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MANAGING GROUP BEHAVIOR: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SENSE OF SELF, AND COOPERATION

David De Cremer

Tom R. Tyler

This chapter focuses on how and why procedural fairness is an important group tool for managing cooperation. We introduce a motivational model of procedural fairness that links the fairness of procedures explicitly to the construction of the social self, a process that, in turn, affects psychological processes and elicits cooperation. First, a review is provided of studies supporting the argument that procedural fairness is related to the social self. Second, an overview is given addressing how the social self relates to cooperation via the processes of trust and goal transformation. An integrative conceptual framework is then introduced and used for understanding the interplay of procedures, self, and cooperation. Finally, some implications of this motivational model are discussed, and conclusions are drawn.

I. Introduction and Overview

Group membership and interaction within groups are central to modern life. We all belong to groups, and within this social context we are influenced by what goes on within the relationships that we have with others in those groups. This group context also has an important influence on our perceptions, motives, cognitions, and feelings. Central to the group context is the interdependence of group members (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Lewin, 1948). As a consequence, our actions in groups affect not only our own interests but also other people's interests.

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psychological concerns underlying these models (e.g., self-esteem, need to belong, self-uncertainty, and concern for reputation) are important for explaining fair procedure effects (De Cremer, 2002, 2003a,b; De Cremer & Blader, 2004; Brockner, De Cremer, Van den Bos, & Chen, in press; De Cremer & Sedikides, in press; De Cremer & Tyler, 2004; Tyler, 1999; Tyler, DeGoey, & Smith, 1996).

In other words, a first purpose of this chapter is to integrate all these various psychological models into a unifying framework based on one common human motivation. We argue that this mechanism points to the argument that procedures motivate people by communicating information relevant to their needs and drives. This information is expected to influence people's social self, which is considered to include and specify people's motives and needs (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Tyler & Smith, 1999).

The role of procedural justice in shaping motivation is only the first part of the definition of motivation. This definition also includes two other parts; namely, directing behavior and maintaining that behavior over time and across situations. These two additional aspects of the motivational equation also have to be supported to understand why procedural fairness is able to promote cooperation. That is, if people's needs and concerns are influenced, this will both activate behavior and maintain that behavior over time.

How will procedural fairness guide the direction that people's behavior takes and whether that behavioral direction is maintained over time? Answering this question will be the second main purpose of this chapter. In determining the answer to this question, we use insights from the cooperation literature and, more specifically, research on social dilemmas. This literature has shown that promoting cooperation is facilitated when trust is reinforced and the interests of the group are experienced as one's own interests (De Cremer & Stouten, 2003; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).

We demonstrate that the ability of procedures to affect people's needs and concerns leads to the creation of positive beliefs within the group (e.g., the judgment that others in the group are trustworthy) and to a transformation of motives from the personal level (acting out of self-interest) to the group level (viewing self-interest and group interest as the same or acting out of group interest). This linkage will be demonstrated using past and recent research (Brockner, Siegel, Daly, Tyler, & Martin, 1997; De Cremer, 2004a; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).

It is assumed that reinforcing the group's interest will direct people's actions (i.e., cooperating for the group's welfare) and the existence of trust will ensure that people will maintain such cooperative behaviour over time and across situations. After discussing procedural fairness as a motivational component comprising the elements of arousal, direction, and maintenance,

our line of reasoning will be summarized in a model of cooperation in which procedural fairness will figure as the regulating factor.

Thereafter, we will conclude by outlining the strengths of this motivational approach by discussing its integrative potential, that is, its ability to integrate the existing procedural fairness models and to link it to other areas such as the social dilemmas literature. Finally, a brief overview will be presented how our findings and model can relate to other social issues addressing important instances of group behavior.

II. The Relation Between Procedural Fairness and Cooperation

Groups are an essential part of our social lives and influence much of our psychological life. Indeed, previous research has shown that memberships in groups can help us to define ourselves; that is, they may tell us who we are (Sherman, Hamilton, & Lewis, 1999). Also, groups may create a setting in which important psychological goods such as approval, self-worth, belongingness, and self-definition are provided to its members (Baron & Kerr, 2003; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Groups help people to meet identity-based and social needs.

Of importance to this chapter is that groups also have functional value because they are better able to protect us and to promote the cooperation necessary for obtaining the survival benefits that can be provided by membership in groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Brewer, 1991). Indeed, for functional reasons linked to survival it is necessary that groups be cooperative and successful in solving internal problems of organization and coordination (Caporeal & Brewer, 1991; Leakey, 1978). So, groups help people to meet material and instrumental needs, as well as helping them meet identity-based and social needs.

One way to motivate cooperation is to appeal to people's material and instrumental needs by promising people rewards when they cooperate or threatening them with sanctions when they fail to cooperate. Although these approaches do motivate cooperative behavior, their influence is weak and difficult to maintain over time (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Further, their use fails to activate, and can even undermine, intrinsic motivations, leading to long-run problems in groups (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2000).

It is much more desirable for groups to encourage intrinsic motivation among group members, and it is our belief that the use of procedural fairness may also be an important antecedent that activates people's intrinsic motivation to promote the interests and viability of the group. To achieve all of

this, we believe that procedural fairness should be implemented within the group by responding to the needs of all members. If group members' needs are met, they will be motivated to cooperate.

Indeed, in most groups where interests "interest diverge" (Baden, 1997), it is found that social arrangements need to be designed to promote the cooperative use of resources (e.g., Steel, Woodell, & Bember, 1997). The establishment of procedures that create a situation in which "procedural fairness" is implemented is crucial.

The important role of procedural fairness has, however, received very little attention. Indeed, procedural fairness often does not include the social dilemmas construct, and the social dilemmas literature has a role of procedures in monitoring and controlling behavior (Cropanzano, Byrne, Boboc, Lind, 2001a; Tyler & Blader, 1995). However, the two literatures are closely related and is influenced by the relationship between the individual and (also including authorities and institutions).

The social self is defined in terms of one's relationship with other group members; that is, it is a sense of personal relatedness, intimacy, and belongingness (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The social self is that people's self is fundamental to their sense of self as a social self (see also Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2000). Tyler & Lind (2003, p. 110) note, "the self is a social self." This means that the psychological self is typically arise in interaction with others.

In social psychology, it is well established that the self is developed and constructed by interactions with others (De Cremer, 2000; Sedikides & Gregg, 2001). One's level of identity and group membership is a function of one's level of identity and group membership (Carver & Scheier, 1998). One's sense of procedural fairness of enacted procedures is a function of one's social self and, in turn, one's sense of procedural fairness behavior aimed at promoting the interests of the group (Ouden, in press; De Cremer, 2000, 2003b). Thus, procedural fairness is a function of one's social self and, in turn, one's sense of procedural fairness behavior aimed at promoting the interests of the group.

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this, we believe that procedures are required that promote a positive climate within the group by responding to the needs and concerns of group members. If group members' needs and concerns are addressed, group members will be motivated to cooperate with the group.

Indeed, in most groups "tragedy strikes when self-interest and social interest diverge" (Baden, 1998: p.51), and therefore it has been advocated that social arrangements need to emerge to restrain competitive actions and promote the cooperative urges of group members (Posner, 2000; Schroeder, Steel, Woodell, & Bembenek, 2003; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). The establishment of such arrangements will foster a group climate in which "procedural fairness" is a given (Schroeder et al., 2003).

The important role of procedural fairness in promoting cooperation has, however, received very little attention. The literature on procedural fairness often does not include behavioral reactions as part of the fairness construct, and the social dilemma literature has not generally focused on the role of procedures in monitoring group behavior to promote cooperation (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel, & Rupp, 2001; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 2002; Lind, 2001a; Tyler & Blader, 2000; Tyler & Dawes, 1993; Tyler & Degoey, 1995). However, the two literatures share a focus on how people's social self is influenced by the relationships they have with the group and its members (also including authorities and institutions).

The social self is defined in this chapter as based on people's relationships with other group members; within these relationships, people evaluate interpersonal relatedness, intimacy, and interdependence within the relationship (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Thus, we argue that people's self is fundamentally relational and, as such, can be conceived of as a social self (see also Andersen, Chen, & Miranda, 2002; Leary, 2002; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Indeed, as Sedikides and Gregg (2003, p. 110) note, "the self operates predominantly within the social world. This means that the psychological phenomena that fall under its umbrella typically arise in interaction with others, real or imagined."

In social psychology, it is well accepted that people's social self is developed and constructed by information that one receives through social interactions with others (De Cremer, 2003a; Leary, 2001; Leary & Baumeister, 2000; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). In turn, this relational information defines one's level of identity and goals and ultimately regulates one's social actions (Carver & Scheier, 1998). On the basis of this argument, we reason that the fairness of enacted procedures communicates information relevant to the social self and, in turn, motivates group members to engage in cooperative behavior aimed at promoting the group's interest (e.g., De Cremer, Tyler & den Ouden, in press; De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b). Thus, procedural fairness (as a group means) serves as a

motivational antecedent of cooperation, because it affects people's social self and their self-regulation. As a consequence, via these self-related processes group members will adopt the goal of promoting the interests of themselves and the other group members (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999).

This line of reasoning is based on the assumption that the social self is dynamic (i.e., the content of the self-concept will vary across situations and experiences) and that by means of procedures, different aspects of people's social self can be altered (e.g., having an individual versus a collective goal/perspective; see also Hogg, 2003; Turner, 1987). Thus, the social self is knowledge that people have about their socially constructed self-concept and that involves goals, values, and beliefs. By activating or reinforcing certain aspects of the social self, particular goals, beliefs, and values will be activated (cf. Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999). Once these goals are accessible and salient, they will energize and direct behavior (Carver, 2001; Pervin, 1982). In other words, this accessible information will influence people's actions and thus guide the process of self-regulation (cf. Kunda, 1999).

Our argument is that the social self has major implications for motivation (see also Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). The way that those implications play out depends on which aspects of the social self are accessible and salient at any given time and in particular situations. From the group perspective, therefore, the key to motivating cooperation is to activate aspects of the social self that are linked to collective goals and perspectives. Once those aspects are activated, people will be motivated to engage in cooperative behavior based on those aspects of the self.

This motivational approach has been suggested by procedural fairness researchers (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003a,b; Tyler & Lind, 1992), but many procedural fairness models have shown a tendency to focus more on the role that cognitive factors play in responding to variations in procedural fairness (see e.g. Folger, 1986; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Lind, 2001a; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). For example, Lind (2001a), in his fairness heuristic theory, advocates the use of more cognitive analyses of fairness judgment processes when he describes the use of fair procedures in terms of heuristics, and Folger and Cropanzano (1998), in their fairness theory, explain justice effects by referring to the effect of attribution-based cognitive analyses.

Furthermore, even Thibaut and Walker (1975), in their pioneering research, were more inclined to a cognitive analysis, as their main concern was to examine how people deal with uncertainty surrounding the decisions they experience in the courtroom (i.e., being seen as guilty or innocent). One important way to deal with this type of uncertainty is to focus on how fairly

the trials were conducted; that is, cognitive uncertainty about the trial process.

Recently, Van den Bos and Lind (2002) have proposed a model of the perception of uncertainty by intragroup members. This model suggests that the more uncertainty people experience, the more people will engage in cooperative behavior. Procedural fairness is the sense of the uncertainty experienced in a given situation is a safe one and will be resolved.

It is important to note, however, that this model does not specify which particular aspects of the social self are activated (Tyler & Blader, 2003a) and, partly, on Thibaut and Walker's (1975) model, uncertainty reflects how people perceive the trial process (see, e.g., Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke, 2001). In the uncertainty management model, people will use procedural fairness in a given situation to reduce uncertainty about outcomes. This model is based on the idea that people will (regardless of the valence of the uncertainty) and will try to manage the uncertainty by using fairness information as a substitute for the missing information (see also Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).

In this chapter, however, our focus is on how procedural fairness plays a role in motivating cooperation and its related social motives. As noted above, we have paid too little attention to the role of cognitive factors such as motives, needs, and attribution. While most models do include some motivational factors, they do not seem to be of primary importance in explaining the motivational account (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). In the procedural fairness models were not developed, the focus on cooperation (see Tyler & Blader, 2000) is to articulate a motivational account of the role of procedural uncertainty.

¹Van den Bos (2001) also acknowledges the role of cognitive factors in a general way. For example, Van den Bos (2001) states that people will engage in cooperative behavior and cannot be expected to have the same level of uncertainty if they focus on "relationships between uncertainty and cooperation."

²This model may also partly include the role of cognitive factors after Tyler (1990), as noted by Van den Bos (2001).

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Recently, Van den Bos and Lind (2002) elaborated on this original conception of uncertainty by introducing the uncertainty management model. This model suggests that the higher the degree of uncertainty that people experience, the more people will make use of procedural fairness information. Procedural fairness is then used as a cognitive heuristic to make more sense of the uncertainty experienced (i.e., fair procedures indicate that the situation is a safe one and will thus reduce uncertainty).

It is important to note, however, that the uncertainty management model does not specify which particular types of uncertainty were being talked about (Tyler & Blader, 2003a,b).¹ As their model seems to build, at least partly, on Thibaut and Walker's prior work, it is our impression that in this model, uncertainty reflects how uncertain people feel about their outcomes (see, e.g., Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997).² As such, the uncertainty management model deals to a certain extent with how people use procedural fairness in a cognitive way (i.e., as a heuristic) to manage uncertainty about outcomes. For example, if an outcome is unexpected (regardless of the valence of the outcomes), then people will experience uncertainty and will try to make sense of the outcome by using procedural fairness information as substitutability information (see Lind, 2001a; see also Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).

In this chapter, however, our motivational account focuses on how procedural fairness plays a role in dealing with uncertainty about the social self and its related social motives. Thus, we argue that these cognitive analyses have paid too little attention to the role of subjective elements of procedures such as motives, needs, and affect. However, we do wish to note that some models do include some motivations but do not consider defining motivation to be of primary importance, or have not elaborated on or created a motivational account (Van den Bos, 2003). In addition, these procedural fairness models were not developed to explain behavioral effects like cooperation (see Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b). Hence, we distinguish our effort to articulate a motivational account from efforts to deal with outcome uncertainty.

¹Van den Bos (2001) also acknowledged that their model discusses uncertainty in a rather general way. For example, Van den Bos (2001) argues that "all uncertainties are not the same and cannot be expected to have the same effects," and he went on to invite justice researchers to focus on "relationships between uncertainty, self-esteem, confidence and control" (p. 940).

²This model may also partly include a self-relevant analysis (see Van den Bos, 2001) modeled after Tyler (1990), as noted by Van den Bos (2004).

Why is it so important to emphasize such a motivational account? Literature on social cognition, for example, has shown that cognition and motivation are closely connected (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2001), so it follows that it is important that a social psychological analysis of procedural fairness also focuses on the role of motivation. Furthermore, a motivational account of procedural justice events becomes even more important to look at when we wish to investigate procedural fairness effects on behavioral instances such as cooperation. Indeed, as argued by Carver (2001, p. 307), "social behavior is built . . . on motivational processes." Although behavioral reactions to procedural fairness are not considered to be part of the fairness construct, it is essential that a psychology of procedural fairness include a motivational component to account for the effect of procedural fairness on behavior.

In the justice literature (e.g., Cropanzano et al., 2001), it is readily acknowledged that to understand the fundamentals of procedural fairness we particularly need to know which motives and concerns drive people to pay attention to the fairness of procedures enacted by authorities, thus advocating a motivational approach. In the following section, we provide an overview of how previous procedural fairness models have accounted for the possible role of motives in the psychology of procedural fairness.

III. Procedural Fairness Models: Motives and Social Self

The issue of fairness is a dominating theme in our daily lives, and concerns about the meaning of justice go back to ancient moral philosophers such as Plato and Socrates (Rawls, 1971; Ryan, 1993; for a review see Tyler et al., 1997). Indeed, the concept of justice is intuitively related to humanitarian and ethical standards that describe how we should act and treat others (e.g., Folger & Cropanzano, 1998; Miller, 2001). In effect, fairness can be considered one of the most important guidelines in our lives, leading both scholars and lay people to frequently pose the question of why we care so much about fairness. One specific instance of fairness that people attend to very carefully is whether groups and organizations use correct and fair procedures in making decisions and allocating outcomes; that is, procedural fairness (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).

Not surprisingly, the topic of procedural fairness is and should be an important topic of inquiry in the field of social psychology (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Indeed, historically, we can point out the influence of various social phenomena and issues that highlight the significance of procedural fairness. The most well-known example is the problem with effective third-party conflict resolution efforts that led John Thibaut, a psychologist, and Laurens

Walker, a lawyer, to collaborate on procedural fairness (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).

In essence, the study of procedural fairness has become important because it helps us understand why people behave in a particular way. In fact, a wide variety of studies have shown that the motivation of both individuals and groups made within groups, organizations, and procedural justice effect emerges in various organizations, in education, and in the workplace.

The one important question is why are people motivated to cooperate as a result of procedural fairness? There are many illustrations from social psychology that procedural fairness and group consequences (social norms) do not tell us what drives and motivates people to cooperate within groups. For example, fellow group members and their evaluations of their performance initially react to a wide variety of factors when they are trying to make a decision (Bos et al., 1997). To understand the manner to the above question, a more detailed effects is necessary. In doing so, the central role of the social self is highlighted.

Several fairness models have focused on motives in relationships and the role of procedural fairness. We will focus on the emphasis on the relational aspects of these models. These models represent an attempt to understand the noninstrumental aspects (i.e., the relevance to the social self) of the importance of motivational factors in procedural fairness matters within groups. The group-value model provides a contribution to the understanding of procedural fairness that

A. THE GROUP-VALUE MODEL

The group-value model focuses on the relationship between judgments of procedural fairness and the perceived value of the group.

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Walker, a lawyer, to collaborate, study, and make more prominent issues of procedural fairness (Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler, 1990).

In essence, the study of the role of procedural fairness in social phenomena has become important because social psychologists have recognized a need to understand why people were and are behaving in particular ways. In particular, a wide variety of studies indicates that procedural justice is central to the motivation of both immediate and long-term cooperation with the decisions made within groups, organizations, and societies (Tyler, 2000). This procedural justice effect emerges in studies conducted in legal settings, in work organizations, in educational settings, and in families (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

The one important question that we wish to address here is why people are motivated to cooperate as a function of procedural fairness. As noted above, there are many illustrations in the fields of organizational behavior, economics, and psychology that procedural fairness leads to many desirable organizational and group consequences (see Tyler, 2000, for a review), but these examples do not tell us what drives and motivates these findings. Why is people's willingness to cooperate within groups shaped by the fairness they associate with their fellow group members and group authorities? In particular, why do people react to their evaluations of procedural justice? After all, people could potentially react to a wide variety of aspects of their social and group environments when they are trying to manage cognitive and social uncertainty (cf. Van den Bos et al., 1997). To understand such findings and to respond in a satisfactory manner to the above questions, a motivational analysis of procedural fairness effects is necessary. In doing this analysis, we advocate the need to examine the central role of the social self in the psychology of procedural fairness.

Several fairness models have been proposed to understand the importance of motives in relationships and the importance of social self in the psychology of procedural fairness. We will be focusing here on a set of models that share an emphasis on the relational and self-relevant implications of fairness evaluations. These models represent a programmatic research program designed to understand the noninstrumental value of the psychology of procedural fairness (i.e., the relevance to the social self). In doing so, these models point out the importance of motivational processes in understanding why procedural fairness matters within groups. Below, we will first discuss how each of these models provides contributions to the development of a motivational account of procedural fairness that ultimately may predict cooperation in groups.

A. THE GROUP-VALUE MODEL

The group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) focuses on the antecedents of judgments of procedural fairness and predicts that noninstrumental factors

will influence procedural fairness judgments, and that these factors will matter more within the context of one's own group. That is, not only are procedures used by the group valued to obtain control of the resources one may receive from this group but, even more importantly, the fairness of procedures is important because fair procedures also signal a symbolic message that one is valued by the group and, therefore, is viewed by others as worthy of receiving respectful treatment.

An experiment by Lind, Kanfer, and Earley (1990) provided evidence that such relational or noninstrumental concerns do indeed play a role in the psychology of procedural fairness. These authors used a goal-setting context, in which participants were allowed to express their opinion—or not—about the type of goal that had to be reached. In this study, providing voice or not was the manipulation of procedural fairness (Folger, 1977). Participants received an opportunity to voice their opinion before the experimenter had decided on the goal (predecision voice), after the experimenter had decided on the goal (postdecision voice), or not at all (no voice). The results showed that perceptions of fairness were enhanced by the possibility of voice, even when there was no chance of influencing the decision (i.e., postdecision voice). In addition, predecision voice was found to lead to even greater perceived fairness than postdecision voice. Similarly, field studies of voice indicate that people are influenced by whether they receive opportunities for voice, even when they feel that what they say has little or no influence on the outcomes they obtain (Tyler, 1987).

Taken together, studies supporting the group-value model make it clear that procedures have the potential to communicate to group members that they are valued members and, as such, can use the group as a reference point to define themselves (see also Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Thus, the motive of defining oneself in terms of a valued group membership is clearly acknowledged in this model.

B. THE RELATIONAL MODEL OF AUTHORITY

The relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992) focuses on the possible social psychological factors shaping reactions to treatment by authorities. This model predicts that procedural fairness will influence reactions to authorities, and that the effect of these procedures is influenced by relational concerns—in particular, how neutral, trustworthy, and respectful an authority is when dealing with group members. For example, research by Tyler (1989) showed that the fairness of police officers and judges determined people's judgments and attitudes about legal authorities. More specifically, being treated fairly by the police or court indicates to people that

one is respected and, as such, (see also Tyler, 1994). In a indicates that one's social status as positive. In turn, this type of several studies to significant illustrating how strongly the social self and self-worth (Tyler, 1994).

Taken together, studies support a motivational account by showing relevant implications that show status or social reputation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2001). Also, in line with a motivational account, Lind (2001b) recently concluded that "the mechanism for the relational model of authority, Lind (2001b) argued that these procedures affirm the organization at hand. In other models of justice "focuses on and Blader (2002) provided evidence that judgments about justice are influenced by group membership. Thus, in the relational model of authority position communicates information relevant to social reputation.

C. THE GROUP-ENGAGEMENT MODEL

The group-engagement model draws on insights of the group-value model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992). In essence, the group-engagement model extends the group-value model of authority by positing that people and groups who engage in their groups psychological procedures may play a role in their engagement.

According to this model, the group-engagement model motivates people toward group membership to define themselves (e.g., intergroup identity; Tyler, 1994). In the form of a certain type of engagement, it is considered to be the primary

and that these factors will group. That is, not only are control of the resources one importantly, the fairness of ure also signal a symbolic herefore, is viewed by others

1990) provided evidence that do indeed play a role in the rors used a goal-setting conress their opinion—or not—In this study, providing voice rness (Folger, 1977). Particiion before the experimenter after the experimenter had at all (no voice). The results nanced by the possibility of nfluencing the decision (i.e., ice was found to lead to even ice. Similarly, field studies of hether they receive opportu-at they say has little or no 987).

p-value model make it clear unicate to group members use the group as a reference rner, 1986). Thus, the motive up membership is clearly

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Lind, 1992) focuses on the eactions to treatment by l fairness will influence reac-procedures is influenced by trustworthy, and respectful rs. For example, research by e officers and judges deter-legal authorities. More spe-urt indicates to people that

one is respected and, as such, receives the treatment good citizens “deserve” (see also Tyler, 1994). In addition, such positive relational information indicates that one’s social standing within society or the group is regarded as positive. In turn, this type of relational information has been shown in several studies to significantly influence people’s level of self-esteem, thus illustrating how strongly these relational concerns are related to people’s social self and self-worth (Tyler et al., 1996).

Taken together, studies supporting this model provide evidence for a motivational account by showing that procedural fairness has strong self-relevant implications that shape people’s sense of social worth and social status or social reputation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2004; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Also, in line with a motivational approach, Cropanzano et al. (2001, p. 177) recently concluded that “the need for belonging could serve as one mechanism for the relational model” of authority. Further, in a recent commentary, Lind (2001b) argued that one reason people value fair procedures is that these procedures affirm their sense of belongingness to the group or organization at hand. In other words, the key assumption of these relational models of justice “focuses on messages of inclusion” (Lind, 2001b). Tyler and Blader (2002) provided empirical support for this argument by showing that judgments about justice linked to inclusion influenced reactions to group membership. Thus, in support of a motivational account, the relational model of authority points out that the fairness of procedures communicates information relevant to one’s need for belonging and concerns for social reputation.

C. THE GROUP-ENGAGEMENT MODEL

The group-engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b) integrates the insights of the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988) and the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992) but is broader in its scope. In essence, the group-engagement model broadens the focus of procedural fairness models by positing a general model of the relationships between people and groups. In doing so, this model tries to understand why people engage in their groups psychologically and behaviorally and to what extent procedures may play a role in this process.

According to this model, the reason procedures have the potential to motivate people toward group engagement is that they influence how people define themselves (e.g., interdependent versus independent, collective versus personal identity; Tyler, 1999). In turn, these identity judgments (which take the form of a certain type of social self; see Tyler & Smith, 1999) are considered to be the primary factors shaping attitudes, values, and behaviors

in groups. Taken together, the contribution of the group engagement model to a motivational account of procedural fairness is that it assumes that procedures influence people's social self by shaping their self-definition.

D. INTEGRATING MOTIVES AS PART OF THE SOCIAL SELF

Reviewing these procedural fairness models, it can be concluded that procedures enacted within the group have implications for the social self. More precisely, these models assume that within group settings, people extract relational information from procedures that are being used to make outcome distribution decisions. As such, people infer their social reputation, their degree of belongingness, their level of identity, and their degree of self-uncertainty within the group from the perceived fairness of procedures. Thus, procedures viewed as accurate or as allowing voice opportunities are considered fair and, consequently, self-validating at the social level. In contrast, inaccurate or no-voice granting procedures are considered unfair and, consequently, self-devaluing.

This line of reasoning fits well with findings derived from the self-evaluation literature (Sedikides, 2002; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). That is, people, at least in part, base their feelings of social self-worth on relational information, such as direct interpersonal appraisals (Tice & Wallace, 2003), clues about social acceptance or rejection (Leary & Baumeister, 2000), and the subjective sentiment of the need for relatedness not having been met (Deci & Ryan, 2000). Taken together, we conclude that the motives of social reputation, belongingness, level of identity, and self-uncertainty form important needs that guide the extent to which people attend to procedures; the reason being that procedural fairness is assumed to communicate this type of information, which people see as relevant to the social self.

Further, with respect to the issue of cooperation, and following a motivational account, all these motives are believed to influence the goal and direction one will take during the process of self-regulation. That is, if procedures shape whether or not people experience belongingness, influence people's satisfaction with one's intragroup status, shape whether people define themselves in terms of their relationships with the group, and finally, shape whether or not they experience self-uncertainty, people's goals will be shifted toward a group orientation, and cooperation is more likely to emerge (e.g., De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002). To demonstrate that procedures indeed communicate information relevant to these social self-features, we describe below several of our own studies illustrating such a linkage between procedures and self-related consequences.

IV. Overview of

In this section, we describe procedures enacted by both authorities and individuals to significantly influence people's social self. People's needs, their concerns about social self, and their degree of self-uncertainty are communicated through information relevant to these relationships, our social self (Snyder, 1993), in which it is a relationship with the authority and one's own personal values, goals, and needs.

This person-situation approach (Snyder, 1998) indicates that the psychological impact of (un)fair procedures depends on individual interpretations may vary as a function of the situation. For example, if I am someone who values communication, then procedural fairness may be more important. In communicating information about social self, examining the moderating effect of individual differences on procedural fairness, this approach suggests that the process of social self information processing is interactive.

This interactional strategy is detailed in detail by Snyder and Ickes (1998). Regularities and consistencies in the influence of dispositional and situational variables on social self information processing uses measures of personal characteristics and, as such, can be used to predict social self information processing: a reciprocal interplay between individual characteristics and social situations (Snyder and Cantor (1998), this interactional strategy is an "approach to concerns with motivation" (p. 100). This approach focuses on motives that is of part of the social self that is related to the social self that is related toward procedural fairness.

Thus, people will interpret a situation based on their own motivational orientations and specifications communicated in social situations can guide individuals' social self as the information derived from social self and motives of the specific individual.

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OF THE SOCIAL SELF

models, it can be concluded that implications for the social self. within group settings, people procedures that are being used to make people infer their social reputation, identity, and their degree of self-perceived fairness of procedures. Following voice opportunities are identifying at the social level. In procedures are considered unfair

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IV. Overview of Procedural Fairness Research

In this section, we describe research findings showing that procedures enacted by both authorities and fellow group members have the potential to significantly influence people's social self by affecting their belongingness needs, their concerns about social reputation, their type of self-definition, and their degree of self-uncertainty. Procedures are expected to communicate information relevant to these features of the social self. In demonstrating these relationships, our studies made use of the functional approach (Snyder, 1993), in which it is assumed that social situations (e.g., the relationship with the authority and group) can be seen as an input into one's own personal values, goals, and agendas.

This person-situation approach (e.g., Mischel, 1973; Snyder & Cantor, 1998) indicates that the psychological effect of a situational feature such as (un)fair procedures depends on how people interpret the situation, and such interpretations may vary as a function of individual difference variables. For example, if I am someone who cares very much about inclusive relationships, then procedural fairness may influence my reactions if procedures indeed communicate information about belongingness and inclusiveness. Thus, by examining the moderating effect of individual differences in motives on procedural fairness, this approach may enhance our insight into the type of social self information procedural fairness actually communicates.

This interactional strategy between person and situation was first articulated in detail by Snyder and Ickes (1985). This strategy seeks to understand regularities and consistencies in social behavior in terms of the interactive influence of dispositional and situational features. In doing this, this research line uses measures of personality processes and constructs as moderator variables and, as such, can be referred to as a dynamic interactionist approach: a reciprocal interplay between person and situation. According to Snyder and Cantor (1998), this interactionistic approach (combining personality and social situations) is an effective tool "because they focus on shared concerns with motivation" (p. 639). As mentioned earlier, it is exactly this focus on motives that is of particular interest when determining the concerns related to the social self that underlie people's interest in and reactions toward procedural fairness.

Thus, people will interpret any given social situation as a function of their own motivational orientations and, in turn, will be guided by the opportunities and specifications communicated by those situations. In other words, social situations can guide individuals in their actions and reactions as long as the information derived from this social situation fits well with the needs and motives of the specific individuals involved. That is, social situations can

be perceived as inputs to the personal agenda of the individual actor involved in the situation (Snyder, 1993).

A. BELONGINGNESS AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

According to the relational model of authority, procedures communicate messages of inclusion and belongingness (Cropanzano et al., 2001; Tyler & Smith, 1999; Tyler & Blader, 2002; Tyler & Lind, 1992). Thus, procedures carry with them information about how much the group considers you as belonging to the group. De Cremer and Blader (2004), therefore, argue that the extent to which procedural fairness influences people's reactions should be a function of how strong people's need to belong is. The theoretical analysis that these authors put forward is that people attend to procedural fairness because it is relevant to the evaluation of their belongingness in the group. They do so in their effort to develop a sense of self vis-à-vis the group. De Cremer and Blader (2004) argue that an implication of this theoretical assumption is that differences in the need to belong should affect the extent to which people react to procedural fairness, which would provide support for the implicit assertion of the relational models that belongingness needs are the fundamental motive driving people's reactions to justice. Lack of such evidence would challenge the validity of those models and the relevance of the fundamental psychological motives on which they are based.

To test these predictions, three studies were conducted to examine the relationship between belongingness needs and procedural fairness. In the experimental study, these authors first assessed participants' need to belong by means of a recently developed individual difference scale (Leary, Kelly, Cottrell, & Schreindorfer, 2001; see appendix I for example items). Thereafter, participants were given a booklet that informed them about the task that they would have to perform during the experimental session. It was explained that their performance on this task would be evaluated by means of a settled procedure (i.e., performance would be accurately assessed and the leader would take sufficient time to evaluate). Thereafter, the procedural fairness manipulation was introduced. For this purpose, De Cremer and Blader operationalized procedural fairness by applying the rule of consistency (Leventhal, 1980). That is, participants were told that the leader evaluating the performance was someone who always used the described procedure across persons and time (i.e., high consistency condition) or that the leader was someone who did not always follow up the procedures (i.e., low consistency condition). Results revealed that participants' level of self-esteem was higher when the leader was consistent rather than inconsistent, but only when participants were high in need to belong. Thus, these findings provide

evidence that procedural fairness provides motivational information related to belongingness.

In a related manner, De Cremer and Blader (2004) tested the belongingness component of procedures, that is, the human motive of belongingness, in a laboratory experiment. Participants started with the experiment, then they were assigned to a group of four people to perform a task. The responses of each group member were aggregated together to form the group response. After the task, and thereafter responses were evaluated. In the respect manipulation was introduced, the response from the other group member was used to evaluate the respect for this person and his or her contribution to the group. Finally, participants were asked to evaluate the group for the remainder of the experiment.

As expected, results revealed that participants who wanted to leave the group were more likely to be expected, but this pattern was not observed for those who wanted to belong. Again, these findings support the associated relational component of the model, that is, people's belongingness needs.

In addition, De Cremer and Blader (2004) tested the extent that belongingness is related to procedural fairness. High need to belong should be related to procedural fairness. That is, their concern with procedural fairness, more generally, with determining the outcome of the group) should lead them to perform better on the task systematically, as compared with those who are less concerned with the procedure. Therefore, in line with dual-process theory (Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), procedural information should be processed automatically, which is expected to be related to belongingness needs. These authors suggested that these findings further indicate that procedural fairness provides information and, because of this, it is expected that those who are in need of this specific information will be more concerned with procedural fairness.

This line of reasoning was tested in a laboratory experiment. Participants had to imagine that they were part of a group in an organization. Before reading the

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evidence that procedural fairness information carries with it important motivational information related to belongingness needs.

In a related manner, De Cremer and Tyler (2004) showed that a relational component of procedures, that is, respect, is also related to this fundamental human motive of belongingness. In a laboratory study, they invited participants to the laboratory, where they had to perform a group task. Before starting with the experiment, participants' need to belong was assessed (see also De Cremer & Blader, 2004). Thereafter, participants were told that they would work in a group of four and that they first had to complete a survival task. The responses of each group member on this task would be taken together to form the group response. Participants then completed this task, and thereafter responses were sent to the other group members. After this, the respect manipulation was introduced. Participants received a message from the other group members communicating either that they had much respect for this person and his or her responses or that they disrespected this person. Finally, participants were asked to what extent they wished to leave the group for the remainder of the study.

As expected, results revealed an interaction showing that participants wanted to leave the group when they were disrespected rather than respected, but this pattern was only found among participants high in need to belong. Again, these findings indicate that procedural fairness and the associated relational components like respect have a strong influence on people's belongingness needs.

In addition, De Cremer and Blader (2004) further reasoned that to the extent that belongingness is indeed related to process fairness, those with a high need to belong should be more vigilant processors of fairness information. That is, their concern with accurately judging process fairness (and, more generally, with determining the extent to which they are included in the group) should lead them to process procedural fairness information more systematically, as compared with those with a low need to belong who are less concerned with the procedural evaluation and what it communicates. Therefore, in line with dual-process theories (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), they predicted that the processing of procedural information should depend on an individual's processing motivation, which is expected to be shaped by an individual's belongingness needs. These authors suggested that showing such a cognitive effect would further indicate that procedures are recognized as sources of belongingness information and, because of this function, will attract the attention of those who are in need of this specific relational information.

This line of reasoning was tested in a scenario study in which participants had to imagine that they were a member of a department within a larger organization. Before reading this scenario, however, participants first filled

out the need-to-belong scale. Thereafter, they started reading the scenario. Participants were told that because of bad economics, departments (including the participants') had to be restructured. Therefore, the organization had hired an external manager to guide this process. In trying to guide this restructuring process, this manager decided to give the members of the department involved voice. Thus, each participant was told that the manager would listen to their ideas and suggestions. To examine "processing motivation," a common method in social psychology was used by varying argumentation strength (i.e., the strength of the reasons provided why voice was given). Half of the participants were provided with compelling reasons for why a manager would be providing their employees with voice, whereas the other half of participants were provided with poor reasons.³ As predicted, participants' reactions (in this case fairness and trustworthiness judgments) were more strongly influenced when a strong reason rather than a weak reason was given (i.e., fairness and trust judgments were higher and more positive when voice relative to no voice was given), and this was particularly the case for those participants who were high in need to belong.

Taken together, these studies thus reveal consistent evidence that a motivational account to explain procedural fairness effects has its validity, because procedures do seem to communicate information that satisfies people's need to belong. Further, because procedures communicate information relevant to belongingness needs, it was also shown that procedures will attract more attention and matter more in influencing people's reactions when one is in need of belongingness information. As such, the use of fair procedures satisfies belongingness needs; a process that in turn shapes people's social self. The findings were consistent across research setting (i.e., field versus laboratory) and research paradigm and hold for relational information communicated by both authorities and equal-status group members.

B. SOCIAL REPUTATION AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

Another part of the social self that procedural fairness is assumed to influence is people's sense of social reputation. As early as the writings of James (1890), researchers have acknowledged that one's social self is at least

³The strong reasons that were used included "the manager believes in democratic values indicating to people that they are important and valuable" and "the manager considers it important that all employees are heard and feel that they are part of the company," whereas the poor reasons that were used included "the manager once heard about giving voice opportunities and thought it was a fun idea" and "giving voice just feels good at this moment." The relative strength of the reasons has been used successfully in prior research (see De Cremer & Blader, 2004; De Cremer & Sedikides, 2004).

partly determined by one's social reputation, an important element in the process of self-regulation. People are, by their very nature, concerned about their reputation (see, e.g., the extensive literature on reputation skills; Baumeister, 1982; Baumeister & Dorn, 1987; Erez, Kiker, & Motowidlo, 1994). This concern includes a concern about social reputation, which is about one's reputation within a social group.

The powerful effects of social reputation on behavior are demonstrated by recent research showing that people engage in positive behavior when their reputation is high and negative behavior when they have a positive image. This is true for enjoyable relationships with others (see, e.g., De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewett, 2004; De Cremer, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2004). This research also argues that people care about their reputation.

In a series of studies, De Cremer & Blader (2004) showed which people high in concern for social reputation (i.e., a reputation for respect) showed more positive reactions of respect (i.e., a reputation for respect). In the first study, participants were asked to complete a questionnaire assessing their concern for social reputation. Details, see De Cremer & Blader (2004). Participants scoring high on the need-to-belong scale are generally less concerned about how they are perceived by others. They were asked to recall a situation in which they were respected or disrespected. They were asked to recall a specific situation (most stories were about a situation in the classroom). Then, participants were asked to recall the situation. This revealed an interaction showing that participants were higher when they recalled a situation in which they were respected. This pattern was only found for those high in concern for reputation.

To obtain more evidence for the effects of social reputation, De Cremer & Blader (2004) conducted a study in which concern for reputation was manipulated. Participants read a scenario about a situation in which they were respected. This time, a broad range of questions asking participants for both their social reputation. As in the previous study, results showed that negative and positive emotions were

started reading the scenario. Economics, departments (including therefore, the organization had access. In trying to guide this to give the members of the department was told that the manager examine "processing motivation" was used by varying arguments provided why voice was not with compelling reasons for employees with voice, whereas the poor reasons.³ As predicted, trustworthiness judgments were higher and more consistent (and this was particularly in need to belong). Consistent evidence that a motivation effects has its validity, information that satisfies people's needs to communicate information has been shown that procedures will be influencing people's reactions. As such, the use of fair process that in turn shapes perceptions across research setting (i.e., field) hold for relational information and status group members.

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

Procedural fairness is assumed to be important. As early as the writings of Aristotle, it was recognized that one's social self is at least

partly determined by one's social reputation. Indeed, social evaluation is an important element in the process of constructing the self (cf. Tice, 1992). People are, by their very nature, very motivated to obtain a positive image or reputation (see, e.g., the extensive literature on people's public self-presentation skills; Baumeister, 1982; Leary, 2001). In fact, social reputations largely determine how one's behaviors are recognized and rewarded (e.g., Johnson, Erez, Kiker, & Motowidlo, 2002). As a result, one's social self clearly includes a concern about social evaluation and, consequently, a concern about one's reputation within the group.

The powerful effects of social reputation in groups have, for example, been demonstrated by recent research showing that people exhibit more cooperative behavior when their reputation is threatened, help others more easily when they have a positive image, and are more likely to develop positive and enjoyable relationships with others if they possess a positive reputation (e.g., De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001; Gächter & Fehr, 1999; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002). All of these findings are consistent with the argument that people care about how they are evaluated by others.

In a series of studies, De Cremer and Tyler (2004) examined the extent to which people high in concern for reputation were influenced by manipulations of respect (i.e., a relational feature of procedural fairness) and voice. In the first study, participants were required to fill out a recently developed questionnaire assessing their concern about their social reputation (for more details, see De Cremer & Tyler, 2004; see appendix for sample items). Participants scoring high on this scale are generally concerned and worried about how they are perceived by others, whereas those scoring low on this scale are generally less concerned. After filling out this scale, the participants were asked to recall a situation in their department in which they felt respected or disrespected. They were asked to write a short story about this specific situation (most stories described situations of respect or disrespect in the classroom). Then, participants' level of self-esteem was assessed. Results revealed an interaction showing that participants' level of self-esteem was higher when they recalled a situation of respect rather than disrespect, but this pattern was only found among participants high in concern for social reputation.

To obtain more evidence for this relation between respect and concern for social reputation, De Cremer and Tyler (2004) also conducted a study in which concern for reputation was assessed first, before participants had to read a scenario about a situation in which they felt respected versus disrespected. This time, a broader range of dependent measures was used by asking participants for both their positive and negative emotional reactions. As in the previous study, results revealed significant interactions on both negative and positive emotions. Participants were more happy when they

manager believes in democratic values and "the manager considers it part of the company," whereas the manager is not concerned about giving voice opportunities to employees "good at this moment." The relative importance of these factors has been examined in previous research (see De Cremer & Blader, 2004).

received respect rather than disrespect and were more angry when they received disrespect rather than respect. As expected, these patterns only emerged among those high in concern for social reputation.

Finally, De Cremer and Sedikides (2004) also conducted a series of studies in which procedural fairness was directly manipulated by providing participants the opportunity to voice their opinion (or not). As in the respect studies, concern for social reputation was assessed by using the same individual difference scale. Results of these studies revealed that procedural fairness and concern for social reputation interacted in a similar way respect and concern for social reputation did. Indeed, the procedure of voice influenced participants' self-esteem reactions only when participants were high in concern for social reputation.

Furthermore, the studies of De Cremer and Sedikides also showed that violations in procedural fairness (i.e., lack of voice in one study and communicating weak arguments for giving voice in another study) diminished the reported self-esteem of participants with a positive reputation but not of those with a negative reputation (i.e., valence of reputation was induced by asking participants to recall social situations in which their reputation was clearly positive versus negative). These findings thus demonstrate that fair procedures signal a positive contribution to one's reputation, and therefore those with a positive reputation are most sensitive toward signs from their supervisor that carry self-evaluative information (cf. Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001).

All these studies thus convincingly show that procedural fairness strongly influences people's social self by affecting people's self-evaluative concerns. One such specific concern is the extent to which people care about their reputation among others in the group. This focus on the importance of people's social reputation in accounting for procedural fairness effects is closely related to Tyler's (2001) notion of the reputational social self. This distinct aspect of the social self refers to people's concern about their position and reputation within the group (Tyler & Smith, 1999). Tyler indeed argued that self-related information such as procedures has a major effect on people's reactions when their reputational social self is salient.

C. SELF-DEFINITION AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

Relational models of procedural fairness have in common that the relationship between procedures and features of the social self must directly influence people's sense of identity or, in other words, one's self-description in terms of their identity. As a result, using our moderator approach, the predictions of these models should be particularly applicable to those people

who assign importance to their reasons. Such a focus on how the parties, such as authorities and identity fits well with the strong the importance of the social self (Brewer, 2001). Which type of information of using relational information social self?

One psychological variable is the significance that people assign to interdependent self-construal (Sedikides, 1994). ISC refers to the extent on the basis of their relationships with others conceptualized ISC in the context of differences in people's cognitive structures. Researchers advocated the perspective that countries differ in how they perceive relationships with others. However, ISC does not predominate in the context of the individual across cultures (Sedikides, 1994).

Thus, scales assessing individualism and collectivism, and especially, Vandello and Cohen (1994) within-culture variance in individualism are closely related to ISC. In short, the theory and research, it is now well established even in studies conducted within cultures.

Thus, people with a more interdependent psychological significance to their relationships to those with lower levels of individualism. A relational explanation of procedural fairness is applicable to those with high individualism. This explanation posits that procedural fairness influences the attitudes and behaviors of those high in ISC (see also De Cremer & Van den Broek, 2001, level of those high in ISC as a function of relational concerns).

These predictions were examined in three studies. In a first experiment, we tested out the interdependent self-construal. After this, participants engaged in a procedure with another participant present in the room, creating a number of squares that

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who assign importance to their relationships with others for self-definitional reasons. Such a focus on how the quality of relationships one has with other parties, such as authorities and groups, influences people's type and level of identity fits well with the strong focus of contemporary social psychology on the importance of the social self and identity motives (see, e.g., Sedikides & Brewer, 2001). Which type of identity is likely to play a role in the process of using relational information such as fair procedures to construct one's social self?

One psychological variable likely to reflect the degree of psychological significance that people assign to their relationship with another party is interdependent self-construal (ISC; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Singelis, 1994). ISC refers to the extent to which people define themselves on the basis of their relationships with others. Markus and Kitayama originally conceptualized ISC in the context of trying to account for cross-cultural differences in people's cognitions, emotions, and behaviors. Initially, researchers advocated the perspective that individuals in Western and Eastern countries differ in how they perceive and define themselves in terms of their relationships with others. However, more recently it has been argued that ISC does not predominate in one specific culture but, rather, exists within the individual across cultures (Singelis, 1994).

Thus, scales assessing individual differences in ISC were developed. Relatedly, Vandello and Cohen (1999) recently found evidence of meaningful within-culture variance in individualism-collectivism constructs that are closely related to ISC. In short, although ISC had its roots in cross-cultural theory and research, it is now coming to be seen as a meaningful variable even in studies conducted within a single culture.

Thus, people with a more interdependent self-construal assign greater psychological significance to their relationships with other parties, relative to those with lower levels of ISC. It therefore stands to reason that the relational explanation of procedural fairness effects would be particularly applicable to those with high levels of ISC. Put differently, the identity explanation posits that procedural fairness factors should be more likely to influence the attitudes and behaviors of those high, rather than low, in ISC (see also De Cremer & Van den Bos, 2003, for evidence that the cooperation level of those high in ISC as a function of voice is explained largely in terms of relational concerns).

These predictions were examined by Brockner et al. (in press) in a series of three studies. In a first experiment, these authors asked participants to fill out the interdependent self-construal scale, as developed by Singelis (1994). After this, participants engaged in a task that they would perform with another participant present in the laboratory. The task consisted of identifying a number of squares that were highlighted in a figure at the upper left

of the computer screen (see Van den Bos & Lind, 2002, for more details of this specific experimental task). Participants had to try to finish as many tasks as possible within a period of 10 minutes. After they finished this task, they were told that they would receive lottery tickets that they could use to earn money. The better they performed, the more lottery tickets they could receive. Then the procedural fairness manipulation was introduced by telling participants that they would receive voice to articulate their opinion about how many tickets they should receive or that they would not receive such voice opportunity. Finally, participants' positive affect was measured.

Results revealed that procedural fairness influenced participants' positive affect positively, but this was only the case among participants high in ISC and not those low in ISC. To increase the external validity of these findings, these authors also conducted a field negotiation study in which participants' level of ISC was assessed before engaging in the negotiation task. During the negotiation task, participants' perceptions about how fairly and respectfully they were treated was measured. Results again revealed an interaction between ISC and procedural treatment in a way that participants were more likely to continue the interaction between themselves and the negotiation partner when treatment was perceived as fair rather than as unfair. Again, this pattern was only found among those high in ISC.

These studies show that the fairness of procedures is used for purposes of self-definition. Procedural fairness is assumed to indicate to group members that they are valued by the group and its authority, which enables them to use their group membership to define themselves (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b). Individuals high in ISC consider their social memberships (i.e., those within groups and relationships) as important because they perceive self and others to be intertwined, and therefore information about their relationship with the authority and the group (i.e., procedural fairness) influences their reactions.

D. SELF-UNCERTAINTY AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

According to the uncertainty management model (Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), feelings of uncertainty make procedural fairness more important, but in our opinion, as noted earlier, this model emphasizes particularly how people cognitively deal with uncertainty about outcomes. In this analysis, we suggest that people's sense of uncertainty about their social self also makes people be more responsive and attentive toward procedural fairness issues. In fact, in the group-engagement model, Tyler and Blader (2003b) argue that the influence of outcomes occurs through the influence of outcomes on

identity judgments. In contrast to the uncertainty management model, attitudes, values, and behavior

However, we argue, as do others (e.g., Van den Bos & Lind, 2002), uncertainty about one's social identity (and one's social identity as a member of a group) leads people to seek information about their social identity, as most relevant to that social identity.

More specifically, we suggest that people's sense of procedural justice as an informational source in their social environment and the self, and their sense of self-identity (e.g., Sedikides & Strube, 1997). When people's sense of self-identity and inclusiveness) is high, they are more responsive to procedural justice (e.g., Tyler, 1990). On the one hand, such a sense of self-identity is a positive but fragile self-aspect that is vulnerable to a negative aspect. In the first case, affective responses are overly positive, and in the second case, affective responses are overly negative. On the other hand, variations in procedural justice clarification potential. Such information leads to inferences concerning their social identity and standing inferences (Tyler, 1990).

To examine the potential influence of a sense of self-uncertainty, De Cremer and Tyler (2003) conducted several studies in which self-uncertainty was manipulated by means of self-esteem stability (e.g., Berry, Herlocker, & Anderson, 2003; Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallée, & Oleson, 2000; items), and self-doubt (Oleson & De Cremer, 2003; appendix for sample items). In the first study, self-esteem (Dykman, 1998) was manipulated as either possessed stable or unstable self-esteem. Participants read a scenario in which they were a member of a company. In this scenario the company was facing a procedural fairness manipulation. In the fair procedure condition, participants were eligible for a promotion. In the unfair procedure condition, participants had to pass nine tests to select the best candidate for the promotion. In the fair procedure condition, participants read that they were selected. Finally, participants' fairness perceptions were measured.

In line with predictions of the uncertainty management model, it was revealed that for both fairness perceptions, the influence of procedural fairness was mediated by the procedural fairness

Lind, 2002, for more details of s had to try to finish as many minutes. After they finished this lottery tickets that they could rmed, the more lottery tickets rness manipulation was intro- receive voice to articulate their receive or that they would not r participants' positive affect was

influenced participants' positive among participants high in ISC ternal validity of these findings, on study in which participants' he negotiation task. During the out how fairly and respectfully again revealed an interaction ay that participants were more hemselves and the negotiation r rather than as unfair. Again, th in ISC.

cedures is used for purposes of l to indicate to group members thority, which enables them to elves (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988; gh in ISC consider their social d relationships) as important ertwined, and therefore infor- uthority and the group (i.e.,

PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

model (Van den Bos & Lind, d fairness more important, but l emphasizes particularly how t outcomes. In this analysis, we out their social self also makes ard procedural fairness issues. and Blader (2003b) argue that the influence of outcomes on

identity judgments. In contrast, the influence of identity judgments on attitudes, values, and behaviors is direct.

However, we argue, as does the uncertainty management model, that uncertainty about one's social self (i.e., about reputation and status in a group) leads people to seek information. The information that people view as most relevant to that social self is information about procedural justice.

More specifically, we suggest that people use variations in procedural justice as an informational source, as a critical link between the social environment and the self, and as a way to reduce uncertainty about the self (McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). When self-uncertainty (e.g., doubts about one's identity and inclusiveness) is high, people will be particularly sensitive and responsive to procedural justice variations (cf. Brockner, 1984; Campbell, 1990). On the one hand, such variations will be seen either as validating a positive but fragile self-aspect or as threatening a negative and fragile self-aspect. In the first case, affective, cognitive, and behavioral reactions will be overly positive, and in the second case they will be overly negative. On the other hand, variations in procedural justice will be perceived as having self-clarification potential. Such information will enable the individual to draw inferences concerning their social inclusiveness, social acceptance, or social standing inferences (Tyler, 1989, 1999).

To examine the potential influence of procedural fairness on people's sense of self-uncertainty, De Cremer and Sedikides (2003) conducted several studies in which self-uncertainty was measured and operationalized by means of self-esteem stability (Kernis, Whisenhunt, Waschull, Greenier, Berry, Herlocker, & Anderson, 1998), self-concept clarity (Campbell, Trapnell, Heine, Katz, Lavallee, & Lehman, 1996; see appendix for sample items), and self-doubt (Oleson, Poehlmann, Yost, Lynch, & Arkin, 2000; see appendix for sample items). In a first study, participants' stability of self-esteem (Dykman, 1998) was assessed to determine whether participants possessed stable or unstable self-esteem. Thereafter, they were required to read a scenario in which they had to imagine being an employee of a company. In this scenario they were eligible for a job promotion. Then the procedural fairness manipulation was introduced by informing participants that those eligible for a promotion had to participate in nine different tests. In the fair procedure condition, participants read that the company rated all nine tests to select the best candidate, whereas in the unfair procedure condition, participants read that only one of the nine tests was rated. Finally, participants' fairness judgments and positive affect was assessed.

In line with predictions of the uncertainty management model, results revealed that for both fairness judgments and affect, participants were influenced by the procedural fairness manipulation in such a way that the

accurate treatment was judged to be more fair and elicited more positive affect than the inaccurate treatment. However, this pattern only emerged for those with unstable self-esteem.

To further corroborate these findings, another study was conducted in which participants first had to fill out the self-doubt scale (Oleson et al., 2000). Self-doubt captures more directly the sense of disbelief and distrust in one's abilities or characteristics than self-esteem stability does. High scores on this scale indicate that people experience doubts (i.e., are less certain) about their self-concept. After this, participants read a story saying that they were employees at a high-flying company and that, because of the company's strong profit, a bonus of 10,000 Dutch Guilders (approximately \$4,500) would be passed on to them. The allocation decision would be made by the management. Thereafter, the procedural fairness manipulation was introduced by informing half of the participants that management decided to give them voice to make this decision, whereas the other half of the participants was informed that no such voice was granted to them. Finally, participants' negative affect was measured. Again, in line with predictions, results indicated that participants receiving no voice reported stronger negative affect than those receiving voice, but this was only found among those high in self-doubt.

Further evidence for the proposition that procedural fairness influences people's social self via uncertainty related to the self was obtained in a study in which the authors asked participants to fill out the self-concept clarity scale. Self-concept clarity can be defined as "the extent to which the contents of an individual's self-concept (e.g., perceived personal attributes) are clearly and confidently defined, internally consistent, and temporally stable" (Campbell et al., 1996, p. 141). After responding to this scale, participants were placed in separate experimental cubicles and told that they had been asked to help the university board of a Dutch university in designing electronic planners that students could use to organize their studies and preparations of assignments. Therefore, the board needed comments from students. To make this issue clear to the participants, the students were given information about these electronics planners, and they also read a newspaper article that addressed this issue. Thereafter, participants were required to write down their comments on a piece of paper that was lying in front of them. After finishing this assignment, the comments were picked up by the experimenter, and participants had to wait while a representative of the university board read the comments and decided who would be asked to voice their comments to the university board. After a few minutes, half of the participants were told that they were given voice, whereas the other half was told that they did not receive voice. Finally, participants' negative affect was measured.

Again, results revealed a significant effect of procedural fairness on negative affect was reported in the no-voice condition, but only among those

E. SUMMARY

These studies consistently demonstrate that procedural fairness influences negative affect because they directly address the social self. Previous studies indicate that the motivation to be fair when making decisions is related to the satisfaction of social related needs by providing a sense of belonging, a sense of social self-uncertainty. As such, it is argued that procedural fairness has pervasive implications for the social self.

Final evidence that satisfaction with procedural fairness reflects a procedure that is positively reinforced is provided by Dijksterhuis et al. (2004). These authors assessed the need to belong, concern for social self-uncertainty) together with the results of this study showed that although on one specific big five factor (the five model of personality traits: extraversion, conscientiousness, etc., see Digman, 1990).

Previous research has shown that self-esteem correlated with measures of social self-esteem because self-esteem involves social self-esteem (Baumeister, 2000), it can be argued that the social self—need to belong, dependent self-construal, and neuroticism strongly indicate a concern about maintaining or establishing relationships they have with others (Locke, & Durham, 1997, for a review of the evaluation). As we argued earlier, the social self within groups to manage social self-esteem.

Although the above studies do not appear to be directly related to significantly affect people's

fair and elicited more positive affect, this pattern only emerged for

In another study was conducted in which a self-doubt scale (Oleson et al., 1997) was used to measure a sense of disbelief and distrust in management stability does. High scores on the scale (i.e., are less certain) indicate that participants read a story saying that they had been told that, because of the company's financial difficulties (approximately \$4,500), a decision would be made by management that fairness manipulation was intended. In line with predictions, results showed that management decided to grant the other half of the participants. Finally, participants reported stronger negative affect only found among those high

procedural fairness influences the social self was obtained in a study by Oleson et al. (2004) in which participants filled out the self-concept clarity scale to the extent to which the contents of their personal attributes are clearly defined, and temporally stable. According to this scale, participants were informed and told that they had been informed by a Dutch university in designing a board to organize their studies and needed comments from participants. The students were given a newspaper, and they also read a newspaper. Participants were required to report that was lying in front of them while a representative of the board decided who would be asked to report. After a few minutes, half of the participants were picked up by the newspaper, whereas the other half was not. Participants' negative affect was

Again, results revealed a significant interaction indicating that more negative affect was reported in the no-voice condition relative to the voice condition, but only among those low in self-concept clarity.

E. SUMMARY

These studies consistently show that procedures influence people's reactions because they directly affect the social self. More precisely, all these studies indicate that the motivational implication of using procedural fairness when making decisions in a group is that they satisfy people's social self-related needs by providing people with a positive reputation, a sense of belonging, a sense of social interdependence, and a decrease in feelings of self-uncertainty. As such, it can be argued with confidence that procedural fairness has pervasive implications for people's evaluation of these aspects of the social self.

Final evidence that satisfying these needs and motives by means of fair procedures reflects a process in which people's social self-evaluation is positively reinforced is provided by a study of De Cremer and Van Hiel (2004). These authors assessed all four features of the social self (i.e., need to belong, concern for social reputation, interdependent self-construal, and self-uncertainty) together with the big five factors questionnaire. Results of this study showed that all four features of the social self loaded highly on one specific big five factor: neuroticism. Neuroticism is part of the big five model of personality that includes five broad factors (neuroticism, extraversion, conscientiousness, agreeableness, and openness to experience; see Digman, 1990).

Previous research has shown that neuroticism is strongly (and negatively) correlated with measures of self-esteem (Watson, Suls, & Haig, 2002). Because self-esteem involves self-evaluation by means of assessing how well one is regarded and accepted by others (see sociometer theory; Leary & Baumeister, 2000), it can thus be concluded that our finding that concerns about one's social self—need to belong, concern for social reputation, interdependent self-construal, and self-uncertainty—loaded highly on the factor neuroticism strongly indicates that these motives reflect people's concerns about maintaining or establishing a positive self-evaluation within the social relationships they have with the group and its members (see, e.g., Judge, Locke, & Durham, 1997, for evidence that neuroticism is in fact a core self-evaluation). As we argued earlier, procedural fairness is one powerful tool within groups to manage such self-evaluation process.

Although the above studies demonstrate that procedures have the potential to significantly affect people's social self by arousing the different aspects

of this type of self, a motivational approach of procedural fairness still requires an explanation of how this social self then motivates people to act as good group members; that is, to engage in cooperation. In this chapter, it is assumed that the process of activating the social self will define the appropriate goals and that this, in turn, will guide people's self-regulation process, in which action is undertaken (Carver & Scheier, 1998).

In a group context, the goals that are most likely to be made salient will be group or collective-oriented goals. Indeed, procedures enacted by the group and its authority will contribute to the social self of its group members and will make them define themselves more as a part of the group or, using terms of self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), will make them experience themselves as an embodiment of the group. This has as a consequence that the group's goals are experienced as one's own goals, and consequently, group goals will guide one's actions and decisions. In terms of a motivational account, one could thus argue that the fairness of procedures will first motivate group members by significantly influencing their social self. A second step in such a motivational analysis requires us to explain how this motivation is directed toward action.

V. Social Dilemmas and Procedural Fairness: Trust and Goal-Transformation

Now that we have established that procedural fairness significantly influences people's motivation via the process of shaping the construction and maintenance of the social self, it becomes more understandable why it is that procedures should have the potential to motivate group members to cooperate for the group's welfare. By satisfying people's social motives and activating their social self, people will be motivated to accept the goals and beliefs of the group that treated them fairly. As such, group members will adopt the goal of promoting the group's interest, and this will guide the process of self-regulation and, consequently, their decisions and their actions.

This self-regulating process that is guided by the goals that are made salient by people's social self (i.e., the group's goal in this particular instance) links well with research that shows that how people define themselves (e.g., as a group member vs. an individual or as a leader vs. someone lower in power) influences their tendency to engage in action. For example, recent research by Galinski, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) showed that if people define themselves as someone high in power they are more motivated to take action as the behavior of taking action fits better with the goals and beliefs associated with power. Thus, powerful persons have the goal to take more

action, and this will shape the behavior of those whose social self is activated. In these situations, procedures will be more likely to be followed if that cooperation is more likely to be rewarded.

A similar argument has been made by Komorita & Parks (1994). Social dilemmas in which the personal interest and the group interest representing a mixed-motive situation (see Pruitt, 2002). In these situations, the decision to contribute to the group interest and not to contribute to the personal interest those in a given situation adapt to the situation. The outcomes will be worse than if all acted rationally. According to Dawes (1980), a social dilemma has two important features: first, defecting is socially rational, regardless of what others do, and second, rationality (i.e., defecting) will lead to a worse outcome for the group.

Within the social dilemma literature, the social self defined will determine the type of behavior exhibited by group members. That is, people will act in a way that the self is defined more socially or more personally. The level of the group. Thus, if the social self is defined more socially, then group members are more likely to cooperate. Following this logic, Kramer and Lewicki (1994) show that the extent to which people cooperate in terms of their group membership is related to their decision behavior. In other words, if the social collective is reinforced, "the group is more likely to cooperate" (1987; p. 34). Thus, how people define themselves or other possible social cues) will influence their motivation to pursue the group's interest.

Why is it so important that people are motivated to cooperate? Recent research has shown that positively reinforced social self-regulation is the influence of two dominating motives: fear and greed (De Cremer & Vrij, 2003). Thus, creating a strong sense of social self (i.e., aspect of the self) diminishes the motivation for cooperative efforts and that the social self. In addition, under these circumstances, people will be guided by personal greed. Vrij & De Cremer (2003) expect

In the late 1970s, Pruitt (1979) used social expectation theory to predict

Each of procedural fairness still self then motivates people to act in cooperation. In this chapter, it is the social self that will define the self and will guide people's self-regulation (Tyler & Scheier, 1998).

It is likely to be made salient will be the procedures enacted by the group and the social self of its group members and part of the group or, using terms from (Tyler & O'Leary, 1997), will make them experience procedural fairness. This has as a consequence that people will pursue their own goals, and consequently, their interests. In terms of a motivational perspective, the fairness of procedures will first influence their social self. A second perspective requires us to explain how this

Procedural Fairness: Trust and Cooperation

Procedural fairness significantly influences the construction and the understanding of why it is that people invite group members to cooperate. People's social motives and activation to accept the goals and beliefs of the group, group members will adopt and this will guide the process of their decisions and their actions.

Guided by the goals that are made salient (the goal in this particular instance) people define themselves (e.g., as a leader vs. someone lower in status) in action. For example, recent research (Tyler, 2003) showed that if people are more motivated to take action, they are more motivated to take action better with the goals and beliefs of the group. People who have the goal to take more

action, and this will shape their behavioral tendencies. In a similar vein, those whose social self is activated and positively reinforced by the use of fair procedures will be more likely to act in terms of their social self, which means that cooperation is more likely to emerge.

A similar argument has been used in the social dilemma literature (Komorita & Parks, 1994). Social dilemmas are interdependence situations in which the personal interest is at odds with the collective interest, thus representing a mixed-motive situation (Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002). In these situations, the dominant choice is to follow one's own personal interest and not to contribute to the interest of one's group. However, if all of those in a given situation adopt this economically rational strategy, the outcomes will be worse than if all members or both partners decide to cooperate. According to Dawes (1980), a social dilemma is thus characterized by two important features: first, defection will always be economically most beneficial, regardless of what others decide, but second, if all act this way, individual rationality (i.e., defecting) will lead to collective disaster.

Within the social dilemma literature it is assumed that how the self is defined will determine the type of goal (personal or collective) that is pursued by group members. That is, people try to serve their own self-interest, but if the self is defined more socially, people's level of interest may be situated at the level of the group. Thus, if people's social self is positively promoted, then group members are more likely to cooperate in social dilemmas. Following this logic, Kramer and Brewer (1984) were the first to experimentally show that the extent to which individual decision-makers define themselves in terms of their group membership may function as a reference point for their decision behavior. In other words, when affiliation with the group or collective is reinforced, "the group is the basis of cooperation" (Turner, 1987; p. 34). Thus, how people's self is defined (by means of procedures or other possible social cues) determines the extent to which people are motivated to pursue the group's welfare.

Why is it so important that people need to have a social self to promote cooperation? Recent research has argued that if group members have a positively reinforced social self, this psychological state will reduce the influence of two dominating motives in social dilemma situations; that is, fear and greed (De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002; De Cremer & van Vugt, 1999). Thus, creating a strong sense of belongingness (i.e., reinforcing the social aspect of the self) diminishes people's fear that others will exploit their cooperative efforts and that they will end up as the "sucker" (Kerr, 1983). In addition, under these circumstances, people's actions are also less likely to be guided by personal greed. Why?

In the late 1970s, Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) developed their goal/expectation theory to predict under which circumstances cooperation in

mixed-motive situations is most likely to emerge. According to these researchers, two conditions have to be fulfilled: group members need to have a cooperative goal and to trust the others in their cooperative intentions. In other words, "the goal of achieving mutual cooperation is insufficient to elicit cooperative behavior. It must be accompanied by the expectation that the other will cooperate" (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977, p. 375). Hence, trust or lack of trust in others is central to obtaining cooperation.

A recent study by De Cremer and Stouten (2003) indeed showed that cooperation levels in a public good dilemma (a specific instance of a social dilemma) were highest when group members trusted the others and when they felt that the group and its interests were merged in their own self-definition (see self-other merging; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991). Thus, following the rationale of goal/expectation theory, it seems clear that enhancing trust in others and creating a collective or prosocial goal will reduce fear for exploitation and a tendency to pursue greed, respectively.

That both having trust in others and having a prosocial goal are important determinants of cooperation has been demonstrated by a vast amount of empirical research. Trust has been argued to represent a psychological construct that may be beneficial in solving the conflict between one's own interest and the interest of the others (Dawes, 1980; De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; Kramer, Brewer, & Hanna, 1996). Following Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995), trust can be defined as "the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectations that the other will perform a particular action important to the truster, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party" (p. 712). Most studies of trust have used definitions similar to this one.

In general, this perspective indicates that when trust is high, people will have confidence in another's goodwill, will expect others to act in a moral way, and therefore engage in reciprocal cooperation (e.g., Granovetter, 1992; Ring & van de Ven, 1994). As such, people will experience less fear that others will exploit them, making it easier for them to justify their decisions to cooperate (Yamagishi & Sato, 1986). In line with this, research on social dilemmas has shown that a high level of trust influences expectations about other's motives with respect to oneself (e.g., Brann & Foddy, 1987; De Cremer, 1999) and affects behavior in interdependence situations (e.g., Messick, Wilke, Brewer, Kramer, Zemke, & Lui, 1983; Parks & Hulbert, 1995). Interestingly, these studies also showed that high trusters (who expect reciprocity) cooperated irrespective of whether others cooperated, indicating that trust is also linked to a sense of moral commitment (Kramer & Goldman, 1995).

With respect to having a prosocial goal (see Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), research on social value orientation, or preferences for particular patterns

of distributions of outcomes for (Van Lange, Otten, De Dreu, & Mannix, 2000) is also relevant. Research on this concept has identified a social value typology, including prosocial or other-regarding, and enhancing equality in outcomes or distributive, and self-regarding outcomes for self with no or little regard for others (i.e., self-interestive orientation (i.e., enhancing self-interest). The latter two are often combined as self-regarding or proselfs (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1995).

Extant evidence indicates that people with a prosocial orientation to act and think in a collectively good for the group), whereas individuals with a self-regarding orientation and think in an individually good for themselves). Also, non-self-regarding prosocials approach other-regarding prosocials with personal restraint in so-called resource allocation tasks (i.e., distributive) to a variety of strategies (e.g., Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; Messick & Murnighan, 1988). They have been consistently observed to cooperate in give-some and take-some games.

All these findings provide support for the idea that prosocials and proselfs represent different orientations to objective social situation as a function of their social value orientation. Prosocials will focus on cooperation, whereas proselfs will focus on self-interest (e.g., Thibaut, 1978). Thus, if one's self is salient, then the interdependence situation in a cooperative setting.

Within social dilemma research, the idea of a social self reinforcing the social self (as prosocials) has shown positive effects on cooperation (e.g., De Cremer, 1999).

⁴In give-some and take-some dilemmas, the social self is assessed by measuring how many chips a participant wishes to give to their partner (give-some) and how many chips they wish to take from their partner (take-some). For example, the give-some dilemma task is a social dilemma choice between five options, varying systematically in the number of chips given and taken. Participants are told that they are paired with another participant who is informed that they are given four blue chips and must choose a task (and who is unknown to them) is given to the partner for himself or herself is worth 25 units. The same logic applies for the partner: if the participant chooses each chip the partner gives to the partner.

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of distributions of outcomes for self and others (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, & Joireman, 1997), is particularly relevant. Research on this concept has revealed support for a three-category typology, including prosocial orientation (i.e., enhancing joint outcomes and enhancing equality in outcomes), individualistic orientation (i.e., enhancing outcomes for self with no or little regard to other's outcomes), and competitive orientation (i.e., enhancing relative advantage over other's outcomes). The latter two are often combined and form one specific group referred to as proselfs (Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991).

Extant evidence indicates that individuals with prosocial orientations tend to act and think in a collectively rational manner (i.e., to think about what is good for the group), whereas individuals with proself orientation tend to act and think in an individually rational manner (i.e., thinking about what is good for themselves). Also, numerous studies indicate that, relative to proselfs, prosocials approach others more cooperatively, exercise more personal restraint in so-called resource dilemmas, and respond more cooperatively to a variety of strategies (e.g., Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986; Liebrand & Van Run, 1985; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988). Such patterns have been consistently observed in several different social dilemmas like give-some and take-some games (see Van Lange, 2000).⁴

All these findings provide support for the notion that differences between prosocials and proselfs represents differences in how they transform an objective social situation as a function of their own motives and goals (i.e., prosocials will focus on cooperative features in the interdependence situation, whereas proselfs will focus on noncooperative features; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Thus, if one's motives are socially based (i.e., the social self is salient), then the interdependence situation will be perceived as a cooperative setting.

Within social dilemma research it has been argued and demonstrated that reinforcing the social self (as procedural fairness does) may, in fact, have positive effects on cooperation, because it positively influences beliefs of

⁴In give-some and take-some dilemmas, individual decision makers' level of cooperation is assessed by measuring how many chips (which all have a monetary value) each individual wishes to give to their partner (give-some) or take from a common resource (take-some). For example, the give-some dilemma task is presented in such a way that participants can make a choice between five options, varying systematically from most to least cooperative. Participants are told that they are paired with another person participating in the same study. They are informed that they are given four blue chips and that the partner with whom they will play the task (and who is unknown to them) is given four yellow chips. Each chip the participant keeps for himself or herself is worth 25 units, whereas a chip given to the partner is worth 50 units. The same logic applies for the partner: each chip the partner keeps is worth 25 units, whereas each chip the partner gives to the participant is worth 50 units.

trust and the elicitation of prosocial goals. Research on the self and relationships within groups has indeed made a similar claim. With regard to trust, research on intergroup relations has suggested that a salient social self may produce more positive expectations toward the other ingroup members, relative to outgroup members (i.e., ingroup favoritism; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). For example, in line with an ingroup favoring explanation, Brewer (1979) argued that ingroup members are judged as more trustworthy and honest than outgroup members, particularly when a socially based self or identity is salient (Brewer, 1979). As Brewer (1981, p. 356) puts it: "As a consequence of shifting from the personal level to the social group level of identity, the individual can adopt a sort of 'depersonalized trust'."

With respect to adopting a prosocial goal, group dynamics and social dilemma research has argued that depending on the type of self (personal versus social), people pursue personal self-interest or the group's interest. Indeed, Brewer (1991; p. 476) argued that, "when the definition of self changes the meaning of self-interest and self-serving motivations changes accordingly." A salient social self thus implies that interdependent relationships (as observed within groups) will be more characterized by mutual concern for one's own interest and the interest of the others.

Some convincing support for this assertion that a salient and strong social self positively influences trust and prosocial goals is given by De Cremer and Van Dijk (2002), who conducted an experimental study in which participants were invited to the laboratory to play a public good dilemma game. Participants were business students and were given an endowment of 300 Dutch cents (1.50 US\$) at the start of the first contribution session, and were free to contribute any amount of it to establish the common good. It was explained that the amount that had to be contributed was 1050 Dutch cents (in a group of seven individuals). If achieved, this amount would be split equally among all members regardless of their contribution. In this study, the introduction of an intergroup manipulation reinforced people's social self. That is, participants were told in the high group identification condition that the decisions of groups of business students would be compared to the decisions made by students of the psychology department. In the low group identification condition, they were told that the individual decisions of each student within the group would be compared.

Before the start of this experiment, participants' social value orientation was also assessed (see Van Lange et al., 1997, for specific details about the measurement; see Appendix II for a sample item). Social value orientation is a stable individual difference variable, which refers to the value people assign to their personal welfare versus the collective welfare (De Cremer & Van Lange, 2001). The results of this study revealed an interaction showing that reinforcing identification with the group (i.e., a strong social self) motivated




Fig. 1. Cooperation as a function of Social Value Orientation (SVO).

proselfs to contribute more, which was reinforced by the group identification manipulation (see Fig. 1).

Thus, identifying strongly with the group and motives from the personal level reinforced cooperation. Thereafter, participants who succeeded or failed in obtaining the public good. In the high group identification condition, the group succeeded, whereas in the low group identification condition, the group failed. Participants were asked again how much they would contribute in the second session.

Results revealed that after the first session, there was a significant interaction between group identification and SVO in establishing the public good, in which high SVO participants in the high group identification condition remained high in their contribution. In the low group identification condition, there was no effect of group identification on cooperation. Also, no moderating effect of SVO was found.

This second analysis thus indicates that SVO must have reinforced perceptions of group identification. Participants who started to play a role in the second session knew how the group as a whole would be identified (inferred). Taken together, this indicates that people who have a salient social self are more likely to identify with the group and express more trust and contribute more.

research on the self and relation-ilar claim. With regard to trust, ted that a salient social self may d the other ingroup members, up favoritism; Tajfel & Turner, p favoring explanation, Brewer dged as more trustworthy and ly when a socially based self or er (1981, p. 356) puts it: "As a level to the social group level of 'depersonalized trust'."

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


Fig. 1. Cooperation as a function of group identification and social value orientation (SVO).

proselfs to contribute more, whereas prosocials were not affected by this manipulation (see Fig. 1).

Thus, identifying strongly with the group made people transform their goals and motives from the personal to the group level, consequently enhancing cooperation. Thereafter, participants were told whether their group succeeded or failed in obtaining the public good. In half of the conditions the group succeeded, whereas in the other half the group failed. Then, participants were asked again how much they were willing to contribute during a second session.

Results revealed that after the group feedback a significant interaction between group identification and feedback emerged. When the group failed in establishing the public good, it was shown that those with a strong sense of group identification remained cooperative, whereas those with a low sense of group identification dropped their levels of cooperation (Fig. 2). No effect of group identification was found when the group was successful. Also, no moderating effect of social value orientation was observed anymore.

This second analysis thus indicates that enhancing group identification must have reinforced perceptions of trust in others as well, but this only started to play a role in the second contribution session (when participants knew how the group as a whole performed and perceptions of trust could be inferred). Taken together, this important experiment makes clear that once people have a salient social self they use the group goals as their own goals and express more trust and confidence toward their fellow group members.




Fig. 2. Cooperation as a function of group identification and group feedback.

Because both the procedural fairness literature and the social dilemma literature have in common their reference to promoting people's social self, we argue that procedural fairness is an important group tool that is able to promote cooperation because it should positively influence both psychological processes of prosocial goal activation and beliefs of trust as articulated in the social dilemma literature. In line with this suggestion, we will now review some recent studies that have indeed demonstrated that these processes underlie the positive relationship between procedural fairness and cooperation within groups.

VI. Overview of Cooperation Research

In social dilemmas a strong research tradition exists examining the emergence and effect of authorities on cooperation (Tyler & DeGoey, 1995). In this literature, authorities have been referred to as structural solutions to social dilemma problems (e.g., Messick & Brewer, 1983), and the validity of this type of solution was based on the famous phrase of Hardin (1968), who argued for "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" solutions to solve the problem of cooperation. Because the interest in authorities emerged from this tradition, this type of solution has mainly been adopted to restrain people's tendency to maximize self-interest.

The reason for an instrumental perspective of cooperation is that many social scientists believe that voluntary cooperation in social dilemmas is a

"fragile flower, easily crushed (Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983), and require sanctioning of self-inter

However, it has quite often b has to be accepted by all and, as that all group members can buy be made more transparent by p procedures need to communicat needs and concerns of all group

In this way, structural solu incorporate procedural fairnes others. Being unbiased and app already described as procedural argue that an accepted and legi uated as procedurally fair, whic comply and cooperate with the (1997). Below we will describe s rities are effective tools to prom and prosocial goals play an imp

A. PROCEDURAL FAIRNES

Does procedural fairness inf play a role in this process? To Knippenberg (2002, experimen fairness (in addition to a manip we will not discuss here) on c manipulated whether group m their opinion or not about how procedures are supposed to cr members, they also predicted mediate the effect of procedura

Results indicated that a pro tributions more than a proced feelings mediated the relation b Another study by De Cremer relational qualities of procedu dilemmas. In this study, partic participate in a public good di they would be informed about t group showed respect (i.e., res

"fragile flower, easily crushed by self-interest" (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983), and therefore, structural leadership solutions require sanctioning of self-interested behavior.

However, it has quite often been overlooked that the structural solution has to be accepted by all and, as such, needs a kind of regulation philosophy that all group members can buy into. Therefore, Hardin's suggestion has to be made more transparent by pointing out that any coordination rules or procedures need to communicate that they are free of bias and appeal to the needs and concerns of all group members (see also Rawls, 1971).

In this way, structural solutions like leaders and authorities need to incorporate procedural fairness if they are to be effective in influencing others. Being unbiased and appealing to members' needs fits what we have already described as procedural fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988). As such, we argue that an accepted and legitimate authority will be perceived and evaluated as procedurally fair, which, in turn, will motivate group members to comply and cooperate with the group and its authority (see Tyler et al., 1997). Below we will describe several studies that have shown that authorities are effective tools to promote cooperation and that in this process trust and prosocial goals play an important role.

A. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND PROSOCIAL GOALS

Does procedural fairness influence cooperation and does the social self play a role in this process? To answer this question, De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002, experiment 2) studied the effects of leader procedural fairness (in addition to a manipulation of leader's self-sacrifice; something we will not discuss here) on cooperation in a public good dilemma. They manipulated whether group members were given the opportunity to voice their opinion or not about how to allocate the public good. Because fair procedures are supposed to create a sense of belongingness among group members, they also predicted that these belongingness feelings would mediate the effect of procedural fairness on cooperation.

Results indicated that a procedurally fair leader indeed promoted contributions more than a procedurally unfair leader and that belongingness feelings mediated the relation between procedural fairness and cooperation. Another study by De Cremer (2003b) provided further evidence that the relational qualities of procedural fairness influence cooperation in social dilemmas. In this study, participants were told that they as a group would participate in a public good dilemma but that, before making the decision, they would be informed about the extent to which the other members in their group showed respect (i.e., respect is perceived as an important relational

- High Group Identification
- Low Group Identification

dentification and group feedback.

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ve of cooperation is that many
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quality of procedural fairness; De Cremer & Tyler, in press; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Respect versus disrespect was manipulated by giving participants the average score of the rest of the group members on a respect scale that was assessing how respectful they were toward the others (i.e., the focal participant). Results revealed that participants contributed more to the public good when the others were respectful rather than disrespectful (see also De Cremer & Tyler, 2004). Moreover, this effect was mediated completely by participants' feelings of belongingness.

Because sense of belongingness was treated as a dependent variable rather than a moderator variable, these findings do not speak to the moderating role of the social self. Therefore, De Cremer and Van Vugt (2002, experiment 1) examined the extent to which leader's procedural fairness influenced cooperation levels in social dilemmas as a function of group member's sense of group belongingness. In this experiment, participants would play a public good dilemma game. After explaining the game, participants were told that a leader was appointed. Thereafter, information about leader characteristics was manipulated; that is, whether the level of group commitment of the leader was high or low (which we will not discuss here) and whether the leader was procedurally fair or not (operationalized as the opportunity to voice their opinion or not). In addition, by either introducing an intergroup comparison (between the participants' own university and a rival university) or an intragroup comparison (between the individual group members; see also De Cremer & van Dijk, 2002) participants' level of group identification was manipulated. On the basis of our prediction that procedural fairness communicates information relevant to people's social self, it should be expected that particularly those individuals with a strong desire to belong (i.e., who identify strongly with the group) should care most about procedural fairness information. In line with this prediction, results revealed that fair (as compared to unfair) leaders were more effective in enhancing contributions, particularly when group members exhibited strong group identification.

Tyler and DeGoey (1995) obtained similar results to De Cremer and Van Vugt (2002), but this time in a real-life setting. These authors examined people's perceptions of the fairness of the legal authorities in California and their sense of identification with this state. At the time of the study, California was plagued by a severe drought, and as such, people had to try to maintain water resources; a situation that qualified as a social dilemma (see e.g., Kahrl, 1982; Ostrom, 1990).

Results of this survey study in a real-life social dilemma situation revealed that procedural fairness perceptions significantly influenced people's willingness to save and maintain water resources but particularly when they exhibited a strong sense of identification with the community (see also Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996; Tyler et al., 1996 for more evidence regarding

the moderating effect of belongingness on procedural fairness effects).

A final study by De Cremer and Van Vugt (2002, experiment 2) examined belongingness in the context of a social dilemma game (see also De Cremer, 2003b for a more general aspect of procedural fairness). In this study, participants were installed by classifying participants into two groups (see Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 2001). In this study, group members were people that were clear examples of the social self that characterized their group. Efforts were also made that were clear examples of the social self that characterized their group. Efforts were also made that were clear examples of the social self that characterized their group. Efforts were also made that were clear examples of the social self that characterized their group. Efforts were also made that were clear examples of the social self that characterized their group.

Because of this attractive group, group members (regardless of their personality) should wish to belong. Because of this attractive group, group members (regardless of their personality) should wish to belong. Because of this attractive group, group members (regardless of their personality) should wish to belong. Because of this attractive group, group members (regardless of their personality) should wish to belong.

The results showed that contributions were higher in the group only among the peripheral group members when people really wish to belong to gain more inclusion in the group. The quality of treatment with the group was also higher when people really wish to belong to gain more inclusion in the group.

Taken together, these studies suggest that the relational qualities of procedural fairness are important for cooperation. In line with the goal of the study, the reason for this behavior is because fair procedures create a sense of belonging, frequently promoting cooperation to having a prosocial goal, by being in accordance with this assumption. Procedural fairness also affects

B. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS

Tyler and DeGoey (1995) showed that trust influenced

Tyler, in press; Tyler & Smith, 1996, 1998). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001).

As a dependent variable rather than a moderating role (see also Van Vugt (2002, experiment 1) on procedural fairness influenced cooperation. The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001).

Results to De Cremer and Van Vugt (2002, experiment 1) on procedural fairness influenced cooperation. The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001). The moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects (see also Tyler & Smith, 1998, 2001).

Social dilemma situation revealed that procedural fairness influenced people's willingness to cooperate, particularly when they expect to benefit the community (see also Huo, 1996 for more evidence regarding

the moderating effect of belongingness and identification on procedural fairness effects).

A final study by De Cremer (2002) showed the moderating effect of belongingness in the context of respectful versus disrespectful treatment (see also De Cremer, 2003b for the notion that respect constitutes a relational aspect of procedural fairness). In this study a strong need to belong was installed by classifying participants as peripheral versus core group members (see Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995, for a similar procedure). Peripheral group members were people that were just inside the personality category that characterized their group, whereas core group members were people that were clear examples of this personality category and thus of the group. Efforts were also made that membership in this group (which was characterized by the specific personality trait) was perceived as very attractive to all group members (regardless of the experimental condition they were in). Because of this attractive group membership, it was assumed that peripheral members should wish to gain inclusion in this attractive group (i.e., a high need to belong), whereas core group members would have not have such strong need because they were considered as very inclusive group members. Thereafter, respect was manipulated by sending participants an e-mail message that was written by the other group members and that was either disrespectful in content or respectful.

The results showed that respect positively influenced contributions (i.e., contributions were higher in the respect than in the disrespect condition), but only among the peripheral group members. This result thus indicates that when people really wish to belong (i.e., because they are peripheral and wish to gain more inclusion in this attractive group) they care more about the quality of treatment with the group.

Taken together, these studies show that procedural fairness and associated relational qualities of procedural fairness like respect indeed influence cooperation. In line with the goal/expectation theory (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977), the reason for this behavioral effect of procedural fairness to emerge was because fair procedures created a prosocial goal among followers, consequently promoting cooperation. Of course, this theory states that in addition to having a prosocial goal, beliefs about trust also need to be enhanced. In accordance with this assumption, several studies have provided evidence that procedural fairness also affects this process of trust significantly.

B. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND TRUST

Tyler and DeGoey (1995), in their real-life social dilemma study, also showed that trust influenced views about the legitimacy of authorities and

that these attitudes and perceptions influenced the willingness of community members to accept decisions voluntarily and to obey group rules. Thus, trust was communicated by the fairness of procedures enacted, and this process, in turn, affected levels of cooperation. In a similar vein, De Cremer (2004a) conducted a series of studies to examine the extent to which trustworthiness mediated interactions between two elements of procedural fairness; that is, bias and accuracy (see Leventhal, 1980). Participants in this experiment were said to be part of a group led by a person known to be biased or unbiased. In addition, this leader would have to use a procedure to determine how the individual performances of each group member would be rated. In the accurate procedure condition, all the tasks that the group member performed were rated, whereas in the inaccurate condition only some of the tasks were rated.

The results revealed that, if leaders were seen as unbiased, participants' responses were influenced by the accuracy procedure (i.e., participants' reactions were more positive when accurate relative to inaccurate procedures were used), but this was not the case when the leader was perceived as a biased person. More important, this interactive effect between bias and accuracy on participants' responses was largely explained by participants' perceptions of the leader's trustworthiness. Thus, information about leader's procedural fairness in a group performance context clearly communicated to participants how trustworthy the authority enacting the procedures was.

Van den Bos, Wilke, and Lind (1998) provided further evidence that trust and procedural fairness have a strong relation. These researchers demonstrated that if procedural fairness information is lacking (i.e., one does not know the exact procedures used), people use information about the authorities' trustworthiness as a substitute to direct their reactions. Van den Bos and colleagues as such argue in their fairness heuristic theory that trust acts as a substitute for procedural fairness information. Furthermore, Van den Bos et al. (1998) also suggested that more research on the relation between trust and procedural fairness is required and that, in doing so, researchers should focus on types of trust studies in the context of social dilemmas. That is, "future studies may pay attention to other operationalizations of trust, and, more important, may want to try to integrate the various research domains in which trust has been studied, such as ... social dilemmas" (p. 1456). This suggestion clearly demonstrates that in the justice literature, procedural fairness is seen as having clear relations with the concept of trust as it is approached and articulated in the social dilemma literature.

In a related manner, Brockner et al. (1997) also showed in a series of organizational field studies that when information is given about the favorability of one's own outcomes, procedural fairness information is translated

by employees in terms of trust in their colleagues, procedural fairness, and trust in the organization (Schweiger, and Sapienza (1999) and De Cremer (2004a) examined procedural fairness and trust in another context, decision-making teams. Their findings showed that the positive relation of each team member positive relation was fully accounted for by trust. This finding strongly indicates that trust within groups, with respect to decision-making and, ultimately, cooperation.

C. CONCLUSION

The above review of studies on trust, procedural fairness and creating a prosocial environment by group authorities is clearly supported by Lind (1977), procedural fairness and trust influence the two processes needed for cooperation. Procedural fairness is likely to be perceived as fair by Lind (2001a), when he argued that responding to social situations might be termed the individual member of the larger social environment. ... people in group mode are perceived as fair to the group and what they can do to improve the group.

Empirical support for this theory is provided by Lind (1977) and Blader, 2000) and support for this theory is provided by Lind (2002). These attitudes and values and such behaviors become important for the interest. In other words, people's trust is linked to their own internal values. Procedural fairness influences trust and that because of this effect promoting cooperation are likely to be observed. Thus, it seems clear that the relation between trust and the justice literature, and as a result of cooperative group behavior. Procedural fairness as a main focus of the social dilemma Based Model of Cooperative Behavior is a special focus of the social dilemma

the willingness of community to obey group rules. Thus, trust rules enacted, and this process, similar vein, De Cremer (2004a) extent to which trustworthiness of procedural fairness; that is, participants in this experiment were not to be biased or unbiased. In procedure to determine how the member would be rated. In the that the group member perceived condition only some of the

when as unbiased, participants' procedure (i.e., participants' relative to inaccurate procedures the leader was perceived as a positive effect between bias and fully explained by participants' is, information about leader's context clearly communicated to affecting the procedures was. led further evidence that trust n. These researchers demonstrate is lacking (i.e., one does not information about the author's their reactions. Van den Bos heuristic theory that trust acts tion. Furthermore, Van den arch on the relation between hat, in doing so, researchers context of social dilemmas. to other operationalizations try to integrate the various ed, such as . . . social dilemmas demonstrates that in the justice ing clear relations with the dlated in the social dilemma

also showed in a series of on is given about the favor- less information is translated

by employees in terms of trust. That is, according to Brockner and colleagues, procedural fairness acts as a source of trust. Finally, Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapienza (1995) examined the relation between procedural fairness and trust in another decision-making situation; that is, strategic decision-making teams. Their results revealed that providing consideration of each team member positively enhanced trust in the leader and that this relation was fully accounted for by procedural fairness perceptions. As such, this finding strongly indicates that the enactment of fair procedures promotes trust within groups, which, consequently, may promote decision making and, ultimately, cooperation.

C. CONCLUSION

The above review of studies shows that the relation between procedural fairness and creating a prosocial goal and belief in the trustworthiness of group authorities is clearly supported. Thus, following Pruitt and Kimmel (1977), procedural fairness acts as an important group tool that is able to influence the two processes necessary to promote cooperation. The fact that procedural fairness is likely to influence cooperation has also been suggested by Lind (2001a), when he argues that "fair treatment leads to a shift from responding to social situations in terms of immediate self-interest, which might be termed the individual mode, to responding to social situations as a member of the larger social entity, which might be termed the group mode. . . . people in group mode are primarily concerned with what is good for the group and what they can do to reach group goals" (p. 67).

Empirical support for this argument flows from studies indicating that experiencing fair procedures encourages commitment to groups (Tyler & Blader, 2000) and support for group authorities (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002). These attitudes and values are found to shape cooperative behaviors, and such behaviors become less strongly linked to considerations of self-interest. In other words, people's motivations become autonomous and are linked to their own internal values. Until now, this chapter has shown that procedural fairness influences the social self of individual group members and that because of this effect on their social self, two essential processes for promoting cooperation are likely to be influenced: trust and prosocial goals. Thus, it seems clear that the social self has taken an important place in the justice literature, and as our findings show, particularly in relation to cooperative group behavior. Before describing our motivational analysis of procedural fairness as a management tool of cooperation in terms of a Self-Based Model of Cooperation (SMC), we first elaborate further on this special focus of the social self in the justice field.

VII. The Self and Justice Research

The arguments outlined in our motivational account about the psychology of cooperation do not only provide important insights into why procedural fairness relates positively to cooperation but, at the same time, help us to understand changes in the justice literature over the last several decades. In this section we focus primarily on these changes to arrive at a better understanding of how justice research has come to assign much weight to the importance of self- and identity-related concerns.

A. THE SHIFT FROM DISTRIBUTIVE TO PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

Early research on justice focused on the argument that people's feelings and behaviors in social interactions flow from their assessments of the fairness of their outcomes when dealing with others (distributive fairness). This hypothesis was widely supported. In particular, a series of experimental studies demonstrated that people were most satisfied when outcomes were distributed fairly (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978).

What was most especially striking and provocative, because it contradicts self-interested predictions, were the adverse reactions by those who received more than they felt they deserved: people did not react well to being "over-benefited." This finding indicates that people will give up resources and accept less when they believe doing so is fair. Other studies show that people will leave a beneficial, but unfair, situation to move to a fairer situation in which they receive fewer resources (see Tyler et al., 1997).

Despite the impressive findings of early studies of distributive justice, the focus of attention among justice researchers has increasingly shifted away from studying only distributive justice to a combined focus on people's distributive and procedural justice concerns. A number of factors have driven this shift. First, research shows that distributive justice judgments are often biased (e.g., Messick & Sentis, 1985; Ross & Sicoly, 1979; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). This limits the utility of distributive justice as a construct, because people will often see themselves as deserving more favorable outcomes than others see them as deserving. As a consequence, people frequently cannot be given what they feel that they deserve, and distributive justice has not proved as useful in resolving group conflicts as was initially expected (Leventhal, 1980).

A greater focus on procedural justice issues was also driven by later studies that looked simultaneously at the effect of distributive and procedural justice judgments and found a predominant influence of procedural justice

on people's reactions to groups (Ruderman, 1987; Tyler & Caine, 1997). In which people had information about procedural justice, found that procedural justice was more influential in shaping people's reactions to group decisions. This research echoes these findings about the importance of distributive justice concerns (Tyler & Smith, 1997). When people are asked to talk about their reactions to group decisions, they are usually found to talk primarily about being treated with a lack of respect with others (Messick, Bloom, Bolger, & Tanzer, 1990).

Justice research has followed this trend. Both experimental and field study evidence shows that the focus on procedural justice comes from their judgments. Tyler et al., 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1997. People no longer consider issues of distributive justice as a particularly strong focus on procedural justice research. This shift toward issues of procedural justice that people focus on those issues that are most relevant to their identity of identity-relevant information. The importance of procedural justice is heavily intertwined with the self.

B. THE FOCUS ON ISSUES OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

A second important shift in justice research is the focus on procedural justice is conceptualized and guided by the influential research of Thibaut and Walker centered their theory of justice as mechanisms for making decisions in courtroom trials to resolve disputes. They focused on formal procedures in legal settings. So Thibaut and Walker's theory of justice is primarily to issues of decision making about allocation of resources. These theories were rooted in an era where distributive justice was the goal of procedural justice. This influenced their theory development and their focus on procedural justice to their desire to

Research

account about the psycholo-
gical insights into why proce-
dural justice, but, at the same time, help us
understand over the last several decades.
Changes to arrive at a better
understanding to assign much weight to the
findings.

PROCEDURAL JUSTICE

argument that people's feelings
stem from their assessments of the
treatment of others (distributive fairness).
In particular, a series of experimental
studies found that people are more
satisfied when outcomes were
fair (Lind, 1978).

Procedural justice, because it contradicts
the expectations by those who received
unfair outcomes, do not react well to being "over-
treated." They will give up resources and
cooperate. Other studies show that people
are more likely to move to a fairer situation in
the future (Tyler et al., 1997).

Shifts of distributive justice, the
focus has increasingly shifted away
from a combined focus on people's
assessments of distributive justice judgments
(Lind, 1985; Ross & Sicoly, 1979;
Tyler, 1985). The utility of distributive justice
is diminished as people see themselves as deserving more
resources. As a consequence, people
do not feel that they deserve, and
are less likely to resolve group conflicts as

This shift was also driven by later
research on the influence of procedural justice

on people's reactions to groups to which they belong (Alexander &
Ruderman, 1987; Tyler & Caine, 1981). These studies, conducted in settings
in which people had information about both distributive and procedural
justice, found that procedural justice judgments typically play the major role
in shaping people's reactions to their personal experiences. More recent
research echoes these findings about the relative effect of procedural and
distributive justice concerns (Tyler & Blader, 2000). In addition, when
people are asked to talk about their personal experiences of injustice they
are usually found to talk primarily about procedural issues, in particular
about being treated with a lack of dignity and politeness when dealing
with others (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985; Mikula, Petri,
& Tanzer, 1990).

Justice research has followed the path outlined by this converging ex-
perimental and field study evidence indicating that the primary effect on
people comes from their judgments about the fairness of procedures (see
Tyler et al., 1997; Tyler & Smith, 1998). This does not mean, of course, that
people no longer consider issues of distributive justice but, rather, that there
is a particularly strong focus on issues of procedural justice in recent re-
search. This shift toward issues of procedure is consistent with the argument
that people focus on those issues that provide them with the greatest amount
of identity-relevant information because, as we have been outlining,
procedural justice is heavily intertwined with issues of status, identity, and
the self.

B. THE FOCUS ON ISSUES OF INTERPERSONAL TREATMENT IN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE FRAMEWORKS

A second important shift in justice research has been a change in how
procedural justice is conceptualized. Early work on procedural justice was
guided by the influential research program of Thibaut and Walker (1975).
Thibaut and Walker centered their procedural justice studies on procedures
as mechanisms for making decisions about the allocation of outcomes in
courtroom trials to resolve disputes about outcome fairness. In particular,
they focused on formal procedures that related to decision-making processes
in legal settings. So Thibaut and Walker linked their discussions of proce-
dural justice primarily to issues of decision making and, in particular, to issues of
decision making about allocation decisions. Because their procedural models
were rooted in an era where distributive justice dominated, their focus on
outcome fairness as the goal of procedures was natural. This context also
influenced their theory development, because they linked people's desire for
fair procedures to their desire to achieve equitable (i.e., fair) outcomes.

They proposed that people valued procedural justice (operationalized in their research as voice or process control in the context of an adversary trial) because it facilitated the decision-makers' ability to make equitable judgments. In other words, procedures were valued insofar as they affected the outcomes that were associated with them. The focus on equity as a fair distributive justice principle is key, because a judge cannot make an equitable decision without having information about the parties' contributions—information they can provide when they have their opportunity for voice. If, in contrast, equality were the principle of outcome fairness that was used, input would not be necessary, because everyone would receive the same amount. This is one reason that other justice theorists recognize the value of equality as a principle of outcome fairness (Messick, 1995).

This exclusive focus on decision making in allocation contexts is no longer true of procedural justice research. Researchers have increasingly moved their attention away from a central focus on the decision-making function of procedures to include more attention to the interpersonal aspects of procedures. Those interpersonal aspects of procedures arise because procedures are settings within which people are involved in a social interaction with one another. This is true irrespective of whether the procedure involves economic bargaining, a market exchange over purchasing something, team interactions among equals, or a third-party procedure with a decision maker, such as mediation or a trial. Of course, in groups, interactions with authorities are central.

In social interactions there is considerable variation in the manner in which people treat one another. They can act politely, respectfully, rudely, with hostility, and so on. These aspects of the interpersonal experience of a procedure—which occur in the context of an interaction whose overt purpose is to make a decision about how to allocate resources or how to resolve a conflict—may also influence those who are involved (which parallels our idea mentioned earlier on in this chapter that social interactions and its associated features like the use of procedures affect the self of those involved, see e.g., Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). In other words, although people may go into an interaction with a task purpose, there are socioemotional aspects to interaction that also influence people.

An example of this shift from an exclusive focus on decision-making to a focus that includes attention to the interpersonal quality of the interaction can be found in the literature on process control. In the early work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), as we have outlined, the opportunity to present evidence was linked to the desire to influence the decisions made by third-party decision makers. The value of the opportunity to speak was directly related to a person's estimate of how much influence they had over the decision maker. As a consequence, in this research, people were not asked

about whether they were treated by the decision maker: Quality of treatment was the focus.

However, later studies of voice and process control showed that "voice" had interpersonal or "value" to any estimated influence over outcomes. Studies showed that people still valued voice to any estimated influence over outcomes if they had voice than if they lacked voice. Studies showed that people still valued voice if they had little or no influence on the decision maker (Lind & Tyler, 1985). This was true even in the context of a decision maker communicating that voice has no influence on the decision maker (Lind & Tyler, 1985; Lind et al., 1990). The value of voice came after the decision maker's decision, beyond its ability to shape decision outcomes (Lind & Tyler, 1985; Bos, 2003; Lind et al., 1990). The value of voice went beyond its ability to shape decision outcomes.

What factors drive the influence of voice on the eventual outcome or decision? If, in our arguments, we might hypothesize that the value of voice is conferred by interpersonal respect (as reported by the finding that people value voice if they feel that the authority is "considerate" and indicates that people were focused on the decision and were treated respectfully by the decision maker independent of whether or not the decision maker resolve those concerns was adopted).

Other research on people's process control and people's focus on the quality of the interaction ("status recognition") and finds that people's interest in the fairness of decision-making. In our findings, the relational model of procedural justice includes issues of interpersonal treatment and procedural justice concerns. The relational model of procedural justice includes the importance of interpersonal treatment and issues of interpersonal treatment on procedural justice judgments (De Cremer & Tyler, 2004; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In fact, issues of interpersonal treatment are the most important factors shaping procedural justice judgments.

These interpersonal aspects of procedural justice studies to be so powerful in their findings that they might potentially be treated as procedural justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Tyler & Lind, 1994). The quality of the treatment that people receive is considered a distinct form of procedural justice.

lural justice (operationalized in the context of an adversary trial) ability to make equitable judgments insofar as they affected the outcome. The focus on equity as a fair procedure for a judge cannot make an equitable judgment about the parties' contributions—only about their opportunity for voice. If the focus on outcome fairness that was used in the procedure, everyone would receive the same outcome. These theorists recognize the value of voice (Messick, 1995).

allocation contexts is no longer the focus. Researchers have increasingly moved away from the decision-making function to focus on the interpersonal aspects of procedures. These procedures arise because people are involved in a social interaction, whether the procedure involves purchasing something, team decision-making, or a group procedure with a decision maker. In groups, interactions with

the variation in the manner in which people are treated (politely, respectfully, rudely, etc.) and the interpersonal experience of a social interaction whose overt purpose is to allocate resources or how to resolve a conflict (which parallels our focus on social interactions and its effects on the self of those involved). These effects, although people may go beyond the socioemotional aspects to

focus on decision-making to a focus on the interpersonal quality of the interaction. In the early work of Tyler and Lind, the opportunity to present one's views on the decisions made by third parties and the opportunity to speak was directly related to the influence they had over the outcome. In their research, people were not asked

about whether they were treated politely and with dignity by the decision maker: Quality of treatment was irrelevant.

However, later studies of voice indicated that having the opportunity for "voice" had interpersonal or "value-expressive" worth that was not linked to any estimated influence over the decisions made (Tyler, 1987). These studies showed that people still rated a procedure to be more fair if they had voice than if they lacked voice, even if they estimated that what they said had little or no influence on the decisions made (Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985). This was true even in the most extreme case that can be created for communicating that voice has no instrumental value—when the opportunity for voice came after the decision was already made (De Cremer & Van den Bos, 2003; Lind et al., 1990). These findings indicate that voice has value beyond its ability to shape decision making processes and outcomes.

What factors drive the influence of voice, even when it clearly cannot affect the eventual outcome or decision? If an authority listens to people's arguments, we might hypothesize that people think that the authority was conferring interpersonal respect on that person. This argument was supported by the finding that people only value such voice opportunities if they feel that the authority is "considering" their arguments (Tyler, 1987). This indicates that people were focused on whether or not they had their concerns and were treated respectfully by being taken seriously by the decision maker, independent of whether or not the course of action they recommended to resolve those concerns was adopted.

Other research on people's procedural justice concerns directly measures people's focus on the quality of their interpersonal treatment ("standing" or "status recognition") and finds that it has an effect that is distinct from their interest in the fairness of decision-making judgments. Drawing on these findings, the relational model of authority (Tyler & Lind, 1992) explicitly includes issues of interpersonal treatment within the framework of procedural justice concerns. The relational model, therefore, directly recognizes the importance of interpersonal treatment. Subsequent studies confirm that issues of interpersonal treatment or standing independently shape procedural justice judgments (De Cremer & Sedikides, 2004; De Cremer & Tyler, 2004; Tyler, 1994; Tyler & Huo, 2002; Van Prooijen, Van den Bos, & Wilke, 2002). In fact, issues of interpersonal treatment are often found to be the most important factors shaping procedural justice assessments.

These interpersonal aspects of procedures have been found by recent studies to be so powerful in their effect that some researchers have argued that they might potentially be treated as a separate type of "interactional" justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; Tyler & Bies, 1990). Irrespective of whether the quality of the treatment that people experience via procedures is actually considered a distinct form of justice (see Blader & Tyler, 2003a,b),

justice researchers have again followed their findings about what most strongly affects the people they study by increasingly turning their research toward exploring interpersonal or interactional aspects of procedures.

Again, this shift in focus is consistent with the arguments outlined here. Because people are focused on issues of the social self and identity, their primary concern is with the self-relevant implications of their experiences with others. Interpersonal respect is central to status messages and is therefore important to people in group settings. This focus can be contrasted to the focus of early research on decision making. That early focus assumed that the key issue that shaped reactions to procedures was the manner in which a decision was made (i.e., the ability of a procedure to produce a fair outcome). Here the focus is on the experience that people have when they are dealing with others (i.e., whether their identity and status are affirmed or undermined by the treatment they receive from others).

C. MOVING FROM ANGER AND NEGATIVE BEHAVIORS TO POSITIVE ATTITUDES/VALUES AND COOPERATIVE BEHAVIORS

Early research on justice was grounded in the literature on relative deprivation, a literature whose origins lie in efforts to understand and explain riots, rebellion, and other forms of collective action (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1970). This focus on negative attitudes and behaviors continued in later efforts to understand distributive influences on pay dissatisfaction, employee theft, sabotage, turnover, and resistance to third-party decisions and rules (Tyler & Smith, 1998). However, recent research on procedural justice increasingly focuses on more prosocial actions, such as how to build trust, encourage responsibility and obligation, generate intrinsic motivation and creativity, and stimulate voluntary cooperative behavior in interactions with others (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Similarly, there has been increasing attention to exploring when justice motivations encourage people to provide resources to the needy and disadvantaged (Montada & Schneider, 1989). Interestingly, this shift is consistent with a shift that has been taking place within psychological research more generally (Snyder & Lopez, 2002). In recent years the positive psychology movement has focused the attention of psychologists on the goal of stimulating desirable behavior and encouraging high self-esteem, happiness, and favorable mental health (Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003).

This broadening of the focus of justice research is consistent with the argument that justice theories provide a basis for understanding the nature of people's relationship to groups. That includes both people's negative

reactions to injustice and the ability to engage in social interaction, cooperation, and participation. Society wants to riot or destroy. It also wants to cooperate. In particular, we are interested in cooperation and productive effort on behalf of groups.

While continually supporting these shifts in focus have the character of justice research since the 1970s, researchers might have trouble recognizing about justice—at least as they originally viewed it—of viewing justice as residing in the treatment of people in a group (Leventhal, 1980; Thoma, 1980). This is recently viewed as being strongly influenced by interpersonal treatment, such as the treatment received in social interactions. It is also focused on promoting cooperation, rather than minimizing conflict.

We argue that these changes—within the field of justice research—can best be understood in terms of the dynamics underlying justice (i.e., the psychological processes that lead people to act in certain ways when they are dealing with others). Research on showing that justice matters; on the effects of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; and on the information indicating that information about social situations (Tyler et al., 1996) has led to a deeper understanding of justice. In light of these shifts in research focus we have called for attention to the psychology underlying justice.

Several models have been proposed to describe the psychology underlying procedural justice. We focus on the relational implications model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the group engagement model, and the group engagement model. These models represent a programmatic approach to the psychology of justice.

The models differ first in their focus on the psychology underlying judgment. The relational implications model explores the factors shaping judgments within groups, organizations, and communities. It is concerned with psychological processes (i.e., with cooperation). The mo-

their findings about what most increasingly turning their research on the motivational aspects of procedures.

with the arguments outlined here, the social self and identity, their implications of their experiences related to status messages and is therefore. This focus can be contrasted to the early focus on making. That early focus assumed that the manner in which people view a procedure to produce a fair outcome that people have when they are denied status and identity and status are affirmed or denied (from others).

NEGATIVE PROCEDURAL JUSTICES/VALUES AND

in the literature on relative deprivation, efforts to understand and explain the negative action (Crosby, 1976; Gurr, 1974) and behaviors continued in later research on pay dissatisfaction, employee reactions to third-party decisions and the recent research on procedural justice. Social actions, such as how to build trust, generate intrinsic motivation and cooperative behavior in interactions. Similarly, there has been increasing research on how to provide procedural justice (Montada & Schneider, 1989). A shift that has been taking place in the literature (Snyder & Lopez, 2002). In the recent past has focused the attention of researchers on desirable behavior and encouraging positive mental health (Cameron, Dutton,

research is consistent with the emphasis for understanding the nature of justice includes both people's negative

reactions to injustice and the ability of experiencing justice to motivate their engagement and cooperation. Society, after all, does not just want people not to riot or destroy. It also wants them to be satisfied and cooperative. In particular, we are interested in cooperation of two forms—rule following and productive effort on behalf of groups (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b).

While continually supporting the basic importance of people's justice judgments, these shifts in focus have also resulted in a dramatic change in the character of justice research since the 1960s. In fact, early justice researchers might have trouble recognizing many recent justice studies as being about justice—at least as they originally understood that construct. Instead of viewing justice as residing in the rules used in the distribution of resources in a group (Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 1975), justice is more recently viewed as being strongly linked to issues related to the quality of interpersonal treatment, such as treating people with politeness and dignity in social interactions. It is also focused on stimulating commitment and cooperation, rather than minimizing anger and destructive behaviors.

We argue that these changes—which were guided by the empirical results of justice research—can best be understood by considering the psychological dynamics underlying justice (i.e., we need to understand why people care about justice). These changes can be explained by considering the psychological processes that lead people to react to issues of justice or injustice when they are dealing with others. Much early justice research was focused on showing that justice matters; that is, in demonstrating that people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are shaped by their justice judgments, indicating that information about justice is central to people's evaluations of social situations (Tyler et al., 1997; Van den Bos & Lind, 2002). However, to develop a deeper understanding of why these effects emerge—and why the shifts in research focus we have outlined have occurred—we need to pay attention to the psychology underlying justice.

Several models have been proposed to understand the psychology underlying procedural justice. We focus here on a set of models that share an emphasis on the relational implications of justice evaluations—the group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992), and the group engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b). These models represent a programmatic research program designed to understand the psychology of justice.

The models differ first in their focus. The group-value model focuses on the psychology underlying judgments of procedural justice. The relational model explores the factors shaping reactions to authorities and rules within groups, organizations, and societies. The group engagement model is concerned with psychological and behavioral engagement in groups (i.e., with cooperation). The models also differ in their predictions. The

group-value model predicts that noninstrumental factors will influence procedural justice judgments, a prediction confirmed both by findings of noninstrumental voice effects (Lind et al., 1990; Tyler, 1987), and by demonstrations that people care more about issues of procedural justice when dealing with members of their own groups (Tyler, 1999).

The relational model predicts that procedural justice will influence reactions to authorities, as has been subsequently found by studies of legal, political, managerial, familial, and educational authorities (Tyler & Smith, 1998). It further predicts that relational concerns—in particular neutrality, trustworthiness, and status recognition—will influence procedural justice judgments, an argument supported by a number of studies (Tyler, 1989, 1994; Tyler et al., 1996).

The group engagement model identifies the antecedents of attitudes, values, and cooperative behavior in groups, positing a general model of the relationship between people and groups (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b). The group engagement model argues that identity judgments will be the primary factors shaping attitudes, values, and cooperative behaviors in groups. It further suggests that two factors shape identity judgments: evaluations of resources and assessments of procedural justice. This model is shown in Fig. 3.

Each of these group engagement predictions has received empirical support (Tyler & Blader, 2000). Those members of work groups who identify more strongly with their groups are more psychologically and behaviorally engaged in those groups. They have more favorable attitudes and more supportive values and are more behaviorally engaged in voluntary cooperation—including both voluntary deference to rules and engagement in extra-role behaviors. Further, neither resource-based connections to groups nor procedural justice judgments directly shape engagement when identification




Fig. 3. The group engagement model.

is controlled for. Identification, in connections and by the procedural

The support found for the group it is consistent with the core argument shaping cooperation is the self. The resources on cooperation occurs through the connection between the individual. Two aspects of the self are important: status in relationship to the group and the status of the group (pride). People in a status group. Second, their feeling. People are more strongly invested

D. SUMMARY

To sum up, justice research has currently seems to have arrived at a focus and emphasis on understanding procedures on people's thinking, feeling interactions. One important consequence of procedural fairness has major implications for cooperation. As we have shown, the effect on cooperation seems to be self—constituting a variety of self-reputation, identity, and uncertainty. To describe the social psychological matters, the fairness of procedures matters.

VIII. Summary

Within groups, organizations, and behaviors that do not always collective, and as such constituting of this conflict in motives is that people's welfare, the obligation to follow rules, classified as acts of cooperation motives, and self-definitions. In contrast, as conflicting with people's values. Social psychologists the importance

umental factors will influence confirmed both by findings of (1990; Tyler, 1987), and by demonstrations of procedural justice when (Tyler, 1999).

ocedural justice will influence frequently found by studies of educational authorities (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003b). The identification—will influence procedural justice by a number of studies (Tyler, 1999).

he antecedents of attitudes, values, and self-identifying a general model of the relationship between procedural justice and cooperative behaviors in groups. It is shown that procedural justice evaluations influence cooperative behaviors in groups. This model is shown in Figure 1.

ons has received empirical support from studies of work groups who identify themselves as psychologically and behaviorally committed. They show more favorable attitudes and more engaged in voluntary cooperation. The model shows that procedural justice influences identification and engagement in extraroles and engagement in extra-connections to groups not only when identification

is controlled for. Identification, in turn, is influenced both by resource-based connections and by the procedural justice of the group.

The support found for the group engagement model is important because it is consistent with the core argument we are making here. The key factor shaping cooperation is the self. The impact of both procedural justice and of resources on cooperation occurs because those organizational factors shape the connection between the individual and the group—they shape the self. Two aspects of the self are important. First, people's feelings about the status in relationship to the group. One such feeling is their feeling about the status of the group (pride). People are more strongly invested in a high status group. Second, their feelings about their status in the group (respect). People are more strongly invested in a group in which they have high status.

D. SUMMARY

To sum up, justice research has been around quite some time now and currently seems to have arrived at a new point in its existence that puts a focus and emphasis on understanding the psychology of the effect of procedures on people's thinking, feeling, and behavior within the context of social interactions. One important consequence of this focus is the observation that procedural fairness has major implications for positive group behavior like cooperation. As we have shown, the psychological underpinnings of this effect on cooperation seems to reside within the concept of people's social self—constituting a variety of self-related concerns regarding belongingness, reputation, identity, and uncertainty. In the following section, we will describe the social psychological model that we put forward in explaining why the fairness of procedures matters in promoting cooperation.

VIII. Summary and Conclusions

Within groups, organizations, and societies, people have their own goals and behaviors that do not always align well with the aims of the higher collective, and as such constituting a mixed-motive situation. A consequence of this conflict in motives is that people do not always consider the collective welfare, the obligation to follow rules, acts of voluntarism—which can all be classified as acts of cooperation—to be important to their own values, motives, and self-definitions. In other words, cooperation is often thought of as conflicting with people's views of their own self-interest. Thus, for social psychologists the important question becomes understanding how

Attitudes,
values, and
voluntary
cooperative
behavior

ent model.

cooperation with others can be viewed by people as self-relevant and self-motivating and creating conditions under which people will more easily internalize the value and importance of cooperative acts.

Earlier research mainly focused on the effects of punishment and rewards to increase the attractiveness of cooperation. For example, studies have shown that cooperation increases if the payoff for the cooperative choice becomes more attractive and the payoff for the defecting choice less attractive (see Van Lange, Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992). Despite the fact that such monitoring and sanctioning systems may work to some extent, the potential side-effects are that they undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 2000). As a consequence, once such instrumental (or self-interest based) incentives are removed, the level of cooperation is likely to drop again and will fall to even lower levels if intrinsic motivation has been undermined (Mulder, van Dijk, De Cremer, & Wilke, 2003).

Thus, sanctioning or monitoring systems targeted at individuals' self-interest do not motivate people to value cooperation for intrinsic reasons. As a result, their use commits a group to a never-ending need to have available the resources to reward desirable behavior and to create and maintain a credible sanctioning system that will discourage rule breaking through the provision of sanctions. These mechanisms are costly and inefficient and constitute a constant drag on the ability of groups to deploy their resources in ways that are most adaptive for the group. Further, groups are least likely to have the ability to provide incentives or deploy sanctions during times of crisis or change, when cooperation is most needed for the group to survive and flourish. During a crisis, for example, groups need for all members to focus on group needs and group survival. Yet during wars, economic downturns, or natural disasters, it is least possible to provide immediate incentives for cooperation. If everyone pursues their own immediate self-interest in such times the viability of the group is threatened.

Even when societies are not threatened by immediate events, the motivation of cooperation by incentives and sanctions is a costly and inefficient mechanism. Incentives are problematic because of their inefficiency. To provide incentives to cooperate it is necessary to specify desired behavior in advance, so that people will know what to do and authorities will know what to reward. However, many of the behaviors that are desirable in groups require people to use their discretion—acting as is appropriate to a unique situation. In work settings we value employees who engage in voluntary behaviors that solve immediate problems; in communities we value people who step forward to act in resolving the immediate issues within the community. These behaviors are hard to specify and incentivize in advance. Because it is hard to know what to tell people they will be rewarded for doing in advance, incentive systems are generally not a good way to motivate

behavior. They work when the behavior is self-relevant (i.e., with clearly specified and repeatable lines).

Sanctions are inefficient because they require authorities to constantly maintain the credibility of the system. The greater the severity of the punishment, the more likely people are to comply (Webster, 2003; Tyler, 2003). Hence, the use of sanctions is a waste of resources. In the modern world people are surrounded by parks, at entrances to buildings, and in public places. The ubiquitous presence of police officers and security cameras in communities and organizations. Such systems are costly and produce undesirable behavior (Tyler, 2003).

Finally, as we have noted, the use of incentives and sanctions has a long-term effect of undermining intrinsic motivation. People who work for incentives, their motivation to work out of enjoyment and to comply out of fear of punishment. The motivation to obey are undermined. Hence, the use of incentives do not take advantage of the motivation to work. They actually undermine these other motivations. Over time the use of incentives and sanctions, however costly or unwieldy they may be, are not used in any other way, because other motivations are diminished or extinguished.

To be able to change the approach to cooperation it is necessary to increase our understanding of the factors that directly affect people's needs and values. This involves the concept of the social self (Tyler, 2003). If people are positively influenced, then people will cooperate in a group. One relevant group means that the social self is the fairness of procedural justice and representative authorities.

In the prior sections, the studies have shown that fair procedures affect people's social reputation, need for belonging, and self-esteem. Finally, self-construals (i.e., the self-concept) are positively influenced. In other words, fair treatment makes a person view themselves as social beings, therefore increasing their social self. Further, if people evaluate their relatedness with others as positive

by people as self-relevant and self-rewarding which people will more easily engage in cooperative acts.

The effects of punishment and rewards on cooperation. For example, studies have shown that the payoff for the cooperative choice is more attractive than the payoff for the defecting choice less attractive (Doob & Webster, 1992). Despite the fact that punishment systems may work to some extent, they do not undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1992). Such instrumental (or self-interest) systems of cooperation is likely to drop significantly if intrinsic motivation has been undermined (Doob & Webster, 2003).

Systems targeted at individuals' self-interest for cooperation for intrinsic reasons. This leads to a never-ending need to have external rewards for the behavior and to create and maintain systems that discourage rule breaking through punishment. Punishments are costly and inefficient and require groups to deploy their resources in a way that is not optimal. Further, groups are least likely to use punishment to deploy sanctions during times of crisis when most needed for the group to survive. In such situations, groups need for all members to be motivated. Yet during wars, economic downturns, or other crises, it is difficult to provide immediate incentives that appeal to one's own immediate self-interest in such situations.

Systems based on immediate events, the motivation for cooperation is a costly and inefficient system because of their inefficiency. To ensure that people will specify desired behavior and that authorities will know what to do and authorities will know what behaviors that are desirable in groups. This is not always as appropriate to a unique situation as is appropriate to a unique situation. For example, employees who engage in voluntary cooperation in communities we value people who are motivated by immediate issues within the community. To specify and incentivize in advance. This is generally not a good way to motivate

behavior. They work when the behavior desired can be specified in advance (i.e., with clearly specified and repetitive jobs such as work on assembly lines).

Sanctions are inefficient because their use requires the authorities to constantly maintain the credible threat of sanctioning. Research suggests that it is the likelihood of punishment, rather than the anticipation of severity in punishment, that most strongly shapes behavior (Doob & Webster, 2003; Tyler, 2003). Hence, sanctioning requires widespread surveillance. In the modern world people are familiar with surveillance cameras in parks, at entrances to buildings, and even in bathrooms, just as there is a ubiquitous presence of police officers and private security personnel in many communities and organizations. Such efforts are costly for groups, organizations, and societies and produce only minimal decreases in the level of undesirable behavior (Tyler, 2003).

Finally, as we have noted, the use of incentives and sanctions has the long-term effect of undermining internal motivations for cooperation. When people work for incentives, their intrinsic motivation (i.e., the degree to which they work out of enjoyment of work) is undermined. When people comply out of fear of punishment, their feelings of responsibility and obligation to obey are undermined. Hence, it is not only that these approaches do not take advantage of the motivating power of internal motivations but they actually undermine these other sources of motivation for cooperation. Over time the use of incentives and sanctions can create a situation in which, however costly or unwieldy they may be, it is not possible to manage groups in any other way, because other motivations for cooperation have been diminished or extinguished.

To be able to change the approach taken to motivating cooperation it is necessary to increase our understanding of particular group means that directly affect people's needs and values. We argue that these are linked to the concept of the social self (Tyler & Smith, 1999). If the social self is positively influenced, then people will be motivated to cooperate for the group. One relevant group means that we have discussed for shaping the social self is the fairness of procedures that are enacted by the group and its representative authorities.

In the prior sections, the studies discussed have provided clear evidence that fair procedures affect people's social self by influencing concerns of social reputation, need for belongingness, feelings of self-uncertainty, and finally, self-construals (i.e., the self as being interdependent or not). In other words, fair treatment makes a positive contribution to people's sense of themselves as social beings, thereby installing a salient and positive social self. Further, if people evaluate their relationships, interdependence, and relatedness with others as positive and rewarding, those others are likely to




Fig. 4. A presentation of a "self-based model of cooperation."

be perceived as positive and more attractive (Brewer, 1979). Consequently, cooperative behavior toward others will be facilitated.

Our description of social dilemma research showed indeed that if a positive attitude and attachment toward the group and its members exists, cooperation rates increase significantly. The reason for this effect is that a salient social self motivates group members to merge the personal self into the group, consequently transforming personal goals into collective goals (De Cremer & Van Vugt, 1999; De Cremer et al., in press), and to increase trust in the group (and its members; Brewer, 1979; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 2002). In addition, these transformation processes may also be associated with an increase of trustworthiness and feelings of morality (e.g., Kramer & Goldman, 1995; Rusbult & van Lange, 1996).

To conclude, fairness of procedures can be seen as a useful group tool to manage the social self and, consequently, facilitating the psychological processes that are believed to underlie the emergence of cooperation, that is, trust and goal-transformation (see De Cremer & Stouten, 2003; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). Therefore, in this chapter, we refer to the psychology of this relation between procedural fairness and cooperation as a "Self-Based Model of Cooperation (SMC)" (see Fig. 4).

A. THIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

Our approach, as presented in this chapter, contributes in a variety of ways to the existing social psychology literature on justice and cooperation.

First of all, as we mentioned earlier, many of the psychological models addressing justice have a strong cognitive flavor (Lind, 2001a). Although these models have been very effective in unraveling justice problems and stimulating exciting experimental and field studies, we suggest that a cognitive framework is too limited and that motivational accounts of justice issues also need to be examined. After all, both cognition and motivation act


in tandem when it comes down to life (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000) and understanding of the psychology on both the dimensions of cognition and motivation.

Moreover, our proposition that a salient social self motivates people to engage in cooperation is in line with other research in the field of social psychology. This research recognizes that if people are socially motivated to pursue the social perspective argues that motivation to the individual, thereby suggesting that procedural fairness influencing group membership and social self can be assumed to be related to social rewards (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000).

In a similar vein, our studies have shown that procedural fairness (by means of procedural fairness) can consequently eliciting voluntary cooperation (in press). Further, research on the motivational tradition by its emphasis on self-accuracy, and self-verification at the individual and collective level (Tyler & Smith, 2003).

Finally, as mentioned earlier, procedural justice also emphasizes the importance of the concept of justice to issues like trust and cooperation. In this line, researchers on social interaction and less cognition is required to understand the psychology of social interactions (see Kelley, 2003). As a matter of fact, Zajonc and Levenson (1995) argue that "need to look less at the individual and more at the group together, the present motivational tradition in addition to the existing justice literature, the present motivational tradition to take seems then to be to integrate the cognitive and motivational dynamic social model of fairness and justice." (Tyler & Smith, 2003).

Second, by focusing on the psychology of cooperation, this chapter presents a bridge between two domains of scientific research; that is, procedural justice and cooperation. In a review, Tyler and Dawes (1993) argued that the study of procedural fairness and social justice are related as they both have a common focus on instrumental concerns. That is, in both



model of cooperation."

Brewer, 1979). Consequently, elicited.

showed indeed that if a group and its members exists, a reason for this effect is that a group merge the personal self into collective goals into collective goals (e.g., in press), and to increase (e.g., 1979; De Cremer & Van Dijk, 1999). Processes may also be associated with issues of morality (e.g., Kramer &

seen as a useful group tool to facilitate the psychological emergence of cooperation, that is, (e.g., De Cremer & Stouten, 2003; Pruitt & Ferrel, 1997). We refer to the psychology of this cooperation as a "Self-Based

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contributes in a variety of ways to the understanding of justice and cooperation. The integration of the psychological models of justice and cooperation (Lind, 2001a). Although the study of justice problems and dilemmas, we suggest that a cognitive account of justice issues that integrates cognitive and motivation act

in tandem when it comes down to predicting behavior and people's affective life (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2001), and as such it is clear that a complete understanding of the psychology of procedural justice involves an emphasis on both the dimensions of cognition and motivation.

Moreover, our proposition that the fairness of procedures intrinsically motivates people to engage in cooperative behavior by its influence on the social self integrates well with other motivational analyses as we know them in the field of social psychology. For example, self-determination theory recognizes that if people assimilate identities into the self they are intrinsically motivated to pursue the associated goals (Ryan & Deci, 2003). This perspective argues that motivation flowing from self-conception is intrinsic to the individual, thereby suggesting that the effectiveness of procedural fairness influencing group members' motivation and behavior through their social self can be assumed to be less contingent on monitoring and external rewards (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000).

In a similar vein, our studies have shown that making the social self salient (by means of procedural fairness) motivates people to adopt collective goals, consequently eliciting voluntary cooperation (e.g., De Cremer et al., in press). Further, research on the social self has been well-grounded in the motivational tradition by its explicit foci on processes like self-enhancement, self-accuracy, and self-verification (Sedikides & Strube, 1997), both on the individual and collective level (Tesser, Stapel, & Wood, 2002).

Finally, as mentioned earlier, our present conception of procedural fairness also emphasizes the importance of social interaction by linking the concept of justice to issues like treatment and social behavior. Along related lines, researchers on social interaction recently argued that more motivation and less cognition is required to examine the determinants and consequences of social interactions (see Kelley, Holmes, Kerr, Reis, Rusbult, & van Lange, 2003). As a matter of fact, Zajonc (1998) even concluded that social psychologists "need to look less at the mind and more at interactions." Taken together, the present motivational account can thus be seen as an important addition to the existing justice literature. In our opinion the next logical step to take seems then to be to integrate both motivation and cognition into one dynamic social model of fairness.

Second, by focusing on the relation between procedural fairness and cooperation, this chapter presents a theoretical and conceptual integration between two domains of scientific research that have existed independent from one another; that is, procedural fairness and social dilemmas. In their review, Tyler and Dawes (1993) already made the suggestion that the fields of procedural fairness and social dilemmas should be urged to communicate as they both have a common focus on the role of instrumental and non-instrumental concerns. That is, in both literatures it is assumed and shown that

not only economic but also relational concerns drive people's preferences for fair procedures and cooperative behavior. Also, Lind (2001a) suggested that the noninstrumental or relational component of procedures will be particularly important when people are concerned about potential problems with social interdependence; a situation that he referred to as the fundamental social dilemma (see also De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2003).

This theoretical integration thus is important because it backs up recent suggestions that "fair treatment leads to a shift from responding to social situations in terms of immediate self-interest, which might be termed the individual mode, to responding to social situations as a member of the larger social entity, which might be termed the group mode. . . . people in group mode are primarily concerned with what is good for the group and what they can do to reach group goals" (Lind, 2001a, p. 67).

Further, it provides a simple and elegant answer to recent questions highlighted in the justice literature regarding the predictive role of procedural fairness with respect to behavioral responses. That is, recently, Greenberg (2001, p. 254) argued that the justice literature is "hard-pressed to tell exactly what form a response might take." This model provides an answer to this concern by showing that fair procedures motivate group members to behaviorally respond in a cooperative manner and by identifying the psychological processes underlying this response to justice.

Finally, this model can also be considered as parsimonious because it reduces complexity surrounding the relation between procedural fairness and positive behaviors like cooperation by highlighting the role of similar psychological processes across different research traditions examining cooperation (a task much needed in the social justice field; see Colquitt & Greenberg, 2001, for a comment).

B. IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

1. *Social Self, Procedures, and Emotions*

Our motivational approach to understanding the relation between procedural fairness and cooperation can also be seen as having implications for the role that emotions may play in this process. In fact, Tesser, Wood, and Stapel (2002, p. 6) recently argued that "emotion is an integral facet of motivation." How could emotions play a role in our line of thinking? In this chapter we started from the assumption that the self is socially constructed by, among other things, the fairness of procedures. Relevant to this point of view is Haidt's (2001, p. 197) recent argument—derived from his social intuitionist model in the justice area—in which he stresses "the importance of social

interaction as the best way to try to understand that our motivational approach to understanding the relation between procedures on cooperation by focusing on the role of emotions may best be served by also including the role of the psychological processes accompanying this regulation.

Including an emotional component is particularly important, as it responds to recent suggestions that overlooked the importance of emotions in justice procedures (Bies & Triandis, 1999). Indeed, Weiss et al. (1999) in their empirical research assessing emotions in justice procedures is a serious omission" (p. 786). It is important that "to understand justice in organizations, we need to understand that arouse the sense of injustice" (p. 786). Thus, clearly more justice research is needed on these questions (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

Responding to this call, we support the importance of emotions in motivation. More precisely, we support the role of emotions in the context of social interaction. Emotions, in turn, may significantly affect behavior. Research on emotions has suggested that emotions connected to our relationships and behaviors. In fact, Barrett (1995) reported that pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment are elicited within the context of social interaction. In the present model, it may be easy to see how embarrassment can be linked to social interaction (cf. Miller, 1995).

Thus, it seems clear that a wide range of emotions of the self (Lewis, 1992, 1995), such as pride (e.g., shame; Leith & Baumeister, 1998) are connected with processes like lower self-esteem and self-evaluative emotions. These emotions, like, for example, shame, may have deflected in a cooperative manner.

Finally, a focus on emotions in justice procedures motivational models in social interaction focus theory (Higgins, 1998) and the role of gains and safety. As a consequence, justice is aimed at pursuing hopes and dreams and aimed at pursuing duties and responsibilities.

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interaction as the best way to trigger new appraisals." From this, it follows that our motivational approach of understanding the positive effect of procedures on cooperation by focusing on the regulating role of the social self may best be served by also including a focus on the intuitive or emotional processes accompanying this regulating process.

Including an emotional component in procedural fairness models is also important, as it responds to recent claims that justice research has largely overlooked the importance of emotions in understanding consequences of justice procedures (Bies & Tripp, 2002; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999). Indeed, Weiss et al. (1999) even argue that "the relative lack of empirical research assessing emotional reactions to conditions of unfairness is a serious omission" (p. 786). In a similar vein, Bies and Tripp (2002) state that "to understand justice in organizations, one must understand the events that arouse the sense of injustice—the emotions of injustice" (pp. 204–205). Thus, clearly more justice research is required that includes affective reactions (Tyler & Smith, 1998).

Responding to this call, we therefore find it important to point out the importance of emotions in motivational accounts of procedural fairness. More precisely, we support the notion that the social self—as it is situated in the context of social interaction—has a strong affective component that, in turn, may significantly affect self-regulation and behavior. For example, research on emotions has suggested that emotions indeed are "intimately connected to our relationships with others" (Tangney, 1999, p. 543). As a matter of fact, Barrett (1995) regularly refers to self-conscious emotions like pride, shame, guilt, and embarrassment as "social emotions" because they are elicited within the context of social interactions. Relating this to our present model, it may be easy to see that emotions such as, for example, embarrassment can be linked to our social self concern of social reputation (cf. Miller, 1995).

Thus, it seems clear that a wide range of emotions exist involving the concept of the self (Lewis, 1992, 1995), both emotions reflecting the global self-concept (e.g., shame; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995)—which are associated with processes like lower self-esteem and enhanced feelings of social exclusion—and self-evaluative emotions (e.g., guilt) that are related to more specific behaviors, like, for example, cooperating and even overcompensating after having defected in a cooperative environment and feeling guilty about it.

Finally, a focus on emotions is something that is incorporated by other motivational models in social psychology as well. For example, regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1998) assumes that people have the need to strive for gains and safety. As a consequence, people may have a promotion focus aimed at pursuing hopes and aspirations (ideal self) or a prevention focus aimed at pursuing duties and obligations (ought self). Studies (e.g., Higgins,

Shah, & Friedman, 1997) have shown that a promotion focus is associated with dejection-related emotions (cheerfulness) and a prevention focus with agitation-related emotions (quiescence). Thus, "regulatory focus offers a motivational distinction with specific evaluative, emotional, and behavioral consequences" (Shah, Brazy, & Higgins, 2004), and therefore, we argue that a motivational integration of the concepts of procedures, social self, and cooperation inevitably may also benefit by linking it to an emotional component. As such, future justice research is, more than ever, urged to include such affective dimensions.

2. *Social Self, Procedures, and Leadership*

Our analysis also has the potential to contribute significantly to the leadership literature. Indeed, in many fairness studies (including our own) procedures are enacted by an authority. However, it is striking that the justice literature has hardly devoted any attention to how insights of leadership may help unraveling further the psychology of procedural fairness. In fact, within social sciences both literatures hardly refer to one another, whereas it is clear that leaders are expected to act fairly and that enactment of procedures often includes a form of leadership style (De Cremer & Alberts, 2004; De Cremer et al., in press). This lack of integration is, for example, illustrated by statements such as that "social justice research typically has not been thought of as being research about social influence" (Tyler, 2001, p. 69) and that "the role that justice plays . . . in paradigms of leadership . . . has only recently begun to receive research attention" (Pillai, Scandura, and Williams, 1999, p. 763). Because leaders are expected to motivate groups and their members to go beyond their own self-interest (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978), procedural fairness could be an important tool to manage this aim.

In light of this, it is noteworthy that the assumption of our SMC model that procedures affect people's social self indeed parallels very recent thinking in the leadership literature that effective leadership depends strongly on how leaders regulate and shape followers' self (Tyler, 2004a,b; Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, De Cremer, & Hogg, in press). For example, recent articles in *Advances of Experimental Social Psychology* (Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003) and *Research in Organizational Behavior* (Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003) present evidence that leaders often take the positions of entrepreneurs of self and identity (cf. Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).

Moreover, in an attempt to combine both the leadership and procedural fairness literatures, De Cremer (2004b) recently introduced Leader Fairness Theory (LFT). According to LFT, the important question in the procedural

fairness literature is to ask when procedural fairness has influence. One obvious way to examine this is to look at the conditions involved when enacting the procedural fairness literature (see Tyler, 2004a,b).

LFT makes the argument that procedural fairness affects followers' social self and, consequently, social self-esteem. Social self-esteem is more strongly affected by procedural fairness is believed more strongly. For example, De Cremer et al. (2004) found that leaders install a sense of self-efficacy of this social self-related dimension. This leads to stronger emotional reactions (e.g., disappointment) by procedural fairness (i.e., a voice in the process). In another study by De Cremer et al. (in press), it was found that at rewarding group members for a job well done (procedural fairness), competence and autonomy—all believed to be important consequences, social self-esteem was more strongly affected and exerted stronger influence (see De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, van Dijke, & Bos, 2004). Van Knippenberg, & Blaauw, 2001) found that procedural fairness effects are stronger among individuals with a high social self-esteem.

All of this indicates that our findings on procedural fairness has implications for one's social self. Social self-esteem also have implications for leadership. Social self-esteem can thus be seen as important organizational outcome. Social self-esteem in such a way that procedural fairness affects group and organizational outcomes.

This approach leads to a strategy to encourage voluntary cooperation. Tyler (2004a,b). It is based on the work on behalf of leaders is directly affected by procedural fairness by which those leaders exercise their influence in ways that followers experience as being fair. This leads to motivated to accept the leader's direction in ways that go beyond those motivated by self-interest. Leaders can lead by the manner in which they

3. *Procedural Justice, Self, and R*

The other aspect of cooperation is to gain voluntary cooperation with the leader. This leads to the ability of individuals to accept

promotion focus is associated with a prevention focus with a "regulatory focus offers a cognitive, emotional, and behavioral focus and therefore, we argue that the procedures, social self, and the link to an emotional component is more than ever, urged to include

contribute significantly to the literature (including our own). However, it is striking that the link to how insights of leadership of procedural fairness. In fact, they refer to one another, but not fairly and that enactment of leadership style (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004) is, for example, that "social justice research and research about social influence" are the plays . . . in paradigms of social psychology research attention" (Pillai, 2004). These leaders are expected to transcend their own self-interest and could be an important tool to

implementation of our SMC model indeed parallels very recent research on leadership depends strongly on the social self (Tyler, 2004a,b; Van Knippenberg, 2004; Hogg, in press). For example, *Social Psychology* (Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2004) and *Organizational Behavior* (Van Knippenberg, 2004) that leaders often take the role of a leader (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). The link between leadership and procedural justice introduced Leader Fairness question in the procedural

fairness literature is to ask when procedures actually exert their strongest influence. One obvious way to examine this is to look at the behavior that is involved when enacting the procedures; that is, to identify the influence of leader behavior (see Tyler, 2004a,b).

LFT makes the argument that different leadership styles influence followers' social self and, consequently, because of the activation of people's social self, procedural fairness is believed to influence followers' reactions more strongly. For example, De Cremer (2004c) showed that self-confident leaders install a sense of self-efficacy and autonomy, and that by activation of this social self-related dimension (cf. Deci & Ryan, 2000), participants' emotional reactions (e.g., disappointment) were more strongly influenced by procedural fairness (i.e., a voice manipulation) (Folger, 1977). Further, another study by De Cremer et al. (in press) also showed that a leader aimed at rewarding group members for a job well done installed a sense of competence and autonomy—all believed to enhance one's social self-esteem. As a consequence, social self-esteem was promoted and procedural fairness exerted stronger influence (see De Cremer, 2003a; De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, van Dijke, & Bos, 2004; Vermunt, Van Knippenberg, Van Knippenberg, & Blaauw, 2001, for evidence that procedural fairness effects are stronger among individuals with high social self-esteem).

All of this indicates that our findings demonstrating that procedural fairness has implications for one's social self and as such promotes cooperation also have implications for leadership and management. Leaders can thus be seen as important organizational and group tools that can affect social self in such a way that procedures will reveal stronger effects on valued group and organizational outcomes like cooperation.

This approach leads to a strategy of leadership explicitly designed to encourage voluntary cooperation. This strategy is process-based leadership (Tyler, 2004a,b). It is based on the argument that people's willingness to work on behalf of leaders is directly connected to their assessments of the fairness by which those leaders exercise their authority. If leaders lead in ways that followers experience as being fair, those followers become motivated to accept the leader's directions and to work on behalf of the group in ways that go beyond those motivated by their own self-interest. Hence, leaders can lead by the manner in which they exercise their authority.

3. *Procedural Justice, Self, and Regulation*

The other aspect of cooperation involves the ability of authorities to gain voluntary cooperation with rules and decisions that restrict and regulate the ability of individuals to act in self-interested ways. Whether the

issue is consuming resources (Tyler & DeGoey, 1995) or ignoring rules and the directives of authorities (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002), being an effective authority requires the ability to gain "buy in" even when decisions are not in the person's immediate self-interest. As we have outlined, procedural justice is central to gaining voluntary cooperation, and that centrality is mediated by legitimacy. When leaders are viewed as acting fairly, people's self-conception involves feelings of obligation and responsibility to defer to those authorities because they are legitimate and entitled to be obeyed (see Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Consistent with this identity-based view of legitimacy, studies indicate that people are more influenced by their social values when identity issues are more salient (Skitka, 2003; Tyler, 1997).

The importance of this perspective lies in the possibility of engaging people's sense of self in the task of regulation. Rather than regulating by the threat or application of sanctions, people can be motivated to self-regulate if their personal values and identity are linked psychologically to the needs and concerns of the group. When this happens, people take personal responsibility for supporting the rules of the group, and it is not necessary to threaten punishment for noncompliance. Because the self is activated procedurally, this leads to a strategy of regulation similar to the model of leadership we have already outlined. That strategy is process-based regulation.

Tyler and Huo (2002) explore the possibility of process-based regulation in a sample of people with recent personal experiences with the police and the courts. Their findings suggest that reactions to authorities are strongly based on the procedures by which they exercise their authority. Further, as hypothesized by an identity-based model, people were more strongly influenced by procedural judgments when they were more highly identified with the group that the authorities represent—in this case American society. When people are more identified with American society their identity is more strongly intertwined with status in that society, and their treatment is more relevant to their identity. In this situation, as we would predict, people are more strongly influenced by the nature of their treatment by authorities. Conversely, those whose identities are less strongly intertwined with the group focus more heavily on the favorability or fairness of their outcome when deciding whether or not to defer to legal authorities.

C. CONCLUSION

Social psychology shares with other social and policy sciences an interest in understanding how to motivate cooperative behavior on the part of the

people within groups, organizations, and societies. This literature in social psychology in the literature is focused on how to obtain cooperation in the social sciences are united by an interest to understand how to structure social norms to promote cooperative behavior among individuals. In social psychology, one of the most useful literatures, because cooperation has been shown to be influenced by justice judgments, and procedural justice judgments in organizations.

The value of securing cooperation in organizations and societies because when interacting with others they are in a mixed-motive situation where their self-interest is consistent with the interests of others to cooperate, and that, to some extent, people are motivated to act in ways that also serve the interests of others, leading to the motivation to cooperate. People are motivated both to act in ways that also serve their own self-interest and to act in ways that serve the interests of others. People must balance between those interests when determining their cooperative behavior.

Social psychologists have examined the possibility of procedural conflict by exploring the possibility of cooperative behavior in interpersonal interactions (e.g., bargaining to long-term relationships; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The possibility of procedural conflict also lies at the root of classic dilemmas such as the prisoner's dilemma game (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1992). Mixed-motive conflicts have been studied by social psychologists in the context of dilemmas. This literature asks how the pursuit of short-term self-interest in the long run, to damage to the interests of others (Tyler, 2002).

1. Real-World Cooperation

The issue of cooperation is not only central to many of the problems in social psychology, but also central to many of the problems in the social sciences, and societies (Van Vugt, Snyder, & Tyler, 2002). In fields of law, political science, and economics, it is important to most effectively design institutions

Degoey, 1995) or ignoring rules (Tyler & Huo, 2002), being an gain "buy in" even when deci-self-interest. As we have outlined, voluntary cooperation, and that leaders are viewed as acting of obligation and responsibility are legitimate and entitled to consistent with this identity-based people are more influenced by their more salient (Skitka, 2003; Tyler,

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people within groups, organizations, and societies. This concern is reflected in social psychology in the literature on social dilemmas—a literature focused on how to obtain cooperation in social settings. In particular, the social sciences are united by an interest in organizational design. We all want to understand how to structure social situations so as to most effectively promote cooperative behavior among the people within them. Within social psychology, one of the most useful literatures has been the procedural justice literature, because cooperation has been found to be linked to procedural justice judgments, and procedures are a core element in the design of organizations.

The value of securing cooperation is important in groups, organizations, and societies because when interacting with others people often find that they are in a mixed-motive situation in which, to some degree, their self-interest is consistent with the interests of others, leading to the motivation to cooperate, and that, to some extent, their interests differ from those of others, leading to the motivation to compete. As a result, people are motivated both to act in ways that also benefit others and to act in ways that maximize their own self-interest at the expense of the interests of others. People must balance between those two conflicting motivations when shaping their cooperative behavior.

Social psychologists have examined how people manage this motivational conflict by exploring the psychological dynamics underlying cooperative behavior in interpersonal situations that range from dyadic bargaining to long-term relationships (Rusbult & Van Lange, 2003; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). The problem of cooperation in mixed motive dyads also lies at the root of classical problems in economics, problems such as the prisoner's dilemma game and the ultimatum game (Poundstone, 1992). Mixed-motive conflicts within groups and societies have also been studied by social psychologists within the literature on social dilemmas. This literature asks how people deal with situations in which the pursuit of short-term self-interest by all of the members of a group leads, in the long run, to damage to the self-interest of all (see Kopelman et al., 2002).

1. Real-World Cooperation

The issue of cooperation is not confined to games and experiments. It is also central to many of the problems faced by real-world groups, organizations, and societies (Van Vugt, Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000). As a result, the fields of law, political science, and management all seek to understand how to most effectively design institutions that can best secure cooperation from

those within groups. Their efforts to address these issues are informed by the findings of social psychological and economic research on dyads and small groups.

Within law a central concern is with how to effectively regulate behavior so as to prevent people from engaging in actions that are personally rewarding but destructive to others and to the group—actions ranging from illegally copying music and movies to robbing banks (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002). In addition, the police and courts need the active cooperation of members of the community to control crime and urban disorder by reporting crimes and cooperating in policing neighborhoods (Tyler & Huo, 2002). Hence, an important aspect of the study of law involves seeking to understand the factors shaping cooperation with law and legal authorities.

Government also wants people to cooperate by participating in personally costly acts ranging from paying taxes to fighting in wars. Further, it is also important for people to actively participate in society by voting, working to maintain their communities by working together to deal with community problems, and otherwise helping the polity to thrive. For these reasons, understanding how to motivate cooperation is central to political scientists.

Work organizations seek to prevent personally rewarding, but destructive, acts such as sabotage and stealing office supplies by creating and encouraging deference to rules and policies. They also encourage positive forms of cooperation like working hard at one's job and contributing extra role and creative efforts to one's work performance (Tyler & Blader, 2000). For these reasons a central area of research in organizational behavior involves understanding how to motivate cooperation in work settings.

2. *Motivating Cooperation*

The literature on cooperation suggests that the use of incentives and sanctions can effectively shape cooperative behavior. However, although effective, rewards and punishments are not a particularly efficient mechanism for shaping behavior for reasons that we have already outlined. First, their effect on behavior is marginal. Further, these effects are costly to obtain because organizations must commit considerable resources to the effective deployment of incentive and sanctioning systems. For these reasons, the adequacy of instrumental approaches to motivating cooperation has been questioned within law (Tyler, 1990; Tyler & Huo, 2002), political science

(Green & Shapiro, 1994), and many others (Tyler & Huo, 2000).

A key contribution of social psychology is to identify social motivations that can supplement the existing social cooperation within organizations. (Tyler & Huo, 2000). Psychological mechanisms—procedures—have the important cooperation-enhancing effect. In other words, we want to provide a framework that it is possible to understand why people cooperate in shaping people's psychological processes within organizations, and societies. People have a variety of aspects of their social experiences that are striking that they focus their attention on. This experience when dealing with others might intuitively think that people have an intuition would be consistent with the cooperation and the justice literature. The degree to which people focus on their outcomes.

Central to our argument is the influence of information that speaks to one key function that groups perform: to maintain an identity, with information influence on the favorability of that identity. People are sensitive to information that undermines their identities, and procedures are central to people's assessments of their self-esteem. Hence, procedures are central to cooperation.

Acknowledgments

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A key contribution of social psychology is the suggestion that there are social motivations that can supplement instrumental motivations in securing cooperation within organizations. Our goal is to explore one of these social psychological mechanisms—procedural justice. Our concern is with why it has the important cooperation-enhancing properties we have outlined. In other words, we want to provide a psychological framework through which it is possible to understand why procedural justice plays such a central role in shaping people's psychological and behavioral engagement in groups, organizations, and societies. People could potentially pay attention to a wide variety of aspects of their social experiences when reacting to others, and it is striking that they focus their attention on the fairness of the procedures they experience when dealing with other people, groups, and organizations. We might intuitively think that people would focus on their outcomes, and such an intuition would be consistent with early psychological models from both the cooperation and the justice literatures. However, recent work emphasizes the degree to which people focus on issues that are at best indirectly linked to their outcomes.

Central to our argument is the suggestion that people seek and are influenced by information that speaks to their identities. This is the case because one key function that groups provide is to help people to develop and maintain an identity, with information from others having an important influence on the favorability of that identity. When dealing with others, people are sensitive to information that is relevant to affirming or undermining their identities, and procedural information is widely found to be central to people's assessments of their self-worth and, consequently, to their self-esteem. Hence, procedures are linked to the self, and the self is linked to cooperation.

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Appendix I

Type of scale	Number of items	Sample items	Range of scale
Need to belong (Leary et al., 2001)	10	"If other people don't seem to accept me, I don't let it bother me" (reverse-scored) and "I do not like being alone"	1 = <i>not at all characteristic of me</i> , 5 = <i>extremely characteristic of me</i>
Concern for reputation (De Cremer & Tyler, 2004)	7	"I find it important that others consider my reputation as a serious matter," "I try hard to work on my reputation (in my relationships with others)," and "I am rarely concerned about my reputation" (reverse scored)	1 = <i>not at all characteristic of me</i> , 5 = <i>extremely characteristic of me</i>
Interdependent self-construal (Singelis, 1994)	12	"I often have the feeling that my relationships with others are more important than my own accomplishments," and "My happiness depends on the happiness of those around me"	1 = <i>strongly disagree</i> , 7 = <i>strongly agree</i>
Self-doubt (Oleson et al., 2000)	8	"When engaged in an important task, most of my thoughts turn to bad things that might happen (e.g., failing) than to good" and "I sometimes find myself wondering if I have the ability to succeed at important activities"	1 = <i>not at all characteristic of me</i> , 5 = <i>extremely characteristic of me</i>
Self-concept clarity (Campbell et al., 1996)	12	"My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another" (reverse score) and "In general, I have a clear sense of who I am and what I am"	1 = <i>not at all characteristic of me</i> , 5 = <i>extremely characteristic of me</i>

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Appendix II

Participants are asked to imagine that they have to allocate points (which have a monetary value like, for example, 1 US\$) between themselves and an anonymous other. They have a choice between three alternatives (A, B, or C) and have to make this decision nine times. In the social psychology literature these choices are framed in terms of decomposed games. Below, an example of a decomposed game is presented.

Item	Range of scale
ple don't cept me, t bother me" red) and ke being alone"	1 = not at all characteristic of me, 5 = extremely characteristic of me
ortant that ider my as a serious try hard my in my s with d "I am erned about on" red)	1 = not at all characteristic of me, 5 = extremely characteristic of me
the feeling tionships are more hen my own nents," and ess depends ness of those	1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree
ed in an ask, most of turn to bad might happen than to good" times find tering if I have succeed at activities"	1 = not at all characteristic of me, 5 = extremely characteristic of me
out myself t with one verse score) ral, I have a f who I am m"	1 = not at all characteristic of me, 5 = extremely characteristic of me

	A	B	C
You	560	500	500
Other	300	500	100

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SO RIGHT I GROUPTHINK UBIQUITOUS POLARIZED DECISION M

Robert S. Baron

A review of the research on groupthink leads to the conclusion that the theory has largely failed to support its controversial predictions, especially in conditions with groupthink phenomena. The theory's inception indicated that the conditions described by Janis occur in a wide range of situations originally envisioned. Collectively, the theory erred when identifying the necessary conditions for groupthink. A ubiquity model of groupthink revised set of antecedent conditions for groupthink occurs in mundane, temporary, and invariant feature of group decision making.

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Janis's model of groupthink is a simplification of psychological principles of social decision making. It had to have pleased its author.