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Peace made, peace built?

Participation, countryside, and politics in the 2010s Colombian peace process

Juan Sebastián Lara-Rodríguez

Orientador: Doutor Andrés Malamud

Tese especialmente elaborada para obtenção do grau de Doutor em Estudos de Desenvolvimento.

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To Marina and Rosa

Abstract

This thesis argues that the pursuit of participation and inclusion of all the society and inform well the citizenry about the terms of the accord is vital to achieving peacemaking on the one hand; and, a rural restructure, changing political parties' informal coercive institutions and shifting the social norm of war towards peacebuilding on the other, are crucial coordinates so as to a routing a genuine development for Colombia. A nation that during the 2010s faced the challenge to end its long-standing civil war between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia − People's Army (FARC-EP) rebels. I advance the argument in two parts: first, peacemaking is divided in two chapters. One examines participation and inclusion in the 2016 peace settlement based on democratic innovation and the ladder of citizen participation, arguing in a constructivist way, and applying hermeneutics that inclusion does not necessarily mean a civil society's control over the peacemaking process, being the participation of the political society and insurgency a precondition. The second chapter of this section focuses on the 2016 peace plebiscite, conceptually argues that personal, relational, cultural, and structural causes are intimately related to voters' attitudes. And quantitatively discloses from municipal data that spaces with rural poverty, coca crops, victims, remote from the centre and an intense presence of the rebels had positive associations with the yes vote, a heterogeneous influence of the warring parties, and that the vote for no won at higher population and high abstention. The second part of this thesis addresses peacebuilding through three chapters. The first, argues that civil war has been encouraged by the grievance to reduce rural poverty, so, based upon Latin American Structuralism and original data empirically finds a paradox of land redistribution, intense positive effects of technical progress to defeat rural poverty, a dependency that undermines the better rural standard of living, ditches that become greater between centre-periphery, and the egregious effects of forced displacement for the countryside. The second chapter of this section examines the brutality, narcotics trafficking, and corruption enforced by active Colombian political parties (19 parties and one social movement) from 2011 to 2020. To do so, I addressed historical contingencies of the party politics and build a novel panel data set where the brutality composite indicator, the corruption indicator and coca crops are response variables for the explanatory matrix of political parties elected to executive branch positions. The findings unmask political parties who enforced or rejected these three coercive and violent informal institutions beside divergent causes. Lastly, in chapter five, the third part of section two, posits eight individual political preferences (kinship, funding, perpetuation, ideology, decision-making, religion, military, and media) that cement the norm of civil war. Hence, I carry out an experiment with all members of the 2018-

2022 Colombian Congress cohort (102 subjects in the Senate and 170 in the House of Representatives). The results indicate that the population is dominated by a selfish adapted community with heterogeneous preferences according to subjects' chamber or the experimental groups (i.e., self-enforcers, dodgers, and scofflaws).

Keywords: Colombia, Peace Process, Participation, Latin American Structuralism, Institutions, Social Norms

Resumo

Paz feita, paz construída? Participação, o campo e a política no processo de paz da Colômbia (2011-2020)

A tese argumenta que a procura da participação e inclusão da sociedade, e informar bem à cidadania sobre os termos do acordo é vital para a formulação da paz, por um lado; e a reestruturação rural, mudar as instituições informais coercitivas dos partidos políticos, e virar a norma social da guerra orientando-a à construção de paz, de outro lado, são coordenadas cruciais para o roteamento de um desenvolvimento genuíno para Colômbia. Uma nação que durante a década dos 2010 defrontou o desafio de concluir sua guerra civil de longa duração entre o governo e a guerrilha das Forças Armadas Revolucionarias da Colômbia – Exército do Povo (FARC-EP). Levo a cabo o argumento em duas partes: A primeira, pacificação, é dividida em dois capítulos. Um examina a participação e inclusão no acordo de paz de 2016 baseado na inovação democrática e a escada da participação cidadã, a discutir de uma forma construtivista e aplicando hermenêutica que a inclusão não necessariamente significa um controle da sociedade civil no processo de pacificação, sendo a participação da sociedade política e da insurgência uma precondição. O segundo capítulo desta secção foca-se no plebiscito de paz de 2016, conceitualmente trata que causas pessoais, relacionais, culturais e estruturais estão intimamente conexas com as atitudes dos votantes. E quantitativamente revela a partir de data municipal que espaços com pobreza rural, culturas de coca, vítimas, distantes do centro e com uma intensa presença de rebeldes têm associações positivas com o voto sim, uma influência heterogênea das partes em conflito, e que o voto pelo não ganhou em lugares de alta densidade demográfica e de elevada abstenção. A segunda parte da tese aborda a construção de paz mediante três capítulos, por tanto, o primeiro fundamentado no estruturalismo latino-americano e data original, empiricamente descobre um paradoxo na distribuição da terra, efeitos positivamente intensos do progresso técnico a fim de vencer à pobreza rural, uma dependência que abate um melhor standard de vida no campo, fossos que se engrandecem entre o centro e a periferia, e os atrozes efeitos do deslocamento forçado para o campo. O segundo capítulo da segunda parte examina a brutalidade, o narcotráfico, e corrupção reforçada pelos partidos políticos colombianos ativos (19 partidos e um movimento social) de 2011 até 2020, para fazê-lo, abordei contingências históricas da política partidária e construo um conjunto de dados painel onde o indicador composto de brutalidade, o indicador de corrupção e as culturas de coca são variáveis de resposta para a matriz de partidos políticos eleitos em cargos do ramo executivo. As descobertas desmascaram partidos políticos que reforçam ou rejeitam essas três

instituições informais coercitivas e violentas além de causas divergentes. Por fim, no capítulo cinco, a terceira secção da parte dois da tese, postula oito preferências políticas individuais (parentesco, financiamento, perpetuamento, ideologia, tomada de decisões, religião, militares e média) que cimentam a norma de guerra civil. Assim sendo, levo a cabo um experimento com todos os integrantes do Congresso de Colômbia da coorte 2018-2022 (102 sujeitos no Senado e 170 na Câmara de Representantes). Os resultados indicam que a população é dominada por uma comunidade egoísta adaptada com preferências heterogêneas segundo à câmara e grupo experimental (i.e., auto executores, trapaceiros, e burla leis) dos sujeitos.

Palavras-chave: Colômbia, Processo de Paz, Participação, Estruturalismo Latino-Americano, Instituições, Normas Sociais.

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List of Abbreviations

ACORE   Colombia's Armed Forces Veterans' Association
ADA   Afro-Colombian Democratic Alliance Party
AICO   Movement of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia Party
ANAPO   National Popular Alliance Party
ANDI   Industrial National Association
ANOVA   Analysis of Variance
ASI   Indigenous Social Alliance Party
AUC   United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
BACRIM   Drug Traffickers and Gang Bands
BC   Before Christ
CC   *Convergencia Ciudadana* Party
CD   Centro Democrático Party
CNE   Electoral National Council
CR   *Cambio Radical* Party
DANE   Colombia's National Statistics Department
ECLAC   Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ELN   National Liberation Army
EPL   Popular Liberalization Army - *Esperanza, Paz y Libertad* Political Organisation
FARC   Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Common Party
FARC-EP   Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People's Army
FE   Fixed Effects
FEDEGAN   Ranchers National Federation
FEVCOL   Federation of FARC-EP victims
GAM   Generalized Additive Model
GDP   Gross Domestic Product
GLU   Grazing Livestock Units
GSC   Significant Groups of Citizens
ISI   Import Substitution Industrialization
ISIC   Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities
JAC   Councils of Communal Action
LA   Latin America
LAPOP   Americas Barometer
LAS   Latin American Structuralism
LGBTI   Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex
Logit   Multiple Logistic Regression
LLA   Livestock Land Available
LSDVFE   Dummy Variable Regression with Fixed Effects
M19   Movement April 19th - *Alianza Democrática* M19 Party
MAIS   Indigenous and Social Alternative Movement Party
MIO   Inclusion and Opportunities Movement Party
MIRA   Independent Movement of Absolute Renewal Party
MOIR   Revolutionary and Independent Worker Movement

MPI	Multidimensional Poverty Index
MRL	Revolutionary Liberal Movement
NB	Negative Binomial
NEC	National Electoral Council
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OC	Opción Ciudadana Party
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OCGs	Organised Crime Groups
OLS	Ordinary Least Square
P. de la U	Unidad Nacional Party
PCC	Colombian Communist Party
PDA	*Polo Democrático Alternativo* Party
PIN	National Integration Party
RCPTC	Regional Councils of Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence
RMSE	Root Mean Square Error
SAC	Colombian Farmers Society
SD	Standard Deviation
SNIES	Colombian Higher Education Data Centre
SLP	Expected Livestock Land Productivity
U.S.	United States
UBN	Unsatisfied Basic Needs
UN	United Nations
UNAL	National University of Colombia
UNO	National United Opposition
UP	*Unión Patriotica* Party
USD	United States Dollar

Introduction

Being at war or peace is a persistent dichotomy manifested throughout humankind's history. To understand why this inherent social nature prevails in the lives of people remains in a constant multidisciplinary learning process. Hence, the importance of deciding on such bifurcation lies in that depending on the selected path, there will be an unchangeable condition, whether common or individual. Seminal literature has addressed war bonded to strategy and statecraft. Between 475 and 221 B.C.E, Tzu (2011) asserts that war is a national crisis which is never initiated by the military itself, but by the command of the civilian government. This author also assures that weapons are instruments of ill omen, and that war is immoral. He asserts that military action is like a fire; that if it is not stopped, it will burn itself out. In this way, victory preserves perishing nations and perpetuates dying societies. In contrast, failing to win means losing territory and perpetually threatened sovereignty. Aristotle (1999) in 350 B.C.E links war with revolution, stating that poverty is the parent of revolution and crime, and that the principal causes of revolutions in democracies are the powerful persons' insolence and avarice; dishonour, a man who sees others obtaining honours without merit; superiority, when the monarchy or oligarchy have more power than the state and the government; fear, of punishment or anticipating an enemy; differences of races; rulers' trifles; intemperance of demagogues. But for Aristotle, the chief cause of warfare out of revolution is the desire for equality, in which inferiors revolt in order that they may be equal, and equals that they may be superior.

Writing in the 16th century, Machiavelli (2003) considers war as a profession, describing the 'art' of soldiering. A military organisation appears to be a reason to unite the country, thus soldiers will willingly make war in order to have peace, and will not seek to disturb the peace to have war. Nevertheless, he stresses that modern wars impoverish those who win as much as those who lose. In a subsequent volume, the same author[1] (Machiavelli, 2008) points out that persistent disorder elicits war, so a prince ought to have no object, thought, or profession but war, its methods, and its discipline, the only art (*virtù*) expected of one who governs. In the following century, Hobbes (1651) posits civil war like the death of its Leviathan, a metaphor for the commonwealth (i.e., the state) intended for protection and defence. He understands that civil war is the result of a lack of a common power to fear, where every man is enemy of every man and all live without security than that offered by their own strength. Under such a

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[1] Machiavelli cited by Rosseau (2005, p. 117) supports another facet of war as precursor of state building: 'It seemed that in the middle of the murders, proscriptions, and civil wars our republic was growing more powerful because of them; its citizens' virtue, their integrity and independence, did more to strengthen the state than their quarrels did to weaken it'.

condition, there is no place for society, and worse, man lives under constant fear and danger of violent death. He lives a solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short life. Accordingly, he formulates a first natural law: 'that every man ought to endeavour peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he may seek and use all helps and advantages of war' (Hobbes, 1651, p. 80).

In 1762 Rosseau (2005) addressed the right and state of war and the application of law to appease it. He first concluded that a despot ensures civil peace for his subjects. If a despot's wars stemmed from his ambition, his greed, and the troubles of his inner circle of associates, then what do they gain if civil peace is a source of misery? Indeed, prisoners live peacefully in their dungeons. So, the ambitious conquest is less of an overt desire for national aggrandizement and more the desire to increase the internal authority of the rulers by diverting the citizens' attention with the thought of war. Second, no government is as vulnerable to civil war and internal disturbance as the democratic, for none has so strong a tendency to change, and none calls for so much vigilance and courage for its form to be maintained. Hence, by law and not by sovereignty, covenants[2] can extinguish the flames of civil war. In this light, thirty years later, Kant (1991) declaims the notion of perpetual peace conformed by three rules or guidelines: (1) that every state should be grounded in a republican constitution based on principles of freedom, dependence of all upon a single legislation, and by law of their equality so that the consent of citizens is required to decide whether to undergo the calamities of war; (2) the law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free states or a league of peace to end all wars forever based on its supreme moral legislative authority which absolutely condemns war as a legal recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty; and (3) the law of world citizenship, or the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he arrives in the land of another.

At the beginning of 20th century, Weber (1978) proposes that, the state is a compulsory political organisation with continuous operation insofar its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of a physical force in the enforcement of its order ─ among other monopolies such as the fiscal and monetary systems, creation of money, creation of rules and the administrative function. In wartime, Weber underlines the role of the 'warlord' with their own charisma as the main element of the chieftain, which rises and falls in its efficacy as does the demand for it. The warlord becomes a permanent figure when there is a chronic

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[2] Rosseau (2005, p. 175) posits that the first heroes, such as Hercules and Theseus, who made war on brigands, nonetheless exercised brigandage themselves; and among the Greeks the name 'peace treaty' was often given to treaties made between peoples who had not been at war.

state of war. It wasn't until 1945 and as a provision to end the Second World War that, in practice, a great part of globe polity agreed to settle on an institutional common frame known as United Nations (UN) in order to maintain international peace and security. This milestone encouraged the contemporary theoretical proposals around how to achieve and sustain peace.

In this line, instead of military victories and their aftermath, peace processes became sets of particular bargaining and implementation stages to end wars and build peace, despite their characteristic volatility. These processes vary depending on the type of the confrontation. On the one hand are interstate wars that imply conflict between governments of different nations with diffuse territorial sovereignty. On the other hand, there is intrastate war where the clashes are between pro-government (formal or informal) armed forces and insurgency movements in a national sovereign space. Hence, the stages of a peace process in countries at intrastate war could be summarized in peace-making and peacebuilding ─ though between both of these and based upon the provisions of agreements, military peacekeeping[3] operations are sometimes demanded.

Peace-making is the act of bringing hostile parties to agreement through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and deferral to regional agencies or arrangements as peace-making techniques, or, if necessary, by the authorisation of an international military force to impose a settlement to the conflict (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Kittani, 1998; Paris, 2004). Though conflict resolution as a sub-discipline is relatively young, having emerged after World War II (Deutsch, 2006), it is occasionally interpreted as a peace-making *per se* (Coward & Smith, 2004, p. 6). Nevertheless, echoing Avruch (1998) there are two conceptions of this social field addressing peace-making. The first refers to conflict resolution as any strategy that brings a socially visible or public episode of conflict to an end (e.g., negotiations to share resources or adjust perceptions). The second conception excludes retreat, coercion and war modes of conflict resolution. Thus, resolution aims to address to the root causes of conflict and not merely treat its episodic or symptomatic manifestation. This approach shows affinity with peace studies in that the restricted sense of resolution is bonded with the distinction that Johan Galtung made between 'negative peace' (defined simply as the absence of war) and 'positive peace' (defined as a societal condition in which structures of domination and exploitation which underlie war have been eliminated).

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[3] Can rightly be called the invention of the UN. Operations of military, police and civilian personnel and logistics under the flag of the UN (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Peacebuilding is intimately tied to the functions that a civilized international community, and the states that make it up, should carry out, for instance putting in place effective international rule systems, providing dispute-resolution mechanisms, and meeting basic economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian needs. These also include rebuilding societies that have been shattered by war (Kittani, 1998). Peacebuilding in the 1990s was underpinned by the notion that the promotion of 'liberalisation' in countries that had experienced civil war would create the conditions for a stable and lasting peace. In politics, this notion was manifested via democratisation, periodic and genuine elections, and constitutional limitations to constrain power. It focussed on civil liberties based on freedom of speech, assembly and conscience; on fostering a market-oriented economic model, minimizing government intervention, expanding private investment, and a *Laissez-faire* (Paris, 2004) approach to producers and consumers. Nevertheless, these notions raise reservations, the local turn proposed by Ginty & Richmond (2013) reopens the debate of power, peace, social justice, concerned about a framework in terms of emancipation, engaging with the local and the ways in which peace is formed in context by local forces and not to give into the forces of global capitalism or assumptions of western superiority. Thus, the sub-discipline of conflict management entails the prevention of conflict from becoming violent or expanding to other arenas. Accordingly, it includes the enforcement of existing treaties and peace accords (Coward & Smith, 2004, p. 6).

War and peace can be understood as having a dyadic relationship ─ the potential states coexist and coevolve together ─ embedded in human history. War materialises all of the brutal passions, anti-civilised tendencies and diplomatic incapacity of tyrants, despots or warlords towards the unattainable desire to rule the greatest number of people possible. In contrast, in some western societies, freedom, democracy and inclusive institutions are the pillars of peace, cementing rule of law states. Despite that death and destruction are legacies of the horror of this human trait, in wartime, the desire for glory and the submission of the opponent are conflated with the conception of peace, stimulating the imagination, creativity and invention of the warring parties. Indeed, when peace is achieved by the military superiority of the victor, they then learn and consolidate the proper foundations of the nation, that is, the will and culture to conform a collective political identity. In the case of peace processes based on peace-making and peacebuilding, the warring parties formally bargain to explicitly resolve the grievances, which are the roots of warfare, into a suite of armistices, treaties, or covenants so-called today a peace settlement. The latter mean to achieve peace is the focus of this thesis. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to study from an explanatory approach peace-making and peacebuilding

based on original viewpoints which are in a cross-sectional manner usually implemented in development studies.

So that according to the mentioned above, theoretically, two sub-disciplines: first, conflict resolution (focusing on peace-making), and secondly, conflict management (focusing on peacebuilding), are both part of a conceptual scaffolding that bear up the social science field of peace studies. So, echoing Kuhn (1962) the emergence in the destructive-constructive paradigm is elicited by an anomaly in the normal science. Hence, considering that a paradigm consists of the following components: ontology[4], epistemology[5], methodology, and methods. Throughout this thesis, I shall analyse the anomalies of peace-making and peacebuilding in the case of the 2016 Colombian peace settlement. Such 2010s peace process of Colombia is singular, due to its nature of long-standing irregular civil war (i.e., more than 60 years of insurgency resistance conflict and a half of that time trapped in a narco trafficking war), in the milieu of unresolved rural issues, and under conditions of asymmetrical liberal democratic institutions. Accordingly, I argued that the pursuit of participation and inclusion of all the society and inform well the citizenry about the terms of the accord is vital to achieving peace-making on the one hand; and, a rural restructure, changing political parties' informal coercive institutions and shifting the social norm of war towards peacebuilding on the other, are crucial coordinates so as to a routing a genuine development for Colombia. To do so, conflict resolution shall be addressed from participatory/inclusionary and electoral conceptual viewpoints; the conflict management topics will be studied from Latin American structuralism cornerstone assumptions and Neo-institutional approaches, being considered epistemologically novel in the advance of these sub-disciplines. The methodology will be positivistic dominant, or in other words, quantitatively driven research using the assumptions of the posited theoretical frameworks. So, every chapter uses a different research design, and I will refer to big data strategies in order to mine the diverse data sets created. Hypothesis testing will be carried out in an eclectic fashion and according to the nature of the data gathered.

This thesis consists of two sections. The first, peace-making, is composed of two manuscripts. The first, 'Peacemaking Through the Lens of Participation: the 2016 Colombian Accord', inquire about, how should we analyse democratic participation mechanisms created to end an intrastate governmental war? This chapter aims to examine participation towards the design and

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[4] "Ontology is the study of being (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). Ontological assumptions are concerned with what constitutes reality, in other words what is" (Scotland, 2012, p. 9).

[5] "Epistemology is the branch of philosophy which studies the nature and claims of knowledge." (Kanbur & Shaffer, 2007, p. 185).

ratification of the 2016 Colombia's peace settlement. Analysing theoretically democratic participation approaches, arrive to stress in the application of the rung of citizen participation, and the democratic innovation frameworks. So that elicits a debate with the commonly accepted frame of inclusionary peacemaking. Taking a normative argument, which places it into the realm of political theory and more focused on constructivism ontologies, I shall move forward, with a reviewing of official reports, proceedings, and formal rules engendered by the peacemaking, in order to disclose in what fashion, the stakeholders participated to formalise the accord between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia−People's Army (FARC-EP) rebels. The case argues that inclusion does not necessarily mean a civil society's control over the peacemaking process, being the participation of the political society and insurgency a precondition.

The second part of section one is the chapter entitled, 'Dimensional Causes for Turn Down the 2016 Colombia´s Peace Referendum.' Direct legislation through a ballot box is a common strategy towards peacemaking institutionalisation, so, what dimensions can classify and explain the causes of a peace referendum's voting results? This chapter aims to frame the causes that led to reject a peace plebiscite ratification. Addressing Colombia's 2016 accord, I set up a theoretical review about it in the scientific database Scopus to argue that personal, relational, and cultural causes are intimately related to voters' attitudes. But when we consider the terms of a peace settlement as structural causes, those denote be strongly linked with the societal fracture that the agreement wants to heal. To formalise the role of the terms in the structural dimension, simple variables related to each term were tested in OLS and logit regressive modelling. The results bear out that: spaces with rural poverty, coca crops, victims, remote from the centre and an intense presence of the rebels had positive associations with the yes vote, a heterogeneous influence of the warring parties, and that the vote for no won at higher population and high abstention.

Section two, on peacebuilding, is organised into three parts. The first (Chapter 3), is entitled 'Back to Latin American Structuralism: Evidence from the 2010s rural Colombian conflict'. It asserts that the long-standing Colombian civil war has been encouraged by the grievance to reduce rural poverty, such that a term of the 2016 peace settlement is devoted to building up an inclusive sector. Besides that, the national rural development research and policy-making enforce orthodox approaches made from and for advanced economies. This article aims to examine empirically the Colombian agricultural sector during the last decade (2011–20) through the lens of the Latin-American structuralism (LAS). I study this period and formalise

to the case assumptions of Raúl Prebisch and Celso Furtado related to stagnation and land concentration, technical progress, dependency, and centre-periphery, but further, critical junctures of the ongoing civil war. Revisiting the LAS allowed the operationalisation of variables based on data analysis and geoprocessing of several state organisations' public datasets and posit determinants that constrain the standard of living in the countryside. To do so, a novel rural technical progress indicator unifies the sector legal industries' features, the soil use capability and its formal labour. Thus, I employ OLS and negative binomial testing of the hypotheses to model the structural determinates of rural poverty. The results denote a paradox of land redistribution, intense positive effects of technical progress to defeat rural poverty, a dependency that undermines the better rural standard of living, ditches that become greater between centre-periphery, and the egregious effects of forced displacement for the countryside. Lastly, some insights based on the empirical results propose the reinforcement of the rural term explicit into the peace accord.

The second part of the second section (chapter 4 of the document) entitled 'Party Politics Amid Civil War: Brutality, Narcotrafficking and Corruption in Colombia's Transition.' Democracies are and have been besieged by civil war. Such that, understanding the political parties' role in the enforcement of coercive informal institutions can push the success of a peace process, a topic that so far has been theoretically and empirically neglected. This chapter examines the brutality, narcotics trafficking, and corruption enforced by active political parties (19 parties and one social movement) in the latest Colombian peace transition, which spans from 2011 to 2020. To do so, first I addressed historical contingencies of the Colombian party politics to disclose strong, charismatic/personalistic, parapolitical, rebel, ethnic and neo-Pentecostal parties. Then, I build a novel data set where the brutality composite indicator, the corruption indicator and coca crops are response variables for the explanatory matrix of political parties elected to executive branch positions. Modelling government categories (i.e., mayors, governors, presidents) in electoral scenarios, the panel data was analyzed through spatial regression up to dummy variables with fixed models. The findings bear out the hypotheses unmasking political parties who enforced or rejected the three coercive informal institutions inquired about. Although the models' results denote divergent partisan causes, of these, several coincide with the abrupt history of the Colombian partisanship system.

The third part of the second section (chapter 5) is called 'When Civil War is The Norm: Experimenting with Colombian Institutions.' This study explores the political preferences that preserve or proscribe intrastate war in a peacebuilding process. I argue that dominant

communities of antisocial or prosocial subjects adapt themselves to the formal institutions engendered by a peace settlement, and that their individual preferences build the expectation of stagnation in the social norm of war or the evolution towards peace. To move forward with the argument, I hypothesize eight political preferences (kinship, funding, perpetuation, ideology, decision-making, religion, military, and media) and apply an experiment with all the Colombian Congress of the 2018-2022 cohort (102 subjects in the Senate and 170 in the House of Representatives) about the implementation of some political provisions of the peace accord between FARC-EP rebels and the government ratified in 2016. Supported by the Colombian justice system, the data collected allowed me to catalogue three experimental groups of legislators (1) self-enforcers, (2) dodgers and (3) scofflaws. I utilize Social Network Analysis to determine dominant communities and Multiple Logistic Regression (Logit) as well as the Generalized Additive Model (GAM) to define the causal effects of preferences to mould the expectations. The results characterize the population as a selfish adapted community on the one hand, and with heterogeneous preferences according to the subjects' chamber or experimental groups on the other. Hence, concisely, legacies, private funding, decisions based on the executive branch and a weak military support linkage are political preferences that cement the norm of civil war. In contrast, the legislators supported by Jewish, secular, 'other' religious group voters and self-declared as moderate-left or ideologically leftist push peacebuilding.

Finally, I assert some general conclusions of the thesis in the sixth section. Moreover, I have to caveat that the current introduction as chapters I, II, III, and the general conclusions were edited in British English and that chapters IV and V were edited in American one, because these pieces were simultaneously submitted in journals with such grammar guidelines.

PART I

PEACE-MAKING

CHAPTER ONE

PEACEMAKING THROUGH THE LENS OF PARTICIPATION: THE 2016 COLOMBIAN ACCORD

1.1 Introduction

Participation is at the core of democratic decision-making processes and is crucial to refining the rules that constrain our behaviour in society. Politics designs institutions, nevertheless, based on the citizens' involvement these formal rules could be appropriate to respond to vital social demands. Hence, as Held (2006) points out, there must be a shift in democratic theory from a focus on macro-political institutions to an examination of the various diverse contexts of civil society, some of which nurture deliberation and debate. Today, experimentation is taking place with several inclusive mechanisms to foster participation and enable political and social learning. Nevertheless, an important issue remains, whether in such attempts people have sufficient decision-making power to change the norms that uphold unfair political, economic and social structures, or war as well. Accordingly, seminal frameworks have attempted to catalogue the extent of citizens' participation in governance (Arnstein, 1969; Fung, 2006), examine public participation in organisational structures (Smith, 2009), and understand participative citizenship movements (Bayat, 2010) but, there is a lack of its application in bargaining contexts to end warfare. On the other hand, peacemaking is the act of bringing hostile parties to agreement through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, deferral to regional agencies or arrangements as peacemaking techniques (Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Kittani, 1998; Paris, 2004). So that, throughout the peacemaking process, inclusivity refers to the extent and manner in which the views and needs of conflict parties and other stakeholders are integrated, such that arguably the fundamental causes of the conflict and needs of the affected could be identified, also, increase the legitimacy and involvement of the peace settlement, and reduce the likelihood that the opposition will undermine the process (United Nations, 2012b).

In fact, peace agreements have been a prevalent method of ending civil wars since the end of the Cold War, albeit the peace achieved in this specific case could be fragile relative to peace achieved through military authority. The provisions of peace accords create incentives for one or both sides to cease hostilities and power-sharing arrangements commonly engage former

insurgent parties in peacebuilding processes, but inclusiveness has become the paramount strategy to engage civil society in the peace process as a whole. Nilsson (2012) states that the inclusion of civil society actors in peace accords is vital in anchoring the peace or drafting the terms of the agreement and is common. Cuhadar & Paffenholz (2020) pointed out that three decades ago the pioneers of a multi-layered peace process fostered connect different levels of society, with the called 'circum-negotiation' or 'public peace process', in which mapped a dialogue methodology for how to engage citizens in a peace process in addition to the elites. Today, a variety of stakeholders are considered, as Paffenholz & Zartman (2019) introduce political parties, armed actors, business, civil society, religious and youth are taking part, also these authors sum up that multilateral institutions guidelines stress that without inclusion there is: no prevention of violence, no mediation or peacebuilding, and no sustainable political system.

In this line, Paffenholz (2014) posits that exclusion is apparent in the fact that agreements generally only pertain to the warring parties, while presumably avoiding the complexities of consensus building. By contrast, including civil society actors helps address the causes of the conflict beyond the belligerents' own interests and leads to a greater sense of ownership, thereby reducing recurrence risk. So, a multiple negotiation framework (regime type, government's political ideology, political and legal constraints faced by negotiation actors) may maximize a government's short-term goals, but a legalised, transparent, and inclusive framework is more likely to promote the conclusion of a peace agreement (Bakiner, 2019). This body of knowledge, that build a dominant inclusionary approach to conflict resolution, takes for granted that inclusion means participation and vice versa. So, in our understanding, there is no scholarship specially devoted to examining a peacemaking process based on democratic participation approaches *per se*.

This piece addresses the participation mechanisms activated during the stage of peacemaking into the 2016 Colombian civil war peace process. Accordingly, a milestone of the country's seemingly endless intrastate governmental conflict was the peace agreement reached following talks (the informal phase of which took place from March 2011 to August 2012 and the formal phase from October 2012 to November 2016) between the prime guerrilla group the 'Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia−People's Army' (FARC-EP), and the government of Manuel Santos-Calderón (in power from 2010 to 2014 and from 2014 to 2018). Albeit, 'the Colombia's peace negotiations took place under legal guarantees, and were relatively transparent and inclusionary' (Bakiner, 2019, p. 484), the research of this conflict resolution

case through the lens of participation had been neglected and focused on the inclusion through the political representation of the victims of war (Mendes, 2019)' or mainly in the 2016 peace plebiscite results analysis. For instance, the structured political predispositions and attitudes were clustered into specific types of voters (Muñoz & Pachón, 2021) the experiences of violence (Esparza et al., 2020; Kreiman & Masullo, 2020), and similarly, political preferences and conflict exposure (Liendo & Braithwaite, 2018) or exclusively negative attitudes towards rebels based on their criminality (Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz, 2018), also the polarisation on account of a game-theoretic approach (Laengle et al., 2020), overlooking roles undertaken by the citizenry previously.

Furthermore, with regard to this specific case, policy makers, politicians and civil society have raised multiple concerns about the legitimacy and the quality of the accord, jeopardizing the feasibility of the peacebuilding stage. This prompts us to ask, how should we examine democratic participation mechanisms created to end an intrastate governmental war? This chapter aims to examine the participatory process of designing and formalising a peace settlement in a country at war. We argue that notwithstanding peacemaking could be interpreted as a set of inclusionary mechanisms, whereby the civil society of that forming nation contributes to achieve a peace settlement, the belligerents' participation (i.e., the political society and the insurgency) is the core of the accord's feasibility. To this end, we address from a case study perspective every participatory facet of the 2016 Colombian peacemaking process. That is to say: the agreement signs, the peace referendum, the settlement amendment, and its final ratification. Accordingly, this piece is organised as follows. The second section presents the method, remarking on the nature of the Colombian conflict (i.e., the case study) as well as the instruments applied. The third section analyses the democratic participation approaches. The fourth section demonstrates how following a democratic innovation line, the terms of the agreement were drawn based on six participation mechanisms. The fifth section provides an overview of direct legislation for peacemaking stressing in the participation singularities of such mechanism. The sixth section examines the accord's amendment lead by a political society and its implicit exclusionary approach. Subsequently, we emphasize in use the ladder of citizen participation frame and simultaneously organisational aspects of the mechanisms activated. Finally, we conclude in section eight.

1.2 Case selection and method

Departing from notions of Bobbio (2014) Gramsci has noted that society can be organised into two distinct super-structural levels. First, civil society which he conceptualises as private

sphere, and second that of the state, or political society. Both levels are mutually reinforcing in so far as they give rise to a hegemony whereby dominant groups exercise direct domination through the public spheres, which influences the private sphere. Hence, we stress that civil society includes not the whole material relationships, but the whole ideological-cultural relations; not the whole commercial and industrial life, the whole spiritual and intellectual life (Bobbio, 2014, p. 30). Besides that, political and economic interests have enabled the perpetuation of the Colombian civil war. On the political side, the civil war is embedded into the Colombian society since its independence from the Spanish Crown two centuries ago. The belligerence between Conservatives and Liberals to consolidate a state model was accentuated by the assassination of the Liberal-Socialist 'redeemer' Gaitán (1948), unleashing a bipartisan war known as *La Violencia* and allowing a simultaneous conformation of communist guerrillas mainly in the countryside. Accordingly, in the mid-1960s inspired on the Cuban revolution (R. Karl, 2017) the onset of FARC-EP occurs, wielding flags or grievances against that political elites. So, there are hegemonic groups who have long denied the grievances of dominated populations through so-called extractive institutions (Acemoğlu et al., 2013). These elites have managed to preserve political power thanks to their electoral assets in regions where votebuying and electoral fraud are feasible. In the process, they have succeeded in maintaining an electoral system that privileges private funding and thereby interests of professional politicians and their supporters. On the economic side, civil war has been fuelled by narcotrafficking, since the 80's Colombia has been consolidating its notorious world's leading cocaine producer role, controlling up to 64% of this drug's global supply (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2021a). It is also home to rampant inequality incarnate mostly in the rural areas, for instance, its rural Gini coefficient nearly 0.72 (Unidad de Planificación Rural Agropecuaria, 2016) denotes the prevalence of colonial productive regimes of '*Hacienda*' where large landowners control territories and constraint land productivity by means of technology use or fostering the peasants' work with fair wages.

Hence, armed actors defend the interests of narcotraffickers who perform brutish acts to protect their coca crops, smuggling routes and compete with others (Millán-Quijano, 2019). Furthermore, armed wings of rightist groups linked with *Hacendados* try to preserve the ownership of their patrons' unproductive lands. These non-state armed actors (i.e. insurgents and paramilitaries) allows the emergence of 'underground states' in the periphery, where the legitimate monopoly on the use of force, taxation and justice to build public goods is overlooked by incumbents and assumed by some rebel groups (Lara-Rodríguez, 2021). Thus, in Colombia

the central state can develop without establishing a monopoly on the use of the force, because there may be a symbiotic relationship between the parties controlling the central state and non-state armed actors (i.e. paramilitaries) providing political support (Acemoğlu et al., 2013).

The Colombian civil war aftermaths according to the National Victims Unit (Unidad para las victimas, 2020), since 1985 has resulted in approximately 7,992,981 people internally displaced by illegal armed groups (i.e. FARC-EP, ELN[6], AUC[7] and BACRIM[8]), 180,161 missing persons, 1,035,585 homicides, 37,372 kidnappings and 8,194 forcibly recruited children and adolescents.

Regarding the method, this article is taking a normative argument, which places it into the realm of political theory and more focused on constructivism ontologies. Hence, we resort to an interpretivist paradigm and a hermeneutics driven application of theoretical frames devoted to participation assessment, hence we shall use a case study strategy through two main instruments to move forward our argument. First, it uses a theoretical instrument, by reviewing seminal works about democratic participation evaluation, a focus into these frameworks allowed us to cement the analysis of a peacemaking level inner the peace process. Second, considering each participative mechanism as a unit of analysis, the piece use of a documentary analysis of reports, peace builders' official documents and formal rules from 2010 up to 2016 which allows the examination of different relevant stakeholders to be embedded in our participation approach frame. To do so, it is necessary to disclose the groups and characteristics of the stakeholders involved throughout every participatory mechanism activated during the facets that compose the peacemaking process. Also, as much as the number of individuals or peacemakers that used a loudly word about her or his demands for peace, and as an upshot the organisational learning that allowed interaction with the Havana's negotiating table.

Lastly, we emphasise that the thread of the following narrative is a critical theory framework of the participatory mechanisms activated in the pursuit to make the peacemaking inclusionary for the Colombian civil society, and not a criticism of the deliberative democracy of this nation or posit an adequate conceptual model to analyse it.

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[6] National Liberation Army (*Ejército Nacional de Liberación*, ELN).

[7] United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (*Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia*, AUC).

[8] *Bandas Criminales* 'Drug traffickers and gang bands: Disturbing agents of rule of law, which appeared after the demobilization of 31,000 members of AUC groups between 2003 and 2006' (Prieto, 2012).

1.3 Participation approaches

In western societies, democracy is generally adopted as a political system to allocate decision-making power, being full suffrage something that has been fought for. Steaming from the republican conception of the state as an ethical community and from the liberal conception of the state as the guardian of market society, Habermas (1998) pointed out that deliberative politics remains a component of a complex society in which a discourse-theoretic reading of democracy that regards the political system as the peak of one action system among others, provides solution of social problems; then, politics must be able to communicate, via the medium of law and institutionalise opinion- and will-formation. Nonetheless, between the models of democracy underlined by Held (2006) vital institutions of liberal democracy ─ competitive parties, political representatives, periodic elections ─ will be unavoidable elements of a participatory society. So that emerge the principle of a participatory democracy which can achieve equal right to liberty and self-development, combined with concern for collective problems and contributes to the formation of an informed citizenry capable of build the decisions to govern themselves. Echoing Held, he posits that the direct participation of citizens in the institutional design, and maintenance of an open system to innovate in politics are key features of participatory democracy; whereas, amid its general conditions the amelioration of poverty, the minimization of bureaucracy and openness of information to ensure informed decision-making are crucial to concrete the model. Although some participatory ambiguities have emerged, the 'participation of the governed in their government is, in theory, the cornerstone of democracy' (Arnstein, 1969, p. 216). Participation approaches are diverse, so their elements vary considerably. Citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power in the redistribution of power, which enables those excluded from political and economic processes to be deliberately included in the future; on the other hand, participation mechanism yield synergy between public participation, representation and administration (Fung, 2006).

Some influential frameworks for characterise or comprehend citizen participation provide crucial assumptions to analyse inclusionary peacemaking. First, Arnstein's ladder of citizen participation proposes three levels that typify eight rungs from bottom to top (see Table 1a), with manipulation as the lowest extent of participation and citizen controls the highest. Second, Smith's democratic innovations framework stresses two aspects: citizen engagement and institutionalised participatory political forms at different levels of decision making (i.e., policy, legislative and constitutional decision making). This analytical framework focuses on the achievement of six democratic goods, as depicted in Table 1b. Nevertheless, the innovations

are categorised into four based on similarity: (a) popular assemblies, referring to forums open to all citizens, with rotation used to allocate positions of political authority; (b) mini-publics, which are examples of random sampling to engage diverse citizens in discussing common concerns; (c) direct legislation, whereby through the ballot box, citizens have equal decision-making power whenever the popular vote has a legislative or constitutional effect; and (d) e-democracy, whereby information and communications technology is used to enhance citizen engagement in political decision making.

Table 1. Typologies of participation

(1a) Ladder of citizen participation		(1b) Democratic innovation	
		Goods	Features
Non-participation	1. Manipulation	1. Inclusiveness	Open to all, without restriction, with equal rights.
	2. Therapy		
Degrees of tokenism	3. Informing	2. Popular control	The equal right of citizens to take part in collective decision making.
	4. Consultation	3. Considered judgement	The capacity of citizens in decision making is based on an informed and reflective assessment of the issue.
	5. Placation		
Degrees of citizen power	6. Partnership	4. Transparency	The ability of citizens to scrutinize decision making regarding trust in the political process.
	7. Delegated power		
	8. Citizen control	5. Efficiency	Feasibility between financial costs and new democratic participation.
		6. Transferability	These will be taken at the city, national, transnational and global levels.

Source: Own elaboration based on Arnstein, (1969) and Smith, (2009)

Other approaches as 'the democracy cube' (Fung, 2006) considers an intricate three-dimensional geometric abstraction where classify the grade of participation in each axis, the mechanisms of public participation are presented as democratic from the lowest to the highest extent, except for the x-axis, which shows the opposite relationship. Lastly, organic manifestations of street politics, or social nonmovements in which the citizenry organise itself his political actions using informal channels, through which demands the change of unequal and totalitarian societal structures (Bayat, 2010). Such that, we consider the analysis of the rungs and the achievement of democratic goods as reliable instruments for examine democratic participation in peacemaking − the democratic cube denotes a peculiar implementation, whilst the street politics in our case could be further pertinent in a peacebuilding stage. So, first we shall embrace notions of the democratic innovation to address every participatory mechanism,

then in a second stage we will debate the application of the ladder of citizen participation assumptions.

1.4 Popular assemblies and mini-publics

1.4.1 'Mesas' to contribute to the end of the conflict

The participatory mechanisms applied during Havana's negotiations denote heterogeneous organisational forms. The first facet of regional forums, called '*mesas*', or table to helped end the conflict (United Nations, 2012a) in late 2012 and had the outcome of promoting the submission of proposals from different social practitioners concerned with peace in Colombia. These proposals pertained to three terms of on the agenda: (1) agrarian development policy, (2) political participation and (3) illicit crops and drugs. The aim of the mesas was twofold: guaranteeing civil society's broad participation in the agreement's terms; and assuring that the proposals submitted would contribute to the peace talks in Havana. Indeed, these initiatives were being delivered by guarantors.

The *mesas* were open, with no random selection sampling device that would allow them to be considered mini-publics. Nevertheless, indicating the key trait of popular assemblies, namely, because its openness fit. Accordingly, nine of these forums or assemblies took place across the country: two in both the Caribbean and the southern regions and one each in the centre, the south-west, the north-west, the south and Bogotá *Distrito Capital* (D.C.). Different social and sectoral organisations were represented by delegates of peasants, indigenous groups, Afro-descendants, women, unionists, higher education students, human rights defenders, children, youths, environmentalists, LGBTI communities, peace initiatives, churches, trade unions, entrepreneurs, scholars, social researchers, victims of the armed conflict and Councils of Communal Action (JAC). In addition, political activists, networks, movements, and guilds and 2,990 citizens from 1,333 organisations across 32 provinces participated.

The process of each *mesa* was moved forward two days. On the first day, workshops regarding the elaboration process of proposals, so participants with previous registrations organised in groups of 20 up to 25 members argued the concerning term. On the second day, from each group, the organisers provided a speaker, who with the elected delegates edited the final proposal. The workshops stressed to the delegates the necessary aspects of the proposals: i.e., avoiding an assessment of the situation and focusing on specific points, but including discord statements or terms. Once the delegates had defended the proposals in each *mesa*'s plenary, the documents were signed by the members of the *mesa*, the Congress members of the Peace

Commission (i.e., of the Senate and the House of Representatives) and the Resident Coordinator of the United Nations (UN).

In some cases, the delegates sent the initiatives via email after the presentation of the proceedings. The nine *mesas* comprised 83 working groups, with 213 deputies (including 95 women). All the proposals were systematised and edited in eight books.

1.4.2 National rural development policy

In this light, by the end of 2012, a national rural development policy forum was conducted with a territorial approach (United Nations & UNAL, 2012) through mini-publics. An intentional sample tried to call the implicated. The forum's organisers, as members of the UN and the National University of Colombia (UNAL), called for representatives of the Colombian Farmers Society (SAC), the Ranchers National Federation (FEDEGAN), the Industrial National Association (ANDI), non-profit civic organisations, social movements and delegates of peasants, indigenous groups, Afro-descendants, victims, women and human rights defenders, among others who had previously registered electronically. The forum saw the participation of 1,341 individuals. The participants formed groups of 60 to argue the terms of the agenda related to agricultural issues during two sessions, each lasting four hours. The members registered an explicit statement to be debated in their groups, and the members without previous registration spoke at the end. Each group produced a report to be submitted in a 'socialisation group', formed by fusing two initial groups, resulting in 10 groups of 120 individuals. In a subsequent session, the reports were synthesised to create a final report accepted by the entire public. The forum comprised 40 speakers and 40 stenographers.

1.4.3 Political participation

At the beginning of 2013, a political participation forum (United Nations & UNAL, 2013b) was accomplished. Proposals were related to three provisions on the agenda: (1) rights of and assurance for the political opposition, in particular, the new political parties' outcomes from the peace settlement and their access to the media; (2) democratic mechanisms for citizen participation and direct participation; and (3) effective measures to push the political participation of vulnerable citizens and its security guarantees. Thus, this forum included the corporate sector and delegates of peasants, indigenous groups, Afro-descendants, women, unions, human rights defenders, development programmes, churches, scholars, youths, LGBTI, victims, grassroots organisations, non-profit organisations, associations, citizenship platforms (especially social movements) and parties or political movements with a proportion of the public near to 11% and 20%, respectively; but all of them with previous digital registration.

Each organisation had to send 50% of this delegation from remote regions of the nation, also, the groups should be composed of half female. In total, 1,245 individuals and 480 organisations participated; hence, all the delegates of the parties, social movements and organisations invited attended. The right-wing party Democratic Centre (*Centro Democrático*), headed by the Senator and former president Álvaro Uribe-Vélez, refused to take part.

Forty speakers and 40 stenographers with better skills to promote fair word usage coordinated the groups based on illustrative material. On the first day, a methodological explanation was provided, and four panels were established. On the second day, a session of 20 base groups, each comprising 60 persons, presented proposals regarding concerning terms on the agenda and registered their proceedings or their willingness to submit an oral dissertation. Each base group produced a report on the aforementioned three provisions. Subsequently, the four stenographers of the respective groups compiled the proposals into one report. On the third day, the participants were merged into five socialisation groups of 240 persons each to review the reports, with every group writing one report. Thus, the five reports and the 20 sub-reports of the base groups were delivered to the central committee of stenographers, who systematised the proposals per term and provision to end the session with a plenary, in which the final report was submitted, including a section with other recommendations.

1.4.4 Women's summit on implementation and verification

Placed in Bogotá between October 23rd and 25th of 2013, and backed up by European diplomacy and NGOs, the UN Colombia and UN women borne the organisation of the National Women's Summit for Peace (Organización de Naciones Unidas Mujeres, 2014), which was promoted by nine organisations and women's platforms of the Colombian society. The mechanism aimed to convene the whole society and namely women to participate in peacebuilding, focused in the sixth term of the peace accord: Implementation and verification. The forum convoked women from the Caribbean, Amazon, Andean range, eastern plains and the pacific regions (i.e., 30 provinces, and 68 municipalities), to talk about political visions and experiences in peacebuilding, and make a proposal regarding how to front challenges of a likely post-accord scenario. Hence, 449 women participated in the summit, with delegates of feminist organisations, human rights organisations, peasants, victims, indigenous peoples, afro-descendants, students, youths, environmentalist, business leaders, church, representatives of educative, research and cultural organisations, unions, grassroots, press and athletes. Furthermore, 89 delegates of communities settled in countries abroad and the national government.

Of the nine base organisations, four were elected as panellists of a national and international forum, regarding to (1) the women's role in the ratification and accountability of the peace agreements, and (2) the women's implication into the implementation of the accords from her voices. The initiatives were elected to highlight the women's role in fostering a peaceful culture and mediated conflict resolution steaming from different expressions of violence. Between these initiatives we found resistance, feminist movements, victims' organisations, land recovering and collective reparation, humanitarian treaties, dealing with the past, forced recruitment and sexual violence prevention, communitarian press, business, and housing projects, which are the lessons systematised into the summit proceedings. Further, the participatory mechanism thought about scenarios and processes to overcome hatred, inequalities, cultural and structural factors of violence.

Hence, 31 initiatives (70%) become from urban areas, and 12 initiatives (30%) were developed in rural communities, but spatially the Andean range region concentrated 51% of the social initiatives, therefore, 30,200 persons (mainly direct war victims) participated into the 43 local initiatives documented by the base organisations. The findings disclosed that peace for women goes beyond that lay down the arms, pointing out cultural discrimination and patriarchalism as other logic to perpetuate violence. So that, the belligerent parties supported and acknowledged the women's rights in the peacemaking process, at the extent that after the summit two women's delegates were included into the Havana's negotiating table.

1.4.5 Illicit crops and drugs

Towards the end of 2013, regional and national forums on the issue of illicit crops and drugs (United Nations & UNAL, 2013a) were formed in line with the third term on the agenda. The national forum performed with 1,200 citizens (in Bogotá D.C.) and several regional forums with 300 participants, had singularities. To secure the massive presence, required that practitioners of the particular issue be identified, specifically individuals: from regional platforms (approximately 10%); with experience in crop substitution (9%); with expertise in public health and narcotics consumption (9%); and with know-how in the production and trafficking of narcotics (5%). Moreover, this forum included the corporate sector and delegates of peasants, indigenous groups, afro-descendants, women, unions, human rights defenders, development programmes, churches, universities, youths, LGBTI communities, victims, grassroots organisations, non-profit organisations, social movements, environmentalists and political parties. The registration shifted to a limited quorum controlled by the organisers, who had contacted the leaders and the deputies of different social movements and social

organisations, stressing into the corporate sector and political parties, in virtue of their attendance but low participation degree during the last participatory peacemaking mechanism.

The forum took place for three days. On the first day, methodological instructions and information regarding achievements in the negotiations in Havana were based on the proposals of the first term on the agenda. On the second day, thematic groups and socialisation groups were organised, altering the activities of the most recent forums. Every group worked for eight hours (two sessions of four), with participation based on explicit rules. Each group had two speakers and two stenographers, who developed their functions according to explicit rules. The stenographers of each group were charged to write the group's diary, with footnotes to acknowledge the author(s) of the proposal and the group's report based on the debated provisions. On the third day, five thematic groups joined all the participants of the previous day. Thus, two socialisation groups each with 300 individuals argued about provision (a) on illegal crop substitution, two socialisation groups each with 200 individuals debated provision (b) on health policy and programmes to prevent consumption and one group containing 200 individuals debated provision (c) pertaining to drug production and trafficking. Subsequently, the 21 reports produced were combined into three. Therefore, 10 groups of 30 citizens each, take part in the socialisation of term (a), resulting in one report. Another report for the seven groups discussing provision (b). And four groups of the last thematic group (c), resulting in a third final report. The session closed with the declamation of these documents − not the group's diary as the past forums − to the plenary.

In addition, provisions (a) and (c) were considered during the regional forum in the city of San José del Guaviare, located in a largely rural area characterised by intensive coca bush cultivation. The province of Guaviare sent 200 participants, compared to 50 each from Meta and Caquetá. These participants were divided into 10 groups, each containing 30 individuals. The regional forum lasted for three days. On the first day, the organisers provided methodological explanations and information relating to advances in the rural development policy term in Havana. A presentation of the national forum for the term in question, a regional contextualisation conference and a panel of experiences also was presented. On the second day, the goal was narrative building from collective testimonials. Stenographers registered the collective testimony, the proposal for each group and a report emphasising the terms of the discussion. On the third day, two final reports were written (one per term) and displayed. The narratives and reports were sent to the negotiating table in Havana.

1.4.6 Victims

The citizen participation mechanisms for the design of the peace agreement ended with the victims' forums (United Nations & UNAL, 2014) developed during the second half of 2014. The cornerstone of this term in particular was a statement by the negotiating table in Havana (Gobierno de la República de Colombia & FARC, 2014) introducing ten principles[9]. Indeed, through three regional forums in the cities of Villavicencio, Barrancabermeja and Barranquilla as well as a national forum in the city of Cali, provisions (a) 'Human rights for victims' and (b) 'Truth' of the fifth term (victims) were argued. The spaces where the forums were carried out are associated with the most affected regions by civil war. Nevertheless, all 32 provinces and the capital city sent deputies.

Thanks to the importance of the victims affecting the Colombian society, all social sectors were included, with emphasis on the victims of any armed actor and diverse forms of harm or violence. 17% per cent of the participants in the regional forums and 60% in the national forum were victims *per se* and deputies of organisations of human rights violations, also deputies of offenders of the international human rights, refugees, and foreign victims (connected by video-conference). Delegates of the following organisations composed the remainder of the public: corporations, peasants, indigenous groups, afro-descendants, women, unions, political parties, social movements, development programmes, churches, universities, youths, LGBTI communities, grassroots organisations, environmentalists and the media. Each regional forum was originally meant to include 400 participants, but due to demand the number increased to 500. Whereas, the national forum was supposed to comprise 1,200 participants, but this number ultimately reached 1,500, 33% of whom came from Colombia's Pacific and southern regions.

In each forum, women represented 50% of the public. In this process, the meaning of 'victim' was based on the UN General Assembly's resolution of 16 December 2005. The sample of victims considered the following features of victimisation: forced displacement, land dispossession and loss of belongings, massacres, indiscriminate attacks, executions, sexual- and gender-based violence in the conflict, enforced disappearance, assassinations, land mines, kidnapping, torture, children involved in the civil war, dead threat, freedom restrictions, violence against vulnerable communities and violence against political organisations. The selection of the public was an intentional sample, performed searching fulfill pluralist aspects

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[9] (1) Victims' acknowledgement; (2) Responsibility acknowledgement; (3) Victims' rights satisfaction; (4) Victims' participation; (5) The clarification of truth; (6) Victim's reparations; (7) Safety and protection guarantees; (8) non-repetition guarantees; (10) Rights' approach.

by the organisers. Given the weak participation of political parties and their essential role in decision-making processes, the organisers contacted their leaders and representatives and called for their assistance in engaging with the victims. Again, citizen participation was ensured by telephone calls, emails, word of mouth and social platforms to contact its members.

Based on the principles of negotiating table statement, the three regional participatory practices were performed in the same number of cities, which convened citizens for two days. On the first day, a speech regarding the advances of the peace talks in Havana and explanations of the methodology and the working groups were given to the public. After that, it ended with mourning to be accomplished on the second day. On the same day, the groups argued, and the act of remembrance was carried out. Thus, the groups' reports were compiled and presented to the public, with the organisers' words closing the session. Therefore, 12 groups, each comprising 41 participants, discussed the 10 principles. Furthermore, Afro-descendant citizens required a single group opening, which was consented to. Every group was assigned with two speakers and two stenographers, who performed their roles according to explicit rules. Each participant was given five minutes to make their argument. One week after each regional forum, the organisers sent the final report for each practice to the negotiating table.

Three weeks later, a single report of the national forum consolidated everything. Nevertheless, the participants' anonymity was honoured in order to avoid re-victimisation episodes. On the other hand, psychosocial and judicial support was provided during all the forums by the *Personería del Pueblo* (People's Ombudsman). The national victims' forum was carried out over three days. On the first day, a speech about the advances made at the negotiating table in Havana and a presentation by a panel of experts and scholars addressing multidimensional concerns for the victims were carried out. The latter was made up for organisations, social platforms and other populations acknowledged as victims and ended with a methodological explanation. On the second day, a panel of organisations presented its proposals, roles and the groups worked around the principles. The groups interchanged during the third day morning session. In the afternoon session, a mourning ritual was performed, and the groups' reports were presented. Thirty-one groups were created and worked simultaneously; 10 pertained specifically to the concerns of the provinces of Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Cauca, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima, Caldas, Risaralda, Quindío, and Huila, including one group of adolescents and youth. All of the groups argued about the 10 principles, with each comprising 50 participants from diverse backgrounds. Each group also included two speakers − who were

given five minutes of speech each one − two stenographers, who compiled the proposals based on the principles shared.

1.5 Direct legislation

In this facet of the peacemaking process, the settlement achieved at Havana's negotiating table based upon the interaction of the previous participatory mechanisms was submitted to plebiscite for the entire Colombia's citizenry. So that its particularities can tilt the preference of the masses towards a decision that either permits or impedes direct legislation, the latter also weakens the institutions of representative democracy, leaving the responsibility to incompetent citizens; indeed, in referendums, voters commonly reflect the interests of the powerful (Smith, 2009). Also. leads to a debate generally superficial, ill-informed and thoughtless; voters exhibit a clear sense of disconnection from the political process, suffering alienation, with an emphasis on politicians' personalities, rather than a focus on policy, pervades by a media-saturated elections (Held, 2006). So the agreement-ratification referendum, introduce to voters and opposition groups opportunities to de-rail carefully constructed peace settlements, hence, the primary risk of these consultations is voter rejection (Collin, 2020).

Thus, on September 26th, 2016, the final peace settlement, 'Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace', was signed at a magnificent ceremony in the city of Cartagena de Indias on Colombia's Caribbean coast. Accordingly, on October 2nd, a referendum was carried out for the citizenry to ratify that peace accord. The electoral result was its rejection, the 'No' for peace vote winning by a narrow margin of 50.21% of the 13,066,047 total votes, a difference of 53,894 ballots (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016b).

Nonetheless, a subsequent verdict of December 16th 2016 by the 'State Council'(Consejo de Estado, 2016), the highest court of Colombia's public administration affairs, exposed examples of electoral fraud in this participatory mechanism and showed how elites had manipulated citizens' judgement. At the final court level, 'No' supporters had inflicted psychological violence against voters and misrepresented several crucial aspects of the peace agreement submitted to the vote. The broadcasting of massive and systematic fallacies was brought to light, especially with regard to gender ideology, the elimination of grants, pensions, impunity, victims and a shift towards a Venezuelan state model.

1.6 Peace settlement amendment

The following facet of this conflict resolution case was the acceptance of the unexpected results of the previous democratic mechanism and the negotiation table reactivation. Nevertheless, now

focused on the active participation of the political society who represent the hegemony of belligerence or notion of a state military victory against the rebels − or for them the terrorists. Hence, the government initiated a new participatory mechanism called 'National talks towards union and reconciliation' (*Diálogo Nacional para la Unión y la Reconciliación*). This was moved forward in October 2016 headed by the President, through meetings with both 'No' and 'Yes' promoters. As well including different social groups to debate and modify the terms and provisions of the accord signed in Cartagena; but acting with celerity to maintain the cease of hostilities. The 'No' supporters, led by the former presidents Uribe-Vélez and Andrés Pastrana, convened delegates of the Colombia's armed forces veterans' association (ACORE), three neo-Pentecostal religious groups (CMA, CEDEMOL, PCP), the federation of FARC-EP victims (FEVCOL), eight high-profile career politicians and rightist activists and the Democratic Centre party, including the vigorous participation of the next president Iván Duque (2018 ─ 2022) (Presidencia de la República 2018). Accordingly, up to 445 proposals to make changes, adjustments and clarities were submitted to the negotiating table in Havana. Thus, the amendment of the agreement occurred thanks to the hegemonic elite or the opposition participation.

 Simultaneously, the government kept forward building up a political coalition via the 'National Political Deal' (*Gran Acuerdo Político Nacional*). However, a significant part of the 'No' supporters borne a sturdy opposition towards the amended peace settlement. Then, on November the 24th 2016 at the Colón Theatre in the capital city, Bogotá, the government and FARC-EP signed the new peace agreement. Accordingly, to avoid the soaring political polarisation among the civil society, the direct consultation was disregarded, and the ratification of the accord was moved forward through representative liberal democracy scenarios, that is to say, into the Colombian Congress. Albeit the participation of the legislative branch was constant in the peacemaking process, due to the creation of the House of Representatives accidental commission of peace, assigning it the function of study, analyse and propose initiatives to overcome situations of the intern conflict which disturb peace and reconciliation between the nationals (Cámara de Representantes, 2010). On the same day, the bill reached the legislative for deliberation and unanimous approval. As a result of the government's National Political Deal, a stable coalition existed in the two chambers to complete the ratification. In the four debates and final vote on 1st of December 2016, the Senate obtained 75 votes and the House of Representatives 130 approving the bill, with zero votes against (El Tiempo, 2016). A few days later, to proceed with the demobilisation and implementation of the accord, the

Constitutional Court through the Sentence C-699/16 (Corte Constitucional, 2016) reinforced the explicit activities of the constitutional amendment of July the 7th 2016.

Despite the peace agreement reached, its amendment denotes political practices carried out by the executive branch, to reach enough governance toward ratification. The opponents' modifications were a result of informal political decision-making processes rather than an explicit participatory mechanism. The political deal headed by the national government in the Congress indicated absolute unanimity. Indeed, to some extent, the formalisation of the participatory mechanisms addressed were democratically consolidated via representative processes. Simultaneously, the formal institutions that cemented the peace process were reinforced by higher courts of the judicial branch. In this crucial facet, the participatory elements were mostly moved forward by the political society and tailored to Colombian polity and its particular structures of power.

1.7 Climbing the ladder of participation

So far, we have evidenced the facets of the 2010s Colombian conflict resolution stressing the participatory mechanisms from the democratic innovation or democratic goods lenses. So, in this second stage, we revisit each one from the notions of the ladder of citizen participation complemented with organisational aspects so as to set up the assessment. The *mesas* which helped end the conflict convened 2,990 citizens across the entire national space. Albeit in the ladder it was a consultation being open to all and encouraged the social interaction of the Congress' delegates. The knowledge in this mechanism bears in recognising the peace talks, the activities moved forward through the explicit submission of proposals based on some agenda's terms, and the encouragement of social interaction of peace builders who began to believe in the peace process. The mechanism was inclusive, transparent and, in some way, transferable, although, this one does not leave behind the grade of tokenism, nevertheless its importance lies in that it was a first step for a subsequent societal and political learning process.

The rural development policy forums saw the participation of 1,341 citizens, but with limited space, due to the fact that the mechanism took place in Bogotá, so, in the ladder (see Table 1a), we perceived a placation considering the nature of the participants. The activity explicitly code knowledge in the shape of reports experienced some constraints because speakers and stenographers did not have adequate experience, whereas the organisers knew the dynamics. The degree of social interaction, notwithstanding, was remarkable between the delegates of the traditional agricultural and large-scale producers, like corporations and peasants' movements. Further, this interaction enabled the spread of considerable knowledge about the term, thereby

influencing citizen participation in poor rural areas. The process was transparent, transferable, and presumably efficient, through managing the costs of convening the occupied workforce in the sector.

The political forum involved 1,245 individuals, stressing in convene professional politicians. In the rung taxonomy, configures a placation, considering the exiguous participation of hegemonic parties. The accumulated knowledge and activities of the rightist party proved be crucial to defending the status quo. To do so, they boycotted the mechanism and further on the peacemaking process. This mechanism was performed in a reduced space because it was settled in the capital, limiting social interaction. Also, we can note its inclusiveness and efficiency, albeit with limited judgement and popular control, especially with regard to the opposition of rightist political movements. The women's summit fostered by the UN was relatively different to the other mechanisms in which the UNAL performed a role as organiser, and were moved forward at the behest of the negotiating table. In the summit 538 women were included drawing up peacebuilding initiatives of diverse regions and from divergent conflict aftermaths considering approximately 30,000 persons, so that two women were included in the negotiation table. Then, we perceive one step forward to the grade of citizen power, namely, at the rung of partnership. Because, this forum, in particular, allowed the creation of a gender sub-commission — also integrated by delegates of the LGBTI community — resulting intimately related in a peace agreement with a gender perspective.

Albeit the regional and national forums on illicit crops and drugs called for 1,500 practitioners, in the ladder, it did not pass the rung of tokenism. Also, we perceive that the knowledge sharing occurred in a repetitive fashion or through reports transferred to Havana, including the viewpoints of social scientists. Although, the activities seem to be the same of a forum. However, this mechanism spread knowledge at the extent to inform the judgment of involved citizens. On the other hand, the participation became more dynamic, enlarging the space and including locals of regions affected by coca bush cultivation. Lastly, a diverse set of participant groups allowed a fluent social interaction.

The victims' regional and national forums reveal to be one of the most evolved non-electoral conflict resolution participatory mechanisms up to the Cartagena de Indias peace agreement signs. The refined activities called for up to 3,000 persons involved. Here, the spaces were significantly improved, involving four cities, but encouraging the presence of deputies from each province and e-democracy or online attendance for refugees. Again, the participation of the political society was poor. Although this practice essentially spread knowledge about the

brutality of the civil war and its aftermaths, the social interaction was weak at the extent to be insufficient to influence the voters' attitudes at the ballot box. Such that, we state that this deliberative mechanism elicited the direct participation of the victims through its delegates at the high level and fostered the creation of the victims' commission attached to the negotiating table. Accordingly, it is evident a citizens' power via partnership, thanks to the relevant role carried out by these stakeholders in the consolidation of its own term into the peace settlement.

To understand the elements of direct legislation for ratifying the accord, the space was enormous because of its nationwide application, so in the rung there is a citizen control because the attitudes of the citizens were translated into the ballot box. Similarly, the Colombian citizenry exerted a direct authority. But a great proportion of the civil society was influenced as a spectator following the hatred broadcasted by the hegemonic political society, in which fallacies and psychological violence performed a determinant role in the attitudes of the voters in urban areas, who goes to the ballot box feeling anger. Such that, was a confused public electoral contest, in which the points of the settlement were poorly informed disclosing delays by the government's campaign.

The facet of the settlement amendment was in the hands of the political society, so the hegemonic elites bargained about the modification of the rejected version of the peace accord, thanks to the spurious support of the plebiscite results. Nevertheless, this facet unmasked the power of other stakeholders (i.e., former militaries and their dependents, neo-Pentecostalism movements) that refrain to participate during the mini publics or peace forums mechanisms, so headed by its charismatic leaders the participation of this segment of the civil society can be understand as a manipulation or therapy. The final ratification of the accord signed in the Colón Theatre is difficult to sort out in the ladder of citizen participation, because this facet depends on the manner as each legislator took her or his decisions. Whether they carried out permanent interaction with its constituency (which could be considered as a citizen power) or were pressured by the public opinion and the media, or also they voted the bill according to interests adapted to the coalition in order to back up the government agenda. Hence, the ratification of the settlement was determinate by the traits of the Colombian democracy and its political society preferences.

1.8 Conclusions

This chapter has questioned; how should we examine democratic participation mechanisms created to end an intrastate governmental war? To respond it, we amplified and provide systematic evidence to the argument of Mendes (2019), in which inclusion into these peace

processes have been used as a 'bureaucratic box' with no distinction between the notions of participation and representation, similarly, we propose a practice-driven answer in a novel case to the question placed by Paffenholz & Zartman (2019), in which address at what level, under what conditions, in what relations with others, and for what purpose include youth, religious groups, violent or non-violent parties, and business groups. And, lastly our method could complement the inclusion modalities of Paffenholz (2014) related to her models one up to four, particularly in a peacemaking process. Such that, through this case study, we implement theoretical notions of the ladder of citizen participation, and the achievement of democratic goods through peacemaking facets, essentially: the agreement signs, the peace referendum, the settlement amendment, and its final ratification, which has formalised the 2016 peace settlement.

Our findings denote a diverse set of participatory mechanisms towards conflict resolution. The popular assemblies and mini-publics mechanisms follow the notion of 'track-two diplomacy'(Cuhadar & Paffenholz, 2020) also known as interactive-conflict resolution, these were fruitful attempts of inclusion and splendid organisational forms to spread a disruptive, nation's peace ideal. Although, the decision-making power remains premature in these mechanisms, the grievances and claims of the people engage with peace were − according to the Havana peace negotiation table − incorporated in the approximately 300 pages of the final peace accord. When, the negotiation and mediation moved forward, these mechanisms experimented a refinement process during its application, but with homogeneous features. Indeed, elicited the commonly consider acme participation mechanism in the peacemaking process, nonetheless, the results expressed the interests and strategies of the hegemony in opposition, unmasking the nation's fracture that is the root of this irregular civil war.

Regarding the ratification of the emended accord through the legislative branch with a unanimous approval. We can consider the mechanisms of representative democracy activated, but with presidential incentives so as to strength a coalition to support peace and respond to the public opinion pressure. But in this facet, one can assume that to some extent the previous participatory mechanisms were reinforced by the citizenry representatives. On the other hand, some caveats of the 2010s peacemaking process, was the exclusion (by refuse or omission) of other armed illegal groups that compose the irregular Colombian civil war, as the ELN rebels and BACRIM. Lastly, the inclusion or participation mechanisms in a peacemaking process is relevant to move forward successfully a conflict resolution negotiation, but the willingness of the rebels and the political society is a precondition. Therefore, the civil society control of over

the peacemaking process was spurious, because this was conditioned by the will of the political society and the Colombian liberal democracy traits, where the citizenry is poor informed about the interests of its elites, who are elected thanks to the linkages with the market and its boldness to gain votes based on charisma and fallacies of its leaders. So that, albeit the process from a liberal viewpoint was democratic supporting the hegemony, this could be understand as one stage of a learning process in the pursuit of a more deliberative democracy. Or a society with an active well-informed citizens concerned about its crucial problems, in our case the war.

This piece does not address the notions of street politics proposed by Bayat (2010), in virtue of that these organic participation mechanisms stepped up during the strikes, riots and urban citizenry manifestations in the peacebuilding stage (2019). Such that the examination of this popular disruption, in particular, can complement in one way the model nine or mass action posit by Paffenholz (2014) making it a potential avenue for future research. In the policy making and the conflict resolution fields, this paper tried to contribute to the peacemaking from a novel participatory approach rather than argue with the commonly accepted frame of inclusionary peace processes, although are divergences in the fashion to assess participation and inclusion, these both can complement each other.

CHAPTER TWO

DIMENSIONAL CAUSES FOR TURN DOWN THE 2016 COLOMBIAS' PEACE REFERENDUM

2.1 Introduction

A peace process is devoted to stop the egregious consequences of long-standing warfare (i.e., casualties, victims and destruction), based on it the warring parties, international guarantors and ─ contingent on the extent of participation of the process ─ the civil society, bargain to design a peace settlement, so its consequent ratification and implementation is explicit in the terms and provisions of the accord(s). Toft (2009) evidenced that between 1940–1999 70% of civil wars ended by a military victory, followed by 19% by negotiated agreements, but since the conclusion of the Cold War, of the approximately 37 wars ended, a negotiated resolution rose up to 40.5%. Hence, the provisions of peace accords create incentives for one or both sides to cease hostilities, and power-sharing arrangements commonly engage former insurgent parties in peacebuilding. In the latter stage, the state's capacity, intervention (i.e., third parties and mediators) and implementation is vital for the process success (DeRouen et al., 2010). Nevertheless a 'good' agreement results in durable peace, whereas a 'bad' agreement results in delays, setbacks or even the collapse of the peace process (Arnault, 1996). Additionally, Högbladh (2011), points out that an agreement constitutes a peace process in which the warring parties decide to settle their incompatibility through a process whereby issues, phrased as terms (i.e. military, political, territorial, justice and implementation), are regulated by an agreement that builds on a previous peace agreement (or agreements). To sum up, a peace settlement in an intrastate war is a contract between warrying parties in which informal grievances of social and economic reform are translated into explicit arrangements to change truculent passions for reasonable political arguments. Herein the concern is how to formalise such contracts involving civil and political society to avoid relapse in animosity between members of the same nation under construction.

In peacemaking stages one of its more reliable participation mechanisms to involve the citizenry in decision-making is the direct legislation, also known as the referendum vote. Today the latter is apply to: (1) founding new states, (2) amendment of constitutions or its creation, (3) establishment of sub-state autonomy and (4) transfer of sovereign powers from the state to international institutions or vice versa (Tierney, 2012). Hence, these types of direct legislation are strong related with the terms of a peace settlement. Also, the inclusion of civil society actors in peace accords is critical in anchoring the peace or drafting the terms of the agreement

(Nilsson, 2012). Similarly, including civil society actors helps address the causes of the conflict beyond the belligerents' own interests and leads to a greater sense of ownership, thereby reducing recurrence risk (Paffenholz, 2014). Thus, although the inclusion of civil society in peace processes can be achieved through forums, mini publics, e-democracy or delegates at the negotiating table, the referendums are the acme attempt to involve all of civil society in peacebuilding thanks to these electoral scales. The concern, however, is what are the causes which can influence the informed judgement of the citizens and back up or turn down advances towards peace.

Direct consultation has particularities that can tilt the preference of the masses towards a decision that either permits or impedes direct legislation, such that weakens the institutions' representative democracy, leaving the responsibility to incompetent citizens; indeed, in referendums, voters commonly reflect the interests of the powerful (Smith, 2009). However, echoing Collin (2020), focused only on peace process referendums, denotes two main theoretical approaches: literature which sustains peacemaking on the one hand and authors who argue that referendums endanger peace on the other. Based on the phases of a peace process and the 31 peace consultations since the end of WWII, she posits a taxonomy of three types of peace referendums: (1) process initiation, (2) agreement ratification and (3) agreement conclusion. But onto this body of literature, we can elucidate a vacuum in resolve, what dimensions can classify and explain the causes of a peace referendum's voting results? Based on that inquiry in this article we resort to the four Lederach's (1997) dimensions of conflict transformation (e.g., personal, relational, structural and cultural), addressing the case of the Colombia's 2016 peace ratification referendum, that subject is emblematic thanks to the longstanding nature of his intrastate governmental war against guerrillas whose brandish flags of the excluded countryside poor people. Accordingly, through a systematic literature review of publications indexed in Scopus database we examine the literature that try to explicate the causes, and in order to fulfill the gaps we complement the structural causes with a basic regressive modelling of the terms of the accord represented as simple variables.

Hence, the aim of this chapter is to frame the causes that led to the turn down of a peace plebiscite ratification. I argue that personal, relational, and cultural causes are intimately related with the voters' attitudes, but when the terms of a peace settlement are considered as structural causes as well, these denote be strongly linked with the preferences of the citizenry and the societal fracture that the peace agreement wants to heal. So that, in order to reduce the rejection likelihood of future peace referendums, the negotiating parties must target the less involved

voters with the conflict resolution process. This piece is organised as follows: the second section provides historical junctures of the civil war in question and particularly political contingencies between the rebels of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - Peoples' Army (FARC-EP) and Colombian governments. The third section develops the dimensional framework (i.e., personal, relational, structural, and cultural) to catalogue previous studies addressing the case of the 2016 peace accord ratification in the Colombian peace process. In the fourth section, I complement the structural dimension, positing the terms of the accord as potential causes of its rejection; to do so, I carry out a regressive modelling using ordinary least square (OLS) and logistic (logit) methods and subsequently introducing the empirical findings. The final section discusses the framework but mainly the results that formalise our assumption and concludes.

2.2 Historical junctures: from FARC-EP origin up to its referendum

Two centuries after its independence from the Spanish Crown, the Republic of Colombia has been incapable of guaranteeing a legitimate state monopoly over the means of violence, and the reasons are merely political. The 1948 assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (former Mayor of Bogotá with a socialist discourse, leader of the leftist movement of the Liberal Party and the candidate with higher chances of achieving the presidency) is the milestone of the contemporary conflict. That incident triggered a confrontation between the Conservative and Liberal parties and unleashed a brutish partisan war known as The Violence (*La Violencia*). The aggression's intensity ceased when the only military coup ever reached power successfully in 1953. The military council held the office for less than four years (1957) because Liberals and Conservatives entered into a coalition to overthrow the military administration and end partisan violence. The strategy was an explicit political agreement (*Pacto de Sitges*) to proclaim the National Front (*Frente Nacional*). The agreement's core term was a shift-to-shift in power for four years, for 16 years, or up to 1974.

The sound victory of the Cuban Revolution (1959) encouraged a common sentiment of change based on peasants' and popular insurgency in some peripheral regions of Latin America. Accordingly, the origin of the FARC-EP guerrilla took place in 1964. Between 1957 and 1966, various attempts in the so-called Creole Peace and reformist governmental proposals were on the table (R. Karl, 2017). In the coming years, there were more peace attempts with FARC-EP. During the 1980s, the Conservative president Belisario Betancur [1982–1986] conducted the agreement of *La Uribe*, conforming to the Patriotic Union (*Unión Patriótica, UP*) party as a political concession with the rebels. Nevertheless, the guerrilla group stuck to performing illegal activities, stirring up the perpetuation of violence by rightist elites, drug lords and state agents

allied with paramilitary groups. The result was the massacre of about 4,000 UP partisans (e.g., two presidential candidates, legislators, deputies of provinces and city councils, mayors, and former mayors, and so forth).

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Andrés Pastrana administration [1998–2002] negotiated with FARC-EP in El Caguán, a demilitarised zone. However, after four years of dysfunctional peace talks, it ended with FARC-EP military and financial strengthen but with a spoilt public image. A political asset for the upcoming hard-right government of Uribe-Vélez [2002–2006 and 2006–2010], changing the approach to peace with the rebels by bargaining to pursue a military victory through its Democratic Security policy, with an unscrupulous offensive against all types of guerrilla ─ then called narco-terrorist groups ─ in comradeship of neo-paramilitary and traffickers' groups like the Gulf Clan (*el Clan del Golfo*), Black Eagles (*Águilas Negras*) *Urabeños, Rastrojos* and *Paisas*, also known as BACRIM, triggered a new spiral of violence in the countryside and urban peripheries. Finally, based upon the Victims and Land Restitution Law (2011) and the Juridical Framework for Peace (2012) in 2016, the Colombian government headed by Juan Manuel Santos [2008–2012 and 2012–2016] and the FARC-EP signed the demobilisation agreement. So that 6,804 rebels of such guerrilla were demobilised and made to submit 7,132 individual weapons, 7,476 explosive artefacts and 987,807 units of ammo (Fundación ideas para la paz, 2017). However, the aftermath of the Colombian civil war since 1985, according to the National Victims Unit (Unidad para las victimas, 2020), on account of the action of belligerent groups (i.e. FARC-EP, National Liberation Army, United Self-Defences Forces of Colombia, Colombian Armed Forces and BACRIM) has left approximately 7,992,981 internally displaced people, 180,161 missing persons, 1,035,585 related homicides, 37,372 kidnappings and 8,194 forcibly recruited children and adolescents.

The informal phase of the latest peace process took place from March 2011 to August 2012 and its formal phase from October 2012 to November 2016. During the latter, based on La Habana, members of the national government, delegates of the insurgent group, mediated by the United Nations, beside international referees (i.e., Venezuela and Chile) and guarantors (i.e., Cuba and Norway) carried out peace talks. At the heart of the talks was the inclusion of civil society to achieve its engagement in the process. To do so, many participation mechanisms were carried out supplying knowledge to design the terms and provisions of the accord; namely, in late 2012 regional forums called *Mesas* helped end the conflict, as did the national rural development policy forum by the end of 2012, a political participation forum at the beginning of 2013, and regional and national forums on the issue of illicit crops and drugs toward the end of 2013.

Lastly, during the second half of 2014 the forums and mini-publics ended with the victims' forums and the inclusion of victims at the negotiating table.

In the mid of 2015 the government and its congressional coalition submitted a bill positing a referendum as a ratification means for the final peace accord, ending the same year it was approved and sent it to the Constitutional Court for a final decision. So, on 23 June 2016, the government and the FARC-EP made public the cease-fire treaty, arms rejection and security warranties, and an accord to accept and enforce the decision of the Constitutional Court (Presidencia de la República, 2018). Hence, Law 1806 was approved, which defined a new threshold: 'the citizenry will approve the *plebiscito* whether the Yes option obtains a higher ballot than 13% of the total electorate and overcome the ballots in favour of the No option'.

Table 2 Outline of the peace accord

Term	Provision	Term	Provision
1. Toward a New Colombian Countryside: Comprehensive rural Reform.	(a) Registry and restitution of land. (b) Regional development programmes. (c) Infrastructure and soils. (d) Social development: health, education, household, poverty. (e) Capacity-building (f) Food security	4. Solution to the Problem of Illicit Drugs.	(a) Illegal crops substitution. (b) Health policy and programmes to prevent consumption. (c) Resolve the drugs' production and trafficking issue (coca paste→coca base→and cocaine hydrochloride).
2. Political Participation: A democratic opportunity to build peace.	(a) Opposition statute (security guarantees). (b) Direct political participation. (c) Inclusive political participation.	5. Agreement regarding the victims of the conflict.	(a) Human rights for victims. (b) True. (c) Victims' reparation.
3. End of the conflict agreement cease fire, arms rejection and security warranties.	(a) Bilateral and definitive end of hostilities (b) Disarmament. (c) Concessions for FARC-EP's convicts. (d) Law enforcement against BACRIMs. (e) Institutional reforms for peace. (f) Security guarantees. (g) Paramilitary groups victims.	6. Implementation and verification mechanisms.	(a) Implementation system with a regional approach. (b) Implementation and assessment commissions. (c) Mechanisms for disagreement resolution.

Based on Gobierno de la República de Colombia and FARC (Gobierno de la República de Colombia & FARC, 2012).

Thus, on 26 September 2016, the Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace ─ the latest in a long line ─ at nearly three hundred pages long (297), is the longest peace agreement produced in intrastate conflict (Bell, 2016), the terms and provision titles of which are depicted in Table 2, was signed at a magnificent ceremony in the

city of Cartagena de Indias on Colombia's Caribbean coast. Accordingly, on 2 October, a referendum was carried out for the citizenry to ratify that peace accord. The electoral result was its rejection, the 'no' for the peace vote winning by a narrow margin of 50.21% of the 13,066,047 total votes, a difference of 53,894 ballots (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016b).

2.3 Dimensional causes framework

To build our theoretical review we resort to analyse published texts at the Scopus database, carrying out a search with the following script search: ALL ("Peace process") AND ("referendum") OR ("peace") AND ("referendum"), resulting in 682 items in November 2021. Of that search results, we identified by reading into its tittle and abstract the articles and book chapters that addressed the study of the Colombian 2016 peace ratification referendum, obtaining 25 matches, which compose the body of knowledge written in English that was reviewed. To do so, we catalogued the aims, theoretical approaches, methods, and key takeaways of each piece, and then following the dimensional feature the frame was built up. We echo Lederach (1997), who refers to conflict transformation as a change that can be understood descriptively and prescriptively across four dimensions: personal, relational, structural and cultural. Hence, we embraced this conflict management approach and adapted it to organise the approaches which elucidate causes that influenced the citizenry's decision-making at the ballot box. Also, this targeted review allowed us to identify the gaps or discarded causes that elicited the result, thus stressing according to Lederach's descriptive lens that the (1) personal dimension indicates war-positive and -negative affectations of the individual in their well-being, self-esteem, emotional stability, perception and spiritual integrity; (2) the relational dimension is the conflict-changing relational patterns of communication and interaction of how people perceive themselves, one another, and the conflict, as well as future relationships and roles; (3) the structural dimension refers to the analysis of social conditions that give rise to the conflict and encompass issues such as basic human needs, access to resources, decision-making patters; and lastly, (4) the cultural dimension is interested in how the conflict affects and changes the patterns of a group and how these accumulated patterns affect the way people understand and respond to the conflict.

2.3.1 Personal

The theory converges on this dimension in order to disentangle voter behaviours concerning the peace settlement. The structured political predispositions and attitudes were clustered into specific types of voters (Muñoz & Pachón, 2021), the experiences of violence (Kreiman &

Masullo, 2020) and similarly, political preferences and conflict exposure (Liendo & Braithwaite, 2018) even stressing its perpetrators (Tellez, 2019a) or exclusively negative attitudes towards rebels based on their criminality (Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz, 2018), are argued. This dimension includes the moral disengagement of the voter (Parra Grajales et al., 2019) and finally how the information influences citizens' support for this type of consultation (Masullo & Morisi, 2019). Methodologically, the instruments are dominated by positivist approaches, mainly applying ordinary least square (OLS) regressive modelling (Kreiman & Masullo, 2020; Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz, 2018; Muñoz & Pachón, 2021). Moreover, there is a common source of data, the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) used in a repetitive fashion (Esparza et al., 2020; Liendo & Braithwaite, 2018; Masullo & Morisi, 2019; Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz, 2018).

Accordingly, (Muñoz & Pachón, 2021) found heterogeneous results but three consistent voter profiles (1) pro-government, (2) right-conservative and (3) evangelical, so as to condense political predispositions of citizens. Moreover, for Kreiman and Masullo (2020) the municipalities mostly affected by FARC-EP violence were more prone to support the agreement, and those mostly affected by paramilitary BACRIM attacks were more prone to vote against the accord. In this line, using multivariate regression and multinomial logit variables, Esparza et al. (2020) evidenced that the personal impact of conflict violence and human rights violations does not exercise consistent and statically significant support for the peace process but that it was strongly influenced by the trust in government and the levels of violence in the community, yet with a lack of proof of the same effect at the individual level. In an experiment using marginal component effects and a prominent sample (Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz, 2018), was tested whether individual considerations moved by normative considerations prefer agreements that punish actors perceived as perpetrators and reward actors perceived as victims. Thus, the enemies of the process framed the agreement, emphasising its justice-related shortcomings and obscuring its agrarian reform measures. In an ordered logistic regression manner and stressing public opinion, Liendo and Braithwaite (2018) demonstrated that political preferences were critical determinants of Colombian attitudes toward the peace process, being the conflict-related experiences' non-significant shapers of these attitudes, but Colombians with more years of education, who live in urban areas, and who identify as Catholic reproved the talks with the rebels.

In consonance, Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz (2018) posited that voters are less likely to support specific components of a settlement, indicating that the cues and concessions to the rebels may

have helped the opposition to effectively make a popular campaign against a peace process. Also, the information was crucial because highly knowledgeable voters were more likely to support the deal than those with low levels of knowledge on the one hand, and campaign arguments stressed that the risks or opportunities of the agreement did not affect voting preferences on the other. Indeed, positive arguments have a great influence on uninformed citizens (Masullo & Morisi, 2019). Lastly, in a qualitative way based on some interviews in the city of Cali (Parra Grajales et al., 2019), argued that the participants who voted in the plebiscite were not clear on their opinions about each term, so male participants with lower education did not demonstrate more moral disengagement than female participants, nor did individuals with higher education levels.

2.3.2 Relational

Collective and individual traits or features linked with civil war, which have been researched from a variety of lenses, surround the direct legislation to peacemaking. These include objective and subjective victimhood, understanding the self-proclaimed victims, bystanders, victims and self-defied victims (L. Acosta, 2021), geographies of peace, considering the evangelical bias of protecting so-called 'family values' (Koopman, 2020), monitoring the rationality of the peace process (Mendes et al., 2020), polarisation on account of a game-theoretic approach (Laengle et al., 2020). The yes and no campaigns and their strategies to connect with their audiences and constituencies (Lucio et al., 2019), should also be included as well as knowledge, identity and difference concerning the interactive production of speech (Mejía-Cáceres, 2018). The desynchronisation between the changes of the political sphere and the social sphere of the peace process (Rios Oyola, 2018) and lastly, the theory of elite framing (Matanock & Garcia-Sanchez, 2017) should be taken into account.

Based on interviews and observation on the periphery of Bogotá and Medellin and the public discourse of political elites (L. Acosta, 2021), proposed a victimhood dissociation, where self-proclaimed victims and self-denied victims are prone to not support the peace accord; in contrast, victims of forced displacement, homicide, terrorist attacks and bystanders supported it. Through textual analysis of the accord and interviews with leaders, Koopman (2020) has shown that anti-LGBT bias, race, gender and sexuality in and throughout space shaped the opposition because that settlement addresses those inequalities. From a peacemaking monitoring specialist's viewpoint and based on epistemological and analytical assumptions Mendes, Siman, and Fernández (2020) uncovered the invisibility of multiple temporalities and political disputes surrounding the inconceivable 'no'. Positing polarisation as the negative

sentiments, such as hatred or envy arising from ideological, religious, historical or ethnic issues, Laengle, Loyola, and Tobón-Orozco (2020) have suggested that negotiators underestimated the hatred level of the median voter and also its polarisation. Considering a forum with 1,200 diverse people, workshops and a survey, Lucio, Sheyle, and Amling (2019) posited that Colombians did not say 'no' to peace because it was naïve to manage the yes campaign as a political one and that the notion of peace for the average citizen living in cities was neither addressed in the agreement nor connected through the yes-vote communication strategy.

In a linguistic understanding of the peace process in five stages from dialog up to consensus, Mejía-Cáceres (2018) moved forward a socio-political analysis uncovering two ideologically polarised actors: them (bad, criminals, leftist) and us (good, legal), who in a symbolic building, unifying and linking collective identity generated tolerance for the opposition. Them Rios Oyola (2018) throughout fieldwork in Bojayá and between the multiple political and social temporalities, found that the temporality of reconciliation, trust and forgiveness was heterogeneous among civil society. Indeed, the referendum and the FARC-EP's apologies pushed the social process but competed with the opposition. Finally, using LAPOP's response of two questions (2004–2016) and a simple correlation between the plebiscite results and the 2014 presidential election, Matanock and Garcia-Sanchez (2017) suggested that if elite division exists, the direct voter approval splits rather than provides legitimacy and a strengthening of the peace process.

2.3.3 Structural

In this dimension, the social conditions that are rooted in the Colombian civil war remain blurred, although much scholarship has dealt with certain aspects and assumptions considering the yes and no vote as a variable response. The aforementioned work of Kreiman and Masullo (2020) posited the exposure to violence in a set of variables consisting of attacks in each municipality and two explanatory variables: FARC-EP´s attacks and the paramilitary BACRIM´s attacks, and control variables, such as rural index, coca and poverty, among others. Branton, Meernik, and Pulido (2019) by means of a spatial autoregressive model with disturbances used two explanatory variables at the municipal level as well: violence and a preference for President Santos in the 2014 presidential election, including some confounding municipal-level social and economic factors. Also, they used simple correlational analyses in factors such as land redistribution, victims by gender, age and ethnicity (DeMeritt et al., 2019). Through coarsened exact matching and positing the peace referendum results and the 2014 presidential elections as response variables, Pechenkina and Gamboa (2019) applied violence

figures as explanatory variables, with some covariates: rurality, land conflict and poverty rate, among others. Based on hierarchical Bayesian modelling, Dávalos et al. (2018) identified the explanatory variables as exposure to violence, the support for the opposition party *Centro Democrático* in the 2014 elections, unemployment in 2015, GDP growth 2013–2014 and inflation 2015 for 860 Colombian municipalities. Lastly, a qualitative legal assessment of peace agreements was undertaken (Bell, 2016).

The findings in this dimension denote that those municipalities which were exposed to the highest levels of political violence were greatly in favour of the peace accord (Branton et al., 2019; DeMeritt et al., 2019; Kreiman & Masullo, 2020), and particularly Branton and colleagues (2019) illustrated that ballot initiatives in the plebiscite were often influenced by the political environment and the partisan and other cues available to voters. Complementing the assumption of DeMeritt et al. (2019) about the support for the referendum was heavily concentrated in rural areas and in a clear and strong relationship with the support for President Santos. Similarly, from an anti-perpetrator attitudes approach, Pechenkina and Gamboa (2019) formalised that state and non-state violence in a locality substantially reduce the probability that congressional candidates would campaign against the peace process in 2014 and also that localities exposed to non-state violence or counterinsurgency tend to punish the responsible group by voting for a more hawkish state policy. According to Dávalos et al. (2018) greater unemployment resulted in lower support for the accord. Also, a complementarity between high victimisation rates and both rejection and support for no, in addition to the per capita rate of victimisation was a positive covariate of support for the accords. Ending this dimension, though the referendum can be a useful tool for broader public legitimacy of the peace process, the risk is that with many provisions and terms, people who are opposed to just one of these can end up voting against the entire peace agreement (Bell, 2016).

2.3.4 Cultural

Here, some aspects such as education regarding peace, the use of social media platforms and religious taboos had been addressed. Using ethnography, Burnyeat (2020) built a narrative between a victim and a peasant of the province of Antioquia, the ethnographer and Pilar, the envoy of 'the peace pedagogy' (i.e. government strategy to inform about the peace agreement on the periphery). For the author, this is a global innovation because the administration engaged society in rural localities with information to bring out peace. In line with this, Gomez-Suarez (2017) proposed a peace-process pedagogy in four stages: (1) create awareness, (2) dismantle fake scripts about the transitional context, (3) use embodied action for participants and students

to reassess mindsets against the peace process using the recurrent scripts, and (4) employ four principles for interaction: solidarity, respect, honesty and generosity. In a field experiment on Twitter during the plebiscite, Gallego et al. (2019) could not get subjects to change their expressive behaviour in favour of peace via non-political public institutions; additional social media, elites and public figures, to some extent, shape citizens' opinions and subsequent decisions, thereby eliciting polarisation. Finally, (Freitas Macedo and Conte Jacobucci (2020) have argued that right-wing populists have been using religious jargon and mobilising the Neo-Pentecostal evangelic church against the gender-based approach to LGBTI achievements included in the peace accord.

2.4 Underpinning the structural causes

We have seen above that in the body of knowledge indexed in the Scopus scientific database there are several and significant contributions in order to understand the Colombia's peace referendum results. But within and between all the causes previously inquired, we can perceive that consider the terms of the accord (see Table 2) as potential structural causes for the rejection of the peace plebiscite have been hitherto neglected. So, in stressing the structural dimension relative to 'content' or 'substance' of a conflict, this encompasses issues such as basic human needs, access to resources and politics, or the famous Johan Galtung's assumption of 'positive peace' (defined as a societal condition in which structures of domination and exploitation which underlie war have been eliminated). On the other hand, we have to consider, that the referendum as a democratic constitutional decision instrument is linked to the changing dynamics of representative government as citizen trust and efficacy erode in the face of normative, political and economic pressures (Tierney, 2012). Hence, the terms of the accord are structural causes that strongly influenced the judgement of voters and citizenry behaviour during the direct legislation election. I shall formalise that assumption by avoiding seeing every term of the peace settlement as a variable that must be operationalised, or theoretically explained in conjunction with its statistical background application. The end is to complement the structural causes visited, not to impose a model to undermine these.

Colombia is divided into 1,103 municipalities, 18 non-municipal areas and San Andrés Island, so there are 1,122 local administrative entities. Still, to be more pragmatic going forward, all are considered municipalities, our primary unit of analysis. We employed OLS and logistic logit regressive modelling to test our assumption. The variables' summary statistics are depicted in Table 3, and below we describe the origin of the data, which data sets and R scripts are available in Lara-Rodríguez (2022d) and the variables for the analyses between square brackets.

Per municipality, I transfer the voting obtained by the yes vote [Yes_peace] and no vote [No_peace], from the Colombian electorate system (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016a). So that, for the OLS models the figures were processed in their nominal form. For logit models, I transform such nominal data in binary, one (1) when the voting was larger than or equal to 50.0 [Yes_dummy], and zero (0) if it did not fulfil such condition [No_dummy] ─ because the data summation overlooks invalid votes. Panel a and b of Figure 1 portraits the results geographical distribution.

Table 3 Summary statistics

Variable	Min	Median	Mean	Max	St Dev	Var
FARC	0	0	0.22	1.00	0.3	0.10
Paras	0	0	0.11	1.00	0.2	0.04
Yes_peace	0	50.38	52.38	100.00	17.2	296.28
No_peace	0	49.55	47.40	89.56	17.3	300.03
Voter_turnout	0	35.85	35.31	62.41	8.4	70.52
Victims	0	1,739	8,777	816,612	38,573.2	1,487,888,517
Rural_poverty	7.315	47.03	48.23	99.25	18.1	325.90
Coca	0	0	50.23	6,558.25	280.0	78,383.65
Distance	0	353.6	397.90	1,664.30	257.2	66,164.77
Population	279	12,766	43,011	7,412,566	253,826.2	64,427,743,375

Source: Own elaboration based on based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022d)

The first term of the peace accord was a rural reform to tackle the impoverishment of the countryside. Hence positing the variable rural poverty represented in Figure 1d [Rural_poverty], we examined the municipalities' unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) figures for 2011 (CEDE, 2020) and the multidimensional poverty index (MPI) of 2018 based on the census results (DANE, 2018b). The indices in percentages have the spatial measurement in common for villages and the countryside (rural), cities (urban) and an absolute value, so we used the rural average. The goal of the second term ─ state changes to the electoral system and public-driven organic mechanisms to access the media and founded campaigns ─ was to encourage a vote in some way. Accordingly, we included the direct consultation participation [Voter_turnout] (see Panel c Figure 1) and the data was extracted from the Colombian electorate system (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2016a) being the percentage of the citizenry which voted in the 2016 peace referendum per municipality.

Figure 1 Geographical distribution of response and explanatory variables

The third term, aimed at ending the armed conflict, established the measures of the FARC-EP demobilisation/reintegration and law enforcement campaigns against BACRIM. We understood the presence of both, namely when elections occurred. Regarding the presence of FARC-EP [FARC], according to the data from the Colombian electoral monitor (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2021b), in particular, the historical electoral presence risk of FARC-EP data set. We analysed the presence of the armed rebel group in the 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2015 elections and also in the 2016 referendum per municipality, the latter being when some FARC-EP cleavages carried out military activity. So, their presence is an indicator composed of a factor's incidence of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1, respectively, and is depicted in Figure 1a. Regarding the presence of paramilitaries [Paras], according to data of the Colombian electoral monitor (2021), in particular, the historical electoral presence risk of (PBCO) former-AUC data set. To do so, we analysed the presence of BACRIM groups in the 2007, 2010, 2011 and 2015 elections and also in the 2016 referendum per unit of analysis. So, their presence is an indicator composed of a factor's incidence of 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1b.

The fourth term sought to end the problem of illicit drugs by addressing the mechanism of rural peacebuilding programmes which offer substitutes for coca leaf cultivation, a set of health programmes, and law enforcement. Thus, we understood [Coca] as the average of coca bush crops (2011–2016) in hectares per municipality; the data proceeded from the municipal monitor *Observatorio Municipal* (CEDE, 2020) and is detailed in Panel d Figure 1. The fifth term Victims [Victims] sought ambitious justice, reparation and no repetition means, so the variable represents the statements of people who considered themselves to be victims of the Colombian civil war (Unidad de Victimas, 2021), as detailed in the purple scale of Panel c Figure 1. As the municipality where the person recorded the statement usually differed from the venue where the violent fact occurred, and the time of the records spans from 1985 to 2020. A caveat of our assumption formalisation is that the sixth term regarding implementation and verification − as in every settlement − designs the instruments to an *ex post facto* assessment of the terms' implementation. Hence, its current time operationalisation is unfeasible.

Finally, in the modelling we included two covariates. (1) Distance [Distance]: using the tool's measure lines in QGIS 3.16.1-Hannover, we calculated distances in km first from the capital city to the capital of each province, and second, we summed the longitude to the province's capital cities to the municipality itself, all in straight trajectories. (2) Population density

[Population]: the number of people who settled in the municipality in the latest national census (DANE, 2018a).

2.4.1 Terms of the accord as structural causes

Acknowledging, the simplicity of the statistical operation and its variables. I carried out the OLS and logit modelling per unit of analysis in order to corroborate the similarity, consistency of the results and estimate the probability to vote yes or no in the peace plebiscite. Nevertheless, some previous correlations were identified (see Appendix A1). For instance, the yes vote showed moderate positive correlations with rural poverty and distance, the no vote denoted the opposite correlated values. Also, some weak correlations appeared; the presence of FARC-EP had a negative link with a no ballot, voter turnout and yes for peace was negative, while it was positive for the no option. Lastly, the weak correlation of coca crops revealed affirmative figures for the yes vote, but it diminished with respect to no to peace.

Table 4 Structural causes by OLS

	Model 1	Model 2
	Response variable	
	Yes_peace	No_peace
FARC	5.202***	-5.397***
	(1.545)	(1.568)
Paras	0.159	0.03
	(2.557)	(2.594)
Voter_turnout	0.182***	-0.188***
	(0.06)	(0.061)
Victims	0.00002	-0.00002
	(0.00001)	(0.00001)
Rural_poverty	0.294***	-0.286***
	(0.033)	(0.033)
Coca	0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Distance	0.025***	-0.025***
	(0.002)	(0.002)
log(Population)	-1.034**	1.066**
	(0.491)	(0.498)
Constant	30.288***	69.262***
	(5.904)	(5.991)
Observations	1,111	1,111
R^2	0.351	0.342
Adjusted R^2	0.347	0.337
Residual Std. Error (df = 1102)	13.779	13.98
F Statistic (df = 8; 1102)	74.652***	71.621***
RMSE	13.723	13.923

Note: Statistical significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05, ***p<0.01; Standard errors are in parentheses.
Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022d)

In the first step, we applied OLS. The best-fit model for the yes preference is portrayed in model 1 (OLS-M.1), and model 2 (OLS-M2) shows the no option (see Table 4). So, in OLS-M.1 there

was a significant positive association between FARC-EP presence and the yes vote. Also, participation and the yes option were favourable and substantially linked. Rural poverty, coca cultivation and distance from urban centres were highly positively associated with the yes vote. The plots of Appendix A.2 Fig. A.2.1 give us a straightforward view of the explanatory variables in OLS-M.1. Nonetheless, in this model, the population size was negatively associated with the yes vote. OLS-M2, the relations of which are graphed in Fig. A.2.2 pointed out total opposite factors to those found in OLS-M1; indeed, the no vote was significantly negatively associated with the presence of FARC-EP, participation, rural poverty, coca and distance. Also, the linkage between the no for peace and the population was substantially positive. To close, Fig. A.2.3 illustrates the OLS modelling.

In a second step, we considered the response variable as a dummy, so the logit method allows explaining the binary result (see Appendix A.3). In model 1 (Logit-M.1) and model 2 (Logit-M.2), warring parties' presence was broken down into reference categories on the same scale as Figure 1 a, b. In Logit-M.1, there was a moderate negative significant association with low (0.2) and medium (0.4) presence of FARC-EP, and a weak positive bond when the presence of paramilitaries was low (0.2) with the yes ballot. However, victims (positive) and population (negative) showed with some moderately significant statistical linkages to say yes. Lastly, this model expressed that rural poverty and distance had a positive and strong association with support for peace. As hoped, Logit-M.2 denoted exactly the reverse associations of Logit-M.1 but dismissed the paramilitaries' contribution. In models Logit-M.3 and Logit-M.4, the presence of belligerents was not categorised; thus, victims and coca had a moderate positive association with yes for peace and population a negative one. Again, poverty and distance typified a strong positive bond supporting peace. Finally, Logit-M.4 (No) depicted tailored negative associations as a whole. The R script to achieve that findings is depicted in Appendix A.4.

2.5 Discussion and conclusions

This chapter has achieved its aim. After analysing and review the body of knowledge created to understand the reasons or causes to reject into the ballot box the ratification of a peace settlement studying the Colombian 2016 process, we managed to classify in a comprehensive fashion such reasons, so a framework of personal, relational, structural and cultural causes can explicate a peace-ratification referendum result. Accordingly, due to the lack of research that undertake the terms of that contract between warring parties as structural causes, which at the

end influenced the citizenry attitudes so as to deny back on the accord, we implement a simple statistical analysis, enforcing the structural causes and formalising our assumption.

In this light, following the settlement order, as OLS-M.1, Logit-M.1 and Logit-M.3 pointed out, rural poverty had the strongest positive association with yes ballot. Similarly, considering the spatial distance between the urban centres and the periphery (or countryside), either in a linear or logistic regression, when distance tends to be large, the affirmative vote for peace tended to be chosen. As models OLS-M.2, Logit-M.2 and Logit-M.4 posited, the vote for no won at higher population density rates. In a regressive linear manner, we found that the non-involvement of the majority of civil society with the peace process was crucial. Although there was significant participation to vote for yes, this was negatively counterbalanced when the no option prevailed with less participation (see OLS-M.1, 2).

So, in linear modelling, an intense presence of FARC-EP hugely increased the preference for a yes ballot (OLS-M.1) on the one hand, whereas the presence of BACRIM seemed to be irrelevant with respect to any result (OLS-M.1, 2) on the other. In the logistic models (Logit-M.1, 2), the associations were opposite to the linear ones, just, as long as I split the presence into five intensity factors, in other words, the upshots diverge because they are getting more heterogeneous; for instance, Logit-M.1 denotes a negative significance with low (0.2) and medium (0.4) spatial presence of FARC-EP influencing the yes vote. Further, a minor positive linkage emerged where a low (0.2) presence of BACRIM was associated with the Yes ballot. Hence, the presence of warring parties influencing the direct legislation practice results were heterogeneous. Moreover, spaces with coca crops showed indisputable support for the yes for peace in a linear (OLS-M.1) and logistic (Logit-M.3) regressive forecast, with a positive, rather than moderate, statistical significance. Lastly, we found a moderate logistic regression relationship between the victims and the preferences (see, Logit-M.1, 2, 3, 4), being positive for the yes option and negative for no. In other words, a high presence of victims was linked with the yes vote for peace and vice versa. Nevertheless, the causality was not strong enough considering a linear base. So, the presence of victims in a municipality did not guarantee an augment in the support of one particular of the voting options.

Looking up at the models, the OLS M.1 achieved a better goodness-of-fit with a decent R square (0.351), adjusted R square (0.347) and an RMSE (13.779), to explicate the findings. Hence, I discard confounding and spurious variables. Meanwhile, in a logistic fashion, Logit-M.1 indicated a lower Akaike information criterion and a better McFadden's pseudo R2 (0.235) than the other models.

To sum up the peace referendums are the acme participation mechanism to engage the people in peacebuilding, but these must be seriously assessed when the conflict denotes serious structural issues, or in the case examined, the nation is fractured. To echo Gellner (1983), the nation's will and culture and the convergence of both in political units are the conditions that make an individual being politically united with all of those. In the case of Colombia, we have seen that the peace settlement encouraged a structural transition of key issues that historically had created fissures within the state. So, terms such as rural reform, illicit drugs, political participation, and victims (mainly justice) are considered to drastically reduce the power of large-estate owners, narcotraffickers, rightist politicians and warlords. In contrast, peasants, excluded groups (i.e., Afro-Colombian grassroots, indigenous people, women and LGBTI people), political activists, and victims or those afflicted by civil war are engaged in that transition. Future research dealing with this topic should explore the implementation of these terms because it is at that stage that the societal and economic fractures can heal.

Lastly, some caveats of this study are, for instance, overlooked review the literature not indexed in the Scopus scientific database and moved forward a modelling in a heterodox manner getting rid of hypothesise our assumption.

PART II

PEACEBUILDING

CHAPTER THREE

BACK TO LATIN AMERICAN STRUCTURALISM: EVIDENCE FROM THE 2010s RURAL COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

3.1 Introduction

Latin-American Structuralism (LAS) is rarely discussed outside the southern cone of South America, in Argentina R. Prebisch, and Brazil C. Furtado, respectively, have influenced the development model of their nations, thanks to the crucial roles performed as pioneer promoters of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), instituted by the United Nations (UN), over 70 years ago. In Colombia, the development policy-making is based upon international advice-aid arrived from North America. The U.S.-American group of advisors lead by W. Kemmerer in 1923 defined the country's fiscal and monetary structure. And simultaneously with his southern colleagues, the Canadian L. Currie (1950), guiding the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development mission, supported the National Planning Department creation, setting up studies of the agricultural sector, railway organisation, employment, stability, influencing the nation policy-making.

Currie (1961) concluded that the high unemployment in Colombia, concentrated in rural areas, was the result of misallocations of human and technical resources not failures of the money flux as in the Great Depression. To him, move the workforce from the countryside to cities, employing workers in activities with low labour force qualifications (e.g., construction) could resolved that issue. Simultaneously, agriculture might move technically forward increasing its productivity and improve rural employment with fair wages. Nevertheless, Colombia's rural development policy was driven by the United States (US) Kennedy's administration programme called Alliance for Progress ─ a Latin America (LA)-oriented programme reacting to the Cuban revolution. The policy was a redistributive land reform. During the 1970s, based upon Currie's (1974) leading sector strategy, the stress changed from land tenure to increase the agricultural productivity (or its modernisation) and to ensure a better allocation reducing differences in levels of consumption. Such a plan sought to stimulate exports and implement a radical change of the urban policy. Accordingly, as de Janvry and Sadoulet (1989) pointed out, land concentration increased between the agricultural censuses of 1960 and 1971.

Late in the 1970s and during the 1980s, the rural policies still concentrated on modernisation, triggered by the integrated rural development sponsored by World Bank and US-AID. The defense of private property remained as a paramount purpose, combined with the government investment for the sector so as to spark the adoption of new technological processes fostered by the Green Revolution. As a result of 30 years of rural development policies, the Gini coefficient of farm distribution by size decreased from 83% in 1960 to 82 percent in 1984 (de Janvry & Sadoulet, 1989). Further, Colombia's rural poverty has been higher than its proportion of urban poor. According to Kalmanovitz and López (2003), the rural monetary poverty at the end of the 1970s included 94% of countryside inhabitants; a decade later, this shrunk to 80 percent, before stagnating during the 1990s at 79%. Economic misery (i.e., income less than USD 2 per day) exhibited a similar pattern, moving from 59% to 38% and 30%, respectively.

During the 1990s, the goal was to dismantle state intervention, the core of the ECLAC developmentalism model, in lieu of the Washington Consensus implementation. Despite the constitutional reform of 1991, the rural issue was overlooked in the national political agenda now centered on the economic overture and the '80s cocaine trafficking boom in the US. Due to the rural sector's backwardness, remote countryside regions were designated as cocaine clusters and battlefields for leftist guerrilla groups, rightist paramilitary groups financed by drug cartels, and state agents. The notorious linkages of drug lords with politicians configuring narcotrafficking cartels and the rampant urban violence of drug kingpins against the state to avoid its extradition became the executive branch principal concerns. In the 2000s, the Plan Colombia drew up the rural pathway, implementing a set of strategies from 2000 to 2006 to eliminate narcotics production, end violence and human rights violations, and foster social and economic development, funded by the US with USD 7.5 billion. Nonetheless, as Franz (2016) noticed, Plan Colombia became a military strategy for eradicating coca crops and training the army and police against insurgency, thanks to the pressure of Colombian elites and the Clinton administration. With increased military spending due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the policy at the beginning formulated to pursue peace, prosperity, and statecraft became a militarised set of means implemented by the far right against the leftist rebels, renamed as terrorists.

During the last decade (2011−20), the peace settlement signed in 2016 between the Colombian government and the major guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia−People's Army (FARC-EP) influenced the rural sector and also likely will be intimately involved in its future. The first term of that accord named agricultural development policy included several provisions: (a) Formalisation and restitution of land; (b) regional

development programmes; (c) infrastructure and soils; (d) social development: health, education, household, poverty; (e) capacity-building; and (f) food security. These are the upshots of participation mechanisms moved forward since 2012 following great inclusive mediation procedures. So that this brief compilation of contingencies building up Colombia's rural sector prompt us to ask: how in light of a Latin American developmental viewpoint can we examine the nation's agricultural sector development in that peacebuilding transition? Indeed, which are the structural determinates of rural poverty in Colombia? Finally, framing such questions in key notions of the analytical framework, what sort of associations rise between rural poverty and land inequality, technological progress, dependency, centre-periphery, or the civil war?

This chapter aims to examine the structure of the agricultural sector of Colombia during the last decade (2011-20). I argue that we can revisit and formalise some assumptions of LAS to increase the standard of living in poor rural areas, and at the same time, reinforce the implementation of the peace accord rural term and its provisions, thus avoiding decay in violent land conflict resolution. The article proceeds as follows. I begin discussing LAS and its notions, positing hypotheses based on fundamental concepts such as stagnation and land concentration, technical progress, dependency, and centre-periphery. Subsequent, in the third section I explore historical-critical junctures of the rural sector and its linkages with civil war. Section four describes the research design, the features of the variables, and their data. The following section emphasises the design and application of the novel rural technical progress indicator, one of the three explanatory variables. Section six evidence the empirical findings, drawing on regressive modelling and the analysis of the results. Concluding with a discussion about the urgency to enforce the rural term of the 2016 peace settlement.

3.2 Notions of Latin American Structuralism

At the juncture of the 19th century international labour division, LA was assigned as part of the periphery, a food and mineral commodities supplier for the global industrialised centre. For Prebisch (1949), the industrialisation became key to catch part of technical progress and progressively elevate the standard of living of the masses. Such that the goal of industrial development is to arrange machinery and instruments and to take swift advantage of the technique's progress, with an agriculture sector demanding the same process. Prebisch states that LA needed a significant importation of capital goods but with the necessity to export primary goods to achieve it.

Nonetheless, the goal of that technology transfer is only feasible with the accumulation of foreign currency in savings or through foreign direct investment. Therefore, the industrial employment of unemployed or unwaged people results in an increasing productivity and originating higher national incomes as long as the productive factors remains continuous and efficient. The author posits that, on the one hand, an augmented productivity and the agricultural efficacy are only accomplished via technical progress. On the other hand, industrialisation and good rules can improve wages incrementally, then the income unbalance between centre and periphery could be amended.

In his analysis of Venezuela, Furtado (1957) asserts that the structural features of an underdeveloped country are their own productive structure and workforce employment, which unleash enormous disparities between and within economic activities (i.e., the structural heterogeneity). Such heterogeneity is also nurture by high unequal income distribution amid rural and urban regions and between social groups of the same area, further, patterns of low consumption by the masses, lack of education and culture gaps. Furtado notes that when no structural changes of the economic system are implemented during rapid growth stages based on external booms, the upshot is a stagnation point. Hence, the GDP agricultural participation collapse seems to be result of productivity imbalances with other domestic economic sectors. Rather than genuine development (e.g., people employed in industry) and people performing rural jobs remains stranded. Thus, when the sectorial industrial development is weak to correct the relative agriculture backwardness, the supply of goods is substituted by imported ones. Some are mainly consumed by rent-seeking elites to sustain a luxury ostentation status, impacting the balance of savings.

Therefore, a vital feature of these foundational ideas is the originality of its method to be conceived. They overlook strict post-positivism conceptions, privileging interpretative and humanistic development approaches over deterministic and naturalistic bias. Nevertheless, the prime contribution was the self-conceptualisation of LA's own socio-economic and cultural development, suitable to the political constraints and natural advantages of the region.

3.2.1 Stagnation and land concentration

The results of the import substitution industrialisation (ISI) policy created scepticism during the late 1960s. The rocketing unplanned urbanisation was escorted by massive pauperisation and rampant settling of slums. Also, it disclosed the incapacity to absorb the rural workforce in modern productive activities and transferred countryside poverty to the cities. This issue was called 'dynamic insufficiency', to avoid it, Prebisch (1963) argued back a social structural

change up combined with an income reallocation, mainly through agricultural reforms. To sum up, retake the 1950s' notion of constraining the flashy consumption of the wealthiest classes vis-à-vis fostering technical progress, but now centred on the agricultural sector. In rural regions, the *latifundistas* or almost feudal landlords back off the technical progress, so peasants' land access should be pushed by the state, triggering agricultural productivity, and promoting the settlement of rural families in the countryside to avoid its urban marginalisation.

Prebisch (1963) pointed out the urgency for an agricultural reform for three main reasons: (a) to achieve a structural change allowing to take advantage of potential savings and to promote social mobility, with substantial economic, social and political effects; (b) to satisfy the demand of a rising population that needs to enhance its nutrition, and (c) to improve the standard of living of the masses. The achievement of the last two goals is only possible with augmented agricultural productivity, so a mere land redistribution without productivity incentives can heal the rural social tension in a transitory way, with mild improvements in people's income. One of the vital constraints to overcome the stagnation is the high land tenure inequality, so the lack of redistributive land policies likely unleashes poverty in the cities or the countryside. It follows that:

H.1: High land concentration is more as well as less prone to rural poverty.

3.2.2 Technical progress

Prebisch (1952) invites us to consider the significant number of people that work the land in LA. Thus, we perceive that solving the concern of property is only a fragment of the development problem. He posits that improve the standard of living of people who work the soil will not be possible without the technical progress to reduce the unoccupied workforce. The latter will not be absorbed by productive activities when the new allocated lands and crops do not demand additional labour. Accordingly, in regions where land tenure is not a vital issue, a lack of investments and the state's technical actions impede agricultural progress. In this text, Prebisch reflects Currie's point in the Colombian case, that a feasible option is to burden the land according to its productive potential. The owner with inappropriate land use, compared with the industrious, will pay a fine or tax on unproductive land. Concisely, Furtado (1974) sees technical progress as the way to adopt cutting-edge, efficient and productive methods as the means to introduce brand-new consumption goods. According to the stagnation issue, it is desirable to pursue the massive use of technology to increase productivity via augmenting land-driven incomes rather than investments to substitute the workforce (Prebisch, 1963). These

notions stress on the prime role that the technical progress could perform so as to defeat poverty, allowing us to hypothesise:

H.2: Areas with low rural technological progress should be more likely to have low rural living standards than regions with upward rural productivity.

3.2.3 Dependency

For Furtado ([1974]) peripheral elites bear its power on the following societal traits: the agricultural structure, the land and workforce availability, the control of finances and trade, and the state bureaucracy. So that, the timid productivity progress return to this small minority; therefore, that revenues are intended to consume imported goods in a growing way. These local elites tend to follow the centre consumption patterns losing every contact with their homeland cultural sources. Furtado emphasises that the existence of a rent-seeking ruling class with the habit of imitating the patterns of consumption of the centre — where the capital accumulation is higher and based on technical progress — and foreign subsidiary firms' presence in the backward local productive structure, are evolutionary factors of peripheral countries. Thus, when the domestic manufacturing sector is incapable of supplying substitutes to the imported goods embedded in the elites' consumption patterns, there is a lock-in or situation of dependency that is hard to breakout. Indeed, Furtado concludes with the assumption that every underdeveloped economy is dependent because underdevelopment is a dependency upshot. This allows the presumption:

H.3: The importations of agricultural-based goods increase rural poverty.

3.2.4 Center-periphery

The spatial or geographical notion of centre and periphery is one of the points in which Prebisch and Furtado converge. Furtado ([1974]) stresses that LA has two technological levels — the centre, where the technologies are modern or productive, and the periphery where the technologies are traditional or unproductive. In this latter, the dependency phenomenon intensively happens, disclosed in importing goods and technologies, perpetuating underdevelopment, so that the periphery uses obsolete techniques. Furthermore, there is a predominantly precarious infrastructure with a low supply of higher education programmes to build the demanded human capital to spread technical progress, also the periphery is located far away from the centre which is settled in the capital and main cities of the country. The global centre concretised by industrialised nations also enforces peripheral countries' underdeveloped condition, establishing enclaves to extract mineral and agricultural commodities, such that the

earnings of its extraction are invested in new forms of capital in such developed countries. According to Furtado (1961), underdevelopment is a particular process defined by modern capitalist firms' presence in colonial structures. The situation is evident with foreign firms that import or export goods coexisting inner a subsistence economy. Indeed, that process prevails for long periods and is spatially fractal. I also seek to understand the centre-periphery through its evident relationship with poverty itself. So that our fourth hypothesis follows this line of thought, surmising that:

H.4: Geographic determinants amplitude (centre-periphery) increases the likelihood of elevated rural poverty levels.

3.3 The rural milieu in the Colombian civil war

Since the independence of Colombia from the Spanish Crown (1819), war and violence appear to be rooted in its society being these roots deepest in the countryside. The intrastate warfare dates back to the so-called 'war of thousand days' (1899–1903) between Conservatives in power and Liberals defending interests of coffee plantation landowners and merchants. A deficient set of macroeconomic policies left the nation in ruin, and the government failure to respond to the opposition claims (e.g., fines and expropriation of property), resulted in approximately 60,000 to 130,000 deaths. Such conflict ceased when the Liberals achieved power, promising democratisation, social and economic reforms and in order to fund the reconstruction, the province of Panamá was conceded to the US (Britannica, 2020). Later, the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán (1948), the socialist leader of the leftist wing in the Liberal Party and the candidate with higher chances to be president, stirred the return of partisan belligerence up a period known as *La Violencia* (1948–1953). The aftermaths were nearly as 57,737 deaths, but considering the post-deal that reached 1966, roughly 113,032 homicides were linked (J. Romero & Meisel, 2019, p. 28), and an estimated two million people were forcibly displaced, or almost 20 percent of the population in that time (Rueda, 2000, p. 4).

When the 1953 military coup left the state administration in the Armed Forces' hands, Liberals and Conservatives formed a coalition to revoke the military regime; the *Pacto de Benidorm* formalised via referendum in 1957 proclaimed the *Frente Nacional* (National Front). The deal's core term was a shift in power for four years per party, lasting 16 years, that is to say, up to 1974, and without explicit term or provision addressing rural or countryside issues. The origin of FARC-EP guerrillas occurred in 1964 amid these junctures and triggered by the Cuban Revolution (1959). As Karl (2017) elucidates, several attempts in the so-called creole peace and reformist governmental proposals were on the table; nevertheless, these were insubstantial

about land property redistribution and democracy. During the 1960s and 1970s, a common stateless sentiment in the countryside fostered the formation of up to eight new significant armed insurgent movements from diverse ideologies (i.e., Communist, Leninism, Marxist, Indigenous, Socialist, etc.).

In the 1980s, anti-insurgent groups led by drug lords in association with cattle ranchers were the foundations of armed wings of hard-right parties (Clawson and Rensselaer, 1996), later known as the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) by the mid-1990s (Flores and Vargas, 2018). But during the 1980s, a conservative administration achieved the cease-fire of *La Uribe* with FARC-EP, conforming the Patriotic Union (UP) party as power sharing agreement, defining explicitly that the peace commission would encourage the agricultural reform and the role of the state to take care of peasants. Nevertheless, a new wave of political violence pushed by the anti-insurgent groups and state agents beside paramilitary groups resulted in the extermination of around 4,000 UP partisans. In the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, another conservative administration pursued a negotiation with FARC-EP in *El Caguán*, a demilitarised region of the countryside. However, after four years of dysfunctional peace talks, the FARC-EP ended military and financial strengthened, but waking up rejection by the public opinion.

With the far-right government of Uribe Velez (2002–2010) in power, the 2000s were an at-all-cost massive offensive against any form of rebellion, or in its jargon, terrorism. The demobilisation of the AUC under the Justice and Peace law allowed that around 30,000 of its presumed members were judged in a special judicial frame, avoiding any political allowance. Indeed, no explicit chapter or article in this law is related to victims' land restitution or reparation *per se*, with weak social and labour reincorporation programmes for former paramilitaries. This situation unleashed the conformation of neo-paramilitary groups or BACRIM. Thus, the end was to achieve peace through military supremacy rather than a negotiated peace with the leftists' guerrillas. The latter mean was chosen by the executive branch headed by Santos Calderón (2010–2018); the victims and land restitution law of 2011 was a remarkable institutional change from the civil war path dependence and opened new trajectories to peacemaking. The peace talks with FARC-EP began in March 2011 with informal negotiations, to end in November 2016 with the ratification of the peace accord by the Colombian Congress. The first term, 'Agricultural development policy,' condenses and addresses fifty years of an armed political revolution by such guerrillas, in which the rural concerns are paramount.

According to *Fundación ideas para la paz* (2017), 6,804 rebels of FARC-EP were demobilised and laid 7,132 individual weapons down, 7,476 explosive artefacts, and 987,807 units of ammunition. The aftermaths of the Colombian civil war since 1985, according to the National Victims Unit (Unidad para las victimas, 2020) are approximately 7,992,981 internally displaced people by illegal armed groups (including FARC-EP, ELN, AUC, and BACRIM), 180,161 missing persons, 1,035,585 homicides, 37,372 kidnappings, and 8,194 children and adolescents forcibly recruited. Based on these facts one can assume that the violence is more intense in the periphery, or in the countryside, that the cocaine production, violent homicides, the forced displacement, and rebellion actions are engendered by poverty. It then permits to presuppose that:

H. 5: Areas with high rural poverty are associated with areas where the civil war is more intense.

3.4 Research design and data

Colombia is a middle-income country. Its economy is based on non-renewable natural resource extraction, particularly fossils (i.e., oil and coal), gold and nickel, and a timid manufacturing sector, but with a vibrant service sector in travel and tourism industries. The agriculture sector's mean contribution to the GDP between 2010–2017 is 6.2%, which can be further segmented by coffee (0.67%), other crops (2.79%), livestock (2.39%), and fishing and aquaculture industries (0.35% each) (DANE, 2018e). According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2013), Colombia is classified as megadiverse thanks to hosting close to 10% of the planet's biodiversity, and with 314 types of ecosystems, it ranks as one of the world's wealthiest countries by aquatic resources. Its topography is steep because of the Andean Range cut across the country with three tall and long formations.

Echoing the National Statistics Department (DANE, 2018a, 2018c), Colombia's rural population is nearly 11,833,841 people, mainly comprised by its youth population ─ 52% of Colombians in rural areas are less than 30 years old. The government expenditures to foster rural development in the period 2013–2020 have a mean of USD 922,706,392,[10] achieving a maximum value of $1.5 billion in 2015 and a minimum of $519 million in 2020. In this light, due to the sector's potential to unfold, the necessity to reinforce peace, and to avoid the recurrent mistakes in rural development policymaking, this article tests structural determinants of rural poverty. I employ a data analytics methods focusing on the pursuit of longitudinal values during

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[10] Calculated according to national budget figures in COP, converted to USD via the exchange rate average per year.

the last decade (2011–2020). The time period is limited to data available in public repositories of Colombian state organisations. The cross-section values are obtained from geoprocessing data built on a municipal level. Colombia is divided into 1,103 municipalities, 18 non-municipality areas, and San Andrés Island, so there are 1,122 local administrative entities. Still, to be more pragmatic going forward, all are considered municipalities, our primary unit of analysis.

3.4.1. Response variable: Rural poverty

During the 2011–2020 timeframe, the direct/dimensional methods to measure poverty in Colombia were mainly two, the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) method measures four factors (housing, sanitation, education, and consumption capacity) with six dimensions and 12 indicators (Feres & Mancero, 2001, p. 11) on the one hand. And the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is divided into three dimensions ─ health, education, and living standard ─ through a set of ten indicators (Alkire & Santos, 2014, p. 252) on the other. Although the methods differ, both aim to measure poverty itself. Accordingly, to achieve a less blurry picture, I examined the municipalities' UBN figures of 2011 (CEDE, 2020) and the MPI of 2018 based on the census results (DANE, 2018b). The indices have the spatial measurement in common for villages and the countryside (rural), cities (urban), and an absolute value. Table 5 denotes some descriptive data of Colombia's 1,122 municipalities. The poverty during that range of time has been increased in absolute terms by 9.20, while rural poverty specifically rose by 5.67. Nevertheless, in urban areas, poverty has decreased by 24.33.

Table 5 Poverty 2011 and 2018

Estimator	UBN (2011)	MPI (2018)	Rural UBN (2011)	Rural MPI (2018)	Urban UBN (2011)	Urban MPI (2018)
Mean	32.617	41.818	45.396	51.071	52.525	28.187
Min	0.00	4.50	5.43	8.10	9.07	0.00
Max	100	98.5	100	99.2	100	82.1
SD	20.474	17.347	21.137	17.537	20.858	14.207

Source: Adaptation based on DANE (2018b) and CEDE (2020)

Some provinces are more impacted by poverty, whether urban or rural; nevertheless, in the centre or the capital city Bogotá, such levels are homogenous and lowest. In the periphery or the countryside, poverty is exacerbated, with a profound stagnation as compared to urban spaces, where poverty predominantly decreases (see Appendix B1). To sum up, 6,044,956 people were living in poverty in the Colombian countryside in 2018. Figure 2 Panel a depicts the spatial distribution of rural poverty.

3.4.2 Explanatory variables: Rural land inequality and importation of agro-based goods

The Planning Rural Department carried out the last attempt to measure the land inequality in the Colombian countryside during 2014 (Unidad de Planificación Rural Agropecuaria, 2016). On it are implemented four indicators that analyse the rural property allocation behaviour in terms of inequality, heterogeneity, and disparity or extreme inequality of such distribution. The first indicator is an adaptation of the income Gini, adapted to the land tenure. That method responds to the property measure, comprehended as the right enforced over the land, and not in the plots' distribution or share-tenants, accordingly, called Gini index of landowners. Although such an indicator is used to describe the property concentration, it is implemented as an index of inequality in land distribution. The second indicator through the Theil index measures the allocation heterogeneity as an alternative expression of inequality, which represents the area's variability according to the owner. Finally, a measure of excessive inequality is called disparity. Such that, I implemented the Gini index where zero (0) represents perfect equality and one (1) perfect inequality. Figure 2, Panel c illustrates the values per municipality; hence, one can perceive a vast and prevalent rural inequality. For instance, taking the provinces and the capital 30 of 33 measures have values greater than 0.63 (see Appendix B.2), indeed, the national rural inequality mean is 0.7215. Nevertheless, missing data were emended according to the last appendix.

I analysed the public data for national importations from 2012 to 2020 (DANE, 2020), finding that only the year 2012 has traits of applying a congruent classification of the imported products, founded on the standard industrial classification of all economic activities (ISIC) (United Nations, 2008). The features of the agricultural-based imported products during 2012 (see Appendix B.3, Table B.3.1) at national extent are valuated using its raw weight in kilograms but converted in tonnes. Thanks to that, the Colombian open data of international trade only denotes the variable '*DEPTODES*' or 'destination province'. The importations per municipality were estimated according to the gross weight per capita of agricultural-based goods imported for each province, multiplied by the municipality's population size (DANE, 2018a). Accordingly, Figure 2, Panel d posits that Bogotá, Cali, and Medellín are the cities that mostly import finished goods whose value-added have agricultural raw materials as main components according to its ISIC. As a result, Colombia imported 7,162,055 tonnes of those goods.

Figure 2 Geographical distribution of response and explanatory variables

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022b) using QGIS

The third explanatory variable is the rural technical progress, which I will formulate such an indicator in the section five, further on.

3.4.3 Control variables

To ascertain that the results obtained are not spurious, I included some other control variables, which likely affects the rural Colombian structure, whether perpetuating or breaking the exclusion. First, the social structure of the periphery is extremely impacted by the civil war construct, which is, in principle, a crucial determinant in the poverty issue because, in the regions where rampant violence prevails, the state's capacity to relocate or warrant the land tenure rights and technological progress of powerless people could be precarious. Secondly, the geographic construct, configured according to our framework, is applied following the notions of centre-periphery as a means to diffuse development or the technical progress spillover effect in a specific space.

The construct of civil war that I posit is composed by the following four variables: First, (1) the rate of homicides per 1,000 inhabitants recreates the municipalities where the absence of the rule of law encourages the conflict resolution through the violent elimination to one of the parties by his counterpart or preserves the cycle of murders as a revenge retaliation. In a study in the US, Williams (1984) reinforces that poverty had a significant positive effect on the homicide rate, founded on a nonlinear form. Next, (2) illicit coca crops in hectares; the coca leaf and mainly one of its outcomes (i.e., cocaine) represent some of the most notorious sources of financing the civil war in Colombia, for it is the most profitable crop in the underground economy, although its cultivation is concentrated in ten provinces at the moment. Dion and Russler (2008) demonstrate that poverty has significant inverted-U relationship with coca cultivation rates, as very low and extremely high levels of poverty are associated with little coca cultivation.

(3) Internal forced displacement serves as the third construct variable. As Ruiz (2011) posits, it fits with the intensification of land accumulation, the reduction of small estates or landowners, and is thus indicative of agrarian counter-reform of a massive scale. She sums that the strategy for land concentration has been forced displacement. The effect of forced displacement in poverty is included as institutional attributes whose improvement has reduced poverty in some regional clusters of Colombia (Nieto-Aleman, et al., 2019). And fourth, we take measure of (4) subversive actions, given that the two major insurgent groups, FARC-EP (active up to 2016) and ELN carried out ambushes, terrorist bombings, captures of towns, massacres, and attacks on infrastructure and pipelines. Nevertheless, the rebel organisation is less likely to operate in

areas of high poverty. Daly (2012, p. 476), in her research on Colombia (1964-84), rejects the hypothesis that 'the lower the economic opportunities available in the local economy, the higher the likelihood of insurgency' (the source of the last four variables are depicted in Table B.4.1, Appendix B.4.

I posit five control variables for the centre-periphery construct: First, the (1) physical infrastructure could perform a key role to dynamise trade, mobility of people, transport of supplies, technologies, raw materials, and finished goods. Also, it provides massive seasonal employment opportunities both in construction and stable jobs devoted to maintenance work. Ali & Pernia (2003) include electricity and irrigation; they posit that the investment in rural infrastructure can lead to higher productivity, employment, and increased availability of wage goods, thereby reducing poverty. Therefore, a composite indicator (see Appendix B.4.1) was created using cartographic geodata from Colombia's Geographical Service (IGAC, 2016) at scales of 1:500,000 and 1:100,000, processed using QGIS 3.16.1-Hannover. Herein, I understand the infrastructure as roads, ports, railroads, canals, airports/airdromes, and airstrips. In sum, Colombia has a performance of 3.29% (see Appendix B.4.1, Table B 4.1.2) The centre (i.e., Bogotá, D.C.), obtains a performance of 34.37%, or the mean of the provinces' capital cities is 11.90%.

Second, (2) higher education in agriculture portrays the diffusion of explicit technological and scientific knowledge, which is crucial in optimising land resources. In particular, this scientific field's measure obeys the negative role of education as a whole on agricultural wage income because educated household members seek better remunerative markets and sectors (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2000). Therefore, I consulted the Colombian higher education data centre (SNIES) in education and training for the agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and veterinary sectors (Ministerio de Educación Nacional, 2020). The geographical supply of vocational education as technicians, technology, and their respective graduate diplomas, including higher education degrees as bachelor, graduate diplomas, master, and doctorate, are analysed. The method to build the indicator is moved forward in Appendix B. 4.2. The urban centres Bogotá, Medellín, and Manizales obtained the highest performance. Indeed, in 1,017 of 1,122 municipalities there is an absence of tertiary education devoted to the rural field.

The final three variables can be discussed briefly. Using the tool's measure lines' in QGIS 3.16.1-Hannover, (3) distance can be calculated first from the capital city to the capital of each province, and second, from the province's capital cities to the municipality itself (See Appendix B. 4.3) as a line connecting two points. In principle, the spatial distance is vital in centre-

periphery; poverty is higher at a distance from the centre. Next, the number of inhabitants per municipality, or (4) population, could foster the demand for agricultural goods. At bigger the market is for; the consumption should be satisfied by the supply of domestic rural producers. Also, one can assume that gentrification and urbanisation reduce the rural sector, with a gradual substitution via manufacturing and service sector activities. Finally, (5) area, the high availability of land potentially presumes high volumes of agricultural activities in addition to exacerbated or less poverty and inequality. The two latter variables' sources are illustrated in Table B.4.1, Appendix B.4.

3.5 Rural technical progress indicator

The composite indicator is a mathematical combination of single indicators, for our aims, based on multicriteria decision-making, particularly elementary methods (El Gibari et al., 2019). Nevertheless, addressing our theoretical framework assumptions and being constrained by the data availability bias. The technical progress composite indicator proposes the weighted of crucial dimensions that, on the one hand, pushes, and on the other hand, explicate rural productivity. Table 6 summarizes the indicator's building. The column "name" of this table refers to the name of the data set available; the column "mean" was calculated considering such values in the universe or 1,122 municipalities of Colombia. Thus, the column performance represents the nationwide results. In other words, the average rural technical progress of Colombia calculates to 0.254; indeed, in the mean, 41.8% of the farms have crops. Also, Figure 2, Panel b illustrates the map of performances per municipality. Therefore, as we shall see, the methodological features and descriptive previous statistical results of each single indicator elucidate the technical structure of the Colombian agricultural sector.

Table 6 Colombia's rural technical progress

N°	Single indicator	Name	Weight %	Mean	Performance
1	Rural technical capability	Techni_Capa_N	15	0.2378	0.03567
2	Land productivity in large-scale agriculture	LSA_Prod_N	15	0.4922	0.07383
3	Land productivity in traditional agriculture	Trad_Prod_N	15	0.4909	0.07364
4	Land productivity indicator in livestock	LPIL_N	15	0.0171	0.00257
5	Aquaculture	Aquacul_N	7.5	0.0690	0.00511
6	Fishery	Fisher_N	7.5	0.0680	0.00510
7	Soil use capability	Soil_Capa_N	15	0.3192	0.04788
8	Formal labor	Formal_Lab_N	10	0.1039	0.01039
		Total	100	0.2247	0.25419

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022b)

3.5.1 Rural technical capability

Here, technical capabilities include the use of technologies and explicit or scientific knowledge by peasants or farmers so as to increase the productivity of land. Some items related to the farms' technical capability were identified in the latest Colombian rural census performed during 2013 (see Table 7) by DANE.

Table 7 Items of rural technical capabilities

Variable
Type of agricultural machinery
Agricultural buildings
Water sources for agricultural use and irrigation districts
Topics that the farmer states have received capacity-building
Credits for financial leverage of agricultural activities
Soils use protection and restrictions
Type of energy applied in the agricultural activities

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE (2016e, pp. 6–7)

Then, I calculated some factors per municipality according to the data available. The weight of each factor is symmetrical (0.125) to achieve the indicator's final value. Table 8 shows those factors and describes their results in a national scope. The remainder of statistical procedures to arrive at the result are portrayed in Appendix B.5. The national rural technical capacity has a mean of 0.2378, disclosing a wide heterogeneity within the sector, but at the same time indicating the state and market incapacity to spread fundamental knowledge and very basic technologies or services for make of the agriculture a vital contributor to the economy.

Table 8 Factors descriptive values at the national level

N°	Factors of technical capability	Mean	SD	Max	Min
1	Farms that have machinery	0.180	0.150	0.754	0.001
2	Farms that use artificial sources of energy	0.339	0.196	0.896	0.000
3	Farms that use chemical fertilizers	0.275	0.173	0.852	0.000
4	Farms that use chemical herb/pesticides	0.264	0.183	0.903	0.000
5	Farms that have received a financial credit	0.105	0.075	0.507	0.000
6	Farms have received capacity-building	0.166	0.158	0.877	0.000
7	Farms that have irrigation systems	0.134	0.130	0.718	0.000
8	Farms that have agricultural buildings	0.193	0.156	0.853	0.000

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE (2016c, 2016d)

3.5.2 Land productivity in large-scale agriculture

The agricultural commodities diversification and production at a large-scale are weak compared with the traditional methods. I identified the large-scale harvest per municipality, based on the modality of large-scale producers of the 2013 rural census; Table 9 portrays the key figures of commodities outcome. I calculated the yield per product in each municipality, and the weight of every variable is fitted based upon its basket or diversity of supply of these goods per municipality. The large-scale agriculture land productivity single indicator results from the yield's summation by the given weight. Appendix B.5.2 clarifies the method employed.

Table 9 Large-scale agricultural commodities area and production at the national level

N°	Variables	Sum	Mean	SD
1	Cocoa crop area (ha)	164,331.64	146.46	638.45
	Cocoa production "dry beans" (ton)	87,632.42	78.10	331.76
2	Coffee crop area (ha)	751,577.87	669.86	1,408.72
	Coffee production (ton)	776,522.20	692.09	1,443.91
3	Cotton crop area (ha)	28,881.47	25.74	221.68
	Cotton production (ton)	71,135.77	63.40	524.00
4	Other "sorghum, soybean" crop area (ha)	666,523.05	594.05	1,943.02
	Other "sorghum, soybean" production (ton)	292,966.83	261.11	733.78
5	Palm oil crop area (ha)	356,455.26	317.70	1,759.69
	Palm oil production "raw oil" (ton)	1,017,046.44	906.46	5,023.09
6	Rubber crop area (ha)	21,036.03	18.75	141.91
	Rubber production "dry latex" (ton)	26,586.90	23.70	213.07
7	Sugar cane crop area (ha)	220,783.07	196.78	1,580.63
	Sugar cane production (ton)	2,116,403.21	1,886.28	15,208.33
8	Tobacco crop area (ha)	18,777.01	16.74	118.78
	Tobacco production "dry leaf" (ton)	43,747.67	38.99	260.54
9	Unrefined brown sugar cane crop area (ha)	297,031.01	264.73	626.14
	Unrefined brown sugar cane production "Jaggery" (ton)	1,438,623.22	1,282.20	2,994.41
	Total area (ha)	2,525,396.40		
	Total production (ton)	5,870,664.68		

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE (2016b)

3.5.3 Land productivity in traditional agriculture

Peasants and small farmers are the main contributors to the national crop production. The agricultural outcomes that were not considered large-scale are set in a group of traditional producers. Based on the census method 245–268), Table 10 depicts the values of areas and production per item(s) in the Colombian territory as a whole.

Figure 3 Tree map of agricultural outcomes and its land

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE (2016b)

Procedures were similar to those mentioned above in large-scale agriculture but essentially changed in types of weights due to the diversity of crops (see Appendix B.5.3). Accordingly, the total agricultural area is 7,023,699.29 hectares, and its production comes to 33,679,979.29 tonnes. Figure 3, Panel a summarises the country's agricultural output; each plot by colour discriminates the product's contribution to the national outcome. Figure 3, Panel b on the right illustrates the proportion of land that each product uses. In this line, in Colombia, the products catalogued as traditional have a higher production than large-scale agriculture, and their productivity is quite similar (see mean of Table 6).

Table 10 Traditional agriculture area and production at national level

N°	Variables	sum	mean	SD
1	Avocado crop area (ha)	74,991.18	66.84	234.35
	Avocado production (ton)	442,652.16	394.52	1,480.31
2	Banana for exportation crop area (ha)	47,541.92	42.37	590.43
	Banana for exportation production (ton)	1,711,386.14	1,525.30	21,339.40
3	Banana crop area (ha)	141,587.24	126.19	426.32
	Banana production (ton)	813,970.04	725.46	2,635.11
4	Cassava crop area (ha)	443,929.63	395.66	906.61
	Cassava production (ton)	4,869,506.97	4,340.02	9,113.90
5	Citrus fruits crop area (ha)	143,552.03	127.94	318.74
	Citrus fruits production (ton)	1,681,876.76	1,499.00	4,239.29
6	Condiment aromatics plants crop area (ha)	41,479.90	36.97	155.49
	Condiment aromatics plants crop production (ton)	92,738.00	82.65	378.44
7	Flowers and Foliage crop area (ha)	13,110.12	11.68	57.97
	Flowers and Foliage production (ton)	320,358.25	285.52	1,808.58
8	Forests plants crop area (ha)	106,092.23	94.56	380.44
	Forests plants production (ton)	1,040,971.98	927.78	4,038.32
9	Other cereals crop area (ha)	91,196.95	81.28	359.32
	Other cereals production (ton)	74,661.42	66.54	296.57
10	Other fruits crop area (ha)	474,248.04	422.68	1,016.35
	Other fruits production (ton)	727,252.17	648.17	1,464.43
11	Other tubers crop area (ton)	203,089.67	181.01	642.06
	Other tubers production (ha)	521,112.26	464.45	1,544.18
12	Papaya crop area (ha)	20,675.75	18.43	68.06
	Papaya production (ton)	514,934.91	458.94	2,206.04
13	Pineapple crop area (ha)	95,501.35	85.12	326.03
	Pineapple production (ton)	1,854,163.36	1,652.55	7,212.83
14	Plantain crop area (ha)	840,764.52	749.34	1,776.91
	Plantain production (ton)	4,831,240.92	4,305.92	10,247.19
15	Potato crop area (ha)	172,016.08	153.31	778.73
	Potato production (ton)	2,742,348.46	2,444.16	12,815.65
16	Rice crop area (ha)	473,165.84	421.72	1,890.29
	Rice production (ton)	2,425,572.65	2,161.83	11,005.95
17	Vegetable production (ton)	1,433,021.88	1,277.20	3,609.89
	Vegetables crop area (ha)	233,702.97	208.29	545.98
18	White maize crop area (ha)	233,751.30	208.33	455.95
	White maize production (ton)	838,461.62	747.29	1,763.69
19	Yellow maize crop area (ha)	329,883.57	294.01	868.35
	Yellow maize production "dry grain" (ton)	1,191,107.27	1,061.59	3,633.16
	Total area (ha)	4,498,302.89		
	Total production (ton)	27,809,314.64		

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE (2016b)

3.5.4 Land productivity in livestock

The use of land for livestock is usually unproductive. The values extracted from the 2013 Colombian rural census to describe the livestock are a mix. Thus, I set up livestock per factor at the national level descriptively, adjacent to the land available for such end at the same level, which is depicted in Table 11. The column Grazing Livestock Units (GLU) denotes coefficients of livestock unit per hectare for South America, following the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). In the donkeys, horses, and mules, the mixed values of the census allow us to posit the mean of each coefficient used for international comparisons. Also, the GLU for buffalo is the FAO estimation to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.

Table 11 Grazing livestock and grassland at the national level

Livestock per units (heads)	sum	mean	SD	GLU
Cattle	21,502,811	19,164.72	34,639.20	0.70
Goats	753,778	671.82	8,225.26	0.10
Sheep	777,513	692.97	6,000.87	0.10
Donkeys, horses and mules	1,211,889	1,080.11	1,812.06	0.58
Buffalo	175,492	156.41	616.53	0.70
Chickens	720,368,173	642,039.37	2,621,035.32	0.01
Pigs	5,001,978	4,458.09	15,726.30	0.25
Total	749,791,634			
Pasture (ha)	24,797,933	22,102	85,853	
Stubble (ha)	9,628,687	8,582	24,887	
Agricultural buildings (ha)	121,406	108	271	
Total	34,548,027			

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE, (2016e) & FAO (2011, p. 37)

Figure 4 Tree map of the expected land livestock demanded

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE, (2016e) & FAO (2011, p. 37)

I employ the proposed land productivity indicator in livestock, using the valuation of the Livestock Land Available (LLA) and the expected Livestock Land Productivity (SLP), whose procedures are presented in Appendix B.5.4. As a result, the nationwide LLA is 24,489,053 hectares, and the indicator has a negative performance of -29.12%. Figure 4 illustrates the plots

of land demanded to achieve the production values pointed out in the second column of Table 11 based on the GLU averages.

3.5.5 Fisheries and aquaculture

The fishing and aquaculture industries are weak, underutilising the two oceans and hydrologic advantages. According to data available in the 2013 rural census, the fishery is described only as farms with aquaculture units and those that performed fishing without distinction between salty or fresh waters. Unfortunately, as the has noticed in Colombia, the sector's data collection is lacking. Table 12 details descriptive data of the sector at a national level. The index results from farms with these productive systems in each municipality, divided by the number of farms per unit of analysis. Finally, the indices were min-max normalised.

Table 12 Factor and index of aquaculture and fisheries

N°	Factor	sum	mean	SD
1	Farms with aquaculture	25,084	22.357	31.596
2	Farms with fisheries	101,904	90.824	322.723
	Total	126,988		
N°	Index	mean	SD	max
1	Aquaculture	0.0138	0.0182	0.200
2	Fishery	0.0655	0.1714	0.963

Based on DANE, (2016e)

3.5.6 Soil use capability

The capability of the Colombian soils requires technology and scientific knowledge to be improved. A soil's capability classification is based on its classes from one to eight (see Appendix B.5.5, Table B.5.5.1). Further, an accumulative subclass classification system specifies five certain constraining factors for each soils cartographic unit. Accordingly, the class and subclass define the suitable agrologic classification for the cartographic unit; class one is the best soil, and class eight the most meagre. The subclasses are represented by lowercase letters that indicate slope or mountain ranges (= p), erosion (= e), soils (= s), moisture (= h), and climate (= c). As a result, I identified 104 classes of soil use capability in Colombia. Table 13 illustrates the findings as a whole, where column X_m is the area (in percentage), and Bj the soil capability index.

However, the body of water areas, which represents 1.683%, and the urban areas (0.1639%) are overlooked for our aims. Thus, the Colombian Soils Capability (SC) sum comes to 0.2844, or in the soil capacity scale, the country has on average, a soil class of six with four subclasses. Appendix B.5.5 considers the method to achieve those findings.

Table 13 Colombia's soil capability

Class	X_m	B_j	SC	Class	X_m	B_j	SC	Class	X_m	B_j	SC
1	0.0746	1	0.000746	2	0.0191	0.875	0.0002	3	0.0401	0.75	0.0003
				2c	0.1845	0.85	0.0016	3c	0.1112	0.725	0.0008
				2s	0.2064	0.85	0.0018	3e	0.0237	0.725	0.0002
				2e	0.0027	0.85	0	3h	0.0175	0.725	0.0001
				2sh	0.003	0.825	0	3p	0.0389	0.725	0.0003
				2es	0.0012	0.825	0	3s	0.7764	0.725	0.0056
				2ec	0.0008	0.825	0	3hs	0.4386	0.7	0.0031
				2sc	0.0953	0.825	0.0008	3es	0.015	0.7	0.0001
								3ps	0.0274	0.7	0.0002
								3sc	0.8165	0.7	0.0057
								3pe	0.0002	0.7	0
								3ec	0.0057	0.7	0
								3pc	0.0132	0.7	0.0001
								3sh	0.032	0.7	0.0002
								3sec	0.039	0.675	0.0003
								3psc	0.0295	0.675	0.0002
Total	0.0746		0.00075	Total	0.513		0.00434	Total	2.4248		0.0172

Class	X_m	B_j	SC	Class	X_m	B_j	SC	Class	X_m	B_j	SC
4	0.2259	0.625	0.0014	5	0.089	0.5	0.0004	6	0.1228	0.375	0.0005
4c	0.0071	0.6	0	5c	0.0733	0.475	0.0003	6c	0.2598	0.35	0.0009
4e	0.188	0.6	0.0011	5e	0.0205	0.475	0.0001	6e	0.0367	0.35	0.0001
4h	0.1377	0.6	0.0008	5h	3.9324	0.475	0.0187	6h	0.0196	0.35	0.0001
4p	0.4142	0.6	0.0025	5s	0.5725	0.475	0.0027	6p	2.6034	0.35	0.0091
4s	3.4206	0.6	0.0205	5es	0.0001	0.45	0	6s	5.1944	0.35	0.0182
4es	0.4662	0.575	0.0027	5ec	0.0064	0.45	0	6hs	0.5916	0.325	0.0019
4hs	1.4476	0.575	0.0083	5hs	5.328	0.45	0.024	6hc	0.0003	0.325	0
4sc	1.6826	0.575	0.0097	5esc	0	0.425	0	6sc	0.9563	0.325	0.0031
4ec	0.015	0.575	0.0001	5pes	0.0013	0.425	0	6pe	1.625	0.325	0.0053
4pc	0.0833	0.575	0.0005					6pc	0.2353	0.325	0.0008
4pe	0.0755	0.575	0.0004					6ec	0.0219	0.325	0.0001
4ps	0.3314	0.575	0.0019					6ps	3.5005	0.325	0.0114
4hsc	0.432	0.55	0.0024					6es	2.3174	0.325	0.0075
4pes	0.1424	0.55	0.0008					6esc	0.0725	0.3	0.0002
4psc	0.0682	0.55	0.0004					6psc	0.1841	0.3	0.0006
4sec	0.096	0.55	0.0005					6pse	0.1589	0.3	0.0005
4pesc	0.0053	0.525	0					6pec	0.0209	0.3	0.0001
								6pesc	0.0037	0.275	0
Total	9.2387		0.0541	Total	10.0236		0.0463	Total	17.9251		0.0602

Class	X_m	B_j	SC	Class	X_m	B_j	SC
7	0.0717	0.25	0.0002	8	14.82	0.125	0.0185
7c	0.6236	0.225	0.0014	8c	0.0004	0.1	0
7e	1.112	0.225	0.0025	8e	0.0141	0.1	0
7h	0.5401	0.225	0.0012	8h	1.3941	0.1	0.0014
7p	12.6675	0.225	0.0285	8p	2.7001	0.1	0.0027
7s	0.8055	0.225	0.0018	8s	0.0694	0.1	0.0001
7ec	0.2042	0.2	0.0004	8ch	0.0011	0.075	0
7es	3.7139	0.2	0.0074	8hs	0.1531	0.075	0.0001
7hs	0.4072	0.2	0.0008	8pc	0.4172	0.075	0.0003
7pc	0.9684	0.2	0.0019	8pe	0.0579	0.075	0
7ps	5.7113	0.2	0.0114	8ps	0.2986	0.075	0.0002
7pe	4.4696	0.2	0.0089	8pes	0.2893	0.05	0.0001
7sc	0.5659	0.2	0.0011	8psc	0.0319	0.05	0
7esc	5.1427	0.175	0.009	8hsc	0.0024	0.05	0
7pes	0.5353	0.175	0.0009				
7hsc	0.0029	0.175	0				
7pec	0.0294	0.175	0.0001				
7psc	0.1317	0.175	0.0002				
Total	37.7031		0.0779	Total	20.2503		0.0236

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022b)

3.5.7 Formal labour

Colombia has rampant informal labour figures, particularly in 2016, when the formal labour rate was 31.52% in toto Table 14 illustrates the values obtained nationwide, while Appendix

provides the method to achieve those values. To end with the composite indicator, in I posit some caveats.

Table 14 Colombia's labour market

Estimator	Working age population	Formal workers population	Formal labour rate
Max	4,860,921	2,779,741	99%
Min	67	1	0.01%
Mean	24,507	7,725	10.39%
SD	163,026	92,695	11%
Total	27,497,074	8,667,326	31.52%

Source: Own elaboration based on data extracted from Ministerio de Trabajo (2016), DANE (2018c, 2018d)

3.6. Empirical results

I used ordinary least-squares (OLS) and negative binomial (NB) regressions to model rural poverty's structural determinants, compare its upshots, and support the final models' validity (the R syntax is available in Appendix B.8). OLS is congruent with the earliest analysis (see panels e and f, Appendix B.6), evidencing linear and dispersed correlations between the response variable and some explanatory/control variables. The application of NB regression models obeyed the dispersion count data and noted that the conditional variance exceeded the conditional mean, as Table 15 portrays. No year's effect conditioners are employed here due to the data constraints; thus, the generalised estimation is based on the best fitted datasets, for each variable from 2012–2018, or its mean when several years were available. I advanced two scenarios of data processing. In the first, the analysis included all 1,122 units, whereas the second scenario excludes each province's capital city (32) to reduce a likely outlier's robust influence.

Table 15 Summary statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Variance	Min	Max	N
Rural Poverty (%)	48.234	18.052	325.901	7.315	99.250	1,122
Rural Technical Progress (index)	0.402	0.127	0.0162	0	1	1,122
Rural property concentration (rural Gini coefficient)	0.721	0.092	0.0084	0.389	1	1,122
Importations of Agricultural-based goods (Norm)	0.002	0.030	0.0009	0	1	1,122
Homicides (per 1000 inhabitants)	0.258	0.255	0.0651	0	2	1,122
Subversive actions (number)	5.405	156.114	24,371.58	0	5,229	1,122
Forced Displacement (number)	1,401.204	6,583.828	43,346,790	0	178,426	1,122
Coca crops (Ha)	50.229	279.970	78,383.65	0	6,558	1,122
Infrastructure (index)	0.095	0.112	0.0126	0	1	1,122
Agricultural higher education (index)	0.007	0.0467	0.0021	0	1	1,122
Distance from the center (km. sq.)	397.869	257.225	66,164.77	0	1,664	1,122
Population	43,011.135	253,826.2	$64,427^6$	279	7,412,566	1,122
Area (Km2)	1,016.904	3,197.146	10,221,741	15.835	65,597	1,122

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022b)

In this chapter, I want to explain rural poverty's structural determinants rather than predict them, carrying the constructs' design without accounting for potential endogeneity. Usually, the quality of endogenous variables is estimated using instrumental ones, but in this case considering the assumption of no correlation between the error term (E) and the regressors (Xs) which I called response variables. The argument to discarded endogeneity is that as long as the Xs are non-random or because they are fixed there is no correlation with E, then the estimator is not going to be bias. In this line, the datasets of the supplementary material are available for future predictive inquiries. However, the heteroscedasticity effect in the OLS regression is potentially managed via robust standard errors.

Before the regression models, I identified some partial correlations with rural standards of living (see panels a, b, c, and d of Appendix B.6). In the first scenario of all the municipalities, we find that rural inequality, agricultural higher education, rural technological progress, and infrastructure are considerably negatively correlated in a range of -0.312 to -0.154 with the response variable; further, positive correlation coefficients addressing rural poverty appear with control variables as distance, area, and, to a lesser extent, coca crops (0.516 to 0.171). Similarly, in the second scenario all the explanatory variables, including importation of agro-based goods, infrastructure, agricultural higher education supply, and the population, are appreciably negatively correlated with rural poverty (between -0.311 to -0.124). On the other hand, positive correlation coefficients exist with a higher value for distance, followed by area, coca, and forced displacement in a range of 0.572 to 0.120.

3.6.1 Stagnation and land concentration

The inferential results support the LAS argument that land concentration is not the only crucial determinant associated with stagnation or, concisely, rural poverty. H.1 is partly excluded, by virtue of a high incidence of statistical significance. Table 16 depicts the rural inequality variable test, in all across models, either for the first or second scenario. We can notice a highly significant negative regression coefficient in all models, which suggests that as the explanatory variable increases, the response variable tends to decrease. In other words, when the rural Gini coefficient goes up, rural poverty tends to bring down. In the NB regression models (Appendix B.7), the associations have the same behaviour in all eight models. The coefficients opt for a little adjustment among scenarios, given that it fits better in the second. Accordingly, in the countryside, rural inequality is consistently associated with less poverty. This enables us not to discard, that regions with high land concentration are less prone to rural poverty than regions with better rural land equality. There are historical facts to this, because the *latifundios* use -

Table 16 Structural determinants of rural poverty in Colombia (2012-2018), municipalities OLS models

Variables	First scenario				Second scenario			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Rural Technical Progress	-19.854***	-22.207***	-12.869***	-14.950***	-16.966***	-18.812***	-11.747***	-13.835***
	(3.989)	(4.178)	(3.358)	(3.501)	(4.073)	(4.227)	(3.423)	(3.548)
Rural Inequality	-57.825***	-58.688***	-31.845***	-34.560***	-54.434***	-55.708***	-29.914***	-32.383***
	(5.533)	(5.509)	(4.591)	(4.561)	(5.706)	(5.593)	(4.673)	(4.603)
Importations	-37.312**	-39.668**	150.964***	209.698***	-1,039.718***	-1,409.802***	-665.381**	-795.699**
	(16.573)	(16.301)	(43.304)	(44.035)	(217.944)	(223.473)	(334.669)	(344.172)
Violence		0.727		2.34		0.857		2.347
		(2.156)		(1.747)		(2.129)		(1.718)
Rebellion		0.0002		-0.002		-0.0001		-0.003
		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)		(0.003)
Forced Displacement		0.0002***		0.0003***		0.0005***		0.0004***
		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)
Coca		0.009***		0.002		0.006***		0.002
		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)		(0.002)
Infrastructure			-21.465***	-21.990***			-14.724***	-14.625***
			(4.263)	(4.238)			(4.569)	(4.515)
Agricultural Higher education			-16.302	-14.944			-70.405***	-73.155***
			(15.319)	(15.106)			(24.856)	(24.36)
Distance			0.032***	0.032***			0.034***	0.033***
			(0.002)	(0.002)			(0.002)	(0.002)
Population			-0.00002***	-0.00003***			-0.00002	-0.00003*
			(0.00001)	(0.00001)			(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Area			0.001***	0.001***			0.001***	0.001***
			(0.0001)	(0.0001)			(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Constant	98.029***	98.663***	64.910***	67.082***	95.402***	96.222***	62.886***	64.972***
	(4.189)	(4.166)	(3.650)	(3.627)	(4.291)	(4.207)	(3.697)	(3.641)
Observations	1122	1,122	1,122	1122	1090	1,090	1,090	1090
R^2	0.121	0.156	0.436	0.456	0.132	0.182	0.451	0.476
Adjusted R^2	0.118	0.150	0.432	0.45	0.129	0.176	0.446	0.47
Residual Std.	16.952	16.642	13.600	13.393	16.749	16.288	13.353	13.063
	(df = 1118)	(df = 1114)	(df =1113)	(df =1109)	(df = 1086)	(df = 1082)	(df = 1081)	(df = 1077)
F Statistic	51.095***	29.306***	107.763***	77.314***	54.842***	34.337***	110.804***	81.558***
	(df = 3; 1118)	(df = 7;1114)	(df=8;1113)	(df=12;1109)	(df = 3; 1086)	(df = 7; 1082)	(df = 8;1081)	(df=12;1077)
RMSE	16.72755	16.50354	13.8226	13.3151	16.30313	16.2214	13.33222	12.98527

Source: Own elaboration . Note: Statistical significance *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses.

colonial schemes to make the land productive, for instance, through sharecroppers. The path-dependence policies searching the sector's modernisation via incentives oriented to large landowners, make that the peasants, landless and subfamily farmers always look for livelihood in land owned by the powerful. Also, thanks to a tiny standard deviation or homogeneity of high land inequality allows bearing that explanation. Thus, a paradox of land redistribution emerges, because a land reform redistribution-driven scheme does not guarantee the change of these antique productive lock-ins and, to the contrary, can unleash more rural poverty.

3.6.2 Rural technical progress

The LAS thesis which posits the paramount role of technical progress towards development is consistently formalised for the Colombian agricultural sector. The eight OLS models tested (Table 16) denote a highly significant association between technical progress and rural poverty. The same models tested using NB (Appendix B.7) reinforce the effects, with a negative coefficient in pervasive fashion for both methods. Indeed, in scenario one and two the effect prevails, accentuating the coefficients' fits in the scenario without provinces' capitals. Therefore, H.2 is confirmed, because there is a negative link: when rural technical progress grows, rural poverty is prone to decline. Nonetheless, one can observe that the standard errors are less substantial compared with other explanatory variables, indicating a more precise coefficients estimation for both regression methods. Indeed, to resolve the paradox of land redistribution, the reforms must stress on push and foster the new owners' engagement with technical progress. Besides that, the set of policies must emphasise on landowners who are or will be in restitution processes. That is to say, spreading a countryside culture that privileges rural technical progress as a precondition for rural equality.

3.6.3 Dependency

The consistency of associations between the importation of agro-based goods and the parameter fluctuates, constrained according to the scenario and other structural determinants (Table 16 and Appendix B.7). In models three and four of both methods, the effect is positive, resulting in a highly significant association. In the former model, I extracted the civil war construct, and in the latter, all the structural determinants are included. In that way, I formalised the LAS prediction (H.3). An augmented importation of rural-based goods tends to elevate rural poverty, including all the population. The centre-periphery determinants are more relevant than the civil war construct to explain the links between the elites' behaviour of mimicking consumption of the global centre to display ostentation in the provinces' capitals, and the rural impoverishment of the countryside. To reinforce the role of the nation's accentuated dependency eroding the

rural standard of living, the coefficients of all models in the second scenario, either in OLS or NB, portray negative associations. When the parameter goes up and the volume of importations decreases, the periphery is incapable of imitating the centre's consumption behaviour, basically because they have fewer incomes and consume domestic agro-based goods.

3.6.4 Center-periphery

The control variables that configure the centre-periphery construct indicate ditches that enlarge. However, I tested the construct in models three and four, the difference of residuals or the estimation redundancy, including the provinces' capitals, which could indicate spurious results. So, in models seven and eight of Table 16, infrastructure and agricultural higher education have a highly significant adverse effect in the response variable; besides, in the same models, distance and area entail positive coefficients with a high statistical significance (near-zero). infrastructure and agricultural higher education have a highly significant adverse effect in the response variable; further, in the same models, distance and area entail positive coefficients with a high statistical significance (near-zero). The population seems to have an irrelevant effect on the parameter. So, at constant values, when rural poverty grows, infrastructure and higher education in agriculture are liable to be lower, while distance and area tend to be wider. Thus H.4 is not rejected; indeed, the centre-periphery construct is key in the LAS modelling assumptions, thanks to the essential contribution to the models' fit represented in R^2 differences between each other. Further, the NB (Appendix B.7) enforces the construct's status with quite similar reactions in models seven and eight. These facts formalise the incapacity of the state to offer public goods and services in the periphery.

3.6.5 Civil war

The control variables of violence, rebellion, forced displacement, and coca frame the civil war construct, which is incongruent in determining the parameter performance. We can observe that both violence and rebellion have no association with the response variable, while violence shows in models four and eight of NB (Appendix B.7) a modest significant but inconsistent effect. The variables of forced displacement and coca crops are highly associated with rural poverty (see models two and six Table 16). Coca crops tend to increase when rural poverty is elevated, a causality that overlooks the centre-periphery construct. After examining explanatory variables and the civil war construct, coca's role is essential and more representative in the second scenario due to a best-fitted coefficient. Forced displacement is the most consistent variable of civil war that influences rural poverty positively; when the latter increases, forced displacement tends to grow. As an effect evidenced across all models of both methods, in that

way ─ thanks to the demobilisation of FARC-EP and the legacy of AUC in the formation of BACRIM paramilitaries, besides the disdain of hard-right administrations to guarantee the property rights of the powerless ─ one can presume political challenges for any rural reform.

3.7. Conclusions

This chapter revisits developmental LAS assumptions formalising them into Colombia's rural sector based on national public data gathered between 2011–2020. This genuine framework's policy guideline is applicable today and likely must be refined in the pursuit of peace and development for the Colombian rural sector. Based on the empirical results and the addressed theoretical notions, I suggest a set of insights that seek an escape to the egregious cycle of rural poverty that is as antique as the war itself and congruent with the term agricultural policy and its provisions contained in the 2016 peace settlement.

The provision, formalisation, and restitution of land are coherent with the powerless' social demands and the former rebel's grievances for land property in the countryside. However, there is not an expropriation-driven reform itself. Albeit, whether or not the strategy's emphasis is the redistribution, some points require prior analysis. The paradox of land redistribution prevention demands a conditional strategy, a decisive fostering of technical progress to disassemble heterogeneous structures between regions and within agricultural industries. That is to say, it is necessary to reduce the regional dispersion of every single indicator that configures the rural technical progress indicator and for the latter as a whole. So, by virtue of the weak Research and Innovation (R&I) intensity, according to the World Bank (2020), having an average of 0.256% of the GDP during 2010-18 in Colombia ─ while Argentina invests 0.587% and Brazil 1.220% in the same period ─ it is definitive to encourage such investment that can upgrade the sector performance, its industries and finally reduce poverty. The sources to foster the R&I in agriculture could come from instruments such as fines or expropriation of unproductive land, alongside better taxation of imported agriculture-based goods.

The provisions of regional development programmes and infrastructure and soils are related to technical progress and centre-periphery assumptions. However, R&I are crucial to foster the invention of new domestic agriculture-based goods with high value-added features, which can substitute the imported goods or even be exported and promote optimal and sustainable land use. Without the human capital able to undertake these innovations, the investment could be wasted in corruption. In front of this, before an aggressive R&I strategy, the improvement and placement of tertiary education programmes in agriculture in the periphery is imperative, including the vast rural young population. Indeed, education degrees

could escort the land restitution or grant land to those who completed studies and research, which will be productive by the farms or agricultural firms created by them but must particularly be directed towards victims of the civil war and former combatants of all parties ─ in line with the accord's provision devoted to regional development programmes for places affected by war. The infrastructure construction in the periphery is vital to dynamise the trade of the new firms' products and the entry of public goods and services to narrow these ditches.

Social development provisions of the accord ranging from health, education, household, poverty, and capacity-building are cross-sectional to the rural poverty defeat. To sum up: as we note in the final models four and eight (Table 16) with an R^2 of 0.456 and 0.476, respectively, it indicates a decent model's data fit, but also a root-mean-square error (RMSE) 13.315 for the first scenario and 12.985 for the second one. This supports the closeness to explain or predict ─ refining endogeneity concerns ─ the response variable. The NB method (Appendix B.7), model eight, is the one with a minimum Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), demonstrating a better fit. The last provision, food security, is essential because most people have access to food in Colombia, which reduced starvation. The issue is not food access but quality, with diets based on a large consumption of high carbohydrate foods, saturated fats, and sugars, causing undernourishment and a high incidence of overweight, obesity and chronic illnesses. So, the crops of cassava, plantains, and potatoes require R&I to produce foods with better nutrients or products based on these raw materials and increase the production of vegetables, fruits, cereals, and fish that are labour-force intensive industries. The marijuana and coca cultivation to develop legal products is a feasible option to pursue industrial diversification and employment.

A native top-down set of policies addressed to reform the structural determinants of rural poverty, strengthen the rule of law, and ensure the consequent implementation of the peace accord can change the actual underdevelopment rural model. This state incapacity has transformed the countryside as the stage of brutality and exclusion in Colombian history. Nevertheless, warmongering, rent-seeking elites have captured democracy and are the main obstacle preventing institutional changes towards inclusiveness. For instance, this is borne out from the formal government of Uribe Velez, whose association with paramilitaries to achieve his election and coalition of clientelism networks towards constitutional reform for his re-election are indisputable. During that administration, the main rural programme made for peasants affected by the free trade agreement with the US (*Agro Ingreso Seguro*) delivered grants of around USD 8,620,780 for drug kingpins, *latifindistas* and the president himself.

Recently, the informal administration of Uribe Velez, represented by his protégé in office Duque Márquez (2018-22), jeopardises the implementation of the peace accord. Indeed, the return of brutality in the rural periphery is evident. Since 2018, 228 FARC-EP ex-combatants have been murdered, 2019 registered 36 massacres (i.e., the highest number since 2014) and 2020 54 of these carnages, and since the ratification of the peace accord, there were 378 killings of political activists and human rights defenders. Thus, the elites' reaction to the accord implementation results in bloodsheds in the countryside because they refuse to lose power, and in the centre, urban informed citizenry and alternative parties manifests its anxieties about peace with massive protests. These forms of political participation that foster citizens' informed judgment and activism in the periphery are hushed by armed wings of the powerful. Because they require these votes to secure election, this is the crucial democratic trait in Colombia that was overlooked in this chapter, as also the informal institutions enforced by the civil society and the state which sustain an exclusive set of rules. These elements can be a fruitful structural determinants of rural poverty for future research.

CHAPTER FOUR

PARTY POLITICS AMID CIVIL WAR: BRUTALITY, NARCOTRAFFICKING AND CORRUPTION IN COLOMBIA'S TRANSITION

4.1. Introduction

In liberal democracies, party politics organize the citizenry participation to self-govern the masses' future, and the conformed political parties enforce diverse sets of rules to increase crowd support. Nevertheless, as Michels (1915) pointed out, there is a tendency towards oligarchy in all party organizations. Hence, the origin of civil wars can lie in the incapacity of such elites to spread homogeneously promises of prosperity for the population and also undermine the political participation of fired-up opposition groups. So, if political leaders' bottom line is to achieve and maintain the parties in power, what kind of informal rules are enforced by these organizations when democracy is permeated by civil war? Previous studies on party politics and civil war have been focused on the transition of rebel groups to politics (B. Acosta, 2014; Ishiyama and Widmeier, 2020; Manning and Smith, 2019; Pearce, 2020; Söderberg, 2021), the identity change of former guerrillas in politics (Ishiyama, 2019), how these brand new parties weaken strong parties (Reilly, 2013), the role of political parties in forced displacement (Balcells & Steele, 2016), or in post-war the victors' electoral success (Daly, 2019). Regarding such rules, informal institutions' scholarship of party politics in the case of Latin America have addressed typology proposals to understand their effectiveness (Helmke and Levitsky, 2006) or the organizational formality and informality of two representative parties in that region (Freidenberg & Levitsky, 2006). In these studies, it is difficult to explicate whether some political parties in office determine the enforcement of informal institutions linked with civil war or peace.

I shall respond to the question above examining the case of the long-standing Colombian civil war. This case is quite peculiar because this nation has a democracy almost as old as its own intrastate conflict, but this study focuses on the 2016 peace settlement between the national government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC-EP), because this milestone has the potential to be an anxious transition towards peacebuilding. Prior scholarship about the party politics of this case has been devoted to the implications of democratization and the dangers of holding competitive elections during civil war (Steele & Schubiger, 2018), or the deinstitutionalization of the country's party system (Albarracín et al., 2018; Dargent & Muñoz, 2011), and in a repetitive fashion the research of the rejected 2016 peace ratification referendum through: personal (Kreiman & Masullo, 2020; Tellez, 2019b),

relational (Acosta, 2021; Koopman, 2020), structural (Bell, 2016; Pechenkina & Gamboa, 2019) or cultural (Burnyeat, 2020; Gomez-Suarez, 2017) causes. Accordingly, the Colombian informal institutions of civil war enforced by its political parties have hitherto been neglected.

I argue that during the 2010s, the Colombian political parties in power enforced or prevented in a divergent manner three coercive informal institutions, namely: brutality, narcotics trafficking and corruption, thus jeopardizing a satisfactory transition to peace. Therefore, this paper aims to examine empirically the enforcement of these informal rules by the 19 active Colombian political parties and the Significant Groups of Citizens (GSC) during the 2011–2020 time span, in which occurred a vital part of the latter and promising peace process. To do so, I shall clarify concepts of party politics embedded in civil war, and then hypothesize the enforcement presumption by political parties and the GSC of the informal institutions under inquiry. Afterwards it is vital to consider the historical contingencies of the partisanship milieu within the civil war to identify its actors, which will be recreated very briefly. The informal rules are estimated according to a novel brutality composite indicator, the original corruption indicator and areas with coca crops per municipality for each time period in office of executive branch positions (i.e., mayors, governors and presidents). To test the hypotheses, all elected parties in the time span of the branch vote were systematized in a binary mode, so I will resort to panel data spatial regression, pooled ordinary least square (OLS), fixed effects (FE), and dummy variable regression with FE (LSDVFE) as modelling techniques. The results reject significantly the null hypotheses and put in evidence the political parties that enforce the tacit rules of civil war in Colombia.

This paper contributes to the understanding of informal political institutions in democracies besieged by civil war, but particularly the enforcer role of political organizations in power. Moreover, the modelling includes some covariates such as the presence of rebel groups, pro-government militias, voter turnout and risk of electoral fraud, disclosing the implication of other political actors.

4.2. Party politics in a nation at civil war

The origin of civil wars lies in the incapacity of the incumbents to spread credible promises of resources allocation and public utilities to the masses, or also the overt abuse of power in office to cut off the political participation of the dissatisfied citizenry, in both cases and under conditions of liberal democracy the role of political parties is vital in organizing national polity. Echoing the rational choice axioms of Downs (1957), each political party (or coalition) is a team of persons who seek office to enjoy power, gaining this via a higher number of votes by

means of a differentiated ideology, resources and information vis-à-vis its competitors. Once elected, the aim is to implement policies to achieve further constituencies and then improve its re-election options. But a vital democracy trait is that winners cannot use the powers of office to vitiate the ability of losers to compete in the next election. Therefore, the formal existence of a political party requires a critical mass (i.e., a percentage of the electorate defined by the Constitution) of citizens that share the ideas and strategies of its leaders to achieve and preserve power (White, 2006). Party politics is indiscriminate in conflict scenarios, Michels (1915) pointed out that the principles of a party are often a stumbling-block to increasing its membership, thus the leaders are in favour of disregarding such kinds of principles to capitalize on electoral advantage.

Hence, when the expectations of access to public utilities and democracy are captured by local elites, there is a threshold for the appearance of belligerent groups. On the one hand, there are the rebel groups, such as military organizations that fight against the central government using violence to compete for political power, and on the other, armed groups such as pro-government militias or criminal groups with purely profit motives (Ishiyama, 2019). So, following the meaning of civil war as 'armed combat within the boundaries of a recognized sovereign entity between parties subject to a common authority at the outset of the hostilities' (Salyvas, 2006, p. 17), the scholarship on party politics and civil war has been mainly focused on how rebel organizations make their transitions from arms to politics by means of a rebel party (B. Acosta, 2014; Ishiyama and Widmeier, 2020; Manning and Smith, 2019; Pearce, 2020; Söderberg, 2021), its identity change (Ishiyama, 2019), or undermining the development of strong parties (Reilly, 2013). Weinstein (2006) asks why some civil wars last so much longer than others and based on a micro-level he points that it is due to the organization of the rebel group, such as its membership, policies, structure, and culture.

However, Fjelde (2020) states that, on a macro-level, strong political parties enhance the prospect for peaceful electoral dynamics. Besides rebel parties, different typologies of political parties could be applied in a democracy experiencing intrastate war. First, there is the strong ruling party in autocratic settings, according to Meng (2021), which is one that can perpetuate its own existence, beyond the influence of individual leaders, indeed, 'by increasing accountability towards citizens and promoting elite cohesion around regime maintenance, regimes with strong ruling parties should experience fewer outbreaks of civil conflict' (p. 536). Second, there are the ethnic parties which are internally heterogeneous and dispersed: most Indians live in mono-ethnic indigenous communities located far from the cities. In the case of

Colombia, indigenous movements are relatively united, institutionalized and even based in former rebel indigenous groups prior constitutional reform, and also mainly allied with leftist parties (Van Cott, 2005). Third, there are the charismatic parties, according to Pedahzur and Brichta (2002), which are linked with the right wing, have a total symbiosis between the leader and the organizational identity of the party, with a cohesive dominant coalition held together by loyalty to the leader and identified as a highly centralized organization, and which, lastly, subverts the socio-political status quo. Finally, there are evangelical parties, which consolidate their constituencies considering the church-affiliation (i.e., Protestantism, Pentecostals, or Evangelicals); their political leaders are the same religious shepherds or their protégés. In the words of Sotelo and Arocena (2021), these parties put forward an intense conservative and patriarchal agenda, assuming themselves to be conservative and right wing, opposed to the left, feminists, secularists, LGBT groups, abortion and sexual rights.

The existing literature on party politics in an ongoing civil war or into its transition for peacebuilding does not resolve which are the roles performed by political parties in the enforcement of politically and socially atrocious informal institutions that perpetuate the conflict.

4.3. Party informal institutions

The meaning of institutions has evolved since the seminal works of classic authors such as Hobbes, Rousseau and Webber and addressing them surpasses the bounds of this paper. Hence, I propose building the notion considering institutions according to North (1990, p. 3), who pointed out that these are, 'the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction'. Nevertheless, Hodgson (1995, 2006) identified the thread between the institutions or formal and informal rules in constraining human behavior. Accordingly, while the informal rules are tacit and enforced by peers, the formal rules are written in a legal frame and enforced by courts. Acemoğlu and Robinson (2012) classify institutions as extractive or inclusive but overlook their nature. More precisely, institutions are 'social systems of explicit and tacit rules' (Lara-Rodríguez, 2018, p. 309). Then, the concern is to what extent tacit rules reinforce the explicit ones, and herein lies the importance of these informal institutions in fulfilling the end to reduce uncertainties.

Regarding political informal institutions Helmke and Levitsky (2006, p. 5), define informal rules as: 'socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels'. Thus, brand new labels of these tacit rules emerge, for instance, as predatory informal rules, which in the words of Schwartz (2021, p. 51) are

'institutional arrangements that subvert the official activities state organizations are typically expected to perform (i.e., the collection of tax revenue, monopolization of violence, and provision of basic goods and services)'. That is to say, informal institutions on the edge of that which could be considered as criminal or illegal. Accordingly, it is feasible to posit that the political parties governing can play a vital role in the reinforcement of the informal rules of civil war.

Our first informal institution is the war-driven intentional psychological or physical harming between individuals identified as members of the same emerging nation. In spite of, for instance, the estimation of individual exposure to civil war or household level victimization index in Burundi to quantify violence in wartime (Voors et al., 2012; Voors & Bulte, 2014). I argue that in our case the violence goes much further. Brutality as a cultural modality is maintained and perpetuated through the production, repetition, and objectification of a violence that exceeds its concept, an extreme (i.e., irrepressible, unthinkable, or unspeakable) violence against another person or even groups, including one or the merging of modalities, such as: homicide; violent death; pillage; robbery; vandalism; arson; forcible displacement; kidnapping; hostage taking; detention; beating; torture; mutilation; rape; desecration of dead bodies (Salyvas, 2006, p. 20; Sánchez, 2020), among others. Counterinsurgent armies are notoriously brutal, with significant collateral damage to civilians in the pursuit of weakening rebels' foundations, but at the same time their actions foster their victims to join guerrilla groups, in particular, to protect non-combatants from further attacks from pro-government armed groups (Weinstein, 2006). Rebel groups use a different repertoire of brutality, inflicted mainly on local elites, through looting household property; extorting payments from entrepreneurs; kidnapping; mugging; attacks on public utilities; and trading in illegal economy to fund its operation. Also, the extent of brutality takes the form of armed illegal groups competing to informally rule a territory and control its illegal economic assets. To sum up, brutality indicates the use of egregious forms of merciless violence perpetrated by belligerent actors so as to capture a turf.

For Fjelde (2020) strong political parties reduce the risk of electoral violence by internal routinization, that is, rules of engagement and decision-making being formalized, regularized, and complied, she argues that this 'routinization' reduces the risk of electoral violence by imposing constraints on political leaders. In irregular or non-irregular civil wars, political parties as such as ethnic groups, sect, tribe or profession associated with rivals by contested armed groups arrive to situations of 'colective targeting', being victims, for instance, of forced displacement (Balcells & Steele, 2016). Daly (2019) argues that in postwar, political parties

with violent past or the victors performed well electorally depending in the military balance of power, this through two mechanisms that she called 'security voting' and 'mitigating the violent past', discarding the arguments of vengeful or coerced voting. Moreover, informal and semi-official pro-government militias equipped for violence are linked to military institution, the president, a minister or political parties, upwarding by five times the occurrence of civil war (Carey et al., 2013). This body of knowledge overlooked peace process transition situations on the one hand and discarded the violence (or brutality) as informal coercive institution enforced within party politics.

Mazzei (2009) noticed in Colombia that paramilitaries, sometimes with government support, regularly targeted rebel parties, unions, indigenous rights leaders, human rights and NGO workers, journalists who spoke out against such groups, teachers, incumbents and judicial officials investigating paramilitary crimes. Indeed, the United Self-defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) and informal or semi-official Paramilitary Self Defense Groups/Death Squads are by Carey et al., (2013) catalogued as Colombian pro-government militias. Yet, in this country the Patriotic Union (UP) party vote share has a positive and significant effect in the level of forced displacement, although, similar to a third party vote share, this, in a spatial modelling during the 1990s municipal councils elections (Balcells & Steele, 2016). Meanwhile, electoral violence is used to reduce uncertainty about the electoral outcome, e.g. disenfranchise voters, intimidate, demobilize or even kill opposition, or to influence vote choice at the ballot (Fjelde, 2020). These strategies have been widely implemented by paramilitary groups (Acemoğlu, Robinson, and Santos 2013; Gutiérrez 2015). Accordingly, democratic institutions can be undermined by civil wars and in synchrony fuel new forms of political violence: in Colombia wartime, democratic reforms as well as decentralization are likely to provoke an escalation of violence (Steele & Schubiger, 2018). Lastly, two studies using regression discontinuity modelling offer some assumptions of the role of political parties triggering forms of violence in Colombia. On the one hand, based upon mayoral elections during 1997-2015 with a restricted sample to races between a paramilitary-politician and a nonparamilitary-politician at the end of the electoral contest (515 observations), Daly (2022) finds that being ruled by a militia-linked mayor significantly reduces levels of insecurity and crime, but has pernicious effects on the provision of public utilities. On the other hand, Fergusson et al., (2021) covering the same elections but from 1997 to 2011 and a sample of 152 races and 43 parties (13 left-wing, 2 right-wing, and 28 neither), discover that electing a left-wing mayor leads to a substantial and statistically significant increase in subsequent right-wing paramilitary violence. Hence, one can understand

that the scholarship of the political parties role into this civil war has been concentrated in its linkages with progovernment militias and in a lesser extent left-wing political organizations, neglecting the party politics and the political party as concrete subject of investigation. Moreover, through the lens of institutions the Colombian constitution, as prime set of formal rules, delegates to the executive branch the responsibility of guaranteeing and coordinating with law enforcement agencies the state's legitimate monopoly of the use of violence into its administrative territories, these incumbents (i.e., president, governors, and mayors) were elected to each position, thanks to the political party or coalition back up, it follows that:

H.1: Some political parties in power increase or reduce the risk of brutality.

Narcotrafficking is the second political tacit rule. As Collier (2007) observed, 95% of global narcotics production is from countries in conflict. In Latin America narcotic trafficking cartels have for decades been suborning politicians, criminal gangs have managed to 'rent' cooperative figures throughout Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela some Central American and island states (Rotberg, 2019). Such that, to describe the relationships between drug kingpins and polity, the prefix 'narco' is commonly associated with notions such as narco-state, narco-democracies, narco-authoritarianism, narcostatization and so forth. In this context, Chouvy (2016) points to three criteria to classify a country as a narco-state: first, the area is covered by illegal drug crops; second, the size of the narcotic market overall in terms of the percentage of the national economy (GDP); and third and most important for our aims, the state-sponsorship of illegal drug production and trafficking. Moreover, in narco-states, leaders of the most powerful trafficking groups occupy high-ranking government positions and misuse state structures for their own illicit business, mainly via the ineffectiveness of the law enforcement agencies (Paoli et al., 2007).

The drugs political-criminal networks are shaped by several actors playing different interests' roles, such as: Organized Crime Groups (OCGs), guerrillas, pro-government militias, law enforcement agencies, the government, political parties, the United States (US) government, civil society organizations, economic elites, transnational crime cartels, among others (Rensselaer W & Thoumi, 2003). Political parties as guerrilla groups are politically motivated, in contrast OCGs and drug cartels pursuit local power through turf war with other groups or the state and are economically motivated to control the illicit markets. Nevertheless, when partisans are elected with support of OCGs and once performing roles of authority fails to provide effective protection or pursuit the rivals of its underworld allies, stimulate the cartel to murder the politician; also, the risk of the incumbent's die soars (mainly in mayoral and municipalities

council positions), when there is a decisive implementation of antidrug policies (Trejo & Ley, 2020). So, the creation of private militias happens in the midst of subnational electoral democratization and the alternation of political parties, because the OCG renegotiation of informal protection with incoming opposition authorities by means of bribes and coercion collapse (Trejo & Ley, 2018).

The collusion between political parties and OCG or cartels in Colombia, despite having been repetitively argued, shows that such bonds are sustained in weak empirical evidence. Since the 90's the links between the *Liberal* party and the Medellin and Cali cartels are disclosed by Clawson & Rensselaer (1996), or in *exposés* of the alleged relationships between the former President Uribe-Velez [2002-2010] and its echelons with the Medellin and the Mexican Sinaloa cartels (Brodzinsky, 2012; Casey, 2018), as well paramilitary groups (S. Romero, 2007). Nevertheless, the Colombian cocaine industry has adapted itself to face anti-narco policies, since the war against drugs sponsored by the US that allowed the neutralization of powerful drug lords such as Escobar or Rodríguez brothers in the 90s. Today, drug trafficking is embedded in a global chain of local operations, and Colombia seems to assume a supplier role rather than a big trading player because Mexican cartels are taking the control of logistics and contraband routes to North American markets combined with the emerging position of Venezuela towards European markets (Millán-Quijano, 2019).

The civil war belligerent parties are also crucial actors of the narco-state. The linkages between Colombian rebel groups and narcotics trafficking began in the 80s and 90s, with tariffs on the production or the use of smuggling routes of coca paste or coca hydrochloride in the captured turf. Later, in the 2000s, these groups became producers and exporters of the narcotic (Clawson and Rensselaer W. 1996; Millán-Quijano 2019). On the other hand, in the 80s powerful drug cartels conjoined with cattle ranchers and large estate owners, organizing anti-insurgency squads, but with the cartels' downfall in the mid-90s and their first approximation with polity, paramilitary groups headed by less conspicuous kingpins took possession of the traffic networks with a hard informal political engagement (Echandía Castilla, 2013; Thoumi, 2009). Thus, in the cocaine value chain which begins with the coca bush cultivation, the role of officials of the central and decentralized governmental agencies are crucial in undermining or enforcing the rule of narco. In order to achieve this, these incumbents were elected in the ballot boxes supported by a political party or coalition, which prompted us to the presumption:

H.2: Certain political parties governing elevate or shrink the likelihood of narcotics trafficking.

Corruption is our third informal institution of Colombian party politics, which is the misuse of public power for private gain (Rose-Ackerman, 2016, p. 91). Echoing this author when a quid pro quo exists (i.e., a favor granted in return for something) the principal can be corrupted by a price and an agent through a bribe, thus when the quid pro quo is tacit the former can be corrupted by a gift, and the latter by a tip. As a result, the lack of trust in the state leads to principals or agents winning/gaining a reputation of providing private actors with the means to fulfil their interests. Indeed, in patrimonial systems, incumbents are the patrons and the private are the clients, so a reverse relationship leads to a clientelistic state. According to Johnston (2009) Elite Cartel corruption can bridge public with private sectors, political with economic power, mediated by political parties which intervene bureaucracy and guarantee collusion that builds and sustains elite networks or even organized crime − such was the case in the *partitocrazia* of Italy. In this light, the strong political party in Mexico the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) facilitated narcotic trafficking cartels, such that, the political parties are powerful locally, so are traffickers and organized crime, each feeds off the other, parasitically (Rotberg, 2019, p. 23). Due the necessity of parties for funding to compete under conditions of uncertainty, this can set the stage for political corruption; indeed, corrupt campaign financing has discouraged participation in political parties, hence reducing meaningful competition (Mwangi, 2008). Accordingly, in premature liberal democracies, some political parties are organizations that concentrate interests without reputational constraints to achieve the election of principals, who once in power allocate power in networks of clients and patrons favoring their contributors during the campaign and the electoral race. Or there are political parties that through deliberation and clean reputational background posit their candidates, fund their campaigns with the support of organic movements and public money and once in power pursue anticorruption policies and accountability.

Previous academic research about corruption in Colombia has been focused on electoral preferences. For instance, corruption accusation coming from the leading newspaper drive down levels of support and trust for corrupt politicians relative to identical accusation made against the same candidates by NGOs and the judiciary (Botero et al., 2015). Greater rates of perceived corruption are associated with reduced political participation, whereas experience with corruption leads to higher participation (Školník, 2020). Moreover, Carreras & Vera (2018) show that well informed voters regarding corrupt politicians in race, lowers the intention to turn out in future elections, and that corruption demobilizes voters even when these politicians are able to provide works to their constituencies. Based on the analysis of news

reports of the watchdog agency *Procuraduria General de la Nación* for the years 2004-2015, Martinez (2018) operationalized data (1381 cases in 516 municipalities) of mayor and other incumbents prosecuted, found guilty, and removed from office, to state that higher resources royalties lead to increase the probability of administrative corruption. Regarding the electoral system, from a qualitative approach, Albarracín et al., (2018) argue that the networks of the provision of goods in exchange for political support or clientelism in the country became more decentralized and atomized, vote buying on the eve or day of elections replaced long-term bonds between client and patron. Nonetheless, this not only happened during elections: a public contractor states that the Colombian government allocates, to governors or senators, contracts in which the principal has a 20% price, half of which is for him/herself and the other to fund the campaign of one copartisan, thus its constituencies support the president in the polls (Robinson, 2016).

Scholarship devoted to understanding the role of political parties reinforcing corruption in Colombia during a peace process transition has been hitherto overlooked. The mayors play a role in corruption, in territories with the presence of paramilitaries the 10% price of every public contract was split between the municipal administration and to tip the illegal-armed squad (Gutiérrez, 2015), although, this price or even higher is implicitly acknowledged by private actors that execute public contracts with municipalities. Hence, patrimonialism is a tacit rule spread and enforced in every public decentralized organization. As Lara-Rodríguez (2018, 2021) points out, thanks to the Law 80 of 1993, public administrative tasks are mainly moved forward by contractors without establishing a formal public employment relationship; they are recruited based on external social relations with the few full-time incumbents who maintain political–business connections with the local oligarchs, thus the contractors must support the campaign of the full-time officials' political allies if they want to preserve the job. Regarding the role of political parties, stemming from data and estimation methods mentioned in our first coercive informal institution, Fergusson et al., (2021, p. 11) 'find no evidence that left-wing mayors or their secretaries are more corrupt than municipal executive officials from other parties'. So probably, there are political parties that during its mandates corruption is self-reinforced, or parties that being in office reduce the likelihood to reproduce this tacit rule. This allows us to surmise that:

H.3: With such political parties in office the possibility of corruption is high or low.

4.4 Colombian civil war and its party politics

The Colombian political regimes are particular. Using institutionalized political parties, informal political rules in this nation had failed to meet the prerequisites of achieving a strong centralized state and the rule of law (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012). Hence, civil war is intimately related to the nation-building history of Colombia, and the gradual resolution of such conflicts has relied on polity and at some grade democratic arrangements. Accordingly, this section provides a timeline of the party politics contingencies, arriving at the period of the last peace settlement transition.

4.1.1 Civil war and its bipartisanship hatred (1819-1930)

Since the independence of the Spanish Crown in 1819, Colombia created and enforced various political constitutions and shaped political actors to calm hostilities. As a starting point, headed by the general of the victorious creole armies Simón Bolivar the 1821 *Gran Colombia* constitution regulated progressive freedom of enslaved people, reformed the Catholic Church, and declared the government as popular and representative; the current countries of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Panamá and disputed lands of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru and Brazil formed its territory (Larosa & Mejía, 2014). With the death of Bolivar (1830), the states of Ecuador and Venezuela disintegrated the latter constitution diplomatically, and with the remained territory the *Nueva Granada* was conformed in 1831, so that, proclaiming its constitution a year after, giving more power to the province's delegates and defining clearly the power state branches, its defense army and elections (Alonso, 2014). Nevertheless, between 1838-1842 some *caudillos* or warlords of the leading provinces started a war against the central government, demanding better attributions, but being subsequently defeated by the army, which founded the origin of a new constitution (1843), strengthening the presidents' power, education reforms, and the defense of the status quo (Uribe de H., 2003).

The origin of the *Liberal* party (1848) occurs as a reaction to the ruling aristocrat and ecclesiastic regime, stemming from ideals of a free market and private initiative. But almost simultaneously, the *Conservador* party (1849) is formally formed to safeguard social and religious traditions and also protectionism (Uribe de H., 2003). Due to the first *Liberal* President at the office and his slavery abolishment and dead penalty ban principles, among others, in 1851, the *Conservador* militancy encouraged a civil war stopped by the central government during that year, allowing the Republic proclamation through the 1853 constitution, in which consolidate the right to vote, divide state and church and foster municipal autonomy (Jurado, 2011). The revolution of 1854 was a *coup de etát* headed by general Melo

with the support of craftspersons and a faction of the *Liberal* opposed to reducing importation tariffs and oligarchs' rule. Hence, the two political parties allied themselves and built an army called *constitucionalistas* which beat the eight-month *de facto* regime. In 1856 a proportion of unsatisfied supporters of both parties formed a powerful nationalist coalition called *Partido Nacional,* nominating its presidential candidate. During a *Conservador* administration, the 1858 constitution declared the *Confederación Granadina*, a confederation integrated by eight states also this set of explicit rules delegated more autonomy for each state and defined a four-year term for senators and President (Larosa & Mejía, 2014).

Between 1860-1862 a new intrastate war took place; on the one side, the *Conservador* government was supported by their administered states, and the *Liberal* in companionship with its partisan states whose has been declared sovereigns against the central government, on the other; the insurrection side won allowing the federal constitution (1863) of the *Estados Unidos de Colombia* (González-Rojas, 2005). From 1876 to 1877, the *Conservador* revolted against the *Liberal* administration to tackle the implantation of a lay education system; despite the rooted religious beliefs of the population, the ruling party prevailed during that confrontation (Oviedo, 2014). After that, a radical wing of the *Liberal* party entered into conflict (1884-1885) with the government led by Nuñez of the *Partido Nacional* due to its strong notions of centralism, nevertheless, *Conservador* and moderated *Liberal* leaders supported the government; despite this, in 1885 a failed *coup de état* was carried out by a group of the conservatives (Larosa & Mejía, 2014). In this light, the new constitution of 1886 was ratified and enforced for rather than a century. The political system gets back to being centralized with traits of hyper-presidentialism, better powers for the church, and a threshold for a *Conservador* hegemony. Later, the war of the thousand days (1899-1902) was an irregular conflict of radical *Liberal* members vs the government in the hands of the *Partido Nacional*, albeit the government defeated the little wars, Panama was an exception and the Wisconsin Treaty ended the war (Demarest, 2001); declaring a draw but with one provision devoted to removing *Partido Nacional* from the political arena.

4.1.2 *La Violencia* briefly

Albeit there was a formal attempt of the Armed Forces and an ephemeral military council to monopolize the legitimate use of the violence, the ruling bipartisanship made peace to get their war back. The conservatives ruled the country from 1886 up to 1930, the same year of the creation of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC) (Duque-Daza, 2012), during this period, the universal male suffrage was re-instituted, and the bipartisan animosity yet lies up, but even

increased when the *Liberal* won the presidency consecutively from 1930 to 1946 ─ being Eduardo Santos elected in 1938 to 1942 ─ these sixteen years are known to some historians as the little *Violencia* (Gutiérrez Sanín, 2017). Afterwards, in 1946 a *Conservador* President was elected; however, in 1948, the assassination of the *Liberal* and socialist leader Gaitán unleashed a ferocious revolt in the capital city known as the *Bogotazo*, such that a new bipartisan civil war named *La Violencia* began, spreading it in all the nation's territory (Larosa & Mejía, 2014, p. 114), on one side were groups of *Bandoleros* or armed peasants who organized assaults against larger estate owners and oligarchs. And Armed Forces jointly with private squads, such as, *Chulavitas* or *Pájaros* at the service of conservative elites on the other side. Later, occurs the successful *coup de état* to the *Conservador* administration by the Armed Forces headed by the lieutenant general Rojas-Pinilla in 1953, during the only formal military dictatorship, the female right to vote was recognized, the PCC was banned, and the first rebel group peace agreement called *Declaración de Sogamoso* demobilized the Eastern Plains *Liberal* Guerrilla (Espinosa, 2020). Although the partisan confrontation continued latent, the two parties celebrated an alliance ─ the *Liberal* headed by the further later President Lleras-Camargo ─ to revoke the military council regime and promising end formally the partisan war, the *Pacto de Benidorm* & *Sitgest* formalized via referendum in 1957 proclaimed the *Frente Nacional* (Schuster, 2009). The deal's core term was a shift in power for four years toward each party, lasting 16 years up to 1974. Also, once the deal began to be enforced the demobilized leaders of the *Liberal* guerrilla were assassinated.

4.1.3 Extermination of rebel parties

In a formal opposition to the *Frente Nacional,* a leftist faction of the *Liberal* conformed the Revolutionary Liberal Movement (MRL) party (1959–1967) and led by the former military president Rojas-Pinilla the party National Popular Alliance (ANAPO) began in 1961. Moreover, the permanent exclusion of the PCC from the national debate, as well as the sound victory of the Cuban Revolution, were building blocks for the emergence of the rebel groups. Thus, with the aftermath of *La Violencia* still active in the countryside, four major insurgent organizations appeared: the birth of the FARC-EP dates back to May 1964, supported by few surviving PCC members, civil war victims and peasants (Karl 2017: 217). Second, encouraged by the youth wing of the MRL and Cuban patronage, in July 1964 the Marxist-Leninist National Liberation Army (ELN) was formed (Stanford University, 2019). Third, the Popular Liberalization Army (EPL) was created in 1967, defending communism and socialism ideologies. But, as a wing of the ELN, and bearing a Maoist heterodox approach, the formal

Revolutionary and Independent Worker Movement (MOIR) was founded in 1970 (Archila, 2008). And fourth, in the *Frente Nacional* offspring, presumably fraudulent presidential election results in 1970, in which the Conservador party defeated the ANAPO's leader and candidate, elicited the foundation of the rebel group Movement April 19th (M19).

Although the organization of leftist or former rebel political parties was in its apex, its participation was repressed by pro-government militias or OCGs led by anti-communist drug-kingpins, eliciting a narcotrafficking political violence era. The coalition National United Opposition (UNO) worked from 1972 to 1982, during which the PCC, MOIR, and a group of ANAPO achieved some seats in congress. In 1984, during a *Conservador* government, peace talks with the FARC-EP allowed the foundation of the Patriotic Union (UP) party (1985) integrated with a significant part of PCC partisans, as a political provision of a potential demobilization agreement that never happened. So, after several prior reforms, the centenary of the Constitution of 1886 allowed the popular election of governors and mayors through popular election, where before the former were elected by the president himself, and the latter by the governors, and induced the electoral code sanction. Hence, in 1986 significant UP candidates were elected, but in spite of that, a political genocide of the party was carried out by hard-right paramilitary groups (Cepeda, 2006).

The Movement of the Indigenous Authorities of Colombia (AICO[11]) was formalized in 1987, being the first ethnic political party. In 1990 the peace settlement with the rebel group M19 was signed, allowing the creation of the *Alianza Democrática M19* party. The presidential election of that year was a bloodbath, in which the leaders and candidates of M19, *Liberal* and on two occasions the UP, were assassinated by paramilitaries and the Armed Forces. So, a *Liberal* president was elected calling a Constituent Assembly in which, via the ballot box, M19 obtained 19 seats, and the UP two. In 1991 a second major rebel group lay down their arms: the EPL shifted to formal politics with its movement *Esperanza, Paz y Libertad* (Hope, Peace and Freedom), its partisans exterminated by paramilitaries and mainly FARC-EP squads, who considered them as traitors (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2020b).

4.1.4 A new constitution and drug-kingpins in politics

The 1991 constitution fostered party diversification, including the creation of two reserved seats in the Senate for Indians, and one reserved indigenous seat in the lower chamber (Van Cott 2005, p. 191) ─ prompting the creation of the ethnic party Indigenous Social Alliance (ASI), in

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[11] https://participacion.mininterior.gov.co/content/aico

which the demobilized indigenous rebel group *Quintín Lame* took part. In addition, the constitution provided financial support and free access to state-run media to legally recognize political parties and movements. Further, Law 70 of 1993 article 66 defines two seats in the lower chamber for black or Afro-Colombian communities. Nevertheless, with a brutish offensive of the Medellin drug cartel against the state in pursuance of impeding its extradition to the U.S., an investigation known as (*Proceso 8000*) 8,000 Process began to investigate whether the political campaigns of strong parties, and in particular *Liberal*, received funds from kingpins of the Cali cartel (Clawson and Rensselaer, 1996). Simultaneously, paramilitaries with the patronage of drug lords and cattle-ranchers, organized counterinsurgency squads in disputed territories, where the demobilized rebel groups had a presence, originating the foundation of the inter-paramilitary organization the AUC in 1997 (Mazzei, 2009, p. 93). In the same year, the *Cambio Radical*[12] (CR) party appeared, based on a group of former *Liberal* partisans, as well as the hard-right party *Convergencia Ciudadana* (CC), founded by a former member of M19. The following year, a *Conservador* administration was elected based on the collective expectation of FARC-EP demobilization, being the peace talks moved forward by almost four years in the demilitarized zone of *El Caguán* a failed attempt and leaving the rebel group militarily and financially strengthened.

4.1.5 multi-Party system and paramilitary rule

The 2000s were a turning point for the hegemony of the ruling bipartisanship, but the war continued and transformed itself as an all-cost offence against FARC-EP and ELN, then called 'terrorists' groups'. In the political arena, the neo-Pentecostal party Independent Movement of Absolute Renewal (MIRA[13]) was founded in 2000. After having been rejected as a candidate of *Liberal*, the hard-right former governor Uribe-Vélez won the 2002 presidential election through an informal coalition between *Conservador*, the moderate *Liberal*, CR and CC, under the figure of a non-profit foundation called *Primero Colombia.* Accordingly, a political reform was found to make the Colombian party system more competitive and was carried out in 2003, reducing the power of party leaders and giving more political and financial autonomy to local candidates, reducing their need to join parties (Dargent & Muñoz, 2011). Also, to reduce fragmentation, define an electoral threshold of two per cent to maintain parties' legal recognition and recognize social movements or (GSC) which could enrol candidates by subscription of citizen's signatures. Indeed, the gradual dissolution of ANAPO and M19

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[12] https://www.partidocambioradical.org/nuestra-historia/
[13] https://partidomira.com/historico/historia-del-partido-politico-mira/

unleashed a new wave of opposition parties or a realignment of their foundations. The center *Verde*[14] party stemmed from a former M19 leader, also the leftist *Polo Democrático Alternativo*[15] (PDA) derived from former partisans of ANAPO, M19, PCC, MOIR, UP and independent movements. Similarly, streams of strong parties led by heirs of political legacies were reorganized or emerged – for instance, in 2004 Vargas-Lleras, grandson of a mentioned *Liberal* president of *Frente Nacional*, became the leader of the right CR. In 2005 the moderate right *Partido de la Unidad Nacional*[16] (P. de la U) was founded by Santos-Calderon, who's great was the mentioned 30s *Liberal* president.

Still in 2005, the constitution was emended mainly by legislators linked with the AUC (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2012, p. 382), or thanks to a direct lobbying nexus, through bribery with the administration (Semana, 2008) sanctioning the presidential re-election. Hence, in 2006 Uribe-Vélez was re-elected under his same coalition *Primero Colombia,* adding the recently formed P. de la U. The AUC demobilization took place in the same year under the justice and peace law, in which a ruling determined confessions from paramilitary leaders in return for amnesty, but without any formal reincorporation process of ex-combatants or political provisions, leading to the formation of BACRIM.[17] As a result dozens of legislators affiliated to pro-government political parties were arrested in the scandal called Parapolitics (Bakiner, 2020, p. 611); this included, eight *Liberal* and CR each, seven *Conservador*, six P. de la U, five CC, and ten from minor parties, a total of 26 members of the Senate and 18 members of the lower chamber at the end of 2009. In the latter year other constitutional reforms of the system were introduced, as a result of the Parapolitics scandal, the 'empty seat' mean that politicians elected but condemned could not be replaced by another member of the same party, increasing the threshold to legal recognition to three per cent, introducing harsh punishment for parties linked with illegal armed groups or narcotrafficking and pursuing formal coalitions and inter-party consultations (Batlle & Puyana, 2013). Additionally, with half of its elected members in prison, the CC party joined with other minor Parapolitical parties and created the National Integration Party (PIN) at the end of 2009.

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[14] https://www.alianzaverde.org.co/nosotros/historia
[15] https://www.polodemocratico.net/nuestro-partido/
[16] https://www.partidodelau.com/historia/
[17] Networks of Emerging Criminal Gangs such as *Urabeños* (Gulf Clan), the *Puntilleros*, and the *Pelusos*, dedicated to narcotrafficking, illegal taxation and criminal gold mining using local political capture strategies (Duncan and Suárez, 2019). Includes organizations of hit men such as *Oficina de Envigado* or the *Águilas Negras*.

4.1.6 A truculent peace process

In 2010, the P. de la U leader won the presidential election with the support of the *Liberal*, *Conservador*, CR, and the outgoing administration. The same year saw the birth of the Inclusion and Opportunities Movement (MIO) party, headed by a former PIN member and Senator arrested by Parapolitics and linked with narcotrafficking (Montero, 2011). In addition, the Afrovides ethnic party began, based on an Afro-Colombian quota headed by a congressman investigated by Parapolitics. So a new reform of the political system was approved: the 2011 parties' law regulated a gender quota of 30%, further punishment for double-affiliation politicians, and made the Electoral National Council (CNE) a strong enforcer of the party system (Batlle & Puyana, 2013). In the middle of 2011, FARC-EP and the government started a phase of informal peace talks, initiating the formal peace negotiation table in October 2012. Uribe-Vélez viewed the peace process as a betrayal and encouraged the organization of its own charismatic party called *Centro Democrático*[18] (CD) party in 2013, the same year that PIN changed its name to *Opción Ciudadana* (OC). That time also marks the beginning of the ethnic party Indigenous and Social Alternative Movement (MAIS[19]). The progress at the peace negotiating table contributed to strengthening the public opinion of the government, hence Santos-Calderon's re-election in 2014. Nevertheless, the following year the congress revoked the presidential re-election, which was only feasible by referendum or constituent assembly.

In 2016 the peace settlement was submitted to plebiscite for its ratification but was rejected by voters by a narrow margin of around 53,894 ballots, a bitter–sweet victory for the opposition headed by the CD, because the settlement would be modified based on the victors' suggestions and subsequently ratified through the Colombian Congress. Based on the second term of the settlement called political participation and its three provisions – (1) oppositions statute (security guarantees); (2) direct political participation; and (3) inclusive political participation – the 2017 political reform bill was carried out, in which the CNE could be reformed, e.g., with a shift in the selection of its members, providing it greater autonomy and promoting the use of digital platforms. In addition, a third consecutive term in the congress or assemblies was banned and the state's role in funding campaigns for emergent parties was boosted, but the bill would be filed. The rebel party formation of the Revolutionary Alternative Force of the Common (FARC[20]) took place in this year, with the certainty that thanks to the accord, five seats in each

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[18] https://www.centrodemocratico.com/
[19] https://www.mais.com.co/perfil/quienes-somos
[20] https://partidofarc.com.co/farc/nuestra-historia/

chamber would be for its partisans leaders for the next two terms. At the end of 2017 *Justa Libres* was formed as the second significant neo-Pentecostal party.

The 2018 presidential elections were won by the CD candidate Duque-Márquez, with the promise to reset the peace settlement, but being elected in questionable circumstances. A scheme of systematic vote-buying in north Colombia coordinated by a local drug kingpin called *Ñeñe* (killed in strange circumstances) under the command of the former president and Senator Uribe-Velez to favour his protégé for the second round of the presidential contest, was exposed (Guillén, 2020). In addition to that, in 2019 the Afro-Colombian Democratic Alliance (ADA) party, based on one Afro-ethnic seat of the House of Representatives, was established, this having the informal support of the ex-convicts and leaders of PIN and MIO, but with PIN member still in prison charged with bribery to influence the extradition of a FARC congressman under investigation (Semana, 2019), which elicited the conformation of splinter factions of the rebel party, so that some ex-guerrillas get back to arms. In 2020 Uribe-Velez became the first former president to be under arrest, accused of the obstruction of justice, risking prosecutions against him for bribery and fraud on the court. Meanwhile, the case of *Colombia Humana* party is particular. Led by a former M19 and PDA member, it started as a GSC called *Progresistas* in 2011, but because the political organization did not fulfil the CNE's requirements of being a party it was attached to the UP and was only formalized in the party system in 2021. Finally, FARC rebel party changed its name to *Comunes* in that year.

4.5 Data

Colombia is divided into 1,103 municipalities, 18 non-municipality areas, and San Andrés Island, so there are 1,122 local administrative entities. However, to be more pragmatic going forward, all are considered municipalities, our primary unit of analysis. The response variable is each of our three hypothesized informal institutions enforced during the 2011–2020 decade ─ this time span is pivotal because it includes the FARC-EP transition. To do so, for the first response variable, I propose a brutality composite indicator, for the second (narcotrafficking) the area covered of coca crops, and the third a corruption indicator. So, for the response variables I posit party-elected as a binary indicator: when the party won the election either alone or in coalition it has a value of one (1) and zero (0) if not (19 political parties and one GSC). In the time span two presidential elections (2014, 2018), and three gubernatorial and mayoral elections simultaneously (2011, 2015, 2019) are included. Lastly, some control variables, such as the presence of belligerent groups (i.e., Paramilitary, ELN, and FARC-EP), voter turnout and

electoral fraud risk were included. Data features and sources are portrayed in Table C.1 (see Appendix C1).

4.5.1 Response variables

4.5.1.1 Brutality indicator

There are three fatal acts of brutality perpetrated by the warring parties, which tacitly spread a strong political or power message for the citizenry, due to their cruelty and ferocious preparation. Echoing the National Center for Historical Memory (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, 2020a), first the (1) enforced disappearances, which encompass capture and retention, the former executed by state agents, presumably in legal terms, but from that moment resulting in an unknown location for the victim; and the latter executed by an armed squad with the aim of holding the victim and performing the murder on another venue; (2) massacres, a deliberate homicide of four or more helpless people in the same place, time and mode, with egregious public exposure of violence directly inflicted by the armed actor; and (3) targeted killings, the deliberate homicide of at least three helpless persons in the same mode, place and time perpetrated by the civil war actors or its participation. Figure 5 depicts values from 2011 to 2020 by the perpetrators. One can notice that the enforced disappearances have plummeted during the last decade, (i.e., 1047 in 2011 to 19 in 2020). Nevertheless, the massacres have a U pattern, because their recent numbers attain the same levels as those at the beginning of the 2010s. Targeted killings appear to be the most regular brutish act performed by the belligerents, as we can see in the right box of Figure 5, their levels fluctuating less (Max 926, Median 525, Min 333) with a disturbing positive tendency.

The perpetrators of these brutalities, identified during the 2010s, are mainly composed of unknown armed actors for the state and former paramilitaries. According to the data source of Figure 5, 57% of the enforced disappearances have been performed by an unknown agent, 24% by post-AUC paramilitaries and 18% by the rebels. The post-AUC paramilitaries executed 35% of massacres, followed by unknown agents with 32%, and rebel groups with 23%. Lastly, the rampant unknowing of the targeted killing perpetrators is critical because attains 47% of the reported cases, while the post-AUC groups are responsible by 28%, and finally guerrillas with the 20% of the proportion.

Figure 5 Mortal acts of brutality in Colombia by the perpetrator (2011–2020)

Notes: In targeted killings, the decade's values for gangs (15) and fragments of former armed groups (8) were not included.

There are other sets of non-mortal brutality acts performed that contribute to the ongoing civil war, which have been transforming the repertoire to infringe violence upon people. Figure 6 depicts 13 of these manifestations, so, the red line points out the victims of forced displacement in terms of the scale on the right-hand side of the plot. Although the peak of the 2013–2014 reaches nearly 311,500 per year, one can perceive that the ceasing of hostilities during the peace negotiation process and the peace accord ratification (2014–2017) depleted their intensity. This pattern is replicated by another ten of the remaining 12 manifestations of brutalization without

fatalities, which are indicated in the staked bars looking at the scale on the left of Figure 6. Although belongings and land dispossession, kidnapping, landmine/explosives, terrorism-clashes-attacks, torture and war-affected youth have seen a significant reduction since the beginning of the peace process, events, such as freedom and sexual crimes, death threats, or physical injuries remain almost stable. So, over the last three years confinement has become the preferred action of the warring parties to frighten people. Nonetheless, the significant reduction in the most used acts of brutality in 2020 can be explained by the mobility restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Figure 6 Non-mortal brutish acts in Colombia (2011–2020)

Source: Own elaboration based on *Unidad de Victimas* (2021)
Notes: A total of 52 unclassified victims were overlooked

Table 17 Brutality Indicator Variables (2012-2020)

Sub-indicator	Weight	Obs.	Mean	SD	Max
Enforced disappearances [E.Dis]	15%	10,107	0.1072	0.968	39
Massacres [Massc]	15%	10,107	0.0093	0.100	2
Targeted Killings [T.Kill]	15%	10,107	2.1879	2.105	76
Set of Non-mortal Acts [Non. Mort]	55%	10,107	243.434	1,158.7	57,650
Indicator	Weight	Obs.	Mean	SD	Max
Brutality Indicator [Brutal.Ind]	100%	8,976	0.0201	0.0533	0.6812

Source: Own elaboration based on data set Brutal.Ind (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)Notes: In square brackets of column one the name of each sub- and indicator The municipality of Busbanzá, Boyacá has no record in the victims' data sets (Unidad de Victimas, 2021) compared with the 2018 National Statistics Office population census (DANE, 2018a), thus the values were processed with the province's mean. The population census removed the municipalities of Santa Rita, and San José de Ocune in the province of Vichada, accordingly these former municipalities were not included

The brutality indicator was calculated as the following. (1) Per unit of analysis each three brutal mortal cases averaged by the period of government in office (Mayor, Governor, President), as well all the non-mortal brutality victims. For instance, for the mayoral race of 2011, I assigned

to each administration the average of these acts into its territory during 2012–2015 – for 2018's presidential race (2019–2020), or for 2019's gubernatorial and mayoral elections (2020), thus, the average is constrained to 2020's data availability. (2) Each of the four values were divided by the municipality population mean[21] during the same administration period. (3) This per capita amount was min–max normalized. Then it was multiplied per the sub-indicator weights that conform the brutality indicator and are allocated in column two of Table 17. The other columns denote descriptive figures of the raw data. (4) Lastly the summation of the sub-indicators determines the National Brutality Indicator, registered per administrative period, incorporated into the FINAL data set with the variable [Brutal.Ind]. So, the last row of this Table 17 describes the nationwide indicator averages during the entire decade. Figure 7 depicts the spatial distribution of the brutality indicator per administrative time period in the 2010's decade.

Figure 7 Colombia's brutality spatial distribution 2010s

Source: Own elaboration based on data set Brutal.Ind (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)

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[21] The annual values were calculated according to the exponential growth rate per quinquennium 2010–2015 and 2015–2020 per province (DANE 2010: 52), based on the results of the 2018 Colombian national census (DANE, 2018a).

4.5.1.2 Corruption indicator

According to the Colombian Attorney General's Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación, 2021) and the *Código Penal* or Criminal Law (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2000), corruption crimes are classified into five groups. Accordingly, processing more than two million national legal records carried out from 2011 to 2020, Figure 8 panel (a) depicts the 19 charges and number of cases of administrative corruption, panel (b) denotes the 17 crimes committed via electoral corruption; judicial corruption (see, panel d) points out the eight rules most infringed. Figure 8 panel (c) classifies the eight types of private corruption cases, and finally panel (e) elucidates the four further broken articles of Criminal Law related to fiscal corruption.

Figure 8 Nationwide cases of corruption by type of the crime and year of the fact (2011-2020)

Source: Own elaboration based on *Congreso de la República de Colombia* (2000) and *Fiscalía General de la Nación* (2021)

Notes: The articles' names are a free translation by the author considering the Colombian *Código Penal Ley* 599 *de* 2000. Records that do not cite explicitly an article in particular were included in the value of the article with grammatical binding subject.

As we can see, the national records of corruption during the 2010s are homogeneous with an average of nearly 24,000 new prosecutions per year. Nonetheless, as Figure 9 details, in 2020 the records seriously shrank (see total according to the right-hand side of the scale), likely thanks to the constraints of mobility because of the COVID-19 pandemic impacting any citizenry accountability effort. Albeit the group of judicial corruption is, by a high proportion, the set of dishonest behaviors further self-reinforced in the social system, the fraud on the court, obstruction of justice and perjury could be considered as customs. With regard to the administrative corruption, peculation, illegal public contracts, and the subgroup of bribes (Art. 404 to 407) are basically enforced by incumbents. Fiscal crimes had a rampant increase during the second half of the decade (excluding 2020), with the alleged omission of the tax authorities as a key perpetrated injury to the state's funding, completed by the supply of services or products in which the state has a monopoly (Art. 312). Also, one can observe a pattern of higher levels of electoral corruption which are quite elevated in regional and local election years (2011, 2015, 2019) compared to national ones (2014, 2018), with taking identity, freedom of choice, and judgement of voters as common targets of electoral lawbreakers.

Figure 9 National corruption records per group (2011-2020)

Source: Own elaboration based on *Fiscalía General de la Nación* (2021)

I understand that the aforementioned corruption behaviors are not equivalent, due to the fact that charges and punishments vary according to the explicit rules of the Colombian Criminal Law, in terms of bails, fines, or years in prison as the social cost to pay from who inflicted harm on society. Herein, the concern is an accurate measure of corruption rather than weighing which is harmless or egregious. Thus, the corruption indicator is built considering all corruption records per year (2012–2020) by unit of analysis, in four steps: (1) average of corruption facts by administration in office, that is to say the mean of cases in the four or available subsequent years of local, regional or national governments; (2) parameters were divided per the previously

used municipality population mean for the time period in question; (3) obtaining the corruption per capita, that values were min–max normalized per administrative period at national level; (4) the data set results [Corrupt.Ind] and their variable were incorporated into the FINAL data set (see Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a). Table 18 describes in the second row statistics of the corruption facts from the mined data of the nine years; the last row points out descriptive figures of the processed indicator. Lastly, I calculate the indicator's performance and its spatial distribution into the governing time periods in Figure 10.

Table 18 National corruption indicator (2012–2020)

Corruption Indicator	Obs.	Mean	SD	Max
Raw data of years	10,098	21.079	132.745	6,070
[Corrupt.Ind]	8,976	0.0798	0.0920	1

Source: Own elaboration based on data set Corrupt.Ind (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)
Notes: The municipality of Busbanzá, province of Boyacá have no record in the 2018 National Statistics Office population census (DANE, 2018a), thus values were processed according to data of the municipality's website.

Figure 10 Colombia's corruption spatial distribution 2010s

Source: Own elaboration based on data set Corrupt.Ind (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)

4.5.1.3 Narcotrafficking

Colombia is the world's notorious top cocaine producer in the 2010s, with growing perspectives of enlarging the supply and ruling the global market of this narcotic. In the first half of the decade (2011–2015) the Colombian slice of the global potential supply of cocaine hydrochloride was 42.43%, but in the second half (2015–2019) it reached an average of 64.06%. The coca bush crops, which are the main raw material, reveal a similar pattern: in the first half it performed 44.44%, and in the second it rose by 22.21% of the world harvesting. As Figure 11 denotes, one can assume that since the demobilization of FARC-EP, the coca cultivation and cocaine manufacturing achieved the largest figures ever, with a slope that presumes Colombia's lead position in cocaine narcotrafficking, globally.

Figure 11 World and Colombia's coca crops and potential cocaine production (2011–2020)

Source: Own elaboration based on United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2021b, p. 55, 2021a, p. 11–12)

The contribution of the cocaine industry to the Colombian GDP is near to 4% (La República, 2021). So, due to the fact that the potential manufacturing is based on the yield per coca bush hectare and the so-called *refinaderos* to refine the alkaloid are difficult to identify by law enforcement agencies, mainly because of the steep terrain and the associations of drug lords with public servants, I will use the number of hectares of coca crops to measure narcotrafficking, acknowledging that once the traffic-laundered money is inserted into the financial system its monitoring is further complicated, attaining all social echelons. Therefore, according to data of the Colombia's Drugs Observatory (ODC, 2020), the parameter was calculated per municipality. Firstly, the area average of coca fields was calculated in hectares, this, per time of administration in office [Coca.crops] (see, Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a). Secondly, the values were compiled in the FINAL data set. Descriptive data of the processed figures are

portrayed in Table 19, the measure unit being hectares, and finally, Figure 12 indicates the spatial distribution of coca crops in the time periods.

Table 19 Coca fields (2012–2020)

Item	Obs.	Mean	SD	Max
Raw data years	10,098	103.49	716.59	23,147.95
[Coca.crops]	8,976	114.86	758.38	19,613.29

Source: Own elaboration based on data set Coca.crops (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)

Figure 12 Colombia's coca crops spatial distribution 2010s

Source: Own elaboration based on data set Coca.crops (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)

4.5.2 Explanatory variables

4.5.2.1 Political parties

Based on the official results of every election for executive branch positions per unit of analysis during the time span, the political parties elected were systematized. Thus, I consider each political party and GSC as one explanatory variable, this recorded in a binary fashion, one (1)

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when the party was elected either in coalition, and zero (0) when it had not been elected. The elections are divided per category: mayors; governors; and president. The radars of Figure 13 depict elected parties per municipality, time period and category – for instance, panel a) denotes how most of the elected mayors belong to only six unique parties with coalitions being unnecessary to achieve local government, as we can perceive in Figure 13b. In gubernatorial elections it seems that the coalitions are vital to win, as illustrated in panel c) only the *Liberal* obtains a solid individual performance, but this was weakened in the 2019 race; indeed, in that year the coalition seems to have been an indisputable strategy to be elected in that contest (see Figure 13c). The elected presidential candidates' parties indicate that formal coalitions are a precondition to compete. Figure 13e shows the spectrum where each team won the election, but with the caveat that in both options GSC were allies. My party matrix was compiled in the FINAL data set (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a) and in Table C.2 Appendix C1 I illustrate the summary statistics.

Figure 13 Political parties elected at the executive branch (2011–2020)

(b)

Party or Coalition	Mayors elected			
	2011	2015	2019	Total
P. de la U.	258	181	94	533
Conservador.	197	156	119	472
Liberal.	182	156	106	444
Cambio Radical.	154	134	65	353
Centro Democrático.	0	56	73	129
ASI.	56	35	28	119
Verde.	48	25	44	117
Null and protest vote.	41	22	51	114
GSC.	58	13	28	99
Opción Ciudadana, ADA.	36	50	0	86
Cambio Radical and P. de la U.	5	38	25	68
Cambio Radical and Liberal.	5	16	22	43
MAIS.	0	21	20	41
				[196 rows more]

(d)

Party or Coalition	Governors elected			
	2011	2015	2019	Total
Liberal.	154	122	53	329
P. de la U.	148	91	5	244
GSC.	163	23	26	212
Verde and Liberal.	0	90	112	202
Cambio Radical, Liberal and P. de la U.	65	22	72	159
Conservador.	99	19	19	137
Liberal and Partido de la U.	98	32	0	130
Cambio Radical and Liberal.	11	104	15	130
Cambio Radical.	22	80	27	129
ASI, Cambio Radical, Liberal, Conservador, MAIS and P. de la U.	0	0	115	115
ASI, Cambio Radical, MAIS, and Partido de la U.	0	97	0	97
Verde, Cambio Radical, Partido de la U and GSC.	0	0	95	95
Verde.	84	5	5	94
				[71 rows more]

(f)

Coalition	President elected		
	2014	2018	Total
Conservador and Centro Democrático.	613		613
Verde, Cambio Radical, Liberal, P. de la U, Unión Patriotica., Polo Democrático Alternativo and MIRA.	509		509
Liberal, Conservador, Opción Ciudadana, Centro Democrático, GSC and MIRA.		849	849
Verde, MAIS, GSC, Unión Patriotica. GSC, Polo Democrático Alternativo, Colombia Humana and Comunes.		273	273
Total	1122	1122	2244

Source: Own elaboration based on data set FINAL (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a)

4.6. Empirical strategy

I built the data set to be balanced for panel data modelling, time periods (government period) on the one hand, and spatial units (municipalities) on the other, configuring each cross-sectional unit. I drive the heterogeneity issues in different ways. First, in a structural fashion splitting the different executive elections by their own executive branch categories: (1) mayors; (2) governors; and (3) president. So, the three data subsets keep their particularities – for instance, as the summary statistics Table C.2 (see Appendix C.1) points out for provincial and national executive elections, the parties' matrices are quite heterogeneous with volatile standard deviations (SD), eliciting matrix singularity issues or collinear vectors. The opposite occurs with the mayors' subset, where the SDs are more stable.

Thus, the panel data modelling is adapted to the heterogeneity adjustments, basically following the features of each of the three data subsets. First, for mayors, I use spatial econometrics; which, is the set of techniques to deal with methodological concerns elicited from considerations of spatial effects, in particular, spatial autocorrelation and spatial heterogeneity (Anselin, 2003). So, I am interested in the estimation of regressive models that incorporate spatial effects, and are based on classical panel data assumptions. To do this, I use the freeware GeoDa[22] 1.20.0.8 (Anselin, 2017). The spatial regression model suited for our interests is the spatial lag model (Equation 1), which includes a lagged response variable, where Wy is the spatially lagged response variable, matrix observations on the explanatory variable (X), ε the vector of error terms, ρ and β are parameters:

$$y = (\rho)Wy + X(\beta) + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

Subsequently, the modelling estimation is carried out by maximum likelihood, whose technical aspects are addressed by Anselin (2003, sec. 4) and are included in his GeoDa syntax; the spatial weights per cross-sectional unit are created using that software (.shp file is available in Lara-Rodríguez, (2022a)). Second, in the governors' provinces' data set, so as to reduce heterogeneity, I move forward some discrete variations, dividing three scenarios of cross-sectional units: (1) elected party or all parties which won; (2) winning party or party which won in the municipality and the province; and (3) parties in opposition or which won in the municipality but lost in the province. Thus, for each balanced panel, I run a classic OLS estimator regression considering every response variable. Accordingly, seeing that each panel indicates constants as time (t) and location (i), and to avoid omitted variable bias, the fixed

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[22] https://geodacenter.github.io/download.html

effect (FE) regression was a suitable modelling[23], where (*Y*) is the response variable, (*X*) the political party or control variable in measuring its causal effect on Y; also, the unobserved variables (*Z*), and *U* its error term, are detailed in Equation 2. Subsequently, to understand better the fixed effects, the OLS dummy variable regression with fixed effects (LSDVFE) is applied, by adding a dummy for each municipality to estimate a clear effect of the parties, or controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, each dummy can absorb the effects particular to each municipality.

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 Z_i + U_{it} \qquad (2)$$

And third, for the presidential parties or coalitions one can assume that these data are quite homogeneous because there are only two patterns per time period. So, I handle heterogeneity in the aforementioned fashion, dividing three scenarios of cross-sectional units (i.e., elected, in office and in opposition) and modelling using the pooled OLS and the FE; indeed, we do not run the OLS dummy variable regression (LSDV) with fixed effects because of severe collinearity issues. Lastly, for governors' and presidents' parties we use the *plm* package for R-programming (Croissant & Millo, 2008), the syntax is included in Appendix C.5 and the data in Lara-Rodríguez (2022a).

4.7. Results

4.7.1 Brutality partisan determinants

In a spatial regressive modelling with a high positive statistical significance, the mayors affiliated to the MIO party increase the enforcement of brutality, followed by partisans of the PDA and to a lesser extent the municipal governments of Afrovides. In contrast, there is a negative significant cause between brutality and the MAIS party, and to a lower degree CR, so the municipalities governed by these two political parties are quite prone to reinforce peace (Appendix C.2). Nevertheless, considering our control variables, we evidenced another determinant of brutality, such that the presence of paramilitaries and FARC-EP are highly positively related with the response variable, but in contrast the negative and significant coefficient of the presence of ELN rebels demonstrates that this group was not as sadistic as its counterparts. I posit these statements, based on Model 1 of Appendix C.2 with a decent R^2 of 0.414, the goodness of fit of 5,704.6 and a negative AIC. Also, we can assume

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[23] Although usually the panel data considered follow with random effects modelling, and then run a Hausmann test to decide whether to use fixed or random, the panels seem to be singular matrices and cannot be inverted; also, some vectors are collinear.

heteroscedasticity based on a substantial Breusch–Pagan test, and accordingly reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.

In the governors' category the pooled OLS models estimator is portrayed in Table C.3.1 (Appendix C.3), hence the FE in Table C.3.2, arriving to LSDVFE models illustrated in Table C.3.3. Herein the parties elected scenario is MIO, MIRA, UP and ASI have substantial positive antecedents with brutality, so a negative causal association took place in municipalities where the people voted for ADA, Humana, Justa Libres, CD, MAIS, CR and AICO. When the governor's party were MIRA or ASI, the response variable vigorously increased, followed by GSC and slightly less intense with MIO or Humana in power. Therefore, in the municipalities where the victorious governor pertains to Justa Libres, P. de la U, MAIS, CR or Verde the likelihood of less violence is superior, followed by AICO and at a lower level by CD. Regarding municipalities in opposition to the governor in charge, only when the UP won did the brutality consistently go up, with a reverse causality when Humana won, when the place was less violent. Finally, with regard to control variables, the paramilitaries' presence is consistently a positive determinant of brutality in any scenario; in contrast, municipalities where the ELN had a presence seem significantly less quick to merciless violence. These assertions are formalized by models one, four and seven of Table C.3.3, the Adjusted R^2 being 0.52, 0.55 and 0.47 respectively, and with a significant diagnostic test (F statistic) for the models one and four, so the results of our third scenario are inconclusive.

For the presidents' category I ran a pooled OLS model estimator depicted in Table C.4.1, allowing the application of FE models illustrated in Table C.4.2 (Appendix C.4). Due to the homogeneous data, in the first scenario only the rebel party FARC (Comunes) had an elevated positive statistical significance with brutality, on the one hand, while our covariates Paramilitaries or ELN presence and electoral fraud risk revealed the same trend, on the other. Also, municipalities with higher voter turnout tended to be less brutal. These observations are founded in a weak R^2 of 0.13, but significant thanks to their F statistic (Model 1). For the second scenario as Model 4 of Table E2 represents, the significance is quite similar to the latter, except for the FARC party, but with a R^2 of 0.15. In the opposition scenario Model 7 shows that only voter turnout has a high negative significance with brutality, the presence of FARC-EP and ELN has a medium and low positive significance, respectively, but with a relatively low R^2.

4.7.2 Parties and causes of coca

Municipalities whose mayor was a *Conservador* or *Liberal* partisan have had a low positive enforcement of coca crops, a similar nuance to the experimented by Mexico with PRI in power,

because these strong parties have long data informal business with the ORCs or drug cartels. Relative relative to our control variables the presence of ELN and FARC-EP rebels were highly positive reasons for coca cultivation, so only municipalities with high voter turnout had a medium rejection of this illicit institution. I based these statements according to Model 2 of the mayors' spatial regression (Appendix C.2), with a R^2 of 0.16, a considered fitness and a negative AIC. Also, in virtue of the robust Breusch–Pagan test for this model, heteroscedasticity is assumed. Municipalities where the governor candidate was elected with the support of the *Verde* party and to a lesser extent P. de la U or AICO, demonstrate positive sequences for coca cultivation, in contrast to a medium negative significance of the elected governors by support of GSC. Also, the covariates indicate a strong negative linkage of coca bush when the area has a paramilitary presence, the latter an opposite causality for the presence of ELN guerrillas (see Model 2, Table C.3.3), that based on an adjusted R^2 0.74 and significant F-statistic. So, for the second scenario depicted in Model 5 Table C.3.3, the governors in office affiliated to the parties *Verde* and P. de la U have had a positive high statistical enforcement of coca crops, along with a low of MIRA. On the contrary, the ADA party and GSC administrations denoted a medium negative cause of the alkaloid leaves cultivation, relative to covariates as paramilitaries and ELN rebels, these detailed the same effects of their first scenario, this according to adjusted R^2 0.70 and a significant F. Finally, in the opposition scenario (Model 8), Justas Libres and UP evidenced high positive bonds with the response variable in question, and Humana a reverse causality. Regarding the control variables paramilitaries and ELN showed a low negative significance, but the presence of FARC-EP a positive one. These assumptions elicited from an adjusted R^2 of 0.72 and a significant F-statistic.

In municipalities where the president was elected with the support of the FARC party there was a high positive significance to coca, with the same effect but for the presence of all non-state armed groups in that scenario, nevertheless, again municipalities with an elevated voter turnout rejected coca cultivation. These notions resulted from Model 2 of Table C.4.1 (Appendix C.4) with an R^2 of 0.107 and high significance. For the scenario of parties in office, only Justas Libres evidenced a normal positive causality, and the control variables typified the same exact effects as in the previous scenario (R^2 0.11, significant F-statistic). Ending the partisan effects of coca in a presidential administration, the opposition scenario of Model 8 entails that, where the candidates promoted by FARC party won, coca cultivation is prevalent. There was a similar effect with the presence of paramilitaries or the ELN, nonetheless, the electoral fraud risk denotes a positive medium statistical significance in coca when the party won in the

municipality but not in the national total election. Lastly, the voter turnout suggested a solid negative effect with this response variable, such that these observations are induced by an R^2 of 0.12 and a strong significance of F-statistics.

4.7.3 Partisan reasons for corruption

Mayors of the ADA party in office demonstrated a low positive enforcement of corruption; in contrast, mayors affiliated to OC, MAIS, *Conservador* or AICO have revealed a negative and low statistical significance on the corruption indicator. In this spatial regressive modelling portrayed in Model 3 (Appendix C.1) no control variables expressed significant effects with corruption, which is due to an R^2 of 0.34 and a significant heteroscedasticity of the Breusch–Pagan test, the latter being low compared with other response variables studied. In municipalities where the governors elected were affiliated to AICO and OC, the corruption was reinforced to a high degree for the former and to a medium degree for the latter. The rejection of corruption in this scenario occurs with a high intensity when *Liberal*, *Conservador*, *Verde* and GSC were elected, and also to a medium level with ASI administrating. Still the covariates are indecisive, according to adj. R^2 of 0.54 and a significant F-statistic (see Model 3, Table C.3.3). In the second scenario, only with AICO in the governor's office is the corruption positively significant; however, with GSC, *Liberal* or *Conservador* in power, this informal institution is highly rejected, and similarly in a medium intensity in municipalities where *Humana* or *Justa Libres* was elected. Also, with a low negative significance ASI and *Verde* close the causality; these notions stem from a significant Model 6 with adj. R^2 0.53. In the opposition scenario, as Model 9 of Table C.3.3 posits, only when PDA lead the election in these municipalities the corruption was refused in a low degree (adj. R^2 0.54, significant F-statistic).

The fixed effects modelling for presidents of Table C.4.2 (Appendix C.4) elucidate (models 3, 6 and 9) a vague F-statistics significance. So, I resorted to pooled OLS models of Table C.4.1. Hence, in the elected presidents' scenario, MIRA and FARC parties denoted a negative highly statistical significance with corruption, although with a weak adj. R^2. The second scenario is empty, so, finally in presidential parties in opposition, only the FARC party's support indicated a total denial of this coercive institution, but with a weak model fit.

4.8. Conclusions

This chapter addressed the question: what kind of informal rules are enforced by political parties when democracy is permeated by civil war? To answer this, we examined the case of the Colombian civil war, posited three coercive informal rules, which were hypothesized and configured as: brutality composite indicator; corruption indicator; and areas with coca crops.

Descriptively, nationwide, we observed that the peace process transition with FARC-EP has shrunk brutality, the corruption remains constant and, since the rebel groups' demobilization, there has been a coca crops boom. Analyzing the party politics in Colombia, the executive power in the time span has been concentrated in the *Liberal* and *Conservador* prevailing historically as strong parties, followed by personalistic parties of leaders with powerful kinship such as CR, P. de la U including a charismatic party such as CD. This group of five parties dominate the executive political decision-making with allies such as evangelical parties and parapolitics parties. The center *Verde* party and ethnic parties are the opposition organizations who received more support at the ballot box. Similarly, the GSC as a spontaneous political movement but not as a party *per se*. So, rebel parties of previous peace processes such as UP or the latest with FARC have had poor results in the executive elections, their leaders or constituencies being systematically exterminated. However, ending the timespan, the weak leftist opposition headed by the PDA and *Humana* has been incapable of consolidating a mass of voters.

I reject the null hypotheses based on the results mentioned in the previous section, the causal effects being divergent. So, the Colombian political parties enforce or reject these civil war tacit rules to different grades, according to the governing categories and election scenarios. Also, the spatial heterogeneity of brutality and narcotics trafficking is rather more accentuated than corruption; indeed, in the two former, non-state armed groups performed a positively notorious role, whereas in the latter the negative causality of voter turnout indicates citizens' accountability concerns. Finally, I point out some data caveats: first, the general's attorney office is elected by the president himself, so the prosecutions of corruption in which the government party or parties are implicated could be overlooked. Also, the coca crops per hectare are sized by satellite images such that the levels of cloudiness in the Pacific coast or the Andean range can constrain the measures. In addition, the coca yield per hectare fluctuates according to technical changes.

CHAPTER FIVE

WHEN CIVIL WAR IS THE NORM: EXPERIMENTING WITH COLOMBIAN INSTITUTIONS

5.1 Introduction

Edison Gómez was an elementary school teacher and political activist for the Murui indigenous peoples in the province of Caquetá on the periphery of Colombia. He and his community received death threats from an illegal armed group who demanded that he did not participate as an observer in a polling station in the May 2022 presidential election. After exercising his electoral right, Edison's corpse was found on the riverbank in Caquetá two days later.

Similarly, Yolima Pérez was an ex-combatant and signatory to the 2016 peace settlement between the FARC-EP and the Colombian government. She was engaged in the reincorporation process with active participation to enforce women's rights and implementation of the peace accord in the province of Meta. She was murdered in her home in April 2022.

The cases of Edison Gómez and Yolima Pérez are among the 930 political activists (126 women) and 245 former guerrillas (11 women) assassinated between August 2018 and June 2022 (Indepaz, 2022).

A stream of civil war scholarship suggests that low state capacity during the transition period following civil war affects peacebuilding and that power-sharing agreements addressing common security concerns are related to the likelihood of returning to war (DeRouen et al., 2010; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003). But examining civil war as a social norm that jeopardizes a successful peacebuilding process is an approach that deserves more attention. Echoing Sherif (1936), social norms are specific cases of customs, traditions, standards, stereotypes, values, fashions, and all other criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contact of individuals. In the words of Ensminger and Henrich (2014, p. 20) "depending on one's preference and disciplinary background, norms could be composed of a combination of preferences and beliefs, mental models (or scripts and schema) and motivations, or decision rules and expectations". In this vein, Axelrod (1986, p. 1097) points out that a norm exists to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when seen not to be acting this way. Accordingly, new norms may not replace the old ones spontaneously: through inertia, they may persist for several years and then disappear (Putnam et al., 1993; Sherif, 1936). How, then, can we unmask the preferences that underpin the norm of remaining at civil war in an ongoing peacebuilding process?

From prior studies about the long-standing Colombian civil war, it is known that the preferences of individuals (i.e. citizens) regarding the peace process are gathered from some data sources, specially the Americas Barometer (LAPOP) in a redundant manner (Liendo & Braithwaite, 2018; Matanock & Garbiras-Díaz, 2018; Tellez, 2019a) and namely focused on peace-making rather than peacebuilding. Although directly consultation with legislators is a regular data source (Cooper, 2007; Huckshorn, 1965; Kelm et al., 2019; Putnam et al., 1993) in political science, experiments with these individuals have been underutilized despite the importance of these bodies when it comes to anchoring peace—for instance, in the case of Ireland's civil war when the IRA's decommissioning of weapons allowed the UK government to reinstate the Northern Ireland Parliament; the law making around the demobilization of the Free Aceh Movement in Indonesia (DeRouen et al., 2010); or even the ratification of the Colombian peace settlement (El Tiempo, 2016). Hence, experimentation with legislative bodies, elected in democratic regimes, to reveal preferences that cement the social norm of war during the stages of peacebuilding can provide a representative population that describes the national behavior.

Usually, social experiments detail preferences for fairness, altruism, reciprocity, social punishment, and risk-seeking, among others (Cardenas, 2014; Ensminger & Henrich, 2014; Voors et al., 2012), applied in groups and using money as the main incentive to participate. This paper, alongside altruism, emphasizes political preferences such as dynasties, funding, perpetuation, ideology, criteria, religion, military support, and media, applied to active legislators, taking as its stimulus the participation of institutions or social systems with explicit and tacit rules (Lara-Rodríguez, 2018), but particularly the explicit or formal rules which are enforced by control agencies, police or the judiciary. This chapter therefore aims to examine the Colombian Congress and its judicial system to know the political preferences that sustain the social norm of war.

The argument in this piece is twofold. Firstly, dominant altruistic or selfish communities seek to control the population through variation, selection and retention of behaviors, adapting themselves according to the political formal institutions engendered by the peace settlement. Secondly, individual preferences vary according to the congressional chamber and reputation of the subject: the latter allows the preferences of experimental groups to be catalogued, while the former defines natural collective preferences, building the expectations of stagnation in the norm of civil war or evolving to peace. To make the argument plausible, the chapter underlines assumptions about experimental approaches in social science in order to build on a novel experimental conflict resolution approach applied in politics. Next, the theory of norms

hypothesizes political preferences in addition to some demographic traits of Congress and its potential role in peacebuilding. In the subsequent section, the formal institutions for political participation in the peace process of the government and FARC-EP are synthesized. The methodology describes the legal process to obtain the data and its features: hence, the experimental groups (i.e., self-enforcers, dodgers and scofflaws) are catalogued according to the behaviours evidenced. The argument is pursued empirically, first through social networks analysis, and then with the use of two regressive modelling techniques: (1) multiple logistic regression (Logit) and (2) the generalized additive model (GAM). Accordingly, the main results of the experiment are presented, and the final section draws conclusions.

5.2 Experimenting with Institutions

Experimental approaches in the study of social norms are common, eliciting a variety of techniques and strategies to address issues according to the field of inquiry. For instance, in experimental economics, playing games (dictator game, ultimatum game, third-party punishment game) with nontrivial sums of real money reveals co-evolutionary patterns of social norms of fairness and punishment, development of markets, religions and denser populations (Ensminger & Henrich, 2014). In political science, the study of norms can be addressed based on evolutionary or rationality assumptions. In evolutionary assumptions, based upon a norms game, boldness levels have fallen due to populations' vengefulness and the absence of incentives to pay the enforcement cost of punishing a defection. Subsequently, the norm collapse because vengeance becomes rare. The average level of boldness rose again; nevertheless, mechanisms such as dominance, internalization, deterrence, social proof, membership, law and reputation are also important for the support of norms (Axelrod, 1986). In a rational approach, a control group and a treatment group were split randomly and subjects asked about their participation or witness of certain activities: the control group included non-sensitive items and the treatment group contained sensitive items (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020). However, in social psychology, experiments are directed at identifying the individual frame of reference—that is to say, the set of social norms established and incorporated as a product of social contact by the subject and carried out in laboratories (Sherif, 1936).

In post-conflict Burundi, Voors et al. (2012) applied economic experiments as a variant of the dictator, simple gamble, and time preferences, with an incentive of five days' wages for 279 individuals in villages seriously affected by war. In Colombia, experimental economics games in sample village populations in the Pacific basin provided valuable information about people's preferences for fairness, altruism, reciprocity and social punishment (Cardenas, 2014). The

endorsement experiment applied by Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz (2018) examined surveyed individuals' approval of the peace process. The control group was asked about people (not rebels) proposing a victims' quota at Congress; the treatment group was asked about FARC-EP members proposing a victims' quota at the Congress, revealing preferences among the population. A subsequent experiment stimulated a randomised treatment group primed about insurgency ties with cocaine, while the control group overlooked the illegal stimuli. The authors posited that the cues and claims about concessions to the rebels may have helped the opposition effectively make a case against a peace process. Institutional frames such as the quality of institutions in civil war contexts found no theoretical evidence, their improvement showing no association with government or other organizations (Voors & Bulte, 2014).

In this body of knowledge, one can perceive that experiments are moved forward on the "have-nots", or people with humble living standards; indeed, experiments with political elites or lawmakers in peacebuilding stages are overlooked. Accordingly, this study proposes a novel interpretation of experimental conflict resolution where the subjects are the legislators, representing the attitudes of the Colombian citizenry 2018–2022. The subjects' preferences in terms of the implementation of key political provisions of the peace accord denote their pro-social and altruistic beliefs. The laboratory is a real situation regulated by formal rules and enforced by Colombia's third parties (the judiciary and control agencies). For this, the concept of norms and preferences in politics amid civil war ought to be precise.

5.3 Political preferences and norms in peacebuilding

Civil war encourages institutional changes. Many changes seen to be progressive are underpinned by violence. In peace processes, power-sharing institutions can provide guarantees that allow former combatants to participate safely in civilian political life, although wartime presents institutional changes because the imperative of defeating insurgency alters the enforcement of formal institutions (Cramer, 2006; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Schwartz, 2020). Nevertheless, the formal power sharing institutions working towards peacebuilding have their foundations in informal institutions. Social norms are thus both public and shared informal norms: when the sanctions enforced are informal for the transgressor (gossip, open censure, ostracism or dishonour), social norms become part of our system of values, promoting compliance. However, these must be distinguished from moral rules: indeed, conformity to a social norm is conditional on expectations about other people's behavior (Bicchieri, 2006).

In this light, Bicchieri (2017) posited that in order to identify social norms we need to gauge personal normative beliefs composed by empirical social expectations (i.e., belief that they will

continue to act as in the past) and normative ones (i.e., other people strongly believe that some behaviors are praiseworthy). However, social expectations, or our conception of how other people will behave in a certain situation, proceeds from conditional preferences based on what others do or believe should be done. So, "preferences of people are endogenous and respond to experiences or (changes in) the context" (Voors et al., 2012, p. 959). Therefore, there arises a collective belief in what ought to be done or what is socially and politically accepted or rejected: 'the norm'. The nature of the norm is understood in relation to collective variation as the selection and retention of preferences throughout networks of subjects who synchronize individual preferences to form dominant communities that can enforce the norm to prevail in the population. This study shall examine the political preferences that likely underpin the more antisocial and selfish norm, war.

The first hypothesis (H1) is that legislators with a preference for belonging to or being outside political legacies tend to apply or discard the main political participation provisions of the peace accord. This hypothesis is premised on the role of hegemonic families maintaining civil war. Bó et al. (2009) posited that in politics, power begets power, so self-perpetuation is a situation whereby holding political power for longer increases the probability that one's heirs attain political power in the future regardless of family characteristics. The election of these dynastic legislators or leisure class members (Veblen, 1899) is thus related to contacts or name recognition rather than voters' attitudes. In a context of civil war-like criminal conflict (Mexico) Dorff (2017) found that kinship networks of victimization increase the likelihood of social or political engagement of individuals, so, arguably, legislators without powerful family ties are more likely supporters of the institutional transition of peace.

The impact of institutions depends on the interaction between *de jure* political power and *de facto* political power. In a captured democracy, pro-elite institutions that allow hereditary ruling classes may invest more in the latter power (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2008; Mosca, 1939). Campaign funds are a crucial investment in *de facto* political power. Public money is an important determinant of competitive elections: officials elected under clean election programmes will not need to pay back their supporters and special interests, and will instead pass legislation to aid the collective interest (Malhotra, 2008). However, in democracies besieged by civil war or in a peacebuilding process, party politics often use campaign strategies to buy votes, moved forward by brokers contracted by politicians or the political party itself (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2020). Based on these assumptions, the second hypothesis (H2) is

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that some lawmakers' preferences for funding their campaigns determine legislative efforts to allot political participation provisions to formal institutions of the peace accord.

Democracy seems to be a system for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In interstate war, leaders are constrained by other bodies, such as parliaments, to calculate the real cost of war. However, in an internal conflict, if individuals are denied political rights and consequently economic inclusion, they may react with aggression and organize violent political opposition (Hegre, 2014). Accordingly, what is posited here as legislative perpetuation is a long-term legislator (Bó et al., 2009), a professional legislator or one with prior legislative experience (Shair-Rosenfield & Stoyan, 2017, p. 1) in the Congress, where politicians' long tenure has contributed to public discontent eliciting turnover and term limits (Moncrief et al., 2004). Hence the third hypothesis (H3), that the preference of perpetuation of lawmakers affects the degree of encouragement of applying political participation provisions explicit to the peace settlement.

Nonetheless, legislators must have ideological preferences. According to Liendo and Braithwaite (2018), the surveyed persons who self-identified with the CD party were significantly less likely to support the peace process, whereas the National Unity coalition (*Liberal*, CR, P. de la U, and the *Verdes*) were much likely to have a favourable opinion of the negotiations, but with no evidence of concrete left-right support for the peace process. However, for Tellez (2019a), leftists appeared more willing to make concessions and support negotiating with FARC-EP. Also, those more inclined towards the Santos-Calderón government favour concessions and the whole peace process, while the right seems to approve the peace process subtly, favouring concessions but not reintegration. So, the political spectrum signifies the type of policy or style of formal rules which are cemented in ideologies around the developmental model of the nation and the role of the state in its achievement. These notions prompted the fourth hypothesis (H4), that political spectrums with which the Congresswoman or man is aligned prompt them to support or reject the political participation of institutions in the peace agreement.

The fifth hypothesis (H5) posits that the legislators' preferred source of information to decision-making, grow or decrease their possibilities of back up the political participation rules explicit into the peace accord. This stems from the idea that despite Latin American hyper-presidential regimes promoting their policy agenda above the legislative agenda (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006; Shair-Rosenfield & Stoyan, 2017), particular preferences for decision-making remain open. Huckshorn (1965) argued that the legislator is influenced by many dynamic forces—constituent, political party, executive, interest groups, and intra-legislative—and these (or a

combination thereof). Sabatier and Whiteman (1985) pointed out that while specialist legislators primarily rely on staff, non-specialist legislators have more contact with external sources and staff. Constituents and other private individuals are the third most important external source, but the main criteria for selecting sources were their accessibility and their ability to provide concise, relevant information promptly.

In ancient societies politics rested upon religion, God being the protector of the territory and the people (Mosca, 1939). Certainly, the role of religion in conflict is vital; it promotes what might be called militancy on behalf of the other, as well as militancy aimed against the other (i.e., the ambivalence of the sacred); it promotes both intolerance and hatred, as well as strong tolerance (e.g. the willingness to live with, explore, and honour difference), upholding universal human rights or denying them to heretics or infidels (Coward & Smith, 2004). Ensminger and Henrich's (2014, p. 34) analysis indicates a positive relationship between practising a world religion (Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism-evangelical and non-evangelical) and prosocial behavior towards anonymous others. Nevertheless, as Liendo and Braithwaite (2018) pointed out, Colombians who self-identify as Catholic were less supportive of peace talks with FARC-EP. Albeit the civil war in question cannot be categorized as a religion-driven conflict, these concepts lead to the sixth hypothesis (H6), the legislator's preference for military-linked voters augment or break the likelihood to support the political participation rules of the peace settlement.

The seventh hypothesis (H7) the legislator's preference for military-linked voters cause a high or low reinforcement of the political participation rules of the peace settlement. This hypothesis is premised on Latin American polity being strongly influenced by politically-oriented individuals within the armed forces. Indeed, according to Wyckoff (1960), components of the political elite represent the military power to exert violence, employing police state methods to brutalize and persecute the political opposition either to defend the status quo or overthrow it. A military career offers this leisure class (Veblen, 1899) privileges compared with the living standards of the masses. Also, larger armies involve a significant number of families (voters). But Colombia has atypical obedience to civilian authority. The society is not praetorian, since economic benefits are so minimal as the education that adjusted moderate level of social mobilization. Civilian political institutions have been sufficiently strong to legitimate and maintain political order, and the late modernization of the army encouraged the long civil military tradition (Ruhl, 1981). Nevertheless, the country has suffered a long-lasting process of militarization—that is to say, a process of normalization of the military presence in everyday

life. This is the outcome of chaos and the use of counterinsurgency forms of warfare promoted by governments to confront the risk of losing to the rebels, and thanks to U.S. patronage (Rodriguez, 2018).

Echoing Mayo and Perlmutter (1998), news media are dependent on the government for information allowing manipulation by government officials. Although news media do not radically change public attitudes, they influence the agenda of public attention and the elite opinion leaders in government set the agenda of the press. Channels of communication include mass media (newspapers and television), interpersonal forms of communication (colleagues and interest groups) and new media (computers and internet). In this line, legislators use media tactics to aid re-election and to advance their policy goals by reaching constituents, policy elites and other media. However, interest groups and the public outside their constituency are also prime targets, such that legislators use the media in law-making, and those with more resources appear to use media tactics more often (Cooper, 2007). Today, the mediatization of politics or the spillover effects of media on politics, institutions and actors have increased. Politicians address fragmented social media audiences directly with their messages, and popularity is represented by the number of likes, shares, or retweets, so work online is vital for individuals (Kelm et al., 2019). The last hypothesis (H8) lies in these assumptions of media in the legislative environment, arguably a preferred channel of communication among legislators to inform their electors to constrain or trigger enforcement of the political participation provisions of the peace agreement.

Finally, although previous scholarship has focused on how conflict exposure reduces appreciation of state-level institutions and local political leaders (Dorff, 2017; Voors & Bulte, 2014), we can consider another covariates in Colombia. Concerning demographic traits, Liendo and Braithwaite (2018) stated that citizens with more years of education and who live in urban areas were at least somewhat less supportive of peace talks than their counterparts. In this vein, Tellez (2019a) noted that age plays a role in shaping reintegration attitudes, older respondents being more reluctant to reintegrate with ex-combatants, whilst women appear to favour both reintegration and concessions much less than men. Regarding Congress but not considering conflict, legislators in Latin America with professional job experience should positively impact legislative strength (Shair-Rosenfield & Stoyan, 2017).

5.4 Political formal institutions for peacebuilding in Colombia

The *de jure* foundations of the peace negotiations up to the ratification of the settlement are addressed in Appendix D.1. This study addresses the institutional development of the frame to

achieve the provisions, arrangement and meaning of political participation in the peace accord using a timeline, but stressing three formal rules that aim to protect the political participation of the excluded. Figure 14 portrays the outline of the term in question. First of all, Law 8013 (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2017) states that the political group of citizens promoting the formation of the rebel party shifted from FARC-EP to the politically legal scenario will designate three deputies in each chamber of the Congress (Senate and House of Representatives) to participate in debates on constitutional and legal reforms in the frame of Act No. 1 of 2016 (see Appendix D.1).

Figure 14 Political participation term outline

Source: Own elaboration

Act No. 3 of 23 May 2017 regulates the direct political reincorporation of former FARC-EP rebels. The resulting party will accomplish the same duties as the others, excluding: the number of partisans, the number of candidates in the electoral contests, and achieving the vote threshold up to 2026. The rebel party will be publicly funded (1) by the average received by other parties or political movements until 2026; (2) by 7 per cent annually or the total budget received by

other parties to spread its platform and agenda; (3) through support to the Senate and presidential elections of 2018 and 2022. Such amounts will be new funding to avoid affinities for other parties. The rule promotes access to media for its followers to the same extent as constituted parties. It also has an accounting role in the National Electoral Council (NEC) up to 2026. Thus, the rebel party will achieve seats in the Senate and House of Representatives according to the constitution's Articles 263 and 176 respectively; nevertheless, the NEC will assure five seats in each chamber in addition to the voted Congress seats.

Appendix D.1.2 underlines aspects of Law 898 and the Seats for Peace as complementary aspects of this frame. The first formal institution to test is Law 885 May 26th 2017, which set up the National Council of Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence (Presidencia de la República de Colombia, 2017a), modifying Law 434 of 1998 devoted to creating the National Peace Council, the legacy of previous peace processes. Law 885 facilitates the implementation and normative development of the arrangement 2.2.4. (see Figure 14). It follows government advice to move the means and action towards coexistence and respect for peacebuilding and reconciliation. Delegates of the executive branch, decentralized governments, likely the armed forces, the legislative branch and its decentralized parts, control agencies and civil society representatives shape the National Council. It is led by eight principles: integrity, solidarity, responsibility, participation, negotiation, gradualness, territorial approach, and differential approach. A key point is that the mentioned arrangement establishes Regional Councils of Peace, Reconciliation and Coexistence (RCPTC) with the aim of advising and local authorities in the implementation of political participation. Among others, the RCPTC could comprise provincial assemblies and municipality councils, on the initiative of the Governor or the Mayor, the provincial or municipal council of peace, and the citizenry.

The second rule to be examined is Law 895 May 29th, 2017. This law builds the security system to participate in politics (Presidencia de la República de Colombia, 2017b). This law by decree seeks to make and implement arrangement 2.1.2. and means 2.1.2.1. and 2.1.2.2 (see Figure 14). The system aims to accomplish a framework of safety and freedom, and to foster coexistence and tolerance, life respect, and freedom of thought and speech. Thus, it embodies strength and democracy, adopting tools to promote the permanence of political activist in its territory and guarantee no re-victimisation. The system comprises four elements: (1) the rules, that mainly strengthen punishment of crimes against participation in politics and offer the capability to prosecute and judge such behaviors; (2) prevention, encouraging the alert system addressing gender and territorial measures; (3) protection, pursuing a program to protect former

FARC-EP combatants, a technical body of security and protection, and programs to protect the opposition; and (4) system assessment and monitoring.

The study also considers a third formal rule, Law 1909 July 9th 2018 (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2018), which adopts the statute of political opposition and some rights for independent political organizations. Basically, this confirms the statement of political parties or organizations as opposition, independent or government affiliated. The rule fosters rights for opposition groups, in particular access to media and official information, funding, participation in councils and public elected corporations' agendas, participation in international affairs commissions, and participation in municipal and national planning and budgeting bodies. It also creates direct seats on legislative bodies of centralized and decentralized executive organizations for candidates with the second highest number of votes. A last institutional development was the political and electoral reform proposal explained in Appendix D.1.2.

5.5 Method and data

The data gathering strategy consisted in the use of a set of fundamental political rights, enforced by different instances of Colombia's justice system, carried out using Colombian Spanish. The first stage identified active legislators in the Colombian Congress in the Senate[24] and House of Representatives[25] at the beginning of June 2021. Biodata relative to their name, email, address, political party, ID, age and according to the site *Congreso Visible*[26] education and ongoing judicial investigations were compiled and considered as demographic covariates. The second stage involved addressing a questionnaire (*derecho de petición*) to every Congresswoman or man's official email (see an example in Appendix D.2.1). The content of the request fulfils the demands of Article 23 of the Colombian Constitution, which defines that every person has the right to place polite requests to incumbents for reasons of particular or collective interest and obtain a prompt response (República de Colombia, 1991). The applications followed the guidelines of Law 1755 of 2015 (Ley 1755 de 2015, 2015); Article 14 indicates that every petition must to be resolved in a period of 15 to 30 days. As Table 20 depicts, every question in the instrument is related to our eight hypotheses or explanatory variables (preferences). The three formal political institutions for peace's responses together comprise the prosocial or altruistic behaviour of our subjects.

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[24]https://www.senado.gov.co/index.php/el-senado/senadores
[25] https://www.camara.gov.co/representantes
[26] https://congresovisible.uniandes.edu.co/

Table 20 Variables

Explanatory Variables	Questions and Categories
Political dynasty [*Kinship*]	Do you have or have you had a familiar elected for a popular vote position? (a) Yes; (b) No
Capture democracy [*Funds*]	Which was your main source for funding the 2018 Congress campaign? (a) State contributions; (b) Own patrimony; (c) Private contributions; (d) Party income; (e) Party patrimony; (f) Bank credit; (g) FARC Party
Professional legislators/perpetuation [*Perpetuation*]	How many times (no matter the chamber) have you been elected as a legislator? (a) 1; (b) 2; (c) 3; (d) 4; (e) 5 or more
Political ideology [*Spectrum*]	With which political spectrum are you identified? (a) Radical or extreme right; (b) Right; (c) Moderate right; (d) Centre; (e) Moderate left; (f) Left; (g) Radical or extreme left; (j) Other
Decision-making criterion [*Criteria*]	What are your political decisions based on? (a) Party; (b) Coalition; (c) Constituency; (d) Executive branch; (e) Legislator's staff; (f) Oneself
Support of religious constituency [*Religion*]	What is the religious preference of your electorate? (a) Catholic; (b) Christian; (c) Evangelical; (d) Jewish; (e) Not religious; (f) Other religion; (g) Secular
Support of military constituency [*Military*]	Is a significant proportion of your constituency composed of state armed forces' relatives or former militaries? (a) Yes; (b) No
Access to media [*Media*]	Which is the most commonly used channel to inform the public and electorate about your legislative labour? (a) Public TV,; (b) Public radio; (c) Private TV; (d) Private radio; (e) Internet and social media; (f) Press; (g) Word of mouth
Response Variables	Questions
Political opposition [*Law_1909*]	For your legislative seat, have you used attributions of Law 1909 July 9th 2018? (a) Yes; (b) No
Security to participate in politics [*Law_895*]	Have you convened control debates of the national executive branch during your legislative sessions to reinforce Law 895 of 2017? (a) Yes; (b) No
Regional peacebuilding councils [*Law_885*]	According to Law 885 May 26th 2017, have you fostered, created or consolidated regional peacebuilding councils? (a) Yes; (b) No

Source: Own elaboration

The third stage, and the second legal instance to obtain clear responses, was applying a 'recourse of insistence' Law 1712 of 2014, and Constitutional Court Sentence T-464/97 for such answers, trying to expand on the core of the question. Thus, the third instance was based on Article 23 of the aforementioned Law 1755, addressing the Inspector General's Office (*Procuraduría General de la Nación*) as a third party that enforces the right to petition unanswered requests, who must notify individuals in writing in ten working days of its duty to resolve the issue during the following 30 working days (see Appendix D.2.2). A caveat is that the Inspector General is itself elected by the same Senate and the President.

The fourth legal instance implemented was to place a recourse to enforce constitutional rights (*acción de tutela*) based on Article 86 of the Constitution (República de Colombia, 1991) due to infringing the right to petition by the legislators. This includes another constitutional rule, Article 133, in which the elected Congresswoman or man is politically responsible to society and its constituency in terms of fulfilling their duties. Congress Resolution N° 0777 of 2020, based on the COVID-19 outbreak, allowed that all the functions of Congress could be fulfilled

using virtual channels. To do so, there is recourse to a judge who allocates lawsuits for diverse courts in Bogotá D.C., regardless of the field (civil, criminal, administrative, and so forth) because of the nature of fundamental right enforcement grievance. Therefore, a judge decides if the action of a Senator or House Representative is fair, requiring the politician to answer within ten working days (see Appendix D.2.3).

The fifth legal instance used was a Contempt of Court (*Incidente de Desacato*) against legislators who disobey the judge's verdict, the procedure being based upon Article 86 of the Constitution and Decrees 2191 of 1991 and 306 of 1992. Basically, the court insists that the defendant complies with the judicial order and the plaintiff must inform the court if the offender does so. Up to three attempts can be made. If the defendant continues to disobey, the court proceeds to impose arrest for one month, a fine of five times the monthly minimum wage, and the right of reply to the petition (see Appendix D.2.4).

5.6 Empirical Strategy

The variables are mostly categorical. Panels a, b, c and d of Figure 15 reveal how Congress is composed according to biodata or demographic traits of the population. Panels (1) to (11) of Figure 15 define the frequencies of the explanatory and response variables. Descriptively, one can state that the Colombian Congress (2018–2022) is patriarchal, with traditional (*Liberal* and *Conservador*) and personalistic (CD, CR and P. de la U) political parties controlling the majority. A large part of the population has domestic graduate studies (specialization or Master's) and is more than 36 years of age, and almost a fifth of its members is under judicial investigation. In terms of collective preferences, four in every ten legislators has a political legacy. Their political campaigns lie in particular interests of private funding sources (e.g., banks, groups of interest, personal business). The legislative branch is not so professional but has significant turnover, although this may be spurious as some brand new Senators or Representatives are pupils of powerful former sanctioned legislators. The political ideology of the Congress is predominantly of the center, moderate right and right; decision-making is based on the political party, or their constituency and the great majority were elected by Catholic electors. The indirect military affiliation of the legislator's supporters is irrelevant to them winning their seat, and social media is the preferred channel of communication with the electorate. The dataset is available in Lara-Rodríguez (2022c).

Figure 15 Frequencies (summary statistics)

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)

In this vein, centrality refers to the relevance or prominence of a subject within the social network: its technical aspects are contained in the algorithm of the selected software for the analysis. So, the community structure is represented by a cohesive group of nodes that are connected densely to the vortex, but its representation depends on a network topology. For this,

the Congress data are analysed in terms of edges, nodes, chamber, and response, running a circular package using Gephi software (Bastian et al., 2009).

Secondly, to determine the causality of individual preferences in the consolidation of the norm in the population, regressive modelling techniques are tailored to the data features and the institutionalized organized groups as much as the experimental ones. Omitted variables' bias is acknowledged and stressed in the form of Congress—that is to say, Senate and House of Representatives. The first modelling technique used is multiple logistic regression (Logit) (Agresti, 2018, p. 465), because it applies to binary response variables (variables with just two possible outcomes) as a yes or no to re-enforcement of the formal rules of political participation in the question, or α. Because our explanatory variables (x) are categorical *per se* and mainly ordinal with β coefficients, the formula is thus: $\log[P(y = 1)] = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \cdots + \beta_p x_p$.

In this light, the data are processed using the R-statistics package glm2 (Marschner, 2011) (see Appendix D.5). Subsequently, although a commonly accepted agreement to estimate the goodness of fit of the Logit models remains unclear, I corroborated these, first, using an analysis of variance (ANOVA) which compares the ratio of likelihoods to a X^2 distribution and summarizes the overall strength of the models, with 0 indicating a model with no predictive value and 1 indicating a perfect fit. And, second, I estimated a pseudo R-squared (McFadden, 1973) expressed by some variants, much of these based on the deviance of the model(s), indeed, higher pseudo R-squared indicates which model better predicts the outcome. The variance of binomial distribution is a function of its mean: if there is over-dispersion, the coefficient estimates will be more confident (smaller standard error values) than they should be. One can detect over-dispersion by comparing the residual deviance with the degree of freedom. If these two numbers are close, there is no over-dispersion. Residual deviance much larger than the degree of freedom indicates over-dispersion. Accordingly, analyses assuming binomial distributions are also sometimes invalid because of over-dispersion (Agresti, 2002).

Thirdly, to manage heterogeneity issues, the subjects are split according to the experimental groups (i.e., self-enforcers, dodgers, scofflaws), considering this a structural change of the data configuration. Logit binary data assume a linear (or some parametric) form for the explanatory effects, so the second regressive modelling technique replaces the linear function by an additive function called the generalized additive model (GAM). Indeed, the Logit model for binary data is generalized to $\log[p(X)/1 - p(X))] = \sum_1^p s_j(X_j)$, and the local scoring procedure provides nonparametric, smooth estimates of the $s_j(\cdot)$ (Hastei & Tibshirani, 1986). A Gaussian

distribution is therefore assumed with robust standard errors and the modelling carried out based upon the GAM R-package (Hastie, 2022) (see Appendix D.5). Lastly, using GAM, the demographic variables were modelled as another suite due to their modest association with the other predictors.

5.7 Results

Two communities emerge following the type of stimulus applied—the prosocial or altruistic community on the one hand (i.e., densification of nodes liked with vortex 'yes'), who enforce bills, convene the executive branch to control the enforcement of political participation in formal rules of peace, or move forward particular actions to reinforce the peace frame in question; and the anti-social or selfish community (i.e., group of nodes linked with vortex 'no'), on the other, who are not interested in carrying out legislative efforts toward achievement of the peace provisions and arrangements under inquiry. Table 21 shows that the selfish community has the upper hand in the Senate, underestimating the support of the three political formal rules, such that modularity indicates how balanced the communities are, evidencing the prevalence of the selfish community in the population. The centrality of the senators shows that retention of the behavior of each node shrinks when the institution is further focused on promoting political participation toward peace. In the House of Representatives, the selfishness domain is further adapted with a modularity inclined to the anti-social community. The direct centrality denotes that nodes' prominence in the House is inconsequential, further revealing the community's domination over the population. The population's anti-social behaviors show greater retention if we consider that essentially Law 1909 promotes the statement of a legislator as part of the government, independent, or in opposition, at the beginning of the legislative cohort.

Table 21 Network factors

Network estimations	Senate (N=102)			House (N=170)		
	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885
Altruist Community	48	18	8	47	17	12
Selfish Community	54	84	94	123	153	158
Modularity	0.489	0.295	0.156	0.399	0.186	0.139
Eigenvector Centrality	0.00421	0.00615	0.00750	0.00316	0.00432	0.00462

Source: Own elaboration using Gephi based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)

Figure 16 Communities' networks

Edges	Political Party	Edges	Political Party	Edges	Political Party	Edges	Political Party
	Liberal		Polo Dem. Alternativo		Verde		MIRA
	Cambio Radical		FARC		Centro Democratico		Humana-UP
	Partido de la U		Justas Libres		Conservador		ASI
	MAIS		AICO				

Source: Own elaboration using Gephi based on Lara-Rodríguez ([2022c](#))

the 'no' vortex. Regarding the House of Representatives, one can perceive a similar pattern of selfish community overlap. Figure 16d points out the 170 nodes and a clear 'no' adherence to the opposition Law; Figure 16e fortifies the behavior of denigrate the security system to participate in politics; lastly, Figure 16f illustrates massive unawareness about peacebuilding and reconciliation, something that strongly underpins the norm, considering that the Representatives have constituencies or are elected by and to regional spaces.

The regressive modelling begins with the Logit technique (Appendix D.3). Taking into acount the Congress in full, in the model of Law 1909, there is positive and strong statistical significance, with legislators supported by secular voters, followed by not religious, left, moderate left and, to a lesser extent, 'other' political spectrum legislators. In Law 895, there is a moderate positive association with the 'other' spectrum; to a lower degree, politicians on the moderate left and those supported by Christians denote key causality with a negative and low association: kinship and funding from own patrimony or private contributions rejects the notion that political security means rules. Regarding Law 885 Logit model, subjects with a moderate degree of significance were from the left, while Law 885 supported a less statistically significant moderate left, right or extreme right. However, legislators funded by private contributions and to a moderate degree from own patromony rejected the formal institution.

In Logit modelling, based on the Senate group, with a low level of significance only senators of the 'other' political spectrum favoured the opposition statute; in constrast, with a moderate degree of significance, moderate right senators and, to a lower extent, military followers reject the application of the rule. Modelling Law 895 indicates that funding coming from interest groups or personal business are a modest negative cause of fostering the political security of the excluded. Furthermore, in the House of Representatives group, legislators with electors from the moderate left and secular religious electors showed a moderate positive significant association, and 'other' political spectrum showed a small positive association on Law 1909, along with their left colleagues, with a less level of intensity. Respecting Law 895, only moderate left Representatives are in a light causality degree engaged in the security concerns of active participatory citizens. Finally, Law 885 is repudiated at a low level by politicians sponsored by private contributions. These models reveal decent residual deviance, achieving the assumption of normal over-dispersion for Logit (see Appendix D.3), allowing the goodness of fit of models to be checked as detailed in Table 22. Hence, this table details determinants of the response variables in a broad sense. The residual deviances compared with the residual

degrees of freedom seem elevated in some cases. Model six is not addressed due to being the only one with over-dispersion.

Table 22 Logit models likelihood ratio test with ANOVA

			Congress in full					
			(1) Law 1909		(2) Law 895		(3) Law 885	
		Resid.		Resid.		Resid.		Resid.
	Df	Df	Deviance	Dev	Deviance	Dev	Deviance	Dev
Null		271		350.701		204.962		137.772
Kinship	1	270	2.214	348.487	5.946*	199.016	0.986	136.785
Funds	6	264	6.707	341.779	16.379*	182.637	16.406*	120.379
Perpetuation	4	260	0.895	340.883	3.937	178.699	3.391	116.987
Spectrum	7	253	53.352***	287.53	18.363*	160.336	23.869**	93.118
Criteria	5	248	1.039	286.49	5.866	154.469	9.341 .	83.776
Religion	6	242	23.151***	263.339	23.086***	131.383	11.297 .	72.479
Military	1	241	4.573 *	258.765	3.905*	127.477	1.465	71.013
Media	5	236	6.932	251.833	5.801	121.676	5.326	65.687
McFadden pseudo R²			0.2819		0.4063		0.5232	

			Senate					
			(4) Law 1909		(5) Law 895		(6) Law 885	
		Resid.		Resid.		Resid.		Resid.
	Df	Df	Deviance	Dev	Deviance	Dev	Deviance	Dev
Null		101		141.048		95.063		56.083
Kinship	1	100	4.855*	136.193	6.607*	88.456	0.466	55.617
Funds	4	96	3.705	132.487	8.410 .	80.045	10.748*	44.869
Perpetuation	4	92	1.331	131.156	5.080	74.965	7.188	37.68
Spectrum	6	86	34.464***	96.691	14.810*	60.155	11.140 .	26.539
Criterium	4	82	3.306	93.385	8.864 .	51.291	19.947***	6.591
Religion	6	76	11.789 .	81.596	13.699*	37.591	6.591	4.8E-09
Military	1	75	4.847	76.748	2.481	35.110	2.10E-10	4.6E-09
Media	3	72	3.596*	73.152	0.837	34.272	1.70E-09	2.9E-09
McFadden pseudo R2			0.4814		0.6395		1.00E+00	

			House of Representatives					
			(7) Law 1909		(8) Law 895		(9) Law 885	
		Resid.		Resid.		Resid.		Resid.
	Df	Df	Deviance	Dev	Deviance	Dev	Deviance	Dev
Null		168		197.873		105.868		81.372
Kinship	1	167	0.364	197.508	1.429	104.439	0.650	80.721
Funds	6	161	7.348	190.159	9.117	95.322	9.581	71.14
Perpetuation	4	157	10.771*	179.388	4.344	90.978	4.122	67.017
Spectrum	6	151	24.205***	155.183	11.695 .	79.282	20.510**	46.507
Criterium	5	146	1.605	153.577	4.491	74.79	4.562	41.945
Religion	5	141	14.849 *	138.727	9.513 .	65.276	0.500	41.444
Military	1	140	6.160*	132.567	1.908	63.367	2.161	39.283
Media	5	135	6.68	125.886	5.974	57.393	0.740	38.542
McFadden pseudo R2			0.3638		0.4579		0.5263	

Source: Own elaboration according to the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)
Note: Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '·' 0.1 ' ' 1.

In this vein, GAM is used, applying the experimental groups to deal with such heterogeneity. Appendix D.4 contains the preferences modelling. In the self-enforcers group, the left and moderate left legislators showed a fair degree of statistical significance, followed in a low intensity by who was elected by non-religious voters and as a trend the politicians elected by

secular citizens encourage the achievement of Law 1909. With a moderate positive causal effect, legislators with Jewish and 'other' religion supporters, alongside taking decisions by oneself, are engaged with Law 885. Similarly, with lower significance, the moderate left and the public money funded FARC party converge in the defence of that rule. In contrast, the Congresswoman or man funded by own patrimony, party incomes or private contributions denies the reinforcement of the accord's reconciliation and coexistence means. In the self-enforcers group, on the one hand, there is a lower but positive implication of moderate left subjects, with Jewish or seculars voters and with a trend to have as source of financing the rebel party to push security for political participation; on the other hand, legislators with political powerful family ties and own patrimony to fund its campaigns reject Law 895 with medium intensity, followed at a low level by colleagues funded by party incomes or private contributions.

Congress members in the dodgers group have the following preferences about the peace frame analysed. Legislators with secular supporters show a strong positive association with the opposition statute, converging with the trend of the left and moderate left, while moderate right political spectrum co-partners demonstrate a negative trend in implementing Law 1990. Reconciliation, coexistence, and no stigmatization (Law 885) are strongly reinforced by the lawmakers with four Congressional periods; whose ideological spectrum is of moderate left, make their own decisions and are supported by Christians. Others go along with colleagues whose campaigns were sponsored by the state, are from the left, make decisions according to their staff, political party or even constituency, but with modest positive statistical significance. In contrast, with a low causal degree, members that make decisions based on the executive branch, despise that peace law. Finally, in this experimental group, Congress members mainly financed by the state or with four turns in any chamber denote high positive significance in relation to Law 895, followed by moderate left politicians or those supported by Christians to a modest degree. Senators or Representatives who make decisions according to the executive branch show a high negative association with that formal rule.

In the scofflaw experimental group (see Appendix D.4), lawmakers self-identified as the left endorse the opposition statute with medium and positive statistical significance; there is only a positive tendency among other political spectrum politicians and those who use public radio as a communication channel indicate some degree of support for Law 1909. Law 885 is highly applied by left and extreme left legislators and to a very low level by rightist ones, but the Congress members who received state contributions to fund the campaign to a reduced negative

degree overlook the importance of peace, reconciliation and coexistence. Finally, scofflaw subjects that take decisions based on their constituency uphold the security system to protect political participation to a low level, with a positive tendency among members supported by non-religious voters, but a negative tendency among subjects whose followers are aligned with other religions.

Using GAM regression and data stemming from demographic traits such as position, gender, political party, education, and allegiance of subjects, and keeping the experimental groups, Table D.4.2 (Appendix D.4) models the causal effects in the support or rejection of the formal peace rules studied. The self-enforcers group indicate for Law 1909 that Humana-UP, MIRA and Verde foster that formal institution to a weak positive degree, with Polo and MAIS displaying a positive trend. FARC and MAIS show a modest positive association with the application of Laws 885 and 895. For Law 895, MIRA amplified the intensity of that positive effect. In the dodgers group, Verde partisan legislators are highly linked to boosting the opposition act; Polo, MAIS and Liberal parties show moderate ties, and senators linked to other political organizations adjust in a reduced degree the application of that provision. Lawmakers affiliated with FARC and MAIS strongly defend reconciliation, coexistence, and no stigmatization; senators to a lesser degree and members under judicial investigation also contribute to the implementation. Finally, FARC and MAIS parties moderately reinforce security issues for exerting political participation. Nonetheless, male legislators reject that support with weak negative significance.

As for scofflaw group, the opposition statute is highly reinforced by senators, and with very low significance by males. The political parties CD and *Justas Libres* reject Law 1909 with a weak negative causal effect, P. de la U showing a negative trend. Only Law 885 is to a moderate extent promoted by subjects with secondary education. CR, CD, *Conservador*, *Humana-UP*, *Justas Libres*, *Liberal*, and PD political parties show a median negative significance—in other words, they mainly reject the reinforcement of security guarantees to exercise political activism. In this vein, but to a weak degree, FARC, *Verde* and other political organizations underestimate that provision, while, with low positive association, lawmakers with a Ph.D education support Law 895. Finally, in Appendix D.4 Table D.4.3, GAM is used to model the effects of subjects' age and behavior to support or not the legal frame analysed: there are no significant links.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter experimented with Colombian formal institutions to elucidate the preferences that sustain the civil war as a social norm. The first part of the argument was empirically validated

using network analysis, looking at how the dominant anti-social or selfish community selects and retains negationist behaviours towards the formal institutions of political participation in the peacebuilding process and the population adapts itself to preserve the civil war as a social norm. Accordingly, as the Congress as a democratic representative body reflects the preferences of the society as a whole, one can posit that in the 2018–2022 cohort, political participation in peace in Colombia was postponed from the political agenda, anchoring the violence against political activists and former rebels in reincorporation processes, prolonging the democratic grievances answered by each provision, arrangement and mean included into the peace settlement.

The second part of the argument is confirmed due to the heterogeneous preferences evidenced between senators, House Representatives, and the experimental subject groups (self-enforcers, dodgers or scofflaws). Individual preferences vary according to the chamber and reputation of the subject, but looking at the results together in relation to the hypotheses that signify political preferences, the following can be stated. (H1) Legislators with political legacies reduce the political security provision and the reconciliation, coexistence and no stigmatization of citizens that want to be included in the democracy. (H2) Lawmakers whose campaign funding came from personal business; party incomes or interest groups are prone to undermine Laws 895 and 885. (H3) The level of Congress member professionalism is not congruent with the response variables; therefore, this hypothesis is rejected. (H4) Congresswomen or men with moderate left and left ideologies pursue peacebuilding. (H5) Legislators who base their decisions on the executive branch are susceptible to weakening the implementation of the term in question, and those who take decisions by themselves especially defend Law 885. (H6) Congress members with voters who are Jewish, not religious, secular and, to a lesser extent, of other religions are engaged with the formal rules studied. (H7) Although the significance is low, the direction of the coefficients for these indicators tend to support the theorized relationship of negative support to the peacebuilding term by legislators supported by voters affiliated to the armed forces. (H8) The channel of communication used by politicians is an irrelevant preference in relation to application of the legal frame examined. Regarding demographic traits, senators are liable to apply the opposition statute, and the gender of the subject is irrelevant in determining support of these peace laws. Political parties such as *Centro Democrático* (Government party) and Justas Libres discard the implementation, while Verde, FARC and MAIS encourage the formal rules addressed. The education of the lawmakers seems to be unimportant, as does whether the legislator is under investigation.

In this light, the expectation of predominance of the social norm of civil war goes on if the negative preferences identified converge. The expectation of evolving to a social norm of peacebuilding demands the dominance of positive preferences determined in this research. Finally, although it was not the aim of this study to assess the Colombian justice system, one can state that it is efficient in the enforcement of fundamental rights, but only for those who have the information to access it.

6. General conclusions

The aim of this thesis was to study from an explanatory approach peace-making and peacebuilding based on original viewpoints which are in a cross-sectional manner usually implemented in development studies. The latter theoretical application was condensed in the following argument: the pursuit of participation and inclusion of all the people and inform well the citizenry about the terms of the accord is vital to achieving peace-making on the one hand; and, a rural restructure, changing political parties' informal coercive institutions and shifting the social norm of war towards peacebuilding on the other, are crucial coordinates so as to a routing a genuine development for Colombia. To make this argument plausible, I resorted to accepted developmental approaches stemming from diverse methods and data. First, we implement theoretical notions of the ladder of citizen participation, and the achievement of democratic goods through peacemaking facets, essentially: the agreement signs, the peace referendum, the settlement amendment and its final ratification, which has formalised the 2016 peace settlement. The findings denote a diverse set of participatory mechanisms, popular assemblies and mini-publics mechanisms following the notion of 'track-two diplomacy' also known as interactive-conflict resolution, these were fruitful attempts of inclusion and splendid organisational forms to spread a disruptive, nation's peace deliberated ideal. Although, the decision-making power remains premature in these mechanisms, the grievances and claims of the people engage with peace were incorporated in the approximately 300 pages of the final peace accord. So, when the negotiation and mediation moved forward, these mechanisms experimented a refinement process during its application, nonetheless, the peace plebiscite results materialise the interests and strategies of the hegemony in opposition eliciting the polarisation of this irregular civil war. The subsequent ratification of the emended accord through the legislative branch, shows the activation of representative democracy mechanisms but these required the executive branch push. Such that, I argued that albeit peacemaking could be interpreted as a set of inclusionary mechanisms, whereby the civil society of that forming nation contributes to achieve a peace settlement, the belligerents' participation (i.e., the political society and the insurgency) is the core of the accord's feasibility.

Second, I managed to classify in a comprehensive fashion the reasons or causes to reject into the ballot box the ratification of a peace settlement by studying the Colombian 2016 process. So, a framework of personal, relational, structural, and cultural causes can explicate a peace-ratification referendum result. Nevertheless, the lack of research that undertakes the terms of the contract between warring parties as structural causes allowed us to carry out a simple

heterodox statistical analysis. Accordingly, I posited the assumption that the terms of the accord are structural causes which strongly influenced the judgment of voters and citizenry behavior during the direct legislation election. Using OLS, the findings bear out that: spaces with rural poverty, coca crops, victims, remote from the centre and an intense presence of the rebels had positive associations with the yes vote, a heterogeneous influence of the warring parties, and that the vote for no won at higher population and high abstention. Hence, peace referendums are the acme participation mechanism to engage the people in peacebuilding, but these must be seriously assessed when the conflict denotes serious structural issues, or in the case examined, the nation is fractured. The peace settlement is oriented to these historical fissures within the state, so the rural reform, illicit drugs resolution, political participation, and justice to victims reduce the power of political elites, and on the contrary, empowered the excluded in that nation building transition.

Peacebuilding concerns were observed through two conceptual lenses: the LAS (Latin American Structuralism) and Neo-institutionalism. I revisited the following LAS assumptions: stagnation and land concentration, technical progress, dependency, and centre-periphery disparity, while also considering critical junctures of the ongoing Colombian civil war and applying these to the rural struggle. Land concentration in the hands of large landowners in patterns inherited from colonial land distribution is not the only key determinant connected to stagnation. Such schemes intended to make the land productive in the colonial period are embedded in the rural sector's policies, preserving relations of servitude between landlord and peasant. Hence, landless and subfamily farmers seek their livelihoods from the land owned by the powerful, who are the main beneficiaries of public-driven technology transfers. That pattern has allowed me to propose a paradox of land redistribution in which access to land does not guarantee the change of these antiquated productive systems, and to the contrary, can instigate greater rural poverty. In this light, the technical accomplishment constitutes the paramount strategy to make the land productive and defeat rural poverty. Additionally, the importation of agricultural goods requires review due to its tendency to contribute to rural poverty. The centre-periphery notion was formalised in this case based on the lack of infrastructure and absence of agriculture-related higher education and these factors' association with low rural standards of living, aggravated when the distance from the urban centres is wider. Lastly, externalities of civil war, such as coca cultivation and forced displacement, are shown to be indicators linked with the stagnation of the Colombian countryside.

I interpret neo-institutionalism in two streams, though both converge in the Colombian political institutions and their association with civil war. The first stream includes the concept of informal institutions, or in the Colombian case, coercive and violent informal institutions including nominated brutality, coca cultivation and corruption as tacit rules enforced by political parties elected to the executive branch (i.e., mayors, governors and president) during the 2010's. I observed that the peace process with the FARC-EP has reduced brutality, corruption remains constant and since the rebel group's demobilisation there has been a boom in coca cultivation. In a broad sense, the executive power has been concentrated in the traditional parties: *Liberal* and *Conservador*, followed by personalistic parties of leaders with powerful kinship such as CR, P de la U and charismatic parties such as CD. These five parties dominate executive policy-making with their allies such as evangelical and Parapolitics parties. The centre *Verde* party and ethnic parties are the opposition groups with increasing voter support. Rebel parties such as UP or the latest with FARC have had weak voter support, perhaps because their leaders have been systematically targeted for assassination. And the leftist opposition headed by PDA and *Humana* has been unable to consolidate a mass of voters. Thus, the Colombian political parties enforce or reject these civil war tacit rules to different degrees according to the governing categories and election scenarios and given the spatial heterogeneity of brutality and narcotrafficking which is rather more accentuated than corruption.

The second neo-institutionalism stream navigated is the study of social norms. I posit that the norm of civil war overshadows the formal institutions of peacebuilding constituted thanks to the peace settlement. On the one hand, when the dominant anti-social or selfish community makes the variation, selection and retention of negationist behaviours facing the formal institutions of political participation, the population adapts to preserve the civil war as a social norm. Therefore, political participation term of the accord in the 2018-2022 cohort has been postponed from the political agenda, prolonging the persecution and extermination of political activists and former rebels in reincorporation processes. On the other hand, the evidenced heterogeneous preferences between Senators, members of Congress and the experimental groups (i.e., self-enforcers, dodgers or scofflaws) demonstrate that individual preferences vary according to the chamber and reputation of the subject. Hence, unifying these legislators with political legacies deteriorates the political security provision as well as the reconciliation, coexistence and de-stigmatisation of citizens seeking inclusion in democracy. Given that lawmakers' campaign funding often comes from personal businesses, parties and interest groups are prone to undermining Laws 895 and 885. The level of Congress member

professionalism is not congruent with the response variables; therefore, this hypothesis is null. Members of congress with moderate-left and leftist ideologies tend to pursue peacebuilding. Legislators who base their decisions on the executive branch are susceptible to weakening the implementation of the term in question, and those who take decisions independently especially defend Law 885. Congress members with Jewish, not religious, secular and to a lesser extent, other religions voters, are engaged with the formal rules studied. Finally, the channel of communication used by the politicians is an irrelevant preference toward the application of the legal frame examined. Thus, I conclude that informal institutions and social norms are theoretically effective approaches to understand peacebuilding in the case in question.

This thesis contributes quantitatively to the study of Colombian development, in four ways. The data set of the second chapter is organised with geo-localisation variables (i.e., 1,122 units of analysis) such as: support for the peace accord; the presence of paramilitaries and the FARC-EP; victims, rural poverty; coca plantings; distance and population density taking the 2010s in a broad sense (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022d). The third chapter contemplates the 1,122 Colombian municipalities using public data for the decade under examination. It is built on a novel composite indicator of rural technical progress which includes soil capabilities and labour formalisation . In addition to the brutality composite indicator and corruption indicator, in chapter four, I present an original matrix of the political parties in executive power in a time series for the period from the year 2011 to 2020. This comparison is used to test my presumptions considering geodata of all municipalities of Colombia (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022a). Finally, in chapter five, the experiment with the 2018-2022 Colombian Congress cohort provides genuine and new data about nine individual and collective preferences of the 270 subjects ─ who represent the attitudes of the Colombian society as a whole ─ and to some extent about the nation's Judicial system (Lara-Rodríguez, 2022c).

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APPENDIX A. Appendix to Chapter Two

A.1 Structural causes visible correlations

Variable	FARC	Paras	Yes_ peace	No_ peace	Voter_ turnout	Victims	Rural_ poverty	Coca	Distan ce	Popula- tion(log)
FARC	1	0.337	0.21	-0.205	-0.104	0.178	0.242	0.348	0.098	0.072
Paras	0.337	1	0.083	-0.077	-0.096	0.448	0.05	0.163	0.129	0.304
Yes_ peace	0.21	0.083	1	-0.971	-0.234	0.018	0.509	0.177	0.497	-0.013
No_ peace	-0.205	-0.077	-0.971	1	0.249	-0.015	-0.513	-0.173	-0.504	0.013
Voter_ turnout	-0.104	-0.096	-0.234	0.249	1	0.009	-0.472	-0.096	-0.478	0.051
Victims	0.178	0.448	0.018	-0.015	0.009	1	-0.071	0.094	0.015	0.864
Rural_ poverty	0.242	0.05	0.509	-0.513	-0.472	-0.071	1	0.171	0.561	-0.127
Coca	0.348	0.163	0.177	-0.173	-0.096	0.094	0.171	1	0.094	0.012
Distance	0.098	0.129	0.497	-0.504	-0.478	0.015	0.561	0.094	1	-0.037
Popula- tion(log)	0.072	0.304	-0.013	0.013	0.051	0.864	-0.127	0.012	-0.037	1

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022d)

A.2 OLS models plots

Figure A.2.1 OLS Model 1 response variables plots

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022d)

Figure A.2.2 OLS Model 2 response variables plots

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez ([2022d](#))

Fig A.2.3 Structural causes by OLS models plot

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez ([2022d](#))

A.3 Logit Models

Table A.3 Structural causes logistic regression model

| | Response variable | | | |
	Yes dummy	No dummy	Yes dummy	No dummy
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
FARCF0.2	-0.454**	0.418**		
	(0.205)	(0.203)		
FARCF0.4	-0.601**	0.550**		
	(0.244)	(0.243)		
FARCF0.6	0.096	0.084		
	(0.329)	(0.327)		
FARCF0.8	0.45	-0.466		
	(0.362)	(0.36)		
FARCF1	0.304	-0.336		
	(0.322)	(0.321)		
ParasF0.2	0.383*	0.313		
	(0.224)	(0.222)		
ParasF0.4	-0.054	0.054		
	(0.294)	(0.293)		
ParasF0.6	0.074	0.061		
	(0.401)	(0.396)		
ParasF0.8	0.708	-0.694		
	(0.648)	(0.645)		
ParasF1	0.156	-0.157		
	-0.832	-0.829		
FARC			0.15	-0.184
			(0.264)	(0.263)
Paras			0.084	-0.033
			(0.432)	(0.431)
Voter_turnout	0.013	-0.013	0.011	-0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Victims	0.00000**	-0.00000**	0.00001**	-0.00001**
	0	0	0	0
Rural_poverty	0.028***	-0.027***	0.027***	-0.026***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Coca	0.001	-0.001	0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Distance	0.005***	-0.005***	0.004***	-0.004***
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)
log(Population)	-0.203**	0.207**	-0.218**	0.220**
	(0.09)	(0.089)	(0.088)	(0.088)
Constant	-1.5	1.423	-1.363	1.307
	(1.036)	(1.03)	(1.015)	(1.012)
Observations	1111	1111	1111	1111
Log Likelihood	-588.544	-592.5	-598.707	-601.158
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,211.088	1,219.001	1,215.414	1,220.316
McFadden's Pseudo R^2	0.2355	0.2302	0.2223	0.2190

Note: Statistical significance *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses
Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022d)

A.4 R syntax

```
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------#
#                                                                         #
#       Dimensional causes for turn down the 2016 Colombia's              #
#                       peace referendum                                  #
#                                                                         #
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------#
#                            Working_directory                            #
setwd("C:/Dimensional_causes_for_turn_down_a_peace_referendum.dta")
#                              Packages                                   #
install.packages("plyr")
install.packages("gmodels")
install.packages("rio")
install.packages("piecewiseSEM")

#                            Active Libraries                             #
library(dplyr)
library(plyr)
library(rio)
library(stargazer)
library(jtools)
library(openxlsx)
library(aod)
library(ggplot2)
#                              Variables                                  #
Yes_peace<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Yes
No_peace<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$No
FARC<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$FARC
Paras<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Paramilitaries
Yes_dummy<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Yes_dummie
No_dummy<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$No_dummie
Voter_turnout<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$`Voters
turnout`
Victims<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Victims
Rural_poverty<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Rural_Pov_
Coca<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Coca_crops
Distance<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Distance
Population<-Why_does_a_nation_choose_to_remain_at_civil_war$Popul
log(Population)
#                           Explore variables                            #
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(density(FARC))
plot(density(Paras))
plot(density(Yes_peace))
plot(density(No_peace))
plot(density(Voter_tunrout))
#                           Previous datasets                            #
Direct_consultation<-data.frame(FARC, Paras, Yes_peace, No_peace,
Yes_dummy,No_dummy, Voter_turnout, Victims, Rural_poverty,
Coca, Distance, Population)
Direct_consultation[is.na(Direct_consultation)] <- 0
#                             Correlations                               #
corrm<-cor(Direct_consultation)
Corr<-round(corrm, digits=3)
print(Corr)
export(Corr, "correlation_IPPP2.xlsx")
# Table . Summary statistics
sum.tab<- subset(Direct_consultation, select=c(FARC, Paras, Yes_peace,
No_peace,Voter_turnout,Victims, Rural_poverty, Coca, Distance,
Population));
```

```r
summary_stats<-summary(sum.tab)
summary_stats1<-print(summary_stats)
write.csv(summary_stats1, "summary_stats.csv")
sd(FARC, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Paras, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Yes_peace, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(No_peace, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Voter_turnout, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Victims, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Rural_poverty, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Coca, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Distance, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Population, na.rm = FALSE)
var(FARC, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Paras, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Yes_peace, na.rm = FALSE)
var(No_peace, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Voter_turnout, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Victims, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Rural_poverty, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Coca, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Distance, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Population, na.rm = FALSE)
#                                  Modelling                                  #
## OLS
M.1_ols<-
lm(Yes_peace~FARC+Paras+Voter_turnout+Victims+Rural_poverty+Coca+Distance+l
og(Population))
M.2_ols<-
lm(No_peace~FARC+Paras+Voter_turnout+Victims+Rural_poverty+Coca+Distance+lo
g(Population))
stargazer(M.1_ols, M.2_ols,  type = "text")
Modeling<-stargazer(M.1_ols, M.2_ols,  type = "text")
Modeling2<-data.frame(Modeling)
write.csv(Modeling,"models_direct_consultation.csv", row.names = FALSE)
RMSE<-function(error){ sqrt(mean(error^2)) }
RMSE(M.1_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.2_ols$residuals)
#                            Models visualization                             #
plot_summs(M.1_ols, M.2_ols, scale = TRUE, plot.distributions = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.1_ols, pred = FARC, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.1_ols, pred = Paras, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.1_ols, pred = Voter_turnout, interval = TRUE, plot.points =
TRUE)
effect_plot(M.1_ols, pred = Victims, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.1_ols, pred = Rural_poverty, interval = TRUE, plot.points =
TRUE)
effect_plot(M.1_ols, pred = Coca, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.2_ols, pred = FARC, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.2_ols, pred = Paras, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.2_ols, pred = Voter_turnout, interval = TRUE, plot.points =
TRUE)
effect_plot(M.2_ols, pred = Victims, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
effect_plot(M.2_ols, pred = Rural_poverty, interval = TRUE, plot.points =
TRUE)
effect_plot(M.2_ols, pred = Coca, interval = TRUE, plot.points = TRUE)
# ------------------------------------------------------------------- #
#                          Logit regression                                  #
str(Direct_consultation)
FARCF<-as.factor(FARC)
ParasF<-as.factor(Paras)
```

```r
Direct_consul_Logit<-data.frame(Yes_dummy, No_dummy, FARCF, ParasF,
Voter_turnout,Victims, Rural_poverty, Coca, Distance, Population)
Logit_peace<-glm(formula = Yes_dummy ~ FARCF + ParasF + Voter_turnout +
Victims + Rural_poverty + Coca + Distance + log(Population), family =
"binomial")
Logit_peace2<-glm(formula = No_dummy ~ FARCF + ParasF + Voter_turnout +
Victims + Rural_poverty + Coca + Distance + log(Population), family =
"binomial")
Logit_peace3<-glm(formula = Yes_dummy ~ FARC + Paras + Voter_turnout +
Victims + Rural_poverty + Coca + Distance + log(Population), family =
"binomial")
Logit_peace4<-glm(formula = No_dummy ~ FARC + Paras + Voter_turnout +
Victims + Rural_poverty + Coca + Distance + log(Population), family =
"binomial")
Logit_models<- stargazer(Logit_peace, Logit_peace2, Logit_peace3,
Logit_peace4, type = "text")
write.csv(Logit_models,"Logit-models_direct_consultation.csv", row.names =
FALSE)
## Now calculate the overall "Pseudo R-squared" and its p-value
ll.null_Logit1 <- Logit_peace$null.deviance/-2
ll.proposed_Logit1<- Logit_peace$deviance/-2
ll.null_Logit2<-Logit_peace2$null.deviance/-2
ll.proposed_Logit2<- Logit_peace2$deviance/-2
ll.null_Logit3 <- Logit_peace3$null.deviance/-2
ll.proposed_Logit3<- Logit_peace3$deviance/-2
ll.null_Logit4 <- Logit_peace4$null.deviance/-2
ll.proposed_Logit4<- Logit_peace4$deviance/-2
## McFadden's Pseudo R^2 = [ LL(Null) - LL(Proposed) ] / LL(Null)
(ll.null_Logit1 - ll.proposed_Logit1) / ll.null_Logit1
(ll.null_Logit2 - ll.proposed_Logit2) / ll.null_Logit2
(ll.null_Logit3 - ll.proposed_Logit3) / ll.null_Logit3
(ll.null_Logit4 - ll.proposed_Logit4) / ll.null_Logit4
## The p-value for the R^2
1 - pchisq(2*(ll.proposed_Logit1 - ll.null_Logit1),
df=(length(Logit_peace$coefficients)-1))
2 - pchisq(2*(ll.proposed_Logit2 - ll.null_Logit2),
df=(length(Logit_peace2$coefficients)-1))
```

APPENDIX B. Appendix to Chapter Three

B.1 Poverty [Rural_Pov_] Poverty by province and the capital

Source: Own elaboration based on CEDE (2020) and DANE (2018b)

B.2 Rural inequality [Gini]

The missing data of 13 villages in the province of Chocó were fulfilling with the entire GINI provinces' mean (DANE, 2017a, p. 7), the same for one municipality of La Guajira (DANE, 2017b, p. 7), and one of Nariño (DANE, 2017c, p. 7), respectively. The income allocation of the city of Cali (DANE, 2017d) was associated, as well. Finally, the non-existent data of some municipalities of Amazonas, Guainía and Vaupés were attributed with the national mean.

Fig. 2.1 Rural GINI by province and the capital

Source: Own elaboration based on Unidad de Planificación Rural Agropecuaria (2016)

Table B.3.1 Importation of agricultural-based products (2012)

ISIC Code	Description	Weight (ton)	ISIC Code	Description	Weight (ton)
0	Crop and animal production, hunting and related service activities	482,091.9	1331	Manufacture of textiles	4,435.3
10	Growing of non-perennial crops	1,771.7	1339	Manufacture of wearing apparel	123.4
81	Growing of sugar cane	15.8	1411		1,384.6
82		0.1	1413	Manufacture of wearing apparel, except fur apparel	0.2
90	Growing of tobacco	1,659.7	1414		12.8
111	Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oilseeds	75.8	1415		102.5
112	Growing of rice	5,795.8	1422	Manufacture of articles of fur	2.1
113	Growing of vegetables and melons, roots and tubers	155.8	1431	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted apparel	1.9
114	Growing of sugar cane	14.4	1490	Manufacture of wearing apparel	792.6
115	Growing of tobacco	1,841.0	1511	Tanning and dressing of leather; dressing and dyeing of fur	105,330.1
116	Growing of fibre crops	13.2	1512	Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness	7,200.8
117		88.0	1521		22,246.6
118	Growing of other non-perennial crops	215.7	1522	Manufacture of footwear	184,713.4
119		192.0	1530	Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials	36,718.6
121	Growing of grapes	770.2	1541		705,346.5
122	Growing of tropical and subtropical fruits	16,581.0	1542		184,694.5
123	Growing of citrus fruits	574,827.8	1543	Manufacture of paper and paper products	1,460,177.
124	Growing of pome fruits and stone fruits	17.0	1551		1,727.5
125	Growing of other tree and bush fruits and nuts	5,176.7	1552		45,720.8
129	Growing of other perennial crops	20.9	1561		83.9
130	Plant propagation	2,804.4	1562	Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard	0.2
140	Animal production	2,124.4	1563		2,576.7
201	Forestry and logging	47.9	1564		0.3
202	Dairy Products	59.9	1571	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers	15,436.5
1010	Processing and preserving of meat	271,242.0	1581		48,749.0
1110	Growing of cereals (except rice), leguminous crops and oil seeds	2,586,262	1582		7,113.2
1120	Growing of rice	143,783.0	1583	Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard	3,762.3
1200	Manufacture of tobacco products	0.01	1589		170,262.6
1310	Preparation and spinning of textile fibres	1,454.6	1600	Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork	5,490.3
1320	Manufacture of textiles	2,785.3	1810	Manufacture of man-made fibers	45,960.1
				Total	7,162,055

Source: Own elaboration based on DANE (2020)

I analysed the figures available per month. Although, March, June, July, August, and December, do not evidence recording of goods related to agriculture. Lastly, the results per municipality were normalised using the Min-Max scale (see equation 1).

B.4 Control Variables

Table B.4.1 List of control raw data variables

Variable	Source
Homicides per 1000 inhabitants, mean 2011 to 2017 **[Homi_thou]**.	*Observatorio municipal* CEDE (2020).
Coca crops in hectares, mean 2011 to 2016 **[Coca_crops]**.	*Observatorio municipal* CEDE (2020).
Forced displacement, sum 2011 to 2017 **[Forced_Dis]**.	*Observatorio municipal* CEDE (2020).
Subversive action, sum 2011 to 2017 **[Subver_act]**.	*Observatorio municipal* CEDE (2020).
Population 2018 **[Popul]**.	Adjusted by access (DANE, 2018a).
Area in km^2 **[Area]**.	Municipios (Esri Colombia, 2020)

B.4.1 Infrastructure indicator [Infr_Ind]

I handled the datasets in the four following stages: (1) the application of the algorithm 'fixing invalid geometry' of QGIS Hannover, (2) using the latter software I executed the algorithms 'sum line lengths' for linear objects as roads, railroads, and canals, and (3) In QGIS I used the 'attributes by location processing' for polygons or location objects (i.e., ports, airports/airdromes, and airstrips), (4) the last two based on the municipalities' polygons, aforementioned. Thus, to determine the infrastructure status, we built an indicator according to that data. Firstly, the roads are catalogue in a range to one up to eight following the IGAC's (2010) scale; table B 4.1.2 denotes national features and descriptive results. The column 'indicator weight' (B 4.1.2) portraits a subjective measurement of relevance for each infrastructure.

Secondly, I attained the data for each infrastructure per municipality in km or units/location; these values normalised using the Min-Max scale (see equation 1). Thirdly, the normalized data multiplied by the respective infrastructure sub-indicator weight, and then the summation of each one determines each object's performance. Lastly, the results were normalised.

Table B 4.1.2 Colombia's infrastructure data and indices

Road type	Features	Width (m)	Sum Km	SD	Mean	Min	Max	Indic. Weight	National mean
1	Two or more carriages, hard coating, paved.	> 5.5	10,874.85	13.735	9.692	0	101.99	0.13	1.24%
2	Two or more carriages, soft coating, without paved.	> 5.5	11,981.21	22.157	10.678	0	195.93	0.1	0.55%
3	One carriage, hard coating, paved.	> 2.5; < 5.5	1,324.43	5.349	1.1804	0	128.66	0.075	0.07%
4	One carriage, soft coating, without paved.	> 2.5; < 5.5	27,702.76	34.367	24.690	0	326.51	0.05	0.38%
5	One carriage, soft or without coating, natural road surface (i.e, gravels, sand/clay).	> 2.5; < 5.5	124,857.0	259.955	111.280	0	4,860.28	0.035	0.08%
6	Green lane, without coating.	> 2; < 2.5	27,915.4	103.332	24.880	0	1,714.37	0.025	0.04%
7	Forests road, transited by horse-drawn and people.	Undef	8,100.88	59.678	7.220	0	1,148.50	0.02	0.01%
8	Footpaths	Undef	33.02	0.9855	0.029	0	33.02	0.015	0.00%

Other infrastructure by length	Sum Km	SD	Mean	Min	Max	Indic. Weight	National mean
Railroads (freight transport)	2,988.52	8.143	2.663	0	87.21	0.13	0.40%
Canals	1,000.8	4.451	0.892	0	68.00	0.1	0.13%

Infrastructure by units/location	Sum (units)	SD	Mean	Min	Max	Indic. Weight	National mean
Airports and Aerodromes	216	0.767	0.192	0	18	0.12	0.17%
Airstrips	296	1.028	0.263	0	18	0.075	0.13%
Inland ports and seaports	89	0.372	0.079	0	6	0.125	0.11%
Total						1.000	3.29%

Source: Own elaboration based on IGAC (2016)

B 4.2 Indicator of higher education in agriculture [Agro_Edu]

To a nationwide extent I normalised on a Max-Min scale the number of programmes supplied per municipality. Thereafter, these values multiplied according to the subjective weight pointed in B.4.1.3, so, the summation of such estimation compose the indicator of higher education in agriculture, which finally was normalised. The indicator's national mean is 0.008, with a population SD of 0.091.

Table B.4.1.3 The national supply of tertiary education in Agriculture and its weights

Degree	Programs	Indic. Weight
Ph.D.	17	0.25
Master	53	0.175
Bachelor graduate Dip.	60	0.1
Bachelor	140	0.15
Technology graduate Dip.	51	0.07
Technology	198	0.12
Technician graduate Dip.	1	0.06
Technician	47	0.075
Total	567	1

Source: Own elaboration

B.4.3. Distance [Distance]

I tried to measure distances by road using ORS tools (a QGIS package), but the accessibility of several municipalities is only possible using intermodal transportation due to infrastructure constraints. So that, in a first step, I calculated the linear distance between each province's capital city and its municipalities. The second step was the distance valuation from Bogotá (Capital District) and every province's capital; this, based on the administrative state structure. The third step considers the sum of the obtained distances. For instance, Leticia's linear distance (the capital city of the province of Amazonas) and its municipality Puerto Alegría is 575 Km. The distance between Leticia and Bogotá are 1,089.35 Km. Thus, the distance value for such a municipality is 1,664.35 Km.

B.5 Rural technical progress composite indicator [RTPI_N]

B.5.1 Rural technical capability indicator

The technical capability factors were divided into the number of farms per municipality. The data normalisation for each factor was the Min-Max scale, where:

$$Xnorm = \frac{X - X\,min}{X\,max - X\,min} \qquad (1)$$

Such that, using a Weighted Sum Model, each factor relies on an equal weighting of 0.125. In other words, all the technical capabilities factors are given the same weight to obtain the whole indicator, as equation 2 posits.

$$A_i^{WSM} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} Wj\, Xij \qquad (2)$$

A_i denotes the unit of analysis' score of rural technical capability, the X_{ij} is the normal performance value of each municipality, and W_j is the equal-weights per factor. Lastly, the results were standardised using the Min-Max scale (equation 1).

B.5.2 Land productivity indicator in large-scale agriculture
Some farms are devoted to agribusiness, and its outcomes use extensive production methods. Its Yield per hectare γ, has been obtained as Rudra (1968, p. 1041) posits, by dividing the gross value of output $\theta("tons")$ by the gross cultivated area $\mu("ha")$. The values obtained indicate the γ of each large-scale agriculture product *(p)* represented in equation 3.

$$\gamma(p) = \frac{\theta("tons")}{\mu("ha")} \qquad (3)$$

The adjustable weight β (equation 4) is obtained according to the agricultural commodities specialisation per product for each municipality. Each product's weight varies from one to nine, that is to say, the number of agricultural commodities produced in a municipality *N(m)*. The equal indicator weight, in this case, is no fit because we cannot compare the γ in crops, for instance, the cane, with the outcomes in tonnes of crops as coffee, cocoa, and so on.

$$\beta(p) = \frac{1}{N(m)} \qquad (4)$$

I drove a data normalisation in Min-Max scale per *y* and consistent by *m*. The large-scale agriculture land productivity indicator was calculated via Weighted Sum Model; each relies on the adjustable weighting *βj* by *p* and per *m*. Here, B_i represents the performed score of large-scale agricultural commodities (equation 5). And the X_{ij} is the normal performance value of each product per municipality.

$$B_i^{WSM} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta j\, Xij \qquad (5)$$

B.5.3 Land productivity indicator in traditional agriculture

The Yield per hectare γ was obtained in the same fashion as the large-scale. The adjustable weight β is attained according to the traditional agriculture specialisation per product for each municipality. Accordingly, the γ data were normalised using the Min-Max scale. Thus, the land productivity indicator in traditional agriculture C_i represents the performed score by implementing a Weighted Sum Model (see equation 6); each relies on the adjustable weighting βj by p (0, to 19) and per m (1122). X_{ij} is the normal performance value of each product per municipality.

$$C_i^{WSM} = \sum_{j=1}^{n} \beta j \, X_{ij} \qquad (6)$$

B.5.4 Land productivity indicator in livestock

Although, the stocking rate depends on many factors such as how improved the pasture is, climate, soil type, rotation schedule, and so forth. I represent the stocking rates in 'Grazing Livestock Units' (*GLU*) per hectare, a unit being a 500 kg Friesian/Holstein cow. According to Finch, Samuel, & Lane (2014), there is a correlation of such rate, the use of nitrogen fertilizers and farm profitability, obtaining high *GLU*/ha, but conversely, lower rates associated with organic farms and poor grass growing conditions. Therefore, equation 7 builds the livestock land available (*LLA*). The Pasture (*Ps*) are active grasslands. The Stubble (*St*) or *Rastrojo* in Colombian Spanish considers often for grassland management, albeit in Colombia, no seasons *per se* exist. Large-scale agriculture uses 2,525,396.40 ha of land, and no measures of hayland are carried out. Thus, one can assume that the stubble is a potential livestock land. I include the Agricultural Buildings (*Ab*) because into these, mainly chickens and pigs on a medium and large-scale gain weight.

$$LLA = Ps + St + Ab \qquad (7)$$

The expected livestock land productivity (*SLP*) equation 8 results from each factor of livestock units per municipality (*m*), multiplied with the *GLU* portrayed in Table 11. Such that: Cattle units (*Ct*), Goats units (*Go*), Sheep (*Sh*), donkeys, horses and mules, that is mean Equines (*Eq*), Buffalo (*Bf*), Chickens (*Ch*), and Pigs (*Pg*).

$$\begin{aligned} SLPm = &Ct(0.70) + Go(0.10) + Sh(0.10) + Eq(0.58) + \\ &Bf(0.70) + Ch(0.10) + Pg(0.25) \end{aligned} \qquad (8)$$

We assume that the food production for the chicken production is domestic. Thereby, the Land Productivity Indicator in Livestock (*LPIL*) results from the expected livestock land

productivity minus the livestock land available, divided in the latter (see equation 9). Below I illustrated an example at the national level. Lastly, the values were normalised using the Min-Max scale (equation 1).

$$LPIL = \frac{(SLP-LLA)}{LLA} \mid \frac{(24,489,053-34,548,027)}{34,548,027} = \text{-29.12\%} \qquad (9)$$

B.5.5 Soil use capability indicator

Throughout a petition right[27] addressed to the Colombian Geographical Service (IGAC), I noted that there is no public information of soil capability available per municipality. So, I processed the agrologic soil maps[28] to 1:100.000 scale of the 32 provinces. Using the software QGIS 3.10.10-*A coruña*, the steps to achieve the soil features were the following: (1) based on the province shapes obtained from the IGAC, I applied the algorithm 'fixing invalid geometry.' (2) Considering Colombia's municipalities division shape[29], each province was isolated. (3) A spatial join is moved forward through the 'attributes by location processing' algorithm. Per province the geodata coordinates do not indicate a layered vector in common resulting in the soil area per municipality. (4) We moved forward a depuration process of soil areas (according to the object geometrical geo-reference and size) shared by some municipalities in each province to prevent redundancies. Finally, (5) the data was normalised in the percentage of the soil capability identified according to each municipality area.

Therefore, the soil capability per municipality (SC_m) depicted in equation 10 results of the soil capability index (B_j), which have a reverse weight according to its class and number of subclasses multiplied by the percentage area (X_m) of such soil in the municipality. Lastly, I normalised the results per municipality using Max-Min scale.

$$SC_m = \sum_{j=1}^{8} \beta j \, Xmj \qquad (10)$$

---

[27] Constitutional instrument of the petition right (derecho de petición). According to Article 23 of Colombia's political constitution (República de Colombia, 1991), every person – Colombian citizen or foreigner – has the right to submit such petition claims to the authorities, and received prompt responses.
[28] See <<https://geoportal.igac.gov.co/contenido/datos-abiertos-agrologia>>
[29] See << https://datosabiertos.esri.co/>>

Table B.5.5.1 Colombia's soil capability classes

Feature	Parameter	Class 1	Class 2	Class 3	Class 4
Slope	%	0 - 3	0 - 7	0 - 12	0 - 25
Erosion	Grade	None	None; light	None; light	None; light; moderate
Mass movement	% area affected	None	None	None; few (< 5%)	None; few (5 to 25)
Natural drainage	Condition	Good	Good; Moderate	Good; Moderate; Defective	Excessive; Good; Moderate; Defective; Poor
Floods	Frequency and time	No exist	None; rare; short	None; rare; short; casual	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short
Waterlogging	Frequency and time	None	None; rare; short	None; rare; short; casual	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long
Effective depth	cm	> 100	> 75	> 50	>25
Texture	Family	Loamy fine	Loamy fine; silty fine; Mixed	Loamy fine; silty fine; loamy thick; fine; mixed	Loamy fine; silty fine; loamy coarse; silty thick; fine; mixed
	Group	Moderately fine	Moderately fine	Moderately fine; medium; moderately coarse; fine	Fines; few permeable; moderately fine; medium; moderated coarse; fine
Fragments in soil	% of volume	< 3	< 3	3 to 15	15 to 35
Surface stoniness	% of affected area	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 3	3 to 15
Rocky outcrop	% of affected area	< 0.1	0.1 - 2	< 10	< 25
Fertility	Grade	Very high; high; medium	Very high; high; medium	Very high; high; medium; low	Very high; high; medium; low; very low
Soil salinity	% salts	No exist	No exist; light	No exist; light; moderate	No exist; light; moderate
Sodium content	Depth	No exist	No exist	No exist; in depth > 100 cm	No exist; in depth > 50 cm
	% of Na	None	None	< 15	< 50
Salts and sodium	% of affected area	None	< 5	5 to 15	15 to 50
	Depth	Na > 100 cm	Na > 100 cm	Na > 100 cm	Na > 50 cm
Ca / Mg	Link value and depth	Normal	Normal > 50 cm	Normal; narrow; inverted	Normal; narrow; inverted
Aluminium Saturation	%	< 15	< 15	15 to 30	< 60
Rainfall allocation	Allocation	500 - 1000 mm	500 - 1000 mm	500 - 1000 mm	1000 - 2000 mm
Thermal floors	Type	Warm; Balmy; Cold	Warm; Balmy; Cold	Warm; Balmy; Cold	Warm; Balmy; Cold
Moisture	Environment	Humid dry	Humid dry	Humid to dry	Humid to dry
Temperature/frost	°C and frost events times	>12 °C without frost	>12 °C without frost	>12 °C with 3 up to 10 frost a year	>12 °C with 3 to 10 frost a year

Feature	Parameter	Class 5	Class 6	Class 7	Class 8
Slope	%	0 - 7	25 - 50	50 - 75	Any
Erosion	Grade	None; light	None; light; moderate	None; light; moderate, excessive.	Any
Mass movement	% area affected	None; few (< 5%)	None; few; very few; frequent (25 to 50)	None; few; very few; frequent (50 to 75)	Any
Natural drainage	Condition	Defective; Poor	Excessive to Poor	Any	Any
Floods	Frequency and time	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long or pretty long.	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long or pretty long.	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long or pretty long.	Any in time and duration
Waterlogging	Frequency and time	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long or pretty long.	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long or pretty long.	None; rare; short; casual; short; pretty short; long or pretty long.	Any in time and duration
Effective depth	cm	Any	Any	Any	Any
Texture	Family	Loamy fine; silty fine; loamy thick; silty thick; fine; mixed	Sandy, Loamy fine; silty fine; loamy thick; silty thick; fine; mixed	Any	Any
	Group	Fine; few permeable; Moderately fine; medium; moderately coarse	Any	Any	Any
Fragments in soil	% of volume	15 to 35	35 to 60	> 60	Any
Surface stoniness	% of affected area	3 to 50	15 to 50	50 to 90	Any
Rocky outcrop	% of affected area	< 10	< 50	< 90	> 25
Fertility	Grade	Any	Any	Any	Any
Soil salinity	% salts	No exist; light; moderate, heavy	No exist; light; moderate, heavy	No exist; light; moderate, heavy	Any
Sodium content	Depth	No exist, or at any depth	No exist, or at any depth	No exist, or at any depth	Any
	% of Na	< 75	< 50	< 75	Any
Salts and sodium	% of affected area	< 75	< 50	> 75	> 75
	Depth	Any	20 to 50 cm	< 25 cm	< 25 cm
Ca / Mg	Link value and depth	Any value and depth	Any value and depth	Any	Any
Aluminium Saturation	%	< 60	60 to 90	> 90	Any
Rainfall allocation	Allocation	1000 - 2000 mm	1000 - 2000 mm	2000 - 4000 mm	Any
Thermal floors	Type	Warm; Balmy; Cold	Warm; Balmy; Cold; Very Cold	Warm; Balmy; Cold; Very Cold	Any
Moisture	Environment	Very humid to very dry	Pluvial and very dry	Pluvial and semi-arid	Any
Temperature/frost	°C and frost events times	>12 °C with 3 to 10 frost a year	Any	> 4°C; any frequency	Any

Source: Own elaboration based on IGAC (2014)

B.5.6 Formal Labour Indicator

According to the Colombian Ministry of Labour (Ministerio de Trabajo, 2016), a person that makes contributions for the social care system (i.e., pension and health) is recorded in the integrated form for contributions payers (PILA). Indeed, such contributions could have been carried out by firms at each employee's name or the self-employed persons himself. In this order, I take the median values of the number of workers that pay contributions for the social care system during the 12 months of 2016, per municipality. Further, based on the 2018 Household and Population Census geodata, the results of counted persons between 18 and 67 years old are adjusted. So that, the rural (DANE, 2018c) and urban (DANE, 2018d) population in that age range is considered at working age. The indicator is the percentage of formal workers (registered into PILA), divided in the working-age population per municipality. Finally, I normalise it as a rate.

B.5.7 Data caveats

The soil capability data seems to have different typologies applied. In the case of the province of Sucre the latest data available from the IGAC date back from 1997 and is unsuitable to the method proposed ─ that data frame does not use classes and subclasses. Similarly, stems from an odd typology so-called thematic '*TEMATICA*,' for instance: '03c1' where the first digit shows a pattern between zero and two, the second digit displays a pattern between zero and nine, the third bit represents an alphabetical pattern between 'a' and 'f.' Thus, I understand that the second digit has similarities with the presumably standard typology. The letters fit into the main soil types: clay, sandy, silty, peaty, chalky, loamy. As a result, I take the second digit of each object as a reference for our ends. According to the data provided, Cesar's province brings forward homogenous data in several polygons per soil use; this data generates many reservations. Finally, the spatial join by the QGIS algorithm 'attributes by location processing' could have a degraded performance due to a spatial index gap in common.

B.6 Variables correlations

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez (2022b)

B.7 Negative binomial models

Table B.7.1 Structural determines of rural poverty in Colombia (2012-2018) per municipality using NB models.

Variables	Rural poverty all municipalities				Rural poverty without provinces' capitals			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
RTP	-0.490***	-0.543***	-0.322***	-0.386***	-0.429***	-0.478***	-0.281***	-0.351***
	(0.086)	(0.090)	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.075)	(0.077)
Rural Inequality	-1.158***	-1.196***	-0.691***	-0.772***	-1.095***	-1.165***	-0.665***	-0.752***
	(0.119)	(0.118)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.121)	(0.118)	(0.102)	(0.099)
Importations	-1.152***	-1.192***	4.200***	5.767***	-28.205***	-38.880***	-21.893***	-26.901***
	(0.417)	(0.417)	(1.092)	(1.096)	(4.919)	(5.143)	(7.777)	(7.965)
Violence		0.008		0.076**		0.009		0.078**
		(0.046)		(0.038)		(0.045)		(0.037)
Rebellion		0.00001		-0.00004		-0.00000		-0.0001
		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)		(0.0001)
Forced Displacement		0.00001***		0.00001***		0.00001***		0.00001***
		(0.00000)		(0.00000)		(0.00000)		(0.00000)
Coca		0.0002***		0.00003		0.0001***		0.00002
		(0.00004)		(0.00003)		(0.00004)		(0.00004)
Infrastructure			-0.404***	-0.419***			-0.231**	-0.220**
			(0.095)	(0.095)			(0.101)	(0.099)
Agricultural Higher education			-0.700*	-0.664*			-2.351***	-2.551***
			(0.362)	(0.359)			(0.592)	(0.584)
Distance			0.001***	0.001***			0.001***	0.001***
			(0.00004)	(0.00004)			(0.00004)	(0.00003)
Population			-0.00000***	-0.00000***			-0.00000	-0.00000*
			(0.00000)	(0.00000)			(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Area			0.00002***	0.00002***			0.00002***	0.00002***
			(0.00000)	(0.00000)			(0.00000)	(0.00000)
Constant	4.903***	4.930***	4.249***	4.312***	4.856***	4.906***	4.210***	4.280***
	(0.090)	(0.089)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.081)	(0.078)
Observations	1,122	1,122	1,122	1,122	1,090	1,090	1,090	1,090
Log Likelihood	-4,758.573	-4,736.716	-4,541.700	-4,518.729	-4,606.182	-4,569.494	-4,389.814	-4,353.624
theta	8.997***	9.414***	14.624***	15.436***	9.498***	10.266***	15.709***	17.235***
	(0.454)	(0.479)	(0.825)	(0.883)	(0.490)	(0.537)	(0.912)	(1.028)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,525.146	9,489.433	9,101.400	9,063.458	9,220.364	9,154.989	8,797.628	8,733.249

Source: Own elaboration based on Lara-Rodríguez ([2022b]). Statistical significance *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses.

B.8 R syntax

```
#--------------------------------------------------------------------#
#            Back to Latin American structuralism: Evidence from      #
#                    the 2010s rural Colombian conflict               #
#_____#
#                            Working_directory                        #
setwd("C:/Users/Rural_Col")
#                              Import Data                             #
Campo<-column_to_rownames(Rural_Col, var = "Cod_Mun")
#                            Activate libraries                        #
library(Hmisc)
library(psych)
library(car)
library(texreg)
library(jtools)
library(sandwich)
library(dplyr)
library(tidyverse)
library(stargazer)
#The data set is without missing data #
#                              Variables                              #
Poverty<-Campo$Rural_Pov_
RTP<-Campo$RTPI_N
Rural_Inq<-Campo$Gini
Imports<-Campo$Impor_N
Violence<-Campo$Homi_thou
Rebellion<-Campo$Subver_act
Forced_Dis<-Campo$Forced_Dis
Coca<-Campo$Coca_crops
Infrastructure<-Campo$Infr_Ind
Agro_HiEdu<-Campo$Agro_Edu
Distance<-Campo$Distance
Population<-Campo$Popul
Area<-Campo$Area
#                            Explore variables                        #
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot(density(Poverty))
plot(density(RTP))
plot(density(Rural_Inq))
plot(density(Imports))
plot(density(Violence))
plot(density(Rebellion))
plot(density(Forced_Dis))
plot(density(Coca))
plot(density(Infrastructure))
plot(density(Agro_HiEdu))
plot(density(Distance))
plot(density(Population))
plot(density(Area))
plot(Poverty)
hist(Poverty, breaks = 20)
summary(Poverty)
##Previous data sets
Campo1<-data.frame(Poverty, RTP, Rural_Inq, Imports, Violence, Rebellion,
Forced_Dis, Coca, Infrastructure, Agro_HiEdu, Distance, Population, Area)
Campo2<-data.frame(RTP, Rural_Inq, Imports, Violence, Rebellion,
Forced_Dis, Poverty)
Campo3<-data.frame(Coca, Infrastructure, Agro_HiEdu, Distance, Population,
Area, Poverty)
```

```r
# Check for variable dependencies
# As all numeric, we will rely on correlation
# Check if there are visible correlations
pairs(Campo2,
      main="Poverty Correlations (g=Low, b=Med, r=High)",
      pch = 21, bg = c("red", "green3",
"blue")[unclass(factor(Poverty_clas))])
pairs(Campo3,
      main="Poverty Correlations (g=Low, b=Med, r=High)",
      pch = 21, bg = c("red", "green3",
"blue")[unclass(factor(Poverty_clas))])

# No predictor association was identified or need to be removed
# If we deal with continuous vars use correlation function and plots
#                      Correlations first scenario                #
# Get a correlation matrix
corrm<-cor(Campo1)
Corr<-round(corrm, digits=3)
print(Corr)
export(Corr, "correlation_13v.xlsx")
# Corplot
par(mfrow=c(1,1))
install.packages("corrplot", dependencies = TRUE)
library(corrplot)
corrplot(corrm, method = "circle")
# Correlation corgram
install.packages("corrgram", dependencies = TRUE)
library(corrgram)
corrgram(Campo1, order=TRUE,
         main="LGA Poverty",
         lower.panel=panel.shade, upper.panel=panel.pie,
         diag.panel=panel.minmax, text.panel=panel.txt)
corrgram(Campo1, order=TRUE,
         main="LGA Poverty",
         panel=panel.ellipse,
         text.panel=panel.txt, diag.panel=panel.minmax)
# Table Summary statistics
sum.tab<- subset(Campo1, select=c(Poverty, RTP, Rural_Inq, Imports,
Violence, Rebellion, Forced_Dis, Coca,Infrastructure,
Agro_HiEdu, Distance, Population, Area));summary(sum.tab)
sd(Poverty, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(RTP, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Rural_Inq, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Imports, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Violence, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Rebellion, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Forced_Dis, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Coca, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Infrastructure, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Agro_HiEdu, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Distance, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Population, na.rm = FALSE)
sd(Area, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Poverty, na.rm = FALSE)
var(RTP, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Rural_Inq, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Imports, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Violence, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Rebellion, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Forced_Dis, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Coca, na.rm = FALSE)
```

```r
var(Infrastructure, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Agro_HiEdu, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Distance, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Population, na.rm = FALSE)
var(Area, na.rm = FALSE)
# Table Structural determinants of rural poverty in Colombia (2012-2018,
# municipalities OLS models.
## OLS Linear model first scenario
M.1_ols<-lm(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports)
M.2_ols<-lm(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports+Violence+Rebellion+Forced_Dis+
            Coca)
M.3_ols<-lm(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports+Infrastructure+Agro_HiEdu+
            Distance+Population+Area)
M.4_ols<-lm(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports+Violence+Rebellion+Forced_Dis+
            Coca+Infrastructure+Agro_HiEdu+Distance+Population+Area)
stargazer(M.1_ols, M.2_ols, M.3_ols, M.4_ols, type = "text")
Models1to4<-stargazer(M.1_ols, M.2_ols, M.3_ols, M.4_ols, type = "text")
export(Models1to4, "Models1to4.xlsx")
write.csv(Models1to4,"M1-M4.csv", row.names = FALSE)
write.xlsx(Models1to4,"M1-M4.xlsx", row.names=FALSE)
### Data set without for the second scenario
nrow(Campo)
city.codes.remove<-c("05001","11001","41001","76001", "08001", "15001",
"88001",
                  "73001", "95001", "68001", "20001", "70001", "44001",
"50001",
                  "85001", "81001", "52001", "19001", "27001","47001",
"13001",
                  "18001","91001", "97001", "99001", "17001", "66001",
"63001",
                  "54001","94001", "86001", "23001")

Campo_C<-Campo[!(row.names(Campo) %in% city.codes.remove),]
Poverty_C<-Campo_C$Rural_Pov_
RTP_C<-Campo_C$RTPI_N
Rural_Inq_C<-Campo_C$Gini
Imports_C<-Campo_C$Impor_N
Violence_C<-Campo_C$Homi_thou
Rebellion_C<-Campo_C$Subver_act
Forced_Dis_C<-Campo_C$Forced_Dis
Coca_C<-Campo_C$Coca_crops
Infrastructure_C<-Campo_C$Infr_Ind
Agro_HiEdu_C<-Campo_C$Agro_Edu
Distance_C<-Campo_C$Distance
Population_C<-Campo_C$Popul
Area_C<-Campo_C$Area
#
Campo_Cities<-data.frame(Poverty_C, RTP_C, Rural_Inq_C, Imports_C,
Violence_C,Rebellion_C, Forced_Dis_C, Coca_C, Infrastructure_C,
Agro_HiEdu_C, Distance_C, Population_C, Area_C)
# Appendix C variables correlations second scenario
#
## Get a correlation matrix
corrm<-cor(Campo_Cities)
round(corrm, digits=3)
export(corrm, "corr_without_cities.xlsx")
corrplot(corrm, method = "circle")
corrgram(Campo_Cities, order=TRUE,
        main="Poverty",
        lower.panel=panel.shade, upper.panel=panel.pie,
        diag.panel=panel.minmax, text.panel=panel.txt)
```

```r
corrgram(Campo_Cities, order=TRUE,
        main="Poverty",
        panel=panel.ellipse,
        text.panel=panel.txt, diag.panel=panel.minmax)
## Table Structural determinants of rural poverty in Colombia (2012-2018),
# municipalities OLS models.
## OLS Linear model second scenario
M.5_ols<-lm(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C)
M.6_ols<-lm(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C+Violence_C+Rebellion_C+
            Forced_Dis_C+Coca_C)
M.7_ols<-lm(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C+Infrastructure_C+
            Agro_HiEdu_C+Distance_C+Population_C+Area_C)
M.8_ols<-lm(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C+Violence_C+Rebellion_C+
            Forced_Dis_C+Coca_C+Infrastructure_C+Agro_HiEdu_C+Distance_C+
            Population_C+Area_C)
stargazer(M.5_ols, M.6_ols, M.7_ols, M.8_ols, type = "text")
Models5to8<-stargazer(M.5_ols, M.6_ols, M.7_ols, M.8_ols, type = "text")
export(Models5to8, "Models8to8.xlsx", row.names=FALSE)
write.csv(Models5to8,"M5-M8.csv", row.names = FALSE)
write.xlsx(Models1to4,"M1-M4.xlsx", row.names=FALSE)
#  Validation through Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
RMSE<-function(error){ sqrt(mean(error^2)) }
RMSE(M.1_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.2_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.3_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.4_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.5_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.6_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.7_ols$residuals)
RMSE(M.8_ols$residuals)
#Appendix Negative binomial models
## Table Structural determines of rural poverty in Colombia (2012-2018),
#municipalities Negative Binomial models.
library(MASS)
library(magrittr)
M.1_NB<-glm.nb(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports)
M.2_NB<-glm.nb(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports+Violence+Rebellion+Forced_Dis+
            Coca)
M.3_NB<-glm.nb(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports+Infrastructure+Agro_HiEdu+
            Distance+Population+Area)
M.4_NB<-glm.nb(Poverty~RTP+Rural_Inq+Imports+Violence+Rebellion+Forced_Dis+
            Coca+Infrastructure+Agro_HiEdu+Distance+Population+Area)
Models1to4NB<-stargazer(M.1_NB, M.2_NB, M.3_NB, M.4_NB, type = "text")
write.csv(Models1to4NB,"M1-M4-NB.csv", row.names = FALSE)
#
M.5_NB<-glm.nb(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C)
M.6_NB<-
glm.nb(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C+Violence_C+Rebellion_C+
            Forced_Dis_C+Coca_C)
M.7_NB<-glm.nb(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C+Infrastructure_C+
            Agro_HiEdu_C+Distance_C+Population_C+Area_C)
M.8_NB<-
glm.nb(Poverty_C~RTP_C+Rural_Inq_C+Imports_C+Violence_C+Rebellion_C+
            Forced_Dis_C+Coca_C+Infrastructure_C+Agro_HiEdu_C+Distance_C+
            Population_C+Area_C)
Models5to8NB<-stargazer(M.5_NB, M.6_NB, M.7_NB, M.8_NB, type = "text")
write.csv(Models5to8NB,"M5-M8-NB.csv", row.names = FALSE)
#Because the values of response variable are not integers, some warnings
can emerge!
```

APPENDIX C. Appendix to Chapter Four

C.1 Variables and Summary Statistics

Table C.1 Variables and its data sources

Response variables (2012-2020)			Source
Brutality Composite Indicator: (ordinal, 0 to 1)			
Sub-indicator	Weight	Obs.	
Enforced disappearances [E.Dis]	15%	10,107	Victims Department (Unidad de Victimas, 2021).
Massacres [Massc]	15%	10,107	
Targeted Killings [T.Kill]	15%	10,107	
Set of non-mortal acts [Non. Mort]	55%	10,107	
Indicator	Weight	Obs.	
Brutality Indicator [Brutal.Ind]	100%	8,976	
Corruption Indicator [Corrupt.Ind]: (ordinal, 0 to 1) (1) Average of corruption facts by the administration in office (2) divided per municipality population mean in the period in question. (3) min-max normalized corruption per capita. Raw data Obs. 10,107. Indicator Obs. 8,976			Colombia's General Attorney Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación, 2021) and the *Código Penal* or Criminal Law (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2000).
Narcotrafficking [Coca.crops]: (categorical) the average area of coca fields in hectares, this, per time of administration in office [Coca.crops]. Raw data Obs. 10,107. Indicator Obs. 8,976			Colombia's Drugs Observatory (ODC, 2020).
Explanatory Variables (2012-2020)			Source
Political party/parties in office: (dummy variable) Semantic analysis of formal coalitions to achieve executive power. Obs. 179,520.			Colombia's Electoral College (Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil, 2021) election 2011. Colombian Electoral Monitor (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2021b) elections of 2014, 2015, 2018, 2019.
Voters turnout: (categorical) percentage. Obs. 8,976.			Ibid.
Presence of non-state armed groups: (dummy variable) Presence in the municipality during the electoral year of paramilitaries [AU_Pr], or rebel groups [ELN_Pr, FARC_Pr] Obs. 26,928.			Colombian Electoral Monitor (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2021c, 2021a), (Indepaz, 2020).
Electoral Fraud [Elec_Fraud]: (continuous) 0 no risk, 1 low, 2 medium, 3 high. Obs. 8,976			Colombian Electoral Monitor (Misión de Observación Electoral, 2021c, 2021a).

Source: Own elaboration. Note: The 2018 and 2019 FARC_Pr data are FARC-EP's scission groups based on the Indepaz (2020)

Table C.2 Summary statistics Colombian executive elections 2010s

Variables	Mayors			Governors			Presidents		
	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.	N	Mean	St. Dev.
Brutality Ind.	3,366	0.022	0.057	3,366	0.022	0.057	2,244	0.014	0.04
Corruption Ind.	3,366	0.077	0.091	3,366	0.077	0.091	2,244	0.089	0.094
Coca Crops	3,366	109.4	730.134	3,366	109.437	730.134	2,244	131.156	837.704
MIO	3,366	0.007	0.084	3,366	0.026	0.159	2,244	0	0
Afrovides	3,366	0.006	0.075	3,366	0.006	0.079	2,244	0	0
MIRA	3,366	3e-03	0.017	3,366	0.014	0.117	2,244	0.605	0.489
ADA	3,366	0.047	0.212	3,366	0.031	0.173	2,244	0	0
Humana	3,366	3e-03	0.017	3,366	0.015	0.122	2,244	0.122	0.327
Justa Libres	3,366	0.003	0.057	3,366	0.025	0.157	2,244	0.378	0.485
Polo Dem. Alternativo	3,366	0.009	0.092	3,366	0.018	0.134	2,244	0.348	0.477
Unión Patriotica	3,366	0.002	0.046	3,366	0.016	0.127	2,244	0.348	0.477
GSC	3,366	0.040	0.195	3,366	0.176	0.381	2,244	0.5	0.5
Partido de la U.	3,366	0.264	0.441	3,366	0.391	0.488	2,244	0.227	0.419
Centro Democrático	3,366	0.086	0.28	3,366	0.072	0.259	2,244	0.652	0.477
Opción Ciudadana	3,366	0.043	0.202	3,366	0.04	0.197	2,244	0.378	0.485
MAIS	3,366	0.033	0.179	3,366	0.098	0.298	2,244	0.122	0.327
Conservador	3,366	0.214	0.41	3,366	0.254	0.435	2,244	0.652	0.477
Liberal	3,366	0.230	0.421	3,366	0.471	0.499	2,244	0.605	0.489
Cambio Radical	3,366	0.210	0.408	3,366	0.364	0.481	2,244	0.227	0.419
Ali. Social Indigena.	3,366	0.074	0.262	3,366	0.191	0.393	2,244	0	0
Partido Verde	3,366	0.077	0.267	3,366	0.193	0.395	2,244	0.348	0.477
Partido AICO	3,366	0.024	0.153	3,366	0.071	0.256	2,244	0	0
Comunes (FARC)	3,366	3e-03	0.017	3,366	0	0	2,244	0.122	0.327
Voters turnout	3,366	0.674	0.126	3,364	0.677	0.101	2,244	0.542	0.114
Paramilitary Pr.	3,366	0.158	0.365	3,366	0.158	0.365	2,244	0.14	0.347
ELN Pr.	3,366	0.059	0.235	3,366	0.059	0.235	2,244	0.108	0.311
FARC-EP Pr.	3,366	0.129	0.336	3,366	0.129	0.336	2,244	0.105	0.307
Elec. Fraud Risk	3,366	0.636	0.812	3,366	0.636	0.812	2,244	0.537	0.736

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a)

C.2 Mayors spatial panel data modelling

Variable	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crop	(3) Corruption	Variable	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crop	(3) Corruption
Self Variable	0.7193*** (0.02018)	0.7207*** (0.022298)	0.6500*** (0.027561)	Liberal	-0.003422 (0.00187)	52.4277* (25.553)	-0.00213 (0.003596)
Constant	0.0046769 (0.00438)	111.531 (58.9911)	0.0164356 (0.008438)	Cambio Radical	-0.004411* (0.001905)	-2.13482 (25.9482)	-0.0006737 (0.003651)
MIO	0.0380*** (0.00902)	-68.6489 (122.851)	-0.0195453 (0.017291)	Ali. Sc. Indigena	0.0042247 (0.002910)	45.109 (39.6279)	0.0017344 (0.005577)
Afrovides	0.020735* (0.01012)	19.2557 (137.918)	0.0100692 (0.019411)	Partido Verde	-0.0039440 (0.002874)	63.0275 (39.1015)	-0.0095363 (0.005503)
MIRA	0.0835449 (0.04364)	-3.73433 (594.295)	0.0098335 (0.083647)	Partido AICO	-0.0030241 (0.004924)	-24.9 (67.0579)	-0.020689* (0.009438)
ADA	-0.012452 (0.01168)	41.7769 (159.151)	0.055126* (0.022400)	Comunes (FARC)	-0.0436839 (0.048315)	-1055.37 (658.039)	0.0039935 (0.092616)
Humana	0.033077 (0.04804)	-369.838 (654.397)	0.0102729 (0.092105)	Voter Turnout	-0.0041590 (0.006246)	-254.682** (84.9485)	0.0229014 (0.011919)
Justa Libres	0.0027176 (0.01318)	15.0451 (179.494)	0.0014508 (0.025264)	Paramilitary pre..	0.0351*** (0.002406)	-44.3283 (32.6131)	0.0049683 (0.004589)
Polo Dem. Alternativ.	0.02631** (0.00862)	-214.961 (117.456)	-0.0277672 (0.016528)	ELN presence	-0.0120*** (0.003377)	419.65*** (46.4863)	0.0019451 (0.006473)
Unión Patriotica	-0.039615 (0.02024)	433.26 (275.77)	-0.0167272 (0.038814)	FARC –EP presence	0.0123*** (0.002758)	175.67*** (36.917)	-0.0003468 (0.005146)
GSC	0.0007034 (0.00397)	45.17 (54.1643)	-0.0094745 (0.00762)	Electoral Fraud Rk.	0.001925* (0.000942)	15.4459 (12.8328)	-0.000287 (0.001804)
Partido de la U.	-0.002509 (0.00182)	4.10278 (24.8792)	-0.003105 (0.003500)	Observations	3366	3366	3366
Centro Democrático	-0.005015 (0.00278)	15.0361 (37.978)	-0.004455 (0.005344)	R-squared	0.414068	0.160048	0.340287
Opción Ciudadana	0.0134102 (0.01223)	-27.1656 (166.629)	-0.046506* (0.023452)	Log likelihood	5704.6	3530.21	-26337.5
MAIS	-0.0134** (0.00427)	-21.6794 (58.2797)	-0.020380* (0.008202)	Akaike info criterion	-11355.2	-7006.43	52729
					Diagnostics for Heteroskedasticity		
Conservador	-0.003683 (0.00196)	54.8042* (26.7504)	-0.008864* (0.00376)	(random coefficients) Breusch-Pagan test	DF 25; VAL 2661.0221***	DF 25; VAL 21830.6988***	DF 25; VAL 689.6349***
			Continued		Diagnostics for Spatial Dependence		
				Likelihood Ratio Test	DF 1; VAL 770.80***	DF 1; VAL 819.84***	DF 1; VAL 428.03***

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a). Note: Statistical significance *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

C.3 Governors panel data modelling

Table C.3.1 Pooled OLS Models Estimator Governors

Response variables	Explanatory variables								
	Governor parties elected			Governor parties in office			Governor parties in opposition		
	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crops	(3) Corruption	(4) Brutality	(5) Coca crops	(6) Corruption	(7) Brutality	(8) Coca crops	(9) Corruption
MIO	0.032***	-189.777	0.031*	0.025**	-31.118	0.008	0.114***	-84.563	-0.017
	(0.008)	(119.926)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(167.770)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(241.190)	(0.038)
Afrovides	0.003	76.396	-0.012	0.015	153.075	-0.016	-0.017	-110.355	-0.037
	(0.011)	(151.862)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(179.629)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(272.502)	(0.043)
MIRA	0.101***	-12.477	-0.003	0.166***	80.224	-0.008	-0.005	-506.760**	-0.012
	(0.010)	(145.539)	(0.019)	(0.013)	(203.302)	(0.026)	(0.022)	(226.293)	(0.036)
ADA	-0.042***	59.987	0.007	-0.052***	-134.727	0.026	0.015	304.144**	-0.008
	(0.009)	(123.991)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(239.201)	(0.030)	(0.014)	(144.772)	(0.023)
Humana	-0.260***	-1,140.49***	0.022	-0.0004	-142.820	-0.045*	-0.279***	-1,458.53***	0.024
	(0.026)	(364.049)	(0.048)	(0.013)	(209.765)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(331.569)	(0.052)
Justa Libres	-0.030***	-44.629	-0.031**	-0.016*	-167.055	-0.026	-0.014	321.128**	-0.024
	(0.007)	(94.785)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(131.946)	(0.017)	(0.014)	(147.095)	(0.023)
Polo Dem. Alternativo	0.008	-189.343	-0.013	0.001	86.774	-0.004	0.012	-956.402***	-0.022
	(0.010)	(139.381)	(0.018)	(0.011)	(175.930)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(236.431)	(0.037)
Unión Patriotica	0.252***	1,374.470***	-0.043				0.266***	2,446.997***	-0.028
	(0.026)	(374.497)	(0.049)				(0.036)	(363.195)	(0.057)
GSC	0.003	92.413**	-0.007	0.015***	149.723***	-0.031***	-0.014**	-43.520	0.040***
	(0.003)	(36.183)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(48.610)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(60.936)	(0.010)
Partido de la U.	-0.004**	46.163*	-0.010***	-0.008***	64.510*	-0.010**	0.007	-37.905	-0.0005
	(0.002)	(27.537)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(34.758)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(52.540)	(0.008)
Centro Democrático	-0.024***	-43.669	-0.017**	-0.022***	-7.496	-0.034***	-0.013*	-39.072	-0.001
	(0.004)	(54.327)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(76.971)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(79.086)	(0.013)
Opción Ciudadana	-0.004	-42.590	0.041***	0.008	-89.014	0.046***	-0.016	44.008	0.030*
	(0.006)	(82.230)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(128.556)	(0.016)	(0.011)	(109.470)	(0.017)
MAIS	-0.008**	-108.092**	0.009	-0.012***	-113.353*	0.019**	-0.016	28.676	0.006
	(0.004)	(51.477)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(64.480)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(139.682)	(0.022)
Conservador	0.002	55.932*	0.003	0.0002	49.880	0.012**	-0.001	-15.808	0.004
	(0.002)	(31.301)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(42.037)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(51.897)	(0.008)
Liberal	-0.006***	29.238	0.003	-0.0001	71.765*	-0.008*	-0.002	-87.918	0.009
	(0.002)	(27.973)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(37.412)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(54.569)	(0.009)
Cambio Radical	-0.014***	23.062	-0.003	-0.011***	24.310	-0.011**	-0.016***	-9.961	(Continued) 0.016*

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	(0.002)	(28.216)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(34.206)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(53.899)	(0.009)
Ali. Social Indigena	0.011***	-27.600	-0.003	0.021***	-11.768	-0.013*	0.005	-8.542	-0.027***
	(0.003)	(38.909)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(55.237)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(60.867)	(0.010)
Partido Verde	-0.004*	19.765	-0.012***	-0.006**	20.196	-0.010**	-0.007	-0.530	-0.008
	(0.002)	(32.325)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(38.764)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(65.404)	(0.010)
Partido AICO	-0.005	125.641**	-0.022***	-0.005	141.611**	-0.018**	0.002	-38.628	-0.064
	(0.004)	(57.530)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(64.914)	(0.008)	(0.026)	(262.138)	(0.041)
Voter Turnout	-0.045***	-725.844***	0.038**	-0.043***	-841.931***	0.049**	-0.028	-378.913**	0.010
	(0.009)	(123.639)	(0.016)	(0.010)	(158.400)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(176.274)	(0.028)
Paramilitary presence	0.033***	6.910	-0.002	0.034***	2.590	-0.001	0.028***	44.589	-0.005
	(0.003)	(38.599)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(47.171)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(62.433)	(0.010)
ELN presence	0.013***	577.020***	0.001	0.015***	660.949***	0.002	-0.003	190.610**	0.006
	(0.004)	(53.845)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(63.570)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(95.832)	(0.015)
FARC presence	0.035***	417.623***	-0.008	0.034***	440.433***	-0.009	0.033***	370.913***	-0.002
	(0.003)	(42.599)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(52.546)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(66.917)	(0.011)
Electoral Fraud Risk	0.004***	10.032	-0.0002	0.003**	5.600	0.002	0.004*	3.634	-0.003
	(0.001)	(14.904)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(18.339)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(23.179)	(0.004)
Constant	0.050***	445.036***	0.060***	0.042***	477.999***	0.062***	0.041***	306.775**	0.069***
	(0.006)	(87.312)	(0.012)	(0.007)	(113.796)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(121.948)	(0.019)
Observations	3,364	3,364	3,364	2,575	2,575	2,575	789	789	789
R2	0.294	0.132	0.030	0.313	0.138	0.044	0.336	0.189	0.080
Adjusted R2	0.289	0.126	0.023	0.307	0.130	0.035	0.315	0.164	0.051
F Statistic	57.90*** (df = 24; 3339)	21.167*** (df = 24; 3339)	4.330*** (df = 24; 3339)	50.55*** (df = 23; 2551)	17.705*** (df = 23; 2551)	5.068*** (df = 23; 2551)	16.12*** (df = 24; 764)	7.419*** (df = 24; 764)	2.762*** (df = 24; 764)

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a)

Note: Statistical significance *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

Table C.3.2 Fixed Effects Governors

Response variables	Governor parties elected			Governor parties in office			Governor parties in opposition		
	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crops	(3) Corruption	(4) Brutality	(5) Coca crops	(6) Corruption	(8) Brutality	(7) Coca crops	(9) Corruption
MIO	0.030**	-90.193	-0.002	-0.028	14.527	-0.021	0.132***	-92.181	-0.035
	(0.012)	(183.784)	(0.024)	(0.059)	(967.554)	(0.115)	(0.032)	(338.989)	(0.050)
Afrovides	-0.017	162.235	-0.045	-0.096***	422.116	0.021	-0.065	-337.807	-0.066
	(0.020)	(302.397)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(605.695)	(0.072)	(0.047)	(508.044)	(0.075)
MIRA	0.037**	-150.149	-0.049	0.155***	208.824	0.190*	0.014	-1,294.712**	0.064
	(0.016)	(248.244)	(0.032)	(0.058)	(942.085)	(0.112)	(0.055)	(589.389)	(0.087)
ADA	-0.005	176.563	0.025	-0.068	783.677	-0.311*	-0.011	2,335.972***	0.025
	(0.012)	(181.452)	(0.024)	(0.095)	(1,545.455)	(0.184)	(0.040)	(426.609)	(0.063)
Humana	-0.287***	706.148	0.075				-0.324***	-1,509.705**	0.109
	(0.030)	(457.411)	(0.060)				(0.055)	(584.750)	(0.086)
Justa Libres	-0.015	67.369	-0.008	-0.035	-448.714	-0.029	0.009	424.574	-0.032
	(0.011)	(164.731)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(588.665)	(0.070)	(0.036)	(390.349)	(0.057)
Polo Dem. Alternativo	-0.005	-582.658***	-0.012				-0.011	-1,649.62***	-0.003
	(0.014)	(219.756)	(0.029)				(0.043)	(458.518)	(0.067)
Union Patriotica	0.290***	-190.447	-0.032				0.337***	2,047.885***	-0.082
	(0.030)	(461.216)	(0.060)				(0.056)	(603.786)	(0.089)
GSC	0.007	32.788	-0.010	0.013	112.167	-0.044	0.002	99.497	-0.064**
	(0.005)	(69.983)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(346.754)	(0.041)	(0.017)	(186.063)	(0.027)
Partido de la U.	-0.005	-47.241	-0.010	-0.0004	-82.704	0.018	0.036***	79.006	-0.014
	(0.003)	(50.785)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(244.719)	(0.029)	(0.013)	(133.899)	(0.020)
Centro Democratico	-0.006	-22.301	-0.024*	0.022	182.007	-0.072	-0.013	-246.421	-0.061
	(0.006)	(96.388)	(0.013)	(0.035)	(574.353)	(0.068)	(0.024)	(261.329)	(0.038)
Opcion Ciudadana	-0.010	-254.880**	-0.026	-0.006	-50.071	0.052	0.009	-520.268**	-0.011
	(0.008)	(126.951)	(0.017)	(0.037)	(612.343)	(0.073)	(0.024)	(253.564)	(0.037)
MAIS	0.008	-106.311	0.002	-0.023	-317.832	-0.015	0.008	-120.175	-0.040
	(0.008)	(119.852)	(0.016)	(0.028)	(453.352)	(0.054)	(0.031)	(336.244)	(0.049)
Conservador	0.005	50.862	0.011	-0.023	-62.466	0.055*	0.011	-88.625	-0.019
	(0.004)	(56.538)	(0.007)	(0.016)	(254.452)	(0.030)	(0.011)	(121.270)	(0.018)
									(Continued)
Liberal	-0.005	-28.875	0.002	-0.016	-129.493	-0.015	-0.038***	-421.402***	-0.015
	(0.003)	(49.590)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(216.439)	(0.026)	(0.012)	(129.637)	(0.019)
	-0.002	17.386	0.004	-0.004	47.688	0.036	0.004	11.478	0.023

Cambio Radical	(0.004)	(56.349)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(203.041)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(132.955)	(0.020)
Ali. Social Indigena	0.0001	23.478	-0.008	0.039**	296.674	-0.024	-0.006	-433.806**	-0.018
	(0.004)	(66.481)	(0.009)	(0.019)	(303.752)	(0.036)	(0.016)	(168.288)	(0.025)
Partido Verde	0.006	82.952	-0.014*	0.029*	209.372	-0.036	0.010	22.876	-0.015
	(0.004)	(57.670)	(0.008)	(0.018)	(288.225)	(0.034)	(0.012)	(126.591)	(0.019)
Partido AICO	-0.017**	134.582	-0.012	-0.008	81.608	-0.029	-0.021	-62.197	0.005
	(0.007)	(114.557)	(0.015)	(0.018)	(299.105)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(570.242)	(0.084)
Voter Turnout	-0.036***	-1,047.4***	0.054**	-0.034**	-1,160.8***	0.060**	-0.054*	-595.185*	0.049
	(0.012)	(185.174)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(231.311)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(315.695)	(0.046)
Paramilitary presence	0.016***	109.407**	0.011*	0.017***	60.349	0.004	0.016*	164.163*	-0.004
	(0.003)	(49.168)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(63.669)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(90.896)	(0.013)
ELN presence	0.016***	643.449***	0.003	0.012**	517.009***	0.005	0.029**	420.747***	0.005
	(0.004)	(66.671)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(83.965)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(134.488)	(0.020)
FARC-EP presence	0.026***	326.550***	-0.005	0.028***	435.580***	-0.006	0.023***	279.453***	0.004
	(0.004)	(53.966)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(70.187)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(94.357)	(0.014)
Electoral Fraud Risk	0.002**	25.261	0.001	0.003**	29.404	0.0001	0.003	37.903	0.005
	(0.001)	(18.061)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(23.245)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(32.501)	(0.005)
Observations	3,364	3,364	3,364	2,575	2,575	2,575	789	789	789
R2	0.166	0.127	0.015	0.121	0.115	0.014	0.333	0.24	0.038
Adjusted R2	-0.265	-0.324	-0.494	-0.558	-0.569	-0.747	-0.257	-0.432	-0.813
F Statistic	18.33*** (df = 24; 2218)	13.436*** (df = 24; 2218)	1.364 (df = 24; 2218)	9.509*** (df = 21; 1452)	8.967*** (df = 21; 1452)	1.008 (df = 21; 1452)	8.695*** (df = 24; 418)	5.514*** (df = 24; 418)	0.690 (df = 24; 418)

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a)

Note: Statistical significance *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

Table C.3.3 Least square dummy variables regression with fixed effects Governors

Response variables	Explanatory variables								
	Governor parties elected			Governor parties in office			Governor parties in opposition		
	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crops	(3) Corruption	(4) Brutality	(5) Coca crops	(6) Corruption	(7) Brutality	(8) Coca crops	(9) Corruption
(Intercept)	-0.001	1.4e+01	0.124***	0.012	-2.2e+01	1.2e-01	-3.6e-02	108.64	0.146*
	(0.024)	(2.2e+02)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(4.3e+02)	(6.5e-02)	(4.7e-02)	(311.92)	(0.059)
MIO	0.056***	-6.0e+01	0.002	0.026*	1.4e+02	-7.1e-03	6.4e-02	-49.274	0.060
	(0.008)	(8.0e+01)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(1.2e+02)	(1.8e-02)	(4.0e-02)	(269.79)	(0.051)
Afrovides	-0.002	1.0e+02	0.022	-0.003	7.5e+01	3.4e-02	1.4e-02	3.001	-0.001
	(0.010)	(1.0e+02)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(1.6e+02)	(2.5e-02)	(6.7e-02)	(450.40)	(0.086)
MIRA	0.145***	8.6e+01	0.006	0.188***	3.2e+02*	-7.9e-03	4.3e-02	-388.05	0.009
	(0.010)	(9.5e+01)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(1.5e+02)	(2.3e-02)	(4.0e-02)	(268.18)	(0.051)
ADA	-0.054***	-1.0e+02	-0.020	-0.017	-5.6e+02**	-1.3e-02	-1.3e-02	-228.89	0.008
	(0.008)	(8.0e+01)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(1.9e+02)	(2.9e-02)	(2.1e-02)	(140.84)	(0.026)
Humana	-0.090***	-3.4e+02	-0.030	0.032*	-7.2e+01	-7.2e-02**	-3.1e-01***	-2,967.7 ***	-0.097
	(0.025)	(2.4e+02)	(0.040)	(0.015)	(1.7e+02)	(2.5e-02)	(7.4e-02)	(493.65)	(0.094)
Justa Libres	-0.062***	-2.4e+01	-0.013	-0.070***	-9.6e+01	-4.8e-02**	-3.5e-02	689.14***	-0.052
	(0.006)	(6.2e+01)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(1.0e+02)	(1.5e-02)	(2.9e-02)	(195.12)	(0.037)
Polo Dem. Alternativo	0.005	-4.0e+01	0.020	-0.010	4.7e+01	3.6e-02	9.3e-03	-456.30	-0.158*
	(0.010)	(9.3e+01)	(0.015)	(0.012)	(1.3e+02)	(2.0e-02)	(5.1e-02)	(339.71)	(0.064)
Unión Patriotica	0.091***	3.8e+02	-0.053				2.9e-01***	3,537.1***	0.081
	(0.026)	(2.4e+02)	(0.041)				(8.0e-02)	(530.6)	(0.101)
GSC	0.005	-7.2e+01 **	-0.018***	0.010**	-1.1e+02**	-3.9e-02***	-6.1e-03	6.197	0.003
	(0.002)	(2.5e+01)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(4.1e+01)	(6.3e-03)	(1.3e-02)	(92.36)	(0.017)
Partido de la U.	-0.004 *	4.6e+01*	-0.006*	-0.009***	1.0e+02***	-4.2e-03	5.6e-03	0.781	0.016
	(0.002)	(1.8e+01)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(2.8e+01)	(4.3e-03)	(9.3e-03)	(62.03)	(0.011)
Centro Democrático	-0.017***	2.1e+01	0.006	-0.015*	-2.2e+01	1.5e-02	1.1e-02	-90.88	-0.004
	(0.004)	(3.7e+01)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(7.0e+01)	(1.0e-02)	(1.5e-02)	(103.2)	(0.019)
Opcion Ciudadana	0.006	-1.3e+01	0.028**	0.010	6.6e+01	2.0e-02	-3.3e-03	23.75	0.042
	(0.005)	(5.3e+01)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(1.1e+02)	(1.6e-02)	(2.1e-02)	(144.8)	(0.027)
MAIS	-0.016***	-5.6e+01	-0.005	-0.024***	-4.7e+01	-1.1e-02	1.5e-03	22.47	-0.004
	(0.003)	(3.6e+01)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(5.3e+01)	(8.0e-03)	(3.3e-02)	(224.9)	(0.042)
Conservador	-0.004	-6.4e-01	-0.018***	-0.003	5.2e+00	-2.4e-02***	-2.1e-02	108.4	-0.004
	(0.002)	(2.1e+01)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(3.3e+01)	(5.0e-03)	(1.1e-02)	(77.50)	(0.014)
Liberal	0.001	-3.4e+00	-0.013***	0.001	2.6e+01	-2.2e-02***	1.2e-03	-98.08	0.017
	(0.002)	(1.9e+01)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(3.2e+01)	(4.9e-03)	(1.0e-02)	(71.20)	(0.013)

(Continued)

Cambio Radical	-0.014***	3.5e+01	0.009	-0.015***	1.1e+01	4.1e-03	-1.7e-02	55.41	-0.003
	(0.002)	(2.0e+01)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(3.0e+01)	(4.6e-03)	(1.1e-02)	(79.28)	(0.015)
Ali. Social Indigena	0.013***	8.2e+00	-0.011**	0.020***	-1.0e+00	-1.6e-02*	-1.5e-02	39.68	0.006
	(0.002)	(2.6e+01)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(4.3e+01)	(6.5e-03)	(1.2e-02)	(80.04)	(0.015)
Partido Verde	-0.002	7.9e+01***	-0.012***	-0.010***	1.4e+02***	-1.0e-02*	-5.9e-05	46.55	0.015
	(0.002)	(2.2e+01)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(3.4e+01)	(5.2e-03)	(1.5e-02)	(102.0)	(0.019)
Partido AICO	-0.014***	7.7e+01*	0.022***	-0.014**	5.6e+01	2.5e-02**	-3.6e-02	-39.97	0.019
	(0.004)	(3.8e+01)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(5.1e+01)	(7.8e-03)	(4.0e-02)	(266.10)	(0.050)
Voter Turnout	-0.020	3.8e+01	0.006	-0.026	-1.8e+01	2.6e-02	5.9e-02	-222.1	-0.105
	(0.014)	(1.3e+02)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(2.0e+02)	(3.0e-02)	(5.8e-02)	(384.7)	(0.073)
Paramiliary presence	0.031 ***	-1.0e+02***	0.001	0.029***	-1.2e+02***	3.2e-03	5.2e-02***	-200.0*	-0.007
	(0.002)	(2.5e+01)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(3.6e+01)	(5.4e-03)	(1.1e-02)	(78.23)	(0.014)
ELN presence	-0.029***	2.1e+02***	0.011	-0.026***	2.9e+02***	1.1e-02	-4.9e-02**	-254.9*	0.006
	(0.004)	(4.2e+01)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(6.0e+01)	(9.1e-03)	(1.7e-02)	(115.8)	(0.022)
FARC-EP presence	0.007*	2.5e+01	0.005	0.004	3.0e+01	-5.2e-04	2.1e-02	221.9 *	0.015
	(0.003)	(3.4e+01)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(4.9e+01)	(7.4e-03)	(1.4e-02)	(95.02)	(0.018)
Electoral Fraud Risk	-0.002	-3.3e+00	-0.002	-0.002	-1.4e+01	-2.9e-03	-1.0e-02	-17.26	0.000
	(0.001)	(1.2e+01)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(1.8e+01)	(2.7e-03)	(5.6e-03)	(37.67)	(0.007)
n=	1122	1122	1122	1102	1102	1102	347	347	347
N=	3364	3364	3364	2575	2575	2575	789	789	789
T=	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Total Sum of Squares:	10.888	1793800000	27.906	7.7645	1532900000	22.148	3.0939	260770000	5.753
Residual Sum of Squares:	3.4395	300070000	8.4233	1.9533	253650000	5.772	0.34933	15343000	0.560
R-Squared:	0.68411	0.83272	0.69816	0.74843	0.83453	0.73939	0.88709	0.94116	0.90266
Adj. R-Squared:	0.52104	0.74637	0.54234	0.55342	0.70627	0.53737	0.47039	0.72402	0.54345
F-statistic:	4.195*** on 1145 and 2218 DF	9.643*** on 1145 and 2218 DF	4.480*** on 1145 and 2218 DF	3.837*** on 1124 and 1450 DF	6.506*** on 1124 and 1450 DF	3.660*** on 1124 and 1450 DF	2.288 on 620 and 168 DF	4.334*** on 620 and 168 DF	2.512*** on 620 and 168 DF,

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a)

Note: Statistical significance *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

C.4 Presidents panel data modelling

Table C.4.1 Pooled OLS Models Estimator Presidents

Response Variable	Explanatory Variables								
	President parties elected			President parties in office			President parties in opposition		
	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crops	(3) Corruption	(4) Brutality	(5) Coca crops	(6) Corruption	(7) Brutality	(8) Coca crops	(9) Corruption
MIRA	0.003 (0.002)	47.728 (49.066)	-0.018*** (0.006)						
Justa Libres	-0.003 (0.002)	62.670 (47.269)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.002)	120.388** (57.750)	-0.004 (0.005)			
Comunes (FARC)	0.013*** (0.003)	192.261*** (59.235)	-0.040*** (0.007)				0.014*** (0.003)	180.763*** (37.398)	-0.040*** (0.007)
Voter Turnout	-0.048*** (0.007)	-605.994*** (152.171)		-0.041*** (0.008)	-598.667*** (222.419)		-0.063*** (0.012)	-683.078*** (156.114)	
Paramilitary presence	0.018*** (0.003)	245.353*** (63.870)		0.018*** (0.004)	291.074*** (98.773)		0.020*** (0.005)	193.351*** (59.886)	
ELN presence	0.031*** (0.003)	422.374*** (58.193)		0.038*** (0.003)	523.097*** (86.316)		0.018*** (0.005)	208.470*** (58.353)	
FARC-EP presence	0.004 (0.003)	331.794*** (75.747)		0.007 (0.004)	497.098*** (116.517)		-0.001 (0.006)	40.991 (72.035)	
Electoral Fraud Risk	0.006*** (0.001)	16.719 (23.423)		0.008*** (0.001)	4.400 (34.748)		0.005** (0.002)	47.725** (23.407)	
Constant	0.028*** (0.004)	259.678*** (90.658)	0.106*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.005)	237.072* (128.111)	0.088*** (0.004)	0.038*** (0.007)	342.899*** (89.259)	0.106*** (0.004)
Observations	2,244	2,244	2,244	1,358	1,358	1,358	886	886	886
R2	0.203	0.107	0.018	0.259	0.119	0.001	0.143	0.125	0.035
Adjusted R2	0.201	0.103	0.016	0.256	0.115	-0.0002	0.137	0.119	0.034
F Statistic	71.327*** (df = 8; 2235)	33.366*** (df = 8; 2235)	13.364*** (df = 3; 2240)	78.880*** (df = 6; 1351)	30.456*** (df = 6; 1351)	0.716 (df = 1; 1356)	24.481*** (df = 6; 879)	20.994*** (df = 6; 879)	32.215*** (df = 1; 884)

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a)

Note: Statistical significance *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

Table C.4.2 Fixed Effects Presidents

Response Variable	Explanatory Variables								
	President parties elected			President parties in office			President parties in opposition		
	(1) Brutality	(2) Coca crops	(3) Corruption	(4) Brutality	(5) Coca crops	(6) Corruption	(7) Brutality	(8) Coca crops	(9) Corruption
MIRA	0.005 (0.004)	-33.310 (85.206)	0.020** (0.010)						
Justa Libres				0.009 (0.049)	-309.144 (1,310.301)	-0.003 (0.116)			
Comunes (FARC)	0.017*** (0.006)	-216.385* (121.983)	0.012 (0.014)				0.012 (0.048)	-81.953 (652.322)	-0.245* (0.126)
Voter Turnout	-0.065*** (0.015)	-1,147.104*** (305.284)	0.002 (0.036)	-0.052*** (0.017)	-1,444.091*** (444.045)	0.091** (0.039)	-0.069*** (0.022)	-1,146.361*** (302.566)	-0.005 (0.059)
Paramilitary presence	0.012*** (0.004)	149.222* (83.855)	0.017* (0.010)	0.013** (0.005)	267.379* (141.004)	0.014 (0.013)	-0.002 (0.006)	212.647** (86.965)	0.019 (0.017)
ELN presence	0.025*** (0.004)	234.645*** (84.296)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.034*** (0.005)	546.412*** (141.570)	0.001 (0.013)	0.011* (0.006)	202.417** (85.948)	0.006 (0.017)
FARC-EP presence	0.003 (0.005)	422.502*** (104.736)	-0.016 (0.012)	0.003 (0.007)	600.468*** (174.366)	-0.007 (0.015)	0.017** (0.008)	55.727 (113.318)	-0.008 (0.022)
Electoral Fraud Risk	0.009*** (0.002)	18.948 (33.196)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.010*** (0.002)	15.880 (51.979)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.047 (34.235)	-0.006 (0.007)
Observations	2,244	2,244	2,244	1,358	1,358	1,358	886	886	886
R2	0.131	0.076	0.007	0.155	0.115	0.010	0.057	0.092	0.013
Adjusted R2	-0.747	-0.859	-0.997	-0.704	-0.784	-0.996	-0.909	-0.839	-0.999
F Statistic	24.088*** (df = 7; 1115)	13.107*** (df = 7; 1115)	1.157 (df = 7; 1115)	20.592*** (df = 6; 673)	14.598*** (df = 6; 673)	1.152 (df = 6; 673)	4.422*** (df = 6; 437)	7.372*** (df = 6; 437)	0.965 (df = 6; 437)

Source: Own elaboration based on the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022a)
Note: Statistical significance *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

C.5 R syntax

```
#------------------------------------------------------------------------#
#       Party politics amid civil war: Brutality, narcotrafficking and    #
#                    corruption in Colombia's transition                   #
#                                                                          #
#------------------------------------------------------------------------#
# Data files #
directory <- "C:/FINAL.xlsx"
#Packages
library(stargazer)
library(plm)
library(dplyr)
library(tidyverse)
# Create the sub-levels
# 1. Mayors data set elections
City_Hall<-filter(Execute_elec_2010s, Election == "City Hall")
stargazer(as.data.frame(City_Hall), type="text", title = "Table1: Summary
Statistics Mayor", out = "Table1 Summary Statistics Mayors.csv")
# 2. Governors data set elections
Governors<-filter(Execute_elec_2010s, Election == "Governor")
stargazer(as.data.frame(Governors), type="text", title = "Table2: Summary
Statistics Governor", out = "Table2 Summary Statistics Governor.csv")
#3. Presidential data set elections
President<-filter(Execute_elec_2010s, Election == "President")
stargazer(as.data.frame(President), type="text", title = "Table3 Summary
Statistics President", out = "Table3 Summary Statistics President.csv")
#----------------------Governor parties elected----------------------#
Coca_Gov<-Governors$Coca.crops
Brutal_Gov<-Governors$Brutal.Ind
Corrup_Gov<-Governors$Corrupt.Ind
MIO_Gov<-Governors$MIO
Afrovides_Gov<-Governors$Afrovides
Comunes_Gov<-Governors$Comunes
MIRA_Gov<-Governors$MIRA
ADA_Gov<-Governors$`Partido Ada`
Humana_Gov<-Governors$`Colombia Humana`
Justa_Gov<-Governors$`Justa Libres`
Polo_Gov<-Governors$`Polo Dem Alt`
Union_Gov<-Governors$`Uni□at`
GSC_Gov<-Governors$GSC
De_la_U_Gov<-Governors$`P. de la U`
C_Democrat_Gov<-Governors$`C. DemocrPco`
O_Ciudada_Gov<-Governors$Ciudadana
MAIS_Gov<-Governors$MAIS
Conservat_Gov<-Governors$Conservative
Liberal_Gov<-Governors$Liberal
ASI_Gov<-Governors$ASI
Radical_Gov<-Governors$Radical
Verde_Gov<-Governors$Verde
AICO_Gov<-Governors$AICO
Muni_Code_Gov<-Governors$MPIO_CCNCT
Quad_Gov<-Governors$Election
Vot_Turn_Gov<-Governors$`Voters turnout`
Paras_Gov<-Governors$AU_Pr
ELN_Gov<-Governors$ELN_Pr
FARC_Gov<-Governors$FARC_Pr
Fraud_Gov<-Governors$Elec_Fraud
#------------------------Governor parties in office-------------------#
GovernorsWon<-filter(Governors, WON == "1")
#
```

```r
Coca_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Coca.crops
Brutal_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Brutal.Ind
Corrup_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Corrupt.Ind
MIO_GovW<-GovernorsWon$MIO
Afrovides_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Afrovides
Comunes_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Comunes
MIRA_GovW<-GovernorsWon$MIRA
ADA_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`Partido Ada`
Humana_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`Colombia Humana`
Justa_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`Justa Libres`
Polo_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`Polo Dem Alt`
Union_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`Uni□at`
GSC_GovW<-GovernorsWon$GSC
De_la_U_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`P. de la U`
C_Democrat_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`C. Democrрco`
O_Ciudada_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Ciudadana
MAIS_GovW<-GovernorsWon$MAIS
Conservat_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Conservative
Liberal_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Liberal
ASI_GovW<-GovernorsWon$ASI
Radical_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Radical
Verde_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Verde
AICO_GovW<-GovernorsWon$AICO
Muni_Code_GovW<-GovernorsWon$MPIO_CCNCT
Quad_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Election
Vot_Turn_GovW<-GovernorsWon$`Voters turnout`
Paras_GovW<-GovernorsWon$AU_Pr
ELN_GovW<-GovernorsWon$ELN_Pr
FARC_GovW<-GovernorsWon$FARC_Pr
Fraud_GovW<-GovernorsWon$Elec_Fraud
#---------------------Governor parties in opposition-------------------#
GovernorsL<-filter(Governors, WON == "0")
#
Coca_GovL<-GovernorsL$Coca.crops
Brutal_GovL<-GovernorsL$Brutal.Ind
Corrup_GovL<-GovernorsL$Corrupt.Ind
MIO_GovL<-GovernorsL$MIO
Afrovides_GovL<-GovernorsL$Afrovides
Comunes_GovL<-GovernorsL$Comunes
MIRA_GovL<-GovernorsL$MIRA
ADA_GovL<-GovernorsL$`Partido Ada`
Humana_GovL<-GovernorsL$`Colombia Humana`
Justa_GovL<-GovernorsL$`Justa Libres`
Polo_GovL<-GovernorsL$`Polo Dem Alt`
Union_GovL<-GovernorsL$`Uni□at`
GSC_GovL<-GovernorsL$GSC
De_la_U_GovL<-GovernorsL$`P. de la U`
C_Democrat_GovL<-GovernorsL$`C. Democrрco`
O_Ciudada_GovL<-GovernorsL$Ciudadana
MAIS_GovL<-GovernorsL$MAIS
Conservat_GovL<-GovernorsL$Conservative
Liberal_GovL<-GovernorsL$Liberal
ASI_GovL<-GovernorsL$ASI
Radical_GovL<-GovernorsL$Radical
Verde_GovL<-GovernorsL$Verde
AICO_GovL<-GovernorsL$AICO
Muni_Code_GovL<-GovernorsL$MPIO_CCNCT
Quad_GovL<-GovernorsL$Election
Vot_Turn_GovL<-GovernorsL$`Voters turnout`
Paras_GovL<-GovernorsL$AU_Pr
ELN_GovL<-GovernorsL$ELN_Pr
```

```r
FARC_GovL<-GovernorsL$FARC_Pr
Fraud_GovL<-GovernorsL$Elec_Fraud
#----------------Table A1 Pooled OLS Models Estimator------------------#
#
CocaGov_ols <- plm(formula = Coca_Gov ~ MIO_Gov + Afrovides_Gov +
Comunes_Gov + MIRA_Gov + ADA_Gov + Humana_Gov + Justa_Gov + Polo_Gov +
Union_Gov + GSC_Gov + De_la_U_Gov + C_Democrat_Gov + O_Ciudada_Gov +
MAIS_Gov + Conservat_Gov + Liberal_Gov + Radical_Gov + ASI_Gov + Verde_Gov
+ AICO_Gov + Vot_Turn_Gov + Paras_Gov + ELN_Gov + FARC_Gov + Fraud_Gov,
                   data = Governors, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
BrutalGov_ols <- plm(formula = Brutal_Gov ~ MIO_Gov + Afrovides_Gov +
Comunes_Gov + MIRA_Gov + ADA_Gov + Humana_Gov + Justa_Gov + Polo_Gov +
Union_Gov + GSC_Gov + De_la_U_Gov + C_Democrat_Gov + O_Ciudada_Gov +
MAIS_Gov + Conservat_Gov + Liberal_Gov + Radical_Gov + ASI_Gov + Verde_Gov
+ AICO_Gov + Vot_Turn_Gov + Paras_Gov + ELN_Gov + FARC_Gov + Fraud_Gov,
                   data = Governors, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
CorrupGov_ols <- plm(formula = Corrup_Gov ~ MIO_Gov + Afrovides_Gov +
Comunes_Gov + MIRA_Gov + ADA_Gov + Humana_Gov + Justa_Gov + Polo_Gov +
Union_Gov + GSC_Gov + De_la_U_Gov + C_Democrat_Gov + O_Ciudada_Gov +
MAIS_Gov + Conservat_Gov + Liberal_Gov + Radical_Gov + ASI_Gov + Verde_Gov
+ AICO_Gov + Vot_Turn_Gov + Paras_Gov + ELN_Gov + FARC_Gov + Fraud_Gov,
                   data = Governors, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
#
CocaGovW_ols <- plm(formula = Coca_GovW ~ MIO_GovW + Afrovides_GovW +
Comunes_GovW + MIRA_GovW + ADA_GovW + Humana_GovW + Justa_GovW + Polo_GovW
+ Union_GovW + GSC_GovW + De_la_U_GovW + C_Democrat_GovW + O_Ciudada_GovW +
MAIS_GovW + Conservat_GovW + Liberal_GovW + Radical_GovW + ASI_GovW +
Verde_GovW + AICO_GovW + Vot_Turn_GovW + Paras_GovW + ELN_GovW + FARC_GovW
+ Fraud_GovW,
                   data = GovernorsWon, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
BrutalGovW_ols <- plm(formula = Brutal_GovW ~ MIO_GovW + Afrovides_GovW +
Comunes_GovW + MIRA_GovW + ADA_GovW + Humana_GovW + Justa_GovW + Polo_GovW
+ Union_GovW + GSC_GovW + De_la_U_GovW + C_Democrat_GovW + O_Ciudada_GovW +
MAIS_GovW + Conservat_GovW + Liberal_GovW + Radical_GovW + ASI_GovW +
Verde_GovW + AICO_GovW + Vot_Turn_GovW + Paras_GovW + ELN_GovW + FARC_GovW
+ Fraud_GovW,
                   data = GovernorsWon, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
CorrupGovW_ols <- plm(formula = Corrup_GovW ~ MIO_GovW + Afrovides_GovW +
Comunes_GovW + MIRA_GovW + ADA_GovW + Humana_GovW + Justa_GovW + Polo_GovW
+ Union_GovW + GSC_GovW + De_la_U_GovW + C_Democrat_GovW + O_Ciudada_GovW +
MAIS_GovW + Conservat_GovW + Liberal_GovW + Radical_GovW + ASI_GovW +
Verde_GovW + AICO_GovW + Vot_Turn_GovW + Paras_GovW + ELN_GovW + FARC_GovW
+ Fraud_GovW,
                   data = GovernorsWon, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
#
CocaGovL_ols <- plm(formula = Coca_GovL ~ MIO_GovL + Afrovides_GovL +
Comunes_GovL + MIRA_GovL + ADA_GovL + Humana_GovL + Justa_GovL + Polo_GovL
+ Union_GovL + GSC_GovL + De_la_U_GovL + C_Democrat_GovL + O_Ciudada_GovL +
MAIS_GovL + Conservat_GovL + Liberal_GovL + Radical_GovL + ASI_GovL +
Verde_GovL + AICO_GovL + Vot_Turn_GovL + Paras_GovL + ELN_GovL + FARC_GovL
+ Fraud_GovL,
                   data = GovernorsWon, model = "pooling",
                   index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
#
```

```r
BrutalGovL_ols <- plm(formula = Brutal_GovL ~ MIO_GovL + Afrovides_GovL +
Comunes_GovL + MIRA_GovL + ADA_GovL + Humana_GovL + Justa_GovL + Polo_GovL
+ Union_GovL + GSC_GovL + De_la_U_GovL + C_Democrat_GovL + O_Ciudada_GovL +
MAIS_GovL + Conservat_GovL + Liberal_GovL + Radical_GovL + ASI_GovL +
Verde_GovL + AICO_GovL + Vot_Turn_GovL + Paras_GovL + ELN_GovL + FARC_GovL
+ Fraud_GovL,
                      data = GovernorsWon, model = "pooling",
                      index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
#
CorrupGovL_ols <- plm(formula = Corrup_GovL ~ MIO_GovL + Afrovides_GovL +
Comunes_GovL + MIRA_GovL + ADA_GovL + Humana_GovL + Justa_GovL + Polo_GovL
+ Union_GovL + GSC_GovL + De_la_U_GovL + C_Democrat_GovL + O_Ciudada_GovL +
MAIS_GovL + Conservat_GovL + Liberal_GovL + Radical_GovL + ASI_GovL +
Verde_GovL + AICO_GovL + Vot_Turn_GovL + Paras_GovL + ELN_GovL + FARC_GovL
+ Fraud_GovL,
                      data = GovernorsWon, model = "pooling",
                      index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
#
stargazer(CocaGov_ols, BrutalGov_ols, CorrupGov_ols,CocaGovW_ols,
BrutalGovW_ols, CorrupGovW_ols, CocaGovL_ols, BrutalGovL_ols,
CorrupGovL_ols,type = "text",
          title = "Table4: Pooled OLS Models Governors", out =
"Table4_Pooles_OLS.csv")
#
#-------------- Table Fixed Effects within estimator--------------------#
#
FECoca_Gov <- update(CocaGov_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FEBrutal_Gov <- update(BrutalGov_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FECorrup_Gov <- update(CorrupGov_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FECoca_GovW <- update(CocaGovW_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FEBrutal_GovW <- update(BrutalGovW_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECorrup_GovW <- update(CorrupGovW_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECoca_GovL <- update(CocaGovL_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FEBrutal_GovL <- update(BrutalGovL_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECorrup_GovL <- update(CorrupGovL_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
stargazer(FECoca_Gov, type = "text", title = "FE_Coca-Gov", out = "FE_Coca-
Gov.csv")
stargazer(FEBrutal_Gov, type = "text", title = "FE_Brutal-Gov", out =
"FE_Brutal-Gov.csv")
stargazer(FECoca_Gov, FEBrutal_Gov, FECorrup_Gov, FECoca_GovW,
FEBrutal_GovW, FECorrup_GovW, FECoca_GovL, FEBrutal_GovL,
          FECorrup_GovL, type = "text", title = "Table7: Fixed Effects
Governors", out = "Table 7_Fixed Effects Governors.txt")
#
#-Table Least square dummy variables regression with fixed effects------#
#
CocaGov_DV <- update (CocaGov_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_Gov))
BrutalGov_DV <- update (BrutalGov_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_Gov))
CorrupGov_DV <- update (CorrupGov_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_Gov))
CocaGovW_DV <- update (CocaGovW_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_GovW))
BrutalGovW_DV <- update (BrutalGovW_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_GovW))
CorrupGovW_DV <- update (CorrupGovW_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_GovW))
CocaGovL_DV <- update (CocaGovL_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_GovL))
BrutalGovL_DV <- update (BrutalGovL_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_GovL))
CorrupGovL_DV <- update (CorrupGovL_ols, ~ . + factor(Muni_Code_GovL))
#
summary(CocaGov_DV)
```

```r
yhat <- fitted(CocaGov_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(CocaGov_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FECoca_Gov)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(BrutalGov_DV)
yhat <- fitted(BrutalGov_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(BrutalGov_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FEBrutal_Gov)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(CorrupGov_DV)
yhat <- fitted(CorrupGov_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(CorrupGov_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FECorrup_Gov)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(CocaGovW_DV)
yhat <- fitted(CocaGovW_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(CocaGovW_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FECoca_GovW)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(BrutalGovW_DV)
yhat <- fitted(BrutalGovW_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(BrutalGovW_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FEBrutal_GovW)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(CorrupGovW_DV)
yhat <- fitted(CorrupGovW_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(CorrupGovW_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FECorrup_GovW)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(CocaGovL_DV)
yhat <- fitted(CocaGovL_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(CocaGovL_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FECoca_GovL)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(BrutalGovL_DV)
yhat <- fitted(BrutalGovL_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(BrutalGovL_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FEBrutal_GovL)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
#
summary(CorrupGovL_DV)
yhat <- fitted(CorrupGovL_DV)
y <- pmodel.response(CorrupGovL_DV)
(mss <- sum((yhat - mean(y))^2))
(ess <- sum(resid(FECorrup_GovL)^2))
(rsquared <- mss / (mss + ess))
```

```r
# Random effects estimator --------------------------------------------------
# Random effects estimator (Singular matrix and cannot be inverted, some
vectors are collinear)
CocaGov_RE <- update (CocaGov_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
BrutalGov_RE <- update (BrutalGov_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
CorrupGov_RE <- update (CorrupGov_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
CocaGovW_RE <- update (CocaGovW_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
BrutalGovW_RE <- update (BrutalGovW_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
CorrupGovW_RE <- update (CorrupGovW_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
CocaGovL_RE <- update (CocaGovL_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
BrutalGovL_RE <- update (BrutalGovL_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
CorrupGovL_RE <- update (CorrupGovL_ols, model = "random", random.method =
"walhus")
#----------------------President parties elected----------------------#
#There is a homogeneity issue because the results in 2014 and 2018 are the
opposite #
Coca_Pres<-President$Coca.crops
Brutal_Pres<-President$Brutal.Ind
Corrup_Pres<-President$Corrupt.Ind
MIO_Pres<-President$MIO
Afrovides_Pres<-President$Afrovides
Comunes_Pres<-President$Comunes
MIRA_Pres<-President$MIRA
ADA_Pres<-President$`Partido Ada`
Humana_Pres<-President$`Colombia Humana`
Justa_Pres<-President$`Justa Libres`
Polo_Pres<-President$`Polo Dem Alt`
Union_Pres<-President$`Uni□at`
GSC_Pres<-President$GSC
De_la_U_Pres<-President$`P. de la U`
C_Democrat_Pres<-President$`C. Democrᵽco`
O_Ciudada_Pres<-President$Ciudadana
MAIS_Pres<-President$MAIS
Conservat_Pres<-President$Conservative
Liberal_Pres<-President$Liberal
ASI_Pres<-President$ASI
Radical_Pres<-President$Radical
Verde_Pres<-President$Verde
AICO_Pres<-President$AICO
Muni_Code_Pres<-President$MPIO_CCNCT
Quad_Pres<-President$Election
Vot_Turn_Pres<-President$`Voters turnout`
Paras_Pres<-President$AU_Pr
ELN_Pres<-President$ELN_Pr
FARC_Pres<-President$FARC_Pr
Fraud_Pres<-President$Elec_Fraud
#----------------------President parties in office--------------------#
PresidentWon<-filter(President, WON == "1")
Coca_PresW<-PresidentWon$Coca.crops
Brutal_PresW<-PresidentWon$Brutal.Ind
Corrup_PresW<-PresidentWon$Corrupt.Ind
MIO_PresW<-PresidentWon$MIO
Afrovides_PresW<-PresidentWon$Afrovides
```

```r
Comunes_PresW<-PresidentWon$Comunes
MIRA_PresW<-PresidentWon$MIRA
ADA_PresW<-PresidentWon$`Partido Ada`
Humana_PresW<-PresidentWon$`Colombia Humana`
Justa_PresW<-PresidentWon$`Justa Libres`
Polo_PresW<-PresidentWon$`Polo Dem Alt`
Union_PresW<-PresidentWon$`Uni□at`
GSC_PresW<-PresidentWon$GSC
De_la_U_PresW<-PresidentWon$`P. de la U`
C_Democrat_PresW<-PresidentWon$`C. Democrᴘco`
O_Ciudada_PresW<-PresidentWon$Ciudadana
MAIS_PresW<-PresidentWon$MAIS
Conservat_PresW<-PresidentWon$Conservative
Liberal_PresW<-PresidentWon$Liberal
ASI_PresW<-PresidentWon$ASI
Radical_PresW<-PresidentWon$Radical
Verde_PresW<-PresidentWon$Verde
AICO_PresW<-PresidentWon$AICO
Muni_Code_PresW<-PresidentWon$MPIO_CCNCT
Quad_PresW<-PresidentWon$Election
Vot_Turn_PresW<-PresidentWon$`Voters turnout`
Paras_PresW<-PresidentWon$AU_Pr
ELN_PresW<-PresidentWon$ELN_Pr
FARC_PresW<-PresidentWon$FARC_Pr
Fraud_PresW<-PresidentWon$Elec_Fraud
#-------------------President parties in opposition--------------------#
PresidentL<-filter(President, WON == "0")
Coca_PresL<-PresidentL$Coca.crops
Brutal_PresL<-PresidentL$Brutal.Ind
Corrup_PresL<-PresidentL$Corrupt.Ind
MIO_PresL<-PresidentL$MIO
Afrovides_PresL<-PresidentL$Afrovides
Comunes_PresL<-PresidentL$Comunes
MIRA_PresL<-PresidentL$MIRA
ADA_PresL<-PresidentL$`Partido Ada`
Humana_PresL<-PresidentL$`Colombia Humana`
Justa_PresL<-PresidentL$`Justa Libres`
Polo_PresL<-PresidentL$`Polo Dem Alt`
Union_PresL<-PresidentL$`Uni□at`
GSC_PresL<-PresidentL$GSC
De_la_U_PresL<-PresidentL$`P. de la U`
C_Democrat_PresL<-PresidentL$`C. Democrᴘco`
O_Ciudada_PresL<-PresidentL$Ciudadana
MAIS_PresL<-PresidentL$MAIS
Conservat_PresL<-PresidentL$Conservative
Liberal_PresL<-PresidentL$Liberal
ASI_PresL<-PresidentL$ASI
Radical_PresL<-PresidentL$Radical
Verde_PresL<-PresidentL$Verde
AICO_PresL<-PresidentL$AICO
Muni_Code_PresL<-PresidentL$MPIO_CCNCT
Quad_PresL<-PresidentL$Election
Vot_Turn_PresL<-PresidentL$`Voters turnout`
Paras_PresL<-PresidentL$AU_Pr
ELN_PresL<-PresidentL$ELN_Pr
FARC_PresL<-PresidentL$FARC_Pr
Fraud_PresL<-PresidentL$Elec_Fraud
#--------------------------Pooled OLS estimator------------------------#
CocaPres_ols <- plm(formula = Coca_Pres ~ MIO_Pres + Afrovides_Pres +
Comunes_Pres + MIRA_Pres + ADA_Pres + Humana_Pres + Justa_Pres + Polo_Pres
+ Union_Pres + GSC_Pres + De_la_U_Pres + C_Democrat_Pres + O_Ciudada_Pres +
```

```
                             MAIS_Pres + Conservat_Pres + Liberal_Pres + Radical_Pres + ASI_Pres +
Verde_Pres + AICO_Pres + Vot_Turn_Pres + Paras_Pres + ELN_Pres + FARC_Pres
+ Fraud_Pres,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
BrutalPres_ols <- plm(formula = Brutal_Pres ~ MIO_Pres + Afrovides_Pres +
Comunes_Pres + MIRA_Pres + ADA_Pres + Humana_Pres + Justa_Pres + Polo_Pres
+ Union_Pres + GSC_Pres + De_la_U_Pres + C_Democrat_Pres + O_Ciudada_Pres +
MAIS_Pres + Conservat_Pres + Liberal_Pres + Radical_Pres + ASI_Pres +
Verde_Pres + AICO_Pres + Vot_Turn_Pres + Paras_Pres + ELN_Pres + FARC_Pres
+ Fraud_Pres,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
CorruptPres_ols <- plm(formula = Corrup_Pres ~ MIO_Pres + Afrovides_Pres +
Comunes_Pres + MIRA_Pres + ADA_Pres + Humana_Pres + Justa_Pres + Polo_Pres
+ Union_Pres + GSC_Pres + De_la_U_Pres + C_Democrat_Pres + O_Ciudada_Pres +
MAIS_Pres + Conservat_Pres + Liberal_Pres + Radical_Pres + ASI_Pres +
Verde_Pres + AICO_Pres + Vot_Turn_Pres + Paras_Pres + ELN_Pres + FARC_Pres
+ Fraud_Pres,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
CocaPresW_ols <- plm(formula = Coca_PresW ~ MIO_PresW + Afrovides_PresW +
Comunes_PresW + MIRA_PresW + ADA_PresW + Humana_PresW + Justa_PresW +
Polo_PresW + Union_PresW + GSC_PresW + De_la_U_PresW + C_Democrat_PresW +
O_Ciudada_PresW + MAIS_PresW + Conservat_PresW + Liberal_PresW +
Radical_PresW + ASI_PresW + Verde_PresW + AICO_PresW + Vot_Turn_PresW +
                        Paras_PresW + ELN_PresW + FARC_PresW + Fraud_PresW,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
BrutalPresW_ols <- plm(formula = Brutal_PresW ~ MIO_PresW + Afrovides_PresW
+ Comunes_PresW + MIRA_PresW + ADA_PresW + Humana_PresW + Justa_PresW +
Polo_PresW + Union_PresW + GSC_PresW + De_la_U_PresW + C_Democrat_PresW +
O_Ciudada_PresW + MAIS_PresW + Conservat_PresW + Liberal_PresW +
Radical_PresW + ASI_PresW + Verde_PresW + AICO_PresW + Vot_Turn_PresW +
Paras_PresW + ELN_PresW + FARC_PresW + Fraud_PresW,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
CorruptPresW_ols <- plm(formula = Corrup_PresW ~ MIO_PresW +
Afrovides_PresW + Comunes_PresW + MIRA_PresW + ADA_PresW + Humana_PresW +
Justa_PresW + Polo_PresW + Union_PresW + GSC_PresW + De_la_U_PresW +
C_Democrat_PresW + O_Ciudada_PresW + MAIS_PresW + Conservat_PresW
+ Liberal_PresW + Radical_PresW + ASI_PresW + Verde_PresW + AICO_PresW +
Vot_Turn_PresW + Paras_PresW + ELN_PresW + FARC_PresW + Fraud_PresW,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
CocaPresL_ols <- plm(formula = Coca_PresL ~ MIO_PresL + Afrovides_PresL +
Comunes_PresL + MIRA_PresL + ADA_PresL + Humana_PresL + Justa_PresL +
Polo_PresL + Union_PresL + GSC_PresL + De_la_U_PresL + C_Democrat_PresL +
O_Ciudada_PresL + MAIS_PresL + Conservat_PresL + Liberal_PresL +
Radical_PresL + ASI_PresL + Verde_PresL + AICO_PresL + Vot_Turn_PresL +
Paras_PresL + ELN_PresL + FARC_PresL + Fraud_PresL,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
BrutalPresL_ols <- plm(formula = Brutal_PresL ~ MIO_PresL + Afrovides_PresL
+ Comunes_PresL + MIRA_PresL + ADA_PresL + Humana_PresL + Justa_PresL +
Polo_PresL + Union_PresL + GSC_PresL + De_la_U_PresL + C_Democrat_PresL +
O_Ciudada_PresL + MAIS_PresL + Conservat_PresL + Liberal_PresL +
Radical_PresL + ASI_PresL + Verde_PresL + AICO_PresL + Vot_Turn_PresL +
Paras_PresL + ELN_PresL + FARC_PresL + Fraud_PresL,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
```

```r
CorruptPresL_ols <- plm(formula = Corrup_PresL ~ MIO_PresL +
Afrovides_PresL + Comunes_PresL + MIRA_PresL +
ADA_PresL + Humana_PresL + Justa_PresL + Polo_PresL + Union_PresL +
GSC_PresL + De_la_U_PresL + C_Democrat_PresL + O_Ciudada_PresL + MAIS_PresL
+ Conservat_PresL + Liberal_PresL + Radical_PresL + ASI_PresL + Verde_PresL
+ AICO_PresL + Vot_Turn_PresL + Paras_PresL + ELN_PresL + FARC_PresL +
Fraud_PresL,
                        data = President, model = "pooling",
                        index = c("MPIO_CCNCT", "Period"))
#
stargazer(CocaPres_ols, BrutalPres_ols, CorrupPres_ols,
          CocaPresW_ols, BrutalPresW_ols, CorrupPresW_ols, CocaPresL_ols,
          BrutalPresL_ols, CorrupPresL_ols,type = "text",
          title = "Table9: Pooled OLS Models Presidents", out =
"Table9_Pooles_OLS_Presidents.csv")
#
#Table Fixed Effects within estimator
#
FECoca_Pres <- update(CocaPres_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FEBrutal_Pres <- update(BrutalPres_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECorrup_Pres <- update(CorruptPres_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECoca_PresW <- update(CocaPresW_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FEBrutal_PresW <- update(BrutalPresW_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECorrup_PresW <- update(CorruptPresW_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECoca_PresL <- update(CocaPresL_ols, model="within", effect= "individual")
FEBrutal_PresL <- update(BrutalPresL_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
FECorrup_PresL <- update(CorruptPresL_ols, model="within", effect=
"individual")
stargazer(FECoca_Pres, FEBrutal_Pres, FECorrup_Pres, FECoca_PresW,
FEBrutal_PresW, FECorrup_PresW, FECoca_PresL, FEBrutal_PresL,
          FECorrup_PresL, type = "text", title = "Table10: Fixed Effects
Presidential", out = "Table 7_Fixed Effects Presidential.csv")
#------------------------ End of the script ------------------------#
```

APPENDIX D. Appendix to Chapter Five

D.1 Foundations of the political participation term

The peace process with FARC-EP has its dawn in an executive branch initiative to end the long-standing civil war in negotiated terms with that guerrilla, and the rebel's expectative to attain some formal decision-making power with explicit reforms based on its grievances. So, between the power-sharing arrangements the political term and its provisions denote and intricate process of formal institutional changes and refinements. The Victims and Land Restitution Law 1448 of 2011 (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2011), firstly, recognize human rights of people direct affected by war, and secondly, fosters the reinforcement of inflicted property rights to powerless land-owners, mainly persons internally displaced by paramilitaries, state agents, insurgents, or by clashes between these groups. In political rights, this explicit rule does not encourage the political participation of the victims itself. Actually, the person to be considered as victim must to deny any political interest performed by the non-state armed group or terrorist that perpetrated and committed human rights crimes against the injured. Nonetheless, Law 1448 stipulate that the Colombian state will adopt the measures to achieve the dismantle of economic and political structures that has been sustaining non-state armed groups, with the end to assure the accomplishment of no repeat assurance. Lastly the rule stress, in the subjects of collective reparation including politicians, groups and social organizations, even communities with judicial political or social acknowledge.

The formal institutions that encouraged the peace talks have its corner stone on instruments for a transitional justice in the frame of the 22nd article of the constitution (i.e., the right to peace). The act 01 of July 31st 2012 (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2012), provides a provisory constitutional amendment of article 67. Proclaiming that a statutory Law will regulate which will be the crimes considered as related to political crime with effect to participate in politics. The crimes against humanity or genocide instigated in a systematic way, cannot be consider as related political crime. Accordingly, the condemned and selected by these crimes, cannot participate in politics or be elected. Thus, before the ratification of the agreement by the Congress, the President and the legislative branch were empowered to rule in the pursuit of the potential peace settlement enforcement, through Act 01 of 2016 (Congreso de la República de Colombia, 2016). The former, with special faculties to decree norms with law status, and the latter to process the rule-making for peace in the half number of debates or sessions, called special legislative procedure to peace, a fast-track of 180 days.

D.1.2 Complementary rules of political participation term

Accordingly, Law 898 May 29th 2017 (Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, 2017) concedes to the Attorney General a special unit of prosecution, dismantling of organizations and criminal behaviors responsible of homicides and massacres against human rights defenders, and social or political movements. Also investigate who menace or attack peace builders, especially former paramilitaries groups and its networks. Law 898 facilitates the implementation and regulate the means 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2 (see Figure 14). Indeed, ascribe to the office of the vice attorney general the new Deputy Against Organized Crime focusing in (1) organized crime, (2) corruption, (3) the narcotrafficking, (4) human rights violations.

The arrangement 2.3.6. (see Figure 14) engaged the executive branch to foster the creation of 16 transitory special seats to elected congresswomen/man in the house of representatives for regions devastated by civil war for two mandates. Thus, bill 05 2017 propose victims' direct participation in the legislature 2018-2022 and 2022-2026 (Ministro del Interior, 2017). Such candidates are outside formal political organizations or parties; indeed, they must become from social movements or more organic participative scenarios, and be considered as victims. Nevertheless, initially this bill died because ending the fast track frame obtained 50 votes of the 102 senators or in a first glimpse no simple majority. But after four years searching its revival in diverse instances, finally the Constitutional Court via sentence SU-150/21 (Corte Constitucional, 2021) commands that the seats will apply to the cohorts 2022-2026 and 2026-2030, and that the electoral organization will carry out the measures to allow the subscription and election of candidates to the "seats for peace" for the electoral race of 2022. The sentence is based on the process to approve the bill, which obtained the simple majority because irreplaceable seats should be deducted ─ three senator men were condemned for paramilitarism and corruption to that date ─ so 50 or more positive votes approved the law, since the senate was formed by 99 senators.

An electoral ad hoc group was conformed following the arrangement (Figure 14) 2.3.4. political and electoral reform proposal (Misión Electoral Especial, 2017). That group proposed guidelines to assure the better autonomy and independence of the electoral organization, modernize and make more transparent the electoral system, and refine guarantees to participate in politics with equality to improve the quality of democracy. So, three axis built the reform's proposal: (1) institutional structure, (2) the electoral system, (3) politics financing. Accordingly, to sum up five guidelines are posited, (1) make or reach solid electoral bodies with social and political legitimacy, high qualified incumbents with the capacity to move forward quality

processes that augment the citizenry trust in elections. (2) the political decision-making improvement based on representation quality, fostering the participation of youth, ethnic groups and women. (3) promote a strong partisan system, less personalist and clientelism, opened to new expressions with cohesive, democratic, institutionalized and transparent organizations. (4) pursue a political financing system with high contributions of the state, reducing the costs of campaigns and partisanship activities, pursuing transparency and effective control. And (5) encourage participation to solve the abstentionism rates, which are the highest of LA.

D.2 Data collection instruments

D.2.1 Right to petition (example)

09/06/2021

Honorable Senadora,
Ruby Helena Chagüí Spath
Correo: ruby.chagui@senado.gov.co
Capitolio Nacional, Piso 3
Congreso de la República de Colombia
Bogotá D.C.

Asunto: Derecho de petición art. 23 C.P

Yo Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez identificado con la cédula de ciudadanía 80'873.555 de Bogotá D.C, con dirección profesional en la Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9, Freguesia de Ajuda, CEP 1600-189, Lisboa, Portugal, con correo electrónico «juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt» y número de teléfono de contacto +351 961553410. En el ejercicio del derecho de petición consagrado en el artículo 23 de la Constitución Política de Colombia y con el lleno de los requisitos del artículo 5 del Código Contencioso Administrativo. Respetuosamente me dirijo a su despacho con la finalidad de encontrar respuesta a una serie de cuestionamientos referentes a las acciones llevadas a cabo durante el presente periodo constitucional para el cual fue elegido, y las cuales a continuación enumero del uno al 11.

1. Responda sí o no, ¿Tiene alguna persona con la cual usted guarda o guardó parentesco de cualquier grado de consanguinidad o afinidad, que desempeñe o haya desempeñado algún cargo de elección popular?

a. Sí ☐

b. No ☐

2. De las fuentes de financiación consignadas abajo, ¿Cuál fue la que usted principalmente usó para gestionar su campaña electoral del 2018?

a. Anticipos del Estado ☐   d. Ingresos del partido ☐

b. Patrimonio propio ☐   e. Patrimonio del partido ☐

c. Aportes de personas naturales ☐   f. Créditos bancarios ☐
y jurídicas

3. Indique soslayando la corporación, ¿En cuántos periodos constitucionales ha sido elegida(o) como representante ante el Congreso de la República de Colombia?

a. Uno ☐   d. Cuatro ☐

b. Dos ☐   e. Cinco o más ☐

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c. Tres ☐

4. De las siguientes orientaciones políticas, ¿En qué espectro político usted se considera?

a. Extrema derecha o radical ☐   e. Izquierda moderada ☐

b. Derecha ☐   f. Izquierda ☐

c. Derecha moderada ☐   g. Extrema izquierda o radical ☐

d. Centro ☐

5. A partir de las siguientes organizaciones, ¿Generalmente de dónde proceden los criterios para la toma de decisiones en su accionar político?

a. El partido ☐   d. La rama ejecutiva ☐

b. La coalición ☐   e. Su unidad de trabajo legislativo ☐

c. Su electorado ☐

6. Con base en las congregaciones mencionadas abajo, ¿Cuál cree usted es la preferencia religiosa mayoritariamente profesada por su electorado?

a. Católica ☐   d. Judía ☐

b. Cristiana ☐   c. No religiosa ☐

c. Evangélica ☐   d. Otra ☐

7. Responda sí o no, ¿Una parte significativa de su electorado está compuesto por familiares o retirados de las Fuerzas Militares de Colombia o la Policía Nacional?

a. Sí ☐

b. No ☐

8. Basada(o) en los canales de comunicación indicados a continuación, ¿Cuál es el medio de comunicación que preferiblemente utiliza para informar a su electorado o público en general sobre los logros de sus legislaturas?

a. Televisión pública ☐   e. Radio privada ☐

b. Radio pública ☐   f. Redes sociales u otros canales de internet ☐

c. Televisión privada ☐   g. Medios impresos ☐

9. Según la Ley No 1909-9 julio de 2018 «Por medio del cual se adoptan el estatuto de la oposición política y algunos derechos a las organizaciones políticas independientes» responda sí o no, ¿Durante la contienda electoral de 2018 o su periodo constitucional ha ejercido alguna de las atribuciones dispuestas en la ley 1909-9 de 2018?

a. Sí ☐

Página 2 de 3

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b. No ☐

10. A partir del Decreto Ley Nº 895 de 2017 «Por el cual se crea el Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política» responda sí o no, ¿Durante las legislaturas del periodo 2018 al presente ha promovido debates de control político al ejecutivo sobre la implementación del Decreto Ley 895 de 2017?

a. Sí ☐

b. No ☐

11. De acuerdo al Decreto Ley Número 885 del 26 de mayo de 2017 «Por medio del cual se modifica la Ley 434 de 1998 y crea el Consejo Nacional de Paz, Reconciliación y Convivencia» responda sí o no, ¿En el transcurrido de las legislaturas del presente periodo constitucional ha promovido la creación de Consejos Territoriales de Reconciliación Convivencia y no Estigmatización?

a. Sí ☐

b. No ☐

Por favor responder de acuerdo al término legal y constitucional, preferiblemente por vía digital, a los correos electrónicos abajo indicados.

Cordialmente,

Juan Sebastián Lara-Rodríguez
C.C. 80873555 de Bogotá D.C.
Av. Professor Aníbal de Bettencourt, 9
CEP 1600-189
Lisboa, Portugal
Tel. +351 961553410
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt
juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

Página 3 de 3

JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

De: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Enviado el: miércoles, 9 de junio de 2021 6:08 p. m.
Para: ruby.chagui@senado.gov.co
Asunto: Derecho de Petición
Datos adjuntos: D_P_ H. Sena. Ruby Helena Chagüí Spath.pdf

Honorable Senadora
Ruby Helena Chagüí Spath

Espero que éste mensaje le encuentre bien.

Escribo para solicitar muy respetuosamente sea diligenciado el Derecho de Petición que coloco a su consideración mediante el presente comunicado.
Adjunto encontrará el documento «.pdf» el cual consigna las preguntas busco considere responder.
Con antecedencia, ¡Muchas gracias por su gentileza!

Cordialmente,

Juan Sebastián Lara-Rodríguez
c.c. 80.873.555 de Bogotá D.C.

1

Source: Own elaboration

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D.2.2 Inspector general office (example)

PROCURADURIA
GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN

Solicitud de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición

Número de Radicado	Fecha de Radicado	Fecha de Presentación
E-2021-392096	26/07/2021 10:21:49	26/07/2021 10:21:49

Ventanilla : **SEDE ELECTRÓNICA**

Nota: Se recomienda el uso de Mozilla ó Internet Explorer 9.0. ó superior para el diligenciamiento de este formulario. El tiempo máximo con el que usted cuenta para diligenciar este formulario es de veinte (20) minutos. Se recomienda, que usted escriba su solicitud en Word, y cuando ya la tenga completa, copie desde allá y peguela en el formulario.

Primer Nombre : **JUAN**   Segundo Nombre : **SEBASTIAN**
Primer Apellido : **LARA**   Segundo Apellido : **RODRIGUEZ**
Dirección : **RUA HUGO CASAES 25**
Correo Electrónico : **juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt**
País : **PORTUGAL**   Ciudad de Consulado : **LISBOA**
Teléfono : **1961553410**   Celular : **3132044438**

Datos del derecho de petición

¿A Quién Dirigió su Petición? : **ENTIDAD**
Nombre de la entidad persona natural, organización o institución privada a la que dirigió su petición : **SENA.**
RUBY HELENA CHAGÜÍ SPATH
Fecha de Radicación de su Petición : **09/06/2021**
Número de Radicación de su Petición : **RUBY.CHAGUI@SENADO.GOV.CO**
Tipo de actuación : **PEDIR INFORMACIÓN**
Días hábiles : **10**

Objeto de la Petición

Procuraduría General de la Nación | NIT: 899999119-7
| Carrera 5ª nro. 15 - 60 | BOGOTÁ D.C. (BOGOTÁ)
Línea gratuita para todo el país: 018000 910 315 - Línea reducida: 142 - PBX: (571) 5878750
Correo electrónico exclusivo para recibir notificaciones judiciales. No reenviar el
documento en físico. CPACA ART. 197 procesosjudiciales@procuraduria.gov.co
Para otros asuntos: quejas@procuraduria.gov.co / webmaster@procuraduria.gov.co

---

ENCONTRAR RESPUESTA A UNA SERIE DE CUESTIONAMIENTOS REFERENTES A LAS ACCIONES LLEVADAS A CABO DURANTE EL PRESENTE PERIODO CONSTITUCIONAL PARA EL CUAL FUE ELEGIDO, Y LAS CUALES ENUMERO DEL UNO AL 11.

Clase de Inconformidad Presentada

Tipo de inconformidad presentada : **NO CONTESTADA**

Detalle de la inconformidad

LA LEY 1755 ART. 16 SOSTIENE QUE LA AUTORIDAD TIENE LA OBLIGACIÓN DE EXAMINAR INTEGRALMENTE LA PETICIÓN, Y EN NINGÚN CASO LA ESTIMARÁ INCOMPLETA POR FALTA DE REQUISITOS O DOCUMENTOS QUE NO SE ENCUENTREN DENTRO DEL MARCO JURÍDICO VIGENTE, QUE NO SEAN NECESARIOS PARA RESOLVERLA O QUE SE ENCUENTREN DENTRO DE SUS ARCHIVOS. Y LA RESPUESTA NO SERÁ SUMINISTRADA EN UN PERIODO NO MAYOR A 30 DÍAS HÁBILES. IGUALMENTE SOSTENGO QUE LO REQUERIDO EN NINGÚN MODO RECABÓ INFORMACIÓN EXCEPTUADA POR DAÑO DE DERECHOS A PERSONAS NATURALES O JURÍDICAS, DISPUESTAS EN EL ART. 18 DE LA LEY 1712 DE 2014. EXTIENDO EL ARGUMENTO REFERENCIANDO LA SENTENCIA T-464/97 PROFERIDA POR LA EXCELENTÍSIMA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL EN LA QUE REFUERZA LA PROHIBICIÓN DE RESPUESTA EVASIVA AL INSTRUMENTO DE CONSULTA INTERPUESTO POR EL PETICIONARIO. EN ESE ORDEN DE HECHOS, SOLICITO QUE SE REFUERCE MI DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL Y LEGAL CON LA RESPUESTA INMEDIATA A LAS PREGUNTAS DEL DERECHO DE PETICIÓN ENTREGADO POR VÍA DIGITAL VÍA CONSAGRADA LEY 1712 DE 2014 Y RADICADA EN LA CORRESPONDIENTE DIRECCIÓN DE CORREO ELECTRÓNICO PUBLICADA EN LA PÁGINA DE INTERNET DEL CONGRESO. Y TANTO COMO EL CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COLOMBIA MEDIANTE LA MODIFICACIÓN DE LA LEY 5 DE 1992, CREÓ UN MARCO JURÍDICO QUE ORIENTA EL DESARROLLO DE SESIONES VIRTUALES Y VOTO VIRTUAL DE LAS COMISIONES CONSTITUCIONALES Y PLENARIAS DEL SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA Y LA CÁMARA DE REPRESENTANTES, LAS CUALES HAN SIDO IMPLEMENTADAS EN EL CONTEXTO DE PANDEMIA.

Ley de Habeas Data

Se han aceptado los enunciados de Habeas Data.

¿Tiene condición especial? : **NO**

Notificaciones

Usted desea ser notificado del trámite de esta solicitud: **SÍ**

[X] ¿Correo electrónico?

juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt
Correo Electrónico : **juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt**

Procuraduría General de la Nación | NIT: 899999119-7
| Carrera 5ª nro. 15 - 60 | BOGOTÁ D.C. (BOGOTÁ)
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Correo electrónico exclusivo para recibir notificaciones judiciales. No reenviar el
documento en físico. CPACA ART. 197 procesosjudiciales@procuraduria.gov.co
Para otros asuntos: quejas@procuraduria.gov.co / webmaster@procuraduria.gov.co

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Documentos requeridos adjuntados

Copia escaneada en formato PDF del derecho de petición radicado: Documento adjunto Rad. D_P_ H. Sena. Ruby Helena Chagüí Spath.pdf

Avisos legales

-Declaración Responsable
El interesado manifiesta, bajo su responsabilidad, que los datos aportados en su solicitud son ciertos y que cumple con los requisitos establecidos en la normativa vigente para acceder a la pretensión realizada.

Tratamiento Datos Personales
(*) Los datos facilitados por Ud. en este formulario pasarán a formar parte de los archivos automatizados propiedad de la Entidad y podrán ser utilizados por el titular del archivo para el ejercicio de las funciones propias en el ámbito de sus competencias. De conformidad con la Ley 1581 del 17 de octubre de 2012, de Protección de Datos de Carácter Personal, Ud. podrá ejercer los derechos de acceso, rectificación, cancelación y oposición mediante instancia presentada.

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Para otros asuntos: quejas@procuraduria.gov.co / webmaster@procuraduria.gov.co

---

PROCURADURIA
GENERAL DE LA NACIÓN

AUTO 220 DE 2021

Referencia: Requerimiento de respuesta a peticiones.

Bogotá, D.C., cinco (5) de agosto de dos mil veintiuno (2021).

El suscrito Procurador Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales, en ejercicio de la facultad contemplada en el artículo 8.3 del Decreto Ley 262 de 2000, y

CONSIDERANDO

1. Que el artículo 23 de la Constitución[1], desarrollado por la Ley 1755 de 2015[2], consagra el derecho fundamental de petición, el cual ha sido definido como la prerrogativa que tienen los ciudadanos de presentar solicitudes respetuosas ante las autoridades y ciertos particulares, y la garantía consecuente de recibir respuesta a las mismas de forma oportuna, clara, precisa y congruente, independientemente de que se acceda o no a sus pretensiones[3].

2. Que en el artículo 8.3 del Decreto Ley 262 de 2000[4], se contempla la Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición (SDP) como un procedimiento a cargo de la Procuraduría Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales.

3. Que, según la Resolución 029 de 2021[5] de la Procuraduría General de la Nación, la SDP consiste en un trámite administrativo sumario[6], en el que se requiere a la autoridad o particular correspondiente para que atienda la solicitud de una persona en consonancia con los mandatos constitucionales y legales, so pena de remitir copia de las actuaciones al operador disciplinario o administrativo competente a fin de que, si hay lugar a ello, investigue e imponga las sanciones del caso[7].

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[1] "Artículo 23. Toda persona tiene derecho a presentar peticiones respetuosas a las autoridades por motivos de interés general o particular y a obtener pronta resolución. El legislador podrá reglamentar su ejercicio ante organizaciones privadas para garantizar los derechos fundamentales".
[2] "Por medio de la cual se regula el Derecho Fundamental de Petición y se sustituye un título del Código de Procedimiento Administrativo y de lo Contencioso Administrativo".
[3] Cfr. Corte Constitucional, Sentencias C-951 de 2014 (M.P. Martha Victoria Sáchica Méndez) y C-242 de 2020 (M.P. Luis Guillermo Guerrero Pérez).
[4] "Por el cual se modifican la estructura y la organización de la Procuraduría General de la Nación y del Instituto de Estudios del Ministerio Público (...)". "Artículo 8º. Procuraduría Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales. La Procuraduría Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales tiene las siguientes funciones: (...) 3. Supervigilar y promover el cumplimiento de las disposiciones que regulan el derecho de petición".
[5] "Por la cual se regula el trámite y desarrollo de la función preventiva y/o de intervención de Supervigilancia al Derecho Fundamental de Petición (...)".
[6] Al respecto, cabe resaltar que al ser la Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición un procedimiento donde sólo se profieren actos de trámite, las providencias emitidas dentro del mismo carecen de recursos según lo dispuesto en el artículo 75 del Código de Procedimiento Administrativo y de lo Contencioso Administrativo.
[7] Sobre el particular, el artículo 31 del Código de Procedimiento Administrativo y de lo Contencioso Administrativo establece que "la falta de atención a las peticiones y a los términos para resolver, la contravención a las prohibiciones y el desconocimiento de los derechos de las personas de que trata esta Parte Primera del Código, constituirán falta para el servidor público y darán lugar a las sanciones correspondientes de acuerdo con el régimen disciplinario". A su vez, el parágrafo 3º del artículo 32 ibídem señala que "ninguna entidad privada podrá negarse a la recepción y radicación de solicitudes y peticiones respetuosas, so pena de incurrir en sanciones y/o multas por parte de las autoridades competentes".

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4. Que en el artículo 6° de la Resolución 029 de 2021, se indica que las solicitudes de SDP en las que se alegue la omisión de contestar una petición dentro del término legal, darán lugar a que la Procuraduría Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales requiera a la autoridad respectiva para que, en el término de cinco días hábiles, remita copia de la respuesta dada a la persona atendiendo a los parámetros constitucionales y legales[8].

5. Que el artículo 2° de la Resolución 029 de 2021 señala que *"el Grupo Especial de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición tendrá las siguientes funciones: (…) 8. Proferir respuestas a las solicitudes relacionadas con las funciones que ejerce"*.

6. Que el señor Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez acudió ante la Procuraduría Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales a efectos de que se disponga la SDP frente a las solicitudes que presentó ante los congresistas respectivos, pues considera que a la fecha no ha recibido respuesta conforme lo determinan los mandatos constitucionales y legales.

7. Que las referidas solicitudes ciudadanas de SDP resultan procedentes por cumplir con los requisitos establecidos en la Resolución 029 de 2021, por lo cual se requerirá a las autoridades correspondientes para que si no lo han hecho procedan a dar respuesta al peticionario en el término de cinco días y a remitir un informe de ello a esta Procuraduría Auxiliar.

8. Que una vez se realicen los requerimientos respectivos, se archivarán los procedimientos de SDP[9].

9. Que, sin perjuicio de lo anterior, en caso de que los requerimientos de SDP realizados por la Procuraduría Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales relacionados en la parte resolutiva de esta decisión no sean atendidos desconociéndose los mandatos legales, el peticionario podrá solicitar que el trámite de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición se reactive, para lo que deberá informar dicha situación a esta dependencia para que:

(i) Se realice un segundo requerimiento a la entidad o al particular que omitió dar respuesta a la solicitud; y/o

(ii) Se remitan las diligencias a las dependencias competentes para que inicien las acciones disciplinarias y/o administrativas a las que haya lugar.

10. Que es necesario poner de presente que el peticionario, además de solicitar lo establecido en el anterior numeral, tiene la posibilidad de interponer acciones de

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[8] *"Artículo 6°. Regulación de la función y trámite de la Supervigilancia. (…) 6.3 Si el peticionario anexa a la solicitud de Supervigilancia la copia íntegra de la petición y prueba de su efectiva radicación, (…) se requerirá a la entidad vigilada. El término que se le otorgará a la entidad para brindar respuesta será de cinco (5) días hábiles, contados a partir del recibo del requerimiento".*
[9] De igual manera, recibidos los informes de las entidades y particulares se archivarán los mismos dejando las constancias y anotaciones correspondientes a fin de ser utilizados como insumos en caso de solicitarse la reactivación del procedimiento.

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tutela en contra de las entidades correspondientes, con fin de que el juez constitucional disponga la protección de su derecho fundamental de petición en los términos del artículo 86 de la Constitución Política y el Decreto 2591 de 1991[10].

RESUELVE

PRIMERO.- REQUERIR a las Unidades de Trabajo Legislativo de los Senadores de la República que se enumeran a continuación, para que, en el término de cinco (5) días hábiles: (i) si no lo ha hecho, proceda a dar respuesta a las peticiones elevadas el nueve (09) de junio de 2021, por el ciudadano Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez; y (ii) remitan al correo electrónico quejas@procuraduría.gov.co, citando los radicados SDP y SIGDEA respectivos, un informe de la actuación correspondiente que incluya copia de las respuestas dadas a las solicitudes y las comunicaciones de las mismas.

No.	SDP	SIGDEA	Peticionario	Autoridad
1	SDP-2639-21	E-2021-391160	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Laureano Augusto Acuña Díaz
2	SDP-2640-21	E-2021-391161	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Fabio Raúl Amín Saleme
3	SDP-2641-21	E-2021-391163	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Fernando Nicolás Araújo Rumié
4	SDP-2642-21	E-2021-391165	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Roy Leonardo Barreras Montealegre
5	SDP-2643-21	E-2021-391166	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Miguel Ángel Barreto Castillo
6	SDP-2644-21	E-2021-391168	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Julián Bedoya Pulgarín
7	SDP-2645-21	E-2021-391568	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Armando Alberto Benedetti Villaneda
8	SDP-2646-21	E-2021-391664	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-John Moisés Besaile Fayad
9	SDP-2647-21	E-2021-391730	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Nadia Georgette Blel Scaff
10	SDP-2648-21	E-2021-391799	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Ana María Castañeda Gómez
11	SDP-2649-21	E-2021-391870	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Mario Alberto Castaño Pérez
12	SDP-2650-21	E-2021-391916	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Jesús Alberto Castilla Salazar
13	SDP-2651-21	E-2021-391969	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Fabián Gerardo Castillo Suárez
14	SDP-2652-21	E-2021-392015	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Juan Luis Castro Córdoba
15	SDP-2653-21	E-2021-392063	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Efraín José Cepeda Sarabia
16	SDP-2654-21	E-2021-392096	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Ruby Helena Chagui Spath
17	SDP-2655-21	E-2021-	Juan Sebastián Lara	Senador de la República-Arturo Char

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[10] Cfr. Corte Constitucional, Sentencias T-260 de 2002 (M.P. Alfredo Beltrán Sierra), T-192 de 2007 (M.P. Álvaro Tafur Galvis), T-165 de 2017 (M.P. Alejandro Linares Cantillo) y T-426 de 2016 (M.P. Gloria Stella Ortiz Delgado).

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No.	SDP	SIGDEA	Peticionario	Autoridad
		392123	Rodríguez	Chaljub
18	SDP-2656-21	E-2021-392151	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Alejandro Corrales Escobar
19	SDP-2657-21	E-2021-392225	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Andrés Cristo Bustos
20	SDP-2658-21	E-2021-392260	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Edgar Jesús Díaz Contreras
21	SDP-2659-21	E-2021-392295	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Jaime Enrique Durán Barrera
22	SDP-2660-21	E-2021-392467	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Laura Ester Fortich Sánchez
23	SDP-2661-21	E-2021-392512	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Julián Gallo Cubillos
24	SDP-2662-21	E-2021-392565	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Daira de Jesús Galvis Méndez
25	SDP-2663-21	E-2021-392591	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Nora María García Burgos
26	SDP-2664-21	E-2021-392631	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Juan Carlos García Gómez
27	SDP-2665-21	E-2021-392676	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Lidio Arturo García Turbay
28	SDP-2666-21	E-2021-392727	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-José Obdulio Gaviria Vélez
29	SDP-2668-21	E-2021-392754	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Mauricio Gómez Amín
30	SDP-2669-21	E-2021-392802	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Juan Diego Gómez Jiménez
31	SDP-2670-21	E-2021-392830	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Jorge Eliécer Guevara Murcia
32	SDP-2671-21	E-2021-392853	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Honorio Miguel Henríquez Pinedo
33	SDP-2672-21	E-2021-392878	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Paola Andrea Holguín Moreno
34	SDP-2673-21	E-2021-392894	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Germán Darío Hoyos Giraldo
35	SDP-2674-21	E-2021-392908	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Carlos Abraham Jiménez López
36	SDP-2675-21	E-2021-392917	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Didier Lobo Chinchilla
37	SDP-2677-21	E-2021-392933	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Criselda Lobo Silva
38	SDP-2678-21	E-2021-392945	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Jorge Eduardo Londoño Ulloa
39	SDP-2681-21	E-2021-392976	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Alexander López Maya
40	SDP-2700-21	E-2021-394016	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-José Ritter López Peña
41	SDP-2701-21	E-2021-394017	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Maritza Martínez Aristizábal
42	SDP-2702-21	E-2021-394018	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Luis Iván Marulanda Gómez
43	SDP-2703-21	E-2021-394019	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Carlos Manuel Meisel Vergara

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No.	SDP	SIGDEA	Peticionario	Autoridad
44	SDP-2704-21	E-2021-394020	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Carlos Felipe Mejía Mejía
45	SDP-2705-21	E-2021-394021	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Carlos Fernando Motoa Solarte
46	SDP-2706-21	E-2021-394022	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-José David Name Cardozo
47	SDP-2707-21	E-2021-394023	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Iván Leonidas Name Vásquez
48	SDP-2708-21	E-2021-394024	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Temístocles Ortega Narváez
49	SDP-2709-21	E-2021-394025	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Eduardo Emilio Pacheco Cuello
50	SDP-2710-21	E-2021-394026	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Edgar Enrique Palacio Mizrahi
51	SDP-2711-21	E-2021-394027	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego
52	SDP-2712-21	E-2021-394029	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Miguel Ángel Pinto Hernández
53	SDP-2713-21	E-2021-394031	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-José Aulo Polo Narváez
54	SDP-2714-21	E-2021-394032	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Ciro Alejandro Ramírez Cortés
55	SDP-2715-21	E-2021-394034	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Jorge Enrique Robledo Castillo
56	SDP-2716-21	E-2021-394035	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-John Milton Rodríguez González
57	SDP-2717-21	E-2021-394037	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Roosvelt Rodríguez Rengifo
58	SDP-2718-21	E-2021-394039	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Antonio Eresmid Sanguino Páez
59	SDP-2720-21	E-2021-394240	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Victoria Sandino Simanca Herrera
60	SDP-2721-21	E-2021-394258	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-John Harold Suárez Vargas
61	SDP-2722-21	E-2021-394278	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Jonatán Tamayo Pérez
62	SDP-2723-21	E-2021-394303	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Pablo Catatumbo Torres Victoria
63	SDP-2724-21	E-2021-394325	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Carlos Andrés Trujillo González
64	SDP-2725-21	E-2021-394341	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senadora de la República-Paloma Susana Valencia Laserna
65	SDP-2726-21	E-2021-394368	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Gabriel Jaime Velasco Ocampo
66	SDP-2727-21	E-2021-394396	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Antonio Luis Zabarain Guevara
67	SDP-2728-21	E-2021-394417	Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez	Senador de la República-Israel Alberto Zúñiga Iriarte

SEGUNDO. - Por intermedio del Grupo Especial de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición:

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Sources: Author and *Procuraduría General de la Nación*

PROCURADURIA
GENERAL DE LA NACION

(i) **REMÍTASE**, vía correo electrónico, a las autoridades relacionadas en el numeral anterior copia del presente auto junto con las peticiones del solicitante, para que procedan a dar cumplimiento a lo ordenado.

(ii) **INFÓRMESE**, vía correo electrónico, la presente decisión al peticionario.

TERCERO. - Realizados los requerimientos correspondientes, **ARCHIVAR** las diligencias de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición relacionadas en el numeral primero.

CUARTO. - Recibidos los informes de las entidades, **ARCHIVAR** los mismos dejando las constancias y anotaciones correspondientes a fin de ser utilizados como insumos en caso de solicitarse la reactivación del procedimiento.

QUINTO. - ADVERTIR al peticionario que de no recibir la respuesta a su solicitud podrá solicitar que el trámite de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición se reactive, para que se realice un segundo requerimiento y/o se remita a la autoridad disciplinaria o administrativa que sea del caso, para lo cual deberán informar tal situación al correo electrónico quejas@procuraduría.gov.co.

SEXTO. - INFORMAR al peticionario que tiene la posibilidad de interponer acciones de tutela en contra de las entidades correspondientes, con fin de que el juez constitucional disponga la protección de su derecho fundamental de petición en los términos del artículo 86 de la Constitución Política y el Decreto 2591 de 1991.

SÉPTIMO. - ADVERTIR a los interesados que contra este auto no procede recurso alguno.

Comuníquese y cúmplase,

Juan Sebastián Vega Rodríguez

JUAN SEBASTIÁN VEGA RODRÍGUEZ
Procurador Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales

Elaboró: Grupo Especial de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición
Revisó: Luz Andrea Bernal Ortíz – Coordinadora del Grupo Especial de Supervigilancia al Derecho de Petición

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Sources: Author and Procuraduría General de la Nación

D.2.3 Recourse to enforce constitutional rights (example)

27/09/2021

ACCIÓN DE TUTELA

Excelentísimo(a) Señor(a)

Juez(a) civil (reparto)

El accionante: Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez, colombiano con cedula de ciudadanía No 80.873.555 de Bogotá, residente en la ciudad de Lisboa en la dirección Rua Hugo Casaes Nº 25, Primeiro direito, freguesia de Santa Clara, Teléfono celular. + 351 961553410, correo: juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt.

El(La) accionado(a): La presente acción se dirige en contra del(la) honorable, Senadora Ruby Helena Chaguí Spath identificado(a) con cédula de ciudadanía 52863429, al momento de la notificación y cuya dirección es la ciudad de Bogotá Capitolio Nacional, Piso 3 con correo electrónico ruby.chagui@senado.gov.co.

LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES VIOLADOS

Con el proceder que más adelante relato, considero que el(la) accionado(a) ha infringido sistemáticamente una serie de derechos políticos fundamentales así: el Artículo 23 de la Constitución Política de Colombia (CPC) que al ser ejercido por el accionante complace de lleno los requisitos de la Ley 1755 de 2015. Igualmente, en el ejercicio de este derecho, lo requerido en ningún modo recaba información exceptuada por daño de derechos a personas naturales o jurídicas, dispuestas en el art. 18 de la ley 1712 de 2014. Como también, configura al accionado pasar por alto la Sentencia T-464/97 proferida por la Corte Constitucional en la que refuerza la prohibición de respuesta evasiva al instrumento de consulta interpuesto por el peticionario. Además, excelentísimo(a) Juez(a), en virtud de la naturaleza del accionado, el(ella) no refuerza su responsabilidad política ante la sociedad y electores, como el Artículo 133 de la CPC define.

LOS HECHOS

1. Mediante uso del Derecho de Petición consagrado en el Artículo 23 de la Constitución Política de Colombia. Presenté PETICIÓN al accionado(a) el día 09-06-2021 solicitando la respuesta concisa a once preguntas de su accionar político para el periodo constitucional para el cual fue elegido(a).

2. El 26-07-2021 el accionante interpuso una solicitud de supervigilancia al derecho de petición ante la Procuraduría General de la Nación.

3. El auto No. 220 de 2021 del 06/08/2021, proferido por el Procurador Auxiliar para Asuntos Constitucionales, solicitó al accionado dar respuesta en los términos señalados en la petición.

PRUEBAS

Solicito al (la) señor(a) Juez(a) considerar las siguientes:

1. Radicado (por correo electrónico) del derecho de petición

2. Radicado E-2021-392096, solicitud de supervigilancia al derecho de petición .

FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO

Fundamento mi pedimento en los artículos establecidos en los Artículos 23, 86, y 133 de la Constitución Política de Colombia y Decretos Reglamentarios 2591 de 1991, 306 de 1992 y D. L. 1382/2000; Ley 1755 de 2015; Ley 1712 de 2014 y Sentencia T-464/97 Corte Constitucional.

DECLARACIÓN JURADA

Manifiesto bajo juramento que no he presentado a otros juzgados o jueces otra tutela por los mismos hechos y contra los mismos demandados ante ninguna otra corte o instancia.

ANEXOS

1. Las relacionadas en las pruebas.

2. Cedula de ciudadanía.

NOTIFICACIONES

Accionado: Capitolio Nacional, Piso 3, ruby.chagui@senado.gov.co, Bogotá. D.C. Colombia.

Accionante: Rua Hugo Casaes Nº 25, Primeiro direito, freguesia de Santa Clara, correo: juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt.

_____
Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez
C.C. 80.873.555 de Bogotá D.C.

Source: Own elaboration

Rama Judicial
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
República de Colombia

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JUZGADO 007 DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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Calle 11 No. 9a - 24 Teléfono (1) 2832273
Edificio Kaysser

Bogotá, D.C., 28 de Septiembre de 2021
Oficio No. 3114

Señor
JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

REF: NUMERO INTERNO 55400
No. único de radicación: 110013187007202100046
Accionado: RUBY HELENA CHAGUI SPATH
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

ASUNTO: NOTIFICACIÓN

En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el Juzgado 007 de esta especialidad, mediante auto del martes, 28 de septiembre de 2021, comedidamente le comunico que este Estrado Judicial AVOCÓ el conocimiento de la acción constitucional de la referencia, instaurada por usted, por presunta vulneración a sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, en contra de la Senadora de la República RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH.

Se anexa copia del aludido auto, para su conocimiento y demás fines pertinentes.

Cordialmente,

SANDRA MARCELA BECERRA SARMIENTO
ESCRIBIENTE

Al contestar sírvase citar el número único de radicación y de ubicación interna

Source: Colombian Judicial System

Rama Judicial
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
República de Colombia

JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
Y MEDIDAS DE SEGURIDAD
BOGOTA D.C.
CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado: 11001-31-87-007-2021-00046-00
NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

Bogotá, D.C. veintiocho (28) de septiembre de dos mil veintiuno (2021)

Ha ingresado a despacho la acción de tutela interpuesta por el señor JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ contra la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH, con el fin de que se tutelado su derecho de petición, toda vez que por la accionada no ha respondido su solicitud radicada vía correo electrónico el 9 de junio de 2021

Toda vez que la señora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH ostenta la calidad de Senadora de la República, por tanto, es un servidor público que hace parte de una entidad pública del orden nacional, este despacho de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 2° artículo 1° del decreto 333 de 2021, AVOCA el conocimiento de esta acción de tutela y en consecuencia dispone la notificación de la existencia de la misma a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPETH, remitiéndole el escrito contentivo de esta y sus anexos, para que en el término de tres (3) días contados a partir del siguiente a aquel en que se surta tal diligencia, manifieste lo que considere pertinente y haga uso de su derecho de contradicción y defensa.

Notifíquese vía correo electrónico este auto al accionante.

CUMPLASE,

MARTHA JAHEL AMEZQUITA VARON
JUEZ

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CENTRO DE SERVICIOS ADMINISTRATIVOS
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Edificio Kaysser

Bogotá, D.C., 11 de Octubre de 2021
Oficio No. 3278

Señor
JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

REF: NUMERO INTERNO 55400
No. único de radicación: 110013187007202100046
Accionado: RUBY HELENA CHAGUI SPATH
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

ASUNTO: NOTIFICACIÓN FALLO DE TUTELA

En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el Juzgado 007 de esta especialidad, mediante auto del lunes, 11 de octubre de 2021, comedidamente le remito fallo de tutela proferido por este Juzgado, mediante el cual resolvió:

"Amparar el derecho de petición que le ha sido vulnerado al señor JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ por parte de la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

(…)"

Lo anterior, para su notificación y para que proceda de conformidad con los fines pertinentes. (4 folios).

Cordialmente,

SANDRA MARCELA BECERRA SARMIENTO
ESCRIBIENTE

Al contestar sírvase citar el número único de radicación y de ubicación interna

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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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BOGOTA D.C.
CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado: 11001-31-87-007-2021-00046-00
NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

Bogotá, D.C. once (11) de octubre de dos mil veintiuno (2021)

ASUNTO A DECIDIR

Ha ingresado a despacho la acción de tutela interpuesta por el señor JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ contra la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH, con el fin de que se tutelado su derecho de petición, toda vez que por la accionada no ha respondido su solicitud radicada vía correo electrónico el 9 de junio de 2021

APORTA, entre otras pruebas copia del derecho de petición con constancia de envío por correo electrónico.

ACTUACION PROCESAL

Este Juzgado por auto de 28 de septiembre hogaño, toda vez que la señora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH ostenta la calidad de Senadora de la República, por tanto, es un servidor público que hace parte de una entidad pública del orden nacional, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el numeral 2° artículo 1° del decreto 333 de 2021, AVOCÓ el conocimiento de esta acción de tutela y dispuso la notificación de la existencia de la misma a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPETH, para que en el término de tres (3) días contados a partir del siguiente a aquel en que se surtiera tal diligencia, manifestara lo que considerara pertinente y hiciera u uso de su derecho de contradicción y defensa.

Toda vez que la accionada no dio respuesta a esta acción de amparo, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 20 del decreto 2591 de 1991 se darán por ciertos los hechos narrados por al accionante.

CONSIDERACIONES Y DECISION DEL DESPACHO

El artículo 86 de la Carta Política establece que las personas pueden interponer acción de tutela para reclamar ante los jueces mediante un procedimiento preferente y sumario, la protección inmediata de sus derechos constitucionales fundamentales, cuando quiera que éstos resulten vulnerados o amenazados por la acción o la omisión de cualquier autoridad pública, y que ésta es procedente cuando el afectado no dispone de otro medio judicial, salvo que se utilice como mecanismo transitorio para evitar un perjuicio irremediable.

A su vez el artículo 23 de la Constitución Nacional consagra el derecho de petición.

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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado: 11001-31-87-007-2021-00046-00
NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

Es de anotar que en el presente asunto el accionante radicó el 9 de junio de 2021 una petición vía correo electrónico con destino a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH, la cual hasta la fecha no ha sido contestada.

Ha sostenido la H Corte Constitucional en reiterada jurisprudencia, siendo el caso citar la sentencia T 997 de 2005, Magistrado Ponente doctor JAIME CORDOBA TRIBIÑO, lo siguiente:

"*La Corte Constitucional resumió las reglas básicas que rigen el derecho de petición, tal y como han sido precisados en su jurisprudencia*[1]:

"a) El derecho de petición es fundamental y determinante para la efectividad de los mecanismos de la democracia participativa. Además, porque mediante él se garantizan otros derechos constitucionales, como los derechos a la información, a la participación política y a la libertad de expresión.

"b) El núcleo esencial del derecho de petición reside en la resolución pronta y oportuna de la cuestión, pues de nada serviría la posibilidad de dirigirse a la autoridad si ésta no resuelve o se reserva para sí el sentido de lo decidido.

"c) La respuesta debe cumplir con estos requisitos: 1. oportunidad 2. Debe resolverse de fondo, clara, precisa y de manera congruente con lo solicitado 3. ser puesta en conocimiento del peticionario. Si no se cumple con estos requisitos se incurre en una vulneración del derecho constitucional fundamental de petición.

"d) Por lo anterior, la respuesta no implica aceptación de lo solicitado ni tampoco se concreta siempre en una respuesta escrita.

"e) Este derecho, por regla general, se aplica a entidades estatales, esto es, a quienes ejercen autoridad. Pero, la Constitución lo extendió a las organizaciones privadas cuando la ley así lo determine.

"f) La Corte ha considerado que cuando el derecho de petición se formula ante particulares, es necesario separar tres situaciones: 1. Cuando el particular presta un servicio público o cuando realiza funciones de autoridad. El derecho de petición opera igual como si se dirigiera contra la administración. 2. Cuando el derecho de petición se constituye en un medio para obtener la efectividad de otro derecho fundamental, puede

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[1] Estos criterios fueron delineados en la sentencia T-377 de 2000, MP: Alejandro Martínez Caballero.

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Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

protegerse de manera inmediata. 3. Pero, si la tutela se dirige contra particulares que no actúan como autoridad, este será un derecho fundamental solamente cuando el Legislador lo reglamente.

"g) En relación con la oportunidad de la respuesta, esto es, con el término que tiene la administración para resolver las peticiones formuladas, por regla general, se acude al artículo 6º del Código Contencioso Administrativo que señala 15 días para resolver. De no ser posible, antes de que se cumpla con el término allí dispuesto y ante la imposibilidad de dar una respuesta en dicho lapso, la autoridad o el particular deberá explicar los motivos y señalar el término en el cual se realizará la contestación. Para este efecto, el criterio de razonabilidad del término será determinante, puesto que deberá tenerse en cuenta el grado de dificultad o la complejidad de la solicitud. Cabe anotar que la Corte Constitucional ha confirmado las decisiones de los jueces de instancia que ordenan responder dentro del término de 15 días, en caso de no hacerlo, la respuesta será ordenada por el juez, dentro de las cuarenta y ocho (48) horas siguientes.

"h) La figura del silencio administrativo no libera a la administración de la obligación de resolver oportunamente la petición, pues su objeto es distinto. El silencio administrativo es la prueba incontrovertible de que se ha violado el derecho de petición.

"i) El derecho de petición también es aplicable en la vía gubernativa, por ser ésta una expresión más del derecho consagrado en el artículo 23 de la Carta. Sentencias T-294 de 1997 y T-457 de 1994."[2]

En la sentencia T-1006 de 2001,[3] *la Corte adicionó dos reglas jurisprudenciales más:*

j) "La falta de competencia de la entidad ante quien se plantea no la exonera del deber de responder",[4]

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[2] Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T-377/00, MP: Alejandro Martínez Caballero.
[3] Corte Constitucional, Sentencia T-1006/01, MP: Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa.
[4] Corte Constitucional, Sentencia 219/01, M.P. Fabio Morón Díaz. En la sentencia T-476/01, MP: Rodrigo Escobar Gil, la Corte afirmó "*Desde una perspectiva constitucional, la obligación de realizar el traslado de la solicitud, en caso de incompetencia de la entidad ante la cual se eleva la petición, es un elemento del núcleo esencial del derecho de petición, toda vez, que la simple respuesta de incompetencia, constituye una evasiva a la solicitud y de acuerdo a lo expresado por la Corte: "...[las respuestas simplemente formales o evasivas] ... no satisfacen el derecho de petición, pues en realidad, mediante ellas la administración elude el cumplimiento de su deber y desconoce el principio de eficacia que inspira la función administrativa, de conformidad con el*

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CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

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NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

k) "Ante la presentación de una petición, la entidad pública debe notificar su respuesta al interesado".[5]

Conforme lo jurisprudencia trascrita y toda vez que la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH no respondió la solicitud ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de 2021 , este despacho amparará el derecho de petición que le ha sido conculcado al petente y dispondrá que en el término de 48 horas, si aún no lo ha hecho, la citada senadora de respuesta a tal requerimiento

En mérito de lo expuesto el Juzgado Séptimo de Ejecución de Penas y Medidas de Seguridad de Bogotá, administrando justicia en nombre de la república y por autoridad de la ley:

RESUELVE:

PRIMERO.- Amparar el derecho de petición que le ha sido vulnerado al señor   JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ por parte de la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH.

SEGUNDO. – Disponer que en el término de 48 horas, si aún no lo ha hecho, la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH conteste la petición ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de 2021 .

TERCERO.- Notifíquese esta decisión vía correo electrónico al accionante y a la accionada.

CUARTO.- Si esta determinación no fuere impugnada en los términos de ley remítase a la Corte Constitucional para su revisión.

NOTIFIQUESE Y CUMPLASE,

MARTHA JAHEL AMEZQUITA VARON
Juez

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artículo 209 de la Constitución..."
[5] Corte Constitucional, Sentencia 249 /01, M.P. José Gregorio Hernández Galindo.

Source: Colombian Judicial System

D.2.4 Contempt of Court (example)

Lisboa, 18/10/2021

Su Señoría
Jueza, Martha Jahel Amezquita Varon
Juzgado Séptimo de Ejecución de Penas y Medidas de Seguridad
Bogotá D.C.

Asunto: Incidente de desacato de acción de tutela

Accionante: Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez

Accionada: Rubi Helena Chagüi Spath

Radicado del proceso: Numero Interno 55400; No. único de radicación:
110013187007202100046

Yo Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez, colombiano con cedula de ciudadanía No
80.873.555 de Bogotá, residente en la ciudad de Lisboa en la dirección Rua Hugo
Casaes N° 25, Primeiro direito, freguesia de Santa Clara, Teléfono celular. + 351
961553410, correo: juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt.
Mediante el presente memorial presento respetuosamente a Su Señoría el siguiente
INCIDENTE DE DESACATO contra la Honorable, Senadora Ruby Helena Chagüí
Spath identificada con cédula de ciudadanía 52.863.429, al momento de la
notificación y cuya dirección es la ciudad de Bogotá Capitolio Nacional, Piso 3 con
correo electrónico ruby.chagui@senado.gov.co. A causa de los siguientes hechos.

Hechos

1. El 27/09/2021, accione el derecho de tutela en contra de la Senadora Ruby
Helena Chagüí Spath, por:

1.1. Mediante uso del Derecho de Petición consagrado en el Artículo 23 de la
Constitución Política de Colombia. Presenté PETICIÓN al accionado(a) el día
09/06/2021 solicitando la respuesta concisa a once preguntas de su accionar
político para el periodo constitucional para el cual fue elegido(a).

1. 2. El 26/07/2021 el accionante interpuso una solicitud de supervigilancia al
derecho de petición ante la Procuraduría General de la Nación.

1. 3. El auto No. 220 de 2021 del 06/08/2021, proferido por el Procurador Auxiliar
para Asuntos Constitucionales, solicitó al accionado dar respuesta en los
términos señalados en la petición.

2. Al no recibir respuesta alguna el 28/09/2021, mediante oficio 3114 su respetable
despacho avocó conocimiento de la acción de tutela con el Radicado: 11001·31·87·
007·2021·00046·00 NI:55400.

3. El 11/10/2021 a través del oficio 3278 Su Señoría amparó mi derecho de petición
vulnerado por la Honorable Senadora. Dicha sentencia ordena «Disponer que en el
término de 48 horas, si aún no lo ha hecho, la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI
SPATH conteste la petición ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de
2021.»

Página 1 de 2

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4. A la fecha, la Honorable Senadora Ruby Helena Chagüí Spath no ha cumplido el
fallo proferido por su despacho, motivo por el cual interpongo este incidente de
desacato.

Petición

Solicito que se disponga en término inmediato a la honorable Senadora Ruby Helena
Chagüí Spath el cumplimiento y el acatamiento de lo ordenado por su despacho en
la acción de tutela precitada.

Fundamentos de Derecho

Fundamento este incidente de desacato en los artículos 86 de la Constitución Política
de Colombia, 27, 52 y 53 del Decreto 2191 de 1991 y 9 del Decreto 306 de 1992.

Pruebas

Solicito Su Señoría, que se decreten, practiquen y tengan como pruebas las
siguientes:

1. Sentencia de tutela emitida por su respetable despacho.

Notificaciones

Las dirigidas a la honorable, Senadora Ruby Helena Chagüí Spath, Capitolio
Nacional, Piso 3, ruby.chagui@senado.gov.co, Bogotá. D.C. Colombia.

Las dirigidas a mi a la Rua Hugo Casaes N° 25, Primeiro direito, freguesia de Santa
Clara, juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt, Lisboa. Portugal.

Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez
C.C. 80.873.555 de Bogotá D.C.

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Edificio Kaysser

Bogotá, D.C., 9 de Noviembre de 2021
Oficio No. 3751

Señor
JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

REF: NUMERO INTERNO 55400
No. único de radicación: 110013187007202100046
Accionado: RUBY HELENA CHAGUI SPATH
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

ASUNTO: NOTIFICACIÓN

En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el Juzgado 007 de esta especialidad, mediante
auto del viernes, 05 de noviembre de 2021, comedidamente le remito copia del
aludido auto mediante el cual este Despacho dispone:

*"Requerir a la señora Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH con
el fin de que acredite el cumplimiento del fallo emitido por esta Oficina
Judicial el 11 de octubre hogaño."*

Cordialmente,

SANDRA MARCELA BECERRA SARMIENTO
ESCRIBIENTE

Al contestar sírvase citar el número único de radicación y de ubicación interna

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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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BOGOTA D.C.
CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado: 11001-31-87-007-2021-0046-00
NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

Bogotá, D.C. cinco (5) de noviembre de dos mil veintiuno (2021)

Con el fin de dar trámite al incidente de desacato interpuesto por el señor JUAN
SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ, en la acción de tutela por él tramitada contra el la
senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH, se dispone

Requerir a la señora Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH con el fin de que acredite
el cumplimiento del fallo emitido por esta Oficina Judicial el 11 de octubre hogaño.

Al anterior requerimiento acompáñese copia de la providencia mencionada.

Notifíquese vía correo electrónico este auto al accionante.

CUMPLASE,

MARTHA JAHEL AMEZQUITA VARON
JUEZ

Source: Author and Colombian Judicial System

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Bogotá, D.C., 26 de Noviembre de 2021
Oficio No. 4054

Señor
JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

REF: NUMERO INTERNO 55400
No. único de radicación: 110013187007202100046
Accionado: RUBY HELENA CHAGUI SPATH
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

ASUNTO: NOTIFICACIÓN

En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el Juzgado 007 de esta especialidad, mediante auto del jueves, 25 de noviembre de 2021, comedidamente le remito copia del aludido auto, mediante el cual este Despacho dispone:

"Requerir a la señora Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH con el fin de que de manera inmediata acredite el cumplimiento de la determinación emitida por esta oficina Judicial el 11 de octubre de 2021."

Lo anterior, para efectos de su notificación.

Cordialmente,

SANDRA MARCELA BECERRA SARMIENTO
ESCRIBIENTE

Al contestar sírvase citar el número único de radicación y de ubicación interna

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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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CALLE 11 # 9 A - 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado: 11001-31-87-007-2021-0004600
NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

Bogotá, D.C. veinticinco (25) de noviembre de dos mil veintiuno (2021)

ASUNTO A DECIDIR

Ha ingresado a despacho escrito del accionante remitido vía correo electrónico institucional manifestando que la accionada no ha dado cumplimiento al fallo emitido por este juzgado el 11 de octubre hogaño por el cual se amparó el derecho de petición en su favor.

ACTUACION PROCESAL

Este juzgado en sentencia de 11 de octubre de 2021 amparó el derecho de petición en favor del señor LARA RODRIGUEZ y dispuso que en el término de 48 horas, si aún no lo ha hecho, la Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH contestara la petición ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de 2021

Por auto de 5 de noviembre de 2021 se requirió a la accionada para que acreditara el cumplimiento de tal decisión, sin que a la fecha haya dado cumplimiento a lo allí dispuesto.

CONSIDERACIONES Y DECISION DEL DESPACHO

Como se anotó en precedencia este juzgado en sentencia de 11 octubre de 2021 dispuso que la Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH, contestara la petición ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de 2021, sin que haya sido probado por parte de la citada accionada el acatamiento a tal proveído.

En consecuencia y previo a dar inicio al incidente de desacato, de conformidad con lo dispuesto en al artículo 27 del decreto 2591 de 1991, el Juzgado Séptimo de Ejecución Penas y Medidas de Seguridad de Bogotá,

RESUELVE:

PRIMERO.- Requerir a la señora Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH con el fin de que de manera inmediata acredite el cumplimiento de la determinación emitida por esta oficina Judicial el 11 de octubre de 2021, remitiéndole nuevamente copia de la misma.

SEGUNDO.- Por el Centro de Servicio Administrativo adscrito a los juzgados de este especialidad poner en conocimiento de la señora PROCURADORA GENERAL DE LA NACION, doctora MAGARITA CABELLO BLANCO el incumplimiento por parte de la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH,

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Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
República de Colombia

JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
Y MEDIDAS DE SEGURIDAD
BOGOTA D.C.
CALLE 11 # 9 A - 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado: 11001-31-87-007-2021-0004600
NI:55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

de la orden impartida por este juzgado el 11de octubre de 2021,remitiéndole copia de la citada decisión, para los fines indicados en el artículo 27 del Decreto 2591 de 1991.

TERCERO.- Notifíquese esta determinación mediante correo electrónico al accionante y a la accionada

NOTIFÍQUESE Y CÚMPLASE,

MARTHA JAHEL AMEZQUITA VARON
JUEZ

Rama Judicial
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
República de Colombia

CENTRO DE SERVICIOS ADMINISTRATIVOS
JUZGADO 007 DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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Calle 11 No. 9a - 24 Teléfono (1) 2832273
Edificio Kaysser

Bogotá, D.C., 22 de Diciembre de 2021
Oficio No. 4412

Señor
JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

REF: NUMERO INTERNO 55400
No. único de radicación: 110013187007202100046
Accionado: RUBY HELENA CHAGUI SPATH
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

ASUNTO: NOTIFICACIÓN

En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el Juzgado 007 de esta especialidad, mediante auto del martes, 21 de diciembre de 2021, comedidamente le remito copia del aludido auto, mediante el cual este Despacho dispone:

"En consecuencia y toda vez que no ha sido acreditado por la accionada el cumplimiento del fallo emitido por esta Oficina judicial el 16 de octubre hogaño, se dispone requerir a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH para que en el término de tres (3) días contados a partir del siguiente a aquel en que se surta la notificación personal de este proveído acate la determinación referida".

Cordialmente,

SANDRA MARCELA BECERRA SARMIENTO
ESCRIBIENTE

Al contestar sírvase citar el número único de radicación y de ubicación interna

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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
Y MEDIDAS DE SEGURIDAD
BOGOTA D.C.
CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado 11001-31-87-0007-2021-00046-00
NI 55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELEN CHAGUI SPATH

Bogotá, D.-C. veintiuno (21) de diciembre de dos mil veintiuno (2021)

Ha ingresado escrito remitido por el accionante manifestando que la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH no da dado cumplimiento al fallo emitido por este juzgado el 11 de octubre de 2021

Es de anotar que en el citado proveído este juzgado ordenó:

"(...)

PRIMERO.- Amparar el derecho de petición que le ha sido vulnerado al señor JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ por parte de la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH.

SEGUNDO. – Disponer que en el término de 48 horas, si aún no lo ha hecho, la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH conteste la petición ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de 2021

(...)"

Es del caso señalar que la accionada, no obstante haber sido requerida en dos oportunidades para que de cumplimiento a la citada sentencia, ha sido renuente..

El artículo 52 del del decreto 2591 de 1991, a texto dice:

"ARTICULO 52.- Desacato. La persona que incumpliere una orden de un juez proferida con base en el presente decreto incurrirá en desacato sancionable con arresto hasta de seis meses y multa hasta de 20 salarios mínimos mensuales, salvo que en este decreto ya se hubiere señalado una consecuencia jurídica distinta y sin perjuicio de las sanciones penales a que hubiere lugar.

La sanción será impuesta por el mismo juez mediante trámite incidental y será consultada al superior jerárquico quien decidirá dentro de los tres días siguientes si debe revocarse la sanción. La consulta se hará en el efecto devolutivo."

En consecuencia y toda vez que no ha sido acreditado por la accionada el cumplimiento del fallo emitido por esta Oficina judicial el 16 de octubre hogaño, se dispone requerir a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH para que en el término de tres (3) días contados a partir del siguiente a aquel en que se surta la notificación personal de este proveído acate la determinación referida.

Al acta de notificación personal de esta providencia anéxese copia de la decisión emitida por el este juzgado el 16 de octubre hogaño.

Rama Judicial
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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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BOGOTA D.C.
CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado 11001-31-87-0007-2021-00046-00
NI 55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELEN CHAGUI SPATH

Notifíquese este auto mediante correo electrónico al accionante.

CUMPLASE,

MARTHA JAHEL AMEZQUITA VARON
JUEZ

Rama Judicial
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
República de Colombia

SIGCMA

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Edificio Kaysser

Bogotá, D.C., 22 de Febrero de 2022
Oficio No. 906

Señor
JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
juan.lara@phd.iseg.ulisboa.pt; juan.lara@edu.ulisboa.pt

REF: NUMERO INTERNO 55400
No. único de radicación: 11001318700720210046
Accionado: RUBY HELENA CHAGUI SPATH
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ

ASUNTO: NOTIFICACIÓN

En cumplimiento de lo dispuesto por el Juzgado 007 de esta especialidad, mediante auto del viernes, 18 de febrero de 2022, comedidamente le remito fallo de incidente de desacato proferido por este Juzgado, mediante el cual resolvió:

"En cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en el artículo 52 del decreto 2591 de 1991 imponer a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH sanción de arresto por un (1) mes y multa de cinco (5) S.M.L.M.V. por el incumplimiento a lo dispuesto por este juzgado en sentencia de 16 de octubre de 2021."

Lo anterior, para su notificación y para que proceda de conformidad con los fines pertinentes. (3 folios).

Cordialmente,

SANDRA MARCELA BECERRA SARMIENTO
ESCRIBIENTE

Al contestar sírvase citar el número único de radicación y de ubicación interna

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Rama Judicial
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JUZGADO SEPTIMO DE EJECUCION DE PENAS
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CALLE 11 # 9 A – 24 EDIFICIO KAYSSER PISO 8

Radicado 11001-31-87-0007-2021-00046-00
NI 55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPA

Bogotá, D.-C., dieciocho (18) de febrero de dos mil veintidós (2022)

ASUNTO A DECIDIR

Ingresaron a despacho vía correo electrónico con destino a la acción de tutela instaurada por el señor JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ contra la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH :

Acción de tutela instaurada por el accionante, la cual fue asignada por reparto al Juzgado Primero Penal del Circuito Especializado de esta ciudad. Despacho que la remite a esta Oficina Judicial teniendo en cuenta que este juzgado había tramitado una acción de amparo sobre los mismos hechos, la cual fue objeto de decisión de fondo mediante sentencia de 11 de octubre de 2021 y por ello dicha demanda corresponde al incidente de desacato que se decide.

De otra parte en cumplimiento a lo ordenado por este juzgado ingresa informe de trazabilidad de la notificación del auto de 21 de diciembre de 2021, la cual fue realizada el día 1º de febrero de 2022 vía correo electrónico y radicación de los documentos en el Capitolio Nacional, con destino a la Oficina de la Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH

ACTUACION PROCESAL

Este juzgado en sentencia de 11 de octubre de 2021 amparó el derecho de petición conculcado al señor Lara y dispuso:

"(...)

PRIMERO.- Amparar el derecho de petición que le ha sido vulnerado al señor JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ por parte de la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH.

SEGUNDO. – Disponer que en el término de 48 horas, si aún no lo ha hecho, la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH conteste la petición ante ella formulada por el accionante el 9 de junio de 2021

(...)"

La accionada, no obstante haber sido requerida para cumplir la citada sentencia, ha sido renuente.

Este juzgado por auto de 25 de noviembre de 2022 dio inicio al incidente de desacato, de conformidad con lo ordenado en al artículo 27 del decreto 2591 de 1991 y dispuso:

"PRIMERO.- Requerir a la señora Senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH con el fin de que de manera inmediata acredite el cumplimiento de la determinación emitida por esta oficina Judicial el 11 de octubre de 2021, remitiéndole nuevamente copia de la misma.

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Radicado 11001-31-87-0007-2021-00046-00
NI 55400
Accionante: JUAN SEBASTIAN LARA RODRIGUEZ
Accionado: RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPA

SEGUNDO.- Por el Centro de Servicio Administrativo adscrito a los juzgados de este especialidad poner en conocimiento de la señora PROCURADORA GENERAL DE LA NACION, doctora MAGARITA CABELLO BLANCO el incumplimiento por parte de la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH, de la orden impartida por este juzgado el 11de octubre de 2021,remitiéndole copia de la citada decisión, para los fines indicados en el artículo 27 del Decreto 2591 de 1991".

Cumplido el trámite indicado la accionada no dio cumplimiento a la sentencia.

CONSIDERACIONES Y DECISION DEL DESPACHO

El artículo 52 del del decreto 2591 de 1991, a texto dice:

"ARTICULO 52.- Desacato. La persona que incumpliere una orden de un juez proferida con base en el presente decreto incurrirá en desacato sancionable con arresto hasta de seis meses y multa hasta de 20 salarios mínimos mensuales, salvo que en este decreto ya se hubiere señalado una consecuencia jurídica distinta y sin perjuicio de las sanciones penales a que hubiere lugar.

La sanción será impuesta por el mismo juez mediante trámite incidental y será consultada al superior jerárquico quien decidirá dentro de los tres días siguientes si debe revocarse la sanción. La consulta se hará en el efecto devolutivo."

La Corte Constitucional en sentencia **SU034/18** sobre el incidente de desacato sostuvo

"(..)

El derecho de acceso a la administración de justicia no se circunscribe exclusivamente al ejercicio del derecho de acción, sino que está inescindiblemente vinculado al debido proceso y a la expectativa de las partes de que, una vez en firme, la decisión judicial que pone fin a una controversia se materialice en debida forma. Desconocer esta premisa básica implicaría soslayar el carácter vinculante y coercitivo de las providencias judiciales, en detrimento no solo de los derechos fundamentales, sino del orden constitucional vigente.

(...)

Y mas adelante la misma sentencia afirmó:

"(...)

Acerca de la finalidad que persigue el incidente de desacato, la postura que de vieja data ha acogido la Sala Plena de esta Corte y que se ha mantenido es que, si bien una de las consecuencias derivadas de este trámite incidental es la imposición de sanciones por la desobediencia frente a la sentencia, su auténtico propósito es lograr el cumplimiento efectivo de la orden de tutela pendiente de ser ejecutada; de suerte que no se persigue reprender al renuente por el peso de la sanción en sí misma, sino que ésta debe entenderse como una forma para inducir que aquel encauce su conducta hacia el cumplimiento, a través de una medida de reconvención cuya objetivo no es otro que auspiciar la eficacia de la acción impetrada y, con ella, la reivindicación de los derechos quebrantados.

"(...)

Source: Author and Colombian Judicial System

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En consecuencia, acatando la jurisprudencia trascrita y dando cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en el artículo 52 del decreto 2591 de 1991, toda vez que no ha sido acreditado por la accionada el cumplimiento del fallo emitido por esta Oficina judicial el 16 de octubre del año inmediatamente anterior, se dispone imponer a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH sanción de arresto por un (1) mes y multa de cinco (5) S.M.L.M.V.

OTRA DETERMINACIÓN.

En cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en el artículo 52 del Decreto 2591 de 1991 se ordena. remitir en Consulta el expediente digital a la Sala Penal del Tribunal Superior de Bogotá.

En mérito de lo expuesto el Juzgado Séptimo de Ejecución de Penas y Medidas de Seguridad de Bogotá

RESULEVE

PRIMERO. - En cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en el artículo 52 del decreto 2591 de 1991 imponer a la senadora RUBI HELENA CHAGUI SPATH sanción de arresto por un (1) mes y multa de cinco (5) S.M.L.M.V. por el incumplimiento a lo dispuesto por este juzgado en sentencia de 16 de octubre de 2021.

SEGUNDO. - Por el Centro de Servicio Administrativo adscrito a los despachos de esta especialidad dese cumplimiento a lo dispuesto en el acápite de otras determinaciones.

TERCERO.- Notifíquese esa determinación mediante correo electrónico al accionante y a la accionada.

NOTIFIQUESE CUMPLASE,

MARTHA JANEL AMEZQUITA VARON
JUEZ

D.3 Logistic models

Table D.3.1 Preferences about peace

Individual preferences	Congress in full			Senate			House		
	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885
(Intercept)	-1.040	-3.552	-21.948	-1.162	-29.97	-73.645	-0.047	-17.439	-38.237
	(1.143)	(1.988)	(5109.7)	(2.43)	(5535.4)	(491010)	(2.761)	(4830.3)	(14500)
(Kinship) Yes	-0.174	-1.587*	-1.945	-0.943	-6.633*	-19.014	-0.217	-1.144	-0.868
	(0.334)	(0.622)	(1.012)	(0.709)	(2.636)	(112283)	(0.505)	(0.903)	(1.135)
(Funds) Farc Party	14.639	22.073	19.763				17.380	76.805	22.148
	(3956.1)	(10754)	(17730.3)				(10754)	(30772)	(29232)
(Funds) Own patrimony	-0.063	-1.928*	-3.104*	1.415	-7.385*	-43.291	-0.303	-1.597	-2.541
	(0.503)	(0.795)	(1.237)	(1.165)	(2.965)	(194078)	(0.722)	(1.092)	(1.428)
(Funds) Party incomes	-1.248	-1.514	-0.443	-2.402	-5.70	-10.364	-17.798	-19.236	-16.902
	(1.104)	(1.344)	(1.539)	(1.685)	(3.243)	(180881)	(5000.2)	(13528)	(12502)
(Funds) Party patrimony	-16.538	-17.190	-16.566				-18.434	-19.281	-1.636
	(3956.1)	(10754)	(17730.3)				(10754)	(29232)	(29403)
(Funds) Private contributions	-0.261	-1.502*	-3.619**	-0.724	-7.494*	-62.249	-0.280	-1.401	-3.241*
	(0.508)	(0.745)	(1.261)	(1.015)	(3.113)	(126396)	(0.726)	(1)	(1.573)
(Funds) State contributions	-0.173	2.838*	-1.738	-14.565	0.80	-34.111	0.655	37.569	-0.716
	(1.143)	(1.337)	(1.516)	(2547.3)	(2.864)	(221403)	(1.713)	(6159)	(2.317)
(Perpetuation) Four	-0.123	-0.253	1.568	1.171	13.65	26.084	-19.290	-37.048	-5.136
	(1.053)	(1.754)	(2.076)	(1.65)	(3674.6)	(239950)	(3578.3)	(15591)	(21229)
(Perpetuation) One	-0.297	-0.408	-0.336	-0.158	14.10	29.010	-1.774	-2.811	-3.945
	(0.792)	(1.349)	(1.745)	(1.305)	(3674.6)	(208143)	(1.932)	(2.005)	(2.289)
(Perpetuation) Three	-0.416	0.565	-1.677	-2.012	13.93	-20.404	-1.642	-1.995	-2.597
	(0.904)	(1.42)	(2.114)	(1.435)	(3674.6)	(316033)	(2.121)	(2.179)	(2.522)
(Perpetuation) Two	-0.468	0.668	-1.745	1.496	13.71	10.031	-3.171	-2.107	-5.630
	(0.835)	(1.39)	(1.864)	(1.259)	(3674.6)	(300645)	(2.078)	(2.051)	(3.211)
(Spectrum) Left	3.734**	-0.275	4.798**	36.104	0.73	43.132	3.088*	-52.605	19.131
	(1.155)	(1.232)	(1.778)	(3376.8)	(2.926)	(130206)	(1.366)	(9613)	(3163)
(Spectrum) Moderate left	1.698**	1.931*	4.503*	1.469	2.14	-1.728	3.881**	2.579*	22.823
	(0.577)	(0.803)	(1.878)	(1.086)	(1.574)	(191376)	(1.331)	(1.301)	(3163)
(Spectrum) Moderate right	-0.856	0.025	3.324*	-2.922*	0.85	4.382	-0.253	0.309	18.649
	(0.505)	(0.798)	(1.693)	(1.217)	(1.874)	(122674)	(0.683)	(1.075)	(3163)

(Continued)

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Independent behaviours	Congress in full			Senate			House		
	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885
(Spectrum) Other	1.087* (0.537)	2.186** (0.819)	2.973 (1.954)	2.859* (1.38)	5.783* (2.329)	6.308 (459289)	0.476 (0.877)	0.882 (1.625)	17.940 (3163)
(Spectrum) Radical or extreme left	-2.711 (1.988)	0.879 (2.493)	6.015* (2.790)				-1.453 (2.235)	1.477 (15424)	18.859 (14382)
(Spectrum) Radical or extreme right	-16.822 (3956.1)	-17.382 (10754)	-15.417 (17730.3)	-19.274 (10754)	-18.61 (17730.3)	1.551 (413910)			
(Spectrum) Right	-0.182 (0.490)	-0.283 (0.936)	3.119 (1.943)	-0.575 (1.019)	0.63 (1.996)	-10.924 (188402)	0.335 (0.683)	0.268 (1.284)	18.728 (3163)
(Criterion) Legislator's staff	-0.929 (1.257)	-15.069 (2220.5)	18.805 (5109.7)	-1.604 (2.82)	3.48 (7488.6)	79.681 (575835)	0.481 (2.172)	-1.490 (11889)	3.312 (15543)
(Criterion) Executive branch	-16.009 (3956.1)	-18.833 (10754)	3.450 (18451.9)				-16.186 (10754)	-39.628 (29646)	22.273 (32631)
(Criterion) Oneself	-1.108 (1.161)	2.544 (1.935)	20.508 (5109.7)	0.567 (2.913)	21.40 (4151.6)	69.469 (529920)	-1.544 (1.999)	18.714 (4830)	23.842 (14151)
(Criterion) Party	0.530 (1.045)	1.729 (1.887)	18.289 (5109.7)	0.707 (2.433)	19.00 (4151.6)	38.896 (581799)	0.918 (1.86)	17.616 (4830)	22.468 (14151)
(Criterion) Constituency	0.483 (1.065)	3.172 (1.957)	20.229 (5109.7)	2.000 (2.505)	22.50 (4151.6)	80.623 (560110)	0.905 (1.892)	19.109 (4830)	23.119 (14151)
(Religion) Christian	0.127 (0.686)	1.976* (0.855)	1.951 (1.426)	-1.094 (1.156)	2.29 (1.759)	20.913 (127456)	-1.997 (1.857)	1.886 (1.627)	-0.074 (1.85)
(Religion) Evangelic	0.252 (1.394)	-19.252 (4023.7)	-17.198 (7618.2)	-2.333 (2.185)	-6.20 (11137.6)	-23.439 (493539)	-16.949 (6064.9)	-21.011 (18810)	-17.939 (19766)
(Religion) Jewish	19.180 (3956.1)	39.499 (10980.8)	26.636 (17730.3)	21.297 (10754)	41.29 (18793.8)	66.476 (567761)			
(Religion) Non-religious	3.660** (1.271)	0.176 (1.499)	-0.568 (1.839)	20.853 (3770)	-2.62 (2.933)	-45.184 (68954)	2.186 (1.548)	-17.575 (14161)	2.157 (14726)
(Religion) Other	0.073 (0.645)	-3.052 (1.657)	-0.260 (1.580)	-3.755 (2.083)	-3.34 (2.646)	11.496 (525584)	0.491 (0.848)	-55.344 (8660)	-0.723 (1.932)
(Religion) Secular	1.758*** (0.508)	0.455 (0.705)	1.195 (1.036)	1.269 (0.997)	-0.32 (1.436)	20.759 (168513)	2.588** (0.81)	1.122 (1.196)	1.775 (1.585)
(Military) Yes	-2.268 (1.314)	-17.950 (2491.5)	-18.741 (3982.3)	-3.643* (1.787)	-20.24 (6474.8)	-39.598 (314207)	-20.633 (3092.7)	-19.707 (8780)	-21.201 (7955)

(Continued)

Independent behaviours	Congress in full			Senate			Chamber		
	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885	Law 1909	Law 895	Law 885
(Media) mouth to mouth	-17.567 (2780.2)	-19.029 (6735.9)	-18.051 (12412.3)				-19.801 (6653.1)	-20.430 (19417)	-18.869 (20478)
(Media) Press	-16.533 (1755.9)	1.722 (1.551)	-13.923 (7103.1)				-18.198 (3941.2)	1.808 (1.755)	-0.437 (12544)
(Media) Private Radio	-0.218 (0.923)	0.194 (1.678)	-18.398 (4553.8)	0.806 (2.787	3.40 (37.433)	14.134 (545565)	-16.750 (3575.8)	-16.546 (9861)	-15.301 (20637)
(Media) Public Radio	0.819 (0.748)	-16.960 (2913.4)	-17.617 (4364.0)	2.514 (1.475	-9.67 (5728.0)	-59.176 (221438)	-0.780 (1.406)	-19.692 (11627)	-18.614 (10604)
(Media) Public TV	0.187 (0.724)	1.003 (0.887)	-18.881 (3791.0)	-0.550 (1.213	-1.38 (1.623)	-28.701 (173677)	1.420 (1.628)	3.703 (2.227)	-15.995 (16878)
Null deviance: Degrees of freedom	350.70 on 271	204.96 on 271	137.773 on 271	141.049 on 101	95.064 on 101	5.608e+01 on 101	197.87 on 168	105.869 on 168	81.372 on 168
Residual deviance: Degrees of freedom	251.83 on 236	121.68 on 236	65.687 on 236	73.153 on 72	34.272 on 72	2.9243e-09 on 72	125.89 on 135	57.393 on 135	38.543 on 135
AIC:	323.83	193.68	137.69	133.15	94.272	60	193.89	125.39	106.54
Number of Fisher Scoring iterations:	16	18	19	18	19	25	20	20	20

Source: Own elaboration according to the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)

Note: Statistical significance *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *< 0.05; Standard errors are in parentheses

D.4 Generalized Additive Models (GAM)

Table D.4.1 Preferences by experimental group

Independent behaviours	Self-enforcers			Dodgers			Scofflaw		
	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895
(Intercept)	0.061	0.196	0.521 .	0.341	-0.088	0.138	0.280	-0.040	0.005
	(0.393)	(0.253)	(0.303)	(0.383)	(0.105)	(0.174)	(0.361)	(0.147)	(0.275)
(Kinship) Yes	0.001	-0.115	-0.266**	-0.041	-0.004	0.040	-0.114	-0.035	-0.098
	(0.120)	(0.077)	(0.092)	(0.106)	(0.029)	(0.048)	(0.114)	(0.046)	(0.087)
(Funds) Farc Party	0.257	0.685*	0.690.						
	(0.506)	(0.326)	(0.390)						
(Funds) Own patrimony	0.012	-0.296*	-0.395**	-0.078	-0.047	0.002	0.011	0.034	-0.080
	(0.185)	(0.119)	(0.143)	(0.153)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.176)	(0.072)	(0.134)
(Funds) Party incomes	-0.306	-0.455*	-0.624*	-0.164	-0.090	-0.055	0.034	0.203	-0.299
	(0.324)	(0.209)	(0.250)	(0.262)	(0.072)	(0.119)	(0.367)	(0.150)	(0.280)
(Funds) Party patrimony							-0.052	0.037	-0.107
							(0.473)	(0.193)	(0.361)
(Funds) Private contributions	0.035	-0.301*	-0.333*	-0.060	-0.047	0.001	0.014	-0.013	-0.064
	(0.183)	(0.117)	(0.141)	(0.153)	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.191)	(0.078)	(0.146)
(Funds) State contributions	-0.133	0.056	0.237	-0.414	0.274*	0.946***	0.046	-0.260*	0.012
	(0.380)	(0.245)	(0.293)	(0.424)	(0.117)	(0.192)	(0.280)	(0.114)	(0.214)
(Perpetuation) Four	-0.244	-0.121	-0.471	0.884	0.946***	0.966***	-0.201	0.105	-0.150
	(0.387)	(0.249)	(0.299)	(0.609)	(0.168)	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.113)	(0.212)
(Perpetuation) One	0.107	-0.062	-0.241	0.202	-0.102	-0.034	-0.432 .	0.067	-0.132
	(0.236)	(0.152)	(0.182)	(0.324)	(0.089)	(0.147)	(0.246)	(0.100)	(0.187)
(Perpetuation) Three	0.006	-0.246	-0.087	-0.049	-0.074	-0.036	-0.123	0.051	-0.084
	(0.253)	(0.163)	(0.195)	(0.368)	(0.101)	(0.167)	(0.277)	(0.113)	(0.211)
(Perpetuation) Two	0.094	-0.157	-0.126	0.015	-0.098	-0.013	-0.291	0.036	-0.005
	(0.237)	(0.152)	(0.182)	(0.339)	(0.093)	(0.154)	(0.254)	(0.103)	(0.193)
(Spectrum) Left	0.629**	-0.026	-0.136	0.839 .	0.298*	-0.176	0.814**	0.363***	0.237
	(0.215)	(0.138)	(0.165)	(0.426)	(0.117)	(0.193)	(0.253)	(0.103)	(0.193)
(Spectrum) Moderate left	0.588**	0.328*	0.334*	0.327 .	0.228***	0.206*	0.305	-0.005	0.101
	(0.211)	(0.136)	(0.163)	(0.196)	(0.054)	(0.089)	(0.223)	(0.091)	(0.170)

Independent behaviours	Self-enforcers			Dodgers			Scofflaw		
	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895
(Spectrum) Moderate right	0.046 (0.154)	0.166 (0.099)	-0.073 (0.119)	-0.228 . (0.135)	0.019 (0.037)	-0.019 (0.061)	0.102 (0.159)	0.021 (0.065)	0.054 . (0.121)
(Spectrum) Other	0.307 (0.204)	0.060 (0.131)	0.201 (0.157)	0.134 (0.185)	-0.027 (0.051)	-0.081 (0.084)	0.368 . (0.217)	0.004 (0.088)	0.314 (0.165)
(Spectrum) Radical or extreme left				-0.529 (0.551)	-0.001 (0.152)	-0.033 (0.250)	0.322 (0.569)	1.308*** (0.232)	0.699 (0.434)
(Spectrum) Radical or extreme right							-0.128 (0.466)	0.008 (0.190)	-0.289 (0.355)
(Spectrum) Right	0.122 (0.187)	-0.101 (0.120)	-0.203 (0.144)	-0.026 (0.150)	0.011 (0.041)	-0.040 (0.068)	0.098 (0.152)	0.132* (0.062)	0.110 (0.116)
(Criterion) Legislator's staff	-0.404 (0.487)	0.029 (0.313)	0.031 (0.375)	-0.136 (0.409)	0.228* (0.113)	-0.115 (0.186)	-0.138 (0.350)	0.069 (0.143)	0.095 (0.267)
(Criterion) Executive branch				0.009 (0.719)	-0.434* (0.198)	-1.367*** (0.326)			
(Criterion) Oneself	-0.069 (0.336)	0.581** (0.217)	0.158 (0.259)	-0.561 (0.446)	0.446*** (0.123)	0.111 (0.202)	-0.041 (0.347)	0.146 (0.141)	0.213 (0.264)
(Criterion) Party	-0.055 (0.303)	0.207 (0.195)	0.166 (0.234)	-0.135 (0.368)	0.206* (0.101)	-0.122 (0.167)	0.322 (0.316)	-0.043 (0.129)	0.217 (0.241)
(Criterion) Constituency	-0.031 (0.303)	0.242 (0.195)	0.216 (0.233)	-0.060 (0.385)	0.232* (0.106)	-0.050 (0.175)	0.318 (0.331)	-0.030 (0.135)	0.331* (0.252)
(Religion) Christian	0.231 (0.309)	0.240 (0.199)	0.221 (0.238)	-0.097 (0.300)	0.353*** (0.083)	0.275* (0.136)	-0.052 (0.181)	-0.027 (0.074)	0.280 (0.138)
(Religion) Evangelic	-0.261 (0.381)	-0.291 (0.245)	-0.191 (0.294)				0.006 (0.398)	-0.107 (0.162)	-0.152 (0.304)
(Religion) Jewish	0.894 (0.624)	1.192** (0.402)	1.086* (0.481)						
(Religion) Not religious	1.201* (0.577)	0.138 (0.371)	0.022 (0.445)	0.125 (0.339)	0.006 (0.093)	-0.024 (0.154)	0.463 (0.296)	-0.033 (0.121)	0.198 . (0.226)
(Religion) Other	0.334 (0.518)	0.948** (0.334)	-0.248 (0.399)	0.175 (0.212)	0.000 (0.058)	0.015 (0.096)	-0.068 (0.175)	-0.017 (0.071)	-0.091 . (0.133)
(Religion) Secular	0.300 . (0.151)	0.073 (0.097)	0.246* (0.117)	0.540** (0.183)	-0.040 (0.050)	-0.024 (0.083)	-0.112 (0.231)	0.005 (0.094)	-0.314 (0.176)

(Continued)

Independent behaviours	Self-enforcers			Dodgers			Scofflaw		
	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1990	Law 885	Law 895
(Military) Yes	-0.246 (0.272)	0.147 (0.175)	0.075 (0.209)	-0.411 (0.264)	-0.008 (0.073)	-0.004 (0.120)	-0.134 (0.243)	-0.050 (0.099)	-0.312 (0.186)
(Media) mouth to mouth				-0.391 (0.509)	-0.145 (0.140)	-0.134 (0.231)	-0.172 (0.500)	0.003 (0.204)	0.233 (0.381)
(Media) Press	-0.078 (0.281)	-0.047 (0.181)	-0.005 (0.216)				-0.414 (0.463)	-0.010 (0.189)	-0.009 (0.353)
(Media) Private Radio	-0.023 (0.361)	0.076 (0.233)	0.274 (0.278)	-0.071 (0.279)	0.030 (0.077)	0.022 (0.126)	0.208 (0.279)	-0.034 (0.114)	0.145 (0.212)
(Media) Public Radio	0.173 (0.277)	-0.222 (0.178)	-0.286 (0.213)	-0.053 (0.243)	-0.106 (0.067)	-0.145 (0.110)	0.719 . (0.383)	0.060 (0.156)	0.091 (0.292)
(Media) Public TV	0.160 (0.239)	-0.236 (0.154)	0.131 (0.184)	0.179 (0.304)	-0.145 (0.084)	-0.141 (0.138)	-0.076 (0.230)	-0.101 (0.094)	0.215 (0.175)
R-sq.(adj)	0.196	0.321	0.281	0.116	0.617	0.390	0.231	0.320	0.062
Deviance explained	0.4900	0.569	0.544	0.375	0.729	0.569	0.510	0.567	0.403
GCV	0.3041	0.126	0.181	0.278	0.021	0.057	0.281	0.047	0.163
Scale est.	0.1905	0.079	0.113	0.190	0.015	0.040	0.177	0.030	0.103
n	83	83	83	100	100	100	89	89	89

Source: Own elaboration according to the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)
Note: Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '·' 0.1 ' ' 1; Standard errors are in parentheses

Table D.4.2 Demographic traits by experimental groups

Covariates	Self-enforcers			Dodgers			Scofflaw		
	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895
(Intercept)	0.165	0.203	0.023	0.079	-0.037	0.023	0.642	0.117	1.032**
	(0.303)	(0.271)	(0.282)	(0.305)	(0.129)	(0.193)	(0.433)	(0.232)	(0.371)
(Position) Senator	-0.038	-0.104	-0.043	0.212*	0.107**	0.073	0.309***	-0.002	0.049
	(0.092)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.093)	(0.039)	(0.059)	(0.084)	(0.045)	(0.072)
(Gender) Male	0.075	-0.059	0.045	-0.151	-0.059	-0.159*	0.240*	-0.003	0.110
	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.095)	(0.105)	(0.044)	(0.066)	(0.116)	(0.062)	(0.100)
(Party) Cambio Radical	0.111	0.09	0.126				-0.45	-0.002	-0.929**
	(0.389)	(0.347)	(0.362)				(0.373)	(0.200)	(0.319)
(Party) Centro Democratico	0.088	-0.034	0.027	-0.08234	-0.017	-0.018	-0.786*	0.023	-0.985**
	(0.382)	(0.341)	(0.355)	(0.131)	(0.055)	(0.083)	(0.367)	(0.197)	(0.314)
(Party) Conservador	0.053	-0.063	0.074	-0.06	0.027	0.112	-0.575	0.006	-1.069**
	(0.405)	(0.361)	(0.377)	(0.140)	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.374)	(0.200)	(0.320)
(Party) FARC	0.873	1.047*	1.160*	0.708	0.930***	0.902**	-0.056	0.055	-0.746*
	(0.536)	(0.478)	(0.498)	(0.488)	(0.207)	(0.309)	(0.399)	(0.214)	(0.342)
(Party) Humana - UP	0.993*	0.315	0.261				0.028	0.044	-1.195**
	(0.408)	(0.364)	(0.379)				(0.516)	(0.277)	(0.442)
(Party) Justas Libres	-0.038	-0.104	-0.043	-0.241	0.001	0.021	-0.991*	-0.009	-1.034**
	(0.511)	(0.456)	(0.475)	(0.279)	(0.118)	(0.177)	(0.429)	(0.230)	(0.367)
(Party) Liberal	0.088	-0.056	0.205	0.320**	0.045	0.041	-0.498	-0.053	-0.942**
	(0.393)	(0.351)	(0.366)	(0.119)	(0.050)	(0.075)	(0.372)	(0.199)	(0.318)
(Party) MAIS	1.000 .	0.960*	1.000*	0.864**	0.517***	0.511**			
	(0.502)	(0.363)	(0.467)	(0.284)	(0.120)	(0.180)			
(Party) MIRA	0.956*	-0.083	1.071**						
	(0.423)	(0.377)	(0.393)						
(Party) Other				0.865*	0.054	0.058	-0.683	-0.011	-1.075*
				(0.381)	(0.161)	(0.241)	(0.511)	(0.274)	(0.437)
(Party) Partido de la U	0.138	0.147	0.422	0.047	0.061	0.102	-0.730 .	0.014	-1.072**
	(0.384)	(0.342)	(0.357)	(0.124)	(0.052)	(0.078)	(0.375)	(0.201)	(0.321)

(Continued)

Demo-variables	Self-enforcers			Dodgers			Scofflaw		
	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895
(Party) Polo Dem. Alternativo	0.890 .	0.435	0.526	0.758**	-0.035	-0.025	-0.07	0.057	-1.250**
	(0.451)	(0.403)	(0.420)	(0.284)	(0.120)	(0.180)	(0.477)	(0.255)	(0.408)
(Party) Verde	0.934*	0.049	0.212	0.858***	-0.041	0.091	-0.128	0.134	-0.899*
	(0.408)	(0.364)	(0.380)	(0.174)	(0.074)	(0.110)	(0.397)	(0.213)	(0.339)
(Education) Especialization	0.119	-0.03	-0.06	0.207	0.043	0.078	-0.209	-0.092	-0.123
	(0.130)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.276)	(0.117)	(0.175)	(0.187)	(0.100)	(0.160)
(Education) Master	0.061	0.055	-0.035	0.064	0.119	0.151	-0.199	-0.103	-0.067
	(0.123)	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.290)	(0.123)	(0.184)	(0.196)	(0.105)	(0.168)
(Education) PhD				0.094	0.004	-0.005	-0.063	-0.246	0.707*
				(0.387)	(0.164)	(0.245)	(0.410)	(0.220)	(0.351)
(Education) Secondary Education	0.087	-0.151	-0.204	-0.095	-0.007	-0.066	0.142	0.302**	0.087
	(0.170)	(0.152)	(0.158)	(0.353)	(0.149)	(0.223)	(0.200)	(0.107)	(0.171)
(Education) Technician	0.109	-0.435	-0.526				-0.011	-0.118	-0.014
	(0.451)	(0.403)	(0.420)				(0.358)	(0.192)	(0.307)
(Education) Undergraduate				0.265	0.018	0.065	-0.192	-0.111	-0.192
				(0.282)	(0.119)	(0.179)	(0.189)	(0.101)	(0.161)
(Investigated) Yes	-0.065	-0.029	-0.028	-0.114	0.121*	0.118	-0.011	-0.064	0.126
	(0.118)	(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.113)	(0.048)	(0.072)	(0.109)	(0.058)	(0.093)
R-sq. (adj)	0.466	0.135	0.305	0384	0.373	0.174	0.472	0.197	0.191
Deviance explained	59%	33.5%	46.6%	49.6%	48.7%	32.4%	59.2%	37.9%	37.5%
GCV	0.16661	0.1326	0.14412	0.167	0.03000	0.0670	0.1585	0.0456	0.1160
Scale est.	0.12647	0.1007	0.1093	0.1353	0.02430	0.05433	0.1211	0.03486	0.088647
n	83	83	83	100	100	100	89	89	89

Source: Own elaboration according to the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)

Note: Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '·' 0.1 ' ' 1; Standard errors are in parentheses

Table D.4.3 Legislators by age groups in experimental groups

Coefficients	Self-enforcers			Dodgers			Scofflaw		
	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895	Law 1909	Law 885	Law 895
(Intercept)	0.333 .	0.167	1.95E-16	0.230 .	-4.E-17	1.E-17	-4.6E-16	6.2E-17	2.70.E-16
	(0.197)	(0.137)	(0.160)	(0.129)	(0.054)	(0.071)	(0.275)	(1.2E-01)	(0.192)
Age Group (36-45)	0.208	-0.083	0.2083	0.163	6E-02	9.E-02	0.272	-1.1E-16	0.090
	(0.220)	(0.153)	(0.179)	(0.153)	(0.064)	(0.084)	(0.293)	(1.2E-01)	(0.205)
Age Group (46-55)	-0.048	-0.024	0.1429	-0.005	2E-16	6.E-02	0.307	3.8E-02	0.076
	(0.223)	(0.155)	(0.181)	(0.154)	(0.064)	(0.085)	(0.291)	(1.2E-01)	(0.203)
Age Group (56-65)	-0.083	-0.117	0.150	0.103	1.E-01	0.1111	0.407	7.4E-02	0.185
	(0.225)	(0.156)	(0.182)	(0.170)	(0.071)	(0.094)	(0.290)	(1.2E-01)	(0.203)
Age Group (>66)	0.083	0.167	0.416*	0.369	-3.E-17	-1.E-17	0.545 .	9.1E-02	0.181
	(0.241)	(0.168)	(0.196)	(0.246)	(0.103)	(0.136)	(0.311)	(1.3E-01)	(0.217)
R-sq.(adj)	0.013	0.025	0.023	0.036	0.008	-0.0207	0.00706	-0.0208	-0.0187
Deviance explained	6.06%	7.20%	7.12%	4.38%	4.78%	2.06%	5.22%	2.56%	2.76%
GCV	0.249	0.121	0.16366	0.231	0.041	0.07064	0.24152	0.046953	0.11821
Scale est.	0.234	0.114	0.1538	0.219	0.037	0.06711	0.22795	0.044315	0.1116
n	83	83	83	100	100	100	89	89	89

Source: Own elaboration according to the replication data Lara-Rodríguez (2022c)
Note: Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '·' 0.1 ' ' 1; Standard errors are in parentheses

D.5 R syntax

```r
#========================================================================#
#                  When war is the norm: Experimenting with             #
#                        Colombian institutions                         #
#========================================================================#
# Working_directory
#
setwd("C:/")
#
library(dplyr)
install.packages("glm2")
library(glm2)
install.packages("pscl")
library(pscl)
install.packages("janitor")
library(janitor)
library(MASS)
install.packages("gam")
library(gam)
install.packages("mgcv")
library(mgcv)
#
#To export the results
library(openxlsx)
library(rio)
install_formats("csvy", "feather","fst", "hexView", "jsonlite", "readODS",
                "rmatio", "xml2", "yaml")
#
#Summary data
#
library(FactoMineR)
library(factoextra)
install.packages("Factoshiny")
library(Factoshiny)
result<-Factoshiny(Congress)
Edu_Spec <- CA(Congress$Education, graph = FALSE)
fviz_ca_biplot(Edu_Spec, repel = TRUE)
# Logistic models independent behaviors
#
Congress<-Colombian_Congress_Peace_Data
senators<-filter(Colombian_Congress_Peace_Data, Position == "Senator")
rep<-filter(Colombian_Congress_Peace_Data, Position == "Representative")
# Congress in full
Model_A1 <- glm2(formula =
Law_1909~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=Colombian_Congress_Peace_Data,
                family=binomial(link = "logit"))
summary(Model_A1)
Model_A2 <- glm2(formula =
Law_895~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=Colombian_Congress_Peace_Data,
                family=binomial(link = "logit"))
summary(Model_A2)
Model_A3 <- glm2(formula =
Law_885~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=Colombian_Congress_Peace_Data,
                family=binomial(link = "logit"))
```

```r
summary(Model_A3)
#Likelihood ratio test congress in full
ANOV_Model_A1<-anova(Model_A1, test ="Chisq")
ANOV_Model_A2<-anova(Model_A2, test = "Chisq")
ANOV_Model_A3<-anova(Model_A3, test = "Chisq")
export(ANOV_Model_A1, "ANOV_Model_A1.xlsx")
export(ANOV_Model_A2, "ANOV_Model_A2.xlsx")
export(ANOV_Model_A3, "ANOV_Model_A3.xlsx")
#Pseudo R square [McFadden] congress in full (pscl library)
pR2(Model_A1)
pR2(Model_A2)
pR2(Model_A3)
# Senate members
Model_S1 <- glm2(formula =
Law_1909~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=senators, family=binomial(link =
"logit"))
summary(Model_S1)
Model_S2 <- glm2(formula =
Law_895~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor (Media), data=senators, family=binomial(link =
"logit"))
summary(Model_S2)
Model_S3 <- glm2(formula =
Law_885~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor (Media), data=senators, family=binomial(link =
"logit"))
summary(Model_S3)
#Likelihood ratio test senate
ANOV_Model_S1<-anova(Model_S1, test ="Chisq")
ANOV_Model_S2<-anova(Model_S2, test = "Chisq")
ANOV_Model_S3<-anova(Model_S3, test = "Chisq")
export(ANOV_Model_S1, "ANOV_Model_S1.xlsx")
export(ANOV_Model_S2, "ANOV_Model_S2.xlsx")
export(ANOV_Model_S3, "ANOV_Model_S3.xlsx")
#Pseudo R square [McFadden] congress in full (pscl library)
pR2(Model_S1)
pR2(Model_S2)
pR2(Model_S3)
# Chamber members
Model_Ch1 <- glm2(formula =
Law_1909~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=rep, family=binomial(link =
"logit"))
summary(Model_Ch1)
Model_Ch2 <- glm2(formula =
Law_895~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=rep, family=binomial(link =
"logit"))
summary(Model_Ch2)
Model_Ch3 <- glm2(formula =
Law_885~factor(Kinship)+factor(Funds)+factor(Perpetuation)
+factor(Spectrum)+factor(Criteria)+factor(Religion)+factor(Military)+
                factor(Media), data=rep, family=binomial(link =
"logit"))
summary(Model_Ch3)
```

```r
#Likelihood ratio test senate
ANOV_Model_Ch1<-anova(Model_Ch1, test ="Chisq")
ANOV_Model_Ch2<-anova(Model_Ch2, test = "Chisq")
ANOV_Model_Ch3<-anova(Model_Ch3, test = "Chisq")
export(ANOV_Model_Ch1, "ANOV_Model_Ch1.xlsx")
export(ANOV_Model_Ch2, "ANOV_Model_Ch2.xlsx")
export(ANOV_Model_Ch3, "ANOV_Model_Ch3.xlsx")
#Pseudo R square [McFadden] congress in full (pscl library)
pR2(Model_Ch1)
pR2(Model_Ch2)
pR2(Model_Ch3)
#Groups
Self_enforcers<-filter(Congress, Reply_days<=30)
tabyl(Self_enforcers, Position)
Dodgers<-filter(Congress, Reply_days>=31 & Reply_days<=110)
tabyl(Dodgers, Position)
Scofflaw<-filter(Congress, Reply_days>=111)
tabyl(Scofflaw, Position)
#Generalized Additive Models (GAM) self-enforcers
dat$group <- factor(dat$group)
Self_enforcers$Kinship<-factor(Self_enforcers$Kinship)
Self_enforcers$Funds<-factor(Self_enforcers$Funds)
Self_enforcers$Perpetuation<-factor(Self_enforcers$Perpetuation)
Self_enforcers$Spectrum<-factor(Self_enforcers$Spectrum)
Self_enforcers$Criteria<-factor(Self_enforcers$Criteria)
Self_enforcers$Religion<-factor(Self_enforcers$Religion)
Self_enforcers$Military<-factor(Self_enforcers$Military)
Self_enforcers$Media<-factor(Self_enforcers$Media)
Model_SR1Gam<-gam(Law_1909~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                  +Religion+Military+Media, data=Self_enforcers)
summary(Model_SR1Gam)
Model_SR2Gam<-gam(Law_885~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                  +Religion+Military+Media, data=Self_enforcers)
summary(Model_SR2Gam)
Model_SR3Gam<-gam(Law_895~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                  +Religion+Military+Media, data=Self_enforcers)
summary(Model_SR3Gam)
#GAM Dodgers
Dodgers$Position<-factor(Dodgers$Position)
Dodgers$Kinship<-factor(Dodgers$Kinship)
Dodgers$Funds<-factor(Dodgers$Funds)
Dodgers$Perpetuation<-factor(Dodgers$Perpetuation)
Dodgers$Spectrum<-factor(Dodgers$Spectrum)
Dodgers$Criteria<-factor(Dodgers$Criteria)
Dodgers$Religion<-factor(Dodgers$Religion)
Dodgers$Military<-factor(Dodgers$Military)
Dodgers$Media<-factor(Dodgers$Media)
Model_Dgr1Gam<-gam(Law_1909~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                   +Religion+Military+Media, data=Dodgers)
summary(Model_Dgr1Gam)
Model_Dgr2Gam<-gam(Law_885~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                   +Religion+Military+Media, data=Dodgers)
summary(Model_Dgr2Gam)
Model_Dgr3Gam<-gam(Law_895~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                   +Religion+Military+Media, data=Dodgers)
summary(Model_Dgr3Gam)
#GAM Scofflaw
Scofflaw$Position<-factor(Scofflaw$Position)
Scofflaw$Kinship<-factor(Scofflaw$Kinship)
Scofflaw$Funds<-factor(Scofflaw$Funds)
Scofflaw$Perpetuation<-factor(Scofflaw$Perpetuation)
```

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Scofflaw$Spectrum<-factor(Scofflaw$Spectrum)
Scofflaw$Criteria<-factor(Scofflaw$Criteria)
Scofflaw$Religion<-factor(Scofflaw$Religion)
Scofflaw$Military<-factor(Scofflaw$Military)
Scofflaw$Media<-factor(Scofflaw$Media)
Model_Scf1Gam<-gam(Law_1909~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                    +Religion+Military+Media, data=Scofflaw)
summary(Model_Scf1Gam)
Model_Scf2Gam<-gam(Law_885~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                    +Religion+Military+Media, data=Scofflaw)
summary(Model_Scf2Gam)
Model_Scf3Gam<-gam(Law_895~Kinship+Funds+Perpetuation+Spectrum+Criteria
                    +Religion+Military+Media, data=Scofflaw)
summary(Model_Scf3Gam)
#GAM for attributes per experimental group
#Self-enforcers
Self_enforcers$PositionF<-factor(Self_enforcers$Position)
Self_enforcers$GenderF<-factor(Self_enforcers$Gender)
Self_enforcers$PartyF<-factor(Self_enforcers$Party)
Self_enforcers$EducationF<-factor(Self_enforcers$Education)
Self_enforcers$InvestigatedF<-factor(Self_enforcers$Investigated)
GamMSF1909Att<-
gam(Law_1909~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                  data = Self_enforcers)
summary(GamMSF1909Att)
capture.output(summary(GamMSF1909Att), file="GamMSF1909Att.txt")
GamMSFAge1909<-gam(Law_1909~age_group, data = Self_enforcers)
summary(GamMSFAge1909)
capture.output(summary(LinearMSFAge), file="amMSFAge1909.txt")
GamMSF885Att<-
gam(Law_885~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                  data = Self_enforcers)
summary(GamMSF885Att)
capture.output(summary(GamMSF885Att), file="GamMSF885Att.txt")
GamMSF885Age<-gam(Law_885~age_group, data = Self_enforcers)
summary(GamMSF885Age)
capture.output(summary(GamMSF885Age), file="GamMSF885Age.txt")
GamMSF895Att<-gam(formula =
Law_895~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                  data = Self_enforcers)
summary(GamMSF895Att)
capture.output(summary(GamMSF895Att), file="GamMSF895Att.txt")
GamMSF895Age<-gam(Law_895~age_group, data = Self_enforcers)
summary(GamMSF895Age)
capture.output(summary(GamMSF895Age), file="GamMSF895Age.txt")
#Dodgers
Dodgers$PositionF<-factor(Dodgers$Position)
Dodgers$GenderF<-factor(Dodgers$Gender)
Dodgers$PartyF<-factor(Dodgers$Party)
Dodgers$EducationF<-factor(Dodgers$Education)
Dodgers$InvestigatedF<-factor(Dodgers$Investigated)
GamDgr1909Att<-
gam(Law_1909~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
             data = Dodgers)
summary(GamDgr1909Att)
capture.output(summary(GamDgr1909Att), file="GamDgr1909Att.txt")
GamDgr1909Age<-gam(Law_1909~age_group, data = Dodgers)
summary(GamDgr1909Age)
capture.output(summary(LinearDgr1909Age), file="LinearDgr1909Age.txt")
GamDgr885Att<-
gam(Law_885~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
```

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                  data = Dodgers)
summary(GamDgr885Att)
capture.output(summary(GamDgr885Att), file="GamDgr885Att.txt")
GamDgr885Age<-gam(Law_885~age_group, data = Dodgers)
summary(GamDgr885Age)
capture.output(summary(GamDgr885Age), file="GamDgr885Age.txt")
GamDgr895Att<-
gam(Law_895~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                  data = Dodgers)
summary(GamDgr895Att)
capture.output(summary(GamDgr895Att), file="GamDgr895Att.txt")
GamDgr895Age<-gam(Law_895~age_group, data = Dodgers)
summary(GamDgr895Age)
capture.output(summary(GamDgr885Age), file="GamDgr885Age.txt")
#Scofflaw
Scofflaw$PositionF<-factor(Scofflaw$Position)
Scofflaw$GenderF<-factor(Scofflaw$Gender)
Scofflaw$PartyF<-factor(Scofflaw$Party)
Scofflaw$EducationF<-factor(Scofflaw$Education)
Scofflaw$InvestigatedF<-factor(Scofflaw$Investigated)
GamScf1909Att<-
gam(Law_1909~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                  data = Scofflaw)
summary(GamScf1909Att)
capture.output(summary(GamScf1909Att), file="GamScf1909Att.txt")
GamScf1909Age<-gam(Law_1909~age_group, data = Scofflaw)
summary(GamScf1909Age)
capture.output(summary(gamScf1909Age), file="LinearScf1909Age.txt")
GamScf885<-gam(formula =
Law_885~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                data = Scofflaw)
summary(GamScf885)
capture.output(summary(GamScf885), file="GamScf885.txt")
GamScf885Age<-gam(Law_885~age_group, data = Scofflaw)
summary(GamScf885Age)
capture.output(summary(GamScf885Age), file="GamScf885Age.txt")
GamScf895<-gam(formula =
Law_895~PositionF+GenderF+PartyF+EducationF+InvestigatedF,
                data = Scofflaw)
summary(GamScf895)
capture.output(summary(GamScf895), file="GamScf885.txt")
GamScf895Age<-gam(Law_895~age_group, data = Scofflaw)
summary(GamScf895Age)
capture.output(summary(GamScf895Age), file="GamScf895Age.txt")
#------------------------- End of the script -------------------------#
```