

MASTER

Negotiating with local communities in the lens of regulatory focus theory the case-study of an off-shore wind farm

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Marseille, September 2012

Negotiating with local communities in the lens of regulatory focus theory

The case-study of an off-shore wind farm

By:

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In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of


Master of Science

in Operations Management and Logistics

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Preface

The report you are about to read is the result of my graduation project in completion of the Master of Science degree in Operations Management and Logistics at the Eindhoven University of Technology, the Netherland and my engineering school Ecole Centrale Marseille, France. This report symbolizes the end of a very important phase in my life and the start of a new chapter. This research project has been carried out in collaboration with EDF Energies Nouvelle; it lasted from February 2012 till August 2012. I have conducted a challenging project from which I have learnt a lot. For this experience I would like to thank several people who supported me during the project.

First of all, I would like to thank my first supervisor: Sonja Rispens. Your critical reflection of my work and your insightful recommendations really inspired me during my project. Your patience and flexibility were also greatly appreciated even if I challenged it unintentionally by sending you the wrong version of the research proposal... Once again, my bad! It was always a pleasure to exchange with you especially thanks to your sense of humor and openness. In addition, I would like to express my gratitude to Josette Gevers, my second supervisor from TU/e. You have provided me with valuable, constructive feedback even though we did not have the opportunity to meet each other during the project.

From GPMM, I would like to thank Hervé Moine, first for supporting my effort and encouraging me to initiate my project in the direction of the negotiation with local community. Thank you also for your quick reaction after realizing that the first project would not be an option. I really appreciated how you introduced me to the different actors, facilitating the exchange with them, providing me with crucial information and offering me your unconditional trust. You are an enthusiastic coordinator who eagerly takes on new challenges arising at GPMM without losing the mythical spirit of Provence.

I also would like to thank Philippe Veyan from EDF, who accepted to collaborate with me and allowed me to assist him. You offered me your precious time in this complex context and helped me understand the behavior of each actor. I know that it was difficult for you to trust me but I hope that my advises will help you in the ongoing negotiations; hopefully we will soon have a wind farm in the large of Fos.

I would like to thank my parents and two brothers for always supporting me (both mentally and financially) and for making sure I would not forget other important aspects of life. Your love and the strength you kept giving me were very dear to me and I would have never managed to be who I am now without you. Thank you for bearing with my impatience, for listening to me, and for all the great times we had, have and will have together.

Abstract

In the complex environment of large projects involving multiple agents, project managers are more and more involved in negotiation with local communities. Recent research has already tried to investigate the role of regulatory focus in this kind of exchange but often limited its analysis to simulations involving students. Also, very few researchers have tried to look at regulatory focus in group context. This case study investigates how self-regulation impacts on the choice of a negotiation strategy from the perspective of the project management depending on the self and collective regulatory focus of the disputants and depending on their level of trust and entitativity. The data collection was realized through interviews, meetings observation, archives investigation and regulatory focus questionnaires. The study first confirmed two aspects of self-regulation and its relationship to negotiation: self-regulatory focus can be guessed by preparation and observation; and it does influence the choice of a strategy for negotiation. It also revealed that though it is possible to adapt to regulatory focus when the orientation is clear, when no preference was noticeable, versatility of behaviors and opinions represented a real impediment to the choice of a negotiation strategy. The results also pointed out the importance of two moderators: entitativity and trust. Finally, it was concluded that a more acceptable representation of the relationship between these notions was to use Pareto efficiency in a dynamic model rather than using a systemic view.

Key-words: negotiation, self-regulation, collective regulatory focus, trust, entitativity, local communities.

Executive summary

In the complex environment of large projects involving multiple agents, project managers are more and more involved in negotiation with local communities. Especially, recent renewable energies projects suggest a notable rise in the variety of actors, interests and stakeholders that sum up in the balance to create a source of numerous complications (Vajjhala, 2006). Indeed, it involves not only the investors and the company responsible for the project realization but also more challenging actors like the local community, the politicians such as the mayor, and sometimes even external groups of pressure like environmentalist NGOs. Each of those stakeholders has more or less distant objectives, constraints and interests. One can therefore easily imagine how conflicts can be generated from this interaction between the project management and the local community. The gap in interests on the one hand and the dynamics of the exchange leveling the non economic outcomes constitute a premise to the negotiation (Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2011). However, the choice of a negotiation strategy is not something decided on the spur of the moment, it needs to be wisely reflected upon based on different criteria. The approach needs indeed to be adjusted to the counterpart: choosing between a hardline negotiation –aggressive approach with rare concessions– or a softline one – softer approach with concessions aiming at facilitating the exchange (Hüffmeier et al, 2011). The management also needs to decide on a strategy based also on the level of concern chosen by the company, between the concern for their own selves and the concern for the disputant (Rahim, 2002). The interests in debate can therefore be either financial or socioemotional according to the concerns. Depending on those elements, the negotiation can either be oriented towards distribution, or win-lose contest, or towards integration, characterizing a win-win exchange.

Recent research has already tried to investigate the role of regulatory focus in this kind of exchange but often limited its analysis to simulations involving students. Self-regulation is defined as people's capacity for altering their behaviors in terms of flexibility and adaptability, which enables people to adjust their actions to social and situational demands (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). People's behavior is determined by an orientation towards either promotion or prevention which serve as opposed forces guiding the individual towards a preferred outcome. People who have a high promotion focus are oriented towards nurturance, action, accomplishment and advancement. On the opposite, people with prevention focus aim at protection, safety, and responsibilities (Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Cesario, & Scholer, 2008). Of course, one's orientation is never fixed and one is not categorically either promotion or

prevention oriented. The relationship to one's interests depends on the degree to which the experience of working toward a particular goal actually fits the characteristic regulatory focus of a person (Hoyle, 2010). Therefore, if understanding the personality of an opponent is necessary, knowing about his experiences is also of particular importance. Merging those two aspects gives access to the self-regulatory orientation which is bound to play a critical role in the negotiation considering its influence on persuasion process (Higgins et al, 2008).

The difference between self-regulation and collective regulation comes from the influence of group context which modifies the dynamics through entitativity which refers to the perception that a group of individuals really forms a group. It corresponds to the strength of the bonds that link the different members of a group to make it more compact (Lickel, Hamilton, Wierzchowska, Lewis, Sherman, & Uhles, 2000). The level of entitativity predicts the strength of those group phenomenon and as such, the more entitative a group is the easier it gets for the negotiator to form anticipation of the members' behavior because they share more group-relevant characteristics and are therefore more unified and more coherent. Considering those elements, it is easy to understand the importance of collective regulation and entitativity in the exchange occurring between the project management and the local communities.

In addition to those criteria, a negotiator must also take into account the influence of public trust. Indeed, recent research insists on the importance of trust and fair participatory decision making processes in order for the public to judge whether the decision really is fair and can be accepted (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2009). In particular, in this kind of project entailing conflicts associated with a significant danger of impasse, substantial tensions and low trust are typically observed between the conflicting parties, which in turn prevent the necessary mutual concessions to approach an agreement (Boyle & Lawler, 1991; Lawler, Ford, & Large, 1999).

The aim of this case study was to investigate how self-regulation impacts on the choice of a negotiation strategy from the perspective of the project management depending on the self and collective regulatory focus of the disputants and depending on their level of trust and entitativity. I proposed that the management based his negotiation according to its regulatory orientation depending on the strategy expected from the opponent. This strategy was supposed to be determined by the self-regulatory focus of the representatives, the collective regulatory focus of the associations and the level of perceived entitativity. The level of trust perceived

came as an additional element to decide on the strategy after having evaluated the expected approach of the locals.

The study first confirmed two aspects of self-regulation and its relationship to negotiation: self-regulatory focus can be guessed by preparation and observation; and it does influence the choice of a strategy for negotiation. It was indeed observed that promotion-oriented disputant willing to collaborate contributed to more efficient exchanges under integrative approach than prevention-oriented ones. Also, against promotion oriented disputants radically opposed to the project used patterns of communication displaying more eagerness and disruptive behavior, which as a consequence influenced the management to show less concern using compromise rather than integration. Against prevention-focused opponent opposed to the project, the management stuck to integrative behavior, willing to make an effort and show concern for the other party in order to switch the polarization of the debate. However, clear-cut characterization into promotion or prevention was not always possible. When no preference was noticeable, it was either due to a high score in both categories, which could be expressed by a sometime versatile behavior and changes of thoughts; or to a low score in both which resulted in a rather passive attitude. Those two types of orientation were the most difficult for the management to exchange with. **Managers should therefore look into the regulatory focus and negotiation literature to learn more about how to recognize the type of negotiators they are facing.** To do so, managers need to look closely into the context and history, read literature, and investigate on the actors themselves.

The results also point out the importance of two moderators: entitativity and trust. Collective regulatory focus was a first aspect influenced by entitativity because it was more or less observable by the behavior of the group when the entitativity was high after analyzing the context. On the other hand, when entitativity was low, another difficulty aroused because of the incoherency in the group. The negotiation strategy of the management followed the same behavior, losing its direction because of the confusion in the group of opponent. This lack of coherency resulted therefore in a lack of credibility. The management decided to follow the negotiation approach that resulted in the most collaborative disputants depending on their attitude, intentions and regulatory focus. This clearly illustrated how a negotiation strategy can shift from one to another depending on the evolution of the criteria studied. Rather than a factor, entitativity could therefore be qualified by a moderating role. **To achieve a successful negotiation with poorly entitative participants, a short preliminary attempt of two-timing negotiation with each pole of the group could be conducted after which the most**

promising strategy needs to be preferred to the other. But a requirement is to stay coherent and keep track of the evolution of the negotiation via a sort of feedback loop logic, using the same kind of negotiation evaluation grid that I utilized for example in order to keep control over the negotiation process.

Moreover, trust was identified as a particularly important moderator influencing the range of acceptable agreement for the different parties. **When managers understand this effect of trust on the whole perception, they can try to build or re-build trust in the disputant's side.** The company GPMM has already started this kind of approach in the project Fos 2XL, and they represent therefore an example that needs to be followed by the other companies in the region. **Another approach consists in gaining the trust of outsiders that belong to the network of the disputant.** Gaining the support of an NGO or any association that is supported and respected by the disputant can serve as a bridge to cross the gap between the two negotiators and enable integrative strategies.

I – Introduction

In the complex environment of large projects involving multiple agents, project managers are more and more involved in negotiation with local communities. Especially, recent renewable energies projects suggest a notable rise in the variety of actors, interests and stakeholders that sum up in the balance to create a source of numerous complications (Alker, Joy, Roberts, & Smith, 2000; Adams, Disberry, Hutchison, & Munjoma, 2001; Vajjhala, 2006). Indeed, it involves not only the investors and the company responsible for the project realization but also more challenging actors like the local community, the politicians such as the mayor, and sometimes even external groups of pressure like environmentalist NGOs (Otter & Kleis, 2009). Those stakeholders have more or less distant objectives, constraints and interests. One can therefore easily imagine how conflicts can be generated from this interaction between the project management and the local community. The gap in interests on the one hand and the dynamics of the exchange with the effect of group decision and negotiation on the other hand create a particularly complex equation. This study aims at understanding the choice of a negotiation strategy considering the various elements involved.

The project of renovation of the maritime port l'Estaque in Marseille (France) is an example of a high scale industrial project that begs the question of whether or not the conclusions reached in the context of intra-organizational matters are subject to a generalization to the inter-organizational sphere. This kind of projects raises the complexity to a higher level because of the diversity of actors, interests and goals, without the limiting frame of the organization and its hierarchy. The project's goal is enlarging the dike, renovating it, and giving it the needed size in order to be able to receive the largest Ferries. Another motivation for the project is to enhance the dynamism of the entire geographical area surrounding the port and strengthening the economic power of the city by creating more jobs and by developing tourism more. The potential return is therefore huge, and so are the financial investments provided by the stakeholders. The pressure on the team responsible for the realization of the project and its management is of proportional size. However, the other side of the story is the impact of the project on the life of the inhabitants and on the environment. Indeed, bringing in such a huge number of additional tourists would also mean increasing the density of population in Marseille, and thus potentially increasing problems like violence or pollution from which the citizens already suffer. As a matter of fact, the local community is united by a representative team which defends their concern for the preservation of their

region and of the local activity. The project management, therefore, has to interact with the local representatives in order to bring the project to its end. Unfortunately, the management failed to find the right strategy for negotiation; and as a consequence the project was frozen for an undetermined duration in January 2012 because of the pressure from politics and local communities opposing to the project.

Each of those stakeholders has more or less distant objectives, constraints and interests. One




Figure 1: Different actors, different goals

can therefore easily imagine how conflicts can be generated from this interaction between the project management and the local community. The gap in interests on the one hand and the dynamics of the exchange leveling the non economic outcomes constitute a premise to the negotiation (Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2011). A lot of studies have already focused on intra-organizational conflicts (Song, Xie, & Dyer, 2000; Jehn & Mannix, 2001; Gibson, Cooper, & Conger, 2009) but much fewer have tried to apply the findings it to inter-organizational contexts. To extend this view, a clear necessity is indeed to investigate

the consequences of a tension opposing parties that are bound neither by hierarchy nor by financial obligations. More precisely, the study will focus on how the project management interacts with the local community or its representatives through negotiations and problem-solving decisions in order for the project to be realized.

Because the effects of these matters have often been underestimated by private developers, conflicting opinions between these stakeholders have put a serious threat on the process in the early stages of developments and often led to stagnation (Bercovitch, 2008). The importance given to this kind of actors has therefore been rising lately. Major energy facilities are no more only sited based on technical considerations using a “decide-announce-defend” approach; rather, as more and more projects were delayed or cancelled because of public opposition, stakeholder participation and early citizen involvement have become cornerstones of such high scale projects (Vajjhala, 2006). Therefore, the dynamics of the negotiation processes and the consequences of these interactions create a growing need for more research in this field. The key to the resolution of such conflicts lies in how to cross these different interests through mediation and negotiation in order to avoid ending up in an impasse. In this logic, the need to understand which aspects influence public acceptance is primordial. In particular, while the basis of the argumentation of the investor is financial it is also important for the management to consider the public and environmentalists’ fear of change in alignment with the tendency for protection and prevention (Rogers, 1975). This means that the actors have to play on two different grounds: a financial and a socioemotional one (Hüffmeier et al, 2011). This leads therefore to more intensive and more complex approach of negotiation to reach a satisfying agreement. As a matter of fact, the strategy chosen for the negotiation is critical. The approach needs indeed to be wisely adjusted to the counterpart: choosing between a hardline negotiation –aggressive approach with rare concessions– or a softline one – softer approach with concessions aiming at facilitating the exchange (Hüffmeier et al, 2011). Further, depending on the aggressiveness of his/her approach, the project might either advance in favor of the investors or be completely frozen.

Depending on the counterpart’s level of trust and personality, depending on the personality of the management and of course depending on what the goals pursued are, the choices made and the first approach will guide the negotiation towards either success or failure. Therefore, it will be important to focus on the moderators impacting on the choice of the strategy. One is whether or not the management and the stakeholders defending the project feel the need to

gain the trust of the public. Indeed, recent work insist on the importance of trust and fair participatory decision making processes in order for the public to judge whether the decision really is fair and can be accepted (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2009). In particular, in this kind of project entailing conflicts associated with a significant danger of impasse, substantial tensions and low trust are typically observed between the conflicting parties, which in turn prevent the necessary mutual concessions to approach an agreement (Boyle & Lawler, 1991; Lawler, Ford, & Large, 1999). Therefore it is important to examine how trust between the different stakeholders develops during the course of such a large scale project. Further, an area of investigation that comes as a necessity in early stages lays in the importance to understand how the mechanisms of individual and group persuasion are articulated by the management. Indeed depending on how the person reacts in front of a certain argument, the chosen strategy will differ. Therefore, we need to know how an individual on the one hand and a group on the other hand reacts to the arguments proposed by the management; what needs to be taken into account both in the project and in its evaluation by the counterpart; and how this evaluation influences his/her behavior (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2008). This may indeed help the management to frame arguments in a more convincing way. For this purpose, I use the theories of self-regulation (Higgins & Crowe, 1997) and social identity (Tajfel, 1978) to understand how project management can influence the decision-making process of the opposing party (i.e. local community). Self regulation describes the tendency to either ensure the presence of positive outcomes (promotion focus) or the absence of negative outcomes (prevention focus). Social identity refers to the part of an individual's identity that is defined by or creates the link to the group he/she belongs to.

The aim of this study will therefore be to investigate how self-regulation impacts on the choice of a negotiation strategy from the perspective of the project management. It is indeed interesting to determine towards which strategy a management for example promotion oriented, will behave in front of the opposition usually prevention oriented. Also, if the management is prevention oriented, what will the influence of the upper sphere of the organization be towards both management's regulation focus and chosen strategy? As a matter of fact, how will the management choose to communicate their interest and goals to the opposition?

II - Theoretical background

What is negotiation? How is it used to solve conflicts? Which are the approaches and strategies available? Considering the complexity and large number of actors, what role do self-regulation and group dynamics play in the choice of this approach? Through this theoretical section, I will introduce the findings exposed in the recent literature to try to propose a model answering the above mentioned research questions.

II – a. Negotiation

Negotiation refers to a dynamic process in which individuals entertain social interactions in order to try to reach an agreement about an issue in dispute with the assumption that the parties involved are willing to communicate and to offer propositions and counter-propositions. The agreement occurs if and only if the offers made are accepted by all involved parties. It generally involves several key components including two or more parties, their interests, their personalities, the different alternatives, the process, and the negotiated outcomes (Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Neale & Northcraft, 1991).

A party to a negotiation comprises a person or a group of persons (Thompson, 1990). The scientific literature has addressed a lot of attention to two-party or dyadic negotiations, recent studies however, focused on negotiation occurring between higher numbers of individuals representing their own or others' issues. The greater the number of parties involved is the more complex and dynamic the negotiation process becomes and the more difficult it is to reach an agreement (Bazerman et al, 2000). The case studied here belongs to the multi-party category which makes it particularly interesting.

Preparing the negotiation

The research has shown that the historical, socio-cultural, economical and legal contexts determine the codes and conduct that frame both the expectations and the perception of what is permitted or not in the negotiation (Watkins, 2000). The perception of the actors is largely influenced by their previous experience and by the context; as such, negotiators are undoubtedly influenced by their previous bargaining experience.

In particular, the dimension of time represents a matter of serious importance. More precisely the negotiators need to identify whether it is a one-time negotiation or whether it follows a previous one and is expected to derive on future bargaining (Thompson, 2006). This has therefore consequences on the strategy to be chosen since it might for example incline investors towards making concessions. More importantly, the perception of time pressure has a significant influence on the negotiation through information processing strategies. De Dreu (2003) exposed this effect by the fact that for a same given amount of dedicated time for bargaining, negotiators feeling high levels of time pressure invested less attention to process information, proposed less developed and less persuasive arguments, and used more heuristics than those perceiving lower time pressure. This impeded as a matter of fact on the quality of the resulting outcomes of the negotiation.




Figure 2: Batnas and Zopa

Another important aspect of negotiations is to get a clear picture of the positions, interests, and goals of the involved parties. By focusing on the interests involved as opposed to the positions held, research suggests that more mutually satisfying solutions are possible (Lytle, Brett, & Shapiro, 1999). Moreover, the degree to which the interests of the parties are aligned can facilitate the negotiation. When the interests are somehow close, opportunities for resolution can be identified more easily. However, it does not mean that recognizing the degree of alignment is a simple task. Indeed, negotiation is also an art of information management where concealing ones interests can become a wise strategy (Thompson, 1998). It will therefore be interesting to analyze how parties initially present their goals in their strategy of communication.

Another challenge of the preliminary phase of negotiation is to estimate alternatives to the negotiation as well as degrees of satisfaction from the anticipated range of outcomes (Pinkley, Neale, & Benett, 1994). It is therefore important to know what the Batnas and Zopa of the involved parties are. The Best Alternatives To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNAs), describe the options left in case the negotiation fails. It helps the management to evaluate the best deal

and the walk away point, the first step is to determine. The Zone Of Potential Agreement (ZOPA) corresponds to the range in which a negotiation seems acceptable and more benefiting than going with the BATNAs (Jin & Geslin, 2009). These two requirements serve as a key to the selection of the negotiation strategy. Indeed the range of acceptable agreement was identified by researchers to be a moderator of negotiation because it tells participants how far they can actually push or concede, which helps them to level the aggressiveness of the negotiation (Hüffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2011). The better the BATNAs, the higher the negotiation power the actor has.

Determining the fitting negotiation strategy

While conflicts over other facilities are often connected to the agendas and activities of politics and or established environmental organizations, local opposition to is typically organized by ad hoc groups, consisting of neighbors and other people in the community, who feel that their local environment is being threatened. The management has to lever the interests of the local community that are the protection of their lifestyle and environment, and the interests of the investors who wants the project to be realized to generate a maximum return on investment (Khan, 2004). Different approaches are possible to solve this conflict.

Depending on the regulatory orientation, the personality and the motives, the negotiator can choose to show consideration only for his/her own objectives or to care also for what the other want to accomplish. Rahim (2002) propose a framework for solving conflict related to the way one places his interests regarding the interests of the other actor. Five behaviors can therefore be adopted as described in figure 3.




Figure 3: The Dual Concern Model of the Styles of Handling Interpersonal Conflict: adapted from Rahim (2002)

II – b Different factors influencing the choice for a strategy

The individual: Self-regulation

Regulatory focus

Self-regulation is defined as people’s capacity for altering their behaviors in terms of flexibility and adaptability, which enables people to adjust their actions to social and situational demands (Baumeister & Vohs, 2007). People’s behavior is determined by an orientation either towards promotion or prevention which serve as opposed forces guiding the individual towards a preferred outcome (Higgins (2002) (Higgins & Crowe, 1997). People who have a high promotion focus are oriented towards nurturance, action, accomplishment

and advancement (Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Cesario, & Scholer, 2008). It can be defined as a “get it no matter what” behavior. On the opposite, people with prevention focus aim at protection, safety, and responsibilities (Higgins, 2002; Higgins, Cesario, & Scholer, 2008). It can be described as a “play it safe” behavior. A person inclined towards prevention will focus on the prevention of negative outcomes. Of course, one’s orientation is never fixed and one is not categorically either promotion or prevention oriented. The relationship to one’s interest depends on the degree to which the experience of working toward a particular goal actually fits the characteristic regulatory focus of a person (Hoyle, 2010).

Is the management pushed towards promotion focus rather than prevention because of their role in the project?

Regulatory Fit

Regulatory focus theory also proposes that the individual will prefer certain strategic goal-seeking means that fit their regulatory focus because it brings them in a state of regulatory fit. This state describes a superficial satisfaction corresponding to the aspect of “feeling right” about an activity pursued that fits and do not disrupt their motivational orientation (Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, 2004; Higgins, Idson, et al., 2003).

More precisely, Higgins (2002) proposes that when an actor in a promotion focus pursues goals, he will prefer the use of eager strategic means of goal attainment, whereas an actor in a prevention focus will prefer the use of vigilant strategic means. *“Eager means are means that ensure the presence of positive outcomes (look for means of advancement) and ensure against the absence of positive outcomes (do not close off possible advancements). Vigilant means are means that ensure the absence of negative outcomes (be careful) and ensure against the presence of negative outcomes (avoid mistakes)”* (Higgins, Cesario, & Scholer, 2008, p. 445). For example, showing eagerness would be making sure the project is realized, even at the expense of additive costs and procedural engagement (e.g. environmental policies, engagement concerning the workforce...). Vigilance would consist in making sure that nothing goes wrong in the end, for instance making sure that the construction respects all norms and is 100 percent safe. To clarify this notion, we can take the example of a two customers shopping for clothes, one being prevention oriented and the other promotion focused. If the seller is being pushy, using eager means, like advising additional clothes that would look good on the customer, the promotion focused customer will “feel right” about it while the prevention focused one for whom the approach of the seller might seem too

aggressive will not feel right, which will affect the latter's motivation to buy clothes in the shop.

Which kind of means will the management use for the negotiation and in which category can they be classified?

Self regulation and its effects on persuasion

Cesario et al. (2004) and Lee and Aaker (2004) argued that regulatory fit theory can be used to support a persuasive appeal. They found that eager-framed arguments had a greater persuasive impact for promotion-focused than prevention-focused message recipients, whereas the reverse was true for vigilant-framed arguments. More recent literature has taken a deeper look into the relationship between regulatory fit theory and persuasion. The literature indeed makes the distinction between an experience of fit within the context of the persuasive message or out of it. An experience of fit actually raised by the situation discussed is referred to as integral fit and has indeed proved to lead to greater persuasion than a situation of non-fit (Cesario & Higgins, 2008). The management would therefore gain in considering the fit or non-fit of the messages addressed to the local community for their current project.

Moreover, regulatory fit in a previous or external situation also impacts on persuasion. This kind of experience is called incidental experiences of regulatory fit. It was proved to increase reliance on source expertise and decreased resistance to counter-persuasion, whereas incidental experiences of regulatory non-fit increased reliance on argument strength and increased resistance to counterpersuasion (Koenig, Cesario, Molden, Kosloff, & Higgins, 2009). Therefore, as explained in the section about the importance of context of the negotiation, for the management to frame a persuasive message, knowing the history of negotiation that occurred beforehand is important.

In the end, it is possible to make use of the regulatory focus theory especially by creating regulatory fit, by adapting the message and the way to frame it in order to align it with the recipient's regulatory orientation. Thus, regulatory fit has a positive effect on persuasion by: (i) making message recipients *feel right* during message reception; (ii) increasing recipients' strength of engagement with the message, which contributes to processing fluency; and (iii) influencing elaboration likelihood (Cesario, Higgins, & Scholer, Regulatory Fit and Persuasion: Basic Principles and Remaining Questions, 2008).

What would result from a confrontation between the management and the local community if their regulatory focuses differ?




Figure 4: Summary of regulatory orientation theory

Dealing with a group

The group

The management of the project as well as the members of a community is not defined as individuals but as part of a group. Therefore the self-regulation orientation cannot be considered distinctively of the influence of the organization, the project management has to adjust its self-regulatory orientation with the direction chosen by the organization. More precisely, even if the management has in mind that the prevention oriented local community should be addressed to with care; it could be the case that a promotion orientated organization does not root for the use of vigilant means rather for the use of eager means such as absence of notification and forceful planning. Hence, it is interesting to take a look at this interaction between the individual and the group to understand how they influence each other.

The two main theories governing group thinking are social identity (Tajfel, 1978) and self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). The social identity theory

explains that the individual's identity can be split in two parts: one that is characteristic of the individual's self and one that is characteristic of the group he/she belongs to. It is this group specific part referred to as social identity that defines the group's particularity and allows the characterization of members who share those traits as part of the group. The second theory derives from the social identity approach. It develops the idea of the depersonalization occurring as individuals assume that all the group members including themselves share the same values, ideas and inclinations which as a whole form the group norms. Individuals tend therefore to comply with group norms and to reject ideas that conflict with these collective beliefs.

From these initial theories, related notions were developed by researchers in order to extend the understanding of group dynamics. As such, entitativity refers to the perception that a group of individuals really forms a group. It corresponds to the strength of the bonds that link the different members of a group to make it more compact. A group of people waiting at a bus stop scores on entitativity around 3 while the members of a local environmental association score around 7.5 according to Lickel et al (2000). The more entitative a group is the easier it gets for the negotiator to form anticipation of the members' behavior because they share more group-relevant characteristics and are therefore more unified and more coherent. However, even in strongly entitative groups, individuals may strive for individuality in order to be considered as an important distinct member (Brewer, 1991). This competition between distinctiveness and inclusiveness is what leads to division into sub-groups with individuals influencing a majority and others influencing a minority.

Depending on the influence of the majority and the minority, the group decision is buffered toward different direction which can sometimes be misguided. Despite the level of expertise of its members, a group can be brought to take poor decisions depending on the level of conformity pressure and on the quality of the group processes. This phenomenon is referred to as groupthink (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998). In this respect, researchers have identified factors, like conformity pressure, time pressure and social identity, which influence positively this collective reality denial. In parallel to groupthink, the phenomenon of group polarization also takes an important place in the dynamics of sub-groups influence. It describes the extreme position taken by a group or a sub-group compared to the initial opinion of the group members (Myers & Lamm, 1976). Hogg, Turner and Davidson (1990) explain this phenomenon by the effect of self-categorization where the tendency of a group to differentiate itself from the others pushes it towards a more extreme ideal norm. High group identification

and entitativity will lead to strong conformity and strong differentiation from other groups, which will therefore increase the polarization phenomenon. These aspects play a big role in the group decision process.

Regulatory focus in group contexts

From the perspective developed above, it is therefore possible to extend the results from self-regulation to the group level via the notions of self-regulation and group polarization. In this approach, researchers define the notion of collective regulatory focus as the orientation towards promotion or prevention that drives the group members as part of their social identity (Shah, Brazeal, & Higgins, 2002; Faddegon, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2008). Thus in the same way as promotion, respectively prevention, focus inclined individuals' own choices towards accomplishment, respectively avoidance, the same influence is observed in group decision process. Collective regulatory focus predicts the behavior of a group depending on the inclination of its members towards either prevention or promotion. Faddegon also showed that the influence from the group members' own regulatory focus on the group's collective regulatory focus was even stronger in the case of high entitativity. We therefore have an influence both top-down and bottom-up between collective regulatory focus and self regulatory focus. The results obtained by Faddegon (2008) were however only obtained based on a study involving students, thus this paper will help to provide some generalization of those results to a more practical context. We can indeed imagine how important it is to consider the regulatory focus of ad hoc groups such as environmentalists and local communities in comparison to that of a group of students, for which it is easier to install a prevention or promotion orientation by giving them a particular task.

A particular group: local community

Depending on the approach chosen, the local community can be either ruled out or be considered as an active member of the project. While project developer often fail to involve the public in the crucial early stages of the planning process and the role this played in turning differences of opinion between the parties into a polarized conflict (Enzenberger, Fichtner, & Rentz, 2003; Khan, 2004), research has shown that it can have a decisive influence on the outcome of a project. This concern originates both from their legal rights and from the fact that people nowadays are more aware about environmental matters and better able to fight for their case (Khan, 2004). Planning strategies with the aim of hurrying through projects with a minimum of information and dialogue will be more and more difficult to pursue, and

developers will face the risk of being discredited. To evaluate to which degree the local community is involved, a ladder of citizen participation was constructed depending on the power given to them (Arnstein, 1967): figure 5.




Figure 5: Ladder of citizen participation (Arnstein, 1967)

Public trust is also important because the effective functioning of organizations in society depends on the extent to which people trust these organizations. Particularly in the context of modern technologies, public opinions and thus public acceptance depend all the more on the extent to which the public trusts the organizations involved in the issue (Siegrist & Cvetkovich, 2000). The level of trust at the beginning of the negotiation will also be determinant for the choice of a fitting strategy: in a context where no trust is possible it is difficult to concede a lot while higher trust will on the contrary extend the previously mentioned ZOPA. Indeed, recent work demonstrated the importance of trust and fair participatory decision making processes in order for the public to view the decision as being fair and to accept the decision (Terwel et al, 2009).

When examining organizational motives, two principal types of motives can be distinguished. *Public-serving motives* reflect organizational concern for public welfare and benefits of

people outside the organization (i.e., members of the general public). These are usually inferred when the company is an environmental NGO. *Organization serving* motives refer to a focus of the organization on economic gain and maximization of benefits for the organization itself and are often directly associated when mentioning industrial organizations (Forehand & Grier, 2003; Terwel et al, 2009). In this case, it can be the financial profit and the perspective of several opportunities for projects and partnership in the future. Terwel et al (2009) showed that the public judged more trustworthy environmental NGOs and explain it by the fact that they associate it with public motives. Therefore, we might be inclined to think that the local communities will distrust the investors in this project unless they gain the support of environmental NGOs. In a second study, the researchers also showed how important the discourse used by the organization was especially in terms of congruency and validity of the arguments communicated. Therefore, if an industrial firm wants to defend its project, it is often wiser to play on the economical ground. We can also imagine that if the environment comes to the center of attention, then partnership with NGOs and/or valid arguments that are congruent with the interest first announced might be a key of the negotiation.

II – c. Towards a model proposal

The strategy within a negotiation process refers to the approach negotiators select to pursue their objectives. The tactics designate more the tools and elements which when aggregated form the strategy: information sharing, misleading hints, financial pressuring. It also includes verbal and non-verbal behavior used for the purpose of convincing the counterpart during the negotiation (Thompson, 1990). It is important to know which strategy is more adapted for the negotiation, and the choice of the strategy depends on different aspects that need to be examined in the preparation of the negotiation. This paper's aim is to understand the role regulatory focus theory plays in it.

Choosing to defend ones' own interests first: distributive negotiation

Typically, when the actors do not see beyond their own interests, the literature refers to it as a fixed pie situation (Bazerman & Neal, 1992). The case of Frank Borman, president of Eastern

Airlines, illustrates such a situation¹. In late 1985, the airline was struggling through tough and trying economic times. Labor costs were a critical issue that Mr. Borman sought to address. Mr. Borman tossed an ultimatum at the three unions. Either they were to agree to give the airline hefty wage concessions or he would sell the airline. The unions first called bluff.

To add weight to his edict, Mr. Borman began to initiate talks with the ruthless Frank Lorenzo, an industry heavy weight who had previously crushed the unions at Continental airlines. This obviously made the union become jittery. What the unions and Lorenzo didn't know was that Mr. Borman was bluffing as he really didn't intend to sell the airline. Mr. Lorenzo submitted such a significant proposal to the Board of Directors of Eastern Airlines; they began to seriously look at the offer with considerable interest. The unions, in the meantime, began to re think their position. As the negotiations progressed, both the flight attendants' and pilots' unions agreed to a 20% wage claw back. However, the machinists' unions would only agree to a 15% slash in wages.

Borman didn't accept their position. They argued voraciously over the dispute 5%, and both of them took the position that if either side were to fail to make a concession over the disputed amount, the airline would be ruined. Neither accepted a consensus before the ominous deadline for Lorenzo's offer arrived. The Board of Directors for Eastern Airlines accepted Lorenzo's offer. As a result, Borman was tossed, and out of a job. In the bitter end that followed, Lorenzo forced huge wage cuts on the hapless unions and eliminated so many jobs that Eastern Airlines filed for bankruptcy in March of 1989.

In this kind of situation, when the interests of the parties involved are diametrically opposed, the negotiation is known as a distributive negotiation (Thompson, 1990). This strategy will be more aggressive, starving for a win-lose strategy, making no concessions and trying to gain satisfaction with no regards to the outcome on the counterpart's side. It uses the previously mentioned eager means in order to win the conflict. This might be a type of situation that managers would want to avoid because they often lead to open conflicts between the parties. This also begs the question of the choice made for the strategy of communication to expose the interests of the investors and grasp the interests of the local communities. It is indeed important to reflect on what perspectives and opportunities of consensus the management offers when addressing to the public.

¹ <http://www.negotiations.com/case/union-negotiation/>

In this type of negotiation, research has shown that hardline strategies lead to higher economic outcomes, whereas softline strategies lead to higher socioemotional outcomes (Hüffmeier et al, 2011). Depending on what needs to be achieved and what kind of relation the investors want to establish in the future with the local communities, the project management will have to adapt between these two strategies. In their meta-analysis, Hüffmeier et al (2011) prescribe to evaluate the risk and cost of impasse and to avoid choosing a softline strategy in the case those are high. Finally, the study reveals that hardline negotiators gain the highest economic outcomes when visual contact is possible, when the opposing party is male, when negotiators are instructed to maximize individual outcomes, and when they know the bargaining zone. Moreover, we have seen earlier that a promotion oriented group would lead to higher performance when using eager means.

Claiming and adding value: towards an integrative negotiation

When interests are neither purely opposed nor purely compatible, the negotiation is termed an integrative negotiation. It corresponds to a cooperative approach which will push towards information sharing and concessions made in order to reach a consensus. This is also referred to as a win-win strategy. This type of negotiation comprises the majority of conflict situations and typically involves more than one issue in contention (Lewicki, Saunders, & Barry, 2006). In such a situation, optimizing the solution involves not only compromising, but also creating value by increasing the amount of the resource in dispute. Creating value in this way is also known as expanding the pie. The solution to be reached in this scenario represents an integrative solution as both parties maximize the use of the renovated port according to their preferences. There might also appear possibilities of logrolling. This strategy infers that concessions are granted on issues that are less important to one party in exchange for concessions on issues that are of greater importance to the counterpart (Lewicki et al., 2001). Partly aligned interests also offer the opportunity to use integrative solutions called nonspecific compensation. This strategy allows for one party to achieve its objectives in exchange for a payoff that suits the needs of the party whose objectives are not directly met. Similarly, with the strategy of cost-cutting, one party achieves the outcomes it wants in exchange for a reduction of the other party's costs.

De Dreu et al (2000) also insisted on the fact that integrative negotiators are usually aiming for prosocial rather than egoistical goals. They are therefore usually classified by researcher in

the positive social interdependency category who engage in problem solving and try to reach high joint outcomes because they perceive that they can reach their goals if and only if the other individuals also reach their goals and, therefore, promote each other's efforts to achieve the goals (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). Among the outcomes hoped for, integrative negotiators give a high importance to trust and mutual association. For instance, if the aim of the project is to install a first facility that should be followed by the installation of multiple others, it is important to nurture those positive socioemotional outcomes. However, the research on integrative negotiation has been limited until now to school context which represents a serious limitation when studying procedures and processes of this type of negotiation (Johnson & Johnson, 2003). It also still requires some research in terms of framework and procedures in comparison to distributive negotiation.

To install the win-win atmosphere between the different counterparts, the actors need to fully understand the value they of the matter in dispute. If the project management knows the different component that constitute the value discussed with its counterpart, and more importantly if it is known what the counterpart values the most, project management will have a chance to use it to its advantage, by insisting on the specific aspect that really matters for the local community. Higgins (2002) described the three types of values that come in the balance when making a decision: (i) outcome value, (ii) value from fit, and (iii) value from proper means.

Outcome value is the first aspect that comes to mind when we try to evaluate something, because we first think in terms of result. The evaluation of the consequences depends on the perception and interpretation of the individual (Thaler, 1999). Then, value from fit describes the alignment between the strategy and objectives with the way the goals are getting reached. This notion results from the consistence between the goal and the means. It corresponds to the value induced by Regulatory Fit. Finally, value from proper means answers the question: are we doing things the right way? The evaluation of the value from proper means acts like a kind of justification of our actions: our actions are prescribed by pre-established rules and history. The management has to understand which aspects of value matter the most for the communities in order to align his message and propositions to their evaluation criteria.

Negotiation and all the aspects that relate to it are dynamic and evolve all along the relationship, and so is the value discussed in the game of bargaining. Each of the negotiators try to draw the outcome to his side by claiming value of what is proposed by his side while the other is doing the same exact thing in the opposite direction. At the same time, the value of the outcome evolves because in the process of the debate, some new aspects and new opportunities appear. In this come and go, shared interests and creative thinking of both actors trying to find an agreement, value is




Figure 6: Claim and creation of value

created, which at the same time enlarge the range of negotiation and get close to the optimized deal. This range of negotiation is depicted on figure6 by the surface delimited by the Pareto Frontier, which represents the highest level of value that could be reached if negotiators made perfect use and exchange of information in combination with the greatest use of creativity. For this creation of value to occur, it often requires an integrative orientation of the negotiation entailing a mutual gain. Ultimately, an ideal integrative negotiation would lead to the middle of the Pareto Frontier encircled on the figure. If the management chooses this direction for negotiation, we could imagine that the outcome would be profitable for both sides and might offer better negotiation opportunities for the later oncoming projects.

In the context of a large scale project involving a multitude of actors, we can therefore wonder how the regulatory focus of both the management and of the representatives for the local community influences the choice of a strategy. If for example the local communities are more prevention oriented, is it beneficial for the management to choose an integrative negotiation entailing long discussions, consensus making and maybe additional costs? On the contrary, what would follow a distributive negotiation considering the regulatory focus of each actor and the context of the project? Is it possible to navigate between the two strategies? In any case, how does the management chooses to communicate and more generally to negotiate with the local communities depending on each side's regulatory focus and depending on their concern for the other and for themselves?




Figure 7: model proposed for the choice of a strategy

I propose therefore the model presented in figure 7 as a possible way through which the negotiation strategy will be chosen by the project management under the influence of regulatory focus. I added the perceived level of entitativity and trust as additional moderator because I think their role in the decision taken cannot be undermined.

III - Case description

In January 2011, the French government decided to boost the efforts in renewable energies. On this initiative, it was decided to create off-shore wind farms. One of three big projects launched consist in the installation of a new type of windmill: a vertical axed floatable type. The project will be developed in the large of the Mediterranean Sea². A first test consisting in the installation of 13 windmills in the large of Fos-Sur-Mer near Marseille will serve as an example before launching a larger scale installation. Three heavy league industrials are in charge of the project: EDF NE, Eiffage and Technip. The company owning the technology is a dynamic start-up specialized in wind power. Two companies also act as coordinators: first an incubator which serves as a connection between the different industries when a project is developed in South of France, the Pôle PACA Mer; and second the company of the Maritime Port GPMM (Grand Port Maritime de Marseille) which is responsible for the different

² <http://paca.elus-ecologistes.fr/communiques/nos-communiques-2011/7191-eoliennes-flottantes-17012011/>

activities in the geographical area of Fos and the port. Note that my initial contact for this project was one of the project managers of GPMM; he serves as a coordinator between the different companies and me. In this particularly complex project, the negotiation between the different managers, which we will generalize as a management group; and the other actors is extremely interesting. Indeed, the area concerned brings opposing parties to the ground. The implication of the association of fishermen is unavoidable since the farm might have repercussions on their activity. However, this problem was partly solved by the port which delimited an area away from the roads taken by the boats according to what was explained to me by the project management of the GPMM. Moreover, environmentalists also oppose the project, stating that even if the aim is to enable the use of renewable energies, it might deteriorate both the sight and the environment. Finally, the local communities and mayors of the geographical area concerned are opposing to the project because the new project endangers their current lifestyle: one of the restaurants would need to be relocated or simply closed, and the large cables will need to go through the area in order to reach the facility. They also fear the risk due to magnetic fields as well as the inconvenience that could arise from having a wind farm of 100 windmills in the large of their sea. The local representatives also have a heavy weight in this climate of presidential elections which therefore hinders political pressures that represent not only a liability but also a real threat for the realization of the project. The management of the project needs to deal with the pressure of the investors while facing those various oppositions. Even if they benefit from the support of the government, they might need to negotiate with the different parties to avoid seeing the project being overly slowed down or even forced to abandonment. The strategy chosen to communicate their interests and to negotiate the terms of the development of the project will therefore be determining its success. Different approaches are available for the managing teams. By negotiating with the representatives and finding constructive agreements, the management could try to avoid strikes and movements of opposition that could slow down or end the project. Another approach would be to follow the directives of investors and of the hierarchy which means forcing the project without taking care of the opposition by simply justifying their action with the project being supported by the government.

In this project, we can therefore wonder how the regulatory focus of both the management and of the representatives for the local community influences the choice of a strategy. If for example the local communities are perceived as more prevention oriented, is it beneficial for

the management to choose an integrative negotiation entailing long discussions, consensus making and maybe additional costs? Also, how does the management chooses to communicate and more generally to negotiate with the local communities depending on each side's regulatory focus and depending on their concern for the other and for themselves? Finally, how can the project management evaluate its negotiation strategy taking into consideration not only regulatory focus but also entitativity and trust?

IV - Methodology

IV – a. General approach

I chose to use the case study methodology to examine the formulated research questions. A case study is a method of learning about a complex instance, based on a comprehensive understanding of that instance obtained through extensive description and analysis of that instance taken as a whole and in its context (Stake, 1995). This approach was appropriate because 1) the study was explanatory since it tried to answer to “how” questions; 2) I had little control over the events studied considering that it focused on the interaction between the project management and the local community; and 3) the study aimed at understanding what happens in real-life situations in a contemporary context rather than limiting it to the students of a university like it has often been done on this subject.

For the whole study, triangulation was utilized like prescribed by the literature on case study design. Triangulation in general means the multiple employment of various sources of data, observers, methods, and/or theories in investigations of the same phenomenon (Denzin, 1970). Here, I intend to use Data Triangulation, which entails gathering data through several sampling strategies, so that slices of data at different times and social situations, as well as on a variety of people, are gathered. Yin (1994) suggested three principles of data collection for case studies:

1. Use multiple sources of data
2. Create a case study database
3. Maintain a chain of evidence

The idea behind utilizing multiple sources of data is the triangulation of evidence. Triangulation increases the reliability of the data and the process of gathering it. See appendix for the different sources of evidence that can be used.

IV – b. Regulatory focus

The aim of this investigation was to determine the self and collective regulatory focus in order to compare it with the means and strategy chosen for the negotiation. In the perspective of assessment of the regulatory focus in order to evaluate the regulatory fit influence, I adapted a questionnaire mixing the regulatory focus questionnaire developed by Higgins et al (1996) and a list of proverbs corresponding to either promotion orientation or prevention orientation. This methodology was demonstrated by Stekelenburg (2006) in a study where she proposed the idea that people's motivation to participate in political protest stems from *self-regulation* mechanisms originating in a perceived threat to their needs, goals and values. She also investigated the influence of regulatory focus on the frame chosen by organization to communicate with protesters and the resulting persuasive appeal depending on its frame and on the people concerned. It was therefore interesting to use a similar approach since the case studied here also involved the relationship between organizations and local communities (even if the sample of the investigation was composed once again of students rather than companies and actual members of the local community protesting). However, the list of proverbs in our study needed to be adapted from it using the closest French translation possible of the English proverbs utilized. I also adapted the questionnaire developed by Higgins et al because the questions were originally addressed to students. If it did make sense to have one and only one question about the interviewee's childhood, having multiple question relative to the subject's parents and education seemed not logical, rather questioning about previous project did make more sense. The questionnaires were therefore introduced to the project management and the different actors of the negotiation (local community, mayors and partners when possible) after steering a description of the notions of regulatory focus and regulatory fit. More precisely, the contacts I had both in EDF and GMM were addressed a questionnaire after an interview, while the other actors for whom I had no certainty of answer were emailed the same questionnaires in addition to an introduction explaining why intentions and what I was trying to ascertain. When no answer was obtained from these additional actors, the opinion of the actors' regulatory focus perceived was asked to the project managers from EDF and GMM. It was then crossed with the analysis of the context to try to confirm the perceived orientation. The aim was to assess the regulatory focus of the management in general, as a trait, and if possible of the local communities.

Moreover, as mentioned right above, the analysis of the result from those questionnaires was coupled with the analysis of the context of the negotiation (antecedents, expectation and

general climate during the project). Reports, letters and PowerPoint presentation of previous consultation, protest and negotiation processes had been gathered by the project management of the maritime port in order to seize the climate of the discussion. I also investigated the frame chosen by the project management to address the local community in the press as well as in the letters of notification. It was interesting to analyze the way the press, as well as the blogs and websites of the different actors present the project reflecting the reaction of the public. This information enabled me to determine the collective regulatory focus and its origins by classifying the information under a table qualifying the data gathered either with promotion or prevention connotation. This helped me to grasp the regulatory focus as a state of the moment justified both by personality and context rather than as a trait.

In combination to the regulatory focus, I evaluated the entitativity using the measure developed by Spencer-Rodgers Williams, Hamilton, Peng, & Wang (2007) (see appendix 4). This scale was designed to capture individual differences in the tendency to perceive a particular social group as entitative. I was therefore interested here in the perceptions of people rather than the objective assessment of groups per se. This helped me to determine the importance given by the project management to the influence the group possesses on the actors in order to evaluate the way they interpreted the balance between the collective regulatory focus and the representatives own regulatory orientation. Since it aimed at grasping the “perceived” entitativity of the local group from the point of view of the project management, it was of much more use to include them in the guidelines of the interviews rather than sending it as a questionnaire.

IV – c. Negotiation strategy

For this aspect of the study as well, a triangulation between different sources was utilized. A first analysis of the different documentations and archive records available was needed: reports of debates and previous negotiations, historic of the area studied, agenda and study reports. This helped me to determine and understand the distribution for each actor of concern of self and concern for others.

An observation during meetings was used to confirm the orientation of the means used towards either vigilance or eagerness, which will help us determine whether there is a regulatory fit or not. Being the only judge, there was a high chance of missing important elements like behavioral evidence or certain key-words revealing the use of a particular tactic. Therefore, the meetings and debates were taped when allowed.

Interviews were conducted to evaluate the importance of the regulatory orientation on the choice of the strategy and the role of eventual other factors. These interviews were an important element of the study because they enabled a clear focus on the subject of interest and helped to reveal some causal links between behaviors and regulatory focuses. They were addressed to the project management from EDF who was responsible for the negotiation with the local communities, but also to project managers from the GMM which served as coordinator and were responsible for the various projects realized in Fos. I was also able to conduct the interview of one mayor and one representative of the region. To conduct these interviews which lasted 90 to 120 minutes, I used the prescription recommended by McCracken (1988). I reviewed analytical and cultural aspects through a semi-structured questionnaire prepared and adjusted according to the preliminary phone and email exchanged with the interviewees, and utilized probing techniques like the use of a recorder, when allowed, and by emailing supplementary questions for confirmation of the more fuzzy elements. I also sent the first draft of the report to the management and to my coordinator in order to ensure the validity of the description.

To identify and evaluate the negotiation strategy, I adapted a grading scale (Appendix 5) developed originally for the purpose of grading law students in a course of negotiation developed by Siegel and Fischer (1987). Though the educational intent did not match the business context in which I was conducting my study, I judged it well fitted because as a student, it was easier for me to evaluate a behavior based on a scale developed for students to understand their notation. Also, this scale had the advantage of focusing more on the process than on the results which was clearly more adapted to my analysis considering the short period of time during which I assisted the project management. Moreover, Siegel and Fischer developed the scale according to two criteria that were also well suited for my analysis: “(1) it contributes to an understanding of how a negotiator’s behavior relates to the process and result of a negotiation; and (2) it divides negotiation into manageable elements for analysis and grading by identifying units of negotiation behavior or of the negotiation process” (p.415). In addition to a separation into phases and categories of process, the scale makes use of opposite standards corresponding to either effective or ineffective negotiation characteristics. This separation that forces to make a choice between effective or ineffective made the evaluation clearer and helped to identify the areas of incongruence.

IV – d. Analytic strategy

Statistical robustness was not an absolute necessity in all case studies. Data analysis consisted of examining, categorizing, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence to address the initial propositions of a study (Yin, 1994). The analysis of case study was one of the least developed aspects of the case study methodology. The researcher needs to rely on experience and the literature to present the evidence in various ways, using various interpretations. Miles and Huberman (1984) suggested alternative analytic techniques of analysis in such situations, such as using arrays to display the data, creating displays, ordering the information. This had to be done in a way that would not bias the results.

Yin (1994) suggested that every investigation should have a general analytic strategy, so as to guide the decision regarding what will be analyzed and for what reason. He presented some possible analytic techniques: *pattern-matching*, *explanation-building*, and *time-series analysis*. In general, the analysis relied on the theoretical propositions that led to the case study. If theoretical propositions were not present, then the researcher could consider developing a descriptive framework around which the case study is organized.

Trochim (1989) considered pattern-matching as one of the most desirable strategies for analysis. This technique compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one. If the patterns match, the internal reliability of the study is enhanced. The actual comparison between the predicted and actual pattern might not have any quantitative criteria. The discretion of the researcher is therefore required for interpretations.

Explanation-building remained the most reasonable choice if pattern matching did not prove to be applicable. Time-series analysis was indeed more compromised because of the short period allocated to the study. On these bases, the data collected were summarized, classified and then served as input to the development of the explanations (Appendix 5 - 6 - 7).

V - Analysis

The first section of the analysis aims at summarizing the information gathered through preliminary interviews and archives consultations in order to better seize the atmosphere of the project. Indeed, I explained earlier that to determine the negotiation strategy, a precise investigation of the antecedent history and a description of the intentions is needed in order to get a better understanding of the atmosphere and the opportunities left for the choice of the strategy (Thompson, 2006).

V – a. A complicated context

A long history of contestations

The activity in area chosen for the project has always been related to the port of Marseille. In 1964, from a national effort to coastalize the iron and steel industry, and in order to reinforce the exchange between North and South of France, the region of Marseille was forced to boost its activities. Therefore, to avoid an overload of the city, it was decided to expand the port to the area of Fos-sur-Mer. 1971 embodies the beginning of the protestation with the election of the socialists to oppose to the




Figure 8: Axe of exchange North/South

uncontrolled industrialization, the state monopole of development and all the industrial risks caused by this empowerment of the activities in this region. The development of the industrial area quickly became a threat and source of fear for the environment and for the identity of the local population with for example the destruction of the antique bridge of Arles.

Previous projects in the area

After a 15 year-long period of economical struggle which followed the oil crisis, the region felt the need to promote the development of ports of distribution of containers along the South-North axis and thus at the same time the redevelopment of a stable energetic supply.

The region therefore started to bet on the development of a huge distribution port project called at first Distribport then Fos 2XL in order to match the expansion of this new market. They also started projects initiated by the national company for energy supply EDF-GDF. However those various projects quickly became another source of conflict between local communities and companies.

At the origins of the dissensions, 5 causes can be highlighted:

- Institutional complications: the concept of consolidated city–county was established between the 1970 and 2000 with no regards of the lifestyle and political incongruence.
- Incoherent estate planning that resulted in recurrent modifications and thus recurrent problems with the locals. In the same frame, it resulted in a lack of relations with the urban community of Marseille.
- Unsited and poorly developed road and infrastructure network
- Environmental protection of a lot of areas in the region chosen for the projects
- Protection of the lifestyle of locals and of public health.

As a consequence, massive contestations against the different projects started to rise among the population from local communities to environmental associations especially against the power station and the treatment of its wastes. The horizon of the project Fos 2XL was indeed still far. The citizens were not consulted for the installation of the power station of EDF-GDF in 2003. As a consequence, an even stronger feeling of rebellion started to rise. The strongest emblem of this movement of contestation was the refusal at 98% of the local referendum that questioned the construction of an incinerator to treat the wastes of Marseille. After this objection from the local communities, the project management for Fos 2XL began to change its approach and started a process of collaboration with the local communities in order to develop the region together with its inhabitants rather than facing them and creating a frustration that would result in the abandonment of the project as it occurred for the incinerator. The management understood that while the absence of dialogue was the source of failure in the previous project, the success of future projects in the region lies in the ability to federate the different actors and make use of the local intelligence to create compromising solutions.

This story explains therefore why the maritime port of Marseille which acts as a consultant and adviser for the project studied chose to advise an integrative approach. The atmosphere had indeed started to change after the effort from the port to engage a dialogue with the locals for Fos 2XL, giving therefore a push towards compromise and integrative development. From the point of view of industrials and companies aiming for projects in Fos-sur-Mer, the image given by the locals after analyzing such a history of conflicts and opposition closer a collective regulatory focus oriented towards prevention.




Figure 9: The rise of a fear from industrial development

It also illustrates how unified the locals are in their opposition which reveals a strong entitativity. As explained in the literature review section, an entitative group is characterized on the one hand by a higher power of decision and therefore of opposition, but also on the other hand by a more readable and easy to anticipate behavior. It is therefore important for the project management to be careful in the way they address to the representatives and even more importantly how they choose to convey their message, because a wrongly manage image of the project can easily lead to a phenomenon of what was described earlier as groupthink. As proven by the project of the incinerator, even if the project had positive intentions which were to improve the quality of life of the locals by getting rid of wastes, the opposition was absolute with a score of 98% to the referendum. Such a massive and unilateral

opposition illustrates how quickly the opinions in the population get polarized towards a unified decision.

Previous experiences of dialogues and discussions

The project management of EDF has already faced confrontations in the past as explained earlier. However, they had used a strategy of negotiation much closer to a dominating approach than in this project. In fact, even if the project management had the advantage of being aware and used to the opposition of the locals, they had never tried an approach of consultation and discussion. However, I had the opportunity to consult the archives of the projects of GPMM which gather the different types of correspondence and consultation means used for the development of previous projects. The choice of communication media is indeed important in negotiations and decision making processes (Purdy & Nye, 2000). Media richness which characterizes the amount of information that can be conveyed through a communication medium is dependent on the possibility to add in parallel to the core message other cues like the possibility to establish a personal presence and facilitate feedback or conveying emotions for example (Poole, Shannon, & DeSanctis, 1992).

Two types of exchange existed before 2004: official letters, and meetings. The advantage of official letters was the traceability of the exchange. Though the richness of this media is limited, it does not require a mutual effort, especially when the negotiation is difficult and the negotiators do not intend on sacrificing time for meetings and discussions. It was therefore particularly adapted to the quite frozen exchange between the parties. The meetings, much more rare before 2004, had the advantage of easing the discussion and enabled a better exchange as it was a face to face communication. Face-to-face communication conveys information more easily through both verbal and nonverbal communication but is much more time consuming (Purdy & Nye, 2000). Also, since the tension was high during the exchange, the animosity of some participants perturbed the exchange. This might be because the form and especially the label of meeting did not induce a compromising and knowledge sharing atmosphere. However this lack of frame was going to change.

In 2004, the signature of the “Pacte de Concertation pour la ZIP de Fos”-- a pact of consultation for the industrial port of Fos - was signed with the aim of formalizing the effort of collaboration instituted by the GPMM as explained in the historic of the region. The

development of the industrial area is from this point on managed more smoothly. The GPMM and the region which intervene in a lot of projects in this area have therefore been advising collaboration and discussion. On the public implication ladder (figure5), this corresponds to consultation. Of course it only counts as an advice and does not oblige EDF EN to do so. It is however wiser for a company willing to install a facility to follow their advice as they have already paved the way for a collaborative development.

V – b. The actors of the project

Project management

The management is shared by three companies, each responsible for a different aspect of the project. They communicate when needed but have no obligation towards each other except for making the project successful. In a nutshell, Nénuphar is responsible for the technical aspects, Technip is in charge of the construction and installation of the wind farm, and EDF EN has been given the role of the administrator. Therefore, my main interlocutor has been the three project managers of EDF EN since they were the ones, especially the chief manager, who exchanged with the contestants of the project. The other two companies were only contacted when data was needed in the discussion. As for the EDF EN team, the members of the staff



Figure 10: The three companies working on the project and their roles

were almost exclusively represented in their discussions with contestants by the chief manager.

The partners

A complex project like this one is almost never realized without the support of a solid network to serve as back up, advisers, and persuasive appeal. In the case studied here, the company possesses three partners of excellent quality. The first one is the region of PACA. Indeed, as EDF is only partially private, the



Figure 11: EDF energies nouvelles and its partners for the project

state plays a big part in its decisions. As a matter of fact, the project is supported by the government, more precisely by the pole created for the development of renewable energies called “IEED (Institut d'Excellence en Energies Décarbonées) France Energies Marines”. It has therefore partly contributed to the support given by the region. The latter rendered its support official after a vote in February 2011. The delegate of IEED also explained me that in association with its second partner Grand Port Maritime de Marseille and local industries specialized in energy; a comity dedicated to wind power was created in January 2012 in order to ease the development of the project. Finally a third partner is involved in the project which role comes in handy to help with environmentalist associations: Europe Ecologie, the political party dedicated to the environment, the equivalent of GroenLinks in Holland.

Here we can already clearly guess the collaborative approach chosen by EDF putting up front an image of environment friendly organization (with a green logo), supported not only by the ecologist political party (Europe Ecologie) and representatives of the region (Région PACA), but also by a company (Grand Port Maritime de Marseille) that has proven to aim for a co-development of Fos in respect of both the environment and the residents.

The disputants

The regional comity of fishermen was presented to me by the project management as an ad-hoc group with a vague hierarchy and very diverse members. Indeed, the installation of such a huge wind farm in the large of Fos was doomed to impede on the activity of local fishermen who fear a possible impact on the fauna. Also, in terms of logistics and organization, it requires some considerations of the areas utilized for net fishing and aquaculture.

Local associations gather Association de Défense et de Protection du Littoral du Golfe de Fos sur Mer, Collectif Anti Incinération de Port Saint-Louis-du-Rhône, FARE Sud, Mouvement Citoyens de tout Bord Golfe de Fos Environnement. They constitute a complex nest of ad-hoc groups, each of them with specific representation and specific interests, sometimes completely opposed. The amalgam formed by these disputants embodies the heart of the contestations. At stake here: the localization of the test phase; the potential visual impact from the coastline; the perturbation and possibly relocation of some activities (two restaurants and 3bars); and the development of a steering park in the large of Fos.

Those local associations have also summoned the help of much bigger organizations such as the NGO WWF which focuses on environmental protection. As explained earlier, the development of the industrial area of Fos is seen as a particular threat for environmentalists because of the numerous protected areas surrounding the site. Therefore the effort of the local environmentalist associations caught the attention of wider organizations. This represents a particularly difficult aspect of the project because of the paradox between the environment friendly effort of EDF, even supported by the political party Europe Ecologie, and the fierce opposition faced by the managers.

Finally, the ones that the project management referred to as the officials correspond to the mayors, of the cities concerned in some ways to the project for example because a cable cross their municipality. They protest separately without consulting each other; therefore they do not act as a group but correspond more to a category of actors though they are all part of the regional comity.

V – c. First approach, back up and message delivered

This aspect represents an important milestone for the negotiation. It was indeed important to gain the trust and stimulate the enthusiasm of mayors and local community. However, the

message was not sent through the right media. Indeed, the mayors concerned by the project were contacted directly only after the public announcement rather than prior to that. More precisely, the first message delivered was the publication of an article in La Provence³, the local newspaper, announcing the future revolutionary project. Of course, the reaction of the mayors was quick: after reading the news, they immediately contacted the company which explained that they were just about to plan a meeting with them in order to discuss the project. Unfortunately, the first impression was already tarnished. Even if the company had decided to choose an integrative style under the advice of the GPMM and after a preliminary analysis of the actors' distribution, the first message corresponded more to a distributive one. At least, considering the history of the region, this kind of announcement looked more like a dominating approach. Because of that, the preventive oriented mayors and local communities began to contest ferociously the project.

Thankfully, the management calmed the atmosphere and installed a climate of discussion, but the trust was still difficult to re-build. More importantly, they have benefited from the support of the region. As explained before, the locals and the mayors attached a lot of importance to the fact that the region kept the control of the different project. Nugent (2002) explained that depending on the situation, an intern conflict in a team can benefit from the intervention of the manager as a third party taking the role of either facilitating or arbitrating or non-intervention. The help of the region as a third part to facilitate the exchange can be seen as an extension of these conclusions. For the same reasons, the GPMM is entrusted with a crucial role as advisers for the project. Since they have already experienced this kind of conflicts and have witnessed the evolution of the general dialogue between industries and local communities around Fos-sur-Mer, the managers of GPMM can also act as a third party to coordinate and facilitate the exchanges between the companies and the community. As such, they reacted quickly after this first mistake and advised EDF EN to “act more smoothly” as explained by my contact at GPMM: in other terms, they advised them to adopt a more integrative approach and to avoid using eager means.

Finally, EDF EN has tried as well in its first approach, after the mistake explained, to show how environment friendly their intentions are. Indeed, the project is deeply inspired by the national effort called “Grenelle de l'Environnement” to turn the French energy production into a clean one. Notice as a matter of fact the logo of the branch of EDF responsible for the

³ <http://www.laprovence.com/article/economie-a-la-une/des-eoliennes-au-large-de-fos>

project, which is called Energies Nouvelles (EN) for new energies. The green color is here to remind the public of its effort to respect the environment. It can therefore be accounted as a preliminary attempt to gain the trust of the public.

In a nutshell, the company is promotion oriented but has decided to change its approach in reaction to the political incentives that favors green energies and thus shifted its strategy from eagerness to vigilance. The management explained me that both the history of the region, in particular the signature of the pact of 2004 between the different associations, the region and the industries, and the will to promote this new branch of the company were the top reasons motivating this new approach. Indeed, considering the delay taken by the country in terms of green energies compared to its neighbors like Germany or Norway, the potential opportunities, on short term with the ongoing projects, mid-term with this new one, and long term with the possibilities various possibilities a success could enable, represented an incredibly profitable economical niche. Consequently, the negotiations for this project would need to take into consideration that the trust relationship was particularly important as many other negotiations were going to follow these ones.

V – d. Impressions of the PM and the representatives after the first face to face meetings

The project management

The manager in chief of the project explained me from the start that his intentions were to discuss as much as possible with the different actors in order to find the best-fitting solutions. However, the manager of GPMM responsible for the exchange with EDF explained me that from his point of view, the approach from the PM of EDF was still too timid to create a real discussion. Indeed, from my own observation, I had the impression that approaching the PM of EDF was quite difficult. For instance, even if I was supported by a project manager of GPMM who was exchanging a lot with him, it was really difficult to gain his trust and obtain information from him. In particular, the answers provided to emails and voice mails were delayed by two weeks on average, often reacting only to reminders. The manager from GPMM explained to me that it was partly due to the secrecy surrounding any project in renewable energies, by fear of the competition, and partly due to the personality of the project

manager of EDF EN with whom it had taken about one year for him to attain a satisfying level of exchange. This comment caught my attention and motivated me to determine the regulatory focus of the manager of EDF in order to evaluate whether the negotiation would be affected by this aspect. Also, it is interesting to compare this personality trait to his regulatory orientation as regulatory focus depends on personality as much as it depends on experiences (Hoyle, 2010). As explained earlier, regulatory focus is related to experience in two ways, incidental experience and integrated fit (Koenig et al., 2009). As such since what matters is regulatory fit in opposition to non-fit, finding out his regulatory focus and comparing it with his personality tells us more about regulatory fit. I tried therefore during the first interview to investigate his previous experiences and the way he managed his exchanges with the other actors. According to him the communication was relatively good. Also he explained me that he felt really invested in a mission of importance in this project because he considers that for the wind farm to be built successfully, it was vital to exchange beforehand with the local community.

After our first meeting, I had him fill in the regulatory focus questionnaire. The result indicated a **regulatory focus score of +0.069** which corresponds to a rather neutral score, with a slight preference for promotion. We can therefore conclude from this that the chief manager is quite flexible in terms of regulatory fit and that he is able to adapt to the instructions given by the company. Whether he is successful or not and the effectiveness of the negotiation strategy will be discussed later.

Now, it is also important to analyze the first impression that could have been left to the project management from the different actors. As explained earlier, the first impression is critical for a negotiation (Thompson, 2006). As the PM had already met the disputants before my arrival, I could only evaluate it from the correlation between the descriptions the PM gave me from their first meeting and my own impressions after meeting them. The regulatory focus questionnaires were systematically handed in to the actors after the meetings. The answers were received by e-mail.

The partners

During my first meetings with the partners, among whom my contact and coordinator from the GPMM, I could notice the promotion orientation of almost all of the acting partners, except for the representative of the prefect of the region, who showed less enthusiasm during the discussions and seemed to analyze




Figure 12: RF scores, level of trust and entitativity of the partners

what was being explained more than expressing suggestions and his posture was not open to dialogue, looking at the table rather than at other actors. The regulatory focus questionnaires indicated a strong orientation towards promotion of the two advisors: the project manager from GPMM (**+1.069**) and the project manager from Pôle Mer PACA (**+0.869**). The non-verbal communication patterns indicated more enthusiasm through the movement of hands, the distribution of the attention given to each participant and the variations of intonation. Those two organizations are part of the incubator of technologies in the region and can therefore be characterized with a certain level of entitativity even if they only share inter-organization relationships because they are associated in a lot of projects. Thanks to their status of advisors, a good level of trust has been installed with the PM of EDF EN.

The representative of Europe Ecology was also very optimistic and showed a lot of enthusiasm, she expressed great satisfaction of witnessing finally some real progress towards the respect of the “Grenelle”, the environmentalist pact. Her attitude showed a rather average level of trust with a balance between acknowledgement of the efforts of EDF towards green energy and at the same time some concerns for the localization because of all the protected areas. As long as EDF does not overstep the regulations imposed for natural parks, they benefit from their full support. Her regulatory focus score was not as high as the one of the advisors but still positively oriented towards promotion (**+0.384**). In terms of entitativity, the party is really cohesive and its members share the values that unify them under the color of Europe Ecology.

As for the assistant of the prefect who represented the region PACA, he was more distant so it was more difficult to guess a regulatory focus from his side. The regulatory questionnaire indicated a preference for prevention (-0.292). The collective regulatory focus could however not be estimated but from the impression I had of official documents and dialogues, some dissensions could be observed, indicating a rather medium level of entitativity.

The disputants

The fishermen

According to the manager and his colleague, the association of fishermen was **one of the most difficult to evaluate**. Five representatives came to the meeting when I was present. They could be described as an aggregate of antagonist characters with 2 of them extremely conservative and the others on the contrary very modern. The conservatives were quite hostile and stuck to their position without wanting to make any step in favor of EDF EN. They adopted a rather dominating approach sometimes going as far as to refuse dialogue and other times expressing anger over concrete arguments. They kept displaying their emotions of frustration and sometimes anger in their gesture hammering the pen, hand or pile of papers on the table and even at one point stomping the foot on the floor. To sum up, they were not very inclined to make concessions and were even reluctant to discuss. The modern ones are on the contrary very open to dialogue, accept to think about the propositions made and even propose solutions themselves. The first impression I had when meeting them somehow confirmed this description with some of them being more willing to discuss. The opposition between the personalities could be observed when they sometimes argued among themselves after that a proposition was made. They illustrated their arguments with the tendencies and recent figures that proved the threat embodied by industries. However they did not want to acknowledge the environmental friendly intentions of EDF. On the contrary, the modern members were less doubtful and showed some hope in this project, willing to give a chance to EDF on the condition that they did ensure the involvement of the fishermen in the project decisions and accept to work together with them to find solutions acceptable for their lobby. To compare their attitude to that of their colleagues, they showed open hands nodding and smiling at some propositions and explanations, as proof of their good will and openness to discussion. Four of them accepted to fill in the regulatory focus questionnaire developed, but only three actually sent it back. The results characterized one modern fisherman as slightly promotion oriented

(+0.169) with a high score on both prevention and promotion which may explain his strong versatility, another modern as slightly prevention oriented (-0.092) with medium score on both orientations, and one conservative as promotion oriented (+0.415). In terms of entitativity, it could be perceived that the group was split in two but still unified by shared values and a strong belief in their cause, characterizing therefore a rather **low entitativity**. This heterogeneity among a group where values take such a large place is particularly disturbing because the general message conveyed is clear but the attitudes towards the interlocutor varies from an extreme to the other. If entitativity was a notion that could be divided into specific aspects of the group then it would be described as high in terms of values, codes and norms, but low in terms of flexibility and protectionism. As a consequence of this chiasmic structure, the collective focus seemed less evident, because the general message was not clear either. Some of them were trying to “play it safe” and to stay vigilant preferring discussion while others seemed ready using eager means. More precisely, this variety of regulatory focus could be felt in both sides. Among conservative fishermen, one of them was threatening of using strikes and demonstrations in the whole region, attitude characterizing a promotion focus, while others were refusing discussion – “it is completely useless to try to discuss with you, you don’t understand us, you don’t know what being a fisherman means” or reminding the project management of the risks for their lifestyle and their traditions – “do you imagine what it means for us if you start building on the sea? The only thing that should be set on a sea is a boat and nothing else!”. Among the modern ones, while some were proposing alternatives and compromising solutions, showing therefore a promotion oriented attitude others were also insisting on the risks for the environment, insisting on conditions that needed to be respected, displaying their preference for prevention – “What certainty do can you provide us with concerning the disruption of the fauna? We do not know enough about the consequences on life of the magnetic fields induced. Also in period of strong winds, it would not be impossible to assist to a collision between a boat and a wind mill that would have drifted from its original position, would it? Could you ensure that it cannot happen?”. Therefore, due to this low entitativity and the disparities in terms of regulatory focus, **collective regulatory focus was rather neutral**, neither in preference of promotion nor in preference of prevention. The visit of their website did not indicate supplementary information on this aspect. In terms of trust, as explained, **the level of trust was rather low**, with a lot of doubts emitted except for the modern promotion oriented members.

The officials

The second group that I had the chance to meet was composed of the president, the vice-president and the secretary of SAN Ouest, a comity of mayors and prefects administrating intercity projects. Among them, the vice-president was the one who reacted fiercely after the mistake of EDF in its first approach message with the article in the newspaper being published before any discussion. He was concerned especially by the large underground cable which was going to cross his city where the roads had just been renovated. At first he was radically opposed to it and appeared really inflexible, raising the arms in the air and pointing the finger at both the figures and the project manager. He started to loosen his position as the discussion advanced but was **not completely trustful**. As a matter of fact, his regulatory focus only slightly inclined towards prevention (**-0.062**) can probably explain his no-loss and vigilant attitude with still a slight tendency to react vehemently if he feels threatened – as he did after discovering the article in *La Provence*. The president and the secretary were however more proactive and more focused on the long term outcome, insisting on the need to make the project beneficial to the residents in terms of taxes and commodities, using what could be described as approach strategic means. They were nonetheless vigilant concerning the process and means used by the company to communicate and insisted on the need for a well thought planning phase. The president had a regulatory focus inclined towards promotion (**+0.269**). He also described the rest of the members of SAN Ouest to be quite enthusiast about this project on the condition that the continuation of the project remained controlled, collaborative and well advertised in order to allow the community to fully understand what the different goals are and what is to be awaited. This reflects a collective regulatory focus oriented towards promotion, with a rather **medium level of entitativity** as we can see the slight difference in opinion between the president and vice-president. However, they both agree that trust needs to be built carefully, not only among the mayors but also among the population to avoid misunderstandings as it already happened. Also, based on the history of the region, they advised the company to carefully discuss with the environmentalist and residents associations in order to realize the project peacefully and to avoid the tensions that had been witnessed for other projects.

Local association of residents

Local associations of residents and environmentalists are also complex interlocutors as they have very peculiar motives. In terms of personalities, I noticed that the residents were doubtful at first and rather vigilant, but I had the impression that they were ready to discuss. At least, they expressed their firm intentions of “being part of the development rather than just being victim of it”. They intend to “fight for their rights and protect their region actively”. I met the representatives of two of those local associations. They explained me that they nurtured a profound attachment to their land and traditions, and that they intended on transmitting as much as possible this spirit to their children and grand-children. I also visited their website as well as blogs⁴ where I could find photos of demonstrations and sittings conducted by them in their fight against the methane facility project. I concluded from those elements that their level of **entitativity was rather high**, with a **collective regulatory focus oriented towards promotion**. Confirming the impressions I had from the presidents of those associations, their score in the regulatory focus questionnaire indicated a preference for promotion with a rather high score for the first one (+0.338) and a lower one for the second president (+0.069). As expected, their **level of trust was rather low**, even if they admit being extremely satisfied




Figure 13: RF scores, level of trust and entitativity of the disputants

with the approach chosen by EDF EN and their general motives. They still fear for their lifestyle and especially for the littoral and are still very doubtful about whether or not the landscape will be deteriorated by the presence of those windmills.

⁴ http://www.ecoforum.fr/associations/association_de_defense_de_protection_du_littoral_du_golfe_de_fos

The environmentalists

The last group that I met was a local association of environmentalists. Here again, I could feel a **high level of entitativity**, with a very cohesive group, in terms of both norms and values. Their very conservative arguments left few places for discussion, and they supported each element with regulations about protected natural parks or historical facts. It was therefore easier for the management to understand their point of view in comparison to the exchange made with the fishermen. The **collective regulatory focus was clearly prevention oriented** with an evident “play-it-safe” attitude, whispering among each other at some points to evaluate the information and requesting a lot of precision in the explanations. The president himself presented a very neutral self regulatory focus (+0.015) indicating that he was able to adapt to the strategy chosen by the group and at the same time that he was able to understand the management of EDF EN. He was however complaining about the attitude that the group EDF-GDF had dealt the conflict surrounding the methane industry during the last couple of years but he was ready to listen to the management of EDF EN since they seemed to have changed both their behavior towards environment and their approach towards the local communities. However he added that “though he was ready to listen to them, he was also standing firmly on his positions and was going to be very cautious about what was going to happen in the oncoming months and years”. This attitude between doubts and hope could be assimilated to a **medium level of trust** that also fitted the rather neutral RF score.

V – e. Evaluation of the negotiation strategy chosen and its efficiency

Using the grading scale as a support to define and evaluate qualitatively the negotiation strategy and efficiency of the actors, I noticed that strategies were sometimes intertwined and that actors often switched from one strategy to the other. The project management was alternating between integrating and compromising depending on the disputant. Against the local associations who were switching from distributive to compromising, with a slight promotion orientation according to the regulatory focus analysis, the PM often used integrating approach because he felt more room for discussion and joint profit. It was more an attempt to gain their trust and improve the exchange by showing concern. He used compromising approaches when he felt that an effort was needed in order to avoid deadlocks because no other possibility than a give-and-take solution was available. All in all, the

negotiation with the local communities were time consuming but advanced towards the right direction.

On the contrary, when opposed to the environmentalists, less flexible, prevention oriented and clearly in a distributive approach, he had fewer opportunities to use the integrating approach. The idea was to solve the issues with them to confirm their environment-friendly orientation in order to raise the level of trust among the local community, while avoiding to concede too much because he was conscious that the environmentalists had unrealistic goals and were too intransigent at some points. It was on those moments of deadlock risks that he chose to use the integrating approach in order to try to open a door and find a creative solution to solve the conflict. The set of acceptable agreements was more restricted than with the local communities but by using creative approaches, the management was able to open some rooms and extend the zone of acceptable agreement of each side.




Figure 14: Strategy chosen by the PM and disputants' characteristics

Unfortunately, I was not invited to participate in the negotiation between the project management and the mayors. The discussion I assisted to came only after and concerned a presentation of the onwards steps of the project. Combined with the details described by the project management and my coordinator from GPMM, I understood that the first approach

chosen was integrating, in order to counterbalance the mistake of the first message displayed. The shifts from compromising to the integrating approach and vice versa came afterwards when the management perceived that the ZOPA was more equilibrated. The shifts from integrating to compromising can be explained by the fact that as long as the ZOPA was equilibrated, the company started to show less concern for the officials and were more concerned by their own and their investor's interests. This shows that the management opted for a shift from softline to hardline strategy, maybe because the aim was not trust anymore but started to be more financially oriented. It would therefore not be surprising to see some shifts towards distributive strategy occasionally during the oncoming months.

Finally, the debate with the fishermen was more intriguing. As explained, because of the low entitativity of their group, if their interests were easy to grasp, their approach differed significantly from a representative to another. Therefore, it was more difficult to reach agreements since even among them they had trouble to express a well-organized message under the same voice. Strangely enough though, in the fisherman group, the general entitativity was low while the entitativity in sub-groups tended to be medium. As a consequence, I could notice that the management was playing on two levels depending on the sub-group concerned, adopting a softer line of negotiation with the moderns who were more inclined to collaborate but were still prevention-focused; and utilizing more eager means with the conservatives who were more collective-promotion-oriented. However, even splitting the negotiation strategy was not sufficient because in the end it was very difficult to find an agreement. In a way, the management was trying to shift the battle of power in order to let the fishermen fight among themselves. Unfortunately, their arguments and propositions started to lack consistency. Considering their low level of trust and the aloof, and even hostile, attitude of some of them, the management insisted on conveying their message to the modern ones who were slightly inclined towards compromise and even integration at some points.

At the end of my period of observation, the dynamics of the negotiation was in general progressing positively towards optimality. Though the Zopa was still far from reaching the Pareto frontier, a clear progress could be assessed according to the project management. A lot of efforts had born fruits in terms of trust and opportunity for creative integrative solutions. Among the measures taken, a Liaison Committee will follow the experimental phase to assess the impact on both the environment and the local activity. Financial compensations and a modification of the taxation will be prescribed for fishermen, local communities and environmental associations. A preferential effort will be made to create jobs for the locals and

the design of the wind farm will be harmonized with the nature. Other solutions are still in development and the negotiation is still ongoing. An important step will be the meeting that will gather all the involved actors around the table for a discussion to help the convergence of solutions and maybe identify possible logrolling opportunities and eventual integrating solutions that have not been found until now. The project management had planned this extraordinary summit for mid-July but due to different circumstances the meeting was adjourned to mid-September.

However, as explained in the description of the different choices of negotiation strategy available, if integrating has higher chances of reaching optimality, it can be quite costly. When asked about how he evaluates the advancement of the discussions and the effectiveness of the process in itself, the PM qualifies it of extremely positive despite the considerable laborious process of discussions and meetings with each actor separately. It was indeed excessively time consuming: 150 meetings in less than a year, which is around 3 meetings a week.

VI - Discussion and managerial implications

The aim of this case study was to investigate how self-regulation impacts on the choice of a negotiation strategy from the perspective of the project management depending on the self and collective regulatory focus of the disputants and depending on their level of trust and entitativity. I proposed that the management based his negotiation according to its regulatory orientation depending on the strategy expected from the opponent. This strategy was supposed to be determined by the self-regulatory focus of the representatives, the collective regulatory focus of the associations and the level of perceived entitativity. The level of trust perceived came as an additional element to decide on the strategy after having evaluated the expected approach of the locals.

A first interesting aspect of this study concerns the compatibility between observable behavior and self/collective regulatory focus. More exactly, it is interesting to analyze whether it is possible to guess the regulatory focus of a disputant based on two elements, what we know of his/her previous experiences in the context, and the attitude displayed during the first exchange, what we see. Most of the time, the combination between those two aspects did result in the right guess. Careful however, as explained all along the report, promotion

oriented does not mean in favor of the project. It is in term of approach that the disputant will show regulatory orientation. It was easy to notice a prevention behavior when even if the intentions of the interlocutor were to collaborate the process still took a lot of time because of hesitations, reformulations and expressions of doubts. On the other hand, a prevention focused interlocutor in a distributive approach fighting against the project would take fewer risks and proclaim fewer threats than a promotion oriented one. Still, some interlocutor would show some real versatility in their behavior which made the distinction much less evident. This description corresponds particularly well to the vice-president of the fishermen federation. The regulatory questionnaire revealed indeed a tendency to both prevention and promotion with a high score on both. We can conclude that regulatory focus is a good indicator of the possible approaches that can be taken by an opponent. The results of the negotiation suggest indeed that negotiating with a promotion-focused disputant willing to collaborate will provide a more efficient negotiation than with a prevention oriented one. On the contrary, negotiating with a promotion oriented negotiator opposed to the project and unwilling to collaborate will be more difficult to manage than a prevention-focused one because of the risks the opponent is willing to take. However the most difficult disputant is still characterized by a rather neutral regulatory focus, in particular if both promotion and prevention scores are high because it signifies that the opponent is susceptible to reverse the flow of the discussion and perturb the negotiator by changing of position. Nonetheless, it is possible after a thorough investigation and with a good sense of observation of the regulatory-focus specific behaviors to determine the regulatory tendency of the disputants, and possibly the orientation they will tend to choose for the negotiation. Aware of the regulator focus of the disputants, the project management has the opportunity to make use of it and to justify more wisely and more easily the choice of his strategy and negotiation tactics. Managers should therefore look into the regulatory focus and negotiation literature to learn more about how to recognize the type of negotiators they are facing.

This brings us once again to the importance of preparation. The negotiation grid displays in the category preparation the criterion opponent's personality, on which the management was lacking effort. The managers often forget to conduct research prior to the negotiation on the personality of the opponent, which is important as we explained the role it plays in regulatory focus. Guessing the regulatory focus, when possible, requires as explained above to know about both the personality and the context. If the context is accessible through archives, learning about the personality of the opponents requires an investigation among the network

in order to find out about their reputation (Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002; Thompson, 2006). This is a possibility at the same time to discover our own reputation, a point that the project manager was lacking because he seemed to not know what partners and disputants thought of him. A more thorough investigation would have informed him that some actors were more difficult to exchange with because of their very versatile personality, matching as explained a neutral regulatory orientation with high scores on both prevention and promotion. Moreover, a better investigation of the personality of the disputants as well as the reputation of the company among the disputant would have helped the project management to have a better control of their communication means, avoiding the initial mistake of the announcement of the project in the press before any preliminary discussion. By being prepared, the project management would have noticed the possible preventive inclination of the mayor concerned and would have chosen a softer line of communication. For future projects, an important element of preparation is therefore to investigate among networks, blogs and also the opinions of managers of previous projects in the same region in order to grasp a clear understanding of the actors and their personality.

Another important aspect revealed by this study concerns the link between regulatory focus and trust. This indirect link comes from the role played by past experience on regulatory focus. More exactly, this was referred to in the literature as incidental. It can be observed that the lack of trust exacerbates the behavioral manifestation of the regulatory focus. More precisely, it was possible to notice that a prevention oriented individual was more tempted to avoid risks and to avoid decisions. Likewise, a promotion oriented disputant acted more impulsively and was even more ready to take actions when protesting against the project. There is therefore a particular role played by trust in the negotiation process at different levels. Regulatory focus can therefore not be easily isolated from trust. This observation confirms the findings of Writz and Lwin (2009) explaining that trust mediates fairness perceptions on promotion-focused behaviors whereas privacy concern, assimilated in this study to lack of the lack of trust, mediates fairness perceptions on prevention-focused behaviors. As already mentioned in the theoretical background, fairness perception corresponds in regulatory focus theory to regulatory fit, which corresponds according to Cesario et al (2004) to "feeling right" about an event. Therefore, trust acts as a moderator of value perception through its role in the regulatory fit induced between the disputant's regulatory focus and the events. When managers understand this effect of trust on the whole perception, they can try to build or re-build trust in the disputant's side. The company GPMM

has already started this kind of approach in the project Fos 2XL, and they represent therefore an example that needs to be followed by the other companies in the region. Another approach consists in gaining the trust of outsiders that belong to the network of the disputant, like it was proposed by Terwel et al (2009). Gaining the support of an NGO or any association that is supported and respected by the disputant can serve as a bridge to cross the gap between the two negotiators and enable integrative strategies. Of course it might represent a source of new costs and complications depending on the NGO, the choice needs therefore to be well discussed among the managers and their network.

Another concern of the study was the role played by entitativity and collective regulatory focus. In other terms it begged the question of the relationship between the group and the individual in negotiation. How to adapt to a group with low entitativity and whom to address in this case? What influence does the group collective regulatory focus have on the individual depending on entitativity and which consequences does it have on the negotiation strategy? I noticed that without a doubt, negotiating with a group characterized with low entitativity was much more challenging for the project management, confirming the findings of Lickel et al (2000). Still, as explained in the theoretical section, low entitativity groups are less subject to group polarization, which also leaves room for a disputant specific approach, preferring a strategy for some members and utilizing a different approach for others. That is exactly what the management tried to achieve with the fishermen. This behavior where a sub-group is preferred for the negotiation to another according to its regulatory focus or to its openness to collaboration corresponds to another type of fit: interaction fit (Galinski, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 2005). Interaction fit concerns whether two interacting individuals need to be in the same set of mind, in other terms in the same regulatory focus, to increase social coordination and positive interpersonal consequences. According to some research, prevention focused individuals are more sensitive to the possibility of rejection (Ayduk et al., 2003), which could lead to greater perspective-taking, a sense of connectedness, and consideration of the other person's goals. However, on the contrary, some study proposed that two promotion-focused negotiators achieved more Pareto efficient agreements (Gatliniski et al, 2005; Cesario et al, 2004; Lee and Aaker, 2004). As discussed above, each regulatory focus has its own advantages depending on the position taken and the intentions of collaboration. Unfortunately, at some point, the management needs to choose between one of the two approaches and stick to it, otherwise the loss in consistency of the argumentation results in a loss of credibility, detrimental to the negotiation, as public trusts is particularly sensitive to

the congruency and consistency of the arguments delivered (Terwel et al, 2009). As a consequence, it is possible to imagine that to achieve a successful negotiation with this set of participants, a short preliminary attempt of two-timing negotiation with each pole of the group could be conducted after which the most promising strategy needs to be preferred to the other. However, an important requirement to this approach is to keep track of the evolution of the negotiation and keep a feedback loop logic, evaluating the criteria and guidelines of the negotiation strategies followed and maintain coherency. An evaluation scale similar to the one I utilized can therefore serve as a support to control the negotiation process.




Figure 15: Revised model

The last and most important topic concerns the adequacy of the model proposed with what the study revealed. Considering the results and implications just enounced, it seems necessary to modify some elements of it, more precisely to modify the role given to trust and entitativity. As explained, trust acts as a moderator of the perception of possible agreements in a more indirect role; it is a moderator of the influence of self-regulation on negotiation. Then,

entitativity acts as a moderator of the relationship between the group and the negotiation expected. As a consequence, on the contrary to the proposed model, the level of perceived is not introduced with a direct influence on the expected negotiation strategy but rather as a moderator influencing the relationship between the collective regulatory focus and the expected negotiation strategy.

However, considering that negotiation is a dynamic process, this systemic view of the model might be too simplistic or at least too reductive. It feels necessary to imagine a more flexible representation. The literature on negotiation proposes to evaluate negotiation in terms of Pareto efficiency (Hider, Prietula, & Weingart, 2000; Galinsky et al, 2005). The Pareto efficiency was developed by Tripp, T. M. & Sondak, H. (1992) and aims at evaluating the quality of a dyadic negotiation, in other terms the green area on figure 16 in comparison to the optimal area. Therefore, why not introducing regulatory orientation, trust and entitativity using the Pareto frame in the distribution of value between two negotiators or two groups of negotiators? More precisely, the considerations and conclusions induced can lead us to imagine an extension of the model of value claiming described by the negotiation literature by introducing dependant variables F, G and H, described below, that evolve with the independent variables self regulatory focus, collective regulatory focus, trust, entitativity and strategy, basically the input to be taken in consideration for a negotiation. Thanks to these variables, it might be possible to predict the evolution of a negotiation, or more precisely to characterize the efficiency of the exchange by situating the state of the negotiation in comparison to the Pareto frontier. For example, the figure 16 illustrates the case of a negotiator A, value on the abscissa, and a negotiator B, value on the ordinate. In the situation described, A is promotion oriented with a low score on prevention and a medium score on promotion; while B is slightly prevention oriented with a medium/high promotion orientation and a high prevention orientation. Also, B is very doubtful of A with a high level of entitativity, while A is trustful of B with a low level of entitativity. In terms of strategy, A is compromising while B is dominating. With this conditions established it is possible to evaluate the role of the different notions in the evolution of the Pareto efficiency in the process of the negotiation.

F: strength influencing the zone of acceptable agreement of each side. It corresponds to the effort of negotiation to enhance the value perceived by the opponent.

G: strength stretching the available zone delimited by the Pareto frontier. Corresponds to the effort required to change the mental state.

H: concern balance, depending on the strategies embraced by A and B. Corresponds to the shift in terms of concern for the other and for oneself.




Figure 16: Extension of the model: Value claiming and Pareto efficiency in the scope of regulatory focus theory in group context.

VII - Limitations

The first limitation concerns the reliability and rigor of the measure. While the methods utilized for the measurement of regulatory focus and entitativity, I failed to use a method to evaluate quantitatively the level of trust and the collective regulatory focus. While the literature needs to put more effort on the development of measurement methods specific to collective regulatory focus, researchers propose methods to evaluate quantitatively the level of trust (Terwel, Harinck, Ellemers, & Daamen, 2009). However, I focused on regulation focus and its role in negotiation with local communities which did not infer directly the quantitative measure of trust, which led me to consider that a qualitative evaluation of trust was sufficient. As for the use of a negotiation evaluation grid, it had the advantage of rendering the measure more rigorous, though the reliability of this method could not be proved in this study because I was the only observatory.

A second limitation that impacts directly on the evaluation of the validity of the model concerned the lack of numerical model as instrument to link the different inputs used to specify the negotiation strategy. The utilization of the usual structural equation modeling methods studied in the course Research Design, Data Collection and Analysis was not possible because the evaluations were mostly qualitative rather than quantitative. Also, the sample size itself did not permit the utilization of statistical tools like SPSS (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010), a quantitative analysis could be imagined in the future but this would imply the study of multiple cases or the investigation among all the members of the local associations rather than on the representatives. However, in the context and in the frame of this study, this option was not possible to hope for because of the lack of time and because of the scarcity of information revealed by individuals.

This leads us to a more practical limitation which concerns the particularity of the exercise of a real life case study. When conducting a real life study, it is difficult to control the direction taken by the project because not only the student but also the members of the company have to follow the hierarchical instructions and timeliness. This is the reason why literature on the design of case studies recommends a particular attention to the selection of the case out of a first set of various cases based on the criteria and conditions that were fixed by the preliminary theoretical analysis (Yin, 1994). In my case, the theoretical frame passed only barely the selection criteria; but as my set of choices was limited to three possible cases, with my initial choice having been abandoned in January, I was still satisfied with how well the project fitted my requirements. The problem lied in the fact that the negotiation had already started and that the decision concerning the strategy of negotiation depended too much on the company's instructions. Fortunately, since negotiation is a dynamic process that needs rethinking and changes in strategy, my analysis of this project was still justified so this did not represent a real hindrance, only a limitation in terms of instructions and timeliness. This last aspect was particularly difficult to handle, because time does play a big role in negotiation. Not being able to follow the negotiation from the beginning to its end represented a real impediment in the evaluation of the negotiation. If an evaluation of the process was achieved, an evaluation of the final outcome and agreement would have been a great added value to characterize the Pareto efficiency of the negotiation.

Last but not least, the main hindrance to this project on my side was the difficulty embodied by the realization of a master thesis in France. Indeed, due to the huge difference in educational system, I had a lot of trouble in obtaining the trust of the project management of

the company. Since I was hired neither as an employee nor as a trainee, the management was extremely unwilling to share information. I had to sign a moral engagement that did not convince them that I was ensuring the confidentiality of my study and that gave me access to a very limited part of the project and its information. If I wanted to have access to the information like a Dutch student does in the Netherlands, I needed to be hired as a trainee, which was completely unthinkable for the company because they did not acknowledge my master thesis as being an added value to the project as it was too theoretical. The final project in France is much more practical and the trainee's job is almost assimilated to that of a project manager, in the sense that the student works full-time on the project without any theoretical frame and the only objective is to prepare the student to the entry in the active world as an engineer. I had therefore to "fight my way in" by means of long exchanges with both my coordinator and the project management of the company.

VIII - Conclusions and future research

In conclusion, this case study has confirmed the important role that regulatory focus plays in the choice of a negotiation strategy against local communities. An important improvement in comparison to previous studies on this topic was both the real life context which showed that regulatory focus is not just a theoretical but also a practical and observable notion; and the attention given to local communities which have become more and more involved in large scale projects. As such, these projects represent the challenge of engaging the management in a very complex process that is multi-issue, and multi-agent negotiation.

First I noticed from my observation that preparation was indeed a key to negotiation. A thorough preliminary investigation can help the manager to understand the regulatory focus of the local communities by analyzing both the context and the opponents' personalities. A key element to this preparation is to understand the importance of reputation: the management's own reputation among the locals as well as the representatives' reputation. By crossing this information with the analysis of the context, the management can access to the regulatory focus of the disputants. However, this is not the end of the preparation. The management also needs to seize the level of entitativity in the groups of the opposition as well as their level of trust. Those two characteristics play the role of moderators of the influence of collective and self regulatory focus. The access to those additional inputs then enables the management to

estimate the expected negotiation strategy and therefore to characterize the potential sets of alternatives of the negotiation, in order to form a judgment on the Pareto efficiency, which is the evaluation of the attainable sets of agreement compared to the optimal set of agreements. This estimation will then lead the management to the choice of a strategy, depending on the collective and self regulatory focus of its members.

The second advantage of this study was the observance of the shifts in negotiation strategy that confirm the dynamic aspect of this exchange between the local communities and the management. This use of different strategy could be accounted to two aspects. First, it was possible to notice a change of interests pursued by the company's management when negotiating with the officials. The approach changed from a softline to a slightly harder line because the management decided to focus more on the economical interests of the investors rather than looking for socio emotional benefits. The second change in strategy was due to two complementary phenomena: the change of orientation in regulatory focus when the actor scores high on both prevention and promotion; and the low entitativity in the group of disputant that perturbs the perception of the debate. The complexity revealed by this possibility of change in strategy influences particularly the choice of communication patterns which as a consequence leaves the management with the risks of losing coherence and thus credibility.

Finally, the model proposed to explain the choice of a strategy was modified and led to the possibility of an extension to a more dynamic and less systemic view of the negotiation process integrating the roles of all four characteristics studied here: self regulatory focus, collective regulatory focus, entitativity and trust. To investigate this extension of the model as suggested in the discussion, future students or researchers could use simulation software like Vensim for example which was used in the course System Dynamics, though it stays in the systemic approach of the notions; or more advanced and negotiation specific simulation systems develop for multi-agent interactions. For example, in terms of mathematical and probabilistic models, recent research proposes the utilization of fuzzy logic rather than using game theory which is too simplistic (González, Espín, & Mazcorro, 2012). Fuzzy logic is a form of probabilistic logic which replaces fixed and exact truth by approximation. The use of this kind of models might therefore extend the reasoning of my study by creating simulation in order to avoid a case specific analysis. In addition to that, empirical research is still needed to extend and confirm the findings of negotiation research and regulatory focus in group context.

Appendix 1

*Overview of the different steps of the project*⁵

Phase 1

On floor trial of a first experimental windmill: project VERTIFL

Phase 2

Sea trial of a testing reproduction: project VERTIW

Project holder

Phase 1: NENUPHAR. Phase 2: TECH

Industrial partners

Phase 1: ALSTOM Hydro (Spain), CONVERTEAM (France) Phase 2: EDF EN, EDF R&D, Nénuphar, Converteam, Seal Engineering, Bureau Veri

Research partners

Phase 1 : ENSAM LILLE, TU DELF (Pays bas), Université du Pays Basque (Spain) Phase 2 : ENSAM Lille, ISITV,

Budget

Phase 1: 3,200 k€. Phase 2: 17 800 k

Public co-investment

Phase: Cofinanced in the frame of the program EUROGIA+ (EUREKA) Phase 2: Cofinanced in the frame of “AMI Energies Marines Renouvelables de l’AD”

Year of labeling

2009

Year of co-investment

Phase 1: 2010. Phase 2: 2011

⁵ <http://www.smartplanet.fr/smart-technology/eoliennes-flottantes-nenuphar-se-jette-a-l%E2%80%99eau-avec-le-projet-vertiwind-3315/>

Appendix 2

Source of Evidence	Strengths	Weaknesses
Documentation letters, memoranda, agendas, study reports, ...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> stable - repeated review unobtrusive - exist prior to case study exact - names etc. broad coverage - extended time span 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> retrievability - difficult biased selectivity reporting bias - reflects author bias access - may be blocked
Archival Records service records, maps, charts, lists of names, survey data, ...	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as above precise and quantitative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as above privacy might inhibit access
Interviews	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> targeted - focuses on case study topic insightful - provides perceived causal inferences 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> bias due to poor questions response bias incomplete recollection reflexivity - interviewee expresses what interviewer wants to hear
Direct Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> reality - covers events in real time contextual - covers event context 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> time-consuming selectivity - might miss facts reflexivity - observer's presence might cause change cost - observers need time
Participant Observation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as above insightful into interpersonal behavior 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Same as above bias due to investigator's actions
Physical Artifacts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> insightful into cultural features insightful into technical operations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> selectivity availability

Appendix 3

Overview of prevention and promotion items of RFQ-proverb

a - Where there's a will, there's a way =>

(Quand on veut on peut)

b - You never know what you can do until you try =>

(On ne peut pas savoir si on n'a pas essayé)

c - Prevention is better than cure =>

(Mieux vaut prévenir que guérir)

d - Don't skate on thin ice =>

(Ne joues pas avec le feu)

e - Broaden your horizons =>

(Cultive la diversité)

f - Discretion is the better part of valor =>

(Prudence est mère de sûreté)

g – Life is for living =>

(La vie vaut la peine d'être vécue)

h - A cat in gloves catches no mice =>

(Jamais chat emmitouflé ne prit souris)

i - A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush =>

(Un tiens vaut mieux que deux tu l'auras)

j - One swallow does not make a summer =>

(Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps)

k - If you're not in, you can't win =>

(Qui ne tente rien n'a rien)

Aside from these proverbs, the RFQ developed adapted from Higgins et al (2001) was answered.

- 1- Compared to most people, are you typically unable to get what you want out of life?

Comparativement à la plupart des gens, rencontrez-vous des difficultés à obtenir ce que vous voulez de votre vie ?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 2- Growing up, would you ever “cross the line” by doing things that your parents would not tolerate?

Dans votre jeunesse, vous arrivait-il de dépasser les limites fixées par vos parents?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 3- How often have you accomplished things that got you "psyched" to work even harder?

Avez-vous souvent réalisé des projets qui vous ont boosté et motivé à travailler plus dur encore ?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 4- Did you often get in conflict with your colleagues and superiors regarding projects and decisions?

Lors de précédents projets, vous arrivait-il d'entrer en conflit avec des collègues ou des supérieur au regard de certaines décisions?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 5- How close did you stick to the rules and regulations established by the company?

Jusqu'où suiviez-vous les règlementations et directives établies par l'entreprise ?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 6- During your previous projects, did you ever act in ways that your colleagues thought were objectionable?

Lors de précédents projets, vous est-il arrivé d'adopter des démarches que vos collègues désapprouvaient ?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 7- Do you often do well at different things that you try?

Réussissez-vous souvent dans différentes choses que vous entreprenez?

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 8- Not being careful enough has gotten me into trouble at times.

Un manque de vigilance m'a souvent amené à des difficultés.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 9- When it comes to achieving things that are important to me, I find that I don't perform as well as I ideally would like to do.

Quand il s'agit de projets importants pour moi, je ne me trouve pas aussi performant que je le souhaiterai idéalement.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

- 10- I feel like I have made progress toward being successful in my life.

Je considère que j'ai déjà beaucoup progressé & sur le chemin de la réussite.

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

11- I have found very few hobbies or activities in my life that capture my interest or motivate me to put effort into them.

J'ai trouvé très peu de passe-temps ou activités dans ma vie que capture mon intérêt ou

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

RFQ Scoring Key:

Promotion = [a + b + e + g + h + k + (6 - Q1) + Q3 + Q7 + (6 - Q9) + Q10 + (6 - Q11)] / 12

Prevention = [c + d + f + i + j + (6 - Q2) + (6 - Q4) + Q5 + (6 - Q6) + (6 - Q8)] / 10

RF = promotion - prevention

Appendix 4

Measure of Group Entitativity developed by Spencer-Rodgers et al (2007)

1. How cohesive is the group?
2. How important is the group to its members?
3. How organized is the group?
4. Overall, how similar are members of the group to each other?
5. To what extent do you think the members of the group feel that they are part of the group?
6. Some groups have the characteristics of a "group" more than others do. To what extent does this group qualify as a group?
7. Some groups possess a core personality; although there may be differences and similarities in their behaviors, underneath they are basically the same. To what extent does the group possess a core personality?
8. How variable are the behaviors of the group?
9. Some groups possess basic or fundamental qualities that do not seem to change much over time. Other groups possess qualities or characteristics that do change. How *changeable* are the characteristics of the group?
10. Some groups are conflicted; they are uncertain or unsure of their attitudes, values, and goals. Other groups' attitudes, values, and goals are definite and firm. How conflicted is the group?
11. To what extent is the group able to achieve its goals and make things happen (e.g., produce specific outcomes)?
12. Some groups are coherent; their attitudes, values, and goals seem to be harmonious and compatible. Other groups' attitudes, values, and goals seem to be incompatible or in disagreement. How coherent is the group?
13. Some groups' attitudes, values, and behaviors depend very much on where they are or who they are with. Other groups' attitudes, values, and behaviors are pretty much the same regardless of where they are or who they are with. How much do the attitudes, values, and behaviors of the group depend on where they are or who they are with?
14. Some groups have the characteristic of being distinctive or unique. That is, they do not share many qualities or characteristics with other groups. How distinctive is this group?

Appendix 5

Source	Type of info	Example	Conclusion deduced
Archives	Facts, figures, maps, records of letters and meetings	Historical ladder of crises in the region and maps showing the geographical changes with the implementation of industries.	Extension of the current and potential areas occupied by industries, endangering natural parks and residential areas. Justification of the prevention orientation
Phone call	Rhythm and volume of the conversation, tone of voice, acceptance to discuss subjects, duration of the call	Hastiness in tone, hesitations, silences, short phrasing	Unwillingness to discuss, probably showing prevention focus or lack of trust, the interlocutor might not be willing to cooperate
Interview	Verbal and non-verbal communication patterns	Long answers, waving and explicit movements of the hands, eye contact, variation of tone	Enthusiastic interlocutor, feels implicated and personally concerned by the project, probably promotion oriented
Observation	Verbal and non-verbal communication patterns, dynamics of the exchange, atmosphere of the negotiation	Hammering of the table, with the hand sometimes with the pen, violent circling of the area concerned, elevation of voice,	Probably promotion oriented, expressive and passionate interlocutor with high implication in the project
E-mail	Level of details in the answers, availability for further exchange, delay for answer	more than 1week of delay, short answers, no time to set a meeting in the near future	Probably prevention oriented, reluctant to share information and lack of trust
Questionnaire	1-5 scores on dedicated questions	A score of 3,7 on promotion and 2,5 on prevention, in comparison to another actor with 3,2 and 3,5	clear promotion focus for the first actor; no clear cut focus or slight prevention focus for the second one who can therefore sometimes display promotive sometimes preventive orientation

Appendix 6

I. PREPARATION			
EFFECTIVE		INEFFECTIVE	
A. knowledge of regulations		A. unsure of regulations	
B. prepared on demand figures		B. unprepared on demands	
1. estimates \$ ranges		1. misestimates/no estimates	
2. uses present value		2. fails to use	
C. knowledge of facts, regulations and history		C. unsure of facts, regulations and history	
1. assesses strong and weak		1. no assessment of strong and weak	
2. hypothesizes unknown		2. no hypotheses	
D. articulated goals/needs		D. vague goals/needs	
E. articulated theory		E. uncertain of theory	
F. clear arguments		F. weak arguments	
G. choice of strategy		G. no strategy	
1. issue		1. issue	
	a. relative power		a. unsure of strength
	b. zero/non-zero sum		b. no distinction
2. personalities		2. personalities	
	a. yours		a. no self-knowledge
	b. opponent's		b. no research
	c. client's		c. lacks rapport
3. type of negotiation		3. type of negotiation	
	a. subject matter		a. no distinctions
	b. norms of behavior		b. unaware
4. reveal by choice		4. obvious/haphazard	
H. Manager's needs		H. Misses manager's needs	
1. economic return		1. unaware of return	
2. good reputation		2. ignores own reputation	
II. OPENING PHASE			
EFFECTIVE		INEFFECTIVE	
A. setting agenda		A. setting agenda	
1. identifies issues		1. cedes issues	
2. prioritizes issues		2. cedes or no priority	
3. reformulates issues		3. accepts opponent's form.	
B. sets goals		B. lacks goals	
1. articulates own		1. unclear	
2. discovers opponents		2. does not learn	
3. chooses opening strategy		3. follows opponent's strategy	
C. assesses situation		C. oblivious to dynamic	
1. opponent's strategy		1. fails to discern	
2. opponent's personality		2. no assessment	
3. tone		3. opp. sets	
4. clarifies, probes		4. accepts as given	
5. creates doubt in opponent		5. too reassuring	
6. separates tangibles/intangibles		6. confuses	
D. reaches for overall formula		D. avoids/misses formula	
1. clarifies issues to own advantage		1. does not clarify to own advantage	

III. STRATEGY			
COMPETITIVE			
EFFECTIVE		INEFFECTIVE	
A. ADHERENCE TO POSITION		A. ADHERENCE TO POSITION	
1. Goals and Expectations		I. Goals and Expectations	
a. high expectations		a. unrealistic expectations	
b. commitment to goals		a. intransigence	
2. Issue Selection		2. Issue Selection	
a. high power		a. low power	
b. zero-sum (distributive)		a. non-zero sum	
3. Tactics		3. Tactics	
a. forces settlement range		a. creates deadlock	
b. uses deadlines		b. breaks deadlines	
c. risks deadlock		c. uncontrolled risks	
d. changes perceptions		d. unpersuasive	
e. slow to reveal position		e. refuses to state	
4. Concessions and Demands		4. Concessions and Demands	
a. high initial demand		a. extreme initial demand	
b. few concessions		b. no concessions	
<i>b-1. small and late</i>		<i>b-1. unaware of timing</i>	
<i>b-2. unilateral gain</i>		<i>b-2. breakdown</i>	
c. cedes throwaways		c. cedes nothing	
d. measures against formula		d. no assessment to formula	
B. INFORMATION FLOW		B. INFORMATION FLOW	
1. minimal disclosure		1. no disclosure	
2. conceals authority		2. misrepresents authority	
3. seeks control		3. abusive	
4. probes, questions		4. hides, repeats	
a. seeks clarification		a. accepts statements	
a. frames appropriately		b. unclear; off-point	
c. well-timed		c. misses opportunities	
d. renews, rephrases		d. accepts first answer	
e. responds ethically		e. deceives	
f. responds appropriately		f. reveals too much or too little	
5. pretense		5. deception	
a. false demands		a. impossible demands	
b. feigns cooperation		b. disruptive	
C. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS		C. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS	
1. credible threats		I. non-credible threats	
2. evasion		2. misrepresentation	
3. adamant		3. belligerent	
4. pressures		4. arrogant	
5. persuasive arguments		5. unpersuasive argument	
a. use of favorable information		a. misuse of information	
b. value-oriented		b. misues regulations; values	
c. seeks control		c. denigrates opponent	
d. puffing		d. lies	
e. ground in facts and regulations		e. lacks basis	
6. emotional, intangible issues		6. intolerant, tactless	
7. takes appropriate risks		7. inappropriate risks	
8. hides weakness of position		8. fails to meet weakness	
9. good legal argument		9. poor legal argument	
a. detailed; fully developed		a. cursory; incomplete	
b. multidimensional		b. unidimensional	
c. balanced		c. unilateral	
d. structured; focused		d. diffuse	
e. subtlety		e. simplistic	
f. emotional content		f. lacks conviction	
D. RELATIONSHIP		D. RELATIONSHIP	
1. self-interest		1. rigidity	
2. aloof		2. hostile	
3. wariness		3. suspicious	
4. assumes competition		4. sarcastic	
5. manipulates		5. deceptive	

III. STRATEGY			
INTEGRATING			
EFFECTIVE		INEFFECTIVE	
A. ADHERENCE TO POSITION		A. ADHERENCE TO POSITION	
I. Goals and Expectations		I. Goals and Expectations	
	a. fair expectations		a. minimal expectations
	b. seek convergence		b. loses sight of goals
2. Issue Selection		2. Issue Selection	
	a. equal power		a. high power issue
	b. zero sum		b. non-zero sum
3. Tactics		3. Tactics	
	a. seeks fair solution		a. accommodates opponent
	b. adapts to new information		b. misses new information
	c. seeks agreement		c. stalls
	d. mutual concessions		d. unilateral concessions
	e. shares honest information		e. divulges information
4. Concessions and Demands		4. Concessions and Demands	
	a. integrative initial demand		a. minimal initial demand
	b. trades concessions		b. concedes easily
	c. realistic changes		c. shifts without reasons
	d. measures against formula		d. no assessment against formula
B. INFORMATION FLOW		B. INFORMATION FLOW	
	1. fair exchange		1. reveals all
	2. trades facts/authority		2. divulges facts/authority
	3. organized		3. unsure
	4. probes, questions		4. hides, repeats
	a. seeks clarification		a. accepts statements
	b. frames appropriately		b. unclear; off-point
	c. well-timed		c. misses opportunities
	d. renews, rephrases		d. accepts first answer
	e. responds ethically		e. deceives
	f. responds appropriately		f. reveals too much or little
	5. honest cooperation		5. concessions
	a. shares goals/concerns		a. discloses all
	b. cooperates		b. concedes
C. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS		C. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS	
	1. promises		1. forgives
	2. discussion of issues		2. pleads his cause
	3. explores proposals		3. unaware of problems
	4. flexible		4. obliging
	5. good rational arguments		5. poor argument
	a. considers opponent's ideas.		a. asks for freebie
	b. task-oriented		b. sociable
	c. seeks equivalence		c. minimizes own position
	d. straightforward		d. underplays strength
	6. cognitive, factual issues		6. diffuse
	7. repackages or restates proposal to meet weaknesses		7. fails to adjust to meet weaknesses
	8. good managerial argument		8. poor managerial argument
	a. detailed; fully developed		a. cursory; incomplete
	b. multidimensional		b. unidimensional
	c. balanced		c. unilateral
	d. structured; focused		d. diffuse
	e. subtlety		e. simplistic
	f. emotional content		f. lacks conviction
D. RELATIONSHIP		D. RELATIONSHIP	
	1. trust		1. overvalues relationship
	2. future oriented		2. expedient
	3. seeks rapport		3. trusts immediately
	4. assumes diversity		4. idealistic/naive
	5. overlooks slights		5. reacts personally

III. STRATEGY			
COMPROMISING			
EFFECTIVE		INEFFECTIVE	
A. ADHERENCE TO POSITION		A. ADHERENCE TO POSITION	
1. Goals and Expectations		1. Goals and Expectations	
a. satisfies needs		a. obscures needs	
b. avoids concession-making		b. seeks concessions	
2. Issue Selection		2. Issue Selection	
a. non-zero sum		a. inappropriate zero-sum	
b. equal power		b. low power	
3. Tactics		3. Tactics	
a. non-positional bargaining		a. reverts to positions	
b. honest statements		b. misstates needs	
c. principled/rational		c. no fixed principles	
d. creates solutions		d. focuses narrowly	
e. free exchange		e. irrelevant exchange	
4. Concessions and Demands		4. Concessions and Demands	
a. expands pie		a. limits pie	
b. flexible on means		b. flexible on needs	
c. seeks common ground		c. misses chances	
d. integrative solution		d. self-interest only	
B. INFORMATION FLOW		B. INFORMATION FLOW	
1. open exchange		1. obscure; evasive	
2. honest		2. hesitant; evasive	
3. shares goals/concerns		3. hides goals;	
4. probes, questions		4. hides, repeats	
a. seeks clarification		a. accepts statements	
b. frames appropriately		b. unclear; off-point	
c. well-timed		c. misses opportunities	
d. renews, rephrases		d. accepts first answer	
e. responds ethically		e. deceives	
f. responds appropriately		f. reveals too much or too little	
5. log-rolling		5. positional	
6. adaptive; creative		6. rigid	
C. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS		C. COMMUNICATION PATTERNS	
1. offers solutions and ideas		1. reacts or rejects	
2. discusses opponent's needs		2. ignores opponent's needs	
3. explores proposals		3. accepts as presented	
4. flexibility		4. misses opportunity	
5. avoids arguing position		5. argues positions	
a. considers opponent's ideas		a. makes no use	
b. task-oriented		b. sociable	
c. seeks equivalence		c. minimizes own needs	
6. cognitive		6. diffuse	
7. good legal argument		7. poor legal argument	
a. detailed; fully developed		a. cursory; incomplete	
b. multidimensional		b. unidimensional	
c. balanced		c. unilateral	
d. structured; focused		d. diffuse	
e. subtlety		e. simplistic	
f. emotional content		f. lacks conviction	
D. RELATIONSHIP		D. RELATIONSHIP	
1. separates from issues		1. emphasizes	
2. future-oriented		2. short-term gain	
3. incorporate other's needs		3. avoids other's needs	
4. moves toward problemsolving		4. remains positional	
5. sensitive to cues		5. insensitive	

IV. AGREEMENT			
EFFECTIVE		INEFFECTIVE	
A. clear		A. unclear	
B. within authority		B. beyond authority	
C. benefits client		C. no gain for client	
D. efficient		D. costly	
E. enforceable		E. creates new problems	
F. strategy-related standard competitive		F. strategy-related standard	
1. maximizes for client cooperative		1. minimizes for client	
2. fair for both integrative		2. fair for opponent	
3. satisfies needs		3. leaves needs unmet	
G. no harm to relationship		G. hurts relationship	
H. benefits other interested constituencies		H. ignores or harms other constituencies	
I. chooses deadlock when appropriate		I. avoids deadlock at all cost; or forces unnecessarily	

Appendix 7

Regulatory scores and orientations

	Promotion score	Prevention score	RF score	RF orientation
Project manager of EDF EN	3.769	3.7	+0.069	neutral
Project manager of GPMM	3.769	2.7	+1.069	promotion
Project manager of Pôle Mer PACA	3.385	3	+0.384	promotion
Representative of Region PACA	3.308	3.6	-0.292	prevention
Representative of Europe Ecologie	3.769	2.9	+0.869	promotion
President of San Ouest Provence	3.769	3.4	-0.092	neutral
Vice-president of San Ouest Provence	3.538	3.6	-0.062	neutral
President of FFPM Paca	3.308	3.4	+0.092	neutral
Vice-president of FFPM PACA	3.769	3.6	+0.169	slightly promotion
Member of prud'homme de Martigues for fishermen	3.615	3.2	+0.415	promotion
Representative of the first environmental association	3.538	3.7	-0.162	prevention
Representative of the second environmental association	3.6154	3.6	+0.015	neutral
Representative of the third environmental association	3.769	3.7	+0.069	neutral
Representative of the local residents	3.538	3.2	+0.338	promotion

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