Social entrepreneurship, and the technopolitics of millennial development in Cape Town.

Andrea Pollio

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Institute for Culture and Society

Western Sydney University

New South Wales

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WESTERN SYDNEY
UNIVERSITY

Institute for Culture
and Society

The work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original except as acknowledged in the text. I hereby declare that I have not submitted this material, either in full or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.

[redacted]

to all my teachers, starting from my parents, and to Sheppy, who unteaches me

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List of Abbreviations

ANC — African National Congress

ANT — Actor-Network Theory

ASEN — African Social Enterprise Network

BEE — Black Economic Empowerment

B-BBEE (BBBEE) — Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment

BENBO — Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development

BM — Business Model

BMC — Business Model Canvas

BoP — Bottom Of the Pyramid

CBD — Central Business District

CEO — Chief Executive Officer

CDRA — Community Development Resource Association

CID — Central Improvement District

CIDA — Community & Individual Development Association

CNBC — Consumer News and Business Channel

CPUT — Cape Peninsula University of Technology

CSR — Corporate Social Responsibility

CTICC — Cape Town International Convention Centre

CV — Curriculum Vitae

DC — District of Columbia

DNA — Design Network Africa

EDP — Economic Development Partnership

ENCA — E-News Channel Africa

EMES — EMES European Research Network

FF — Inyathelo's Funding Finder

FIFA — Fédération Internationale de Football Association

FPA — Funding Practice Alliance South Africa

GAWC — Globalization and World Cities Research Network

GBI — Global Business Institute Inc.

GDP — Gross Domestic Product

GEAR — Growth Employment And Redistribution plan

GEM — Global Entrepreneurship Monitor

GIBS — University of Pretoria Gordon Institute of Business Science

GPS — Global Positioning System

GSB — University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business

HIV — Human Immunodeficiency Virus

IA — Impact Amplifier

ICT — Information and Communication Technology

IMF — International Monetary Fund

IOL — Independent Online South Africa

IOT — Internet Of Things

IT — Information Technology

JPAL — Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab

KPGM — Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler

LGBT — Lesbian Gay Bisexual Transgender

LLC — Limited Liability Company

MBA — Master of Business Administration

MOCAA — Museum Of Contemporary African Art

MIT — Massachusetts Institute of Technology

MVP — Minimum Viable Product

NASA — National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NEC — Native Economic Commission

NGO — Non-Governmental Organization

NPO — Not-for-Profit Organization

OECD — Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

PBC — Peninsula Business Club

PBP — Philippi Business Place

PEDI — Philippi Economic Development Initiative

PIN — Personal Identification Number

POS — Point Of Sale

PwC (PWC) — PricewaterhouseCoopers

R — South African Rand

RDP — Reconstruction and Development Programme

SAB (SAB-Miller)— South African Breweries (Miller)

SAIA — South African Institute for Advancement

SAIS — South African Innovation Summit

SASE — Southern African Social Entrepreneurs

SAVCA — Southern African Venture Capital & Private Equity Association

SDI — Spatial Development Initiative

SME(s) — Small and Medium Enterprise(s)

STS — Science and Technology Studies

SUT — Sisulu Uluthu Technologies

SW — Startup Weekend

SWCT — Startup Weekend Cape Town

TRC — Truth and Reconciliation Commission

UBS — UBS Bank

UCT — University of Cape Town

UN — United Nations

UN-Habitat — United Nations Human Settlements Programme

UNU-WIDER — United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research

UK — United Kingdom

US — United States of America

USB — Universal Serial Bus

USD — United States Dollar

VEGA —VEGA School at the Independent Institute of Education Pty South Africa

VPUU — Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading

WEF — World Economic Forum

WTO — World Trade Organization

Abstract

In Cape Town, as in many other cities of the Global South, a range of new developmental experiments have emerged around the idea that, by empowering entrepreneurs, poverty can be fought with profit. Social enterprises, for example, are being promoted by global institutions as organisations that, by seeking both financial profit and social good, are ideal vehicles for meeting the demands of contemporary development. As a result, local authorities, NGOs, and other developmental agencies have all embraced social entrepreneurship as one of the devices that have the capacity to yield market solutions to poverty.

Bringing together insights from postcolonial human geography and critical ethnography, this research examines how social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology of 'millennial development', by tracing the experiments through which ingrained issues such as racialised poverty and urban marginality are framed as domains of entrepreneurial innovation. Hence this work asks: what does seeing social entrepreneurship as a system of developmental expertise reveal about the claim that social enterprises are empowering? What kind of technical and political regimes are mobilised, invented, and experimented to address economic marginality in a postcolonial, post-apartheid city?

To address these questions, this dissertation follows a network of very diverse sites of expertise, where social entrepreneurship is put into action in material ways. First, it identifies some of Cape Town's 'centres of calculation', which accumulate and distribute authoritative

knowledge: a development agency, a research centre, and a consulting firm. Second, it follows three pedagogical experiments designed to produce the market subjectivities of social entrepreneurship: a business school, an office complex and an investment firm. Third, it charts how the know-how of social entrepreneurship is given material form through dedicated conferences and start-up competitions. Fourth, it explores the infrastructural support of social entrepreneurship in the functioning of two business incubators in Cape Town's marginal areas. Lastly, using the material politics of a portable point-of-sale, this dissertation shows how social entrepreneurship coexists with ubuntu, another political technology of redistribution in contemporary South Africa.

The empirical core of this research combines ethnographic and interview material gathered between March and November 2015. Drawing on fieldnotes and documentary evidence, this dissertation argues that it is through tentative, material and failure-ridden experiments that social entrepreneurship becomes a viable technology of development expertise. The findings of this research also show that the technopolitics of millennial development in Cape Town are not only centred around finding market solutions to poverty. Social entrepreneurship, while opening new frontiers for capitalist expansion, is also a terrain of diverse opportunities, where distinct technical, economic, and ethical regimes are cultivated. This dissertation thus concludes that examining social entrepreneurship as a political technology reveals its spatial, material and performative qualities in reproducing the promises of millennial development, as well as the possibility for alternative politics of entrepreneurial empowerment.

0. Introduction.

0.1. Research background and objectives: Millennial Development in Cape Town.

Since the late 1990s, the philosophy of empowerment through entrepreneurship has become central to economic development in the Global South. States and institutions like the World Bank or the World Trade Organization (WTO) have embraced the idea the more entrepreneurial forms of development are best suited to address the contemporary predicaments of the postcolonial world[1]. This was a response to the policy failure of previous developmental paradigms (Best, 2014; 2017). It was also a rejoinder to critics—most prominently the anti-globalization movement—who argued that international development had served the interests of large corporations and done little to lift the majority of the world out of poverty (Elyachar, 2002; Sparke, 2012).

The entrepreneurial turn in the discourses and practices of developmental institutions has been termed "millennial development" by scholar Ananya Roy (2010). In her work, she highlights how financial models for entrepreneurial empowerment unfold through global circulations of experts and ideas, as well as contextual economic laboratories, experiments and failures. She also argues that, by devolving the responsibility for development to the individual, producing new

1 For example, OECD 2003; UNU-WIDER, 2008; World Bank, 2012. See also Naude, 2010.

financial assets, and promising market solutions to the problem of poverty, the ideas of millennial development uncannily resonate with the doctrine of late neoliberalism. In this sense, millennial development is a critical term that encompasses a series of diverse concepts and practices that institutions like the World Bank as well as postcolonial states use to frame economic paradigms centred around the possibility of entrepreneurial empowerment.

The research presented in this dissertation follows in the footsteps of a rich scholarship that has taken technical expertise as its entry point into understanding development as a postcolonial condition (for example, Ferguson, 1990; Cooper, 1997; Mitchell, 2002; Elyachar, 2005; Mosse, 2005; Li, 2007; Roy, 2010). Though diverse, these studies share the conviction that the making of authoritative knowledge for development has been inextricably both technical and political. The practices of contemporary development too are underpinned by a small number of powerful technical ideas that could be described as 'political technologies'. The latter, in a framework inspired by Foucault's writings on power (2001), are systems of applied expertise that respond to a "problem of collective life" (Lakoff and Collier, 2010, p.244). In other words, they are ideas that become capable of articulating a problem and apparently apolitical solutions to it—in this case, poverty in the postcolonial world—through technical systems that include experts, institutions, facts, policies as well as material artefacts (Rose & Miller, 1992). Among the political technologies that sustain millennial development, this thesis focuses on one in particular: social entrepreneurship.

As suggested by one of my interlocutors, social entrepreneurship is aptly summarized by the motto 'doing well by doing good'. This is a recurring catchphrase among developmental organizations as well as a widespread slogan title in business magazines such as Forbes

(see Chapter 1). Many institutions—not least the World Bank—and corporations operating in the Global South use the adage to showcase their commitment to social and environmental causes. For Collier *et al.* (2017), this motto encircles a series of micro-policies, companies, apps, platforms, and objects that are designed to combine financial profit and humanitarian efforts in the attempt at improving the lives of marginal populations. Among these technologies, social entrepreneurship can be described as a system of expertise that is predicated on the possibility of applying entrepreneurial tools and profit-making schemes to social change. Social entrepreneurship is then a vast field of knowledge, not least an academic object in itself, that perfectly responds to the key question of millennial development: how to fight poverty by extending the domains of entrepreneurial profit?

Whilst other powerful ideas of millennial development, such as microfinance (Roy, 2010; Rankin, 2013), social capital and the informal economy (Mayer & Rankin, 2002; Elyachar, 2005), development partnerships (Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Pieterse, 2001), the bottom-of-the-pyramid approach (Blowfield & Dolan, 2014; Dolan, 2012; Elyachar, 2012; Dolan & Roll, 2013) and "factivism" (Mitchell, 2016), have received much critical scrutiny, the role of social entrepreneurship as a political technology has received less attention. In fact, much of the debate on the topic is limited, at least geographically, to the contexts where the literature on social enterprises initially described them as a form of organization—namely Western Europe and North America.

The main objective of this dissertation is thus to show how social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology of contemporary economic development in the Global South, using specific places and practices in the city of Cape Town, South Africa, as research objects. A powerful, though unstable and shifting, system of knowledge, social entrepreneurship frames poverty, racialized marginality and urban

segregation as potential domains of profitable innovations. In this process, I argue, social entrepreneurship is mobilized and reinvented through technopolitical experiments that have an intrinsic relationship to the geographies and histories of Cape Town and South Africa. In exploring these contextual experiments with the expertise of 'doing well while doing good', this dissertation offers a unique perspective on millennial development in one of its specific sites—a postcolonial, post-apartheid city—ultimately questioning the technical and political regimes that are thereby mobilized.

To these ends, this dissertation charts the "ecologies of expertise" (Ong, 2005, p.337) that undergird social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. Specifically, I draw an "ethnography of circulations" (Appadurai, 2001) which follows technocrats, economic experts, sites, documents, books, and other calculative devices in their capacity to shape social entrepreneurship as an enabling technology of contemporary development.

Based on extensive fieldwork conducted in 2015, this dissertation sheds an ethnographic light on how authoritative knowledges, best practices, facts about social change and business innovation are established and circulated through urban spaces, such as development agencies, business incubators, global firms' headquarters, business schools, informal settlements and NGOs, where global and local 'truths' about social entrepreneurship are assembled. It is an account of how powerful institutions inscribe their knowledge and their agendas into the practice of humanitarian development, but also of how individuals in those institutions negotiate their critiques and their positioning, how 'marginal' facts are tested against performative certainties, and how alternative narratives coexist with those of social entrepreneurship.

My contribution also articulates the complex ways in which the ecologies of social entrepreneurship are endowed with a "radical political

indeterminacy" (Ferguson, 2015, p.31). Scholars of development have long argued that development is not a unidirectional trajectory and that alternative political ends can be imagined and inscribed into its making as expert knowledge (Gibson-Graham & Ruccio, 2001; Power, 2003; Escobar, 2010). In this regard, my research does show that millennial development unfolds as an attempt at expanding the frontiers of capitalist markets in the Global South, by tapping into the 'capital' of poverty, as Ananya Roy argues (2010), and that social entrepreneurship is a forefront of this expansion. The results of these processes, however, are not predetermined. By paying attention to what Foucault would call "the lines of fragility in the present" (Foucault, cited in Brown, 2001, p.107), the experimental sites of social entrepreneurship described in this work appear as fields where diverse technical and political regimes collide and are rearranged.

Specifically, I argue that social entrepreneurship often produces what could be described, expanding on Marx, as a 'fictitious capital', a claim on future rather than real profit opportunities. Social entrepreneurship's fictitious capital, a terrain of possibilities and hopes, does contain the promise of accumulating wealth. Yet, as many of the stories narrated in this thesis show, the promise of profit was rarely fulfilled. The fictitious possibility of 'doing well' (financially), instead, served the purpose of 'doing good' in conditions of incredible scarceness and uncertainty. As such, it was a vital source of many experiments performing alternative, "diverse economies" (Gibson-Graham, 2008) of development. Put differently, this fictitious capital is a by-product of how social entrepreneurship articulates, in a technical form, the question of expanding capitalist accumulation in the postcolonial world. At the same time, it engenders the possibility for alternative ways of inhabiting market relations and modes of ownership.

0.2. Key concepts: Development, humanitarianism, social entrepreneurship.

Millennial development, as suggested by Ananya Roy (2010), manifests in the convergence of international development and humanitarianism in the Global South. Both are fields of knowledge—and critical speculation—that have informed life in the postcolony since World War II. Although intertwined, development and humanitarianism initially specified different framings of the postcolonial world, and operated, to a large extent, through separate vehicles, institutions, and languages. Schematically, while international development is a body of knowledge and practices constructed around the question of poverty (Ferguson, 1990) humanitarianism is a system that has human suffering at its core (Fassin, 2011).

By taking poverty as its entry point, development was based on a teleology of modernity whereby former colonies[2]—and colonized peoples—were constructed as 'underdeveloped' and, therefore, in need of a capitalist transition to modern life (Chakrabarty, 2009). Underdevelopment itself became a matter of knowledge, through specific calculative practices and agencies (Mitchell, 2002). For Arturo Escobar, an influential critical commentator of development, the latter was, in fact, a discourse that "created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the exercise of power over, the Third World" (Escobar, 1995a, p.9). In a more nuanced perspective, Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (1997) described development as a technocratic architecture that informed a way of rethinking the political geography of the world in

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2 This is a schematic simplification of development and colonialism. As Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler convincingly argued (1997), the relationship between colonisers and colonised, underdeveloped and developed, was always more complex than a dichotomy. Franz Fanon, for example, had given a psychiatric perspective to colonial forms of dependency, whilst Edward Said had analysed the performative power of cultural representations in fashioning and self-fashioning the colony. This line of thought has been further developed by a group of influential Indian writers, such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2002), Partha Chatterjee (1993) and Gayatri Spivak (1999).

the aftermath of colonialism. This conceptual framework, they argued,

> gave rise to a veritable industry in the academic social sciences, with a complex and often ambiguous relationship to governmental, international, and private agencies actively engaged in promoting economic growth, alleviating poverty, and fostering beneficial social change in "developing" regions of the world (1997, pp.1–2).

Development was thus an "anti-politics machine" (Ferguson, 1990, p.250), a technocratic order that, making poverty a matter of managerial expertise, not only allowed post-colonial states to establish and expand their bureaucratic power, but also to dispense with its politics and pursue a range of diverse, if not contradictory, agendas (Gupta, 2012).

Humanitarianism, on the other hand, was a technocratic order constructed around the politics of the "suffering body" (Ticktin, 2014). As such, humanitarianism was specifically associated with providing relief after natural disasters, wars, refugee crises, and it was articulated by its own pool of experts (Barnett, 2011): nurses, doctors, human rights lawyers, bureaucrats, policymakers, all contributing to the script of what Didier Fassin has described as "humanitarian reason" (2011: *passim*). The latter, according to Miriam Ticktin, is

> an ethos, a cluster of sentiments, a set of laws, a moral imperative to intervene, and a form of government. In its dominant characterization, humanitarianism is one way to "do good" or to improve aspects of the human condition by focusing on suffering and saving lives in times of crisis or emergency (2014, p.274).

Although international development and global humanitarianism initially operated via different intellectual framings of the postcolonial world, and via different agencies, boundaries between the two as areas of knowledge have always been blurred and slippery (see Feldman &

Ticktin, 2010). Moreover, recent research work in various disciplines and geographical contexts[3] has shown that, also historically, humanitarianism and development are converging and intersecting within a larger nexus of state agencies, developmental organizations, transnational NGOs, philanthropic foundations, and financial institutions that constitute what Ananya Roy has called "millennial development" (2010).

The shift from a development exclusively concerned with economic growth to a "kinder and gentler" human version (Roy, 2010, p.7) found a very explicit articulation in the Millennium Development Goals defined by the United Nations (UN) in 2000, where elements of neoliberal adjustment coexisted with metrics that concerned various domains of human wellbeing. A crucial narrative of this shift has been 'empowerment' (Elyachar, 2002; 2005; 2010; Sharma, 2008), a term originally used in the context of gender and race struggles for enfranchisement. When it became part of the language of developmental and humanitarian institutions, its meaning shifted to a mode of economic citizenship (see Mayer & Rankin; 2002). The World Bank, for example, "since the 1980s [...] has been doing a lot to seek out and *empower* the people whom critics see as its victims" (Elyachar, 2002, p.495) through programmes and initiatives that actively frame the question of poverty as a matter of empowerment. In this context, empowerment has become associated with a very specific realm and vehicle of economic life: entrepreneurship.

Entrepreneurship is a thread that weaves together disparate discourses, practices, actors, and calculations, from microfinance and microcredit (Roy, 2010; Rankin, 2013) to the influential writings of liberal gurus like Hernando de Soto and C.K. Prahalad (Roy, 2012a; Mitchell & Sparke, 2016), from the notion of "development as empowerment" as

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3 For example, Bornstein, 2005; Comaroff, 2007; Elyachar, 2005; Li, 2007 Rankin, 2004; Redfield, 2012; 2013. Mitchell K., 2016 Mitchell K & Sparke, 2016.

Image 1. The Big Issue vendors in Cape Town wear very visible vests which remark the idea of entrepreneurship as empowerment.

theorized by economist Amartya Sen (Hill, 2003), to the appropriation of the 'informal economy' and 'social capital' by developmental and humanitarian institutions (Rankin, 2002; Elyachar, 2002; Li Murray, 2007). Though diverse, these doctrines of empowerment through entrepreneurship are based on the recognition that development should help people help themselves (Dolan & Rajak, 2016).

These trajectories of development, as I discuss in Chapter 1, can also be observed in the recent past of contemporary South Africa. The apartheid state had used the concept of development to justify segregation (Tapscott, 1995). The post-apartheid state, on the other hand,

has embraced the language of empowerment and entrepreneurship as key tools of reconciliation (Manzo, 1995; McEwan, 2003a; Andreasson, 2006; Ferguson, 2007). Through the workings of NGOs, voluntourists, development experts and policymakers, concepts like microcredit, the informal sector, social capital, as well as social entrepreneurship, have all found their way into the technopolitics of the 'rainbow nation' project.

These ideas and practices, I argue, can be described as political technologies because they are "systematic relations of knowledge and intervention applied to a problem of collective life", which, in this case, is the failure of 'traditional' development and aid in erasing poverty (Lakoff & Collier, 2010, p. 244, drawing on Foucault, 2001). Among these imbricated political technologies—enacted through diverse, often dispersed geographically, sometimes competing, "mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures" (Rose & Miller, 1992/ 2010, p. 273)—this dissertation is focused on a specific one: social entrepreneurship. As explained in the most quoted article on the subject,

> the idea of "social entrepreneurship" has struck a responsive chord. It is a phrase well suited to our times. It combines the passion of a social mission with an image of business-like discipline, innovation, and determination commonly associated with, for instance, the high-tech pioneers of Silicon Valley. The time is certainly ripe for entrepreneurial approaches to social problems. Many governmental and philanthropic efforts have fallen far short of our expectations. Major social sector institutions are often viewed as inefficient, ineffective, and unresponsive. Social entrepreneurs are needed to develop new models for a new century (Dees, 2008, p.1).

Unlike other technologies of millennial development, social entrepreneurship was not born in the Global South or within the traditional nexus of developmental institutions (see Chapter 1). Although the World Bank now runs a social entrepreneurship blog,

which marshals best practices from developing nations (Koch, 2016), the social enterprise originated both as a mode of organization and as a field of academic interest in Europe and North America. In fact, much of the research on the topic, be it in the field of management, policy, organization studies or a critical appraisal of neoliberal welfare models, has remained confined to the West[4].

For this reason, the making itself of social entrepreneurship as a concept deserves some attention. As the scholars of economic performativity have shown, economic doctrines are never a mere description of the world, but they actively produce, often through material devices, the world they purport to describe (Mackenzie *et al.*, 2007; Cochoy *et al.*, 2010). What is defined and debated as social entrepreneurship, too, shapes and alters what exists as such. This understanding, which Çalışkan and Callon have described, in general terms, as a study programme of "economization" (2009), enriches the notion of political technologies which, in a strictly Foucauldian framework are exclusively related to (human) discourse. By opening the heuristic idea of political technologies to the sociology of translation (Callon, 1984) or science in action (Latour, 1987), the formation of concepts too, in academia and elsewhere, is understood as a form of calculation that produces and participates in the world it is purported to debate and describe (Mitchell, 2005; Mackenzie, 2006; Barnes, 2008; Gibson-Graham, 2008).

This also has epistemological consequences that I address further in the remainder of the introduction. In sum, however, this thesis shows that also the construction of social entrepreneurship as a field of academic inquiry is one of the calculative actions that filters down to

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4 With significant exceptions, of course (see Lyne, 2017, but also Daya, 2014a; Rajak, 2011, for South Africa specifically). It is worth noting, however, that most of the research on social entrepreneurship derives from Euro-America (see Essers et al, 2017), whilst best practices from the Global South are more and more brought in as empirical evidence, following a North/South epistemological line that a few scholars have underscored in recent years (Connell, 2007; de Sousa Santos, 2007; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012).

the material sites of millennial development, with definitions, books, diagrams, conferences, and travelling university professors. The line dividing social entrepreneurs, development experts, and academics who conceive definitions and theories is blurred: they all, in their own terms, make social entrepreneurship into a technology of millennial development.

0.3. Research setting: Cape Town and the global circuits of social entrepreneurship.

Postcolonial geographers have long argued that—just as much there never was a single colonialism—there is not a single postcolonial condition or development (Sidaway, 1993; 2000; Jacobs, 1996; Power, 2003; McEwan, 2003b; 2008; Power *et al.*, 2006). For this reason, they maintain, studies of contemporary development need to be grounded in the spatial, historical and cultural specificity of its sites. This call for a situated, geographical understanding of development is particularly important because, as Gustavo Esteva puts it, the "metaphor of development gave global hegemony to a purely Western genealogy of history" (Esteva, 1992, p.9, cited in Power, 2003, p.8). On the contrary, a postcolonial geography of development displaces this "regulating fiction" (Robinson, 2003, p.275) by embracing the multiplicity of locations where developmental expertise is translated, produced and put into action.

In questioning how social entrepreneurship functions as a technology of millennial development, therefore, I chose to have the city-region of Cape Town as setting, because of its unique colonial past and present centrality in the "global circuits" (Thrift, 2005) of entrepreneurial developmentalism and humanitarianism. Built on and around the heights of the South-western cape of Africa, Cape Town is often described as the entrepreneurial capital of South Africa, and, hence, all

Africa, despite the recent rise of new hubs such as Lagos, Accra and Addis Ababa. Like other cities involved in the startup economy (Silicon Hills in Austin, Silicon Alley in New York City, Silicon Beach in Sydney, etc.) Cape Town's business scene is described—and formally trademarked—as the 'Silicon Cape' of Africa, a "scenographic" initiative (McNeill, 2015) whereby local entrepreneurs are ideally linked to the Bay Area in San Francisco.

According to international rankings, its universities and business schools top the African section. A recent report illustrates how a striking 56% of SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in South Africa is headquartered in the Western Cape, mainly in the Cape Town-Stellenbosch metropolitan area (PwC, 2015) (Image 2). Similarly, 58% of venture capitals land in the city (SAVCA, 2015). With a very active convention centre, the city regularly hosts international events, such as the World Economic Forum on Africa in 2015. For the occasion, the Schwab Foundation's Africa Social Entrepreneurs of the Year Award Ceremony was held in the city[5]. A year before, Cape Town was nominated World Design Capital—confirming the city's global aspirations in the creative sector (Wenz, 2012). As a KPMG (Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler) junior manager explained to me,

> *you must think of Jo'burg and Cape Town as of New York and San Francisco. New York has money, finance, San Francisco has all the ideas. Cape Town is where creativity is* (personal conversation, August 2015).

At the same time, Cape Town tops the list of the most unequal cities in the world (for example, in the UN-Habitat 'State of the World's Cities' Report, 2016). One of the largest slums in Africa occupies the Cape Flats, a vast plain between Cape Town and Stellenbosch, with formal

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5 https://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-africa-2015/sessions/africa-social-entrepreneurs-year-award-ceremony [accessed 04/07/2017]

Image 2. As part of a positioning strategy of the city, a series of local development agencies partnered in 2017 to launch a collection of infographics which showcase the prominence of Cape Town in Africa's entrepreneurial scene.

and informal settlements experiencing one of the highest murder rates on the planet[6]—a result of economic marginality, unemployment and gang violence that derive from racialized urban planning during Apartheid (Western, 1981).

Diagrammatic scores and rankings, from the Gini coefficient for inequality (UN-Habitat, 2016) to the WEF Global Competitiveness Index (WEF, 2014), are part of what Donald McNeill describes as "global urban ordering[s]' (2017, Chapter 3). This is not simply a metageography of how global cities are interlinked and, therefore, hierarchically ordered, as in the GAWC global city taxonomy, but also the set of practices through which metrics and measurements, for example global standardization processes, "render urban life technically commensurable" (McNeill, 2017, p.74). By adhering to these standards, Cape Town has produced world-class business incubators, a world-class sports stadium, a world-

6 http://www.businessinsider.com/most-violent-cities-in-the-world-2016-1/?r=AU&IR=T/#9-cape-town-south-africa-had-6553-homicides-per-100000-residents-42 [accessed 04/07/2017]

class convention centre, a world-class waterfront, and so forth. David MacDonald's book on Cape Town's "world-city syndrome" (2012) offers an exhaustive compendium of how spaces, policies and urban agencies in the region are produced in relation to orderings and visual registers of a—often utopian—elsewhere. For the author, these "worlding experiments" (as phrased by Ong & Roy, 2011) mark the neoliberal entrenchment of the racial, economic, spatial segregations that the city inherited from apartheid.

These inherited divides across racial and economic lines, however, are also fertile terrains for millennial development, with its core humanitarian and entrepreneurial concerns. In the words of a young North American MBA student who was volunteering for a Christian social enterprise, experimenting an alternative currency in a poor township, there was no better place than the Mother City (as Cape Town is often called in the media):

> *Cape Town is where we all come because there is so much to do. And it's challenging, a real challenge, applying what you've learnt about marketing in this context, there are so many worlds here (...) so much work to do, and feel you're helping, but still feel safe and go to the beach in the weekend.* (personal conversation, September 2015).

This peculiar nexus of charity and business innovation knowledge (and tourism) is not unique to Cape Town. Other cities in the Global South are the sites of such intersections. However, for its idiosyncratic relation to neoliberalism (Parnell & Robinson, 2012), and for its centrality in the circuits of entrepreneurial capitalism in Africa, Cape Town offers a proficuous vantage point for observing how social entrepreneurship is established as a key technology of millennial development, one that speaks to both the 'worlding' aspirations and the developmental concerns that mark contemporary urbanism in the Global South (Robinson, 2006). Through a collection of physical and virtual sites, human and

non-human actors, infrastructural platforms and politicized artefacts, successful as well as unfortunate choreographic and pedagogic practices, this research work shows how entrepreneurial mantras, humanitarian expertise, and situated knowledges collide in Cape Town as frontier experiments on "the contours of contemporary capitalism" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2012, p.113).

In this sense, the urban in this research is not just a setting, but an experimental site in the making of millennial development. As in Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift's words,

> the urban is not just a microcosm of the world, a window through which the economy can be read, but also a forcing house with considerable power to shape and drive the economy through its gatherings (2007, p.150).

Abdoumaliq Simone has noted how urbanism, in fact, has long been a way of shaping relations on the continent:

> the long period in which different versions of colonialism were in operation was, of course, critical to the shaping and present-day capacities of most African cities. But the importance of colonialism is not that it gave rise to cities in what was for the most part a rural continent. Rather, the crucial move was to shape urbanization so cities would act instrumentally on African bodies and social formations (2001, p.18).

That African urbanism was a crucial technology of colonialism first, and international development later, is an argument that has been a crucial tenet of dependency theory (see Arrighi, 1970). Yet, as James Ferguson's ethnography (1999) of the post-crisis Zambian Copperbelt showed, this relationship between the urban and the epistemic object of development, modernity, was a contradictory one, in a more nuanced landscape than what Marxist critique allowed for. In his account of Islamic welfare organizations in East Africa, Simone (2001) further

argued that the connection of African cities to the world is not limited to the way in which they become channels of resource exploitation—what François Bayart famously depicted as "extraversion" (1999). Even "spaces of incapacity and marginality", Simone wrote (2001, p.23), are linked to a global order of knowledge, and power, as African urbanites pilot spaces of transaction that reach the rest of the globe, "worlding" the African city "from below" (2001, p.3).

As I show how social entrepreneurship works as a technology of millennial development in Cape Town, the question of knowledge production (and translation) in the city becomes central. This is something that has been of great interest to urban scholars for quite some time. The knowledge practices of travelling urban policies, for example, have received a great deal of attention (McCann, 2011)—to the point that the centrality of gurus, experts and technocrats has been described as a form of "telescopic urbanism", which focuses its lenses on a small number of actors and leaves the living realities of the majority in the background (Amin, 2013). This concern is also shared by Colin McFarlane, whose work (2011a; 2011b) marshals a wide array of learning practices, disruptive and incremental, formal and informal, codified and spontaneous, to describe the urban as a knowledge assemblage. "Cities", he writes,

> —as spaces of encounter and rapid change, of concentrations of political, economic and cultural resources, and of often perplexing unknowability—are constantly sought to be learnt and relearnt by different people and for often different reasons, from coping mechanisms and personal advancement to questions of contestation and justice. It is in this very concentration and demand of and for learning that the city is cast as a learning machine (2011b, p.362).

McFarlane's conceptualization of learning assemblages has been influential in shaping a critical theory of urban learning, and in moving

beyond policies and their apparently seamless mobilities (Coe *et al.*, 2013). In this work, however, I suggest that Cape Town, the city, is cast as a pedagogic machine as well as a machine for learning. By focusing on expert knowledge, I underscore the importance of certain urban spaces, even physical architectures, as inscriptions of development. Shifting from learning to pedagogical experiments, I argue, is also coherent with opening the Foucauldian understanding of governmental technologies to the sociology of translation (Callon, 1984), whereby actors, both technocrats and subaltern subjects, are not only continuously learning, but crucially trying to teach what they have learnt, in order to enrol knowledge allies and to engender the right kind of (market) subjectivities (see Callon, 1984; Latour, 1987).

0.4. Research design: ecologies of expertise and ethnographic circulations.

The notion of political technology, through which I describe the system of expertise that revolves around social entrepreneurship, is a powerful heuristic device. It represents how a discursive rationality—doing well while doing good—holds together very disparate actors and practices, by articulating a series of practical, technical answers to the questions of millennial development. Political technologies, however, are always more than just the discourse which upholds them (Rose & Miller, 1992). This is because, as scholars of Actor-network theory (ANT) have variously shown, discourse is never something external to social processes[7] (Law & Urry, 2004), and social processes cannot be detached from the knowledge that describes them (Latour, 2005).

From a methodological perspective, then, the notion of political

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7 This is something that Foucault himself acknowledged, but never fully addressed (1984; 2001; 2007; 2008).

technologies implies looking at more than discursive scripts, and, to use a famous ANT slogan, 'following' actors and their connections (Best & Walters, 2013). This, as Latour concedes (2005), might not only be a painstakingly long research process, but simply not possible to the extent of tracing *all* the emerging links that make a phenomenon. Hence, the epistemic act of following is always limited by the material possibilities of what is observed and by how the observation is performed. This means that singular sites, singular objects can be taken as terrains of research—provided they are not treated as bounded realities—because they may be the only possible, practical entry points into something relevant or interesting (Law & Mol, 2008).

The research of this thesis, too, needed a practical site to observe how social entrepreneurship worked as a technology of what has been summarized as "millennial development" (Roy, 2010). Such a site, in the case of this work, was an "ecology of expertise", a network of experts, bureaucrats, buildings, material and immaterial things whose relational geographies I 'follow' hereafter. Building on Niklas Luhmann's metaphor (1998), Aihwa Ong uses the words "ecology of expertise" to characterize the alignment of technical knowledges and technoscientific players in the making of forms of citizenship that are functional to specific political agendas in Singapore (2005). Specifically, ecologies of expertise are shifting combinations of mobile knowledge, knowledgeable actors and their diverse sites of knowing (2005, p.339). In this thesis, I expand this definition to accommodate the technopolitical focus that I gave to my research. Hence, the ecology of expertise that I describe is not only composed by a coalition of experts, technocrats and volunteers, but it also includes material inscriptions, such as books, documents, offices—artefacts that, in some sort of way, embody, or convey, or even refract, or contradict the narratives of social entrepreneurship as a technology of development.

The word 'ecology' also suggests the importance of exogenous fluxes, mobilities, and adaptations of the system that I have taken as setting of my research. As Arjun Appadurai argued in a 2001 seminal paper, the globalized "geographies of governmentality" which reshape the (postcolonial) world require, from a methodological perspective, a "move from an ethnography of locations to one of circulations" (2001, p.25). An ethnography of circulation, however, can take many different forms. George Marcus, for example, has described and advocated a "multi-sited" ethnographic practice (1998) in "different, complexly connected real-world sites of investigation" (Marcus, 1995, p.102). Anna Tsing, instead, uses the material life of commodities to reveal the connections of predatory economic chains (Tsing, 2011). Nicole Starosielski (2015) gives the idea of circulation an entirely infrastructural quality, by following submarine cables to underscore the economic geography of Internet services.

Among the many ways of understanding and doing an "ethnography of circulations", I am influenced by John Law's methodological reflections (2004). Disputing a 'modern' view of method as a set of tools which, somehow, social scientists can use to describe truths about the world, John Law argues that ethnographic practice, like other ways of knowing, is "a combination of reality detector and reality amplifier" (2004, p.14). As a detector, ethnography offers a temporary, ephemeral grasp of the messiness of the phenomena it purported to observe. As an amplifier, ethnography is also an intervention, a way of validating one reality over others. This does not only apply to ethnography as a mode of producing reality: Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar have made similar claims for scientific laboratory practices (Latour, 1987; Woolgar, 1988), and Michel Callon has shown how economic knowledge about the economy performs the economy itself (Callon, 2007). In this context, the idea that an ethnography of circulations has both 'detecting' and 'amplifying' dimensions has practical and political consequences.

From a practical perspective, this methodological perspective gave a centrifugal quality to my research—in that it did not "limit in advance the shape, size, heterogeneity, and combination of [possible] associations" (Latour, 2005, p.11). This is not only because, as Ananya Roy has explicitly argued (2012b), researching millennial development calls for an ethnography of circulations that extends to the multiple and awkward scales at which global circuits of knowledge and capital become tangible. Rather, it means that if ethnography is a method that seeks the messiness and unexpectedness of a process, there is a need "for heterogeneity and variation" (Law, 2004, p.6). Detecting the messiness involved, in the case of my research, more than a traditional thick description of a single given context, but of a multiplicity of sites in relation.

Over the course of seven months in Cape Town, between March and November 2015, I explored, as a participant, several locations where social entrepreneurship was experimented. These locations were a development agency, a consulting firm, a research centre, a business school, a coworking facility, an incubator space, a market, a business centre, a conference centre, and many of the internet cafes and living rooms where NGOs and other non-profit organizations hold their meetings because they cannot afford office space. Other locations were not entirely physical but had their own server-governed geographies in the city: an online platform, a radio programme, and, obviously, social media and other websites.

Participating in these spaces meant that I often volunteered, making explicit the intention of my research, and worked alongside the experts that I was trying to observe. It meant that I was often part of the scripting of entrepreneurship as a technology of 'good' development. One of my key informants, for example, the head of a very important business foundation, agreed to meet me more than once on the condition that I

brought her the ten best academic papers on social innovation and social entrepreneurship. She told me that she wanted to gather an academic perspective on the work she was doing as a practitioner. As I was picking the papers, I was not only bartering my academic position for access to her informed perspective, but also producing something that I could not overlook. I too was one of the white, international specialists that I often met during my fieldwork.

I discuss my role in more detail as I present the cases, but one general premise is that I was, for most of the people I encountered in my ethnography, 'an expert' myself. First, there was my experience in the field. Some years ago, prior to my research, I was involved for two years in the social economy[8], with a European Union project, and with my own social venture. Second, as a PhD student, I was usually deemed to have a certain level of expertise in the topic of social entrepreneurship. More than one of my interlocutors told me that I, myself, should have the knowledge that I was asking them about. My alleged or perceived expertise granted me access to spaces where I would not have had access otherwise. In other words, I could not and cannot remove myself from the circuits of knowledge that this research describes: ultimately, this research, too, performed social entrepreneurship as a technology of development. Or, as John Law puts is, it crafted the realities it was enmeshed in by amplifying them (2004, p.116).

My access as 'expert' also put me in touch with what Douglas Holmes and George Marcus described as the "para-ethnographic" (2005; 2006). Research in the domain of expertise, they argue, implies the recognition of a

> para-ethnographic dimension—the de facto and self-conscious critical

8 Another way of framing the so-called 'third sector' (see Amin, 2009).

> faculty that operates in any expert domain as a way of dealing with contradiction, exception, facts that are fugitive, and that suggest a social realm not in alignment with the representations generated by the application of the reigning statistical mode of analysis (2005, pp.236–237).

This gives an additional nuance to the claim of ANT scholars such as Bruno Latour (2005) and John Law (2004). The latter, going against the traditional epistemic separation between researcher and informant, argues that every informant is an ethnographer herself. Holmes and Marcus (2005) take this further by maintaining that there is a scientific and conscious quality to these ethnographic capacities, especially in the domain of expert knowledge[9].

Practically, over the course of seven months, I conducted 26 one-hour long interviews with practitioners who held key positions in the ecology of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. These informants were rarely social entrepreneurs themselves: they were instead economic experts, consultants, managers, investors who were recognized as experts in the ecology of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. To recruit them, as I detail in Chapter 2, I started my research with the most evident centres of calculation, the material sites where knowledge about social entrepreneurship was produced and disseminated. From my original informants in these sites, my research relationships multiplied and snowballed reaching the very diverse settings, experiments and individuals that I address later. Importantly, though, many of my informants had developed, in one form or another, their own ethnographies and self-ethnographies to deal with their successes and

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9 This line of argument is also supported by research in economic performativity, for example in the seminal collection of essays edited by Michel Callon — *The Laws of the Market* (1998) — in which some of the contributors explicitly highlight how economic disciplines like marketing and accounting involve research practices that are akin to those of Anthropology. Annelise Riles (2004; 2010), Caitlin Zaloom (2005; 2006; 2009) and Hirokazu Miyazaki (2013) have made similar claims concerning finance experts.

failures. In the course of this dissertation, particularly in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I explicitly discuss this form of para-ethnographic knowledge—which was shared with me—as a powerful vehicle for understanding how discursive rationalities, such as 'doing well while doing good', are apprehended and made sense of in ordinary, mundane ways.

The second consequence of understanding my ethnography of circulations as an assemblage of reality detector and reality amplifier is political. First, I have an ethical responsibility to the hopes and to the desires of my informants—many of them—not to be represented as the hapless pawns of global capitalism in Africa. Several had developed and put into action their critique and scepticism of social entrepreneurship or other technologies of millennial development. In many cases, they actually scripted alternative narratives and calculation in the processes through which authoritative knowledge was constructed in the specific context. At other times, however, their "will to improve" (Li, 2007) was an ambiguous and ingenuous tool in the production of millennial development. If anything, then, "reading for difference"—as Gibson-Graham puts it (2006, p.xxxi)—is a responsibility to not conflate the divergent, multiple realities of millennial development in one single narrative or direction.

Second, I consider what Annemarie Mol calls "ontological politics" (1999); she writes:

> the reality we live with is one performed in a variety of practices. The radical consequence of this is that reality itself is multiple. An implication of this might be that there are options between the various versions of an object: which one to perform? But if this were the case then we would need to ask where such options might be situated and what was at stake when a decision between alternative performances was made. We would also need to ask to what extent are there options between different versions of reality if these are not exclusive, but, if they clash in some places, depend

> on each other elsewhere (1999, p.74).

Ontological politics, in other words, are the additional reasons, the *political* ones, for choosing to *amplify*, methodologically, one reality over another. Hence, my ethnography of circulations is not only an attempt to "make small facts speak to large concerns" (Gibson-Graham, 2014, p.147), but also to give substance to what seems marginal, or navigating against "powerful discourses that organize events into understandable and seemingly predictable trajectories" (2014, p.147). Within this perspective, I hope to underscore how social entrepreneurship, as a political technology, also becomes a malleable device for alternative governmentalities, and suggest that millennial development—if the latter is seen as territory "of possibilities that historically situated actors constantly resist or realize" (Mbembé, 2000, p.261)—is not as an uncontested playbook, but also a field of resistance, subversion and hopes that may or may not determine alternative futures. In this sense, I will suggest in the conclusion of this work, one of the findings of this research is that social entrepreneurship is also a strategic fiction, whereby the promise of profit serves the purpose of experimenting alternative modes of development.

Finally, my methodological choices also influenced my writing style. As James Clifford noted, ethnography is about conducting a fieldwork just as much as writing it up. He writes:

> Experiential, interpretive, dialogical, and polyphonic processes are at work, discordantly, in any ethnography. But coherent presentation presupposes a controlling mode of authority. [...] [T]his imposition of coherence on an unruly textual process is now, inescapably, a matter of strategic choice (1983, p.142).

In the case of this dissertation, my "strategic choice" is to, at once, represent the diversity and multiplicity of the fields where I conducted my research, and also the ways in which I could not extricate myself

from them, because many of my interlocutors saw me as an expert, and my access was thus mediated by their expectations. Hence my ethnographic style could be described, as in Van Maanen's classification, as "impressionistic"; that is, combining "realist and confessional" techniques (Van Maanen, 2010, p.7), moments of self-reflection as well as narrative observations on the events, experiments and conversations in which I participated. This writing strategy allows me to render explicit the manifoldness of my research fields, but also the politics of representation that could not be disentangled from my own role in these fields.

0.5. Outline of the dissertation.

This dissertation is organized in six chapters and a conclusion. Whilst the first chapter contains a short literature review, the other five are empirical interventions into the key argument of this work—that social entrepreneurship is a fundamental political technology of millennial development. Specifically, each chapter highlights a core theme of this thesis and takes it to the material sites of the ecology of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. Although the five themes are distinct, they are logically interconnected and return to the main objective of this research: exploring how this form of applied expertise contributes, though contradictorily, to the reproduction and "fluctuations" (Foucault, 2007) of millennial development in a city of the Global South.

Chapter 1 contains an introductory review of the critical literature on contemporary forms of development, in South Africa in particular, and on social entrepreneurship. In the chapter, I draw on the contribution of both the historiography of Southern Africa and on the critical scholarship of development, but I also chart the making of social entrepreneurship into an object of intellectual interest in academia. These two separate strands of literature highlight the longer histories and genealogies of

some of the phenomena that this dissertation is concerned with.

Using empirical evidence from my research, Chapter 2 shows that the manufacturing of social entrepreneurship into a technology of millennial development is anchored to urban "centres of calculation" (Latour, 1987), and to their intrinsic relationships with the city as an aggregate of economic, political and social networks. By focusing on three of these sites of calculation—a development agency, a research centre and a private consultancy—I argue that the paradigms of millennial development are not held together just by individuals and institutions, but by a large collection of materialities through which calculations are contemporarily accumulated and distributed: books, papers, architectures, TV shows, blogs, and so forth.

The third chapter of this thesis is concerned with the way in which the markets of millennial development are populated by the 'right' kind of economic subjects. Drawing on Michel Callon's work on the making of markets (2007; 2009), I focus on three pedagogical experiments that were taking place in Cape Town during my fieldwork: a World-Bank-funded business school; a real-estate intervention designed to host entrepreneurs; an impact finance acceleration programme. These experiments were designed to engender the human 'supply side' of the markets of millennial development—in other words to create social entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and business mentors, through practices that explicitly moved the science of entrepreneurship out of the 'laboratory' (Law & Mol, 2001).

Having observed how social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology through its centres of calculation (Chapter 2) and pedagogic experiments (Chapter 3), Chapter 4 charts how the capacity to engage the future is a vital skill that needs to be taught to prospective social entrepreneurs as well as domesticated for the experts of social entrepreneurship. Specifically, it argues that aesthetic, choreographic

and calculative performances contribute to the enactment of social entrepreneurship as a developmental technology by teaching both experts and entrepreneurs to profitably engage their hopes and their failures.

In Chapter 5, I turn to the infrastructural tissue that undergirds the possibility of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. In particular, I look at two entrepreneurial incubators in Khayelitsha, Cape Town's largest township. These infrastructures mobilize experts, knowledge and capitals around the idea of fighting poverty by expanding the frontiers of profit accumulation. However, even when designed for the purpose of creating profit opportunities, the possibility of refunctioning is always at hand. Despite the templates, the rules, and their "obligatory passage point[s]" (Callon, 1984), individuals inscribe their desires, their hopes, and their agendas in the operations of such incubators. I suggest that it is the material forms of these infrastructures that reveal their heterogeneous aims: not only the extraction of profit at the "frontiers of capital" (Fisher & Downey, 2006; Dolan and Roll, 2013) but also the will to redistribute opportunities, wealth and connectivity.

Entrepreneurial redistribution is, in fact, at the centre of the last empirical chapter of this work. The imperative of redistribution, as a pivotal concern of the post-apartheid state, filters down to various governmentalities that, as James Ferguson has convincingly suggested, has produced an idiosyncratic but powerful system of social security (2015). One of these discursive technologies is *ubuntu*, a moral philosophy that, as a purportedly African ethos, was used in the post-apartheid years as a beacon of reconciliation and as a discourse of redistribution. In the chapter, I explore *ubuntu* narratives as they take shape in one artefact—a remote point of sale (POS)—which reveals its contradictory technopolitics. By displacing the centrality of social entrepreneurship, and bringing to the fore another, equally mighty, discursive technology

of 'doing well by doing good', the last chapter suggests that this thesis could only address some of the forms of authoritative expertise that produce the territory of millennial development in Cape Town. Other powerful discursive technologies, such as *ubuntu*, coexist and produce alternative, mundane forms of entrepreneurial redistribution.

In the concluding chapter of this dissertation, I offer some reflections of on the consequences and the contributions of this research and its attempt at, using the words of Gibson-Graham's, "reading for difference" (2006) in an ethnography of the always temporary, material alignments and circulations of ideas, experts and capitals through which millennial development is produced.

A note on quotation style and marks:

"*Direct speech*" is signalled by italics and double quotation marks, unless *indented*. Quotations from papers, documents and articles are signalled by "double quotation marks", unless indented.

A note on language, on the problematic use of certain categories.

In the epistemic perspective embraced by this work, words are never mere descriptors, but have an inherent performative quality. As ANT scholars argue, some categories function as 'actants'. Black, White, Coloured, Township, Slum, Informant, Informal—in the context of South Africa—are all deeply charged concepts. It was not easy to use any of the words above, but I have tried to mirror—in my writing—the way in which my interlocutors used them. I am aware that this solution does not solve the problem of representation—and that it could be critiqued precisely for this reason and for not offering enough critical

distance. Adopting a more neutral/critical language, however, would have presented very similar issues.

A note on not capitalizing development: In this dissertation I have chosen not to capitalize 'development' even though many scholars of the latter argue for the need to distinguish the official discourse of Development from its actual economic processes (developments). Political geographer Gillian Hart, for example, writes:

> "Big D" Development I define as the multiply scaled projects of intervention in the "Third World" that emerged in the context of decolonization struggles and the Cold War. "Little d" development refers to the development of capitalism as geographically uneven but spatially interconnected processes of creation and destruction, dialectically interconnected with discourses and practices of Development (Hart, 2010, p.119).

Others argue that, as a political strategy, little d development should characterize the efforts to build alternatives to Big D development (see Bebbington *et al.*, 2008). However, as this research shows, following in the footsteps of many of the contributions on which it is based, the boundaries between these two practices, even between official discourse and critique, are often indistinguishable.

Chapter 1.

Millennial development and social entrepreneurship in South Africa.

> The bottom line is simple: *It is possible to "do well by doing good."* [...] What is needed is a better approach [...] to innovate and achieve sustainable win—win scenarios where the poor are actively engaged and, at the same time, the companies providing products and services to them are profitable. This collaboration between the poor, civil society organizations, governments, and large firms can create the largest and fastest growing markets in the world. Large-scale and widespread entrepreneurship is at the heart of the solution to poverty. (Prahalad, 2005, pp. 2-4, my italics).

> On the one hand, [millennial development] is a reinvention of development as an enterprise of building global industries and global asset classes. For such a task, new types of development expertise [...] must be produced and circulated. On the other hand is the aspiration that such forms of development can democratize capital and stretch market forces to reach the world's bottom billion (Roy, 2012b, p.32).

1.1. Doing well by doing good

Some 45 minutes of train journey away from Cape Town's central station, Westlake is a small neighbourhood on the foothills of Constantiaberg, one of the peaks of the Table Mountain range. A large, suburban commercial park is at the centre of the area, where the dividing lines of apartheid urban planning are still particularly visible. Side by side, lower-income and wealthy communities are neatly separated by roads, railways and fences that used to demarcate racial as well as socio-economic groups. Still today, gated estates, quaint mansions with swimming pools, golf courses, securitized car parks and crowded swaths of impoverished one-storey houses are incredibly close and yet deeply divided. As we walk through the manicured green of the commercial park, Jay, a self-named

social entrepreneur, talks me through the physical and immaterial boundaries that even a small neighbourhood like Westlake manifests to our view as legacies of racialized planning.

Jay's point, however, is that today these boundaries are also opportunities. Specifically, they are opportunities for "*doing well by doing good*" (personal conversation, September 2015). In Jay's case, doing well by doing good means having created a profitable enterprise that employs young men from marginalized communities to work as handymen for small construction and other housework in more affluent urban areas. In exchange for each transaction on the website, a small fee is set apart. One local magazine has described his venture as the "Uber of handymen"[10], although Jay stresses that what he does is different. His "social enterprise", as he calls it[11], is not simply an on-demand labour platform. By targeting a very specific group of workers, Jay believes that his company's profits are socially transformative. That is, they allow the market of construction work to include those who are excluded by the mainstream economy. It is hard not to read, in his words, an echo of the very powerful ideas that underpin contemporary forms of development in the Global South, in particular the narrative that market forces can be stretched to reach the world's poor (Cross & Street, 2009; Elyachar, 2012; Roy, 2012b; Schwittay, 2011).

This sketch offers a glimpse of the convergence of development and humanitarianism in what Ananya Roy (2010; 2012a; 2012b) has called 'millennial development'. These two words mark two fundamental aspects of the subject of this research. In Roy's definition, the word 'development' signals the persistence of a system of expertise that lays

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10 For reasons of confidentiality, I am leaving these sources unnamed.

11 As I will explain in the next chapter, calling "social" an enterprise is not a neutral act—particularly in South Africa, where, at the time of this research and this writing, there is no legal framework or government definition for this kind of companies.

claims on the former colonial world and aims at expanding capitalist modernity in it, by targeting economic growth and poverty. The adjective 'millennial' evokes its temporal setting at the turn of the millennium, but, ever more[12], as in the words of Jean and John Comaroff, a development "that presents itself as a gospel of salvation; [...] that, if rightly harnessed, is invested with the capacity wholly to transform the universe of the marginalized and disempowered" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000, p.292).

In the critical scholarship of development, millennial development describes a "disposition of things"[13] (Foucault, 2007), that is, specific calculations and techniques of government through which the economy of what is now called the Global South is rendered thinkable and manageable. In Foucauldian terms, this means that behind the making of millennial development a range of overlapping discourses, rationalities and political technologies are articulated in often competing centres of power, and within different ethical regimes. Although some institutions—the World Bank, for example—are particularly powerful, as Ananya Roy has shown (2010), there is not a single central authority in the making of contemporary development. The latter encompasses supranational developmental organization and states, but also small companies like Jay's. His digital application is what Collier *et al.* call "little development devices/humanitarian goods" (2017, np). These can be described as

> things that also seek to do well (financially) while doing good. Humanitarian

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12 The word millennial in reference to contemporary neoliberal globalisation was introduced by Jean and John Comaroff in a series of influential writings published at the beginning of the new century (2000; 2003a; 2003b). For the authors, the adjective alludes to the salvific doctrine of Millenarianism in early Christianity, and remarks the almost magical qualities that are attributed to global forces and markets when they are apprehended, constructed, and even studied in academia.

13 Something that Foucault would also refer to as apparatus or dispositif—"a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid" (1980, p.194).

> goods that are premised on conditions of state fragility often hold out the promise that they can transform that fragility in productive or profitable ways. Things like solar lanterns or nutritionally fortified foods, for example, are also built to generate economic value for a diverse array of investors, via sales to institutional consumers like humanitarian or aid organizations as well as directly to the poor (Collier *et al.*, 2017).

For Jay, 'doing well by doing good' summarized the way in which he understood the possibilities of profit laying behind the grim legacies of apartheid. Though simplistic, Jay's business motto can be extended—as this dissertation shows—to a wider geography of antipoverty experiments, development agencies and experts, international corporations, global philanthropic institutions, material devices and inscriptions that constitute millennial development.

His use of the adage should not be surprising. Before starting his "*social enterprise*", Jay worked as a consultant on large development projects delivered through private partnerships. 'Doing well by/while doing good' is a ubiquitous catchphrase among the various developmental organizations that seek to create markets in Africa and in other parts of the Global South. More generally, it is a recurring motto exemplifying what critical scholars like Michael Edwards and Katharyne Mitchell have described as "philanthro-capitalism" or "venture philanthropy" (Edwards, 2009; Mitchell, 2016)—a market-oriented apparatus concerned with global poverty and environmental degradation. *Fortune* magazine, for example, publishes an annual "'Change the World" List of Companies That Are Doing Well By Doing Good"[14]. *Forbes* has dedicated various instalments to discussing how "doing well while/by doing good" can be articulated with corporate social responsibility, impact

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14 http://fortune.com/change-the-world/ [accessed 12/05/2017]

entrepreneurship and public-private partnerships[15].

In an interview, UBS investment bank's chief executive recently explained that since the United Nation established its 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), "there has never been greater drive for doing well by doing good"[16]. "Today's investors", he said, "want to see a positive impact on society and the environment as well as solid financial returns". The World Bank too, and other multilateral lending institutions, are offering grants and running projects that link entrepreneurial profit (doing well) and various forms of social impact (doing good)[17]. A series of social and environmental certifications have also established parallel regulatory frameworks that facilitate the marketing of ethical, developmental practices among corporations: that is, they have created a business case for "doing good" (for South Africa, see McEwan & Bek, 2009b).

While it is hard to trace a clear genealogy of the doing well/doing good bottom line, the idea is not foreign in academia either. Most famously, it is spelled out in C.K. Prahalad's *The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through Profits* (2005)—as quoted in the first epigraph of this chapter—a best-selling book that provides an academic perspective to the idea that fighting poverty can be a global, profitable enterprise (Cross & Street, 2009; Elyachar, 2012; Roy, 2012a). Unsurprisingly, Jay was not the only person who described social

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15 https://www.forbes.com/sites/barbarakurshan/2017/10/03/what-comes-after-doing-well-by-doing-good-redefining-what-we-mean-by-impact/#1c03862b4586 [accessed 1/3/2018]
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerkay/2015/03/02/doing-well-by-doing-good/#7183311c17b1 [accessed 1/3/2018]
https://www.forbes.com/sites/avidan/2017/10/23/for-pg-doing-good-is-good-business/#24334c5f32c3 [accessed 1/3/2018]
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveparrish/2014/12/15/3-companies-doing-well-by-doing-good/#7ed4e90540e1
[accessed 12/05/2017].

16 https://www.cnbc.com/advertorial/2017/06/08/doing-well-by-doing-good.html [accessed 12/05/2017].

17 See the *Promoting Prosperity by Improving Women's Rights - Doing Well by Doing Good* report (World Bank, 2017).

Image 3. Another Big Issue street vendor, showcasing the perfect image of the millennial entrepreneur.

entrepreneurship in such terms. I transcribed the same motto from an interview with a bureaucrat working for GreenCape, a development agency instituted by the Western Cape government and by the city to support 'green' entrepreneurship (interview with Bongani, August 2015). That indicates, as I begin to foreground in this chapter, that also the state has had an important stake in the making of contemporary development in Cape Town.

In this dissertation I consider how social entrepreneurship—as a system of expert knowledge—articulates the question of doing well by doing good. Or, in other words, I investigate how social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology of millennial development, by promising new frontiers of profit in the enterprise of fighting poverty. Using social entrepreneurship as an entry point, this work questions the technopolitics of contemporary development in Cape Town. It traces the technical and political formations that are mobilized and experimented to put the science of 'doing well by doing good' into action. It asks how the technopolitics of development are situated in the peculiar geographies

of a post-colonial, post-apartheid city that has reinvented itself as the entrepreneurial capital of the African continent. Hence, before moving onto the empirical core of this research, I offer here a short literature review of the two key themes in this work: contemporary development, with an eye on South Africa, and social entrepreneurship. These two short genealogies on the one hand help me situate my research within a broader intellectual territory and, on the other, begin to foreground social entrepreneurship as a field of academic inquiry that participates in the global circulations that this dissertation addresses.

1.2. Defining millennial development.

Millennial development manifests in the convergence of international development and humanitarianism in the Global South. In what comes next, I outline a definition of the two, and then move to explain how both systems of knowledge have influenced economic discourses in the apartheid and the post-apartheid state in South Africa.

International development and humanitarianism are at the same time fields of practical knowledge and concepts used by critical scholars to describe the two discourses that organized and framed the postcolonial world during the cold war and after. Schematically, while international development was concerned with economic interventions designed to transform former colonies into 'developed' nations, humanitarianism was constructed around the problem of human suffering (Ticktin, 2014). At least initially, then, these apparatuses of experts, institutions and practices operated differently. Developmental schemes involved the construction of large infrastructural projects whose rationale was to trigger a capitalist transition that would, eventually, erase poverty (Mitchell, 2002; Chakrabarty, 2009). Conversely, humanitarian institutions such as the United Nations and international NGOs acted on the question of human suffering, by producing concepts and

knowledge about human rights, disaster relief, and responses to various other crises. In very general terms, the entry point of development was poverty (Ferguson, 1990) while the rationale of humanitarianism was the "suffering body" (Fassin, 2011).

Both international development and humanitarianism, however, shared a technocratic nature: they have been systems of knowledge as well as modes of intervention (see Stoler & Cooper, 1997). Moreover, boundaries between the two as areas of knowledge are slippery (see Feldman & Ticktin, 2010). Even when openly criticizing development as a form of neo-imperialism, Arturo Escobar (1995a) explained, international humanitarianism relied on the same hegemonic knowledge. Recent critical work on the topic (Bornstein, 2005; Comaroff, 2007; Elyachar, 2005; Li, 2007 Rankin, 2004; Redfield, 2012; 2013; Mitchell, 2016; Mitchell & Sparke, 2016) has also highlighted how humanitarian and developmental work historically intersected and morphed one into each other. Contemporary forms of development, for example, have abandoned their traditional economic hard lines and shifted to *gentler* humanitarian versions, where individual human welfare is at the centre. This both discursive and practical shift, as Ananya Roy has argued (2010), is a vehicle for expanding profit opportunities to the realms of poverty and solidarity. In such a process, traditional developmental institutions, such as the World Bank, are just as active as a nexus of philanthropic, often transnational NGOs—that is, humanitarian organizations—which were once largely opposed to the project of development (Elyachar 2002; Roy, 2010).

A crucial narrative of this shift has been the idea of 'empowerment' (Elyachar, 2002; 2005; 2010; Sharma, 2008), a term that originated to describe gender-and-race-related forms of struggle and emancipation. When empowerment was reappropriated by developmental institutions, its meaning evolved to signify a mode of economic citizenship centred

around entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial self-help (see Mayer & Rankin; 2002). The philosophy of entrepreneurial empowerment has since become one of the most powerful narratives of millennial development. Microfinance and microcredit, for example, are predicated on the possibility of unleashing the entrepreneurial potential of poor women by making them empowered financial subjects (Roy, 2010; Rankin, 2013).

Other doctrines of contemporary development as well—from the bottom-of-the-pyramid approach envisioned by C.K. Prahalad (2012) to Hernando de Soto's idea of "dead capital" (2000)—share the conviction that, if anything, development should help people help themselves. It should use the entrepreneurial potential of the world's poor to empower them, and do so in innovative, entrepreneurial ways. In this sense, social entrepreneurship offers the right kind of narratives and devices—in that it articulates, in a practical way, the possibility of doing well (financially), while—or even by—doing good.

1.3. Development and redistribution in South Africa

Before moving on to social entrepreneurship, however, it is worth noting how older as well as contemporary forms of development have informed economic discourses in South Africa, the postcolonial state where my research is set. In this section, drawing on key contributions from South African historians, geographers and anthropologists, I offer a glimpse of the somewhat idiosyncratic evolution of developmental expertise during and after the apartheid regime. The literature on the topic is obviously vast. The aim of this section is not to offer an exhaustive review, but to trace some of the paths of development in South Africa. In doing so, this section paints a deeper backdrop to the ecology of expertise that I address in the remainder of the dissertation.

South Africa became independent much earlier in the twentieth century

than most other African colonies. Hence, the question of development arose in relation to a different social and intellectual environment in comparison to the Keynesian developmentalism that dominated the post-second-World-War period (Mitchell, 2002). When South Africa entered the Great Depression in the early thirties, the Union had already experienced some twenty years of relative autonomy, since the South Africa Act of 1909 (Thompson, 2001). While the financial stability of the country was guaranteed by the mining industry—thanks to the global demise of the gold standard, which allowed the metal's price to double in the decade since 1929—the economic downturn had revealed another pressing social issue: 'poor whiteism' (Beinart, 2001; Bundy, 1979; 1986; Morrell, 1992). 'Poor whiteism' was the term used to describe a social paradox in the light of the racial Darwinism that informed colonial power in Southern Africa and elsewhere—the existence of poor white settlers that lived in conditions similar to those of 'undeveloped' Black Africans, or even worse than those of the partially enfranchised Cape Coloureds[18].

It is in relation to poor-white issues that questions of development emerged in the Union of South Africa. The Great Depression was harsh for the white poor, most of whom were Afrikaner peasants who found political representation in the rise of Afrikaner nationalism. As historian William Beinart (2001) explains, a problem of economic equality within a capitalist-oriented market was portrayed as a problem of race. The same thing had happened in the decades before with the relationship between unionized, white mine workers and black workers: better workfare for white workers had been achieved through segregation.

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18 Cape Coloureds were a group of mixed-race South Africans that, particularly in the Cape colony where they were the largest ethnic class, had received more rights than native Africans. With the 1950 Population Registration Act, one of the key legislations of apartheid, the category 'Coloured' was formally created and a 'Cape Coloured' subcategory later added. With this and other laws, Coloured people in the Cape province lost most of the privileges they once had (Posel, 2001).

In the early thirties, a newly-appointed Native Economic Commission (NEC) formulated important policy indications, on the basis that the poor-white problem was related to black urbanization and glitches in the functioning of the African reserves (Wolpe, 1972). Urbanization, according to the commission, was not the right way to *develop* African people. "Development and social modernization should come from within the 'tribal' system under the chiefs" (Beinart, 2001, p.123), an idea that was germane to the racialized territorial segregation that was finally established in 1936 with the Native Trust Land Act, and also to the requests of various sections of the white society, rural farmers in particular. Segregation, Beinart (2001, p.124) continues, was conceived as an appropriate form of 'development' for African people.

The apparatus that sustained this ideological and moral justification, was not only political, but also, as in the words of Cooper and Packard (1997, p.1) "a veritable industry", made by expert commissions, departments, inspectorates, various 'centres of calculation' that functioned as a segregative bureaucracy of development even before the rise of formal apartheid. The link between segregation and development also addressed concerns about environmental degradation. A series of expert commissions in the pre-World War II years framed ecological issues as problems of race and urbanization, leading to the 'Betterment' proclamation of 1939. 'Betterment' was never fully realized, but officials had planned, in the name of environmental interests, a socio-ecological experiment along the lines of racial and rural/urban separation, by which millions would have been displaced (see Baldwin, 1975; Letsoalo & Rogerson, 1982). As Tania Murray Li argues (2007), although in a different context, "the will to improve" is the hegemonic discourse underpinning the practice of addressing social and environmental matters through expert knowledge. In the Union of South Africa, the will to improve was sustained by a very peculiar and abominable expertise—the management of the native—which brought together

economists, urbanists, sociologists, anthropologists, and environmental engineers in the formulation of racial segregation as an appropriate form of development that would address at once social, economic and environmental challenges (see Dubow, 1995). Like elsewhere (see Power & Sidaway, 2004), geography too was one of the colonial disciplines that participated in the construction of development and underdevelopment[19].

Strictly-speaking apartheid began in the late 1940s, emerging as synthesis of different positions among the ruling parties. Whilst many nationalists argued for a complete apartness, economic as well, others—representing white farmers and industrialists—were more pragmatic and recognized the impossibility of dispensing with black labour. The concept conceived by the Minister of Native Affairs was that of 'separate development' (Beinart, 2001, p.147), and it was implemented via different technologies of social and territorial management.

I will not discuss here the relationship between separate development, urbanization, industrialization and the racial order that sustained this architecture (see Swanson, 1968; Wolpe, 1972; Smit, 1985; Wellings & Black, 1986). Leonard Thompson's *A History of South Africa* (2001) contains a rich review of the interpretative conundrum that many critical scholars, especially Marxist historians, saw in the fragility and yet resilience of separate development with regards to modernity, urbanism and capitalism. Segregation, particularly along the lines of urban/rural divides, was functional to capitalist interests, a free market based on cheap black labour, but it also hindered the expansion of that same market. What is interesting here is that, for these—fundamentally practical—reasons, separate development did not manage to enforce

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19 Geography was also involved in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, by documenting their "inhuman geography" (Rogerson & Parnell, 1989).

rurality and ethnicize Africans, as it had envisioned. A displaced form of urbanization, between 1960 and 1980, became the solution to the recognized impossibility to stop black urbanization/modernization—new towns were created in the homelands (the native reserves) (Smit, 1985), and other settlements in the outskirts of major cities (Baldwin, 1975). These settlements, the "townships"[20], as Cosmas Desmond famously showed to the world in his *The Discarded People,* were "barely planned rural slums, [...] urban in respect of the population density and lack of agricultural opportunity, but rural in relation to facilities, services and employment" (Beinart, 2001, p.214; see also Beavon 1982; Pirie 1984a, 1984b).

Nonetheless, developmental ideas in South Africa, despite the peculiar racial inflection[21], were akin to international development elsewhere in Africa. As Chris Tapscott put it (1995, p.174):

> Anxious to legitimate the system of separate development in the eyes of a sceptical world, the apartheid state adopted the language of that world. In the period leading up to the 'independence' of the Transkei bantustan, for example, the Bureau for Economic Research re Bantu Development produced a series of publications designed to draw favourable comparisons 'between the homelands as developing countries and other countries in Africa' (BENBO, 1976, p.194). Citing various selective statistics (many of which were highly contentious), these reports purported to demonstrate that 'the development level of the homelands compares quite favourably with (and in many cases

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20 The word 'township'—originally meaning a suburban community— was used to characterise Black and Coloured segregated and marginal urban neighbourhoods (Beavon, 1982). In its common usage, today, 'township' is mostly associated with urban areas of poverty and marginality and is hence synonym of 'slum'. However, although some organisations linked to international slum-dwellers movements are based in South African townships, I will not be using the words 'township' and 'slum' interchangeably. In this dissertation, unless it is specified that a certain place is, in fact, an informal shack community, the concept of township refers to non-white urban neighbourhoods built on the margins of the city.

21 Although, as Sarah White argues (2002), development everywhere was marked by racial remainders of colonialism.

higher than) that of independent countries in Africa' (BENBO, 1976, p.194).

As Escobar explained (1995a), the logic of development was sustained by these kinds of efficient *apparati* for producing knowledge—a knowledge that, as Cooper and Packard (1997, p.1) put it, constituted a way of rethinking the political geography of the world, a "veritable industry" that, unlike colonialism, appealed to both former colonizers and colonized. In the context of Southern Africa, James Ferguson showed (1990, p.250) that development was also an "anti-politics machine", a technocratic order that, using poverty as its entry point, and making it a matter of managerial expertise, not only allowed the state to establish and expand its bureaucratic power, but also to depoliticize their claims over what was right[22]. This potential for depoliticizing thorny issues became particularly relevant, writes Tapscott (1995), in the context of South Africa in the last fifteen years of apartheid, where the reformist thrust of prime minister Botha found a 'technical' support in the idea of a 'new' version development, a paradigm that would "uncouple the concept development from the now economically and politically problematic notion of 'separate development'" (177).

Confronted by political protests, and by the failure of separate development, the late-apartheid machine sought legitimation by, once again, depoliticizing and technocratizing the 'management of the native', but, this time, it did so including diverse academic disciplines, political positions and segments of the white society, in particular civil society organizations, which were incorporated in the debate about a 'right' form of development (Tapscott, 1995). This new paradigm included various facets. The pool of bureaucrats and experts that rescripted development

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22 Historians like Colin Bundy and Will Beinart have argued that the bureaucracy of apartheid was, in fact, fundamental in the making of modern state institutions in South Africa.

was not immune to the critiques of developmentalism which were coming from both academia and global NGOs, and culminated in the anti-globalization protests in Washington and Seattle, 2000. Neither had been the World Bank, which, from the late eighties, had embraced the need to rethink development. On this, Julia Elyachar writes:

> By the end of April 2000, development as critiqued by anthropologists and others since the 1980s had evidently been given a discursive burial. No one wanted to defend development anymore—not even the World Bank. Indeed, the president of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn, defended his policies against the antiglobalization protestors by insisting that he, too, was against development. "We," he said, "are way ahead of the protestors." To prove his point, he cited charts to illustrate the decline of development lending for large projects at the bank and the parallel rise of so-called microloans, that is, very small loans to individuals selling goods in the marketplace, often in the Third World (2002, p.495).

Similarly, the shift from large (civilization) projects to entrepreneurial individuals in the 'informal sector' of the economy was a key feature of South Africa's developmentalism during the last years of apartheid (see Preston-Whyte & Rogerson, 1991). As Tapscott put it:

> The promotion of small business ventures and the 'informal sector' was seen as a medium through which the black population could identify with the social and political order. The informal sector was now a breeding ground for an entrepreneurs' corp (Tapscott, 1995, p.182).

This vocabulary of entrepreneurial empowerment coming from informality did not disappear with the demise of apartheid (Ponte *et al.*, 2007). Its appeal resisted the political turmoil of the early nineties and reached different sectors of the South African society, not least the spheres of the leading anti-apartheid movement who came to power—the African National Congress (ANC)—and other civil society

organizations, which had originally shunned developmentalism[23]. Yet, as Julia Elyachar illustrates in the context of Egypt (2002), it was a new 'version' of development that was taking shape, a version consistent with both critiques of development and a project of neoliberalism. It must be said here that also 'traditional' development interventions marked the process of democratic normalization in South Africa, with grants and large 'reconstruction' loans from the World Bank and the IMF (Manzo, 1995).

Nonetheless, the new focus on entrepreneurial individuals and communities was seen, by NGOs and other civil society organizations, as a way to right the wrongs of old versions of development by empowering those that apartheid had disempowered. At the level of global discourse, downloading development to the 'people' cannily resonated with the critiques of development of the likes of Arturo Escobar:

> Third World reality is inscribed with precision and persistence by the discourses and practices of economists, planners, nutritionists, demographers, and the like, making it difficult for people to define their own interests in their own terms—in many cases actually disabling them from doing so (Escobar, 2005b, p.208).

This shift was also a way, Elyachar explains (2002), to expand the space of the free market, by disengaging the state from the 'informal economy'—an approach that struck a chord in dominant neoliberal ideologies[24]. The promise of 'microentrepreneurship/microfinance', a sister concept of 'empowerment' and 'informal economy', for example, was also in that

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23 Although this claim must be taken with a pinch of salt, as anti-modernist discourses like the black consciousness movement did have a role in the shaping of post apartheid South African politics (see Manzo, 1995), the ANC continued the effort initiated by the (white) National Party: convincing the world that the country belonged to the 'underdeveloped' league, and, therefore, opening it to developmentalist discourses (and funds).

24 Nonetheless, as Elyachar shows elsewhere (2005), the complex nexus of NGOs and other international organisations that gave shape to micro-entrepreneurial programmes in the third world, ended up fuelling the bureaucracies of the states that they were meant to bypass.

it was, unlike structural adjustment or other developmental doctrines, a product of the Global South—precisely Bangladesh (see Roy, 2010)—and in that it bypassed, via NGOs and other technologies of finance, the sclerotic institutions of 'third-world' states (see Rankin, 2008). In the complex geographies of the "Washington/Bangladesh consensus on poverty", as Ananya Roy (2010) words it, global humanitarian practice was not immune to this entrepreneurial turn. Suffice it to say that the first microfinance institution in the World, the Grameen Bank, is itself a humanitarian organization, a 'social enterprise', and that its founder, Muhammad Yunus, is one of the good 'heroes' in David Bornstein's bestseller *How to change the World, social entrepreneurship and the power of new ideas* (2007).

It must be noted, however, that these entrepreneurial forms of development did not simply disengage the state in South Africa. In fact, the state was key in promoting enterprise approaches and it did so by creating an efficient, although not always effectual, policy framework (Rogerson, 2004). Moreover, the construction of liberalism in the 'rainbow-nation' project, as James Ferguson has observed, fluctuated between expanding economic redistribution and fostering rapid economic growth that benefited the few (2007; 2010; 2015). Several scholars of contemporary South Africa have shown how the post-apartheid state has engaged in one of the largest government-led developmental projects ever undertaken. From financial inclusion (James, 2012; 2014) to infrastructural provisions (Von Schnitzler, 2008; 2013; 2016), from land restitution (James, 2007) to creating biometric systems of service delivery (Breckenridge, 2005), from cash payments (Ferguson, 2007; 2010; 2015) to industrial policies and small enterprise development (Rogerson, 2002; 2004), the rainbow nation fully embraced what Deborah James describes as a "redistributive neoliberalism" (2011): a state project of development caught between market forces and the need to redress economic inequalities.

In general, these different contributions argue that in the post-apartheid, liberal state, the politics of redistribution have been foundational—both as discourse and as actual, technical means of economic distribution. As I will further explain in the last chapter of this dissertation, this state-wide redistributive effort has been articulated through various discursive rationalities, and social entrepreneurship has not been the only one. I will show how the modes of organization that social entrepreneurship produces are also attached to other ideas, such as a purportedly 'ethnic' conceptualization of economic participation called *ubuntu* (Ferguson, 2015, p.180). *Ubuntu*, as an ethos of moral and civil life, marked the transition from apartheid to democracy, but it also contributed to the definition of economic citizenship in the post-1994 nation.

To conclude, in South Africa, the various trajectories of development described in this section have been and continue to be locally translated within the unique legacy of racial segregation. Post-apartheid economic development strategies had to explicitly deal with the question of race, not only with poverty and stagnation. Empowerment, for example, became the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), a business legal framework that, in many ways, spoke a racially-conscious version of "spurring entrepreneurship" at the base of the pyramid (Tangri & Southall, 2008). For reasons of space, I cannot discuss here the various entanglements of politics and economic expertise that contributed to these strategies, from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the GEAR (Growth Employment and Redistribution (see Beinart, 2001; Terreblanche, 2002 and Gillian Hart's *Disabling Globalization,* 2002), to the recent B-BBEE (Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment). On this racial inflection of entrepreneurship in South Africa, Shari Daya comments (2014a) that despite the unimpeachable best intentions of this kind of 'development', the discourse of empowerment reflects and further entrenches difference along the lines of race or other problematic categories. A similar argument has been made by Dinah

Rajak, who has used CSR (corporate social responsibility) in South African companies to highlight the persistence of racist paternalism and to question the very possibility of empowerment in the nation's project of redistribution (2008; 2011). I momentarily leave aside this important point, although legacies of racial segregation speak at various points of the next chapters, where I address some of the urban geographies where and through which social entrepreneurship becomes a technology of millennial development.

The reason for starting this discussion with historical remarks about development (both as a global system and as it featured in South Africa) is to settle on a few arguments that allow my ethnographic chapters to speak to a larger set of concerns. First, that South Africa is not, and never was, devoid of influences from globally mobile economic doctrines and paradigms, despite the country's long international isolation (see Manzo, 1992). Second, that there are forms of technical authority, as in the case of economic development, that resisted the demise of apartheid and even became more powerful through the policies of the new democratic state, though in contradictory ways (Ferguson, 2007; 2013; 2015). In spite of a neoliberal rhetoric of rolling back government intervention, South Africa has been a very proactive state in embracing developmentalism. Third, that the historical and geographic legacies of racial segregation gave a peculiar shape to the local architectures of in humanitarian and economic development expertise. Lastly, as a consequence of the previous point, the fight against apartheid presented South Africa with a very strong, international and diverse civil society (see Habib & Kotze, 2003), a counter-expertise that, today, is negotiating what 'doing well by doing good' means in the field of economic development:

> *There was a moment, in the early days of Mandela, when money for NGOs was falling from the sky, you didn't even need to ask, and some funders would come along, and that was because of the horrors of apartheid, and how visible they had*

> *become. But things have changed, and we, also, had to change, and learn how to change (personal conversation with Stephen, CEO of an NGO, August 2015).*

For Stephen, changing meant that he had to become more entrepreneurial and begin a sister business that now channels financial resources into the not-for-profit legal advice organization he founded before the end of apartheid. This and other stories that I narrate in what follows are the material manifestations of the schematic history of the convergence between development and humanitarianism that I have sketched above. Although I have not produced an exhaustive recollection of a literature that spreads across heterogeneous disciplines, languages and places, I have outlined a background that serves the purpose of this research. History, however, was never simply a backdrop in the lives of my interlocutors or in the economic experiments that they were a part of. Rather, as I will show, histories were what Latour in his *Paris Ville Invisible* describes as performative objects themselves, "actants", and "figurations" capable of producing meanings and realities in material ways (Latour *et al.*, 1998).

1.4. Social entrepreneurship, millennial development.

In the convergence of development and humanitarianism, a number of political technologies have emerged as "systematic relations of knowledge and intervention" (Lakoff & Collier, 2010, p. 244, drawing on Foucault, 2001). Among these technologies, some were born as forms of knowledge in western academia, like the 'informal economy', whilst others, like microfinance, were first introduced as economic experiments in the Global South (see Roy, 2010; Rankin, 2013). Other ideas, like 'empowerment', were sourced from emancipation struggles and became mechanisms of developmental policy (Elyachar, 2002; Hill, 2003; McEwan, 2003; Sharma, 2008). In the context of South Africa, for example, the idea of entrepreneurial empowerment—that is, the idea

to redress economic imbalances by fostering forms of entrepreneurial citizenship—has been at the forefront of the redistributive efforts of the post-apartheid state (McEwan & Bek, 2006). Specifically, scholars of economic development in South Africa have underscored how the redistributive thrust of the rainbow nation project, even when the latter shifted from nation-building to neoliberal governance, featured a number of techniques, from quality certifications and audits (McEwan & Bek, 2009a; 2009b) to points-based tender systems like the B-BBEE (Andreasson, 2006; Ponte *et al.,* 2007), to community-based services and other partnerships (Miraftab, 2004; 2007) designed to engender the actually-existing economic forms of economic redistribution.

To address millennial development in Cape Town, the focus of this thesis is on one of these political devices—social entrepreneurship—and on its "mundane programmes, calculations, techniques, apparatuses, documents and procedures" (Rose & Miller, 1992/ 2010, p. 273). My objective is to show how social entrepreneurship, as a system of expertise, functions as a technology of millennial development. Hence, in this section, I chart a short genealogy of social entrepreneurship as an academic field of inquiry. Without the aim of being comprehensive, it is important to acknowledge that social entrepreneurship is not only an economic practice, but also, and often indistinguishably, a *theory of* economic practice. Michel Callon ironically writes that there is "no economy without economics" (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009, p.370). Similarly, there are no social entrepreneurs without research on social entrepreneurship, without the multiple acts of abstraction, qualification, definition that are part of academic life (see also Callon & Law, 2005; Law, 2004; 2009). In Chapter 2 and 3, in particular, I show in what ways university research and surveys materially contribute to performing social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. Here I take a step back and highlight some broad trends in the academic literature on the topic.

Like entrepreneurship more generally, one of the key questions of social entrepreneurship research is defining the figure of the entrepreneur. The latter, "one of the most elusive characters in the cast that constitute the subject of economic analysis" (Baumol, 1968, p.64) has often been a problematic actor to theorize. Economic sociologist Richard Swedberg, for example, has argued that entrepreneurship is a litmus that sets economic theories apart (2000). This is because, as Joseph Schumpeter famously noted in 1911, most economic theories are based on assumptions (e.g. of the rational *homo oeconomicus*) which are not reflected in the behaviours of entrepreneurial individuals. According to Schumpeter, it is in these behaviours, not in marginal utility (i.e. the maximization of profit), that one finds the very mechanism of capitalism—both as a mode of production and as a social system (1934).

Similarly, social entrepreneurship has so far defied strict categorizations and definitions. If anything, the quest for a stable definition of what is social about social entrepreneurship and what is entrepreneurial about social change has generated hundreds of contributions (see Short *et al.*, 2009; Teasdale, 2012 for an overview). There are, however, three major strands of research around which different approaches to social entrepreneurship have coalesced: 1) a focus on the social enterprise and its relation to the social economy; 2) a focus on the entrepreneur and the modes of innovation; 3) a focus on organizational technologies, i.e. seeing social entrepreneurship as a method or mode of economic life.

The first of these approaches to studying social entrepreneurship is rather Eurocentric. Schematically, researchers have pointed to how post-war continental and insular Europe had developed a certain kind of "third sector", a space made of "socio-economic initiatives which belong neither to the traditional private for-profit sector nor to the public sector" (Defourny, 2001, p.1).

In Europe, the concept of social enterprise made its first appearance

> in the very early 1990s, at the heart of the third sector. According to a European tradition (Evers & Laville 2004), the third sector brings together cooperatives, associations, mutual societies and, with increasing frequency, foundations – or, in other words, all not-for-profit private organizations; such a third sector is labelled the "social economy" in some European countries.

This associative space had its roots in the history of European workfare, for example in the workers' associations that provided recreational and welfare services to their members. Such a sector had always been of some interest, but it was when it evolved into more entrepreneurial forms that European scholars of different disciplines, from management to social sciences, begun to explore it, eventually founding EMES, a research network that was initiated in 1996 under the sponsor of the European Union. EMES researchers have been focusing on the entrepreneurial evolution of the third sector, often seen as a result of the sclerosis of European welfare models, as well as of their neoliberal withdrawals (Evers & Laville, 2004). In sum, the research effort of EMES has been largely concerned with modes of profit, organization and innovation that emerged from the "social economy" (Amin, 2009).

The second approach to studying social entrepreneurship focuses of the figure of the social entrepreneur rather than on the social enterprise as a third-sector organization. According to European scholars, this approach is linked to North-American global management schools, where social entrepreneurship is now taught as a subject and even offered as a management degree (Galera & Borzaga, 2009). The underlying idea is that social entrepreneurs are individuals who seize business opportunities for doing good, at their own risk (Dey & Steyaert, 2010). Books like David Bornstein's *How to Change the World,* with their tales of entrepreneurial success, have been powerful vehicles in establishing these narratives. Such stories are also intertwined with the rise of Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, as they chronologically correspond to Ronald

Reagan's famous "Age of the Entrepreneur"[25], and to the rhetoric of capitalist heroism that blossomed around figures like Steve Jobs and Donald Burrs. Bill Drayton, founder of Ashoka, which is the largest social-entrepreneurship support platform and network in the world, writes:

> What defines a leading social entrepreneur? First, there is no entrepreneur without a powerful, new, system change idea... There are four other necessary ingredients: creativity, widespread impact, entrepreneurial quality, and a strong ethical fiber (2002, p.124).

In the most quoted definition of the social entrepreneurship, J. Gregory Dees (2001) adds that "social entrepreneurs are one species in the genus entrepreneur" (p.2), and that "they are entrepreneurs with a social mission" (p.2). Shortly, the second approach to social entrepreneurship has focused on the role of social entrepreneurs and their relation to innovation—in a way that, as Richard Swedberg argues, revamps a Schumpeterian understanding of social change (2006).

This is a schematic geographic distinction (see Defourny & Nyssens, 2010). Not all social entrepreneurship literature coming from Europe centres on the social economy, and not all literature coming from North America focuses on entrepreneurial individuals. In fact, many of the recent contributions to the debate on social entrepreneurship are very nuanced in relating the two aspects and have highlighted the performative capacity of economic theories (Dey & Steyaert, 2012). Nonetheless, what I want to underscore is that there are two main, recognized sources of case studies and theories of social entrepreneurship: one drawing from Silicon Valley as a metonym of individual-led innovation and one drawing on Western Europe as an example of coextensive economic spaces. These two sources, as I argue throughout the dissertation, were

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25 As Reagan himself phrased it several times.

present in the stories, the anecdotes, the books and the papers that my informants read, used, sometimes lent to others, sometimes borrowed from my computer, and often criticized.

In this sense, it should be mentioned that of the vast literature on social entrepreneurship, a much smaller number of contributions have either focused on the Global South or engaged the practice of development (as also argued in Essers *et al.*, 2017). Even papers specifically focused on social entrepreneurship in South Africa acknowledge the "limited availability of published data on social entrepreneurship in Africa" (Karanda & Toledano, 2012, p.201). There are, however, revealing works that have documented the embrace of social entrepreneurship in South Africa (for example, Shari Daya's penetrating analyses of production in the Western Cape: 2014a; 2014b; 2016; with Authar, 2012). What seems to emerge is that social entrepreneurship in the post-apartheid nation may reveal that neoliberal development, as in James Ferguson's analysis (2015), may open the door to radically different technopolitical inflections. This is a line of argument that this dissertation seeks to explore, speaking to both the literature that has engaged entrepreneurial empowerment very critically (McEwan & Bek, 2006; 2009a) and the work that has underscored the alternative politics of 'doing well by doing good' (Daya, 2014b; 2016).

These latter contributions belong to a third strand of social entrepreneurship/social economy literature which focuses on the former as a mode or method of economic life. Several scholars have highlighted, for example, the processes that bring together both the organizational model (the enterprise) and the personal, entrepreneurial endeavour (entrepreneurship) (see Sullivan Mort *et al.*, 2003; Robinson, 2006; Martin & Osberg, 2007; Amin, 2009). The common thread is that social entrepreneurship is a specific form or technology of economic change (Trexler, 2008; Nicholls, 2008; Zahara *et al.*, 2009). In her map of

economic forms, for example, J.K. Gibson-Graham (2008) describes the social enterprise as one of the many hybrid organizations that exist in alternative forms of capitalism: in this diagram, social entrepreneurship exists as a mode of economic life at the intersection of capitalist and non-capitalist configurations. In that, the "ontological politics" (Mol, 1999) that are attached to the performative power of academic research become visible. Placing and narrating social entrepreneurship is not a neutral act, but an enactment of some realities over others (Dey & Steyaert, 2010): in the specific case, it gives validity and visibility both to the diversity of capitalist enterprises and to the existence of alternative organizational forms.

1.5. Conclusion.

> In South Africa, [...] the government has identified the social economy, and social enterprise specifically, as a key area for support, viewing it as a strategic means of reducing poverty, increasing work opportunities, and encouraging investment in the country (Steinman, 2009; Karanda & Toledano, 2012). Social enterprise is also encouraged by the government's Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) legislation. In addition, several large corporations are actively involved in supporting social enterprise through their own corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes. These include funding and projects such as the South African Breweries (SAB) Foundation Innovation Awards, the De Beers Fund for development, and the AngloAmerican Chairman's Fund (Daya, 2014a, p.120).

Social entrepreneurship, I argue throughout this thesis, can be understood as a political technology, a field of expertise that offers conceptual and practical solutions to the challenges of millennial development in the Global South. In the remainder of this work, I show how as a system of knowledge it includes experts, centres of calculation, spatial experiments, infrastructures and devices that incorporate the

possibility of erasing poverty through entrepreneurial profit. Or, as Jay put it, of "*doing well by doing good*". In doing so, I will use the ecology of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town to question the technopolitics of millennial development in one of its actual sites.

The role of this introductory chapter, in sketching some of the trajectories of developmentalism in South Africa, between apartheid and structural adjustment, and giving a brief genealogy of social entrepreneurship as a field of academic research, was to situate my dissertation within two rich scholarly fields. In what follows—the ethnographic chapters of my dissertation—I will also consider these two genealogies as two of the ways in which I encountered my fieldwork. In fact, the next chapter is dedicated to charting three "centres of calculation" (Latour, 1987), three nodes of social entrepreneurship knowledge in Cape Town. In these three centres, I investigate how the history of developmental expertise in South Africa, as well as social entrepreneurship as a field of academic research, are mobilized and translated for specific purposes—not least articulating social entrepreneurship as a viable technology of economic development.

The idea that retrospective genealogies could be built into specific modes of ethnographic knowing was championed by a number of South African anthropologists—most notably Max Gluckman and Jean and John Comaroff. Specifically, they argued against a Levi-Straussian understanding of history and ethnography as two separate ways of dealing with two distinct forms of otherness:

> "the representation of larger, impersonal systems," in short, is not untenable in "the narrative space of ethnography" (Marcus 1986, p.190). Apart from all else, such systems are implicated, whether or not we recognize them, in the sentences and scenes we grasp with our narrow-gauge gaze. But more than this: ethnography surely extends beyond the range of the empirical eye; its inquisitive spirit calls upon us to ground

> subjective, culturally configured action in society and history—and vice versa—wherever the task may take us (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1992, p.11).

Hence, within the broader scope of my dissertation, this chapter contributes to anchoring my ethnographic research to a broader set of concerns than what my participant observation alone could account for. On the one hand, the two genealogies that I have sketched speak to a broader intellectual territory and, on the other hand, they begin to foreground the performativity of social entrepreneurship as a field of academic research that participates in the global circulations of millennial development.

Chapter 2.

Centres of millennial calculation.

> A 'centre' can only become such through its position within the complex of technologies, agents and agencies that make government possible. But, once established as a centre, a particular locale can ensure that certain resources only flow through and around these technologies and networks, reaching particular agents rather than others, by means of a passage through 'the centre' (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.189).

2.1. Development and its centres of calculation.

May 2015: in one of Cape Town's finest hotels, PwC (PricewaterhouseCooper), the global auditing and management consulting firm, has gathered some fifty key players of the local startup scene. The goal of the event, 'Gamechangers', is to launch an incubation programme for 'creative entrepreneurs': a PwC pilot initiative to enter the market of small and medium enterprises in Africa. On the stage, there is a diverse assortment of speakers. A PwC senior partner, a successful entrepreneur, who has returned to South Africa after a successful career in Silicon Valley and is now an advocate of pro-entrepreneurship policies, a tech-enthusiast who has launched the Google-powered Startup Grind community in Cape Town, some representatives of local not-for-profit organizations, and Dr Russell Ally.

"*Russell Ally*"—explains the host—"*needs no introduction*" (personal notes, May 2015). After the end of apartheid, he served on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's Human Rights Violation Committee, worked as chief Southern Africa officer for the Ford Foundation, held a position at United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human

Rights, and now serves as one of the executive directors at the University of Cape Town. His speech, which kicks off the event, is concerned with the need for more of more entrepreneurial forms of social policies:

> *As a man of the Left, I should not be saying this, but don't get me wrong—this country has been too preoccupied with redistribution. Redistribution is important, but not without growth and innovation. Otherwise we are simply redistributing the same, small amount of wealth that once belonged to the white minority. [...] The reason why Brazil succeeds better than us is that their social grants are linked to entrepreneurial incentives* (personal notes, May 2015).

As the 'Gamechangers' presentations move on, it becomes clearer that there is a shared understanding of what is needed for South Africa's sluggish economy and inequality problems. The people in the conference room—tech-innovators, PwC managers and partners, NGO leaders, and one of South Africa's democratic fathers—all agree that more entrepreneurial forms of development are necessary. As part of this effort, PwC is launching an idea-to-business pipeline programme that specifically targets young entrepreneurs from marginal communities. Preference will be given to those entrepreneurs that are able to combine a prospect of profit with innovations that will benefit the poorer sectors of South African society. Yet the PwC partner who presents the initiative makes no mystery of the fact that this programme is also a vehicle for the consulting company to enter new, unexplored markets.

This sketch speaks to the pervasiveness of "millennial development" (Roy, 2010): a range of ideas and practices that are predicated on fighting poverty through entrepreneurial profit. As the speakers at the event make clear, however, it is not *any* kind of profit that they are referring to, but one that, if rightly harnessed, has the potential of doing good, of empowering those that are yet to glean the benefits of entrepreneurial capitalism. Millennial development, I have explained in the first chapter, is a mode of governing articulated in a range of overlapping discourses,

rationalities and political technologies. What ties them together is precisely the kind of powerful discourse emerging from the words of Russell Ally: the possibility of applying profitable, entrepreneurial innovations to the challenges of economic development, and, by doing that, forging new frontiers of wealth.

In this first empirical chapter, my argument is that this consensus on social entrepreneurship as a technology of good development is established in material settings that I analyse, after Latour (1987; 1988), as "centres of calculation". How, I ask, does a peripheral city in the Global South, Cape Town, become a laboratory of experiments at the intersection between business innovation and humanitarian solidarity? What does it take to translate the ideas presented at the 'Gamechangers' event into actual forms of expert knowledge? How are developmental agencies and philanthropic NGOs forced into restructuring their architectures to accommodate the "*disruption mindset*" —as the PwC partner put it (personal notes, May 2015)—or, more disingenuously, the opportunity of profit?

The ethnographic material that I present hereafter suggests that it is in a handful of experimental sites that social entrepreneurship is constructed as a viable technology of millennial development. In this sense, I use Latour's conceptualization of centres of calculation to show that a powerful discourse, such as the one worded by Russell Ally and others at 'Gamechangers', cannot be dissociated from the establishment of the material sites, which are involved in

> a very practical activity: network-building, that is, [tying] as many settings as possible to as few elements as possible through as few intermediaries as possible" (Latour, 1988, p.160).

As Latour further explains, this does not mean replacing discourses and ideas with physical settings and networks, as this would be an equally

reductionist practice. Rather, from an epistemological perspective, it means charting how centres of calculation are equipped with the capacity of building networks that perform those explanatory discourses. As Heike Jöns argues (2011), the notion of 'centres of calculation' has contributed to understanding how modern scientific knowledge, regardless of discipline, was anchored to venues—nodes such as research centres, departments, museums, and even individuals—which condensed the capacity to store facts, data, discoveries, and so forth, in material forms.

In this chapter, I use this insight to underscore how social entrepreneurship functions as a technology of millennial development through nodes where it becomes a form of applied expertise in the first place. Articulating the knowledge of 'doing well while doing good', I argue, would not be possible without specific spatial laboratories for experimenting with economic life. In this sense, I treat social entrepreneurship as a form of 'science in action' (Latour, 1987), as a process of truth-making that enrols a vast array of diverse resources that are 'accumulated' in particular sites. These sites are "centres of calculation", powerful institutions or individuals that have the capacity to make authoritative or scientific claims about specific matters, through their capacity to cluster "cycles of accumulation" (Jöns, 2011, p.159). As Rose and Miller explain:

> The accumulation of inscriptions in certain locales, by certain persons or groups, makes them powerful in the sense that it confers upon them the capacity to engage in certain calculations and to lay a claim to legitimacy for their plans and strategies because they are, in a real sense, in the know about that which they seek to govern. The inscriptions of the world which an individual or a group can compile, consult or control play a key role in the powers they can exercise over those whose role is to be entries in these charts (1992, pp. 185–186)

Inscriptions, as Callon explained, are "the result of the translation of one's

interest into material form" (Callon, 1991, p.143). In other words, they are all the 'things' that are accumulated in these centres of calculation: meetings, calculative devices, architectural forms, conferences, books, websites, and so forth. They are both processes and objects through which and in which the scientific knowledge of social entrepreneurship is distributed. In particular, as Latour argues (1987), inscriptions seek to temporarily 'fix' and circulate in some form what might otherwise be contested.

Hence, I argue in this chapter, social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology of millennial development through its contextual centres of calculation. These are nodes that belong to what I call the 'ecology of expertise' of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town, and, as such, have an intrinsic relationship to the history and geography of the city. In these nodes, knowledge is translated, produced, and altered, and the science of 'doing well while doing good' is put into action through specific inscriptions. I focus on three different centres of calculation which my interlocutors pointed out as nodes that owned the expertise of social entrepreneurship: Inyathelo (a developmental philanthropic organization), Bertha Centre (an academic research centre), and Marcus Coetzee, a charismatic consultant who introduced the idea of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town.

In what follows, I investigate empirically how these three different centres of calculation are invested in the making of social entrepreneurship by centralizing its inscriptions. Specifically, these are multiple interrelated activities through which knowledge is accumulated and brokered. They range from the creation of guidelines, policies, rules for ruling (Rose & Miller, 1992) to the actual production of knowledge that is then distributed and circulated through pamphlets, research papers, books, as well as real-life experiments of which results are coordinated in specific forums. Actor-network theory also offers an analytical toolkit

to conceptualize the "calculations" that such centres use to become central. It is in their measuring, qualifying, and labelling practices that they become indispensable, "obligatory passage points" (Callon, 1984) for anybody interested in social entrepreneurship in Cape Town—including myself as doctoral researcher.

More generally, what joins the three empirical cases of this chapter is their capacity to 'problematize' the questions of contemporary development in Cape Town. As scholars like Callon (1984) and Latour (1987) have shown, the power of scientific experts resides in their capacity to articulate problems, more so than in the solutions that they offer. Similarly, it will be seen how Inyathelo, Bertha Centre and Marcus Coetzee, as centres of expertise, are involved in a multiplicity of centralizing initiatives designed to question, critique, and challenge the practice of development. In fact, my ethnographic engagement with these three centres will also show that millennial development is not an uncontested script, and that within these institutions the practice of critique is often a fundamental part of their capacity to become calculative authorities. The very fact that these centres of calculation are recognized as having an agency in the making of millennial development, whatever their form or "figuration", as Latour explains (2005), means recognizing their capacity to develop their own meta-theories of action.

2.2. Inyathelo.

> *I must start this conversation by telling you that I volunteered for this chat because, when I read your e-mail, I thought it was a very interesting research. I receive lots of requests, these days, by people that want to create social enterprises, and they use this language, and I wonder—how did it happen? How did this model become so dominant?—we don't even have a legal framework for social enterprises here in South Africa* (conversation with Laura, June 2015)

Laura is one of the chief advancement officers at Inyathelo, a NGO headquartered on the main floor of a reconverted nineteenth-century industrial building in the "up-and-coming", "creative", "gentrifying" neighbourhood of Woodstock (see Wenz, 2012). The finely restored building is a legacy of Atlantic Philanthropies, one of the world's largest philanthropic foundations in financing built environment for civil society and other public scopes, an organization that recently brought to a close its South African mission. Inyathelo's main goal as an "advancement and sustainability centre" is to provide civil society, non-profit and other solidarity organizations with the right skills to become sustainable, particularly in financial terms, but also as far as capacity building goes in the context of social and human capital.

Inyathelo was founded in 2002 by author, historian and unionist Tariq Millet[26], and writer Shelagh Gastrow, who was the outgoing director at the time of my fieldwork and who had famously compiled the influential *Who's Who in South African Politics* (1985), a book that mapped undercover, imprisoned, and exiled anti-apartheid leaders at a time when only white South Africans had legitimate political representation. Both founders had been involved in the struggle against the country's illiberal regime, and maintained their activity in the post-apartheid civil society. Sheilagh Gastrow, in particular, became implicated with large fundraising missions to finance the physical construction of the growing University of Cape Town—an expertise which she later brought to other tertiary institutions in the country[27].

Millet and Gastrow launched Inyathelo under the auspices of Mamphela Ramphele and Cyril Ramaphosa, two key political figures of the transition who would later become, respectively, managing director of

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26 http://www.sahistory.org.za/people/patric-tariq-mellet [accessed 4/1/2018]

27 https://kresge.org/news/inyathelo-stories-shelagh-gastrow [accessed 3/31/2018]

the World Bank and the country's fifth president. In the anti-apartheid sphere, both these leaders represented the liberal-democratic side of a very variegated political spectrum, encompassing everything from communism to ethnonationalism. The two cofounders were also able to marshal initial support from some important philanthropic donors, including Atlantic Philanthropies, which would later sponsor Inyathelo's headquarters, the Liberty Foundation and the Open Society Foundation, the South African branch of George Soros's global network of NGOs. The much discussed and controversial billionaire had long been engaged in the country's politics: he himself narrates that South Africa was one of his very first philanthropic interventions in the 70s (Soros, 2012), and later he supported the outlawed ANC financially. The South African branch of Open Society was one of its first, and also one of the first international NGOs to be established in the country after the end of the isolationist period, in 1993.

The Open Society foundation, as it is known, is inspired by Karl Popper's political writings and thus linked to the Mont Pelerin Society, the think-tank where "the neoliberal thought collective" was generated (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015). In fact, the first chairman of Inyathelo (then called SAIA) did not shy away from expressing the organization's support for a free-market, liberal democracy:

> Over the last decade, South Africa has emerged from years of repression and upheaval with a model constitution, a democratic legislative and governance system, a free-market economy based on sound fundamentals and the most efficient tax-collection regime that the country has ever implemented. However, the legacy of Apartheid and South Africa's formidable list of needs continues to cast a shadow over the success of these achievements. It is clear that, even with the best intentions, the new state on its own is unable to address the country's costly and diverse requirements including, inter alia, education and training, health, housing, poverty relief and job creation (Inyathelo, 2004).

In this context, the original mission of the organization was to better connect philanthropic donors and civil society organizations that were delivering aid and services in the areas where the new democratic state was falling short, and to enhance the financial sustainability of these operations. Such scepticism towards the possibility of redressing the legacy of apartheid through government intervention does resonate with the Mont Pelerin ideas. However, over the years, Inyathelo grew to become more independent from its initial supporters (as documented in the yearly reports which I had access to; 2004–2016). Moreover, its leaders were outspoken critics of some roll-back reforms—showing

Image 4. The building where Inyathelo is hosted is one of the many warehouses of the once industrial Woodstock, now Cape Town's up-and-coming creative hub.

instead support for government-led action[28]. The bearing of Inyathelo's work has also diversified much beyond its original focus on philanthropy.

In fact, after a few months of my fieldwork, several of my informants had pointed out how Inyathelo had played an important role in their understanding of how the technology of the social enterprise could reshape their work as venture capitalists, 'changemakers', volunteers, and so on. In their words, Inyathelo and a few other authoritative institutions were the key spaces emanating expertise on the topic. Much to my surprise, when I finally got to access the organization, Laura, my contact, was disconcerted by this association. Not only she wonders how the social enterprise arrived in Cape Town, where neither corporate law or the non-profit legislation define such an organizational mode, but—she tells me—Inyathelo is generally rather sceptical about social entrepreneurship. On the contrary, her critique of the social enterprise model is poignant and well-sustained. "*When they come to me, with their social enterprise aspirations, I make this drawing"*—she drew a diagram on my notebook—*"and show them that, first, there is no such thing as a social enterprise here"*.

> *Us—as a non-profit organization—we are also looking at our human capacity and skillset that we have etc, and as these new models and hybrids are popping up, we also need to learn [...] it's not only about being able to provide the right assistance to people that come in to see us, but also protecting the interest of pure, classic non-profit organizations. [...] our funders are more likely to fund organizations operating as social enterprises, because they speak the same language as funders do; because they are providing solutions that are saleable, scalable and all those wonderful words. But what about true social justice projects for which there isn't a saleable product or a market solution?*

Beyond the concerns for how the philanthropic landscape is changing,

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28 https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2015-03-06-philanthropy-in-times-of-disaster-beyond-the-emergency#.WsApZohubZu [accessed 9/12/2015]

Laura admits that, through the 'clinic', the free consulting service that Inyathelo offers to non-profit organizations, entrepreneurialism is sometimes the key to advancement—the social and financial sustainability of civil society organizations trying to produce social change. Although sceptical, Laura and her colleagues have been advising various organization about how to script revenue models into their functioning. Inyathelo itself has always been concerned with its financial sustainability, Laura recollects, building a 'reserve' from its inception, and becoming a "*healthy*" non-profit organization, entrepreneurial in many ways. Yet, this is not the only reason why, for many others in the field of social entrepreneurship, Inyathelo is a key node of social entrepreneurship.

A few days before my meeting with Laura, I had had the chance of a guided tour in the building (Image 4) —whose second floor was bought, renovated and donated to Inyathelo by Atlantic Philanthropies as a last legacy of their South African mission. An inspirational quotation-marked passage on the website of the organization reads as follows: "Good buildings for good minds can make the difference in the lives of a lot of people—Chuck Feeney, founder of the Atlantic Philanthropies". Good buildings, it suggests, are also architectures of knowledge and financial sustainability:

> "If done properly, philanthropic support for a building is not the purchase of a product. It's an investment in enterprise, a long-term underwriting of whatever goes on inside" [29].

The main lounge of Inyathelo is called the 'civil society hub'. Inyathelo itself occupies a series of aquarium-like glass workstations, almost all visible from the hub. "*We worked with the architects, they wanted to give*

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29 http://www.atlanticphilanthropies.org/ [accessed 10/07/2017]

Image 5. The hot desks of the Funding Finder, where visitors can access Inyathelo's database of financial opportunities and other philanthropic scholarships.

this idea of a public space and transparency", I was told by Sajidah, the chief communication officer (personal conversation, May 2015). In the glass offices, Inyathelo is managed and operates to offer its free consulting services. In the hub, the public can use a series of facilities that operate as resources into a vast geography of philanthropic expertise. There are free computer facilities, meeting pods, and, most importantly for understanding how Inyathelo has come to be a key player in the expertise on social entrepreneurship, the book lounge and the funding finder.

A square space enclosed by shelves, the book lounge is a rich library collection that the centre has been gathering over the years. Some of these titles are very familiar in the "global circuits" (Thrift, 2002) of knowledge around social entrepreneurs and changemakers:

> *They are books we need, or that we've used for some references, or simply thought they could be of help, and so, when this space was designed, we decided to put them in the hub, as a resource for everyone that uses the space"* (conversation with Sajidah, June 2015).

The funding finder (FF)—three workstations on a high desk (Image 5)—is Inyathelo's carefully crafted golden egg, a database of funders

and philanthropic organizations around the world. Through the FF, non-profit organizations can search by donor, by area of philanthropic interest, by geographic location, and access information about grants, funding opportunities, deadlines etc. The service is free for those who use it from the hub. Remote access is obtainable via payment of an annual fee. The FF is another resource that, through the topological architecture of the organization, operates on a scale that includes various forms of knowledge from elsewhere. It is now less surprising that Inyathelo is identified as a centre *emanating* social entrepreneurship. If anything, some of my interlocutors had to *physically* access to building to research funding opportunities for their social enterprises. Besides, by Laura's own admission, global philanthropists are more and more keen on directing their grant-making schemes to social enterprises or organizations with a financially sustainable structure. The FF grants an easy access to these schemes, which, *pace* Inyathelo's concerns, are quite often "obligatory passage points" (Callon, 1984) in how civil society organizations translate their operations into funding readiness.

Inyathelo's building is not only a space of access to knowledge, a 'small world' where global and local case studies and authoritative truths converge and are reassembled, but also a live specimen of how financial sustainability can be scripted into the structure of a social enterprise, even in its brick-and-mortar architecture (Image 6). As an example of how sustainability becomes tangible, Sajidah points me to a glass door, looking on the right from the lounge. The door separates the hub from a bright, refined office space where a dozen people are working on their computers in small cubicles.

> *That's the space we rent to other organizations. Of course, their purpose must be compatible with our core mission... at the moment, it's the World Wide Web foundation's African office* (conversation with Sajidah, June 2015).

Renting the office space to an organization whose mission is to "advance



Image 6. Inyathelo's floor plan shows how the financial sustainability of its operations are scripted into its very blueprint, with flexible space that can be rented out to other organisations.

the open Web as a public good and a basic right"[30] is part of Inyathelo's entrepreneurial financial strategy. Similarly, a series of conference facilities hosted in the other wing of the building can be rented at commercial fees. Again, the market is not open to anyone, but only to those that the organization deems in line or compatible with its ethical and moral code. In those same conference spaces, Inyathelo can run workshops or other activities for non-profit entities. As both Laura and Sajidah like to stress, in Inyathelo's headquarters' financial sustainability is taught in the space and through the space[31].

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30 http://webfoundation.org/about/ [accessed 21/03/2016]

31 What I am suggesting is not a simple, deterministic relation between the architectural design and its social functions. Such a perspective has been rightly criticised by flat-ontology scholars like DeLanda (1995). Although my informants liked to stress that the new headquarters had been designed following their inputs, it would be simplistic to assume that form follows function, or that there was a single, deliberate rationality behind the building blueprint. Rather, I suggest that physical elements of Inyathelo are what Latour and Callon call "inscriptions", knowledge that appears in a material form. Multiple inscriptions are contained in a centre of calculation like Inyathelo. Some are simply objects containing knowledge, such as the books about social entrepreneurship in the lounge. Others, like the FF, are more complicated algorithms: coded gateways to other calculative agencies, for example grant schemes. Other inscriptions, finally, are the ways in which my interlocutors saw their knowledge about financial sustainability reflected in the architectural form of the

Image 7. The Independent Code of Governance for Non-Profits features its own logo, which can be used by non-profit organisations which subscribe to the rules set by Inyathelo.

At the heart of the organization's work, there is a laboratory of expertise about social change. Beyond the pedagogic nature of the clinic, which delivers capacity building in different sectors of an organization's structure, from fundraising to marketing, the services offered include a 'leadership retreat', an 'academy', a 'certificate', etc. A 'funding practice alliance (FPA)' binds Inyathelo with CDRA, "a centre for developmental practice"[32], and the social change assistance trust (Scat), a grant-making development agency[33]. The alliance works "to transform the relationship between civil society organizations (CSOs) and funding agencies (private, business and state) in order to support and strengthen a vibrant civil society that takes care of itself, provides a service and is a security net

building.

32 http://www.cdra.org.za/ [accessed 22/03/2016]

33 http://www.scat.org.za/ [accessed 22/03/2016]

for the poor and vulnerable"[34]. For Inyathelo, the alliance is a strategic step into developmental practice, creating a connection between the humanitarian sphere and programmes, run by the partners, that are aligned with the United Nations Organization Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

In its capacities as an experimental facility, where research is conducted and facts are established, Inyathelo extends influence from Cape Town to the entire country. In this sense, one of the organization's main achievements has been *The Independent Code of Governance for Non-Profits in South Africa*, which was drafted "following widespread recognition of the need for South African NPOs to adopt their own distinct code that reflected their unique values and needs rather than be regulated by government or corporate sector codes"[35]. Organizations that subscribe to the code are allowed to use the logo (Image 7) to express their embrace of the principles of good governance that are stated in the document, and their belonging to a "community of practice" (Lave & Wenger, 1991; Amin & Cohendet, 2004) that Inyathelo is explicitly invested in. As of the time of my research in Cape Town, for example, Inyathelo had been consulting in the process to overhaul the country's current legislation on non-profit organizations, another step in the engineering of a strategic position in South Africa's developmental landscape.

In addition to these practices of network building, which are crucial in ensuring that the relevant knowledge travels 'back' to Inyathelo, the consensus on social entrepreneruship penetrates the philanthropic world via distinct pedagogical arrangements. For example, every year Inyathelo hosts a competition between not-for-profit organizations, an

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34 http://www.inyathelo.org.za/how-we-help/funding-practice-alliance.html [accessed 22/03/2016]

35 http://www.inyathelo.org.za/how-we-help/npo-policy-and-legislation.html [accessed 21/03/2016]

event which I attended in August 2015.

The competition takes place during a cold winter morning in the Cape. Warm tea is served in the hub, where a crowd of curious people, mainly coming from the NGO world, have gathered for Inyathelo's 'Donor Dragons' Den' final. In the conference rooms, removable walls have been lifted to accommodate the audience, a stage for the presenters, and a table of judges/dragons. On the stage, four finalists will pitch their social change projects to the audience, and the judges/dragons—mostly donors or experts of the funding world—will give a feedback on the presentations and pick the best pitch. The winning organization will bring home a series of Inyathelo's services that are not usually free: remote subscription to the FF, tickets to attend the Advancement Academy and other useful material—not least the chance to strike a chord in the heart of some donor in the audience. "This event" reads the invitation, "is a rare opportunity to learn more about how real donors make decisions over which organizations and projects to fund[36]".

The spatial and temporal organization of the event is not new, and neither is the language. Dragons' Den is a UK reality television show featuring entrepreneurs who competitively pitch their ideas to a panel of venture capitalists, who usually sit in a dark, post-industrial setting. The show is based on a Japanese format, and its intellectual rights are still owned by Sony. Translating and rescaling Dragons' Den for Inyathelo means introducing an element of blatant competition beyond the usual grant-seeking procedures that civil-society organizations are used to. Whilst applying for a grant may well be a competitive endeavour, with the Donor Dragon's Den the contest is choreographed on a stage.

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36 http://www.eventbrite.com/e/inyathelo-donor-dragons-den-wednesday-19-august-2015-tickets- [accessed 13/09/2015] 17917862810?utm_source=eb_email&utm_medium=e-mail&utm_campaign=order_confirmation_email&utm_term=eventname&ref=eemailordconf [accessed 13/09/2015]

The narrative emerging from the judges' responses is that social disruptions are fast, unflinching, brazen: social entrepreneurs are here to tame the dragons in a fierce competition. In giving a feedback to a presenter, who has naively taken more time than the allotted four minutes, one of the panellists scolds her:

> *Donors are like venture capitalists, they don't have time. You need to be able to stick to the time you are given, and be convincing in that short time. If it takes more than 4 minutes it means either that your idea is not very good, or, if it is, that you are not clear on how to realise it. In both cases a donor is not interested.* (personal notes, August 2015)

Another competitor—a nurse who leads a non-profit startup which proposes a personal development scheme for health workers in Africa—is told to "*add spice*" to her flat presentation style. The performance is key. *"Set the stage with a problem, present the solution, tell why you are the best solution, ask for money"*, Sajidah has reminded the audience, at the beginning of the competition. The final prize will not necessarily go to the best idea, explains one of the jurors, but to the team which is best capable of putting together a convincing pitch.

As the *matinee* unfolds, the unquestioned truth on which the event is based becomes clearer: global philanthropy is a stage of innumerable, competitive social entrepreneurs and few, time-scarce donors. This is, of course, a fiction that serves the purpose of the competition. From my previous conversation with Laura, for example, I know that Inyathelo is wary of introducing the idea that only competitively marketable projects are worthy of receiving support. As I show in the next chapters, many other experts, volunteers, and organizations are sceptical about these narratives of scarceness and competition. However, the performance of Donor Dragon's Den is a further mode of inscription, in this case a pedagogical one, through which Inyathelo situates itself in the know about social entrepreneurship, about the business of 'doing good'.

More precisely, as I am told by my informants, the Donor Dragons' Den is specifically designed as a learning exercise that is meant to force organizations to ponder, challenge their perspectives, focus their objectives, and improve their capacity to engage the future[37]. In other words, it is not just about 'doing good'.

This nexus of scientific practice, critique, and experimentation is even clearer in the working of the Bertha Centre for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship, an academic research centre to which I, in fact, gained access through Inyathelo.

2.3. Bertha Centre.

In its capacity as a centre of calculation that engineers a community of practice, Inyathelo produces and circulates holistic forms of knowledge about social entrepreneurship. Other centres of calculation, however, are nodes of a more 'scientific' knowledge that is vital in establishing the truths of millennial development. Economic doctrines, even more so than others (see Thrift, 2005; Mitchell, 2005), need to be established with facts and experimental accuracy. The Bertha Centre for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship (Bertha Centre from now on) is a centre of calculation where the scientific validity 'of doing well while doing good' is produced through the making of an "epistemic community", a hybrid constituency of experimenting subjects and experimental objects (Knorr Cetina, 1999).

Bertha Centre is a research centre at the University of Cape Town Graduate School of Business (GSB). Unlike the university's main campus, perched onto the slopes of the Devil's Peak, some miles from the city bowl, the GSB is very centrally located. The business school is

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37 See Chapter 3 and 4 or a more detailed discussion of these two aspects: the pedagogic (3) and the capacity to embrace the future (4).

Image 8. The breakwater prison and the V&A Waterfront precinct, Africa's most-visited tourist attraction.

housed in the former Breakwater Prison (Image 8), a colonial convict-labour lodge, only steps away from the CBD, Cape Town International Conference Centre (CTICC), and, most importantly, the world-famous waterfront. Fenced, highly securitized and glamorous, the Victoria and Albert Waterfront is Africa's top tourist attraction, more visited than the pyramids in Egypt, as well as a famed case in urban studies: an instance of urban entrepreneurialism in redeveloping industrial seafronts (Ferreira & Visser, 2007), an example of how cities reinvent their brands through global models and local tropes (Bickford-Smith, 2009), a case of enclave urbanism[38] in the post-apartheid city (Houssay-Holzschuch, M., & Teppo, 2009). The breakwater prison—where the business school is hosted—actually belongs to the private holding that owns the entire waterfront.

From the GSB's securitized perimeter, the 60-meter tall, heritage-listed Grain Silo towers on the horizon of the waterfront. In 2015, shining prismatic windows were being added to the colonial building according

38 See Sidaway, 2007.

to the inventiveness of British star-designer Thomas Heatherwick. In the near future, it would host the first contemporary art museum in Africa, the MOCAA, thanks to the foundational philanthropic donation of a Swiss collector[39]. During a visit to the site, Elana Brundyn, director of Institutional Advancement, explained to me how the museum will be run as a hybrid enterprise, chasing both financial sustainability and the potential of making art accessible to everyone (personal notes, August 2015). Free entrance and free educational activities would go hand in hand with a luxurious boutique hotel in the top floors of the industrial building. From the perspective offered by the GSB's Bertha Centre, this approach could not make more sense.

As one of the research units at the GSB, Bertha Centre is the "leading academic centre in Africa dedicated to uncovering, pioneering, connecting and advancing social innovation and entrepreneurship in Africa"[40]. Established in 2011, in partnership with Bertha, a philanthropic foundation, the centre has catalysed quite some attention in the field of social entrepreneurship, in a country that, as Laura from Inyathelo reminded me with a diagram on my notebook, *"there is no such thing as social enterprise"*. At the GSB, the centre has managed to elevate "Social Innovation & Entrepreneurship to one of three new strategic themes of the GSB", explains the website[41], as well as "uncovered and documented over 300 innovative models and solutions, and convened over 5,000 people [...]". Strategic partnerships expand the knowledge geographies of the centre both spatially and disciplinarily. Policy research gives them a voice in advocating changes into legal frameworks, or, as in

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39 The museum is now open, and has been widely celebrated in the media https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2017/sep/21/cape-town-zeitz-mocaa-art-museum-africa-open-september-2017 [accessed 4/1/2018]

40 http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/s.asp?p=389 [accessed 19/03/2016]

41 http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/s.asp?p=389 [accessed 19/03/2016]

the case of the time of my fieldwork, the introduction of legislation creating a supportive financial environment for social enterprises (i.e. the introduction of social impact bonds in South Africa). The location of the Centre within the GSB, the only business school in Africa to successfully enter international rankings, guarantees academic solidity and legitimizes eventual claims of scientific authority.

A nicely designed foldable quarterly—*Inside|Out*—offers a perspective on the laboratory practice of the Centre (Image 9). Case studies are narrated, advocacy documents shared, facts and statistics on Africa's investment landscape visualized in captivating infographics that speak to NGOs, impact investors, and other academics, not least those working in the other departments of the GSB. As a Bertha researcher explains to me, the publication is a unique attempt at creating a converging medium whereby academic facts are made to be useful, or at least understandable, to the practitioners that usually shun these kind of journals as overly theoretical and not concerned with matters of fact (personal conversation with Karen, September 2015). It is also a way of establishing connections with other centres of calculation. In Inyathelo's reading room, for example, a copy of *Inside|Out* was on the coffee table of the library lounge.

Scientific research at the Bertha Centre, and consequent conferences, workshops, papers, and divulgation quarterlies are not just involved in the process of uncovering the existence of social entrepreneurship in (South) Africa. Rather, as stated in the biography of Bertha's founding director François Bonnici, it is a process that helps "establish an environment in which social enterprises can thrive"[42]. In other words, there is an explicit performative quality to the research conducted at Bertha. For my informants, researching social entrepreneurship means

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42 http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/s.asp?p=409 [accessed 09/04/2016]

Image 9. InsideOut is the foldable quarterly published by the Bertha Centre for Social Entrepreneurship, one of the knowledge inscriptions designed to circulate as immutable mobiles.

also producing more of it, through particular forms of inscriptions that are specifically meant to circulate outside the institution. These inscriptions are Bertha's research outputs: not just academic papers, but, even more, popular magazines like *Inside|Out*, its diagrams, figures and charts—material items that circulate with the aim of producing a better environment for social entrepreneurship.

Bertha's publications are not, however, the only type of scientific inscriptions through which the research centre participates in the knowledge of social entrepreneurship. The act of researching in itself can be just as productive. For example, in a 2016 email (see Box 1) that many NGOs and other actors of the local 'ecosystem' received from the Bertha Centre, everyone was invited to take part in a survey about social

enterprises in Africa.

> We are trying to understand tricky questions like what are they, area of operation, who do they employ, and why are they important. [...] Our study is only useful if we can get as many people as possible involved — social enterprises, those who *think* they are social enterprises, those who *are and don't know it*, and those on the cusp of change. We're happy to filter who *is* and *isn't* (my italics).

The survey aimed to understands what social enterprises looked like in South Africa (line 1), it possibly invited anybody, included those who did not know if they were social entrepreneurs (line 4), because the eventual researchers would be able to screen those who were not (line 5). As my informant Karen openly put it (August 2015), Bertha's research is strategically aligned to the politics of what they champion. In filtering what is and what is not a social enterprise, Bertha becomes capable of brokering policies, designing legal structures, experimenting financial instruments, because the centre is in the know, scientifically speaking, of social entrepreneurship.

These various modes of material inscription, from travelling quarterlies like *Inside|Out* to calculative practices like surveys, which set the rules of social entrepreneurship, are part of the functioning of Bertha Centre as a particular kind of centre of calculation. Bertha is a node where knowledge is transferred and translated, where global concepts and know-hows are applied to humanitarian work and tested against local contingencies, in order to create a viable ecosystem for social entrepreneurs. Publications and surveys are also accompanied by scientific experiments that literally take managerial and economic ideas and test them outside the laboratory. This was the case for 'social franchising', a business model fad which was trialled during my fieldwork, in 2015.

To test social franchising, Bertha created a specific unit, the Social Franchising Accelerator, funded by the Rockefeller foundation

Box 1 — Blog post published on 17/03/2016, advertising the online survey for social enterprises in South Africa. http://gsbblogs.uct.ac.za/berthacentre/

Invitation: Participate in researching social enterprises in South Africa

Posted on March 17, 2016 by olwenm

The Gordon Institution of Business Science (GIBS) Network for Social Entrepreneurs and the Bertha Centre for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship, a specialised unit at UCT's Graduate School of Business, have teamed up to research what social enterprise looks like in South Africa, and we'd love your help.

We are trying to understand tricky questions like what are they, area of operation, who do they employ, and why are they important. The aim of the study is to get a foundational understanding so that we can influence and inform policy and improve the working environment for social entrepreneurs. Helping us along this journey is research house Social Surveys Africa who have been commissioned for Phase One of the project.

We need your help

Our study is only useful if we can get as many people as possible involved — social enterprises, those who think they are social enterprises, those who are and don't know it, and those on the cusp of change. We're happy to filter who is and isn't. But for now we would love as many people as possible to participate in the study.

So we would be very grateful if you could complete the five question questionnaire by clicking on the following link: https://j8dao.enketo.kobotoolbox.org/webform.

For us this is the start point of what we hope is a journey that will provide some concrete answers on social enterprise in South Africa, to influence funding and legislative channels.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with [...] at Social Surveys Africa.

All the best, and we look forward to hearing from you.

[...]

and dedicated to support social enterprises that want to scale up in geographical terms. The franchising model of expansion, as explained on the website, is a specific way of managing the replication of a commercial business model:

> Social franchising is based upon the approach commercial franchises, like the Body Shop® or Pizza Express®, use to expand: a proven business model is 'boxed' up and passed on to others to replicate with appropriate support.

> It enables organizations to reach increased numbers of beneficiaries far more quickly than would be possible if they were to expand on a wholly owned or branched basis as it makes use of social franchisees' resources and local knowledge. Social franchising is one form of replication, defined as "Reproducing a successful social purpose organization or project in a new geographical location or for a new beneficiary group" (from the web page of the Social Franchising Accelerator[43]).

Social franchising requires a distinct know-how that needs to be adapted to the local context, translated into useful tools for civil society organizations and hybrid enterprises, and finally disseminated. The scheme represented in Image 10 is a good example of how translation allows a commercial paradigm to be moulded into social entrepreneurship: whilst the validation of the business model is coupled with the validation of the social impact, and business planning is coupled with grant readiness, the whole process is a systematic application of managerial intelligence to the replication of an organization's social change model. Such a process is indeed advocated by leading academics and experts in the field, not least in NESTA's *Open book of social innovation,* where it is described as one of the organizational technologies for growing innovation and impact (Murray *et al*., 2010).

The Accelerator is a spatial technology that applies the theory of franchising to a real-life experiment, with specific pedagogical practices that are measured and monitored. This is not, however, a smooth outpouring of expertise onto South African humanitarian organizations. My ethnographic encounter with these experimental spaces revealed instead that they were theatres of struggles over languages, values, ideologies and pragmatic ways of make-do. Through these struggles, reflexivity and critique become incorporated in Bertha's far-reaching

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43 http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/s.asp?p=527 [accessed 09/03/2016]

geographies of scientific circulations.

My access to social franchising was brokered by one of the informants of my fieldwork, Henry, a retired businessman who sold his company to become a philanthropist and, in his words, a "*social entrepreneur*" (personal conversation, May 2015). It is an early-September morning when I run into him in a local cafe, not far from the GSB. As he sees me, he asks me if I am interested in a workshop that is about to take place at the Bertha centre. "*Jump in the car, I am going there, I am interested to know what you think about it, and I think it will be useful for your research"* (personal notes, September 2015). Henry's curiosity for the Social Franchise Workshop goes beyond the fact that he is now a social entrepreneur and a philanthropist. In fact, his successful career in commercial business was based on the franchising of a recruitment service. While in the car, he talks about his scepticism concerning the keynote speaker, who is South Africa's best-known franchising guru. "*I've talked to her, she is a very fine expert, but I don't think she gets that social enterprises work with different logics and that optimization is not necessarily what people look for*" (personal notes, September 2015). In other words, his argument is that a managerial approach to social entrepreneurship misses the fact that the optimal allocation of resources might go against the very nature of the aims of a social venture. Beyond the anecdotal nature of my serendipitous access to the workshop, Henry's invitation speaks both about the wide reach of the Bertha centre, but also about the fact that I found myself positioned as an expert in the field, and, as such, scepticism and doubts were shared with me as matters of concern. Had I not been implicated as a purported 'insider', my contact with the field would have possibly been very different.

The workshop (Box 2) has gathered more people than the actual capacity of the conference room, which is part of a social entrepreneurship hub space for Cape Town established by Bertha. During the morning, the

Centre's experts and academics will avail themselves of the opportunity of reflecting publicly about the prototyping experience of the Social Franchising Accelerator. Some of the social enterprises and NGOs that have been accelerated will speak about their direct exposure, and, later in the day, an actual workshop will take place, whereby participants will contemplate their *"replication readiness*" and receive feedback from the "*experts*" (personal notes, September 2015). The key figure, and the reason why Henry is there, is the keynote speaker, a well-known consultant who works for a company that offers business development and capacity-building services in the field of franchising. As Henry tells me, she has been a strategic advisor for some of South Africa's largest corporations. The workshop is a spatial arrangement that allows knowledge to move from the laboratory, i.e. the Accelerator, to a wider ecosystem of actors. Its main concern is how the non-profit world can learn technologies of scalability, franchising in particular, to expand their reach in terms of social change and, eventually, through various forms of profitability.

The central moment of the keynote speech is a long list of dos and don'ts that are explained on the basis of the speaker's experience with the NGOs that were selected for the acceleration programme. Most of the points are very general rules-of-thumb that could be applied to any replication prototype, but some introduce the idea that even social justice can work through market-making practices like branding. "*Recognize the value of your brand; protect your intellectual property*" are two of the suggestions that the speaker offers to the audience (personal notes, September 2015). Brand is not only a matter of recognisability, but also, and more importantly, a way of establishing certain qualities:

> *the language of franchising is hard to adopt. Despite this, you need a very strong, clear agreement* [with eventual franchisees]: *I know it's odd to accept in the social entrepreneurship ecosystem, but you need to understand that you want to avoid a substandard version of your organization* (personal notes, September 2015).



Image 10. The stages of Social Franchising. Each of the usual replication stages is translated in this diagram to include the social mission as well as the commercial one.

To make the point even clearer, she uses one of the organizations in the room as example. *"They began with replicating their model with different brands"*, she sighs. *"We had to tell them: guys, you don't find red McDonald's' signs, or blue ones, or green, McDonald's' sign is yellow and always is"* (personal notes, September 2015). Branding, she argues, may be a tool that allows organizations not only to increase the appeal of social justice, but also to better focus it as an entrepreneurial mission.

Other examples concern the practicalities of establishing agreements with the franchisees (*"The thing is to have a minimum standard: choose the right people, define a written agreement, and establish what is needed for a franchisee to be a part of your organization)*, or the constraints in replicating a complex, hybrid business models ("*Take XXX as an example, they do too many things, so we advised them to franchise only their shops, the job-creation machine of their complex organization"*). She also reminds the audience that "*social franchise is not a one-size-fits-all*", and that the nature of the organization is key—*"they were too organic, there was no order, so it was hard to drive their development through franchising"* (personal notes, September 2015).

Box 2 — Email advertising the Social Franchising Workshop, sent to the Bertha Centre for Social Entrepreneurship mailing list on 18/08/2015.

Free: Social Franchising Workshop

Insights into Social Replication: Lessons from the Social Franchising Accelerator

Over the last 18 months, the Bertha Centre for Social Innovation and Entrepreneurship, a specialised unit at the UCT Graduate School of Business and its partners, Franchising Plus and the International Centre for Social Franchising, have been running the world's first Social Franchising Accelerator. To share insights and learning outcomes, we will be hosting four workshops across South Africa in order to give social enterprises, funders and practitioners insights into what it takes to extend their outreach through replication and social franchising. During the workshop, we will share the journey of the accelerator's participants as well as invite you to work on case studies.

Please join us in your city to learn more about social franchising. Also, you are welcome to forward the invitation to organizations in your network that would be interested in participating.

The golden thread that emerges throughout the morning is that there is a certain attitude towards innovation and disruption that is the linchpin of successful modes of expansion. *"The scaling mindset must be embraced"*, she says, at one point. *"Be clear about your scaling objectives but allow for local adaptations"*. She uses again the example of McDonald's. *"The Big Mac is made of chicken in India. Besides, the Big Mac was the invention of one of McDonald's' first franchisees. Look out for franchisees' innovation!"*. Yet, experts are aware that translating franchising might encounter opposition from organizations and individuals that see social justice as an entirely different realm from business. "*Some social enterprises that we've helped so far... they were recalcitrant* (sic) *to apply business language to social impact. It was often a confrontational dialogue. Sometimes we had to drop some words"*. She makes a series of examples that concern how the expertise and vocabulary of humanitarian bodies have changed the features of social franchising, at least in the way it was piloted by the Accelerator. At this point, the director of the centre intervenes: "*But the business language has an incredible impact on any organization. Even if you don't franchise, but you start the process of thinking about it, you learn a lot*

about how your organization works" (personal notes, September 2015).

When the talk is opened to questions from the public, several members of the audience disclose their scepticism. For some, a strict franchising model hinders learning from a more informal and organic structure. For others, the financial and human efforts spent in activities like branding, intellectual property protection, writing memorandums is all lost on other potential activities that would be of more benefit to those whom the enterprises target. During a coffee break, a social entrepreneur tells me that she wonders if the objective of her work should be to solve the issue to which her organization is dedicated to, or scale up to do the same elsewhere (personal notes, September 2015). The workshop has left her question unanswered.

When the practical section of the workshop begins, social franchising is not a monolithic technology anymore. Critiques and doubts have been incorporated in the way in which managerial expertise is disseminated. Experts themselves have conceded that franchising is just one of the ways of fostering innovation through entrepreneurialism. Their conclusion is that, more often than not, social franchising is a way of reconciling ideas of social justice with pragmatic tools that have their origin in the corporate world. The workshop is a way to disseminate such knowledge, but also, as I have tried to show, an instance of reflexive science, whereby experiments such as the Social Franchising Accelerator are extended to the public domain and contested.

2.4. A pioneer of social entrepreneurship.

Lastly, in this section of the chapter, I take into account the role of those individuals whose expertise, charisma and hard work put them in very visible positions in the ecology of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. I had the chance to interview Marcus Coetzee, a consultant who

several of my informants described as the pioneer who introduced the concept of social entrepreneurship in the Western Cape. He generously shared his personal story with me, during a coffee break in June 2015.

From a methodological perspective, I consider the way in which Marcus understood himself to be as a centre of calculation, an obligatory passage point in the translation of social entrepreneurship expertise into practice. This means tapping into what Douglas Holmes and George Marcus (2005) call "para-ethnography": engaging the capacity of technocrats to develop their own ethnographies to determine the limits and possibilities of their knowledge. This resonates with Latour's call for recognizing that

> actors are also able to propose their own theories of action to explain how agencies' effects are carried over. Being full-blown reflexive and skilful metaphysicians, actors [...] also have their own meta-theory about how agency acts (Latour, 2005, p.57).

Describing a single actor as a centre of calculation may seem counterintuitive. However, this is precisely the point: calculative agencies take very different "figurations" through which they are understood and represented (Latour, 2005, p.53). In this case, it was Marcus himself, as it emerged from our conversation, who saw himself as capable of brokering "cycles of accumulation" (Jöns, 2011, p.159)—that is, he thought his power derived from the fact that any discussion, debate, or experiment concerning social entrepreneurship in Cape Town had to refer to his own work. Moreover, behind a single individual who is recognized as having some form of agency in the production of knowledge, as Latour explains, there is never a single individual:

> This is exactly what the words 'actor' and 'person' mean: no one knows how many people are simultaneously at work in any given individual; conversely, no one knows how much individuality there can be in a cloud of statistical data points (Latour, 2005, p.54).

Drawing on this understanding of "figuration", Marcus's para-ethnography shows how even a single person can become an intermediary of, in this case, global circulations of managerial knowledge, precisely because they are capable of giving a personal character to their calculative agency.

Marcus has been involved in the social enterprise world for twenty years, *"except that back then we didn't call it social enterprise"* (personal conversation, June 2015). At eighteen, he had a "*call*": he realized that his mission was social change. For this reason, he decided to study at the University of Cape Town to become a social worker, but, before enrolling, he had to go through the compulsory military service that white South Africans were forced to attend during the apartheid regime. Because of his medical interests, he was sent to a remote San community, where he lived and worked as a paramedic. During that experience, Marcus matured the decision to abandon the idea of being a social worker and decided, once he got back, to study Business Science. In the bushman community, he had realized how organizations are able to transform reality for the better or the worse, as in the case of the powerful apartheid bureaucracy, which had been capable of the contained displacement of an entire indigenous people in the Cape. He had also understood that social work was not enough to achieve the mission of social change he felt a call for.

Having studied business, he entered a world, the humanitarian sector, that was fighting the last offshoots of the apartheid regime, and rethinking how to address inequality in a democratic future. At that time, he recalls, the non-profit sector was only made up of activists and social workers. As a business expert, he used to spark huge fights and conflicts around ideas on how to move the praxis of solidarity forward. When he started consulting, after working in the management of a large non-profit organization for some years, he soon realized that business talk was, in

fact, a taboo. Nonetheless, he increased his effort, certain that a major shift was needed to address the idiosyncratic codependency of social change and international philanthropic donations. It took him three years to find someone else who had a business degree in the field. Yet, now it is not so uncommon. With articles, presentations, books, YouTube videos, a radio programme, and, especially, his consultancy, Marcus believes that his work has contributed to demystifying management as a tool for social change. "*People now are no longer surprised to hear strategy thinking applied to this world*" (personal conversation, June 2015).

Although Marcus is now using the words 'social entrepreneurship' throughout his consulting work, he only encountered them relatively recently. Before that, he used to call his approach 'strategy-thinking', or 'business-thinking'. In 2005, his mentor sent him a business article that contained the words 'social entrepreneurship' —a paper describing how civil-society organizations could boost their impact by adopting more entrepreneurial mindsets. Marcus liked the concept immediately. It resonated with his own thinking and it captured a lot of what he was trying to do: helping organizations enhance their impact potential through strategic and profitable technologies. Social entrepreneurship was not only a nice title, but a concept that qualified the possibilities of mutual knowledge relationships between solidarity and business.

As Marcus recalls, the first obstacle was to identify the issue with the crisis of solidarity in South Africa. This also meant convincing the wide, diverse, civil society that had emerged from anti-apartheid struggles that a change was needed:

> *This sector was artificially boiled up by apartheid, because a lot of funding around activism, rebuilding South Africa, HIV money, etc, kept pouring in from overseas. So I have clients that were social enterprises with a perfect business model, but they didn't use it, and relied on donors' money. It was just easier. [...] But then that money started pulling out, and then social enterprises became more popular in the*

> *late Nineties, and [...] now the spectrum for philanthropists and donors is much wider, they can invest in social investments or donate* (personal conversation, June 2015).

A lot of Marcus's effort—he explains—concerned persuading those organizations not to fear the possibility of using profit, or even just strategic thinking, as a mechanism to achieve their goals. As a result, at organization after organization he consulted, convinced, and transformed (not without struggles), he gradually became indispensable. At the moment of my interview, Marcus mentions that he is helping the Western Cape provincial government design a strategy for social entrepreneurship to fill the 'legal' gap that was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. He has also helped the Bertha centre with their framework for social impact bonds, advising on contractual models for delivering them. Nationally, he is working with two government departments to design a procurement tender platform that addresses both cost efficiency and social sustainability. In the past, he also worked internationally, consulting for the International Labour Organization on employment issues surrounding hybrid organizations.

Although Marcus believes in the idea that the world of solidarity should learn from the world of business and vice versa, he is also wary of management fads and trends. He summarizes the basis of his consulting work in three words: plans don't work.

> *If you are able to get people thinking clearly, your work is done. [...] Clarity is worth ten strategic plans. [...] Think of scenario planning, scenarios enable organizations with the capacity of thinking with clarity about how to deal with the unexpected* (personal conversation, June 2015).

A lot of his work involves convincing people that business thinking is not evil, but also, he tells me, aligning actors. Connecting people. Establishing the right relationships. As part of this effort, Marcus also

became the director of the African Social Enterprise Network (ASEN), a short-lived experiment for a regional, collective platform for like-minded organizations.

These entangled roles—ranging from consulting work to assuming the leadership of a lobbying association of social enterprises—have all been part of establishing himself as a knowledge broker, as a central figure in the ecosystem, something Marcus is very aware of. Indeed, when Marcus tells me that "plans don't work", he is not only describing eventual strategies for the organizations he consults, but also explicitly bringing forth his role in the ecosystem. Social entrepreneurship is a script that needs to be continuously, even if very temporarily, managed in the relationships between actors, and between actors and various forms of business expertise. Fixing these relationships, Marcus stresses at various points of my interview, is what his work is mostly about.

Marcus has done more than engineer his position as a passage point in the relationship between knowledge about social entrepreneurship and his customers. He is also crucially involved in the local adaptation of a paradigm that travels from one laboratory to the other. His story shows how the ingenuity of individuals, their desires and beliefs, their personal experiences and political agendas constitute the terrain where the alignment of facts and contexts is held stable and, therefore, it becomes one of the open grounds where authoritative truths are unfurled to a wider community of practice. On his website, Marcus notes, after listing a long line-up of past clients, that he has "also informally assisted over 750 individuals and organizations during the past 15 years through [his] 'coffee shop sessions' ". It is there, a work-friendly, hip coffee shop in Observatory, not far from the University of Cape Town, that I met him, and realized that he saw our interview, too, as one of the many mundane activities—"or coffee shop sessions"—of his social entrepreneurship science in action.

2.5. Conclusion.

I started the chapter with an ethnographic sketch which offered a glimpse of the consensus that entrepreneurial inclusion will, at once, create new profitable markets and fight poverty with profit. This narrative is what Ananya Roy has described as one of the key rationalities of millennial development (Roy, 2012a). The latter, as a critical concept, encompasses a series of narratives and practices based on the shared idea that entrepreneurialism, if done well, offers a solution to the core predicaments of collective life in the postcolonial world (Elyachar, 2002; 2005; 2012; Rankin, 2002; 2004; 2008; 2013; Roy, 2010; 2012a; 2012b; Dolan, 2012; Ballard, 2013). Such a solution is perfectly articulated by the system of applied knowledge—that is, a political technology—which revolves around the notion of social entrepreneurship.

Social entrepreneurship, however, is not made of thin air, nor does it simply travel to Cape Town from elsewhere. As a system of knowledge, it needs specific ecologies of expertise, porous arrangements of humans and materials which do the work of using "the world as a laboratory" (Mitchell, 2005, p.297). Put differently, the key argument of this chapter has been that social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology of millennial development through its material "centres of calculation" (Latour, 1987). These are nodes of "cycles of accumulation", where

> resources are systematised, classified, transformed, tied together and re-presented in order to build a strong web of associations that makes up a new knowledge claim when all the assembled human and nonhuman allies successfully control one another and thus act as a unified whole (Jöns, 2011, p.160).

These collective, calculative agencies—which are represented differently, or take different "figurations" depending on how they are made sense of (Latour, 2005)— not only produce the knowledge that

underpins their claims to truth, but also perform the world that such knowledge seeks to portray. As Latour and Woolgar's seminal work (1979) shows, the production of scientific truths is both a production of contents and the engagement of allies that give such contents a space to exist as facts. Yet the performance of social entrepreneurship does not mean that it did not exist before practitioners and academics made of it a field of practice and inquiry. Studies on economic performativity consider knowledge as an integral but subtle part in the making of the realities economists study (Mitchell, 2005). In this sense, the notion of centres of calculation has allowed my chapter to explore some of the diverse material "inscriptions" (Latour, 1988) that engender the capacity of social entrepreneurship as a powerful political technology of contemporary development in Cape Town: from institutions to buildings, books, performances, reports, surveys and leaders.

Seeing Inyathelo, Bertha Centre and Marcus Coetzee as centres of calculation provides a way to chart their capacity of "governing at a distance" (an expression by Rose & Miller, 1992, p.181, borrowing from Callon & Latour, 1981). It also provides an insight into the modes through which these three examples achieve their centrality in the ecosystem of social entrepreneurship. Among many interconnected activities of governing at a distance, some became particularly evident in my research: creating 'rules for rule'; mobilizing 'immutable mobiles'; measuring; problematizing; coordination. I will briefly consider these modes of governing now.

Creating "rules for rule" (Rose, 1993, p.285) refers to the activities whereby a centre of calculation does not simply accumulate knowledge, but it also produces the norms of that knowledge. Specifically, Inyathelo, Bertha centre and Marcus Coetzee were all participating, as consulting voices, to the provincial and state legislation that would reform corporate law to include the definition of social enterprises. The two centres also

produced specific code of conducts, regulatory frameworks, and even designed certification procedures, as in the case of Inyathelo's good governance code.

Mobilizing "immutable mobiles" (Latour, 1987) refers to the capacity of these centres of calculation to accumulate and produce inscriptions that can travel while maintaining some of their characteristics intact (Law, 2002). As seen in the chapter, these are, for example, Bertha's research outputs: its academic papers, but, even more, popular magazines like *Inside|Out*, and its diagrams, figures and charts. They also include logos, podcasts, PowerPoint presentations, and similar mobile objects that circulate in the field.

'Measuring' refers to the multiple acts of calculation that take place in these centres of calculation, distributed "among humans and non-humans" (Callon & Muniesa, 2005, p.1236) As John Law and Annemarie Mol (2001, p.609) write, "labelling, marking, repeating, cleaning, numbering, noting, interpreting [are] the activities which compose science-in-action". Put differently, the very act of surveying (see Law, 2009) filters the realities of social entrepreneurship. This was particularly evident in the activities of Bertha Centre, where specific research experiments are monitored and measured. More generally, however, the labelling of certain economic activities as social enterprises is so powerful that these have become known as such even in the absence of a legal framework that defines them.

'Problematization' is a concept used by Michel Callon in his characterization of "translation" as a way of analysing power (1984). While "translation" generally refers to the processes through which scientists manage to become indispensable in determining the application of their knowledge (1984), "problematization" is the specific strategic moment when experts become "obligatory passage points" because they are recognized as capable of articulating a problem and, therefore,

of offering a solution. This was very clear in Marcus Coetzee's own understanding of his journey as a consultant, but multiple processes of problematizing the questions of economic development in Cape Town were revealed in my encounters with Inyathelo and Bertha. The very birth of Inyathelo as a civil-society organization was described by its first chairman as a response to the failing of the post-apartheid state, and the research practices of both centres contribute to problematize issues of development by literally putting them "in the known" of the issue.

Finally, 'coordinating' involves managing the various relationships between knowledge and actors, and between actors. In my case studies, this manifested in specific pedagogical practices, like competitions, acceleration programmes, "clinics", and consulting. It ranged from very theatrical performances, like Inytahelo's Donor Dragons' Den, to more *scientific* "learning forums" (Callon *et al.*, 2009), like Bertha Centre's workshop, where an organized environment was set as a stage for including different actors in a debate, and, eventually, coordinating the way in which scientific knowledge (in this case, social franchising) moved out of the laboratory. Marcus Coetzee, too, acknowledged that a crucial part of his work was brokering the right kinds of networks. In the next chapters, more details about these pedagogic (Chapter 3 and 5) and choreographic (Chapter 4 and 5) endeavours will be discussed.

To sum up, charting the centres of calculation where the science of social entrepreneurship is made begins to foreground two important ideas about the technopolitics of millennial development in Cape Town. First, they show how the paradigms of contemporary economic development are not held together just by individuals and institutions, but by a vast array of materialities through which calculations are contemporarily accumulated and distributed: books, papers, architectures, TV shows, blogs, and so forth. In other words, "science-in-action" displaces that

centrality of discourse that a purely Foucauldian genealogy of millennial development would have. What emerges, instead, is a "geography of heterogeneous associations" (Murdoch, 1997, p.321), where global and local, macro and micro, historical and present are not dualistic, but indistinguishably folded into their centralizing spatialities.

Second, the centres of calculation where the questions of millennial development find a technical answer in social entrepreneurship are also sites of critique. As emerged from my empirical encounter, the possibility of critical speculation was not just external to Bertha Centre or Inyathelo. It was, instead, incorporated into their functioning. Laura, for example, believed that social justice was not a marketable product. Therefore, she saw competitions like Donor Dragons' Den as strategic fictions designed to help volunteer groups to survive in conditions of scarcity, but also to strategically endow Inyathelo with the capacity to be vocal about its own critiques of developmental practices. To what extent these forms of counter-expertise are capable of performing insurgent versions of social entrepreneurship is a question that returns at various point in this dissertation, as I further explore the experiments and failures of contemporary development in Cape Town, starting with its pedagogical practices in the next chapter.

Chapter 3.

Pedagogies of millennial development.

> The socio-technical worlds we inhabit are shaped by a continuous series of experiments. The experiments sometimes bring together the caged economics of the academy and the broader projects of economics in the wild—the economics of think tanks, foundations, corporations, development programs, government agencies, NGOs, and others outside the confines of academic economics. (Mitchell, 2005, pp.317–318).

3.1. The subjects and market devices of millennial development.

In the previous chapter, I have shown, through the encounter with certain institutions of Cape Town, how specific geographies of expertise become the laboratory where social entrepreneurship is established as a political technology of millennial development. Cape Town, a somewhat peripheral city in the cultural circuits of global managerial knowledge, and yet more central in the African philanthropic landscape, is a site where truths, facts and instruments of millennial development are experimented. In this process, the city's marginality is contrasted by a series of centralizing practices, whereby certain individuals and organizations 'accumulate' knowledge about social entrepreneurship, which makes them "centres of calculation" (Latour, 1987), authorities that have the power to engender these truth-making experiments. The spatial nature of such centres (Jöns, 2011), and their intrinsic relationship with the city, I have argued, allow for more than a simple mobility of concepts and epistemic devices from places like Silicon Valley or from the World Bank's headquarters in Washington DC, or even from global philanthropic foundations that are active in Cape Town. First, these

centralizing arrangements are key in the holding of what is true and what is false, what is desirable and what is not; second, they allow critiques, doubts, and concerns to be incorporated in the articulation of social entrepreneurship at the local level. Third, they also enable experts to move knowledge from the laboratory to wider social settings. Lastly, these centres are capable of distributing their calculative potential in a vast array of resources: humans, of course, but also artefacts, like papers, logos, diagrams, books, magazines, and urban infrastructures, like coworking spaces and internet cafes.

This chapter shifts the attention from the making of expert knowledge in these centres of calculation, to the making of the 'right' economic subjects for the sort of moral markets that underpin social entrepreneurship. Producing subjectivities is, according to the scholars of economic performativity, one of the key activities involved in the creation of markets (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010). Although emphasis is usually put on the conception, circulation and valuation of goods, the same processes of attachment and detachment, abstraction and specification, entanglement and disentanglement (Callon, 1998b; Callon & Law, 2005) involve subjectivities as well—whether they are physical or moral persons (Muniesa, Callon & Millo, 2007). Indeed, if markets are understood as collective agencies—or "*agencements*" (Callon, 2013)—then among the numerous discursive and material devices that intervene in their construction is the making of market subjects. More specifically, as Fabian Muniesa and his colleagues argue (2007), subjectivity is enacted in these devices, it is an integral part of discourses and objects that—in the case of this thesis—form the pedagogies of social entrepreneurship as a political technology of millennial development.

In the previous chapter, I have already touched upon some didactic devices, by showing how workshops and acceleration programmes are key technologies in moving expert knowledge out of the laboratory.

Here, I look more specifically at how markets are created, or fail to be created, through diverse pedagogical experiments that are designed to produce the 'right' economic subjects. I use the word 'market' in the sense defined by Çalışkan and Callon (2010), as a collective *agencement* that allows the definition, circulation, evaluation and eventual exchange of goods and services. These goods and services, here, are the specific products of social entrepreneurship. However, its market subjects are not only social entrepreneurs, but also slum-preneurs, investors, venture capitalists, business angels and mentors. In other words, the human supply side of the millennial economies that social entrepreneurship promises in the Global South. The making of such economic subjects entails a vast range of knowledge resources, practices, discourses and material artefacts—or, as Muniesa *et al.* (2007) put it, "market devices".

In cultural studies, particularly in the study of cultural economies, the idea that market selves, such as consumers, are produced not only by explicit advertising (i.e. discourses), but also by the mundane politics of the material objects exchanged (i.e. market devices), has been explored by many (Hawkins, 2006; Bennett, 2009; Hawkins, *et al.* 2015). In *Mundane Governance* (2013), Steve Woolgar and Daniel Neyland chart the modes of existence of a series of 'things', from traffic cameras to biometric ID cards, from the architecture of an airport to letter bombs, to show how governance is made actionable through the material features of such objects (and how it fails to deliver too). Elsewhere, Jaime Cross has followed the life of a cheap solar-powered lamp to show how it materializes both the ethic of care and the ethic of commercial interest that animate social entrepreneurship in the Global South (2013). In more general terms, Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon's take on what they define as "marketization" (the making of markets) implies that calculative capacities do not only belong to those who exchange things, but to the things and places of exchange too (2010).

Following these insights, this chapter charts the way in which social entrepreneurship, as a political technology, underpins the making of economic subjects in three experimental sites: respectively, 1) Philippi Village, an office complex in Philippi, one of Cape Town's townships, 2) Business Bridge, a World-Bank founded business school, with its various formal and informal locations across the city's poorest settlements (a business centre, a public library, a startup accelerator), and 3) Impact Amplifier, an impact investment firm, with headquarters in the Victoria and Alfred waterfront.

In each of the three cases, I focus on a particular market device with pedagogical qualities: the organizational architecture of Philippi Village, the didactic approach of Business Bridge, and the capacity of Impact Amplifier's capital investments to shape both social entrepreneurs and investors. In mapping their pedagogical qualities, their explicit attempts at creating market subjectivities, I will not only focus on the material forms of these market devices, but also on the discursive rationalities that are embedded thereof. As Muniesa *et al.* (2007) have shown, ideas, discourses, and worldviews are never external to the markets they perform. Rather, as this chapter confirms, they are invested in their multiple pedagogies, often for very mundane reasons.

3.2. Entrepreneurial workspace: Philippi Village.

This section is dedicated to a large real-estate experiment, Philippi Village, driven by the Bertha Foundation, the same global philanthropic organization behind the Bertha Centre for Social Entrepreneurship, and in partnership with a local development agency. The aim of the experiment was to create a business centre and a market for social entrepreneurs and other supporting economic subjects, in Philippi, an area of the city far—both geographically and socially—from the bustling central business district and gentrifying neighbourhoods of

the previous chapter. Here, the South African branch[44] of the Bertha foundation invested a large sum for the redevelopment of a former factory into a multifunctional business centre that, in their words, would showcase "market-based solutions" to the troubles affecting the city of Cape Town[45].

In what follows, I chart how this spatial experiment incorporates a series of market devices (Muniesa et al, 2007)—material and discursive features—which have pedagogical functions. I argue that catering to the needs of particular market subjectivities with specific spatial arrangements, some of which have a long history in the post-apartheid economic planning, is a fundamental process of marketization in itself. A process, in this case, which engenders the very possibility of social and other forms of entrepreneurship in Philippi.

Philippi is one of Cape Town's largest townships among the so-called Cape Flats, the vast lowland that lies southeast of the city centre, separated by the iconic Table Mountain. Despite its size, Philippi is not densely populated. According to the official census, less than two hundred thousand people live on an area that is larger than the city bowl. The gentle slopes are formally and informally cultivated, scattered with marshlands, dunes, houses, shacks, shelters and some remainders of colonial times, like centuries-old alien gumtrees and farms with thatched roofs and white gables, which Afrikaner settlers moulded on the architectures of Amsterdam. In the distance, the famous vineyard hills of Constantia are visible and yet almost inaccessible. Apartheid

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44 Founded in 2010, the Bertha foundations operates across a series of fields, from supporting activism, to financing enterprises. Bertha South Africa, in particular, as explained by its director Lisa Kropman, is focused on providing "capital for launching and scaling businesses that have high potential to drive change and have wide-scale social or environmental impact". From its South African base in Cape Town, the impact investment fund of the foundation supports social enterprises across all Africa. http://berthafoundation.org/ [accessed 4/4/2018]

45 http://insideoutpaper.org/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-bertha-foundation-in-south-africa/ [accessed 4/4/2018]

Image 11. A view of Marikana, not far from Philippi Village. Marikana is one of Philippi's densely populated areas.

urban planning left enduring scars on the city structure: motorways, train lines and other hard infrastructures mark the boundaries of what were meant to be racially distinct neighbourhoods (see Western, 1981).

Philippi is no exception. As a stark contrast to the idyllic hills in the background, the area is dotted with informal settlements of the apartheid era, relatively new slums—places of recent migration, especially from other conflict-ridden nearby townships—and abandoned industrial buildings. Large and polluting factories like cement and power plants are another landmark of apartheid urban structure, standing in areas where cheap black labour was available, and tracing boundary lines with their vast precincts (Pirie, 1984a). One of these industrial complexes now houses Philippi Village, not far from the M9 motorway, its northern border, in a section of the township which is, unlike the rest of the land, densely occupied by shack-dwellers (Image 11). On the other side of the motorway, clearly visible from the factory, stands Crossroads, one of Cape Town's most infamous illegal settlements, dense with

recent public-funded houses, and histories of racial violence, killings, displacement and political action.

Philippi Village is not an abandoned factory anymore but, according to its website[46], "an entrepreneurial development with a social impact". It is a large real-estate intervention on an industrial precinct that has been used, in recent years, as setting of rave parties and, more famously, for location shooting in Hollywood movies. A very favourable currency rate, a tax-beneficial national scheme, stark landscapes and abandoned, imposing industrial naves and silos made the factory a perfect destination for adventure blockbusters. This is no more the case. A third of the main industrial building has been filled with floor space on several levels. On the official website, the artist impressions show a grand project for the 12-hectare site: in the future, other sections of the plant will be reconverted, leaving no decadent space for film-shooting.

> Philippi Village is an entrepreneurial development, providing a space where entrepreneurs and businesses can grow; where residents can develop skills and increase their employability. The development will invigorate the area with work, trade and recreational activities. Entrepreneurs will be encouraged to cluster and collaborate to strengthen their businesses, stimulating local entrepreneurship and creating promising economic futures within Philippi. Businesses located within Philippi encourage job opportunities for residents within the area and negate them travelling [sic] long distances in search of work (from the Philippi Village website[47]).

I drive to Philippi Village with two of my informants, the CEO of a non-profit organization and a voluntourist employed by the same entity. On the way there, from Cape Town's central business district, they comment on how the landscape changes when driving to the Cape Flats, the plains

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46 http://www.philippivillage.co.za/ [accessed 22/03/2016]

47 http://www.philippivillage.co.za/ [accessed 22/03/2016]

Image 12. The Container Walk, as seen from outside, and the refurbished footpath.

where Philippi, as most other township settlements, lies. "*Look at the kerbs and the pavements. No one cares, here*" (personal notes, August 2015). Surfaces are rutty and pocked with earth. Pavements suddenly become a metaphor of unevenness, as my interlocutors complain about how much money is spent to take care of the roads in the central and tourist areas of the city, and how little to provide a decent urban setting along the wide roads that cut across the Flats. Once we get to Philippi Village, I cannot help noticing that the sidewalks around the new precinct have been recently upgraded (Image 12). The area is securitized. Cameras and guards watch the vast fenced perimeter that encompasses the old factory buildings.

At the moment of my visit, the complex is still a construction site, with

Image 13. A bird's eye view of the old cement factory now converted to office, workshop and retail space.

workers hurrying to deliver the final touches (Image 13). In less than a week, though, the village will open to the public with a big launch to which the entire community has been invited. In the days that follow, the project will become fully operational. Some tenants are already moving in, unloading furniture from their vans. The landscape gardeners are working on the interstitial space amidst the industrial buildings. One of the managers takes us around the premises, explaining the various functions and the next stages of the project. A similar explanation is provided by Amor Strauss, general manager, to the cameras of the Cape Business News Channel[48].

> *Philippi village is an integrated development: it means that we will have a business component, we will have a commercial component, there will be a retail component, we will have a leisure component, there will be industrial-agriculture component, we have educational facilities on site... so we do have social real-estate. We are standing on the 12-hectare site: it is smacked* [sic] *in the middle of the township*

48 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2u10oZfIss0> [accessed 29/04/2016]

of Philippi. I think in the nineteen-seventies it was used as a cement factory, so what you see, here, used to be the place where they had all the stone and the lime and the sand that they mixed to create concrete products like the tetrapods that you find in the waterfront and the vibracrete fencing [...]. We converted a third of these buildings to become a business park and an office centre. We've got three types of tenants that we aim to attract in this building. On the ground floor we have what we call our social and our normal tenants. We are having a beautiful new library move from Nyanga to here. On the south side what you have is either business incubation or [...] employment acceleration. The first floor will be used by small-medium entrepreneurs, so it's small offices where you have co-locating and coworking. You also have split-spaces you can rent for a day, [or for] one hour, if you want to, and meeting facilities. The second floor will be used for call centres, either that, or the creative industry: we're not sure yet, we are trying to attract those tenants in. In essence, it is an 'integrated development', and if you look at it more broadly you would say it is an 'integrated neighborhood development' because you are catering to the needs of the immediate neighbourhood in absorbing workforce but also offering jobs. We are trying to accommodate all the tiers of the economy.

Our guide is more specific about the grand scheme. Not only the office

Image 14. Philippi Village. The Silos.



Image 15. Philippi Village from the outside.

space, but also the rest of the industrial plant will be reconverted, once the first phase is operational. The silos will house a hotel. Plans for a private hospital are underway. She points to other structures: "*these buildings here are the famous ones, they have been used for movies many times. Sometimes I hope they would leave them like this, but there is a plan to transform them as well*" (Image 14). The hotel will be strategic, she explains. We are very close to the airport. Besides, as media report,

> the hotel would give guests a taste of the township experience. The hotel is being planned for the silo buildings of the old factory, and will include a nightclub on the top floor (IOL[49], 2015).

The hotel, the hospital, and the nightclub are later stages of much bigger plan that is still to be fully defined. Our guide takes us to the back of the building. She points to the fence that separates us from a vast empty land where cows are grazing. "*There*", she says, "*the idea would be to have common gardens, a food-producing farm connected to the activities of the village, zero-km organic products*". A well-known social enterprise/NGO focused on urban agriculture will be moving into the office space in a week's time.

We finally walk to the last section of the intervention that is currently

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49 <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/plan-for-capes-new-central-suburbs-1894411> [accessed 13/12/2015]

being built as part of phase 1A of the project. It is called the 'container walk' (Image 15). Brightly coloured containers are stacked along one of the perimeter of the complex. Doors and windows have been cut through the corrugated metal sheets. The containers will host 120 retail outlets, workshops or additional office spaces for small entrepreneurs. *"There is a desperate need for retail and trading space in Philippi*", explains our guide. Interestingly, the architecture of the 'container walk' mimics the makeshift architecture or 'real' township retail spaces and workshops. Even the vivid colours with which the containers are painted remind us of the brightly-dyed hair-salons, cobblers, internet-cafes, butchers and *shisa nyama* (popular informal barbecues), *spazas* (convenience stores) and other small businesses that are spread throughout South African townships, usually in containers or even more haphazard shelters. The result is a visual imitation of the improvised architecture that tourist brochures use to promote their township tours. While container-based buildings are common all over the world, from London to Brooklyn, often housing artists and makers, here there is an unmissable link between the informal microentrepreneurs that the container walk targets as eventual tenants, and the real, makeshift containers that these same entrepreneurs use, just on the other side of the road from the village.

In this sense, Philippi Village speaks to two important and related rationalities of contemporary development: the aestheticization of poverty and informality, and the notion that the latter are, potentially, new profitable markets. The first, as Ananya Roy explains (2004), is the establishment of an aesthetic relationship between the tourist and the slum, between the development expert and the development field, "between viewer and viewed, between professional and city" (302). The design outcome, therefore, reduces poverty to its form, that is, in this case, makeshift containers. This aestheticization of economic informality is also confirmed by the explicit programme to make Philippi

Village a destination of so called 'slum-tourism' (Frenzel & Koens, 2012), whereby the briskness of slum markets and the spontaneous quality of shacks are packaged as attractions where Euro-American travellers experience 'diversity' (Dovey & King, 2012). As documented elsewhere, the figurative register of this vibrant, make-do architecture of African urban imaginaries is a powerful visual rationality (see Gandy, 2005, on Lagos), one which denotes "the vast symbolic associations we link with particular kinds of spaces" (Pieterse, 2011, p.12). In the specific case, Philippi Village is designed, consciously or unconsciously, on the association of how Philippi is imagined as a township.

Secondly, the container walk is purposefully designed to target the needs of microentrepreneurs[50]. As documented in many scholarly contributions, these economic subjects are at the centre of contemporary developmental ideas (Rankin, 2002; 2013; Roy, 2010 among others). The capacity of the poor to survive through small, informal enterprises is seen, at least in the recent narratives of the World Bank (Elyachar, 2002; 2005) and other international institutions like Grameen Bank (Roy, 2010), as key in fighting poverty and marginality. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 1, these forms of entrepreneurship are presented as possible terrains for profit opportunities. The very idea of microfinance, for example, is based on creating financial opportunities for these kind of businesses, which are mostly unbankable (Maurer, 2012; Rankin, 2013). Late business guru C.K. Prahalad coined the concept of "fortune at the bottom of the pyramid" (BoP) precisely to describe the potential of addressing poverty within poverty itself, harvesting the innovation and wealth that may come from the bottom billion of the world's poor, by creating an ad-hoc market of products and services (2005; see Elyachar, 2012; Dolan & Roll, 2013).

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50 http://www.philippivillage.co.za/part/the-container-walk [accessed 4/4/2018]

Similarly, Hernando de Soto (2000), whose work has been particularly influential in recent international development schemes for countries of the Global South, paints slum economies as vibrant ecologies of heroic entrepreneurs fighting for their assets ('dead capital') to be recognized by the inane institutions of developing states. His solution is moving the informal economy from the restricting domain of the state to the unleashing sphere of the market (a dichotomy that often proves to be false, as showed by Elyachar, 2005). Both the BoP and dead capital are powerful narratives in the construction of millennial development (Roy, 2010), and of the slum as a cradle of entrepreneurial innovation (McFarlane, 2012).

In Philippi, stacking up colourful containers for small businesses might be an innocent architectural *homage* to the beauty of picturesque and low-cost building techniques, but it is also a canny representation of certain views on informality that build on the powerful ideas of neoliberal gurus and international development organizations. In practical terms, a market made of painted containers visualizes the idea that, if provided with the right tools—in this case, workshops and office space—survivalist entrepreneurs can thrive as agents of good development. Corroborating this idea, on the homepage of its the website, Philippi Village is described as aligned to the *National Development Plan 2030*, a government initiative geared around promoting economic growth and equality through "entrepreneurial communities"[51]. These economic ideas and doctrines are, as scholars of economic performativity argue (Muniesa *et al.* 2007), market devices in themselves. Put differently, they are an intrinsic constituent of the market subjectivities that make economies work, and they are materially distributed in space and time,

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51 http://www.philippivillage.co.za/home/welcome [accessed 4/4/2018] https://nationalplanningcommission.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/ndp-2030-our-future-make-it-work_0.pdf [accessed 4/4/2018]

not least in architectural and urban forms.

This does not mean that the creation of Philippi Village could be simply ascribed to a neoliberal logic of development, whereby fighting poverty becomes a matter of creating opportunities for profit. In the remainder of this section I show how, in fact, the making of Philippi Village mobilized a wider range of market devices, including other discursive rationalities that belong to the post-apartheid nation-building effort, and that coexist with the appropriations of poverty entrepreneurialism by economists, by tourist tours, and, eventually, local architects.

Philippi Village is, despite the lack of a specific definition in the national legislation, a hybrid enterprise. It is not just a single social enterprise, but a wider economic and pedagogic experiment. In this section, I chart its institutional history as well as its explicit pedagogic intentions, to show the complex and often discrepant technopolitics behind the investment.

The organization that is behind Philippi Village—a registered entity in its own rights—is called PEDI, Philippi Economic Development Initiative, and is a Section 21 company. The present Non-profit Organizations Act 71 of 1997 allows NGOs and other not-for-profit organizations to have a legal structure that resembles that of large businesses, reprising Section 21 of Companies Act 61 of 1973, the old commercial legislation of the country. This legal form (Section 21) is specifically recommended for large development organizations, as it fundamentally facilitates large movements of money, for example in the access to credit. Besides, as a developmental organization, PEDI highlights how Philippi Village, in the present form, echoes a longer-standing engagement of the post-apartheid state in initiating or operating these kinds of spatial experiments of economic development, as I detail below.

PEDI was founded in 1998 as a joint venture of the city government and

the provincial government, with the aim of increasing employment in Philippi, through a micro-regional industrial scheme. This regionalist approach to economic development built on the previous experience of the Spatial Development Initiative (SDI), a fascinating and much-studied programme that was meant to restructure the idiosyncratic regional disparities of the apartheid state, which had sought and engineered a divided industrialization (see Jourdan, 1998). SDI was an integral part of the controversial GEAR (see Thompson, 2001), the second economic programme of the new democratic state, and as such it bore the same contradictions and tensions between attracting foreign investment, opening the country to a globalized market, and redistributing opportunities in a racially-segmented economy (Crush & Rogerson, 2001). These tensions converged in a form of regional planning that oriented development to clusters and corridors (Rogerson, 2002) and were also mirrored in urban interventions that shared similar successes and obstacles (see Parnell, 2005). In that, there was a radical shift from the way in which the developmental state had been intended in the decades before, both inside and outside South Africa (see Chapter 1).

> With the birth of the SDIs, efforts to stimulate development would no longer be thinly spread, but rather concentrated in areas with the capacity to perform [...]. SDIs are characterised by intensive short-term intervention into an identified area to fast-track private sector investment, to stimulate the growth of small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs) and to enhance the empowerment of local communities (Jourdan *et al.*, 1996; Hirsch & Hanival, 1998). The intention is to focus policy attention in certain regions of the country with potential for economic growth, concentrate investment in those areas and then re-focus efforts later on the more marginal and problematic areas (Rogerson, 2002, p.40).

The experience of SDI set the path for later economic initiatives at a smaller, micro-regional scale, of which PEDI is an example (Rogerson, 2004). Initiatives of the sort capitalize on low land cost, a large pool of

available labour, and combine the promotion of local enterprises with the attraction of foreign investments in areas of marginality, as explicitly asserted by the organization's CEO[52]. In Philippi, PEDI was key in the establishment of a series of institutions and projects, among which was Philippi Business Place (PBP), the organization that originally bought the cement factory precinct.

PBP is a NGO that offers free consulting services to local entrepreneurs, and runs leadership and incubation programmes that are targeted to what are identified as the market needs of the Cape Flats, i.e. both formal and informal[53] township economies. In 2006, PBP commissioned Noero Architects to develop a plan that would transform the cement factory and the surrounding area into a large low-income housing estate. Remainders of this vision are in the words of our guide, when she points out to the part of the settlement which is still to be redeveloped. According to the blueprint, houses and urban farms will fit the remaining space. That social purpose is, again, scripted in the architectural form of the plan could not be expressed more rhetorically than in the description of the designers themselves:

> The architects believe firmly that there is a role for architects to play in the provision of adequate and plentiful housing for the urban poor and that design is crucial to this role. We believe that [...] it is possible to fuse social purpose and architectural form into a mutually satisfying set of relationships. The Philippi Cement Factory Project seeks to realise this potential[54].

After some years of low profile, PEDI was relaunched and hit the news

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52 <http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za/2012/02/edp-creating-a-platform-for-collaborative-advantage-and-inclusive-growth-in-the-western-cape/> [accessed 11/05/2016]

53 As elsewhere, I am using the concepts with knowledge that these are contested fields, particularly in South Africa (see Devey *et al.*, 2006).

54 <http://www.noeroarchitects.com/philippi-sustainable-housing/> [accessed 09/05/2016]

again in 2011[55]—post-municipal elections—for the decision of the local landowners to establish a CID (central improvement district), the local name of the 'business improvement districts'. The CID is an urban area where landowners choose to pay additional levies to constitute an authority that provides supplementary services to the neighbourhood. In South Africa, the experience of improvement districts emerged in the aftermath of apartheid, when urban crime dramatically intensified. CIDs became seen as technologies to fight crime and grime in business and middle-class areas of cities, with Cape Town leading the way (see Schmidt, 2010 on the institutional and leadership history of South Africa's first improvement district and partnership). Today, these institutional arrangements streamline the delivery of urban developments conceived by planners and economic experts by guaranteeing what seems to be the first concern of any economic actor investing in South Africa: safety (Didier *et al.*, 2013).

Although the Village is not the first intervention of this kind in Philippi—in 2012, a securitized commercial plaza was opened not far from the cement factory[56]—security anxieties loom large. As the press reports,

> Philippi doesn't have a reputation as a welcoming space. It's close to Nyanga, Cape Town's "murder capital" and access from major roads is difficult. Strauss said she was not unaware of the security challenges of the area. Instead of just hiring more security, she said the Village would have a security training school on-site, and would also rely on neighbourhood watches that would get people to the precinct safely[57].

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55 <https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/MediaReleases/Pages/PEDIandthePhilippiLandowners initiateestablishmentofaCIDforPhilippiEastIndustrialarea.aspx> [accessed 05/05/2016]

56 <https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/MediaReleases/Pages/PhilippiPlazaushersinanewerao fshoppingforlocalresidents.aspx> [accessed 09/05/2016]

57 <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/plan-for-capes-new-central-suburbs-1894411> [accessed 09/05/2016].

In the case of the Village, the provision of safety is shaped by and part of the economic form that underpins the experiment—as such, it connects social and financial sustainability with the goal of creating new jobs and forming professional security staff. In other words, security is built in as part of the social-entrepreneurial mandate of the Village. Experiments in the nexus of security, sustainability, private ventures and humanitarian enterprises are not new in the Cape[58]. A vast and diverse geometry of such trial-and-error undertakings is spread from the richest to the poorest of the city's neighbourhoods, where partnerships between public actors, private ones and civil society organizations are designed to maximize real-estate values and—at once—address the socio-spatial legacies of apartheid segregation (Lemanski, 2006; McDonald, 2012; Didier *et al.* 2013; Paasche *et al.*, 2014; Graham, 2015).

The various institutional arrangements through which Philippi Village was established show that the market project itself came into being as a hybrid enterprise, surfacing on the humus of urban planning for economic development, regional development policies, local histories, and global philanthropic capital. Legally and financially, Philippi Village is a private limited company (Pty Ltd), owned in equal shares by PBP and Bertha, the global foundation which, as I described in the previous chapter, sustains the Bertha Centre for Social Entrepreneurship at the Graduate Business School of the university of Cape Town. Bertha Centre provided the knowledge support to undertake the project. The Bertha Foundation, on the other hand, provided the capital to start off the investment, which they describe as a display case of this kind of impact finance, combining scalability and an educational purpose[59].

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58 Edgar Pieterse's *Counter-Currents* contains a visual collection of such experiments and more (2010). See also Paasche, 2013.

59 http://insideoutpaper.org/7-things-you-need-to-know-about-the-bertha-foundation-in-south-africa/ [accessed 4/5/2018]

The partnership between the private entity (Bertha) and the publicly supported NGO (PEDI/PBP) was also functional to garner assistance at a higher scale of policy, for example in the rolling out of public transport routes that intersect the area of the Village[60]. The legal structure of the Pty Ltd, on the other hand, favoured a large investment that is a quite unique instance in the world of social entrepreneurship, and that was configured in the form of a joint seed between the Bertha foundation and the Jobs Fund, a grant-making institution of the National Treasury.

As in many cases in the context of contemporary South Africa, the access to funding opportunities was predicated onto the rhetoric of job creation through enterprise development (see Barchiesi, 2012; 2016; Ferguson, 2015). This narrative parallels the idea that poverty entrepreneurialism could be, potentially, harvested to fight economic segregation and unemployment through profit. The general manager of the Village specifically described this connection as part of the vision that defines the urban nature of the intervention.

> [E]ntrepreneurship is often a means of survival in townships where jobs are scarce. Driven by the desperate need to earn money, many entrepreneurs start their businesses without adequate funding, infrastructure or knowledge. Limited access to these vital resources severely compromises their chances for success. The vision behind The Hub, and the greater mixed-use Philippi Village, is to create vibrant, creative 'new urban space' in which to work, learn, create and play. A space where two worlds — that of the Philippi township and the rest of Cape Town — can meet and interact[61].

The two worlds represented in the lines above are more than a metaphor

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60 <http://www.groundup.org.za/article/ambitious-plans-philippi_3102/> [accessed 09/05/2016]

61 <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/Local/City-Vision/Philippi-now-launches-the-Hub-20150916> [accessed 17/04/2016]

of a divided city. They also reflect the functional distribution of the Village space. On one hand, the container walk, as well as the hub, cater to the needs of the local bottom-of-the-pyramid entrepreneurs, who are confronted by the dearth of retail space, workshops, office space and internet connections. On the other hand, the Village serves the need of developmental organizations to have office space that is safe, connected, relatively cheap and central to their humanitarian work in the township. Having an office in Cape Town's CBD or rich southern suburbs is both expensive and physically disconnected.

The list of NGOs that have moved into the complex since its opening is a striking catalogue of Cape Town's most popular social enterprises and hybrid organizations, as of 2016. 2nd Take Clothing is a franchise that brings second-hand high-fashion clothing to deprived urban areas of South Africa. Abalimi is a NGO whose aim is to fight poverty through urban gardening, also by creating micro-farmers that are little short of microentrepreneurs. The Afri-CAN charity, as the name goes, is a charity organization, which operates various initiatives: Afri-CAN social ventures, a support programme, Afri-CAN cafes, which offer employment and training in bakeries and coffee shops that are, unsurprisingly, housed in disused containers, Afri-CAN restaurants, inspired by Jamie Oliver's chef-skill-creating foundation, Afri-CAN fish farms, and others, mostly related to food security. The Fish Farm Philippi is a social business that employs local workers on a communal basis. Ethical Co-Op is an ethical purchasing business that delivers organic produce.

Other not-for-profit organizations are instead in the education sector. Edunova promotes ICT literacy programmes for schools and other learning institutions, by combining investment in human and technical capital. The PBP, which owns the cement factory, is also a provider of technical education in the field of entrepreneurship and management.

Community Connections is a NPO that designed a training course for community-based development initiatives. Sizisa Ukhanyo Training, a spin-off of a township-based driving school, provides short courses and training to obtain skills as cashiers and petrol attendants. Leap Academy channels donations to Science & Maths programmes in areas of poverty and marginality. A pre-primary school is about to be established by Beta Foundation. The list goes on, showing a very diverse assortment of organizations, from an office of the Department of Agriculture, to one of the corporate social responsibility programmes of Anglo-American, the global mining company, to Sebenza, a microfinance fund that delivers business development support and mentoring as well, to Siyazana, which compiles an open-source database to map the political and commercial connections of both profit and not-for-profit organizations in South Africa.

Philippi Village is thus a pedagogic institution, not only in its formal mandate, but also in the way it cultivates entrepreneurial subjects. Many of the tenants explicitly or implicitly embrace the idea that poverty entrepreneurship is a catalyst of innovation and, eventually, will overcome economic disparities and social injustice. Some officially target these entrepreneurs with leadership, management, marketing and other courses. Others show the way by applying entrepreneurial schemes to development work. At the time of my fieldwork, in 2015, these tenants were just moving in, so I do not have insights into their actual didactic practices. However, the number of NGOs working across education and entrepreneurship was striking. The Village itself is a large social enterprise that sets the example and narrates a success story of impact investment.

Social entrepreneurs are raised in the intersection of entrepreneurial humanitarianism and poverty entrepreneurialism, NGOs and township innovators. The presence of a “fortune” at the bottom of the pyramid

is not just in the background. As the CEO of PEDI says to the cameras of IOL,

> there is a little gold mine that sits here if we can get the developments take place between both private sector and the public sector... and it's happening: this is a hundred-million-rand project that we're standing on now[62].

Yet the institutional complexity goes beyond these neoliberal doctrines of millennial development, even simply in the fact that, against free-market ideologies, government intervention was central in the realization of the Village, and in the long history of planning for regional development. Using South African policies as example, James Ferguson (2010) has shown that there is a gap between the political reason of neoliberalism and its actual technologies of implementation. In the domain of poverty alleviation more than elsewhere, informal and formal economic structures are brought into dialogue by market experiments that defy the regulatory function of state assistance, but heavily rely on the latter through various forms of dependence (Elyachar, 2005; Ferguson, 2007). Even when looked at as developmental urban intervention, Philippi Village shows a complexity of ideologies and institutions that confirms what Susan Parnell and Jennifer Robinson (2012) write about urban policies in South Africa, on the coexistence of progressive and free-market ideas of and about the city—an argument that I will reprise in the conclusion of the chapter (and in Chapter 6).

3.3. Failure at the bottom of the pyramid: Business Bridge.

Market devices—that is, socio-technical arrangements which produce the possibility of exchange and value—are not only physical structures,

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62 <http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/plan-for-capes-new-central-suburbs-1894411> [accessed 13/12/2015]

as seen in the previous section. As Fabian Muniesa and his colleagues write (2007), markets are also objects and products of research, of experimental and testing practices that "provoke" them (Muniesa, 2014). Similarly, the markets of economic development, as argued by Julia Elyachar (2005), are also the result of experiments that mobilize knowledge from economics and other social sciences. In this section, I chart one of these experiments, a pedagogic enterprise that was designed to foster entrepreneurship at the bottom of the pyramid and that, eventually, failed.

Thus far, I have argued that in its peculiar architecture, geographic position, and institutional and financial nexus, Philippi Village teaches how the moral markets of social entrepreneurship are ways of life. In its very form, the Village materializes the ideas of bottom-of-the-pyramid entrepreneurialism, and the tenet that markets can be moral as well as economic, a fundamental narrative of millennial development. Breeding this kind of *homines oeconomici*[63] represents a new promise of success, drawing on the failures of microfinance and moving beyond the trap of aid co-dependency[64]. In the Village, for example, many entrepreneurial NGOs do not only share the space with slum-preneurs, but they aim at the pedagogic creation of more of these actors: socially conscious, market-conscious individuals. In the conjuncture of millennial development, poverty can be fought by forging disruptive entrepreneurs.

Among the charities and businesses that were meant to be hosted in the

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63 As Callon writes: "Yes, *homo economicus* does exist, but is not an ahistorical reality. It does not describe the hidden nature of the human being. It is the result of a process of configuration, and the history of the strawberry market shows what this framing consists of. Of course it mobilizes material and metrological investments, but we should not forget the essential contribution of economics in performing the economy (Callon, 1999, p.192)

64 For example, in the narrative of the World Bank, the social enterprise holds the promise of righting the wrongs of microfinance (see <http://blogs.worldbank.org/psd/a-perfect-storm-for-social-enterprises> accessed 11/12/2017).

Village is an organization called 'Business Bridge', which was, indeed, a partner of Business Place, the NGO that owns the cement factory. Business Bridge, however, does not exist anymore. What exists is an open-source set of materials that I was generously granted access to by the CEO of the organization, Robert, who also kindly allowed me to interview him a few days before the project was finally dismissed, in 2015. Whilst the website of the organization confirms that the project has come to an end without delving into details, Robert's insights into the story of Business Bridge speak to the possibility of failure in forging the entrepreneurs of millennial development. There was a certain sadness when he narrated the convoluted journey of his enterprise, but there was also, he told me, the feeling that the experience of the experiment could teach a lot to others starting the same journey elsewhere, or in the future. *"I want this to be an open-source model*", he said, "*an open-source success and failure*", and he later shared, in this spirit, the entire Dropbox folder of the organization with me.

The following section is based on my ethnographic encounter with the Dropbox folder and with Robert's own para-ethnography. I am using this concept in relation to Douglas Holmes and George Marcus's take (2005) on what they call "cultures of expertise". They argue that experts do not only produce knowledge relating to their field of authority: they also develop an understanding of social dynamics that is akin to ethnographic practices in social sciences. These meta-ethnographies are critical to scientific expertise, especially when the latter is confronted with contradictions and failures that may undermine its solidity. The idea that experts are also ethnographers has long been a claim of STS scholars (see Law, 2004; Latour, 2005). Annelise Riles has shown how technocratic and anthropological knowledge share similar modes of critical speculation, some of which are, in fact, practices of ethnographic observation (Riles, 2004; 2010). From my interview with Robert (and from other interviews that follow in this dissertation), it was clear that

he himself was a good ethnographer. Not only had he trained himself to record detailed notes of his business journey, which he was using to make sense his failure, but he had developed a very clear understanding of how critical faculties contributed in the making of the experiment he was involved in.

Business Bridge, as with many development initiatives in Africa, was conceived in the old capital of the Empire to which South Africa belonged to. At the London Business School, the idea of Business Bridge came from Michael Hay, "Professor of Management Practice in Strategic and International Management and Entrepreneurship"[65]. "He was Acting Dean of CIDA City Campus in Johannesburg in 2007, has worked as a consultant for the United Nations and was a Davos Forum Fellow of the World Economic Forum", reads his biography[66]. He is also the codirector of Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), a research consortium that he cofounded in 1999. "The aim was to consider why some countries are more 'entrepreneurial' than others", explains the website[67]. Seventeen years on, GEM is now an established institution that publishes annual reports on national performance indicators around SMEs and attitudes towards entrepreneurship, such as 'Perceived Capabilities', 'Entrepreneurial Intention', or 'Fear of Failure'. One of the most recent reports (2014) asserts that South Africa shows "an alarmingly low level of entrepreneurial activity in spite of high unemployment"[68]. It is worth relating here some lines from the report, as they manifest the performative power of indicators and rankings in producing the humus

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65 <http://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty/profiles/hay-m-g> [accessed 18/05/2016]

66 <http://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty/profiles/hay-m-g> [accessed 18/05/2016]

67 <http://gemconsortium.org/about/news> [accessed 18/05/2016]

68 <http://gemconsortium.org/country-profile/108> [accessed 19/05/2016]

for initiatives like Business Bridge.

> South Africa's rate of entrepreneurial activity is very low for a developing nation — a mere quarter of that seen in other sub-Saharan African countries. Unemployment is around 40% of the adult population; despite this, the number of people starting businesses due to having no other option for work (necessity entrepreneurship) is low. [...] A good infrastructure and banking system are the biggest enablers of entrepreneurship in South Africa. Major constraints are an inadequately educated workforce, inefficient government bureaucracy, high levels of crime and onerous labour laws. [...] There are very few government initiatives that are contributing towards improving entrepreneurship. The most successful ones are supported by private companies, such as Anglo American's Zimele programme, and South African Breweries KickStart initiative, to name just two[69].

In these lines, besides the neoliberal concerns about government inefficiency and excessive labour protection, two very important points about entrepreneurship in South Africa are clarified, at least from the point of view of a supposedly objective economic gaze. One is that the country has a major dearth of entrepreneurs. The other is that those that have been successful at fostering enterprise development are philanthropic or corporate social responsibility initiatives. It should not be surprising that the Sebenza fund, for example,—a part of the Zimele programme mentioned in the monitor—is hosted in the newly built Philippi Village too. It is this nexus of charity, business schooling, supranational institutions and enterprise development that Business Bridge exemplifies very well in its attempt to "deliver high quality business education at low cost on a mass scale"[70].

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69 <http://gemconsortium.org/country-profile/108> [accessed 19/05/2016]

70 <http://www.london.edu/faculty-and-research/faculty/profiles/hay-m-g> [accessed 18/05/2016]

Business Bridge was, as many initiatives of the sort, an academic idea, a model that needed to be tested in a real-life laboratory. I have already argued, drawing on the work of scholars like Callon (1984) and Latour (1987), that the capacity to enrol actors in a real-life laboratory, i.e. to bring facts from the ivory tower of pure research to the world, in this case the business world, is crucial to the establishment of truths, and therefore to performing the realities that these truths seek to represent. This is, once again, the case. From his position at the London Business School, Professor Hay was able to marshal a series of powerful experts, not least from the World Bank and from JPAL[71]—a world-leading institution in poverty expertise, whose mission is "to reduce poverty by ensuring that policy is informed by scientific evidence"[72]. The premises of the project were very similar to those expressed by the GEM—the general agreement that SMMEs are agents of employment and GDP growth. More specifically, however, Business Bridge was predicated on the idea that enterprise development models should target informal entrepreneurs with training activities that would increase their revenues and employment creation rates. In this formulation, the ideas of bottom-of-the-pyramid entrepreneurialism are taken to the domain of pedagogy. In a promotional YouTube video, Professor Hay summarizes—"*We set the Business Bridge up because we believe that business education, at the right level and with the right quality, really has the capacity to transform individual lives"*[73]. Robert, who was the substantive CEO of the organization at the time of my fieldwork, articulated these thoughts in a somewhat different way.

He had this vision of taking the environment that you found in a business school—

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71 What is interesting here is that JPAL was founded by Abhijit Banerjee, no less than the MIT economist who wrote *Poor Economics* (2011) with his partner Esther Duflo.

72 <https://www.povertyactionlab.org/> [accessed 19/05/2016]

73 Video on you tube

> *he describes it as the walled garden of business education, [...] and how do you make that accessible and affordable at the base of the pyramid?. [...] His thinking was, what you get in a business school is phenomenally simple, you get professors who know a bit more than the students, the students, who are all from the same demographics, they all want to go in the same direction... the strength and the real learning doesn't come from the profs, you can read everything online or in a library if you really wanted to, but the strength comes from the networks and the conversations, and the discussions... so why can't you take that concept and put it at the base of the pyramid, with similarly aspirational guys who just are in a different sector of the economy?* (personal conversation, August 2015).

When Robert got involved in Business Bridge, the project had been running a test phase for more than two years, in South Africa and India. Coming from a background in education, he was enrolled to design and manage the training aspect of the project, which was, at the time, a research initiative funded by the World Bank, and led by the London School of Business. JPAL, a third party institution, was entrusted with a randomized control trial of the project, i.e. a scientific statistic practice whereby groups are randomly assigned to two sample groups: one receiving a treatment, in this case business training, and one not receiving the treatment, or receiving a placebo, in this case unskilled informal entrepreneurs. At the beginning, Robert recollects, Business Bridge was long-distance managed from London.

> *I was sold a fancy PowerPoint of what the breaking point should be, and how sustainable the business model was, and how effective were things on the ground. I joined the organization and realised that none of that was the case, that we had very little idea of what we were actually doing on the ground, and we were in a desperate financial situation. The only hope of survival we had was to make this research [with the World Bank] a success. [...] A PhD student at the London School of Economics had dedicated two years of his life to this project already, I didn't want to let him down, so [I thought] okay, I'll give it six months, on the ground in South Africa, to see whether we can make it work. If it works, we stay, if it doesn't work, it's only six months* (personal conversation, August 2015).

After the first six months, by the end of 2012, they realized that Business Bridge was promising. They had a sample of a thousand entrepreneurs, had trained some five hundred of them, and there was a "*massive appetite*" for the kind of training that Business Bridge was providing. The first course was designed around a series of pedagogic questions, which, as Robert explains to me, were targeting the BoP entrepreneurs.

> *The bottom of the pyramid for us was subsistence entrepreneurs, those that run their business to put food on the table tonight, they have zero business acumen, they would take a job if they were offered it, they plan no more than one day or two in advance and they live on the margin of survival or failure* (personal conversation, August 2015).

Which does not mean, he explains, that there is no money in the townships, or that these people are not smart businesspeople.

> *There is a layer of entrepreneurs, in the townships, who have been running their businesses for a long time, who are really stuck in a glass ceiling, [because] you go to townships, there is zero support, these guys are natural entrepreneurs, [...] they started their businesses with nothing, and they are making a reasonably good shot at it, but how do they take that next step?* (personal conversation, August 2015).

This idea of the glass ceiling is very similar to the "bell jar" that Hernando de Soto describes in his book (2000). Another glass metaphor, the jar is a mix of red tape, bureaucratic inefficiency, corrupt privileges that prevent the poor from accessing the potential of their "dead capital". Inside the bell jar, property laws apply, whilst outside of it, informal consensus reigns through various extra-legal arrangements (De Soto, 2000). Inside the bell jar, capital is fungible, protected by the law, and could spring prosperity. That Hernando De Soto is often associated with neoliberal experiments in international development is because his solution to remove the bell jar usually involves disenfranchising the state as an agent of economic regulation (see Mitchell, 2008). However,

the idea behind Business Bridge is that the glass ceiling could be broken through business literacy. Kim Rey, director of Business Bridge, explains to the cameras of a short promotional video:

> *Our students come to us with a vision. And many of them are running sustainable businesses already. But those businesses need to grow and realise their full potential. And what we are able to do by giving them these formal business skills [is] help them break down barriers and build confidence to really being able to enhance the potential of those businesses and to grow their turnover as well as the employment generating opportunities. And that's really exciting. And that's where the true value comes from this initiative*[74](personal conversation, August 2015).

In person, however, Robert shares the stalwart neoliberal rhetoric of the likes of Hernando de Soto. He tells me that focusing on training skills is a way to overcome the sclerosis of state institutions. Informal entrepreneurs could seek aid, support, etc., by becoming formal and, therefore, access credit/debit, grants, etc. But the process is so onerous, complicated, corrupt, that it is better to break the glass ceiling with education than with state dependence. Such kind of education necessarily translates into a know-how focused on increasing revenues and turnovers, rather that dealing with "formal" institutions like banks and state agencies. This is a small but radical shift from De Soto's vision. He writes:

> Without formal property, no matter how many assets the excluded accumulate or how hard they work, most people will not be able to prosper in a capitalist society. They will continue to be beyond the range of policymakers, of the reach of official records, and thus economically invisible (2000, p.159).

Conversely, Business Bridge is concerned with raising the economic opportunities of informal entrepreneurs rather than moving them to

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74 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfwmLDku4og [accessed 21/05/2016]

the realm of formality. To increase economic chances, Business Bridge embraces, rather explicitly, another doctrine of millennial development that has already appeared in this discussion: the bottom-of-the-pyramid approach, or BOP (Elyachar, 2012). As the late business guru C.K. Prahalad championed, a fortune lies among the bottom billions of the world's poor: successful enterprises can, at the same time, grasp this fortune and erase poverty by having the poor as target customers. The BOP approach is twofold: on one hand, it predicates the need to develop products and services that are poor-friendly: a classical example is the cheap solar-powered lamp that Jaime Cross (2013) describes as a "humanitarian good". On the other hand, the BOP approach recognizes the entrepreneurial and innovating qualities of survivalist businesses. To unleash them, with targeted services like microfinance, means multiplying the opportunities for *good* profit—profit that contributes to erasing poverty. In the case of Business Bridge, both elements are present: it is a product-service (business education) targeted to the poor and, not incidentally, it is designed to foster entrepreneurship at the bottom of the pyramid.

These ideas, Robert narrates, seemed very good on paper, but needed to be put into practice. From his office in London, Professor Hay had a global vision, "*he thought that he could have this hub in London that he could be very involved in along his professorial duties, [...] and that he could drop this model on different countries, and there a partner organization would pick it up and run with it"* (personal conversation with Robert, August 2015). The original thinking was that partners would pay a fee to access course material and deliver it on the ground. However, when Robert moved to South Africa for the last phase of the test, they had already realized that their training material, for as good as it could possibly be, was never going to be a sufficient trigger to have other organizations buy it for a fee. An *ad-hoc* pedagogic enterprise had to be created in the township. They also realized that they had to "*own"* their training material. Buying

it from Imparta, a London-based corporate training organization, founded by a London Business School alumnus, was not sustainable in the long-term. There was also a too large discrepancy in terms of how to teach marketing or sales in contexts as different as London and an African slum.

According to Robert, during the World Bank study, teaching meant that Business Bridge also had to learn how to teach, by adapting the coursework to the local contingencies, and by coming to terms with the limits of formal pedagogy. The first course was a sales programme. The second one was a managing-money unit, i.e. finance applied to township economies. The results were, as confirmed by the data, "*extraordinary*". Over the course of six months[75], the businesses involved grew in revenues and number of employees. The randomized control trial showed that not only the results were incredibly positive, but they were directly linked to the delivery of the curricula.

Nevertheless, Business Bridge realized that these successful results, as much as they were due to the training, paradoxically, did not come from the application of what the target entrepreneurs were trained to do.

> *We were trying to teach entrepreneurs how to do budgets, liquidity ratios, all those kinds of financial things that we, as western, ehm, non-township business owners, need in order to survive. But if you went to any of our graduates, a handful, maybe, were doing budgets. Not that many were keeping records at all... so if they are not applying the course material effectively, what is it that is making the difference? The randomized control trial showed amazing impact, particularly in increasing sales. Something from the training is really helping these guys... something is changing these guys, and yes, what we are changing is their outlook, their confidence. Entrepreneurs across the Cape Flats, they are so used to shocks that their confidence is short, they're expecting the next thing that*

75 This data was gathered from the Dropbox folder.

> *is going to destroy them, and what Business Bridge really gave, and we never really managed to track, was this idea that you could plan for the future, that you could think strategically [...] and here was a language that would actually made you feel like a real business person rather than someone who puts food on the table* (personal conversation, August 2015).

Owning a particular language, more than applying its consequent tools, was the impact of Business Bridge. In another promotional YouTube video[76], Kim Rey unambiguously explains that giving names to processes as a way to think about those processes is a strategy to create future-looking entrepreneurs and rational economic beings (*homines oeconomici)*. I will go back to this aspect of hope-building in the next chapter. What matters here is that during the learning curve of Business Bridge, as an organization trying to deliver business training at the bottom of the pyramid, at some point Robert and his colleagues realized that the pedagogic effort was not yielding results in the domain of literacy, but only in the domain of hope/confidence. At various points of our conversation, Robert tells me how crucial it was for the graduates of Business Bridge to feel as important as to deserve business training from "*formal"* professors that would not usually cross the divide, "*cross the [Table] Mountain*", leave the city for the townships, and dedicate their time to teaching hopeless businesspeople. But "*hope and good"*, he says, *"are hard to measure"*. The success of Business Bridge was also the reason for its demise. It is here also that the hybrid nature of the organization comes into play.

Although Business Bridge launched as a charity (a NPO in the national legal framework), it was envisioned, since its very beginning, as a social enterprise, committed to deliver a profitable business model. Not only had financial sustainability always been in the mission of the

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76 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DfwmLDku4og [accessed 22/05/2016]

organization, but the very idea of moving from a World Bank study to an independent structure was a way of proving the feasibility of a BOP approach to business and education. In this spirit, creating viable opportunities for profit among the poor was not only a way of fighting marginalization, but also a good entrepreneurial opportunity it itself—a way of seizing the *fortune* at the bottom of the pyramid.

Despite the first promising results of the World Bank study (see Box 3), after twelve months of suboptimal results, Business Bridge had to shut down for lack of funding. The road to financial sustainability was rocky. After the realization that the entrepreneurs were increasing their profits and employees without actually using the formal business tools they had been taught, another disappointment followed. The later rounds of trainees showed very little improvements, if at all. The second course was less useful, "*there was a law of diminishing returns*", Robert explains. Creating new pedagogic material was not cost effective. One of the reasons was that the second and later rounds were comprised of entrepreneurs who were not as successful as those who were initially recruited for the World Bank study. Their average income was much lower, often below the threshold of business sustainability. The study had set the bar at a level that was not reachable in a real-world experiment. *"By our four key metrics, sales, profits, job creation and survival rates, we were not having the impact".* And yet, Robert narrates to me, the "*change*" was evident to the eyes of the teachers and the managers that ran Business Bridge. Graduates kept turning up to the classes in the hope of learning something that would give them the leverage to become a successful business. Their confidence was really the domain where the largest improvements were being made.

Building on this insight, Business Bridge decided to pivot. Instead of producing new coursework, they launched a networking platform, trying to address business confidence as well as the lack of collaboration

and sharing practices. As Robert puts it, the networking platform was meant to cultivate *"potential sustainable supply chains within the townships"*. After a three-month pilot of the networking platform, they realized that too was a failure.

> *The main learning behind that was, [...] that nobody in the townships wants to be in townships... they desperately don't want to be poor. They constantly have these golden carrots dangling in front of them: education, jobs ... [...] all this stuff promised to them, and it never turns up. And the problem is, they see Cape Town here, and they are there. They see other businesses in the townships, they are also poor and uneducated, why would they want to do business with them? The answer is that they don't want to do business with other poor people. They want to do business with people in town, but they don't know how. And they were coming to the course to meet teachers that were not from the townships, but from this side of the [Table] Mountain* (personal conversation, August 2015).

Attendance to the networking events dropped. The only occasions when people would turn up, he says, is when they added an external speaker coming from the city. *"Even if they'd heard that person from the bank five times, even if they knew that they couldn't get a loan, they would turn up in the hope that maybe, somehow, possibly, somebody would throw at them some money"*. Eventually, the networking platform was shut down together with the whole organization. The fact that hope and confidence could not be measured was not the only reason, though. With this came the realization that the pedagogic model was faulty. Eight-week long business courses might be sufficient to give the basis of marketing or finance to an already trained businessperson. But with untrained, informal entrepreneurs, the need was for a much longer, more thorough, radical formation. This was an endeavour that was beyond the capability of Business Bridge as a small enterprise, but also incompatible with the promise of a quick, easy profit that had been made to and through the World Bank.

Box 3 — Poverty Action Innovation factsheet about the Business Bridge trial study financed by the World Bank.

Details of the Intervention

This study compared the impact of two intensive training programs for SME business owners. One program focused on marketing skills and the other taught financial skills. In addition to assessing the direct impact of the programs on firm sales, profit, and employment outcomes, the evaluation looked at how business owners applied the knowledge they gained in training.

Researchers partnered with the Business Bridge Initiative to identify and train the entrepreneurs in urban, suburban, and slum neighbourhoods in the greater Cape Town metropolitan area. The participants were selected through a recruitment process aimed at identifying firms with the potential to grow. Businesses were selected through a multi-round recruitment process. Firms operating out of a physical structure, rather than a small stand or cart, were asked if they wanted to apply for the program by participating in a short screening survey. Using information from the survey, respondents were scored on their potential for growth based on entrepreneur and business characteristics like number of employees, business structure, level of education, and number of business practices employed. Those with the highest scores were invited to a one-hour long registration session.

Participating firms were randomly assigned to one of three groups: 272 business owners were offered the opportunity to participate in an intensive training on marketing and sales; 261 business owners were offered the opportunity to participate in an intensive training on finance and accounting; and 299 business owners were not offered training.

Each of the trainings ran for eight weeks, with entrepreneurs attending one four-hour class per week. Seven of the classes involved two to four hours of work outside of class. Classes were taught by volunteer business professionals who had academic and corporate experience in marketing, finance, and/or running a business. Instructors attended a one-day training course that introduced them to course materials.

A baseline survey was conducted prior to the training. Surveys to track changes in business practices and business sales, costs, profits, and employment were conducted after six and 12 months.

Retrieved from <http://www.poverty-action.org/study/impact-marketing-and-finance-training-firm-performance-south-africa> [accessed 23/05/2016]

As Robert details the winding journey of the organization, he also tells me that Business Bridge clashed with the workings of philanthropic and government grants. When the funding from the World Bank dissolved, at the end of the pilot study, Business Bridge ran on the almost in-kind work of the teachers, and on funding that came from traditional philanthropic institutions and governmental grants. Instead of helping, philanthropic capital accelerated the fall:

> *Funders were willing to fund operations, which means, in this case, pens and papers. But not my salary or the salary of other people running the organization. We were crippled by the restrictions on the funding we received. We had funds for operations but not for the people who actually had to run them* (personal conversation, August 2015).

Robert is so disenchanted with the non-profit model that now he believes that one of the reasons of the failure was the paralysing nature of solidarity intended as "*gift*"[77]. On the contrary, Business Bridge intended solidarity as business innovation. This was precisely the tipping point. Business Bridge had been conceived on a study that, with a randomized control trial performed by experts of a third-party organization, proved that impact metrics could be very positive. For a matter of coherence, when numbers faded, Business Bridge was turned off. Robert did not fully agree with that decision.

> *As a small non-profit, we need to improve, constantly improve, innovate what we are doing... the reason why we closed down, as my chap in the UK describes it, was trying to change the engine whilst driving the car, like... now that we know what we know, can we justifiably scale up this model, knowing that we probably need something that is even better than [hope].... I don't agree with that at all, [because] what we are doing is better than what is there at the moment, which is nothing, but... I see him as an academic, looking at numbers, where he comes from. I don't agree but I understand* (personal conversation, August 2015).

Replicating the metrics and results of the World Bank study was not possible *"and would never be"*—I am told by Robert, in a heavy-hearted honesty. Having a successful business was never in the cards. But Robert

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77 The gift has long been an object of ethnographic research and the idea that the gift presents itself as a non-reciprocal exchange has been variously debunked. Both reciprocal and asymmetrical relations, as scholars like Marilyn Strathern have shown (1988), are activated through gifts. In the context of contemporary South Africa, James Ferguson has further argued that many relations of interdependence are activated by transactions that are gift-based (2015). However, Robert used the word gift to explain the non-reciprocity of what he described as the "*traditional*" not-for-profit model. Although he failed to grasp the various forms of reciprocity that solidarity engenders, his point was that it did not yield the promised fortune that was scripted into the business model.

regrets that Business Bridge could have been truer to its mission rather than to its business metrics. And yet, as we say goodbye, he tells me that he will probably move to Johannesburg to work for a startup in the field of poverty education. He himself, even if he never mentions it, is a specimen of the hopes that Business Bridge incidentally created while trying to raise profit metrics. "*You must play the capitalist game*", he tells me at end of our conversation, at the same time sceptical and optimistic about the possibility of fighting poverty through entrepreneurial fortunes.

3.4. Capital formations of social entrepreneurship: Impact Amplifier.

Of the various things that I learned from Robert, one was that, in his experience, the ideas of Business Bridge clashed with old-school humanitarianism. He argued that traditional organizations and funders were wary of profit schemes and, therefore, profit-driven enterprises like Business Bridge had a hard life. This was not a vision shared by everyone. At Inyathelo (see Chapter 2), for example, my interlocutors were worried that building profit models into humanitarian organizations was shifting the focus of philanthropic capitals from social justice to the possibility of profit accumulation. Laura called it "scaling". As she eloquently put it, *"capitals of any kind tend to prefer profits over simply staying afloat"*. Robert, on the other hand, did not only disagree, but he also lamented that old-school philanthropic capital was too rigidly structured to support hybrid enterprises, across business and social development. As he detailed, donors were not willing to fund the management work required for project like Business Bridge to be run, because, accordingly, they held onto an antiquated idea of social justice.

This apparent contradiction, one that many of my informants were continuously confronted with, brings me to the nature of capital, in

Image 16. The crafts market on the ground level of the Watershed.

particular to how capital formations shape entrepreneurial innovation in the territory of millennial development. Here, I focus on the way in which diverse capitals themselves are endowed, through their investment processes, with the didactic capacity to shape subjectivities: social entrepreneurs as well as other, related economic actors, such as impact investors, mentors and business angels. To do so I consider the experimental practices of an impact investment firm, Impact Amplifier (IA), drawing on a conversation that I had with Gareth, one of its cofounders.

IA was founded in 2012 by Jack, Mike and Gareth. Despite its vast reach, with distant investors and even more distant startups across Africa, the firm operated through a series of investment practices, individuals and technologies that were centralized in its headquarters in Cape Town. Impact Amplifier's short life—it was three years old at the time of my fieldwork—highlights some of the strategic affordances that are used to create a pipeline whereby both profit and social good are produced as outcomes.

The idea behind Impact Amplifier was to facilitate and accelerate what Gareth called the "*impact investing pipeline*" (personal conversation,

April 2015). In other words, IA's main goal was not to garner investment opportunities, even if it might participate in investments at certain times and through various technologies of financial risk, but to fuel the possibility of investment for other impact financial capitals. To do so, IA operated in the process of connecting capitals, entrepreneurs, and, most importantly, *"impact investment knowledge"* (personal conversation, April 2015). Put differently, Impact Amplifier 'formed' both social entrepreneurs and social venture capitalists with the skillset that they needed in order to produce a virtuous investment cycle in the field of social entrepreneurship (which, from an equity perspective, is called 'impact investment'). IA's business model was thus based on the capacity to fasten investment-ready social ventures with capitals. But I will return to this model later in this section. For now, it is useful to think of impact investing as the financialized side of social entrepreneurship: a specific domain of capital, or, as investors would call it, an 'asset class'.

An asset class is a group of securities that have similar characteristics. Assets that belong to a class are deemed to have a similar behaviour. In a complex fund structure, capital is usually divided in different securities that belong to different classes. The ratio characterizes the level of risk that a fund undertakes. For example, the more 'safe' state bonds compose the asset allocation, the safer the fund; the more stocks and options, the more aggressive the investment strategy. Traditionally, the distinction in different classes was based on the legal and financial nature of the underlying security: bonds and stocks and options have indeed a different financial nature. Yet, emerging asset classes are less distinguishable for the characteristics of their securities, and more for the architecture of expertise that is built around them. It is in these terms that a 2010 J.P. Morgan report describes impact investment: an emerging asset class whereby its stakes are "intended to create positive impact beyond financial return" (2010, p.5). In other words, classes can be thought of as a segmentation based on what people can do with

capitals, or, more interestingly, on how capitals shape their surrounding architecture. Beside impact investing, also equities, seeds, and venture capitals may have similar securities, but shape very different investment landscapes around them.

Impact investments are characterized by the famous 'double, or triple, bottom line'—a concept explaining that financial risk and returns are to be managed along social impact, environmental impact, or both. On this topic, every year, the Bertha Centre (see Chapter 2) publishes a brochure called *Impact barometer*, where it is explained that impact investment may also constitute a subsection of the strategy of larger funds. That is, highly speculative funds use impact capitals to perform their corporate responsibility by investing in socially and environmentally sustainable enterprises . The *Impact barometer* survey analyses the investment practices of these funds using a series of indicators that reveal how each fund performs in criteria that qualify impact. For example, in 2015, the survey found that 47% or the funds screened had some sort of impact strategies emplaced across the three main economies on the African continent .

What is interesting about the research that Bertha conducts is that it follows the idea that impact investing is not characterized by the nature of the capitals, but by how the latter operates in shaping its environs, for example through the inclusion of indicators, or in the behaviours of the investors. This characterization echoes the way in which J.P. Morgan's global research team summarily depicts impact investing as an emerging investment class:

> While certain types of impact investments can be categorized within traditional investment classes (such as debt, equity, venture capital), some features dramatically differentiate impact investments. We argue that an asset class is no longer defined simply by the nature of its underlying

> assets, but rather by how investment institutions organize themselves around it. Specifically we propose that an emerging asset class has the following characteristics: • Requires a unique set of investment/risk management skills • Demands organizational structures to accommodate this skillset • Serviced by industry organizations, associations and education • Encourages the development and adoption of standardized metrics, benchmarks, and/or ratings (2010, p.5).

These characteristics do not come into being by parthenogenesis. Unique management skills, standardized practices, and *ad-hoc* organizational modes need to be enacted through specific calculative regimes. In the second chapter of this thesis, for example, I have described how the workings of the Bertha centre's social franchise accelerator crucially contribute to the establishment of facts and regimes of expertise around social good. In this case, the performative power of economic categories, like an asset class of securities, is reflected in IA's didactic undertakings, through which both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists are taught to be part of the impact investment pipeline.

At the time of my fieldwork, the organization was based in the Watershed, the newest addition and architectural wonder of the Victoria & Alfred waterfront. Like many of the other buildings in the securitized precinct, the Watershed used to be an industrial structure of the old commercial harbour—originally the electrical repair workshops of the proximate drydock. Unlike other buildings in the waterfront, though, the Watershed is not a shopping mall but a unique coworking space/incubator—unique in that it is thought of as specimen of a marketplace. The original idea, as the CEO of the waterfront explained in a press release, "was to create a space in which startups and experienced companies, profit and non-profit, big and small, could come together to collaborate and innovate" . The design of the incubator was commissioned to Wolff Architects—a young local firm with an impressive portfolio of public projects in various marginal areas of the Western Cape—who proposed to create

something more than an incubator. Going against the design brief, they advanced the idea of fabricating a marketplace, a public street through the building, which would work as an architectural specimen of economic life. Not 'any' economic life, though. In their words:

> This commercial pattern was learnt from studying street based business in various urban situations. It is fundamental, in the context of unjustifiable inequality in South Africa, that big business should establish themselves in the city in a manner that sets up opportunity or benefits for smaller businesses. This project shows how this can be done.

The relationship between the urban container (the Watershed) and the content (Impact Amplifier and other startups) in not incidental. In this case, as seen in Philippi Village before, the architectural blueprint suggests a specific configuration of social and economic life. As I argued in the previous chapter, this is not a deterministic claim about the capacity of architectural and urban forms to manufacture social life. However, as Timothy Mitchell has shown (2002), specimen architectures

Image 17. The coworking space on the upper level of the Watershed.

can be the material inscriptions that materialize the technopolitics of development—even when they eventually fail to deliver their promises (Elyachar, 2005).

On the first and second level of the building, the Watershed offers what is normally expected from an incubator: office space, coworking space, conference facilities, a cafeteria, etc. On the ground level, the market is an artificial, sleek reproduction of an ethnic bazar populated with African curiosities, printed fabrics, refined ceramics and self-produced knick-knacks. Some workshops even produce jewellery and textiles locally, for the benefit of curious tourists who may finally encounter the third-world women empowered by their entrepreneurial creativity. Most businesses display their Africanness in the form of their social commitment and footprint. Dolls in the shape of safari animals are filled with fluffy padding by unemployed women in some remote village of the Eastern Cape. Pillows made of recycled industrial flour sacks are hand-embroidered by some other community in some other remote village. Elephants, giraffes, buffalos, and lions may have been put together by township poor with metal scraps, following the design of a local artist. Bangles and necklaces are made of beads that prisoners of the city's jail have rolled using red tea carton boxes.

The Watershed is, like Philippi Village, another spatial experiment with entrepreneurialism and social change, but, this time around, it does not take place at the bottom of the pyramid. The small businesses that have been singularly picked for the market respond to a precise curatorial effort led by Trevyn McGowan, who runs, with her partner, the largest design business in Africa, Source™, exporting African crafts to the rest of the world. She is also the director of the DNA—Design Network Africa—, a Danish-aid funded platform meant to achieve "Good Business Through Good Design" , and the cofounder of Southern Guild, a gallery whose objective is to

marketize African collectables at a global scale. The small businesses chosen for the Watershed are therefore representative of this nexus of art business, design, and "good" entrepreneurship (Image 16).

On the level above the market, in the coworking/incubator space (Image 17) run by a third-party organization, OPEN, small ventures like Impact Amplifier all come from the same nexus of art and good business which the Watershed purposefully crafts. Gareth has a long experience in the area where art and business converge. Among other things, he consulted for Spier, a renowned historic wine farm which has made of its art patronage and CSR a powerful selling strategy. Before IA, he founded Africa Centre, "a physical entity and ongoing philosophical journey that explores how Pan-African cultural practice can be a catalyst for social change" . The organization is a social enterprise that runs art programmes, such as 'artists in residency', that are meant to "explore what it means to be in Africa today and what is conceivable for 21st-century Africans . Today, Africa Centre is a client of IA, through an impact investment

Image 18. The exterior of the Watershed, in the V&A Waterfront precinct.

fund called Earth Capital. This organizational structure shows the convergence of impact finance, design and curatorship that is very vivid just a level down from IA, in the Watershed's 'market'.

However, IA, as a startup venture, was prompted by a question that went way beyond art philanthropy: it was, as Gareth explains, a question of how finance could empower social entrepreneurs. In 2011, on behalf of the national government, Gareth organized a conference on entrepreneurship and development, during which he ran day-long session about social entrepreneurship with the two people that later became the founding partners of IA. They shared the feeling that to answer that question some knowledge was missing.

> *The story that was told was too simple: there is an alleged desire to invest in Africa but somehow this foreign capital is not reaching social entrepreneurs here. The capital is there, but is not being deployed. There is a lot of capital that wants to find a home but cannot find one. Was that true? And why was that true? We had the feeling that things were not working, and now we can confirm that, now that we have three years of experience, that some understanding was missing, that investors were not at ease in this context. We tried to understand why and how to change that. We met people, we spoke to people, we started helping people, but we finally realized that there was no viable way to deal with early stage social entrepreneurs. Basically, there was no way of channelling financial capital from abroad or from here to early stage changemakers. So that was the issue, and now IA addresses that issue. That is what we can do: deal with later stage social entrepreneurs* (personal conversation, April 2015).

What Gareth means here, as he explains to me in more detail later in the conversation, is that the tale by which foreign capital is there but the entrepreneurs and the mechanism of investment are not, is inaccurate, if not entirely false. According to their experience, none of these are there: not the investors, not the entrepreneurs, not the pipeline. *"Foreign capital is in a very narrow band in South Africa"*, he goes on, meaning that foreign investment is rarely channelled to social impact. A high level of

currency risk and high rate of perceived corruption discourage funds to participate in small projects with inherently little chance of return. The "small band" of available capital is characterized by highly profitable, perilous and financialized investments in tourism, energy, real estate, and, obviously, mining. There is an idiosyncratic trickle-down effect, whereby hedge funds have what is sometimes called, in jargon, "*Africa footprint*" (I have previously described this as a strategy of corporate social responsibility for large reserve funds); however, the existence of these various social funds, Gareth says, does not mean that the money is channelled to social enterprises.

> *There is money to be spent on social innovation but that does not mean that that money can be channelled to entrepreneurs. Most social ventures, even when they are profitable, will not have access to capital. It's just too hard. The return is too little, the interest is small, people do not want to put equity in this country. They'd rather 'give' than invest* (personal conversation, April 2015).

The recognition that foreign capital, even when targeted to social innovation, rarely intersects social entrepreneurs is joined by the understanding that impact finance in South Africa has peculiar characteristics, among which is the tendency to fund projects in the form of pure donations rather than investments. Other characteristics determine the feasibility of the pipeline. According to Gareth, funds are local, small and very conservative, which means that they tend to support incremental innovations rather than disruptive ideas, and wager on later stage investments rather than seeds. Besides, a dearth of angel investors in the landscape determines that capitals require independent, autonomous enterprises, rather that startups in need of mentoring as well as funding. For IA, this translates into the decision of dealing with "*later state social entrepreneurs*", which, in turn, means shaping their capacities and skills in order to push them in the pipeline. This includes specific pedagogic practices defined by the nature of the capitals that I described. Two different acceleration programmes

structure this strategy for aligning funds and enterprises.

> *The first is a traditional one-on-one consulting programme, with mentorship and teaching in different fields. Business modelling, growth strategy, branding, etc., basically what they need to do to be ready for an investment. In fact, we call this programme Investment Readiness, as we prepare social enterprises to be ready for an investment. This programme is for pay. Entrepreneurs pay us a fee and they become part of the acceleration programme. Sometimes, when they cannot afford the fee, we buy some of their shares as a risk investment. But that's a thing we don't like to do, and usually we don't have to do because we only work with later stage entrepreneurs, so they usually have the money to afford a consulting service as the one we offer. Either through their own equity or through grants, our ventures can usually afford our services without us buying shares, which only happens very rarely* (Gareth, personal conversation, April 2015).

Accordingly, investment readiness is the most important step towards capital raising. *"We find is that our entrepreneurs, even later-stage ones, always need investment readiness"*, Gareth explains.

> *The second acceleration model is a group-learning programme. Now, at its first edition, we used to have eleven ventures, now they are ten and will be pitching at investors on the 11th of June. This programme is externally sponsored by a Dutch fund, and we use the teaching material provided by GBI, a US based company which we partnered with. Through this programme, every week our entrepreneurs receive personal mentorship and common teaching sessions were they basically learn the skills to get to the stage of being ready for searching capital. They learn how to produce an investment teaser, a two-page document to entice investors, but also how to build up an investment case, which is a more complicated document with a longer narrative of how your business works in a three-year timeframe. During the programme the ventures have assignments that we evaluate online. The three things that they basically learn to produce at the end of the programme are an investment teaser, an investment case and a pitch presentation* (personal conversation, April 2015).

Through this double-sided acceleration model, however, the problem

of the pipeline is not entirely solved, but social entrepreneurs are now a "*fit*" for the kind of capitals that might help them. This process is called 'portfolio creation':

> *when we realized that we couldn't create the pipeline that was needed to channel foreign money, and that investments would be small and local, a portfolio of successful businesses, it was more that than anything else that was missing, the dearth of a large number of competing social ventures, we realized that we needed a model with a double side, the one-on-one acceleration and the group programme, externally sponsored. And to run it, we partnered with GBI, buying their learning material. Of course, we changed 30% of their course structure, and 30% of their content. We find that African entrepreneurs want examples that are local, and not theoretical, so especially in the last phase of the acceleration process, we use their cases as business case studies, so they feel they have a better understanding of what the teaching is about. We use them as examples.*

Creating the right kind of entrepreneurs through investment readiness also speaks to the geographies of these pedagogical practices. Gareth tells me that many of the entrepreneurs they have helped are in the field of environmental technologies, therefore they are based in various remote, rural parts of Southern Africa. They are reached via Skype calls and other technologies of connection, online assignments, and eventual meetings in the mother city. All these activities are funnelled through IA headquarters in the Watershed. However, the firm is also involved in centrifugal operations, because the size of the impact investment pipeline is not sufficiently large yet to allow the organization to live on the acceleration fees solely. Thus, a series of other activities in the field of corporate social responsibility consulting and impact investing research are part of the services that IA offers beyond portfolio creation. These activities expand the geographies of IA to global philanthropic foundations and to large multinationals operating in Africa. In doing so, they also expand the range of subjectivities that are 'taught' in order to populate the markets of millennial development: capitalists, angel

investors, business analysts and so forth. These far-reaching pedagogies, I have suggested, are engendered by their capital formations but also by the relationships that the latter entertain with specific, localized experiments.

On the results of these pedagogies, Gareth argues that the most important achievement thus far has been to formulate the possibility—for entrepreneurs doing good things but with small revenues—to exist as social entrepreneurs. In his words:

> *Social entrepreneurship is not yet part of the local language. They call themselves entrepreneurs, and mainly they think they are just that. Many are just opportunistic, but in Europe or US we would describe their efforts as social entrepreneurship. Very few come from the civil society, contrary to what you would expect. The narrative is that NGOs are becoming more entrepreneurial and people from NGOs know the issues, and if you know the issue you can build an entrepreneurial solution, and blah blah blah, but this is happening very rarely here. That's what's happening elsewhere. NGOs are from an older school here, so our social entrepreneurs are mainly people that are failing entrepreneurs. We teach them that they are more than that.*

In the context of this chapter, Impact Amplifier highlights two important things. One is that to make the markets of millennial development work, it is not sufficient to make social entrepreneurs. It is instead necessary to teach a series of diverse economic subjects to be part of fruitful investment pipelines. These investment pipelines, as Gareth explained to me, come into being through experiments with economic forms that rely on the knowledge ecology to which he himself has contributed to: a nexus of business innovation, art, design, good entrepreneurship, financial expertise and all their material inscriptions, including its headquarters in the Watershed.

Second, the case of IA begins to foreground that social entrepreneurship can be a strategy to deal with market failure, even in the context of

financialized assets. What Gareth suggested, in the last quote, was that creating a market for impact entrepreneurs and impact capitals meant, among other things, scripting the possibility of low-to-no returns into the landscape of hopeful promises of profit that millennial development holds.

3.5. Conclusion.

This chapter has focused its attention on three pedagogical experiments that were designed, more or less explicitly, to engender the market subjects of social entrepreneurship: not only social entrepreneurs, but also impact investors, venture capitalists, business mentors, and socially conscious informal entrepreneurs. I argued that Philippi Village's, Business Bridge's and Impact Amplifier's market devices, though different, participated in the production of the human supply side of the markets of millennial development. As was clear in the intentions of each of these three undertakings, the markets that they envisioned would bring both financial profit and social good. For these markets to exist, however, the 'right' economic subjectivities needed to be performed.

How are these 'right' economic subjects created, or, at least, attempted? To address this question, I focused on the didactic practices that moved the science of entrepreneurship out of the 'laboratory' (Law & Mol, 2001). In the case of Philippi Village, the whole real estate complex was configured as a didactic enterprise of 'good development' at the bottom of the pyramid. Business Bridge was conceived, notwithstanding its eventual failure, as an organization that would harvest profit by 'forming' BoP entrepreneurs. Impact Amplifier aimed at building a pipeline through which investment capitals would shape both investors and investees, and perform an alternative financial market that would include low returns as a possibility. All these practices were experimental

in the sense that they made a laboratory of reality, but also in that they were constituted by trials and errors and conducted by distributed calculating agencies.

In this sense, this chapter has drawn upon an understanding of markets that builds on the work of some important scholars of economic performativity. Accordingly, if markets are, as Callon puts it, collective "*agencements*" (Callon, 2013) that need to be performed through various forms of calculation, markets subjects too need to be produced in the processes where the economy is "provoked" (Muniesa, 2014). More specifically, for a market to function, its calculating subjects, as Donald Mackenzie has argued (2009), ought to reflect its material features and politics. In the field of development, several contributions have explored this insight, with a particular focus on the making of commodities, "goods" that materially embody the tenets of humanitarian development (see Dolan & Scott, 2009; Redfield, 2012; Cross, 2013). Noortje Marres has noted that material objects are, in fact, vantage points to understand how political and other subjectivities are engendered through experiments that enrol a variety of agencies, often outside the traditional experimental settings of the laboratory (Marres, 2012)

In this contribution, however, I did not focus on particular objects or commodities, but I brought into focus the didactic qualities that the three development experiments showed across their spatial, architectural, organizational, and financial forms. This has allowed me to outline four suggestions about the way in which social entrepreneurship articulates the technopolitics of contemporary development in Cape Town.

First, the three case studies are empirical evidence of the necessary pedagogic operations that allow the economic doctrines of millennial development to become real-life experiments. These experiments, as Fabian Muniesa has argued more generally for a multiplicity of

research, marketing and consulting practices (2014), are not only epistemic, but they also do ontological work: that is, they "provoke" economic realities. Philippi Village, for example, was at the same time constructed as a prototype of impact finance and as a machine that would foster the entrepreneurial individuals needed by impact finance. Business Bridge's aim, on the other hand, was to transform a World-Bank experiment into a profitable business that would glean its profit from forming entrepreneurs. Impact Amplifier, lastly, did not hide their commitment to disseminating knowledge that would eventually fuel a pipeline of investments. In sum, the production of subjects was the central concern of all these operations.

Second, Philippi Village, Business Bridge, and Impact Amplifier show how social entrepreneurship, as a domain of development expertise, is enmeshed with other discursive technologies of millennial development, from the informal economy, to Hernando de Soto's dead capital, to C.K. Prahalad's BOP approach, to microfinance. All these political technologies are underpinned by their own organizational structures and their systems of expertise which, as detailed in this chapter, produce the actually-existing pedagogies of millennial development.

Third, the three experiments of this chapter could easily be characterized as neoliberal. The making of entrepreneurial subjects is indeed a hallmark of neoliberal governance, whereby the burden of economic wellbeing is transferred from the state to the individual. As Katharyne Mitchell writes,

> this growing nexus of market foster care collaborators further constitutes and enlists individual celebrities, fans, politicians, donors, and recipients in a geosocial moral economy of pastoral care, security, development, and self-improvement that is often boldly post-political (2016, p.5).

This is evident in the development ideologies that converge in the

making of Philippi Village, Business Bridge and Impact Amplifier: as a result of investing entrepreneurs with the task of undoing economic marginality, the state is potentially disenfranchised from these market experiments, and the processes are potentially depoliticized. However, the realities of the three experiments show a much more complex and contradictory political background. The example of Philippi Village is very vivid in this sense: it shows how state-driven employment policies, redistribution strategies as well as neoliberal operations are inextricably intertwined in the material features of the redevelopment. As Peter Redfield puts it, writing on medical humanitarianism:

> it might be tempting to gloss this attempt at reconfigured governance simply as neoliberalism. However, such an analytic move risks overlooking specificities involved and the manner in which actors foreground moral and medical rather than market values. Their logic might indeed often emphasize self-governing subjects, accept profit motives, and minimize the role of state institutions. Nonetheless, their ethical sensibility extends beyond any faith in market reason (2012, pp.158–159).

"Reading for difference", as Gibson-Graham maintains (2006), is one of the performative epistemologies of any research concerned with letting the "lines of fragility" of the present (Foucault, cited in Brown, 2001, p.107) speak to its multiple possibilities. The experiments in this chapter have brought 'failure' to the fore—that is, the possibility that social entrepreneurship fails to hold its millennial promises of profit.

Failure, however, is not simply in the fact that some attempts at erasing poverty through profit simply fail, as Business Bridge did. In fact, failure may be a constitutive element in the making of the subjects that populate the markets of millennial development in Cape Town. Impact Amplifier's pedagogical work was revealing in this regard: as many of the entrepreneurs that went through its acceleration programme were inherently in a condition of failure on the market, IA's move was to teach

them to be social entrepreneurs rather than simply entrepreneurs, so as to be able to access a specific subsection of funding opportunities. Put differently, IA "graduates" were thought to leverage on their market failure rather than to navigate against it, to embrace the idea of small profits. Social entrepreneurship became a technology that served the purpose of scripting a compatible version of their failure in a different moral market, shaped by different capitals, and populated by different subjectivities.

Chapter 4.

Training the future: aesthetics, choreographies and calculative devices of social entrepreneurship.

> *The role of design is crucial. You know, changemakers have big ideas to sell. I think they have the hardest sell of all businesses around. Because they are selling ideas to change the world and not to make money. People who are investing in their businesses know that they probably won't see anything back, or very little. It's the hardest sell, yes. You are selling hope and not returns* (conversation with Trevor, May 2015)

> [H]ope inheres in knowledge's incessant movement and all the work that ensures its own reorientation to the future unknown. Hope becomes knowledge in a specific sense. Hope is a paradoxical step in the process of knowing through an embrace of the limits of knowledge (Miyazaki, 2016, p.9).

> What we then recognize is a simple material fact about the way our world [...] works. It is full of an incredible variety of imagined schemes, many of which get constructed. Some schemes fail. Others are wildly successful. Some work for a time and then fall apart. It is the cold logic of the market place [...] that fixes the success or failure of the outcome. But it is the engagement with future possibilities that starts the whole affair (Harvey, 2000, pp.204-205).

4.1. Hopeful futures.

In the previous chapter, I recounted some lines from my first and only encounter with Robert, the CEO of Business Bridge. He had moved to Cape Town from London, with the idea of spending six months in order to understand whether the enterprise of creating a business school for the bottom of the pyramid could work out. After three years, and the realization that Business Bridge was a failed enterprise, he was ready to move on to next adventure. "*Johannesburg*", he told me, "*is a city*

that is more disenfranchised from old-fashioned humanitarianism" (personal conversation, August 2015). There, people better understood the need for a business mindset in the context of fighting poverty. What he had learnt from his experience was that building the capacity to think about the future was crucial for the informal entrepreneurs that his company targeted. The history of South Africa, and its present legacies in a divided economy, he explained to me, had an impact on the confidence of the entrepreneurial subjects that Business Bridge was trying to form. Uncertain living conditions hindered their capacity to plan prospective schemes, or to envisage anything but daily difficulties. According to Robert, what the World Bank study could not grasp was that business training did not translate into business literacy, but into the fundamental introduction of confidence in a very uncertain economic present.

This was very clear in Robert's understanding of his own failure. It was indeed the main reason for his sadness about the closing down of the company. "*This is where we were having an impact*", he admitted, still apologetic about not being able to create a successful enterprise out of the experiment that I charted in the previous chapter (personal conversation, August 2015). However, for all his scepticism about philanthropy, about social entrepreneurship, and about impact finance, Robert was ready to take up another similar challenge, in a different city, building on the insights that he now felt he owned. It did not surprise me that, for a person who seemed to understand so well the importance of future thinking as a way of being in the world, a bitter failure did not prevent him from moving on to other entrepreneurial undertakings.

Robert's Business Bridge, as I explained in Chapter 3, revealed how millennial development markets can be manufactured (or fail to be) by forging economic subjects—specifically, by teaching entrepreneurship and making a social enterprise out of it. However, the didactic practices of Business Bridge also spoke to the importance of engaging the future

in certain ways, both for social entrepreneurs themselves and for experts like Robert, who, in spite of his fiasco, was not any less convinced about "*playing the capitalist game*" (personal conversation, August 2015). His critique of institutions (the World Bank, the Business School, South African funding agencies, philanthropy), technologies of organization (the traditional NGO), and economic modes (turbocapitalism and pure solidarity) fed an unflinching optimism that was, at least partly, based on his own understanding of the failure of Business Bridge. "*Hope*", he said, was what kept moving him, what he had *"learned to manage"*, and what he wanted to "*teach others*" (personal conversation, August 2015).

This chapter is dedicated to, and built on this tension: between educating others and oneself about the future. In particular, it is devoted to understanding how anticipatory capacities are mobilized as an object that can be taught, and as a device through which social entrepreneurship becomes a viable system of expertise for millennial development, in spite of and because of its mundane failures. In particular, this chapter charts how the future is engaged through 1) poetic, 2) choreographic and 3) calculative performances that contribute to the enactment of social entrepreneurship as a developmental technology. I use the word 'enactment' here (Mol & Law, 2004), because this chapter argues that these anticipatory capacities—as trained in these performances—involve both their objects and their subjects. That is, they shape the capacity of social entrepreneurs to engage the future in profitable ways, but also the lives of the experts committed to such performances.

In other words, this chapter asks: how is social entrepreneurship actualized through a series of performative practices that are devoted to teaching both eventual entrepreneurs and expert selves how to profitably address the future—in spite of a terrible past of racial violence, in spite of present difficulties, and in spite of eventual future failures? To answer this question, I trace three different case studies. First, a design-

consulting practice, Pigeonpie, and the work of Trevor, its founder, who had turned social entrepreneurship imagination into a creative business. Second, I consider how the capacity to engage the future is choreographed through conferences and gatherings that are meant to distribute the speculative opportunities of social entrepreneurship (and more generally, of any form of entrepreneurship). I use the two most important entrepreneurial conferences in South Africa, Tech4Africa and SAIS (South Africa's Innovation Summit) as examples. In the last section of the chapter, I focus on the 'lean startup' method, in particular on its material calculative devices, which are conceived to abstract future possibilities and opportunities. For each of these case studies, I highlight how the training of anticipatory skills is a fundamental mechanism through which social entrepreneurship articulates the technopolitics of millennial development.

Contemporary scholars of development have indeed argued that present experiments and initiatives that are designed to extend market forces so as to include the world's poor rely on the capacity to produce hopeful, appealing prospects: for state agencies, for international development organizations, for private companies, and for eventual entrepreneurs alike (see Cross, 2014; Elyachar, 2012; James, 2011; 2012; Roy, 2015). These anticipatory capacities, whilst they might appear instinctive and spontaneous, need in fact to be trained. As Dolan and Rajak write:

> what is of particular interest, we suggest, is that while this new paradigm of development places the 'raw entrepreneurial energy of the people' (Chang, 2010, p. 53) at the heart of economic growth, we see a significant shift from earlier framings of African entrepreneurialism in which it was cast as innate (even indigenous), needing only to be unleashed, to an emphasis on training, disciplining and transformation, driven as much from without as from within. [...] While the entrepreneurial spirit may reside in all, liberating the inner entrepreneur is not a matter of simply removing the constraints on market access and thereby 'democratizing

> the market'. But, rather, what we find here is a great emphasis on training at a practical, psychological and moral level to produce this army of entrepreneurs who are enjoined to relinquish the quest for formal employment and go from 'job-seeker' to 'job-creator'. The entrepreneur emerges as both beneficiary and catalyst, producer and product of this new economy of development (Dolan & Rajak, 2016, p.515)

This chapter shows that the training to engage the future does not only involve social entrepreneurs but also the experts of social entrepreneurship. By experts, I mean the researchers, the mentors, the professionals working for development agencies, and the consultants whom I interviewed during my fieldwork. For them, the capacity to engage the future was not only something to teach, but also, I argue, a mode for understanding, managing and dealing with the failures and the limits of their own knowledge.

In this sense, this chapter draws upon my ethnographic notes but also on my interlocutors' own para-ethnographic skills and operations (Holmes & Marcus, 2005), because, in face of failure, experts develop their own ethnographic practices, to understand the scope of their authority and the dimensions of their impact (Ong, 2005; Zaloom; 2005; Miyazaki & Riles, 2005). These para-ethnographic practices, as Annalise Riles writes (2006), are not only ubiquitous in the cultures of economic, financial, legal and humanitarian expertise: they also pose the long-standing epistemological problem of "studying up" (Nader, 2002) in a new light. In fact, if expert interlocutors "are themselves producers of cultural analysis rather than sources of raw data" (Islam, 2015, p.231), their insights deserve attention as theories of action. In the case of Pigeonpie, Trevor's self-reflective consultancy was a crucial entry point into the technical, poetic, and speculative life of social entrepreneurship—one that revealed how the hopeful futures of millennial development are taught to others and domesticated for the self.

4.2. Aesthetics of social entrepreneurship: Pigeonpie.

The post-apartheid city, especially in the first years of democracy, was a place of perceived uncertainty and insecurity. Many businesses and corporations left Cape Town's CBD, which was described by the press as a place of crime and grime (see Pirie, 2007a; Miraftab, 2007; Didier *et al.*, 2013), for secure, gated business centres built from scratch in the suburbs. With the introduction of the first African improvement district, however, the CBD became again an attractive real estate location (McDonald, 2012; Didier *et al.* 2013). Firms and middle-class tenants started to move back into the heritage-listed Cape Colony buildings and the Art Deco high-rises (Pirie, 2007a). With tourism, hotels, restaurants and bars also reopened in the CBD, contributing to the revitalization of the old city centre, and to the inevitable increase in rent prices. For this and other reasons, today, suburban business centres are much cheaper and less desirable than they used to be. Whilst some gated communities like Century City remain prime real estate locations, with their mix of canals, fake Venetian architectures, shopping centres and large office complexes, other smaller business centres have lost their appeal. Rents are cheaper and can therefore be afforded by small businesses, startups and non-profit organizations (as a matter of fact, I met many of my informants in this kind of environment). It is in one of these gated business parks that I connected with Trevor, who had just moved in with his startup—Pigeonpie.

The reason for my interest in Pigeonpie Design Lab was that the small company (four employees at the time of my interview) operated in a very specific sector, offering design, branding and marketing consulting to organizations that worked as social enterprises or to business innovators with a strong social goal.

Great ideas change things. They challenge our thinking, create

> opportunities, and they drive us to take action. Great ideas have the power to influence the future. We work with the change-makers, the rule-breakers, the visionaries and those who are creating things that are changing the world. We build their brands and amplify their influence. Welcome to Pigeon Pie.

My first meeting with the founder and CEO of the startup, Trevor, takes place in the Business Park where he has just moved to, in Observatory, a suburb some fifteen minutes away from the city bowl. Black River Park, the business centre, is a mix of old warehouses and new glazed office buildings, all surrounded by an electrically fenced boundary wall. Despite the corporate-like architecture of the building where Pigeon Pie shares a floor with other small businesses, a pool and a ping-pong table in the floor lobby are a reminder of a creative startup culture whose Silicon Valley narratives (see Thrift, 2000; 2002) are not at ease in the formal environment of a securitized business park. As more than one informant pointed out to me, organizations like Pigeonpie must negotiate an uneasy spatial relationship between the South African corporate world and the somewhat different sphere of the so-called "change-makers" whom they have as clients.

I met with Trevor four times over the course of six months, but accidentally crossed paths much more often, as we developed a relationship of mutual help that I will later discuss. This relationship was incredibly helpful for me to access other experts and events where I conducted interviews or participated as observer. As I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, this was only possible because Trevor saw me, from our first encounter, as having an expertise in the field. The trust and openness I was accorded were larger than in a usual informant-researcher relationship, at least in my experience. As he later told me in one email, he hoped that my research would shed light on the importance of the work of "*changemakers*" in Cape Town. Hence, my position in the field was not neutral—if a neutral one

exists. It was instead mediated by my perceived belonging to a certain culture of expertise, but also by the hope that research work in their world would be beneficial to their cause. I was invested with a role and a goal—being their academic counterpart—which I had then and have to now negotiate with the need of engaging critically with the findings of my research (I discuss this in more detail in the conclusive remarks to this dissertation). However, as I show hereafter, Trevor himself had articulated his own views of our relationship.

'Changemakers' is a word that often arose in my first conversation with Trevor, and on Pigeonpie's website. It is not surprising, given that many popular books on social entrepreneurship, since Drayton's *Everyone a changemaker: Social entrepreneurship's ultimate goal* (2006), use the concept to describe innovators in the field across business and solidarity. For Trevor, 'changemaking' is a way of framing the boundaries of his design and consulting services, as his consultancy offers branding and strategic marketing exclusively to social entrepreneurs, NGOs and other organizations that claim to have a social impact—but it is also a way of framing his own journey.

> *I come from a low-income community, in the Cape Flats. I studied design at VEGA (a private university of communication studies). All through my life, I have been in touch with people that changed things, that turned situations around. My Mum was the first one, the first changemaker of my life. She was a single parent, my dad divorced her and stopped contributing to the family. She was a good cook, so started preparing jar preserves and selling them. Then she started a transport business, she would collect all the kids of the neighbourhood, and take them to a better school. In this way she could afford to take my brothers and me to a decent school, not a great one, but still she managed to get us there. Not that it was always easy; I recall a time when we couldn't pay the rent. For that month, a neighbour helped us. It was like that, in the Flats, I witnessed how people were willing to help each other, and to create a net of mutual life. That is how I have always known that I wanted to be part of that. Besides, I have always felt privileged enough, and*

> *studied more than my peers. To get a scholarship, to use the gift that my mother gave us, I would not join my school mates in their parties, but spend the weekend studying. I was what I could give, from my side, to be part of that change-making. I have always felt, as a witness, that change and progress come from innovation* (personal conversation, May 2015).

He later explains that by innovation he specifically means the kind of entrepreneurial innovation that he sees in both companies with a strong social goal and in non-profit organizations that are enterprising in their mission. Pigeon Pie itself was conceived as a branding-strategy firm that is selective about the project it chooses to support, as it targets only clients that are regarded as "changemakers". It was a risky choice, he says.

> *I felt that there was a need, though, for communication and branding for those changemakers trying to create a different future for our country. That is how I can participate in making a change, with my skills and my capacity. It was a big bet, but now I can even talk to you about my cash flow. It is little, it barely survives the running cost of Pigeon Pie, but it is there* (personal conversation, May 2015).

Various urban spaces are inextricably woven into the journey of the firm. The Cape Flats, for example, stand as the place where Trevor learnt the rules and the potential of mutual help.

This narrative of the townships as a place of dire life and yet communal life is at the same time real and imagined. Experts like Robert of Business Bridge like pointing out, with their data and surveys, that there is little mutuality in the informal economy. Others, instead, describe reciprocal arrangements as staples of the 'second economy'—as it was called by former President Mbeki (Devey *et al.*, 2006). Commenting on literary representations of South African townships, Megan Jones (2014) reflects on this duplicity, which she describes as a twofold, ambiguous presence is in the poetic representations of urban segregation. She writes—

> The origins of townships can be read as ghostlike, haunting the peripheries of white industrial capitalism, repressed and feared. So too, have the inhabitants of townships and ghettos been made revenant (Jones, 2014, p. 264).

And yet, she notes, novelistic representations of those same places are also haunted by the possibility of hopeful futures and overturning the inequality the urban segregation makes most visible. Trevor's tales, too, are caught between an idealized reciprocity and the eeriness of segregation. Twofold memories are also associated with another historical geography of Pigeonpie:

> *The name comes from District Six, where my family comes from, and where they were evicted from and moved to the Flats. It is a story that my grandfather used to tell me: he was a cook, and he used to make a Pigeon Pie, that he would then share with the community of neighbours. They all knew about it, and this history of sharing part of what you create with your skills is what inspires me and has inspired my business* (personal conversation, May 2015).

District Six is a deep scar in the memory of the Cape Coloured community in the city. Writing in 1988 about the razing of District Six, urban geographer Deborah Hart described the striking landscape of a recently bulldozed neighbourhood:

> between the imposing Devil's Peak and the shores of the Atlantic Ocean stretch several hectares of mostly barren, rubble-strewn red earth. A closer inspection reveals the disintegrating remnants of cobbled and gravel roads, isolated churches and mosques, and a row or two of quaint, white-washed Victorian cottages. The periphery of the forlorn, solemn scene presents a spectacle of cranes, concrete, and construction activity. This jarring juxtaposition of solitude and activity, of gravel and tar, of crumbling age and disorderliness amidst geometric lanes and sanitized, newly erected town houses signifies a disturbing facet of South African urban geography (Hart, 1988, p.605).

Between the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, some fifty thousand inhabitants had been relocated to the Cape Flats, following the declaration of District Six as a white-only neighbourhood, in compliance to the infamous Groups Area Act that had started off apartheid's physical engineering of space in 1950 (Pirie, 1983). Prior to that, the neighbourhood had accommodated large part of the Muslim, Malay community of Cape Town, along with Afrikaner whites, Xhosa migrants, Indians, and other mixed people defined as Coloured first by custom and then by law (Hart, 1988; Bickford-Smith, 1990). The razing of that urban community faced an unprecedented backlash and immediately produced symbolic geographies of forfeiture and displacement . Novelists like Alex la Guma (1962) gave voice to the oppressed urban cultures that resisted those erasures. Today, only in part reconstructed, District Six is a vast stretch of grass visible from many parts of the city. The politics of the space are still a contested terrain between loss, memory, reconstruction (McEachern, 1998) and experiments with undoing the legacy of spatial segregation through land restitution (Pieterse, 2010).

For Trevor, District Six is also the imagined social geography of a lost history that he is trying to reenact through Pigeonpie. Whatever happens with the area today, land restitution included, Trevor still refers to a long-gone, ideal community of sharing which, if it ever existed as such, has its only place in familiar tales and the small District Six Museum housed in a former worship hall in the city. The idea that specific skills, like cooking in this case, can become vehicles of solidarity is something that Trevor likes highlighting. He recognizes, however, that such commitment is a risky business, with little financial return, and products that are hard to sell. Yet, his experience with Pigeonpie is in itself a service he offers to his clients as learnt lesson in risk-management, in a very tentative environment.

> *It all started with a R250* [20 USD] *investment in business cards. And literally, those business cards got me my first client, who liked them. Then I got my first computer. I had used my brother's one to design the business cards. I had no portfolio, no experience, yet those business cards opened a way. Later I started participating in as many events as I could, like startup grind, and those kinds of events. Networking is the most important asset. Then came the social media marketing, I was invited to speak to events—being in the social-change field, my background helped—, and I started getting more and more job opportunities* (personal conversation, May 2015).

There is one dimension of his successfulness that is particularly relevant in our conversation: reflexivity, or, in other words, the capacity to understand the reason of his success. Printing cheap but well-designed business cards was a lucky bet—especially considering that he had decided to work exclusively for a certain type of clients—but also an instructive lesson. First, he understood that dysfunctional market agents, like social entrepreneurs and philanthropists, needed a new approach to market-making. Second that he needed not a large investment, but that incremental, tentative steps could work if segmenting the targets in the right way—he would later tell me how inspirational *The Lean Startup* was for his journey. Third, he explains, he understood the perks of becoming a thought leader, a powerful Twitter account, a speaker at conferences, in order to not only get clients, but shape and bend his market in a productive way. During these performances, he never forgets to mention the origin of the name for Pigeonpie, a tale that evokes a lost community, and produces a poetic reenactment of its idealized mutual culture. These poetics efforts, however, are also supported by a series of calculative practices: for example, tracking the metrics of his own tweets to understand what kind of narratives work better than others, and so forth.

These three lessons (the need for new forms of marketing, incrementalism, and positioning), Trevor tells me, are always what

he tries to deliver to his clients, regardless of their actual briefs. He believes that even a customer that only needs a new logo may benefit from understanding the poetic efforts behind it. He also tries to pass on another insight: the crucial importance of networking, that is taking part in events that might sound very uninteresting but could become the setting for the right kind of encounters. As shown in anthropological studies of risk-taking individuals, like financial traders (Zaloom, 2005; Miyazaki, 2013) risk is performative in many different ways, and it also requires management and understanding of the self—a kind of para-ethnography that Trevor uses to deal with Pigeonpie, as well as to orient his clients to successful choices. Specifically, he has developed a dashboard of performance indicators to track the number of business cards given and received, emails exchanged, and other metrics that help him evaluate his performance at events. These painstaking notes show that networking is not a collateral side of the investment, but part of the wager itself. Socialising at events requires explicit and tacit knowledge, and, possibly, a transformation of the self. Drawing on these insights, Trevor has a lesson for me as well: if I want to succeed in my research, I must blend in at the events—he says—he will be inviting me to.

As Annalise Riles has shown (2000) in the context of international relations, networkers produce, narrate, and disseminate a distinct ethnographic expertise, which is functional to the maintenance of their networks. As much as risk-taking shapes his networked life, Trevor has also fathomed the productive nature of his own capacity to engage the future in hopeful ways. On one hand, this capacity allows him to grasp business opportunities; on the other, it informs the nature of his work as an aesthetic technique. Trevor, like many experts in advertising and branding, is also good ethnographer of the "market":

> *You are selling hope and not returns. That's where design and communication come in. You must tell the story of what is possible, stories of hope that inspire*

> *those that should invest money in your idea of change. Usually NGOs have these negative narratives, they show poor-porn, but this thing is old. People want to be inspired, not to feel guilty. That is precisely what we do. Think of the work we did with Boundless Heart* [NGO]. *Our strategy was never to show shacks, boys dying of starvation. That is what normal NGOs do to catch the attention. Our strategy was to show the positive side, in that case how good things can take place in the townships just like anywhere else. Making people feel guilty and sorry does work to get money but not to change things* (personal conversation, May 2015).

In other words, encoding hopefulness as a specific aesthetic choice is Trevor's selling strategy. By translating this into a specific expertise, Pigeonpie's brands, websites, brochures, and logos reflect the need to communicate what changemakers do and strive to achieve, rather than the issues they address—the future rather than the present. Trevor has conceived a poetic language for dealing with the future. This also applied to those clients who are less entrepreneurial, he explains;

> *A lot of our clients don't have a product or a service to sell. They want to change the world. And you do that by inspiring other people to do the same, so inspiration is not only a side effect of starting your own social venture, it's actually the main goal.*

Trevor is aware that there is a specificity to his solution, and that distinct urban geographies are constitutive of both his journey and the context of Pigeonpie's clientele. The aesthetic form that he gives to 'good' entrepreneurship is also a result of this recognition.

> *You know, what I always say is that this city has enormous potential, for its apartheid and divisions, and for the fact that it is still divided, there are two sides of the mountain—the rich suburbs and the Flats. We have both worlds in one city, the capital, the rich, people that want to change the status quo because they feel privileged, and access to the challenges. They are just there, a few kilometers away, in our townships. And people on that side have brilliant ideas, because they know what the issues are, their knowledge is located. You don't have this elsewhere, the money and the ideas, separated by a mountain, in the same city* (personal

conversation, May 2015).

4.3. Choreographies of successful entrepreneurship: Tech4Africa and SAIS 2015.

As I mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, after our first conversation, Trevor and I started a mutual relationship that was very fruitful for my research. It was, however, his idea from the very beginning, that my somewhat academic expertise and his connections, my time and his insights could be bartered. He had in mind a mutual relationship whereby he would help me with connecting to other "*changemakers*" because of the serendipity of what I could offer to them. "*I truly believe this, and live by it*", he said (personal conversation, May 2015). It was the same potential that he saw in the possible connections between two sides of a mountain, one with money, one with issues and ideas. A few weeks after our first meeting, I experienced a first taste of this engineered serendipity, being invited to participate to Tech4Africa, the largest technology startup conference in Africa.

It is a short email, in which he kindly asks me whether I was successful at getting a free student ticket to the otherwise expensive event. To get a free ticket for himself, he has volunteered to manage the Twitter account of the organization and to provide a live-tweeting service for the entire day. This will allow him to be there, but also give Pigeon Pie the chance to network among the startup scene of the entire country and beyond. To do so, one of his employees, the commercial officer, has been given the task of roaming around the conference venue dropping business cards at the various exhibitors and stalls. I answer his email explaining that I was fortunate enough to get a free ticket, and I genuinely ask whether any help is needed. His reply is immediate.

> *That will be amazing, and much appreciated! We could use another brain and hand on twitter. Tech4Africa has a twitter account that we can tweet from, and*

> *I have my personal account which we can tweet from. The idea is to get as much exposure for the event on twitter as possible [...] There'll also be multiple rooms with different speakers in each, and having two people on the twitter account would mean that we can cover two rooms at once* (personal email, August 2015).

He organizes a Skype conference for later in the day—it is the day before the event. During our Skype meeting, he tests my familiarity with managing a live Twitter account. I tell him that I have done it before, having covered live soccer matches on Twitter for an international TV network—a gig job as a student. I can also use social media management software, like Hootsuite, or TweetDeck. Trevor is excited about not having to teach me how to use such tools, which we will eventually be availing ourselves of to manage the event coverage. We discuss some more details about the next day, and, as we conclude the conversation, he reiterates how this 'helping each other' is the sort of investment multiplier he believes our relationship will have. He explicitly suggests that I should use Tech4Africa to recruit informants and that he himself will introduce me to some of them.

Image 19. The Green Point Stadium, one of the controversial legacies of the 2010 World Cup, was the location of Tech4Africa and SAIS 2015.

Tech4Africa starts very early in the morning, at the conference centre of the Green Point Stadium, a visible, controversial, legacy of the FIFA World Cup that South Africa hosted in 2010 (Image 19). The event venue itself is in the bowels of the stadium. The structure has different conference facilities, all built underneath the spectator terraces. Some of them, the more expensive to hire, have glazed openings looking onto the field. Other parts are entirely windowless. Tech4Africa is hosted in one of this lower, cheaper facilities. In the artificial light, several startups have built their stalls in the hall where lunch and coffee are served. I tell Trevor that this setting reminds me of other startup conferences I have attended before. The similarities are striking and yet unsurprising. He responds by joking about the fact that the conference venue is so enclosed: "*Africa is outside*", he says, "*you can be here and think this conference is in Australia"* (personal conversation, August 2015). Notwithstanding his remarks, and the actual lack of daylight, Africa is a powerful presence throughout the conference.

Not long before the first keynote address and salutation, one of the organizers takes us to a haphazard media booth—a table on the back of the main stage—from which we will be managing the social media accounts of the organization that runs the event.

> *We trust you, just pump it up all through the day. Just don't do silly things and everything will be fine* (personal notes, August 2015).

Details have been arranged the day before: we have already set up our computers and tablets with Tech4Africa accounts, we have a list Twitter accounts of either participants to the conference or trend-setters in the African startup scene, we have divided the tasks, and I have been briefed about how to focus on inspirational quotes from the talks—whilst Trevor will be creating the media beat from other accounts. In one hour or so, we manage to take the #tech4africa hashtag to the top five trending topics in the continent, and we keep a top-ten position in South Africa

throughout the day. Not longer after we start the Twitter beat, the same person who has taken us to the media booth, comes back to our table and compliments us about our achievements in the trending topic list. Entrepreneurs from South Africa and elsewhere have been engaging with my "*inspirational quotes*", which, contrary to Trevor's ironic remark, are mostly about Africa. Africa as a market, Africa as a potential, Africa as a pool of ideas, Africa as an opportunity, Africa as hope.

The conference is a choreography of business wisdoms and fads (the lean startup, the omnichannel marketing, bootstrapping, etc.) intertwined with various stories of entrepreneurial success. It is a choreographic exercise in that there is a collegial script and an aesthetic form to the way in which its various reasons unfold through assembling people, media, banners, modular exhibition systems, business cards and so forth. The future of entrepreneurship in Africa is both a landscape (booming Africa, rising Africa, potential Africa) and impersonated by successful entrepreneurial subjects, who share their stories and reach the diverse geographies of the local startup scene through a Twitter beat that I contribute to. Failure itself, packaged in the right way, can be part of the choreography:

> From my notes*: Nic Harry, Greek-heritage South African. He designs, produces, and sells socks for techie hipsters. He started his journey with a tech startup that did not survive but, accordingly, failed in a miserable way. Building on the insights of his failure, he was able to find an investor that bet on his idea of producing men's socks with colourful patterns. He now runs a successful business with an online and a growing number of physical stores. Business innovators wear his socks. He partnered with Uber and hid pairs of socks in the cars. His tale is the classic story of success after a bungle. His keynote slides are sleek, minimalistic, and with lists of bullet points—last of which is a follow-your-dream item. [...] He does not forget to mention the social and environmental commitment of his sock-manufacturing. He wears three quarter pants that show his socks* (August 2015).

According to Nic Harry, failure needs to be managed in prospective, not retrospective terms. In fact, entrepreneurial failure begets useful knowledge. As another speaker at the conference points out, there are entire websites dedicated to startup post-mortems and even an aggregator of entrepreneurial autopsies where you can learn from the mistakes of other ventures. However, I argue, entrepreneurial failure is not only "additive knowledge" (Riles, 2004, p.398). Because of the way in which it is choreographed at events of the likes of Tech4Africa, it works as an extension of the success stories that these conferences stage. It teaches the audience, both the entrepreneurs at the stadium and those following the event on Twitter, how to profitably engage the future, even in light of the many uncertainties which South African changemakers face and which the keynote speakers do not shy away from mentioning.

In fact, entrepreneurial conferences articulate, in such staged performances, the prospective thrust that is needed to align the inspiration coming from successful business tales and the aspirations of would-be (social) entrepreneurs. I myself participated, with my inspirational-quote tweets, in this choreographing exercise of lining up desirable opportunities and exhilarating achievements. As Trevor puts it to me, after a particularly inspiring keynote about a social venture that delivers coding literacy among the poor, "*these events are really about inspiring people... and networking, of course*" (personal notes, August 2015).

Tech4Africa was not a single instance during my fieldwork. Conferences, summits, startup platforms—I came to understand—are all choreographed performances of the future. They are such in many different ways, some traditionally associated with this kind of event: new markets are anticipated, sales are projected, future cash-flows are forecasted, marketing trends are explained and so forth (Thrift, 2005; Bathelt & Henn, 2014; Henn & Bathelt, 2015). They also

create opportunities for potential, serendipitous encounters (what Trevor describes as 'networking'). More importantly, I suggest, these choreographies work as tools for keeping the prospective momentum of entrepreneurial knowledge, both for commercial and social ventures. They teach, in other words, how successes and failures can become future-oriented knowledge. There are, however, other types of performances and other forms of knowledge that can be choreographed into such events. At the 2015 South African Innovation Summit (SAIS), for example, storytelling was accompanied by a wider set of staged arrangements.

SAIS is the most important gathering for innovative businesses in South Africa. Though privately organized, many government agencies support the event, which is also a stage for institutional networking. As with Tech4Africa, tickets to the event are very expensive—not only because they include socially and environmentally-friendly luncheons, but also a heavy participant packet, which included a colour-printed agenda of the summit, with pages to take notes about the talks and other perks. To participate, I am covering the event as a reporter, writing for the blog of a local non-profit organization. This arrangement also allows me to have one-on-one interviews with some of the keynote speakers. Once again, I am also tweeting the summit's highlights as part of the deal—what Trevor would describe as the *quid pro quo* of my access to the research field.

The innovation summit is held in the conference centre of the Green Point Stadium, where I previously attended Tech4Africa. This time, the hired venue is higher up in the structure of the stadium, with glazed walls opening on the spectator terraces. Early in the morning, the field attendants are taking care of the manicured grass. As a reporter, I am allowed to use a dedicated press room, on the last level of the building. There, I liaise with professional journalists who are covering the event

for various innovation-related pages and TV programs, but also with other bloggers who, like me, observe what more skilled journalists do to grab famous speakers and corner them into an interview. Luckily, the blog I am writing for is rather well known, and I am now more confident about rehearsing the networking performance that Trevor and I have discussed—several times, at this stage. For the following three days, I roam around the conference facilities, taking part in roundtables, lectures and workshops. With the excuse of the blog, I introduce myself, my research and my reporting tasks to various participants, who come from all over the country, as well as from many government institutions. I manage to collect some of their views, and many promises of later interviews, some of which will actually happen in the following weeks.

What is interesting about SAIS as a choreography of entrepreneurial knowledge is that the performance is not limited to the sharing of tales of innovation and success (or failure) and networking. The reason is that participants explicitly see the summit as a transactional source of knowledge. In the words of the chairwoman of the summit, Audrey Verhaeghe, a young, articulate, inspiring speaker, SAIS is *"really"* not a conference, but a "*platform*". "*Every partnership*", she explains, "*even in-kind, even when you retweet us, is what this summit is about*": it is a platform to create the knowledge needed to "*change this country from an economic and from a social innovation perspective*" (personal notes, August 2015). She is echoed by Professor Franklyn, Dean of the Johannesburg Business School which is cohosting the summit. After illustrating how SAIS will become an academic report on innovation trends in South Africa—a report that features both keynote speeches and participants' tweets that contain the hashtag #SAISME—he gives the audience a lecture on 'divergent thinking', that is, the capacity to generate multiple solutions instead of focusing on a single outcome (which is convergent thinking).

During the talk, Professor Franklyn shows a diagram that explains

what the right kind of attitude towards the future should be: a method of apprehending the possibilities of the present. When there is an innovation, of any kind—he continues—the interesting, tentative, innovative aspects of it are already a thing of the past. It is the explorative process that leads to it that constitutes a successful state of mind. "*Practice open-mindedness*", he suggests to the audience, pointing to the messy section of his diagram, because open-mindedness is what SAIS is meant to distribute and divulge (personal notes, August 2015). To make the point even clearer, his speech is followed by a lecture titled 'the business of disruption', where Dion Chang, South Africa's most famous futurologist and trend analyst, offers a perspective on the way in which "*the future should become part of the present"* as a way of "*doing business or social innovation*" (personal notes, August 2015).

Dion Chang is a skilled public speaker. Besides running a trend-watching consultancy firm, he often appears on TV shows and writes for various magazines. He stuns the audience with dazzling videos of innovations happening in Africa: drones fly over a rural village bringing Internet, a quadcopter endowed with an iPhone-controlled defibrillator lands somewhere in the Savannah and saves the life of a white tourist, trendy black women call an Uber in an unnamed, bustling African metropolis. The keynote is inspired and inspiring. Drawing on economic guru Jeremy Rifkin (2014), he argues that the present historical stage is not capitalism any more. The *zeitgeist* of this age is hope. A new world order is in the wake, where capitalist value chains are collapsing, and emerging trends engage the future by disrupting existing modes of accumulation. No wonder, he explains, that Uber's global marketing strategist used to be Obama's spin doctor: "*we are in the middle of a political campaign against the present*"(personal notes, August 2015). Traditional industries are in the line of fire: transport, health, media. "*As innovators we must find our place in the future*" (personal notes, August 2015). The audience is enraptured. The performance has been successful. Dion Chang has not

only shed light on the future, but explained how the future is, in itself, a valid business model and a way of life. "*Particularly in Africa"*, he has underlined at some point, provoking an impromptu round of applause (personal notes, August 2015).

The staging of these events is a crucial mechanism of exchange whereby the capacity to apprehend the future is mobilized into the landscape of bureaucrats, business experts and entrepreneurs. Figures like Dion Chang, with their flamboyant brilliance, are part of the choreography; they are the evocative, inspiring speculators who set the scene for more mundane stories of success and failure. They write the grand narrative of millennial development (or capitalism) that functions as a backdrop of the various storytelling performances. Later in the conference, a less garish speaker asks the audience to draw a triangle in their notebooks, then to draw something else starting from the triangle. I draw a bird—the triangle being its beak. Participants tweet pictures of their drawings. The speaker shows them on the main screen: a tilted house, a bow, an airplane, etc. *"We must look at the present as we look at the original triangle"*, he explains, engaging with Chang's point about making the future into a business (personal notes, August 2015). This is to say that these complex choreographies do not only feature relatable stories of prosperous enterprisers, but include grand narratives, exercises designed to train anticipatory capacities and a complex, aesthetic materiality of colour-printed agendas, green luncheons, networking strategies, tweets, podcasts, hand drawings, and, of course, conference venues. In the next section, I focus more specifically on the calculative materialities through which future prospects are domesticated.

4.4. Devices of Abstraction: the lean startup

Both at Tech4Africa and at SAIS, I was also exposed to a series of objects and artefacts that enable a reorientation of present knowledge

towards the future, through the calculations that they embed. Whilst the conferences themselves—as I explained in the previous section—worked as choreographic performances, with their distinct materialities of networking and storytelling, the capacity to engage the future entrepreneurially is also distributed by mundane things of calculation.

My understanding of calculation resorts to Callon and Muniesa's definition (2005, p.1231):

> Calculating does not necessarily mean performing mathematical or even numerical operations (Lave, 1988). Calculation starts by establishing distinctions between things or states of the world, and by imagining and estimating courses of action associated with those things or with those states as well as their consequences. By starting with this type of definition (wide, but usual) of the notion of calculation, we try to avoid the distinction (also conventional, but too sharp) between judgement and calculation.

Such characterization of calculation is useful in that it broadens its range to include not only the act of quantification—or qualification for that matter—but also the various acts of abstracting and reconnecting that make things calculable. As far as training anticipatory capacities of development experts and entrepreneurs is concerned, engaging the future in a productive form is precisely an act of this sort: a calculation on various levels. Drawing on Callon and Muniesa (2005) again, calculation is made possible by many material (socio-technical) devices, ranging from statistical formulas to supermarket displays. Here, I look specifically at one set of these devices: the lean startup paraphernalia. These are books, videos, diagrams, and gadgets which travelled from the Silicon Valley to the South African world of solidarity, through the various centres of calculations discussed in the previous chapters, as well as through gatherings like Tech4Africa and SAIS.

The lean startup is an approach to entrepreneurial innovation that

merges various prototyping and decision-making devices in a codified model for creating a venture from a cutting-edge digital innovation. The name 'lean startup' was introduced in 2008 by Eric Ries, now a bestselling entrepreneurial guru who has, since then, trademarked the concept. However, as he himself concedes (2011), the lean startup represents a trend, a paradigm that had informed the previous decade of Silicon Valley new ventures before he came up with a name for it (Blank & Dorf, 2012).

Despite being relatively new, the term 'lean' had already been used in the context of management studies. Specifically, 'lean production' was the way in which, in 1990, some Harvard and MIT business scholars labelled a change in the production system of cars: from the Fordist, mass production, that had characterized US and Europe from the early twentieth century to the nineteen-eighties, to the *lean* production system, which had been introduced by Toyota in the aftermath of World War II and had made the fortune of the Japanese automotive industry (Holweg, 2007). Popular and academic books have been written on how Toyota revolutionized car production: the 'lean' in the lean startup signifies a link to a past innovation culture that has an almost magical quality.

'Lean' referred to the range of innovations introduced by Eiji Toyoda and his production manager Taiichi Ohno since the late forties (Ohno, 1982)—in particular, the continuous experimenting in all the phases of the production, with the capacity to recognize mistakes 'in the making', and the acknowledgement of clients as a community of users. For these reasons, Eric Ries coined the term 'lean startup' to describe a shift in the way in which innovation processes and failures begun to be managed in digital ventures, after the dot-com burst of the early 2000. Conversely, the first digital ventures had operated in what Steve Blank calls "stealth mode" (2013, p.63): internet innovators would work in the secrecy of

their garage, and then drop their finalized product on the market, as a result of thousands of hours of secret development, and business plans that often did not comply with reality. Accordingly, that was one of the reasons why many companies, after receiving substantial capitals and making enormous market success, failed during the dotcom burst, not being able to become sustainable.

In the book that popularized the 'lean' concept as a business methodology (and in the many talks that followed), the author explicitly describes the lean startup as a tool for dealing with uncertainty. Ries marshals a series of case studies from his personal entrepreneurial journey and other well-known examples to make the case for the lean startup as a method of innovation. "Entrepreneurship is management", he writes, summarizing the main principle of his method[78]. The book, however, is not just a collection of case studies and catchphrases, though there are many of them throughout. It also contains a detailed description of specific techniques, from customer interviews to prototyping, that even have their own materiality with an appendix of templates and the end of the volume. These materialities of calculation surfaced in various way throughout my fieldwork, in contexts that were, often, quite far from the world of digital startups (see also Chapter 5).

A good example of how the materiality of the lean startup enters the world of social entrepreneurship is the third and last day of the South Africa Innovation Summit (SAIS). This last day is mainly dedicated to social innovation. Celebrity speakers have left, and a much smaller number of reporters enjoy their early coffee in the press room, high on the top level of the stadium. South Africa's largest business foundation (belonging to one of the largest sin industries in the world—SAB Miller) has organized a masterclass on social innovation with Wim

78 http://theleanstartup.com/principles [accessed 31/7/2017]

Vanhaverbeke, a management of innovation scholar. Professor of Innovation Management & Strategy in Belgium and Singapore, he is an expert of open innovation, with a vast publishing track record that made him part of the 2014 top 50 authors of Technology and Innovation Management, a list created by the International Association of Management of Technology[79]. The title of the masterclass, according to the SAIS programme, is 'Open Innovation and Social Entrepreneurship'.

Despite the title, few entrepreneurs have come along. There are, however, representatives of various important NGOs, some of whom I know already. In fact, the target of the masterclass is not social entrepreneurs specifically, but organizations that may become profitable by 'doing good'. As he explains, the lecture is organized into two parts—a more theoretical one, with case studies and trends in the field of social innovation, and a workshop where he will be giving feedback to the various organizations attending, focusing on how they can use the lean startup method to learn and implement innovative, entrepreneurial strategies for their goals.

The first part of the masterclass is a showcase of examples of the way in which "*advanced capitalism [is] cracking the shell of humanitarianism*" (personal notes, August 2015). By advanced capitalism Vanhaverbeke means digital startups, but many of his examples relate to large corporations like Coca Cola or Unilever, and how they have introduced processes of open innovation into their business. His advice, though, is to learn from small innovative companies (specifically, digital startups), to mimic their management strategies and bring them in a context as different as that of a non-profit organization. Social entrepreneurship, he explains, is the organizational form that is better fit for introducing open innovation practices into the cracked "*shell of humanitarianism*".

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79 http://www.wimvanhaverbeke.be/ [accessed 10/07/2016]



Image 20. The business model canvas as a device of abstraction.

During the second part of the masterclass, after a few aphorisms on networking, matching assets and entrepreneurialism, we finally get to the lean startup. In particular, to the business model canvas (BMC) (Image 20). One of the key principles of the lean paradigm is that of embracing uncertainty through the "*business model*" (Ries, 2011). Whilst business plans are based on a great number of hypotheses that might not turn out to be real, business models define how value is created for the customers and for the company using an entirely different method of abstraction. As Vanhaverbeke illustrates, business plans are not good for NGOs—they entail the wrong kind of calculations. Conversely, the business model is endowed with the capacity to frame different forms of value, social for example, and to measure the future in terms that are not strictly monetary, or numerical. This, he says, presents a valid opportunity for non-profit organizations or social enterprises.

The BMC, however, is not an abstract entity, but a material object around which the rest of the masterclass revolves. As a participant, I am given a black-and-white paper copy of the BMC, a template developed

by Alexander Osterwalder to frame the "9 building blocks"[80] of a new venture, from customers to costs. Another version of the canvas, the "lean canvas" was developed by Ash Maurya, who has contributed to the popularity of the lean startup with his bestseller *Running Lean* (2010). That book, too, has an appendix with templates that can be photocopied and distributed. Vanhaverbeke, however, has chosen the original version. We watch a video from strategyzer.com, the website where the template can be downloaded from. In the video, the blocks become physical, stop-motioned platforms inhabited by little puppets. At the centre of the canvas lays the block containing the Value Propositions, which are statements enucleating the elements of a business that produce value, of any form, for its customers. We watch another video where a management expert explains how Nespresso's systems fit the BM canvas. Somebody from the audience asks how that could be "*applied to something less evil*" (personal notes, August 2015).

As a response, we collaboratively test the BMC on a real case on which Vanhaverbeke worked as a consultant: a company producing self-adjustable spectacles to be sold in rural Africa. It is a classic example of the Bottom-of-the-pyramid approach—the right kind of product for the poor kind of people (see Chapter 1 and 3). According to Vanhaverbeke, the BMC canvas showed the problem of the company was in the way they abstracted its value propositions. Self-adjustable glasses were too boring. They did not come in different colours and shapes, and were not aesthetically pleasing. A second problem that he highlights on the canvas, in the "Channels" section, was that of delivering thousands of spectacles to rural areas. "*We learned from Coca-Cola: you know why you can always find a coke anywhere in Africa?*" he asks. "*That's the last mile strategy, they use informality to deliver where formal means of transport have no access*"

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80 https://strategyzer.com/canvas [accessed 4/4/2018]

(personal notes, August 2015). His point is that the BMC allowed the abstractions needed to carve out the problems. By separating instances into 'fields', and 'blocks', the BMC formalized a process that detaches economic issues from social issues, logistic issues from aesthetic ones and so forth. In other words, it allows its users to abstract problems that are seen as social from problems that are seen as technical (e.g. economic, managerial, etc.): artefacts of calculation, such as the canvas, determine temporal agreements on how value is calculated in future terms.

Professor Vanhaverbeke explicitly argues that the canvas can be applied by not-for-profit organizations to envisage revenue schemes—that is, to train their imaginative capacities in the field of financial sustainability (personal notes, August 2015). He argues that the attendees should learn how to use the canvas for framing their commitment to delivering certain values, but also for not foreclosing other, potential outcomes that wrong kinds of abstraction (such as the business plan) creates. In other words, as Professor Vanhaverbeke adds at the end of the masterclass, the canvas should also allow everyone to put aside their social or ecological commitments (to overlook them) in order to explore the possibilities of entrepreneurial profit that may realize those commitments.

As one device of a larger set of paraphernalia found within the lean startup paradigm, the BM canvases are germane to training the entrepreneurial capacities of the individuals and the organizations working in the field of humanitarian development. Engaging the future in the right kind of framework and with the right kind of abstractions is indeed crucial to explore the opportunities of profit that fighting poverty may offer. In the remainder of this section, another example from my fieldwork highlights how the lean startup offers a material form to the calculation/abstraction of such hopeful futures. The lean startup did appear many times over the course of my fieldwork. For

reasons of space, I cannot report here all the other instances in which I encountered the paraphernalia of the lean methodology, and neither the views of many of my informants who actively reengineered the lean paradigm for the social entrepreneurship field. Instead, I consider another artefact of calculation, the Minimum Viable Product (MVP), which is also designed to engage future prospects.

Another key element of the lean startup method is "customer development", whereby the final customers are understood as a community of users, rather that customers, and therefore they become part of the creation process through a series of managerial tools that range from the initial prototyping tests to circular feedback for improvements in the final product (Ries, 2011). To achieve the kind of flexibility required by customer development, the way in which software is 'produced' requires a flexible structure as well, called 'agile'. Agile development came specifically from the software industry, where the creation of new services is based on iterative and incremental improvements that are often experimental as well. Although incremental methods have always existed in software development, it was in 2001 that an "agile manifesto"[81] established the term both for older and new practices of incremental, flexible design in the context of programming. An element of this process is the Minimum Viable Product (MVP), a pretotype that is used to understand how users and the same developers interact with the features of a certain service. The MVP is also what entrepreneurs show to either venture or philanthropic capitalists. It is a proof of commitment. However, the MVP was conceptualized more broadly by my informants who were using lean principles. To them, it was not necessarily a piece of software, but, a placeholder, a hinge between their present hopes and the future.

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81 http://agilemanifesto.org/ [accessed 12/09/2016]

In September 2015, I attended an event which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5. Suffice is to say, here, that it was a weekend-long competition where different teams had been created around a number of entrepreneurial ideas. By the end of the weekend—assisted by mentors and experts—each of the team would present their business idea (on a BM canvas) and a MVP of their software. The context of the competition was a publicly subsidized business incubator in Cape Town's largest township, Khayelitsha. The event was sponsored by a global firm which owned the competition's trademark. One of the requirements of the sponsorship was that teams adhered to a template which included uploading a wireframed MVP onto the competition's global platform, and using a version of the BMC to frame their business ideas.

Most participants were local. They had turned up on a sunny spring weekend in the hope that somebody would listen to their business ideas and eventually fund them. Though organizers and mentors specified several times that there would not be any financial prize, participants had read about these events in other parts of the world. One of them, a student of management, asked me:

> *Are you an angel investor? I read that they hide in this kind of startup events, they pretend to be mentors, and then they give you a shitload of money if they like your idea.*

She then explained that my foreign accent had made her think I could be an investor. Eventually, reality failed those that were expecting venture philanthropists and business angels to be in disguise, or to appear at some point. However, these expectations had given a very specific meaning to filling the BM canvas. Once presented with the canvas as a tool to better formulate their ideas, participants had embraced the notion that the template would give them the possibility to articulate concepts that sounded adroitly economic, and to speak the language of potential investors. Even when these did not show up, they still believed

that the BMC had taken them to a different level of entrepreneurship. In other words, the BMC had offered participants a language to interact with those who they hoped would be there at the competition[82]. Even after the realization that no venture capitalist would turn up to shower the participants in money, the BMC remained an important piece of their entrepreneurial puzzles.

For Benny, an engineer from Limpopo—South Africa's most rural and isolated province—the BMC was *the* missing piece. Thanks to a government scholarship, he had been able to study engineering at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, in Cape Town. In 2013, with a fellow mechanical engineering student, he had founded PBC, Peninsula Business Club, a startup that, by his own admission, was still a messy, naive undertaking. Nonetheless, in the previous two years, he had been able to raise an investment from a foundation, and additional sponsorship from a private philanthropist. Despite his success at winning funds, Benny felt what he needed to succeed was a business model.

> *I need to survive. I have no stipend, philanthropists only want to sponsor things, never people. I need money. My family is pressing me, I am an engineer, I can get a job, but I am committed to this. If only I had a good business model* (personal conversation, September 2015).

As we looked at the empty canvas that we drew together on a white board, the first morning of the weekend competition, the BM stood in the way as a milestone, a physical one, a touchpoint, a hinge between what Benny desired and what he had been able to do that far. The following day, I talked to him again. The BM canvas had failed him. "*It's a stupid exercise, what I need is an app. I need an MVP*", he told me (personal

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82 On the 'performance' of entrepreneurship in Africa, through technologies of the self like language and clothing, see Dolan & Rajak, 2016.

conversation, September 2015). I was not that surprised. I had seen, over the course of the previous hours, how the BMC had let many down. No venture capitalists had miraculously appeared after the participants succeeded in filling the nine blocks of the canvas. Some, though, still believed that the canvas would be a step in the future. They would take photos of the whiteboards, they kept redrawing them until they looked as nice as those shown as examples. Benny, however, was disappointed (the BMC had revealed that his business ideas were hard to be realized), and had moved to the next material device of calculation: the MVP.

Whilst I was not surprised that Benny had been let down by the BMC *"exercise"*, as he called it, I still asked him why he needed an MVP app, when the core business of his social venture was not digital at all. He shrugged, without replying. Instead, he enrolled two girls that had been trained in agile development in a philanthropic school that was based in the same incubator space. These "agile girls" would make sure that all the contestants finally had an app prototype to upload on the competition's online platform. In few hours, they developed a wireframe app for Benny. By then, his scepticism had faded away. During the final pitch to the jury, he proudly showed the application, and chaotically described how its features represented the various services that his social startup would offer. Understandably, Benny's social startup did not make the winning shortlist. With the competition over, I finally reached him for a goodbye and found him still playing with the mock-up of his app, enamoured of its digital materiality.

For Benny, the MVP was not just a mechanism of abstraction any more. As a physical token that had entered the affective sphere of the competition, it was also a tangible gimmick of his own aspirations. Calculations, even numerical ones, as Maurer argues, always have a dimension of emotional attachment (2003). Here, the technical rationality of the MVP had been supplanted by its affective qualities. Benny reminded

me of another one of my informants who, by his own admission, would sleep with a copy of *Running Lean* on his bedside table, having filled in the canvas in the appendix of the volume. As I argue in the conclusion to this chapter, the training of anticipatory capacities is also directed to the self, through material objects, which, as placeholders, point to hopeful futures.

4.5. Conclusion.

In the economic experiments explored by this dissertation, the capacity to engage hopeful futures is vital. The very word 'millennial' in millennial development evokes both the historical situation at the turn of the millennium and the messianic, salvific narratives which imbue contemporary capitalism and development (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000). In fact, the possibility of profit for social entrepreneurs is, thus far, just a hopeful prospect. In the pedagogic experiments that I described in this chapter and in the previous one, profit is not a reality yet. Many of these developmental experiments do fail. How are then millennial development hopes kept alive?

By charting specific performative practices, from marketing and design to the application of the lean startup protocol, this chapter has argued that hopes are nurtured and cultivated by training both eventual social entrepreneurs and the expert selves of social entrepreneurship to profitably engage the future. In other words, this chapter has addressed some of the material ways in which the promises of social entrepreneurship are nourished by training the anticipatory capacities of experts and entrepreneurs alike—even when reality fails both.

The importance of future-thinking and other speculative practices in the domains of contemporary economic development has variously been addressed in contemporary scholarship (Li Murray, 2007; Appadurai,

2013; Redfield, 2013). Scholars of postcolonialism (see Chatterjee, 1993) and development (see Ferguson, 1990; 1999) have also long argued that these technocratic systems were upheld by narrative promises that appealed to both the governed and those who governed. As Anna Tsing has further argued (2000), the grand promises of capitalist profit need constant choreographing. She writes:

> In speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before it can be extracted; the possibility of economic performance must be conjured up like a spirit to draw an audience of potential investors [...] the more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible an investment frenzy" (2000, p.117–118).

This chapter, however, did not focus on the making of these spectacular productions, although it was argued that events like SAIS and individuals like Dion Chang have the capacity to weave contingent anecdotes into grand narrations about the future of Africa. Instead, I mapped the more mundane performances whereby imagination is taught, both to raise the prospective momentum of future social entrepreneurs, and to deal with the limits of expert knowledge around the same.

The central argument of this chapter has been that social entrepreneurship, as a system of expertise, requires a certain kind of knowledge and attitude towards the future, in order to function as a technology of millennial development. Trevor, who showed a very deep understanding of his own role as a design consultant, called this attitude *"hope"* (personal conversation, May 2015). He not only saw the capacity to engage the future as generative for his work as designer, but he interpreted his networked life as a search for serendipitous encounters. He was so committed to this prospective momentum, that he variously tried to teach me how to network, and how to keep the possibilities of my fieldwork as open as possible. He had delivered this same lesson to many "changemakers" who had been his clients.

In this sense, hope could be interpreted, as Hirokazu Miyazaki suggests (2004; 2006), as a method of knowledge that experts use to deal with the failures of their schemes, with the limits of their expertise, and with the possibility of making sense of their winding journeys. As he puts it, "hope suggests a willingness to embrace uncertainty and also serves as a concrete method for keeping knowledge moving in conditions of uncertainty" (2016, p.8). Hence, hope does not only depict a willingness to engage the future, but also begets concrete methods for keeping the future thrust of any knowledge endeavour. I could not report here all the voices of the experts I talked to, for obvious reasons. For many of them, however, hopefulness was something that they were trying to teach both to themselves and to others.

Another one of Trevor's insights was that startup conferences are important occasions for unexpected and proficuous contacts. Whilst these kinds of conferences have been addressed by economic geographers as a key component of the global pipeline of managerial and entrepreneurial knowledge (Bathelt *et al.*, 2004) and the transfer/translation of such knowledge over distance, my interest is in their performative qualities as future-oriented conjurings of entrepreneurship. What I suggest is that events like Tech4Africa and SAIS are not only composed to offer "reference points" and opportunities for encounters (Henn & Bathelt, 2015). In the field of development, they also train individual as well as collective anticipatory capacities by mobilizing future-thinking into the landscape of bureaucrats, business experts and, eventually, social entrepreneurs. Through storytelling and other choreographic practices, I have argued, these gatherings stage and distribute hopefulness in the ecology of social entrepreneurship by teaching both experts and entrepreneurs how to engage the future with the right kind of calculations.

In this sense, this chapter also illustrated the way in which future-thinking

is inscribed into objects that have the capacity to produce abstractions about the future. I focused on a specific set of paraphernalia—the performative artefacts of the lean startup approach. The latter, an entrepreneurial paradigm for streamlining the startup phase of a digital innovation, relies on particular objects—books, blogs, templates, prototypes—to travel from Silicon Valley to the territories of millennial development. These objects are, in Latourian terms (1987), "immutable mobiles": devices designed to move and, in moving, maintain some of their features intact in order to carry some form of meaning. What artefacts like the Business Model canvas and the Minimum Viable Products also do, however, is to allow abstractions about the future. I have thus described them as "placeholders", borrowing the concept from Annelise Riles (2010), who describes them as arrangements of human and non-human instruments in the form of a document, "a material, sociotechnical phenomenon" (2010, p.803). She writes:

> the temporality of such documents, as artefacts that engender distinct moments of creation, form filling, filing, analysis, and circulation, [...] encourage certain kinds of anticipatory or retrospective analysis and certain experiences of the present [...]. One creates a placeholder in order to overlook it for the moment. In other words, it is a technique for working with and in the meantime (Riles, 2010, p.803).

As shown in this chapter, placeholders such as the BM canvas and the MVP are not only a hinge between present wills and desired future achievements. They also allow further speculation, most importantly about the possibility of profit, but they are also constantly negotiated around the interplay of reason and affect. Specifically, these placeholders blur the line between the speculative and the affective dimension of entrepreneurial undertakings.

In this sense, I suggest that the tools, fads, and abstraction devices of social entrepreneurship are never merely technical. They too enrol desires,

promises and aspirations of both social change and entrepreneurial profit. This kind of future thinking is vital for social entrepreneurship to function as a political technology of millennial development. It serves the willingness of both experts and entrepreneurs to engage the uncertainty of the future, to keep the prospective momentum going, in spite of failures and setbacks. It is also what needs to be taught, as a method, to the subjects of millennial development, in order for them to do the same: overlook difficulties, take risks, engage the future in the hope of a profit that will change their lives.

Behind this "economy of appearances" (Tsing, 2000), however, stands the need for making sense of one's life journey as *"changemaker"* (personal conversation with Trevor, May 2015). My Capetonian interlocutors did find ways to incorporate failure in their modes of dealing with the limits of their expertise about 'doing well while doing good'—they did so with the same networks, conferences, and calculative objects that gave a form to their desires. This suggests, as I explained earlier, that political technologies are not, in fact, just discourses. As a system of expertise, social entrepreneurship is also produced by various materialities that enable the mundane governance of the future. Yet, these materialities are never just technical: as a book on the bedside table, they also are objects of "affective attachment" (Knorr Cetina, 1997), things that keep hopes moving in spite of everything else.

Chapter 5

Infrastructures of social entrepreneurship.

> If cities are socio-technical allocation machines worked through the silent placements of diverse infrastructures, from water grids and public parks to schools and coding systems, they qualify the agency of human subjects and authorities in at least three ways: firstly, as less than supreme, secondly as incorporated in the machinic, and thirdly, as dependent on the latter. This goes for all cities, regardless of their technical intensity, sophistication and spread, for even the most rudimentary, improvised and broken systems, as this paper has tried to show, are full of agency and meaning. Uncovered, the urban infrastructure turns out to be not only as active as any community or institution, but also the medium through which much of the latter is orchestrated (Amin, 2014, p.156).

5.1. Incubators of millennial development.

In this chapter, I chart the infrastructural life of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town—that is, its production and reproduction through material, relational mediums. I have argued, thus far, that social entrepreneurship, as a form of applied knowledge, travels through, is anchored to, and is translated in specific centres of calculation where humanitarian and economic expertise are made and unmade (Chapter 2). I have shown that these peculiar geographies of expertise become the laboratory where social entrepreneurship functions as political technology of millennial development. In Chapter 3, I have then argued that these millennial urban economies require the right kind of economic subjects: the right kind of entrepreneurs, of philanthropists, venture capitalists, and so forth. Therefore, I described some of the didactic experiments that are meant to engender their existence. In Chapter 4, I focused on a specific aspect of these pedagogical efforts: the capacity to engage the future. I suggested that the aesthetic, choreographic

and other calculative performances of social entrepreneurship do the work of keeping the future thrust of social entrepreneurship alive, in conditions of uncertainty. Anticipatory capabilities also allow experts to manage the limits of their authority.

I now turn to the making of the infrastructures that mobilize social entrepreneurship as a political technology of millennial development. In other words, I bring to attention the infrastructural tissue that undergirds the possibility of social entrepreneurship in a city like Cape Town, with sprawling townships where poverty and unemployment are the norm. Once again, the perspective of my research moves from the "experts", the knowledge-bearers, or, more generally, from forms of expertise, and explores how these experts produce and are produced by infrastructures that sustain the project of achieving social change through profit and innovation. In this sense, I take a "technopolitical" approach, whereby infrastructures are both means and ends of political projects (Barry, 2001; Mitchell, 2002) even when, as in the case of my research, they are not railways and ports, but 'softer' platforms of connection, such as entrepreneurial incubators. The technopolitics of these incubators are interesting because they reveal the complex, contradictory political rationalities of transforming development and humanitarianism, as well as the possibility of inscribing other political projects in their material functioning.

As Susan Leigh Star explained in a seminal paper (1999), the relationship between political projects and infrastructures has long been a core subject of inquiry, at least since Langdon Winner's anecdote of Robert Moses's New York bridges, too low in height to allow public buses to reach wealthier suburbs (Winner, 1980). Both the tale itself and Winner's techno-determinism have been debunked (Woolgar & Cooper, 1999), but they still speak to wide cross-disciplinary concern: the capacity of infrastructure to incorporate political projects, their eventual success or

failure in achieving those projects, and the possibility to inscribe other agendas by tinkering with features of technical nature. As Timothy Mitchell (2002) shows, in his study of postcolonial Egypt, technopolitical projects may be very diverse in their form: they may take the shape of a technological solution (a pesticide), a piece of 'hard' infrastructure (a dam), or even a 'knowledge' infrastructure (like quantity surveying and economics). In a similar vein, this chapter will consider various devices, from technical objects to "spaces of calculability" (Callon, 1998a), but I will focus on an emerging infrastructural formation: the entrepreneurial incubator.

Once central argument of the scholarship on technopolitical projects has been to rethink the location of politics, even when these politics are central in the formation of the (neo)liberal state (Barry, 2001; Collier, 2011) or the colonial and postcolonial state (Chatterjee, 2004), by shifting the attention from government apparatuses to other material forms of modern societies: devices, commodities, technologies, infrastructures (see Woolgar & Neyland, 2013). In this sense, one way of looking at public artefacts is to question the kind of collectives that are gathered, created and transformed by them (Collier *et al.*, 2016; McFarlane & Graham, 2014).

At the same time, it could also be observed how certain forms of collectivity 'act' back upon infrastructures, in order to politicize their means, or to generate other possibilities of various kinds. Such interest in the politicization of infrastructure has been particularly important in Africanist scholarship. Achille Mbembé (2001), for example, argues that Africa has a long history of 'doubling' between what infrastructures were meant for and they were actually used for. In his account, the technical functions of roads and bridges, as well as bureaucratic technologies in postcolonial Africa, are not clear bearers of modernity as they are of an inextricable mesh of interests, contradictory projects, oppression and

resistance at the same time[83].

In recent years, Antina von Schnitzler's work (2008; 2010; 2013; 2016) on South Africa has revealed that infrastructures meant to enforce particular forms of neoliberal citizenship, like water and prepaid electricity meters, may become malleable technologies for other ethical and political engagements. Janet Roitman (2005), instead, has explored how the fiscal infrastructure that undergirds the state in central Africa maintains its authority by coupling regulation and illegality. Conversely, Abdoumaliq Simone has questioned the 'working' of Africa's urban infrastructures, arguing not only that cities do work, possibly through idiosyncratic webs of formal and informal systems, but that the administrative machines coexist with "pirate" ones as ways of "seeing" the world (2006), and that technocratic architectures, despite their initial aims, can be transversally enrolled in the functioning of other processes (2004; 2005; 2014). In this sense, Simone has called for a wider notion of infrastructure:

> African cities are characterized by incessantly flexible, mobile, and provisional intersections of residents that operate without clearly delineated notions of how the city is to be inhabited and used. These intersections, particularly in the last two decades, have depended on the ability of residents to engage complex combinations of objects, spaces, persons, and practices. These conjunctions become an infrastructure—a platform providing for and reproducing life in the city (Simone, 2004, pp.407–408).

The "infrastructures" of this chapter are similarly caught in these contradictions, between what they were meant to engender, and what they were eventually used for, between their politics and their form,

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83 On this 'doubling' of governmental rationalities, James Ferguson (1990) showed that where a complex infrastructural project in Thaba-Tseka, Lesotho, failed in addressing poverty, it did realize its technopolitics by creating the conditions of a bureaucratic state, and by rendering technical the question of development.

between the failure of expert knowledge and the productive life of technical failure.

This chapter offers an ethnographic account of the making of one kind of these infrastructures, one that is becoming more and more popular in contemporary African cities: entrepreneurial incubators in deprived urban areas. By focusing on the life (and death) of two of these incubators in Khayelitsha, the Barn and the Hub, I show how these are the results of a convergence of many ideas, projects and desires of millennial development. In addition, I argue that the functioning of these incubators is supported by multiple layers of other infrastructures, not least what Simone (2004, p.407) calls "people as infrastructure", the human networks that make cities work in contemporary Africa. Lastly, in this chapter, I suggest that the technopolitics of entrepreneurial infrastructures include the possibility of failure and/or the possibility of other rationalities that escape the politics of millennial development.

Incubator spaces in urban areas of poverty are one of the infrastructural frontiers of millennial development: they promise a democratization of capital and access to profit through an egalitarian arrangement of opportunities at the bottom of the pyramid. Spaces of economic marginality are not only "excluded from or resistant to entrepreneurial strategies": they are indeed "a key frontier of contemporary urban entrepreneurialism" (McFarlane, 2012, p.2795). As I argue throughout the chapter, various elements of these entrepreneurial incubators are precisely designed for the purpose of extracting Prahalad's "fortune at the bottom of the pyramid" (2005 - see also Chapter 3). Some other elements, however, may "emerge out of and store within them forms of desire and fantasy [or] can take on fetish-like aspects that sometimes can be wholly autonomous from their technical function" (Larkin, 2013, p.329). Other technical features, finally, can be re-inscribed for purposes other than capitalist extraction.

As socio-technical formations meant to create the conditions for social entrepreneurship in the deprived urban areas of Cape Town, the two incubators of this chapter rely on a web of material and immaterial connections, where ideas and business models are just as important as their brick-and-mortar architectures; they are predicated on egalitarian poetics of redistribution; they materialize the rationalities of millennial development as well as alternative political ends; they are patched with alternative political aspirations and improvised forms of sociality (see Amin, 2014).

5.2. The Barn Khayelitsha: a lively infrastructure for a divided city.

In this section, I address the early life of an incubator space in Khayelitsha, Cape Town's largest township. I consider one event in particular, which took place in September 2015, as an example of the way in which the existence of such a facility depended on the coming together of a number of other "lively infrastructures" –that is, "complexes of socio-technical alignment and allocation composed of corporate interests, regulatory standards, social expectations, hybrids of human-software-hardware intelligence, and historical legacies of organization and supply" (Amin, 2014, p.138)–each with their own technopolitics and different degrees of openness. The entrepreneurial incubator of this case study is called The Barn Khayelitsha. The event is Startup Weekend, a competition with its own global franchise, and which I already mentioned in Chapter 4.

Startup Weekend (SW) is a format for an entrepreneurial contest that lasts 54 hours, from a Friday night to the evening of the following Sunday. The event gathers tech enthusiasts, developers, designers, but also people who are not familiar with the world of digital startups. At the beginning of the weekend, individual participants pitch their ideas for new ventures. Among those ideas, a number of them is selected and teams are formed accordingly. During the rest of the contest, the teams

develop a working prototype of their business, and prepare a final presentation to give on the last evening. At this point, a panel of judges selects a winning startup, which receives a prize—usually consisting of future help in the development of the business. The organizer guide forbids cash awards and suggests in-kind forms of rewards: coworking space, travel grants, networking opportunities and so forth. SW is often described as an entrepreneurial platform, a launchpad for entrepreneurial opportunities that catches the zeitgeist of the age of the digital startups:

> While Startup Weekend obviously bears no resemblance to Henry Ford's River Rouge plant, it is at the heart of the new producer society because, as discussed below, it expands the meaning of "producer." In the first place, the Startup Weekend ethos is the same one that underlies Open Source Ecology and TechShop—the desire to create, to build something. Second, a software program or line of code is a product that is increasingly important to manufacturing—your car, for example, is basically a computer—and has market value. It might not exist in the same sense as a piece of furniture, but it can otherwise play a role similar to the traditional factory widgets (Stangler & Maxwell, 2012, p.7).

The first SW took place in Boulder, Colorado, in 2007[84]. The idea came from Andrew Hyde, an interface designer employed by Techstars, which was a still small startup accelerator in its second year of operations. Techstars had been modelled on Ycombinator[85], providing an accelerated mentorship programme alongside a small seed investment in exchange for a small equity in the companies[86]. As of today, both Ycombinator and Techstars have raised billions in capital and topped various lists of

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84 https://techcrunch.com/2007/07/07/startupweekend-70-founders-create-company-in-one-weekend/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

85 http://www.denverpost.com/2007/05/18/how-techstars-was-born/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

86 http://www.inc.com/magazine/20070501/finance-raising-funds.html [accessed 10/12/2016]

best incubators in the world[87]. Ycombinator was the cradle of Airbnb, Dropbox and Reddit. Techstars has expanded to several cities, from Berlin to Tel Aviv, from New York to Cape Town, created an inhouse capital fund, and vertical acceleration programmes in music, retail, mobility, IOT and finance[88].

Back in 2007, Techstars was still a small organization when Hyde and other employees gathered with the idea of launching a startup in one weekend. In the original format, all the participants would own an equitable stake in the new companies. All teams had the same brief: prepare a prototype of a decision-making application. The success of the event led to its repetition, both in Boulder and in other cities of the United States. At the beginning, SW was an independent spin-off of Techstars, and was run by three people and a network of volunteers (UP Global, 2014). A member of the team would travel to any new location and manage the first event, according to a strategy of cross-pollination based on social media marketing and the strong brand identity of the competition[89].

By the end of 2011, SW had expanded to 195 cities in 65 countries, with 35000 attendees and 800 active startups (UP Global, 2014). An online platform had been rolled out to facilitate the organization of the events, and to better track the metrics of the enterprise (UP Global, 2014). In the following years, SW continued its expansion, eventually merging with Startup America, in a new company called UP Global. Under UP Global, the presence of Startup Weekend nearly doubled, reaching 501

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87 http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2015/03/17/the-best-startup-accelerators-of-2015-powering-a-tech-boom/#2beeedfd34e4 [accessed 10/12/2016]

88 http://www.techstars.com/programs/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

89 https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/218104 [accessed 10/12/2016]



Image 21. The entrepreneurial colour-coded journey through Techstars's programmes.

cities in 135 countries[90], and further diversified its operations with a new week-long event called Startup Week, and a specific philanthropic programme targeted to the Global South (Entrepreneurs Across Borders). UP Global's expansion strategy for SW was both horizontal, with the opening of headquarters in India, Malaysia and Brazil (UP Global, 2014), and transversal, with Startup Next, a pre-acceleration programme meant to pipeline startups into world-leading accelerators like Techstars. UP Global also launched Startup Digest, a news aggregator in the form of a personalized newsletter that reached more than half a million subscribers in 2014[91]. The expansion of UP Global generated the need to create an overarching narrative that would frame the diverse activities in which it was involved globally. Alongside the unique corporate identity, UP Global articulated the now six sub-brands under

90 http://casefoundation.org/blog/new-path-up-global/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

91 http://upglobal.slides.com/upglobal/impact2014/fullscreen#/16 [accessed 10/12/2016]

the narrative of a colour-coded journey (Image 21), which outlines the specific phases every entrepreneur goes through in pursuit of creating a prosperous venture" [92].

UP Global did not have a long life. In April 2015, the non-profit company announced a layoff of 33% of its US staff[93]. In June, Techstars acquired UP Global[94] for an undisclosed price. At the moment of the acquisition, both Techstars and UP Global were operating on a similar global scale, with offices in various continents, but whilst the first remained a franchise accelerator programme with its own capital firm, the latter was involved in a vast range of projects worldwide. According to Brad Feld, the acquisition completed Techstars's original vision "to make entrepreneurship accessible to everyone"[95]. After the acquisition, SW retained its independence, and even its former partners, like Google for Entrepreneurs. The weekends became free events, managed by the independent brand of Startup Weekend. All programs, however, belong to Techstars, which functions as a limited liability company (LLC), a legal arrangement that allows, under US law, single owners or small partnerships to run a company under circumstances similar to those of a corporation.

Even before the acquisition by Techstars and the merger with Startup America, which boosted the global expansion of the event, Startup weekend had reached the shores of Cape Town and other African cities.

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92 http://www.techstars.com/content/startup-next/education-entrepreneurs-partners-imagine-k12/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

93 http://www.geekwire.com/2015/startup-weekend-operator-up-global-lays-off-33-of-u-s-staff-in-seattle/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

94 http://www.techstars.com/content/blog/techstars-acquires-up-global/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

95 http://www.feld.com/archives/2015/06/techstars-global-join-forces-support-entrepreneurial-journey.html [accessed 10/12/2016]

In 2012, 2013, and 2014[96], Startup Weekend was held in Cape Town's best-known startup space, the Bandwidth Barn (The Barn), which prides itself on being "Africa's leading and most established incubator and accelerator"[97].

The Barn is an enterprise of The Cape Innovation and Technology Initiative (CiTi), formerly known as the Cape IT Initiative, which was founded in 1998 as a non-profit partnership. CiTi, like Silicon Cape and the Business Process Enabling South Africa (BPeSA), is a private sector-led organization that played a crucial role in establishing the institutional framework of Cape Town's startup scene[98] and lobbying support from government and global firms[99]. CiTi is now a private-public flagship alliance of the technology industry in the region, and enjoys support from local government, but also from the national Jobs Fund, from the Department of Trade and Industry, from TELKOM, the former national telecommunication provider, from the Insurance Sector Education and Training Authority, and from the Wholesale and Retail Sector Education and Training Authority. Beside the incubation and acceleration programmes, CiTi also maintains several initiatives under the brands of VeloCiTi and CapaCiTi. VeloCiTi includes a series of enterprise development platforms, entrepreneur mentoring, as well as supplier development to ease the participation of technology firms into the Black Economic Empowerment Framework. Under CapaCiTi, various skills initiatives are organized to promote literacy and job placement in software-related industries. Put shortly, CiTi is a

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96 http://capetown.startupweekend.org/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

97 http://www.citi.org.za/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

98 http://www.zdnet.com/article/is-south-africa-the-best-place-to-start-your-start-up/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

99 https://techcrunch.com/2011/04/08/silicon-south-africa-google-launches-incubator-for-african-startups/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

developmental agency focused on innovative entrepreneurship.

The Barn itself is not a single incubator space, but a hybrid institution with coworking facilities, vertical acceleration programmes, even a cryptocurrency incubation programme, and two addresses: one in the gentrifying, hipster suburb of Woodstock, the other in middle of Khayelitsha. At the time of SW in 2015, The Barn Khayelitsha had just been opened, thanks to a private and public financial effort to convert a scarcely used hall into a coworking hub. Unlike the other SWs in Cape Town, which all took place in Woodstock, the 2015 event was held in Khayelitsha's brand new Barn. This was not only to formally mark the importance of the new incubator space for the development of the township, as one of the organizers explained to me. It was also a logistics-driven choice: by moving the event to the township, access would be easier for local entrepreneurs, for whom travelling to the city would be difficult. Conversely, middle-class citizens could easily drive their cars to the Barn in Khayelitsha. The decision to locate the event in Khayelitsha, some 40 km out of the city bowl, was in itself played on the severe urban divides of Cape Town, with its visible legacies of racialized planning.

I should add some words about how I got involved in the event and thus became a participant. For months, at the time of SW, I had been trying to do some research in the Barn. The reasons of my interest were multiple. The Barn was another centre of calculation, where knowledge was transferred, translated and produced. It was a specific didactic enterprise, with various entrepreneurial and coding courses. Most importantly, it had recently opened its spin-off incubator in Khayelitsha: I was therefore interested in the relationship between a business incubator and the diverse urban economies that exist in places that have a very vast range of entrepreneurial activities, from makeshift to formal businesses, as well as several organizations that operate in

the not-for-profit sector. However, my emails had been bounced from one manager to the other. I had attended some of the public events hosted in Woodstock, trying to practice the networking skills that my informant Trevor suggested I improve, but had little success in getting a proper access to the people of the incubator. With other excuses, I had visited both headquarters, in one case asking a security guard to escort me through the premises after dark, but, after several months, I had given up the idea of gaining ethnographic notes beyond those that I had by attending a few public events. In the spirit of collecting other materials, I had subscribed to the mailing list of the incubator, and that is where I read about Startup Weekend Cape Town (SWCT).

With renewed hopes, I sent an email to the organizers, offering them to help with anything that may be needed. My email to the anonymous address capetown@startupweekend.org received a reply from a Silicon Cape board member, who was managing the SW brand locally. She connected me to Crecencia, an employee of the Barn who had been involved with CiTi and its incubator in various capacities, before becoming manager of the enterprise development programme in 2014. The two emails revealed that behind SW in Cape Town the two main technology industry associations of the city were involved in some way. Silicon Cape had been pivotal in bringing SW to the Cape, while CiTi, through the Barn, was delivering the organizational effort. Crecencia, who was overseeing the 2015 SWCT, interviewed me on the phone and, much to my surprise, decided I should participate as a mentor, not just as a volunteer. She thought my previous expertise could be useful to the prospective entrepreneurs, as they were short of mentoring volunteers.

After the phone call, I received a formal invitation letter which followed the SW template that I was already familiar with. Each aspect of the organization is homogenized through practices of formalization and standardization that are engineered by templates, guides and checklists.

Not long after my reply to the invitation, with a short bio and a photo as requested, my name appeared on the event webpage, alongside the judges, the other mentors, the organizing committee and the sponsors. Hence, it is as a mentor that I entered SWCT and could observe the event as an active participant. Once again, my position in the field was not neutral, but endowed with prospects that I had to comply to and expectations that I did not foresee.

Startup Weekend Cape Town 2015 takes place between the 11th and the 13th of September. Although the competition is held in Khayelitsha, the weekend begins, for me and others, in Woodstock, not far from the CBD. While it is easier for people living the middle-class suburbs to access the township, rather than the opposite, a shuttle bus has been organized for the late afternoon of the Friday, to make sure that participants without cars can reach Khayelitsha. The same arrangement will work throughout the weekend. Transportation will be free. As I am later told, the organizers have worked hard to guarantee that the sponsors would support services like free shuttles, which ensure the inclusivity of the event beyond geographical and socio-economic disconnections. In Woodstock, the bus is waiting outside the office of the Barn, which is inside the securitized Woodstock Exchange, a former industrial complex that used to house artistic workshops and cheap eateries, and has recently been converted into a sleek business centre, with a single-origin cafe, a tattooed-barber shop and various design stores. Unsurprisingly, the Woodstock Exchange is often described as one of the key real estate transformations that contributed to the gentrification process[100] of the neighbourhood.

A mixed crowd of about fifteen people gets on the shuttle, following the

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100 http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-03-15-woodstocks-urban-renewal-much-more-at-stake-than-the-loss-of-parking/#.WEX2COZ94vg [accessed 10/12/2016]

instructions of the organizers. Once on the bus, the geography of the event becomes the first topic of discussion. Some participants comment on the fact that we are leaving the Woodstock Exchange, how sly was the entrepreneur that started it, how the neighbourhood is becoming a playground for middle-class, hipster students, and losing its diversity with the recent evictions.

During the one-hour ride to Khayelitsha, we also animatedly discuss the local entrepreneurial scene. As we drive through the shacks and small public housing units of the Cape Flats, Trevor, the founder of Pigeonpie (see Chapter 4) talks about the divided geography of starting up a business. He explains that such geography begins at primary school:

> *because of the legacies of apartheid spatial planning and present catchment areas, if you go to a lesser school in a deprived area, you will never have access to the right people. Nobody of your school mates will study law or management. Nobody will have access to a venture capitalist, or something like that. This fragmentation creates different entrepreneurs: the right ones, and the less right ones...* (personal notes, September 2015).

I have heard this before, from Trevor and other informants. This time, he adds that these geographic and socio-economic divides are precisely why entrepreneurial platforms like the Barn, and competition like Startup Weekend are important. They bridge the gaps, I am told, between having good entrepreneurial ideas and being born on the wrong side of the city. For him, who is a successful entrepreneur already, SW is a technology of networking and reciprocity, a way of giving back. This narrative is not uncommon: UP Global itself had developed a communalist tale of giving back after success, a narrative explicitly articulated in the idea of the entrepreneurial journey which, not incidentally, culminates with mentoring younger generations. In this case, this narrative is also imbued with his personal journey (see Chapter 4) and the *ubuntu* ideas of redistributing personal fortune to the wider community, which are

very common in South Africa's economic discourses (see Chapter 6). As we get closer to the Barn, the participants on the bus list a number of thriving local startups, as a sort of ceremony that sets the expectations high. A foreign national, who works for an immigration consultancy, jumps in the conversation, excited by this long list of fortunate stories, with words that seem to be unspoken thus far:

> *I just kinda know that I need to have my own business, a child to grow. Some days are so desperate and bleak, with this sense that you are not doing enough to make it happen* (personal notes, September 2015).

We all silently agree, and finally arrive in the small, fenced gravel car park that rests outside Lookout Hill, the complex where the Barn is located. As the name explains, Lookout Hill is a small sandy hill on the vast flat land of Khayelitsha. On top of it, a wooden deck overlooks an horizon of informal settlements, formal township sections, and the long, white shore of False Bay. At dusk, Table Mountain is just a distant shape, although we all know that we are now on the less fortunate side of the mountain.

Lookout Hill is a sort of 'panorama' of poverty. International tourists get to the fenced car park, and enter the building through a small gate that leads to a courtyard. The buildings form an enclosed citadel at the base of the hill. On two of the sides of the internal court, small workshops sell various African souvenirs. There is a tailor, a ceramist, a small tourist office, all offering a particular, drab gaze on the township economy (Pirie, 2007a). On one side of the court is an event space with a large hall and outdoor seating area where tour groups can taste food prepared by local women. Originally meant to be a museum, the coworking space stands on the other side of court. Few of the buildings have openings on the outside: most of them are designed to look exclusively within the enclosed perimeter of the courtyard. From the upper level of the outdoor area, a wooden walk takes one up to the lookout, where tourists

can take pictures of the township, protected by a barbed-wire fence. Tourism was such an important part of the architecture of Lookout Hill that in 2014, when the city launched a marketing campaign to promote Table Mountain as one of the New Seven Wonders of Nature, the top of the hill was one of the four locations selected to host a four-meter-wide yellow frame produced by South African artist Porky Hefer to celebrate the postcard beauty of the iconic peak (Image 22).

Down in the Barn, the organizers are working on the last preparations. At the registration desk, guests are divided into mentors, coaches, creative geniuses, business gurus, coders, speakers and judges. Roleplaying is not only part of the ice-breaking activities, but it also allows teams to be sufficiently diverse and feature all the competences needed to prototype a piece of software, from its business model to its actual design and code. Name tags are colour-coded so as to make it easy to recognize each participant's role. Much to the organizers' surprise, more than a hundred people turn up, which is a big number for a startup weekend, and the tags seem to be running out so fast that, against the rules of the template, it is decided to pause the registration and start the event.

Crecencia takes the stage to introduce the event and the guest speakers that will open the competition. When her time is over, Chris Vermeulen, head of the enterprise development programme at CiTi, gives an institutional welcome on behalf of the organization that runs the space where we are all seated. He mentions the importance of incubators like the Barn in places like Khayelitsha. Summarily, his argument is that technological innovation can be a solution to poverty, that new software can disrupt the status quo in the way in which Uber did. As I have written elsewhere (2018), the presence of Uber in Cape Town signifies a success in its world-city aspirations, but it also a reenactment of developmental narratives of entrepreneurialism. "*In this facility*", Vermeulen continues, *"we will test real things, this will be the real innovation hub for Africa"* (personal

Image 22. Lookout Hill, in Khayelitsha, was one of the four iconic spots chosen for a social media campaign during Cape Town's year as World Design Capital, in 2014.

notes, September 2015).

The following speaker is Alan Winde, Minister of Economic Opportunities for the Western Cape province. In what seems now a cliché, he tells the audience that he has just had a meeting with Uber's corporate team in Cape Town. The presence of Uber, however, does not come without issues—the Minister continues.

> *The motor industry is one of the most subsidized sectors of the economy, not just directly: governments pay for roads, traffic lights, traffic police. Uber will not only disrupt the taxi industry, it will have a broader effect on the way in which we think about cities. Today, and tomorrow, and Sunday, you may want to work on ideas that take up this challenge, the way in which we will live without owning cars* (personal notes, September 2015).

It becomes immediately clear that the Minister's speech has a specific goal: orienting the competition towards areas of innovation where his department think more job and economic opportunities can be created.

Mobility is the first of these areas, with mentions of Uber's, Elon Musk's, Apple's and Google's self-driving cars as examples of how steadily that industry is changing. However, it is predictable that the Minister's suggestions on the development of new ideas for the automobile industry will not generate much following. The car park outside is almost empty. Most of the participants are young, unemployed or scarcely employed dwellers of Khayelitsha. Creating an app for self-driving cars is not the reason they have come to SW.

Other areas of innovation that the minister suggests are similarly distant from the concerns of most of the participants: energy and green-tech; smart city and big data services; agriculture and tourism.

> *Think about tourism. Tourism is the biggest engine room of our economy. It grew in the last year by 6.7% and jobs by 7.7%. Way ahead of the GDP growth of South Africa. [...] I don't know exactly what [the innovations] are—you guys will come up with those kinds of ideas. But! We've got customers. Millions of them, around the world, who want to come, here, to enjoy the space that we've got, to come see our beauty, to meet our people, to enjoy our foods, to drink our wines, ... so just by doing that, how do we create new systems that join customers with suppliers [...] and make it easy?* (personal notes, September 2015).

Other sectors seem more appropriately targeted, like Wi-Fi internet access, for which the Minister has an example:

> *I want to tell you the story of the guy with a little booster. [...] When we opened the free Wi-Fi [...] facility in George, a guy walks in with a .... And I said to him: what is that?, and he said, you've launched this Wi-Fi hotspot [...] in the hall of the school, but unfortunately I live in a shack 1 km away [...], and the hotspot has only three or four hundred meters of connectivity. So what I did, I took a half a litre coke bottle, I siliconed a wifi booster on it, I put a coke can cut in half on the side as reflector, I've got two meters of USB extension, I put it on the roof of my shack, and I have free Wi-Fi at home. That's innovation* (personal notes, September 2015).

After his speech, other spokespeople of the local technology sector take the stage to address the audience with more examples of the possibilities at the intersection of digital innovation and social challenges. A representative of the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership (EDP) tells the story of a group of Danish entrepreneurs that are experimenting a GPS-enabled system of garbage collection that empowers homeless citizens in District 6. She has put together a long PowerPoint presentation full of similar initiatives in various cities around the world, and some didactic slides with definitions of concepts like smart city, open data and others. After the speech, she waves a USB flash drive containing the PowerPoint, pledging to share her contents with the participants.

The talks that follow are similarly concerned with both orienting the competition and showing examples of fortunate startups. Interestingly, many of these examples are NGOs or identify themselves as social enterprises. Sizwe tells his successful story: his small ethical farm has hit the headlines globally, when he was featured as keynote speaker at a recent Slow Food conference. His tale shifts the attention from technological innovation to something that seems more fathomable by the audience: hopes of personal success. The measure of his accomplishment is the fact that he has managed to build a prosperous business while remaining in the township and addressing issues like unemployment and food safety. He is doing well for himself while doing good for others. Global fame is the seal of his achievements.

At the end of Sizwe's talk, it is time for a Skype speech. Dr Dragos Bratasanu, a German-Romanian entrepreneur-guru, connects from somewhere else in the world. *"He is a film-maker and a scientist who wants to change the lives of 1 billion people in the next ten years",* explains the host, reading his biography (personal notes, September 2015). He begins his talk by showing the trailer of "The Amazing You", a movie he produced

by collecting on camera a number of personal fulfilment stories of "NASA top leaders, Stanford University visionaries, Silicon Valley award-winning entrepreneurs, New York Times bestselling authors, Angry Birds, Rock stars and polar explorers"[101]. The background is set: SW is not anymore only about startups, self-driving cars, tourists, smart cities, but a springboard to build visionary entrepreneurial selves. Future prospects range from personal wealth to the gratification of having created social change. When Crecencia takes the stage again, to conclude the introductory section of SW, her final words are welcomed by the biggest round of applause thus far:

> *You will learn how to be an entrepreneur, to look at problems as opportunities, to have the lifestyle of an entrepreneur* (personal notes, September 2015).

It is already clear that the expectations of the organizers will be met in a very idiosyncratic way: while ideas of social change, personal success, and tackling local challenges find immediate response, technological, digital, software concerns appear to have a much weaker grip on the imagination of the participants and the mentors. Ikhonko, who is sitting beside me, shakes her head while the Minister speaks. She thinks the focus on technology and innovation is misplaced. She is the CEO of a non-profit enterprise that delivers business management training to informal female entrepreneurs in the townships, giving them the legal tools to register their enterprises and access the formal economy.

> *I can do my own thing, to give a better life to my children, but if the other children that are playing around the corner don't have the same luck, then what? That's is why I think you have to be a social entrepreneur here, not just a technological entrepreneur* (personal notes, September 2015).

As she explains to me, coding a good piece of software is of little

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101 http://www.drdragosb.com/movie.html [accessed 10/12/2016]

importance if it makes just somebody rich. This is the reason why she has decided to volunteer as business mentor: she hopes her insight filters down as a focus on social outcomes rather than a focus on innovative tools. She will use her mentoring position to influence the teams.

However, when the competition formally starts, with individual participants pitching their ideas in a very short presentation, it is already evident that very few of them are proposing innovations that entail digital breakthroughs, or ideas that could become profitable innovations. Even fewer have specific technical solutions in mind. Janet is an exception. A business student at Stellenbosch university, she is proposing a software application to buy electricity remotely. After the end of apartheid, South Africa has shifted to prepaid electric meters as a way of enforcing payments (see Von Schnitzler, 2013 and Chapter 6 of this dissertation). This has generated, among other things, what is perceived as a peculiarly complex, inconvenient way of purchasing electricity. It is, obviously, a middle-class issue which is in an uncanny, stark contrast with what the other presenters are laying before the audience: an idea to protect the rights of informal domestic workers, a system to prevent fire accidents in shack dwellings, a mechanism for sharing water in water-scarce areas, an application for financial literacy, a scheme for accessing healthcare for slum dwellers, and so forth. Though some of these ideas have a technical side, the presenters are not preoccupied with giving details about the technological solution they have in mind. Eventually, they will all be asked to develop a piece of software as part of the script of SW. But late at night, when the first day comes to an end, nobody is worried about technicalities, and the organizing team decides to postpone to the next morning the selection of the ideas that will be actually developed.

The following morning, exhilarated by the performances of the participants who pitched their ideas the night before, ten more want to

pitch their plan. The SW team decides to accommodate their will, and by 9 am some 25 competitors have given a sixty-second talk. Only ten of them, however, will be actually developed during the weekend, in compliance to the template guidelines. To select them, Crecencia gives three post-its to each participant. The three post-its correspond to three votes, which can be cast by sticking one of them on the white A2poster that each presenter is holding. This analog polling system is a way of bypassing the digital divide of Khayelitsha. Though most contestants seem to own phones, not all of them have access to the Internet. The organizers have opted out of the scripted online poll (Image 23, 24).

The ten most voted ideas are variegated but, as expected, all somehow concerned with issues of living in the townships. With her idea for remotely-controlled electric meters, Janet manages to be in the top ten and she forms the only team with a business model that targets a clearly profitable market. Other teams are formed by distributing the capabilities of the participants. Unusually for the tech industry, the contestants with coding skills are all young female students of JavaScript, trained in an after-school tech education programme that takes place in the Barn Khayelitsha itself. These young women have been nicknamed 'agile girls', as they are trained in the 'agile' approach to coding. Mentors are asked to concentrate their help on two or more teams, in order to distribute their skills. I will collaborate with Benny and his Peninsula Business Club, a mentoring and networking platform for university students, and with a group of four young men who want to tackle a typically male issue of the township: the unmanageability of financial debt.

Among the members of the two teams, Mark is the only one who has a middle-class background. His Indian family from the KwaZulu-Natal province sent him to a good university, where he studied marketing. At 30, he now works for a company that manages South Africa's largest

property website. Concerned about the precarious working conditions of the domestic worker who helps his family, he tried to convince her to become part of a cooperative, but they could not manage to find a proper arrangement. At SW, his idea was to create an innovative organizational technology to facilitate the enrolment of domestic workers into forms of labour protection that would allow them to access sick and maternity leave, and minimum wages covering transport costs as well. However, his idea was not selected in the top ten, and he is now collaborating with Peninsula Business Club, Benny's social venture. Although SW is about new startups, Benny has been persuasive enough for the organization committee to let him work on his two-year old project.

Benny is from the remote province of Limpopo. Thanks to a government scholarship programme for rural South Africa, he was able to attend the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, an institution located both in the city and Belville, in the metropolitan area, not far from Khayelitsha. He graduated in mechanical engineering in 2013. With another fellow engineer, who will join us the following day, he started an organization called Peninsula Business Club (PBC). Their goal was to create a networking platform for graduates and soon-to-be-graduate students in technological fields. Compared to the more prestigious University of Cape Town, CPUT lacks many of the industry links that secure employment after graduation. For this reason, Benny and his friend decided to set up a venture that would mentor and connect students, find internships for them, and, most importantly, organize its own version of Startup Weekend in the form of pitching sessions where students team up and pitch their business ideas to venture capitalists. Thus far, they have received money from the SAB foundation (South Africa's largest company), and a philanthropist is paying their expenses. However, they have not yet found a way of plugging into any capital fund.

Benny speaks of venture capitalists as a key component of his business model, but he admits that he has never met one in person. Their registration as a non-profit organization means that when they receive money from external philanthropic organizations, it is very hard to use it to pay their own stipend. After a degree in engineering, Benny's family is expecting him to start a "*proper*" job and contribute to the rural household (personal notes, September 2015). I have discussed Benny's PBC in Chapter 4, his short infatuation for the idea of filling in the Business Model Canvas, then his disappointment, and his desire to have a Minimum Viable Product as a tangible result of Startup Weekend. I have argued that both these objects, the business model canvas and the prototype of his app, were material technologies of hope, placeholders that stood for the successful future of his venture. I add here that Benny is also, himself, a subject of admiration for the young men who join him, and for the organizers that let him have his way in defiance of the rules.

The second team that I help is called FinWell. Of the four young men, three are from Khayelitsha, and Lindile, the leader, from a township nearby. Unlike the others, he went to university and holds a degree in management. His goal is to tackle a pressing need of male youth: overindebtedness. Given the scarce and sporadic employment opportunities, often very small gigs, young men accumulate debts that are hard to be repaid through usual monthly instalments[102]. The desultory nature of income in the townships needs a different form of lending and repayment, and this, according to Lindile, can only start by training people to a different understanding of their financial situation. The problem, he explains, is that young men manage their debts according to paradigms that only work in the case of a steady

102 Technologies of debt and credit, as Deborah James has shown (2014), are inextricably interwoven into the making of economic subjectivities in post-apartheid South Africa.

income, and in situations where expenses are planned in the medium term. When young unemployed men receive a payment for an odd job, they tend to use up the money for immediate needs, especially if paid in cash[103].

What if, asks Lindile, we can have a system that allows these men to be reminded of their debt each time they receive a monetary settlement? This system would, for example, prioritize lenders and function on a reimbursement plan based on gig jobs rather that wage labour, but also vary in percentage according to the value of the sum. In his vision, his startup will be an alternative lending institution, based on the needs of the poorest of the borrowers, and would create a new financial paradigm for the informal economy. But Lindile is also a realistic person. He believes he needs to change the way people think about and get into debt before his revolutionary institution starts. Therefore, at SW, he is only willing to prototype the induction engine of his financial institution: a mechanism to train people in a more concrete and pragmatic understanding of indebtedness. When I ask him what this system looks like, if it is an app, a website, he shrugs. He is here to find out.

As mentors, we have been briefed and asked to help our teams develop a Business Model Canvas. In the previous chapter, I discussed how the BMC is a device of abstraction, whereby the different parts of a business idea are artificially segmented into calculable or understandable portions. I have also shown how the BMC yields a particular form of abstraction: it is a material touchpoint of hopeful aspiration, a hinge between the present and the future, and a mechanism for not foreclosing

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103 As a matter of fact, there are several informal, semi-formal and formal systems for avoiding profligacy in condition of indebtedness (see James, 2014; James and Rajak, 2014). These technologies of saving, however, were seen by Lindile as perpetuating old-school approaches to debt, whereas his idea was genuinely and possible naively aimed at upending the current credit system.



Image 23. Startup Weekend Cape Town. Morning voting.

eventual opportunities for profit. The two teams that I help, however, react very differently. Benny has a short-lived enchantment with the idea of the business model. Once we fill in the template, it becomes clear that his ideas are unclear. It is at that point that he decides that the BMC is a just an "exercise", and that what he needs is a wireframe application. Conversely, the FinwWell team become so enamoured of their carefully-filled canvas that during the final pitch they will be showing it as a proof of their hard work.

Halfway through the morning, while we are still working on defining the business model of the startups, Crecencia calls the team back to the main hall, where they will receive a short training session about online tools that they can use to 'bootstrap' some of the features of their business ideas. On the stage, two of the mentors, Krystina and Adil, speak for half an hour about free online tools that startuppers can use

Image 24. Startup Weekend Cape Town. Morning voting.

to create mailing lists, to test a brand name, to manage social media accounts, to develop a free landing page, to automatize accounting, and so forth. Having worked with the two teams for some hours, it seems to me that many of Krystina and Adil's suggestions are too ambitious. Their high-flying tips find little resonance among the members of the teams that I am helping. However, their story is worth reporting here as it speaks about the mobility of startup knowledge and its capacity to create transnational, profitable infrastructures in the nexus of solidarity and business.

Krystina and Adil, a young Russian woman and a young Dutch-Lebanese man, are the cofounders of MAQTOOB, "a platform for entrepreneurs to search, rate, and review business apps"[104]. Maqtoob is based on a

104 http://www.adilgherib.com/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

freemium business model, but it is mainly a collaborative aggregator where online applications are categorized according to the need they target. As Adil tells me, the idea behind MAQTOOB was never about profiting from user-generated content, but about giving entrepreneurs an easily accessible overview on the immense landscape of applications and tools that exist beyond the usual giants like Google, Dropbox etc. As of 2015, the platform features more than 1500 applications, organized by categories, with photos and ratings for each feature. Users can create their own lists of useful tools, and check the ratings in four different sectors, ranging from the affordability of the app (10 for free, 0 for expensive) to its usability. App owners can list their tools to promote it among subscribers. A simple listing is free, while a more detailed profile is available as premium by subscribing. MAQTOOB also runs a blog on Medium, where a range of authors contribute by writing short articles with tips and trends in the digital business ecosystem.

Although Forbes elected MAQTOOB—"the Ikea for entrepreneurs"—as one of 2015's top 5 up-and-coming startups of London's Silicon Roundabout[105], both Krystyna and Adil like describing themselves as more than tech entrepreneurs. They both believe in the social mission of making digital tools accessible to entrepreneurs all over the world, which is the purported goal of MAQTOOB. Krystyna, for example, writes on *the Observer* and other digital prints about the importance of making a positive impact as part of one's personal self-realization. She runs a Medium publication called *Mindful Entrepreneurship*, where she focuses on the idea that entrepreneurship is a way of discovering the self and empowering other selves. In her upcoming book, she writes, on finding purpose:

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105 http://www.forbes.com/sites/edmundingham/2015/01/20/welcome-to-the-ikea-for-entrepreneurs-1000-handpicked-apps-to-help-build-your-business-overnight/#3a3a13e96804 [accessed 10/12/2016]

> the business we build doesn't hinge on success or failure. It has its definitive purpose in itself. It creates value. It has positive social impact. It is worthy[106].

Similarly, Adil describes himself as "a creative entrepreneur who believes in the social impact of entrepreneurship, driven by the power of technology"[107]. Their commitment to these beliefs is the reason why they are in South Africa. Earlier in the year, they started a journey across the Global South, *MAQTOOB On the Move*, with the purpose of reaching entrepreneurs who do not read Forbes or TechCrunch.

> There are scores of useful business apps launched onto the market every month. Unfortunately, most of them never reach the majority of the existing 125 million micro, small, and medium businesses, which often depend on Excel spreadsheets at best. Even though these businesses drive economic growth, especially in developing and emerging countries, they are not a typical marketing target of tech companies and software developers. That's why, in April 2015, we are setting off on a tour around the world to introduce local entrepreneurs to affordable and simple tools that can help them stay competitive[108].

Having already been in the Middle East (Lebanon and Iran), in Morocco and in Kenya, South Africa is the fifth stop of their journey, which is documented by a blog made of travel and entrepreneurial diary entries[109]. Before Cape Town, they were in Johannesburg, for another Startup Weekend in another deprived urban area. In the mother

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106 http://observer.com/2016/05/making-a-positive-impact-why-personal-growth-matters/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

107 http://www.adilgherib.com/ [accessed 10/12/2016]

108 https://maqtoob.com/on-the-move [accessed 10/12/2016]

109 https://maqtoob.com/on-the-move [accessed 10/12/2016]

city, they organized a training session for Microsoft and Thinkroom interns, showing them what available tools they can use to speed up their work. Events like SW, or workshops with interns, are the kind of activities that *MAQTOOB On the Move* undertakes to live up to the ambition to disseminate awareness about easily accessible business tools in developing countries. It is not a mystery that this strategy also engineers a user base and, therefore, makes MAQTOOB more enticing for premium users. What is interesting is that the production of a service like MAQTOOB intersects the working of SW in the peculiar nexus of digital innovation and voluntarism that has been choreographed in Khayelitsha. On the experience, Krystyna writes:

> Our last workshop was a real treat. A few courageous enthusiasts organized a Startup Weekend right in the midst of Khayelitsha township. We witnessed scores of talented aspiring entrepreneurs pitching their business ideas, learning, and innovatively prototyping over the span of only three days. In my opinion, we couldn't have finished our stay in more motivating atmosphere.
>
> All in all, we will always remember South Africa as a country that provokes emotions. Breathtaking scenery contrasts with dire condition of sprawling townships. Well-developed infrastructure of urban areas contrasts with their poor security situation.
>
> We experienced inspiring ambition surrounding the new generation of change makers. We experienced the tragic loss of South Africa in the Rugby World Cup. We experienced how it feels to be always on alert when walking in the streets.
>
> South Africa is boiling and as always its ranks of determined entrepreneurs hold up the torches of hope[110].

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110 https://blog.maqtoob.com/south-africa-on-a-crazy-road-trip-mother-nature-and-hope [accessed 10/12/2016]

These torches of hope, in the hours that follow Krystina's inspiring talk, are confronted with a problem. Some of the teams do not have a business model that can be easily prototyped as a digital application. At the same time, the organization crew keeps pushing them to work on their piece of software, explaining that only teams with a developed MVP will be able to compete. The 'agile girls', the young female students of Java, are actually too small in number to help all the teams. It is in this peculiar situation that some of the teams take an unexpected direction in the development of their business.

Confronted by the lack of coding skills, they take a peculiar step in bridging the urban and digital divides of a place like Khayelitsha. The FinWell team, for example, develops a very easy application that does not contain any financial literacy tools. It is instead an empty piece of software that connects users to what Lindile is trying to build: a network of volunteers, university students that would give their help to people in

Image 25. Startup Weekend Cape Town. Last-minute programming.

need to manage their debts. It is people like him, he tells me, people that were fortunate enough to go to university coming from the township, that will make the FinWell software work. It is a particular infrastructural underpinning that he has envisioned, one made of people that work as connective tissue where disconnection is the norm, where digital and financial literacy are part of the same cleavage that separates the Cape Flats from the rest of Cape Town.

Similarly, Benny's polished MVP is an application that has the fundamental divides of the city at its core. Out of the many features of his messy and complicated business idea, he has decided to develop software for connecting students from poor backgrounds to mentors working in corporate environments. As he explains to the audience during his final pitch, even when they go to university, students from the townships only understand how the informal economy works. They lack the ability to apply their knowledge to the environment where they live and come from. It is for this reason that his PBC features a layer of middle-class volunteers that are willing to mentor and help these students finding ways to bridge the disconnection between their careers and their backgrounds. Benny himself has had a mentor, a local social entrepreneur whose enterprise sponsored some of PBC's early activities.

As the end of the second day approaches, other teams have been more successful in finding ways to make their ideas more profitable, or to have a business model based on a digital innovation. One of them, for example, is working on an app to streamline the application to universities by creating a unique platform to upload the needed documents to. Janet's team has obtained information from the energy department, in order to prototype a software that responds to the technical requirements of the electric meters in current use. However, their focus has shifted from the idea of 'buying electricity remotely' to the idea of 'saving electricity' by having software that, among various things, allows remote purchase.

Image 26. Startup Weekend Cape Town. The organising team.

This is, of course, a variation in the narrative of their purpose, rather than a change in the business idea, but it shows how pervasive the concept of *good* entrepreneurship has become in less than two days.

There is an implicit sense of what is acceptable and what is not in relation to the fact that SW is taking place in Khayelitsha, and that many of the participants have been experiencing a present, or at least a past, of sheer poverty. A middle-class issue, like not having to punch a code in an electric meter, has become a matter of environmental sustainability. The software is an application that, by monitoring electric consumption, raises awareness about the need to reduce profligacy. On the other hand, ideas that seemed a hard sell at the beginning, with little

opportunities for profit, have been developed into profitable business models. This is what happened to the team working on a platform to connect sports enthusiasts in the townships. They now have a well-scripted profit mechanism attached to what was originally presented as a website to connect footballers across the Cape Flats.

When the morning of the third day comes, most groups are finalizing their software and polishing their presentations. Judges will arrive in the early afternoon, and Crecencia keeps rekindling the competitive spirit of SW by reminding the participants of the short time remaining. Only one group is still struggling with an impasse in their project. It is lunchtime when Baratang, the managing director of the Barn Khayelitsha, comes to me to ask for help. Her mentees, a group of five young women who are working on a system to prevent blazes in the shacks, have not prototyped anything yet. She asks me to help them design a quick wireframe of the application that they have envisioned. At the present stage, their idea is not competitive because they do not have any software. As I start working with them, however, I realize that the software is the last of their concerns, despite Baratang's apprehensions. In fact, I am told that their fire-prevention mechanism relies on the networks of women that exist within the township. It is an alarm system that spreads through the connective tissue of established social relations—again, using networks of people as infrastructural patches. The warning moves through this human fabric and reaches shack-dwellers both through their phones, via SMS, and through the actual distress-signals that women are able to physically circulate. It is clear that there is little or no need for a software application. The model relies entirely on infrastructures that are often digitally disconnected. They are, in fact, made of human relations of proximity and mutual living. However, the women have taken to heart the competitive nature of SW, so we prototype a wireframed app that geolocates distress alarms and contains a series of instructions to deal with the early stage management of fire events (Image 25).

The relevance of their idea, although many aspects are underdeveloped, will eventually give them the first prize. Even in their team name, Khayafighters, the reference to Khayelitsha could not be more apparent. In their final pitch, they also attach a profit mechanism to their idea, which will eventually lead to the installation of fire detectors, an activity that will create jobs and wealth. The final presentation is a mixture of extremely naive and extremely pragmatic pieces. Whilst the profit mechanism remains very simplistic, their capacity for envisioning ways to bypass the lack of digital connections through other forms of infrastructure, which work even in a place like Khayelitsha, is extremely sophisticated. It is this specificity which impresses the judges. One of them, a technology journalist, will write in the following days:

> Startup Weekend here is an important milestone in identifying opportunities within the Khayelitsha township and community, 12 miles -- but worlds apart -- from Cape Town's business district. In the middle of rows of informal and formal housing, steel bin barbecues and free-grazing animals is the region's newest tech incubator: The Barn Khayelitsha. Building this facility here creates an unprecedented accessibility for people removed from the shared work spaces and tech hubs in mainstream Cape[111].

The sun is still up when the competition is over. The judges leave in their vehicles, some participants in the shuttle bus, but most of them just walk out of the car park, onto the main road. Sunday evening in Khayelitsha is when young people gather just around the corner from Lookout Hill, for *Pakhini*. The few car-owners put music on and leave the doors of their vehicles open in the middle of the road, which becomes an *ad-hoc* event space. Informal meat vendors and ramshackle barbecues pop up on the dilapidated footpaths. The air becomes thick

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111 https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247029 [accessed 1/9/2017]

with smoke, *kwaito* music, and isiXhosa chatter. I have been invited by the three team members of FinWell to join them, as they want to ask me if their startup stands a chance, and thank me with a beer bought from the local *shisa nyama*. Lindile has left. They know that with his degree and his network of other university students like him, he does not really need them. They still wonder whether he will be successful. In a moment of sheer honesty, they confess that the reason why they participated to SW was in the hope to be given a job, by someone, somehow. That they enjoyed the competition, and learning new things, but they are disappointed that so few of the ideas bore the promise of profit and wealth. Even the judges and the mentors were of little help. And yet, as I have argued in Chapter 4, SW was also a choreographed exercise that taught them something about engaging the future, especially in its promise of creating connections between a divided city. A lively proof comes two days later, in the form of an email that one of them sends me:

> Yho my friend this is Siviwe I thought I should just pop you a mail and just check up on you and I just sent some of my documents if maybe there might be some one looking for some one for some vacancy just hook them up with stuff my nigga I would appreciate that to the fullest "thanks" (personal email, September 2015).

He has attached a series of certificates and diplomas. In the following months, I will be sending him various links to job vacancies or other opportunities. He will, eventually, enrol in a coding course, thinking that his struggles with unemployment will be finally over, once skilled in software development. I have, since then, lost contact with him, but our last conversation was again about the promise of entrepreneurial knowledge, this time in the form of JavaScript, a promise which was not started by Startup Weekend alone, but certainly cultivated and encouraged during those 54 hours is September 2015.

5.3. Hubspace: waiting for 'patient capitals'.

This section is dedicated to another incubator that, very much like the Barn Khayelitsha, developed as a franchise of an existing entrepreneurial project—Hubspace—which had opened a sister coworking space in Harare, a neighbourhood of Khayelitsha not far from Lookout Hill. However, while the Barn Khayelitsha was just taking its first steps—at the time of my fieldwork, in 2015—Hubspace Khayelitsha had been recently closed. Still, several of my interlocutors would point to it as the first experiment of its kind, an experiment that, despite its failure, had set the standard for developing good entrepreneurial opportunities in the Cape Flats. As I show in the remainder of this chapter, the making of Hubspace Khayelitsha as an infrastructure for good entrepreneurship was inextricably intertwined with other structures, from violence prevention to fundraising mechanisms, from academic to personal networks of capitals, volunteers and knowledge. However, the focus of this case study is on an individual, Melilizwe Gqobo (from now on Meli), who generously shared with me his story as founder and manager of Hubspace Khayelitsha in September 2015.

By the time we met, I had understood Meli was a sort of celebrity in the entrepreneurial ecosystem of the Cape. Not only had he been mentioned several times by my other informants as someone who pioneered—in a practical and not only theoretical way—an experiment in bridging the entrepreneurial gaps of city, but I had also come across a short documentary where he was featured as one of the young 'changemakers' of the country. The short movie, part of a series of other portraits, was produced by a company, Youngpreneur Media, which creates storytelling content for startups and established companies. As other firms seen in this dissertation, Youngpreneur Media mixes profitable activities with public-spirited goals—in this case promoting the success stories of young South African entrepreneurs through their channels.

It is in one episode of their web series, *I am youngpreneur*, that I first see Meli, who summarizes his goal to the camera:

> *Our dream is basically to take kids from the corner of the street and introduce them to the boardroom—through them we want to introduce social entrepreneurship in limited resources communities* (interview to Meli[112]).

A 28-year-old young man of Xhosa background, Meli has been featured on many other online magazines, but, in particular, on LeadSA, a non-profit organization that supports the socio-entrepreneurial ecosystem of the country with conferences, networking activities and leadership programmes. As a LeadSA 'hero', Meli has a page on the website, where his TED-inspired talk is broadcasted:

> *My name is Melilizwe, which is a gift and a curse. It's a gift from my parents, but at the same time it's a curse because it literally means stand up for the world. And for most of my life I've learnt to stand up for my own world, but I always find myself having to stand up for other people's worlds. [...] This comes from the background of [...] being raised by a mother who is a community activist* (interview to Meli[113]).

When we meet, at the Graduate School of Business, in the Civil Society Hub of the Bertha Centre for Social Entrepreneurship, one of the crucial centres of calculation that I analysed in Chapter 2, Meli gives me further details about his background. He was raised by his single mum in Dunoon, a small township on the West coast of the Cape, where the city ends and gives way to the so-called Cape Farms, vast estates where Mediterranean harvests are produced. Like other townships, Dunoon grew in a peripheral residual space between main roads and industrial complexes. An area of recent migration from the Eastern Cape and from other townships, it is a mix of government-funded private houses

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112 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A_2LOTf21Vk&t=3s [accessed 1/3/2018]

113 http://www.leadsa.co.za/articles/6549/social-issues-addressed-by-melilizwe-gqobo [accessed 1/9/2017]

and informal shack dwellings. This is where Meli started his career as entrepreneur, running an internet cafe that, accordingly, gave him the first idea for his future entrepreneurial platform.

> *It really all started with the experience of running an internet cafe and also just being exposed to the library environment. This was in 2009. I had never understood the concept of a library, where you have this space, abundance of information, and you've got young people in it, but you don't allow them to engage and talk to each other. [...] In the meanwhile, I am running this internet cafe, and what I am picking up is that there are lots of young kids that just come in to access Facebook... even the most illiterate people started using it, because they understood the whole concept of connection to people... so for me it was like woah, there's a digital boom, and then spaces that are redundant, [...] so I wanted to create a space where I could imagine the two environments together, the library and the internet cafe, but a space that was more than just somewhere to go for a desk* (personal conversation, September 2015).

In 2011, Meli began to work on his idea, pitching it to competitions, and networking across various institutions for feedback and support. The original name was ECLabs, which meant 'Endlini Computer Labs'—'endlini' being the isiXhosa word for 'inside'.

> *I wanted it to be a space 'inside' for young people, because I thought that if you give them a space like a library, but where they can connect and engage, they would come up with hundreds of ideas* (personal conversation, September 2015).

From the very beginning, however, his idea was to create both a profitable mechanism to run the space, and to have something different than a coworking space, more like an incubator, which was not new for Cape Town, but certainly for its shantytowns. In the meanwhile, Meli managed to enrol into the most prestigious entrepreneurial diploma for informal entrepreneurs and people from disadvantaged backgrounds, the Raymond Ackerman Academy for Entrepreneurial Development. A philanthropic institution for tertiary education, the Raymond Ackerman

Academy has a clear developmental approach that reflects recent trends in anti-poverty initiatives:

> The course is offered to young people who are passionate about business and personal development who have not had the opportunity to access a tertiary education. It aims to empower young people on their entrepreneurial journey while developing their business and life skills. Mr. Raymond Ackerman together with the UCT Graduate School of Business established The Raymond Ackerman Academy in January 2005 with the desire to offer youth with financial or socio-economic challenges a chance to develop themselves and to make a difference in not only their own future, but also in the future of their communities. The Academy offers a six-month, full time programme that is run twice a year: from January to June and from July to December. The programme is offered in Cape Town at the UCT Graduate School of Business and at the Soweto Campus of the University of Johannesburg (opened in 2009)[114].

As part of the diploma, students are required to do a ten week internship in a suitable business or organization that reflects the entrepreneurial vocation of the Academy's programme. It is in this way that Meli, in search of an internship opportunity, got in touch with another socio-entrepreneurial enterprise that existed in Cape Town: the Hubspace.

In 2012, the Hubspace was one of the coworking incubators in Woodstock, often referred as Cape Town's Brooklyn[115], the same neighbourhood of the first Barn. Like the Barn, Hubspace was in a reconverted industrial facility, and was part of a broader organization, Heart Capital. Unlike the Barn, the Hubspace brand targeted social entrepreneurs specifically, and was owned by a not-for-profit entity, founded by Peter and Many Shrimpton, two of Cape Town's best-known philanthropists. Both with

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114 https://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/raymond-ackerman-academy [accessed 4/25/2018]

115 Wenz, 2012

a successful background in business—Peter as stockbroker with his own asset management company and Mandy as managing director of one of Africa's largest news distribution agencies—they started Heart Capital as a boutique impact-investment firm in 2004 (apparently, after a near-death experience[116]).

The firm owns a portfolio of social enterprises as well as other initiatives like Hubspace, and provides professional investment management services in the field of impact capitals (which they refer to as 'blended value'), and occasionally offers consulting services for corporate social responsibility and enterprise development[117]. In his career, Peter was awarded the emerging Social Entrepreneur of the Year Award by the SASE (Southern African Social Entrepreneurs) in partnership with global institutions the Gordon Institute of Business Science and Ashoka. It is for this reason that Meli approached him, to intern in one of the initiatives of Heart Capital.

> The Heart Charitable Investment Trust was established by Heart Capital to facilitate the investment of grant capital into the early-stage social enterprises in our portfolio.
>
> The mandate of our Charitable Trust (Heart) is to tackle critical social and environmental problems at the grassroots level where it matters most — food, shelter, money.
>
> [...] Our goal is to lift people out of poverty through entrepreneurship.
>
> We achieve this by enabling poor people to earn a sustainable livelihood by producing wholesome, essential, life-sustaining products for their communities[118].

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116 http://www.heartcapital.co.za/our-founders [accessed 1/3/2018]

117 http://www.heartcapital.co.za/foundation [accessed 4/4/2017]

118 http://www.heartcapital.co.za/foundation [accessed 4/4/2017]

As of 2016, the investment opportunities offered by Heart Capital for impact funds and private philanthropists are various and rather inventive. One of the schemes is meant to

> [p]rovide a R15,000 private housing loan to a deserving family and give them the chance to get rid of their unsafe, ugly, hot, leaking shack and move into a lovely micro-house made by Homes with Heart. These micro-houses are warm in winter, cool in summer, dry in the rain, bullet proof (SIC) and fire proof[119].

Another portfolio opportunity consists of buying an allotment of native plants, *portulacaria afra*, or elephant bush, a small-leaved succulent that is used for food and decoration. This investment comes with 1000 hours of employment for a poor family which is given the task to look after the small trees until they are ready to be sold with a speculative margin. The nurseries are franchisees of Wonder Plant, one of the portfolio social ventures of the fund. Other options include investing in one of the activities that Heart Capital owns, usually through franchising: impact investors can acquire franchise licenses to open a new coworking hub, or a new Food Pod, micro-hydroponic food farms in a poor township. These licenses can be sold to second and third-tier investors, through a speculative architecture that allows immediate returns for the latter, whilst giving more "patient capitals" the opportunity to kick off the franchisee and reselling the asset. Patient capitals are, accordingly, those belonging to grant makers and philanthropists who do not seek quick profit. Another opportunity for (less) patient capitals is to contribute to another portfolio venture of Heart Capital, a residence that will house voluntourists, interns and volunteers that come from overseas to have an experience with poverty alleviation projects, and whose rents yield royalty shares to the ownership of the structure.

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119 https://www.heartcapital.co.za [accessed 18/10/2016]

When Meli got in touch with Peter to start an internship, the franchisee model was still experimental, and only one coworking hub (Hubspace) was running. Peter was looking for somebody who could open a new Hubspace. In Mali's words:

> *I worked on the concept of EC labs for two years, until 2012, and I was introduced to a guy that owns the brand Hubspace. [...] the first Hubspace was opened in Woodstock, and it was meant for people exactly like yourself, coming into Cape Town for six months, and needing a coworking space with a social target. It was also a place where Peter was trying to pioneer social entrepreneurship.*
>
> *What he didn't like was that every time he walked into the Hubspace in Woodstock, all he'd see was white people, white foreigners, white people, white foreigners, coming up with solutions for South Africa... for him, it didn't really make sense, because he'd worked in Khayelitsha for ten years—he is a white South African) [...]—so that really didn't sit well with him [...] So in 2012 I was put in touch with him as I was looking for an internship. I was studying at the GSB, on a six-months programme around entrepreneurship which is sponsored for previously disadvantaged people. (it is one of the most successful entrepreneurial programmes in Cape Town, in terms of producing entrepreneurs in the townships) Whilst you do that, you have to do a 10 week internship, so I was introduced to Peter [...] When I met up with him, I wanted to have a conversation about my internship, but the conversation ended up being about a business opportunity to operate a franchise incubator in Khayelitsha—which was very cool. And that's how the snowball started rolling. Me, with concept of EC Labs, and him, with his will of not having just white people using his coworking space* (personal conversation, September 2015).

After a year of work, in 2013 the first township coworking space was opened in Khayelitsha, in the CBD of Harare, which was also the setting of a controversial spatial experiment called VPUU (Violence Prevention Through Urban Upgrading). As Meli recollects, the first year was spent recruiting the right kind of entrepreneurs, and it was a year of hard work. As manager of the Hubspace Khayelitsha, and having only one person

helping him, running the space was not easy, not even with the help of various international voluntourists. The lack of human resources was the foremost obstacle to the success of the space.

> *I was building stakeholder relations, coming up with initiatives to operate the space, organizing events, and still making sure that the place was clean and functional for the people that were using it, it was crazy. Not having enough human capital can really hamper the functioning of any infrastructure. The management of the space was moulded on the templates that already existed for the original Hubspace in Woodstock, but it still took lots of work for one person. Ideally, in an ideal world, you have the Hubspace manager, and then the event manager, entrepreneur correlator, and then the host, whose role is to make sure that the space is proper, I ended up playing all those roles. I had access to interns, but interns come with a very expert knowledge, and they come first and foremost to experience the country, you get few that are really into the project, but most are tourists, really, here for the experience. [...] the trick is moving the workload from one intern to the next one, and that's always a nightmare, and it's like playing the game of the broken telephone, ... so yeah, it was good to have some hands to help, but it was not sustainable in the long term* (personal conversation, September 2015).

Since then, after the end of his experience with Hubspace, Meli has been able to travel, for the first time outside of his country, and visit the Impact Hub in London, Rockstart in Amsterdam and other incubator spaces across Europe. He has learnt that the success of these organizations is built upon teams that engineer the collaborative culture that makes "*spaces like these work*". Regardless of the for-profit or not-for-profit nature of the hubs he has visited, he tells me, they all had people that worked as community managers, creating value beyond the physical, material utility of desks and internet access.

> *Setting the business up in K. was a challenge. I actually had to go and seek protection. You have to deal with township politics. If you think that government politics are messy, township politics are even messier. You have certain bodies*

> *and certain individuals that have their own interest. I remember approaching one of the forums in K, to let them know that the Hubspace was coming, did a whole presentation to the community, and a huge meeting, shaking hands, taking pictures, the whole fun part, and then a week down the line, we were building the space, you have a few guys coming over and say, hey, you guys have to pay this more for security, to make sure that no one breaks into your space and I'm like fuck that, I am not gonna pay, that was not part of the agreement, the agreement was that we go to the forum and we let them know that the business is taking shape, we just needed their approval, but nobody talked about security, actually, there is already an armed security guard in the precinct, the space is already securitized, there is a gate - well all I know, we ended up paying the security, there are people who are sort of poachers* (personal conversation, September 2015).

Despite the difficult start, however, Meli ran the operations of Hubspace for almost three years, garnering his fame as the entrepreneur who opened the first incubator space in a township. Recruiting the entrepreneurs, the 'right kind' of socially-minded entrepreneur they had in mind, was also a challenging task, and it took almost a year, culminating in what he describes as a pitch-perfect event. After months of recruitment, they gathered the resources and the right number of people to organize a one-day launch of the space, with a pitching session, food, music, the Premier of the Province (then also national leader of the main opposition party), and a jury which would choose the first ten entrepreneurs who would be incubated in the Hubspace K. Meli's previous experience with internet cafes gave him the idea about where to start the recruitment process: knowing that many township entrepreneurs use these kind of facilities to access email and other desktop services, he distributed advertising material across the many of these businesses that exist in Khayelitsha.

In fact, Meli's network of support began with Luvuyo Rani, who became a sort of mentor and later participated as judge to the enterprise selection. Luvuyo Rani is the owner of Sisulu Ulutho Technologies (SUT), a

franchise empire which started as a single internet cafe in Khayelitsha. With more than 30 branches, SUT is an oft-quoted example of township entrepreneurialism across solidarity and business. SUT cafes are more than just places where people access internet, but they respond to the idea of creating an infrastructure of IT support in deprived urban and rural areas. They offer services from CV creation to printing, from phone repairs to opening a Whatsapp account[120], while at the same time educating and giving jobs to young unemployed millennials who are part of a college-like programme. According to Rani, SUT will "*become the biggest college to come from the community*"[121]. Not surprisingly, Rani was someone Meli wanted to have in the final jury, but also a personal legend: before opening his cafe in Dunoon, he "*went to him and kissed his ring*" as a way of showing respect and reverence (and promising he would not be a direct competitor) (personal conversation, September 2015).

If the success of Hubspace, which was conceived as a "*platform for knowledge*", was to be measured through the quality of the startups that were incubated, says Meli, Hubspace K. would still be running. Many of their ventures were featured on newspapers and blogs across the world. Wandisile Nqeketho, for example, became the much-publicized face of the 18 Gangster Museum[122], a mobile museum housed in a container that can be moved across the city (and the globe). Ex-gang members worked there as guides, giving tourists a taste of the gang subcultures of South Africa's townships. Siyavuya Mlungu, who ran the Iyeza Express, a bicycle delivery services for HIV and other medication in Khayelitsha,

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120 http://www.capetalk.co.za/index.php/articles/13987/how-a-single-township-internet-cafe-grew-into-a-nationwide-it-franchise-business [accessed 1/3/2018]

121 http://www.capetalk.co.za/index.php/articles/13987/how-a-single-township-internet-cafe-grew-into-a-nationwide-it-franchise-business [accessed 1/3/2018]

122 https://www.facebook.com/18gangstermuseum [accessed 1/3/2018]

was mentioned among the Forbes' Africa's 30 Entrepreneurs Under 30[123]. Another enterprise, was also based on bicycles, offering township bike tours to tourists. Iilima cleaning and recycling was featured in a popular TV show on ENCA (eNews Channel Africa), significantly called "Against All Odds", which is a queer, melodramatic version of "How I Made My Millions" (a popular CNBC TV show). Iilima provided unemployed youth with a mechanism of getting food vouchers in exchange for recyclable waste[124].

Meli also knows the back stories of these successful, at least in the media, entrepreneurs. As a matter of fact, he thinks that the difficulties experienced by these businesses, often concealed by the celebrations of their successes, reveal why Hubspace K. was eventually shut down. Iyeza Express was featured on Forbes, and yet, its business model had seepages and cracks, and, at the time of the interview, was still struggling to find impact investors.

> *He takes [the medications] from the clinic and delivers them at your doorstep at almost the same price. It addresses a very very basic problem of simple access to medications in the townships. But you look at a venture who is trying to solve a very pressing issue, a guy who is 23/24 years old, charging a very nominal fee—which hampers the possibility of making a good profit—and it has not been done before, so there are so many trials and errors it will take him five years to be running smoothly. And he has local knowledge, he understands the geographical challenges, but I still think that most investors won't back that up. The leeway is too great for a commercial investment, the impact before the profit is hard* (personal conversation, September 2015).

In a similar way, Hubspace K. needed more time to learn.

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123 http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2013/02/23/30-under-30-africas-best-young-entrepreneurs/ [accessed 1/3/2018]

124 https://www.enca.com/media/video/recycling-initiative-bringing-change-khayelitsha-township [accessed 1/3/2018]

> *We were not given any breathing room. We did not have five years to learn, realize our impact, and then become commercially viable. I bet that if the investors that decided not to support us could look back from the future, their choice would have been different* (personal conversation, September 2015),

Regretfully, Meli explains to me that they had envisioned a promising business model, built upon the legal framework of the Black Economic Empowerment Framework. Corporations that deal with the government, in South Africa, have to garner points that make them competitive for participating to public tenders, but also for other benefits. These points are achieved on the basis of markers that represent the percentage of black ownership, black managers, black suppliers and so forth. With its pool of black entrepreneurs, Hubspace would sell 'seeds' to corporations obliged to invest in black businesses (an area which gives many points). However, Meli never got to sell a single seed. The issues were multiple. There was scepticism on the entrepreneurs' side in selling equity in their enterprises. But, above all, capitals were not patient enough. He has given lots of thoughts to this issue.

> *Yes there are no Facebooks or Airbnbs or Ubers coming out of Africa, or similarly appetizing companies, but at the same time, the challenges that are faced in Africa present so many opportunities that... well... it's a chicken-before-the-egg type of a situation, do we need the entrepreneurs finding solutions to social challenges first, or capitals?* (personal conversation, September 2015).

Capitals were not patient enough with Hubspace Khayelitsha either, and Meli ended up managing the space for free.

> *The original idea was to set up the operations for one year, find the first round of entrepreneurs, groom them, provided that someone was funding it. Then the plan was for me to go and open other similar spaces. I ended up working for free when funds dried up. Because I believe in it, I understand the importance of it, but I can go on only for so long without resources.*
>
> *In places like Khayelitsha, funders should finance five years of learning, and then*

> *invest into commercially viable enterprises* (personal conversation, September 2015).

Despite the failure, Meli is proud of his journey with Hubspace. He believes Hubspace has opened a new frontier of investments and opportunities. As of today, Heart Capital indeed runs a Hubspace in Philippi, another township of the Cape, and one in Kayamandi, one of Stellenbosch's largest shantytowns. In his speech at the LeadSA event, Meli had mentioned the idea social entrepreneurship is a frontier experiment that expands the opportunities of capital investment.

> *Africa is considered to be the next frontier with regards to entrepreneurship. I hope that a lot of people that are wearing the entrepreneurship badge or social change, or changemaker state of mind, actually grab the opportunity because a lot of people - all eyes are on Africa - are looking to the chances of our social issues* (personal conversation, September 2015).

When I ask him about this, he explains that Hubspace was exactly this kind of frontier experiment.

> *What Hubspace managed to do was this: the industry was looking this way* [he points to the ceiling], *and we shifted* [he indicates the floor], *we opened up the terrain of opportunities. They were only looking for markets within the CDB area, and we really showed them that there were other possibilities, we did the learning and the failure for them. As market leaders you have no reference, I don't see the closing down of Hubspace as a failure, it is not a success, of course, because we didn't have the resources we needed, and we are not claiming it was a success even if some of our entrepreneurs were listed on Forbes, you know* (personal conversation, September 2015).

During the journey, Meli also tried to get a diploma in marketing at a local private school, an experience that helped him with technical tools, but also made him think he needed further education. Travelling across Europe to see other incubators working with social entrepreneurs also opened the horizon of his own frontiers. When we met, he had just

received a grant to study overseas, in Bern, Switzerland, at Kaospilot, a school that offers a training programme for innovative entrepreneurs and changemakers. Kaospilot is a franchise of a school that was prototyped in Aarhus, Denmark, at the intersection of business and design, and has successfully produced graduates that went on to create startups and NGOs. *"Studying will be another springboard"*, Meli tells me, and that he will come back with more ideas for patient capitals, for the rich, unexplored potential of Khayelitsha (personal conversation, September 2015). In 50 years, he continues, tourists will not only come to Cape Town, but to Khayelitsha too, "*which will be a metropole of its own"* (personal conversation, September 2015).

5.4. Conclusion.

This chapter has focused on a particular infrastructural form, the entrepreneurial incubator, and its relationship to social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. When created in places of economic marginality, such as Khayelitsha, these incubators mobilize experts, knowledge and capitals around a core idea: fighting poverty by expanding entrepreneurial opportunities. These mobilities at the forefront of millennial development are made possible by incubators like the Barn and the Hub, entrepreneurial infrastructures which, in turn, are undergirded by other infrastructural layers.

Following Andrew Barry (2001), one could suggest that such incubator spaces are the infrastructural ends through which capitalist modernity is cultivated by endowing citizens with the technical skills they need to inhabit neoliberal democracies (from JavaScript to managerial tools). Lilli Irani has rightly shown, for example, how hackathons and accelerated entrepreneurial programmes are the generative humus of entrepreneurial citizenship (2015). However, as Colin McFarlane has suggested (2012), the co-production of entrepreneurialism in places

of economic marginality like slums, where global neoliberal mantras are renegotiated against local networks of solidarity and alternative economies, often goes much beyond the mere focus on market inclusion.

By tracing the lives of the Barn and the Hub as incubators, through genealogies, ethnographic and para-ethnographic accounts, I have set forth three key empirical arguments in this chapter. First, that such incubators are key in the process through which social entrepreneurship becomes a viable political technology in the restructuring of humanitarian development outside its "laboratory life". If a political technology is defined as a system of applied expertise to a collective end (such as development), it needs centres of calculation (Chapter 2), real-life pedagogical experiments (Chapter 3) but also infrastructural terminals through which actors, knowledge and capitals are mobilized (Lakoff & Collier, 2010).

Second, the two incubators of this chapter are examples of the way in which urban spaces in Cape Town produce the tensions and fields that underpin the expert ecologies of millennial development. This is not simply because the Hub and the Barn are, indeed, specific urban spaces, caught in a double life between a gentrifying neighbourhood (Woodstock) and a poor township (Khayelitsha). More so, because their infrastructural life is made possible by connections and disconnections, by the urban divides inherited from apartheid and the capacity of poor people to cross those gaps by working as infrastructures themselves (Simone, 2004). Even when unsuccessful, the incubators of this chapter operated to monetize this connective capacity—a process that has been documented in other contexts of the Global South, where capitalist operations incorporate such connective tissue with the help of humanitarian and developmental institutions. As Elyachar writes:

> social infrastructures of communicative channels are being formatted as social ecologies for user-driven telecommunications like mobile phones

> [...] and as payments space in projects undertaken by corporations like Vodafone, Visa, Mastercard, and Intel in cooperation with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and other philanthropic funders [...]. Companies like Intel, Vodafone, and Visa employ ethnographers and integrate Malinowski's theories of the kula into their business models [...] When corporations institute business models for telecommunications projects in the global South, they find a ready-made infrastructure for their investments (Elyachar, 2012, p.461).

One of the key narratives of millennial development, the bottom-of-the-pyramid approach, is indeed predicated on the possibility of harnessing the infrastructures that bridge the divides of poverty (see Maurer, 2012).

Ash Amin has written that urban infrastructures in divided cities are often bearers of hopes and promises: they offer a glimpse of future possibilities which "render the incomplete and often unfulfilling present bearable", and produce "an imagined commons of shared affects and assets supposed to iron out the divisions and differences of the everyday city" (Amin, 2014, pp.138–139). Incubators are not a typical kind of infrastructure. However, as in Ash Amin's words above, they do produce shared understandings of what forms of economic life are best suited for the development of a deeply divided South African city. And yet, they are also built on the sharp divides that they purport to erase with social entrepreneurship. If anything, they are built on the possibility of monetizing practices and ideas that, somehow, bypass the digital, physical and socio-economic demarcations of Cape Town. Yet this is not, as I have shown, a straightforward, unambiguous process.

This brings me to the third point of this chapter: that, as infrastructures, incubators function through a number of technical features that, inevitably, can be hacked for alternative projects. Even when designed for the purpose of creating profit opportunities, the possibility of

refunctioning is always at hand. Despite the templates and the rules, individuals inscribe their desires, their hopes, and their agendas in the operations of such infrastructures. As I have hinted at in various points, the material forms of these incubators reveal their heterogeneous politics: not only the extraction of profit at the frontiers of capital (Fisher & Downey, 2006; Dolan & Roll, 2013) but also the will to redistribute opportunities, wealth and connectivity.

I analyse this redistributive thrust in more detail in the next and last empirical chapter of this thesis. However, what the two case studies here disclosed was that both the politics of redistribution and those of extraction materialize in such infrastructural forms. This may well be, as Ananya Roy suggests (2012b), the contradictory nature of millennial development, the fact that hopes of profit and inextricably enmeshed with the promises of economic inclusion. Yet, the failed promise of empowerment through entrepreneurship also bore, at least for some of the informants that I have mentioned in this chapter, the recognition of such failure, and the need for an alternative ground for redistributive politics.

Chapter 6

Ubuntu, eLula and the technopolitics of entrepreneurial redistribution.

> Distributive claims, after all, may rest on the most compelling ethical and political rationales, but they can lead to actual distributive outcomes only to the extent that there exists an effective and universal apparatus of distribution. Without that, even the most assertive gestures of common ownership (such as nationalization) are unlikely to have genuinely distributive outcomes, as we have learned only too well (Ferguson, 2005, p.189).

6.1. Social entrepreneurship and the rainbow nation project of redistribution.

Thus far in this thesis, I have argued that social entrepreneurship is a crucial political technology of millennial development, in that it articulates the possibility of extending the benefits of capitalist profitability to those, in the Global South, who have yet to experience its privileges. The social enterprise, however, is not the only political technology of this millennial promise. From microfinance to other bottom-of-the-pyramid technologies, a number of additional discursive rationalities have been mobilized to manufacture the markets of millennial development. In other words, social entrepreneurship is not a lone technology. It exists with and in relation to other governmentalities. In this chapter, then, I bring to light another political technology that has a parallel life in contemporary South Africa.

The reason for shifting the attention from social entrepreneurship to *ubuntu*—a natively South-African narrative of, among other things,

economic life—is twofold. On one hand, this chapter shows that the questions of millennial development find multiple articulations, even in their mundane governance. On the other hand, *ubuntu* helps me trace the relationship between social entrepreneurship and the vast, contradictory, state-led project of economic redistribution that has been at the core of the post-apartheid rainbow nation. So far, the South African nation state has remained a mostly silent participant on the canvas of this dissertation. However, I claim in this chapter, there are state-driven political technologies that encompass and intersect the ecology of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town.

Many scholars of contemporary South Africa have argued, drawing on their different disciplines[125], that the post-apartheid state has been engaged in a unique and pervasive attempt at managing and transforming economic life in the nation. James Ferguson has showed that this state-wide economic experiment has been fundamentally hinged on the necessity to redistribute access to economic resources in a nation where these were, and still are, unequally divided as a result of racialized planning (apartheid) (Ferguson, 2015). Through specific modes of actual redistribution, such as cash payments, South Africa has engendered a powerful system of social security, a welfare predicated on the imperative of redressing the wrongs of apartheid but also on other liberal governmentalities of citizenship (Ferguson, 2007; 2013; 2015). For example, the proposal of a redistributive basic income—which is already a reality for poorer South Africans—is the indication that neoliberal mantras of entrepreneurial self-help coexist with the idea that every citizen is entitled to a "rightful share" in the nation's wealth (Ferguson, 2010; 2015).

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125 Among these scholarly works: Barchiesi, 2011; Breckenridge, 2005; 2014; Ferguson, 2007; 2010; 2013; 2015; James; 2007; 2011; 2017 Von Schnitzler, 2016.

This means, on one hand, that the category of neoliberalism needs to be displaced for understanding contemporary South African policies (see also Parnell & Robinson, 2012; Von Schnitzler, 2010; 2013) but also that the material politics of redistribution deserve attention, as Ferguson (2015) puts it in the epigraph that opens this chapter. Economic redistribution is made possible by narratives, things, and institutions that articulate its politics in practical ways. Keith Breckenridge, for example, has argued that the construction of a "biometric state" contributed to the very possibility of redistribution by forming actual channels of circulation for, among other things, welfare allowances (2005). Antina Von Schnitzler has shown that water and electric meters were crucial infrastructures in the articulations of citizenship rights in the post-apartheid state project (2016)—the very rights that justified large government spending in the distribution of resources such as housing, utilities, and, more recently, internet access. In a similar vein, Deborah James has argued that the distribution of financial credit needs to be read against a

> broader backdrop ... one in which the sometimes contradictory forces of state and market have intertwined to create a redistributive neoliberalism in which people at all levels attempt to make "money from nothing" (James, 2014, p.S28).

Redistribution, Ferguson further argues, is underpinned by various ideas of what economic participation ought to be. Among these ideas, one may find neoliberal mantras of empowerment through self-help–which compels Deborah James to speak of a "redistributive neoliberalism" (2014, p.28)–,

notions of Christian mutuality, as well as purportedly 'ethnic' conceptualizations of sharing such as *ubuntu* (Ferguson, 2015, p.180).

Ubuntu (Nguni for humanity), a word that sealed the epilogue of the transitional constitution of 1993, was one of the narratives that was

used in the passage from white-minority rule to a democratic state. Specifically, *ubuntu* represented a moral philosophy that some anti-apartheid leaders used to frame the non-vindictive, redistributive nature of transitional justice. Still today, *ubuntu* marks the idiosyncratic nature of liberal governmentalities in South Africa (see Ferguson, 2015). The focus of this chapter is on the material and discursive politics of *ubuntu* in creating forms of economic life that exist alongside the modes of social entrepreneurship.

However, *ubuntu* and social entrepreneurship do not represent a local/global dichotomy. Both the social enterprise and *ubuntu*, as travelling technologies of social change, have global qualities and condense particular forms of worldliness in their material instantiations, as I have discussed throughout this work. The objective of this chapter is to displace the centrality of social entrepreneurship to show that millennial development is not an uncontested script, that alternative politics of redistribution are inextricably enmeshed within it, and that state institutions of South Africa have played and continue to play a pivotal role in articulating the need for 'good' entrepreneurship and redistributive liberalism.

In the first section of the chapter, I briefly chart the histories of *ubuntu* in contemporary South Africa, from public policies to economic organizations. Its pervasiveness has been variously criticized for its capacity to depoliticize public life and promote neoliberal rationalities (Maluleke, 1994; Andreasson, 2010; McDonald, 2010; Mangharam, 2011; Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013). However, less attention has been paid to the actual technologies of government that engender the modes of *ubuntu*. By focusing on its material politics, a more complex landscape of experiments with extraction and redistribution, profit and antipoverty emerges (Antenucci & Pollio, 2018). As a technology of nation-building, *ubuntu* has also worked as a discursive frame for social change achieved

through entrepreneurial endeavours. In this, *ubuntu* is a device that can be activated in very different contexts. As examples, I show how in some of the experiments and locations of the previous chapters, the moral philosophy of *ubuntu* was silently (or explicitly) at work in ambiguous ways.

In the central section of the chapter, I explore the performativity of *ubuntu* through the artefacts where its technopolitics become visible. My aim is to address how redistribution and social change—two of the major concerns of contemporary urban life in South Africa—are translated into the modes of existence of material objects which, through *ubuntu*, become political. My account of the lives of these objects traces judgements and calculations that determine both their function and their form. I also show how *ubuntu*, as a semantic field, rearranges divergent and competing discourses in its political and "poetic" materialities (Larkin, 2013)—that is, on the scripts that are designed for a practical function as well as those which give an aesthetic form to such functions. I will focus on one object—a GPS enabled point of sale (POS)—which, I argue, produces ambivalent modes of economic citizenship that translate, innovate, and reframe some of the concerns of social entrepreneurship through a different light.

6.2. Ubuntu: a philosophy for statecraft, citizenship and economic life.

In this section I briefly chart the pervasiveness of *ubuntu* in post-apartheid South Africa. As a word, *ubuntu* comes from the Nguni languages of South Africa, a group of widely spoken Bantu languages—some of which are recognized as official—and lacks a literal translation into English. Depending of the context, 'ubuntu' has been rendered as *humanity*, *humanness*, *personhood, human nature*, or even *human dignity*, with the general agreement that the Nguni term encompasses all these

meanings (see Kamwangamalu, 1999). Linguists have also pointed out that *ubuntu* refers to a concept that is found in other parts of Africa: *umuntu* in Kenya, *vumuntu* in Mozambique, *bomoto* in Congo, and so forth (Gade, 2012). The geographical spread of the concept, across different nations, upholds the claim that the basic idea of ubuntu is a natively African concept (Broodryk, 1996; Kamwangamalu, 1999). However, it was only in the last two decades of the last century that *ubuntu* was both rediscovered and reinvented as an African ethical and moral philosophy (Shutte, 1993; Metz, 2011; Lenkabula, 2008)—and this happened in relation to the late postcolonial struggles of Southern Africa: the Zimbabwean independence and the end of apartheid in South Africa and Namibia.

This process of rediscovery, through which *ubuntu* emerged as a key pillar of contemporary statecraft in the southern part of the continent, is a relatively new phenomenon—one that has received quite some attention in the literature (Coertze, 2001; Marx, 2002; Andreasson, 2010; Akinwumi, 2013). However, ideas of *ubuntu* were recorded by European writers as early as in the nineteenth century, and the narrative of returning to traditional values was critical in African socialist movements of earlier decolonization struggles. As an example, Christian Gade (2011) finds that *ubuntu* resonates with Julius Nyerere's writings. As president of the newly independent Tanganyka (later Tanzania) from 1962 to 1985, Nyerere promoted the return to a uniquely African version of socialism, reinvented for the contemporary context: *ujamaa* (familyhood in Swahili). This particular socialism was predicated on two intertwined ideas: the need for Africanization, hence the rejection of some key pillars of both liberalism and Marxism, and the return to a moral philosophy based on the communalism of the extended family (Nyerere, 1966). Put differently, *ujamaa* socialism is not triggered by class conflict, but the future it projects contains a return to the past as an alternative form of modernity. Similarly, the reappropriation of

ubuntu in South Africa contained both a romanticization of precolonial African culture (Maluleke, 1996), what Mbembé and Rendall describe as naive nativism (2002), and a principle for new African narratives of modernity, potentially at least (Cornell, 2004; 2011; Venter; 2004; Eze, 2008; Metz, 2011).

Among the first advocates of *ubuntu* as a worldview that could contribute to nation-building after the wounds of colonial rule was Zimbabwean academic and activist Stanlake Samkange, who wrote one of the first books on the topic (with his wife Tommie Samkange). In fact, they specifically argued that *hunhu* (the Shona word for *ubuntu*) constituted a practical ideology in the process of shifting from white minority rule to black majority:

> This month (February 1980), Rhodesians are called upon to choose men and women of a political party that will lead them into a new era: the era of one man, one vote; black majority rule — and Zimbabwe. This is a great moment in the history of the country. The question is: What political philosophy or ideology should inspire the new Zimbabweans in this new era? Should the solution to the country's problems be based on capitalist, socialist, fascist, communist — Marxist, Leninist or Maoist — thinking? Is there a philosophy or ideology indigenous to the country that can serve its people just as well, if not better than, foreign ideologies? (Samkange & Samkange 1980, cited in Gade, 2011, p.309).

The Samkanges used the word *ubuntu* to describe a political philosophy that underpinned their particular vision for the then new democratic Zimbabwe: whilst they did define *hunhu* as a moral quality whereby individuals show friendliness, empathy, mutuality, and willingness to collaborate, they used the resulting worldview to prescribe a much larger set of principles for the new nation, encompassing economic, legal, education, and foreign policy. Notably, ubuntuism justified the coexistence of private, state and collective property, in a vision

that surpassed both staunch liberalism and socialism (Samkange & Samkange, 1980).

In South Africa, *ubuntu* came to prominence in a different context (that of the transition from the apartheid state to the democratic one) through different intellectual channels, and with a slightly different meaning. It became a matter of intellectual interest in theological writings, as an interactive ethic that was closely associated with a famous isiXhosa proverb—*umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu* (a person is a person through other persons). This linkage might have been a completely new creation, as Gade suggests (2011), showing how before the democratic transition the word was more often used to describe a human quality rather than a set of ethical principles, and never explained in those terms. Nonetheless, precisely in the context of the democratic transition, *ubuntu* became a worldview, a philosophy of action that predicated both a return to African values and a code for the new democratic state. While *ubuntu* is still a personal quality, in the daily speech of many South Africans, a trait that singles out good humans from those lacking moral qualities (Gade, 2012), the public discourse around *ubuntu* took another dimension, particularly with reference to the Xhosa aphorism that describes personhood as a mirror of otherness. As Cornell and Van Marle (2005) summarize,

> Ubuntu in a profound sense, and whatever else it may be, implies an interactive ethic, or an ontic orientation in which who and how we can be as human beings is always being shaped in our interaction with each other. This ethic is not then a simple form of communalism or communitarianism, if one means by those terms the privileging of the community over the individual. For what is at stake here is the process of becoming a person or, more strongly put, how one is given the chance to become a person at all. The community is not something `outside', some static entity that stands against individuals. The community is only as it is continuously brought into being by those who `make it up', a phrase we

> use deliberately. The community, then, is always being formed through an ethic of being with others, and this ethic is in turn evaluated by how it empowers people (2005, p.89).

This particular understanding of *ubuntu* as an "ontic orientation" was popularized in the early nineties by academics like the late Augustine Shutte, who wrote a book, *Philosophy for Africa* (1993), that was an attempt at systematizing a dialogue between Western philosophy and traditional African beliefs, which too often, he lamented, were not considered equally important tools for thinking (Giddy, 1995)[126]. Interestingly, Shutte also framed the need for an African ethic in relation to the democratic transition of his country, which needed new epistemic devices to come to terms with its past and move to a better future. Though little was said about *ubuntu* in the first edition of the book, in the 1995 introduction to the American publication, Shutte explained that this essential worldview was, in fact, *ubuntu*, a perspective on human relations that yielded its own moral philosophy (see Gade, 2011). However, it was really Archbishop Desmond Tutu, one of the key figures of the anti-apartheid movement, who sanctioned this meaning of *ubuntu* as a guiding theological and philosophical beacon of reconciliation.

A prominent member of the South African Anglican Church, and a peace-Nobel-prize laureate for his anti-apartheid activism, Tutu had been voicing the need for reconciliation between the disenfranchised black majority and the white minority for quite some time prior to the lifting of the ban on the African National Congress. In this sense, his position on the future of South Africa had been somewhat different and more conciliatory than that of many other liberation leaders, and for this reason he had been able to meet with both presidents Botha and

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126 However, ideas of African epistemological differences regarding the relationship between individual and community had been highlighted much earlier, for example in the work of Ifeany Menikiti (1971).

de Klerk much earlier. In a famous episode of the transition years, Tutu took everyone by surprise when in Soweto, at the funeral of Chris Hani, leader of the South African Communist Party, in a context of bitter resentment, and on the verge of a racial war, he

> got up, spoke into that crowd of thousands and, and got them—all of them—to wave their hands in the air, saying: 'We are all God's children—black and white" (Krog, 1999, p.232)[127].

This vision of reconciliation was embraced by Nelson Mandela as well, who legitimized it precisely in the well-known televised speech that followed the same funeral and that is considered a turning point of the transition era (Zagacki, 2003). However, as Michael Battle argues in his detailed study of Tutu's theology of community (1997; 2000), it was the latter who became the nation's confessor, operating a vision of truth and forgiveness underpinned by *ubuntu*. This idea of reconciliation found a way through the multiparty negotiation process that led to the Interim Constitution of 1993, where the principle was unmistakably worded in the epilogue:

> The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge. These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993).

The Interim Constitution provided the guidelines for the formation

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127 Interestingly, the latter passage is taken from one of the most famous memoirs of the transition years, Antjie Krog's *Country of my Skull*, a semi fictional book that recollects her two-year work as a radio reporter on the TRC. One of the central questions in the book concerns the potential of ubuntu as a healing experiment, and its shortcomings.

of the constitutional assembly, for the new constitution, which incorporated its Bill of Rights, and prescribed the institution of a special commission that would look into the crimes of apartheid and establish a restorative form of transitional justice in the spirit of *ubuntu* (see Wilson, 1996; 2001). This resulted into the creation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), in 1995, guided by Tutu and other spiritual leaders of the late anti-apartheid movements (see Kaplan, 1999; Lombard, 2003). The TRC was a court-like agency that was given the legal authority to establish facts around human rights violations during apartheid and grant amnesty to those who agreed to appear in the trials (see Akinwumi, 2013).

Over the years that followed the TRC process, which concluded in 1998, the role, the purpose and the effectiveness of the commission have been praised, scrutinized and criticized (Wilson, 2001; Marx, 2002; Herwitz, 2003). Its results, in particular, have been questioned as far as real reconciliation is concerned: although few amnesties were conceded, the commission overlooked the need for real reparations and may have implicitly justified acquiescence (Marx, 2002).

The TRC forged a new meaning of truth and forgiveness, which justified the need of restorative or reconciliatory justice over reparative justice, and sanctioned the importance of *ubuntu* in the 'rainbow nation' project. The TRC's idea of truth, for example, derived from the communalist epistemology of *ubuntu*: facts were established in a form of collective storytelling which was unprecedented in the context of trial hearings (see Lenta, 2003). In short, the TRC's "third way of conditional amnesty" between "Nuremberg and national amnesia"—as wrote Tutu himself in his ex-post reflections on the process—was made possible by the "African *Weltanschauung"* of *ubuntu* (Tutu, 1999, p.34).

Although the final constitution did not mention the word *ubuntu*, various court rulings have since established that some passages of the

Bill of Rights do express its values as concerning human dignity beyond individualistic notions of human rights, but also as a compass of the restorative, healing nature of the constitutional effort on the whole (Tshoose, 2009). Gade (2011) has additionally highlighted how these constitutional court rulings framed *ubuntu* in a narrative of "return" to something that had been lost or compromised during apartheid. At work, according to Akinwumi (2013, p.159), was a strategic "will to transform", a state-led project of reconciliation that was the result of a pact between different political rationalities. Such a governmental project of nation building, caught between the diverging forces of reconciliation and transformation, was orchestrated in a choreographic architecture of legality, spirituality, and leadership, where *ubuntu* was one of the devices that functioned as a conciliatory bridge between past and future (Andreasson, 2010).

Even politicians like Thabo Mbeki, Mandela's deputy and then himself President, who had stressed the need of accompanying reconciliation with economic redistribution (see Marx, 2002), embraced the indigeneity of *ubuntu* as a governmental device that filtered down to various state policies, not least the overarching economic agendas of RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) first, and GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) later. As Tinyiko Maluleke discussed (1994; 1996) *ubuntu* was portrayed as an 'old' value for the future of a nation in crisis, and used to legitimize the making of the right economic subjects/citizens. In the language of *ubuntu*, *masakhane*, for example (literally 'let us build one another up') was a programme whose main objective was to "encourage the payment of residential services, rent and mortgages in black communities which [had] a history of deliberate non-payment as a political protest strategy" (Maluleke, 1996, p.39). At the highest level of government, Mbeki did not only organize a policymaking *imbizo* (gathering) to debate how *ubuntu* should influence policy, but eventually lamented the lack of *ubuntu* as an explanation of

the country's moral and economic difficulties (see Andreasson, 2010). In doing so, Mbeki reinstated a key idea of the TRC ten years earlier: that *ubuntu* was a still open-ended project of reconstruction through Africanization;

> [W]e have not done enough to articulate and elaborate on what ubuntu means as well as promoting this important value system in a manner that should define the unique identity of South Africans (Mbeki, 2005; quoted in Metz, 2011).

Over more than twenty years into the new democratic state, *ubuntu* remains a pervasive narrative in many areas of statecraft. As briefly mentioned before, *ubuntu* was significant in the shift from RDP to the more neoliberal, orthodox GEAR, as it provided a language of community and individual self-help to policy makers (Terreblanche, 2002; van Eeden *et al.*, 2000), in particular through the BBBEE programme (Andreasson, 2006; 2010). Mel Gray has argued that this language was central in the debate around the two different models of social and developmentalist welfare (2006). *Ubuntu* narratives have also been used in the context of urban renewals, in the management of urban security, in the marketing of South African cities as world-class tourist destinations and mega-event venues (McDonald, 2008; Antenucci, 2016). As far as marketing is concerned, *ubuntu* is also a vehicle that serves the purpose of increasing sales or market value (Mangharam, 2011), in the broader context of the commodification of African identities that Comaroff and Comaroff outline in their *Ethnicity, Inc* (2009). In recent years, there has been an 'Ubuntu Party', which participated to the 2014 national elections. In the same period, during Cape Town's year as World Design Capital, London's Central Saint Martins organized an exhibition—*The craft of Ubuntu*—dedicated to the idea of African design as a practice of community empowerment through craft. Notable South Africans have been using the concept for various purposes: Mamphela

Ramphele, black-consciousness activist first, and Managing Director of the World Bank after apartheid, is one of the most prominent voices of *ubuntu* as a healing bond that needs to be rekindled[128]. During the short-lived political experiment that she led between 2013 and 2014, she used *ubuntu* to condemn the excesses of Zulu nationalism and tribalist xenophobia that the frontrunner to the presidency was allegedly silent about[129] (for a more detailed list of the ways in which *ubuntu* has been harnessed in recent years see Eliastam, 2015).

These different, pervasive ramifications of *ubuntu* to the construction of South African identities, politics, and state infrastructures, fundamentally impacted the working of organizations and companies, both profit and non-profit enterprises. All the various meanings of *ubuntu* that I briefly charted in this section have been somehow enrolled in the world of businesses, NGOs and hybrid entities. This is where *ubuntu* becomes an Afromodern[130] political technology that works alongside the Europe-born social enterprise model in reshaping development in South Africa. Many of the institutions, experiments and organizations that I have dealt with in the previous chapters of this thesis have explicitly framed their rationales by resorting to narratives of *ubuntu*. Most prominently, it was the idea of building economies of return and redistribution that featured in the words of many of my informants, from Sajidah, a community manager at Inyathelo (see Chapter 2) to Melisizwe at Hubspace (Chapter 5). Sajidah said that:

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128 http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/mamphela-rampheles-full-speech-1472163 [accessed 5/1/2018]

129 http://www.enca.com/south-africa/ramphele-calls-reclamation-ubuntu-values [accessed 5/1/2018]

130 "Afro-Modernity represents a particular understanding of modernity and modern subjectivity among people of African descent. At its broadest parameters, it consists of the selective incorporation of technologies, discourses, and institutions of the modern West within the cultural and political practices of African-derived peoples to create a form of relatively autonomous modernity distinct from its counterparts of Western Europe and North America. It is no mere mimicry of Western modernity but an innovation upon its precepts, forces, and features" (Hanchard 1999, p.247).

> *the history of South Africa shows why pure social justice should exist. The fight against apartheid was not profitable for people fighting it. And, today, you can say the same about gender equality, LGBT issues etc. So if you want to make all these things entrepreneurial, okay, but they should not put profit first. Rather, the need to mend this disaggregated social fabric, return to the ubuntu that the apartheid regime tried to erase (conversation with Sajidah, August 2015).*

Similarly, at Hubspace, entrepreneurship was framed as a way of giving back. As a local startup blog reports:

> If the spirit of entrepreneurship is instilled in South Africans growing up in townships, so too is a sense of shared responsibility for the community, Hubspace entrepreneurs say. They refer often to *ubuntu*, a word that can be loosely translated as "human kindness." The word comes from a phrase in Zulu, explains Ayanda Cuba, the Slinch co-founder. "Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu," Cuba recites. "You're not just a person on your own, but the people around you make you who you are." Gqobo, Hubspace Khayelitsha's founding director, says the spirit of *ubuntu* extends to how the entrepreneurs share the space. Everyone pitches in on communal tasks, such as keeping the coffee and tea well stocked, he said. Even snacks are shared. "I cannot buy a packet of chips or a packet of sweets and just eat them alone in my corner," he says. "It's just fundamental."[131]

At other times, my informants were much less explicit, but still stressed that there was something uniquely and yet implicitly South African to their efforts. According to Catherine Besteman's ethnography of voluntarism in Cape Town, NGO and community workers have a unique, embodied sense of belonging to a nation-building project that is much wider than their grasp (2008). Similarly, my interlocutors often referred to a moral obligation stemming from their privilege as much as from their attachment to the South African democratic project. Emma,

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131 http://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2015/04/04/397101933/far-from-silicon-valley-a-disruptive-startup-hub [accessed 08/07/2017]

for example, who is the founder of the award-winning Code4CT[132]—a not-for-profit organization that delivers coding education to young women—explained that:

> *it is not just because I am a white, privileged woman. It is not just because I can do it, I have a degree and can fall back to a corporate job, but because I belong here, because I was raised here learning about a past I never experienced, but also about the unique undertaking of dealing with it* (personal conversation, October 2015).

The different perspectives of my interlocutors show that in South Africa, today, *ubuntu* works as a discursive technology that addresses a series of collective problems beyond nation-building: from economic marginality, to urban security (see Antenucci & Pollio, 2018), to creating possibilities of profit through new forms of communalism. It could be rightfully observed that notions of community and participation are often mobilized for political and economic purposes (see Rose and Miller, 1992), and they are not necessarily specific to the *ubuntu* framework. What is specific however, is the ways in which these ideas have been historically activated, and how they still generate particular practices and norms. It is the historical and political situatedness of *ubuntu* that makes it relevant for understanding modes of entrepreneurial redistribution in South Africa. For Ferguson, for example, *ubuntu* is one of the frameworks through which redistributive politics mark the South African way to neoliberalism (2015). They do so, I have suggested, in both discursive and material ways. For this reason, in what follows I address the performativity of *ubuntu* in one artefact: a remote point of sale (POS), a device designed to provide economic opportunities to informal vendors, but also to harvest profit at the bottom of the pyramid. This object, I argue, shows how the technopolitics of redistribution,

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132 http://code4ct.com/awards-and-recognition/code4ct-honored-by-the-queen/ [accessed 22/05/2018]

through *ubuntu*, are given a technical, material form.

6.3. Nomanini: ubuntu technopolitics of redistributive entrepreneurship.

As I have argued thus far, *ubuntu* is an "ethos" that permeates the "postcolony and its public discourse" in South Africa (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009, p.44). However, the geographies of this commodified narrative are wider. In the context of business, *ubuntu* has travelled overseas, from sports teams, to FIFA commercials (Mangharam, 2011), from the fair-trade® ubuntu cola®, to the Ubuntu operating system for Linux. It should not come as a surprise that one of the most diffused open-source OS in the world, based on the collaborative participation of Linux developers, is called Ubuntu (with an interface called Unity). Ubuntu OS is published by a company, Canonical Ltd., which raises revenues through technical support but offers a free, open-source license on the OS. This double bottom line is, in fact, one of the point of contacts between the social enterprise model and the *ubuntu* enterprise.

The technical object that I analyse in this chapter is eLula, a remote point-of-sale (POS). This section traces some of the technical concerns that engender the life of this small artefact. To do so, I begin with a brief historical parenthesis, based on Antina Von Schintzler's work (2008; 2010; 2013; 2016), which gives an overview to the political nature of prepaid technologies. These are, in fact, crucial to understand why eLula exclusively sells PIN-based products in post-apartheid South Africa.

During the last years of apartheid, when it became clear that separate development (see Chapter 1) was untenable, one of the key mechanisms of political protest in urban areas was the refusal to pay for rents and public services, especially electricity and water. As a strategy of fiscal disobedience, the then-banned African National Congress (ANC) encouraged disenfranchised urban dwellers to withhold payments for

rents and utilities, in order to make the townships "ungovernable" (see Swilling et al, 1991). This strategy was, on one hand, a clear sign that the apartheid regime could not stop the progressive urbanization of black South Africans—as was the original plan of separate development (see Chapter 1). On the other, it transformed contractual relations with the state into sites of insurgency and tools of political mobilization.

In this context, the late-apartheid bureaucratic machine searched for a solution that was primarily technical—a solution that could depoliticize the provision of public services in non-white urban areas. Teams of engineers working for the parastatal service providers were sent on missions in order to study and experiment technologies of connection and disconnection that would enforce payments (Von Schnitzler, 2016). What was clear was that the solution ought to be distributed "technically" between users, providers and the utility itself. It was at this time that an object from overseas travelled to South Africa: a prepaid meter.

Prepaid meters had their own political history in the late Victorian London. The penny-in-the-slot meter had been introduced in 1888 in order to deal with what was seen as a crucial hygienic issue of the modern city: the darkness of the working class-home:

> The penny-in-the-slot enabled the integration of the whole city within a networked grid. However, it simultaneously divided its population into two sets. A first segment, mostly wealthier households, who could be trusted to pay monthly or quarterly bills and hence would have a contractual relationship to the utilities. And a second segment, mostly the working classes, who would have their connection to infrastructure regulated by a technical device, and were thus more precariously located outside of such contractual relations. [...] In many reports of the time, prepaid meters were described as devices that would aid in the production of a more rational attitude to spending and accustom the working classes to inhabit a contractual exchange relation (von Schnitzler, 2013, pp.677ff).

A century later, the new generation of the penny-in-the-slot had arrived in South Africa. As von Schnitzler narrates, for the engineers that were given the task of finding a solution to fiscal disobedience, it was clear that the penny-in-the-slot could not be trusted technically, because township residents could not be trusted morally (2013). The technology needed to be translated and redistributed. It is in this context that a natively South African version of the electric meter was created by retrofitting the penny-in-the-slot: a meter that, instead of working with real money, worked with analog or digital tokens: numerical codes that need to be punched in order for the household to receive the utility (von Schnitzler, 2013; 2016). Implementing PINs on single household meters meant that the meter itself was technically harder to be manipulated and therefore township residents more likely to pay their bills.

Fast forward ten more years, and the first democratically elected government of South Africa, led by Nelson Mandela and the ANC, was faced by the legacy of their own previous political strategies, in particular by "make the township ungovernable". One of the key issues was that the culture of non-payment was at odds with the creation of a liberal state, where all individuals pay taxes and fees for the services they enjoy (see Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003b). At the same time, it was recognized that a great public investment was needed to modernize the townships with public urban infrastructures (Bond, 2000). This great public investment was only tenable if supported by a distributed morality whereby poorer residents, when given access to welfare resources of any kind, would comply to the rules of liberal citizenship. In these complicated and often contradictory histories of South African neoliberalism, as Ferguson has variously argued (2007; 2010; 2012), redistribution, individualism, cost-efficiency and private-public relations are often in uneasy forms of kinship. Electric and water meters became, once again, the technology through which particular forms of citizenship were engineered, and eventually depoliticized. Still, as technical objects, meters could be

tampered with (even the PIN technology had a way around it) and repoliticized within a different regime (as objects of grassroot protests) (Von Schnitzler. 2012). It is then that the ethics of *ubuntu* became a handy tool to redistribute the risk of non-payment—otherwise concentrated in the delicate, hackable mechanics of the meter.

As discussed, two of the key aspects of *ubuntu* in South Africa are 1) a public morality that has a collective orientation 2) the idea that *ubuntu* is a natively African version of such ontic orientation. Building on these two pillars, in 1996 the SA government launched the *Masakhane* campaign—which means, literally, *let us build on one another*. The operation was a marketing effort to create a culture of payment among township dwellers, by using the idea of a collective African ethos that applied to something as mundane as the payment of utility bills. The aim of the initiative was to create, at least nominally, a principle of cost-recovery in the delivery of public services, such as sewage, refuse removal, water and electricity (Naidoo, 2007). *Masakhane*, in the context of the broader RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) first, and GEAR (Growth, Employment and Redistribution) later, gave a purportedly African rationale and ethics to the economic underpinning of the whole operation, endowing it with the spirit of a civic *ubuntu*, in the same way as the theology of *ubuntu* was framing the narrative of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in the same period (see Maluleke, 1994; 1996).

Despite its effort and the voice of leaders like Mandela, *Masakhane* was unsuccessful in establishing a culture of payment. However, it legitimized the idea that purportedly native concepts like *ubuntu* could be useful in framing policy-making; as mentioned earlier, President Mbeki reprised *ubuntu* both to frame his economic policies and to explain the country's difficulties. Still today, *ubuntu,* or lack thereof, is often used to explain failures at various levels of government (Matolino & Kwindingwi, 2013).

In the meantime, various experiments with water and electric meters have expanded their political reach by fashioning new relations with 'old' values of *ubuntu* communalism and new ecological imperatives. A controversial operation called *Gcin'amanzi* (Zulu for 'Save Water'), for example, was

> a large-scale project initiated by Johannesburg Water, to install prepaid water meters in all Soweto households. [In this context], the prepaid meter has been re-rationalised as a pedagogical device 'aiding' residents to calculate and economise their water consumption (von Schnitzler, 2008, p.899).

On the other hand, both electric and water meters can be deployed as means of political mobilization: it is not uncommon for service delivery protests to use such objects as weapons, as symbols that can be scraped off the wall and brought to the public arena as specimens of governmental failure (Von Schnitzler, 2008; Naidoo & Veriava, 2009).

In summary, prepaid meters are the embodiment of a large number of political and economic concerns through their multiple "modes of existence" (Simondon, 1958 [2011]). Suffice it to say, South Africa is the largest manufactures of meters in the world: the commodification of the meter in the continent underpins the existence of a working class that depends on the sector, from their industrial production, to their installation and maintenance (McDonald, 2012). Second, meters can embody the political rationalities of neoliberal cost recovery and/or ecological citizenship (as discussed by Von Schnitzler, 2008, and Peter van Heusden, 2009). Third, meters can become objects of political protests, or, more subtly, technologies to tinker with, which in turn generates subterranean regimes of self-help, corruption, illegality and illicitness (see Roitman, 2005).

Fourth, meters generate and perpetuate the existence of informal/cash

economies—which is probably the most visible contradiction of prepaid citizenship. On one hand, the liberal idea of contractual citizenship, whereby the meter brings the state to the household. On the other, the meter, though unwittingly, legitimizes the perpetuation of the cash, informal economies that are not and cannot be "seen" by the liberal state. The meter bypasses the need of being a traceable economic subject, with a bank account or a personal utility "profile", while the PIN evades any form of contractual relationship with parastatal agencies or credit recovery systems, because for each transaction a single, anonymous token is produced (for a discussion of the performativity of payment spaces see Maurer 2012).

It is in this opening to the informal economy that prepaid citizenship creates what we can call a 'third' economic space, between the formal or 'first economy' and informal or cash economies, or the 'second economy', as it is called in South Africa (Devey *et al.*, 2006). Specifically, it creates opportunities for profit at the intersection of the two. One example of these possibilities is condensed into another technical object: eLula, a small orange box that contains a GPS-enabled POS (point of sale).

eLula (Image 27) is the second-generation payment platform developed by Nomanini, a fintech company started in 2011 by Vahid and Ali Monadjem. Having raised seed capital from the Department of Technology Innovation, Nomanini was incorporated in Cape Town, initially providing a streamlined payment system for informal taxi drivers. Soon enough, however, the cofounders of the company realized the potential of connecting a broader range of informal operators to the formal economy, and launched a POS that would emit prepaid PINs in exchange for cash. The device would enable people in informal markets to buy PIN-only products, such as airtime and, of course, electricity, water, and insurance vouchers. In 2012, Forbes and Ventureburn mentioned Nomanini as one of the African startups to keep an eye on in

2013[133]. Not long after, the startup received another investment round from Goodwell, a Dutch impact investment capital which was interested in the potential inclusiveness of the business: as Bill Maurer and others have noted, the rhetoric of financial inclusion in Africa is a powerful one, through which NGOs, philanthropists and businesses seem to align their agendas (Maurer, 2012). Interestingly, Nomanimi was described by the media as a "social enterprise", although the South African corporate legal framework does not provide for such denomination (Venturebeat, 2013). The idea of a redistributive form of finance, however, permeates the narratives that the company uses to marketize itself: the following excerpt is from the description that Nomanini used to register in the Fintech Africa database and competition.

> The problem: There are 500m unbanked people in Africa. These are potential bank account holders, but most earn just $5 a day and are widely distributed geographically. They generally make small value transactions frequently. Consequently, banks tend to ignore this market because building and maintaining banking channels, such as branches, ATMs, and even agency banking, are considered too expensive to serve them. Our solution: Nomanini enables financial inclusion via local informal retail merchants, who already serve as a daily touch point for over 80% of people in Africa. Nomanini enables merchants and agents to facilitate a wide-range of basic transactions including mobile top-ups, utility payments, remittances, deposits, withdrawals, account opening and mobile money/card acceptance. Nomanini works with banks to enable existing third-party merchant aggregators, such as mobile and FMCG distributors, to acquire and serve merchants efficiently[134].

Thanks to the Dutch impact investment, Nomanini expanded to six

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133 https://www.forbesafrica.com/technology/2014/11/01/ten-technology-start-ups-watch/ accessed 22/8/2017.

134 https://2017.fintech-africa.com/companies/nomanini [accessed 1/3/2018].

Image 27. Nomanini's eLula point-of-sale.

other African countries, and today it caters to the needs of thousands African street hawkers. Leaving aside the tale of entrepreneurial success, the eLula terminal is interesting both as a commodity and as a technology of transaction. As a commodity, it replicates some of the aesthetic features that are common in "little development devices" (Collier *et al.*, 2017). It is bright, orange, rugged, waterproof, friendly for users with low digital and financial literacy: all characteristics that point to one of the most powerful ideas of contemporary development: the Bottom of the Pyramid approach (BoP). As mentioned earlier, according to the BoP doctrine, the issue with poverty is that capitalist enterprises do not develop products that are poor-friendly. For late guru C.K. Prahalad, the major proponent of BoP, poverty can be fought through profit *only if* the right kind of commodities are made accessible to poor people (2006). eLula is an example of a product that incorporates such ideas in its simplified financial functions, targeted to informal street

transactions[135]. As the founders put it:

> Big as they are, giant retailers like Walmart are only one small part of the global retail market. More than half of the world's population relies on informal markets, buying from street vendors or marketplaces where cash is king. Many around the world don't have a bank account, and instead use prepaid vouchers to buy services such as phone airtime, electricity and insurance through a network of regional distributors[136].

It is not only in its technical features, however, that eLula targets BoP markets: its bright, colourful aesthetics, for example, are inscriptions of financial inclusion too. The colourful, rugged sturdiness of the POS is a reminder of the visual register with which township economies are often represented (see Chapter 3). The name *Nomanini* as well, which means *anytime* in siSwati, a Bantu language, speaks to the capacity of millennial capitalism to inhabit ethnic narratives as well as traditional regimes of consumption—which Jean and John Comaroff have analysed as "Ethnicity, Inc" (2009). Moreover, the company has recently moved to incorporate existing mobile payments, such as mPesa, to further embrace the possibility of distributive finance[137].

As a technology of exchange, eLula draws on the existence of both the informal economy and prepaid citizenship, two different and yet interrelated spaces of calculability. However, there are other dimensions of calculability that can be built over these relations. In the words of Nomanini's CEO, the company is "sitting on a lot of valuable data" which

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135 In the words of Nomanini's CEO: "However, we have to acknowledge that there is a reason that these markets are under-served. They represent relatively low-income consumers (compared to global standards) and are not the first destinations for multi-nationals. Businesses that are able to work in these markets, with these margins need to be the most lean and efficient in the world. This is why we believe that businesses that succeed in Africa will present models that can be competitive globally". http://www.eva-fund.com/vahid-monadjem-nomanini-our-market-niche-is-transactions-at-informal-points-of-sales [accessed 7/7/2018].

136 https://cloud.google.com/customers/nomanini/ [accessed 1/3/2018]

137 http://ventureburn.com/2016/05/nomanini-claims-1-500-transaction-growth/ [accessed 1/3/2018]

could provide insights into informal market dynamics (Ventureburn, 2015). As Nomanini expands its services, it now provides data dashboards to geotrack the metrics of informal vendors, which would otherwise be untraceable. Any means of extracting data from the informal sector are obviously very enticing to state and private actors that have not yet been able to access those markets, which contribute in a very high percentage to the GDP of sub-Saharan countries[138]. In addition to that, data dashboards can be used by third parties to manage the various, precarious forms of employment that are common in South African townships: In their words:

> Most important are the metrics-driven service management tools that enable merchant aggregators' call centre staff, field representatives and sales managers to optimize their activity to maximize the "Ready-to-Trade" percentage. The platform also provides accurate and real-time reporting on sales data and geo-location of merchants[139].

As such, Nomanini's data dashboard produces a further space of calculability in the existing hierarchies between township entrepreneurs and gig workers. These multiplying layers of profit, however, are intertwined with the concerns of what could be called, now, an '*ubuntu* enterprise'. Profit and redistribution, the "double bottom line" of the social enterprise, are not only inextricably reproduced through the various activities of the company, but given a purported moral and natively African compass within the project of 'return' of the rainbow nation. As an example of this commitment, it is worth adding that my first encounter with Nomanini happened in the context of the Startup Weekend Khayelitsha (see Chapter 5). There, the marketing manager

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138 For a somewhat different and yet relevant take on the informal economy as an object of knowledge that determines whether it belongs to the gaze of the market or to the state see Julia Elyachar's book on Egypt: *Markets of Dispossession*.

139 https://cloud.google.com/customers/nomanini/ [accessed 1/3/2018]

and one of the founders volunteered as mentor and judge respectively. Occasions like Startup Weekend are crucial in establishing the right kind of fame and reputation among survivalist entrepreneurs who might, in the future, become clients of Nomanini. However, it was also, as I have shown in the specific analysis of the event, a choreography of redistributive efforts, where knowledge, time, and support from *ubuntu* businesses were reallocated to the less privileged, with diverse outcomes.

6.4. Conclusion.

The construction of contemporary South Africa as a liberal, non-racial democracy has been a process far more complicated (and unresolved—see Habib, 2013) than I could account for in this chapter. My aim was to use *ubuntu*—one of the narratives that, through charismatic leaders, philosophers and various choreographies of statecraft, has contributed to nation-building—to displace the centrality of social entrepreneurship which features in the other chapters of this work. By looking at how *ubuntu* reframes the possibility of addressing social issues through entrepreneurial profit, I have shown that finding market solutions to poverty is not only a script of millennial development, but may also belong to a formidable project of economic redistribution.

In fact, as James Ferguson has argued (2015), *ubuntu* is one of the overarching narratives that the South African state has used to explain and justify the redistributive effort which characterized the transition to a liberal democracy. At the centre of the rainbow nation project, the politics of redistribution have been variously articulated. The eLula POS manifests one of the ways in which *ubuntu* gives a technical, material shape to the politics of (re)distribution. As a commodity and as a technology of financial inclusion, eLula also shows how some of the meanings of *ubuntu* express the idea of good entrepreneurship in a

different language. For all its discursive power, which I charted in the other four empirical chapters of this dissertation, social entrepreneurship coexists with other discourses that produce the same, or similar, forms of collective and economic life.

In the previous chapter in particular, I argued that social entrepreneurship, through its material infrastructures, contained the possibility of a political project of redistribution. Here, I took this argument further, showing that the politics of redistribution are already engendered by notions of mutuality and return to African values, such as *ubuntu*. The latter finds specific material forms in urban artefacts as mundane as a point of sale (POS). This object reveals how *ubuntu* moves from the sphere of statecraft to some of the calculative inscriptions where it becomes visible. Throughout this process, the constellation of ideas that *ubuntu* stands for meets the, similarly blurred, semantic field of social entrepreneurship, in a conjuncture of developmental experiments, redistributive finance (Maurer, 2012) and post-apartheid statecraft.

The object that I have chosen for this chapter is just one of many an example of material "ethno-commodities", to use Comaroff's and Comaroff's expression (2009), which I encountered in my research. Beaded bracelets, container architectures, robotic patrolling Segways, high-visibility vests could have been just as revealing to understand how *ubuntu*, from the sphere of statecraft, filters down to the material governance of distribution. In her beautiful account of street life in Johannesburg, for example, Mpho Matsipa uses black hair braiding to show how distributive urban economies also take an aesthetic form (2017). My choice shows that in the nexus of financial inclusion, redistributive politics, and developmental efforts, both market and state forces produce a terrain for the kind of entrepreneurship that does 'well by doing good'.

This leads to another point that I wanted to raise in this chapter, which

is that although the state has remained, thus far, a mostly silent actor in my dissertation, the great project of nation building that South Africa undertook after apartheid was not uninfluential. Because I have mainly focused on technical experts, the state has not had a prominent voice in my work. However, the narratives of redistribution that were essential to governing transition from apartheid to democracy were also fundamental in articulating the modes of development. In seeing *ubuntu* as a discursive technology that coexists with social entrepreneurship, therefore, this chapter suggests that this thesis could only address some of the forms of authoritative expertise that have been key in establishing, translating, and articulating the social enterprise as a technology of just development in South Africa. The landscape of knowledge surrounding the politics of profit and redistribution is much wider than could be given account for. At the same time, the technologies of development need to be constantly negotiated within and without multiple ethical and political regimes.

7. Conclusions.

7.1. Overview.

At the beginning of this dissertation, I recounted how the failure of international development begat new forms of expertise, new experiments, even new ontologies of economic life (Best, 2013; 2017). By the end of the twentieth century, this failure had led to a radical rethinking of the solutions to poverty in the Global South[140]. As a result, empowering individuals has moved at the centre of developmental policies and market efforts (Elyachar, 2002; 2005; Li Murray, 2007; Mitchell & Sparke, 2016; Rankin, 2002; 2013). As a thread that weaves together different experiments with individual empowerment, entrepreneurship has been seen as a frontier of both capitalist expansion and poverty reduction.

As explained in the introduction to this work, "millennial development" is the eloquent name that Ananya Roy has given to this new paradigm of poverty alleviation rooted in the promise of entrepreneurialized inclusion (Roy, 2010). The adjective 'millennial' suggests that this shift in international development has taken place at the turn of the millennium, but also that its narratives and practices are ridden with contradictory, millenarian hopes that profit will eradicate poverty (see Chapter 1). In this understanding of the word 'millennial', there

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140 Although, as I have noted in the introduction, the World Bank and other developmental institutions still work with large loans as they used in the past — despite the new narratives of individual empowerment (Elyachar, 2012).

is a clear reference to the work of Jean and John Comaroff (2000), who argued that contemporary forms of capitalism are never merely about accumulation, but always imbued with messianic, even spiritual promises. Hence millennial development encompasses a series of discourses and techniques of government that are designed to expand the opportunities for profit by promising to address the predicaments of the postcolonial world.

The purpose of this dissertation was to show how social entrepreneurship, as a system of applied knowledge, functions as a political technology of millennial development. Defining social entrepreneurship as a political technology—a system of expertise that offers practical knowledge for a collective concern (Lakoff & Collier, 2010)—I have charted how it articulates contemporary development in one of its specific sites: a city that became part of what was once called the 'developing world' after several decades of racial segregation. With both ethnographic and interview material, I have shown how this process manifests through technopolitical experiments and practices. In particular, as the word 'ecology' suggests, I built into my account of millennial development not only experts, but a collage of centres of calculation (Chapter 2), pedagogic initiatives (Chapter 3), calculated performances that keep knowledge alive and train entrepreneurial capacities (Chapter 4), infrastructural ends (Chapter 5) and politicized artefacts that revealed the existence of alternatives to millennial development (Chapter 6).

By charting the technical and political modes of existence of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town, this work showed that millennial development is ridden with failures, and that alternative political technologies participate in the promise of *"doing well by/while doing good"*. To this end, I have not only investigated the functioning of social entrepreneurship as a political technology of millennial development, but also its "radical political indeterminacy" (Ferguson, 2015, p.31). I

have hence argued that entrepreneurial forms of development do not unfold as undisputed scripts, but that, as experimental forefronts, they both expand the "frontiers of capital" (Fisher & Downey, 2006) and the possibilities of alternative economic forms.

In the remainder of this chapter, I trace back the key findings of this dissertation, remarking what social entrepreneurship, and its ecology of expertise, revealed about millennial development in Cape Town. I gather the findings around three key themes that emerged throughout the empirical discussion of this work: the spaces, the performances and the material politics of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town. In the last section, I conclude by discussing the failed promises of profit. What my ethnographic encounter with social entrepreneurship in Cape Town also showed was that the latter is often not very successful at generating new profitable markets, and yet it is very capable of keeping the promises of profit alive, forging millennial subjectivities, and rearticulating the narratives of earlier developmental and humanitarian efforts in the city. These radical inconsistencies may well be at the essence of finding market solutions to poverty (Roy, 2015), but my research also shows that they can be used to cultivate different political and economic agendas. More specifically, as I further explain in the last pages of this dissertation, the promise of entrepreneurial profit, even when it does not live up to its expectations, can be used as a strategy for navigating against—or even just ignoring—the politics of millennial development.

7.2. Technopolitics/Spatialities.

The first finding about the technopolitics of development in Cape Town was that social entrepreneurship acts as one of its technologies because of the work of some sites that are capable of accumulating expertise. In Chapter 2, I have analysed these sites as "centres of calculation" (Latour, 1987), nodes that amass cycles of knowledge through a series of

centralizing practices: from network building to research, from creating rules to systematizing resources, from producing and circulating material outputs to—quite literally—putting the science of social entrepreneurship in action with experiments and didactic programmes.

In Cape Town's ecosystem of social entrepreneurship, three centres of calculation were recognized by my informants as more prominent than others: Inyathelo (a civil society organization), the Bertha Centre (an academic research centre) and Marcus Coetzee's consultancy. Charting their capacity for "governing at a distance" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p.181) and the modes through which they had achieved their centrality, revealed that contemporary development in Cape Town is not just underpinned by powerful rationalities, but by tireless activities of researching, problematizing, networking, surveying, measuring, and eventually establishing facts. The mobile discourses of social entrepreneurship, I have argued, even when coming from powerful supranational institutions and global philanthropic powerhouses (see Chapter 1), are flattened into the mundane practices through which these centres organize and accumulate knowledge.

In fact, what emerged from my empirical encounter with these centres of calculation was that they are also sites of critique. Critical speculation, debates, and discrepant political agendas are all incorporated into their functioning as nodes that translate social entrepreneurship. This means that, as part of their capacity to accumulate knowledge inscriptions, they are also endowed with the capacity to be strategically critical, for example about the market fundamentalism that upholds some narratives of social entrepreneurship. This was not only evident in my interviews with single individuals, but also in my ethnography of the workshops and activities designed to bring social entrepreneurship out of the lab. These experiments, as "hybrid forums" (Callon *et al.*, 2009), combine opportunities for debate with the possibility to retranslate

social entrepreneurship for purposes that are alternative to its initial claims (see Chapter 2).

The second finding about the spatialities of millennial development cuts across all chapters of this dissertation. Cape Town was a revealing vantage point because the city is at the forefront of entrepreneurial innovation in South Africa and in the continent as a whole. Described by many as the startup hub, or the 'Silicon Cape' of Africa, the city constituted a very fertile terrain for observing social entrepreneurship as a technology of development. This was because, as I explained in more detail in Chapter 1, post-apartheid South Africa has been invested in a vast project of state-led development, but also because the city's divided geography was 'figured' by my interlocutors as both a developmental problem and an entrepreneurial opportunity.

In this sense, Cape Town was not the mere physical setting of the research. For as much as the city, with its blossoming entrepreneurial scene, constituted an advantageous site for observing the reengineering of development, Cape Town was also an "actant"—to use a Latourian term (1990)—a figuration or assembly of actors that act by the act of mediating, translating, and modifying other entities. For STS scholars, a site is never merely a setting, a backdrop—it is an active participant, even in the way it is understood by other actors as a site (Latour *et al.*, 1998). This is particularly relevant, as I mentioned, in the way in which the city was imagined as divided, economically and geographically, across the scars of apartheid planning. Anecdotally, for example, the geographical metaphors through which the economy of the city was often described—most prominently, the "mountain" as a dividing line between the rich and the poor—informed the way in which many of my informants understood their commitment to development but also their critiques of it. More generally, particular neighbourhoods, from District Six to Khayelitsha, contributed to defining and performing the

relationship of social entrepreneurship with the scars of apartheid, but also the boundaries between formal and informal (Chapter 3, Chapter 6), between top and bottom of the pyramid (Chapter 3, Chapter 5), between fast and patient capitals (Chapter 5), between sources of ideas and sources of material nature (Chapter 4 and 5). In other words, the city too was an actant in several of the technopolitical experiments that I addressed in this dissertation.

This speaks to an important debate in postcolonial geography about the relationship between development and cities. For a long time, postcolonial cities were understood as sites that channelled ideas, experts and dollars in the postcolony (Abu-Lughod, 1971; Arrighi, 1970). More recent contributions on African urbanism, however, have challenged the assumption that cities on the continent have simply been vehicles in a globalized system of domination and exploitation (Robinson, 2006). In fact, as Achille Mbembé and Sarah Nuttall contend (2004), it is possible to write a different story for African cities, one where they do not simply qualify as a particular case or vehicle of global capitalism (one of "absolute otherness"), but constitute their own old and new political, social and cultural formations, even in their being part of world-scale movements of capitals and ideas.

Similarly, in the case of this dissertation, I wrote about global systems of knowledge, such as millennial development and social entrepreneurship, without dissolving the city of my research into a specific or local case of the former. This was not only because the dichotomy between global and local has little ontological value (Law & Mol, 2008), but because it showcased how Cape Town scripted its own reality of millennial development. In fact, drawing on Colin McFarlane's contribution, I argued that the city not only multiplied the possibilities of "learning" (2011) but also those of 'teaching'. In Cape Town, entirely new, ambivalent, political and technical modes of economic development

were experimented and disseminated. My argument here was that Cape Town, as an actant, contributed to translating social entrepreneurship for the purpose of economic development, but it also re-politicized its premises in relation to its realities of inequality, entrepreneurialism, innovation, and survival in a postcolonial city marked by the scars of separate development.

This is relevant in relation to a common critique of social entrepreneurship, and "social innovation" more generally: that these hybrid, entrepreneurial forms of civil-society undertakings contribute to shift responsibilities away from the state to other forms of governance (see Swyngedouw, 2005). In South Africa, however, as I argued in more detail in Chapter 1, 3 and 6, the state has had a very proactive role, also financially, in designing the modes and the spaces of local economic development driven by hybrid enterprises, even when a clear definition of the latter is still lacking in the legal system (see Chapter 2). Whilst this thesis was not exhaustive in charting policies and government actions, it shed a light on the fact that a seemingly post-political discourse, such is 'doing well by doing good', is continuously articulated within and in relation to a deeply political state-led project of redistribution that defies a categorization as simply neoliberal (Ferguson, 2015). In fact, this research revealed that social entrepreneurship is not only cast as a technology of neoliberal governance, which favours market interests beyond the state, but also as a device of development that recentres urban politics around the possibility of entrepreneurial redistribution.

7.3. Technopolitics/Performances.

A second set of findings concerned the performativity of social entrepreneurship as a system of developmental expertise. As made clear in the introduction, this dissertation is indebted to Timothy Mitchell's seminal work (2002) on the technopolitics of development

in contemporary Egypt, but more generally to the contribution of STS scholars who studied the relationship between realities and the scientific practices defining them (Callon, 1984; Latour, 1987. Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Mol, 2002). In this sense, I charted how specific pedagogies, performances and other choreographic practices (Chapter 2, 3, 4) were designed to produce the developmental economies of social entrepreneurship. This follows the insight that knowledge about the economy is crucial in performing the economy that it is purported to describe (Çalışkan & Callon, 2009), but also that economic expertise needs to be taken out of the scientific laboratory to be put "into action" (Latour, 1987).

This research found that to produce viable developmental economies, social entrepreneurship is moored to the making of its markets and its market subjectivities: that is, not just social entrepreneurs, but also capitalists, investors, mentors, policy-makers and leaders. This is achieved, as seen in the experiments of Chapter 3, through specific didactic experiments, but also, as seen in Chapter 4 and 5, through less formal and more choreographic performances, like story-telling sessions, competitions, and other staged acts that bring the promises of millennial development to its subjects.

As far as the pedagogies of social entrepreneurship are concerned, I have shown that the formation of millennial economic subjectivities takes place in experiments, like Business Bridge or IA, which are designed to forge at once good-doing entrepreneurs and opportunities for profit. It also takes place in the making of other subjectivities, such as impact capitalists, who are shaped by enrolling them into manufactured investment pipelines. Less formal, but equally widespread are the pedagogical performances that train the anticipatory capacities of both experts and entrepreneurs, with the kind of conferences, competitions, workshops and consultancy services discussed throughout this

dissertation. These didactic operations, I have argued, are crucial in setting the millennial narrative that pieces together the physical, material possibilities of social entrepreneurship, with its business schools, accelerator programmes, coworking spaces, networking events, competitions and incubators.

A second finding about these pedagogies shows that social entrepreneurship is inextricably entwined with other political technologies of development, other powerful ideas that are experimented in the formation of economic subjects. Specifically, in this dissertation I argued that social entrepreneurship speaks to the bottom-of-the-pyramid approach, to the idea of the 'informal economy', 'dead capital' and to microfinance in ways that make it, in fact, one of many devices for finding market solutions to poverty.

Lastly, the performativity of social entrepreneurship revealed, in contrast with the hopeful promises of millennial development, the possibility of failure, the possibility that subjectivities and markets fail to be created or to deliver the change they were designed to effect. In particular, this research showed how failure becomes incorporated in the performances of social entrepreneurship, how it is acknowledged and made sense of, how it becomes performative in itself, by forging new knowledge, and even new selves for the development experts that I interviewed for this research.

7.4. Technopolitics/Materialities.

A third set of findings concerned the materialities of development. In my research, I paid attention to the "mundane governance" (Woolgar & Neyland, 2013) of development, or, in other words, to how its knowledge practices assume specific material forms. This follows in the footsteps of some important scholarly contributions that have

addressed the material politics of contemporary development, focusing on "humanitarian goods" and "development devices" (Collier *et al.* 2017; see also Redfield, 2012; Cross, 2013), technical protocols, and how they come into being through conferences, reports, and other mobile objects (Roy, 2010; 2012; Elyachar, 2012), or specific infrastructures, from physical buildings and neighbourhoods to immaterial platforms (Elyachar, 2005; Larkin, 2013; Maurer, 2012). All share the view that the economic, financial and technical expertise supporting contemporary development interventions is also articulated in material ways: through devices, media, infrastructures and objects.

This research has confirmed that social entrepreneurship functions as a political technology of millennial development through technopolitical arrangements that involve specific materialities. In fact, these political technologies are not mere discursive rationalities. Neither they are simply upheld by experts and bureaucrats. On the contrary, they are also a matter of matter: physical buildings, infrastructures, artefacts that, in the case of this work, belonged to Cape Town's ecology of social entrepreneurship.

This was evident from the very first empirical chapter of this work, where I described how some centres of calculation accumulate knowledge by storing, centralizing and systematizing material inscriptions of social entrepreneurship: books, papers, logos, but also the email servers, the case studies folders, the policy protocols and all the other instruments through which their calculative capacities are distributed. The tangibility of social entrepreneurship also emerged in relation to both the pedagogic and the choreographic performances of Chapter 3 and 4. In particular, I argued that experiments with economic life are underpinned as well as showcased by buildings and devices designed to multiply the possibilities of profit, while stretching market forces to include those that older forms of development—including separate

development—had left behind. In this sense, the prospects of social entrepreneurship are also mobilized by specific infrastructural ends: the incubator spaces where social entrepreneurs find their socio-technical networks of support. In Chapter 5, by tracing the lives of the Barn and the Hub, I suggested that these incubators are key in the process through which social entrepreneurship becomes a viable political technology in the restructuring of humanitarian development outside its "laboratory life".

The materialities of social entrepreneurship also exposed the unexpected politics of millennial development in Cape Town. More specifically, my research has showed that it is precisely because of their tangible materiality that developmental experiments can be hacked, transformed, and contested. For example, it was by tinkering with the material rules of the competition that the contestants at Startup Weekend inscribed their alternative political and ethical agendas into a mechanism designed to foster profit at the bottom of the pyramid. In this and in many other occasions, my interlocutors would go off-script (Akrich, 1994), defying the purposes, contesting the rules, and criticizing the features of the developmental technologies that they consciously employed.

It was also a material object, a remote point of sale (POS) in Chapter 6, that revealed how the idea of 'doing well by doing good' is not only articulated by the discourses of social entrepreneurship, but by a local ethos called *ubuntu*, a distributed morality of redistribution. The materiality of *ubuntu* displaces the centrality of social entrepreneurship as a technology of millennial development, and shows how the same concerns of redistributing access to profit are articulated by other logics and narratives. *Ubuntu* thus reveals how social entrepreneurship is far from being the only technical rationality undergirding millennial development in present South Africa. Rather, it is one among many

political technologies that give voice to the hopes of redistributing wealth and access to economic opportunities in a still deeply unequal country.

7.5. Fictitious capital: not doing that well...Yet doing good.

> "This is the power of development: the power to transform old worlds, the power to imagine new ones" (Crush, 1995, p.2).

> "I understand your scepticism about 'development.' But after all, there really are an awful lot of poor, sick, hungry people out there. What's to be done about it? If 'development' isn't the answer, then what is?" (Ferguson, 1990, p.279)

As this research shows, social entrepreneurship does not often live up to its millenarian promises of profit. Moreover, whilst poverty has indeed been reduced by the expansion of social security in several countries of the Global South (Ferguson, 2015; Roy & Crane, 2015), the effects of entrepreneurial development are contested and arguable (see Elyachar, 2005; Rankin, 2008). Experts are more and more aware, for example, that microcredit is not working as a mechanism to forge businesses, but as consumption loans, or, as Jonathan Morduch puts it, as a "credit card" for the poor (2017). In other words, while poverty finance expands, the prospect of unleashing an untapped entrepreneurial force falls back, and the only result of microfinance is the sale of banking services to the poor. Similarly, whilst impact capitals and philanthropic organizations are more and more keen to invest in social enterprises, the successful rate of these experiments is suboptimal. The policies and techniques of millennial development are ridden with fiascos. As a matter of fact, some of the pedagogical experiments charted in this dissertation eventually turned up to be about teaching entrepreneurs to survive in conditions of market failure (see Chapter 3 and 4).

For this reason, the promise of a redemptive profit must be reinvigorated every time reality fails it. More than profit itself, then, it is the capacity to engage the future at lies at the core of social entrepreneurship, and,

more broadly, development. The imaginative power of development, as Jonathan Crush reminds us in the epigraph at the beginning of this section, is indeed *the* power of development (1995). This is an area where I sought to make an intellectual contribution, by dedicating an entire chapter (Chapter 4) to charting how training the anticipatory capacities of both market subjects and development experts is crucial in reproducing the promises of social entrepreneurship, especially considering the failures of expertise.

As I look back at my field notes, I find so many failures that those which I have discussed in the dissertation are only the tip of an iceberg of development fiascos. This is the reason why I want to suggest that the diverse economies of social entrepreneurship in Cape Town are not only "the active frontiers of contemporary capitalism, the greenfield sites where new forms of accumulation are forged and expanded" (Roy, 2011, p. 229). Social entrepreneurship also produces a "fictitious" terrain of capitalist expansion—a concept that I borrow from the third volume of Karl Marx's *Das Kapital*. Marx did not fully develop the concept of "fictitious capital", which was later reprised by Engels, but he suggested that a proportion of capital, which he calls "*fiktiv*", cannot immediately converted into the accumulation of use-values. It is an invention that nurtures the confidence in the future growth of 'real' capital (Marx, 1981, chapter XXIX). "*Fiktiv'*, indeed, can also be translated as 'fictional', as it represents an accumulation of claims rather than an accumulation of values. For this reason, the idea of fictitious capital has been used in Marxist understandings of banking and finance (which was also the original context of Marx's writing). Here, however, I use it more metaphorically as a speculative fiction that produces, for millennial development, a territory of virtual, rather than real, expansion.

What I want to suggest is twofold. If social entrepreneurship is a political technology for 'doing well', that 'doing well' often remains

only a promise that needs to be constantly nourished in conditions of incredible uncertainty—as I showed in Chapter 3, 4 and Chapter 5. If millennial development is indeed a frontier of capitalist expansion (Roy, 2010), that expansion bears very small fruits in comparison to its promises. On the contrary, as this thesis argues on the whole, it is a laborious, impractical, financially-risky path. So much that one might ask whether empowerment through (social) entrepreneurship really has anything to do with the fast forces of global capitalisms. This does not mean that the fictitious capital produced by social entrepreneurship is without forms of structural violence or its own "accumulation by dispossession" (Harvey, 2004). If anything, the speculative power of entrepreneurial hopes is predicated on the very existence of poverty, of urban areas of marginality that become the domains of entrepreneurial profit. It would be easy then to subsume social entrepreneurship under an all-encompassing "fiction" of global capitalism (Tsing, 2011): one that expands its reach in unexplored terrains. It could be argued that structural poverty is, indeed, reproduced by the efforts of giving a human "face" to development (Dolan, 2012).

On the other hand, however, one may see social entrepreneurship as a fiction in itself, one that is strategically indifferent to global capitalism. This fiction, then, appears as a strategy for doing good first, rather than doing well at all costs. It is strategic in that it conceals that there is no fortune at the bottom of the pyramid. And it is a fiction because it produces claims that are based on speculations about future profits, and less so on real evidence. Sometimes, my interlocutors admitted to tampering with the facts on which their promises to investors and mentors were made. More generally, however, they did not hide their scepticism about the real possibility of extracting, with social entrepreneurship, any kind of "fortune" at the bottom of the pyramid—which they saw as a parable more than as a real possibility. In this regard, Timothy Mitchell has shown that the very making of 'neoliberal' development

in late nineties Egypt, in many ways a failed enterprise, was predicated on doctored facts and numbers, but also on an overarching fiction of what capitalism was (Mitchell, 1999). As a matter of fact, most of the social entrepreneurs I encountered during my fieldwork were not really doing well. Neither were the experts who I talked to were particularly convinced that they could do any better. And yet, they kept nurturing an ecology of millenarian promises.

This is a suggestion that is vital to understanding the unfolding of millennial development in Cape Town. Often, as Ananya Roy concedes too, millennial development is a fictional narration of the "capital" of poverty (2010) and the virtual terrains of its possibility. The discrepancy between the promises and the realities of social entrepreneurship, however, remained a productive site to propel the expansion of its experimental frontiers. Many of my informants did see such a contradiction, but not as simply as a constellation of failures, or as an inherent component of global capitalism; rather, I suggest, they saw it as a strategy for "doing good" against all odds, or even as a strategy to incorporate their alternative political schemes into the technical quandaries of social entrepreneurship.

Almost thirty years ago, as reported in the second epigraph of this conclusive section, James Ferguson questioned the relevance of ethnographic research into the apparatus of development through the words of one of his interlocutors. I myself was asked that question many times over the course of my fieldwork: how was my research going to help? My informants also had views on what my research should do. For some, it was understanding why social enterprises kept failing. For others, it was finding out what kind of network infrastructure would best fit the needs of a market where social change is more important than maximizing profit. Or it was advocating the need for *"patient"* capitals. Some even had more specific suggestions: this work should

prescribe the importance of coding skills for development in Africa, or explain why the ASEN (African Social Enterprise Network) failed and was dismissed. Obviously, the conclusion of this thesis would let them all down. There is one promise that I made to some of my informants, however, that I did not want to let go: not to portray their efforts as uncritical, uninformed manoeuvres of a neoliberal agenda aimed at *simply* finding new profitable markets amidst the legacies of colonialism and apartheid.

In fact, this dissertation speaks to how a multi-sited ethnographic immersion into the urban geographies of developmental expertise could reveal the contradictory unfolding of "millennial capitalism" (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000). In doing so, I sought not to misrepresent the hopes and desires that I found in Cape Town, within its diverse, cosmopolitan, ordinary ecology of 'doing well while doing good'. To keep this promise, my tactical strategy was, as suggested by J.K. Gibson-Graham (1996), to read "for difference", or, to use James Ferguson's words again, to attend the "radical political indeterminacy" of any political technology (2015, p.31). Reading for failures, unattended expectations, and alternative politics such as those of *ubuntu*, I showed that my informants were not—not everyone, at least—hapless agents of the expansion of global capitalism. In fact, many of them articulated conscious critiques of millennial development and saw their experiments as possibilities for inhabiting market relations in alternative ways. Or even for transforming social entrepreneurship.

The technopolitical formations that I charted in this dissertation were also sites of translation, where the expansion of profit opportunities was often, if not always, negotiated with the different possible meanings that my interlocutors attributed to social justice in a city divided by its colonial and racial past. In this sense, social entrepreneurship constituted a discursive field that at the same time allowed them the

possibility to cultivate a multiplicity of technical, economic and ethical regimes, beyond the pursuit of profit. Many of my interlocutors—some explicitly, some less so—used the openness of social entrepreneurship as a political technology to circumvent the constraints, the demands, but also the politics of finding market solutions to poverty.

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9. Appendices

Appendix 1. List of interviews.

Interviewee	Organization	Date
Sajidah	Inyathelo	May 2015, August 2015
Rashiq	Future Cape Town	May 2015
Melisizwe	HubSpace	Sept 2015
Jay	Social entrepreneur, former development consultant	September 2015
Bongani	GreenCape	August 2015
Karen	Bertha Centre for Social Entrepreneurship	September 2015
Henry	Retired philanthropist	May 2015, Sept 2015
Gareth	Impact Amplifier	April 2015
Laura	Inyathelo	June 2015
Andrew	Western Cape Provincial Government	April 2015, May 2015, Sept 2015
Baratang	The Barn (incubator)	Sept 2015
Emma	Code4CT	Oct 2015
Martha	Silicon Cape	Sept 2015
Ryan	US voluntourist at RLabs	Sept 2015
Robert	CEO of Business Bridge	Aug 2015
Marcus Coetzee	His own consultancy	Jun 2015
Jessica	Legal Resource Centre	May 2015
Emily	Accelerate CapeTown	May 2015
Trevor	PigeonPie	May 2015, May, 2015, Aug 2015. Sept 2015
Andrew	Cape Town Partnership	March 2015
Malini	PWC (PriceWatersCooper)	Aug 2015
Brett Comaille	Angel Investor	Aug 2015
Renee	Philippi Village	Aug 2015
Stephen	Social Entrepreneur/CEO of NGO	Sept 2015
Elana	Zeitz Foundation	Aug 2015
Cheryl	SAB Miller Foundation	Sept 2015
Karel	Social Entrepreneur	Oct 2015

Appendix 2. List of image sources.

Image 1. https://insp.ngo/big-issue-south-africa-vendor-makes-hollywood-debut-in-cape-town-film/ [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 2. http://ventureburn.com/2017/03/new-infographic-focuses-cape-town-startup-capital-africa/ [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 3. http://www.bigissue.org.za/news/big-issue-video-wins-an-award/ [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 4. Photo taken by the author on 19th August 2015.

Image 5. https://www.inyathelo.org.za/cache/widgetkit/gallery/33/VB2_1668-cf444718e6.JPG [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 6. http://www.inyathelo.org.za/images/blogimages/inyathelo_floor_plan2015.pdf [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 7. http://www.governance.org.za/ [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 8. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b1/Breakwater_Lodge.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 9. https://www.slideshare.net/lorentreisman/inside-out-finance-issue [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 10. http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/s.asp?p=527 [accessed 5/24/2018]

Image 11. https://www.groundup.org.za/media/uploads/images/Gallery/PhilippiSanitation-7989HR.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 12. Photo taken by the author on 5th September 2015.

Image 13. http://www.philippivillage.co.za/img/original/layout2.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 14. Photo taken by the author on 5th September 2015.

Image 15. http://pedi.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/PV-Containers-for-web2.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 16. http://theguildgroup.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/GG_WATERSHED6.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 17. http://www.wolffarchitects.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/by-Dave-Southwood-17.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 18. http://www.wolffarchitects.co.za/wp-content/

uploads/2014/08/by-Heinrich-Wolff-3.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 19. http://www.greenpointcricketclub.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/capetownairporthome.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 20. https://mindboxstudios.com/app/uploads/2014/06/Screen-Shot-2014-08-14-at-3.27.46-PM.png [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 21. http://www.techstars.com/content/startup-next/education-entrepreneurs-partners-imagine-k12/ [accessed 24/5/2018].

Image 22. https://www.tablemountain.net/cache/ce_img_cache/local/uploads/files/Khayelitsha_residents_Muzikayise_Radebe_poses_for_Mfesane_Cwati_at_the_Lookout_Hill_frame_of_Table_Mountain_in_Khayelitsha_1027_684_90_s.jpg [accessed 5/7/2018].

Image 23. Photo taken by the author on 12th September 2015.

Image 24. Photo taken by the author on 12th September 2015.

Image 25. Photo taken by the author on 13th September 2015.

Image 26. Photo taken by the author on 13th September 2015.

Image 27. http://wiseman-design.com/wp-content/uploads/Nomanini-Double-shot-DOF-e1517925016272.png [accessed 5/7/2018].

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