

## CHAPTER ONE

### Introduction

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations have become a feature of conflict management processes. Despite the frequency of operations little improvement to practice has been witnessed. There have been some successes; there have been many failures. The purpose of this thesis is to examine aspects of the current UN peacekeeping model that need improvement, analyse in which ways various UN peacekeeping missions, especially during the 1990s have failed and to suggest potential improvements to the practice of peacekeeping methods which are viable and realisable in contemporary society. This will involve examining what have been the characteristics, objectives and outcomes of various missions to see what cumulative lessons have been absorbed. The goal of the peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding process is to deliver a society at peace, a society which affirms non-violence as opposed to violence – what is, in fact, a sustainable peace.

The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate how improved peacekeeping can contribute to building a culture of peace. On the basis of review of selected examples, new methods will be suggested. My objective is to project the view that the international community and particularly the peacekeeping mission involved must commit itself to working *with* the local community at a level unprecedented up to now. Such a recognition will pave the way for the role of the international community, particularly the UN, to be perceived as one of facilitation with the peacekeeping teams encouraging activism on the part of the indigenous community. My aim is to show how this new role requires a new model of peacekeeping. The implementation of this new model may not be, indeed cannot be, immediate. Its methods comprise a long term goal directed at establishing a new peacekeeping paradigm which can help to create a culture of peace in the global context. Such a daunting but rewarding enterprise requires a change in thinking on the part of the individual, the heads of governments, and the heads of our world organisation, the United Nations. However idealistic that may sound, it must be stressed that the task is both practicable and realisable. The limitation is that its realisation may take some time. While it is no quick fix solution, it presents a solution that is enduring and just.

To begin, it is necessary to ask, exactly what *is* peacekeeping. This is a crucial question. Before the context of the new system is outlined, an introduction to what peacekeeping is and has been about will be presented. The crux of this thesis hinges on determining exactly what is effective peacekeeping today which means examining what peacekeeping has been in the past, both remote and recent.

Peacekeeping is an *evolving* concept and practice developed by the UN to aid in managing the transitions from conflict to post conflict. That it has evolved is evident in the differences distinguishing first generation from second generation peacekeeping missions. First generation peacekeeping predates the end of the Cold War and consisted of maintaining ceasefires until a political negotiation could be reached. Second generation peacekeeping operations are much more complex and ambitious post Cold War missions that may involve, as well as militarily containing the conflict, implementing the settlement and rebuilding a war-torn state, politically, socially and economically.

Investigating how peacekeeping has evolved and how far the UN has been involved will provide a background into comprehending the aims and objectives of this thesis which will be subsequently discussed. Walker (1996:13) provides an interesting description of the link between control of aggression at the individual level and that at the international level:

In our human efforts to eschew war and pursue peace we cannot change the nature – the aggressive nature – of the prime elements in the international mix. There are two things we can try to do: At the level of the individual to canalise our aggressive instincts and at the international level to create systems to control them. The United Nations (UN) is of course intended to be such a system, a global one.

The first article of the UN Charter confirms that the main purpose of the UN is ‘to maintain international peace and security’. Peacekeeping has become a means through which this goal has been seen as realisable. It is a concept which was born with the creation of the UN. However, it is not specifically provided for in the Charter which makes no reference to the word. It is, in effect, a response to a variety of international conflicts which have found themselves on the UN agenda over the years where Charter provisions could not be implemented as envisaged. Despite serious shortcomings, peacekeeping has often proved an important *modus operandi* for the control and resolution of conflicts on the global scale.

Goulding (1993: 453-455) provides a useful summary on the established principles of peacekeeping operations:

- (1) They were (as already discussed) UN operations. Such operations were borne of the collective will of the international community thereby giving credibility to the mission itself.
- (2) They were set up only with the consent of the parties to the conflict in question. The continuing consent and cooperation were necessary for the success of the operation.
- (3) The peacekeepers themselves had to be impartial between the parties, advancing neither the interests of one party nor those of the other.
- (4) It was recognised that it would not be practicable for the UN to maintain a standing army. Therefore national armies and police forces would provide the troops required for UN peacekeeping operations. Thus member states were relied upon to provide the necessary personnel and equipment on a voluntary basis.
- (5) Force was only to be used to the minimum extent necessary and that normally fire should be opened only in self-defence.

Based on the above principles, Goulding (1993: 455) advances a more sophisticated definition of peacekeeping:

Peacekeeping operations are field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily by them, acting impartially between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary.

While this definition encapsulates the ethos of peacekeeping, it remains a general definition. In peacekeeping operations there have been departures from these conditions. One of the most important facets of peacekeeping that has already been stressed is that it has evolved over time separating the types of peacekeeping operations into two broad categories – what earlier has been referred to as first and second generation peacekeeping. As loosely defined above, first generation peacekeeping consisted principally of maintaining ceasefires until a political negotiation could proceed, i.e. UN troops were interposed between the conflicted opponents where there already existed a ceasefire. While this supervision of a truce was seen as an interim arrangement, it could in fact last for a very long time – an

extended peacekeeping operation may sometimes be 'the least bad option' available to the international community if the war was likely to recommence (Goulding 1993: 457).

Second generation peacekeeping largely incorporates operations since the end of the Cold War. These operations have become bolder, much more elaborate and multifaceted because of the different changes and challenges the world now faces. The conflicts are usually civil ones. Some characteristics of these new conflicts include numerous parties to a conflict, undisciplined factions, an ineffective ceasefire, the total absence of law and order, violations of human rights, opposition to UN forces, collapse of civil infrastructure and the presence of many refugees (Army Field Manual 1995). This has caused the UN to redefine the undertakings that peacekeeping involves. It may well mean trying to put a war-torn society back together. Kofi Annan (1999: 1) states:

We are now more often deployed as part of an agreed process, to help implement a fledgling political settlement. This involves us in such activities as collecting weapons, disarming and demobilising militias, supervising elections, and monitoring – sometimes even training – police forces.

The second generation peacekeeping operation is also intimately connected with 'humanitarian intervention', an intervention based on political humanitarian objectives. Tasks here include, for example, the promotion of human rights, the delivery of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance, and assistance in the development of civil and social services<sup>1</sup>. Such services are specified in the mandates of the peacekeeping operation and carried out by peacekeepers themselves as well as representatives of NGOs and aid agencies.

Having said then that the UN was intimately connected with the origins of peacekeeping, it has to be acknowledged that regional arrangements and agencies also play a part in modern peacekeeping. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as well as member countries by themselves in addition have dispatched peacekeeping teams to various conflicts around the globe. However, it is the UN that can claim to be the most detached and impartial in conflicts as well as having an expertise and capacity which has accumulated over the years.

This introduction to peacekeeping aims to acquaint the reader solely with the concept of peacekeeping which is the subject of this thesis. Additional definitions and discussions of first and second generation peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention will be given as this thesis progresses. An identification of aims and objectives will now be presented to provide the rationale for the thesis overall which will also reveal the context for reviewing theories and concepts associated with peacekeeping in its entirety.

### **Aims and Objectives of Thesis**

This thesis, through various approaches that will be outlined below, will explore the reasons for the recent failings of UN peacekeeping missions and will contribute to a growing literature on current peacekeeping processes. I am asking the question:

**‘Can there be improvements within the existing UN peacekeeping system that will ultimately contribute to a culture of peace?’**

I aim to show that the answer to this question is in the positive. I contend the model that I am going to recommend will make an important contribution to the continuing debate on how to improve peacekeeping methods: My key insight is the need to promote local indigenous involvement in peacekeeping missions. More specifically, however, this promotion will be made under the auspices of a new peacekeeping mission model, the United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC), an elite, standing all-volunteer, internationally recruited, multi-tasked, rapidly deployable peacekeeping force. The UNPC is a concept created by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg, Emeritus Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota. Linking the UNPC in with indigenous community involvement, I believe, has the potential to reaffirm the UN as the world’s foremost peacekeeping authority.

I believe too much is expected of UN peacekeepers today under present circumstances. UN peacekeeping cannot be all things to all people. It cannot solve every problem or necessarily be appropriate to all cases. Thus, I aim to show that there must come to exist a clear recognition of the role of UN peacekeeping and the role of local communities in the host country. While there is a need for the UN to develop an improved peacekeeping model to respond and be adapted to the needs of

contemporary crises, there is also a need for the UN to be seen more as a catalyst than as a panacea, *sparking* off necessary changes.

To accomplish these aims I will begin by presenting a critical review of the evolving concept of peacekeeping. It will be seen that historically peacekeeping has changed dramatically. Today there is a growing emphasis on humanitarian intervention as a reason for the instigation of peacekeeping operations bringing with it the inclusion of humanitarian objectives in peacekeeping mandates. This introduces a far greater complexity and urgency into a peacekeeping mission. An examination of six case studies from different parts of the world will confirm that the failings associated with these studies relate closely to this pursuit of humanitarian objectives. Owing to the nexus between peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention, the military form that is employed today in peacekeeping missions is no longer appropriate to accommodate the changing nature of the face of peacekeeping. I will therefore critique the concept in peacekeeping proposed by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg, the UNPC, to reveal that there are some very positive changes that this model can contribute to peacekeeping methods. Such a new form of peacekeeping shows that there is still a place for the military in the philosophy and practice of peacekeeping. However, the case studies will also disclose that something more is required and that is more civilian input at the level of local communities in the host country. How this can be achieved is a question that rests at the heart of this thesis.

Lessons drawn from the case studies underscore the realisation that with changes incorporating the mobilisation of indigenous communities in recovery actions combined with the functionality of Professor Schwartzberg's proposal, there can be improvements in UN peacekeeping missions. These changes will reinforce the recognition that the UN's primary role is that of 'facilitator'. The facilitation of indigenous activism via the mechanism of the UNPC concept would introduce a creative yet utilitarian perspective to peacekeeping. While Schwartzberg's idea is new and widely encompassing, implicating many changes both structurally and psychologically for the *organisation*, it may seem too far reaching, too unattainable, too radical and altogether too expensive. However, before committing the proposal to trial, it would be salutary to note that all new ideas are radical and some of these ideas have greatly progressed humankind throughout history. As for expense, we should

perhaps make ourselves cognisant of the penetrating and prophetic words of Schwartzberg (1997:1) himself: 'If you think peacekeeping is expensive, try anarchy.' However, becoming and remaining aware of the benefits of what Schwartzberg's concept of peacekeeping can offer, one should also ask just who are the best equipped to deal with the humanitarian challenges of a peacekeeping mission. Surely it is the communities themselves. Thus the UN is best set up to act as a *medium* which can facilitate activism on the part of local communities. What I therefore am promoting is the idea that a loosely defined partnership be conceived at the outset between the peacekeeping team and the indigenous community of the host country.

Establishing the *character* of peacekeeping therefore becomes essential to proceed with the enquiry into exactly what *is* improved peacekeeping. In order to do this, it is necessary to explore the idea of peace.

### **The Interrelationship Between Peace and Peacekeeping**

Peace can be defined as being 'positive' and 'negative' (see, for example, Harris and Lewis 1999; Galtung 1990; Swan 1997). Negative peace is simply the absence of war and is of course preferred to direct violence. Negative peace does not encompass notions of justice, equality, participation and representation. Positive peace, on the other hand includes structures which ensure some degree of political liberty and social justice. Power relations as well as cultural attitudes within community and state determine the kind of peace which exists in society. This is substantiated by Galtung (1990) who identifies violence as being direct, structural and/or cultural, a typology which is not composed of isolated elements but of elements which are interlocking. In looking at what constitutes peace then, there is a necessity to look more closely at what constitutes these three forms of violence in order to understand the factors that impede progress toward peace:

- Direct violence: The violence of aggression which results in the injury or the killing of human beings
- Structural violence: The violence of exploitation where the 'top' layer of society get more out of the structure than the 'bottom' layer. The structure which comprises political, economic, social and legal frameworks

discriminates against certain sectors of the population prohibiting equal development when compared to the rest of the population. Poverty, malnutrition and illness are examples of results of structural violence.

- Cultural violence: Violence where the values adopted by a culture and held to be universal truths are used against that portion of a society which does not conform to such values. 'Culture' thus can legitimise the ill treatment of those who are different eg in the idea of a 'master race' or a 'chosen people'.

The three concepts of violence, while forming a triangulation of interactions, possess different time relations: Direct violence is an event; structural violence is a process; cultural violence is a 'permanence' (Galtung 1990:292-294). There is therefore, metaphorically, a complex edifice to the concept of violence. Peace is about attempting to dismantle this entire edifice, the *less visible* forms (structural and cultural) in addition to the *visible* forms (direct). This is a very challenging task. The most difficult form of violence to address is the cultural - it can be defended by the offending society as 'sacred' territory and hence is considered inaccessible to an outside force – yet it is the cultural that can legitimise the direct and structural!

What does this mean for peacekeeping? It means that some conflicts may be extremely difficult to address if the roots of that conflict lie in cultural violence. So a peacekeeping team may have to accept that there are limitations with which they have to work and that peacekeeping itself can be an demanding challenge. Nevertheless, it needs to be understood that peace is not just about overcoming the adversary but the re-establishment of a political, social and economic stability which may not be the same model as before the conflict, for as Spence (1999) argues, replicating the pre war conditions will likely reproduce the inequities that may have precipitated the conflict. Peace demands, therefore, the elimination of structural violence which contributed to the physical violence in the first place. In terms of my view for improved peacekeeping then, peacekeeping's objective is to ultimately deliver positive peace as opposed to simply the absence of conflict. It is my contention and my aim to show that this requires a versatile peacekeeping force capable of dealing more directly and more effectively with local communities.

All peace processes have been in recent tradition often seen as part of a continuum towards positive and sustainable peace: The terms 'preventive



diplomacy', 'peacemaking', 'peacekeeping' and 'peacebuilding' are all integrally related and often seen as proceeding along the continuum from a conflict arising to the restoration of peace after conflict has been resolved. A basic tenet of this thesis is that the sequence of these events is not linear. A particular discipline may be required at different times during a conflict or even at the same time as another. For example, peacekeeping and peacebuilding can be very much mutually supportive. This challenges the very concept of a continuum. There is no doubt, however, that these disciplines interact and reinforce one another and hence are important to define.

While 'preventive diplomacy' is seen by Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1995) as resolving tensions before they result in conflict, peacemaking represents attempts to stop the conflict and recreate government. It is a diplomatic and political endeavour to apply strategic efforts through mediation and negotiation so that the conflict will be arrested or at least prevented from escalating.

Peacekeeping, as earlier discussed, is an attempt to halt the violence of a conflict through military intervention by using a non-violent ethic as far as is possible as opposed to an enforcement action. Thus, briefly speaking, peacekeeping is the endeavour to bring hostile parties to agreement preferably through peaceful means. However, this will sometimes necessitate the application of military *force*. A distinction needs to be clearly made between peacekeeping and peace enforcement as both have different conceptual frameworks. Peace enforcement is the use of aggressive military force if peaceful means fail in a situation. It is provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. For example, in the situation between Iraq and Kuwait, the Council chose to authorise Member States to take measures on its behalf and these involved a military attack on Iraq. Thus peace enforcement was used in this situation.

Peacebuilding is the peaceful political and socio-economic reconstruction of the country. Peacebuilding works to prevent a recurrence of conflict – a reconstruction on all fronts, political, social, economic, and humanitarian so that peace will endure. The peacebuilder's objective is thus to create peaceful social change after conflict (Harbottle 1980: 120-121). While this thesis will be primarily concerned with peacekeeping, the interactive nature of the terms, preventive

diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding must be stressed and references will be made throughout the thesis to all these concepts.

Thus it must be understood that peacekeeping is not a basic concept. It is a multi-faceted one. In terms of how I intend arguing for improved peacekeeping I present my methodology below.

### **Methodology**

This thesis does not adopt what Kellehear (1993:19-23) terms either a hypothetico-deductive approach or an ethnographic-inductive approach. It is located in between these two extremes. My ultimate intention is to find an improved peacekeeping model. In order to realise this, a series of case studies will be analysed to determine the failings of the current peacekeeping system. Using the theoretical implications of what I discover, I will then suggest what I consider to be the most suitable model, analyse it to find if it possesses failings and then posit an enhancement of the model so as to meet the challenges of contemporary peacekeeping.

The theme that reverberates through the entire thesis is that the changing nature of world conflict can only be addressed by a peacekeeping practice that evolves as well. Part I therefore comprises a critical appraisal based on the evolving concepts of peacekeeping. This appraisal shows how the post Cold War shift in conflict has fostered the evolution of peacekeeping practices from First Generation to Second Generation. This provides the background and demonstrates the need for a further progression in the advancement of peacekeeping methods as a response to how world values may change as well as the nature of conflict itself. For example, the diminishing status of national sovereignty, resulting from a change in world opinion, is forging more consensus in the United Nations for the authorisation of humanitarian intervention operations, operations which address conflicts usually where massive human rights abuse has taken place. New conflict agendas require new methods to address them. Thus the evolving concept drives the search for an improved peacekeeping paradigm.

The six case studies on Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor form the data of this thesis. I have chosen to analyse these six in detail as they offer different perspectives on peacekeeping operations. This representative sample enables me to study a small number of units in place of all second generation peacekeeping operations, completed and current, i.e. they supply data that informs different aspects of peacekeeping operations per se. The six case studies therefore form the core of the research enterprise: An analysis of each will reveal successes but more importantly, the failings of these United Nations peacekeeping missions. Compiling data from these failings will allow further analysis to be made which will facilitate the formulation of theoretical propositions performed in Part III. Researching the case studies represents Part II of the thesis.

In Part III, data from the case studies is tabulated to present the specific causes of failings for each mission. From this tabulation the underlying causes of the failings are then extracted and grouped. This reveals the errors that are consistently being made in UN peacekeeping operations. The theoretical implications of this analysis form a basis from which to predict what could be a suitable improved model. The model chosen, Professor Joseph Schwartzberg's United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC), is then subject to an analysis to disclose its merits and shortcomings. While this model is seen to possess high credibility, a significant shortcoming consists of an inability of the UNPC to sufficiently facilitate indigenous activism. A literature review is then applied to address the nature of the military in peacekeeping activities, the results of which lead me to posit that more civilian input is required in UN peacekeeping. I conclude by proposing the enhancement of Professor Schwartzberg's UNPC with the addition of a civilian corps to the military corps, both under military command. It is then demonstrated through the description of the peacekeeping mission in Mozambique and the peacemonitoring mission in Bougainville that military/civilian cooperation is a workable reality.

An intrinsic component of the methodology in Part III is a dialogue with the architect of the improved peacekeeping model, Professor Joseph Schwartzberg<sup>ii</sup>. Contact was made with Professor Schwartzberg who readily agreed to engage in a dialogue regarding his concept on the United Nations Peace Corps and on related peacekeeping issues. Ethics approval was subsequently obtained for this process.

The bulk of the dialogue was conducted by email. With regard to the interview's execution, it is semi-structured in that while I have kept control over the questioning process by fielding questions to Professor Schwartzberg in the areas and direction I chose, I have allowed him to elaborate and digress where he considered necessary. Thus, personal interest in the issues for discussion has been expressed by both interviewer and interviewee in the dialogue. The interview was used to expand and clarify Professor Schwartzberg's views on topics related to both his improved model for peacekeeping published in the journal article *A New Perspective on Peacekeeping: Lessons from Bosnia and Elsewhere (1997)* and also peacekeeping in general.

Sources used in this thesis have included books, journals, United Nations citations such as the *Dayton Peace Agreement* and computer generated documentation from the internet. The latter has been used chiefly with regard to the case studies as little information has been published on the more recent UN peacekeeping missions. There are four appendixes: Sections from the United Nations Charter, Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the Interview with Professor Joseph Schwartzberg and the Abstract of a paper delivered on the 'United Nations Administrative Academy' by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg.

The methodology thus takes on a multi-method, interdisciplinary approach. Literature reviews, case studies, compilation of data and analysis are used concomitant with an interview with the designer of the peacekeeping model chosen to exemplify improved peacekeeping. In enhancing the UNPC model, I have used further analysis and literature reviews in turn. Generally speaking, the disciplines of history, politics, sociology and psychology are brought to bear on analysing the topic as a whole entity.

### **Thesis Overview**

Part One Chapter Two will constitute a critical appraisal on the history of the evolving concept of peacekeeping. This will show that peacekeeping has indeed evolved: With this evolution must come new approaches to peacekeeping to accommodate the changing conditions. This calls for reassessment of existing methods. One major factor effecting differences in the type of peacekeeping today has been the inclusion of humanitarian interventions in peacekeeping missions. Humanitarian interventions

have multi-dimensional, comprehensive mandates. Thus this kind of mission will be examined quite closely to monitor the impact that the mandate has on the outcome of the mission. This connects with my search for improved peacekeeping which is to ensure a *sustainable* peace where ongoing cycles of violence are broken. Hence it is necessary to see, in the chapter, how peacekeeping has evolved and its current status in order later to explore its shortcomings and to posit improvements within the system.

Part Two Chapter Three will present three case studies on Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda. An analysis of these case studies will review the reasons for failure as highlighted in Chapter Two, illustrating the historical background to the conflict, the mandate, and specific failures in the mission. This grouping represents Case Studies I.

Part Two Chapter Four will present two case studies on Bosnia and Kosovo in the Former Yugoslavia. As in Chapter Three, again the failures will be reviewed and the reasons for these discussed. This grouping, representing Case Studies II, embodies more complex mandates than Group I.

Part Two Chapter Five will present a case study on East Timor representing Case Studies III, the most highly complex humanitarian intervention to date. Even though peacekeeping operations in East Timor represent a marked shift from military to military/civilian engagement, it will demonstrate that they failed in basic peacebuilding endeavours. Failures again will be noted and it will be seen how in a humanitarian intervention of this nature, the lack of indigenous participation in the recovery process is perhaps the most basic essential for sustained peace. This is a most important and useful discovery with implications for improving peacekeeping methods.

Part Three Chapter Six analyses the data obtained in the case studies and presents it in two tables: Table 1 looks at specific failures while Table 2 looks at the underlying reasons for these failures. Examination of this information will allow me to posit improved peacekeeping methods - a critique of Professor Joseph Schwartzberg's proposal will be carried out for an elite, cost-effective UN Peace Corps (UNPC) to find if it could empower the UN and improve peacekeeping methods by setting the stage for sustainable peace.

Part Three Chapter Seven will comprise a response to the shortcomings of the UNPC model. The question will be posed, 'Is military input enough in peacekeeping

missions?' The issue of civilian input will be explored particularly in the context of indigenous populations in host countries. The ideas of incorporating civilian contingents within the UNPC and creating loose partnerships between UNPC personnel and representatives of the local people will be posited.

Chapter Eight, the final chapter, will contain my conclusions and recommendations for improvements to the current UN approach to the discharge of its peacekeeping responsibilities.

### **Summary**

This chapter has identified the main research question that will be explored in the later chapters. It has also discussed the principal operational definitions as well as presenting the methodology that will be employed in the thesis which attempts to specify improved methods of peacekeeping. The following chapter is a critical appraisal of the evolution of peacekeeping. This is necessary to expose exactly what peacekeepers face in contemporary second generation missions and the links between peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in the increasingly frequent humanitarian intervention missions of today which the case studies, later in the thesis, will demonstrate.

## CHAPTER TWO

### **History of the Evolving Concept of Peacekeeping**

This chapter constitutes a critical appraisal of the evolving concept of peacekeeping. The context against which this evolution occurs will be discussed after which the characteristics of traditional or first generation peacekeeping will be presented. The innovative features of post Cold War second generation peacekeeping, the early years until 1991 followed by the contemporary years, 1991 to the present will then be discussed. The chief evolving features of this progression will be explored. The increased challenging of national sovereignty will be examined leading to a discussion of the development of the peacekeeping/humanitarian intervention nexus. Despite the evolution of the *forms of conflict* undertaken by peacekeepers since the early days of the Cold War and the *expansions* of mandates, the *forms of UN forces* have remained the same. This chapter ends by asking if it is not time that we saw some structural evolution also. It is now pertinent to ask against what background today's peacekeeping prevails and why has peacekeeping become so fundamental to the needs of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **Context and Significance of the Problem**

The world is experiencing radical political, social and economic upheaval. The aftermath of two world wars and a Cold War has unleashed a new set of dynamics. At the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the need for peacekeeping eclipses all previous periods in history: Profound socio-political changes are tearing apart the ethnic, racial and religious fabric within many nations which is creating the need for increased and more far reaching peacekeeping missions. Sallehuddin Abdullah (1996) argues forces at work in the global arena are causing the old international system to evolve into a new configuration. Events deriving from these forces include the end of the Cold War in 1989 signifying the collapse of the bipolar alignment between the United States of America (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the spread of democracy, challenges to state and sovereignty and the gathering momentum of the global economy. Our world is in transition, in turbulent transformation. A growing number of writers (see, for example, Weiss 1995; Last 1997; Featherston 1994) contend that post Cold War struggles for national identity have resulted in ethnic, religious and political disintegration in many nation

states. We are not yet in a successor system to the Cold War paradigm. As Rasmussen (1997:45) says, we are 'between paradigms'. As faultlines are created by the opposing forces of nationalism and globalisation challenging the concept of the nation-state and causing smaller ethnic entities to splinter from the main state, such as in the Former Yugoslavia and arguably in Indonesia, new types of warfare are being waged. For instance, Rasmussen (1997) contends that contemporary conflict has seen, since the end of the Cold War a rise in small-scale warfare between groups and a decline in interstate confrontations.

While this may not seem alarming at first sight, it is very disturbing when it is realised that most of the casualties are civilians. In conflicts today, 90 per cent of casualties are civilians while a high proportion of combatants are children as compared with World War One statistics when 90 per cent of all victims were soldiers. (UNRISD 1995:110). In addition, local disputes, owing to their ethnic or religious character, can spread beyond national borders as in the Former Yugoslavia and ultimately pose a threat to global security. These factors combined with the increasing number of intra-state disputes can be construed as the principal reasons why peacekeeping operations have become so prevalent so early in this new century and in the last decades of the previous century.

As indicated already, peacekeeping has been an important component of UN responsibility. This organisation, Durch (1997a:1) explains, intended to provide 'global collective security'. The UN was established on 24 October 1945 by 51 nations and today nearly every nation in the world belongs to it, a testament to its viability and necessity in the modern world (<http://www.un.org/Overview/brief.htm> 2000: accessed 6 September 2000). During the Cold War, the UN was prevented from fulfilling its primary commitment to the people of the world, of maintaining peace, because of a world divided into two hostile blocs; one led by the USA and the other led by the USSR. Still, while carving out a more modest traditional peacekeeping role, the UN, while not freeing the world from war, did conduct some peacekeeping campaigns with modest successes and prevented many wars from dangerously escalating. The history of the evolving concepts of peacekeeping begins with examining traditional peacekeeping.



### Traditional Peacekeeping

In order to promote the understanding of traditional peacekeeping it is necessary to touch on the founding of the United Nations Charter. Fetherston (1994:8-10) notes that after World War II, it was the 'victorious' nations which set up the UN Charter and the greatest among those which decided upon the power structures of the UN. From the very outset of the UN's history, it was recognised that the Organisation could operate effectively only if its dominant members, the five permanent members of the Security Council, could act in concert: This was structured in the form of both the veto and permanent membership, given to the five states, the United Kingdom (UK), France, China, the USA and the USSR, that had *cooperated* together to defeat fascism (Falk 1995).

These great 'power framers' gave their attention to enforcement and dealing with the *immediate* causes of disputes at the expense of the *underlying* causes of conflict which resulted in the Security Council functioning in a crisis management mode than in a conflict resolution mode, i.e. a peaceful *status quo* was the object of traditional peacekeeping (Fetherston 1994). However, the great East-West conflict that was to come, polarised relations in the Security Council and grossly impaired collective security machinery for crisis management. With the "West" backing one side and the "East" thereby automatically backing the other, the Security Council became ineffectual. A situation was created whereby the Security Council could not take appropriate action in times of severe international crisis as was intended by the mechanism of the Charter (Fetherston 1994:12). As a result, traditional peacekeeping served primarily US and Soviet desires to avoid direct confrontation in regions of tension (Durch 1997a). The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report – Para 17) (2000: accessed 8 October 2000) also argues that traditional peacekeeping treated the symptoms rather than the sources of conflicts. As a result they had no 'built-in exit strategy' and associated peacemaking was usually slow to progress. Traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for varying extended periods of time lasting up to 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle-East, and India/Pakistan). Although they are relatively low cost as compared with contemporary complex operations, they remain essentially a ceasefire accord which *does not* result in a durable and lasting peace settlement (The Report of the Panel on

United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report – Para 17) (2000: accessed 8 October 2000).

Hill & Malik (1996:14-18) present an interesting perspective on traditional peacekeeping. They claim peacekeeping does not appear anywhere in the UN Charter and while its origins date to the Cold War, it was a substitute for collective security and in response to the stalemate that perennially existed between the Permanent Members of the Security Council – it was used to prevent the two superpowers being involved in localised disputes. Peacekeeping, therefore emerged in response to the *lack* of Great Power co-operation and while it did not deliver total peace, it was a primary tool used to bring some semblance of order to the international system. Thus traditional peacekeeping became second best to the idealism of Great Power unity. The weakness of the Security Council's ability to mediate disputes during crises resulted in the Security Council overlooking long-term solutions for short-term gain in the form of signed ceasefires. This failure is clearly demonstrated in the number of long-standing disputes such as those, already mentioned, in the Middle East, Cyprus and India/Pakistan. For example, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) in the Middle East has been running for over 46 years while the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has endured 31 years.

In *operational* terms, traditional peacekeeping involved inter-positioning of UN troops between warring parties where a ceasefire was already in existence. Peacekeeping therefore entailed 'ceasefire monitoring, surveillance and conflict prevention'. The command was totally UN based whilst the UN member states bore the costs of the operation. These operations were characterised by the three key principles of 'consent, impartiality and minimum force' (Slim 1995:6). The principle of consent implied that both parties in conflict sanctioned or gave approval to the peacekeeping operation and that this consent was an underlying necessity to the continuance of the operation. The principle of impartiality meant that neither party's interests were advanced above the other in the peacekeeping arrangements. The principle of minimum force allowed for force to be used to the minimum extent, normally in self-defence only.

The end of the Cold War brought a change to traditional peacekeeping. The shift in conflict from inter-state to intra-state has resulted in a clear evolutionary progression from first generation traditional peacekeeping to contemporary second generation peacekeeping. This impacts heavily on my search for improved peacekeeping methods. New conditions have demanded a new kind of mission, one that comprises much more complex and multi-tasked operations. In examining second generation peacekeeping, there is also clearly an evolutionary link between the early years (1988-1991) and after. These two periods will now be considered in the light of exactly what changes have taken place in peacekeeping missions and what this ultimately means for improved peacekeeping. But first, it is important to discuss the nature of UN peacekeeping forces.

### **The Nature of Contemporary UN Forces**

Vogel (1996:5) draws attention to the fact that the UN does not have any military capabilities of its own and military intervention has to be carried out by either UN troops provided by individual member countries 'which poses serious practical problems' or by regional subcontractors (such as the French in Rwanda, the Russians in Georgia or NATO in Bosnia [and Kosovo]). These two approaches are beset with the same problems. Governments tend to regard their troops as instruments of their foreign policy, irrespective of the fact that they are operating under UN command. This case was illustrated in Bosnia where UN command carried a definite distinction to UN authorisation: On two occasions the NATO general secretary, declaring that NATO was not a 'sub-contractor' of the UN, enforced heavy weapon exclusion zones without any Security Council authorisation. Vogel (1996), however, sees no alternative to the UN system of humanitarian assistance and intervention: Multilateral action or at least unilateral action authorised by the Security Council is necessary to ensure basic humanitarian aims.

Rapid, effective deployment has been a key to the success of peacekeeping missions in the past. It will be seen that it is even more so today in preventing missions based on humanitarian interventions from escalating out of control. It is paradoxical, therefore, that delays in launching a UN response at present have increased to months (Urquhart and Heisbourg 1998). Response time is a crucial element in the strategy of a mission – there is a relationship between effectiveness of

peacekeeping forces and time lapse before troops deploy. It is therefore imperative to find means to minimise this time lapse.

Another central feature of the UN peacekeeping system is that it is a predominantly a military one – there are few civilians. With UN contingents being composed of member nations' troops, there is a warrior ethos pervading the entire UN peacekeeping force, a warrior ethos that provides an offensive mechanism. This runs counter to peacekeeping which requires a deterrent approach through conflict management. Can these two methodologies be reconciled? Surely a different form of training is going to be required.

The nature of UN forces has therefore consisted and consists today, of predominantly military contingents belonging to different member nations which pose problems for the UN to access and which results in delays in responding to a crisis. The military composition and nature of the peacekeeping force can itself compromise the preventative rationale that is the objective in peacekeeping operations.

### **Second Generation Peacekeeping: The Early Years (1988-1991)**

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:89-90) at the beginning of what looked to be a promising new decade for United Nations Peacekeeping, claimed that the new era had brought 'new credibility' to the UN as the end of the Cold War had led to an impressive expansion in the demand for peacekeeping support. The second half of the 1980s had brought requests for new peacekeeping missions in the Persian Gulf, Southern Africa, South Asia, and Central America. The first major mission to be undertaken by the UN in the post Cold War period was the decolonisation of South West Africa into the independent state of Namibia. In what was to become Namibia, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), 1989-1990, was given three main objectives: to monitor democratic elections, to monitor the actions of the South West African Police and to monitor the ceasefire. The monitoring of elections, especially, represented a new direction in peacekeeping giving to the *concept* of peacekeeping a new complexity. The first three years of post Cold War peacekeeping (1989-1991) were an 'unqualified success' (Hill and Malik 1996:65). Before the end of 1991 the UN had established ten new peacekeeping operations over various parts of the world. The growing sophistication and magnitude of these mandates were

becoming much more visible with each mission, however. While this should have provided an early warning to UN planners that the existing strategies on which peacekeeping were based required review, it failed to do so.

One of the major confrontations to which the UN significantly contributed during this period in a peace enforcement capacity, was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent Gulf War: Operation Desert Storm, consisting of troops from 28 countries acted on the authorisation of the Security Council under US command forcing out the Iraqi occupation from Kuwait on 27 February 1991. Walker (1996:16) emphasises that Iraq's action was not a partial take-over, a raid or a temporary invasion: It was a 'total take-over'. World Order as envisioned by the international community made it possible for an international coalition to be forged to remove the Iraqi presence from Kuwait. Peace enforcement under Chapter VII of the Charter – UNSCR 678 – authorised 'all necessary means' to compel Iraq to leave Kuwait. Walker (1996:16) contends that because the international response was so decisive, its success was accompanied by talk of a 'New World Order'. The UN's role in this action was pivotal allowing for the co-ordination of international action, illustrating the potential efficacy of the global organisation and confirming that the UN does have a vital function to fulfil in global conflict. The Iraqi-Kuwait conflict was an *interstate* one, however, and with *intra-state* conflicts becoming, by comparison, much more prevalent, the ramifications were that the UN had to begin to think in different terms to sustain its effectiveness in this evolutionary process.

Huldt (1995: 103) claims that with the operations launched between 1988 and 1991, the UN system was 'now said to work as it had been intended to, with a Security Council acting in unity and with purpose'. Gone was the superpower stalemate which curtailed effective and lasting conflict resolution of major discords. Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:89) stated: 'Together the international community and the U.N. Secretariat need to seize this extraordinary opportunity to expand, adapt and reinvigorate the work of the United Nations so that the lofty goals as originally envisioned by the charter can begin to be realised.' However, the rapid expansion of these early post Cold War years was to seriously compromise the success of future UN peacekeeping missions. The UN hadn't planned ahead despite the early warnings. UN resources for planning, deploying and maintaining operations in the

field were completely inadequate for the number, size and especially the complexity of the operations which the UN initiated in response to the calls from the international community ( Hill and Malik 1996). Consequently, the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s were beset with difficulties. Attention had not been given to the evolving nature of peacekeeping and what this meant for the model that peacekeeping missions were based upon. In order to propose an improved peacekeeping system, it is essential to know the inadequacies of the present one. It is therefore now pertinent to discuss how peacekeeping has evolved in the contemporary years and its shortcomings in addressing modern conflicts.

### **Second Generation Peacekeeping: The Contemporary Years (1991- 2001)**

Today's UN forces are trying to do much more than they have ever done before usually in much more difficult circumstances.

Slim (1995:5)

The above quotation captures the ethos of the contemporary years of second generation peacekeeping. These new missions, increasingly described as 'complex emergencies' represent a major new player in today's peacekeeping operations – 'a large new kid on the block' (Slim 1995: 2). Second generation peacekeeping may involve attempts to *rebuild* a war-torn society in its entirety with the peacekeeping team helping the parties implement the comprehensive settlement that was negotiated. This represents a series of tasks of staggering ambition. The negotiated settlements involve both military and civilian matters relating to an unprecedented range of functions:

[These functions encompass] the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilisation of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programs; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect of human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organisation and conduct of elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995:11)

The conflicts that this type of peacekeeping addresses have many common features:

- They are often rooted in tensions between factions, clans, ethnies or other groups for political power rather than ideology.
- They are usually fought between hostile groups of armed civilians and not armies.
- The combatants may pursue a scorched earth policy.

- The combatants use light weapons and landmines rather than heavy artillery.
- The media may influence the agenda of confrontation.
- Hostilities create large numbers of refugees.
- The co-existence of war and peace is prolonged – there is often lack of a clear resolution.

(UNRISD 1995:110-113)

What is new is that such conflicts are no longer left to continue unaddressed. While it is feared that they may involve neighbouring states, there is often international consensus, based on moral grounds, to act to ameliorate the situation. There is also, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, capacity, for the UN to address these destructive struggles. These sorts of conflicts have created second generation peacekeeping which means *in addition* to militarised tasks such as demobilising militias and maintaining ceasefires, the peacekeeping team *oftentimes* engages in socio-economic and political reconstruction as well, frequently in dangerous conditions. Moore (1996:3), although not labelling it as such, captures the essence of a highly developed second generation peacekeeping mission in the following account:

Renovating pitifully damaged clinics, schools, roads, irrigation canals and markets, stimulating income-generation and employment opportunities, and bolstering the renewal of local administration and the building of civil society, usually with weak governments and an extremely thin capacity to absorb outside assistance might well appear to be a foolhardy acceptance of large responsibilities against long odds.

Thus second generation peacekeeping has been expanded to encompass an entirely new set of peacekeeping initiatives.

This new interventionist period has posed a great challenge to UN agencies as well as UN military forces and members of the UN Security Council who have made the difficult decisions of engagement (Slim 1995). One of the biggest hurdles that has been overcome is the principle of national sovereignty. Broadly speaking it is a doctrine of non-intervention in the affairs of states. National sovereignty once stood as the cornerstone of the UN Charter. Dallmeyer (1995:21) relates this fact to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 which divided the powers of church and state and gave to the nation state (virtually) the power once reserved for the church, sovereign equality eventually becoming incorporated into the UN Charter as Article 2(7)<sup>iii</sup>. Challenges to national sovereignty, however, have come to characterise post Cold

War peacekeeping. No longer is national sovereignty regarded as the sacrosanct principle it used to be.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992:99), for example, claims that 'a major intellectual requirement of our time is to rethink the question of sovereignty' and proposes the idea that more important than national sovereignty is the idea of 'universal sovereignty' which resides in all people everywhere in the world. That the international community has the right to checkmate national sovereignty is also espoused by Gilberg (1999:10) who cites Kosovo as an example. In Kosovo, a number of major powers were willing to go to war in order to uphold humanitarian values against what were considered criminal activities being carried out by one faction of the population against another. This was being done under the umbrella of the sacred principle of national sovereignty. (Although the situation in Kosovo was a contentious one, the principle still applies.) Similarly Featherston (1994:4,10) speaks of the 'erosion of the principle of sovereignty' upon which the UN charter was founded as symptomatic of a system which has been forced to adapt to changes unforeseen by the Charter's founders. Sovereignty which has underpinned the UN Charter and interstate relations can be called 'a fiction of sorts' created ostensibly to protect weaker states from the powerful but actually serving autocratic governments to ward off intrusion in their internal domestic repression (Weiss 1995: 5). Claims of sovereignty in the face of international peacekeeping plans, originate from fears by 'entrenched elites' in target states (Ratner 1995: 35). However, like the attitudes toward slavery and colonialism in other epochs, international attitudes have changed and decision-makers are now increasingly likely to intervene in another state's affairs when that state does not give sufficient protection to its citizens. One of the first noteworthy examples in the previous decade was the, already discussed, UN's stance over the Iraqi offensive against Kuwait where the world organisation became the centre for decision-making to address Iraqi aggression and to dictate the terms of peace (Weiss 1995).

However, there is far from a complete consensus over breaking the sovereignty principle for what could be termed seriously valid reasons and the issue still retains much controversy. For example, Weinrod (93: 3) asks, 'Is the urge to alleviate the conscience sufficient rationale to support the unprecedented extension of



UN authority to actually intervene militarily inside a sovereign nation?' There is a need to recognise the danger of precedence and devise a method of identifying the cases where such intervention can be applied. In broad terms, Weinrod (93: 3) opposes its use:

In general, the United States ought to proceed cautiously in cases where UN action might undermine the system of state sovereignty, which traces its modern roots to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. While the system has its flaws, and may further evolve over time, it continues to serve the interests of the United States and freedom.

Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has also argued that the doctrine of national sovereignty must prevail in interstate relations:

...interference can only occur with the consent of the state concerned ... we do not deny that the United Nations has the right and duty to help suffering humanity. But we remain extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last defence against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision-making process of the Security Council ...

Walker (1999: <http://www.crimesofwar.org/essays/huminvessay.html>)

While there does still exist today tensions within peacekeeping agendas on the right to challenge the principle of sovereignty, what must be examined is why the frequency of these challenges has increased so sharply. The answer to such a question possesses important implications in the search for improved peacekeeping methods as both new opportunities and new problems for peacekeeping have been created. What interests are these then that are so contentious that they continue to override national sovereignty? They are humanitarian interests and the involvements are called 'humanitarian interventions'.

### Humanitarian Intervention

Peacekeeping operations that include humanitarian interventions, aimed as they are at assisting communities to recover from the effects of conflict and secure a more stable peace, are a new type of second generation peace operation that violates local sovereignty. By finding that a threat may breach international peace and security, the Security Council overrules the Charter's prohibition on the domestic jurisdiction of a state. The US and UN led operations in Somalia, the UN operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the US led Operation "Provide Comfort" in northern Iraq were all examples of peacekeeping operations combined with humanitarian intervention (Durch 1997a). Ratner (1995) also lists the missions in Namibia, Haiti,

Nicaragua, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique as combined humanitarian interventions.

Humanitarian intervention can be complex because of the presence of national, international and non-governmental relief groups who may have been on the scene before the intervention of the UN. There then needs to be co-operative interaction between all the agencies if meaningful conflict resolution is to occur (Durch 1997a). Mills (1997) differentiates between humanitarian access and humanitarian intervention stressing that access provides humanitarian aid to a needy population through agencies and organisations, usually requiring no military operation. Access is unable to address larger political issues while the agencies providing aid must observe neutrality, i.e. they must not side with or against the government or other parties involved in a conflict. Vogel (1996:5) quotes Dowty and Loescher regarding how humanitarian access to political crises can undermine the efforts to solve the underlying problems: 'Charity alone often helps to perpetuate the injustice that caused the refugee flight, since it relieves the sending country of pressure to correct the injustice.' Humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, usually involves wider political and military issues and the criteria under which it may be contemplated are much more restrictive than in the case of humanitarian access: An overriding humanitarian motive must be present such as widespread gross violations of human rights such as, for example, genocide (Mills 1997).

Humanitarian interventions are thus politically sensitive and complex, usually involving a wide mandate which aims for democratisation of the existing political regime if the regime in question was of an authoritarian nature as for example, in Cambodia and East Timor. Tasks that peacekeepers may perform include:

- Organising and conducting an election
- Establishing an effective administration
- Rebuilding infrastructure
- Assisting in the development of civil and social services
- Ensuring the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance
- Supporting capacity-building for self-government
- Assisting in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development

- Promoting human rights
- Facilitating a democratic political process

It is not hard to appreciate that these new tasks involve an innovative range of expertise compared with the more traditional tasks that characterise first generation peacekeeping and even some second generation peacekeeping. The majority are in fact peacebuilding tasks. In addition, in the delicate and sensitive political atmospheres of say Cambodia or Bosnia, for example, at the time of the peacekeeping missions, the peacekeepers would by necessity have to attend to serious peacemaking concerns. Thus peacekeeping today, when it involves humanitarian intervention, is inextricably linked with peacemaking and peacebuilding, and often with relief, development and rehabilitation.

In cases where intervention is a possibility, states are not the final arbiters of rights. Mills (1997) reconceptualizes sovereignty to include human rights where states or the international community simply cannot ignore abuses. Thus through legal legitimacy and morality is humanitarian intervention justified. International intervention can be divided into unilateral, regional and global humanitarian intervention. The compelling argument against unilateral intervention (according to Mills) is that states always act in their own interest, any action and interest to another state being subordinated to the acting state's interest. India's invasion of East Pakistan in 1971 in response to the slaughter by the West Pakistan Army and Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1979 to overthrow Idi Amin's brutal regime are two examples of unilateral action (Mills 1997). While these two examples appear to provide best scenario cases for only humanitarian motives, in the case of India's invasion, it gave India the opportunity to decrease its rival's power. The same could be said of Tanzania and Uganda – there had been long-standing animosity between Uganda and Tanzania which Tanzania sought to address (Mills 1997). Thus Mills' claim that the inability of states to act with purely humanitarian motives appears to have a well substantiated base and should continue to be regarded internationally as illegitimate.

Regional humanitarian intervention would include action by organisations such as the Organisation of American States (OAS) or the Organisation of African

Unity (OAU). While regional collective action may have a more 'true expression' of community than a global organisation, most regional organisations do not have the institutional capacity to take effective action, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) being a major exception, however, and one which will be further discussed later in this thesis.

This leaves the global organisation, the UN, affirming the basic principle of non-intervention but also affirming the protection of human rights as a goal (Mills 1997). Thus it is at the global level, the UN directly, that this thesis targets. How can peacekeeping methods be improved taking into account that the composition of second generation peacekeeping operations include humanitarian interventions which means overriding national sovereignty? Challenging national sovereignty means invoking the displeasure of the host government. This in turn means that peacekeepers are in a hostile environment. What is required is a consensus in the international community for being in the "host" country and the UN, our global organisation, to be its representatives. Johansen (1990: 55) contends that multilateral peacekeeping under UN auspices, although no panacea is more successful than unilateral and regional action to resolve military conflicts, because unilateral acts lack legitimacy. Peacekeeping works best because it is believed to be impartial and implements rules established by the world community - rules interpreted by the UN which, although imperfect, do symbolically represent the human community (Johansen 1990). The UN and with it the Security Council *can be* also a reflection of state interests, especially those of powerful states. While the UN is *not* an autonomous actor above state interest, however, meaning these state interests will be reflected wherever a response to a humanitarian situation is contemplated, we must acknowledge 'the UN can come closer to expressing universal outrage at human rights abuses than any other body' (Mills 1997:10). Hence the UN can claim to be the most appropriate instrument to execute humanitarian intervention through peacekeeping measures.

Humanitarian intervention has put political humanitarian objectives into contemporary second generation peacekeeping missions. Does this in fact change the nature, the structure, the organization of current peacekeeping? The issue raises many questions and doubts about modern peacekeeping practices. Some of these doubts

include the composition of peacekeeping teams, the achievability of humanitarian objectives, the integrity of attempting to institutionalise a Western System of governance and a neo-liberal economy in host countries, the co-ordination of peacekeeping with peacemaking, peacebuilding and humanitarian activities and most importantly the giving of sufficient recognition for indigenous capacity so it becomes a vital ingredient in the recovery process (Spence 2001a). The case studies will reveal the relevance of such themes which will be consequently addressed after the case studies themselves have been presented. One major area of concern is the configuration of peacekeeping forces and how these forces are brought to alert and action. This has not altered since the inception of peacekeeping. Also specialized training for peacekeepers is surely necessary because the tactics of peacekeeping are significantly different from conventional military conflicts and even traditional peacekeeping. These aspects have *not* been subject to an evolving mechanism. Is the world best served by a different peacekeeping paradigm? In this thesis I attempt to present a convincing alternative to the current model.

### **Summary**

This chapter has seen the evolving concepts of peacekeeping discussed. Traditional peacekeeping, it was seen, was largely limited to holding the line between opposing forces and supervising a truce. Such ceasefire accords often stayed in place for decades. Post Cold War peacekeeping or second generation peacekeeping before 1991 involved slightly more complex missions which included, for example, the overseeing of elections. Second generation peacekeeping missions after 1991 involved more heavily funded “complex emergencies”, often the result of a humanitarian intervention. This comprised very large, complex and multi-tasked operations which incorporated a great many peacekeeping troops and agendas.

What has emerged, however, is a debate whether there are grounds for humanitarian interests to override national sovereignty which has created both opportunities and problems for peacekeeping. Humanitarian intervention is becoming more and more an issue in contemporary ethnic and religious based conflicts with which the UN is faced. When a state cannot meet its obligations towards its own citizens, those citizens have a right to ask the international community for help and expect to receive it. This directly challenges the sovereignty discourse and represents

a paradigm shift in the relationship between the individual and the international community. It also challenges traditional concepts of power and authority.

Contemporary peacekeeping is thus increasingly seeking to meet humanitarian intervention objectives. The contemporary challenge of increasing intra-state, ethnic and religious rivalries has also brought more exposure and credibility to the UN as the primary peacekeeping agent of all nations. In order to appreciate the problems that have besieged the UN in its second generation peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention activities, it is necessary to examine a series of case studies which can clearly illustrate the difficulties that arise in a peacekeeping mission. What is also relevant is that the peacekeeping world is a military one where troops have to be provided by member countries or by regional subcontractors which can create problems of authority, protocol and loyalty. This arrangement has not been subject to any evolving concepts since peacekeeping began. A salient question can be asked, 'Is this the best possible arrangement?' Would there be value in the UN having its own troops?

There are in fact many types of problems that can challenge the peacekeeping mission and such problems will be revealed through the case studies in the following three chapters. Chapter Four will examine the peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Rwanda and Somalia leaving Bosnia and Kosovo for Chapter Five and East Timor, the most complex humanitarian intervention, for Chapter Six. My case studies will attempt to isolate the reasons for the specific failures in the group of missions selected and in so doing will provide the data for an analysis to determine the more underlying causes for failure. This will provide insight into the structure of UN peacekeeping missions today and pose the question, 'Is this the right way of conducting peacekeeping missions?'

'Is there an alternative?'

This will lead to an examination of an alternative model: The UNPC, an elite, all volunteer, internationally recruited, rapidly deployable standing peacekeeping force proposed by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg. Further suggestions for improved peacekeeping will also be made to dovetail with the effectiveness of this model.

## **PART II**

### ***The Findings***

## CHAPTER THREE

### Case Studies I

Chapter Three presents three case studies on Cambodia, Somalia and Rwanda. In these case studies, an analytical comparison of each mission's mandate will highlight shortcomings and failures of the peacekeeping mission. While the successes will be noted, it is the failures of the peacekeeping missions that are going to be emphasised. This information will be used to reflect on improvements within the system. Therefore showing how peace was not sustained is a most positive action. It is not to criticise the efforts of the peacekeepers and the UN peacekeeping system in an effort to simply denigrate these very well intentioned agents in worthy endeavours. It serves a very useful and practical purpose. It will further understanding on how to instigate positive change within the system. Further case studies in the following two chapters will similarly be critiqued.

#### **Case Study 1: Cambodia, The UN's Largest Complex Emergency**

A corollary to Mills' (1997) and Vogel's (1996) contentions that the UN can be a reflection of state interests is that in a UN mission, the national interests of member states must be subservient to the interests of the host country. This appears to be a very contentious issue. The overall reputation of the UN is dependent upon its success in relation to the global security agenda (Falk 1995). Barriers that can arise in a UN mission to challenge the integrity of the UN itself are well illustrated in the Cambodian mission. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was the biggest apparatus which the UN had set up in an attempt to manage its activities in a war-torn country. The UN response to Cambodia's plight was greatly retarded – UN responses can be selective. Cambodia had suffered physical and cultural genocide by the time the UN decided to act. The problem of the sanctity of sovereignty of a country was a hurdle for UN involvement but the international community did eventually jump the hurdle to attempt to solve hitherto intractable problems. The first crucial question to ask is, 'What was UNTAC sent to do?' This can best be answered by considering UNTAC's mandate following a very brief look at Cambodia's historical context.



### ***Historical Background***

From the 6<sup>th</sup> century when the Khmers (Cambodians) conquered the Kingdom of Funan in the fertile Mekong River until the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Khmers enjoyed centuries of prosperity. Classical Khmer civilisation flourished. However, in 1432, the Thais sacked Angkor. This triggered centuries of decline, loss and suffering for the Khmer people which has continued to this day with very little respite. Since 1800 Cambodia has been colonised or invaded by five countries: Thailand, Vietnam (twice), France, the United States and China. As a result of these intrusions, Cambodian people have been labelled as ‘docile’ by some nationalities (Chandler 1996).

Far worst of all, however, has been its own “revolution” at the hands of the Khmer Rouge from 1975 to 1978. Pol Pot’s goal was to transform Cambodia into a completely self-sufficient agrarian communist state. Khmer society was to be re-invented. The Khmer Rouge proclaimed it to be “Year Zero”. The cities were evacuated. People made their way into the countryside to begin a life of continuous toil. Even the hospitals were evacuated, doctors performing surgery ordered at gunpoint to abandon their patients. The legacy of the Khmer Rouge social “experiment” today includes widows and orphans, the maimed, children who have learned to kill and those who have succumbed to mental sickness. Cambodia was “rescued” from the grip of the Khmer Rouge by the invasion of the Vietnamese in 1978. While the Khmer Rouge were weakened, they remained a resilient force until the close of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Following the Vietnamese liberation of Cambodia in December 1978, the Khmer Rouge fled to the border to later join forces with its former enemies, the anti-communist resistance parties of Son Sann and Sihanouk. This rebel coalition, headed by Prince Sihanouk, was *recognised* by the United Nations – the Khmer Rouge, in fact, retained Cambodia’s seat at the UN until 1982, when the seat was then held in the name of a coalition of resistance forces, in which the Khmer Rouge was the senior partner. The Vietnamese backed government remained isolated for 10 years by the international community. Thus Cambodia was consequently plunged into civil war yet again where famine and deterioration contributed to the country’s decay.

The first draft of a plan for an international peacekeeping operation in Cambodia was produced in February 1990 principally through the efforts of Australian Foreign Affairs Minister, Senator Gareth Evans. This ultimately led to the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in Paris on 23 October 1991. Under the Agreement, the Supreme National Council of Cambodia (SNC) was 'the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined'. SNC, which was made up of all four Cambodian factions, delegated to the United Nations 'all powers necessary' to ensure the implementation of the Agreements (United Nations Department of Public Information [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untac.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untac.htm)). The four Cambodian factions were: The State of Cambodia (SOC), the Khmer Rouge (known as the Party of Democratic Kampuchea), Prince Sihanouk's Funcinpec and the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (Shawcross 2000).

#### ***UNTAC Mandate***

The mandate given to UNTAC included aspects relating to:

- Human rights
- The organisation and conduct of free and fair general elections
- Military arrangements
- Civil administration
- The maintenance of law and order
- The repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons
- The rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period (United Nations Department of Public Information [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untac.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untac.htm))

Upon becoming operational on 15 March 1992, UNTAC absorbed the United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC), which had been established to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations. Later, this mandate had been enlarged to include a major training program for Cambodians in mine-detection and mine-clearance of repatriation routes, reception centres and resettlement areas. UNTAC's mandate ended in September 1993 with the promulgation of the

Constitution for the Kingdom of Cambodia and the formation of the new Government (United Nations Department of Public Information 2000: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/untac.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untac.htm)).

As can be seen, UNTAC's mandate contained very broad administrative and humanitarian objectives as well as the conducting of elections which underpinned the promotion of a democratic ethic in a country which was accustomed to authoritarian structures. The mine education and clearance, an inheritance from UNAMIC, was understandably an appropriate directive but the many tasks designated in the mandate resulted in UNTAC being a very complex mission.

### ***Fulfilling the Mandate***

Did UNTAC fulfil the mandate? There were indeed some successes. UNTAC encouraged the population to vote – 90% of the Cambodian people appeared at the polls to cast their vote. Also, the peace process did offer Cambodia hope for an end of two decades of war and its long international isolation as well as more tangible successes in the successful return of more than 370,000 Khmer displaced persons and refugees. The introduction of human rights principles and practices must be counted as a concrete success as well (Curtis 1998). However, the mission was far from a complete success. The mandate was not fulfilled<sup>iv</sup>. It incorporated many facets of peacemaking and peacebuilding in its structure and these facets encompassed many problems. These problems then impacted onto peacekeeping undertakings which became highly problematic. UNTAC illustrates without doubt the complexity of second-generation peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding merge into one another – in the second-generation mission they cannot be seen as discrete entities. The rest of this chapter will explain the barriers faced to the fulfilment of the UNTAC mandate.

### ***Failures in Peacemaking Process***

UNTAC's operation was based on the notion of host-state consent. However, basic to UNTAC's success lay a problem with the very process on agreeing how peace could be made. Hampson (1996:537) explains that the Khmer Rouge faction (there were four political factions) refused to cooperate with UNTAC in the implementation of the provisions of the Paris Peace Accords agreed upon in 1991

regarding cantonment, disarmament and demobilisation, repeatedly violating the cease-fire. The Khmer Rouge also refused to participate in the election. Thus while there was readiness to pursue negotiations and reach a *political* settlement, there clearly was not this readiness to keep the Khmer Rouge from defecting from the peace process and resuming its armed struggle against the government afterwards (Hampson 1996). Roberts (1998) contends that there was a basis of legitimacy for the Khmer Rouge defection. Almost a million Vietnamese had been given ID cards by Phnom Penh<sup>v</sup>. In addition there were allegations of UNTAC collusion with Phnom Penh by means of uneven implementation of the civil administration mandate leaving the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) advantaged in relation to their opposition. As Crocker (1996:187) asserts there is a vast range of intervention options between 'doing nothing and sending in the US Army's 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division'. It appears that a balance must be struck that will deliver peacemaking success. A major barrier to successful peacemaking is the absence of a successful peace process through the procedure of negotiation where the parties to the conflict *redefine* their interests and develop a real commitment to a political settlement (Hampson 1996). Third-party assisted negotiators can and must help the parties realise there are other options than fighting, i.e. national member interests must be subordinated to those of the host country. What seems to be required is not only third-party involvement at the political level but also a more comprehensive third-party involvement at the implementation as well as the negotiation phases of a peace agreement.

The Khmer Rouge signed the Paris Peace Accords but defected from the political process later on. Although their legitimacy was undermined because they broke earlier commitments, how much more successful would have been the peacemaking process if they have had stood by their commitments? One wonders if the peace process could have delivered this. This question is pitted against another equally valid question – should the Khmer Rouge and their legacy to the people of Cambodia been represented at all? If they were not represented, however, how much harder it would have been to absorb this faction into society. The peace process is thus fraught with difficulty. A major barrier is how recalcitrant factions such as the Khmer Rouge are to be treated – ignored, absorbed, represented or censured? In this particular case, the peace process gave them dignity to allow them to respond with commitment, the difficulty being to keep power seeking out of the equation. This

decision was no simple task and was met with failure. Lederach (1995:20) refers to 'Micah's Dilemma' which is a paradox of justice and mercy appropriate to the peacemaking process. Justice involves advocacy for those harmed, for open acknowledgment of the wrongs committed while mercy involves compassion and forgiveness to those who have wronged. Mercy supports persons who have committed injustices. It encourages them to change. The tension of these two forces is all too apparent in peacemaking. Lederach (1995:20) states:

The unique challenge of the Micah dilemma is to . . . pursue justice in ways that respect people and to achieve restoration of relationships based on recognising and amending injustices. In fact we might suggest that reconciliation is best understood as the bringing together of justice and mercy in the context of fractured relationships.

Thus a major barrier to successful peacemaking is that by its very nature the peace process itself must incorporate recalcitrant factions. It must address the Micah Dilemma with its paradox between justice and mercy. This resulted, in the Cambodian case, in the Khmer Rouge being included as a legitimate faction at the outset and their subsequent destabilising effect to the peace process when they defected. This constituted a continuing major threat to UNTAC's peacekeeping success.

### ***Reliance On Foreign Aid***

Another central failure was that UNTAC set the stage for heavy reliance on both foreign aid and foreign technical assistance. In development terms everything before UNTAC was rejected including the resourcefulness and dedication applied to rebuilding which had been done with the support of international NGOs during the 1980s (Curtis 1998). Thus existing community mechanisms were ignored in favour of direct delivery of programs and services by UN agencies. The State of Cambodia (SOC) was completely disempowered:

At provincial and district levels of government, the reduced status of the SOC, the hand-to-mouth budgets and the overwhelming UNTAC presence combined to produce an unprecedented state of disorganisation and demoralisation, which rendered the government structure incapable of contributing to the relief and rehabilitation effort. A patchwork of interventions by NGOs and international organisations virtually operated in an institutional vacuum.

Curtis (1998:73) in quoting a UNTAC Representative

Sales (1996:87) emphasises that the UN pioneered such development and supervised its application. He further claims that a 1992 analysis of the situation in

some ways resembled 'a business report or an outline of commercial opportunities'. There were clear aspects of capitalist enterprise underlying its conception. The Secretary-General's Consolidated Appeal called for training resources 'to be revamped to meet the needs of a market oriented economy'. Such moves left Cambodia open to the insatiable excesses of capitalist piracy. For example, the traffic in women still remains a major earner of foreign currency. UN personnel and UN brothels brutalised women depriving them of their dignity as human beings. There were formerly approximately 6,000 prostitutes with an average age of 18 in 1990. The number tripled and the age levels dropped because of UNTAC. The emphasis upon aid and trade has created a mercantilist milieu where the cunning capitalist entrepreneur may flourish but where the deprived and underprivileged Khmers will not.

### *Necessity of Aid Co-ordination*

Hundreds of aid agencies working in a country, each pursuing its own agenda, understandably produce chaos. UNRISD (1993) acknowledges this to have been the case in Cambodia and stresses the necessity to have established a more effective mechanism for co-ordinating the efforts of these agencies as well as the efforts of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and UNTAC. Such an agency, through oversight of the aid process, would necessarily have exposed the limited participation of the indigenous population in the recovery process. It would have indeed been recognised that aid agencies are indeed insensitive to the question of the need for Cambodians to have a direct influence on the rebuilding of their country.

An agency for aid co-ordination could also monitor the type of assistance being given and attempt to direct a better balance between humanitarian and development aid. A better balance between short-term humanitarian assistance and development aid could have been achieved in Cambodia by channelling more resources toward small-scale community-based projects such as the rehabilitation of agricultural production and essential social services. Longer term development assistance could have been redirected from large-scale capital intensive projects to more human resource development including safety nets for vulnerable groups (UNRISD 1993).

### ***Lack Of Training***

UNTAC had no specific mandate to train or otherwise enhance the capacity of the four existing administrations or Cambodian nationals. Any training that took place during UNTAC was narrowly directed to the various components of the UNTAC operation, with little thought to the country's longer-term human resource needs (Curtis 1998:89). Thus the lack of choice and absence of Cambodian control over key inputs into the rehabilitative and development process were key features of UNTAC administration. What also emerged was that the donor programs remained uncoordinated resulting in chaotic conditions. The UNTAC experience, then, with respect to rehabilitation and development had the unwanted effect of diminishing the capacity and confidence of an administration already suffering a critical lack of trained and qualified staff. Uncritical acceptance of massive amounts of foreign technical assistance therefore undermined the standing of local communities. This essentially portrayed the Cambodians as helpless whilst lauding the donor community.

If Cambodians were to assume increased responsibility for the recovery process, the international aid community should have expanded opportunities for training Cambodian counterparts to plan their own development. Greater efforts should have been made to encourage and facilitate Cambodian participation on a *team-level* basis in all facets of the training process.

### ***Escalating Social and Economic Problems***

The influx of hundreds of aid agencies and UNTAC into Cambodia saw a rapid escalation of social problems. This was characterised by 'an increase in lawlessness, banditry, corruption, xenophobic tensions, and violence' (UNRISD 1993:19). UNTAC peacekeeping troops had, in various ways, a very negative impact on the local population. For example, the incidence of HIV/AIDS infection rose sharply. UNTAC personnel drove around recklessly in their military vehicles showing little concern for the local population. Instead of researching into the culture of the Cambodian people to obtain a better insight into the Cambodian psyche, they displayed what could only be described as a lack of respect for the host population which did not augur well for social relations particularly with the more vulnerable groups (UNRISD 1993).

The local economy was devastated by the impact of this mega mission. UNTAC expenditures contributed significantly to the rise in certain prices. Local wages and the price of housing were pushed up by competition between UNTAC and international agencies. The UNTAC presence deflected labour and investment away from the production of essential goods towards services for foreigners who were living in Cambodia. Also, as much of the development work was situated in and around Phnom Penh, this presence of concentrated funds in the capital fuelled rural to urban migration and ignored the pressing needs of the bulk of the population' (UNRISD 1993).

### ***Collaboration***

Crocker (1996) emphasises that history makes it clear that interventions can succeed as well as fail. Intervention, after all, is a serious affair and must be pursued by third parties with a commitment that maintains neutrality to all factions in the conflict and an abiding loyalty to the overall authority, in the case of Cambodia, UNTAC. There is no room here for a particular third-party country to pursue its own agenda. As Hampson (1996:548) argues, 'third-parties need other third-parties if they are to work efficiently in nurturing the conditions for peace'. A real barrier to the success of the peacekeeping mission is the difficulty for peacekeeping troops to be truly neutral, to observe the commands of the UN only and not the priorities and/or agendas of their own governments (Shawcross 2000).

There was collaboration between the Khmer Rouge and the Indonesian UNTAC battalion stationed in the province of Kompong Thom. The Indonesian commander, Colonel Ryamizard, defended his position by claiming his battalion had better relations with the Khmer Rouge than any other foreign troops in Cambodia while UNTAC officials in Kompong Thom believed that *was* the problem. There was discussion in UNTAC over whether the Indonesians were following a separate mandate owing to several incidents which clearly demonstrated the Indonesian support for the Khmer Rouge (Shawcross 2000:60).

Indonesia is an important Southeast Asian regional power and may have felt it could behave as it wished. The truth was that the Indonesian government had long-



term strategic interests in Indochina which would remain long after UNTAC left – it wished to maintain good relations with all Cambodian factions in order to prevent a fall-out with any member of the coalition government. Top hierarchal attitudes thus filtered down to the behaviour of the troops in the battalion. As a consequence such behaviour threatened third-party neutrality which in turn compromised the entire peacemaking process and thereby the peacekeeping mission itself. ( Shawcross 2000:61).

### ***Overcoming Confrontational Politics***

Confrontational negotiating techniques are a barrier to the peacemaking process. Improving negotiation techniques for the purposes of national reconciliation should have been part of UNTAC's mandate. For example, central to the election was the negotiation process among the four factions. Fisher, Ury and Patton (1981:10-14) decry positional bargaining which is the common political negotiative process resulting in zero-sum games. The end result of positional bargaining is either 'yield to pressure' or 'apply pressure'. This was the sort of confrontational politics that characterised UNTAC's dealings with the Cambodian factions, specifically through the Supreme National Council (SNC). This type of negotiation presents a real obstruction to effective problem solving and peacemaking. UNTAC could have better encouraged 'statesmen' to act in the best interests of the country and the Cambodian people as a whole. The UNTAC-led process rarely rose above politics to contribute toward nation building. UNTAC could have played a greater role toward this end by providing more instruction in conflict resolution skills in general. Also, too confined to political actors, UNTAC excluded other forms of leadership such as the Buddhist *sangkha* or other forms with some social legitimacy (Curtis 1998).

Thus the logical outcome was some kind of coalition government. Indeed the result, a coalition between the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) was a necessary compromise. FUNCINPEC's Prince Norodom Ranariddh became the first prime minister while CPP's Hun Sen became the second prime minister forming the Royal Government of Cambodia. Curtis (1998:18) proffers the view that the international community, including UNTAC, *believed* that a

'free and fair election' would *solve* the long-standing Cambodian conflict. On the other hand, the Cambodian people were less optimistic:

While Cambodians placed their faith in the UNTAC sponsored election as a way toward positive change, they were not convinced that the electoral process would resolve Cambodia's political problems – or that a mere election would fundamentally alter or restructure the country's political culture.

Curtis (1998:18)

This has, in fact, proved to be the case. The Paris Agreements did *not* place a high priority on the consolidation of liberal democracy in Cambodia. What they insisted on was a new political arrangement via a free and fair electoral process. The two agendas are different. However, the Agreements did commit Cambodian politicians to constitutional provisions and left it to them to integrate such provisions into the realities facing the country once UNTAC was gone (Curtis 1998:32). The local politicians were not versed in negotiating techniques or inventing options for mutual gain which Fisher, Ury and Patton (1981) promote as sound conflict resolution practices. Preconditions underlying democratic consolidation were simply not present in Cambodia. All parties that stood for election voiced support for liberal democracy. There were no apparent ideological differences. There was also no dialogue among the factions. UNTAC may have been able to stimulate this, had it the mandate. This would have clarified where each party stood. It was a lose-lose scenario all around – even the winners (FUNCINPEC and CPP) were also losers. There existed just a fragile coalition based on necessity which bought time for future political confrontation.

What has become apparent in peacekeeping missions is that one election cannot produce democracy – democracy cannot exist as an isolated structure. An extremely important construct necessary for the operation of democracy is civil society. Writing from a pluralist position, Diamond (1994:5-7) sees civil society as an intermediary entity, autonomous from the state. It stands between the private sphere and the state and involves people acting collectively for public rather than private ends. Civil society is a "vital instrument" for checking the power of democratic governments. He idealises it, perhaps, as one homogenous bloc against the state but irrespective of this idealisation, civil society is a necessity, which acts as a vigorous check on the power of the state.

### ***Election Outcome***

Although UNTAC mobilised 90% of the Cambodian people to vote, were there structures in place to sustain democracy? For example, did the government *understand* the implications of democracy? Where were the civil society organisations so important to the democratic process that would ensure long-term stability? The Cambodian people were recovering from collective psychic trauma coupled with the fact these people had historically habituated themselves to authoritarian structures. It was a massive psychological quantum leap for them to suddenly be able to manage democracy. Hughes (1996:65) in quoting Ledgerwood provides an eloquent modern Cambodian psychological profile:

The perceptions among Khmer that their culture has been lost, or is being lost is pervasive. The destruction from years of warfare, the horrendous losses during the years of Democratic Kampuchea (1975-1979), followed by the presence of their traditional enemies, the Vietnamese . . . , all raise the fear that the Khmer as a people will cease to exist.

The UN was so absorbed with the election that it failed to take into account the very condition of the people. Cambodia was not ripe for democracy – the people could not build civil society structures. This presented a real barrier to the success of the UNTAC peacekeeping mission.

Since the election, the Cambodian political elite have subsequently resisted democratisation in a variety of ways. Although Cambodia was visibly pushed down the path of democratisation, what existed in 1999 was more of a ‘venerer than a meaningful, substantive democracy’ (Roberts 2001:203). While elements of democracy are today extant, many of those that appear democratic are not so when scrutinised more closely. For example, the Senate’s core role relates to patronage and clientelism rather than in curbing possible excesses in the National Assembly; political opposition lacks the freedom to criticise the government; there exists only a limited sense of a clear separation of powers between the executive and the judiciary to name but several of Cambodia’s democratic inadequacies. Thus eight years after the UN arrived to implant democracy in Cambodia, some significant features are indeed still missing (Roberts 2001).

### *Civilian Input*

The composition of UNTAC was made up of 22,000 people from 45 nations. This consisted of more than 16,000 military troops, 3600 civilian police and 2400 civil administrators including electoral, and to a lesser extent, rehabilitation, refugee and human rights workers (Saunders 1994:7). Although civilians were included in the peacekeeping force, they (excluding the police) constituted not quite 11 per cent of the *total* peacekeeping force. It is significant that civilians were included in this mission but also significant that they were far outnumbered by their military colleagues. Most of the civilians were, however, connected with the overseeing of the electoral process and associated administrative activities. As Downie (1994:21) says, "My biggest criticism of the UN is that it had tunnel vision. It was so focussed on the election that it was everything, and it didn't look sideways at other possibilities." A greater civilian contingent and a keener awareness of what civilians might contribute to peacekeeping could have created more engagement with the local people, an involvement that will be seen to have important implications for improved peacekeeping. It was an opportunity missed.

### *Case Study Summary*

In summarising why UNTAC failed in meeting the conditions to its mandate, it must be recognised that the UNTAC mission was extraordinarily multifaceted meeting in every sense the words 'complex emergency' characteristic of second-generation peacekeeping. In this country, national interests of member states were not always subservient to the interests of the host country. The neutrality of peacekeeping troops was not guaranteed. In peacekeeping activities, the local population was not acknowledged, consulted and included in the operation of rehabilitation, but disempowered by overwhelming them with foreign aid. The concept of democracy was introduced to a people, who had been accustomed to authoritarian structures, through the overseeing of just one election. Confrontational politics dominated the peace process instead of conflict resolution processes, causing disruption by dissident factions. The tension between justice and mercy was not in any way relieved, resulting in a total disregard to the Cambodian people in their psychic trauma. Thus in this plethora of side-effects, it can be seen that failures in the peacemaking process caused and exacerbated failures in the peacekeeping process showing that the two are interlinked and are not separate entities. In addition, the role that civilians might play

in peacekeeping could have been explored but instead was ignored. It was inevitable that peace was not sustained.

### **Case Study 2: Somalia, A Humanitarian Crisis**

The most critical events in Somalia happened at a most inopportune time for the UN. The UN was engaged in executing peace operations elsewhere of unparalleled size and scope. Cambodia was absorbing nearly 20,000 military and civilian personnel for the implementation of peace accords there while another 12,000 were deploying to separate Croats and Serbs in Croatia. Genocide in Bosnia was drawing the attention of the international community. The UN organisation knew that it was stretched 'as thin as paper' (Durch 1997b:350). Enter Somalia. It was like an apocalyptic vision. The legacy of anarchy was famine, war and death. Warlords who roused support through clan allegiance became the powerful driving force through sheer force of arms. The country became increasingly fragmented through civil war while the means of food production was destroyed. By June 1992, 5000 people were dying each day from starvation, 1.5 million were on the brink of death and 4.5 million people were nearing starvation. The entire population was in a life-threatening position. Somalia has been described as 'the single worst humanitarian crisis in the world' (Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes, and Toralv Nordbo 1995:18).

### ***Historical Background***

In assigning culpability for such a huge disaster, it is necessary to take a brief look at Somali culture. The Somalis comprise a homogenous population in terms of culture, linguistics and religion. However they are divided into six distinct clans with people identifying with their clan, not with the state, with the result that the state has always been a weak institution. Since 1991, when Siad Barre was deposed by rival clans, there has been effectively no government. The clans that took over had no concept of the "nation state". The already weakened state collapsed into anarchy. 'By 1992, Somalia was more a geographical expression than a country' (Shawcross 2000:67). Prendergast (1994) contends that the primary cause of the interventions in the first place was the ferocious fighting between the clan-based forces of the warlords wreaking devastation and suffering on the less belligerent southern cultivators who produce most of Somalia's grain. However, treating the problem as a humanitarian crisis only demanding a charitable solution did not address the real

underlying political and human rights context. Hunger may have been relieved but in the long run human suffering was prolonged.

Against this background, the Security Council unanimously imposed a general and complete arms embargo on Somalia in January 1992. On 27 and 28 March 1992, agreements were signed between the rival parties in Mogadishu resulting in the deployment of United Nations observers to monitor the cease-fire of 3 March 1992. The agreement also included deployment of United Nations security personnel and humanitarian assistance activities. The Secretary General then recommended the establishment of a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM). On 24 April 1992, the Security Council formally established UNOSOM I ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unosomi.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm) accessed 31 October 2001).

#### *UNOSOM I, UNITAF, UNOSOM II Mandates*

The United Nations Operations in Somalia I (UNISOM I) endured from April to December 1992. The mandate of UNISOM I was:

- To monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia
- To provide protection and security for UN personnel, equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu
- To escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centres in the city and its immediate environs ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unosomi.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm) 2000: accessed 31 October 2001).

In August 1992, UNOSOM I's mandate and strength were enlarged to enable it to protect humanitarian convoys and distribution centres throughout Somalia. In December 1992, after the situation in Somalia further deteriorated, the Security Council authorised a multinational force, organised and led by the US to use 'all necessary means' to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. UNITAF worked in coordination with UNOSOM I to secure major population centres and ensure that humanitarian assistance was delivered and distributed ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unosomi.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosomi.htm) 2000: accessed 31 October 2001).

The United Nations Operations In Somalia II (UNOSOM II) was to complete, through disarmament and reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, law and order. More precisely its mandate was:

- To monitor the cessation of hostilities preventing resumption of violence
- To seize unauthorised small arms maintaining security at ports, airports and lines of communication required for delivery of humanitarian
- To continue mine-clearing
- To assist in repatriation of refugees in Somalia
- To assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life
- To re-establish the country's institutional structure achieving national political reconciliation recreating a Somali state based on democratic governance
- To rehabilitate the country's economy and infrastructure (<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2p.htm> 2000: accessed 31 October 2001).

In February 1994, after several violent incidents and attacks on UN soldiers, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods. UNOSOM II was withdrawn in early March 1995 (<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2p.htm> 2000: accessed 31 October 2001).

### ***Fulfilling the Mandates***

In the following analysis, it will be shown that the mandates were not fulfilled and questioned whether they were, in fact, realistic in nature to begin with. As can be seen from these mandates, the peacekeeping mission in Somalia was set up to facilitate humanitarian aid to people caught up in civil war and famine. From this simple beginning, however, the mission developed into an expansive attempt to stop the conflict and to direct the building of a viable democratic state.

### ***Fulfilling the Mandate: UNOSOM I***

By March 1992, the civil infrastructure in Somalia had completely collapsed. No basic services existed such as electricity, communications, schools, health services or transportation. In 1988 there had been 70 hospitals in Somalia. In 1992 only 15

remained partially operational and these were entirely dependent on external assistance. The hospitals had no drugs or basic equipment. As a result vaccination programs were abandoned and diseases spread without check (Jarar Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo 1995). The situation was ripe for international intervention. The wording of UNOSOM I's mandate illustrates the unwillingness of the Security Council to take political action: Its basis was purely humanitarian, i.e. the human suffering in Somalia was a threat to peace and security. Until now a threat to international peace and security had to involve a cross border dispute engaging at least two sovereign states.

Jarar Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo (1995) claim that the major flaw of UNISOM I was to attempt to apply the peacekeeping model at the wrong time. UN officials behaved with the factions as they would with sovereign governments. Therefore the UN aimed to achieve a ceasefire. While a ceasefire only between two chief warring factions (Mahdi and Aidid) was achieved, there was never a real ceasefire throughout Mogadishu itself in any case. The troops of UNOSOM I were Pakistanis who, although being authorised in April, did not arrive till September largely because Aidid refused to allow them. As the mandate demanded, they could not protect UN personnel, equipment and supplies or the aid in general for they remained virtual prisoners at the airport, ill-treated by armed gangs of looters who made it impossible for them to execute their mission. Instead of the aid going to the starving, much of it went to the clan fighters. In the Somalia situation, humanitarian assistance provided the warlords with currency to escalate the situation. Thus there was no protection for the delivery of humanitarian assistance but the assistance itself created protection rackets in Somalia (Shawcross 2000). UNOSOM I was not mandated to use force. Depending exclusively on the consent of the warring factions, none of its aims were met. It looked as if force had to be used. The Security Council welcomed an offer by the US to send in troops. This multinational mission of armed humanitarianism, UNITAF, authorised to use 'all necessary means' to establish a secure environment for the delivery of aid, left in April 1993.

### ***The Role of the US***

The US also took on too much themselves and failing to coordinate activities with the UN severely limited the success of its mission

(Moore 1996)



Lack of co-ordination between the US and the UN resulted in two forces performing two separate agendas. This prevented an effective working relationship between the UN and the US and an appreciation and respect of each other's roles to develop. There was even a coordination problem between the different political entities of the UN and the local political process. To be effective in such anarchical conditions, the UN had to provide a centre of gravity so that an alternate form of leadership could develop. However, the situation was too fragile and was disrupted by warlords (Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo 1995). Resolution 794 allowed the US military to use force to accomplish stability. The force comprised approximately 37,000 troops which included international and American troops, the vast majority, 28,000, being Americans. However, the impact of the US Army was a key factor in further destabilising the country. Owing to the fact that there were no institutions, the Army became in effect the state. Shawcross (2000) argues that before they could withdraw, they were morally bound to create a new state to succeed them and this was not possible.

There was contention between the US and the UN Secretary General: What constituted a 'secure environment for humanitarian relief'? Did it mean to establish and protect corridors for deliveries of assistance to end the famine? Or did it mean creating secure conditions so that the UN could operate without restriction? If it were indeed to be the latter, the US would have had to alter the conditions of anarchy operating in Somalia. This would have meant addressing the root cause of the anarchy through processes of national and political reconciliation. The US had not intended this: It did not want to 'pacify Somalia' (Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo 1995: 27). Durch (1997b: 325) speaks highly of the 'effective, unified command' but claims that there was no political structure left behind that could sustain UNITAF's results without the support of strong outside military backing. While UNITAF was hailed as 'non-political', this was mere rhetoric – such a vast military intervention had to have a political impact.

### ***Fulfilling the Mandate: UNOSOM II***

The mission that UNOSOM II took on was extraordinary: It was a flawed concept from the outset. Although authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter<sup>vi</sup>,

its presence in the country was conceived to be one of 'assistance'. 'Assistance' meant local consent; enforcement did not. However, the variety and number of tasks assigned to UNOSOM II as described in the mandate completely exceeded an "assistance" concept. In fact UNOSOM II's mandate of peace building, rehabilitation, repatriation of refugees, national reconciliation and the recreation of a Somali state based on democratic governance constituted essentially social and political tasks (Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo 1995). Thus peacekeeping merged into peacemaking which merged into peacebuilding. The mandate encompassed the whole three undertakings which are often erroneously recognised to be quite separate disciplines<sup>vii</sup>.

UNOSOM II was dominated by US officers most of who were under US command. With so many US marines pulling out at the closure of UNITAF, the UN forces remaining were taken by surprise. In weeks the numbers of troops were reduced from 38,000 to 28,000. Many of the new troops came from developing countries with some countries sending troops for national prestige while others just for the training provided (Shawcross 2000). With this reduced force, therefore, UNOSOM II faced a much more difficult task than the more powerful UNITAF. Much more had to be accomplished with fewer resources. In order to fulfil the mandate, to found the structural logic of a new authority for example, UNOSOM II required anthropological, sociological and psychological expertise fed by an integration between international forces and the indigenous population. Instead, peacekeepers were insufficiently briefed on the local social and political situation which bred opposition and exclusion in *resistance* to integration with local Somalis. These tasks were consequently being approached with military and diplomatic instruments. In addition, UNOSOM II was completely dominated by military imperatives thus compromising the major portion of its mandate. (Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo 1995). Moore (1996:34) also confirmed that during the most crucial phases of UNOSOM II's existence, 'its whole character was too dominated by military priority and mentality'. It became questionable whether the peace process, especially with respect to peace building and rehabilitation, could be successfully conceived as part of a military agenda. In hindsight what was seen to have been required was some dedicated and professional civilian staff to oversee political, economic and socio-cultural reconstruction. Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and

Toralv Nordbo (1995) claimed that civilian staff had not been a priority at all. No one had thought seriously how to conduct a political operation with the result that civilian staffing was quite arbitrary and slow. This in turn impeded the development of a non-military operational concept.

The role that the US designed for itself in UNOSOM II did not integrate US initiatives with those of the UN. The US retained both effective and juridical independence from the UN command structure, unlike all other contingents which were subordinate to the collective. The US criticised the UN for its military decisions claiming that more force used earlier would have brought greater success rather than invoking a limited force concept (Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes and Toralv Nordbo 1995). Thus the coalition formula inhibited effective peacekeeping. US military analysis seemed to demand a greater use of force which wrought conflict with UN methodology. The US also sustained some heavy casualties. President Clinton announced that all US troops were to be withdrawn from Somalia by the end of March 1994. However, the administration also withdrew from the whole concept of multilateralism with Clinton pronouncing, "The UN must know when to say no to peacekeeping" (Shawcross 2000:101). With the collapse of support for American involvement in peacekeeping operations, came a reluctance to finance such operations, leaving the UN to face a looming crisis in funding. Apart from easing the humanitarian crisis by providing some aid relief, UNOSOM II has to be recognised as a failure, a mission which fell far short of successfully completing any of its mandate.

However, in examining the mandates of the missions, in defence of mission participants, could it not be said that, owing to the anarchic conditions in Somalia where the state had completely disintegrated, these mandates, especially that of UNOSOM II were highly unrealistic? To ask a peacekeeper to lay the foundations of a democratic state under the umbrella of a totally militarised environment in complete lawless conditions is surely asking too much. For a UN mission to succeed in the field, then the UN mission planned at Headquarters must be realistic to begin with.

### *Case Study Summary*

In summarising the barriers to peacekeeping experiences in Somalia, it would have to be recognised that while UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNISOM II provided

much needed humanitarian relief, these missions were otherwise largely failures. Somalia had not only entered a phase of anarchy, there was a complete collapse of civil infrastructure. No basic services existed. The peacekeeping missions that responded to such calamity did so in a fragmented, retarded and highly militarised manner. A source of continuing conflict was the lack of coordination between UN command and US command. The US would not subordinate its command to that of the UN and placed an emphasis on using more force in operations. Overall a military mentality infused all facets of each of the three missions which did not facilitate any sort of rapport with the local population. Political, economic and socio-cultural reconstruction was governed by military imperatives which inhibited the growth of a peace process. Peace was not sustained. Finally the Americans withdrew prematurely with the whole concept of multilateralism at stake. This impacted greatly upon the efficacy of the existing remnants of the UN peacekeeping mission. It is appropriate to ask, however, if this was enough to show UN planners and coordinators at Headquarters that in order for a peacekeeping mission to succeed, its mandate needs to be realistic in terms of the conditions that prevail on the ground in the host country.

### **Case Study 3: Rwanda, A Genocide of Appalling Magnitude**

Genocide of appalling magnitude occurred seemingly to the indifference of the international community between April and July of 1994 in Rwanda. The Tutsi population was devastated as well as the moderate Hutus. Atrocities were committed both by the militia and the armed forces but also by civilians against civilians.

#### ***Historical Background***

Rwanda is situated on some ten thousand square miles, is land-locked and is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. To its detriment in terms of attracting international attention, it is not strategic to any major power. Rwanda's two principle peoples are the Hutu and the Tutsi who share a common culture<sup>viii</sup>. From October 1990 until August 1993, the government of Rwanda and a Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), engaged alternately in civil war and peace negotiations. UNAMIR was established as a neutral peacekeeping force to help implement a transitional period of power-sharing and free elections. However, in April 1994 the reconciliation process degenerated and the four-year civil war

culminated in a three-month period of genocide where over 800,000 Tutsis were murdered by Hutus. It has been estimated that the daily killing rate was five times that of the Nazi death camps (Shawcross 2000).

### ***UNAMIR I, UNAMIR II and Operation Turquoise Mandates***

UNAMIR I was established by the Security Council 5 October 1993 to help implement the Arusha Peace Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993. UNAMIR I's mandate was:

- To assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali
- To monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarised zone and demobilisation procedures
- To monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government's mandate leading up to elections
- To assist with mine-clearance
- To assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirM.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirM.htm). 2000:accessed 31 October 2001)

After renewed fighting in April 1994, the mandate of UNAMIR I was adjusted on the 21 April 1994, so that it could act as an intermediary between the warring Rwandese parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire, assist in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible and monitor developments in Rwanda including the safety and security of civilians who sought refuge with UNAMIR I ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirM.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirM.htm) 2000: accessed 31 October 2001).

UNAMIR II was established 17 May 1994. Its mandate was adjusted on separate occasions to meet the changing needs of the conflict. Below is a synopsis of this expanded mandate.

- To contribute to the security and protection of refugees and civilians at risk through means including the establishment and maintenance of secure humanitarian areas
- To provide security for relief operations to the degree possible

- To stabilise and monitor the situation in all regions of Rwanda to encourage the return of the displaced population
- To provide security and support for humanitarian assistance operations inside Rwanda
- To promote through mediation and good offices national reconciliation in Rwanda ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirM.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirM.htm) 2000:accessed 31 October 2001)

UNAMIR II's mandate was adjusted 9 June 1995 to include such tasks as assisting in the training of a national police force and to contribute to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need and again on 12 December 1995 to facilitate the safe and voluntary return of refugees. The mandate of UNAMIR II came to an end on 8 March 1996 with the withdrawal of the mission completed in April 1996 ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unamirM.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unamirM.htm) 2000; accessed 31 October 2001).

OPERATION TURQUOISE was a French led mission conducted with the authorisation of the Security Council although not under UN command. It was mandated under Chapter VII<sup>ix</sup>, unlike UNAMIR I and UNAMIR II which were Chapter VI interventions. Its broad mandate was to assure the security and protection of displaced persons and civilians at risk in Rwanda (Report Of The Independent Inquiry Into The Actions Of The United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda 1999) henceforth known as 'The Inquiry'.

### *Fulfilling the Mandates*

Each task itemised in the mandate with the exception of promoting national reconciliation is within the umbrella of peacekeeping operations and hence appears, at first glance, achievable by peacekeeping forces. However, circumstances meshed together in such a way that made success impossible. It is important to recognise that the UN missions were conducted at the request of the former belligerents and had their formal consent. The use of force was therefore limited to self-defence but what occurred could only be described as a bloodbath demanding a more adequate mandate. Operation Turquoise had a Chapter VII authorisation<sup>x</sup>, however. To have two operations present both with the authorisation of the Security Council but with diverging powers was problematic. The following discussion will illustrate why the

mandates of UNAMIR I and UNAMIR II were not reached and why these peacekeeping missions were failures.

### ***Reluctance To Be Involved***

When the genocide began, most of the peacekeeping force was withdrawn leaving only a small mediation mission. However, when the human toll became known, UNAMIR II was launched to protect civilians. Unfortunately, troops and equipment were not forthcoming from member states as quickly as required and France instigated Operation Turquoise, a UN authorised intervention in the southwestern part of Rwanda. It is indeed strange that this operation was sanctioned while UNAMIR II was in force. Perhaps France's motives need to be questioned<sup>xi</sup>. In any case, the resources committed by France and other countries to Operation Turquoise would have greatly benefited UNAMIR II. The genocide ended with the formation of a new government in July 1994 by the RPF. UNAMIR II attempted to work with the government to help stabilise the country but the government, wary of the UN's presence, forced UNAMIR II to withdraw by April 1996 (Vaccaro 1997).

"Reluctant" could best describe the international community's attitude to get involved in Rwanda. Canadian General and UNAMIR Force Commander, Romeo Dallaire wrote later that he was told by UN officials that Rwanda was not a strategic interest of any country and that UNAMIR was to be conducted on the cheap: Strict economy in personnel and funding was observed. Dallaire was sent only half battalions from Bangladesh and Belgium and a battalion from Ghana. Thus the command and control structure was totally inefficient as well as required equipment inadequate. The resources provided did not in any way meet the gravity of the crisis which led Dallaire to consider that it would perhaps be better for the UN to withdraw the mission than to stay pretending it was effective (Shawcross 2000:107).

### ***Links With Peace Process***

According to The Inquiry (1999:23) the UN mission was 'predicated on the success of the peace process'. The initial planning process lacked clear and sufficient political analysis. There was no contingency planning for the prospect that the peace process did not succeed. Dallaire himself acknowledged that the reconnaissance mission, which he headed, lacked the political competence to make an in-depth

analysis of the political situation. Human Rights reports made by various NGOs during the year all discussed the possibility that a genocide was being committed in Rwanda but such reports were not taken seriously by the planners of the large UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. This shows a serious lack of co-ordination on the part of various UN organs and NGOs (The Inquiry 1999). UN peacekeeping in Rwanda began as a traditional peacekeeping operation to monitor the implementation of an existing peace agreement. The genocide offensive should have led decision-makers within the UN to conclude that the original mandate and the neutral mediating role of the UN was no longer adequate. A more assertive response based on a more forceful and encompassing mandate combined with the necessary means was required. An inadequate and inappropriate mandate, therefore, was another cause of the failure of the UN mission in Rwanda: UNAMIR I was simply too passive.

### *Political Will*

Problems of political will dominated both UNAMIR I and UNAMIR II. States which had the capability for rapid military deployment lacked the will to take action. UN missions already underway in Bosnia and Somalia had demonstrated that humanitarian interventions were complex, costly, controversial and difficult. As to their efficacy, it could be argued that these missions bordered on being futile. Somalia particularly was seen to be failing when the Rwanda conflict burst upon the scene. Bosnia and Somalia had committed 75 percent of the 70,000 troops available to UN peacekeeping worldwide. This had greatly taxed the UN's peacekeeping management and resources. Under these difficult circumstances member states, particularly the US, were hesitant to take on another conflict in yet another failing state (Vaccaro 1997). Within a week of the genocide, the UN force was emasculated and yet had to function as if its size had not been severely diminished. That it did so is a tribute to the peacekeepers who held their ground firmly. Dallaire's view was that it was "inexcusable by any human criteria" (Shawcross 2000:115). Dallaire felt that Rwanda and UNAMIR had been abandoned: UNAMIR had neither the mandate nor the supplies to face the disaster. Resources such as stores, ammunition, medical supplies, water and food were lacking to the mission. All of this, Dallaire said, was "a description of inexcusable apathy by the sovereign states that made up the UN that is completely beyond comprehension and moral acceptability" (Shawcross 2000:115).



Shawcross (2000:117) argues that there was no enthusiasm for real intervention. The British permanent representative, Sir David Hannay, claimed that reinforcing UNAMIR would only mean “a repetition of Somalia with its well-known and dire consequences”. He was concerned against pulling out the whole mission, however, as this would have “a negative impact on public opinion”. Washington’s view of the peacekeeping force was that it “was not appropriate now and never will be”. Such an opinion was in great contrast to that of the Nigerian Ambassador, Ibrahim Gambari, who quite rightly spoke of the tens of thousands of civilians who were dying and asked: “Has Africa dropped from the map of moral concern?” (Shawcross 2000:117) Kofi Annan, who had unsuccessfully approached about one hundred different governments, agreed that Dallaire could save hundreds of thousands of lives with five thousand troops but admitted that “the will to provide men, the will to act was not there” (Shawcross 2000:117).

So while various nation states particularly the US acted to delay deployment, Dallaire was ‘standing knee deep in mutilated bodies, surrounded by the guttural moans of dying people, looking into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots and flies’ (Shawcross 2000:119). Death in Rwanda without the thought of help or relief was a truth that was faced every day. The Inquiry (1999: 23) called it ‘a wave of some of the worst brutality humankind has seen in this century’.

### ***Case Study Summary***

Hindsight concerning Rwanda has unearthed numerous indicators that what happened was going to happen.

Vaccaro (1997:401)

The above quotation supports evidence that much information concerning troubled states is available *within* the UN system and access to the information that member states, NGOs, humanitarian and human rights agencies provide to the UN is far superior to the intelligence which member states alone can submit to guide the votes of the Security Council. Ill-informed decision making by the Security Council has thus been cited by Vaccaro (1997) as one of the major shortcomings that failed to contain the Rwandan genocide. It appears what is required is a mechanism to process

disparate information from the various inputs to the UN system that can act together in concert with input from member states' intelligence.

Ill-informed Security Council decision-making was not the only reason for the failure of UNAMIR although it played a vital part. International indifference, an inadequate mandate and problems of political will also contributed to the failure of this mission. The existence of French based Operation Turquoise also detracted from the efficacy of the UN missions. Peace was not sustained. This was certainly not because of the efforts of UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire and his peacekeeping troops who acted courageously in the face of great adversity and deprivation. That the Rwandan crisis occurred in the wake of Somalia's failing state disaster was perhaps the greatest single influence on member states' reluctance to become involved.

### **Summary**

In these case studies problems that have challenged the success of peacekeeping missions have been discussed and failures examined. In Cambodia, for example, the need for peacekeeping troops to be truly neutral ensuring third-party neutrality presented a basic peacekeeping problem. Also how to incorporate recalcitrant factions into the peacemaking process and the tension between justice and mercy impacted upon peacekeeping success. The imposition of a free and fair election which was somehow going to save Cambodia from all further political upheavals without the recognition that the people of Cambodia were suffering from a collective psychic trauma was a basic oversight that compromised the peace process. In addition, an opportunity to explore the contribution that civilians could make in engagement with indigenous peoples was overlooked. In Somalia, the inability of the US and the UN to form a cohesive relationship that worked in appreciation and respect of each other's roles was a major factor which failed to anchor the rapidly developing anarchical conditions. The domination of UNOSOM II by military imperatives and mentality also caused the peacekeeping missions to falter. In Rwanda, principally international indifference and lack of political will combined with an insufficiency of human resources worked to prevent a peacekeeping success.

Every time there is a peacekeeping mission, there are unique lessons to be gained from it. Such lessons offer to the world another chance to get it right. Such

lessons should not go to waste. The UN peacekeeping mission can be an effective, peace sustaining mission. In the following chapter, as missions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the Former Yugoslavia are examined, shortcomings and failures again will be highlighted in order to expose exactly why peace has not been sustained in this troubled area paving the way for more constructive proposals.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Case Studies II

This chapter examines the peacekeeping missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in the former Yugoslavia against the backdrop of their peacekeeping mandates. It will be seen how these missions too, although producing some successes, must be seen as bearing many failures. The reasons for failure will be investigated. In order to appreciate the complexity of the Yugoslavian situation, a brief explanation of Yugoslavia's birth and disintegration will firstly be presented followed by a listing of the many peacekeeping missions that have been sent to this troubled area. It will become apparent why this region has been so conflicted and why Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo have become so problematic.

#### Yugoslavia: Birth to Disintegration

It is possible to go back to medieval times to discuss the conflict that has wracked the Balkan region and resulted in the hostilities that are present there today. However, this is too long a story and it is expedient to start at the beginning of the last century. Yugoslavia was founded around a Serbian core in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries as the Ottoman Turkish Empire fragmented. The Serbs were the dominant ethnic grouping in the region. They were orthodox Christians. The other two ethnic identities were the Croats who were Roman Catholics and the Muslims who lived mainly in ethnically mixed towns and cities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This ethnic and religious mix proved to be an explosive combination.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as it was initially called before the name of Yugoslavia was adopted in 1929, lasted from 1918 to 1941. It was an uneasy union. For the Serbs, the main advantage was that all Serbs belonged to one single state. For the other peoples, the main advantage was in reuniting several different peoples on an equal footing. The state was a monarchy dominated by Serbs. Anti-Serb sentiment among the other peoples was widespread. After the war, however, Tito emerged victorious and created a loose but authoritarian communist regime which was largely free of ethnic problems. Tito had rejected the principle of the domination of one people over the others. This federation of six autonomous republics - Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (referred to generally as

Bosnia), Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia - could be seen more in terms of the reunification of different peoples based on equality. However, two events eventually led to war among these different ethnic identities: The death of Tito in 1980 exposing the fragility of the federation he had ruled and the collapse of neighbouring communist governments at the end of the 1980s. Croatia and Slovenia subsequently declared their independence on 25 June 1991, an independence which the German Government controversially recognised. Such a provocation sounded the death knell for Yugoslavia as Yugoslav army tanks failed to crush the movement. In Croatia the situation became inflamed when fighting erupted between Croats and local Serbs (Roberts 1992).

### **UN Peacekeeping Missions in the Former Yugoslavia**

The UN became actively involved in the situation in Yugoslavia on 25 September 1991 when the Security Council expressed deep concern at the fighting in that country and called on all states to implement an embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment. This led to the Security Council on 21 February 1992 establishing the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for an initial period of 12 months. UNPROFOR was originally set up in Croatia as an interim arrangement to create conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement to the Yugoslav crisis. Its mandate was continually enlarged and strengthened, however, to include in addition to Croatia the locations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. On 31 March 1995, the Security Council decided to restructure UNPROFOR, replacing it with three separate but interlinked peacekeeping operations – UNPREDEP (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNCRO (Croatia) ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unprof\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_p.htm) accessed 15 November 2001).

Summarised below are UN missions which have been administered in the Former Yugoslav Region since UNPROFOR. It can be seen by this complex network of operations how conflicted this region has been and how problematic the solution.

- UNPROFOR, March 1995, was limited to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (UNCRO), March 1995- January 1996, designed to replace UNPROFOR in Croatia. Function included the facilitation of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia.
- United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), March 1995- February 1999. This mission was designed to replace UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
- United Nations Transitional Administration In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sermium (UNTAES), set up January 1996 with both military and civilian components.
- United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG), January 1998- October 1998. This mission took over policing tasks from UNTAES when that mission's mandate ended.
- United Nations Mission Of Observers In Prevlaka (UNMOP), established February 1996 to take over from UNCRO the task of monitoring the demilitarisation of the Prevlaka Peninsula, a strategic area disputed by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), was established December 1995, extended until June 2002 and encompassed the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and a United Nations civilian component.
- United Nations Interim Administration Mission In Kosovo (UNMIK) was born on 10 June 1999 and established in the war-ravaged province of Kosovo as an interim civilian administration led by the United Nations under which its people could progressively enjoy increasing autonomy (<http://www.un.org/> accessed 21 November 2001).

The following two case studies will be examining Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo respectively. As can be seen it is not so easy to isolate the mandate that must be investigated for with Bosnia and Herzegovina, several missions were involved – UNPROFOR, UNCRO and UNMIBH. Although it is a complex situation, UNCRO was principally concerned with Croatia and UNMIBH consisted largely of civilian police and had a very limited mandate so the mandate that will be examined in the Bosnian case study will be for the UN mission UNPROFOR.

### **Case Study 1: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armed Conflict in Europe**

The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina has often been projected in the media as a tragedy that is analogous to the Holocaust, a fight for good against evil. The Serbs are represented as the forces of darkness. They are seen to be responsible for all the atrocities, the ethnic cleansing and mass killing. However, the Muslims have been able to gain 'significant military parity' with the Serbs while still maintaining the image of victim in the eyes of the world. Scarred shells of Catholic churches and Muslim mosques attest to the barbarity of Muslim and Croat violence. Such violence was likely done, as is Serb violence, for 'revenge for real and alleged sins of the past and the perceived demands of present security' (Boyd 1995: 5,6).

Bosnian Serbs, like their Muslim and Croat neighbours are surely not without some legitimate interests and concerns in this conflict. Serb expansion has epitomised the popular image of the war but the reality is that much of Bosnia has historically been Serb. Vilification of the Serbs intensifies Serb perception that the world is against them. Negotiating with one side and condemning the other, which has characterised the dynamics of this war, is not a sound conflict resolution tactic.

#### ***Historical Background***

I felt that no party in Bosnia was free of at least some of the blame for the cruel conflict.  
Boutros Boutros-Ghali in Shawcross (2000:50)

Croatia and Slovenia's independence exacerbated an already volatile situation in Bosnia which had large minority populations of Croats and Serbs. When Bosnia's government declared independence from Yugoslavia in April 1992, both Serbs and Croats found themselves living adjacent to Croatia and Serbia, respectively, but governed by a Muslim-led regime. Subsequent to this, war erupted among Bosnia's three major ethno-religious groups; Roman Catholic Croats who represented 17% of the population; Eastern Orthodox Serbs, 31% of the population; and Muslims, 44% of the population. The Croat and Serb factions fought to merge their territories with Croatia and Serbia respectively while the Bosnian Muslims fought to maintain a unified, multiethnic Bosnian state in which they would be the largest ethnic group. It was considered by many to be 'the most serious armed conflict in Europe since World

War II' (Dempsey 1998: 1,8). The UN responded with the mission UNPROFOR which had been initially deployed in diverse regions of the former Yugoslavia and from March 1995 was restricted to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Basically, each faction fought the other with a ferocity that is hard to comprehend. There was no 'innocent' party. The refugee crisis grew continually as more and more people were forced from their homes. This, in turn, encouraged more war, as all sides, particularly the Bosnian government tried to retrieve territory 'ethnically cleansed'. Each side constantly lied to and sought to influence the UN, promising to help the effort and then renegeing. Politicians exploited ethnic differences in order to gain personal power and privilege. The Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian Muslim media dispensed hate radio day after day (Shawcross 2000:127-128).

A precarious Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia was eventually formed in August 1994, however. After this both Muslims and Croats, unenthusiastic allies, sought a common enemy in the Serbs. In October 1995, following US-NATO bombing to Serbian strongholds, approved by the UN the month before, a cease-fire was produced between the Muslim-Croat and Serb armies by the US. This resulted in the Dayton Agreement signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The agreement formally ended the war and instituted a new national constitution for Bosnia. Bosnia was consequently seen as a single state consisting of two 'entities': The Muslim-Croat Federation with 51% of the territory and the Republika Srpska with 49% of the territory. Elections held in September 1996 under OSCE supervision resulted, however, in further entrenching nationalistic fervour – Muslim, Croat and Serb nationalist parties in the republic scored major victories, each capturing about 80% of the vote of their ethnic constituencies.

As part of the peace settlement, NATO promised to deploy 60,000 peacekeeping troops in Bosnia to put into operation the military agenda of the Dayton Agreement, 20,000 of which would be Americans. The NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was regarded as having an achievable mission – troop deployment was limited to one year. However, as the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR) replaced IFOR, NATO essentially holds an open-ended, nation-



building commitment in Bosnia with a current troop complement of approximately 20,000.

### ***UNPROFOR Mandate and NATO Objectives***

In June 1992, as the Yugoslav conflict intensified and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's mandate and strength were enlarged:

- To ensure the security and functioning of the airport at Sarajevo
- To deliver humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and its environs
- (From September 1992) To support efforts by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina
- To protect conveyances of released civilian detainees if the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) so requested
- To monitor the 'no-fly' zone, banning all military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the UN 'safe areas'
- To use force in self defence in reply to attacks against these areas
- To coordinate with NATO the use of air power in support of its activities
- To monitor the implementation of a cease-fire agreement signed by the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Croat forces in February 1994
- To monitor cease-fire arrangements negotiated between the Bosnian Government and Bosnian Serb forces beginning 1 January 1995 ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unprof\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_p.htm) updated 31 August 1996; accessed 15 November 2001)

UNPROFOR was the largest peacekeeping operation in the history of the UN.

NATO originally became involved in the Bosnian war in support of the UN. It monitored and enforced the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia; provided close air support to UNPROFOR on the ground; and carried out air strikes to lift the siege of Sarajevo. NATO forces helped prepare the groundwork for the peace agreement by conducting air operations against Bosnian Serb forces for 12 days in August and September 1995. This action helped shift the balance of power between parties on the ground and "persuade" the Bosnian Serb leadership to accept the peace settlement. IFOR had a one-year mandate to oversee implementation of the military aspects of the peace

agreement. As SFOR succeeded IFOR at the end of 1996, the mission's aims became more ambitious. In addition to preserving a secure environment, deterring a resumption of hostilities and promoting a climate in which the peace process could continue to move forward, they include providing an increased level of selective support to civilian organisations. It is of note that SFOR has a UN mandate not just to maintain peace in Bosnia, but also, where necessary, to enforce it (<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm> updated 8 May 2001: accessed 29 November 2001).

### *A Limited But Challenging Mandate*

In contrast to, for example, UNTAC in Cambodia, UNPROFOR had a rather limited mandate but it encompassed several different territories: Bosnia, Croatia and Macedonia initially before being restricted to Bosnia from March 1995. In addition to this difficulty, UNPROFOR was forced to deal, on a daily basis, with the warring mentality of three factions: Serbs, Croats and Muslims who displayed continually that neither sought a real settlement and resolution to the crisis. For example, there was some evidence that the different sides were shelling themselves in order to gain favour. This led General MacKenzie, the first UN Commander in Sarajevo to declare: "If you'd just stop shelling yourselves, maybe we'll have peace around here" (Maass in Evans-Kent 2000:9). He later told the House Committee on Armed Services, "Dealing with Bosnia is a little bit like dealing with three serial killers, ... One has killed fifteen. One has killed ten. One has killed five. Do we help the one who has only killed five?" (Maass in Evans-Kent 2000:9).

UNPROFOR's mission in Bosnia was first and foremost a humanitarian one which, through extensions of its mandate had grown complications. At a very fundamental level, there existed a conflict between two of the mission's most important tasks: Support for humanitarian assistance and the safe area concept. A "safe area" could be defined as one which was created to be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. The Security Council decided that the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde, Bihac and Srebrenica should be considered safe areas. It was, however, essentially a pro Muslim and anti Serb concept. Apart from harbouring legitimate Muslim civilians, all safe areas served as home for significant active Muslim army resources, and as a springboard for their military offensives. Using UNPROFOR to protect them was clearly not moral and meant taking sides in

open contradiction to the overall humanitarian objective of their mission (<http://www.suc.org/politics/myth/havens.html> 1995: accessed 20 November 2001). Such a concept and its implementation made UNPROFOR blatantly appear to be protecting the rights of one faction of the war against the other two. This action cost UNPROFOR its impartiality and compromised the UN's integrity.

One of the principal mandates of UNPROFOR was to support efforts by the UNHCR to distribute humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia. UNHCR was the lead agency in the delivery of humanitarian assistance. While UNHCR had been able to deliver food, clothing and shelter to many people in the Former Yugoslavia, it was often unable to reach those most needy in the war zones. Access to populations in need was repeatedly denied or sabotaged for political or military purposes especially by the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat sides. All *three* sides frequently threatened the security of the personnel of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other organisations. As a result convoy operations and the international airlift to Sarajevo were interrupted on a number of occasions ([http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co\\_mission/unprof\\_b.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unprof_b.htm), accessed 15 November 2001). The delivery of aid was therefore grossly impeded and could even be stopped by the warlords at will. One of the most unwelcome developments was that the government in Sarajevo increasingly saw UNHCR's mandate as a weak substitute for more forceful action by the international community. Thus even this government would block assistance when it wanted to put political pressure on the West (Shawcross 2000). Conditions in Sarajevo were dire. One editorial reported that UNPROFOR had accepted restrictions and harassment that were *unknown* in other peacekeeping operations. Another report suggested that peacekeepers in Sarajevo had lost confidence in the rules of engagement as well as in command (Pfaff in Fetherston 1994).

These impediments made UNPROFOR's task very challenging. While it had been able to ameliorate human suffering with airlifts and convoys, the lack of a consensus in the Security Council forced UNPROFOR into directing its own course of action which was to be a rather passive one. The deviousness of the factions cannot be overestimated. They wielded too much power over UNPROFOR. In short, UNPROFOR was dealt an impossible mission. A discussion on the difficulties in the mandate follows.

### *Crossing the Mogadishu Line*

Unlike combat troops, which are often concentrated, out for victory and utilising the surprise element, peacekeepers are always out in the open and dispersed. They are there to be seen. They are deployed to have direct contact with the parties at conflict and are not equipped to fight ... Such troops are inescapably vulnerable.

Kofi Annan in Gardels (1995:40)

The vulnerability of peacekeeping troops is an issue that is manifestly connected with their function and mandate. Second generation peacekeeping so often is a response to the words, 'Something must be done!' that describe a situation that has breached humanitarian standards. In this case, peacekeepers' authority is based on the authority of the UN rather than the consent of the conflicting parties, i.e. the legal basis of second generation peacekeeping is based less on an environment of consent of the parties in conflict than on the international powers that have become involved in the process through community outrage and concern. Complications will occur if there is a discrepancy between what the mandate authorises and what is the reality, given the conditions on the ground, the conflict environment and the means given to the peacekeepers. UNPROFOR illustrates such complications well.

When the Bosnian conflict erupted in 1992, the international community appeared neither to want to abandon Bosnia nor intervene militarily. Instead, the UN sent UNPROFOR into Bosnia to support the delivery of humanitarian relief and to protect released detainees. Such apolitical activities defined UNPROFOR's aim as reducing the level of suffering while being receptive to any indication of peace that might emerge. UNPROFOR's peacekeepers were not warriors. The fact that equipment was painted white with black lettering testifies to the fact that visibility was being enhanced rather than reduced, illustrating its deterrent role. UNPROFOR's mission was not to stop the bloodshed and to coerce the parties into a settlement: UNPROFOR was a non-combatant, neither put together nor mandated for peace enforcement. However, the extensions to UNPROFOR's mandate to help protect designated safe areas threw the mandate into doubt and the peacekeepers into confusion. While the Security Council authorised UNPROFOR to deter attacks against safe areas and to promote the withdrawal of attacking forces, it did not authorise UNPROFOR to defend safe areas or to ensure or enforce the withdrawal of

attacking forces. UNPROFOR's main deterrent capacity would be its *presence* in the safe areas (MacInnis 1995:98).

It is to be hoped that peacekeepers carry dictionaries with them and that they are conversant with semantics. They certainly could be excused for interpreting *deter* to mean protect, especially in the confusion of an attack thus making them liable for adopting a hostile posture vis-à-vis the attacking party. For example, while social support for UNPROFOR coming from Bosnian and Croat quarters was eroded by its lack of success in deterring the Serbian attacks on the safe areas, such deterrent activities threatened relationships with Serbian political authorities and became an issue in reaching a settlement to the conflict. At the same time, however, cautionary behaviour on the part of UNPROFOR with respect to the safe areas produced negative reactions from those more militant elites in contributing countries. Dandeker and Gow (1997: 341) distinguish between impartiality and neutrality. With the extension of the mandate into deterring attacks on safe areas, it was feared by certain UN policymakers that peacekeepers would indeed lose their neutrality and become associated with one side of the conflict. However, according to Dandeker and Gow (1997), this view of neutrality confines the peacekeeper to a mere passive role of observer. Impartiality means the application of coercive force in pursuit of UN mandates. This may mean applying force more to one side than the other at a given point in time but only if that side is the one most in breach of the mandate on, for example, the safe areas. This is a highly controversial point of view and certainly one which luckily is to be investigated by policymakers and not peacekeepers who might otherwise have to be walking tightropes whilst being attacked. The point to be made is that peacekeepers in Bosnia were really not backed up by a mandate that was intelligently constructed. It was ambiguous and contained contentious wording. Further, there was no peace to keep. The three factions were at war with each other in one form or another. To ask the UN peacekeepers to deter attacks on the safe areas was inviting confused responses and provoked accusations of the UN crossing the Mogadishu line, changing from peacekeeper to combatant. The peacekeepers were left vulnerable with a mandate that was inappropriate and undeliverable.

If it was not the protection of the safe areas that made the UN cross the Mogadishu line then it could well be argued that the use of NATO air strikes,

approved by the UN, against major Serb military targets did so. In order to appreciate how difficult was the conflict in Bosnia and how this represented an impossible task for the peacekeepers with their contentious mandate, it will be necessary to briefly examine NATO's efforts to enforce the Dayton Peace Agreement. It will be seen how NATO, with a broad, expansive mandate not only to maintain peace but also to enforce it, dealt with the recalcitrance, sedition and deceitfulness of these factions all the time vying for power and influence. The investigation into NATO's deployment is only to illuminate the complexity of what UNPROFOR was asked to do and how this was unrealistic in the face of existing conditions at the time.

### *NATO's Deployment after Dayton*

The Dayton Agreement was signed on the 21 November 1995 by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<sup>xii</sup>. According to the terms of the agreement, a sovereign state known as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisted of two entities: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia. Has this facilitated the reconciliation among ethnic groups? US authorities have claimed that there have been significant successes in ethnically mixed Bosnia in the five years since Dayton. The Dayton Accord ended the violence and established a framework upon which Bosnia has begun the transition toward a multi-ethnic democracy. However, in some important respects, the Dayton framework prevents Bosnians from being citizens with equal rights throughout the country, favours nationalist parties and makes self-sustaining peace difficult to achieve (United States Institute of Peace 2000).

The three ethnic groups maintain largely the same position they did during the war. Both Serbs and Croats continue to strengthen the autonomy of each division at the expense of the joint institutions while the Muslims attempt to strengthen the Bosnian state through institutional means. While this is occurring, the international community increasingly intervenes in local political life contributing to the political irresponsibility of local leaders. The presence of an electoral system that favours ethnically based parties and the micro management of the country by the international community do not instil accountability into local ethnic leaders (Belloni 2001).

What is also of the utmost significance is that the security environment in Bosnia today is 'artificially stable' because of the international military presence. The international NATO based IFOR and the follow-on SFOR have established calm and stability. Since the end of the war, there have been few major incidents of organised inter-ethnic violence. SFOR maintains an active and visible presence and proves to be an effective deterrent against military clashes. However, each of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia continues to maintain an army, with each army postured against the other. There is a rough balance of military capabilities between the three ethnic military structures (United States Institute of Peace 2000: 11). The mere existence of three competing armies is completely undermining efforts to make Bosnia and Herzegovina a single country. The armies promote the continuation of powerful ethnic myths which in turn keeps alive the animosity and ancient hatreds that have been generated through the ages. A withdrawal of the international community now would certainly mean the possibility of war.

A very significant issue which has emerged with NATO's presence in Bosnia and which will be taken up in more detail later in this thesis is the need to refocus training and development for troops participating in peace operations. Senior commanders such as Gen Eric K Shinseki, Gen William Crouch and Gen Montgomery Meigs complained of having no specific training for what they encountered in Bosnia. Gen William Crouch said: "I was on my own. I'd certainly never been trained for something like this" (Olsen and Davis 1999:4). The training that the senior officers received encompassed the art of warfighting and high intensity conflict. However, after the prospects of open warfare had faded, it became obvious that the skills acquired by the general officers – the ones that many of these senior leaders had used so effectively in the Gulf War – were not enough for what they were called upon to do in Bosnia (Olsen and Davis 1999).

It appears to be finally recognised that peacekeeping in Bosnia holds a degree of complexity and disturbance that is new. It could very well be the paradigm of future peacekeeping. What are the skills necessary for a peacekeeper to possess to be an effective agent in sustaining peace? Well in Bosnia it appeared that the warrior mentality was still required. For example, Olsen and Davis (1999: 8) report that time and time again, the generals in Bosnia pointed to occasions when the former warring

factions would test, prod, push and hope that the US forces would misstep. In each case, the former warring factions watched America's senior military leadership counter their every move with swift deployment of forces and decisive action. These reactions avoided potential conflict. This is a point that can be well taken but many other skills are necessary to operate in a stability operation in addition to the skills of a soldier. They include conflict resolution skills and negotiation techniques, how to deal with hostile and friendly media, how to work with civilians in the international community and how to read a peace map in the figurative sense. In addition, being conscious and knowledgeable of the culture of the host country as well as perhaps having a limited ability to speak and understand some of its languages are essential. The Americans would do well to take lessons from their English counterparts who have a history of extended colonial experience and have been immersed traditionally in studying different cultures and languages.

NATO with deployments IFOR and SFOR have created an artificial stability in Bosnia, artificial because of the military presence required to enforce peace amongst the three ethnic divisions which each possess a military capability of its own. NATO senior military leaders have expressed the great difficulty faced in dealing with the situation in Bosnia, quelling the rising tide of conflict among the three ethnic groupings. UNPROFOR was there before the Dayton Peace Agreement came into effect. It did not have an enforcement mandate, as does SFOR. Clearly, peacekeepers with UNPROFOR were on a mission impossible.

### ***Case Study Summary***

The delivery of humanitarian aid has been the primary task of UNPROFOR. In that it has partially achieved its aim. Its presence to deter hostilities in the safe areas must be seen as a failure. However, in considering UNPROFOR's performance, it must be acknowledged that its organisation reflected its mandate to operate through agreement rather than through enforcement and this has influenced the measures which it was able to take in fulfilling the mandate. UNPROFOR was given a contentious mandate. It could not protect the safe areas, merely deter. Legally it could only use its *presence* to deter. That the UN crossed the Mogadishu line with the safe area controversy and the NATO bombing, which the UN approved, proved how difficult the situation was in Bosnia with its entrenched ethnic divisions supported by



three ethnic armies. While the Dayton Agreement brought peace to this troubled territory, it is a fragile peace, made stable only by the presence of NATO. The difficulties that NATO has faced up to the present, attests to the hardship that UNPROFOR peacekeepers confronted without an enforcement but controversially undeliverable mandate. The UN has been very generous with its mandates in Bosnia but very light on resources. The new skills that NATO troops and generals are being forced to learn in the Bosnian peacekeeping environment is revealing a new paradigm for the future.

### **Case Study 2: Kosovo, Arguably An Excuse to Start Bombing**

The magnitude of Kosovo reverberates across the centuries . . . Six hundred years ago, on St. Vitus Day, [the] Christian army of Serbian Prince Lazar and Islamic conquerors under Turkish Sultan Murat fought a great battle on the plains of Kosovo. Serbs were defending themselves and Christian Europe from the Ottoman invasion, but at Kosovo they were defeated. Prince Lazar and the cream of the Serbian nobility all died heroically . . . Kosovo is many diverse things to different living Serbs but they all have it in their blood . . . It has survived 609 years and throughout the succeeding generations Kosovo has become the inspiration of an entire nation . . . Through the centuries, Serbian sacrifice and Kosovo have become synonymous . . . Kosovo permanently changed the face of Europe and altered history.

We Serbs are a proud people who have endured throughout history and still our homeland suffers the agonies of war.

A compilation of excerpts from *The Saga of Kosovo*  
From *Kosovo Heritage*  
(<http://www.srpska-mreza.com/mlad>)

The above text illustrates well the fact that Kosovo is seen as the cradle of Serb civilisation. To the Serbs, Kosovo holds clear historical significance: The Serbs have long regarded the area of Kosovo as being home to some of the most sacred symbols of Serb nationhood. In June 1994, the Serbian governor of Kosovo spoke for all Serbs when he said, 'A Serbia without Kosovo is unimaginable. Every Serb monastery here is older than the discovery of America' (Jones 1994: accessed 6 October 2000). Thus the conflict in Kosovo is historical and national in character which has been fuelled by ancient ethnic hatreds.

The Albanians represent a huge Muslim majority in what Serbs regard as their traditional heartland. This is a result of the victory of the Ottoman invasion in the 14<sup>th</sup> century. Constant conflict, enmity and violence have subsequently persisted between the two factions. A US State Department Report (1999) provides extensive data of human rights violations and war crimes that have been perpetrated on the Albanians

by the Serbs: Forced expulsions, looting, burning, detentions, the use of people as human shields, summary executions, systematic and organised mass rape as well as the finding of 500 mass grave and killing sites in Kosovo. From as early as 1990, for their part, the Kosovo Albanians practised a strategy of non-violence as a response to Serb repression but they failed to attract the attention of the International Community (Scatterwhite 2000). This failure facilitated the birth in 1996 of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA increasingly focussed on Serb targets gaining the support of much of the Kosovo Albanian population (Shawcross 2000).

### ***Historical Background***

The conflict really began to conflagrate in 1989. From 1974 up to this time the Albanians had “enjoyed” autonomy conferred upon them by the uncontested authority of the charismatic Marshal Tito. Former President of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic inflamed the already volatile situation in Kosovo by abolishing that autonomy. The consequences of the abolition of Kosova’s autonomy included the disbanding of police, the abolition of courts, the closing down of schools in the Albanian language, the destruction of health institutions, the occupation and blockade of cultural institutions and the destruction of the Albanian economy (Kosovo Crisis Centre 1991). Herein lies the complex dynamic that fuels the Kosovo conflict. Revoking the autonomous status was a crucial decision. It completely destabilised the multiethnic fabric of the Yugoslavian system. This helped facilitate the rise of the KLA. What motivated such a decision? Is it logical that it could be simply a Serbian need to oppress Albanians? Dividing participants of a conflict into categories of “victim” and “villain” appeases one’s penchant for assigning blame but it lacks depth. Both sides more often than not have legitimate grievances that need to be examined. Naureckas (1999: accessed 14 February 2001) cites Binder from the *New York Times* who filed various reports (1982-1987) of atrocities which have included rape, arson, pillage and industrial sabotage by the Albanians designed to drive Kosovo’s remaining indigenous Serbs out of the province to form an ethnically pure Albanian region, a “Republic of Kosovo” in all but name. It may not be that both sides are equally at fault but it is naïve to think that one side is completely blameless: There must be some *sharing* of responsibility for the conflict. There usually are two sides to every story.

What cannot be denied, however, is that the Kosovo Albanians have suffered seriously in terms of structural violence: 'the structures which maintain the dominance of one group at the centre of power over another group, often a majority, at the periphery' (Harris and Lewis 1999: 29-30). This has meant for the Kosovo Albanians, limited political representation, legal rights and little control over their lives. While the two nationalisms, Serbian and Albanian, have competed with each other since the formation of each ethnic identity, the plight of the Kosovo Albanians finally drew the concern of the West in late 1998. How did the West resolve the impasse?

### *'Resolution' Of The Conflict*

At 2:00 PM EST on the 24<sup>th</sup> March 1999, NATO, the world's most powerful actor, initiated a bombing campaign to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic had used to 'depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo' (<http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/> 1999: accessed 1 February 2001). NATO did not possess Security Council authorisation in taking this enforcement action. NATO issued no statement setting out the legal justification for the action (O'Connell 2000). For NATO, humanitarian catastrophe and Yugoslavia's violation of international law justified the use of force. It remains to be seen just what repercussions such action, action without Security Council approval, will have on the future status of the United Nations – will this precedent change the rules completely? I believe it will seriously undermine UN authority.

A crucial factor in the search for a solution to the Kosovo conflict lies in the context of the Rambouillet Accords. There were two parts to the peace proposals: A political agreement on autonomy for Kosovo and an implementation agreement on how to carry out the political deal, understood to require international peacekeepers in Kosovo. The Serb side had agreed to the essentials of a political deal. It was the implementation part that was a problem. The US wanted the Kosovo plan to be implemented by NATO troops under a NATO command to which the Yugoslavian leadership was opposed. A UN or OSCE force however, was favourably being considered by that leadership (Rendell 1999). The failure of negotiations has been put squarely on the shoulders of Serbian intransigence in the media but has this really been the case? The US adamantly refused to consider any force other than NATO.

Appendix B of the Rambouillet Accord details NATO's powers in terms of the status of the Multi-National Military Implementation Force. They can only be described as sweeping. For example, clause 8 refers to NATO personnel enjoying 'together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters' (<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm> 1999: accessed 26 June 2002). This effectively means that NATO would have had extraordinarily intrusive access to the whole of Yugoslavia. Becker (2000: 1-3) argues that there were, in fact, no negotiations at all and claims that 'no sovereign, independent state could have signed the Rambouillet agreement', that it was, in truth, 'a declaration of war disguised as a peace agreement'. Other voices of protest can be heard. For example, it has been reported by Kenny and Jatras, administration personnel, that media were told at Rambouillet under embargo that:

"We intentionally set the bar too high for the Serbs to comply. They need some bombing, and that's what they are going to get."

<http://www.fair.org/press-releases/kosovo-talks.html> (1999: accessed 15 February 2001)

Shawcross (2000:329) expresses the injustice of the Rambouillet Accords even more convincingly in a quotation from Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state:

[The Rambouillet Text] was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should not have been presented in that form.

It is highly significant that *only* a NATO force was acceptable to the US.

Rendell (1999: <http://www.fair.org/press-releases/kosovo-solution.html>) quotes from a leaked version of the Pentagon's 1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance report:

[The United States] must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO . . . Therefore, it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for US influence and participation in European security affairs.

From this can be seen the importance of NATO to the US. This is really *another* agenda. It is thought that all peaceful options for arriving at a settlement in Kosovo had been exhausted. In view of the strict NATO requirement in the Rambouillet Accords, it appears that they were not. In any case, launching a massive wave of destruction (78 days of widespread bombing) to end the cycle of violence in Kosovo did not achieve its goal. While not one NATO soldier had died in combat, the campaign cost the lives of those whom the war was supposed to save, the people of

Kosovo (Shawcross 2000). Both Kosovo and Serbia have been devastated. The war also fuelled more violence between the protagonists. About 10 weeks after NATO stopped bombing Yugoslavia, only about 20,000 Serbs remained in Kosovo out of a prewar population of 200,000 ie 90% of Kosovo Serbs had become refugees since 'peace' was proclaimed (Coen 1999). As Western leaders hailed the bombing a victory for democracy and human rights and presented this victory to the world as a moral imperative, NATO could congratulate itself for being the major agent of recovery in the Kosovo conflict. However, while NATO may have prevented further Serb invasion, in reality they succeeded in perpetuating the struggle and preventing the conditions to emerge for a stable peace.

Clearly, NATO's humanitarian intervention was controversial. While the mass persecution against the Albanian Kosovos was eventually halted, the attacks caused immense population displacements to say nothing of the questionable ethics of the Rambouillet Accords which were biased against the Serbs. For this reason NATO remains a contentious actor on the Kosovo stage leaving the UN in the form of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to clean up the mess. UNMIK began the long process of building peace, democracy, stability and self-government in the devastated province with a mandate born on 10 June 1999.

#### *UNMIK Mandate*

UNMIK was authorised to lead an interim civilian administration in Kosovo under which its people could progressively enjoy substantial autonomy. In particular, the mandate called upon UNMIK to:

- Perform basic civilian administrative functions
- Promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government
- Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status
- Coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies
- Support the reconstruction of key infrastructure
- Maintain civil law and order
- Promote human rights

- Assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm> 2001: accessed 15 November 2001).

To implement its mandate, UNMIK initially brought together four 'pillars' under its leadership. At the end of the emergency stage, Pillar I (humanitarian assistance), led by UNHCR, was phased out in June 2000. In May 2001, a new Pillar I was established. Currently, the pillars are:

- (1) Pillar I: Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the UN
- (2) Pillar II: Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the UN
- (3) Pillar III: Democratisation and Institution Building, led by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
- (4) Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU) (<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm> 2001: accessed 15 November 2001).

#### *A Multitude of Actors for a Complex Mandate*

The mandate is a very complex one characteristic of a humanitarian intervention. The recovery process currently has four substantive components: police and justice (UN-led) - this has replaced humanitarian affairs which was UNHCR-led - interim civil administration (UN-led), reconstruction (EU-led) and institution building (OSCE-led). A NATO-led Force, Kosovo Force (KFOR), provides an international security presence. There are many NGOs involved. Thus there is a plethora of major actors. Typical of this type of mandate, there is a blurring of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks. Surely one of the great challenges in this mission, in the reconstruction of Kosovo, is how these major actors interact. Inter-agency co-ordination, co-operation, management and dexterity in bringing things together have been and are going to continue to be vital.

There has been some success, for example, in the co-ordination of activities involving indigenous staff. The establishment of a Kosovo-UNMIK Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS) shared provisional management of Kosovo until elections were held. This was set up 15 December 1999 as a means for sharing the responsibility for central and administrative services. Local counterparts for administering the province were appointed (later, at municipal level, elected)

representatives of a broad cross-section of Kosovo society. This enabled involvement of minority groups in the decision-making processes. By February 2000, JIAS had officially replaced all previous parallel security and administrative structures. By the end of 2000, elected Municipal Assemblies were in place in most municipalities (<http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/unmik12.html> 2000: accessed 15 November 2001).

In addition, while UNHCR successfully repatriated 825,000 refugees by the end of February 2000 (<http://un.org/peace/kosovo/news/kos30day.htm> 2000: accessed 15 February 2001), the EU had commenced and completed many tasks to build up the infrastructure of Kosovo as well as a customs service with the support of international experts funded by the EU. This provided Kosovo with its first self-generated income, helping it to stand eventually on its own financially ([http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/see/Kosovo?1\\_year\\_on.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/Kosovo?1_year_on.htm) 2000: accessed 24 February 2001). The OSCE, meanwhile, in an effort furthering democratisation, organised municipal elections in conjunction with UNMIK for the 28 October 2000 and general elections for 17 November 2001.

While major actors have been able to successfully co-ordinate some key projects, however, caution is required if it is thought that the entire operation has been one skilfully balanced interrelationship. It has not. This massive interface of actors means 'constantly redrawing the lines of responsibility'. For example, NATO was one hundred times superior in manpower and resources than most other actors and when not engaged militarily, began encroaching on other actors mandates (McNamara 1999: <http://www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rm/116/rm/11609.htm>). The OSCE Head of Mission, Ambassador Daan Everts, meantime expressed extreme dismay at the continuing violence which was undermining efforts at democratisation – attempts at creating conditions for peaceful co-existence were being shattered by constant acts of terrorism ([http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news\\_id=1468](http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?news_id=1468) 2001: accessed 26 February 2001). Violence cannot be a symptom of a good relationship. It seems the international actors, particularly UNMIK and KFOR, have not streamlined their approach to the problems of demilitarisation and the demobilising of combatants sufficiently to quell problems of inter-ethnic conflict.

For the international community, the election of a new national assembly endowed with limited powers of self-rule is a logical step in the effort to build democracy in a war ravaged province. For the Albanian majority, however, it is the first step towards independence from the Yugoslav Federation. This was confirmed by the themes in the election campaign – the Albanians have pushed for independence; the Serbs have fought against it. While the reality is that the new Assembly does not have the power to decide the province's future status and that Kosovo will remain overall under UN control for some years, moderate pacifist Ibrahim Rugova representing the Democratic League of Kosovo and winner of 45.7% of votes said that independence was the most precious word for Albanians and he wanted it as soon as possible (<http://groups.yahoo.com/group/decani/message/62085> 2001: accessed 13 December 2001). While the new assembly will continue the massive democratic and social rebuilding project started by the international community, it is a concern that the low Serb turnout will not legitimise the election results and lend credibility to Kosovo's new parliament in the eyes of the international community. This in turn will not reinforce Kosovo's political status failing to provide a climate in which reconciliation can flourish between the Kosovo Albanians and the non-Albanian minority.

### ***Reconciliation: How Likely Is It?***

Reconciliation, while not usually specified in mandates and therefore not a visible goal, must nonetheless surely be a basic goal of the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding processes for it is the bedrock upon which all other recovery action rests. Issues of national reconciliation are particularly important where political violence has divided communities (Lewis 1999c). Thus in Kosovo one of the major barriers affecting political reconstruction is a failure to reconcile ethnic divisions. Previous enemies need to gain knowledge in how to relate to each other. At least a first step has been taken in this direction. An Inter-ethnic Dialogue and Conflict Resolution Workshop was held in February 2001 consisting of 28 participants representing Albanian, Serbian, Bosniak, Roma and Gorani ethnic communities, coming from Kosovo and Serbia proper. The workshop focused on the process of dialogue between ethnic communities and the process of dealing with conflict by non-violent means ([http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?\\_news=1480](http://www.osce.org/news/generate.php3?_news=1480) 20 February 2001: accessed 26 February 2001). This exercise was like a building



block in a solid foundation of the processes for democratic governance. It may only represent a small piece of conflict resolution but it is a piece that will contribute to sustain *long-term* political reconstruction.

Spence (1999) argues, however, that addressing the effects of conflict involves the healing of both those that perpetrated the war and those who suffered because of it. This is one of the major tasks of social reconstruction. It is especially relevant in the Kosovo case for as has been outlined in this thesis already, the hatred and animosity between Serb and Albanian has a long and complex history. The recovery process has been fraught with continuing conflict between these two nationalities. A significant breakthrough came with "The Airlie Declaration" when representatives of the Serb and Albanian communities within Kosovo met together in Airlie, Virginia, from July 21-23 2000 with the facilitation of the United States Institute of Peace. At this meeting, both Albanians and Serbs faced each other in a spirit of searching together for positive steps toward building peace despite the sorrows of the past. Serbs acknowledged that they had to work with the Albanians to build democratic institutions in Kosovo while Albanians recognised that Serbs and others must have equal rights and protection. The Albanian viewpoint was that Serbian participation in the electoral process would provide evidence of Serbian commitment to a free and democratic Kosovo. The Serbian viewpoint was that while recognising the need for elections, conditions had not been created for Serbs to participate ([http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/000723\\_airlie\\_decl.html](http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/000723_airlie_decl.html) 20 January 2001: accessed 19 February 2001). The general elections of 17 November 2001 have demonstrated that both Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs are thinking still very much in ethnic directions and not towards a united Kosovo – Albanians canvassed for independence while a half the Serb population of Kosovo refrained from voting! Decades of tension and conflict have left civil society in Kosovo deeply divided. While a program such as the above stimulates the development of multiethnic elements within civil society which is required for reconciliation to take place in the wider context of social reconstruction, there is still so much more work to be done here. There needs to be many more 'Airlies'.

Reconciliation is the leading thread that runs through the processes of recovery and reconstruction whether they are political, social or economic. For

example, no amount of *political reconstruction* can overcome conflict and hatred between Serb and Albanian and if that conflict and hatred is not addressed, then political reconstruction will not succeed. Lederach (1998:178) rightly claims that 'there is no Holy Grail of conflict resolution': While reconciliation is hard work, solutions cannot be imported from outside – they have to emerge from the soil where the conflict is rooted. People who have been affected by the conflict must air their experiences. Airing the truth as each side experiences it, exposes vital issues of oppression and power imbalance. Agencies in the past have addressed these issues with an "empowerment paradigm", i.e. empowerment has been emphasised as if such empowerment must be taken from some dominant group. Bock & Anderson (1999: 334-335) however, speak more appropriately of a "belongingment paradigm": Humans hunger to belong and while this tendency can work in the direction of either violence or peace, people who have shared the experiences of war have a great deal in common. It is these shared common experiences which must be built upon and which can reinforce the linkages of peace. Both Serb and Albanian "share" traumatic war experiences. Recovery processes must focus to a far greater extent on the reconciliation between these two ethnic groups. Although some attempts have been made to do this such as the Airlie Declaration, this is just touching the surface of a much deeper issue. This issue will have to be addressed in a much more comprehensive way if reconciliation is to be achieved. Reconciliation does not appear likely at this stage.

### ***Case Study Summary***

It has been shown that conflict in Kosovo is not just a recent phenomenon. There has been a long history of tension between Serb and Albanian and while the two sides might not be equally at fault, there is a sharing of responsibility to some degree for the conflict. With no approval from the Security Council of the United Nations, NATO addressed the humanitarian catastrophe via means of a bombing campaign. In view of the fact that it was debateable whether all avenues *had* been explored through the controversial Rambouillet Accords, NATO must remain a very contentious recovery actor. This action has seriously undermined UN standing. The UN, discarded and disdained for a time, became the essential actor in the recovery process along with the OSCE and the EU as well as KFOR, a NATO-led security presence. This plethora of actors has created problems of co-ordination and co-

operation which needs addressing by all contributors, particularly UNMIK which leads the mission.

There has been *some* recognition within UNMIK of the need to bring the Serbs and Albanians together in a co-operative spirit of understanding and reconciliation. A commitment does exist theoretically that both Serb and Albanian meet face-to-face and work together in the interests of peace and a way forward for both ethnic groups. As the general election has shown, however, this commitment has remained largely an abstraction, something that has not been translated into practice. Surely this represents one of the hardest processes of recovery yet receives the least attention. It is arduous and contentious requiring great dexterity on the part of the mediators and courage and application on the part of the participants, but altogether necessary. There can be no successful political, social and economic recovery without it. All of the actors in the Kosovo reconstruction team need to see the truth in this.

### **Summary**

The disintegrating Former Yugoslavia has been wracked with conflict. Two of the most troublesome areas have been Bosnia and Kosovo. The constant in these two areas have been the introduction of the world's most powerful actor, NATO, into the conflict. In Bosnia, NATO acted with the approval of the UN. In Kosovo, NATO acted without UN consent, performing a bombing campaign in Serbia *before* the Rambouillet Accords were given adequate time to be resolved. This action seriously undermined the credibility of the UN as the world's peace agent and surely has created some contempt and doubt regarding the UN's ability to deal with humanitarian intervention.

While Bosnia initially had a limited mandate, it grew complications concerning safe areas that made the mission extremely problematic for the peacekeepers. Bosnia became mission impossible. On the other hand, after NATO had finished bombing Kosovo and the UN had inherited the chaos, UNMIK was given an extremely expansive mandate which involved peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The sheer complexity of the mandate brought great difficulties to the peacekeepers who still struggle with it today.

One of the principal lessons that has come from the missions in Bosnia and Kosovo is the importance of reconciliation in the process of peacekeeping. The deeply entrenched ethnic hatreds that characterise these regions are such an obstacle to any sort of recovery process. Fundamental to political, social and economic reconstruction of any kind is dealing with the reconciliation process first or at least concurrently with the other processes. This poses a challenging task to the peacekeeping mission which must work to facilitate reconciliation through working directly and actively with the indigenous population itself.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Case Studies III

Chapter Five explores to date the most complex peacekeeping mission that the UN has initiated. It will be seen how this mission exemplifies the nexus that exists between peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention and how peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping interrelate and impact upon one another. This case study is particularly pertinent as the peacekeeping mission in East Timor was comprised of military and non-military personnel. Lack of indigenous participation is seen to be one of the foremost problems that could ultimately lead to failure of this mission.

#### **Case Study: East Timor, Independence and Reconstruction after a 25-year brutal occupation by Indonesia**

On 20 May 2002, East Timor celebrated its independence. President Jose Alexandre Gusmao exhorted his citizens to make the best of their hard won freedom. The ceremony was attended by Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri accompanied by four Indonesian warships and more than 100 security guards. Does this signify a happy end to a long bitter struggle for the East Timorese people? Not yet. East Timor will join the ranks of the world's poorest countries and will need international aid for years to come. In order to sustain nationhood, the people of this newest of nations must commit themselves to a set of tasks, the range of which is staggering. The people of East Timor, however, have demonstrated they possess the courage: Four centuries of Portuguese colonialism fostered a keen, rebellious resilience, an attribute useful in confronting the challenges to come.

In December 1975, Indonesian troops landed in East Timor and pro-Indonesian parties declared establishment of a 'provisional government of East Timor'. While Indonesian East Timor was recognised by certain countries, notably Australia, it had never been recognised by the United Nations. The long struggle that ensued between the East Timorese for independence and the Indonesian authority representatives was comparable to Cambodian experience. Trying to lead a normal life under an oppressive regime that invades one's daily activities is something the

East Timorese had plenty of time to learn about. Cox and Carey (1995:89) capture the mood of this period:

A climate of fear pervades life. Nervous smiles have come to symbolise East Timor; fear is so overwhelming that looking over your shoulder is instinctive. Knowing who you are talking to can sometimes be difficult. The Indonesians force people to spy or become informers through threats.

Thus severe human rights abuse characterised Indonesia's occupation of East Timor.

### ***Historical Background***

The Prime Minister [Mr Whitlam] said that he felt two things were basic to his own thinking on Portuguese Timor. First, he believed that Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia. Second, this should happen in accordance with the properly expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor. . . . At the same time he believed that Portuguese Timor was too small to be independent. It was economically unviable. Independence would be unwelcome to Indonesia, to Australia and to other countries in the region . . .

The President [President Soeharto] said that Portuguese Timor faced two alternatives:

- (1) Independence; and
- (2) Incorporation with another country

If Portuguese Timor were to become independent, it would give rise to problems. It was not economically viable. . . . Ultimately the Indonesians hoped for the incorporation of Portuguese Timor as being in the best interests of the region, of Indonesia and of Australia. The president shared the belief that this should occur on the basis of the freely expressed wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor.

Excerpt from a record of a meeting between Whitlam and Soeharto  
State Guest House, Yogyakarta, 6 September 1974, 10a.m.  
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2000:95-97)

On 7 December 1974, under the unquestioned acquiescence of an Australian Government, Indonesian forces, with no reservations as to governmental objectives of incorporating the former Portuguese colony into Indonesia, invaded East Timor. Prior to this event on 28 November 1975, the Portuguese withdrawn, Fretilin, an East Timorese organisation formed to fight for independence, had declared East Timor an independent state (Taylor 1999: 201). Political rhetoric and posturing seems to cover a multitude of sins. Despite the reservations of both Whitlam and Soeharto as to the 'economic unviability' of an independent East Timor, Taylor (1999: 65) argues that Fretilin had devised development strategies whose full implementation could have 'created the infrastructure for a successfully planned economy, based on the indigenous needs of the population' - in fact, under external threat and internal conflict, the foundations for a successful nation-state had been founded, economically, politically, culturally and socially.

Thus, despite evidence suggestive of the viability of an East Timorese nation-state, Indonesia for its own political imperatives invaded the territory and began a brutal occupation which was to last twenty-five years. Following the invasion, Fretilin forces retreated into the mountains and began a 24-year long guerrilla war against the Indonesian army. Hence life in East Timor for the indigenous person, balanced between two armed combatants, became a prolonged nightmare, a nightmare where intimidation by the Indonesian Army played a large part in the role of subjugating the population. Change of presidency, however, provided a small window of opportunity to change the fate of East Timor. President Habibie allowed a vote to be taken: Autonomy with Indonesia or independence. This was an historic opportunity for the East Timorese people. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was sent to oversee this vote.

#### *UNAMET Mandate*

UNAMET's mandate was to organise and conduct a popular consultation on the basis of a direct, secret and universal ballot, in order to ascertain whether the East Timorese people accepted the proposed constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia or rejected the proposed special autonomy for East Timor, leading to East Timor's separation from Indonesia. This involved firstly, registering all eligible voters and then conducting the ballot. UNAMET was not a peacekeeping mission but a Chapter VI intervention<sup>xiii</sup> – one undertaken with the consent of all the parties involved. Throughout its mission, Indonesia was responsible for maintaining appropriate security in the territory and for protection of the UN personnel, with the role of the international police contingent strictly advisory (Cotton 2000:3-4).

#### *Problems with UNAMET*

Crucial to the lasting success of any post-conflict peace settlement, is the effective demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants back into society (Lewis 1999a). This presented a problem right from the start of the UNAMET operation for Indonesian militia groups who were organised and supplied by elements of the Indonesian military (Cotton 2000). The aim of the militia seemed to be to intimidate the population and destabilise the independence camp. Such activity was confirmed

by Van Klinken (2000:46) who claims the militia were 'trained, armed, paid and directed by the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI)' who allowed them to intimidate and kill without reference to the law, anyone who was suspected of pro-independence activity. The Armed Forces for an Independent East Timor (FALINTIL), the armed wing of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT), although being sorely tested remained in cantonments and did not engage in retaliation against the militias which may have aborted the consultation process altogether (Cotton 2000). A free and fair ballot required that the TNI stop supporting the militias. Despite this great disadvantage to UNAMET and the East Timorese people, the ballot went ahead.

### *Outcome of Elections*

On voting day, 30 August 1999, 98% of registered voters went to the polls deciding by a margin of 21.5% to 78.5% to reject the proposed autonomy and begin a process of transition towards independence (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetB.htm> 2001: accessed 31 March 2001). As soon as the polls closed, however, the militias launched a horrifying assault on the population which only increased as time passed. While some countries began to call for intervention by a UN peacekeeping force, Indonesia's President Habibie did not approve. The violence was clearly orchestrated – Shawcross (2000:357) calls it 'ethnic cleansing Indonesia-style' and quotes Peter Carey, an East Timor specialist who called it 'a policy of political genocide, eliminating all members of the pro-independence intelligentsia'. Owing to deteriorating conditions however, on 12 September 1999, Habibie acquiesced unconditionally allowing a mission, the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) to be mobilised.

### *INTERFET Mandate*

On 15 September 1999 the Security Council approved a Chapter VII peace enforcement intervention, INTERFET, which provided the force three tasks to perform:

- To restore peace and security in East Timor
- To protect and support UNAMET



- To facilitate within force capabilities humanitarian assistance (Cotton 2000:5).

INTERFET was an interim fully-fledged peacekeeping mission, with a powerful mandate led by a contingent of Australian peacekeepers. UNAMET re-established a presence in Dili on 28 September 1999 but there were no administration personnel or structures remaining in the territory. UNAMET was thus faced with a major humanitarian crisis which demanded a much more comprehensive effort by the international community. This resulted in a mission called the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

### *UNTAET Mandate*

UNTAET with augmented powers and executive, legal, and administrative responsibilities was therefore planned to incorporate the following components. It was to:

- Provide security and maintain law and order
- Establish an effective administration
- Assist in the development of civil and social services
- Ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and development assistance
- Support capacity-building for self-government
- Assist in the establishment of conditions for sustainable development

(<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm> 2001: accessed 18 March 2001)

Thus UNTAET's mandate was very wide and very powerful. It has been taking the responsibility for the reconstruction of a devastated territory, repatriating refugees and acting as the supreme civil authority in East Timor until the inauguration of the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) on 20 May 2002. In examining UNTAET's mandate, however, it can be seen that the first directive, to provide security and maintain law and order, is the only one that is strictly within a peacekeeper's discipline; the other five directives fall within a peacebuilding structure. A salient question to ask however is, 'Where does peacekeeping stop and peacemaking and peacebuilding begin? They are not the discrete entities they are conceptualised to be. These three concepts impact on one another. Failures in peacemaking and peacebuilding will compound peacekeeping problems. The

following section, while discussing failures in peacekeeping will also include how different understandings of peacemaking and peacebuilding complicate failures in the mandate as well.

It is also significant that UNTAET not only included a civilian contingent consisting of 737 international civilian personnel representing 7 per cent of the total peacekeeping force, it also signed up 1,745 local civilian staff which represents 17 per cent of the total peacekeeping force as at 31 March 2002 (<http://www.un.org/peace/timor/UntaetF.htm> 2002: accessed 27 June 2002). Hiring local civilian staff was a great step forward but it will be seen UN peacekeeping authorities failed to capitalise on their potential and the potential of the international civilian personnel by failing to adequately engage at the local level, to interact constructively and meaningfully with the local population regarding its input into the processes of recovery.

#### ***UNMISSET Mandate***

Independence Day, 20 May 2002, marked the establishment of a new UN mission, The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) for an initial period of 12 months. The mandate of UNMISSET is to:

- Provide assistance to core administrative structures critical to the viability and political stability of East Timor
- Provide interim law enforcement and public security and to assist in the development of a new law enforcement agency in East Timor, the East Timor Police Service (ETPS)
- Contribute to the maintenance of the external and internal security of East Timor (<http://www.un.org/peace/timor/unmissetM.htm> 2002: accessed 27 June 2002)

The Council also requested UNMISSET to give full effect to the following three Programmes of the Mandate Implementation Plan as set out in Section III A 3 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2002/432) of 17 April 2002:

- Stability, Democracy and Justice
- Public Security and Law Enforcement
- External Security and Border Control (<http://www.un.org/peace/timor/unmissetM.htm> 2002: accessed 27 June 2002).

UNMISSET, the successor mission to UNTAET, takes into account that certain governmental and administrative structures are now in place and so there are understandably some differences in the mandate. A notable difference is a decrease in both military and civilian personnel reflecting the post-independence state. A civilian support group of technical experts will continue to assist the East Timorese Government in areas critical to the stability of the nascent state (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs2.PDF> 2002: accessed 1 July 2002). Therefore while the percentage of international civilians has remained constant, there is a marked decrease in the percentage of local civilians from 17 per cent of the total peacekeeping force to only 9 per cent as at 31 May 2002 (<http://www.un.org/peace/timor/unmissetF.htm> 2002: accessed 27 June 2002). While this might be due to the fact that some of the original local civilians may have been absorbed into governmental and administrative structures, it shows little acknowledgement of the role that indigenous people can play in the continuing reconstruction of their country.

Owing to the very recent transition from UNTAET to UNMISSET, the following analysis is largely focussed on UNTAET's objectives. It is considered that not enough time has elapsed to objectively critique the subtle differences between the mandates of the two missions.

### *The Virtues and Shortcomings of External Intervention*

The international community must accept a great deal of responsibility in war torn communities. Primarily it is they who bring the suffering of the people within the community to the world outside, to make it visible, detectable. Xanana Gusmao, once leading CNRT activist and now President of East Timor acknowledges this in Martinkus (2001: VIII):

When the Indonesian military and their militia proxies embarked on the campaign of killing, depopulation and the destruction and theft of property in East Timor in response to the independence result, it looked as though East Timor and the suffering of its people would once again be hidden from the outside world. It was only a handful of internationals who remained to try and document the final crimes of the Indonesian military that took place before international peacekeepers were allowed into the country.

The international community does have its virtues and arguably can learn from past lessons. In contrast to UNTAC, for example, UNTAET has more readily sought to work with the local population and structures of East Timor. This is due to the fact that non-military personnel in the form of both international civilians *and* local

civilians have been involved in the operational structures. While UNTAET has been dependent upon the military for its existence, the inclusion of so many civilian personnel has been something of an evolution but there has been a failure to capitalise on this initiative by not engaging to any significant extent with the local population.

There has been some interaction, however, with East Timorese representatives. At his farewell press conference, Acting SRSG, Ian Martin said that the UN and the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) had begun a dialogue on possible joint structures for future cooperation. On 24 November 1999, the SRSG made his first field visit to the western region of East Timor travelling with Xanana Gusmao and CNRT members. Subsequently, a 15 member joint East Timorese-UNTAET body through which representatives of the people of East Timor could actively participate in the decision making process in the transition period was formed. With respect to donor funding, the community, through representatives, was involved at the outset for the disbursement of funding. For example, World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, Xanana Gusmao and the SRSG signed a grant agreement for the disbursement of \$21.5 million over two and-a-half years for community empowerment and local government projects (United Nations 2000: accessed 13 December 2000). Such involvement enhanced the standing of the local communities whilst preparing them for the responsibilities ahead. Unlike UNTAC which left the Cambodians with no knowledge of managing foreign investment, UNTAET's state-building program planned to oversee such an important area. In support of these events, the UN granted UNTAET a longer transition phase to facilitate a stronger institutional base before elections were held.

Donors and UN agencies also appear to be acting more in concert in contrast to UNTAC's chaos. For example, UNTAET and UNICEF met on 27 March 2000 to plan a joint effort to raise public awareness of the serious threat posed by unexploded ordnances. On 3 April, UNTAET, the World Bank and UNDP signed a grant agreement for \$499,000 towards a project to create employment for the poorest communities in Dili. On 12 April, UNTAET, USAID and JICA (a Japanese aid agency) became involved in clean-up projects (United Nations 2000: accessed 13 December 2000).

However, recovery of East Timor still remains very slow. A number of issues support this assertion. In addressing humanitarian needs, UNTAET has failed to make an adequate transition from the emergency phase to the development phase resulting in insufficient capacity building at the indigenous level. Politically, in the creation of the National Council (NC), many groups were excluded from participation such as women, youth groups and traditional leaders. There was also no mechanism established through which NC members could consult with the grassroots. It was thought that NC members represented the grassroots, but this was arguably not the case. Capacity has not been built for a functioning bureaucracy. This is evident in the Civil Service and the Judicial and Legal System, both suffering from recruitment and training problems. With respect to civic education, the non-involvement of East Timorese civil society resulted in a case of too little too late. Had UNTAET had a culture of Timorese inclusion in the first place, this could have been complemented (<http://www.tip.net.au/~wildwood/01seppopular.htm> 2002: accessed 1 June 2002). Only 33 out of 2000 schools have been repaired. On Timorese initiative, the schools were re-opened by volunteer teachers and about 7000 volunteer teachers are unpaid (Murphy 2002).

Thus once conflict has become visible and external agencies begin the operation of assisting to reconstruct the war-torn country, a disturbing dynamic emerges. While funding is crucial to recovery, funding mechanisms can overwhelm the local community to its detriment, obstructing the building of local capacity. Pugh (2000) goes so far as to suggest that such mechanisms can be used as political tools to manipulate recovery actions in ways that benefit the interests of funders. The same can be said, although to differing degrees, of all external recovery actors. Even the UN may be considered as having its own agenda in imposing a westernised democratic ideal onto a 'backward' state. The ubiquitous promotion of a Western style democratic society institutionalises the Western system of governance and the neo-liberal economy. Is this to cater to the needs of the host country or is it 'to integrate the country into the dominant world paradigm?' (Spence 2001a:141). Pugh (2000:5) also questions the integrity of post-conflict peacebuilders:

The dominant intervention paradigm places a premium on creating stability rather than security; law and order rather than justice; and the ability of societies to participate in global capitalism rather than provide welfare.

What then becomes of the war-torn state? It will not progress toward a culture of peace because the contribution of its own culture has not been channelled into the reconstruction planning. Significant indigenous participation is an essential requirement to recovery (Spence 2001a). There are serious consequences to the reliance of only external intervention to a host country – dependency, resentment and a reluctance to take on the responsibility when the external intervention ceases. To what degree, in fact, has indigenous participation been allowed to emerge in East Timor?

### *Material, Political and Economic Recovery Needs*

The difficulty with respect to political reconstruction in East Timor has been that the state had to start from 'scratch'. Institutionally, the total collapse of the state has been a critical area preventing rapid reconstruction (Timmer 2000:245). Previous UN sponsored efforts such as in Cambodia by contrast retained the superstructure of many civil and social institutions. This liability, however, in East Timor could arguably be a benefit in the long term as more people have had the chance to share in the reconstruction from the ground up. Spence (2001a) asks is it even realistic to expect external agencies to rebuild politically, economically and socio-culturally throwing the focus on to indigenous responsibility and capability. The heavy dependence of local NGOs on external donors has a strong impact on their effectiveness: Top down planning and funding and upward accountability detract from participation (Belloni 2001). A construct such as La'o Hamutuk, for example, a joint East Timorese international organisation is important as it seeks to facilitate greater levels of East Timorese participation in the reconstruction of the country. Thus, it seems a balance must be sought between international and indigenous input for the success of political reconstruction. Further, the commitment to the democratic peace process by the indigenous population must also be seen as crucial in political reconstruction. As for the East Timorese leadership, it has expressed a great willingness and capacity to take on its share of the responsibility while at the same time respecting international contributors, especially UNTAET. For example Xanana Gusmao cautions the East Timorese people on the need to 'care' for democracy:

Democracy is not built overnight and it is by experiencing the system that democracy can be shaped. Some think that mere political party membership is a synonym of democracy and, therefore, it does not need to be cared for. . . . The year 2000 must be mostly considered as one of learning the numerous aspects of and the relationship with UNTAET, with the

international institutions and with the International Community. If we do not understand this we will think of ourselves as able enough to rehabilitate everything overnight and to immediately do all that is necessary. This is being unrealistic.

Xanana Gusmao (2000: accessed 8 April 2001)

Gusmao here gives the right balance to the political reconstruction process: A respect for the international community for its assistance in the political reconstruction of his country combined with a commitment to ultimately *owning* the political process altogether.

Looking at this issue from the reverse perspective, how much participatory input has UNTAET *invited* from East Timorese representatives? Firstly let it be said that the people of East Timor, once a subservient colony to Portugal, have withstood invasion by the world's fourth most populous nation and an oppressive occupation for 25 years. Despite threats and bloody violence by militia, trained and condoned by Indonesia, the people of East Timor collectively decided to vote yes to independence. This has required massive courage under fire. The people of East Timor took justified pride in their accomplishment. The people of East Timor have prevailed against extraordinary odds. The people of East Timor possess extraordinary resourcefulness. They have demonstrated great creativity in the survival strategies during their brutal ordeals. As Spence (2001a:8) asks, why then is such resourcefulness neglected when external agencies design recovery procedures? It appears that external agencies, in the case of East Timor, particularly UNTAET, had *considered* incorporating the capacity of the East Timorese in their plans but one must ask what these plans are: They are a western style democratic society where the capacity of the East Timorese is considered not sufficient to occupy leading governmental positions to direct the developmental process. While nine countries offered to train the East Timorese in the art of diplomacy, one is forced to ask how this is really going to achieve facilitating the East Timorese to build a secure and just reconstructed country, one that deals with healing the trauma of past suffering? What use is going to be the already demonstrated capacity of the people of East Timor? Spence (2001a: 9) boldly and appropriately asks: 'Have external agencies become the new colonisers?'

East Timor is being built as a Western style democracy and a neo-liberal economy. Transition phase was planned at three years. During this time a new

governmental system has been installed, elections held and the public service rebuilt. However, is democratisation the best possible path at this stage? I believe finding strategies for giving ownership of the rehabilitation process to the East Timorese first to encourage accountability and fortify civil society structures which are prerequisites for democracy in the first place, a better course of action.

It is here that the peacekeeper again finds his/her role in the peaceful resolution of internal disputes and societal conflicts sparked off by a contentious interpretation of the goals of peacemaking and post conflict peacebuilding. This represents a difficulty in the concept of peace in general. There are links between the peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding processes – each impacts on the other. When peacemaking and peacebuilding fail, this exacerbates the peacekeeping role as seen in the above situation. The lack of indigenous participation and the imposition of the Western political democratic construct in East Timor have created a situation which has called for an escalation of the peacekeeping role due to social conflict and unrest. As Hunt, Bano and Patrick (2001) argue, coping mechanisms among the population are quite likely to have been eroded through continuing contact with conflict. Their revival is a high priority. Local NGOs are able to augment the recovery process through representation and empowerment of civil society. However, local NGOs have been marginalised owing to lack of indigenous participation. While this has had a negative impact on recovery, it has also meant a deeper continuing involvement for peacekeeping.

An important innovation of UNTAET, however, with respect to recovery needs has been the rendering of assistance through the creation of a Civil Military Affairs (CMA) structure. This has capitalised on the presence of civilians and has drawn on their expertise. CMA activities include:

- Distribution of educational materials to schoolchildren
- Improvement and maintenance of infrastructure
- Rebuilding assisting for schools and other public facilities
- Provision of First Aid and Language instruction
- Instruction on improved agricultural techniques including the construction of a demonstration village by the Thai battalion in Sector East



- Provision of medical assistance to East Timorese in regular clinics conducted by peacekeeping units
- Tae Kwon Do instruction for East Timorese youth and East Timor Defense Force personnel by ROKBATT (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs17.PDF> 2002: accessed 1 July).

As can be seen this assistance is also humanitarian in nature. Creating 'partnerships with the people' eventually became a stated aim of UNTAET and used in connection with the efforts of the CMA (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs17.PDF> 2002: accessed 1 July 2002). Thus the civilian presence can be seen to have galvanised a greater sense of relationship with the local population to some degree. Arguably, the inclusion of civilian personnel into a predominantly military endeavour has helped advance the material, political and economic recovery needs of the East Timor fledgling state.

### ***Emotional Recovery Needs***

Having touched on political and economic reconstruction needs, it is also helpful to briefly examine socio-cultural reconstruction to illustrate the problematic nature of the UNTAET mandate in terms of how peacemaking and peacebuilding has compounded the role of peacekeeping. It will also be seen how the inclusion of civilian personnel has also helped address emotional recovery needs.

Militia activity is the remnant of what is *visible* with respect to the violence that the East Timorese suffered. The more abstract and intangible effects of warfare are its psychological impact. Militia violence has caused much suffering to the East Timorese population. What is more, individual and collective trauma may take many years to surface (Lewis 1999b:99). For example, in the immediate post-war period, survivors may seem extremely resilient but when the demands of this period are over and stresses de-escalate, this represents a very vulnerable period and trauma may surface. Thus one of the crucial processes of peacebuilding is to create means where the psychologically injured may relate their grievances and for those people affected to know it is *safe* to recount those experiences. Counselling and trauma healing are necessary to facilitate reconciliation among members of the East Timorese population where conflict, differences and animosities proliferated. Thus emotional recovery

needs to proceed along with material development among the people. This complex state of affairs requires a peacekeeping presence particularly if this recovery process is not addressed properly or is compromised. For example, how can the broader question of reconciliation occur between people across borders – between what were the Indonesian militias and the East Timorese who suffered under their hands? On 1 November 1999, the last Indonesian Army troops (TNI) left East Timor (United Nations 2000: accessed 13 December 2000). While Kingsbury (2000) noted there were moves towards reconciliation with some militia members, this is just a small movement toward what needs to be a much more encompassing process. Thus the problem of reconciliation remains problematic within the East Timorese population.

Healing some of the wounds of the past was partially addressed however, with the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor finding evidence of serious violations of human rights and recommending the setting up of an investigative and prosecutorial body and an international human rights tribunal made up of both Indonesian and East Timorese judges to receive complaints, conduct trials and sentence those found guilty. Also the Security Council encouraged Indonesia to institute a 'swift, comprehensive, effective and transparent legal process' to bring to justice those responsible for violations against human rights laws (United Nations 2000: accessed 13 December 2000). While these methods would have undoubtedly helped toward reconciliation and stability in East Timor, they did not come close to solving the problem.

Prosecution of criminals is not sufficient. Victims know that individual therapeutic treatment is also not sufficient. They need to know that *their* society as a whole knows what has happened to them. Truth means shared mourning, shared memory and an acknowledgement that grievous wrong was done to them (Danieli 1995). Until such issues are addressed, a peacekeeping mission cannot be said to be completed. What would it take for the people of East Timor to experience a lasting reconciliation, a healing from the trauma, a leap towards the creation of a culture of peace? While the presence of Indonesian President, Megawati Sukarnoputri, at the independence celebrations will help in this regard, I believe a sincere apology from the government of Indonesia, an apology that set forth its injustices from the days of invasion to the days when it condoned militia violence against the East Timorese,

would go much further in healing the trauma. This, however, is unlikely to happen. What else has been and can be done?

Civilian UNTAET Advisors have facilitated a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor to be formally established. National Commissioners were selected following a public consultation process in January 2002 after which the commissioners, themselves elected, chose regional commissioners. The Commission is an independent authority which aims to achieve dual goals of reconciliation and justice. It will operate for two years and has three primary functions:

- First, it will seek the truth regarding human rights violations in East Timor within the context of the political conflicts between 25 April 1974 and 25 October 1999. The Commission will establish a truth-telling mechanism for victims and perpetrators to describe, acknowledge and record human rights abuses of the past.
- Second, it will facilitate community reconciliation by dealing with past cases of lesser crimes such as looting, burning and minor assault. In each case, a panel comprised of a Regional Commissioner and local community leaders will mediate between victims and perpetrators to reach agreement on an act of reconciliation to be carried out by the perpetrator.
- Third, it will report on its findings and make recommendations to the government for further action on reconciliation and the promotion of human rights (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs8.PDF> 2002: accessed 1 July 2002).

While the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation will help address emotional recovery needs, a deeper healing is still required. Maynard (1997:210)<sup>xiv</sup> speaks of successful programs in 'grassroots psychological recovery'. While there is a recognition in these programs that there is no cathartic cure for the wounds of war, the view is projected that fundamental to recovery is safe access to community resources wherein the act of sharing traumatic experiences and resulting emotions with other people together with mourning the losses form a communalisation process of grieving. Therefore rituals, 'group' burials, cultural activities such as music and

dance, and commemoration such as in the building of monuments take on symbolic significance in the healing of trauma. Of importance also is the gaining of conflict resolution skills which can be addressed in small forums and can improve dispute management within groups. Some grassroots organisations have even tried to establish a new paradigm of interaction. Mentioned previously, Bock & Anderson (1999:335) suggest that the older, frequently used 'empowerment' paradigm be replaced with a 'belongingment' paradigm which embraces inclusive justice and shared power at the expense of the empowerment of just one group. Belongingment is a very powerful motivator and one that indigenous organisations such as Grassroots International and the Catholic Church can and have used well to the advantage of the East Timorese people. La'o Hamutuk, a semi-indigenous organisation can mobilise international elements into the process also thereby strengthening local constructs.

At the international level, not a lot of recognition is given to healing the trauma of victims of war-torn countries. Yet it remains one of the most basic elements in recovery and a task indigenous people must accomplish largely through their own motivation and efforts. The international community needs to recognise the central importance of this activity to the lasting stability of the reconstructed country and make efforts to facilitate the founding of indigenous organisations which can aim to address this fundamental need. Without such an attempt, the failure in the understanding of what peacebuilding is supposed to achieve will heavily impact on the success of the peacekeeping mission.

Perhaps toward this objective UNMISET has targeted human rights, with particular consideration for gender and vulnerable persons issues, as an integral part of all programmes (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs2.PDF> 2002: accessed 1 July 2002). The creation by UNTAET of the first ever Gender Affairs Unit could be considered a prelude to this direction and a reflection of civilian input into planning. The unit focuses on raising awareness on promoting gender equality in policies, programmes and legislation of initially, the East Timor Transitional Administration, and now the government. The basic foundation for incorporating gender into the policies of a mission with as broad a mandate as UNTAET is an understanding of the gender situation of East Timor. UNTAET, through civilian influence, has made efforts to understand the 'overarching patterns of inequality and develop ideas and

strategies to overcome entrenched barriers to equality' (<http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs11.PDF> 2002: accessed 1 July 2002). The Gender Affairs Unit is a valuable pilot project, in itself and also from which to acknowledge civilian participation.

### ***Case Study Summary***

While East Timor has been a far greater success story than the other five countries so far examined in this thesis due in large part to the civilian military mix, one central factor that has caused great dislocation is the failure to acknowledge on the part of the international community, the UN and its agencies, the damage caused by the lack of significant indigenous participation: Impaired relationships represent a far greater danger to creating stability than is currently comprehended. The failure to grasp this vital fact in the areas of peacemaking and peacebuilding compromises solutions to other problems in the peacekeeping areas. Involving indigenous people in reconstruction tasks at all levels is essential to the creation of faith and belief in the international effort. When everything is said and done, it is the indigenous people, the East Timorese in this case, who are going to ultimately own the political and economic processes that will run the country and it will be the efforts that the East Timorese have done in the socio-cultural sphere that will have contributed towards healing the trauma of the population caused by war and conflict. Until the international community gets its priorities right, i.e. until the UN, its agencies and all the rest of the NGOs and aid agencies decide to commit to furthering local participation in all aspects of recovery instead of trying to establish a Western style democratic government that is able to slot into place in the global capitalistic network, in the long term the peacekeeping mission will fail and peace will not be sustained.

### **Summary**

In East Timor it has been the dramatic lack of indigenous participation which has so fundamentally threatened the success of peacebuilding initiatives which in turn has compounded failures in the peacekeeping mandate. From this case study in particular, it has also been seen how peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping are not the discrete entities that they are presented to be. Each is fundamentally linked with the other and a failure in one area compromises a success in another area. Therefore the significance of these interrelationships cannot be understated. It has

been shown that even with the inclusion of civilian personnel into the UNTAET structure, the UN failed to address key peacemaking and peacebuilding processes. Are we asking peacekeepers to do too much and then blaming them when a mission fails? I believe we are. They are often not given the resources, the training or the time to become familiar with the complexities of a mission so they are ill prepared to cope with the harsh realities that comprise humanitarian intervention and second generation peacekeeping. Part III will concentrate on how these problems can be addressed.

## **PART III**

### ***Analysis and Suggested Considerations for Improvement***

## CHAPTER SIX

### **Analysis of Peacekeeping Operations: Isolating the Underlying Causes for Failure and Proposing a New Direction in Peacekeeping**

This chapter presents in tabular form the specific mission failures of the six case studies (Table 1) and from this data extracts more underlying causes (Table 2). These underlying causes comprise the following factors: military, military-civil coordination, peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordination and those attributable to the United Nations. From an examination of these underlying causes, a new direction that improvements to peacekeeping practice may take will be presented. This new direction is in the form of a concept called the United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC) created by Emeritus Professor Joseph Schwartzberg, University of Minnesota<sup>xv</sup>. The UNPC, an outline of which will be provided, is an evolved form of military peacekeeping where the focus is on voluntary, international recruitment and a low intensity military presence to accommodate the changing goals of contemporary peacekeeping. While there exist similar standing force proposals which will be briefly critiqued, this particular model is recommended because it offers the best in a non-national driven force combined with a recognition of the need for peacemaking training as well. The underlying causes will then be examined to see if this evolved UNPC structure can absorb the failings that they represent.

Two results will be found. (1) The UNPC appears to address the military and United Nations causal factors to a convincing degree. (2) The UNPC does not adequately address the military-civil and peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordinating factors. The reasons for this will be discussed. It will be seen that the acknowledgement and use of indigenous capacity is central to both these factors and necessary for the success of peacekeeping missions. It appears that the peacekeeping mission must seek to facilitate more participation on the part of local communities. Can this be achieved within the auspices of the UNPC which in many other situations represents a much improved peacekeeping concept? This last question will be carried over into the next chapter.



### Case Study Data Analysed

Below is Table 1 which lists the specific mission failures for each conflict studied. This table is location based.

**Table 1 Specific Case Study Mission Failures**

<b>Location</b>	<b>UN Mission</b>	<b>Conflict Type</b>	<b>Specific Mission Failures</b>
Cambodia	UNTAC	Civil War Genocide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retarded response</li> <li>• Slow in overcoming sanctity of sovereignty</li> <li>• Failure to deal effectively with Khmer Rouge faction</li> <li>• Difficulty for troops to be neutral – collaboration between Khmer Rouge and Indonesian UNTAC battalion</li> <li>• Poor negotiation</li> <li>• Failure to address justice and mercy paradox</li> <li>• Too much reliance on foreign aid</li> <li>• Too much reliance on foreign technical assistance</li> <li>• No effective aid co-ordination</li> <li>• No mandate to train Cambodian nationals</li> <li>• Escalation of indigenous social and economic problems with impact of mission</li> <li>• One election could not implant democracy</li> </ul>
Somalia	UNOSOM I  UNOSOM II	Civil war Anarchy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unwillingness of Security Council to take political action</li> <li>• Recognised a quasi-state by treating factions like sovereign governments</li> <li>• No real ceasefire was produced throughout Mogadishu</li> <li>• Aid did not get to starving but to warlords which created protection rackets</li> <li>• Not mandated to use force<sup>xvi</sup></li> <li>• UNOSOM II's mandate encompassed complex peacebuilding tasks with a much reduced force than the powerful UNITAF</li> <li>• Too many inexperienced troops</li> </ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Resistance to integration with local Somalis</li> <li>• Dominated by military imperatives</li> <li>• Very little professional civilian staffing</li> <li>• US component retained independence from UN command structure</li> <li>• Highly unrealistic mandate</li> </ul>
Rwanda	UNAMIR I  UNAMIR II	Civil war Genocide	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reluctance by the international community to be involved – held no strategic interest</li> <li>• Inadequate Chapter VI mandate</li> <li>• Lacked clear and sufficient political analysis</li> <li>• No contingency planning</li> <li>• Lack of co-ordination between UN and NGOs – NGOs were alerted to possibility of genocide but UN failed to act</li> <li>• Lack of commitment to take action by member states</li> <li>• Apathy by international community to suffering</li> <li>• Totally inadequate resources</li> <li>• Having the French operation together with the UN operation was problematic<sup>xvii</sup></li> </ul>
Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNPROFOR	Civil war Ethnic rivalry	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The mandate was at first limited but then subsequently extended to deliver goals which proved impossible given the time frame.</li> <li>• The mandate was not ‘intelligent’ in that it did not reflect the conditions on the ground. All three sides were at war with one another – there was no peace to keep</li> <li>• Meeting the ‘Safe Area’ conditions compromised UN impartiality</li> <li>• All three sides sabotaged delivery of aid and threatened security of UNPROFOR personnel</li> <li>• Security arrangement today is artificially stable<sup>xviii</sup></li> </ul>
Kosovo	UNMIK	Civil war	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Co-ordination poor among international actors especially UNMIK and KFOR regarding</li> </ul>

			<p>demilitarization and demobilising of combatants</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor Serb participation in Municipal election questioned election's authenticity</li> <li>• Low Serb turnout in General election may hinder its legitimacy internationally</li> <li>• Reconciliation process not recognized as crucial to political, social and economic reconstruction</li> <li>• NATO's bombing campaign in Serbia without UN consent undermined the credibility of the UN</li> </ul>
East Timor	UNTAET	Independence from Indonesia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presence of militia groups threatened success of UNAMET</li> <li>• Total collapse of state prevented rapid reconstruction</li> <li>• Lack of recognition of indigenous capacity despite willingness shown by East Timorese to participate</li> <li>• Imposition of the Western political democratic construct ignoring needs of the East Timorese</li> <li>• Local NGOs marginalised owing to lack of indigenous participation</li> <li>• Lack of recognition of importance of trauma treatment for victims by international community in rebuilding social dimension</li> <li>• Lack of recognition that impaired relationships undermine stability – requires presence of greater 'psychologically' oriented component in mandate</li> </ul>

The striking feature of the mission failures is their variety. This plethora of failures reflects a 'system' which has serious flaws, which cannot cater for the wide diversity of possible outcomes that a second generation peacekeeping mission must meet. It can be seen that *some* of these failings relate to the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. For example, in Cambodia the organisation and conduct of free and fair general elections could not produce democracy for democracy was not grounded in political culture or in civil society but projected onto the people of Cambodia. There were no

structures to sustain democracy. What resulted was only the erection of a veneer of democracy. In Somalia, UNOSOM II's mandate to assist the Somali people in rebuilding their economy and social and political life and to re-establish a state based on democratic governance was impossible with the totally inadequate force assigned to the mission. In Rwanda, the mandate to promote national reconciliation through mediation and good offices with a budget that was to be conducted on the cheap was completely unrealistic. In East Timor, there was a lack of recognition of indigenous capacity despite the willingness shown by the East Timorese to participate and this undermined the recovery process. In scanning the specific mission failures, it can be seen that the failings attributed to the pursuit of humanitarian objectives emerge to some degree in all cases considered across the locations.

However, examining the data from other perspectives results in more clear-cut divisions. For example, some failings relate to purely military reasons such as the difficulty for troops to remain neutral as evidenced in Cambodia with the collaboration between the Khmer Rouge and the Indonesian battalion and in Somalia the lack of experience of the troops. At the military-civil level, such as in Kosovo the lack of coordination among international actors especially that between UNMIK and KFOR has meant that demilitarisation and demobilising of combatants has suffered and at the peacekeeping-peacebuilding level, such as in East Timor the lack of recognition that impaired relationships undermines stability prevents more attention being given to reconciliation work. The UN also has been the instigator of many problems such as retarded responses particularly in Cambodia and Rwanda and the compilation of unrealistic mandates in locations like Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia. Thus the specific case study mission failures can be suitably regrouped into divisions that more clearly represent the underlying causes. These divisions are: Military, military-civil coordination, peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordination and United Nations.

Condensing and regrouping the information then into these encompassing headings produces **Table 2**.

**Table 2 Underlying Causes**

<b>Causal Factors</b>	<b>Location</b>	<b>Example of Specific Failure</b>
<b>Military</b>	Cambodia Cambodia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to deal effectively with Khmer Rouge Faction</li> <li>• Difficulty for troops to be neutral – collaboration between Khmer Rouge and Indonesian UNTAC battalion</li> </ul>
	Somalia Somalia Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Too many inexperienced troops</li> <li>• Mission dominated by military imperatives</li> <li>• US component retained independence from UN command structure</li> </ul>
	Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of co-ordination between US and UN missions exacerbated the situation</li> </ul>
	Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Having the French operation together with the UN operation was problematic</li> </ul>
	Rwanda Bosnia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lacked clear and sufficient political analysis</li> <li>• All three sides sabotaged delivery of aid and threatened security of UNPROFOR personnel</li> </ul>
<b>Military - Civil Coordination</b>	Cambodia Cambodia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor negotiation of roles</li> <li>• Escalation of indigenous social and economic problems with impact of mission</li> </ul>
	Cambodia Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Necessity for aid coordination</li> <li>• Aid did not get to starving but to warlords which created protection rackets</li> </ul>
	Rwanda	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of co-ordination between UN and NGOs – NGOs were alerted to possibility of genocide but UN failed to act</li> </ul>
	Kosovo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Poor Serb participation in municipal election questioned election's authenticity</li> </ul>
	Kosovo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Low Serb turnout in general election may hinder its legitimacy internationally</li> </ul>
	Kosovo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Co-ordination poor among international actors especially UNMIK and KFOR regarding demilitarization and demobilizing of combatants</li> </ul>
<b>Peacekeeping – Peacebuilding Co-ordination</b>	Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Somalia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to address justice and mercy paradox</li> <li>• Too much reliance on foreign aid</li> <li>• Too much reliance of foreign technical assistance</li> <li>• One election could not implant democracy</li> <li>• UNOSOM II's mandate encompassed complex peacebuilding tasks with a much reduced force than the powerful UNITAF</li> </ul>
	Kosovo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reconciliation process not recognized as crucial to political, social and economic reconstruction</li> </ul>
	East Timor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of recognition of indigenous capacity despite willingness shown by East Timorese to participate</li> </ul>
	East Timor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local NGOs marginalized owing to lack of indigenous participation</li> </ul>
	East Timor	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of recognition of importance of trauma</li> </ul>

	East Timor	<p>treatment for victims by international community in rebuilding social dimension</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lack of recognition that impaired relationships undermine stability – requires presence of greater ‘psychologically’ oriented component in mandate</li> </ul>
United Nations	<p>Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia Somalia Rwanda Rwanda Rwanda Bosnia  Bosnia  Bosnia Bosnia Kosovo  East Timor</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Retarded response</li> <li>• Slow in overcoming sanctity of sovereignty</li> <li>• No mandate to train Cambodian nationals</li> <li>• Mandate unrealistic</li> <li>• Lack of commitment to take action by member states</li> <li>• Apathy by international community to suffering</li> <li>• Totally inadequate resources</li> <li>• The mandate was at first limited but then subsequently extended to deliver impossible goals</li> <li>• The mandate was not ‘intelligent’ in that it did not reflect the conditions on the ground. All three sides were at war with one another – there was no peace to keep</li> <li>• Meeting the ‘Safe Area’ conditions compromised UN impartiality</li> <li>• Security arrangement today is unstable</li> <li>• NATO’s bombing campaign in Serbia without UN consent undermined credibility of UN</li> <li>• Imposition of the Western political democratic construct ignoring needs of the East Timorese intrusive</li> </ul>

A major theme that contributes to many of the underlying causes is that peacekeeping operations are conducted by the military, the military of those member nations that can afford to contribute. This causes problems of troop neutrality, the presence of inexperienced troops and lack of coordination between unilateral actions such as the US in Somalia and the UN contingent. Also poor military-civil coordination escalates social and indigenous problems from the impact of the mission – this occurred to an atypical degree in Cambodia – as well as being a factor in failing to establish a supportive atmosphere to foster participations in elections – this occurred in the municipal and general elections in Kosovo. Peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordination is essential to foster indigenous participation and to prevent marginalisation of local NGOs as happened in East Timor. Without this coordination, the civilian military mix failed to capitalise on their potential. Also the method of contemporary military peacekeeping is not conducive to rapid responses to crises by the UN. This has happened in most conflicts of today. I will now discuss

the inadequacies of the military model of peacekeeping, suggest an improved military system and then return to the other area which has produced failings in peacekeeping operations, the pursuit of humanitarian objectives. I will then investigate the improved military system to see if it can also address the failings in the pursuit of humanitarian objectives in contemporary peacekeeping missions.

### **Inadequacies of the Military Model of Peacekeeping: The Military Ethos**

Armed Forces are constituted by individual sovereign states to provide for their own defense. They are the means of ensuring the territorial integrity of their own country, of defending and promoting their interests, and are the symbol of nationhood. . . . Their employment in the service of peace to benefit primarily the interests of the international community, separate from narrowly defined national interests, is an innovation of the twentieth century.

(Bowen 2000: 2)

Armed forces by their very nature exhibit coercive strength. It is their central *raison d'être*. However, a peace operation is not a theatre of war. Intervention doesn't take place in a vacuum: 'It carries a moral and political burden'(Bowen 2000:3). Wood et al (2001: 7) contend that peace operations encumber combat troops with a concept of security that relies too heavily on force in circumstances that demand 'legitimacy, restraint and diplomacy'. US soldiers in particular are too highly specialised in the "Western way of war" to be effective at lower thresholds of violence which characterise peace interventions. Combat troops are therefore not the appropriate instrument for peacekeeping operations -- peacekeeping operations demand operational, organisational and philosophical changes to high intensity warfare. This is disorienting and disturbing to the combat soldiers who must nevertheless adapt to the new scenario bringing with them unwanted vestiges from their immediate past training and deployment.

Why are combat troops really so unsuitable for peace operations? According to Wood et al (2001), who have catalogued a study of military shortcomings in peace operations, it is not simply a matter of the combat soldier 'switching' to peacekeeping mode. Combat emphasis is the default mode. The deification of the warrior elite is so deeply entrenched into an army's system of indoctrination that its survival is almost certain despite peacekeeping 'training'. Peacekeeping tasks mean, also, regular war fighting skills are ignored and degraded which is anathema to military hierarchy. However, peacekeeping cannot be ignored by the military either, for today it is part of

their operations. Peacekeeping schools are springing up in various countries of the world such as Ireland, Canada and Italy. Becker (1999:2) reports that peacekeeping courses are being created for American ground forces in places such as Fort Bragg, the Army War College in Pennsylvania and the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School where negotiating skills are being taught. Such courses are intended to instil the gifts of peacemaker in soldiers trained in the use of force. Instructors here derided the notion that they needed to undo a soldier's fighting reflexes. Rather, the teaching adds new skills to ingrained instincts. Lt. Col. Michael D. Clay who helped develop the program said:

No, we don't retrain soldiers not to kill, no way . . . There isn't any problem of soldiers making that mental leap from wartime to peacekeeping missions. That's just gibberish that comes from watching too many Sylvester Stallone movies.

Becker (1999:2) quoting Clay

But is it? College training is innovative. Usually, as Wood et al (2001) confirm, the US army expects to 'adapt' combat forces assigned to peace operations by providing spur-of-the-moment training *after* the unit has been assigned to deploy. Hence, such training is not really sufficient.

Surely no more than superficial changes can be effected in the behaviour of soldiers when complex subjects such as 'negotiating' and 'intercultural communications' are conducted in the minimum of time between assignment and deployment. As has been stressed in this thesis repeatedly and shown in the case studies, a second generation peacekeeping mission today brings with it complex human endeavours. They cannot be learnt in a perfunctory manner and certainly not in the face of aggressive, warrior-like training that has been instilled into the soldier since admission to the military force for the primary purpose of defending his/her country.

Using an American example, it is recognised to an extent, that peace operations require specialised training. They actually require legitimacy and relationship in respect to relevant local communities also but certainly specialised training is a primary requirement. The US Army Field Manual 10023 and Peace Operations and the Joint Warfighting Center's Handbook for 'Joint Task Force Commanders' on 'Peace Operations' contain subject area lists on this topic. Wood et



al (2001:X-XII) indicate the subjects that are less likely to be learned during “just in time training” in the following list:

- The nature of PK
- Regional Orientation
- Contributions to maintenance of law and order
- Negotiating skills
- Investigation and reporting
- Media interrelationships
- Rules Of Engagement
- Enforcing UN Sanctions
- Protecting the human rights of people
- Restoring law and order
- NGO Operations
- PSYOP [PSYchological OPERations]
- Intercultural Communications

It is obvious that the majority of these subjects require advanced schooling, supervision and experience. They cannot successfully be taught on-the-fly.

This is not to say that there is no value in a military intervention but a military intervention, under current auspices, necessarily produces soldiers who are not sufficiently clear on their duties vis-à-vis peacekeeping operations. Inadequate training and the indoctrination of the warrior ethos prevents troop suitability for such a mission. As Wood et al (2001) claim, one of the most serious consequences of military intervention is that the offensive potential of combat troops in non-combat interventions creates the perception of coerced settlements because it can undermine the legitimacy of indigenous leaders. These are serious shortcomings. However, a military intervention does have its justifications - the maintenance of security, the logistic network, the manpower and the expertise to accomplish political-military goals cannot be equalled by non-military interventions.

In a positive development, a military intervention capability under changed auspices, especially created for peacekeeping operations, a United Nations force to be trained solely as peacekeepers has been suggested by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg,

Emeritus Professor of Geography, University of Minnesota. This standing force has numerous advantages over the current ad hoc system and promises to be a vast improvement in peacekeeping methods. However, before critiquing Professor Schwartzberg's system, it is necessary to briefly discuss permanent standing forces that have been proposed by other writers in order to see why this particular system is the more meritorious.

### **Proposed Permanent Standing Forces**

#### ***Standing Proposal by Boutros Boutros-Ghali***

Boutros Boutros-Ghali advocated a UN standing army, i.e. a force available on a permanent basis, not on an ad hoc basis. This proposed standing army included force contributions from 20 member-states, each providing 2,000 troops on 48-hour notice. To pay for the program, Boutros-Ghali suggested an international sales tax on weapons and international air travel providing \$50 million for emergency humanitarian purposes and a \$1 billion peace endowment. Command of the UN standing force would alternate periodically between the five permanent members meaning four-fifths of the time permanent members would not command their own forces (Holmes 1993).

Firstly, 40,000 troops is quite a modest force and would limit what could be achieved in an ongoing crisis situation. The real disadvantage, however, is that loyalties among the troops would be to their national divisional head. Thus such a force would be impeded by national boundaries. The United Nations would remain purely conceptual in practice. Hence the force would be heir to all the problems of a national driven force existing within the framework of the UN. For these reasons I consider this concept too limited in scope.

#### ***Standing Proposal by Robert Johansen***

Johansen (1990: 58) disparages the unilateral use of force and commends the growth of UN peacekeeping as a 'central focus in the development of a global political strategy for eventually replacing the war system with a peace system'. He acknowledges that some states have been reluctant to respect UN forces because national governments are suspicious of ad hoc forces containing national armed forces which can be perceived as serving national interests rather than the interest of

peacekeeping in its entirety. Johansen (1990:59) therefore suggests creating a permanent UN force individually recruited by the UN from among individuals volunteering from different nations. Such a force would be loyal to UN authorities. According to Johansen, this force could perform a world wide educational role as well as a coercive role: It could nurture the idea that it is possible to have international enforcement of rules that can govern all people to help our species survive.

This is indeed an encompassing idea and a commendable one. It is very similar to that proposed by Professor Schwartzberg. However, Johansen does not provide any details how such a scheme can be materialised. He does not take it any further; it remains simply a sketch of an idea which holds promise. There is no description of how it may be financed, of how recruitment and training may be arranged, of its functions, of internal command and control and of how the current structure of the UN can accommodate such a scheme. It is commendable that Johansen has fashioned such a possibility but there is not enough substance to his proposal such that it can be appraised.

#### *Standing Proposal by Sir Brian Urquhart*

Sir Brian Urquhart, in Urquhart and Heisbourg (1996:189-195), proposes the establishment of a small, standing, highly trained volunteer rapid-response group within the United Nations. His conception is for this group to be a military force about ten thousand strong. Urquhart's rationale is based on his contention that in earlier years it was usually possible to deploy peacekeeping operations in a matter of days. Rapid and effective action is, to Urquhart, imperative if civil and humanitarian conflict is to be kept under control. It now takes months to mobilise a UN peacekeeping operation (Urquhart and Heisbourg 1996).

A rapid response group cannot take the place of traditional peacekeeping forces. It would act more as an emergency framework to get negotiations started in waiting for the rest of the peacekeeping team to arrive. It is therefore a highly laudable idea and owing to its size more practical to create than that proposed by Professor Schwartzberg. However, more feasible financially as it may be, my interest remains with the revolutionary, ground-breaking and sweeping nature of the standing force proposed by Schwartzberg because it is a genuine attempt to present a global

peacekeeping force that may have both the power to curtail the need for national military establishments and to successfully address conflicts that might erupt around the globe. While Diehl (1989: 27-34) critiques the permanent standing force concept and concludes that while it does have some advantages its 'marginal utility is not great', it must be understood that this perspective predates the great peacekeeping missions of the 1990s with their attendant failings. Schwartzberg's standing force concept must be considered as a serious option that could in time help usher in a new culture of peace for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### **A Proposal for an Improved Military Peacekeeping System by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg**

The United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC) is a concept for an elite, standing all-volunteer, internationally recruited, multi-tasked, rapidly deployable peacekeeping force. It is completely military in nature. However, its military nature is entirely geared to global peacekeeping requirements and *not* to the exigencies of national military establishments. The key features which conceive it as unique from other standing forces which have been proposed from time to time, are its mechanism of recruitment and its methods of training.

Recruitment would be on an entirely *individual* basis. UN information and/or UNDP offices in capital cities could be used as recruitment offices. Qualifying exams could be administered by these offices for potential UNPC recruits. News about recruitment could be obtained globally via the web. Much preliminary screening could take place via electronic or other forms of correspondence. Financial assistance might be made available to enable especially promising candidates to come to the recruiting office for the final screening exams. Recruits, once selected, would be directed to report, all expenses paid, to training centres which would be integrated *without* regard to national origin, though recruits normally would speak the same basic language as their peers (often, however, as a second language). All recruits would take an oath of allegiance to the UN, the Human Family and the Planet Earth. None would wear insignia indicating his/her country of origin (Schwartzberg Interview 2001). The advantages of such a recruitment process are incomparable to any other system in existence today where reliance is made on individual nations sending contingents of war fighting soldiers generally unaccustomed to peacekeeping

conditions and where primary loyalties go logically to each nation sending the contingent. This creates problems of allegiance wherever different nations form a UN force which is generally with every mission. In the UNPC, loyalties go and stay with the United Nations. It is designed that way. Here a corps of men and women in global service are tied by 'a common allegiance to humanity, rather than to specific countries, [which] would help forge a new, much-needed planetary consciousness' (Schwartzberg 1997:6).

An important issue that the UNPC concept addresses is the fact that recruitment would be open to women as well as men. It is envisaged that women would receive the same training in the use of small arms as that given to men such that they could defend themselves in those hopefully rare eventualities when such action might prove necessary. However, women would be given the option of exempting themselves from combat duties in situations when armed pacification of local combatants should prove to be necessary. Basically, women would be permitted to make the choice of serving in any way needed, including combat, subject to the discretion of the commander in the field. No special role is foreseen but it is anticipated that women would prove to be particularly effective in performing some of the inter-personal tasks that the UNPC will have to perform from time to time. Tasks, however, would not automatically be assigned on the basis of gender (Schwartzberg Interview 2001). The inclusion of women in peacekeeping forces is of great value for half of local populations are female whose needs and contributions often go unacknowledged. It is likely that the women of many local populations would relate more closely, directly and openly to a peacekeeping officer of the same sex. Women have largely remained an untapped source in peacekeeping operations.

Although the military personnel will be trained for fighting, the limited potential combat roles of the UNPC and the expected lower thresholds of violence encountered would mean that little time would have to be devoted to mastering the use of sophisticated weaponry and that more time could thus be devoted to the development of skills appropriate for UNPC missions. To dovetail with this advantage, UNPC recruits would be chosen for their ability to perform ad hoc multi-tasking relevant to the duties that would be required in a peacekeeping mission. It is

envisaged that recruit selection would ensure that UNPC personnel would be able to perform these duties with more adaptation and expertise than the rank and file of recruits in most existing armies which tend to regard peacekeeping activities as extraneous to their central mission. Finally, from the very outset specialised UNPC units would be trained for the *diversity* of tasks that the UNPC might reasonably be expected to perform (Schwartzberg Interview 2001).

There are many benefits that the UNPC could bring to peacekeeping both within the Peace Corps itself and as an operating organisation within the world. The internal benefits and external benefits are mutually reinforcing and create an empowerment of the UN which idealistically would pave the way for a reduction in national military establishments and so mitigate the risks of war overall. **Table 3** shows a listing of these benefits.

**Table 3 Benefits Of The UNPC: A Peacekeeping Proposal**  
 (Adapted from Schwartzberg (1997) and Schwartzberg Interview 2001)

Internal Benefits (Within UNPC)		External Benefits (Within the World)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Oath of allegiance sworn to the UN/the Human Family/Planet Earth – not to a specific country</li> <li>• Creates esprit de corps among all peacekeepers</li> <li>• Promotes cohesiveness and professionalism due to ‘standing’ nature of organization</li> <li>• Brings the elite of different countries into close working contact</li> <li>• Helps to break down negative cultural and gender stereotypes</li> <li>• Helps to establish enduring bonds of international amity</li> <li>• Engenders communication in new languages</li> <li>• Fosters cultural interaction with host country</li> <li>• Forges common allegiance to humanity rather than to specific countries</li> <li>• When force is sanctioned in a mission, greater likelihood that command will be unified</li> <li>• Less chance of potential corruption due to high standards in carefully recruited elite force</li> </ul>	<b>M u t u a l l y  R e i n f o r c i n g</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Averts possible wars</li> <li>• Minimises need for national militaries</li> <li>• Forges new planetary consciousness</li> <li>• One country or organization cannot act at cross-purposes from the UN as a whole</li> <li>• Empowerment of the UN is preferable to a further build up of capabilities of existing regional organizations</li> <li>• Will possess credibility as a deterrent</li> <li>• Peacekeeping would finally be acknowledged as a core function of the UN</li> <li>• Facilitates training on indigenous histories, cultures and religions by accumulating knowledge from mission to mission</li> </ul>

**The UNPC: Addressing The Underlying Causes of Failings Within Peacekeeping Missions**

Geared as it is towards a new expression in *military* peacekeeping and an empowerment of the *United Nations*, the UNPC appears, at a cursory examination, to have the capacity to address in some measure the underlying reasons of failings relating to the causal factors of ‘military’ and ‘United Nations’ specified in Table 2. The operative question is ‘how much’ measure.

### *Military and United Nations Causal Factors in the UNPC*

The UNPC concept, its mechanisms of recruitment and methods of training would ensure the allegiance of troops to the UN as a whole. Thus the difficulty with troop neutrality and command structure that occurred in Cambodia and Somalia, for example, could have been prevented if these missions had come under the auspices of a UNPC structure. In Cambodia, collaboration occurred between the Indonesian battalion of UNTAC and the Khmer Rouge thus causing major disruption to the mission. In Somalia, the UNOSOM II mission contained a US component which did not integrate its initiatives with those of the UN: The US retained effective and juridical independence from the UN command structure. This inhibited successful peacekeeping. Other elements that could have been addressed in Somalia with a UNPC structure were the inexperience of the troops and the lack of coordination between the separate UN and US missions: It was up to the UN to provide a centre of gravity in the situation. The UN was not strong enough to do this. With an empowered UN peacekeeping presence this would have been highly possible.

In addition, an empowered United Nations with its own troops, own training and recruitment systems, could build on its own accumulated base of knowledge and lessons learned capacity in a way that is not possible at present where different contingents of troops are sent to various missions and valuable information is lost. Planners organising mandates would become more acutely aware of just what is attainable and what is not. For example it is a feature of many case studies reviewed that the mandates were highly unrealistic. This is especially true of Somalia and Bosnia. UNOSOM II's mandate of recreating a state based on democratic governance was impossible in the face of conditions existing in Somalia at the time while UNPROFOR's mandate in Bosnia, initially limited and then extended, could not even be called intelligent in that it did not really reflect the conditions on the ground: UNPROFOR was forced to deal with three warring factions on a daily basis. Furthermore, there was a conflict between support for humanitarian assistance and the safe area concept, two central tasks of the mandate. The mandate of a UNPC mission where the troops and resources *belong* to the UN, would be, through insight and necessity, much more realistically and intelligently conceived.



A great advantage of an increased UN peacekeeping presence in the form of a UNPC is that there would be a lesser need to depend on regional organisations such as NATO. It is a fact that NATO's bombing campaign in response to the crisis in Kosovo seriously undermined the credibility of the UN. This was a very controversial act. Surely this would have been better dealt with by peacekeeping forces of our global organisation, the United Nations, which ideally represents the interests and views of the world. Today, in Bosnia, SFOR, a deployment of NATO, is keeping the peace but it is an artificial stability because each of the three ethnic divisions possesses a military capability of its own in waiting. If SFOR leaves, it simply opens the way for renewed hostilities. A UNPC with its low-key military presence, enhanced training techniques and a realistic mandate may have well been able to defuse the situation in opposition to the robust military response that Bosnia received.

Another great advantage of a UNPC over the current form of peacekeeping is that a UNPC with its contingents already in place has the capability of a much higher response time in getting to the crisis site as well as control over its resources. Peacekeeping operations in Rwanda epitomise these two inadequacies. Response time has much to do with political will, i.e. nations must *want* to acknowledge the crisis situation and must *want* to contribute troops and resources. There was a problem of political will in Rwanda, not strategic to any major power. Hence, states which had the capability to respond rapidly and militarily lacked the will to do so. 5000 peacekeepers, who could very well have made a difference, could not be mustered despite major efforts by the Secretary-General. The whole mission was kept from being withdrawn simply due to fear of public opinion but left to wallow, useless in dire circumstances. A UNPC could have addressed the situation in its entirety – having the forces and resources and not being subject to considerations of political will, a UNPC could have saved thousands of lives.

A UNPC while possessing credibility as a deterrent would finally give status to peacekeeping as a *core function* of the United Nations. As a core function peacekeeping would become, through a mission knowledge data-base more honed, adapting itself to new situations quickly. Thus we could expect to see improvements over time. At present how well does it address the underlying causes for failings of contemporary second generation peacekeeping missions? What kind of failings can it

manage? Looking at Table 2, the most visible causal factors that have been largely addressed have been the 'military' and 'United Nations' factors. What it has not addressed have been the military-civil and peacekeeping-peacebuilding connections, the *coordinating* linkages. Why is it that these causal factors remain neglected?

***Military-Civil and Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding Coordination (Humanitarian Objectives) Causal Factors in the UNPC***

Peacekeepers indeed help build peace and facilitate the transition from conflict. However, with ever more expansive mandates, they are increasingly concerned also with post-conflict situations. Never before has the peacekeeper played such a key role in the recovery process. As the case studies in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 have shown, failures in peacekeeping missions are often centred on failures in humanitarian objectives. These are embodied in the specific failures headed by the causal factors military-civil and peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordination in Table 2. Can peacekeepers really be expected to do humanitarian intervention also and if so, what can be done to facilitate the way forward for peacekeeping and to ameliorate the plight of the peacekeepers?

Professor Schwartzberg (Schwartzberg Interview 2001) acknowledges that peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are likely to be inextricably entwined in contemporary peacekeeping missions. Consequently, he theorises there will usually be a need to complement the military and policing efforts of a UNPC mission with a variety of diplomatic and other services that might best be rendered by skilled mediators, constitutional experts (in the likely event that new constitutional arrangements will be needed), administrators (to train local cadres, rather than to administer on their own), educationists, development experts, and so forth. The UNTAET model tried to accomplish this in part.

To provide the needed skills and personnel, Professor Schwartzberg (Schwartzberg Interview 2001) sees six potential sources:

- Local experts who have not been seriously 'tainted' by previous political action on behalf of one of the sides in a given dispute
- Specialised units, if and when available, from the UNPC itself

- Specialists recruited through the UN for limited-term assignments from countries that can spare their services
- Personnel from a permanent UN administrative corps, the United Nations Administrative Academy (UNAA)<sup>xix</sup> yet to be created
- Personnel from NGOs (eg Oxfam) already familiar with the area of dispute
- High-level UN personnel (eg as in the case of Lakhdar Brahimi in Afghanistan) with the prestige to handle the most delicate and high levels of negotiation and to coordinate the mission as a whole

Obviously providing such resources will require a scale of funding that is probably just as alarming as the cost of the UNPC itself – a major argument against the implementation of both. Speaking just for the UNPC, Schwartzberg (1997:10-12 & Schwartzberg Interview 2001) discusses possible ways of bridging barriers to the establishment of the UNPC. I have encapsulated these in Table 4.

**Table 4 Major Barriers To The Establishment Of The UNPC (Adapted from Schwartzberg (1997) and Schwartzberg Interview 2001)**

Major Barriers	Bridging Barriers
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of UNPC would alienate major powers from UN</li> <li>• The establishment of a UNPC may require changes to the structure of the UN itself</li> <li>• Cost may be thought unrealistically high – estimate of cost (by author) of UNPC in non-military mode is \$12 billion annually</li> <li>• There is a difficulty of obtaining such large revenue to finance UNPC</li> <li>• Major barrier to UNPC is acceptance of radical peacekeeping concept by the status quo</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Major powers finally to put global security ahead of obsolete nationalisms</li> <li>• Changes could be effected in tandem with one another rather than as a series of discrete steps</li> <li>• For period 1995-1999, the Clinton Administration budget for the US alone was \$1302 billion – it is a question of priorities</li> <li>• Impose tax on defence expenditures and/or international arms sales of all UN member nations</li> <li>• UNPC attained through step by step increments towards accomplishment of larger whole</li> </ul>

If the barriers could be bridged in the long term as the above table may suggest and the six potential sources to provide needed skills and personnel included, a vital question that must be asked is: Is this proposal still going to address the military-civil and peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordinating linkages discussed earlier that seem to be the result of the humanitarian intervention type of intervention?

### ***UNPC and Indigenous Capacity***

Both forms of coordination discussed, military-civil and peacekeeping-peacebuilding, have one factor in common: A need to include indigenous participation in their methods of operation. The mobilisation of indigenous capacity is a basic, common requirement in the reconstruction of war-torn societies. In examining each specific failure in Table 2 with respect to causal factors military-civil coordination and peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordination, there is an argument that supports an action of including indigenous personnel from the ground up. A successful peacekeeping mission, so it seems, requires a liberal presence of local peacemakers and peacebuilders who can coordinate with their international counterparts and with each other.

Does the UNPC seek to mobilise indigenous capacity at all? Professor Schwartzberg (Schwartzberg Interview 2001) refers to 'local experts who have not been seriously 'tainted' by previous political action', an allusion to indigenous capacity. In addition, in the abstract on the UNAA (see Appendix IV)<sup>xx</sup>, he talks about specialists of that Academy who could help train indigenous talent to take over from UN peacekeeping forces. However, while indigenous capacity is *acknowledged* in his UNPC concept, Schwartzberg does not seem to fully recognize its intrinsic and pragmatic worth. What is therefore the scope for indigenous community involvement in the UNPC model?

### ***The UNPC: Is It Viable?***

The UNPC is a concept for a low-key military peacekeeping force of elite men and women, recruited internationally and trained uniquely and solely for peacekeeping missions but distanced from the politics of national imperatives. The concept is thus an evolved form of peacekeeping. It has the capacity to eliminate many types of failures caused by aspects attributable to both the current military peacekeeping form and to the United Nations. It transcends obsolete nationalisms thereby giving credibility to the ideal of allegiance to the world as a whole. In its ultimate form the UNPC holds great advantage: It has the capacity to avert possible wars and minimise the need for national militaries. Nevertheless it does appear to possess a major failing. It is based on the conceptualisation that external intervention is the key to sound peacekeeping practises. However, it has been shown that second

generation peacekeeping today includes humanitarian interventions which have intertwined peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. There now exists an interrelationship between these three concepts. They cannot be cut off from one another. Local peacemakers and peacebuilders therefore seem to be required to mobilise indigenous capacity in peacekeeping operations. There is clear evidence that the supporting by external actors of indigenous capacity in a war-torn society in transition is essential if that society is going to experience recovery. Is there a place for local peacekeepers, peacemakers and peacebuilders in the UNPC? Can mobilising indigenous capacity become an essential ingredient in UNPC applications and philosophy. These questions will need to be considered to determine the ultimate functionality of the UNPC.

### Summary

The specific failures of the six case studies – Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor – were presented in Table 1 and from this data, Table 2, a listing of the more underlying causes for failure was extracted. These causal factors comprised four categories: military, military-civil coordination, peacekeeping-peacebuilding coordination and factors attributable to the United Nations. While it was seen that the military does not produce the best peacekeepers due to the warrior ethos of the military establishment, a concept for improved peacekeeping was presented in the form of the United Nations Peace Corps (UNPC). The UNPC represented an evolution in peacekeeping: A low-key military standing force where methods of recruitment and training would not only ensure member allegiance to the *planet* in deference to the superseded concept of a *nation* but where peacekeeping in such a form would become a deterrent and be perceived as a core function of the UN.

However, while the UNPC appeared to be able to address the majority of military and United Nations causes for failures, it did not adequately address the coordinating factors, military-civil and peacekeeping-peacebuilding appropriate to humanitarian intervention types of peacekeeping missions. These factors have been seen to commonly involve indigenous capacity as a focal reason for these coordination failures. It has been posited that *facilitation* by the peacekeeping mission can stimulate *activism* by the local communities. The UNPC concept has so

much to offer in many areas of peacekeeping and represents an evolutionary step forward in peacekeeping methods. However, can it accommodate to the essential requirement of facilitating indigenous activism through incorporating local peacekeepers, peacemakers and peacebuilders into its means of operation? This question will be explored in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### **The UNPC: Facilitating Indigenous Activism**

The UNPC, it was seen in the previous chapter presented a concept for improved peacekeeping which represented an evolution in peacekeeping methods. However, it did not possess the capacity to mobilise activism at the indigenous interface. It did not have the means of incorporating local peacekeepers, peacemakers and peacebuilders into its methods of operation which are required for total peacekeeping success. This chapter examines how the UNPC, a proposed military institution, can be adapted through the addition of a civilian corps to address those areas where the military could not successfully resolve problems. What is suggested is military and civilians co-functioning and complementing each other.

The importance of facilitating indigenous activism will be highlighted. Volunteer services, civilian peace teams and the civilian police are explored for the purpose of establishing the contribution that civilian interventions can make. The civilian police are presented as a bridge between a military force and a purely civilian one facilitating a discussion on how to integrate civilians into the structure of the UNPC. This is a crucial consideration for a viable UNPC. Finally, examples are provided on the expediency of military-civilian cooperation in the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique and in the Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) and Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) in Bougainville, instances of military-civilian co-functioning as well as the mobilisation of indigenous activism. Such analysis is intended to support the argument that a civilian arm to the UNPC is a viable proposition.

### **The UNPC: A Military Institution**

You have to have much greater sensitivity. You aren't warfighting. You are building it up. You aren't destroying things. It isn't a battlefield. You must be able to transition from one to the other.

Gen John Menzies  
NATO Commander in Bosnia  
Olsen and Davis (1999:11)

The above quotation supports the finding that was reported in Chapter Six concerning the relationship between the military and peacekeeping, i.e. traditional

military training is inadequate for peacekeeping purposes because it is predicated on the warrior ethos which is offensive and aggressive in nature. Peacekeeping, in contrast, engages in conflict management through deterrence and typically shows restraint in response to provocation. However, UNPC methods of training are in accord with this condition as training time would primarily be given to developing skills for peacekeeping missions. Nevertheless the UNPC is still military in concept and being military in concept is still subject to the structure and working methods of military institutions. As Gourlay (2000:36) explains, military institutions value command and control, top-down hierarchical organizational structures and clear lines of authority, conformity and accountability. Nevertheless, much effort is invested into seeing that military personnel can function independently under adverse circumstances. Approaches to problem solving are usually coercive. As has been seen in the previous chapter, however, there is an application for the military approach in certain areas of peacekeeping operations. (These were designated under military and United Nations causal factors.) Such applications include factors such as controlling violence, providing protection of populations or of relief agencies in the context of forceful suppression and resolution of conflict as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo, the provision of technical or logistical support and demining and demobilisation.

However, as has been also seen, in the humanitarian intervention peacekeeping operation, peacekeepers are being called on to provide more direct assistance to civilian populations. Such assistance includes becoming involved with the reconciliation process, trauma treatment and political, economic and social recovery processes. In short, military peacekeepers are increasingly having to involve themselves with activities and tasks relating to indigenous people in the host country. In order to be a viable concept, the UNPC must develop ways in which to facilitate this indigenous capacity. How can this be accomplished?

### **Compromising the Purely Military Nature of the UNPC**

In the matter of direct civilian assistance, there are structural differences evident in the distinct approaches of the military and civilian organisations. For example, Gourlay (2000:36) contends that humanitarian organisations are less hierarchical and more participatory in styles of decision-making than the military.



They focus more on the 'process' of performing operations because they attach more importance to long-term impacts. However, they have fewer back-up resources and plan less for contingencies to ensure that short-term objectives can be met quickly. Thus there is a tension between military and civil operating methods. This means that the military are able to accomplish certain designated tasks (such as establishing secure conditions) better than could a civil organisation. It also means that a civil organisation is able to accomplish other designated tasks (such as reconciliatory work) better than the military. What these claims are based on is the contention that the structure of an organisation defines how well it is able to perform differing tasks. This contention is well substantiated by Gourlay (2000: 36-37).

I therefore contend that the UNPC's capacity could be enhanced with the inclusion of civilian contingents which could be directed toward more peacebuilding oriented tasks and hence ultimately to facilitating indigenous activism. Bringing the military and civilians together would of course present challenges but it is important to note that there has already been civilians working directly in peacekeeping operations – the number of civilians working directly in an operation authorised by the Security Council has increased from 6-9% in traditional peacekeeping to approximately 20 % during the more recent complex endeavours. Despite these low statistics, the involvement of civilians has changed the concept of peacekeeping. Although little has been documented concerning the actual civilian participation, even at these lower civilian levels, military dominance has been decreased (Harleman 2000:6).

There is an increasing awareness of the value of the mobilisation of civilian personnel in peacekeeping missions. Boulding and Oberg (1996), for example, argue the need to further develop the civilian peacebuilding capacity of UN forces. This refers not only to civilian staffing at UN Headquarters but of peacekeeping operations in the field. There is worth, it is claimed, of moving UN peacekeeping practices toward more civilian participation in peacekeeping missions. Harleman (2000:8) stresses the more complex blend of 'political exploitation and severe socio-economic injustices and factionalism' that are characteristic of modern conflicts -- what has been described in this thesis as second generation complex emergencies – and advocates mobilisation of the civilian capacity.

How then can civilians be conceptually integrated into the construct of the UNPC? Professor Schwartzberg (Schwartzberg Interview 2001) has spoken of supplementing UNPC Units with specially recruited (or seconded) civilian personnel. The top administrative personnel might be UN-appointed civilians, especially where mediation is called for. Such individuals would work in coordination with the top UNPC officer in the field. In other cases, however, a UNPC officer might head the mission. Such decisions would be at the discretion of the UN Security Council. This sort of civilian participation, however, is mainly directed at the administration level and geared to the upper hierarchy rank. In these circumstances such civilians would be more suitably qualified for *specific* tasks. What is appropriate and necessary in the peacekeeping situation is that *peacebuilding* tasks be addressed. There is a high probability that civilians who are less hierarchically organised and who possess a more participatory style of decision-making would be more adept at the indigenous interface. Tasks to be performed at this interface require a looser, freer environment. Civilians can be more effective actors here than military personnel also because civilians are perceived as “neutrals” by local peoples and can work their “neutrality” to their advantage. They can thereby build a measure of legitimacy and find acceptance among indigenous populations more readily than their military counterparts. Thus they can more easily create partnerships with representatives of the host society.

This contention is supported by Boulding and Oberg (1996: 26) who claim that civilian peace teams can do what the military are often not equipped to do: ‘Work with local groups to develop grassroots peacebuilding and reconstruction activities, to develop trust and patterns of cooperation’. UN peacekeepers may be seen by the warring parties as *part* of the conflict. In such situations, civilian peace workers who can be seen as carrying no threat to any of the parties could be skilful in creating ‘listening spaces in the midst of violence’ to work with and mobilise the population at the indigenous interface.

Consider Bosnia under NATO deployment. From the outset of the Bosnian stability operation, the American military-trained personnel were confronted with a series of non-traditional challenges. The question was how to apply military force to

these operations effectively. Olsen and Davis (1999) report that a completely new skill set was found to be required. Such a skill set was compiled by the American NATO generals and encompassed the following qualities:

- The warrior ethos was found to be still relevant. Time and again the generals in Bosnia pointed to occasions when the former warring factions would provoke the US forces which countered their moves with decisive action. These responses averted potential conflict.
- Vision was required for linkage to a broad understanding of the international political landscape.
- Risks needed to be taken to move the peace process along.
- Interpersonal skills were required including the ability to interact with those outside the military as well as consensus and team building.
- Flexibility, mental agility and ability were required to adapt to the new environment.
- It was essential to have the confidence to delegate authority.
- It was essential to maintain fairness for all parties and to prevent dehumanisation of the factions involved.
- Much patience was required. (It is noteworthy that certain observers maintained patience as one of the attributes most lacking in US army general officers. Not one of the generals listed this as a required skill but all of the civilians did.)

Olsen and Davis (1999:8-12)

This skill set is most revealing. While the first skill listed indicates that the military's coercive power seems to be still required to contain the warring factions in Bosnia to make possible the implementation of other recovery action, the rest of the list calls for a different organisational structure than the military to facilitate the skills needed to allow the peace process to progress. Thus the military must become extremely versatile and paradoxically unmilitary like in its methods of operation to cater for all events. Fortunately, such a scenario can be addressed in another manner: Civilian contingents could be placed with the military in such a way that they *complement* each other. Through this approach, military and civilian means can be balanced.

Boulding and Oberg (1996), in fact, speak of civilian peace teams *co-functioning* with military peacekeepers. Such could be the case in the context of the UNPC. A Civilian Corps as part of the overall Peace Corps, could negotiate with local power figures in, for example, the Bosnian situation, for safe space in which humanitarian NGOs could work or facilitate peacebuilding work. As civilians in the Peace Corps, not subject to military imperatives, they could seek out, connect with local wisdom and in possibly averting conflict, set the stage for the development of trust and mutual collaboration.

In order to see how effective civilians could be in a UNPC structure, it is worthwhile briefly investigating the rationale of various civilian services from diverse sources in the arena of peacekeeping/peacebuilding. Explored will be volunteer services, civilian peace teams, and the civilian police in UN peacekeeping operations.

### **Volunteer Services**

Creating a culture of peace includes the contribution that an individual can make. It is not just limited to the efforts of political or military leaders. Spence (2001b:75) likens peace to a mosaic made up of memories, teachings, and nurturing on the individual level which includes practices of teaching, caring and compassion as well as, on a governmental level, economic behaviour that promotes economic sustainability, forms of governance that are participatory and conflicts that are resolved in a non-violent manner. How a volunteer can contribute to this peace mosaic is not only through their professional expertise but through the intangible effects of building relationship:

By acting as, advocates for the community in which they have been placed, as networkers between the community and non government and government agencies with which they are involved, and as facilitators of peace oriented activities, volunteers encourage informal local-level peacebuilding processes that will continue long after they have returned to their home countries.

Spence (2001b:76)

By living in a host country and sharing skills and knowledge as well as building up relationships, volunteers actually form partnerships with communities from the host country. Creating partnerships means extending the ability of local communities to profit from the interaction with the volunteer. This involves spreading the skills and relationships, newly formed, to help reduce marginalisation of the peoples from that community. This may be a slow process but it is an effective

one, a valuable alternative to the technicist approach of development assistance which is also useful though short term. The volunteer approach allows for the slower building up of relationships which creates space in which new perceptions can form, marginalised people can be empowered and new means of working can surface.

It is easy to underestimate or to simply disregard the changes that volunteer services can bring to a host country. No matter how small a ripple they make, at the end of the day such ripples can create currents which ultimately can make a real difference in the transformation of the host country. Important also is the fact that the process is reciprocal: The volunteer comes away with a unique and lasting experience which can also be passed on in helping to build upon the peace mosaic.

### **Civilian Peace Teams**

'Civilian Peace Teams' is an umbrella term describing a wide range of activities performed by civilians in areas of conflict. For example, four NGOs are currently involved in civilian intervention projects. There are Peace Brigades International (PBI), Witness for Peace (WFP), Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT) and the Balkan Peace Team (BPT). A team in the making, the Global Nonviolent Peaceforce, (GNP) is in the process of establishing its parameters and directives after having completed a feasibility study.

Such teams aim at widening the efforts of local activists in a variety of ways. These ways can be categorised into 'peacekeeping', 'peacemaking', 'peacebuilding' and 'activism'. Peacekeeping is dissociative in its approach to peace, i.e. it keeps the conflicted parties apart from each other to prevent violence so as to provide space for negotiation between the parties. Civilian groups are mostly involved in dissociative activities. 'Accompaniment' aims to deter violence through interveners living with individuals or groups such as activists or communities that are intimidated by threats because of their involvement in particular activities. This helps create space so that the parties can work for nonviolent social change. Maintaining a "presence" with groups or communities is also a method civilian peacekeepers use to deter violence. This allows the peacekeepers to show "solidarity" as a primary objective. Peacemaking, in contrast, brings the parties together in a conflict resolution process enabling them to facilitate transformation of their conflict. This method is

“associative” in approach. ‘Peacebuilding’ activities are often associated with a phase in which there is no direct violence. The bringing of relief supplies, for example, is an expression of a peacebuilding presence. Increasing the negotiating power of one of the parties is an example of ‘activism’. This may occur when the parties to a conflict have radically different levels of power. Activism is sometimes seen as inappropriate because siding with one of the parties decreases the impartiality of the intervention. Thus civilian peace teams usually employ dissociative techniques but also undertake a number of other associative or activist methods (Schirch 1998).

PBI is an example of how effective a civilian organisation can be in terms of non-violent human rights protection. PBI had its birth in Guatemala where an efficient system of state terror was preying upon its citizens who were trying to organise democratically. State forces had murdered thousands of people and many had simply disappeared. A Mutual Support Group (GAM) was founded from which people who lost relatives could organise. This was a very dangerous thing to do. Hence arose the idea of personal accompaniment which was the beginning of PBI ‘escorting’, i.e. continually providing the surviving GAM leadership with unarmed bodyguards. With this protective accompaniment from PBI, high-profile killings ceased. PBI had developed a new tool in human rights protection. The survival of the GAM paved the way for the rebirth of activism in Guatemala (Mahony 2000).

In order for this action to foster a stronger organisation some form of international backing was required. Outside Guatemala, the organisation built links with human rights and Central America solidarity organisations developing a network to muster international support in response to emergencies. Thus the power of accompaniment extended to giving people around the world a picture of what was happening in Guatemala, thereby mobilising an international instrument. PBI has also met success with its accompaniment strategy in El Salvador, Sri Lanka and more recently in Colombia. PBI has shown how civilians can function as effective peacekeepers and peacemakers by being in the community and learning from the community.

Civilian interventions unquestionably hold forth a convincing promise. In most locations civilian interveners are often invited because human rights abuse is

usually apparent but also because their mandate is unquestionably nonviolent. Yet is it functional to place civilians without weapons alongside a contingent of peacekeepers with weapons as would happen in the UNPC? I believe it is as each contingent would follow a strict division of labour: Armed peacekeepers would be involved with the more military aspects of the intervention while civilian peacekeepers would engage in more peacebuilding oriented tasks including human rights issues and the treatment of trauma. It is also possible that civilian PBI and other peace teams could act in cooperation with the UNPC.

### Civilian Police in UN Peacekeeping Operations

The civilian police can be conceptualised as a bridge between a military force and a purely civilian force. The tasks assigned to United Nations Civilian Police are to supervise and /or control local civil police. This is effected in order to ensure law and order are maintained impartially and human rights are protected. This involves activities such as patrolling, liaison, investigation and assistance to the local population (Chappell and Evans 1997:29). A former CIVPOL Commander comments on what he would like to see in a police commissioner:

First, a police commissioner should be a person with a solid police background, operational background and supervisory or command experience in a police force. He or she has to be well disciplined and ethical. And sensitive to mission conditions. You have to look at the culture and the history and the religion of the mission. You have to be sensitive to and try and understand the culture of the people you are working with. So you cannot afford to bring with you your home baggage, or the way you used to do things, because you have to appreciate conditions under which you serve. It means that you have to be out in the field, you have to work with your people. . . You cannot be racist, you have to accept everyone as an equal human being.

(Chappell and Evans 1997:30-1)

Despite the fact that police, when acting as neutral and independent agents of the UN, cannot often perform the tasks expected of them because of their limited mandate, the fact that they are unarmed in areas where weapons proliferate has an important stabilising and soothing effect on the local population. Commissioner O'Rielly from UNCIVPOL in the UNPROFOR mission commented:

One woman explained to me, it is so nice to see civilian police walking around, she said, because they don't seem to be afraid, they're not armed and she said, they're just wearing a shirt. They're not wearing helmets, and she said, it means that there must be safety out there . . . There was a sense of calm because of the unarmed police patrol.

(Chappell and Evans 1997: 93)

Harleman (2000: 5) contends that the unarmed presence and non-military appearance of the civilian police make them more politically suitable than military

observers. While their tasks, comprised of monitoring and counselling of local police activities concerning basic security and law and order, usually carry no law enforcement power, in this specific role the civilian police have proven to be 'an excellent instrument in the peace-keeping environment'. Chappell and Evans (1997) argue that the link between the rebuilding of a country, which most importantly includes the re-establishment of the criminal justice system, and lasting peace is becoming increasingly more evident. A well-functioning criminal justice system is a cornerstone of society. Good social order cannot be maintained without one. Civilian police have contributed enormously to this end in many UN peacekeeping operations. In the light of this, the usefulness of civilian police personnel must be acknowledged. What else must be acknowledged is that the civilian police can be perceived as having the facility to serve as a *link* between military and civilian functions. This link is a very powerful piece of evidence in support of the capacity that civilians could play in peacekeeping operations.

It was asked earlier in this chapter how civilians could be conceptually integrated into the construct of the UNPC. The question now becomes, 'How can civilians be mobilised in such a way so as to build a civilian component, a civilian corps, to strengthen the military standing of the UNPC?'

### **Integration of Civilians into the Structure of the UNPC**

How will trained and unarmed civilians as a Civilian Peace Corps fit into the structure of the UN Peace Corps, a military entity? I see that the most preferable option is to put the unarmed civilian force directly under the charge of the military commander to work in tandem with the armed contingents, i.e. to have them completely integrated into the military force. Thus there would be two arms of the UNPC: The military arm and the civil arm both accountable to the commander of the military force. Each arm, in its own way, would strengthen and support the other. For example, the military arm could be responsible for security and stability of the region, for the provision of technical and logistical support, for demobilisation and destruction of weapons and for the establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies allowing the civilian arm to focus at the indigenous interface on the creation of social spaces for the rebuilding of relationships. This would include negotiating, message carrying, conflict resolution, economic and social



reconstruction and the facilitation of social healing from the traumas of war suffered by women, men and children. Like the military arm, the civilian arm would comprise female recruits as well as male. Thus the UNPC construct would become a multinational, mixed-gender, civilian-military peacekeeping force.

The burden-sharing arrangement of the entire force would require a clear-cut division of labour between members of the military UNPC and members of the civilian UNPC. This philosophy would need to be deeply imbedded into the structure of the UNPC. A pattern of cooperation between the two arms would have to be established based on their designated areas of competency. By briefly examining the possible spheres of philosophy and training and deployment, an insight into the viability of the establishment of a civilian arm of the UNPC can be gained.

#### ***Philosophy/Relationship of a Civilian Arm to the UNPC***

The UNPC civilian arm has to mesh successfully with the UNPC military arm. This must be accomplished, however, subject to the following conditions. I believe that the ultimate objective to efforts of the UNPC should be for the indigenous community at the end of the day to *own* the processes of recovery. Hence locally-driven decisions will be encouraged and accepted where possible. This aim signifies that there must exist a commitment for UNPC members to work in partnership and comradeship with the local population. Thus a multicultural awareness would permeate all aspects of Peace Corps education, operation and governance. In order to facilitate these intentions decision-making would need to be democratic at the supervisory level of the civilian arm of the UNPC.

#### ***Training and Deployment of a Civilian Arm to the UNPC***

It is envisaged that training for civilians would include military training models that would focus on preparation for entering an arena of conflict. General training would also be given in areas such as conflict resolution and mediation, cultural sensitivity and the psychology of trauma. In addition to this general training, specific training would have to be employed on the local region of deployment in the areas of history, language, culture, and conflict analysis. This specific training could be accomplished with the use of local inhabitants including possibly teachers,

peacemakers and other individuals who could make a relevant contribution to the understanding of the conflict in the designated area.

The goal in deployment would be for the civilian corps to create space for peaceful resolution of conflicts and the building up of relationships so that in conjunction with local activists, they could address such issues as human rights, economic and social reconstruction and begin the process of healing traumatised war victims. Civilian peace corps teams would, in all cases, hand over to local groups as soon as is expedient.

Is it possible, however, for civilians to work in such close teamwork with military personnel under military leadership? They would of course be working in a professional and formal capacity quite unlike incidents in history where civilians were obliged to support military projects in certain critical times such as the Berlin Airlift<sup>xxi</sup> which nevertheless, produced a highly successful outcome. A discussion on civil-military cooperation will be presented followed by two examples where such cooperation resulted in what has been considered successful missions.

### **Civil-Military Cooperation**

One of the central criticisms that Pugh (2001) levels at methods of seeking to control modern conflict, accords with the heart of my argument for empowerment of the UNPC model enhanced by civilian peacekeepers. It is that politicians and military intervenors see the world as statist, i.e. as an international community of states. The fact is that modern conflict challenges this concept of sovereignty. Rarely is conflict based on ideology today but on the exploitation of resources which is the result of marketisation and privatisation. In many areas it is a case of a sustained emergency.

The military which answers the emergency call has the backing of the state that sends them. Military personnel are trained to interrogate and negotiate with political elites and warlords. They share a common language. In UN missions today strategic command often remains with a national government. Western military establishments in particular adroitly avoid being accountable to international officials in the UN. National contingents under the UN set up parallel reporting and control structures with their home states (Pugh 2001). The UNPC structure would

completely circumvent these very problems: UN personnel would head the command in all circumstances.

In contrast to national militaries, the civilian sector is much more dispersed in the chain of responsibility. NGOs, for example, escape being caught in the statist structure and form *transnational* communities. Having the power to operate in local populations, they can mobilise at the grassroots level. This includes reaching groups without power as well as local authority networks. Thus as Pugh (2001) postulates, there is a distinction between state/military and non-state/civil actors which in his opinion, however, may preclude the establishment of an integrated civil-military ideal. NGOs and their representatives, for example, may not want to be characterized with military association. This is again the very reason why the UNPC with a civilian arm would be a viable compromise in this context: Civilian contingents forming part of the Peace Corps itself need, by the conditions of their service, to accept being coalesced *with* the military and would find acceptance *within* the military structure.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of uniting civil and military elements, there has come into effect a doctrine known as CIMIC, the NATO acronym for Civil Military Cooperation. The doctrine basically is that the relations between Allied Forces and civilian organisations in peacekeeping type missions is crucial for good military operations. Pugh (2001) criticises this construct for being pro statist, not allowing individuals and non-state communities equality in expression and involvement and presenting the risk to them of being coopted by the state. However, CIMIC was very active in the crisis in Bosnia. CIMIC operations were instrumental in facilitating a wide variety of activities in support of organisations such as the OSCE, UNHCR, World Bank, EU, ICRC and others who were responsible for implementing the majority of civil actions outlined in the General Framework Agreement for Peace. A principal reason why IFOR CIMIC operations played such a critical role in the success of the IFOR deployment was that they were able to coordinate efforts with civilian NGOs and IOs so effectively (Landon 2001).

Thus while there exists debate about how functional civil-military alliances are, civil contributions to what has been predominantly military operations are a reality and must be acknowledged. The UNPC construct, adapted by including the

enlistment of civilians in a civilian arm, would transcend the possibility of the civilian component being overpowered or made ineffective by the military or being coopted by the state as the state would be replaced by complete UN control. Two examples of civil-military cooperation will now be made to show its feasibility. The UNTAET example showed a flawed model of civilian-military cooperation. The two cases are the UN peacekeeping operation in Mozambique, ONUMOZ, and the peace monitoring operations in Bougainville, the TMG and PMG.

### Examples of Civil-Military Cooperation

#### *Mozambique 1992-1994*

The United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) has been reported as a model UN peacekeeping operation; a response to 14 years of devastating civil war. The mandate of ONUMOZ included four important elements: political, military, electoral and humanitarian. Jett (2002:1) states that while ONUMOZ *facilitated* the process, it was 'the Mozambicans themselves who made peace a reality'. What worked was a mix of strong leadership, donor coordination and aggressive diplomacy which underpinned the movement of the peace process. Thus it was the human element that played the major role in making ONUMOZ a success.

The military aspect of the operation was closely linked to the humanitarian effort. 100,000 soldiers were disarmed, demobilized and reintegrated into civil society. An ONUMOZ technical unit which was staffed by civilian personnel assisted in implementing the demobilisation program and collaborated closely with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOHAC) on the program's humanitarian aspects. ONUMOZ's military component also contributed to humanitarian activities by providing engineering and medical assistance. However, the principle goal of the ONUMOZ humanitarian assistance program was to cater to the reintegration needs of all Mozambicans. This included internally displaced persons, refugees, and demobilised soldiers and their dependants (United Nations Department of Public Information 1996).

What evidence was there of civil-military cooperation? Jett (2002) contends that it was not the military presence which made the UN system work in Mozambique. It was leadership with strong donor government engagement. While a

contingent of military personnel staffed assembly areas and assisted demobilisation, the Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG), Aldo Ajello willingly involved the donor community making them full partners in the process. All donors were brought into the operation. Donor coordination was built on the legacy and expertise of a prolonged donor and NGO presence in the country. Moore (1996) stresses that NGOs generally are very much of benefit to local populations. In Mozambique there were around 150 in operation at the time of ONUMOZ. Such sustained coordination and cooperation meant that problems involving the UN and Mozambican parties could be addressed very effectively.

Jett (2002) also emphasises the importance of local expertise in the success of the mission. Ajello in the UN structure and key donor representatives participated in practically every decision affecting the Mozambican transition finding creative, *local* decisions to problems that otherwise would have been referred back to the UN. What is more, local NGOs were actively engaged, not performing just a supporting role. As has already been stressed in this thesis, the indigenous population is better placed and more committed to making things work than the UN bureaucracy. This was the case in Mozambique. Local NGOs played a crucial role. While NGO and donor coordination was contributing to a successful outcome, the military played its role by providing forums for day-to-day monitoring and problem solving in the overseeing of the ceasefire and in the creation of a new military for Mozambique.

### ***Bougainville 1997-2001***

The islands of Buka and Bougainville comprise the remotest province of Papua New Guinea (PNG). Between 1988 and 1997 civil war devastated this province causing death and massive destruction to infrastructure. The conflict began as a local dispute over the copper and gold mine at Panguna and then escalated into a wider separatist movement causing divisions within Bougainvillean society. The issue of independence eventually came to occupy centre stage. In October 1997, the Burnham Truce officially brought an end to the fighting. This instigated the introduction of the unarmed TMG led by the new Zealand Defence Force followed in due course by the PMG led by the Australian Defence Force. When referring to these peacekeeping operations of Bougainville, the two monitoring groups will simply be

referred to as the TMG/PMG: The difference represents a shift from truce to cease-fire.

The TMG/PMG has been hailed as a convincing success. This peacekeeping/peace-monitoring force consisted of forces from Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Vanuatu. PNG wanted strong civilian participation from the outset. The Bougainville Interim Government (BIG)/ Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) were also eager to see civilian representation. In addition the BIG/BRA requested female monitors, an appeal which resulted in having a very positive effect on local communities. In fact the combination of culturally sensitive personnel in the presence of Maori, Fijian and Vanuatu agents combined with the civilian presence, which included female monitors, facilitated local reconciliation and emphasised the importance of working closely with local peace committees and clan leaders (Regan 2001). Thus a military-civilian, multicultural, mixed-gender peacekeeping force was able to both work with the indigenous community and facilitate indigenous activism. MacMillan (2001:117), a military analyst comments: 'I could not help but be awed by the commitment of ordinary people to rebuilding their lives'.

The value of having female civilians in the operation cannot be over-stated. A female monitor could make a more effective link with the local women than could a male. Making the link then had the capacity to bring indigenous women more actively into the peace process. This was the experience with Bray (2001: 132) who said that local women readily embraced her. Bray claims women were prepared to be 'clear and honest' in assessing post-crisis situations and were willing to communicate freely if they saw the PMG were prepared to listen to them. In addition the women were exceptionally active in facilitating contact and discussion between conflicting factions. Parry (2001) also claims that local women felt angry and excluded from the peace process, emphasising that they had a keen interest in political and peace developments. Like Bray, Parry asserts that women really knew what was taking place in their area as opposed to the Chief whose pride may have distorted his account of the situation.

It can be seen then that indigenous women actively encouraged peace. The political and cultural value of women's activities were thus brought to the attention of

the TMG/PMG through female civilian monitors. Bray (2001) alleges, however, that as a woman she had to work to clarify her role within the PMG. Parry (2001:105) also disparages the military by labelling it a 'masculine, hierarchical organisation' which did not recognise that local women were a political significant force. To acknowledge Bray's criticism, Foster (2001:120), a male Operations Officer readily concedes, however, that 'a patrol with a female performed better'. While it must be acknowledged that the military might require educating, the decision to include women as part of the TMG/PMG was a good one. The success of this mixed-gender force will hopefully encourage the inclusion of more female field personnel in future peacekeeping operations especially those under UN auspices.

In the TMG/PMG there was a change of focus from pure military mechanics to political and cultural *engagement*. Patrols spent increasingly longer intervals in the villages and patrol commanders were allocated the same villages to assist in the deepening of relationships. The winning of trust and building of confidence were the aims of the exercise. Patrols took the time to listen to villagers' stories such that an empathy was created between them. Friendships were able to form and contributed at the grassroots level to the peace process. Extending the hand of friendship included the mobilisation of former combatants into sporting competitions with members of the TMG/PMG, inviting the villagers to share music particularly with the Maori, Fiji and Vanuatu members, learning the language of the Bougainvilleans and respecting the native culture (Breen 2001).

Thus from the perspective of a participant, a four nation military-civilian peacekeeping operation showed how cohesive such a force could be. Military-civilian interoperability was of a high standard although female civilian contribution was not sufficiently recognised by the military hierarchy. Nevertheless the operation benefited from the female presence having a positive educating influence upon this institution. Working at the indigenous interface, these peacekeepers have shown they can be effective peacemakers who have interacted with the local population and facilitated their activism. This is important because the peace process ultimately belongs to the people of PNG and Bougainville and it is their responsibility to find a durable solution which will lead to a culture of peace.

## Summary

What has been suggested in this chapter is that the UNPC, a concept created by Professor Joseph Schwartzberg to improve peacekeeping methods, can be further enhanced to facilitate indigenous activism through the addition of a civilian corps to the military corps. The civilian corps, like the military corps would be multinational and of mixed-gender. This would result in military and civilian personnel co-functioning and complementing each other in such a way that all areas of the peacekeeping enterprise can be addressed making possible the introduction of *local* peacekeepers, peacemakers and peacebuilders into the peacekeeping arena. Such an eventuality would ensure the indigenous community ultimately owning the recovery processes, surely a real objective of and improvement to modern peacekeeping methods. The realisation of this possibility would represent a genuine evolution in the concept of peacekeeping.

The feasibility of civilians working in a UNPC structure was investigated by considering the positive contributions to conflict zones of volunteers, peace teams and civilian police while the viability of a civilian arm to the UNPC was established by revealing the successful civilian-military co-function and complementation in the UN peacekeeping operation, ONUMOZ, in Mozambique and the peace monitoring operations, TMG/PMG in Bougainville. Both these operations also demonstrated that their peacekeepers effectively facilitated indigenous activism, a primary requirement toward establishing a culture of peace in the host country.



## CHAPTER EIGHT

### Conclusion

Part I of this thesis discussed the evolving concepts of peacekeeping. A change in the nature of peacekeeping has been brought about by a change in world conflict which moved from an interstate to an intrastate dynamic after the Cold War. This has underpinned the evolution of peacekeeping missions from the far simpler first generation type to the complex second generation type. The second generation mission is now based on a mandate composed of multifaceted and far-reaching tasks which call for broader indigenous community involvement as a basis for success. Part II comprised the exploration of six case studies representative of second generation peacekeeping missions today – the peacekeeping missions of Cambodia, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor – in order to provide data for an analysis to be performed in Part III. Part III analysed this data, isolated the underlying causes for failure and proposed a new direction in peacekeeping. That direction, simply stated, is that second generation peacekeeping has the potential to be significantly enhanced by a broad civilian military response.

Why a broad civilian military response is required is directly related to the finding that a major failing in contemporary peacekeeping missions has proven to be the inability to acknowledge the needs of the indigenous community, to invite their participation in reconstruction and most importantly to facilitate their activism in this enterprise. Specifically, the peacekeeping mission must engage at grassroots level with local communities and in the process of working with them, encourage them to meet the challenge of claiming the responsibility for their own recovery. However, it has been demonstrated that predominantly military peacekeeping forces have not been able to mobilise indigenous community involvement adequately. Military organisation and structure is not conducive to this task while the exigencies of the highly prioritised security component of the peacekeeping mandate does not allow the time nor resources to be devoted to what must be justifiably considered, from a military perspective, a lower priority. A civilian team is much better equipped to engage at the indigenous interface than a military one. Civilian organisation has a different *modus operandi* than military organisation. It is less hierarchical, more participatory, with a focus on the process at hand rather than planning for other

contingencies which the military must address and does well. Thus civilian organisation possesses the flexibility and freedom to perform peacebuilding tasks that are associated with the human element of capacity building such as addressing human rights issues, reconciliation and mediation work but most importantly, actually mobilising the indigenous community into action such that they will ultimately own the processes of recovery themselves. This also frees the military personnel to do what they do best - peacekeeping and some of the more fundamental facets of peacebuilding which do not require such intensive interpersonal interaction: Today's peacekeeper cannot be expected to perform all three functions of a mission, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding.

Thus a civilian military response means civilian and military personnel co-functioning and complementing each other in ways such that the mission may benefit from the best of what civilian personnel can offer and the best of what military personnel can offer given that both components work in mutual support of one another. While civilian personnel can contribute a more participatory style of decision-making conducive to engagement with the indigenous population, military personnel, given that they are part of a top-down hierarchical organisation, offer the unique skills of military discipline required in keeping the peace and protecting the population of the host country in its entirety. That civilians and the military can complement each other in performing the many varied and arduous functions of a peacekeeping operation may seem unrealistic at first sight. However, it is a necessary strategy to pursue if the consistent errors characteristic of second generation missions are to be effectively addressed. The UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique and the peacemonitoring mission in Bougainville, both regarded as successful missions, have demonstrated to some degree that civilian /military co-function and complementation can become a reality. While these missions are supportive of civilian mobilisation and interaction with military function, it must be acknowledged, however, that there exists a deficit in knowledge of civilian based models, of relationships between contending factions, arbitration, and rivalry with military components. While this, of course, must temper my reasoning and introduce moderation to my argument, I offer this suggestion for the potential of improvement that it may hold over the present system.

A viable focus for a civilian military partnership is for Professor Schwartzberg's concept, the United Nations Peace Corps, to be linked in with community indigenous involvement through the addition of a civilian corps to co-function with the military corps. It is this combination of concepts that I recommend for consideration as a long term solution to peacekeeping problems. Such a solution would bring into being an elite, standing, volunteer force with methods of recruitment and training geared completely to the undertaking of global peacekeeping. Loyalties would remain with the United Nations and not be subject to the caprice of national military establishments. This, in turn, as time passed and the UNPC became an effective deterrent, would ideally reduce the need for the national military institution altogether. The inclusion of a civilian corps, like that of the military corps, would be multinational and of mixed gender and subject to similar recruitment processes as that of the military corps.

The importance of adding a civilian corps cannot be overstated. The peacekeeping mission must commit itself to working much more extensively with the local community as the peacekeeper now plays a key role in the recovery process of second generation peacekeeping missions particularly humanitarian interventions. However, a humanitarian intervention usually involves political, social and economic reconstruction necessitating the implementation of peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks in addition to those of peacekeeping. Professor Schwartzberg does acknowledge that peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are likely to overlap in contemporary peacekeeping missions and suggests complementing the military and policing efforts of a UNPC mission with a variety of other services as well as establishing an Administrative Academy (Schwartzberg Interview 2001). These are admirable suggestions and would no doubt address the situation in some measure. However, the advantages of incorporating a civilian corps directly into the UNPC concept itself holds the potential to more effectively facilitate indigenous activism, a primary requirement for success of the second generation peacekeeping mission.

It is acknowledged that the integration of the UNPC model enhanced by a civilian corps into peacekeeping methodology is subject to a major limitation. It is a project that is realisable only with an empowerment of the United Nations. Thus it represents a long term solution. Reform of the UN is not an unrealistic concept,

however. While globalisation is one of the forces tearing apart the political, cultural and economic fabric of many societies thereby causing intrastate conflicts and necessitating the mobilisation of peacekeeping operations, paradoxically it also has a positive aspect in the growth of global consciousness and responsibility ranging from the individual through to the governments of nations. An example of this is seen in the decreased importance of national sovereignty facilitating the humanitarian intervention type of peacekeeping mission. Thus while a radical empowerment of the UN may not be the next step, it may very well represent a future step in an evolutionary progression of steps concomitantly enabling the framework to be erected for the enhanced UNPC peacekeeping model. The realisation of such a project would make peacekeeping a core function of the UN.

In the meantime, I suggest that peacekeeping methods would benefit greatly from consideration of the proposal that second generation peacekeeping missions require an integrated military and civilian solution. The military are needed because, in short, they provide a disciplined force that is capable of the multifarious duties of protection in the broadest sense, preserving peace between rival factions and combat when it is deemed necessary. Civilians are needed to build local capacities and mobilise activism of local populations such that they can ultimately own the processes of recovery. Harmonisation of military and civilian agents can thus produce a complementary effort. While the two 'forces' may be separate entities, distinctive, they cannot be separated functionally in the attainment of overall objectives. They intermesh at ground level working together, each with their own separate mandates, toward the common goal of fostering a culture of peace in the host country.

Another significant limitation is that while I have demonstrated how indigenous community involvement brings about better outcomes, I have been dealing with the limits of past cases. Thus I, too, recognise the limits of my own study. Having established this focus, future research could be operationalised in a number of areas. For example, identifying the respective roles and points of collaboration between civilian and military bodies represents a key challenge. Also, how to practice coordinating future civilian and military cooperation is fundamental to the success of my proposals and comprises an area where much research is required.

I end this study by reflecting on one final issue. It has been established in this thesis that creating a culture of peace in a host country depends upon eventual indigenous ownership of the processes of recovery. Imposed externally generated programs will not gain acceptance by local populations long term nor acknowledge the contribution that these populations must make to their own recovery. Through assistance, reinforcement and active mobilisation, I believe that ultimately giving ownership of recovery processes to the indigenous population fosters within that population the responsibility of its own survival. Concomitant with this gradually comes the rebirth of civil society structures necessary for a flowering of democratic practices. The building of civil society must come first, from within the society, to accommodate the framework of democracy. Imposing a paradigm of Western style democracy externally, without direction by the local population, completely ignores indigenous values and capacity. It cannot create a civil society in the host country. This has been a basic and major failing of peacekeeping mandates in second generation peacekeeping. The principles of an unthinking democratisation underscore the reconstruction planning of war torn states which is reflected in the mandates of peacekeeping missions which, in turn, peacekeepers have to implement. It is understandable that they fail. As my final suggestion, I recommend that compilation of mandates which forms the basis of direction for peacekeeping missions, be decided upon not only by representatives from the United Nations but by contributing NGOs, aid agencies and most importantly the host country itself. Therein lies justice and without justice there can be no culture of peace.

## Endnotes

<sup>i</sup> See the mandates of the large missions of the 1990s. The mandates of the Kosovo and East Timor missions, for example, encapsulate these tasks.

<sup>ii</sup> See Appendix III for the interview with Professor Schwartzberg.

<sup>iii</sup> Refer to Appendix I – Sections from the United Nations Charter. Article 2(7) establishes the inviolability of the domestic jurisdiction of a state subject to a valid circumstance where the application of enforcement measures as defined under Chapter VII of the charter would apply.

<sup>iv</sup> See for example Sales (1996) and UNRISID (1993) for a critique of the mandate.

<sup>v</sup> The presence of Vietnamese in Cambodia has caused deep rooted conflict since the annexation of Southern Cambodia to Vietnamese imperialism in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Vietnamese imperial hegemony is further underscored by the December 1978 invasion of Cambodia by Hanoi that ignited the contemporary conflict.

<sup>vi</sup> See Appendix I – Sections from the United Nations Charter. A Chapter VII authorisation grants enforcement measures.

<sup>vii</sup> The implications of this reality are discussed further in my concluding chapter.

<sup>viii</sup> Shawcross (2000) explains that the Tutsis make up only about 10 percent of the population but had ruled over the Hutu majority for centuries. The Hutus eventually overturned the monarchy, killing many Tutsis and sending many into exile. The Hutu regime then became more totalitarian and excluded Tutsis from all positions of power.

<sup>ix</sup> See Appendix I – Sections from the United Nations Charter. A Chapter VII authorisation establishes the legitimacy of enforcement.

<sup>x</sup> Refer to Appendix I – Sections from the United Nations Charter. Articles 39, 41 and 42 taken together of Chapter VII establish the legitimacy of enforcement actions in certain given situations. A Chapter VII authorisation is powerful and is linked to the use of force as opposed to the peacemaking provisions established under Chapter VI. A Chapter VII authorisation might be construed as being morally justified but it could not be neutral or impartial.

<sup>xi</sup> France has had considerable colonial interests in Africa. Shawcross (2000) claims that Paris had always seen the Tutsi-led RPF as a stooge of Uganda's president, Yoweri Museveni, and through him of Washington and of the wider 'Anglo-Saxon world'. The possibility of an RPF victory disconcerted many French officials, who argued that Rwanda would be only the first domino to fall to '*les anglo-saxons*', and others would be toppled also. Anglo-Saxon influence was an anathema throughout France's client regimes, known as *la francophonie*. The French proposal of a unilateral Chapter VII enforcement gave birth to the idea among some quarters that the French were more interested in saving the remnants of the Hutu regime from whose extremist wing the genocide sprang than saving innocent lives.

<sup>xii</sup> Appendix II is a summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The military aspects in Annex 1-A detail NATO's rigorous supervision.

<sup>xiii</sup> Refer to Appendix I – Sections from the United Nations Charter. A Chapter VI intervention bears the consent of both parties to the dispute which is aimed by all parties to be resolved by peaceful means. It is pacific settlement of disputes as opposed to a Chapter VII authorisation which legitimises an enforcement action.

<sup>xiv</sup> Maynard here outlines five phases of psychological recovery: Establishing safety; communalisation and bereavement; rebuilding trust and the capacity to trust; re-establishing personal and social morality; and reintegrating and restoring democratic discourse.

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<sup>xv</sup> The reference for this work is 'A new Perspective on Peacekeeping: Lessons from Bosnia and Elsewhere', *Global Governance*, 3, pp. 1-15.

<sup>xvi</sup> UNITAF, a US peacekeeping mission, was subsequently authorised to use "all necessary means" to establish a secure environment for the delivery of aid. This contrasted strongly with UNOSOM I's passive role. The lack of coordination between the US and UN missions exacerbated the situation.

<sup>xvii</sup> The French mission, Operation Turquoise, had a Chapter VII authorization. This operation consisted of many troops who could have been allotted to UNAMIR II. Conflicts of interest were likely to have occurred between the two missions.

<sup>xviii</sup> NATO based SFOR has been an effective deterrent against military conflicts. However, each of the three ethnic groups in Bosnia maintains an army with each postured against the other. A withdrawal of SFOR would mean a high possibility of war.

<sup>xix</sup> Please see Appendix IV for an Abstract of a Paper presented at panel on 'United Nations Responses to Terrorism and Security' at the Fifteenth annual meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS) in Cascais, Portugal, June 2002. The paper is based on the theoretical establishment of a United Nations Administrative Academy (UNAA) which would consist of a standing reserve of highly trained administrative specialists to work in transitional regimes on tasks such as working closely with UN peacekeeping forces, relieving them of tasks the military is ill equipped to perform and helping to train indigenous talent to take over from them.

<sup>xx</sup> The abstract on the UNAA reveals that such an academy would be a very positive development. Its essential feature would be to train civilian personnel to take over from military personnel in tasks which the military is not well equipped to perform. This has the potential of creating teams which could engage at the indigenous level.

<sup>xxi</sup> The German people, operational 24 hours a day, seven days a week, worked with shovels, hoes and other hand tools to make a 6,000 foot runway at Tegel Forest transforming it into a working airfield. At its peak the Berlin Airlift involved 32,000 American military personnel backed by another 23,000 civilians from the US, Allied Nations and Germany (Powell 1998:8)

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## APPENDIX I

## **Appendix I**

### **Sections from the United Nations Charter Chapter I; Chapter VI; Chapter VII**

# CHAPTER I

## PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

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### Article 1

The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.



### Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.

- 7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.**

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## CHAPTER VI

### PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

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#### Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.



#### Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.



#### Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.



#### Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.



### Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.



### Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

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## CHAPTER VII

### ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

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#### Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.



#### Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.



#### Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.



#### Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.



#### Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.



### Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.



### Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.



### Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.



### Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.



### Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they remembers.



### Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.



### Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.



### Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## APPENDIX II

## **Appendix II**

### **Summary of the Dayton Peace Agreement**

Fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, December 11, 1995. Reference: <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/dayton.html>, assessed 29 November 2001.



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## Summary of The Dayton Peace Agreement

Fact sheet released by the Bureau of Public Affairs, December 11, 1995.

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The Dayton proximity talks culminated in the initialing on November 21, 1995, of a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement was initialled by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was witnessed by representatives of the Contact Group nations-the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia-and the European Union Special Negotiator. According to the terms of the agreement, a sovereign state known as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities: the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Federation of Bosnia.

The agreement and its annexes are summarized below.

### General Framework Agreement

- Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agree to fully respect the sovereign equality of one another and to settle disputes by peaceful means;
- The FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina recognize each other and agree to discuss further aspects of their mutual recognition;
- The parties agree to fully respect and promote fulfillment of the commitments made in the various annexes, and they obligate themselves to respect human rights and the rights of refugees and displaced persons; and
- The parties agree to cooperate fully with all entities, including those authorized by the United Nations Security Council, in implementing the peace settlement and investigating and prosecuting war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

### Annex 1-A: Military Aspects



- The cease-fire that began with the agreement of October 5, 1995, will continue;
- Foreign combatant forces currently in Bosnia are to be withdrawn within 30 days;
- The parties must complete withdrawal of forces behind a zone of separation of approximately 4 km within an agreed period. Special provisions relate to Sarajevo and Gorazde;
- As a confidence-building measure, the parties agree to withdraw heavy weapons and forces to cantonment/barracks areas within an agreed period and to demobilize forces which cannot be accommodated in those areas;
- The agreement invites into Bosnia and Herzegovina a multinational military implementation force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN;
- The IFOR will have the right to monitor and help ensure compliance with the agreement on military aspects and fulfill certain supporting tasks. The IFOR will have the right to carry out its mission vigorously, including with the use of force as necessary. It will have unimpeded freedom of movement, control over airspace, and status of forces protection;
- A Joint Military Commission is established, to be chaired by the IFOR Commander. Persons under indictment by the international war crimes tribunal cannot participate;
- Information on mines, military personnel, weaponry, and other items must be provided to the Joint Military Commission within agreed periods; and
- All combatants and civilians must be released and transferred without delay in accordance with a plan to be developed by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

### **Annex 1-B: Regional Stabilization**

- Representatives of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia, and the Bosnian Serb Republic must begin negotiations within 7 days, under Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) auspices, with the objective of agreeing on confidence-building measures within 45 days. These could include, for example, restrictions on military deployments and exercises, notification of military activities, and exchange of data;
- The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia, and the Bosnian Serb Republic, as well as Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, agree not to import arms for 90 days and not to import any heavy weapons, heavy weapons ammunition, mines, military aircraft, and helicopters for 180 days or until an arms control agreement takes effect;
- All five parties must begin negotiations within 30 days, under OSCE auspices, to agree on numerical limits on holdings of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters;
- If the parties fail to establish limits on these categories within 180 days, the agreement provides for specified limits to come into force for the parties; and
- The OSCE will organize and conduct negotiations to establish a regional balance in and around the former Yugoslavia.

### **Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundary**

- An inter-entity boundary line between the Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic is agreed to;
- Sarajevo will be reunified within the Federation of Bosnia and will be open to all people of the country;
- Gorazde will remain secure and accessible, linked to the Federation of Bosnia by a land corridor; and
- The status of Brcko will be determined by arbitration within one year.

### **Annex 3: Elections**

- Free and fair, internationally supervised elections will be conducted within six to nine months for the presidency and House of Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for the House of Representatives of the Federation of Bosnia, and the National Assembly and presidency of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and, if feasible, for local offices;
- Refugees and persons displaced by the conflict will have the right to vote (including by absentee ballot) in their original place of residence if they choose to do so;
- The parties must create conditions in which free and fair elections can be held by protecting the right to vote in secret and ensuring freedom of expression and the press;
- The OSCE is requested to supervise the preparation and conduct of these elections; and
- All citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina aged 18 or older listed on the 1991 Bosnian census are eligible to vote.

#### **Annex 4: Constitution**

- A new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which will be known as "Bosnia and Herzegovina," will be adopted upon signature at Paris;
- Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue as a sovereign state within its present internationally-recognized borders. It will consist of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic;
- The constitution provides for the protection of human rights and the free movement of people, goods, capital and services throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- The central government will have a presidency, a two chamber legislature, and a constitutional court. Direct elections will be held for the presidency and one of the legislative chambers;
- There will be a central bank and monetary system, and the central government will also have responsibilities for foreign policy, law enforcement, air traffic control, communications and other areas to be agreed;
- Military coordination will take place through a committee including members of the presidency;
- No person who is serving a sentence imposed by the international tribunal, and no person who is under indictment by the tribunal and who has failed to comply with an order to appear before the tribunal, may stand as a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public office in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

#### **Annex 5: Arbitration**

- The Federation of Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to enter into reciprocal commitments to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them, and they agree to design and implement a system of arbitration.

#### **Annex 6: Human Rights**

- The agreement guarantees internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms for all persons within Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- A Commission on Human Rights, composed of a human rights ombudsman and a human rights chamber (court), is established;
- The ombudsman is authorized to investigate human rights violations, issue findings, and bring and participate in proceedings before the human rights chamber;
- The human rights chamber is authorized to hear and decide human rights claims and to issue binding decisions; and
- The parties agree to grant UN human rights agencies, the OSCE, the international tribunal and other organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation.

**Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons**

- The agreement grants refugees and displaced persons the right to return home safely and either regain lost property or obtain just compensation;
- A Commission for Displaced Persons and Refugees will decide on return of real property or compensation, with the authority to issue final decisions;
- All persons are granted the right to move freely throughout the country, without harassment or discrimination; and
- The parties commit to cooperate with the ICRC in finding all missing persons.

**Annex 8: Commission to Preserve National Monuments**

- A Commission to Preserve National Monuments is established;
- The commission is authorized to receive and act upon petitions to designate as national monuments movable or immovable property of great importance to a group of people with a common cultural, historic, religious, or ethnic heritage; and
- When property is designated as a national monument, the entities will make every effort to take appropriate legal, technical, financial and other measures to protect and conserve the national monument and refrain from taking deliberate actions which might damage it.

**Annex 9: Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations**

- A Bosnia and Herzegovina Transportation Corporation is established to organize and operate transportation facilities, such as roads, railways, and ports; and
- A Commission on Public Corporations is created to examine establishing other Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations to operate joint public facilities such as utilities and postal service facilities.

**Annex 10: Civilian Implementation**

- The parties request that a high representative be designated, consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions, to coordinate and facilitate civilian aspects of the peace settlement, such as humanitarian aid, economic reconstruction, protection of human rights, and the holding of free elections;
- The high representative will chair a Joint Civilian Commission comprised of senior political representatives of the parties, the IFOR Commander, and representatives of civilian organizations; and
- The high representative has no authority over the IFOR.

**Annex 11: International Police Task Force**

- The UN is requested to establish a UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) to carry out various tasks, including training and advising local law enforcement personnel, as well as monitoring and inspecting law enforcement activities and facilities;
- The IPTF will be headed by a commissioner appointed by the UN Secretary General; and
- IPTF personnel must report any credible information on human rights violations to the Human Rights Commission, the International Tribunal or other appropriate organizations.

**Agreement on Initialing the General Framework Agreement**

- In this agreement, which was signed at Dayton, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agree that the negotiations have been completed. They and the Entities they represent commit themselves to sign the General Framework Agreement and its annexes in Paris.
- They also agree that the initialing of the General Framework Agreement and its Annexes in Dayton expresses their consent to be bound by these agreements.

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## APPENDIX III

## Appendix III

### Interview with Professor Joseph Schwartzberg

This interview was conducted via email and therefore exhibits characteristics and limitations that such an interviewing medium generates, such as an abruptness when a new topic is introduced, for example. Hence the interview takes on the form of separate dialogues rather than a strict question and answer format. The asterisks in the text indicate where one dialogue stops and another starts.

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**Deanna (D):** Professor Schwartzberg, my first question to you concerns the changing nature of warfare. Different authors have pointed out that there has been a change in the nature of contemporary warfare from inter-state to more internal conflicts since the end of the Cold War and this has led to an expansion in the number and size of UN peacekeeping missions.

**Professor Schwartzberg (PS):** This is an indisputable fact.

**D:** With the apparatus of the UN no longer being compromised by Cold War dynamics, do you see this as an ideal opportunity to empower the United Nations, to put in force the substance of your proposal?

**PS:** While I do see the need to act swiftly, I don't believe that the top people in the UN believe that such a course of action is presently politically expedient given the anti-UN political climate in the US Republican party (more specifically, under Senator Jesse Helms, who heads the Senate Foreign Relations Committee). Kofi Annan urged the world's leaders at the UN Summit Meeting on Sept. 6-9 to give careful study to and support for the recommendations of the Brahimi Committee Report which was commissioned by the UN to make a set of recommendations relative to peacekeeping operations. These recommendations are all good, as far as they go, but they are much

less sweeping than what I propose or than what Boutros-Ghali suggested in his published 'Agenda for Peace'.

**D:** In order to address the more internal conflicts, would there not be and is there not a collision with the much revered precedent of 'state sovereignty'?

**PS:** Indeed there is.

**D:** Where do you personally stand with this issue?

**PS:** That collision is inevitable in my view. The process is already underway in Kosovo and is bound to be accelerated with the passage of time.

**D:** How do you think nations are going to react to an incursion on this long held almost sacred principle?

**PS:** The responses will depend on who benefits and who loses. That's how politics normally works.

**D:** Do you think that the international community, as opposed to nation-states, will respond favourably to a reduced stature of 'state sovereignty'?

**PS:** That reduction in sovereignty will be widely opposed; but as more and more enlightened states become convinced that, from a systemic point of view, the gains will outweigh the costs, they will, if they are logical, alter their view. But this could be wishful thinking on my part. People and states do not always behave logically.

\*\*\*\*\*

**D:** Your proposal for a multipurpose UNPC is as you say very 'sweeping'. You suggest that as recognition spreads that 'reliable international mechanisms' can contain violence,

the justification for keeping large national military establishments will diminish. You also state (in your previous dialogue) that reduction in sovereignty although widely opposed at first will increasingly become accepted as gains will outweigh the costs and enlightened states become aware of this (if they are logical). This point of view seems to indicate that you would ultimately countenance a reduction in US military force in favour of a much enhanced UN capability.

**PS:** I would countenance not merely 'a reduction' but a major diminution in the size of our armed forces and those of other states as well.

**D:** It seems that you do not think that a vision of 'international law' is utopian, that it is indeed a possible viable reality. Is this indeed the case or am I off on a tangent?

**PS:** You are quite correct.

**D:** Personally I do not think that empowerment of the UN to make it a new authority of global governance is a utopian vision. I hope in time it can become a viable reality.

**PS:** I have long been a world federalist and am committed to the proposition that global problems require global solutions, i.e. a world government or, if that is too heady a prescription, some radically new system of global governance in which the force of law replaces the law of force.

**D:** It may be the next logical step in the evolution of humankind.

**PS:** Well, a future step anyway, if not quite the next step. I would guess that making some important reforms in the UN will help pave the way.

\*\*\*\*\*



**D:** The first few questions relate to the effectiveness of a dialogue between the UN, the world's most effective global organization, and NATO, the world's most effective military alliance. In your paper, you call into question the legitimacy of NATO's taking on a bigger role especially when a single power, the US, occupies so prominent a position. However, NATO and the UN have to live with each other in an 'overlapping geo-political space'. While the UN has very encompassing mandates that seek to include humanitarian issues and NATO has potentially a very decisive combat role, do you see that they can complement each other in any way?

**PS:** In principle they could. The UN Charter does allow for peacekeeping by regional organizations. US preference for NATO operations, however, is based on its unwillingness to have global control over its actions when it perceives that so many of the world's countries have interests at variance with US interests.

**D:** Could this become a useful and permanent arrangement? Do you think such a relationship is a healthy one for the UN?

**PS:** It could become useful and healthy if there were more consultation and if NATO did not act at cross-purposes from the UN as a whole.

**D:** Did you approve of the UN and NATO working together in Bosnia? Do you think NATO's involvement weakened the image or the foundation of the UN? Do you think it will set precedents for the future or was it a one-off situation?

**PS:** I am not an expert on the Bosnian situation, but my understanding is that NATO acted very much as it pleased and then expected the UN to adapt to the situation it had created rather than the other way around. But seek other advice on this subject.

**D:** Because NATO was 'forced' to intervene in Kosovo due to the fact that the Security Council had become paralysed, is this perhaps tied up with the genesis of your own idea for a UNPC for empowering of the UN at a peacekeeping/combat level?

**PS:** My ideas were developed independently of the situation in Kosovo and prior to the onset of large-scale abuses in that region. If the UN Security Council had been reformed in ways that I advocated [in my other papers] (ie no veto), it would not have suffered from paralysis in respect to Kosovo. Had the US been more forthcoming in the UN, paralysis might also have been averted.

**D:** According to a report made by the International Peace Academy, NATO does not regard itself as a regional arrangement under the terms of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Rather it is a defense alliance designed to deal with threats from outside its own members. Consequently, do you perceive NATO as a powerful tool that both the world and the UN need OR would you rather see an empowerment of the UN at the expense of NATO's force?

**PS:** I believe that the question of whether NATO is a 'regional' organization is moot. I've seen arguments that it is. I'd prefer empowerment of the UN to a further build-up of the already vast capability of NATO.

**D:** The next questions relate to Boutros-Ghali's 'Agenda for Peace' and 'An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later'. Boutros-Ghali remarks that globalism and nationalism 'need not be viewed as opposing trends'. It is difficult not to do so. It is often acknowledged that the foundation stone of the UN is the state but Boutros-Ghali comments that 'the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed'. (I know we've had this conversation before.) As far as I can see meeting the needs of a more interdependent world means, in effect, some sort of formal recognition of the declining stature of state sovereignty. Given time, do you think such a recognition will ever be made by Member States?

**PS:** I believe that Boutros-Ghali is correct and see increasing limitations on national/state sovereignty as an inevitable development in world affairs.

**D:** While the end of the Cold War drew us back from the brink of a possible world-threatening confrontation, Boutros-Ghali notes, 'there may not be a third opportunity for our planet which, now for different reasons, remains endangered'. Boutros-Ghali places a high importance on 'preventive diplomacy' in this regard. It is to avoid a crisis while peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence. Would you say that the primary function of the UNPC that you envisage would be peacekeeping as opposed to these other two measures?

**PS:** An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure; so, obviously, I would prefer preventive diplomacy wherever possible; but most such diplomacy could be effected without actual deployment of the UNPC. However, simply having a UNPC in place and ready for use would make preventive diplomacy much more effective. My guess is that the actual deployment of the UNPC would, more often than not, occur in a peacekeeping mode.

**D:** Or, do you perceive a function for peacebuilding as well such as the building up of infrastructure. If this is the case, will not the corps of recruited people need to be extremely versatile and will not this extreme versatility present a problem?

**PS:** Peacebuilding may take numerous forms, including the build-up of infrastructure; but, for practical reasons, the task of building infrastructure would be confined mainly to that of the democratic host countries where the UNPC would regularly be based.

**D:** Boutros-Ghali makes the point that 'a prerequisite for democratization is that democracy must grow roots in the country's own soil'. Given the lack of democratic tradition in some countries such as Angola and Cambodia, is there some way that the Peace Corps could help by overseeing the implementation of human rights and possibly the structures of civil society? Or is this too specialized a function? Is it even possible to try to help develop structures of democracy such as civil society when there is a 'form' of government present? This question seems important to me for what is the point of overseeing elections if the people don't know how to use democracy?

**PS:** The need for building democracy must be addressed on numerous fronts and the UNPC cannot, for the foreseeable future, be expected to become the principal agent in furthering this process or in promoting national development. The latter is the principal task of the UNDP, not to mention the World Bank Group of agencies and a host of NGOs and national agencies.

**D:** Boutros-Ghali says, 'Too much is expected of the UN.' You have said, 'If you think peacekeeping is expensive, try anarchy.' Are you in fact optimistic? The NEED for an effective UN is paramount. Do you think, whether by gigantic leaps or by little steps, the peoples of this planet will actually find the necessity to build an empowered global United Nations?

**PS:** I'm an eternal optimist. However, what I foresee is see a period marked by a number of little progressive steps in planetary development leading up to a time when a sufficient reservoir of hope and trust is built up to enable the world to draft a brand new UN Charter, which would provide the institutional framework within which the world could make some quantum leaps towards democratization and sustainable development.

\*\*\*\*\*

**D:** The UNPC, is it not a concept for a combat-capable, United Nations, rapid deployment military force intended for active peacekeeping purposes and not simply post conflict roles?

**PS:** Yes, I do anticipate that it might, from time to time, actually see combat, especially in an early period when its credibility as a deterrent force would not yet have been established.

**D:** Are we talking here about intervention that would be sometimes contentious – intervention without invitation by the national government, intervention when humanitarian need is in conflict with state wishes?

**PS:** Yes, if intervention were authorized by the Security Council, it could be effected without the consent of a state to which the intervention was directed. This would be especially likely in the case of ‘Humanitarian Intervention’.

**D:** If killing within a country is defined by the major players as ‘genocide’, does this sanction, legitimize intervention? If it remains defined as simply a ‘humanitarian crisis’ does intervention then become controversial, not legitimate owing to questions of state sovereignty?

**PS:** Unbridled state sovereignty has become anachronistic. In recent comments Kofi Annan (among others) has said as much. No state can any longer legitimately use the shield of sovereignty as a cover for genocide.

**D:** Kofi Annan in his statement on the report of the independent inquiry into the Rwanda incident called on ‘ways in which the United Nations could intervene more promptly, and more effectively, to prevent or halt massive and systematic violations of human rights. Rwanda has obviously been a failure of preventive diplomacy and peacemaking. Would you say that such failures call for a rapid and legitimate peacekeeping response that may involve military action despite the barriers of national sovereignty? If so, do you think your concept of the UNPC could have delivered the goods? Why?

**PS:** I cannot think of a more obvious case where a UNPC-type intervention would have been justified. Nor is there any other case, I believe, where such a small force (say 1-2,000 airborne troops) could have been wholly successful in averting mass slaughter.

**D:** The independent enquiry in Rwanda found that the overriding failure in the response of the UN was a ‘lack of resources and a lack of will’ to commit to the task. Lack of

political leadership, military capacity, coordination and discipline and problems of command and control all contributed to the failure, according to the enquiry. I know you have spelt out details of command and control in your paper, but could you briefly describe the steps which would have mobilized a force of the UNPC to resolve the Rwanda situation.

**PS:** I envisage highly trained, elite troops, ever at the ready, strategically located in several parts of the world to facilitate their being promptly deployed when the need arises. For an initial period, however, logistic support would probably have to be provided by the US and other major powers. That would depend on the scale of the operation. In time, however, I would hope that the UNPC would gradually build up its own independent logistic capability.

**D:** The enquiry found that there was no contingency planning for the eventuality that the peace process did not succeed. Principally, the mandate was not adequate to deal with the problem. Would this be any different had a UNPC been in force or do you see this as a problem with the anachronistic structure of the UN today? Do you, in fact, think that if the UN adopted the concept of the UNPC, such a change would gather momentum and it would be easier to reform other elements of the UN?

**PS:** There is no guarantee that a UNPC intervention, in and of itself, would always be successful (although in Rwanda it surely would have been). Therefore, in some cases (Croatia and Bosnia might be cases in point) the members of the Security Council might have to commit back-up forces in the event that a recalcitrant regime had the temerity to resist UNPC intervention. If such support were to be withheld, the Security Council might, sadly, simply have to refrain from authorizing a UNPC action.

**D:** The Rwanda Mission was plagued with lack of resources – even troop contributions to UNAMIR did not provide their contingents with basic weaponry and other material. In effect the mission was too weak to start with. In your paper you acknowledge that the costs of establishing and maintaining the UNPC would exceed current ongoing UN

peacekeeping operations and this is understandable for the UNPC to be effective. Can you suggest some ways how the UNPC can be financed?

**PS:** There are many possible ways. The simplest would be an enhanced assessment levied on all UN Member Nations based on ability to pay. Another would be a tax on arms shipments (though that might simply send them underground). The proposed 'Tobin Tax' on all speculative foreign currency transactions is yet another possibility. If, as it should, the existence of a UNPC enables states to cut their military budgets, those that do will come out ahead from a fiscal perspective.

**D:** Are there any comments you'd like to make about any of these questions?

**PS:** Nothing other than what I've already said. The fact that I've offered an answer to all your queries, however, does not imply that the actual implementation of anything I've recommended will be easy. As in any complex venture, mistakes will be made. But that, alas, is often the way that we learn.

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**D:** According to the Brahimi Report (Section 17) traditional peacekeeping treats the symptoms rather than the sources of conflicts and has no 'built-in exit strategy'. Hence associated peacekeeping was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan). Do you think that UN peacekeeping has effectively combined with peacebuilding in the more complex peace operations of the post Cold War era limiting the post conflict duration of peacekeeping? For example, do you really believe the conducting of national elections offers an exit strategy? Do not successful elections require a base of democratization?

**PS:** Good Question. The cited critique of the Brahimi Report is essentially correct. Although I am not sure – speaking off the top of my head – that peacekeeping and

peacebuilding efforts have, as yet, ever been ideally combined, some of the results, say in Guatemala, have been pretty good. The Cambodian operation appeared for a time to be on the verge of making a democratic breakthrough, but then stumbled in the face of the obduracy of the local leadership. To say that successful elections absolutely must have 'a base of democratization' strikes me as too sweeping a generalization. The Namibian elections appear to have resulted in a very stable democratic state, even in the absence of a prior democratic tradition. Much of what is possible, I would guess would depend on local culture and the unpredictable circumstances of local leadership. As for an exit strategy, there is still too little experience to build on; nevertheless, I'd think that conducting successful elections and installing legitimate governments would provide as good an exit strategy as one could wish.

**D:** According to the Brahimi Report (Section 28) it is acknowledged that 'peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers' support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders work'. Isn't the implementation of human rights therefore within the auspices of peacebuilding? You have stated in answer to another question that 'the need for building democracy must be addressed on numerous fronts and the UNPC cannot, for the foreseeable future, be expected to become the principal agent in furthering this process or in promoting national development'. However, would it not be worth considering, that the UNPC, as well as being a force of peacekeepers include provisions for peacebuilding as well as the two seem to be so interlinked?

**PS:** Despite what I said before about what might happen in the 'foreseeable future', I do think that the UNPC could have an important role to play in peacebuilding, even if only as a catalyst in setting democratizing forces in motion in particular areas of the world. (Yugoslavia might be a case in point in somewhat different circumstances than those now obtaining.) As time goes on, however, the political and human rights capabilities of the UNPC would, hopefully, be expanded.



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**D:** Sue Downie notes that some countries are better prepared than others at preparing for missions eg the Canadians selected for Cambodia underwent almost 3 months military and diplomatic training on the history of the UN, UNTAC, and the history, culture and religion of Cambodia while most international staff attended two or three days of briefings after arriving in Cambodia which proved to be insufficient. Do you think that a big advantage of a UNPC would be that such training would be readily and more easily available and accessible to all peacekeepers?

**PS:** I do believe that the UNPC would greatly facilitate training of the type to which you refer notwithstanding the fact that UNPC units could not be expected to include experts on every part of the world. The reason is that some sort of generalized background training could provide a groundwork on which the ad hoc area-specific training could build.

**D:** In your opinion how important is the need for missions to include people who understand and can analyse the local political, military, social, cultural and economic scene? Would a standing UNPC be able to do this as well as ad hoc missions which can be in a sense hand picked?

**PS:** The UNPC could not do the job alone. Short-term experts would have to be recruited to provide the area-specific expertise that the UNPC would lack.

**D:** Sue Downie comments that one of the lessons that should be learned from Cambodia is that the UN mission should not end with the election of a new parliament where no consideration was given to what would happen the next day. There needed to be a mechanism for the UN mission to assist the new government. I know I keep harping on this subject but I don't think peacekeeping is an isolated activity. As Sue Downie says, peacekeeping and rehabilitation should be intertwined, 'and the linkage should be defined

in the planning phase'. If a UNPC is only going to accommodate peacekeeping, will this not make an operation more difficult in the rehabilitation and state building phases?

**PS:** Although I am not personally familiar with the writings of Sue Downie, I believe, from what you say, that she is correct. The UNPC cannot be all things to all people and other expertise and responsibilities will be needed.

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**D:** Professor Schwartzberg, where do you stand in relation to the Piers Wood study that you referred me to: *An Ill-fated Mismatch – Peacekeeping and the Military: A Catalogue of Military Shortcomings in Peace Operations*? I remember I asked you once in relation to the UNPC, did you conceive it to be 'a combat-capable, United Nations, rapid deployment military force intended for active peacekeeping purposes and not simply post conflict roles? You replied, 'Yes, I do anticipate that it might, from time to time, actually see combat, especially in an early period when its credibility as a deterrent force would not yet have been established.' Do you want to qualify in any way this statement? Or do you want to make further statements to elaborate your position? Do you want to say anything at all about the impact of such a study on your conception of a UNPC?

**PS:** With regard to your key question on whether I would sanction the use of force by the type of UNPK force that I envisage, I stand by my original position that, however undesirable it may seem, there will be occasions when doing so will prove necessary. Stopping genocide or massive human rights abuses that are already underway would be the most obvious examples. Such action, with no more than a small number of casualties, instead of the 800,000 that actually occurred, in Rwanda is an obvious – even though hypothetical – case in point. However, I will keep an open mind on this. Once I've read Mel's paper, it is conceivable that my position will change. With respect to the paper's asserted infrequency of success of PK missions, I have two observations. First, there are degrees of success; so 'failure' is a relative term. Second, I suspect that the unsatisfactory success rate is largely due to the inadequacy of training of many (most?) of

the soldiers involved, as well as the insufficiency of the support that they are given, all of which are discussed in the Brahimi Report with which you are already familiar.

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**PS:** Deanna, I have finally gotten around to reading 'An Ill-fated Mismatch: Peacekeeping and the Military', which Mel Duncan commissioned. On the whole, I found it a very well done study, which calls for little comment other than general approbation. I cannot quarrel with any of its conclusions and agree with the sentiment expressed by both you and Mel that it lends support to my own argument about the need for an elite, standing all-volunteer, internationally recruited, multi-tasked, rapidly deployable Peace Corps.

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**D:** Would you say that the introduction of a UNPC could lead to more *sustainable* peace settlements than what has occurred with these ad hoc type UN arrangements? Or that that would be the job of a more peacebuilding process?

**PS:** My surmise is that they would, as a rule, prove to be more sustainable than those that have sprung up from ad hoc arrangements. This is because: a) the settlements would be brought about through the use of personnel who were more professionally trained than those generally used to date; b) given PC presences more robust than those characterizing most UN PK missions to date, there would be fewer nasty incidents, on average, between the arrival of the peace force and the establishment of a settlement; and c) because the very existence of a UNPC would presume a significantly heightened commitment within the UN to peacekeeping and peacemaking and to creating the requisite senior civilian staff positions.

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**D:** Do you think there is a capacity for corruption in the UN? Do you see any ways that the establishment of a UNPC might make the situation worse or better?

**PS:** There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that there is a potential for corruption in the UN. At the Secretariat level, however, I would suppose that instances of blatant corruption – as opposed, say, to favoritism – are rare, simply because the ability of that body to dispose of tangible or monetary goods is very limited. But the buying of influence and of votes on key issues in the General Assembly was, as I understand it, a very common feature of the Cold War period, though data on the subject are lacking. To what extent the practice continues I cannot say; but I should be surprised if the extension of quids pro quo, especially among delegates from very small countries, were a thing of the past.

As for the possibility of corruption in a UNPC, one could not rule it out a priori. Even though there should, in theory, be less corruption in a carefully recruited elite force, bad apples can emerge anywhere. But, I would be very surprised if the levels of corruption in a UNPC would ever approach some of them that I've read about (anecdotally to be sure) among some contingents of peacekeepers in recent UN peacekeeping (and NATO) operations. These include selling off of arms and other military supplies to potential and actual combatants, organizing prostitution networks, etc.

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**D:** The UNOSOM missions in Somalia had a US based mission present, UNITAF, which posed problems of authority and coordination between the UN based and US based missions. Similarly, the UNAMIR missions in Rwanda had to contend with the French based mission, Operation Turquoise, which had a Chapter VII authorization while UNAMIR only had a Chapter VI based authorization. Surely this was problematic. Do you agree that just ONE mission, a UN mission, would have been the best scenario in these cases particularly if it was a UNPC mission, trained, competent and with an adequate mandate? Do you want to add anything here?

**PS:** Although I do not know a great deal about the peacekeeping missions in Somalia and Rwanda, in principle, divided commands would always seem to be a bad idea. Hence, I cannot but agree that a single UN mission would be preferable, especially if it were of the type that I describe in my UNPC article.

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**D:** While researching second generation peacekeeping, it became clear to me that most (not all) missions encompass elements of humanitarian intervention. This has ultimately meant that peacekeepers have to deal with what is really peacemaking and peacebuilding. It has been thought that these three concepts, peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding are discrete entities. They are not. There exists a nexus between peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention which draws on peacemaking and peacebuilding. Where does peacekeeping stop and peacemaking and peacebuilding begin? These three concepts impact on one another. Failures in peacemaking and peacebuilding will compound peacekeeping problems. Thus the peacekeeping mandate is problematic from the start. This peacekeeping/humanitarian intervention dialectic is a hurdle to deal with. Should there be a much more coordinated and cohesive response to humanitarian intervention using the humanitarian intervention agencies that are already there to facilitate humanitarian intervention objectives?

I don't think this problem can be just ignored as it has such an impact on peacekeeping. We give peacekeepers impossible tasks then blame them for not succeeding. Just perhaps the fault doesn't lie with them. I'm concerned the peacekeepers don't get a fair deal. They can sometimes be seen as scapegoats while the real fault lies further up the hierarchy of the UN. Professor Schwartzberg, could you comment on this? I'm of course interested to know how you see this impacting on your concept of the UNPC.

**PS:** I believe that you are entirely correct in noting that peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding are likely to be inextricably intertwined and that the failure to attend

sufficiently to one of those processes can seriously jeopardize the chances for success with the others. Consequently, there will usually be a need to complement the military and policing efforts of a UNPC mission with a variety of diplomatic and other services that might best be rendered by skilled mediators, constitutional experts (in the likely event that new constitutional arrangements will be needed), administrators (to train local administrative cadres, rather than to administer on their own), educationists, development experts, and so forth. No two problems or areas will have an identical set of needs.

To provide the needed skills and personnel, I see six potential sources: a) local experts who have not been seriously "tainted" by previous political action on behalf of one of the sides in a given dispute; b) specialized units, if and when available, from the UNPC itself; c) specialists recruited through the UN for limited-term assignments from countries that can spare their services; d) personnel from a permanent UN administrative corps (yet to be created), to do much the same types of work as in c); e) personnel from NGOs (e.g. Oxfam) already familiar with the area of the dispute; and, finally, f) high-level UN personnel (e.g., as in the case of Lakhdar Brahimi in Afghanistan), with the prestige to handle the most delicate and high levels of negotiation and to coordinate the mission as a whole. Obviously, providing such resources will entail commitments of will and funding on a scale that the UN has not seen till now. But, if the requisite commitments are made and if future armed conflict is thereby averted, the savings will be more than worth the investment. This is the identical argument that I used for the UNPC itself.

You are also correct that time and again the UN has been given an impossibly broad mandate without the resources to execute effectively. This is an almost certain prescription for failure and only serves to erode the UN's prestige and diminish faith in its capability, which, in turn, provides the rationale for unilateral initiatives by the United States and, less frequently, other countries as well. As you note, this simply isn't fair.

I doubt that anything I've just said is new to you, as it was either explicitly stated or implicit in your last communication; but, perhaps having these assurances of the correctness of your analysis will put your mind at ease.

One other matter: critiques of peacekeeping operations to date have noted that the military personnel involved are trained for fighting, not as police or peace-builders. This ignores the fact that most modern armies do include contingents of military police; but that is not the main issue. The implication in the critique is that the UNPC would have the same problem as units that have been used in peacekeeping missions to date. I disagree for several reasons. First, the UNPC would be made up entirely of relatively elite young men and women, for whom ad hoc multi-tasking would be much easier than for the rank and file of recruits in most existing armies. Second, the limited potential combat roles of UNPC would mean that little time would have to be devoted to mastering the use of sophisticated weaponry and that more time could thus be devoted to the development of skills appropriate for UNPC missions. Third, from the very outset specialized UNPC units would be trained for the diversity of tasks that the UNPC might reasonably be expected to perform.

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**D:** I understand the UNPC is to be internationally recruited. Does this mean recruitment country by country or is the recruitment emphasis more on a volunteer 'global' basis? The reason I ask is to establish if a prospective member will be able to give his/her loyalty to the UN and **NOT** to their country of origin. In effect what do you envisage the *mechanism* of recruitment to be?

**PS:** Most of the world's countries have some sort of a UN information and/or UNDP office in their capital city. Micro-states will often be exceptions to this rule, however. These offices could also double as recruitment offices, administering qualifying exams for potential UNPC recruits at regular intervals, say quarterly or semi-annually depending on the location. News about recruitment could be obtained globally via the web. Much preliminary screening could take place via electronic or other forms of correspondence. Financial assistance might be made available to enable especially promising candidates to come to the recruiting office for the final screening exams. Recruitment would be

entirely on an individual basis and recruits, once selected, would be directed to report (all expenses paid) to training centers which would be integrated without regard to national origin, though recruits normally would speak the same basic language as their peers (often, however, as a second language). All recruits would take an oath of allegiance to the UN, the Human Family, and the Planet Earth. None would wear insignia indicating his/her country of origin.

**D:** This all volunteer force, is it to be a complete military force or military trained force or is it to include both 'military' and 'civilian' personnel? You mentioned in a previous correspondence that 'specialized units, if and when available, from the UNPC itself' will 'complement the military and policing efforts of a UNPC mission with a variety of diplomatic and other services that might best be rendered by skilled mediators etc' This was only one of six potential sources. Other sources were extraneous to the UNPC. The crux of the matter is I want to know if your intention is to recruit civilian personnel too and if so, would these civilian personnel be trained in non-military but essential tasks like mediation, mobilizing indigenous capacity, reconciliation work for example, as might exist in the complex humanitarian interventions of today?

**PS:** The UNPC would be completely military, but some specialized units would perform a variety of functions (e.g., policing, sanitation and public health activities) that are not normally assigned to conventional military forces. Depending on the severity of the situation, however, it might be necessary to supplement these units with specially recruited (or seconded) civilian personnel. The top administrative personnel might be unappointed civilians, especially where mediation is called for. Such individuals would work in close coordination with the top UNPC officer in the field; but in other cases a UNPC officer might head the mission. Such decisions would be at the discretion of the UN Security Council and/or the Secretary General.

Although I have yet to write on this, I envisage the creation of a civilian UN administrative academy (UNAA), somewhat on the order of Haileybury in England, where the elite administrative officers who were sent out to British India were trained.



(In independent India a similar Training Academy and Program has been maintained.)  
The trainees in question would also be internationally recruited and would have to be older and have a higher level of education than recruits to the UNPC. The UNAA, I believe, would be a tremendously worthwhile investment in nation-building and also in fostering a heightened global consciousness. Its graduates would serve with the UN for periods of say up to six years and then, in most cases, join the Civil Services of their respective home countries. Some, however, would be subject to recall when an emergency need arises.

**D:** I understand the UNPC will be sanctioned the use of force when it is approved by the Security Council but that the UNPC role would be that of limited potential combat as much as possible. The existence of the UNPC will ideally be able to act as a deterrent in the long term. Is this correct?

**PS:** That is my hope and belief. In the early days of the UNPC, however, it is likely that there would also be a need for national military contingents prepared to do more serious battle. These units would be held in ready reserve for use in situations in which a given state or guerrilla force adamantly refused to cooperate with the UNPC and posed a threat that the UNPC simply could not handle.

**D:** Do you envisage that the diversity of tasks required in a contemporary mission would be met by specialized UNPC units both military and civilian as well as outside resources such as NGOs etc ?

**PS:** See my answer above to the second question.

**D:** Would ad hoc multi tasking which so characterizes what is required in modern complex emergencies be an important element in training members of the UNPC?

**PS:** Yes.

**D:** Professor Schwartzberg, I guess I wanted to mainly establish whether it was your

intention to include civilian personnel in your concept and whether the training was going to cover the less 'military type' tasks but tasks essential to peacekeeping missions that exist today.

**PS:** I hope all the above is sufficiently clear. Let me know if it is not.

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**D:** As I'm not sufficiently conversant with the military role, could you list roles separately that the military might play in peacekeeping missions, e.g. controlling violence, providing protection for the relief effort etc.

One thing we might disagree on is the mobilization of indigenous capacity. I understand that your emphasis is in the peacekeeping phase, the key being external intervention. I think there is a need for local peacemakers and peacebuilders too.

**PS** With respect to the roles that the military might play, I don't have much to add that isn't already in my GG essay. How much responsibility the military (i.e., UNPC) would assume, would depend on how much ancillary civilian support (from the UN or elsewhere, including INGOs) was on the ground. In this context, you might find useful the appended abstract of a paper (see Appendix III) I plan to write for the ACUNS meeting in Lisbon this summer. It does suggest, albeit briefly, the value of mobilizing and training "indigenous capacity." I agree with you on the need for "local peacemakers and peacebuilders;" but they would have to be guaranteed a safe space within which to operate, which, I would judge, might be possible only when the UNPC is allowed to do its job.

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**D:** The final question, Professor Schwartzberg, is to do with women recruits for the UNPC. I feel that you mentioned somewhere that your concept included both male and female recruits but I can't find it and so I put the question to you. Do you envisage including female recruits in the UNPC if they meet the same requirements as their male counterparts? Do you see women being able to fulfill a role in peacekeeping that has not been previously tapped? If so, what kind of role would this be? I'm trying to establish that the UNPC would be a multicultural and mixed gender elite force.

**PS:** Your question about the role of women in the UNPC is a good one and I confess that I have not previously given it the thought it deserves. Your memory that I did envisage the participation of women is correct. At the bottom of p. 6 of my article I wrote: "Service in the UNPC would be open equally to men and women from all parts of the world." From that it might be inferred that all jobs within the UNPC could be held by women as well as by men; but I did not say so explicitly. The key question, of course, would be whether or not women might be assigned combat roles, other, say, than in such traditional fields as nursing. That same question arises in the national armed forces of a number of countries whose armed forces do include women. In Israel, perhaps the only country in which all able-bodied young women are required to undergo a period of military service (18 months, I believe, as opposed to 30 for men [confirm this]), every effort is made to keep them from actual front-line combat. The same is true in the American armed forces, though women have succeeded in their bid to fly combat aircraft. I have no idea as to how many other countries allow women to engage in combat, though that would not be especially unusual in non-state guerrilla armies. So, the precedents are not terribly clear. But then, there is no precedent for the UNPC itself.

My recommendations – somewhat off the top of my head – would be: a) to give all women recruits the same training in the use of small arms as that given to all men, such that they could defend themselves in those hopefully rare eventualities when such action might prove necessary; b) to allow all female recruits the option of exempting themselves from combat duties in situations – also hopefully rare – when armed pacification of local combatants should prove to be necessary (e.g., in forestalling a Rwanda-type genocide):

c) to allow women who wish to serve in any way needed, including combat, to make that choice, but then to leave to the commanders in the field the final decisions on when, where, and how to use such volunteers.

Realistically, gender-related issues will inevitably arise that will call for discretion on the part of officers in base camps and in the field. I have no ready-made answers as to how to handle all contingencies; but, in setting up the UNPC, early consultation involving female and male officers (not necessarily in the UNPC itself) with experience in armed forces comprising both male and female personnel would help the UNPC anticipate likely problems and establish protocols for handling them.

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**PS:** Deanna, rereading your questions, I realized that I neglected to answer the key one, namely: did I envisage any special role for female recruits in the UNPC. Briefly, the answer is no. I would anticipate that certain women will prove to be particularly effective in performing some of the inter-personal tasks that the UNPC will have to perform from time to time; but, even if that should be the case that does not mean that such tasks would automatically be assigned on the basis of gender. Whichever individuals seem up to the mark where their skills are called for should be called on to do specific jobs.

**PS:** Professor Schwartzberg, that concludes the interview. Thank you indeed for your time, patience and thoughtful responses to my many enquiries.

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## APPENDIX IV

## Appendix IV

### Abstract of Paper Presented at Annual Meeting of the Academic Council on the United Nations System, Cascais, Portugal, June 2002

#### NEEDED: A UNITED NATIONS ADMINISTRATIVE ACADEMY

Failed states and political regions to which central state authority no longer extends have become increasingly common features of the contemporary political scene. In places such as Somalia, Rwanda, Cambodia, East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo the United Nations has been called on to help fill resultant voids in civil authority. Many other such cases may be anticipated in future decades. Staffing for governance missions to which the UN has become a party poses a perennial problem. In terms of both quantity and quality available administrative resources have often fallen far short of what was needed and the effectiveness and even the legitimacy of UN missions have accordingly been compromised. High level administrators have been recruited disproportionately from relatively affluent countries or, alternatively, from the elite stratum of society in a handful of poor countries. In either case, they typically lack deep familiarity with the cultures of the areas to which they are assigned. Moreover, they often serve for terms that are too short to enable them to obtain the requisite familiarity with the local situation to ensure the success of the UN mission.

A viable antidote to the systemic shortcomings just noted would be to develop a standing reserve of highly trained administrative specialists through the institution of a UN Administrative Academy (UNAA). Such specialists would fill a variety of posts in transitional regimes - working closely with UN peacekeeping forces (and relieving them of tasks the military is ill equipped to perform) - and help train indigenous talent to take over from them. Recruits to the UNAA would come mainly from the developing countries of the world, and admission standards would be such that only individuals of exceptionally high ability and promise would be selected. Training would be fully subsidized. Apart from general administration, areas of specialization would, at a minimum, include police supervision, and fiscal management. In time, other specialties such as community development, and educational reform might also be developed. Training would initially be in English, French, and Spanish; but substantial cadres of trainees would, of course, also have fluency in one or more of each of the other major languages of the world. After a training period of several years, UNAA graduates would normally be employed in the civil services of their home countries with the understanding that they would be ready to serve, on relatively short notice, in areas where their skills were needed. Their reserve status would be for a minimum of ten years, but be renewable if need arose. At the outset of their service, most UNAA graduates

would serve in relatively junior posts; but assignments of increasingly high responsibility would come to those of particular merit.

The costs of establishing and maintaining the proposed UNAA would be remarkably modest in comparison to the benefits it would confer. Even in times when graduates are not needed to staff UN missions (which would probably be of longer average duration than when they are so needed), their skills would still do much to promote the social and economic development of their home countries and contribute to their stability. Additionally, the work that the UNAA would facilitate would do much to counter the dangerous and widespread sense of marginalization and alienation in the developing world.

Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Professor Emeritus, University of Minnesota