

## Selection and balancing for debiasing of SRAM-PUF

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# Selection and Balancing for Debiasing of SRAM-PUF

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


Fig. 1. Fuzzy commitment scheme

The fuzzy commitment scheme (Fig. 1) binds a cryptographic key  $s^k$  to an SRAM-PUF observation  $x^n$ . Helper data  $w^n$  is published, such that the key can be reproduced from another (noisy) observation  $y^n = x^n + e^n$  of the SRAM-PUF. Uniformity of the SRAM-PUF observations (i.e.  $\Pr(X=1) = \Pr(X=0)$ ) ensures that the key is secure from an attacker who can observe only the helper data  $w^n$ .

When the SRAM-PUF observations are not uniformly distributed (i.e.  $\Pr(X=1) \neq \Pr(X=0)$ ), the helper data  $w^n$  may reveal information about the key, and the fuzzy commitment scheme is not secure. Leakage can be prevented by preprocessing the observation vectors to ensure that the input to the fuzzy commitment scheme is uniformly distributed. This is achieved by so-called debiasing schemes, and several methods have already been proposed in the literature [1]–[4].

Two principal methods for debiasing are selection and balancing. Here, we present both methods and derive the corresponding secret-key capacity. For our analysis we consider a binary PUF source that generates i.i.d. pairs (x, y) s.t.

$$Pr(X = 1) = Pr(Y = 1) = p,$$
 (1)

$$\Pr(X \neq Y) = q. \tag{2}$$

Furthermore, we assume that  $0 and <math>0 < q \le 2p^1$ .

The **selection** method (randomly) selects a subset of the bits such that the output sequence has a uniform distribution. The selected bits are used as a regular input (of reduced length) to the fuzzy commitment scheme. The indices of the selected bits are attached to the helper data, such that the decoder can select the corresponding bits from its observation  $y^n$ .

We define a new random variable V that is 1 in case of selection and 0 otherwise. Then the selection probabilities are:

$$\Pr(V = 1|X = x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = 1, \\ \frac{p}{1-p} & \text{if } x = 0. \end{cases}$$
 (3)

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The **balancing** method (randomly) flips a subset of the input bits, such that the output sequence has a uniform distribution. Here a bit flip corresponds to changing the value of 0 to 1 and vice-versa. The resulting sequence is used as a regular input to the fuzzy commitment scheme.

We define a new random variable  $X^{\prime}$  that represents a bit X after the balancing method. Then

$$\Pr(X' = 1 | X = x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = 1, \\ \frac{1/2 - p}{1 - p} & \text{if } x = 0. \end{cases}$$
 (4)

This results in Pr(X'=1)=1/2, and thus the output bits have an unbiased distribution.

The secret-key capacity for fuzzy commitment after debiasing is shown for both methods under various conditions in Fig. 2. We conclude that selection results in a higher secret-key capacity than balancing.

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


Fig. 2. Capacity of fuzzy commitment after selection + and balancing o.