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Report

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REPORT

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REPORT

WEST POINT UNDERGRADUATE HISTORICAL REVIEW VOLUME 2, ISSUE 1; FALL 2011

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ABOUT THE REVIEW

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The cadet editorial staff is pleased to present the second issue of *Report*. Founded last spring, the journal seeks to provide a creative outlet for exemplary cadets whose work is unique in scope, skill, and ambition, encouraging the study of history as a medium through which we can better understand our own time. We hope that *Report* furthers West Point's mission of producing creative and thoughtful leaders who can adapt to the challenges that face our army and nation. More so than perhaps ever before, our army relies on extensive cultural awareness, in tandem with conventional military techniques, to meet its challenges. In the words of this fall's Thayer Award recipient, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates: "language, regional and cultural skills are enduring warfighting competencies that are critical to mission readiness in today's dynamic global environment." Successful officers must understand their unique historical setting and appreciate the tremendous weight that their decisions may carry, addressing problems not with ingrained biases but, rather, with as clear and comprehensive an understanding as possible. In the words of our Cadet Prayer, we must simply endeavor "never to be content with a half truth when the whole can be won." It is our hope that *Report* will do justice to our colleagues around the world who already epitomize this maxim.

The following articles reflect this dedication. Natalia Gruenbaum's novel analysis of the Rwandan Genocide reveals the grave consequences of making assumptions about the past in order to shirk one's own responsibility for prior events. Peter Mitchell and Shelton Proctor investigate the intransience of cultural convictions, noting that no popular judgment is eternal. Brian Sears and James Byrn reevaluate such convictions in papers unique to the United States Military Academy: narratives of wartime events that grant credence to subjects who might otherwise have been forgotten. Finally, we present two award-winning senior theses from last year's graduated class, the authors now both serving as lieutenants. Diane Leimbach's study of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II and Thomas Richardson's original work on Joan of Arc exemplify the depth of research and quality of writing that the best of history scholars strive for.

We would like to thank the History Department, led by Colonel Lance Betros, for its continued leadership and financial support that allows cadets each year to pursue their passions and broaden their intellectual horizons.

Steven J. Stringfellow
Editor-in-Chief
West Point, NY

THE MYTH OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE: WESTERN PERCEPTIONS OF AFRICAN TRIBALISM AND ETHNICITY

BY
NATALIA GRUENBAUM

Natalia Gruenbaum is a senior studying International History at the United States Military Academy. She wrote this paper to fulfill her research requirement for a senior faculty course titled Race, Ethnicity, and the Nation. Her thesis will focus on gender and sexual violence during the Rwandan genocide.

Gross international confusion occurred as a result of culturally-skewed reporting, and this constitutes one of the many tragedies of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Headlines for major western newspapers reduced the complex nature of the conflict into simple terms that aligned with cultural bias and implied African primordialism.¹ According to Allan Thompson's *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, foreign correspondents, unable to communicate in the local language and ignorant of Rwandan culture, relied on phrases like "ancient ethnic warfare" and "tribal conflict" to describe the slaughter they witnessed but could not understand. Thompson argues that the international community understood Rwanda as "little more than brutal tribalism [since] words like 'ethnic' or 'tribal'" appeared interchangeably in almost all major news sources.² He suggests that the media "fixated on tribal differences because that reinforced ideas about African primitivism."³ In their rush to publish stories, journalists failed to uncover the root of the conflict and hastily summarized the genocide as the remnants of pre-colonial conflict.⁴ The careless use of terms like "ethnic" and "tribal" played into stereotypes of inherent African weakness and created a discourse for the Rwandan genocide that journalists and historians alike cannot escape. The western media misrepresented the Hutu-Tutsi conflict as ancient or pre-colonial when, in fact, it sprung directly from European racialization practices during the twentieth century which resulted in the creation of a Hutu ethnicity.

¹ See *The New York Times* Archives for a listing of headlines concerning the 1994 Rwandan genocide to include "Terror Convulses Rwandan Capital as Tribes Battle," "Peace Talks a Casualty of Tribal War in Rwandan Capital," and "Tribes Battle for Rwandan Capital." Available at : <http://query.nytimes.com/search>.

² Allan Thomas, *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (London: Pluto, 2007), 265.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 263.

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In the media, the word “tribal” was most often used to describe the Rwandan genocide since it fit nicely into European stereotypes of non-Arab Africa. In his chapter titled “Terminology Chaos,” the political scientist Walker Connor addresses the common misuse of this term and attempts to deliver a clear definition. He explains that, in its application, tribes more closely resemble nations than ethnicities since tribalism “constitute[s] separate nations or potential nations in and by themselves.”⁵ In addition, Connor makes the claim that separate tribes are as psychologically and tangibly different as France and Germany, for example.⁶ According to the Rwandan scholar Peter Uvin, the Hutu and the Tutsi could not qualify as tribes since they “spoke the same language, believed in the same god, shared the same culture, and lived side by side by the time Europeans arrived.”⁷ Even though the contemporary western media perceived the genocide as remnants of “ancient tribal warfare,” the homogeneity of pre-colonial Rwandan society disproves this assumption since clear distinctions between the two groups did not exist.

Although Hutu and Tutsi labels existed prior to colonialism, they indicated class rather than ethnic difference. After the fourteenth century, Hutu and Tutsi developed into labor titles as the state expanded and groups “were incorporated as Hutu if they were predominantly farmers, or as Tutsi if they were predominantly herders, and aristocrats of both ‘groups’ were assimilated and intermarried with the old aristocracy.”⁸ Classification did not hold political implication and the two groups assimilated thoroughly through marriage. The author of “Contested Identities,” Villa Jefremovas, concludes that pre-colonial Rwanda “was never one single coherent unit with two tribes, but rather a state created by conquest and assimilation.”⁹ For tribalism to have existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, it would have required that each group retain its distinctiveness and avoid amalgamation, neither of which occurred. Since ancient Rwanda did not contain two separate tribes with distinct differences, it could not have experienced pre-colonial tribal warfare as journalists in the 1990s reported.

Although anthropologists, social scientists, and historians generally disagree about the specifics of ethnicity, most seem to agree on three essential characteristics: 1) the perception of shared ancestry, 2) perception

⁵ Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 107.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ Peter Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power in Burundi and Rwanda: Different Paths to Mass Violence,” *Comparative Politics* 31, 3rd ser. (1999): 255.

⁸ Villia Jefremovas, “Contested Identities: Power and the Politics of Ethnicity, Ethnography, and History in Rwanda,” *Canadian Anthropology Society* 39.1 (1997): 95.

⁹ *Ibid.*

of similarities, and 3) the perception of a shared historical past.¹⁰ In ethnicity, it is a *sense* of sameness that unites its members and overshadows most differences that may exist.¹¹ Members of an ethnicity choose to overlook internal differences and instead stress shared similarities within the group. Although kinship and similarity are critical to ethnicity, they alone are not enough to maintain the unity of an ethnic group.¹² According to the noted sociologist Max Weber, “[w]here [perceived shared memories] are lacking, or once they cease to exist, the sense of ethnic group membership is absent, regardless of how close the kinship may be.”¹³ The group must remember and reflect on the history that served to develop its ethnicity. If a group forgets or does not share a common history, the members will not understand why such ethnicity was, and remains, critical to the survival and/or success of the group and each of its members.

Ethnicity, like race or gender, serves as a form of group and individual identity. Ethnicity may be ascribed or prescribed and may change for an individual.¹⁴ As the cultural anthropologist Jack Eller explains, a “century of observation has taught us that, while some ethnic groups may indeed be ancient, others are brand new, and not only the groups but also the cultures or traditions, or ‘heritages,’ to which they refer can be of recent vintage.”¹⁵ Ethnicity can be “made and unmade and remade” as perceptions of common descent, similarities, and shared history change.¹⁶ Ethnicity most often emerges amid conflict and serves to designate rewards or sanctions. During periods of peace, ethnic labels may even fade away since “[those] who live in their culture unproblematically tend not to be ethnic.”¹⁷ Once conflict arises, however, new ethnicities or new forms of ancient ethnicities may appear so long as the three criteria apply.

Based on Rwandan oral traditions and written European accounts, it appears that the Tutsi arrived in Rwanda in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.¹⁸ In pre-colonial Rwanda, the Hutu were farmers, the Tutsi were cattle-rearing, and the Twa served as potters and hunters. During this time

¹⁰ Conner, *Ethnonationalism*; Jack David Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict: an Anthropological Perspective on International Ethnic Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1999); Max Weber, “Ethnic Groups,” *New Tribalisms: The Resurgence of Race and Ethnicity*, Michael Hughey, ed. (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Aimable Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham: Ethnicity, Regionalism, and the 1994 Rwandan Genocide* (Lanham, Md.: University of America, 2003); Joane Nagel, “Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture,” *New Tribalisms: The Resurgence of Race and Ethnicity*, Ed. Michael Hughey (New York: New York UP, 1998).

¹¹ Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity to Conflict*, 13.

¹² *Ibid.*, 10.

¹³ Weber, “Ethnic,” 22.

¹⁴ Nagel, “Constructing Ethnicity,” 240.

¹⁵ Eller, *From Culture to Ethnicity*, 15.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹⁸ Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power,” 255.

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“Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa were more social class markers than codified ethnic labels” as flexibility remained.¹⁹ The population of Rwanda became relatively homogenous as the population spoke Kinyarwanda, believed in the same god, shared the same culture, and intermarried.²⁰ Although pre-colonial Rwandan society experienced significant assimilation, inequality between Tutsis and Hutus remained in the form of patron-client relationships within an oligarchic form of government. Clients who received land from a patron chief became known as Hutu while cattle-holding lineages became Tutsi.²¹ In exchange for land, Hutus were required to fulfill obligatory labor service, *uburetwa*, in which they worked two out of every five days for the patron. Although a Hutu-Tutsi societal hierarchy existed in pre-colonial Rwanda, no widespread violence erupted unlike during the 1950’s and 1994 when the Hutu majority gained political power.²²

While Hutus and Tutsis encompassed different classes and consequently maintained arguably different cultures, neither qualified as a distinct ethnicity in pre-colonial Rwanda. The African historian, Enid Schildkrout, argues that ethnic groups must have a notion of distinctiveness, which neither group possessed.²³ When the Europeans arrived in the twentieth century, Hutus and Tutsis had assimilated to the point where they fulfilled the criteria for an ethnicity: kinship, similarities, and a common history. In addition, both groups accepted the patron-client relationship relatively peacefully and consequently felt no need for distinguished ethnic boundaries at that point in time. Ethnicity can transcend other identities, including class, so one may argue that in pre-colonial society, Rwandan served as an ethnic identity, incorporating both Hutus and Tutsis.²⁴ Regardless of the conclusion one draws, it is clear that Hutus and Tutsis did not have distinct differences and therefore did not constitute separate ethnic groups before European colonialization.

Rwandan colonialism first began in the early twentieth century under German rule and continued when the Belgians took over in 1912. As Europeans arrived, they observed the patron-client system in Rwanda and concluded that the Tutsi were the natural rulers.²⁵ As white Europeans in the early twentieth century, the Belgians assumed that “wherever in Africa there was evidence of organized state life, there the ruling groups must have come

¹⁹ Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham*, 19.

²⁰ Twagilimana, *The Debris of Ham*, 22; and Uvin, “Ethnicity and Power,” 255.

²¹ Jefremovas, “Contested Identities,” 94-95.

²² Before his assassination in 1994, President Habyarimana was considered a moderate Hutu and rejected extreme anti-Tutsi attitudes. His death allowed more radical members of the government to pursue violent anti-Tutsi policy during a time of economic crisis. *Ibid.*, 97.

²³ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California, 2006), 53.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Jefremovas, “Contested identities,” 96; and Sanders, “The Hamitic Hypothesis,” 530.

from elsewhere.”²⁶ They used the biblical story of Ham to explain Tutsi dominance like earlier Europeans had used it to explain civilization in Egypt.²⁷ The Hamitic thesis allowed European settlers to conceptualize development in African within Victorian-era racial theory. Since Africans were biologically incapable of advancement, Europeans postulated that a non-African race, the Hamitics (of which the Tutsis were members) had long ago invaded and conquered portions of Africa.²⁸ Europeans perceived the Hamitic race as a branch of the Caucasian race and, therefore, biologically superior to native Negros.²⁹ In this way, Europeans were able to rationalize the socioeconomic hierarchy they found in Rwanda within their own racial theory. The Belgians saw a racial/biological divide rather than a social one and forced their perception upon Rwanda through colonial policy.

In order to advance Belgian interest in the region, colonialists used racist policies to change the oligarchic structure to one based on racial superiority. They handpicked those rulers favorable to European exploitation.³⁰ Through institutions like schools, the Catholic Church, and census, Europeans created distinct ethnic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi.³¹ Over a short period of time, these policies created conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi and made ethnic boundaries relevant. As tension mounted, distinctions between Hutu and Tutsi became more important for the distribution of European rewards and sanctions.

Under colonial policy, Hutus developed perceptions of kinship, similarity, and most importantly, of shared history separate from Tutsis. With racialization policies, Hutu and Tutsi became permanent ethnic labels based on lineage rather than socioeconomic status. Over the course of several generations, entire families became composed solely of one ethnicity and this led to the perception of common descent. In addition, ethnic myths served to explain the “social difference” between the Tutsi and Hutu and stressed Hutu kinship stemming from Ham and Gahutu.³² Like kinship, societal similarities created a distinct Hutu culture as a result of colonial exploitation and oppression. Regardless of economic status, each Hutu was required to contribute forced labor, forced crops, and forced sales.³³ These obligations united all Hutus in Rwanda and worked to create the

²⁶ Mahmood Mamdani, . *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 80.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁸ Edith Sanders, “The Hamitic Hypothesis: Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective,” *The Journal of African History* 10.4 (1969), 528.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 526.

³⁰ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, 96.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 87-88.

³² Gahutu was perceived as the mythical ancestor of the Hutu people according to ethnic Rwandan myth. *Ibid.*, 79.

³³ *Ibid.*, 95-96.

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distinctiveness needed for ethnicity. Likewise, oppressive policies established during the colonial period left a strong memory of harsh servitude. Even after some Belgian policies ended, the sociopolitical structure of Rwanda served as a constant reminder of Tutsi domination. As a result of their distinct kinship, similarities, and history of oppression under Tutsi power (with Belgian endorsement), Hutu became an ethnic identity in postcolonial Rwanda.

The western media misunderstood and misrepresented the Rwandan genocide as the remnants of ancient tribalism and pre-colonial warfare. Ignorant of the culture and short on time, journalists described the conflict in terms that aligned with stereotypes of primitive Africa. In reality, however, Hutu and Tutsi never constituted separate tribes prior to colonization. In order to become tribes, Hutus and Tutsis needed distinct differences which they did not acquire until the twentieth century. As a direct result of racist Belgian policy, Hutu and Tutsi did eventually qualify as ethnic labels. Even if one or both of the groups did qualify as ethnic prior to the colonial period, their 1994 ethnicities would have been a new variation.

Only one group needed to develop into an ethnicity to facilitate ethnic violence as it creates an “us against the world” mentality as happened with the Hutu. Postcolonial Rwanda was the first time that Hutus experienced a sense of distinctiveness born from their perceptions of kinship, similarities, and most importantly, shared history of oppression. Consequently, the Hutu ethnicity first appeared in the postcolonial period. Since tribalism and ethnicity did not exist prior to colonization, the 1994 genocide could not be rooted in ancient ethnic and tribal warfare as the western media claimed.

Although eighteen years have passed since the Rwandan genocide, the international community could benefit from reexamining the conflict. In their efforts to alert the international community, journalists oversimplified the issue and excused western inaction. Few westerners were surprised to see further evidence of African brutality and violence, and they consequently rejected any moral obligation to intervene. Upon further study, it becomes clear that Rwanda’s ethnic problems stemmed from European colonialism, rather than from some inherent African weakness. While this may not hold true for all African conflicts, it does challenge scholars, historians, and leaders to reject stereotypes of African tribalism. Instead of picturing face paint and spears, it is these individuals’ responsibility to recognize the complexity and individuality of each conflict. Africa, like Europe and North America, deals with complex issues and deserves careful examination after so many years of thoughtless dismissal.

LUPAE ET LENA: SEXUAL MORALITY IN THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

BY
PETER N. MITCHELL

Peter N. Mitchell is a senior studying International History at the United States Military Academy. He wrote this paper for a course on the History of Ancient Greece and Rome. His interest in classical Rome has been sharpened by recent explorations into the topic by modern entertainment and the multiple corrections that he has had to make to his classmates upon the topic.

The modern view of the Roman attitude towards sex, sensationally documented in such series as “Spartacus: Blood and Sand” and “Rome,” is of lascivious conduct so shocking as to appall and impress the modern viewer with its debauchery. Unfortunately for *Showtime*, the historical evidence about these mores does not support such a perception. It is obvious that the producers of modern television know that sex markets well, and to not take advantage of legendary Roman perversity would be foolish. It would be equally foolish to take these productions at face value, since ancient sources provide proof to the contrary. Although there is generally a common misunderstanding of Roman society as shockingly sexual, due in part to surviving artistic and literary depictions of graphic activity, the Romans did in fact have their own moral standards and sexual mores that kept their society ordered even before the emergence of Christianity. If an accurate depiction of upper-class Roman views toward prostitution and sexual conduct in the Late Republic is made, one can draw further conclusions about the culture that did so much to shape the modern Western World and learn lessons from the challenges they faced regarding the regulation of prostitution and other vices.¹

Justinian's Digest, compiled in the sixth century A.D. of Roman law dating back to the early Principate, classifies prostitutes as *infames*, those who lack reputation (*fames*).² *Infamia* was a vital tool in Roman society for enforcing acceptable behavior, similar to the modern mark of a convicted felon. The loss of *fames* through unsavory behavior resulted in a legal and moral stigma that would deprive the offender of many of her legal

¹ Special care has been taken to distinguish between the upper-class views of sexual morality and the lower-classes, as the more wealthy and educated had the ability to share their perspectives through laws and literature, a luxury the poor could not afford.

² Tribonian, *Corpus Juris Civilis*, Book XXII, Title V, 4.

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privileges.³ Prostitutes, as *infames*, were not allowed to speak on behalf of others in a court of law and were forbidden to bring accusations against others, save in exceptional cases.⁴ This shows the depth to which Roman society despised the activity of prostitutes, leaving them no legal protection in case of any outrages committed against their persons. The scorn with which the populace held these ladies of the night can be seen in their nickname, *lupa*, meaning “she-wolves.”⁵

Seneca describes the woeful condition of the prostitute as a common slave for sale, “Naked she stood on the shore, at the pleasure of the purchaser; every part of her body was examined and felt. Would you hear the result of the sale? The pirate sold her; the pimp bought her, that he might employ her as a prostitute.”⁶ To be seen naked in public in Roman society was a sign of utter degradation, as only slaves were stripped in such a way. To lose one's clothing was to lose all hope of human dignity and control over one's body. Horace speaks of the experience of seeing prostitutes through their sheer silk dresses, “Of the matron, except for the face, nothing is open to your scrutiny unless she is a Catia [prostitute] who has dispensed with her clothing so that she may be felt all over thoroughly, the rest will be hidden. But as for the other, no difficulty there! Through the Koan silk it is as easy for you to see as if she were naked.”⁷ For many Roman writers, prostitution represented the basest form of female existence imaginable. Plautus, in the comedy *Curculio*, mockingly maintained that the prostitute was the *via publica*, the public road that all might trample underfoot.⁸

Pimps (*lena*), both male and female, were shown no clemency in the matter, sentenced to infamy just the same as the girls they exploited. “The occupation of a pimp is not less disgraceful than the practice of prostitution. We designate those women as procuresses who prostitute other women for money.”⁹ Pimping was defined in Roman law by the act of receiving money in a transaction regarding a prostitute. These types of associations with prostitution were looked down upon in Roman society and stigmatized as well. Pimps were solely responsible for the protection and care of their prostitutes, as there was no legal assistance offered for *infames*. “You stood with the prostitutes, you stood decked out to please the public, wearing the

³ This paper chooses to focus on female prostitution. For those interested in the also-common male prostitution, read Amy Richlin, *The Garden of Priapus* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983).

⁴ Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner, *Roman Sexualities* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 66.

⁵ Sarah Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity* (New York: Schocken, 1995), 23.

⁶ Seneca, *Controversiae*. i, 2.

⁷ Koan is an extremely expensive, fine, and transparent silk from the Aegean island of Kos. Horace, *Satires*, I, ii.

⁸ Hallett and Skinner, 82.

⁹ Tribonian, *Corpus Juris Civilis*, Book XXII, Title V, 5-6.

costume the pimp had furnished you.”¹⁰ Whether managing a prostitute’s income, advertising and soliciting customers as they passed by, or simply owning a house in which prostitutes congregated, all were grounds for the loss of *fames* and being forbidden to run for public office, a corresponding loss of privileges shared with actors and gladiators.¹¹ Although the Romans did not want to stop the vast entertainment industries of prostitution, stage plays, or gladiatorial combat, this did not stop them from looking down upon those who chose it as their profession.

Corresponding with these harsh regulations against the selling of sex, the Senate mandated that all prostitutes be registered with the *aedile*, giving her correct name, her age, place of birth, and the pseudonym under which she intended to practice her disreputable profession.¹² The whole process is explained in detail in the comedy *Poenulus* by Plautus. If the young prostitute-applicant appeared to be of a respectable background, the *aedile* would advise her to consider an alternative career. Failing this, the young *lupa* would be registered in the records and receive her *licentia stupri*.¹³ Once recorded, her name could never be removed, remaining an impassible barrier to respectability should her fortunes ever improve.¹⁴ The account is unclear if pimps were mandated to undergo such registration.

We now follow our recently-registered prostitute to her new place of work. Most brothels in ancient Rome, known as *lupanarium*, were exceedingly nasty places, as noted by Horace.¹⁵ Seneca, in addressing a compatriot recently returned from a night of carousing, commented, “You reek still of the soot of the whorehouse,”¹⁶ in reference to the confined spaces heated by simple oil lamps. This intimate knowledge of the inside of a common brothel, at the least through hearsay, from such diverse writers as Seneca, the son of wealthy Hispanian equestrians, and Horace, the son of a freed slave, point to a ubiquitous custom among Roman men of patronizing such houses of ill-repute. Despite the loathing that their society placed upon the workers there, it seems contradictory to our modern sensibilities that partaking of the services offered in a brothel bore no undue stigma towards Roman men.

Cicero, in his speech *Pro Marco Caelio*, goes to great lengths to discredit the female plaintiff Clodia by comparing her personal life to a prostitute, “that in such a home as that in which the mistress of the house

¹⁰ Seneca, *Controversiae*, i, 2.

¹¹ Hallett and Skinner, *Roman Sexualities*, 82.

¹² An *aedile* is a Roman governmental rank roughly equivalent to a modern-day county commissioner.

¹³ “Unchastity license;” Plautus, *Poenulus*, 1010-1014.

¹⁴ Mary R. Lefkowitz and Maureen B. Fant, *Women's Life in Greece and Rome* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 118.

¹⁵ “Place of the *lupae*;” Horace, *Satire* i, 2, 30.

¹⁶ Seneca, *Controversiae*, i, 2.

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lives after the fashion of a prostitute – in which nothing is done which is fit to be mentioned out of doors – in which debauchery, and lust, and luxury, and in short all sorts of unheard of vices and wickednesses are carried on.”¹⁷ Cicero's acidic jabs on the floor of the Senate provide a window into the rigid morality that the Roman upper-class held their women to. As indicated by their epitaphs on tombstones, women were expected to respect the rules of *fides marita* and remain faithful to their husbands. Even the remotest suspicion of sexual misconduct could be enough to ruin a woman's reputation. Practically, such restrictions would vary between social strata, as women of the lower-classes would have fewer eyes on them, and thus relatively more sexual freedom. Even so, such activities were risky, as women could become *infames* if they were caught in the act of adultery or even remarried too soon after their husband's death.¹⁸ Adultery, made a criminal offence by Caesar Augustus but highly stigmatized during the Republic, was defined as the sexual activity between a married woman and a man that was not her husband.¹⁹ Married men had no legal containment over their sexual activity, aside from being prohibited in turn from fornicating with another man's wife.

Men were far less constrained in their sexual choices, being restrained more by personal dignity and reputation rather than any sort of morality. Prostitution was seen as an activity more disgraceful to the prostitutes than those who frequented their company. Slaves provided an outlet that did not even require the man to leave his house. Marcus Cato the Elder, censor of the Late Republic famed for his puritanical standards, had his own nocturnal dalliances with a slave girl recounted by Plutarch:

Having lost his own wife, he married his son to the daughter of Paulus Aemilius, who was sister to Scipio; so that being now a widower himself, he had a slave girl who came privately (κρύφα) to visit him, but the house being very small, and a daughter-in-law also in it, this practice was quickly discovered; for the young woman seeming once to pass through it a little too boldly, the youth, his son, though he said nothing, seemed to look somewhat indignantly upon her.²⁰

“κρύφα,” describing the girl's actions, is translated by John Dryden as “secretly” and Bernadotte Perrin as “privately,” implying that Cato was attempting to keep his activities unknown to the rest of the household. Interestingly, Cato is then obligated to halt his trysts due to the displeasure

¹⁷ Cicero, *Pro Marco Caelio*, 57.

¹⁸ Triboniam, *Corpus Juris Civilis*, Book XXXII, Title 3, 1.

¹⁹ Hallett and Skinner, *Roman Sexualities*, 154.

²⁰ Plutarch, *Marcus Cato*, 24.1-2.

of his son upon noticing Cato's liaisons with a slave girl. Cato appears more concerned about his son's approval of such actions than any possible blows to his reputation, showing that trysts with slave girls were far from unusual, even from such dour and parsimonious examples of Roman virtue as Cato. Plutarch relates Cato's resolution of the matter in his usual practical manner by promptly going out to the Forum the next morning and marrying the daughter of one of his *clienta*.²¹

The Floralia, a colorful festival dedicated to the goddess Flora and held on the Calends of May, was first introduced in 238 BC and was mournfully heralded by Cato the Elder as a beginning of the decline of the "good old" Roman values. Lactantius, an early Christian adviser to Constantine in the third century A.D., gives a rather sensational account of its origin.

The games were solemnized with every form of licentiousness. For in addition to the freedom of speech that pours forth every obscenity, the prostitutes, at the importunities of the rabble, strip off their clothing and act as mimes in full view of the crowd, and this they continue until full satiety comes to the shameless lookers-on, holding their attention with their wriggling buttocks.²²

This spectacle, although probably exaggerated considerably by Lactantius, as he was writing for a Christian audience, was still shocking to the more prudish members of the upper-class when the festival first began. The actions performed were considered rude enough for the censor at the time, Cato the Elder, failing to get the Senate to ban the Floralia entirely, to demand that the more bawdy aspects of the festival be postponed until he and his retinue had departed the theater.²³ Such displays of public wantonness and excess like the Floralia or the Festival of Bacchus were considered uncouth by most upper-class Romans, although they were still staged to the apparent delight of the plebeian masses.

From this evidence surrounding Roman prostitution, one can draw the conclusions that social mores regarding sexuality most likely developed around the necessity of determining the legitimacy of children. For the sake of defining the family line and property rights, controlling female sexuality within marriage was a societal imperative. Since men did not bear the children that would hold the future of a *gens*, they were allowed relatively free access to prostitutes and slaves, since a child produced from such a

²¹ Ibid, 3-5.

²² Lactantius, *Divinarum Institutionum*, xx 6.

²³ Ibid. xx, 8.

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coupling would not have any legal right to the father's inheritance.²⁴ Much of an individual's social standing during the Republic depended heavily on the *gens* to which he belonged, and whether or not he came from a patrician or plebian *stirp* of his *gens*. Due to Roman religious beliefs, contrary to modern Judeo-Christian philosophy, marriage was not considered a sacred institution from a moral standpoint. Though marriage was held to rigid legal standards, like the power of the husband in *pater potestas*, the intimate activities of a husband and wife were not nearly as regulated. It appears that it was common and acceptable for a man to consort with women other than his wife, evidenced by the sources regarding prostitution and other such activities. Women were held to a much stricter chastity standard. However, the Roman social concept of *dignitas* demanded that such sexual activity be moderated and not give the appearance of excessive hedonism, for fear of losing all respectability. Being seen by one's peers as moderate in all things, to include sex, was a cornerstone of Roman virtue, and probably did more to control a Roman man's sex life than legal or moral considerations.²⁵

²⁴ The Latin term for a clan who shared the same *nomen* and claimed descent from a common ancestor. A branch of a *gens* was called a *stirps* (pl. *stirpes*).

²⁵ μηδεν ἄγαν, "Nothing in excess," inscribed in Apollo's Temple in Delphi.

AMERICAN PHOENIX: THE RESPONSE TO ALEXANDER HAMILTON'S DEATH

BY
SHELTON L. PROCTOR

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“In my defense, and that of the American press, this greatest of men made his mightiest effort” – Harry Crosswell on the death of Alexander Hamilton.¹

“If Hamilton had lived twenty years longer, he would have rivaled Socrates or Bacon, or any other of the sages of ancient or modern time, in researches after truth and in benevolence to mankind” – Chancellor James Kent²

The circumstances surrounding Alexander Hamilton's death shocked the American public. Hamilton had been a major general in the Continental Army, a prominent New York lawyer, the former secretary of the treasury, a “favorite son” of the late George Washington, and a powerful, Federalist political boss. At the age of 49, he was killed in a duel of honor with none other than the vice president of the United States – Aaron Burr. His life was one of intensity and controversy – from his upbringing as an illegitimate child, to his role as Washington's aid-de-camp, to his political battles with bitter rivals such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. He died young, perhaps with his best years as a political figure in front of him. To Federalists, Hamilton was a saint. To Republicans, he was regarded as a destructive power. Despite his controversial political views, the nature of Hamilton's death elevated him to the status of founding father.

After Hamilton was mortally wounded on the New Jersey side of the Hudson River, he returned to Manhattan Island for treatment. When it became obvious that he would die, the Right Reverend Benjamin Moore hesitantly administered Hamilton's last communion. Shortly after the general's last breath, Moore wrote a letter to a Mr. Coleman, the editor of the *New York Evening Post*, Hamilton's own newspaper. It begins:

I have thought it would be grateful to my fellow citizens, would provide against misrepresentation and perhaps, be conducive to the

¹ Richard Brookhiser, *Alexander Hamilton: American* (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 214.

² Robert Hendrickson, *Hamilton II (1789 – 1804)* (New York: Mason/Charter, 1976), 657.

advancement of cause of Religion, were I to give a narrative of some facts which have fallen under my observation.³

The letter contains the minister's initial rebuttal of dueling followed by a heart-wrenching account of Hamilton coming to terms with his own death. Moore's narrative portrays Hamilton as a regretful yet composed individual. Hamilton is seen as a God-fearing and wise man who has made a ghastly mistake. The clergyman explains to the dying Hamilton that dueling is against God's law. Hamilton admits his sin, proclaims a faith in the mercy of Jesus Christ, and states that he meant no harm towards Burr during the duel. Hamilton also says he forgives Burr, as if directly targeting an enemy in a duel was unspeakable. Within hours, the *New York Evening Post* published the letter as their top story. As word spread of Hamilton's death, "Thursday Evening, July 12, 1804 by Benjamin Moore" was published in Federalist and Republican newspapers across the United States.

The importance of this article to the nation's perception of Hamilton's death cannot be overstated. The letter represented the last time that the American people would hear directly from Hamilton. Moore's account of Hamilton's death contains deeply religious tones which would have been very popular to an "awakened" population. The message conveyed is one of sympathy towards Hamilton, who is seen in the letter as a religious, judicious gentleman. The publicity this letter received was astounding. Within a few weeks, it had reached every region of the United States. By reading this article, Americans could easily come away with respect and love for a fallen patriot. The theme of this letter is obvious: Hamilton is a devout, genuine Christian who has just made a terrible mistake.⁴ Whether or not this account of Hamilton displayed his true nature, the American public bought the story. Some of his most hated critics lifted him up in his death. According to Robert Hendrickson, "Many editors who had been political opponents generously united in praise."⁵ The article had the ability to change everything people thought of Hamilton.

New England provided the loudest and most mournful cry after Hamilton's death. A region of staunch Federalism, New Englanders looked to Hamilton as a hero. Hamilton's contemporaries in government believed that they were fighting for the very fabric of America.⁶ If control of the country was relinquished to opposing political minds, according to Federalists, then the Constitution would cease to exist. To many in New

³ Benjamin Moore, "Thursday Evening, July 12, 1804," *New York Evening Post*, 13 July 1804.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Hendrickson, *Hamilton II*, 658.

⁶ James Roger Sharp, *American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 9.

England, Hamilton was a savior of the Constitution and therefore America. The reaction of newspapers to his death proves this point. The *Catskill Reporter* cried, “Weep! Columbians Weep! For the fall of virtue, talents, patriotism – the firmest pillar of your national dignity.”⁷ The *Columbia Courier* of New Bedford, Massachusetts focused on the virtues of Hamilton as a man.⁸ The *Windham Herald* of Connecticut compared Hamilton’s death to George Washington’s death.⁹ As one would expect, the editors of New England newspapers with political views most similar to Hamilton were his finest eulogists. According to Hendrickson, “newspapers everywhere rivaled each other in expressions of sorrow.”¹⁰ Although many of his decisions as secretary of the treasury were regionally divisive, New England seemed to always get the winning hand, and the people did not forget the friend they had in Hamilton.

Nowhere was the mourning more intense than in New York City. Despite opposing political factions led by fellow New Yorkers George Clinton and Burr, Hamilton was the pride of the city. He was by far its most famous and powerful politician. Hamilton’s dealings in the banks, law, and education made him highly recognizable in the community, even after his withdraw from public office. The city declared the day of his funeral to be a public day of mourning.¹¹ Ron Cherow explains:

Everybody in New York knew that the city had lost its most distinguished citizen . . . the New York Supreme Court draped its bench in black fabric, while the Bank of New York building was also draped in black. For thirty days, New Yorkers wore black bands on their arms.¹²

The Virginia Argus reported that all businesses were shut down and that hundreds of people lined the streets for the funeral procession. British and French ships in the city’s harbor fired cannon in respect.¹³ New York City stood as the epicenter in a storm of extreme mourning.

As news of the duel spread, southern coverage of Hamilton’s death was surprisingly mournful and matter of fact. While Hamilton was secretary of treasury, the South and other generally rural areas had been on the losing end of many national financial decisions. The entire region was more politically aligned with the Republicans. Despite the growing sectionalism

⁷ “Catskill, July 16,” *Catskill Recorder*, 16 July 1804.

⁸ “Gen. Hamilton,” *Columbia Courier*, 13 July 1804.

⁹ “July 13,” *Windham Herald*, 19 July 1804.

¹⁰ Hendrickson, *Hamilton II*, 658.

¹¹ Brookhiser, *Alexander Hamilton*, 215.

¹² Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 710.

¹³ “New York, July 13,” *Virginia Argus*, 25 July 1804.

of the nation, most of the southern press put aside politics to realize the contributions of Hamilton. Not only were truces made, but editors showed genuine sympathy. The South's newspapers focused on the tragedy of losing a national leader. Most papers did not expound on Hamilton as a politician. For example, the *Virginia Argus* provided an account of Hamilton's funeral and its eulogies.¹⁴ The *Maryland Herald* published Moore's letter and a detailed account of Gouverneur Morris' eulogy.¹⁵ In a region of Republicanism and disdain for Hamilton's Federalism, most southern writers were gracious towards Hamilton.

One of the few Republican newspapers that did comment on Hamilton's politics was Fredericktown, Maryland's *Republican Advocate*. Though it acknowledged Hamilton as a prominent figure in the early years of America, the paper did not refrain from publishing jabs at his political ideology: "We entertain the same opinion of General Hamilton now that we ever did. For his genius and talents we admire him . . . but for his aristocratic principles, we dislike him."¹⁶ The article goes on to say: "As a luminary of law, we accord to him the meed of praise, but as a statesman, he was not of that class which is favorable to liberty, and therefore we do not think him a great one."¹⁷ The bluntness of the *Advocate* demonstrates that some Americans refused to glorify Hamilton in death.¹⁸ In fairness, the newspaper also published Moore's letter. No doubt staffed by staunch Republicans, the *Advocate* admitted that Hamilton was a fascinating and bright individual, but it refused to bow in his honor like the majority of the country's press.¹⁹ The seemingly apocalyptic political battles with Federalists over the years proved too immense for some to forget and reconcile.

The reaction of Hamilton's political rivals was less than mournful. Though Aaron Burr would suffer socially and politically for killing Hamilton, the actual event of the duel did not disturb him.²⁰ Burr would jokingly refer to, "my friend Hamilton – whom I shot".²¹ James Madison wrote to James Monroe complaining that Federalists were using the press to glorify a man who deserved no glory.²² John Adams, who blamed Hamilton for costing him his reelection as president, said that "no one wished to get rid of Hamilton in *that* way."²³ Thomas Jefferson stayed relatively quiet on

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ "New York, July 16," *Maryland Herald*, 25 July 1804.

¹⁶ "Alexander Hamilton," *Republican Advocate*, 20 July 1804.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 714.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

the matter. According to historian Richard Brookhiser, “Jefferson included him in a list of ‘remarkable deaths lately’ in a letter to a European friend, and made no other comment.”²⁴ However, Jefferson did wish to have Hamilton’s military rank posthumously demoted from major general to colonel.²⁵ Other rivals believed Hamilton’s death did him more justice than was due. The reactions of his rivals demonstrate the deep hatred for Hamilton in the political realm. Due to years of political combat, they were not ones to cry over Hamilton, and some were rather happy to see him go.

If his political enemies were ungracious, his friends were brotherly. According to Robert Hendrickson, “Hamilton’s New York friends organized themselves to try to mend the destitution in which he had left his family.”²⁶ Rich men from Maryland to Massachusetts sent money to his estate.²⁷ The massive debt Hamilton had left to his wife was quickly paid off, and they gave him only the highest praise.²⁸ Fisher Ames said: “I could weep for my country, which as it is, does not know the half of its loss. It deeply laments . . . and sees what Hamilton *was*; but my soul stiffens with despair when I think what Hamilton *would have been*.”²⁹ His friends held him in high respect. They recognized him not only as a personal friend but a friend to all Americans. They understood the importance of his political work. The acts of kindness by his friends speak of the enormous respect that Hamilton had gained from his closest peers.

Before his duel with Vice President Burr, no one would have ever expected Alexander Hamilton to die as a hero of the entire country. The tragic event enshrined him as a legend. Nothing can illustrate this more than the posthumous title of “Founding Father.” How was Hamilton a founding father? He enjoyed an interesting yet largely concealed role as Washington’s aide-de-camp. He was a rather undistinguished delegate from New York at the Constitutional Convention, and the convention’s final product was penned by rival James Madison.³⁰ Hamilton was secretary of treasury and led a political faction that would later become the Federalist Party. However, his role in executive politics was more divisive than anything else. In fact at the time of his death, Hamilton had inspired at least three major, rival factions who believed that he was trying to destroy the country. After his time in office as secretary of the treasury, Hamilton played a politically subversive role during the Adams and Jefferson administrations and the presidential elections of 1796 and 1800 – all while being a private lawyer in

²⁴ Brookhiser, *Alexander Hamilton*, 214.

²⁵ Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*, 714.

²⁶ Hendrickson, *Hamilton II*, 660.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ Brookshire, *Alexander Hamilton*, 214.

²⁹ Hendrickson, *Hamilton II*, 660.

³⁰ Sharp, *American Politics in the Early Republic*, 33.

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New York City.³¹ Hamilton's career does not appear to compare with the likes of George Washington, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, or Thomas Jefferson. However, he received praise as a founding father. It was Hamilton's sudden and tragic death that changed his status in America's history. Ill feelings were loosed and tempers immediately cooled. The shock and mourning of the nation as a whole secured his permanent place as an American statesman.

³¹ Ibid., 148-160, 239-240.

THOUGH WAR BREAK OUT AGAINST ME: THE COURSE AND EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS REVIVAL IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMIES

BY:
BRIAN SEARS

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Much of Civil War history in the modern day focuses on the military, political, economic, and social aspects of the costly war. In the last several decades, with vast changes in historiography, historians have focused less on the military aspect and more on the other factors that caused and affected the war. There is, however, one glaring omission to most discussions on the Civil War; the transformative nature of religious revivals on the northern and southern armies during the conflict.¹ While hardly something new to the American experience, the wartime revivals that swept through the camps of the various armies in 1863 were unprecedented in their breadth and scope. While met with defeat on the field of battle, the religious revivals in the southern armies served to strengthen the resolve of Confederate soldiers and became the lasting legacy for many in the post-war South. For the southern soldier, religion was “of greatest importance . . . [his] life was dramatically altered – if not actually ended – by war’s demands.”² To properly understand the context of these revivals, we shall look to the condition of the armies at the beginning of the war, the contemporary understanding of the nature of salvation, the nature of the revival, and then the effects that this had upon their duty as soldiers.

Although by the end of the conflict a Confederate chaplain could write that the “moral miracles” in the southern armies “were as great as ever appeared among armed men since the dawn of Christianity,” at the war’s advent this sentiment would not have agreed with reality.³ At the beginning of the war, the moral state of the southern armies would have shocked and horrified most upstanding citizens.

¹ Drew Galpin Faust, “Christian Soldiers: The Meaning of Revivalism in the Confederate Army,” *The Journal of Southern History* 53, no. 1 (1987): 63.

² Samuel J. Watson, “Religion and Combat Motivation in the Confederate Armies,” *The Journal of Military History* 58, no. 1 (1994): 30.

³ William W. Bennet, *A Narrative of The Great Revival which prevailed in the Southern Armies during the late Civil War between the States of the Federal Union* (Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, 1877), 16.

After the first battle of Manassas, the southern armies and people fell into moral decline. This immorality led a former chaplain reflecting in later days to say, “The vices common to most armies ran riot through our camps.”⁴ Using blatantly religious languages, the chaplain of the Twenty-Third North Carolina Regiment wrote “I fear that while Lincoln may slay his thousands, the liquor-maker at home will slay his tens of thousands.”⁵ A Christian soldier wrote back to his family expressing a widespread sentiment, “War is pretty sure to relax the morals of everybody it comes in contact with.”⁶ Within the southern armies, it was not only drunkenness, but profanity, playing cards, and, although more common to northern armies, prostitution.

Such vices offended the moral sensibilities of the southern chaplains, many of their congregants back home, and some soldiers, Christian and non-Christian alike. Chaplains regularly wrote to the religious journals of the day, encouraging prayer for the soldiers while lamenting the moral turpitude of their own men. Highlighting a lack of chaplains assigned to units in the beginning of the war, Brigadier General R. F. Floyd wrote to Florida’s governor on December 18, 1861, requesting that the governor “appoint a chaplain to this regiment.”⁷ The lack of such a chaplain and the lack of a unified chaplain’s command that existed in the Union army caused southern commanders to scramble while their wayward soldiers sinned. Such was the debauched estate of the armies of the Confederacy when the revivals began in 1862 and grew in earnest throughout the course of 1863.

From a religious point of view, the soldiers in this state of sin had the very pressing necessity of being saved by Jesus Christ. However, the understanding of salvation at this time was very different from what is preached in most American churches today, and thus an exploration of this discrepancy is necessary. The revivals that swept the southern armies were evocative of the Second Great Awakening, which had rushed through the South several decades before. That experience, as well as the doctrinal teaching it inspired, held that a man must have a “complete inward assurance” that he had engaged in true repentance and then “genuinely trusted in Christ alone to save him.”⁸ It was widely expected that this saving grace and the perception of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit would not normally occur at the first occasion of conviction. Salvation then was viewed

⁴ J. William Jones, *Christ in the Camp or Religion in the Confederate Army* (Atlanta: The Martin & Hoyt Co., 1887), 267.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 268.

⁶ Bennet, 142.

⁷ U.S. War Department. *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*; Series 1 – Volume 6, 355.

⁸ Steven E. Woodworth, *While God is Marching On: The Religious World of Civil War Soldiers* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 211.

more as a process of determination, with those in that process being called “seekers” or “mourners.”⁹ Thus, hundreds of mourners often approached the mourner’s bench for prayer after the service, but this did not always equal the number of professed conversions.

Therefore, rather than being based on one emotional experience, the conversions that took place and those decisions of rededication to the Gospel were often accompanied with a great resolve to reform one’s life that they might with their whole heart sing the hymn, “I am a Soldier of the Cross.”¹⁰ In a culture already deeply imbued with the ideals of duty, the converted soldiers expressed a resolve to do their Christian duty, to glorify Jesus, whether in life or in death. Seeing themselves as “soldiers of the Cross” was reinforced by the fact that the Gospel and their Christian duty that was presented to them by chaplains in military language they could readily identify with and understand.

For these soldiers who received the gift of salvation, it was not merely a conversion; it was an act of enlistment. Each of them reported for duty as a soldier in the Army of the Lord. A narrative published by the Evangelical Tract Society of Petersburg, Virginia and written by the Reverend Hugh Roy Scott represented the language and sentiments of that time. Therein, an officer was commended for never forgetting he was “a soldier of Christ.”¹¹ When discussing the salvation of a group of six men, they were said to come forward “to enlist under the banner of the great Captain,” and “to enlist zealously in the service of the Redeemer.”¹² In the rite of baptism, they were said to have “put on the Christian armor.”¹³ Thus, although the intention was to “know nothing but Jesus Christ and Him crucified,” there was a distinctly military presentation and explanation of the Gospel, although one not unique to this period.¹⁴

The Great Revival, as it came to be known, was distinctly military in nature, and while reminiscent of previous awakenings and revivals in the South, the contemporary revival was characterized by much more solemnity than previously associated with revivals. Reports written by chaplains often declared that, “The most perfect decorum is observed during divine service, and the most perfect respect is manifested for those who serve God.”¹⁵ This solemnity was a stark contrast to the apathy or outright mockery which would have been expected at the

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 210.

¹¹ Jones, 287.

¹² Ibid., 288.

¹³ Ibid., 289.

¹⁴ Reid Mitchell, “Christian Soldiers? Perfecting the Confederacy,” in *Religion and the American Civil War*, Randall M. Miller, Harry S. Stout, and Charles Reagan Wilson, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 306.

¹⁵ Woodworth, 211.

beginning of the war. However, confronted with the likelihood of death, and the possibility of defeat, southern soldiers almost reflexively turned to religion for protection.

God as protector featured prominently in various personal accounts testifying to salvation. Alabama Lieutenant Albert T. Goodloe, fighting in the Western theater, admitted: “Death was staring us in the face all the time, a perpetual reminder of the final judgement in the presence of God.”¹⁶ The prospect of death or injury in battle often caused many to be “serious and thoughtful,” as a chaplain observed.¹⁷ Furthermore, a soldier testified that, “There is something irresistible in the appeal which the Almighty makes when he strikes from your side, in the twinkling of an eye, your friend and comrade.”¹⁸ Thus, when confronted with the reality of the carnage around them, many soldiers sought the assurance of salvation so that even if killed, they might die expecting the joys of heaven.

Often, a soldier’s reaction to the carnage of the battlefield not only included the fear of death itself, but also relief and gratitude for getting out of the fighting alive. Soldiers gave thanks, praising the sovereignty of Almighty God for securing their deliverance. They were thus compelled to turn to God, whom they had previously ignored. They came with such testimonies as: “But for God I would have been slain;” “God preached to us as all the preachers on earth could not do;” “After the battle at Malvern Hill, I was enabled to give my soul to Christ – this war has made me a believer in religion, sir.”¹⁹ Thus, surrounded by the offensive reality of death and destruction, they came quickly and convincingly to the Gospel that offered assurance of eternal rest.

Separately, the existence of a doctrine of salvation emphasizing one’s duty to God and demanding complete surrender, the direct confrontation with the likelihood of death, and the gratitude from those who survived fearsome battles, each had powerful effects upon the Confederate soldiers. Combined, they represented a complete transformation of the southern soldier’s identity. It was often the example of these Christian soldiers, both the consistently pious and those recently converted, that made a profound impression upon their fellow soldiers, causing them to likewise become converted.

In his *Narrative*, the Rev. Doctor Bennett related the story of a soldier who lay mortally wounded, surrounded by his comrades. Rather than express fear, or cry out in pain, this soldier sang hymns, testified of the joy of his salvation, and

¹⁶ Albert Theodore Goodloe, *Confederate Echoes: A Soldier’s Personal Story of Life in the Confederate Army from Mississippi to the Carolinas* (1897; Washington, DC: Zenger Publishing Co., 1983), 236.

¹⁷ Woodworth, 192.

¹⁸ Bennett, 172.

¹⁹ Woodworth, 192; Bennett, 172-174.

asked that the chaplain tell his father “that Christ is now all my hope . . . that I am not afraid to die – all is calm.” With his dying breath, he uttered his last words: “Father, I’m coming to thee!” The effect upon the twenty-four soldiers who witnessed the young soldier’s resolve was “very marked.” One expressed the sentiment that, “I never want to die happier than that man.” Yet another, “I never prayed until last night; but when I saw that man die so happy, I determined to seek religion too.”²⁰ This story is one of the many in which the living or dying of a soldier convinced comrades of their need for salvation.

An interesting result of the revival was the effect it had upon soldiers’ military performance. During the war the consensus formed within the military that to be a good Christian was to be a good soldier.²¹ In the winter of 1861, Bob Gibbs, a soldier in the Ninth Tennessee, was holding an evening prayer meeting with members of his company. All others present were older than Gibbs and none professed to be believing Christians. His commander was so impressed upon discovering this, that he made Gibbs regimental color-bearer on the spot.²² Beginning with the experience of the revival during the Civil War, the definition of southern manhood appropriately revolved more around his Christianity, for to be a good soldier, to be a good man, was to be a good Christian.

Similarly, within the revival common soldiers exercised leadership through its propagation, expressing concern for the spiritual well-being of their comrades. The story of Gibbs shows that this proclivity among enlisted soldiers to take initiative in leadership stood out to officers, proving advantageous at times. Captain Richard H. Powell observed that his regiment “held prayer meetings regularly . . . three times a week” and further noted that most often, these meetings occurred “in the absence of a chaplain.”²³ Even when chaplains and missionaries were present, they would often remark that as they left to go to another meeting, the soldiers would continue to pray and sing well past midnight.²⁴ This characteristic of active laity harkened back to previous revivals. Yet, more than that, it also served to solidify units, bring cohesion, and make men into moral, effective soldiers.

Historians have estimated that over 100,000 Confederate soldiers received salvation during the last three years of the American Civil War. While some, like Ried Mitchell, attack the representation of this Great Revival as merely another tool of manipulation within the arsenal of the Lost Cause, the profound effect it had upon individual southern soldiers, and by extension their armies, cannot be

²⁰ Bennett, 182-183.

²¹ Woodworth, 217; Mitchell, 300.

²² Woodworth, 189.

²³ Ibid., 207.

²⁴ Ibid.

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denied. Not only did units experience cohesion due to physical hardships and spiritual raptures, this proclivity towards religion liberated the Confederate armies from the effects of drunkenness and debauchery. The countless southern soldiers, believing in the doctrine of God's sovereignty and their eternal rest, fought gallantly and died peacefully, serving as an example to their comrades. Thus, the spiritual unity of the soldiers solidified their commitment to each other, their duty as soldiers, and to their God. This legacy of the Christian soldier then, would be the legacy of the South, true not only for those who found saving grace amidst battle, but for the posterity to which they would defend their cause.

MONMOUTH: BATTLING THE ELEMENTS

BY
JAMES BYRN

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In the summer of 1778, British General Sir Henry Clinton was forced to evacuate the city of Philadelphia and march nearly 10,000 British and Hessian troops to New York City in an attempt to form a strong link between British forces in the northern and middle colonies.¹ The decision to march instead of sail up the coast was meant to avoid destruction on the seas by the French fleet then aiding the Americans, but what Clinton did not count on was a pitched battle against the Continental Army at Freehold, New Jersey that would result in significant British casualties and a strategic defeat for the British.²

When the Battle of Monmouth started on June 28, 1778, the rear of the British column under Clinton seemed to have the day won, but as the abnormally hot day continued, the British were eventually held and driven back by the once hopeless and floundering American line.³ These weather conditions before and during the Battle of Monmouth, particularly the heat, became the main factor leading to a strategic American victory. The constant movements of fatigued British forces in the extreme conditions, and the lack of British reinforcement throughout the day, allowed an outmaneuvered and retreating American force to stand its ground in the end.

Long before the Battle of Monmouth started on June 28, British and American troops slogged through the New Jersey backcountry in horrid weather conditions for nearly ten days.⁴ General George Washington in particular feared on the day of the engagement that his men would not be in good health for the impending battle. He wrote that, “our advance from the rainy weather and intense heat . . . has been greatly delayed. Several of our

¹ Michael Stephenson, *Patriot Battles: How the War of Independence Was Fought* (New York: Harper Collins Books, 2008), 282.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 283.

⁴ John M. Palmer, *General Von Steuben* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), 185.

men have fallen sick from these causes, and a few unfortunately have fainted and died in a little time after.”⁵

Even though both armies endured harsh weather, the hefty British baggage train met greater difficulty in its movement as the Continentals destroyed many of the main causeways over key river crossings to slow the British advance.⁶ The excruciating labor on these causeways endured by Clinton’s troops is evidenced by his correspondence to Lord Germain in which he wrote that, “as the country is much intersected with marshy rivulets, the obstructions we met with were frequent, and the excessive heat of the season rendered the labour of repairing the bridges severely felt.”⁷ Eventually Washington’s men were able to catch up with Clinton near the town of Freehold. Clinton, despite also having fatigued troops, immediately threw some of his best men, including the 17th Light Dragoons, into battle against General Charles Lee and the Marquis de Lafayette’s force of about 4,000 men.⁸ General Clinton, being supported at that time by the nearby Hessian army of General Wilhelm von Knyphausen, felt his men would be able to fend off General Lee’s relatively small skirmishing force, but he did not anticipate the fatal error that would come from his pursuance of the enemy into the late morning heat.⁹

When General Lee’s troops met with General Clinton’s, the scene that followed was complete and total chaos, but it was a chaos that lured the British into a natural incinerator. Lee’s men at first succeeded in pushing the British Light Dragoons and Simcoe’s Queen’s Rangers back into the baggage train on the outskirts of Freehold, but a constant battering by British cannonade and a lack of communication by Lee with his field commanders resulted in the main elements of the attack rearing back in retreat.¹⁰ It was at that moment that General Clinton received his only fresh reinforcements of the day to protect his rear guard under the command of General Charles Cornwallis. Upon seeing the routed Americans, Clinton immediately made the decision to pursue.¹¹ It was this decision that would result in the true turning point of the battle.

⁵ General George Washington to the President of the Continental Congress, June 28, 1778, *Writings of Washington Volume 12*, John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print Office, 1934), 128.

⁶ General Sir Henry Clinton to Lord George Germain (No.5), July 5, 1778, *Documents of the American Revolution Volume 15*, K.G. Davies, ed. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1972), 160.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 161.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ William S. Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, William S. Myers, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), 154-155.

¹¹ Palmer, *General Von Steuben*, 185.

Around 10 o'clock in the morning, Lee began his retreat, and the thermometer was already "at the astonishing height of ninety-two."¹² General Clinton's diary mentions his concern of the heat in his offensive. He wrote that, "the enemy fell back and took a strong position on the heights above Freehold Courthouse. The heat of the weather was intense and our men already suffered severely from fatigue, but our circumstances obliged us to make a vigorous exertion."¹³

Lee marched his men in a disordered and panicked column back towards a nearby wooded area about 100 yards behind what became known as the east ravine (there were three ravines on the battlefield: east, middle, and west).¹⁴ General Lee attributed his order to retreat itself to the heat of the day in his court martial following the battle in which he asked General Stewart, "did you not conceive, when I ordered you to take your men to some place to save their lives, pointing to an orchard in front, that it was done that you might take them to some place to shade them from the heat of the weather?"¹⁵ Brigadier General Maxwell also noted Lee's concern with the weather being too hot and the men being too fatigued to fight the British on open ground when he said that "you [General Lee] appeared to be disturbed only on account of the situation of the men from the heat of the day."¹⁶ This concern for "the heat of the day" was well-placed as it was coming into effect already in those late hours of the morning, but the loss of momentum and the constant push of Clinton's fast-advancing troops caused the Americans to fall back over nearly five kilometers of land rather than just to the orchard Lee had intended.¹⁷ It was this rapid advance of the British, however, that would ultimately result in their defeat.

As the Continental and British armies crossed this large expanse of land, fully exposed to the sun in most places, soldiers from both sides felt the intense effects of the scorching temperatures. A number of the troops marching with the British were composed of small detachments of Hessian soldiers who, when adorned for battle, often wore uniforms that were far from conducive to the high temperatures present that afternoon.¹⁸ According to New York colonial inhabitant William Dunlap, the Hessian soldier often wore a "towering brass-fronted cap, his hair plastered with tallow and

¹² Continental Soldier to Family Member, June 29, 1778, *Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution*, Frank Moore, ed. (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 67.

¹³ Sir Henry Clinton, July 4, 1778, *Documents of the American Revolution Volume 15*, 160.

¹⁴ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 157.

¹⁵ *Proceedings of a General Court Marital, Held at Brunswick, in the State of New Jersey by the Order of His Excellency General George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States of America, for the Trial of Major General Lee*, July 4, 1778 (New York: 1864), 153.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 108.

¹⁷ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 157-60.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 201.

30 : Report

flour...his blue uniform almost covered by the broad belts sustaining his cartridge-box, his brass hilted sword, and his bayonet; a yellow waistcoat with flaps, and yellow breeches were met at the knee by black gaiters.”¹⁹ This heavy-set uniform became so much of a factor that it actually reduced the combat-effectiveness of the Hessian troops. According to Dr. Samuel Forman, the county physician, many Hessian soldiers “swore that they would not fight in such fervid heat.”²⁰ This statement was also confirmed by an anonymous Continental soldier who said that, “we are well assured the Hessians absolutely refused to engage, declaring it was too hot.”²¹

The Continentals fared about as well as the British during the retreat, with their men also dying of heat stroke and “two or three dropping down at the time by the side of the pieces” as they moved artillery and equipment across the marshy rivulets back to the west ravine.²² At that moment, the situation for Lee’s element seemed hopeless until it received something the British were unable to get the rest of that unbearable day: reinforcements.

Washington and his regulars had finally arrived on the battlefield near the west ravine at around 11:30, as Lee and his men convened in that location falling left and right from the heat and fatigue of marching for miles.²³ Washington, furious with Lee for losing so much ground, sent Lee and his men far behind the lines to rest from the heat while freshened troops under General Wayne and Lord Stirling were sent up to engage the already exhausted British forces.²⁴ On a nearby fence line under the shade of an orchard, the Continentals held their ground against nearly three battalions of British regulars.²⁵ The fighting went on for hours with the British attempting three desperate charges on the American positions “until the last of their [soldiers’] eighty-cartridges-per-man had been expended.”²⁶

The temperature during the afternoon encounter had risen to nearly ninety-seven degrees and by that time, according to Dr. Forman, “the tongues of many of the men were so swollen by thirst that it rendered them almost incapable of articulation.”²⁷ Some even maintained that “many, without a wound, crawled along the stream at the west ravine to drink and to

¹⁹ William Dunlap, *History of the American Theatre Volume 1* (London: Richard Bently, 1833), 85-86.

²⁰ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 202.

²¹ Continental Soldier to Family Member, June 29, 1778, *Documents of the American Revolution Volume 15*, 68.

²² Proceedings of a General Court Marital, Held at Brunswick, in the State of New Jersey by the Order of His Excellency General George Washington, Commander in Chief of the Army of the United States of America, for the Trial of Major General Lee, *Documents of the American Revolution Volume 15*, 155.

²³ Alfred Hoyt Bill, *New Jersey and the Revolutionary War* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1964).

²⁴ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 208.

²⁵ Bill, *New Jersey and the Revolutionary War*, 83.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 201.

die from the heat and fatigue.”²⁸ In a last-ditch effort, the British decided to try one more charge and they attacked the Americans, who were still dug in within the confines of the fence and a shady orchard.²⁹ During this final charge, a prominent British officer, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Monckton fell dead on the field of battle and the Americans, “coatless and with shirt sleeves rolled up,” quickly rushed out to retrieve his body showing clearly how the Americans were able to concern themselves with keeping their bodies cool from their formidable positions as the British were forced to charge fully-clothed with no respite for hours on end.³⁰ The British dead were often found at the end of the day “without any wound, but being heavily clothed.”³¹ This final attempt to overcome the Americans failed and Clinton, who had finally called for reinforcements at nearly five in the afternoon and never received them in time, was forced to retreat.³²

As the British retreated, they were not chased by Washington and his men. Colonel Joseph Cilley, who had been commanding the men who repulsed the final British advance in Washington’s center, did not pursue as his soldiers “were so overcome with the heat that the General [Washington] thought it not advisable to pursue.”³³ Washington, attempting to avoid the mistake that Clinton had made earlier in the day, justified his failure to counter-attack in his letter to his brother John when he wrote that, “it [a counter attack] was found impracticable with our men fainting with fatigue, heat, and want of water.”³⁴

Under cover of darkness, Clinton withdrew his troops away from Monmouth Court House and marched them northward to link back up with their original baggage train.³⁵ Clinton remarked on his decision to retreat when he said that “By this time [following the last charge] our men were so overpowered with fatigue that I could press the affair no farther.”³⁶ He went on to remark about his men who “did it [held together] under such disadvantages of heat and fatigue that a great part of those we lost fell dead as they advanced without a wound.”³⁷ Clinton’s observation was correct as it is estimated that nearly 59 of Britain’s 358 casualties were from heat stroke

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Colonel Henry B. Carrington, *Battles of the American Revolution* (New York: A.S. Barnes, 1876), 444.

³⁰ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 217.

³¹ Ibid., 68.

³² Clinton, July 4, 1778, *Documents of the American Revolution Volume 15*, 163.

³³ Colonel Joseph Cilley to Mr. Thomas Bartlett, July 22, 1778, in *A Salute to Courage*, Dennis P. Ryan, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 133.

³⁴ General George Washington to John Augustine Washington, July 4, 1778, *Writings of Washington, Volume 12*, 157.

³⁵ Bill, *New Jersey and the Revolutionary War*, 82.

³⁶ Clinton, July 4, 1778, *Documents of the American Revolution Volume 15*, 162.

³⁷ Ibid.

or extreme fatigue, and this number could have been significantly higher had Clinton continued to attack as he had done throughout the day.³⁸

The Battle of Monmouth was not a tactical victory for either the Americans or the British, but its strategic value was paramount to victory in the Middle Colonies for the Continental Army. The battle, according to the late politician Henry Cabot Lodge, “ended all effective military operations to recover English supremacy in the Middle States” by hemming Sir Henry Clinton and his subordinates into New York City.³⁹ As one colonist put it, “Clinton gained no advantage except to reach New York with the wreck of his army.”⁴⁰ But when the Battle of Monmouth began, Clinton commanded some of the strongest troops he had to muster against a detachment of fearful and retreating Americans and yet still managed to lose the day and his strategic advantage along with it.⁴¹ The weakness in Clinton’s strategy was not his army or even his strategy but, rather, his inability to conceive the effects of harsh weather on his men.

The temperatures during the Battle of Monmouth stayed above 92 degrees (closer to 100 for most of the day) and this heat caused a normally well-functioning and disciplined British army to collapse.⁴² The Americans also suffered from the heat, but the fact that the Americans were able to provide fresh reinforcements during the hottest part of the day put them at a great advantage. Clinton’s reinforcements had been committed long before their five kilometer charge across the tough terrain near Freehold, and this charge would ultimately bring about their downfall. The Americans, well-shaded and able to take off their uniforms almost at their leisure, were able to fight back the rapidly-advancing and heavily-dressed foe during those brutal hours of elemental exposure.

Had Clinton given his men time to rest before committing them to charge again and again, it is wholly possible that he could have won the day. But unfortunately for Clinton, his aggressive tactics on June 28 failed him as he ultimately neglected to fully identify the enemy that had silently chipped away at his men for nearly ten days prior. The Americans were wary of this silent enemy and the decision of Washington to call off the counter-attack at the end of the day clearly shows it. Had Clinton had the same foresight, Britain could have had another major victory under its belt and the Americans’ renewed sense of fortitude following Valley Forge could have wavered under the mounting British victories.⁴³

³⁸ Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth*, 261.

³⁹ Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Story of the Revolution* (Oakland: C. Scribner’s Sons, 1903), 234.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 233.

⁴¹ Stephenson, *Patriot Battles*, 287.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 286.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 284.

FAILURE TO FREE AN ENEMY: HOW THE DYNAMICS OF WWII PREVENTED THE SUCCESS OF OSS OPERATIONS IN HUNGARY

BY
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In many ways, the allied success in Europe during World War II would have been much more difficult had it not been for a little unconventional help from the United States' clandestine intelligence organization, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The accounts of agents parachuting into Germany, establishing resistance groups in France, foiling Nazi plans, and rescuing downed airmen highlight the bravery and cunningness of the OSS. Their official records contain reports that read like fantastic spy adventures with agents just as successful as James Bond. Yet, for the remarkable actions in Western Europe, the OSS efforts elsewhere more often than not met with failure. One such area was Hungary, a beleaguered ally of Germany. Hungary was deeply involved in Germany's eastern European operations and as the war continued, it increasingly sought a way out, a means of escaping its alliance with Germany. The OSS attempted to play a key role in organizing the surrender of the Hungarian government starting in 1942. However, when the OSS conducted serious operations to get the Hungarian government to commit to a separate peace in 1944, the missions failed. Administrative and staffing issues within the OSS, Hungarian social biases, and the inability to establish reliable communication within Hungary prevented the OSS from being successful.

It is important to not automatically demonize Hungary for its alliance with Adolf Hitler and to understand why, by 1943, a separate peace was the sincere wish of its leaders. Hungary was, by all accounts, a small, poor, and miserable nation during the interwar years. It had been on the losing side of the First World War as part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. The 1920 Treaty of Trianon, signed between the Allies and Hungary, not only dissolved the Empire, but gave two-thirds of Hungary's historic land to

Austria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia.¹ Understandably, the loss of their ancient territory devastated the Hungarian people and for the next twenty years, there would be cries to revise the treaty. With the loss of the land came the loss of 89% of Hungarian iron production, 84% of its timber, and over 60% of its railroad system. These losses, coupled with the global depression of the 1930s, led to a 20% unemployment rate and severe food shortages across Hungary.² Facing a desperate nation, the Hungarian regent, Admiral Miklós Horthy, commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian Navy during World War I, met with Adolf Hitler two days after he took office in 1933. The meeting resulted in a series of trade agreements, signed by Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Gombos, that strengthened the Hungarian economy. Germany, a strong economic power, purchased 96% of Hungary's bauxite production and bought substantial amounts of Hungarian cotton for a better price than the world market could offer.³ With 52.2% of Hungarian exports going to Germany, Hitler successfully tied the Hungarian economy closely to his own.⁴ Both the Hungarians and Germans understood that the success of Hungary's economy was tied to the German economy.

Besides holding the purse strings of the Hungarian economy and effectively buying himself an ally, in 1938 and 1940, Hitler coerced Romania and Slovakia to give back some of Hungary's lost territory. These Vienna Arbitration Awards put Hungary in Germany's debt, but also convinced Horthy that through Germany, the Hungarian land could be reunited. Thus, given economic pressure from Germany and the chance to regain its land, Hungary allowed itself to become part of the German war machine and allowed limited use of its army in German military operations to remain in Hitler's good graces. However, Horthy never truly trusted Hitler. He fought with him often and did all that he could do to keep German influences at an arm's reach to prevent Hungary from becoming a puppet government like so many others in Germany's orbit.⁵ In 1939, the

¹ Treaty of Trianon, *Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary and Protocol and Declaration*, 4 June 1920, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Trianon.

² Cecil D. Eby, *Hungary at War* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 5, 8.

³ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁴ Ioannis-Dionysios Salavrakos, "Explaining Different FDI Inflows in Eastern European Countries," *Global Business and Economic Review* 8 (2006): 62.

⁵ During a 1938 shooting trip with Hitler, Horthy told him that "Germans will never dominate the world, because they were so universally disliked for their bad manners." At a separate meeting that year, Hitler tried to convince the Regent to commit troops to the invasion of Slovakia. Horthy flatly replied, "You will get another world war and you will lose it, because you have no sea power." At this, Hitler began shouting and screaming, and according to the US ambassador to Hungary, Horthy asked him not to forget that "he [Hitler], the leader of an infant state, was speaking to the head of a thousand-year old state; and told him that unless he was treated as such, he would leave at once!" Hitler calmed down. If Horthy was intimidated by Hitler, it did not show. The first time they met, Hitler bowed to Horthy who, in return,

foreign minister of Germany instructed Hungary to prepare its railroads for the transport of German troops and military equipment to Poland. The Hungarian Premier, Pál Teleki refused, fearing a situation “whereby the German Reich in passing through the country slowly takes everything into its own hands.”⁶ Teleki instead offered the use of the railroads for materials in locked wagons with no military escort to avoid conflict. When the Allied landing in North Africa occurred in 1942, Horthy suspected Germany would lose the war.⁷ Reports from Budapest in 1943 state quite frankly that Hungary tried many times to pull away from Hitler economically and militarily, but every time they tried, Hitler’s threats that he would allow the Rumanians to occupy Hungary forced the Hungarian government to back down. Hungarian leaders understood they would be unable to escape Hitler on their own, and the idea of following Italy’s example and establishing a separate peace with the Allies was seriously considered.⁸ Hitler, aware that his ally was attempting to defect, invaded in 1944 and killed thousands of people. The Russians would “liberate” the capital in 1945 and then oppress the Hungarians with decades of communism under Soviet rule. In the end, Hungarians would pay a steep price to become a sovereign state and free people again in 1989 after nearly four decades of hardship.

The American secret intelligence community, the OSS monitored these Hungarian hardships throughout WWII. The inception of the OSS can be directly traced to Colonel William J. Donovan, a World War I Congressional Medal of Honor recipient turned New York lawyer. Having worked as the assistant attorney general with the Justice Department in the mid-twenties, he was well-traveled and well-connected in political circles.⁹ After the fall of France, Donovan was asked to visit London and assess the likelihood of British success against the German army should there be an invasion. While abroad, Donovan learned of England’s intelligence service and “techniques of unorthodox warfare.”¹⁰ Given what he saw, he not only reported that Britain would hold, but committed much of what he saw to memory to be used later.¹¹ The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor showed how

remained erect. John Flournoy Montgomery, *Hungary – The Unwilling Satellite* (New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1947), 69.

⁶ Karoly Kapronczay, *Refugees in Hungary* (Toronto: Matthias Corvinus Publishing, 1999), 196.

⁷ When the Germans recognized the immense scale of the landings, Rommel called Count de László Almaszy, a desert researcher with the Germans, and told him, “You are a Hungarian and can leave us at any time. If I were you, I should get out while the going’s good. We are going to lose this war.” John W. Gordon, *The Other Desert War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1987), 159.

⁸ Edward Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II* (New York: Richardson & Steirman, 1986), 20, 26.

⁹ Corey Ford, *Donovan of OSS* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 91-94.

¹⁰ The British had a series of underwater pipelines that, in the event of a German invasion, would make every beach a flaming sea of oil. Ford, *Donovan of OSS*, 91.

¹¹ John V. Grombach, “Personal Papers of Grombach,” Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

woefully inadequate the United States' intelligence efforts were, and throughout the next several months, Donovan advocated for the creation of a centralized intelligence organization. Finally on 13 June 1942, the President used executive order 9241 to create the OSS solely for use in, and only for the duration of, the war.¹² Upon its creation, the organization started growing with Donovan at the head. The organization employed foreign nationals as contacts, average businessmen as spies, military men as radio operators, and women as non-threatening deceptions in hundreds of espionage, sabotage, intelligence gathering, and other dangerous missions throughout the war. As more and more records become declassified, the role of the OSS in many Allied successes in the Pacific theater and in Europe becomes clearer. What they cannot claim, however, is success in Hungary.

Hungary was by no means the main concern of the OSS. With agents around the world in places like Algiers, Italy, Yugoslavia, France, Germany, Burma, India, and China, the OSS was involved in nearly every aspect of World War II.¹³ It employed thousands of people to include Julia Child, the future French chef, Major League Baseball player Moe Berg, actor Sterling Hayden, and future Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg.¹⁴ With agents around the world, overseas offices were set up to manage their operations. The London, Lisbon, Istanbul, and Yen'an offices were the main locations and instrumental in secretly facilitating the many operations of the OSS.¹⁵ Perhaps the best known missions of the OSS were by the Jedburgh Teams in Germany and France. These teams jumped into occupied territory, organized resistance fighters, armed them, and carried out harassment missions against the Germans.¹⁶ However, the OSS played a more critical role elsewhere in the world. It was instrumental in establishing favorable connections with the Free French in North Africa before Operation TORCH and the first "official" relations between the United States government and the communists in China through the work of the Dixie Mission to northern China.¹⁷ Colonel Ivan Yeaton, Chief of the Dixie Mission, felt that the OSS exerted "more influence on [the] Chinese Communist Party policy than any other unit."¹⁸ Thus, throughout the war, the OSS maintained a global focus,

¹² "Eastern Europe," 6 October 1942, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

¹³ *The Secrets War*, George C. Chalou, ed. (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1992), vii.

¹⁴ Andrea Stone and Emily Bazar, "Famous Personnel Included in Opened OSS Spy Files," *USA Today*, 14 August 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-08-14-archives_N.htm.

¹⁵ *The Secrets War*, vii, 302.

¹⁶ John Singlaub, interviewed by author, 29 January 2011. Singlaub is a former member of the OSS and retired as a Major General in the United States Army.

¹⁷ Richard Harris Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Guildford, Conn.: The Lyons Press, 1972), 51.

¹⁸ Maochun Yu, *OSS in China* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 183.

conducting operations whenever and wherever possible to assist in the Allied victory. Hungary was just one small part of the OSS's overall focus. As an important ally to Germany due to its rich resources and strategic location, it was a potential breeding ground of Nazi supporters and therefore, an important region to the OSS.

For all the good that the OSS did during the war, it struggled to produce substantial results within Hungary. The goals of the OSS were to aid resistance movements in Hungary and, later on, convince the government to join the allies. Unfortunately, many of its well-intentioned actions failed badly. For instance, throughout 1942, the Hungarian Desk of the OSS began formulating "Eastern Europe Project 7": Location – Hungary. The objective of this mission was to gain "General strategic information; and to attempt to influence Hungarian public opinion" by manipulating a neutral press agency.¹⁹ By October, the operation was approved and in preparation. Imre Bekessy, the owner of the Geneva Press Service in Switzerland, under the guise of journalism, was to send a correspondent to Budapest. The "journalist" would relay "information otherwise unavailable and unobtainable" back to Switzerland and the United States for analysis and also get subscriptions to newspapers and magazines of interest to the OSS. In addition to this, the agent would comment on the reaction of Hungarians to coded propaganda articles submitted by the Geneva Press Service to native papers and magazines.²⁰ In a series of letters and telegrams, the organization for this project began to take shape. However, none of the newspapers requested came through, and those that did offered little information the OSS did not already have.²¹ Ultimately, the project was suspended because it lacked results.

In 1943, the OSS toyed with the idea of establishing radio communication with the underground, The Popular Front, in Hungary. However, the operation ended with all Hungarian members of the operation being arrested by the Gestapo.²² The secondary and tertiary affects of this failure were serious, as will be discussed later. What was to be an easy mission, turned into a disaster as did most of the Hungarian missions. The reasons for these failures have not been well documented. There is very little written on the OSS in Hungary or the Hungarian Desk personnel.

¹⁹ "Report on Status of All SI Projects," 6 October 1942, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

²⁰ "Hungarian Project," 18 August 1942, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

²¹ Imre E. Bekessy, "Mikrofilm Roll No: 101," 19 September 1942, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

²² "Secret Intelligence – Turkey and Hungary," 9 June 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

Little is known about many of the agents, but what can be determined tells a story of a strategic mission that appeared destined to fail.

One of the most important reasons that the OSS struggled so greatly with accomplishing anything in Hungary was simply the fact that it was dealing with Hungary. The Hungarian language is extremely unique with its closest possible connection being to an ancient Finno-Ugric dialect.²³ Thus, finding people who could speak the language, or even learn the language, was difficult. To be the head of a regional desk at the OSS, one had to fulfill many requirements to include: “(i) thorough knowledge of the country . . . acquired through extensive residence or travel in the area. (ii) Fluent proficiency in the language . . . (iii) training or experience in intelligence,” along with the ability to prepare reports and manage a staff. Agents also had to be less than fifty years old.²⁴ To fulfill a desk position for Germany or France was relatively easy considering how many Americans and immigrants were familiar with the countries and their language. However, as Hungary was a relatively obscure country, at war with the United States twice in forty years, it was difficult to find qualified individuals to head the desk. Major General (Ret.) John Singlaub, a former highly-decorated OSS agent, states that, given these factors, it is highly possible and probable that the OSS was forced to lower its standards for these state-side, planning positions simply because the bodies to fill them did not exist.²⁵ In 1940, there were 1,589,040 American citizens who considered German their primary language. In the same year, there were only 241,220 Hungarian speakers.²⁶ This testifies to both the small number of Hungarians in the United States and the vast disparity of possible OSS agents for the German and Hungarian operations. This factor has not been considered by the vast majority of historians, possibly because few have studied Hungary in depth, and therefore have not considered it a major problem. However, lowering standards routinely correlates to increasing problems within an organization.

This certainly seems to be the case with the Hungarian Desk. John Torok (originally “Toch”) was a Hungarian Jew born in Budapest who later became a Catholic priest. After working closely with communist radicals during the 1918 Hungarian Revolution, he immigrated to the United States because the church did not approve of his “political connections.”²⁷ While in America, Torok established connections in the Balkans, swindled money

²³ Pál Engel, *The Realm of St. Stephen* (New York: I. B Tauris Publishers, 2001), 9.

²⁴ “Report from ETO Section, Washington, D.C.” October 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

²⁵ John Singlaub, interviewed by author, 29 January 2011.

²⁶ U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Mother Tongue of the Foreign-Born Population, 1910 to 1940*, Table 6. 9 March 1999, <http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab06.html>.

²⁷ “Subject: John Torok,” 13 November 1943, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

from a Wisconsin bishop, and then fled when the conspiracy was revealed. For a time, he moved all over the eastern United States selling the idea of a unification of all Hungarians across all Christian denominations in the United States, the idea being that it could form a powerful (nay, violent) party able to demand changes to the Trianon Treaty. Using his pitch to collect donations, swindling followers out of money in an estate scam, and selling fake paintings, he accrued quite a bit of money and had a rather exhaustive criminal record. Yet, this was the man chosen to handle the Hungarian Desk and affairs for the OSS, presumably because he fit the minimal qualifications and had an intimate knowledge of the country.²⁸ Although he was cleared by the Civil Service Commission and the FBI for a “responsible Government position,” the FBI continued to interview those who were in contact with him. While serving in the OSS, he was under FBI scrutiny after claiming to a friend that he had confidential memos from the Office of Price Administration.²⁹

It is slightly troubling that, because of the presumed lowering of standards, at the head of the Hungarian desk was a man who had no intelligence experience and arguably questionable morals. Not only was the FBI watching Torok, but he was also under the scrutiny of the Coverage and Indoctrination Branch (code name – The Pond). This was another government sanctioned intelligence organization whose secrecy was so guarded, MG Singlaub had never heard of the group or its leader, Colonel John Grombach – surprising seeing as how MG Singlaub was also a founding member of the CIA.³⁰ Their records only began to be declassified in 2010 and have not been studied by historians in depth at all. In Grombach’s personal papers, he argues that the “lack of experience of the key personnel in the OSS resulted in poor administration, poor security, wastefulness of lives and money, embarrassment to our Government, and the compromise of the OSS all over the world to our enemies, allies and neutrals during the war.”³¹ Grombach lists eleven of the most senior men, to included Donovan, Edward Buxton, the Deputy Chief of the OSS, and Lawrence Lowman, who was in charge of radios and communications, all of whom had no prior knowledge of, or had ever worked with, intelligence.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Steve Rosswurm, *The FBI and the Catholic Church* (Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 246.

³⁰ Grombach, a West Point graduate and colonel in the U.S. Army, believed that the OSS compromised its secrecy by cooperating and coordinating with allied services and neutral nations. He felt that an exclusively American secret intelligence agency would be of value, and thus, the Coverage and Indoctrination Branch (CIB) was born. It is my conclusion that hundreds of OSS records are yet to be declassified because they reference or are about the CIB, whose records are slowly becoming available to the public.

³¹ John Grombach, “Inexperienced Personnel – Conclusion,” Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

With Torok, a radical with no experience, commanding the Hungarian desk, it is little wonder that details of planning and secrecy were put aside while developing operations. Although it was not unheard of for criminals to be used by the OSS, they were most often used for a specific skill. Smugglers were employed to sneak equipment and people into different areas, and counterfeiters were pulled out of prisons to forge paperwork.³² However, for a person with Torok's background to be entrusted with a regional desk, the OSS must have been unable to find a more suitable candidate.

One of the major obstacles that the desk had to overcome, and never quite did, was the political complications in trying to gain the trust of the Hungarians. One of the major concerns that kept Hungarians as a whole wary of America was its alliance with the Soviet Union, resulting in the perceived American support of Bolshevism. One Hungarian contact told OSS agents that "the U.S. lost Hungarian sympathy when she began to collaborate with the Soviet [sic]."³³ The fear that a German loss would result in Europe being overrun by Bolsheviks was common and not entirely outrageous, considering how close the Soviet Union was located to Hungary. Many Hungarian agents with connections to the Hungarian government held this fear and were unwilling to cooperate much with the OSS.

Another political complication was that of German pressure on the Hungarian government to continue cooperating with the Reich. Despite OSS efforts to encourage a separate peace with Hungary, Horthy and his government were compelled to back down. Each time Hitler sensed his ally pulling back slightly, economic pressure and threats of violence against Hungary or the government were stronger than the Hungarian will to resist. Even the idea of disowning Horthy, as the Italians did Mussolini, and surrendering was quickly dropped when Hitler made it clear that Rumania would be given the "permanent title to all of Hungary up to the Tisza river."³⁴ The Hungarian ancient territory was in many ways directly linked to national honor, and the idea that it could be lost prevented cooperation from many Hungarian contacts as well. These political and cultural problems were obstacles to success that were never fully overcome.

The problem faced by the OSS with establishing *reliable* contacts in Hungary made the administrative problems pale by comparison. In the more easily accessible western countries, the OSS had an established protocol for contacting and verifying the validity of contacts. The standard plan was for agents to jump in behind enemy lines and scout out potential resistance

³² John Singlaub, interviewed by author, 29 January 2011.

³³ "1534-1538. Action: Washington, Information: London," 2 January 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

³⁴ "Current Situation in Hungary," 27 October 1943, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

fighters. Once a reliable contact was found, a “welcome committee” was arranged.³⁵ Teams of specialized, uniformed military men and host country nationals then jumped in and determined the absolute sincerity of the contact. They then formed, led, and armed the new resistance group.³⁶ This was all entirely possible because Germany and France were within the American and British sphere of influence. The Americans and British did the majority of the fighting and dying there, and all action in those countries fell under American and British command. Thus, parachuting OSS teams in and conducting espionage, propaganda, and rescue missions was predominantly within American control.

This was not the case with Hungary or other Eastern European nations where there was a greater Soviet influence. By 1943, it was clear that the Soviets would inevitably liberate Eastern Europe and the Balkans and that they would fall under Soviet control in the post-war years, just as the Western Allies would take West Germany and Austria. Thus, by the time the OSS seriously attempted to put teams into Budapest in 1944, they were unable to do so without the Soviets’ permission which proved to be a major obstacle.³⁷ This prevented the verification of strong anti-Nazi contacts in Hungary because all communication had to be done outside the country or via intermediaries.

In 1944, the OSS began execution of the Toledo Mission – a daring and important mission that ultimately failed because, Soviet clearance could not be received to penetrate Hungary. The objective of the mission was to make contact with resistance groups within Hungary, collect “military intelligence of strategic importance” and to act in the emergency that Hungary fell early.³⁸ The head of the operation, Maj. Gilbert Flues, was to jump with his three-man team deep into the mountains of Yugoslavia and make contact with the Yugoslav partisans led by Marshall Josip Tito. They would, in theory, assist the team with secretly slipping across the Hungarian border. Upon initially landing, Flues was to radio for the equipment they would need for the penetration.³⁹ As of mid-September, a month after landing, the team had not been given clearance into Hungary by the Soviet-backed Tito who was, most likely, operating under Moscow’s guidance. The partisans had been growing more difficult to work with for they were

³⁵ Colin Beavan, *Operation Jedburgh* (New York: Penguin Group Inc, 2006), 30.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 293.

³⁷ Charles Fenyvesi, *When Angels Fooled the World* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2003), 67.

³⁸ “To: Commanding Officer,” 13 May 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

³⁹ “To: Mr. Eugene Warner,” 13 August 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

suspicious of the Americans and aggressive in their communist rhetoric.⁴⁰ A month later, the partisan corps commander decided that no help would be given unless orders came down from his headquarters. Even then, he said, only a small partisan division would be of assistance.⁴¹ The OSS scrubbed the Toledo Mission shortly thereafter when it became clear the operation would never get off the ground.⁴² In late 1944, when the Soviets were en route to Budapest, the OSS determined that trying to put an “active penetration team” in Hungary was pointless, and that it would be more logical to simply wait for the Soviets to take the city. Then, a “city team” of 51 OSS officers could enter the city, with Soviet permission, to assist in post-war reconstruction and stability operations. Moscow, however, denied them permission and the teams were disbanded before they could leave America.⁴³ Opportunities such as these, denied to the OSS, prevented the development of strong ties to any pro-western liberation group within Hungary and demonstrated the influence that the Soviets had over the region. Placing “fault” on the OSS for wasting an opportunity is too strong. Rather, conflicting interests between nations and personalities prevented the OSS from conducting successful missions.

Thus, proving the validity of contacts in Hungary was nearly impossible, and given the questionable administration of the Hungarian Desk, the scrutiny of contacts was not as thorough as need be. The OSS base in Istanbul, a regional desk responsible for subversive action in the old Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire, was located in a hot bed of Soviet and Axis intelligence agents, all “stumbling over each other” working on recruiting agents.⁴⁴ Although Cereus, the major intelligence network operating out of Istanbul, provided the OSS with over 700 reports, most of the intelligence later proved to be false, for the chain was filled with German operatives.⁴⁵ Historian Patrick K. O’Donnell asserts that the OSS carelessly handled its agents within Istanbul and traps set by pro-German Hungarians within the government resulted in the arrest of many OSS agents in Europe,

⁴⁰ Nowell Robin, “Report of Geisha Mission,” 13 October 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Winston Churchill sent his son to work with the Partisans to show Tito that Britain supported the partisan operations, much the same way that kings would marry daughters off to rival kingdoms for peace. However, Tito requested more British troops to protect Churchill’s son because he was so obnoxious, Tito was afraid his own men would get rid of the son. John Singlaub, interviewed by author, 29 January 2011.

⁴³ Budapest was slated to have the largest “city team” of all the capitals to be liberated. CIA records show that the large focus on Budapest may be the result of the OSS’s close work with a Swedish diplomat in Hungary by the name of Raoul Wallenberg – one of the angels referred to in the title – who was responsible for saving more Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe than any other person or agency during the war. Fenyvesi, *When Angels Fooled the World*, 86.

⁴⁴ Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 224.

⁴⁵ Patrick K. O’Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs* (New York: Free Press, 2004), 75.

members of the Hungarian General Staff (who were also in contact with Grombach), and many other contacts within Hungary.⁴⁶

Such is true in the infamous “Hatz Case,” a peripheral operation to Cereus. In December of 1943, months before the German invasion of Hungary, the Hungarian military attaché in Ankara, Turkey, Colonel Bartalics, was replaced by Lt. Colonel Otto Hatz, described as “undoubtedly stupid and . . . spending more money than he had, especially on woman.”⁴⁷ This proved fortunate for the OSS operating out of Istanbul as they had been in contact with Hatz since October of that year. Hatz met with American OSS agents who repeatedly tried to persuade him that it was in Hungary’s best interest to defect from the Nazis and that he should help establish an underground resistance. Talks continued throughout December with Hatz relaying the content of the meetings to the German-Hungarian intelligence organization (Hungarian Abwehr) in Budapest.⁴⁸ The OSS had no need to be concerned. That Hatz was relaying information to his superiors was actually beneficial, for it kept them from suspecting him of being a traitor and it spread the OSS’s message. The Germans and Hungarians did not feel threatened by him communicating with Americans because he was clearly turning them down and frustrating their efforts. It was as if he were spying on the allies. The trouble came, however, from a similar lackadaisical approach to the man who had originally contacted Hatz for the OSS – Andre Gros, alias Andre Antol Gyorgy.⁴⁹ Gyorgy cooperated with the Gestapo and was indeed known as a double agent to the OSS.⁵⁰ In early 1944, Gyorgy and Hatz agreed to partner in an attempt to smuggle a radio into Hungary. They enlisted the help of General Kadar, head of the counter-espionage section of the Hungarian General Staff. The radio was hidden in the home of Kadar’s mistress. However, Gyorgy sold the entire operation out to the Gestapo. Hatz escaped death due to Regent Horthy’s intervention, but Kadar is listed as both executed and merely imprisoned, while his mistress was placed under surveillance. Only Gyorgy made it through unscathed.⁵¹ The mission failed because the Hungarian Desk and coordinators in Istanbul placed trust in a double agent and a fool. To the OSS, Gyorgy had the potential to supply them with great amounts of information or contacts. As

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ “German Reports on the Hungarian Colonel, Hatz,” Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁸ “German Conversation with Hungarian Colonel, Hatz,” December 1943, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁴⁹ “#1534 – 1538. Action: Washington, information: London,” 2 January 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁰ “Your DX-35 of 24 May 1944,” 8 June 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁵¹ “Activities of Andre Antol Gyorgy,” 13 June 1944, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

will be seen later, he was not the only imposter to dupe the OSS. The failure of this mission had many negative effects. John Grombach's intelligence organization later tried to plant another radio in Hungary. However, he concluded that "the Hungarians . . . were burned so badly on their last contact with a U.S secret intelligence agency, that they are afraid to smuggle . . . radio sets for the use of" the underground that was providing valuable information.⁵²

Similarly, one of the most problematic and prolific double agents within the Cereus ring was "Dogwood," a Czech businessman who had worked with the British, but was transferred to the Americans when he was reassigned to Istanbul.⁵³ It was here that Dogwood, a Mr. Alfred Schwartz, deceived the Americans.⁵⁴ He claimed to have connections with prominent anti-Nazi members of the Abwehr, such as Helmut James Graf von Moltke, son of the famous World War 1 German Chief of Staff (which proved to be false).⁵⁵ He fed the OSS "reams of intelligence, most of it planted by the Germans. He never revealed his sources, merely assigning them code names, making the intelligence he provided impossible to verify."⁵⁶ Suspicion first came when Dogwood's contacts, his "flowers," whose identities were not known by the OSS until long after suspicion arose of Schwartz's true loyalty, passed along information about Hungary that was easily proven wrong by other local contacts.⁵⁷ Therefore, it becomes clear that although the Istanbul office was perhaps too trusting of this agent Dogwood, and took his word that the flowers were legitimate contacts, the question arises, what more could the OSS have done to prevent such a blatant security breach? With limited maneuverability in Eastern Europe and a relatively small overseas desk, it was difficult to determine who was a friend and who was an imposter.

It is for all these reasons that actual, legitimate attempts in 1944 to negotiate peace with Hungary were destined to fail. With so many factors working against the OSS, the two famous efforts – Operation Sparrow and the Bowery Mission – were bound to be ineffective. The Hungarian

⁵² Pond records, disdainful of the OSS as a rule, tend to argue that the OSS generally performed so badly that they lost the trust of locals and could not provide as much intelligence as Grombach's men. In a March 1944 document, a Pond agent stated that Hungarian government gave him a "frank disclosure" of Hungarian troops still on the Russian front in order to give "convincing proof of their confidence in the fairness of the United States," but with the hope that the information would not be given to other sources. "Secret Intelligence – Turkey and Hungary," 9 June 1944 Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁵³ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies and Saboteurs*, 75.

⁵⁴ "Dogwood Chain," Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁵⁵ Ronald Florence, *Emissary of the Doomed* (New York: Viking, 2010), 128.

⁵⁶ O'Donnell, *Operatives, Spies, and Saboteurs*, 75.

⁵⁸ "Dogwood Chain," Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 263, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Ronald Florence, *Emissary of the Doomed* (New York: Viking, 2010), 129.

diplomatic mission in Bern launched Operation Sparrow. Using OSS channels, in which Hatz and Dogwood had access to, a request was sent for OSS agents to go to Hungary and arrange for the collaboration of the Hungarian government and hash out practical steps for the Hungarian government to take towards surrender. Unbeknownst in Bern, Hatz and possibly other double agents alerted authorities and betrayed the OSS again.⁵⁸ The idea behind the mission was for three Americans to jump into Hungary, and be “captured” by the Hungarian army. A high ranking contact in the army would meet with them to discuss terms.⁵⁹ The “sparrows” were lead by the flamboyant Colonel Florimond Duke, who had never made a jump before. Regardless, the three Americans parachuted into a remote section of Hungary on 15 March 1944.⁶⁰ At first, the mission went perfectly as planned and the Americans enjoyed the hospitality of the Hungarians while sitting comfortably in jail. However, the regent was in Germany at the time, being delivered a harsh tongue-lashing by Hitler who suspected Hungary’s disloyalty.⁶¹ Hitler ordered an invasion of Hungary, and the sparrows attempted to blend in with the aviators who were being taken to POW camps. Instead, the Gestapo knew to look for them and interrogated them separately before sending them to the infamous Colditz Castle to sit out the rest of the war.

The reasons for the failure of Operation Sparrow are tragically many, though the blame lies mostly on the planning and intelligence work prior to the start of the operation. After suspicion had already arisen about the loyalty of the Dogwood chain, the British intelligence service actually generated a report of German agents in Hungary, and many of them worked for Dogwood. Furthermore, it was discovered that critical reports generated by OSS agents in Hungary were identical to the reports given to the Germans.⁶² Clearly, there were some issues in who was employed and listening to the advice of the British. However, Donovan himself became extremely worried given this information and attempted to talk sense into those in charge. “Packy” MacFarland, who was heading the Istanbul desk, refused to believe that the Dogwood chain could be compromised or that Hatz was a double agent. He insisted that all the accusations against Hatz were simply part of his “cover story” though he would use caution with him.⁶³ Even more disappointing was that Dogwood’s “handler” did not seem to understand the importance of the information that had just been

⁵⁹ Yehuda Bauer, *Jews for Sale?* (New York: Yale University, 1994), 137.

⁶⁰ Douglas Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan* (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc, 2011), 197.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Paul Schmidt, *Hitler’s Interpreter* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), 270-71.

⁶³ Agostino Von Hassell, *Alliance of Enemies* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2006), 181.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 182.

received and did nothing to monitor or check the agents' activities.⁶⁴ These untrustworthy Hungarian agents were allowed to operate because of the poor control by the Hungarian Desk and Istanbul office. Even when given credible intelligence that something was amiss, the Istanbul desk did painfully little to protect any ongoing missions involving the questionable contacts. Most historians now agree that Hatz was one of the most involved contacts in informing the Germans about the Sparrow Mission.⁶⁵ This may account for why Horthy was out of the country at that time and was therefore unable to help the men he had earnestly waited for to help deliver his country from war.⁶⁶ The Hungarian official that the Americans met with was imprisoned by the Gestapo as well and forced to produce a report on the matter.⁶⁷ It seems as though the Gestapo allowed the meetings (of which they had full knowledge) to go on until they had all the evidence that they needed to convict all the players involved. Days later, a group of Austrians working for the OSS, code name Cassia, went to Budapest to pick up radios, passing easily through the country since Austria and Hungary were allies. They too were betrayed by enemy agents, and a total of twenty people were executed.⁶⁸ Both the attempt to plant the radio and the Cassia operations were victims of the Dogwood/Cereus chain.

With the failure of Operation Sparrow and the German invasion of Hungary, a new mission was undertaken by the OSS to deliver to Horthy a plea seeking an armistice. The Bowery Mission was taken on by one understudied man given his extraordinary adventure – a Monsignor of the Roman Catholic Church and a professor in the Vatican City. Monsignor Moly (for whom a full name is not given in the OSS report) was about 40 years old, short for a man, and Hungarian by birth and nationality.⁶⁹ On 7 October 1944, Moly was flown to a secret airfield in Slovakia and taken across the border into Hungary by a Slovakian guide. He made his way alone to Vamoslady, his birthplace and found refuge with a fellow priest who gave him clerical “garb” and escorted him further to Zselig.⁷⁰ His saga continued as he traveled by train and found Justinian Cardinal Seredi, also Prince Primate of Hungary, an old friend who was “transfixed by surprised” when Moly revealed himself and explained his mission.⁷¹ Cardinal Seredi hid

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Agostino Von Hassell, *Alliance of Enemies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006), 181.

⁶⁷ N.F. Dreisziger, ed., “Part II of the Interrogation Report on Veessenmayer,” *Hungarian Studies Review* 23 (1996): 61.

⁶⁸ Waller, *Wild Bill Donovan*, 198.

⁶⁹ Von Hassell, *Alliance of Enemies*, 183.

⁷⁰ Howard M. Chapin, “Resume of Moly Operation,” 17 April 1945, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

Moly until he was able to secure a train ticket to Budapest and located a friend, a well-connected professor who was able to contact General Pal Pongracz, a member of the regent's cabinet. Pongracz arranged for Moly to meet with Horthy and personally drove Moly and his friend to the royal palace, then walked them past all the guards. Moly was able to convince the chief of the regent's military cabinet and first adjutant to allow him to speak with Horthy and arrange for a piece of his radio to be repaired. That night, Horthy saw Moly who explained that all Hungarians outside the country saw that the war was lost, and that the foreign ministers and Allies all advised that Hungary seek an armistice and "surrender unconditionally to the Allies, and equally to the United States, Great Britain and the USSR."⁷² However, everything Moly was about to advise the regent to do, Horthy had already set in motion by sending an armistice delegation to Moscow. They spoke of the armistice, and then, after an hour and a half, left and took refuge at a local monastery. The rest of his tale is amazing: He hid in a cousin's house for two and a half months to avoid the Gestapo which was hunting for Horthy sympathizers. When a bombing raid in January of 1945 destroyed the house, he fled to another monastery run by a Mother Superior who had once lived in Philadelphia. He stayed there until the Russians overran the country and he was able to reveal himself to them as an American agent and return to the United States.⁷³

Although Moly's adventure truly reads like that of a movie character, the impact his mission had is generally not noted by many historians. Moly himself felt that his talk with Horthy played a large part in solidifying the defiant attitude of the regent, which proved to be the catalyst for the formation of the puppet government of Hungary. When Moly spoke with Horthy, the regent stated that "The interests of Hungary are more important than my personal safety. I would be willing to put my head under the guillotine if it would save Hungary . . . If I have sufficient troops to defend the capital against the Germans I will manifest my will to the Nation."⁷⁴ Moly and Horthy talked at length about just how to protect Hungary, Moly all the while encouraging the armistice. The day after Moly left, Horthy's son was kidnapped and the emboldened Horthy made a radio address announcing the armistice. Moly noted that many of the phrases that the regent used, he had said during their meeting. To Moly, their talk seemed to be what Horthy needed to commit himself to making the announcement. Sadly, this proclamation so enraged Hitler that he ordered the arrest of

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Howard M. Chapin, "Resume of Moly Operation," 17 April 1945, Modern Military Records Division, Record Group 226, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

Horthy by the Gestapo and quickly replaced the Hungarian government with pro-Nazi leaders who would remain until the communists' rule began.⁷⁵

While in many ways, Operation Bowrey was a success in that Moly, the lone OSS agent to enter that deep into Hungary, was not captured or killed, but it may have inadvertently pushed Horthy to make the proclamation that resulted in the complete occupation of Hungary and the end to Horthy's rule. Announcing the armistice was, sadly, exactly what the OSS wanted Horthy to do – except the consequences were completely unexpected and unintentional. It was as if the planning of the operation did not take into account what the Germans would do in response. Moly was an absolutely loyal contact, yet, just as the Sparrow Mission instigated the occupation of Hungary, Moly may be responsible for the creation of the Nazi government in Hungary and ending any chance of separating Hungary from Germany.

It is a tragic conclusion that can be drawn from the OSS involvement in Hungary during World War II. Because of the uniqueness of the country, the OSS had a difficult time recruiting qualified agents to work for the organization. Hungarian concerns with the American alliance with Russia led to difficulties in forming relationships with Hungarian contacts, not to mention the trouble they had in even contacting and verifying anti-Nazi Hungarians because of Russian influence in that area. As a result, operations were often muddled and not secure, thus resulting in failed outcomes, such as the penetration attempts from Yugoslavia, to tragically failed operations such as Cassia and Sparrow. Even more disappointing, are the operations that had unintended, unforeseen, but possibly predictable results like those that resulted from the Bowery Mission. It was not for lack of trying and honest good intentions that the OSS could not achieve its goals in Hungary. The OSS achieved amazing results in Western Europe that saved lives and shortened the war as so many books and veterans can attest to. However, so many factors were working against the American attempts to influence Hungary that those same miracles were not only unrealistic, but destined to fail.

⁷⁵ After Germany's defeat, Horthy was handed over to the Americans who happily testified at the Nuremberg trials, and then retired to Portugal where he wrote his memoir and lived out the rest of his life.

THE POWER OF INSPIRATION: HOW JOAN OF ARC TURNED THE TIDE OF THE HUNDRED YEARS' WAR

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The Hundred Years' War, fought between 1337 and 1453, was a power struggle between the competing English and French monarchies vying for control of what is now modern-day France. Though casualties throughout the conflict were high for both sides, the war was especially destructive for the French, as it was fought almost entirely on French soil. More significant than the mere physical destruction, however, was the political discord sown during the course of the conflict. During the Hundred Years' War, a struggle began inside of the French court, pitting two factions, the loyalist Armagnacs and the pro-English Burgundians, against each other in addition to the English threat. The story of the Hundred Years' War after 1415 is one of Armagnac defeat at the hands of the English and their Burgundian allies. Indeed, by October 1428, the English had begun the siege of Orléans, the last bastion of Armagnac power north of the Loire River. With the capture of this strategic city, the English and Burgundian forces would have cemented Henry VI's claim to the French throne while discrediting the claim of the Armagnac Dauphin, the future Charles VII.

However, the English never captured Orléans. From a small, obscure village on the political and geographic periphery of France came Joan of Arc, a girl who claimed to have a mission from God to save France from the English. This illiterate and militarily inexperienced teenage peasant-girl gained the sponsorship of the dauphin and became a leader of the army of France, leading it from one victory to another, beginning with the relief of Orléans in 1429. By the time of her capture and untimely death in 1431, France had retaken the initiative in the Hundred Years' War, and would go on to defeat the English in 1453. The victory, however, began with Joan. In a mere three years, Joan of Arc had reversed the tide of the Hundred Years' War. How was this possible?

To undertake any analysis with the purpose of answering that question, one must begin with a description of exactly how bad the situation was for the French at the time of Joan's arrival on the scene.

The Hundred Years' War began as a territorial dispute between the monarchies of France and England. The English monarchy actually had sizeable land holdings in modern-day France in the thirteenth century, including Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Touraine, Poitou, and Aquitaine.¹ By 1259, however, the balance of power on the continent had shifted such that the Treaty of Paris had re-established the English monarch as a vassal of the French king and left only Aquitaine in English hands.² When the French King Philip VI legally seized this last English province in 1337, English King Edward III went to war against his nominal suzerain.³

Edward was prepared for war with his French "overlord." On January 26, 1340, Edward III made the famous Ghent declaration, in which he declared himself king of France and England.⁴ English forces destroyed the French fleet at Sluys in 1340 and advanced into Brittany by 1342.⁵ In 1346-7, the English sacked Caen and captured Calais, inflicting a humiliating defeat on Philip's numerically-superior army at Crécy on August 26.⁶ This battle was followed by the descent of the Black Death upon Europe, which ravaged the armies and populations of England and France alike.⁷ King John II was defeated by a smaller English force at Poitiers in 1356; in fact, the French monarch was captured in the battle, forcing his country to relinquish Aquitaine and Ponthieu as well as the town of Calais and pay a ransom of three million golden crowns for its king.⁸ Thus, after almost twenty years of war, the French had lost nearly every major battle and their king was a prisoner in London.

Despite some military successes in the latter half of the fourteenth century, the French leadership had descended into civil war by 1407 with the assassination of the Armagnac Louis of Orléans by the Burgundian John the Fearless.⁹ John followed this victory with a successful campaign against his political enemies, seizing Velleux, Rougemont, Ham, Bourges, and Arras, as well as the provinces of Picardy, Champagne, and Berry.¹⁰ Perhaps even

¹ Deborah A. Fraioli, *Joan of Arc and the Hundred Years' War* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), 1-2.

² *Ibid.*, 2.

³ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵ Kelly DeVries, *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* (Gloucestershire, England: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1999), 10-11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 11-12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁹ Fraioli, 56.

¹⁰ DeVries, 18.

more ominously, John had also made a truce with the English in 1407, which, as historian Kelly DeVries asserts, “set the stage for the later English-Burgundian alliance which was to play such an important part in the next phase of the Hundred Years’ War.”¹¹

The English took advantage of the raging civil war in France by launching another invasion of the continent. After a month-long siege, the town of Harfleur fell to the English under King Henry V in September 1415.¹² On October 25, 1415, in what has become “one of the greatest and most immortalized victories of the entire Middle Ages,” the English, though outnumbered almost four to one, destroyed an entire French army at Agincourt.¹³ According to DeVries, this loss was staggering: “Agincourt had taken its toll not only on the French army’s leadership and numbers, but, perhaps more importantly, on its military confidence as well.”¹⁴ The French losses did not end at Agincourt, however. Henry V led the English to victory after victory, securing Normandy and capturing the important city of Rouen on January 19, 1419.¹⁵

The Burgundians were not idle observers to the English and French conflict. John the Fearless expanded his control of northeastern France, capturing Chartres and Montl’héry in October 1417.¹⁶ On May 29, 1418, the Burgundians entered Paris, capturing the French King Charles VI and Queen Isabeau of Bavaria; however, they failed to capture the only surviving male heir to the throne, the future Charles VII, who had already fled south.¹⁷ Seeking to make peace with the Armagnac leader and perhaps unite forces against the growing power of the English, John met with Charles VII on a bridge at Montereau on September 10, 1419.¹⁸ Whatever the initial purpose of the meeting, its only real effect was to throw the Burgundians headlong into the English camp, as John the Fearless was murdered on that bridge.¹⁹ His son, Philip the Good, would prove an able ally of the English.

The political repercussions of the English military might and the assassination of the Duke of Burgundy were embodied in the Treaty of

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 20.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid., 22.

¹⁵ Ibid., 24.

¹⁶ Ibid., 24-25.

¹⁷ Ibid., 25.

¹⁸ Fraioli, 57.

¹⁹ Ibid. and DeVries, 26. Whereas both sources relate the death of John, Fraioli and DeVries differ slightly in their interpretation of the event. Fraioli implicates the dauphin openly in John’s assassination, writing, “Despite the professions of goodwill and intricate precautions for safety, on the day of the meeting, the dauphin’s men hacked the duke of Burgundy to death.” DeVries, however, does not necessarily attribute the Duke’s untimely death to a plot by Charles: “In meeting with Charles on the bridge at Montereau under a writ of ‘safe passage’, [John] was set upon and murdered by Armagnac adherents.”

Troyes. Signed between Henry V, Philip the Good, and the ailing Charles VI on May 21, 1420, the treaty disinherited Dauphin Charles VII and replaced him with Henry V (or his firstborn son in case of death) as heir to the throne of France.²⁰ As Fraioli describes, “To those who believed in the dignity and rights of the French crown, the last forty years, culminating in the Treaty of Troyes, had brought France to the point of heartbreaking desolation.”²¹ Obviously, the Armagnacs did not accept the treaty as legitimate, and still accepted the dauphin as the rightful heir to the French throne.

Both the English and Burgundians continued to push into Armagnac land in the years following the Treaty of Troyes. Indeed, the relative ease with which they did so is indicative of the military and psychological weakness of the Armagnac forces. In the two years immediately following the treaty, English and Burgundian forces had captured Ballon, Beaumont-le-Vicomte, Montfort-le-Retrou, Fresnay, Harcourt, Dreux, St. Valery-sur-Somme, Gamaches, Crepy, Compiègne, Pontoise, Melun, Epernon, Gallardon, Bonneval, Montereau, Villeneuve-sur-Yonne, La Charite, and Meaux, as well as several important cities, such as Auxerre, Sens, Laon, Soissons, and Reims; most of these locations were captured without even token opposition from Armagnac garrisons.²² The English army defeated its French and Scottish counterparts at Cravant in July 1423 and at Verneuil, a “second Agincourt,” in August 1424, both of which were English victories despite the French army’s numerical superiority.²³

By 1428, the English had devised a plan to bring the war to a successful conclusion. If the English army under the command of Thomas Montagu, Earl of Salisbury, could capture the city of Orléans, the English would control the entire Loire River and would thus be in a position to strike at the dauphin in his headquarters at Chinon.²⁴ With this intent in mind, Montagu set about consolidating English control of the regions around Orléans, and began the siege of that city on October 12, 1428.²⁵

Thus, the French situation by the time of Joan’s arrival on the scene was desperate, to say the least. As DeVries describes:

When Joan of Arc involved herself in the Hundred Years’ War, she entered a hornets’ nest of military and political problems. If anything could have discouraged her, the state of France in 1429 should have. Wracked by a war that had lasted nearly a

²⁰ DeVries, 26.

²¹ Fraioli, 57.

²² DeVries, 27.

²³ *Ibid.*, 28.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

century by this point, half of it occupied by a foreign military, its society frightened by marauding armies and confused by the political dispute waged between two parties whose arguments had little grassroots permeation, its economy broken by the constant marching of armies across its agricultural fields, their soldiers largely living off the land, and its industries blocked from the markets and trade routes which had once made them prosperous, with no crowned king, and few others who could or would rise to take over leadership of the government or the armies, the kingdom of France was not even a shadow of its thirteenth-century prototype.²⁶

Perhaps even more daunting than the challenges facing France were the disadvantages Joan herself had to overcome in order to be in a position to facilitate change. The daughter of a poor farmer, Joan was born in about 1412 in the village of Domremy.²⁷ She was illiterate, as were most peasants at the time.²⁸ Her entire career, with all of its astounding successes, took place while she was still a teenager; indeed, when she was burned at the stake in 1431, she was only about nineteen. The young woman who would take command of the army of France grew up having absolutely no military experience whatsoever.²⁹ Joan's career is especially remarkable in that she commanded an army of men and earned their loyalty, respect, and admiration in an age in which women were excluded from the military and commoners excluded from command. Perhaps most surprising of all, she possessed neither noble blood nor powerful familial connections. It seems that someone facing as many obstacles as Joan would be an unlikely candidate to turn the tide of the Hundred Years' War, yet she was able to do just that in spite of her military inexperience, her illiteracy, her femininity, and her peasant upbringing.

Joan had a lasting impact on the Hundred Years' War. Her actions at the siege of Orléans inspired the demoralized French army to relieve that city and win its first major victory in nearly a decade. The army's newfound confidence was further enlarged by another victory at Patay, in which the French, again spurred into action by Joan, defeated their English counterparts on the field. These victories enabled Joan to lead the army to Rheims, where the dauphin was crowned Charles VII, giving France an

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Malcolm G.A. Vale, *Charles VII* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 45-46.

²⁸ Frances Gies, *Joan of Arc: The Legend and the Reality* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 21.

²⁹ Ibid, 22. Gies writes, "Joan's early life has resembled that of other girls in all the villages of France. . . . Except that she may have been a little more pious than most, there was little to distinguish her from all the others."

anointed monarch once again. Though she would not live to see her France entirely cleansed of English forces, Joan's leadership and her ability to inspire turned the tide of the war in favor of the French. Orléans and Patay had reawakened the French Army's belief in its own ability to win, and the dauphin's coronation gave the French people a leader to follow. Though the English would fight on for another twenty-two years after her death, it was Joan's actions that set the stage for their eventual defeat. As the mastermind behind the English victories to that point, the Duke of Bedford wrote to King Henry VI, "Everything prospered [in France] for you until the siege of Orléans. . . . At which time . . . it seemed that there fell by the hand of God a great stroke upon your people assembled there, caused in great part, as I think, by lack of proper belief and by a disciple and follower of the fiend called the Pucelle."³⁰ Joan of Arc had reversed the tide of the Hundred Years' War through her ability to inspire and her generalship.

HISTORIOGRAPHY

Joan's story is perhaps one of the most frequently discussed topics among medieval historians.³¹ Indeed, the incredible nature of the topic has sparked a massive amount of research and numerous opinions concerning the motivations, means, and consequences of Joan's extraordinary achievements. While many of these works address *what* Joan was able to accomplish, none provide a satisfactory answer addressing *how* Joan accomplished all that she did. Beginning in the last century, however, several historians have attempted to answer this question. The evolution of that answer is discussed below.

In her narrative work *Joan of Arc: The Legend and the Reality*, Frances Gies tests the validity of some of the commonly-accepted facts about Joan of Arc. She focuses her writing on the story of Joan, from her rise to prominence in France to her death. Throughout the book, Gies retains a relatively unbiased tone, citing evidence both in favor of and against the usual heroic narrative of *La Pucelle*, the virgin saint.

After providing her own reasonable narrative, Gies critiques other less-neutral scholars who have written on the topic. These writers include a vast number of French, English, and American historians, as well as notables such as Shakespeare and Freud.³² Gies argues that these sources, consisting of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century English and Burgundian chroniclers outraged at Joan's success, French *philosophes* downplaying her religious

³⁰ John of Lancaster, Duke of Bedford, "The Duke of Bedford's memorandum" (14/15 June 1434) in *Joan of Arc: La Pucelle*, Craig Taylor, ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 239.

³¹ Vale, 46.

³² Gies, 245, 257.

conviction, and American writers enhancing the romance of her story, all spin their narrative in support of a certain agenda, using the story of Joan to advance their respective causes. As Gies herself writes, “Every biographer and historian who has written about Joan has in one way or another expressed dissatisfaction with her real story.”³³ Gies is not exempt from this rule; she argues that the commonly-accepted status of the Treaty of Arras in 1435 as the turning point of the Hundred Years’ War is due to the bigotry of male historians. She contends that the relief of Orléans, Joan’s campaigns in the Loire Valley, and the Battle of Patay were, collectively, the turning point, citing the beneficial effect of victory on French morale, as well as the corresponding decline in English morale following the French successes.³⁴ Her work provides an accurate, well-balanced, properly documented narrative of *La Pucelle*, and it built the foundation for future analysis of Joan’s accomplishments without conducting such an analysis itself. Gies’ work successfully informs the reader as to what Joan did, but, being more of a narrative work than one of analysis, does not venture to determine how Joan accomplished what she did.

The first significant answer to this question can be found in *Joan of Arc: A Military Leader* by Kelly DeVries. In this book, DeVries explains Joan’s exploits from a military standpoint. He points out that, although numerous studies have analyzed Joan from religious, feminist, nationalist, and socialist views, few have devoted intense study to her primary reason for fame: her military accomplishments.³⁵ Indeed, he devotes his entire book to this aspect of Joan of Arc.

According to DeVries, “Joan of Arc was a soldier, plain and simple.”³⁶ This part of Joan’s life, DeVries asserts, is the most important aspect of study, as without her military ability, Joan would never have been as successful as she was. He supports this claim with an impressive historiography and detailed descriptions of her Loire River campaign, culminating in the crowning of the dauphin at Reims in July 1429.³⁷ Yet DeVries’ study, in focusing explicitly on Joan’s military leadership, discounts other important reasons for her success. The spiritual and religious factors that led to her prominence in the French army certainly contributed to the military victories DeVries so arduously promotes. While he excellently describes the soldierly qualities of Joan and how crucial they were to her success, DeVries’ answer is too narrow as it does not consider

³³ Ibid., 258.

³⁴ Ibid., 100.

³⁵ DeVries, 2.

³⁶ Ibid., 3.

³⁷ Ibid., 134.

the role of Joan's religious conviction and her ability to inspire as other factors in her success.

Indeed, DeVries' analysis of Joan's accomplishments tends to downplay inspiration. Though DeVries correctly asserts the military nature of Joan's accomplishments, as well as her ability to influence events both on the battlefield and in the conduct of the war itself, he does not give due credit to her role as an inspiration to the soldiers of the demoralized French Army.

Stephen Richey, in his book *Joan of Arc: The Warrior Saint*, analyzes Joan's leadership abilities. He asserts that Joan's success was due to her intuitive knowledge of military tactics, to the qualities of intellect and character that she possessed, enabling her to lead soldiers, and a series of lucky circumstances.³⁸ Richey organizes his work into two parts: first, he provides an exposition of the literature on Joan of Arc and describes what feats she actually accomplished; second, he delves into the intellectual and spiritual qualities Joan exhibited, as well as the fortuitous circumstances surrounding her rise to power in the French army, all of which, he argues, is why Joan was able to accomplish what she did.

Richey begins his work with an exposition of the arguments already presented about Joan, presenting her historiography in detail.³⁹ His analysis is both thorough and diverse, detailing research done on Joan of Arc from the mid-nineteenth century to the present day. He describes the situation in France at the time of Joan's arrival on the scene, including the aftermath of the Battle of Agincourt and the alliance between England and Burgundy, as well as the capitulation of Charles VI to Henry V.⁴⁰ This background information, while providing no new or insightful material, gives the reader the foundation required to understand Joan in her historical context.

Had he stopped there, his work would not have produced anything different from DeVries. Indeed, Richey uses much of DeVries' research in his own exposition of Joan's accomplishments. Yet he expands upon DeVries' argument, accepting that Joan's soldierly aptitude contributed to her success but disagreeing with DeVries that her military prowess was the sole reason for her achievements. Richey argues that Joan's success stemmed not only from her ability as a soldier, but also from her use of religious "symbols" as an inspirational tool. Among the symbols he includes in his writing are Joan's use of prophetic statements, her sword, and her battle standard.⁴¹ Overall, Richey's argument is useful in its articulate

³⁸ Stephen W. Richey, *Joan of Arc: The Warrior Saint* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 6.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 7-12.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 16-23.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 102-109. Joan's sword was supposedly the sword of St. Catherine-de-Fierbois, and her standard included not only the fleur-de-lys (a symbol representing the Virgin Mary), but also the names "Jhesus-Maria."

descriptions of Joan's charisma and military effectiveness, and he rightly expands upon DeVries' incomplete argument, yet still, he does not fully address Joan's role as an inspirer.

Richey asserts Joan's use of symbols inspired those who followed her. Yet it was Joan who inspired, rather than the sword she used or the banner she carried. While these things enhanced her inspirational ability, the source of inspiration was Joan herself, including, but not limited to, the prophetic abilities Richey identifies. Richey's argument, then, while it does expand upon DeVries by citing the power of Joan's religious symbols, is also inadequate as he does not go far enough. Joan was successful in turning the tide of the Hundred Years' War not only because of her competence as a soldier, and not only because of her use of religious symbols, but because she inspired the French to military success between 1429 and 1430 via her inspirational abilities on both a personal level and as a general.

Joan was not only a soldier, nor was she merely a soldier who manipulated religious symbols. Joan's true strength lay in her ability to inspire. Yet she was also not a mere "mascot," for her inspiration derived from the example she set for those around her as a leader.⁴² She set this example not only through her spiritual qualities, but also through her qualities as a soldier and general. These qualities and their inspirational effects on her followers are evidenced throughout her short-lived career, beginning at Vaucouleurs and continuing even beyond her untimely death at Rouen. Yet no instance better exemplifies her spiritual and military qualities as the relief of Orléans. The rest of this project will be devoted to delving into Joan's inspirational qualities and their effects, concluding with an analysis of those qualities in action at the turning point of the war, the relief of Orléans.

Despite the extensive research reviewed above which explores how Joan accomplished all she did, no historian has yet adequately answered how Joan was so successful when presented with the opportunity to alter the course of the Hundred Years' War. The situations surrounding this success were influenced by the way Joan was perceived by her contemporaries – as a saint, gifted with the voice of prophecy.

⁴² DeVries, 7. He concurs with my assertion here; I am indebted to him for providing the term "mascot" to describe what some historians erroneously label Joan's main role in the Hundred Years' War. Though I am unsure as to the origins of the term, I also extend my thanks also to Professor Clifford Rogers for identifying a reference to Joan as "mascot" in Frances Winwar, *The Saint and the Devil* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Harper, 1948), 149.

JOAN'S SPIRITUAL QUALITIES

Joan often spoke with authority on the outcome of certain future events that came to pass in the manner that she predicted. This seeming ability to prophesy was a source of inspiration that led many witnesses of her life to believe in her cause. Catherine Royer, Joan's hostess during her stay at Vaucouleurs, was one of the first to experience this prophetic gift. Faced with the skepticism of Robert de Brandicourt, the commander of the camp, Joan insisted that he aid her in her quest to meet with the dauphin at Chinon, quoting a prophecy which indicated that a virgin from Lorraine would restore France.⁴³ The inspirational effect of Joan's referencing this prophecy was swift, as Royer recalls, "I remembered having heard that, and I was flabbergasted. . . . And after that I believed what she said and so did many others, so much so that Jacques Alain and Durand Laxart agreed to escort her."⁴⁴ Royer's reaction gives the reader a glimpse of the power of the spiritual realm in the mind of the medieval Christian. Catherine believed in the prophecy, and thus Joan's assertion that she was the one to fulfill that prophecy gave her credibility even before she could produce any kind of proof of her divine mission. Thus, even at the early stages of her public life, Joan exhibited the ability to inspire followers through her prophetic spirit.

Upon her arrival at Chinon, Joan continued to display a gift for prophecy. According to the account of Husson Lemaitre, an observer at the dauphin's court, Joan recognized the future monarch, who had concealed himself among his court, despite having never seen the man before.⁴⁵ Joan's ability to see past the deception demonstrated an apparent supernatural power, giving credence to her insistence that she was sent by God. Indeed, even the dauphin himself believed in her divine mission, as her confessor, Jean Pasquerel, reports:

⁴³ Regine Pernoud, *The Retrial of Joan of Arc: The Evidence at the Trial for her Rehabilitation 1450-1456*, J. M. Cohen, trans. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1955), 75.

⁴⁴ Pernoud, 76. *The Retrial* is one of the few primary sources that recount the life of Joan. Twenty years after her death at the hands of the English, Joan was rehabilitated by the Church in a separate trial. Pernoud's work is an exposition of that rehabilitation trial. It is filled with the testimonies of witnesses from every segment of Joan's life, including her childhood, her journey to Chinon, her examination at Poitiers, the relief of Orléans, the Loire River campaigns, her defeat at Paris, her capture at Compiégne, her imprisonment at Rouen, her trial, and her execution, as well as interviews with several of the judges in her trial. Thus it is a very valuable primary source. When reading the accounts of the witnesses, however, the reader must keep in mind that the information may not be entirely accurate. Firstly, the rehabilitation trial took place twenty years after Joan's death, and memories are not as clear with the passage of time. Secondly, since many of the witnesses to her life were close friends of Joan, their testimonies undoubtedly contain a bias in her favor. Finally, the reader must also consider that events came about as Joan had predicted: the English were kicked out of France. Thus, some witnesses may have been influenced by the desire to be seen as a stronger supporter of Joan than they were in reality. For all its shortcomings, however, *The Retrial* remains one of the most important windows into the life of this extraordinary woman, and any serious analysis of Joan's life must include it.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 94.

Joan repeated: “I tell you on behalf of the Lord that you are the true heir of France and the King’s son. He has sent me to you to lead you to Rheims, there to receive your coronation and your anointing, if you will”. After he heard this, the King said to those who were present that Joan had told him a certain secret that nobody knew or could know but God. That is why he had great confidence in her.⁴⁶

This was perhaps the most important outcome of Joan’s travel to Chinon. The support of the dauphin was necessary for Joan to fulfill her mission of saving France. She would have been unable to accomplish anything of significance without first gaining the dauphin’s confidence. It was through her remarkable performance at Chinon and her mysterious knowledge of the dauphin’s private secrets that she did just that.

Joan continued to play a key role as an inspiration for the dauphin. Seeking some reassurance as to the validity of the supposedly divine origin of Joan’s mission, the dauphin ordered an investigation of Joan by the theologians at Poitiers in March 1429.⁴⁷ When pressed to perform some sign to provide her divine aid, Joan became indignant, as Seguin Seguin, one of her examiners, recalls:

She answered: “In God’s name, I have not come to Poitiers to make signs. But lead me to Orléans, and I will show you the signs I was sent to make.” . . . And then she prophesied to me and those others present four things which were then still to come, and which fell out as she foretold. . . . I have seen all this come true.⁴⁸

The four signs Joan promised at Poitiers would each seem miraculous in its own right when viewed through the lens of the dispirited and demoralized French in 1429. According to the Duke of Alençon, one of Joan’s lieutenants, her four missions were: to expel the English; to have the King formally anointed and crowned at Rheims; to free the Duke of Orléans from the English; and to relieve the siege of Orléans.⁴⁹ It was by these signs, Joan asserted, that the Poitiers council could judge her worth as one having been

⁴⁶ Ibid., 140-41.

⁴⁷ Taylor, “The conclusions of the Poitiers investigation (March – April 1429),” 72. This source, though most likely not the official records of the theologians, nonetheless describes the causes and effects of the investigation.

⁴⁸ Pernoud, 87.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 123.

sent by God. Having already considered the desperate situation of France in 1429, the accomplishment of even one of these tasks would be viewed as something miraculous to the French people. And, although Joan neither expelled the English nor freed the Duke of Orléans, she did relieve the siege of Orléans in April 1429 and enabled the king's coronation at Rheims in July of that same year.

Indeed, as the army, accompanied by the dauphin, approached the gates of Rheims, the King hesitated. As Simon Charles, an important member of the dauphin's court, testifies,:

Joan said to [the King]: "Have no fear. The people of Rheims will come out to meet you." And before they reached the city of Rheims the citizens surrendered. The King was afraid that they might resist. . . . But Joan bade the King ride boldly forward, for if he would but advance courageously he would recover his whole kingdom.⁵⁰

This testimony demonstrates Joan's profound impact on the outcome of the war. Her ability to steady and reassure the wavering dauphin through her confidently prophetic statement led to his coronation, cementing Charles VII's claim to the French throne in the eyes of his subjects.

Joan's seeming knack for prophecy extended to the battlefield as well. On June 17, 1429, the eve of the Battle of Patay, the leaders of the French army received word of the approach of an English army under the command of Sir John Fastolf. Much of the French leadership sought to flee, fearing the threat of an English attack, but Joan advocated the opposite course of action. As Alençon recalls, "She maintained that she was certain of victory, and said in French: 'The gentle King shall have the greatest victory today that he has had for a long time. My Counsel tells me that they are all ours.' And I very well know that the English were routed and killed without great difficulty."⁵¹ Described by Burne as a "disaster" for the English, Patay was Joan's first victory against an English army in the open field.⁵² With Talbot's portion of the army annihilated and the rest under Fastolf in retreat, the English would be able to do little to impede the French from consolidating their control over the Loire Valley. The battle was undoubtedly won, of course, by the force of French arms, but those arms

⁵⁰ Ibid., 85. He was the President of the Chamber of Accounts, and, according to Pernoud, is one of the finest sources on relations between the King and Joan.

⁵¹ Ibid., 123.

⁵² Alfred H. Burne, *The Agincourt War: A Military History of the Latter Part of the Hundred Years' War from 1369 to 1453* (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Essential Books, Inc., 1956), 260.

would not have been put into action without the inspiration of the Maid and her Voices.

Yet perhaps the most powerful example of Joan's prophetic ability comes to us from the testimony of the Duke of Alençon. He explains:

During the attack on the town of Jargeau, Joan told me at one moment to retire from the place where I was standing, for if I did not "that engine" – and she pointed to a piece of artillery in the town – "will kill you." I fell back, and a little later on that very spot where I had been standing someone by the name of my Lord du Lude was killed. . . . I wondered greatly at Joan's sayings after all these events.⁵³

Examples such as this enhanced the belief in the army and among the other followers of Joan that she had the gift of prophecy, as well as a connection to the divine so strong that it indicated sainthood.

That Joan's contemporaries considered her a saint is more significant that it seems when viewed from the distance of several centuries since her life and over a century since her formal beatification by the Catholic Church. First, medieval society did not usually confer such an honor on women, as André Vauchez writes in *Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages*: "Women laboured under a dual handicap which, in general, denied them access to sainthood: their physical and moral weakness, which, in the minds of their male contemporaries, was not in doubt; and their status within the Church, which condemned them to a passive role."⁵⁴ Thus, most women, even those who exemplified the Christian life, faced resistance to achieving sainthood based solely on their sex. Yet, as the following examples will show, Joan did not exhibit physical or moral weakness; rather, her physical and moral courage served as an inspiration for the professional (and male) soldiers around her. Additionally, no historian can accurately describe her role in history as anything approaching "passive."

Secondly the term "saint" is fairly commonplace in medieval writing. According to Aviad M. Kleinberg in *Prophets in their Own Country*, "The medieval perception of sainthood was fluid; it was personal, concrete, and of an ad hoc nature."⁵⁵ These "saints" were people who possessed "moral excellence" or "virtue;" however, this mere holiness did not mean they were

⁵³ Pernoud, 121.

⁵⁴ André Vauchez, *Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages*, Jean Birrell, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 371.

⁵⁵ Aviad M. Kleinberg, *Prophets in their Own Country: Living Saints and the Making of Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 5.

saints by the modern-day concept of the word.⁵⁶ Kleinberg asserts that the true saints (in the modern-day sense) of medieval society were those who exhibited not only holiness, but demonstrated supernatural power as well: “The saint possessed virtue (meaning both a quality of life and power) and as such gave rise to the expectation that she would manifest her power.”⁵⁷ Thus, according to Kleinberg, medieval society believed in the sanctity of those who demonstrated holiness and performed supernatural feats; indeed, as saints, such holy people were expected to possess supernatural powers.

Joan’s faith in God, her deep morality, her conviction in the sanctity of her mission, and the heroism she displayed at her death convinced many witnesses at her retrial that she was a saint by whom they were inspired. The testimonies of these witnesses are filled with references to her Voices, her personal holiness, her humility in spite of success, and the inspirational effect all of these factors had on the people around her.

Joan was known to be a holy person, and she called those around her to live holy lives as well. For instance, a priest of Orléans, Messire Pierre Compaing, asserts that it was Joan who convinced the mercenary captain La Hire to make a confession.⁵⁸ Another stirring example of her inspirational holiness comes from the testimony of Reginalde, widow of Jean Huré and citizen of Orléans:

One day a great lord was walking in the open street, cursing and blaspheming God in a most shameful fashion. When Joan heard and saw him she was most troubled and immediately went up to him. Then, taking this blasphemous gentleman by the shoulder, she said to him: “Ah, sir, do you dare to blaspheme our Lord and Master? In God’s name, you will withdraw your words before I go from here.” And then, as I saw – I who speak to you here – that gentleman repented and at the Maid’s exhortation begged for pardon.⁵⁹

Thus, the witnesses to her life establish that Joan exhibited an exemplary and inspirational holiness.

Combined with her personal holiness, Joan’s confidence in the ultimate success in her mission encouraged those around her and served to convince some who followed her of Joan’s saintliness. Bertrand de Poulengy, one of Joan’s original companions on the road to Chinon,

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 6-8.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁵⁸ Pernoud, 114; she describes La Hire as “a valiant soldier but a terrible pillager.”

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 115. This example also serves as a demonstration of Joan’s courage and confidence (discussed in further detail below), as she does not shy away from critiquing her social and military superiors when they behave in a manner that does not befit their station.

remembers the journey from Vaucouleurs: “We had plenty of alarms on the road. But Joan always told us not to fear, and that once we had reached the town of Chinon the Dauphin would welcome us. She never swore, and I was myself greatly encouraged by her voices, for she seemed to me to have been sent by God . . . she seemed like a saint.”⁶⁰ On the road to Chinon, Joan demonstrates sainthood through her personal holiness and her confidence that God was guiding the group. If a normal soldier in her company testified as such, so early in Joan’s career, one can reasonably suggest that such a sentiment, as well as the inspiration it produced, was only enhanced as she accomplished more and more.

Joan’s personal holiness inspired others to strive for a more holy life as well, not only increasing their resolve and willingness to fight alongside her, but also convincing them of her divine support. The Bastard of Orléans, Jean, Count of Dunois, testifies, “As for myself and the rest, when we were in her company we had no wish or desire to approach or have intercourse with women. That seems to me to be almost a miracle.”⁶¹ Though Joan’s ability to inspire others to lead a more Christian life does not have a direct correlation to her turning the tide of the war, her example of holiness reinforced the belief in her as a divinely-guided saint, inspiring loyalty and devotion in those around her and enabling them to more readily follow and trust in her directions. Furthermore, had the Maid not been so adamant in her pursuit of holiness, this would cast into doubt the divine source of her aforementioned power of prophecy, as well as the sanctity of her mission itself, because medieval saints, like those of more modern times, were expected to exhibit personal holiness. Joan’s ability to remain a virgin in the midst of such company as the soldiers of the French army was also a significant indicator of her saintliness. As Vauchez writes in *The Laity in the Middle Ages*: “[Most people] believed that those who managed to preserve their virginity in particularly difficult circumstances acquired thereby a sort of supernatural power.”⁶² This is important because, as stated above, saintliness was defined by a combination of personal holiness and supernatural power. Joan’s holiness and personal sanctity convinced others to follow her because they viewed her as having been sent by God. This is further evidenced by the words of her squire, Jean d’Aulon:

Joan appeared to me a good and modest woman who lived a Christian life. . . . She was angry when she heard anyone

⁶⁰ Ibid., 79.

⁶¹ Ibid., 111. The *Retrial* is filled with accounts of this type; for example, see p. 123-124 for such a testimony from Alençon.

⁶² André Vauchez, *The Laity in the Middle Ages: Religious Beliefs and Devotional Practices*, Daniel E. Bornstein, ed., Margery J. Schneider, trans. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 202.

blaspheming God's name or anyone swearing. I heard her reprimand my lord Duke of Alençon several times for swearing or uttering some blasphemy. On the whole, nobody in the army would have dared to swear or blaspheme in front of her for fear of a reprimand from her.⁶³

Thus, Joan's holiness inspired great loyalty among her troops, giving the army the confidence it needed to achieve victory in battle, as the men strived to make themselves worthy of such a saintly leader.

Joan served as an inspiration of saintliness even to witnesses of her execution. The references from the *Retrial* are numerous; perhaps the most remarkable is the testimony of Isambert de la Pierre, an assessor in Joan's trial who visited her on her last day. He describes:

Immediately after the execution, the executioner came up to me. . . . He was struck and moved by a marvelous repentance and terrible contrition; and he was desperate with fear that he would never be able to obtain God's pardon and indulgence for what he had done to the saintly woman. He said and affirmed that, notwithstanding the oil, sulphur and charcoal that he had applied to Joan's entrails and heart, he had not found it possible to burn them or reduce them to ashes. He was astonished at this as a patent miracle.⁶⁴

Many of these witnesses expressed their admiration of her holiness, both during her trial and at her death; for some, this is in spite of political opposition to her cause, as several such references indicate that Joan inspired even her domestic enemies.⁶⁵ Even though her execution occurred after she had already made her impact on the Hundred Years' War, the above testimony indicates that the example of Joan's life caused some of her enemies to have a change of heart. If such holiness at her death inspired those opposed to her, how much more inspiring was the holiness Joan displayed during her life to those who followed her?

⁶³ Pernoud, 138. This is yet another example of Joan's courage and confidence in correcting her social and military superiors. D'Aulon recalls a similar example on p. 128, in which Joan jokingly threatens to have Dunois beheaded if he allows the English to get past his position. On p. 138, Louis de Coustes also cites an incident in which she chased away the mistress of one of the knights in the army with a "naked sword."

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 212.

⁶⁵ The *Retrial* is indeed full of quotations from "enemy" witnesses to Joan's execution which indicate their admiration of her holiness and saintliness. See pages 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, and 212 for examples of Englishmen, French supporters of the English, and even Joan's judges being inspired by the her demeanor at her death.

As the above sources indicate, Joan's spiritual qualities of prophecy and the holiness of a saint, though hardly martial qualities in their own right, were catalysts for French military success, as those qualities cemented Joan's claim to have been sent by God and gave credibility to her insistence that the French would defeat their English enemies. Moreover, Joan's exemplary holiness, as well as certain seemingly supernatural acts she performed, gave the French soldiers cause to believe that she was indeed a saint. However, were Joan simply a saintly prophet, she could not have had nearly as profound an impact on the course of the war as she did. Just as Joan was not merely a soldier, she was also not just a "spiritual cheerleader," who made dramatic prophecies and exhorted others to live holy lives. Joan inspired the French to win victories not only with her gift of prophecy and her holiness, but also through her qualities as a soldier. Throughout her career, Joan exhibited both moral and physical courage, possessed the presence of mind and decisiveness to make key decisions quickly and forcefully, and demonstrated an inexplicable knowledge of good military tactics. These qualities of generalship inspired Joan's followers even further, directing the energy created by her spirituality and harnessing it to win victories against the English.

JOAN'S MARTIAL QUALITIES

Joan demonstrated moral courage through her willingness to pursue her mission in spite of resistance or disagreement from the military and political leaders of her day. She did not hesitate to disagree with her more experienced military superiors when their plans conflicted with the plan she had been given by God. Alençon tells of her exhortation to several timid leaders of the French army, who suggested a withdrawal before Fastolf's arrival at Patay: "Many of the King's men were frightened, and said that it would be a good thing to send for the horses. 'In God's name,' cried Joan, 'we must fight them. If they were hanging in the clouds we should get them. For God has sent them to us for us to punish them.'"⁶⁶ In this instance, Joan's decision to advocate the course of action opposite that of her social and military superiors demonstrates moral courage, and, as already discussed, the fruit of this courage was the greatest victory France had experienced in years.

Indeed, Joan exhibited moral courage throughout her entire career. She apparently knew, or at least believed, that her time in the public arena would be short, as Alençon reveals, "I sometimes heard Joan say to the King

⁶⁶ Ibid., 123. This quote also serves as an example of her ability to prophesy, as she asserts that God will aid the French in the battle.

that she herself would last a year and scarcely more, and that they must think during that year how to do their work well.”⁶⁷ This simple statement reveals so much about the courage of *La Pucelle*. If Joan really believed that her actions in the service of Charles VII and France would result in her death, yet still chose to serve anyway, can a finer example of moral courage exist? Indeed, knowing that Joan herself believed in her own impending death makes her physical courage in battle all the more remarkable, as she continually thrust herself into situations in which that premonition of death could be realized.

Joan habitually demonstrated courage in battle, providing her soldiers with an example to follow as they fought the English. Her personal courage inspired them with the will to win victories they had always had the ability to win; after all, France had always had a larger population base and a stronger economy than the English, and, as previously stated, the French usually outnumbered their enemies at the onset of most battles.⁶⁸ What the French army lacked, however, was the belief that they could overcome the English after so many years of defeat. To break this “loser’s mentality”⁶⁹ required courageous action. Joan displayed such courage at several points during her career.

Joan exhibited courage at Troyes, a city on the road to the coronation city of Rheims. As Simon Charles again recounts:

But at the moment when [the King] arrived before the city the soldiers saw that the provisions were exhausted, became dispirited, and were on the point of retreating. But Joan told the King to have no fear, for the town would be his next day. Then she picked up her standard, and a number of foot-soldiers followed her, and these she ordered to cut faggots to fill the moat. They cut a great number, and the next day Joan cried: “Charge!” as a signal to throw the faggots into the moat. At the sight of this the people of Troyes feared an assault, and sent to the King to negotiate a surrender. And the King made terms with the townsmen and rode into Troyes with great ceremony, Joan carrying her standard beside him.⁷⁰

As Charles’ testimony indicates, Joan’s courage by leading the charge at Troyes enabled the French to easily take the town, clearing the way for

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ DeVries, 10.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 29.

⁷⁰ Pernoud, 84. See also p. 36 of this work for a similar example from the battle of Orléans. This particular account also serves as another example of Joan’s gift of prophecy, as she predicts the victory of the French army despite the fact that their supplies were already drained.

Charles VII's coronation at Rheims. Yet she displayed such courage even earlier in her career, as at Jargeau in June 1429. Alençon provides some of the most vivid examples of this courage. He describes Joan's actions following a successful English sortie from the town: "But when Joan saw this, she picked up her standard and went to the attack, exhorting the soldiers to be of good courage. And they were so successful that that night the King's soldiers were lodged in the suburbs of Jargeau."⁷¹ Providing further detail, he recounts her actions:

Joan was on a ladder, holding her standard in her hand; this standard was torn and Joan herself was struck on the head by a stone, which broke on her steel cap. She was thrown to the ground, and as she picked herself up she cried to the soldiers: "Up, friends, up! Our Lord has doomed the English. At this very hour they are ours. Be of good cheer!" At that moment the town of Jargeau was taken, and the English retired toward the bridges with the French in pursuit.⁷²

Joan exhibited courage in battle even when she was wounded, a quality that had obvious and palpable effects. Indeed, this behavior must have been even more inspiring to her soldiers, particularly those of noble blood, who would undoubtedly feel ashamed to stand by or flee while a peasant girl continued to advance in spite of injury.⁷³ Thus, at both Troyes and Jargeau, the inspiration produced by Joan's courage contributed to the French victory.

If Joan's courage, both physical and moral, was a key source of inspiration on the battlefield, so too were her abilities as both a soldier and tactician, especially in light of her humble upbringings. Indeed, given her peasant background and gender, Joan should not have been a good soldier. Yet she was able to handle herself well in spite of her non-military heritage. Her skills as a soldier impressed even the most experienced veterans, as Marguerite La Touroulde, Joan's hostess at Chinon, recalls: "From all that I know of her she was absolutely ignorant except in the matter of arms. For I have seen her ride a horse and wield a lance as well as the finest soldier, and

⁷¹ Ibid., 120-121.

⁷² Ibid., 122. A more famous episode of Joan continuing to lead the French despite wounds occurred at Orléans, and is referenced below on p. 36. This instance also reinforces Joan's gift of prophecy, as she rallies the soldiers with the statement of impending English doom.

⁷³ I argue that the shame a professional male soldier feels when he cowers while an inexperienced, young, peasant girl advances is in itself a form of inspiration, albeit a very crude form. Regardless of their intention, which is impossible to truly ascertain, the fact remains that the French soldiers performed better when Joan was present on the battlefield. The evidence indicates that a contributing factor to this performance was Joan's courageous actions, such as the example at Jargeau cited above. Since it was Joan's heroic actions that caused a renewed effort on the part of the French soldiers, I am correct in asserting that those actions were an inspiration which contributed to the French victory.

the soldiers themselves were most astonished by this.”⁷⁴ Joan’s ability to adapt to and excel in living the life of a soldier motivated her troops, who would have been surprised to see such feats from a lowly peasant girl. Indeed, regardless of how holy, prophetic, or courageous she may have been, Joan’s possession of such soldierly qualities as cited by La Touroulde were absolutely essential if soldiers were to be inspired by her in battle; after all, how can one inspire mounted knights by leading them in a charge if one cannot ride?

Joan’s skills as a soldier were enhanced by an uncanny but impressive grasp of military tactics. Somehow, without any kind of formal or informal education, Joan knew what to do during the battles she fought and was able to successfully lead veterans to victory. *Alexon* eloquently describes this quality:

In everything that she did, apart from the conduct of the war, Joan was young and simple; but in the conduct of war she was most skilful, both in carrying a lance herself, in drawing up the army in battle order, and in placing the artillery. And everyone was astonished that she acted with such prudence and clearheadedness in military matters, as cleverly as some great captain with twenty or thirty years experience; and especially in the placing of artillery, for in that she acquitted herself magnificently.⁷⁵

Joan’s inexplicable grasp of tactics was undoubtedly a crucial factor in the victories at Orléans, Jargeau, and Patay, victories which breathed new vigor into the fledgling French cause. The Maid’s knowledge of how to handle an army and use it to defeat her enemies was an inspiration for the troops who followed her, not only in its own right, but also because such knowledge required years of training and experience to accrue under normal circumstances, reinforcing Joan’s assertion that she had been sent by and received aid from God. Armed with the tactical expertise comparable to that of a grizzled veteran, Joan knew what to do when faced with a battlefield decision.

Joan’s decisiveness was another quality which inspired her followers and enhanced the fighting power of her soldiers. Though she lived centuries before her fellow Frenchman, the Maid of Orléans understood the importance of the sentiment underlying Napoleon’s Maxim 65: “The same consequences which have uniformly attended long discussions and councils

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 124.

of war will follow at all times. They will terminate in the adoption of the worst course, which in war is always the most timid, or, if you will, the most prudent. The only true wisdom in a general is determined courage.”⁷⁶ Joan faced war councils on numerous occasions throughout her military career. In each case, the French leadership attempted to recommend cautious actions, whereas Joan sought to act aggressively. Such was the case at Jargeau, as Alençon describes:

There was a debate among the captains because some were of the opinion that they should attack the town and others held a contrary view, maintaining that the English were very powerful, and were there in great numbers. When Joan saw that there was discussion between them, she told them to fear no numbers in attacking the English, for God was conducting their campaign.⁷⁷

The French leadership was used to defeat at the hands of English forces, even when the English were outnumbered, lending a sense of invincibility to the invaders. Dunois addresses this perception of English invincibility in his statement that, before Joan arrived, two hundred Englishmen would have been “sufficient to rout eight hundred or a thousand of the royal army.”⁷⁸ Thus, the caution of the French leadership was founded in the sobering reality of their repeated defeats against what appeared to be an inferior foe. However, Joan’s decisive nature drove the French army from victory to victory; her consistent admonishments to the other leaders of the French army to go on the offensive and be aggressive slowly helped them realize in their own minds what had already been proven a reality with the relief at Orléans: the myth of English invincibility was just that, a myth. Indeed, even as the attack on Jargeau began, the Duke of Alençon hesitated, prompting Joan to say to him: “Do not have doubts. When God pleases, the hour is ripe. We must act when God wills it. Act, and God will act.”⁷⁹ As previously stated, Jargeau fell to the French attack. Joan’s decisive nature served as an inspiration for the army and its commanders, galvanizing the leaders to be aggressive and renewing their confidence in the abilities of their soldiers. After all, if this saint, believed to have been sent by God, had confidence in the French army, then who was

⁷⁶ Napoleon Bonaparte, “Military Maxims,” *Roots of Strategy: A Collection of Military Classics*, vol. 1, Thomas R. Phillips, ed. (London: John Lane the Bodley Head, Ltd., 1943), 233.

⁷⁷ Pernoud, 120.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 106.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 121.

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the Duke of Alençon, the Bastard of Orléans, or any other French general to disagree?

Joan not only had the knowledge to make battlefield decisions, she demonstrated an ability to make good decisions even under great stress. This quality, which the renowned military theorist Carl von Clausewitz names “presence of mind,” is best exhibited in Joan’s life during her trial in Rouen. Though her testimony at her trial could hardly have contributed to the French fortunes in the Hundred Years’ War, her behavior there highlights the presence of mind that she possessed. Unfortunately, references to this quality from her campaigns are rare; however, the trial records are full of statements by Joan which inspire skeptics and even enemies. Even a brief analysis of several of these statements indicates the power of this presence of mind that Joan possessed, a power which inspired those at her trial, and, as we shall see, during her life as well.

Joan possessed a strong presence of mind, exhibited most especially at her trial. Clausewitz defines “presence of mind” as “the conquest of the unexpected.”⁸⁰ In order to possess this quality, he asserts, one must first possess “resolution,” which he describes as “an act of courage in a single instance, and, if it becomes a characteristic trait, a habit of the mind.”⁸¹ Having already examined the numerous accounts of Joan’s courage, we can safely assert that it was a characteristic trait of hers. So the question then becomes: how did Joan “conquer the unexpected” during her trial?

To answer that question, one can first consider the testimony of Nicolas de Houpeville, a Bachelor of Theology who observed the case; de Houpeville remarked that Joan possessed a remarkable “steadfastness . . . that caused many to say she had spiritual aid.”⁸² This steadfastness refers to the strength of Joan’s self-defense against the accusations of the trial judges. As Guillaume Manchon, a notary in the case, testified, “She answered very wisely, and sometimes very simply, as can be seen from the record of the trial. I do not think that she would have been capable of defending herself alone in so difficult a case against such learned men, if she had not been inspired.”⁸³ This testimony indicates Joan’s proficiency at withstanding the expert intellectual assault of the judges in her trial.

Joan amazed those around her with her defense of her actions in the Rouen trial. Several specific examples of this inspiration exist in the

⁸⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, O. J. Matthijs Jolles, trans. (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, Inc., 1950), 35.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁸² Pernoud, 207. Again, this also reinforces Joan’s gift of prophecy.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 166. Other witnesses indicate this same sentiment, including a skeptic, p. 167, who began to believe in her saintliness after hearing her wisdom, her torturers in her prison, p. 170, and even three of the judges in her case, pp. 168, 193, 195.

testimonies of the *Retrial*. For instance, Jean Massieu, an usher in the trial, recalls:

I well remember that they often asked Joan questions in several parts, and several of them asked her difficult questions at the same time. Then, before she could reply to one, another put another question. She disliked this, and said: "Please take your turns." And I was surprised to see how well she could reply to the subtle and tricky questions that were asked her, questions that an educated man would have found it difficult to answer well.⁸⁴

This example demonstrates not only Joan's courage in facing the challenge of an academic debate with some of the most educated men in France, but also her presence of mind in thinking to insist on being allowed to answer each question in its turn. And, of course, she further demonstrated that same presence of mind by providing satisfactory answers for the difficult questions posed! The confidence Joan exuded during these proceedings was admired even by those judging her, as Nicolas Caval testifies, "She had a very good memory. For when they asked her a question she would say: 'I have already answered that, and in these words.'; and she would make the notary turn up the day on which she had given her answer. And they found it all to be exactly as she had said. Considering how young she was, people were astonished."⁸⁵ As this example demonstrates, Joan's presence of mind, her ability to respond to unexpected challenges at her trial, was a source of admiration and inspiration for those who witnessed the trial – even including her accusers.

The most famous example that demonstrates Joan's presence of mind, however, comes from the second scribe in the case, Boisguillaume. During the rehabilitation trial, he recalls:

I remember that she was asked more than once whether she was in a state of grace. She replied that it was a very big thing to answer a question like that. But finally she replied: "If I am, may God keep me in it, and if I am not may God make me so, for I had rather die than not be in the love of God." Her interrogators were dumbfounded by this answer, and they

⁸⁴ Ibid., 165.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 196.

stopped at this point, asking her no more questions for the moment.⁸⁶

Joan's response as depicted in this testimony reveals wisdom and a presence of mind which enables her to escape the trap set by her judges. More importantly, this response so surprised and impressed them that they ceased questioning. Just as her presence of mind on the battlefield contributed to the French victories at Jargeau, and, as we shall see, Orléans, so did that same quality in the courtroom allow her to withstand the barrage of challenging questions by her judges.

If Joan's performance at her trial served to inspire her enemies and fill them with respect and admiration for her presence of mind, her successful military campaigns also inspired the English army – with fear. Joan's accomplishments and reputation inspired fear in many English soldiers which impacted the way in which they fought the French under her command. This fear of Joan reduced the effectiveness of the English, further enhancing the fighting quality of the French opposing them. Joan's victory against the English at Orléans was the first major check to English power in years. This victory had a tremendously positive impact on French morale, and shattered the growing myth of English invincibility. Indeed, Clausewitz describes this phenomenon in *On War*, writing, "Everyone thinks less of his enemy's courage as soon as he turns his back, and everyone ventures much more in pursuit than when pursued."⁸⁷ Clausewitz's words accurately portray the confidence of the French advance under Joan's leadership. By contrast, Joan's victory was troubling to the English, especially considering the remarkable circumstances leading up to her arrival at Orléans. Following the seemingly-miraculous French victory at Orléans, the English armies lost much of their confidence. The Duke of Bedford himself recalled this loss of courage in a letter to King Henry VI in 1434: "A disciple and follower of the fiend called the Pucelle, who used false enchantment and sorcery. . . . [Her] strikes and complete victory not only greatly reduced the number of your people there but also drained the courage of the remnant in marvelous ways and encouraged your adversary's party and enemy to rally at once in great number."⁸⁸ Thus, the apparently-supernatural abilities of Joan inspired fear in the English armies, which, like the French armies, were composed of Christians who believed in the supernatural powers of both God and the devil. Ultimately, the English fear of Joan impeded their ability to conduct operations. For example, as Friar

⁸⁶ Ibid., 167.

⁸⁷ Clausewitz, 72.

⁸⁸ "The Duke of Bedford's memorandum (14/15 June 1434)," in Taylor, 239.

Jean Toutmouille, a Dominican friar who visited Joan on her last day, testifies:

Before her death the English proposed to lay siege to Louviers, but they quickly changed their minds and said that they would not besiege the town until the Maid had been examined . . . immediately after her burning they went and besieged Louviers. They reckoned that while she was alive they would have no glory or success in the field of war.⁸⁹

Thus did Joan inspire fear in the hearts of her adversaries.

So far, this analysis has examined Joan's impact on the Hundred Years' War from nearly every moment of her public life, with one notable exception. The French victories at Jargeau, Patay, and Troyes, the coronation of Charles VII at Rheims, and the drama of Joan's trial and execution all occurred after the Maid's most important contribution to the French cause. It was at Orléans in 1429 that the fate of the entire war hung in the balance, and it was here that Joan made her greatest and most important contribution to the Hundred Years' War: Joan of Arc inspired the French to defeat their English occupiers, and she turned the tide of the Hundred Years' War. Joan's inspirational abilities, both in her various personal characteristics and through her generalship, are best represented in practice at the relief of the Siege of Orléans.

THE TURNING POINT: ORLÉANS

Joan demonstrated resolution and moral courage in her letter to the English. Illiterate and thus unable to write herself, she dictates:

King of England, and you, Duke of Bedford, who call yourself Regent of the kingdom of France; you, William de la Pole, Earl of Suffolk; John Lord Talbot; and you, Thomas Lord Scales, who call yourselves lieutenants of the said Duke of Bedford, make satisfaction to the King of Heaven; surrender to the *Pucelle*, who has been sent here by God, the King of Heaven, the keys of all the good towns that you have taken and violated in France. . . . And you too, archers, companions-at-arms, gentlemen and others who are before the town of Orléans, go back to your own country, by God. And if you do not do this, await news of the *Pucelle* who will come to see you shortly, to

⁸⁹ Pernoud, 154.

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your very great harm. King of England, if you do not do this, I am commander of war, and in whatever place I come upon your men in France, I will make them leave, whether they wish to or not. . . . I have been sent here by God, the King of Heaven, to drive you out of France, body for body.⁹⁰

In this letter, Joan clearly and definitively states her position: there will be no compromise. The English will leave France, or she will throw them out. She uses the letter to announce her intent to relieve Orléans, and her words are filled with a spirit of determination and zeal that galvanize the French into action. Though she would not live to see the complete expulsion of the English, Joan began the long process of the liberation of France with this letter.

Joan demonstrated both physical and moral courage during the battle as well. Simon Charles recounts a confrontation that occurred on May 6, 1429, between Joan, who wanted to assault the English fortresses, and Lord de Gaucourt, who wanted to remain in defense of Orléans: “Joan called the Lord de Gaucourt a wicked man. ‘Whether you like it or not’, she said, ‘the soldiers will charge, and they will win as they have done in other places’. And despite the Lord de Gaucourt, the soldiers who were in the town broke out and made an assault on the Bastille des Augustins, which they captured.”⁹¹ Here Joan, never fazed by her humble roots, showed the moral courage to overcome the social stratification between her peasant upbringing and de Gaucourt’s nobility, enabling her to counter his ineffective orders and lead the soldiers to victory. Additionally, the passage also demonstrates her physical courage, as she led the assault on the Bastille. This same scene is recounted by Jean d’Aulon:

When they saw the enemy coming out of their bastille to attack our men, La Hire and the Maid, who were always in the van to protect the rest, swiftly couched their lances and were the first to strike out at the enemy. Then everyone followed them and began to strike out at the enemy so effectively that they drove them back into the Bastille des Augustins.⁹²

This quote clearly demonstrates Joan’s courage and soldierly skills, as she and La Hire charged the enemy force, prompting the rest of the group to follow them into battle. This action, inspirational in itself, also demonstrates just how powerful Joan had already become in the minds of the French

⁹⁰ “Joan of Arc’s letter to the English (22 March 1429),” in Taylor, 74-75.

⁹¹ Pernoud, 84.

⁹² Ibid., 130.

soldiers by the time she arrived to Orléans, as the entire force followed her and claimed the fortress. This scene is again described by a third witness, Louis de Coutes:

Towards evening, when the King's men saw that they were achieving nothing and that night was already near, they despaired of taking the fort. Joan, however, continued to persist, and promised them that they would capture the place without fail that day. The King's men got ready to attack again; and when the English saw this they put up no defence. They were terrified.⁹³

Joan's courage in this instance inspired the French troops when they were prepared to give up, and her leadership enabled them to achieve victory.

Joan demonstrated physical courage at other points during the course of the battle as well. Having just awoken to the sound of battle on May 4, Joan rushed to join the battle, as d'Aulon recalls,

While I was arming her, we heard a great noise and loud cries from those in the city, who shouted that the enemy were doing great harm to the French. . . . [Joan] went out into the street, where she found a page on a horse. Immediately she made him dismount, and quickly mounted the beast herself. Then straight and as fast as she could, she made her way right to the Burgundy gate where the greatest noise came from.⁹⁴

Here, Joan demonstrated not only physical courage, but also displays a clear presence of mind, as she rides towards the place where she knows she will be most needed. She continued to display this courage as d'Aulon and Dunois left Orléans with a small force to bring back reinforcements from Blois, Joan screened their departure, as d'Aulon testifies,

Then with La Hire and a certain number of her men, she went out into the fields to guard us from any attack by the enemy. And to do this, the Maid placed herself and her men between the enemy's army and the city of Orléans. So successful was she that notwithstanding the great power and numbers of the

⁹³ Ibid., 137.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 128.

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English army, thanks be to God, my lord Dunois and I got through with all our men and safely went on our way.⁹⁵

This action demonstrates a selfless disregard for her own safety. In protecting Dunois as he left the city, Joan put her own life at risk for the sake of her companions. D'Aulon's admiration of the Maid rings clearly through his testimony.

Joan did not inspire the French to victory through her courageous example alone; rather, she made several prophetic statements as well. Indeed, Dunois, after first meeting her, recounts an apparent miracle performed by Joan as the army, stranded on the south side of the Loire, awaited a favorable wind to cross:

Then Joan said to me: "In God's name, the counsel of the Lord God is wiser and surer than yours. . . . I am bringing you better help than ever you got from any soldier or and city. It is the help of the King of Heaven. It does not come through love for me, but from God himself who . . . has refused to suffer the enemy to have both the body of the lord of Orléans and his city." Immediately, at that very moment, the wind, which had been adverse and had absolutely prevented the ship carrying the provisions for the city of Orléans from putting out, changed and became favourable. . . . From that moment I had great hopes of her, greater than before, and I begged her to agree to cross the Loire and enter the city of Orléans.⁹⁶

This testimony reveals just how inspirational the Maid was in the mind of Dunois, as well as those who followed her. Whether or not the change in the wind was the result of divine intervention or mere coincidence, its effect was the same: the soldiers of the French army believed in the Maid. Joan was already known to maintain a high degree of personal holiness, and thus her seeming ability to perform supernatural acts, such as changing the wind, supported the French belief in her sainthood.⁹⁷ As Dunois indicates, this incident was viewed as miraculous, and gave credence to her claim to have been sent by God. Confident that Joan was being guided by the divine, the French soldiers were inspired to victory by her apparent gift of prophecy,

⁹⁵ Ibid., 127.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 105.

⁹⁷ See the testimonies (cited above in this document) of the examiners at Poitiers, Bertrand de Poulengy, and Jean d'Aulon.

especially her continued assertion that God would aid them in their struggle against the English.⁹⁸

The effects of the victory at Orléans with respect to how the French soldiers viewed Joan were immediate. The Duke of Alençon testified, “From what I have heard of the soldiers and the captains who were there, they all regarded almost everything that happened at Orléans as a miracle from God, and considered it to have been the work of no human hands but to have come from on high.”⁹⁹ As Alençon asserts, the French viewed Joan as a saint, and many came to share in her conviction that God would aid them in their mission to expel the English. As the Bastard of Orléans himself proclaimed, “I believe that Joan was sent by God, and that her deeds in the war were the fruit of divine inspiration rather than of human agency.”¹⁰⁰ Here, Dunois asserts that Joan was guided by God, and that the victories wrought during her time with the French army were inspired by that guidance; he acknowledges that the French army could not have won the victories of Orléans, Jargeau, or Patay without the inspiration it received from God through Joan.

Finally, in what is perhaps the most celebrated, recreated, and dramatized episode of Joan’s entire career, Joan demonstrated profound personal courage during the battle despite being wounded, as Dunois recounts:

Joan was wounded by an arrow. . . . Despite this, she did not retire from the battle and took no remedy against the wound . . . I was going to break off, and intended the army to retire into the city. Then the Maid came up to me and requested me to wait a little longer. Thereupon she mounted her horse and retired herself into a vineyard. . . . When she came back, she immediately picked up her standard and took her position on the edge of the ditch. The moment she was there the English trembled with terror; and the King’s men regained their courage and began to climb, delivering their assault against the bulwark and not meeting with the least resistance. Then that bulwark was taken.¹⁰¹

This scene epitomizes the various inspirational qualities of *La Pucelle*. Despite her wound, Joan returned to the fight, exhibiting physical courage. She retired to pray, demonstrating her holiness. She prepared to charge,

⁹⁸ Pernoud, 105.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 120.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 103.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 106-107.

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showing keen presence of mind by choosing the exact time and place of her advance. And, finally, she led her soldiers to victory.

CONCLUSION

Joan was not just a soldier, nor was she merely a soldier who manipulated religious symbols. Joan's true strength lay in her ability to inspire. It was through her holiness, her gift for prophecy, her courageous example, her presence of mind, and her tactical expertise that Joan inspired the French to victory at Orléans. And, indeed, it was Joan herself who enabled the French to victory, as Jean Luillier, spokesman for the townsmen of Orléans at Joan's retrial, testifies:

I and all the people of the city believe that if the Maid had not come from God to help us, we the inhabitants and the city would shortly have been at the mercy and in the power of the enemy who were besieging us. I do not think that the inhabitants or the soldiers who were in the town would have been able to put up a long resistance against an enemy who was then so much superior to them.¹⁰²

The significance of Joan's victory at Orléans is clear: the tide had turned. The Hundred Years' War, though it would continue for nearly thirty more years, would never be as close as it was just before Joan's arrival on the scene. Joan of Arc changed the course of history through inspiration.

¹⁰² Ibid., 113.

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