 147.

Britain. Tragedy struck during their voyage, however, as the Cherokees' interpreter succumbed to an illness he had contracted prior to their departure. Coupled with Timberlake's infirm grasp of the Cherokee language, this death significantly frustrated their communication. If Timberlake had not been acquainted with the gist of Ostenaco's message before the interpreter died, any accurate communication would have been very challenging.[32]

Arriving at their destination by mid-June, Ostenaco was outwardly relieved to have made it to Britain safely. But just as his voyage there had been marred by misfortunes and seasickness, so too would his visit be made uncomfortable by the throngs of spectators who flocked to his side wherever he went. Uncomfortable with the amount of attention they received daily from the people of London, the Cherokee diplomats made frequent requests to be taken to "some public diversion," so as to take their mind off their stressful environment. These outings, though perhaps amusing at times, were not the object of their mission. Anxious to meet with the king, the Cherokees felt confused as to why it was taking so long to organize a meeting with him. Contented upon learning that the king was recovering from an illness, the diplomats nonetheless felt "displeased" with the current state of affairs.[33]

After several weeks of waiting, the Cherokees were finally able to have their audience with the king in early July. Dressed in regal outfits of blue, scarlet, and gold, complimented by their face and body paints, the Cherokee diplomats spent an hour and a half speaking with the king. Ostenaco communicated his message of peace to his royal audience through Timberlake's rough translations, and in a more accurate translation sent to the king upon the Cherokees' return home. Less noted for his oratory abilities than his contemporary, Attakullakulla, Ostenaco got

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[32] Ibid, 56-58.
[33] Ibid, 59-62; "Postscript," *St. James's Chronicle or the British Evening Post,* July 29-31, 1762. Upon arrival at Plymouth, Ostenaco's "solemn dirge" sung in gratitude for his safe arrival attracted many spectators.

straight to the point. There would be no more war between the Cherokees and the British, proclaimed Ostenaco, and he would see to it himself that justice be done should any Cherokee breach their peace treaties. He informed the king that Cherokee women were "breeding children night and day to increase our people," and that their children would be taught not to make war against the British. Ostenaco must have suspected that the king knew of the devastation in much of the Cherokees' country, and perhaps this comment served as a way to assert that the Cherokees were quickly recuperating. Concluding his talks, Ostenaco stated that he was now set on returning home.[34]

Though their talks were mired for the want of an adequate interpreter, Ostenaco nonetheless came away from this exchange feeling mostly satisfied by what he had accomplished. Weary from years of war, his talks concerned only the profound subject of peace. His business in Britain concluded, the headman now wished to return home so that he might play a part in the maintenance of that peace. Worries surrounding the attitudes of other Cherokee leaders toward the British preoccupied Ostenaco's mind, and the headman was ready to return home and continue his efforts. This would not occur until late August 1762, when the three Cherokee delegates were able to depart for North America. The shortest of any of the southeastern Indigenous embassies in Britain, the 1762 delegation returned home after two months abroad.[35]

Changing Conditions: The Twilight of the Anglo-Cherokee Alliance

[34] "Conference of Governor Boone and the Council with Osteneco (Judd's Friend) about his Visit to England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 201; Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and diversity in Native American communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 182.
[35] Ibid, 201-202; King, *Memoirs of Lt. Henry Timberlake,* 72-73.

Ostenaco returned home in November of 1762 and related his experiences to his Cherokee peers. Only a few months later, in March of the following year, officials in Charles Town received a translation of a talk delivered by Attakullakulla on behalf of the rest of the Overhill Cherokees in response to Ostenaco's diplomatic mission. He was happy to communicate that the messages brought by Ostenaco from Britain were well received, and that they would remember them in conjunction with his own message from the previous king over thirty years prior. Unsurprisingly, his attention quickly turned toward the resumption of trade. Despite assurances from the previous fall that traders would be sent into the Overhills, none had come, and Attakullakulla politely pressed his counterparts in Charles Town to fulfill past promises and send merchants into his towns. He reminded them of the Cherokees' loyalty to the Anglo-Cherokee alliance against their mutual French and Indigenous enemies, and of their recently concluded peace with the Mvskoke. Now that relations were in good order, Attakullakulla expected that a healthy trade could finally resume.[36]

With the conclusion of the Seven Years' War in 1763 came worries throughout eastern North America concerning the future. Britain's formal acquisition of French and Spanish lands to the east of the Mississippi produced questions among the empire's administrators regarding how Indigenous peoples would react to the impending changes. Anticipating unrest, colonial governors decided that a pan-Indigenous conference be hosted by representatives from several of Britain's southeastern colonies to acquaint their Indigenous allies of their continued desire to "live in Peace and brotherly Friendship together." In other words, they wanted their Indigenous allies to understand that the British did not aim to make war against them or to "possess and

[36] "Talks of the Cherokee Headmen to Governor Boone and the Council about their Loyalty to the English," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 203-205.

enjoy their Lands." Assembling representatives from the Cherokee, Mvskoke, and other southeastern tribes, the diplomats convened in Augusta, Georgia in early November 1763. Among the six Overhill Cherokee representatives were Attakullakulla and Ostenaco.[37]

The message presented by the colonies' representatives was simple: the war was over, the French and the Spanish were gone, and the tribes had nothing to worry about. So long as all parties agreed to "act like friends and brothers," then traders could happily live among and supply the various Indigenous groups, and the colonial governments would be friendly toward their allies. The officials hoped that the diversity of imperial representation would serve as testimony to their concerted policy.[38]

Sincere intentions for the establishment and maintenance of peace between the assembled parties characterized much of the Indigenous response to the talks offered by the governors. These stated objectives are unsurprising given that all the people represented in this conference were affected by the Seven Years' War. It was time to rebuild for many people. But two key issues were raised by various Indigenous leaders, Attakullakulla standing out among them with the length of his talk. These were concerns regarding the encroachment of lands and the proper carrying out of trade. To the latter point, Attakullakulla first addressed the colonial representatives, in which he expressed his hopes that South Carolina would reopen its trade with the Overhill Cherokees, as he found the prices set by Virginia's traders to be far too high. Nonetheless, he hoped that, as the king had promised him goods decades prior, each of the

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[37] "Earl of Egremont to Governor Dobbs about the Augusta Conference," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 205-206; "Journal of the Congress at Augusta with the Indians," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 281-282; Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 261.
[38] Ibid, 281-284.

governors would send a handful of traders to the Cherokees. Turning his attention toward the other Indigenous groups present at the conference, he requested that, in the name of peace, they "remove the blocks that may obstruct the path" to and from his town of Chota. As a show of good faith, he assured the Mvskokes there that the Cherokees would forgive and forget their having killed several Cherokee hunters earlier in the year.[39]

Regarding commercial relations, Attakullakulla and the Overhill Cherokees' objectives remained consistent with their understanding of Articles of Friendship and Commerce made over thirty years prior. Defense of their lands, too, remained a critical point. These defensive concerns were significantly readjusted, however, by the time of the Augusta Conference. The French and their Indigenous allies were no longer encroaching upon the Cherokees, rather the Anglo-American settlers were the greatest cause of their concern. Attakullakulla wished to prevent any further settlement nearer to the Cherokees. His fears not only centered on the potential for conflict between the Cherokees and the settlers, but also the potential to lose economically critical hunting grounds. Unfortunately for the Cherokees, the governors were unwilling to meet Attakullakulla's demands. They suggested that perhaps the Cherokees offered too little in payment for goods, which amounted to there being fewer traders among them. As to the issue of land, they disagreed with Attakullakulla in his assertion that several Anglo-American settlements extended beyond the established boundaries. Instead, they offered their promises that should any further encroachments occur beyond the fixed borders, the Cherokees could apply to the governors to have the settlers removed. The Cherokee representatives departed from Augusta that

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[39] Ibid, 287-290.

November in 1763 having signed a new treaty, but without the advancements they hoped to obtain.[40]

Attakullakulla was concerned by this failure to firmly secure the Cherokees' borders and obtain the desired traders among the Overhills. Unsatisfied with the proceedings of the Augusta Conference, within weeks after its conclusion he applied to the governor of South Carolina to be sent on an envoy to Britain. He must have been thinking back to the diplomatic mission of his youth, from which he returned home with a solemn treaty that had bound the Cherokees and the British to one another and had assured the Cherokees easy access to European goods. King George II had entered into this agreement with him, and Attakullakulla sought to ensure that his successor honored it. To his disappointment, his request was swiftly denied by his counterparts within the colony as well as those across the ocean. Always one to explore whatever options were available, his application to Virginia several months later for the same purpose was also denied. By 1764, imperial officials no longer saw the need for hosting any Indigenous delegations to Britain.[41]

The chain of friendship was not completely gone, however. Both Cherokee and colonial officials endeavored to adhere to their treaties, even in the wake of disaster. In May of 1765, backcountry settlers attacked a party of Cherokees traveling to Winchester, Virginia, in which five Cherokees were killed. Remembering that such indiscriminate violence ignited war between themselves and the Cherokees less than a decade prior, Virginia's officials scrambled to make

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[40] Ibid, 290, 294-299; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 133-134.
[41] "Governor Boone to the Earl of Halifax about the Request of Little Carpenter and Oconostata to visit England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 209-210; "Denial by the Earl of Halifax of the Cherokee Request to visit England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 211; "Governor Fauquier to Board of Trade about Desire of Other Cherokees to Visit England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 307.

things right, fearful that the Cherokees might fall upon their frontiers. Sending word to the Cherokees that measures had been taken to capture the guilty persons, who were in no way sanctioned by the government, Governor Fauquier hoped that the Cherokee headmen would understand.[42]

Assuming his role as mediator yet again, Attakullakulla made the trip to Williamsburg "to make what was crooked, strait." Unlike his largely unsupported overtures through the course of the Anglo-Cherokee War, Attakullakulla informed the governor that he had been "sent here by his Nation." That the headmen appointed a diplomat to settle affairs without bloodshed suggests the Cherokees' general inclination by 1765 toward keeping peace with the Anglo-Americans despite traditional obligations to seek revenge for lost clan members. Furthermore, the decision to send Attakullakulla for this purpose is indicative of the Cherokees' understanding of his personal standing with their colonial allies. Receiving promises that gifts would be sent to the grieving relations of the murdered individuals, Attakullakulla was confident that the governor's apologies would appease those affected. After another dismissed attempt at obtaining passage to Britain, Attakullakulla departed for home. He was obligated to take the long way, through North Carolina, because intelligence arrived that an armed mob of forty backcountry settlers were waiting to ambush him upon his return passage. The settlers' disregard for imperial policy and their Cherokee neighbors became the paramount issue.[43]

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[42] "Colonel Lewis to Governor Fauquier About Murder of Cherokees," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 310-311; "Governor Fauquier to Cherokee Chiefs about Murders," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 314-315.

[43] "Little Carpenter Meets in Williamsburg 'To Make What Was Crooked, Strait,'" in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 319-320. The families of the murdered individuals reportedly never received satisfaction for their losses, see "Superintendent Stuart's Journal of the Proceedings at the Cherokee Treaty of Hard labor," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 281.

Land encroachment became the premier political crisis for the Cherokees in the years preceding the American Revolution. Where once the issue of trade dominated the political dealings of Cherokee diplomats like Attakullakulla and Ostenaco, now the negotiation and renegotiation of boundaries between themselves and Anglo-American settlers took precedence. Roughly a decade prior, violent offenses and disregard of established boundaries were enough to push many of the Cherokees to favor war with their British allies. By the late 1760s, however, fatigue from conflict, repeated seasons of poor hunts, and unreliable trade with the colonies, had convinced many Cherokee leaders that a different approach was needed to alleviate the worsening situation. Recognizing that many of these issues stemmed from or were amplified by border strife, elder Cherokee leaders turned to land cessions in attempts to address these situations.[44]

Attakullakulla and Ostenaco both endorsed this policy, but not without reluctance. Looking back on his audience with King George III during boundary negotiations in 1767, Ostenaco cited the king's wishes that neither the Cherokees nor the Anglo-American settlers "encroach on the other," as they should live separately in peace under the king. Unsatisfied with the payment they received for the land cession, "which soon wear out but Land lasts always," Ostenaco nonetheless hoped that this negotiation, like the others that preceded and followed it, would put an end to the Cherokees' worries regarding settler abuses.[45]

Attakullakulla's negotiations at the 1770 Treaty of Lochaber took the critiques of Ostenaco a step further. He remarked that it felt as though Anglo-American settlements were

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[44] Colin G. Calloway, *Pen & Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in American Indian History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 91-92; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 145-146.
[45] "Cherokees' Reply to Governor Tryon," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 252-254; "Exchange of Talks between Judd's Friend (Osteneca) and the North Carolina Boundary Commission," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 256-257.

right at the Cherokees' doorsteps, and that the game they once hunted was now scarce as the newcomers drove it all away. Attakullakulla recalled the negotiations of his youth with the previous king, in which cheap goods were promised, "but now goods are much dearer… now all our Talks are about Lands." Another headman complained that invaders were not only diminishing their food supply by hunting deer on their lands but were also threatening to kill the Cherokees when they endeavored to put a stop to it. A further cession of land was made in order to dispel "all Cause of Dispute" regarding the encroachments.[46]

The reconciliatory stances taken by leaders like Attakullakulla and Ostenaco failed to appease the encroaching settlers. As Attakullakulla himself noted at the Treaty of Lochaber, the conditions had changed. Land, rather than trade, was the principal interest of their counterparts at the other end of the chain of friendship. By the 1770s, years of boundary negotiations that amounted to little more than further aggravations convinced many Cherokees, especially the younger generation of leaders, that accommodation was no longer viable. One such leader was Dragging Canoe, who did not hide his disapproval of the cession of lands. The son of Attakullakulla, Dragging Canoe grew up within the framework of the Anglo-Cherokee alliance and the fruits of his father's diplomatic efforts. To Dragging Canoe, these fruits were spoiled. In March of 1775, the younger headman admonished his elders, including his father, for their accommodationist treaties, and reminded them that the younger Cherokees had a mind to restore their lands. Withdrawing himself from the negotiations early, he did not affix his mark to the resulting treaty.[47]

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[46] "Journal of Proceedings at Treaty of Lochaber," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* 364-368.
[47] "Deposition of John Reid in Opposition to the Cherokee Treaty of March 1775," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIV,* 365; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 156-157.

This breakdown in the faith of the compromising policies of elder Cherokees toward settlers coincided with the onset of the American Revolution, which saw the splintering of Cherokee country into factions favoring neutrality or war against the Americans. Seizing the opportunity to drive the settlers out of Cherokee lands, Dragging Canoe led the pro-war faction in siding with the loyalists in their cause against the rebels. An alliance of convenience, the younger headman was content for the time being to cooperate with loyalist forces as it suited his desire to be rid of the troublesome backcountry settlers. Dragging Canoe and other militant leaders launched their attacks in the summer of 1776, which culminated in their repulse and eventually devastating counterattacks that razed dozens of Cherokee towns throughout several regions. Prompted by heavy losses, Cherokees in favor of continuing their struggle against the Americans established new towns to the west.[48]

As Dragging Canoe and other like-minded Cherokees removed westward, away from the Americans, Attakullakulla and Ostenaco served as some of the primary figures involved in signing peace treaties with the Americans. Attakullakulla reportedly pledged to send warriors against the Southern Loyalists. Not to be taken for genuine turncoats, both men seem to have been acting more out of desperation to stop the destruction. Soon after these negotiations, Ostenaco relocated among Dragging Canoe's newly established Cherokee towns along Chickamauga Creek. An older man by this point, he had likely had enough fighting, but his storied experience regarding settler invasions likely informed his difficult decision to abandon his home in the Overhills. For Attakullakulla's part, the last record made of him was of a pledge

[48] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 157-162.

to Superintendent Stuart in early 1778 to send warriors against the Americans, echoing his earlier years of exploring all available options.[49]

The Chain of Friendship Eclipsed by Land

At the apex of its functionality, between the 1730s and mid-1750s, the Anglo-Cherokee alliance centered on trade. Differing interpretations of how that trade was to be conducted made it impossible to truly define what was expected of either party and indeed the alliance faltered on more than one occasion due to this disconnect. But for the larger part of this period the alliance was guided by the efforts of diplomats on both sides who looked to its foundations across the Atlantic Ocean during good and bad times. The act of transatlantic diplomacy provided a solemn agreement with which the Cherokees could hold their allies to account. Despite the occasional failure of this course of action, a generation of Cherokee leaders enjoyed several diplomatic successes as a result of their holding their end of the chain of friendship. Guided in their interests to secure commercial benefits from their British allies, Cherokee leaders like Attakullakulla cited this treaty for decades following its enactment to legitimize their authority and their demands that Britain make good on its promises.

Following the Anglo-Cherokee War, however, irreconcilable differences emerged that could not be quelled by even the most earnest upholders of the Articles of Friendship and Commerce of 1730. Defined since then by their commercial ties, by the 1760s the issue of land took precedence over trade. Seemingly well-intentioned imperial officers fatally juxtaposed with Anglo-American settlers, whose growing interest in westward expansion could not be abated by the flurry of treaties ratified on their heels. Cherokee leaders of the older generation sought

[49] Fullagar, *The Warrior,* 124-126; Kelly, "Attakullakulla," 26-27.

through a few final and futile attempts to polish the chain of friendship and hearken back to their alliance established over forty years prior by the onset of the American Revolution. But a decade of unsubstantiated accommodationist policies convinced many of the younger Cherokees that their allies could not be soundly relied upon. The militant Cherokees' cooperation with the British in the early years of the revolution served only as a temporary means to a desired end: to rid their borders of aggressive Anglo-American settlers.[50]

The middle third of the eighteenth century was a period of diplomatic opportunity for the Cherokees. Utilizing their commercial ties to Britain's southeastern colonies, Cherokee headmen secured a profitable trade and assurances of assistance in times of war—invaluable boons to any group in the ever-volatile eighteenth century North American Southeast. Both parties within the alliance had proven that they could not wholly be relied upon for these agreements, but for over three decades the alliance stood relatively firm. What ultimately proved to be the alliance's undoing, however, was the growing separation between imperial policy and colonial practice. No longer able to hold their allies accountable to their promises to supply the Cherokees with "all Kinds of Goods." By the 1770s, the age of Attakullakulla and Ostenaco's diplomacy was over.[51]

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[50] Calloway, *Pen & Ink Witchcraft,* 9.
[51] Thursday, A.M., the 5th day of July, 1753," *Colonial Records of South Carolina, I,* 439.

Conclusion: The Influence of Indigenous Transatlantic Diplomacy, 1730-1775

Southeastern North America could be a dizzying environment for anyone not versed in the complicated alliance networks that characterized the area during the eighteenth century. As newcomers and inhabitants since time immemorial sought to make sense of one another, a myriad of opportunities and dangers presented themselves to all peoples throughout the region. Considering the politically diverse nature of the Southeast during this period, skilled diplomats with far-reaching connections had the potential to wield considerable sway within their communities. Indigenous leaders were conscious of these realities, as well as of the options available to them. Individuals like Attakullakulla and Tomochichi understood this space better than anyone else, both of whom were properly acquainted with the risks and rewards that could be expected from diplomatic commitments.[1]

Deeply invested in the future of their homes, these diplomats endeavored to strengthen their communities through establishing ties to Britain and obligating themselves to one another. Earlier in the century, Indigenous delegates took advantage of the ambitions of imperial agents, sanctioned or not, who harbored their own vested interests in sponsoring a transatlantic delegation. Once in Britain, far from approaching these journeys as favors to their escorts, these diplomats seized the opportunity to negotiate with their metropolitan counterparts. Confirming alliances through composite rituals of Indigenous and European treaty-making, the delegates utilized their strengthened relationships with Britain to leverage their positions as influential diplomats towards acquiring benefits at home.

[1] Jack P. Greene, "Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and American Worlds," *The Journal of Southern History 73,* no. 3 (August 2007): 526-529.

Personal objectives varied, but two common interests existed between the voyagers of the 1730s. The first concerned the establishment and fair regulation of profitable trade with Britain's colonies. The procurement of goods at affordable prices and agreement upon regulating trade constituted significant policy goals of these leaders, who assumed the responsibility as a gateway between the people they represented and foreigners. Bringing in goods not only underscored their abilities as headmen but comprised an essential function of their position vis-à-vis their communities. In many ways a continuation of tradition regarding southeastern Indigenous leadership duties, the opportunities for acquiring such goods and an open trade, available through transatlantic pathways, presented aspiring influential figures with a new avenue to accomplish similar feats. These continuities and adaptations help explain just how these Indigenous diplomats conceptualized the potential of their ventures.[2]

The second common policy goal of transatlantic Indigenous diplomats was bolstering their defenses through alliance with Britain. Fresh memories of violent struggles like the Yamasee War (1715-1718) and the ignition of a decades-long conflict between the Cherokees and the Mvskoke informed the actions of these leaders. Making allies of a strong regional power could help prevent such occurrences again, at least at home. Indigenous diplomats made sure to highlight their military commitments to one another in such foundational treaties as the Articles of Friendship and Commerce of 1730 and hearkened back to these assurances for years afterward. Both the Cherokees and the Yamacraw viewed alliances with the British as potential lines of defense against Indigenous and European enemies.[3]

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[2] Jessica Yirush Stern, *The Lives in Objects: Native Americans, British Colonists, and Cultures of Labor and Exchange in the Southeast* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 45.

[3] William L. Ramsey, *The Yamasee War: A Study of Culture, Economy, and Conflict in the Colonial South* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 1-2; Tyler Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation: Town, Region, and Nation among Eighteenth-Century Cherokees* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 2011), 57-59; "Answer of

For the Yamacraw, their remarkable influence as a diasporic community ceased following the deaths of two of their most prominent transatlantic diplomats. Their position tenuous to begin with, the strength of their diplomacy hinged upon the interpersonal relationships established by Tomochichi and Tooanahowi with James Oglethorpe and the Georgia Trustees. The Yamacraw's policy of holding firm to their alliance with Britain effectively secured their defensive and trade interests throughout the remainder of these two individuals' lives. Tooanahowi's tragically early death in 1744, however, spelled the end of the Yamacraw's time as an influential mediator, and by 1750 the grounds near Savannah on which "those formerly called Yamacraw Indians" once lived was embroiled within a land dispute between the Mvskoke and Georgia. Their more specific goals ultimately unrealized, the 1734 Yamacraw diplomats nonetheless initiated a working relationship between the Mvskoke and Georgia that would continue well beyond the death of Tooanahowi.[4]

For the Cherokees, their alliance with Britain codified within the Articles of Friendship and Commerce of 1730 ushered in a period of cooperation and mutual benefit that endured throughout much of the middle third of the eighteenth century. Despite occasions of communication breakdown, the alliance functioned relatively smoothly from 1730 to the outbreak of the Anglo-Cherokee War (1758-1761). Drawing upon the experience and prestige he acquired in his youth, Attakullakulla consistently invoked the Cherokees' treaty with Britain when it was most conducive to his desires to bring goods to and defend the frontiers of the Overhill Cherokees. His experience in Britain did not permanently wed him to the Anglo-

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the Cherokees to the Proposed Treaty," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 XIII, ,* ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 138-139.

[4] Alden T. Vaughan, *Transatlantic Encounters: American Indians in Britain, 1500-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 161-162; "Stephens and Assistants to Martyn," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789, XI,* 199-200.

Cherokee alliance or to South Carolina, instead keeping his options open for many years following his transatlantic voyage. After this period of exploring other diplomatic avenues, however, he reoriented himself back toward South Carolina and Virginia. Grounding his key interests of trade and, following the Anglo-Cherokee War, peace with the British within the Articles of Friendship and Commerce, Attakullakulla remained a prominent figure up to his death around the year 1780.[5]

Cherokee country as a whole was significantly affected by the developments produced by this diplomacy. Though Anglo-Cherokee relations did not begin with the 1730 delegation and treaty, this year did mark a critical turning point in Cherokee history. Their diplomatic ties to Britain from then onward served to both accentuate regional differences and interests throughout Cherokee country, as well as consolidate a sense of Cherokee identity between these regions through coordinating their foreign policies. Pursuing local interests did not necessarily conflict with promoting a concerted effort within the maintenance of their alliance, and so Cherokee towns embraced these simultaneous changes with seemingly little to no contradiction.[6]

Attakullakulla's policies also initiated a trend among senior Overhill Cherokee leaders to adopt an accommodationist strategy. Ostenaco, a notable contemporary of his, took notice of Attakullakulla's references to his time in Britain. Taking the initiative in the aftermath of the Anglo-Cherokee War to venture to Britain and further confirm the recently concluded peace, Ostenaco was fully aware that Attakullakulla leveraged his status as a transatlantic Cherokee diplomat for influence at home. His decision to press for his own embassy to London is demonstrative of his recognition of transatlantic negotiations as a potent diplomatic strategy.

[5] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 113, 121; James C. Kelly, "Notable Persons in Cherokee History: Attakullakulla," *Journal of Cherokee Studies* 3, no. 1 (Winter 1978): 28-29.
[6] Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 33-34.

Inspired by the precedent from over thirty years prior, Ostenaco's top priority was to confirm to King George III that he would do everything he could to prevent the outbreak of another war between the Cherokees and the colonists. His transatlantic envoy embodied the addition of accommodationist policies to the Cherokees' diplomacy, which continued into the American Revolution. Ceding lands to secure their frontiers but failing to achieve these ends, the shortcomings of this policy convinced a younger generation of Cherokees that their Anglo-American allies could no longer be relied upon to act in good faith. By the time of Ostenaco's death around the year 1780, many Cherokees had taken up arms against the Americans and subsequently relocated westward. Ostenaco went with them.[7]

This decline in the ability to cooperate mirrored similar developments between colonial governments and their settlers. Supporters of the American Revolution considered colonial officials' willingness to deal with Indigenous allies to be one of their greatest offenses, and their disdain for this practice was a principal unifying force for the rebellious thirteen colonies. As Indigenous and imperial officials alike made efforts to strengthen their ties, their mutual failure to obligate frontier settlers to adhere to the agreements of their alliances made the diplomacy of Attakullakulla, Tomochichi, and Ostenaco's generations all but impossible by the 1770s.[8]

The middle of the eighteenth century was a time of diplomatic opportunities and pitfalls in the North American Southeast. Exploring new options as they became available in the interests of their own communities, Cherokee and Yamacraw diplomats took full advantage of

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[7] "Governor Fauquier to Board of Trade about Ostenaco's Plans to Visit England," in *Early American Indian Documents: Treaties & Laws, 1607-1789 V,* ed. W. Stitt Robinson (Bethesda: University Publications of America, 2001), 254-256; Boulware, *Deconstructing the Cherokee Nation,* 157-162; Kate Fullagar, *The Warrior, The Voyager, and the Artist: Three Lives in an Age of Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), 125-126.
[8] Robert G. Parkinson, *Thirteen Clocks: How Race United the Colonies and Made the Declaration of Independence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2021), 2-3.

transatlantic pathways. Rather than tagging along in these ventures as passive participants in Britain's alliance-making system, these diplomats had their own objectives in mind when boarding their oceanic transports. From 1730 through the end of the Seven Years' War, these leaders worked to maintain both balance and strength within the diversely contested Southeast. The web of alliance networks comprised of Indigenous and European powers provided checks and balances that obligated mutual dependency. However, following 1763, the removal of key foes from the continent altered the playing field. As older Indigenous leaders attempted to uphold the diplomacy that had maintained and enhanced their positions for decades, a growing rift within their imperial ally over these practices made it increasingly difficult to continue as before. Jaded from repeated disappointments through this diplomacy by the 1770s and the loss of significant swathes of territory, the successors to the transatlantic diplomats were ready to try something new. Many Indigenous groups of the Southeast and the Eastern Woodlands saw militant opposition as the most viable solution to halt settler incursions, resulting in a period of conflict between pan-Indigenous alliance networks and the United States that would last into the next century.[9]

The significance of Indigenous transatlantic diplomats extended beyond the personal and local conditions that prompted their journeys. Individual diplomats enjoyed the fruits of their labors for varying degrees of time, though in the long run their visions for alliances with Britain fell short of perpetuity. Their efforts, however, influenced changes within Indigenous communities that reflected core understandings of their missions. By representing essentially whole nations abroad, the diplomats participated in the gradual consolidation of the interests of a

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[9] Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1775-1815* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), xviii; Gary B. Nash, *The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America* (New York: Viking Press, 2005), 12-13.

plethora of regional identities. These regional identities by no means ceased to exist or diminished so drastically through this period that they did not continue to play crucial roles in the political sphere, but these identities were increasingly united by overarching interests brought about in large part by this diplomacy. While considering their own localized objectives, the diplomats were cognizant of the fact that their actions abroad had wider impacts outside of the purview of their towns.

Though their diplomatic achievements with Britain lost much of their potency by the final quarter of the eighteenth century, the legacy of their policies continued into succeeding generations of leaders. The importance of long-standing personal connections to these delegations becomes crucial in this respect, to which the deaths of two of the Yamacraw's principal negotiators within ten years of their journey and their subsequent dissolution can attest. For the Cherokee, the legacies of Attakullakulla and Ostenaco's missions were more pronounced due in large part to their continued presence in the political sphere. Their policies spawned two distinct political camps by the 1770s within Cherokee country. The first continued the neutral, accommodationist strategies adopted later in life by their oceanic voyagers, desirous of maintaining peace at high costs after several years of destructive conflict. The second, being those who relocated along Chickamauga Creek, adopted a militant stance regarding Anglo-American encroachment. Nonetheless, this latter group's strategies were influenced by their predecessors' diplomatic outreach. The difference, however, lies in the target of their policies. Instead of looking toward the coast and across the Atlantic Ocean for allies, as Attakullakulla and

others had once before, leaders like Dragging Canoe directed their attention within North America, toward a pan-Indigenous alliance.[10]

[10] Jamie Myers Mize, "'To Conclude a General Union' Masculinity, the Chickamauga, and Pan-Indian Alliances in the Revolutionary Era," *Ethnohistory 68,* no. 3 (July 2021): 430, 438-439.

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