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Master's Thesis of International Studies

Korea's global role and its contributions within  
International organizations: Regional protector,  
Regional subsystem Collaborator, and  
Developer?

대한민국의 국제기구 내 국제적 역할과 기여:  
지역 수호자, 지역 하부체제 협력자, 개발자?

February 2023

**Graduate School of International Studies**  
**Seoul National University**  
**International Cooperation Major**

**Seokwon Choi**

**Korea's global role and its contributions  
within International organizations:  
Regional protector, Regional subsystem  
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**Professor JeongHun Han**

**Submitting a master's thesis of  
International Studies**

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**Graduate School of International Studies  
Seoul National University  
International Cooperation Major**

**Seokwon Choi**

**Confirming the master's thesis written by**

**Seokwon Choi**

**February 2023**

Chair	<u>          Woosik Moon          </u> (Seal)
Vice Chair	<u>          Seong-Ho Sheen          </u> (Seal)
Examiner	<u>          JeongHun Han          </u> (Seal)

# Abstract

This research applies Holsti's role theory derived from realist perspective on foreign security policy to evaluate the Republic of Korea's role and contribution to the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. The role theory was introduced in the 1970s and this theory understands the role of the state as its foreign policy decision-making and its actions, and include attitude of the government, decisions and functions that are set together to be defined as the role. The application of this perspective contains numerous advantages throughout this research.

Firstly, this theory enables South Korea to be compared with other Asian partnership for cooperation states such as Australia and Japan, who are already entitled with specific national roles assigned by Holsti. This is particularly because of the fact that, Australia with the regional protector role and Japan with the regional subsystem collaborator and the developer role, are eligible be to compare with South Korea as all of them are Asian partner states among seventeen different roles. Secondly, since Holsti left South Korea without any national role due to incomplete and insufficient data on its foreign policy and actions, it would be incredibly significant to define what role the ROK takes on in the 2020s that is quite different from the 1970s.

Moreover, in the contribution dimension, this research delivers academic achievements as follows. This research gives important necessities on further studies on the OSCE, as the current studies tend to focus more on the United Nations, the UN Peacekeeping operations, and other regional security organizations such as the NATO or the ASEAN. By assessing South Korea's actual contribution to the OSCE that is not commonly discussed in the current literature, this paper aims to understand

Korea's tangible contribution rather than simply focusing on the ROK-OSCE bilateral relationship. As this research concentrates on the contribution evaluation, it will include detailed assessment on partnership fund, special contribution, and personnel contribution provision. By following these steps, this research reveals similarities and differences between South Korea and Australia and Japan, who are Asian partnership for cooperation states.

Therefore, this research could provide several crucial findings. First of all, in the regional protector role, Australia and South Korea were compared based on the partnership fund and policy cooperation. The result shows Australia has a slightly larger partnership fund than South Korea, while South Korea shows wider, and more diverse policy cooperation and this implies South Korea takes on regional protector role with weaker financial contribution but stronger policy contribution. Secondly, Japan and South Korea were compared according to the same contribution measurements from the first comparison. The result shows that Japan plays much a stronger financial contribution, while South Korea plays a wider, more diverse policy contribution in the regional subsystem collaborator role. Lastly, in the developer role Japan gives much a stronger contribution in both special funding and personnel dimension while South Korea shows its weakness and limitations as a latecomer.

Thus, the role of the ROK to the OSCE covers the following features. Firstly, in the regional protector role, the Republic of Korea shows a slightly smaller financial contribution in the partnership fund than Australia and a wider and much diverse policy contribution than that of Australia. Secondly, South Korea clearly shows a much smaller financial contribution in the partnership fund than that of Japan, with a wider and much diverse policy contribution than Japan. Finally, in the developer role, the Republic of Korea shows shorter and smaller financial

contribution in both special funding contribution and personnel contribution. By conducting an assessment on Korea's role and contribution, this research finds advantages and disadvantages from the three different roles, and these findings show what South Korea needs to improve in Korea's diplomacy in the near future.

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Keywords: role, role conceptions, contribution, security cooperation, OSCE, The Republic of Korea  
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# Chapter 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Study Background

The Post-Cold war era has immensely changed the existing international order. The bipolar competition between the United States and the Soviet Union finally ended with the collapse of the USSR, was replaced to American unipolarity. While Europe was able to end the Cold war with maintaining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, other regions such as Northeast Asia could not still end the Cold war. The deformed security of East Asia, where South Korea, the US, and Japan coalesce against North Korea, China, and Russia has continued until now. Due to this hostile regional security, it seems almost impossible to construct a multilateral security platform.

The end of the Cold war has diversified middle, small, and weak powers. The instability and non-existence of peace in Asia was still apparent. While the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, functions as a multilateral ground for regional security cooperation, was limited to the Southeast Asian region. However, East Asia, failed to meet any kinds of platform to sustain the security cooperation. A good example is the failure of six-party talks, where South Korea attempted to build a common ground for her neighboring states to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. This implies that, Northeast Asia is still facing the Cold war, without any form of regional common ground.

Despite of these difficulties, South Korea has consistently tried to play a crucial role to solve this regional dilemma. The role of Korea in this region was not clear in the beginning due to Korean war which is nominated on The Guinness book



of world records for the war in which most countries to support an ally in war.<sup>①</sup> Despite its rough start, South Korea developed its economy with a GDP ranked 10<sup>th</sup> largest country, becoming the only country that successfully transitioned from a developing to a developed state acknowledged by the UNCTAD.<sup>②</sup> The role of Korea, based on increased national capacity, includes many foreign policies that such as ODA policies, aid programs, humanitarian aids and supports, as well as monetary contribution to numerous IOs that are under the United Nations, and its related sub-organizations.

South Korea is one of the most active states in securing global peace in coalition-based frameworks. Being the 10<sup>th</sup> largest donor to UN PKO activities, it has also collaborated with other countries for the regional stability. Here, examples of Korean contribution to the global peace are numerous joint exercises. The ROK has also decided to show its strengths in its joint exercises to other allies of the United States, such as Cobra Gold, Red flag, Sea Dragon, and Talisman Saber. Other military activities that contribute to regional and global peace are multiple Korean troops in the UN peacekeeping operations and missions.

However, the ROK has not been a full supporter of other international, or intra-regional organizations beyond Korean matters, as South Korea rather performed as an observer or guest state within those organizations. This was due to the fact that Korea is reluctant to work on matters beyond the Korean issues. For examples, South Korea is not a permanent state of the OSCE, but a partnership

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<sup>①</sup> The Guinness book of world records. (2010). Most countries to support an ally in war. Guinness Media.

<sup>②</sup> UNCTAD. (2021, July 22). General profile: Korea, republic of. UNCTADstat. Retrieved November 21, 2021, from <https://unctadstat.unctad.org/countryprofile/generalprofile/en-gb/410/index.html>.

state.<sup>③</sup> South Korea is not a full member of the NATO but remaining as a “partners across the globe”.<sup>④</sup> Albeit South Korea was able to join Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and installed mission to NATO in its Korean embassy in Belgium, it is not still a full member.<sup>⑤</sup>

In this sense, it is important to understand where South Korea in the globe is, in terms of its role in different regions, with its own unique capacities and responsibilities. With its increased national strengths maintained with both economic and military abilities, South Korea’s role beyond the Korean peninsula needs to be analyzed in order to see how South Korea could actually contribute to other regions. Most importantly, Korea’s contributions that are directly related to a specific role that South Korea seeks to have as an official national image should be measured to see what role South Korea plays in the globe.

## **1.2. Purpose of Research**

This research aims to reveal what role does the ROK hold in the international organizations, specifically within the organization for security and cooperation in Europe. Nowadays global environment is asking more actions from middle power countries such as South Korea. This is becoming an unviable situation for middle powers, and this tendency is likely to be continued. Firstly, the new cold war is emerging from the trade war between the United States and China. Secondly, international problems and concerns that require great powers and middle powers

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<sup>③</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020). The OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation: Reflections and Perspectives. 24-28

<sup>④</sup> NATO. (2022, May 23). Relations with the Republic of Korea. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved November 12, 2022, from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50098.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50098.htm)

<sup>⑤</sup> NATO. (2022, September 26). Alliance agrees the Republic of Korea's mission to NATO. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Retrieved November 12, 2022, from [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_207639.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_207639.htm)

are becoming more obvious and demanding. Lastly, great powers are asking middle power countries to make concessions in the form of coalition, multilateral cooperation, and regional scale cooperation. Thus, the role of middle powers is in truly needed in this era.

Hence, there is a need to analyze Korean role and contribution to the OSCE as one of the few security-related IOs in which Korea participates. Korea's role in the international system needs to be analyzed, to see whether Korea is fulfilling its role or not. To analyze Korea's contribution, this study will examine the actual contribution in terms of financial support, and provision of experts and professionals, and policy cooperation. Also, these contributions of Korea will be compared with other states who are in analogous positions, and those who share similar strengths and influences. From this perspective, excavating Korean contributions in the OSCE with other states could provide several meaningful results.

The organization for security and cooperation in Europe, the OSCE is where South Korea joined as a "Asian partner for cooperation" status. It is one of five different Asian partnership countries who is cooperating with the OSCE in the comprehensive security domain.<sup>⑥</sup> In the East Asia, only Japan, the ROK are only regional partners attached to the OSCE while China and North Korea are not members, along with Mongolia and Russia as permanent members. In spite of the OSCE's main concern to the European security, South Korea has joined in this organization in the 1994, to seek cooperations and solutions to the Northeast Asia's missing multilateral security cooperation.

Forthwith, the research question of this paper is to figure out how Korea

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<sup>⑥</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2006). ASIAN PARTNERS FOR CO-OPERATION. The OSCE Magazine. OSCE Secretariat

contributes to international organizations such as the OSCE and what role does Korea perform inside of this system. This main argument includes two major components, contribution measurements and role analysis. Contribution measurements will contain actual contributions that South Korea did within the OSCE such as financial, personnel contributions and policy contribution. The methodological approach to find these contributions, official reports, factsheets, and press releases from the Ministry of foreign affairs of the ROK, the OSCE, and other related parties will be utilized. Role analysis will contain cross comparisons between the ROK and other related states with provided contributions.

In methodological approach, Holsti's role theory will be used, which describes policymakers' definitions of decisions to their states in the international structure that shows the appearance of their state toward the outmost environment. To depict the national role that Korea plays, this theory will compare Korea with other states such as Australia and Japan who already possesses certain roles such as regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer. For the comparison, measurements towards monetary, personnel, and policy contributions will be analyzed for its frequency, stability, and quantity. These measurements will function as the barometer to define whether Korea's role as regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer is strong or weak.

## **Chapter 2. Literature Review**

Previous part has already explained the importance of the bilateral relation between South Korea and the OSCE. Especially, measuring Korean contribution within the OSCE requires what role that South Korea carries inside the organization. Then, how does one simply define and assess one state's capacity and role of the

state? There are many different perspectives to this question, as state's capacity and role could be assessed by each different measurement. To understand such context, there needs to be an approach from the theoretical background that analyzes the basic environment of the international relations. Also, along with how to view the international system, the role of the state within the system could not be omitted, as different powers with its own national goals behave differently.

## 2.1. Realism and Middle Power

Among various IR theories, In realism scholars such as Morgenthau (1958) introduces realism to explain this question, as he argues that states are unitary actor under the anarchy, which force them to rely on themselves.<sup>⑦</sup> Another realist scholar, Kenneth Waltz (2000) modernized this concept, asserting that international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities.<sup>⑧</sup> Realism-based theories here, could explain the situation of the Northeast Asia where the cold war was never ended. Also, scholars such as Fox (1954)<sup>⑨</sup>, Ritchie (1988)<sup>⑩</sup>, Enrico (2017)<sup>⑪</sup>, and Vital (1967)<sup>⑫</sup> categorize, in the modern geopolitical landscape, states are divided to superpower, great power, middle power, and small power. With these different states, the ability and role of the state could be measured.

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<sup>⑦</sup> Morgenthau, H. (1958). REALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Naval War College Review, 10(5), 1–15. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/44640810>

<sup>⑧</sup> Waltz, K. N. (2000). Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), 5–41. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2626772>

<sup>⑨</sup> Evans, G.; Newnham, J. (1998). Dictionary of International Relations. London: Penguin Books. p. 522. ISBN 9780140513974

<sup>⑩</sup> Owendale, Ritchie (January 1988). "Reviews of Books: Power in Europe? Great Britain, France, Italy and Germany in a Postwar World, 1945–1950". The English Historical Review. Oxford University Press. 103 (406): 154.

<sup>⑪</sup> Fels, Enrico (2017). Shifting Power in Asia-Pacific? The Rise of China, Sino-US Competition and Regional Middle Power Allegiance. Springer. p. 213. Retrieved 2016-11-25.

<sup>⑫</sup> Vital, D. (1967) The Inequality of States: A Study of Small Power in International Relations

What decides the size of one country's power and its role? The idea of the structural realism could play a crucial role to choose the type of state. There are three types of the actors in the globe. The first one is a superpower, which is a unipolar state that does not have any potential competitor. Then followed by the great power, which is smaller than superpower but still possesses the means and capacities to put its strengths and influences. Then there is a middle power, which is not a superpower nor a great power but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. Lastly, there is a weak power, who is heavily influenced by both superpower and great power, with lacking capacity and influence, and low international recognition.

Assuming South Korea is in the middle power category, there are still questions regarding the capacity of South Korea itself, as it cannot simply be determined as a "middle power". If so, which power is South Korea well known for? According to Brandfinance, a brand valuation company, South Korea was ranked as 11th strongest soft power index in the globe in the year of 2021.<sup>13</sup> For hard power, South Korea is 10th largest GDP in the world from the IMF's report<sup>14</sup>, and South Korea is the 6th strongest country in military strength according to the GPI report.<sup>15</sup> From these results, it could be understood that South Korea's hard power is still more influential than its soft power.

Then, how does middle power of international relations is being analyzed?

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<sup>13</sup> Brandfinance. (2021, September 27). Global Soft Power index 2021: South Korea Ranks 11th: Press release. Brand Finance. Retrieved November 15, 2022, from <https://brandfinance.com/press-releases/global-soft-power-index-south-korea-ranks-11th>

<sup>14</sup> International Monetary Fund. (2022). World Economic Outlook:War Sets Back the Global Recovery. Washington, DC, April. pp.43

<sup>15</sup> Global Firepower. (2021, January 10). 2022 military strength ranking. Global Firepower - World Military Strength. Retrieved November 12, 2022, from <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.php>

According to Kim (2009), he argues that definition of the middle power is divided into realism approach and liberalism approach.<sup>16</sup> In realism approach, hierarchical side decides middle power, followed with hard power while liberalism approach highlights functional and behavioral side with soft power. He also stresses the importance of South Korea's both structural and diplomatic capabilities which enables most of the middle powers to be actively engaged with international system. South Korea's case where it is a member of the coffee club and G20 implies the possibility of South Korea to become an initiative-taking middle power state in the global affairs areas.

With these ideas, South Korea could be labelled as one of the middle powers. And another point regarding the relationship between middle power states and the international systems, where they could contribute its assets, values, and perspectives are demanded. Scholars such as Glazebrook (1947) asserts that middle powers who are differentiated from great powers, tends to show opposition to improper control by the great powers, tendency of the collective behavior, and lastly, influence.<sup>17</sup> According to Canadian senior diplomat Riddell (1963), he claims that middle power states contribute to the United Nations with resource, responsibility, and leadership.<sup>18</sup> He also claims that they are those who are close to become great powers in terms of its size, resources, responsibility with will and capability, influence, and stability.

Followed by the how one specific middle power state could contribute to

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<sup>16</sup> Kim, C. (2009). Middle Power as a Unit of Analysis of International Relations : Its Conceptualization and Implications. *Journal of International Relations*, 49, 7-36.

<sup>17</sup> G. deT. Glazebrook. (1947). The Middle Powers in the United Nations System. *International Organization*, 1(2), 307–315. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703870>

<sup>18</sup> Soward, F. H. (1963). On Becoming and Being a Middle Power: The Canadian Experience. *Pacific Historical Review*, 32(2), 111–136. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4492152>

international world, several scholars revealed that middle powers bolster United Nations capacity for collective actions. Laatikainen (2006) claims middle powers such as Dutch and Nordic states were granted larger legitimacy and influence within the UN context than their actual capacity.<sup>19</sup> Davis (2020) puts that Australia as a middle power, needs to take certain actions in order to better adapt regional challenges by selecting specific, goal oriented foreign policies.<sup>20</sup> Wood (1987) points out potentials of middle powers in the international order that contains both opportunities such as collective concerted efforts, while possess obstacles that are less ambitions and choosing important decisions.<sup>21</sup>

Besides the United Nations, are there any research focused on the cooperation between middle powers and regional security organizations. This paper plans to reveal South Korea's role in the OSCE, by realizing measurements as how state in the international system cooperates, coalesce, and achieve national interests while following principles of the structure. Additionally, another question is that if middle powers contribute to the international organizations, how does one state contribute to international organizations? However, there are only existing papers about the introduction of the OSCE, and its mechanisms, its institutional and structural origins, and its practical sub-organizations. The actual contribution of the ROK to the OSCE is not revealed in any academic papers.

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<sup>19</sup> Laatikainen, K.V. (2006). *Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN. The European Union at the United Nations*. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. [https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503731\\_4](https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503731_4)

<sup>20</sup> DAVIS, M. (2020). *AUSTRALIA AS A RISING MIDDLE POWER*. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep24285>

<sup>21</sup> Bernard Wood. (1987). *MIDDLE POWERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL*. WP 11. Wider Working Papers.



## 2.2. The OSCE, Northeast Asia, and South Korea

Academic results below show what are major research that related to the OSCE and Korea. Choi (2017) introduces “the Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly: Second Edition” declared by the OSCE/ODIHR which leads legislators and practitioners to better implement laws that regulate issues pertaining to the freedom of assembly.<sup>22</sup> This guideline broadly explains the guidelines and core purposes, it also includes diverse and various practice examples, case laws, and commitments and standards of participating states. The publication of this document, measured very importantly by the author, is the selection of seven principles regarding the freedom of peaceful assembly. By giving this clear vision, the guideline provides possibilities and limitations of the freedom of peaceful assembly, while mentioning implementing problems to initiate

Lee (2018) introduces multilateral security cooperation within the European region and military control governance and how these systems could be implemented to Korean peninsula.<sup>23</sup> He points out Helsinki process which successfully transformed former socialist states to democratic regimes while alleviating numerous security threats and reinforcing these experiences. The author believes that, in order to ultimately implant multilateral security cooperation and military control governance, it is essential to install common principle for peace, to adapt CBMs and its consolidation towards the Northeastern Asian peace system.

Lee (2010) believes that the multilateralism approach is required in order to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem while asserting that the

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<sup>22</sup> 최명일. (2017). 평화적 집회의 자유에 관한 지침. 민주법학, 64(0), 149-291.

<sup>23</sup> 이정우(Lee, Jeongwoo). (2018). 다자간 안보협력과 군비통제의 모색. 세계지역 연구논총, 36(3), 105-130.

multilateralism functions as an ideology among membership states of the specific international organization, which enables states to cooperate more, improving relationship to create better international order.<sup>24</sup> He takes the OSCE as an example which makes states to cooperate within international institutions, achieving mutual goals that is a stable sustainability of the international order. He concludes that the preventive diplomacy could be effective, if multilateralism-based approach could change North Korea to be engaged in the six parties talks.

Correspondingly, other scholars such as Byeon (2019) compares the reduction of arms in Europe, the US and the USSR in the framework of the CSCE. He stresses the value of a comprehensive parallel approach strategy with a multilateral cooperation to promote arms reduction, which could be also applied to the Inter-Korean arms reduction issue.<sup>25</sup> Suh (2010) also emphasizes lessons from Helsinki final accords which promoted arms control and confidence building measures in Europe during the Cold War, that could be adopted by North and South Korea to create peace by pushing agendas of previously established agreements.<sup>26</sup>

Other scholars, focus on specific mission that the OSCE carries outside of Europe, such as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the OSCE Minsk group. For example, scholars such as Heiko Ital (2011) brings a case study of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the OSCE in the neorealist paradigm, while delivering mechanisms such as the OSCE Minsk Group and conflict resolutions.<sup>27</sup> The author

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<sup>24</sup> 이승근. (2010). 북한 핵문제와 다자주의적 접근의 유용성. 국제정치연구, 13(1), 27-49

<sup>25</sup> 변현도. (2019). 한반도 군비감축 추진환경 및 접근전략. 전략연구, 26(3), 205-243.

<sup>26</sup> 서보혁. (2010). 헬싱키 협정의 이행(바스켓I): 군비통제의 기원과 동북아에 주는 함의. 한국정치외교사논총, 32(1), 101-131.

<sup>27</sup> 하이코 이탈리아. (2011). 신현실주의 패러다임을 통해 본 나가노-카라바크 갈등과 유럽안보협력기구(OSCE)에 관한 사례 연구. 한독사회과학논총, 21(3), 233-258.

borrowed ideas from neo-realists such as Waltz, Buzen, and Waever to analyze the conflict case, with resolutions as well. Following with each different idea, he concludes that the system level does not seem strong enough to enforce a resolution, thus it is on regional disputants and other regional powers to cooperate.

There are also certain scholars who focus on the CSBM/CBM mechanism that the OSCE has tried to achieve within the European region. Shin (2015) reviews the OSCE's CSBM (Confidence and security building measures), its consultation mechanism and its secretariat.<sup>28</sup> He goes over the 'Vienna Document' and 'Code of Conduct' as they represent the CSBMs of this organization and he reveals that participating states conduct the CSBMs based on these two principles, and they function as not only normative but also principles-based documents. He points out that, the study of the OSCE's CSBMs could give credible implications to design and plan effective and sustainable CSBMs over the Korean peninsula.

Hong (2010) also talks about the role of the OSCE amid of the regional conflict, that is a Nagorno-Karabakh conflict caused between Armenia and Azerbaijan.<sup>29</sup> Although the OSCE has attempted to solve this problem via arbitration through the multilateral platform called the Minsk Group, the arbitration met the deadlock as Armenia asserts the right to self-determination., whereas Azerbaijan backs the principle of territorial integration. He points out that, it is on two parties' leadership to construct the peace, starting from the basic principles' agreement.

The concept of multilateral security cooperation is another important

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<sup>28</sup> 신동민(Dong-Min Shin). (2018). OSCE의 군사적 신뢰구축조치(CSBM) 검토. 통합유럽연구, 9(2), 203-232. 10.32625/KJEI.2018.17.203

<sup>29</sup> Ki Joon Hong. (2010). The OSCE's Intervention in the Nagorno Karabakh Conflict. 유럽연구, 28(2), 381-404.

concept that Korean scholars worked on. Jeong (2017) discusses the multilateral security cooperation and how could it be applied in the East Asia.<sup>30</sup> He mentions that areas in which security cooperation covers such as natural disasters, environmental issues, and terrorism have become larger than the past and it also effects East Asia recently. He highlights the fact that the process of CBM (Confidence building measures) and comprehensive security needs to include more players in this region. He highlights the existence of neutral parties who mediate conflicting parties, and issues dealt in the process should be comprehensive in order to link many different issues that will eventually facilitate negotiations.

Likewise, Kim (2002) argues that the regional security cooperation based on the regional consensus could be achieved, despite of the Northeast Asia's particular situation without the institutionalized platform such as the OSCE in Europe.<sup>31</sup> Lee (2004) reveals his perspective on the experience of the CSCE that could be implemented to the Northeast Asia if states in this region start to build mutual trust by actively continuing their multilateral diplomacy within various regional platforms.<sup>32</sup>

Similarly, Suh (2009) analyzes the case studies of the C/OSCE in the dimension of the creation of multilateralism and institutionalization, and to connect these values to the Northeast Asian security cooperation.<sup>33</sup> He argues that co-prosperity and peace could be pursued at the status quo level of the current

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<sup>30</sup> 정한범(Hanbeom Jeong). (2017). 동아시아 다자안보협력의 전망. 세계지역연구논총, 35(3), 107-126.

<sup>31</sup> 김경일. (2002). 동아시아지역의 다자안보협력 모색과 그 가능성 -유럽지역과의 비교를 중심으로-. 대한정치학회보, 10(2), 349-374.

<sup>32</sup> 이승근. (2004). The Experience of the CSCE/OSCE:Its Implications for the Establishment of a Multilateral Security Regime in Northeast Asia. 유럽연구, 19, 269-294.

<sup>33</sup> 서보혁. (2009). 다자안보협력의 제도화 경로 : C/OSCE의 경험과 동북아 적용 방안 연구. 국제정치논총, 49(2), 7-31.

international order, and 1.5 track and Government Organizations' cooperation with NGOs are required for establishment of multilateral security cooperation. He also notes that both gradualisms, CBMs and liquidation of adversarial relations between states are main tasks thus applied to Northeast Asia as important lesson. However, he also points out that European experience does give lessons, but specific methods should be devised considering Northeast Asia's particular features.

Kim (2005) focuses on the Helsinki process with the North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, and to evaluate the adequacy of the Helsinki process to the current Korean peninsula's North Korean human rights concerns.<sup>34</sup> The author proposes the creation of 'Organization for Security and cooperation of Korean peninsula'. She argues that 'OSCKP' could play a role to solve Korean peninsula-related concerns and problems. The author believes it will improve two Koreas' relationships while also improve other parties' relationships such as US-North Korea relationship. If applied, the author talks that 'OSCKP' could be a mechanism to solve other issues beyond the human rights concern, arriving to peaceful unification to two Koreas.

Moreover, Kim also connects the Helsinki process and six party talks. Kim (2007) sets a question about how to improve North Korean human rights issue, particularly concentrates on approaches and methods.<sup>35</sup> She brings the Helsinki process which contains decision-making process and implementation supervision process and connects it to the North Korean policy. The author analyzes and evaluates the Helsinki process in the legalists' perspective, with the political

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<sup>34</sup> 김민서(金民瑞). (2005). “헬싱키 프로세스와 미국의 북한인권법”. 국제법학회논총, 50(3), 47-75.

<sup>35</sup> 김민서(金民瑞). (2007). 헬싱키 프로세스의 대북유용성. 국제법학회논총, 52(2), 37-56.

mechanism of it. She emphasizes that implanting the Helsinki process into Korean peninsula could, create an extra platform for Two Koreas to have dialogues, and it could provide an environment where stakeholders and non-stakeholders could join to solve Inter-Korean problems.

Plus, Kim (2011) reviews the Helsinki process and six party talks in order to find a correlation in the legalist's perspective.<sup>36</sup> She broadly goes over the Helsinki process and points out important features such as accompanied process of principles within the CSCE basket, soft-law approach, procedural approach, and lastly operation of the CSCE based on the sovereign equality of all participating states. The author cross-compares Helsinki process with six party talks, and how it differs from one another. She asserts that, a broader six party talks not solemnly focused on the North Korean nuclear threat, it is on hands of other five countries who need to build a mutual and firm consensus, then allure North Korea to choose six-party talks to take the Helsinki process.

In addition to that, scholars such as Kim (2007) introduces security governance and based on this new approach; the author overviews the complexity of the European security cooperation.<sup>37</sup> Since the concept of security governance was introduced in the times when security cooperation within changing European security cooperation, it has both strengths and weaknesses to explain about the European security cooperation's reality. Strengths such as comprehensiveness and flexibility support security governance as an adjustment mechanism are obvious, but weaknesses including lack of normative theoretical background related to efficiency

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<sup>36</sup> 김민서. (2011). “헬싱키 프로세스와 6자회담의 상관성에 대한 법적 고찰”. 국제법학회논문집, 56(2), 11-46.

<sup>37</sup> 김학성. (2007). 유럽 안보협력제도의 이론적 쟁점과 실제 : 안보거버넌스를 중심으로. 한독사회과학논총, 17(2), 45-72.

and failure possibility, and possibility of theory building outside of Europe.

Lee (2022) introduces the cyber diplomacy and compares CBM (Confidence building measures) between the OSCE and the ARF(ASEAN Regional Forum).<sup>38</sup> Since the OSCE has developed the concept of CBMs and attach them to the cyber security, it has widely covered sixteen different CBMs in cyberspace. He argues the OSCE has been played a constructive role, and it has consistently developed the cyber CBMs to create transparency, predictability, and mutual trust. This also delivers meaningful results to the ROK which is an ICT-leading country who has cooperated with the OSCE on cyber security cooperation between Europe and Asia and becoming a co-chair country of ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting.

The concept of the comprehensive security, which does not discuss much in Asia, is being analyzed by the scholar such as Koo (2003), who critically reconstructs the overcoming of the Cold war system and the lost decades of collective security.<sup>39</sup> He argues that the end of Cold War with peace, especially Eastern European countries that successfully transformed themselves in non-violent approach, was largely due to the Détente and the CSCE. Moreover, he reveals that overcoming of the Cold war was the opportunity to create a collective security system, although not realized due to the turning of foreign diplomacy direction of Clinton Administration. The author points out that cooperative collective security can be obtained in the more connected globe, and the comprehensive security can be an effective system to deal with such crisis.

There are also research on sub-branches of the OSCE such as High

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<sup>38</sup> 이상현. (2022). 사이버외교의 국제비교: OSCE와 ARF의 사이버 신뢰구축조치 비교분석. *세계지역연구논총*, 40(2), 225-257.

<sup>39</sup> 구춘권. (2003). “냉전체제의 극복과 집단안보의 잃어버린 10년”. *국제정치논총*, 43(2), 29-51.

Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, and the OSCE Minsk Group. Park (2009) gives a detailed explanation on the OSCE HCNM.<sup>40</sup> Plus, Lim (2020) A talks about the OSCE and HCNM and their role of the ‘preventive diplomacy’ that deals with conflicts between states and national minorities.<sup>41</sup> He asserts that the existence of HCNM manages conflicts successfully so that conflicts do not escalate to security crises, and this could be achieved as the OSCE/HCMN guides states based on monitoring and recommendations while maximizing the efficiency of crisis management through swift prior alerts and proactive measures.

These existing research results indicate three distinctive features before moving on to the theoretical framework. First of all, these findings tend to focus on the introductory parts of the OSCE, rather than concentrate on the bilateral relationship between the ROK and the OSCE. Secondly, these papers show important mechanisms of the OSCE, that is the confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) and confidence building measures (CBM). Lastly, there has been an enthusiastic interest on how to implement the essences, morals, and objectives of the OSCE to the Northeast Asia, where the concept of the regional security cooperation is absent, with unfinished structure of the Cold War. Also, it is interesting to observe some scholars bring North Korean issue to the OSCE. With these findings, since they do empirically highlight the role and contribution of the ROK to the OSCE, the research question of this topic will be discussed in this paper thoroughly.

As research related to the OSCE and Korea are sorted out, this paper will

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<sup>40</sup> 변현도. (2019). 한반도 군비감축 추진환경 및 접근전략. 전략연구, 26(3), 205-243.

<sup>41</sup> 임일형(Lim, Il-Hyung). (2020). 유럽안보협력기구의 ‘포괄적 안보’ 전략과 소수 민족 문제. EU연구, (54), 35-66



then move onto examining other existing literatures that discuss motivations of states within the structure, and contributions of states in formal international organizations, and role of states and its membership to the organizations. These academic findings are expected to imply states perform or act in various international organizations, with their own innate interests, motives, and concerns from their background and foreign policies. From academic perspective, it is difficult to fully estimate policymakers' perspectives. In South Korea's case, the main question derives from the current situation of the South Korean national security's vulnerabilities and weaknesses, and South Korea's solutions and alternative paths to overcome them.

To elaborate and gauge the foreign policy of specific state and its related outcomes, there needs to be an approach from the ideological and theoretical framework. Based on both interpretations from the first source information and second source academic papers which highlight states' behaviors, actions, and policy choices. This comes from the inherent environment of the government policy papers and official documents which do not contain sufficient information and data to fully analyze the key elements and salient conditions to commence foreign policy. Also, there have been abundant sources to explain how and why some states such as South Korea initiate a foreign policy to be engaged with an international organization that is rather collateral than pivotal, even though its contribution is not remarkable to be noticed from both domestic and overseas perspectives.

### **2.3. Roles, Motives, and Contributions**

If so, what kinds of theoretical approaches can be applied to explain South Korea's motive to participate in the Organization of Security for Co-operation of Europe? In the existing kinds of literature, there are many ideologies and theories

that attempt to give an account to this type of governmental decision regarding the membership and participation of the IOs. This aims to understand why and how South Korea made such a decision like this should be evaluated and analyzed. Also, this paper could deliver some implications to future and related academic works that touch upon the cases of the OSCE and South Korea's other strategic attempts or participation in other security-related IOs that could be both beneficial and profitable.

Abbott and Snidal (1998) claim from their rational-institutionalist perspective, that states use formal international organizations to manage both their daily interactions and more substantial episodes including international conflicts.<sup>42</sup> They assert that centralization and independence are identified as the key properties of formal IOs, and their essentiality is illustrated with wide arrays of examples. Their opinion also reveals that IOs as community representatives further enable states to create and implement community values and enforce international commitments. Rey and Barkdull (2005) point out that democratic states, especially with their consensus democracy format, adopt a kinder, gentler foreign policy that covers enthusiasm to participate in multilateral, cooperative international institutions, depending on negotiation and compromise to reach arrangements for common problems.<sup>43</sup>

Ward and Dorussen (2016) argue that the policy complementarities and centrality in the network of policy complementarities are significant for states who consider deployment of the troops, and it is likely that states with more companions

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<sup>42</sup> Abbott, K. W., & Snidal, D. (1998). Why States Act through Formal International Organizations. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42(1), 3–32.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/174551>

<sup>43</sup> Rey, D., & Barkdull, J. (2005). Why Do Some Democratic Countries Join More Intergovernmental Organizations Than Others? *Social Science Quarterly*, 86(2), 386–402.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/42956070>

are likely to provide a larger amount of troops.<sup>44</sup> Meanwhile, Lupu and Greenhill (2017) insist that states share relatively many international governmental organization (IGO) connections with each other, both directly and through indirect links through third and fourth parties.<sup>45</sup> They urge that pacifying effect of IGO membership stems from the states who are deeply embedded within the wider IGO network. These theories imply that states could get close to the mutual peace if certain motives are met. Plus, these findings support the idea that states could cooperate while using force to maintain the security.

There are also other academic findings that signifies the role of the IOs as the alternative approach to solve the international conflicts and problems. Thompson (2006) points out that utilization of the neutral international organization and communication benefits including information transmission enables powerful states to channel coercive policies.<sup>46</sup> Corbett et al (2020) also imply that small states could pursue their interests and opinion in the international organizations since they have to accommodate assertive emerging powers and more active participation by a large number of small states.<sup>47</sup> This shows that even though powerful and large states have less restrictions in the IOs, small states could still cooperate and lead the consensus in a large scale.

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<sup>44</sup> Ward, H., & Dorussen, H. (2016). Standing alongside your friends: Network: centrality and providing troops to UN peacekeeping operations. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(3), 392–408. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43920597>

<sup>45</sup> Lupu, Y., & Greenhill, B. (2017). The networked peace: Intergovernmental organizations and international conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 54(6), 833–848. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48590477>

<sup>46</sup> Thompson, A. (2006). Coercion through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission. *International Organization*, 60(1), 1–34. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877866>

<sup>47</sup> Jack Corbett, Mélodie Ruwet, Yi-Chong Xu, Patrick Weller. (2020) Climate governance, policy entrepreneurs and small states: explaining policy change at the International Maritime Organisation. *Environmental Politics* 29:5, pages 825-844.

With these ideas, it could be carefully estimated that, South Korea has joined the OSCE for mainly following reasons. To start with, the ROK's partial affiliation could be related to install community values and apply international commitments, based on its capacity and its democratic regime background. Also, Korean contribution to international governmental organization could be understood as one of its diplomatic accesses to achieve mutual peace on shared common motivations with other states. In addition to that, membership of particular organization such as the OSCE could provide South Korea a diplomatic space to advertise its national policies, with its assertiveness and justifications.

Importantly, it is crucial to check different types of international security institutions that serve different purposes, directions, to protect security. Duffield (2006) introduces the concept of international security institutions (ISIs) and how different institutions vary with distinct features.<sup>48</sup> Also, he asserts the institutions could be divided into four different categories, based on operative and contingent rules, and with inclusiveness and exclusiveness. In his paper, he explains this concept with a two-by-two matrix and goes over that international security institutions vary based on four different characteristics, thus divided into inclusive ISIs with operative and contingent rules, and exclusive ISIs with operative and contingent rules.

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<sup>48</sup> Duffield, John S., "International Security Institutions: Rules, Tools, Schools, or Fools?" (2006). Political Science Faculty Publications. 35.  
[https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political\\_science\\_facpub/35](https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub/35)

<b>Table 1.1</b> <i>A Typology of ISIs (By Duffield)</i>		
	Inclusive ISIs	Exclusive ISIs
Operative Rules	Arms control agreements (e.g., ABM, SALT, NPT, CBMs) Use of force prohibitions (e.g., UN Charter)	Export controls arrangements (e.g., COCOM, Nuclear Suppliers Group)
Contingent Rules	Collective security systems (e.g., League of Nations, UN)	Alliances (e.g., NATO, WEU)

According to Duffield (2006), international security institutions concern with international, politically motivated acts of physical violence directed by one political actor against another, generally but not exclusively states, those cross international boundaries.<sup>49</sup> With table 1.1, he states that ISIs wish to manage the threat and use for political purposes of instruments and responses to such threats and uses by other actors. In his theory, ISIs seek to regulate the production possession, exchange, and transfer of weapons of various types. Additionally, ISIs seek to address the peacetime deployment and activities of military forces armed with such weapons. With these features, it is also noted that many ISIs also address concerns that extend beyond these issues.

It could be expected that the ROK has joined both inclusive and exclusive ISIs based on giving values to operative or contingent rules. But his paper fractionally explain how and why state such as South Korea joins them. Therefore, instead of focusing on the international organizations, this paper will concentrate more on the role of the state within the international organizations. Because of that,

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<sup>49</sup> Duffield, John S., "International Security Institutions: Rules, Tools, Schools, or Fools?" (2006). Political Science Faculty Publications. 35.  
[https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political\\_science\\_facpub/35](https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/political_science_facpub/35)

the role of the state will be analyzed to provide more accurate tool. The idea of the role theory is could be adopted to provide a theoretical background. This would also provide how does role that one specific state carries within the organization is performed with principles, mechanisms, and values in the multilateral settings.

When it comes to role of Korea, and Korean role to the international environments, there are sufficient literatures related to the UN, UN peacekeeping operations, and other regional organizations. Oh (2005) points that South Korea's participation in UN PKOs have evolved from passive and monotone to active and diverse mode, securing international peace and security, and taking more active attitude towards humanitarian and human security.<sup>50</sup> Jeon (2018) asserts that the ROK played a diversified role to improve North Korean human rights issue in the UN, but there have not been effective results yet to come.<sup>51</sup> This also means that, the ROK has worked with governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations to observe human rights issues in North Korea, demanding improvements based on observations, findings and policy recommendations.

Plus, Jonsson (2017) points out the Korea's role in the UN human rights council (UNHRC) is viewed inconsistent and divided by the progressive and conservative party in domestic politics, but it still performs and participates within the structure, increasing general awareness of North Korean human rights and pressuring North Korea to amend its legislation.<sup>52</sup> While Lee (2008) assesses the Roh administration's foreign policy with the role of South Korea as a pivotal middle

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<sup>50</sup> Young Dahl Oh. (2005). South Korea's Role in UN Peacekeeping Operations and its Cooperation with Japan. *Journal of Asia-Pacific Affairs*, 7(1), 129-146.

<sup>51</sup> Jeon, I. (2018). UN Activities on North Korean Human Rights and Role of Korea. *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, 87, 49-69.

<sup>52</sup> Jonsson, G. (2017). South Korea's Role in the UN Human Rights Council. *International Journal of Korean Studies*, XX(2), 1.

power, which shows active influence on North Korean nuclear threats, being a facilitator of regional and international concerns, and reinforcing national brands by adopting continuous soft power policy.<sup>53</sup>

These research regarding the ROK's role, Korean role in the international organization, or foreign policy of specific administration show that existing ideas are focused on the UN, subordinate structures of the UN, and Korea's role as a foreign policy identity. Among these findings, Lee et al (2018) talk about the partnership between NATO and South Korea based on narratives of Korean elites' interviewees, it shows that partnership could bolster benefits to non-traditional security areas, fostering the ROK-US relationship.<sup>54</sup> Although this research provides incomplete and partially structured findings towards the partnership of Korea and NATO, it still shows how the partnership has been achieved so far.

In this account, the role theory given by two different scholars, Hoslti and Harnisch, could install the framework to define the Korean role in the OSCE. This shift could give explanations what role does the ROK carry in the structure. Holsti (1970), in his paper, discusses about how role and role conceptions are made, with 16 different role conceptions that states can have.<sup>55</sup> Meanwhile, Harnisch (2011) approaches the role theory from European and constructivist's perspective, states concept of role that describes how individual gives specific ideas and values during

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<sup>53</sup> 이수형. (2008). 참여정부의 외교안보정책: 평가와 과제 ; 중추적 중견국가론과 참여정부의 균형적 실용외교. 한국과국제정치(KWP), 24(1), 217-249.

<sup>54</sup> Sung-Won Yoon, Adiyasuren Jamiyandagva, Vlad Vernygora, Joe Burton, Byambakhand Luguusharav & Munkhtur Dorjraa (2018) Views on NATO from Mongolia and the Republic of Korea: Hedging Strategy, and "Perfunctory Partnership"?, Asian Security, 14:1, 51-65, DOI: 10.1080/14799855.2017.1361733

<sup>55</sup> Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. International Studies Quarterly, 14(3), 233-309. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>

the interaction with others.<sup>56</sup> He adds the composition of role of domestic and external factors, and role could be changed with adaption and learning, depends on conditions and objectives.

While Harnisch (2011) gives interesting points to role of states by adaptation and learning, using Holsti's theory of national role conceptions could deliver more abundant and beneficial implications to this research. First of all, Holsti has developed traditional national roles into more detailed, capacity and responsibility given national roles. Secondly, the author has utilized official statements and press releases to categorize specific states to dissimilar role conceptions, making these roles more solid and classified. Lastly, in his paper South Korea was labelled as states with insufficient themes with possibility of being labelled independent, internal development, isolate and protectee types, this gives proper opportunity to reassign the role of south Korea in this research.

To draw a literary conclusion, the current existing knowledge contains several important ideas such as organizational mechanism of the OSCE, importance of Helsinki final act, OSCE's sub institutions and structures, details of the comprehensive security including confidence security building measures, and implications of the OSCE to the Northeast Asia and North Korea. However, all these reviewed literatures actually lack empirical findings on Korean contributions to the OSCE. However, motivations to join and participate in the international organizations as a middle power, and benefits of participation within these groups are explained. But also, current implications do not explain why states such as South

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<sup>56</sup> Harnisch, Frank, Maull, Harnisch, Sebastian, Frank, Cornelia, & Maull, Hanns. (2011). Role Theory in International Relations : Approaches and Analyses / Edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank & Hanns W. Maull. pp.1-30



Korea joins regional security organizations such as the OSCE.

Also, existing theories related to the definition on states' role in the international systems have shown to measure Korea's contributions to the OSCE. Especially, since there are several academic findings on Korea's role within the international system such as United Nations, UN peacekeeping operations, ASEAN, etc. But these academic papers only describe about these groups, not mentioning about the OSCE. The tendency of heavily focusing existing literatures on the UN, the ROK-US alliance, and Northeast Asia based research, any European security related works such as the OSCE are often neglected. These low interests on the OSCE could be another cornerstone that provides rationale to further accelerate this paper's research question.

Moreover, selecting Holsti's role theory to measure Korean contributions to the OSCE could bring two major important implications. First of all, this theory could give incomplete simplification why Korea conducts certain foreign policy decisions, such as joining the OSCE in the year of 1994. Secondly, framing Korea with specific national role conceptions then comparing with other states who are in Asian partnership for cooperation position could provide some meaningful academic findings. Thirdly, understanding South Korea is a latecomer in the international system as a pivotal state, assessing role conceptions of Korea could bring implications to Korean contributions to the OSCE that are human resource, and financial resource.

In the next part, there would be a general introduction of the role theory. This starts with how national conceptions and prescriptions are created, and how national conceptions are depicted by states themselves. Moreover, sixteen different national role conceptions will be demonstrated one by one, then applied to South

Korea. Here, the ROK is labelled as regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer as its fellow Asian partners to the OSCE, Australia and Japan carry these roles defined by Holsti. Thus, Korean contributions will be compared with Japanese and Australian contributions as a regional partner state. By conducting this experiment, role assessment could be achieved, being able to label whose role is stronger or weaker.

## **Chapter 3. Role Theory and Application**

### **3.1. Holsti's Role theory**

After reviewing multiple academic works, they help to create a fundamental background on “how to measure South Korea’s role and contribution to the OSCE.” Findings show following expected assumptions. Firstly, South Korea has consistently built its strategic relationship with the OSCE, focused on its functions and mechanisms. Secondly, South Korea’s main interests related to the OSCE could be CBM or CSBM. Lastly, South Korea’s role could be defined as regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer from Holsti’s framework. With these findings, there is also a necessity to understand how and why South Korea is doing this at the moment. In order to fully demonstrate and understand Korea’s stance toward the globe, using and applying several theories and forming hypotheses to conduct a diagnosis could be the first step.


According to Role theory given by Holsti (1970), role is defined through a balance role expectations and role performance, with actions of governments that is informed by policymakers’ own conceptions of their state’s role in a region or in the outer surroundings.<sup>57</sup> He introduces the term of the national role conception, which

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<sup>57</sup> Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy.

contains the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions and actions proper to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a sustaining foundation in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. He also adds that, it is their image of the suitable orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the exterior environment. Thus, he regards national role conceptions as independent variables.

Holsti reveals the theoretical framework of national role conceptions adapted from individual-level role theory. He introduces four different concepts that assists to inspect foreign policy, which are role performance, national role conceptions, role prescriptions, and lastly, a position. He also explains that, based on different studies, the relationship between role conceptions and role prescriptions are differently regarded, as ego's role conceptions and alter's prescriptions perform in different manner. He also points out that, foreign policy analysis, highlights the self-conceptions of decision makers, which are considered as circumstances of national interests and normally ignores the role prescriptions of alter, that is of others in the system. The author further addresses the problem on the concept of the role, that often conducted in different environment, as integrated society and analysis of foreign policy and international politics are dissimilar.



In the image 1.1, Holsti defines national role performance as the general foreign policy behavior of governments that covers patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments toward other states. These patterns are then identified as national roles. So that, a national role conception includes the policymakers' own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and functions their state participate on sustainable basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems. These so-called functions to their image, which transform to national role conceptions such as regional defender, mediator based on their function. It is crucial to understand that;

national role conceptions are prime aspect of the entire intellectual milieu in urgently changing daily decisions on foreign policy.

Holsti also reveals how different national role conceptions are created, based on different varied sources such as topographical location, economic resources, capabilities, national values, and political needs of key policymakers. He also tells that; national role conceptions are also related to the role prescriptions emanating from the outer environment. The role prescriptions derive from the international system, licit principles, rules, and suppositions of states. It is important to note that, the point where external role prescriptions become significant, varies by state to state and in different situations. With these features, role theory offers framework for depicting national role performance and role conceptions and for searching the backgrounds of those role conceptions.

**Image 1.2**  
National role conceptions (*By Holsti*)

**TABLE 9**  
**SOME SOURCES OF NATIONAL ROLE CONCEPTIONS**

<b>Role Conception</b>	<b>Sources</b>	<b>Countries</b>
Bastion of revolution-liberator	ideological principles; anti-colonial attitudes; desire for ethnic unity	Com. China Cuba Indonesia North Korea
Regional leader	superior capabilities; traditional national role	Egypt Japan
Regional protector	perception of threat; geographic location; traditional policies; needs of threatened states	Australia New Zealand U.S.A. U.S.S.R.
Active independent	anti-bloc attitudes; economic needs-trade expansion; geographic location	France India Yugoslavia Rumania Zambia
Liberator supporter	anti-colonial attitudes; ideological principles	most African, Asian, and Communist states in sample
Anti-imperialist agent	ideological principles; perception of threat; anti-colonial attitudes	Iraq Syria most Communist states
Defender of the faith	perceptions of threat; ideological principles; traditional national role	Rep. China U.S.A. North Viet Nam
Mediator-integrator	traditional national role; cultural-ethnic composition of state; traditional non-involvement in conflicts; geographic location	Lebanon Sweden
Regional-subsystem collaborator	economic needs; sense of "belonging" to region; common political-ideological traditions; geographic location	Belgium Ethiopia Guyana Japan Sweden Switzerland
Developer	humanitarian concern; anticipated consequences of underdevelopment; superior economic capabilities; balance U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition in underdeveloped areas	Canada France Japan Kuwait U.S.A.

Image 1.2 shows different role type, major functions, and primary role sources that draw a distinctive line between different role of states. With nine different models commonly mentioned in the international relations studies. Holsti also upgrades this framework to further definitions with more details. Here, Holsti

introduces other role conceptions based on its degree of inactivity or buoyancy in foreign policy that the role conceptions seem to infer. With seventeen different role conceptions and other role conceptions, the author aims to analyze how states view themselves through the foreign policy and its role toward the international environment. Each different role focuses on different objectives, directions, and attitude to overseas as their perception is different, and this causes states to behave in not similar ways as others do.

According to Holsti, the first one is bastion of revolution-liberator. This national role believes that one state has a duty to lead and organize revolutionary movements in overseas, liberate others or perform as revolutionary movements, to provide and support physical and moral support to foreign revolutionary leaders. Secondly, regional leader is a role which state views obligations or unique responsibilities that a government perceives for itself in a particular region and subsystems. Thirdly, regional protector emphasizes on the function of yielding shielding for adjoining regions, while implies special leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis. Fourth, Active Independent is a national role with evasion of permanent military or ideological commitments, it aims to fertilize relations with as many states as possible, and occasional interference into bloc conflicts.

Fifth role is liberation supporter, which does not stipulate formal responsibilities for mobilizing, leading or physically providing liberation movements abroad. This role is a mild version of the first one, with unstructured and vague attitudes about actions required to enact the role conception. In the sixth role, states view imperialism as a deep threat, many governments see themselves as agents of struggle against this evil. Seventh role is defender of the faith, and this role regards

foreign policy goals and commitments in terms of guarding value systems from attack. With this role conception, states assuredly undertake special responsibilities to protect ideological cleanliness for a group of other states. Eighth role is mediator-integrator role; this role believes itself as capable of undertaking special tasks to pacify conflicts between other states or groups of states. This role conception implies a continuing task to aid adversaries reconcile their disparities.

**Image 1.3**  
Continued National role conceptions (*By Holsti*)

**TABLE 9 (Continued)**

Role Conception	Sources	Countries
<b>Bridge</b>	geographic location; multi-ethnic composition of state	Belgium Pakistan
<b>Faithful ally</b>	perception of threat; insufficient capabilities; traditional policies; ideological compatibility	Albania Hungary Italy Portugal Great Britain
<b>Independent</b>	anti-bloc sentiments; anti-colonial sentiments; economic needs; threat perception	many new African states; Nepal, etc.
<b>Example</b>	no revealed sources	
<b>Internal development</b>	socio-economic needs; perception of threat through foreign involvement	Brazil Finland Indonesia Pakistan
<b>Isolate</b>	perception of threat; insufficient capabilities	Burma Cambodia Laos
<b>Protectee</b>	perception of threat; insufficient capabilities	Laos Czechoslovakia

Ninth national conception role is regional-subsystem collaborator, and it is different from mediator-integrator category, as it does not confront occasional mediation into areas or issues of conflict. Instead, this role shows pervasive commitments to cooperative efforts with others to construct wider communities and cleaving subsystems. Tenth role, developer reveals a peculiar duty to support



impoverished countries, while this role demonstrates giving novel proficiencies for undertaking such continuing tasks.

Image 1.3 demonstrate other roles with each different labels. Eleventh role, bridge appears in imprecise form, with its blurred foreign policies with ephemeral patterns. It often follows communication function, operating as a translator of information between states. Twelfth role, faithful ally comes from alliance pledges made through reciprocal assistance and treaties. It also shows support for other states' actions and policies. Thirteenth case is independent, and this go after policy of non-alignment, which focuses on state's own interests based on self-determination while neglecting task or function in the system. Fourteenth role is example, which highlights the importance of retaining influence in the international structure by pursuing certain inner policies. It reveals low passivity and activity, as it does not require formal diplomatic programs outside of state.

Fifteenth one is internal development, and this role has minimum contact with the international system, as it only concentrates problems of internal development without inclusion of international synergy, in economic and practical matters. Sixteenth role is isolate, similar to the internal development covers external cooperation, crucially in the economic and cultural fields, it requires a minimum of external contacts, while bypassing external involvements, then keeping self-reliance. Last role is protectee, and this role alludes to the liability of other states to safeguard them, while showing no specific functions to the external environment. This national role conception is a state than a role, and it is visible in the international environment.

**Image 1.4**  
States without national role conceptions (*By Holsti*)

**TABLE 8**  
**STATES FOR WHICH SUFFICIENT THEMES WERE UNAVAILABLE**

Austria	Honduras	Panama
Botswana	Iceland	Paraguay
Burundi	Irish Rep.	Peru
Colombia	Jamaica	Rwanda
Costa Rica	Lesotho	Sierra Leone
Cyprus	Libya	Somali Rep.
Dahomey	Malawi	South Korea
Denmark	Maldivs Is.	Togo
Dominican Rep.	Malta	Upper Volta
Ecuador	Mauritania	Uruguay
El Salvador	Mexico	Yemen
Greece	Nicaragua	
Guatemala	Nigeria	
Haiti	Norway	

The author mentions other roles, such as balancer, anti-revisionists, anti-Zionist, anti-communist agent role, and defender of the peace. Among seventeen different roles, the author reveals the national roles through certain attitudes, decisions, and policies and how differences in the self-conceptions appear within different types of states. One interesting note that Holsti made in his paper is that, although he labeled countries like US as regional protector, defender of the faith, Japan as regional leader, regional-subsystem collaborator, and North Korea as bastion of revolutionary liberator.

Especially, Holsti does not label South Korea to any categories. He points out that, states who do not belong to specific national role conception, are nor major powers and no major regional powers, without clear and definite foreign policy statements. Here, countries including Austria, Ireland, Norway, South Korea is regarded as independent, internal development, isolate, and protectee types. However, one feature that Holsti misses in the contemporary condition, is that South

Korea in 1970s and South Korea in 2020s is very different. Nowadays, based on foreign policy statements, South Korea could be in similar position with Japan, France, Belgium. That being said, role conceptions could be regional protector, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer.

Holsti has labelled different states into different role conceptions based on his collected statements from the highest-level policymakers, with minimum ten sources, and sources from the period January 1965 to December 1967. With three different rules, the author has commenced the project in order to see how states differently emphasizes their role with specific objectives. He also claims in the paper that a large number of statements from states are confined to narrow and specific issues and this means policymakers have little notion of a global and regional role and of specific international tasks. This categorization and differentiation of national role conceptions also reflects the degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy.

In order to decide which role Korea plays, the period that I have set in this paper, is between September 2017 to September 2020, with statements, press, releases by high level policymakers. Below are ten different statements, remarks, speeches, and opening remarks from South Korean President and foreign minister. All these data were collected from Korean embassies and MOFA Korea. From official records by South Korean policymakers, concepts, and ideas such as peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, multilateralism connected to peace, security, and stability. Also Korea's role to other regions than East Asia, with activity that carries peace, development, and humanitarian assistance.

Holsti (1970) has labelled different states into different role conceptions based on his collected statements from the highest-level policymakers, with minimum ten sources, and sources from the period January 1965 to December

1967.<sup>58</sup> With three different rules, the author has commenced the project in order to see how states differently emphasize their role with specific objectives. He also claims in the paper that a large number of statements from states are confined to narrow and specific issues and this means policymakers have little notion of a global and regional role and of specific international tasks. These categorizations and differentiations of national role conceptions also reflect the degree of passivity or activity in foreign policy.

In order to decide and label which role South Korea plays, the period between September 2017 to September 2020 was fixed, and official statements, press releases by highest-level policymakers were examined to see the role of South Korea on their perspectives. Below, there are several keywords from ten different statements, remarks, speeches, and opening remarks from South Korean President Jae-In Moon and foreign Minister Kyung-wha Kang. All these data were collected from Korean embassies and MOFA Korea. From official records by South Korean policymakers, concepts and ideas such as peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia, multilateralism connected to peace, security, and stability were shown. Also, Korea's role to other regions than East Asia, with activity that carries peace, development, and humanitarian assistance were highly emphasized.

Here are official statements from the President Moon, where he accentuates Korea's role in the region that seeks peace and prosperity, sense of mutual engagement, and through economic and security cooperation. In 72nd UNGA, President Moon asserted "promoting peace and economic cooperation in Northeast Asia" (President Moon, 2017). In the 132nd session of the IOC, President Moon

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<sup>58</sup> Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 240. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>

made a congratulatory remark, stating values such as peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia and working together with Japan and China (President Moon, 2018). In 73rd UNGA, President Moon asserted “East Asian Railroad Community leads to a multilateral peace and security architecture in Northeast Asia” (President Moon, 2017). In 74th UNGA, President Moon highlighted “The Republic of Korea intends to create a “peace economy” whereby peace can lead to economic cooperation” (President Moon, 2019). In 75th UNGA, President Moon pointed out “Peace on the Korean Peninsula will guarantee peace in Northeast Asia”

Here are also given official statements from the foreign minister Kang, where she stresses the Korea’s role that is attached to the international community, responsibility of the humanitarian assistance, and economic contribution to the international organizations. In 37th Session of the Human Rights Council, Minister Kang emphasized “My government will continue to join the international community” (Minister Kang, 2018). At the Ministerial to Promote a Future of Peace and Security in the Middle East, Minister Kang showed “We have also prioritized humanitarian assistance and economic partnerships” (Minister Kang, 2018). In 2019 UN Peacekeeping Ministerial, Minister Kang highlighted “the Republic of Korea has joined the top ten financial contributors to the UN peacekeeping budget” (Minister Kang, 2019). In 2020 IFANS conference on global affairs, Minister Kang underlined “We have been actively initiating and participating in regional and global discussions to build health, economic, and political solidarity to overcome Covid-19” (Minister Kang, 2020).

After scrutinizing ten different official statements and gathering values inside them, it could be regarded that Korea share values of regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer. First role focuses on matters in

regional scale, regional leadership on an issue-area basis. Second role gives extensive commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build communities within subsystems. Third role concentrates on helping others, especially undeveloped states, giving out particular skills or advantages for generating tasks. These three different roles implicate Korean role conceptions, as it either includes or overlaps the Korean role in the regional and international level. In the next chapter, there will be in-depth evaluation on each different role.

Based on official statements, remark, and keynote speech, there are certain values and ideas of the role that South Korea seeks. The value of peace and prosperity within the region, with application of economy and security cooperation and active contribution to the international organizations were strongly declared. Thus, roles such as regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer could be applied in this case. In the next part, South Korea is going to be compared with Australia for the first role, then Japan and South Korea will be compared for two latter roles. For the first comparison, partnership fund contribution and conference participation will be measured. Then following second and third comparison, the former will contain same comparing sources, while the latter will reveal special contribution and personnel contribution. These comparisons will reveal whether Korea contributes sufficiently, with its proper participation within its assigned roles.

After scrutinizing ten different official statements and gathering values inside them, it could be regarded that Korea belongs to regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer. First role focuses on matters in regional scale, regional leadership on an issue-area basis. Second role gives extensive commitments to cooperative efforts with other states to build communities within subsystems. Third role concentrates on helping others, especially undeveloped states, giving out

particular skills or advantages for generating tasks. These three different roles implicate Korean role conceptions, as it either includes or overlaps the Korean role in the regional and international level. In the next chapter, there will be in-depth evaluation on each different role.

## **Chapter 4. OSCE**

### **4.1. Overview**

The birth of the OSCE started from Europe, where the cold war was still dividing world into two giant factions with different ideologies. Europe was notably one of the geopolitical place where the cold war was explicit, and this was soon appeared as the competition between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However, this tension was resolved by the Détente between two parties in the 1970s, changed the atmosphere of Europe into a geopolitical region where the comprehensive security was slowly built. This amicable relationship between two great powers, was shown in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that enabled thirty-five states to agree on common grounds. The result was Helsinki accords or Helsinki Final Act, constructed a platform where states agreed on variety of issues.

The CSCE was functioning as a conference rather than an organization, and this was due to keep the CSCE itself flexible, as a politico-diplomatic conference. However, participating states who signed the charter of Paris in 1990, made the CSCE to contain a format of institutionalism, reflecting the changes in Europe and the new challenges for the post-Cold War era. The end of the Cold war caused a lot of changes in security and security cooperation situation in Europe, demanding the CSCE to have more strengths. This was soon resulted as a Budapest document where it changes CSCE to OSCE in 1995. Since that time, the OSCE has embraced current

NATO members and former Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union states, expanding its existence to Pan European level.



The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence- and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counterterrorism, and economic and environmental activities. All fifty-seven participating States enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis. Along with these participating states, the OSCE possesses eleven partners for cooperation. This group is separated into two groups, concentrate on two regions: Asia and Mediterranean. States such as Korea and Japan are belonging to the former group, whereas states such as Israel and Algeria belong to latter group.

Its distinctiveness is quite different from the NATO, where the collective security is achieved by the collective multilateralism based on the military strengths. The OSCE does not follow the same way. Instead, the OSCE takes a different step towards the security issues that, non-violence methods can be used to protect the security. Instead of actual military force, non-violence approaches are used. The OSCE pursued the non-violence methods throughout the difficult times. It also



concentrates on the focus of comprehensive security, which encompasses various areas such as politics, security, economy, environment, human security. This broad approach and focus on the comprehensive security is also extensive than NATO approach, and it covers larger and broader concept of the security.

The importance that the OSCE brings to the world, is the realization of the comprehensive security that enclose outer areas of the traditional security. Essentially, the OSCE provides a forum where vital issues of peace, security and human rights could be discussed and further processed to take actions. The concept of collective security and stability, which seems often unrealizable in other regions, is in fact, realized in Europe and Central Asia. The end of the Cold war, consensus-based agreements, cooperation on conflict prevention and crisis management implicate its significance to other regions such as Northeast Asia, who could adopt lessons and experiences from this case.

## **4.2. History**

The idea of the European conference on security issues was actually proposed by the Soviet Union in 1954 at the Geneva conference, but the US and other Western European states dismissed it. However, the détente during early 1970s has led them to start on Helsinki consultations in 1972, made the Soviet Union, the US, and Western European states to sign the Helsinki Final Act.<sup>59</sup> The CSCE has also compromised three important documents that fortify its role and influence. These documents are Budapest Declarations, Paris Charter for a New Europe, Budapest Declaration, Istanbul Charter for European Security, and Astana

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<sup>59</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1975). Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

Commemorative Declaration. Through these institutionalizations, C/OSCE was able to construct comprehensive security.

The creation of the CSCE, it began as a conference which is split to committees and working groups by three dimensions: political/military, economic and environmental, and human.<sup>60</sup> As CSCE, it functioned as a series of forums and its implications of membership states. In the year of 1994, the CSCE was developed into a broader, institutionalized, and permanent organization, under the name of the OSCE. The OSCE, its advent after the cold war shows its functionality, scope, and comprehension towards the issue of security in a broader way. And it has sustained its 46 years of history as a largest international security organization. Starting with new name, it begins to focus on the larger and broader range of new policies and institutions.

The fundamental mechanization of the CSCE could be founded in charter of Paris and Budapest document. In the first document, it declares institutionalization, systematization, consolidation of the organization in order to better adapt and react towards new security environment and its related threats. In this sense, charter of Paris signifies CSCE's functional, and structural reaction towards the regional security environments.<sup>61</sup> Examples are creations of the secretariat, conflict prevention centre, office for free elections, CSCE parliamentary assembly. Meanwhile, Budapest document states the transition of the structure from conference to organization with certain major adjustment and addition of structural organs and

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<sup>60</sup> Bayefsky, A. F., Alexeyeva, L., Kampelman, M. M., Tabory, M., Maresca, J. J., & Henkin, A. H. (1990). Human Rights: The Helsinki Process. *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law)*, 84, 113–130. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25658533>

<sup>61</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1990). *Paris Charter for a New Europe of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Guidelines for the future. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.*

mechanisms.<sup>62</sup> This is another important document where it asserts the need of broader and comprehensive role of the O/CSCE in the globe.

The strengthening and reaffirmation of the OSCE, could be witnessed from the Istanbul charter and Astana declaration. In the Istanbul charter, it sets organization's capacity to security challenges, and to implement the OSCE's capacity to settle and prevent conflicts.<sup>63</sup> In this document, there are several common challenges that are conflicts within states, international terrorism, violent extremism, and organized crime and drug trafficking.<sup>64</sup> In addition, this declaration puts importance to reconfirmation of adherence and commitments of participating states to OSCE principles. This document highlights existing norms, values, and its inclusive and comprehensive security coverage which provides a unique forum. It also stresses the security in the era of transnational and complex, inter-connected world that requires wholesome commitments.

With these documents, OSCE aims to construct European security that is sustained by OSCE principles, norms, and values on the basis of consensus and sovereign equality. These values are realized through commitments and efforts of participating states that is connected to its adjacent regions of Mediterranean and Asian regions. Although the OSCE is facing new and transnational threats that requires modern solutions, it has installed mechanisms and put efforts with agreed principles, prevention attempts, and to collectively cooperate with participating states and partner states. The OSCE in this way, has been working on the

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<sup>62</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1994). Budapest Document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Budapest Decisions. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

<sup>63</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1999). Istanbul Charter for European Security of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

<sup>64</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2010). The Astana Commemorative Declaration: Towards a Security Community of the OSCE.

comprehensive security framework by updating and improving former documents to better adapt to new surroundings and threats.

The OSCE currently touches upon many areas that are related to security, politics, human, and environment. Also, its actions have taken places in disputed areas and politically turbulent states show its contributions to the world and the peace. OSCE conducts various missions and field activities that are actively going on in countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and other disputed areas of the OSCE participating countries, or neighboring countries of the OSCE. It is notable to understand that the OSCE does cover the wide area of the field activities and field missions that contains the comprehensive security. Since the OSCE covers 57 countries that are different from each other, this makes distinctive feature where one country is being monitored by means such as election observation, consultative group, or consultative commission of other 56 membership countries.




Image 2.2 demonstrates how large is the OSCE, with countries with blue color. They are Albania, Andorra, Austria, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Cyprus, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Lithuania, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, Monaco, Montenegro, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Slovenia, Switzerland, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, United States, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.<sup>65</sup> From the list of participating countries, most of the member states are either European countries or countries whose strategic tie is close to the Europe.

Also, countries from Asia and Mediterranean region are regional partners. In Asia, the OSCE has mutual relationship with Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. Unlike Mediterranean partners, Asian partner states have joined the OSCE in separate years. In the Mediterranean region, the OSCE has relations with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. It was the Mediterranean partners who joined the CSCE in the year of 1975 except for Jordan. From the map, it is possible to know that these partnership countries are dispersed, having little features in common. Comparing Asian and Mediterranean partners, Asian partners do share more similarities in the group than Mediterranean partners.

The OSCE is a political forum and there are two different methods of joining and participating as a state. Firstly, state can join as a participating state. Secondly, state can participate as a partner state as well. The difference is huge, as

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<sup>65</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (n.d.) Participating States. OSCE. Retrieved December 29, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/participating-states>

participating states can have access to most of the meetings, summits, forums and they are permitted to attend decision-making processes of the OSCE. On the other hand, regional partnership countries have limited access to the OSCE, where they perform with limits. This comes from the availability of the decision-making power, as participating countries can join the decision-making process, while partnership countries can attend but cannot include their opinions.

The OSCE also works with multilateral organizations across the globe. These institutions are UN economic commission for Europe, European Bank, IOM, UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, WTO, and IMF. The OSCE has also worked with commonwealth of Independent States, CSTO, GUAM, OBSC, SEECP. Then the OSCE has strategic ties with five Asian and six Mediterranean partners. This indicates that the OSCE has worked in the bilateral frameworks with other prominent International organizations.


The OSCE has been an active player in disputed regions, countries, and frontiers such as North Africa, Central Asia, and Middle East. It was affected by various neighboring regions mentioned above. The areas where the OSCE steps in to cooperate, and deal with the security issue are either former disputed ones, or currently disputed ones. The purpose of field operation has to do with democracy, human rights, building trust ship and prevent any disputes or conflicts. The role of the OSCE has emphasized the universal distribution of vaccine. By conducting such of these missions and field operations, OSCE makes it sure that participating states follow the official principle, guidelines and ideas given in the OSCE.

**Table 2.1**Contributions by participating States in 2021 *(By author)*

Name of states	Amount	Name of states	Amount
Albania	91,052.63	Estonia	129,703.64
Andorra	91,052.63	Finland	2,646,700.80
Armenia	45,768.48	France	14,277,462.25
Austria	3,189,241.33	Georgia	45,758.48
Azerbaijan	45,758.48	Germany	15,030,785.84
Belarus	200,222.92	Greece	1,158,662.59
Belgium	4,600,337.45	Holy See	91,052.63
Bosnia and Herzegovina	91,052.63	Hungary	656,830.58
Bulgaria	369,425.48	Iceland	184,775.89
Canada	7,494,844.12	Ireland	1,067,655.51
Croatia	200,228.27	Italy	14,241,703.37
Cyprus	199,734.35	Kazakhstan	264,099.06
Czech Republic	671,045.52	Kyrgyzstan	45,758.48
Denmark	2,855,087.91	Latvia	133,594.24


**Table 2.2**Continued contributions by participating States in 2021 *(By author)*

Name of states	Amount	Name of states	Amount
Liechtenstein	91,052.63	Slovakia	285,816.01
Lithuania	133,594.24	Slovenia	268,429.75
Luxembourg	478,373.09	Spain	6,657,417.21
Malta	94,943.23	Sweden	4,596,098.46
Moldova	45,748.48	Switzerland	3,813,504.50
Monaco	91,052.63	Tajikistan	45,758.48
Mongolia	45,758.48	Turkey	1,193,550.47
Montenegro	45,758.48	Turkmenistan	45,758.48
Netherlands	5,403,215.09	Ukraine	519,603.62
North Macedonia	91,052.63	United Kingdom	14,276,010.41
Norway	2,848,746.43	United States	17,838,769.00
Poland	1,632,319.65	Uzbekistan	250,278.65
Portugal	1,027,590.20		
Romania	455,727.48		
Russian Federation	5,568,829.50		
San Marino	91,052.63		
Serbia	10,011.46		



Graph 1.1 demonstrates different and various contributions by participating states, varying from Albania, one of Eastern European country to Uzbekistan, one of Central Asian country. We can differentiate these fifty-seven countries into three different categories. First one is active contributors including France, the UK, and US. Second category is fewer active contributors that cover Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. Last one is passive contributors that is consisted of countries like Moldova, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. It is clearly visible notice that, countries who contribute substantially compared to others, are rule-makers, active countries in the globe, and leading countries in various international organizations.





Graph 1.2 clearly reveals which country contributes the most among fifty-seven participating countries in the previous year. Top contributors of the OSCE are, mainly compose of two North American countries, Western European countries, and Nordic countries. It is eminent to remember that these countries who are working as participating states of the OSCE, are also active parties in this organizations. States such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The Netherlands have already taken care of leadership of the OSCE one or more than one time. US and Canada are another predominant figure whose contributions are considerable.

**4.3. Structure**

The OSCE, in terms of the number of states belong to this group, is larger than any other region-based multilateral organizations. This comes from its distinctiveness, and its fundamental identity as a comprehensive security platform.

Since this organization sets comprehensive security which covers a broad range of the security, the OSCE has several institutions and structures that assist states to implement its mandate. This organization undertakes a variety of preventive diplomacy initiatives designed to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict within and among the participating States. It has its own institutions and initiatives to activate its objectives and directions.

Image 2.3 shows that the OSCE contains standing decision-making bodies, permanent headquarters and institutions, permanent staff, regular financial resources, and field offices. From summit, Ministerial Council, permanent Council to OSCE mission and OSCE Parliament Assembly, there are diverse and multilevel structure organizations that withstand the function of the OSCE. The diversity in such an organization is due to its aim to realize the common security from the European perspective. Also, one distinctive feature of the OSCE is Troika, where three chairmanship states (former, present, and the future) to discuss about initiatives, issues, and policies.




Image 2.2 that shows the organization structure, with its functions, coverage, and policy directions. The OSCE includes the permanent council, forum for security cooperation, economic and environmental forum, summits, and ministerial council. The OSCE also contains chairperson-in-office, secretary general, secretariat, parliamentary assembly, office for democratic institutions and Human rights (ODIHR), high commissioner on national minorities (HCNM), representative

on freedom on media (RFOM), court of conciliation and arbitration. These upper bodies and lower bodies concentrate on each body's mission, objectives and aims to achieve.

The OSCE parliamentary assembly (PA) has of 323 parliamentarians from Canada to Russia and it sets a forum for parliamentary diplomacy and debate, guides election observation missions, and bolster international cooperation to advocate commitments on political, security, economic, environmental, and human rights issues.<sup>66</sup> This organization also carries resolutions to conflicts and backs the development of democratic institutions in participating states. The assembly's special representatives monitor border cooperation to national minorities, while it sends off parliamentary field visits and missions to various parliamentary-related international organizations.

The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), engages in situation when there are tensions concerning national minorities that could be agitated to conflicts.<sup>67</sup> This branch does identify and address causes of ethnic tensions and conflicts. The OSCE HCNM acts when a participating state isn't satisfying its political commitments and standards and this branch is ready to assist with analysis and recommendations. Plus, it circulates recommendations and guidelines that advise on common challenges and best practice, and also offers structural support through programs that directs to gain sustainability through augmenting local ownership.

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<sup>66</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2022). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. OSCEPA. Retrieved December 29, 2022, from <https://www.oscepa.org/en/documents/factsheets/669-factsheet-english>

<sup>67</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2021). The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities. OSCEHCNM. Retrieved December 28, 2022, from [www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/33317\\_5.pdf](http://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/8/3/33317_5.pdf)

The office for democratic institutions and human rights (ODIHR) brings guidance to participating states to buttress democracy, rule of law, human rights and other values such as non-discrimination and tolerance.<sup>68</sup> ODIHR supervises elections, reviews legislation and assist governments on developments and sustainability of democratic institutions. This branch oversees training programs for officials who are in government and law-enforcement, and non-governmental organizations regarding the endorsement, promotion, and monitoring of human rights.

The OSCE representative on Freedom of the Media (RFoM), its representative's activities can be mainly two divided areas. The first one is to monitor media developments as part of an early warning function, and second one is to boost participating states follow their commitments to freedom of expression.<sup>69</sup> The RFoM's efforts are to ensure the safety of journalists, to help with the development of media pluralism, advance internet freedom. RFoM hold annual conferences covering diverse parties such as governments officials, academics, and journalists to debate current freedom issues.

The OSCE has the court of conciliation and arbitration, and this branch provides a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes between states.<sup>70</sup> This mechanism could be used by any state party to the convention for a dispute between one or more states. The court distributes reports and recommendations to the

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<sup>68</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2022). The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. OSCEODIHR. Retrieved December 26, 2022, from [https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/8/521239\\_0.pdf](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/8/521239_0.pdf)

<sup>69</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2018). The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media. OSCERFoM. Retrieved December 25, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/9/9/186381.pdf>

<sup>70</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020). The OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration. Retrieved December 24, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/9/459919.pdf>

parties at the conclusion stage. The parties then have 30 days to decide whether they accept those or not. If the parties decided not to take such recommendations and if agreements do not come, and if the parties agreed to submit to arbitration, an ad hoc arbitral tribunal may be installed whose ruling will be legally binding on the parties. Arbitral proceedings may also be started by agreement between state parties that are concerned.

The OSCE Minsk Group was created when Armenia and Azerbaijan got into a conflict, caused by the geopolitical region named Nagorno-Karabakh.<sup>71</sup> The OSCE put various attempts and efforts to settle down the crisis between two states while gaining support from France, Russia, and the United States who are also co-chairs of this process. This group also contains Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Turkey as permanent members. The Minsk Group conducts several activities to find a peaceful solution to this conflict. Although there are some critics of the Minsk Group's efficacy, it still shows the multilateral negotiation towards the conflicts between permanent states.

Lastly, the OSCE Secretariat provides operative support to the organization itself. It is consisted of administrative and programmatic departments and units concerned on conflict prevention, economic and environmental activities, cooperation with partner countries and organizations, gender equality, anti-trafficking.<sup>72</sup> It also broadly covers domains such as transnational threats, including anti-terrorism, border management and policing reform. They superintend trends,

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<sup>71</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (1995). Mandate for the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Process. Retrieved December 23, 2022, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/f/f/70125.pdf>

<sup>72</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (n.d.). OSCE secretariat. OSCE. Retrieved January 8, 2023, from <https://www.osce.org/secretariat>

offer expert analysis, and implement projects in the field. This branch functions as the backbone of the OSCE chairmanship, OSCE field activities, keeps contacts with international and non-governmental organizations, while providing various logistics.

Additionally, Forum for Security Cooperation is important as it focuses on military security and stability increase within Europe and it also covers some of the most fundamental politico-military agreements of the OSCE participating states.<sup>73</sup> This branch helps to establish confidence and security-building while developing assistance to non-proliferation of illicit small arms and sharing of military information among the participating states. Asian and Mediterranean partners for cooperation states also have an opportunity to observe the process of the comprehensive security installation of the OSCE participating states in this forum.

The permanent council is another very important feature as it widely covers important parts of the OSCE. this council operates negotiating process and political dialogue, decision-making process.<sup>74</sup> It also has informal subsidiary bodies including the security committee, economic and environmental committee, and human dimension committee. Other groups are the preparatory committee, the advisory committee on management and finance, and contact groups with partners for cooperation. Both Asian and Mediterranean partners have closely worked with the permanent council, as it is a core component of the OSCE.


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<sup>73</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020). The OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation. OSCE. Retrieved December 21, 2022, from [https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/a/77535\\_1.pdf](https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/a/77535_1.pdf)

<sup>74</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (n.d.). OSCE secretariat. OSCE. Retrieved January 8, 2023, from <https://www.osce.org/permanent-council>

#### 4.4. Asian and Mediterranean Partners of the OSCE

As previously mentioned, the OSCE have regional partners for co-operation members in Asia and the Mediterranean region. Firstly, The OSCE has special relations with six Mediterranean partners for cooperation who are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. Originally, except Jordan who joined the OSCE in 1998, other five states were formally included in the CSCE, as they were involved with the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. Secondly, the OSCE also holds special relations with Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Korea, and Thailand. Unlike Mediterranean partners, five Asian partners joined the CSCE/OSCE in separate times. Chronologically, it is ordered by Japan (1992), Korea (1994), Thailand (2000), Afghanistan (2003) and Australia (2009).



The Cooperation with Asian and Mediterranean partners to the OSCE have created common objectives, mutual interests, and shared security visions. For Asian partners, a number of topic including new security threats and paradigm, applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia, human dimension of security, anti-



trafficking has been shared. For Mediterranean partners, lessons and practices covering women economic empowerment, fight against terrorism, cooperation in cyber security, and migration and integration policies. While two partner groups are equally invited to OSCE yearly events and partnership group conference, Mediterranean group is assisted with special side events hosted by the OSCE PA.

The OSCE and its regional partners have cooperated in political dialogues such as summits, review conferences, and ministerial council meetings. The cooperation between participating states and partnership promotes them to make solutions for security challenges. It is also remarkable that, now regional partners are able to attend meetings of Permanent council, Forum for security cooperation, and to the Corfu process. Also, creation of the partnership fund in 2007, well demonstrated the importance of structured cooperation between the OSCE and regional partners.

In support of the OSCE Chairmanship and the respective Chairs of the OSCE Asian and OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation Groups, the OSCE Secretariat compromises yearly Asian and Mediterranean Conferences, as well as for the co-ordination of technical assistance projects requested by the Partners.<sup>75</sup> This relates annual conferences, regional conferences, and contact group conferences. Due to its recent official status within the OSCE of partnership countries, regional conference and contact group conference are slowly achieved among participants and partners.

Notably, Asian, and Mediterranean partners cooperate with its own security goals in the OSCE. Each partner engages co-operatively on particular issues of

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<sup>75</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020, July 1). OSCE secretariat. OSCE. Retrieved December 28, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/secretariat>

common interests. The Mediterranean Partners are particularly focused on issues related to anti-terrorism, border security, and migration management.<sup>76</sup> Asian Partners for Co-operation focus on the OSCE's comprehensive security and CSBMs. These partners have also shared experiences in responding to transnational threats, managing borders, addressing transport issues in the OSCE frameworks.<sup>77</sup>

In addition to that, these regional partners cooperates with the OSCE by financial and personnel contribution. First method is by supporting financial support to the partnership fund or by financially supporting specific OSCE missions. Second method is providing experts and professionals to the OSCE activities, field operations and missions. Through these two different provision of national resources, regional partners could contribute to the OSCE even though they are not permanent members. The OSCE annual reports have records of regional partners' financial contributions, which will described in next paragraphs.

From the 1993 annual report, the very first financial report was seen in the 1996 annual report. After that, annual reports made by OSCE shows three interesting aspects. First of all, the very first annual reports made by CSCE do not clearly shows the overall budget until the year of 1997. Secondly, from the year of 2000, it began to reveal the staff of OSCE including both permanent members and Partner for cooperation states such as Japan, as well. Thirdly, OSCE began to reveal its extra-budgetary support list in the annual report of 2010. Fourth, OSCE annual report 2012 started to reveal the actual amount of extra budgetary contributions made by both permanent members and partners for co-operation states. However, the accurate and

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<sup>76</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020, July 1). OSCE secretariat. OSCE. Retrieved December 28, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org>

<sup>77</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020, July 1). OSCE secretariat. OSCE. Retrieved December 28, 2022, from <https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation>

exact amount of voluntary pledge used into which extrabudgetary missions are still unknown at the moment.

**Table 2.3**


Partnership Fund contributed by Asian Partners from 2000~ 2010 (*By author*)

Monetary Contribution	Year	Afghanistan	Australia	Japan	Korea	Thailand
Yes / No / NA	2000	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2001	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2002	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2003	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2004	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2005	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2006	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2007	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2008	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2009	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
	2010	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

**Table 2.4**

Partnership Fund contributed by Asian Partners from 2011 ~ 2021 (*By author*)

Monetary Contribution	Year	Afghanistan	Australia	Japan	Korea	Thailand
	2011	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
	2012	0	360,682	6,740	7,550	0
	2013	0	0	642,154	7,360	0
	2014	0	201,206	1,371,535	115,263	50,000
	2015	0	13,500	2,257,812	9,214	0
	2016	0	0	790,678	98,670	0
	2017	0	0	880,802	106,392	0
	2018	0	0	907,13	89,760	800,00
	2019	0	69,590	736,072	92,768	0
	2020	0	0	197,136	36,000	0
	2021	0	0	675,326	84,700	0



According to table 2.3 and 2.4, there are some interesting findings regarding Asian partners. First of all, Japan has contributed the most among the Asian partners. Then South Korea, Australia and Thailand follow it. Japan has continuously contributed its voluntary contributions to OSCE the most. Then Australia, with its two-track contribution by supporting monetarily with the government, then with public organizations that focus on aids to foreign countries. There is one more interesting aspect to go over, as South Korea decided to increase its voluntary contribution starting from the year of 2016. The ROK, starting from 2016, pays more voluntary contribution than Australia. So that it can be understood as Japan is the largest contributor then followed by Australia, South Korea, Thailand and lastly, Afghanistan.

**Table 2.5**

Partnership Fund contributed by the Mediterranean Partners from 2000 ~ 2010  
(By author)

Monetary Contribution	Year	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Morocco	Tunisia
Yes / No /N/A	2000	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2001	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2002	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2003	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2004	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2005	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2006	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2007	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2008	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2009	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
	2010	No	No	No	No	Yes	No

**Table 2.6**

Partnership Fund contributed by the Mediterranean Partners from 2011~2021  
(By author)

Monetary Contribution	Year	Algeria	Egypt	Israel	Jordan	Morocco	Tunisia
Yes / No /N/A	2011	N/A	Yes	Yes	N/A	Yes	N/A
Amount	2012	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2013	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2014	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2015	0	0	10,000	0	0	0
	2016	0	0	9,000	0	0	0
	2017	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2018	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2019	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2020	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2021	0	0	0	0	0	0

According to table 2.5 and table 2.6, Mediterranean partners for cooperation states shows different results with the partnership fund contribution. First, these partners did not really contribute significantly. One notable result was that out of six countries, three countries including only Egypt, Israel and Morocco did pay some voluntary contributions to the OSCE. Especially, Israel paid the most out of six countries, then Egypt and Morocco following next, without exact amount. Table 3.3 shows Israel's contributions from the 2015 to 2016, with 10,000 euros and 9,000 euros. Except Israel, no other partners did really contribute at all. This implies

Asian partners play larger responsibilities than the Mediterranean ones.

#### **4.5. South Korea-OSCE relations**

The history of the bilateral relationship between the OSCE and the ROK must go back in the 1994. The year of 1994 is remarkable for both the OSCE and the ROK, as South Korea was able to join its first multilateral security organization that includes both West and East with inclusiveness, while the CSCE successfully transformed itself to OSCE. As the Republic of Korea soon earned its membership in the 1996, it began to participate in summit, ministerial and review conference from that year. South Korea has paid its first special contribution from 1997, just a year after the accepted partnership membership. Also, South Korea has held its first official conference with OSCE, in 2001 under the title of Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia.

The ROK joined the OSCE in 1994, two years right after Japan who enjoyed the organization in 1992. In this regard, the ROK is not a latecomer, rather it is an early member of the OSCE as a regional partner. Then Thailand joined in 2000, then Afghanistan in 2003, and lastly, Australia joined in 2009. Unlike Mongolia, ROK did not fully join the OSCE as a participating member state. There has not been a clear reason behind this intention of staying as a partner country rather than a permanent country. These Five countries have simultaneously worked together in areas such as security, and multilateral dialogues, security-related related issues such as cybersecurity and democracy building.

The year of 2020 is remarkable year for Asian partners, as it is the 25th anniversary year of OSCE Asian partnership.<sup>78</sup> For 25 years, the cooperation

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<sup>78</sup> Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020). The OSCE Asian Partnership for Co-operation: Reflections and Perspectives. 24-28

between the OSCE and its regional partners have grown consistently. Also, the ROK has grown its appearance in the OSCE with two major factors: annual partnership fund and extrabudgetary projects. South Korean interests are focused on transnational threats such as cybersecurity and security of ICT, extremism, and terrorism. Recent project that ROK has deeply engaged with preventing and countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes in Central Asia in 2019–2020”.

The ROK aims to build mutual and cooperative atmosphere in these security areas by holding interregional conferences. Also, the ROK is interested in using rich sources from the OSCE for building multilateral and comprehensive security co-operation in North-East Asia, particularly with regard to the OSCE’s expertise in CSBMs as reflected, for example, in the Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Platform. This shows South Korea plays a major role with OSCE when it comes to cybersecurity, anti-terrorism, and transnational threats. Starting from the year of 2001, the ROK has shared and built strong relation with OSCE. The goal of OSCE and ROK has common interests and mutual goals, therefore both players can gain benefits.

**Table 2.7**  
Conference between OSCE and the ROK *(By author)*

No.	Year	Type of Conference	Policy Area
1	2001	1 <sup>st</sup> ROK-OSCE Conference	Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia
2	2003	1 <sup>st</sup> OSCE-IFANS/MOFAT Workshop	Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia
3	2005	2 <sup>nd</sup> ROK-OSCE Conference	New security threats in the post-Cold War era
4	2007	1 <sup>st</sup> OSCE Joint Contact Group Conference	The OSCE and Its Partners for Co-operation: Present State of Affairs and Way Forward
5	2010	1 <sup>st</sup> OSCE Asian Conference	Comprehensive Approach to Security Issues
6	2015	2 <sup>nd</sup> Asian Conference	Changing global security environment and visions of multilateral security co-operation in Asia
7	2017	1 <sup>st</sup> ROK-OSCE cybersecurity conference	Cyber/ICT security
8	2018	Inter-Regional Conference on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism	Violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism
9	2019	2 <sup>nd</sup> ROK-OSCE cybersecurity conference	Cyber/ICT security
10	2020.10.12	3 <sup>rd</sup> OSCE Asian Conference (Virtual Conference)	Multilateral responses to the global security challenges
11	2020.10.14	1 <sup>st</sup> ROK-OSCE conference on new technologies (Virtual Conference)	New technologies
12	2021.06.23	3 <sup>rd</sup> Inter-Regional Conference on Cyber/ICT Security	Cyber/ICT security
13	2021.09.03	OSCE-APCG	Korean peninsula
14	2021.09.21	2021 OSCE Asian Conference	Multilateral responses to the global security challenges
15	2022.06.15	2022 OSCE Asian Conference	Common responses to emerging challenges in advancing comprehensive security

By looking at table 2.7, there has been total ten conferences that both ROK and OSCE agreed to open. This various conference not only covered policy areas that Korean national interest was included, but also with Asian partners for cooperation, to discuss and share ideas in the framework of OSCE and other Asian partners. These two tracks of conference already show meaningful background for



South Korea. First of all, by cooperating and participating with the OSCE, South Korea is not only able to learn and share experiences, knowledge, and methods but also policy common grounds to cooperate with potential cooperative states.

In the case of South Korea, it wishes to adopt the concept of multilateral security approach to northeast Asia where the concept of the multilateralism is not ripe enough. Unlike other regions where the concept of the multilateralism is strong, the Northeast Asia has faced difficulties adopting this concept. In this region, the ROK seeks to build a comprehensive security in Northeast Asia. By joining the OSCE as an Asian partnership country, Korea has followed two different tracks in the context of the cooperation. First one is through financial contribution to the organization, second one is through providing human resource. The former was maintained by contributing to partnership fund, while latter was sustained as South Korea sent experts to OSCE missions.

Following part will focus on South Korea's contribution to the OSCE as a regional partnership state attached to the OSCE, with national role conceptions created by Holsti. This will emphasize three different points for role analysis and contribution measurements of Korea and other Asian partnership states who are being compared. Since South Korea was not labelled by any role conceptions in the Holsti's paper, the next part will cover what role that South Korea carries, and how these roles are kept, with strong or weak role image. Therefore, this research assigns Australia and Korea for regional protector role comparison, Japan and Korea for both regional subsystem collaborator and developer role comparison.

## **Chapter 5. Korean Contribution: Three roles**

### **5.1. Roles and States**

Before going directly to the assessment of Korean contribution into a role theory-based framework, there needs to be an explanation on how this assessment on contribution and the role of state will be decided. To begin with, South Korea's contribution and its role will be measured and compared in this approach. To start with, since the ROK is an Asian partner, it will be only compared with other fellow Asian partners. This will enable a research without containing any spuriousness within and sets a fair comparison with states with same status. Also, this will make Korean contribution less minute towards other participating states whose contribution is relatively higher than regional partners.

In addition to that, among Asian partners, this evaluation will include certain national role conceptions that these partners are labelled. Holsti have assigned Australia as regional protector, whereas Japan is selected as regional subsystem collaborator and developer. There are other states with full membership of the OSCE such as the US, Belgium, France who has more than one national role conception. However, these participating states are quite different from regional partners such as South Korea, in terms of responsibilities, rights, and contributions, so these states will not be compared with South Korea despite of its available data to compare. Therefore, contribution measurement and role analysis will be only processed between Asian partners.

## 5.2. Regional Protector

In this part, the Republic of Korea is compared with Australia, whose national role is defined as regional protector. Previously in the literature review, Holsti (1970) stated regional protector is a state that highlights the provision of guarding for nearby regions, while states essential leadership responsibilities on a regional or issue-area basis.<sup>79</sup> He assigned New Zealand, the US, and the USSR, former Russia, and Australia for this role. Among five countries, only Australia is the Asian partner, and this gives an opportunity for South Korea to evaluate whether it satisfy the role conceptions, and whether its contribution is similar or higher than that of Australia. Hence, to see whether this role is satisfied by the ROK, there would be three different areas to look into, that are partnership fund and policy conferences. Two states will be measured and compared for the satisfaction of the role with two different contributions.

Australia, being a newest Asian partner for cooperation who joined the OSCE in 2009, it contributes via two-track, where it contributes directly by the department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), or by the Australian Agency for international development and Australian development agency. In numerous annual reports of the OSCE, it is difficult to specify which missions and initiatives that Australian extrabudgetary fund was used, but it could be expected as it is either related to OSCE missions, ROK-OSCE related initiatives at the current moment. Meanwhile in policy conference, Australia has strategically cooperated with the OSCE in women, peace, and security agenda-oriented policy coordination.<sup>80</sup> This

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<sup>79</sup> Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233–309. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>

<sup>80</sup> Australian Embassy to Austria. (2016, October 14). Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Australian perspectives. Home. Retrieved January 14, 2023,

policy-related theme has supported by Australia in Asian conference.

**Table 3.1**

Partnership fund contributed by Australia (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Amount
2010	AusAID	n/a
2011	DFAT/AusAID*	n/a
2012	DFAT/AusAID	360,682
2013	DFAT/AusAID	248,278
2014	DFAT	201,206
2015	DFAT	13,500
2016	DFAT	0
2017	DFAT	0
2018	DFAT	0
2019	DFAT	69,590
2020	DFAT	0
2021	DFAT	0

**Graph 3.1**

Partnership fund contributed by Australia (*By author*)




Table 3.1 describes Australia’s financial contribution to the OSCE partnership fund from the year 2011 to 2021. This table shows three detailed aspects,

from <https://austria.embassy.gov.au/vien/OSCEAsianPartners14Oct16.html>

that is could be understood from the Australia’s diplomatic approach to the OSCE. First, graph 3.1 shows the relative amount of the financial contribution has decreased from 2012 to 2015, while from 2012 to 2014 is gradual decrease, whereas from 2014 to 2015 is steep decrease. Second, the overall contribution paid by Australia is 842,673 euros, but it is not consistently distributed, as there are several years with no amount such as 2016 to 2018, then from 2020 to 2021. Lastly, Australia’s financial contribution was provided in two ways, one is by AusAID, and another is by DFAT. This may reveal that, in certain policy areas, Australia seeks indirect engagement with government’s subordinate branch. With these findings, Australia is function as its own kind of regional protector.

**Table 3.2**

Australia’s policy conference to the OSCE (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Policy area
2013	DFAT	Improving the Security of Women and Girls

Table 3.2 shows policy conference between Australia and the OSCE. Since Australia is the newest member of the Asian partners, it has held its first policy conference in 2013, where the topic focused on security of women and girls. In this conference, Australia was able to share its vision and objectives related to Women, peace, and security (WPS) with the OSCE, and other Asian partners. The importance of this conference is that Australia was able to brings its own national security related area that was possible to attach with the OSCE’s Asian and pacific security concerns. The Australian government officially pushes this WPS agenda, followed by the DFAT’s second Australian national action plan, to implement these related commitments. Moreover, Australia’s attempts to install this value could be observed

from other followed Asian conferences.

**Table 3.3**

The ROK’s financial assistance to the OSCE partnership fund *(By author)*

Year	Organization	Amount
2010	MOFAT Korea	n/a
2011	MOFAT Korea	n/a
2012	MOFAT Korea	7,550
2013	MOFA Korea	7,360
2014	MOFA Korea	115,263
2015	MOFA Korea	9,214
2016	MOFA Korea	98,670
2017	MOFA Korea	106,392
2018	MOFA Korea	89,760
2019	MOFA Korea	92,768
2020	MOFA Korea	36,000
2021	MOFA Korea	84,700




Table 3.3 describes South Korea’s financial contribution to the OSCE partnership fund from the year 2011 to 2021. This table shows three detailed features

from the Korean perspective towards the OSCE. First, graph 3.2 reveals the relative amount of the financial contribution has fluctuated from 2012 to 2021, with small increase and decreased mixed together. Second, the overall contribution paid by Australia is 647,677 euros, and it has distributed with stable consistency, as it has not skipped any year to support the partnership fund. Lastly, South Korea's financial contribution was provided by MOFA. This may imply that, the ROK government wishes to directly engage with foreign affairs rather than any other subordinate organizations of the MOFA. With these findings, the ROK is function as its own kind of regional protector.


**Table 3.4**

The ROK's policy conference to the OSCE (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Policy area
2001	MOFAT Korea	Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia
2003	MOFAT Korea	Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia
2005	MOFAT Korea	New security threats and a new security paradigm
2010	MOFAT Korea	Comprehensive Approach to Security Issues
2015	MOFA Korea	The Changing Global Security Environment and Visions of Multilateral Security Co-operation in Asia
2017	MOFA Korea	Cyber/ICT security
2018	MOFA Korea	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism
2019	MOFA Korea	Cyber/ICT security
2020	MOFA Korea	New Technologies

Table 3.4 shows policy conference that was held between Korea and the OSCE. South Korea has held its first policy conference in 2001, where the topic focused on relevancy of confidence and security building measures. In this conference, Korea was able to share its vision and concerns related to CSBMs in

Northeast Asia with the OSCE, and other Asian partners. The importance of this conference is that Korea was able to bring its own national security policy related area that was possible to attach with the OSCE's Asian security concerns. From then, South Korea it was able to bring its own agenda to the OSCE. Also, Korea has opened other conferences focused on new security and comprehensive security, which expands the Korean perspective on foreign affairs and policies with other Asian partners.



Graph 2.3 shows how much Australia and South Korea has contributed from 2012 to 2021. The amount of partnership fund paid to the OSCE in 2010 and 2011 by both states were unable to specify the exact amount. The overall amount of Australia that is 842,673 euros whereas Korean contribution is 647,677 euros. Australia's highest peak was in 2012, while South Korea's peak was in 2016. Australia has contributed inconsistently, but South Korea has contributed steadily



throughout the years. Therefore, in partnership contribution Australia plays stronger role than South Korea. On the other hand, in policy conference area, Australia plays weaker role than South Korea as it has not actively cooperated with the OSCE. While the ROK held 5 different times with each specific security concerns, Australia has held only once. In policy conference, South Korea plays larger role than Australia.

This comparison provides several meaningful implications for both contribution measurement and role analysis. It is no doubt that Australia plays larger role in partnership fund, and it is important to note that, partnership funds are distributed to other OSCE structures, missions, and other projects. The gap between Australia and South Korea is around 200,000 euros, and this gap could be easily overcome by the ROK if it decides to contribute with consistency within two or three years, if Australia continues to not contribute. Then in policy conferences, South Korea maintains larger role, as it broadly and narrowly coordinates with the OSCE. It is crucial that South Korea is learning from the OSCE and expanding its national policy boundaries to the OSCE and other Asian partners. Thus, South Korea could be regarded as regional protector, with little flaws in economic contribution ability than its stable and wide policy contribution strengths.

## **5.2. Regional Subsystem Collaborator**

In this part, the Republic of Korea is compared with Japan, whose national role is defined as regional subsystem collaborator. Previously in the literature review, Holsti (1970) stated regional subsystem collaborator is a state that reveals pervasive commitments to cooperative efforts with other to build expansive communities and cleaving subsystems. This type is also derived from values such as economic needs,

common traditions in politics and ideologies, etc.<sup>81</sup> He assigned countries like Belgium, Ethiopia, Guyana, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland. Among five different countries, only Japan is the Asian partner, and this gives an opportunity for South Korea to evaluate whether it satisfy the role conceptions, and whether its contribution is similar or higher than that of Japan. Hence, to see whether this role is suitable with the ROK, there would be two different areas to look into, that are partnership fund and policy conferences. Among two different contributions, two states are measured and compared for the satisfaction of the role.

Japan, being the eldest Asian partner for cooperation who joined the CSCE in 1992, it contributes directly by the ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA). In numerous annual reports of the OSCE, it is difficult to specify which missions and initiatives that Japanese extrabudgetary fund was used, but it could be expected as it is either related to OSCE missions, Japan-OSCE related initiatives at the current moment. Meanwhile in policy conference, Japan has actively cooperated with the OSCE in comprehensive security, conflict prevention, and experiences and knowledges of the OSCE oriented policy coordination.<sup>82</sup> This policy-related theme has also been supported by Japan in Asian conference held by the OSCE and other Asian partners.

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<sup>81</sup> Holsti, K. J. (1970). National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly*, 14(3), 233–309. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584>

<sup>82</sup> Australian Embassy to Austria. (2016, October 14). Implementing UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: Australian perspectives. Home. Retrieved January 14, 2023, from <https://austria.embassy.gov.au/vien/OSCEAsianPartners14Oct16.html>

**Table 4.1**

Partnership fund contributed by Japan (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Amount
2010	MOFA Japan	n/a
2011	MOFA Japan	n/a
2012	MOFA Japan	6,740
2013	MOFA Japan	642,154
2014	MOFA Japan	1,371,535
2015	MOFA Japan	2,257,812
2016	MOFA Japan	790,678
2017	MOFA Japan	880,802
2018	MOFA Japan	907,130
2019	MOFA Japan	736,072
2020	MOFA Japan	197,136
2021	MOFA Japan	675,326

**Graph 4.1**

Partnership fund contributed by Japan (*By author*)




Table 4.1 describes Japanese financial contribution to the OSCE partnership fund from the year 2011 to 2021. This table shows three detailed aspects, that is could be understood from the Japan’s diplomatic approach to the OSCE. First, graph 4.1 shows the relative amount of the financial contribution has reached its peak in 2015 then fluctuated with both increases and decreases from 2016 to 2020, then rebound in 2021. Second, the overall contribution paid by Japan is 8,465,385 euros, with both stability and consistency and this is so far the largest amount to partnership fund by Asian partners. Lastly, MOFA Japan provided financial contributions to the OSCE. This may imply that; Japanese government wishes to directly engage with foreign affairs. With these findings, the Japan is function as its own kind of regional protector.

**Table 4.2**

Japan’s policy conference to the OSCE *(By author)*

Year	Organization	Policy area
2000	MOFA Japan	Comprehensive Security in Central Asia – Sharing OSCE and Asian Experiences”
2004	MOFA Japan	the Search for Conflict Prevention in the New Security Circumstances - European Security Mechanisms and Security in Asia
2009	MOFA Japan	"Sharing knowledge and experiences between the OSCE participating States and Asian Partners for Cooperation — Co-operation to address common challenges
2014	MOFA Japan	Sharing experiences and lessons learned between the OSCE and Asian Partners for Co-operation

Table 3.5 shows policy conferences between Japan and the OSCE. Since Japan is the eldest member of the Asian partners, it has held its first policy conference in 2000, where the topic focused on the comprehensive security in Central Asia. In this conference, Australia was able to share its vision and objectives related to

comprehensive security and Central Asia with the OSCE participating states. The Japanese government officially pushes this Silkroad diplomacy after the collapse of the USSR, to improve relations with Central Asian states. Moreover, other followed conferences regarding the OSCE experiences and knowledge are beneficial for Japan who wishes to enhance cooperation and exchange between Asia and Europe in security fields. Since Japan has vigorously worked together with the Europe in security and diplomacy areas.

**Table 4.3**

Partnership fund contributed by the ROK (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Amount
2010	MOFAT Korea	n/a
2011	MOFAT Korea	n/a
2012	MOFAT Korea	7,550
2013	MOFA Korea <sup>83</sup>	7,360
2014	MOFA Korea	115,263
2015	MOFA Korea	9,214
2016	MOFA Korea	98,670
2017	MOFA Korea	106,392
2018	MOFA Korea	89,760
2019	MOFA Korea	92,768
2020	MOFA Korea	36,000
2021	MOFA Korea	84,700

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<sup>83</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade became Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23rd of March 2013




Table 4.3 shows the decade of Korean financial assistance to the OSCE. Exactly similar to the Japanese financial assistance to the OSCE record, the OSCE annual report from 2010 and 2011 does contain a record that Korea has financially assisted the OSCE, but they did not include the accurate amount of the financial assistance. From graph 4.2, it can be understood that the year of 2014 and 2017 had highest financial contribution, reaching it to one hundred thousand US doll.ar. Except the year of 2012, 2013, and 2015, the amount of the financial assistance has been sustained ten thousand US dollars from the year of 2016, and 2018 to 2020. The year of 2020 is exceptional case when the amount of the financial assistance has been declined due to the Covid-19 crisis, which made actual cooperation between Korea and the OSCE difficult to cooperate.


**Table 4.4**

The ROK's policy conference to the OSCE (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Policy area
2001	MOFAT Korea	Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia
2003	MOFAT Korea	Applicability of OSCE CSBMs in Northeast Asia
2005	MOFAT Korea	New security threats and a new security paradigm
2010	MOFAT Korea	Comprehensive Approach to Security Issues
2015	MOFA Korea	The Changing Global Security Environment and Visions of Multilateral Security Co-operation in Asia
2017	MOFA Korea	Cyber/ICT security
2018	MOFA Korea	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism
2019	MOFA Korea	Cyber/ICT security
2020	MOFA Korea	New Technologies

Table 4.4 shows policy conference that was held between Korea and the OSCE. Since Korea is the second oldest member of the Asian partners, it has held its first policy conference in 2001, where the topic focused on relevancy of confidence and security building measures. In this conference, Korea was able to share its vision and concerns related to CSBMs in Northeast Asia with the OSCE, and other Asian partners. The importance of this conference is that Korea was able to bring its own national security policy related area that was possible to attach with the OSCE's Asian security concerns. Since Korea's main diplomacy is concentrated in this region and Korea has put several efforts to realize peace in this region, it was able to bring this agenda to the OSCE. Also, Korea has opened other conferences focused on new security and comprehensive security, which expands the Korean perspective on

foreign affairs and policies with other Asian partners.



Graph 4.3 shows how much Japan and the ROK has been contributed from 2012 to 2021. The amount of partnership fund paid to the OSCE in 2010 and 2011 by both states were unable to specify the exact amount, therefore two years were removed. The overall amount of Australia that is 8,465,385 euros whereas Korean contribution is 647,677 euros. Australia's highest peak was in 2015, while South Korea's peak was in 2016. Therefore, in partnership contribution Japan plays stronger role than South Korea. On the other hand, in policy conference area, Japan plays similar role with South Korea but with different policy objectives and area of interests. While the ROK tends to focus more on CSBMs in Northeast Asia, and new paradigm of security including new security threats and cybersecurity, Japan tends to concentrate on current security issues and mechanisms of the OSCE.



This comparison provides several meaningful implications for both contribution measurement and role analysis. It is no doubt that Japan plays much larger role in partnership fund, and it is crucial to note that, partnership funds are being distributed to other OSCE structures, missions, and other projects. The gap between Japan and South Korea is around 7,000,000 euros, and this gap could not be easily overcome by the ROK, unless Korean main interest on the Northeast Asia slightly shifts to European security and security cooperation with the Europe.

Then in policy conferences, South Korea maintains equivalent role, as it broadly and narrowly coordinates specific security areas with the OSCE. It is crucial that South Korea is learning from the OSCE and expanding its national policy boundaries to the OSCE and other Asian partners. While Japan also cooperates actively with the OSCE, it is essential to know that South Korea is pioneering in new areas of the security. Thus, South Korea could be regarded as regional protector, with large flaws in economic contribution ability than its consistent policy contribution strengths.

### **5.3. Developer**

In this part, the Republic of Korea will be compared with Japan, whose national role is defined as developer. Previously in the literature review, Holsti (1970) stated developer is a state that unique duty to support poor states, while this role also shows distinctive skills for managing such sustaining tasks. This type is also derived from values such as economic needs, common traditions in politics and ideologies. He also assigned countries like Belgium, Ethiopia, Guyana, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland in this group.

Among six different countries in this role category, only Japan is the Asian

partner of the OSCE, and this gives an opportunity for South Korea to evaluate whether it satisfy the role conceptions, and whether its contribution is similar or higher than that of Japan. Henceforth, to see whether this role is suitable with the ROK, there would be two different areas to look into, that are special financial contribution besides the partnership fund, and personnel contribution. Among two different contributions, two states will be measured and compared for the satisfaction of the role.

Japan, being the eldest Asian partner for cooperation who joined the CSCE in 1992, it contributes directly to the OSCE by the ministry of foreign affairs (MOFA). In numerous annual reports of the OSCE, it is difficult to specify which missions and initiatives that Japanese extrabudgetary fund was used, but it could be expected as it is either related to OSCE missions, Japan-OSCE related initiatives at the current moment. Meanwhile in policy conference, Japan has actively cooperated with the OSCE in comprehensive security, conflict prevention, and experiences and knowledge of the OSCE oriented policy coordination. It could be also observed that Japan has contributed special financial contribution and personnel contribution to the CSCE and OSCE. This policy-related theme has also been supported by Japan in Asian conference held by the OSCE and other Asian partners.

**Table 5.1**

Japan's special contribution to the OSCE missions 1992~2014 (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Monetary Contribution	Purpose
1992~1993	MOFA Japan	800,000 ATS	Satellite Communication Equipment
1994~1995	MOFA Japan	60,000 USD	Satellite Communication Equipment
1994.02	MOFA Japan	25,000 USD	The Rule of Law
1995	MOFA Japan	33,000 USD	Voluntary Contribution to Secretariat
1995.05	MOFA Japan	23,000 USD	Promoting the Creation of SMEs
1995.11	MOFA Japan	23,000 USD	Inter-Ethnic Relations and Regional Co-operation
2008	MOFA Japan	1.1 mil EUR	OSCE Centre in Ashgabat
2009	MOFA Japan	2.72 mil EUR	Stabilization of Afghanistan <sup>84</sup>
2012	MOFA Japan	4.2 mil USD	OSCE BSMC
2013	MOFA Japan	1 million EUR	Tajik Customs Service
2014	MOFA Japan	2,000,000 EUR	OSCE SMM

**Table 5.2**

Japan's personnel contribution to the OSCE missions 1992~2019 (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Observer number	Mission Type	Host Country
1992~1993	MOFA Japan	2	SMM	Macedonia
1994~1995	MOFA Japan	2	MLD	Macedonia
1994.02	MOFA Japan	1	Seminar	Kyrgyzstan
1994.09	MOFA Japan	1	Seminar	Estonia
1995.09	MOFA Japan	1	Seminar	Austria
1995.10	MOFA Japan	1	Seminar	Uzbekistan
2014~2015	MOFA Japan	1	Field Mission	Kosovo
2015.6~2020	MOFA Japan	1	Field Mission	Kosovo
2014.05	MOFA Japan	20	Presidential	Ukraine
2014.10	MOFA Japan	20	Parliamentary	Ukraine
2017~2019	MOFA Japan	1	SMM	Ukraine
2019.02	MOFA Japan	1	SMM	Moldova
2019.03	MOFA Japan	3	SMM	Ukraine
2019.04	MOFA Japan	5	SMM	Ukraine
2019.06	MOFA Japan	2	SMM	Kazakhstan
2019.11	MOFA Japan	2	SMM	Belarus

<sup>84</sup> United Nations. (2010, February 5). Stronger role in European Security, better cooperation with United Nations among key priorities for regional body, incoming chair tells Security Council. United Nations. Retrieved January 14, 2023, from <https://press.un.org/en/2010/sc9857.doc.htm>

These two tables, 5.1 and 5.2 show special financial contribution that was given by Japan and distributed to OSCE missions and seminars. It could be found that Japan has supported various projects and seminars held by the CSCE/OSCE, such as supplying financial resource for satellite communication equipment for two times, and various seminars, and even voluntary contribution to secretariat. The official records of Japanese special contribution from 1996 to 2007 are missing, as they are scattered and not recorded uniformly. From 2008, these contributions are becoming more tangible, as Japan started to contribute to specific mission such as OSCE Centre, projects including stabilization of Afghanistan. Also, it is notable to mention that Japan donated financial support to OSCE border security management college, Tajik customs service and OSCE special monitoring mission (SMM) with amount augmented 10 times bigger than the past.

**Table 5.3**

The ROK's special contribution to the OSCE missions 1996~2014 (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Monetary Contribution	Purpose
1996	MOFAT	100,000 USD	Bosnia Presidential Election
1997	MOFAT	100,000 USD	Bosnia Municipal Elections
2007	MOFAT	30,000 USD	Tajikistan removal of landmines
2008	MOFAT	10,000 EUR	Afghanistan election support
2009.07	MOFAT	10,000 USD	Afghanistan election support
2009.11	MOFA	30,000 EUR	Afghanistan Border Management Support
2014	MOFA	100,000 EUR	Ukraine Presidential election observer

Table 5.3 shows special financial contribution that was provided by the

ROK and distributed to OSCE missions in Balkan peninsula, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. It could be found that Korea has financially assisted elections, removal of landmines, border management and election observation held by the OSCE, by supplying voluntary contributions to each programs. Although the amount of these special financial contributions is not large and it is inconsistent and differs by the time, it shows South Korea is still contributing its special financial contribution. Plus, the most recent contribution to the Ukraine case show that it recovered financial amount to 100,000 euros. The official records of Korean special contributions from 1997 to 2006 do not appear, showing its inactivity during that time. Also, it is notable to mention that South Korea focused on elections and election observations and other practical operations.

**Table 5.4**

The ROK's personnel contribution to the OSCE missions 1996~2016 (*By author*)

Year	Organization	Observer number	Election Type	Host Country
1996	NEC	12	Presidential	Bosnia
1998	NEC	5	Legislative	Bosnia
1999	NEC	2	Presidential	Macedonia
2002	NEC	4	Municipal	Kosovo <sup>85</sup>
2005	NEC	4	Presidential	Kyrgyzstan <sup>86</sup>
2007.05	NEC	2	Legislative	Armenia
2007.05	NEC	12	Presidential	Bosnia
2008.10	NEC	5	Legislative	Bosnia
2008.10	NEC	5	Legislative	Bosnia
2011	NEC	2	Presidential	Macedonia
2011.03	NEC	2	Presidential	Kazakhstan <sup>87</sup>
2014	NEC	2	Municipal	Kosovo
2015	NEC	2	Presidential	Kyrgyzstan
2016.03	NEC	3	Legislative	Armenia
2016.06	NEC	5	Legislative	Mongolia
2016.09	NEC	6	Presidential	Austria
2016.11	NEC	2	Presidential	United States

<sup>85</sup> 외교부 (2002). OSCE주관 코소보 지방선거 감시단 파견. 보도자료. 외교통상부 안보정책과.

<sup>86</sup> 외교부 (2005). 키르기즈스탄 대통령 선거감시단 파견. 보도자료. 외교통상부 안보정책과.

<sup>87</sup> 중앙선거관리위원회. (2011). 2011. 4. 3. 실시 카자흐스탄 조기 대통령 선거 참관 보고서. 대한민국 중앙선거관리위원회 행정국제과 국제협력계.

Table 5.4 shows personnel contribution provided by Korea to various countries in Central Asia, Eastern Europe, East Asia, and even North America. It could be seen that South Korea has sent election observers to various types of elections that were observed by the OSCE and by its fellow participating states. South Korea's personnel contribution begins from 1996, when the ROK has sent 12 election observers to presidential election held in Bosnia. Then South Korea has sent different observers to other states until 2016. These election observers are not from MOFA, but they are from National committee of election (NEC) of the ROK who are invited to take part requested by the MOFA. Korean election observers do not simply help election observation, but also open bilateral talks with host country's representatives from election related organizations.


While Japan supplied much thoughtful processes on special contribution and personnel contribution, they do not have any records on these activities. However, there were documents from NEC Korea on Mongolia and Kazakhstan election observations. The first one is the lower parliament of Kazakhstan election, where South Korea has convoyed three personnel who is working in the National election committee. The highest rank of this NEC personnel was 4th rank of Korean civil servant, which is right under the high civil servant rank, the 3rd.

These NEC personnel were invited by the CEC, central election commission of Kazakhstan. Also, this election observer group had total 955 personnel, including the 286 OSCE/ODIHR observers and 75 OSCE PA members. This can be regarded that, it can be understood that, along with Korean monetary pledge, actual Korean personnel was added to this OSCE/ODIHR observation group. This does show a partial, limited Korean contribution towards the Kazakhstan


election. NEC have sent twelve representatives with not only civil servants but also other administrative domain workers as well. As presidential election took more time to be processed, NEC was able to meet the head of Mongolia Central election commission and monitored how does the overall election goes by.

Also, OSCE/ODIHR always create a final report about the election results, where it can be either improved or developed, revised to form a better OSCE committing country. NEC report tends to focus more on the general observation, where it focuses on the fairness of the election support and exchange of opinions about the ODA plans, along with the international exchange and cooperation strengthening process. OSCE final report is more in-depth analysis where it goes over diverse aspects of the elections, such as voter registration, electoral system, and legal framework, etc. This report also imposes whether the country is following the OSCE guidelines within the electoral process. As the OSCE considers each participating state's commitments and following recommendations and guidelines, it is crucial to understand that the OSCE indirectly ask state's commitments in the OSCE's policy areas.

**Graph 5.1**  
 Personnel contribution comparison between Japan and the ROK  
*(By author)*



**Graph 5.2**  
 Special financial contribution comparison between Japan and the ROK  
*(By author)*



Two graphs, 5.1 and 5.2 briefly show the comparison between in personnel contribution and special financial contribution to the OSCE by Japan and the ROK. The first graph proves the overall personnel contribution by Japan and South Korea, where Japan has sent more personnel to the OSCE missions than the ROK. The second graph shows the special financial contribution by Japan and South Korea



where Japan has contributed far more financial support to the OSCE missions than South Korea. Although the ROK attempted to contribute to the OSCE, Japan outweigh much larger than that of South Korea. Thus, Japan's developer role is relatively stronger than that of Korea's developer role.

The analysis shows Japan plays much larger role in special contribution from the OSCE's operations since 1992. The gap between Japan and South Korea is huge, and this gap could not be easily overcome by the ROK, due to being a latecomer as a rich contributor to the field activities and operations of the OSCE and lack of interest in those areas. Then in personnel contribution, South Korea keeps an equivalent role, as it has broadly sent particularly election observers to various states. It is also crucial to note that, Japan has sent diverse type of experts to various states. Thus, South Korea could be regarded as developer, with large flaws in economic contribution ability than its personnel contribution.

#### **5.4. Role Evaluation**

Previously conducted South Korea's role evaluations on the regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer have been verified, giving several implications for further research. From these analysis, South Korea was compared with Japan and Australia. This is due to the fact that the analysis would be fair and equal if states with the same membership were compared. Also, other regional partnership states have minute contributions to be compared and comparing South Korea with other participating states would be inequivalent because of the status and ability differences from the membership.

Holsti's role theory although introduced in 1970, reveals explanatory ideas on the role of the state based on its national slogan, its actual role performance, and

its role function. South Korea, being a middle power with remarkable national capabilities can be defined to three different roles that Holsti has mentioned in his paper. Due to Korea's clear foreign policy doctrines, other roles such as internal development, isolate, and protectee were easily removed, while certain roles such as regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer were examined. Especially, while performing an assessment of Korean contribution to the OSCE, these roles could be applied and verified whether Korea applies to these roles and whether its contributions work as evidence of given roles.

The first role to analyze, the regional protector role was evaluated with comparisons of contributions to the OSCE based on the partnership fund and policy conferences. Australia and Korea were compared together since both of them are Asian partners of the OSCE. From the results, South Korea was a weaker contributor than Australia even though South Korea has steadily contributed since 2012 while Australia unsteadily contributed to the partnership fund. Although overall Korean contribution does not surpass Australian contribution, there is a slight gap that could be reversed in the near future. In policy conferences, South Korea plays a wider and more diverse role than Australia. Thus, South Korea could be labeled as a regional protector with slightly weak economic capability and strong policy contributions.

The second role to analyze, the regional collaborator role was tested with comparisons of contributions to the OSCE based on the partnership fund and policy conferences. Japan and South Korea were compared together since both of them are Asian partners of the OSCE. The comparison shows Korea is a weak regional subsystem collaborator as its contribution is far behind of Japanese contribution to the partnership fund. Even though the annual contribution to the partnership fund by South Korea has its stability, the difference in the financial quantity is still obvious.

In policy conferences, South Korea plays a wider and more diverse role than Japan. Therefore, South Korea could be labeled as a regional protector with weak economic capability and strong policy contributions.

The third role to analyze, developer role was tested with comparisons of special financial contribution and personnel contribution to the OSCE missions. Japan and South Korea were compared together since both of them are Asian partners of the OSCE. The comparison shows Korea is a weak developer as its special financial contribution is far behind of Japanese contribution to the OSCE missions. Even though the South Korea has supported multiple OSCE participating states in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while the gap in the financial quantity is still obvious. In personnel contribution comparison, Japan plays a wider and more diverse role than South Korea. Therefore, South Korea could be labeled as a developer with considerably weak economic capability and weak personnel resources.

## **Chapter 6. Conclusions**

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, one of two main regional security linchpins that hold European security and the Republic of Korea, a middle power state in Northeast Asia cooperates despite its distant geographic location and the lack of common interests. South Korea being the second oldest Asian partnership state, has consistently cooperated with its own national interests related to the installation of the comprehensive security, cyber security, and new security with the OSCE. This signifies that, South Korea is following two independent tracks, where the former is learning from the existing structure, while the latter is to pioneer and create rules of new security-related areas.

This paper has shown mainly three prominent facts about South Korea's

role and its contribution to the OSCE throughout its evaluation of self-contribution and comparisons with other partnership states. Firstly, South Korea has actively contributed financially to the partnership fund and supplied government personnel to the OSCE missions and field operations. Secondly, South Korea has also cooperated with the OSCE in terms of the policy dimension such as cybersecurity and new security concerns. Lastly, based on Korean contribution to the OSCE as a regional partnership state, Korea could be regarded as the second most active state among other regional partners of Asian and Mediterranean partners.

The role evaluation in order to evaluate whether South Korea could be labeled as a regional protector, regional subsystem collaborator, and developer implies other interesting results. In this regard, the ROK was compared with Australia and Japan, as the three states hold their membership in the OSCE as an Asian partnership for cooperation. To start with, South Korea could be perceived as a regional protector with moderately weak financial contribution but with broad and diverse policy contribution. Then, South Korea is a regional subsystem collaborator with largely weak financial contribution but with broad and diverse policy contribution. Lastly, South Korea is labeled as a developer with again, largely weak special financial contribution and personnel contribution.

The evaluation of the three different roles to the ROK is important as it demonstrates how South Korea performs its capacity and responsibilities of these roles. Among three roles, except the developer role, two other roles could be improved if South Korea decides to reinforce financial aid to the OSCE, and sophisticate its approach with more specific and designed financial aids and experts to the OSCE missions. Also, if the ROK decides to cooperate with the Europe in the security area in the future, the bilateral relationship between the ROK and the OSCE

could be much institutionalized and regularized. It needs to be emphasized that the current relationship between two parties also needs to be sustained in the same level.

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# Abstract

## 요약(국문초록)

본 연구는 현실주의적 외교안보에 대한 시각에서 파생된 홀스티의 역할이론을 활용하여 유럽안보협력기구에 대한 대한민국의 역할과 기여도를 평가한다. 여기서 역할 이론은 1970 년대에 처음 등장하였으며 국가의 역할에 대해서 국가의 외교정책 결정과 행동을 의미한다고 보고 있으며, 정부의 태도, 결정 그리고 기능을 포함한다고 규정하고 있다. 이러한 이론의 적용은 다음과 같은 유용성을 갖고 있다. 첫째로 유럽안보협력기구 내 준 회원국 지위를 갖는 호주 및 일본과 같은 국가들과 한국을 비교할 수 있게 한다. 이는 홀스티가 제시하고 있는 17 개의 역할들 중 호주와 일본이 보유하고 있는 지역 수호자, 지역 하부체제 협력자, 그리고 개발자라는 역할을, 같은 준 회원국 입장에서 비교 및 평가할 수 있기 때문이다. 둘째로 홀스티의 연구에서 대한민국에 대한 평가가 보류되었다는 점에서, 1970 년대와 다른 2020 년대의 한국 외교에 대해서 국가역할을 부여할 수 있다는 의의를 갖는다.

그리고 기여도 측면에서는 다음과 같은 맥락에서 학문적 의미를 전달하고 있다. 국내 학계에서 유럽안보협력기구가 북대서양조약기구 및 유엔평화유지군에 비해서 덜 알려져 있다는 점에서 유럽안보협력기구에 대한 연구 필요성을 환기한다. 우선 유럽안보협력기구에 대한 실질적인 기여도를 평가함으로써 기존 문헌에서 크게 다루고 있지 않은 분야를 선정함으로써, 단순히 유럽안보협력기구와 대한민국의 양자적 관계에

대한 탐구에서 머물지 않고 실질적 기여도를 파악하는 중요성을 갖는다. 이와 더불어 기여도 측정이라는 점에서, 한국이 유럽안보협력기구에 자발적으로 제공하고 있는 파트너십 기금, 특별기금, 전문인력 제공 등에 대해서 보다 자세한 연구를 전개하고 있다. 이를 통해서 한국의 독자적 금전적 지원과 인적 지원을 열거하고, 이를 타 아시아 동반 협력자 국가인 호주와 일본의 기여도와 비교하여 공통점과 차이점을 도출하고 있다.

그리하여 본 연구에서는 다음과 같은 학문적 발견을 획득할 수 있었다. 우선 지역 수호자 역할에서는 파트너십 기금과 정책협력이라는 두 가지 기여도 측면에서 한국과 호주를 비교하였다. 이를 통해서 파트너십 기금에 대한 금전적 지원에서는 호주가 한국보다 근소하게 더 기여도가 크며, 정책협력 기여도에서는 한국이 기여도가 훨씬 더 크고 다양한 것으로 보여진다. 이를 통해서 약한 금전적 지원과 강한 정책적 지원을 가진 지역 수호자 역할을 갖는다고 본다. 지역 하부체제 협력자 역할에서는 동일한 기여도 측면에서 일본과 한국을 비교하였다. 여기서 파트너십 기금에 대한 금전적 지원에서는 일본이 한국보다 훨씬 기여도가 크며, 정책협의 기여도에서는 한국이 기여도가 훨씬 더 크고 다양한 것으로 보여진다. 마지막으로 개발자 역할에서는 특별 기금과 전문인력을 비교하였으며, 특별기금의 기여도에서 더 오랜 기간에 걸쳐서 더 많은 금액과 다양한 전문인력을 지원하였음을 발견할 수 있었다. 이를 통해 한국은 아직 일본보다는 덜 적극적인 역할을 보여주고 있다.

따라서 전반적으로 볼 때 대한민국의 유럽안보협력기구 내 역할은 다음과 같은 특징을 갖는다고 결론지을 수 있을 것이다. 첫째, 지역 수호자 역할에서 대한민국은 오스트레일리아보다 근소하게 적은 파트너십 기금 기여와 크고 다양한 정책적 기여를 보인다. 둘째, 지역 하부 체 협력자 역할에서는 대한민국은 일본보다 크게 적은 파트너십 기금 기여와 크고 다양한 정책적 기여를 보인다. 마지막으로 개발자 역할에서 대한민국은 일본에 비해 크게 적은 특별 기금 기여를 보여주며, 전문인력 기여 측면에서는 상대적으로 짧고 적은 기여도를 나타내고 있다. 한국의 역할 평가를 통해서 세 가지 역할에서 한국이 갖는 강점과 약점을 파악하며, 향후 한국 외교에 있어서 어떤 노력이 필요한지에 대해서 알 수 있었다.

주요어: 역할, 역할개념, 기여, 안보협력, 유럽안보협력기구, 대한민국  
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