

# The Industrial Attitudes of Active White Collar Civil Service Trade Unionists

by

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
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### SYNOPSIS

This thesis describes and explains a recent industrial relations phenomenon, the "Industrial attitudes of active white-collar civil service trade unionists." It begins by tracing the problem facing the civil service trade unions back to the institutionalized low pay of their members and the apparently autocratic character of their employer.

Evidence was gathered which showed that the Government, in its role as employer, had over the years gradually disarmed the representatives of its employees seemingly through the exercise of its prerogative. However, when the exercise of prerogative took on a new meaning, for instance, making decisions unilaterally and enforcing pay increases which were unacceptable to the unions, it was seen by civil service trade unionists as an abuse of power.

The thesis contains further evidence which shows how overt Government attitudes gradually transformed its hitherto intentionally docile workers into a militant workforce. It illustrates the process by which the Government anaesthetized itself in order to overcome the growing militancy among its employees. It delineates a connection between Government practices in the area of industrial relations and low morale in the civil service. Analyses of data gathered through a wide ranging survey provide substantive grounds for a categorical dismissal the myth that higher grade civil

servants were right wing and were consequently less militant than lower grade civil servants, and more prone to shirk their unions' activities. It amply demonstrates how the attitude of active white-collar civil service trade unionists to industrial action is influenced more by their experience of the negotiating process and the behaviour of their employer, than by the structure of their personal circumstances. It argues that because the unions failed in their endeavour to win better pay and in particular, as a direct result of their defeat by the Government in the 1981 pay campaign, the level of militancy had declined, thereby jeopardizing the effectiveness of their negotiating strategy.

The thesis concludes by highlighting the distinctive outcome of the survey, namely, that militancy is a more significant aspect of trade union power than high density of membership.

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I should particularly mention Mr Ken Jones, Director of Research, SCPS, for his stimulating comments and unfailing assistance, and Professor Robin Alston of the University College, London, for his invaluable assistance with the data base and the timely loan of his personal computer.

I am also indebted to Dr Bal Chansarkar of the Middlesex Polytechnic for his advice on the design of the survey questionnaire.

But I reserve a special word of thanks and gratitude to my supervisors Dr Bernard James and Dr Alan Cowling for the thoughtful care with which they have supervised this study. Their insightful criticisms and practical suggestions have provided me with a model of scholarly activity. This thesis is dedicated to them.

## DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to Dr Bernard James and Dr Alan Cowling whose immeasurable support, encouragement and advice throughout this long endeavour inspired me to carry on, especially when the journey proved tough and the road seemed to be impassable. These two gentlemen stood by me particularly when a series of illness and hospitalization placed a huge obstacle in my way.



## INTRODUCTION

Low pay has always been at the centre of the problems of the civil service trade unions since their inception last century.<sup>1</sup> The concept of cash limits which recently gained prominence in the determination of civil service pay was frowned upon by the union leaders and events in the past few years have shown that the little credibility which the concept may have had has totally disappeared. Until 1981, civil service pay was governed by a National Agreement which incorporated the system of Pay Research. This system was based on the principles recommended by the Priestly Commission (1953-55), that is, "fair comparisons" or "comparability", by which salaries paid for civil service jobs were determined by reference to the rates paid for equivalent jobs in the private sector. Two independent research projects, commissioned by the Megaw Inquiry, came to the conclusion that the pay of civil servants, taken over the whole period from 1956 to 1980, was kept broadly in line with pay in the private sector. Nevertheless, the intention of the Government was becoming more and more transparent. It envisaged abandoning the system whereby pay was determined primarily by comparison in favour of a situation where pay was determined by cash limits, with market forces playing a significant role. For instance, the Treasury declared that "The Government does not consider the pay of civil servants, or any other group, should be determined by the needs of

individuals. Pay is a matter for the market place and social needs are the province of the social security system."<sup>2</sup> Market forces as the major determinant of pay was questioned by Kessler (1980), not least because of its inadequacy in determining pay "in the non-trading public sector".<sup>3</sup>

In October 1980, the Government withdrew from the National Pay Agreement and suppressed the reports of the Pay Research Unit, having announced a 6 per cent cash limit as the main determinant of civil service pay for 1981. This action exacerbated the longest and most costly dispute in the civil service. The defeat suffered by the unions after a 21 week campaign of industrial action (March to July 1981), created a new culture among their members. The realisation that their employer, the Government, had the ability to resist them indefinitely appeared to have altered their views, particularly regarding the efficacy of strike actions. By 1983, the Government had successfully forced unacceptable pay offers on civil servants while their unions were virtually powerless to negotiate better deals.

A survey of the attitudes of civil servants to militancy and to their unions, which had interested the author since the 1981 major defeat, became crucial around 1984 when most union members seemed reconciled to the notion that their unions were ineffective. Employed as a civil servant himself, the author took an active interest in trade union

affairs. Having recently completed a Masters degree, he wished to carry out an in-depth research. His interest in the changing attitudes of civil servants coupled with his curiosity as a participant observer<sup>4</sup>, compelled him to search far and wide both in published works and in discussions with other practitioners of industrial relations, for answers to the riddles posed by repressive trade union laws, apathy of members and an often unreasonable employer. The survey became even more compelling since no research appeared to have been carried out, at the time, on the attitudes of white-collar civil service trade unionists. The research carried out by Fosh (1981) focused on blue-collar activism at branch level; it was not designed to investigate the attitudes of white-collar civil service trade unionists<sup>5</sup>. The decision to carry out this survey was taken before the works of Corby (1984), Arthurs (1985) and Kessler (1990) all of which focused on specific areas of industrial relations in civil service. Whereas Corby<sup>6</sup> dealt with the dissonance which might affect members of the Association of First Division Civil Servants (FDA) because of their role as senior civil servants, Arthurs<sup>7</sup> focused on issues arising from the Government's prohibition of trade union membership at its General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). Kessler<sup>8</sup>, on the other hand, studied pay determination in the civil service from the point of view of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS). The research carried out by Kelly (1980)<sup>9</sup> focused on the industrial behaviour of white-

collar civil servants, with reference to the sociological concept of proletarianization. Cappelli's work (1983)<sup>10</sup> examined the operation of the pay research system in the wake of the Megaw Commission's report. It traced the development of comparability in the determination of civil service pay; but it differs from Kessler's work because it covered all groups of civil servants. Neither Kelly's nor Cappelli's work was designed to investigate the behaviour of trade unionists in particular. Each of these works is unique in its own context but significantly different from this survey in the fact that it was designed to cover all the unions of the civil service and it considered many more aspects of industrial relations. Circumstances explained in chapter 2, prevented the inclusion of the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) and IPCS.

Emphasis on active trade unionists was prominent in the design of the survey. There are trade unionists who are members, only to the extent that they pay their union dues. They neither attend union meetings nor take any interest in their union affairs. The survey was not likely to benefit from reliance on such a group of trade unionists. Since they have so little interest in trade union affairs it would be difficult to persuade them to sacrifice even a few minutes to complete a questionnaire. The reason for concentration of the survey on the influences on "active white-collar trade unionists" is that the effectiveness of the civil service

trade unions depends on their active members' willingness to participate and lead, and even more so on the maintenance of their morale.

The survey therefore, investigated the industrial attitudes of active white-collar civil service trade unionists and examined their reactions to most industrial relations pressures. Its purpose was to discover the factors which influence their attitudes to militancy, especially in view of the current trade union laws and the tough attitude of their employer towards them. No such survey had been carried out before. Although the survey was primarily intended as a work of pure scholarship, it was also partly intended to:-

(a) provide a basis for corroborating earlier studies in industrial relations; (b) reveal the union members to themselves and thereby awake them to the realities of having the Government as their employer; (c) improve the understanding of industrial relations in the civil service; and hopefully, (d) restore the credibility of the unions.

Because there are so few written work on the attitudes of British white-collar civil service trade unionists, chapter 1 begins with a review of literature dealing with some major aspects of industrial relations which may be pertinent to the subject of the investigation; contributions from the United States are included. Despite the differences between


Great Britain and the United States in terms of the development of their respective trade union organizations and industrial law, no distinction is made in this review between the theories originating from both countries. The British civil service may be unique in many ways but it is certainly not unique in the context of human relations. An assumption in the chapter that man is rational-economic, leads to the suggestion that white-collar trade unionists elsewhere, including the United States, would react in the same manner as the British white-collar civil service trade unionist. Chapter 2 describes the methodology used in the survey and explains the reason for the proportions of active and non-active unionists used to make up the sample population. An account of the process by which the hypotheses used in the thesis were developed, is given in this chapter. In chapter 3, the structural characteristics of the sample are analysed and explained. Chapters 4 and 5 analyze and interpret the data collected; comparisons are made between higher and lower grade civil servants and between branch officers and ordinary members. These chapters demonstrate that whereas the tendency to rationalize strike decisions is greater among higher grade civil servants, the propensity to militant actions is nevertheless greater among them. The view that members in higher grades may find it difficult to reconcile their commitment to their job and their commitment to their unions (Corby 1984), is examined. The view that younger members are more prone to militancy

than older members is also examined. In chapter 6 the data interpreted in chapters 4 and 5 are synthesized. In addition to reporting the outcome of tests carried out on a variety of influences on attitudes and behaviours in chapters 4 and 5, chapter 6 assesses the validity of seven particularly important hypotheses enunciated in chapter 2.

Militancy is a common factor throughout all the seven hypotheses; it is also the most important theme of the main hypothesis of this thesis, namely, that "Militancy is a more potent factor in trade union power than high union membership." (See page 313 et seq.) This hypothesis is therefore held as an empirical law until proven otherwise by evidence of further research.

Chapter 7, the concluding chapter, fulfils two objectives. Firstly, the survey findings and the problems facing the unions and their members are summarized. Secondly, some practical solutions are discussed; this is included primarily to satisfy an obligation to the General Secretaries of the unions whose interest made the research possible. At this stage, a model of influences on the attitudes of active white-collar civil service trade unionists begins emerge, but although the fulfilment of such a task is beyond the remit of this thesis, the following diagram illustrates an important outcome of the survey.

A MODEL OF INFLUENCES ON THE ATTITUDES OF ACTIVE  
WHITE-COLLAR CIVIL SERVICE TRADE UNIONISTS





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2. Evidence given to the civil service Arbitration Tribunal hearing (1982).
3. Kessler, Sid, **Developments in Industrial Relations - Past, Present and Future**. The City University Business School Working Paper No. 14, p.7. 1980.
4. The author was a branch secretary of the Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS), now known as the National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS), and was an accredited member of his Establishment's Whitley Council, representing his members on several Committees and Sub-committees. He resigned his position in order to give fuller attention to this survey.
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## CHAPTER 1

### A REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON RELEVANT INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS THEORIES

In order to provide a conceptual framework within which the survey would be conducted it was desirable to undertake a synopsis of the field of industrial relations theory, focusing only on those theories which relate to the subject of the investigation. This, together with a number of hypotheses derived by contrasting theories of power and conflict with views gathered from pilot interviews would help in developing a frame of reference for planning the research, and would facilitate interpretation of the results in an emerging and historical perspective.

Existing literature on the British Civil Service apart from those already mentioned in the introduction, consists of a number of historical treatises such as Gladden (1943)<sup>1</sup>, (1945)<sup>2</sup>, (1967)<sup>3</sup>, Humphreys (1958)<sup>4</sup>, White (1933)<sup>5</sup>, Brown (1921)<sup>6</sup>, Campbell (1955)<sup>7</sup>, Parris (1973)<sup>8</sup> and Wigham(1980)<sup>9</sup>. Only three of the literature sources mentioned in the introduction deal directly with white-collar civil service trade unionists. All the literature reviewed in this chapter deal with subjects of a wider context which are nonetheless applicable to the subject matter of the research.

The assumption that the worker is a rational-economic man is implicit in the approach of most writers to the industrial relations theory. This assumption is also implicit in the

view that the reactions which are the subject of the theories discussed in this chapter are common to the parties involved in industrial relations both within the civil service and elsewhere. The problem of determining the right wage has been a basic preoccupation of trade unions. Dunlop (1941)<sup>10</sup> tried to apply the economists' theory of the firm to the trade union. He developed a model which puts the trade union on the same footing with an economic institution, that is, maximizing wage/employment dimensions for its members. In sharp contrast to this approach, Arthur Ross (1948)<sup>11</sup> saw the union as a political institution working in an economic context. He maintained that political struggle within the union would mean that the leadership, in order to keep its position, would strive to obtain for its members wage increases similar to those obtained by other union leaders. Therefore, in determining union wage policy, what he termed "orbits of coercive comparison" would become important. Clark Kerr (1948)<sup>12</sup> drew the two approaches together, arguing that a combination of politics and economics would provide a more realistic understanding. Chamberlain (1951)<sup>13</sup> went a completely different way, proposing that theories concerning the nature of collective bargaining could be reduced to three, namely, the marketing, governmental and managerial theories, which he considered to reflect the stages in historical development of collective bargaining. He defined collective bargaining as: "(a) a means of contracting for the sale of labour; (b) a form of industrial

government and (c) a method of management." Flanders and Clegg (1954)<sup>14</sup> argued that the growth of United Kingdom system of industrial relations has been inextricably intertwined with the growth of our entire social system.

In 1958, Dunlop declared industrial relations a discipline in its own right, arguing that it was the study of the establishment and administration of rules.<sup>15</sup> Modifications to this theory was put forward by Walker (1959), which brought industrial relations nearer to integrated theory.<sup>16</sup> By 1961, the influence of the process of industrialization on the behaviour of men and societies was already being studied. The work of Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers<sup>17</sup> was an attempt to use comparative studies to analyze the inter-relationships of management, labour and government as the world was going through waves of economic development. Behrend (1963)<sup>18</sup> tried to portray how different schools of thought had approached industrial relations from different points of view but himself arrived at similar statements of problems that arise, for example, the need to study motivation (psychology), the power struggle between management and union (politics) and the importance of the institutional and economic background.

### THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

Three theoretical approaches to industrial relations have been proposed:-

- (a) the Oxford approach
- (b) the Systems approach
- (c) an Industrial Sociology view.

### OXFORD v SYSTEMS APPROACH

Flanders is probably the best known proponent of the Oxford approach.<sup>19</sup> The theoretical basis of the policy recommendations of the Donovan Commission owes a lot to this approach. The "Oxford view" is that industrial relations is the study of the institutions of job regulation. It emphasizes the process of rule making through collective bargaining while the "Systems model", one of the works of Dunlop, stresses the role of wider influences on rule determination. In the Dunlop tradition, the rules of any industrial relations systems are seen as either procedural or substantive. An industrial relations system is viewed logically as an abstraction and is not designed simply to describe in factual terms the real world of time and space. Dunlop described the structure of a system as follows:-

...the theoretical framework is concerned with analysing the workings of industrial relations systems which vary in scope from an enterprise to a sector or to a country as a whole. Regardless of its scope, an indus-

trial relations system is regarded as having certain common properties and structures and as responding to specific influences...Every industrial relations system involves three groups of actors: (1) workers and their organizations, (2) managers and their organizations, and (3) governmental agencies concerned with the workplace and the work community. Every industrial relations system creates a complex of rules to govern the workplace and work community. These rules may take a variety of forms in different systems: agreements, statutes, orders, decrees, regulations, awards, policies and practices and customs...The actors in an industrial relations systems are regarded as confronting an environmental context at any one time. The environment is comprised of three interrelated contexts; the technology, the market or budgetary constraints and the power relations and status of the actors...The system is bound together by an ideology or understandings shared by all the actors. The central task of a theory of industrial relations is to explain why particular rules are established in particular industrial relations systems and how they change in response to changes affecting the system.<sup>20</sup>

Part of the significance of Dunlop's "Systems model" for the study of industrial relations as an academic discipline, was its attempt to change the central focus of the subject from

industrial conflict and collective bargaining towards rule determination. In this respect, it has led to a broadening of the perspective of industrial relations. However, the model has been criticized because it suffers from two major defects. Firstly, it did not explain clearly that a system of industrial relations is not a system of rules but a conceptual framework in which one component element is the rules. Secondly, the analytical meaning given to the concept of "system" is not made clear. By contrast, whereas the "Systems model" saw economic, sociological and ideological variables as more important, the "Oxford school" saw political variables as of more paramount importance. The Oxford approach was therefore criticized on the grounds that it was too narrow to provide a comprehensive framework for analysing industrial relations problems. It over-emphasized the significance of the political process of collective bargaining and gave insufficient weight to the role of the deeper influences in the determination of rules.

#### INDUSTRIAL SOCIOLOGY APPROACH

Margerison's "Industrial Sociology Approach"<sup>21</sup> rejects the special emphasis given to rule determination by the "Systems and Oxford models". It suggests a method of inquiry which attempts to develop sociological models of conflict. It emphasizes the importance of studying the generation and nature of conflict as well as conflict resolution.

### POWER STRUGGLE: A FEATURE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS

The notion of conflict is implicit in all three approaches discussed above because both job regulation and rule making presuppose inter-personal relationships in which conflict is endemic. Conflict is an outcome of power rivalry. Consequently, so much effort has been put into discovering the nature of power and its exercise in the context of industrial relations. Lukes (1974) maintained that power is an essentially contested concept.<sup>22</sup> Although there can be no doubt about the meaning of the concept when viewed from the platform of a winner or a loser, power is one of those taken-for-granted notions which have continued to remain illusive. Its central role in the study of industrial relations has been acknowledged by various authors, for example, Craig (1973)<sup>23</sup>, Chamberlain (1951)<sup>24</sup>, Dahl (1957)<sup>25</sup>. Some theorists actually refuse to get involved with the analysis of power within the industrial relations system. Dunlop, for instance, argued that his concern was neither with the distribution of power within the industrial relations system, the relative bargaining powers among the actors, nor with their controls over the processes of interaction and rule setting. He was more interested with the distribution of power outside the industrial relations system.<sup>26</sup> These rejections strike at the very core of the transactions between the employer and the employed. When a third dimension is added, for instance, profit motive or the tax paying public, (as in the case of the civil service) a void emerges



in Dunlop's systems theory, which brings us right back to the ethos of Margerison's proposition.

Rules and rule determination are essential aspects of industrial relations and, since rules are not made in a vacuum but with the actors specifically in mind, it becomes important that the attitudes and behaviours of the actors which are implicit in every conflict should also be a subject for investigation.

If we accept Hyman's view of industrial relations as "the study of processes of control over work relations"<sup>27</sup> then we should also accept his argument that an increasing power struggle is an essential feature of industrial relations. Power here, is interpreted as the "ability of an individual or group to control his (their) physical and social environment", from which, "ability to influence the decisions which are, and are not taken by others"<sup>28</sup> can be deduced. The situation between the Government and the civil service trade unions has from time to time assumed this form; the Government always has the superior power. With the advent of "administrative action" the Government is seen to acquire and exercise a new form of power. As Hyman puts it:-

..the ability to overcome opposition is one sign of power; but a more subtle yet perhaps even more significant form of power is the ability to preclude opposi-

tion from even arising - simply because, for example, those subject to a particular type of control, do not question its legitimacy or can see no alternative.<sup>29</sup>

The Government can and does order wage offers to be implemented whether they are accepted or not. When this happens, civil servants and their unions grumble about the inadequate offers only for a while. As soon as the offers are in the wage packet the recipients tend to echo "a bird in hand" kind of sentiment. Such offers have never been known to improve after the administrative action.

The power path of trade unionism in the civil service supports Marchington's "path model"<sup>30</sup>. In this model, Marchington suggests that workgroup power may be viewed as a process of several distinct but related phases, the first phase consisting of the "power capacity" which any workgroup may possess. This power capacity derives from structural factors relating to the dependence of other parties (in this case, the Government, as employer, and the public) on the workgroup (civil servants), for the provision of vital services. The next step in the path model is the phase of "power realisation". This is a realisation by the workgroup that it possesses a certain power capacity. A correct realisation of low power capacity would halt the model at this point. However, the correct realisation of high power capacity can lead to the third phase of the model - "power testing", where the workgroup tests its perception of its own

power capacity by some form of action. The final phase of the model - "power outcome", is reached with the successful or unsuccessful result of the action. The "power capacity" phase for civil servants as a group occurred when they began to club together to lobby MPs and present their personal grievances.<sup>31</sup> The "power realisation" phase came in the late 1880s when the first permanent associations were beginning to form and be recognized.<sup>32</sup>

Although a valuable addition to the literature on power in industrial relations, Marchington's model as discussed above has certain limitations. The model was criticized for taking the workgroup as the appropriate level of analysis and applying this level of analysis in all situations. It is not possible to decide the appropriate level of analysis a priori, and indeed there may be many situations in which power is best understood by the study of individual workers or the workplace as a whole. However, the major limitation of the model is that it relates power to structural position and yet ignores the origins of that structure and the processes that created it. As Clegg eloquently argued from this perspective, power in the workplace "begins to look rather like an ongoing game of chess in which the pieces gain their power through their current position, rather than gaining the current position through their power to make moves according to the rules of the game."<sup>33</sup>

Edwards (1978)<sup>34</sup> made a distinction between two measures of power - "bargaining power", defined as "the ability of an individual or group to get his or its own way in the face of other competing objectives, and "control", defined as "the ability of the managers/employers' representatives to get their own way in the decision making process regardless of whether the decisions were the subject of conflict". These measures concentrated on the observable behaviour of the parties and the winning issues in the decision making process. When they were used to analyze data from two collieries the following results emerged: the bargaining power measure revealed that "although at both collieries the manager has greater bargaining power than the union, at the Midland colliery the union is more successful in bargaining with management than in the North."<sup>35</sup> The control measure showed that management generally decided issues in both collieries. On the basis of her data and analysis, Edwards concluded "that estimates of bargaining power based on disputed decisions alone, while actually representing the relative power of participants in high conflict situations, would tend, in situations where overt conflict is low, to underestimate participants' ability to obtain their objectives through persuasion."<sup>36</sup>

Edwards' approach has some rather unfortunate consequences. Firstly, it results in a concentration on the outcomes of power activity. In the industrial relations context Edwards'

work is superior to those economists who see power as directly reflected in wage rates, because she considers a much wider range of results or outcomes. However, this concentration upon outcomes results in a consequential neglect of both the origins and processes of power. Secondly, power is seen to be reflected in the ability to "win" or "influence" decisions or issues. The party that is able to achieve its objectives on an issue is seen as "powerful" and it is therefore possible over a series of issues to establish the most powerful actor in a relationship. Yet such a view ignores the fact that the "losing" party may still have a substantial amount of power. For instance, the fact that civil service unions have often failed to win in negotiations does not necessarily make the unions totally powerless. On the contrary, their change of strategy from one round of negotiation to another indicates a residue of power, the origins of which are from both the membership and the negotiation experience of the union leaders.

This approach is therefore rather ineffectual in that it does not distinguish between relative and absolute power or between an issue where a party only just manages to "win" and one where a party wins easily. Thus, while Edwards' work succeeds in mapping out the "winning" of decisions, it fails to explain the origins of power which make such "winning" possible. Such a distinction is analogous to the distinction between "influence" and "authority", which has been an on-

going discussion among organization theorists.

### INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY

Peabody (1964)<sup>37</sup> remarks that there have been three approaches to the conceptualization of authority and influence. Some authors have tended to equate them; some tended to equate power with influence and assert that authority is a special case of power; and others see authority and influence as distinctly different dimensions. Building on the work of Barnard (1938)<sup>38</sup>, Simon (1953)<sup>39</sup> sees authority as the right to make decisions that affect the activities of others in the organization. The superior frames and transmits decisions with the expectation that, because they are normatively supported by organizational rules, the decisions will be accepted by subordinates. Accepting the right of the superior to make such decisions, subordinates feel obliged to comply with the decisions. This view is echoed in Salaman's work.<sup>40</sup>

The unique aspect of authority is that subordinates accept without question and are willing to (a) suspend any intellectual or moral judgements about the appropriateness of the superior's directives, or (b) act as if they subscribe to the judgement of the superior even if, in fact, they personally find the directive distasteful, irrational, or morally suspect. As Bierstedt (1950)<sup>41</sup> notes, authority implies involuntary submission. An individual has authority

when he or she can obtain unquestioning obedience from subordinates. The superior/subordinate relation implied in this concept of power goes against the true spirit of Whitleyism. Yet the actions of the Government in implementing wages that have not been accepted or ratified by the unions has a smack of absolute power - "authority". In contrast, influence implies that subordinates do not suspend their critical faculties or willingness to act on the basis of their own inclinations. Parsons (1956) throws another light on the issue: "Power we may define as the realistic capacity of a system-unit to actualize its interest within the context of system-interaction and in this sense exert the influence on processes in the system".<sup>42</sup> Bierstedt portrays power as force or ability to apply sanctions.<sup>43</sup> His contention was that it is a potential and not to be confused with the actual use of force, that is, the application of sanctions. Furthermore, power is distinguished from influence in that power is inherently coercive and implies involuntary submission. Dahl (1957)<sup>44</sup> fuses the "potential" and "use" dimensions of power and also equates power with influence. From Dahl's point of view, power is exercised whenever one party affects the behaviour of another, combining what Bierstedt calls force and influence. Moreover, Dahl's conception implies that an unused potential is not power, because power implies successful use of the potential. This point is untenable in industrial relations. It is rather similar to a contention that there is no power in a live-wire simply

because it is dormant or because it is not touching a living body. For instance, we do not look at the Government as a powerful actor only when it takes one of the multitudes of actions which signify power, so that in the absence of such an action it is judged not powerful. It is powerful whether the action is taken or not, as long as it is capable of taking and getting away with such an action.

#### TRUST AND CONTROL

Purcell's typology of "trust" in a bargaining situation makes a significant contribution to the "power" debate. He distinguishes between high and low trust in an environment where formalisation is high or low. According to Purcell, where there is low trust in an environment of high formalisation the pattern of industrial relations is termed Antagonistic Constitutionalism. He describes this pattern as follows:-

Here the agreed procedures and institutions are used as a means of expressing the distrust and aggression which exists. Each party will often complain about the conduct of the other or the failure to abide by promises. Informal conduct between the parties is at a minimum and there is heavy reliance on formal procedures, especially for dispute and grievance handling. Numerous claims are pursued through the procedure by the union. Management tends to adopt an



inflexible and bureaucratic stance in grievance negotiations, both in terms of the interpretation of existing agreements and statutes and in delaying negotiations until formal approval has been gained within the management hierarchy.<sup>45</sup>

On the other hand, high trust in an environment of high formalisation produces Cooperative Constitutionalism. Purcell describes this pattern as follows:-

In this pattern high trust and cooperation between the parties takes place within the framework of comprehensive agreements, usually focussed on JNC meetings. A particular effort is made to abide by the constitution, which is seen to establish mutual rights and obligations which should not be breached.<sup>46</sup>

Adaptive Cooperation is said to result from high trust and low formalisation, and is described as follows:-

The dominant characteristic in this pattern is high trust and cooperation between negotiators, which extends to institutional trust but is embodied in the personal relationship between a few key people on either side, supported by their advisers. There are few, if any, formal written agreements, especially of a procedural nature, or, if there are, they are largely

ignored, replaced by the informal, adaptive relationship between the negotiators.<sup>47</sup>

A combination of low trust and low formalisation produces Uninhibited Antagonism; this is described as follows:-

Industrial relations are conducted in an ad hoc, conflict-based manner, with bargaining advantages frequently exploited by either side when circumstances permit. The relationship is marked by mutual suspicion and distrust. The behaviour of one party is often seen by the other as irrational and unpredictable.<sup>48</sup>

Relationship between the Government and the civil service unions may fluctuate between "uninhibited antagonism" and "antagonistic constitutionalism", depending on the existing degree of formalisation. This vicious circle sometimes assumes the appearance of what Fox (1974) termed the "Continuous-Challenge Pattern". Fox describes this pattern as follows:-

Here we find the work group refusing to legitimize management's claim to assert and pursue objectives..... The group may, of course, be forced to submit but it continues to withhold legitimacy; fighting guerrilla skirmishes wherever possible, seeking ways to undermine management's position and aspiring to mobilise enough

power for an effective challenge... No equilibrium relationship develops; only periods of uneasy truce as each side licks its wounds and watches the enemy for signs of a weak spot in its defences.<sup>49</sup>

Fox further suggests a pattern of "Sophisticated Paternalism". He suggests that this occurs only rarely but is clearly possible and can develop from either "cooperative constitutionalism" or "adaptive cooperation". ... "management finds itself with a passive and largely inert unionised labour force which throws up little or no assertive leadership of its own".<sup>50</sup> Management is left free to pursue its own policies without challenge, even though it goes through the charade of negotiating with the union.

Indeed the practices of the Government on the negotiating table sometimes leave the union negotiators wondering whether they had been discussing the same subject with the other side. The speed with which the Government swings round and super-impose the discussion with its own pre-determined decision bamboozles the unions into a tentative acceptance, with the full knowledge that the decision is usually irreversible.

Mann (1970) examined this nature of acceptance and drew a distinction between two types:-

Pragmatic acceptance: where the individual complies because he perceives no realistic alternative, and

Normative acceptance: where the individual internalises the moral expectations of the ruling class and views his own inferior position as legitimate.<sup>51</sup>

When this happens, procedures are relegated to an insignificant position and chances of a peaceful settlement of disputes are severely restricted. As Kevin Hawkins observed:-

..procedures impose restraints on the use of power. They may be entirely voluntary in the sense that they are established by the parties themselves without any kind of external compulsion, or they may be influenced by the general view of what is, and what is not, good practice. Fundamentally, however, they reflect an agreement by both sides to be bound by a code of "Queensberry rules" in their day-to-day relationships.<sup>52</sup>

There are many other theoretical treatments revealing even further complexities, for instance, Wrong (1968)<sup>53</sup>, Blau

(1964)<sup>54</sup>, Etzioni (1964)<sup>55</sup>, French and Raven (1959)<sup>56</sup>, Thibant and Kelley (1959)<sup>57</sup>, some of which will come up again for discussion later in the analyses.

### CONFLICT

As mentioned above, one of the outcomes of the exercise of power is conflict and conflict begets strikes. It is tempting to group these two phenomena together and casually explain one away while delving deeply into the other. The point of view held by Kornhauser and his colleagues is that "strike is the principal overt manifestation of conflict".<sup>58</sup> There is a general agreement that conflict, per se, is not a bad thing.<sup>59</sup> In fact, a conference on business ethic held in Windsor Castle (1971) concluded: "Conflict is an essential part of growth, truth, justice and the development of good human relationships, but it is neutral. It can be good or bad, creative or destructive. Creative conflict towards a common end, from which all benefit, is a good and necessary factor in the industrial situation."<sup>60</sup> This view that conflict can serve a useful purpose is contrary to the view of the human relations school which focused on personal and organization costs of conflict.<sup>61</sup> A wide definition of conflict by Thomas (1976) tends to support the implication of the human relations movement that conflict should be avoided or eliminated. Thomas tentatively defined conflict as "the process which begins when one party perceives that

the other has frustrated, or is about to frustrate, some concern of his."<sup>62</sup> He used this definition as a basis for developing his model of dyadic conflict. Analysing the behaviours of the opposing parties in a conflict he delineated a number of positive effects of conflict. The view that "under conditions of low tension people may welcome or seek out the novelty of divergent opinions, the challenge of competition and at times, the excitement of overt hostility", has some sociological basis and the extension of that logic to the inclusion of other positive advantages of conflict, for instance, the contention that "the confrontation of divergent views often produces ideas of superior-quality", since they tend to be based on different evidence, different considerations, different insight, different frames of reference", brings it into the realm of industrial relations. Thomas further claims that "aggressive behaviour in conflict situations is not necessarily irrational or destructive". Corroborated in the works of Litterer (1966)<sup>63</sup>, March and Simon (1958)<sup>64</sup> and Van Doorn (1966)<sup>65</sup>, this contention considers a different perspective of conflict without dismissing the original point of view.

The shift of emphasis from the elimination of conflict to the management of conflict echoed in Thomas's work is subjective, as he himself admits, since all conflicts cannot be constructive or beneficial (Janis and Katz: 1959)<sup>66</sup>. His "Process" and "Structural" models of conflict however con-

stitute a significant contribution in the literature of conflict. The elaborate treatment given to the anatomy of conflict echoes much of the work of Pondy (1966)<sup>67</sup>, (1967)<sup>68</sup>, Walton (1969)<sup>69</sup> and Walton and Mckersie (1965)<sup>70</sup>.

Both models are more applicable in interpersonal situations but may be applicable in employer/employee relations. The word "dyadic" suggests two individuals or two groups; it does not necessarily qualify the interests of the individuals or groups. For instance, a Sales manager and a Production manager would normally work to one accord; they are not necessarily in opposition to each other in the sense applicable to employer/employee situation. This fringe of conflict in which the interests of the actors are polarized is depicted by Thomas as an "either/or conceptualization of a conflict issue".<sup>71</sup> Blake et al. (1964)<sup>72</sup> refer to it as a "win-lose" situation. "Here", continues Thomas, "conflict of interest is total: the only outcomes seen are total satisfaction and total frustration, and each party's satisfaction is seen as occurring at the expense of the other", a displacement of "ophelimity" in Pareto's language.

Edwards and Scullion introduced the concept of non-directed conflict to explore the significance of actions which are not overtly conflictual, the implication being that the particular way individuals view their action is central to the determination of the degree of conflict. An individual's

absenteeism, for instance, may be perceived by that individual as an expression of conflict. In other words, action speaks louder than voice. The individual's action may say more about his attitude to work than he himself is prepared to admit.<sup>73</sup>

There is a general agreement that industrial conflict is a reality which can never be avoided. Chamberlain argues that any attempt to eliminate conflict by co-operation is doomed to failure. Even where both parties recognize their interdependence and work to one accord in order to achieve a mutually desired objective, disagreements over the apportionment of income/profit is almost inevitable. "The special interest which a union has in the continuity and profitability of the business firm with which it is associated is a basis for both conflict and co-operation with management. Co-operation in its most fundamental sense of working together, is essential to the satisfaction of the elemental organizational goal which both recognize. Yet this simple fact, which has often been stated, does not eliminate conflict over the apportionment of the benefits and disadvantages derived from this co-operative functioning, benefits and advantages which flow from the character of participation in the functional process as well as from money receipts" (Chamberlain:1954)<sup>74</sup>. The same sentiment is expressed by Hyman, although more forcefully: "Yet the popular identification of industrial relations with conflict is not



wholly due to the sensationalism of the media. In part it reflects a straightforward recognition of the fact that sophisticated academic discussion often obscures: that work relations (within capitalism) are an inevitable source of dispute. The interests of employees are in large measure opposed to those of employers: hence both parties seek to wield power and mobilise resources in order to ensure the predominance of their own interests. The strategies they adopt inevitably clash, and conflict is the obvious outcome" (Hyman:1975)<sup>75</sup>. Kessler (1980) corroborates these views more objectively: ".....I believe that there are certain basic industrial relations problems which are always with us: they are not new problems: they have existed in the past: they exist in the present, and they will exist in the future. What is true is that the acuteness of some of the problems may vary over time, and what may be new is changes in social attitudes and expectations and the awareness of greater power on the part of the workpeople to try to achieve their objectives".<sup>76</sup> The Civil Service unions have their objectives. Attempts by the Government to negate these objectives necessitate a reappraisal of their power base and an endeavour to maintain their countervailing force.

### STRIKE

The strike is said to be the most obvious manifestation of industrial conflict. Kelly and Nicholson (1980)<sup>77</sup> did a study of the dimensions of strike processes with particular

reference to industrial relations climate. They drew distinctions between trigger issues and demand; strike content and context; and transitional and final strike outcomes. They classified existing literature on the subject into four main approaches: the theoretical approach, as exemplified in work of Anderson (1967)<sup>78</sup>, Dahrendorf (1959)<sup>79</sup>, Eldridge (1973)<sup>80</sup>, Kerr (1954)<sup>81</sup>, (1969)<sup>82</sup>; analyses of historical and statistical data gathered on the incidence of conflict, for example, Kerr and Siegel (1954)<sup>83</sup>, Ross and Hartman (1960)<sup>84</sup>, Shorter and Tilly (1974)<sup>85</sup>; case study approach, for example, Gouldner (1954)<sup>86</sup>, Karsh (1958)<sup>87</sup>, Lane and Roberts (1971)<sup>88</sup>; and the empirical approach. They examined the hypothesis that there is a link between job dissatisfaction and grievances over wages and conditions: Birchall (1975)<sup>89</sup>, Hackman and Lawler(1971)<sup>90</sup> and Kornhauser(1954)<sup>91</sup>. After considering the work of Nicholson, Chadwick-Jones and Brown, Kelly and Nicholson concluded that there is no sufficient evidence to firmly establish this link although some thought was given to a possible link between industrial conflict and alienating work. In proposing their social-psychological model of strikes, they examined and identified the social processes leading to strikes and explained the variations in the outcomes of these processes.

More recently, the work of Kessler (1980)<sup>92</sup> covered several significant points on collective bargaining, pay determination and the role of the Government in industrial relations.

His recipe for better industrial relations in the future specifically excludes overt Government intervention; but as the Government is a major employer this is perhaps too much to hope for. Since it is used to having its own way with its employees the Government would probably find it difficult not to extend its autocratic tendencies to the rest of the working population. The constant reference to making an example of civil servants for the rest of the working community bears this out.

The Government's inordinate quest for power is euphemistically translated as "realism" by Salaman (1980)<sup>93</sup>:-

The Conservative Government has sought to project an image of a "new realism" in industrial relations in the 1980s: trade union power subject to greater legal regulation; an acceptance of economic "reality" in wage bargaining; and management able to re-exert its prerogative to implement the necessary changes within the organisation to become more competitive.

It is also "realism" that this seizure of power triggered off large scale industrial relations confrontations even within the confines of the Government's testing ground - the civil service.

The work of Goldthorpe and Lockwood(1963)<sup>94</sup> also ought to be mentioned in the context of power match between the Government and the civil service unions. Having examined the phenomenon of "working-class affluence" Goldthorpe and Lockwood concluded that despite the prevalent spirit of conservatism whereby working-class families are sometimes assimilated to the middle-class, the gap between the two classes remains as wide as ever before. The work of Kelly(1980)<sup>95</sup> supports Goldthorpe and Lockwoods' conclusion in confirming that there is little basis for the thesis of embourgeoisement. The Government does exercise its power to keep civil servants "proletariat" by subduing their unions despite the civil servants' habit of considering themselves middle-class. This habit in many ways makes the Government's task easier but the unions' lack of power is not only a constant reminder that the gap exists but most importantly it is a confirmation that the embourgeoisement thesis is not applicable. The work of Bain (1971)<sup>96</sup>, Clegg (1975)<sup>97</sup>, and David Winchester (1983)<sup>98</sup>, highlight the ever increasing power of the Government particularly in connection with its own employees.

The theories of power reviewed in this chapter are all relevant to the design and outcome of this survey. In a simple employer-employee relationship the share of power between the two sides is not only feasible but necessary in the interest of good industrial relations. The complex rela-

tionship between the Government and its employees leaves no room for such a share of power. The concept of "good employer" which may have contributed to the introduction of Whitleyism in the civil service appears to have been suffocated by the quest of the Government for absolute power. It is possible that the civil service unions and their members are unaware of this fact simply because the Whitley system is still used in the service; reference to "good employer" is no more than lip service. The design of the survey highlights the seizure of power by the Government and the survey results confirm the fact.

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CHAPTER 2  
THE RESEARCH METHODS USED IN THE SURVEY

Participant Observation

It was decided to use both participant observation and survey methods in this investigation in order to obtain the required data. The reason for this decision was based on the fact that there is no one correct method for doing a sociological research. In reality there are several methods which can be used in combination for obtaining information from the social world.<sup>1</sup> This position questions the assumption that there is a normative methodology prescribed by sociological textbooks without any consideration of the "idiosyncrasy" of the researcher and the "circumstances" in which the research is carried out.<sup>2</sup> The subject of the investigation "Industrial attitudes of active white-collar civil service trade unionists", is a complex issue which needs the use of the qualitative method in order to obtain an adequate understanding of the problem.

Participant observation is one of the principal research techniques used in this survey because it enables the researcher to obtain a better insight into social reality, since the observer participates in the activities of those under investigation. The author was quite aware of the criticisms levelled against qualitative approaches. Such criticisms claim that participant observation lacks reliability in contrast to the methods used in natural sciences which are believed to be more reliable because if other

researchers used the same methods of investigation on the same material they would produce the same results. Moreover, it is argued that by replicating an experiment it is possible to check errors in observation and measurement.

However, it can be argued that social sciences will never achieve the standard of reliability attained in the natural sciences.<sup>3</sup> Thus, despite these criticisms, participant observation gives the researcher the opportunity to directly observe the social world. Although observations are sometimes unsystematic and results are rarely quantified, nevertheless, participant observation provides useful insights. The dual role of the author as an active civil service trade unionist and a scholar helped to structure his observations and systematically put them together as reliable data. The general idea behind this thesis and especially the seven hypotheses enunciated below stemmed from his dual role.

### The Survey Method

The problems involved in surveys and the criticisms levelled against quantitative approaches in social investigation are well known. It has been claimed, for instance, that these techniques often employ questionnaires which contain a pre-determined set of questions which the respondent is requested to answer, involving in this way the idea that the researcher has already decided what is important. This leads to the imposition by the researcher of his own assumptions

about the nature of the social world on the respondents. Despite the heavy criticism of positivism, there are some obvious advantages in survey techniques. For example, that precise relationships between social phenomena can only be established when the social world is expressed in numerical forms. It is also true that only when data are quantified by means of reliable measuring instruments can results of different studies be directly compared. It has been argued by the supporters of positivism that without quantification, sociology would remain at the level of impressionistic and unsupported insight and it would be impossible to replicate studies in order to establish relationships and support generalizations. This research technique was used in this investigation in order to be more systematic in the inquiry and achieve more systematic results.

#### The Pilot Survey

A pilot survey was carried out before the final questionnaire was developed. Some of the questions included in this pilot exercise were made up after discussions with fellow-officers. Others derived directly from comments made by disillusioned members who grumbled about paying their union dues for nothing. The hypotheses enunciated below were developed in a similar manner. The author simply made a note of his observations during committee, branch or Whitley meetings, discussed these observations with colleagues afterwards, then tentatively proposed a hypothesis which he

ratified after referring to views expressed in the pilot questionnaire. (See Appendix 1). So, views gathered from the pilot survey helped to formulate the hypotheses and to minimize mistakes in the wording and arrangement of the main questionnaire.

### THE HYPOTHESES

The notion that civil service trade unionists are under dual pressure, one from the Government as their employer and the other from oppressive anti-trade union laws<sup>4</sup>, is bound to influence their attitude to militancy. On the other hand, because they are mostly in the low income group, relative to the rest of the working population, and because they have been defeated in a previous power contest with their employer, the idea that their present frame of mind would be dominated by militancy seems far fetched. As explained above, the following hypotheses were derived partly from views gathered through the pilot survey and partly from views gathered after intensive debates with colleagues, on topics such as strikes and commitments, conflict, power, influence and authority. Although theories related to these topics were reviewed in chapter 1, the hypotheses do not refute but corroborate some of them.

1. High personal commitments produce anti-militant attitude among union members.

2. When members put their personal commitments above everything else in their hierarchy of priorities they would tend to yield more readily to offers made in a wage bargaining by their employer. In other words their resistance curve would tend towards 0 as the employer's concession curve tends towards 0, having discovered his employees' reaction curve.
3. Assuming a trade-off between the employer's power<sup>5</sup> to impose a wage and the trade union's power to resist, anti-militant tendencies among union members would shift the employer's resistance curve towards  $\infty$ .
4. The level of militancy among the active civil service trade unionists had declined to such a point that it threatened the effectiveness of their unions' negotiating strategy.
5. Militancy is a more potent factor in trade union power<sup>6</sup> than high membership.
6. Within the civil service the higher the grade of work being done the greater is the pressure on the individual to leave his union activities behind.
7. Unorganised conflict is more manifest when the union exhibits anti-militant tendencies.



### THE MAIN QUESTIONNAIRE

The main questionnaire was designed in groups of related questions, retrospective of the above hypotheses in order to facilitate data collection and analyses. (See Appendix 1a).

The problem of selecting a representative sample of respondents was addressed by examining the population of civil servants in the UK and Northern Ireland and systematically eliminating those who did not fit the envisaged category. Defining the category as "active white-collar civil service trade unionists" automatically eliminated industrial civil servants, non-industrial civil servants who did not belong to a union and those who did belong to a union but only insofar as they paid their union dues. This made it easier to focus attention on those non-industrial civil servants who were union members and were interested in the affairs of their unions. A further distinction was made within this category - those who were interested enough to take part in the organization of the union's local activities, such as committee members and local office holders, and those who were interested but perhaps only enough to attend meetings occasionally. The reason for this option is discussed in chapter 4.

The next problem was that of selecting a sample which was representative not only of the various groups within the

unions but also of different parts of the country. The following table illustrates the initial attempt to select a balanced sample in which all the civil service unions from all parts of the British Isles were adequately represented:-

**TABLE 1**  
**PLAN FOR DISTRIBUTION OF QUESTIONNAIRES NATIONWIDE**

UNION	NUMBER OF BRANCHES PER UNION	NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES PER BRANCH	TOTAL NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES PER UNION
CPSA	25	30	750
SCPS*	25	30	750
IPCS	25	30	750
CSU*	25	30	750
POA	25	30	750
IRSF	25	30	750
FDA	25	30	750
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>5,250</b>

\*These two unions concluded a merger and became The National Union of Civil and Public Servants (NUCPS) in 1989.

It was anticipated that the UK would be divided into five areas for the purpose of distributing the questionnaires. Seven unions were originally envisaged, each of which was to nominate five branches from each of the five areas and each of the nominated branches was to circulate 30 questionnaires. Altogether, 30 questionnaires were to be distributed in each of 175 branches, making a distribution total of 5,250. However, a number of changes occurred after further

interviews with the General Secretaries. With the exception of the Institution of Professionals, Managers and Specialists (IPMS), then known as the Institution of Professional Civil Servants (IPCS), all the unions welcomed the investigation and expressed a willingness to help. The lack of co-operation from the IPMS slightly altered the original plan. All the unions had agreed to circulate the questionnaires at their own expense, as part of their assistance with the investigation. The feasibility of handling the huge amount of data which was likely to be generated was overlooked at that stage.

As a result of the IPMS refusal the total number of questionnaires was reduced to 5,000. Also, the size and density of the remaining unions, now including the Northern Ireland Public Services Association (NIPSA), came into the consideration. A new distribution structure, which reflected the size of membership, emerged. Each participating union was allocated a percentage proportionate to the ratio of its membership in the total population. The following table illustrates the revised distribution strategy:-

**TABLE 2**  
**ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION PLAN**

UNION	ESTIMATED MEMBERSHIP ( ,000 )	PERCENTAGES ALLOCATED %	NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES DISTRIBUTED
CPSA	144	39	1,950
SCPS	88	24	1,200
CSU	32	9	450
POA	24	7	350
IRSF	56	15	750
FDA	8	2	100
NIPSA	3	4	200
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>355</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>5,000</b>

Five thousand questionnaires were delivered to the union headquarters according to the above criteria, for onward distribution. The response was quite impressive; about 3,000 replies were received. However, after collating over half of the returns it was apparent that the questionnaires allocated to CPSA were conspicuously missing. Enquiries from the CPSA headquarters revealed that the questionnaires were not distributed as promised. Although the research had progressed for over seven months there was no sign of CPSA willingness to distribute the questionnaires. They had tacitly withdrawn their promised co-operation. Since all the grades represented by IPMS and CPSA were adequately covered by the remaining unions, their participation was no longer necessary.

Due to lack of resources, the large amount of data finally collected became too difficult to handle. A new set of criteria for selecting a reasonably practical sample from the total number of questionnaires returned, was evolved. That task was addressed as follows:-

1. All questionnaires which were partially completed or returned with parts missing, were filtered out.
2. The remainder, well over 2,000, was sorted out first into the respective unions, then within each union, they were sorted into eleven regions, Northern Ireland being specified as the eleventh region.
3. A percentage allocated to each union according to the size of its membership was used to calculate its proportion of the sample.
4. This proportion was then randomly selected from stage 2 above.

The following table illustrates how the final 500 respondents were selected:-

TABLE 2a  
THE FINAL SAMPLE

UNION	%	R E G I O N S											TOTAL SAMPLE
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11*	
SCPS	39	46	31	19	5	11	11	20	20	12	20	-	195
IRSF	25	30	20	12	3	7	7	13	13	8	12	-	125
CSU	14	17	11	7	2	4	4	7	7	4	7	-	70
POA	11	13	9	5	2	3	3	6	6	3	5	-	55
FDA	4	5	3	2	1	1	1	2	2	1	2	-	20
NIPSA	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35	35
TOTAL	100	111	74	45	13	26	26	48	48	28	46	35	500

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\*Northern Ireland.

Before a decision was taken about who to include in the sample the survey was focused on trade union members in general. However, a slight shift of emphasis occurred when the pilot survey revealed that well over two thirds of the respondents who completed and returned their questionnaires were active members, that is, those who held local offices. Since this trend was repeated in the main survey a ratio of 3:1 had to be maintained in the final sample selection in order to emphasize the focus of the investigation on active trade unionists and to facilitate a comparison between officers and ordinary members.

### DATA ANALYSES

All data are analysed by a consistent use of tables. Analyses are carried out strictly in the same sequence as the questionnaire arrangement. Tables are used in order to facilitate comparisons. Comparisons are made between two variables, for example, between lower and higher grades, or between ordinary members and local officers. Where applicable, a third and in some places, a fourth variable features in a comparison, for example, when age, marital status and financial commitments are the main variables in analysing decisions to take a strike action. Statistical calculations are kept as simple as possible. These consist mainly of arithmetic mean ( $\bar{x}$ ). Each data analysis is followed by an interpretation. Where necessary, chi-square tests are carried out on some results in order to verify interpretations. Chi-square calculations and results are shown in appendix 2, 3 and 4.

### HYPOTHESES TESTING

A due process of verifying the hypotheses has been adhered to by collecting observations and classifying, analysing and interpreting them. The observations are factual. Where the facts support a hypothesis then the hypothesis is true. Furthermore, the general rule<sup>7</sup> of adding observations until all possibilities of error have been exhausted, or until a point is reached where the addition of more facts does not

add to the probable truth of the hypothesis, forms the basis of the process. Observations which are corroborated many times over in chapters 4 and 5 are used to prove or disprove the hypotheses. This procedure is underpinned by four principal criteria of truth recommended by logicians:-

1. The principle of contradiction: the same attribute cannot at the same time be affirmed and denied of the same subject, or, the same subject cannot have two contradictory attributes.<sup>8</sup>
  
2. The principle of identity: conceptions which agree can be affirmed of the same subject at the same time. This principle complements the former.<sup>9</sup>
  
3. The principle of the middle being excluded: either a given judgement must be true or false; there is no middle ground.<sup>10</sup>
  
4. The principle of sufficient reason: whatever exists or is true must have a sufficient reason why the thing or proposition should be as it is, and not otherwise.<sup>11</sup>

The principles or laws derived from the above hypotheses can only be "empirical", for their veracity does not go beyond the data, authentic observations, from where they owe their origin. In the absence of results of other investigations in the same field with which they can be compared it is safer



to regard them only as empirical laws.

A systematic verification of the hypotheses is undertaken in the following sequence:-

1. statement of the hypothesis
2. interpretation and assumptions
3. corroborative evidence
4. statement of veracity.

#### REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid.
3. Cicourel, V.A., *Methods and Measurement in Sociology*. Free Press, New York. 1964: also, Atkinson, M.J., "On the Sociology of Suicide", in *Sociological Review*, 1968, Vol.16 pp.83-92.: and Gouldner, A. *Enter Plato*. Routledge and Kegan, London. 1967.
4. Comments in the daily newspapers, notably *The Guardian*, on the recent Green Paper on employment law indicate that many of the anti-trade union laws are in breach of the country's international legal obligations. It was also stated that the International Labour Organisations "roundly" condemned the Government for these laws. *Creeping assault on Workers' rights*. *The Guardian*, Friday, August 9, 1991, p. 11.
5. Power as "the ability of one person or group of persons to influence the behaviour of others, that is, to change the probabilities that others will respond in certain ways to specified stimuli." (Kaplan, A., *Power in Perspective*. in R. L. Khan and E. Boulding (Eds.) *Power and Conflict in Organizations*. Tavistock, London, 1964).
6. Power as "the ability of persons as groups to impose their will on others despite resistance through deterrence either in the form of withholding regularly

supplied rewards or in the form of punishment inasmuch as the former, as well as the latter, constitutes in effect negative sanction." (Blau, P.M., Exchange of Power in Social Life. Wiley, N.Y., 1964).

7. Almack, J.C., Research and Thesis Writing. Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1930, chapter 7.
8. Welton, J., and Monahan, A.J., Intermediate Logic. University Tutorial Press, London, Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 3

STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE POPULATION

Selecting the final sample of 500 out of about 3,000 respondents who returned their questionnaires was not an easy task. As the primary objective of the selection was to obtain a bias-free sample in which all participating unions from the British Isles were proportionately represented no attention was paid at that stage to age, gender or personal attributes. These characteristics are explained and analysed in this chapter.

Table 2b shows the age distribution of respondents. The number of male and female respondents eventually selected was purely random and not by design.

TABLE 2b

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY AGE AND GENDER

SEX	AGE GROUP					TOTAL
	UNDER 21	21-30	31-40	41-50	51 & OVER	
MALE	2	76	161	69	44	352
FEMALE	1	42	55	32	18	148
TOTAL(z)	3	118	216	101	62	500

Next, an attempt was made to link qualifications with respondents' grades. These initial analyses will be linked with questions dealing with strike action and acceptance of offers made by the Government in order to determine the level of militancy along the hierarchy.

TABLE 2c

DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE POPULATION BY QUALIFICATION AND GRADE

QUALIFICA- TIONS	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
None	22	17	10	5	7	1	4	66
1-5 "O.L." GCE	16	42	12	43	28	2	33	176
6 or More "O.L." GCE	5	22	9	34	24	2	33	129
"A" Levels	-	2	-	9	5	1	5	22
HNC/HND	1	5	4	6	2	2	4	24
Law Degrees	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2
Other Degrees	1	7	-	14	5	-	24	51
Diplomas & Postgrads.	1	1	1	7	1	-	4	15
Masters & PhD	-	-	1	2	-	2	10	15
Totals	46	96	37	121	72	10	118	500

The sample population was made up of 300 respondents in the lower grades and 200 respondents in the higher grades. 13 per cent of the total population had no qualifications; 18 per cent of these were nevertheless in the higher grades. The majority of respondents had qualifications ranging from one to over six Ordinary Level General Certificate of Education. At least 61 per cent were qualified up to Ordinary Level standard and 4 per cent had Advanced Level qualifications. 16.6 per cent were graduates, 0.4 per cent had Law degrees and 3 per cent had a Masters degree or a PhD. The sample therefore comprised respondents with a wide range of educational background.

It is necessary at this stage to observe how the different wage groups were financially committed because reference will be made later to the degree of commitment when correlation between grades and propensity to strike is established. The tables below link wage groups with commitments of both male and female respondents:-

TABLE 3(i)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(a) Rent and other monthly commitments			
	Rent	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	1	-	1	-
51 - £100	11	3	5	3
101 - £150	18	1	13	4
151 - £200	18	1	8	9
201 - £250	5	2	-	3
251 - £300	1	-	-	1
301 - £350	-	-	-	-
351 & over	-	-	-	-
Totals	54	7	27	20

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TABLE 3(ii)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(b) Mortgage and other monthly commitments			
	Mortgage & no others	& others under £100	& others over £100	
Under £51	-	-	-	-
51 - £100	12	-	8	4
101 - £150	90	5	34	51
151 - £200	76	4	33	39
201 - £250	41	1	16	24
251 - £300	16	-	4	12
301 - £350	4	-	2	2
351 & over	15	-	2	13
Totals	254	10	99	145

TABLE 3(iii)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(c) Owner* and other monthly commitments			
	No Mortgage	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	-	-	-	-
51 - £100	8	-	5	3
101 - £150	17	-	8	9
151 - £200	7	1	4	2
201 - £250	5	-	3	2
251 - £300	3	-	1	2
301 - £350	-	-	-	-
351 & over	1	-	-	1
Totals	41	1	21	19

\* House owner who has paid off his/her mortgage



TABLE 3(iv)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: MALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS						
	(d) None* and other monthly commitments				Source of Income		
	None*	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100	a+b+c+d	One	More than one
Under £51	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
51 - £100	-	-	-	-	31	9	22
101 - £150	-	-	-	-	125	60	65
151 - £200	1	-	1	-	102	48	54
201 - £250	2	-	-	2	53	21	32
251 - £300	-	-	-	-	20	9	11
301 - £350	-	-	-	-	4	2	2
351 & over	-	-	-	-	16	5	11
Totals	3	-	1	2	352	155	197

\* A situation where an individual lives with relations and pays no rent or where free accommodation is provided with the job, eg., Prison Officers

TABLE 4(i)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(a) Rent and other monthly commitments			
	Rent	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	1	-	1	-
51 - £100	10	-	8	2
101 - £150	9	-	6	3
151 - £200	2	-	-	2
201 - £250	-	-	-	-
251 - £300	-	-	-	-
301 - £350	-	-	-	-
351 & over	-	-	-	-
Totals	22	-	15	7

TABLE 4(ii)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(b) Mortgage and other monthly commitments			
	Mortgage	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	1	-	1	-
51 - £100	21	4	11	6
101 - £150	53	3	21	29
151 - £200	24	2	11	11
201 - £250	7	-	-	7
251 - £300	1	-	1	-
301 - £350	1	1	-	-
351 & over	1	-	-	1
Totals	109	10	45	54

TABLE 4(iii)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(c) Owner* and other monthly commitments			
	No Mortgage	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	-	-	-	-
51 - £100	5	1	3	1
101 - £150	8	-	4	4
151 - £200	3	1	1	1
201 - £250	1	1	-	-
251 - £300	-	-	-	-
301 - £350	-	-	-	-
351 & over	-	-	-	-
Totals	17	3	8	6

\* House owner who has paid off his/her mortgage.

TABLE 4(iv)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: FEMALE RESPONDENTS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS						
	(d) None* and other monthly commitments				Source of Income		
	None* & no others	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100	a+b+c+d	One	More than one
Under £51	-	-	-	-	2	1	1
51 - £100	-	-	-	-	36	14	22
101 - £150	-	-	-	-	70	24	46
151 - £200	-	-	-	-	29	10	19
201 - £250	-	-	-	-	8	1	7
251 - £300	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
301 - £350	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
351 & over	-	-	-	-	1	1	-
Totals	-	-	-	-	148	51	97

\* A situation where an individual lives with relations and pays no rent or where free accommodation is provided with the job, eg., Prison Officers.

TABLE 4a(i)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(a) Rent and other monthly commitments			
	Rent	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	2	-	2	-
51 - £100	21	3	13	5
101 - £150	27	1	19	7
151 - £200	20	1	8	11
201 - £250	5	2	-	3
251 - £300	1	-	-	1
301 - £350	-	-	-	-
351 & over	-	-	-	-
Totals	76	7	42	27

TABLE 4a(ii)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(b) Mortgage and other monthly commitments			
	Mortgage	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	1	-	1	-
51 - £100	33	4	19	10
101 - £150	143	8	55	80
151 - £200	100	6	44	50
201 - £250	48	1	16	31
251 - £300	17	-	5	12
301 - £350	5	1	2	2
351 & over	16	-	2	14
Totals	109	10	45	54

TABLE 4a(iii)

FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS			
	(c) Owner* and other monthly commitments			
	No Mortgage	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100
Under £51	-	-	-	-
51 - £100	13	1	8	4
101 - £150	25	-	12	13
151 - £200	10	2	5	3
201 - £250	6	1	3	2
251 - £300	3	-	1	2
301 - £350	-	-	-	-
351 & over	1	-	-	1
Totals	58	4	29	25

\* House owner who has paid off his/her mortgage.



TABLE 4a(iv)  
FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS: SUMMARY

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	FINANCIAL COMMITMENTS						
	(d) None* and other monthly commitments				Source of Income		
	None* & no others	& no others	& others under £100	& others over £100	a+b+c+d	One	More than one
Under £51	-	-	-	-	3	2	1
51 - £100	-	-	-	-	67	23	44
101 - £150	-	-	-	-	195	84	111
151 - £200	1	-	1	-	131	58	73
201 - £250	2	-	-	2	61	22	39
251 - £300	-	-	-	-	21	9	12
301 - £350	-	-	-	-	5	2	3
351 & over	-	-	-	-	17	6	11
Totals	3	-	1	2	500	206	294

\* A situation where an individual lives with relations and pays no rent or where free accommodation is provided with the job, eg., Prison Officers.

TABLE 4b  
DISTRIBUTION OF MEN AND WOMEN ALONG THE WAGE GROUPS

WAGE GROUP £(pw)	MEN		WOMEN	
	Number of men from 352 sample	%	Number of Women from 148 sample	%
Under £51	1	.28	2	1.4
51 - £100	31	8.8	36	24.3
101 - £150	125	35.5	70	47.2
151 - £200	102	28.9	29	19.5
201 - £250	53	15.1	8	5.4
251 - £300	20	5.6	1	0.7
301 - £350	4	1.1	1	0.7
351 & Over	16	4.5	1	0.7
Total	352		148	

TABLE 4c  
SOURCES OF INCOME

	ONE	MORE THAN ONE
Men	44%	56%
Women	34%	66%

Most of the respondents, men and women, were in the £51-£200 per week wage group. However, more women were in the lower wage group and more men were in the higher wage group. This probably accounts for the reason why more women had more than one source of income.

All possible variables which characterize a trade unionist have been carefully considered and included in the sample. The survey was designed not only to observe the attitudes of the typical trade unionist but more importantly to highlight the influences on the attitudes of the typical trade union activist. The main characteristic of the survey is therefore the distinction drawn between a typical trade unionist and a typical trade union activist, the former being an ordinary union member and the latter being a local officer. It is important to remember that these two people are motivated differently, according to their respective frames of reference. Age, sex, educational attainment, income and financial commitment may well contribute to the influences on their attitudes but what makes one more active than the other probably has nothing to do with these variables.

CHAPTER 4  
THE INDUSTRIAL ATTITUDES OF SAMPLE POPULATION

WHY CIVIL SERVANTS JOIN THEIR UNIONS

In strict adherence to the questionnaire arrangement, the next group of questions to be analysed, questions 5 and 6, relate to the industrial attitudes of the respondents. An important aspect of the respondents' characteristics which was not analysed in chapter 3 is the fact that they were all trade union members. The subject of this investigation, namely, their attitudes, derives from this fact. This chapter therefore, appropriately begins with an endeavour to elicit their views about trade union membership.

An attempt was made in question 5b to assess the reason why individuals joined their respective unions. When asked why they joined their unions nearly all the respondents interviewed<sup>1</sup> and who subsequently completed a questionnaire stated that they had never stopped to think about it before. Indeed, the question gave them food for thought and replies on the questionnaire varied widely, some making more sense than others. To facilitate analysis, nine most repeated and key category of reasons were identified, under which all the replies were classified, as follows:-

WHY DID YOU JOIN YOUR UNION

REASON	REPLY	%
1.	Because I believe in trade unionism	26.4
2.	I was encouraged to join on recruitment by the Department/Employer. Transferred after promotion. Everyone should be a member of an independent trade union.....	14.4
3.	Protection against employers' exploitation. It is in the interest of the employee....	2.6
4.	Solidarity. Unity is strength. It is my responsibility to contribute to an organization that represents my interest....	5.4
5.	I was persuaded to join by my branch union rep.....	7.6
6.	To safeguard my industrial rights. Protection of interests, better working conditions, better pay and security, all these require strong union with maximum membership....	31.0
7.	To exercise my democratic right. It is done thing. Everybody was doing it...	5.6
8.	To secure the benefits that accrue to members both on personal and general matters. A chance to make your voice heard...	4.4
9.	I don't know. No particular reason...	1.4
10.	No answer....	1.2

The above replies were analysed according to qualification and grade as follows:-

TABLE 5  
WHY INDIVIDUALS JOINED THEIR UNIONS:  
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION

R E A S O N	Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S									TOTAL
	N O N E	GCE "O" TO 5	GCE "O" OR MORE	GCE "A"	HNC/ HND	LLB/ LLM	FIRST DEGREE BSc., BA., etc	DIP LO MA	MASTERS & PHD	
1	22	50	25	2	2	-	18	6	7	132
2	6	29	25	2	1	-	3	3	3	72
3	2	4	2	1	2	-	2	-	-	13
4	5	5	11	2	2	1	1	-	-	27
5	4	16	9	1	2	-	6	-	-	38
6	23	54	41	8	10	-	9	5	5	155
7	1	8	7	2	3	1	6	-	-	28
8	1	7	7	4	-	-	3	-	-	22
9	-	3	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	7
10	2	-	2	-	1	-	-	1	-	6*
Total	66	176	129	22	24	2	51	15	15	500

\* Respondents who did not answer question 5b but answered question 5c.

**TABLE 5a**  
**WHY INDIVIDUALS JOINED THEIR UNIONS**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

REASON	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1	9	16	10	40	24	2	31	132
2	7	10	5	23	6	1	20	72
3	-	1	-	5	2	1	4	13
4	3	6	1	8	3	1	5	27
5	3	9	2	7	7	1	9	38
6	17	41	13	27	20	4	33	155
7	1	4	4	7	6	-	6	28
8	3	7	-	3	3	-	6	22
9	-	2	2	-	-	-	3	7
10	3	-	-	1	1	-	1	6*
TOTALS	46	96	37	121	72	10	118	500

\*Respondents who did not answer question 5b but answered question 5c.

The most popular reason elicited was No.6 - safeguarding industrial rights and protection of interests etc. 31 per cent of the population sample said they joined their unions in order to secure better working conditions and better pay. 88 per cent of these were from less qualified groups. Only 12 per cent were graduates or respondents with higher qualifications. Reason No.1 - belief in trade unionism - was the next most popular, with 26.4 per cent of the sample.

Again, about 77 per cent of these were in the less qualified groups. Grade or status appeared to have no significant influence on the reasons given. For instance, reason No.1 was given by 25 per cent of respondents in the lower grades and 28.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades. The minor differences cancel out as comparisons are made between one reason and the next. Those who said they joined their union for no particular reason were distributed almost evenly between the two groups. The next table analyses replies to the question: "How important to you is your belonging to your union?"

TABLE 6  
IMPORTANCE OF BELONGING TO A UNION  
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION

R E P L I E S	Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S									
	N O N E	GCE "O" TO	GCE "O" OR	GCE "A"	HNC/ HND	LLB/ LLM	FIRST DEGREE BSc., BA., etc	DIP LO MA	MASTERS & PHD	TOTAL
Very*	40	109	85	19	12	-	32	11	9	317
Quite*	13	35	32	1	3	-	12	3	2	101
Moder- ately*	9	21	9	1	4	1	1	1	4	51
Not Very*	2	10	3	1	5	1	6	-	-	28
No Opi- nion	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
Totals	66	176	129	22	24	2	51	15	15	500

\*Important



In the above analysis most respondents, regardless of their qualifications, considered belonging to their unions to be very or quite important. Only a small minority across the educational groups said it was moderately or not very important. Ironically, both respondents with Law degrees were among those few. In some circumstances therefore, educational attainment would seem to have little or no effect on people's attitude toward belonging to a union. In other circumstances however, such attitudes may be entirely governed by professionalism. For instance, medical doctors may regard belonging to their associations necessary.

TABLE 6a  
IMPORTANCE OF BELONGING TO A UNION  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

REPLIES	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
Very*	20	57	31	83	51	6	69	317
Quite*	15	23	1	20	14	1	27	101
Moderately*	5	12	3	11	4	1	15	51
Not Very*	5	3	1	7	3	2	7	28
No Opinion	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	3
Totals	46	96	37	121	72	10	118	500

\*Important

As with educational qualification attitudes towards belonging to a union were the same throughout the grades. Grade had no significant influence.

What members expect from their unions would sometimes differ from what they actually get, and this difference may affect their attitude towards their membership. However, it is not unusual for individuals to maintain their membership despite a significant variance between their expectation and the eventual outcome. For instance, in the question "In your opinion, does your union satisfy your expectation in terms of the reason you have given for joining?", not every respondent answered "yes". In fact, a good number of respondents answered "no" and still retained their membership. The result was as follows:-

Yes.....	338	(67.6%)
No.....	128	(25.6%)
Don't know.....	25	(5.0%)
No reply.....	9	(1.8%)

Those who answered "yes" may have benefitted from the advantages of union membership at some time and it was not necessary to explore their reasons any further. Similarly, as it would seem that those who answered "Don't know" and those who did not reply had neither benefitted nor suffered significant disappointment from their union it was not necessary

to explore their attitude any further. It was interesting however, to examine the reasons given by those who answered "no", and to observe the spread of these reasons along the grades. The reasons were classified into nine categories as follows:-

CATEGORIES	REASONS
1.	The union does not carry enough weight to influence management and the Government on key issues, eg., pay, new technology etc.
2.	The Executive Committee is too distant from its members - I do not feel I am being fully represented by a union which has now been taken over by extreme left wing activists.
3.	The union is more interested in the Administration grades - Officers are there to further their own causes - The union sometimes gets involved in issues unrelated to conditions of service.
4.	The union is too right wing, too willing to settle disputes - softly, softly approach; too political in its attitude.
5.	The union's inability to instil an "esprit de corps" in its negotiations.
6.	Civil servants are apathetic and complacent; the unions are therefore too weak to fight an employer who is also the Government.
7.	The union's inability "to face up to the problems" of dealing with a difficult Government.
8.	The Government does not give decent deals to unions.
9.	Those who answered "no" to the question but did not give any reason.

These reasons were analysed by grade and educational qualification as follows:-

TABLE 7  
REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE UNION;  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASONS (CATEGORY)	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1	4	11	1	1	5	-	3	25
2	1	1	1	4	-	-	2	9
3	1	3	1	3	2	3	12	25
4	-	1	2	2	1	-	2	8
5	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
6	4	7	1	7	9	1	9	38
7	1	2	1	6	3	-	1	14
8	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	2
9	-	2	1	1	-	-	1	5
TOTALS	11	28	8	24	21	4	32	128

The most popular reason given was No.6 - the weakness of the civil service unions; both the lower and higher grades were split 50/50 on this reason. Reason Nos.1 and 3 were equally popular but reason No.1 echoes No.6 in a different way. Whereas No.6 blames the unions' weakness, that is, lack of power in Blau's (1964)<sup>2</sup> sense, on the complacency and apathy of civil servants, No.1 appears to emphasize the unions' lack of power, that is, power in Kaplan's (1964)<sup>3</sup> sense,

thus implying lack of internal control. No.3 suggests that the unions' weakness was linked with the fact that officers were there to further their own interests and were therefore often powerless to challenge the management. It is interesting that 68 per cent of respondents who held this view were in the higher grades.

TABLE 7a  
REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION WITH THE UNION:  
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION

R E A S O N S	Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S									TOTAL
	N O N E	GCE "O" TO 5	GCE "O" OR MORE	GCE "A"	HNC/ HND	LLB/ LLM	FIRST DEGREE BSc., MA, BA., etc	DIP LO MA	MASTERS & PHD	
1	6	9	6	-	1	-	3	-	-	25
2	2	1	3	-	1	1	-	1	-	9
3	2	7	7	2	1	-	1	3	2	25
4	-	5	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	8
5	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
6	1	16	13	4	1	-	1	1	1	38
7	3	5	4	1	-	-	-	1	-	14
8	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	2
9	1	-	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	5
TOTAL	16	43	36	9	6	1	6	7	4	128

Only 19 per cent of respondents who stated reasons for dissatisfaction were in the higher education groups (HNC/HND upwards), compared with 81 per cent in the lower education groups (GCE "A" downwards). The 19 per cent constitutes 22 per cent of the higher education population sample. This lower percentage may be interpreted to mean that the higher the level of education the more members would be capable of understanding the difficulties of the unions. An "a fortiori" case for this interpretation is that the reasons stated were concrete and none of them can be dismissed as non-existent.

An opportunity to give more thought to the question analysed above and the answers evoked was prompted in the next question in order to elicit views which may have been restricted in the previous replies. The first part of the question "Have the problems and outcome of the pay negotiations of the last five years affected your reason for remaining a member of your union?" produced the following replies:-

Yes.....	146	=	29.2%
No.....	341	=	68.2%
Don't know....	8	=	1.6%
No reply.....	5	=	1.0%

The second part of the question, (6b) - "In what way?", was meant for respondents who answered "yes" in the previous question. This question was answered by 93 per cent of those respondents. The following categories of views were elicited:-

CATEGORY	VIEWS
1	As the union has greatly helped to improve my pay and conditions of service, continued membership is necessary to make future improvements possible.
2	The crassness of the employer and its cruelty make union membership even more crucial in order to build a much stronger union.
3	I grow more and more disappointed in my fellow members and more and more convinced that the union is divorcing itself from the real world.
4	I am now a more committed member and I would not want to be among the one or two that are non-members.
5	My union achieved pay settlement rationally. They come up with the right answers.
6	Reasonable achievement regarding wages demand but less regard for the lower paid.
7	Anything we have obtained has been obtained with the union muscle, without which we would have got even less.
8	Despite failure of the unions, it is only through membership of a union that one can directly influence employer/employee industrial relations.
9	As the Government does not pay any attention to a wage claim put by the unions, the unions' power has become so weak that it is not effective as a wage negotiator.
10	Non-reply.

These views were analysed in terms of grades as follows:-

TABLE 8  
REASONS FOR CONTINUING MEMBERSHIP\*  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

VIEWS (CATEGORY)	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS	
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII		
1	1	1	-	2	-	-	4	8	
2	4	8	4	6	6	-	9	37	
3	-	-	1	1	2	-	2	6	
4	2	2	1	4	4	-	8	21	
5	1	2	2	1	-	-	1	7	
6	1	1	-	2	1	-	1	6	
7	6	9	4	7	4	-	4	34	
8	1	3	1	2	3	-	1	11	
9	-	6	3	3	1	-	1	14	
10	NON - REPLY						(2)**		
TOTALS	16	32	16	28	21	-	31	144	

\*"Yes" respondents only. \*\*Not included in the totals.

The two most expressed views were categories 2 and 7; 26 per cent and 24 per cent respectively. Category 4 followed with 15 per cent. The realization that civil servants were dealing with a very difficult, faceless and often unreasonable employer was echoed in most of the views but even more so in categories 2 and 7. The resolve to be a more committed



member in category 4 was more pronounced in the higher grades.

These views were also examined in terms of educational attainment:-

TABLE 8a  
REASONS FOR CONTINUING MEMBERSHIP\*  
ANALYSIS BY QUALIFICATION

V I E W S	Q U A L I F I C A T I O N S									TOTAL
	N O N E	GCE "O" 1 TO 5	GCE "O" 6 OR MORE	GCE "A"	HNC/ HND	LLB/ LLM	FIRST DEGREE BSc., BA., etc	DIP LO MA	MASTERS & PHD	
1	-	3	3	-	-	-	1	1	-	8
2	1	16	11	5	1	-	3	-	-	37
3	1	2	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	6
4	4	4	11	1	-	-	-	1	-	21
5	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	2	1	7
6	2	2	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	6
7	13	11	4	1	1	-	3	-	1	34
8	2	2	3	1	-	-	3	-	-	11
9	2	4	5	1	2	-	-	-	-	14
10	NON - R E P L Y (2)**									
TOTAL	26	45	40	9	4	-	13	5	2	144

\*"Yes" respondents only. \*\*Not included in the totals.

A relatively lower percentage of respondents who continued their membership despite their dissatisfaction were in the higher education groups (HNC/HND upwards) - 17 per cent compared with 83 per cent in the lower education groups (GCE "A" downwards). This corroborates earlier result analysed on table 7a, where only 22 per cent of respondents in the higher education groups ( $24/107 \times 100$ ) stated reasons for dissatisfaction with their unions. Again, in the present analysis, 22 per cent of respondents in the higher education groups stated reasons for continued membership despite personal dissatisfaction. Therefore, it can be generalized that education is a factor in the degree to which members find fault with their unions. The same generalization may apparently be made about continued membership; one naturally follows from the other. As in the case of dissatisfaction it may be inferred that all things being equal members would have reasons to continue their membership despite dissatisfaction with their unions but dissatisfaction is less expressed the higher the educational level of the member.

The next group of questions, (questions 7-12) deal with union activities and the extent of participation. The distribution of local officers and ordinary members in the sample along the grades is shown in the following table:-

TABLE 9

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS (OFFICERS AND ORDINARY MEMBERS):  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

RESPON- DENTS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE
	I	II	III	IV		
Local Officers	20	58	32	98	208	69.3
Ordinary Members	26	38	5	23	92	30.7
Total Sample	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

TABLE 9a

DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS (OFFICERS AND ORDINARY MEMBERS):  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

RESPON- DENTS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE
	V	VI	VII		
Local Officers	47	6	77	130	65.0
Ordinary Members	25	4	41	70	35.0
Total Sample	72	10	118	200	100.0

AGGREGATES

Local Officers.....338 (67.6%)

Ordinary Members.....162 (32.4%)

As it was initially assumed that the higher up the grades the fewer would be the number of members who were interested in union activities the difficulty of finding sufficient number of local officer respondents in the higher grades was anticipated. However, this assumption was unfounded since

the number of completed questionnaires received particularly from the FDA and from members of other unions in the higher grades turned out to be excellent. Additional comments made on their questionnaires reflected their interests not only in trade union issues but surprisingly in the survey itself.

The relevance of question 8 "position held by officers" was significant when the sample was intended to be made up of union officers only. Its importance diminished when the sample structure changed. The comparison envisaged was no longer among officers but between officers and ordinary members. Question 8 was left out of the analysis on this account. In question 9 however, it was necessary to observe how the pay campaign in the years 1981, 1982 and 1983 affected the stability of the membership as well as measure the degree of support from members in those periods. Because of the confidential nature of this information questions 9, 10 and 11 were restricted to branch secretaries only. The following observations were made:-

TABLE 10

THE IMPACT OF THE PAY CAMPAIGN (1981-83) ON MEMBERSHIP

Members Recruited			Members Lost (resignations)		
1981	1982	1983	1981	1982	1983
203	136	187	286	92	96

The above data were interpreted as follows:-

TABLE 11  
NET MEMBERSHIP GAINS AND LOSSES

YEAR	GAINS	LOSSES
1981	-	83
1982	44	-
1983	91	-
Total	135	83

This represents a net gain of 52 members over the period in the branches sampled.

The assumption that the age of a branch and the (workplace) geographical distribution of its members would each reflect the amount of support which the branch actually gets when it takes industrial action was tested by correlating replies to question 9(iii) with that of question 10 and comparing the results with the result of correlating the replies to the same question (9iii) with the replies to question 11. Question 9(iii) "How much support did your members give", elicited the following replies:-

TABLE 12

## PAY CAMPAIGN (SELECTIVE STRIKE)

DEGREE OF SUPPORT	B R A N C H E S		
	1981	1982	1983
A lot	66	28	29
Poor	40	75	70
None	3	4	10

It is evident from these results that support drastically diminished after 1981. The Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) had mounted a strong campaign for what was termed "a fair living wage" for civil servants in 1981. Despite the well organized strategy and the massive support from non-striking members to maintain a prolonged selective strike the Government managed to sustain its stance till the end. The unions' claim of moral victory in the fact that the strike inflicted massive financial loses on the Treasury, seemed an illusion. The above results are indicative of the fact that the CCSU membership did not recover from the defeat of 1981. The poor support of the membership in the 1982 and 1983 campaigns was a regrettable aftermath. The following tables show how support was affected by age of branch and workplace geographical distribution of members:-

TABLE 13

DEGREE OF SUPPORT: ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH

YEAR	SUPPORT	AGE OF BRANCH (Years)			
		Under 5	5-10	11-20	Over 20
1981	A lot	9	6	25	26
1981	Poor	6	6	11	17
1981	None	-	-	1	2
1982	A lot	2	1	11	14
1982	Poor	13	11	24	27
1982	None	-	-	1	3
1983	A lot	3	1	10	15
1983	Poor	11	9	23	27
1983	None	1	2	4	3

TABLE 13a

DEGREE OF SUPPORT: ANALYSES BY WORKPLACE  
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

YEAR	SUPPORT	BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles)			
		Within 1	Under 5	Under 10	Over 10
1981	A lot	12	3	7	44
1981	Poor	14	2	3	20
1981	None	2	-	-	1
1982	A lot	9	2	2	15
1982	Poor	17	3	8	46
1982	None	2	-	-	2
1983	A lot	10	2	2	15
1983	Poor	17	2	6	44
1983	None	2	1	2	5

Although the above tables indicate greater support from older branches it is quite feasible if not absolutely true that branches which have been in existence for over ten years in the civil service unions out-number those which are under 10 years old. The possibility of such a disparity affecting the results in the above table should not be overlooked. Nevertheless, it is equally plausible to infer from the above analysis that older branches are more active than new ones. However, the analysis by workplace geographical distribution shows a significant difference between the amount of support from branches where members are scattered in areas over 10 miles and those where members are scattered in areas under 10 miles. A possible explanation of this, apart from chance, is that where members would have to travel distances over 10 miles in order to participate in union activities, local arrangements usually mean that instead of one meeting place there would be many meeting places within the branch. This facility ensures maximum participation in a branch where the large area covered is relative to the number of members represented. For the same reason, participation appears to be better in a branch where area covered is within one mile than in a branch where area covered is under 5 miles and under 10 miles respectively. Members may be reluctant to travel over one mile in order to participate.



MEETING ATTENDANCE

The complex problem of verifying who attended what meeting during the years 1981-1984 was dealt with in question 12. Emphasis was placed on two types of meetings, that is, the AGM and the Mandating Meeting (usually held before the annual conference). The third type of meeting was unspecified although "Pay Meetings" (meetings called to discuss pay offers) were mentioned by some respondents. The initial analysis distinguished between respondents who had attended only one type of meeting and did not attend the other two. Next, those who had attended two meetings were distinguished from those who had attended all three meetings. The following tables illustrate:-

**TABLE 14**  
**ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS (1981/82)**  
**ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS**

MEETINGS	LOCAL OFFICERS	% OF SAMPLE (N=338)	ORDINARY MEMBERS	% OF SAMPLE (N=162)
AGM	21	6.2	6	3.7
Mandate	1	0.3	1	0.6
Pay	8	2.3	3	1.9
AGM & Mandate	29	8.6	3	1.9
AGM & Pay	3	0.9	1	0.6
Mandate & Pay	4	1.2	1	0.6
All Meetings	221	65.4	13	8.0
Totals	287	84.9	28	17.3

**TABLE 14a**  
**ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS (1982/83)**  
**ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS**

MEETINGS	LOCAL OFFICERS	% OF SAMPLE (N=338)	ORDINARY MEMBERS	% OF SAMPLE (N=162)
AGM	20	5.9	5	3.1
Mandate	7	2.1	1	0.6
Pay	8	2.3	3	1.9
AGM & Mandate	34	10.0	5	3.1
AGM & Pay	5	1.5	1	0.6
Mandate & Pay	4	1.2	1	0.6
All Meetings	222	65.7	14	8.6
Totals	300	88.8	30	18.5

**TABLE 14b**  
**ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS (1983/84)**  
**ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS**

MEETINGS	LOCAL OFFICERS	% OF SAMPLE (N=338)	ORDINARY MEMBERS	% OF SAMPLE (N=162)
AGM	13	3.8	10	6.2
Mandate	6	1.8	-	-
Pay	7	2.1	5	3.1
AGM & Mandate	41	12.1	3	1.9
AGM & Pay	6	1.8	1	0.6
Mandate & Pay	5	1.5	1	0.6
All Meetings	234	69.2	17	10.4
Totals	312	92.3	37	22.8

From the above analysis, the average attendance over the three years is as follows:-

$$\text{Local Officer: } \frac{84.9 + 88.8 + 92.3}{3} = 88.7\%$$

compared with

$$\text{Ordinary Members: } \frac{17.3 + 18.5 + 22.8}{3} = 19.5\%$$

In both groups, attendance increased gradually from year to year. However, local officers were more regular at meetings than ordinary members. The result indicates the possibility of a branch meeting being attended by branch committee members only, and sometimes with very few ordinary members present. Evidently, fewer members attended meetings and by far the greatest majority of members who attended all meetings were branch officers.

The frequency of attendance by respondents of various grades is analysed in the following tables:-

TABLE 14c  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/82)  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

----- LOWER GRADES -----						
MEETINGS	I N=46	II N=96	III N=37	IV N=121	TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE N=300
-----						
AGM	3	4	3	8	18	6.0
Mandate	-	1	-	-	1	0.3
Pay	2	2	1	2	7	2.3
-----						
AGM & Mandate	1	8	2	7	18	6.0
-----						
AGM & Pay	2	1	-	1	4	1.3
-----						
Mandate & Pay	-	1	1	1	3	1.0
-----						
All Meetings	9	37	22	68	136	45.4
-----						
Totals	17	54	29	87	187	62.3
=====						

**TABLE 14d**  
**MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/82)**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

MEETINGS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE N=200
	V N=72	VI N=10	VII N=118		
AGM	3	-	6	9	4.5
Mandate	1	-	-	1	0.5
Pay	-	1	3	4	2.0
AGM & Mandate	6	-	8	14	7.0
AGM & Pay	-	-	-	-	-
Mandate & Pay	1	-	1	2	1.0
All Meetings	37	3	58	98	49.0
Totals	48	4	76	128	64.0

TABLE 14e  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83)  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

MEETINGS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE N=300
	I N=46	II N=96	III N=37	IV N=121		
AGM	4	7	3	4	18	6.0
Mandate	-	2	2	1	5	1.7
Pay	3	1	1	1	6	2.0
AGM & Mandate	2	9	2	10	23	7.6
AGM & Pay	1	1	-	3	5	1.7
Mandate & Pay	-	2	-	1	3	1.0
All Meetings	9	42	22	68	141	47.0
Totals	19	64	30	88	201	67.0

TABLE 14f  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83)  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

-----					
HIGHER GRADES					
MEETINGS	V N=72	VI N=10	VII N=118	TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE N=200
-----					
AGM	3	-	4	7	3.5
Mandate	2	-	1	3	1.5
Pay	1	1	3	5	2.5
AGM & Mandate	6	-	10	16	8.0
AGM & Pay	-	-	1	1	0.5
Mandate & Pay	-	1	1	2	1.0
All Meetings	37	3	55	95	47.5
Totals	49	5	75	129	64.5
=====					

**TABLE 14g**  
**MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84)**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

-----						
LOWER GRADES						
MEETINGS	I N=46	II N=96	III N=37	IV N=121	TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE N=300
-----						
AGM	6	7	3	2	18	6.0
Mandate	-	-	1	1	2	0.7
Pay	2	2	-	3	7	2.3
AGM & Mandate	4	9	3	11	27	9.0
AGM & Pay	2	1	-	2	5	1.7
Mandate & Pay	-	2	1	1	4	1.3
All Meetings	10	43	22	74	149	49.7
Totals	24	64	30	94	212	70.7
=====						



TABLE 14h  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84)  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

MEETINGS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE N=200
	V N=72	VI N=10	VII N=118		
AGM	1	-	4	5	2.5
Mandate	2	-	2	4	2.0
Pay	-	1	4	5	2.5
AGM & Mandate	7	1	9	17	8.5
AGM & Pay	1	-	1	2	1.0
Mandate & Pay	-	1	1	2	1.0
All Meetings	38	3	61	102	51.0
Totals	49	6	82	137	68.5

As explained above, three types of meetings were listed individually in the questionnaire and respondents were asked to indicate the meetings they had attended. This made the questionnaire simpler than having to include all possible combinations of the meetings as in the analysis above. A pattern of attendance was mapped from the analysis of the combinations. Since the resulting figures are mutually exclusive, in other words, figures representing attendance at one meeting are not included in the other categories, the "totals" in tables 14-14h are free from double counting, and represent the total attendance at all meetings including attendance at one and two meetings.

There is no significant difference in the above pattern between the attendance of the lower and the higher grade respondents. Taking the aggregate of the three types of attendance, that is, one meeting, two meetings and all meetings, over the three periods, the lower grades' attendance was 9.1, 10.2 and 47.4 per cent respectively, compared with 7.2, 9.3, and 49.2 per cent respectively. The slight differences indicate that fewer higher grade respondents attended one or two meetings and fewer lower grade respondents attended all meetings. However, the differences were not significant to warrant a generalization that one group attended more meetings than the other. The evidence is not strong enough.

In order to observe the effect of geographical (workplace) distribution of members, and the age of branch on attendance, the above results were further analysed in the light of questions 10 and 11 which were designed for branch secretaries only.

TABLE 15  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/82)  
ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH

MEETINGS	AGE OF BRANCH (Years)			
	Under 5	5-10	11-20	Over 20
AGM	3	1	1	5
Mandate	-	-	1	-
Pay	-	1	1	1
AGM & Mandate	1	2	2	4
AGM & Pay	-	-	-	1
Mandate & Pay	-	-	1	-
All Meetings	19	8	33	39
Totals	23	12	39	50

TABLE 15a  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83)  
ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH

MEETINGS	AGE OF BRANCH (Years)			
	Under 5	5-10	11-20	Over 20
AGM	2	2	-	5
Mandate	-	-	2	-
Pay	-	1	1	-
AGM & Mandate	1	3	3	4
AGM & Pay	1	-	-	1
Mandate & Pay	-	-	-	-
All Meetings	19	8	34	41
Totals	23	14	40	51

TABLE 15b  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84)  
ANALYSES BY AGE OF BRANCH

MEETINGS	AGE OF BRANCH (Years)			
	Under 5	5-10	11-20	Over 20
AGM	1	1	1	4
Mandate	-	-	3	-
Pay	-	1	1	-
AGM & Mandate	2	3	2	7
AGM & Pay	-	-	-	1
Mandate & Pay	-	-	-	-
All Meetings	23	9	32	41
Totals	26	14	39	53

TABLE 16  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1981/82)  
ANALYSIS BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

MEETINGS	BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles)			
	Within 1	Under 5	Under 10	Over 10
AGM	4	-	-	6
Mandate	-	-	-	1
Pay	2	-	-	1
AGM & Mandate	1	1	1	6
AGM & Pay	-	1	-	-
Mandate & Pay	-	-	1	-
All Meetings	22	7	10	62
Totals	29	9	12	76

TABLE 16a  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1982/83)  
ANALYSIS BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

MEETINGS	BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles)			
	Within 1	Under 5	Under 10	Over 10
AGM	5	-	-	4
Mandate	-	-	-	2
Pay	1	-	-	1
AGM & Mandate	1	1	2	7
AGM & Pay	-	1	-	1
Mandate & Pay	-	-	-	-
All Meetings	23	7	11	63
Totals	30	9	13	78

TABLE 16b  
MEETING ATTENDANCE (1983/84)  
ANALYSIS BY WORKPLACE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

MEETINGS	BRANCH GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION(miles)			
	Within 1	Under 5	Under 10	Over 10
AGM	2	-	-	5
Mandate	-	-	-	3
Pay	1	-	-	1
AGM & Mandate	3	1	2	8
AGM & Pay	-	1	-	-
Mandate & Pay	-	-	-	-
All Meetings	24	7	11	65
Totals	30	9	13	82

The tables established a similar pattern over the three years. Local officers who attended selected meetings only were very few. This was no surprise since the sample comprised branch secretaries only. It would have been unusual for the result to be the other way round, that is, for branch secretaries to attend predominantly selected meetings only; for this would mean that most branch secretaries simply did not attend meetings. It is therefore safe to infer that occasions when selected meetings were attended were instances when a branch secretary was indisposed and was unable to attend the other meetings.

However, looking at the table more closely, age of a branch and geographical distribution of members within the branch showed no observable effect on attendance. Fluctuation in the figures representing attendance in the branches as distinguished by age and distance was proportionate to the number which represented each group in the sample. For example, the number which represented attendance in branches under 5 years old was proportionate to the total number of branches which fell under that group. Similarly, the number which represented attendance in branches where membership was scattered over an area of 10 miles was proportionate to the number of branches which fell under that group. Therefore, there was no evidence that the age of a branch or the geographical distribution of its members had any effect on attendance.

In table 14 it was shown that on average, only about 19.5 per cent of ordinary members attended meetings, compared with about 88.7 per cent of local officers. Because fewer ordinary members attended meetings the next question was an attempt to elicit the reasons for non-attendance. The following reasons gathered from pilot interviews, were proposed. Respondents were asked to tick those which closely matched theirs:-

#### Question 12b

"If you missed any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for doing so: tick no more than three boxes for each you have missed"

#### Reasons

1. They don't achieve anything.
2. not interested in subject of meeting.
3. meetings tend to be long and boring.
4. was not told meeting was being held.
5. domestic reasons.
6. leave/official duty.
7. difficult to travel to/held at difficult time.
8. individual cannot influence decisions.
9. pressure of work.
10. no meeting was held.
11. other (a miscellany of reasons).

The replies were analysed by grades in the following tables:

**TABLE 17**  
**REASONS FOR MISSING THE AGM**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

REASONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1	-	1	-	-	1	0.4
2	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	3	-	-	3	1.0
4	1	-	-	-	1	0.4
5	6	4	-	6	16	5.3
6	-	1	3	-	4	1.3
7	1	1	1	2	5	1.7
8	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	3	-	1	4	1.3
10	-	-	1	-	1	0.3
11	-	-	-	1	1	0.3
Totals	8	13	5	10	36	12.0
Abstentions	38	83	32	111	264	88.0
Sample(N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0



**TABLE 17a**  
**REASONS FOR MISSING THE AGM**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

REASONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-
3	1	-	-	1	0.5
4	1	-	1	2	1.0
5	3	-	4	7	3.5
6	-	-	4	4	2.0
7	1	-	1	2	1.0
8	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	-	2	2	1.0
10	-	-	1	1	0.5
11	1	1	1	3	1.5
Totals	7	1	14	22	11.0
Abstentions	65	9	104	178	89.0
Sample(N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

**TABLE 17b**  
**REASONS FOR MISSING THE MANDATE MEETINGS**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

REASONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1	-	1	-	1	2	0.7
2	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	-	2	-	1	3	1.0
4	-	-	-	1	1	0.3
5	5	5	1	5	16	5.3
6	-	1	2	2	5	1.7
7	2	3	1	4	10	3.3
8	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	1	5	-	2	8	2.7
10	2	-	3	4	9	3.0
11	-	1	-	1	2	0.7
Totals	10	18	7	21	56	18.7
Abstentions	36	78	30	100	244	81.3
Sample(N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

**TABLE 17c**  
**REASONS FOR MISSING THE MANDATE MEETINGS**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

REASONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	2	2	1.0
3	1	-	-	1	0.5
4	1	-	-	1	0.5
5	-	-	5	5	2.5
6	-	-	2	2	1.0
7	1	-	1	2	1.0
8	-	-	-	-	-
9	1	-	3	4	2.0
10	-	-	3	3	1.5
11	1	1	1	3	1.5
Totals	5	1	17	23	11.5
Abstentions	67	9	101	177	88.5
Sample(N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

**TABLE 17d**  
**REASONS FOR MISSING SPECIAL MEETINGS**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

REASONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1	-	1	-	-	1	0.3
2	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	1	-	-	-	1	0.3
4	-	-	-	1	1	0.3
5	4	2	1	5	12	4.0
6	-	1	1	3	5	1.7
7	2	1	1	1	5	1.7
8	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	-	2	1	2	5	1.7
10	-	-	-	1	1	0.3
11	-	-	-	-	-	-
Totals	7	7	4	13	31	10.3
Abstentions	39	89	33	108	269	89.7
Sample(N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

TABLE 17e  
REASONS FOR MISSING SPECIAL MEETINGS  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1	-	-	-	-	-
2	-	-	-	-	-
3	1	-	1	2	1.0
4	-	-	-	-	-
5	3	-	4	7	3.5
6	1	-	3	4	2.0
7	-	-	1	1	0.5
8	-	-	-	-	-
9	1	-	3	4	2.0
10	-	-	3	3	1.5
11	1	1	1	3	1.5
Totals	7	1	16	24	12.0
Abstentions	65	9	102	176	88.0
Sample(N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

The paucity of replies to question 12b would seem to suggest that the majority of respondents who ignored it did so because they had attended all the meetings. However, judging from the number of replies to question 12a, "Which meetings did you attend?", the large number of respondents who omitted that question or failed to specify the meetings they attended and were deemed to have missed the meetings, would

support the inference that those who did not state the reasons for their absence, nevertheless missed the meetings.

TABLE 17f  
REASONS FOR MISSING MEETINGS  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

R E A S O N S	AGM			MANDATE			SPECIAL			ALL MEETINGS					
	GRADES	T	%	GRADES	T	%	GRADES	T	%	GRADES	T	%			
1	1	-	1	0.2	2	-	2	0.4	1	-	1	0.2	4	-	4
2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	0.4	-	-	-	-	2	2
3	3	1	4	0.8	3	1	4	0.8	1	2	3	0.6	7	4	11
4	1	2	3	0.6	1	1	2	0.4	1	-	1	0.2	3	3	6
5	16	7	23	4.6	16	5	21	4.2	12	7	19	3.8	44*	19*	63*
6	4	4	8	1.6	5	2	7	1.4	5	4	9	1.8	14	10	24
7	5	2	7	1.7	10	2	12	2.4	5	1	6	1.2	20	5	25
8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
9	4	2	6	1.2	8	4	12	2.4	5	4	9	1.8	17	10	27
10	1	1	2	0.4	9	3	12 <sup>+</sup>	2.4	1	3	4	0.8	11	7	18
11	1	3	4	0.8	2	3	5	1.0	-	3	3	0.6	3	9	12
TOT AL	36	22	58	11.6	56	23	79	15.8	31	24	55	11.0	-	-	-

The above analyses show that the most popular reason for absences was No.5 - Domestic reasons. The pattern observable established conclusively that the lower grades had a greater

tendency to miss meetings for domestic reasons. 69.8 per cent,  $(44/63 \times 100^*)$  of those who cited domestic reasons were in the lower grades group, compared with 30.2 per cent  $(19/63 \times 100^*)$  in the higher grades group.

On average, the mandate meeting seems to have the highest absence rate. 15.8\*\* per cent of the reasons given were for absences from mandate meeting, compared with 11.6\*\* per cent and 11.0\*\* per cent for the AGM and the Special meetings respectively. At least 15 per cent  $(12/79 \times 100^+)$  of those who missed the mandate meeting said they did so because none was held. Since all delegates to the Annual Conference are usually mandated from their branches the only feasible explanation for this unusual phenomenon is that those branches did not send delegates to the Annual Conference.

Another aspect of absence from meetings is leaving before the meeting is over. This aspect was dealt with in question 12c. Respondents were asked to state their reasons if they had left before the end of a meeting in the years 1981/82, 1982/83 and 1983/84. Because some respondents were unable to recall accurately what they did during all three periods it was decided to focus on one period (1983/84) for the purpose of the analyses. Respondents were asked to identify their own reasons from the following:-

TABLE 18  
REASONS FOR LEAVING BEFORE THE END OF A MEETING

REASON	Number Of Respondents	% (N=35)
1. I had to go back to work	9	25.7
2. I had to attend to my private business	21	60.0
3. I got bored	3	8.6
4. Other	2	5.7

TABLE 18a  
REASONS FOR LEAVING BEFORE THE END OF A MEETING  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASONS	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1	1	2	3	-	-	-	3	9
2	2	5	-	5	5	-	4	21
3	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	3
4	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2
TOTALS	4	8	3	6	7	-	7	35
SAMPLE	46	96	37	121	72	10	118	500

Only 7 per cent of the sample (35x100/500) gave reasons why they left early. The rest either did not attend any meetings or did not leave early. Here again, the analysis does not indicate any observable difference in attitudes among the grades but the notion that union meetings are boring is examined. 8 per cent of the respondents left early because they were bored. Boredom at union meetings depends more



often on the interests of members present. A member who sits through discussion of topics on which he has no views and no contribution is more likely to be bored in the course of the discussion. Contribution presupposes views and views presuppose interest. The 60 per cent who left in order to attend to their private business chose to do so because they were not interested in the discussions taking place. If they were, they would have made alternative arrangement for their business commitments rather than miss the discussions.

On the other hand, those who leave early in order to attend to their private business stand in danger of being accused of abusing facility time, whereas they may not be doing so. The rules of facility time vary between departments but they share a common principle. Facility time is usually granted to coincide with, and often overlap lunch or other statutory brakes. Members whose prior lunch time private appointments clash with union meetings but do not wish to miss either may decide to attend their meetings but leave early in order to accommodate their own appointments.

The 26 per cent who left early in order to go back to work were not necessarily all members in the higher grades as might be expected. This observation will form a premise in the sequence of syllogisms when testing the hypotheses.

DEGREE OF MILITANCY

The depth of militancy among members was examined in the next question (13). The 1981 pay negotiation was a particularly difficult one. The Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) adopted a strategy of "selective strike" whereby instead of a total shut down of the entire civil service, labour was withdrawn from a number of areas, a few at a time, calculated to be of some strategic importance from the point of view of the campaign. These areas were considered to be vital to the revenue of the Central Government. Branches not selected for the strike were urged to make financial contributions towards the strike fund. In the first part of this question, respondents were asked to state what stage of the campaign they were prepared to accept the offer proposed by the Treasury. The result was as follows:-

TABLE 19  
STAGES AT WHICH TREASURY OFFER WAS ACCEPTED

STAGE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	% (N=460)
1. Before the selective strike	45	9.8
2. After two weeks of the strike	7	1.5
3. Half way through the strike	49	10.7
4. Offer was never acceptable to me	359	78.0

TABLE 19a  
STAGES AT WHICH TREASURY OFFER WAS ACCEPTED  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

STAGES	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1	4	8	5	13	2	-	13	45
2 (q)	2	2	1	2	-	-	-	7
3	1	9	1	12	7	3	16	49
4(r)	24	69	26	90	61	5	84	359
TOTALS(s)	31	88	33	117	70	8	113	460

Before interpreting the above data it should be noted that the Treasury resorted to a "post-negotiation executive action"<sup>4</sup> by implementing their offer even though it had been turned down by the CCSU in accordance with the result of the ballot of the membership. The survey indicates that whereas about 10 per cent of the respondents would have accepted the offer without the need to strike and another 12 per cent actually succumbed after the strike had begun, by far the greatest majority (78 per cent) rejected the offer and would probably have been prepared to carry on the strike action.

The above data indicate an overall high degree of militancy. Also indicated is a higher degree of militancy among members in the higher grades. The empirical calculations are as

follows:-

Respondents who opted for stages 1 to 3 (q) were considered to be non-militant or less militant than respondents who opted for stage 4 (r). Taking the total number of respondents in each grade as (s) and calculating the percentage of respondents who opted for stage 4 ( $r/s \times 100$ ) in each case, then calculating the arithmetic mean of the lower grades and that of the higher grades, a mean difference is obtained as follows:-

TABLE 19b  
MEAN ( $\bar{x}$ ) OF LOWER GRADES

GRADES	I	II	III	IV	$\bar{x}$
Percentages ( $r/s \times 100$ )	77	78	78	77	77.5

TABLE 19c  
MEAN ( $\bar{x}$ ) OF HIGHER GRADES

GRADES	V	VI	VII	$\bar{x}$
Percentages ( $r/s \times 100$ )	87	63	74	74.6

$$\text{Mean difference} = \frac{L}{N} (\bar{x}) - \frac{H}{N} (\bar{x}) = 77.5 - 74.6 = \underline{2.9\%}$$

This difference is much less than can be accounted for by the higher ratio of lower grade members to higher grade members in the sample. The overall population sample is made up of 60 per cent of respondents in the lower grades and 40 per cent of respondents in the higher grades, a difference of 20 per cent.<sup>5</sup> This difference is narrowed down in the number of respondents who actually answered the question, 58.5 per cent lower grades and 41.5 per cent higher grades,

a difference of 17 per cent, which is further reduced to 2.9 per cent in the above analyses. An interpretation of this decrease is a higher level of militancy among the higher grades.

The second part of the question (13b) was an attempt to corroborate the empirical findings in the first part with more evidence. After several weeks of sustained selective strike a ballot of the membership on the Treasury offer was taken. Respondents were asked to indicate how they voted. The following results emerged:-

TABLE 20  
BALLOT ON TREASURY OFFER

VOTE	NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS	% (N=467)
Accept	155	33.2
Reject	288	61.7
Abstain	24	5.1

TABLE 20a  
BALLOT ON TREASURY OFFER: ANALYSIS BY GRADE

VOTES	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
Accept(t)	15	29	12	37	15	3	44	155
Reject(u)	14	55	20	80	56	2	61	288
Abstain	4	5	2	1	-	2	10	24
Totals(v)	(a) 33	(b) 89	(c) 34	(d) 118	(e) 71	(f) 7	(g) 115	(h) 467

Using the same pattern of calculation as above, this time with emphasis on respondents who rejected the offer, a mean difference between the lower grades and the higher grades is obtained as follows:-

TABLE 20b  
MEAN ( $\bar{x}$ ) OF LOWER GRADES(Reject Offer)

GRADES	I	II	III	IV	$\bar{x}$
Percentages (u/vx100)	42.4	61.8	58.8	67.8	57.7

TABLE 20c  
MEAN ( $\bar{x}$ ) OF HIGHER GRADES(Reject Offer)

GRADES	V	VI	VII	$\bar{x}$
Percentages (u/vx100)	78.9	28.6	53.0	53.5

$$\text{Mean difference} = \frac{L}{N} (\bar{x}) - \frac{H}{N} (\bar{x}) = 57.7 - 53.5 = 4.2\%$$

The "mean" ( $\bar{x}$ ) of respondents who answered this part of the question is 58.4 per cent<sup>6</sup> (lower grades) and 41.3 per cent<sup>7</sup> (higher grades), a difference of 17.1 per cent.

Here again, the difference in the "means" of respondents who rejected the offer in the lower grades and those in the higher grades (4.2 per cent) is much smaller, and corroborates the result obtained in the first part: a higher degree of militancy among the higher grades.

The next question (14) examines the reason for each ballot decision with a view to tracing the pattern which was beginning to emerge regarding attitude to militancy. Answers to

this question are germane to the rationale of the survey. The remaining parts of the questionnaire were designed to corroborate or refute the answers to the question in order to facilitate tests of the hypotheses, a vital aspect of the survey conclusion. The reasons for each of the options given in table 20 are analysed in the next three tables.

TABLE 21  
DECISION TO ACCEPT THE OFFER

REASON FOR DECISION	IMPORTANT				N	TOTALS
	V	Q	MO	N	O	
	E	U	DE	O	INF	
	R	I	RA	T	EN	
	Y	T	TE	VE	CE	
		E	LY	RY		
The offer was good enough	9	4	2	-	-	15
Escalation of the dispute would be futile	89	9	3	-	-	101
I could not afford further loss of earnings	28	2	-	-	-	30
I do not agree with strikes	8	-	-	-	-	8
Lack of support from the rest of the membership	1	-	-	-	-	1
TOTALS	135	15	5	-	-	155

87 per cent of those who decided to accept the offer believed the reason for their decision to be very important. Only 13 per cent perceived their reasons as quite or moderately important. The most popular reason was that "escalation of the dispute would be futile". Over 60 per cent of

those who voted acceptance had lost faith in the efficacy of the strike. About 19 per cent gave up because their losses were beginning to bite. Those who felt the offer was good enough were under 10 per cent and those who did not believe in strikes were only 5 per cent. Those whose decision to accept was influenced by lack of support for the strike were under 1 per cent.

TABLE 22  
DECISION TO REJECT THE OFFER

REASON FOR DECISION	IMPORTANT				N O INF LU EN CE	TOTALS
	V E R Y	Q U I T E	MO DE RA TE LY	N O T V E R Y		
Felt offer meant still lower living standards	162	14	3	-	-	179
A little more resistance would have forced a concession	75	8	1	-	-	84
Belief in the CCSU's ability to succeed	9	2	-	-	-	11
Political opposition to Government policy	12	-	-	-	-	12
<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>258</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>286</b>

Over 90 per cent of those who voted for rejection thought the reason for their decision to be very important. Under 9 per cent felt their reasons were less important. Well over 62 per cent said the offer meant still lower living standards for civil servants. 29 per cent were optimistic enough



to believe that more resistance would have forced a concession. Very few respondents (4 per cent) believed in the ability of the CCSU to succeed and were prepared to back their belief by rejecting the Treasury offer. Turning down the offer as a gesture of "political opposition to government policy" was neither anticipated nor thought of as a feasible answer in the survey. Over 4 per cent gave this as the reason for their decision. A few respondents abstained from the ballot for the following reasons:-

TABLE 23  
DECISION TO ABSTAIN FROM BALLOT

REASON FOR DECISION	IMPORTANT				N O INF LU EN CE	TOTALS
	V E R Y	Q U I T E	MO DE R A T E LY	N O T V E R Y		
I felt the offer would not improve anyway	14	1	-	-	-	15
I was fed up with the CCSU	4	-	-	-	-	4
I was fed up with the employer	2	-	-	-	-	2
I could not care less	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS	20	1	-	-	-	21

Nearly all respondents who abstained from the ballot believed their reasons to be very important; 71 per cent felt the offer would not improve whatever the result of the

ballot was; 19 per cent said they were fed up with the CCSU, and about ten per cent said they were fed up with the employer. The 71 per cent who felt the offer would not improve were quite right, for as stated above, the Government implemented it despite the fact that it was rejected.

The reaction of respondents to the series of half day strikes was elicited in the next question (15). Every civil service trade unionist was involved in the pay campaign, some more directly than others. The half day strikes gave all members of the CCSU an opportunity to be directly involved. There were mixed feelings about the action even among those who freely contributed to the strike fund regularly. Question 15 asked respondents to state their reactions to the series of half day official all out strikes during the period. In analysing the question, particular care was taken to observe the correlation between respondents' reactions and their age group, grade and economic circumstances. The questionnaire proposed the following list of reactions from which respondents were asked to choose:-

1. Agreed and took action.....(x)
2. Agreed but did not take action.
3. Disagreed but took action...(y)
4. Disagreed and took no action.

TABLE 24  
REACTIONS TO HALF-DAY STRIKE  
AGE ELEMENT

REACT- ION No.	AGE GROUP					TOTAL
	UNDER 21 (i)	21-30 (j)	31-40 (k)	41-50 (l)	51 & OVER (m)	
1. (x)	-	75	142	59	31	307
2.	-	1	8	13	4	26
3. (y)	-	25	45	12	14	96
4.	-	4	13	9	8	34
TOTALS (z)	-	105	208	93	57	463

An overall 87 per cent of the respondents came out even though 21 per cent disagreed with the action. Only 13 per cent ignored the strike. However, it would appear that about 6 per cent of these were in favour of it despite their inability to come out. The effect of age on the propensity to strike was examined as follows:-

(x) which represents those who agreed and took action, plus (y) which represents those who disagreed but took action, calculated as a percentage of the total sample of those in each age group (z) who answered the question:

$$\frac{x + y}{z} \times 100$$

TABLE 24a  
THE EFFECT OF AGE

FORMULA	AGE GROUP (%)				
$\frac{x + y}{z} \times 100$	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)
	-	95.2	89.9	76.3	78.9

$$\text{Averages:- } \frac{(j+k)}{2} - \frac{(l+m)}{2} = 92.6 - 77.6 = 15\%$$

This calculation shows that age group (j), 21-30, is the most militant. It also shows that trade unionists are more militant up to the age of 40 and less so from age 41 and above. 15 per cent indicates the degree by which militancy is higher in the age groups up to 40.

TABLE 25  
REACTIONS TO HALF DAY STRIKE  
INFLUENCE OF STATUS

REACTION No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.(x)	22	57	18	76	49	4	81	307
2.	2	5	9	6	-	1	3	26
3.(y)	5	16	2	31	20	1	21	96
4.	4	8	5	6	2	1	8	34
TOTALS(z)	33	86	34	119	71	7	113	463

Concentrating on respondents who took action, whether they agreed with the strike or not, that is, reactions 1 and 3, the percentage for each grade is calculated as follows:-

$$\frac{x + y}{z} \times 100$$

TABLE 25a  
INFLUENCE OF STATUS - PERCENTAGES

LOWER GRADES (L)				HIGHER GRADES (H)		
I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
81.8%	84.9%	58.8%	89.9%	97.2%	71.4%	90.3%

The mean of lower grades ( $\bar{x}$ ) =  $\frac{L}{n} = \frac{315.4}{4} = 78.9\%$

The mean of higher grades ( $\bar{x}$ ) =  $\frac{H}{n} = \frac{258.9}{3} = 86.3\%$

Again, this indicates a higher degree of militancy among the higher grades.

TABLE 26  
EFFECT OF FINANCIAL COMMITMENT (DWELLING)

REACTION No.	WHAT IS PAID FOR ACCOMMODATION				TOTALS
	MORTGAGE	RENT	OWNER*	NONE**	
1.	44	235	28	-	307
2.	2	16	8	-	26
3.	16	70	8	2	96
4.	3	25	6	-	34
TOTALS	65	346	50	2	463

\*Owner, after paying off the mortgage

\*\*Leaving with parents or where accommodation is provided with the job.

89 per cent of respondents who answered this question were either mortgage or rent payers and only 11 per cent were outright owners of their houses or did not have to pay for their accommodation. 89 per cent of those who had rent or

mortgage commitments came out on strike and only 11 per cent did not. On the other hand, 73 per cent of those who had no rent or mortgage commitments came out and 27 per cent did not. Therefore, rent and mortgage commitments had negative influence on decision to strike.

TABLE 27  
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: SINGLE PERSONS

REACTION No.	FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES								TOTALS
	CHILDREN UNDER 18				CHILDREN OVER 18				
	1	2	3etc.	NONE	1	2	3etc.	NONE	
1.	2	2	-	74	1	-	-	77	78
2.	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	2
3.	-	-	-	23	-	-	-	23	23
4.	-	-	-	9	1	-	-	8	9
TOTALS	2	2	-	108	2	-	-	110	112

The table above is summarized as follows:-

TABLE 27a  
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: SINGLE PERSONS

REACTIONS	CHILDREN UNDER 18				CHILDREN OVER 18			
	1	2	3etc.	NONE	1	2	3etc.	NONE
Took action %	100*	100*	-	89.8	50	-	-	90.0
No action %	0	0	-	10.2	50	-	-	10.1

\*There were only two people in each of the categories and they all took action.

The sample of 112 respondents analysed above consisted of 6 single parents. Two of these each had 1 child under 18, two had two children under 18 and two had 1 child over eighteen. The rest were single persons without children. The first

observation here is that out of the six single parents only one disagreed with the strike and took no action. The other five agreed and took action. It would therefore seem that family responsibility had little or no influence on decisions about strike. Although no generalization can yet be made from this until results from other categories and samples have been examined it is significant that only one out of six single parents with children did not come out. Secondly, it should be observed that reasons for the reactions had nothing to do with family commitment. Thirdly, over 90 per cent of the single persons took action, a positive reaction, although it would not have altered the above findings if they all reacted negatively by ignoring the strike. It would only reinforce it.

TABLE 27b  
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT; MARRIED PERSONS

REACTION No.	FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES								TOTALS
	CHILDREN UNDER 18				CHILDREN OVER 18				
	1	2	3etc.	NONE	1	2	3etc.	NONE	
1.	52	45	14	86	18	6	2	171	197
2.	2	4	1	14	3	1	1	16	21
3.	17	18	4	24	2	3	-	58	63
4.	3	7	2	8	3	-	-	17	20
TOTALS	74	74	21	132	26	10	3	262	301

Above table is summarized as follows:-

TABLE 27c  
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: MARRIED PERSONS

REACTIONS	CHILDREN UNDER 18				CHILDREN OVER 18			
	1	2	3etc.	NONE	1	2	3etc.	NONE
Took action %	93.2	85.1	85.7	83.3	76.9	90	66.7	87.4
No action %	6.8	14.9	14.3	16.7	23.1	10	33.3	12.6

Every member of this population sample is married. Taking each group separately, that is, those with one, two, three and no children, the percentage of those who took action was in each case much larger than those who did not. Here again, the earlier findings are corroborated - family commitment did not have a significant effect on decisions to strike. This refutes the popular notion that financial commitment is a factor in the propensity to strike, in other words, that people's attitude towards strike is determined by their level of financial commitment. These findings neither support nor contradict Edwards' (1979) findings that high wages provide the means to support a strike.<sup>8</sup> However, they do confirm that in the case of active civil service trade unionists, moral principles play a greater part in decisions to take a strike action. A useful distinction ought to be made at this point between three types of union membership, in order to facilitate interpretation of these results. The three types of membership are governed by attitude and identification. The attitude aspect is universal. It governs all



the three types of membership - ordinary members, active members and local office holders - in the same degree. But the extent to which identification governs the types of membership would vary according to the degree of individual involvement. For instance, the degree to which one identifies himself as a member intensifies when he decides to become more actively involved and, when this involvement is transformed into taking on a local officer responsibility, identification, a fortiori, is at its peak.

The sample population of this survey excluded those ordinary members whose degree of identification was low. They may have possessed the right attitude in joining their unions but with their low identification profile their indifference to matters relating to their organization perforce segregated them as unreliable for the survey. Those respondents whose questionnaires were returned uncompleted or with only a few answers and were therefore weeded out before the final sample was selected, fitted into this category. The impossibility of interpreting blank questionnaires made the inclusion of such pusillanimous members impractical. The result of the survey is therefore representative of those who genuinely, by virtue of their conscious affiliations and involvement with their unions, possessed values about which valid interpretations and generalizations can be made.

The next table is an analysis of the reactions of divorced or separated members. The candid replies elicited from these and most of the respondents made objective comparisons possible.

TABLE 27d  
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: DIVORCED/SEPARATED PERSONS

REACTION No.	FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES								TOTALS
	CHILDREN UNDER 18				CHILDREN OVER 18				
	1	2	3etc.	NONE	1	2	3etc.	NONE	
1.	3	4	-	25	2	-	-	30	32
2.	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	1	2
3.	3	-	-	7	1	-	2	7	10
4.	1	-	1	3	-	-	1	4	5
TOTALS	7	5	1	36	4	-	3	42	49

Above table is summarized as follows:-

TABLE 27e  
EFFECT OF FAMILY COMMITMENT: DIVORCED/SEPARATED PERSONS

REACTIONS	CHILDREN UNDER 18				CHILDREN OVER 18			
	1	2	3etc.	NONE	1	2	3etc.	NONE
Took action %	85.7	80	0	88.9	75	-	66.7	88.1
No action %	14.3	20	100*	11.1	25	-	33.3	11.9

\*Only one person fitted the category and he/she did not strike.

There was only one divorced person with three or more children under 18 in the sample and he/she did not take action. Since there were not enough respondents in the category the 100 per cent indicated in the above summary is not

significant. However, it could be interpreted to mean that divorced/separated persons who have three or more children under 18 have very low to 0 propensity to strike. As this is a chance occurrence, a generalization from it would not be valid. However, the overall picture is that among divorced/separated persons family commitment has very little effect on decision to strike. The following table would facilitate generalization on the issue of the influence of family commitment on decision to take strike action:-

TABLE 27f  
INFLUENCE OF FAMILY COMMITMENT ON DECISION TO STRIKE

FAMILY COMMITMENT	SINGLE		MARRIED		DIVORCED/ SEPARATED	
	(A)%	(B)%	(A)%	(B)%	(A)%	(B)%
C U H N I D L E D R R E 1 N 8 ONE	100.0	0	93.2	6.8	85.7	14.3
I D L E D R R E 1 N 8 TWO	100.0	0	85.1	14.9	80.0	20.0
I D L E D R R E 1 N 8 THREE OR MORE	-	-	85.7	14.3	0	100.0
I D L E D R R E 1 N 8 NONE	89.8	10.2	83.3	16.7	88.9	11.1
C O H V I E L R D R E 1 N 8 ONE	50.0	50.0	76.9	23.1	75.0	25.0
C O H V I E L R D R E 1 N 8 TWO	-	-	90.0	10.0	-	-
C O H V I E L R D R E 1 N 8 THREE OR MORE	-	-	66.7	33.3	66.7	33.3
C O H V I E L R D R E 1 N 8 NONE	90.9	10.1	87.4	12.6	88.1	11.9
MEANS(x)	86.0	14.0	83.5	16.5	69.2	30.8

=====  
(A)=Took action; (B)=Took no action.

The following interpretations are feasible from the above summary:-

1. There was no significant difference between the reactions of single and married persons with or without children. The varied degree of family commitments from none to three or more children under or over 18, had very little effect on their decision to strike.
2. Divorced/separated persons with children over 18 reacted differently. They seem to have lower propensity to strike, whereas those of them who had children under 18 reacted exactly in the same manner as the rest.
3. All three groups, single, married and divorced without children, reacted in the same manner. They had no family commitments and displayed a high propensity to strike. By comparison, those with commitments, that is, one, two and three or more children under 18, displayed the same level of propensity. The influence of family commitments is therefore slight except in the case of married and divorced persons with three or more children over 18, where the lower strike propensity may be linked with the heavier family commitments.

Question 16 (a-d) probed deeper to find out how respondents took their ballot decisions. The reasons elicited are analysed in the following tables. In question 16a respondents who agreed with the half-day strikes and took action were asked to identify their reasons from the following:-

1. To maintain union solidarity.
2. Loyalty to my branch.
3. I must play my part.
4. I believe in our cause (right to a living wage).
5. Other...

TABLE 28a  
AGREED AND TOOK ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASON No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.	10	24	10	37	29	1	33	144
2.	-	4	-	-	1	-	4	9
3.	2	3	1	8	2	1	12	29
4.	10	26	7	31	17	2	33	126
5.	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
TOTALS	22	57	18	76	49	4	83	309
	-- 173 --				-- 136 --			

=====

The above results are interpreted from a point of view different from previous analyses by grade. The number of respondents representing the lower grades in the main population sample was 300 and 200 represented the higher grades. According to the above figures, 58 per cent ( $173/300 \times 100$ ) of

the lower grades agreed with the strike and took action, compared with 68 per cent (136/200x100) of the higher grades. The higher grades appeared to be more militant. Once again this corroborates earlier findings.

Those respondents who agreed with the half-day strikes but did not take part were asked to give their reasons. The following reasons were listed and analysed:-

1. One day/half-day strikes would not influence the final outcome.
2. Most members in my branch did not come out.
3. I could not afford the loss of pay.
4. To avoid disciplinary action of my employer.
5. My post does not allow strikes.
6. Not required to strike.

TABLE 28b  
AGREED BUT DID NOT TAKE ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASON No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.	-	1	3	3	-	-	-	7
2.	1	-	1	4	-	-	2	8
3.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
4.	-	2	2	-	-	1	-	5
5.	-	2	1	1	-	-	-	4
6.	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2
TOTALS	2	5	9	8	-	1	2	27
	-- 24 --				-- 3 --			

=====

Quite clearly, respondents who agreed with the strike but failed to come out were in the minority: 8 per cent of the lower grades as against 1.5 per cent of the higher grades. The fact that a greater proportion of these were in the lower grades, as shown in the above analysis, reinforces previous results - degree of militancy was lower in the lower grades and higher in the higher grades. Not everybody who agreed with the strike came out and obviously there were respondents who came out without necessarily agreeing with the action. The reasons given for this reaction are listed below and analysed in the next table:-

1. To maintain union solidarity.
2. Loyalty to my branch.
3. I was under pressure to conform.
4. Other...

TABLE 28c  
DISAGREED BUT TOOK ACTION; ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASON No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.	4	13	1	26	18	1	19	82
2.	2	2	1	3	2	-	1	11
3.	-	1	-	1	-	-	3	5
4.	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
TOTALS	6	16	2	31	20	1	23	99

-- 55 --

-- 44 --

=====

Interpreting the above data using previous formula, that is,  

$$\frac{\text{respondents who came out}}{\text{population sample}} \times 100,$$

produces the following results:-

Lower grades:  $\frac{55}{300} \times 100 = 18.3\%$   
 Higher grades  $\frac{44}{200} \times 100 = 22.0\%$

Again, the higher grades are shown to be more militant.

Reasons given by respondents who disagreed and took no action are listed and analysed below:-

1. Claims were not justifiable in the economic circumstances.
2. I do not believe in strikes.
3. The Government would not have given in.
4. My work would suffer.

TABLE 28d  
DISAGREED AND TOOK NO ACTION: ANALYSIS BY GRADE

REASON No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.	-	3	-	2	-	1	3	9
2.	2	5	3	2	1	-	4	17
3.	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	4
4.	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
TOTALS	3	8	5	4	2	1	8	31
	-- 20 --				-- 11 --			



Using the same formula, the data indicates the same pattern as above. The percentage of lower grades who disagreed and took no action -  $20/300 \times 100 = 6.6\%$  is higher than the percentage of higher grades -  $11/200 \times 100 = 5.5\%$ , again confirming lower propensity to strike among lower grades. It is interesting to note that only five respondents refused to take strike action on account of their work. Four of these agreed with the action but did not come out because their posts did not allow "strikes". The fifth person disagreed with the action and did not come out because his work would suffer. All five surprisingly were in the lower grades. If anyone would opt out of a strike on account of his work it is more likely to be someone higher up in the hierarchy who had allowed himself to be overwhelmed by what Festinger (1957) termed "cognitive dissonance".<sup>9</sup> The results indicate that this is not so.

The pay campaign in the years 1979-83 were particularly difficult. On each occasion the campaign began with great enthusiasm which mellowed as the employer continued to maintain resistance. The employer's resistance in 1981 appeared to have shaped the future attitudes of many union members towards strikes. The notion that taking a strike action against the Government was a waste of time had become firmly fixed in the minds of many. How widespread or real was this notion? Question 17 exploits the experience of 1981 and asks for respondents' views on an all-out indefinite strike. The question was hypothetical in so far as this category of industrial action was contemplated but not invoked. What was envisaged here was the possibility of monitoring any attitude change which might have taken place as a direct result of the disappointment suffered in 1981. To the question "If an all out indefinite strike were called by the CCSU and endorsed by your union in support of pay claim for 1981, 1982 or 1983 what would you have done?", the following alternative replies were proposed:-

1. Stay out indefinitely.
2. Come out for a week or two then return to work.
3. Ignore the strike call.

Once again, the analysis of the result is linked with grades in order to ascertain the consistency of the replies with other findings:-

TABLE 29a  
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1981/82

REACTIONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1.	11	52	16	80	159	53.0
2.	10	20	4	14	48	16.0
3.	10	17	13	21	61	20.3
TOTALS	31	89	33	115	268	89.3
ABSTENTIONS	15	7	4	6	32	10.7
SAMPLE(N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

TABLE 29b  
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1981/82

REACTIONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1.	53	2	57	112	56.0
2.	12	2	18	32	16.0
3.	7	4	37	48	24.0
TOTALS	72	8	112	192	96.0
ABSTENTIONS	-	2	6	8	4.0
SAMPLE (N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

TABLE 29c  
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1982/83

REACTIONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1.	11	42	12	60	125	41.7
2.	11	28	7	26	72	24.0
3.	11	20	13	27	71	23.6
TOTALS	33	90	32	113	268	89.3
ABSTENTIONS	13	6	5	8	32	10.7
SAMPLE(N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

TABLE 29d  
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1982/83

REACTIONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1.	47	2	43	92	46.0
2.	15	1	20	36	18.0
3.	10	5	48	63	31.5
TOTALS	72	8	111	191	95.5
ABSTENTIONS	-	2	7	9	4.5
SAMPLE (N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

TABLE 29e  
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1983/84

REACTIONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1.	14	43	14	63	134	44.7
2.	10	28	5	22	65	21.6
3.	13	21	13	30	77	25.7
TOTALS	37	92	32	115	276	92.0
ABSTENTIONS	9	4	5	6	24	8.0
SAMPLE(N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

TABLE 29f  
REACTION TO ALL-OUT STRIKE (HYPOTHETICAL) 1983/84

REACTIONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1.	46	2	42	90	45.0
2.	15	-	18	33	16.5
3.	11	6	53	70	35.0
TOTALS	72	8	113	193	96.5
ABSTENTIONS	-	2	5	7	3.5
SAMPLE (N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

The results indicate a gradual increase in the number of respondents who said they would ignore the strike call in the three years:-

TABLE 29g

YEAR	LOWER GRADE	HIGHER GRADE
1981/82	20.3	24.5
1982/83	23.6	31.5
1983/84	25.7	35.0

The number of respondents who said they would stay out indefinitely declined:-

TABLE 29h

YEAR	LOWER GRADE	HIGHER GRADE	$\bar{x}$
1981/82	53.0	56.0	54.5
1982/83	41.7	46.0	43.9
1983/84	44.7	45.0	44.9

Between 1981/82 and 1982/83 there was an increase in the number of respondents who were not quite sure whether to stay out indefinitely or ignore the strike call. The figure dropped in 1983/84.

TABLE 29i

YEAR	LOWER GRADE	HIGHER GRADE
1981/82	16.0	16.0
1982/83	24.0	18.0
1983/84	21.6	16.5

Thus, the effect of the 1980/81 pay disappointment was quite palpable. The number of respondents who would strike declined over the three years, 47.8 per cent compared with 80.6 per cent who actually struck in 1980/81. However, the effect was not decisive in so far as there was a good number of respondents who would still come out nevertheless.

The results also show that the tendency to rationalize a strike decision is greater now. The following analyses show that although there had been a significant change in attitude towards strikes, the change was more palpable among the higher grades.

TABLE 29j  
PROPENSITY TO STRIKE

TABLES SUMMARIZED	LOWER GRADES				% OF SAMPLE (N=300)	HIGHER GRADES			% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	I	II	III	IV		V	VI	VII	
28a +28c (Totals only)	28	73	20	107	76*	69	5	106	90**
	(x <sup>1</sup> )					(x <sup>2</sup> )			
(Y)	12	46	14	68	46***	63	2	47	56****
	(x <sup>3</sup> )					(x <sup>4</sup> )			
					30				34

(Y)= Respondents who said they would stay out indefinitely in tables 29a, 29c and 29e divide by 3 and in tables 29b, 29d and 29f divide by 3, in each grade.

$$* = \frac{x^1}{300} \times 100; \quad ** = \frac{x^2}{200} \times 100; \quad *** = \frac{x^3}{300} \times 100;$$

$$**** = \frac{x^4}{200} \times 100$$

Propensity to strike had dropped among the lower grades by 30 per cent and by 34 per cent among the higher grades.

Interest was next focused on respondents who felt they would have ignored the hypothetical strike. In question 18, respondents were asked to indicate the strength of their reason if they had opted to ignore the hypothetical strike. It was hoped that replies to this question would corroborate the findings about the effect of the failures of the 1980/81 pay campaign. The following reply options were suggested:-

1. I do not believe in strikes.
2. I cannot afford to go on strike.
3. Strike would conflict with my job.
4. I do not believe in the unions' cause.
5. Members would not support the strike.

The analyses were based on income, commitment, grades, trade union position held and educational qualification:-



TABLE 30a  
RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE  
ANALYSIS BY INCOME GROUP

REASON No.	INCOME GROUPS [(£) Wages Per Week]								TO TA LS
	Under 51	51- 100	101- 150	151- 200	201- 250	251- 300	301- 350	351- etc.	
1.	-	4	8	9	5	2	1	2	31
2.	1	5	11	10	9	-	1	3	40
3.	-	-	2	5	4	3	-	4	18
4.	-	-	2	1	1	-	-	2	6
5.	-	7	20	18	7	4	1	2	59
TOTALS	1	16	43	43	26	9	3	13	154
SAMPLE(N=)	3	67	195	131	61	21	5	17	500
% of (N)	33.3	23.9	22.1	32.8	42.6	42.9	60.0	76.5	-

The number of respondents who would rather ignore the strike call, (iii) of question 17 were as follows:-

1981.....	109
1982.....	134
1983.....	147
(FIGURES FROM TABLES 29A-F, REASON NO.3)	

This gives a total of 390 over the three years and a mean ( $\bar{x}$ =130), as against 154 in the above table, showing a difference of 24. This may be accounted for by the number of respondents who had ticked box (i) or box (ii) in question 17 and yet answered question 18, which was meant only for respondents who had ticked box (iii).

From the above calculations, the percentage of respondents who would ignore the strike in each wage group ran almost parallel to the level of income. The analysis indicates that propensity to strike diminished more up the top end of the wage ladder. This result reinforces previous findings of the comparison by grades, (cf. Tables 29a-f), and questions Edwards' (1979) contention that "higher earnings permit workers to employ various means of withdrawal from work.."10 It is doubtful that Edwards' suggestion would be applicable to higher grade civil servants amongst whom propensity to strike is shown in this survey to have diminished. Arguably, their higher earnings, in retrospect, might have been a contributory factor in the fact that their groups were shown to be more militant. But because they are currently more apprehensive of strike and its outcome, their rational approach makes this a thing of the past; for it would seem that militancy amongst civil servants in general had become latent.

**TABLE 30b**  
**RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE**  
**ANALYSIS BY COMMITMENTS**

REA SON No.	1 with			2 with			3 with			4 with			TOT TALS
	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	a	b	c	
1.	-	2	-	1	10	10	-	5	3	-	-	-	31
2.	-	2	4	-	14	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
3.	-	-	-	2	2	9	-	1	3	-	-	1	18
4.	1	1	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
5.	-	8	2	4	21	20	-	2	1	-	-	1	59
TOTALS	1	13	6	7	48	62	-	8	7	-	-	2	154
GROUP TOTALS	-	20	-	-	117	-	-	15	-	-	2	-	154
GROUP SAMPLE	-	76	-	-	363	-	-	58	-	-	3	-	
% of SAMPLE		26.3			32.2			25.9			66.6		

1= Rent; 2= Mortgage; 3= Owner after paying off mortgage;  
 4= Free accommodation; a= No other commitments;  
 b= commitments under £100; c= commitments over £100.

In the above table, those who said they would ignore the strike call were analysed in terms of their reasons and commitments. The analysis show that the group with the highest ratio of abstention (from the strike action) was apparently group 4, that is, those who did not have to pay for their accommodation. Two out of three respondents said they would ignore the strike but they both had other financial commitments over £100 per month and were in the £201-£250 per week wage group (see Table 3(iv)). Their reasons,

"strike would conflict with my job" and "sufficient members would not support the strike" would have to be accepted as genuine as it would be unlikely that with a "take-home" pay of over £1,000 per month, their reasons would be financial. On the other hand, it is possible that their commitments were so high that they could not afford a strike, but they would not admit it. However, no generalization can be made from their attitudes because the sample population of that group was too small.

The next group with a high abstention ratio was those who paid mortgages. 32 per cent of that group said they would ignore the strike. Their reasons were:-

1. I do not believe in strikes.....18%
2. I cannot afford to go on strike.....29%
3. Strikes would conflict with my job.....11%
4. I do not believe in the unions' cause.....3%
5. Sufficient members would not support the strike...39%

The fact that about 53 per cent of this group had financial commitments over £100 per month and 41 per cent had other commitments under £100 per month obscures their various reasons. Their mortgages and financial commitments appear more likely to have influenced their decision. By contrast, it is significant that a smaller proportion of those who paid neither mortgages nor rent and had little or no financial commitments said they would ignore the strike.

**TABLE 30c**  
**RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

REASON No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.	2	7	5	5	2	1	9	31
2.	5	5	-	9	1	2	18	40
3.	-	3	5	4	1	-	5	18
4.	1	-	-	2	-	-	3	6
5.	5	8	4	13	7	2	20	59
TOTALS	13	23	14	33	11	5	55	154

Calculating the percentages of the lower grades and higher grades for each reason, the following results emerge:-

**TABLE 30d**

REASONS	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	TOTAL	%	TOTAL	%
1.	19	61.3	12	38.7
2.	19	47.5	21	52.5
3.	12	66.7	6	33.3
4.	3	50.0	3	50.0
5.	30	50.8	29	49.2

A larger percentage of respondents in the higher grades said they could not afford to go on strike - 52.5 per cent compared with 47.5 per cent of respondents in the lower grades. This occurrence may be explained by the possibility

that those respondents in the higher grades might have had much heavier commitments. The most significant result is reason No.3; 66.7 per cent of those who stated that a strike would conflict with their jobs were in the lower grades as against 33.3 per cent in the higher grades. This result reinforces the earlier result analysed in table 28d where it was shown that the respondent who did not take strike action was in the lower grades group. The number of respondents who said that sufficient members would not support the strike was almost evenly distributed between the two groups.

TABLE 30e  
RESPONDENTS WHO WOULD IGNORE THE STRIKE  
ANALYSIS BY TU MEMBERSHIP STATUS

REASON No.	OFFICERS		ORDINARY MEMBERS	
	Number of Resps.	%*	Number of Resps.	%**
1.	17	5.0	14	8.6
2.	22	6.5	18	11.1
3.	12	3.6	6	3.7
4.	4	1.2	2	1.2
5.	37	10.9	22	13.6
TOTALS	92	27.2	62	38.2

\* % of sample (n=338)    \*\* % of sample (n=162)

27.2 per cent of the branch officers sampled said they would ignore the strike, compared with 38.2 per cent of the ordinary members. It should be noted that the reasons given

for ignoring the strike were shared by both groups. Although this result does show that officers were more militant than ordinary members further proof will be sought later before a generalization can be made.

Overtime ban was another weapon in the unions' armoury and indeed the civil service unions had a tacit policy against overtime working. It was strongly contended that work done during overtime should be made available to people on the dole queue especially in times of high unemployment. The introduction of a nationwide overtime ban during the selective strike was therefore an understandable reinforcement of the unions' militant effort. The inclusion of a question to ascertain the level of support given to this seemingly minor sacrifice was necessary in order to corroborate earlier findings about militancy as well as provide concrete evidence for generalization.

Question 19 asked what respondents did when the CCSU called a ban of overtime for an indefinite period. Most of the respondents who did not answer the question stated that overtime was not available in their departments. Analysis of the replies was based on wage groups, grades and membership status. The following options were suggested for replies:-

1. Boycott overtime while the ban lasted.
2. Boycott overtime for a short while.
3. Ignore the ban altogether.

TABLE 31  
REACTIONS TO OVERTIME BAN  
ANALYSIS BY WAGE GROUPS

REACTION No.	INCOME GROUPS [(£) Wages Per Week]								TO TA LS
	Under 51	51- 100	101- 150	151- 200	201- 250	251- 300	301- 350	351- etc.	
1.	1	47	151	90	41	16	2	3	351
2.	1	1	7	8	2	-	-	-	19
3.	1	3	14	16	9	1	3	6	53
TOTALS	3	51	172	114	52	17	5	9	423
RWIQ*	-	16	23	17	9	4	-	8	77
SAMPLE	3	67	195	131	61	21	5	17	500
3 as % of SAMPLE	33.3	4.5	7.2	12.2	14.8	4.8	60.0	35.3	
Mean ( $\bar{x}$ )	Lower pay group = 14.4				Higher pay group = 33.4				

\*RWIQ = Respondents who did not answer the question.

Because most of the respondents worked overtime (about 15 per cent did not) the ban was an effective weapon. 83 per cent supported it while it lasted; about 5 per cent supported it for a short while and 12 per cent ignored it altogether. Well over 66 per cent of respondents in the wage group (£351 and over) per week, ignored the ban. This high percentage was probably due to the fact that respondents in the top salaries grades took time off in lieu of overtime pay. The seemingly lack of support was peculiar to the group earning £351 and above; it did not necessarily reflect the reactions of all respondents in the higher grades. However,



on the assumption that wages up to £250 per week on the table represent lower wages group and that those who ignored the ban simply continued working overtime, the larger  $\bar{x}$  of the higher wages group would suggest that this group was less militant; thus corroborating earlier findings (cf. table 30a et seq.).

TABLE 31a  
REACTIONS TO OVERTIME BAN  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

REACTION No.	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES			TOTALS
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
1.	24	77	27	87	58	2	76	351
2.	1	4	1	7	3	1	2	19
3.	4	5	2	14	8	4	16	53
TOTALS	29	86	30	108	69	7	94	423
RWIQ*	17	10	7	13	3	3	24	77
SAMPLE	46	96	37	121	72	10	118	500
3 as % of SAMPLE	8.6	5.2	5.4	11.6	11.1	40.0	13.6	
Mean ( $\bar{x}$ )	Lower pay group = 7.7				Higher pay group = 21.6			

\*RWIQ = Respondents who did not answer the question.

The above analysis shows that fewer respondents in the lower grades ignored the overtime ban and more respondents in that category ignored the question altogether. But more respondents in the higher grades ignored the ban and fewer respondents in that category ignored the question.

A number of interpretations are possible:-

- (a) Those who ignored the question had no overtime facility in their departments and never worked overtime.
- (b) The question was misunderstood and therefore was not answered.
- (c) Some of those who replied that they ignored the ban gave that reply because overtime was not available in their departments.

These results corroborate the results of the previous analysis, that is, a larger mean ( $\bar{x}$ ) for respondents in the higher salaries grades. Most people who work overtime do so in order to supplement their income, in other words, in order to make ends meet. Despite the importance of overtime to their income 90 per cent of respondents in the lower grades and 84 per cent in the higher grades supported the ban. If on the strength of this result respondents in the lower grades appeared to be more militant than respondents in the higher grades it was probably because overtime was usually worked more frequently in the lower grades. Therefore, this analysis provides no conclusive evidence that one group is more or less militant than the other.

TABLE 31b  
REACTIONS TO OVERTIME BAN  
ANALYSIS BY TU MEMBERSHIP STATUS

REASON No.	OFFICERS		ORDINARY MEMBERS	
	Number of Resps.	%*	Number of Resps	%**
1.	253	74.8	98	60.5
2.	11	3.3	8	4.9
3.	25	7.4	28	17.3
TOTALS	289	85.5	134	82.7
ABSTENTIONS	49	14.5	28	17.3
DEGREE OF SUPPORT <sup>+</sup>	253+11		98+8	
	-----x 100=91.3%		----- x 100=79.1%	
	289		134	
DEGREE OF NON- SUPPORT <sup>+</sup>	25		28	
	---x 100= 8.7%		---x 100= 20.9%	
	289		134	

\* % of sample (n=338)    \*\* % of sample (n=162)

+ Abstentions were not included in these calculations because it was not known whether the respondents supported the ban or not.

The ban was very well supported. The above table indicates a higher degree of support from branch officers. This was consistent with the official policy of the unions regarding overtime working. The officers were seen to practise what they preached. The result does prove that branch officers were more militant than ordinary members on this issue. It also proves that the degree of militancy is more relative than absolute. For any individual, the degree of militancy is a factor of that person's conviction. An individual would be more or less militant depending on how strongly he feels

about a particular issue. Before the overtime ban was invoked branch officers had spearheaded a national rejection of overtime in order to release work for the unemployed. The ban was therefore widely supported both by branch officers and other members because it was orchestrated.

#### THE USE OF ARBITRATION

The attitude of members towards reference of pay to arbitration seems to have been influenced by government "vetoes" on arbitration decisions over the years. In what way were the changes of attitude reflected on the various grades and educational strata? Question 20 tries to elicit views on the value of arbitration on civil service pay bargaining. In the first part of the question respondents were asked to indicate their views; the reasons for their views were gathered in the second part. Their views on the value of resort to arbitration were ranked for analysis as follows:-

1. Very valuable
2. Quite valuable
3. Some value
4. Little value
5. No value

TABLE 32a  
THE VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

RANGE OF VALUES	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1.	21	37	11	38	107	35.6
2.	9	18	9	22	58	19.3
3.	8	23	3	22	56	18.6
4.	3	6	7	26	42	14.0
5.	2	8	6	12	28	9.3
TOTALS	43	92	36	120	291	-
SAMPLE (N=)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0

TABLE 32b  
THE VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

RANGE OF VALUES	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1.	20	3	44	67	33.5
2.	16	3	25	44	22.0
3.	17	3	24	44	22.0
4.	13	-	12	25	12.5
5.	4	-	9	13	6.5
TOTALS	70	9	114	193	-
SAMPLE (N=)	72	10	118	200	100.0

The above analyses indicates a trade-off between the number of respondents who felt arbitration was "very " valuable and

those who felt it was "quite" valuable: 35.6 per cent of the lower grades felt arbitration was very valuable as against 33.5 of the higher grades, a difference of 2.1 per cent; whereas 19.3 per cent of the lower grades felt it was quite valuable, compared with 22 per cent of the higher grades, a difference of 2.7 per cent. If those who felt arbitration was "very" valuable were considered together with those who felt it was "quite" valuable, the differences attenuate.

Similarly, a trade-off occurs between respondents who felt arbitration had "some" value and those who felt it had little value. 18.6 per cent of the lower grades felt it had "some" value, compared with 22 per cent of the higher grades, a difference of 3.4 per cent; whereas 14 per cent of the lower grades felt it had "little" value, as against 12.5 per cent of the higher grades, a difference of 1.5 per cent. Taking the two values (little and no value) together, the differences again attenuate, although not in the same degree as the previous two groups. More respondents in the lower grades felt arbitration had little or no value. This is consistent with the overall views expressed. There was more trust in the efficacy of arbitration among respondents in the higher grades.

**TABLE 32c**  
**VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION**  
**ANALYSIS BY EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION**

RANGE OF VALUES	LOWER EDUCATION GROUP				T O T A L	% OF SAM PLE (n=383)
	None	GCE "O" Levels		"A" Levels		
		1 - 5	6 or More			
1.	24	69	48	5	146	38.1
2.	22	27	22	7	78	20.4
3.	6	40	28	2	76	19.8
4.	3	24	20	6	53	13.8
5.	7	14	8	1	30	7.8
TOTALS	62	174	126	21	383	-
SAMPLE	66	176	129	22	393	-

**TABLE 32d**  
**VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION**  
**ANALYSIS BY EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION**

RANGE OF VALUES	HIGHER EDUCATION GROUP					T O T A L	% OF SAM PLE (n=101)
	HND/ HNC	LLB/ LLM	BA/ BSc etc	POSTGRAD DIPLOMA etc	MASTER/ PhD		
2.	4	1	10	4	5	24	23.8
3.	8	-	13	1	2	24	23.8
4.	2	-	9	1	2	14	13.9
5.	3	-	6	1	1	11	10.9
TOTALS	21	2	49	15	14	101	-
SAMPLE	24	2	51	15	15	107	-

There were more respondents in the lower qualification groups than in the higher qualifications groups, 393, compared with 107. Consequently, the number of respondents who felt arbitration was very valuable and quite valuable was much larger in the former groups, 224, compared with 52 in the latter groups. This is not necessarily contrary to the findings of the previous analysis by grades since higher qualifications in the sample do not necessarily mean higher grades. Just over a quarter of the respondents in the higher grades were graduates, and over 92 per cent of non-graduates in that group had qualifications well below "A" level. (cf. table 2). 58.5 per cent of respondents in the lower education group strongly believe in arbitration, compared with 51.5 per cent in the higher education group.

The picture is slightly different with respondents who felt arbitration had "some" or "little" value. This group had less faith in arbitration and a slightly larger percentage of these respondents were in the higher education groups, 37.6, compared with 34.2. Similarly, in the group which felt arbitration had "little" or "no" value, a slightly larger percentage of the respondents were in the higher education groups, 24.8, compared with 22.2. Again, this is consistent with the results of earlier analysis by grades.



**TABLE 32e**  
**VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION**  
**ANALYSIS BY TRADE UNIONS**

UNIONS	VALUES OF ARBITRATION					F	G	H
	A	B	C	D	E			
SCPS	52	41	46	36	18	193	2	195
IRSF	46	24	23	16	9	118	7	125
FDA	12	3	3	1	1	20	-	20
CSU	33	14	12	5	3	67	3	70
NIPSA	14	9	8	3	1	35	-	35
POA	17	11	8	6	9	51	4	55
TOTALS	174	102	100	67	41	484	16	500
% OF SAMPLE	34.8	20.4	20.0	13.4	8.2	-	3.2	-

=====

A=Very valuable; B=Quite valuable; C=Some value;  
D=Little value; E=No value; F=Totals; G=Abstentions;  
H=Population sample.

The above analysis indicates that 55.2 per cent of the sample felt arbitration was either "very" or "quite" valuable. The following table illustrates how the views of each union were distributed along the values:-

TABLE 32f  
VALUE OF RESORT TO ARBITRATION  
VIEWS OF THE UNIONS

UNIONS	VALUES OF ARBITRATION (% OF SAMPLE)					
	A	B	C	D	E	G
SCPS	26.7	21.0	23.6	18.5	9.2	1.0
IRSF	36.8	19.2	18.4	12.8	7.2	5.6
FDA	60.0	15.0	15.0	5.0	5.0	-
CSU	47.1	20.0	17.1	7.1	4.3	4.3
NIPSA	40.0	25.7	22.9	8.6	2.9	-
POA	30.9	20.0	14.5	10.9	16.4	7.3

A=Very valuable; B=Quite valuable; C=Some value;  
D=Little value; E=No value; G=Abstentions;

These figures are percentages of sample taken from each of the unions. They indicate that belief in resort to arbitration was highest among FDA members and lowest among SCPS members.

REASONS FOR VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION

A further probe was necessary to elicit reasons for the views expressed above. The reasons elicited were grouped as follows:-

TABLE 33  
REASONS FOR VIEWS ON ARBITRATION

GROUP No.	REASONS	VIEWS
1.	Arbitration shows our union and members to be sensible people who see strikes as a last, not first resort.	SOME VALUE
2.	It is important as an outside (independent) view and it can result in greater commitment for members.	VERY VALU- ABLE
3.	It is a logical step especially when the findings are binding on both sides.	QUITE VALUABLE
4.	It is better than nothing...It highlights the Government's intransigent attitude and hopefully, gains public support...Even if the findings are not honoured now, they can be used in future and the publicity value is beneficial.	QUITE VALU- ABLE
5.	It has no value if the Government refuses to be bound by its decision and it is no substitute for a strong union.	LITTLE VALUE
6.	Arbitration without preconditions can replace any need for a strike action when a ballot for a strike would be negative anyway.	SOME VALUE
7.	It is never either independent or fair... It does not judge issues on merit...It seeks compromise loaded in favour of the Treasury.	NO VALUE
8.	It is a cop-out and rarely produces any result favourable to workers....It is a complete waste of time.	NO VALUE
9.	It would provide a more balanced and fairer means of establishing civil service pay... It is essential for stability and solidarity. It is our only hope.	VERY VALUABLE

This range of views is analysed in the tables below according to grades and unions:-

TABLE 33a  
REASONS OF VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

Reason No.	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
1.	-	4	-	5	9	3.0
2.	2	2	1	3	8	2.7
3.	6	13	3	5	27	9.0
4.	-	4	3	10	17	5.7
5.	7	25	17	54	103	34.3
6.	3	5	-	8	16	5.3
7.	-	1	-	5	6	2.0
8.	1	2	1	3	7	2.3
9.	1	7	3	7	18	6.0
TOTALS	20	63	28	100	211*	70.3
SAMPLE(N=)	46	96	37	121	300*	100.0

\*The gap between these figures accounts for respondents who did not answer the question.

**TABLE 33b**  
**REASONS FOR VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

REASON No.	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
1.	3	-	3	6	3.0
2.	1	-	4	5	2.5
3.	6	1	14	21	10.5
4.	3	1	12	16	8.0
5.	33	2	46	81	40.5
6.	1	1	10	12	6.0
7.	5	-	2	7	3.5
8.	1	-	4	5	2.5
9.	5	-	5	10	5.0
TOTALS	58	5	100	163*	81.5
SAMPLE (N=)	72	10	118	200*	100.0

\*The gap between these figures accounts for respondents who did not answer the question.

The reasons are arranged in their "rank" order of popularity below:-

TABLE 33c

REASON No.	AGGREGATES		(x)	RANK ORDER	
	LOWER GRADES	HIGHER GRADES		RANK	REASON No.
1.	6.0		3.0	1	5
2.	5.2		2.6	2	3
3.	19.5		9.8	3	4
4.	13.7		6.9	4	6
5.	74.8		37.4	5	9
6.	11.3		5.7	6	1
7.	5.5		2.8	7	7
8.	4.8		2.4	8	2
9.	11.0		5.5	9	8

From the above analyses, Reason No.5 seems the most popular. More respondents in both lower and higher grades, about 37 per cent of the sample population, felt that resort to arbitration had no value if the Government refused to be bound by its decision. This is followed, though not closely, by Reason No.3. Nearly 10 per cent of the sample felt that resort to arbitration was a logical step, particularly when the findings are binding on both sides. Reason No.4 alluded to honouring the findings and Reason No.6 emphasized arbitration without preconditions. A consensus common to almost

all the views expressed is that arbitration should be sacrosanct; in other words, it should be independent, free from abuse, unfettered by preconditions and its decisions should be binding. Those who regard it as a worthless exercise were undoubtedly scandalized by the Government's frequent abuse in setting aside its recommendations. Reason Nos. 2, 7 and 8 did not have many supporters. However, it is important to note that whereas the sample of respondents in the lower grades was larger than that of respondents in the higher grades, proportionately more respondents in the higher grades answered this part of the question - 81.5 per cent of 200, compared with 70.3 per cent of 300 respondents in the lower grades. This was an indication that more respondents in the higher grades had clearer views about arbitration and did not hesitate to express them.

A different system of analysis is used for comparing the unions. Unlike the analysis by grades where all the grades are divided into two groups, lower and higher grades, and the aggregates of the two groups compared, the unions are compared individually. The mean ( $\bar{x}$ ) of all unions in each group of reasons is therefore different from that of the grades. The results nevertheless corroborate each other.

TABLE 33d  
REASON FOR VIEWS ON RESORT TO ARBITRATION  
ANALYSIS BY UNIONS

REA SON No.	UNIONS												(x)% ALL UNIONS
	1	a	2	a	3	a	4	a	5	a	6	a	
1.	8	4.1	4	3.2	-	-	3	4.3	-	-	-	-	1.9
2.	5	2.5	2	1.6	2	10.0	1	1.4	1	2.9	2	3.6	3.6
3.	14	7.2	15	12.0	3	15.0	9	12.9	4	11.4	3	5.5	10.7
4.	21	10.8	4	3.2	-	-	1	1.4	1	2.9	6	10.9	4.9
5.	85	43.6	45	36.0	7	35.0	13	18.6	15	42.8	19	34.6	35.1
6.	10	5.1	7	5.6	4	20.0	5	7.1	1	2.9	1	1.8	6.9
7.	5	2.5	4	3.2	1	5.0	-	-	1	2.8	2	3.6	2.7
8.	7	3.6	1	0.8	-	-	3	4.3	-	-	1	1.8	2.8
9.	12	6.2	5	4.0	2	10.0	4	5.7	2	5.7	3	5.5	6.2
TOTALS													
	167	85.6	87	69.6	19	95.0	39	55.7	25	71.4	37	67.3	74.8
(b)	28	14.4	38	30.4	1	5.0	31	44.3	10	28.6	18	32.7	25.2
(c)	195		125		20		70		35		55		
=====													
1=SCPS; 2=IRSF; 3=FDA; 4=CSU; 5=NIPSA; 6=POA; a=% of Sample; (b)=Abstentions; (c)=Population Sample.													

In the above comparisons the percentage of abstentions was higher among the unions which organize lower grade civil servants. For example, FDA had 5 per cent abstentions, SCPS had 14.4, NIPSA had 28.6, IRSF had 30.4, POA had 32.7 and CSU had 44.3 per cent. This result is consistent with the result of the previous analysis by grades.



### SUMMARY

A number of positive statements can be made from the above analyses:-

1. Most of the respondents joined their unions in order to safeguard their rights. Many respondents joined because they believed in trade unionism.

2. A great majority of respondents felt it was very important to belong to a union and were satisfied with their unions. Those who were dissatisfied nevertheless continued with their membership.

3. Lack of success in the 1981/83 pay campaigns had no significant impact on the size of membership. The branches surveyed indicated a net gain of members during the period. However, support for strikes declined after 1981.

4. Officers attended meetings more often than ordinary members; but there was no significant difference between the pattern of attendance of the higher and the lower grades.

5. Age and geographical (workplace) distribution of branches had no significant influence on the pattern of attendance.

6. The most popular reason cited for absence from meetings

was domestic.

7. Most of the respondents rejected the Treasury offer.

8. Respondents on higher grades were more militant.

9. Family responsibility had no significant effect on decisions to strike.

10. The failure of 1981 pay campaign had more impact on the higher grades.

11. Most respondents felt resort to arbitration was valuable only if the recommendations were binding.

REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES

1. Only very few people were interviewed. Because of the costs involved it was not possible to retain "interview" as a major aspect of the survey.
2. Blau, P.M., 1964, op. cit.
3. Kaplan, A., 1964, op. cit.
4. Achike, B.C., The System of Industrial Relations in the British Library: A Critical Review of the Operations of the Conflict Resolution Mechanism and Recommendations for Managerial Reform. Unpublished MBA Dissertation, Middlesex Polytechnic, 1982, p.43.
5. The difference is accounted for by the fact that there are many more members in lower grade jobs than in higher grade jobs and there are fewer higher grade jobs than lower grade jobs.
6. 
$$\frac{(a)+(b)+(c)+(d)}{(h)} \times 100$$
7. 
$$\frac{(e)+(f)+(g)}{(h)} \times 100$$
8. Edwards, P.K., Strikes and Unorganised Conflict: Some Further Considerations...in British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 17, March 1979, pp.95-98.
9. Festinger Leon: A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: Tavistock Publications, 1957. pp.260-1.
10. Edwards, P.K., op. cit., 1979.

CHAPTER 5  
FURTHER ASPECTS OF THE INDUSTRIAL ATTITUDES OF SAMPLE  
POPULATION

Apart from their attitudes towards strikes, overtime bans and arbitration, respondents' views on a number of issues which impinge upon workplace industrial relations were tested. They were asked to state how important the issues were to them and how effectively their unions had handled the issues for them. The civil service unions originated not because of ideological reasons but rather because members had a cumulation of grievances for which they sought redress.<sup>1</sup> The search for redress is still very much a basic motivation in the affairs of civil service unions. If this attitude had changed it can only be by degree, not all the way. Questions 21a and 21b attempt to measure the probable changes which may have occurred and the replies are linked with grades in order to facilitate interpretation. Respondents were asked how important certain specified issues were to them and how effectively their unions represented them on these issues. The replies are analysed in the following tables:-

**TABLE 34a**  
**PAY ISSUES: ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(b)	-	-	-	2	2	0.7
	(c)	-	-	-	1	1	0.3
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	2	2	2	7	2.4
	(b)	1	6	1	10	18	6.0
	(c)	1	1	1	-	3	1.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	13	24	9	33	79	26.3
	(b)	17	36	16	50	119	39.7
	(c)	8	23	6	21	58	19.3
TOTALS		41	92	35	119	287	95.7
ABSTENTIONS		5	4	2	2	13	4.3
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

=====  
(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.  
=====

**TABLE 34b**  
**PAY ISSUES: ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	-	-	-	-
	(b)	-	-	2	2	1.0
	(c)	-	-	1	1	0.5
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	-	7	8	4.0
	(b)	4	-	12	16	8.0
	(c)	-	-	5	5	2.5
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	25	1	30	56	28.0
	(b)	27	6	42	75	37.5
	(c)	15	3	16	34	17.0
TOTALS		72	10	115	197	98.5
ABSTENTIONS		-	-	3	3	1.5
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 34c**  
**PAY ISSUE: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPORTANCE OF PAY ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	3	1.0	3	1.5
Fairly Important	28	9.3	29	14.5
Very Important	256	85.3	165	82.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

**TABLE 34d**  
**PAY ISSUE: SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	86	28.7	64	32.0
Adequately "	139	46.3	93	46.5
Poorly "	62	20.7	40	20.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The analyses above indicate that pay issue was very important to most members of both groups - 85.3 per cent of respondents in the lower grades group and 82.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades. 9.3 per cent of the lower grades and 14.5 per cent of the higher grades said it was fairly important. Only 1.0 per cent of the lower grades and 1.5 per cent of the higher grades felt it was not very important. These low percentages are most likely representative of those members at the lower end and those at top end of their salary scales. Annual pay increases would not make much difference to their status because their pay is either

too low or too high to be influenced by it. Although the views of both groups on the importance of pay issue were not significantly different they differ on how well they were represented.

TABLE 35a  
HOURS, HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	-	-	2	2	0.7
	(b)	-	1	-	3	4	1.3
	(c)	1	-	-	-	1	0.3
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	9	3	16	29	9.7
	(b)	6	23	4	35	68	22.7
	(c)	1	6	1	13	21	7.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	16	14	6	5	41	13.7
	(b)	13	27	16	26	82	27.3
	(c)	1	11	5	17	34	11.3
TOTALS		39	91	35	117	282	94.0
ABSTENTIONS		7	5	2	4	18	6.0
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.



**TABLE 35b**  
**HOURS, HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	-	6	8	4.0
	(b)	2	2	5	9	4.5
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	3	1	13	17	8.5
	(b)	21	1	44	66	33.0
	(c)	8	1	9	18	9.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	10	2	7	19	9.5
	(b)	15	1	17	33	16.5
	(c)	10	2	16	28	14.0
TOTALS		71	10	117	198	99.0
ABSTENTIONS		1	-	1	2	1.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 35c**  
**HOURS, HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	7	2.3	17	8.5
Fairly Important	118	39.3	101	50.5
Very Important	157	52.3	80	40.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

**TABLE 35d**  
**HOURS, HOLIDAY/LEAVE ISSUES**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	72	24.0	44	22.0
Adequately "	154	51.3	108	54.0
Poorly "	56	18.6	46	23.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The divergence of views on the issues of hours, holiday and leave was not unexpected. Lower grade civil servants have longer conditioned hours than higher grade civil servants. Until recently, higher grade civil servants had more days leave in the year than lower grade civil servants.<sup>2</sup> It was therefore logical that lower grade civil servants should be more concerned about these issues. Sustained erosion of the traditional differential between the grades gave the higher grades the feeling that they were poorly represented.

More respondents in the higher grades said the issues were "not very important": 8.5 per cent, compared with 2.3 per cent of the lower grades. Similarly, more respondents in the higher grades said the issues were "fairly important": 50.5 per cent compared with 39.3 per cent of the lower grades. It was therefore consistent that more respondents in the lower grades felt the issues were "very important": 52.3 per cent, compared with 40 per cent of the higher grades. 23 per cent of the higher grades said they were poorly represented, compared with 18.6 per cent of the lower grades. This reflects their feelings about the gradual process by which the unions organizing the lower grades have been successful in narrowing and eventually removing what was considered an anomaly, namely, the unjustifiable gap in the hours worked and leave allocation.

**TABLE 36a**  
**JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	-	-	1	1	0.3
	(b)	-	-	-	4	4	1.3
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-	-
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	5	1	4	10	3.3
	(b)	5	7	4	14	30	10.0
	(c)	1	2	2	4	9	3.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	16	28	14	41	99	33.0
	(b)	19	38	9	34	100	33.4
	(c)	1	11	5	17	34	11.4
TOTALS		42	91	35	119	287	95.7
ABSTENTIONS		4	5	2	2	13	4.3
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 36b  
JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	-	6	7	3.5
	(b)	2	-	11	13	6.5
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	1	9	11	5.5
	(b)	7	2	19	28	14.0
	(c)	3	-	4	7	3.5
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	15	5	24	44	22.0
	(b)	31	1	29	61	30.5
	(c)	11	1	14	26	13.0
TOTALS		71	10	116	197	98.5
ABSTENTIONS		1	-	2	3	1.5
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 36c  
JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	5	1.7	20	10.0
Fairly Important	49	16.3	46	23.0
Very Important	233	77.7	131	65.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

TABLE 36d  
JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADES

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	110	36.7	62	31.0
Adequately "	134	44.7	102	51.0
Poorly "	43	14.3	33	16.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

Job protection and redundancy have clearly become issues of great importance in the civil service. The security which was traditionally attached to civil service jobs is a thing of the past. 77.7 per cent of respondents in the lower grades and 65.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades considered job protection and avoiding redundancy to be "very important" issues. However, it is significant that

more respondents in the higher grades felt that the issues were either "fairly important" or "not important" - 23 per cent and 10 per cent, compared with 16.3 per cent and 1.7 per cent respectively. This may be interpreted as a greater sense of job security among the higher grades. But whether this is so in reality is doubtful. Arguably, the principle of "last in first out" may suggest that provided most people in the higher grades had progressed from lower grades they should be more secure in their jobs than those in the lower grades, since their length of service should be longer. This hypothesis is examined in the analyses below:-

TABLE 36e  
ANALYSIS BY LENGTH OF SERVICE AND GRADES

LENGTH OF SERVICE	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE
	I	II	III	IV		
Under 1 year .	2	4	-	4	10	3.3
Over 1 " 2 years	6	6	2	11	25	8.3
" 2 " 5 "	9	13	4	18	44	14.7
" 5 " 10 "	20	44	6	43	113	37.7
11 years & over	9	29	25	44	107	35.7
Totals	46	96	37	120	299	99.7
Abstentions	-	-	-	1	1	-
Sample	46	96	37	121	300	-

**TABLE 36f**  
**ANALYSIS BY LENGTH OF SERVICE AND GRADES**

LENGTH OF SERVICE	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE
	V	VI	VII		
Under 1 year	1	-	9	10	5.0
Over 1 " 2 years	8	-	10	18	9.0
" 2 " 5 "	8	2	21	31	15.5
" 5 " 10 "	19	2	39	60	30.0
11 years & over	36	6	39	81	30.5
Totals	72	10	118	200	-
Abstentions	-	-	-	-	-
Sample	72	10	118	200	-

**TABLE 36g**  
**ANALYSIS BY AGE GROUP AND GRADES**

AGE GROUP	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE
	I	II	III	IV		
Under 21 years	3	-	-	-	3	1.0
21 - 30 "	11	39	6	30	86	28.7
31 - 40 "	9	24	14	67	114	38.0
41 - 50 "	11	17	13	17	58	19.3
51 years & over	12	16	14	7	39	13.0
Totals	46	96	37	121	300	=
Abstentions	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sample	46	96	37	121	300	-



TABLE 36h  
ANALYSIS BY AGE GROUP AND GRADES

AGE GROUP	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE
	V	VI	VII		
Under 21 years	-	-	-	-	-
21 - 30 "	13	3	16	32	16.0
31 - 40 "	39	5	57	101	50.5
41 - 50 "	13	1	29	43	21.5
51 years & over	6	1	16	23	11.5
Totals	71	10	118	199	99.5
Abstentions	1	-	-	1	-
Sample	72	10	118	200	-

The above analyses indicate that there was no respondent in the higher grades under 21 years old. In both the lower and higher grades a larger percentage of respondents have been in service for more than 5 years. A slightly larger percentage of the higher grades have been in service for 11 years and over - 40.5 per cent, compared with 35.7 per cent of the lower grades. However, the difference was not sufficient to account for the gap in the sense of security between the two groups. The analysis by age group and grades indicates that 67.7 per cent of the lower grades were in the age group up to 40 years and 32.3 per cent were in the age group 41 years and over, compared with 66.5 per cent and 33 per cent respectively in the higher grades. Age distribution among the lower grades was approximately the same as in the higher

grades. It would seem that the number of respondents who progressed from lower to higher grades was not large enough to justify the assumption that longer service had any connection with the higher grades' sense of job security. Therefore, the above hypothesis is false.

Perhaps a more feasible explanation of the respondents in the higher grades being less concerned about protection of jobs and avoiding redundancy may be found in the Civil Service Department's policy of "natural wastage rather than redundancy". Civil servants in the higher grades are like statutory tenants. Where "natural wastage" applies, posts vacated through resignations, retirements, death, etc are not usually filled. The duties of those posts are redistributed among existing staff. This may mean no more than extra work for those in similar grades in the vicinity but it reflects adversely on the lower grades as promotion opportunities are seriously curtailed.

The views of both groups on how well they were represented on the issues were not too widely apart. 36.7 per cent of the lower grades said they were well represented, 44.7 per cent said they were adequately represented and 14.3 per cent said they were poorly represented; this compares with 31, 51 and 16.5 per cent respectively of the higher grades. On the basis of this comparison, 81.4 per cent of the lower grades and 82 per cent of the higher grades said they were either

"well" or "adequately" represented. The difference (0.6 per cent) is not significant. The issues of job protection and redundancy are very high on the agenda of the Trade Union Side and are usually debated vigorously at Whitley Councils.<sup>3</sup> The 14.3 and 16.5 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively, who felt they were poorly represented reflect the success of the unions in avoiding escalation of redundancy and keeping as much as possible to the policy of "natural wastage."

TABLE 37a  
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV ENESS OF REPRES ENTATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	2	-	3	5	1.7
	(b)	5	4	2	4	15	5.0
	(c)	2	2	-	2	6	2.0
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	1	-	4	6	2.0
	(b)	6	15	3	35	59	19.7
	(c)	5	8	6	11	30	10.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	5	9	3	7	24	8.0
	(b)	10	30	13	30	83	27.6
	(c)	4	19	8	23	54	18.0
TOTALS		38	90	35	119	282	94.0
ABSTENTIONS		8	6	2	2	18	6.0
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 37b  
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	-	-	2	1.0
	(b)	6	1	6	13	6.5
	(c)	-	-	1	1	0.5
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	-	7	9	4.5
	(b)	25	-	23	48	24.0
	(c)	8	1	11	20	10.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	3	11	16	8.0
	(b)	12	3	23	38	19.0
	(c)	14	2	33	49	24.5
TOTALS		71	10	115	196	98.0
ABSTENTIONS		1	-	3	4	2.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 37c  
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	26	8.7	16	8.0
Fairly Important	95	31.7	77	38.5
Very Important	161	53.6	103	51.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

TABLE 37d  
CAREER PROSPECTS ISSUE  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	35	11.7	27	13.5
Adequately "	157	52.3	99	49.5
Poorly "	90	30.0	70	35.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The percentage of respondents in the lower grades who felt career prospects issue was "not important" was about the same as in the higher grades - 8.7 and 8.0 per cent respectively. More respondents in the higher grades felt it was "fairly important" - 38.5, compared with 31.7 per cent in the lower grades. But more respondents in the lower grades felt it was "very important" - 53.6, compared with 51.5 per cent of the higher grades. Although the majority of respondents in both groups felt career prospects issue was "very important" the larger percentage of the lower grades who held this view can be expected. This is because more respondents in higher grades should be at the top of their career, unlike those in lower grades, the majority of whom would continue to aspire for higher grades.

There is no surprise in the fact that fewer respondents from both groups felt they were well represented - 11.7 and 13.5 per cent respectively of the lower and higher grades. 52.3

and 49.5 per cent respectively, of the groups felt they were adequately represented. But as much as 30 and 35 per cent respectively felt they were poorly represented. These results reflect a general low morale in the civil service where career prospects are very much subject to the influence of the public funding system. The unions have an uphill task in their negotiations especially in view of the Treasury's preemptive brief to cut spending to the limits of cash provided. Their endeavour to publicize their efforts achieves very little when members judge them by their failures rather than the amount of fight they have had to put up. A larger percentage of the higher grades felt they were poorly represented probably because a good number of them had lingered in their positions when they should have moved on higher.

TABLE 38a  
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	4	1	3	10	3.3
	(b)	5	4	1	13	24	8.0
	(c)	6	1	2	4	13	4.3
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	6	3	3	13	4.3
	(b)	8	19	9	25	61	20.4
	(c)	1	4	1	11	17	5.7
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	7	19	3	24	53	17.7
	(b)	7	21	9	23	60	20.0
	(c)	2	10	5	13	30	10.0
TOTALS		39	88	35	119	281	93.7
ABSTENTIONS		7	8	2	2	19	6.3
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 38b  
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	4	-	3	7	3.5
	(b)	6	2	16	24	12.0
	(c)	1	-	5	6	3.0
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	4	13	19	9.5
	(b)	13	1	29	43	21.5
	(c)	2	-	13	15	7.5
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	12	2	11	25	12.5
	(b)	17	1	18	36	18.0
	(c)	12	-	9	21	10.5
TOTALS		69	10	117	196	98.0
ABSTENTIONS		3	-	1	4	2.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 38c  
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	47	15.6	37	18.5
Fairly Important	91	30.3	77	38.5
Very Important	143	47.7	82	41.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.



TABLE 38d  
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	76	25.3	51	25.5
Adequately "	145	48.3	103	51.5
Poorly "	60	20.0	42	21.0

=====  
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

More respondents in the higher grades said that the introduction of new technology issue was "not very important" - 18.5, compared with 15.6 per cent of the lower grades. Similarly, 38.5 per cent of the higher grades said it was "fairly important", compared with 30.3 per cent of the lower grades. These two results are consistent with the larger percentage of the lower grades who said it was "very important" - 47.7, compared with 41 per cent of the higher grades. The results reflect the policy of the unions especially those which organized staff in lower grades at the time of the investigation, namely, to oppose the introduction of new technology unless it was pre-negotiated. Some unions opposed new technology "per se". The issue was evidently more important to the lower grades because main-frame computers which required the services of staff in those grades as operators, junior programmers and analysts, were becoming wide-spread. Nowadays, micro computers are available practically in every office, particularly for the use

of more senior staff. No additional pay was agreed for those who use this aspect of the new technology in the course of their normal duties. However, the unions were able to negotiate sizable allowances for those employed mainly as operators, programmers and analysts. The views of both the lower and higher grades on the effectiveness of union representation were the same. It would be interesting to observe the reaction of the higher grades in the reality of having to use the new technology to cope with present day demands of their duties without any financial rewards. The new technology issue would be just as important to them now as it was to the lower grades in earlier years.

Issues relating to "job protection and redundancy" appear to be the same as the issues relating to "defence of job security". A distinction is made here between the two aspects in order to achieve a thorough analysis. Aspects relating to "job protection" refer to the post, the actual position and aspects relating to "defending job security" in the following tables refer to the person, the individual in the post.

**TABLE 39a**  
**DEFENDING JOB SECURITY**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	-	-	-	-	-
	(b)	-	2	1	4	7	2.3
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-	-
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	2	1	7	10	3.3
	(b)	2	9	5	19	35	11.7
	(c)	1	-	2	3	6	2.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	19	28	13	29	89	29.7
	(b)	14	40	8	43	105	35.0
	(c)	2	7	5	14	28	9.3
TOTALS		38	88	35	119	280	93.3
ABSTENTIONS		8	8	2	2	20	6.7
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 39b**  
**DEFENDING JOB SECURITY**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPORTANT	(a)	-	-	-	-	-
	(b)	2	-	15	17	8.5
	(c)	1	-	3	4	2.0
FAIRLY IMPORTANT	(a)	1	1	7	9	4.5
	(b)	11	-	25	36	18.0
	(c)	-	1	3	4	2.0
VERY IMPORTANT	(a)	18	6	16	40	20.0
	(b)	33	2	37	72	36.0
	(c)	6	-	9	15	7.5
TOTALS		72	10	115	197	98.5
ABSTENTIONS		-	-	3	3	1.5
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 39c**  
**DEFENDING JOB SECURITY**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	7	2.3	21	10.5
Fairly Important	51	17.0	49	24.5
Very Important	222	74.0	127	63.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

**TABLE 39d**  
**DEFENDING JOB SECURITY**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	99	33.0	49	24.5
Adequately "	147	49.0	125	62.5
Poorly "	34	11.3	23	11.5

=====  
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The results here are rather predictable. Both groups agreed by an overwhelming majority that defending job security was a "very important" issue. However, more respondents in the lower grades held this view: 74.0, compared with 63.5 per cent of the higher grades; thus corroborating earlier results (cf. Table 36a et seq.) Another interpretation of this result should be considered. Because the number of posts in the lower grades is usually by far larger than those in the higher grades and sometimes the duties of the lower grade posts are not as involved as those of the higher grade posts, cuts are more likely to be focused among the lower grade posts. It is therefore feasible that the incumbents of the lower grade posts feel the full rigours of job losses long before it is felt by the incumbents of the higher grade posts. As on tables 36c and 36d (cf.), more respondents of the higher grades felt that "defending job

security" was either "not very important" or "fairly important", 10.5 and 24.5 per cent respectively, compared with 2.3 and 17.0 per cent of the lower grades.

Respondents' views regarding representation on this issue almost replicates the views expressed on the issues of job protection and redundancy. On the issue of defending job security, 82 per cent of the lower grades said they were either well or adequately represented, compared with 87 per cent of the higher grades. 11.3 per cent of the lower grades said they were poorly represented, compared with 11.5 per cent of the higher grades. On the issues of job protection and redundancy, 81.4 per cent of the lower grades said they were either well or adequately represented, compared with 82 per cent of the higher grades. 14.3 per cent of the lower grades said they were poorly represented, compared with 16.5 per cent of the higher grades.

TABLE 40a  
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	2	-	-	2	0.7
	(b)	1	-	-	1	2	0.7
	(c)	-	-	1	-	1	0.3
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	7	1	13	22	7.3
	(b)	3	19	5	29	56	18.7
	(c)	-	1	3	3	7	2.3
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	20	18	11	27	76	25.3
	(b)	14	36	8	28	86	28.7
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS		39	83	29	101	252	84.0
ABSTENTIONS		7	13	8	20	48	16.0
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 40b  
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPORTANT	(a)	-	-	1	1	0.5
	(b)	3	-	7	10	5.0
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-
FAIRLY IMPORTANT	(a)	3	-	8	11	5.5
	(b)	16	2	33	51	25.5
	(c)	4	-	7	11	5.5
VERY IMPORTANT	(a)	14	7	13	34	17.0
	(b)	28	1	31	60	30.0
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-
TOTALS		68	10	100	178	89.0
ABSTENTIONS		4	-	18	22	11.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 40c  
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	5	1.7	11	5.5
Fairly Important	85	28.3	73	36.5
Very Important	162	54.0	94	47.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.



TABLE 40d  
WORKING CONDITIONS ISSUE  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	100	33.3	46	23.0
Adequately "	144	48.0	121	60.5
Poorly "	8	2.7	11	5.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The views of both groups diverge very widely on the above issue. In the lower grades group a smaller percentage of respondents felt working conditions were either "not very important" or "fairly important" issues - 1.7 and 28.3 per cent respectively, compared with 5.5 and 36.5 per cent of the higher grades. From this, it would seem that the higher grades were not as concerned about working conditions as the lower grades. Hence, more respondents in the lower grades said that working conditions issues were "very important" - 54, compared with 47 per cent of the higher grades. This result reflects the reality of superior furnishings and sometimes ornate environs of the offices of higher grade civil servants. The stipulation of minimum standards in offices as part of the health and safety regulations is arguably to protect the working conditions of lower grade staff who are sometimes obliged to work under intolerable

conditions. The local branch of each union usually appoints a health and safety representative from among its members to look after their interests. As the results of "effectiveness of representation" show, the unions keep a watchful eye on standards despite the fact that sometimes only those health and safety officers representing lower grades show interest and are more active.<sup>4</sup> Those representing higher grades often do not take part in the usual official activities, for instance, periodic inspection of office premises. Both groups agree however, that they were "well" or "adequately" represented - 81.3 and 83.5 per cent, compared with 2.7 and 5.5 per cent respectively who said they were poorly represented.

**TABLE 41a**  
**PERSONAL PROBLEMS (eg. Transfers, Promotions etc.)**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	-	-	2	3	1.0
	(b)	4	2	5	4	15	5.0
	(c)	1	-	1	-	2	0.7
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	6	4	18	30	10.0
	(b)	5	17	6	27	55	18.3
	(c)	1	9	-	3	13	4.3
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	11	20	7	30	68	22.7
	(b)	8	25	8	25	66	22.0
	(c)	8	10	4	9	31	10.3
TOTALS		41	89	35	118	283	94.3
ABSTENTIONS		5	7	2	3	17	5.7
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 41b**  
**PERSONAL PROBLEMS (eg. Transfers, Promotions etc.)**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	-	7	9	4.5
	(b)	2	-	8	10	5.0
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	7	2	13	22	11.0
	(b)	17	1	19	37	18.5
	(c)	5	-	5	10	5.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	17	2	35	54	27.0
	(b)	16	3	20	39	19.5
	(c)	6	2	10	18	9.0
TOTALS		72	10	117	199	99.5
ABSTENTIONS		-	-	1	1	0.5
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 41c**  
**PERSONAL PROBLEMS (eg. Transfers, Promotions etc.)**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	20	6.7	19	9.5
Fairly Important	98	32.7	69	34.5
Very Important	165	55.0	111	55.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

**TABLE 41d**  
**PERSONAL PROBLEMS (eg. Transfers, Promotions etc.)**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	101	33.7	85	42.5
Adequately "	136	45.3	86	43.0
Poorly "	46	15.3	28	14.0

=====  
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The hypothesis that the higher the grade of an individual the less is he likely to have personal problems in connection with his work, is tested in the above analysis. This hypothesis assumes that because staff in higher grades are usually members of management they are not likely to have quarrels with the establishment, being themselves representatives of the establishment as far as the rest of the staff are concerned. On the basis of the above results this hypothesis is untenable. Both groups have more or less the same views about the importance of issues concerning personal problems. 55.5 per cent of the higher grades said the issues were "very important", 34.5 per cent said they were "fairly important" and 9.5 per cent said they were "not very important". These results compare with those of the lower grades where 55 per cent said the issues were "very important", 32.6 per cent said they were "fairly important" and 6.7 per cent said they were "not very important". The slight difference between the two sets of results is accounted for

by the number of abstentions - 5.7 per cent of the lower grades abstained, compared with only 0.5 per cent of the higher grades, an indication that the higher grades took the issues more seriously. This can be so, not because of some ideological reasons, for instance, the "them and us" kind of situation, but because individuals in the higher grades have themselves had personal problems. The proof of this is in the results of the other half of the question - "how effectively does your union represent you on these issues?". 85.5 per cent of the higher grades said they were either well or adequately represented, compared with 79 per cent of the lower grades. Only 14 per cent of the higher grades said they were poorly represented, compared with 15.3 per cent of the lower grades. This shows that the unions do a very good job to afford their members with strong representation on these issues.

TABLE 42a  
ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	1	-	-	1	0.3
	(b)	4	5	-	6	15	5.0
	(c)	1	2	-	5	8	2.7
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	1	1	9	11	3.7
	(b)	8	16	5	24	53	17.7
	(c)	3	8	2	21	34	11.3
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	6	5	-	2	13	4.3
	(b)	11	29	15	28	83	27.7
	(c)	10	25	12	22	69	23.0
TOTALS		43	92	35	117	287	95.7
ABSTENTIONS		3	4	2	4	13	4.3
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 42b**  
**ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	-	-	-	-
	(b)	5	-	3	8	4.0
	(c)	1	-	4	5	2.5
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	-	3	4	2.0
	(b)	26	1	23	50	25.0
	(c)	11	1	16	28	14.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	1	6	9	4.5
	(b)	15	3	26	44	22.0
	(c)	9	4	33	46	23.0
TOTALS		70	10	114	194	97.0
ABSTENTIONS		2	-	4	6	3.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 42c**  
**ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	24	8.0	13	6.5
Fairly Important	98	32.7	82	41.0
Very Important	165	55.0	99	49.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.



TABLE 42d  
ENSURING JOB SATISFACTION  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	25	8.3	13	6.5
Adequately "	151	50.3	102	51.0
Poorly "	111	37.0	79	39.5

=====  
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

The issue of job satisfaction is more involved than it may seem. Most civil service jobs are repetitive and boring, particularly, jobs in the lower grades, where a lot more effort is needed in order to concentrate. The results above confirm this fact. Only 8 per cent of the lower grades and 6.5 per cent of the higher grades said that ensuring job satisfaction was "not" a very important issue. 55 per cent of the lower grades and 49.5 per cent of the higher grades said it was "very important". But 32.7 per cent of the lower grades said it was "fairly important", compared with 41 per cent of the higher grades. In general, staff in lower grades are more likely to tolerate lack of job satisfaction than staff in higher grades. How do unions ensure job satisfaction in an environment severely pressured by cash limits? An answer to this question would be very hard to come by. It is therefore understandable that only 8.3 per cent of the lower grades and 16.5 per cent of the higher grades felt they were well represented on the issue. 37 and 39.5 per cent respect-

ively said they were poorly represented. The 50.3 and 51 per cent of the lower and higher grades who said representation was adequate and the minority who felt they were well represented obviously understood the unions' predicament in the matter.

TABLE 43a  
DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV ENESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	3	-	4	7	2.3
	(b)	4	5	3	10	22	7.3
	(c)	-	-	-	2	2	0.7
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	6	2	8	18	6.0
	(b)	10	18	6	29	63	21.0
	(c)	1	2	1	2	6	2.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	13	26	9	33	81	27.0
	(b)	7	29	11	23	70	23.3
	(c)	5	2	3	7	17	5.7
TOTALS		42	91	35	118	286	95.3
ABSTENTIONS		4	5	2	3	14	4.7
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 43b**  
**DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	-	5	7	3.5
	(b)	7	-	13	20	10.0
	(c)	-	-	1	1	0.5
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	5	2	16	23	11.5
	(b)	14	1	28	43	21.5
	(c)	5	-	2	7	3.5
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	22	4	24	50	25.0
	(b)	14	1	18	33	16.5
	(c)	3	2	5	10	5.0
TOTALS		72	10	112	194	97.0
ABSTENTIONS		-	-	6	6	3.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 43c**  
**DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	31	10.3	28	14.0
Fairly Important	87	29.0	73	36.5
Very Important	168	56.0	93	46.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

TABLE 43d  
DISCIPLINARY AND GRIEVANCE PROBLEMS  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	106	35.3	80	40.0
Adequately "	155	51.7	96	48.0
Poorly "	25	8.3	18	9.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

As shown in the analyses of tables 41(a-d) q.v., problems in employment are not peculiar to lower grades only. Staff in higher grades are also liable to have problems. There is however, a difference between the problems under consideration here and those dealt with in table 41. The problems envisaged here are those which could lead to dismissal and those referred to in table 41 are those which could lead to resignation; nevertheless, they are equally important, for both dismissal and resignation mean that one is out of job. The fact that staff in lower grades are more likely to have disciplinary and grievance problems is reflected in the above analysis. 56 per cent of the lower grades said that issues relating to disciplinary and grievance problems were very important, compared with 46.5 per cent of the higher grades. 39.3 per cent of the lower grades said that the issues were either "not very important" or "fairly important", compared with 50.5 per cent of the higher grades. The frequent occurrence of these problems is a constant reminder

to the unions and an unquestionable indication that the situation has not changed since the early days when the search for redress necessitated their inception. 8.3 and 9.0 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively felt they were poorly represented; this is expected.

TABLE 44a  
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	4	5	3	9	21	7.0
	(b)	7	18	5	47	77	25.7
	(c)	-	3	1	9	13	4.3
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	4	3	3	3	13	4.3
	(b)	8	22	8	19	57	19.0
	(c)	1	4	1	6	12	4.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	4	7	6	2	19	6.3
	(b)	9	18	3	13	43	14.4
	(c)	4	5	4	6	19	6.3
TOTALS		41	85	34	114	274	91.3
ABSTENTIONS		5	11	3	7	26	8.7
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

=====  
 (a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
 (c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 44b  
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT  
ANALYSIS BY GRADES

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	3	-	5	8	4.0
	(b)	24	2	37	63	31.5
	(c)	3	1	7	11	5.5
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	-	8	10	5.0
	(b)	19	3	22	44	22.0
	(c)	6	-	11	17	8.5
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	1	4	6	3.0
	(b)	5	2	12	19	9.5
	(c)	6	1	7	14	7.0
TOTALS		69	10	113	192	96.0
ABSTENTIONS		3	-	5	8	4.0
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

TABLE 44c  
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	111	37.0	82	41.0
Fairly Important	82	27.3	71	35.5
Very Important	81	27.0	39	19.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

TABLE 44d  
SECURING EARLY RETIREMENT  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	53	17.7	24	12.0
Adequately "	177	59.0	126	63.0
Poorly "	44	14.6	42	21.0

=====  
(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

Early retirement has been a contentious issue between staff and employer on the one hand and between unions and their members on the other. Lowering the retirement age in the civil service is seen by employees as a ploy. They regard it as one of the inevitable consequences of "cash limits". The unions on the other hand welcome it as a remedy for the ever increasing unemployment. However much the unions advocate a lower retirement age, it is not appreciated by members who frequently plead with the management for an extension of service. Staff in lower grades who are able to furnish cogent reasons, usually economic, are allowed to stay on an additional year, may be two. Higher grade staff are sometimes re-employed in lower grades if they so desire or hired on short term contracts as consultants. Significantly, the unions are never involved in these arrangements.

In the above analysis, only 19.5 per cent of the higher grades and 27 per cent of the lower grades said the issue

was "very important". 76.5 per cent of the higher grades and 64.3 per cent of the lower grades said it was either "not very important" or "fairly important". Views on the effectiveness of representation have to be more on the positive side. 76.5 per cent of the lower grades and 75 per cent of the higher grades said they were either "well" or "adequately represented. 14.6 and 21 per cent respectively of the lower and higher grades said they were "poorly" represented.

TABLE 45a  
OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
		I	II	III	IV		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	-	1	1	6	8	2.7
	(b)	1	10	2	14	27	9.0
	(c)	-	-	-	-	-	-
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	2	3	3	9	17	5.7
	(b)	5	18	5	29	57	19.0
	(c)	2	2	-	-	4	1.3
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	10	15	8	21	54	18.0
	(b)	16	34	11	29	90	30.0
	(c)	5	7	5	8	25	8.3
TOTALS		41	90	35	116	282	94.0
ABSTENTIONS		5	6	2	5	18	6.0
SAMPLE		46	96	37	121	300	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.



**TABLE 45b**  
**OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADES**

IMPOR TANCE OF ISSUE	EFFECTIV NESS OF REPRESEN TATION	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
		V	VI	VII		
NOT VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	1	-	2	3	1.5
	(b)	5	-	8	13	6.5
	(c)	2	-	-	2	1.0
FAIR LY IMPOR TANT	(a)	5	-	6	11	5.5
	(b)	21	2	28	51	25.5
	(c)	1	-	5	6	3.0
VERY IMPOR TANT	(a)	11	4	23	38	19.0
	(b)	16	3	32	51	25.5
	(c)	7	1	10	18	9.0
TOTALS		69	10	114	193	96.5
ABSTENTIONS		3	-	4	7	3.5
SAMPLE		72	10	118	200	-

(a)=Well Represented; (b)=Adequately Represented;  
(c)=Poorly Represented.

**TABLE 45c**  
**OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT**  
**SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Not Very Important	35	11.7	18	9.0
Fairly Important	78	26.0	68	34.0
Very Important	169	56.3	107	53.5

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

TABLE 45d  
OVERALL PENSION ENTITLEMENT  
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS BY GRADE

EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION	LOWER GRADES		HIGHER GRADES	
	(a)	(b)	(a)	(b)
Well Represented	79	26.3	52	26.0
Adequately "	174	58.0	115	57.5
Poorly "	29	9.7	26	13.0

(a)= Number of Respondents; (b)= % of Sample.

One of the main reasons for attributing security to civil service jobs was the automatic right to non-contributory pension which was unique to government employees. Today, pensions are universal. Even private firms and self employed individuals set up pension schemes for themselves and their employees. The government is no longer the only employer who gives its employees non-contributory pensions. Government pensions, when calculated from very poor civil service pay are so meagre they are hardly worth looking forward to. Nevertheless, the so-called free pension scheme had been under considerable attack since the turn of the century, having been cited by some Whitehall oracles as a good enough reason for keeping civil service pay very low. This problem is reflected in the above analyses. Only 11.7 per cent of the lower grades and 9 per cent of the higher grades said overall pension entitlement was "not very important". 82.3 and 87.5 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively, said it was either "fairly" or "very important". A

significant change has occurred in this aspect of the civil service industrial relations. Civil servants are no longer complacent about the security of their jobs or indeed about their automatic right to free pensions. "The Civil service Unions have been very vigilant and have maintained their strong resistance against a forced proletarianisation of their members."<sup>5</sup> The majority of respondents agree that union representation on this issue is effective. 84.3 and 83.5 of respondents in the lower and the higher grades respectively said they were either "well or adequately" represented, compared with only 9.7 and 13 per cent who said they were "poorly" represented.

Tables 34a to 45d analysed respondents' views on the importance of some fundamental workplace issues and the effectiveness of their union representation on those issues. The results indicated to some degree certain changes which have occurred since the turn of the century. But it was necessary to measure how those changes have affected morale in the civil service. Respondents were therefore further asked to express their views on selected aspects of workplace industrial relations. The views expressed were analysed in the following tables:-

TABLE 46  
VIEWS ON MANAGEMENT

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII		
(a)	4	7	2	3	16	5.3	2	1	6	9	4.5
(b)	17	19	6	32	74	24.7	12	5	28	45	22.5
(c)	12	31	12	41	96	32.0	31	3	44	78	39.0
(d)	11	28	13	32	84	28.0	19	1	28	48	24.0
(e)	2	10	4	13	29	9.7	8	-	11	19	9.5
(f)	46	95	37	121	299	99.7	72	10	117	199	99.5
(g)	-	1	-	-	1	0.3	-	-	1	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad;  
 (f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample;  
 (x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample.

The first point to be made here is that the views analysed above refer to local management and not to the Government as employer, although local management can be just as good or bad as the Government since it would be implementing government policy. It was interesting to observe how respondents in higher grades some of whom were themselves managers expressed views similar to those expressed by respondents in lower grades. 9.5 per cent of the higher grades felt their management was "very bad" and 24 per cent felt they were "bad", compared with 9.7 and 28 per cent of the lower grades. 27 per cent of the higher grades and 30 per cent of the lower grades said it was either "good" or "very good" and 39 per cent of the higher grades compared with 32 per

cent of the lower grades said it was "fair". This means that as much as 62 per cent of the lower grades and 66 per cent of the higher grades felt their management was either not "bad" or not "very bad". In that respect, morale could be interpreted as high.

TABLE 47  
VIEWS ON PAY

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES				(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII			
(a)	1	-	-	1	2	0.7	-	-	1	1	0.5	
(b)	7	12	7	7	33	11.0	4	1	11	16	8.0	
(c)	11	29	14	34	88	29.3	18	4	38	60	30.0	
(d)	18	37	10	52	117	39.0	39	3	52	94	47.0	
(e)	8	17	6	24	55	18.3	11	2	14	27	13.5	
(f)	45	95	37	118	295	98.3	72	10	116	198	99.0	
(g)	1	1	-	3	5	1.7	-	-	2	2	1.0	
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0	

(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad;  
(f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample;  
(x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample.

In an earlier analysis, pay was shown to be a very important issue (cf. tables 34 [c-d]). In the above analysis, the role of pay as an indicator of morale is unmistakable. Morale may be regarded as "very high" if most respondents felt that pay was very good, "high" if most respondents felt it was good and "low" if most respondents felt it was bad. Only .7 per cent of respondents in the lower grades and .5 per cent of the higher grades felt that pay was "very good". As much as

39 per cent of the lower grades and 47 per cent of the higher grades felt it was "bad"; 18.3 per cent of the lower grades and 13.5 per cent of the higher grades felt it was "very bad". 11 per cent of the lower grades and 8 per cent of the higher grades felt it was "good". 29.3 and 30 per cent respectively, felt it was "fair". By the above definition morale may be regarded as low rather than very low. Along the hierarchy, morale may be regarded as lower in the higher grades than in the lower grades. 60.5 per cent of the higher grades said pay was either "bad" or "very bad", compared with 57.3 per cent of the lower grades. The result reflects the constant conflict between the Government and its employees.

TABLE 48a  
VIEWS ON WORKING CONDITIONS

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII		
(a)	4	5	2	7	18	6.0	4	1	8	13	6.5
(b)	16	30	2	28	76	25.3	14	5	37	56	28.0
(c)	21	38	18	55	132	44.0	39	4	49	92	46.0
(d)	3	16	7	26	52	17.3	9	-	18	27	13.5
(e)	1	4	8	4	17	5.7	6	-	5	11	5.5
(f)	45	93	37	120	295	98.3	72	10	117	199	99.5
(g)	1	3	-	1	5	1.7	-	-	1	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad;  
 (f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample;  
 (x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample.

The consensus of both the lower and higher grades on issues relating to working conditions was that they were important and that union representation on the issues was effective:-

TABLE 48b  
WORKING CONDITIONS (cf. table 40[c-d])

IMPORTANCE			EFFECTIVENESS OF REPRESENTATION		
VIEWS	LG%	HG%	VIEWS	LG%	HG%
Very Important	54.0	47.0	Well Represented	33.3	23.0
Fairly "	28.3	36.5	Adequately "	48.0	60.5
Total	82.3	83.5	Total	81.3	83.5

=====  
LG=Lower Grades; HG=Higher Grades.

From that result it could be inferred that working conditions were generally good. The views analysed in table 48a above support this inference but not equally along the grades. For example, 0.2 per cent more respondents in the lower grades said working conditions were very bad. 3.8 per cent more respondents in the same grades said they were bad, whereas 0.5 per cent more respondents in the higher grades said they were very good; 2.7 per cent more respondents in the same grades said they were good and 2 per cent more in the same grades said they were fair. 23 per cent of the lower grades, compared with 19 per cent of the higher grades said working conditions were either bad or very bad, whereas 80.5 per cent of the higher grades, compared with 75.3 per cent of the lower grades said they were either "very good", "good" or "fair". The 5.2 per cent difference indicates that working conditions were better for the higher grades.

**TABLE 49**  
**VIEWS ON PROMOTION PROSPECTS**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII		
(a)	-	-	-	1	1	0.4	-	2	1	3	1.5
(b)	4	11	3	7	25	8.3	3	-	9	12	6.0
(c)	16	28	13	34	91	30.3	16	3	47	66	33.0
(d)	10	30	15	47	102	34.0	26	3	38	67	33.5
(e)	15	25	6	31	77	25.7	27	2	20	49	24.5
(f)	45	94	37	120	296	98.7	72	10	115	197	98.5
(g)	1	2	-	1	4	1.3	-	-	3	3	1.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad;  
 (f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample;  
 (x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample.

More respondents across the grades felt promotion prospects were bad or very bad - 59.7 per cent of the lower grades and 58 per cent of the higher grades. The views of both groups were not significantly different. On the other hand, only 0.4 per cent of the lower grades, compared with 1.5 per cent of the higher grades felt promotion prospects were very good. 38.6 per cent of the lower grades, compared with 39 per cent of the higher grades felt they were either "good" or "fair". Although the difference is negligible, the result does indicate that promotions within the groups were more frequent than promotions across the groups, that is, from lower to higher grades.



TABLE 50  
VIEWS ON TRADE UNION FACILITIES

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII		
(a)	13	9	2	10	34	11.3	6	2	9	17	8.5
(b)	13	35	11	39	98	32.7	30	2	41	73	36.5
(c)	16	41	20	48	125	41.7	29	4	49	82	41.0
(d)	2	5	4	15	26	8.6	5	-	13	18	9.0
(e)	1	3	-	8	12	4.0	2	1	5	8	4.0
(f)	45	93	37	120	295	98.3	72	9	117	198	99.0
(g)	1	3	-	1	5	1.7	-	1	1	2	1.0
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad;  
 (f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample;  
 (x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample.

A difference between the views expressed by the two groups on the subject of trade union facilities was not likely, insofar as the management was not likely to give more or better facilities to one group in the same establishment. Facility time given for union business is not usually a matter of discretion; the rules prescribe a minimum length of time beyond which any extra time needs to be justified by the individuals. Only 12.6 per cent of the lower grades and 13 per cent of the higher grades felt that trade union facilities were "bad" or "very bad". The percentage of those who said they were "very good", "good" or "fair" was consistent with the government policy which tended to encourage rather than discourage trade union activities in

its establishments, except at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) dealt with below.

TABLE 51  
VIEWS ON UNION/MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES				(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII			
(a)	9	9	3	11	32	10.7	4	2	8	14	7.0	
(b)	15	30	9	39	93	31.0	26	4	46	76	38.0	
(c)	19	47	16	53	135	45.0	32	3	43	78	39.0	
(d)	1	5	5	12	23	7.6	9	1	12	22	11.0	
(e)	1	4	4	6	15	5.0	1	-	7	8	4.0	
(f)	45	95	37	121	298	99.3	72	10	116	198	99.0	
(g)	1	1	-	-	2	0.7	-	-	2	2	1.0	
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0	

=====  
 (a)=Very good; (b)=Good; (c)=Fair; (d)=Bad; (e)=Very bad;  
 (f)=Totals; (g)=Abstentions; (h)=Population sample;  
 (x)=Total; (y)=% of Sample.

The relationship between the trade unions and management in any establishment is governed by many factors; for example, how forthright the management is and the degree of aggressiveness of local and full time officials. A management that is unable to handle change would always have an uneasy relationship with the trade unions unless the union representatives are "yes-men", whose main objective is to "feather their own nests". In the above analysis only a small percentage of respondents said that relations were either "bad" or "very bad" - 12.6 and 15 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively. This is by no means an indication that

the management of all the establishments sampled were forthright or that the trade union representatives were all "yes-men". For instance, the 86.7 per cent of the lower grades and the 84 per cent of the higher grades who felt their relationship with management was not "bad" or "very bad" were made up of 10.7 per cent of the lower grades and 7 per cent of the higher grades who maintained that relations were "very good", 31 per cent of the lower grades and 38 per cent of the higher grades who said relations were "good" and 45 per cent of the lower grades and 39 per cent of the higher grades who said relations were "fair".

#### UNORGANISED CONFLICT

The survey examined some manifestations of personal and unorganised conflict. In question 22, respondents were asked to identify from a specified list, which personal actions they had taken as a direct result of the unrest between their unions and their employer:

Relation between the CSD as employer and the civil service unions has been less than satisfactory in recent years. This question is to assess the degree of passiveness or militancy on the part of individual members in view of the employer's tough stance. Since absolute confidentiality is guaranteed, please answer this question regardless of what is politic. What we need here is your own personal reaction....

Due to your union's inability to negotiate successfully

with your employer (including, where applicable, negotiations at branch level), which of the following personal actions have you taken?

An attempt was made here to discover how individuals expressed their frustration. The replies were analysed in two dimensions:-

1. To compare the degree of individual militancy or passiveness among active union members, that is, branch officers, with that of other ordinary members.
2. To observe the influence of grade on the actions taken.

TABLE 51  
ACTIONS MANIFESTING UNORGANISED CONFLICT  
ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS

ACTIONS TAKEN	(a)	(b)%	(c)	(d)%	(e)	(f)%
Work to rule	170	50.3	63	38.9	233	46.6
Overtime ban	222	65.7	76	46.9	298	59.6
Sabotage	18	5.3	2	1.2	20	4.0
Sick absences	45	13.3	12	7.4	57	11.4
Work with less or no enthusiasm	181	53.6	70	43.2	251	50.2
Lateness	38	11.2	9	5.5	47	9.4
Actively looking for another job	108	32.0	44	27.2	152	30.4
No action at all	51	15.1	46	28.4	97	19.4

=====  
 (a)=Local Union Officers; (b)=% of Sample(n=338); (c)=Ordinary Members; (d)=% of Sample(n=162); (e)=(a)+(c); (f)=%of(a+c)

Predictably, a larger percentage of union activists participated in each of the actions and most of them took a combination of two or more actions. On the other hand, a larger percentage of ordinary members took "no action at all" - 28.4 per cent, compared with 15.1 per cent union activists. An interpretation of this is that branch officers are more militant than ordinary members. This result is corroborated by previous evidence (cf. tables 30e and 31b)

A total of 80.6 per cent of the respondents, activists and ordinary members took one or more of the specified actions; the 19.4 per cent who said they took no action are regarded as passive. This high degree of militancy portrays hidden discontent which may be interpreted in terms of low morale in the civil service. "Work to rules" and "overtime bans" are often instigated by the unions and are seen as official industrial action in those circumstances. However, together with the other specified actions they are being considered here as unofficial, that is, spontaneous action.

Elimination of overtime has always been an official policy of the unions. Nevertheless, most members, including branch officers, do overtime in order to supplement their income.<sup>6</sup> Therefore, the fact that a significant percentage of respondents, an overall 59.6 per cent, spontaneously abandoned it, provides yet another evidence of low morale.

The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English defines Sabotage as:

Malicious or wanton destruction, especially, doing damage to plant etc by workmen on bad terms with their employers.

The Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary gives an additional dimension to this definition:

action taken to prevent the achievement of any aim.

Sabotage, featuring malicious or wanton destruction, was clearly not envisaged in the context of the above question. It is unlikely and there is no evidence that civil servants vent their frustration by destroying government property; for if this were the case, government buildings and property all over the country would be in a perpetual state of wreckage, judging from the degree of low morale already evidenced in this survey. It is more feasible that individuals would rather take action to prevent or delay the achievement of certain management objectives. The survey indicates that a small percentage of employees have from time to time resorted to this form of industrial action.

The survey also indicates that a small percentage of respondents have sometimes resorted to sick absence and lateness. This should not be interpreted to mean that individuals have stayed away from work pretending to sick or that they have deliberately gone to work late. As a respondent explained:

It is rather a question of effort. A person may stay away from work because he really feels unwell whereas he would have gone to work if he had made a little more effort. Similarly, he may find himself behind time on a particular morning not because he had planned to be late; then he may decide not to hurry. The frustrations he had suffered at work had sapped the will-power he needed to cope with those occasions.

A significant number of respondents said they worked with less or no enthusiasm and others said they were actively looking for another job. This is yet again another confirmation of the low morale hypothesis.

If each of the actions specified above fits within the wider and more comprehensive definition of sabotage, that is, "action taken to prevent the achievement of any aim", the result of the above analysis conclusively proves that the government has created a large population of frustrated workforce who from time to time express their frustrations in sabotage.

**TABLE 53a. ACTIONS MANIFESTING UNORGANISED CONFLICT  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

ACTIONS	LOWER GRADES				TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=300)
	I	II	III	IV		
Work to rule	24	43	20	60	147	49.0
Overtime ban	19	69	26	70	184	61.3
Sabotage	2	4	2	3	11	3.6
Sick absences	7	11	6	20	44	14.6
Work with less or no enthusiasm	16	49	15	70	150	50.0
Lateness	1	9	4	15	29	9.7
Actively looking for another job	9	31	7	36	85	28.3
No action at all	20	14	4	21	59	19.7

**TABLE 53b. ACTIONS MANIFESTING UNORGANISED CONFLICT  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

ACTIONS	HIGHER GRADES			TOTAL	% OF SAMPLE (N=200)
	V	VI	VII		
Work to rule	48	1	37	86	43.0
Overtime ban	57	2	55	114	57.0
Sabotage	4	1	4	9	4.5
Sick absences	6	-	7	13	6.5
Work with less or no enthusiasm	40	5	56	101	50.5
Lateness	9	1	8	18	9.0
Actively looking for another job	27	3	37	67	33.5
No action at all	8	4	26	38	19.0



The above analyses show that members of the lower grades suffer frustrations just as much as members of the higher grades. However, taking the actions singly, significantly more respondents in the lower grades said they worked to rule, boycotted overtime and took sick leave; more respondents in the higher grades said they were actively looking for another job. The action most taken by both groups was overtime ban. Approximately 50 per cent of the respondents said they worked with less enthusiasm and about 46 per cent said they had worked to rule. These figures not only emphasize the point already made about low morale, they provide an alternative view of militancy along the hierarchy. Whereas earlier analyses had indicated greater propensity to militancy among the higher grades (cf. tables 19b, 19c, 20a, and 25a et seq.) the above analyses indicate that the higher grades are more likely to take part in collective action rather than in individual and spontaneous action.

A larger percentage of respondents in the higher grades said they were actively looking for other jobs. This was probably because they had more qualifications and wider experience than respondents in the lower grades and were therefore more mobile.

A slightly higher percentage of respondents in the higher grades said they resorted to sabotage. In the light of the above definition members in higher grades have more capacity

to influence corporate objectives. The efforts of members in lower grades to prevent or retard the achievement of overall workplace objective would be less effective because of the importance of their position relative to those of the higher grades. However, it is debatable which of the two groups has more negative power.

The higher percentage of respondents in the lower grades who said they resorted to sick absences was consistent with the fact that jobs in the lower grades are more boring than those of the higher grades.

Question 23 focuses on personal accidents and injuries sustained at work. The assumption here was that accidents at work could reflect conflict and therefore a probability of direct link with frustration. No one would deliberately cause an accident either for himself or for others, but frustration at work may lead to carefree attitude with a high risk of avoidable accidents. Although the possibility may be remote for an individual to fake an accident in order to have a seemingly good reason to get away from a conflict situation as well as claim compensation from his employer, the probability cannot be overlooked. The results of this aspect of the survey are not a reliable indicator of morale because there are not many people who would want to indulge in such an impractical solution to a conflict. Furthermore, there would always be a number of cases where accidents are

genuine. With these "caveats" in mind, some of the accidents declared may be directly linked with personal conflict.

Once again, the replies are analysed by grades in order to observe any indicative patterns. In the first part of the question respondents were asked to state how many accidents they had over a period of five years up to the time of completing the questionnaire. In the second part they were asked to state the total duration of absences, if any, occasioned by injuries sustained.

**TABLE 54**  
**ACCIDENTS AT WORK**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

NUMBER OF ACCI DENTS	LOWER GRADES				HIGHER GRADES						
	I	II	III	IV	(a)	(b)	V	VI	VII	(a)	(b)
None	36	72	22	97	227	75.7	56	10	103	169	84.5
Up to 10	9	24	15	24	72	24.0	14	-	15	29	14.5
Over 10	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	0.5
Total	45	96	37	121	299	99.7	71	10	118	199	99.5
(c)	1	-	-	-	1	0.3	1	-	-	1	0.5
(d)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
(a)=Total; (b)=%of Sample; (c)=Abstentions;  
(d)=Sample Population.

If the above result were taken as a measure of spontaneous militancy then it corroborates a previous finding, that is, whereas higher grades were more militant than lower grades

they were less likely to take spontaneous action (cf. table 53). 84.5 per cent of respondents in the higher grades said they had no accidents, compared with 75.7 per cent of respondents in the lower grades. On the other hand, 24 per cent of the lower grades, compared with 15 per cent of the higher grades, said they had up to ten accidents within the five years.

**TABLE 55**  
**DURATION OF SICK LEAVE DUE TO ACCIDENTS**

DURATION OF ABSENCE	LOWER GRADES						HIGHER GRADES				
	I	II	III	IV	(a)	(b)	V	VI	VII	(a)	(b)
None	42	84	27	112	265	88.3	65	10	108	183	91.5
1-7 Days	-	3	2	3	8	2.7	5	-	3	8	4.0
8-14 "	2	3	2	1	8	2.7	-	-	-	-	-
3 - 6 Weeks	1	3	4	2	10	3.3	-	-	-	-	-
Over 6 Weeks	-	3	2	1	6	2.0	1	-	-	1	0.5
Total	45	96	37	119	297	99.0	71	10	111	192	96.0
(c)	1	-	-	2	3	1.0	1	-	7	8	4.0
(d)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Total; (b)=%of Sample; (c)=Abstentions;  
(d)=Sample Population.

The number of days taken in sick absences was more among the lower grades, in other words, fewer respondents in the higher grades had taken sick leave due to injuries caused by accidents at work. Only 0.5 per cent of the higher grades

had been away sick for over 6 weeks, compared with 2.0 per cent of the lower grades. 4 per cent of the higher grades took up to 7 days sick leave, compared with 2.7 per cent of the lower grades. But 6 per cent of the lower grades were away sick for between 8 days and 6 weeks, compared with none in the higher grades. For the reasons indicated above, this result is not an adequate measure of morale particularly since some of the days taken might have been for serious accidents uninfluenced by frustrations.

Yet another method is used to determine the degree of militancy in question 24. A number of controversial statements were proposed, with which respondents were asked to agree or disagree. The proverbial "them and us" barrier existing between the lower and the higher grades is monitored in this question. It was primarily assumed that some of the statements particularly antagonistic to management would elicit defensive sentiments from members of the higher grades. Some extreme statements were deliberately added in order to assess leftist tendencies in the hierarchy. The results were analysed by grades.

**TABLE 56**  
**STATEMENT 1**  
**MEMBERS OF SENIOR GRADES FEEL THAT UNION ACTIVITIES**  
**CONFLICT WITH THEIR ROLE AS MANAGERS**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	17	27	20	48	112	37.3	24	6	36	66	33.0
(b)	10	36	13	48	107	35.7	29	4	62	95	47.5
(c)	9	21	3	13	46	15.3	9	-	4	13	6.5
(d)	3	8	-	9	20	6.7	7	-	12	19	9.5
(e)	1	3	1	3	8	2.7	1	-	4	5	2.5
(f)	40	95	37	121	293	97.7	70	10	118	198	99.0
(g)	6	1	-	-	7	2.3	2	-	-	2	1.0
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
 (e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
 (h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

A greater majority of respondents both in the lower and the higher grades agreed or strongly agreed with the above statement - 73 and 80.5 per cent respectively; but the magnitude of this feeling was not reflected in earlier analyses. The analyses of participation in branch activities, for instance, attendance at meetings and representation of members, indicate almost equal participation between the two groups - 69.3 per cent of the lower grades held local offices, compared with 65.0 per cent of the higher grades (cf. tables 9 and 9a) and in the years 1981/82, 1982/83,

1983/84, an average of 66.7 per cent of the lower grades attended all meetings, compared with 65.7 per cent of the higher grades (cf. tables 14c-14h) The differences (1.7 and 1.0 per cent respectively) are not significant and certainly do not corroborate the feelings expressed. Therefore, the higher grades appeared to have made greater sacrifices in order to participate in union activities as they did.

**TABLE 57**  
**STATEMENT 2**  
**MERGERS BETWEEN CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE NECESSARY**  
**TO EXERT SIGNIFICANT PRESSURE ON THE EMPLOYER**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	16	33	7	56	112	37.3	32	4	39	75	37.5
(b)	9	23	8	34	74	24.7	17	4	37	58	29.0
(c)	7	14	9	11	41	13.7	11	1	10	22	11.0
(d)	10	18	8	10	46	15.3	9	-	17	26	13.0
(e)	2	8	4	10	24	8.0	2	1	15	18	9.0
(f)	44	96	36	121	297	99.0	71	10	118	199	99.5
(g)	2	-	1	-	3	1.0	1	-	-	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
 (e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
 (h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

The assumption here was that since any pressure on the employer affects management and by implication members of the higher grades the above statement would elicit more dissonant attitudes from the majority of respondents in the

group, and a greater majority of respondents in the lower grades would be less dissonant on the matter. However, this was not the case. Whereas 62 per cent of the lower grades agreed or strongly agreed, a larger percentage of the higher grades, 66.5 per cent, also agreed or strongly agreed. 23.3 per cent of the lower grades and 22 per cent of the higher grades disagreed or strongly disagreed. Although both groups seemed to share the same sentiments the higher grades appeared to be even more militant about the issue rather than be defensive of management/employer. An implication of this result is that members of the higher grades would neither necessarily identify with the employer on all issues nor suffer a conflict of loyalty on matters which impinge directly upon their personal well being. Their role as "management" and sometimes representatives of the employer would not necessarily alter the common values which, as employees, they share with members of the lower grades.



TABLE 58  
STATEMENT 3  
IT IS INEVITABLE THAT THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE EMPLOYED BY  
THE CIVIL SERVICE WILL DECLINE WITH THE INTRODUCTION  
OF NEW TECHNOLOGY

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	12	21	12	22	67	22.3	17	2	12	31	15.5
(b)	18	50	21	49	138	46.0	26	5	57	88	44.0
(c)	3	12	2	14	31	10.3	8	-	20	28	14.0
(d)	9	8	2	26	45	15.0	14	3	22	39	19.5
(e)	1	4	-	9	14	4.7	6	-	7	13	6.5
(f)	43	95	37	120	295	98.3	71	10	118	199	99.5
(g)	3	1	-	1	5	1.7	1	-	-	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
 (e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
 (h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

The main idea behind the above statement was that as new technology became widespread in the civil service, automation of most jobs may mean that fewer employees would be required. Here again, it was assumed that since "management" was in accord with the employer in the introduction of new technology and the consequent reduction of the civil service workforce, respondents in the higher grades would be more inclined to agree with the statement than respondents in the lower grades. However, the result indicates that both groups had taken for granted the inevitability of the outcome of widespread use of the new technology in the civil service. Both groups agreed with the statement but probably not

because they approved of it. Since most lower grade jobs were routine and therefore more easily computerized, job losses and redundancies would hardly be a welcome prospect for employees in those grades. 68.3 per cent of the lower grades and 59.5 per cent of the higher grades agreed with the statement. The higher grades, being perhaps more enlightened, were less pessimistic. A larger percentage of respondents in those grades disagreed, probably not because they disapproved but rather because they were acquainted with new technology well enough to know that it would not always mean fewer jobs or job losses. The result indicates a more rational approach by the higher grades.

**TABLE 59**  
**STATEMENT 4**  
**THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE RIGHT TO TRY AND PROTECT JOBS**  
**BY BANNING OVERTIME**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	22	46	19	55	142	47.3	34	5	48	87	43.5
(b)	14	27	12	42	95	31.7	21	1	39	61	30.5
(c)	2	17	3	15	37	12.3	5	2	10	17	8.2
(d)	5	4	3	6	18	6.0	10	1	14	25	12.5
(e)	1	2	-	3	6	2.0	1	1	5	7	3.5
(f)	44	96	37	121	298	99.3	71	10	116	197	98.5
(g)	2	-	-	-	2	0.7	1	-	2	3	1.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Overtime has always been a tendencious issue among union members. Even among those members who endorsed banning overtime as an official policy of the unions, there were those who did it because it was an essential supplement for their very low income. It was not unusual for a local union officer, taking part in a Trade Union Side debate, to agree and indeed vote in favour of a ban but refuse to implement it because it would mean a significant cut in his own income.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, it was usually the case that majority of those who supported overtime ban did not themselves do overtime either because they had no need for it or because it was not available in their departments. Those members who argued against a ban were usually those who depended on overtime to make ends meet and were grateful that it was available to them.

It was assumed that nearly all the respondents in the higher grades would agree with the above statement, either because overtime was not available to higher grades or because members in those grades had very little need for it. The opposite was assumed for the lower grades. Over 80 per cent of the sample population, lower and higher grades, did no overtime because it was not available in their departments. This is consistent with the result which indicates that in both groups a larger percentage agreed and a smaller percentage disagreed with the statement. However, 5 per cent more respondents in lower grades agreed and 8 per cent fewer

respondents in the same group disagreed with the statement.

**TABLE 60**  
**STATEMENT 5**  
**ON KEY ISSUES MOST MEMBERS ARE PREPARED**  
**TO SUPPORT THEIR UNIONS**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	5	11	7	1	24	8.0	2	2	2	6	3.0
(b)	16	56	17	46	135	45.0	30	4	34	68	34.0
(c)	9	13	7	32	61	20.3	18	3	33	54	27.0
(d)	11	10	6	31	58	19.3	21	1	41	63	31.5
(e)	2	5	-	10	17	5.7	-	-	8	8	4.0
(f)	43	95	37	120	295	98.3	71	10	118	199	99.5
(g)	3	1	-	1	5	1.7	1	-	-	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
 (e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
 (h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

The above statement was intended to examine the loyalty of union members after the bitter experience of the defeat suffered by the civil service unions in the 1981 pay campaign. It should be generally accepted that members ought to back their unions on key issues. However, two very important circumstances unfortunately affect this common assumption, namely, the apathy of members and the fact that government intervention has put severe restrictions on the power and negotiating successes of the unions. During the 1982/83 pay campaign many members withdrew their support

simply because they felt the unions' pursuit of fair wages was unrealistic in view of the insensitive attitude of the Government. In retrospect, it is difficult to tell whether subsequent defeats of the unions might have been self-inflicted or whether it would have happened even if the unions had the full support of their members. This statement tests the current attitude of members and suggests that unions must be supported by their members in spite of, and especially because of the frequently difficult, if not unreasonable attitude of the employer.

The result indicates that members of the higher grades were more sensitive to the unions' failure, or rather, the intransigence of the Government. 37 per cent of that group agreed with the statement, 35.5 per cent disagreed and 27 per cent were uncertain. In the lower grades group, 53 per cent agreed, 25 per cent disagreed and 20.3 per cent were uncertain. There is enough evidence in this result to suggest that the unions can no longer be certain of adequate support from their members notwithstanding the importance and reasonableness of the issue. This finding will be tested in the next question on the GCHQ issue.

**TABLE 61**  
**STATEMENT 6**  
**IN THE LIGHT OF CURRENT UNEMPLOYMENT THE CIVIL SERVICE**  
**UNIONS' POLICY OF RETIREMENT AT 60 SHOULD BE REVIEWED**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	15	22	9	31	77	25.7	12	1	26	39	19.5
(b)	13	33	13	34	93	31.0	21	4	47	72	36.0
(c)	4	18	5	24	51	17.0	9	2	12	23	11.5
(d)	9	14	8	21	52	17.3	22	1	28	51	25.5
(e)	2	8	1	9	20	6.7	6	2	5	13	6.5
(f)	43	95	36	119	293	97.7	70	10	118	198	99.0
(g)	3	1	1	2	7	2.3	2	-	-	2	1.0
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
 (e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
 (h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Both the policy of retirement at 60 and the unions' overtime policy reflect their perennial concern for the less fortunate, in this case, those who have no jobs. The retirement policy assumes that jobs vacated by retirees would be available for the unemployed. The rationale of the overtime policy is that jobs usually covered by overtime should be passed on to people on the dole queue. Although the policies may impose hardship on some poorly paid civil servants, they are supposed to ease the pressure on the job market; the intention is noble. However, the above statement suggests that the current age limit should be further reduced. Unlike overtime ban, retirement age is every working person's con-

cern and there are very good arguments both for and against early retirement. Even in spite of recent changes in pension laws which have been widely publicized, most workers do not begin to think constructively about their pension until they are at the threshold of retirement. Retirement takes many people by surprise. Another factor in the debate which supporters of retirement at 60 and earlier often fail to consider is the current average life expectancy. The fact that people tend to live longer nowadays ought to mitigate the argument in favour of retiring workers so early in order to release jobs for people in their teens. The argument goes on but it is not the intention of this survey to indulge in the complex debate. However, the reactions of both the higher and the lower grades are scrutinized in the light of the above discussion. More respondents in the higher grades seem to have considered the issue, since only 11.5 per cent of that group, compared with 17 per cent of the lower grades were uncertain about their views. Also, only 1 per cent of the higher grades abstained, compared with 2.3 per cent of the lower grades. 32 per cent of the higher grades, compared with 24 per cent of the lower grades disagreed with the statement. Those who agreed with it, 56.7 and 55.5 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively were probably more influenced by the fact that the statement was only hypothetical. They would most likely disagree if it were presented as a real option.

**TABLE 62**  
**STATEMENT 7**  
**UNLESS A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THE INTRODUCTION OF**  
**NEW TECHNOLOGY IS REACHED THE UNIONS SHOULD IMMEDIATELY**  
**START A POLICY OF NON-COOPERATION**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	10	23	10	28	71	23.7	26	3	11	40	20.0
(b)	14	44	17	36	111	37.0	26	2	35	63	31.5
(c)	10	13	6	20	49	16.3	7	1	23	31	15.5
(d)	8	11	3	28	50	16.7	13	3	33	49	24.5
(e)	2	2	1	9	14	4.6	-	1	14	15	7.5
(f)	44	93	37	121	295	98.3	72	10	116	198	99.0
(g)	2	3	-	-	5	1.7	-	-	2	2	1.0
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Statement 3 indicates that the lower grades accepted more readily than the higher grades the fact that new technology would displace people from their jobs. The fear implied in that acceptance was reflected in the action proposed above. As a statement calling for a policy of non-cooperation was a proposal of a sanction against "management" it was assumed that the higher grades would be less inclined to agree with it. On the contrary, more respondents in those grades disagreed with it - 32 per cent, compared with 21.3 per cent of the lower grades. Predictably, 60.7 per cent of the lower grades, compared with 51.5 per cent of the higher grades



agreed with it. But it would seem that the two groups agreed or disagreed with the statement for different reasons. The lower grades seem to have reacted purely out of a sense of insecurity - their jobs were jeopardized by the advent of the new technology. The higher grades disagreed probably not because they sided with "management" but most likely in order to ensure fair play.<sup>8</sup>

**TABLE 63**  
**STATEMENT 8**  
**IF THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE BETTER**  
**PAY, IT'S NO USE CONTINUING MY MEMBERSHIP**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	2	-	3	2	7	2.3	1	1	3	5	2.5
(b)	1	9	-	1	11	3.7	4	1	3	8	4.0
(c)	6	7	2	6	21	7.0	3	-	6	9	4.5
(d)	18	40	17	41	116	38.7	21	6	39	66	33.0
(e)	18	39	15	69	141	47.0	43	2	67	112	56.0
(f)	45	95	37	119	296	98.7	72	10	118	200	100.0
(g)	1	1	-	2	4	1.3	-	-	-	-	-
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Earlier analyses have indicated how important the pay issue is. Both groups agreed that they were adequately represented (cf. table 34a et seq.). In the above statement an observat-

ion is made to see whether the importance of pay pervades the continuation of membership. It was assumed that all members were rational and would endeavour to put all circumstances surrounding their membership into economic perspective. This assumption was tested to observe which of the two groups would tend to rationalize their membership on a "quid pro quo" basis. The analysis indicates only 1.3 per cent abstention among the lower grade, with 7 per cent uncertain. 4.5 per cent of the higher grades were also uncertain. However, the overall result was not as anticipated. Approximately the same percentage of respondents from both groups agreed with the statement - a low 6 per cent. A larger percentage of the higher grades disagreed - 89 per cent, compared with 85.7 per cent of the lower grades.

It would seem therefore that whereas ability of the unions to negotiate better pay may encourage most members to continue their membership, inability to negotiate successfully would not significantly affect their decision to stay. Other factors, such as personal grievance against the union or its officials, would have to be present in order to make any difference.

**TABLE 64**  
**STATEMENT 9**  
**FAILURE TO SECURE BETTER PAY WOULD SERIOUSLY**  
**AFFECT MY ATTITUDE TO WORK**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	8	11	3	18	40	13.3	12	1	12	25	12.5
(b)	17	32	13	40	102	34.0	26	3	43	72	36.0
(c)	4	16	2	24	46	15.4	17	3	22	42	21.0
(d)	12	31	13	28	84	28.0	15	2	32	49	24.5
(e)	3	4	4	10	21	7.0	2	1	8	11	5.5
(f)	44	94	35	120	293	97.7	72	10	117	199	99.5
(g)	2	2	2	1	7	2.3	-	-	1	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

People's attitude to work is subject to various influences; pay is certainly one of them. Equity demands that if pay is good individuals should work hard to justify it. Should the opposite apply if pay is bad? Most members believe, with good reasons, that civil service pay is bad. This belief is mainly responsible for the low morale in the service. The above statement assumes that morale is lower among the lower grades and anticipates that a larger percentage of respondents in those grades would agree with it. It also assumes that if morale is higher among the higher grades more

respondents in that group would disagree with it. However, the result did not endorse these assumptions. 13.3 per cent of the lower grades strongly agreed, compared with 12.5 per cent of the higher grades. The slight difference is cancelled out in the percentages of those who "agreed" - 36 per cent of the higher grades, compared with 34.0 per cent of the lower grades. Taking those who "strongly agreed" and those who "agreed" together, the analysis indicates that 48.5 per cent of the higher grades agreed, compared with 47.3 per cent of the lower grades. More respondents in the higher grades were uncertain - 21 per cent, compared with 15.4 per cent of the lower grades. More respondents in lower grades disagreed - 28 per cent, compared with 24.5 per cent of the higher grades. Also, the lower grades had a larger percentage of those who "strongly disagreed" - 7 per cent, compared with 5.5 per cent of the higher grades. More respondents in the higher grades agreed with the statement and more respondents in the lower grades disagreed with it; the differences are only slight. Contrary to the assumptions, morale was just as low in the higher grades as it was in the lower grades.

**TABLE 65**  
**STATEMENT 10**  
**BRINGING INFLATION DOWN TO A VERY LOW SINGLE FIGURE**  
**IS AT PRESENT MOST IMPORTANT FOR THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC**  
**RECOVERY**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	4	8	7	2	21	7.0	-	2	5	7	3.5
(b)	10	16	5	11	42	14.0	9	3	17	29	14.5
(c)	10	18	4	16	48	16.0	12	2	16	30	15.0
(d)	11	29	11	47	98	32.7	17	1	35	53	26.5
(e)	7	24	10	44	85	28.3	34	2	44	80	40.0
(f)	42	95	37	120	294	98.0	72	10	117	199	99.5
(g)	4	1	-	1	6	2.0	-	-	1	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Statement 10 is a right wing statement which was purposely included in order to test the propensity of both groups. The unions which organize members in lower grades were regarded by many to be left wing. Consequently, the notion that unions which organize members in higher grades were right wing, is assumed. This statement and the next three were designed to examine the veracity of both assumptions. More respondents in the lower grades were expected to disagree with the statements and more respondents in the higher grades were expected to agree with them. In the above

statement more respondents in the lower grades strongly agreed - 7 per cent, compared with 3.5 per cent of the higher grades. 21 per cent of the lower grades agreed, compared with 18 of the higher grades. This is contrary to expectation. More respondents in the higher grades disagreed - 66.5, compared with 61 per cent of the lower grades. Again, this is contrary to expectation.

Although both groups appeared to be left wing, the higher grades apparently appeared to be more left wing than the lower grades. These findings may be corroborated in the next three analyses.

**TABLE 66**  
**STATEMENT 11**  
**IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMIC COMMONSENSE THE POWER OF**  
**TRADE UNIONS SHOULD BE CHECKED**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	3	2	1	-	6	2.0	-	1	4	5	2.5
(b)	6	10	2	12	30	10.0	4	1	15	20	10.0
(c)	8	12	7	8	35	11.7	6	1	19	26	13.0
(d)	13	28	14	37	92	30.7	23	4	36	63	31.5
(e)	15	41	13	62	131	43.6	39	3	43	85	42.5
(f)	45	93	37	119	294	98.0	72	10	117	199	99.5
(g)	1	3	-	2	6	2.0	-	-	1	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
 (e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
 (h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Statement 11 intentionally attacks the power of the unions with the expectation that whichever group is right wing would agree with it. Approximately equal (small) percentage of respondents from both groups agreed with it - 12 per cent of the lower grades and 12.5 per cent of the higher grades. A higher percentage of the higher grades was uncertain - 13 per cent, compared with 11.7 per cent of the lower grades; a higher percentage of the lower grades abstained - 2 per cent, compared with 0.5 per cent of the higher grades. Both groups cancelled each other out in this respect. Majority of respondents in both groups disagreed - 74.3 per cent of the lower grades and 74 per cent of the higher grades. Again, both groups appeared to be left wing, but whereas this result was expected in the case of the lower grades, it was contrary to expectation in the case of the higher grades.

**TABLE 67**  
**STATEMENT 12**  
**NEW TOUGHER LAWS TO SEVERELY RESTRAIN PICKETING**  
**SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	3	4	2	2	11	3.7	1	2	10	13	6.5
(b)	5	14	9	12	40	13.3	7	1	18	26	13.0
(c)	8	12	3	11	34	11.3	3	2	11	16	8.0
(d)	11	23	11	34	79	26.4	21	4	33	58	29.0
(e)	17	40	12	60	129	43.0	40	1	45	86	43.0
(f)	44	93	37	119	293	97.7	72	10	117	199	99.5
(g)	2	3	-	2	7	2.3	-	-	1	1	0.5
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Statement 12 proposes further emasculation of the unions, a very right wing idea. It was assumed that members in higher grades would find picketing repugnant to their tight schedule because it is time consuming. Indeed it is rare to find members in higher grades, for example, principal, senior principal or above, on picket lines. When picketing appears difficult on a government premises it is more often than not because "management" is leaning heavily on junior staff on picket duty. Since senior staff represent "management" it was assumed that their rarity on picket lines should reflect their favourable attitude towards the statement.



Very small percentages of both groups agreed with the statement. As expected, the result indicates that more respondents in the higher grades "strongly" agreed - 6.5 per cent, compared with 3.7 per cent of the lower grades. 13 per cent of the higher grades and 13.3 per cent of the lower grades agreed, but a greater majority of both groups disagreed. In each group, 43 per cent "strongly" disagreed. 26.4 per cent of the lower grades and 29 per cent of the higher grades "disagreed". The combined percentages of those who "strongly" disagreed and "disagreed" were 69.4 per cent of the lower grades and 72 per cent of the higher grades. This larger percentage of the higher grades was contrary to expectation.

The result again corroborates earlier findings. Both groups were left wing in their views but members of the higher grades appeared to be more left wing.

**TABLE 68**  
**STATEMENT 13**  
**AS MUCH OF BRITAIN'S CIVIL SERVICE AS POSSIBLE**  
**SHOULD BE PRIVATISED**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)
	I	II	III	IV	(n=300)		V	VI	VII	(n=200)	
(a)	-	2	1	2	5	1.7	-	1	2	3	1.5
(b)	2	4	4	6	16	5.3	2	-	9	11	5.5
(c)	-	9	-	3	12	4.0	3	-	2	5	2.5
(d)	15	23	9	13	60	20.0	5	3	21	29	14.5
(e)	28	56	23	96	203	67.7	62	6	84	152	76.0
(f)	45	94	37	120	296	98.7	72	10	118	200	100.0
(g)	1	2	-	1	4	1.3	-	-	-	-	-
(h)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

(a)=Strongly Agree; (b)=Agree; (c)=Uncertain; (d)=Disagree;  
(e)=Strongly Disagree; (f)=Total; (g)=Abstentions;  
(h)=Sample Population; (x)=Totals; (y)=% of Sample.

Statement 13 advocates privatisation of the civil service. The unions have always fought against privatisation simply because it would commercialize the vital services provided, thus putting profits before welfare. Again, this is a right wing idea which was expected to command the approval of members in higher grades. The result indicates that the same percentage from each of the groups, although very small, agreed with the statement. 1.7 per cent of the lower grades and 1.5 per cent of the higher grades "strongly" agreed; 5.3 per cent and 5.5 per cent respectively "agreed". A larger 90 per cent of the higher grades and 87.7 per cent of the lower

grades disagreed. This replicates previous results and proves that the higher grades were no more right wing than the lower grades. The assumption that members in higher grades were right wing or less left wing than members in lower grades was unfounded. Evidence from the above analyses show that members in higher grades were even more left wing in their attitudes than members in lower grades.

The analyses of results from all the 13 statements indicate that members in higher grades were more militant, more left wing and more prone to rationalize their reactions to industrial relations issues than members in lower grades.

#### THE GCHQ ISSUE

The issue of abolition of trade unions at the GCHQ was very much on the news headlines during the preparation of the questionnaire. Feelings were running high among civil service trade union membership. There were demonstrations outside Downing Street and organized marches to the House of Commons were well attended. Nevertheless, there were also a good number of activists who agreed with the government on the issue. The situation presented an ideal opportunity to test members' attitude towards strikes especially when principle, not financial improvements, was at stake. The two final questions were designed to elicit the contrasts of opinion which might exist. For instance, would a member who disagreed with the abolition necessarily come out on strike

in support of his/her views?

The following tables measure the attitude differences between the grades and contrast the views of union activists and ordinary members.

**QUESTION 25a**

Are you in favour of the decision to abolish trade unions at GCHQ?

**TABLE 69**  
**ABOLITION OF TRADE UNIONS AT GCHO**  
**ANALYSIS BY GRADE**

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES (x) (y)				(n=200)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII		
(a)	1	1	-	6	8	2.6	-	1	4	5	2.5
(b)	42	90	37	112	281	93.7	69	9	112	190	95.0
(c)	2	4	-	3	9	3.0	3	-	-	3	1.5
(d)	45	95	37	121	298	99.3	72	10	116	198	99.0
(e)	1	1	-	-	2	0.7	-	-	2	2	1.0
(f)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0

=====  
 (a)=Yes; (b)=No; (c)=Don't know; (d)=Totals;  
 (e)=Abstentions; (f)= Population Sample; (x)=Total;  
 (y)=%of Sample.

Only 5 per cent of the higher grades and 6.3 per cent of the lower grades either agreed with the decision, abstained or did not have an opinion on the issue. 95 per cent and 93.7 per cent of the higher and lower grades respectively disagreed with the decision. The views of both groups were not markedly different. Belonging to a trade union is believed

to be a fundamental human right and the unions in attacking the abolition decision were fully aware of the Government's reasons. The Government placed more importance on "national security" than on the human rights of members at GCHQ.

Although both groups overwhelmingly supported the unions the higher grades were more in accord with the unions' principles. This once again corroborates earlier findings that the higher grades were more prone to rationalize, and slightly more militant.

TABLE 69a  
ABOLITION OF TRADE UNIONS AT GCHQ  
ANALYSIS BY TRADE UNION STATUS

REPLIES	(a)	(b)	(c)	(b)
Yes	7	2.1	6	3.7
No	324	95.9	147	90.7
Don't know	6	1.8	6	3.7
Totals	337	99.7	159	98.1
Abstentions	1	0.3	3	1.9
Sample Population	338	100.0	162	100.0

(a)=Union Officers; (b)=%of Sample; (c)=Ordinary Members;

The above table indicates an overwhelming support for the unions' views both by the branch officers and ordinary members. Only 9.3 per cent of the ordinary members either agreed with the Government's decision, abstained or were uncertain, compared with 4.1 per cent of the branch officers. This was predictable.

Question 25b

Assuming a ballot in favour of an all out strike, would you come out in support of your GCHQ colleagues?

TABLE 70  
STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF GCHQ MEMBERSHIP  
ANALYSIS BY GRADE

VIEWS	LOWER GRADES				(x)	(y)	HIGHER GRADES			(x)	(y)	(n=200)
	I	II	III	IV			V	VI	VII			
(a)	28	56	20	89	193	64.3	59	4	68	131	65.5	
(b)	8	15	12	14	49	16.3	4	4	30	38	19.0	
(c)	9	24	5	14	52	17.4	9	2	18	29	14.5	
(d)	45	95	37	117	294	98.0	72	10	116	198	99.0	
(e)	1	1	-	4	6	2.0	-	-	2	2	1.0	
(f)	46	96	37	121	300	100.0	72	10	118	200	100.0	

=====  
 (a)=Yes; (b)=No; (c)=Don't know; (d)=Totals;  
 (e)=Abstentions; (f)= Population Sample; (x)=Total;  
 (y)=%of Sample.

Those respondents from both groups who answered "no", "don't know" or abstained, averaged 35.1 per cent. This means that an average of 64.9 per cent of the respondents (both groups) said they were prepared to strike in support of their GCHQ colleagues; a seemingly impressive response. However, in statement 5 above, the assumption that members would generally support their union on key issues was tested. An unimpressive result of that test led to the conclusion that

the unions could no longer safely rely on their members' support on key issues. A closer examination of the negative replies to that question shows the following results:-

TABLE 70b  
NEGATIVE REACTIONS TO STATEMENT 5

REACTIONS	LOWER GRADES %	HIGHER GRADES%
Abstentions	1.7	0.5
Uncertain	20.3	27.0
Disagree	19.3	31.5
Strongly disagree	5.7	4.0
Total	47.0	63.0

Up to 63 per cent of the higher grades either disagreed, strongly disagreed or were uncertain, compared with 47 per cent of the lower grades. Only 37 per cent of the higher and 53 per cent of the lower grades agreed or strongly agreed. This is not consistent with the result of question 25b above. 63.4 per cent of the lower grades and 65.5 per cent of the higher grades said they would strike in support of their GCHQ colleagues. If an earlier test for degree of support on a key issue indicates only 47 per cent and 53 per cent then the larger percentages indicated on the GCHQ issue can only be optimistic. In other words, a ballot of the entire membership might show an impressive percentage of members who say they would strike but when the chips are down the percentage of members who would actually back their promise would most likely be disappointing.

The comparison made between the lower and the higher grades in table 70 did not show a significant difference in the views of the two groups. However, the comparison made below between union officers and ordinary members is worthy of closer examination.

TABLE 70c  
STRIKE IN SUPPORT OF GCHO MEMBERSHIP  
ANALYSIS BY UNION STATUS

REPLIES	UNION OFFICERS	% OF SAMPLE	ORDINARY MEMBERS	% OF SAMPLE
Yes	245	72.5	79	48.8
No	44	13.0	43	26.5
Don't know	44	13.0	37	22.8
Totals	333	98.5	159	98.1
Abstentions	5	1.5	3	1.9
Population Sample	338	100.0	162	100.0

In the above analysis, 72.5 per cent of union officers said they would strike, compared with 48.8 per cent of ordinary members. It should be noted that this result is a product of the same population sample which produced an earlier unimpressive result. Even if the union officers were to give 100 per cent support, which according to the above result is not possible, it would still fall short of what can be regarded as an adequate support. This is because there are many more ordinary members than there are branch officers. A new strategy to increase the percentage of ordinary members who



would back their promises or respond at least in comparable proportion to union officers, would have to be developed in order to reverse the apparent loss of enthusiasm among the membership. This places an onus on branch officers and a greater charge on full-time officials to target "anomie" for elimination and simultaneously eradicate apathy in the membership. Until this happens, the unions should be cautious of any vote of confidence from their members. Furthermore, the strike, which is traditionally a weapon of last resort should be further relegated until the revival of "esprit de corps".

#### SUMMARY

The following positive statement can be made from the above analyses:-

1. Most respondents felt that pay and conditions, job protection, job security and career prospects were very important and that they were adequately or well represented on these issues.
2. Morale in the civil service was very low.
3. Most respondents worked to rule and/or worked with less or no enthusiasm; many were actively looking for other jobs.
4. Sick absences and "late coming" were not popular among respondents.

5. It was felt that union activities conflicted with the role of senior civil servants as managers.

6. Most respondents disagreed with the statement that most members would support their unions on key issues.

7. Retirement at 60 was acceptable to most respondents.

8. Ability of the unions to negotiate better pay had no influence on respondents' decisions to stay with their unions.

9. A large majority of respondents were against restriction of union power and privatization of the civil service.

10. A large majority of respondents were against the abolition of trade unions at the GCHQ and were prepared to take a strike action to maintain the "status quo."

REFERENCES AND FOOTNOTES

1. Achike, B.C., op. cit., 1988.
2. Leave entitlements are now determined by length of service rather than by grade.
3. This information was gathered from interviews with the General Secretaries of the Unions.
4. Information gathered from informal interviews.
5. A respondent's comment attached to a questionnaire.
6. An interviewee's comment.
7. The author witnessed this as a participant observer.
8. Additional comment on questionnaires.

## CHAPTER 6

### SYNTHESIS OF INTERPRETED DATA AND VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES

In this chapter, the seven hypotheses enunciated in chapter 2 are each discussed and tested in order to establish their validity. The link between the hypotheses and specific questions in the survey questionnaire makes it possible to cite the results of data analysed in the previous two chapters (4 and 5) as proof of validity or invalidity, as the case may be. The hypotheses facilitated data collection and in turn the data form a basis for their validation. Some of the theories reviewed in chapter 1, notably, the theories of power and conflict played a significant part in the development of the hypotheses. Most of the hypotheses and the survey results on which their validity depends support Margerison's "Industrial Sociology Approach" to Industrial Relations. Unlike Dunlop's "Systems model" which emphasizes theoretical aspects of rule making or Flander's "Oxford Approach" which places more value on political variables, the "Industrial Sociology Approach" more readily acknowledges the concept of the economic man and the endemism of conflict in an employer-employee relation. As militancy presupposes conflict, a study of conflict in all its aspects necessarily implies a study of militancy.

Since the focus of this investigation is the attitude of trade union activists it seems reasonable to begin with what

Allen (1966)<sup>1</sup> considers inherent in their efforts to improve income and conditions - militancy. Marsh (1979)<sup>2</sup> defines militancy as:-

combative or warlike attitudes by trade unions or their members, taking the form of strikes, overtime bans, go-slows, withdrawal of co-operation or demonstrations in order to bring pressure to bear on employers.

**HYPOTHESIS 1. High personal commitments produce anti-militant attitude among union members.**

This hypothesis imposes a limitation on the contention that one has to break an egg in order to make an omelette. Militancy in the form described above involves personal sacrifices and it usually presupposes the achievement of a desired goal. It is suggested here that willingness to make these sacrifices is severely restrained by high personal commitment. In times of crisis when union leaders feel it appropriate to flex the union's muscle by proposing an industrial action, responses such as "I can't afford a strike now - I have a mortgage to pay or I have mouths to feed" are not uncommon. This hypothesis proposes that such high commitments reduce the degree of militancy among members.

**EVIDENCE:** The survey examined the reactions to a strike call of members with the following categories of commitments:-

- (a) Financial commitments such as mortgages and rent;  
(compared with those who had no such commitments).
- (b) Single persons with dependant children; (compared with those who had none).
- (c) Married persons with children; (compared with those who had none).
- (d) Divorced/separated persons with children; (compared with those who had none).

**RESULTS:-**

(a) The notion that members with higher financial commitments such as mortgages and rent would be less inclined to militant actions was unfounded. Of the 500 sample population, 463 respondents indicated their reactions to the strike call; 37 abstained. Basing the calculation on those who gave their reactions, 403 respondents (87 per cent) took action; 60 respondents (13 per cent) did not. This sample was divided into three groups - mortgage payers, rent payers and those who had no such commitments. 65 respondent, (14 per cent) paid mortgages; 346, (75 per cent) paid rent and 52, (11 per cent) had no such commitments. Of the 65 respondents who paid mortgages, 60, (92 per cent) came out on strike. 305, (88 per cent) of the 346 who paid rent came out and 38, (73 per cent) of the 52 who had no such commitments also came out. Since the percentage of those who had higher commitments and yet came out was larger

than the percentage of those who had no such commitments, financial commitments such as mortgages and rent appear to have negative effect on militancy.

(b) Out of the 112 single persons who gave their reactions to the strike call 2 had one child each under eighteen, 2 had two children each under eighteen and 2 had two children each over eighteen; 106 had no children. A comparison made between the reactions of these four groups shows that family responsibilities among single persons had no significant effect on a decision to take a strike action. 100 per cent of the groups with one and two dependant children under eighteen supported the strike but only 50 per cent of the group with one dependant child over eighteen supported it, compared with 91 per cent of those who had no children. Because of the small sample in three of the groups this result is not significant per se; it can only be supplementary.

(c) The result of comparison between married persons who had children and those who had none was more significant. Of the 301 married persons who recorded their reactions, the following had dependant children under eighteen:-

74	-	one child
74	-	two children
21	-	three or more
132	-	none;

the following had dependant children over eighteen:-

26	-	one child
10	-	two children
3	-	three or more
262	-	none.

In the above distribution, the following percentages took action:-

children under eighteen (%):-

one child	-	93.2
two children	-	85.1
three or more	-	85.7
none	-	83.3

children over eighteen (%):-

one child	-	76.9
two children	-	90.0
three or more	-	66.7
none	-	87.4

Thus, each of the groups was militant but in varying degrees. However, to the extent that the percentage of those who had no children but took action was smaller in each category than the percentage of those who had two children, family commitment had negative effect on militancy; but to the extent that the percentage of those who had three or more children over eighteen and took action was smaller than the percentage in all the other categories, family commit-



ment had little (not significant) effect on militancy.

(d) A similar evaluation of family commitment among divorced/separated persons indicated that the following percentages took action: children under eighteen (%):-

one child	-	85.7
two children	-	80.0
three or more	-	nil
none	-	88.9;

children over eighteen (%):-

one child	-	75.0
two children	-	nil
three or more	-	66.7
none	-	88.1

This establishes a pattern similar to the married persons. Here again, the effect of high personal commitment on militancy was not significant.

High personal commitment would not per se produce anti-militant attitude among members. Other factors, for example, principle, political etc., must be present. The very reason why the civil service unions originated supports this conclusion. Even though pay was very poor and individuals were muzzled by the blackmail of the patronage system of recruitment into the service, a cumulation of grievances

soon produced principles strong enough to fillip the pioneers of the civil service trade unions into action. Their very poor economic condition did not deter their discovery of the essence of united effort. The result of this aspect of the survey proves conclusively that the rationale of clubbing together as a trade union has remained constant over the years. Strong feelings about the situation pervaded the economic circumstances of the pioneers and formed an underlying principle of trade unionism. High personal commitments would not necessarily produce anti-militant attitude among union members because the financial and other personal commitments examined in the above evidence had no influence on the respondents' response to a strike call.

**HYPOTHESIS 2.** When members put their personal commitments above everything else in their hierarchy of priorities they would tend to yield more readily to offers made in a wage bargaining by their employer. In other words, their resistance curve would tend towards 0 as the employer's concession curve tends towards 0, having discovered his employees' reaction curve.

This hypothesis presents an "a fortiori" case.

Even in spite of previous defeats of the unions by the Government after prolonged industrial action, the Government

can never be certain that union leaders will not call a strike and that union membership will not support it. In other words, the threat of industrial action will always remain a potent weapon as long as the employer's uncertainty remains. The situation envisaged in this hypothesis was where union members will not support a strike primarily on account of their commitments. It was proposed that the employer's knowledge of this weakness among the union membership would automatically put him in a stronger bargaining position and he would tend to be stingy with his concession.

Two issues need to be explained before testing the hypothesis:-

1. commitments are not the only reason why union members may be unable to support a strike;
2. the employer may not be in a position to discover his employees' reaction curve in time for the discovery to influence his concession curve.

Members may have other varied reasons for their refusal to support a strike but economic and financial situations are the most likely reasons to create a chronic obstacle to a strike. On the other hand, discovery of the relative weakness of the employees' position by the employer is only a question of time. He is usually able to guess the unions strengths and weakness from the beginning; his approach is

dictated by what he perceives as expedient in the circumstances. Besides, if the employer decides not to acknowledge the union's position of strength the employees' resolve to strike to the bitter end is not likely to deter him.<sup>3</sup> According to Magenau and Pruitt, power can only exist and be exerted if there is a reciprocal perception of it. In their view, the fact that "I feel stronger than you" is "no guarantee that you will feel weaker than me or...that you will accept my contention that you should concede."<sup>4</sup> However, it may be argued that the employer's determination not to acknowledge the union's power, that is, to ignore the strike, is underpinned by his assessment of the union's relative weak position due to a palpable reluctance of the employees to strike.

The decision of the CCSU to take a selective strike action in the 1981 pay campaign was not only for convenience; it was necessary. Despite the widespread discontent among civil servants there was an undercurrent of lethargy concerning industrial action. When the unions and the membership expressed sympathy for the public because of the disruption to public services which an all-out strike would cause, their concern was construed by the Government as a sign of weakness; and rightly so. It was evident that a call for an all-out strike would not be adequately supported. The selective strike and the series of half-day strikes were therefore calculative. Their effect on the Government was a

resolution to maintain a tough stance through to the end. In that instance, the Government was able to predict the reaction curve of the membership and successfully anaesthetized its concession curve.

**EVIDENCE:** Two aspects of the Treasury offer were examined:-

- (a) ballot on the offer
- (b) the stages at which individuals were prepared to accept the offer.

467 respondents gave their reactions to the ballot on the Treasury offer. Of that population, 155 (33.2%) accepted the offer, 288 (61.7%) rejected it and 24 (5.1%) abstained. With reference to the selective strike, 460 respondents stated the stages at which they were prepared to accept (or not accept) the offer. Of that population, 45 (9.8%) were prepared to accept before the selective strike, 7 (1.5%) were prepared to accept after two weeks of the strike, 49 (10.7%) were prepared to accept half way through the strike and 359 (78.0%) said the offer was never acceptable to them.

**RESULT:**

Since the hypothesis was based on personal commitments, readiness to accept an offer, and the influence of these on the outcome of a bargaining process it was necessary to analyze the commitments of those respondents who said they would accept the offer before the selective

strike together with those who said the offer was never acceptable to them, then compare the results. The following criteria formed the basis of the comparison:

- (a) Rent payment
- (b) Mortgage payment
- (c) Owners of property (probably ) after paying off the mortgage
- (d) Those who had no property and paid nothing for their accommodation
- (e) Financial commitments under £100 per month
- (f) Financial commitments over £100 per month
- (g) Those who had no financial commitments
- (h) Those who had one child
- (i) Those who had two children
- (j) Those who had three or more children
- (k) Those who had no children

The comparison necessitated 48 combinations of commitments as follows:-

TABLE 71.

COMMITMENTS	RESPONDENTS WHO ACCEPTED THE OFFER BEFORE THE SELECTIVE STRIKE	RESPONDENTS WHO SAID OFFER WAS NEVER ACCEPTABLE
	%	%
a+g+h	-	-
a+g+i	-	-
a+g+j	-	-
a+g+k	-	1.7
b+g+h	2.2	0.6
b+g+i	-	0.3
b+g+j	-	0.3
b+g+k	4.4	2.5
c+g+h	-	0.3
c+g+i	-	0.3
c+g+j	-	-
c+g+k	2.2	0.3
d+g+h	-	-
d+g+i	-	-
d+g+j	-	-
d+g+k	-	-
a+e+h	2.2	2.2
a+e+i	-	0.8
a+e+j	-	-
a+e+k	6.7	4.4

TABLE 71 CONTINUED

COMMITMENTS	RESPONDENTS WHO ACCEPTED THE OFFER BEFORE THE SELECTIVE STRIKE	RESPONDENTS WHO SAID OFFER WAS NEVER ACCEPTABLE
	%	%
b+e+h	6.7	5.0
b+e+i	13.3	5.7
b+e+j	2.2	1.7
b+e+k	15.6	13.6
c+e+h	2.2	0.8
c+e+i	2.2	0.8
c+e+j	-	0.3
c+e+k	6.7	2.8
d+e+h	-	-
d+e+i	-	-
d+e+j	-	-
d+e+k	-	0.3
a+f+h	-	1.4
a+f+i	-	0.3
a+f+j	-	0.3
a+f+k	-	3.6
b+f+h	-	8.9
b+f+i	-	10.3
b+f+j	2.2	2.2
b+f+k	15.6	24.0
c+f+h	2.2	0.8



TABLE 71 CONTINUED

COMMITMENTS	RESPONDENTS WHO ACCEPTED THE OFFER BEFORE THE SELECTIVE STRIKE	RESPONDENTS WHO SAID OFFER WAS NEVER ACCEPTABLE
	%	%
c+f+i	-	0.3
c+f+j	2.2	0.3
c+f+k	8.9	2.5
d+f+h	-	-
d+f+i	2.2	-
d+f+j	-	0.3
d+f+k	-	0.3

If in the above comparisons the respondents who accepted the offer before the selective strike had predominantly more commitments than those who said the offer was never acceptable to them, then it would have been safer to conclude that their decision to accept before the strike, was exacerbated by their commitments. But since the larger majority who said the offer was not acceptable were also just as committed, such a conclusion would be untenable. Therefore there was no evidence that personal commitments had any significant influence on the decision to accept or not to accept the offer.

However, even though 61.7 per cent of the respondents voted for rejection of the offer and this decision was solidly

backed in the actual event by a prolonged industrial action, the employer's concession curve was nevertheless 0. It was unlikely, indeed it was impossible that a less militant reaction from the CCSU would have elicited any concession.

**HYPOTHESIS 3.** Assuming a trade-off between the employer's power<sup>5</sup> to impose a wage and the trade union's power to resist, anti-militant tendencies among union members would shift the employer's resistance curve towards  $\infty$ .

This is a corollary of the previous hypothesis. It was assumed that Pareto's law<sup>6</sup> operates in the relationship between the unions and employers, being a factor in the power rivalry between the two sides. The idea that "one man's gain is another man's loss" takes on a significant role in the power struggle. The 'endemism of weakness on the union's side historically stemmed from the recognition by the individual employee, of the employer's "managerial prerogative". This prerogative is similar to what Hyman(1975) referred to as "the right accorded to management in capitalism to direct production and to command the labour force".<sup>7</sup> Fox (1971) defines the employees weak position as follows:-

....in entering into a contract of employment, the employee legitimises the employer in directing and

controlling his actions...and legitimises, too, the employer's use of sanctions if necessary to maintain this obedience.<sup>8</sup>

The same sentiment is echoed by Torrington and Chapman:-

....the individuals who become employees of the organisation surrender a segment of their personal autonomy to become relatively weaker, making the organisation inordinately stronger.<sup>9</sup>

But more specifically, the weak position of a civil servant relative to the power of the Government, his employer, stems from the early patronage system of recruiting into the service. Although this system has long been eradicated the ethos of the employer's superiority has remained and is continuously expressed in the Government's habitual "executive and administrative" actions. Salaman(1987) argues that:-

Management's inherent authority is based, therefore, on society's infrastructure legitimising its role and power in the operation of the economic system. Consequently.....it has little need to utilise overtly coercive power in exercising this authority because the subordinates it seeks to control accept the values on which its power and authority rests.<sup>10</sup>

It is precisely the use of this power or its abuse that necessitated a countervailing force in the authority of trade unions. The employer's authority is legitimised by the same law which challenges the legitimacy of the unions' power. Unlike the employer, the unions need to increase their authority and sustain their power by being militant. In this hypothesis, it is proposed that anti-militant tendencies among union members would make the employer even more powerful, giving him an unlimited capacity to resist the unions.

**EVIDENCE:** The survey systematically plotted the gradual decline in militancy throughout the civil service, paying particular attention to:-

- (a) Support given to the selective strikes during the 1981/84 pay campaigns.
- (b) Respondents' reaction to a hypothetical all-out strike during the same period.
- (c) Members' attitude towards their unions.

**RESULTS:-**

(a) A total of 109 branches gave their responses to a request for support during the pay campaign of 1981/82, 1982/83, and 1983/84. Three types of support were identified from the responses:-

- (i) a lot
- (ii) poor
- (iii) none

To facilitate interpretation of the result, types (ii) and (iii) were grouped together. In 1981/82, 66 (60.5 per cent) of the branches said their members gave a lot of support; 43 (39.5 per cent) said their branches gave poor or no support. Support drastically declined in 1982/83 - 28 branches (25.7 per cent) said their members gave a lot of support, and 81<sup>11</sup> branches (74.3 per cent) said their members gave poor or no support, a massive drop of 34.8 per cent. A similar decline was recorded for 1983/84 - 29 branches (26.6 per cent) gave a lot of support and 80 branches (73.4 per cent) gave poor or no support.

Because the civil service union membership had become less militant their employer became very powerful and gradually dismantled the mask by which it portrayed itself as a reasonable employer. Taking unilateral action became commonplace. For instance, disbanding the civil service Pay Research Unit was not a chance action of the Government; it was done retrospective of perceived powerlessness of the civil service unions.

(b) The above results were corroborated in a hypothetical question about an all-out strike during the same years. Three reactions to the question were elicited:-

- (i) stay out indefinitely
- (ii) come out for a week or two then return to work
- (iii) ignore the strike call.

Again to facilitate interpretation, reactions (ii) and (iii) were merged with those who abstained from the question. 271 respondents (54.2 per cent) said they would have stayed out indefinitely and 229 (45.8 per cent) said they would have stayed out for a short while or ignored the strike call in 1981/82. For 1982/83 and 1983/84 the number of respondents who would have stayed out indefinitely declined and those who would have ignored the strike call increased. The figures were 217 (43.4 per cent) and 283 (56.6 per cent), and 224 (44.8 per cent) and 276 (55.2 per cent) respectively. These results indicate an unmistakable decline in the unions' capacity for militancy.

(c) Members' support for their unions on key issues was tested in the statement "On key issues most members are prepared to support their unions." The following reactions were elicited:-

- (i) strongly agree.....30
- (ii) agree.....203

(iii) uncertain.....	115
(iv) disagree.....	121
(v) strongly disagree.....	25
(vi) abstain.....	6

To facilitate interpretation, (i) and (ii) were grouped together and the rest were put in one separate group. 233 respondents (46.6 per cent) either agreed or strongly agreed, and 267 (53.4 per cent) disagreed or strongly disagreed etc. The significance of this result is that a disagreement between the union membership and the leadership is a sufficient cause of weakness in the movement. Union leaders should be cautious of a ballot majority in favour of an industrial action especially if they instigated it. Anti-militant tendencies were apparent in the above evidence. The Government's awareness of the union leaders' predicament is evident in their ability to veto arbitration rulings with impunity, implement rejected wage offers, take administrative action such as banning trade unions at GCHQ; all these suggest that the Government's resistance curve now tends towards  $\infty$ .

**HYPOTHESIS 4.** The level of militancy among the active civil service trade unionists had declined to such a point that it threatened the effectiveness of their unions' negotiating strategy.

Wage claims put forward by civil service trade unions are usually the result of calculations, comparisons with the pay of similar jobs outside the service and most importantly, surveys often sponsored jointly by the CCSU and the Treasury (see Appendix 5 and 6). The wage negotiation strategy of asking for an over-inflated and unrealistic figure is hardly feasible in an environment dominated not by the caution of how much the firm can reasonably sacrifice from its profit but by political pressures and sometimes unfounded worry of triggering wage inflation. Given that the claims put forward are generally what union leaders genuinely believe and can substantiate to be equitable remuneration for their members it must be frustrating for them to face year after year the type of response which can be expected only from "cowboy" employers, not from a reasonable employer which the Government purports to be.

For instance, at the beginning of the 1985 pay campaign the Government's prior announcement of 3 per cent public sector cash limits was a sign of an impending conflict. Against the background of the announced figure, a 15 per cent claim



might have seemed unrealistic but it was quite reasonable judging from the low pay settlements since 1980 - the year in which the Government unilaterally scrapped the civil service National Pay Agreement and Pay Research Unit. Since then, the Government had forced pay deals which led to the gradual erosion of civil service pay in respect of its purchasing power and its comparability with that of other workers. The Retail Price Index showed that an Executive Officer on maximum pay would need a 14.1 per cent rise for his/her salary to be restored to its 1980 purchasing power. Even the Government's own New Earnings Survey indicated that the same Executive Officer needed a 25.5 per cent rise for his/her salary to regain its 1980 position in relation to the pay of workers doing similar jobs outside the service. In spite of these facts, the CCSU submitted a claim for 7.5 per cent base both on what they felt the Government could reasonably afford and on a survey jointly sponsored by the unions and the Treasury. The Government ignored the survey and made an offer of just 3 per cent, which was later increased to a range of 4.5 - 5.0 per cent.

This hypothesis postulates that lack of militancy or anti-militant responses from union members render union leaders incapable of achieving an optimum wage settlement thereby creating a serious gap between what they can substantiate to be equitable and the eventual outcome.

**EVIDENCE:** The survey examined anti-militant tendencies among members under the following contexts:-

- (a) Pre-survey attitudes of members
- (b) Attendance at meetings and participation in union activities.
- (c) Attitudes monitored from the survey: reactions to statements 1, 3, 5 and 9.

**RESULTS:-**

(a) Trade union movement in the civil service was a product of militant action. Civil servants who were hitherto barred from expressing and seeking redress for their grievances gradually picked up the courage to speak out. Common grievances and shared sense of purpose brought them together; the discovery of strength in numbers underpinned the inauguration of the movement. The movement was born militant and it remained so until its propensity towards militancy was attenuated by another equally potent initiative - Whitleyism.<sup>12</sup>

The success of Whitleyism in the public service was attributed to the fact that civil servants had "almost jettisoned industrial action, strike action, and so forth, as a means of settling their disputes,...because of being in the public service,...[they] fully utilise all the opportunities of negotiation, of persuasion, of argument, that the Whitley

Council system gives..."<sup>13</sup> The General Strike of 1926 brought them to the brink of a strike action but virtually all of the 12,640 civil servants who actually came out were industrial civil servants.<sup>14</sup> Until the late 1970s, "strike" had remained an ultimate weapon, the threat of which was rarely used. The uneasy peace which seemingly prevailed was in the words of Flanders "...by constant capitulation of the one side to the other's demands, or by joint acquiescence in stagnation and the avoidance of any change that would stir up resistance."<sup>15</sup>

With feelings running high, matters were bound to come to a head when an overdue showdown would once again re-establish the significance of trade unionism. The showdown did come (1981). The apparent failure of CCSU in the event may be attributed to two remote causes:-

(i) The General Strike of 1926 had shown the non-industrial civil servants as passive and the Government had come to regard them as incapable of any degree of militancy worth bothering about. Consequently when the showdown came in 1981, the daily papers, echoing the Government, were saying they will soon back down - it would not be long - they have not got the stamina. So, even though the strategy of selective strike action meant that the unions were able to carry on the strike for much longer than expected, the Government endured the losses inflicted hoping that its

theory of the unions' lack of stamina would prevail. The Government was right.

(ii) Salaman's contention that power over people has internal and external dimensions in the context of the collective nature of industrial relations, makes a significantly relevant point with regard to the civil service unions. He argues:-

Any collectivity, whether a work group, trade union or management, exercises internal power and authority over its individual members in the establishment and achievement of the collectivity's objectives. Without the exercise of such power and authority the collectivity lacks direction and control (i.e. is not a collectivity). It is the exercise of this internal power and authority which, to a large measure, provides the real source and extent of the power which the collectivity may direct towards influencing others and controlling their situation.<sup>16</sup>

Unfortunately, the only situation that would give the civil service unions such power and authority is a "closed shop" situation; for then individuals would have a valued reward for being a member - a civil service job. Then also, the

unions would have some enforceable sanctions which they could use to keep their members in line; for instance, a suspension or expulsion from the union would be meaningful - loss of pay or loss of job. At present the threat of suspension or expulsion from the union means nothing. In fact, if a civil service union expels a member the union is the loser not the member who would keep his/her subscription money as well as enjoy nearly all the benefits of membership. He/she would merely join the gang of free-riders. On the other hand, the loss of one member means a lot to the union which is constantly in search of ways to increase its membership. Thus, internal discipline is almost non-existent and without it the union will always find it impossible to control its members. It cannot make such stipulation as would require members to attend meetings or take an industrial action under the pain of losing pay or their jobs.

Consider the following equation:

The degree of importance which members attach to their belonging to their union ( $\theta$ ) is equal to the effectiveness of the union's sanction on them:-

Let:

$\theta$  = high degree of the union's importance to its members

$\mu$  = highly effective union sanction

$x$  = ability to free ride

$y$  = degree of apathy

$\sigma^2$  = closed shop situation

$\mu_1$  = low level effectiveness of union sanction

$$\sigma^2 = \mu_1;$$

$$\frac{\sigma + x}{y} = \mu_1; \text{ and } \frac{\sigma + x}{y^1; (y^2, y^3, \dots)} = \mu^1; (\mu^2, \mu^3, \dots)$$

The Government was aware of this lack of internal control and capitalized on it by playing the so called free-riders<sup>17</sup> against union members. The 1985 pay offer of 4.5 per cent cited above was the final despite the threat of an all-out or selective strike action. The gap between 7.5 per cent which the unions originally claimed and the final offer was never bridged. It became a loss which members wrongly regarded as a weakness of the CCSU.

(b) Attendance at meetings and degree of participation in branch activities were examined in the analysis on table 15. The following results were gathered from a sample of 162 ordinary members:-

TABLE 72

MEETINGS ATTENDED	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84
	%	%	%
AGM only	3.7	3.1	6.2
Mandate meeting only	0.6	0.6	-
Pay meeting only	1.9	1.9	3.1
AGM and Mandate meeting	1.9	3.1	1.9
AGM and Pay meeting	0.6	0.6	0.6
Mandate and Pay meeting	0.6	0.6	0.6
All meetings	8.0	8.6	10.4

Over the three year period those who attended only the AGM represented an average of 4.3 per cent of the sample. From the same sample, attendance of the Mandate meeting (only) averaged 0.4 per cent in the same period and attendance of Pay meeting averaged 2.3 per cent. Those who attended two of the meetings averaged 2.3 per cent for AGM and Mandate, 0.6 per cent for AGM and Pay and 0.6 per cent for Mandate and Pay meetings. Average attendance of all meetings was 9.0 per cent. If these percentages were applied to the total rank-and-file civil service non-industrial union membership they would represent a population of members who care very little about their union affairs, a clear indication of anti-militancy.

This degree of participation and support of branch activities together with the growing number of free-riders and

those who would always cross picket lines because they do not believe in strikes, make the Government's resistance very easy. There is no magic way union leaders can win equitable wage increases. If members do not support their union and are not willing to be militant over a justified cause such as pay, then there will always be a gap between what the union leaders ask for and what they actually get.

(c) Reactions to some of the statements analyzed in the previous chapter in order to measure the degree of militancy indicate that there is at least a good degree of "notional" anti-militancy among members. In statement 1, the idea that members of senior grades feel that union activities conflict with their role as managers, was examined. There is at least a potential danger that members who feel that union activities conflict with their role as managers would sooner or later be anti-militant. It is not uncommon for members to resign either from their branch offices or from their union because they are taking on new duties or because they are being promoted in their departments. Respondents who said they disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement exhibited some measure of militancy; but those who agreed or strongly agreed were regarded as anti-militant. The former category was 10.4 per cent and the latter was 76.0 per cent of the sample, a clear sign of overall anti-militancy.



Statement 3: It is inevitable that the number of people employed by the civil service will decline with the introduction of new technology. When the new technology was being introduced most sub-committees of the civil service Whitley Council had heated arguments about its implications, particularly with regard to manning levels. It was widely believed that most jobs would disappear as result of computerisation. The official side was cautious about signing the "no redundancy agreement". Experience has since shown that manning levels have increased considerably even in spite of the new technology. Despite the installation of many personal computers with word processing facilities in offices, typists and typing pools still function as a vital part of the office. Statement 3 assumed that those respondents who agreed or strongly agreed with it were pro-management and therefore anti-militant, and those who disagreed or strongly disagreed with it were not just optimistic but militant. Unions organizing lower grades, notably the CPSA, instructed their members not to co-operate with the introduction of new technology in their environment. Not many members obeyed the instruction. 64.8 per cent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with statement 3, and 22.2 per cent disagreed or strongly disagreed with it. Again, the survey indicates tendency towards anti-militancy.

Statement 5: On key issues most members are prepared to support their unions. The assumption that a large majority of respondents would agree or strongly agree with this statement is not a primary indicator of militancy or anti-militancy. Agreement of the union membership with union leaders on key issues was thought to be fundamental to the achievement of union objectives, especially improvement of wages and conditions of employment. However, since the employer is not likely to make a concession without a fight, militancy becomes an important aspect. The result indicates that 46.6 per cent of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement and 53.4 per cent disagreed, strongly disagreed, abstained or were uncertain. This again indicates anti-militant tendency.

In statement 9: failure to secure better pay would seriously affect my attitude to work: militancy was linked with attitude to work. Since the civil service pay was linked with low morale it was reasonable to assume that fewer respondents would disagree or strongly disagree with the statement because most members believed that pay in the civil service was bad. The survey result was contrary to this view. A larger majority of respondents disagreed with it. Only 47.8 per cent agreed or strongly agreed with it; thus corroborating the anti-militant tendency.

Anti-militant tendencies among members of the non-industrial

civil service unions are exemplified in the evidence studied above and are largely responsible for the apparent lack of success of the CCSU in wage negotiations with the Government.

**HYPOTHESIS 5. Militancy is a more potent factor in trade union power<sup>18</sup> than high union membership.**

This hypothesis considers the two basic elements of trade union power, that is, militancy and density of unionization. It assumes that whereas the larger the proportion of potential members who are actually in the membership of a union the more powerful the union would be; the powerfulness being totally subject to the degree of militancy within the membership. This assumption may be viewed in different ways. One way is to regard union density as a motor car without fuel and militancy as its fuel. From the point of view of power and achievement both militancy and density of unionization are interdependent just as a motor car and its fuel are interdependent from the point of view of motion. However, if the two elements are visualized in units and varying units of one element are mixed with varying units of the other, for instance where militancy is (x) and union density is (y), larger quantities of (x) would produce better results with smaller quantities of (y) than vice versa. In other words:-

$$2x * y = (2x)y$$

would produce better results than

$$2y * x = (2y)x$$

The largest conceivable units of (x) is a situation where militancy in the union is at its peak; in other words, when there is 100 per cent co-operation between the union leaders and members. Without this co-operation any industrial action of the members unsupported by the leaders would be regarded as unofficial, for it would have taken place without the official approval of the union and according to the provisions of its rules. Apart from achieving nothing, members who take this type of action may face disciplinary action of the employer or dismissal.

On the other hand, the largest concentration of (y) is a "closed shop" situation, either pre-entry or post entry. Here again, the co-operation of the membership is an absolute must if the union leaders' call for an industrial action is to achieve any measure of success. Any action of the union leaders unsupported by the membership is like barking without a bite, a mere noise of a toothless bulldog. However, this hypothesis maintains that the power of the union depends more on the members' capacity for militancy rather than on the number of its members.

**EVIDENCE:** The survey indicated a high degree of militancy on some issues and little or none on others. The importance of these issues are examined here to establish:-

- (a) their significance in the union/management power struggle;
- (b) the effect of union density on the success/failure of militant actions.

**RESULTS:-**

(a) The first indicator of militancy examined in the analyses was the degree of support given by branches during the pay campaign of 1981, 1982 and 1983. It was established that branch support declined in 1982 and 1983 after the failure of the same exercise in 1981. Militancy over pay, an issue of paramount importance to members, was in decline. Attendance at meetings was next examined; it was shown that an overall poor attendance was prevalent. Whether this is construed as anti-militant behaviour or simply a perennial dislike of meetings, it betrays a repugnance inherent in members towards any strain additional to the normal strain of daily work. This repugnance is apparently more prevalent among the non-industrial civil servants.<sup>19</sup>

The 1981 pay campaign gives a clear picture of the ideal state of mind indicative of a militant membership. Although there were divergent views about what type of industrial

action to take, it was quite evident "ab initio" that among those members who were vociferously in favour of an all-out strike there were those who were uncertain about themselves going on strike and those who were quite sure they would not. Nevertheless, the resounding war cry of the membership together with the resolve of the union leaders should have achieved the purpose of making the Government think twice about the tough stance which it had chosen. The survey question about the stages at which the Treasury offer was acceptable to members showed that the offer was never acceptable to 78.0 per cent of the respondents. This could be interpreted as willingness to strike if necessary. However, the discretion of the union leaders to opt for selective strike action showed foresight. An all-out strike would not have lasted even two weeks, let alone the eventual duration of the selective strike, in spite of the huge demonstration of willingness to go all out.

On the other hand, failure of the selective strike did not diminish the efficacy of militancy. The degree of militancy was just not enough to match the Government's bullishness. Similarly, the degree of militancy indicated by the ballot on the Treasury offer was inadequate. Although 61.7 per cent of the respondents voted to reject the offer it would not have made any difference if the offer were rejected by the entire membership, since it was implemented without the consent of the unions. The membership and the union leaders

were not prepared for the degree of militancy necessary to intimidate the Government. And rightly so; for it would have necessitated something more than the NUMS' type of militancy without any guarantee of success.<sup>20</sup>

Reaction to the series of half-day strikes in support of the 1981 pay campaign was very favourable; over 80 per cent of the survey respondents took part. If all those who took part knew that what was required of them for the fight was the ferocity of ten million lions they would probably have preferred not to exert their wild-cat aggressiveness. Their response showed militancy but it was not enough.

The Government's rebuttal of the foregoing instances of militancy dealt a lasting blow on the future willingness of members to strike. By 1982, propensity to strike had irrecoverably dropped.

Responses to two of the statements previously examined are discussed here in order to highlight their implications for the power struggle. The three statements were singled out because they demonstrate fundamental weakness in members' attitude to militancy. If it is accepted that solidarity is a connotation of militancy then participation in union activities and giving full support to its cause are prerequisites to the claim of membership. Payment of union dues, an action which is relegated to oblivion as soon as a

check-off authority has been signed, is not a substitute for the physical, mental and moral support which are the essence of the movement. Union dues are necessary; they pay the salaries of full-time officials. But full-time officials are not psychic. Their effectiveness depends on the participation of members. They are there to channel the effort and energy of members into achievements.

The pioneers of the civil service trade union movement were brought together by common purpose. With solidarity and effort, the movement grew out of genuine grievances and functioned with energy until it was necessary for the members to put the elements - solidarity, effort and energy - into proper perspective. Then they acquired the services of full-time personnel to spearhead their drive for redress. Not only was militancy at its peak, it was a phenomenon which presented civil servants in a different light; their behaviour had become unpredictable. This element of unpredictability has now faded away. Civil servants nowadays appear by and large to have reverted to the pre-trade union days when individuals had work related problems, suffered injustices and accommodated unreasonable employer's attitude simply because they were afraid to speak out.

From reactions to statement (1): "Members of senior grades feel that union activities conflict with their role as managers" and statement (5): "On key issues most members are



prepared to support their unions" it can be inferred that attitude to militancy has changed. 76 per cent of the survey respondents agreed or strongly agreed with statement (1), an indication that members in higher grades nowadays perceive union activities as a burden. How do members of junior grades feel about union activities? An answer may be inferred from their participation at meetings. The following figures gathered from the analysis on table 15 are indicative, (junior grades only):-

TABLE 73

MEETINGS	ATTENDANCE (% of sample) (1981/82)	ATTENDANCE (% of sample) (1982/83)	ATTENDANCE (% of sample) (1983/83)
AGM	6.0	6.0	6.0
MANDATE	0.3	1.7	0.7
PAY	2.3	2.0	2.3
AGM & MANDATE	6.0	7.6	9.0
AGM & PAY	1.3	1.7	1.7
MANDATE & PAY	1.0	1.0	1.3
ALL MEETINGS	45.4	47.0	49.7

TABLE 74

(senior grades only):-

MEETINGS	ATTENDANCE (% of sample) (1981/82)	ATTENDANCE (% of sample) (1982/83)	ATTENDANCE (% of sample) (1983/83)
AGM	4.5	3.5	2.5
MANDATE	0.5	1.5	2.0
PAY	2.0	2.5	2.5
AGM & MANDATE	7.0	8.0	8.5
AGM & PAY	-	0.5	1.0
MANDATE & PAY	1.0	1.0	1.0
ALL MEETINGS	49.0	47.5	51.0

The above figures include branch officers. From this pattern of attendance it can be seen that the attitude of members in junior grades towards union activities was not significantly different from that of members in senior grades. The contention here is that militancy would be repugnant to members who regard union activities as a burden. Their attitude to militancy is now more predictable than ever before.

Over 52 per cent of the respondents failed to agree with statement 5. Perhaps this would have been justifiable if the statement had specified support on "all issues"; for that would tantamount to declaring the union infallible. If the union cannot rely on the support of all its members at least on "key issues", it is hardly feasible for the union to

count on sufficient momentum when the achievement of an objective necessitates even a modicum of militancy.

The argument that high union membership or high density of unionization is a less potent function of union power, is reinforced by comparing contemporary density of unionisation against the background of the degrees of militancy discussed above. In 1979 the public sector labour force was estimated at 6.3 million, out of which, union membership was estimated at 5.2 million - a density of 82.4 per cent.<sup>21</sup> Between 1979 and 1982, this figure had risen to 83.8 per cent.<sup>22</sup> Non-industrial civil service unions recorded an average density of 82.7 per cent during this period. Despite these healthy numbers the unions suffered repeated defeats from the Government. If high density of unionization were more potent than militancy the high density should have made up for what was lacking in the degree of militancy. This was not so. Indeed, it can be argued that if the civil service unions operated closed shop but were lacking in militancy they would have been defeated just the same. However, it seems rather ironic that were the civil service unions to develop such coherence and authority to make them powerful enough to challenge the Government on any issue and win they would do so at the peril of being condemned as anarchists by the very individuals on whose behalf the victory was won.

**HYPOTHESIS 6.** Within the civil service the higher the grade of work being done the greater is the pressure on the individual to leave his/her union activities behind.

This hypothesis postulates that civil servants on higher grades are often under pressure to abandon their involvement with their unions because of their affiliation with management. When the duties of a job include formulation of policies which are sometimes inextricably linked with conflict management, or dealing with highly confidential management matters such as corporate finance and personnel, it is unethical to burden the same person who is involved with union matters either as a lay activist or a local officer, with the responsibility of secrecy which such a job entails. Indeed, it is not unusual for individuals offered promotions into such positions to be asked to resign from their unions either as a precondition or as a voluntary gesture. The former Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS)<sup>23</sup> organised members from junior management grades to directors. SCPS had a membership agreement with the First Division Association (FDA) mainly in order to prevent poaching. SCPS members who were promoted into very senior positions sometimes resign from their current union and join the FDA. Although they cite their long-standing and distinguished services to SCPS in defence of their action, it

sometimes seems they have been seduced by the lofty name and the idea of the elite FDA. In reality however, they tacitly aspire for the comfort of being among colleagues who share with them the same idea of where their loyalty should be, particularly in times of conflict - on the management side. As SCPS members, it would be quite embarrassing for them to cross picket lines where their fellow members are on picket duty. They would probably find it easier if they were FDA members because of the absence of group pressure and because FDA would have voted against the action anyway.<sup>24</sup> Although the latter excuse became less convincing since the formation of the Council of the Civil Service Unions (CCSU) the influence of group pressure on individual FDA members would be different from that of the SCPS, that is, to abstain rather than to participate.

**EVIDENCE:** The survey compared the responses of members of the lower grades with those of the higher grades in the following aspects:-

- (a) Attendance of meetings.
- (b) Reaction to the hypothetical all-out strike during the same period.
- (c) Reaction to the series of half-day strikes.

**RESULTS:-**

- (a) The comparison of the frequency of meeting attendance made above between the higher and the lower

grades indicates no significant difference. Indeed, on aggregate, members in the higher grades seemed to attend meetings more frequently than members in the lower grades. 47.4 per cent of respondents in lower grades attended all meetings, compared with 49.2 per cent of respondents in higher grades (see Tables 3 and 4). On the other hand, fewer respondents in higher grades attended single meetings during the same period - 7.2 per cent compared with 9.1 per cent of respondents in lower grades. This may be interpreted to mean that members in lower grades are more likely to ignore their branch meetings than members in higher grades. In this context therefore, the survey results did not support the hypothesis.

(b) Taking part in any industrial action is always a good indicator of involvement in union activities. In particular, to go on strike is not a casual act these days when there are stringent rules, most of which discourage strikes with an implied threat of disciplinary action or dismissal for breach of contract. The replies of respondents to the question on a hypothetical all-out strike action were given with the full awareness of such repercussions. The effect of previous unsuccessful strikes also played a part. Reactions to the question were unfettered by pressures such as are possible in ballots taken by show of hands and may be regarded as a reliable indicator of degree of participation in union affairs. The comparison made in the previous

chapter between the reactions of respondents in higher and lower grades showed a slight difference which may be regarded as significant from the point of view of this hypothesis. The percentage of respondents in higher grades who abstained from the question over the three year period was 4.0 ( $\bar{x}$ ), compared with 10.6 ( $\bar{x}$ ) of respondents in lower grades. 46.5 per cent of respondents in lower grades said they would stay out indefinitely, compared with 49.0 per cent of the higher grades. This means that 53.5 per cent and 51.0 per cent of the lower and higher grades respectively were nominally non-supporters of the hypothetical strike. A slightly higher percentage of respondents in the higher grades, by the above definition, showed involvement in union activities.

(c) An implication of this hypothesis was that most members in higher grades shy away from union activities and that in a strike situation, those who cross picket lines or refuse to strike regard strikes as demeaning, hiding under a welcome group pressure. The hypothesis also implied that the behaviour of most members in lower grades is exactly the opposite. However, according to respondents' reactions to the series of half-day strikes this view is untenable. 88.0 per cent of respondents in higher grades participated, compared with 75.7 per cent of the lower grades. This means that 24.3 per cent of the lower grades avoided the strike, compared with 12.0 per cent of the higher grades.

**HYPOTHESIS 7. Unorganised conflict is more manifest when the union exhibits anti-militant tendencies.**

The concept of unorganised conflict as distinguished from organised conflict has been challenged by Edwards<sup>25</sup> to be a questionable idea. He argued that most individual actions may reflect group pressures and certain institutionalised norms. Indeed, any individual actions in which group pressures are apparent or which reflect institutionalised norm should not be mistaken for unorganised conflict. Also, it is true that a given action need not be unorganised any more than it should reflect the presence of conflict. Absenteeism for instance, may arise from several causes and it may well be difficult to say whether it is unorganised or conflictual. Nevertheless, a certain amount of deliberate absenteeism does exist and if the cause of it can in any way be linked with the definition of conflict as proposed by Kornhauser et al.<sup>26</sup> and numerous other writers on the subject, then it is conflictual.

The gulf of difference between centrally orchestrated action from a union headquarters and a spontaneous action of an individual union member, makes it imperative to establish a nomenclature for each of the concepts. The concept of unorganised conflict envisaged in this hypothesis strictly



relates to an action of an individual motivated not by another individual or group, certainly not by the union, but by a personal or collective grievance. For instance, lack of promotion prospects may induce an individual to adopt casual attitudes to work. The main concern of this hypothesis is whether individual employees resort to personal "tit for tat" actions when their unions fail.

**EVIDENCE:** The survey examined a number of actions which are manifestations of unorganised conflict. The reactions of respondents to the following individual actions were scrutinized:-

- (a) Work to rule.
- (b) Sabotage.
- (c) Absenteeism.
- (d) Working with less or no enthusiasm.
- (e) Lateness.
- (f) Actively looking for another job.

**RESULTS:-**

(a) Working to rule is a stoppage of work which usually takes the form of retarding or interrupting a service or process by the literal carrying out of orders, or rules, or the mass observation of safety regulations. As a form of industrial action it is difficult to operate without the sanction of the union. This is because the individual

needs to be acquainted of the legality of such a practice and unions are usually better informed. However, it is quite possible for an individual to carry out his duties strictly according to his employment contract, thereby implementing work-to-rule without being in breach of his contract. In the civil service, for instance, an individual might send the manuscript of a report or correspondence to the typing pool, knowing that it could take up to three weeks to get it back, whereas he could do it within days on his office personal computer. Individuals may implement such delays with impunity particularly if the use of PCs, word processors or typewriters were not in their contract or job description. Do they resort to such actions? The result discussed here excludes occasions when members were advised to work-to-rule from their union headquarters.

Every year since the major defeats of the civil service unions in the early 1980s pay increases made by the Government have been less than satisfactory. More often than not, the offers have been made with grudge and have been forced on civil servants, allowing them no option of resort to arbitration. The Government acquisition of this quasi-despotic power over its employees was progressive. First, to eliminate the embarrassment of perpetually setting aside the findings of an authentic research carried out by a duly constituted body, the Government dismissed the PRU. Next, the very essence of arbitration was vilified when the

Government time and time again chose to ignore its recommendations. Refusal to go to arbitration was the Government's "coup de grace". This situation did put a huge number of civil servants, especially those with several years of service, in a predicament. For many, it was too late to start looking for another job. Recession and high unemployment made this option very difficult for those who were willing and able to change their jobs. Most civil servants were therefore caught with their backs to the wall. The Government had developed total immunity from the countervailing force of the unions. In spite of the fact that the civil servant today has a union, belongs to a collective, he is almost as helpless as his counterpart in the days of the patronage system.

It is significant that 46.6 per cent of the respondents said they practised work-to-rule. The recent ploy of linking pay increases to performance is an indirect admission by the Government that the individual is quite capable of imposing his own sanction where the unions fail.

(b) Sabotage: Only 4 per cent of the respondents said they had resorted to sabotage. This may well be so if the concept of sabotage is only limited to damage to property. An observation was made in the previous chapter that if sabotage of this nature were widespread Government buildings throughout the nation would be perpetually vandal-

ized. However, sabotage has a wider meaning than destruction to property. When it means "action taken to prevent the achievement of any aim", it would also cover four of the items listed above, that is, working to rule, absenteeism, working with less or no enthusiasm and lateness. It is debatable that certain sick absences can come within the category. In this wider context therefore, sabotage may be more widespread than is apparent.

(c) Only 11.4 per cent of the respondents said that they had taken sick leave. Compared to the general level of sick absences in the civil service, this figure is very low. However, it should be noted that the figure represents sick absences induced by frustration. Frustration can also induce another type of sick absence. The phrase "on-site sick absence" is used here to facilitate a definition. An "on-site sick absence" involves a situation where an individual excuses himself from certain duties of his job on account of an ailment which does not totally prevent him from attending work. In other words, he would go to work regularly but he would limit the range of duties he may perform. For example, if part of his duties include climbing ladders he might say that he suffers from vertigo and produce a doctor's certificate advising him not to climb ladders. Or, a person who uses a word processor or a computer to perform some of his duties might say that constant use of the VDU gives him a headache and substantiate his claim with a doctor's certifi-

cate. Most of these cases may be genuine but there is no denying that some may be claims made purely in order express latent frustration, since there is no easy way to test the veracity of the claims.

(d) The above definition does not constitute "working with less or no enthusiasm" because there is an element of negotiation involved before an individual is allowed to abstain from some of his duties. Working with less or no enthusiasm is not negotiable, as individuals, driven to listlessness by frustration, go about their work spontaneously avoiding as much of it as they can possibly get away with. Some of them would pretend to be working hard when they are being observed. The basic principle which underlies this discussion is motivation. Lawler (1967)<sup>27</sup> postulates that an employee's motivation to perform effectively is determined by the following variables:

1. The probability that a given amount of effort towards performing effectively will result in a reward or valued outcome.

This variable really contains two aspects:-

- (a) the probability that effort will result in performance
- (b) performance will result in reward;

Vroom (1964)<sup>28</sup> refers to the first of these subjective prob-

abilities as an "expectancy" and to the second as an "instrumentality"

2. The individual's perception of the value of reward or outcome that might be obtained by performing effectively.

In Lawler's view, reward value and effort/reward probability combine multiplicatively in order to determine the individual's motivation. On the other hand, Adams (1963)<sup>29</sup> and Homans (1961)<sup>30</sup> postulate "that perceived discrepancies in ratios of rewards to investments (of effort)<sup>31</sup> produce feelings of inequity, and consequently negative effect, regardless of the direction of the discrepancy. In other words, tension is produced by relative gratification as well as relative deprivation. Discrepancies produced by "over-reward" are associated with feelings of guilt, while those produced by "under-reward" are associated with feelings of anger or unfairness".<sup>32</sup> It is unlikely that the feeling of unfairness such as has permeated morale in the civil service will be eradicated by the Government's current pressure to link pay increases with performance. At least 50.0 per cent of the respondents said they worked with less or no enthusiasm. This is hardly a surprise; had the civil service unions succeeded in securing equitable pay the situation would have been different. Success in linking pay increases with performance cannot be absolute; it can only be

relative. Since the yardstick by which performance can be measured in most civil service jobs is subject to the supervisor's personal opinion, background and frame of reference, reliance on this method of determining pay increases can only generate more dissatisfaction and further deterioration of morale.

(e) The views expressed here about lateness naturally excludes unintentional late-coming. Arriving late due to unforeseeable delays in transportation can hardly qualify as a manifestation of conflict. It is a sign of conflict however, when individuals deliberately will not make an effort to arrive on time. The focus of this area of the survey was on this aspect of lateness. Many civil service jobs have a direct link with the public where opening hours have to be maintained and offices manned. For this reason, lateness is not typical and cannot be acceptable in the service. On the other hand, the introduction of flexible working hours in the service has gone a long way to making individuals very conscious about time keeping. Given these preconditions, an overall 5 per cent lateness, including involuntary ones, throughout the civil service may be regarded as significant. Over 9 per cent of the survey respondents said they resorted to lateness as an expression of their dissatisfaction. Since group pressure was not feasible in those instances they were manifestations of militancy at personal level; unorganized conflict was in evidence.

(f) Actively looking for another job: It is hardly a desirable option for anybody currently in a job to be constantly looking for another job. Most people would prefer to have a permanent and secure job. Unfortunately, this is no longer so in the civil service since pay and conditions are being forced on employees as "Hobson's choice". For many civil servants who have spent their entire working lives in the service and are either too old or too demoralized to look for other jobs, it is a very difficult option to have to stay in a job they are fed up of doing. It is equally difficult for those who are able and willing to move, because jobs are not easy to find these days. So, morale is abysmally low all round. The survey shows that over 30 per cent of the respondents said they were actively looking for another job. Evidently, these people would be searching outside the civil service and their success would mean a loss of members to the civil service unions. It is therefore hardly feasible that the unions would instruct or advise their members to leave their civil service jobs. The decision to move out of the civil service can only be personal and spontaneous, arising from dissatisfaction. This is interpreted as an indisputable evidence of unorganised conflict.



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## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS

This chapter begins with a summary of the survey conclusions and findings, followed by a summary of the hypotheses which were tested in the previous chapter. Then the theories outlined in Chapter 1 are reviewed in order to highlight their relevance to the survey and to indicate areas in which fresh knowledge has been contributed to the debate. This is followed by a discussion of the problems which are facing the unions and their members, as interpreted from the survey. Some solutions are suggested mainly for the benefit of the unions.

### SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

#### CONCLUSION 1

Most members join their unions in order to safeguard their rights to better pay, better working conditions and job security.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey findings:-

- (a) A belief in trade unionism had the greatest influence on the various reasons given by respondents for joining their unions.
- (b) Educational background or qualifications of respondents

had little influence on their reasons for joining.

(c) Grade or social status of respondents had no influence on their reasons for joining although it might have played a significant part in their decision to join.

#### CONCLUSION 2

Belonging to their unions was just as important to respondents as possessing relevant qualifications for their jobs.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey finding:-

Only very few respondents said belonging to their unions was not very important; and fewer still said they had no opinion about the importance of belonging to a union. The majority of these respondents were in the lower education group or had no qualifications.

#### CONCLUSION 3

The unions by and large met the respondents' expectations in terms of their reasons for joining.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey findings:-

(a) Most of the respondents were satisfied with the perform-

ance of their unions and even those who had reasons to be dissatisfied, about 25 per cent of the sample, maintained their membership nonetheless. (See page 88)

(b) A larger majority of the respondents would continue their membership even if the unions fail to negotiate better pay. (See table 63).

#### CONCLUSION 4

The defeat suffered by the unions in the 1981 pay campaign had an adverse effect on respondents' willingness to support future campaigns wholeheartedly. Consequently, it would be ill-advised for the unions to rely on the support of their members when it comes to a show-down.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey findings:-

(a) Branches from where there was no support for the pay campaign increased in 1982 and 1983. Similarly, branches from where there was poor support increased in those two years.

(b) Most respondents felt less willing to support their unions on key issues. (See table 60, statement 5.).

(c) The attitude of active white-collar civil service trade

unionists to industrial action is influenced more by their experience of the negotiating process and the behaviour of the employer than it is by the structure of their personal circumstances, whether inside or outside of the work situation.

#### CONCLUSION 5

The propensity to strike was higher among younger respondents.

#### CONCLUSION 6

Respondents in the higher grades exhibited greater degree of militancy.

#### CONCLUSION 7

Branch officers were more militant than ordinary members.

These conclusions can be derived from the following survey findings:-

(a) More respondents in the age groups 21-30 and 31-40 took the series of half-day strike actions. (See tables 24 and 24a).

(b) More respondents in the higher grades rejected the 1981 pay offer outright.

(c) More respondents in the higher grades took the series of

half-day strike actions. (See tables 25 and 25a).

(d) Fewer branch officers said they would ignore the hypothetical strike. (See table 30e).

(e) More branch officers supported the overtime ban. (See table 31b).

#### CONCLUSION 8

Family and financial commitments had little or no influence on decision to take the strike action.

#### CONCLUSION 9

Moral principles played a greater part in decisions to take strike actions.

These conclusions can be derived from the following survey findings:-

(a) More respondents who had rent or mortgage commitments came out on strike. (See page 140).

(b) More single/married respondents with children came out on strike. (See pages 141 and 142).

#### CONCLUSION 10

Belief in the efficacy of "arbitration" was greater among respondents in the higher grades.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey finding:-

More respondents in the lower grades felt "arbitration" had little or no value. More respondents in the higher grades trusted "arbitration". (See tables 32a and 32b).

#### CONCLUSION 11

Pay in the civil service was low.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey finding:-

Most respondents in both the higher and the lower grades felt that civil service pay and promotion prospects were bad or very bad. (See table 47 and 49).

#### CONCLUSION 12

The responsibilities of senior civil servants as managers conflict with their role as trade unionist.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey finding:-

The view expressed by majority of respondents in both the lower and higher grades was that the duties of the higher



grades as managers were not compatible with their trade union activities, although this did not necessarily diminish their participation. (cf. tables 14(c-e) and 14(f-h) and see table 56).

### CONCLUSION 13

Although the Government's abolition of trade unions at the GCHQ is a key issue and despite the fact that majority of the respondents said they would come out on strike against the decision, an adequate support for such a strike would be very doubtful.

This conclusion can be derived from the following survey findings:-

(a) Since the unsuccessful pay campaign in 1981 support for industrial action, especially strikes, has been in decline. It is even more so now with the onslaught of anti-trade union laws.

(b) Most respondents would regard GCHQ as a moral issue but because of the logical conclusion of the argument, that is, that abolition of trade unions in the civil service was not likely in the foreseeable future, it would remain only a key issue. More respondents disagreed, strongly disagreed with or were uncertain about supporting their unions on key issues.

### SUMMARY OF THE HYPOTHESES

The first hypothesis postulates that members' propensity to militancy is influenced by high personal commitments; however, there is no significant evidence from the survey results to support this. A comparison between respondents who had financial, family and other commitments and those who had none, indicates greater propensity to militancy among the former group.

The second hypothesis proposes a corollary of the first. It assumes that the more importance individuals place on their personal commitments the less militant they would tend to be. Again, the empirical evidence does not support this. The majority of those respondents who voted to reject their employer's offer and escalate the dispute had more personal commitments than those who accepted the offer.

In the third hypothesis, militancy was conceptualized as the life-line of trade unionism. The employer is assumed to acquire more power as the union is perceived to be less militant. Three separate evidence cited from the survey corroborated each other in one conclusive proof. If militancy is visualized as a continuum, the degree of militancy exhibited by the unions in the 1981 struggle was just enough to push the Government's resistance curve to infinity ( $\infty$ ). Resistance became much easier for the Government in the years that followed, whereas if carried to the other extreme

of the continuum, militancy might have forced the Government to capitulate, since the British Government was not likely to react in the same way as the Peking Government at Tiananmen Square if civil servants were to resort to civil disobedience in pursuit of their claim.

The fourth hypothesis reinforces the proof of the third hypothesis. Discovery of weakness among the union membership made the Government more forceful and unreasonable at the bargaining table, thereby frustrating the efforts of the union negotiators.

The fifth hypothesis highlights militancy as the main force behind trade union power. Density of membership is seen as an important variable but not as essential as militancy. Although the survey indicates a decline in the level of militancy after the 1981 defeat the fact that union density in the years that followed that defeat was well over 80 per cent did not compensate for the decline; whereas tenacious militancy, even by a declining membership, emphasized not by refusal to attend union meetings or to support other union activities but by giving full support, intensified by actions such as hunger strikes or even civil disobedience might have forced the Government to concede.

The contention implicit in the sixth hypothesis, that higher grade civil servants instinctively avoid involvement with

their union activities is not supported by the survey result. A comparison between the higher and the lower grades from the point of view of attending union meetings and participating in union activities shows that members in higher grades took part and supported their unions more than members in lower grades.

The seventh hypothesis argues that "indirect (unorganized) militancy" exists, especially in view of the unions' anti-militant tendencies. The failure of the unions to negotiate better pay may not cause loss of membership but there is evidence from the survey that it causes low morale and when morale is low enthusiasm to perform better is almost non-existent. Low morale saps the courage to avoid manifestations of unorganized militancy.

#### RELEVANCE OF THE THEORIES OUTLINED IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW

Much of the theories examined in the literature review centred on the endemism of conflict in the relationship between the employer and employee. The acquisition, threat and the use or abuse of power has been and will always remain a contentious issue; it has been a major preoccupation of observers and writers in Industrial Relations. The legitimacy of slavery, a master's quasi-devine right of life and death over his slaves has long been eradicated, but something similar to such a right has threatened to persist in the relationship between capital and labour, employer and

employee, and indeed, between the Government and its employees. The war against slavery was vigorously waged by right-thinking men who spoke out fearlessly, fought to the death and were no less prolific in producing written argument which ultimately vanquished the protagonists of slavery. Those industrial relations analysts and industrial sociologists who busy themselves collecting data, analyzing them and interpreting empirical laws deduced from them will continue to perform a similarly essential task until employer/employee relationships have been purged of the connotations of slavery.

However, the writers engaged in this war of words and proliferation of theories are polarized according to the context of their argument. For instance, writers on power and conflict, such as Thomas (1976), Dunlop (1944), Hyman (1975), Dahl (1957), Edwards (1978), Marchington (1975), Lukes (1974) and many more, are popular for their definition of Industrial Relations concepts. Others like Kessler (1980), Fox (1974), Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963) and Purcell (1981) are noted for their critical appraisal of the characteristics and attitudes of the actors on the industrial relations arena. The work of both groups nevertheless contribute significantly to the knowledge and understanding of Industrial Relations and are equally relevant to the findings of this survey.

Thus, Thomas (1976) depicted the fringe of conflict in which the interests of the actors are polarized as an "either/or conceptualization of a conflict issue". Blake et al. (1964) visualized it as a "win/lose" situation. Whatever epithet is accorded to the concept, the bottom line is that it illustrates "Pareto Optimality" which exists between the Government and the civil service unions where conflict of interest between the two sides is total. The survey results indicate that the outcomes of pay campaigns over the years have been total satisfaction for the Government and total frustration for the unions; the Government's satisfaction occurring at the expense of the unions and their members.

Hyman(1975) traces the endemism of conflict in the employer/employee relationship back to the fact that the interests of both groups are largely at variance, each group seeking to wield power and mobilise resources in order to ensure the predominance of its own interests. The civil service unions harangue their membership in order to mobilise support and generate militancy. The resulting power is neutralized by the Government through its legislative powers. The Government then goes on to assert its predominance by enforcing unilateral decisions and wage levels which have been vociferously rejected by the unions. Hyman's theory is actualized in the perennial clashes between the Government and the civil service unions and in particular, in the abysmal level to which the survey shows morale to have sank.

Purcell's contribution is directly relevant to the findings of the survey. His analysis of the patterns of industrial relations traces the phases of the relationship between the Government and its employees' organizations from what he termed "cooperative constitutionalism" to "adoptive cooperation" and from "antagonistic constitutionalism" to "uninhibited antagonism". Analyses of the survey data indicate that the Government had gone through all the four phases and has currently settled within the latter two phases, leaving the civil service unions no choice but to comply.

This situation exemplifies the findings of Edwards and Scullion (1982) who concluded that conflict may not always emerge in action if the power of one side is so great that all forms of protest are suppressed. Success in suppressing conflict in this way has many implications. For instance, the party with the upper hand, which in the case of the civil service means the Government, feels free to ignore or set aside procedures. Industrial peace is sacrificed on the altar of the Government's ego. The survey highlights instances when the Government repeatedly sets aside the recommendations of arbitration and other pay review bodies. It also indicates that failure of the Government to recognize the rationale of loyalty to procedure is partly responsible for the perpetual unrest in its relation with its workforce; Fox's observation is thus corroborated:-

The desirability of peaceful settlement; the importance of observing the other party's expectations in respect of procedure; the restraints and conventions of social interaction which maintain an environment favourable to compromise; these are at once the preconditions and the consequences of successful conflict-regulation. In so far as there is normative agreement about these behaviours, it embodies a recognition by both sides that any immediate tactical advantage resulting from violation of shared expectations would be outweighed by damage to the system within which they had hitherto accomplished satisfactory results.<sup>1</sup>

This sentiment is echoed by Kevin Hawkins:-

....the essential prerequisite of effective procedural relations is a recognition by both sides that their power to take action unilaterally must be held in check.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, the conclusions of Goldthorpe and Lockwood are directly relevant to the survey results in that despite undesirable Government practices in the area of Industrial Relations highlighted in the survey, practices which continue to keep civil servants proletariat, the Government tries to project an image which portrays its employees as



middle-class. Had this middle-class image been correct the embourgeoisement thesis would have been confirmed. However, evidence from the survey which indicates that a much larger proportion of the civil service workforce only qualify as working-class confirms that the embourgeoisement thesis is largely unfounded and corroborates the findings of Goldthorpe and Lockwood.

#### THE PROBLEMS FACING THE UNIONS AND THEIR MEMBERS

The essence of trade unionism is in its capacity to provide a day-to-day means of democratic representation of its members' interests. If a union lacks this capacity it might as well cease to exist. By this definition, the civil service unions were approaching a point where their existence was becoming meaningless; their prestige was declining and limitations to their power posed internal organization problems which was alienating their frustrated members. At a time when members were becoming keenly aware of the extent to which their employer had relegated them in terms of pay and conditions, their interest in the union had suffered considerably from atrophy. Local branches were running short of officers because very few members were interested. A vicious circle was beginning to set in - members felt the unions had lost their power and were becoming increasingly "dues paying members" only; at the same time the unions felt the need to flex their muscles but stamina was almost non-existent. Members' attitudes were changing but only few

recognized the change that was taking place or why it was happening. Some of the unions knew something was wrong but did not know what it was and others simply refuse to acknowledge the fact that a change was taking place; everything was attributed to the "apathy of members".

Let us assume that "apathy" was rightly responsible for the unions' predicament, it is not sufficient to just leave it at that and use it as a scapegoat. One way out of the difficulty is to investigate the causes of apathy and examine the factors which influence members attitude towards the problems which they are up against. This is the reason for the necessity of this survey. More specifically, the hope and enthusiasm which underpinned members' fight for better pay and conditions in the late 1970s and early 1980s were vanquished by their employer. These, together with the events leading up to 1984 when the Treasury repeatedly implemented pay offers that were rejected by the civil service union membership had left most members disillusioned and less optimistic about the success of future strikes. The timing of the survey was therefore appropriate not only from the point of view of the historical context but more importantly from the point of view of capturing in real time the reactions of members to the new constraints imposed on them. In the years up to 1982 the Government pretended to negotiate pay and conditions with the CCSU whereas in fact their intent was to enforce predetermined packages. They were

successful in doing so in spite of heavy financial losses caused by the strikes. In 1983, the claim put forward by the CCSU was well researched and was backed with supporting evidence (see Appendix 5). The constituent unions of the CCSU also each put forward their own evidence in support of claims for better conditions (see Appendix 6 "SCPS" Supporting Evidence for Claim for Reduction in Hours of Work). In line with the Government's nonchalant attitude nothing came out of the logical argument put forward. Low pay and poor conditions which were at the roots of the grievances of Government employees in the last century seem to have remained the principal cause of low morale in the service.

It should be recalled that trade union movement in the civil service did not come into existence just for its own sake. The exigencies of the time formed the basis of its spontaneous characteristics which are almost lacking in the movement today. The exigencies are still present, though they differ somewhat from those which filliped the pioneers of the movement into action. The fact that employment in the civil service was a favour which members of parliament handed out as they pleased, placed civil servants at the time in an awkward position. The so-called patronage system made it difficult for employees to voice any criticisms against their employers or grumble about the injustices which they suffered. All the employees shared one common handicap - they had no means of redress for their

grievances.

Despite the progress which was made since that time, from the acceptance of trade unionism in the service through to the successes attributed to Whitleyism, the consequences of the patronage system seem to have surfaced again only this time in a form more serious than it was in the last century. When employees were muzzled and prevented by their debt of gratitude from seeking redress for their grievances they did not have a means of democratic representation which seemingly exists today. The Government, having allowed trade unions to function in the civil service, seem to regret their existence and is doing everything possible to render them useless.

Thus, this survey puts the present day problems of the unions into context by making a distinction between popular beliefs and real life views interpreted from the collected data. The problems may be summarized as follows:-

(a) Low pay

This originated from the fact that the pay of civil servants is funded from public revenue. The excuses made by the Government for keeping it low include the security of civil service jobs, right to the so-called non-contributory pension and the claim that pay increases in the service cause inflation.

(b) Low morale

Low morale is a direct consequence of low pay. Those employees who have already spent the major part of their working lives in the civil service find it difficult if not impossible to move to other jobs. They are thus forced to stay in a job which gives them little or no job satisfaction and an inequitable remuneration. Most newly employed persons who take civil service jobs because there are no other jobs available leave as soon as they can find a better alternative. If there are no alternatives then the civil service jobs are just better than going on the dole queue.

(c) Difficult/Unreasonable employer

An employer who has the advantage of the formidable power of capital at his disposal is in a position of strength compared with his employees who are constantly in need of subsistence. If the employer also turns out to be the Government with the authority to make and unmake laws then his power is unlimited. Such is the power which the Government has over its employees. The only time a slight equilibrium may be restored between the two sides is when there is a severe labour shortage which makes recruitment into the civil service extremely difficult. The unions apparently have

very little power to match that of the Government, especially when the Government uses all possible means, including artificially created unemployment, to maintain its supremacy.

(d) High unemployment

Apart from the problem of decimating the union membership, high unemployment makes pay negotiations extremely difficult for the unions. For instance, if the Government insists on giving increases just enough to retain staff or ease recruitment problems then the unions will never be able to produce any reason good enough to justify increases beyond the limit set by the Government; with the current rate of unemployment there cannot be recruitment or retention problems such as could make the Government shift from its position.

(e) The recession

Unemployment always gets worse during a recession because as business loses momentum firms are forced to lay off staff and redundancies abound. Recession affects almost all forms of business and its knock-on effect usually throws the economy into a vicious circle. The Government needs no further excuses to squeeze its own employees even

harder during a recession; like the familiar cliché "there is a war on!", recession has connotations of extreme sacrifice and austerity specifically for civil servants. They are expected to set an example for the rest of the working population by absorbing the full impact of the nation's economic chasm. The unions have no choice but to co-operate; the Government has seen to that. The worst part of it all is that the forced sacrifices are forgotten as soon as the recession is over. Back to the negotiating table, the Government trumps up other excuses to maintain the squeeze.

(f) The apathy of members

The growing tendency of members to adopt an indifferent attitude towards their unions must be one of the greatest distinguishing marks between the present day membership and those whose effort brought the movement into existence. It is hard to reconcile the fact that those pioneers had very little going for them and yet did not succumb to apathy, whereas present day unionists have a lot more in their favour - density of membership, full time specialists and favourable laws - to name a few, and yet they lack the courage which those early unionists had in abundance.

The problems listed above are by no means exhaustive but they are mutually interconnected, each seemingly reinforcing the other. In other words, a solution for one may go a long way to solving the others. But the reality of having to deal with a difficult and often unreasonable employer poses an almost insurmountable obstacle. High unemployment and the recession are political problems; there is not much the unions can do about them. The problem of apathy however, although not apparent, is singularly viable. Solve the apathy problem and the solution for low pay and low morale may well be within reach.

#### DISCUSSION

One of the simplest questions in the survey questionnaire was why individuals joined their unions; it also turned out to be for some respondents a very difficult question to answer. Many interesting reasons were given - see chapter 4, p. 83, but the most startling was the answer given by about a dozen interviewees. It did not seem important at the time but after analyzing the questionnaire replies and it was observed that none of the 500 respondents gave that particular answer, it was quite clear how more convenient it is to have plenty of time to consider each question before putting down an answer, rather than having to give an instant reply. The interviewees' answer was that they had never stopped to think about it. This is quite different from the "I don't know" type of answer because given the



time the interviewee would probably be able to specify a reason. The "I don't know" reply is almost the same as joining the union for no reason. An observation that can be easily overlooked from the reactions of both the interviewees and the respondents is that neither of them would react to the question if it was not put in the first place. This is precisely why many union members lose interest in their union affairs from the very moment they sign their membership forms. It is also why unions prosper more in factory situations. The local white-collar union representative does not usually function in the same way as his factory shop-steward counterpart. The shop-steward's duty toward his constituents does not end, but begins when he signs them on. He takes personal interest in their welfare in the factory, checks on them frequently to make sure they have no problems and if they have, he tries to sort them out. They respect him because they know he is trustworthy. In time of crisis, all he has to do is say the word and everybody is out on strike; not so much because of group pressure but because of loyalty to him primarily, then to the group which he has formed and then to the union.

The so-called membership secretary in a local branch of a civil service white-collar union should learn to perform in a similar manner. There is no magic way to inspire interest in union affairs. Interest should originate from the organizers, the local officer, not by ushering members to

union meetings but by sharing in their day-to-day cares and by establishing a bond with them which transcends the "officer/rank-and-file" relationship. When this trust relationship has been achieved no other form of soliciting interest in union affairs is necessary, as members would have already learnt to share in the interests of a trusted officer just as he manifestly does in theirs. Rapport thus established may not guarantee 100 per cent attendance at union meetings but it would attract a good number of attentive members. It may be argued that there is not enough facility time to permit this degree of liaison with members. The local officer who takes on the duties of membership secretary should be dedicated and should be prepared to spend some of his/her own time in order to cover his constituency adequately. If there are many members in the constituency, the number could be split among as many membership secretaries as would give each secretary not more than a dozen members at the most. Where there are more than three membership secretaries, a periodic coordinating meeting should be held among them in order to compare notes and lend a helping hand to one another if necessary.

Perhaps one of the reasons why there is always a shortage of volunteers for local offices is because members feel they are thankless jobs. Comments like "I get nothing but criticism out of it" is common and is largely true.<sup>3</sup> If members feel this way then a simple solution is for the union to pay

local officers some allowance commensurate to the amount of their own time spent.

#### MORE UNION INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR MEMBERS' WORKPLACE AFFAIRS

The relationship described above is a necessary prelude to a direct participation of the union in the development of its members. Unions should objectively motivate their members to perform efficiently and if necessary, keep a record of their achievement in this direction for negotiation purposes. They should participate in suggesting, and if possible, designing courses that would help their members' self development. Courses developed for members should not be limited to trade union affairs alone; they should cover all aspects of their day-to-day duties. This degree of union involvement has become even more urgent and necessary in view of the recent "performance point" agreement. Having achieved this, it becomes imperative that they should also participate in monitoring the progress of their members to ensure that no-one who deserves to move on, stagnates. This should not be difficult; after all, unions do take part in job evaluation and job satisfaction exercises.

The benefits of this degree of union involvement are many. In the first place, it is in the interest of the unions to promote an educated workforce; their productivity bargaining would be that much more effective. Since the training thus provided would be available to members only, the unions

would create an elite workforce that would perform more efficiently and more effectively than their non-member colleagues. Also, when rapid progress, linked strictly with merit, is one of the benefits the unions can offer their members, it becomes per se, a selling point, particularly if management is unable to provide such training and development. Not only would the unions gain the loyalty of their existing members they might even get more non-members to join. There can be only very few people in the workplace who do not care about advancement. Every successful case is an invitation to non-members.

#### HEALTH AND SAFETY ASPECT

The current system of periodic health and safety tour of the premises is a perfect recipe for boredom. Inspection of the premises by one or two persons representing management and one or more representatives from each union is carried out as quickly as the management representatives can possibly make it; the quicker, the better for them. Rather than object to the slapdash method, the union representatives usually go along with it because they too invariably wish to get it over and done with. But by far the greatest criticism of the unions' performance in this area is the fact that they often cannot find anyone to represent them. Time spent in each area of the premises is hardly more than the time required to walk briskly from one end of the area to the other. Members working in the area probably recognize the

management representatives but usually cannot tell which local officer represents what union. They do not even know who their own union's health and safety representative is; sometimes their union has no one to represent them. In those circumstances, rather than speak to strangers who would regard them as trouble makers if they spoke of any hazards in the area, they simply look on while the group moves along. If there is any hazard worth reporting it is drawn to the attention of the group. Because it is reported to the group and not to the reporter's own local representative it is more often than not left unattended to; none of the union representatives at the scene feels it is his/her responsibility to chase it.

The purpose of the periodic tours is to discover potential health and safety hazards before they become major problems. Management may feel that a reported incident is not worth bothering about but it is the duty of the local union representatives to put pressure and insure that no member suffers as a result of management negligence. This aspect of the unions' functions is just as important as all the others. The unions should therefore consider incentive payments in order to attract volunteers who would take the duties seriously.

### PROTECTION AGAINST THE CONSEQUENCES OF STRIKE

Strikes have consequences for strikers. Even before legislations which severely restricted freedom to take a strike action were brought in, strikes involved financial sacrifices. Enthusiasm for the cause being fought for was often checked only by the thought of losing money while the strike was on. The situation is different nowadays when individuals may face disciplinary action or dismissal. The probability of losing the fight against an employer that has long proven records of intransigence is very high and can be a powerful deterrent. One more factor which is rapidly beginning to gain grounds is apparently not the fear of losing money or the risk of disciplinary action, but the growing concern about incorrect deductions from pay packets after a strike.<sup>4</sup> If the deductions are too small no one would complain. It is usually more than double what it should be and it takes several months to put right.<sup>5</sup> Whether this is a deliberate ploy of the employer (via local management) should be a subject for another investigation.

In the interest of their members and for the sake of their own survival the unions should take these deterrents more seriously and find ways to counteract them. For instance, the feasibility of taking out an insurance cover to indemnify members against financial losses caused by strikes should be investigated. The unions should have a policy of replying centrally all disciplinary letters pertaining to a strike

action. The risk of losing members by leaving them to face the management by themselves after a strike (official or unofficial) is too great. Members who do not resign may never again react positively to the union's instruction to strike.

Where illegal deductions have been made on account of a strike action, it is the duty of the union to see to it that the error is put right forthwith.

#### GETTING MEMBERS INVOLVED IN THEIR OWN TRADE UNIONS

The pioneers of the trade union movement in the civil service handled their own affairs in spite of the difficulties and the odds stacked against them. When they wrote their own petitions, organized their own protest meetings and lobbied parliament on their own behalf, it is hardly conceivable that apathy would have played a significant role among them as it does among the membership today. It is therefore logical to view apathy as a side effect of the involvement of full-time officers in the organisation of the movement. The advent of full-time officers was supposed to ease the pressure on those enthusiasts who coordinated and channelled the efforts of the pioneers. It did more. The full-time officers who were selected to take on the pressure, handled the business skilfully and their achievements, despite some initial problems, enabled the pioneers to leave matters reliably in their hands. It was a

gradual process which was bound to introduce inertia among the hitherto very active pioneers. The inertia appears to have developed into what is regarded as apathy today. Apathy is linked with the reality of paid full-time individuals who now organize, negotiate and think for members. Dues paid by members bought not only the services of the full-time officials but sadly also a feeling of complacency. The full-time officials' dilemma is that if they ran the union both at headquarters and at local branch level, members would object to being treated as morons; whereas, left to organize their own local branches, they do it so halfheartedly: a "dog in the manger" situation!

The union and its members are like a horse and its jockey; one cannot do without the other. It is therefore necessary for their mutual survival that the malady of complacency is isolated and eradicated. The pioneers took the initiative when they invited the full-time officials to organize them; now it is the turn of the full-time officials to take the initiative and educate their members so that they would once again fulfil their role with the confidence which was characteristic of their forebears. At present, a full-time official is assigned to each branch of the union. Education of members could take the form of more active involvement of the full-timer in the organization of the branch, using a standard format. All the suggestions made in the foregone discussion, put together, could make a coherent pattern of



reform and way forward for the unions.

#### THE PROBLEM OF FREE-RIDERS

A free-rider is "a non-unionist; a worker who receives the benefits of the union's activities in collective bargaining without paying the contributions which union membership implies, hence getting something for nothing".<sup>6</sup> If non-unionists were asked why they choose not to belong to a union several interesting answers would certainly emerge. Although no one would freely admit it, the lure of getting the main benefits of membership without paying the dues is much too great for them to resist. There are those who would say that they had never been asked; others might use the "conscientious objector" argument. The fact is that those who belong to unions are exercising their democratic rights and those who choose not to belong should be allowed the same rights. That argument however, only covers the right to belong or not to belong to a union. It has nothing to do with payment for services rendered. When the union negotiates pay and conditions it is done for members and non-members alike; whatever the union achieves is applied to all employees affected, unionists or non-unionists. If the employer will not negotiate singly with each employee but will only deal with an accredited representative and apply the bargaining results to all employees, then every employee who benefits should pay for the "labour relations" services rendered by the representative. A sum, equivalent to at

least 85 per cent of the union dues, should be deducted from the pay of non-unionists and paid to the appropriate unions for services rendered. This is only fair. A similar system operates at Polytechnics and Universities in Britain today. When students enrol for courses they are charged a fee for the students' union. This fee is automatic; the student is allowed no choice.

There is no need for a protracted "closed shop" argument here. The unions perform labour relations services for which all employees should pay. Payment of this fee should not obligate individuals to join any of the unions but those who wish may pay the extra 15 per cent and sign an agreement to be bound by the rules of the union. The 85 per cent fee entitles employees to the benefits of collective bargaining and no more; whereas those who pay the extra 15 per cent obtain the full benefits of union membership.

#### THE CHANGING NATURE OF MILITANCY

As observed earlier, the essence of union power is militancy. Militancy was the root of trade union movement in the civil service and must be kept alive if the movement is to survive. Because of new laws aimed at severely curbing union power, new forms of militancy must be devised to circumvent legal restrictions - a form of militancy without repercussion. The civil service trade union movement needs to be reformed in order to accommodate the changing phase of

militancy.

#### THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SURVEY FOR THE UNIONS

The findings of this survey of influences on the attitudes of active white-collar civil service trade unionists should provide some insight into the nature of the Government's power and the likely responses of the civil service trade unions to the introduction of more anti-trade union laws and attempts to reduce them to the status of staff associations. However, it is debatable whether it is possible - on the basis these findings - to generalize about the trade unionists' reaction to the ever increasing power of the Government. On the issue of strikes, the survey adequately demonstrated the view that the sense of common purpose is still alive among members and that militancy is very important if the unions are to retain their countervailing force. In certain respects, such as where an action is recommended from the headquarters, union leaders should proceed with extreme caution if a ballot turns out in favour of the action.

Finally, there are certain implications derived from this investigation which are important for any policy initiative which attempts to implement changes in response to the pressures of the Government whose behaviour is made unpredictable by the amount of power it controls. Firstly, this investigation demonstrated the importance of leadership in

initiating policies. In spite of the enthusiasm of the local activists the rationale of apathy means greater reliance on the expertise of full-time officials. Since apathy stems from the existence of headquarters and full-time staff, it means greater responsibility of the full-timers to intensify their involvement with individual members.

Secondly, the civil service unions do not operate "closed shop" or "union shop". Moreover, if the Government has its way, it would restrict the operation of trade unions in the service in such a way that they might as well cease to exist. A strategy must be developed which would enable the size of membership to take care of itself. The unions may be powerless in dealing with the Government but they can put more effort into achieving more success for individual members in respect of advancement in the job so that non-members, feeling left behind, would wish to join and share in their colleagues success. This would also probably help with the problem of free-riders. The Government cannot interfere with this manner of success without violating human right and natural justice.

Thirdly, even though the investigation shows little evidence that financial commitments stifle militancy, it is necessary to establish adequate financial benefit for members who take legitimate strike action. The possibility of indemnifying each member with insurance companies against such a contin-

gency should not be overlooked.

Fourthly, a recognition that there is a wide gap between the proletarian reality in which the overwhelming power of the Government forces civil servants and the utopian middle-class which they assume for themselves should provide full-time officers and their leaders with the impetus to fight on.

Thus, the findings of this thesis not only support the conclusions of Goldthorpe and Lockwood (1963)<sup>7</sup>, Bain(1971)<sup>8</sup>, and Clegg (1975)<sup>9</sup>, but it confirms the conclusion of Winchester (1983)<sup>10</sup>:-

It can be concluded that until a more systematic analysis of the forms of state economic intervention and the nature of power in collective bargaining is combined with an institutional analysis of public sector industrial relations, future developments will appear as unpredictable as many of the changes of the last fifteen years have seemed to observers and participants.

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Fox, A., *A Sociology of Work in Industry*, Collier Macmillan, 1971, p.149.
2. Hawkins, K., *op. cit.* 1978, p.200.
3. This comment was repeatedly made to the author as a participant observer.
4. A number of interviewees raised this matter. They seriously objected to the fact that more money was deducted from their pay than was necessary and decided not to take a strike action again.
5. Some members actually gave up trying to correct the error after nine months of frustration.
6. Marsh, A., *op. cit.* (1979), p.119.
7. Goldthorpe, J.H., and Lockwood, D., *op. cit.*, 1963.
8. Bain, G.S., *op. cit.*, 1971.
9. Glegg, S., *op. cit.*, 1975.
10. Winchester, D., *op.cit.*, 1983.

APPENDIX 1

A SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  
IN THE  
WHITE-COLLAR CIVIL SERVICE

PILOT SURVEY

Middlesex Polytechnic  
Faculty of Business Studies and Management  
The Burroughs  
London NW4 4BT

CIVIL SERVICE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: an independent survey

THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please complete this questionnaire as soon as you receive it and return it to MIDDLESEX POLYTECHNIC in the stamped addressed envelope provided. Before answering each question, please read all the alternative answers and the instructions. Most of the questions just ask you tick the box next to the answer that best fits your views. Remember, we want your own reactions to various industrial relations issues in recent years. We guarantee total confidentiality to all participants.

First, please give us some details about yourself that would help us analyse the results.

1a. What is your grade? .....

1b. Where do your work? .....

1c. How long have you worked there?

- (i) Under 1 year
- (ii) 1 - 2 years
- (iii) 2 - 5 years
- (iv) 5 - 10 years
- (v) 11 years or more

1d. What did you do before that .....

1e. Father's occupation .....

What work does (did) your father do?

- Blue-collar
- White-collar
- Don't know

1f. Do you work in New Technology area?

- Yes
- No

If you have answered Yes to question (1f.) please continue with question 1g; otherwise, continue from question 2a.

1g. Has your area of new technology recently undergone a change?

Yes (please elaborate):- .....

.....

.....

No



1h. Do you feel threatened by new technology?

Yes

No

2a. What is your sex?

MALE

FEMALE

2b. What is your age?

Under 21

21 - 30

31 - 40

41 - 55

56 - or over

3. Marital status (including family)

Single

Married

Divorced/Separated

Children

Under 12

12 or over

None

4a. Please indicate your category of dwelling

House

Flat

Room/Apartment

Other (Please specify)

4b. Which of the following commitments do you have:-

Hire purchase

Car maintenance

Life assurance

Alimony

Other (Please specify)

4c. Please indicate which wage bracket your total income (including overtime and income from other sources) puts you under:- 376

Pounds (net) per week  
Under 51

51 - 100

101 - 150

151 - 200

201 - 250

251 - 300

301 - 350

351 or over

5a. Which of these do you pay for your dwelling?

Rent

Mortgage

Other (Please specify)

5b. How many full time wage earners are there in your home?

One

More than one

Now, please answer the following questions about your Trade Union and related issues.

6. Do you hold any local union or Trade Union Side Whitley position?

Yes

No

If you have answered Yes to question 6. please continue with question 7a. onwards; otherwise, continue from question 8.

7a. Which position(s) do you hold?

Please tick appropriate box(es)

Branch Chairman/President

Branch Secretary

Branch Treasurer

Branch Committee member

Member of the Executive Committee

Headquarters staff

Member of TU Side (Office Whitley)

Other(s) (Please specify)

7b. Please answer the following questions about all or any of the pay campaigns listed.

- (i) How many new members did you recruit in your branch/area during these periods?
- (ii) How many members resigned from your branch/area?
- (iii) How much support did your members give:-
  - Took part in selective strike
  - A lot
  - Poor
  - None

1981	1982	1983
****	****	****
	****	****
	****	****
	****	****
	****	****

7c. How old is your branch?

- (i) Under 5 years
- (ii) 5 - 10 years
- (iii) 11 - 20 years
- (iv) 21 - 30 years
- (v) Over 40 years

Please tick appropriate box

7d. What is the geographical distribution of your membership ?

- (i) Within 1 mile
- (ii) Under 5 miles
- (iii) Under 10 miles
- (iv) Over 10 miles

Please tick appropriate box

8. Please give the following details about the union meetings you attended during the periods listed below:-

8a. Which meetings did you attend?

A.G.M.

Meeting before Conference -  
(Mandating meeting)

Other (Please specify) .....

1981/82	1982/83	1983/84

8b. If you missed any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for doing so:-

(Tick no more than three boxes for each you have missed)

	AGM	MANDATING MEETING	OTHER (specify)
They don't achieve anything			
not interested in subject of meeting			
meetings tend to be long and boring			
was not told meeting was being held			
domestic reasons			
leave/official duty			
difficult to travel to/ held at difficult time			
individual cannot influence decisions			
pressure of work			
no meeting was held			
other (please specify)			

8c. If you have left early from any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for doing so:-

	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84
had to go back to work			
had to attend to my private business			
got bored			
other (please specify)			

9. Please answer the following questions about strikes and overtime bans:-

9a. During the 1981 pay negotiations, at what stage were you prepared to accept the offer proposed by CSD/Treasury?

	1981
before the selective strike	
after two weeks of the strike	
half way through the strike	
offer was never acceptable to me	

9b. When a ballot was taken on the final offer, did you:-

	1981
vote for acceptance	
vote for rejection and escalation of industrial action	
abstain	

9c. If you voted for acceptance, please indicate your reason:-

	1981
the offer was good enough	
escalation of the dispute would be futile	
I could not afford further loss of earnings	
other (please specify)	

9d. If you voted for rejection, please indicate your reason:-

	1981
offer meant still lower living standards	
little more resistance would have forced a concession	
belief in the CCSU's ability to succeed	
other (please specify)	

9e. What was your reaction to the series of one day/half day all out strikes during the period:-

	1981
(i) agreed and took action	
(ii) agreed but did not take action	
(iii) disagreed but took action	
(iv) disagreed and took no action	

9f. If you have ticked box 9e (i) please indicate your reason:-

to maintain union solidarity

loyalty to my union

I must play my part

I believe in our cause (right to a living wage)

other (please specify)

9g. If you have ticked box 9e (ii) please indicate your reason:-

one day/half day strike would not influence the final outcome

most members at my branch did not come out

I could not afford the loss of pay

to avoid disciplinary action of my employers

other (please specify)

9h. If you have ticked box 9e (iv) please indicate your reason:-

claims were not justifiable in the economic circumstances

I do not believe in strikes

other (please specify)

10a. If an all-out indefinite strike were called by CCSU and endorsed by your union in support of pay claim 1981, 1982 or 1983 would you have:-

	1981	1982	1983
(i) stayed out indefinitely _____			
(ii) come out for a week or two then return to work _____			
(iii) ignored the strike call _____			

10b. If you have ticked boxes in 10a (iii) please indicate your reason:-

I do not believe in strikes

I cannot afford to go on strike

strike would conflict with my job

I do not believe in the union's cause

11a. When the unions called a ban on overtime for an indefinite period, did you:-

	1981
(i) boycott overtime while the ban lasted_____	
(ii) boycott overtime for a short while_____	
(iii) ignore the ban altogether_____	

11b. If you have ticked box 11a (iii) please indicate your reason :-

- I could not do without overtime
- I considered the ban ineffective
- I did not agree with the union's cause
- my work would suffer
- other (please specify)

12. Now please give us your views about the issues listed below:-  
(Tick appropriate boxes for each issue)

(a) How important to you are these issues?				(b) How effectively does your union represent you on these issues?			
No opinion	Not very important	Fairly important	Very important	ISSUES	Well	Ade- quately	Poorly
				Pay			
				Hours/Holidays/Leave			
				Protecting jobs in your establishment and avoiding redundancy			
				Career prospects			
				Introduction of new technology			
				Improving service to the public			
				Working conditions			
				Individual personal problems, eg transfer, promotions etc			
				Ensuring job satisfaction			
				Disciplinary and grievance problems			
				Securing early retirement			

13. Have you in the past 12 months approached any of the following for help or advice on any topic?

13(a) If you have, how did you usually contact them?			13(b) In general, how helpful was their response?			
Telephone	Letter	Face to Face		Helpful	Adequate	Not helpful
			Branch Secretary			
			Member of Branch Committee			
			Member of Executive Committee			
			Anyone at your Union HQ			

13c. If you have not, what was your reason? (Please write in).....

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14. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the statements below by placing a tick in the appropriate box:-

	strongly agree	agree	un-certain	dis-agree	strongly disagree
Members of senior grades feel that union activities conflict with their role as managers					
Mergers between Civil Service unions are necessary to exert significant pressure on the employer					
It is inevitable that the number of people employed by the Civil Service will decline with the introduction of new technology					
The Civil Service unions are right to try and protect jobs by banning overtime					

Cont'd....



Cont'd....

	strongly agree	agree	un-certain	dis-agree	strongly disagree
On key issues most members are prepared to support their unions					
In the light of current unemployment the Civil Service unions policy of retirement at 60 should be reviewed					
Unless a satisfactory agreement on the introduction of new technology is reached, the unions should immediately start a policy of non cooperation					
If the Civil Service unions are unable to negotiate better pay it's no use continuing my membership					
Failure to secure better pay would seriously affect my attitude to work					
Bringing inflation down to a very low single figure is at present most important for the country's economic recovery					
In the interest of economic common sense the power of Trade Unions should be checked					
New tougher laws to severely restrain picketting should be brought in					
As much of Britain's Civil Service as possible should be privatised provided the price is right					

15. Finally, please indicate your views on the following aspects in your work place:-

	Very Good	Good	Fair	Bad	Very Bad
Management					
Pay					
Working Conditions					
Promotion Prospects					
Trade Union Facilities					
Union/Management Relations					

PLEASE DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM.  
BEFORE YOU POST IT BACK TO US IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED COULD YOU READ IT THROUGH TO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS.

Thank you very much for your help.

The Burroughs  
London  
NW4 4BT  
01-202 6545  
Telex 8954762

November 1985

## APPENDIX 1a

Dear Colleague,

With the permission of your HQ I distributed a pilot questionnaire late last year in connection with the research into 'The Industrial Attitudes of White Collar Civil Service Trade Unionists' which I am doing at the Middlesex Polytechnic. Since the completion of the pilot survey, the project has shown some promise and I have obtained further permission of your HQ to seek your co-operation in completing this main questionnaire.

The research focuses on the consequences of ending the pay comparability process in 1981 and examines the stability in the Civil Service which is particularly threatened by uncertainty over the issues of pay and employment security. The objectives are to develop further and follow up the areas initially explored in the pilot exercise, i.e. to analyse in a broader context the attitudes of Civil Service trade unionists, including their economic circumstances, work and union situations, etc., in order to approach their reactions to specific issues such as pay determination. The response of the group to their new environment will be of great importance in determining the future climate of industrial relations in the Service.

The questionnaire enclosed has been designed to be completed in no more than 15 minutes. The information you give will be treated with strict confidentiality.

If you would be kind enough to take a few minutes now to complete and return it to the Polytechnic, I would be grateful. A reply-paid envelope is provided.

Thanks for your co-operation.

Yours sincerely,

Bede Achike,  
Research Student.

Enc.

**A SURVEY OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS  
IN THE  
WHITE-COLLAR CIVIL SERVICE**

**Middlesex Polytechnic  
Faculty of Business Studies and Management  
The Burroughs  
London NW4 4BT**



1h. Marital status

Single

1

Married

2

Divorced/Separated

3

1i Family:-

(i) How many children under 18 have you?

(16)

One

1

two

2

three or more

3

none

4

(ii) How many children have you over 18 and still your responsibility?

(17)

One

1

two

2

three or more

3

none

4

1j. Please indicate your level of academic/professional qualification :-  
[TICK ONLY THE HIGHEST ATTAINED]

(18)

None

1

GCE "O" [1-5

2

Level [6 or more

3

GCE "A" [1-3

4

Level [4 or more

5

HNC/HND

6

LLB/LLM

7

BA., B.Sc. etc.

8

POSTGRADUATE DIPLOMA

9

MA., M.Sc., MBA. etc.

1

Ph.D

2

Professional qualifications

(19)

(Specify)

(20)

2a. Please indicate your category of dwelling

(21)

- House  1
- Self-contained flat  2
- Room e.g. bed-sitter  3
- Other (Please specify)  4

2b. Which of these do you pay for your dwelling?

(22)

- Rent  1
- Mortgage  2
- Other (Please specify)  3

2c. Please indicate the extent of your monthly commitment in the following categories:- (Tick appropriate boxes)

	Under £100	Over £100	None
Hire purchase (including car purchase)			
Car maintenance			
Life assurance (other than mortgage linked)			
Alimony			
Credit Cards			
Bank Loans/Overdrafts			
Other (Please specify)			

(23)

(25)

(27)

(29)

3a. Please indicate which wage bracket your total income (including overtime and income from other sources) puts you under [Respondent's income only].

(30)

- Pounds (net) per week
- Under 51  1
- 51 - 100  2
- 101 - 150  3
- 151 - 200  4
- 201 - 250  5
- 251 - 300  6
- 301 - 350  7
- 351 or over  8

3b. How many full/part time wage earners are there in your home?

Full-time

(31)

Part-time

(32)

One

1

One

1

More than one

2

More than one

2

4. Please answer the following questions about your work:

4a. Has any area of your work been affected by the introduction of computerised methods within the last 3 years?

(33)

Yes  1

No  2

If you have answered yes to question 4a please continue with questions 4b and 4c; otherwise, continue from question 5.

4b. Please state approximately when these were introduced and describe briefly how your work has been affected.

---



---

(continue on a separate sheet if necessary).

4c. Please indicate the ways you consider your job has been modified by the computerisation:-

(34)

Made harder

Made easier

Become more interesting

(36)

Become less interesting

More responsibility

(38)

Less responsibility

No difference

(40)

5. Now, please answer the following questions about your Trade Union and related issues.

5a State the name of your union and the year you joined:

Name \_\_\_\_\_ (41) Year \_\_\_\_\_

(42)

5b Why did you join your union?

(Please write your answer here: continue on a separate sheet if necessary)

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5c How important to you is your belonging to your union? [TICK ONLY ONE BOX] (43)

Very important .....  1

Quite important .....  2

Moderately important .....  3

Not very important .....  4

No opinion .....  5

5d In your opinion, does your union satisfy your expectations in terms of the reason(s) you have given in question 5b above? (44)

Yes .....  1 (Go to question 6a)

No .....  2 (State your reason(s) in 5e below)

Don't know .....  3 (Go to question 6a)

5e If your answer to question 5d is "No" please state your reason(s):-

---



---



---

Continue on a separate sheet if necessary

6a Have the problems and outcome of the pay negotiations of the last 5 years affected your reason for remaining a member of your union? (45)

Yes .....  1 (Please answer question 6b)

No .....  2 (Go to question 7) (46)

Don't Know .....  3 (46)

6b In what way? (Please write your answer here).

---



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---

7. Do you hold any local union or Trade Union Side Whitley position? (47)

Yes  1

No  2

If you have answered Yes to question 7. please continue with question 8 onwards; otherwise, continue from question 13.



8. Which position(s) do you hold? appropriate box(es)
- Branch Chairman/President \_\_\_\_\_  (48)
  - Branch Secretary \_\_\_\_\_
  - Branch Treasurer \_\_\_\_\_  (50)
  - Branch Committee member \_\_\_\_\_
  - Member of your Group/Section Executive Committee \_\_\_\_\_  (52)
  - Member of TU Side (Office Whitley) \_\_\_\_\_
  - Other(s) (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_ (54)

Questions 9-11 Branch Secretaries only

9. Please answer the following questions about all or any of the pay campaigns listed.  
(Branch Secs. only)

- (i) How many new members did you recruit in your branch/area during these periods?
- (ii) How many members resigned from your branch/area
- (iii) How much support did your members give:-
  - A lot
  - Poor
  - None

PAY CAMPAIGN

1981	1982	1983
****	****	****

(55)-(60)  
(61)-(66)  
(67)  
(69)

10. How old is your branch?  
(Branch Secs. only)

- (i) Under 5 years
- (ii) 5 - 10 years
- (iii) 11 - 20 years
- (iv) Over 20 years

Please tick appropriate box

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

(70)

11. What is the geographical (workplace) distribution of (Branch) your membership?

Please tick appropriate box

(71)

Secs. only)

- (i) Within 1 mile
- (ii) Under 5 miles
- (iii) Under 10 miles
- (iv) Over 10 miles

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

(80 Card 1)

12. Please give the following details about the union meetings you attended during the periods listed below:-

12a Which meetings did you attend?

	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	
A.G.M. _____				(1)-(3)
Meeting before Conference - (Mandating meeting) _____				(4)-(6)
Other (Please specify) _____				(7)-(9)

12b If you missed any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for doing so:-

(Tick no more than three boxes for each you have missed)

	(10)-(14)	(15)-(19)	(20)-(24)
	AGM	MANDATING MEETING	SPECIAL MEETING
They don't achieve anything			
not interested in subject of meeting			
meetings tend to be long and boring			
was not told meeting was being held			
domestic reasons			
leave/official duty			
difficult to travel to/ held at difficult time			
individual cannot influence decisions			
pressure of work			
no meeting was held			
other (please specify)			

12c If you have left early from any of these meetings, please give your main reasons for doing so:-

	1981/82	1982/83	1983/84	
had to go back to work				(25)-(27)
had to attend to my private business				(28)-(30)
got bored				(31)-(33)
other (please specify)				(34)-(36)

Please answer the following questions about strikes and overtime bans if you were a member of a Civil Service White Collar Union in the year(s) mentioned below:-

13a During the 1981 pay negotiations, at what stage were you prepared to accept the offer proposed by CSD/Treasury?

	1981	
before the selective strike		1
after two weeks of the strike		2
half way through the strike		3
offer was never acceptable to me		4

13b When a ballot was taken on the final offer, what did you do?

	1981	
vote for acceptance		1
vote for rejection and escalation of industrial action		2
abstain		3

14. Referring to the following scale please indicate in the box against each reason in questions 14a, 14b, 14c, 16a, 16b, 16c, 16d, 18 & 19b, how important you felt the reason to be in your decision:-

- 5..... Very important
- 4..... Quite important
- 3..... Moderately important
- 2..... Not very important
- 1..... No influence

eg., in question 14a, if you felt your most important reason for accepting the offer was that you could not afford further loss of earnings, put 5 in box(c); if you felt your next reason, in your order of importance, was that the offer was good enough, put 4 in box(a) etc....

14a If you voted for acceptance, please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the above scale:-

	1981	
the offer was good enough		(a) (39)
escalation of the dispute would be futile		(b) (41)
I could not afford further loss of earnings		(c) (41)
other (please specify)		(d)

14b If you voted for rejection, please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the above scale:-

	1981	
felt the offer meant still lower living standards		(a) (45)
a little more resistance would have forced a concession		(b) (45)
belief in the CCSU's* ability to succeed		(c) (45)
other (please specify)		(d)

14c. If you abstained, please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the above scale:-

	1981	
I felt the offer would not improve anyway		(a) (47)
I was fed up with the CCSU		(b) (49)
I was fed up with the employer		(c) (49)
I couldn't care less		(d)

15. What was your reaction to the series of one half day official all out strikes during the period:-

	1981	
(i) agreed and took action		(51)
(ii) agreed but did not take action		
(iii) disagreed but took action		(53)
(iv) disagreed and took no action		

\*Council of Civil Service Unions

16a. If you have ticked box 15 (i) please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-

to maintain union solidarity		(a)	(65)
loyalty to my branch		(b)	
I must play my part		(c)	(57)
I believe in our cause (right to a living wage)		(d)	
other (please specify)		(e)	(59)

16b. If you have ticked box 15 (ii) please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-

one day/half day strike would not influence the final outcome		(a)	(60)
most members at my branch did not come out		(b)	
I could not afford the loss of pay		(c)	(62)
to avoid disciplinary action of my employers		(d)	
other (please specify)		(e)	(64)

16c. If you have ticked box 15 (iii) please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-

to maintain union solidarity		(a)	
loyalty to my branch		(b)	(66)
I was under pressure to conform		(c)	
other (please specify)		(d)	(68)

16d. If you have ticked box 15 (iv) please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-

claims were not justifiable in the economic circumstances		(a)	
I do not believe in strikes		(b)	(70)
other (please specify)		(c)	

17. If an all-out indefinite strike were called by CCSU and endorsed by your union in support of pay claim 1981, 1982 or 1983 what would you have done?

	1981	1982	1983	
(i) stay out indefinitely				(1)-(3)
(ii) come out for a week or two then return to work				(4)-(6)
(iii) ignore the strike call				(7)-(9)

18. If you have ticked boxes in 17 (iii) please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-

I do not believe in strikes		(a) (10)
I cannot afford to go on strike		(b)
Strike would conflict with my job		(c) (12)
I do not believe in the union's cause		(d)
Members would not support the strike		(e) (14)

19a. When the unions called a ban on overtime for an indefinite period, what did you do?

	1981	
(i) boycott overtime while the ban lasted		1 (15)
(ii) boycott overtime for a short while		2
(iii) ignore the ban altogether		3

19b. If you have ticked box 19a (iii) please indicate the strength of your reason with reference to the scale in question 14:-

I could not do without overtime		(a) (16)
I considered the ban ineffective		(b)
I did not agree with the union's cause		(c) (18)
my work would suffer		(d)
other (please specify)		(e) (20)

20a Please indicate, by ticking one box below, your view on the value of resort by the CCSU to arbitration on pay matters:

(21)

- Very valuable .....  1
- Quite valuable .....  2
- Some value .....  3
- Little value .....  4
- No value .....  5

20b Comment on the view express above:-

---



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21a Now please give us your views on the issues listed below:-  
(Tick appropriate boxes for each issue)

(a)  
How important to you are these issues?

(b)  
How effectively does your union represent you on these issues?

	Not very important	Fairly important	Very important	ISSUES	Well	Ade- quately	Poorly	
(22)				Pay				(34)
				Hours/Holidays/Leave				
(24)				Protecting jobs in your establishment and avoiding redundancy				(36)
				Career prospects				
(26)				Introduction of new technology				(38)
				Defending job security				
(28)				Working conditions				(40)
				Individual personal problems, eg transfer, promotions etc				

Continued

(a)  
How important to you are these issues?

(b)  
How effectively does your union represent you on these issues? 398

	Not very important	Fairly important	Very important	ISSUES	Well	Ade- quately	Poorly
(30)				Ensuring job satisfaction			(42)
				Disciplinary and grievance problems			
(32)				Securing early retirement			(44)
				Overall pension entitlement			

21b Please indicate your views on the following aspects in your work place:-

	Very Good	Good	Fair	Bad	Very Bad	
Management						(46)
Pay						
Working conditions						(48)
Promotion prospects						
Trade Union facilities						(50)
Union/Management relations						

22. Relation between the CSD as employer and the Civil Service Unions has been less than satisfactory in recent years. This question is to assess the degree of passiveness or militancy on the part of individual members in view of the employer's tough stance. Since absolute confidentiality is guaranteed, please answer this question regardless of what is politic. What we need here is your own personal reaction. You may tick up to seven boxes but if you tick box 8, boxes 1-7 will not apply.

Due to your union's inability to negotiate successfully with your employer (including, where applicable, negotiations at branch level), which of the following personal actions have you taken?

1. Work to rule	_____		(52)
2. Overtime ban	_____		
3. Sabotage	_____		(54)
4. Sick absences	_____		
5. Work with less or no enthusiasm	_____		(56)
6. Lateness	_____		
7. Actively looking for another job	_____		(58)
8. No action at all	_____		



23. The following questions relate to your accidents at work and associated absences.

23a Please indicate how many accidents you have had in the past 5 years:

	Accident involving personal injury	Accident without personal injury	
(i) None			(60)
(ii) 1-9			
(iii) 10 and over			(62)

23b Please indicate the duration of absence (in total) necessitated by the injuries listed above: (63)

- (i) None  1
- (ii) 1-7 days  2
- (iii) 8-14 days  3
- (iv) 3-6 weeks  4
- (v) Over 6 weeks  5

24. Please indicate your agreement or disagreement with each of the statements below by placing a tick in the appropriate box:-

	strongly agree	agree	un-certain	dis-agree	strongly disagree	
Members of senior grades feel that union activities conflict with their role as managers						(64)
Mergers between Civil Service unions are necessary to exert significant pressure on the employer						
It is inevitable that the number of people employed by the Civil Service will decline with the introduction of new technology						(66)
The Civil Service unions are right to try and protect jobs by banning overtime						
On key issues most members are prepared to support their unions						(68)
In the light of current unemployment the Civil Service unions policy of retirement at 60 should be reviewed						

	strongly agree	agree	un-certain	dis-agree	strongly disagree	
Unless a satisfactory agreement on the introduction of new technology is reached, the unions should immediately start a policy of non co-operation						(70)
If the Civil Service unions are unable to negotiate better pay it's no use continuing my membership						
Failure to secure better pay would seriously affect my attitude to work						(72)
Bringing inflation down to a very low single figure is at present most important for the country's economic recovery						
In the interest of economic common sense the power of Trade Unions should be checked						(74)
New tougher laws to severely restrain picketing should be brought in						
As much of Britain's Civil Service as possible should be privatised.						(76)

25. Finally please give us your views on the G.C.HQ issues.

25a. Are you in favour of the decision to abolish trade unions at G.C.HQ? (77)

Yes

 1

No

 2

Don't know

 3

25b. If you have answered 'No' to question 25a please answer this final question:-

Assuming a ballot in favour of an all out strike, would you come out in support of your GCHQ colleagues? (78)

Yes

 1

No

 2

Don't know

 3

(Card 3 80)

PLEASE DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM.

BEFORE YOU POST IT BACK TO US IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED COULD YOU READ IT THROUGH TO MAKE SURE YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS.

Thank you very much for your help.

$\chi^2$  TEST FOR DATA ON TABLES 27, 27b AND 27d  
INFLUENCE OF FAMILY COMMITMENT ON DECISION TO STRIKE

Strike Decision	Single	Married	Divorced	Total
Took action (1+3)	101	260	42	403
Took no action (2+4)	11	41	7	59
Total	112	301	49	462

$$\chi^2 = \sum \frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$$

O	E	O - E	(O - E) <sup>2</sup>	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
101	97.7	3.3	10.9	0.11
260	262.6	-2.6	6.7	0.03
42	42.7	-0.7	0.5	0.01
11	14.3	-3.3	10.9	0.76
41	38.4	2.6	6.7	0.17
7	6.3	0.7	0.5	0.08
				$\chi^2 = 1.16$

Number of degrees of freedom:  $n = (c-1)(r-1) = 2 \times 1 = 2$ .

The value of  $\chi^2$  in this case is 1.16. With 2 degrees of freedom, the value of chi-square at 5 per cent level = 5.99. Therefore, it would seem that there was no significant difference between the three groups as far as decision to strike was concerned. Family commitment had no influence on their decision to take strike action.

APPENDIX 3  
 $\chi^2$  TEST FOR DATA ON TABLE 36c  
IMPORTANCE OF JOB PROTECTION AND REDUNDANCY ISSUES

Views	Lower Grades	Higher Grades	TOTAL
Not very important	5	20	25
Fairly important	49	46	95
Very important	233	131	364
Total	287	197	484

$$\chi^2 = \frac{\sum (O - E)^2}{E}$$

O	E	O - E	(O - E) <sup>2</sup>	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
5	14.8	-9.8	96.04	6.5
20	10.2	9.8	96.04	9.4
49	56.3	-7.3	53.30	0.9
46	38.7	7.3	53.30	1.4
233	215.8	17.2	259.84	1.2
131	148.2	-17.2	259.84	1.8
			$\chi^2 = 21.2$	

Number of degrees of freedom:  $n = (c-1)(r-1) = 2 \times 1 = 2$ .

The value of  $\chi^2$  in this instance is 21.2. At 5 per cent confidence level and 2 degrees of freedom, the value of chi-square is 5.99. This confirms that the greater sense of security among the higher grades was more than could be explained by chance. The difference in the sense of security between the two groups was quite significant.

$\chi^2$  TEST FOR DATA ON TABLE 63 STATEMENT 8:  
IF THE CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS ARE UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE BETTER  
PAY, IT'S NO USE CONTINUING MY MEMBERSHIP

	<u>Lower Grades</u>	<u>Higher Grades</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Agreed	18	13	31
Disagreed	257	178	435
Totals	275	191	466

$$\chi^2 = \frac{\sum (O - E)^2}{E}$$

O	E	O - E	(O - E) <sup>2</sup>	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
18	18.3	-0.3	0.9	0.06
13	12.7	0.3	0.9	0.07
257	256.7	0.3	0.9	0.003
178	178.3	0.3	0.9	0.005
				$\chi^2 = 0.128$

Number of degrees of freedom:  $n = (c-1)(r-1) = 1$

The value of  $\chi^2$  is 0.128 and there is 1 degree of freedom. The value of chi-square at the 5 per cent level where  $n=1$  is 3.84. Result of the chi-squared test therefore, indicates that there is no significant difference between the views of both grades on the issue and corroborates the finding.

# COUNCIL OF CIVIL SERVICE UNIONS

## APPENDIX 5

# 1983 PAY CLAIM

## Supporting Evidence

February 1983

PART 1INTRODUCTION

- 1.1 As indicated in our letter dated 11 January 1983, the prime objectives of the Council's claim are threefold; first, to begin the process of reversing the decline since 1980 in the living standards and relative pay levels of all civil servants; second, to alleviate the particularly adverse effects of this deterioration in Civil Service pay on lower paid civil servants; and third, to reduce the working week. This memorandum is concerned with the first two objectives and a separate paper will be produced on the third.
- 1.2 The starting point for the Council's evidence on pay is the 1980 pay settlement; i.e. the last time rates were set by comparison with outside pay levels. In taking 1980 as the baseline for our evidence, we have assumed that the 1980 Civil Service rates, with the exception of those settled by administrative action, were generally set at the correct level, in that civil servants were neither over nor under paid in comparison to their outside counterparts. In making this assumption, we are supported by the conclusions of the Megaw Inquiry into Civil Service pay, which, after considering the detailed statistical evidence contained within two separate, commissioned research papers, determined that, during the lifetime of Pay Research (1956 to 1980), movements in Civil Service earnings kept broadly in line with movements in private sector earnings (CMND 8590, paragraphs 49 to 55). The detailed evidence on these aspects is in Part 2, paragraphs 2.1 to 2.3.
- 1.3 However, since 1980, an examination of movements in various price and pay indicators shows a rapid deterioration in the living standards and relative pay position of civil servants. Between 1980 and 1982, prices rose on average by 24.3 per cent, and earnings rose by 26.5 to 31.7 per cent, depending upon the particular measure used. During the same period, Civil Service pay rose by only 13.8 per cent. Taking account of projected measurements and in order to restore fully the 1980 pay position of civil servants, we would be justified therefore in claiming

up to 25.6 per cent. Notwithstanding this, our aim in 1983 is only partially to restore the 1980 pay position. Part 2, paragraphs 2.4 to 2.16, amplifies the above and shows the detailed evidence substantiating these figures.

- 1.4 The decline in living standards of civil servants since 1980 has had a particularly harsh effect on the lower paid and current statistics and other sources make it clear that the effective rate of inflation has been substantially higher for those on lower incomes. For this reason, all the Civil Service unions have decided, within the general aim of restoring some of the decline in Civil Service pay since 1980, to give priority in the claim to the lower paid and to seek £12 a week for all those earning up to and including £6,264 p.a., as well as a minimum wage of £85 a week. Part 3 of this memorandum explains the case for the £12 a week basic increase and Part 4 details the case for the £85 a week minimum wage.
- 1.5 Making progress in restoring some of the deterioration during 1981 and 1982 in Civil Service pay does require that the 1983 Civil Service pay increase matches at the very least the rate of increase of outside earnings during the current 1982/83 pay round and takes account of the true inflation rate. In Part 5, we give our views on the current developments in pay and prices which are relevant to the achievement of this objective.
- 1.6 Finally, in Part 6, we draw attention to other factors relevant to the claim. First, we examine recruitment and retention (paragraphs 6.1 to 6.4) and we then turn to manpower and efficiency (paragraphs 6.5 to 6.8). We conclude this Part by drawing attention to the implications of the underspend (paragraphs 6.9 to 6.11).



In this section of our evidence, the Council will show that increases in Civil Service pay would be necessary on 1 April 1983 in order to fully restore Civil Service pay to its 1980 level, relative to external rates of pay and relative to prices.

### 2.1 External Comparisons

Although there has been no agreement on the recommendations of the Report of the Inquiry into Civil Service Pay and while the Treasury and the unions may have differences on the degree of importance to be attached to external comparisons, we note the Megaw Inquiry's conclusion that "the case for the use of comparisons in the collective bargaining process is therefore established" (CMND 8590, paragraph 113) and the Inquiry's subsequent recommendation that "comparisons should be used in the determination of Civil Service pay..." (Recommendation 93). Irrespective of what other factors either side may wish to bring into consideration, in our view a major factor in the negotiations on 1983 pay rates must therefore be external comparisons.

2.2 Ideally, the Council would have preferred to base its claim on up-to-date evidence of the levels of remuneration for comparable jobs outside the Civil Service. Such evidence has, however, been denied us since the suspension of the National Pay Agreement on 27 October 1980. Our approach has been therefore to take as the base for our claim the Civil Service rates set in April 1980 - this being the last time rates were set with reference to external comparisons, apart from those settled by administrative action - and to compare movements in Civil Service pay since 1980 with movements in indicators of outside pay over the same period.

2.3 In taking 1980 as the baseline for our evidence, we have assumed that the 1980 Civil Service rates generally reflected the middle or average rates paid to those in comparable employment outside the Civil Service. We are supported in this assumption by the Megaw Inquiry's conclusion - drawn from two independent, commissioned research papers - that over the twenty-five years

of its existence, the Pay Research system "operated ... in a way which succeeded in keeping Civil Service pay broadly in line with outside pay" (Paragraph 61). Specifically, the two research papers commissioned by Megaw suggested that from 1956 to 1980 earnings for male civil servants may have advanced by between half (Layard) and one percentage point (Elliott), relative to private sector earnings (paragraph 53). In addition, it is clear that the broadly comparable rates of pay arrived at in 1980 have since been seriously undermined by the very low level of settlements in 1981 and 1982, compared with the general level of settlements outside.

#### 2.4 Pay Movements 1980 - 1983

In presenting evidence of the decline since 1980 in the relative pay position of civil servants, we have proceeded as follows: First, using several different measures of outside pay, we assess actual movements in outside pay between 1980 and 1982. Second, by applying the latest available figure for the rate of annual increase in the Department of Employment's Index of Average Earnings to the actual outside pay movement shown for 1980 to 1982, we project a range of estimates for total outside pay movements between 1980 and 1983. Third, we compare our estimates of outside pay movements between 1980 and 1983 with actual Civil Service pay movements between 1980 and 1982, in order to calculate the increase in Civil Service pay required in 1983 to restore civil servants to their 1980 relative pay position.

#### 2.5 Average Earnings Index: all employees seasonally adjusted

The Department of Employment's monthly index of average earnings shows movements in total earnings - that is, basic pay plus overtime, bonuses, etc. - for manual and non-manual workers combined. Between April 1980 and April 1982, the average earnings index moved as follows:

Average Earnings Index

April 1980	175.1
April 1981	199.5
April 1982	219.8

Total increase Apr.1980 - Apr.1982 = 25.5%

2.6 New Earnings Survey

As we have noted above the Average Earnings Index covers manual and non-manual employees combined and does not allow any differentiation to be made between them. However, in April of each year, the Department of Employment carried out a more extensive survey of the make-up and distribution of earnings, breaking down the results into manual and non-manual categories. These results are published in the New Earnings Survey (NES). Between April 1980 and April 1982, total earnings for male and female white-collar workers increased as follows:

NES Non-Manual Average Gross Weekly Earnings

	<u>Male (£)</u>	<u>Female (£)</u>
April 1980	141.3	82.7
April 1981	163.1	96.7
April 1982	178.9	104.9

Total increase Apr.1980 - Apr.1982 = Male 26.6%  
Female 26.8%

2.7 Salary Surveys

In addition to the Government's own figures on pay movements, information can also be obtained from various independent salary surveys. We refer to three of the most reputable salary surveys.

The Reward Salary and Cost of Living Report is published every March and September to provide up-to-date facts on salaries and trends for professional and executive staff. The information is based on material provided by over 600 companies nationwide, representing a wide range of industry and company size.

Between 1980 and 1982, the Reward survey showed increases as follows:

	<u>Percentage increase</u>
March 1980-81	15.0
March 1981-82	11.2

Total increase from Mar.1980 - Mar.1982 = 27.9%

(b) British Institute of Management

In January of each year the British Institute of Management, in conjunction with Remuneration Economics Ltd., undertake a "National Management Salary Survey", which in 1982 for example covered 26,097 executives, drawn from 324 companies. Between 1980 and 1982, the BIM survey reports that total earnings for managers increased as follows:

BIM Survey of Executive Earnings

	<u>Percentage increase</u>
January 1980-81	17.3
January 1981-82	12.3

Total increase from Jan.1980 - Jan.1982 = 31.7%

(c) Inbucon Salary Survey

In July of each year, the Inbucon Salary Research Unit carried out a "Survey of executive salaries and fringe benefits".

In 1982 this survey covered 555 companies and 6,312 individual executives. 96 per cent of the companies and 97 per cent of the executives came from the private sector with a heavy bias towards manufacturing industry. Median total earnings of executives in the Inbucon Survey rose as follows:

Inbucon Survey of Executive Earnings

	<u>Percentage increase</u>
July 1980-81	13.1
July 1981-82	13.0

Total increase from July 1980 - July 1982 = 27.8%

(d) Institute of Administrative Management

The Institute publishes each year the results of its survey of "Office Salaries". Data is collected in March each year from over 600 companies, covering roughly 40,000 employees and represents one of the most comprehensive sources of information on salaries below management level. Data is presented for 8 grades of work (A - H), covered by the Institute's grading scheme. The figures below represent the average of the increases reported in the median for each grade:

	<u>Percentage increase</u>
March 1980-81	16.7
March 1981-82	8.4

Total increase Mar.1980 - Mar.1982 = 25.6%

- 2.8 From the evidence the Council has compiled, it is clear therefore that between 1980 and 1982 - when Civil Service pay rates rose on average by 13.8% - pay levels outside the Civil Service rose by between 26.5% and 31.7%, depending on the index used. In order to calculate the increase required in Civil

Service pay on 1 April 1983, we need to project forward to 1983 the various indicators of outside pay movements. To do this, we have used the latest estimate of the underlying trend in annual increases from the Department of Employment's Average Earnings Index - which shows 8.5% for November 1982. This procedure is followed for all indicators.

Pay Movements 1980 to 1983 (1980 = 100)

	<u>Actual</u>		<u>Projected</u>	
	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>(Projection factor)</u>
<u>Average Earnings</u>	100	125.5	136.2	(1.085)
<u>NES Non-Manual Earnings</u>				
Male	100	126.6	137.4	(1.085)
Female	100	126.8	137.6	(1.085)
<u>Reward</u>	100	127.9	138.8	(1.085)
<u>BIM</u>	100	131.7	142.9	(1.085)
<u>Inbucon</u>	100	127.8	138.7	(1.085)
<u>IAM</u>	100	126.5	137.3	(1.085)
<u>Civil Service</u>	100	113.8	-	-

- 2.9 From the projected pay movements for 1980 to 1983, it is then possible to calculate the percentage increase required in Civil Service pay on 1 April 1983, in order to restore the 1980 position relative to the various pay indicators.

Percentage Increase Required in Civil Service Pay on 1.4.83 to Restore 1980 Position Relative to:

<u>Average Earnings</u>	19.7
<u>NES Non-Manual Earnings</u>	
Male	20.7
Female	20.9
<u>Reward</u>	22.3
<u>BIM</u>	25.6
<u>Inbucon</u>	21.9
<u>IAM</u>	20.6

On this basis, the percentage increase required in Civil Service pay on 1 April 1983 in order to fully restore the 1980 relative position is in the range of 19.7% to 25.6%.

2.11 Real Value of Civil Service Pay

Comparing movements in prices and Civil Service pay rates since April 1980, it is clear that there has been a substantial decline in the real value of Civil Service pay rates, with a particularly harsh effect on the lower paid (see Part 3 below). This section, therefore, only relates to the general position indicated by the RPI.

2.12 Taking actual figures for the Department of Employment's Retail Price Index for 1980, 1981 and 1982 and projecting the RPI forward to 1983, using the latest (December 1982) rate of annual increase in the RPI, produces a projected increase in the RPI of 31.0%.

Retail Price Index

March 1980	252.2
March 1981	284.0
March 1982	313.4
March 1983	330.3 (estimated)

Total increase between 1980 and 1983 = 31.0%

Note: (i) The RPI for March is taken as it is the RPI operative at 1 April, the Civil Service pay settlement date.

(ii) The March 1983 RPI is projected by multiplying the March 1982 RPI of 313.4 by 1.054, representing the December 1982 annual rate of increase in the RPI.

2.13 Comparing the projected movement in the RPI of 31.0% between 1980 and 1983 and the actual aggregate Civil Service pay increase of 13.8% between 1980 and 1982, a rise of 15.1% in Civil Service

pay rates on 1 April 1983 is necessary to restore the real value of Civil Service pay to its 1980 position.

2.14 Whilst civil servants have suffered a dramatic decline in the real value of their pay, the same cannot be said for workers generally. Since the beginning of 1982, the trend has been for increases in average earnings to exceed the annual rate of inflation, as the table below makes very clear:

<u>1982</u>	<u>Annual Increase Average Earnings (underlying trend) (%)</u>	<u>Annual Increase in RPI (%)</u>
Jan	11	12
Feb	10.75	11
March	10.5	10
April	10.25	9
May	10.0	9
June	9.5	9
July	9.25	9
Aug	9.0	8
Sept	8.75	7
Oct	8.75	7
Nov	8.5	6

2.15 There can be no basis therefore for the last year at least to claim that workers generally have experienced a decline in the real value of their total earnings. The same is true for the overall period since 1980.

#### 2.16 Conclusion on External Comparisons and Real Pay

Between April 1980 and April 1983, Civil Service pay rates will have declined by between 19.7% and 25.6%, relative to outside pay levels. By 1 April 1983, notwithstanding any temporary drop in the inflation rate, the real value of Civil Service pay rates will have declined by 15.1% since April 1980.



In our view, this fully justifies our claim for substantial percentage increases, providing, in particular, 10% up to £9,758 p.a.

Introduction

- 3.1 There are several factors which have convinced all Council unions (not just those representing the lowest paid grades) that priority must be given to the lowest paid grades whose needs are particularly acute. That is why the Council's claim is designed to give proportionately greater increases for the lowest paid Civil Service grades.
- 3.2 Firstly, it is clear from official statistics and other sources that the effective rate of inflation in recent years has been substantially higher for those on lower incomes. The Council attaches considerable importance to the need to relate pay increases broadly to movements in the cost of living. Other factors are also important but pay increases must take into account the movements in the real value of wages and salaries. It follows that if the rate of inflation experienced by different income groups varies markedly, then the annual pay awards must take account of this fact and be structured accordingly. In the following paragraphs, we present evidence which demonstrates conclusively that the rate of inflation experienced by lower paid staff has been greater than the average indicated by the Retail Price Index and the Tax and Price Index. In common with the rest of the community, the widening of real differentials and the hardships involved, have created great feelings of resentment.
- 3.3 Secondly, we draw attention to the effect of percentage increases within the Civil Service and the compounding effect of changes in the tax and national insurance structures during the past few years. In the past two years, Civil Service pay settlements have yielded broadly similar percentage increases for the grades covered by these settlements. In addition, changes in the tax and national insurance structures have favoured the high-paid and have borne harshly on the lowest paid.

TABLE 1

Patterns of Expenditure - Variation With Household  
Income and Composition: 1980

Proportion of expenditure allocated to:

	(i)	(ii)	(iii)	(iv)	(v)	(vi)	(vii)	(viii)		
	House- ing	Fuel light and power	Food	Alcoholic drink and tobacco	Clothing and footwear	Household and other goods	Transport and vehicles	Services and miscell- aneous	Sub-total of groups (i), (ii) and (iii)	Total all perc gre
Households	15	5	23	8	8	15	15	11	43	100
Household income										
Households with income:										
the lowest 20%	23	11	28	6	6	11	5	10	62	100
the second 20%	18	8	25	8	7	14	11	9	51	100
the third 20%	15	6	24	8	8	14	15	10	45	100
the fourth 20%	14	5	23	8	8	15	16	11	42	100
the highest 20% of the income distribution	13	4	20	7	9	16	17	14	37	100

Source: 1980 F.E.S. (Table J)

3.4 Thirdly, there is incontrovertible evidence that civil servants<sup>418</sup> as a group have suffered a relative decline in earnings since 1980. We have provided details of this in paragraphs 2.4 to 2.15 above. The Council does not and will not accept this development as a permanent shift in the relative pay position of civil servants; we are determined to restore our relative position to one more closely in line with the last occasion on which pay was determined by reference to comparable employees outside the Civil Service. The Council's claim, if accepted, will go some way towards restoring the relative pay position of all civil servants. But we think it right that priority in restoring relative earnings should be given to the lowest paid. What is a difficulty for all civil servants, represents real hardship for those on low wages.

### 3.5 Household Income and Patterns of Expenditure

Inflation can be experienced in different degrees at different income levels because expenditure patterns are known to vary with household income. So much is a matter of record and is charted annually in the Family Expenditure Survey produced by the Government Statistical Service. Table 1 below overleaf shows the variations in expenditure patterns revealed by the 1980 FES.

Low income households spend proportionately more on housing (mainly rented), fuel, light and power and food. Table 1 shows that compared to the average income household, half as much again is spent in proportion on these three items alone. Compared to the highest income groups, low income families spend almost twice as much in proportion on these three items. In addition, although low income households spend proportionately less on transport and vehicles, they are more dependent upon (and their budgets more sensitive to changes in the cost of) public transport.

### 3.6 Differential Inflation

Regular statistics from the Department of Employment clearly demonstrate that there have been marked and dramatic differences

in the rates of increase of the various elements of the Retail Price Index. Table 2 below illustrates the changes from 1 April 1980 up to 1 December 1982.

Table 2

Elements of Retail Price Index 1.4.80 - 1.1.83  
and Civil Service Pay

Category	Percentage Increase
Fuel and Light	64.0
Housing (of which, rents)	43.0 (85.5)
Services	32.6
RPI Average	29.1
Transport (of which Rail Fares)	27.6 (54.7)*
(Bus Fares)	38.3
Food	19.5
Civil Service Pay	13.8
Consumer Durables	11.0
Clothing	5.0

Source: Department of Employment

\* mid-January 1982 estimate

3.7 The implications of Tables 1 and 2 for low income households are obvious and stark. Taking a typical household as an example will illustrate the practical effects on household budgets. The following data shows elements of the spending pattern of a typical household in 1980 with an income of £70 - £80 a week (in the area of overlap between the Clerical Assistant scale and

the Clerical Office scale). The second column shows the percentage increase in the price of each category from 1.4.80 to 1.1.83. The third column shows the expenditure required to maintain the same standard of expenditure throughout this period.

Table 3

Increased Expenditure 1.4.80 - 1.1.83 for a Typical  
Low Income Household (Income £70 - £80 pw in 1980)

Category	1980 Expenditure	% Inc.	1.1.83 Expenditure	Diff.
Housing (rent)	£11.03	85.5	20.46	£9.43
Fuel Light and Power	6.25	64.0	10.25	£4.00
Food	19.19	19.5	22.93	£3.74
Transport	7.62	27.6	9.72	£2.10
(part total)	44. 09		63.36	£19.27

Table 3 shows that in order to meet increased costs on these staple items (not the whole household budget), an increase of £19.27 (net) was required over the period 1.4.80 - 1.1.83. This implies a need to increase gross income by approximately £30 a week in order to continue consumption of these staple commodities at the (already basic) levels of 1980.

- 3.8 The average low paid worker has not quite managed to keep pace with this explosion in the cost of basic goods and commodities. Over the period 1.4.80 to 1.12.82, the average worker increased his/her earnings by 34.3%. For a worker earning £75 a week in April 1980, earnings will have increased by approximately £26 up to 1 December 1982. A civil servant earning £75 a week in 1980, by contrast, has received approximately £10.50 a week gross

increase over the same period. Little more needs to be said about the impact on the living standards of a low paid civil servant. Although the above examples are hypothetical, they are far from unrealistic. Individual low paid civil servants may have fared better or worse, depending on personal circumstances. But for many of them, the above examples will be an accurate reflection of the struggle for financial survival over the last three years.

### 3.9 Reward Regional Surveys Data

A similar picture emerges from the regular data produced by Reward Regional Surveys Ltd., which allows comparison of the increased cost of living for households with varying incomes and lifestyles. (The Reward methodology was fully described in the Council's Arbitration Case in 1982 (Appendix 7).) Appendix 8 of the Council's Arbitration Case gave details of the income required to maintain the various "lifestyles" over the period 1980 -1982. Table 4 overleaf gives similar data for the period 1980 - 1983: an assumption is made about the annual rate of inflation for the year to May 1983 of 5.8% - the current annual rate of increase in the official TPI. (We have used the TPI to follow the Reward methodology)

3.10 Table 4 shows that in order to maintain May 1980 living standards, increases ranging from 24.7% (council tenant), through 19% (average lower income household), tapering down to roughly 10% (middle and high income households) will be necessary in May 1983 for civil servants. The data corroborates, inter alia, the example described in Table 3 and paragraphs 7 and 8.

### 3.11 The Low Paid Price Index (LPPI)

The Low Paid Price Index (LPPI) published jointly by CPSA and the Low Pay Unit is designed to measure the changes in the cost of living for a household whose income is around £90 per week in current terms. Although not an "official index", it is calculated using data supplied by the Department of Employment and weights derived from the GSS "Family Expenditure Survey".

Income Required To Maintain Living Standards (May 80 - May 83)

Standard	A	A1	A/A1 <sup>*</sup> (avg)	B1	B	C	D
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
<b>REQUIRED INCOME</b>							
(1) May 1980	5287	6663	(5860)	7608	9383	12160	15391
(2) May 1982	7093	8093	(7510)	9386	11239	14485	18305
(3) May 1983 (est)	7504	8562	(7946)	9930	11891	15325	19367
<b>INCREASE IN REQUIRED INCOME</b>							
(4) May 80 - May 83	2217	1899	(2086)	2322	2508	3165	3976
<b>INCREASE RECEIVED</b>							
(5) (13.8%)	730	919	(809)	1050	1294	1678	2124
<b>SHORTFALL</b> (i.e. increase required at May 83)							
(6) £ pa	1487	980	(1277)	1272	1214	1487	1852
(7) £ pw	28.49	18.77	(24.46)	24.37	23.26	28.49	35.33
(8) Base Salaries (1.4.82)	6017	7582	(6669)	8658	10677	13838	17515
(9) % increase required	24.7	12.9	(19.1)	14.7	11.4	10.7	10.6

Sources: 1980 - 82 Reward Regional Surveys Ltd.  
1983 Estimated annual increase of 5.8%

\* Weighted Average (A = weight of 3.5; A1 = weight of 2.5)

**Notes:**

- (1) and (2) The income required on the given dates to support the particular standards of living A to D.
- (3) The estimated income required to support the particular standards of living A to D assuming a 5.8 % increase from May 82 to May 83.
- (4) The difference between (3) and (1).
- (5) The average increases received by civil servants in 1981 and 1982.
- (6) and (7) The difference between (4) and (5) expressed in annual and weekly terms.
- (8) The required incomes at May 1980 enhanced by average value of the 1981 and 1982 Civil Service increases i.e. (1) plus (5).
- (9) The percentage increases required in 1983 to maintain 1980 living standards i.e. (6) as a % of (8).



The LPPI was fully described in the Council's Arbitration Case in 1982 (Appendix 5).

3.12 On the basis of the latest available figures, the LPPI shows an increase from 1.4.80 to 1.1.82 of 35.0% - against 29.1% shown by the official RPI and 29.9% shown by the RPI "re-weighted". The rate of inflation for the low paid is therefore indicated at between 5 and 6 per cent ahead of the rate indicated by the official RPI for average and higher income households. For the reasons explained in the 1982 Arbitration Case, the LPPI is likely to understate the difference in inflation experienced by those on low incomes.

### 3.13 Low Incomes and Fiscal Policy

The Low Paid Price Index takes no account of changes in fiscal policy, which inevitably affect living standards (i.e. there is no Low Paid "Tax and Price Index" to compare with the official TPI). In order to make a comparison with the movement in the TPI and with data from Reward Regional Surveys Ltd., some account has to be taken of the differential effects of recent fiscal policy on households and individuals at different income levels. These effects have been well documented by the Treasury and Civil Service Committee of the House of Commons using data supplied by the Treasury and Table 5 overleaf is based on this official information.

3.14 The most marked effect of fiscal policy on family income has been the shift in favour of the very well off. But even at lower levels, the family on 75% of average earnings has experienced an increase in tax and NI contributions, some 1.5 points greater than the family on average earnings and some 2.0 points greater than the family on twice average earnings.

### 3.15 Conclusion

The evidence from the Low Paid Price Index shows that the low paid have experienced a rate of inflation some 5 to 6% in excess of that indicated by the official Retail Price Index over the

Table 5

Proportion of Gross Family Income taken by Income tax and  
National Insurance (less Child Benefit) 1978/79 to 1982/83  
at Various Income Levels

	1979/80	1982/83	Diff.
<u>75% Average Earnings</u>			
Married Couple (no children)	24.18	27.08	+2.9%
Married Couple (2 children)	15.1	17.9	+2.6
<u>Average Earnings</u>			
Married Couple (no children)	28.0	29.9	+1.9
Married Couple (2 children)	21.2	23.1	+0.9
<u>2 x Average Earnings</u>			
Married Couple (no children)	31.6	32.4	+0.8
Married Couple (2 children)	28.0	29.0	+1.0
<u>5 x Average Earnings</u>			
Married Couple (no children)	50.9	44.9	-6.0
Married Couple (2 children)	49.2	43.5	-5.7

Source: HM Treasury (Appendix 6 to 5th Report of Treasury & Civil Service Committee HC (1980-81): Appendix 5 to 1st Report of T & CS Committee HC (1981-82): Hansard Written Answers 25.10.82 Cols 255-258)

3.15 reference period. Evidence on fiscal trends indicates that in recent years the lowest income groups have been adversely affected to the extent of a further 1.5 to 2% compared to average and higher income groups. Compared to average and higher income groups, low earners have therefore suffered a relative decline in the region of 6.5 to 8% in real disposable income.

3.16 Evidence from Reward Regional Surveys shows a very similar picture. Evidence from the Department of Employment (elements of RPI) and the Government Statistical Service (Family Expenditure Survey) helps us to understand the aggregate effects shown by LPP1 and Reward data. The Government and the Treasury, by their policies of strict cash limits on state industries (EFLs),

the "Gas Tax" and forced increases in rents via the Rate Support Grant are chiefly responsible for the adverse price trends experienced by the lower paid.

- 3.17 The Government, in its other role as employer, has sought (successfully) to restrain the increase in earnings of its employees below the average level of earnings growth across the whole economy. We provide clear evidence to show that this is the case.
- 3.18 There have been two clear differential trends in prices and earnings in recent years. Firstly, the low paid, in all sectors of the economy, have suffered a relative decline in living standards. Secondly, civil servants (as a whole) have suffered a relative decline in earnings. Low paid civil servants have experienced both these trends.
- 3.19 In the view of the Council, therefore, low paid civil servants must be given priority in negotiations over 1983 pay. The precise expression of that priority is a matter for judgement, taking into account the evidence available. We feel that the part of our claim providing for a basic increase of £12 a week is fully substantiated by the evidence presented above. If implemented, it would yield proportionately greater increases for the lowest paid and go some way towards restoring the relative earnings position of civil servants.

PART 4£85 MINIMUM WAGE

- 4.1 In our evidence to the Megaw Inquiry (Section H) we gave detailed arguments in support of action on low pay. The main arguments are two-fold. Firstly, that many rates of pay are so low in the Civil Service that they are insufficient to support even a small household. Individual choices are restricted: people do not have the choice to set up independent households, get married, have children etc: they are trapped by low pay.
- 4.2 Secondly, the relative value placed on certain types of work is too low. We believe that a minimum relationship should be established between low pay and average earnings. In the same way that Equal Pay for Women was a modification of the "market" - now fully accepted but pioneered in the Civil Service - Government should set an example by instituting a programme to set minimum standards in the Civil Service.

4.3 Relative Earnings

The Council of Europe, of which the UK is a member state, includes in its Social Charter Article 4 which inter alia requires member Governments

"to recognise the right of workers to a remuneration such as will give them and their families a decent standard of living".

The United Kingdom Government has agreed that this principle should apply in the UK.

- 4.4 Interpretation of the Articles of the Social Charter is the responsibility of a "Committee of Independent Experts" appointed by ministers from each member state. After considerable debate and research the Committee concluded in 1977 that the definition of a "decent standard of living" should be set at "a level of 68% of the national average wage".

- 4.5 The Committee also has the function of monitoring the compliance of member states with the provisions of the Charter. In its latest report (for 1978/79) the Committee noted of the UK practice: "Following the method established by the Committee, these salaries (examples from the DE New Earnings Survey) were below the 68% of the national average wage which seemed to be about £80 per week". The Committee went on to conclude that this position, "could not be considered in conformity to this provision of the Charter".
- 4.6 The various yardsticks which have been suggested as a minimum wage, including that of the Committee of Experts, are as follows:

68% of national average (men and women)	£92.76
two-thirds of average	90.94
lowest decile adult male earnings	89.70

Source: New Earnings Survey, April 1982

This data confirms that a minimum wage of around £90 per week (April 1982) is a reasonable measure of the requirement of the European Social Charter and closely conforms to other definitions which have been used in the UK. The Council believe that for reasons of cost and practical application progress towards this standard should be on a phased basis, as with the introduction of Equal Pay. As a first step we believe that a minimum wage of £85 per week (at age 18+) would enable the Government to demonstrate to the Council of Europe that it takes its commitment to the European Social Charter seriously and that it is not merely seeking to use the Charter to create an illusion of a fair wage policy.

#### "Needs" Criteria

- 4.7 The Government by its decisions on the level of family income support establishes a publicly recognised "poverty line" - the intention of the Social Security apparatus is to ensure

that incomes do not fall below these levels. The simplest of these indicators is the "qualifying level" for Family Incomes Supplement. Currently a family with two children receive FIS if their income is less than £91.50 per week (not including Child Benefit). Even where such families claim FIS (and 50% do not, for whatever reason), they are scarcely any better off than if they were receiving short-term Supplementary Benefit. Indeed, if their housing costs are greater than the average council rent and rates or work expenses exceed £5.50 per week, they could be worse off than an equivalent family on Supplementary Benefit.

- 4.8 It is simply not good enough to argue that individual needs are the province of the Social Security system. This "poverty trap" which can mean civil servants receiving less in net income than clients on the other side of the counter, is a function of three separate variables. The Supplementary Benefit Commission has summed up the problem as follows:

"The real solution seems to lie not in reducing benefit to these families but in a generous level of family support, a raising of tax thresholds for low wage earners and higher levels of earnings".

SBC Annual Report 1975

- 4.9 In recent years Governments have had a reasonable record on preserving the value of Child Benefit and raising tax thresholds. But at the same time this Government has deliberately sought to restrict the growth of incomes of its employees to below the rate of inflation. The result has been to push increasing numbers of civil servants into the poverty trap. The logic and coherence of these various policies is difficult to grasp.
- 4.10 We consider that the case for a minimum wage is undeniable. We believe that full-time, fully-trained adult staff should have the right to a "decent remuneration". We support the aims of the European Social Charter and specifically the aim of a minimum wage at not less than 68% of average earnings. As

a first step towards this target, there should be established in the Civil Service a minimum wage for all those aged 18 of over, of £85 per week.

PART 5      CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN PAY AND PRICES

Introduction

- 5.1 In the earlier part of this memorandum, we have drawn attention to both the real and the relative developments affecting Civil Service pay since the base-date of 1 April 1980. The Civil Service has fallen badly behind during this period, as the evidence in Part 2 demonstrates. In order to bring Civil Service pay into line, it is necessary to provide for the shortfall and to match the current pay movements. At present, we only have experience of rather less than half of the 1982/83 pay round. We have, therefore, to rely on forecasts for the remainder of this pay round. The Treasury's forecast (see paragraph 5.3 below) is, in our view, an underestimate. But Treasury forecasts have consistently underestimated what has turned out to be the case. We have, therefore, reviewed all the authoritative assessments to make an accurate forecast of current pay developments (paragraphs 5.3 to 5.15 below).
- 5.2 In paragraph 5.16, we review all the evidence on current trends in the cost-of-living.

(a) Forecasts of 1982/83 Earnings Increase

- 5.3 The Treasury's forecast for 1982/83 is that pay settlements will average between 5 to 5.5%, with average earnings rising by 6.5%. (Because of the impact of overtime, bonuses, shift allowances and the like, estimates of earnings increases are usually 1 to 2% higher than increases in pay rates.) Most other forecasts of earnings increases are however higher than the Treasury's. We are not surprised at this, for, as indicated above, Treasury forecasts in this area have been shown consistently to be underestimates.



- 5.4 The House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee is of the view that the Treasury's forecasts are optimistic. Independent advice given to the Committee has led them to forecast settlements averaging 7%, with total earnings growth of 9%. (Reported in The Guardian 17.11.82)
- 5.5 Industrial Relations Review and Report in a statement on the bargaining outlook for 1983 takes the view that the Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee's estimate is "much closer to reality". (Report No. 286, December 1982, p.3) Moreover the economic forecasts of the London Business School (LBS), the CBI and the National Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR) all project wages and salaries settlements higher than the Treasury's estimate of 5 to 5.5%.

Forecast Annual Increase in  
Wages and Salaries in 1983 (%)

LBS	6.9
CBI	6.2
NIESR	7.0

Source: Income Data Service Report 391 (December 1982) p. 27

- 5.6 These forecasts of increases in wages and salaries of between 6.2 and 7.0% are compatible with higher projected increases in earnings. The NIESR, for example, forecasts that average earnings will go up by 8.2% in 1982/83, as compared to the forecast rise in wages and salaries of 7.0% (IDS Report 391, December 1982, p. 27). Furthermore, IDS also point out that stockbrokers Laing and Cruickshank estimate that average earnings will rise by 8.3% in 1983, as compared to a rise in wages and salaries of 7.4%.

(b) Actual Earnings Increases so far in 1982/83

- 5.7 We rely on three sources of information on actual earnings increases recorded so far in the 1982/83 pay round. First, we examine the CBI Databank which is published monthly. Before we analyse the latest CBI pay figures, two points need to be stressed.

- 5.8 First, the CBI Databank is confined solely to manufacturing industry. It does not include other sectors of the economy such as banking, finance and insurance, where settlements in recent years have been higher than in manufacturing.
- 5.9 Second, the CBI Databank records the "estimated percentage increase in individual average earnings attributable to the settlement". It does not therefore take account of other sources of earnings such as incentive payments, bonuses, profit sharing schemes, or changed patterns of overtime working. The figures given in the CBI Databank thereby give an underestimate of the rise in total earnings.
- 5.10 The latest CBI Databank summary, issued on 19 January 1983, is reproduced below. It shows that since 1 August 1982, 64% of settlements in manufacturing industry have been in the range 5 to 8%, and 75% of settlements have been in the range 5 to 10%. The mean level of settlement since 1 August 1982 has been 6.2% (CBI Press Release 19.1.83).
- 5.11 Assuming that earnings increases are running about 1 to 2% higher than settlements on pay rates, then the CBI Databank figures are consistent with an increase in average earnings of between 7.2 and 8.2% in the 1982/83 pay round in manufacturing industry.

CBI Databank 19.1.83

Estimated Percentage Increase in  
Individual Average Earnings  
Attributable to Settlement

Proportion of  
Settlements (%)

Under 3	8.0	Mean level of settlement = 6.2
3-4	12.8	
5-6	37.6	
7-8	26.5	
9-10	11.1	
11-12	2.7	
Above 12	1.3	

(Source: CBI Press Release 19.1.83)

5.12 The Incomes Data Services (IDS) Pay Chart is also produced monthly. As with the CBI Databank some caution needs to be exercised in interpreting the figures contained within the IDS Pay Chart. First, unlike the CBI Databank the IDS Pay Chart does attempt to cover all sectors of the economy and is not therefore confined to manufacturing industry only. Second, the information given in the Pay Chart relates to the percentage increase awarded on the lowest adult rate. As with the CBI Databank the IDS Pay Chart does not therefore show increases in total earnings.


5.13 The latest IDS Pay Chart is reproduced overleaf. It shows that since August 1982 the vast majority of pay settlements have fallen within the 5 to 8% range, with an average base-rate increase of between 6 and 7%. Very few settlements have been below 5%. The IDS Pay Chart is therefore consistent with average earnings increases of between 7 and 9% in the 1982/83 pay round.

5.14 The Department of Employment Average Earnings Index (whole economy, seasonally adjusted) is published monthly, two months in arrears. The latest figures, issued on 19 January 1983, show that from November 1981 to November 1982 average earnings rose by 8.3%, with an underlying trend in earnings increases of 8.5%. (The underlying trend figure is a more trustworthy indicator as the actual year increase can be artificially raised or lowered because of delayed settlements and back-pay).

(c) Summary of Evidence on Earnings

5.15 Discounting the Treasury's own forecast, a fair and cautious summary of the evidence on actual earnings increases so far, combined with an assessment of various economic forecasts of the final outturn in earnings increases for the 1982/83 pay round, leads us to conclude that average earnings outside the Civil Service will rise by between 7 and 9% in the 1982/83

**PAY SETTLEMENTS CHART - Increases On Basic Rates By Month. April 1982 to March 1983**



Key: Industry settlements setting minimum rates ■

Settlements with further stages ★

Settlements setting effective rates ●

No of employees covered:  
 ● up to 500  
 ● 500 to 1000  
 ● 1000 to 5000  
 ● 5000 to 10000

Notes: 1. Percentage increases on the adult rate, net of consolidated existing supplements.

2. The month indicates the effective date of increases (first stage)

pay round. However, basic rates comprise a much higher proportion of total earnings for civil servants than is the case for workers outside the Service. For example, according to the 1982 New Earnings Survey, the proportion of total earnings provided by basic rates was as follows:

	<u>Percentage contribution to total earnings of basic rates</u>	
	<u>Civil Service</u> <u>Whitley Council</u>	<u>Whole</u> <u>Economy</u>
Male	95.3	85.7
Female	98.6	94.8

(Source: New Earnings Survey Tables 1,2 and 3)

Given the much greater weight of basic pay rates as a component of total earnings within the Civil Service, this means that in order for civil servants to enjoy a total increase in pay on 1 April 1983 in excess of the increase in average outside earnings during the current 1982/83 pay round, Civil Service pay rates will have to increase by more than 7 to 9%.

#### Movements in Prices

5.16 In the context of movements in the RPI, two important points need to be emphasised. First, although the Council accepts that it is likely that inflation will fall at the beginning of 1983 at around 5%, we do not accept this fall in the inflation rate as anything but a temporary phenomenon. In our view, the fall in the inflation rate will disappear as the effects of the recent devaluation in Sterling, as well as other factors, combine to push the RPI in an upward direction. Even before the recent devaluation in Sterling, the consensus of 21 separate economic forecasts, reported in the Financial Times on 6 January 1983, was that the rate of inflation would begin to rise after the Spring of 1983 to an average expected rate of 6.4% by the end of 1983. Bearing in mind that the authoritative London Business School has already suggested that the decline in Sterling (which may

well continue as a result of the fall in oil prices) will add 2 percentage points to the inflation rate this year (1983) and 3.5 percentage points to what it would have been in 1984 (reported in the Times 17.1.83). It is clear from this that the inflation rate by the end of 1983 may therefore rise to a level of around 8.5%.

## I Recruitment and Retention

- 6.1 The Council takes the view that the best guide to market forces is relative pay levels. Given sufficient information on relative pay levels, there would be little or no need to seek out other measures of the supply and demand for labour such as data on recruitment and retention.
- 6.2 In any case, as the Megaw Report recognised (paragraphs 208 to 211), the available data on recruitment is generally inadequate for the purposes of assessing trends in the supply and demand for labour inside and outside the Civil Service. It is worth emphasising that Megaw recommended that evidence needed to be collected from within and outside the Civil Service (Recommendation 29). According to Megaw, simply providing statistics on recruitment and retention within the Civil Service alone is not enough. As Megaw comments:

"It is difficult to perceive whether a recruitment problem of a high wastage rate is significant unless management and unions have a broad awareness of the experience of comparable employers of similar labour."

(paragraph 209)

- 6.3 In other words, recruitment and retention, in order to be a useful guide to market forces, has to be viewed relatively. However, as we have already noted, there are at present practical problems in obtaining properly comparable data on recruitment and retention. The Megaw Report, for example, points out that one of the main determinants of the number of applicants for a job is the method and cost of advertising (paragraph 210). In other words, if the Civil Service advertises much more widely and/or in a more costly fashion than other employers, then the number of applications for a job may be as much to do with the method of advertising as with the overall attraction of a job in the Civil Service.

6.4 Although at present little detailed information is available on recruitment and retention outside the Civil Service, what limited information there is, suggests that the experience of outside organisations is broadly similar to the Civil Service. For example, the 1982 British Institute of Management's "National Management Salary Survey" comments:

"Not surprisingly in the current economic climate, only 2.8% of organisations reported that they had experienced difficulties with retention.

"The number of companies reporting difficulty with recruitment was 9.6% compared with 12.8% in 1981 and 20% in previous years. The main source of these difficulties is, as in recent years, the need for specialised skills in potential recruits."

(p.62)

It is the Council's contention therefore that there can be no basis on recruitment and retention grounds for civil servants to continue to receive lower pay levels than their outside counterparts.

## II Manpower and Efficiency

6.5 Reference has been made to "improvements in general efficiency" (Mr Le Cheminant's letter of 23 December 1982). It is the view of the Council that the Government has extracted in full measure what any organisation could reasonably expect of its workforce in this respect. Regardless of what might happen in 1983/84, the developments of the last three to four years ought to be reflected in the employer's judgement of an appropriate pay increase.

6.6 In its response to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee (CMND 8616), the Government made substantial claims of improved efficiency in the Civil Service. The Council and



the Treasury may disagree as to whether all these developments are truly improvements in efficiency and effectiveness, but, what is undeniable is that civil servants in most Departments are under considerably increased pressure to carry out the workload, which has not reduced in commensurate terms.

- 6.7 Civil Service manpower has been cut over the life of this Government by 11 per cent - a greater proportionate reduction than in the economy as a whole. Taking the non-industrial Civil Service alone, the reduction in employment has been broadly the same as in the economy as a whole (8 / 8.5%). Yet in the rest of the economy, employees have, on average, increased their standard of living, whilst real rates of pay for civil servants have been cut savagely, as we have clearly demonstrated in Part 2 of this memorandum.
- 6.8 The Megaw Inquiry concluded that productivity bargaining as such should not be introduced in the non-industrial Civil Service: that is also our firm view. But Megaw recommended that civil servants should "have the opportunity to gain collective recognition for major improvements in efficiency". The Government is claiming major improvements in efficiency but, at the same time, it is forcing the pay of its employees ever lower relative to average earnings. To talk of "improvements in general efficiency" in the context of 1983/84 pay costs tends to beg the question. As a result of manpower and other policies in recent years, the work pressure on Civil Servants has increased substantially. Where is the recognition from the Government for these substantial changes?

### III Underspend

- 6.9 In order to meet the Council's claim, additional funds will need to be made available over and above the proposed cash limits. But the evidence of the operation of cash limits clearly shows that there is systematic underspending which has occurred in every year in which the cash limit system has operated.

The scale of the increased funds to meet the Council claim will be substantially less therefore than would be suggested by a crude costing of the claim.

6.10 For the last six years, underspending in the Civil Service on pay and general administrative expenses has averaged 4.9%. On an annual basis the figures are as follows:

<u>Overspend (+) or Underspend (-) %</u>	
1976/77	-5.2
1977/78	-5.4
1978/79	-3.6
1979/80	-4.2
1980/81	-3.9
1981/82	-7.1

Source: CMND 7295, 7681, 7983, 8437, 8615

- Notes: (i) The figures for underspend are calculated by comparing cash limit provisions for all rates which were controlled by the Civil Service Department prior to its reorganisation, with actual outturn figures provided by the Treasury.
- (ii) The figures exclude the Ministry of Defence, as the cash limit vote for MoD includes armed forces' pay as well as civilian pay.

6.11 The Council recognises that cash limits are made up of approximately 80% pay and 20% general administrative expenses and that the underspend may not be in equal proportion for each element. For example, we are aware that in October 1980, the Civil Service Department estimated that their then estimate of 4.5% underspend on pay and administrative expenses for 1979/80 broke down into 2% attributable to administrative expenses and 2.5% attributable to pay alone. Whilst this means that underspend on pay alone is likely to be less than the total 4.9% average figure for pay and administrative expenses combined, a substantial portion of the regularly occurring underspend must nevertheless be attributable to pay alone. If, for example, underspend on pay and general

administrative expenses were to follow the 1979/80 division <sup>441</sup>  
(45.4% administrative expenses, 55.5% pay), then the average  
underspend on pay alone over the last six financial years would  
be 2.7%.

## PART 7

## CONCLUSION

- 7.1 The evidence produced in this memorandum provides an overwhelming substantiation of the Council's claim. We have shown in Part 2 how Civil Service pay has declined since 1980, in both real and relative terms. In Parts 3 and 4, we have demonstrated the particularly harsh effects of the pay decline of price increases on the lower paid and provided a compelling case for a minimum wage. Part 5 has identified the current trends in pay and prices and in Part 6, we have adduced the other factors which we feel are relevant to "meaningful negotiations" in 1983.
- 7.2 In conclusion, we remind the Treasury of the following assurance from Mr Le Cheminant's letter of 23 December 1982:

"First, you asked us whether there would be room for genuine negotiations about pay with the CCSU next year. The answer is an unconditional yes. We intend the negotiations to be genuine and to conduct them with the aim of reaching an agreed settlement."

The evidence we have put forward provides the basis for genuine negotiations and, in our view, should lead to an early agreed settlement.

**PAY 1983**

APPENDIX 6

23rd February 1983

C.32/83

To : Section, Branch and Area Committee Secretaries  
(1 per Branch)

Dear Colleague,

PAY 1983 - SUPPORTING EVIDENCE (HOURS)

Please find attached one copy of the above document, which has now been formally submitted to the Treasury. It should be used as part of a speaker's brief for any discussions with Branch membership during the coming weeks.

Yours sincerely

GERRY GILLMAN

General Secretary

Encl.

Introduction:

- 1.1 The supporting evidence contained in the present memorandum concerns the Council's claim that there should be a reduction in net hours worked by civil servants in the provinces from 37 to 35 and by civil servants in London from 36 to 35\*. Much of this evidence can be considered as supplementing the evidence we presented when last claiming a reduction of hours in 1980. We would like the Official Side therefore to consider this memorandum in conjunction with the evidence presented in 1980.
  - 1.2 In Part 2 of this memorandum, we argue that when hours were last reduced, following the 1964 arbitration tribunal, the claim made by the National Staff Side was based on the trends which were then identifiable. We also present evidence on the movement that has taken place since the award.
  - 1.3 In Part 3, we provide evidence to show that there has been a significant trend towards a reduction in hours since the national engineering agreement in 1979. Since then, the majority of manual workers have benefitted from agreements reducing the normal working week by one or more hours. There is clear evidence that this response to the current high levels of unemployment and to the long-term trend of reduced employment opportunities caused by the introduction of new technology will continue in the future. There are examples of groups of workers who have already negotiated a second reduction in hours since 1979. Other groups who have not yet achieved a first reduction are
- \* In referring to 35 hours net, we wish to reserve the position of grades not conditioned to the current 36/37 hours, which will need to be dealt with separately but for whom we would want to claim a reduction of 1 hour in London and 2 hours elsewhere.

including a claim for shorter hours as a key element of negotiations in this year's pay round. We also examine the response of non-manual workers to the changes that have taken place. Although the evidence is less comprehensive than for manuals, it is clear that there have been movements in non-manual hours. A substantial number of agreements have been reached for non-manual workers to work 35 hours or less a week.

- 1.4 In Part 4, we explain why Official Side "full cost" estimates of a reduction in hours are misleading. First, we point out that the low level of enhancements to basic pay in the Civil Service means that the flow-through effect on earnings is very limited when compared to groups where shift and overtime working are more widespread. Second, we argue that the Official Side's costings overstate the effect on manpower of a reduction in hours. Even if their costings were correct, the Government itself has argued that there have been substantial improvements in productivity in recent years. We believe that these benefits should be shared by staff.
  
- 1.5 In conclusion, we argue that given the time which has elapsed since the 1964 arbitration award and the evidence of reduced hours in outside employment, it is time for the Official Side to respond positively and realistically to our claim for shorter hours.

1964 Arbitration Case

- 2.1 In compiling this claim, we have looked at the evidence presented to, and the award of, the Civil Service Arbitration Tribunal in 1964. The Staff Side claim for a reduction in hours was based upon the need for Civil Service office staff to share in the general movement towards a shorter working week. The Tribunal, after giving "careful consideration" to the submissions made on behalf of the two parties, made an award which reduced working hours. There is once again substantial evidence of a trend in hours reductions which has not been reflected in Civil Service conditions.
- 2.2 The Staff Side quoted Ministry of Labour statistics on large-scale reductions in hours of work which had taken place for industrial workers since 1956 and referred to figures by the Institute of Office Management which indicated that similar movements had taken place for non-manual workers. We said that "it would be quite unfair for the Civil Service to have to wait until the whole of outside employment had achieved a reduction of hours before it could secure any improvement". We also argued that staff should share in the benefits of improved productivity.
- 2.3 Since 1964 the trend towards reduced hours in outside employment has continued. In 1979 the Institute of Administrative Management (previously the Institute of Office Management) produced its latest report on hours for office staff. This showed that in 1978 54% of establishments were working less than 37 hours, a rise of 27% since 1963. Figures taken from IOM/IAM reports since 1961 are presented in the table below. (This table is reproduced from our 1980 evidence.) This clearly demonstrates the trend towards shorter hours in outside employment. It also illustrates that in 1978 35% of establishments were working less than 36 hours per week.

Hours of work of office staff 1961-1978Percentage of Establishments Working

<u>Hours</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1978</u>
Under 35	2 (2)	2 (2)	8 (8)	4 (4)
" 36	6 (8)	10 (12)	24 (32)	31 (35)
" 37	10 (18)	15 (27)	16 (48)	19 (54)
" 38	40 (58)	44 (71)	45 (93)	37 (91)
" 39	23 (81)	19 (90)	5 (98)	4 (95)
" 40	7 (88)	5 (95)		
40 and over	12 (100)	5 (100)	2 (100)	5 (100)

\* Cumulative totals in brackets  
(Source: IOM/IAM reports)

- 2.4 Our 1980 submission also pointed to the fact that PRU evidence for 1980 showed that the mode of outside settlements in the Clerical, Secretarial, Data Processing and Administrative (Middle and Higher) grades was 35 hours net per week. The major surveys showed that 35 hours or less were worked in 27% of outside organisations and less than 37 hours in 45%.
- 2.5 We would argue therefore both that the Staff Side's arguments on trends which were used in 1964 and the subsequent long-term movements in outside industry provide a basic case for hours improvement. In 1979 a major impetus was given to hours reduction by the engineering agreement to reduce hours from 40 to 39. In Part 3 we turn to more recent trends following that agreement.



Recent Movements in Hours of Work

- 3.1 In its 1980 submission the Council quoted from a recent IDS Report which stated that approximately 5 million manual workers were covered by agreements to shorten the working week. Most of those agreements had been reached in the one year that had elapsed since the engineering workers had, in September 1979, negotiated a one hour reduction in the working week.
- 3.2 The trend which we noted in 1980 has continued and the pace at which change has taken place has remained rapid. Estimates of the number of workers who have now been affected by agreements in the last four years to reduce working hours vary, but they range from 6½ million mentioned in the latest TUC progress report on the campaign for reduced working time (No. 9, January 1983) to 8½ million mentioned in a recent Industrial Relations Review and Report (IRRR 287, January 1983). It is estimated by the TUC that some two-thirds of the manual work-force have achieved reductions in hours in this period.
- 3.3 While the majority of the agreements reached to reduce working hours for manual workers have taken the form of a one hour reduction to 39 hours this is not generally seen as an established norm. In a report at the beginning of 1982 by the independent Incomes Data Services (IDS Report 368, January 1982) the following assessment was made:

"Our own view, based on discussions with a large number of employers during the past year, is that the 37½ hour week for manual workers will have become quite common by 1983. Few of the employers we have talked to on this subject view the 39 hour week as anything other than a transitional step".

In a study commissioned by the Department of Employment (Research Paper No. 38, Shorter Working Time Through National

Agreements) it was argued that, while no firm conclusions could be reached on future trends in hours, "one factor could be the expectations of management and unions about future developments. Here the survey's evidence was rather strong, since the great majority believed that further reductions were inevitable within the next five years, and many spoke of a trend towards a 35-hour-week".

3.4 In Annex A to this memorandum, we provide a list of settlements involving cuts in working hours agreed since October 1981, taken from a recent issue of Industrial Relations Review and Report (IRR 287, 11 January 1983). While most of the agreements are for cuts to 39 hours, a number show cuts below that level. The list however is not fully comprehensive. Many reductions for smaller firms are not reported to IRRR. The Department of Employment Research Paper (see above) found that:

" In the engineering industry, the proportion of establishments with hours below the 'norm' stipulated by their industry agreement appeared to have doubled between 1979 (when the norm was 40 hours) and 1981/82 (when the norm was 39 hours). At the time of the survey, those below the norm establishments constituted 22 per cent of the engineering sample".

Also some agreements for larger groups of workers are not recorded because they were reached before October 1981. Gas workers have had their hours reduced to 38 3/4, British Telecom engineers to 37 1/2, nurses to 37 1/2, electricity supply workers to 37 and day workers at British Nuclear Fuels to 37. On London Transport, both bus workers and underground workers have agreements to reduce their hours to 38.

3.5 An indication of the pace at which change in working hours is continuing is provided by the latest two fortnightly issues of IRRR (IRR 288 and 289). In the first of these, six agreements to reduce hours were reported, including a two hour reduction at ESSO to 38, a half-hour reduction at Shulton cosmetics to 35 1/2 and a 1 hour reduction for studio artists and related employees to 35.

A seventh agreement for Littlewoods Mail Order staff 449 involved a commitment to negotiate a reduction from the present 36½ hours in 1983. In the latest issue, a further six agreements to reduce hours are reported. They include a reduction from the current 39 hours to 38 hours at Boots and an examination of ways of bringing about a 2½ hour reduction (to 37½ hours) in the flour-milling industry.

- 3.6 Most of the available evidence on hours reduction relates to manual workers, but what evidence is available points to a response in non-manual areas of employment. We have already quoted from the study commissioned by the Department of Employment on working hours. In this it was decided to investigate the 'knock-on' effects from the national agreements on working hours for manual workers to local agreements on working hours for white collar staff. The conclusion was that:

"The survey in fact identified widespread reductions in the hours of white collar employees, most pronounced in the industry with the strongest white collar unions, engineering. There, no less than 36 per cent of establishments were granting shorter hours to their staff in 1981/82. There appears to be little room for doubt that reductions in hours are spreading to white collar groups, presumably to resist the reduction in differentials which the national industry agreements imply." (DE Research Paper No. 38)

- 3.7 Further evidence of the spread of shorter hours to non-manual workers has been collected by the Transport and General Workers Union. Annex B lists 200 firms which have agreed hours for general office staff of less than 37. The majority of these in fact involve agreement to work 35 hours or less. The list which was prepared in July 1981 was not, even at that time, claimed to be exhaustive. A separate study by the Labour Research Department at the end of the 1981/82 pay round (LRD Book of Wage Rates, Hours and

Holidays 1982) found that approximately one million non-manual workers out of a total of about 5 million included in the survey worked normal hours of 35 or less.

3.8 We have already drawn attention to the latest IAM figures (which relate to 1978) and the 1980 PRU evidence. These figures are corroborated by research done by the Hay organisation for the Megaw Inquiry. In paragraph 1.31 of their research study on Methods of Determining Pay (Cmd 8590-1 Volume 2), they say that normal working hours have fallen in the last few years and this is reflected in their figures reproduced below. The finance sector is a particularly significant competitor with the Civil Service for administrative and clerical staff.

TABLE 2: Hours of Work of Office Staff, 1981

	<u>% of organisations</u>	
	<u>Industrial &amp; Services</u>	<u>Financial</u>
Under 35	1	16
35	18	75
Between 35 and 37	15	5
37	14	-
37½	37	2
Between 37½ and 40	5	1
40	4	-
Over 40	6	1

Source: Inquiry into Civil Service Pay, Volume 2.

3.9 We believe that superimposed on long-term trends towards shorter hours for office staff there has been a recent rapid movement towards shorter hours in the economy generally. This started with the engineering agreement and had its initial impact on manual workers. There is now increasing evidence that non-manual workers are responding to this reduction in differentials. We would argue that this

situation represents a parallel to that which gave rise to the arbitration award in 1964 and that current non-manual agreements already support a reduction in hours for the non-industrial Civil Service.

PART 4The Cost of Introducing Shorter Hours

- 4.1 In evidence to the 1964 Arbitration Tribunal, it was the Staff Side's view "that hours of work and annual leave were separate factors in the conditions of service which needed to be looked at separately from time to time". It is still the Council's strongly held view that the costs of introducing the shorter working week should not be traded off against the cost of increases in rates of pay in any one year. We therefore reject the manner in which the Official Side presented costings of the Council's claim at the meeting to discuss pay on Friday, 11 February 1983. Having said this, we believe the "full-cost" estimates for the hours claim presented at that meeting were an exaggeration.
- 4.2 The cost of introducing a shorter working week can be divided into two parts - an earnings cost and a manpower cost. The first of these is a tangible cost which finds expression in an increase in the total earnings of the person whose hours have been reduced. The second is intangible and depends on the extent to which the reduction in hours offsets efficiency measures and the effects of the introduction of new technology.
- 4.3 The extent to which earnings are affected by changes in hours depends on how much of pay is made up of enhancements to basic pay. With a low level of enhancements, changes in the basic hourly rate consequent on a change in hours have little effect, whereas with a high level the effects can be quite significant. An examination of the ratio of enhancements to basic pay using figures from the 1982 New Earnings Survey shows that civil servants on average have a very low level of enhancements. The ratio of overtime, shift and bonus payments to basic pay is shown in Table 3.

Enhancements as a percentage of basic pay - April 1982

All full-time men	16.7%
full-time men - manual	31.3%
full-time men - non-manual	6.2%
Full-time men - Civil Service NWC	4.9%

(Source: NES 1982)

It is clear from these figures and the above argument that the tangible cost of reducing civil servants' hours would be negligible.

- 4.4 The less tangible cost relates to additional manpower. The question that has to be considered is how many additional staff the Government would take on if our claim was conceded. There are two points that the Council would like the Official Side to consider in this respect. The first is that the reductions in hours following the 1964 CSAT award had no noticeable effect on manpower trends. Between April 1964 and April 1966, which covers the period during which the changes took place, the number of non-industrial civil servants increased by 3.3%. This can be compared with an increase between April 1962 and April 1964, the period immediately preceding the reduction in hours, of 5.0%. These movements are represented in the diagram in Annex C taken from the 1971 issue of Civil Service statistics. In this, the years 1963 to 1966 appear as a lull in a period of growth in Civil Service numbers. Secondly, the Government's interpretation of last year's award on leave was that this did not lead to an increase in the cost of the overall award. Yet the qualitative effects on manpower of an increase in leave and a reduction in hours are the same.
- 4.5 The Council believes that a cost of 5% on the hours part of the claim is far in excess of the real cost of conceding the claim. However, even if the cost were as high as the Official Side claim, it would less than offset the reductions which have taken place

in manpower since 1979. Figures taken from 'Staff in Post' are 454 set out below.

	<u>Non Industrial</u>	<u>Total Industrial &amp; Non Industrial</u>
1.4.79	565,815	732,000
1.4.80	547,655	705,067
1.4.81	539,919	689,602
1.4.82	527,972	666,362
1.4.83	513,600 (estimated)	652,000 (estimated)

The reduction in non-industrial staff between 1979 and 1983 is 9.2%. This represents almost twice the number of jobs which would be created if the hours reduction were implemented on a "full-cost" basis.

4.6 Since the ending of pay research in 1980, outside gains in productivity have not been reflected in Civil Service conditions. At the same time, there have been substantial productivity gains, partly due to technological changes within the Service. Civil servants believe that they are entitled to share the benefits resulting from productivity with management and the public, in the same way as employees outside.



PART 5Conclusion

- 5.1 It is now nearly 20 years since Civil Service hours were reduced. During that time outside movements have continued downwards and we now consider that the evidence is sufficiently strong to warrant a reduction to 35 hours, both in London and outside.
- 5.2 The Official Side have attempted to put a crude cost to our claim. We reject both the arguments which lie behind full costing and the calculation itself. There is not likely to be a large effect on earnings; and past experience has not shown a full impact on manpower. On the other hand, the Civil Service has in recent years suffered manpower reductions which would more than cover any increased demand for manpower, even on the crude basis adopted by the Official Side.

## ANNEX A (Source: IRRR 287)

<b>Cuts in working hours agreed since October 1981</b>			
<b>Public sector</b>			
<b>Negotiating group</b>	<b>Operative date</b>	<b>Old and new basic hours</b>	<b>Additional comments</b>
Omnibus Industry - manuals (55,000) PABB 62	13 2 82	40-39	Subject to local negotiations
British Nuclear Fuels - shiftworkers (6500) PABB 61	1 3 82	40-38½	Defered from 1.1.82 40¾ hours gross a week including half hour paid breaks. New shift patterns, including extra rest days
United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority - manuals (4700) PABB 61	4.5 82	40-37	Brings manuals into line with non-industrial staff. Abolition of daily 20-minute tea break.
National Health Service - craft workers (7000) PABB 66	1.7 82	40-39	
British Broadcasting Corporation - manuals (5000) PABB 66	1.10 82	40-37	New 42-hour week with paid one-hour lunch breaks. Immediate large reduction preferred to a series of small ones
Local Authorities - manuals (1 039,000) PABB 58	1.11 82	40-39	
- building and craft workers (100,000) PABB 65	1.11 82	40-39	
- residential staff PABB 77	1.11 82	40-39	
Civil Service - industrials (140,000) PABB 72	1.1 83	40-39	
<b>Private sector industry agreements</b>			
Glass Container NJC - manuals (11,500) PABB 56	9 9 81	40-39	Workers on four, set, three shift system continue on current hours and are paid overtime for all weekly hours over 39
Exhibition industry - manuals (3500) PABB 51, PABB 71	5 10 81 2 4 84 5 1 87	38-37 37-36 36-35	One hour less and no tea-breaks on Wednesday One hour less on Tuesday One hour less on Monday
Lift industry - manuals (4500) PABB 59	1.11.81	40-39	In line with Engineering agreement
Plant hire industry - crane drivers (2000) PABB 58	2 11 81	40-39	In line with Construction industry agreement
Engineering construction NJC Travellers (30,000) PABB 50	2 11 81	40-39	New national agreement setting new standard working week

Negotiating group	Operative date	Old and new basic hours	Additional comments
Sheffield tool manufacture - manuals (4000) PABB 58	2 11 81	40-39	
Thermal insulation industry - craft and manual (6000) PABB 60	1 1 82	40-39	
Plumbing - Scotland - manuals (10,000)	22 2 82	38-37 1/2	
Plumbing JIB - E&W - manuals (30,000) PABB 60	28 3 82	38-37 1/2	Overtime premia only apply to hours worked in excess of 40 a week.
Independent Shipyards - manuals (3500) PABB 56	1 4 82	40-39	Follows 1981 commitment.
Graphic reproduction - craftworkers PABB 63	5 4 82	36-35	
Scrap metal industry JIC - manuals (10,000) PABB 72	3 5 82	40-39	Follows 1980 commitment
Independent Broadcasting Authority - staff and manuals (1300) PABB 73	5 7 82	36-35	Final move of cut from 40 hours in 1980, part of harmonisation policy
Cast stone and concrete NJIC - manuals (17,000) PABB 70	1 8 82	40-39	
Retail Food Wages Council - retail staff (520,000) PABB 60	4 10 82	40-39	Overtime premia only apply to hours worked in excess of 40 a week
Retail Non-food Wages Council - retail staff (560,000) PABB 60	4 10 82	40-39	Similar overtime provisions (In excisable liquor trade, hours cut from 42 to 40 as from 4 10 82, and 40 to 39 from 4 4 83)
Retail Multiple Shoe - retail staff (29,000) PABB 64	4 10 82	40-39	In line with Wages Councils
Button Manufacture - manuals (8000) PABB 53	4 10 82	40-39	
Road Passenger Transport NJIC - manuals (26,000) PABB 59 - craft workers PABB 63	1 11 82 1.11.82	40-39 40-39	Each day now 7 hrs 48 mins Local negotiations on implementation to include review of working practices
Private cemeteries - manuals PABB 72	4 11 82	40-39	In line with the rest of the industry
Refractories industry - manuals (6000) PABB 69	1 12 82	40-39	40-hour production targets to continue

Negotiating group	Operative date	Old and new basic hours	Additional comments
Leyland Vehicles - manuals (7500) PABB 52 - stall (800) PABB 56	1.11.81 1.11.81	40-39 37½-37	Abolition of washing up time at the end of each half shift ½-hour reduction for clerical staff see IR-RR 273
Bl Cars - manuals (60 000) PABB 53	1.11.81	40-39	Similar reductions for 40-hour staff
James Howden - manuals (500) PABB 52	1.11.81	40-39	
Davy Loewy - manuals PABB 55	1.11.81	40-39	
Jones & Shipman - manuals (800) PABB 57	1.11.81	40-39	
JH Fenner - manuals (420) PABB 58	1.11.81	40-39	
Solex - manuals PABB 72	1.11.81	40-39	
Ilford - process & craft PABB 57	1.11.81	40-39	
Thomas Cook - stall (3200) PABB 55	1.11.81	37½-37	
Vauxhall - manuals (15 500) PABB 61	23.11.81	40-39	Friday day shift cut by an hour and rest break eliminated Each of the four night shifts cut by 15 minutes
Burroughs Machines - manuals (550) PABB 57	5.12.81	40-39	Changes to working practices to improve flexibility
Rolls-Royce - Scotland - manuals (4500) PABB 58	Dec 1981 and Jan 1982	40-39	36 minutes off Friday afternoon and six minutes off Monday to Thursday
Baxters Butchers - manuals PABB 58	1.1.82	40-39	HGV drivers' guaranteed week cut from 50 to 49 hours
Renault - distribution workers (90) PABB 59	1.1.82	40-39	Shortened working hours on Friday
Toshiba - Plymouth - manuals (300) PABB 63	1.1.82	40-39	½ day off each month - normally Friday
Reed Decorative Products - manuals (1050) PABB 63	1.1.82	39-37½	Productivity changes including continuous machine running through meal breaks
Tank Leight - drivers (600) PABB 67	1.1.82	40-39	

Negotiating group	Operative date	Old and new basic hours	Additional comments
Motor vehicle retail and repair NJC - manuals (370,000) PABB 57	6.12.82	40-39	
Tin printing industry - manuals (2000) PABB 74	20.12.82 16.4.84	40-39 39-37½	Discussions on avoiding increased costs by improving productivity and efficiency.
Cutlery Trade - manuals (4500) PABB 61	1.1.83	40-39	
Environmental Engineering NJC - staff (30,000) PABB 58	1.1.83	37-36½	
Dairy Trade - manuals (90,000)	1.1.83	40-39	
Multiwall Sack manufacture - manuals (8000)	1.1.83	40-39	
Paper and Board manufacture - dayworkers (27,000)  - shiftworkers PABB 61	1.1.83	1823 hrs pa to 1775 hrs pa 1914 hrs pa to 1867 hrs pa	Adoption of annual hours system and changes to working practices.
Power Cable Jointers NJC - manuals (400) PABB 67	1.1.83	40-39	Subject to agreement to offset costs
Unlicensed Places of Refreshment WC - retail staff (130,000) PABB 65	3.1.83	40-39	
Retail Meat JIC - retail staff (40,000) PABB 64	4.4.83	40-39	
Surgical Dressing NJC - operatives (4000) PABB 72	9.5.83	40-39	
Paper Box Manufacture - manuals (8000)	June 1983	40-39	
<b>Individual companies</b>			
Glaxo Operations - manuals (7600) PABB 51	July 1981	40-39	See IR-RR 209
Wilkinson Transport - manuals (1350) PABB 53	27.7.81	40-36¾	
GEC Telecommunications - manuals (4900) PABB 62	30.10.81  --	40-39	½-hour off Thursday and Friday - abolition of Thursday and Friday tea breaks and clocking-on concessions

Negotiating group	Operative date	Old and new basic hours	Additional comments
Atlas Express - manuals PABB 72	1.1.82	45-42½	Guaranteed week cut from 45 to 42½ hours (40 hours basic plus 2½ hours overtime), with no loss of pay - subject to increased productivity and controlled tea-breaks.
Cadbury Typhoo - manuals (6000) PABB 51	4.1.82	40-39	
Cadbury Bournville - craft workers (300) PABB 70 - manuals (3700) PABB 64	4.1.82 25.4.82	40-39 40-39	
Grattan Warehouses - distribution and office staff (4000) PABB 74	11.1.82	37-36	Brought forward from June 1982.
Reckitt and Colman - manuals (900) PABB 57	5.4.82	39-38	Extra rostered day off every four weeks
Co-operative Wholesale Society - greengrocers PABB 70 - egg packers PABB 70	3.5.82 3.5.82	40-39 40-39	
Legal & General - weekly paid staff PABB 68	10.5.82	39-38	Overtime threshold for engineering staff cut from 40 to 41 hours a week
Ford - manuals (52 000) PABB 57, PABB 58	1.6.82	40-39	Similar reduction for work-related staff. But new 39-hour staff to be recruited on lower scales from 1.1.83
May & Baker - Dagenham - manuals (850)	1.7.82	40-37½	In line with staff hours. New shift arrangements. Similar move at Norwich plant
Granada - television engineers PABB 77	July 1982	40-39	
Uniroyal - manuals (570) PABB 65	23.7.82	40-39	
Talbot - manuals (4500) PABB 63	7.8.82	40-39	Abolition of washing time
Caterpillar Tractor - manuals (650) PABB 77	16.8.82	39-37½	Changes to shift patterns.
Burton Manufacturing - craft workers PABB 57	1.9.82	40-39	Postponed from 1.9.81 - temporary 10p an hour compensatory supplement.
Shulton GB manuals (130) PABB 64	6.9.82	37-36	¼-hour off Monday to Thursday

Negotiating group	Operative date	Old and new basic hours	Additional comments
Littlewoods - retail staff (16,700) PABB 65	4.10.82	40-39	
Mobil Oil - drivers and depot workers (500) PABB 68	1.1.83	40-39	1981 commitment
Mobil Refineries - Coryton - manuals (600) PABB 69	1.1.83	40-37½	1981 commitment
Shell - manuals (2000) PABB 72	1.1.83	40-39	Implementation determined at local level - subject to "the need to contain additional costs"
Esso - Fawley - manuals (1400) PABB 74	1.1.83	39-38	Subject to satisfactory operation of the productivity agreement
Manor Caterers - retail staff (1000) PABB 71	3.1.83	40-39	Implementation subject to local negotiations
Scottish & Newcastle - manuals (6000) PABB 77	April 1983	40-39	
Rowntree Mackintosh - manuals PABB 70	May 1983	40-39	Follows 1981 commitment
Berger - manuals (450) PABB 64	1.12.83	39-37½	Deadline for final part of harmonisation programme - includes changes to working practices

R.C. Abercrombie	$33\frac{3}{4}$
Adamson Green and Co.Ltd.	35
Aeronautical and General Instruments Ltd	35
Aero Zip Fasteners	35
Albany Engineering Co.Ltd.	35
Allied Breweries Ltd (Burton on Trent)	35
Ambrose Shardlow and Co.	35
Ament Engineering Co.Ltd.	35
Angus Fire Armour	35
Ansell's Brewery Ltd	35.50mins
Bardic Systems	35
Thos. Barber and Sons	35
Bass Charrington Ltd(Burton on Trent)	35
VVA Group of Companies and Mintex	35
Beckman Instruments	35
Berry Wiggins Ltd	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Blakedale - NSE Ltd	35
Bovril	35
Bowyers Ltd	36
Bradbury Wilkinson and Co.	35
Bradley and Co.	35
Bradley and Graven Ltd	35
Bridge Foundry (F)	35
British Engines Ltd	35
British Oxygen Co.Ltd.	34
British Ropes	35
William Broady and Son Ltd	$33\frac{3}{4}$
Brockway Engineering Ltd	35
B.T.R. Silvertown Ltd (Burton on Trent)	35
Burman and Sons Ltd	$34\frac{5}{6}$
Cambrian Castings	35
Campbell Isherwood	35
Cavenham Foods Ltd (S. West	$35\frac{1}{2}$
Chiswick and Wright Ltd	35
Chloride Lorival Ltd	35
Clarkson International Tools	35
Commercial Union	$33\frac{1}{2}$ HO: Branches 35



Container Bases Ltd.	35
Corporate Laboratories(formerly BISRA)	35
David Crabtree and Son	35
C & S Antennas	35
Customs Coils Ltd	35
John Dale Ltd	35
The Delta Metal Co.	35
Denys Fisher Toys	35
Distillers Co.Ltd.	35
Dowty Mining Equipment (F)	34.55
Duncan Low Ltd	35
Edge and Sons Ltd	35
Edwards VAC Components	35
Engineering Development Ltd	35
Engineering Tech. Services	35
EPE Co ('Ham) Ltd.	35
Fletcher Sutcliffe and Wild	35
Flexible Drivers (Gibians)	35
Floatex Separations Ltd	35
Galloway Mechanical Services	35
General Descaling Ltd	35
Govan Shipbuilders	35
Grampian Engineering Co.	35
Gregson and Co.Ltd.	35
Hanson and Edwards Ltd	35
Harding Crossweller	35
John Hastle and Co.Ltd	35
Hayman and Partners	35
Hockley Chemical Co.Ltd (F)	35
J.F. Holland	35
C.D. Holmes	35
Holset Engineering Ltd.	35
Industry Services International..	35
Institute for Industrial Research and Standards	35
Richard Johnson and Nephew (Steel)Ltd	35
Thomas C. Keay Ltd	35
Allan Kennedy and Co.Ltd	35

Kenyon Refrigeration and Air Conditioning	35
Landore Foundries and Eng. Works	35
Lawsidc Eng. and Foundry	35
Lion Foundry Co.Ltd	35
Lionweld Ltd	34½
Liptak Bradley Ltd.	35
London Brick Co.Ltd.	36
Lorival Ltd.	35
Lyle Barclay	35
Chas. McNeil Ltd	35
Major Equipment Co.Ltd.	35
Marston, Thompson and Evershed Ltd.	35
Medway Ports Authority	35
Metal Products Group	35
Middlesex Tool and Gauge	35
Midland Electric Co.Ltd.	35
MIL (Bottles Div) (F)	35
MIL (Heath Town) (F)	35
Miles Redfern Ltd	35
Mintex Ltd	35
Modern Industrial Ventilation and Oven	35
Mono Containers Ltd.	35
Mono Pumps (Eng.)Ltd	35
National Cash Register	35
Neckar Water Engineering	35
Needham Bros. and Brown	35
Newhome - Veritas (formerly stoves)	35
Norwood Steel Equipment	35
O'Connor and Davies Ltd	35
OLAU(UK)Ltd (Sheerness)	35
P&B Designs	35
Peabody Ltd	35
Penham Ltd	34½
Pirelli Ltd (Bon Trent)	35
H.K. Porter Co.(GB)Ltd	35
Porter Lacastria	35

Porvair Ltd	36
Powder Couplings Ltd.	35
Rank Leak Wharfedale Ltd.	35
Redpath Pearson	35
Renold Ltd	35
Roberts and Birch Ltd	35
Royal Liver Friendly Society	35
Soft (UK)Ltd.	35
A. Schraders Son	35
Schreiber Frurniture Ltd.	35
Scottish Computer Services Ltd.	35
Scottish Film Council	35
Scottish and Newcastle Breweries Ltd.	35
Selection Trust	35
Shandon Southern Instrument (F)	35
John Smiths Tadcaster Brewery Co.	35
Soion Housing Ass.	35
Spillers French Bakers Ltd. (NE)	35
Steeley (MFG)Ltd.	35
Stoves Ltd	35
Street Crane Co.Ltd.	35
Sturtevant Engineering Co.Ltd.	35
Sun Ventilation Co.Ltd.	35
Sunblest (Glasgow)Ltd.	34½
Tate and Lyle Technical Services	35
Taylor and Challen	35
Therm save Eng. Ltd.	35
Towler and Son Ltd.	35
Truman Ltd.	35
John Waddington Ltd.	35
A.E. Waller	34½
Waters and Robson Ltd.	35
Watney Mann Ltd.	35
Weston Hydraulics Ltd.(F)	35
Westwood Major Group	35
C. Whittaker and Co.Ltd.	35
Samuel Williams Thames Terminal Ltd.	35
Woolen Blanket Trade, Wilney	33 <sup>3</sup> / <sub>4</sub>

Woodbourne Construction	35
W & W Development and Designs(F)	35
Delta Metal Co.Ltd (Rod Division)	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Schrader Automotive Products Ltd.	35
Simpson Lawrence Ltd (HQ) Glasgow	35
Simpson Lawrence Ltd Hillington Estate	$36\frac{1}{2}$
Plessey Ltd	36
HCR Dundee	35
Veedor Root Ltd., Dundee	35
General Motors(Scotland)Ltd	$35\frac{3}{4}$
Brook Motors Ltd	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Humberside Shipbuilding and Shiprepair Engineering Co.Ltd.	35
Sissons Engineering Ltd Derbyshire	$26\frac{1}{4}$
River Don Stampings Ltd Sheffield	35
Mullard Ltd.	35
W J Paxman	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Kirkstall Forge Engineering Co.	36
Godfrey Holmes Ltd	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Hunting Engineering Ltd. (Federated)	$36\frac{1}{2}$
Funditor Ltd	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Dowty Mining Equipment Hucknall	35
Antartex, Coatbridge	$36\frac{1}{4}$
AA	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Terry Barnes	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Bass Charrington North Ltd	35
Thos. Bolton Froghall	36/40
Bondine, Halifax	$36\frac{1}{2}$
Clarkson Intl. Tools Walsall	$36\frac{1}{4}/40$
Delsons Birmingham	35
Delta Rods - Extruded Metals W.Bromwich	$35\frac{1}{4}$
Dobson Hydraulics Colwick	$36\frac{1}{2}$
Edward Chainbelt Derby	35.55mins
Firth Furnishings Heckmondwike	35/40
Funditor Wembley	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Goldrei Foucard and Son	36

Hunting Eng. Amptill	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Imperial Tobacco	$36\frac{1}{4}$
Jeyes, Thetford	35 $\frac{1}{2}$
Kenton Utilities Jarrow	35
Lucas	$36\frac{1}{4}/40$
Donald McPherson Bury	$36\frac{1}{2}/37\frac{1}{2}$
Horatio Myer Vauxhall	35
NCR Dundee	$35/40$
New Day Furnishing Stores Stockport	35
Pearson Machine Tools Ltd. Walker	35
Plessey S'land	$36\frac{1}{2}/40$
Sunblest Aberdeen	36 $\frac{1}{2}$
Schrieber Furniture Harlow	$35/40$
Suttons Bakeries Coventry	36
Victor Products Wallsend	36 $\frac{1}{2}$
RHM Bakeries	35

## Diagram A

## Civil Service Non-Industrial and Industrial Staff 1951 - 1971

