

MASTER

Bidonvilles in Casablanca

a new strategy for the permanent eradication of the slums and the resettlement of their dwellers

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EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY

FACULTY OF THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT
MASTER OF ARCHITECTURE, BUILDING AND PLANNING
MASTERTRACK URBAN DESIGN AND PLANNING

MASTER'S THESIS

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A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE PERMANENT ERADICATION
OF THE SLUMS AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF THEIR
DWELLERS

Mediha Aicha El-Kebir

Student number 0746794

Graduation Committee
dr.ir. DOEVENDANS, C.H.
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d.p.l.g. ROUSSEAU, S.S.S.

1 August 2017

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Abstract

SLUMS are an ever-appearing phenomenon in modern day cities. For the past centuries many different approaches have been developed to tackle this problem, but none have proved to be permanently successful. This very problem will be discussed in this thesis, by both looking at the fortes and the shortcomings of previous strategies, and building upon the successes these strategies brought along. First, a particular focus will be put on the strategies and plans of Écochard and his colleagues regarding the slums of Casablanca, Morocco, in the 50s and 60s of the last century. Second, the approaches developed after the independence of Morocco will be analysed, with the fundamental points of Écochard's strategy in mind. Our approach is threefold. Third, the current state of the slums of Casablanca will be explored, using both official data from stakeholders and the current main slum eradication program, *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*, as well as personal on-site experiences. These three components will be used as the cornerstone of a new strategy that seeks to permanently eliminate the slums in Casablanca and rehouse their former residents appropriately, with a particular focus on the implementation of said strategy in *Carrières Centrales*, one of the biggest of Casablanca's slums. The main guideline for this strategy will be the sentiments of the slum dwellers themselves, as they are the ones to whom this strategy is targeted, but have been continuously overlooked by those behind the drafting table. A newly established non-governmental organisation will be the driving force to ensure all stakeholders have the appropriate and necessary influence on the process.

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List of Definitions

Acronym	French	English
ADS	<i>Agence de Développement Social</i>	Social Development Agency
DHSAF	<i>Direction de l'Habitat Social et des Affaires Foncières</i>	Direction of Social Habitat and Real Estate Affairs
FOGARIM.....	<i>Fonds de Garantie pour les Ménages à Revenus Modestes et/ou irréguliers</i>	Guarantee Fund for Households with Modest and/or irregular Income
HOA.....	<i>Holdering d'Aménagement Al Omrane</i>	Residential Holding Al Omrane
MAD.....	Moroccan Dirham
MEF	<i>Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances</i>	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MHPV	<i>Ministère de l'Habitat et de la Politique de la Ville</i>	Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City
MICL	<i>Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Locales</i>	The Ministry of Interior and Local Government
MSFFDS	<i>Ministère de la Solidarité de la Femme de la Famille et de Développement Social</i>	Ministry of the Solidarity of the Woman of the Family and Social Development

NGO.....	Non-Governmental Organisation
OPH.....	<i>Opérateur Public de L'Habitat</i>	Parastatal Housing Companies
PSIA.....	Poverty and Social Impact Analysis
VSB	<i>Villes Sans Bidonvilles</i>	Cities Without Slums
VSBP.....	Villes Sans Bidonville Programme
ZAP	<i>Zone d'aménagement progressive</i>	Zone of progressive housing
ZEP	<i>Zone d'équipement progressif</i>	Zone of progressive equipment

Term	English
<i>'Assas</i>	Local volunteer 'security guard' of the neighbourhood
<i>Bidonville</i>	Slum, shantytown
<i>Caïd</i>	Head of the <i>moqaddems</i> of a number of neighbourhoods
<i>Hamman</i>	Moroccan bathhouse
<i>Imam</i>	Islamic head of the mosque
<i>Moqaddem</i>	Civil representative of a neighbourhood

Summary

SLUMS have been, and still are, for many countries a seemingly insolvable problem that has for many years demanded significant resources to be resolved temporarily, only to appear again as if they were never dealt with before.

This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that many of the strategies concerned with this problem are all similar to each other; they chiefly deal with the physical factors that are associated with slums, such as, but not limited to: quality of housing, social class of dwellers, mean income of households, etc.

It is however rarely characterised as an organic phenomenon, that contains many unpredictable variables that result in two cases never being the same. Stakeholders are mainly concerned about basic questions such as the amount of inhabitants and the state of housing, only to relocate slum dweller with little to no interaction with the slum dwellers themselves. A slum is however, characterised by those who live in it, as they have shaped the slum to its current state, without a formal plan or involvement of a city planner. It is shaped to the needs of those who live in it, and, due to the fact that people most often do not share the same needs, slums are characterised by a lawless, heterogeneous cityscape. This cityscape is reminiscent of an organic population, which is essentially what characterises them best. Therefore not only non-human factors such as housing situation and poverty, but humane factors, such as social participation and education of slum dwellers play a big role in slum development and manifestation. One must therefore look at both factors, physical and humane, while focussing on the humane factors in particular, which is oftentimes neglected in existing slum development strategies.

The new strategy introduced in this thesis therefore addresses both the relocation/development of slums to proper urban quarters, as well as the prevention of the emergence of new slums. Such a strategy is, in other words, a sustainable and humane approach to the elimination of slums. By replacing the conventional top-to-bottom power-structure with an organic structure consisting of the government and the citizenry, with an independent NGO connecting both parties. The NGO's duty is to continuously ensure a mutual, transparent, flow of information between both parties, and more importantly, to ensure that both parties respect one another's needs and wishes. The NGO acts as a mediator in the broadest sense of the word: they control whether information from

one side reaches the other, based on the merit of either side. This is entirely founded on the principle of mutual respect, as both sides must respect each other for anything to happen, which is the very basis of human interaction. To enforce this concept of mutual respect, the NGO has statutorily been given a monopoly on communication between the citizenry and all other parties involved. This allows the NGO to impose a sanction on a misbehaving party in the form an interruption of communication from one party, that behaves uncivilly, to another, that behaves civilly, causing development to be suspended until both parties behave civilly and respect each other's needs, thus being equally disadvantageous for both parties. It is therefore primarily a preventive measure than a reactive measure, so as to keep all parties in check and ensure unwavering progress of the slum development programme.

By implementing a strategy in which the needs of all parties are considered equally, but the well-being of the citizenry is prioritised at all times, one is able to instil a sense of involvement and recognition in the souls of the slum dweller's, who will in turn be more willing to adhere to the newly develop policies and pick up life as a regular metropolist. To achieve the latter, slum citizens will be actively involved in the development process, using regularly scheduled meetings, surveys and workshops that are targeted to all parts of society (including of course: women, elderly, physically impaired and children), as they are part of the bedrock of a community and must not be disregarded when educating an entire population.

The aforementioned measures will ensure the satisfaction and involvement of slum dwellers in the development of their future. The development of new slums at the hands of the citizenry themselves will be prevented by educating all layers of society, so as to provide everyone with a stable position in society (i.e. a permanent job and a secure future), removing the need to live in clandestine dwellings due to financial difficulties, a need that all slum dwellers have in common. Ultimately, the vestiges of former slums will disappear with the former slum dwellers enjoying a righteous life without financial worries, a healthy community and a secure future, as they will live in formal, modern, housing with the NGO at their disposal if any troubles would occur.

Preface

CASABLANCA is a city I have visited many times in my life during our holidays to Morocco, the country in which my mother was born. Since we have a house in nearby city, Mohammedia, the city of Casablanca is a second hometown to me.

During my studies I have found myself to be interested in the social aspects of urban planning. In particular, the day-to-day struggles of citizens have piqued my interest, especially when considering how these struggles can be solved by good urban planning, in which the citizens' wishes are taken into account and, as a result, livable places are created for them. Highly densified cities and Third World problems have interested me, which has led me to choose for an individual subject for my graduation project as opposed to a group project.

Given my love for Morocco, proficiency in the language and interest in relevant urban world problems, I have decided to choose the slums in Casablanca as the subject of my research. In April 2015, I travelled to the city, where I got acquainted with the different stakeholders and actors, and have performed research on-site, all while being helped by immensely kind people. Based on the experience I gained while working on my thesis, I am earnestly considering to live and work in Morocco in the future.

— Mediha Aicha El-Kebir

Waalwijk, 1 August 2017

Introduction

IN my graduation thesis I will focus on the cross-cultural character of contemporary architecture and urbanism. I will explore appropriate methods of analysis in different cultural contexts. In such an unfamiliar environment, outside the known European context, one is challenged to develop other roles, approaches and techniques as a response to the particular cultural, social, environmental, political and economic conditions.

The aim of my research is to investigate a pressing issue in the rapidly developing urban territory of Casablanca in Morocco – at the beginning of the 20th century a town of only 20,000, today a metropolis of over 5 million. Casablanca has experienced several waves of urban growth, which have resulted in a set of pressing issues. One of these issues are the bidonvilles of the city that fulfil an important economic role but lack primary living qualities. Such precarious dwellings as can be found in bidonvilles, can be found all over the world. My aim is therefore to develop a new approach that is as comprehensive as possible, while continuously focussing on the needs and wishes of the citizenry. Such an approach may well be utilised by institutions that are concerned with slum development all over the world, as it will focus on a flexible framework that can easily adapt to the needs of a wide range of cultures and social classes because of its focus on the needs of the slum dwellers themselves.

Slums in the world

THE total number of slum dwellers in the world stood at about 924 million people in 2001 ([United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003](#)). This represents about 32% of the world's total urban population. At that time, 43% of the combined urban populations of all developing regions lived in slums, while 78.2% of the urban population in least developed countries were slum dwellers. In some cities in developing countries, slums are pervasive to such an extent, that it is the rich who have to segregate themselves behind small gated enclaves.

Efforts to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers (especially those in developing countries) have been feeble and incoherent over the last decade or so, having peaked during the 1980s. However, renewed concern about poverty has recently led governments to adopt a specific target on slums in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, which aims to significantly improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year

2020. As stated in *The Challenge of Slums* ([United Nations Human Settlements Programme, 2003](#)), slums are a manifestation of the two main challenges facing human settlements development at the beginning of the new millennium: rapid urbanisation and the urbanisation of poverty. Slums areas have the highest concentrations of poor people and the worst shelter and environmental conditions.

The city of Casablanca

As architect Henri Prost stated in *Le Plan de Casablanca* (1917): “One of the major features that characterizes Casablanca is its ever-growing native population. It is perhaps the only Muslim town in the whole of North Africa where this type of development has occurred. As a consequence, grim suburbs and squalid slums have sprung up, unfortunately squeezed right in between the European quarters.”

The city of Casablanca is located in the north-western part of Morocco on the west coast of the Atlantic Ocean. This rapidly growing North African port city can also be classified as an “emerging megacity”. Its population grew substantially during the 20th century and still continues to do so today.

At the beginning of the 20th century Casablanca was a small urban settlement of approximately 20,000 inhabitants ([Kaioua and Troin, 2002](#), p. 59) and it covered approximately 50 hectares ([Chavagnac, 2004](#), p. 16). Nowadays, with over 5.11 million inhabitants the city of Casablanca is the largest and most densely populated city in Morocco. It is the economic heart of Morocco.

A continuous influx of country dwellers during the 20th century is the cause of Casablanca’s tremendous population growth. In 1952, at the end of the French protectorate, a census was held, which indicated that only 8% of the city’s population was born in Casablanca, 17% came from other Moroccan towns, whereas 75% originated from the countryside ([Awad, 1964](#), p. 1). Between 1936 and 1952, 60% of all rural migrants settled down in the booming town of Casablanca ([Adam, 1972](#), p. 325).

The hope for a job and better living conditions seems to have driven rural migrants to the new economic heart of the country. However, in the course of the 20th century economic development fell behind population growth, the labour market became saturated and a serious housing problem arose ([Adam, 1972](#), p. 85). This did, however, not stop the rural migrants from going to Casablanca and, as a result, unemployment kept increasing.

Today Casablanca is the largest city of Morocco and one of the largest cities in Africa. The city is a centre of international trade and commerce, a place of economic development and modernity. Yet, for many slum habitants, who once left the countryside with great future expectations in mind, it is a place of hardship as they were, and still are,

not able to profit from the city’s economic development and returning to the countryside does not seem to be a reasonable option.

In the early 2000s, 57% of Morocco’s population lived in its cities. The number of households identified as slums was 212,000, which represented 10% of the urban population. However, another 19%, 520,000 households, were marked as clandestine quarters (World Bank, 2006, p. 7). Between 1992 and 2001, the number of households living in slums increased at 5.6% per annum and the clandestine quarter households increased at 4.9% per year (Benjelloun, 2003, p. 2).




Figure 1: Density of the population in 2004 (inhabitants per km²)
Source: Document prepared by the regional inspection of MHPVAE - Region of Grand Casablanca in 2010




Figure 2: Casablanca’s demographic growth from 1907 until 2004
Source: Agence Urbaine de Casablanca - Rapport diagnostic du nouveau SDAU (2006)

Table 3: Total population development in Casablanca, 1921-2004

Year	Population
1921	101,690
1926	106,608
1936	257,430
1952	682,388
1960	965,277
1971	1,515,321
1982	1,856,669
1994	2,717,125
2004	2,949,805

Source: Royaume du Maroc - Ministère de l'Economie National- Division de la Coordination Economique et du Plan, Tableaux Economiques du Maroc 1915-1959 (Rabat 1960) 25; Centre d'Études et de Recherches Démographiques, Migration et Urbanisation au Maroc (Rabat 1993) 91, 92.

Many strategies to eradicate the slums of Morocco have already been developed and implemented in the course of the last century, but all of them proved to be unsuccessful. These strategies include Michel Écochard's strategy (1943) (1950) (1955), with many successive iterations, all based on the Écochard's original plan that was conceived in the 50s of the previous century. The most recent strategy, namely the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme, had been announced in Morocco in 2004, after the 2003 bombings in Casablanca that were carried out by residents of a slum in Casablanca. In 2008 the demolition of bidonvilles in Casablanca and the rehousing of the inhabitants started. Even though a lot of bidonvilles have already been demolished, there are still some issues that have been overlooked during the process, with in particular the role of one stakeholder: the slum residents with their unheard wishes. Despite the fact that Bidonvilles have been high on the urban agenda of Morocco for many decades, all past strategies have not succeeded in permanently eradicating the slums.

The experiences gained from these strategies will all be used as a foundation for this research, together with personal on-site experiences and the information gained from local authorities and the actual slum citizens. So as to develop a new, conceivable strategy, the following research question has been formulated:

“Which strategy can be implemented to efficiently and permanently eradicate the bidonvilles and resettle their dwellers keeping the social, political, legal, economic and urban layers as well as the wishes of slum dwellers and government in mind?”

In order to answer this question, desk-research and field research are carried out using quantitative and qualitative analysis. This research is the backbone of the interventions proposed for Carrières Centrales and the new strategy. As a final result of my graduation project, I will introduce a new strategy to be implemented, based on the results of my

research. Said research will result in an overall strategy and a set of proposals on how to improve the complete process of permanently eradicating the slums and resettling their residents by introducing a mediator between the different parties involved.

In order to be able to answer our main research question,

“Which strategy can be implemented to efficiently and permanently eradicate the bidonvilles and resettle their dwellers keeping the social, political, legal, economic and urban layers as well as the wishes of slum dwellers and government in mind?”

, we will first answer the following two questions:

1. *“Is it possible for planners to envision a way that increases the empowerment of people and communities? Is it the government that must be involved in this process, or another organisation?”*

We answer this question through the following sub-questions:

- Do inhabitants of the bidonvilles think the bidonvilles are a problem?
 - What do inhabitant want from the government in terms of amenities and assistance?
 - Why do citizens want to move into the slums in the first place?
2. *“What kind of (new) organisatory structure must be introduced and implemented, to effectively eradicate the slums, resettle their citizens in a way that will take their wishes into account so they will not undermine the new strategy, and new slums will stop emerging?”*

The following sub-questions will lead us to the answer of the above question:

- Which proposed solutions are used to permanently remove slums?
- Why did past strategies not work as intended?
- Should we fix one of these solutions or should we find an alternative solution?
- How can the bidonvilles be removed efficiently without causing more problems?
- What are the wishes and demands of the slum residents with regard to resettlement?
- What is the opinion of slum residents on previous slum eradication strategies and the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme?

Finally, the outcome of the research and the interventions proposed for the site will be translated into definite interventions and a new strategy that can be applied in similar situations in order to permanently eradicate slums by introducing a mediator in the power-structures involved. The results of this research will ultimately be of use to the

stakeholders involved in the actual process of slum development all over the world, including but not limited to: governments, banks, research institutes. Said results will provide a relevant framework for these organisations in developing a new, comprehensive and humane, approach to slum development.

Methodology

1. Research

THE research for my thesis starts with a top-down analysis of the bidonvilles. The literature available concerning this topic is quite extensive, which makes this research mainly a desk-research. The available literature is studied, making the analysis of the historical development of Casablanca and the bidonvilles the first step of the process. Following this, the strategies for slum eradication which were implemented in the past are analysed. Finally the strategy currently implemented to eradicate the bidonvilles, the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme, is investigated to define its weak and strong points and its opportunities and threats. This leads to the following results:

1. a periodization
2. history of the development of the bidonvilles
3. an approach to slums in the field of urban design and architecture, with particular attention to Écochard's method
4. an in-depth analysis of the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme and the slum population in Morocco

The bottom-up analysis starts during a field visit to Casablanca. Different stakeholders are interviewed, the various bidonvilles and their surroundings are visited and observations are made. During these visits, interviews with slum residents are held using a non-structured interview approach. The interviews take place as informal conversations so the inhabitants of the bidonvilles will feel at ease and not assume it to be an official interview from the municipality, since some interviewees might be afraid of possible consequences.

The goal of this visit to Casablanca is to gather opinions from as many perspectives as possible, and to view the problem on-site in person. The people to be interviewed include members of the municipality, the Guichet Unique d'Urbanisme, the Agence Urbaine de Casablanca, the Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City and (former) slum residents. This part of the thesis will ultimately be concluded by the analysis and interpretation of the information gathered during this visit.

2. Conceptual framework

FOLLOWING the analysis and the field trip, the research topic is defined. The history of the city of Casablanca is described, especially with regard to that of the bidonvilles. Additionally, the formerly implemented strategies are studied. In 2004 a new strategy was announced, the *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* programme, and in 2008 the demolition of bidonvilles in Casablanca and the rehousing of the inhabitants started. Although a lot of bidonvilles have already been demolished, there are still some issues that have been neglected during the process and in the resettling of the slum residents.

As a result, the main research question is defined as:

“Which strategy can be implemented to efficiently eradicate the bidonvilles and resettle their residents keeping the social, political, legal, economic and urban layers as well as slum dwellers and governments in mind?”

To be able to define such a new strategy a conceptual framework is made, giving an overview of the different factors that play a role. This conceptual framework consists of:

1. preconceptions
2. interpretation of Écochard’s method, other formerly used strategies and the currently used strategy
3. the function of an intermediary organisation in the slum development process
4. the impact of an intermediary organisation on the future of former slum residents after and during their resettlement

3. New strategy and approach

WITH the aforementioned conceptual framework as a guideline and Écochard’s method as an example, a new strategy is developed. The final product of this thesis will essentially be this new strategy, which entails a set of proposals on how to improve the process of removing the slums and resettling their inhabitants while being a mediator between the different parties involved. This strategy aims to create an intermediary between the inhabitants and the governments keeping all stakeholders in mind.

1 | Casablanca and bidonvilles

1.1 Casablanca, from ancient town to French Protectorate

1.1.1 Anfa




Figure 1.1: Casablanca in Morocco




Figure 1.2: Casablanca in the region of Grand Casablanca

CASABLANCA, a place of adventure, a “strange and unsettling city” where anything can happen, yet also a locus of invention and modernity; this is the myth that clung to the city for decades. The aura of Morocco’s commercial capital derives partly from Michael Curtiz’s melodrama of 1946, *Casablanca* (see figure 1.3) – even though the city itself is never shown in that movie (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 11). To understand why the bidonvilles arose in such great numbers in Casablanca, we first have to take a closer look at the the history of the city.




Figure 1.3: Michael Curtiz's, *Casablanca*, 1946
Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002



Figure 1.4: An engraved view of Anfa, from *Civitates orbis terrarum* (c. 1572)
Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002

According to the French sociologist André Adam (1968) the town Anfa (see figure 1.4) – as Casablanca was usually called before the eighteenth century – is probably as old as Marrakesh, which was founded in 1060 (Adam, 1968, p. 9).



(a) The trade routes before the Protectorate (outside urban centres and trade with the desert to Timbuktu - little contact with the coast)

(b) The trade routes in 1950. Morocco now turns to the coast and people move there, changing the previous demographic balance

Figure 1.5: Shift of the economic routes before and after the construction of the modern port of Casablanca: Morocco focusses on marine trade
Source: Écochard, 1955

Around 1770 commerce came back into being after the revival of the city, in the form of regional, national and even international commerce. The harbour played an important role in economic affairs and soon merchants from Genoa and Spain entered the city (Adam, 1968, p. 73). With the revival of the city came also a change of name: Anfa was transformed into Dar el Beida, Europeans used Casablanca as name for the city (and the Portuguese used Casa Branca).

Casablanca's favourable geographic position played a key role in the city's economic development. Firstly, the city is conveniently located at the Atlantic Ocean, at a location next to the main road between Rabat and Marrakesh. Secondly, the city had a bountiful area at its disposal, which led to an increase in commercial ties (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 23). The city gradually became part of a new international trading network, in which it was the main transfer spot (see figure 1.5).

1.1.2 The French in Casablanca

ALTHOUGH Anfa was a thriving centre of trade, it was not until the end of the 19th century that the first European merchants started to properly establish themselves in the port of Anfa. In 1839 the French established their first houses in a "village of a thousand inhabitants" (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 19). Only a few decades later, in 1867, the population was estimated at 8000 inhabitants and the vice-consul of France describes Casablanca as a transformed city.

As can be seen on a map of 1900 (see figure 1.7), despite the city being an intense trading hub, Casablanca did not have a proper trading port yet. In order to facilitate the transport of building materials to the harbour, the French had laid down a small railway (see figure 1.6) straight across a Muslim cemetery (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 36).

As soon as the news got out that this railway would be extended until Marrakesh, Casablanca's population got furious and revolted against the plans. Representatives of the tribes in the environment demanded the caïd to destroy the existing railroad, to stop the work in the harbour and to send the French customs officers home (Adam, 1968, p. 110). The riot eventually led to French reinforcements arriving in great numbers, triggering a fight between the locals and the French army; "carnage is left by a colonial bombardment of Casablanca" (Rabinow, 1992, p. 53). This escalation ended with the occupation of Casablanca by the French.



Figure 1.6: Casablanca's railway



Figure 1.7: Casablanca in 1912

Source: Écochard, 1951

The French Protectorate

CASABLANCA was one of the few cities in which the life of Europeans was secured before the signing of the Protectorate. Furthermore, Casablanca had become the primary port city of Morocco, already being the country's centre of international commerce. Moreover, even before the arrival of the French troops, the city had a considerable number of European inhabitants.

Rural migrants simultaneously arrived in even greater numbers in Casablanca. Most of these new city dwellers came to find a job in the harbour or the rising industry. For a big part their lifestyle kept hold of a rural way of life. As they were accustomed to living in huts and because the largest part of them lacked the financial resources to build a house or to rent an apartment, these migrants made huts in both the city centre in the

Medina, as well as outside of the city walls. For this reason Casablanca had more huts than houses in 1907 (Adam, 1968, p. 68).

These rural migrants are the main reason for the population growth of Casablanca (see figure 1.8), as they arrived in the largest numbers and they produced the most children. This group of new city dwellers was also the most vulnerable part of society because of their very limited educational background and their low financial resources. This would eventually lead to a crisis in the course of the 20th century. However, for the time being, no one was concerned about this; the population grew, the economy boomed and nowhere else in the country as many jobs as in Casablanca were created.




Figure 1.8: Casablanca's demographic growth from 1897 – 1950

Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002

Lyautey and Henri Prost

WHEN Marshal Hubert Lyautey, Résident-Général of the Protectorate and an “enlightened colonialist” (Rabinow, 1992, p. 54), realised that the city’s infrastructure urgently needed to be restructured and that in fact the whole city needed a renovation, as he inspected Casablanca in 1913. He gave this task to the French architect Henri

Prost.




Figure 1.9: Map of Prost’s urban intervention
Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002




Figure 1.10: This map contains three distinct categories divided by the infrastructure: residential (in red), leisure (in green) and industrial (in pink)
Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002

Prost's plan for the city was to rationalise, expand and sanitise by zoning and creating wide, motorised thoroughfares (see figure 1.9). Lyautey and Prost shared the mutual objective of preserving the traditional Moroccan city – the *medina* – and build a new city within the city exclusively for the French.

The local Muslim population was to be kept at a safe distance, since the Western migrants were wary of any interference to their “villes nouvelles intended for the French” (Rabinow, 1992, p. 55). The Muslim migrant was not meant to converge en masse in the new European town, and was vowed to stay away from the new neighbourhoods. This led to double circulation, with Muslims evolving along their own ways, away from the representative thoroughfares (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 201).

Indigenous neighbourhoods were consequently built, implementing the “doctrine of separate community development advocated by Lyautey” (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 77), but also in a more immediate necessity to curb the spread of “infectious neighbourhoods everywhere, considerably hindering the development of European quarters” (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 10).

1.2 The housing issue



Figure 1.11: Bidonvilles of Ain Diab in Casablanca
Source: Écochard, 1955

1.2.1 The emergence of bidonvilles

THE “infectious neighbourhoods” that Prost was talking about, were the infamous bidonvilles. These “bidonvilles” were settlements built by their inhabitants out of canisters (French: bidon) and arose on the outskirts of North African cities from the 1930s onwards ([Avermaete et al., 2010](#)). They were received as overcrowded, putrid and unsafe. A failed attempt was made at banning their construction in 1931 ([Cohen and Eleb, 2002](#), p. 222).

“The shantytown is a product of under-employment. There is therefore only one adequate solution to the problem of the shantytowns; that is creating sufficient employment for the whole population, which is driven into the cities by the rural exodus, i.e. taking a measure which makes them able to pay the rent for a decent living accommodation.” (Adam, 1968, p. 70)

— André Adam, 1968

The commerce in real estate started quickly after 1907 and caused great problems, since prices of property increased dramatically. Through land speculation some people quickly became rich while it became harder to find living accommodations for others (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, pp. 47-48). A lot of the land in the city and its surroundings was bought without the intention to build on it. Speculators just bought land as they expected that its price would rise considerably in the near future (Adam, 1968, p. 49). If this did indeed happen they sold their land, otherwise they waited until the price increased.

This is the reason of the existence of empty spaces in the centre of the city until far in the twentieth century. Houses and apartments were built further away from the city centre, since the prices there were lower. The poorest citizens – primarily the rural-to-urban migrants – were unable to find living accommodations for a normal price because of the house speculation (Adam, 1968, p. 50). One can conclude that house speculation can therefore explain the rise of shantytowns and insalubrious working class areas to some degree.

Another, maybe even bigger cause, however lies in the fact that in a short time many new city dwellers arrived, while there were not enough formal jobs or houses in Casablanca. Lastly, some of the immigrants were not even willing to live in normal living accommodations since they were accustomed to a life in huts. Some former country dwellers seem indeed to have preferred the life in a tent, hut or slum above the life in an apartment on the 10th floor (Adam, 1968, pp. 137-138).

The biggest problem was that larger numbers of rural migrants were unable to find a job. At first, these people pitched up tents or built huts. However, when their financial situation still did not improve, they started to build slums out of scrap materials.




Figure 1.12: The origins of the residents of the bidonvilles
Source: Écochard, 1955



Figure 1.13: Rural exodus to Casablanca
Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002

One of the first shantytowns founded this way was Carrières Centrales (see figure 1.14). These slums, which later became a nestling ground for the Moroccan struggle for Independence, were inhabited by unemployed rural migrants and poor workmen from the nearby power plant Centrales Thermiques des Roches Noires (Adam, 1968, p. 86). Until this day several attempts have been made to move the inhabitants to social housing projects, yet none has completely worked and the shantytowns continues to exist.

Towards the end of the 1930s, the French administration acknowledged that housing shortages in major cities increased urban unrest: “the most critical problem of the last years, and the one which is the most urgent to solve, is that of the organisation of large districts of native housing. The European quarters, surrounded . . . by non-planned clusters of houses (i.e. bidonvilles), are threatened by asphyxiation [sic].” (Dethier, 2010, p. 213).

Few town authorities tried to weaken the growth of slums by using quick responses, however a coherent slum policy was not yet made. In the early 1930s for example, a “New Medina” was created alongside the “Cité Habous” (see figure 1.14) for the native population (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 221), but this did not reduce the unrest. The situation even worsened when a stream of European immigrants arrived in Morocco in 1939, so as to escape the advancing German forces and the threat of a second World War (Johnson, 1972, p. 19).

This threat of war in Europe led to two significant events in the urban history of Morocco: capital flight from Europe to Morocco that laid “a solid industrial base” and the emergence of an urban policy that favoured Europeans (Johnson, 1972, p. 19). Because of industrialisation, more people migrated from the countryside to the cities, in the hope of finding employment.



Figure 1.14: Carrières Centrales in Casablanca

1.2.2 Michel Écochard

ALTHOUGH Michel Écochard had already been internationally active since the beginning of the 1930s (among other places in Syria), the main breakthrough in the development of his toolbox of instruments and approaches came in the 1940s and 1950s within the context of the French Protectorate of Morocco.

As mentioned earlier, from its establishment in 1912, the development of the Protect-

orate was bound to the creation of ten *villes nouvelles*. The planning of new cities such as Casablanca, Rabat, Fes and Marrakesh was a key element in the ‘valorisation strategy’ that Résident-Général Lyautey developed for the Moroccan territory. However, in the middle of the 1940s the availability of 1.1 billion dollars under the Marshall Plan triggered Resident General Erik Labonne to appoint Michel Écochard to develop a firm urban policy (Waterston, 1962, p. 7).

According to Abu-Lughod, the idea that Casablanca was a “potential centre of nationalist fervour” (Planning and Development Collaborative International, 1983, p. 5) led Erik Labonne, the Résident-Général of the Protectorate government, to name Écochard the director of the Urbanism Service, and provide him with “virtually dictatorial powers and . . . a generous budget.” (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 225).

Écochard and an acclaimed team of architects and planners from France were instructed to study the urban structure of Morocco and the problems that came with the bidonvilles in ‘the heartland of the colonial enterprise’ (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 225) that is Casablanca. Between 1952 and 1960, the population of Casablanca had grown by 41%. By 1952, rural immigrants made up 75% of the city’s population, creating a range of urban problems (Awad, 1964, p. 51). Industrialisation and the refusal of the Protectorate government to improve rural living conditions led to an increasing urban immigration (Hagopian, 1967, p. 205).

Consequently, the coastal Moroccan cities continued to expand faster than the interior towns. The French Protectorate installed a political official as a ‘Delegate for Urban Affairs’ in seven cities as a response to this situation and gave these officials ‘broad power in all matters related to security’ (Johnson, 1972, p. 39). Furthermore, planners and architects were asked to create solutions to these problems; “Many were excellent men, yet the central concern of this system, quite explicitly, was security and the control of the population.” (Johnson, 1972, p. 40).

However, according to Pétonnet (1972) the bidonvilles are, in essence, a first port of call for rural migrants. Pétonnet (1972) was one of the scholars who thought of them as a necessary step in the “acculturation” to the urban world. Avermaete et al. (2010, p. 8) state that “these locations translated traditional settlement forms into an urban context”.

The structural organisation of the bidonville in principle can indeed be seen as similar to that of traditional housing in the rural tribes of the Atlas. However, it could be argued that extremely high densities, sometimes over 1000 inhabitants per hectare (Avermaete et al., 2010, p. 138; Écochard, 1950, p. 5) and a lack of resources make day-to-day life far more complex. A map from 1953 shows the official population estimates for the city’s major bidonvilles (see figure 1.15). There were 140,950 bidonville dwellers out of a total population of roughly 650,000, meaning one in every five Casablancans lived in a bidonville (Cohen and Eleb, 2002, p. 322).




Figure 1.15: Map of bidonville populations in the early 1950s

Source: Écochard, 1955

Not only immigration had been dominating spatial development before the government was able to react, but speculation as well. In only 13 years the value of land had multiplied by the factor of 175 (see table 1.1). This exemplifies the force of speculation, which started in the beginning of the 20th century. Plots of land got more expensive the closer they were located to the centre. This led to building the *quartiers populaires*, which were planned for the relocation of slum dwellers, to settle at the far peripheries, “leaving large zones of no-man’s land for speculation in between” (Adam, 1968, p. 19).

Table 1.1: The increase of land prices through speculation

Date	Price of land (₣/m ²)
June 1939	20
January 1943	45
April 1944	90
May 1947	300
January 1948	700
September 1950	1550
July 1951	1900
February 1952	2650
June 1952	3500

Source: Écochard, 1955




Figure 1.16: Number of dwellings constructed annually (1949 – 1953)

Source: Écochard, 1955

Governance in Morocco

AFTER the Second World War, independence movements began to protest; as a result cities like Casablanca were viewed as flash-points against the French colonial regime. Governing this city became an enormous concern for the colonial administration. Urban planning and architecture became key players in this newly uncertain course in governance. They acted both as physical instruments to control the population growth in Moroccan cities and also as tools, to raise the living standards of the local population.

The Service de l’Urbanisme was the administrative bureau where these politics took place. In order to govern Morocco’s “exploding cities” (Écochard, 1943, pp. 26-39), Écochard assembled a large state office of urban planners, architects, engineers, quantity surveyors, anthropologists and draughtsmen. The Service de l’Urbanisme in Morocco consisted of five subordinate offices: the Bureau d’aménagement du territoire, the Bureau d’urbanisme, the Bureau d’architecture, the Bureau des plantations and the Bureau de documentation et expositions. Taken as a whole, these offices were equipped to govern, or control, the territory in a variety of physical and societal manners, in a range of dimensions and scales (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 160).

In addition, the central office of the Service deployed ateliers ambulants – teams made up of an engineer, an urban designer, a topographer and two draughtsmen – that trav-

elled throughout the country to investigate its dwelling culture in a manner at the time viewed as ethnologically sound and respectful. This arm of the Service charted the entire colonial territory and recorded detailed knowledge on rural and urban dwelling conditions in texts, diagrams and drawings (ibid).

The central office was complemented with regional branches responsible for the oversight of numerous building sites all over Morocco. These local offices engaged with the multitude of construction workers, bricklayers, plumbers and carpenters that actually built the soon-to-be independent nation's infrastructure, housing and communal buildings. These local tradesmen, for better or worse, came to represent the core of the Service's influence over territorial governance (see figure 1.17).




Figure 1.17: Diagram of the organisation of Service de l'Urbanisme, c.1950

Source: Phototèque, École Nationale d'Architecture de Rabat

The survey

A GAINST this background of political attempts to control the Moroccan territory and its inhabitants, Écochard starts to develop a first central urban planning tool: the survey or enquête. The main purpose of this survey was 'to analyse the problem within a wider framework, to obtain detailed knowledge about the industrial and social ques-

tions' (Écochard, 1950, p. 28).

Getting in touch with the local and often unknown situation, understanding its logics and rationales in order to establish a solid base for planning decisions, all seem to have been an important first goal. Hence, Écochard's surveys are composed of a double perspective: a close reading of the physical characteristics of the terrain and a critical positioning of these within a broader political, economic, social and cultural context (Écochard, 1950, p. 28).

The large amount of surveys that were performed by the Service de l'Urbanisme confirms their important role in Écochard's planning practice. Examples can be found in the various articles of Écochard, in the book *Casablanca, le roman d'une ville* (1955) and in the large presentation given at the 9th Congrès Internationale d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM) in Aix-en-Provence in 1953 (Écochard, 1955). At this CIAM meeting Écochard and the architects of ATBAT-Afrique, presented a detailed study of the situation in some of the urban poles in Morocco and its underlying rationales.

A variety of methods

ÉCOCHARD typically uses a variety of methods to come to terms with the urban condition. These different methods will be briefly explained based on the information about the survey given by Écochard in his book *Casablanca: le roman d'une ville* (1955) (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 94). The first method that is applied in the survey consists of a quantitative analysis of urban phenomena, such as the distribution of shantytowns on the territory, the degree of urbanisation, the population densities, the logics of internal migration, the demographic growth of the urban population and the size and fashions of occupation in a shack in the bidonville.

The research of this quantitative data is paired with the use of diagrams that were often developed by Écochard. Diagrams did not only provide Écochard the possibility to visualise logics and rationales in comparative ways, but they also offered him the opportunity to articulate and understand some of the large issues that are at stake at first glance, as well as to communicate these to a larger audience of urban actors. Écochard used this first survey method as an inventory of the local situation and for interaction with local actors (politicians, planners, architects).

The second survey method has a more qualitative character and consists of a fine and precise description of the actual terrain. In this qualitative investigation more ephemeral issues are addressed such as collective and individual symbolism in the built environment or expressions of anti-colonial sentiment.

For this purpose Écochard relies on the techniques of photography. Photographic field research and documentation were an integral part of Écochard’s survey approach. The presentation at the 9th CIAM congress shows a large number of photographs that are taken ‘from the ground’; offering a view on the urban environment and its everyday appropriation. This is complemented with aerial photography of urban areas. In Écochard’s approach, aerial photography plays a fundamental role in detecting the patterns and contours of urbanisation, often unknown areas within the context of colonial modernisation.



Figure 1.18: Survey of rural neighbourhoods
Source: Écochard, 1955

In addition to photography, texts are prominent in the survey as well. Through short statements the imagery (diagrams, photography) is commented on, but especially located within a meaningful cultural, social and political context. The text underlines the findings of the imagery and locates them within the qualitative characteristics of the terrain: “It is sufficient to interpret these documents carefully and confront the statistical data with plans and photographs of different dates. In that way, we . . . can get a rather exact idea of the development . . . it even offers us an order of magnitude for future planning.” (Écochard, 1950, p. 28).

The survey offers a theoretical basis for planning decisions. It acts as a semi-rational frame of reference for the international expert and his team upon which planning strategies, models and projects can be based. It also functions as a main element of communication with local experts and decision makers. The survey defines – through drawings, photography and text – the contours of an urban problem. It articulates a shared planning

issue that is to be acted upon by the international expert in close collaboration with the local actors.

In addition, and most importantly, the survey establishes a joint conceptual basis that allows the different actors to discuss urban problems in a common language: “The results of this survey will be used to improve the efforts of engineers, architects, constructors . . . in the domain of housing.” (Michel Écochard, unpublished explanatory note to GAMMA Grid).

As can be concluded from various planning documents by Écochard, the survey is used to define and rephrase the problem of the bidonville among the different professionals that were active in 1950s’ Morocco (letter [Maneville, 26 February 1951](#)). While the bidonville was seen as a great problem, in his survey Écochard managed to establish a more nuanced perspective and language, which defines the bidonville as the locus of problematic dwelling conditions and as the site of interesting forms of acculturation of rural dwelling patterns to urban life ([Écochard, 1950](#)). The survey was an instrument from which new ways of seeing and understanding everyday situations could occur. Defining such a fresh perspective on urban situations – detached from local power fields and political considerations – was often one of the main tasks of the international planning expert.




Figure 1.19: Detail of Habitat du Plus Grand Nombre study by Ecochard and GAMMA architects, presented at CIAM 9, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1953

Source: Écochard, 1955

L’habitat pour le plus grand nombre

THE second urban plan (1952) was created during political instability as well, at the time the nationalist movement clashed with the colonial power. The immediate response of the rulers was social housing on a big scale, with no change in the zoning regulations. Écochard was the leading urban planner and his aim was to integrate the slum dwellers into the city.

Écochard considered the influence of the Prost plan as insignificant in 1947; “since Prost’s departure in 1923, Casablanca didn’t have any urban planning anymore” (Écochard, 1950, p. 59). According to Écochard, Prost had only attempted to control the spatial development, instead of really developing a new urban plan. Furthermore, Prost had only planned for the city perimeter in 1920, yet Casablanca had grown significantly since then and the requirements for urban expansion had not been accomplished at all. Écochard concludes that the political leaders had lost control over the city’s erratic development.

“We are not in the age where we accept anymore” (Écochard, 1955, p. 31), Écochard believed that city development should be in the hands of planners, architects, and other experts. He believes there is no such thing as ‘spontaneous’ or ‘natural’ development of a city. Écochard was inspired by the *Charte d’Athènes* (Charter of Athens), which emphasised the creation of independent zones for the four basic ‘functions’: dwelling, work, recreation and transport.

As mentioned earlier, the political sponsorship for Écochard’s grand project was given to achieve stability and order in Casablanca, which was French Morocco’s most visible and turbulent place at the time. By 1949 about 120,000 people, from a total population of 700,000, were living in slums (Rachik, 2002). As a result, the real aim of the project was not to provide better housing for Moroccans, but rather to house as many poor natives as possible in order to take care of two concerns: public health and security (Abu-Lughod, 1980).

Thus, Écochard’s policy, which he named *l’habitat pour le plus grand nombre* (‘dwellings for the greatest number’), was founded on the principle of housing the maximum number of indigenous populations – in restricted neighbourhoods – using the least amount of resources.

The 8×8 grid

ONE way he did this, was by using the so-called 8×8 grid. According to Avermaete and Casciato (2014) this 8×8 grid, in direct addition to the earlier discussed survey,

is the most important instrument Michel Écochard developed as international planning expert (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 148). This grid of orthogonal axes at a regular distance of 8 m forms the basic structure for a lot of Écochard's planning projects and came to be known in Morocco as *La Trame Écochard* (Cohen and Eleb, 2002).

It is not very clear why Écochard chose these precise dimensions. However, it is clear that the 8×8 grid is the result of an architectural approach to the city. After all, each field in the grid corresponds to the figure of a low-rise patio dwelling that has a total surface of 64 m². This architectural unit is completely defined by a perimeter wall with a height of 2.8 m, along which two or three rooms are located. Each of these rooms has a maximum width of 3 m, which allows for simple construction with a variety of materials and methods. An open air patio of at least 5×5 m occupies the remaining part of the unit and functions as a circulation and access zone for the different rooms, as well as an important outdoor living room (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 148).

In various drawings and collages Écochard illustrates that the grid was not only a way of combining different housing units, but also a method of installing the basic infrastructure of sewers, water wells and roads. As such, the grid composed what Écochard called a 'ground storey frame' which assembles and structures dwellings and infrastructure in a rational and economical figure. In addition, the 8×8 grid also formed a simple basis for construction (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 156).

Several images of the construction of Moroccan neighbourhoods according to the Écochard Grid illustrate how the grid was almost exactly materialised in the foundations of the different dwelling units. The grid was traced on the site and subsequently built as simple concrete foundations. From there the building and rebuilding of the neighbourhood could take place. The 8×8 grid functions as the bedrock for new urban development that complies to standards of hygiene, economy and transport. On this basis a series of different elements can be grafted (ibid).



Figure 1.20: Aerial view of Écochard's plan for Carrières Centrales

Source: Photograph by Michel Écochard. Phototèque, École Nationale d'Architecture de Rabat



Figure 1.21: Detail of Habitat du Plus Grand Nombre study by Ecochard and GAMMA architects, presented at CIAM 9, Aix-en-Provence, France, 1953
 Source: Écochard, 1955




Figure 1.22: Typical plan of an 8x8 dwelling in the *Cité Horizontale*
 Source: Photothèque, École Nationale d'Architecture de Rabat




Figure 1.23: Model of a dwelling in the *Cité Horizontale*
Source: Écochard, 1951




Figure 1.24: Inside an 8×8 dwelling
Source: Photothèque, École Nationale d'Architecture de Rabat

The hierarchy of the neighbourhood

THE Écochard Grid is placed over other conceptual layers that are not universal, but rather specific to the situation. An important conceptual layer that Écochard projects on the basic grid is his thinking on habitat and more specifically on the notion of the neighbourhood. By doing so Michel Écochard defines his own version of the neighbourhood.

In a circular scheme he depicts the neighbourhood as being composed of five ‘neighbourhood units’. Écochard envisions the neighbourhood as a hierarchical composition with at the lowest level the ‘vicinal unity’ for 1800 (based on a study of market settlements and towns in North-Africa) inhabitants and with everyday collective services such as an a mill, an oven, shops and a playground for children. Five of these vicinal or neighbourhood units compose a full neighbourhood of 9,000 people that is filled with public functions in the fields of commerce (market and fondouks), cult (mosque and Quran school), administration and social services (police and health centre), recreation (hammams and theatre) and education (schools and kindergartens) (see figure 1.25).

The hierarchy of the neighbourhood is physically articulated through the various public spaces that are projected on the Écochard Grid. Alleys are located at the level of the neighbourhood unit, just as little squares. These squares with a minimum dimension of 24×16 m are planted with trees and were designed for collective life with the immediate neighbours. On the scale level of the entire neighbourhood, streets and avenues are located, as well as a larger commercial square with the collective oven, hammam and main shops. As such a complex network of public spaces introduces a particular hierarchy of collectivity in Écochard’s Grid (ibid).




Figure 1.25: Écochard’s hierarchy of the neighbourhood

Source: Photothèque, École Nationale d’Architecture de Rabat


Engaging with change and evolution

ANOTHER conceptual layer that Écochard projects on his 8×8 grid, is that of difference and change. He realised that urban development was not an equal or gradual process, and made a plea for urban planning approaches that could be differentiated and were open to change. This interest in creating space for change can be read as an attempt to deal with the field of tension between the transnational practice of the urban planner and the dynamism of local urban development. After all, the success of the planning strategies of the international expert depended largely on their ability of taking variable and varying social, cultural and economical conditions into account (ibid).

As a result, Écochard makes a clear distinction between the short-term temporality of architecture and the enduring legacy of urban planning: ‘Put the factors into order: Urbanism (permanent) in the first place, construction (transitory) afterwards.’ Construction or architecture is considered as a matter that is part of a process of continuous change, hence Écochard writes: ‘Moroccan Habitation, like any object of mass consumption, follows the cycle: conception, production, distribution, utilization, elimination. One must take this fact into consideration and one must be far-seeing.’ (Habitat for the Greatest Number Grid, Panel series: The Problem)

In Écochard’s approach evolutionary dwelling practices are coupled with evolving dwelling environments. He describes the inhabitants of his projects as *evolúés* who are somewhere in-between a rural and urban way of living. The built environment is analogously viewed as a development that starts out as a rural formation and gradually becomes more urban in character (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 159).


This is illustrated in the evolutionary sketches that Écochard made for a non-specified bidonville. The different drawings illustrate how the bidonville quickly upgrades itself from an improved shantytown that is structured and hygienic to a low-rise district and subsequently a high-rise neighbourhood, in full compliance with an urban model of living (see figure 1.26). Throughout this entire process of urban transformation the grid belongs to the perennial realm of urbanism and acts as a stable basis (ibid).



(a) A neighbourhood of 40,000 inhabitants consisting of five units of 8,000 (units 6 and 7 are attached to an existing neighbourhood).



(b) Development of the district in figure 1.26a.



(c) Detail of unit 2 in figure 1.26b

Figure 1.26: Écochard's evolutionary sketches of the development of a bidonville
Source: Écochard, 1955

Écochard made this principle of the grid for 'horizontal concentration' and believed it was the best way to act within the urgent urban situation in Morocco. In order to secure the qualities of horizontal concentration, Écochard called for a new legislation composed of rules (GAMMA Grid, Panel 608-II) that secured:

1. Green space or little squares, directly connected with the lodgings.
2. The minimum area of each bit of ground, which is 64 m^2 , representing a vital minimum for each family with regard to housing.
3. The minimum area of the patio of 25 m^2 , allowing for sunning and airing.

4. The limitation of the ground floor, according to a height of 2.8 metres
5. The minimum area of the units and openings.

Together, the grid and these rules offered a firm frame for changing dwelling needs, patterns and forms. Écochard believed that this would offer an excellent base for future urban development.




Figure 1.27: Écochard's process of horizontal concentration (a → b → c)
Source: Écochard, 1955

Cité Verticale

TO complement the 8×8 grid used in his *Cité Horizontale*, situated in the Carrières Centrales neighbourhood, Écochard called on some of his colleagues at CIAM to design several vertical units to feature at the centre of the grid. This so-called *Cité Verticale* (see figure 1.28) consisted of three high-rise buildings and was built as one of the ‘test projects’ in Michel Écochard’s *Cité Horizontale*, a low-rise urban scheme that was applied for several extensions of Casablanca. The *Cité Verticale* project of Candilis and Woods (see figure 1.28) was situated in the direct vicinity of what was then one of Casablanca’s largest bidonvilles: the Carrières Centrales. The *Cité Verticale* project was explicitly directed at the so-called ‘evolué’ as well (Avermaete et al., 2010).



Figure 1.28: Georges Candilis, Shadrach Woods, Vladimir Bodiansky, new modernist buildings in Carrières Centrales, 1952

Source: gta Archives/ETH Zurich (Sigfried Giedion)

A bird’s eye view of 1958 shows the neighbourhood in its bare state with vertical buildings featured prominently (see figure 1.28). All three buildings are the work of the ATBAT-Afrique, a subsidiary of the firm established by Vladimir Bodiansky for Le Corbusier’s Unité d’habitation (Avermaete et al., 2010, p. 157). They were called *Nid d’abeille* or ‘bee-hive’, *Sémiramis*, and *la tour* or ‘the tower’. The architects’ intention was to “explore modes of composition to be made into reproducible templates” (Cohen & Eleb, 2002, p.325).

The bidonville, that epitomised the effects of colonial modernity on everyday life for large parts of the Moroccan population, played an important role in the definition of these new architectural approaches. As a dwelling environment the bidonville was not only the locus of the first encounters and negotiations with the modern city for a lot of people coming from rural areas, above all it was also the spatial expression of a non-planned way of organizing an urban environment. European architects like Candilis

and Woods declared the bidonville as a full-fledged study object and investigated this environment in an anthropological manner. They ‘learned’ from the inhabitants of the bidonville how everyday dwelling practices enabled an urban neighbourhood through self-organisation (Avermaete, 2005, p. 87).

The force of dwelling practices, discovered in the improvised urban environment of the bidonville, gave rise to new concepts for the dwelling such as habitat. The notion of habitat indicated that new dwellings were adjusted to accommodate culturally defined dwelling practices. Distinctions were made between the ‘population of European origin requiring a European-style habitat’ and the ‘Arab population’ that was accustomed to ‘a habitat of special layout and construction’. The ‘modes of habitat’ of the migrants from rural areas were articulated into the new urban plans of the housing estates and the ground plans of the dwellings (Avermaete, 2005, p. 139-142). As Cohen and Eleb (2002, p. 322) stated on the *Cité Verticale*: “these photogenic buildings mark the meeting of the universalist problematic of modern architecture with the will of adaptation to cultures and to local identities”.




Figure 1.29: Habitat concept
Source: Avermaete, 2010

The *Cité Verticale* and the insights gained in Casablanca played a very important role in the international discourse on *Another Modernism* (Avermaete, 2005). During the 1950s international architectural journals, as *l'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui* and *Architectural Design* paid ample attention to the notion of habitat (see figure 1.29). Ultimately, the presentation of the Bidonville in the so-called GAMMA Grid and the inherent critique expressed at the penultimate CIAM meeting in Aix-en-Provence in 1953 led to the dissolution of the *Congres Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne* (Cohen and Eleb, 2002). Commenting on the specific approach that emerged in North Africa, Alison and Peter Smithson, as well as Georges Candilis and Shadrach Woods (all members of Team 10), wrote that: “this work had allowed a new architectural language to develop that had initially been created by the structures of inhabitation.” (Avermaete, 2005).



Figure 1.30: The architectural design, l'Architecture d'Aujourd'hui
Source: Avermaete, 2010

1.2.3 Morocco's independence

THIS all took place against a background of a growing military presence in the streets of Casablanca, where resistance to the French administration had long since assumed an organised form. The national strike of 1952 announced the beginning of independence (see figure 1.31). Bombings and demonstrations became daily occurrences. The bidonvilles of Carrières Centrales and Ben M'sik were some of the main bases for these actions (Cohen and Eleb, 2002).



Figure 1.31: Protests in Casablanca

Source: Private collection transculturalmodernism

Despite resistance and war the French administration kept on planning modern housing estates. The particular relationship between architectural projects and war in North Africa is best expressed in the now famous remark by the first Résident-Général of Morocco, Hubert Lyautey: ‘A new construction site is worth a battalion, a finished building a victory.’ (Cohen and Eleb, 2002).

While a modern grid of urban infrastructure was newly built, vernacular nouallas and huts were transported from their original rural locations to the maze of the city (Avermaete and Casciato, 2014, p. 156). The increasing number of migrants to cities every year, turned satellite towns that were built to house the slum dwellers into “a supplement and not a substitute for the ‘informal’ town.” (Abu-Lughod, 1980, p. 229). To decrease the flow, the government should have improved living standards and job opportunities in the countryside. Écochard had indeed suggested to build regional centres, however the Protectorate government refused to do so. Instead of reducing the flow into the cities, this contributed to an increasing number of people migrating to the city.

Without the support and coordination of the Protectorate, Écochard was unable to reduce the migration from the countryside to Casablanca and other coastal cities, thus the coastal cities continued to expand faster than the interior towns. Between 1952 and 1960, the population of Casablanca grew by 41% while the population of Rabat grew by 46% ([Abu-Lughod, 1980](#), p. 248) and by 1952, rural immigrants constituted 75% of Casablanca's population ([Awad, 1964](#), p. 51).

Thus, despite Écochard's housing programmes of the late 1940s, at independence in 1956, the Moroccan government was left with growing cities filled with massive bidonvilles containing thousands of unemployed people and migrants from the countryside, who continued to flow into the cities.

2 | Slum policies & stakeholders

2.1 Past strategies

2.1.1 Social housing (1956-1965)

“When France was no longer able to keep the governmental vehicle on the road, she abandoned it, leaving the motor running. The Moroccans climbed in and drove off in the same direction but with even greater speed.” (Dumper and Stanley, 2006, p. 116)

— Paul Bowl, 1982

THE once again independent Moroccan government adopted the urban planning philosophy implemented during the French Protectorate, i.e. Michel Écochard’s philosophy of direct state involvement guided urban policies. The French who stayed after the independence facilitated the implementation of these policies: there were about 20,000 Frenchmen who still retained their positions in the government as teachers, officials and technicians in 1961 (Waterston, 1962, p. 5).

Écochard’s Grid is one of the interventions that have marked the development of Casablanca in a determinate way. Though its dimensions were sometimes slightly adapted, the system to plan urban neighbourhoods via a ‘layered grid’-system remained in place as a main planning strategy until the 1980s in Morocco. For 30 years new housing neighbourhoods all over the country were planned according to the Écochard Grid (Avermaete et al., 2010).

The newly instigated Moroccan government developed and launched three to five year development plans. Housing was placed among the government’s top priorities in the first Biennial Investment Plan of 1958–59 as it announced a 16.7% allocation for housing (Waterston, 1962, p. 56).

A plan with three types of housing for the bidonville was implemented. For the high-income groups, economic lots equipped with drainage, water, electricity and access roads were assigned. For the middle-income group, *trames sanitaire améliorées* (improved sanitary facilities) were provided. These plots were similar to *trame Écochard*.

The standards of these new *trames* were however lowered, so as to decrease costs. The average sizes of the allocated plots were 40 to 50m² and rooms of 12m² were built on each plot. These plots were provided only with essential infrastructure (Planning and Development Collaborative International, 1983, p. 5).

The *trames sanitaires* was the third revision of the *trames*, and was of even lower quality. The size of the allocated lots was 35m² and instead of providing a toilet and a water faucet on the plot, as was the case in the *trames sanitaire améliorées*, the *trames sanitaires* were provided with public toilets and public water facilities (Dethier, 2010, p. 225). Dethier stated that these *trames sanitaires* were “nothing more than bidonvilles materially restructured by the state.” (ibid)

Under the *Plan Quinquennal* (Five Year Plan) of 1960–64, 9,000 *trames sanitaires améliorées* were built by the government. The state constructed 13,355 low-income housing units in Casablanca from its independence until the end of the five year plan in 1965 (Johnson, 1972, p. 125). The Moroccan government was forced to re-evaluate these costly social housing projects towards the end of the five year plan, because of a declining economy and a growing urban population.

2.1.2 Sites and Services Projects

At the end of the 1965–67 development plan the government stated that “the principal objective is to combat the development of bidonvilles and overcrowding in the medinas” (Johnson, 1972, p. 53). However, the plan also cited that a lack of financial means prevented the state from undertaking any new programmes for rental housing (ibid), so expensive social housing would not be provided anymore.

The government invested in preparing 8,800 lots for construction, hoping that residents from bidonvilles would build houses on these prepared lots. To encourage this, the government gave loans per lot. The government rejected the construction of *trames sanitaires* in the new plan, because they were convinced these units were a breeding ground for new slums (Johnson, 1972, p. 55).

At the time government officials believed that potential rural migrants would think twice before migrating if they knew of the shortage in housing and the lack of alternatives. The government therefore stopped the social housing projects and took strict measures to curb slum proliferation. Additionally, a number of warnings urging people to go back to rural areas were spread by the radio and in speeches. In some cases, unemployed people returned to the country in trucks. These measures, however, proved to be unsuccessful (Johnson, 1972, p. 66).

The Centre d’Experimentation de Recherche et de Formation (CERF) played a significant role in the development of the 1968–72 plan. They primarily focussed on developing housing policies for the low-income population. CERF emphasized on creating regional

centres, similar to what Écochard and his team had suggested in the 1950s ([Paddison, 1984](#), pp. 283-298).

The housing crisis in Casablanca was most severe, yet money sufficient to build only 1000 houses was invested despite multiple warnings of CERF. The first major report on how to eradicate slums was submitted by CERF in May 1968. In this report, they called attention to the importance of using the energy present in the bidonvilles and introduced a loan programme that would help slum dwellers improve their housing.

In the end, the type of housing policy implemented based on CERF's suggestions benefited the new middle class and civil servants more than the bidonvillose. This was largely due to the type of loans that were made available ([Johnson, 1972](#), p. 78). Instead of providing finished housing, CERF suggested providing sites and services (*lotissements*), which aligned with the new approach to social housing advocated by the World Bank. Consequently, the Moroccan government prepared "sites and services- access to roads, sewers, water supply, electricity and communal amenities" ([World Bank, 1966](#), p. 295) and people with low-incomes could build their homes using their own resources. In the meanwhile, the situation in the urban areas grew worse. In 1971, Casablanca was home to 31% of all bidonville households ([Office of Housing \(USAID\), 1981](#), p. 23).

2.1.3 The 70s

DURING the period stretching from 1970–80, a new approach consisting of the implementation of urban development projects (PDU) was implemented. This called for the implementation of integrated operations centred on on-site restructuring of shanties. This strategy contributed to the adoption of new practices such as:

- the participation of the recipients in the process
- the simplification of urban development norms and equipment standards
- the restructuring of procedures underlining building permits
- the coordination of different partners

([Kingdom of Morocco, 2012](#), p. 13)

The Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City (MHPV) was established in April 1972 to act in adequate ways and confine the housing crisis. The strategy used by the MHPV focused mainly on the eradication of slums and the equipment of infrastructure of unsanitary housing areas.

The 1973–77 five-year plan focused on urban housing and stopped the special arrangements by introducing postponed areas with equipment over 5 years, 10 years and 15 years (respectively ZEP 5, ZEP 10 and ZEP 15) and housing grids. The objective was expected to drop off operations in favour of a comprehensive response to the needs of

low-income social classes, to reduce land pressure by mobilising significant state reserves and widespread home ownership of the poorest of the social layers to curb the formation of new slums.

The ZEP 5, which was implemented over 5 years, was aimed at relatively well-off social classes. The lots with an area of 80 to 100 m² were to be supplied with basic equipment, with the construction of sanitation, drinking water and public lighting from being commenced from the start of ZEP 5, electricity during the third year and roads during the 5th year. Loans that could be repaid over a period of 20 years were provided to realise the construction work. The ZEP implemented over 10 and 15 years, were based on similar principles as those mentioned above and were intended for the poorest social classes.

In 1974 the government had agreed on abandoning an additional financial support, and converting the ZEP programme to a social programme against slums. Social housing (40m² covered on lots of 100 m²), financed by the state was constructed in urban centres and sold to slum dwellers who were free to complete the construction of the ground floor and other levels.

2.1.4 The 80s

THE shantytown-curbing strategy essentially consisted of equipping land lots and putting them at the disposal of the households concerned. Shantytown-curbing was achieved through operations which evenly integrated sites for the purpose of guaranteeing social mingling and land balance. The projects consisted of developing land, fully equipping it with basic infrastructure, and providing it with public areas where various community activities could take place. In addition to receiving personal property, the recipients also received construction files, including architectural and structural plans, with technical assistance also being provided for ([Kingdom of Morocco, 2012](#), p. 13).

A new way of thinking that breaks with past practice, consisted of promoting the restoration of neighbourhoods, their land regularisation, the development of land and employment of the inhabitants in an integrated urban vision. During the three-year plan of 1978–80, a comprehensive programme for restructuring the big slums was launched.

The appropriations for the construction of housing for relocation were barely sufficient to satisfy 2 to 5% of the inhabitants of the slums (see table 2.1). Some of the largest slums such as Ben Msick in Casablanca counted 80,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. It was therefore decided to switch to an alternative approach that involves on-site restructuring. A distinction was made between large slums (with over 4,000 inhabitants) and small and average slums (with less than 4,000 inhabitants).

Urban development projects (PDU) were launched for large slums. PDUs are integrated operations across the city aimed at achieving basic facilities and socio-collective

facilities. The inhabitants are made landowners of the land they occupy. Technical assistance is provided and industrial zones are established in these neighbourhoods to provide employment for the inhabitants.

Table 2.1: Casablanca’s slum dwellers in relation to the total population

Year	Estimated population living in shantytowns	Casablanca’s total population	% of total population living in slums
1930	50,000	159,000	31%
1940	100,000	±375,000	26.6%
1953	140,950	490,000	29%
1960	180,000	956,277	19%
1982	282,650	2,139,204	13.2%

Source: Cohen & Eleb, 2002

A restructuring policy was implemented for small and medium slums (PMB). Where the action provided under the PDU was of a global nature, the action for the PMB should only concern specific problems of the habitat, as the size of these neighbourhoods already secured incorporation in an urban context. The intervention consists of the realization of infrastructural facilities, such as street sanitation, water and electricity networks.

Density standards (no more than 400 inhabitants per hectare) and liveability standards (no plots of less than 40 m²) were adopted. Thus, 160 small and medium slums were identified in a population of 180,000 inhabitants and only 38 slums (93,748 inhabitants) were selected based on the criterion of the legal status of the land.

In June 1981 violent turmoil had shaken Casablanca. The labour unions and political parties of the opposition had protested against the increased price of certain taxes. Particularly in the working class neighbourhoods many riots erupted. These events led to the development of the third urban master plan for the city, which was made by the newly established Urban Planning Department of Casablanca in 1984 by the architect Pinseau. The Urban Planning Department put emphasis on a substantial policy of social housing, the elaboration of an urban plan for the entire metropolitan region, a de-densification of deprived urban areas, and the extension of the urban road system.

The 1981–85 five-year plan, which had been extended to 1987, acknowledged the need for further government action in the fight against slums and for strengthening the economic housing programme. To achieve this new associations were created. The last years of the 80s were marked by a strategy favouring relocation by providing equipped lots. The ‘urbanism of emergency’ in Casablanca is characterised by the pressure of the social tensions on the Government, and by a rapidity of financial approval for social housing in the hope to uphold social peace (Rachik, 2002, p. 16).

2.1.5 The 90s


TOWARDS the 1990s, the Ministry in charge of Housing implemented a special programme designed to combat unhealthy housing and initiated 107 operations for the benefit of 100,000 households who live in slums. The realization of the project was entrusted to operators acting under the supervision of the Housing Ministry, all in the framework of a contractual policy. The policy adopted by public authorities in shantytown reduction and re-housing of shanty-dwellers allowed them to gain international recognition and distinction ([Kingdom of Morocco, 2012](#), p. 13).

The programme developed in 1991 included restructuring in under-equipped and non-regulatory residential areas and integrated slum upgrading programmes of subdivisions. However, many difficulties were encountered during the implementation, due to the low feasibility of some operations and recovery problems, particularly among the beneficiaries of restructuring.

2.1.6 The 2000s

BETWEEN 1982 and 1989, an average of 9000 units per year was provided by the government. Between 1993 and 2003, the annual rate of the provision of housing units to slum dwellers decreased by half, to about 4500 to 5000 units per year. ([Benjelloun, 2003](#), p. 2) The government's response to lessen urban poverty changed however, due to political instability in the early 2000s.

The Royal Speech delivered on 20 August 2001 defined the main orientations which placed subsidised housing, and in particular the fight against unhealthy housing, among the main national priorities. A governmental programme even defined an intervention strategy based on the following: strict control and effective prevention of violations; the implementation of a policy with a dual aim – a preventive one and a promotional one to promote housing that fights against informal housing – and the launch of significant programmes intended to reduce insalubrious housing ([Kingdom of Morocco, 2012](#), p. 13).



URBAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION

Figure 2.1: The number of slums and clandestine quarters in Morocco in the early 2000s
 Source: World Bank, 2006

In the early 2000s, 57% of the population of Morocco lived in the cities. The number of slums was 212,000, which represented 10% of the urban population. However, another 19%, i.e. 520,000 households, were marked as clandestine quarters (see figure 2.1). Between 1992 and 2001, the number of households living in slums increased at 5.6% per annum and the clandestine quarter households increased at 4.9% per year (Benjelloun, 2003, p. 2). These statistics, when paired with the relatively poor provision of social housing during this period (4500 to 5000 units per year), give a clear picture of the situation in terms of government response: little commitment of the Moroccan government to provide adequate housing for the urban poor (see table 2.2).

Table 2.2: Percentage of the consolidated central government expenditure on housing and amenities

Year	1972	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1990	1995
Morocco	0.49	0.58	2.31	1.18	1.13	1.65	0.57	0.43	0.36

Source: World Bank, 2006

2.1.7 Cities without slums

THE first slum policy of Morocco by Lyautey and Prost has led to complex socio-economic problems that continue to exist to this day. Nowadays one can still find bidonvilles in Casablanca and although several attempts have been made to move the inhabitants to social housing projects, none has completely worked and the shantytowns continue to exist.

Since the government withdrew their assistance to slum dwellers, radical groups took over this task. With the growth of urban poverty, religious organisations began distributing ‘spiritual and physical resources to persons in need’ (Lust-Okar, 2005, p. 131). The Casablanca bombings of 2003 illustrated the threat from radical groups to the regime,

showing that they were able to exploit on the frustrations of the urban poor. After the bombings, bidonvilles became the focus of the Kingdom's social policies.

The government immediately began increasing security and improving access to housing and social services. Following the 2003 bombings, the government implemented a wide variety of social programmes that they had not used before during the independence of Morocco. The government's response was to provide more than just low-income housing for the urban poor.

On World Habitat Day in 2004, King Mohamed VI inaugurated the 2004 – 2010 “*Villes sans Bidonvilles* (VSB)” (Cities without Slums) programme in Casablanca under the sponsorships of the Ministry of Housing and Cities Alliance. The aim of the programme was to provide adequate housing for 212,000 households living in slums ([Cities Alliance, 2004](#)). The Ministry of Housing provided four types of housing for the urban poor under the VSB programme, namely:

- on-site upgrading
- provision of partially serviced lots
- provision of fully serviced lots
- provision of apartment units

([World Bank, 2006](#))

In figure 2.2 an overview of the discussed emergence of the bidonvilles and different implemented strategies are illustrated in a timeline.




Figure 2.2: Timeline on the emergence and evolution of slum eradication strategies
Source: Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City

2.2 A new approach: *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*

IN January 2005 the World Bank and the Moroccan Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning collaborated to assess the likely impacts of the national slum upgrading programme in terms of social development and mitigation of poverty. This section will be devoted to the research done by the [World Bank \(2006\)](#). Some of the questions answered in the study by the [World Bank \(2006\)](#) will also be discussed in this chapter.

The Government of Morocco set out to reform the housing sector in 2003. At the time, about 900,000 Moroccan households, which equates to about 5 million people and one third of the urban population, lived in sub-standard housing. 270,000 of these households were slum dwellings. The general characteristics of Morocco's slums are related to the following factors:

- non-existing or controversial tenure rights
- total or partial lack of on-site infrastructure and services, such as water supply, sanitation, electricity, street paving and lighting, solid waste disposal
- makeshift, overcrowded dwellings

([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 8)

Despite the government's efforts to address this problem, informal housing has developed at a faster pace than formal housing during the last 20 years. According to the [World Bank \(2006\)](#), the main problems of the housing market are of a structural nature, both on the supply side, as the production of affordable housing units has been constrained by a number of sector-wide factors, as well as on the demand side, as low-income families have not been adequately supported.

In 2004 the government initiated a new reform programme to address both the supply and demand side of the housing sector. The Government goal is to produce 100,000 social housing units annually (including serviced land plots and housing units) until 2010. The programme includes three strategic reform areas ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 8):

1. Reforming the legal framework of urban planning to reduce the costs of serviced land and to promote orderly urban development, creating a legal and fiscal environment for the rental market, and reforming real estate taxation and housing subsidies
2. Designing and implementing a new approach to social housing involving a nationwide programme of slum upgrading and the development of serviced or semi-serviced plots to meet the demand of low-cost accommodation
3. More suitable public subsidies and increasing access to housing finance for low-income groups, especially households with irregular or informal incomes, by shifting the Government's support in their favour.

2.2.1 Morocco's bidonvilles




Figure 2.3: The triangle Casablanca-Fes-Tangier

THE coastal plains cities within the triangle Casablanca-Fes-Tanger (see figure 2.3) have the highest concentration of urban slums. Of the 885 slum settlements, 509 (58%) have a population under 100 households, 280 settlements (31%) have a population between 100 and 500 households, and 97 settlements (11%) have a population over 500 households (World Bank, 2006, p. 10).

2.2.2 General characteristics of *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*

THE objective of the “Villes Sans Bidonvilles” programme (VSBP) is to provide decent accommodation to the 212,000 households living in urban slums across Morocco by 2010. The remainder of 58,000 households living in rural slums are not covered by this programme. This programme was formally submitted to the King in July 2004.

Evaluations of previous slum upgrading programmes provided an overview of learnt lessons and suggestions, which gave further motivation for new plans for sub-standard housing. The Casablanca bombings in May 2003, which were carried out by terrorists, most of whom were residing in slum settlements, instilled an even greater sense of urgency into the commitment to eradicate slums.

The basic principles of the Government’s new slum upgrading strategy are as follows :

- a. the integration of single operations at city-wide level
- b. contractual engagements of private and public actors in the slum eradication efforts
- c. increased provision of social housing by private developers
- d. the involvement of the slum population through a process of social support and participation

Villes Sans Bidonvilles takes a city-wide approach, in contrast to earlier interventions that have targeted particular slums or substandard housing needs within a city. All slum settlements are to be addressed within an integrated solution based on the city's urban fabric and available land reserves. While remaining a programme of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (MHPV), VSB is presented as a partnership with all major stakeholders, particularly the local and regional authorities, the public and private sector housing developers, as well as the slum inhabitants. On a city-by-city basis, contractual agreements clarify and document the responsibilities of the different public actors on national and local levels.

The programme's modes of intervention consist of:

- a. on site upgrading, or restructuring of the slum settlement with the provision of roads, drainage and water supply, public lighting and electricity networks
- b. production of fully or partially serviced plots (*Zones d'aménagement progressif* (ZAP)) on urban land, on which the households will build new dwellings and where on-site infrastructure will be provided over time while households build on their plots
- c. construction of apartment buildings to transfer the slum households to

The choice of the method of intervention will depend on the specific context of each city as well as the size of the slum settlements. Programme projections for the use of these operational modalities can be seen in table 2.3

Table 2.3: Tranches and intervention modes of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme

	Intervention modes (number of households)				Total
	On site upgrading	Fully serviced lots	Semi-serviced lots (ZAP)	Fully finished housing units	
Commenced before 2004	16,813	34,930	1,306	15,211	68,290
Engaged in 2004	20,873	26,555	1,584	13,148	62,460
After 2004	24,792	12,553	28,757	15,768	81,870
Total	62,508	74,038	31,647	44,127	212,320
	29%	35%	15%	21%	100%

Source: MHPV, VSB, Orientations stratégiques et programmation, September 2004 in World Bank Report

2.3 Stakeholders Villes Sans Bidonvilles

THE landscape of actors related to the housing sector in general and especially to the programme Villes Sans Bidonvilles is extremely complex. While the policy approaches to informal housing have been changing over the past decades, the institutional context has been changing as well. The conclusion after an intensive period of evaluation at the end of the 1990s was that the success of interventions was severely undermined by both the lack of collaboration between key actors on the national, regional and local levels, and the lack of active engagement of and communication with the target population.

The Implementation document of Villes Sans Bidonvilles states four conditions on which the success of the programme depends, namely:

- a. the strengthening of institutional partnerships
- b. the outreach to and engagement with the slum population
- c. continuous efforts of prevention of the increase of slums
- d. the comprehensive implementation of the housing reform programme

The stakeholder analysis by the [World Bank \(2006\)](#) reveals that many key actors with high levels of influence support the programme and there is general enthusiasm for increased partnership and broad-based collaboration across administrative, regional and societal levels. However, despite this broad support there are general challenges to building genuine and functioning partnerships ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 21).

Conclusions were drawn by analysing the drivers of support of and opposition to Villes Sans Bidonvilles during the PSIA (Poverty and Social Impact Analysis) stakeholder workshop as they vary by stakeholder. The programme's design and implementation depend on each actor's influence and its stakes and interests in it. The following matrix summarises the key stakeholders' characteristics as well as their stated and unstated interests in the implementation of VSB, going from the King of Morocco at one end of the spectrum to the slum residents at the other end (see table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Institutional Stakeholder Matrix of Villes Sans Bidonvilles

<i>Stakeholder</i>	<i>Involvement in the formulation and implementation of VSB</i>	<i>Support of Programme Goals</i>	<i>Level of trust of slum residents</i>	<i>Attitudes towards social support and participatory mechanisms</i>
The King of Morocco	Initiated the new reform agenda to improve the life of slum dwellers	High level of support	High	Favours social support as underlined by recent launch of human development initiative
Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City (MHPV)	Central to the reforms and key organiser of VSB	High level of support	Medium	Technical orientation towards the implementation of VSB; insufficient capacity and human/financial resources devoted to it
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)	Responsible for the design and implementation of housing finance instruments, FOGARIM and Housing Savings Schemes	High level of interest in success of programme	NA	Technical orientation, little involvement in, knowledge of or inclination towards social support and participation
Ministry of the Interior (MICL)	<i>Walīs</i> and Governors supervise the implementation of public programmes & coordinate local institutional actors	Support the timely implementation of VSB	Low	Social support and participation of slum residents is of little importance
Ministry of Social Development	No active involvement in VSB as of yet	High level of support but little influence on implementation	High	High level of concern and interest in social development and participation

Local Governments	Partners in the implementation of VSB as stipulated in contractual agreements; expected to make significant contributions	Varied levels of support as local interests of Local Governments may contradict VBS	Medium	Varied attention to social support but mainly technical orientation
Parastatal Housing Companies (OPH)	Responsible for the implementation of the VSB operations	Supportive of the successful implementation	Medium	Technical orientation, little concern for social support which is left to MHPV, local governments and authorities
Social Development Agency (ADS)	Involvement at the request of the MHPV or OPH to accompany upgrading interventions; support and advise the slum population	Supportive of VSB but little influence because of insufficient staff and limited financial resources	High	Social support and participation are key objectives of ADS and characterise its work
Contractors / Developers	Construction of units at the request of MHPV/OPH	Neutral	Low	Not concerned with social support
Commercial Banks	Delivery of housing credit	Neutral	Low	Not concerned with social support
Micro-credit Orgs	Delivery of housing credit	High level of support but limited influence	High	Mandate to serve the poor, good knowledge of client and high interest in social support
Civil Society	No explicit or foreseen involvement in VSB of Moroccan, slum-based or international NGOs	High level of support but limited influence	High	Concerned with social support for slum residents

Donor Community	Financial and technical contributions and support for design and implementation of VSB	High level of support	High	Social support and participation is of great concern
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Source: World Bank, 2006

2.3.1 Characteristics of main stakeholders

THE main stakeholders have been analysed by the World Bank (2006) during the PSIA and they have noted their characteristics, relationship to reform and interests as can be seen below (World Bank, 2006, pp. 23-26). Although not all stakeholders are equally relevant to my research, it is quite interesting to read about all the different parties and see how complex the programme really is.

King of Morocco

THE King of Morocco has elevated the eradication of slum dwellings to priority status since 2001. With his personal involvement and visible presence he has increased his support and public commitment to the achievement of the slum upgrading goals. He managed to do so by visiting slum settlements, opening building sites, and by attending ceremonies to give housing products to the poor. His personal involvement has proven to be extremely powerful in conveying a message of hope and commitment to the residents, as well as in maintaining the focus of the institutions and administrations involved in the programme's implementation.

Central Government

THE Ministries of Housing and Urban Planning, Finance and Privatization, Interior and Local Government are the central government institutions directly in charge of the design and implementation of the programme.

The Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning (MHPV) has seen its status raised since 2002 as a result of the King's emphasis on the elimination of sub-standard housing and on sector reform, and it reports directly to the Prime Minister's office. MHPV's credibility relies significantly on the success of VSB, which it implements with a primarily technical orientation, through its *Direction de l'Habitat Social et des Affaires Foncières* (DHSAF; Direction of Social Habitat and Real Estate Affairs). The *Directions Régionales de l'Habitat* (Regional Directions of Habitat) are the local departments of the MHPV and contribute to the creation of operational agreements with the parastatal operators. While following the directives of the Ministry, their geographical distance from the centre shifts their perception of priorities and incentives. Some have voiced

frustration over the centre's lack of consideration of local particularities when planning upgrading interventions, and of the time constraints for their implementation.

The Ministry of Finance and Privatisation has a more general involvement in the programme. It is responsible for:

- the supply of public land to parastatal housing operators
- the regulation of the housing sector's fiscal policies and subsidies
- the establishment and management of the housing finance instruments aimed at improving access to credit
- overseeing the budgetary allocations to the MHPV investment budget as well as the use of the Housing Solidarity Fund

The Ministry has no particular stake in the promotion of the social agenda of the VSB programme, but wants to make sure that the allocation of national resources is effectively utilised, and that the programme reaches its stated goals, which are considered of national importance.

The Ministry of Interior and Local Government is involved in the VSB programme through the Regional Prefects, (*Walīs*), and Governors that represent the decentralised power of the State in the cities where the programme is being carried out. Their role is to supervise the implementation of public programmes, facilitate the coordination of institutional actors at the local level, and to exert control over Local Governments. The urgency that the King has instilled into the national slum upgrading programme can be seen through their focus on technical issues and swift implementation. The social dimension of VSB is of little importance to them, and slum residents are perceived as being able to potentially frustrate the national objectives of slum eradication and of prevention of the increase of slums. The lower-level representatives of the Ministry at neighbourhood level, the *caïds* and *moqaddems*, are often at odds with the slum residents and are a source of social tension on account of their often corrupt and authoritarian practices.

The Ministry of Social Development, Family and Solidarity was created in early 2005 with the mandate of addressing the issues of persistent poverty, social exclusion and their negative effects on social cohesion. It is also charged with the provision of traditional welfare and disability benefits. The Ministry is supportive of VSB and sees the programme's success as contributing to its goals of Morocco's National Slum Upgrading Programme - Poverty and Social Impact Analysis Report, as it combats social exclusion. Opportunities for synergies with the VSB operations abound as this Ministry develops a new generation of programmes and investments. Until now, however, there has been no active collaboration or involvement.

Local Government

LOCAL Governments are partners of the programme and are required to make specific commitments, ranging from the mobilisation of municipal lands to financial contributions, to disallowing further proliferation of slum settlements. Municipal councils however, are closely tied to local interests and responsive to financial and political forces that may be set against the VSB programme objectives and that would rather see the limited municipal resources invested in other areas. Local politicians are known to have exploited the presence of slum settlements in return for votes and bribes, either by promising the residents an upgrading operation, the tolerance of the authorities to their illegal occupation of the sites, or by allowing the access to much needed on-site infrastructure like water supply and electricity, despite the illegal nature of the settlements. Informal developers that profit from the sale of rural land to establish slum settlements would also be opposed to VSB, and may use their local political influence to counteract the programme goals.

Parastatal housing companies

PARASTATAL housing companies (Opérateurs Publics de l'Habitat; OPH) have until recently dominated land servicing, the construction of social housing, and the implementation of slum upgrading programmes. Holding AI Omrane (HAO), created in 2004, is charged with the elimination of redundancies and the restructuring of the ten parastatal companies into a single effective group, responsible for the implementation of nearly all of the VSB operations. The Government's goal is for HAO to focus more on land servicing and to disengage from the construction of social housing, in which the private sector is expected to get more involved. As for the VSB programme, HAO primarily displays a civil engineering approach to the measurement of its outcomes, whereby the slum upgrading operations are carried out according to technical and financial parameters, leaving the responsibility of social support and participation, and even of the transfer of the households into the new units, to the MHPV, Local Governments and the authorities.

Social Development Agency

THE Social Development Agency (Agence de Développement Social; ADS) is a relatively new body in the institutional landscape of Morocco. Its mandate is to create and support social development projects and programmes that contribute to fighting poverty in a manner that engages the target population in a participative and collaborative manner. With a previous focus on rural areas, it has increasingly become involved in VSB operations at the request of the MHPV and of some operators, to support and advise the slum population before and during the displacement phase. ADS is, however, a small agency and is oversubscribed; financial and human resource constraints make its involvement in slum upgrading projects difficult, and the agency is in a balan-

cing act, managing catalytic and operational work. It is clear that the mainstreaming of social support and participation in VSB operations cannot be solely based on ADS involvement.

Contractors / Developers

CONTRACTORS and private developers are called upon to increase their role in the production of social housing, and in particular to build apartment blocks in the context of the VSB programme. Via HAO the Government has agreed to transfer urbanised land below market value to them, on the condition that the subsidy is transferred to the buyers in the form of below market sale prices of the housing units, so as to make them affordable. So far, contractors and private developers have shown reluctance to enter into such agreements, primarily because of fears of timely cost recovery, which is critical to their cash-flow in operations that by definition have small profit margins. Demand by slum residents for such social housing units is not deemed as reliable, or easily predictable. Concerns regarding the ability of slum households getting access to credit also motivate the lukewarm response of contractors and developers to the VSB programme so far.

Commercial Banks

COMMERCIAL banks could play a key role in the VSB programme as providers of housing credit, guaranteed by the *Fonds de Garantie pour les Ménages à Revenus Modestes et/ou irréguliers* (Guarantee Fund for Households with Modest and/or Irregular Income; FOGARIM) and backed in the future by the housing saving schemes. As the target population is expected to bear the majority of the financial cost of the programme, access to credit is crucial to the success of VSB. FOGARIM-guaranteed loans could be perceived by the banks as a low-risk opportunity to develop a potentially profitable new market. However, commercial banks are reluctant to do so because of various risks: limited knowledge of the target population; wariness of establishing long-term financial liabilities with economically weak clients; and the transaction costs of reaching out to an uneducated, uninformed population. Banks are also afraid of epidemic defaults when slum-dwellers become aware of the Government guarantees. Therefore, despite the Government's pressure, banks are not actively engaged in the implementation of the VSB programme.

Micro-credit organisations

MICRO-CREDIT organisations have been allowed to lend for housing purposes since 2004 within a maximum amount of 30,000 MAD (Moroccan Dirham), approximately €3000, per loan to buy, build, or improve housing units. Micro-credit organisations have a mandate of serving the poor, a good knowledge of their clients and social support is implicit and built into the lending relationship. As these organisations establish

themselves and gain more independence from the institutions that have supported them in the past, they express a growing interest in forging relationships with banks for the establishment of credit lines for loan retailing at the micro-scale. Given their unique knowledge of the slum settlements, their role in the implementation of the VSB programme could be very positive, but they are currently marginalised on account of the limited amount of financial resources they can mobilise for this purpose.

Civil Society

THE voluntary sector is relatively underdeveloped in Morocco, even though it has been growing significantly over the past ten years. Some Moroccan NGOs (Non-Governmental Organisations), supported by international donors, already work in the slum settlements, but have not been brought into the VSB programme. Slum residents generally underplay the value of their own neighbourhood associations, when present, as compared to civil society organisations managed by outsiders, which they view as having greater legitimacy. It is clear, however, that the network of NGOs and 'formalised' associations is not widely developed and that the community organisations native to the slum areas are not engaged in the planning and preparation of VSB operations in any significant way. There is no notable outreach to or comprehensive inclusion of slum-based community organisations in the implementation of VSB operations.

Donor Community

THE World Bank has supported the preparation of the VSB framework but is aware of serious risks and constraints related to access to housing finance, affordability and timing issues, as well as management limitations including the programme's monitoring and evaluation and delays in the implementation of the social support and participation. Through the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis the [World Bank \(2006\)](#) has explored both its beneficial and adverse implications for the target population, and promotes improvements to the programme design to ensure its success.

Programme beneficiaries are extremely heterogeneous with respect to their socio-economic characteristics, their residential trajectories, their levels of income and savings, and their interests and expectations for the VSB programme, which will be discussed in detail. They are generally uninformed and distant from the reform process and most have only a limited understanding of the government's new policies concerning slum upgrading and access to credit. However, the personal commitment of the King raises their hopes for an improvement of their housing situation, which counterbalances their hostility towards the authorities and their resignation. Contrary to the belief of some stakeholders, a significant proportion of the slum residents are keen to participate actively in the upgrading operations, often despite a history of prior disappointments, on the condition that the public proposals are now firm and that there will be sufficient trust, communication, and follow-through on the declared intentions and plans.

2.3.2 Influence of stakeholders

A stakeholder's stated or unstated interests may or may not influence the implementation or performance of the reform. While a stakeholder's interests give direction to how influence is wielded, the key actors' impact on the implementation and performance of VSB depends on their political, social and financial resources.

Three general observations can be made:

- The stakeholders with the highest influence over the formulation and implementation of VSB are located at the centre of political power. The majority of these stakeholders have a technical rather than a social perspective regarding upgrading slum settlements
- Control over the programme objectives reduces with both geographical and political distance from the centre, while influence over the implementation of the programme may not: interests and stakes tend to be more divergent at the local level and may distort the Government's intentions
- Some stakeholders are crucial to the success of VSB but have minimal interest in participating because of insufficient stimuli or attention to their needs, e.g slum residents, developers, banks and micro-credit institutions. Their lack of engagement puts the success of the programme at risk

2.4 The slum population

As the PSIA (Poverty and Social Impact Analysis) field research of six sample slum settlements ([World Bank, 2006](#)) confirmed, the slum population is extremely heterogeneous with respect to its social, economic and cultural characteristics. These different characteristics all influence the slum population's needs and demand for better accommodation. Equally important for the success of VSB is the understanding of the complex matrix of factors that determine the population's expectations in relation to the programme itself, in order to better assess the extent and quality of the population's, such as acceptance of or resistance to the programme. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive survey data available of the characteristics of the slum population that would allow more detailed breakdowns along social, cultural and financial lines. However, all field research of individual slum settlements confirms their heterogeneity ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 27).

The scope of enquiry and of the field work carried out under the second phase of the PSIA study was limited to five subject areas. Drawing on previous evaluation studies and on the results from the first research phase, these were considered particularly important for the understanding of the slum population:

- a. housing routes and residential strategies of the households
- b. incomes, financial resources and attitudes towards credit and saving
- c. social organization and community dynamics in the slum settlements
- d. previous experiences with slum upgrading and expectations towards VSB
- e. expectations of social support and participation in the programme

The diversity of the population that is revealed through the analysis of the sample slum population through these five lenses is very significant, and implies that the design of interventions and policies has to be sensitive to a great degree of variation in needs and abilities to partake in and benefit from VSB. The analysis also highlights which segments of the population are unable to afford the programme benefits, and therefore raises policy questions as to the programme's current design ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 27).

2.4.1 Trajectories and drivers

MOROCCAN citizens move into slum settlements for a wide variety of reasons. By understanding the trajectories that lead people into or out of slums one can come to understand their economic calculations and survival strategies better, which will determine their demand for better housing and their responsiveness to the national slum upgrading programme.

The results of the field work done by the [World Bank \(2006\)](#) identified the following seven trajectories that drive individuals and households into the slum settlements:

- a. a pursuit for optimisation of scarce financial resources and living space
- b. the desire to establish an urban identity and urban roots in migrating to the city
- c. the anticipation of a future slum upgrading intervention
- d. a reduction of economic means following a critically negative life event, such as an accident, job loss or divorce
- e. the forced displacement by authorities from another precarious settlement
- f. the quest for cheap rental accommodation
- g. the desire or need to leave the family household of origin

([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 27)

These trajectories can be classified as ascending or descending whether they represent an improvement in the quality of life of the individuals and households, or on the contrary a worsening.

For some of the social groups and typologies of slum residents, moving into the slum settlement is an improvement: this is the case of those families that seek to optimise the use of scarce financial resources and find it more advantageous to buy a dwelling in the slum rather than to pay rent for a smaller accommodation, and for those families who consequently make better use of their limited budget (see figure 2.4a). It is also the case of rural migrants who, by settling in a slum (often located in the peripheral areas), establish a foothold in the urban surroundings and are able to survive while seeking employment and perhaps better accommodation in the city, and maintaining oftentimes seasonal links with the region of origin (see figure 2.4b). There also seems to be a trend concerning those households that maintain ownership of a slum dwelling, while having moved elsewhere, for the specific purpose of obtaining a subsidised housing unit thanks to public interventions (see figure 2.4c).




Figure 2.4: The advantages of moving into the slum settlement

For some of the social groups and typologies of slum residents, moving into the slum settlement instead represents a worsening of their living conditions: this is the case of those individuals and households that are impacted by a critically negative life event, such as a serious accident (see figure 2.5a), loss of employment or source of income (see figure 2.5b), divorce (see figure 2.5c), retirement in the absence of family support (see figure 2.5d), and the like. Households that suffered the forced removal from another precarious location at the hands of the authorities, in the context of some land or infrastructure development project, are also on a descending trajectory. Young couples, single young men and students often resort to buying or renting a dwelling in a slum settlement in view of the unaffordable rents of formal units, when wanting to set off on their own.




Figure 2.5: Disadvantageous causes of moving into the slum settlement

According to the World Bank (2006) these different trajectories and drivers must be taken into account while planning the upgrading of the slum settlements, as the demands and responses of each social segment will vary with their residential strategies (see table 2.5). Some will therefore be eager and able to engage with the representatives of the VSB programme in view of gaining access to better accommodation, and will be willing to commit resources to this goal, while others will be either uninterested or unable to do so.

Table 2.5: Ascending and descending trajectories into slum settlements

Social groups	Trajectory	Principal driver(s)	Direction
General	Flight from rental status	Optimisation of resources and space; quest of home ownership	Ascending
Rural migrants	Rural exodus	Establishment of urban identity and quest of economic opportunities	Ascending
Former residents	Maintain connection to slum community	Benefit from public intervention and access to subsidised lot or apartment	Ascending
Victims of negative life events	Falling through the urban fabric	Economic deterioration, loss of family networks and support	Descending
General	Displacement from another slum area	The authorities, in pursuit of land or infrastructure development	Descending
Young single men, male students	Seeking cheap rental accommodation	Optimisation of financial resources, need to become independent	Descending
Young couples	Moving from family accommodation	Creation of new household	Descending

Source: World Bank, 2006

2.4.2 Financial situation

SLUM residents are among the most marginalised social groups in Morocco, and they experience both poverty of income and social exclusion. Their presence is perceived as a potential threat to the environment, public health, and security. The illegal nature of the settlements prevents their inclusion in urban infrastructure development plans and in the provision of health and education facilities. Access to formal employment opportunities and to public social support systems is also often denied to slum-dwellers on account of their lack of formal residence papers (World Bank, 2006, p. 29).

2.4.3 Social organisation and community dynamics

THERE is great variability in the quality, density and types of social networks and community organizations across slum settlements, and there seems to be no correlation with specific characteristics of the settlement, including its location (city centre/periphery), unity of place of origin of the population, or different trajectories leading the residents to the slums (World Bank, 2006, p. 30).

Within slum settlements, inter-personal networks are the most important and robust social ties, but their quality, strength and breadth can vary from one street to the next. These neighbourhood-level interpersonal networks depend on active participation of their members, favouring those who are physically more able, as they often revolve around immediate cooperation to improve living conditions, such as the sharing of water supply or electrical connections, or the evacuation of refuse water. Such initiatives often override allegiances or individual attributes that might otherwise form the basis of social networks.

The young, the male and the more educated seem to have a greater involvement in social networks overall, while the old, handicapped and otherwise marginalised and poor are more likely to be uninvolved and excluded. More recent arrivals, particularly from rural communities, often perceive their new life in the slum settlement as an improvement and therefore engage more eagerly in social networks. In contrast to interpersonal networks, associative life organised around a specific cause or by a particular segment of the slum population is not frequently manifested in the social fabric of Moroccan slums. Formal associations, if any, are generally organized by external actors and specifically targeted at particular social problems, such as health, education, or nutritional issues.

Manipulation of community organizations by local authorities and by public officials in charge of dealing with the slums have generated negative individual, and collective experiences with corruption and incompetence have fuelled the distrust of external attempts to promote particular community activities, and have created tensions among slum residents. International, national or otherwise formal NGOs and associations are often perceived with suspicion by the slum population as they are seen as representatives of the authorities in some form or other.

Besides external influences, there are also internal sources of social fragmentation and conflict. Longer-term residents perceive a rise in asocial behaviour displayed by the younger generation, and experience a weakening of social ties and a decline in community activities (except from religious groups). The process of densification of the slums, which has increased with the tighter control of the authorities over their expansion, leads to a further loss of privacy and results in family and neighbourhood tensions.

These perceived changes, in addition to the different trajectories that have brought the residents into the slums in the first place, have led to a diminished ability to deal

collectively with problems or opportunities that the slum settlement might be facing, such as an upcoming upgrading operation ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 31).

2.4.4 Previous experiences with upgrading and expectations towards Villes Sans Bidonvilles

THE expectations of slum residents towards the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme are very much determined by their experiences with previous attempted interventions of slum upgrading and in some cases of forcible elimination of their settlements. Anxiety, scepticism and distrust are rampant. A lack of adequate, reliable information and transparent communication of the programme ground rules, modalities, calendar, and costs have reinforced these feelings, despite notable efforts by the Government to publicise the programme via different media ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 31).

The comprehension of the programme's goals and benefits is varied because communication channels, internal and native to the slum communities, may not have been effectively utilised. In the absence of communication campaigns by the MHPV that make use of community networks, the established media (radio, TV, print) have failed to effectively convey the important details and key policy messages in a language comprehensible to the residents. There is considerable confusion, and rumours circulate about the actual modalities and parameters of VSB, which is partly an understandable reaction to a legacy of conflicting interventions and programmes in the government's fight against slums. The expectations of success of the upgrading operations and of the programme as a whole are also coloured by slum residents' scepticism regarding the time horizon that the Government has committed for its completion.

Mistrust is generally high, given the history of unsuccessful upgrading interventions, but may be less widespread among recent arrivals to the slum areas because of limited exposure to the difficulties of life in the slums and of the resulting interactions with the authorities. Households express greater trust towards the authorities at central level, such as the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning, than those at the local level, which they perceive as primarily seeking their own gain through the upgrading interventions.

Hope among slum residents with respect to the VSB programme providing a solution to their shelter problems is generally low to medium, reflecting the sense of resignation, economic and social exclusion which are predominant in the slums. Single, vulnerable residents and young unemployed men have lower levels of hope because of bleaker prospects of economic survival and promotion. Long-term slum residents and extended families have social networks and resources that can sustain them and on which they can rely, making them more hopeful to change their life circumstances. Recent arrivals with no prior experience of upgrading projects express a higher hope as to the benefits they may derive from the public interventions (see table [2.6](#)).

Table 2.6: Mistrust, hope and resistance to slum upgrading by segment of slum residents

	Extended families; long-term residents	Nuclear families	Single and vulnerable resident	Young un-employed men; students	Rural migrants; recent arrivals
Mistrust of the authorities	High	Medium	High	High	Low
Hope of programme benefits	Medium	High	Low	Low	High
Resistance to slum upgrading	Medium	Low	Neutral	Medium	Low
Influence on other residents	Medium	Medium	Low	High	Low

Source: World Bank, 2006

The success of VSB depends in greatly on the active cooperation of the slum population with the authorities and participation in the implementation of the proposed interventions. Rural migrants and recent arrivals are likely to carry high hopes of a relatively quick access to proper housing and therefore offer low resistance to upgrading operations. Various segments of the resident population may on the other hand have valid reasons for resisting the planned interventions, particularly if they do not agree with the operational modalities selected by the authorities, if the projected move contrasts with their livelihood activities and social networks, and if their financial resources are insufficient to meet the obligations required from them.

Long-term slum residents may also be unwilling to cooperate in operations based on a relocation given the investments they have made in their dwellings. Single and vulnerable residents may not agree with the proposed interventions but their resource – financial, political and social – are insufficient to support any significant resistance. Young, unemployed men often express high levels of frustration because of the lack of economic prospects and are generally distrustful of the state. These various segments have different levels of influence on the behaviour of other residents, and thus their indirect resistance may be amplified, according to the following they attract ([World Bank, 2006](#), pp. 31-32).

2.4.5 Expectations of social support and participation in the programme

ALTHOUGH the population is heterogeneous, the expectations and demands of the new social approach of VSB are quite consistent across the slum settlements. They are however mitigated by past experiences with the authorities and by instances of unkept promises of assistance from the authorities to access a decent accommodation.

The slum residents demand clarity and transparency in the communication about the programme and the planned interventions in which they are to be implicated. Particularly, the slum residents expect to be sufficiently informed so that they can actively participate in the programme and prepare for the eventual displacement. They also expect social justice to accompany the process of assigning housing solutions to families, good governance and an end to corruption. The authorities in charge of planning the interventions would need to display sensitivity to and understanding of the social characteristics of the households in order to jointly define options that are appropriate to the individual households and tailored to their circumstances. Slum residents value highly external, impartial and expert advice that is not influenced by local institutions but rather takes into account their opinions and finds out about their specific needs. They seek genuine participation and engagement.

It becomes apparent that the slum residents would like to be included much earlier in the decision making process, as for example when the size of the slum population is assessed and surveys for individual slum areas are drawn up. Given that these surveys serve as the basis on which the type of the upgrading operation is planned by the responsible authorities, a genuine involvement of the population may ensure transparency and prevent future disappointment and resentment ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 33).


2.5 Benefits and adverse impact analysis

THE linkages between the stated goals of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme, the role and attitudes of the different stakeholders, and the problems and expectations of the target population provide the basis for the analysis of the expected benefits and adverse impacts of the programme.

This analysis assesses first of all the four operational modalities of Villes Sans Bidonvilles, with particular reference to how they affect the different segments of the slum population, and determines the benefits and adverse impacts foreseen. The affordability of the upgrading operations is then examined, in relation to the incomes of the target population and of the financial instruments put in place by the Government to support the access to credit by households with irregular and/or informal income.

2.5.1 Benefits and adverse impacts of upgrading modalities

THE upgrading modalities of Villes Sans Bidonvilles have been inherited from the previous social housing and slum upgrading programmes, even if they are now part of a more integrated and coherent framework in which they are carried out. Upgrading in situ and the provision of partially or fully serviced lots and of apartment units have been the basis of the previous slum eradication programmes in Morocco for the last two decades. Several studies and evaluations have been carried out to examine the differential impacts of the various types of interventions on the target population, including their social and economic effects. In this respect, many of the findings of the PSIA research mirror the principal observations resulting from these studies ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 34).




ON-SITE UPGRADING

Figure 2.6: On-site upgrading

- A. On-site upgrading (see figure 2.6) is the most beneficial and least disruptive intervention, and is mainly utilized in slum areas that are older and more established, frequently in city centres, and where there is a higher degree of resistance of the resident population to displacement and resettlement. About 70,000 households are planned to be upgraded on site within the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme. With the provision of infrastructure such as water supply, sanitation, streets and street lighting, the residents finally get access to services that were previously unavailable. If these physical improvements are accompanied by access to secure tenure (which is not always the case because of the disputed nature of their occupancy in the first place), the motivations for the households to invest in the progressive improvements of the dwellings are increased, as they acquire transferable value.


Within on site upgrading operations the displacement of a minority of families inevitably occurs, on account of the widening of streets and of the alignment of the settlement boundaries. However the displaced families are accommodated in neighbouring lots, whenever possible. Pre-existing economic activities remain largely undisturbed, and thus there is little negative impact on income generation or disruption of social networks due to the upgrading interventions ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 34).



PARTIALLY SERVICED LOTS

Figure 2.7: Provision of partially serviced lots (ZAP)

B. Provision of partially serviced lots (ZAP; see figure 2.7): The gradual development of land is not a new type of intervention in the fight against sub-standard housing, and it has experienced somewhat of a renaissance (World Bank, 1966, p. 34) in the context of Villes Sans Bidonvilles. About 20,000 households are to be transferred to such areas. This approach is either used to accommodate residents from slum settlements, or to prevent the proliferation of slums, or both. New subdivisions are drawn up, primary infrastructure is laid out, and families are asked to settle and to build their dwellings while further infrastructure servicing is planned and eventually carried out over time. Slum residents are also given title deeds at some point, given that ZAP developments are generally established on public or municipal land. An evaluation study has shown that beneficiaries are generally critical of these operations, on account of the distance of the new settlements from their original location, the absence of adequate infrastructure and services, the uncertainty as to the completion of the infrastructure works, and the additional utility costs they face. These factors may encourage the resale of the lots to families with higher income that are able to invest more quickly in the construction, or to wait for the full infrastructure provision to take place (World Bank, 2006, pp. 34-35).



FULLY SERVICED LOTS

Figure 2.8: Provision of fully serviced lots

- C. Provision of fully serviced lots (see figure 2.8): Slum residents generally favour this mode of intervention because it gives them the possibility to build according to their needs and financial abilities, and allows for gradual construction according to a family's own schedule. In addition, the acquisition of a serviced lot may mean the possibility of attracting the savings of another family to build two housing units on the same plot, or sometimes to generate additional incomes by building and renting additional rooms. About 75,000 households are to be assigned a fully serviced lot as part of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme.

Problems have emerged in some slum settlements because of the condition imposed by the authorities that the slum dwellings first have to be demolished for the households to qualify for the purchase of the lots and/or to occupy them. The time between the demolition of the slum dwellings and the purchase of the lots has exceeded several months in the worst cases. This creates a very difficult transition for the households, who are requested to find provisional accommodation while they are experiencing displacement from their original location, loss of social networks, and more difficult access to health and education services, as well as income-generating activities. Neighbourhoods emerging as a result of site and service subdivisions generally suffer from a lower quality of services and public transport for a long time. Additional costs of formal access to water and electricity are extra hurdles for the households to confront (World Bank, 2006, p. 35).

- D. Provision of apartment units: This mode of intervention is generally favoured by the housing operators in those cities where the availability of public land is scarce, and where urban density makes it difficult to develop low-rise neighbourhoods. About 45,000 households are supposed to be transferred to apartment units as part of the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme. Some beneficiaries value legitimacy and home ownership represented by apartment living, despite the space limitations for poly-nuclear families. Cohabitation, in this case, is not highly significant, as in 1994, single-household occupancy amounted to 93% of cases (World Bank, 1966, p. 35), but profound changes in life-style, sometimes bigger than anticipated, are requested from the families who move into apartment buildings.

The limited size of apartment units and their location are the main negative effects, and together with economic losses seem to weigh more heavily than the loss of social networks in these operations. The transfer into apartment buildings often results in a decline in economic and livelihood activities for some households, as informal commercial activities can no longer be carried out from their dwellings or in their immediate vicinity. Formal access to water and electricity is unavoidable in the new premises, and the related costs can be significant. However, for others residents, particularly the young and women, more urban and service-oriented employment opportunities may become available (World Bank, 2006, p. 35).

2.5.2 Responsiveness to the target population

BESIDES the common features of these operational modalities, and of the typical benefits and adverse impacts described above, each segment of the target population will react differently to the challenges of these interventions, according to the demographic and social characteristics of each segment (these segments are however not mutually exclusive, and their overlaps will vary according to the social characteristics of each slum settlement). The table below (table 2.7) summarizes the degree of adaptation of the different upgrading modalities to the various social groups of which the resident population is composed, while income considerations are discussed in the next section ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 36).

The most vulnerable residents and the poorest households benefit the most from on-site upgrading because of its lower costs, and they benefit disproportionately from the upgrading and supply of new services, even if their savings, incomes or energy levels do not enable them to invest in the improvement of their dwellings as a consequence of the upgrading operations. On the other hand, the other three operational modalities are perceived as not suited to their needs, as they imply bigger financial efforts, displacement, and necessary reconstruction of the dwelling in the case of partially or fully serviced plots, or a major change in lifestyle in the case of apartment buildings.

Young couples and nuclear families will likely give preference to apartment units, as space limitations would not be of immediate concern and there might be more propensities for more modern lifestyles and amenities. For this social group, fully serviced lots would also represent an attractive option, as opposed to on-site upgrading and partially serviced lots. Upgrading is unlikely to solve the problem of cohabitation with the extended family, which is less and less desired by the younger Moroccan generation.

For the rural migrants, the move into slum areas is frequently one of ascent and an escape from poor livelihood circumstances and economic deprivation. This social group is likely to benefit the most from access to on-site upgrading and to fully serviced plots, that are seen as offering high returns and long-time responses to the family housing needs. Rural migrants are also the social group that is less adapted to transition into apartment living. Large poly-nuclear families, that represent between one and two thirds of the households, are also likely to prefer the on-site upgrading and fully serviced site options, as these are more adapted to their needs.

From this analysis it appears that slum upgrading and fully serviced lots are the two upgrading modalities that respond to the largest number of the social groups surveyed, as both encounter the preference of three social groups out of five. The correlations between social characteristics and preferences for upgrading solutions would favour an approach based on the assignment of different upgrading solutions to different groups of households within each slum settlement, as opposed to the imposition of the same upgrading modality to all the households of a given slum settlement, irrespective of their

housing needs and preferences, as is currently the practice. These considerations need to be weighed against other factors, such as the physical characteristics of the existing slums that might impede their upgrading, the location of the slum settlements in environmentally unsafe areas, and the availability of land for the provision of lots (World Bank, 2006, pp. 36-37).

Table 2.7: Degree of responsiveness of upgrading modalities to the segments of population

	Extended families; long-term residents	Nuclear families	Single and vulnerable resident	Young un-employed men; students	Rural migrants; recent arrivals
On-site upgrading	High	Low	Medium	High	High
Partially serviced lots	Medium	Low	Low	Low	Medium
Fully serviced lots	High	Medium	Low	High	High
Apartment units	Low	High	Low	Low	Low

Source: World Bank, 2006

2.6 Interviews with stakeholders

DURING my field visit to Casablanca I interviewed the different stakeholders. The goal of this visit to Casablanca was to gather opinions from as many perspectives as possible and to be able to view the problem on-site first-hand. The people interviewed included members of the municipality, the *Guichet Unique d'Urbanisme*, the *Agence d'Urbanisme de Casablanca*, the Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City and (former) slum residents. The people I met and interviewed, kindly asked me not to mention their names in this report nor to take pictures of them. I have respected their wishes, and have kept the interviewees anonymous accordingly. I will shortly discuss the stakeholders I met and the information they gave me.

The *Guichet Unique d'Urbanisme* is part of the municipality. Their job is mainly to check new plans and approve them. They told me more about the current strategy, *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*, that is implemented to eradicate the bidonvilles. The members of the *Guichet Unique d'Urbanisme* also allowed me to attend one of their meetings in which they checked new dwelling plans.

The *Agence d'Urbanisme of Casablanca* keeps track of the statistics concerning neigh-

bourhoods and their residents and creates the urban plans. Here, I obtained information and documents about the recent plans for Casablanca, particularly the plans regarding the bidonvilles.

The borough municipality of Hay Mohammadi and Aïn Sebaâ has documentation on the statistics and maps of this borough – I received numbers on the population and demolition of the bidonvilles in April 2015. The bidonville Carrières Centrales, which will be discussed later on, is part of this borough municipality.

The Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City focuses on the social aspects of the VSB programme. The VSB programme was introduced in 2004 right after the Casablanca bombings, which were carried out by residents of Sidi Moumen, one of the largest bidonvilles of the city. Another consequence of this attack, was the development of a policy aimed at removing the bidonvilles as fast as possible. Nowadays meetings with residents of the bidonvilles take place once a week at the Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City with the aim of getting an update on the residents' affairs and any potential issues. I also received a great amount of information regarding the history of bidonvilles in Casablanca, which I illustrated in the timeline on page 61 of this report (figure 2.2).

Furthermore, I also interviewed some residents of bidonvilles. Interviews with slum residents were held using a non-structured interview approach. The interviews took place as informal conversations so the inhabitants of the bidonvilles would feel at ease and not assume it to be an official interview from the municipality, since some interviewees were afraid of possible consequences. The residents of the bidonvilles I interviewed talked negatively about the municipality because they are not happy with the VSB programme. One of the reasons is that the residents will be resettled on the outskirts of the city and have to travel far to get to their job. Another complaint I heard frequently, is that the residents feel as if they have been ignored for too long and will get small houses, while they think they deserve better after all those years.

Another person I interviewed was a former resident of a bidonville. She told me that the residents of the bidonvilles consist of three types of people: “poor people, normal people without a normal roof over their head and rich people who act as if they are poor”. I found this quite interesting because I already started to feel sorry for the inhabitants of the bidonvilles, while most were actually exaggerating about their living conditions. The relevant parts of the interviews I have held can be read in this chapter.

Could you tell me more about the process of resettling the slum residents?

There has to be a plan before the construction can start. For example, we have a plan with two rooms, but the residents want to change this number to three. For the architects this is a problem, because the changes go against the law. The architects make the plan, with the plan being checked by the municipality to decide whether it may be approved or alterations have to be made. After this, a commission, that includes the Agence d'Urbanisme, meets. There are written rules in the plans of the city of Casablanca; the city has been divided in different zones, so when deciding upon a new plan, the zone where it has been proposed to be executed has to be checked. This means that, for example, a residential building cannot be built in an industrial zone.

This does sound like the 8×8 grid of Écochard which has been changed by the inhabitants in the past. Is this something that still occurs in Morocco?

The problem is that no one follows the rules and the proposed plans, as Moroccans are all their own architects. When the plan is showed for the first time, new suggestions are given to change the plan, the second time as well and this keeps happening. The municipality has their own department whose task it is to inspect the neighbourhoods, while the neighbourhoods also have their own surveyors who keep an eye on the built environment and any illegal changes. There are three parties involved: the borough municipalities of Casablanca, the Agence d'Urbanisme and the *Ordres des Architects* who inspect. When the buildings are being built these parties will go and visit the site without an appointment to check whether the plan is indeed realised as it was planned on paper.

What is the reason bidonvilles originated in Casablanca?

The reason why there are a lot of bidonvilles in Casablanca, is mainly because this city is the economic capital of Morocco, which has lead to a big wave of migrants. There also was a big drought that led to people leaving the rural country and moving to the city to find a job.

There are different options for resettlement, how are the possible dwellings divided over the residents? For example, how is decided who gets a lot and who gets an apartment?

Every two families get a lot. The problem is that the administration is not up to date, families have been counted and registered in the system, but old households have since split into more households as the children of the original dweller are married now and have families of their own. So every household wants to get their own land. Dwellings

are not simply appointed to the inhabitants, the surroundings are also adapted to the wishes and needs of these inhabitants, which means necessary facilities are also included in the plan, such as a mosque and school.

Do you keep track of and an eye on any new bidonvilles originating?

Yes we do, we have a local government that informs us. New bidonvilles are not being built anymore, the government is very strict about this. When the *moqaddem* sees someone building, he immediately informs the *caïd* (the supervisor of the *moqaddems* of the neighbourhoods who informs the municipality). We have a commission whose sole purpose is to watch any new developments with regard to (new) insalubrious dwellings. On the days this commission does not work people follow their own will, so people may start building on Saturdays and Sundays. Another form of illegal building is building in your garden.

The bidonvilles do indeed develop, however new bidonvilles are not originating. Many bidonvilles are situated in between villas. These bidonvilles came into existence because of the rural exodus and have been surrounded by walls.

All these bidonvilles worsen the city and are illegal, they lower the business level of the economic city. Although the problem of the bidonvilles is being solved, there are still a few bidonvilles left in the city. Let's take a look at the bidonville Bachko, no one ever expected this bidonville to be eradicated. I started working here in 1983 and back then people were already planning to eradicate this slum and it never happened. They just kept burning small parts of the slum down. The biggest difficulty the government has encountered is that families grow, in a few years one households already exists of several new households. So now we have to try to give every household a new dwelling. In some cases however, the head of the household does not work, so giving him a new dwelling is unrealistic and does not happen. The biggest bidonvilles are gone in Casablanca. We also have a housing law in Casablanca, which is crucial when having inhabitants who make up their own rules.

Slum resident and her daughter

13 April 2015

The problem is, the longer it takes to take action, the bigger the problem becomes. The children who have been living with their parents have been overlooked and not counted in the data of the government. They tell them to get out of the bidonville with their parents and get an apartment collectively. The children however do not agree with this as they want to own an apartment of their own as well. The answer they get is that they have not been taken into account in the census, so they do not get the same rights as their parents.

The residents do not even know whether they get a plot or an apartment yet, as noth-

ings has been promised to them. These residents live on so-called *ard warata*, which is inherited land, and they also do not even know where the residents who live on *ard magzen*, which is the government's land, will be resettled. A plot will be appointed to two people, being located elsewhere far from the original site the residents have been living on. This leads to problems with travelling to work, because of the mediocre to bad transport possibilities. The residents are not happy with these plans. They have been living on this site for their whole lives, so they are not looking forward to moving to the outskirts of the city.

For how long have you lived in this bidonville and how are the living conditions? Could you describe what it is like to live here?

There are people who have lived and died on this site. Our mother brought us here when we were younger, my mother bought a slum here and my sisters were born here. We just got electricity, since we live on *ard warata* (inherited land), slum residents who live on *ard magzen* (the government's land) did indeed get a permit to get electricity. In the past we had a small water source where we collected our water. Afterwards the mosque got access to water, so we residents got our water from the mosque as well. The owner of this land is the owner of the mosque, he has expanded his mosque, however the part that has been added will be demolished as well. Of course we would like to see our situation improved, but we are afraid we have lost hope.

Unfortunately, there is a lot of corruption in the country. Once we voted for a member of the parliament, who is in charge of this district. He has used the money that has been invested in the demolition of the slums and the resettlement of their inhabitants by spending it on his future, namely by buying and building villas. He had however promised us to invest in this slum, but as pointed out earlier he did not. Something else this gentleman did with the money the King invests in the residents of the slums was buying simple lemons with it for the residents and keeping part of this money for himself. When some problems took place, he was afraid to get caught and put into jail, so he resigned before his story unfolded.

One year, long ago when the grandmother's, now 34 year old daughter, was still a small child, the houses were marked with numbers in red paint because they wanted to resettle the residents and they built a wall around the slum. However the plans were not followed through, as this slum still exists to this day. The inhabitants do not agree with the way the community works. In their opinion the money is not divided equally and not enough money is invested in the inhabitants of the bidonvilles.

Let me tell some things about the bidonvilles you have not heard yet. As the official instances will make everything look as if it is being taken care of and the residents tell you their side of the story as if they are victims. As an insider, being an ex-slum resident I will give you information you could not get from them.

A shack in a bidonville can have different floors, some just have the bare ground as their floor, others have used tiles to make their floor. The ones who have a lot of children build an extra floor to enlarge their shack. There is one toilet in an area of about 100 shacks. The residents of the bidonvilles do not have water drainage inside their dwellings but outside of them.

Most grounds the bidonvilles were built on were property of the State. Now how this works is as follows, people move to a bidonville to buy a piece of land to build their shack on and now, during this process of eradicating the slums they are offered a new lot of 70 m² with a plan for a new dwelling or a new apartment, so the slum residents really profit from this situation. The people living in the bidonvilles will only complain when you interview them, while they are in fact living a good life in the slums.

You may think the people living in ordinary homes are doing fine and those living in the slums are not, however you may find a Mercedes in the slums outside of the shack, so do not be fooled. The residents of the slums have good jobs, they may be taxi drivers or they may even own a taxi company themselves and employ people.

So the slum residents are not as poor as they seem and act. You might even find some of them living in dwellings more beautiful than ours. There is no poverty in Morocco, even if it might look like it at times. I have a neighbour who is cripple and a beggar, he owns a big villa and a Mercedes, but still begs for money on the streets and in taxis. Begging has become a trade in Morocco. Some beggars on the streets even rent children from someone who does not leave their home frequently to earn more money through begging.

Although the inhabitants are resettled to neighbourhoods far from the slums, they do adapt and get used to their new dwelling environment. However, in the past, the slums were not removed immediately which made way for new households to settle in the slums.

When I had personal problems, I rented in the slum Carrières Centrales for a little while. There are facilities close to the slums, such as schools, hospitals, markets and hammams. However the hygiene of the slum is bad; there are public toilets for all families and no separate toilets for every household. When it rains the slum residents are not sheltered from the rain by their roofs, dirt gets in the dwellings easily, the kitchen is not up to standards and the food gets mouldy quickly.

Currently everyone has access to basic infrastructure, the electricity company itself has

provided the slum dwellers with access to electricity. In the past, the moqaddem wired the electricity available in the neighbourhood in such a way that the slum residents would have access to electricity as well. The slum dwellers get their water from a water source located centrally in the slum, which the government has provided them with. Some women even go to this centrally located water source to wash their clothes.

Architect of the Agence Urbaine

14 April 2015

Why can one still find a big number of slums in the city?

At the beginning of the process of eradicating the slums, the government starts with counting the number of slums. In particular, of the slums established on governments land. The quick growth of families delays the process, making the previously counted numbers incorrect after a short time. The reason there is such a big number of slums is because from the 70s and 80s onwards the residents started to sell or rent their shacks. In the 90s the government tried to resettle the residents to apartments, but there was resistance from the slum dwellers. Although the apartments had already been constructed, the residents did not want to move to these newly built apartments

What is the main reason slums exist in Casablanca and how can they be successfully eradicated?

Unfortunately, there is no organisation that connects all stakeholders and makes sure everyone has all information. There also is no real surveillance team checking whether new residents come to live in the slums, the caïd is the one responsible for this. The problem of the bidonvilles is deeply rooted and has therefore been ignored for a long time, among other things a blind eye has been turned at the villages and rural areas. Rural residents who sell their products in the city rent, buy or build a shack in the slums for their convenience. There is no development in agriculture so rural residents move to the city and start to build villages in the form of slums.

Have you learned from past strategies and do you think this new strategy, Villes Sans Bidonvilles, will succeed in permanently eradicating the slums?

Truthfully, we are just patching the pieces together. We take all residents from a slum and resettle all of them together in a new neighbourhood. Journalists and professionals know this project is simply implemented because of political reasons and in a political way.

The slum residents have never learned to get accustomed to living in the city after having lived in a rural area for so long, they need time to get used to living in the city. To smoothen this process smoother, these rural migrants immediately need to partake in a training to adapt to living in the city. The lack of such a training is the reason

why the process of slum dwellers truly becoming part of the city's population takes many generations.

One must start working from the basis, security is necessary, a lot is necessary and more effort must be put into the task. In the past, 60% of Morocco's population lived in rural areas. It will not be long before the number of the Moroccan population living in rural areas reaches a mere 15% of the population. About 20 to 30% of these people migrating to the city only cause problems, and problems are already present in the city, now the number of problems only increases.

Are you afraid the new strategy will not succeed?

The dwellers have already started to alter their new dwellings, however largely everything is going according to plan so far.

Do you keep an eye on residents illegally modifying the dwellings?

There are rules the residents have to oblige to, it is up to the caïd and moqaddem keep an eye on any lawbreaking in their neighbourhood(s).

Has there ever been some kind of cooperation with slum residents or meetings to inform the slum residents of the new plans?

No, not that I know of. When we start talking with the slum residents, there will be no end to it. The slum residents already get a lot for a very low price, why would we continue to negotiate with them. If we start negotiating with the slum residents, they will tell us they want a swimming pool in their dwelling or even a villa. Our goal is to eradicate the slums to have useful ground again. When we negotiate with them, they will not want to leave the slums until they get what they want. The new costs they have to pay when living in the new dwellings are already too high in their view. They are used to free electricity, which they have stolen from the street, and free water. The service costs they have to pay monthly is too high according to them, since they are not used to paying this. In the West you focus more on the social aspects than the economics aspects.

Is there some kind of follow-up program when the citizens are relocated or a means to keep an eye on them in the beginning?

No, there is no such thing. However, we do of course have policemen in every neighbourhood.

We still have not been appointed a new dwelling, since not enough dwellings have been built yet. The number of households the government has counted is not up-to-date and this is their mistake. Where do they think the new households came from? The residents have registered at the municipality when they married, so in fact this is no new information for the municipality, thus the municipality should have known the total number of households in the slum. We get a questionnaire with about 60 questions, allowing the government to have access to all the information they need. We will stay here until at the latest 2020 and then we all have to pay. Our lawyer is God, we do not have any rights, we can only wait.

2.7 Analysis and interpretation of the past strategies

2.7.1 Écochard's grid nowadays

WHILE Écochard himself already left Morocco in 1953, the grid system that he introduced remained a stable factor in Moroccan urban planning practice. Not only on a conceptual level, but also the physical presence of the Écochard Grid has proven to possess a remarkable perennality.

Although Écochard's urban grid has previously been used extensively in Casablanca, the architecture of the 8 by 8 courtyard houses has almost entirely disappeared. Because of changing family compositions, altering dwelling needs or aspirations, as well as speculation, the grid has started to function as a basis for vertical urban growth. Nowadays, the single-level courtyards are the base of three- to five-level terraced houses. The inhabitants have been adding concrete constructions to their courtyard dwellings, to intensify and extend their houses vertically. This has not only changed the interior plans of the houses, but also the façades.

Even though the original urban plan, as intended by Écochard, has changed tremendously, a certain quality of public space was maintained. Although the initial aim of having sunlight in every room of the dwelling has been discarded through the vertical extensions, the vertical extension does indeed live up to the contemporary needs, aspirations and realities. Many of the dwellings have for example been vertically enlarged because of changes in the number of family members living in the dwelling (see figure 2.9). Moreover, extra floors have also offered the opportunity for rental activities, securing a financial basis for many of the extended families ([Avermaete et al., 2010](#)).




Figure 2.9: Vertical enlargement of the 8×8 grid
Source: Learning from Casablanca exposition

Adam (1968) speaks positively of Écochard’s accomplishments, because of how Écochard’s team of young urbanists, landscape architects, economists, and jurists were in contact with sociologists investigating the customs and living conditions of the Moroccan population. Also because he achieved a solution that considered immediate needs, especially hygienic aspects, but also included a long-term perspective. However, Adam (1968) criticises Écochard’s strong obedience to the sectioning and zoning made by Prost. This separation links back to the Charte d’Athènes and the separation of the four basic functions of living, namely dwelling, recreation, work and transportation.

Rachik (2002) argues that the plans by Prost and Écochard did not respond to the socio-spatial needs of the population, but rather bowed to economic demands (capitalist production and establishment of industries and commerce), demographic pressure (housing for European migrants), and to hygienist rationales. At the moment, a big plan was indeed needed to solve the housing problem and tackle the problem of the slums. Écochard did however have intentions and did indeed try to involve the inhabitants in a way by taking their needs and wishes into consideration through his survey, even though the plans were still altered by the inhabitants.



Figure 2.10: Vertical expansion of *Cité Horizontale*

Source: Photothèque, École Nationale d'Architecture de Rabat



Figure 2.11: Only dwelling of the *Cité Horizontale* left in its original state

Source: Own photograph, April 2015

2.7.2 Former slum policies

THE location of the slum settlements varies, and ranges from enclaves within city fabrics that sometimes pre-date the independence of 1956, to more recent settlements on the outskirts of the cities, often located in dangerous sites such as ravines, unstable lands, or in the immediate proximity of rail tracks and other types of main infrastructure. Access to health and education services, markets, urban transport, and employment opportunities depend greatly on the location and age of the settlements but is generally insufficient.

As discussed earlier, Morocco has many decades of experience in slum upgrading. However, the presence of slums in the context of the urban areas has steadily increased, because of the continued pressure of demographic growth, urbanisation, and the dysfunctional urban land and housing market. After a temporary decrease at the end of the 1980s, the slum population increased sharply again at the beginning of the 1990s, and slums have continued to increase at a rate of 4% per annum. The past strategies have not succeeded in their goal to eradicate slums.

Morocco's new slum upgrading strategy has emerged from a period of intense evaluations of past interventions. The Government has fought slum proliferation since the 1950s but the continued growth of these settlements has been testament to the Government's difficulties to adequately address the problem ([World Bank, 2006](#), p. 10).

The [World Bank \(2006\)](#) states that key issues include rising land prices, complex urban planning regulations, inadequate availability of public finance, beneficiaries' insufficient financial resources, low involvement of local authorities, and ill-defined responsibilities across the different governmental, quasi-public and private actors at the regional and national levels. Rigid project designs, as well as inadequate and insufficient consulta-

tion of the target population in the preparation of the slum upgrading operations, have often undermined the necessary buy-in and support of the slum residents. Public housing companies have systematically neglected the social dimensions of slum upgrading and have given little attention to monitoring and evaluation of the results in the past (DHSAF, 2004).

2.7.3 Limitations and risks of Villes Sans Bidonvilles

ALTHOUGH the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme might seem like a big improvement on the past slums policies that may lead to a successful and permanent eradication of the bidonvilles, the programme might be the next strategy to not succeed in Morocco's goal of eradicating slums in all Moroccan cities. Limited institutional capacity and coordination, upgrading as the only response to social exclusion of slum communities, a limited choice and affordability of programme benefit are risks the programme is facing with regard to the achievement of its objectives. These risks are still manageable if the Ministry of Housing and Urban Planning is willing to address them and to introduce the necessary revisions to the programme design and implementation mechanisms. The main risks identified in the context of the Poverty and Social Impact Analysis to the success of the programme are the following ones:

- The risk that some of the institutional actors on whom the programme depends may not feel the same degree of ownership for the programme's approach, or may not have the incentives or capacity to fulfil their responsibilities
- The risk of emphasizing physical upgrading in the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction approach that would include complementary measures for access to municipal and social services and livelihood security
- The risk that the four upgrading modalities may not be consistent with the socioeconomic reality of slum dwellers, and that each may be applied to all residents of a given slum irrespective of their demands and affordable levels of contribution
- The risk that the institutional practices from the past including inertia, political economy interests and mutual mistrust between local actors and slum dwellers will overshadow the innovations of the programme
- The risk that the over-ambitious time frame may not allow the actors involved in the implementation of the programme sufficient time to experiment, learn and innovate in order to make it truly effective

2.7.4 Citizens own approach to the Villes Sans Bidonvilles Programme

THE division of lots between the residents of the bidonvilles on the new locations does not work out as intended by the Municipality. The residents make up their own

strategies to be able to pay the building costs and get more ground to build on.

As decided by the municipality, every two households get a lot of 70 m² to build their dwellings. The apartments that will be build should be four stories high at the most. Instead of dividing these stories over themselves, the two families decide to rent the ground floor to someone who for example wants to start a shop. By doing so the families can partly pay the building costs with the profit from renting the ground floor.

Another strategy a lot of inhabitants of the bidonvilles use is the strategy of ‘splitting’ the household to get more ground for the whole family. They split their insalubrious dwelling because it is not allowed to build new shacks. Instead of building a new shack, the residents split the house from the inside with an extra wall, effectively dividing the house in two spaces, so one may say there are two houses in one.

One can look at a household of four: for example, this household consists of a father, a mother, an older son and a younger sister. The son eventually gets married and needs a house for him and his spouse. However he does not have the money to afford paying the costs of a dwelling, thus he stays with his parents and they split the house to ‘separate’ their households. In the end the parents, sister and brother and his wife get a lot of 70 m² and build an apartment of four stories high for themselves without any family drama. This is just a simple example of the ‘splitting’ of households. People get divorced and marry their children of at a very young age only to officially pretend the family has split, so as to get more land.

2.7.5 Conclusion

CANDILIS, Woods and Bodiansky applied ethnological methods in order to build accommodation that complied to the dwelling practices of local inhabitants. In doing so they transfer improvised dwelling practices, into planning concepts for architectural and urban environments.

Moreover, with their concept for ‘culturally specific’ dwelling typologies, the architects used an essentialised notion of (dwelling) culture. In their everyday practice, however, the inhabitants transgressed these typologies and entered by appropriating the built environment – changing the ground plot, inserting windows, building extensions etc. (Avermaete, 2005).

One can learn a great deal from these projects. Taking the inhabitants and their dwelling culture into account in such a way that the residents do not have to change the design, is something that still lacks in the process of designing dwellings in Casablanca nowadays.

As employees of the Municipality and the Agence Urbaine have stated: ‘Moroccans are their own architects’. Despite the fact that the future inhabitants do have a say in the choice of number and kind of chambers, they still change their dwellings drastically

afterwards. This can however be changed when the design process is altered and the communication between all parties is organized better.

Also, when focusing on the process of removing the bidonvilles there are still some negative points to be found. Some residents of the bidonvilles simply do not want to move to the outskirts of the city. One of the reasons is of course the location of their new dwelling, which in their opinion is located too far away from their job. Another reason is because the residents of the bidonvilles would rather not pay any rent and save a lot of money through their jobs, which might be a main reason for them to stay living in their shack. Some residents on the other hand do not want to leave their shacks, until better dwelling opportunities are implemented and offered to them.

While the bidonvilles are being demolished, the inhabitants are being relocated to new dwellings on the outskirts of town. There, however, still is no new plan for the site of the old bidonville. This leads to a lot of empty spots within the city while it keeps expanding on the outskirts. In a while these empty spots might become the ideal starting point for new bidonvilles.

This process would eventually lead to a new bidonville on the same site. Hence, creating a vicious circle of the removal and development of bidonvilles (see figure 2.12).




Figure 2.12: The vicious circle of rehousing residents of the bidonvilles

Another point which should not be neglected, is the potential danger of housing all the inhabitants of the bidonvilles on the outskirts of Casablanca. These areas might become ghetto-like areas, such as the banlieues in France (see figure 2.13).



Figure 2.13: Banlieue in Clichy-sous-Bois, France
Source: February 2009 ©AFP

For a more appropriate resettlement, recommendations for handling the eviction process and planning of the resettlement of low income people must be made. Appropriate resettlement of low-income dwellers requires a significant amount of effort and time. Finally, the resettlement of these people should be based on the individual needs and choices of the people, as they cannot, and must not, be treated as one homogeneous group.

3 | New strategy and approach

As discussed in the previous chapters, we have explored the history, development and previous slum eradication strategies. The conclusion of this analysis was that there must be a new strategy, as both previous and current strategies are not up to par. In this chapter a new strategy dealing with slum eradication will be introduced in an organic way, by looking at and correcting the mistakes and shortcomings of previous strategies, while building upon the advantages that past strategies have proven to possess. The chapter will be concluded with a concrete strategy specifically targeted at the slum Carrières Centrales, and the implementation of said strategy in a feasible and realistic matter, while considering all relevant stakeholders and their needs.

3.1 Conceptual framework

3.1.1 The process from slum eradication to resettling

At present, the process of relocation is carried out rather hastily, without decent preparation. This is a source of negligence and dissatisfaction, and as such, the involved organisations must have more time to prepare the community for the resettlement. The involved parties should start negotiations in the early stages of eviction, so as to identify possible alternatives for the development on the slum land, in order to prevent resettlement on the fringe of the city.

As discussed in the study ‘Evolution of urban policy and slum clearance in Morocco: successes and transformations of “social contracting”’ (Navez-Bouchanine, 2008) a negative aspect considering the way the Villes Sans Bidonvilles programme is carried out, is that there is little attention and concern to adapt projects to the social, economic and cultural conditions of the populations concerned. Among the consequences most described are the inconsistent access the poorest and most vulnerable of citizens have to the benefits of the projects, i.e. no active and consistent recruitment of citizens who are most in need of the projects, the lack of support provided to these group, the difficulties that come with adapting to the project, as big changes to the lifestyle of beneficiaries are demanded, while they are left without prior knowledge of such changes, oftentimes causing discontent and, in the worst cases, existential trauma.

The lack of information and support given to the residents often results in the pro-

ject putting residents in a traumatic situation, due to the changes that it entails in their way of life or living environment. This lack of information and support can be noted at two crucial moments: during the period of preparation, and the change itself. Of course, subtle differences arise depending on whether it is a relocation or restructuring operation, but the information that circulates badly, and the first months of the new life, generate more or less intense crisis situations in both cases. The case of displacement, particularly when it affects the most fragile households, appears to be the most emblematic, in the worst cases leading to the residents exchanging their privilege for cash, or even ending up in another slum, making the projects efforts go to vain. The appropriate approach to the prevention of slums is the use of proactive measures. To be proactive is to “manage the process of urban expansion so that cities can organise, orient, and initiate their response to the multitude of challenges and opportunities posed by their urban future” (World Bank, 2008, pp. 29-30).

A good and complete information supply between all the organisations and the slum residents is vital to prepare the people for the eviction and resettlement. The slum residents should be informed about their new way of life, well before resettling. Furthermore, courses for skill and job training should be provided and start as soon as possible. These courses will anticipate the slum residents on their new living situation, as there is a possibility of change of jobs. The residents should be well informed about all alternatives for them to be able accommodate best to their future living place.

The surveys as they were taken by Écochard can be reintroduced in a new way to give the stakeholders insight on the wishes and demands of the slum residents concerning their future living environment. The wishes and demands of the people as well as the possible consequences of resettlement and the affordability for the people will be accessible via this survey. The resettlement possibilities that correspond best with the result of the survey can be selected by means of these surveys. These alternatives must, of course, first be discussed and evaluated thoroughly. As a result, different alternatives may be selected among the dwellers and the community might decide not to stick together and move as one group. When the result is indeed as aforementioned, multiple resettlement alternatives must be worked out. One can consider a combination of relocation projects, flats nearby and partial landsharing/reblocking. Using this survey special attention can be giving to the households who are financially not able to partake in the long run and might possibly drop out.

The characteristics of the households will lead to some basic guidelines for the location, the prices and the design of the resettlement project. Of course the infrastructure, the basic services and facilities should be completed before the resettlement of the people takes place, taking the efficiency of the implementation and convenience for the residents into consideration.

The follow-up is especially important in the first, critical, phase after the resettlement. During this adjustment phase, the residents must be supported with adjusting to their

new living environment and the consequences of this change in their daily lives. Thus, the activities that started during the preparation for the resettlement should also continue when the household are resettled.

As opposed to the methods currently used, the location of the projects should be selected and/or adjusted based on criteria like: travel time to the old slum, public transport routes, distance to the city centre, job opportunities and public facilities. Different possibilities should be explored as well, for example the development of areas for residents with higher incomes and potential customers for the services the old slum dwellers can continue on this new location. The planning of the projects should also be drafted in close cooperation with the development of the surrounding area.

3.1.2 Architecture of empowerment

THE architects and the technocrats presume to know best what the people need, but the resulting schemes often lack any sense of humanity and fail to provide anything other than basic shelter and amenities (water, sanitation and electricity). The poor are expected to adjust to the surroundings that are provided. The absence of community links and the lack of concern for the needs of the various community members are things that the management of the project has not tried to challenge, and has, as a result, only perpetuated. Thus the challenge that faces those behind the drafting table is to recognise and deal with the needs of the poor as they would with those of the rich.

Housing the poor by cloning a standard unit is the problem, as can be concluded from Écochard's altered 8×8 grid. Architects do not recognise the dehumanising effect that such spaces have, or the need to nest different spaces and scales through the hierarchical progression from public to semi-public to private. Design for the poor must also leave them with options for the future. There should be space for expansion; invariably, the poor build incrementally, and it is necessary to allow for densification. As families grow, they should be able to accommodate the next generation around them, creating stronger links and reducing vulnerability. This helps build the social capital of the community and actually increases their ability to improve their well-being (Serageldin, 1997, p. 9).

One would think it is possible for architects to design in a way that increases the empowerment of people and communities. This way of designing new housing requires the architect/urban designer to function as a mediator between the clashing layers of government and inhabitants, in order for them to bridge the gap between top-down and bottom-up planning (see figure 3.1).




Figure 3.1: The mediator bridging the gap between the government and the inhabitants

The type of architecture that slum dwellers require is one of empowerment, one that encourages their incremental inputs, that sees building more as process than as product. They must feel that they are masters of their immediate surroundings, that they have a firm foundation on which to build a better future for themselves and their children. This can be achieved and the appropriate conditions of shelter and basic amenities can be attained (Serageldin, 1997, p. 11).

3.1.3 Decision making

TO clarify the differences between an institutionalised and a would-be grassroots professional, the decision-making structures in each system must be understood. The simplest way of doing this in housing, is to divide the process of decision-making into three easily recognizable sets of operations as done by Turner (1976, pp. 28-30):

- Planning, or operations that generally precede construction
- Construction or building operations
- The management and maintenance of what is built, necessarily following the greater part of the building operations








These sets of operation should be distributed between the three common sets of actors that is, those persons, groups, enterprises, or institutions that control the resources for the process itself:

- The popular sector, the users
- The private, commercial sector, the suppliers
- The public sector or government, the regulators

By and large in the so-called free market and in mixed economies, these three sectors are clearly distinguishable, even though the former two are almost always treated as a homogeneous whole. This convention for seeing the users and the commercial suppliers as one and the same thing – the private sector – is too violent a distortion of the way things actually work. Large commercial organizations, or ‘growth enterprises’ exist to maximize financial returns for third parties, or perpetuate or expand the organization itself, or all three. Although profitability is often a major factor in individual householders’ or house-seekers’ behaviours, use-values generally predominate – just as most small businesses are maintained for the livelihood of those that run them rather than for investors or for the sake of the enterprise as an institution. The public sector, or public agencies, on the other hand, are motivated primarily by the broad political purpose of maintaining their authority over the public order – even this can be distorted as commercial.






The patterns of decision and control describing the two opposite systems are mirror images of one another, as their diagrammatic representation shows (see tables 3.1 and 3.2).

Table 3.1: Locally self-governing or autonomous housing systems

Plan	Construct	Manage	
			Regulators or Public Sector
			Suppliers or Private (commercial) Sector
			Users or Popular Sector

Source: Turner, 1976

Table 3.2: Centrally administered or heteronomous housing systems

Plan	Construct	Manage	
			Regulators or Public Sector
			Suppliers or Private (commercial) Sector
			Users or Popular Sector

Source: Turner, 1976

It is only when legislative institutions and planning/executing organisations are separated, accompanied with a mediator that facilitates between both parties, that one is able to see a structure among the complex web of stakeholders; a non-hierarchic network of autonomous decision-makers, free to combine as they will, as long as they stay within limits sets by the rules (i.e. regulations instigated by legislative institutions). The rules of such a system must act as limits, rather than prescribed lines of actions. It is only then that both humane and feasible strategies can be conceived.

For centuries there has been a gap between the citizens and government when looking at decision making (see figure 3.1). To reduce the gap between the government and inhabitants, one cannot overlook the cooperation between both parties, by means of a mediator, taking the wishes of both parties in account for the new plans.

3.1.4 Designing for the people

WHILE slum are being demolished, oftentimes there still is no new plan for the old slum area. It is for this reason that inhabitants of the bidonvilles should be rehoused on the original site as much as possible, instead of leaving the spots empty abandoning valuable land, land that is left up for grabs, especially for lobbyists. At the moment there is no relation between lobbyists and citizens. In fact, the citizens are true victims of land speculation. Even though the residents will eventually move from their original living environment, they would rather see their new dwellings being built on the exact same spot. One of the reasons this would be favourable, is because of the short distance to their work and family members. Lobbyists on the other hand, have different plans for the ground of the eradicated slums, because of its ideal location near business

areas and the city centre. They plan to exploit the land because of its already high value and will use the ground for big construction projects. In short, lobbyists' motive is profit, which is the polar opposite of what benefits the original citizens.

The methods used by the architects in the 50s were urban utopias in the eyes of the designers. Nowadays however, Moroccan inhabitants are not as traditional as in the past and will most likely not be satisfied by the design of apartments that was conceived over 60 years ago. Both men and women are responsible for their jobs and households, and some do not live with their grandparents, while the family ties remain of utmost importance in Moroccan culture (see figure 3.2). To not neglect the care of the head of the family, it is desired by families to still live near their elders and be ensured of their well-being. Another point to consider is that the daily life of citizens does not merely consist of working, eating and sleeping, as the modern Moroccan like to go out and sport as well.




Figure 3.2: Family hierarchy in Morocco

The new plans will take social mixture into consideration by housing both former slum residents as well as people from outside the slums in the area, which will prevent any agglomeration of radical thoughts or criminal activities from taking place or erupting. The potential danger of housing all the inhabitants of the bidonvilles on the outskirts of Casablanca is hazardous for the future of these urban plans. These areas might become like the banlieues in France. One must learn from these past experiences, as these teach us that a new living environment living up to the dreams of the residents gives the best results in the long term, and in all terms. The surveys taken at the beginning of the slum eradication process will also be taken into action when designing the new dwellings and appointing households to them.

Some of the main facilities that will be provided in the plan and are not available in the slums are:

- Providing water and sewage networks with connections to each plot or building

- Installing and connecting gas, electricity and telephone service facilities and internet access in all buildings, with provision for connections to future buildings on vacant lots
- Resurfacing the internal road network with pavement
- Providing proper slope and storm drainage connections
- Installing outdoor lighting in all streets
- Providing facilities for solid waste collection and disposal, including containers placed on a number of selected sites
- Providing social service facilities, including a nursery, a clinic and a public bath.

A collective dwelling community with different facilities such as a sports facility, polyclinic, marketplace, community centre, nursery, and a shopping centre will replace the current slum area. The technology, materials, labour force and professionals used to carry out the work are essentially local, differing little from those commonly used in Casablanca.

3.1.5 Citizen Council and City Contract

TO reduce the gap between the government and inhabitants one can work together with the inhabitants to take their wishes into account for the new plans. A new way of policy making can be introduced in which citizen's participation will be encouraged. To make this possible and work effectively a Citizen Council will be introduced and two active citizens of every neighbourhood will be chosen to be part of this council. From every *quartier* (neighbourhood) two members of the council are chosen to present their ideas and proposals to a non-governmental organisation (NGO). This NGO will essentially function as a hub that connects the input of citizens and the other stakeholders, so as to give more consideration to the citizens' voice, as they will be the beneficiaries for whom the project was instigated in the first place. By means of this approach, one third of the opinions and ideas of the residents will eventually be included in the effective implementation of a new design. Besides this, clear communication will take place at all times, as the NGO exists for the convenience of the citizen, who value both an attentive ear as well as a clear voice from those who are responsible for their future dwellings.

New programmes with a big timeframe for certain goals have proven not to work for slum policies. To make the goals achievable and keep an overview of, and cooperation with different stakeholders and projects a city contract will be established. This city contract will be applicable for a period of 5 years. Three objectives guide the development of the city contract, namely:

1. ensuring equality between the territories

2. reducing the development gap between disadvantaged neighbourhoods and urban areas
3. improving the living conditions of residents and promoting cohabitation

Financial support and resources for future projects will be made available by the signatories, and will stop being a point of concern as it is only a matter of time before the efficiency of this approach will become apparent.

The position of the citizen council in the city contract will be as follows: in steering bodies, in territorial conferences of representatives with territorial institutions (e.g. area coordinator, deputy prefect, and elected district policy team of the city) and in participatory workshops, dealing with major operational areas of the city contract and in the presence of the concerned services. To ensure the technical management of the city contract, monitoring and evaluation, a multidisciplinary dedicated project team will be instigated. Its tasks will be the animation of the city contract bodies, coordination with other contracts that impact the territories, implementation and monitoring of operational objectives of the city contract and mobilisation of ordinary means, territorial animation, observation of territories and the evaluation of the city contract.

When combining a citizen council with the use of a city contract and with mediation of an NGO, a complete slum eradication strategy such as *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*, implemented on a big scale with a deadline after many years, becomes more realistic and achievable. With a city contract one can take into account and respond to any problems and obstacles that may be found along the way. Secondly, with the use of a city contract the voice of the residents can be implemented in the design so they will be content with their dwellings and living environment. This is especially feasible considering the establishment of an independent organisation, namely the NGO, whose duty it is to ensure that the voice of the citizen is not ignored or taken lightly. This is a crucial part of the strategy, as past experiences, i.e. the plans of Écochard and his colleagues in the 50s and 60s, have shown what will happen when inhabitants are disregarded. The thoroughness of this approach will of course prove to be an additional load for the government, due to increased workload and time/resource allocation, but the results will surely appear to be a mindful investment in the long term, when the appearance of new slums will have dropped significantly.

Experience from the [L'Alliance des Villes \(2010\)](#) shows that the commitment, ownership and leadership by local stakeholders are key conditions for the success of transformation processes. Successful transformation processes are those that are led by the city itself and involve national governments, local authorities, civil society, private sector actors, and support partners such as agencies and financial institutions. Grouped under the motto of 'engines of urban transformation', these different actors collaborate on a wide range of actions.

When successful, urban transformation processes will give insight into situation of the urban poor and the way in which these populations can contribute to urban development, instead of only being its target. Local governments and their partners will also gain a deeper knowledge of what inclusive urban development is, which leads them to initiate meaningful dialogues and to exchange ideas with all parties stakeholders in the debate on urban issues. The challenges and opportunities can therefore catalyse and consolidate inclusive and expanded partnerships in this process. Bearing in mind the experiences gained, local authorities and national governments can, in partnership with urban communities and development partners, implement policies, strategies and plans and mobilise the necessary funds and other resources for the creation of more inclusive cities.




Figure 3.3: Urban development drivers and the results of their interaction
Source: L'Alliance des Villes (2010)




Figure 3.4: Spaces of eviction and rehousing in Carrières Centrales from 1925–1988
 Source: Ayoub (2004)

3.2 Carrières Centrales and new strategy

3.2.1 History Carrières Centrales

AT the beginning of the previous century, the first shanties started to emerge in Casablanca, as a result of the combined effects of demographic growth, rural-to-urban exodus, and the development of certain urban areas. Carrières Centrales was among one of the first shanty towns to emerge in Casablanca.

In 1920, during the setting up of Roches Noires Heating Plant in Casablanca, the workers operating in the plant expressed a great need for accommodation. They were temporarily housed in barracks to which makeshift tents were eventually grafted. These entities were set up in an old abandoned quarry located near the Centrale (i.e. Heating Plant),

hence the name given to the area, Karyān centrāl, which literally means the Central Quarry. The latter being in fact the first substantial shanty in Casablanca, the appellation was thereafter used to refer to the other shanties which later emerged in Casablanca (such as Karyān Ben Msik; Karyān Bachkou, etc.).

It should be noted that the formation of a major shanty that consists of thousands of shacks is far from being a spontaneous phenomenon; it is the outcome of the gathering of a multitude of smaller shanties that were scattered all over the city. More explicitly, in the face of the urbanisation requirements of the Greater Casablanca, the emergence of factories, and the absence of a voluntary housing and re-housing policy, the first hard-cores to have been formed soon witnessed tremendous growth.

To be precise, Carrières Centrales originated in 1922 and its first core could be seen. Displacement of the state and the regrouping of slums in their current location took place in 1939. Initially, it was a district for migrant workers, later on it became a mixed neighbourhood with dwellings, businesses and markets. The original inhabitants of Carrières Centrales participated in the resistance during the French Protectorate and strongly supported the late King Mohamed V.

The word eviction was used to describe people leaving their homes by decision, in order to resettle them elsewhere. Or, by taking advantage of any natural disaster, the government removed people from certain (disadvantageous) places to relocate them in other (advantageous) places.

The map of evictions of Carrières Centrales (see figure 3.4) shows a very clear array of efforts made to resolve the problem of slums; what can be seen broadly, is that the slum has two important phases in its life. The first concerns the time during the French Protectorate where the trend was expansion, the second phase is that of the time during the Independence when the trend is the shrinking of space, to total resorption, either in cities through resettlement or inclusion in other neighbouring slums.



Figure 3.5: Carrières Centrales in the past
Source: Hay Mohammadi Facebook page



Figure 3.6: Carrières Centrales before and after demolition
Source: Hay Mohammadi Facebook page

3.2.2 Demolition and resettlement

CURRENTLY, the bidonville Carrières Centrales in Hay Mohammadi is completely demolished. The original plan for the Carrières Centrales in 2004, as described in *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*, was that inhabitants were to be rehoused on location and in Sidi Moumen. The number of households was 5702 in this bidonville in 2004 (borough municipality of Hay Mohammadi and Aïn Sebaâ).

Resettlement to Lahraouiyyine (Province Médiouna) had been planned for the residents and the slum had already been partially eradicated, since 2000 shanties were demolished until early September 2010. This is the second relocation operation, as an earlier partial relocation operation, the Hassan II operation, took place in the 90s, but was suspended due to financial difficulties.



Figure 3.7: The new neighbourhood in Lahraouiyyine
Source: Own work, April 2015

Lahraouiyyine is a new site on the outskirts of Casablanca (see figure 3.7). The concept of the new dwellings for the inhabitants of the bidonvilles is focussed on achieving social meeting spots; in the new plan there are spots available for recreation, schools and

community buildings.

As stated many times both by the Municipality and by the Agence Urbaine: ‘Moroccans are their own architects’. Even though future inhabitants who are subject to the current plans do have a say in the choice of number and kind of chambers, they will still change their dwellings drastically afterwards. This unfavourable practice can be prevented by changing not only the design, but by addressing the very root of the problem: the design process itself. This can only be done by ameliorating efforts for communication and transparency on both sides (citizens and government), as this will make both the wishes of the citizens appear in the design, as well as the intentions of the government unmistakably being delivered to the citizens, who will in turn respect them accordingly.

3.2.3 A new strategy

NGO as mediator

FIRST and foremost, a new strategy must deal with the lacking communication that up to this date takes place between the government and the citizens. Efforts have never been made to increase interaction with citizens by installing special taskforces in the government, who are tasked with involving the citizenry with the plans. If one would introduce such a taskforce in the current situation, it will surely only face disdain from the slum dwellers, as it would seem hypocrite of the government to now, after such a long time, interact with the citizens. They would, as a result, not want to be involved with said taskforce, as it goes against their principles, because of the long time of them being ignored by the government in terms of interaction. An alternative way must be sought; an NGO (non-governmental organisation) must be established.

This newly established NGO will be tasked with facilitating between the slum dwellers and the government. This will only be possible if it has a monopoly on the communication between both parties, meaning that it will serve as an absolute mediator at all times. This is achieved by giving the NGO extraordinary rights, signed by all parties involved, as urged by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. One would ask why these parties would voluntarily limit their rights, the reason for this being that no party, will not be able to abuse their rights, i.e. not providing slum dwellers with important information, while at the same time benefiting from a transparent flow of information from the slum dwellers themselves, including their increased cooperation as they are now an active part of the process of slum development. For the NGO to maintain order between both parties, mutual respect must be present for communication to take place. If one party does not behave civilly, i.e. does not take the words of the other party to heart, their voice will not be made clear to the other party. Normal communication between both parties could be shown schematically using the following notation:

Citizens \Leftrightarrow Government

Smooth communication is maintained between both parties, with citizens and the government benefiting from transparency

In this case, both citizens and government enjoy a smooth stream of clear information facilitated by the NGO. This way, no party is disadvantaged, and transparency is maintained at all times. This is essentially why the NGO exists, as its main duty is to maintain a transparent flow of information while assuring that the voices of both parties are respected.

In the case that the government ignores the voice of the citizens, i.e. their wishes and needs, while the citizens respect the orders of the government, they will be sanctioned by the NGO. This sanction is basically a limitation of communication that occurs from the government to the citizens. If this sanction would persist, the government will be unable to execute any of its plans, essentially letting the project fail at their own hands, because the decrease in communication with the slum dwellers will result in modification of newly constructed dwellings, as can be seen in previous strategies, but at a much faster pace. The government could be able to force their wishes on the citizenry by force, as communication with them is not an option anymore per the sanctions, but this would result in even larger losses, as it will only increase the dissatisfaction of dwellers. This puts the government at square one again, in addition having incurred heavy losses.

Citizens \rightarrow Government

Communication from the citizens to government persists, but the government will not be able to influence the citizenry by means of words

In the case that the citizenry disregards the government, while the government respects their needs, they will be met with sanctions, as their voice will be damped, or in the worst case completely muted. This disregard can manifest itself in different forms of at a large scale disregarding official government notices, such as:

- not evacuating at the promised times
- illegally changing the layout of their dwellings
- persisting uncivil behaviour towards government officials, etc.

These forms of misconduct will be clearly included in the contract of the NGO, and will be accessible to all parties at all times, as part of the notion of transparency. Sanction will only occur if misconduct takes place on a large scale, that is such a scale at which decent cooperation between both parties is impossible and as a result, only an execution speed of the project below standards used today is achieved. Said sanctions consist of the NGO prioritising information from the government to the citizens, but not the other way around. In the worst case, for the citizens, the NGO will not relay the needs of the citizens to the government, and the government will have free-play regarding their plans for the slums. If residents will come complaining, the only answer to their complaints

will be that they are simply getting paid for their own mistakes, which was clearly communicated at the initialisation of the sanction.

Citizens \leftarrow Government

Communication from the government to the citizens persists, but the citizens will not have any say in the plans of the government, meaning that they will be subjugated to the government's self-designed plans

The NGO acts as a mediator in the broadest sense of the word: they control whether information from one side reaches the other, based on the merit of either side. This is entirely founded on the principle of mutual respect, as both sides must respect each other for anything to happen, which is the very basis of human interaction. By imposing such sanctions, development will be suspended until both parties behave civilly, thus being equally disadvantageous for both parties, and therefore being more of a preventive measure than a reactive measure. In law this would be known as the 'chilling effect', meaning that sanctions are used as a strategic means of preventing a party of using their rights (in this case of not complying to the other party's wishes). The NGO is an entirely independent entity, they act solely for the good of both parties, citizens and government, but most of all, for the good of Morocco. Because of its selfless motives, as they do not seek any profit or power for their own good in any way, the NGO will be void of corrupt practices.

Corruption within the NGO, and eventually the parties involved, will be annihilated by means of a special system: collegial refereeing. This means that members of the NGO will immediately report any form of corruption, with sanctions ranging from warnings to dismissal of the ones responsible for said corruption. Normally, this ideal system cannot be achieved, as corruption is often condoned by the very proposers of the measures. In this case however, those who are devoted to slum development will be a direct part of the process, namely educated (former) slum dwellers. This is done by means of recruiting capable human resources directly from the targeted slums, with special attention to educated youngsters; they will be offered a (paid) traineeship, the details of which will be touched upon later in this chapter.

As the NGO is partially operated by educated slum dwellers, who are experts when it comes to their own environment, credibility of government notices is increased, as unknown government officials are now replaced by the known faces of the (educated) youth and experienced dwellers of the neighbourhood. In this revolutionary way, citizens will respect the government's needs and will be more willing to cooperate with and yield to development actions, which was not the case with previous strategies.

As time progresses, the NGO will grow to be the trusted partner of both the citizens and government, and a harmonious environment in which all parties are respected will be realised. This development will lead to an overall content population of dwellers, and newly built neighbourhoods will become less susceptible to the illegal 'changes' dwellers

make to their homes, therefore preventing, or at least delaying the development of new slums. There must of course be a follow-up programme consisting of adequate after-care (i.e. enough space for expansion/legally allowed modifications) and the government must still focus on the creation of more housing complexes in order for it to be able to house the ever-expanding Moroccan population.

Structure of the NGO

THE NGO's members are primarily comprised of former-government workers who are filtered through a selection process, assessing whether they possess the necessary commitment with and for slum dwellers in a righteous way.

Additionally, experts on slum environments, such as researchers from universities and students will be invited to cooperate with the permanent staff in order to propose a smoother workflow and increased participation of slum dwellers in the project. By allowing students to do on-site research, both the quality of academic research on slums as well as their development is increased significantly. The NGO can in term benefit from the expertise these scholars have regarding the social environment of the slums, meaning that they will become more able to adapt more adequately to the needs of the slum dwellers and as such, well-tailored services will be provided to all parties involved.

Apart from these two groups, local residents are also encouraged to participate on a voluntary basis, and those deemed capable enough of professional work may even be considered for an official position in the organisation. There will also be a form of active recruitment with a particular focus on promising youth originating from the slums, as they have bright ideas and are experts in terms of life in the slums. These youth will receive a training in the form of a traineeship, meaning they will receive a formal salary for their contributions and get educated in a way they would normally not be able to afford. These opportunities will instil new vigour in the souls of the youth and they will see that performing well at school does truly come with opportunities of which they previously thought were not in their reach. As a result, the overall stance of both students as well as parents towards education will improve. Additionally, the NGO will benefit from the expertise of these promising youngsters, as their traineeship does not only consist of training, but also comprises working at the same time. After completing the traineeship, those who performed well will be offered a (permanent) position at the NGO, leading to more permanent expertise in the organisation and increased enthusiasm regarding slum development. Besides this, corruption levels will be kept in check, as these youngsters will surely not tolerate ones who keep the resources to be spent for their families to themselves, and will want to educate the next generation of youngsters why they must step up their game.

NGO's involvement with other stakeholders

THE NGO is at the very centre of the battlefield that is known as slum development. As such, it must facilitate between not only the government and the citizens, but also between a wide array of other institutions as well. Henceforth, a list of stakeholders will be provided along with an explanation of the involvement of the NGO with each stakeholder.

- **Moroccan Government**

- **Local Government**

- * **Municipality of Casablanca** — The NGO provides data to the municipality such as, population size, average income, literacy rate and other statistical information. They in turn negotiate with the municipality about locations available for temporary residence when developing the slums later on in the process. They also negotiate with the local planners and architects of the municipality, to come to terms on what is best and most favourable in terms of amenities for slum dwellers (e.g. schools, healthcare facilities, etc.). The municipality will also be responsible for adequately linking redeveloped slum areas to the existing transportation networks (bus and tram networks) and to actively promote businesses to settle in the newly developed areas for new job opportunities to emerge and for overall prosperity level in former slum areas to rise.

- **National Government**

- * **Ministry of the Interior (MICL)** — The NGO will cooperate with the local government to facilitate and streamline operations on a local/regional level, regarding slum development and education for the illiterate and other services provided to develop the overall slum environment.
- * **Ministry of Social Development (MSFFDS)** — The NGO will cooperate with the Ministry of Social Development to further ameliorate the literacy levels, educational facilities, healthcare, hygiene and public moral of the slum dwellers, for them to eventually integrate with contemporary urban lifestyle.
- * **Ministry of Housing and the Politics of the City (MHPV)** — The NGO will discuss urban plans with planners of the MHPV, so as to adapt these plans to the needs of slum dwellers and improve the overall workflow regarding the development of said plans, using the statistical data gathered by the NGO (e.g. average household size, average income, hygiene levels, etc.)
- * **Ministry of Finance (MEF)** — The NGO will negotiate about subsidies to be allocated to the slum dwellers so as to soften the impact formal housing has on the financial state of slum dwellers, but also while keeping in mind the budget of the MEF, thus creating a balance between the needs of the slum dwellers and the capabilities of the MEF.

- **Moroccan Civil Society**

- **Moroccan Citizens** — In this case the NGO will primarily target slum dwellers and will inform them about the changes that will take place and survey their wishes and needs accordingly. They will also gather (statistic) data on the slum population and give workshops and trainings at local schools and/or in the mosque targeted at slum dwellers, so as to smoothen the transition between living in informal dwellings to living in formal dwellings. Slum residents are also incorporated in the negotiation process, with those prepared to share their honest opinions at the centre of the information network of the NGO. As for the people not living in slums the NGO will aim to cooperate with (local) media to inform them about the changes that will take place regarding the development of slums, so they too are prepared for those changes and will not face them with hostility.
- **Humanitarian NGOs** — The NGO will cooperate with other already existing NGOs to create progress in the field of human rights, especially concerning dwellings, hygiene, education and food, social and civil safety. Additionally, trainings and workshops will be jointly provided to educate the slum dwellers on the process of job hunting, legal affairs and other crucial skills needed by the modern day metropolist.
- **Media** — The NGO will closely cooperate with both local as well as national media in delivering the latest news on slum development, so as to raise awareness of the issue and raise participation levels. Local newspapers will be utilized for publishing important news regarding the development of the slums, targeted at the slum dwellers, while informing other citizens at the same time. Artists and other producers will also be approached for creating propaganda posters, flyers, promotional videos, in order for them to be able to reach an audience as wide as possible (this includes utilizing social media on the Internet).
- **Academic / Research Institutes** — The NGO will approach scholars to actively participate in the development of slums and do on-site research on the current situation and possible developments to be made in the field. This will benefit both scholars as well as the NGO, as scholars will gain new, transparent insight on the developments taking place in the slums and the NGO will in turn benefit from expert information and opinions regarding the current state of affairs.

- **Moroccan Organisations**

- **Commercial Banks / Micro-credit Organisations** — The NGO will negotiate with banks on the creation of special mortgages and loans to facilitate the transition of slum dwellers to a fully fledged urban life. This will especially benefit the slum dwellers as they previously were not eligible for any substantial loans/mortgages and were therefore reluctant to move out of

their slum dwellings as their was an impeding fear of financial difficulty. The NGO may invoke the support of the MEF when arranging these facilities. The NGO will also have a role in stimulating the use of micro-credit of slum dwellers who have an ambition of starting their own (small) business. They will also introduce these micro-credits as a means of empowerment to previously disregarded social classes, such as women and youngsters. In this context, one can think of housewives to get a formal basic education or youngsters wanting to start their own businesses.

- **Parastatal Housing Companies (OPH)** — The NGO will aim to task most of its construction needs, regarding new dwellings for slum residents, to the OPH. They will negotiate about the different possibilities and aim to increase the range of options available to slum dwellers when ‘designing’ their new homes , so as to prevent slum dwellers from ‘being their own architects’, while still giving them the possibility to work together with the real architects. The NGO will aim to achieve the best possible outcome in terms of living space, local amenities (schools, shops, etc.), as well as costs (which can be pushed back through subsidies from the MEF). There will also be a possibility for physically capable youngsters to perform construction work, so they can gain both income as well as well as a formal on-job training which will increase employment rates and decrease crime rates, as youngsters now have something to focus their minds on instead of conducting mischievous behaviour.
- **Social Development Agency (ADS)** — The NGO will strengthen ties between the ADS and banks and micro-credit organisation, so as to streamline the process of combating poverty by means of education (by the ADS) and implementation of the lessons learned (using loans from banks and micro-credit organisations). It will also preliminary focus on educating weaker members of the slum society, so they to can participate in day-to-day life.
- **Contractors / Developers** — The NGO will mainly task contractors with building public facilities, such as schools, polyclinics, community houses, playgrounds, recreational parks, libraries, youth centres, etc. after consultation with city planners and architects from all relevant stakeholders (i.e. MHPV, OPH and the municipality). Main infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, water and drainage networks, but also secondary infrastructure such as telephone networks and internet networks will be tasked upon them.

Preliminary measures

A new strategy must also deal with both preparatory operations as well as the actual development and relocation of slum residents. For this reason, the strategy that will be introduced hereafter must include both preliminary measures alongside the actual implementation of the relocation plans. These preliminary measures have proven to be lacking in previous strategies, as previously described through the abrupt changes slum

dwellers experience when being relocated. These preliminary measures essentially entail the following elements:

1. **Communication** — Slum dwellers must be informed about the changes that will happen surrounding their living environment long before these changes actually take place, in a clear and concise manner. Inhabitants must be informed of the process of development at all times, not only for them to feel involved with the project, but also to create an image of devotion from the government's part. This is essential, not only because this was lacking in previous projects, but also because it increases slum dwellers' willingness to cooperate with, and their trust towards the government. Communication will take place through the following channels:
 - (a) **Mosques**, after the Friday prayers to which many citizens attend, through a message from the *imam* (head-priest), who will communicate the most essential information to citizens.
 - (b) **Schools**, to which slum dwellers' children attend. Flyers and letters directed to the parents/guardians of the students will be distributed, so both students and their parents know what changes are awaiting them.
 - (c) **Bathhouses**, or *hammams*, are places often frequented by Moroccans in general, including the slum dwellers. Flyers and posters written in understandable Moroccan-Arabic will be clearly visible for citizens to read after a refreshing bath.
 - (d) **Local stores**, as with hammams, these places are also regularly frequented by slum dwellers, making it a fit place for posters and other propaganda regarding the slum development projects. Bakeries, stalls, and local general convenience stores are top spots optimal exposure to these posters and flyers.

1a – Mosque

The imam will also urge citizens to attend meetings organised by an NGO (non-governmental organisation), who is responsible for all communication between citizens and the government. As Moroccans are still very religious, many dwellers will regularly, if not always, attend the weekly Friday prayer, which is the most important prayer of the week. They see the imam as a righteous and sincere person, so they take his advice and teachings to heart, including of course, his call to attention for the slum development project. Active citizens will be encouraged to partake in the meetings organised by the NGO as neighbourhood representative, as they both want the best for their families and fellow dwellers, as well as wanting to answer to this call for participation from the imam on religious grounds.

1b – Schools

By interacting with households through their children, rather than sending letters to slum dwellers' homes as is usual and will still be done, one informs two age groups at the

same time: children (students) and their parents. Teachers will urge the need of the new developments for the future of their students and their families, encouraging students to discuss these changes and the problems surrounding slums at home, discussions that oftentimes do not take place at all. It are these discussions that make households become aware of the importance of these changes and their involvement with them. An additional advantage is that these messages are regarded with respect, as Moroccan and Islamic culture teaches citizens to regard those who bestow knowledge upon them.

1c – Bathhouses (hammams)

Bathhouses are often considered to be the centre of social life, alongside mosques and local stores. These bathhouses, or hammams, are a vital part of life, especially for slum dwellers, as they do not own a personal bathroom. This makes their frequent visit to the hammam inevitable, thus strengthening the social role of this public space. Slum dwellers are more inclined to think critically or receive criticism after a refreshing, mind-opening, bath, which also means that they are more willing to discuss the future of their neighbourhood with other citizens. This means that the hammam is an open place for informal discussion with fellow dwellers, the bathhouse owner and even strangers, allowing for new ideas to develop amongst the citizens. These ideas are in turn communicated to the NGO, preferably by the owner of the hammam or the *'assas*, the local volunteer 'security guard' of the neighbourhood, who most often interacts with slum dwellers. Representatives of the NGO will seek assistance from these 'on-site experts', to sound the unbiased opinions of slum dwellers, who tend to speak frankly only to each other and tend to change their opinion when talking to official representatives of the project. This is an inevitable phenomenon, and cannot be altered by any means, as fear of persecution is instilled in the hearts of slum dwellers, meaning that this is the only means of getting a real, unbiased opinion from the slum dwellers.

1d – Local stores

The local stores will have a similar function as the hammams, functioning as a focal point of sincere opinions (see [Bathhouses \(hammams\)](#)). In addition to this, local stores will expose citizens to propaganda regarding the slum development project, by using clearly visible posters with a limited amount of text and a clear call to action, so they can be understandable for both the educated masses as well as those of weak literacy, as seen in for a example posters used by the American Library Association (see figure 3.8). This will make slum dwellers feel that they are regarded as important, and encourage not only the educated, but all levels of slum society to participate in and cooperate with the development project.




Figure 3.8: A propaganda poster used to promote reading books
Source: American Library Association, 1918

2. **Participation** — Slum dwellers must be actively involved in the design and execution of the slum development process, in order to achieve both transparency as well as gain credibility from the citizens. Furthermore, input from slum dwellers is vital, as they will essentially decide what they want, regardless of what was given to them (cf. the strategies of Écochard et al.). One must therefore ensure that the new plans live up to the standards of the citizens and alter the plans according to their needs, as much as possible. Participation must be promoted through the following means:

- (a) **Active recruitment of (former) slum dwellers**, who are experts in terms of the wishes of fellow slum dwellers and the issues and possible solutions regarding slum problems in general.
- (b) **Passive recruitment of (former) slum dwellers**, by means of widely understandable propaganda in the form of flyers and posters, to which citizens will be readily exposed, so as to trigger an ardour that will compel them to participate in group discussions and workshops surrounding the future of their slums and community development (cf. [Local stores](#)).
- (c) **Encouraging subordinated social classes**, such as women, elderly, physically impaired and children. These social classes have been disregarded by the designers of previous slum development projects, but are an essential part of the society and are not to be turned a blind eye at.

2a – Active recruitment of (former) slum dwellers

Active recruitment of (former) slum dwellers is done by both encouraging civilians to cooperate with the NGO, through discussions, workshops and trainings from which both parties benefit: the NGO will acquire new insights directly from slum citizens, and slum dwellers will feel that they too can make a difference in their community (empowerment), and they will be able to take part in valuable trainings that will help them in their future, as part of the bigger civil community that is Casablanca. Active recruitment will also take place through a traineeship that will aim to recruit promising youth from the slums by benefiting from their knowledge through paid work, but also training them in the field of development, design, administration, etc. for them to get a kickstart into their lives as working adults. By making slum dwellers participate in the development, preferably those who are (reasonably) educated or have proved to be trustworthy with regard to community work, the NGO will not only gain valuable knowledge of and input directly from experts within their organisation, but they will benefit from an overall increased zeal with regards to the development of slums, as these slum residents genuinely wish to help their community with all their might.

2b – Passive recruitment of (former) slum dwellers

Passive recruitment will primarily take place on a voluntary basis, with interested and concerned citizens participating in the development plans out of their own volition, after being encouraged to do so by propaganda in the form of posters, flyers, advertisements

in newspapers, promotions on television and coverage on the Internet. It is not entirely expected that passive recruitment will bring significant results in terms of the amount of people recruited, as the slum dwellers will, unfortunately, remain wary of participating in (official) development projects, owing to the many hardships they had to endure caused by past projects. This will however change, as the NGO will start to appear as a benevolent organisation in the eyes of the slum dwellers, an organisation that not only exists to eliminate the slums, but also to educate their population and provide them with the best possible future through workshops and other supportive activities. This will allow the formerly reluctant citizens to openly participate in the debate surrounding the future of their dwellings, volunteer activities to assist the elderly dwellers, workshops for children (e.g. cooking workshops and other do-it-yourself activities), so as to create a strong and healthy community that continues to exist far into the future of the slums, that by then will have become an inseparable part of the city (in a positive sense, of course).

2c – Encouraging subordinated social classes

These currently disregarded classes, i.e. women, elderly, physically impaired and children, must be approached in an informal manner through meetings and accessible workshops, so as to avoid scepticism and irrational fear of the authorities, and encourage these social classes to take the reins of their life in their own hands. This form of empowerment and education will lead to the development of a healthy modern community where all people are treated as equals, with a righteous and morally correct mindset. In such an environment, crime and other illegal activities (e.g. illegal building modifications), will be disregarded not only by the authorities, but also by the people themselves, creating a self-correcting community that will last much longer than the disorganised and questionable society of the slums of today.

3. **Planning** — The NGO will be responsible for the necessary arrangements needed for the slum development project. This includes arranging the following amenities:
- (a) **Subsidies**, as arranged through banks and the Ministry of Finance. These subsidies must be as favourable as possible for the slum dwellers.
 - (b) **Information services**, by organising a permanent taskforce located at an accessible location in the slums. This taskforce will aim to ease the fears of the slum dwellers by openly receiving and answering questions with sufficient walk-in hours to cater to all levels of the slum community.
 - (c) **Infrastructure and local amenities**, which will be arranged with the municipality, the OPH and the contractors, and is not limited to primary and secondary infrastructure.
 - (d) **New dwellings**, that will include a wide variety of possible modifications and options available at the disposal of slum residents. These options are based on the input gained from the slum citizens, and will therefore very much appeal to them, unlike previous projects that only provided generic housing with very limited space for modifications.

3a – Subsidies

These subsidies range from loans to mortgages with minimum interest rates so to be most favourable for the slum residents. The NGO will aim to both arrange these loans as well as create long-term contracts with involved banks and micro-credit organisations and MEF if applicable. By means of these subsidies slum citizens will be more willing to move to formal dwellings, that are of course more expensive than their illegal dwellings, as they are now able to cover more of the costs with less liabilities awaiting them in the future.

3b – Information services

As stated before, the main task of the NGO will be to provide accessible and transparent information to all parties. This of course includes citizens who are placed as a top priority in the flow of information. There must however be a channel for citizens to inquire and consult when facing doubts or uneasiness regarding the programme's or their own future. This channel will be a taskforce directly accessible by the citizens as it is located in one of the already available public buildings in the slum (i.e. mosques) and will be relocated to formal buildings such as a community centre when the slum has been redeveloped. The availability of this service will make the citizens feel at ease and smoothen the overall transitional process from slums to developed neighbourhood.

3c – Infrastructure and local amenities

The infrastructure that the NGO will be involved in will include primary infrastructure adapted to benefit the needs of slum residents (i.e. wide roads, communal areas, etc.),

secondary infrastructure, that is all of the modern networks such as internet and telephone networks, and last but not least the NGO will provide in the planning of local amenities, that include public building and spaces, such as schools, libraries, pharmacies, polyclinics, community centres, youth centres, sport centres, shopping centres, mosques, bathhouses and parks. These amenities are essential, as they form the very foundation of modern, urban society, as opposed the lacking amenities currently available in the slums.

3d – New dwellings

The new dwellings provided to the slum residents will be designed in close cooperation with the slum residents. From the first phases on, the residents will be involved in the design process of the architect. The residents will first have a community meeting with the NGO, through which the ideas of the slum residents will be bundled and infeasible ideas scrapped. Distilled ideas will in turn be communicated to the architects involved with the project, who will create design plans based on the input from the citizens. These plans will be reviewed by the slum dwellers in a follow-up meeting with the NGO and suggestions will again be communicated to the architect. This process will repeat itself for about 4 times during the development cycle, so as to create the best plans for the citizens. The final number of plans will be around 5 different types of dwellings, with additional internal modifications possible up to 3 months before construction starts (e.g. removing a structurally insignificant wall, or adding kitchen appliances at an extra cost).

Project execution

AFTER realizing all the components of the preliminary measures the project will move on to its execution phase. Prior to the execution of the project however, citizens will still have room to change their dwelling type (out of ± 5 types) up to 5 months before the execution starts, and to request small internal modifications and additions (e.g. optional climate control, separation of bedrooms, etc.) up to 3 months before construction starts. These options will allow for maximum, feasible agreeability amongst the citizens with regards to resettlement.

The dwellings that will be built as part of the development process will be built at the same location as the slums were located as much as possible. The reason for this is that slum dwellers will retain their old social ties, the same distance to work and perhaps most important of all, a similar living environment (in terms of access to amenities in surrounding neighbourhoods). An additional advantage of on-site development, is that there will be no vacant places left in the city centre, which will inhibit new slums from originating, due to careless management. This will also prevent the vacant land from being exploited by those seeking profit through land speculation, as is the case with similar vacant spaces in the city. This will ensure a cohesive city space on all grounds.

During the time that the slums are demolished to make place for the new housing estate, and the actual construction of these houses, the slum residents must be provided with shelter. The arrangement of this shelter will for a large part be the responsibility of the Ministry of Housing, as they will have to provide for decent temporary housing, which can be located at the outskirts of the city or in most extreme cases, other towns or municipalities belonging to the region of Grand Casablanca (in these cases slum residents will be assisted with adequate subsidies, so as to compensate for the inconvenience). The housing that will be used as temporary dwellings, will be made using prefab-materials and are reminiscent of those used after disasters (see figure 3.9). These houses have proved to be quickly buildable (in less than two months), and lasting, since they are still used six years after the disaster.



Figure 3.9: Temporary housing in Fukushima, Japan after the tsunami of 2011
Source: Fukushima On The Globe

In this stage of the process the NGO will primarily ensure smooth communication between executive stakeholders and provide for sufficient information regarding the development during construction to the citizens. As mentioned before, physically capable youngsters will be invited to participate in the construction process in exchange for monetary compensation and on-site training, which will open up new possibilities in their future working career. This process will entirely be in compliance with applicable guidelines as defined by the government, as they will be the end-responsible of the project and the NGO also works as an entity below the government and must therefore adhere to its wishes to reasonable extent.

After resettlement

THE NGO continues to be involved with slum development far after the execution of the resettlement. A term commonly used in the service sector for the type of

activities that occur after services have been delivered, is ‘aftercare’. To adhere to this word, the NGO will aim to provide the best of assistance after resettlement of the slum dwellers, helping them to settle in their new living environment and assisting with any ‘homesickness’ former slum dwellers may experience. Follow-up surveys will be issued, so as to gain a grasp of how the slum residents are feeling about the resettlement and what improvements can be made in the resettlement process or their new dwellings. These surveys will be a reliable source of information for all stakeholders involved and will allow future slum developments to learn from and apply these lessons in practice.

Slum prevention

As mentioned earlier, redeveloped slums will be less susceptible to change into slums, as their citizens will have access to all necessary (financial) amenities in order to assist them in their lives as formal citizens, and more importantly they will have benefited greatly from the workshops and trainings given by the NGO, as they will now have the necessary skills including, but not limited to, job-hunting, legal affairs and a morally correct mindset. Crime rates will also significantly decrease as youngsters will have benefited, and are still benefiting, from the job opportunities created by the NGO (i.e. traineeships and construction work). Additionally, slum citizens will be less inclined to move to other shantytowns or contribute to their development, as they will have learned about the benefits that come with formal housing and are generally content with their new dwellings, as they do not face any immediate (financial) difficulties.

Any slums that are in their early stages of development will be put in check by the authorities, i.e. the local government, by means of a newly instigated surveillance team (see figure 3.10), consisting of law enforcement and special investigating officers belonging to the municipality. A strike system will be introduced, through which the surveillance team will issue two strikes (warnings) returning violators after which permanent removal will take place. The people who are subject to this extreme measure will have three weeks to leave their former residence and relocate to legal, alternative housing, that may be (temporarily) provided for by the government. This will purge newly originating slums and allow for a smoother development process further on, with the most unlawful slum dwellers already taken care of.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITIES




Figure 3.10: The responsibilities the government has in preventing slum development

In the meantime, the government will be constructing affordable housing at a large scale, so as to house the unceasing stream of rural migrants and other low-income groups migrating to the city. This stream can however be weakened by developing the rural communities themselves, so rural dwellers will gradually lose interest in moving to the city, as their own town has grown into a community that caters more to their needs, which must also be done through government backing.

Pamphlet and first meeting for slum dwellers

IN order to make sure the slum residents are well informed, a meeting is planned on 1 September 2017 at 06:00 PM in the local mosque. We also provide the slum dwellers with a pamphlet to inform them on the new strategy, their involvement and influence, and their possible role within the new NGO, as to make sure that all parties involved are aware of the changes that will take place in the near future. You can find the pamphlet in the appendix on page [139](#).

4 | Final considerations

4.1 Conclusion

In this thesis we have discussed the advantages and shortcomings of previous strategies, regarding slum eradication and the current strategy *Villes Sans Bidonvilles* (VSB). Through the lesson learned from these projects we proposed a new strategy. This strategy builds upon the legacy of Écochard's surveys by more actively collecting statistics on the slum dwellers, but also something Écochard did not do, to actually consider the ideas and suggestions of slum residents and directly involving said citizens in the discussions surrounding the development of the plans.

Moreover, the stance that citizenry and government have towards each other will be drastically changed through the introduction of an intermediate organisation. This organisation must however, not be part of the government, as citizens have a deeply engrained suspicion concerning government officials, which is the by-product of what many previous projects have brought along. In order to circumvent this, sometimes irrational, suspicion, a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) must take up the task of mediator between the two parties.

This NGO will however, not only facilitate smooth and transparent communication between the slum dwellers and government, but will also be involved in negotiations with other stakeholders, such as contractors, Parastatal Housing Companies and the Social Development Agency. One can compare the NGO to a linking station in which all communication from the different channels is bundled and delivered to the citizenry as an understandable and concise message that aims to target all layers of slum society. The same will happen the other way around; the NGO will relay the wishes and needs of the slum dwellers to the appropriate institution in such a way that the interests of the citizens are prioritized at all times. This means that the NGO is an organization primarily devoted to the needs of the citizenry, and will as such, aim for the best possible outcome for the slum dwellers, but all the while keeping the figures realistic and bearable for all stakeholders.

Clear communication at all times will have a satisfied slum population as a result. This means that citizens will be more willing to yield to the orders of the government, therefore making the entire process prior to the actual relocation a much smoother one,

without unnecessarily altercations. Before actually resettling the slum residents, clear rules must be made in order to prevent unpreferable behaviour from the slum resident side. These rules entail a clear contract in which not only penalizable behaviour is stated but also the sanctions that follow this behaviour are stated. This will force slum residents to behave appropriately as they know these sanctions will really take place, judging by what the NGO has done for them previously, as they have seen that they really do what they say.

Finally, new slum development will be prevented by means of thorough moral education through workshops, trainings and general discussions. This form of education includes, but is not limited to, training for job hunting, information sessions about legal matters and general civil etiquette. Following resettlement the NGO and other government entities, such as the police, will act as surveyors who look out for any illegal behaviour in the form of misconduct, strives between citizens and above all, the illegal modifications to the new dwellings, which will be penalized severely after multiple strikes, with in the worst case facing a removal from their house. To prevent new slums from originating, the old slums must first all be dealt with using a similar approach with the NGO, after which the government will focus on providing affordable housing for those who are less well off, with special focus on immigrants from rural areas. These dwellings must be provided under the same conditions as those that are applied on the dwellings given to the former slum dwellers. This means that they too will face severe punishments if they illegally modify their dwellings, thus limiting the risk of them performing such activities.

The research question this graduation project started with is *“Which strategy can be implemented to efficiently and permanently eradicate the bidonvilles and resettle their dwellers keeping the social, political, legal, economic and urban layers as well as the wishes of slum dwellers and government in mind?”* As discussed in more detail in the aforementioned a new strategy is developed that keeps all stakeholders in mind, especially the slum residents, thus answering the research question. Not only will the answer to this question, in the form of a detailed and structured new strategy elaborating on all the steps and the interconnected stakeholders, be a feasible strategy for Morocco, but it will also be applicable to similar situations elsewhere in the world.

4.2 Discussion

The lessons learned and the strategy introduced in this thesis are a good starting point for introducing a new approach with regards to tackling the slum problem in Morocco efficiently and successfully. As no two slums are the same and each have a unique and extensive psychological reasoning behind their existence, it is impermissible to apply a general strategy to these problems, as they will essentially have the opposite effect on the problem: discontent among slum dwellers will stay the same or even increase, making the future emergence of slums more likely.

A humane approach to the problem will equally benefit all parties. This is because in addition to the problem being solved, the overall situation of the slum dwellers will improve to such an extent as they will both have quarters that live up to standards, as well as recognition from the other social classes as regular citizens to whom the government does not turn a blind eye.

In order to achieve satisfying results for all parties involved using this humane, people-centric approach is a preconception that must not be neglected. This means thorough analysis and research of different slums are some of the necessities. Additionally, slum redevelopments taking place will be a source of information as well.

For future research, an in-depth research on the actual implementation of the strategy is recommended, to have an overview of what the slum residents think of their new dwelling (environment) and the overall resettlement process, among other things to conclude what improvements can be made in the resettlement process and/or the new dwellings of future projects. To stay ahead of any possible problems, surveys must be continuously performed after the resettlement of the dwellers as well to have an up-to-date medium of feedback. This will be of use for the realization of other plans and keep the NGO informed with real-time statistics and opinions

The process leading to this final report has been a long and educative one. Working on this project has made me not only learn a lot in the field of policy-making and building for the poor, but on a personal level as well. I love to read on current developments considering this topic and have found myself oftentimes getting lost in doing research. There is a never-ending amount of information available on this broad subject/topic, which made deciding what to focus on and being able to eventually translate my findings and thoughts accurately in an adequate strategy the hardest part for me. Looking back on the process and at the final result, I am pleased with how it all turned out.

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Appendix

1. Pamphlet

Maslahat alsukan

Maslahat alsukan (Residents' Interest) is the Non-Governmental Organisation established to oversee the process of eradicating slums and resettling you, the slum dwellers. The NGOs members are primarily comprised of former-government workers who are filtered through a selection process, assessing whether they possess the necessary commitment with and for you in a righteous way. Additionally, experts on slum environments, such as researchers from universities and students will be invited to cooperate with the permanent staff in order to propose a smoother workflow and increased participation of you in the project

A new, people-centred slum redevelopment strategy

Maslahat alsukan

July 31, 2017

The King has elevated the eradication of slum dwellings to priority status since 2001. As you know, many strategies have been implemented in the past, in order to provide dwellings for everyone to not have any citizens living in slums anymore. The last strategy introduced is the Villes Sans Bidonvilles Programme (VSBP) as announced by the King in 2004. The goal of these strategies has always been the same, providing the you, the slum residents, with new dwellings and permanently eradicating slums from the city. Unfortunately, there has never been an overall satisfaction on the process and the final results of these strategies from all parties involved. In particular, you, the residents of the insalubrious dwellings have stated certain dissatisfaction regarding the process and the dwellings. For this very reason, a new approach for this important project has been chosen. Since you are the people on whom the eradication of slums has a direct impact, a close cooperation with you is something the stakeholders strive for. In this pamphlet the new strategy will be described in short to inform you on the new developments and to have your attention for the first meetings with regards to this project.

One of the most important and striking points present at the moment, are a certain level of distrust from the slum residents towards the government and the lacking communication between the government and you. To prevent any distrust in the future and have a transparent communication between all parties involved, a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) has been established to take the role of mediator between all stakeholders and oversee the process of the slum eradication, to the resettlement of the residents and after the resettlement. The NGO will be sure to ensure all parties have an equivalent say in the process, without empowering one above the other. The sole goal of this new approach is to work in a people-centred way, beneficial to the success of the project, to prevent the same mistakes that occurred in the past and actually make use of the wishes and suggestions of the residents as well.

You and the NGO

There will also be a form of active recruitment within the NGO, with a particular focus on promising youth originating from the slums, as they have bright ideas and are experts in terms of life in the slums. These youth will receive a training in the form of a traineeship, meaning they will receive a formal salary for their contributions and get educated on the job. After completing the traineeship, those who performed well will be offered a (permanent) position at the NGO. The NGO will benefit from their knowledge through paid work, but will also train them in the field of development, design, administration, etc. for them to get a kickstart into their lives as working adults. Furthermore, physically capable youngsters will be invited to participate in the construction process in exchange for a salary and on-site training, which will open up new possibilities in their future working career. Additionally, the NGO will encourage civilians to cooperate with them, through discussions, workshops and trainings from which both parties benefit: the NGO will acquire new insights directly from you, and you will be able to take part in valuable trainings that will help you in your future, as part of the bigger civil community of Casablanca.

As stated before, the main task of the NGO will be to provide accessible and transparent information to all parties. There must however be a channel for you to inquire and consult when facing doubts or uneasiness regarding the programmes or their own future. This channel will be a taskforce directly accessible by you as it will be located in one of the already available public buildings in the slum (i.e. the mosque) and will be relocated to formal buildings such as a community centre when the slum has been redeveloped.

The new dwellings

The new dwellings provided will be designed in close cooperation with you as slum residents. From the first phases on, you will be involved in the design process of the architect. You will first have a community meeting with the NGO, through which your ideas will be bundled. Feasible ideas will in turn be communicated to the architects involved with the project, who will create design plans based on your input. These plans will be reviewed by you in a follow-up meeting with the NGO and suggestions will again be communicated to the architect. This process will repeat itself for about 4 times during the development cycle, so as to create the best plans for you. The final number of plans will be around 5 different types of dwellings, with additional internal modifications possible up to 3 months before construction starts (e.g. removing a structurally insignificant wall, or adding kitchen appliances at an extra cost).

The dwellings that will be built as part of the development process will be built at the same location as the slums were located as much as possible. This way you will retain your old social ties, the same distance to work and perhaps most important of all, a similar living environment (in terms of access to amenities in surrounding neighbourhoods).

During the time that the slums are demolished to make place for the new housing estate, and the actual construction of these houses, you will be provided with shelter. Decent temporary housing will be provided, preferably located at the outskirts of the city when temporarily resettlement in vicinity of the slum is not possible.

After resettlement and future slum prevention

The NGO continues to be involved with slum development far after the execution of the resettlement. The NGO will aim to provide the best of assistance after your resettlement, helping you to settle in your new living environment and assisting with any homesickness that may be experienced. Follow-up surveys will be issued, so as to gain a grasp of your thoughts on the resettlement and what improvements can be made in the resettlement process or your new dwellings. These surveys will also be a reliable source of information for all stakeholders involved and will allow future slum developments to learn from and apply these lessons in practice.

In the meantime, the government will be constructing affordable housing at a large scale to prevent new slums from arising. Additionally, any newly originating slums will be put in check by the authorities, in the form of a surveillance team that intervenes when necessary.

The first general meeting will take place on Friday 1 September at 06:00 PM in the local mosque, be sure to attend this meeting!

Abstract

SLUMS are an ever-appearing phenomenon in modern day cities. For the past centuries many different approaches have been developed to tackle this problem, but none have proved to be permanently successful. This very problem will be discussed in this thesis, by both looking at the fortes and the shortcomings of previous strategies, and building upon the successes these strategies brought along. First, a particular focus will be put on the strategies and plans of Écochard and his colleagues regarding the slums of Casablanca, Morocco, in the 50s and 60s of the last century. Second, the approaches developed after the independence of Morocco will be analysed, with the fundamental points of Écochard's strategy in mind. Our approach is threefold. Third, the current state of the slums of Casablanca will be explored, using both official data from stakeholders and the current main slum eradication program, *Villes Sans Bidonvilles*, as well as personal on-site experiences. These three components will be used as the cornerstone of a new strategy that seeks to permanently eliminate the slums in Casablanca and rehouse their former residents appropriately, with a particular focus on the implementation of said strategy in *Carrières Centrales*, one of the biggest of Casablanca's slums. The main guideline for this strategy will be the sentiments of the slum dwellers themselves, as they are the ones to whom this strategy is targeted, but have been continuously overlooked by those behind the drafting table. A newly established non-governmental organisation will be the driving force to ensure all stakeholders have the appropriate and necessary influence on the process.

Summary

SLUMS have been, and still are, for many countries a seemingly insolvable problem that has for many years demanded significant resources to be resolved temporarily, only to appear again as if they were never dealt with before.

This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that many of the strategies concerned with this problem are all similar to each other; they chiefly deal with the physical factors that are associated with slums, such as, but not limited to: quality of housing, social class of dwellers, mean income of households, etc.

It is however rarely characterised as an organic phenomenon, that contains many unpredictable variables that result in two cases never being the same. Stakeholders are mainly concerned about basic questions such as the amount of inhabitants and the state of housing, only to relocate slum dweller with little to no interaction with the slum dwellers themselves. A slum is however, characterised by those who live in it, as they have shaped the slum to its current state, without a formal plan or involvement of a city planner. It is shaped to the needs of those who live in it, and, due to the fact that people most often do not share the same needs, slums are characterised by a lawless, heterogeneous cityscape. This cityscape is reminiscent of an organic population, which is essentially what characterises them best. Therefore not only non-human factors such as housing situation and poverty, but humane factors, such as social participation and education of slum dwellers play a big role in slum development and manifestation. One must therefore look at both factors, physical and humane, while focussing on the humane factors in particular, which is oftentimes neglected in existing slum development strategies.

The new strategy introduced in this thesis therefore addresses both the relocation/development of slums to proper urban quarters, as well as the prevention of the emergence of new slums. Such a strategy is, in other words, a sustainable and humane approach to the elimination of slums. By replacing the conventional top-to-bottom power-structure with an organic structure consisting of the government and the citizenry, with an independent NGO connecting both parties. The NGO's duty is to continuously ensure a mutual, transparent, flow of information between both parties, and more importantly, to ensure that both parties respect one another's needs and wishes. The NGO acts as a mediator in the broadest sense of the word: they control whether information from

one side reaches the other, based on the merit of either side. This is entirely founded on the principle of mutual respect, as both sides must respect each other for anything to happen, which is the very basis of human interaction. To enforce this concept of mutual respect, the NGO has statutorily been given a monopoly on communication between the citizenry and all other parties involved. This allows the NGO to impose a sanction on a misbehaving party in the form an interruption of communication from one party, that behaves uncivilly, to another, that behaves civilly, causing development to be suspended until both parties behave civilly and respect each other's needs, thus being equally disadvantageous for both parties. It is therefore primarily a preventive measure than a reactive measure, so as to keep all parties in check and ensure unwavering progress of the slum development programme.

By implementing a strategy in which the needs of all parties are considered equally, but the well-being of the citizenry is prioritised at all times, one is able to instil a sense of involvement and recognition in the souls of the slum dweller's, who will in turn be more willing to adhere to the newly develop policies and pick up life as a regular metropolist. To achieve the latter, slum citizens will be actively involved in the development process, using regularly scheduled meetings, surveys and workshops that are targeted to all parts of society (including of course: women, elderly, physically impaired and children), as they are part of the bedrock of a community and must not be disregarded when educating an entire population.

The aforementioned measures will ensure the satisfaction and involvement of slum dwellers in the development of their future. The development of new slums at the hands of the citizenry themselves will be prevented by educating all layers of society, so as to provide everyone with a stable position in society (i.e. a permanent job and a secure future), removing the need to live in clandestine dwellings due to financial difficulties, a need that all slum dwellers have in common. Ultimately, the vestiges of former slums will disappear with the former slum dwellers enjoying a righteous life without financial worries, a healthy community and a secure future, as they will live in formal, modern, housing with the NGO at their disposal if any troubles would occur.