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Corresponding Author	Family Name	Appanna
	Particle	
	Given Name	Subhash
	Suffix	
	Organization/University	The University of the South Pacific
	City	Suva
	Country	Fiji
	Email	subhash.appana@usp.ac.fj
Author	Family Name	Naidu
	Particle	
	Given Name	Vijay
	Suffix	
	Organization/University	The University of the South Pacific
	City	Suva
	Country	Fiji
	Email	vijay.naidu@usp.ac.fj
Author	Family Name	Sharma
	Particle	
	Given Name	Karishma
	Suffix	
	Organization/University	Fiji National University
	City	Suva
	Country	Fiji
	Email	karishma.s@fnu.ac.fj
Author	Family Name	Prasad
	Particle	
	Given Name	Reema
	Suffix	
	Organization/University	Fiji National University
	City	Suva
	Country	Fiji
	Email	reema.prasad@fnu.ac.fj

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NPM Falters in Fiji

Subhash Appanna¹, Vijay Naidu¹,
Karishma Sharma² and Reema Prasad²

¹The University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji

²Fiji National University, Suva, Fiji

Synonyms

Controls; New Public Management; Public enterprise restructuring; Traditional context

Definition

New Public Management has been the preferred model for the delivery of public services since 1980.

Public enterprise restructuring involves restructuring public enterprises in order to make them more commercially viable and better providers of public services.

Traditional context refers here to a nonwestern, developing island context.

Introduction

New Public Management (NPM) has virtually replaced traditional public administration as the preferred model for the delivery of public value since 1979 and 1980 when the UK and the USA,

respectively, adopted a radically different approach to management in the public sector. Small government with larger private sector participation in public service delivery has become the “blueprint” for economic development. Contemporary reforms have largely focused on the public sector with governments aiming to introduce greater economy, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and efficiency in the public service. In the process, governments have attempted to reduce both their commitment to and participation in economic enterprise. Public sector reforms, and in particular the restructuring of Public Enterprises, have thus become a worldwide phenomenon. NPM, which attempts to address deficiencies found in traditional public administration, assumes that the market is preferable to government as a coordinator of social relations and public service delivery “since it involves transactions that are voluntary, lateral and decentralized, in contrast to the compulsory, hierarchical and centralized activities of government” (Beetham 1987, p. 33). This reliance on the market as an automatic “adjuster” raises a number of issues in the use of NPM in traditional settings like Fiji. This paper analyzes critically the main features of the NPM “model” and questions its suitability in the restructuring of Public Enterprises in a traditional context like Fiji.

54 **The Fiji Context**

55 Fiji has gone through five coups de 'tat since
 56 gaining its independence from Britain in 1970. It
 57 is a developing island economy comprising
 58 14 provinces with persisting tribal and kinship
 59 relationships still influencing national decision-
 60 making. In addition to this, Fiji has a sizeable
 61 Indo-Fijian population (37%) who are largely
 62 descendants of indentured laborers who came
 63 from India from 1879–1916 to supply the labor
 64 needs of the colonial administration (Norton
 65 1990, p. 22). Institutions of public accountability
 66 were disrupted, destroyed, and heavily
 67 compromised after the 1987 coup (Lal 2000).
 68 From 1987 to 1995, national focus was on stabi-
 69 lizing the political landscape, enacting the 1990
 70 constitution, organizing the 1992 and 1994 gen-
 71 eral elections, and consolidating the Soqosoqo ni
 72 Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) government and
 73 Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka's leadership.
 74 Only in 1996 was the Public Enterprise Act
 75 enacted. Thirteen years later, only five of which
 76 were dedicated to strengthening and
 77 reestablishing necessary accountability mecha-
 78 nisms, another coup in 2000 shattered all expect-
 79 ations of predictability in the institutions of
 80 accountability and good governance. Both the
 81 coups were justified in the name of protecting
 82 the Indigenous community from the hegemonic
 83 designs of the Indo-Fijians. Provincialism, pater-
 84 nalism, political patronage, and nepotism thus
 85 became a part of everyday life making it
 86 extremely difficult to identify and expect conven-
 87 tional objectivity in public decision-making. This
 88 was bolstered by affirmative action programs and
 89 Indigenous considerations which became elevated
 90 to unprecedented levels. The hallowed principles
 91 of meritocracy and considered objectivity, there-
 92 fore, virtually ceased to operate in the public
 93 sector in Fiji. A coup was executed in December
 94 2006 partly in reaction to this increasingly over-
 95 whelming tendency for compromising objectivity
 96 in government conduct. At this point in time, Fiji
 97 has an interim-government that operates in a con-
 98 stitutional vacuum with a standing promise to
 99 draft a constitution that ensures nonparticularism

in public decision-making. These factors, coupled 100
 with the fact that Fiji is not endowed with an 101
 abundance of potential service providers who 102
 could effectively deliver on competitively 103
 acquired government contracts, make it virtually 104
 impossible for the market mechanism to operate 105
 effectively in Fiji. 106

The New Public Management Model 107

Public sector reforms have been part of discourse 108
 on management in the public sector for the past 109
 two decades even though the management and 110
 organization ideas contained in New Public Man- 111
 agement (NPM) can be traced back to earlier 112
 debates in public administration (Savoie 1995, 113
 pp. 119–20). NPM attempts to introduce manage- 114
 ment structures, practices, and principles that are 115
 based on the precepts of freedom to choose and 116
 freedom to manage. It has been linked to the “New 117
 Right” in recognition of its attempts to incorporate 118
 normative concerns in what essentially remains 119
 the business philosophy of maximizing returns. 120
 This new ideology can also be referred to as the 121
 “Enlightened Left” in recognition of the fact that it 122
 has been embraced by traditionally left-leaning 123
 governments in their attempts to amalgamate the 124
 imperatives of both business and society (Appana 125
 2003). 126

The literature on NPM does not exhibit unifor- 127
 mity on exactly what it constitutes, but the follow- 128
 ing ideas and initiatives appear to characterize 129
 NPM: use of hands-on professional management, 130
 managerial autonomy, decentralization, use of 131
 explicit measures of performance that are output 132
 based, use of finance-based performance contracts 133
 and incentives systems, emphasis on discipline 134
 and parsimony in the use of resources, infusion 135
 of competition through disaggregation and 136
 delayering of government bureaus, use of con- 137
 tracts for public service provision by organiza- 138
 tions external to the department/bureau in 139
 question, emphasis on citizen choice, and use of 140
 other private sector-type management practices 141
 (Hood 1991; Pollitt 1995; Boston, et al. 1996). 142
 On the other hand, there appears to be general 143
 unanimity on NPM's fundamental objectives of 144

145 creating an innovative, flexible, problem-solving,
 146 and more entrepreneurial culture that is better
 147 adapted and more adaptable to a changing envi-
 148 ronment (Barzely 1992; Kettl 1997; Rosenbloom
 149 1998). The NPM model, therefore, attempts to
 150 address the more obvious and disruptive short-
 151 comings of traditional public administration. Its
 152 main features are analyzed in use in some detail in
 153 the next section.

154 Professional Management

155 The emphasis of NPM is on the use of hands-on
 156 professional management where a successful
 157 manager with a proven track record is located
 158 and given active, visible, and discretionary con-
 159 trol over a public entity with clear allocation of
 160 responsibilities, and corresponding accountability
 161 appears to place total reliance on the professional
 162 manager to meet performance expectations. In
 163 line with the tenet of "freedom to manage," the
 164 NPM manager can choose whatever approaches
 165 and techniques he considers appropriate in order
 166 to meet expectations. And in a clear attempt to
 167 move away from the rules/procedures focus of
 168 traditional public sector management, the evalua-
 169 tion focus is on output controls with the need to
 170 stress results rather than procedures. Thus, like in
 171 most private sector approaches, managerial per-
 172 formance is gauged ex post on the basis of results
 173 that are evaluated against targets that have been
 174 mutually spelt out prior to commencement of
 175 duties.

176 With the restructure of Civil Aviation Author-
 177 ity of Fiji (CAAF) into Airports Fiji Ltd. (AFL)
 178 and Civil Aviation Authority of the Fiji Islands
 179 (CAAFI) in 1998, Chief Executive Officers
 180 (CEOs) were sought for both entities in an attempt
 181 to recruit the best two people for the crucial posi-
 182 tions on which the whole civil aviation industry
 183 and, therefore, tourism (Fiji's largest industry)
 184 hinged. A foreigner was recruited for AFL
 185 whereas a local filled the CAAFI post. A marked
 186 difference was seen in the degree of freedom that
 187 each demanded as CEO on their employment
 188 contracts. This created an immediate inequity in
 189 decision-making powers. Furthermore, as

190 governments changed, new CEOs were recruited
 191 to meet the requirements and expectations of these
 192 governments. This was more so with AFL, which
 193 has now got its fourteenth CEO in twenty years,
 194 largely because it is a commercial entity with all
 195 its ramifications. CAAFI, on the other hand, has
 196 had a less turbulent history because it merely
 197 carries out the regulatory functions of civil avia-
 198 tion in Fiji and has no real commercial signifi-
 199 cance. Furthermore, NPM's insistence on
 200 recruiting managers with proven track records
 201 has repeatedly been compromised in the appoint-
 202 ment of CEOs. The CEO/AFL appointed in July
 203 2003 had been a dedicated bureaucrat in the Prime
 204 Minister's (PM's) office. The most potent justifi-
 205 cation for his appointment could be seen in the
 206 fact that AFL was a fragmented organization that
 207 needed an "outsider" with considerable human
 208 relations skills to refocus it. It is, however, diffi-
 209 cult not to propose that the same qualifications
 210 could have been found in someone else with the
 211 necessary track record. Additionally, there was
 212 considerable appeal in speculations that his
 213 appointment had a lot to do with his proximity to
 214 the PM and the Soqosoqo Duavata ni
 215 Lewenivanua (SDL) government's "blueprint"
 216 objectives of the time. The CEO/AFL position is
 217 currently held by an acting appointee.

218 The adjunct issue of degree of managerial
 219 autonomy in NPM appears hazy in literature. On
 220 the one extreme, the rules and procedures-
 221 ensconced manager operates in a clearly pre-
 222 scribed, predictable work environment. On the
 223 other end, managers enjoy a strong form of insti-
 224 tutional autonomy where their decisions are not
 225 subject to either prior approval or retrospective
 226 appraisal. This form tends to raise the question
 227 of democratic accountability of governments as it
 228 weakens substantially the link between the public
 229 manager and government. The lack of clarity in
 230 this link between the bureaucrat and their political
 231 head in the traditional public administration
 232 model often led to "political interference" which
 233 has widely been cited as a "weakness" of that
 234 model. It also tends to weaken the ability of gov-
 235 ernments in using public entities to fulfill their
 236 roles as providers of public goods and custodians
 237 of the public good. Thus, somewhere in the

238 middle of this continuum lies a third positioning
 239 of the public manager where he/she has some
 240 degree of discretionary powers in decision-
 241 making while being held answerable to politicians
 242 who can direct them within prescribed limits. This
 243 is the type that is used predominantly, largely
 244 because of its political appeal. Restrictions are
 245 placed mutually between the CEO and the gov-
 246 ernment (or Board) via contracts, which also allo-
 247 cate risks of blame between politicians and
 248 managers. This intermediate form is a hybrid
 249 that attempts to strike a delicate, and at times
 250 politically problematic, balance in creating the
 251 "decision space" for the public manager.

252 In Fiji, this "decision space" is determined not
 253 only by the formally negotiated employment con-
 254 tract of the CEO, but also by a number of subjec-
 255 tive considerations that are linked to the context.
 256 AFL's fourth CEO was appointed by a board that
 257 he had chosen earlier in his capacity as the then
 258 (2000) interim Minister for Civil Aviation. There
 259 would, therefore, have been no negotiations on his
 260 powers. He subsequently proved this by getting
 261 involved in a major row with the Fiji Public Ser-
 262 vice Association (FPSA) where he refused to
 263 entertain both negotiations and pronoun court
 264 decisions. This refusal to implement court deci-
 265 sions stemmed from a firm belief that the AFL
 266 board would not act against him. There was silent
 267 acknowledgment of the reason for the paralysis of
 268 the board being the fact that the new Minister for
 269 Civil Aviation came from the same province as the
 270 controversial CEO. This embarrassment contin-
 271 ued until 2003 when the government appeared to
 272 have been forced to appoint a new minister. Sub-
 273 sequent noncompliance by the CEO led to his
 274 belated dismissal in March 2003. Mechanisms
 275 for the evaluation of managerial performance are
 276 discussed later on in this entry.

277 Private Sector Styles of Management

278 NPM goes on to prescribe a greater use of private
 279 sector styles of management practices in the pub-
 280 lic sector. It specifically mentions short-term
 281 employment contracts, strategic planning, perfor-
 282 mance agreements, performance-based pay

283 systems, new Management Information Systems 283
 (MIS), and a greater concern for corporate image 284
 (Hood 1991; Boston, et al. 1996). These are 285
 clearly aimed at changing worker attitudes from 286
 a public sector type complacency and status quo 287
 orientation to a more private sector type vigorous 288
 and proactive orientation. Monetary incentives 289
 rather than nonmonetary ones are emphasized in 290
 order to elicit compliance and generate worker 291
 enthusiasm. This was the primary source of moti- 292
 vation prescribed by scientific management which 293
 has a heavy influence on new institutional eco- 294
 nomics, which in turn, informed NPM. The pre- 295
 scriptions mentioned here are only a few in a 296
 whole range of options that the NPM manager is 297
 allowed to choose from in their efforts to deliver 298
 expected outcomes. In Fiji, the civil service cul- 299
 ture was extremely difficult to supersede because 300
 it was heavily influenced by and imbued with 301
 traditional structures. Traditional chiefs, for 302
 instance, continued to be given precedence over 303
 commoners in public appointments. This was 304
 clearly an attempt to utilize traditional structures 305
 in a context of professional management. Even 306
 though this is not necessarily a weakness per se, 307
 a traditional chief is likely to raise potentially 308
 damaging traditional expectations within a mod- 309
 ern workplace. This could compromise the pro- 310
 fessionalism required within NPM. The profit 311
 bottom-line, a distinguishing characteristic of pri- 312
 vate sector styles of management, is largely 313
 compromised in these instances. In addition to 314
 this, NPM does not prescribe clearly (apart from 315
 disaggregation and the use of contracts) the means 316
 to achieving its well-articulated ends. This opens 317
 up a host of alternatives that the manager can 318
 choose from. And managers with bureaucratic 319
 backgrounds that are closely linked to traditional 320
 structures would be tempted not to use unfamiliar 321
 entrepreneurial approaches in unstable settings. 322
 NPM attempts to overcome these problems by 323
 featuring explicit standards and measures of per- 324
 formance with a preference for output-based 325
 controls. 326

327 **Performance Measures and Output**
 328 **Controls**

329 NPM lays great emphasis on placing responsibility
 330 and accountability at the same point on the
 331 public organization in a direct departure from
 332 traditional public administration where the doctrine
 333 of ministerial responsibility renders the public
 334 manager/official anonymous. This doctrine of
 335 ministerial responsibility means that the minister
 336 accepts responsibility for both the actions of the
 337 public servant as well as contractors who may
 338 carry out public work. The anonymity operates
 339 as a major impediment in affecting accountability
 340 in the public sector. However, with NPM, the
 341 principle of alternative delivery makes agents
 342 like the CEO/AFL and the CEO/CAAFI responsible
 343 to the ministers as well as any other partners
 344 involved in the arrangement (Lindquist and
 345 Paquet 2000). NPM also features explicit standards
 346 and measures of performance with a preference
 347 for output-based controls. This links a
 348 person's actions more closely with consequences
 349 that are also direct and range from firing to
 350 unprecedented rewards.

351 The employment package of the first
 352 CEO/AFL was reported to have been well above
 353 the quarter million-dollar mark. All successive
 354 AFL/CEOs have enjoyed the same types of relatively
 355 astronomical employment packages. This
 356 has the tendency to create envy and resentment in
 357 a context like Fiji where similar paying jobs are
 358 rare in the private sector. On the other hand, widespread
 359 public service experience and knowledge make it
 360 extremely difficult to accept that the compensation
 361 packages are matched by commensurate effort. In fact,
 362 there was a growing perception that public enterprise
 363 postings were being used by government to "reward
 364 the boys" for services rendered during the pre-2000
 365 coup upheavals, the coup itself, and its aftermath
 366 when some \$25 million was disbursed without
 367 adequate control for agricultural assistance. These
 368 allegations also hound the post-2006 government
 369 even though the focus is largely on the appointment
 370 of military personnel to civilian posts.
 371

On the other hand, for effectively evaluating
 the performance of CEOs as well as Public Enterprises,
 it is important to have explicit standards and measures
 of performance that are clearly spelt out. Clear
 objectives and timeframes need to be set for effective
 control as necessitated by the accountability provisions
 of NPM. Setting clear objectives in the public sector
 is a task fraught with difficulties and contradictions.
 First, it is difficult to lay out and quantify sociopolitical
 objectives. Second, it is often politically imprudent
 to specify economic objectives especially if they are
 likely to prove unpopular. And third, political concerns
 of governments and economic concerns of Public
 Enterprises might not be compatible as is seen in the
 requirement of Fiji's "Blueprint" that 50% of all
 public contracts be awarded to ethnic Fijian
 businesses (Fiji live 2002; Te Karere 2000). The
 Blueprint hoped to bring about 50/50 parity in the
 participation of ethnic-Fijians in Fiji's business
 sector by the year 2020; Public Contracts were
 seen as a major means of accomplishing this. This
 not only makes it difficult for the CEO to meet
 set economic targets, but it also makes it difficult
 for government to enforce the performance provisions
 of the contract if targets are not met. On the other
 hand, traditional positions and affiliations made
 it extremely difficult to punish or remove CEOs
 (and other public officials) for non- or questionable
 performance as seen earlier in the case of the
 AFL/CEO who was removed after performing
 without any controls from January 2001 to March
 2003.

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Disaggregation and Competition

Furthermore, in an attempt to ensure the
 adaptability of private sector styles of management
 in the public sector, NPM proposes disaggregating
 large public sector organizations into "corporatized
 units around products" funded separately and
 interacting with one another on an "arms-length"
 basis. This is clearly aimed at streamlining and
 removing size complications from cumbersome
 public entities so that it becomes easier to manage
 them in a private sector manner. However, in order

417 to disaggregate effectively, governments' com- 462
 418 mercial and noncommercial activities need to be 463
 419 clearly identified, demarcated, and separated. Jus- 464
 420 tification for this is seen in the need to create 465
 421 manageable units and "to gain the efficiency 466
 422 advantages of franchise arrangements inside as 467
 423 well as outside the public sector" (Boston et al. 468
 424 1996). Improved reporting, monitoring, and 469
 425 accountability mechanisms need to accompany 470
 426 this shift. There are a number of problems associ- 471
 427 ated with this especially in developing country 472
 428 contexts. First, it is not easy to demarcate exactly 473
 429 what government activities can be classified as 474
 430 "commercial" because private sector provision 475
 431 might not be feasible. Some activities like provid- 476
 432 ing water are more problematic to commercialize 477
 433 than providing electricity. Second, disaggregation 478
 434 could easily lead to duplication in the use of scarce 479
 435 public resources that countries like Fiji can ill 480
 436 afford. The creation of AFL and CAAFI from 481
 437 CAAF in Fiji highlights this phenomenon to 482
 438 some extent as lots of new equipment was either 483
 439 "lost" or had to be purchased during the restruc- 484
 440 ture. In an interesting twist, AFL's state-of-the-art 485
 441 air traffic control equipment was being used by 486
 442 Strategic Air Services Ltd. (SASL) to provide air 487
 443 traffic management services to AFL under 488
 444 extremely unclear and "uncommercial" terms. 489
 445 This stemmed from an over-emphasis on the 490
 446 requirements of the "Blueprint" to "assist" 491
 447 Ethnic-Fijian entry into the commercial sector. 492
 448 Here, state assets paid for and held by AFL were 493
 449 being used by a private company with virtually no 494
 450 returns for resource use to AFL. 495

451 Contractualism

452 NPM proposes the introduction of more competi- 500
 453 tion in the public sector through the use of competi- 501
 454 tive public-tendering procedures, term 502
 455 contracts, and devolution so that costs are lowered 503
 456 and delivery standards improved through the 504
 457 introduction of market stimulus. Therefore, it 505
 458 exhibits a preference for private ownership, con- 506
 459 testable provision, and contracting out of public 507
 460 services. However, despite the intentions of 508
 461 contractualism and the structures that have been 509

put in place to facilitate its use, principal/agent 462
 relationships are fraught with complications that 463
 inevitably affect the restructuring process as well 464
 as organizational performance. Agency Theory, a 465
 key theory behind NPM, says that social and 466
 political life can be understood as a series of 467
 contractual arrangements between principals 468
 (parliament, ministers, CEOs, etc.), and agents 469
 (CEOs, workers, suppliers, etc.). These contracts 470
 should be professional rather than relational in 471
 nature for maximum benefits. 472

Information asymmetry arises when agents 473
 have access to information that principals do not, 474
 or vice versa. This creates an incentive to exploit 475
 the information gap for personal gains, which 476
 could be detrimental to the greater good. When 477
 Fiji Post and Telecommunications Ltd. (FPTL) 478
 was disaggregated into Post Fiji and Telecom 479
 Fiji Ltd. (PFL) in 1996, the first Chief Operating 480
 Officer (COO) was an Israeli with dubious Amer- 481
 ican academic qualifications. The fact that his 482
 Master's Business Administration (MBA) was 483
 not authentic only came to light after questions 484
 emerged within the organization due to tightening 485
 tension between the then Managing Director 486
 (MD) (Emori Naqova) and the COO (Aharon 487
 Amit). This case serves to highlight the fact that 488
 governments usually do not have the means to 489
 verify personal data provided by aspirants to key 490
 positions in Public Enterprises. They may even 491
 choose to ignore the verification process because 492
 of covertly articulated preferences from positions 493
 of power. This can lead to the problem of adverse 494
 selection, which consequently begins to plague 495
 the organization. In the case of Telecom Fiji Ltd. 496
 (TFL), COO Amit left the organization in disgrace 497
 before his contract had expired. There were 498
 unconfirmed reports that in a baffling twist, gov- 499
 ernment paid him \$5 m for the unserved portion of 500
 his contract and "services rendered." 501

It is obvious that contractualism is used in 502
 NPM partly to place restrictions and controls on 503
 the behavior of agents (and to some extent princi- 504
 pals). The assumption is that market forces would 505
 enhance this control requirement in a free envi- 506
 ronment where contracts can be both contested 507
 and enforced. Unfortunately, a joint economic 508
 study by the Reserve Bank of Fiji (RBF) and the 509

510 University of the South Pacific (USP) found that
 511 the nonenforceability of contracts and corruption
 512 are a major impediment to investment in Fiji (Fiji
 513 live 2003). Furthermore, Public Enterprises in Fiji
 514 do not have access to sizeable numbers of service
 515 providers. SASL, for instance, was awarded the
 516 contract to provide Air Traffic Management
 517 (ATM) services without having to go through a
 518 truly competitive public-tendering process. Air
 519 Terminal Services (ATS) provides ground-
 520 handling services based on a preferential contract
 521 that was signed prior to the restructure but contin-
 522 ues to be operational because 51% of ATS
 523 shares are held by CAAFI. Furthermore, contracts
 524 tend to attempt to constrict the ambit within which
 525 service providers can operate. These centralizing
 526 tendencies grate against the devolutionary focus
 527 of managerialism creating tensions and confu-
 528 sions. In order to attempt to overcome these short-
 529 falls, focus has to move on to the governance
 530 structures of NPM and the wider environment,
 531 but that falls beyond the ambit of this entry.

532 **Conclusions**

533 It can be seen here that NPM is faced with a
 534 multitude of unique and not so unique problems
 535 when it is used for the restructuring of public
 536 enterprises in a traditional context like Fiji. Its
 537 emphasis, on using private sector styles of man-
 538 agement with a professional manager hired on
 539 contract, faces distinct problems. First, the hiring
 540 process itself can be compromised by
 541 uncontestable subjective considerations. Second,
 542 it is difficult to determine and prescribe exactly
 543 how much "freedom" the manager should have.
 544 Third, political objectives that governments are
 545 preoccupied with cannot be articulated in concrete
 546 terms for various reasons. They are also often
 547 difficult to align with the economic imperatives
 548 of management. This makes the appraisal of man-
 549 agement performance an exercise fraught with
 550 difficulties. On the other hand, it is extremely
 551 difficult to punish unacceptable performance
 552 because of traditional considerations that may

Furthermore, NPM's emphasis on market 554
 control of organizational performance does not 555
 operate in the expected manner for a number of 556
 reasons. First, it is difficult to clearly demarcate 557
 government's commercial and noncommercial 558
 activities for effective restructuring. Second, the 559
 setting up of separate entities incurs additional 560
 costs emanating from a forced duplication of 561
 resources. And third, the monitoring and account- 562
 ability mechanisms that are then needed become 563
 very complex and difficult to implement. In addi- 564
 tion to this, market forces are introduced via com- 565
 petitive public-tendering processes. This is an 566
 exercise fraught with difficulties because of the 567
 pitfalls of information asymmetry, uncertainty, 568
 adverse selection, and moral hazard. On the 569
 other hand, the fact that the Fiji economy is not 570
 endowed with an abundance of specialist service 571
 providers makes NPM's reliance on the market, 572
 and the use of public-tendering processes as well 573
 as service contracts, virtually meaningless at 574
 times. Thus, there exist a range of factors that 575
 render the use of NPM in public enterprise 576
 restructuring an extremely problematic proposi- 577
 tion in a traditional context like Fiji. 578

579 **Cross-References**

- ▶ [Controls in the Public Sector](#) 580
- ▶ [Governance](#) 581
- ▶ [Managerialism](#) 582
- ▶ [Public Ethics](#) 583

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