

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.0 Background

Res Ipsa Loquitur – We reside in a world marred by conflict, violence and war. Conflict has been described as a normal human phenomenon (Boulding 2000, Darby 2001 and Lederach 1995) but not a phenomenon to which humans are destined. Individuals are as predisposed to violence and war as they are to peace (Adams, 1989). The “greatest challenge facing humanity on its journey into the new millennium ... [will be] the transformation of a culture of violence into a culture of peace” (Brenes & Wessells 2001:99).

Since the end of the cold war, there have been more inter- and intra-state conflicts and wars, and incidents of violence than occurred before the fall of the Berlin wall; of these, most have been intra-state. During the Cold War era, the two super powers did not engage each other directly, although some might cite the Cuban Missile crisis as an example to the contrary. They did, however, instigate wars and military coups mostly in third world nations in efforts to achieve their own domestic, political or military objectives (Hedges 2002 and Power 2002). Lederach (1997:17) notes, “most wars are located in settings on the margins of the world community that are struggling with poverty, inequities and underdevelopment”.

Lederach (1997) further suggests that the Cold War has left a legacy of legitimacy for a culture of war and violence as a means of resolving conflict, through asymmetric and potentially more devastating means. Although used in greater context since the September 11th 2001 attack on the World Trade Center (Meigs 2003; Williams 2003; Gray 2002), the concept of asymmetry is not new (Rippon 1958). “Some observers believe the Gulf War marked the beginning of *Pax Americana* in which the world will acquiesce in a benign American hegemony” (Nye 2003:251), predicated on a culture of war and violence within an asymmetrical

context. As the sole super power, there is every indication that the United States will continue to reinforce a culture of war (Power 2002) as a legitimate means of resolving differences based upon the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence as opposed to a culture of peace manifested through trans-cultural conflict prevention and resolution methodologies.

Commensurate with Leberach's (1997) observation, Archer and Gartner (1984) propose that war legitimizes violence for both men and women. In a similar vein, Ember and Carol (1994) note a high correlation between the frequency of war and interpersonal violence, suggesting that war socializes males toward aggression in preparation for formal warrior training. Grossman (1996) concurs with this concept of training military personnel for war and violence, but not re-training for peace through repatriation after military service. Thus, war influences the way in which males and females interrelate and legitimizes the dominant roles that the former have maintained in that relationship (D. Adams, personal communication, 4 July 2004). Rutherford (2004:20-21) also comments on this male dominance as it is portrayed in the media and mimicked in life,

in the world of 007 [James Bond], life was organized by the rule of the phallus, meaning that masculine principle of challenge, command, and conquest in which sex and violence were inextricably linked – 'hot babes and cool weapons'. ... Bond as the hero was poised, efficient, effective, the quintessential tough man. The villains were unremittingly evil. ... The Bond pictures were a foretaste of the coverage of the invasion of Iraq. True, there were no 'Bond girls' in Iraq. Well, not quite: the British Forces did call the assault on Basra 'Pussy' and 'Galore'.

Decisions to create cultures of war and violence or a culture of peace are individual, but they are not made in isolation from the social, political, economic and cultural environments that give them shape, structure and meaning. Likewise, decisions to engage or not to engage in interpersonal violence are individual, but are not made in isolation from their social, political, economic and cultural environments that give them shape, structure and meaning. The nexus is the motivation. This

research explores this relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace.

This motivation can be both a means and an end. In the former, the motivation is diverse, including differing wants, needs, beliefs, loyalties, values and ideologies; inaccurate perceptions of intentions or behaviours; competing goals; geopolitical factors including limited or disproportionate distribution of property, resources and wealth; availability of technology; and, disparities in power, amongst others (Pedersen 2001; Sanson & Bretherton 2001). In the latter, the motivation is a perceived benefit derived such as ultimate control or domination. Violence that is focused on the 'means' may not fulfill the 'ends' and vice versa (Maxwell 1998). Hence, contemporary conflict resolution methodologies may not be successful if they do not address the motivation and the culture of the perpetrator and victim from which it is derived because the process of changing the learned behaviour may become more problematic and, perhaps, unattainable.

There is a burgeoning body of research that demonstrates that behaviour, violent or peaceful, is learned (Baron & Richardson 1994, Buss 1995 and Huesman 2002), and victims and victim-states of today learn to become bullies and warring-states of tomorrow (Gottfredson, Hirschi, & Grasmick 1993, Randall 1997 and Salmivalli & Nieminen 2002) if sustainable means to resolve the conflict are not identified and implemented. As an example, the defeat of Germany coupled with the humiliating 'peace terms' post World War I victimized this nation. Twenty years later, the combatants were at war again; Germany had moved from the position of victim state in 1919 to bully state in 1939 (Lindner 2002).

A similar argument can be made between Serbians, Muslims and Croatians in the Balkans (Hedges 2002), and Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda (Dallaire 2003), and between dependence and independence factions in Indonesia and East Timor (Rippon, Girouard, & Lowey 2004). Referring to the current US war against Iraq, Rutherford (2004:159) comments on how humiliation of the Arab world is fostering

new learned war-like behaviours for some Muslims who, otherwise, would have remained moderate non-combatants.

Whatever his sins, Saddam Hussein was widely admired as an Arab strongman with an Arab army who had resisted Anglo-American pressure for a decade. Now he was gone. 'It's a day of shame', claimed a Palestinian engineer. 'On this day Arabs have become slaves. The only man who dared to say "no" to the Americans' face has vanished today. What is left is a bunch of bowing and scraping Arab leaders'. Once more the Arabs have been humiliated and deceived like the crushing defeat we faced during the 1967 war with Israel', noted a businessman in Amman. ... Yet it was a commentator on al-Jazeera who summed up the mood, his gloom provoked by the brief shot of a marine putting the American flag over the head of a statue of Saddam Hussein: 'Everything that happens from now on will have an American smell'.

Absent in these examples has been sustainable methods of resolving differences through peaceful means before they escalated into inter- or intra-state conflicts, violence and war. In this most recent case in point, in Arab humiliation can be found the seeds of the protracted intractable jihad against the unholy *Pax Americana* – the Arab version of the evil empire and the Islamic sequel to the mythical reality of 'The Empire Strikes Back' in which the jihadists are the righteous martyrs and the Americans the barbaric aggressors.

How does the process of transformation from martyr and aggressor to collaborator evolve to a sustainable level of peacefulness? How do leaders mature nation-states from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace? As hypothesized, how do individuals at a micro level learn peacemaking and peacekeeping behaviours that ultimately become a part of their respective cultures at a macro nation-state level? This research focuses on the maturation process of transforming individuals at the micro level through education and praxis for peace and a culture of peace.

1.1 Culture and Conflict

The challenge of dealing with conflict is not new. Based on local cultures and environments, social groups have developed their own strategies for dealing with differences, and means of managing these disagreements have evolved as social groups reorganized into communities and nation-states. Unfortunately, not all have been non-violent. As an example, the Coast Salish First Nation of British Columbia ostracised those who violated minor customs; for major violations, the offender could be killed (T. Jones¹, personal communications, 12 August 2002). In these and other societies, as sub-group elites became more complex and removed from the general population, traditional methods of resolving conflicts changed. Segregation resulted in different languages evolving with different interpretations as *lingua franca* was replaced with *lingua vernacular* (Calvet 1998). In-groups and out-groups (Chattopadhyay, Tluchowska, & George 2004; Searle-White 2001) emerged which, in turn, led to more conflict as dissimilar means of resolving differences progressed and became the norm within each respective culture.

Lund, Morris and LeBaron-Duryea (as cited in Pedersen 2001) suggest a model for resolving conflict that is more culturally-centered may have greater utility and opportunity for success than one that is more diverse and attempts to accommodate all cultures or does not take culture into consideration.

In intercultural conflict resolution even when different cultural groups share the same values, their behavioural expression of these values may differ. Not only can different behaviours have the same meaning, the same behaviour can have different meanings (Pedersen 2001:183).

History is replete with examples of culturally-centered initiatives being taken to diminish inter- and intra-state conflicts, including Charlemagne's efforts to unite the Roman Empire under one religious ideology, the Catholic Church. More recently,

¹ Tim Jones is a member with the Pacheedaht First Nation who, as a leader of the Band's historical initiative, researched traditional customs and practices.

fundamentalist Islamic, Christian and Jewish groups have espoused similar cultural-specific beliefs, oft at the expense of out-groups. Contemporary literature has traditionally identified in-group out-group separations as east west; more recently, research has posited north south polarities.

With reference to the former, most models for resolving conflict are western-based and reflect the norms, values and attitudes of the author's cultures (Sanson & Bretherton 2001). These models mirror the hegemony of western academic quantitative thinking that tends to dichotomizes factors, control for other environmental intervening variables, and employ a rational linear process to arrive at a solution (Burton 1990; Fisher 1997; Mitchell & Banks 1996; Thomas & Kilman 1974), usually singular (Reilly & MacKenzie 1999). The models assume that all conflicts can be successfully negotiated; all parties (usually two) want to negotiate; there are standard procedures that can be employed in all conflict situations; and, outcomes can be described in terms of individual (win/lose) or collective (win/win) (M. Lomax², personal communication, 24 February 2004; see also Sanson & Bretherton 2001). Galtung (1996) postulates that those who perceive conflicts as dichotomized bilateral processes are simplistic in their conceptualization of the phenomenon. Conflict, Galtung and Tschudi (2001) suggest, is ubiquitous and, hence, requires a more comprehensive interpretation.

Case in point, western cultures tend to be more individualistic and autonomous than non-western cultures that have a propensity to reflect a collectivist inclusion approach (Donohue 1990; Kim & Hakhoe 1994; Triandis 1995). The former have developed in social and cultural environments where the relationship among members of a group tend to be more individualistic and less committed to the benefit of the group as a whole; each individual is ultimately responsible for looking after his or her own perceived needs and, accordingly, attaches importance to individual freedoms. Individualism or narcissism has become a dominant factor in western

² Mike Lomax is a lawyer who specializes in mediation and negotiation; he was employed to facilitate the development of the Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) center at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt, Victoria, British Columbia.

cultures contributing to the creation of conflicts (Lowen 1985) as “the self is grounded intra-psychically in self-love, self-definition, and self-direction” (Pedersen 2001:185). The latter tends to reflect strong cohesive groups that take care of the members in exchange for long-term loyalty and mutual obligations. Individual needs either do not exist or are subservient to the needs of the group as a whole (Hofstede, as cited in Pedersen 2001).

Western methods of dealing with conflict, such as Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR), separate the issues from the parties in the conflict and emphasize direct approaches; indirect methods are perceived to be weak and evasive (D. Wong³, personal communication, 29 June 2004). ADR presents the parties to the conflict as unitary actors negotiating bilaterally and requires a neutral third party with no prior history with the conflicting parties to intervene and facilitate the process (Lynch 2001). This style of ADR views the process as linear and logical – cause and effect, and seeks a quick and easy method of dealing with conflict that may not result in the desired long-term sustainable effect of resolution (M. Lomax, personal communication, 24 February 2004; see also (Maxwell 1998 and Ross 2000). The role of culture in the ADR-style conflict is given minimal emphasis, if at all.

In contrast, non-western cultures tend to view the individuals, their cultures and the issues as interrelated. In the latter, the conflict, event, culture, environment, emotions and the parties are perceived to be part of a collective system (Nye 2003). Supporting the argument for the cultural context, Pedersen (2001:192) suggests,

there is a myth that conflicts are merely communication problems and if effective communication can be facilitated, then a conflict will be solved. In fact, the cultural context mediates all communications between groups and must be attended to in all conflict management.

³ Dave Wong is a retired social worker and current head of the ADR Center at Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt, Victoria, British Columbia.

Pedersen (2001) further proposes that getting the parties together in one room may cause destructive and irreparable damage to relationships. In addition, focusing just on individual interests and not on collective values within the cultural context can impair reconciliatory efforts.

Mediators, negotiators and facilitators who work to resolve conflicts with ADR have cultural biases; neutrality is virtually impossible. Being an outsider may be problematic and impede resolution. Perceptions of fairness, equity, reasonableness and rationality differ among cultures and within cultures, as does the definition of neutrality that can be culturally specific (Sanson & Bretherton 2001). Hence, attempting to employ a one-size-fits-all model, such as ADR, for resolving conflict has the potential of being detrimental to the outcome (Pedersen 2001).

Some contemporary western research does address the need to be cognizant of cultural differences between groups and within groups but focuses on managing the differences by developing models that categorize the variances (Sanson & Bretherton 2001). This reflects the American-influenced academic psyche that seeks the succinct 2x2 or 2x4 dimensional models – male/female, realist/liberalist, collectivism/individualism, inclusive/exclusive (Pedersen 2001), and can easily result in the creation of stereotypes. These researchers tend to be reticent to move into the less structured realm (Westen & Weinberger 2004) of systems thinking (Flood 2002 and O'Shry 1996) or spiral dynamics (Beck & Cowan 1996) and qualitative methodologies that better reflect the realities of the dynamics of cultures (Parry 1998 and Sandelowski 1993). Cultures differ substantially; hence, they cannot be readily reduced to comparative dyads.

Today, there are approximately 188 nation-states and 10,000 ethnic, religious and cultural groups that are appreciably different from one another in methods of communications, attitudes, beliefs and means of resolving conflict. These differences can contribute to inter-personal and inter-state instability that has and can continue to set in motion transformation toward cultures of war and violence.

Cohrs and Moscher (2002:139) postulate, “understanding determinants of individuals’ attitudes toward war is a core aim of peace psychology”; it is also inherent in this research. The challenge becomes one of identifying a methodology that could facilitate the transition for individuals and, ultimately, leaders of organizations and nation-states toward a culture of peace, bearing in mind the research that discusses differing approaches for different cultures.

One commonality for most nation-states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) representing ethnic, religious and cultural groups is their membership in or association with the United Nations (UN). A second is their acknowledgement if not acceptance of the mandate of the UN and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to strive for a culture of peace, commensurate with the Program of Action. (I will briefly introduce the concept of a Program of Action; see the Literature Review, Section 2.10, for a full discussion).

1.2 Program of Action

The concept of a culture of peace as an alternative to cultures of war and violence was initially discussed at a conference in 1989 at Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast. The genesis of the model was predicated on universal values and principles of “life, liberty, justice, solidarity, tolerance, human rights and equality between men and women” (Roche 2003:106). These fundamental precepts were presented to UNESCO’s Secretary General, Frederico Mayor, by Dr. David Adams who was on sabbatical from Wesleyan University to UNESCO. Adams, on the invitation of Mayor, joined UNESCO, and for the next decade led the culture of peace project and ultimately became the first Director of the program (UNESCO Executive Board Document 140 EX/28 cites early initiatives).

Based on the assumption that peace is more likely to occur if there is acceptance of common values and beliefs and a common governing body that could mediate any differences, Mayor and Adams (2000) presented a Program of Action with eight areas that, if practiced by all nation-states at the macro level, could move

them from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace (UN General Assembly Resolution A/53/370, 1998; see also UN General Assembly Resolution A/53/243, 1999). These eight areas are:

- Democratic participation
- Tolerance and solidarity
- Participatory communications and the free flow of information and knowledge
- International peace and security, including disarmament and economic conversion
- Education for a culture of peace
- Sustainable economic and social development
- Respect for all human rights
- Equality between men and women

The culture of peace and the eight areas within the Program of Action employ education as the primary vehicle in communicating and soliciting endorsement for sustainable peace through non-violent means of dealing with differences, and seeking means “to transform the cultural tendencies toward war and violence into a culture where dialogue, respect, and fairness govern social relations” (Roche 2003:107-108). To facilitate the education process, Adams (as cited in Roche 2003:108) contrasted a culture of war and a culture of peace, as noted in Table 1-1

Table 1-1
Contrast of a Culture of War and a Culture of Peace

Culture of War	Culture of Peace
Enemy images	Understanding, tolerance and solidarity
Armament and armies	Disarmament – general and complete
Authoritarian governance	Democratic participation
Secrecy and propaganda	Free flow of information and knowledge
Violence – structural and physical	Respect for all human rights
Male domination	Equality between men and women
Education for war	Education for a culture of peace
Exploitation of the weak and of the environment	Sustainable economic and social development

Taught early to children as the means of dealing with conflict or later to youth and adults through behaviour modification, the eight areas within the Program of Action could become a standard model for a broad spectrum of micro inter- and intra-personal methods for dealing with conflict. In the fullness of time, as individuals mature and advance to senior positions in macro organizations, the eight areas could also become a standard model.

Connecting micro individual and macro nation-state interactions is not a new notion; it has been presented as a concept for what Boulding (2000) refers to as the potential future of utopianism. Boulding (2000) draws the connection between individuals as members of over twenty thousand NGO networks that have been established through common interests (NB: the motivation of all NGOs is not peace as defined within a culture of peace). Although these NGOs have few material resources, they have considerable intellectual resources. With support from the United Nations, many are having an impact on nation-state policy making and are influencing local governments, groups and grassroots movements. This stimulus is facilitated by information technology and its ability to connect individuals who share the passion for a culture of peace.

Herr and Zimmerman-Herr (1998) and Francis (2002) concur with Boulding (2000), proposing that peacemaking initiatives start with individuals at a local or micro level. Peacemaking between nation-states can only gain credibility if it has first been successful at a local micro level. The corollary to this assertion is a linkage between the micro individual and the macro organization or nation-state. Also supporting this relationship, Anderson (2004) presents a model that suggests that the inter-relationship of variables associated with peace should be comprehensive.

Supporting this connection, Druckman (2001) postulates that there is a relationship between nationalism at the macro level and individual behaviour at the micro level. Druckman (2001:49) argues,

it is this connection between micro (small groups) and macro (nations) level processes that poses the greatest challenge to students of nationalism. Only a few attempts have been made to develop the connection and few social psychologists have developed the implications of their experimental and survey findings for actions taken by nations.

Commenting on the micro- and macro-linkage, Elias (1997) posits, “in an environment so saturated with violence, a relationship between the violence occurring in different realms no doubt exists”. When children view world political leaders, sports figures and media icons behaving violently toward one another, they learn the basics of violence in problem solving. Tannen (1998) refers to this social learning process within western societies as an element in the argument culture. The transition starts with the individual before it becomes cultural. Cohrs and Moscher (2002:141) concur, stating, “it has been consistently shown that generalized attitudes and value orientations relate to attitudes toward war”. Mayton, Peters and Owens (1999) also establish the connection, noting that warring militaristic behaviour is linked to personal attitudinal values. A manifestation of this phenomenon is the recent violent treatment of some Iraqi ‘detainees’ by their American military captors. Adams (2004) argues that it is imperative to identify the relationship among cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace from the macro international, national and community levels to the micro interpersonal level.

Although the foundation for a conceptual framework has been referred to by these researchers, to date, no formal connection has been made between UNESCO’s eight areas within the Program of Action at the macro level and equivalent areas at the interpersonal micro level. In support of my research, Adams (2004) notes that there is a similar need for analysis to examine the relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, not just for a culture of war and a culture of violence. The premise for this conceptual framework is the established linkage between decisions made at the macro and micro levels. A single individual or group of individuals, acting in concert, ultimately makes a decision to

either engage in war and violence or peace; a nation, *per se*, does not make a decision.

I met with and discussed this relationship with David Adams (Adams, 10 November 2001) while in New York, ironically on the eve of the 9/11 attack on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon; flowing from this dialogue, I created a comparative table, similar to what Adams had formulated contrasting a culture of war and a culture of peace. Table 1-2 depicts my macro nation-state and micro individual relationship of the eight areas.

Table 1-2
Micro Individual and Macro Nation-State Relationship

Macro Nation-State Eight Areas Within The Program of Action	Proposed Micro Individual Eight Areas
Education for a culture of peace	Adopt an individual culture of peace; share with others
Tolerance & solidarity	Exercise patience & understanding; solidarity in virtues
Democratic participation	Take the initiative to exercise individual democratic rights & responsibilities
Participatory communication and the free flow of information	Take the initiative to provide & disseminate information; listen & understand
International peace & security	Establish individual peace & security
Human rights	Exercise & respect human rights
Sustainable economic and social development	Promote personal growth & professional development
Equality for women and men	Take the initiative to assure equality between men and women, and the unfettered equal opportunity for self & others

As discussed, some researchers have suggested that a singular model for dealing with differences or conflict, based primarily on one culture, may have limited

application in other cultures. Would the eight areas proposed in Table 1-2 as presented at the macro level by Adams and at the micro level by me have universal application? In defence of the broader application as presented in Table 1-1, the eight macro areas were developed with involvement of individuals from different cultures, and ultimately were accepted by members of the UN General Assembly. They were also applied with relative success within the culture of peace pilot project in El Salvador on 1993 but not without some problems from within the bureaucracy, government opposition and limited international funding. Although the factions in El Salvador employed the rhetoric of peace, they continued to resist the process. Despite this resistance, “with the help of UNESCO, conflict was transformed into relative co-operation by involving those groups previously caught up in violence in the planning and implementation of human development projects of benefit to all” (Roche 2003:109). In contrast to the tentative accomplishment in El Salvador, the peace process in Mozambique (1993-1995) was less successful, again due in part to problems within the bureaucracy, government operations and minimal funding. The failure of the Mozambique program also had negative ripple effects on the development of the Organization of Economic and Development (OED) programs.

The eight areas demonstrate the potential for applicability at the macro level and have been endorsed by the UN General Assembly; they also form the basis for the UN General Assembly Resolution A/55/377 – International Decade for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence for the Children of the World (2000-2010). Further, Adams (personal communications, 10 November 2001) concurs in principle with the micro relationship that I have developed and present in Table 1-2 with specific emphasis on gender equity as originally set forth in Table 1-1. I would hypothesize, therefore, that the micro eight areas, as presented in Table 1-2, can be employed where interpersonal aggression (Buss 1961, 1995) and structural violence (Galtung 1972, 1996) occur because of their relationship with the macro areas, and their simplicity, egalitarianism and overarching characteristics. Francis (2002:62) argues that an individual would be foolish “to try to impose egalitarian processes in fundamentally hierarchical societies”. I would counter this statement by suggesting

that many organizations and societies have a hierarchical structure and support egalitarianism as a human right. The fundamental issue as asked by Adams is, in what direction and how does a culture of peace develop.

Archer and Gartner (1984) and Ember and Carol (1994) argue that the direction for learning a certain behaviour (not cultures) is downward from the macro war to the micro interpersonal violence; individuals observe violence at the macro level and mimic that behaviour at the interpersonal micro level. Supporting this research, Adams (2004:1) also asserts that “the culture of war at a national level is a major causal factor for culture of violence at the local level, but not vice versa”.

1.3 Micro Macro Linkage

Inherent in the hypothesis is the linkage between the macro nation-state and the micro interpersonal relationships. It is appropriate, therefore, to present a conceptual framework for the macro micro link and the system within which they operate. As with other terminology, the concepts of macro- and micro-linkage has several interpretations and implications (Boulding 2000, Christie 2001, Elias 1997 and Herr & Zimmerman-Herr 1998; see also Christie & Dawes 2001). A common theme, however, is the application to cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace.

Given this body of research, I concur that a macro micro relationship exists between cultures and war and violence at the macro nation-states level and a culture of violence at the micro interpersonal level. I would further assert that a relationship exists between cultures of war and violence at the macro level and a culture of peace at the micro interpersonal and individual level, based on this demonstrated relationship and the assertions made by Adams (2004). This formulates the conceptual framework for this research.

1.3.1 Definition of the Micro Macro Linkage

For the purpose of this research, I define micro as inter- and intra-individual, and macro as nation-state; macro refers to international and nation-state. The term organizational at the meso level will span workplace organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business-style organizations or local government organizations. The parameters are individual between self and another, and interactional between individuals and large numbers of people who interrelate socially and professionally within a society. The rationale for this research is based on the premise that there is a linkage between a culture of war and violence at the macro nation-state level as identified by the UN (Adams 2000), and a culture of violence at a micro individual level. This linkage creates a commonality – a platform that could facilitate resolution if the same model or schema for dealing with differences at the macro nation-state level could be employed at the micro interpersonal level. If demonstrated to be viable as a concept, factors that contribute to the violence could become imperceptible (Avruch 1998).

1.4 Significance Of The Problem

Today, there is a greater need to work toward a global movement for a sustainable culture of peace because of the increased potential for uncontrolled violence and use of weapons of mass destruction by non-nation groups (Soroos 2004). There is a need for critical innovation and the development of culturally-sensitive tools (Algers 1996) in order to create a means of dealing with differences, tempered by realism that transcends personal or state interests (Pedersen 2002). Cairns (2003) suggests that there is an immediate demand to increase the portfolio of techniques to successfully deal with acts of violence and aggression. Dallaire (2003) concurs, stating that there is a whole new lexicon of skills needed, individually refined for 21st century conflicts. Dallaire (2003) elaborates, suggesting that these skills cannot be Dayton Accord-style that allow belligerents to move between levels of Dayton. Instead, such methodologies must focus on how relationships at the micro level are established and maintained, and how conflicts can be resolved. If means for dealing with differences at the micro individual level can be established

with the application of the eight areas identified within the Program of Action, the probability of reducing macro inter- and intrastate conflict should increase. This will require a systems approach (Capra 1996; Lynch 2001) to cultural issues.

Adams (2004) suggests that there is a clear relationship between the macro and the micro with regard to learned aggression, and that relationship is downward – individuals learn aggressive behaviour from their environment. What has not been demonstrated is the relationship between a culture of war and violence at the macro nation-state level and a culture of peace at the micro interpersonal level. How is a culture of peace learned and practiced?

This learning and transformation to a culture of peace could be facilitated if the process were both strategic and operational. Manwaring and Joes (2000) suggest that strategic thinking must change commensurate with the evolving dynamics of war and violence. The conduit between long- and short-term could be the eight areas within the Program of Action because the similarities between a culture of war and violence at the macro nation-state level, and a culture of peace at the micro individual level may be sufficient. By establishing this connection, consistency in communicating common criteria – the eight areas within the Program of Action, could be more easily achieved.

The importance of this research is to establish a more universal application of the macro areas that creates the framework for the Program of Action and the subsequently developed micro areas (Table 1-2). Such universality could form the foundation for positive personal relationships which, in turn, could contribute to constructive prevention and resolution of conflict, and the maintenance of peace (Smith 2004). Where cultures meet, cultures tend to clash, and interpersonal and in-group out-group conflicts arise. The UNESCO Program of Action focuses on issues and behaviours and not on individuals but, most importantly, does not separate the people from the problem within the cultural context. Hence, the opportunity for

sustainable prevention and resolution of conflict, and the maintenance of peace remains the nexus and nucleus of the research.

1.5 Hypothesis

Much of the research and writing on a culture of peace has focused on larger conceptual academic issues. As examples, Lederach (1997) discusses global issues and introduces tables and diagrams to support his theories; Boulding (2000) describes societal issues and peace movements; Herr and Zimmerman-Herr (1998) approach the topic from a Christian theological perspective; Darby (2001) provides explanations from a process perspective; Francis (2002:13) presents theories with diagrams and provides examples of workshops, proposing that “dialogue is at the heart of conflict resolution” at the operational level; Turpin and Kurtz (1997b) define micro macro linkages, although other contributing authors discuss other themes. Much of the literature broaches the topic from a third part perspective.

I have found no research that examines whether the macro areas of UNESCO’s Program of Action can be successfully applied at a micro individual level. Adams (2004), the author of much of the early work on a culture of peace and the first Director of UNESCO’s culture of peace program, states that no research has been undertaken in this most important area. Only Anderson and Christie (2001) and Toh (2001) make specific reference to these macro areas. The former discusses nine psychologically-based principles, briefly alluding to a few of the areas. The latter introduces the areas into his discussion of peace education. I postulate that the praxis of these areas is a central element to the psychology and the culture of peace. Turpin and Kurtz (1997a) reinforce this proposition, suggesting that there is a requirement to explore patterns and underlying themes between micro and macro violence.

The hypothesis proposes that there are similarities between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level, and that education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former. This will

occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace; the direction of the learning is bottom-up. In addition, peace building, peace maintenance and the prevention of conflict should be facilitated as a result of the maturation process. This maturation is akin to what Francis (2002) refers to as conflict transformation, and also what Burton (1990:3) describes in his determination to seek the "solution of the problems which led to the conflictual behaviour in the first place".

The null hypothesis proposes that there are no similarities between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level. Hence, maturation toward a culture of peace at the former will not occur if individuals have been exposed to UNESCO's areas within the Program of Action at the micro interpersonal level.

It would be panglossian to suggest that all violence will be resolved with a successful application. We live in too great an imperfect world for this to occur. However, there should be more positive secondary and tertiary effects if the hypothesis is shown to exist because this transformation will help to empower individuals who interact within the realm of power asymmetry or a myth of equals (Jabri 1996), and within a systems environment.

1.6 Systems Thinking

Conflict resolution is a psychological exploration of subjectivity that includes the realm of human experiences and meaning within cultures (Nordstrom 1997), all of which are inter- and intra-related within a cultural context commensurate with systems approaches (Capra 1996). In this regard, Kelman (1999:203) suggests that the desired outcome of conflict resolution "is directed toward solving the problem shared by the parties which ultimately means transforming the relationship between them". The desired outcome is to resolve the conflict but also to assure personal growth for the parties within their respective cultures, thus giving surety to a

sustainable culture of peace as a means of dealing with future differences. This maturation process toward a culture of peace mirrors the hypothesis of this research which focuses on the micro macro linkage within the broader context of systems. It is appropriate, therefore, to provide a brief explanation of systems thinking.

Thomas Berry (as cited in O'Sullivan 1999: xii) states in the introduction to O'Sullivan's book, *Transformative Learning: Educational Vision For The 21st Century*, "while we will need a new way of living, we need even more urgently a new way of thinking". Lynch (2001) proposes a new way of thinking that involves a systems approach to conflict management that is beyond Alternate Dispute Resolution. Systems thinking, although not a new concept, is becoming a contemporary method of conceptualizing relationships, and a means of transforming attitudes, values and beliefs from cultures of war and violence toward a culture of peace.

A system is anything that takes its integrity and form from the ongoing interactions of its parts. Companies, nations, families, biological niches, bodies, television sets, personalities, and atoms are all systems. Systems are defined by the fact that their elements have a common purpose and behave in common ways, precisely because they are interrelated toward that purpose (Senge 1999). Systems have been described as a web because of the inter-connection (Turpin & Kurtz 1997a), as a progression because of its dynamic and dialectical nature (Lederach 1997), and as a mesh because of the interrelationship of activities (Francis 2002). More importantly, "systems can create consequences not intended by any of the constituent actors" (Francis 2002:33). To change a system, it is essential to understand the intra-relationships among the parts and the inter-relationships with its environment. A case in point – Nye (2003:32-33) suggests, "war is often explained in terms of international systems ... [and] the international political system is a pattern of relationships among the states".

Systems thinking deals with data and focuses less on content and more on the process that governs the data; less on cause and effect that link bits of information and more on the principles of organization that give data meaning. The components do not function according to their nature but according to their position in the network (Capra 1996). To take one part out of the whole and analyze its nature in a laboratory will give misleading results, first, because each part will function differently outside the system, and second, because even it's functioning inside the system will be different depending on where it is placed in relation to other entities.

The fundamental basis of systems thinking is not merely that one is dealing with hierarchies of complexity. Rather the essential characteristic is that the functioning of any part of the network is due to its position in the network rather than to its nature. Nature may determine the range of possible functioning and response, but not what specifically it will express (Atkinson & Hammersley 1998, Friedman 1999, Kral, Burkhardt, & Kidd 2002, Reason & Bradbury 2001 and Walsh-Bowers 2002). The Buddhist teacher, Thich Nat Hanh, affirms that we are not just 'beings' but 'inter-beings' "deeply interconnected in the web of human and planetary existence (Toh 2001). In a similar vein, O'Sullivan (1999), defines essential qualities of the universe and the role that humans play. Within the precepts of systems thinking, any phenomenon, including a culture of peace and cultures of war and violence requires that we acknowledge this relationship and remain accountable. Hence, any phenomenon, including a culture of peace, and cultures of war and violence can only be studied in their natural systems environment – in the field.

Within the context of peace education as a fundamental element of a systems approach to a culture of peace, Coleman and Deutsch (2001:225) suggest,

systems reflect the recognition that individuals are members of groups: They affect the groups and are affected by them; groups are components of organizations which affect them and which they

affect; a similar two-way causation exists between the organizations and their communities.

Coleman and Deutsch (2001) further note that systems thinking approach to resolving conflict would reflect relational views of individuals and their environments, empowerment of all parties and problem-solving through dialogue that would incorporate cultural aspects. The process would not be linear but would include other dimensions such as time and space. This systems approach to problem solving is shared by other researchers (Boulding 2000 and Lederach 1995).

Similarly, Aharoni (2002) proposes that a culture of peace can best be achieved if the concept of a global and regional culture of peace system is adopted as one of the major goals. This is the application of systems theory at the macro level. Coleman and Deutsch (2001) cite, as an example, that children learn from an early age either behaviours that reflect cultures of war and violence or a culture of peace, and what they learn will influence their attitudes, values and beliefs as they mature into adults. Coleman and Deutsch (2001:223) illustrate,

Families and schools are the two most important institutions influencing the developing child's predispositions to hate and to love. Although the influence of the family comes earlier and is often more profound, there is good reason to believe that the child's subsequent experiences in schools can modify or strengthen the child's earlier acquired disposition.

In support of youth learning about a culture of peace within the context of systems thinking, Reardon (1988) suggests that if children are exposed to peace education then their cognitive processes will be transformed reflecting the precepts of a culture of peace within the system of the global village. Subsequently, they will be motivated to become active representative for social justice and a sustainable environment. Peace education, according to Reardon (1988), is the nexus and nucleus for a culture of peace because of the systems thinking approach.

1.6.1 Definition of Systems and Systems Thinking

For the purposes of this research, I define a system as anything that takes its integrity and form from the ongoing interactions of its parts. Their elements have a common purpose and behave in common ways, precisely because they are interrelated toward that purpose. The functioning of any part of the system is due to its position in the network rather than to its nature, although the latter will have an influence on other integrative parts. Systems thinking is a conceptual construct that focuses on the process and on the principles of organization that provides it with meaning.

1.7 **Impetus for the Research**

The impetus for the research came from several sources. Through my service with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), I was exposed to numerous interpersonal and inter-group conflicts. Resolution was attempted with western academic linear methodologies that did not include cultural aspects or a systems approach. As a result, there was no sustainability for peace between or among the belligerents. In fact, the violence often accelerated once the parties had the opportunity to re-engage. The function of the police became one of temporarily incarcerating combatants (usually the male in domestic conflict cases because there were few or no local female jail cells); this procedure became reinforced as part of the culture and an endless violent cycle without hope for change. In the years after I retired, I would receive newspapers from the communities that I policed and would read of the continued conflict and violence among the adults many of whom I had arrested on numerous occasions, and their children who were following in the footsteps of their parents. It was and remains a culture of violence personified.

Following my service with the RCMP, I joined the Canadian Military and, in 1994, completed two tours with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Republic of Yugoslavia – Bosnia and Croatia. There I witnessed the horrors of protracted intractable hatred manifested in genocide, rape, murder and the destruction of cultural images and icons, including churches and mosques,

schools, hospitals, homes, and entire villages in some cases. Ten years before, Yugoslavia had been the center for cultural peace, hosting the 1984 Olympics. In 1994 the stadium where the athletes gathered in peace was a massive cemetery for hundreds of shallow graves of genocide victims.

The Balkans, for centuries, has been a battlefield; the 20th century has mirrored this on-going war and violence. Almost to the hour of the day when Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo in 1914, but eighty years later, I was sitting in a Russian armoured personnel carrier with my Russian host. Eight decades after this incident that started World War I, sniper rounds were ricocheting off our vehicle; little had changed. This Russian officer had been my enemy five years before, so my politicians told me, and yet he was my friend and colleague that day. Amidst the bullets and mortars, we were friends, and spoke of our respective homes and admired photos of each other's families.

Ironically, my host was Ukrainian and he despised the Russians for the murder and genocide that they had perpetrated on his relatives and fellow countrymen decades before. He spoke of the day when the Ukraine would throw off the Russian yoke, with force if necessary and he was prepared to give his life for this cultural cause. Where was the peace, let alone sustainable peace?

As peacekeepers for UNPROFOR, we would set up safety zones where the Croats, Serbians and Muslims would pass through our check-points, temporarily surrendering their weapons. In the safety zone, they would meet with family members, have picnics, make love. At the end of the day, they would pass through our check points, retrieve their weapons and for several more days they would slaughter each other until the next safety zone was created when the process would be repeated. If they could be at peace for one day, where was the motivation to work toward sustainable peace? Unfortunately, the negative forces within and outside UNPROFOR and the UN who profited from the war and violence were stronger than the positive peacemaking and peacekeeping forces.

As a certified human resource professional in my civilian employment, I have been responsible for resolving conflict in the workplace. My training has included forms of ADR and employing instruments such as the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Mode Instrument. I have also been certified as a Harassment Advisor & Investigator for the federal government. None of the methodologies or instruments has resulted in the sustainable resolution of conflict and sustainable peace in the workplace for me or any of my colleagues; the formats have inherent faults. In fact, increased hostility and violence often resulted, mostly in the form of passive indirect aggression.

After thirty-five years of first-hand exposure, I have not experienced methods of policing, peacekeeping or conflict resolution that have resulted in sustainable peace. Conflict has only been managed, at best, in some instances. More often, it has been tolerated. As an example, the unspoken motto of police officers today is 'to go home safely at the end of their shift'. This translates into operating on the periphery of conflict incidents, not resolving conflict. As a UN Peacekeeper, the spoken motto is 'to go home safely at the end of the tour'. Although I and some of my peacekeeper colleagues attempted to implement peaceable initiatives, none was sustainable because the system was unwilling and incapable of addressing the conflict from a culture of peace perspective. More to the point, there were stronger forces that benefited from the cultures of war and violence than a culture of peace. For thirty-five years, I have been frustrated by the inaction but motivated to transform the system. The impetus for this research reflects the motivation. Having experienced a culture of peace in other micro environments, I can say with confident that sustainable peace is possible.

1.8 Scope and Limitations of the Research

The scope of this research is limited to the hypothesis – that there are similarities between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level, and that education and praxis at the latter will facilitate

intervention at the former. The learning process is bottom-up. This will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace. As the research is not longitudinal, finding will neither prove nor disprove definitively the submission that peace building, peace maintenance and the prevention of conflict will be facilitated at the macro level as individual mature and adopted a culture of peace, and move into macro organizations in the fullness of time. Instead, I submit that that peace building, peace maintenance and the prevention of conflict should be facilitated as a result of the maturation process. The latter is an extrapolation of the hypothesis and will be the subject of longitudinal post-doctoral research.

The subjects for this research, although from varying cultural backgrounds, were residents of Canada, some for weeks and months while others for decades. Some were born outside Canada while others were citizens by virtue of birth or domicile status. While they all spoke freely of their cultures, their Canadian residence may have influenced their perspective one way or another – they may have been more honest or more reticent to discuss their true feelings. As an interviewer with thirty-five years experience, I did not sense any reluctance but acknowledge that it could have occurred.

Language is the most influential characteristic of culture as reflected in the hypothesis. The interviews were conducted and this thesis is written in the English language that has inherent strengths and limitations. Just the English terms culture, culture of war, culture of violence and culture of peace have cultural aspects that may not be shared by some other non-English speaking cultures. Although these concepts and terms were developed at the UN (UNESCO) with involvement from multi-cultural member states, they are, nonetheless, influenced by the semantic and syntactic structures of the English language. This is a limitation, perhaps not serious but a limitation nonetheless.

1.9 Guide to Chapters

Chapter II presents a literature review on culture, cultures of war, culture of violence and a culture of peace; Chapter III presents a literature review of aggression and violence. The Research Methodology is outlined in Chapter IV. In Chapter V, I describe QSR NUD*IST in detail, outlining how I employed this qualitative software to analyse the findings. Chapter VI presents the interpretation of the findings. The Discussion is presented in Chapter VII followed by the Conclusion in Chapter VIII.

Annexes A to E are provided for reference. Annex A is the questionnaire submitted to the ethics committee, consent form, letter to employers and letter to participant; Annex B is the evolved questionnaire. Annex C is QSR NUD*IST tree and node structure. Annex D is the article: Rippon, Girouard, and Lowey (2004). Annex E provides a table of attributes of the participants. A list of References cited is the last section.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

CULTURE, CULTURES OF WAR AND VIOLENCE, CULTURE OF PEACE

2.1 Overview

Literature reviews can have several goals or perspectives (Cooper 1988). The two most common are the theoretical review and the integrative review. The theoretical review presents theories in an attempt to explain a particular phenomenon, or compare internal consistencies and the nature of the predictions (Yin 1994). Theoretical reviews usually contain descriptions of experiments undertaken, the basis of theories derived, and an integration of abstract concepts.

The integrative literature review is the more common research method because it is more flexible and it is better suited when the literature being examined is both quantitative and qualitative in nature (Cook & Leviton 1981), such as a culture of war and violence and a culture of peace. Cooper (1989) and Rosenthal (1984) concur with Cook and Leviton (1981), suggesting that the purpose of the integrative literature review is to present the state of knowledge and the importance of the research. More importantly, it attempts to identify issues that have been left unresolved.

To enhance the validity of the literature review, Cooper (1989:37) notes, "researchers should undertake their literature searches with the broadest possible conceptual definition in mind." In addition, "to complement conceptual broadness, reviewers should be exhaustive in their attention to the distinctions in study procedures". Commensurate with these observations, I have employed an integrative literature review that addresses the seminal criteria namely, conflict, culture, violence and aggression, culture of war and violence, and a culture of peace.

2.2 Prudence in Interpretation

Prior to embarking on this definitional sojourn, it is important to note that the majority of researchers who study conflict, culture and violence are American, or were trained in western academic institutions. Perhaps more critical is the fact that these western academics publish the vast majority of the research. Hence, it is western (primarily American) academics who define what is acceptable, valid or reliable; also, English is the *de facto* language of science and publication (Brenes & Wessells 2001) which has an influence of how concepts are created and defined. Language is the primary form of communication; language also limits communication. In addition, the issue is not so much about freedom of speech but freedom of hearing. Alasuutari (1995:65) notes,

even though it would seem natural in an everyday mode of thought to see language as a list of names for real objects, the reality is in actual fact not as simple as that. The way we perceive an object and distinguish it as a separate entity depends on the concepts we use. Besides, language uses a lot of words which do not have a referent outside language.

In contrast, those who research and present these topics as parts of a greater whole within a systems conceptualization tend to be non-western (Eagle 1998; see also Montiel & Wessells 2001) and, as such, tend to develop concepts and theories in non-English languages. Their referent is internal to their language which influences how they perceive and define their world – an emic perspective. When their referent is translated into another language – English (for purposes of publication in western journals) – the definitions and descriptions are altered by the etic influence of the other (English) language, and this transformation can result in the context and seminal arguments being diluted or lost altogether. Their findings have not been given wide endorsement for the above mentioned reasons. This marginalization does not reflect equal participation, a cornerstone of a culture of peace, but demonstrates structural violence (Galtung 1972) instead.

2.3 Rationale for the Structure of the Literature Review

I have selected the following topics for discussion in this literature: culture, conflict, aggression and violence, cultures of war and violence and cultures of peace. All are imperative to the hypothesis because they define both the arguments for the thesis and the antithesis. Culture is the nexus of any discussion of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace; hence, this chapter presents a literature review of culture, cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. A culture of peace is ultimately the focus of this research.

Conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence all relate to the same phenomenon but from differing perspectives. Accordingly, I have provided a literature review of these topics in a separate chapter following this one.

Central to cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace is culture. Therefore, I start this literature review with a discussion of culture and summarize with a definition based on the research. I submit that language is integral to culture and fundamental to peace or conflict, more so than any other entity. As a result, I have chosen to discuss language as a sub-set of the topic of culture.

Upon examination of the literature on cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace, it becomes readily apparent that the vast majority of research is dedicated to the former. I will identify why this has occurred and why, in contrast, research on a culture of peace has only been seriously studied since 1989/1990, although the concept of peace has been articulated and proposed as an alternate to war and violence for centuries.

I have reserved the final section in this chapter for a discussion of peace and a culture of peace, not because it is least important; to the contrary, it is the most important and the essence of this thesis. The former discussions on culture, conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence all lay the foundation for a

culture of peace - culture for the argument stated and conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence because they are the antithesis to peace and a culture of peace. Peace and a culture of peace are about wellness; conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence are indicators of illness.

2.4 Culture

Culture is integral to the discussion of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace because it is the common link. It is also diverse and, as a result, needs to be defined for the purpose of this research. Culture can be viewed in terms of anthropological species-specific attributes or those socially inherited “complex systems of meanings created, shared and transmitted ... by individuals in particular social groups” (Avruch, Black, & Scimecca 1998:10). For the purposes of this research, the latter will be employed because of the social context of cultures within the realms of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace.

Within the social context, Faure and Rubin (1993) suggest that there is no single definition of culture. Williams (as cited in Avruch 1998:6) notes that culture is “one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language”. However, there is some commonality among theories that suggest “culture is a set of shared and enduring meanings, values, and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behaviour” (Faure & Rubin 1993:3). Its western root is in Latin *cultura* and *colere* - to care for (Sinclair 1997).

Culture derives its meaning from the art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities and, as such, provides a means of discussion with regard to relationships among individuals within social groups (Goodman 2002). Within these contexts, culture “is a collection of constructs about the way the world is, about the way people are, and about the way both should be” (Bailey 1998:61). Culture includes assumptions about the nature of reality as well as specific information relating to the reality (Spradley 1979:7). Hence, it is the knowledge that people have learned. They glean the

knowledge about their respective culture by drawing inferences from observations and communications. A part of what people learn comes from tacit knowledge – things they know but cannot talk about for cultural reasons.

Culture, according to Bailey (1998), spans nationalism, institutionalism and individualism; hence, it is necessary in order to comprehend conflict. If thrust on individuals, it may exist but above and separate from the individual culture. Aharoni (2002:2) postulates that “culture is a powerful constituent and a vehicle at the core of possible transformations, given that it mediates and transfers ideas, values and intellectual refinement, between generations and between civilizations”. Lynch (2001:211) re-affirms this observation stating, “culture, in my opinion, is the most significant and valuable, yet least understood, causal factor” in conflict.

Gaining a comprehensive understanding of culture is integral to the praxis of conflict resolution. Previously, culture was relegated to the background of conflict research; today, any researcher who does not acknowledge that culture is a fundamental feature of human behaviour, does so at his or her own peril. Like Faure and Rubin (1993), Avruch (1998:5) submits that culture cannot easily be defined because it has a quality of fuzzy-logic; it has “a derivative of individual experience, something learned or created by individuals themselves or passed on to them socially by contemporaries or ancestors”.

Trice and Beyer (1993) also comment that culture has an inherently fuzzy characteristic in addition to being collective, emotionally charged, historically based, innately symbolic, and dynamic. Trice and Beyer (1993) suggest that culture allows individual members to manage collective uncertainty by providing fixed reference points through ideologies. Culture creates a sense of social order from events, patterns and underlying structures (Fritz 1991 and Innovation Associates Inc. 1993) and provides an orientation for sub-cultures and counter-cultures to emerge when individuals experience a sense of anomie. Culture creates continuity through

socialization; disruption occurs when individuals elect counter-cultures or anti-cultures that may result in change if sufficient inertia is created.

Despite its fuzziness, culture helps individuals “build and preserve their own identity” (Faure & Rubin 1993:5). It creates the collective identity for its members as physical, mental, spiritual, cognitive and emotional constructs are developed and individuals bond to and identify with these formations. Approval of appropriate and disapproval of inappropriate behaviours emanate from internal reference groups and interpersonal dependence. As such, culture reinforces ethnocentrism by causing those within the cultural group to hold sacred their ideologies while at the same time distrusting or fearing individuals from out-groups (Trice & Beyer 1993; see also Stangor, Lynch, Duan, & Glass 1992 and Stein 1999). The culture of war and violence that currently engulfs the US psyche is a prime example of the distrust and fear that Americans have for out-groups. President Bush and his neo-conservative (neo-con) ethnocentric administration have been re-elected on a mandate of fear that has been built and preserved as an integral part of the American culture. It is central to the neo-con collective identity and reinforced by the spiritual (fundamentalist religious) movement. The American way of life is held sacred; disapproval, however slight, is viewed as anti-American. As enunciated by President Bush in his post 9/11 speech to the Congress, “you are either with us or against us”. A culture of war does not accommodate middle ground for open and, honest and candid debate; that only exists in a culture of peace.

As Trice and Beyer (1993) note, within culture, subcultures and countercultures can exist. A subculture is a subset of a broader culture that shares some of the characteristics of the latter but is also noteworthy by its uniquely identifiable social behaviour. Subcultures usually tolerate the dominant culture. Most subcultures distinguish themselves from the main culture by style as a form of protest and as an overt gesture of residing outside the mainstream culture; the peace movements in the US are examples.

In contrast, the counterculture or anti-culture denounces the dominant culture and repudiates overtures to adapt. It consciously and deliberately rejects the values of the mainstream culture, and demands complete rejection of this dominant culture, often through revolution. Both subcultures and countercultures provide a sense of identity for their members (Momiroski 2003), especially when they wear distinctive clothing in the form of uniforms – ‘flying their colors’. The quintessential example of the anti-culture is the 1955 film, *Rebel Without a Cause*, in which Marlon Brando states that he is against what ever the government stands for which, at the time, was a culture of war (Macarthyism and the war on communism) as manifested in curtailment of democratic freedoms – déjà vu 2004. During this period in American history, the state was attempting to enforce a culture of war, top-down from a macro level. Citizens, as reflected in the Brando character, were rebelling from the bottom-up micro level. This process suggests that culture is learned bottom-up starting at the micro individual stage.

In a paradoxical expression, Faure and Rubin (1993:2) references Herriot, a twentieth century French politician, who proposes that culture is “what remains when one has forgotten everything [because it] captures one of the most salient properties of culture: the fact that it is not a matter of substance but a way of thinking or acting of which the subject is typically unaware”. Commensurate with Avruch’s (1998) interpretation, Faure and Rubin (1993:3) provide a more contemporary definition of culture as

an aggregate product of the processes occurring in human society
... that typically consists of such social phenomenon as beliefs,
ideas, language, customs, rules and family patterns. Culture also
expresses itself in artefacts and physical objects such as paintings
or handicraft.

Hence, it is essential for individuals to be cognizant of their respective cultures when required to socialize or communicate within that or any other culture because it takes its meaning from the dynamic interaction of such entities within a systems environment and prescribes the parameters of acceptable or unacceptable

behaviours. The overt and covert characteristics of culture - language, artefacts, behaviours and semiotics - all create meaning that can be correctly interpreted or misinterpreted within the system; the former tends to reflect a culture of peace where the latter is more characteristic of cultures of war and violence.

In a similar vein, Hedges (2002:3) notes that, specific to cultures of war and violence,

war forms its own culture. The rush of battle is a potent and often lethal addiction, for war is a drug ... War exposes the capacity for evil that lurks not far below the surface within all of us. And this is why for many, war is so hard to discuss once it is over. The enduring attraction of war is this: Even with its destruction and carnage it can give us what we long for in life. It can give us purpose, meaning, a reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness of much of our lives become apparent. War is an enticing elixir. It gives us resolve, a cause. It allows us to be noble.

Shakespeare, in *Coriolanus* (Act 4, Scene 5), makes a similar observation,

First Servingman –

let me have war, say I; it exceeds peace as far as day does night; it's spritely, waking, audible, and full of vent. Peace is a very apoplexy, lethargy; mulled, deaf, sleepy, insensible; a getter of more bastard children than war's a destroyer of men.

Second Servingman –

'Tis so: and as war, in some sort, may be said to be a ravisher, so it cannot be denied but peace is a great maker of cuckolds.

First Servingman –

Ay, and it makes men hate one another.

Likewise, peace also has its own culture and the prerequisites for a culture of peace are based upon the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action (Rippon 2004). However, unlike peace, in war "power trumps everything, including culture ...

and the effects of culture are limited in any situation in which *force Majeure* can be evoked (Avruch 1998:48). Case in point is the position of the US as the sole dominant power in the world – *Pax Americana*. US military power trumps other cultures, especially those that overtly challenge the Bush administration and its culture of war and violence. The US is the current *force majeure*.

Knowledge of culture and cultural differences is essential to conflict resolution. Failure to do so may well lead to an increase in violence. Citing, as an example, the failure of Israel to fully comprehend the cultural significance of the cultural logic of deterrence in the war with Egypt, Avruch (1998:54-55) notes,

Israeli use of massive force violated Egyptian understanding of the conventions for vengeance and retribution; in particular, the Israeli's misunderstood Egyptian notions of proportionality. The cultural logic of Israeli deterrence was that the 'more disproportionate the punishment, the greater the victim's compliance Unfortunately ... Egyptian rationality refused to conform to the Western, utilitarian model designed by Israeli strategists'. What the Egyptians regarded as highly disproportionate vengeance had the effect of shaming and humiliating them ... a loss of honor. To erase the shame and regain lost honor, they had to support further attacks against Israel. Continuing Israeli reprisals ensured this support.

There was an incorrect assumption, from Avruch's (1998) perspective, on the part of the Israelis that the Egyptians shared the Israeli concept of cultural cost and benefit. Israel was employing the United States doctrine of the use of overwhelming military force to win the war in the shortest time and with the fewest (Israeli) casualties. The use of overwhelming force has proven to be a very effective military *modus operandi* within a culture of war, as demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War, but only in the short term. It neither enhances peacebuilding or peacekeeping in the short-term nor commitment to a culture of peace in the longer-term. It is unsustainable learned behaviour.

Snibbe (2004:23) supports the argument that it is important not to violate cultural norms. "European-Americans are likely to view themselves as fundamentally

independent, separate and unique, while people from many other cultural contexts are likely to view themselves as fundamentally interdependent, connected and relational". The former are more concerned with individual achievement and high self-esteem while the latter tend to be motivated by the desire to save face, and to maintain social expectations. "Concerns with self-esteem versus face show that while people everywhere want to have positive self-views, cultures differ in what a positive self-view entails".

2.4.1 Learning Culture

Within any one culture, there are levels of sophistication and adherence or refinement. Thus, culture is initially gleaned from observation and modified through operant or classical conditioning, but later becomes a social phenomenon. From this transformative process, we interpret culture as socially learned dynamics of physical, emotional, cognitive and spiritual experiences, interacting within a systems environment. Within any one cultural setting there are differing dimensional characteristics that may not be stable. Avruch (1998:5) suggests that "culture is always psychologically and socially distributed in a group". Accordingly, each person exemplifies many cultures, some of which come into conflict with each other.

Hall (as cited in Sanson & Bretherton 2001:206) suggests that culture is learned at three levels. First, it is learned at childhood and is viewed as the foundation from which all values evolve. What is learned at this level tends to be sacrosanct and will not normally be altered. Second, clusters of behaviours that become part of a culture can be learned informally and involves imitation. There are tacit rules associated with this form of cultural learning and violation of these rules may result in discomfort being felt. Third, is technical learning from a formal or informal teacher or mentor to a student, "technical changes are specific, readily observed, and talked about and transmitted to others".

If behaviour is learned and culture is an aggregate of learned behaviours, then memories are integral to culture. Bartlett and Edwards and Middleton (as cited in Waddell 1998:13-14) note,

emphasize that remembering is social in at least two ways – content and process. This is primarily because the content of what we remember is based largely on what is communicated to us by others, and secondarily because the very process of remembering is part of social settings such as conversations, rituals and so forth.

What an individual remembers about their respective cultures at a micro level is influenced through social identity at a macro level. Hence, to change from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace, would require relearning through social identity from the group, and/or re-evaluating through self-reflection and self-analysis. Ultimately, the transformation is individual, reinforced by the reference in-group and out-group (Pedersen 2001; see also Devine-Wright 2001) and by personal growth and an enlightened awareness. Identity is the nexus to this theory.

Identity is influenced, learned and reinforced by the context of the culture (Pedersen 2002). Low context cultures (North American and some European) place greater importance on the autonomy of the individual, where as high context cultures (mostly Asian) de-emphasize the individual in favour of the inclusive group or collective. The former confront directly with a competitive style when conflicts occur while the latter employs a more indirect collaborative and obliging methodology. Low context cultures perceive indirect approaches to be weak and elusive. In contrast, high context cultures view direct confrontation to be impolite and disrespectful. While low context cultures regard the parties and other variables to the conflict as discrete entities and attempt to affix blame, high context cultures see all parties and intervening variables within a holistic systems model.

In a similar vein, Ross and Rothman (1999) propose that individuals identify with and make sense of their own culture as they compare their culture with other cultures. In viewing the latter, they use their own worldview as the standard which often leads to conflict, violence and war if a dominant culture attempts to impose their cultural standard on a submissive culture. Colonialism of past centuries is a classic example as is current US policy that flows from American cultures of war and violence – the macro state attempting to impose on the micro individual. In the case

of colonialism, citizens within the submissive nation-states eventually establishes their own culture starting at the micro level and, in the fullness of time, overthrew the colonial power, some through non-violence (Ghandi in India) and others through violence (perhaps ironically the initial 13 colonies of the current United States of America). Fisher (1998) argues that the mindsets or cultural lenses with which the disputing parties (colonial and submissive nation-states) view the world are crucial factors for understanding and responding to conflict because they provide a sense of identity from which comparisons can be made.

In summary, culture, in the social sense, is heterogeneous, complex, dynamic and profound, while concurrently being situational and responsive to immediate environments. It reflects “complex systems of meanings created, shared and transmitted ... by individuals in particular social groups” (Avruch, Black & Scimecca 1998:10). Culture is connected to external and internal experiences; individuals learn from their environment and cognitively formulate new paradigms which they pass on to others primarily within their in-group but also to those in out-groups with whom they come in contact. These groups include but are not limited to family, religion, professional affiliations, and socio-economic and political environments. Because each of these groups has a cultural dimension, learning is bi- and multi-lateral. No two individuals and, hence, no two groups share the exact same cultural dimensions. This dissimilarity has been the source of differences, conflict, violence and war, and has become fertile soil for cultures of war and violence to grow from a micro individual to the macro nation-state levels.

Culture has a causal facet. Individuals at the micro level internalize their art, religion, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs as cognitive and conceptual schema that they employ as dogma for discussion in relationships among individuals and within social groups – the causal and affect relationship. Some concepts are cursory and inquisitive, while others are empowered with emotions and passion and inspire wars and violence, and great feats of accomplishment in cultures of peace. The language in which culture is communicated from the micro level upward and

from the macro level downward influences the outcome – cultures of war and violence or a culture of peace.

2.4.2 Language

Of the medium for culture – art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities, language is the most influential. Language provides a structure for reality that is based upon perceptions and establishes a hierarchy for experience (Faure & Rubin 1993). Language embodies culture and culture provides the lens through which events are perceived and interpreted, including cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace.

Calvet (1998:10) postulates that wars “would not have occurred in a world with only one language. At the origin of conflict lies the multilingualism of the planet. It is not the only reason for the war but it is a necessary condition”. Calvert (1998:15) further proposes, “In other words, ever since its origins language has been linked to power relations, to power and negotiation, and so it is not impossible to suppose a relation between these forms of power and the evolution of languages themselves”. Language is the preferred weapon of terrorists and hostage-takers, and the preferred olive branch of peace makers and peace builders. It can be used effectively at both the micro individual and macro nation-state levels.

Calvert (1998) also suggests that language can result in physical or structural violence if it is employed for the purpose of domination. Avruch (1998) concurs, suggesting that language based on differences in cultures can be problematic. The rhetoric of war, for example, is replete with the specific language of war that identifies differences often cloaked in reality but presented with myth. Statements such as ‘Indonesia retaliated’ or ‘the United Nations responded’ “makes good poetry, but is semantic nonsense” (LeShan 2002:34). The use of such language abrogates responsibility and allows individuals to attempt to hide from accountability (Sarbin, 2003 & Moerk 2002; see also Montiel & Anuar 2002 and Smith 2002).

Such language was employed during World War II when the Germans disguised their war crimes by employing euphemisms including terms of resettlement, annexation, removal, and final solution. Members of the Khmer Rouge neither spoke of specific annihilation nor used terms such as killing, assassination or execution but instead employed the term 'baoh, caol' which translates as 'sweep, throw out or discard'. Pol Pot spoke of the glorious revolution and admitted to 'mistakes' and 'shortcomings' in an effort to raise his public image (Power 2002). In a similar vein, Saddam Hussein spoke of the Kurdish problem (4 million of Iraq's 18 million population were Kurds in 1987) and the Anfal (the spoils) campaign that was blessed by the Koran. This military action was described by Iraq as a counter-insurgency offensive. During this eighteen month period in which Iraq committed genocide against the Kurds, the United States referred to Hussein's behaviours as transgressions. This allowed the US to provide "Iraq with \$500 million per year in credits so it could purchase American farm products under a program called the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)" (Power 2002:173). Most recently, with the capture of the alleged al-Qaeda leader, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (2003) reported that the United States was not in a rush to bring him to the US because they wanted to take advantage of lenient interrogation laws outside the US, specifically Pakistan (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2003). These choices of language provided the opportunity to differentiate behaviours for in-groups (US) and out-groups (Iraqi detainees). In cultures of war, truth is the first casualty as the macro nation-state withholds truthful information from the micro individual citizen.

As a function of the in-group out-group phenomenon (Litvak-Hirsch, Bar-On, & Chaitin 2003 and Stangor, Lynch, Luan & Glass 1992), language differences have motivated individuals to "demonstrate the excellence of their own language and the inferiority of the others" (Calvert 1998:44), regardless of the fact that they may have originated from a common source. Such power is an instrument of violence for those who will employ it to their advantage. Some languages gained the reputation of being 'high' while others were considered as 'low'. The former were usually

associated with dominant colonial powers while the latter were relegated to the enslaved subjugated or working class. English and French are still considered as 'high' languages, more often used in commerce and international communication. Those who have a mastery of these languages (in-group) reap the financial and status rewards while others (out-groups) remain among the poorest in the global community. In China, as an example, Mandarin is the language of the wealthy merchants (higher-status group) while Cantonese is used by those who toil through manual labour (lower-status group).

2.4.3 Language, Cultures and National Anthems

The relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace can be observed in the language of national anthems. The feeling of superiority of one's own (national) language over another provides a sense of identity (Chattopadhyay, Tluchowska, & George 2004). No where is this sense of pride more expressive than in the verbiage of National Anthems. These official hymns express patriotic sentiments that often reflect the origins of the nation and the corridors travelled – internal or external wars - or more peaceful paths. Many associate their god with their justifiable cause. The emotional motivation for national anthems varies from prayers for the ruling monarch or exalted leader, to allusions of victorious wars with others nation-states or internal uprisings.

Over the past few centuries and specifically in the past few decades, some nations have been embroiled in wars and internal conflict while others have been more peaceful. The former would include: the United States; the former USSR (Soviet); France; Germany; England; Israel and some Arab nations in the middle east; India and Pakistan; African nations – South Africa, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone and the Congo; and East Timor and Indonesia, to name a few. More peaceful nations, notably fewer in number, would include: Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Australia, and Canada. If we examine the language of these two groups, we note language of cultures of war and cultures of peace (National Anthems with English translations were cited from: <http://www.thenationalanthems.com/>).

Looking at the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, we see language that reflects cultures of war and violence. All four stanzas of the Star-Spangled Banner (American) speak of war, rockets, bombs and the need for freemen to stand and fight.

The French 'La Marseillaise' was born out of the French Revolution and speaks of throwing off the vile chains and irons, and tyrannical yoke, and sacred love for the land, liberty and freedom. It is ironic that France, as a colonial power, placed the yoke on so many people in other nations.

The USSR (Soviet) Anthem, 'The Hymn of the Soviet Union', ironically speaks of freeborn republics and the motherland that is the home of the free that was forthcoming from great Lenin; under the communist rule it was far from that. It does speak of the requirement for individual labour and valorous deeds under the victory of communism's deathless ideal.

Like the USSR, China's National Anthem, 'The March of the Volunteers', is born out of internal revolution and the victory of Communism. It speaks of refusing to be slaves (an irony given Communist ideology and doctrine) and a paranoia that requires the building of a new great wall to ward off the enemies fire - its greatest dangers. There is just one stanza in this anthem and it has as its theme the need to fight.

England, the fifth member of the UN Security Council, has a much less bellicose theme to its National Anthem, 'Land of Hope and Glory'. It speaks directly of freedom that has resulted from God who made England mighty (through a culture of war, conquest and colonialism). Although it does not state so specifically, it supports the monarchy. With one stanza, it speaks to England being mightier yet, one assumes through might that flows from a culture of war, conquest, colonialism and mercantilism, sanctioned by God.

Germany, the other great power of the European continent, excluded as a permanent member of the Security Council that was created post-World War II, has a history steeped in war and harsh Prussian behaviour of its neighbouring nation-states or kingdoms. There were several iterations to the modern-day Anthem, starting with 'Lied der Deutschen' (Song of Germans) that was written in 1841 from a melody of the Austrian Imperial Anthem, 'Gott erhalte Frnaz den Kaiser' (God save Franz our Emperor). It changed in 1871 under Wilhelm I and then again after Germany was defeated in World War I; the first verse was modified during the Nazi era. 'Lied der Deutschen' remains the National Anthem of unified Germany, however, some regions have retained their local Anthems of by-gone eras. The lyrics reflect the image of the superiority of the Germanic people, and the need for protection and defence of the fatherland. It is the only Anthem that speaks specifically of women and fidelity, and their inspiration for noble deeds. Some might find the association of women with wine and song to be pejorative.

Although all nation-states have a military force, several have employed them over the past century in defensive roles only and more recently as UN Peacekeeping forces; these countries do not have recent histories of being offensive by nature. They include Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Australia and Canada. The lyrics of these Anthems tend to reflect a culture of peace more than a culture of war.

Switzerland was last engaged in battle in 1515 with, what would be today, France. The Swiss Anthem was written in the form of a prayer or hymn, praising God. There is no mention of conflict or sacrifice for 'our' land.

The Norwegian Anthem, 'Yes We Love This Country', also makes reference to God and the ruggedness of the land that contributes to its beauty. Unlike the Swiss Anthem, it speaks of sacrifice and the need to defend, but to defend in the name of peace.

The Swedish Anthem, 'Thou Ancient Thou Free', like the Norwegian Anthem, speaks of the beauty of the north but makes no mention of a need to defend.

The Australian Anthem, 'Advance Australia Fair', speaks of the beauty of the land and the wealth that flows from toil. Although proclaimed as the National Anthem in 1984, there is no mention of war (as a member of the commonwealth in World War I or II, or other colonial battles of mother England).

The Canadian National Anthem, 'O Canada', has had at least three previous renditions. The current version that was adopted in 1980 speaks of the 'true north strong and free'. The only reference to force can be gleaned from 'standing on guard'; however, it excludes females (daughters) in its reference to 'in all they sons command'. Like others, it calls on God to keep the land glorious and free.

The language in these anthems exemplifies the essence of the proposition made by Friedman (1999) that underlying structures drive outcome. It is, perhaps, not surprising to note that all five permanent members of the UN Security Council have and continue to make unilateral decisions *ex professo*, separate from the UN Charter, to deploy military troops to other nation-states to protect their own perceived respective self-interests. At the same time, they all openly condemn other nations, including other permanent members of the Security Council, for such unilateral decisions – the most recent case being the condemnation by France and China and to a lesser degree Russia of the decision by the United States to invade Iraq.

Sweden, Norway and Canada, in contrast, in the past fifty years have only deployed military personnel as members of a UN peacekeeping force under Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter. These nations-states, nonetheless, tend to exhibit some characteristics of cultures of war as defined by the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action. To this argument, D. Adams (personal communication, 17 August 2004) comments, "in fact, other than ancient Crete, I am hard-pressed to find

any advanced culture that has ever avoided a culture of war and certainly not any nation-state”.

2.4.4 Summary of Language

In summary, language mirrors the national consciousness. This has become problematic for nation-states (primarily first-world countries) that receive increasing numbers of immigrants, because new arrivals with different perspectives on national consciousness can clash with established nationalists, many of whom have fought or relatives have fought and died for the cultural freedoms enjoyed. Such conflicts can be manifestations of deep-seeded intractable emotions. The greater the intractability and perceived differences, the greater will be the potential for violence. Language reflects the culture from which it is derived and reinforces that culture through written and oral means of communication. In language one sees emotion and pride, often linked to other related cultural identities such as art, food, clothing, customs and traditions. Language is the dogma or medium of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace.

2.4.5 Definition of Culture

Culture is the derivative of experience, reflected in art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities; hence, it is situational and dynamic. It is not uniformly distributed and is not the same for all individuals within a cultural group because of personal internalized encoding procedures (cognitive and emotional) and schemas. Culture mirrors the essence of the nation-state at the macro level and the social group and family at the micro level. It is this micro macro link that is integral to the hypothesis of this research. Culture is the nexus and nucleus of cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace; it can contribute to conflict as much as it can be a factor in peace.

2.5 Cultures of War and Violence

The terms, a culture of war and a culture of violence have been used together (Boulding 2000a) and in separate contexts (Christie, Wagner, & Winter 2001). Like

aggression and violence, a distinction needs to be made where dissimilarities exist. Violence is not the sole domain of war nor is war the sole domain of violence. Certain attributes of a culture of war may not emulate a culture of violence and *vice versa*. For example, art depicting clergy in a military uniform at a remembrance service would qualify for the former but not the latter. Likewise, media depicting brutality at a sports event reflects the latter but not the former. 'Sabre-rattling', a term employed to signify an act of aggression and a warning sign of a culture of war, is usually a precursor to war and an omen of the potential for heinous acts of violence. Accordingly, it could be viewed as a characteristic of both a culture of war and a culture of violence.

To bring some semblance of order to the distinction between the terms, Adams (2004) suggests that it is imperative to elucidate the levels of analysis – international and national (macro), community (meso or micro) and interpersonal (micro) (Adams 2004a). In doing so, cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace can be defined in greater clarity. At the international or national level, a violent event tends to be a manifestation of the culture of war and violence; at the community or interpersonal level the non-violent event tends to be an outcome of a culture of peace.

At the macro level, both internal and external cultures of war and peace can prevail. The threat or olive branch can come from another nation-state or from within the country, in the latter through counter- or anti-cultures, motivated by political, economic, social or cultural factors. At the macro-micro level, a culture of war is not an entity *per se*, although euphemisms are used, for example 'war on drugs' or a 'war on crime'. At the micro level, individuals employ similar terminology, such as 'we are at war over this issue', further complicating the communication. As noted by Adams (2004), clarity is needed when defining a culture of war and a culture of violence. Accordingly, I will discuss a culture of war and a culture of violence separately, and relating each to the hypothesis.

2.6 Culture of War

Dulce bellum inexpertis – War is sweet to those who have never fought. There is an inordinate volume of literature on war (Goulding 2002, Griffith 1963, Howard 1976, Shay 1994, Terry 1985, Toynbee 1950 and Tittle 2000), the psychology of war (Hedges 2002, LeShan 2002, Sarbin 2003 and Searle-White 2001), and trauma and posttraumatic stress resulting from war (Forbes et al. 2003, Novaco & Chemtob 2002 and Porter & Haslam 2001; see also van der Kolk, McFarlane, & Weisaeth 1996). But only in the past half century has there been scholarly articles and publications on a culture of war (Adams 2004b, Hedges 2002 and Roche 2003).

Adams (2003a:2) suggests that “war as an institution is based upon a culture of war that is broader and deeper than wars themselves”. Adams (2003a:3) compares war to an iceberg, suggesting:

war is the tip that may or may not be visible at any given moment, where as the culture of war exists continually, supporting particular wars from below and being continually reinforced by the wars that have already occurred.

Historically, war has been motivated by two factors: the first has been external – the defence against attack by other nation-states; the second has been internal – against the threat of revolt or insurrection from within the state, occasionally aided by external forces. The UN Charter speaks to the former, stating that a nation can use force to defend itself against a pre-emptive attack. The US, in their ‘war on terrorism’, has redefined the term ‘pre-emptive’ in a very broad sense to mean that the US can strike first if it perceives a threat. As a visionary in anticipating such an interpretation, Adams (2002:2) suggests, “today, we need to go beyond the UN definition and program, and consider a question that is too hot for diplomats to handle: is the function of war and the culture of war primarily external defence, or do these exist for the sake of maintaining internal power”? The answer

to this question may help guide the path to a culture of peace as opposed to a culture of war.

The idea of a culture of war evolved as a theoretical concept more recently in unison with discussions and definitions of a culture of peace but the process was not easy. The concept of a culture of war was strongly opposed by some states of the European Union as the idea was evolving and discussions at UNESCO were involving more participants from more nations (Adams 2000b). Adams (2000) suggests that resistance to the concept was high because, since recorded history, power for states depended upon war. The United States also rejected the concept, indicating that if they accepted it then it would be difficult to make war.

2.6.1 Media, Propaganda and a Culture of War

A culture of war precedes war itself, the most prominent indicator being forms of verbal and non-verbal communication – oral and written media (propaganda), art (depictions of good versus evil), music (patriotic hymns, anthems and other lyrics of glory and victorious feats), dress (uniforms, badges, insignia), food (C-Rations, K-Rations, Individual Meal Packs) and beverage used in combination with national celebrations (military mess dinners and toasts to our fallen comrades), social (comradeship – band of brothers; legions), to name a few.

A culture of war is facilitated when there is a belief in secrecy (propaganda) that is allowed to flourish, an enemy is perceived to exist (portrayed through the media), there is authoritative governance, power that is based on force, there is an industry for armament (that produces profit and influence), people are exploited, there is a disregard for a sustainable environment, and there is a dominant male culture (Adams 2004b). Of all of these attributes, propaganda is the prominent process employed, carefully crafted to achieve the end-state. Propaganda is planned at the macro level for deceptive implementation at the micro individual level. In the early days of the rise of the Third Reich, Hermann Goering is purported to have said that if you tell enough lies enough times to enough people, they will believe them.

Propaganda is a function of the media. The term 'propaganda state' was first used in reference to the Bolshevik regime in the initial stages of that revolution, to market and sell the Communist party (ironically, the US is employing propaganda to defend their brand of democracy in the same manner). "The regime prohibited dissent and employed posters, advertising, school books, plays, paintings, newspapers, cinema - all of the apparatus of persuasion - to fashion the new socialism man and woman" (Rutherford 2004:185). All these attributes are characteristics of culture in general; hence, the use of propaganda as a mail gauntlet employed with intent and willful blindness to control and limit not only freedom of speech but, more importantly, freedom of hearing is a deceitful weapon in a culture of war. Rutherford (2004:184) notes,

The Iraq crisis and the Iraq War gave notice of the return of the propaganda state. A propaganda state refers to a regime in which the governors, whether official or unofficial, employ a constant stream of messages to propel the population toward some desired condition of right thinking and right acting. The propaganda state is the dark shadow of democracy, its counter, its contradiction. Both politics are at bottom discursive phenomenon, meaning they are grounded in the manipulation of symbols, words and images, except that propaganda lies more on spectacle and assertion than on argument. The propaganda state thrives when other voices are silenced.

As a means of propaganda, the media glamorize war in film, print, paintings and sculpture (Hedges 2002). A culture of war needs to have identifiable enemy images and the media is complicit in this endeavour (Rippon 2003); if there is no enemy, there can be no war (Adams 2004b). The visual media is the preferred medium to conjure up evil images of the enemy because it is the easiest to manipulate, especially with current digital technology. The term 'glass is not law' has its origin in old English jurisprudence when manufactured glass had so many imperfections that it distorted reality; if a witness to a crime observed the offence through a glass window, the evidence was inadmissible. Today, the camera lens has been perfected beyond what judges sitting in the old Bailey could have imagined but

digital technology has allowed the propagandists to once again distort reality even more so than in past centuries. Secrecy and propaganda in cultures of war have become the benefactors of this contemporary technology.

Through the media, war is not only justified but given a higher status with the Principles of the Justice of War: having a just cause (*jus ad bellum*) - being declared by an authorized body with the right intentions; and, being conducted with proportional use of force to the end state (*jus in bello*) – to minimize collateral destruction and casualties. With these two criteria being met, somehow war becomes and remains moral and honourable, often portrayed through painting of glorious victories, sterile and void of the horrors and carnage of battle.

Those who espouse *jus ad bellum* tend to defend the 'just world' theory, and also tend to support "right wing authoritarian views, political conservatism, the Protestant work ethic, anti-feminism, unsympathetic attitudes toward the poor, and other socially problematic attitudes" (Cejka & Bamat 2003a:22). These attributes are more consistent with cultures of war than cultures of peace.

What is perhaps more alarming is the complacency of attitudes toward a culture of war. Roche (2003:15) stresses,

merely railing against injustice does not accomplish much. But what accomplishes even less is closing our eyes to the massive discrepancies and assuming that the culture of war is sustainable. Action is urgently needed. The goal must be to build a world system that will make war extinct.

While we should never forget the horrors of past wars, the media has become obsessed, motivated by profit, with redefining ever-increasing mythical images of by-gone battles, made easier with current technology that can graphically portray enhanced action scenes of carnage. Violence on the screen sells (Huessman 2002) but only if it can evoke emotions that constantly elevate the narcotic-like rush (Hedges 2002) or ecstasy (Ehrenreich 1997). For this reason, publishers and

producers use terminology and technology that feeds the narcotic-like appetite (Hedges 2002) of the addicted souls to gain market share. As an example, Chopra, Gray and Robin (1999) entitle their book 'Non-violent Communication' *vice* Peaceful Communication. These media-driven depictions, in turn, reinforce the cultures of war and violence through the physiological, psychological and affiliated emotional responses, concurrently experienced with other tangential factors.

2.6.2 Literature and Art, and a Culture of War

In cultures of war, warrior societies have emerged with stories – some factual but more mythical (LeShan 2002) of victories and defeats. Fewer are the images of peace presented in contrast (Meyer 1998). Artists have been commissioned by leaders of the warrior societies, usually monarchs who funded the wars from coffers of the realm, or generals who lead the monarch's armies to victory, to paint their portraits. Boulding (2000a) suggests that there is a dearth of records, literature and art of peace making and peace building because early scribes and artists were few in number and were employed by those in power to record their great warring victories. If you took the king's schilling, you did the king's work. Those who promoted peace had fewer funds to commemorate on canvas or paper their passions for peace. Only in the past century has this trend changed. Education and praxis for peace has emerged from grassroot non-governmental organizations and individuals, some of whom have resources to market a culture of peace. Education and praxis at the micro level is starting to have an impact, commensurate with the hypothesis.

2.6.3 The Psychology of War

The psychology of war is about portraying the enemy as alien, evil, barbaric, uncivilized. We demonize the enemy so that our opponent is no longer human, using demeaning language such as 'gooks', 'the hun', etc.; it is easier to kill a non-human. A most recent example comes from Egyptian Television and its portrayal of the war in Iraq,

Dream TV, an Egyptian service, early on played and later repeated a three-hour discussion by Arabic military experts on why Iraq would defeat the invasion. The language of war was so very different [from the western media version]; coalition troops were called 'aggressors', dead Iraqi soldiers were called 'martyrs', US warplanes were said to target civilian, not military, sites" (Rutherford 2004:156).

Such portrayals allow each side to envision themselves as better, higher, greater; more glorified, moral, ethical, virtuous; as they press the battle. "We speak of those we fight only in the abstract; we strip them of their human qualities. It is a familiar linguistic corruption that has been employed for centuries. Most recently, during the war in Bosnia, "Muslims called the Serbians 'Chetniks'; the Serbian irregulars in World War II, who slaughtered many Muslims. Muslims, for many Serbians, were painted as Islamic fundamentalists. The Croats to the Serbians and Muslims, were branded "Ustashe", the fascist quisling who ruled Croatia during World War II" (Hedges 2002:14). We use Latin phrases to make war honourable – *Dulce et Decorum est Pro Patria Mori* – 'To die for your country is sweet and proper'. We view ourselves, our people, as the embodiment of absolute goodness (Hedges 2002:21).

As Hedges (2002) argues, war provides us with meaning when our lives are void of purpose. Ehrenreich (1997) also describes this psychological transformation that separates peace from war in the mind of the warrior, the warrior society and the society that supports the war as a whole. In a similar vein, (Brady 2003:21) comments that a culture of war and specifically the engagement of war

has been one of the few social initiations that binds together this otherwise wide variety of masculine rites and traditions. Whatever the economic or political reason for war, the elements of ritual cannot be ignored, especially when wars are waged for causes, to affirm national values, and to vindicate and celebrate the national past – pridefully making group and individual identity one. So many of the rituals of wounding and initiation are either primarily or exclusively for men because they do not just confirm that the candidate is a man. Especially in more primitive cultures, when war is endemic and every man is actually or potentially a warrior, they

also emphasize that the candidate is expressly not a woman, and that manhood is eternal.

Much of the psychology of war focuses on the warrior. Being an actual warrior bestows the highest honours on those who are admitted to the special class of heroes who are “not just any men, [but] specifically warriors who defended the family, the tribe, and later even larger groups” (Braudy 2003:22). This initiation under fire reinforced the importance of the military within a society and the role of the male as the leader but also reaffirmed the survival of the society. “The warrior depends for his superior weapons (among other things) on the labor of others, and at the same time, it is his weaponry that enables him to exploit the labor of others” (Ehrenreich 1997:147). Hence, a culture of war has been intrinsically woven into the authority to engage in the just war and govern (exploit the labours of others) the just society by the concomitant authority.

As it relates to the hypothesis in this research, the *raison d'être* remains one of defining war in greater clarity in order to definitively establish the parameters of the antithesis – peace. Like other concepts, the terms ‘war’ and ‘conflict’ have been used interchangeably in research and literature (Spence 1999). Conflict has become the new-age term for armed engagement because the term ‘war’ has evolved as a socially unacceptable expression; conflicts have become tolerable and the management and resolution of conflict honourable pursuits. The distinction between war and conflict is more political than practical. The same soldiers who fought in Europe between 1939 and 1945 and in Korea between 1951 and 1953 could not distinguish a difference yet the former was a war and the latter a conflict or police action¹ by political definition.

Wars officially commence with formal declarations and end with formal peace treaties. Conflicts, on the other hand, seem to grow and intensify and then subside, yet may never have a defined start or end point. President George W. Bush

¹ Research needs to be conducted to bring clarity to the definition of war and conflict. This Herculean effort is beyond the scope of this study.

declared a 'war on terrorism' but the subsequent deployment of military Units to Afghanistan and Iraq was not an official act of war, and individuals forcibly taken to Guantanamo Bay were not prisoners of war but detainees who would be released after the 'war on terrorism' was won, when even that end state might be reached. The US led military engagement in Iraq was declared over in May 2003 but there have been more casualties (military and civilian) since the 'end of hostilities' was declared than occurred in the preceding months of the military offensive.

2.6.4 Definition of a Culture of War

In summary, a culture of war is the accumulation and culmination of all factors that define culture itself - art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities, but promote war. Where culture is the derivative of experience, "socially [and] ... psychologically distributed within a population" (Avruch 1998:18-19), a culture of war also exhibits and, accordingly, can be defined by these attributes. But, as Adams (1984) clearly enunciates, war is not instinctive.

I define war as armed fighting between nation-states or groups within a nation-state engaged in a civic war that involves killing and destruction. A formal declaration of war does not have to be made. I acknowledge the plethora of agenda that has caused some nation-states and their leaders to use the terms 'war' and 'conflict' in the same context or separately as political expediency dictates. I would argue that confusion has crept into the parlance for political purposes. Where conflict was once used in the micro interpersonal context, it is now employed to describe undeclared wars at the macro level; the UN uses the term 'conflict' because its *raison d'être* is peace and not war. In a *lingua franca* expression, 'if it walks, squawks and looks like a duck, it's a duck'.

I would argue that homeopathic clarity is the antidote to the spin doctor's prescription of propaganda. In war, there is conflict just as there is violence but conflict and violence are not the sole domain of war; conflict and violence wane and

fluctuate. In war, there have also been incredible acts of peace, compassion and kindness.

2.7 Culture of Violence

There is a burgeoning body of research and literature on violence (Felson 2002, Meloy 1997, Tedeschi & Felson 1994 and Toch 1997) much dedicated to violence in the workplace (Chappell & Di Martino 1998, Chenier 1998 and Fowlie 1999), media violence (Anderson & Murphy 2003, Bushman 2003 and Vidal, Clemente, & Espinosa 2003), domestic violence (Allen & St. George 2001, Perilla, Bakeman, & Norris 1994 and Walker 1999) and violence prevention (Cox & Leather 1994, Lowey, Murdock, & Coppard 2000, Maxwell 1998 and Murdock, Coppard, & Lowey 1999)}. However, less has been dedicated to the specific topic of a culture of violence (Elias 1997). As previously discussed, more often, the term 'culture of violence' is combined with 'culture of war' and presented as a culture of war and violence (Adams 2004b, Nordstrom & Robben 1995 and Spence 1999).

Interpersonal violence at the micro level in the form of direct/indirect, physical/verbal, and active/passive aggression (Buss 1961, 1995) tends to dominate the literature. Structural violence (Galtung 1990) may be a causal factor of violence between or among individuals, however, there are a myriad of other intervening variables (Kowalski & Leary 1999, Rippon 1997a and Skarlicki, Folger, & Tesluk 1999) including low levels of emotional intelligence (Goleman 1995, Jordan, Ashkanasy, & Hartel 2002), personality disorders (Dutton 1998), and rules and regulations that are perceived to be annoying (O'Leary-Kelly et al. 1996). To engage in inter- or intra-personal violence at this micro level is an individual decision. For this reason, the Manifesto 2000 (Adams 2003b) was developed by UNESCO as an integral part of the Program of Action (Adams 2004b). Adams (2004b) demonstrates the relationship among the Manifesto 2000, the various UN Resolutions and the Culture of Peace New Network (CPNN), thus re-affirming the micro macro linkage between these international, national, community and individual levels.

No single level exists in isolation or independent of the others; they all inter-relate within a system (Azar 1986, O'Shry 1996, Friedman 1999 and Nye 2003). The seminal issue is not that they function mutually but the direction of the causal relationship. Archer and Gartner (1984) and Ember and Carol (1994) argue that the direction is downward from the macro warring behaviour to the micro interpersonal violence. Supporting this research, (Adams 2004a) also asserts that "the culture of war at a national level is a major causal factor for a culture of violence at the local level, but not vice versa". In support of my research, Adams (2004a) notes that there is a similar need for analysis to examine the relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, not just for a culture of war and a culture of violence. This forms the basis of the hypothesis for the research.

Elias (1997:119) suggests that a culture of violence has developed into "a way of life, proliferating throughout American culture", permeating every-day activities, especially sporting events and other forms of visual entertainment. Specifically, gang violence is a "pivotal corrosive fact of societal life" (Childs, 2003:227) that reinforces and has been reinforced by a culture of violence. Through media outlets, American-style culture of violence has been broadcasted to virtually all other nation-states and has consequently influenced the behaviours of individuals world-wide. The roots of violent conflict, according to Roche (2003:26) "are generally deep and often the result of long-standing tensions between groups". This form of violence is enhanced and compounded by the easy access to weapons – implements and artefacts of a culture of violence and a culture of war that are constantly portrayed via the media as not only normal but acceptable instruments to be employed when dealing with differences and conflict.

According to Toh (2002), media violence through films and videos, and war toys promotes cultures of war and violence. This is the micro macro link of which other researchers have identified and I refer to in the hypothesis. We tolerate violence because we have become numbed through the media portrayal of violence at home, at work and in our communities. Part of the numbing flows from the mixture

of fact with myth (LeShan 2002). The media glamorize violence as it glamorizes war but the former has been portrayed in ever-increasing gore and detail (Anderson & Murphy 2003, Coyne & Archer 2004 and Huessman 2002). I would agree that the media has become complicit with the perpetrators of violence (Rippon 2003) but more problematic is the absence of action to reverse the escalation. Speaking to this point, Stewart (2004:8) proposes, "the world is not dangerous because of those who do harm, but because of those who look at it without doing anything".

Remaining complaisant allows violence in all its forms to flourish, unabated. Galtung (1990) differentiates violence into four categories, namely direct, structural, cultural and ecological, each reinforcing the other within an overlapping model. The first, direct violence is visible and active, akin to Buss' (1961, 1995) category of direct/physical aggression; Galtung (1990) does not include in his interpretation direct/verbal aggression.

The second, structural violence, is a manifestation of unjust structures – policies, procedures, rules and regulations that discriminate against classes of individuals, thus inhibiting their full potential for personal or professional growth. It is a manifestation of inequitable political and economic power. The environments can be political, economic, social, legal or religious but they all assure inequitable access to resources. Boulding (2000a:161) provides further clarity, stating that structural violence is "the patterning of social institutions that results in violence, oppression, and injustice for victim sectors of society, whether locally, regionally, or globally".

The third, cultural violence, incorporates values and mores that justify violence. It transforms direct and structural violence into legitimate entities that have the exhibit visual and affective characteristics of being moral and ethical because of the psychological dimensions that portray collective acceptance (Montiel 2001; see also Montiel & Wessells 2001). This legitimization validates attitudes, prejudices and abuse of those who are not a part of the in-group culture.

The fourth, ecological violence, encompasses all non-sustainable behaviours, including pollution, deforestation, pollution of outer space with nuclear waste, and over-consumption of renewable and non-renewable resources. Roche (2002) elaborates on the detrimental and, in some instances, the irrecoverable impact that militarism and globalization have had on the planet.

Spence (1999:4) affirms that these four categories of violence within a self-reinforcing system,

... direct violence as an event, structural violence as a process and cultural violence as the bedrock on which the former two are built. Cultural violence justifies structural violence, the effects of which produce ecological and direct violence.

The roots of violence, Roche (2002:26) suggests, “are generally deep and often the results of long-standing tensions between groups”. Within this context, Roche (2002) is referring to violence in wars. Within a social context, violence is “a universal scourge that tears at the fabric of communities and threatens the life, health and happiness of all” (Roche 2002:27). Because it has existed, unabated, for so long, it is perceived as the norm, without recourse. Griffin (1992). Featherston & Nordstrom (1994) describes how a culture of violence becomes the norm in terms of the phenomenon of habitus. The inertia is created when a multitude of small decisions made in response to external stimuli (constant threat of violence) influences behaviour to the point that it becomes a habit or second nature – habitus. Education and praxis of these small decisions results in a culture of violence. Commensurate with the hypothesis in this research, a similar argument can be made - education and praxis of peaceful behaviours should result in a culture of peace.

Applied institutionally, crime within a community at the micro level tends to reflect social injustices, consequently, structural violence (Rippon 2002). Education and praxis for peaceful (socially acceptable) behaviours for criminals has historically

been top-down with no concern for the cultural environment of the prison; the result has been high recidivism. Applying the hypothesis from this research, I would postulate that if the education and praxis were bottom-up with concerted emphasis on cultures internal to the prison and external in the broader community, then recidivism would be lower. Post-doctoral research of previous analysis (Rippon 2002) will test this hypothesis in a longitudinal study; it is beyond the scope of this research.

2.7.1 Definition of a Culture of Violence

A culture of violence is the accumulation and culmination of all factors that define culture itself - art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities, but promote violence. Where culture is the derivative of experience, "socially [and] ... psychologically distributed within a population" (Avruch 1998:18-19), a culture of violence also exhibits and, accordingly, can be defined by these attributes. All war is violent but all violence is not confined to war. Violent behaviour in a non-war environment may facilitate violent acts during war and *vice versa* because it is a progression of learned and reinforced behaviour. Likewise, learning to be violent in war (i.e.: being trained to become a soldier) will facilitate violent acts during war (Grossman 1996) and during peace, most often immediately after repatriation.

2.8 **Culture of Peace**

Pax potior bello – Peace is more powerful than war. The essence of this research focuses on cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace, the latter being the most important. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, I have reserved the final section for the discussion on peace and a culture of peace, not because it is least important; to the contrary, it is the most important and the essence of this thesis and relates directly to the hypothesis. Peace and a culture of peace are about wellness; conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence are indicators of illness.

The concept of peace has occupied the spirits of humankind for ages although history is more replete with epics of the rise and fall of warring empires than tales of peaceful resolution of differences (Ehrenreich 1997; Galtung 1981). Despite the fact that the concept of peace has existed for centuries, the specific terminology 'culture of peace' is a more recent parlance and was only formally adopted by the UN as a result of the yeoman work of David Adams and Frederico Mayor. The research in the past decade has grown exponentially but it remains small relative to publications on war and violence. Commenting on the overwhelming body of literature on war and the dearth of literature on peace, Finley (2003:150) asks the question, "how can I teach peace when the book only covers war?".

The definition of a culture of peace is not limited to apathy in the face of violence; instead, it is "much more than an 'act of abstaining' and encompasses a positive, action component that is directed toward the reduction of social injustice and the building of cultures of peace" (Mayton 2001:143). Sandy and Perkins (2002) propose that there are states of hot and cold war, and cold and hot peace. Hot war is what is commonly referred to as war, the aim of which is the destruction of the enemy through violent means.

During periods of cold war, there is no actual overt sustained engagement of military forces although there is posturing for hot war with saber-rattling rhetoric, and positioning of weapons and troops. Galtung (1996) makes a similar distinction between negative peace (the mere absence of war) and positive peace (actively working to resolve issues that have and currently contribute to war and violence).

Cold peace is characterized by the absence of actual war and posturing for war. However, there is also an absence of initiatives to establish sustained peace, including efforts to develop trust, respect and honest communications. Combatants remain 'on guard' in the event that they may be required to engage a traditional or yet unknown enemy; the cold war mentality continues to fuel this cognitive conundrum. Cold peace may be characterized by direct or indirect, active or passive

aggression in the form of ostracizing or creating economic sanctions. These behaviours in the guise of cold peace often lead to hot war which reinforce the need to remain 'on guard'. Cold peace can become peacekeeping that involves separating warring factions or conflicting groups. The United Nations peacekeeping mission in Cyprus that has lasted for over three decades is a prime example. Unfortunately, peacekeepers have traditionally been employed in defensive peacemaking roles without strong peacebuilding mandates. Only recently has this changed with some new UN peacemaking mandates for hot peace as long-term objectives.

Hot peace involves active peacebuilding between past, present and potentially future enemies, opponents or antagonists. Energies are focused on fostering endurance toward actual and perceived threats of all forms of aggression and violence through cooperation and integration, with or without the assistance of a third party facilitator. To facilitate hot peace, Galtung (1996) and Woolman (1985) suggest that perceptions of control, identity, inclusion and esteem can best be achieved in smaller social groups that promote wellbeing, the development of relationships, ethical values and conflict resolution. These attributes should be the guiding principles and not materialism that promotes an adversarial climate (Tannen, 1998 and Toulmin 1999).

Aron (1966) draws a similar distinction to hot and cold war but suggests that peace is merely the absence of state violence. The peace of *Pax Romana* and other empires was a negative peace that existed when conquered people acquiesced to imposed military rule of law. The Roman general, Vegetius, is purported to have stated, *Vis pacem, para bellum* (if you wish peace, prepare for war). The alternative to this realpolitik view is positive peace which exists when social and political conditions overtly promote the elimination of conditions that contribute to exploitation or structural violence. The latter exists when individuals are denied the right to personal growth and professional development through forms of social repression that impoverishes lives. Galtung (1969) also makes the distinction between negative peace (the absence of war) and positive peace (elimination of entities that underlie

war). Structural violence, according to Galtung (1969), is woven into the social, cultural or economic fabric and is manifested in indirect and insidious behaviours that disallow basic human rights; it is violence without bullets. In summary, negative peace strives for the status quo in the absence of war or violence; its focus is on peacemaking and peacekeeping. Positive peace is proactive and endeavours to resolve past and present issues that have or could lead to conflict, violence or war; its focus is on peacebuilding.

Supporting the pro-activeness of the hot or positive peace concept, Toh (2002:2) defines a culture of peace as a

growing body of shared values, attitudes, behaviours and ways of life based on non-violence and respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, on understanding, tolerance and solidarity, on the sharing of the free flow of information, and on the full participation and empowerment of women.

Toh (2002) proposes that although conflicts arise, resolution must be through non-violent means – peace by peaceful means as opposed to peace by forceful means. The concept of peace by peaceful means reflects the intent of hot peace (Sandy & Perkins 2002) commensurate with the spirit and intent of the UN mandate. In an ironic twist, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his *Agenda for Peace* (Boutros-Ghali 1992) calls for an international quick-response military force to be ‘on stand-by’ for immediate deployment by the UN to achieve peace by forceful means (peace making). By 1994, twenty-one countries had committed thirty thousand troops to this means of achieving this new form of humanitarian peace. The UN also increased the number of military personnel at the secretariat level and staffed a full-time ‘Situation Center’ for military operations (Slim 2000) during this period. Despite the fact that the UN Security Council agreed that prudence was needed before the quick-response force should be deployed, it would appear that the UN’s culture of peace mandate has a culture of war entity – peace by peaceful means but peace by forceful means if necessary.

Within the context of this shift, Toh (2002) continues to assert that peace by peaceful means is the only sustainable solution. Toh (2002) asserts that a culture of peace is both a vision and a process; the vision cannot be forgotten or usurped by the use of force. Fully peaceful cultures do exist but they are few in number; likewise, purely warring cultures exist but are not common. More frequently, there are cultures that have developed means of balancing peacefulness and aggression (Boulding 1999).

Speaking of the need for an equilibrium in inner city violence, Childs (2003:248) comments on a balance or counter-current to violence that is a manifestation of 'positive culture leadership' (PCL). "The transformation from violence to non-violence, in the face of a society that generally says such change is not possible, is the key aspect of PCL". The transformation is facilitated when creativity is enhanced.

Boulding (2000) also discusses the role of balance and creativity in her definition of a culture of peace, (Boulding 2000b:196) - "a mosaic of identities, attitudes, values, beliefs, and institutional patterns that lead people to live nurturantly with one another and the earth itself without the aid of structured power differentials, to deal creatively with their differences, and to share their resources". Boulding (2000) adds the dimension of ecology to the criteria for creativity and balance that is absent in other research.

Creativity is one of the foundation corner stones for peace according to Roche (2002) who proposes that all humans have a right to peace in the holistic environment that incorporates ecology. Only by guaranteeing a human right to peace will balance be achievable and the planet sustainable.

Lasting peace is a prerequisite for the exercise of all human rights and duties. It is not the peace of silence, of men and women who by choice or constraint remain silent. It is the peace of freedom –

and therefore of just laws – of happiness, equality, and solidarity, in which all citizens count, live together and share (Roche 2003:231).

Examining gender balance and peacemaking, Cejka and Bamat (2003b) note that women tend to have more practical and rational motivations than men. The former define peace within the context of universal human needs and seek practical solutions to build cultures of peace. While both men and women are motivated by practical and rational factors, men are more motivated by ideological criteria than women. The anti-thesis that biology does not make men more aggressive than women (Adams, 1992) presents a similar assertion. Cejka and Bamat (2003) caution not to over-generalize gender differences or similarities in the methods used by men and women as they advance cultures of peace. The goal remains consistent; it is only the paths taken that vary.

2.8.1 The Negative Argument

The Seville Statement makes a negative case for a culture of peace by stating that war is not inevitable. In addition, it does not identify the factors that lead to war (Adams 2000a). Reardon (1988:16) also makes a negative statement by saying that “peace is the absence of violence in all its forms”. Hakvoort and Hagglund (2001) note that children and adolescents refer to peace as the absence of war. In a similar vein, Galtung (1996) defines a culture of peace as the absence or reduction of violence of all kinds or non-violent and creative conflict transformation.

These negative definitions require knowledge of violence because peace is the absence of violence or violence is the absence of peace. Either way, they are mutually exclusive. I suggest that the problem with these definitions is that they do not account for the mere suppression of hostilities. I would argue that it is not sufficient to conclude that failure to actively engage in aggression or violence presumes that peace exists. During the Cold War, there were no overt sustained military engagements between the two super powers in their own territories

(Lederach 1997) but it would be naive to suggest that peace existed². Wars were fought within or over nation-states that aligned themselves with the superpowers.

2.8.2 The Positive Argument

Other researchers make a positive case for peace and a culture of peace. Mayton (2001:143) suggests that “non-violence implies much more than an ‘act of abstaining’ and encompasses a positive, action component that is directed toward the reduction of social injustice and the building of cultures of peace”. From a psychological perspective, Mayton (2001) describes characteristics of active non-violence and exemplifies his descriptors with behaviours of those who have been successful in bringing cultures of peace to fruition, including Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King.

Consistent with this theme of building cultures of peace, (Boulding 2000a:1) starts her discourse on peace culture with a positive statement, namely “a peace culture is a culture that promotes peaceable diversity”. Boulding (2000) defines a peace culture through a dichotomy of war and the concept of the warrior god, and utopia and the peace movement. Hence, she defines the parameters of a culture of peace and a culture of war.

Galtung (1996) proposes that peace studies have similarities to health studies; both require diagnosis-prognosis-therapy. If one focuses solely on illness, the probability of becoming well is low; if the emphasis is solely on wellness, the probability of becoming and remaining well is much higher. Peace studies are multidimensional and must be approached within a context of systems thinking (Flood 2002, Friedman 1999 and Rippon & Anderson 2002; see also Kodama 2004).

Self-restoration, according to Galtung (1996), from a culture of violence or illness to a culture of peace or wellness can best be achieved and sustained with

² One may argue to the contrary in the case of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 or the UN ‘policing action’ in Korea a decade earlier.

limited outside intervention. One only has to examine the history of virtually all UN peacekeeping missions to realize that if peacekeepers retain control for peace building without involvement of the population, peace will not be sustained (Last 1997 and Spence 1999). From my experience as a U.N. peacekeeper in the former Republic of Yugoslavia, I agree with Galtung (1996) and assert that increasing internal capacity of self-restoration with some symptoms of illness is a better principle than being symptom-free with external controls superseding internal self-restoration capability. If health studies are similar to peace studies, then it is necessary to define the parameters wellness (peace) in order to classify illness (war and violence), and the contagion aspect (Gladwell 2000 and Youmans, Paterson, & Sommers 1975) within a culture.

2.8.3 Maturation Toward a Culture of Peace

A culture of peace as an alternative to cultures of war and violence developed momentum as the means of engaging in war became more lethal and control of weapons of mass destruction slipped from the control of a few to many. As lethality increased, there was a transformation in the type of casualties from male soldiers being primarily at risk to civilians – women, children and the elderly outnumbering military casualties. The Cold War fuelled the arms race but it also was the motivator for the study of peace. Post World War II, the Council on Peace Research in History was formed in the United States followed by the creation of the International Peace Research Association and the European Working Group on Peace Research in History. Concurrently, UNESCO promoted bilateral communication between European nations that traditionally had held animosities. UNESCO itself was founded on the premise that education dedicated to learning about peace was a prerequisite to eliminating fear and mistrust that formed the foundation for cultures of war and violence. Education will increase “awareness of structural inequities and power imbalances” (Avruch 1998:49). Praxis will increase involvement and reinforce education.

As a part of the culture of peace program, UNESCO defined a culture of peace at its 28th general conference in 1995:

It consists of a set of values, attitudes and behaviours that reflect and inspire social interactions and sharing, based on the principles of freedom, justice and democracy, tolerance and solidarity; that reject violence, and endeavour to prevent conflicts by tackling their roots and to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation; and that guarantee everyone the full exercise of all rights and the means to participate fully in the endogenous development of their society. (United Nations General Assembly 1998:5 as cited in Brenes & Wessells 2001)

The culture of peace program has moved from being just an UNESCO initiative to the United Nations as a body. The year 2000 was declared by the UN to be the International Year For The Culture of Peace, and the decade 2000-2010 to be the International Decade For A Culture Of Peace And Non-Violence For The Children Of The World.

The Seville Statement on a culture of peace was developed in 1986 by a team of international scientists who gathered to address the myth that violence is inherent in humans. The Statement was adopted by UNESCO in 1989 and laid the foundation for the culture of peace program (Adams 1989). The culture of peace as a specific concept was officially described in 1989 at the Conference of the International Congress on Peace in the Minds of Men at Yamoussoukro, Ivory Coast. The Declaration from this conference was subsequently included in the documentation of the UNESCO conference held in November of this year, along with the Seville Statement of Violence which provide the scientific credentials to the proclamation that “the same species that invented war is capable of inventing peace ... war is based on cultural not biological factors” (Adams 2003a:2). Over the next decade, it became more formalized with United Nations General Assembly resolutions, although, as previously noted, not without resistance.

The UNESCO Program of Action for a culture of peace identifies eight areas that represent cultural aspects that have been central to war and violence, as noted in Table 2-1. Perhaps most important to the Program of Action is the assertion that a culture of peace, and cultures of war and violence are mutually exclusive when these eight areas are applied as criteria. Hence, the transformation from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace encompasses all eight. "Each addresses a cultural aspect that is at the same time the result of war and violence and a condition that makes war and violence possible" (Adams 2000b:261).

Table 2-1
UNESCO's Eight Areas for a Culture of Peace
Within A Program of Action

- Democratic participation
- Tolerance and solidarity
- Participatory communications and the free flow of information and knowledge
- International peace and security, including disarmament and economic conversion
- Education for a culture of peace
- Sustainable economic and social development
- Respect for all human rights
- Equality between men and women

In developing the eight areas and the Program of Action, inter- and intra state wars were examined. Values, attitudes and behaviours of warring nation-states were identified as were the concepts of power, rights, and structures within any one state, and between or among states as they prepare for, engage in and sustain cultures of war and violence. It was determined that these eight areas were necessary and sufficient at a macro level. In 1993, a meeting was held at the United Nations University in Tokyo to develop criteria that could be used to measure the transition from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace.

Democratic participation - Globalization is transforming the power from a democratic process to global corporations and international financial institutions

whose directors and CEOs are not held accountable to the people. Globalization is an authoritarian process that reinforces structural violence and cultures of war and violence. A democratic process replaces a hierarchical structure that characterizes cultures of war and violence at the macro level with a means that allows individuals at the micro level to engage in decision-making and empowerment. Participatory democracy replaces secrecy and control of information.

Tolerance and solidarity - Tolerance and solidarity is a singular inclusive concept in a culture of peace. Tolerance alone can be individual but requires the solidarity of many to gain the requisite inertia to bring about sustainable change. Solidarity reflects inter-group cohesion within a macro micro culture that can unite like-minded individuals at the micro level in a warring or violence cause, but can also unite the powerful and powerless at the micro level in a cause for peace and non-violence (Christie & Dawes 2001). Solidarity is operationalized through mobilization at a grassroots micro stage to build understanding. It cannot be achieved through top-down macro mandates. Together, tolerance and solidarity demonstrate willingness to promote and protract acceptance and patience.

Christie and Dawes (2001) suggest that intolerance is a function of social and psychological paradigms within and outside the bounds of some cultures, including stereotypes, prejudice and racism. Hence, there is a need to comprehend the underlying causes of the intolerance. Acceptance of the concept of tolerance will require psychological transformation and reinforcement of attributes associated with a culture of peace.

In a similar vein, Galtung (1969) suggests that inherent in the concept of tolerance and solidarity is the requirement to eliminate structure-based inequities that contribute to and reinforce structural violence. Similarly, Mayton (2001) postulates that non-violent individuals support self-transcendent values, including social justice and equality. As an example, Gandhi worked toward establishing social justice through non-violence.

Participatory communications and the free flow of information and knowledge

- Secrecy and manipulation of information are precepts of war and violence; they form the nefarious underpinning for propaganda. Once caught in the web, the webmasters are condemned to ply their trade. In the modern political arena, these players are referred to in euphemistic terms as 'spin doctors'.

O, what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive
... Sir Walter Scott

Volumes have been and continue to be written on communication and information processing. Participatory communication and the free flow of information include concepts of freedom of speech and freedom of hearing. Analogues to evidence in a courtroom, these two aspects of communication relate to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. Free speech may be the truth but not the whole truth; the latter emerges when freedom of hearing - the ability to have access to all information - exists.

More recently, research has focused on the influence that culture has on communication and the free flow of information. Aharoni (2002:2) suggests, "what people watch, hear, and read, and the kind of culture, film and literature, and art they are exposed to and absorb, influence their thoughts, feelings and ethics". Aharoni (2002) further suggests that it is the duties of responsible media to ensure that all forms of communication should create a culture of peace and not a culture of war. The seminal issue is one of communication for a culture of peace and not a culture of war and violence. But should war and violence not be communicated? To do so, limits the freedom of hearing. Culture can educate individuals about war and violence, and peace. It requires a balance; excessive media promotion of the brutal detail of war and violence, in the name of education, can re-traumatize primary victims and traumatize secondary and tertiary victims (Rippon 1997b and van der Kolk et al. 1996).

The information technology revolution has enabled those who promote peace to become more successful. *Via* the inter- and intra-net, they can communicate with greater ease and speed. In addition, those who promote peace can more readily publish for a culture of peace for mass readership; freedom of hearing is less problematic because information is no longer controlled by a few at the macro nation-state level. Education and praxis within a culture of peace have been facilitated by information technology which has opened the gates for the free flow of much more information. In the past, the first casualty of war has been the truth because of the ability of the macro nation-state to control information flow to the micro individual level.

Information technology has also spawned new methods of controlling and manipulating information, impinging on the domain of freedoms of speech and hearing from non-traditional dimensions. The concept of information warfare (IW) that focuses on the control and manipulation of communication “is currently being applied well beyond the traditional battlefield, or battlespace as it has come to be known in the age of virtual warfare” (Cronin 2001:1). The purpose of IW is to achieve strategic dominance, a concept that is based on control. Cronin (2001) further suggests that almost anyone can become a warrior in intelligence- and information-based warfare in this age of pervasive and intrusive computers. Ironically, this is an empowering concept whereby a single warrior can gain control over an opponent that is vastly superior in numbers. Information warfare, a contemporary product of a culture of war that curtails the free flow of information does not require education and praxis, especially if a unitary warrior or rogue faction wishes to engage a nation-state in the new battlespace.

International peace and security that includes disarmament and economic conversion – The military machine and even more so the industries that profit from a strong military create a significant inertia for a culture of war. To disarm a military is to disarm a very powerful economic force, a culture of war, which has considerable influence over decision-makers who “opt for military solutions instead of negotiation,

dialogue and compromise” (Adams 2000a:4). Directed at the micro level, Adams (2004) asks a very poignant question – does the mass production of weapons for war, specifically small arms, reinforce interpersonal violence? There is a growing body of research that suggests that it does (Berkowitz 1958 and Meltz 1999).

The challenge to convert armaments to sustainable economic initiatives will require unfettered support from all players, the most influential being non-governing institutions including the corporate elite whose wealth has been built on power and influence, the former derived from corporate militarism. From a governmental perspective, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, an organization whose mandate it is to maintain peace and security, muster the world’s largest military forces, individually expend more on military armament than the entire domestic budget of most other nations, possess most of the nuclear weapons, are the largest arms merchants, and dictate the world economy (Roche 2003:56).

What, then, is the counter force to the big five and the highly influential non-government commercial players. The balance is the equally influential body of non-governmental organizations (approximately thirty-seven thousand to date), and individual commitment and participation in the peace process – the power of the civil society that extend their reach beyond the efforts of formal NGOs (Roche 2003). Some civil society members work from within government while others work externally to influence recalcitrant decision-makers. Roche (2003:224-225) lists fifty paths to disarmament and economic conversion drawn by the troika of understanding, participation and communication that participants in the civil society could employ.

Education for a culture of peace - Education combined with praxis is the nexus and nucleus for a culture of peace because it can negate the negative effect of hegemony, and transform warring values, attitudes and beliefs. Toh (2001:1) postulates, “policies and strategies to transcend violence need complementary educational processes to cultivate values, attitudes and worldviews that are

internalized". In a similar vein, Aharoni (2002) suggests that peace studies and peace culture education should be compulsory courses at all levels of curriculum. Peace education must be pro-active in teaching non-violent means of conflict resolution as viable alternatives to war.

As ordinary people experience critical literacy and empower themselves to participate actively in building a strong civil society to which agencies of state and private power must be accountable in the spirit of authentic democracy, so will all human rights be better protected and promoted (Toh 2002:4).

Transformation through education comes with integration of culture of peace initiatives into curricula, including a holistic perspective to sustainable development and environmental education. This transformation requires active *versus* passive participation. In defence of a sustainable process, some peace educators are critical of superficial efforts to celebrate diversity in schools in the absence of critical understanding of the core issues, and tolerance and solidarity required to support sustained change. Deeper analysis of peace education is beyond the scope of this research.

Sustainable economic and social development - Oppression, authoritarianism and control characterize cultures of war and violence through colonialism and economic exploitation. It also results in extreme poverty that, in turn, contributes to social or structural violence. Sustainable economic and social development cannot germinate in an environment of exploitation and a culture of war.

Historically, economic growth for the few rich nations has been tied to colonial exploitation facilitated through military supremacy – cultures of war and violence. This is not a phenomenon that existed solely in past centuries but continues to thrive today. Previously, the perspective has been east/west with disregard for sustainable economic and social development in southern hemisphere nation-states (Adams, 2003a). Where initiatives have been taken, it has been tied to military aid and the results have tended to favour the north. The arming of southern nations, primarily by

the 'big five' permanent members of the UN Security Council, has not resulted in a fiduciary relationship but has also contributed directly to the instability of the region, not the sustainable economic and social development. It is education for a culture of war and violence and not education for a culture of peace.

Respect for all Human Rights - Article 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter requires member states to be collectively responsible for observance of Human Rights. The term 'observance' does not suggest compliance; hence, violations of Human Rights remain a major issue. Human Rights have not been achieved primarily because it requires a transformation of current attitudes, values and beliefs that built the wealth and power of the few nation-states at the expense of individual Human Rights in most other jurisdictions.

Human Rights are based on the psychology of self and social structures that acknowledges uniqueness. Wedge (1986:59) suggests that if such recognition is denied, individuals who have been marginalized will react with rage and that "many of the sources of political terrorism appear to rest in this dynamic". In addition, "non-recognition as a diplomatic statement, then, may have much more serious consequences than are intended and sometimes lead to intractable conflicts" (Wedge 1986:60).

Respect for all Human Rights, Roche (2003) argues, will be attained only if the human right to peace is affirmed. Given the past performance of the most powerful nation-states of the right to resource use and abuse at the expense of human rights, Toh (2002:4) suggests that "the enormous challenge of promoting and respecting human rights can be linked to trying to keep alight candles in the midst of a storm". Where intolerance exists, Human Rights are suppressed. This was evident in Sierra Leone when schools were destroyed, children forced into military service or the diamond mines, and the intelligentsia murdered or forced to flee (Rippon 2004). Likewise, in Kosovo, 90% of the population who spoke Albanian at home were not

permitted to speak their mother tongue in the schools (Adams 2000a) that were operated by Serbians.

Equality between men and women – War and cultures of war have historically, but not exclusively, been the domain of men (Adams 1983). From victory came power and authority to govern, rule and dominate. This monopoly on power excluded women, thus creating inequity and structural violence at most societal levels. That is not to say that women have never ruled or led their nations to war; they have. In the last half of the past century, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher declared war on Argentina in 1982 over the Falkland Islands; Prime Minister Indira Ghandi dealt violently with her political foes in a bloody internal conflict, and was equally violent when she engaged Sikh militants in the state of Punjab (she was assassinated in 1984 by her Sikh body guards); and Prime Minister Golda Mier led Israel in the Yum Kippur War against Egypt and Syria in 1973. Their tenures, however, are exceptions to the equity rule; males dominate in the world politics, business and most other facets of life.

Today, women have a greater representation in party politics in most western nation-states than ever before in history, but their influence in changing cultures of war and violence does not appear significant for the major powers. The number of women in the United States Senate and Congress is considerable, yet the US is, today, the most bellicose warring nation that promotes cultures of war and violence with the greatest military; it is also the largest penal colony in the world with ten percent of its citizens in jail at any one time. In contrast, the number of women in Canadian, Australian, Swedish, Swiss and Norwegian politics is also significant yet these nations are far more peaceful. This conundrum suggests that there are other intervening variables in the gender equity debate on cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace. As Adams (2000a:6) suggests, “this needs to be studied in some detail”.

In second and third world southern hemisphere nations, however, gender inequality has contributed significantly to the suffering of women and children. Women tend not to share equally in the governance of such nation-states. One only has to look at the plight of women and their families in the Sudan today, a country torn apart by civil war led by a male dominant culture that is motivated by greed and personal power. Central to a culture of peace is the necessity for equality for women. "Women's contribution not only to their own peace but to their entire communities and societies is acknowledged as indispensable" (Toh 2002:4). Inequality has been reinforced through structural violence which is intensifying with increased globalization.

2.8.4 Program of Action

Mayor and Adams (2000:6) developed the Program of Action that was ultimately adopted by the UN General Assembly. Central to the theme was the Manifesto 2000 for a culture of peace and non-violence which was a blueprint for a viable functional process that individuals at the micro grassroots level could follow: The Manifesto 2000 reads:

Recognizing my share of responsibility for the future of humanity, especially for today's children and those of future generations, I pledge in my daily life, in my family, my work, my community, my country and my region to:

- Respect all life - Respect the life and dignity of each human being without discrimination or prejudice;
- Reject violence – Practice active non-violence, rejecting violence in all its forms: physical, sexual, psychological, economic and social, in particular toward deprived and vulnerable, such as children and adolescents;
- Share with others – Share my time and material resources in a spirit of generosity so as to put an end to exclusion, injustice and political and economic oppression;
- Listen to understand – Defend freedom of expression and cultural diversity, giving preference always to dialogue and listening without engaging in fanaticism, defamation and the rejection of others;

- Preserve the planet – Promote consumer behaviour that is responsible and development practices that respect all forms of life and preserve the balance of nature on the planet;
- Rediscover solidarity – Contribute to the development of my community, with the full participation of women and the respect of democratic principles, in order to create together new forms of solidarity.

2.8.5 Definition of a Culture of Peace

I define a culture of peace as the accumulation and culmination of all factors that define culture itself - art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities, but promote peace. Where culture is the derivative of experience, “socially [and] ... psychologically distributed within a population” (Avruch 1998:18-19), a culture of peace also exhibits and, accordingly, can be defined by these attributes. A culture of peace is not just the absence of violence or a culture of war. Instead, it involves active peacebuilding between past, present and potentially future enemies, opponents or antagonists. Energies are focused on fostering endurance toward threats of all forms of aggression and violence through cooperation and integration, with or without the assistance of a third party facilitator.

2.9 Conclusion

I have presented this literature review in the chosen format, and selected the topics of culture, conflict, aggression and violence, cultures of war and violence and cultures of peace for discussion because all are imperative to the hypothesis - they define both the arguments for the thesis and the antithesis. Culture is the nexus of any discussion of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. Conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence all relate to the same phenomenon but from differing perspectives. A culture of peace is ultimately the focal point of the research.

Culture derives its meaning from art, religion, language, food, clothing, tradition, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities. The macro nation-state can influence these aspects of culture through funding of grants;

conversely, it can deter those characteristics that it does not believe are in the best interest of the state – its cultures of war and violence or culture of peace. In the latter, the nation-state can discredit through propaganda or incarcerate those who criticize state policies and actions. Members of sub-cultures and anti-cultures who criticized or challenged the US decision to invade Iraq can attest to such wrath. The Bush administration campaign to discredit Dr. Hans Blix of Sweden and his report on weapons of mass destruction in Iraq is a prime example of the macro nation-state's attempt to influence the individual micro behaviour – a proposition of the hypothesis. *Pax Americana*, the US culture of war and violence, is dominant in national and international arenas, including the UN. Although the hypothesis postulates that individual culture of peace behaviours at the micro level should, in the fullness of time, influence macro decisions at the nation-state level, the reverse is also true. The US efforts to discredit Dr. Hans Blix sent a message to others – challenge the US culture of war and violence at your own peril. The maturation process or conflict transformation toward a culture of peace has not yet occurred.

Culture reflects the nature of the reality and communication of that reality as influenced by the nation-state. Individuals at the micro level glean knowledge about their respective cultures by drawing inferences from what they see, hear and sense. Hence, there is a direct macro micro link to the cultures of war and violence or a culture of peace that may exist. This system of interrelationships and the concomitant education and praxis form the basis of the hypothesis for this research.

Because culture is most often emotionally charged due to its deep-seated history, it is innately symbolic and, as such, can provide a sense of continuity for its members, especially in times of collective uncertainty. Leaders at the macro nation-state level can take advantage of this characteristic to garner support of individuals at the micro level by communicating messages that increase uncertainty (propaganda for cultures of war and violence). If the communication is effective, members of the group will perceive that they need the leaders and their administration to protect them. As an example, the Bush administration in the US successfully employed this macro-to-micro tactic during the Presidential election

campaign; it reinforced the distrust and fear that Americans have for out-groups. The hypothesis speaks directly to this process.

Language is the most influential characteristic of culture as reflected in the hypothesis. This thesis is written in the English language that has inherent strengths and limitations. Just the English terms culture, culture of war, culture of violence and culture of peace have cultural aspects that are not shared by some other non-English speaking cultures. Although these concepts and terms were developed at the UN (UNESCO) with involvement from multi-cultural member states, they are, nonetheless, influenced by the semantic and syntactic structures of the English language. How do those whose native tongue is not English truly incorporate the eight areas within the Program of Action? This question dictates the need to include language in this literature review.

Just as culture is integral to the hypothesis for the reasons stated, a discussion of conflict is paramount because it is the nexus that links cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. The hypothesis proposes that there are connections between cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. The former addresses the issues of conflict in the form of hot and cold war or violence that can, in the extreme, be categorized as protracted and intractable; the latter speaks to the absence of conflict within the context of cold and hot peace. The maturation process as introduced in the hypothesis should occur through education and praxis as individuals move toward a culture of peace. The hypothesis further postulates that the direction of learning will be bottom-up.

Inherent in conflict as it increases in intensity is aggression and violence, the antithesis to peace. Hence, to fully comprehend the essence of peace, it is essential to have an understanding of the parameters of aggression and violence. I have referred to the seminal research and numerous publications of David Adams, UNESCO's first Director of the culture of peace program. He presents the eight areas within the Program of Action for a culture of peace and contrasts them with

eight parallel areas for a culture of war. Adams further defines the relationship between a culture of war and a culture of violence. In summary, he clearly states that the relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace has not been demonstrated. This latter association is the essence of this research as articulated in the hypothesis. This link substantiates the requirement to include a discussion of aggression and violence, as it does for a more in depth literature review of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace.

Conflict, aggression and violence, and cultures of war and violence all relate to the same phenomenon but from differing perspectives. Accordingly, in the following Chapter, I present the literature review on conflict, aggression and violence.

CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
CONFLICT, AGGRESSION AND VIOLENCE

3.1 Conflict, Aggression and Violence

When discussing culture, conflict enters the dialogue. Like culture, there are differing interpretations of what constitutes conflict and, accordingly, different definitions. I will next review the research as it relates to conflict because of this propinquity. I will argue that differences of opinion or interpretation do not always lead to conflict and both differences and conflicts can be resolved without the parties having to resort to aggression or violence. For a definition of these terms, I refer to (Rippon 2000).

Because conflict cannot always be resolved peacefully and does result in aggressive or violent behaviour, I have elaborated on these definitions with a summary of the research. On all the topics in this literature review, I have found that the research on aggression and violence is the most expansive and, as a result, there is the least amount of agreement by researchers on a succinct definition.¹ Hence, I refer to my definition (Rippon 2000).

3.2 Conflict

If there is no conflict, the probability of there being war and violence is low. But what constitutes conflict? Like aggression and violence (Rippon 2000), researchers are not unified on a single definition of conflict. It is important, therefore, to bring some clarity to this quandary. A starting point can be found in the Latin root of conflict, *confligere*, to strike together. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1982) defines conflict as: "a collision; a struggle or battle especially in open warfare; a clash between ideologies" (Sykes 1982:197). In this latter

¹ I attended the 2004 Conference of the International Society for Research on Aggression. Colleagues at this conference who have been studying this phenomenon for decades again reiterated the diversity of interpretations and the difficulty in achieving a unanimous decision on a single definition; they acknowledge the contributions made by of all researchers.

definition, reference is made to war, an analogy noted in most definitional references be they at the macro nation-state or micro individual level.

Conflict has several contemporary interpretations and is used in differing contexts, including conflict resolution (Avruch, Black & Scimecca 1998), conflict management (Borisoff & Victor 1997), non-violent conflict transformation (Galtung 1996), conflict-prone and conflict-resistant (Stokols 1997), conflict intervention (Avruch, Balck & Scimecca 1998), emotional conflict (Glinow, Shapiro, & Brett 2004), interactive conflict resolution (Stein 1999), conflict mediation (Augsberger 1995), conflict prevention (Burton 1990), active non-violent responses to conflict (Mayton 2001), conflict transformation (Lederach 1995), and protracted intractable conflict (Coleman 2003), to name a few. The commonality is the reference to conflict; the difference is the approach taken to describe and, in some cases, attempt to define the phenomenon. From these and other references, I will define conflict for the purposes of this research.

There are situations that tend to facilitate conflict, such as scarcity of resources (Bailey, 1998), structural asymmetries (de la Rey 2000), inequality between men and women (Adams 2000b), power differentials (Boulding 2000b), sense of insecurity (Searle-White 2001), material poverty (Spring 2000), perception of cultural qualities that are deserving of success (Staub 1989), loss of identity (Francis 2002), political agenda (Avruch 1998), court rooms and labour/management arenas (Tannen 1998), and globalisation (Curle 2000).

Conflict may occur when two or more individuals pursue the same sacred goals or when one individual pursues two incompatible goals (Galtung 1996:70). Coleman (2003:6) submits, conflict is “the experience of incompatible activities (goals, claims, beliefs, values, wishes, actions, feelings, etc). Conflicts, Coleman (2003:6) further suggests,

may be distributive in nature (zero-sum but divisible), integrative (with satisfactory alternatives available for all), inefficient (complex and difficult with elusive but nevertheless real integrative or distributive potential), nonnegotiable (with indivisible qualities but nevertheless resolvable), or intractable (inherently irresolvable).

Protracted, intractable conflicts are “ongoing personal, group and international struggles that appear to be inherently irreconcilable and potentially catastrophic” (Coleman 2003:1; see also Montiel 2000). They exhibit historical, political, cultural, moral, legal, spiritual and human dimensions; they have lasted for years, some for generations, and there is every reason to believe that they will persist; the issues are symbolic and defining for the parties; the parties have become polarized; each views their position as righteous and the other as the embodiment of evil; each group entices the other with provocative rhetoric and debauched behaviour; and, the outcome of their violence toward each other causes personal and collective trauma (Coleman 2003:3-4). The factors that contribute to protracted intractable conflicts reinforce cultures of war and violence by garnering deep emotions in individuals at the micro level and motivating them to fight for and defend nationalism at the macro nation-state level. It is this reinforced micro macro connection to which the hypothesis of this research makes reference.

There is a common belief among western researchers that conflict is natural and a normal aspect to any relationship (Fisher 1998), and conflict can be both positive (functional) and negative (dysfunctional) (Pedersen 2001).

Conflict, a phenomenon that arises in the context of perceived or real incompatible goals between individuals or groups, does not inevitably lead to violence. Hence, although conflict is regarded as inevitable or ubiquitous in the West, violent behaviour, whether interpersonal and intergroup, is not inevitable. What matters most is whether or not the parties in a conflict use the situation as an opportunity for creative problem solving that can benefit both, or alternatively, mismanage the

conflict in ways that damage the relationship (Anderson & Christie 2001:177).

Pick (2001:205) concurs, stating, “western thinking is in terms of mutually exclusive categories” and it is this in-group out-group, we/they attitude that germinates conflict.

The question remains – is conflict inevitable or is it the function of western thinking that has produced the argument culture (Tannen 1998). Roche (2003:26) emphasizes,

the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict ... found that deadly conflict is not inevitable. Violence on the scales of wars of the twentieth century does not emerge inexorably from human interaction. Rather, war and mass violence usually result from deliberate political decisions. Violent conflict has often resulted from the traditional preoccupation of governments to defend, maintain, or extend their interests and power.

Is the inevitability of conflict an *emic* or *etic* perspective – is it the native’s point of view or the analysts interpretation? A common expression is, ‘if I had not seen it, I would not have believed it’. Does this statement reflect the concept that conflict is inevitable or is the inevitability a result of, ‘if I had not believed it, I would not have seen it’? If you believe that conflict is inevitable, then the best case scenario is conflict management. If, however, conflict is not inevitable, then the best case scenario is conflict resolution and the genuine potential for a sustainable culture of peace void of violence.

Conflict, I argue, occurs when there is a dearth of leadership toward a common goal. Conflict is counter-productive, even conflict that may have a positive result. (i.e.: the atomic bomb being dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because it demonstrated clearly the potential for the annihilation of the planet – positive result but hardly productive) When leaders inspire a shared vision, encourage from the heart, model the way, challenge the process and enable

others to act (Kouzes & Posner 1987), individuals follow; hence, the probability of conflict is minimized. Conflict can cause harm to relationships, often intractable and long-term (Glinow, Shapiro & Brett 2004). Creative tension (Fritz 1991 and Innovation Associates Inc. 1993), on the other hand, encouraged through self-differentiated leadership (Friedman 1999), enhances sustainable relationships because it is based upon the principles of a culture of peace; it removes conflict and the potential for cultures of war and violence to grow.

The Seville Statement (Adams, Barnett, Bechtereva, & Carter 1990; see also Adams 1997) clearly states that humans are not predisposed to violence. Most contemporary western researchers on cultures of peace concur, yet others state that conflict is inevitable. Schwebel (1998:90), for example, suggests,

although efforts to eliminate some of the sources of conflict may reduce its incidence, nothing in our understanding of human behaviour leads us to believe that conflict *per se* can ever, or even should ever, be eradicated. Our fields have developed creative, non-violent means of resolving conflicts that already are proving useful in curbing violence under circumstances that usually lead to tragic circumstances.

3.2.1 Definitional Attempts

Attempts at defining conflict have been influenced by both views – conflict is inevitable and conflict is not inevitable. Avruch (1998) elucidates two of the most often cited definitions of conflict. The first is Coser (as cited in Avruch 1998:24) who proposes that conflict is “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources, a struggle in which the aims of opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.” The second definition is from Rubin, Pruitt and Kim (as cited in Avruch 1998:24) who define conflict as, “means perceived [as] divergent of interest, or a belief that parties’ current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously”. The former highlights scarcity as the primary motivator and implies violence as the outcome, while the latter

emphasizes differing interpretations of perceptions and beliefs but does not necessitate any outcome, *per se*.

Lederach (1997:63) states, that conflict “is expressive, dynamic, and dialectical in nature ... [it] is never a static phenomenon ... Relationally based, conflict is born in the world of human meaning and perception”. Reflecting on the dynamic perspective, Lederach (1997:63-64) further suggests, “it is constantly changed by ongoing human interactions, and it continuously changes the very people who give it life and the social environment in which it is born, and perhaps ends”. Differences in meaning and perceptions are accentuated when individuals who have been separated into social groups at the micro level view each other differently or view nation-states at the macro level with fear and distrust because they are different.

In discussing the perceived relationship that members of in-groups and out-groups hold, Searle-White (2001:15) proposes that once individuals “were thinking about people who differed from them, they attributed much more extreme attitudes to them than were really the case; they accentuated the differences between them”. This perceived difference contributes to the cycle of conflict as in-group members view their cohorts as more trustworthy than those in the out-group. Others who have studied the in-group out-group phenomenon have noted similar behaviours (Chattopadhyay et al. 2004 and Stangor et al. 1992). The hypnotic-like strength of the in-group evolves from the emotion that is an integral part of identification with the in-group and what the in-group can provide to meet the needs of the individual. This is why cults can provide a strong, bonding identity and fulfill similar unmet needs. Individuals join cults to provide a sense of meaning to their lives or to be taken care of and protected (Deikman 1990). Cults provide a mythical reality similar to war with an ‘us’ *versus* ‘them’ (in-group out-group) perspective of good *versus* evil and right *versus* wrong that motivates and provides a sense of cohesion to such anti-cultures at both the micro small group and macro nation-state levels.

In a similar vein, Francis (2002:3) defines conflict as “the friction caused by difference, proximity and movement. Since people and their lives are, fortunately, not identical, isolated or static, conflict between them is inevitable: a sign of life”. Although Francis (2002) states that violence and war are not inevitable outcomes of conflict, she mirrors the western academic mainstream belief that conflict is, nonetheless, inevitable but may not be negative. The resolution of conflict becomes problematic because when “its Western origins make it untransferable, that its assumptions, diagnosis and prescriptions are so culturally formed and specific that they cannot but be misplaced and inappropriate in non-Western cultures, and that its promulgation amounts to cultural imperialism” (p.59).

In contrast to western cultures, Gegeo and White (1990) (as cited in Pedersen 2001) illustrate how some Pacific Island cultures employ the term ‘disentangling’ as opposed to conflict or dispute resolution or conflict management because ‘disentangling’ describes a process rather than an outcome with the connotations of finality and defined positions that must be defended. The greater the belief that positions must be defended, the greater the probability that protracted intractable conflict will occur at the micro individual level, and will be manifested in cultures of war and violence at the macro nation-state level.

3.2.2 Definition of Conflict

I define conflict as the perceived experience of incompatible activities. The experience can be physical, mental, emotional or spiritual. Perception is integral to the definition because of the communication aspect. For those who benefit and profit from conflict, especially conflict that has advanced to the stage of war, purposeful miscommunication is a fundamental element in creating a perception of incompatibility. Misperception is common in multicultural environments and

can be leveraged to support the perceived need for conflict or war in order to resolve the differences in favour of the in-group over the out-group.

3.3 Aggression and Violence

As it relates to a culture of peace, most research on non-violent behaviour has focused on the antithesis – aggression and violence (Mayton 2001) at the macro nation-state and micro individual levels. To fully comprehend the essence of peace and a culture of peace, it is important to have an understanding of the parameters of aggression and violence.

Like other terminology, aggression and violence, within these contexts, have experienced their own definitional problems (Rippon 2000) resulting in miscommunication. The word ‘aggression’ has so many different interpretations and is used in such a variety of contextual meanings (O’Leary-Kelly, Griffin, & Glew 1996) that it has become virtually useless for purposes of scientific analysis (Scott, 1992). Commenting on this confusion Mayton (2001:144) states, “the terms aggression and violence are oftentimes used interchangeably”. Kool (1993) (as cited in Mayton 2001:144) suggests, “the term aggression is usually used in the context of individual [micro] behaviour where as the term violence is more commonly used in reference to groups or institutions [macro]” but this is not the norm. Due to the range of interpretations and definitions, there is variance in research findings and in the use of psychometric instruments that result in questionable validity and reliability. To add to the confusion, other expressions such as agonistic behaviour have been introduced in research literature in an attempt to clarify the definition (Castro & Caballero 2004), often with contrary results.

This inconsistency is due in part to the apparent indifference with which subtle and not so subtle forms of aggression are treated in the workplace, in social settings, in the courts, within our communities at large, and internationally (Felson 2002, Randall 1997 and Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Bjorkqvist, Osterman, &

Kaukiainen 1996). Attempts have been made to justify violence through association with righteous causes (God deems it to be right i.e: the inscription on the Nazi belt buckle read *Gott Mit Uns* – God with us), human evolution (manifest destiny), the forces of good *versus* evil (us *versus* them) and through high-status language (Latin *jus ad bellum dicendi* – the right of making war; *jus in belli* – the right of practicing war).

All societies have norms that determine how the community will function. It is through the norms, that the acceptability and type of violence are determined. This may seem strange since most people would say that violence is wrong. However, within the definition of wrong, there are levels of acceptability. Certain acts considered wrong become justifiable when situations change. These justifications create levels of acceptability - places where it is all right to use violence. It is within these justifications, levels of acceptability, that violence is allowed to live (Nenon 2000:1).

In an attempt to provide a standard for understanding the terminology, Galtung (1998:2) defines aggression as “whatever harms and hurts”. Galtung (1998) differentiates between direct violence that is perpetrated to intentionally harm, and structural violence that includes cultural and societal systems that repress or exploit individuals or groups either purposefully or unintentionally.

Buss (1961) delineates between angry aggression and instrumental aggression. The former is based on emotion (anger) where the latter does not have a strong emotional basis and yet can be extreme. Buss (1961:6) purposely excluded verbal aggression because “it renders the term fuzzy and imprecise ... it is preferable to avoid the notion of a bruised or wounded ego”. Buss (1961) proposes that all aggression subsumes a large number of responses that share two characteristics: (1) the delivery of noxious stimuli; and, (2) an interpersonal context. Bullying, as an example, delivers a noxious stimuli within an interpersonal context.

Buss (1961) excludes the concept of intent from his definition because he believes that the crucial issue is not the premeditation but the reinforced consequences of the outcome. Angry aggression is motivated by the desire to inflict pain or discomfort, where instrumental aggression is motivated by acquisition of some external reinforcement or the cessation on the noxious stimuli. Instrumental aggression, he argues, is a means to some desired end that is not motivated by an intent to do harm. In contrast, Tedeschi (1983) suggests that instrumental aggression is motivated by the intent to maintain some form of power over others and/or to win at all costs. Certainly, this issue of power is central to bullying behaviour (Namie & Namie 2000 and Olweus 1994) at the micro interpersonal level and at the macro nation-state level. In the latter, I would concur with Power (2002) that US foreign policy with the threat and use of military forces to achieve its objectives is macro bullying behaviour and reflects its cultures of war and violence.

Berkowitz (1993), like Tedeschi (1983), does include intent, and Berkowitz (1993:6) defines aggression as “any form of behaviour that is intended to injure someone physically or psychologically”. Berkowitz (1993) argues that anger or any other strong emotion does not necessarily motivate aggression. Instead, aggression is a part of larger associative networks in which emotions, dispositions and cognitions associated with aggressive behaviours may be stimulated by other interrelated and intervening factors. Berkowitz (1993) incorporates the concept of intent as an essential element. Although this definition is gaining some degree of acceptance amongst researchers, there is still a lack of clarity. As an example, the post 9/11 decision of the Bush neo-con administration to invade Afghanistan and Iraq was based on emotion and intent; the intent was couched in ulterior motives.

I argue that intent is an integral part of the definition of violence (Rippon, 2000) that applies to cultures of war and violence. I would also argue that there is no distinction between an intent to do physical harm and intent to merely control

another person through coercion. Buss (1961, 1995) states that if there is no physical injury then no harm has been done. This is a myopic perspective, given the burgeoning body of research on psychotraumatology (Briere 2002, Hanscom 2001 and Feeny 2000; see also Ferren 1999 and Rosenheck 1998). Emotional harm is central to a culture of war and violence. In modern war, psychological operations (Psy Ops) has been developed and employed with the clear intent to control, manipulate and cause psychological and emotional harm, the results of which can be Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (American Psychiatric Association 1994). In the recent US war in Iraq, "One of the most intriguing weapons was 'PsyOps', or the psychological operation campaign, really a propaganda blitz meant to sell Iraqis, and most particularly Iraqi soldiers, on the wisdom of disobedience and surrender" (Rutherford 2004:55).

3.3.1 Dimensions of Aggression

Buss (1961) proposes eight different kinds of aggression in a three dimensional model: physical-verbal, active-passive and direct-indirect, per Table 3-1. This model incorporates physical, psychological and emotional harm.

Table 3-1
Buss (1961, 1995) Typologies of Aggression

Type of Aggression	Example
Physical-Active-Direct	Stabbing, punching, shooting
Physical-Active-Indirect	Setting a mine or booby-trap, or hiring an assassin
Physical-Passive-Direct	Physically preventing another person from obtaining a desired goal or performing a desired act (e.g.: a sit-in demonstration)
Physical-Passive-Indirect	Refusing to perform necessary tasks
Verbal-Active-Direct	Insulting or causing a person to 'lose face' in public
Verbal-Active-Indirect	Spreading malicious rumours or gossip about another individual
Verbal-Passive-Direct	Refusing to speak to another

	person, or to answer a question
Verbal-Passive-Indirect	Failing to make specific verbal comments (e.g.: failing to speak up in another person's defence when he/she is unfairly criticized or accused)

Some behaviours, as defined by Buss in Table 3-1, are not perceived by those in some sub-cultures (i.e.: sports cultures) to be aggressive. Through the process of psychological exclusion from this table, aggressive behaviours have become not only acceptable but encouraged and rewarded by sports fans, players and media commentators (Goldstein 1986 and Russell 1983). Those who accept this form of interpretative exclusion also do not perceive that a culture of violence in sports exists within their societies at the macro or micro levels. They also argue that there is no or minimal connection between a culture of violence and a culture of war. To counter this argument, one need only examine basic theory on aggression and violence to make the connection between macro and micro levels.

3.3.2 Classic Frustration-Aggression Theory

The genesis of the frustration-aggression theory is found in the seminal research by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears (1939). Theirs is a learning theory adaptation of Freud's early interpretations of aggressive behaviour that was based on Eros, or positive energy, *versus* Thanatos, or destructive energy. The frustration-aggression theory was the first hypothesis that brought the study of aggressive behaviour into the psychological laboratory, although it was subsequently revised (Berkowitz, 1983) and re-interpreted (Dill & Anderson 1995, Felson 1992 and Gustafson 1989).

Dollard *et al.* (1939) postulated that all aggression results from frustration, and the intensity of the aggression is a function of three frustration factors. First, the intensity or accumulation of aggressive energy is related to the perceived need or value of the goal that produces the frustration. As an example, taking

food from starving war refugees will produce more frustration than if they were satiated. A more contemporary example would be the frustration felt by the Bush administration over Iraq's non-compliance with the arms inspectors and the UN's request for full disclosure of any weapons of mass destruction.

The second factor involves the degree of interference. As an example, Iraq's continued non-compliance with requests for arms inspectors (as reported by the media) from the perspective of the US caused increased frustration on the part of the latter. A subset of this degree of interference involves the time frame. Arms inspectors kept waiting for one month is less frustration than being kept waiting for twelve months.

The third and final factor that contributes to the intensity of the frustration involves the number of frustrated responses. As an example, it can be argued that at the macro level in the former republic of Yugoslavia the United Nations unsuccessfully employed non-aggressive means to remove obstacles that were impeding peacekeeping operations at the micro level. As a result, they raised the bar and employed violent means to remove the obstacles including the lethal use of force (the Medac pocket in 1993 when Croatian forces attacked the Krajina, then held by Serbians and murdered innocent non-combatants).

Some historians and researchers on violence argue that displacement of frustration is a motivation for state-sanctioned aggression and violence at the macro level such as battles between captured slaves, gladiators, and predatory attacks of lions on Christians in the Roman coliseums which were staged to please the gods and placate the plebeians (Balsdon 1969, Ehrenreich, 1997, Grant 1967, Guttman 1983 and Shay 1994). Bollinger (1969) describes the Roman games as a safety-valve for dissatisfaction. Guttman (1983) proposes that Roman rulers believed that frustrated plebeians at the micro level needed a place to relieve this energy, and if the macro state did not provide an outlet, social unrest could and, in fact, did result. This form of displacement, it was felt,

provided a catharsis for those who experienced frustration but had no other means available to deal with the underlying emotions and feelings. There was no critical incident stress debriefing (CISD) although one could argue that the Roman baths employed extensively by Centurions did provide a form of defusing. The Roman Empire exhibited all the symptoms of cultures of war and violence at the macro nation-state and micro individual plebeian levels. Similar to today, returning warriors were not debriefed to facilitate the transition to a culture of peace; hence, the games may have been the plebeian substitute for the Centurion's baths at the micro level.

Others argue that modern sports events such as the World Cup provide the same catharsis (Goldstein 1986 and Russell & Arms 1998), and British and German soccer hooligans have little more intellectual capacity or emotional intelligence than did the plebeians of Rome or the peasants of Paris who rejoiced and relished at the sight of another French revolutionary head rolling off the guillotine (Goldstein 1983).

In contrast to Roman sports that were more aggressive and often violent, Greek (Athenian) athletes engaged in far less bellicose activities such as jumping, running and throwing. Perhaps Homer's countrymen at the micro level did not experience the same levels of frustration and the same need for catharsis. Or perhaps it is because historians are more verbose when it comes to gladiators and charioteers than they are about runners and wrestlers (the media of today report *ad nauseam* on violence but not peace and sportsmanship). In a similar context, the Greeks of Homer's Iliad conducted funeral games with symbolic rather than literal death in honour of the fallen Patroklos. In contrast, the Romans celebrated deaths with funeral games in which the dead were honoured with actual acts of killing on stage (Balsdon 1969 and Grant 1967). Plato's Athens mirrored more a culture of peace than any other macro nation-state of its time in the western world. One can only ponder what the world would be like

today had the Athenian culture of peace prevailed over the Spartan culture of war and violence.

Back in the 21st century, I submit that all frustration does not always lead to aggression as suggested by Dollard and his colleagues (1939). In fact, some frustration can lead to positive behaviour, including creative tension (Fritz 1991). Grassroot culture of peace movements often develop from frustration (Boulding 1998). In post-war periods, warriors become either cathartic and introspective or more violent (Ember & Carol 1994). Delaney (2002) references retired General Colin Powell who observed that after violent wars (Viet Nam and the Gulf War) it was not the ex-military who championed a culture of war but those who had not experienced and witnessed the horrors of war first hand.

Frustration is a central theme in micro inter-personal and macro inter-nation-state violence and, hence, is a seminal issue that needs to be addressed when defining a culture of peace. Avruch (1998) and Burton (1990) clearly identify frustration as a core element. There are basic non-negotiable human needs that, if not met, lead to action, and often violent action. If these “basic needs are frustrated or denied expression, individuals will fight institutions implacably, even violently” (Avruch 1998:50). Francis (2002:29) concurs stating, “unmet needs are the most frequent and serious cause of conflict, and there will be no resolution without those needs being met”. In protracted intractable wars with extended histories of heinous violence when so much has been lost and frustration at the micro individual level is so intense, the challenge becomes one of resolving the demand to have the needs met.

In summary, it should be noted that much of the earlier research into the frustration-aggression theory was based on animal experiments behaviour (Falso, 2002, Potegal & Knutson 1994 and Zillmann 1998). Accordingly, caution must be exercised when attempting to extrapolate results from animal behaviour to human.

3.3.3 The Nature or Nurture Debate on Aggression

There is a burgeoning body of research that addresses the issues of whether human aggression at both the macro and micro levels is learned or whether it is inherited, genetic or biological. Darwin's theory of evolution was the first major work to ground human aggression in evolutionary biological history. Instinct, genes, hormones, brain structure and innate aggressive drives are among some of these biological factors that researchers have suggested contribute to aggressive behaviour. In response, the Seville Statement on Violence (Adams, Barnett, Bechtereva & Carter 1990) clearly enunciates that violence and war are not instinctual, are not inherited, have not evolved through the selection for aggressive behaviour and are not biologically inevitable. Humans have the potential to make war and support cultures of war and violence, but they also have the potential to establish sustainable peace and cultures of peace. Paraphrased, the Seville Statement states,

it is scientifically incorrect to say that we have inherited a tendency to make war from our animal ancestors ... Warfare is a peculiarly human phenomenon ... a product of culture.

It is scientifically incorrect to say that war or any other violent behaviour is genetically programmed into our human nature.

It is scientifically incorrect to say that in the course of human evolution there has been a selection for aggressive behaviour more than for other kinds of behaviour ...

It is scientifically incorrect to say that humans have a 'violent brain'. There is nothing in our neurophysiology that compels us to act violently.

It is scientifically incorrect to say that war is caused by 'instinct' or any single motivation ... We conclude that biology does not condemn humanity to war ... The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us (Adams 1989:113-121).

Genetics define some limitations for organisms, including humans. However, human behaviour is not limited solely to biological influences. As an example, the ability to speak is genetic but does not define whether all humans

will speak or what they will say if they do speak. They can speak in terms of cultures of war and violence or a culture of peace. Hence, the genetic composition of humans does not influence the outcome of cognitive and affective states such as thoughts, moods, emotions, or other internal processes that either directly or indirectly influences aggressive or violent behaviour, or peacefulness. Whatever role biology plays in human aggression, theorists and researchers acknowledge that learned behaviours, environmental factors and cultural norms contribute more to aggressive behaviour than do genetics (Baron & Richardson 1994, Berkowitz 1989 and Lightdale & Prentice 1994). This is not the seminal argument in the hypothesis but provides a framework for it, and for this reason needs to be addressed in this literature review.

As illustrated in examples, frustration and aggression have direct application to the macro nation-state and micro individual scenarios. The hypothesis for this research states that there are similarities between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level, and that education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former. This will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace.

Goleman (1995, 1998) would argue that individuals with lower levels of emotional intelligence (EI) will tend to become frustrated more easily and more often than those with higher levels of EI. Hence, if individuals are to 'mature toward a culture of peace' then emotional intelligence would be a factor. Education and praxis for a culture of peace would, logically, have to include training in emotional intelligence.

Giacalone and Greenberg (1997:5) state, "an environmental situation only can become a frustrator for an individual if that individual appraises it as such". Maturity in making accurate appraisals at the micro individual level would require

elevated levels of EI in order not to appraise the situation as frustrating and requiring an aggressive response. Relating to the hypothesis - 'implementing the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action as a means of dealing with differences' would require maturity in order not to be adversely influenced by emotions commonly associated with frustration. At the macro nation-state level there are examples where both low and high levels of maturity have influenced decisions to become aggressive; the former can be found predominately in cultures of war and violence. The latter can be observed in macro nation-states where a culture of peace tends to influence decisions not to become aggressive. Education and praxis for a culture of peace would, logically, have to include training in maturity, in addition to emotional intelligence.

3.3.4 Definition of Aggression and Violence

For the purposes of this research, I define aggression as behaviour with intent to do harm to a living organism whether harm results or not, or behaviour with wilful blindness as to whether harm would result (Baron & Richardson 1994 and Rippon 2000). Violence is synonymous with aggression but is reserved for those acts of aggression that are particularly intense, and are more heinous, infamous or reprehensible (Maoz 2001 and Rippon 2000). War is violent by its very nature. Hence, I will use the term violence when referring to a culture of war. I argue that all such micro interpersonal behaviour may not be violent; some may be aggression. For the purposes of this dissertation, however, I will use the term violence to include both but may use both as appropriate.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introductory Remarks

Discussion in this chapter focuses on the impetus for the research and the research methodology – the research characteristics, research instrument, data collection procedures and analysis. The first section of this chapter describes the motivation for the research and the development of the interview format based on the hypothesis. The subsequent sections will define: the selection of participants; choice of field *versus* laboratory research, and qualitative *versus* quantitative research; researching sensitive topics; standards for qualitative findings; sampling and sample size; research design; and finally data analysis.

4.2 Motivation for the Research

In 2000, I attended a conference of the International Society for Research on Aggression held in Valencia, Spain. The opening plenary speaker was David Adams, the first Director of UNESCO's culture of peace program. The experience can best be described as one of those epiphanies that fewer people encounter but all should. My research and enthusiasm as a Certified Human Resource Professional over the previous two decades focused on violence in the workplace and how to resolve it. Ten years prior, I had served with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as a peace officer dealing with interpersonal conflict without any indication of sustainable success in resolving incidents of domestic violence. The literature on both topics was replete with descriptions including bullying behaviour but few inroads had been achieved on how to achieve sustainable results in violence prevention. It seemed to be a chronic organizational and social virus without an antidote.

Adams introduced me to the concept of a culture of peace as an alternative to a culture of violence. At the end of his presentation, I concluded that my focus needed to change from the illness (violence in the workplace as a symptom of a

culture of violence) to wellness (peace in the workplace as an indicator of a culture of peace). If one only focused on the illness, the probability of becoming well would be low; conversely, if the emphasis was on wellness as the norm then any illness would be an aberration only. This, I summarized, was a short-coming with the research and work conducted to date on violence in the workplace. There were few, if any, examples of sustainable success because the emphasis was consistently directed toward the problem and not the solution as the healthful end-state.

I met with Adams after his presentation and on other occasions during the conference. We communicated by phone and e-mail thereafter, discussing where research needed to be directed. Through these communiqués, I developed the hypothesis. Previous research had established the connection between cultures of war and cultures of violence, and had determined that the learning process was top-down. However, research had not been conducted to establish the relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, and in what direction the learning process might occur. On 10 September 2001, the eve of the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, I met Adams in New York (ironically, he was attending a conference on peace at the UN) and discussed the interview structure and format with which the research should comply and the potential participants, amongst other topics. The draft of the questionnaire that was forthcoming from my discussions with Adams became the foundation of the penultimate questionnaire that I reviewed with my supervisor and ultimately submitted to the Ethics Committee (Annex A).

4.3 Interview Structure and Format

The format of the interview was based on the questionnaire, and followed a sequential process from a broad overview to more specific detail and, as the interview dictated, back to a expansive description and more detailed dialogue. This flexibility and fluctuation between inductive and deductive process allowed participants the freedom to express their thoughts within the parameters of the interview format. Additional probing questions, not formally listed in the questionnaire, were asked as appropriate. On occasion, participants responded with

questions; these were reflected back as statements that required further comment by the participants. Interviews were not limited to specific time constraints; instead, they progressed until the participants concluded that they had addressed the questions to their satisfaction.

The theory emerged inductively from the data with each successive interview. Categories were created from the data and, through coding, subsequent data were linked to the categories. With each successive interview, new categories were created. Coding developed early in the research involved creating nodes to code as opposed to coding into pre-determined schemas. Once transcribed, I browsed each successive interview, coding text into categories where categories had already been created and creating new categories where none existed. I also searched the document's text using string and pattern searches that could be incorporated into the index system as nodes. Throughout this coding process with each successive transcribed interview, the QSR NUD*IST index system (Section 3.9 – Data Analysis provides a discussion of QSR NUD*IST) went through a recurrent revision as data transformed the connotations connected to each category. Hence, the emerging categories drove the process and not any pre-determined assumptions. This was a logical procedure of producing general assertions on the basis of observations from the data. This transformation is commensurate with the inductive procedure defined by Glaser & Strauss (1967) and Parry (1998) that involves a progression of discovery, development, provisional verification and subsequent theorizing.

In concert with the emerging theory, the structure of the interviews evolved from the initial questionnaire format (Annex A) to a more focused configuration (Annex B), consistent with the dynamics of grounded theory defined (Graser 1992). The emerging themes dictated the parameters of the evolved questions and subsequent direction of data collection from which codes were developed and linked to categories.

As culture is the nexus of cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, it was logical that the initial questionnaire format focus on cultures in general. Hence, participants were asked to discuss their backgrounds – how and where they were raised. The interview then progressed to a discussion of conflict within their respective cultural context – what conflict the participants may have observed or experienced; how, when and where did they learn to deal with conflict; how their means of handling conflict did or did not reflect their different cultures. With an understanding of conflict, the interview moved to a discussion of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. What was the participant's interpretation of these concepts; how did their cultural background influence their definitions and interpretation of war, violence and peace, and the respective cultures.

The emerging theory dictated a need for clarity on specifics of culture, cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace; hence, the format of the questionnaire evolved to meet this need. An overview of the participant's background was not as relevant. As a result, questions specific to culture were not asked. Some participants did, however, discuss in detail their cultural background. Likewise, an in depth discussion of conflict became less germane to the hypothesis as theory emerged from the data with each subsequent interview.

4.3.1 Interview Procedures

Participants were informed that the interview should not last much more than two hours; they ranged from forty minutes to two hours with a mean of approximately seventy minutes. This time frame allowed the participants to express their personal perspectives and discuss their individual experiences. The transcripts word count ranged from 1,600 to 4,895 with a mean of 2090 words. The interview format was semi-structured in order to provide general parameters but flexibility to allow the participants to take the interview where they wanted within their cultures. Connell, Lynch and Waring (2001:6) support the semi-structured interview technique acknowledging that it is an arduous task to obtain,

interviewee's personal beliefs, considered opinions and insights ... through structured interviews where rigid questioning prevents opportunities to pursue an interesting angle or call for elaboration. The semi-structured interview technique builds into questioning, sufficient flexibility to capture insights that may otherwise be lost to the imposition of the 'next' structured question.

I transcribed all interviews through note-taking. Commenting on note-taking *versus* tape recording of interviews, Sommer and Sommer (1991:120) suggest, "it is flattering to have someone write down one's statement in detail". I concur that note-taking can have a flattering influence but it does not have to; a skilled interviewer can energize the latter interaction if conducted properly. Tape recording was not used because I believed that the tape recorder could intimidate some participants, particularly those who had a criminal record and had been interviewed on tape by a formal authority such as investigators from a police department or board of enquiry. I found that to be true as a police officer. In addition, I have found from experience that if I take notes, I am better able to follow the script and understand the context of the story being told. Perhaps more importantly, if I tape record it becomes more difficult to accurately record nuances such as body language and non-verbal communication at the appropriate junctures in the interview. By taking notes, I am better able to allow pensive pauses or reflective moments in the conversation when the participant is conceptualizing or cognitively reframing. If tape recording, I am left waiting; if taking notes, I can naturally break eye contact to review notes, thus relieving pressure on the participant to continue the conversation.

As I transcribed, I divided the page with a bar on the left side of the note paper. I used this space to make notes pertaining to the nuances and other non-verbal communications. I recorded hesitations in the language patterns of the patterns – the 'ahems' and "ahs' with a series of periods (e.g.: "I think ... I believe that ...). Although tape recording does accurately record these speech styles, transcription of taped interviews takes much longer than written notes (Sommer & Sommer 1991).

4.3.2 Participants

Participants in this research were volunteers drawn from a population of individuals who had been identified as exhibiting characteristics commensurate with cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. They came from organizations and were referred to the Human Resource Department or they were individuals who had sought counselling on their own. They tended to have a background of aggression and violence or peace as I define these behaviours (Rippon 2000). Participants reflected a broad range of employment sectors (blue collar to white collar and self employed), education backgrounds (less than high school to PhD and Medical Doctor), and socio-economic status (unemployed to independently wealthy).

Some participants identified other individuals whom they believed potentially could provide valuable information for this study. This type of referral has been identified as a 'snowball' effect (Zukmund 1991). Where appropriate, these potential candidates were contacted and after a preliminary conversation, determined if they met the criteria. Three of the fifty-one participants were snowball referrals.

Fifty-one individual interviews were completed between July 2003 and June 2004. No follow-up interviews were conducted because in subsequent interviews, no information was gleaned that prompted a necessity to clarify any points identified in previous interviews. In the final analysis after all interviews had been completed, I reflected on the macro data and did not identify any areas that required further investigation.

Twenty-four participants (47%) were female; the balance (53%) were male. I did not specifically select males and females with the intention of achieving an equal distribution; participants just happened to fall into these generally equivalent categories. Sandelowski (1995:180-181) concurs with this procedure, arguing, "sampling on the basis of demographic characteristics presents something of a problem in achieving both informational and size adequacy in qualitative studies".

Like gender, I did not purposefully sample based on age and did not ask the participants to identify their age because I did not perceive in advance age to be a factor in the phenomenon; the issue is one of whether or not age, as a variable, is integral to understanding the phenomenon. I found no previous research on cultures of peace that identified age as a variable of significance. I estimated the mean age to be approximately 35-40, with a range from late teens to early 70s.

Participants identified a dominant influencing nationality that provided them with a primary sense of cultural identity, as noted in Table 4-1.

Table 4-1
Declared Dominant Nationality of Participants

Nationality	Total
China	3
India	2
Japan	2
Hong Kong	1
England	6
Israel	2
Saudi Arabia	1
United Empire Loyalist	2
Scotland	5
South Africa	2
France	4
Germany	1
Ireland	3
Canada (*2 Aboriginal)	4*
Ukraine	2
Italy	1
USA	3

Lebanon	1
Holland	3
Mexico	1
Kosovo/Serbia	1
Armenia	1

A sense of spirituality is integral to culture because individuals can establish their identity based on how they perceive their respective relationships to their internalized interpretation of spirituality. Religion, as a category of spirituality, prescribes socially acceptable behavior and cultural norms. Where calmness associated with a sense of spirituality can strengthen the relationship, war and violence tend to erode spirituality and, as such, create loneliness. Spirituality can be in relationship to a god or a broader and less defined interpretation of energy within the cosmos (Rippon 2004). Within this context, spirituality is an individual culture that one may feel, conceptualize and, for some, experience; it can provide hope where a void of hopelessness exists.

Spirituality is an integral aspect to reconciliation and movement toward a culture of peace (A. Gates, personal communication, 13 December 2003)¹. Prayers, hymns and sermons provide a means of achieving a sense of truth, balance, forgiveness and ultimately guidance, but only if the spiritual values are shared by the cultures involved. The probability for attainment of a culture of peace through reconciliation is lowered when the values of cultures are contradictory. If consistent, however, spirituality in the form of consciousness-raising within zones of peace (Boulding 1999 and Toh 2002) can enhance the sensitization process.

For these reasons, I worded interview questions that allowed participants to declare spiritual affiliations within the context of their cultures, as noted in Table 2.

¹ Andrew Gates is an Anglican minister with a parish in the Greater Victoria region; he is also a retired Field Officer (Padre) from the Canadian Military. He has been involved in peaceful reconciliation of conflicts for his entire career.

Table 4-2
Declared Spiritual Affiliations of Participants

Religious Affiliation	Total
Buddhist	3
Islamic	3
Hindu	3
Sikh	1
Jewish	4
Protestant	15
Roman Catholic	10
Baptist	4
Atheist	2
Lutheran	1
Orthodox	3
Undeclared	2

4.3.3 Field Research versus Laboratory

I employed field research for this venue, based on the need to develop an operational instrument and not purely an academic theory. Participants cannot be inhibited by unnatural settings as occur in a laboratory. In addition, there may be variables operating in the environment that should be noted, such as semiotics. More importantly, field research tends to be more holistic than laboratory research (Tedeschi 1983 and Graham, Wells & West 1997) because it better reflects the construct of system thinking (Capra 1996 and Flood 2002) that is essential to the outcome.

4.3.3.1 Systems Thinking

A system is anything that takes its integrity and form from the on-going interaction of its parts. Systems are defined by the fact that their elements have a common purpose and behave in common ways, precisely because they are inter-related toward that purpose (Senge 1999). To change a system, it is essential to

understand the intra-relationships among the parts and the inter-relationships with its environment. Systems thinking deals with data, and focuses less on content and more on the process that governs the data; less on cause and effect that link bits of information and more on the principles of organization that give data meaning. The components do not function according to their nature but in response to their position in the network (Capra 1996). To take one part out of the whole and analyze its nature will give misleading results, first, because each part functions differently outside the system, and second, because even its functioning inside the system will be different depending on where it is placed in relation to others. The fundamental basis of systems thinking is not merely that one is dealing with hierarchies of complexity. Rather the essential characteristic is that the functioning of any part of the network is due to its position in the network rather than to its nature. Nature may determine the range of possible functioning and response, but not what specifically it will express (Friedman 1999). The latter is a function of specific factors.

4.3.3.2 Factors

A variety of factors account for the discrepancy between any inhibition of specifically violent behaviour in the laboratory and disinhibited behaviour in real-world interactions that cannot be introduced into the laboratory primarily because of ethical constraints (Richardson, Leonard, Taylor & Hammock 1984; see also Maoz 2000). These factors include but are not limited to the use and abuse of alcohol and or drugs, recent history of verbal or physical provocation, and environmental triggers including sights, smells, and sounds, and family interactions. I anticipated some factors to be present; these, among others, define the parameters of culture – cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace. Hence, they should not be controlled for in a laboratory but must be allowed to exist naturally.

Although some participants indicated that drugs and alcohol were a part of their 'social scene', none were under the influence of these substances during the interview (my service with the RCMP has left me with a keen sense for such substances). Some participants discussed verbal and physical provocations but

exhibited reasonable comprehension of trigger and control mechanisms, including sights, sounds and smells. A few of these and other participants described aggressive or violent family interactions. But like the verbal and physical provocations, they were able to identify trigger and control mechanisms, and coping behaviours that they had or were learning to employ to mitigate the negative impact. Such are the constructs of field research that define it as the preferred venue because they contribute to the richness of the results.

In this regard, Tedeschi (1983) comments that the consensus supports field research as the preferred venue, and only in cases of convenience and predominantly in academic settings should the laboratory be used. The laboratory setting reduces the external and predictive validity because it does not account for what Bear (1998) refers to as real world environmental influences, including cultural factors. Others have made similar observation about the real world and the laboratory. As an example, Graham, Wells, and West (1997:627) note,

even though statistically significant findings in support of a particular explanation have been demonstrated in controlled research, it may be that the conditions under which this explanation applies are so rare in the real world that the explanation is not of major importance in naturally occurring incidents.

I concur with Tedeschi (1983) and promote the field as the preferred location in which to conduct research on cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace because it introduces the requisite flexibility into the research methodology that is necessary in order for the researcher to succeed. In support of the argument for flexibility in research, Miles and Huberman (1994:17) propose that researchers “should not forget why [they] are out in the field in the first place: to describe and analyze a pattern of relationships” that cannot be observed in a laboratory. I would argue that by placing human subjects in laboratories and controlling for variables that form the essence of human behaviour, the laboratory could alter the experimental conditions to the point of reducing the richness of the findings to an inconsequential level.

The richness of the research flows from the complexity and interaction of the intervening variables because the data are “naturally occurring, ordinary events in natural settings” (Miles & Huberman, 1994:10). I would argue that there is little richness in one independent variable influencing one dependent variable, controlling for all others. The rigor and richness of this research came from the analysis of natural variables, and the process of drawing conclusions and postulating explanations and theories based on the comprehensiveness of the complete complement of conditions. The rigor and richness does not come from controlling variables that interact naturally. In fact, by controlling for all that constitute ‘the norm’, the rigor of the methodology is diminished.

4.4 Qualitative *versus* Quantitative Research

I employed a qualitative research methodology because of the holistic nature of the research that cannot be defined through academic specialization, controlling for variables that are integral to the environment, and reducing values, attitudes and beliefs to quantitative statistics. The qualitative analysis allowed me to interpret the information gleaned from the interviews and observations related to the phenomena of violence and peace, within the social and cultural human experience and without imposing pre-conceived interpretations or potential solutions. The data were “considered as a totality ... because they shed light on a singular logical whole” (Alasuutari 1995:11). Hence, this research was a psychological exploration of subjectivity that included the realm of human experiences and meaning within the whole – the cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace (Nordstrom 1997 and Nordstrom & Robben 1995), all of which were inter- and intra-related commensurate with systems thinking (Capra 1996).

Francis (2002:63) supports this argument for qualitative research on conflict transformation, stating “western cultures favour analysis whereas ‘traditional’ cultures favour the more ‘holistic’ approach of story-telling”. The strengths of this qualitative methodology evolve from its ability to provide an opportunity to observe

and describe significant events, meaning, values, attitudes and behaviours sufficient to generate a theory, based on how the participants see the world (Atkinson, Heath, & Chenail 1991 and Miles & Huberman 1994; see also Reason & Bradbury 2001).

It was essential to develop a theory based upon the participants' expressions of meaning, attitudes, beliefs, motivations, particularly when describing emotions and stress which are subjective in nature. It is difficult to separate this phenomenon from the context. Therefore, it was important to describe it from the participants' perspective, relating their reasons for the violence and peace, social behaviours, and the frequency and duration of the interaction. Although some observation data can be quantified, subtle human behaviours that tell more about social interactions tend to be more difficult to break down into discrete categories and, as such, can be overlooked (Berg 1995, Miles & Huberman 1994 and Yin 1994). Likewise, feelings, meanings and attitudes reflected in semiotics can not be quantified easily (McHoul 1996, Rauch 1999, Slikkerveer 1993 and Tobin 1989). QSR NUD*IST, as a qualitative software program, provides this capability.

Table 4-3 depicts my interpretation of the relationship between qualitative and quantitative data and their analysis as described by (Coffey & Atkinson 1996, Cooper 1989 and Parry 1998). This depiction, I would argue, supports my decision to employ a qualitative research methodology and qualitative analysis.

Table 4-3
Qualitative & Quantitative Data
And Their Analysis

	Qualitative Analysis	Quantitative Analysis
Qualitative Data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Unstructured interviewing ➤ Inductive reasoning ➤ Participant observation ➤ Grounded Theory 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Content analysis ➤ Empirical analysis ➤ Deductive reasoning
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Explanation of data 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Empirical

Quantitative Data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ Descriptive analysis ➤ Ethno-statistics ➤ Discourse analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> analysis ➤ Survey questionnaire ➤ Structured interviews
--------------------------	--	---

It is important to note that qualitative research should not “adopt the epistemological stance that one ‘truth’ exists to be derived from data” (Marshall 2002:58). Instead, it is essential to be open to different perspectives, each dependent upon the cultural context and interactive system in which they exist. Rodriguez (2002:3) supports this argument and the need for narrative qualitative research stating,

Compelling narratives push us to act upon the world. They challenge us to understand and reckon with the implications and consequences of our actions and lack thereof. Moreover, compelling narratives encourage us to risk life to strive to understand and experience the world differently. Such narratives assume that no understanding of the world can be achieved outside of being. Compelling narratives push us to look holistically at the world by urging us to make connections and identify complex and nonlinear relationships. They also force us to understand how our ways of being bear upon the condition of the world. In this way, compelling narratives end the disconnect between epistemology and axiology, which is to say that ethics and politics (justice) are no longer seen as merely the fallout of our Truth-matters to be dealt with by ethicists, theologians, jurists, academics, and legislators.

In a similar vein, O'Neill (2002) postulates that the transition from quantitative to qualitative methodology is superficial in some settings and actual in others. He refers to the distinction made by Kidder and Fine (1987:191) with regards to little ‘q’ and big ‘Q’ qualitative research. Little ‘q’

is little more than a hand maid to the numbers. If the t-test washes out and the researcher needs to talk about something, he or she may actually read the explanation given by participants ... big ‘Q’ is not an add-on to quantitative, hypothesis testing research; it is fundamentally different.

Clearly, big 'Q' research falls within the definition of interpretative science that searches for meaning and little 'q' is a quantitative add-on when all else fails. O'Neill (2002: 192) concludes that qualitative and quantitative methodologies are fundamentally different because "they ask different questions and answer them in different ways" and, hence, can co-exist.

Supporting this argument, Stoppard (2002:145) asserts that it is folly to compare qualitative and quantitative methodologies because each addressed research from two separate perspectives. The purpose of the former is to "ensure objectivity of results by ruling out subjective influences, particularly those attributable to researcher subjectivity". Qualitative research is more than a shift from numeric to non-numeric within the positive paradigm; instead, it is an entirely new paradigm. This move reconfigures the role of language as the unit of analysis from discrete non-overlapping categories that the researcher perceives exist in the data, to interpretation of subjective meaning from the subject's perspective and not the researchers interpretation (Coffey & Atkinson 1996 and Seidel & Kelle 1995).

When examining cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, cognitive, affective and environmental aspects must be considered because aggression is a function of these dynamic factors as they interact (Flood 2002). In addition, sampling procedures and methods of data analysis cannot be static because these factors are not static. By definition, therefore, the method of sampling and analyzing data needs to be qualitative. This will allow the richness of the research to flow from the flexibility of the sampling procedures, and the ability of the data to define the parameters of the emerging theory.

I employed qualitative research as my preferred methodology based on the foregoing; I deduced that the probability of proving or disproving the hypothesis would be greater with a qualitative research methodology. A qualitative methodology would allow me to capture the seminal points from the richness of the data and

analyze the features in such a way that the results would complement the observations.

4.5 Researching Sensitive Topics

By their very nature, cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace could be sensitive topics. By studying incidents of aggression and violence or peace, I examined private affairs within the context of private and public conduct, and specifically examined the meanings, values, attitudes and beliefs of individuals. Tannen (1998) suggests that western society (from an American perspective) is conflictual by nature and involves varying levels of private and less than private information which is or can become sensitive. It is the level of conflict that determines how private or public the information may be; the higher or more intense the level of conflict the greater the probability that it will become public knowledge or be accessible through the public domain.

A culture of violence has particular stigma attachments. Research on violence can be an emotive topic in a sensitive environment. Brewer, Guelke and Hume (1988) underscore the need for sensitivity when researching organizations involved in violence. A panglossian portrayal by some researchers has demonstrated cultural indifferences and resulted in scepticism (Brenes & Wessells 2001). Some difficulties in gleaning valid and reliable information have been due, in part, to problems encountered in field research (van den Hoonaard 1997). The resolution of this dilemma is what (Van Mannen 1988) refers to as having the right stuff to get at the heart of the problem. However, despite having the right stuff, (Brewer 1991) postulates that the greater the sensitivity, the greater the chance that some groups will close ranks when required to address topics that they perceive to be sensitive and, therefore, a potential threat. Predominant among these cloistered groups are government, military or paramilitary groups, the latter including special elite forces, security and intelligence institutions and police organization. Examples of behaviours reflective of closing ranks include providing glib answers to questions or making statements such as, 'I don't remember exactly'.

Some participants in this study were from or had been members of elite forces, security and intelligence institutions, or police organizations but none exhibited behaviours that could be construed as closing ranks or protecting their respective institutes. These participants did not discuss any classified information and were forthright about what they could and could not disclose. These parameters were agreed upon prior to the commencement of the interviews. Within these limitations, these participants were honest and open about their experiences.

The definition of sensitive topics has been broadly interpreted. Sieber and Stanley (1989) describe it in terms of topics that could be considered controversial. Ambery (2003) speaks of being granted access to the research 'secrets' that the participant holds. Barnett (1998) postulates that sensitive topics can be interpreted in terms of empirical criteria including cost of responding to questions where as Giles and Field (1978) suggest that the sensitivity is relative to how concerned respondents might be if their superiors were made aware of their responses. Hence, it may not be so much the content of the question that defines sensitivity as the context of the behaviour and question. Lee (1993) proposes that rather than the researcher classifying a topic as sensitive, it would be more prudent to have the respondent identify the topic as being sensitive and describe the conditions under which sensitivity might develop within a specific context, including the research. Sensitivity is not a static phenomenon, but changes in relation to the context – the structure of the questionnaire and format, the culture, the mode of administering the questions and the perceived degree of anonymity. In addition, "responding to the item could affect subsequent estimates of sensitivity" (Barnett 1998:66).

Lee and Renzetti (1993) identify sensitive topics as matters that, in some way, are threatening to those being studied. This could involve threats to the individuals being researched or the researcher. In either case, the interpretation alludes to some kind of costs which could be in actual monetary, psychological or emotional terms. The latter could include reliving of a disturbing event or a wrong

doing that could result in distress or some form of sanctions. Examples would include perpetrators of genocide or mass murders as occurred in Cambodia, Rwanda and the former republic of Yugoslavia, or terrorist bombings as occur in the Middle East, most recently in Israel. Some would argue that those who commit such offences are sociopathic-type (Dutton 1998) or have created a moral interpretation that allows such behaviour (Kelman & Hamilton 1989, Linn 2001 and Toner 2000). To these people, the topic may not be perceived as sensitive.

Within this definition and for the purposes of this research, the potential for substantial threat to the researcher or the participant was assessed to be low because facts were known and openly discussed. Others may have been a matter of public record and were dealt with. Likewise, the collection, holding or dissemination of the research data does not impose a substantial threat. Accordingly, this research may constitute a sensitive topic as perceived by some respondents, but confidentiality and self-censorship were not issues (Alder 1985).

Commensurate with conducting enquiries into potentially sensitive topics, Barnett (1998:63) further suggests that in research, "asking sensitive questions is generally seen as problematic in survey research in that responses are considered as being particularly prone to error and bias". In a counter argument, Kaplowitz (2000:429) notes, although error may occur, "participants in individual interviews raise sensitive topics for discussion more often than do focus group participants". In response, I created a code for topics that either a respondent verbally identified was sensitive or I interpreted may be sensitive based on non-verbal reactions. Kaplowitz (2000:424) supports this coding procedure stating, a "sensitive topic variable [captures] whether or not sensitive subject matter were raised by respondents during a particular focus group or individual interviewer session" and this coding allow for future analysis of potential for error or bias.

In response to the issues raised by Lee (1993), I discussed the potential sensitivity with each respondent before each interview started. During and after the

interview, I asked each participant if they felt uncomfortable about any topic that they had discussed, if any issue were sensitive, and under what conditions the sensitivity might develop within a specific context. None identified issues or circumstances. None indicated that they felt threatened by the interview nor did they exhibit any non-verbal communication that gave me an indication that they perceived the interview to be intimidating. After the interview, I enquired if the respondents wished to add, modify or delete any information; none expressed a concern and, hence, declined the offer.

No participant identified a history of being involved in violent criminal behaviour or crimes against humanity. However, some participants had been members of UN forces deployed to regions where atrocities had been committed; one participant had lived in Kosovo and Serbia during the recent violence and was a resident of Belgrade when the NATO bombing took place. Prior to discussing experiences, I enquired if they had experienced any symptoms of acute stress reaction or posttraumatic stress (American Psychiatric Association 1994) as result of these occurrences². None indicated acute symptoms but did acknowledge that the exposure to these instances did affect how they currently perceive the world. As a trauma counsellor and one who had served with the UN as a peacekeeper in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia at the height of the war, I assessed their responses as 'normal'. I did offer the participants with follow-up counselling services if needed; none identified a need during, or after the interviews. Two participants indicated that they felt good - a cathartic effect - as a result of discussing their experiences once again. This response is common (Connor, Davidson, & Lee 2003, Forbes, Phelps, McHugh,, Debenham, Hopwood & Creamer 2003 and Rippon & Lowey 2004) and one which I experience when I discuss my UN Tours or exposures to other traumatic events as a result of service with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

² I am a trauma counsellor and have conducted critical incident stress debriefing and defusings, nationally and internationally, under combat conditions, natural and man-made disasters and civilian crises; I have treated individuals with acute stress reaction and posttraumatic stress disorder.

4.6 Standards For The Quality Of Findings

I employed qualitative standards to ensure the goodness for (validity of) the qualitative research, based on the need for justification and for shared principles and values (Atkinson & Hammersley 1998, Kral, Burkhardt & Kidd 2002, Reason & Bradbury 2001 and Walsh-Bowers 2002). I acknowledge that standards are an issue that is at the center of the debate by those who defend the positions of quantitative *versus* qualitative methodologies. Traditional quantitative standards have been: reliability, or the degree to which observations or measures are consistent or stable; and, validity, or the degree to which what is observed or measured is the same as what was purported to be observed or measured.

Peshkin (1993) suggests that the standards for the goodness of qualitative research differ from those associated with quantitative research in fundamental ways including the methods of data collection and analysis; hence, it is not surprising that different standards exist. Some have used this difference as a platform for criticism of qualitative methodologies and findings (LeCompte & Goetz 1982, Lincoln & Guba 1985 and Wolcott 1994). Still others have identified the potential for enhancing the richness of the findings by combining both qualitative and quantitative methodologies (Parry 1998, Rossman & Wilson 1991 and Sandelowski 1993).

Reliability and validity relate to standards of quality, trustworthiness and authenticity of the findings (Rosenthal & Rosnow 1994). Although van Maanen (1988) refers to having the right stuff to get at the heart of the problem, and Miles and Huberman (1994) speak of getting it all right, Wolcott (1990) suggests that a more reasonable objective for researchers is not to get it all wrong such as not following an inductive process that will establish a general proposition on the basis of observation.

In order not to get it all wrong but instead to get it right, I followed the criteria espoused by Miles and Huberman (1994) who postulate that standards for qualitative research can be best measured against five criteria, some of which they

pair with traditional terms to facilitate understanding for those who have been schooled primarily in quantitative research methodologies, namely:

- objectivity/confirmability;
- reliability/dependability/auditability;
- internal validity/credibility/authenticity;
- external validity/transferability/fitness; and,
- utilization/application/action orientation.

Sandelowski (1986) identifies similar criteria, and Owens, Shute and Slee (2000) employed these standards in their research on indirect aggression among teenage girls.

4.6.1 Objectivity/Confirmability

To be purely objective is to be completely unbiased. Yet all researchers have some bias. To increase objectivity and confirmability, researchers need to be aware of their biases and take steps to minimize the effect. The test of objectivity is to ensure that the results of the research reflect the participant and not the researcher (Heron & Reason 2001 and Stoppard 2002).

It would be virtually impossible to replicate exactly this research as I and the participants have changed as a result of our mutual interaction, and the environments in which we relate have also changed. We have all grown in different way, resulting in a transformation of perspectives. Given this dynamic, if the methodology were replicated and comparable participants interviewed, similar results, I submit, would be forthcoming. Hence, inductive generalizations could be made about the micro macro relationships to cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace.

Gardner and Lehmann (2002:17) suggest, “we need to consider how our own values and attitudes affect how we approach research”. When interpreting interview

data, there is neither a solitary truth nor a lone technique for analysis. Variances increase when biases are allowed to intervene in the process. Heading into this research, I was and am aware of my own attitudes, values, virtues and beliefs that can contribute to biases. More importantly, I was aware of my relationship to the research process, especially when engaged in one-on-one interviews (Jorgenson 1991).

Being cognizant of these intervening variables facilitates the minimizing of their impact. For thirty-five years, I have been conducting interviews as a professional in the field of law enforcement and human resource management (personnel selection). I am aware of my own biases and acknowledge them. However, where I believe my values, virtues and beliefs reflect a higher standard of moral and ethical behaviour, I do not consider them to be prejudicial and, as such, they do not unfairly influence my ability to form a fair and objective opinion; in fact, they enhance it. Biases exist only when they result in a preference or dislike that, in turn, influences a parallel response.

I openly acknowledge my support for cultures of peace, dislike for cultures of war and violence, and distain for violation of human rights such as genocide, rape and child molestation. In my careers, I have interviewed numerous individuals who have committed such perfidious offences (none in this study); throughout, I maintained a profession objective demeanour. I have also expressed and acknowledged my condemnation for these behaviours, and preferences not to associate with those who commit these acts, if I had my druthers. Is that a bias? Perhaps. I minimized the impact by acknowledging my preferences and acting in a professional manner, commensurate with codes of ethical conduct articulated by professional organizations with which I am associated, namely the Canadian Psychological Association (CPA), American Psychological Association (APA), the Society for Human Resource Management (SHRM), and the Canadian Forces (CF) and CF Personnel Selection Branch.

4.6.2 Reliability/Dependability/Auditability

Consistency refers to reasonableness of stability over time, given the dynamics, and inter- and intra-activity of the real social world of the participants. Kirk and Miller (1986), and Rosenthal and Rosnow (1994) distinguish between diachronic reliability (observation of an event or behaviour that is able to identify change over time) and synchronic reliability (observation of an event as it occurs at one point in time without reference to prior occurrence or long-term consequences). My research fell somewhere between diachronic and synchronic, given the time frame for the research. I observed some changes that were documented and will be discussed in greater detail in the Analysis.

Dependability or auditability can be enhanced if: the researchers describes their roles relative to the participants; the research questions or means of soliciting the information are consistent with the purpose; the information is collected across the broadest spectrum possible, including location, time and subjects; protocols for collecting information are consistent for all researchers if more than one researcher is employed; checks are established for the collection and coding of information; and, there is a means established for peer review.

Prior to each interview, I described my role relative to the participants. Each participant was presented with the written description of the research and the consent form, as authorized by the University of New England Ethics Committee. Any questions posed by the participants were answered. No participant refused to participate as a result of this procedure.

Information was collected over as broad a spectrum as possible, including time, location and participants. Research began in July 2003 and ended in June 2004. I conducted interviews across a broad spectrum within the Provinces of British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Ontario. Participants were both male and female, and came from 20 self-identified national-cultural backgrounds and

twelve declared spiritual beliefs. As I was the only researcher conducting interviews, a protocol was not necessary to ensure consistency among researchers. I employed consistent questions and means of soliciting information, subject to the flexibility required to access the requisite richness of information, and used purposeful sampling to ensure that a broad spectrum was covered. Procedures for the collection and coding of information were reviewed by my supervisors prior to commencement of the interviews and peer reviewed by colleagues during and after.

4.6.3 Internal Validity/Credibility/Authenticity

To establish credibility or authenticity, the research findings need to make sense. The best means of establishing credibility is to have the participants review the finding and make corrections to ensure that the information does make sense from their perspective (Miheusah 1998 and Tuhiwai-Smith 2001). As indicated, I followed this procedure and had participants review the information that they had provided to ensure accuracy.

Quantitative internal validity can be differentiated into face, content, convergent, discriminant and predictive validity (Vogt 1998). The equivalent in qualitative research differentiates among: the types of understanding, namely descriptive (describing situations); interpretative (what meaning the participant places on the event); theoretical (how actions and meanings are explained by the participant); and, evaluative (how the actions and meanings are valued and what is that worth to the participant) (Miles & Huberman 1994). Throughout the interviews, I had the participants describe situations, clarify their interpretation of the events, and define what value, if any, they placed on their meanings and interpretations. In a similar vein, Silverman (1993) suggests that constant comparison of the analytical inductive process is a source of validity in the qualitative methodology. QSR NUD*IST Software permits this procedure.

Taylor (1992) posits that authenticity of inquiry refers to generating a genuine or true understanding of people's experiences. Genuine refers to viewing the world

from the subject's perspective (emic) and not the researcher's interpretation (etic) (Schwandt 2001 and Tagg 1985). It is about structures of meanings and significance, and of being or existing that is not objectified.

The terms, emic and etic, have been used by socio-anthropologists to record phenomena within story-telling cultures (Coyne 1997 and Denzin 1978). Within a traditional context, emic refers to linguistics that are indigenous or unique to a language or culture; etic terms, on the other hand, reflect linguistics that have been developed by the researcher, and employed to describe and contrast cultural systems (Schwandt 2001). Both emic and etic often come together in the interpretation. Today, the terms are employed in more contemporary applications,

Emic is used to refer to first-order concepts – the local language, concepts, or ways of expression used by members in a particular group or setting to name their experience. Etic is used to refer to second-order concepts – the social scientific language used by scientists to refer to the same phenomenon. Etic may also be used to refer to the processes of cataloguing, description, and categorization and etic to indicate the process of explanation (Schwardt 2001:65).

Guba and Lincoln (1989) further define authenticity as: fairness or the degree to which the participants were an equal partner in the interview and were able to express their concerns, issues and values in a balanced manner; ontological or the degree to which the subject became more informed as a result of their participation; educative or how the participants gained a greater understanding and appreciation of others; catalytic referring to how the interview process stimulated or facilitated interaction between the subject and the researcher; and, tactical in the sense that the participants were empowered as a result of the interaction.

Commensurate with Guba and Lincoln's (1989) interpretation of authenticity, I advised participants at the start of the interview that I viewed them as equal partners in the research, offering them the opportunity to review my transcript of their interview and read the final copy of the thesis. At the end of the interview, I asked

each participant what they had learned, whether they had gained a better understanding of the phenomena and if they believed that they were more confident as a result of the time spent together.

In a similar interpretation to Guba and Lincoln (1989), Allen and St. George (2001:110) define authenticity according to five interrelated but unique dimensions:

- 1) fairness in which the voices of all whom have a stake in the research process are included;
- 2) ontological which is related to the participants' understanding of their situations;
- 3) catalytic which refers to creating change in the situation;
- 4) tactical which has to do with a reallocation of power and empowerment among the participants; and,
- 5) educative which entails respect for the legitimacy of multiple perspectives.

Consistent with these dimensions, I enhanced credibility and authenticity by reviewing the research and findings with participants to ensure that they made sense. I systematically related the concepts, identified areas where uncertainty existed and reasons why. As a means of comparison, I researched and presented evidence to the contrary where found, thus specifying research that both supported and argued against my research. As the interviews progressed, I confirmed findings and confirmed or refuted any theories that were presented, and identified observations that were made.

4.6.4 External Validity/Transferability/Fittingness

Transferability or fittingness refers to the potential to draw conclusion from the research findings that could be extended to other contexts and if so, how far could they be extended (Denzin & Lincoln 1994 and Reason & Bradbury 2001). This ability to generalize is similar to external validity – can all or part of the findings be extrapolated.

I achieved this by: describing the participants and their environments in as much detail as possible; identifying threats to the ability to generalize; ensuring that the participants sampled were as diverse as possible; having as many participants as possible review the findings to confirm accuracy; connecting the findings to prior theory; having the participants identify other related environments; and, identifying other studies where the finding have been replicated.

4.6.5 Utilization/Application/Action Orientation

This final category refers to the goodness of the research – what good has come to the participant and the researcher, or others impacted by the process or outcome. Have problems been solved, have benefits been gained, have savings been made, has quality of life been achieved, has the body of knowledge increased? From an ethical perspective, has anyone benefited and how; has anyone been harmed and, if so, to what degree (Benn 1998, Lackey 1997 and Toner 2000).

I worked toward this form of applicability by enquiring if the participants perceived any inequities between them and me. I asked them if they believed that further research was needed, based on each respective interview. In response, some referred me to other potential participants. At the completion of each interview, I asked them to play the gestalt game and trade places with me – if they were the researcher and I was the participant, what additional questions would they have asked of me. Some made pensive observation and, as appropriate, I appended their comments to their initial interview transcripts, always being cognizant of the overall consistency that needed to be maintained to build capacity. At all times, ethical standards as defined by the University Ethics Committee were assured.

4.6.6 Summary of Standards

In summary, standards for the research were established; rational comprehension could not be achieved without it. Qualitative analysis is a means of making sense of a social behaviour, event or phenomenon that cannot be explained or described accurately simply through statistical relations. Hence, statistical

measures of reliability and validity, in the empirical sense, can not easily be applied. Alasuutari (1995:11-12) states that “qualitative analysis requires an absoluteness that differs from statistical research”. Where quantitative analysis is interpretative of statistical relations, qualitative analysis is interpretative of explanations of the phenomenon, meaning, values, attitudes and beliefs of the participants. It is this difference that dictates a separate set of measures that meet similar but distinct standards.

4.7 Sampling and Sample Size

4.7.1 Purposeful Sampling

Purposeful sampling is a selective method of sampling a specific population that is based on a preconceived but rational set of dimensions that were identified in advance of the study (Glaser 1978 and Bear 1998). Schatzman & Strauss (1973:39) suggest that purposeful sampling is essential to qualitative research because the results are “shaped by the time the researcher has available to him, by his framework, by his starting and developing interests, and by any restrictions placed upon his observations by his hosts”. Schatzman and Strauss (1973) further state that as the research proceeds, the researcher gains sufficient insight into the research, the direction or purpose becomes clearer and purposeful sampling is employed to achieve the necessary results. No other sampling methodology can achieve the quality of the results. Patton (1990:169) concurred with Schatzman & Strauss (1973), suggesting,

logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth. Information-rich cases are those from which one can learn a great deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research, thus the term purposeful sampling.

For the purposes of my research, the dimensions were individuals who had a history of violence or peace; I purposefully sampled information-rich cases – individuals with a history of aggressive and violent or peaceful behaviours.

4.7.2 Theoretical Sampling

Theoretical sampling is a rigorous method of analyzing qualitative data in such a way that a theory can be produced (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Glaser (1978:36) describes theoretical sampling as:

the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and describes which data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is controlled by the emerging theory, whether substantive or formal.

I employed purposeful and theoretical sampling in my research in order to access the needed richness of information that allowed me to prove or disprove the hypothesis. Maoz (2001) used similar methodology to examine violent asymmetrical encounters between Jews and Palestinians during Intifada, recruiting one group of participants from an Arab-Israeli high school and second group from a Jewish-Israeli high school. My methodology was similar it that it focused on potential participants from select sources – those who had a history of aggression and violence or peace.

Although people can be counted as individual cases, I view them as essential entities in qualitative research, not so much for who they are but for the direct and personal knowledge that they possess about the phenomena of violence and peace, within a context of cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace. More importantly, they are willing to communicate this knowledge through some narrative story telling. Hence, the violent or peaceful event, incident or experience and not the person, *per se*, is the purpose of the sample (Miles & Huberman 1994 and Strauss & Corbin 1990).

If the event is the source of the richness then greater richness should flow from greater number of events. To gain richness in results, I employed purposeful and theoretical sampling methods as the research progressed. This flexibility has been criticized (Becker, 1993; Stern, 1994) because the sampling procedures often do not provide sufficient detail to replicate the findings exactly (Kitson, Sussman,

Williams, Zeehandelaar, Shickmantet & Steinberger 1982). Becker (1993:254) suggests that many qualitative researchers “borrowed pieces of grounded theory method but [do] not clearly adhered to the critical components”. Specifically, Becker (1993) comments on what he believes is a blurring of purposeful sampling and theoretical sampling. Sandelowski (1995) and Glaser (1978) argue to the contrary, clearly stating that it is this flexibility of the sampling that creates the requisite richness that is the hallmark of qualitative research. These two positions reflect the differences between those who defend qualitative and quantitative methodologies.

For the reasons stated, I chose both purposeful and theoretical sampling because they provided the requisite richness that is the hallmark of qualitative research, as defined by Sandelowski (1995) and Glaser (1978). It is a proven research methodology.

4.7.3 Sample Size

Sandelowski (1995:183) in her article on qualitative research methodology posits,

an adequate sample size in qualitative research is one that permits – by virtue of not being too large – the deep, case-oriented analysis that is the hallmark of qualitative inquiry, and that results in – by virtue of not being too small – a new and richly textured understanding of experience.

Sample sizes in qualitative research “are typically small because of the large volume of verbal data that must be analyzed and because qualitative research tends to emphasize intensive and prolonged contacts with subjects” (Sandelowski 1986:31). Saturation occurs when no new information is forthcoming from the interviews of subsequent participants (Strauss & Corbin 1990). In support of this assertion, Sandelowski (1995:180) argues,

Seeing nothing new in newly sampled units or feeling comfortable that a theoretical category has been saturated are functions

involving the recognition of what is there and what can be made out of the data already collected, and then deciding whether it is sufficient to create an intended product. These functions are acquired through experience.

In this research, sample size was determined by saturation. I continued to sample until no new information was provided by participants and, as Sandelowski (1995) notes, I was comfortable that saturation had occurred. This saturation point occurred at approximately the forty-sixth participant; I sampled an additional five participants to ensure that I had, in fact, achieved saturation. Ragin and Becker (1989) (as cited in Sandelowski 1995:180) suggest that a sample size over fifty is considered large in qualitative research because this research methodology “is generically about maximizing understanding of the one in all its diversity; it is case-oriented, not variable-oriented”.

I was not able to identify the exact sample size in advance of the research because the participants and not I, the researcher, determined the volume of data and the direction that the research travelled. Huberman and Miles (1994:27) refer to this process as “conceptually-driven sequential sampling” because the initial participants will lead the researcher to similar and different circumstances, and behaviours that invite comparisons and contrasting perspectives. In addition, the richness of the interview data and not the researcher determines saturation.

4.8 Research Design

The purpose of any research design is to establish a sense of structure by creating a means of categorizing communication. This encourages or facilitates interpretation and integration by identifying underlying principles and propositions. One of the greatest challenges is integrating the concept of hermeneutics or the nature and means of interpreting text, and defining interpretations as a parallel construct to explanation.

4.8.1 Grounded Theory

As I articulate in the literature review, violent and peaceful behaviours as observed in cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace are an interaction between and among individuals, or within one individual. Traditionally, these phenomena have been studied through quantitative analysis that failed to adequately identify the richness that qualitative analysis can offer. Only recently has the latter methodology been employed despite the identified need, including that of grounded theory (Glaser 1992, Parry 1998, Rennie, Watson & Monteiro 2002 and Stoppard 2002).

Glaser and Strauss (1967) describe grounded theory as a research methodology that permits theory to emerge from the data where it is grounded. The emerging theory is inductively derived as the researcher studies the phenomenon, within the context. Grounded theory examines basic social process from the perspective of the participant. Glaser (1992:13) postulates that grounded theory assists “researchers and practitioners in fields that concern themselves with issues relating to human behaviour in organizations, groups and other social configurations”.

Parry (1998:89) posits that grounded theory is a research technique that allows theory to emerge inductively “from the study of the phenomenon it represents.” [The theory] “is discovered, developed and provisionally verified through systematic data collection and analysis pertaining to that phenomenon” being studied. There is a reciprocal interaction among the collection and analysis of the data, and the subsequent theorizing; this iterative process is the impetus for additional data collection, analysis and the conceptualization of advanced levels of theory. The researcher must spend time some conceptualizing in order to be sensitive to the emerging theory. To do so, it is crucial to be cognizant of the phenomenon, and attuned to the questions, responses, and concomitant behaviours being expressed. Parry (90) summarizes, “the result is the identification of a basic social process and the generation of an explanatory theory”. Hence, grounded

theory is a dynamic process of social influence that is implicitly longitudinal; it “takes a case rather than a variable perspective” (Borgatti 2004:1).

I employed a grounded theory research design in order to allow the theory that is grounded in the data to emerge and verify the phenomena of violence and peace within the context of cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. By following the grounded theory design, the process of data collection, analysis and theory development was reciprocal because the “research steps occur simultaneously” (Jackson & Niblo 2003:24). I did not begin with a theory and either prove or disprove it deductively. Instead, I allowed the theory to emerge inductively as the concepts and relationships were tested. Glaser (1992), Strauss and Corbin (1990) and Glaser and Strauss (1967) refer to this process as a constant comparative method of analysis that is seminal to grounded theory. In a similar vein, Silverman (1993) argues that this constant comparison is a source of validity as new data is gathered, analyzed and weighed.

4.8.2 Methodology Employed

Starting with the data collection, I elicited my themes (categories in QSR NUD*IST) from the interview data by constantly comparing and analyzing as the data become available, commensurate with the procedure defined by (Glaser 1992). I then used the themes to direct further data collection from which codes were continually developed with properties and theoretically coded connections, and with other categories, until each category was saturated. I determined that saturation had occurred when no new themes and codes, and specifically no new seminal information were forthcoming. As part of the analysis, I looked for examples of atypical behaviour to ensure that I had data from the broadest range possible. In some cases, I purposefully sampled these extremes.

Morse (1989) concurs with this methodology and requirement for fluidity, especially when the interview is the method of data collection. Morse (1989) suggests that initially individuals will be interviewed with a broad general knowledge

and as the research continues more specific information will have to be elicited. Finally, individuals who have atypical profiles may have to be interviewed in order to identify the entire range of experiences. Thus, the sampling, both purposeful and theoretical, was used to identify a range of experiences relevant to the phenomenon of violence within the context of the culture of war and violence. My method of sampling and data collection were consistent with Morse's (1989) methodology.

4.9 Data Analysis

4.9.1 QSR NUD*IST

Analysis was conducted using QSR NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theory-building) version 6.0, an Australian-developed qualitative software application (Bazeley 1998, Northey 1997 and Richardson & Richardson 1995). This software is an index-based, multi-functional program that has been designed to help researchers sort, categorize and code unstructured data in an index system that facilitates searching text and patterns of coded data. QSR NUD*IST supports and reaffirms the qualitative research methodology because it is interactive, builds on the results of previous analysis, and constructs new ideas out of old ones; this is an integral part of inductive theory development.

QSR NUD*IST allowed me to identify where the data was located (i.e: in conversations about certain aspects of culture that the participants related), and to connect a 'term' with a 'concept' which, in turn, facilitated the enriching of the index. If expressions are taken out of context, meaning can be altered. Hence, the context in which statements are made is integral to their interpretation. QSR NUD*IST facilitates the search for text before and after the coded statement being examined, thus enabling the context. Klein and Myers (1999) refer to this as the hermeneutic cycle as it allows for the interpretation of the text.

From the beginning, the data were messy; the assumption is that the data are there (Singh & Ricrads 2003) but need to be organized. Using QSR NUD*IST, I was able to enter transcribed interviews, and to code and retrieve text units, thus bring

structure to ideas. This was a process of “abstracting or ‘thinking up’ from the data” (Fritzgerald, Kelly and Cernusca 2003:33). These units, through the codes, were interrelated and organized into hierarchies (Glomb 2002). The codes, referred to as nodes in QSR NUD*IST, were the nexus for text units and were defined by the researcher. QSR NUD*IST allowed me to provide each node with a definition, thus maximizing my ability to operationalize its utility (Bourdon, September 2000). The analysis of the text units can be presented in reports similar to other data software analysis programs. These reports can be also presented as documents that can be subsequently used to determine confirmability, dependability, credibility, transferability and applicability of the data (Bazeley 1998, Northey 1997 and Richardson & Richardson 1995).

4.9.2 Data Analysis

Dey (1993) suggests that there is no one kind of qualitative data analysis, but rather a variety of approaches related to the different perspectives, purposes and predilections that the researcher uses. QSR NUD*IST is one of these approaches. Commensurate with Dey’s (1993) interpretation, Tesch (1990) identifies twenty six analytical strategies, all of which can be applied to qualitative data analysis, including those provided by QSR NUD*IST.

Like sampling, data analysis has evolved into a multi-faceted procedure. Huberman and Miles (1994) describe qualitative data analysis as a three-fold process of data reduction, data display and conclusion drawing; QSR NUD*IST facilitates this process. These authors interpret qualitative data analysis in terms of distinct processes, which are systematic and developmental. In addition, they identify the same fundamental characteristics of data analysis as outlined by Tesch (1990) namely: that the analysis is cyclical and reflexive; the process is comprehensive and systematic but not rigid; the data are segmented and divided into meaningful units but connected to the whole; and, the data are organized into categories that have their basis in the data themselves; QSR NUD*IST makes possible this process. Above all, Tesch (1990) emphasized the necessity for

flexibility and the absence of rigid rules as to how the organization of the data should be carried out. This is not a structureless process but one that requires intellectual and methodological competency. Analysis is, above all, imaginative, artful, flexible and reflexive (Goetz & LeCompte 1984, Stoppard 2002 and Wolcott 1994). QSR NUD*IST mirrors these processes.

Employing QSR NUD*IST software, I analyzed words, phrases, sentences, and inferences and meaning that were mediated via verbal language, semiotics and action. I then coded the data statements inductively. Dey (1993) and Sayer (1992) concur with this process, noting that this procedure is essentially a matter of making distinctions based on the context and social practice. Because of this negotiable quality, communication and meaning are context-dependent and change and evolve over time, separate from the results of the analysis of the data at the time they were gathered.

The analysis of each interview required creative thinking about the categories that the text provided. The ability to achieve this categorization is a fundamental strength of QSR NUD*IST. The broad goal of coding is to develop themes that suggest that there is an underlying issue more all-encompassing than the specific category or individual units. As an example, Mishler (1986) considers the analysis of the response to interview questions within the context of the stories they embody. Riessman (1993) concurs with Mishler (1986) and notes that the people being interviewed can often control the conversation for lengthy periods of time as they relate their stories; their words become the dogma to the themes. As such, the analysis of the narration becomes a formal and perhaps unique research methodological approach.

Riessman (1993) suggests that the researcher examine not only what was said in the interview but also the context in which it was communicated – how the response begins, how it is organized and developed, and how it ends. QSR NUD*IST facilitates this process. This phenomenon/context relationship becomes

most significant when interviewing members of story-telling cultures with all the inherent inferences and connotations. Alasuutari (1995:67) comments on this relationship noting,

The analysis of cultural distinctions within a text differs from the way in which one normally 'codes' the data by organizing them into a typology of cases. Instead of forcing one's own categories on the data, the researcher analyzes the constructs that people use or that exist in the material.

4.9.3 Emic and Etic

Alasuutari (1995) refers to emic and etic principles, or what Strauss (1987) calls *in vivo* codes versus sociological interpretations employed by the researcher. Within this contextual distinction, Avruch (1998:63) describes data analysis from an etic perspective as identifying the "underlying, structurally deep, and trans-cultural forms, expressed in terms of certain descriptors that are putatively capable of characterizing domains across all cultures". To achieve this, I employed several procedures that facilitated the back and forth flow between data and ideas or themes. I used the language and expressions of the participants (emic) that reflected their respective cultures and the names or labels that they employed to define their experiences. I asked for clarification where participants used labels, and recorded the responses in my field notes. Parallel to these notations, I recorded my own interpretation for future reference. With the latter, I confirmed my interpretation by reciting it to the participant and asking for validation.

Thus, in my analysis, I employed an etic style to refer to the same phenomenon but within a social science context. I started the process by organizing, synthesizing and reducing data, and continued this procedure through the interpretation stage. The analysis involved categorizing and coding the *corpus* of data into segments and then establishing a pattern by relating the codes or categories to one another. I coded the data on an ongoing basis throughout the data gathering phase. Finally, I conducted thematic analysis, seeking to discern noteworthy themes and categories.

4.9.4 Summary of Data Analysis

I employed a qualitative research methodology for the reasons presented. In brief, the qualitative analysis allowed for “reasoning and argumentation that is not based simply on statistical relations between variables” (Alasuutari 1995:7) but on the richness of the data that flowed from the grounded theory methodology employed (Chenitz & Swanson 1986, Glaser 1992, Parry 1998 and Strauss & Corbin 1990).

I analyzed the data based on an interpretative approach that created a theory based on the emerging data rather than establishing preconceived notions. The theoretical approach that guided the analysis was hermeneutics – the interpretation of texts. I browsed each successive interview, coding text into categories where categories had already been created and creating new categories where none existed. I also searched the document’s text using string and pattern searches that could be incorporated into the index system as nodes. Throughout this coding process with each successive transcribed interview, the QSR NUD*IST index system went through a recurrent revision as data transformed the connotations connected to each category. Hence, the emerging categories drove the process and not any pre-determined assumptions. This was a logical procedure of producing general assertions on the basis of observations from the data.

I submit that this is the best methodology because of the complexity of the phenomenon of interpersonal experiences that has not been previously researched within this context. Commensurate with a grounded theory approach (Glaser 1992 and Strauss & Corbin 1990), I conducted a bottom-up analysis. The sorting required comparing, contrasting and labelling. The initial process established a sense of order to a largely unorganized volume of data that I generated from the interviews and observations. Employing concepts and typologies common to the data, I defined relationships and established an analytic vocabulary that, in turn, achieved the aim of the research (Gubrium & Holstein 1997). I employed narrative and linguistic

method of analysis, and identified categories, including such as in-group, out-group (Chattopadhyay, Tluchowska, & George 2004 and Litvak-Hirsch, Bar-On, & Chaitin 2003).

CHAPTER V

ANALYSIS WITH QSR NUD*IST

5.1 How This Chapter Will Unfold

I provide a summary of the process for the analysis with QSR NUD*IST, and describe how I used this software program to code the data from the interviews for analysis purposes, commensurate with the procedures outlined in Chapter IV - Research Methodology. I first describe the technical structure of the analysis with QSR NUD*IST, and then outline the practical process of the analysis with QSR NUD*IST.

5.2 The Structure of the Analysis with QSR NUD*IST

Although the data appeared to be messy initially, it quickly became logical and symmetrical as the coding proceeded. There were natural 'Nodes' and 'Children' (terminology from NUD*IST that denote major categories and sub-categories) such as: culture; peace and culture of peace; war and culture of war; violence and culture of violence. The process of coding, although laborious at times because of the volume of data (7,898 text units – a sentence constitutes a text unit), was challenging but relatively easy. Initially, more free Nodes were created than Nodes on the tree. Ultimately, I coded 6 free Nodes and 93 tree Nodes; these Nodes are listed in Annex C.

As the coding progressed with each subsequent interview, the free Nodes were attached or merged into the tree Nodes or Children; some new free Nodes were also created. The procedure was repeated with each successive interview. Ultimately, some free Nodes remained free because they had no obvious place on the tree, as an example the Node 'UN Peacekeeping'. Although UN Peacekeeping is related to peace and culture of peace, it also has a connection to war and culture of war, but the relationship appeared to be indirect. Some respondents who spoke of the UN, the peacekeeping missions and the role of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) units, did so in the context of the success or

failure of a specific Mission, which is a similar but separate topic from culture of peace or culture of war.

If a participant made a general statement that did not relate specifically to one of the Children of a Node, I placed it into the Node. For example, one participant states, "Generally, I agree with the eight areas" (referring to UNESCO's eight areas within the Program of Action); I entered this statement into Node #4 – UNESCO's 8 as opposed to Child to this Node #4-1 to 4-8.

Many statements had implications for more than one Node or Child of a Node. Case in point, one participant states, "Unfortunately, the only super power now, the US, is the biggest bully on the block. They want peace American style which is not sustainable over consumption". I coded this statement under:

- Node #2 - 'Ethnicity', Child to this Node #2-11 - 'American';
- Free Node #4 – 'Peace'; and,
- Node #5 – 'Additional to UNESCO's 8', Child to this Node #5-10 – 'Sustain Planet'.

Many participants discussed the Middle East as a region in the grips of violence and exhibiting characteristics of a culture of war. In their comments, they make distinctions between Israel and Jewish culture, and Syria and Arabian culture, Iran and Persian culture, as examples. Accordingly, I created separate Nodes for each and, likewise, for references to Muslim Islam because of the importance that the participants assigned to these criteria. Consistent with this requirement to identify emergent themes, I created discrete Nodes for other criteria (e.g.: Node #7 – Motivation and Node #8 – Causes of Violence).

The critical criteria in the research were culture, cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace; UNESCO's eight areas; areas additional to these eight; and how individuals learn about culture. All others are subordinate.

Connecting these formative themes is the micro macro linkage of a culture of war at the macro nation-state level; a culture of violence at the macro meso national/community level and a culture of peace at the micro individual or interpersonal level; how, where and when do individuals learn about and communicate these phenomena.

5.3 Practical Process Of The Analysis With QSR NUD*IST

5.3.1 Transcribing and Coding

After each interview, I transcribed the hand-written notes into MSWord. Each document was titled by the date of the interview; the name of the person interviewed did not appear on the hand-written notes or the MSWord document. For purposes of confidentiality, the names of the participants were locked in a file cabinet.

Once transcribed into MSWord, the document was then imported into QSR NUD*IST and coded by the date of the interview. If two interviews were conducted on the same day, the second of subsequent interview was coded with the date followed by the letter 'B' or 'C', etc. The import process was preceded with the procedure to code each sentence as a discrete unit through the Project – Preference – Text Unit Type command function. Three options are available to this function: to was a word, sentence or paragraph as a Text Unit Type. I selected 'Sentence' as the Text Unit Type as this selection provided the best coding option. Words were too cumbersome and were not functional; paragraphs contained too much information to accommodate the requisite requirements for discrete analysis. If the essence of the argument being made by the participant included more than one sentence, then all sentences were coded as one group into the Node or Child of the Node.

The actual function of coding could be carried out by a process of attaching the Node address to the sentence or by dragging and dropping the sentence into the appropriate Node of Children on the tree. I followed the latter

because it was a quicker method. If I made an error in the drag and drop process, I could delete the procedure using the 'UnCode' function. Once the entire interview was coded, I recorded the date that the coding was completed in the on-line Document Box in the Document Explorer window.

Via the Project Pad window, I could easily make Free Nodes, Explore Nodes, and Search and Compare Nodes. With the latter, I was able to combine or remove text, explore the proximity of text, and include or exclude documents. The Project Pad also provides the option for Command Files that that are written instructions that can be read by QSR NUD*IST, which then executes them to carry out different analysis processes, such as importing documents, searching text and searching Nodes. I did not use this option because it duplicated the procedure I employed and, hence, did not add value.

I conducted the first interview on 29 July 2003 with a female participant of Jewish heritage. Her initial comments referenced her ethnic background which she identified as Russian/Jewish and Israeli/Jewish, and the plight of those who emigrated from Russia to Israel. She spoke of her experience with forty years of war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. From this initial introduction, I created Node #1 for Gender (gender of those to whom she referred), Node #2 for Ethnicity (her Russian and Israeli ethnicity). Node #3 I initially coded as 'Violent Background' but later deleted it when I transferred the 'Children' in this Node to Node #6 – Culture, and Children of this Node #6.1 – Violence, #6.2 – Peace and #6.3 – War. This first participant subsequently started to reference UNESCO's eight areas within the Program of Action and other topics. Hence, Node #4 was coded UNESCO's Eight and Node #5 as Additional to UNESCO's eight. As she discussed other topics such as motivation, causes of violence and conflict, I coded these subjects as Nodes #7, #8 and #9 respectfully.

I provided a brief definition as required for clarity for each Node and Child of the Node in the Description Box of the Node Explorer window. With as large number of Nodes and Children of the Nodes, this brief explanation facilitated the coding process for each interview. I also had the option under the Memo function in the Node Explorer window to add additional comments for further clarity. This was not necessary because there was sufficient room in the Description Box for comments.

Initially, I created Node #2 – Ethnicity without any Children. It became readily apparent with subsequent interviews that I would need to identify sub-categories or Children of Ethnicity. By then, I had conducted interviews with participants whose ethnic backgrounds were Eastern Europe, Western Europe, Canada and Asia. Hence, I worked back through the interviews creating Children: #2.1 – Asian, #2.2 – Canada, #2.3 - Eastern Europe, and #2.4 – Western Europe, etc. Node #2.1 – Ethnicity – Asian was subsequently coded into #2.1.1 – Japan, #2.1.2 – China, etc. Node #2.2 – Canada was further coded #2.2.1 – French Canadian, #2.2.2 – English Canadian and #2.2.3 – Aboriginal. Additional Children of the Ethnicity Node were created as subsequent participants made reference to them. This procedure is facilitated by the ‘Search Text of Documents’ function in QSR NUD*IST. I added memos that included my Field Notes to each interview through the ‘Memo’ function in the Document Explorer window.

5.3.2 Analysis Procedure

Once all interviews had been transcribed and coded, I started the analysis via the Browser, Report, Memo and Text Search functions in the Node Explorer window. The Node Explorer window provided a general summary of the size of the document. For example, under the Node - Ethnicity, and Child – Canada, there are 652 text units from 38 of the 51 documents.

With the Browser, I reviewed the text units (sentences) that I had coded to each Node and Children of the Node. If any text units had been coded improperly, I had the option of moving them to the proper Nodes. As I had been constantly reviewing the text units on an on-going basis throughout the coding procedure, none were found to be improperly coded at this juncture. Via the Memo function, I scanned for additional comments that I may have made. I then printed a report of the content of each Node. On occasion, especially when just one text unit (sentence) was coded, I searched with the Text Search function for the context from which the sentence was taken, scanning several sentences above and below the text unit to ensure that I had the correct contextual connotation.

Through scanning, I explored the meaning of the units of analysis by linking them with broader data. This process allowed me to reflect on the ideas that emerged within the respective contexts. I employed the Memo features to record the procedures and the meanings as they developed. As new understanding of the data emerged, I made note of this transformation which was reflected in the index tree structure. Hence, this form of enquiry into the meaning of the data became interactive, emerging from earlier enquiry processes. As I moved free Nodes into the index tree, I studied the conceptual relationships which reflected the logic of the analysis. Creating the Ethnicity Node and the specific ethnic backgrounds as Children to this Node is such an example of a logical relationship.

I developed tentative hunches about an emerging conceptual relationship early in the analysis and in response, I created free Nodes. If the hunch came to fruition, I attached it to the index tree; if it did not, the Node remained free. For this research, I was left with 6 free Nodes. There advantages to creating free Nodes initially and not creating an outline of an index tree. Most importantly, I could pre-empt the discovery of emerging themes, thus affecting perceptions, if I developed an index tree structure too early in the analysis. To overcome this

potential short-coming, I created free Nodes that became areas where I could just hold the units of analysis until such time as the themes emerged bottom-up. This procedure did not interfere with the need to address the questions posed in the hypothesis which formed the conceptual structure of the index tree. For example, I created a Node, 'Culture' and Children of that Node, 'Culture of War', 'Culture of Violence' and 'Culture of Peace'. The micro macro link is the seminal argument to this research and the hypothesis. I chose not to create specific Nodes for 'Micro' and 'Macro' because I strategized that I would search for these terms via the Search Text under the Node Explorer window.

There are two types of searches in QSR NUD*IST – text in documents before they are coded and units of analysis within Nodes after they have been coded; I employed both procedures. The former I employed to identify themes that participants expressed. Searching text within documents before coding was necessary because not all units of analysis (sentences) were coded. Thus, if I just searched in coded Nodes, I would not have accessed all text. The latter I used to search for specific terms such as 'micro' and 'macro'. In both procedures I spread the search to include text before and after to assure conceptual comprehension – the context from which the unit of analysis was taken. I employed string searches to find all text units, for example all 'micro' or 'macro', or 'micro' and 'macro'. Having completed such a search, I saved the results for detailed analysis and reporting.

I report the results of this analysis process using QSR NUD*IST in the following chapter – Analysis and Interpretation of the Findings.

Chapter VI

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS

6.1 How This Chapter Will Unfold

In this chapter, I provide a synopsis of the analysis and interpret the findings from the research, commensurate with the hypothesis. This chapter presents the comments and observations of the participants as they relate to the macro nation-state eight areas within the Program of Action and the proposed micro individual eight areas. The analysis and interpretation are structured analogous to the hypothesis. I argue that the findings from the analysis support the hypothesis.

6.2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis proposes that:

- (1) There are connections between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level;
- (2) Education and praxis for a culture of peace at the micro level will facilitate intervention for cultures of war and violence at the macro level. This will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace; and,
- (3) The direction of the learning of culture is bottom-up.

The null hypothesis proposes that there are no connections between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level. Hence, maturation toward a culture of peace at the former will not occur if individuals have been exposed to UNESCO's areas within the Program of Action at the micro interpersonal level.

Inherent in the hypothesis is the linkage between the macro nation-state and the micro interpersonal relationships. The rationale for this research is based on the premise that there is a demonstrated linkage between a culture of war and a culture of violence at the macro nation-state level (Adams, 2000), and a culture of violence at a micro individual level. This linkage creates a commonality – a platform that could facilitate resolution of conflict if the same model or schema for dealing with differences at the macro nation-state level could be employed at the micro interpersonal level. If demonstrated to be viable as a concept, factors that contribute to the violence could become imperceptible (Avruch 1998). Table 6-1 depicts the proposed relationship.

Table 6-1
Micro Individual and Macro Nation-State Relationship

Para-graph	Macro Nation-State Eight Areas Within The Program of Action	Proposed Micro Individual Eight Areas
6.3.1	Education for a culture of peace	Adopt an individual culture of peace; share with others
6.3.2	Tolerance & solidarity	Exercise patience & understanding; solidarity in virtues
6.3.3	Democratic participation	Take the initiative to exercise individual democratic rights & responsibilities
6.3.4	Participatory communication and the free flow of information	Take the initiative to provide & disseminate information; listen & understand
6.3.5	International peace & security	Establish individual peace & security
6.3.6	Human rights	Exercise & respect human rights
6.3.7	Sustainable economic and social development	Promote personal growth & professional development
6.3.8	Equality for women and men	Take the initiative to assure equality between men and women, and the unfettered equal opportunity for self & others

In support of the hypothesis, Adams (2004) asserts that there is a need for analysis to examine the relationship between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, not just between a culture of war and a culture of violence. The premise for this conceptual framework is the established linkage between decisions made at the macro and micro levels. Although the foundation for a conceptual framework has been referred to by researchers, to date, no formal connection has been made between UNESCO's eight areas within the Program of Action at the macro level and equivalent areas at the interpersonal micro level. Adams (2004) further suggests that there is a clear relationship between the macro and the micro with regard to learned aggression, and that relationship is downward – individuals learn aggressive behaviour top-down. What has not been demonstrated is how culture, specifically cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace, is learned?

I will address each of the three aspects of the hypothesis arguing that there are connections between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level; that education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former; and that the direction of learning culture is bottom up. Within the context of the latter, I will present an argument for how culture is learned.

6.3 Findings

Commensurate with Table 6.1 Micro Individual and Macro Nation-State Relationship, I present the findings for each of the eight areas outlined, drawing the connection between the macro Nation-State areas within the Program of Action and the proposed micro individual areas. These findings address the first and second criteria of the hypothesis. I then address the third criteria – the direction of learning. In support of the arguments, I cite pertinent statements of participants.

6.3.1 Education For a Culture of Peace

All participants concur with the proposition that education combined with praxis is the nexus and nucleus for a culture of peace because it can negate the negative effect of hegemony, and transform warring values, attitudes and beliefs. Complementary education is a prerequisite to cultivate value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace; this would involve harmonizing and balancing the education process with the curricula. Hence, peace studies and peace culture education at the micro level should be compulsory courses at all levels of curriculum. Peace education must be pro-active in teaching non-violent means of resolving differences as viable alternatives to violence and war.

Transformation through education comes at the micro level with integration of culture of peace initiatives into curricula, including a holistic perspective to sustainable development and environmental education, concepts that are implemented by nation-states at the macro level. This transformation requires active *versus* passive participation; active participation involves establishing a strategic perspective, constantly scanning the environment similar to a business SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis, as opposed to passive participation which entails reacting to events after they occur. Some participants are critical of what they consider to be superficial efforts to celebrate diversity in schools in the absence of critical understanding of the core issues such as protracted intractable violence and war that has existed between and among some cultural groups.

A participant who served as a UN peacekeeper in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia comments on the importance of education but the frustration of education for a culture of peace. "One of the other ways to get peace to last is to get the warring factions working together". He cites an example, "they wanted separate schools ... we said one school and one school they got so now all the kids attend one school ... they get to know each other a bit better and learn a bit of each other ... tolerance". He concludes that education at the micro level is

essential to the peace process at the macro level but it will take a few generations to develop a positive sense of self-identity and confidence at the individual micro level. This summary observation supports the hypothesis. Like other participants, he asks, “but whose education standards”? In regions marred by war and violence for millennia, what will be said in the history books will determine, to a large degree, what is learned - the old warring ways or the new peaceful ways.

“Can you trust them to write the history correctly”, he asks? “Probably not so how will they learn peace? I do not really know unless someone else writes the history, but then will it be their history. Yes, we built one school but there are biased history books and biased stories at home”. Education is essential to bring about change but, as this UN peacekeeper asks, ‘whose educational standards and whose history will be taught’?

When discussing the single school, he clearly exhibited personal symptoms of frustration but was maturely resigned to the fact that sometimes, as a peacekeeper, you can only be satisfied with the small gains made in the short-term; enough small gains add up to major accomplishments in the long-term. I was able to relate to his frustrations as I had experienced similar emotions when I served in FRY in 1994; at least he did not have to contend with active war - bullets, mines and mortars. There is relative peace now with virtually no open fighting. (Field Note 32303)

At a micro level, a school teacher notes, “I support peace ... my school works with UNESCO projects. We, as a class, talk about peace and war and the students are peaceful, for the most part. It is as a class that we talk about peace and sustainability for the planet”. The students make individual decisions to work to save the planet in their own ways; this provides them with a positive sense of self-identity and confidence that they can make a difference. She describes how the students work in teams and the team members reinforce each other’s behaviours.

Being affiliated with some of the UNESCO projects also reinforces them. But it is an individual decision - commitment to peace and sustainable behaviours

that brings about change that is sustainable. She asserts, "it certainly isn't forced on them. If it was, I believe, they would not adopt the commitment. It has to come from the individual ... from a grassroots source, such as the classroom". She asserts that it also helps if the family supports what the students are doing. Her observations argue for a bottom-up learning process for culture.

A public service manager and mother argues that education is essential when thinking about culture and peace because culture is a part of education and education allows culture to be presented. The US approach to Iraq, she charges, is not about education "but about propaganda ... to force a cultural change to the American way of doing things which is counter-cultural ... it is not a means of creating and sustaining peace in the region". Her observations reflect those of other participants who pose the question, 'Whose standards, whose history, whose education'?

A self-employed professional woman comments, "My father ... from his extensive travelling experience and education in the ... he taught us to be very much aware of the culture of where we were at the moment, and how to blend in". She describes how she learned from her father and from her formative education that it was imperative to adopt a personal culture of peace and to share those beliefs with others. Only then could peace be sustainable. Some nation-states, like Switzerland where she attended school, promote peace at the micro individual level as a national macro policy. Her observations demonstrate the micro macro link, and the connections between value-based attributes of a culture of peace at the micro and macro levels. Attributes adopted in her formative years continue to influence her behaviours as a successful business woman. Commensurate with the hypothesis, one can postulate that education and praxis at the micro, and meso and macro levels should facilitate value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace at the macro level.

A mature university student who was raised in a culture of violence comments, “peace as I see it is the absence of conflict ... an opportunity for anything ... advancement ... prosperity ... freedom from fear”. He spent his formative years in an environment reflective of hot¹ violence with brief periods of cold violence. This culture influenced his teen years that were marred by conflicts. After counselling, “I decided one day to be at peace with myself and others. At that point, my life changed for the better ... I started to become successful at work and in relationships”. He related to the concept of hot peace at a more macro although he had not heard of it before the interview. He defined his life as being somewhere between cold and hot peace but was working toward the latter. In this example, the participant learned of peace at a micro individual level and then adopted the concept to his workplace at the meso level and interpretation of his macro environment – the micro macro link. When his life changed, he developed a sense of self-confidence and identity, the manifestations of which were less aggression and better interpersonal relationships. This transformation supports the hypothesis that education and praxis at the micro level will facilitate intervention at the meso and macro levels.

A UN peacekeeper suggests if you only know of war and violence and you have lived in a family and community that has only known war and violence, then that is how you will behave. “Hot peace, as you say, is not a concept that these people have ever experienced so they live their lives behaving violently toward one another”. His observations demonstrate the micro macro link and the connection between violent and warring, and peaceful attributes. He cites examples of those who have left their homes and communities, and adopted value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace.

¹ Hot War or violence is commonly referred to as war and violence, the aim of which is the destruction of the enemy or foe through violent means; during periods of cold war or violence there is no actual overt engagements (physical or verbal) but instead there are forms of 'sabre rattling'. Cold peace is characterized by the absence of actual war or violence and posturing; however, there is also the absence of initiatives for sustainable peace. Hot peace involves actual peacebuilding initiatives between past, present and potentially future foes, opponents or antagonists (Mayton 2001 and Galtung 1996).

The female engineer who emigrated to Canada from Bosnia is a case in point. She demonstrates that education and praxis of hot peace attributes at the micro individual level leads to hot peace attributes at the meso level (her civilian organizational employment environment) and macro level (as a CIMIC officer with the military). She described the old communist education system under Tito. “We were taught about war and the glorious victories of Yugoslavia against the Germany in the Second World War and the need to fight for communism against the capitalists. That is all I knew because that is all I was taught”. She describes how, since the death of Tito and the break-up of the former republic of Yugoslavia, young people are learning that there is a better life to be made from peaceful co-existence. Young people are leaving the rural regions for a better life in the larger cities, specifically Sarajevo, or are leaving Bosnia for other more peaceful regions like Canada, as she did. She has re-learned that “peace is possible through peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives such as CIMIC”. She recently graduated from McGill University with a Bachelor degree in Engineering. “When I was in Bosnia as a CIMIC officer I witnessed and experienced how learning about peace as an individual can bring about peace in a region”. The UN peacekeeper and this CIMIC officer both personify the motto of the Canadian military, ‘train for war but strive for peace’ – a combination of both hot peace and hot war.

These observations relating to education for a culture of peace clearly demonstrates the strong micro macro link. Participants speak about the need to adopt an individual culture of peace consistent with the proposed eight micro areas and the macro nation-state area within the Program of Action. They also supports the hypothesis that education and praxis at the micro level will facilitate intervention at the meso and macro levels. This should occur as individuals become aware and gain interaction skills, thus, maturing toward a culture of peace. The female engineer CIMIC officer is a prime example; she learned about war in school while living in Bosnia at a micro level, later learned about peace in

Canada at the micro level, and returned to Bosnia as a UN peacemaker and peacebuilder at the meso and macro level.

6.3.2 Tolerance and Solidarity

Tolerance and solidarity is a singular concept in a culture of peace. Tolerance alone can be individual but requires the solidarity of many to gain the requisite or needed inertia to bring about sustainable change. Solidarity reflects inter-group cohesion within a micro macro culture that can unite like-minded individuals at the micro level who are engaged in war and violence, but can also unite individuals at the micro level who aspire to a culture of peace. Solidarity is operationalized through mobilization at a grassroots micro level to build understanding. It cannot be achieved through top-down macro mandates. Together, tolerance and solidarity demonstrate willingness to promote and protract acceptance and patience.

Tolerance and solidarity are concepts that most participants do not use in unison. “Canadians say that they are tolerant but they aren’t tolerant, they are apathetic. They just conduct their violence in ways you don’t see as much”, suggests a senior human resource manager. “Solidarity is most commonly employed in a culture of conflict not in a culture of peace”, suggests a fervent union supporter. When presented together, this participant became pensive and reflective of the concepts that he was presenting. I sensed that he was attempting to resolve some cognitive dissonance among issues that, perhaps, he had not considered prior to our interview; the concluding comments tended to be positive and supportive.

Several participants comment on tolerance and intolerance as factors that contribute to cultures not mixing. Speaking to this issue and making reference to his African experiences, an administrator who lived in southern Africa during his formative years says, “tribalism requires greater tolerance and, in a selfish, narcissistic society, there is a reduction in tolerance, not an increase. In the

absence of tolerance, there needs to be separation to establish and maintain peace". He ardently argues that some tribes with their codes of conduct are incompatible and need to be kept apart until they learn tolerance at the individual level, and solidarity at a meso group level. At that juncture, a shift in the culture of the tribe toward a culture of peace should occur.

"There is a difference between tolerance and apathy. In Canada, we speak of being tolerant. Canadians are, for the most part, apathetic and not tolerant". Referring to the attainment of sustainable peace, this individual notes that tolerance alone does not guarantee peace. "Tolerance must involve boundaries of acceptable behaviour ... ethics, values ... all of which come from culture that is religious based, for the most part". What he refers to as boundaries are what other participants identify as common value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace. "If the behaviours are outside the boundaries, then there can be no tolerance for that behaviour". When cultures mix, as occurred 300 years ago in the Islamic world, and boundaries based on fundamental beliefs were violated by out-groups, conflict arose and "this conflict has led to the wars we have experienced and will again experience".

The antithesis of tolerance and solidarity is intolerance. Hedges (2002) speaks of war having its own culture that is intolerant and the narcotic-like rush or high that war has on soldiers. The more fundamental and extreme the value-based beliefs and passions, such as those that exist in war, the greater will be the probability that intolerance and inflexibility may prevail. Excerpts from the interviews exemplify limitations and demonstrate barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace. Change to a culture of peace will commence with attitudinal transformation regarding war and violence.

Supporting the argument for the micro macro link, a more philosophical consultant suggests, "religion is an important part of culture ... you learn it from an early age ... from your parents ... and from your extended family in the

church ... the religious community". A business woman with international experience proposes, "religion is a powerful tool to retain values, but it's not necessary... the world needs to focus on secular ethics ... because commitment to Religion and so called 'family values' are declining". A military officer who has served on several UN missions offers a more conceptual perspective. "Look at any religion ... Muslim, Christianity, Judaism ... they are systemic and there is comparing of cultures ... religion being a culture or a characteristic of a larger culture". This peacekeeper has witnessed the worst and the best that religion has to offer as attributes of culture; the worst demonstrate solidarity for intolerance while the best attempt to embrace tolerance with solidarity. He argues that religions are value-based but some values are not ethical or virtuous but instead more motivated by greed and wealth acquired at the expense of those who have no power. In some instances, leaders of the more powerful religions – the Roman Catholic – have abused their authority by imposing Christianity, often with the threat of violent retribution for non-compliance. He asks, "if all religions come from spiritual awareness ... who says that my religion is better than yours ... it is more right". He challenges the right of religions to demand acquiescence as this is a form of structural violence that occurs when cultures that are highly influenced by religious doctrine clash.

Focusing on the broader macro perspective, a self-declared spiritualist who rejected what she refers to as main-stream religion suggests that religion itself has not contributed to war or peace but individual interpretations for purposes of control and greed. Individuals preach intolerance, not religious doctrine. Another participant concurs stating, "values of Christianity, Judaism and Islam are peaceful. It is the political wings ... the fundamentalists ... the extremists who use these religions to make war for their own benefit ... to meet their own greedy needs. I include the Americans here". In support of these observations, a member of the clergy openly admits that religion does not teach aggression; it is the clerics and the ministers and the priests who teach of intolerance and violence, some aggressively. Looking at history throughout the

ages, he admits with a sense of resignation that religion has done relatively little for peace when compared to the war and violence that has been perpetrated in the name of religion.

A female speaks of the clash of cultures when traditional religious cultural celebrations are disallowed “in the name of tolerance” for other cultures. Value-based attributes of a culture often reflect fundamental religious or spiritual beliefs upon which respect is practiced. Some attributes may be negotiable but, as this participant notes, religious beliefs are not. Individuals demonstrate minimal tolerance when they believe that their religion-based beliefs have been violated; such perceived perfidious behaviours demonstrate barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace. The crusades live-on today. “We talk about respect as being necessary for peace. Yes, I agree, but whose peace and whose culture”. This is a question that several participants ask; some propose answers while some pause in reflection. With anger and frustration in her voice she exclaims,

we just celebrated Christmas; it is all about Christ. I have taught my son about Christianity and respect for his fellow human beings. But his fellow human beings ... the School Board members are not respectful to him or to me by taking Christmas out of Christmas in schools. We can't even teach the Christian faith in our schools because of all the other religions that demand their rights.

She concludes with an emotional statement, referring to the other cultures. “Rights, hell ... they never earned their rights. They come to this country and demand their rights over all others ... they demand their welfare that I have to pay for. No respect breeds no respect ... it's as simple as that”. She argues that those, like her, whose cultural background is Christian form the in-group, and all others who she perceives as threats to her Christian faith and challenge her right to celebrate Christmas in schools are out-groups. There is intolerance when faith and spirituality are challenged – the crusades live on. Others argue that immigration policy is a contributing factor to this renewed conflict.

Speaking to the issue of organizational cultures at the meso level and the need for unity as opposed to diversity, a professional and experienced human resource specialist sees intolerance in organizations. "Some say it is good, to mix cultures. Maybe not all the time if they carry old baggage, or if their culture does not endorse tolerance and some do not". She asserts that employees who come from cultures that have a history of intolerance are intolerant in organizations. They cannot, as she describes, leave the old baggage at the door.

Some participants spoke of tolerance while others discussed intolerance. All established the link between individuals exercising patience and understanding or impatience and misunderstanding at the individuals consistent with the proposed micro area, and how that translates into tolerance and solidarity or a lack there of at the macro nation-state level as presented in the macro nation-state area within the Program of Action. Commensurate with the hypothesis, one can postulate that learning and adopting tolerance and solidarity at the micro level would enhance integration at the meso macro level. It also supports the hypothesis that education and praxis at the micro level will facilitate intervention at the meso and macro levels.

6.3.3 Democratic Participation

A democratic process can replace a hierarchical structure that characterizes cultures of war and violence at the macro level with a means that allows individuals at the micro level to engage in decision-making and empowerment. As such, participatory democracy can replace secrecy and control of information. However, democracies can be hierarchical and can be secretive, employing propaganda in the latter.

This general concept of the democratic process was supported by all participants; however, its application divided participants into two distinct groups. The demarcation was the ability to conceptualize democracy. One camp

postulates that for democracy to succeed, the populous needs to be intellectually mature. "Apart from education and identity, to have peace ... or work toward peace, people need to get involved in the process ... democratic process", claims a CIMIC officer who recently worked with the UN in Bosnia. In this region that once was controlled by communists, older individuals are reticent to take the initiative; their education and praxis has taught them to wait for the state to make decisions. In contrast, the youth who are more intellectually mature have the capacity and embrace the precepts of western-style democracy where other less informed individuals may not.

The second camp argues that democracy requires intellect and education where autocracy and communism requires ignorance. "Tribalism does provide a form of stability to uneducated people that western democracy cannot at their level of intellectual maturity. If you are controlled by the fear of what we in the west call 'black magic', do you really believe that these people will embrace democracy", argues an ex-South Africa patriot. Those who do not live in a democratic state look at the US as a model. They see one in ten people in prison, pollution on a scale never before imagined, crime in the streets at epidemic levels, and politicians defaming opponents in an argument culture. The most basic culture would reject this style of democracy over traditional tribalism. Democratic participation does promote a culture of peace where dictatorial forms of control reinforce cultures of war and violence. The caveat lies in the answer to the question, 'whose style of democracy'?

A medical doctor who worked with Doctors Without Borders in Abu Dhabi argues that a culture of peace is possible but under specific conditions that are clearly defined, adopted and practiced by those in the tribe, void of interference by out-groups. She acknowledges that peace is relative and that some of the Bedouin practices may not meet some UN Human Rights standards. For Human Rights to be practiced, "the highest moral standards of all cultures in the global community of tribes must be accepted by all tribes if they wish to enter into the

global community. Now this presents a very interesting dilemma". It would be improper for an outside tribe to impose on another tribe to force the latter to accept the standards of the former, she asserts. "This is currently occurring with the United States imposing their version of democracy on the rest of the world currently in the Middle East". She argues that western-style of democracy is inconsistent with many other cultures and, as such, creates an argument culture the manifestations of which are conflict, violence and war.

"Peace in Africa is defined differently than in Canada ... in the West. Peace is a relative term ... in comparison to Rwanda, there is relative peace in Zimbabwe", suggests a well educated and informed administrator who was born and lived his formative years in southern Africa and worked internationally. To benefit from participatory democracy requires a longer term perspective. But in Africa, "it is inconceivable to be Strategic ... to think about next week let alone in the next generation when you are starving and/or dying from AIDS or another horrible disease. Peace may be just a moment without pain". He asserts that you cannot compare the average African who has never known democracy with the average American black who has been inculcated with western-style democratic principles. What exists is good in relative terms. As a realist he asks and answers his own question. "Could it be better" Yes. Will it be better? Probably not".

He offers a solution to the current limitations and barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace in Africa that includes a form of democratic participation. "For peace to come to southern Africa, you will need at least forty years to bring about any semblance of peace that has a chance for the long-term ... probably longer ... a few generations of leaders". A codicil and caveat to this proposition hinges on concurrent reform in the entire continent. All the countries must come together with major reforms in education, health, economics, all controlled under a fair and equitable infrastructure of governance. "Note I did not say democracy with voting. That form of democracy ... western style may be generations away, after economic, social and education reforms have been well and truly

entrenched". This form of major reform requires significant attitude and cultural change which he postulates is not present. In his pragmatic assessment, he again asks and answers his own question. "Will it occur? Probably not ... it is too altruistic".

Democratic participation as described demonstrates the strong micro macro link. Participants speak to the need to take the initiative to exercise individual rights and responsibilities and support others commensurate with the proposed micro area, and democratic participation consistent with the macro nation-state area within the Program of Action. It also supports the hypothesis that education and praxis of democratic principles, however interpreted, at the micro level will facilitate implementation at the macro tribal of nation-state levels. This should occur as individuals become aware and gain interaction skills, thus, maturing toward a culture of peace.

6.3.4 Participatory Communication and the Free Flow of Information and Knowledge

Volumes have been and continue to be written on communication and information processing. Participatory communication and the free flow of information include concepts of free speech and free hearing. Analogues to evidence in a courtroom, these two aspects of communication relate to the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth; but even in a courtroom, the whole truth is not always allowed to surface. Free speech may be the truth but not the whole truth; the latter emerges when free hearing - the ability to have access to all information - exists. Like democracy, participants are also divided on this area.

Participatory communication "requires a level of intellectual maturity like democracy", suggests a retired teacher. He asserts that most individuals do not possess this level of emotional intelligence; the result is an argument culture. In addition, a democratic free market inhibits the free flow of information because

competitors would gain the advantage. A similar case can be made within political parties and between political foes.

The second group promotes a more positive position. They argue that participatory communication greatly enhances interpersonal relationships because it allows all issues to be aired if an environment includes motivation and trust. Motivation is akin to incentive; combined with trust, they reflect two of the three prerequisites for transformation proposed by a senior executive, the third being common ground. Commensurate with the hypothesis, this group postulates that learned and adopted behaviours at the individual micro level will facilitate intervention at the meso and macro levels.

Holding a minority view of all participants but one that still demonstrates the strong micro macro link, a social worker suggests that there can be free flow of information within and between all cultures. In this statement he asserts that peaceful attributes learned and adopted allude to the connections between a culture of peace at the micro level and a culture of peace at the macro level. His observations also support the hypothesis that education and praxis at the micro level should facilitate intervention and the macro level. He fervently asserts that Canada is fortunate to have immigrants coming with a strong work and family ethic. Their culture allows them to see clearly the attributes of Canadian culture. He believes that 98% or more respect this and work harder in light of it. He elaborates saying,

Canadians have a long way to go ... we can all reach for polarity ... we are a tolerant, accepting country, mostly. We listen as much as we speak but we have limits ... and that is distinctive ... that separates us from the Americans who seem more inclined to act on their strongly defined beliefs rather than listen.

Speaking to the issue of stifling the free flow of information, a participant notes that of all the attributes of a culture of war, propaganda is the prominent process employed, carefully crafted to achieve the end-state; it is “about being

economic with the truth” suggests a retired UN peacekeeper. Several participants present similar views, especially as they apply to cultures of war. Propaganda is planned at the macro level for deceptive implementation at the micro individual level; this is the micro macro link. Propaganda falls under the definition of aggression, as presented. It is about control.

In a similar control context, participants who explain that their cultural upbringing was highly influenced by religion, tend to speak out against religion and the church, specifically the Roman Catholic Church, as exhibiting attributes of a highly controlling environment akin to a culture of violence. “There is huge bias in religion ... although I was brought up in a religious household, I later grew to see religion for what it is ... controlled by a few for the purposes of generating fear to control people”. This highly spiritual and well-grounded participant explains that he was very religious in his youth and as a young adult but, in middle age, he experienced violent bias and prejudice against a Jewish friend whom he describes as the most loving and giving person on this earth. After discussing the violent prejudice experienced, he concludes, “all these biases ... religion, geopolitics ... they all have cultural armour that prevent honest communication”. The lack of honest communication, as he calls it, is consistent with a culture of violence as defined by UNESCO’s Program of Action and the proposed eight micro individual areas that call for open communications and the free flow of information and knowledge. Other participants also comment on the secret nature of most religions that use “absolute and unquestioning obedience” as a form of faith-based hegemony which they define as structural violence.

“Religion, as a sub-set of culture, is the greatest cause of violence and wars. My God, history is replete with religious wars. That is why I left my church”, says a senior public sector female. She explains that she was brought up as a staunch Catholic; she attended church twice of Sunday and other church events during the week. “Just look at the pain, suffering, and abuse that the church has caused, all in the name of God”. She facetiously laments that the Pope told her

that she had to marry a good catholic boy, have many kids to become priests and nuns and pay all her wealth to the church so they can abuse more people. In a final statement of rejection, she defiantly declares, "I became an enlightened woman and threw out the Pope". The church, she argues, withholds the truth.

The examples by these participants clearly demonstrate the strong micro macro link between an individual taking the initiative to provide and disseminate information at the individual level commensurate with the proposed micro area, and participatory communication at the nation-state level as defined by the macro area within the Program of Action. Propaganda is the antithesis. These examples also support the hypothesis that education and praxis at the micro level will facilitate intervention at the meso and macro levels. This should occur as individuals become aware and gain interaction skills, thus, maturing toward a culture of peace.

6.3.5 International Peace and Security, Including Disarmament and Economic Conversion

Res Ipsa Loquitur – the facts speak for themselves. The military machine and even more so the industries that profit from a strong military, create a significant inertia for a culture of war; *bello ergo sum* – I fight, therefore I exist. To disarm a military is to deny identity to those at the micro level whose entire *raison d'être* is the 'profession of arms'; to deactivate a very powerful economic force, a culture of war that has considerable influence over decision-makers at the macro level. The challenge to convert armaments to sustainable economic initiatives will require unfettered support from all players, the most influential being non-governing institutions including the corporate elite whose wealth has been built on power and influence, the former derived from corporate militarism.

Participants concur that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, an organization whose mandate it is to maintain peace and security, muster the world's largest military forces, individually expend more on military

armament than the entire domestic budget of most other nations, possess most of the nuclear weapons, are the largest arms merchants, and dictate the world economy. Participants are divided on the role of armaments in the quest for a culture of peace. Their positions fall into two philosophies – peace by peaceful means and peace by forceful means.

The former is a small minority that supports UNESCO's Program of Action as the only sustainable choice. All other options, they argue, establish limitations and barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace. The latter claim, "there are too many tyrants and terrorists whose only *modus operandi* is violence and war to disband all military forces. The world is too imperfect, today". In this group, some used superlatives such as 'never' when considering a culture of peace as defined by UNESCO. Others, with caution, discuss a culture of peace as a preferred state and one that could be attained in several generations if there was strong leadership wholly committed to this end.

Participants argue that personal peace and security is a manifestation of identity. "Identity is about a bunch of people coming together as a collective". A professional consultant articulates, "we develop our identities through our cultures. That is the problem with many people today ... they do not have a good sense of their identity because they do not have an understanding of their culture". A teacher says, "culture and identity go hand-in-hand ... you identify with your culture and your culture gives you your identity. Identity is very individualistic in a culture ... you identify with a lot of the same things as others but in your own way". That is what provides individuals with a sense of security.

An older participant with a criminal record for numerous assaults notes that when he was young, he was an angry person. He did not know who he was and did not identify with anything. He was a loner and that social isolation made him feel fearful and, ultimately, angry. "When I learned who I was ... then I was better ... wasn't afraid ... respected myself and others. Now I don't carry a knife

like I used to ... I'm OK now ... I feel good about myself". These comments parallel those made by the oldest participant in this study who also had a criminal record; he also found personal peace and security once he was able to confirm his own identity relative to his environment. Learning about identity as a part of culture is a bottom-up learned process.

Reflecting this theme of knowing yourself and being happy with whom you are – your identity, an ER physician suggests that if she were to teach a culture of peace, she would “teach about the importance of identify with self, more so or, perhaps, not even external identity which can be false”. From her experience as a medical doctor treating many people, young and old, she proposes that people need to be able to identify with themselves as good people, inside, not identity with an external imposed standard that someone else has set such as a parent or the media. She suggests that this is a fundamental short-coming in the way that children are raised with expectations that are unrealistic and focused on external reinforcers. Young girls, she suggests, engage in conflict because someone isn't wearing the latest style. They cannot identify with their peers, hence, they feel insecure. That demonstrates a lack of self-confidence and self-respect for who they are as individuals. Tranquility comes from being self-confident and loving yourself for who you are as an individual. Learning about identity is a part of culture and the process, as this doctor describes, is bottom-up starting with the family. Education and praxis at this basic micro level facilitates interaction at the meso and macro levels as adults.

Speaking from a broader interactive systems perspective, a middle-aged mature student reveals, “Identity is important to culture but identity and culture involve many aspects of our lives. You are Canadian, a businessman, a father, a friend, a member of a church”. The common connection or link is the individual identity and a feeling of security that comes from it. “People have to be able to identify who they are as a person. If they cannot then they are in conflict with themselves and will be in conflict with everyone else they meet”. The participants

who had histories of aggression and violence, and those who had criminal records all concur with this assessment.

In a similar vein, a UN peacekeeping veteran notes that on the streets, kids have as many conflicts as do businessmen because they lack identity, from a lack of accomplishing goals. Combine that with low sense of self, low confidence and you have a formula for violence. Applied to a more meso and macro perspective, this participant adds, “you see the same experience on CIMIC duties with the UN. Low self-esteem leads to low sense of security and safety. This leaves you with no identity to be proud of”. This is the micro meso macro link.

For those whose countries have been torn apart by internal or external wars, the physical constructs of their identities, such as places of worship, have been destroyed (this form of focused destruction is the core tactic of genocide-type civil war). Identity provides internal peace and internal peace is a prerequisite of identity. ‘You leave no legacy without identity ... you become violent ... you fight your neighbour and that provides a false sense of identity, but identity nonetheless’. By destroying identity, such as citizenship, the link between cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace is severed. If an individual has never known peace then there can be no connection. For many who have experienced nothing but protracted intractable war and violence, such as Sierra Leoneans (Rippon & Willow 2004), they demonstrate difficulty identifying with a phenomenon that is only a concept and not an experience.

Even in the absence of war, citizenship is critical to individual identity. “It is important to identify with your citizenship. Having said that, you can still identify with your heritage and culture”. This participant of Asian heritage who was a gang member and established his identity from the gang argues that when you start to split up into smaller groups for identity, you then exclude others. He cites youth gangs as an example from his own experience. “If you are from one

of the tongs then you are an enemy of another. The Asian gang problem is bad in Vancouver, especially when, for example, a Chinese gang takes on a Korean gang or a Vietnamese gang”. He provides a solution, again from his own experience. He left the Asian gang community and culture when inter-gang violence escalated to inter-gang murders. “If these people saw themselves as just Canadian, then they would work together toward a common goal”. This gang problem goes back many generations to the old country and the old families.

This interview clearly demonstrates the micro meso link – individual violent behaviour learned and adopted, and then practiced as part of the gang organization. The learning process is bottom-up from the traditional family, if there is one; if not, from the substituted gang family. The inter-gang violence reflects the Klingon model. Commensurate with the hypothesis, I would postulate that, in the fullness of time, this learned and adopted behaviours could become an integral part of a culture of violence at the macro level – organized crime at the nation or international level. This micro macro link has been demonstrated. The anti-thesis, value-based attribute associated with a culture of peace, would also follow this logic.

These comments demonstrate the link between establishing individual peace and security commensurate with the proposed micro area and national peace and security as defined by the macro area within the Program of Action. They also demonstrate a connection between violent and warring attributes and peaceful attributes of a culture. Although contrary to the precepts of a culture of peace, nation-states that have a military presence and communities that have police forces tend to experience a greater sense of internal peace and security. They also demonstrate connections between cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. The latter allude to connections between a culture of peace at the micro level and an eventual culture of peace at the macro level, in the fullness of time – several generations. Together, they support the hypothesis.

6.3.6 Respect For All Human Rights

Article 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter requires member states to be collectively responsible for observance of human rights. The term 'observance' does not suggest compliance; hence, violations of Human Rights remain a major issue. Human Rights have not been achieved primarily because they require a transformation of current attitudes, values and beliefs that built the wealth and power of the few nation-states at the expense of individual Human Rights in most other jurisdictions. Because of this inequity, violations of human rights occur, often without intervention. "When violence gets to the point that the UN must intervene, then there is horrific violence and violations of human rights that require Chapter VII intervention with force". A participant who prefers peace by peaceful means but acknowledges that peace by forceful means is necessary notes, "this is not a perfect world and that means that you need to use force to bring about the cessation of unacceptable and horrific violence, and violations of human rights. But, as several participants point out – "certainly human rights but you have to ask yourself who sets the standards".

All participants agree that education regarding Human Rights must be global, not just local or secular. "Solving problems of humanity are global ... they include respect for mankind ... with Human Rights". Education is important when thinking about culture and peace because culture is a part of education and education allows culture to be presented. "However, if the principles of a culture violate human rights, then there needs to be an international military police force that enters that nation and stops the violations of human rights".

Participants are also unanimous in their positions that no culture should be allowed to violate human rights. One participant reflects the observations of all, arguing for "basic human rights and rights of all living organisms ... people, yes, but also animals and plants and all that makes us a part of the greater living community. There must be equality for all living entities, not just humans".

Equality requires individuals to be accountability. “Those who were responsible for violations of human rights need to be held accountable for their actions”. This begs the question, accountable to what body or jurisdiction. The International Criminal Court (ICC) has been established but not all nation-states, some of whom are currently violating human rights, are members.

Elaborating on the argument that some use culture as an excuse to justify violations of Human Rights, a peacekeeper proposes that power is not a part of culture but an individual behaviour that was learned top-down. Dealing with those who employ power for personal gain or to discriminate against segments of a society or social group is a constant challenge for peacekeepers, he suggests, “So now the peacekeeper has a dilemma ... does he force both boys and girls to attend school because it is right ... a basic human right as defined by the UN or does he keep with tradition and just allows boys to attend”. He offers this solution to what some others perceive as a limitation or barrier to the attainment of a culture of peace. “The answer, in my mind, is simple. The peacekeeper holds the higher value of Human Rights”. He argues, “the same can be said for clothing, food, and shelter. If one class of people get to eat first and get all the resources, leaving none to other classes then that is abuse of power and that must stop”. This type of discrimination and violation of Human Rights is structural violence as defined by Galtung (1996). This situation also poses a dilemma. “Each UN soldier does his job with moral conviction. The problem occurs when the Canadian peacekeeper is required to work along side another national peacekeeper who does not aspire to the higher moral values but instead enforces at the point of a gun bias and prejudice”. These observations demonstrate the micro meso link; they also allude to the macro link because the UN peacekeepers from other nations who do not aspire to the higher standards of human rights have learned this behaviour within their respective nation-state.

Also commenting on the micro meso macro link, a participant argues, “without human rights for the individual, the tribe will not have human rights. Thus, human rights to the highest moral standards of all cultures in the global community of tribes must be accepted by all tribes if they wish to enter into the global community”. He asks and responds to his own question,

what should be the guiding principles for tribes when they observe violations of human rights ... do they impose? First, they inform all tribes, whether within the global community or outside, that human rights are the moral standards for all citizens. The motivation for the potentially offending tribes not to violate human rights would be self-determination, without policing by outside influences.

This issue of equality within the context of Human Rights is integral to the arguments and also demonstrates the micro macro link. Individuals who champion equality as an integral part of Human Rights at the micro interpersonal level also tend to work toward Human Rights at the meso NGO and macro nation-state levels, and support others in the same quest. Equality requires those in power to defend the rights of those who do not have the ability to defend themselves. “Looking at these eight areas, I’d say that human rights are ... may be the most important, but not just having human rights but standing up for and defending those who cannot”.

The macro nation-state area within the Program of Action calls for Human Rights; Roche (2003) proceeds further calling for a human right to peace. The proposed micro individual area requires everyone to exercise and respect human rights; participants identify this practice within their own behaviours and draw the connection to the need for nation-state and global compliance. This is the micro macro link. The arguments cited by the participants suggest that Human Rights be defined by one governing body, ideally the United Nations, and adhered to and defended by all nations at the macro level and individuals within this nation-states and ‘tribes’. The education and praxis, however, comes from the individual

micro level. Only when groups of individuals at the micro level within 'tribes' adopt and practice Human Rights will it become a part of their culture at the meso level – their culture of peace. As more tribes adopt Human Rights as an integral part of their culture, the practice becomes a part of the culture at the nation-state macro level. This is the micro meso macro link; this also demonstrates the bottom-up learned behaviour of a culture of peace as discussed.

6.3.7 Sustainable Economic and Social Development

Oppression, authoritarianism and control characterize cultures of war and violence through colonialism and economic exploitation. It also results in extreme poverty that, in turn, contributes to social or structural violence. Sustainable economic and social development cannot germinate in an environment of exploitation and a culture of war.

Participants tend to agree that, historically, economic growth for the few rich nations has been tied to colonial exploitation facilitated through military supremacy – cultures of war and violence. This is not a phenomenon that existed solely in past centuries but continues to thrive today. Where economic and social development initiatives have been taken, it has been tied to military aid and the results have tended to favour the more affluent nation-states at the expense of the poorer regions. Participants concur that the arming of southern nations, primarily by the 'big five' permanent members of the UN Security Council, has not resulted in a fiduciary relationship. Instead, it has contributed directly to the instability of the region, not the sustainable economic and social development. It is indirect education for a culture of war and violence and not education for a culture of peace.

Only a few participants discuss economic and social development within the context of regions or nation-states; most speak of individual personal growth

and professional development and project how individual growth can eventually impact national growth. This is the micro macro link.

A senior executive provides a philosophical perspective based on the Athenian model of democracy as a case in point. "This is the essence of the democratic state, she argues, "this was envisioned by the early Greeks in Athens ... the unrestricted opportunity for individual growth but accountability to the common code of laws and responsibility to uphold and contribute to the community".

A teacher who was born and lived in South Africa for three decades, offers a similar assessment of the potential for peace in Africa. He is, however, more operational and optimistic but still cautious. "What are the fundamentals to reform for peace in Africa? They are very basic: education, health, infrastructure that allows for economic development, stable governance and a responsible judiciary. This will contribute to stability". He concurs with the implementation process, "it must happen all at the same time in all countries. Without pan-peace, there will be the constant fear of invasion from another tribe". He asserts that it is very complex for Africa because of the tribalistic culture control. It will take "a huge attitude change that will require intellectualization ... the ability to think to the future". He argues that it is possible but not probable because there is no leadership on that scale, or strategic intellect. The key to success for economic and social development is education but, he argues, "education will not occur ... dictators suppress education ... educated people cannot be controlled by dictators who profit with their private bank accounts".

Consistent with these assessments, a well-educated self-employed entrepreneur who also lived and worked in southern Africa argues that peace is predicated upon economic reform but the requisite transformation will not occur because "the current dictators like Mugabe would want all the profits to go into his personal bank account, not into the economy. It is all about power, greed, and

tribalism". Global corporations are reluctant to invest in unstable dictatorships. In addition, communications, the internal media is controlled by the dictators. "No tyrant would acquiesce to such an idea because it would undermine his power and control". Under these conditions, he argues, peace becomes a relative commodity. Aid workers with select NGOs can bring relative peace to some Africans for brief periods but sustainable peace as defined by UNESCO's culture of peace program is generations away, assuming a strong pan-African leader emerges.

These interviews demonstrate the connection between violent and warring attributes and peaceful attributes of culture – the common denominator being culture. Violent attributes of a culture learned and adopted demonstrate the connections between cultures of violence and war. Value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace are curtailed. This is a limitation and barrier to the attainment of a culture of peace. Repressed education and praxis limit awareness and the ability to gain peaceful interactive skills at the meso and macro levels. Thus, maturation toward a culture of peace is destabilized.

These participants argue that the transition in Africa toward sustainable economic and social development will take several generations as it will in other war-torn regions such as the Balkans. In cultures where sustainable personal growth and professional development at the micro level are repressed, economic and social development at the macro level is also inhibited. These observations demonstrate the micro macro link between the proposed micro area and the defined macro area within the Program of Action, and support the hypothesis.

6.3.8 Equality Between Men & Women

Adams (1983) argues that war and cultures of war have historically, but not exclusively, been the domain of men. From victory came power and authority to govern, rule and dominate. This monopoly on power excluded women, thus creating inequity and structural violence at most societal levels. That is not to say

that women have never ruled or led their nations to war; they have. Their tenures, however, are exceptions to the equity rule; males dominate in the world of politics, business and most other control-related facets of life.

Today, women have a greater representation in party politics of most western nation-states than ever before in history, but their influence in changing cultures of war and violence does not appear significant for the major powers. The number of women in the United States Senate and Congress is has increased over the past century, yet the US continues to be the most bellicose warring nation that promotes cultures of war and violence with the greatest military; it is also the largest penal colony in the world with ten percent of its citizens in jail at any one time. In contrast, the increase in the number of women over the same period in Canadian, Australian, Swedish, Swiss and Norwegian politics is also statistically significant yet these nations tend to be far more peaceful. This conundrum suggests that there are other intervening variables in the gender equity debate on cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace.

In second and third world southern hemisphere nations, however, gender inequality has contributed significantly to the suffering of women and children. Women tend not to share equally in the governance of such nation-states. One only has to look at the plight of women and their families in the Sudan today, a country torn apart by civil war led by a male dominant culture that is motivated by greed and personal power. Inequality has been reinforced through structural violence which is intensifying with increased globalization. Central to a culture of peace is the necessity for equality for women.

All participants except three speak of equality in terms of a human right to peace; the others propose that all living organisms have an equal right to peace. Referring to the former, a female senior manager summarizes the observations of the majority of the participants. "When I think of a culture of peace ... equality ...I think of open communication with positive ... non-violent terms and equal

opportunity to debate ... discuss. I think of mature positive relationships that promote equality". Paramount, she argues, is equality of opportunity for women. "Equality does not mean the socialist interpretation of give to those who do not want to work ... it is about the equal opportunity to work and grow and develop; if you chose not to ... well, that is your choice". Equality also refers to equal access to education and health services. Equal access does not mean unlimited right of entry or right to use for superior resources and services, according to her definition. It does mean the removal of limitations and barriers as defined in structural violence. Equality is equality opportunity.

A female HR manager emphasizes the need for a common value-based system. You cannot have a hierarchy based on gender and an organization that has, as a value, gender inequality. Here she refers to equality between men and women, one of the value based attributes associated with UNESCO's culture of peace. "This occurs because we have different cultures that do not believe in the same values ... as long as you mix them, you will have conflict. If that occurs in an organization, then you will have workplace violence, employee turnover and lower productivity". She offers what some might consider to be an intolerant solution but one that she suggests could reduce limitations or barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace in the workplace. "The solution ... either adopt the values of the organization and its culture, as created by the employees and employer, or you are gone ... dismissed. We hire for attitude and terminate for attitude". She referenced Jim Collin's book, *Good to Great*, concurring with his observation that before an organization embarks on its mission, leaders need to get the right people on the bus and the wrong people off the bus. If there is a clash of cultures for equality, either between employee cultures or employee/organizational cultures, then those in conflict need to be removed from the bus.

Discussing gender inequity, another female public sector manager comments on the negative ramifications of creating separate groups such as

'females', 'Aboriginals' and 'visible minorities'. "Power and control holds one group or person back at the expense of another. I do not send you on a promotional course but send a female because there is only one position and we do not have enough females promoted". She asks, "Is that equality"? This behaviour creates the worse attributes of in-groups and out-groups because it prejudices one group over another, she asserts. "You may be the best candidate but the government policy is to promote females or Indians or another minority group. Is that equality"? She asks and responds to her own question. "Will that lead to conflict and will the conflict be long lasting ... and will that decision isolate people into groups? That is what happens now and that is why we have sick organizations and workplace violence ... albeit subtle at times". She argues that this behaviour does not provide balance and it will not promote equity between women and men, a prerequisite for a culture of peace. She repeatedly observes this phenomenon at the federal government level and at the provincial level when the federal government gets involved, especially with French and English, Indians and females. As a female, "I hate that because we all ... all females wear the same label ... you got promoted because you are female and not because you are the best candidate". Speaking from a position of experience, she concludes that this policy causes more harm than good to the gender equity cause, and results in more conflict and backlash than supports coalitions.

The macro nation-state area calls for equality for women and men; the proposed micro individual area requires people to take the initiative to assure equality between men and women, and the unfettered equal opportunity for self and others. In their discussions and observations, participants establish this micro macro link. Equal opportunity for men and women reflects value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace. Without equality, there is repression and structural violence which are attributes of a culture of violence. Commensurate with the hypothesis, education and praxis of equality at the interpersonal micro level should facilitate the learning and adaptation equality attributes at the meso and macro levels, as discussed by the participants.

6.4 Direction of Learning

The hypothesis states that the direction of learning of culture is bottom up. Summary observations and comments by participants in the previous section allude to this assertion. Speaking specifically to the direction of learning of culture, participants discuss how, where and when they learned.

One hundred percent of the participants discuss how, where and when they learned about culture in response to this scheduled interview question. All identify family members, specifically parents, as the initial primary source of information regarding their culture; secondary sources include extended family members, social groups and affiliate cultural organizations at the micro level. Several participants state that macro national organizations or institutions had no influence in their formative years. As they grew older, however, they compared what they originally learned about their culture from their parents and family/social groups with meso or macro environmental factors. They viewed their surroundings and interpreted events through their cultural lenses and drew individual conclusions, some of which included biases.

“Children learn about their culture, their environment from their parents ... the family”, says a single parent. Others state: “We learn culture from our closest contacts ... from our family, our parents and grandparents ... from the stories they tell us about our past. We then come together in common groups ... the commonality being the sameness of what we value in our cultures”; “We learn about our cultures from our families and with that learning we gain a bias against all those who are not a part of our culture. Culture determines how we see the world and how we interpret events”; “What we all are today is determined to some extent by where we were when we grew up and the influence that our parents and grandparents had on us”. These statements demonstrate the micro macro link and emphasize that the learning process is bottom-up.

Commensurate with the hypothesis, education and praxis at the former should facilitate intervention at the latter.

Several participants discuss in greater detail how, where and when they learned about culture. An articulate, professional woman says, "You learn culture first from your family, then from your environment. My son learned his values from me and his father. We go from our parents and transcend to generations. In terms of religion, we did not give him a religion. Instead, we let him figure it out".

This participant is extremely intelligent and well educated. She speaks several languages and has travelled and worked extensively in the Middle East. She has a multi-cultural background. Her past and current employment history adds significantly to her credibility as a participant. (Field Note 168)

She elaborates, drawing on her personal experience living and working in international environments. "We learn about our cultures from the first day we are born ... what is and is not acceptable ... what we need to do to be accepted in the family and other social groups in our communities". Her background is Austrian, Iranian, Scandinavian and Canadian, and she has travelled and worked in all continents. From this diverse upbringing, she states with confidence that all culture is learned in the same manner – bottom-up. Reiterating this observation, she confirms that we do not learn culture from our political leaders. "Just look at Canada ... we are a divided nation with many, many cultures. If politicians were leaders of culture, we would have one culture ... but we don't". Describing her personal circumstances, she asserts that each culture or sub-culture teaches it's own. She learned about her culture from her parents and from her church, social clubs and the schools she attended. When she grew older and started to make decisions, she compared her culture with others she saw and decided to either stay the way I was or modify or change completely. She emphasizes that these were individual decisions and not decisions or directions that were imposed upon her.

A school teacher discusses how, when and where she learned about her culture, and the choices she and others made to accept, modify or reject the value-based attributes associated with their respective cultures. "We learn from our parents ... our families and the groups of people with whom we associate ... we receive reinforcement for our behaviours this way ... from others who behave in the same way". She speaks about her formative years as a child of a military family in the United States during the Vietnam War period. Her father is a Vietnam vet as are her uncles. She was a child of the 60's who was raised on military bases so she culture was influenced by her father and mother and all their military friends. She describes how her friends reacted to the war. "We had friends who protested the war but they were not a part of our groups ... our culture. They were the counter-culture ... smoked pot and protested. That was their culture". With an air of acceptance and tolerance of these peers she says, "As we learned from our families and social groups, so did they ... but they rejected their parent's culture and became a reinforcing culture for their own movement". Although she continues to support the military and the culture of war that it represents, she is critical of US foreign policy.

A social worker also comments on how events in life impact individual learning of culture, "To get to peace in your life, you need to pick and chose your associates ... individuals to learn from and support you ... one-on-one and in small groups". Referring to her practice and her therapy groups, she asserts that as a social worker, this is how we conduct self-help groups; this is how individuals learn to accept new peaceful behaviours, reinforced, validated and supported by friends, family and small social groups. Once learned, you then expand to larger groups and then communities. This expansion process that she refers to is the micro macro link and the bottom-up learning process.

Another social worker describes in the greatest detail of all participants interviewed how his first child learned about culture, from his perspective as a new father. When learning culture, he suggests, we learn from our immediate

environment at the family level. A new born infant cannot see over and above general shapes but they hear and sense the environment. This is their first learning experiences, from their immediate family, mother and father, and perhaps grandparents. Slowly, after the first year, they start to connect with others, extended family members, slowly exploring.

His son is currently in day-care where he experiences mainstream culture beyond his immediate family. "In day-care ... it is different because he is no longer an only child but one of many. He is experimenting with the concept of being aggressive to survive ... rough and tumble to survive in the world". He resigns himself to the stark reality that this 'rough and tumble' behaviour will be a part of his culture that they will either reinforce or modify. In sum, his learned cultural norms will begin with those that his parents pass on to him.

Several participants speak of the role of women in creating a culture of peace for their children and communities as the natural nurturing role of the mother. "In Ireland, it wasn't the churches that brought about the peace but the mothers. For a peace, we need to start with the mothers ... the responsible, mature mothers who have known their spirituality". She elaborates that the global village needs the emotionally mature and intelligent mothers to start the peace process, like in Ireland. We need to have the successful, mature mothers teach the children about tolerance. The family is at the heart of moral behaviour and mothers have the moral influence; this is a part of motherhood, or it used to be for mothers, according to her perception. The problem, she suggests, can be traced to women moving out of the home and into the workplace. The mixing of roles has resulted in the debasing of moral and ethical standards. Unfortunately, fewer and fewer mothers have high moral standards. We need to get back to the tradition of the mother teaching and maintaining the moral standards for the family, and community. She acknowledges that, women libists will not like that but that is their role in society and an absolutely essential role. She concludes, with a strong condemnation of some working women. "Today, many women

have joined the ranks of the immoral workforce, fighting and back-stabbing their way up the corporate ladders; there is no one home guarding the moral values of the family ... the essence of the community". In her analysis, she argues for the micro macro link, suggesting that women are the nexus and nucleus of this fundamental process.

A CIMIC veteran comments on how the UN is attempting to change the culture of war and violence to a culture of peace at the family/community level through a form of psychological operations (PsyOps). The UN focuses their efforts on the women in communities because history has demonstrated that women, more than men, will take the initiative toward peace. "We use PsyOps for propaganda ... tell them to give up their weapons. We communicate this from 0800 to 1700 when the men are away working because the women are more likely to give up the weapons". But there is a price to pay for the women, as this UN peacekeeper relates. An elderly lady surrendered a box of grenades to peacekeepers. However, when the men come home and find the weapons and explosives gone, "the women wore it".

When discussing Op Harvest - the initiative to gather up weapons and munitions from the women, I noted a pensive moment in his demeanour. He was pleased that they had retrieved weapons and especially the box of grenades, but was saddened with the fact that the women 'wore it', meaning that the men physically and mentally abuse the women when they discover that the women have handed over the weapons to the UN peacekeepers - the cost of personal peace. (Field Note 22303)

A taxi driver whose family emigrated from Syria to Canada reinforces the need for women to become involved in the peace process at the micro level by, 'getting rid of all the guns'. Women need to take the upper hand and get rid of all the guns, and the dealers and suppliers. He openly acknowledges that this is an arduous chore because, "guns in the Middle East are like drugs in the US ... they are controlled by the mafia-suppliers who are more powerful than the state ... and in some cases, backed by the state or another state". The influence of

the state and mafia is an example of a top-down process for behavioural change and not cultural transformation, although it could become cultural.

Referring to the role of women in Africa, a teacher who grew up in South Africa reaffirms what these other participants argue - the need for women to become involved in the peace process. "Women need to be empowered to convince the young not to pick up weapons and go to war, slaughtering their own neighbours and family members". Referring to the role of women within the family, he notes that this is a cultural change that needs to take place at the personal level. "Young boys ... mostly ... without families that teach peace will learn from the next social group ... this may be a gang-like group that teaches and reinforced murder and violence". Referring to the bottom-up process of learning that starts with the mother's influence, he adds that culture is not taught by governments. The mother is the nurturer and this is missing in the African cultures. He asserts that this absence of female influence results in increased violence.

This latter interview summarizes what other participants presented, and demonstrates the micro macro link and the bottom-up learning process. Education and praxis at the micro level will facilitate intervention at the macro. All observations presented in this sub-section allude to the connection between a culture of peace at the micro and macro levels. All interviews clearly demonstrate that culture is learned bottom-up; they also suggest a strong micro macro link between violent or warring attributes of culture. In addition, the interviews demonstrate a connection between attributes of a culture of war and a culture of peace. The participant who spoke of her up-bringing as the daughter of a Vietnam veteran spoke of peaceful attributes learned and adopted by her childhood friends who rejected war allude to connections between a culture of peace at the micro level (including counter-cultures), and a culture of peace at the meso and macro levels. She confirms that her counter-culture friends who had adopted many of the value-based attributes associated with a culture of

peace in their formative years continue to behave within these peaceful parameters as adults. To some extent, she has also adopted them and rejects violence but with the caveat that peace by forceful means is often necessary.

6.5 Hypothesis or Null Hypothesis

The hypothesis proposes that:

- (a) There are connections between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level;
- (b) Education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former. This will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace; and, the direction of the learning of culture is bottom-up.
- (c) The direction of the learning of culture is bottom-up.

Analyzed within the context of the macro eight areas within the Program of Action and the corresponding proposed micro individual areas, I would argue that there are connections between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level; and, education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former. Although this research is not longitudinal, it suggests that this transition will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace.

The interviews demonstrate the micro macro link and emphasize that the learning process is bottom-up as postulated in the hypothesis. Education and praxis at the micro level does transfer to the meso level; this should facilitate intervention at the macro level. As hypothesized, if the value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace- are at the core of the micro education and

praxis, maturation toward a culture of peace should occur toward the macro level as individuals become more aware and gain peaceful interaction skills.

This chapter has analyzed the findings and has determined that a connection exists between cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace, and the learning process for culture is bottom-up. These findings demonstrate the hypothesis. In the next chapter, I discuss the findings within the context of the eight macro areas of the Program of Action and the eight micro areas and make recommendations as to how these findings can be put into practice.

Chapter VII

DISCUSSION

7.1 Aim, Objectives, Hypothesis

Adams (2000) states that there is a need for analysis to examine the relationship between cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace, not just between a culture of war and a culture of violence. A culture of war at the macro level contributes to violence at the local level. Based on the assertion that peace is more likely to occur if there is acceptance of common values and beliefs, and a common governing body that could mediate any differences, Mayor and Adams (2000) present a Program of Action with eight areas that, if practiced by all nation-states at a macro level, could move them from cultures of war and violence toward a culture of peace.

Although the foundation for a conceptual framework has been referred to by researchers, to date no formal connection has been made between UNESCO's eight areas within the Program of Action at the macro level and equivalent areas at the interpersonal micro level. If, as Mayor and Adams (2000) postulate, praxis by nation-states of the eight macro areas within the Program of Action could move the nation-states from a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace, would praxis of the proposed micro areas facilitate this process? Is there a connection between the proposed micro areas and the macro areas within the Program of Action? If there is a connection, how do leaders mature nation-states from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace?

This research demonstrates that individuals learn peaceful behaviours at the micro level; these attributes learned at the micro level, associated with a culture of peace, become a part of the respective cultures at a macro nation-state level. Learning culture is a bottom-up process. The proposed micro areas can be employed where interpersonal aggression and structural violence occur.

In this chapter, I outline how progress at the micro level can be transformed into progress at the macro level. I address this process within the context of the eight areas as outlined in Table 2.1. I cite, as a summary example, the role of women in the peace process and the Bedouin Case as described by the medical doctor who worked in the Middle East with Doctors Without Borders Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF).

7.2 Progress Within The Model Of The Eight Areas

I define culture as the derivative of experience, reflected in art, religion, language, food, clothing, traditions, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst other social entities; hence, it is situational and dynamic. Culture is not uniformly distributed and is not the same for all individuals within a cultural group because of personal internalized encoding procedures (cognitive and emotional) and schemas. Culture mirrors the essence of the nation-state at the macro level and the social group and family at the micro level. Culture is the nexus and nucleus of cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace; it can contribute to conflict as much as it can be a factor in peace.

Culture is inherent in the eight macro areas within the Program of Action. As such, they reflect culture at the nation-state level. The proposed eight micro areas also reflect culture and, if adopted, can facilitate the transformation toward a culture of peace.

7.2.1 Education For A Culture of Peace

A few participants referred to Maslow's Hierarchy of Need as a means of explaining the challenges faced by those who promote a culture of peace. This model asserts that individuals will learn best and contribute more at the self-actualization level when they have gained self-confidence, established a supportive social network, realized safety, and had their physiological needs met. Employing this model, one can argue that there is a link between education and

self-confidence as noted in Chapter 5, section 5.3.1; self-confidence includes a positive sense of identity with self and the environment (the social group, tribe or nation-state, and the physical environment).

We develop our identities from our culture through education, reinforced with praxis. Education can be formal through academic and religious instruction or informal through family and social group association. Where cultures in education discriminate by gender, socio-economic status or other forms of structural violence, identities are influenced accordingly. Identity, therefore, is a manifestation of standards associated with curricula. But by whose standards; whose curricula; whose text books; and, whose version of history?

Where culture is unique to a group, tribe or nation-state and defended as a basic right, who is to say that any one standard is incorrect? The challenge becomes one of defending the rights of respective cultures while at the same time assuring a balance of perspectives. Balanced education is more likely to occur where tolerance and solidarity, democratic participation, participatory communication and the free flow of information, peace and security, respect for human rights and gender equity exist.

In reality, however, not all democratic nation-states provide a balanced curriculum; most often, a culture of peace is not discussed because there is insufficient motivation and reward. Rewards in education are linked to monetary attributes; the greatest rewards have traditionally been provided by those who support and profit from cultures of war and violence. Therein falls the dilemma of education – if you take the king's shilling, you do the king's work.

In response to the question, 'by whose standards', I argue, by the UN and UNESCO standards because the UN is the only quasi-governing body to which virtually all nation-states belong and all either accept or acknowledge its role. Success will come with small steps. The first steps toward a culture of peace

have been taken under the leadership of David Adams. The next steps need to be directed along two paths. The first would involve those nation-states that are not engaged in either hot or cold war, but co-exist with other nation-states in relative peace. In many of these environments culture of peace education initiatives have started to take root.

The greatest challenge for those who have taken this path is to establish an agreed upon culture of peace curriculum and coordinate its implementation. UNESCO needs to take the lead role in designing this curriculum and, in doing so, set a universal standard based upon David Adam's work and the Program of Action. Although religion is an integral part of culture, I argue that education for youth needs to be void of religious biases that have in the past and may continue to contribute to cultures of war and violence. In the place of religious doctrine, the curriculum must focus on generic and basic life skills such as situation analysis, problem solving, inductive and deductive reasoning. These skills will facilitate communications and logical decision-making.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserts clearly in his *Agenda for Peace* that the UN needs to take a more proactive role in preventing violence, not just responding when war erupts; education for a culture of peace is proactive. It is essential to teach about a culture of peace in addition to cultures of war and violence in order to present a balanced and comprehensive curriculum. Only then will individuals be able to gain an understanding of the attributes of both cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace, and conclude that only a culture of peace is sustainable. Providing access to balanced perspectives is consistent with the requirements for participatory communications and the free flow of information. This curriculum would establish the link between sustainability of the planet at the macro level and sustainability of all living organisms, including humans, at the micro level.

The human right to peace must reinforce a right to education; education must be a compulsory subject at all curricula levels. This is a macro policy for many jurisdictions where government departments, school boards or parent advisory councils exist. The education process should include implementation of a manifesto for peace that all students have developed together that defines what a culture of peace will consist of in the classroom culture. The classroom manifesto must also include the adoption of an individual culture of peace. Such a peace education process is currently being employed in some schools at the elementary level. It must be expanded and parents in conjunction with education administrators must take the lead role; this is a micro initiative. When parents take the lead role at the micro level, students will emulate the behaviour because culture is learned bottom-up. Through education and praxis a culture of peace will become an integral part of the culture of the students, families, social groups, organizations and, ultimately, the nation-state.

The second path to education for a culture of peace is one not yet travelled. It would involve those nation-states that are or recently have been engaged in hot or cold war and have UN peacekeepers on their sovereign soil engaged in peacemaking, peacekeeping or peacebuilding initiatives. A basic aspect of UN peacebuilding must be to educate parties to the conflict and citizens within the nation-states about a culture of peace as defined by UNESCO and the Program of Action. Clearly, those in the greatest need for peace education are those nation-states where UN peacekeepers are currently serving. At the Pearson Peacekeeping Center this transformation has been started.

The direction of intervention must change from focusing on illness – war and violence to focusing on wellness – peace. This is a fundamental change in philosophy that is consistent with the UN Charter and the role of the peacekeeper as envisioned by Nobel Prize winner, the late Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson. The UN and UNESCO are already involved with nation-states in conflict. Hence, initiating a curriculum for a culture of peace is a natural

progression and one that would complement the peacebuilding process that has evolved in the past decade, commensurate with Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*.

Education for a culture of peace is as much a process as curricula that are holistic in their perspective. Just as it must be a compulsory part of the curriculum in all schools and universities, it must also be compulsory at all levels of nation-state peacebuilding. It must be proactive to problem solving before conflicts arise. At a micro level, some judges in litigious actions direct perpetrators of interpersonal violence to undertake compulsory anger management training. At a macro level, the UN could direct nation-states in conflict to undertake compulsory culture of peace training. At both levels, the process educates as much as the substance of the curriculum.

Although all eight areas within the program of Action and the proposed micro eight areas overlap, education for a culture of peace is the most important and will have the greatest influence in the transformation process.

7.2.2 Tolerance And Solidarity

Tolerance and solidarity is a singular concept in a culture of peace. Tolerance alone can be individual but requires the solidarity of many to become sustainable. It starts at the micro individual level and builds through meso social groups and tribes to macro nation-states. We build tolerance and solidarity through a process of bottom-up mobilization starting at the grassroots micro level. Sustainable change cannot be achieved top-down. The antithesis to tolerance is apathy; the antidote to apathy is action taken by individuals and groups who share this common belief at the micro level.

Tolerance involves agreeing upon boundaries of acceptable behaviour, and establishing common and accepted standards, all of which derive from culture. As a culture of peace replaces cultures of war and violence, boundaries

of acceptable behaviour become the norm. For some, the challenge to change existing warring and violent behaviours that demonstrate little or no tolerance may be perceived as too great, given the protracted intractable history between factions in conflict. The viable solution may be to focus on a culture of peace as defined in the Program of Action, thereby creating tolerance and solidarity for peace. As with education for a culture of peace, focusing on wellness (peace) instead of illness (war and violence) is a fundamental shift in philosophy; intolerance is the illness, tolerance is the wellness.

The steps to tolerance and solidarity are sequential. First, acceptable standards must be identified. Second, acceptable behaviours must be demonstrated – this is discipline by example. Third, positive behaviours must be rewarded. Fourth, behaviours that fall outside acceptable boundaries must be immediately addressed with corrective actions that may include sanctions, among other measures. Ultimately, a culture that supports intolerance must be changed in all aspects; a culture that supports tolerance and solidarity must be rewarded as an example for others to follow.

In reality, achieving a culture of tolerance and solidarity is an enormous challenge because some intolerant behaviours are learned from religious teachings and doctrine that are perceived to be sacrosanct. Participants discuss these concepts in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.2. As much as religious leaders speak of tolerance, they are among some of the most intolerant and have a powerful influence on their flocks. The crusades live on today. Religion has done relatively little for peace when compared to the war and violence that has been perpetrated in the name of respective deity; some religious leaders have demonstrated solidarity for intolerance in the name of their god commensurate with their interpretations of their respective scriptures.

7.2.3 Democratic Participation

Democracy can be defined differently, however, the fundamental process centers on free and equal right to participate in the affairs of a group, tribe or nation-state; it is the rule of the people. Its derivative is Greek – *demokratia*, *demos* – ‘people’ and *kratos* – ‘rule’. Participation in its most basic interpretation involves taking part in an activity.

Democratic participation is a micro activity that is inherent in democracy as a process but can exist outside a democracy just as some democracies exist with less actual participation. The essence of democratic participation is the will and ability to participate. Plato describes two responsibilities of every citizen of the city-state: to take full responsibility for what we refer to today as personal growth and professional development; and, to become involved in the affairs of the city-state. As a democratic responsibility, personal growth and professional development require every citizen to take the initiative to become fully informed and to inform others of their rights and responsibilities. Today, as in the time of Plato’s Athens, not everyone is sufficiently self-motivated to achieve this level of personal growth and development.

This leads to Plato’s second requirement, to become involved in the affairs of the city state. Those who strive to this level of involvement in the democratic process demonstrate leadership. It falls on this leadership cadre to lead others to become educated in the affairs of the state and to achieve sustainable economic and social development. In some jurisdictions, power and control by a few prevents involvement by many.

Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. There isn’t a democratic nation-state that has not experienced corruption and has not used deceit, deception and dishonesty, including the United States that portrays itself as the democratic superpower bringing peace to the world via forceful means, or Canada that attempts to present itself as the purveyor of peace by peaceful

means, yet does not always comply with its own doctrine. One cannot assume that democratic participation, as it is practiced, is the panacea and will guarantee sustainable peace.

Peace and democracy are relative terms. One can successfully argue that more democratic nation-states tend not to become involved in horrific acts of genocide or other heinous crimes against humanity within their respective borders, yet some have turned a blind eye to such violations of Human Rights outside their democratically elected sphere of influence. The United States, as an example, has not committed horrific acts of genocide within their borders in the 20th century¹ on a scale witnessed in Rwanda yet actively discouraged member states within the UN to vote for intervention as genocide was being committed. They minimized the atrocities and argued that it is not within their own self-interest to intervene. Conversely, less democratic nation-states tend to have histories of more abhorrent violations of Human Rights within their borders (eg: Rwanda, Sierra Leon and Cambodia). There are those nation-states, for example Zimbabwe, that define themselves as democratic yet use linguistic euphemisms such as 'tribalism' to disguise violations of Human Rights. In a paradoxical way, there are non-western tribes, for example the Bedouin, that employ other than western democratic styles of governance yet exhibit more attributes of the spirit and intent of a culture of peace than democratic nation-states that supposedly fight for peace, which is an oxymoron. Participants discuss these related phenomena of democracy in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.3.

How does one reconfigure democracy to better achieve the precepts of a culture of peace? Volumes have been written on this topic; these theses are beyond the scope of this study. However, observations and recommendations from this study relating to the micro macro link can be made.

¹ Horrific violations of Human Rights were perpetrated on both sides during the American Civil War (1861-1865).

Leadership toward a sustainable culture of peace must replace leadership that has resulted in unsustainable cultures of war and violence. As demonstrated in this study, culture is learned bottom-up. Leaders within a democratic participatory process educate for a culture of peace starting at the micro individual level, ultimately moving to leadership behaviours at the meso group and macro nation-state levels. Resistance to absolute democratic participation is common in virtually every jurisdiction, even in western societies many of which proclaim to be democratic nation-states. The motivations for resistance are many, the least of which are fear and the perceived need for control; these stall the transformation process. Hence, democratic participation is a relative term.

To achieve transformation toward more democratic participation, concerns must be met. Small successes must be celebrated. Leaders in the transformation process must inspire a shared vision of democratic participation by addressing the fears and rewarding changes however small. Leaders must replace hierarchical structure with a process of involvement by bringing together those in control with those who have not yet become involved in a participatory process. This will require confidence- and trust-building, and empowering individuals through leadership by example. Leaders must challenge the process by demonstrating potential gains that will result in sustainable benefits for all parties. This will require the removal of systemic barriers in order to enable others to act. Such actions reflect Ghandi's approach to peaceful transformation.

Democracy requires a level of intellectual maturity resulting from personal growth and professional development. Participation also requires a level of knowledge gained through education. Therefore, leaders who participate need to educate and empower followers through education and praxis. The process of achieving democratic participation is as important in setting the example and achieving success as the message.

7.2.4 Participatory Communication And The Free Flow Of Information

Participatory communication places obligations on both the sender and the receiver to ensure that the message has been sent and received. Communication requires speech and hearing in the general sense. The sender must confirm the message and the receiver must ask for clarification to assure accuracy. For those who chose not to exercise communication freedoms where they exist and those who are prevented from benefiting from such freedoms, communication and the free flow of information are not achieved.

Freedom of speech is still repressed in some nation-states. However, freedom of hearing, I argue, is more fundamental to the democratic process and efforts to inhibit freedom of hearing are more perfidious. Sanitization of information is a euphemism that is contrary to a doctrine of freedom of hearing. Freedom of hearing involves being told the whole truth, yet it often includes being provided with deceptive information in order to mislead or cause individuals to abandon efforts to identify truth. Without freedom of hearing there cannot be democratic participation or participatory communication; the absence of freedom of hearing inhibits effective participation; the absence of freedom of hearing impedes the free flow of information; the absence of freedom of hearing provides fertile ground for propaganda and secrecy. Like propaganda, impediments to freedom of hearing are planned at the meso organizational and macro nation-state levels for deceptive implementation at the micro individual level.

Leaders must educate followers at the micro level to ask about that information that is not included, data that has been removed from the communication under the guise of sanitization. Leaders must also educate followers to gain maturity in lobby methodologies; such knowledge includes structures of influencing political processes because it is at this macro level that decisions are made and the truth sanitized. Leaders must influence, encourage and support growing groups of youth to become active lobbyists for the peace process.

7.2.5 International Peace And Security

Bello ergo sum – I fight therefore I exist. At the micro level, those who bear arms establish a sense of identity and *raison d'être* from the weapons and the sense of power and control that guns provide. They also establish a sense of personal and collective security against others who may have weapons and those who hold resources that those in the 'profession of arms' may want for perceived security reasons. At the macro level, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council muster the world's largest military forces, individually spend more on military armament than the entire domestic budgets of most other nations, possess most of the nuclear weapons, are the largest arms merchants, and dictate the world economy. From their respective positions, they derive a sense of peace and security. Ironically, because of their respective positions, international peace and security is tenuous at best; hence, their security is fragile which leads them to become more bellicose and bolster their armaments.

This begs the question, how do we assure international and individual peace and security? How do we achieve the requisite transformation from unsustainable cultures of war and violence to a sustainable culture of peace where peace and security are threatened? When should peace by forceful means be employed and when should peace by peaceful means be used to bring about peace and security, given today's reality?

Identity contributes to a sense of peace and security because identity is a function of how individuals interact with one another, either in peace or in conflict. As noted, we develop our identities through our cultures, be they cultures of war and violence or a culture of peace, or both. On the one hand, individuals cannot stand by doing nothing to intervene while horrific acts of violence are being perpetrated. But we need to initiate programs to counter conditions that contribute to war and violence. The former may require peace by forceful means while the latter can best be achieved through peace by peaceful means.

A sense of peace and security is an individual interpretation; its antithesis is fear. Both can motivate. The sense of security flows from confidence, identity, and inner peace that in turn reinforce the awareness of security. Where peace and security prevail, fear tends not to be an influential factor. Leadership toward a culture of peace, therefore, must assure and reinforce the sense of peace and security. This is much easier said than done, even at a micro individual level but it must start at the individual level as an integral part of the life skills education process before it can be incorporated into the culture. Because it is an individual perception, the curriculum needs to reflect the audience; at the meso social group or tribal level, the emphasis needs to change from the psychology of peace and security to the sociology of peace and security.

7.2.6 Human Rights

Human Rights have been defined by the United Nations. They now need to be defended by all individuals within social groups and tribes, social groups and tribes within nation-states and nation-states within the global community. This process is the operationalization of the micro macro link. Only then will Human Rights as defined by the UN to become a sustainable part of the global community within the context of a culture of peace.

How do we educate for and practice Human Rights? Historically, culture has been used as an excuse to justify violations of Human Rights. We need to establish positive rewards for exercising Human Rights and negative sanction for violations. Nation-states and the UN give medals to those (primarily military personnel) who engage in war and peacekeeping duties, respectfully. Yet few nations or organizations such as the UN give medals in equal numbers and with equivalent celebration to those who serve for peace. The Nobel Peace Prize is an exception but this award is reserved for the most distinguished; the everyday efforts of the vast majority of those who strive for peace go unrewarded for their efforts. Even those who worked to develop the culture of peace Program of

Action have not been recognized at the same level as UN peacekeeping soldiers, despite his Herculean efforts. The work and sacrifice of UN peacekeepers is admirable and needs to be recognized. But equally, the efforts of the members of the peace movement need to be recognized and rewarded.

Education and praxis for Human Rights must be global and the micro macro connection reinforced. Without Human Rights for the individual, the tribe will not have Human Rights. Within this context, equality is integral to the argument for universal Human Rights, especially gender equality. The complexity and volume of issues that inhibit or support Human Rights is as substantial as the complexity of the new world order. The solution will come in shifting the doctrine away from violating Human Rights as an acceptable behaviour toward defending Human Rights as the virtuous behaviour.

The first step in achieving this shift is to codify violations of Human Rights as a criminal offence. Such a proclamation would send a clear message. Next, it is essential to identify those factors that motivate, encourage and support the violations in order to establish and implement counter measures. As an example, the use of child soldiers in Africa must be criminalized in conjunction with a global convention on the use of children for military purposes. Using children to keep armed conflictive active should be reason enough to intervene. But if it is not in the self-interest of another nation-state – the large and medium world powers – intervention will not occur. That is a reality of today. The issue becomes one of how do you make intervention a doctrine of self-interest.

Ideally, one would want to eliminate the use of child soldiers altogether but realistically, small steps must be taken to initiate the transition similar to those employed in the process of reducing the use of land mines; alternate weapon systems were offered to replace land mines. In the case of child soldiers, other solutions need to be presented to those factions who are engaged in protracted conflicts that will not be resolved in the near future. Child soldiers use small

arms; if small arms were replaced by large arms that children could not operate, that would negate the use of children.

This and other actions must be considered in the immediate term to render the doctrine of child soldiers ineffective. This is not the preferred solution to achieve a culture of peace as defined but one that parties to the conflict can deal with in the short-term to comply with one aspect of Human Rights violations, given the current socio-economic and political conditions in the region. It is also a solution that allows for progression toward compliance with Human Rights in other areas.

Immediate 'peace by forceful means' intervention must be initiated where violations of Human Rights occur and where 'peace by peaceful means' strategies will not be effective. Rwanda and the former Republic of Yugoslavia are recent examples. Unfortunately, in Rwanda, the international community under the threat of negative sanctions by the United States against certain voting members of the UN General Assembly, amongst other factors, did not intervene to stop the genocide. Likewise, immediate intervention by the UN did not stop violations of Human Rights in Bosnia.

Employing such intervention is 'peace by forceful means' and certainly not the preferred methodology but one that is realistic, given the complexity and asymmetrical nature of the new world order. To facilitate the transformation toward 'peace by peaceful means', such a quick response force, as described by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, must be highly professional, trained with peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding skills. It must have credibility in threat to use force at a level that will be perceived as so overwhelming that parties to a conflict will cease violations of Human Rights immediately and, ideally, not engage in any violations of Human Rights. When employed by the UN to intervene, its mandate must be long enough to ensure that conditions that contributed to the conflict have been replaced with conditions that reflect attributes associated with a

culture of peace. These 'peace by peaceful' measures would be implemented during the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases of the transformation.

7.2.7 Sustainable Economic And Social Development

Peace and security are dependent upon sustainable economic and social development. Unfortunately, economic growth for the few has been achieved through colonialism and mercantilism, at the expense of many. Today, the phenomenon continues as the few trade armaments for resources, thus assuring that the many do not attain sustainable economic and social development. The key to economic and social development is education.

If the UN is to adopt a greater leadership role in the global community, then its mandate will have to shift from its traditional humanitarian role to one that actively pursues economic and social development. Member states must take the initiative to offer more solutions when the General Assembly meets and commit to their implementation, even if implementation is not within their direct self-interest. As an example, in Sierra Leone, the British decided unilaterally to deploy to this region separate from the UN Mission. This was an embarrassment to the UN but no other options had been presented. At that time, the African Union had neither the capability nor sophistication to assure transformation toward sustainable economic and social development; many of their member states were experiencing similar challenges and threats.

I cite again the example of child soldiers in Africa. Demobilization of these children from irregular armies has begun. However re-integration without sustainable economic and social development will result in many being re-recruited back into armies that provide some semblance of economic and social support, albeit a regular diet of sex, alcohol and drugs, and a dysfunctional unsustainable outcome. In the absence of sustainable economic and social development, it become a viable option and, in some instances, the only option.

The use of children as 'soldiers' at a micro level to achieve goals at a meso and macro level is not limited to Africa and violation of Human Rights within a warring context. Children are used in the drug trade in regions like Central America where trafficking is a major economic activity. Just as with child soldiers in Africa, realistic options need to be considered to negate the productivity efficiencies achieved with the employment of children in the drug trade. Such a move is a small but important step in the transformation process. The supposed drug war will not be won soon but the use of children as soldiers in this war can be replaced in the immediate term with other realistic options. Such options need to be presented to the United States, the major power most negatively impacted by the drug trade, in order to make it within the US self-interest (economic and social) to intervene where they have not at previous junctures.

7.2.8 Equality for Women And Men

Equal opportunity reflects value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace. However, equality for women alone, as it is defined, will not guarantee peace. This area within the Program of Action cannot be taken out of context of the other areas if a sustainable culture of peace is to be achieved.

Within the context of gender balance and peacemaking, women tend to have more practical and rational motivations than men. Women, more so than men, tend to define peace within the context of universal human needs and seek practical solutions to build cultures of peace. While both men and women are motivated by practical and rational factors, men tend to be more motivated by ideological criteria than women. It is important not to over-generalize gender differences or similarities in the methods and motivators for men and women as they advance cultures of peace. The goal remains consistent; it is only the paths taken that vary. Participants discuss these issues in Chapter 5, Section 5.3.8.

Several participants speak of the role of women in creating a culture of peace for their children and communities as the natural nurturing role of the mother. One salient statement summarizes the observations: “In Ireland, it wasn’t the churches that brought about the peace but the mothers. For a peace, we need to start with the mothers ... the responsible, mature mothers who have known their spirituality”. The global village needs the emotionally mature and intelligent mothers to start the peace process, like in Ireland. We need to have the successful, mature mothers teach their children about tolerance. This role would facilitate the gender equity process so necessary for a culture of peace.

The family is at the heart of moral behaviour and mothers have the moral influence; this is a part of motherhood, or it used to be for mothers, according to some participants. The problem, they argue, can be traced to women moving out of the home and into the workplace. The mixing of roles has resulted in the debasing of moral and ethical standards. Unfortunately, they assert that fewer and fewer mothers have high moral standards. They postulate that as a society, we need to get back to the tradition of the mother teaching and maintaining the moral standards for the family, and community; “there in no one home guarding the moral values of the family ... the essence of the community”.

A CIMIC veteran comments on how the UN is attempting to change the culture of war and violence to a culture of peace at the family/community level through a form of psychological operations (PsyOps). The UN focuses their efforts on the women in communities because history has demonstrated that women, more than men, will take the initiative toward peace. “We use PsyOps for propaganda ... tell them to give up their weapons. We communicate this from 0800 to 1700 when the men are away working because the women are more likely to give up the weapons”. But there is a price to pay for the women, as this UN peacekeeper relates. An elderly lady surrendered a box of grenades to peacekeepers. However, when the men come home and find the weapons and explosives gone, “the women wore it”.

When discussing Op Harvest - the initiative to gather up weapons and munitions from the women, I noted a pensive moment in his demeanour. He was pleased that they had retrieved weapons and especially the box of grenades, but was saddened with the fact that the women 'wore it', meaning that the men physically and mentally abuse the women when they discover that the women have handed over the weapons to the UN peacekeepers - the cost of personal peace. (Field Note 22303)

Referring again to the Africa example, women need to be empowered to convince their sons not to pick up weapons and go to war. A cultural change needs to take place at the personal level. Mostly young boys but also young girls will learn from the social group or tribe. Learning starts with the mother's influence and the mother as the nurturer is missing in the African and other cultures. The solution starts with empowerment and incorporates education and praxis. In other cultures, the nurturing role is shared by both parents.

Integral to the argument for gender equality is a comprehensive understanding of where and when inequities exist. In the child soldier example, young girls are perceived as more precious resources than young boys because, in addition to being armed soldiers, they can also be employed in the camps as cooks and bush-wives, and in the logistics systems as bearers and maintainers of supplies. Young boys, in contrast, are not as valued as much because their sole purpose is that of a soldier. However, when demobilized and re-integrated into their home communities, the girls are perceived as soiled and, therefore of less value but the boys are revered as warriors with the accompanying hero-status. Value is relative but not equitable. The perception of gender equity within respective cultures needs to be addressed at all levels; transformation will, more than likely, span several generations.

7.3 The Bedouin Case

The medical doctor who worked with Doctors Without Borders in Abu Dhabi presents a comprehensive case for the connection of the eight macro and micro areas. She argues that a culture of peace is possible but under specific

conditions that are clearly defined, adopted and practiced by those in the tribe, void of interference by out-groups. She acknowledges that peace is relative and that some of the Bedouin practices may not meet some UN Human Rights standards. For Human Rights to be practiced, “the highest moral standards of all cultures in the global community of tribes must be accepted by all tribes if they wish to enter into the global community. Now this presents a very interesting dilemma”. It would be improper for an outside tribe to impose on another tribe to force the latter to accept the standards of the former, she asserts. “This is currently occurring with the United States imposing their version of democracy on the rest of the world currently in the Middle East”. She argues that western-style of democracy is inconsistent with many other cultures and, as such, creates an argument culture the manifestations of which are conflict, violence and war.

She asks what should be the guiding principles for tribes when they observe violations of human rights in other tribes. Do they impose? She believes that they should. First, they inform all tribes, whether within the global community or outside that Human Rights are the moral standards for all citizens. “If there are violations, including genocide, then the offending tribe will be dealt with through ‘peace by peaceful means’ if possible; if not, then ‘peace by forceful means’”. The motivation for the potentially offending tribes not to violate Human Rights would be self-determination, without policing by outside influences.

Second, she suggests that all tribes must have internal security to self-govern, but only when they abide by the highest moral standards. This doctor is speaking of implementing ‘peace by forceful means’ as the primary methodology of education and praxis, consistent with the hypothesis. She states, “There is a moral and ethical argument for the use of force to achieve sustainable peace”. One tribe can take the right of self-defence or defence of the higher moral values with offensive action. “Violent action can save lives”, she argues. Sustainable peace will not occur on its own. Instead, “if there is internal war within a tribe, then there is a loss of justice. Thus, peace must be established or re-

established”. That may mean creating and preserving peace with the use of force to assure compliance with the highest moral standards. “This is the balance of which I speak ... the balance that is imperative for peace to prevail”. Peace will not come on its own, nor will it be sustainable if the value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace are not enforced.

Reflecting on her experience with the Bedouin people, this medical doctor does not believe that there is any motivation for any leader to initiate the requisite change. Instead, change toward a culture of peace must come from the individual member of each tribe. “We, you and I, and others who champion peace ... we must educate one person at a time to adopt the high moral values that will bring about and sustain peace ... what you call a culture of peace”. She strongly recommends that peacemakers and peacekeepers study the ways of the Bedouin, “because it is an example of a simplistic society that has survived for centuries ... for millennia. In their tribal ways, in their values and respect and culture are the routes to peace”. She concludes that we need to follow the traditional routes that they [the Bedouin] have followed for millennia, not the route of the west because the west has no history of peace where the Bedouin have.

This interview summarizes the strong micro macro link and the connection between violent and warring attributes and peaceful attributes of a culture that other participants identify. Peaceful attributes learned and adopted allude to connections between a culture of peace at the micro individual level and a culture of peace at the meso tribal level. Commensurate with the hypothesis, one can postulate that, in the fullness of time, learned and adopted peaceful behaviours within a culture of peace at the micro and meso levels, by an increasing number of people, would become an integral part of a culture of peace at the macro level. Education and praxis at the micro level would facilitate intervention at the macro level. This should occur as individuals become more aware and gain peaceful interactive skills, thus, maturing toward a culture of peace.

7.4 Principles and Practices For Transformation Toward A Culture Of Peace

Transformation from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace, I argue, will require the implementation of initiatives in the short-term that reflect both 'peace by forceful means' and 'peace by peaceful means'. At this time, the world is too an imperfect place to conclude otherwise, unfortunately. Those who enforce peace by forceful means must be professionals trained in peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace -building.

Transformation from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace will need to be drawn by a troika of incentive, trust and common ground. To arrive at a sustainable culture of peace, a sequential process must be followed. First, incentive must be established; all parties to conflict, violence or war have their respective coins of the realm that may come from the necessity of blood loss or other powerful motives such as the potential of job loss in an organization or divorce in a relationship. Incentives must also be positive in the form of meaningful rewards. These incentives tend to motivate individuals to move toward sustainable reconciliation or, at least, cessation of aggression in the immediate term. This motivation is consistent with aggression theory as outlined in the literature review.

Trust, the second criteria, is about building confidence and mutual expectation through détente and demonstrated trusting behaviours such as trust developed through goodwill. Trust will allow individuals to move to a common and safer or comparatively safe ground. There is a contagion effect that can be positive or negative; trust can grow into hot peace as mistrust can deteriorate into hot war. In the latter, after war has gained momentum, it is more difficult to rebuild trust and peace. If we look at regions where there is war and violence, one tends to find a disconnect and a lack of true identity with self and others that is needed to form the foundation of trust.

That leads to the third criteria, common ground. This is the 'sameness' factor; the antithesis is the creation of in-groups and out-groups. Individuals look for attributes that are common or shared in some sense. If there is no common ground, then the challenge of agreement becomes more difficult. For those who believe that there is no common ground, a diplomat of détente needs to present more macro options in ascending order. This process could grow to include children and children's rights to a safe and supporting environment, to see a better world for the future. For most cultures, the future for the children of a society is precious. Common ground can move beyond family and children at the micro level to broader issues such as the environmental and the planet as a whole. There are exceptions and we see them today. We have horrendous violence when some societies send their children to their early deaths as suicide bombers or child soldiers. A society that does this is not a society or culture with morals or ethics; it is psychotic.

Peace encompasses the psychology of peace. Psychology involves counselling among other methodologies to bring about transformation toward a culture of peace. To initiate the transition toward sustainable peace at the micro meso levels, those who will lead need to ask the following questions and act on the responses once the troika of incentive, trust and common ground has been initiated:

- Why are we behaving the way we are?
- What is the purpose of what we are doing?
- What do we have to do to transition from cultures of war and violence toward a culture of peace?
- What is the value in moving toward a culture of peace as opposed to maintaining behaviours associated with cultures of war and violence?
- What would happen if the transition did not take place?

- Who defines the agenda and influences the educational processes?

From a social psychology perspective, leaders of peace also need to address responses to the following questions:

- What are the needs of the perpetrators of war and violence?
- What is the social environment that supports the current warring and violent or peaceful behaviours?
- How do we connect people in common efforts – working toward a culture of peace?
- How do we design the environment that supports a culture of peace?
- How do we focus on strengths (peace) and not on weaknesses (war and violence); place the emphasis on wellness not the illness?
- How do we establish and share a deeper sense of purpose?

Social psychology is about needs and meeting these needs. Needs for those whose behaviours reflect attributes associated with cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace are similar, and include but are not limited to identity, connectedness, validation, acceptance, trust, safety, security and esteem.

The psychology of peace also incorporates behaviours associated with internal consulting by the détente diplomat to groups, organizations, tribes and nation-states. The *raison d'être* of such a person in the internal consultant role is to bring about change and learning through education and praxis. The détente diplomat strives to assure that change and learning about a culture of peace are sustainable. Hence, the détente diplomat needs to evoke an exploration of polarity – cultures of war and violence on one side and a culture of peace on the other.

In this leadership role, the détente diplomat will develop sufficient credibility to have some influence with informal and formal leaders at the meso and macro levels. Leadership is not about power but about influence, it is about trusting relationships and the influence that flows from that trust. Once trust has been developed, the détente diplomat will have greater opportunity to lead those in conflict through a series of steps away from cultures of war and violence toward a culture of peace.

Hedges (2002) speaks of the narcotic-like addictive nature of war and its violence. Prochaska, DiClemente and Norcross (1992) present a model for change in addictive behaviours, the manifestations of which are often aggression and violence. To address the narcotic-like addictive nature in the transformation toward a sustainable culture of peace, the détente diplomat needs to be cognizant of the Prochaska, DiClemente and Norcross (1992) model:

- Pre-contemplative (what problem?)
- Contemplative (OK, so maybe there is a problem)
- Preparation (I need to do something about it)
- Action (this is what I plan to do)
- Maintenance (I would like to keep this up)
- Lapse and relapse (I am re-committing)

Initially, those involved in a conflict may perceive their behaviours to be normal and justifiable under the circumstances; in the pre-contemplative stage, they may ask, 'what problem'? Once they acknowledge that war and violence are problems, they may reply, 'OK, so maybe there is a problem'; they then need to realize that action is necessary. Through intervention on their own or facilitated by the détente diplomat, they identify a plan and a means to maintain peaceful behaviours and, ultimately, become committed to the peace process. Lowey, Murdock, Coppard and Rippon (2004) successfully employed this model in their

national Anger Management Program at the micro and meso levels; it had been developed specifically for military personnel, many of whom had been deployed to war zones as UN peacekeepers and exhibited symptoms of aggression and violence.

Where war and violence can often be manifestations of anger at the macro level, détente diplomats or peace leaders can employ these steps to facilitate the transition from cultures of war and violence to sustainable change for a culture of peace. Transition is the process and change is the end state. To lead people to the end state, to achieve sustainable change will require such a process. But there is rarely a static end state, just transition. Hence, the transition to change remains dynamic and requires constant intervention and reinforcement by the détente diplomats.

7.5 A Role For The UN

As presented, the UN may be in the best position to play the role of détente diplomat at the macro level. To facilitate the transformation, there needs to be leadership to assure concurrent implementation of initiatives within a systems context if peace is to be sustainable. Global peace will only occur with strong moral and ethical leadership from one global entity, preferably the UN.

We live in too an imperfect a world motivated by greed to conclude otherwise. Reward needs to come from a body such as the UN with its global mandate for peace. No one leading nation-state has an equivalent mandate or credibility. Likewise, enforcement for non-compliance, by means of a UN military/police force would have to be immediate and swift, consistent with Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, with offenders brought before a world court similar to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Leadership at the UN level must inspire a shared vision of one global community working in unison for the sustainability of the planet. This process has

begun with the Program of Action. Redistribution of basic resources – food, water, and shelter is paramount if a culture of peace is to be established and sustained. The gap between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’ is growing, and with it, increasing mistrust and tensions. Redistribution of these basic resources must be constant and not just a short-term response to a disaster which has been the practice to date with peacemaking missions; this must change to a more strategic perspective.

The media is the purveyor of psychological violence. The media propagate the language of violence and war. Hence, the media as we know it today need to be controlled, not to eliminate reporting or bar news but to provide a balance, ideally in favour of news that promotes a culture of peace. Control can be facilitated with the formation of an oversight committee, established by the UN under a mandate that reflects value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace. As a counter to the negative and violence-focus of commercial media, the UN General Assembly passed resolutions that allowed for the creation of culture of peace news networks (CPNN). The mandate of such an entity is the promotion of peace through interactive communication. CPNN-USA was the first to be created under the leadership of Adams; others have followed and still others are being brought on-line including CPNN-Canada.

The UN needs to establish mandatory reconciliation commissions where violations of human rights have occurred, as a part of the transformation process. Thereafter, psychological services need to be provided to enable victims and perpetrators alike to move forward.

Some cultures just do not mix; that is a current reality that will not be transformed in the immediate- and short-term. In such cases where protracted intractable violence and war occurs, combatants need to be separated until issues can be resolved through the UN General Assembly or other means; this may take decades or generations. The alternative, on-going violence and war, is

not a viable option. The UN must work to create an environment where all parties to the conflict can live; let all parties win and think that they can win or have won, and can tell their side that they have won. If not accepted willingly, the UN must take over the judiciary and governance, as occurred in East Timor (see Annex D), until such time as leadership within the nation-states is firmly established. At that point, a gradual return of power and authority can take place.

7.6 Culture of Peace As A Macro Strategic Initiative

I have presented a potential outline for transformation in the troika and questions that the détente diplomat should employ to facilitate the process. These processes are more operational than strategic, more local than global, and more reactive than proactive. They are important and essential initiatives that take place more at the micro and meso levels. But a culture of peace also needs to be marketed at the macro level as a strategic initiative just as a culture of war is marketed.

7.6.1 Marketing A Culture of Peace As A Strategic Initiative

A culture of peace needs to be presented as the preferred alternative to cultures of war and violence at a strategic level. An important short-coming to date, I argue, is in the methodology of marketing and selling of a culture of peace as an alternative. To successfully move into the marketplace of war and violence at the macro level, one needs to conduct a market analysis, present complementary products and services and sell a niche market. Such a marketing methodology is beyond the scope of this research; however, I present a summary of a comparative analysis.

Warriors have exclusive attention of those making decisions. Détente diplomats need to be at the corporate tables where strategies are being discussed and developed, and decisions are being made. Détente diplomats need to be strategically positioned and must speak the same language in order to be understood and, thus, gain the requisite credibility. Warriors speak of the

'butterfly effect' - when the butterfly flutters its wing in the Amazon jungle, the effect is felt worldwide. Although the butterfly is a most peaceful image, warriors are now using the analogy in aggressive and warring contexts such as the winds of war. The détente diplomat is not present when these dialogues are taking place to re-interpret the imagery.

Warriors have moved into the realm of asymmetrical strategies that emphasize interoperability or multi-tasking and domain awareness. Détente diplomats need to follow suit. As an example, the CNA Corporation is a think tank organization whose representatives, like those from the Rand Corporation, attend military exercises and conferences, and provides feedback to military leaders on how to improve their efficiency and effectiveness of the praxis of war. CNA Corp 'Analysts' were present at a conference of 'Maritime Security Challenges In The Asia-Pacific Region In The Post 9/11 Era' (held in Victoria, British Columbia, 5-7 May 2005), actively courting Admirals from Indo-Asia and other Pacific Rim nation-states. I attended this conference by happenstance and not as a result of a strategic decision to market a culture of peace, although I quickly engaged the Admirals with culture of peace alternatives proposed by the CNA 'analysts'.

At present, culture of peace 'think tanks' either do not exist or do not exist at this macro level, and, as a result, do not have the lobbying influence and ears of the Admirals and Generals and politicians who fund cultures of war. Détente diplomats are not present and, therefore do not have the opportunity to present alternative options to achieving military mission objectives. In the maritime environment, as an example, warriors speak of the strategic global economy in terms of global ocean real estate. They are amassing standing contingency special operations task forces for quick response and mission specific task forces for long-term intervention. Détente diplomats need to be sitting at these macro level tables, offering alternative options.

7.6.2 The Cost of Conducting War

Most militaries are pricing themselves out of the market; high-end armaments of war have become too costly. In response, other military options are being researched. Warriors who are accountable to politicians are cognizant of the bottom line as are their political masters.

Détente options that are much less costly and sustainable are not considered because détente diplomats are not present at the corporate tables. There are accountants and economists within the ranks of the détente diplomats. Comprehensive comparative analyses need to be presented by the détente diplomats who hold CA/CGA designations to their respective professional cohorts who fund cultures of war; McCandless (2002) has demonstrated a leadership role for others to follow.

7.6.3 Culture of Peace and the Bankrupt States Within The Global Marketplace

Peace and security tend to increase in times of relative stability in the international arena. But the international arena is dynamic and nation-states are affected by the fluttering on the wings of the butterfly within a systems context. Failing states have a significant impact on regional and global stability and, hence, peace and security. Failing states also have a major impact on sustainable economic growth and social development. One only has to look at the impact of the fall of the former USSR. As one example, India purchased the Admiral Gorshkov, a Russian aircraft carrier, and Pakistan purchased four other war ships. The butterfly effect of these decisions alone has contributed to the instability in this region.

Détente diplomats were not present when these decisions were being considered; hence, culture of peace options were not presented as alternatives. Miscommunication of events has led to mis-interpretation of intentions which, in turn, have resulted in increases in sabre rattling among nation-states within the region.

7.6.4 Economic Stability

The race for fuel resources at the macro level is being undertaken without opportunity for sober reflection on other than military options. Security is a requisite for peace yet culture of peace options are not being heard as future security landscapes are being designed. Currently, 50% of the world's oil and 1/3 of all commerce maritime traffic passes through the Malacca and the Singapore Straits. The value of these commodities to economic security and stability has resulted in Indo-Asian nation-states increasing their respective navies and military presence to protect economic self-interests. Again, the voices of détente diplomats are not being heard because they are not at the tables when decisions to respond to perceived threats to economic stability are being made. Nation-states have identified that the first line of defence against attack to their economic self-interests (uninterrupted access to oil to fuel their economies) is information about the military potential of competitors, yet peaceful alternatives are not being heard. This issue is not so much a case of freedom of information as freedom of hearing alternative options.

7.6.5 New Questions For A Culture of Peace

I have presented in Section 7.3 questions that individual détente diplomats need to consider as they present culture of peace options at the micro and meso levels. Pursuant to this macro discussion, I propose the following seven questions (S. E. Wimbush, personal communication, 7 May 2005), to facilitate the transformation from cultures of war and violence toward a culture of peace at the macro level. The inter-connectivity once again demonstrates the micro macro link. These seven are think tank initiatives. Culture of peace think tanks must be established, and hedging strategies developed for discussion at all tables but primarily at the most senior strategic levels.

- What are the critical uncertainties facing the global village? There are new features emerging in the security landscape that must be

examined within strategic and operational contexts. Only through such analysis will détente diplomats be able to identify equivalent culture of peace initiatives.

- Who will be the future players and who will pay? Former foes will become new alliance partners and *vice versa*. Bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements will be reached. Détente diplomats must be present to assure peaceful relationships as both transform. But first they must be cognizant of the nuances and become more environmentally competent in order to position themselves to be present when potential transformations are in their infancy.
- What happens when soft problems have hard responses? Environmental protection for pollution spills is an example of a soft problem. In the international arena, there are few protocols; hence, the military usually becomes involved. When militaries from nation-states that have histories of protracted intractable conflicts must work together, the probability of violence increases. Détente diplomats need to establish the protocols at the macro level.
- Is a structure for global détente possible? A cooperative security architecture needs to be designed and implemented that will be viable for current and future situations. The UN has facilitated this process, the Program of Action being a prime example, but solutions have involved military think tank personnel primarily, even at the UN. NGOs have had their own agenda. Détente diplomats need to become involved.
- How will military strategies affect energy strategies. Energy is the single most influential factor for economic stability and security. Today, there is a single source – oil; multiple energy sources, including non-fossil fuels, need to be sought. Détente diplomats need to be involved in these discussions.
- How do we plan for asymmetrical competition? Today and in the future, we will see smaller players with lower levels of technology

employing asymmetrical means to deny larger nation-states of resources; the balance of power will shift asymmetrically. Détente diplomats need to develop peaceful strategies to transform the doctrine of competition into a doctrine of collaboration for sustainable peace. Such a concept has been presented within the Program of Action. Now, operational functional strategies need to be developed.

- Can cascades be managed? Cascading events can spiral out of control, even when checks and balances have been implemented. The events of 9/11 are a prime example. With the increase in the inter-connectedness of economic factors, the fluttering of the butterfly wing has a major impact of global events, the least of which is economic stability and security. Intervention strategies to ideally stop but more realistically slow down the cascading effect need to be developed and implemented with influence from détente diplomats.

7.6.6 Disceptatio

There is a perceived multiplicity of threat vectors by warriors; détente diplomats need to develop equivalent peace vectors to be communicated clearly, concisely, and consistently at all levels, at every opportunity (ie: international conferences of warriors; political lobbying events) and at the appropriate strategic levels. Formal culture of peace think tanks need to be created; this is non-negotiable but instead an absolute necessity.

Consistent with Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal for a Quick Response Force (peace by forceful means), I argue that there needs to be an equally effective Quick Response Détente Diplomat Force for normalcy (peace by peaceful means) that can be sequentially activated at a strategic and operational global levels when crises occur. Détente diplomats need to be on the distribution lists for crisis management discussions at senior levels of government.

The Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self-defence, although a culture of war methodology, has paved the way for a 'Détente Diplomat Doctrine of Pre-emptive Peace'. We have and continue to witness unilateral pre-emptive military action; we need unilateral pre-emptive culture of peace action. Nation-states enter into uni-lateral, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements with other nation-states for interoperability of their military forces. Nation-state peace organizations must follow suit. Détente diplomats need to be at the tables sitting beside the warring think tank analysts as colleagues providing options for balanced sustainable solutions.

I submit that culture of peace diplomats need to initiate dialogue within the context of a market-based approach to peace – how to market a culture of peace as an alternative to a culture of war. Through global marketing of a culture of peace, we need to inform consumers and allow them the opportunity of choice of products and services. This is the essence of democratic participation and the free flow of information. Unfortunately, the events of 9/11 created a paradox that has impaired this process. Interdependence in the global village requires transparency. In the post 9/11 era, small bi-lateral alliances have replaced multi-lateral agreements because of the fear of the unknown. This weakness in the global market place needs to be leveraged by détente diplomats.

7.7 Summary

Participants support the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action with the codicil that they may be difficult to operationalize. In this Chapter, I present functional operational strategies. Their additional recommendations focus on implementation by the UN as a universal body that has representation by members of the global community; thus, it is in the best position to market peace. Transformation toward a culture of peace will only occur with strong visionary leadership established through a democratic-style process.

Unfortunately, peace by forceful means will more-than-likely be required in the immediate- to moderate-term with a professional military/police organization and a world court that has the jurisdiction to hear cases where voluntary compliance with a culture of peace attributes has not occurred. It is too imperfect a world to believe that all will comply. The macro description reflects most modern nation-states today. Although peace by forceful means may have to be initiated to stop heinous violations of Human Rights when they are taking place, it is integral to the peace process to acknowledge that peace by peaceful means is the only sustainable solution in the long-term.

The observations of the participants support the hypothesis proposed that there are connections between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level, and that education and praxis at the micro level will facilitate intervention at the macro level. This will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the areas within UNESCO's Program of Action as a means of resolving conflict and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace. In addition, peace building, peace maintenance and the prevention of conflict should be facilitated as a result of the maturation process.

CHAPTER VIII

Conclusion

8.1 Overview

Today, there is a greater need to work toward a global movement for a sustainable culture of peace because of the increased potential for exponential violence, the use of conventional and non-conventional weapons with massive destructive power, and the increasing number of civilian casualties from inter- and intra-state wars. The motivation for conflict that is often manifested in violence is diverse, including differing wants, needs, beliefs, loyalties, values, ideologies; inaccurate perceptions of intentions or behaviours; competing goals; geopolitical factors including limited or disproportionate distribution of property, resources and wealth; availability of technology; and, disparities in power, amongst others. As a result of this plethora of potential causes of conflict, there is a need for critical innovation and the development of tools to facilitate means of dealing with differences before they escalate into violence, tempered by realism that transcends personal or state interests.

The motivation for this research is based upon this need for critical innovation as identified in the seminal work of David Adams. He acknowledges that the relationship between a culture of war and a culture of violence at the macro level has been established but argues that research needs to be conducted to establish the relationship between macro cultures of war and violence, and a culture of peace at the micro level.

Where cultures meet, cultures tend to clash, and interpersonal and in-group out-group conflicts arise. Much of the contemporary conflict resolution processes dedicated to resolving such conflicts tend not to achieve sustainable peace because they are initiated in isolation of environmental systems, including culture. Conflict and culture are intertwined; conflict is ubiquitous and, therefore, requires a more

comprehensive interpretation. Because of the relationship with conflict, culture needs to be viewed in a similar construct within a systems context.

A model that is more culturally-centered within a systems context may have greater utility and opportunity for success than one that is more diverse within a singular culture and attempts to accommodate all cultures, or does not take culture into consideration. The UNESCO Program of Action is based upon such a global construct; conflict issues and behaviours, and not on individuals *per se* are the focus but, most importantly, the Program does not separate the people from the problem within the cultural context and systems theory. This research mirrors this construct but at the micro level, focusing on the maturation process of transforming individuals through education and praxis within their respective cultures toward a culture of peace.

8.2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis postulates that there are similarities between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level, and that education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former. The direction of learning culture is bottom-up. This will occur as individuals become aware and gain the skills to implement the eight areas within UNESCO's Program of Action as a means of dealing with differences and, as a result, mature toward a culture of peace. In addition, peace building, peace maintenance and the prevention of conflict should be facilitated as a result of the maturation process.

In response to the need identified by Adams and the hypothesis, the research was conducted to explore the macro micro relationship. The universality of the application could form the foundation for positive interpersonal relationships which, in turn, could contribute to constructive prevention and resolution of conflict, and the maintenance of peace. Peacemaking at the macro level can only gain credibility if it has first been successful at the micro level.

8.3 Research Findings

Participants' comments were candid, observations honest, and dialogues dogmatic at times. None reneged on the invitation to become involved in the interviews. I approached each discourse without preconceptions or anticipations of what might be revealed, however, always cognizant of information gleaned from previous discussions and the theories that were emerging from the data, consistent with grounded theory research methodology.

The research findings that elucidate and exemplify covert and overt behaviours of value-based attributes associated more with cultures of war and violence than a culture of peace tend to mirror current incidences of conflict at the micro, meso and macro levels. The lower number of participants who describe themselves and their environments as peaceable is reflective of findings from other studies. The majority acknowledge conflictual and, in some cases, violent lifestyles.

Comments conflict that are described in the literature as common to cultures are consistent with the research findings. Descriptions of limitations and barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace are also constant and tend to parallel the underlying principles presented by Adams as noted in Table 1-1, the most predominant being: the creation of in-groups and out-groups, and the power and control that are the manifestations of these divisions; the creation of enemy images; historical protracted intractable violence that defines one culture as distinct from the competitor culture; and, the clash of cultures and the conclusion that some cultures do not mix and, therefore, should be separated by physical force or barricades if needs be. Observations of peacefulness were far fewer in number.

The findings confirm that a culture of peace requires balance; cultures need to be able to extricate intervening influences that contribute to imbalance. Most important, attributes of cultures are learned bottom-up from the smallest social unit which is usually the family, and then communal groups. Hence, if cultures of war and violence are to be transformed into a culture of peace then the education process

must be bottom-up starting with the family or social group. The role of women in creating and affirming such a sustainable culture of peace cannot be over emphasized. Corrupt the family and you corrupt the nation.

This research confirms a relationship between a culture of peace at the micro and meso levels, and argues that similarities exist between a culture of peace at the micro and macro levels, based on UNESCO's eight areas within the Program of Action. Accordingly, means for dealing with differences at the micro individual level and macro nation-state level can be alluded to with the application of the macro eight areas identified within the Program of Action and the parallel micro areas presented in Table 1-2. This should increase the probability of reducing macro inter- and intra-state conflict within a systems approach to cultural conflict.

There is a clear relationship between the macro and the micro with regard to learned aggression, and that and is top-down; individuals learn aggressive behaviour from their environment. This research affirms this association and demonstrates a relationship between a culture of war and violence at the macro nation-state level and a culture of peace at the micro interpersonal level. The direction of learning culture is up-ward. Commensurate with the hypothesis, one can postulate that, in the fullness of time, learned and adopted peaceful behaviours within a culture of peace at the micro and meso levels, by an increasing number of people, would become an integral part of a culture of peace at the macro level.

There are limitations and barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace. It is panglossian to suggest that all conflicts can be successfully negotiated; all parties want to negotiate; and, there are standard procedures that can be employed in all conflict situations. All conflicts are not dichotomized bilateral processes (Galtung 1996) and education, although the primary vehicle in communicating and soliciting endorsement for sustainable peace through non-violent means of dealing with differences, is not always successful (Salomon 2004). In fact, forcing parties together that are embroiled in a conflict may have negative implications; such a procedure

may cause destructive and irreparable damage to the relationship, deepening the intractableness.

8.4 Theoretical Implication of this Research

There are theoretical and practical implications to the research that impact at the micro individual, meso organizational and macro nation-state levels. Within the theoretical framework, the results of this research contribute to existing knowledge regarding the relationship between cultures of war and cultures of violence, and the top-down direction of learning behaviours. In addition, the findings provide evidence for the importance of both cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace. These results support the hypothesis that there are similarities between cultures of war and violence at the macro level, and a culture of peace at the micro level, and that education and praxis at the latter will facilitate intervention at the former.

In addition, peace building, peace maintenance and the prevention of conflict should be facilitated as a result of the maturation process. There has been less development of the construct of the relationship between cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace since Adams left his position with UNESCO. Given these results, future longitudinal research needs to be conducted that will explore the maturation process of a culture of peace from the micro meso levels to the macro level.

More broadly, the results help advance the culture of peace process and the knowledge about where, when and how individuals learn culture. The research has revealed that current methods of attempting to transform individual behaviours from attributes associated with cultures of war and violence to attributes consistent with a culture of peace through education have a lower probability of being sustainable if the teaching methodology solely focuses on changing behaviour top-down. The process needs to be directed at the culture as opposed to an individual behaviour and must be bottom-up.

In this study, I defined culture generically before discussing cultures of war and violence and a culture of peace, thus demonstrating similarities, commensurate with the hypothesis – the value based attributes of culture being the common denominator. Future research should seek to determine generic features of protracted intractable violence to ascertain if these characteristics are consistent with protracted intractable peace.

Finally, the results suggest that some cultures that have histories of protracted intractable violence should not mix under volatile conditions. The finding imply that certain value-based attributes, primarily those associated with fundamental religious or spiritual beliefs, remain primary contributing factors for cultures of war and violence; the crusades live on. Higher levels of commonality tend to result in fewer wars, less violence, and lower levels of conflict that can be more readily resolved. In contrast, lower levels of commonality result in increased frequency and intensity of conflicts, violence, and wars.

8.5 Practical Implications of this Research

The results of this research have important practical implications with respect to where, when and how individuals learn about culture and, specifically, a culture of peace; the direction is bottom-up. Education is seminal to the transformation from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace. The results demonstrate that for peace education to be sustainable it must focus of the respective cultures as defined and be bottom-up. But education may not be successful in environments where warring parties may have to be separated due to the intractable nature of the violence.

The discussions concerning protracted and intractable war and violence suggest that the probability of peace education being successful in these environments is minimal. These findings parallel those of Salomon (2004: 262) (Salomon, 2004) who argues that “peace education programs, whether in the form of planned interventions or more naturally occurring interactions, may not be

particularly effective in the context of intractable conflict". Education programs, under such conditions, can exacerbate current levels of hatred and resulting violent manifestations by negating motivation or intent to resolve issues, further debasing any sense of trust and concealing characteristics of common ground that may exist. This downward spiral away from transformation fortifies current perceptions of limitations and barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace.

Transformation will not be speedy when protracted intractable violence exists; the conversion may take several generations. Differences in value-based attributes are noteworthy and can be momentous. Different individuals react differently to peace education programs. "It appears the views individuals hold about the conflict and about their adversary impact the way peace education affects them" (Salomon 2004:271). Reinforcing systems theory, Salomon (2004) further suggests that peace education, in isolation of other intervening variables, cannot resolve protracted intractable violence. This observation supports the systems approach of the transformation process toward a culture of peace.

Consistent with research and praxis on emotional intelligence (EI) (Goleman 1998 and Jordan 2002), individuals who function at an advanced level of EI tend to conceptualize potentially conflictual situations differently and, as such, are less inclined to be warring and violent. This level of peaceful functionality is consistent with research on self-actualization (Maslow 1970 and McCrae 1990) and archetypes of adult development (Jung 1971 and Wrightsman 1994). Individuals with greater emotional maturity and the ability to self-differentiate tend to exhibit attributes associated with a culture of peace and, as a result, become better peace promoters.

At the meso organizational level, the practical implications are considerable. Training programs have traditionally focused on individual career development. Employees who demonstrate potential are sent on training courses to learn new skills – the top-down approach. When they return to their respective organizations, the training manuals tend to be shelved and the employees return to their old

behavioural constructs because the culture has not been transformed parallel with the training program. Without attention to cultural transformation, there isn't a critical mass to support the new skills that may have been learned but not adopted.

There are three pre-requisites to adoption of a culture of peace, namely intent, trust and common ground. This research argues that organizational training programs need to focus on an inspired shared vision of the collective (create intent), be inclusive of all who interact within the culture (build on trust) and focus on the culture of the organization (establish common ground). This is the troika for transformation toward a culture of peace. But intent, trust and shared common ground do not guarantee a culture of peace.

Tolerance alone does not guarantee peace either. Tolerance involves boundaries of acceptable behaviour as defined by attributes associated with a culture of peace. If behaviours are outside the boundaries, then there can be no tolerance and, thus, no peace. When the behaviours of one culture are so heinous and violate Human Rights, there must be voluntary compliance or forced compliance – a rule of law for the global community. The findings of this research propose an operational construct to facilitate compliance with value-based attributes associated with a culture of peace commensurate with a rule of law, but this process will not be without resistance.

There is a recounting of resistance by nation-states to a culture of peace program, primarily because their histories are based upon cultures of war and violence; nation-states have the monopoly on war and, in many instances, violence. They create enemy images, support and fund armament, form authoritarian government, promote propaganda and secrecy, violate human rights, justifies inequality supporting male dominance, educates for war and violence, and promotes exploitation of the weak and the environment. Since its inception, the UN has had little recourse to this resistance. These finding can facilitate the transformation by operationalizing the eight areas within the UNESCO Program of Action.

On a positive note, selective elements of the culture of peace program have, more recently, been implemented as a part of UN peacemaking initiatives, most notably CIMIC operations. This has been referred to colloquially by UN peacekeepers as a Chapter 6.5 UN missions because there was no formal culture of peace Chapter written when the United Nations was created. The concept of peacekeeping was defined a decade later by the Nobel Peace Prize recipient, The Honourable Lester B. Pearson, whose efforts resulted in the creation of the first formal peacekeeping force. Within the construct of such a peacekeeping mandate, I have introduced the finding of this research into a peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding training scenario; I will be presenting an assessment of the concept at a military conference in October 2005. The employment of the findings to aid in the maturation transformation will be assessed as potential peacekeepers move between the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding roles.

The initial concept of the UN was not to create a sustainable culture of peace, but to re-establish the status quo of the nation-state to its pre-conflict/war status, regardless of the fact that the latter may be inherently corrupt and premised upon cultures of war and violence, most notably violations of Human Rights. Ironically, peacekeeping operations reinforce cultures of war and violence. Nations that actively participate in UN peacekeeping operations have large defence budgets that support value-based attributes associated with cultures of war and violence. This has led to conferences of military leaders and UN officials on how member states can contribute military forces more efficiently and effectively to UN operations. More recently, an unholy alliance has evolved between the UN and NATO as a direct result of perceived ineffective UN peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. The maturation process toward a culture of peace from UN involvement (UNPROFOR) failed to demonstrate sustainable potential. NATO's subsequent involvement (SFOR and IFOR) demonstrates even less potential, not surprising given the fact that the mandate of NATO does not include peace but collective in-group security achieved through mustering of armaments, sabre rattling and use of force. The Balkans

situation was turned over to the European Union (and the new European army) to 'police'. It is, at best, relative peace achieved through the balance of power – Cold War.

There are those who argue that the same organization that brings about peace by forceful means (military peacemakers and peacekeepers) cannot build a sustainable culture of peace (peacebuilding). This reasoning calls into question Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace*, and *inter alia*, the Quick Response Force. There are those who support this *Agenda* arguing that a Ghandi-style of non-violent peace (peace by peaceful means) is unrealistic when horrific violations of Human Right such as genocide are taking place. In cases such as Rwanda and Bosnia, immediate forceful intervention was called for to halt the violence but was not initiated with requisite expediency. The hidden agenda was for war and violence. The finding of this research, the results of the pilot project and the assessment of the training scenario have practical implications with respect to the *Agenda for Peace*.

The bellicose policies of nation-states that support cultures of war and violence have a significant impact on the availability of funds for peace initiatives and the promotion of a culture of peace. Aid from the UN to nation-states to develop culture of peace programs is funnelled through the respective governments as partners in the process. More often than not, these resources are distributed within the state to those programs that augment programs associated with cultures of war and violence. Hence, they reinforce the power and control of strong central authoritarian government, an attribute of a culture of war and violence. If funding and support for culture of peace programs is withheld, the micro macro link is weakened. Culture remains a bottom-up learning process but the education and praxis for peace becomes a greater challenge because an increasing number of individuals do not become aware and do not gain experience in the requisite interactive skills.

Some gains have been made to overcome limitations and barriers to the attainment of a culture of peace. Former enemies have demonstrated that they can

work collaboratively to achieve relative peacefulness as exemplified in Nicaragua in 1995 when ex-soldiers of the civil war from the Contras and Sandinistas came together as peace promoters. There are other examples including Guatemala, Columbia, El Salvador, and Mozambique that have demonstrated the potential for peace. However, significant gains in culture of peace initiatives need to be achieved before relative peace can be considered as a sustainable outcome. Some success was achieved at the micro level with interpersonal initiatives; the triad of intent, trust and common ground facilitated the transformation.

8.6 Where We Go From Here

Lederach (1998) postulates that transformation from cultures of war and violence to a culture of peace will be lengthy and multi-generational. This time frame is consistent with observations of participants. Cultures are learned based on value-based attributes adopted and practiced from generation to generation. Transforming cultures of war and violence to a culture must follow this process in order to be sustainable. Although humans are not predisposed to war and violence any more than they are to peace, the motivations for the former tend to meet perceived immediate needs; the latter tend to be more altruistic. The challenge becomes one of education and praxis, and thus, maturation toward fruition.

To date, there have been successes and failures in the culture of peace program. But the program is barely a decade and a half young in comparison with cultures of war and violence that have become well ensconced in cultural heritage over the millennia. The future growth of a culture of peace already demonstrates sustainability based to a large degree on the yeoman work of David Adams who continues to champion the cause. Having demonstrated the similarities between a culture of peace at the micro, meso and the macro levels, the bottom-up direction of learning, and the relationship between a culture of peace at the micro level and cultures of war and violence at the macro level, one can postulate that the maturation process can take place. The future challenge will be to achieve a critical mass of peace promoters who, in the fullness of time, having adopted the value-

based attributes of a culture of peace will integrate them at the macro nation-state level.

The greatest challenge may be whether or not we mature ourselves fast enough to achieve the critical mass of leadership for a sustainable culture of peace to seriously engage the global threats that are occurring. ... there must be a triumvirate of an alignment in leadership of the essential forces in the conundrum, a commitment for sustainability, and a vision for a culture of peace. If one is absent, the probability of success will be greatly diminished (Rippon, Girouard, Lowey 2004:11).

Success needs to be measured. An instrument to measure the transformation from cultures of war and violence toward a culture of peace is the next step that I plan to pursue at the post-doctoral level. Preliminary discussions have taken place and a meeting was held at the United Nations University, attended by Adams amongst others.

Interview Format
Sample of General Question and Discussion Format

I would like to talk to you about cultures of war and violence, and cultures of peace. The interview will last approximately one hour and a half.

In an effort to promote cultures of peace, UNESCO identified eight areas that reflected cultures of war and violence between nation-states. I have redefined these eight areas that could reflect violence between individuals. They are:

Macro Nation-State Eight Areas Within The program Of Action	Micro Individual Eight Areas Within The Program Of Action
Education for a culture of peace	Adopt an individual culture of peace; share with others
Tolerance & solidarity	Exercise patience & understanding; solidarity in virtues
Democratic participation	Take the initiative to exercise individual democratic rights & responsibilities
Free flow of information	Take the initiative to provide & disseminate information; listen & understand
International peace & security	Establish individual peace & security
Human rights	Exercise & respect human rights
Sustainable development	Promote personal growth & professional development
Equality for women and men	Take the initiative to assure equality opportunity for self & others

Within this context, culture can mean different things to different people. Culture has been described as the sum of all our experiences that could include language, art, music, religion, food, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst others. Culture provides a means of discussion with regard to relationships among individuals within social groups -- we learn about culture from our social experiences. Hence, within any one cultural setting there are differing dimensional characteristics that may not be stable. For this reason, each person can reflect many cultures, some of which can come into conflict with each other.

Tell me about your cultural background.

Based upon your cultural background, how would you interpret each of UNESCO's eight areas?

Tell me about conflicts in which you have become involved. What contributed to the conflicts? Were the conflicts resolved? If so, how? If they were not resolved, why?

How do you deal with conflicts?

Where did you learn to deal with conflict – who taught you? Were cultural issues in conflict resolution explained?

How has your cultural background either contributed to these conflicts or helped to reduce the conflicts?

Part of culture is the language we use such as words or expressions. Can you tell me how the use of words, or verbal or non-verbal expressions may have contributed to these or other conflicts or helped to reduce the conflicts.

Let's look at the language used in the eight areas. Tell me how you interpret the language used in these areas – how does it communicate a culture of violence or a culture of peace?

Is there ever a time when war, violence or aggression is appropriate? If so, when and under what conditions?

What conditions would have to exist in order for you to support war, violence or aggression?

Do these conditions reflect your culture? If so, how?

From your perspective, what does your culture tell you about war, violence, aggression and peace?

When you hear about war, violence and aggression, what is your emotional reaction?

When you hear about peace, what is your emotional reaction?

If you had the opportunity to develop a system to resolve conflict, what would you do? What would you include?

Looking at the eight areas, would you include them? If so, how? If not, why?

CONSENT FORM
 For Participants In The Study Entitled,
 "The Etiology Of A Culture Of Violence
 And Maturation Toward A Culture Of Peace"

This research will examine the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) eight areas within the Program of Action that represent Cultures of War and Violence, and Cultures of Peace. You will be asked to discuss your cultures and language use in an interview with Tom Rippon, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia. The total time required will be approximately two hours.

Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw from the study at any time, without explanation. Counselling services are available. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions. Whether you participate or choose not to participate will have no negative consequence.

All raw data collected in the study will remain confidential; interview results will be kept in a locked filing cabinet, in a locked room. Only the researcher and the supervisors will have access to the raw data. Your name will not be attached to any raw data or any results, and your anonymity will be protected by using a code number to identify results. The researcher will take notes during the interview. These notes will be destroyed immediately after they have been transcribed.

I, _____ consent to be a subject of this human research study to be undertaken by Tom Rippon under the supervision of Professor Dan Riley, University of New England, Armidale, NSW, Australia. I acknowledge that:

1. the purpose, methods and anticipated benefits of the research have been explained to me;
2. I voluntarily and freely give my consent to participate in this research;
3. my identity will remain confidential;
4. I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, in which event my participation in this research study will immediate cease and any information obtained will not be reported;
5. the raw data collected by the researcher will be destroyed after a period of five years;
6. I have read and understand the information contained in this consent form and the introductory letter; and,
7. the research data gathered for this study may be published provided I am not identified.

Signature of Participant: _____ Date: _____

Signature of Researcher: _____ Date: _____

Date

Dear Employer

I invite you to participate in a research study. I am an external part-time doctoral student with the University of New England in Australia, undertaking research for the degree of PhD. My research topic is: The Etiology Of A Culture Of Violence And Maturation Toward A Culture Of Peace.

If you wish to verify my credentials, my supervisor is Professor Dan Riley, who may be contacted on (phone) 61 ()2 6773 3113 and (e-mail) driley2@metz.une.edu.au. Funding for this research has been made possible through Avalon Institute Incorporated.

The focus of this research will be on a Culture of Peace as defined by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/53/243) Declaration and Program of Action. The UNESCO Program of Action identifies eight areas that represent cultural aspects that have been central to war and violence. Perhaps most important to the Program of Action is the assertion that a Culture of Peace, and a Culture of War and Violence are mutually exclusive when these eight areas are applied as criteria. Hence, the transformation from a Culture of War and Violence to a Culture of Peace encompasses all eight.

I invite you to participate in this research by suggesting employees who have come to your attention or the attention of your Human Resources Department as a result of conflict in the workplace. You are not under any obligation to suggest any employee. I have attached a copy of the 'Letter to Participants' for your information.

To research this topic, I have developed an open-ended questionnaire that requires participants to be interviewed for approximately two hours. Participants will be individuals who are 18 years of age and older and who are experiencing conflict. Participant's involvement in this study is voluntary and they can withdraw at any time. There will be no adverse consequences for them personally if they choose not to participate.

Please be assured that the participation by any person will only be used for the purpose of identifying ways to implement the eight areas within the Program of Action to bring about Cultures of Peace. By participating, the participants will not only be adding to the current understanding and academic research, but also to the development of recommendations applicable to relationships where there is a need to move from Cultures of War and Violence to Cultures of Peace.

All information will be treated confidentially to the extent it can under Canadian law. No information that participants provide will be used for identification purposes. Information will not be disclosed to any third person. The results from the research will be placed in the public domain without identifying participating individuals and schools.

This project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of New England (Approval No. HE03/109, Valid from 30 June 2003) Should you have any complaints concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, please contact the Research Ethics Officer at the following address:

Research Services

*University of New England
Armidale, NSW 2351.*

Telephone: (02) 6773 3449 Facsimile (02) 6773 3543

Email: Ethics@metz.une.edu.au

Any questions concerning the project titled: The Etiology Of A Culture Of Violence And Maturation Toward A Culture Of Peace, may be directed to:

Professor Dan Riley
Senior Lecturer
School of Professional Development and Leadership
University of New England
(phone) 612 6773 2442
(email) driley2@metz.une.edu.au

Should you need to contact me to discuss this research, please call (250) 812-8056 or write to:

Thomas Rippon
P.O. Box 32080
3651 Shelbourne Street
Victoria, B.C. V8P 5S2

Thank you for supporting in this research. Your assistance is greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

T. J. Rippon

1 July 2003

Dear Participant

I invite you to participate in a research study. I am an external part-time doctoral student with the University of New England in Australia, undertaking research for the degree of PhD. Funding for this research has been made possible through Avalon Institute Incorporated.

Your participation is voluntary and you can withdraw from the study at any time, without explanation. You have the right to refuse to answer any questions. Whether you participate or choose not to participate will have no negative consequence. The total time required will be approximately two hours.

All raw data collected in the study will remain confidential; interview results will be kept in a locked filing cabinet, in a locked room. Only the researcher and the supervisors will have access to the raw data. Your name will not be attached to any raw data or any results, and your anonymity will be protected by using a code number to identify results. The researcher will take notes during the interview. These notes will be destroyed immediately after they have been transcribed.

If you wish to verify my credentials, my supervisor is Dr Dan Riley, who may be contacted on (phone) 61 (0)2 6773 3113 and (e-mail) driley2@metz.une.edu.au. Funding for this research has been made possible through Avalon Institute Incorporated.

The focus of this research will be on a culture of peace as defined by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (A/53/243) Declaration and Program of Action. The UNESCO Program of Action identifies eight areas that represent cultural aspects that have been central to war and violence. Perhaps most important to the Program of Action is the assertion that a Culture of Peace, and a Culture of War and Violence are mutually exclusive when these eight areas are applied as criteria. Hence, the transformation from a Culture of War and Violence to a Culture of Peace encompasses all eight.

To research this topic, I have developed an open-ended questionnaire that requires interviews that will last approximately two hours each. I invite you to participate. Please be assured that your participation will only be used for the purpose of identifying ways to implement the eight areas within the Program of Action to bring about Cultures of Peace. By participating, you will not only be adding to the current understanding and academic research, but also to the development of recommendations applicable to relationships where there is a need to move from Cultures of War and Violence to Cultures of Peace. All information will be treated confidentially to the extent it can under Canadian law. Please do not tell me about criminal activity in which you may have been involved.

This project has been approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the University of New England (Approval No. HE03/109, Valid from 30 June 2003)

Should you have any complaints concerning the manner in which this research is conducted, please contact the Research Ethics Officer at the following address:

Research Services

*University of New England
Armidale, NSW 2351.*

Telephone: (02) 6773 3449 Facsimile (02) 6773 3543

Email: Ethics@metz.une.edu.au

Any questions concerning the project titled: *The Etiology Of A Culture Of Violence And Maturation Toward A Culture Of Peace*, may be directed to:

Dr Dan Riley
Senior Lecturer
School of Professional Development and Leadership
University of New England
(phone) 612 6773 2442
(email) driley2@metz.une.edu.au

You are encouraged to retain a copy of this letter and the accompanying Consent Form.

As each participant has been referred to me from the respective Directors of the Human Resource departments and/or the counselling services. The referral has been made because you have been identified as having been involved in a conflict or exhibiting aggressive and/or violent behaviours. Each participant will be monitored for follow-up support as required. Any participants who may exhibit stress-related symptomatology during or after the interview will be referred to their respective Human Resource Directors and/or clinical counsellors who will be monitoring their progress.

Should you need to contact me to discuss this research, please call (250) 812 8056 or write to:

Thomas Rippon
P.O. Box 32080
3651 Shelbourne Street
Victoria, B.C. V8P 5S2

Thank you for taking part in this research. Your assistance is greatly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,
T. J. Rippon

Evolved Interview Format

I would like to talk to you about cultures of war and violence, and cultures of peace. The interview will last approximately one hour and a half.

In an effort to promote cultures of peace, UNESCO identified eight areas that reflected cultures of war and violence between nation-states. I have redefined these eight areas that could reflect violence between individuals. They are:

Macro Nation-State Eight Areas Within The program Of Action	Micro Individual Eight Areas Within The Program Of Action
Education for a culture of peace	Adopt an individual culture of peace; share with others
Tolerance & solidarity	Exercise patience & understanding; solidarity in virtues
Democratic participation	Take the initiative to exercise individual democratic rights & responsibilities
Free flow of information	Take the initiative to provide & disseminate information; listen & understand
International peace & security	Establish individual peace & security
Human rights	Exercise & respect human rights
Sustainable development	Promote personal growth & professional development
Equality for women and men	Take the initiative to assure equality opportunity for self & others

Within this context, culture can mean different things to different people. Culture has been described as the sum of all our experiences that could include language, art, music, religion, food, values, attitudes, beliefs, customs, amongst others. Culture provides a means of discussion with regard to relationships among individuals within social groups -- we learn about culture from our social experiences. Hence, within any one cultural setting there are differing dimensional characteristics that may not be stable. For this reason, each person can reflect many cultures, some of which can come into conflict with each other.

Tell me about conflicts in which you have become involved. What contributed to the conflicts? Were the conflicts resolved? If so, how? If they were not resolved, why?

How do you deal with conflicts?

Where did you learn to deal with conflict – who taught you? Were cultural issues in conflict resolution explained?

How has your cultural background either contributed to these conflicts or helped to reduce the conflicts?

Part of culture is the language we use such as words or expressions. Can you tell me how the use of words, or verbal or non-verbal expressions may have contributed to these or other conflicts or helped to reduce the conflicts.

Let's look at the language used in the eight areas. Tell me how you interpret the language used in these areas – how does it communicate a culture of violence or a culture of peace?

From your perspective, what does your culture tell you about war, violence, aggression and peace?

If you had the opportunity to develop a system to resolve conflict, what would you do? What would you include?

Looking at the eight areas, would you include them? If so, how? If not, why?

Annex C
Free and Tree Nodes

QSR N6 Full version, revision 6.0.
Licensee: Tom Rippon.

PROJECT: Dissertation, User Dissertation, 15:04, 1 May, 2005.

REPORT ON NODE (F 1) 'Intro remarks'
Restriction to document: NONE

(F 1) //Free Nodes/Intro remarks
*** No Description
*** Created: 10:39, 17 Feb, 2004.
*** Last modified: 18:18, 26 Mar, 2004.
*** The siblings of this node are:
(F 2) //Free Nodes/Disenfranchisement
(F 3) //Free Nodes/War & Violence
(F 4) //Free Nodes/Peace
(F 5) //Free Nodes/Productive
(F 6) //Free Nodes/UN Peacekeeping
*** This node has no children.

QSR N6 Full version, revision 6.0.
Licensee: Tom Rippon.

PROJECT: Dissertation, User Dissertation, 15:06, 1 May, 2005.

REPORT ON NODE (1) '/Gender'
Restriction to document: NONE

(1) /Gender

*** Description:

Gender of the Interviewee. Included are general statements about 'gender issues' separate from references to 'Male' or 'Female'

*** Created: 13:55, 22 Sept, 2003.

*** Last modified: 12:29, 30 Aug, 2004.

*** The siblings of this node are:

- (2) /Ethnicity
- (4) /UNESCO's 8
- (5) /Additional to UNESCO's 8
- (6) /Culture
- (7) /Motivation
- (8) /Causes of Violence
- (9) /Conflict
- (10) /Diversity
- (11) /Leadership
- (12) /Relational Influence
- (13) /Sustainability
- (14) /Media
- (15) /Religion/Spirituality
- (16) /Trust
- (17) /Common Ground/Interests
- (18) /Emotional Intelligence
- (19) /Simplicity

*** The children of this node are:

- (1 1) /Gender/Male
- (1 2) /Gender/Female

QSR N6 Full version, revision 6.0.
Licensee: Tom Rippon.

PROJECT: Dissertation, User Dissertation, 15:06, 1 May, 2005.

REPORT ON NODE (2) '/Ethnicity'
Restriction to document: NONE

(2) /Ethnicity

*** Description:

Ethnicity of the Interviewee.

*** Created: 14:02, 22 Sept, 2003.

*** Last modified: 16:58, 22 Aug, 2004.

*** The siblings of this node are:

- (1) /Gender
- (4) /UNESCO's 8
- (5) /Additional to UNESCO's 8
- (6) /Culture
- (7) /Motivation
- (8) /Causes of Violence
- (9) /Conflict
- (10) /Diversity
- (11) /Leadership
- (12) /Relational Influence
- (13) /Sustainability
- (14) /Media
- (15) /Religion/Spirituality
- (16) /Trust
- (17) /Common Ground/Interests
- (18) /Emotional Intelligence
- (19) /Simplicity

*** The children of this node are:

- (2 1) /Ethnicity/Asian
- (2 2) /Ethnicity/Canada
- (2 3) /Ethnicity/East European
- (2 4) /Ethnicity/West European
- (2 5) /Ethnicity/Lebanon
- (2 6) /Ethnicity/Jamaica
- (2 7) /Ethnicity/Jewish
- (2 8) /Ethnicity/Muslim/Islam
- (2 9) /Ethnicity/Israel
- (2 10) /Ethnicity/Africa
- (2 11) /Ethnicity/America
- (2 12) /Ethnicity/Bedouin

- (2 13) /Ethnicity/Iran
- (2 14) /Ethnicity/Egypt
- (2 15) /Ethnicity/Syria
- (2 16) /Ethnicity/FRY
- (2 17) /Ethnicity/Afghanistan
- (2 18) /Ethnicity/Abu Dhabi
- (2 19) /Ethnicity/Arab

LEADERSHIP FOR A SUSTAINABLE CULTURE OF PEACE: THE UN MISSION IN EAST TIMOR

by Major Thomas Rippon, Commodore Roger Girouard and Eliot Lowery



East Timor is a tiny nation-state that occupies half of a small mountainous tropical island some 600 kilometres north of Australia. In the 17th century, the island was colonized by the Portuguese, but, in 1859, it was divided between Portugal (East Timor) and Holland (West Timor). After the end of the Second World War, when the Dutch withdrew from the East Indies, the newly independent Republic of Indonesia incorporated West Timor, but the Portuguese retained control of the eastern part of the island while allowing a form of democratic self-government.

The two major political parties in East Timor were the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), which wanted to retain links with Portugal, and the Revolutionary Front of Independent East Timor, known as the Fretilin, a left-wing socialist party that advocated independence. Violence was endemic, and Indonesia made an unsuccessful attempt to intervene politically in 1974. In August 1975, the Timorese Democratic Union organized a military coup with the objective of destroying the Fretilin. However, the Fretilin army, the Falintil, defeated the forces of the Democratic Union, and its surviving members fled to West Timor. The Portuguese administration withdrew from the capital, Dili, and communicated that it would no longer rule the colony.

In December 1975, the Indonesian army, aided by the Timorese Democratic Union, launched an invasion of East Timor. This was supported by the United States, which, having only recently withdrawn from Vietnam, was concerned about yet another Communist threat developing. (The Americans at this time looked on Indonesia as an oil-producing, anti-Communist ally.) Even Australia, with immediate security interests in the region, acquiesced. Sensing that the international community had given it the green light, or at least would remain indifferent, in July 1976 Indonesia declared East Timor to be a territory under its control. The Indonesian occupation was marked by brutality, and some 100,000 East Timorese civilians were killed in the civil struggle. Over the next two decades, East Timorese leaders consistently pressed the plight of their people at the United Nations. But, since the United States continued to endorse the Suharto regime in Indonesia, the UN paid little attention to the repeated requests for intervention.

THE UNITED NATIONS MANDATE FOR EAST TIMOR


On assuming office in May 1998, President B.J. Habibie of Indonesia announced that East Timor would be governed under a new form of constitutional arrangements¹. His motivation was perhaps more economic than altruistic. Habibie ordered that a referendum be held under supervision of the United Nations to ascertain if the people of East Timor wanted full independence, or if they wanted to remain part of Indonesia. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was subsequently established to ascertain through consultation whether the East Timorese people would accept a constitutional framework of special autonomy for East Timor within Indonesia, or reject the proposal and see East Timor move

toward independence.

This referendum was certainly not endorsed by all elements in the Indonesian government, especially factions in the Indonesian military that had been training and equipping an anti-independence militia in East Timor.² Village lords, militia chiefs and Indonesian army leaders all had a stake in the status quo. The militia "became the armed instruments of interest groups committed to preserving the status quo"³. Threats were made against anyone who supported the referendum process, including Australian diplomats and journalists. In January 1999, the East Timor internet domain was brought down by a faction within the Indonesian government in an effort to suppress the free flow of information⁴.

The referendum was conducted in August 1999. Violence that had marked the referendum campaign exploded into open anarchy following the announcement in September that 78.5 percent of the population had voted for independence. The uprising was led by defiant officers of the Indonesian military and the East Timorese militia. Reports of widespread murder and massacre, along with rumours of genocide and ethnic cleansing, and the inability of President Habibie to assure the safety of UNAMET members, sparked the attention of the international community.

Concurrent with the uprising in East Timor, an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit was being held in Auckland, New Zealand. At an ad hoc meeting of APEC foreign ministers, a consensus was reached that further UN peacekeeping intervention was needed. With the assurance that the peacekeeping force would be truly international – not just Australian and American (although it was ultimately led by an Australian) – President Habibie formally submitted a request to the United Nations to have peacekeeping troops deployed to East Timor.



The UN Security Council took immediate action and, on 15 September 1999, it invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizing the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to restore peace and security in East Timor. Resolution 1264 (1999) authorized the peacekeeping force "to restore peace to East Timor ... protect and support UNAMET in the carrying out of its tasks ... within force capabilities, facilitate humanitarian assistance operations ... and to use air, sea and land forces as may be required to restore and maintain peace, and achieve its mandate mission"⁵. This was a mandate for peacemaking, not peacekeeping, and this marked the first time that the UN assumed total control of a country, albeit a country not yet recognized in the international community.

On 19 September 1999, INTERFET personnel began deploying as approximately 15,000 Indonesian army and Indonesian police started to withdraw. Some Indonesian troops and

police did, however, remain in regions where UN peacekeepers could not be readily deployed, and they did retain control of some of their barracks. But, the most dangerous threat to peace and security came from the Timorese militia, led or advised by elements of the Indonesian army, and which included some members of the Indonesian forces (often from elite Special Forces) who dressed in militia garb.

On 25 October 1999, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) was created under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1272, and in February 2000 it began to function. UNTAET drew in large part on forces already serving under INTERFET and included, among other UN personnel, 1,270 UN civilian police who were given authority to make arrests. This was an integral part of the UN mandate to establish and maintain peace, because it allowed for the capture and arrest of militia members indicted for crimes against humanity, and who were known to be infiltrating back into their former villages as returning refugees⁶.

Two and a half years later, on 19 May 2002, the UN flag was lowered over Dili as administrative, executive and judicial functions were returned to the Timorese people. This transition was motivated by the belief that a sustainable foundation for a culture of peace had been created under the leadership of the UN.

DISCUSSION

If one were to examine the efficacy of the UN deployment of peacekeepers in East Timor, success of the mission would be measured against the UN mandate: to restore and maintain a culture of peace. This would be achieved by adopting a differentiated leadership stance.

It must be said at the outset that the UN was reluctant to take decisive action when the Portuguese departed and Indonesia moved in. East Timor seemed simply yet another place where little progress could be achieved, and in any case the Indonesians had offered to serve as its benefactor. However, the effective lobbying campaign mounted by the independence movement, both in the halls of the UN and in the world media, slowly paid dividends, resulting in the political pressure that brought Indonesian President Habibie to acquiesce in a referendum. This was leadership by influence without formal power.

The UN finally provided a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter with a vision and structure to implement. President Habibie had formal leadership authority, but had been influenced by external factors and forces. The concerted Australian commitment, motivated by the APEC Forum, provided the strategic and operational leadership, and the determination to achieve every aspect of the UN mandate, thus making right their previous abdication of responsibility. The independence movement demonstrated informal leadership by influence. They 'triangled' the media, the church and the communities, acting on Friedman's² concept that the emotional process of triangulation, when used effectively, can be as powerful as a hierarchy. Such triangulation had been effectively employed by Gandhi a half century earlier when he wanted to influence the legislative initiatives of General Smuts in South Africa.

Whether through optimism or a flawed assessment, the UN, however, failed to appreciate the multi-layered nature of power in Indonesia, and the reality of regional 'tithing' to the local leadership – civil, militia and military. This level of corruption meant the stakes were high for those who would lose power and influence by a successful independence vote. President Habibie may have been optimistic that the benevolence of Indonesian rule would win over the population, or he may simply have been happy to rid himself of a troublesome province that brought little of economic value and was a net drain on his treasury. The local barons were less sanguine, and much more treacherous. Prior to the UN intervention,

leadership was lacking, as was a vision of a culture of peace through sustainable initiatives.

The lead-up to the vote brought a rising tide of intimidation and violence. Whether again through optimism, a lack of appreciation for the cultural factors at play, or cold feet on the part of the UN headquarters in New York, there was clearly a failure to take account of a worst-case scenario despite the fact that the symptoms of an imminent backlash were evident. The UN authorities were ill equipped to deal with the pre-vote violence, and with the Indonesian authorities' inability or intransigence in addressing it, and they were simply overcome by the wave of vengeful retribution that was unleashed by the rampage.



DND Photo by Sergeant David Snashall

Canadian soldiers waiting on an isolated beach in East Timor for a resupply landing craft from HMCS *Protecteur*, November 1999.

The insult of rejection in the referendum was a profound motivator for the East Timorese militia and the Indonesian military. The scale of destruction perpetrated over the course of several weeks is almost beyond description. UN officials, journalists and indeed the East Timorese civilians 'hunkered down' or fled to the hills in an attempt to survive an explosion of retribution designed to punish and to remove any mark of improvement and investment by Jakarta. If the Timorese were to have their own country, they would have to build it from the very basics. The level of planning and efficiency that went into effecting the destruction is astounding. Dili, the capital, had some 70 percent of its infrastructure destroyed or damaged. Militias were seen to use fire trucks loaded with gas or kerosene in their water tanks, roaming from village to village and house to house spreading their terror.



DND Photo by Sergeant David Snashall

Two Canadian non-commissioned officers guarding an airfield near Suai, East Timor as an American Sea Stallion helicopter takes off to return to its ship.

With no UN constabulary or military force, and a UN administration almost cut off and often communicating only via emergency channels or through the Australian embassy (itself under siege), only courageous journalists were able to capture the images of horror, and influence world opinion to take a stand against what was happening. This reporting coincided almost through happenstance with the APEC forum that was meeting in New Zealand. Had the news reports not been available for these deliberations, which included discussions among other neighboring Asian leaders, one wonders if Australian leadership alone would have moved the UN to act in time. Indeed, one of the miracles of the sad story of the violence is that there was initially a preponderance of effort made to destroy property, to send East Timor back to the dark ages in a literal sense. While some killing had occurred – notably in Suai where dozens were massacred as the Indonesian army and the militias moved towards the nearby West Timor border – there were relatively few deaths in light of the opportunities presented. If the militia's intention was to go around again after the destruction of the infrastructure was completed, the rapid UN mandate and armed response of the region interrupted those plans.

The effects of diplomatic arm-twisting by the United States as well as Asian neighbours that brought about the Indonesian request for assistance to quell the violence cannot be overemphasized. The Habibie government, which would fall a scant few weeks later, undoubtedly suffered a tremendous loss of 'face', so important in Asia, before it could accept this course of action. The morning view of an armada of foreign ships off Dili harbour served as both signal and turning point to Indonesia. The world had had enough and was taking action. Even the militia warlords understood. That troops from Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom were first ashore would be no surprise. That they would be joined by others from Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Singapore and other Asian nations confirmed that this was about international will and not simply a western agenda being played out. For the first time in the history of UN missions, a peacekeeping force assumed control of the governance and judiciary of the country. The UN force, by its very presence, ultimately provided the requisite leadership, and demonstrated that peace would be established by force, if necessary. The foundation for long-term sustainability for a culture of peace would be

forthcoming.

While a comparatively rapid response to the crisis was vitally important, it would have been of no value had there been no robustness to the effort in terms of a military mandate and Rules of Engagement. Australian Major General Cosgrove's forces stormed ashore with a Chapter VII mandate to bring about peace, not just hope for it. They could defend themselves, project power, and intervene to prevent the violence of the militias. Dili was secured first, and the remaining countryside was patrolled in the following weeks with more and more regularity, and with increasing staying power as the INTERFET force grew to nearly ten thousand.

If the arrival of the UN armada was the turning point, the firefight near the town of Suai was the defining engagement for the UN. To prove that the coalition force had no backbone, a cadre of militia engaged New Zealand troops near the border with West Timor. Though the UN troops took casualties, they broke the will of the irregulars to continue the fight. The integrity of the UN mission was tested, and, because it was upheld, the Militia never again mounted such a determined attack against the coalition. The concept of achieving peace by forceful means was validated in the short term although one can argue that only peace brought about through peaceful means is truly sustainable. What occurred with the INTERFET deployment was an end to fighting, a crucial step toward longer-term peacebuilding.

With security re-established, the flow of humanitarian aid could begin – a vital task given the loss of livestock, burned crops, poisoned wells and an entire planting season missed. Over time, stability, commerce and reconstruction would re-appear. While the classic ambivalence of non-governmental organizations toward the military was apparent, it was clear that with the militia turning to basic banditry to inflict punishment or simply to survive, the armed UN presence was essential to all other effort for months.

The UN mission's major effort was focused on rebuilding the constabulary, the judiciary and the government administration of the fledgling nation after military security and humanitarian assistance had been achieved. This was a major task, given that these roles had been usurped by favourites of the Indonesian regime, many from the main island, thus freezing the local Timorese out of power and experience. Were it not for the strength and leadership of the Catholic Church throughout the Indonesian era, civil society might also have had to have been rebuilt from the ground up.

By early 2000, a transition from military security to that provided by a constabulary was appropriate, and thus INTERFET was stood down and relieved by UNTAET, a mix of blue beret military forces and a robust UN civilian police presence, augmented by the newly trained local constabulary. The judiciary would not be far behind. Peace by forceful means was being replaced with peace by peaceful means through leadership that established a viable concept for a culture of harmony.

CONCLUSION

In East Timor, a will for unanimity began to prevail as the international intolerance for violence grew over time, and as the United Nations leadership and dialogue with Portugal and Indonesia became more substantive. The UN intervention mandate provided a vision around which an international force could rally. In addition, Australia's change of heart in relation to East Timor, and its subsequent leadership role in UNTAET, shifted conditions toward the possibility of sustainable peace. These systemic influences enhanced the conditions for an accord. Similarly, it was a combination of variables (leadership with a vision of a culture of peace and sustainability) that simultaneously converged, based on efforts over time that facilitated the East Timorese toward self-rule. Ultimately, it was the alignment in leadership

that took place from Habibie, the independence movement, Australia (with the APEC Forum as a catalyst), the Roman Catholic Church, and the UN that was the initiating factor for success.

Was the UN mission in East Timor a success? Partially so. Thousands of people perished while the international community and the UN did nothing, despite cries for help. The United States must assume some responsibility for its perfidious behaviour in blocking repeated requests for assistance⁸. When the UN did deploy, peace was achieved in a remarkably short time due, in part, to the Chapter VII mandate and powers that were effectively implemented by General Cosgrove. Such Chapter VII intervention demonstrated the effectiveness of peace achieved by forceful means in the short-term. Whether peace will be sustainable in the long term, only history will tell.

Should peacekeepers have been deployed earlier? If one adopts former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal, *An Agenda For Peace*, as the gauge, then it is clear that UN peacekeeping intervention should have been initiated earlier to prevent gross violations of human rights. Today, economic, social and political initiatives are being employed as prevention measures for potential future violence and to bolster sustainable development, as envisioned by Boutros-Ghali.

Should other intervention strategies have been employed? History demonstrates clearly that peace by peaceful means can be achieved, but with costs to human rights when force is being applied on the civilian population, as was the case in East Timor. Peace by forceful means, the methodology employed in East Timor, is a viable situational leadership structure that can reduce human casualties and destruction to the infrastructure of a nation, both of which threaten sustainability. To this end, the UN mission in East Timor was a partial success.

Did the UN provide the requisite leadership to establish sustainable peace? In the immediate term, yes. However, without long-term leadership, and continued peacekeeping and peacemaking intervention, this long-term goal will probably not be achieved. One need only examine other UN missions, such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and the Congo, to realize that peace is very fragile without commitment through leadership for a sustainable culture of peace. This objective is too complex to be left to those who do not demonstrate the requisite leadership maturity to assure a culture of peace as an alternative to a culture of war and violence.

This concept of maturity and dealing with complexity cannot be overemphasized. With globalization has come a rash of exceptionally complex global challenges, some of which contributed to the culture of war and violence, as witnessed in East Timor. Others, such as environmental devastation, SARS, West Nile Virus, terrorism, and clandestine colonial social and political interventions worldwide threaten the potential for long-term peace. The greatest challenge may be whether or not we ourselves mature fast enough to achieve the critical mass of leadership for a sustainable culture of peace to seriously engage the global threats that are occurring. East Timor could be the flagship of future UN intervention strategies. For the UN to be successful in future missions, there must be a triumvirate alignment in leadership of the essential forces in the conundrum, a commitment for sustainability, and a vision for a culture of peace. If any one of these is absent, the probability of success will be greatly diminished. In this regard, Canada is in a position to play an integral leadership role for sustainable peace.



DND Photo

Naval support to Canadian land forces in East Timor.



Major Thomas Rippon serves in 39 Canadian Brigade Group in Victoria. He teaches cultures of violence and peace at Camosun College and is a faculty project supervisor at Royal Roads University. Commodore Roger Girard is Commander, Canadian Fleet Pacific and served with Canada's contribution to the Australian-led INTERFET coalition in East Timor. Eliot Lowey is a family counsellor, educator and curriculum developer.

NOTES

1. J. Cotton, "Australia's commitment in East Timor: A review article". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23:3, pp. 552-568. Quote from p. 555.
2. D. Dickens, "The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the military operational level". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23:2, pp. 213-232.
3. Cotton, *Op. Cit.*
4. B. Cronin, "Information warfare: Peering inside Pandora's postmodern box". *Fifth Epixtech (Ameritech) Information Society Lecture* 2001, pp. 1-16.
5. Dickens, *Op. Cit.*
6. P. Gorjao, "The legacy and lessons of the United Nations transitional administration in East Timor". *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 24:2, pp. 313-336.
7. E.H. Friedman, *A failure of nerve: Leadership in the age of the quick fix*. Bethesda, MD: The Edwin Friedman Foundation, 1999.
8. S. Power, *A problem from hell: America and the age of genocide*. New York: Basic Books, 2002.



"References"

- Adams, D. (10 November 2001). (Personal Communication). New York, NY.
- Adams, D. (1983). Why there are so few women warriors. Behavior Science Research, 18(3), 196-212.
- Adams, D. (1984). There is no instinct for war. Psychological Journal (Moscow) Academy of Sciences of Russia, 5, 140-144.
- Adams, D. (1989). The Seville statement on violence: A progress report. Journal of Peace Research, 26(2), 113-121.
- Adams, D. (1992). Biology does not make men more aggressive than women. In K. Bjorkqvist & P. Niemela (Eds.), Of Mice and Women (pp. 17-26). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Adams, D. (1997). War is not in our biology: A decade of the Seville statement on violence. In J. S. Grisolia (Ed.), Violence: From Biology to Society. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Adams, D. (2000a, July 2000). From a culture of war and violence to a culture of peace and non-violence. Paper presented at the International Society for Research on Aggression, Valencia, Spain.
- Adams, D. (2000b). Toward a global movement for a culture of peace. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(3), 259-266.
- Adams, D. (2002). Moving from a culture of war to a culture of peace. Fellowship(September/October 2002), 1-4 http://forusa.org/Fellowship/Sep-Oct_02/CultureofPeace.html.
- Adams, D. (2003a). Early history of the culture of peace [Internet www.culture-of-peace.info/history/introduction.html]. Retrieved 6 April 2004, 2004, from the World Wide Web:
- Adams, D. (2003b). Manifesto 2000 for a culture of peace and non-violence [internet]. Retrieved 28 December 2003, from the World Wide Web: www3.unesco.org/manifesto2000/uk/uk_manifesto.htm
- Adams, D. (2004a). Review of literature review [Internet]. Retrieved 17 August 2004, from the World Wide Web: personal e-mail
- Adams, D. (2004b). Values, attitudes and behaviours: Culture of war to culture of peace [Internet]. Retrieved 5 August 2004, from the World Wide Web: www.cpnna-usa.org/learn/values.html
- Adams, D., Barnett, S. A., Bechtereva, N. P., & Carter, B. F. (1990). The Seville statement on violence. American Psychologist, 45, 1167-1168.
- Aharoni, A. (2002). Sustainability and the culture of peace. International Journal of Humanities and Peace, 18(1), 29-36.
- Alasuutari, P. (1995). Researching culture: Qualitative method and culture studies. London: Sage Publications.
- Alder, P. A. (1985). Wheeling and dealing. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Alger, C. F. (1996). The emerging tool chest for peacebuilders. International Journal of Peace Studies, 1(2), 21-45.
- Allen, J. R., & St. George, S. A. (2001). What couples say works in domestic violence therapy. The Qualitative Report (<http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR6-3/allen.html>), 6(3), 1-17.

- American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Anderson, A., & Christie, D. J. (2001). Some contributions of psychology to policies promoting cultures of peace. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(2), 173-185.
- Anderson, C. A., & Murphy, C. R. (2003). Violent video games and aggressive behavior in young women. Aggressive Behavior, 29(5), 423-429.
- Anderson, R. (2004). A definition of peace. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 10(2), 101-116.
- Archer, D., & Gartner, R. (1984). Violence and crime in cross-national perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Aron, R. (1966). Peace and war: A theory of international relations. New York: Doubleday.
- Atkinson, B., Heath, A., & Chenail, R. (1991). Qualitative research and the legitimization of knowledge. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 17, 161-165.
- Atkinson, P., & Hammersley, M. (1998). Ethnography and participant observation. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (pp. 110-136). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Augsberger, D. W. (1995). Conflict mediation across cultures: Pathways and patterns. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press.
- Avruch, K. (1998). Culture & conflict resolution. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Avruch, K., Black, P. W., & Scimecca, J. A. (Eds.). (1998). Conflict resolution: Cross-cultural perspectives. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Bailey, F. G. (1998). Terius luctans: Idiocosm, caricature, and mask. In K. Avruch & P. W. Black & J. A. Sciemcca (Eds.), Conflict Resolution: Cross-Cultural Perspectives (pp. 61-83). Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Balsdon, J. P. V. D. (1969). Life and leisure in ancient Rome. London: Bodley Head.
- Baron, R. A., & Richardson, D. R. (1994). Human aggression (2nd ed.). New York: Plenum Press.
- Bazeley, P. (1998). QSR NUD*IST qualitative solutions and research. Melbourne, Au: Qualitative Solutions & Research Ltd.
- Bear, G. (1998, 12-17 July 1998). Sampling in qualitative research. Paper presented at the International Society for Research on Aggression, Mahwah, NJ.
- Beck, D. E., & Cowan, C. C. (1996). Spiral dynamics: Mastering values, leadership and change. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Becker, P. H. (1993). Common pitfalls in published grounded theory research. Qualitative Health Research, 3(2), 254-260.
- Benn, P. (1998). Ethics. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- Berg, B. L. (1995). Qualitative research methods (2 ed.). Boston, Mass.: Allyn and Bacon.
- Berkowitz, L. (1958). Impulse, aggression and guns. Psychology Today, 2, 18-22.
- Berkowitz, L. (1983). The experience of anger as a parallel process in the display of impulsive, "angry" aggression. In R. Geen, G. & E. I. Donnerstein

- (Eds.), Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews (Vol. 1, pp. 103-134). New York: Academic Press.
- Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration-aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformation. Psychological Bulletin, 106(1), 59-73.
- Berkowitz, L. (1993). Aggression: Its causes, consequences and control. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Bollinger, T. (1969). Theatralis licentia. Winterthur: Hans Schellenberg.
- Borgatti, S. (2004). Introduction to grounded theory [internet]. Retrieved 14 July 2004, from the World Wide Web: www.analytictech.com/mb870/introtoGT.htm
- Borisoff, D., & Victor, D. A. (1997). Conflict management: A communication skills approach (2nd ed.). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
- Boulding, E. (1998). Cultures of peace and communities of faith. In R. Herr & J. Zimmerman-Herr (Eds.), Transforming Violence: Linking Local and Global Peacemaking (pp. 95-104). Waterloo, ON: Herald Press.
- Boulding, E. (1999). Peace culture: The problem of managing human differences. Cross Cultures, 48(4), 445-457.
- Boulding, E. (2000a). Cultures of peace: The hidden side of history (1st ed.). Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Boulding, E. (2000b). A new chance for human peaceableness? Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(3), 193-215.
- Bourdon, S. (30 September 2000). Inter-coder reliability verification using QSR NUD*IST. Paper presented at the Strategies in Qualitative Research, The Institute of Education, University of London, London, UK.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992). An agenda for peace. New York: United Nations.
- Braudy, L. (2003). From chivalry to terrorism: War and the changing nature of masculinity. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- Brenes, A., & Wessells, M. (2001). Psychological contributions to building cultures of peace. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(2), 99-108.
- Brewer, J. D. (1991). Inside the RUC: Routine policing in a divided society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Brewer, J. D., Guelke, A., & Hume, I. (1988). Police, public order and the state. London: MacMillan Publishers.
- Burton, J. W. (1990). Conflict: Resolution and prevention. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Bushman, B. J. (2003). Media ratings for violence and sex. American Psychologist, 58(2), 130-141.
- Buss, A. H. (1961). The psychology of aggression. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Buss, A. H. (1995). Personality. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Cairns, E. (2003). President's Message. Newsletter of the Society for the Study of Peace, Conflict and Violence, 12(1), 1.
- Calvet, L.-J. (1998). Language wars and linguistic politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (2003). Al-qaeda leader captured. Toronto, ON.
- Capra, F. (1996). The web of life. New York: Doubleday.

- Castro, J. J., & Caballero, C. (2004). Effect of the light intensity upon the Agonistic behaviour of juvenile White-seabream. Aggressive Behavior, 30(4), 313-318.
- Cejka, M. A., & Bamat, T. (Eds.). (2003a). Artisans of peace: Grassroots peacemaking among Christian communities. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Cejka, M. A., & Bamat, T. (2003b). Invisible artisans of peace. In M. A. Cejka & T. Bamat (Eds.), Artisans of peace: Grassroots peacemaking among Christian communities (pp. 1-18). Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Chappell, D., & Di Martino, V. (1998). Violence at work. Geneva: International Labour Office.
- Chattopadhyay, P., Tluchowska, M., & George, E. (2004). Identifying the ingroup: A closer look at the influence of demographic Dissimilarity on employee social identity. Academy of Management Review, 29(2), 180-202.
- Chenier, E. (1998). The workplace: A battleground for violence. Public Personnel Management, 27(4), 557-568.
- Chenitz, W. C., & Swanson, J. M. (Eds.). (1986). From practice to grounded theory: Qualitative research in nursing. Menlo Park, Ca: Addison-Wesley.
- Childs, J. B. (2003). Places of sense/senses of place: Gang violence, positive cultures leadership, and peacemaking. In M. A. Cejka & T. Bamat (Eds.), Artisans of peace: Grassroots peacemaking among Christian communities (pp. 226-255). Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
- Christie, D. J. (2001). Peace psychology and the coming resource wars. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(4), 375-378.
- Christie, D. J., & Dawes, A. (2001). Tolerance and solidarity. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(2), 131-142.
- Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., & Winter, D. D. N. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, conflict, and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Coffey, A., & Atkinson, P. (1996). Making sense of qualitative data. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage Publications.
- Cohrs, J. C., & Moscher, B. (2002). Antiwar knowledge and generalized political attitudes as determinants of attitude toward the Kosovo war. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(2), 138-155.
- Coleman, P., & Deutsch, M. (2001). Introducing cooperation and conflict resolution into schools: A systems approach. In D. J. Christie & R. V. Wagner & D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, Conflict and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century (pp. 223-239). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Coleman, P. T. (2003). Characteristics of protracted, intractable conflict: Toward the development of a metaframework-I. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 9(1), 1-38.
- Connor, K. M., Davidson, J. R., & Lee, L.-C. (2003). Spirituality, resilience and anger in survivors of violent trauma: A community survey. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 16(5), 487-494.
- Cook, T., & Leviton, L. (1981). Reviewing the literature: A comparison of traditional methods with meta-analysis. Journal of Personality, 48, 449-471.
- Cooper, H. M. (1988). The structure of knowledge synthesis: A taxonomy of literature reviews. Knowledge In Society, 1, 104-126.

- Cooper, H. M. (1989). Integrating research: A guide for literature review (2nd. ed. Vol. 2). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Cox, T., & Leather, P. (1994). The prevention of violence at work: Application of a cognitive behavioral theory. International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 9, 213-245.
- Coyne, I. T. (1997). Sampling in qualitative research. Purposeful and theoretical sampling; merging or clear boundaries? Journal of Advanced Nursing, 26, 623-630.
- Coyne, S. M., & Archer, J. (2004). Indirect aggression in the media: A content analysis of British television programs. Aggressive Behavior, 30(3), 254-271.
- Curle, A. (2000). Obstacles to peace. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(3), 247-252.
- Dallaire, R. (2003). Shake hands with the devil. Toronto: Random House.
- Darby, J. (2001). The effects of violence on peace processes. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- de la Rey, C. (2000). Structural asymmetries and peace: Hope or despair? Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(3), 217-221.
- Deikman, A. (1990). The wrong way home: Uncovering the patterns of cult behavior in American society. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Delaney, D. E. (2002). 'Us' and 'them': Colin Powell and American civil-military relations, 1963-1993. Canadian Military Journal, 3(2), 49-56.
- Denzin, N. K. (1978). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological methods. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (Eds.). (1994). Handbook of qualitative research. Thousand Oaks, Ca.: Sage Publications.
- Devine-Wright, P. (2001). History and identity in Northern Ireland: An exploratory investigation of the role of historical commemorations in contexts of intergroup conflict. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(4), 297-315.
- Dey, I. (1993). Qualitative data analysis: A user friendly guide for social scientists. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Dill, J. C., & Anderson, C. A. (1995). Effects of frustration justification on hostile aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 21, 359-369.
- Donohue, W. A. (1990). The new freedom : Individualism and collectivism in the social lives of Americans. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- Druckman, D. (2001). Nationalism and war: A social-psychological perspective. In D. J. Christie & R. V. Wagner & D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, Conflict and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century (pp. 49-65). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Dutton, D. G. (1998). The abusive personality. New York: Guilford Press.
- Eagle, G. T. (1998). Promoting peace by integrating western and indigenous healing in treating trauma. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 4(3), 271-282.
- Ehrenreich, B. (1997). Blood rites: Origins and history of the passions of war. New York: Henry Holt & Co.

- Elias, R. (1997). A culture of violent solutions. In J. Turpin & L. R. Kurtz (Eds.), The Web of Violence: From Interpersonal to Global (pp. 117-148). Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Ember, M., & Carol, E. (1994). War, socialization and interpersonal violence: A cross-cultural study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38, 620-646.
- Faure, G. O., & Rubin, J. Z. (Eds.). (1993). Culture and negotiation. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Featherston, A. B., & Nordstrom, C. (1994). Overcoming conceptual habitus in conflict management: UN peacekeeping and warzone ethnography. Peace Research Center Working Paper #147. Canberra, ANU.
- Felson, R. (2002). Violence and gender re-examined. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Felson, R. B. (1992). "Kick 'em when they're down": Explanations of the relationship between stress and interpersonal aggression and violence. The Sociological Quarterly, 33(1), 1-16.
- Fisher, G. (1998). The mindsets factor in ethnic conflict: A cross-cultural agenda. Yarmouth, ME: Intercultural Press.
- Fisher, R. J. (1997). Interactive conflict resolution. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse UP.
- Flood, R. L. (2002). The relationship of systems thinking to action research. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (Eds.), Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice (pp. 133-144). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Forbes, D., Phelps, A. J., McHugh, A. F., Debenham, P., Hopwood, M., & Creamer, M. (2003). Imagery rehearsal in the treatment of posttraumatic nightmares in Australia veterans with chronic combat-related PTSD: 12-month follow-up data. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 16(5), 509-514.
- Fowle, L. (1999, May 31, 1999). Protecting staff from violence. Financial Post, pp. C15.
- Francis, D. (2002). People, peace and power: Conflict transformation in action. London, UK: Pluto Press.
- Friedman, E. H. (1999). A failure of nerve: Leadership in the age of the quick fix. Bethesda, MD: The Edwin Friedman Foundation.
- Fritz, R. (1991). Creating. New York: Fawcett Columbine.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace and peace research. Journal of Peace Research, 6(3), 167-191.
- Galtung, J. (1972). A structure theory of aggression. In I. K. Feierabend & R. L. Feierabend & T. R. Gurr (Eds.), Anger, Violence and Politics (pp. 85-97). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.
- Galtung, J. (1981). Social cosmology and the concept of peace. Journal of Peace Research, 18(2), 183-199.
- Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. Journal of Peace Research, 27(3), 291-305.
- Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Galtung, J. (1998). On the genesis of peaceless worlds: Insane nations and insane states. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 4(1), 1-11.
- Galtung, J., & Tschudi, F. (2001). Crafting peace: On the psychology of the TRANSCEND approach. In D. J. Christie & R. V. Wagner & B. J. Winter

- (Eds.), Peace, Conflict and Violence: Peace Psychology For The 21st Century (pp. 210-222). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Giacalone, R. A., & Greenberg, J. (Eds.). (1997). Antisocial behavior in organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Gladwell, M. (2000). The tipping point. Little, Brown and Company: Boston.
- Glaser, B. G. (1978). Theoretical sensitivity. Mill Valley, Ca.: Sociology Press.
- Glaser, B. G. (1992). Basics in grounded theory analysis. Mill Valley, Ca: Sociology Press.
- Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative research. New York: Aldine Publishers.
- Glinow, M. A., Shapiro, D. L., & Brett, J. M. (2004). Can we talk, and should we: Managing emotional conflict in multicultural teams. Academy of Management Review, 29(4), 578-592.
- Glomb, T. M. (2002). Workplace anger and aggression: Informing conceptual models with data from specific encounters. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 7(1), 20-36.
- Goetz, J. P., & LeCompte, M. D. (1984). Ethnography and qualitative design in educational research. New York: Academic Press.
- Goldstein, J. H. (1983). Sports violence. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Goldstein, J. H. (1986). Sports and aggression. In A. Campbell & J. J. Gibbs (Eds.), Violent Transactions (pp. 249-257). Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.
- Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books.
- Goleman, D. (1998). Working with emotional intelligence. New York: Bantam Books.
- Goodman, A. (2002). Transformative learning and cultures of peace (pp. 18). Toronto.
- Gottfredson, M. R., Hirschi, T., & Grasmick, H. G. (1993). A general theory of crime. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 30, 5-29.
- Goulding, V. J. (2002). Back to the future with asymmetric warfare. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, 30(4), 21-30.
- Graham, K., Wells, S., & West, P. (1997). A framework for applying explanations of alcohol-related aggression to naturally occurring aggressive behavior. Contemporary Drug Problems, 24/Winter, 625-666.
- Grant, M. (1967). Gladiators. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- Gray, C. (2002). Thinking asymmetrically in times of terror. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, 32(1), 5-14.
- Griffin, S. (1992). A chorus of stones: The private life of war. New York: Doubleday.
- Griffith, S. B. (Ed.). (1963). Sun Tzu: The art of war. London: Oxford University press.
- Grossman, D. (1996). On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989). Fourth generation evaluation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- Gubrium, J. F., & Holstein, J. A. (1997). The new language of qualitative method. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gustafson, R. (1989). Frustration and successful vs. unsuccessful aggression: A test of Berkowitz' completion hypothesis. Aggressive Behavior, 15, 5-12.

- Guttmann, A. (1983). Roman sports violence. In J. H. Goldstein (Ed.), Sports Violence (pp. 7-19). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Hakvoort, I., & Hagglund, S. (2001). Concepts of peace and war as described by Dutch and Swedish girls and boys. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(1), 29-44.
- Hedges, C. (2002). War is a force that gives us meaning. New York: Public Affairs.
- Heron, J., & Reason, P. (2001). The practice of co-operative inquiry: Research 'with' rather than 'on' people. In P. Reason & H. Bradbury (Eds.), Handbook of Action Research: Participative Inquiry and Practice (pp. 179-188). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.
- Herr, R., & Zimmerman-Herr, J. (Eds.). (1998). Transforming violence: Linking local and global peacemaking. Waterloo, ON: Herald Press.
- Howard, M. (1976). War in European history. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Huessman, L. R. (2002). Aggression, TV and parenting. Paper presented at the International Society for Research on Aggression, Montreal, PQ.
- Innovation Associates Inc. (1993). Visionary leadership and planning. Framingham, MA.
- Jabri, V. (1996). Discourses on violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Jordan, P. J., Ashkanasy, N. M., & Hartel, C. E. (2002). Emotional intelligence as a moderator of emotional and behavioral reactions to job insecurity. Academy of Management Review, 27(3), 361-372.
- Jorgenson, J. (1991). Constructing the interview/co-constructing 'family'. In F. Steier (Ed.), Research and Reflexivity (pp. 210-225). London, UK: Sage Publication.
- Kelman, H. C. (1999). Interactive problem solving as a metaphor for international conflict resolution: Lessons for the policy process. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5(3), 201-218.
- Kelman, H. C., & Hamilton, V. L. (1989). Crimes of obedience: Toward a social psychology of authority and responsibility. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Kidder, L. H., & Fine, M. (1987). Qualitative and quantitative methods: When stories converge. In M. M. Mark & R. L. Shortland (Eds.), Multiple Methods in Program Evaluation (pp. 57-75). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kim, U., & Hakhoe, H. g. S. (1994). Individualism and collectivism theory, method and applications. Thousand Oaks, CA.: Sage Publications.
- Kirk, J., & Miller, M. L. (1986). Reliability and validity in qualitative research (Vol. 1). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Kitson, G. C., Sussman, B., Williams, G. K., Zeehandelaar, R. B., Shickmantet, B. K., & Steinberger, J. L. (1982). Sampling issues in family research. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 44, 965-981.
- Kodama, K. (2004). History of international peace research association. Special Issue of the International Peace Research Association.
- Kouzes, J. M., & Posner, B. Z. (1987). The leadership challenge: How to get extraordinary things done in organizations (1st ed.). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

- Kowalski, R. M., & Leary, M. R. (Eds.). (1999). The social psychology of emotional and behavioral problems. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Kral, M. J., Burkhardt, K. J., & Kidd, S. (2002). The new research agenda for a cultural psychology. Canadian Psychology, 43(3), 154-162.
- Lackey, D. P. (1997). The ethics of war and peace (1st ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Last, D. M. (1997). Theory, doctrine and practice of conflict de-escalation in peacekeeping operations. Clementsport, NS: Lester B. Pearson International Peacekeeping Center.
- LeCompte, M. D., & Goetz, J. P. (1982). Problems of reliability and validity in ethnographic research. Review of Educational Research, 52(1), 31-60.
- Lederach, J. P. (1995). Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.
- Lee, R. M., & Renzetti, C. M. (1993). What is sensitive research. In C. M. Renzetti & R. M. Lee (Eds.), Researching Sensitive Topics (pp. 3-13). Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications.
- LeShan, L. (2002). The psychology of war: Comprehending its mystique and madness. New York: Helios Press.
- Lightdale, J. R., & Prentice, D. A. (1994). Rethinking sex differences in aggression: Aggressive behavior in the absence of social roles. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20(1), 34-44.
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic inquiry. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Lindner, E. G. (2002). Healing the cycles of humiliation: How to attend to the emotional aspects of 'unresolved' conflicts and the use of 'humiliation entrepreneurship'. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(2), 125-138.
- Linn, R. (2001). Conscience at war: On the relationship between moral psychology and moral resistance. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(4), 337-356.
- Litvak-Hirsch, T., Bar-On, D., & Chaitin, J. (2003). Whose house is this? Dilemmas of identity construction in the Israeli-Palestine context. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 9(2), 127-148.
- Lowen, A. (1985). Narcissism. New York: Collier Books, Macmillan Publishing Company.
- Lowey, E., Murdock, M., & Coppard, P. (2000). Violence prevention program. Victoria, BC: Corrections Branch, Ministry of the Attorney General, Province of British Columbia.
- Lowey, E., Murdock, M. A., Coppard, P. W., & Rippon, T. J. (2004). Canadian Forces Anger Management Program. Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence.
- Lynch, J. F. (2001). Beyond ADR: A systems approach to conflict management. Negotiation Journal, July 2001, 207-216.

- Manwaring, M. G., & Joes, A. J. (2000). Beyond declaring victory and coming home: The challenges of peace and stability operations. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Maoz, I. (2001). The violent asymmetrical encounter with the other in an army-civilian clash: The case of Intifada. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(3), 243-263.
- Maxwell, J. P. (1998). The effects of interpersonal oppressive violence on women and children: Implications for conflict management and violence prevention training. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 4(2), 155-166.
- Mayor, F., & Adams, D. (2000, March, 2000). The culture of peace: A programme of action. Prospects, 1, 3-13.
- Mayton, D. D. M., Peters, D. J., & Owens, R. W. (1999). Values, militarism and nonviolent predispositions. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5(1), 69-77.
- Mayton, D. M. (2001). Nonviolence within cultures of peace: A means and an ends. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(2), 143-155.
- McCandless, H. E. (2002). A citizen's guide to public accountability. Victoria BC: Trafford Publishing.
- McHoul, A. W. (1996). Semiotic investigations: Toward an effective semiotics. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- Meigs, M. C. (2003). Unorthodox thoughts about asymmetrical warfare. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, 33(2), 4-18.
- Meloy, J. R. (1997). Violent attachments. Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson.
- Meltz, B. F. (1999, May 24, 1999). Should boys have war toys? Chronicle-Herald, pp. A8.
- Meyer, L. H. (1998). Theology for a just peace. In R. Herr & J. Zimmerman-Herr (Eds.), Transforming Violence (pp. 219-230). Scottsdale, PA: Herald Press.
- Mihesuah, D. A. (Ed.). (1998). Natives and academics: Researching and writing about American Indians. Lincoln, NB: University of Nebraska Press.
- Miles, M. B., & Huberman, M. A. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded source book. Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications.
- Mishler, E. G. (1986). Research interviewing: Context and narrative. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Mitchell, C. R., & Banks, M. (1996). Handbook of conflict resolution: The analytical problem solving approach. New York: Pinter.
- Moerk, E. L. (2002). Scripting war-entry to make it appear unavoidable. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(3), 229-248.
- Momiroski, T. (2003). The Jewish group: Highlighting the culture problem in nation-states. Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 5(1), 134-150.
- Montiel, C. J. (2000). Political trauma and recovery in a protracted conflict: Understanding contextual effects. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(2), 93-111.
- Montiel, C. J. (2001). Toward a psychology of structural peacebuilding. In D. J. Christie & R. V. Wagner & D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, conflict and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (pp. 282-294). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

- Montiel, C. J., & Anuar, M. K. (2002). Other terrorisms: Psychology, and media. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(3), 201-206.
- Montiel, C. J., & Wessells, M. (2001). Democratization, psychology and the construction of cultures of peace. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 7(2), 119-130.
- Morse, J. M. (1991). Strategies for sampling (Morse, J. M. ed., pp. 127-145). Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage Publications.
- Murdock, M. A., Coppard, P. W., & Lowey, E. (1999). Youth violence intervention program. Victoria, BC: Ministry of Children and Families, Province of British Columbia.
- Namie, G., & Namie, R. (2000). The bully at work. Naperville, Il: Sourcebooks Inc.
- Nenon, J. (2000). Viable ways for changing violence at the community level. Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 3(2).
- Nordstrom, C. (1997). A different kind of war story. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Nordstrom, C., & Robben, A. C. G. (Eds.). (1995). Fieldwork under fire: Contemporary studies of violence and survival. Berkley, CA: University of California Press.
- Northey, W. F. (1997). Using QSR NUD*IST to demonstrate confirmability in qualitative research. Family Science Review, 10(2), 170-179.
- Novaco, R. W., & Chemtob, C. M. (2002). Anger and combat-related posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15(2), 123-133.
- Nye, J. S. (2003). Understanding International Conflicts. New York: Longman.
- O'Leary-Kelly, A. M., Griffin, R. W., & Glew, D. J. (1996). Organization-motivated aggression: A research framework. Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 225-253.
- Olweus, D. (1994). Bullying at school: Long-term outcomes for the victims and an effective school-based intervention program. In L. R. Huesmann (Ed.), Aggressive Behavior: Current Perspectives (pp. 97-130). New York: Plenum Press.
- O'Neill, P. (2002). Tectonic change: The qualitative paradigm in psychology. Canadian Psychology, 43(3), 190-194.
- O'Shry, B. (1996). Seeing systems: Unlocking the mysteries of organizational life. San Francisco: Barrett-Koeler.
- O'Sullivan, E. V. (1999). Transformative learning: Education vision for the 21st century. New York: Zed Books.
- Owens, L., Shute, R., & Slee, P. (2000). "Guess what I just heard!": Indirect aggression among teenage girls in Australia. Aggressive Behavior, 26, 67-83.
- Parry, K. W. (1998). Grounded theory and social process: A new direction for leadership research. Leadership Quarterly, 9(1), 85-105.
- Patton, M. Q. (1990). Qualitative evaluations and research methods. Newbury Park, Ca: Sage.
- Pedersen, P. B. (2001). The cultural context of peacemaking. In D. J. Christie & R. V. Wagner & D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, conflict and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (pp. 183-192). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.

- Pedersen, P. B. (2002). The new rules for international peacemaking. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(2), 175-176.
- Perilla, J. L., Bakeman, R., & Norris, F. H. (1994). Culture and domestic violence: The ecology of abused Latinas. Violence and Victims, 9(4), 325-339.
- Peshkin, A. (1993). The goodness of qualitative research. Education Researcher, 22(2), 23-29.
- Porter, M., & Haslam, N. (2001). Forced displacement in Yugoslavia: A meta-analysis of psychological consequences and their moderators. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 14(4), 817-834.
- Potegal, M., & Knutson, J. E. (Eds.). (1994). The dynamics of aggression: Biological and social processes in dyads and groups. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Power, S. (2002). A problem from hell: America and the age of genocide. New York: Basic Books.
- Prochaska, J., DiClemente, C., & Norcross, J. (1992). In search of how people change: Application to addictive behavior. American Psychologist, 47(9), 1102-1115.
- Randall, P. (1997). Adult bullying. London: Routledge.
- Rauch, I. (1999). Semiotic insights: The data do the talking. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Reardon, B. A. (1988). Comprehensive peace education. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Reason, P., & Bradbury, H. (Eds.). (2001). Handbook of action research: Participative inquiry and practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Reilly, T., & MacKenzie, D. (1999). ADR in the corporate environment: A practical guide for designing alternative dispute resolution systems. North York, Ont.: CCH Canadian.
- Rennie, D. L., Watson, K. D., & Monteiro, A. M. (2002). The rise of qualitative research in psychology. Canadian Psychology, 43(3), 179-189.
- Richardson, L., & Richardson, T. (1995). QSR NUD*IST computer software. Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage.
- Riessman, C. K. (1993). Narrative analysis. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Rippon, C.L. (1958). Jurisdiction in space. Unpublished LLM Thesis.
- Rippon, T. J. (1997a). Aggression and abnormal behaviour. Unpublished research paper, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia.
- Rippon, T. J. (1997b). Posttraumatic stress disorder. Unpublished research paper, University of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia.
- Rippon, T. J. (2000). Aggression and violence in health care professions. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 31(2), 452-460.
- Rippon, T. J. (2002). Cognitive skills training: The value of values. Victoria, BC: Correctional Services Branch, Ministry of Solicitor General, Province of British Columbia.
- Rippon, T. J. (April 2003). The impact of the media on public anxiety resulting from terrorism. Paper presented at the Topoff (T2) Workshop on Homeland Security Emergency Preparedness, Vancouver, BC.

- Rippon, T. J. (February 2004). The role of spirituality in a culture of peace. Paper presented at the LFWA Chaplains Conference, Edmonton, AB.
- Rippon, T. J., & Anderson, M. (2002). Sustainability criteria and a conceptual model development for communities that could potentially support primary reserve units. Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence - Land Force Reserve Restructuring.
- Rippon, T. J., Girouard, R., & Lowey, E. (2004). Leadership for a sustainable culture of peace: The U.N. mission in East Timor. Canadian Military Journal, 5(3), 57-62.
- Rippon, T. J., & Lowey, E. (April 2004). Traumatic stress specialists response to the psychological impact of terrorism. Paper presented at the Conference of the Association of Traumatic Stress Specialists, Burnaby, BC.
- Roche, D. (2003). The human right to peace. Ottawa, ON: Novalis, St Paul University.
- Rosenthal, R. (1984). Meta-analytic procedures for social research. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. (1994). Essentials of behavioral research: Methods of data analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Ross, M. H. (2000). 'Good enough' isn't so bad: Thinking about success and failure in ethnic conflict management. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(1), 27-47.
- Ross, M. H., & Rothman, J. (1999). Theory and practice in ethnic conflict management: Theorizing success and failure. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Rossmann, G. B., & Wilson, B. L. (1991). Numbers and words revisited: Being "shamelessly eclectic". Evaluation Review, 9(5), 627-643.
- Russell, G. W. (1983). Psychological issues in sports aggression. In J. H. Goldstein (Ed.), Sports Violence (pp. 157-181). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Russell, G. W., & Arms, R. L. (1998). Toward a social psychological profile of would-be rioters. Aggressive Behavior, 24(3), 219-226.
- Rutherford, P. (2004). Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Marketing the war against Iraq. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
- Salmivalli, C., Lagerspetz, K. M., Bjorkqvist, K., Osterman, K., & Kaukiainen, A. (1996). Bullying as a group process: Participant roles and their relations to social status within the group. Aggressive Behavior, 22, 1-15.
- Salmivalli, C., & Nieminen, E. (2002). Proactive and reactive aggression among school bullies, victims and bully-victims. Aggressive Behavior, 28(1), 30-44.
- Salomon, G. (2004). Does peace education make a difference in the context of an intractable conflict. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 10(3), 257-274.
- Sandelowski, M. (1986). The problem of rigor in qualitative research. Advances in Nursing Science, 8(3), 27-37.
- Sandelowski, M. (1993). Rigor or rigor mortis: The problem of rigor in qualitative research revisited. Advances in Nursing Science, 16(2), 1-8.
- Sandelowski, M. (1995). Focus on qualitative methods: Sample size in qualitative research. Research in Nursing and Health, 18, 179-183.

- Sandy, L. R., & Perkins, R. (2002). The nature of peace and its implications for peace education. Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution, 4(2), 1-8.
- Sanson, A., & Bretherton, D. (2001). Conflict resolution: Theoretical and practical issues. In D. J. Christie & R. V. Wagner & D. D. Winter (Eds.), Peace, conflict and violence: Peace psychology for the 21st century (pp. 193-209). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Sarbin, T. R. (2003). The metaphor-to-myth transformation with special reference to the "war on terrorism". Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 9(2), 149-157.
- Sayer, A. (1992). Methods in social science: A realistic approach. London: Routledge.
- Schatzman, L., & Strauss, A. L. (1973). Field research: Strategies for a natural sociology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Schwandt, T. A. (2001). Dictionary of qualitative inquiry (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication.
- Schwebel, M. (1998). Introduction: Peace by forceful means? Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 4(2), 89-91.
- Scott, J. P. (1992). Aggression: Functions and control in social systems. Aggressive Behavior, 18, 1-20.
- Searle-White, J. (2001). The psychology of nationalism. New York: Palgrave.
- Seidel, J., & Kelle, U. (1995). Different functions of coding in the analysis of textual data. In U. Kelle (Ed.), Computer-aided Qualitative Data Analysis (pp. 52-61). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publication.
- Senge, P. M. (1999). The dance of change: The challenges of sustaining momentum in learning organizations (1st ed.). New York: Currency/Doubleday.
- Shay, J. (1994). Achilles in Vietnam. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Sieber, J. E., & Stanley, B. (1989). Ethical and professional dimensions of socially sensitive research. American Psychologist, 43, 49-55.
- Silverman, D. P. (1993). Interpreting qualitative data: Methods of analyzing talk, text and interaction. London: Sage.
- Sinclair, L. (Ed.). (1997). Collins Latin Dictionary. New York: Harper Collins.
- Singh, S., & Ricrads, L. (2003). Missing data: Finding 'central' themes in qualitative research. Qualitative Research Journal, 3(1), 5-17.
- Skarlicki, D. P., Folger, R., & Tesluk, P. (1999). Personality as a moderator in the relationship between fairness and retaliation. Academy of Management Journal, 42(1), 100-108.
- Slikkerveer, L. J. (1993). The expert sign: Semiotics of culture: Towards an interface of ethno- and cosmosystems. Leiden: DSWO Press Leiden University.
- Slim, H. (2000). Military humanitarianism and the new peacekeeping: An agenda for peace? Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (www.jha.ac/articles/a003.htm)(3 June 2000), 1-11.
- Smith, C. B. (2004). Building peace through the political processes of the United Nations. International Journal of Peace Studies, 9(2), 11-30.
- Smith, M. B. (2002). The metaphor (and fact) of war. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 8(3), 249-258.

- Snibbe, A. C. (2004). Taking the 'vs.' out of nature vs. nurture. Monitor of Psychology, 35(10), 23.
- Sommer, B., & Sommer, R. (1991). A practical guide to behavioral research. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Soroos, M. S. (2004). Tools for environmental peacebuilders. International Journal of Peace Studies, 9(2), 87-108.
- Spence, R. (1999). Promises of peace: Processes of community participation in building peace in Down District. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of New England, Armidale, NSW.
- Spradley, J. P. (1979). The ethnographic interview. Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.
- Spring, U. O. (2000). The future of humanity: Human, gender and ecological security. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 6(3), 229-235.
- Stangor, C., Lynch, L., Duan, C., & Glass, B. (1992). Categorization of individuals on the basis of multiple social features. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 207-218.
- Staub, E. (1989). The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Stein, J. G. (1999). Problem solving as metaphor: Negotiation and identity conflict. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5(3), 225-235.
- Stern, P. N. (1994). Eroding grounded theory. In J. M. Morse (Ed.), Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods (pp. 212-223). Thousand Oaks, Ca: Sage.
- Stewart, R. (2004). Macropeace [Internet]. Retrieved 5 August 2004, 2004, from the World Wide Web: <http://www.peace.ca/macropeace.htm>
- Stokols, D. (1997). Conflict-prone and conflict-resistant organizations. In H. S. Friedman (Ed.), Hostility, Coping and Health (pp. 65-76). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Stoppard, J. M. (2002). Navigating the hazards of orthodoxy: Introducing a graduate course on qualitative methods into the psychology curriculum. Canadian Psychology, 43(3), 143-153.
- Strauss, A. L., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures and techniques. Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage Publications.
- Sykes, J. B. (Ed.). (1982). Concise Oxford Dictionary. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Tagg, S. K. (1985). Life story interviews and their interpretation. In M. Brenner & J. Brown & d. Canter (Eds.), The Research Interview: Uses and Approaches. New York: Academic Press.
- Tannen, D. (1998). The argument culture: Moving from debate to dialogue. New York: Randon House.
- Taylor, C. (1992). The ethics of authenticity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Tedeschi, J. T. (1983). Social influence theory and aggression. In R. I. Geen & E. I. Donnerstein (Eds.), Aggression: Theoretical and Empirical Reviews (Vol. 1, pp. 135-162). New York: Academic Press.
- Tedeschi, J. T., & Felson, R. B. (1994). Violence, aggression & coercive actions. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

- Terry, W. (1985). Bloods: An oral history of the Viet Nam war. New York: Ballantine.
- Tesch, R. (1990). Qualitative research: Analysis types and software tools. London, England: Falmer.
- Thomas, K. W., & Kilman, R. H. (1974). Thomas-Kilman conflict mode instrument. Tuxedo, NY: Xicom.
- Tobin, Y. (1989). From sign to text: A semiotic view of communication. Amsterdam: J. Benjamins.
- Toch, H. (1997). Violent men: An inquiry into the psychology of violence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Toh, S.-H. (2001). Address by Mr. Toh Swee-Hin Laureate of the UNESCO prize for Peace Education 2000, Paris, FR.
- Toh, S.-H. (2002). Building a culture of peace (pp. 1-9). Edmonton, AB: Unpublished Manuscript.
- Toner, J. H. (2000). Morals under the gun: The cardinal virtues, military ethics, and American society. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
- Toulmin, S. E. (1999). The uses of argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Toynbee, A. J. (1950). War and civilization. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Triandis, H. C. (1995). Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Trice, H. M., & Beyer, J. M. (1993). The cultures of work organizations. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Trittle, L. A. (2000). From Melos to My Lai: War and survival. London, UK: Routledge.
- Tuhiwai-Smith, L. (2001). Decolonizing methodologies: Research and indigenous people. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Turpin, J., & Kurtz, L. R. (1997a). Violence -- the micro/macro link. In J. Turpin & L. R. Kurtz (Eds.), The Web of Violence: From Interpersonal to Global (pp. 1-28). Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- Turpin, J., & Kurtz, L. R. (Eds.). (1997b). The web of violence: From interpersonal to global. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
- UNESCO Executive Board Document 140 EX/28, Cooperation to Promote a Culture of Peace, Paris, 14 August 1992. Retrieved from <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/history/page39.html>.
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/53/370, (2 September 1998). Retrieved from <http://www.culture-of-peace.info/annexes/resA-53-370/coverpage.html>.
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/53/243, (6 October 1999).
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/55/377, (12 September 2000).
- van den Hoonaard, W. C. (1997). Working with sensitive concepts (Vol. 41). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- van der Kolk, B. A., McFarlane, A. C., & Weisaeth, L. (Eds.). (1996). Traumatic stress: The effects of overwhelming experience on mind, body, and society. New York: Guilford Press.
- Van Mannen, J. (1988). Tales of the field: On writing ethnography. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Vidal, M. A., Clemente, M., & Espinosa, P. (2003). Types of media violence and degree of acceptance in under-18s. Aggressive Behavior, 29(5), 381-392.

- Vogt, W. P. (1998). Dictionary of statistics & methodology. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Waddell, N. (1998). Memories of recent ethnic conflicts and their relationship to social identity. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 4(1), 13-22.
- Walker, L. E. (1999). Psychology and domestic violence around the world. American Psychologist, 54(1), 21-29.
- Walsh-Bowers, R. (2002). Constructing qualitative knowledge in psychology: Students and faculty negotiate the social context of inquiry. Canadian Psychology, 43(3), 163-178.
- Wedge, B. (1986). Psychology of the self in social conflict. In E. E. Azar & J. E. Burton (Eds.), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice (pp. 56-62). Sussex, UK: Wheatsheaf Books.
- Westen, D., & Weinberger, J. (2004). When clinical description becomes statistical prediction. American Psychologist, 59(7), 595-613.
- Williams, T. J. (2003). Strategic leader readiness and competencies for asymmetrical warfare. Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Summer 2003, 19-35.
- Wolcott, H. F. (1990). Writing up qualitative research. Newbury Park: Sage.
- Wolcott, H. F. (1994). Transforming qualitative data: Description, analysis and interpretation. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Woolman, D. C. (1985). Education and peace in the thought of Johan Galtung. Currents: Issues in Education and Human Development Education for Peace, 3(2), 7-20.
- Yin, R. K. (1994). Case study research: Design and methods (2nd Ed. ed. Vol. 5). Newbury Park: Sage Publications.
- Youmans, G. P., Paterson, P. Y., & Sommers, H. M. (Eds.). (1975). The biologic and clinical basis of infectious diseases. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company.
- Zillmann, D. (1998). Connections between sexuality and aggression (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Zukmund, W. G. (1991). Business Research Methods. Fort Worth, TX: Dryden Press.