



**THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
IN NIGERIA WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE 1983
GENERAL ELECTIONS**

September 1987

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN NIGERIA:

EUGENE C. MGBEMERE

ABSTRACT

This study deals with the development of political communication in Nigeria, from the colonial, independence and post-colonial periods. Also background information is given on the political communication systems in the pre-colonial period. It is argued that the patterns of pre-colonial systems still persist, particularly in the rural areas of Nigeria.

Hence, the thesis undertakes to examine in detail, the political communication relationships between two separate but relatively autonomous environments in Nigeria with particular reference to the 1983 general elections. The thesis is divided into two parts. The first is a historical theoretical and methodological analysis of politics and communication in Nigeria and the second a specific study of the 1983 general elections.

The first chapter analyses the classical conceptions of political development and the development of political communication. The classical models are discussed and defined in three main stages: traditional, transitional, and modern nation-state. Chapter Two examines the political communication trends that have led to the assumption that modern communication systems are all powerful politically. This leads to my analysis, criticisms and rejection of the linear model of communication development. Following my rejection, of the linear model, I suggested a theoretical and methodological framework for this study. Chapter Three looks at the structure of political and communication systems in the pre-colonial Nigeria. Kinship and religion are established as the mechanisms of sociopolitical and economic relationships in the pre-colonial period. Chapter Four centres on the impact of colonial administration on the pre-colonial institutions and the development of party politics, Christian religion and western education. Chapters Five and Six analyse the development of mass media and their relationship to different groups. Chapter Seven critically evaluates the political role of mass media as

factors that influence electorates' political opinion.

Part two presents an empirical analysis of the 1983 general elections with particular reference to Imo State. Under it, Chapter Eight sets out the method of the research. Major problems encountered in the fieldwork and how they were solved are stated. Chapters Nine, Ten, Eleven and Twelve establish the characteristics and attributes of five groups of participants, their membership of voluntary organisations, their political participation and relationship to channels of communication respectively. In Chapter Thirteen political issues are discussed in relation to voters' views. In Chapter Fourteen, the relationship between the mass media, political personalities and issues are examined. Finally Chapter Fifteen attempts to assess the role and direction of political communication development in Nigeria today. Some suggestions are made as regards to the most useful approach to political communication in Nigeria.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

AG	Action Group
AWO	Awolowo
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
FEDECO	Federal Electoral Commission
FRCN	Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria
GNPP	Great Nigerians Peoples Party
ITV	Independent Television
N	Naira - Nigerian Currency
NAP	Nigeria Advance Party
NBC	Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation
NCNC	National Convention of Nigerian Citizens
NPC	Northern Peoples Party
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigerians Peoples Party
NTA	Nigeria Television Authority
PPA	Progressive Parties Alliance
PRP	Peoples Redemption Party
SWB	Summary of World Broadcast
TV	Television
UK	United Kingdom
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
USA	United States of America
ZIK	Azikiwe
£	Pound Sterling, British Currency

AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of this investigation is to examine in both historical and contemporary terms, the development of new systems of political communications in Nigeria. It aims to set out clearly both quantitatively and qualitatively the pattern of political communication developments and how different identifiable political participants are associated with the old and new political communication systems. These are not examined between religious or tribal groups but within a tribe. This approach should help us to understand the actual structure of political communication in Nigeria.

TITLE

The development of new systems of political communication in Nigeria with particular reference to the 1983 General Elections.

By

Eugene C. Mgbemere M.A.

This thesis is submitted to the Council for National Academic Awards (C N A A) in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D)

Sponsoring Institutions

Middlesex Polytechnic

**Department of Social Science, in Collaboration with International
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DEDICATED TO MY
WIFE CAROLINE CHINYERE, AND
CHILDREN.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

A THEORETICAL APPROACH TO SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Some statements about the problems of political communication, in general terms

The problems of political development in West Africa and, in particular, Nigeria can be seen in terms of the change from a traditional political system to the modern nation-state. A political system is:

"... a particular kind of system. It maintains coordinated expectations among the people who live under it and coordinates a good deal of the actual behaviour by means of their cooperation and compliance habits which are reinforced by rewards and penalties."¹

Contrast this with the narrowly legalistic definition of

"a set of formal legal institutions that emphasize a government or state where modern societies are always and inevitably centralized, in the sense that the maintenance of order is the task of one agency or group of agencies, and not dispersed throughout the society."²

Thus the political system is a vital component of the social system in which the individual, nuclear families, extended kinship networks, the villages, towns, cities, small and large nations interact. This system should be considered as a process of interaction between sub-systems with or without explicit political content such as the 'classic sub-system' - the family and the household sector, the economic sector, the cultural sector and the political sector. Deutsch (1908:146) maintains that "each of these classic sub-systems of the society inter-changes with all the others, and depends on all of them". His concept of 'reward' and 'penalties' in the process of inter-changes between sub-systems is associated with 'power' in relation to the 'state' and legal organizations in a political system.

Interaction between individuals and groups is the substance of political communication. Two types of actors in the system can fulfil the process of political communication through the political or media organizations.

"Members of the top echelons of both organizations might maintain contacts aimed at regulating the memberships between the two; resolving conflicts where they arise and generally defining the boundaries between them and maintaining the smooth functioning of the system". (Gurevitch and Blunder, in Curran, J. et al (ed) Mass Communication and Society, 1977:277).

The environment in which informal interaction between members of the top echelons occur is often social, where 'confidential exchange of views takes place over a drink'. The product of these interactions includes not only streams of specific messages on the problems of the day, policies evolved to deal with them, arguments for and against alternative positions, the personalities involved in the controversy etc. - but also (....) those more abiding ground rules that preserve the standardized formats through which information is regularly presented to the public (Dearlove, 1974) in Gurevitch and Blunder (1977:280).

So while members of different formal organisations engage in horizontal interaction on a person to person basis, they also act independently using the mass media to disseminate and process political information in a vertical direction between opinion leaders and the mass citizenry.

Drawing from the works of Aristotle, Politics (335-332 BC) Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans., 1947 pp. 145-154, and Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Haplan Power and Society, 1950, pp. VIX, 240, R.A. Dahl has defined a political system as:

"... any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, control, influence, power and authority."³

He points out that,

"Many associations that most people ordinarily do not regard as 'political' process are political systems: private clubs, business firms, labour unions, religious organizations, civic groups, primitive tribes, clans, perhaps even families."⁴

Dahl maintains that 'every human association has a political aspect'. But Dahl's definition plays down the importance of the individualistic desires and the motives of the political actors. In Nigerian politics, the concept of motive for personal gain is important in the understanding of the political, social, and economic relationships between political leaders and the masses in the general system. Burgon, Micheal et. al., in their discussion of human association emphasized this point in discussing "a hidden agenda which ..."

"...is a secretly held preference that governs an individual's behaviour. The person with a hidden agenda tries to manipulate the group to take the direction he wants, without appearing to do so. He has already made a private decision about the outcome he desires, which means that he is not approaching the group with an open mind. The real detriment of the hidden agenda is that it usually evolves from ulterior motives that are never exposed to the group ... The hidden agenda may produce decisions that have an unsound basis if the person is successful in manipulating the group. This orientation may bring personal satisfaction but it is not a mark of a good group member."⁵

Such hidden agendas often further individual economic gains rather than rational national political development. It is an aspect of exploitation which leads to political instability, because exploitation in political association as in a social exchange "ultimately ... leads to the termination of social relation" (Ekeh, 1974:56).

Many political writers tend to use the term 'political system' to mean government or state, particularly when Easton's concept of political system is used to describe legislative and institutional relationships.⁶ But Dahl's definition, which is flexible, allows various observable human associations and behaviour to be studied, particularly when they are politicized. Thus, a political system can be systematically studied from the traditional, through the transitional to a modern nation-state, taking account of the political activities of individuals, and the formal and informal organizations and institutions in the system and sub-systems in various communities.

I argue that a flexible, yet systematic attitude to the study of politics, permits the development of a theoretical framework which emphasizes the interrelationship between various apparatuses of the system (government or state). It also helps to reveal the structure of the relationship between the total system and sub-systems, e.g. economic, communication systems, etc.

It offers a broad theoretical model of how the system, as a whole, changes and develops through the process of interrelationship.

Political Communication

The term association or interrelation can be described as communication. Among communication scholars, there is no agreed definition of what is meant by communication. Definitions vary widely according to investigations involving human and animal communication activities. Perhaps, one of the best definitions of communication was provided by I.A. Richards, a literary critic in 1928. He defined communication as a phenomenon of 'human enterprise' in which

"Communication takes place when one mind so acts upon its environment that another mind is influenced, and in that other mind an experience occurs, which is like the experience in the first mind and is caused, in part, by that experience."⁷

Yet Jurgen Ruesch distinguished between 40-50 different types of communication which could be applied to various disciplines of politics, anthropology, psychology, economics, history, law, architecture, etc. Even when the meaning and definition of communication is specific to a discipline such as political systems, the term still defies precise definition. Thus Jack Plano et. al. rely on the pivotal portmanteau term 'meaning' in defining political communication:

"The transmission of meaning having relevance for the functioning of a political system. Political communication like other communication requires a sender, message, some channel of means of transmission, and a receiver."

The definition is appropriate to the understanding of some aspects of an organized political communication system in relation to an undifferentiated political audience and actors. But Plano et. al. point out that:

"Political communication ordinarily involves the written or spoken word, but it may occur by means of any sign, symbol, or signal through which meaning is transmitted. Thus communication would include systematic acts as diverse as burning a draft card, voting, political assassination, or sending a fleet around the world."

They conclude by narrowing the definition and study of political communication to the field of:

"specialized institutions, such as the mass media, government information agencies, or political parties."

Davison and Yu (1974:10) have broadened the focus to include advertising, or international communication which involves many kinds of individuals, collectivities, and situations; rather than restricting it to politics, business, or formal international relations.

Davison (1974:7)) argues that political communication generally focuses on the 'way governments, parties and pressure groups make use of the media'. And in the political development process, communication can be defined in the way 'in which mass media can help to establish or strengthen political and economic and cultural institutions'. In his opinion, mass media rather than initiating political directions 'may much more give expression to ties already established by other means'. Similarly, Katz et al (in Davison and Yu 1974:34) argue that mass media and politics can be defined 'chiefly in terms tied to the aims of would-be persuaders - individuals and groups wishing to influence people and change their attitude'. But Nimmo (1964) warns that influence is subject to time, and time spent in exposure might detract from originating political communication, through a variety of participatory activities. Generally, exposure can be governed by limits of time, economic expenditure and absorptive skills (Davis, B. Bobrow, 1974).

In the study of Indonesian political communication system, (Anderson 1978) defined politics as a mode that involves direct speech. 'Direct Speech' in reality forms the overwhelming block of political communication in any society: gossip, rumours, discussions, arguments, interrogations and intrigues (Anderson, B. in Jackson and Pye, 1978:284). On another level, Anderson points out that where direct speech 'eludes the academic eye because of its fluid and ephemeral nature, symbolic speech escapes attention for rather different reasons. Thus 'public monuments and rituals, cartoons, films and advertisement represent a 'mode of political communication'.

In summary then, political communication in modern day politics involves a complex relationship with other systems which varies in degree from one country to another.

"Political communication provides a fertile field of study nowadays for researchers steeped in a wide range of disciplines and methodologies: historians may compare the technological, rhetorics and public for political communication prevalent at different periods of time; mass media operations may be described through concepts borrowed from pressure group analysis; the relation of media institution to political parties may be observed; and audience members may be studied from those perspectives other than that of effect." (Surevitch and Blumler, 1977:270-1)

Political communication in a transitional nation with a strong kinship system often emphasises horizontal patterns of communication such as rituals, symbols and signs etc. Interdependent on these patterns of communication are the mass media through which new ideas and information are introduced into the traditional communities. Local opinion leaders are the principle persuaders and influencers of new political ideas and behaviour. In Nigeria, it is not uncommon to observe that the mass media while being used to spread new ideas also function as means to reinforce the old values attached to kinship relationships and politics. This is primarily because the ability of the political elites to persuade and influence others in the community, either through horizontal or vertical communication systems, is subject to kinship relationships and associations. By definition and for the purpose of this thesis therefore, political communication in Nigeria involves the appropriate mixture or combination of modern mass media and traditional channels to influence and mobilize the electorate for political participation and voting.

CONCEPTIONS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

(1) The classical models of the development of Political Communication

Classical models of the development of Political Communication have tended to assume three stages: traditional, transitional and modern nation-state Political Communication systems. These general models have been central in many writings of sociologist, anthropologist, political, history and communication scholars.⁹

In West Africa, the change has been straight from the traditional to the national system. In Nigeria, the change in the Political System from the traditional to the modern type is taking place simultaneously with the change in communications from the traditional oral system to mass media networks. In studying political and communication development and change in a society where both processes take place simultaneously, an investigation should focus on long-term changes in which the trend of change seems to be in one direction, i.e. from oral traditional communication to modern nation-state mass media systems. In this view, communication is both indicative and an agent of total political transitions in West Africa, and particularly Nigeria. But Pye maintains that the three stages of political communication development "share much in common and their differences are only relative, not absolute."¹⁰

(a) Political communication in traditional societies

Political communication in traditional societies is characterized by Pye as follows:

- i) Communication is not systematically organised,
- ii) there is a lack of professional communicators,
- iii) participation is as a result of political position or social organisation,
- iv) information flow is according to the line of social hierarchy and an individual's relationship with others in the community.

In a classical traditional political communication system in Nigeria, as will be illustrated in the following discussion of pre-colonial systems, politics, religion, economic, cultural and social activities in the communities were fused in one leader, which made it difficult to define what was political communication. Thus Pye concludes, "the process in traditional societies was not independent of either the ordering of social relationship or the content of the communication."¹¹

Political communication can be studied exclusively in terms of interpersonal and group interaction within and between communities engaged in decision-making and leadership selection processes. In such situations, political information flow between members is informal, decentralized and horizontal.

(b) Political communication in Transitional societies

The classical conception of political communication has further assumed that, in Africa, modern economic, occupational and educational systems have resulted in the development of urban politics: communication which is different from traditional political communications. Among early scholars of this classical concept was Lucian Pye, who has stated that, generally, in transitional political communication systems, the structure of communication is bifurcated and fragmented, because of its inclination to modern technology only in the urban areas. In addition, political communication in such systems has "a separate complex system which conforms in varying degrees to traditional systems in that it depends upon face-to-face relations and tends to follow the patterns of social and communal life."

Pye's conclusion on the relationship between the systems in transitional social systems is problematic in relation to West Africa. As we shall see shortly, the work of P.C. Lloyd (1967) in Nigeria has shown that when the traditional system yields to a transitional pattern, the systems and sub-systems in the communities, either urban or rural operate under the dynamic communication linkages between groups, leaders and the state. Besides, as will be made clear in later chapters, the constitutional development of Nigerian political communication systems have developed in a pattern that encourages and reinforces ethnic and kinship systems reminiscent of the traditional political communication. One of the major factors of modernity is the leading role of the political elites in the transitional system. The balance between modernity and traditionalism is set by the roles of the elites. The composition and functions of the elites in Nigeria as in Ghana, "reflect a society in transition whose values, old and new, have yet to be synthesized" (p.C. Lloyd 1966:107). Lloyd synthesized the major characteristics of a political system in a transitional society through the functions of the elite in a historical process from pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods. The crucial issue of political participation and mobilization for the political elites, who exclusively pull their supports from their ethnic communities, makes the comparative study of traditional, transitional and modern nation political communication in Nigeria important. In other words, the three systems should be revealed in both their historical and contemporary patterns.

In transitional societies:

- a) Communication is partly organized particularly in the urban areas while in the rural areas it remains predominantly unorganized or informal;
- b) most of the professional communicators are directly associated with communication organizations in the urban areas;
- c) participation in politics is a combination of both political position and social organization as well as by the influence of information flow from organized media network.
- d) the most distinctive feature of transitional societies is the relatively autonomous existence of urban and rural political communication network systems.

(c) Political communication in the modern nation-state

Political communication in the modern nation state is characterized by urbanization, centralization, formal organization and consumption by heterogeneous communities and audience. The classical model's close association of modern mass media with the nation-state presents a major problem in Nigerian political communication studies. For example, Pye has argued that urbanization is the ideal environment of the 'modern technology' of communication. Hence he analyses political communication in terms of the mass media and its relationships with state institutions, organizations, political parties etc. But interpersonal communication which is a major characteristic of not only traditional rural political communication but also of urban politics and institutional interactions among and between state officials are marginally analysed. The second problem in the Nigerian context is that a modern nation-state mass media political communication system has been introduced when the nation (Nigeria) has not politically reached a nation-state status.

Many factors influence the bases on which a nation-state can be established, thus the nation-state has many definitions. Broadly, the bases can be common history, culture and language which determine common national identity. For instance, linguistically, England, France, Italy and Germany are modern nation-states. Though other countries such as the USSR, Switzerland etc. are nation-states without a common language, culture or race, a common historical experience has pulled them together as nation-states.

Most of these factors which influence the bases of a nation-state do not exist in Nigeria. While common historical experience ie. colonialization, would have been an important basis for a nation-state in Nigeria, the colonial constitutions and policies, to be discussed in chapter three, pulled Nigeria apart into competing ethnic political regions and then to the present-day 19 autonomous states. A nation is not a thing such as flag, geographical boundary etc. but what people are working to build within a political boundary.

When a country such as Nigeria has developed a modern nation-state political communication system without itself tending towards a nation-state status, political communication becomes dotted with conflicts between modernity and traditionalism. The research problem is to discover which one is real and which is superficial in the context of actual political participation, mobilization and voting, particularly during election period. On the other hand to assume, as Pye has done, that in developing countries modern and traditional communication systems are separate and autonomous implies that in most states, where technology and urbanization have generated a new form of political communication the final stage of political development - the nation-state - has been achieved. The false assumption is that the stage of transition leads directly to separation of the rural population from the urban population. Each would therefore maintain separate political participation and mobilization through communication processes.

In West Africa, it is inadequate to state that Urban Political communication and rural communication systems are relatively autonomous, but very necessary to establish that they are strongly inter-dependent on one another because of the structure of the network of kinship ties (which are frequently politicized) between rural and urban environments. This structure of political communication relationships is peculiar to West Africa as will be illustrated with Igbo communities in the Nigerian 1983 general elections.

The importance of traditional and modern communication systems in any of the three societies - traditional, transitional and nation-state has been noted by Karl Deutch. He warned that:

"In evaluating the political significance, two mistakes may be made ... Over-estimating the importance of impersonal media of communication ... radio broadcast and newspaper, and under-estimating the comparably greater significance of face-to-face contacts."

He illustrated the importance of face-to-face communication in terms of the network and linkage in political system where party politics involves an underground movement and stressed that:

"The face-to-face contacts determine to a large degree what, in fact, will be transmitted more effectively and who will be the 'insiders' in the organization, that is those persons who receive both information and attention on highly preferred terms."

The second level of mistake he points out is the consideration of

"legitimacy myths or symbols in isolation from the actual communications networks, and from the human networks - often called 'organizations', 'machines', 'apparatus' or bureaucracy - by which they are carried and selectively disseminated."¹²

Historically, the works of Pye (1963) Sehramm (1964) and Lerner (1959), were primarily concerned with the study of political communication in relation to the status and position of leadership in a political system. Interest in this approach to political communication was generated by the publication of Karl Deutsch (1963) The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication. He presented a series of models and concepts of political communication in which power or the instruments or agencies of power and formal and informal communication were central to his analysis. For Deutsch, the study of politics is the study of power relationships between people. Communication determines how people comply and are controlled in a society. He points out that every sector of the society has various forms of power relationship and control and then he distinguished five main types - particularly in his later works, Deutsch (1966a, 1966b) instrument of power - the family or kinship, in which informal communication prevails. But public opinion associated with 'pressure group opinion', formal organizations such as the political parties, the school, the church, trades unions, etc., have various forms of sanction and instruments of power and control at their disposal. The state (government) has various branches, the police, the court, the cabinet, parliament etc. with varying degrees of power to control the citizens.

While Deutsch's political communication theory was full of explanatory models of power relationship in a political system, the scope of such power as the determinant of political communication was not adequately explained. For instance, there is no indication of how communication ideologically influences reality. In organized communication channels, media

professionals more often influence reality to shape public opinion; a notion which Habermas regards as a fiction particularly during election campaigns. It is the ideology of those in power that is legitimated. Legitimate instruments of power are also a counterpart of political power. The power of the media to influence opinion would only exist as a fiction but in certain cultures it works, i.e. in reality the power does not exist, yet it dominates the audience and their decision.

One of the practical ways in which this is achieved in organized communication is the way journalists shape the writing of news and this is not independent of the way in which they are trained. In Nigeria, the training has not been addressed to the Nigerian reality. During an election campaign most journalists are interested in the immediate present and not the past or the future. The critical question about the nation cannot be answered without reference to the past or the future. The tendency, therefore, by the media is to be concerned more with personalities than reality, i.e. critical sociopolitical issues.

Despite the inadequate explanation by Deutsch of the scope of power as the determinant of political communication, his cybernetic concept helped him to develop a broader dimension of political communication beyond the level of the mass media in an election campaign. It was at this stage that researchers began to consider mass communication as less synonymous with political development in which elections were the core investigations. Thus mass communication began to embrace wider areas in the socio-economic and political processes which are essential for changes and development.

In general, therefore, the development of political communication has been described as a process of moving from traditional, through transitional to modern nation-state systems. With a functional definition and approach to the study of political communication, Fagen (1966) presented a general summary definition/description of the model of the process. He maintained that the functioning of a political system depends on the follow of information.

"that communicatory activity is considered political by virtue of the consequences, actual and potential, that it has for the functioning of the political system."¹³

But he recalled that he has indirectly 'incorporated' Laswell's 'effects'

model of communication and warned that the concepts of 'sources, messages, channels and audience' are not abandoned by his emphases 'on consequences and political functioning'. His expansion of political communication beyond an election campaign became more apparent in chapter 11, pp 34-52, where he explained the components of communication networks and functional political communication significances. He recommended those theorists who:

"See political development principally in a system's increased capacity to extend national communication networks (and all that this implies) into new sectors of the society. These theorists also view the penetration of previously isolated local and traditional communication by the national system as requisites of political development."¹⁴

An important contribution here is that the penetration of communication into all parts of a political system is no longer the function of the mass media, but also of 'organizations', 'groups', and 'special channels for interest circulation and aggregation'. For instance, the function of a trade union organization, as a political communication channel would be:

"That of providing a channel of communication between the political elite - which may be the government in power or a party in opposition - and the masses. In the best of situations, the channel is two-way To be effective in this channelling function, a union must have the widest possible mass character and it must have means for mobilizing its indoctrinated membership or sympathizers for action and command."¹⁵

Fagen's inclusion of channels of political communication other than the mass media was important for his study of comparative political systems at a global level, but also useful in the study of political development and changes in a transitional society, particularly where the urban and rural political communication systems are apparently or superficially different - i.e. in terms of traditional and modern mass media communication system.

David Lerner (1974) emphasised that in the nation-state it is essential that every organization must have a communication system of some shape, size and sort. Setting up an empirical question, he proposed that in a nation-state communication shapes organizations, a proposition which is generally 'applicable to all varieties of collective behaviour or social institutions: large and small formal and informal hierarchical and egalitarian'. He argued that in a large nation-state and in large organizations, formal communication tends to be more one-way than in 'small, informal egalitarian

organisations'. Furthermore, in a nation-state, political communication revolves around the mass media which are 'mainly owned and operated - or at least regulated - by official agencies of the nation-state'. Lerner then contextualized four classical models of mass communication in a nation-state which operate in terms of size and shape, mobility and participation, disposable income, options and decisions. (Unfortunately, limited space prevents elaboration of these classical models).

However, Bobrow (1974:94) discussed the relationship between communication systems and the political system in a nation-state. He defined mass communication as systems of messages and means of generation and transmission (human and technological) that have three properties: first, the messages and the media are intended for a large and spatially dispersed audience; second, the messages and the media are sufficiently standard to be readily comprehensible to and usable by a large proportion of the intended audience; third, the messages are available, because of media availability to a large proportion of the relevant population. He concluded that mass communication and political processes relate to these properties in terms of message content, media personnel and technology, and cultural level of messages or availability of the media output. But his theory of the relationship between mass media communication and politics in a nation-state casts much doubt on what happens to the control of the mass media content and output by political authorities and pressure groups in such a society.

One of the fundamental relationships between the state and the mass media is the persistent attempt by the former to control the latter. This attempt is found in transitional and nation-states and often more so in the former. Nations such as Nigeria, Ghana and most developing nations have very firm control on the media content and output.

In particular reference to nation-states (industrialized states) such as Britain, Sweden, and Ireland etc. Peter Golding (1974:78) stated that 'the mass media are an integral part of political life'. He agrees that 'the independent newspaper will be one of the future forms of government' because 'for most people the media provide the major or only link with government as well as the information on which political judgements and attitudes are based'.

In illustrating the theoretical relationship between the media and the state, P. Golding and P. Elliott (1979:45-46) pointed out that broadcasting

was involved with government from its inception. In many countries, national monopoly control was taken to be a technical necessity to protect the national interest, represented by military and intelligence users, and generally to regulate the air waves". From the writings of several authors in the 1950s, they drew our attention to a set of theories of broadcasting which spell out the prevailing pattern of media control by the state:

"The first is the authoritarian; the media are for control of the people by the ruling elite, their purpose to service state power ... second, libertarian, derived from the classic writing of Milton ... based on the idea of a free market place for competitive political information and ideals. Third, ... the notion of the freedom of the press, and access to privately owned media over which the state should have no control other than to check excesses and ensure they serve the public interest. Finally ... the totalitarian theory, the media and state apparatus contributing to successful dictatorship by the ruling party."

Gurevitch and Blumler in J. Curran (ed) (1977:282-287) examined the control of political communication in terms of internal and external constraints on the two organizations and believed that the analysis of political communication systems would involve an examination of the 'formal and informal mechanisms that span the boundaries between the two kinds of organizations'. Some of the constraints they explained were 'economic, legal, normative, political etc. Very carefully, they compared the nature of broadcasting networks and how they provide easier means of applying constraints by the state. Constraints are easier in some media than in others. For instance, "... in many democratic countries, newspapers have traditionally belonged in the private sector, whereas the dependence of broadcasting transmission on scarce wave-lengths immediately placed first radio and television in the public domain. Many consequences have followed from this distinction. Perhaps the most important one is the development of a regulatory licensing system for broadcasting, which was either totally absent or far looser in the case of the press."

These constraints when applied to the media in transitional states of developing nations, make the media totally one of the state's apparatus. But Golding and Elliott (1979:46) felt that Nigeria's media, particularly the press (newspapers), are quite different from other African countries in terms of state control and constraints. But with radio, they argued that it has 'emerged as so much part of, and essential to, the policies of government that many of the countries which inherited with independence a statutory corporation in charge of broadcasting, have legislated to bring

radio and television back under direct ministerial control (Ainsle, 1966:174, cited by Golding and Elliot, 1979:46).

But today in Nigeria "broadcasting, like that in many developing countries, has become more rather than less closely integrated into government, at both national and regional level. In fact Nigeria was in many ways exceptional among African countries in not introducing broadcasting from the outset as a government institution." (Golding and Elliott, 1979:49)

Also, they noted that broadcasting in Nigeria had become more integrated with the government after the 1966 military take-over of government. Indeed, it was during the civil war that both Nigerian and Biafran broadcasting networks experienced the highest control by the governments. Ever since then, broadcasting in Nigeria "has moved closer to the state" and "it has adopted many government policies as its own and redefined its own production practices to accommodate them."

The notion of 'accommodation' was then explained by Golding and Elliott in the Nigerian broadcasting context when they pointed out that Nigerian broadcasters in times of "social stress had shown fundamental agreement over the social value of the state in its existing form. Rather, it was that they were prepared to accept specific social values embodied in particular government policies. In a military dictatorship the distinction between government and the state is much less clear than in liberal, western democracies the relationship between broadcasting and the state may be typified as accommodation rather than mediation or intervention" (Golding and Elliott, 1979:27,65). When the media are closely attached to military or party political government, a number of problems regarding media content/output and audiences orientation thereto start to show. For instance, Gurevitch and Blumler (1977) pointed out that a party-tied media system will produce a high proportion of 'one-sided political content, tending as a result to activate partisan role orientations among members of the audience as well as selective exposure mechanism'. When the media are subordinate to a political party, manifestos and party statements tend to generate partisan behaviour. By contrast, comparatively autonomous media increasingly generate a 'balanced' political information flow and a less partisan attitude.

Peter Golding (1974:78-102) has discussed some of the major relationships between broadcasting and the state particularly in an election situation.

He suggested ways of researching and evaluating media roles in politics. He schematised political communication study in terms of 'time-span' into 'long-term' and 'short-term': the long-term approach emphasises orientation towards policy and ideology, while in the short-term approach, the election campaign and inferential structures predominate in the research.

From the above discussion, much of the relationship between the media and the state in terms of control and constraints may help us to understand elite political behaviour in a developing nation and make it more adequately applicable to media and political processes, particularly in short-term electoral activities. But if applied to Nigerian elections, the majority of the electorate - the illiterate and semi-literate masses - political participation and behaviour will be left unaccounted for.

However, the major characteristics of nation-state political communication are:

- a) Many channels of political communication have been developed with very high levels of organisation and efficiency.
- b) Highly skilled and professional communicators are involved in the running of the systems.
- c) Political participation is no longer conditioned by political position or social organisation.
- d) The differences between urban and rural political communication are insignificant, mass media tending to be the dominant channels of political information flow for both urban and rural areas.
- e) National political, social and economic issues rather than the dominant position of political leaders are the central concern of the media particularly at election time.
- f) Though interpersonal communication remains the important channel of political influence, the mass media by far exceed the role of the former in the mobilization of the audience for political support.
- g) Ethnic interests tend to give way to national interests.

h) The predominant face-to-face or horizontal communication in traditional and transitional societies is combined with vertical or mass media communication in political interactions. But the structure of horizontal political communication in traditional society can in many ways differ from those in the industrialized and politically advanced nations. For instance the way journalists participate in parliamentary lobbying among MPs can be entirely different from the way traditional organizations are used to create news about political participation in Nigeria. Both interact horizontally but different roles and political actors are involved.

Before we look at the major weaknesses of the above conceptions of political communication in the context of the West African situation, I shall briefly outline the complex and differing patterns of traditional and transitional political communication systems in the region. I hold the opinion that most West African states are still at the transitional political communication stage where traditional forms of modern media are interrelated.

In general, the underlying conception of the development of political communication, is the view that traditional, i.e. pre-colonial societies, are quite similar in the structure of their political communication. With the advent of colonialism and contact with industrialized nations, a fairly uniform type of modern political communication was introduced in West Africa. Thus, the development of political communication can be described as a fairly uniform process of change from a particular pre-colonial pattern to a pattern resembling that of the Western industrialized nations. While this argument can be sustained in this thesis, it is important to note that the change from traditional to modern political communication systems has not weakened the effectiveness of traditional patterns of communication. It is on the basis of the assumption that traditional political communication patterns have been weakened as a result of contact with industrialized nations, that many observers note that this typology of the development of political communication tends to be very much oversimplified.

(d) Patterns of traditional political communication in West Africa

In relation to West African traditional political communication systems, Pye's major characteristics of traditional political communication are the

typical simplistic type with its tendency to over-generalization particularly as he fails to consider the differences in the political systems of various traditional societies. Such major differences will be illustrated in chapter three on the pre-colonial city-states, kingdoms and village communities in Nigeria.

Evans-Pritchard and Fortes distinguished two types of traditional political systems in Africa: (a) the centralized, and (b) the decentralized political systems. Others refer to them as state and stateless societies. The centralized or city-state political system had recognized authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions. Through these, power, wealth and status are maintained. The rulers in such societies control organized force through which their authority is legitimated and upheld. The Sokoto Caliphate, to be discussed in chapter three, was an example of a centralized traditional political system in West Africa.

The Nuer, Nupe, TIV, and Igbo communities are examples of a decentralized system in which power and legitimacy are linked to kinship network. But between these two systems is the Yoruba political system which was not described by Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (1940:1-15).

P.C. Lloyd in his study of Yoruba political communication system criticized Evans-Pritchard and Fortes by stating that their model clearly:

"Separates the societies ... but being largely descriptive rather than analytical, it lacks the precision necessary to deal with a society falling between these broad groups, particularly those of West Africa, such as the Yoruba in their numerous kingdoms, each with slightly different political structures."¹⁶

Lloyd then fills the gap by distinguishing four different political systems in West Africa based on 'lineages' and 'associations' which were also identified by Paula Brown (1951). The four different lineage systems were illustrated with political systems in Igbo, Yoruba, Mende, Ashanti, Dahomey and Nupe political cultures. Lloyd notes from Brown's analysis and classification that lineage, association and state overlap. The introduction of 'associations' is an important step towards the understanding of political communication and development in West Africa and particularly Nigeria. Though neither Lloyd nor Paula Brown specified whether the associations were voluntary or forced ones, nor did they state the criteria by which members were recruited, their observation remains

analytically important in the development of political communication in West Africa. In the later chapter, the criteria for membership of and way in which associations or what would be frequently referred to as 'clubs' operate as channels of political communication in Nigeria will be accounted for in some detail.

However in understanding the Yoruba political system, Lloyd emphasised the importance of 'associations' which politically are cultural.

"Political system is the constitutional relationship between various institutions and associations which comprise the system. Thus in the case of the Yoruba kingdom, the most important parts of the political structure are the descent groups, with their own internal structure and organization, the various forms of age grade and set, with our without an associated grade or chiefs in which one may rise from the lowest to the highest level ... in each institution, one must know how a man joins or how a man is chosen to assume a title, and on what condition he holds the office.

One must know the chain of authority in the political system by which the legislation is transformed into administrative action and finally executed."¹⁷

Lloyd's approach to the study of the traditional political system offers us a clear insight into traditional politics as a dynamic system which allows for change and at the same time retains its fundamental values in the process of changes.

For instance, in Nigeria, political development was particularly influenced by external factors generated by colonization. After the amalgamation of the North and the South of Nigeria on January 1st, 1914, the North was ruled indirectly through native authorities, while the South and Lagos colonies were ruled directly through a legislative council whose members had no constitutional power. By 1946, the 1922 constitution faced sharp criticism from individuals, organizations and by the press outside the legislative council. But before the Richards's constitution of 1939, Nigeria was already a nation where its citizens had little or no direct political participation on colonial political system. Sir Arthur Richards recognised the cultural and political diversities in Nigeria aimed:

"to promote the unity of Nigeria to provide adequately within that unity for the diverse elements which made up the country and to secure greater participation by Africans in the discussion of their own affairs."¹⁸

This was an important step in political participation and development in Nigeria. The constitution reshaped politics and still, today, has considerable influence on it. The regional structure of Nigeria, as Richards saw it, determined its political structure.

"Nigeria falls naturally into three regions: the North, the West and the East, and the people of these regions differ widely in race, in customs, in outlook and in their traditional systems of government."¹⁹

Thus in 1939, the East and West were separated as two administrative units in the south, while the North remained a separate unit. Hence Nigeria emerged as a geographically three political regions, in which Richards' constitution reinforced ethnic/regional nationalism, and at the same time, put serious limitations to the development of nation-state political system. Politically the North became larger in area and population than the south. Post et. al (1973:41) show that since "population figures were directly translated into regional representation in the Federal House of Representatives, the lower house of the central legislative, this meant that the North was allocated more than half of the seats - 167 out of 312 in 1964". The census became highly politicized and pushed Nigeria into more crises that divided it further along regional or ethnic political lines. But the real problem which generated intense agitation of Richards' constitution was the lack of real political power for the legislators.

The emergence of political parties within the regions led to more demands for real political participation and decision-making. Among these parties was the National Council of Nigeria and the Camaroons (NCNC), founded by Herbert Macauley and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe (ZIK) in 1944. In particular, the NCNC put pressure on the governor general, Sir John MacPherson, to change Sir Richards's constitution which lacked constitutional power for Nigerian leaders.

The new political parties were created out of cultural associations, a point which was stressed by Lloyd above. In this process of political development, the Action Group was established in 1951, which emerged into a political party from a Yoruba cultural organization known as 'Egbe Omo Oduduwa', previously founded and led by chief Awolowo in 1945 among Yoruba students in London. Similarly,

"The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) has its origin in the Jamiyyar Maneu Arewa (congress of the northern peoples) which had been formed in 1949 by some educated Northerners, notably Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, Yohaya Gusan and Dr. R.A.B. Dikko. The congress was intended to be a cultural organization and not a political one, but it was declared a political party in October 1951 ..."²⁰

The NCNC was believed to be the most nationalistic party, but pressure put on it by other ethnic political organizations restricted it to ethnic politics to cater for the interests of the Igbos and other minority ethnic groups in the Eastern part of Nigeria. We are here confronted with a political development which, as a result of constitutional changes reflecting upon the regional differences of Nigeria, never emerged beyond regional politics. The concept of a nation-state through which a national identity is established and national issues are discussed has never materialised in Nigeria. The constitutional regionalization of Nigerian politics has remained at the level of ethnic groups and with strong ethnic nationalism and sentiment, it is only when a nation has become a nation-state that politics can transcend ethnic nationalism and issues rather than personalities, and ethnic distrust and competition become the norms of politics.

Post et al (1973:40) pointed out that "Legislative powers were divided between the centre and the regions, with the balance in favour of the latter. This was reinforced by the more solid party control of the regional government". Indeed, legislative power which enhanced regional political powers of the regional governments at the expense of the federal power remains one of the major drawbacks in nation-state development of Nigeria political system.

From the above brief analysis of the complex Nigerian case of interaction of pre-colonial and colonial patterns of political institution which will be elaborated in Chapter Three, it is clear that there is no uniformity. That is, there was no uniform 'traditional' pattern before the introduction of colonial and Western political institutions and institutions of political communication. Also, there has been no uniform, unilinear process of development from traditional through transitional to modern nation-state. Much depends on the kind of pre-colonial structure and the way this structure interacts with the external influences of ad hoc colonial political arrangements - as illustrated with the brief analysis of the complex interaction of pre-colonial and colonial political institutions

above. Thus, as the classical model of political communication would suppose, Nigeria did not develop as a uniform nation-state but into regionalized ethnic divisions. In particular, the development of political parties strongly reinforced ethnic political associations rather than representing national interests. The use of convergence theory and analysis of data might suggest that today, in part, because of the influence of the mass media and especially because of interpersonal linkages and other national institutions, regionalism is breaking down. But the way the mass media institutions are owned and controlled in Nigeria particularly at state level rather intensifies ethnic politics, secondly, membership of various cultural organizations are strongly based on kinship. These organizations are often politicized and are important linkages between rural and urban populations, they merely reinforce ethnic politics. My position on the theory of convergence will be clarified in chapter two.

(e) Variations in the characterizations of the political communication in the modern nation state

While Fagen, as seen above, has included channels of political communication other than the media in his study of comparative political systems, his conceptual approach was his central weakness.

Fagen's functional approach and his concentration on the comparative global political system renders his analysis of political communication weak, because functionalism could not reveal the structure of political communication when applied to world communities with different socio-political, cultural and economic activities. Furthermore, although he gave full consideration of his definition of political communication in modern nations, he functionally limited his analysis to the relationship between political participation, socialization and development. He undermined the strength of the variations in the character of political communications in different nations by the assumption that communication functions as the agent of change and develops independently of socio-cultural etc. structures.

In a functional approach to political communication, and strictly in the developing areas of political systems, Almon G. and Coleman, J. (1960)

generally argued that socialization and rule-making, application and adjudication, were a function carried out through communication. All activity in the society was communication and communication was politics. For them, political activity should be described and analysed through communication. But when communication changes, the political system remains constant and unaffected - a major weakness of functional approval. What changes is the particular way in which information is gathered and disseminated through the system.

However, they made useful observations in the political communication in modern states and developing nations when they pointed out that:

"The introduction of a mass communication system has not destroyed the traditional communication network based upon personal relations. It simply means that a new network has been introduced which greatly expands the physical area of communication. What cannot now be communicated by face-to-face contact can be communicated through the mass media."²¹

With reference to West Africa and Nigeria in particular, the concept of an independent mass media in the modern nation-state is not a reality in Nigeria. There are several anomalies in the modern political communication system of Nigeria which do not fit the model of what a modern political communication system is supposed to be and how it is supposed to function.

Until the late 1960s, the definition of and research into political communication was broad both in terms of face-to-face, formal and informal interaction and the mass media. Then, Arora and Lasswell (1969) began to narrow down the study of media to a particular mode in relation to a group. Language in the press was examined in terms of American and Indian elites.²²

In recent years, mass communication research has centred heavily on political communication revolving round the press, radio and particularly TV - Chaffee 1975, Kraus Davis 1976, Rivers et. al 1976, Blumer and Gurevitch 1975. The major problem is that when political communication research is developed exclusively in terms of mass media content, influence and effect, the broad view of communication, as an integral part of political development that involves socio-economic and cultural life, is narrowed to only advanced nations. Even in advanced industrial nations, effective interpersonal political communications among decision-makers is neglected.

In a system approach to political communication, analysis takes account of both the system and sub-systems. In this case sub-systems within the system should be identified and the pattern of communication activity recognised. For instance, group formation and the structure of political communication within and between groups. Political communication, then, can be analysed in terms of vertical and horizontal interaction where face-to-face and the mass media can bring together members of a nation from both the rural and urban environments to participate in politics. Or in terms of the wider perspective of the media as major conveyors of political information where it is possible to make a distinction between horizontal communication between members of the 'political public' whose activities the media describe and vertical communication to the 'mass public' for whom the information is provided (Golding, P. 1974:87).

From the above discussions, four broad dimensions of political communication can be identified in any political system, which can be later narrowed to analyse political interaction in a developing nation - Nigeria:

- a) face-to-face communication between traditional political participants,
- b) organized political communication where information flows from organised media to mass audiences,
- c) face-to-face communication between political elites within formal and informal state institutions,
- d) face-to-face communication between political elites and non-elite groups, individuals, etc. in the system.²³

The point made by Deutsch that despite the introduction of modern political communication in a transitional/nation-state, "face-to-face contacts determine to a large degree what, in fact will be transmitted more effectively". This reinforces the importance of the interdependence of these four broad dimensions of political communications. Deutsch's position became clearer when he stressed that political communication should be seen as "a system's increased capacity to extend national communication networks ... into new sectors of society". Communication capacity, therefore, would involve the inter-dependence of the mass media, organizations, groups and special channels for interest articulation and aggregation.

Also, despite the major weaknesses of Fagen, Coleman and Almond's functional approach to the study of political communication, they have strongly

emphasised the importance of face-to-face communication in the seemingly 'effective' new or dominant mass media networks. In transitional political communication systems, Pye (1963), Lloyd (1967), Deutsch's cybernetic concept (1963) suggested that the mass media may not be the key factor in political communication development. West Africa and Nigeria in particular are typical examples of transitional political areas of the world. The inter-penetration of traditional and modern systems is taking place in a way that does not follow the classical model. The key role of the interpersonal network is very important and remains a major argument in this thesis.

In West Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, there is a strong relationship between these dimensions in the political system mainly because of the structure of social and cultural relationships in the communities.

For instance, in the West African political system, there is a close association between political parties and ethnic and kinship systems and, at the same time, modern mass media for political participation and activities have developed along the line of ethnic ties and party politics - Mytton G. (1983), Lewis W.A. (1965), Coleman J.S. (1965), Duyile (1979). Though the mass media are closely related to elite urban political communication, the socio-economic, cultural and political relationship between the elites and the non-elite kin and friends in the rural and urban environments reduces the impacts of the mass media. Political information, mobilization and participation are shaped by the kinship ties. By contrast,

"In an industrially advanced society, most people receive their major information through ... the mass communication network", and the "mass media are comparatively independent of the governing and the basic social process of the country."²⁴

A particular problem for mass media political development in Nigeria is that the political content of the media has been for the exclusive use of the minority but powerful group - the elite. Though the press is decentralized, it was historically developed as a medium of political agitation and most newspapers are printed in a foreign language akin to the elite class. Thus, government policy on the ownership and control of radio and TV constitutes a problem. Social, cultural, etc. differences between different tribes and regions imply that mass media political communication in Nigeria is within rather than between regions/states.

Other particular problems that Nigeria has in the development of politics and communications are either apparent or real. For the former, the extensive developments of education, urbanization, commercialization and capitalism have meant that various aspects of traditional political systems are superficially abandoned. In certain communities, different social factors, e.g. religion, kinship network and obligation, etc. have forced the elites to adhere to conflicting traditional values in order to gain political support. Some of the relationships with the rural population are renewed and strengthened during the election period when they need their votes. The process has led to a distrust of politicians by the masses. Also, the tendency to rely heavily on one's ethnic community for political support has led to a permanent non-national political development in Nigeria, and this increasingly weakens national political stability. The high rate of corruption, particularly among politicians in Nigeria, can be analysed in relation to the lack of nationalism.

Some of the real problems begin to emerge - the army constantly intervenes as a corrective power, but often stays in power so long after independence as to make party political development non-existent in Nigeria. Consequently, political communication, particularly the use of the mass media for participation and mobilization of support, has been greatly undermined. While Nigeria has seen a very rapid expansion in the mass media network, the expansion has very largely reflected commercial, social and cultural change, rather than party political change and development.

The press which developed along ethnic political party lines in the '60s was only as Coleman reported:

"responsible for the recruitment of most literate Africans into the political arena and for the incubation of nationalist sentiment. Its influence in the communication of ideas and of interpretation of events has been far greater than in most countries. Nationalist organizations have grown up around the press rather than around organized membership. During the period 1948-1951 ... the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons ... existed in the pages of Nnamdi Azikiwe chain of newspapers; organizationally, it was moribund."²⁵

It was widely believed that Nnamdi Azikiwe's West African Pilot was the most outstanding newspaper in this respect. Perhaps the paper made ZIK more popular than the NCNC party which he led. "The sensationalism, picture journalism, human interest stories and organized marketing of the Pilot took

its circulation to the unprecedented figure of 12,000 by 1940. Success bred success in the shape of the 'ZIK' group of newspapers." (Azikiwe, 1970 in Golding and Elliott 1979:30).

While Coleman makes the valid point that the press served to reunite elites into the NCNC party, he greatly over-emphasized the role of the press in political development in Nigeria. This is because he embarked upon a functional analysis of political communication which neglected the role of the social structure that determines such organizations as ethnic unions, e.g. Igbo State Union, kinship, regional interests that formed the basis of political support and mobilization of the Nigeria party political system during the elections in the 1960s. The attitude by political elites regarding the power of the media in the 1960s was implanted in this view until the army took over in 1966. Party politics has not developed further to enable scholars to evaluate the relationship between politics, the mass communication media and voters.

Under circumstances of military dictatorship and party political communication in which political leaders mobilize support only from the rural and urban ethnic communities of their origin, Nigeria has not been able to develop a national system of political communication.

Thus, national issues which, since independence, have involved social, cultural and economic difficulties are neglected. As the personalities represent ethnic interests, it is the politicians who matter rather than the issues. The crucial point here is that ethnic political sentiments have overshadowed the political realities of Nigeria.

Under the combination of the various forces, mentioned above, Nigeria has not developed political and communication institutions that look beyond ethnic political changes. Various changes have occurred but they have not been studied in a new political communication context. The rapid economic development, urbanization, industrialization, particularly during the mid-1970s and early 1980s oil boom, and the wide-spread development of higher education, have generated new groups of political interests and participants. The new groups are no longer characteristic of, or identified with, any one or two ethnic groups, but they exist in all groups. Though there is evidence that Nigerian politics and communication are strongly ethnic, the 1983 general elections in Imo State point to a new direction and could provide a new approach towards understanding political communication

in election campaigns in Nigeria.

At this point, I propose that Nigerian political and communication systems can best be understood in terms of a network of systems of participation, mobilization and voting. The changes can be studied within any ethnic group in terms of different participants in the system. From our discussions so far, we can within any community or ethnic group identify the following sectors:

- a) traditional
- b) young school leavers
- c) urban poor
- d) urban elites
- e) rural elites.

These have some marked differences as a result of social, political, economic and cultural changes that have occurred in Nigeria since independence. We cannot clearly understand politics and communication developments in Nigeria by examining the relationship between ethnic groups in a pseudo-national political system when much concentration and orientation of politics have occurred, which seem to reflect the social economic structure of the country.

It is important, at this stage, to establish that the above network groups exist in Nigeria and have different political communication activities. In fact, through their political activities, a more complex social structure is operating in Nigeria than in most political and communication theorists have assumed. The approach, though, presents theoretical and other problems; it is hoped that it carries great potential for a more congruent understanding of political communication in Nigeria. From the definitions of political communications given above, it can be seen that there are broadly two types: traditional face-to-face (informal) and organized mass media. The two most important groups associated with these political communication systems are the traditional network group and urban elite network. The term 'group', in this study, will be clarified later not as a group in terms of members but as aggregated individuals in terms of their socio-economic and demographic characteristics. Other network groups - younger school leavers, urban poor and rural elites are emerging or tend to emerge from either the traditional group or the urban elite sector. The latter is associated with urban

political environment, while the former with rural political communication systems in Nigeria.

RESEARCHES AND OTHER STUDIES INDICATING THE EXISTENCE OF THESE FIVE NETWORK GROUPS/SYSTEMS

1. TRADITIONAL COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

European and American anthropologists were the first to study African political systems in relation to changes that occurred as a result of contact with Europeans. Initial changes were observed in terms of culture rather than politics. Malinowski and Richards (1938, pp. VII, VIII) stressed that European contacts with Africans were the "greatest enemy" ... that "has set the machine above the human being. Changes were introduced that entailed adjustments to mechanical progress which were almost beyond the possibilities of organic adaptation." The changes, however, were more rapid than anthropologists thought. On politics and communication, Malinowski observed that the new systems were "adapted to the African physical environment and remain dependent on the African milieu".

In the 1930s, anthropologists - Fortes, Wagner, Hunter, Mair etc. - studying African political systems, maintained that the impact of European influence on African systems could not be studied within an anthropological framework because, where 'communications are poor, ... one can ... observe marked differences in the extent of European influence on different sections of the same country, while in towns and industrial areas, where the native population is heterogenous and has grown up with no inheritance of tradition, the approach would necessarily be entirely different."²⁷

Mair conversely recognised the differences between urban and rural political and social systems as a result of modernization. In terms of political communication, the crucial contribution of Mair was to locate the communication and interaction between different social and political institutions and how they were internally organized, maintained and related to one another.

The early works of anthropologists thus began to generate interest in the study of comparative political systems within nations and between nations.

All these studies about traditional political relationship, point out clearly that kinship networks were the basic political communication system. The kinship-based political communication system renders less emphasis on power and legitimate right to control others. Thus Habermas J. writes:

"... organized according to kinship relations ... in these societies there are myths that interpret the natural and social order. They fix membership in the tribal group (and its limits) and thus secure a collective identity. Mythological world views here have a constitutive significance rather than a subsequent legitimate significance."²⁹

This is only an aspect of political relation in a traditional society where myths such as in the Igbo mythology constitute only one aspect of the political system. Religion, Habermas, 1979:81, notes, was a powerful legitimacy which helped to resolve conflicts in traditional political systems. Habermas compared legitimate power in African political systems with those in Europe. But Fortes and Evans-Pritchard, from the experience in their study of political and social relations in Tallensi, in Ghana, debated whether, before the colonial period, Africa had any political system.

The problem of legitimacy here is the problem of the methods used to maintain law and order, in order to achieve political stability and progress for the society, rather than a definition of political system. Schapara pointed out that for a traditional political system to survive and the social order of the group to be maintained, the use of physical force was necessary, thus he described political legitimacy in a traditional society as: "that aspect of the total organisation which is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of internal co-operation and external independence" (I. Schapera, London: Watts, 1956, p.217)

Other studies which have examined in some detail the existence, structure, content and characteristics of traditional political systems and interaction are (to name but a few) E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Divine Kinship of the

Shilluk, 1948, The Nuer, 1940; G. Lienhardt, 'The Western Dinka' in Tribes Without Rulers; J. Middleton and Ronald Cohen (eds) 1967; Middleton, 1958; Wagner, J., 1949, etc.

Most of the early studies recognised forms of political communication:

"The Chiefs of higher rank are expected to move within their territory, hold meetings, and explain to people the measures for the improvement of hygiene, cultivation ... if people are to adopt these measures they must be constantly reminded of them, and this measure is the duty of the lower level chiefs, headmen of the villages..."³⁰

The differences between chiefs, headmen, kins and the process of political communication vary widely in Africa. The differences also determine the degree of conflict, power distribution and political stability in the traditional and even in the modern national government in many African countries today. In the New African Year Book, 1979:130, Watson, W. 1977:55, 152, shows how political stability is maintained in traditional and modern African states where both have instituted leadership and association with the rest of the system through kinship.

But where the two have been fused together, Ernest Gellner (1983:13) believed that communication, force, persuasion and dialogues are the major instruments capable of such fusion. He also pointed out that geographically, larger areas within two different political traditions can be fused together through communication processes.

However, the basic unit of political communication in a traditional system is that small groups are held together by common descent or kinship, living in a limited geographical setting. The means of livelihood are the principal occupations were farming, fishing, hunting and trading. Generally, there is lack of formal education in the Western sense of the term. Its major political communication characteristics have been outlined above according to W. Pye (1963:24-25), observation.

Much literature and research results exist which describe and state various approaches to the understanding and analysis of political communication in traditional societies. But in relation to modern political systems and communication, they treat them separately. Often, politics and communication in both systems are studied independently of each other. In

this study, I should argue that in developing countries such as Nigeria, both traditional and urban politics and communication should be studied together to show how the relationships between them and the political participants have brought about the emerging new political communication structures.

2. THE URBAN ELITE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

Perhaps the most important result in the African contact with the European traders, missionaries, and colonials was the development of an elite class which altered the shape of African political communication systems. In the context of Africa, P.C. Lloyd (1966:288) defined African elites as "those men and women who have received a substantial Western education and are (almost in consequence) relatively wealthy. They are a national elite ...". With reference to the Yoruba in Western Nigeria, Lloyd states that the elites "are a small group; they have a highly distinctive style of life; they enjoy great economic privilege in the State. Most leading members were educated in Britain and many participated in left-wing political parties."

He admits that though the elite has its own distinctive lifestyle, 'class' and social stratification as we know them in Europe are totally absent from his description of social relationships in Yoruba society. He concludes that the wealthy but illiterate and semi-literate traders, traditionally orientated and prominent educated Obas and chiefs are excluded from the elite group. The crucial years of elite political power began between 1946 and 1951, thus Arthur Lewis writes:

"the years 1946 to 1951 created a new political situation in West Africa. The new constitutions offered real power; not merely the opportunity to be in a minority of one or two in a legislative assembly dominated by men nominated by the Governor, but the opportunity to influence policy. ... By 1961 every West African country had become independent, except Gambia and Portuguese Guinea. The real road to political power lay through organising millions of voters in the countryside; a few speeches in the capital and articles in the newspapers were no longer central; one had to have widespread organisation and bureaucracy."³¹

In this chapter, the important roles of African elites in the development of a new political communication system are not going to be elaborated; the aim is to show that elite political groups do exist in West Africa, Nigeria and elsewhere. Karl Deutsch, using the mathematical model developed by

Professor Rashevsky in his Theory of Human Relations³² identified three levels of political communication participants - 'active', 'partially active', and 'passive population'. In relation to these levels, he associated different population categories to them - 'active' to 'a relatively small elite' usually of less than 5 percent of the population.³³ Also Deutsch (1966a:156) identified bureaucratic decision-making elites from political party elites.

In terms of symbolic political mobilisation through powerful public speeches, Edelman, in his book 'The Symbolic Uses of Politics', p.72, 180, argued that political leadership should not be emphasised 'in terms of the traits of an elite' but the number of supporters a political leader is able to rally behind him.

Mills, C.W. The Power Elite (1956), discussed the role of the 'power elite' in terms of important political and social issues which are also issues that interest the mass media, hence elite interest and mass media in political terms are unique. Lowi (1963:16, 667-715), and also Bachrach, P. and Baratz, M. (1970) argued that important social and political issues could be irrelevant in the understanding of the roles of political elites because this group tries to keep them out of the agenda. In particular, Lowi argues that what is important in the understanding of elite political roles is the redistributive issues which are class-based. Cohen (1963) also shared similar views of elite political communication roles in democratic politics.

In the production of broadcast news, Golding and Elliott (1979:122) stated that the "elites are covered to the extent that their activities are accessible and to the extent that these activities match other news values. Thus the political circus is a prime focus of attention, while economic and financial elites remain shrouded ... It is those elites whose activities fit, or who choose to be accessible and visible which make news". News is about people they said and in Nigerian context, "organisations and groupings appear less often than isolated individuals as the prime movers in the historical process captured by news stories". Statistically, they showed that 50.5% of NBC TV and 41.8% NBC Radio news content centred around the activities of individual actors. They mentioned that 'this focus on personalities rather than groups inevitably shape the portrayal of events themselves, suggesting the powerful and sudden influence of personalities as the potent drive in the affairs rather than any less tangible, or less objective subjects'. Later, we shall see the relevance of this observation

and empirical report in the discussion of charismatic ethnic leadership, state ownership and control of the media in relation to news and political broadcasts in 1983 general elections in Nigeria.

Perhaps, one of the most elaborate studies on the role of elites and the ruling class, in which concertedness in political, social and family networks formed the basis of relation, was that carried out by Lamb, R.K. (1952). He vividly illustrated the political roles of elites and leading families in America in the struggle for national unity and independent movement and their leadership in American politics thereafter.

From different theoretical points of view, one of the major problems in elite politics is how to identify them in any given society³⁴ so that we can determine whether that society has an elite political system or not. Dahl, R. 'A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model' (1958) distinguished the political elites in terms of influence and power within a political group or system.

"A ruling elite, is a controlling group less than a majority in size that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules. It is a minority of individuals whose preferences regularly prevail in cases of differences in preference on key political issues."³⁵

Dahl stressed that an elite does not determine whether a political system exists or not, but an elite political system exists only when a political system is dominated and controlled by a group of elites - i.e. the masses are not in control of the crucial decision-making processes and the distribution of power and wealth etc. Nettle, J.P. (1967:92) discussed the concept of elite political systems in terms of socio-economic power which in turn yields them political power and authority. He pointed out that those who rule are not exclusively elites but those who have high potential to control. He emphasised the importance of institutionalised authority in relation to elite potential control. Draus, S. and Davis, D. (1978:178) shared a similar view but pointed out that social organisations when centralised, become effective organs of political control by a few elites who have authority to transfer power. They noted that in a democratic political system, the masses have the power to reject the legitimate authority of the elite leaders if they so wish.

Relating these theoretical models to the third world and particularly to Africa, Fagen, R. (1966:126) pointed out that the elements of colonialism generated the emergence of an elite group. He described them as

'charismatic leaders' in fragmented political systems. Samjeeva Nayak (1973) from the work of David E. Apter (1973) classified the elites in Ghana into: civil servants, who were apolitical during the colonial rule; the non-governing elites - the opposition party who try to displace the ruling elite; the ruling elite and its supporters; and the intellectual elite who are engaged in education. The battle for political power ranges between the governing elite and the opposition elite³⁶.

Arthur Lewis (1965:13, 19-25) has demonstrated how the development of elite politics in West Africa has created both horizontal and vertical political struggle. The nature of the struggle between traditional and modern elites illustrates the emergence of a new complex political communication structure in West Africa. The close relationship between elites and the political party system was stated and he concluded that:

"One of the potential merits of a political party is that it can break down apathy and political ignorance, by establishing a cell in every village, maintaining a steady flow of communication between leaders and rank and file, in both directions."³⁷

In Senegal (West Africa), Paul Mercier³⁸ recognised that colonisation resulted in an elite class in West Africa and that individuals in this class competed among themselves for political leadership. Berghe, V. (1965) pointed out that during the colonial period, political struggle in West Africa was between African elites and colonial authorities. Basil Davidson (1978:231) noted that amongst 'top-elites', journalism was primarily responsible for the achievement of independence in West Africa - ie. Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia and Sierra Leone.

The elite political system in Nigeria has the same general characteristics as other ex-British West African countries. Virtually every publication on Nigerian politics and communication systems has emphasised the crucial roles of the educated elites in the systems. The emphases range from leadership in national, regional, urban, small village, to unions or clubs etc - of whose roles K.W. Post and Michael Vickers note 'several' among other functions, "as important communication links between urban migrants and rural communities, and political parties were able to exploit these links for their own purpose." ³⁹

They developed the concept of 'primordial attachments in a conglomerate society', which helped them to distinguish different political groups

through which information flows. Political information, participation, mobilisation and identification are dependent on individual membership of a group in Nigeria.

James S. Coleman (1965), examined the role of the elites in nationalist movements and independent attainment in Nigeria.

"The leaders and most of the active supporters of the Nigerian Nationalist movement come from the ranks of those who had been most strongly affected by Western influences, and in particular from the Western-educated English-speaking minority."⁴⁰

Makintosh (1966) laid major emphasis on the party political system and the working of the Nigerian constitution and his analysis was extremely general but mostly centred on urban and elite political activities. Though he did not fail to observe the strong connection between the urban and rural population in Nigerian political systems.

"Politics in the sense of division of scarce resources among competing villages, tribes and regions, cannot be permanently avoided. Politicians in the sense of men (with local connections and therefore local pressure) whose task is full-time decision-making at the top level, cannot be dispensed with. When these procedures and persons, be they civil or military in origin, have been in action for some time, many of the factors affecting politics are likely to occur."⁴¹

His observation is very important in the understanding of urban/village politics in Nigeria in terms of interpersonal networks of connections.

But, at the group level, linkages between village and urban political participation and mobilisation for support through union, has been noted by Smoch (1971) who emphasised the role of educated elites. She pointed out that ethnic political systems as they operated in the urban areas and their ties with rural areas were organised by those who were most politically conscious. She demonstrated the existence of such political struggle with the Igbo communities in Eastern Nigeria where the development of 'unions' constituted the most powerful socio-political body that integrated the activities of the Igbos in the cities and in the villages. In the process, she pointed out that:

"Confrontation with the forces of modernity unleashed by the colonial administration precipitated the formation of a new and more inclusive identity, the Igbo people. Educated elements first embraced this new identity."⁴²

J.E. Goldthorpe (1961) has argued that 'there is a considerable power component in the term '(elite)' which is not quite or not necessarily justified when we speak of the educated African elite. He feels that the term should be applied only to independent African states, e.g. Ghana. He, however, agrees that to understand how African modern political systems operate, the elite or the educated class should be considered as a group.

In categorising African elites during the colonial period, Professor Busia (1961) distinguished three groups of African elites:

- a) "the traditional 'royal' families"
- b) European or colonial officials
- c) The educated Africans

But at the attainment of independence, the African elites took control of power and

"new elites are thus able to monopolise power ... It is permissible in the Gold Coast (Ghana) to regard all who are literate as an elite because their patterns of aspiration are 'Western', that is European-orientated."⁴⁴

Goldthorpe (1961:147) maintained that it is these elites who have set a new 'standard' in Africa and 'its influence or power being that of a model accepted and considered worth following'. In African political systems therefore, there are traditional elites, with local and non-western education, and the broad or generalised elite with western education, but not all the latter group are political elites. Lloyd (1966:14) distinguishes two significant elites in the early periods of colonialization in Nigeria "The traditional elite of the political office-holders of tribal societies and the earlier westernized elites". Socio-politically, Lloyd (1966:51) then described an African elite as the mediator between western and traditional influences. Its individual members, born most probably into traditional homes, have to decide what to incorporate from the western industrialized world and what to reject. The masses, furthermore, often look to them for leadership in these matters. All the different categories of elites necessary for political communication analysis in Western Africa have been outlined by Nayak (1965); Goldthorpe (1961); Lloyd (1967); Balandier (1955:161) and Leith-Rose (1956:178).

Finally, the expansion of university education in Nigeria has produced a large number of aspirants into the elite political system. The competition for political support now ranges among the elites themselves. Those who cannot win considerable support from their own community to gain political power, now tend to satisfy the requirement of other powerful political elites outside the contender's own ethnic region or state. In socio-political terms, Goldthorpe (1961:156) pointed out that:

"... when the social climber is excluded" or even decides to exclude himself "... from the group to which he aspires, anticipatory socialisation becomes dysfunctional for the individual who becomes the victim of aspirations he cannot achieve and hopes he cannot satisfy."

This concept can be applied to two groups in Nigeria between the 1979 and 1983 general elections. Those individuals who joined other political parties that were dominated by ethnic groups other than their own and the ethnic minorities who joined other larger ethnic groups outside their own geographical region. Most of the leaders in this new political movement, based on identification and participation are the elites. The trend is in fact an important phase in Nigerian political communication, (of participation and mobilisation of support) at rural/urban and national levels.

THE URBAN POOR (THE PROLETARIAT AND LUMPEN PROLETARIAT) YOUNG SCHOOL
LEAVERS AND RURAL ELITES GROUP/SYSTEMS

As pointed out earlier, the above groups are derivatives of either the traditional network system or the urban elite system. The differences between them depend on several inter-related factors, e.g. residence, education, age and occupation etc. In West Africa and particularly Nigeria, their similarities and differences vary widely but differences tend to be softened by the structure of extended family and kinship relationship predominant in West Africa. Leith-Rose comments in reference to Nigeria that:

"The family is not the unit of parents and children but the extended family which looks for financial help or moral support to whatever member has made good. The minister has a sister 'selling

casava in the market', the successful doctor has a 'brother' working as public worker department labourer. The family bond linking rich and poor, literate, influential and insignificant, militates against any idea of strictly isolated 'class'. It also prevents the group, though increasingly westernised from being cut off from its origin."⁴⁵

With particular reference to modernizing African elites, Lloyd (1977:135) has shown quantitatively that there is a strong link between traditional and rural sectors:

"Very many of the elite have come from humble homes. Two fifths of those men with post-secondary education have fathers who never attended school and who were in consequence farmers or poorer craftsmen; only one quarter have fathers who received post-primary education. These latter fathers were, of course, the elite of their own generation - the chief clerks, the primary school headmasters, the clergy, etc."

The observation also prevents any revolution and 'class' struggle similar to what happened in Western Europe in the 1830s and 1840s. It generates nepotism and corruption and furthermore reinforces the fundamentals of ethnic political participation. Narrowly assessed, Arthur Lewis (1965) noted that:

"West African society does not fit into the marxist categories. The area is under-populated, so land is abundant, and in most tribes a man has the right to as much land as he can cultivate. Hence landlord, rents, oppressed peasants and landless labourers are rare."⁴⁶

As groups which emerge are from either the traditional or urban elite groups, I shall state only the principal characteristics and attributes which distinguish them from the two main groups (traditional and urban elite).

3. THE URBAN POOR

A good example of a city in West Africa where there are sharp differences and a steadily widening gap between the poor and the rich is Lagos. In Victoria Island it costs as much as N45,000 (£36,000) a year to rent a three bedroom flat by the rich, while in Idimangro Ikeja, Lagos, the poorest Nigerians live in empty containers or abandoned lorries. The root of urban poor emergence in West Africa has been traced by J.R. Rayfield who argues that the colonial cities - cities founded in the early twentieth century in

West Africa - were founded to serve the interest of the colonial authorities and after independence in the sixties, the cities underwent little or no structural changes. Though the indigenous elites assumed power, the economic power remained in the hands of foreigners. Migration from the rural to urban areas was a continual process. He notes that:

"In most colonial cities, bad housing and unemployment are serious problems, but only Gutkind sees the new urban proletariat as a serious threat to political stability."⁴⁷

Peter Worsely and Franz Fanon have described the urban poor as the 'underclass or proletariat or the victims of urbanisation and industrialisation'. They pointed out that in the colonial system, the urban poor were unable to find a 'bone to grow', they deserted the family and rural occupation and moved into the cities where they became the core 'of the shanty towns' through lack of regular employment, they were forced to embark on 'stealing, debauchery and alcoholism. Juvenile delinquency in the colonial countries is the direct result of the existence of a lumpen proletariat"⁴⁸

A description of the urban proletariat in the African context has been attempted by Amilcar Gabral who described the lumpen proletariat as those city 'declassed people' and the proletariat - 'made up of young people who are connected to petty bourgeois or workers' families" and recently 'arrived from the rural areas and generally do not work ... they have relationship with rural areas as well as with the towns and even with the Europeans. They often live off one kind of work or another but generally live at the expense of their families.'⁴⁹

The urban proletariats are the equivalent of young school leavers who are in part potential members of urban lumpen proletariats or the urban elites. Their future economic status determines which of the groups they would belong to. Because of the unstable character of the socio-political and economic situation in West Africa in relation to different groups, the term proletariat and lumpen proletariat should, to avoid over-generalization, not be frequently used because:

"Generalisations are specially dangerous in societies which are changing."⁵⁰

The truth of this warning is vividly illustrated in Nigeria where within a decade of the oil boom, the nation saw the emergence of a new wealthy class which was previously so poor members of it could ill afford a meal a day. In this respect I chose the simpler term 'urban poor' to describe the socio-political and communication activities of this 'class' in an election campaign.

The definition of social group in terms of economic status has been stated by Lloyd. Even when social groups are defined in ethnic or residential terms, interests are "often couched in economic terms and involving power relations". In the Third World countries "the urban poor are the immigrants from the rural areas" (Lloyd 1984:74).

The real urban experience of the urban poor has been summed up by Philip Hauser, who emphasised that the rapid urbanisation has created 'acute' and chronic socio-political problems which are:

"most discernible in the adjustment of migrant to the urban living. In the city, he is confronted with a bewildering and almost incomprehensible vastness with his fellow villagers or relatives and only gradually becomes accommodated to city life."⁵¹

Adjustment to city life may not be a very serious problem in Nigeria. The degree of the problem varies from one part of the country to the other. The greater the similarities between the rural areas from where the migrant originates and the city where he has started a new urban life, the less the pressure for adjustment in terms of language and culture. The major 'subjective problem' arises as J.A. Jackson observed when:

"successful participation in one social system subjects the individuals to penalties or deprivations in the other. This may arise when participation in more than one sub-system is perceived as an act of disloyalty or when there is discrimination against the migrant in the dominant social system."⁵²

The problem of adjustment for a migrant in African townships is structural and pre-exist the arrival of the migrant himself.

"The young migrant arrives, with or without prior warning, and in most cases makes immediately for the house of his closest relatives. Indeed, many will have already spent a holiday there. A smaller number will join their school classmates who have established themselves. The host acknowledges an obligation to provide board and lodging and help the new comer to find

employment and a permanent place in which to live. Not unnaturally he is anxious to see his lodger independently established as soon as possible and to this end he exploits his own network to the full. The migrant is thus quickly drawn into an established network consisting most immediately of his close kin in the city, and then other members of the same area." (Lloyd 1984:75).

Lloyd emphasised that while new network ties are being created in the urban area, the migrant also maintains a tenacious link with the rural homeland. The link with the rural origin is not 'merely an effective tie, it must be seen in terms of the security which it affords in the urban situation.'

The essential features of the urban poor have been described by Nelson who sums up their status characteristics as 'low', often excluded from formal 'organisations and association' and who at the same time, while they live in the city, exhibit major characteristics that are 'rural in origin'. Particularly, they create informal and private webs of contacts which constitute the urban social structure. He concludes that:

"They may also be culturally marginal, clinging to customs, manners, dress, speech and values which contrast with the accepted urban patterns. They lack ties to, or influence on, the established political institutions."⁵³

Lloyd (1984) did not only identify the urban poor as migrants from the rural area, he also associated them with certain occupations in the city:

"as building construction labourers or temporary unskilled workers". They are mostly artisans or petty traders. A typical village urban migrant is "young who migrates from the village between the age of 15 and 25, perhaps at the end of primary education. Most of these young men/women have abandoned farming which is stagnant. Their poor skill for city jobs makes them extremely vulnerable for lack of moral and financial support. Their most important need is a regular employment. The information on jobs comes from relatives who live in the city. Consequently, there is 'a strong reliance upon those who can provide information about jobs, or introduce one to employers or customers. One's social network is thus a most valued resource; time and energy spent in maintaining it is as important as investing in a savings account - and in conditions of extreme poverty it is much more prevalent. But the network so created is far from congruent with economic, ethnic, or residential categories (Lloyd, 1984).

4. YOUNG SCHOOL LEAVERS

The expansion in education from primary to university levels in Africa is a clear evidence that this group exists. In Nigeria, the evidence can be summed up statistically, thus:

Education (1980-81)

	<u>Schools</u>	<u>Teachers</u>	<u>Students</u>	<u>Student/ Teacher ratio</u>
Primary (age 6-12)	36,683	384,201	14,022,165	36.5
Secondary school (12-17)	4,495	69,005	2,024,025	29.3
Vocational, teacher training	470	12,156	359,817	29.6
Higher	77	-	153,306	-

College graduates per 100,000 population (students graduating 1981): 19.5
literacy (1980): total population literate (30.4%).

(Extract from Britannica World Data Annual, 1985, p.752)

Compared with the Cameroons (55.2%), Liberia (70.5%), Zaire (57.9%), and the Ivory Coast (35.0%), the level of literacy in Nigeria is still very low. This is because the Northern part of the country did not embrace western education as vigorously as the south until a few years after independence. Serious attempts have been made to 'bridge the gap'.

In Nigeria and other West African countries, young school leavers are the floating group who have been described by Arthur Lewis (1965:12) as 'primary school graduates pouring out of the schools at an accelerating pace, and looking for clerical jobs which do not exist'. He believed that unemployment was due to young people leaving the land for the towns (village groups) faster than the cities could provide them with jobs. He recognised their political potential as a group which supplies radical politicians with a solid core as devoted party workers.

Arthur Lewis' notion of what causes of unemployment of young school leavers in the cities is only in part true. In my view, the crucial issue is that the the type of education given to young people in West Africa is practically unrelated to agriculture. Secondly, while the missionaries were establishing schools and colleges in the rural areas, the colonial administration as well as post-colonial authorities failed to set up industries and ministries in the same areas to absorb young school leavers. The cities where these activities were inadequately concentrated became a

great attraction. Manufacturing industries were set up in the colonial metropolitan centres, raw material came back as finished goods to be consumed by the colonialized city population. Young school leavers who left the village for the cities were thus disappointed and frustrated. They could easily become politicised by more 'radical politicians'. In the time of an election, they constitute important political party agents of violence. In this study the young school leaver group also includes secondary and university graduates, who are increasingly constituting the majority of the unemployed young people.

We have noted above that the predominant economic activity of most traditional societies is agriculture. As late as 1966, "agriculture alone is reported to account for some 50 per cent of Nigeria's national income and 85 per cent of the country's export trade" (Carter 1966:30). Recent economic change, and the rapid expansion of primary education (Lloyd, 1966:26) have produced large numbers of young school leavers. The most serious problem, Lloyd (1967:197-198) "is unemployment among school leavers. Young men and women who attend school in villages reject the traditional occupations of their parents and hopefully migrate to the cities in search of paying jobs. With the rapid expansion of basic education, the number of job-seeking youths has increased sharply. But the economy is not growing at a high enough rate to provide immediate employment for more than a small proportion of these school leavers". He concluded that Ibadan, in Nigeria, as a centre of political, administrative and commercial activities, attracts many school leavers who remained unemployed. "Their unemployment condition reflects a major lack of balance between the education process and the developing economy."

Claude Meillassoux (1968:96) also maintained that economic and social factors force young Africans to migrate to the cities from the village. "A young man goes to school in a small town near his village; at the end of his elementary studies, he finds no employment worthy of his literacy. The feeling of losing a precious investment is very keen, both for the young man and for his family. Someone therefore advises him to go to Bamako where opportunities are greater." Socially, Meillassoux feels that another reason which compels young school leavers to migrate to the city was "to free themselves from patriarchal rule."

Margaret Peil (1972) in her study of 'Industrial Milieu in Africa' showed that in Ghana, school leavers from the North and South of the country show

different attitudes to work in the city.

"Those who grew up in the villages, especially Northerners and non-Ghanans, were more likely to escape long periods of unemployment than were southerners and those of urban origin. This is related to the willingness of the former to do unskilled work and farm, whereas the latter are orientated towards 'school leavers' jobs which take longer to find" (Peil 1972:72).

She showed that reasons for the migrants to go to a particular city also differed:

"Three quarters of the urban workers, 84% of Kumabi workes and 89% of rural workers said they chose their destination because of its reputation for jobs". (Peil 1972:144).

Most of her respondents obtained information on jobs through a network of friends and relatives. Another popular reason for a chosen destination was the availability of someone with whom the migrant would stay with 'while looking for work'.

Adrean Pece in her study of migrant workers of Southern Nigeria illustrates that the general characteristics of the migrants are youthfulness - the majority of them are in their late teens and early twenties. And in particular most of them "are educated, though not to a high level. Virtually all have completed primary school, and a sizeable proportion have spent between one and three years in secondary school. The education of most has been prematurely terminated through lack of family finances ..." (Pece, 1979:10-11). Some of his respondents were attracted to Agege, Lagos, because they expected help from ex-school friends or relatives who lived there.

Unemployment is no longer restricted to primary and secondary school leavers but the slow expansion in the economy has resulted in large numbers of university graduates becoming unemployed (Lloyd, 1974:39). Lloyd also pointed out that, not long ago, a holder of a primary school leaving certificate could obtain bureaucratic employment, but today although the situation has changed large numbers of them continue to leave the village for the city as the last hope for employment.

5. RURAL ELITES

Most of the characteristics attributed to African elites described above are applicable to this group. Major differences are that rural elites are mainly teachers by training and professional. And most important of all, they live and teach in the rural areas in Nigeria.

During the colonial period, they played leading political roles. Almond and Coleman (1960:341) observed that in those days in Ghana and Nigeria,

"... 30 per cent of the members of the legislature are teachers. Most of these are from the rural areas and constitute what Lucian Pye has called the 'Provincial elites'. One ... argues that this heavy representation of teachers is mainly attributable to the fact that the primary school teacher enjoys a position in the bush village which gives him a high social standing and great influence. This is also true in Nigeria."⁵⁴

Trained teachers for both primary and secondary institutions have (particularly in Imo state) begun to experience similar problems of unemployment as the school leavers. By 1966, Lloyd noted that Nigeria had only a third of the qualified secondary school graduate teachers needed for the rapidly expanding secondary institutions. Today, large numbers of these graduates who pass out from several Nigerian Universities join the mass of unemployed. There was even a time when:

"Most students received a government scholarship or were bonded by grammar school or teacher-training colleges (the school paid their fees in return for a promise that the student would work there - a means of ensuring a steady flow of graduate teachers at a period when competition for a limited number leaving the universities were very high)". (Lloyd, 1974:98)

With the expansion in secondary and post-secondary education, and the top business class, the role of teachers and civil servants as professional politicians (legislative representatives) became more marginal. In the 1979 and 1983 general elections, they were not allowed to play particular political roles. This does not mean that local teachers did not participate actively as party agents and voters (as will be seen later) in the 1983 elections. Their close contact with the rural population made them a very important political group in the Nigerian political communication system. In fact, through their political activities, a more complex social structure is operating in Nigeria than most political communication theorists have

perceived. Unlike groups of young school leavers, rural elite in Nigeria have a wide range of ages and are deeply involved in education in the rural areas. When they retire from teaching or school administration, most of them remain in their native village and become more active in local political organisations. They understand local politics more clearly than their urban elite counterparts. Political elites tend to depend on their village connections and influence during an election campaign.

By establishing that these different groups of political actors exist in any particular region or state in Nigeria, we shall be able to evaluate roles and processes of political communications between them it is hoped that though this approach presents theoretical and other problems; it offers great potential for a more congruent understanding of political communication in Nigeria. From the definitions given earlier, it can be seen that there are broadly two types of political communication: traditional face-to-face (informal) and organized mass media. The two most important groups associated with these political communication systems are the traditional network group and the urban elite network. Other groups distinguished by their characteristics and activities, are associated with either or both types of communications systems. They are emerging or tend to be emerging from either the traditional group or the urban network group. The urban elite is associated with the urban political environment, while the traditional group is akin to the rural political communication systems in Nigeria.

The five groups identified above have quite different characteristics and attributes. What determines their political communication in terms of participation, mobilisation and voting are these different characteristics and attributes such as the socio-political environment (rural or urban), the population composition (homogenous or heterogenous), education and religion. Other characteristics of the groups are associated with ethnic origin, occupation, age, horizontal and vertical mobility and membership of social clubs. The term network group/system here refers to aggregates of individuals in the population who share similar characteristics and attributes that help them to participate in a particular way in the political communication system in Nigeria. 'Group' in this sense is different from a group made up of numbers, say 1-10, because of its differing and contrasting characteristics. It is also different from an ethnic group which shares a common language and culture but whose members exhibit a variety of dissimilar characteristics. A detailed discussion of the concept of network of political communication will be carried out later.

SOCIAL NETWORK STUDIES IN NIGERIAN URBAN CENTRES

Adrian Peace (1979) carried out a network survey in Agege and Ikeja, Lagos. He focussed on the "migrants" involvement in different types of interpersonal relationships in the town, and in particular in "personal networks of home-town which comprises young men who have migrated from the same Yoruba town or its rural environs" (Peace 1979:21).

Unlike most African cities, he observed that in Agege and Ikeja, there was a general lack of voluntary associations. He suggested that the reason might be that there was a lack of pre-colonial institutions in Agege and the area is a heterogeneous community in which ethnicity was not entrenched "into the economic structure of the town". Also, the distance between the migrants' natal home and Agege was short, so that most of them 'retained close contact with their place of origin thus in part obviating the need for ethnic associations'.

Under the present economic orientation of Nigeria, a new pattern of interpersonal network in the cities is emerging. It is a pattern which is influenced by self-employed men and women in business and trade. In order to maximise economic opportunities, they must build a wider network beyond kinship ties in the city.

"They must ... cultivate an extensive network of personalized relationship with suppliers, journeymen, apprentices, clients and customers. This is not, therefore, a favourable economic context, for formal rule-organized relationships to flourish and prosper. The stress throughout is on competitive individualism and this emphasis Agege people in general carry over into other spheres of urban life." (Peace 1979:22-23)

Prior to the development of a personalised economic network, primary network ties are established which in Peace's view were often negotiated by the parents of the migrants. Most of these primary network ties are kinsmen and elders. However, in time, the emigrant builds up or expands his network to others outside of his tribesmen. But,

"all migrants are quite emphatic that one's friends whatever their origin are of a qualitatively different order to one's urban brothers, in town, these being the third and most important set of relationships, and the ones on which migrants are greatly dependent for support and assistance at all times. It is through

relationships between urban brothers that the major obstacles to individual well-being are met. These are appropriately described as personal networks characterized by the dense and multiplex relationships existing between members at any one moment in time." (Peace 1979:29)

Here Peace's concept of 'social network' is very basic and purely descriptive and particularly employed to describe the migrants' movement from the rural to the urban environment. There, he establishes links with his tribesmen who are already living in the city. The individual expands his personal network through friendships. The more important network is that of the urban brothers and not his friends. His network concept is equivalent to tribal-mutual aid groups. However, Peace admits that his use of the term 'social network' in the study of migrants' behaviour in Agege is really only in an 'elementary descriptive sense' he made reference to Mitchel et.al (1969).

Peace's social network groups in Agege are a homogeneous groups in terms of wages, skill, ethnic origin and age. "The norm is four or five although they range from between two and eight strong". Ethnic origin and economic aid among members of the group are the most important factors which bind the group together. Economically, "networks must carry unemployed members on a recurrent basis".

Once a network of this character is formed, other network groups are connected and wider inter-network group relationships are established in Agege. Information about employment flows between ethnic network groups for the purpose of assisting new immigrant members. In certain cases, networks can extend information about available jobs in towns to relatives in the village. For instance, we saw earlier, that Igbos in Northern Nigeria were disliked by Northerners because they passed information about existing jobs to their relatives in the village in the East.

While Peace's concept of network group in Agege can help us to understand the structural roots of ethnic ties in Nigerian urban centres which generates nepotism, conflicts and corruption, his concept is rather a weak base for the evaluation of a network of political communication where kinship ties play a part with other factors such as the mass media. Interpersonal political communication may involve members other than kin in the city. Peace's network group is rather too homogenous to consider others in their group. "Migrants say that urban brothers, as opposed to his

friends, trust one another, they are generous with one another and that between brothers everything is shared."

This lack of trust between ethnic groups in the urban centers quickly spreads to the villages via networks. Indeed lack of trust extends to all sectors of Nigerian society, a serious factor so much entrenched in the country's ethnic politics and communication that the politicians have used it further divide the nation and exploit it for their personal interest.

We have seen earlier, that in the city, the elites and the elders offer initial accommodation and set about finding jobs for new ethnic members who arrive in the city. This 'benevolent' attitude enhances the popularity of the city elites both in the city and in the village, and in due course could have political implications/consequences. The importance of this economic dependence on ethnic or kinship ties in Nigerian urban centres provoked one person surveyed to responde:

"If you treat your brothers like other townspeople (in relation to debt) then you will be quickly lost. Brothers are the only people you can trust in Agege and if you are not generous with them, then you will not survive." (Peace 1979:35).

While Peace could not discover the existence of ethnic organisations among the migrants in Agege, Lloyd (1974) showed that kinship organizations were wide spread in Ibadan - Western Nigeria. Perhaps one of the main reasons is that Agege is a post-colonial suburb of Lagos. As Peace noted, colonial institutions and policies which encouraged ethnicity could not affect Agege to the extent that they affected a pre-colonial urban centre such as Ibadan. Thus the degree of kinship network formation in terms of small or large ethnic organisations varies in accordance with the age and size of the urban centre and its distance from the village of the migrant.

However, Lloyd's concept of social network is structurally and analytically more powerful than Peace's in the context of network of relationship in Nigerian urban centres.

On the basis of the individual, Lloyd conceptualizes him as the 'ego' who in his "social network comprises the totality of his social relationship, described with refernece to himself, it is thus ego-oriented or ego-centred." (Lloyd, 1974:133).

Lloyd then points out that in his wider definition of 'network', it embraces "only those persons with whom the ego was in everyday contact and communication and to exclude those relationships with acquaintances which are but potentially or very rarely activated".

His concepts of network was applied to the study of migrants' social behaviour in Ibadan.

"Yoruba Urban migrants maintain intensive, or intimate relationships with their close kin, but may if these remain in the rural area, interact with them but infrequently."

In other words, the intensity of the network of relationships is dependent on the physical proximity to each other of the individuals in the network. Mitchel (1969) has shown that in the city the intensity of interaction between members of the network and their distant kin in the village is governed by kinship obligation rather than by proximity.

The relationship between the rural kin and the urban workmates network is described by Lloyd in terms of action or action-set (Lloyd, 1974, Mitchel 1969). Action-set or communication-set are those individuals and relationships which are mobilized for specific ends. Lloyd then applied the concept of 'action-set' to the relationship in the crises between the Igbos and the Yorubas.

"... in the case of a dismissed Ibo worker, two action-sets were activated - his workmates and the Trade Union Officials in order to fight for his reinstatement, and the members of his ethnic group to find him alternative employment." (Lloyd 1974:134)

Other 'specific ends' which involve the activation or formation of an 'action-set' in Nigeria will be looked at more closely with reference to elections and the process of mobilization of electors' support.

Lloyd proposes that network group formation in a traditional Yoruba community is possible under certain criteria which may include: kinship, age, and occupation because a person's network is confined to the individual's town or village. The problem of the type of network under the above criteria is that a network group is hardly different from a tribal group. It does not permit of a dynamic network analysis which would reveal the structure of the social, political and economic change, attitudes and

behaviour of different groups in the urban and rural areas. The criteria of dynamic change would be associated with education, horizontal mobility, residence as well as age, occupation and kinship. Education and occupation have, since the colonial period, produced a new breed of political actors. We should assess how strongly they still adhere to the kinship network for political mobilization and support.

Lloyd maintains that because of geographical mobility, an individual's personal network in Nigeria has become extensive because siblings, parents, children etc. migrate to different urban centres and at the same time they maintain links which are governed by obligatory kinship norms. We noted earlier that there are new economic network groups whose members interact with other Nigerians without any consideration of kinship ties. Also, schoolmates or classmates, and professional groups now form extensive networks. In an analysis of the network of communication in modern day Nigerian society, these new patterns of association should also be considered.

Lloyd, in emphasising the importance of kinship obligation in the Nigerian social network system, carefully outlined how the urban poor and urban elites differently maintain network ties with their rural natal home.

"The pressure on the poor to seek their ultimate social security in the community and on the rich to identify with it, causes both to assiduously maintain those areas of their network in which individuals are separated from them by great physical or social (in terms of rank) distance. For while the poor seek to preserve their relationship with the rich, their potential patrons, so the rich need either the direct support of the poor or else the approval of their equally affluent townsmen. Thus, in spite of the social differentiation produced by economic development, ascribed relationships of kinship and community remain very strong." (Lloyd, 1974:135-5)

When this structure of kinship relationship is politicized, Nigerian political communication becomes strongly oriented towards kinship networks rather than the mass media political role. An exclusive concentration on the media leaves much unaccounted for in Nigerian political communication processes.

During non-election periods, the urban poor generally maintain strong ties with their more illiterate kinsmen in the city. Constrained by poverty, they do not visit home as often as their rich tribesmen, many of whom in

addition to having enough money, also may have a car to visit the village on a fairly regular basis. Their frequent visits to their natal home boost their individual network in the village, and strengthen their network relationship with the traditional sector.

The effects of colonialism in Nigeria are many and varied. Missionary education, Christianity, a colonial 'democratic' political system, the modern mass media, rapid economic change and industrial development, have all contributed to produce within a few decades in Africa, an egalitarian, atomized and individualistic population which depends on the mass media for information and opinion formation. But the strength of kinship ties, and relationships both between urban and rural areas, and between individuals and groups within them have forcefully withstood the powerful influence of colonialism in Nigeria. Kinship ties have become a sine qua none in socio-economic and political relationships in Nigeria and other African states.

Other significant colonial legacies in terms of this thesis also exist. From the early accounts in Chapter Three of colonial administration and policies, which were imposed on the traditional political system in Nigeria, it is clear that the later system was not stagnant as some modernizing theorists would suggest. But colonial policies conditioned and constrained the development of the traditional political system. The most active indigenous political actors during and after the colonial administration were the elites. These put further constraints on the traditional political culture of Nigeria, particularly after independence.

During the colonial period, the relationship between the society and the government tended to be divided. The traditional socio-political system based on kinship and religion had adopted/assumed an alien political system, and a bureaucratic machine, which were incompatible. The ruling African elites tried to identify with both systems. Confusion emerged which proved to be to the advantage of the Nigerian elites or the nationalists.

For instance, the system of indirect rule meant that the colonial officials ruled through traditional chiefs or the emires. Indirect rule eroded the power of the latter. At the same time, the elites who could have participated in the colonial political decision-making were excluded. Consequently, both the traditional rulers and the African elites were dissatisfied with colonial rule. Nigerians, therefore, resorted to kinship ties, ethnic organisations and modern communication - the press - to

mobilise urban and village communities in the nationalist movement for independence. Also, the attitude particularly of the missionaries towards traditional chiefs and their practices, was one of condoning colonial racialist policies. As a result, some of the elites trained by the missionaries turned their back on them. Furthermore, the elites and traditional leaders became more united politically despite the differences in their religious beliefs and political philosophy.

Despite unifying factors among different groups in Nigeria, the impact of colonial political ideology on the elites remained very strong. Western education entrenched in the colonial system resulted in a conscious pursuit by Africans to adopt the European political, social and cultural models. There was no selection or modification to accommodate major indigenous traditional political models.

Furthermore, the impact of colonialization can be seen in the rapid urbanization in Nigeria. The initial creation of new urban centres reflected the economic need of the colonizers more than that of the colonized. The superficial attraction of the urban centre created an unprecedented village-urban migration which resulted not only in the development of urban slums, but also the emergence of an urban poor in sharp contrast to the urban elite. Industrial opportunities and administrative jobs were (and still are) in short supply in proportion to the number of migrants seeking them. In terms of ethnicity, age, skill and creeds, Nigerian urban centres became highly heterogeneous. Competition for jobs and state or federal government contracts, and housing etc. often intensified ethnic conflicts. Though colonisation and urbanization may not be held entirely responsible for the type of race relationships which developed between Nigerians in the city, colonial policies endorsed it and allowed it to become deeply rooted in the community. In particular, the colonial administration played a major role in stopping inter-tribal wars and enhanced geographical and economic mobilities between peoples and regions, but the cities they created became the means of new forms of battle - ethnic competition and conflicts.

African elites began to import not only European and American advanced technologies but also European and American media formats and professionalism into the political communication system. It is here assumed that the vast regions of Nigeria with their multiple cities created by the colonial authorities cannot be reached any longer by the simple symbolic and

traditional communication processes. The elites, therefore, insisted on western communication technologies, formats, training and professionalism. This thesis, however, does not undertake to discuss these issues in any detail. They may be more relevant to the study of the 'long-term' effects of political communication.

While colonization has created the situation discussed above, one dominant historical question remains undefined by colonialisation. That is the ties between the elites and their places of rural origin, particularly in the communities where there were no pre-colonial cities in Nigeria. Very often, as we shall see in the empirical section of this study, the natal-homeland of a political elite became the core region in which a Nigerian political candidate wins the largest and often the only seat/following. Colonial policies helped to create historical movements in which a Nigerian political actor was forced to seek support in his own region.

In this present/current research, political communication in Nigeria turns from looking at ethnic groups and their mobilisation, participation and voting patterns to an examination and an analysis of groups with identical characteristics and attributes and their relationship with the political communication system during an election campaign.

This analysis raises various important empirical questions. From studying these groups, an attempt will be made to discover the type(s) of political communication system that is emerging in Nigeria today. Previously, Nigerians were mobilised to participate in politics purely in terms of ethnic origin. The emergence of competing political leaders within an ethnic group, e.g. Ojukwu and Zik in Igboland, has thrown a new light on the understanding of a new political mobilisation in Nigerian politics. The political struggle is now identified with political conflict not only between ethnic groups at the national level but also between ethnic leaders at the state/regional and village levels. Political mobilisation and participation cannot be assessed in terms of the mass media influencing the urban and the village electorate voting for one or a few ethnic leaders from one dominant ethnic group. The classical model of political communication in a new democracy states that urban centred mass media determine whom the electorate votes for in the modern political system. This concept is not in accordance with what is going on in Nigeria today, particularly with reference to the 1983 general election. Where the traditional and the modern political communication systems in Nigeria are intermeshing it is

likely that the traditional system as defined above will become more effective in mobilising political participants in both rural and urban communities in Nigeria.

In view of this emerging pattern of political communication in Nigeria today, it is now important to study the impact of the mass media and traditional political communication systems together in order to assess their degree of influence on the audience. The audience should not be conceived of as sub-groups of ethnic voters and participants under one leader/one party representing different ethnic groups. The need is to examine different characteristic sub-groups within a larger ethnic group but mobilised by different political parties, e.g. NPP vs NPN, through two or more leaders from the same ethnic group.

Existing data shows that five different groups exist and that these are found in both urban and rural areas of Nigeria. It is important to realise that the groups have intra and inter social, economic, cultural etc. relations which form the core elements of political communication within and between them. Through these groups and their various activities, the two different environments are brought into a continuous relationship in terms of the activities of the actors.

VILLAGE/URBAN MIGRATION IN AFRICA

Hobsbawm (1973:20), Peter Lloyd (1979:90) argue that "since the mass of migrants into the cities in many parts of the world consists of men and women from traditional peasant background, who bring into their new world the modes of action and thought of their old world, history remains a current political force. It would be unwise to neglect it." On the contrary, Gluckman (1960:57) believed that Africans who live in the cities will influence the life style in the traditional rural areas. But I argue that both environments and the people in them influence each other, particularly in the processes of modernization, industrialization and urbanization. In the African context, there is a greater tendency for city dwellers and factors (of industrialisation and urbanisation) to influence traditional values and environments.

In Africa, so much adjustment is required either in the urban centre or in the rural areas according to the greater pattern of influence. It is in this process of adjustment that the initial impact of urban life is experienced by migrant Africans.

"Every year hundreds of thousands of West Africans leave their homes to live and work, at least temporarily, somewhere else. Migration always requires some adjustment to the new place, but the adaptation required of African migrants to the cities is often considerable." (Peil, 1972:126)

The acute problems young migrants experience in the city and how this experience influences their future behaviour has been noted by Peace (1979) in Agege.

"Most young migrants to Agege pass through a trying period of initiation into modern urban-industrial life. Many of the aspirations which they bring southwards to Lagos are quickly confounded and seem unlikely to be revived in the light of their early experiences. To some extent, the interpersonal relationships in which they become involved help mitigate the worst forms of hardship." (Adrian Peace, 1979:44)

Peter Lloyd (1982:75) suggested some reasons why migration from village to city takes place among young Africans. Low infant mortality, spread of clinics and hospitals in the rural areas have brought about increases in the population to the extent that the land can no longer accommodate the growing population. Others have suggested that the economic and social attraction of city life are the major factors which cause several young Africans to migrate to the cities.

When individuals migrate from the village to the city, two main levels of associations are maintained with the former. In this study, the rural sector has two dominant groups: the traditional sector and the rural elite. Relationships with those who have migrated to the city are maintained either on an individual basis or through kinship voluntary associations. Communication between them at these two levels is often horizontal. By contrast, vertical communication through the process of information flow between rural and urban areas is maintained by the mass media. At an individual level, Peil (1972:4) suggested that some urban migrants who planned a long stay in the city might return home if they failed to get jobs. Other migrants who visit home from time to time eventually return to the village permanently. When migrating to the cities "most African workers

expect eventually to return to their home town". Returning home is independent of whether the migrant acquired wealth in the city (Mitchell 1961, Soper and Soper 1955:16, Acquah 1958:39, Meillasoux 1968:78, Peace 1979:44, Peil 1972:181, Lloyd 1979:107-110). However, Galdwell (1969:186-90) has reported lengthy stays in town without returning home.

Members of all five groups show a tendency to return home or visit home occasionally. Among the urban elites (Lloyd et al 1967:143) they "invariably assume financial responsibilities for their parents in their old age". The majority of African old people live in the village. Either they had lived there most of their lives or else they retired to the village after long years in the city. Peil (1972:182) has shown that Africans retire to the village for good reasons:

"Living in a village is much cheaper than living in town and there are relatives at home to look after an old man or woman if they become ill. Many people look forward to an old age of supporting themselves with small farming and maintaining their sense of importance by being elders who can give advice to the young on the ways of living in a city."

Even when children are born in the city, their parents give them a very strong sense of belonging not to the city where they were born and bred but to their parent's home town. They, therefore, 'retain an allegiance to their father's or mother's home village which they may visit with their parents' (Peil 1972:182). Besides the old people in the village, most members of African elites spend a large proportion of their income in financing the education of their brothers, sisters, nephews, cousins, nieces and distant kin who may live in the city or village.

Links with the home town are in every respect strong. Among the urban elite Lloyd et al (1967:145) recorded that in his interview among the Yorubas who lived in Ibadan:

"Half the men have built a house in their home town - these tend to be older men. This house not only indicates an intention to retire to the home town, but also symbolizes the concern of the owner for the place of his birth. Those who have so built also tend to view with approval the activities of town 'improvement union' and such associations. They tend, too, to draw more of their close friends from their own ethnic group."

The younger the member of an elite, the less he is attracted to his home

town but as he advances in age, his community requires his leadership particularly in areas where there are a small number of graduates to lead the community. In general, older people are more drawn to their rural origin where eventually they may be involved in a small scale business, and participation in local politics.

While in the city, socio-economic interaction takes place between members of different groups. Peace (1979) in his study of Agege migrants reported that before a son leaves home his parents or relatives find an older kinsman to host him. "This role is filled either by a kinsman already resident at Agege or by a personal friend of a migrant's father or older relative". The act of caring for young immigrants in the city is highly regarded in the village and endows the host with much respect and honour. He stated that the older kinsmen

"Do so in part because this enhances their prestige and personal reputations in their place of origin. They become known as men who are concerned about the welfare of young men absent from their natal households. These reputations will stand them in good stead when they retire home as they invariably intend, and perhaps make a bid for a village title or more important position." (Peace, 1979:27)

Once young people who receive such benefits from their kinsmen and friends, are themselves settled in the city they in turn render similar help to new arrivals from their hometown. In time, a wide range of network groups made of urban elites, young school leavers and urban poor are built up in the city. Each of them on an individual basis maintain links with the rural origin. The more each of these individuals spends time and money on his kinsmen, the more popular he becomes both in the city and in the village. A situation which indirectly reinforces ethnic politics and participation particularly when this network of kinsmen is politicized. However, "while in general migrants count as friends a preponderance of home-townsmen, this is not to suggest that they are in any sense encapsulated or cut off from non-townsmen" (Mayer, 1961, Peace 1979:29). But the crucial point is that in Nigerian urban centres a network of relationships based on friendship is weak. Lloyd (1979:126), and Sheth (1968), maintained that relatives oblige themselves to assist the young migrants to find jobs in the city. "Hostility against the Igbos in Northern Nigeria was fuelled by beliefs (...) that clerks or artisans in authority would write to their natal village for a youth to come to fill a vacancy". This is a process of strong link between urban and rural areas in Nigeria. 'Just as it is now widely

recognised that the city immigrant arrives to be received by kinsman friends, so too it is stressed that the migrant retains close ties with his community of origin. He has one foot in the town but keeps the other firmly in his village. For this reason terms such as proletarian, which implies a sole commitment to urban wage labour, are, it is argued, inapplicable' (Lloyd, P.C. 1979:133).

The process of establishing personal contacts with the natal community by the migrants consequently leads to the formation of a voluntary association by members of the kin in the city. Collective efforts to establish strong links with the rural community by those in the city is much more emphasised. In some African townships, the role of an association in maintaining social, political, economic and cultural links with the rural community may be far more important than the individual's connection with the natal community. The association in the city may be an extension of those already in existence in the rural areas: Lloyd considered that an,

"... improvement association may exist at all levels, from the smallest village through the district to the province. Perhaps somewhat uniquely, among the Igbo of Nigeria these associations have been structured in a hierarchical pyramid, leading to the Igbo State Union. Educated and wealthy men who were prominent in the higher levels nevertheless active members of their own village association - for most come from the village" (P.C. Lloyd, 1979:137).

Other studies of P.C. Lloyd have shown the importance of ethnic unions and associations not only in the development of social networks of ethnic groups in African cities and their links with rural areas but also in the development of African modern politics, social and economic growth (Lloyd, P.C. 1966:27-40, 234-359, 1974:127-133, 1984:83-91). Meillassoux (1968) described the entire life of the Bamako society as centred round voluntary associations. It was through the voluntary association that young men and women of Bamako arrived to "build a progressive society". In terms of news in Bamako

"Jeli and fune people often come from Mourdiah during the dry season to practice a trade or simply to put themselves in the service of a wealthy urban family. some of them stay permanently. As one of their chores they serve as messengers among the urban dwellers from their home town. They keep the older men informed of news from home and from everyone else in town. Together with them, the elders discuss problems of general interest to people of Mourdiah settled in town and make decisions accordingly." (Meillassoux, 1968:78)

Most importantly, he stressed that the association:

"operates on the assumption that the people from Mourdiah who dwell in Bamako are still citizens of their home town. It is the prolongation into the city of village life and loyalties, that carries into town the concern and problems of the village... there are probably as many of these groups in Bamako as there are towns represented. They cover the entire city with an invisible network, reaching people at all social levels. To try to avoid such 'associations' is considered a mark of egotism, a rejection of the old customs and values, tantamount to breaking relationship with home."

A similar observation was made by Adrian Peace (1979) in Nigeria among urban migrants in Agege. He noted that several Yoruba villages were represented in Agege and most of the migrants from them formed groups, which he described as clubs because "the term 'association' would be far too grandiose a label for these". He argued that 'club formation entails not much more than a minor formalization of existing close-knit interpersonal relationships' which is the basis of a kinship network in the urban centre (Peace 1979:41).

Margaret Peil (1972:175), in her study of patterns of village urban migration in Ghana observed that "ethnic associations are not as popular as seems to be the case in other African countries. Only a quarter of these workers belonged to an ethnic or any other mutual-aid association. Ewes and Nigerians are most often members of such associations."

Modern mass media and traditional communications have combined to bring village and urban actors and activities much closer in Africa in recent years. There are now many modern roads, and "a few villages may have a transistor radio and see the occasional newspaper. One or two of the elderly men may even be returned migrants from the city" (Lloyd, 1979:106). With the development of television in all the states in Nigeria, virtually all parts of the country are reached by TV network broadcasts. The process of rural electrification and the fact that many elites and successful businessmen in Nigeria have plant generators in their homes in the villages provides kinsmen with the opportunity to watch TV programmes.

The strong relationship between news circulation and African social organisations noted above has been recognised.

"The African social organisation characterized by a strong sense of kinship, community and neighbourliness, naturally increased the scope of news circulated ... It was virtuous .. to visit relations and friends in their homes, 'eat from the same pot', and exchange the latest information. The sense of kinship and community did not exhaust itself in the individual town or village; on the contrary it was manifested in a much wider sphere in ... the attitude to relatives in other communities and the relatively harmonious relationship between people in one community and those in another. The extent of these connections and attitudes gives some idea of the scope of news circulation in indigenous society by informal contact". He then argues that "a certain historical continuity exists between the modern newspaper and the indigenous systems of public communication." (Fred, I.A. Omu 1978:1)

Nigerian political communication processes in relation to the five groups described above can be specifically associated with the village and urban environments.

With particular reference to the Igbo rural and urban communities, the socio-political, economic etc. organisations are segmentary in pattern; which (Davidson 1965; Okigbo 1986) believed are "held together by family and religious ties". The interdependence of rural and urban communities through networks of kinship and communication cannot be overemphasised in most parts of Africa.

In the study of political communication in Nigeria, the ties between the rural and urban environments transcend contemporary change and developments. In the Igbo communities, an individual, whatever his or her attitude and characteristic is constantly tied to his rural community by descent or kinship. Okigbo (1986) unlike Omuo (1978) sees the ties not in terms of circulation of information between members of two communities but in terms of an individual's attachment to the land. The land becomes an important factor which ties an individual to his native village when he lives in the city.

"The individual villager is expected to remain loyal to the community not only because it provides collective security, both moral and psychological, but also because the community safeguards all that is precious to the individual citizen especially land". (Okigbo, 1986:14).

The gatekeeper of the Igbo village community and traditions in this study is the traditional group. But with the advent of colonisation, modern capitalism, Christianity, western education, etc. new groups and urban environments emerged.

The ethics, moral obligations and curious Igbomen's attachment to his rural origin has been engrained in all aspects of his life. This particularly implies that whether he lives in the village or in the city, his activities are dependent or immensely influenced by the engrained ethical norms in which all Igbos are judged by their members. An Igboman's achievement is judged by how much he has helped his friends, relatives and community - most of whom live in the village. Even in a modern capitalist economy which is concentrated in the city, the individual's attraction to the village remains very strong. The political structure is not independent of this tendency. Okigbo (1986:16) notes that:

"The Igbo Political structure has generated a parallel economic organization that is segmentary and atomistic (individualistic) but co-operative in the interest of the community. Each individual tends to act by himself in business and economic affairs but co-operates with the family and the community for social work. The political structure has produced an economic structure that cares for its young, poor, disabled, and the aged and infirm. It has created a social security system that has stood for thousands of years."

Igbo political systems - modern or traditional, exist in relationship with its members who are bound by moral codes and not by an absolute legal system. There is a constant and undefined allegiance to the community and a co-operation among kinsmen which forms the basis of the community. In such socio-political and economic structures, interpersonal communication to achieve goals and maintain social and political systems, emphases are laid on linkages between different groups in different communities (e.g. rural and urban). Kinship becomes a major factor that perpetuates the communication process among members who live in the village or city.

In view of the above argument, I state theoretically that although the five different groups I have described have their marked and observable differences, there are strong networks of connectedness between them which in Nigerian politics becomes heavily politicised during election periods. Some groups might influence others more. They do so by using their social, economic and religious power which are more suitable for the articulation of modern day politics in Nigeria.

THE PATTERN OF LINKAGES BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS AND THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERGROUP RELATIONSHIPS AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES




Figure 1

This diagram (figure 1) illustrates the pattern of political influence among the five groups. The arrows show the direction in which political influence via communication is exercised among groups in the urban and rural areas.

The thick arrows indicate the direction of stronger political influence in the association. On the other hand, the dotted arrows show the direction of weaker political influence in the communication linkages between groups in the two environments.

This pattern of political communication and influence should be, therefore, seen as a two-way interpersonal flow. But differences exist in the degree of influence as a result of differences in the groups' social, economic and political power. However, where two thick arrows flow in opposite directions between different groups, they imply that the two groups involved

have balanced strengths of political influence on each other. Also, the two groups can obtain equal or identical political information from various sources or channels of communication. They may have comparable factors of political influence. This pattern of political communication and influence is associated with the urban and rural elites, and sometimes - in terms of political information - between rural elite and young school leavers groups.

All other groups have stronger political influence on the traditional group. Their poor level of education, low social status and weak economic position make them vulnerable to external influences. But in democratic political communication, particularly during election periods, they form the most significant part of the election campaign audience. This is primarily because they constitute the largest political group in Nigeria and the rural areas where most of them live is highly contested by political leaders and their supporters.

While 'kinship' ties, love for the 'land' and rural communities bind together the members of these five different groups, modern mass media which targets an anonymous audience also link rural and urban communities through information.

Later, a theoretical framework will be developed which will be used to analyse empirical data from the most recent general elections in Nigeria, essentially characterised by the general phenomena stated above.

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CHAPTER TWO

DEVELOPING A THEORY AND A METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYSING THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN NIGERIA

Theories and analysis of political development in Nigeria both in the past and in the recent past have concentrated too much on the impact of colonial policies and administration on the political system - Aderibidge (1973), Olusanya (1973), Ikin (1974), Noli (1978), etc. The relationship between the system, the entire population and environment are studied and analysed in relationship with a particular group of urban elites. Similar observations have been made by Lidwi Kapteijns (1977) who states that the

"preoccupation with political history was closely related to the overemphasis on certain social (elite) groups and the relative neglect of the ordinary people."¹

The majority of 'ordinary people' in Nigeria live in the rural areas and fall within the categorical group of the traditional system while another group of them who bear similar characteristics live in cities - the urban poor. Therefore, by implication, Kapteijn's observation in relation to the broader definitions of politics and political communication in Chapter One implies that the traditional political communication system in Nigeria has suffered neglect. Recent political communication researches and publications reflect this trend, Luke Uche (1985), Kurfi (1983), Alabi (1983), Duyile (1979), and Graf (198?). All these writers on mass media or political practices in Nigeria exclusively concentrate on the evolution, growth and the influence of the mass media on the political system. The political system is discussed only in relation with the elite, the urban environment and mass media ownership and control. When the traditional pattern is mentioned, it is only treated in terms of historical development narrowed to reflect the trends towards elite politics. They tend to conclude that the modern political communication system has wiped out much of the traditional political system and communication.

There, the structural root of the power of the mass media which springs from their unique capacity to deliver to the politician an audience of large size (Gurevitch and Blumler 1977) is not possible in Nigeria where the majority

of the electors can not articulate media political information. This is because the principle barrier to the influence of mass media political broadcast is to a greater extent with Nigeria - low level of formal education. This situation is in sharp contrast with the majority of industrialised nations such as the USA, UK, etc. where the level of literacy is very high and audience role can be researched and analysed in terms of what Blumler (1973) described as 'uses and gratifications'. Audience roles and orientations to political communication system can then be divided into categories of: "the partisan, seeking a reinforcement of his existing beliefs; the liberal citizen, seeking guidance in deciding how to vote; the monitor, seeking information about feature of the political environment (such as party policies, current issues and the qualities of political leaders; and the spectator, seeking excitement and other affective satisfactions" (Blumler, 1973, Gurevitch and Blumler 1977).

If we apply these categories to Nigeria's mass media audience, 'partisan' is relevant to urban elite, rural elite and young school leavers, 'liberal citizen' exclusively to the elites and partly to school leavers, 'the monitor' can be associated with urban elite only, the rural elite and the school-leaver can be generally the 'spectators'. The irony is that many elites in Nigeria are politically apathetic because they resent political practices and development in the country. Some of them who would like to develop special interest in Nigerian politics fear to do so because of the persistent presence of the army in government. They feel the risk is not worth taking. The above categories of political communication audience in the Nigerian context may be only superficially represented within the minority elites group.

The 'state-centred history' of political communication development in Nigeria, has created major problems in assessing, in academic terms, the real trend of changes in Nigerian political communication systems. Hodgkin (1976:15) suggested some reasons for this unhelpful trend - namely, that the Nigerian researchers and writers tend to choose easy options to study their political development. Most works are based on documents which 'generally tend to mirror the lives of the ruling families, to establish a working chronology, dynasties. He suggests that these have more and better dates than "the short and simple annals of the poor"; desire to explode the colonial stereotype, with its confused and confusing categories of the 'tribal', 'primitive', 'stagnant' and the like'.² Wrigley (1971:177-8) also made similar criticisms of African writers on political development.

Consequently, the inability to look at politics, and political communication systems outside their relationship with the elite political activities has contributed to a major crisis in Nigeria's decision on the proper direction to develop her communication systems. Research and political communication theories based on 'certain elite group' are bound to distort the truth and lead to further crisis in the nation's political communication development. It is upon this narrow view of the relationship between politics, the media and the elites that wrong decisions are made, hence wasteful development of huge satellite and colour television networks were embarked upon in Nigeria in the mid 1970s.

Some media professionals in the West have developed a critical view of this pattern of communication development in Africa, particularly Nigeria.

"The very development of expensive television, available only to urban elites, has been questioned. Prestige projects abound; in March 1976 Nigeria announced the setting up of a national colour television network in a country where, as elsewhere in the developing world, even a black and white set costs as much as a farmer's annual income. Emphasis is often on production or transmission rather than on reception facilities" (Peter Golding in Curran et al (ed) 1977:305).

Perhaps the less emphasis on reception facilities is that Nigerian media decision-makers believe that communal watching of TV within family circular is very popular. One TV set serves a large number of people at a time. Others who have criticised the pattern of media development in Africa in terms of programmes and professional training include: Head, S.W. (1954), Bamberger (1977), Mytton (1983), Katz & Wendell (1970), Golding and Elliott (1979), Mackay (1964) and Katz (1973).

Further sharp criticisms of 'media institutional forms developed in' developing nations have been made by Peter Golding "... media institutional forms grew as extensions and imitations of those in industrialised societies". Uncritical transplantation of radio norms to television in developing nations has left a residue of inappropriate and unnecessary objectives; specifically "'the goal of non-stop broadcasting, the orientation toward an everybody audience, and the striving for up-to-the-minute news'. International transfer involved far more than organizational replication; it meant the wholesale acquisition of modes of practice, standards and assumptions which came to displace discussion of possible preferences or alternatives" Katz 1973:282, Golding 1977:295).

To a certain extent, Golding, P. blamed some of these weaknesses of media development particularly in Nigeria on the pattern of education, training and qualifications of media journalists.

The recent studies of some political historians and scientists - K.O. Dike and J.A. Ajayi, Alagoa and J.A. Atandu (1973: p.309ff), Afigbo (1936, 1973c) in oral history, if carefully integrated with the works of Frank Ogbuajah (1972) on Oramedia could throw a new light into political communication in Nigeria. The 'state-centred' political communication and traditional network system could converge for the emergence of new political communication and research in Nigeria and other states of Africa.

The major issue is that new research methods for analysing political and communication activities and events are required. To understand the trend, it is not only the political changes and their relationship to one group (the elites) that should be examined. The economic, social and cultural/religious relationships and ties etc., with various groups and how these changes affect the ways these groups politically communicate should be studied at urban/village levels. It is important to bear in mind the stage of Nigerian eco-social and political development as a whole. From Chapter One, there is clear indication that Nigeria is on the 'transitional' or 'take off' stage, both traditional and modern political communication processes operate together.

Thus, the problem of formal and informal political communication process which takes into consideration two distinct environments - urban and rural - becomes acute when we try to design a study of political communication, where the two systems by the two definitions, operate in one event, the election of leadership.

This problem quickly takes us back to the problem generated in the 'People's choice' survey criticised by many, including Elihu Katz who comments that

".... the design of the study did not anticipate the importance which interpersonal relationship would assume in the analysis of the data. Given the image of the atomised audience which characterised so much of mass media research, the surprising thing is that interpersonal influence attracted the attention of the researchers at all."³

By implication of different levels of interplay in political communication

of face-to-face communication, e.g. lobbying and mass media, Katz disagrees with the concept that the mass media were all powerful in directly influencing voting attitude.

In Nigeria, modern mass media and the western political system, for instance the presidential system modelled on the US system, is comparatively new. Furthermore, the emergent political factors in these systems are also new and differently affected by the changes in culture, economy, and social life. Remarkably, unlike most western nations, the relationship and differences between the new and the old systems at various aspects, are clearly defined within two different but interrelated environments - rural vs urban.

The political actors in these two areas are identifiably different in terms of different attributes and characteristics outlined in Chapter One. However, their differences are obliterated by social, cultural and religious factors which are embedded in the traditional systems of Nigeria. For instance (Lloyd et al 1967:148) observed that some traditional and modern associations in Ibadan embrace in their membership both the elite and the non-elites in Ibadan. "The Nigerian Women's Association does endeavour to bring together not only the wealthy but also the unschooled market women and the university graduates to promote schemes of social improvements ...". In similar Women's Association in Owerri, Imo state, both the educated, semi-educated and non-educated women are members and they make substantial contributions in the social, economic and religious development of the state. These traditional binding elements, best described in kinship systems, do not only unify individuals but also the entire relationship of urban and rural activities obey the rules of kinship system. In Nigerian cities, it is difficult to envisage in mass media terms, atomised individuals directly influenced and changed by only mass media political broadcast.

A further problem therefore, is how to develop a general and specific theoretical model to uncover the strength of the two political communication systems in which the five identified political, social and economic groups participate within and from the two environments. Socio-economically, the rural environment is more homogenous while the city is heterogenous. This, as we shall see later, makes Nigeria an interesting place to study in a political communication process.

The structure of the relationship between the two areas is more complicated if we try to apply the concept of what Katz suggested was the solution of the problem with 'People's Choice', the concept of two-step-flow of communication where the function of the opinion leader was essential. This is because factors of direct and indirect influences in Nigerian political communication are different from what exist in America and Western Europe.

Further complications in the relationship between the two systems become problematic with the existence of formal and informal political information flow between and within them. Almond and Coleman (1960) noted that

"the modern, mass, bureaucratically organised, political party has not supplanted the informal conteries of notables which preceded it, but combines with this more 'primitive' type of structure in which amounts to a mixed system."⁴

As we have seen, in organised political communication, the mass media have not 'supported' the 'primary' communication systems. We shall discuss in Chapter Three that in the traditional political communication process, the activities of the chiefs and their representatives are organised, and symbolically formal and communicated particularly on special occasions. At other times the relationship is politically less organised and informal. (The terms symbolic and face-to-face or oral political communication would be referred to as 'informal'.) My concern is that Nigeria is typically a 'mixture' of the two and it is important to reveal the balance by studying it as a state with political communication dualism.

The theoretical model for political communication therefore, must take into consideration the pattern of convergence between the two systems. Also the level of combination must be distinguished form other dimensions e.g. the level of mass media/formal and face-to-face communication within and between the two systems. This will enable us to distinguish between the type of relationships in traditional and modern political systems among the five categorical groups.

The approach will further enable us to assess, in relation with the five groups, which elements or factors in the structure influence political participation, mobilisation and voting in an election campaign.

The history of political communication research theory and data analysis for over 45 years, has developed vast areas of work, based on two main

theoretical models - 'hyperdemic' or 'pessimistic' thesis and in recent years, the convergence model and its derivatives that were central to most anthropological studies dealing with network of relationship among kinsmen or tribesmen in 'simple' societies. All these approaches have involved intricate and rather enmeshed accounts which should, as much as possible, be avoided in this thesis. The entangled theoretical approaches already in circulation are perhaps a result of the staggering range of interests and topics in the study of political communication both in the urban and rural environments.

The problem of an adequate theoretical model to the understanding of political communication is universal. Peter Golding and Graham Murdoch have noted that:

"In reviewing the many critiques of communication studies that have appeared over the years, one theme emerges as central to all of them; the neglect of theory and underdevelopment of a conceptual framework to guide research."⁵

Peter Golding (1974:79) recommends the study of political communication in terms of long term (involving policy and ideology) and short-term (dealing with election campaigns and inferential structures) in the society. He also approves of a wider view of political communication in 'a more general perspective' which will emphasise vertical and horizontal communication in the media and the political system. His horizontal communication deals with informal interaction between top members of political and media organisations in an industrial society such as Britain. In a transitional state like Nigeria, horizontal political communication embodies both concepts but more emphasis is placed on network of interaction (informal) among friends and kin, within and between rural and urban centres.

An example of horizontal/vertical political communication in an industrial society is "seen from one of the less dramatic ministries in Whitehall the lobby correspondents appear as prominent warriors in the political battle who are producing stories that will be on the front pages tomorrow morning, where not only the public but other civil servants, industrial leaders, cabinet ministers, and the Prime Minister, will see them" (J. Tunstall, 1971:63, cited by P.Golding, 1974:88).

Indeed the problem becomes more acute and complex where the society is rapidly undergoing various changes in addition to cultural, linguistic,

religious, etc. differences that constantly tend to divide its members. Rapid changes in government tend to overtake ongoing research projects and render theories inadequate to explain unexpected new events. In response, the researcher embarks on easy options to deal and interpret his data in terms of their first value avoiding elaborate theories that might be more useful in his/her interpretation. Nigeria stands as an example of a developing nation with these problems.

Perhaps communication research based on the mass media which draw their theoretical model heavily on the linear model, was imported into Nigeria by most media professionals trained or educated in Western countries, particularly America.

"Large numbers of students from the Third World come to study in industrialized nations. Those that return take with them not only skills, but values and attitudes, and not least a receptivity to the men and machines they have learned to work with" (P. Golding in Curran et al (ed) 1977:295).

LINEAR MODELS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

"Probably, the earliest communication model was proposed by Aristotle, who specified the speaker, the speech and the audience as the constituent elements of communication act."⁶

But the Aristotelian model of human communication was based on mathematical logic in which 'meaningful interactions between individuals could be transformed to an equally rational close system of mathematics.'⁷

The merit of the model however, lies in its power to carry rational operation, solving algebraic problems. Also, early experimental psychologists, economists, social and natural scientists utilised it in various ways.

In the 1940s, the most popular political communication theory was influenced by the works of H. Lasswell, C. Shannon and N. Weaver. They aimed to discover the most 'effective' channels of communication. Their model consisted of 'who says what and in what channel, to whom, and with what effect'. The model theoretically contains five elements - through which information can flow in a linear pattern - source, transmitter, a channel, receiver and destination. Shannon and Weaver then defined communication as 'a process by which one mind affects the other'.

The historical background of such a concept of communication has been pointed out by David Morely (1981:1):

"The emigration of the leading members of Frankfurt School (Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer) to America during the 1930s led to the development of a specifically 'American' School of research in the forties and fifties."⁸

Until the late 1960s, the linear model dominated major communication, development studies and then attracted major criticisms. But, detailed discussion on the criticisms cannot be considered in this paper. However, an outline of some of its merits and central weaknesses which render it inadequate to explain political communication processes in Nigeria shall be given. These shall form a critical base for seeking alternative models for data analysis in this thesis.

These are only theoretical generalisations which do not intend to produce any contradiction between 'linear model' of communication (direct effects) and the convergence model. In particular, the reference to ex-Frankfurt school which deals with mass society theory is purely a historical reference rather than an attempt to destroy the composure of different models in which information theory could conflict with critiques of mass society and positivists ideas.

The 'linear order' of the model portrays one-directional flow of information and message between the 'sender' and the receiver. But between them, lies instrumental device(s) or channels, indicative of the growth of communication media. In relation to our discussion on two dimensions of political communication in Chapter One, linear model is associated with 'power', formal, centralised, professionalised, institutionalised, and state-controlled communication system. The urban environment with its heterogeneous audience is a favourable ground for the system. McQuail, (1983:7) points out that the model rejects

".... multiplicity, smallness of scale, locality, de-institutionalisation, interchange of sender-receiver roles, horizontality of communication links at all levels of society interaction."

Thus linear model does not reflect the communication realities of rural communities and only partially reflects the communication activities of 'certain elite' groups in Nigeria. Even so, the strong ties between all

classes of elites and the rest of the population in terms of extended family and kinship network would make the model more redundant as a theoretical framework in the analysis of political communication in Nigeria.

Linear model was developed in advanced nations where it has been assumed that elements of traditionalism have died out.

Morley argues that the model:

"reflected the breakdown of modern Germany society into facism, a breakdown which was attributed in part of loosing of traditional ties and structures and seen as leaving people atomised and exposed to external influences, especially to the pressure of the mass propaganda of powerful leaders, the most effective agency of which was the mass media."⁹

As we shall see later, the application of the linear model in the socio-political and economic studies of W. Schramm (1964); Lerner (1958); Pye (ed., 1963) was accepted widely only because their findings 'reflected the views held by media practitioners rather than the main findings of communication research at the time.' (Hedebro 1979:15).

Another critical assumption of the model in evaluating the effect of the message on the atomised audience is that the receiver is prepared to receive the message and the sender has conceived that every message must have a "direct and powerful stimulus to action which would elicit immediate response."¹⁰

Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955:16) therefore, criticised the model as too weak to explain actual political communicatin activities in a society.

In Nigeria, the social structure does not allow for atomised individuals either in the cities or in the rural areas, for political information. The assumption implied in the model is that there is an active source which seeks to influence the masses via the mass media but in my view, this is checked by the greater forces of kinship network and organisation with socially enforced obligations. This structure of social system is rooted into all forms of human relationship in the rural and urban areas alike.

One of the most recent political communication media in Nigeria believed to have a direct effect on the audiences irrespective of their differences in

age, residence, literacy, social and economic status is the television. The visual power of television tends to conceal the semantic problems poised by the linear model concept of direct effect. Besides, in Nigeria, where there are over 250 local languages excluding Arabic, English, French, the meaning of words is bound to create sharp differences from one cultural community to another who view the same political broadcast. Thus, the meaning or preferred reading which the sender would expect a Nigerian audience, assumed to be passive receivers, to accept could produce, in contrast, a wide range of negative responses. This also relates to the problem of encoding and decoding of media messages which are culture bound. Even in a linguistically homogenous society such as Britain, the problem of semantics and encoding and decoding of TV messages still persist.

"The production of a meaning of message in the TV discourse is always problematic 'work'. The same event can be encoded in more than one way ... the message in ... communication is always complex in structure and form. It always contains more than one potential 'reading'. Messages propose and prefer certain readings over others, but they can never become wholly closed around one reading. They remain problematic ... the activity of getting meaning from the message is also a problematic practice, however transparent and 'natural' it may seem. Messages encoded one way can always be read in a different way."¹¹

The semantic and the pragmatic level of communication were either ignored or taken for granted by the linear model.

In transitional or developing nations, e.g. Nigeria, several factors mediate between the media political output and the entire social systems. These intermediaries run from elders, village councils, chiefs, emirs, parents, relatives, co-workers, to religious and social organisations closely knitted by pluralistic nature of the society characterised by symmetrical exchange of information.

The overtly and highly observable, decentralised and de-professionalised communication interaction are relegated by the model.

A list of the general weaknesses of the Linear model has been summarised by Rogers and Kincaid (1981).

1. A view of communication as a linear, one-way-act (usually vertical), rather than cyclical, two-way process over time.

2. A source bias based on dependency, rather than focussing on the relationship of those who communicate and their fundamental interdependency.
3. A tendency to focus on the messages per se at the expense of silence, and the punctuation and time of messages.
4. A tendency to focus on the objects of communication as simple, isolated physical objects, at the expense of the context in which they exist.
5. A tendency to consider the primary function of communication to be persuasion rather than mutual understanding, consensus and collective action.
6. A tendency to concentrate on the psychological effect of communication on separate individuals, rather than on the social effects and the relationships among individuals within networks.
7. A belief in one-way mechanistic causation, rather than mutual causation which characterises human information systems that are fundamentally cybernetic."¹²

Crucial to this criticism of the linear model is the 'bias based on dependency' which influenced most studies in the sixties on socio-political and economic developments in the developing nations. The emphasis was on information which flows from advanced nations to third world countries for the latter's development. The works of Lerner (1958); Pye (1963) and Schramm (1964) and others are major contributions in this respect.

Lerner's (1958) central hypothesis about the mass media and socio-economic and political development is that urbanisation induces an increase in the level of literacy and the latter in turn increases exposure and consumption of mass media; thereafter, development changes will rapidly take place through the process of direct effect of the mass media information. This hypothesis assumed that in all regions irrespective of culture, languages, stages of technological development etc, once the media are introduced, there is a linear vertical relationship between urbanisation, literacy and rapid development acting independently of other social structures, unaffected by urbanisation and literacy. Then, when Russels and Schramm in 1971 tested the hypothesis they found that 'basic variables of urbanisation, literacy, and GNP seem to be related in different ways, in the several regions, to the developing media. Thereupon, they concluded that regional, religious and geographically different political systems, and national policies and goals affect the use of and development of the media.

Lerner, Pye and Schramm hypothesised that economic production and development are the key factors that led to urbanisation and literacy. And within the urban centres, the elites have high incentives (emphathy) for change and modernisation. Politically, they initiate and activate political movements and participation. The elites, in the process of development, are assumed to be isolated from the old system. They basically established a new relationship with the mass media because of their ability to decode information from them to achieve greater social, economic and political power. In the developing countries, the roles of the mass media were seen as teaching new skills from the cities to rural areas.

In this light, Schramm (1964) postulated that the mass media would increase knowledge and skill and supplement for lack of skilled teachers and educational materials in the Third World countries. For political development, nation or states with multiple religious bodies, political systems, geographical diversities, cultural and economic differences, the mass media would awaken national consciousness and awareness to enhance political integration. Where diversity of linguistic and ethnic groups exist, the mass media create a common language and mutual understanding.

Furthermore, Schramm believed that the mass media are the most important stimulators of national awareness and political participation and social change. However, he made an important observation when he noted that the mass media could also serve a negative purpose by diverting national problems away from real politics. This can be observed in Nigerian politics, during election periods when centralisation and control of the media led to over-emphasis on political personalities rather than on political issues.

Pye (1963:229) expressed a very unusual view that in transitional societies, communication media and 'political mobilisation' can be useful if the minority elite control and direct their uses for development.

"Some countries are at the stage of very early transition, all the instruments of communication must be directed to giving support to the legitimacy of the government and the administrative structure of the state which will in time be necessary for guiding further changes a small modernised elite, the weight of communications policies should be on the side of protecting the freedom of these leaders and strengthening their influence throughout the society."¹³

Though Pye's and Schramm's views on the role of the media and development are drawn from the basic concepts of the linear model, there is a serious contradiction here between them. The control of the media by the political elites would possibly lead to neglect or diversion of political issues according to Schramm. On the contrary, Pye advocates total control of the media by the minority elites. This 'oligarchic' view of the media overlooks tribal, economic and cultural conflicts between the elites in power, in countries where ethnic political competition creates political struggle and instability. When the mass media is controlled by ruling elites in conflict with themselves, it is their conflicting interests rather than the interests of the nation as a whole that are projected by the mass media. Nigeria is a clear case of this ill-advice on the use of mass media.

For all these scholars, mass media and political development are seen in terms of economic and social change where the most crucial factor is the linear flow of information from the urban centres to the rural areas. The latter environment is seen as completely passive and insensitive to changes until activated by the media information to respond to changes exactly the way the urban political elites would expect. Once information about changes penetrates the rural areas via the media, traditional institutions, traditional media, rural occupations, kinship systems change to a new pattern of socio-political and economic system to enhance development. All developments are synonymous to Westernisation and industrialisation.

Industrialisation and urbanisation are emphasised and the level of economic and political participation without any indication of the degrees of economic differences among the population studied. For the colonised countries such as Nigeria and other West African countries, the dominant role of the colonial authority, inherited by a few elite classes after independence was neglected. Thus, anything that went wrong in the society was blamed on the colonised or the masses in the urban and rural areas for either deliberately failing to accept or being unable to articulate the information about political, social and economic development and changes from the mass media. In general, traditionalism, ethnic sentiment, are resistance to modernisation as a result of religion, customs, beliefs etc. These were emphasised as major factors for the failure of political participation and integration. The authoritative power of the media owners and failure of political elites to address themselves to the real issues of development are less discussed in the process of media role in development.

In particular, Lerner's model is deterministic:

"After a country reaches 10% urbanisation is there any significant increase in literacy, thereafter urbanisation and literacy increase together until they reach about 25 per cent; and once societies are about 25 per cent urbanised, the close relationship of media growth is with increase in literacy."¹⁴

In fact, the linear model reflected the mode of economic thought in the period between 1940 to 1960s. The origin was related to what Morley (1983:1) has already pointed out. The relationship of the model to African countries emerged from the success of Marshal Aid to Europe by America after the Second World War. The development of Africa, thus was seen only in terms of influencing African socio-political and economic attitude from Europe or America. The cities in Africa were developed as socio-political and economic centres from which rural regions could be influenced for changes - changes that would enhance European and certain elite African interests. For instance, in relation to media professionalism in the Nigerian context, certain media practices in the Third World need to be questioned.

"The transfer of the ideology of professionalism runs parallel to the transfer of technology, which can be alternatively understood as the problem of technological dependence (Cooper, 1972). The media in the large-scale capital intensive form in which they have developed in urbanised industrialised societies, are classic instances of this problem. Import-substituting industrialisation is designed to serve the market dominated by the elite consumers, who require the goods used and demanded by elites in industrialised countries. The technology for their manufacture is only available from these countries whose quasi-monopoly control of unique technologies is reinforced by the international patent system" (Patel, 1974, Vaitos, 1972, in Golding 1977).

The mass media were regarded as the main instrument for such changes. The one-directional influence of the media information to the population from the urban areas to the rural areas was so entrenched in the minds of media professionals that certain observations to the contrary effect such as those of Klapper (1960) were not heeded. He stressed that "the media have little or no direct effect on people. Rather, they tend to reinforce attitudes and behaviours that people already possess. Their potential for change is very little."

When all the genuine criticisms of the linear model are applied to political communication in Nigeria, it will clearly show that active political

participation of the rural areas is overshadowed by false assumptions of the direct effect of the mass media. Radio in Nigeria could be an important impersonal medium for political participation in both rural and urban areas in Nigeria if other factors of influence such as kinship ties, money or ethnic unions are rendered politically ineffective as a result of any extraordinary and extremely unexpected circumstance during the election campaign. Even when linear model's emphasis on centralisation, vertical, one-way mechanistic causation and power base are applied to Nigerian elite political leaders and media control, the linear model would fail to reveal the structure of political communication. This is because there are persistent obligatory networks of kinship ties between the political elites in the city with their kin in both urban and rural areas.

It is this tie that sustains their political power rather than the mass media. Thus, the linear model can neither help us to understand political participation in the city nor help us to approach any aspect of the same process in the rural areas. Its application becomes more problematic when the two environments are studied under one political event - general elections for the selection of national leaders.

However, one of the potential merits of hyperdemic thesis is its concept of 'effect' of information or message on the receiver. Rogers and Kincaid (1981:32) point out that this was a major break though in the study of communication which prior to the development of the model was predominantly descriptive. 'Effects' thereafter initiated a new approach to the study of human communication and socio-political changes. Hence, Newcombe (1953); Gerbner (1956); Osgood et al (1957); Westley, B. and Maclean, M. (1957); Jakobson (1958) and David Berlo (1960) etc., used the linear model in varied modified patterns in their researches. Berlo (1960), like Kapper (1960), introduced a new and dramatic change in the study of communication when he established that the audience was an active audience highly selective and hardly manipulated by the sender of the message. "The audience", he stressed "was a full partner in communication process."¹⁵

Furthermore, in 1973, Wilburn Schramm made a major departure from the old linear model tradition when he identified 'information sign' and the relationship among participants in the communication process as active receivers of messages. Rogers and Kincaid (1981:34) acknowledged that the most important derivative of Shannon and Weaver's contribution to the study of communication has been:

"The concept of information (....), which provided a central focus to the field of communication research. It became the main conceptual variable around which the new intellectual approach began to grow."¹⁶

Thereafter, a wide range of concepts of 'information' emerged - information flow, knowledge gap, information gap, information inequality, information poor, communication gap, etc.¹⁷

The direct effect of mass media output on the audience can not be totally swept aside particularly in the industrialised, relatively individualised Western societies, where we have seen earlier that the media could be the only link between the citizens and the government. In order that the audience be directly influenced by the media, it is essential that a large proportion of the masses are literate and capable of articulating media political output. Nigeria with only 15% literate citizens (African Woman No. 34 July/August 1981:18) falls far short of this essential pre-requisite for media direct effect.

In Europe and North America, recent political communication researches on effects, exposure behaviour, audience roles etc. have modified the view that the media are all powerful and absolute prime moulder of public attitude. "Uses and gratification" (Blumler 1973) tend to establish that audience members have their different orientations to political communication. On the short-term effect of the media Golding (1974:79-83) summarises some of the main findings on the media and election campaigns in recent years. He concludes that:

"It is more likely that the media 'set the agenda' for political debate define the boundaries within which people think about and discuss political issues, and provide the symbols and explanations with which these issues are articulated. Thus the media mould public opinion, and indeed to a great extent media output is public opinion, or at least the most accessible index of what commentators conventionally refer to as public opinion (Golding 1974:834).

Thus, the modified version of the linear model reveals that the media has direct effect on the audience but the contents of the media are also largely part of the audience's opinion of the real world. Political audiences are stratified, some obtain and are directly influenced by the media. These (opinion leaders) in turn directly influence the others in the community. Hence the 'influential theory' of a two-step flow of communication. The

process at various stages involves both horizontal and vertical flow of information among given members of the audience or community.

"Those who are in the habit of talking about politics with family and friends do not constitute a separate, isolated part of the British culture. On the contrary, the information which the voter receives in communications of this sort will normally have had its origin in the mass media, even though it may have undergone various transformations along the way" (Butler and Stokes, 1971:266 in Golding, 1974:84).

Perhaps, one of the most important aspects of mass media direct or mediated effect as we noted earlier is their unique power to reach a wide range of audience who are often heterogeneous in character. Without the media, in most nation-states or even transitional nations, the politicians cannot reach a substantial size or proportion of the electorate for democratic political processes and participation. In this study, the apparent uniqueness of the media not only inform the individual audiences in the urban and rural areas on political issues but also bring the two environments together politically, economically and socially etc. Whether media political information influences the political behaviour of Nigerian audiences or not amidst alternative and even more traditional sources of political influence remains purely an empirical question to be examined later.

In general, the theoretical and practical application of the linear model to socio-economic and political communication has attracted criticisms and rejections which outweigh its merits. Some of its critics in more recent years include Berlo (1977:2,6); Smith (1972); Bauer (1974:319, 1973:142-3); Klapper (1960); Servaes (1985); Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955:132); Hedebro (1979); Katz (1957); Rogers (1962a); Kincaid (1979); Rogers and Kincaid (1981); Bordenare (1972); Brenda Dervin et al (1980, 1982); Watzlawick et al (1967:21-22); Chu (1976); Nolleneumann (1978); Freire (1973); Morley (1980:1-2) and Stephenson (1967).

The structure of socio-political and economic relationships between the urban and rural areas makes it difficult to apply the linear model in the study of the nation's political systems, mobilisation and voting during an election period. I agree that the development of modern political communication is from the city to the rural areas but at the same time I believe that the rural population are not passive receivers of the new system. They equally influence the outcome and the shape, etc. of the new

political communication systems as much as they are influenced by them. I would, therefore, advance an alternative political communication theory which I hope would be more adequate to explain the structure of political communication in Nigeria in an election campaign, particularly in the 1983 general elections.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CONVERGENCE MODEL

Charles Peirce, the English philosopher, is described as the father of the convergence model which was based on sign language - semiotics (Rogers and Kincaid 1981); Gallie (1966). Rogers and Kincaid maintain that Peirce's semiotic principle only evaluates the reactions which meanings of speech utterance provokes.

On the other hand, Gallie points out that

"Peirce's insight captures the two basic principles underlying the convergence model, that information is inherently imprecise and uncertain communication is a dynamic process of development over time."¹⁹

Peirce's convergence model attracted the interest of early anthropologists, Mead (1934); Morris, Simmel (1922). Communication began to be seen as social interaction and exchange of meaning, particularly in the interpretation of signs, language, behaviour and symbolic interactions. In the sociological approach, the characteristics of individuals or groups participating in the communication process are relevant to the interpretation of meaning.

On the other level, cultural interpretation of meaning was also emphasised in the convergence model. Sapire (1935) argues that individuals or groups engaged in communication processes are involved in:

"a highly intricate network of partial or complete understanding between the members of organisational units reanimated or creatively affirmed by particular acts of a communicative nature which obtained among individuals participating in it."²⁰

Gradually, the notion of mutual sharing of information among participants in the communication process began to give rise to a psychological approach to

the study of group interaction. In political communication, power struggle, affiliation, aggression, manipulation, mobilisation, competition, etc. were interpreted as psychological variables. Political actors were basically dichotomised into active and passive participants. Prominent in this approach were Gough et al (1951); McClosky and Schaar (1965); Hennessey (1959); Davies (1963); Milbrath (1965b); Almond (1954); etc. Karl Mannheim challenged the early psychological approach to the study of socio-political communication. In the 1960s, its criticisms began to gather strength - Watzlawick et al (1969:21-22); Barton (1968); Lazarsfeld (1970); and Wilder (1979).

From the psychological approach to the study of convergency in communication process, Malcolm and Westely began to focus on the mass media in terms of roles, message, codes and channels. The approach generated a sociological view of mass communication in America. Irving Goffman, Paul Hare and Bale in various studies of small group exposure and interaction concentrated on socio-political aspects of human communication. The alienation from 'interaction', the dimensions of 'social interaction' and 'how people interact in conferences' were important studies carried out by some of these scholars.

The social cohesion of the group is maintained through interpersonal behaviour, group leadership and social obligation. But, beyond small group interaction, Jack Young (1981:2) points out that "A major convergence in mass media analysis during the 1960s and 1970s has been the development of consensual paradigm theory."²¹

In the consensual paradigm, he concentrated on the analysis of 'news' as the major element in which the real world of different classes of a society are brought together. The problem with most of these studies of convergence is that individuals, groups etc. in communication, formal or informal, are not from two different socio-political environments which are as distinct as the urban and rural conditions in Africa.

THE CONVERGENCE MODEL AS AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN NIGERIA

The Linear model, as shown above is rejected for several reasons. Here its most important weakness in the study of political communication in Nigeria

is that it fails to reveal the structure of communication between the urban and rural system where various elements in them are interdependent and influence each other.

The convergence model deals with evolutionary phenomena where two or more systems previously unrelated, began to develop certain real or apparent structural similarity in order to achieve certain goals. The goals could be economic, political, social or cultural. Often, the two systems can converge to achieve a goal, yet each system retains its basic structural differences from the other. Hence, the tendency for the rural political communication system and urban political communication to move towards each other in election periods so as to mobilise the citizens for political participation, should not in the Nigerian context, be interpreted as an achievement of uniformity. The coming together (convergence) of the two systems show remarkable difference yet the 'object' of the convergence is achieved. The similarities are apparent but the two separate traditions can be studied together.

CONVERGENCE OF POLICIES WHICH AFFECT BOTH RURAL AND URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

1. The process of the convergence of traditional and modern political systems in Nigeria is historical. These can be considered at various levels: (1) Political policies which affect both rural and urban environments and systems; (2) Formal and informal socio-political and institutional organisations in the two systems; (3) The level of actual political and communication actors (network groups) in the two environments; and (4) Communication channels available in the rural and urban system. At the level of political policies, the historical moment in which traditional and modern political systems began to converge in Nigeria was in the colonial administration. Specific to the convergence of two traditions, was the development of Indirect Rule of Native Authority Systems. Opposition to it from certain sections of the country led to the development of representative councils. These political developments were not restricted to urban centres only but also embraced rural politics as well. This pattern of development has remained consistent with modern day politics in Nigeria in which policies, ordinances and legislations have brought traditional and modern politics together. The urban environments, the rural settings and

the elites and traditional leaders (Emirs, Obas, Elders) who participate in both systems are important elements in the convergence. In Chapter Three, the process of this dimension of convergence will be examined in some details.

CONVERGENCE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL SOCIO-POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ORGANISATIONS IN RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS

2. Convergence at the level of formal and informal socio-political and institutional organisations in rural and urban areas is very important in the understanding of political communication in Nigeria. Formal political institutions include political parties, ministries, the court, the prisons, educational institutions, etc. - in sum, all are forms of state apparatus for the maintenance of law and order. Social institutions such as the family can also be politicised during election periods. These institutions, in their present forms exist both in the villages and in the cities. They are linked by different activities of political actors from the five network groups identified in Chapter One. Informal socio-political organisations such as Improvement Unions, voluntary ethnic unions, etc. are particularly important in political communication processes in Nigeria. Membership of these clubs or unions may be based on different criteria such as members of the same kin, village, ethnic group, state, profession, religion, etc. The character and functions of these organisations may be a combination of traditional or modern elements. Besides, these organisations exist both in the villages and the cities. Irrespective of class and status, once the basic criteria are fulfilled, individuals could become members. These organisations can be highly politicised to form important channels of information flow. We have seen earlier from the studies of (P.C. Lloyd et al, 1967) in Ibadan, Western Nigeria, that both elites and non-elites belonged to the same organisation. They were not only concerned with the group's social, economic and political welfare in the city but also the improvement of the economic and social conditions in their villages where some of them hoped to retire at old age. Their organisation is a very strong link between urban and village politics.

The convergence also involved formal and informal socio-political institutions in them. The actualisation and the most important aspect of

the convergence is the roles and functions of political actors in them and these are associated with different network groups in both environments without whom the urban and rural political communication system might not converge. Also, the identifiable network groups are directly associated with informal and formal communication channels which provide the basis for their political participation and mobilisation.

CONVERGENCE OF NETWORKS AND INTERACTION OF POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS

3. One of the most important factors of informal communication and convergence of urban and rural politics in Nigeria is kinship or extended family networks which characterise rural and urban relationships. These are the fundamental elements of mobilisation, participation and voting. When kinship networks and ethnic organisations 'break down' as a result of division between political leaders within them, other factors of influence, mobilisation and voting may surface temporarily, e.g. money, but it does not displace ethnic political consciousness.

"In many of the new states of Africa, the tribe is still the effective community and a principal vehicle of political consciousness that the force of tribalism is far from exhausted is suggested by the experience of Nigeria and other new states where a resurgence of tribal rivalries has presented great obstacles to the process of nation building."¹⁸

Political participation and mobilisation in Nigeria have a strong relationship with kinship network ties and organisations. Upon these rest effective political communication. The different network groups identified earlier utilise them, as well as the mass media, differently. In the convergence of traditional and urban political communication systems, individuals and groups with personal political interests use these channels to delude genuine policies and the possibilities of designing alternative political communication systems in order to solve national problems. The delusion could lead to apathetic political attitudes by certain elite groups. This situation has been noted by Rosenberg (1954), Rokkan (1962a), Almond and Verba (1963) and Erbe (1964).

Another group of political apathetics were identified by Lipset (1960), Bell et. al (1961). There were no voters described as isolated, illiterate, inarticulate and parochial. In Nigeria, ethnic and kinship ties in the cities and villages do not allow for isolated participants. They may be illiterate but they still participate actively. Other factors other than the parties' policies on issues influence them.

COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AVAILABLE IN THE RURAL AND URBAN SECTORS

4. Several factors influence political participation and mobilisation. The process has been shifting since the colonial period when participation and mobilisation were motivated by a struggle for independence to stronger regional sentiment. Regionalisation of party-politics meant that one ethnic political party produced a charismatic leader who dominated the region's politics using individuals, groups and numerous ethnic unions to mobilise ethnic political support. The rural and urban political participants in a particular region in Nigeria can obligatorily take part in politics through these unions. The use of Igbo State Union in the 1960s to mobilise regional political support for the N.C.N.C. will be discussed later to illustrate how rural and urban politics converged.

The level of actual political communication in which actors bring about the convergence of urban and rural environments is perhaps the most important level in this study. At this dimensions, the five groups which have been identified to exist in both rural and urban political environments, become the central focus. Here, one of the primary factors which can bring about the convergence of rural and urban politics is the horizontal and vertical mobilities of the political actors. They are specific characteristics of the network groups which enable them to move from village to city and back again and during this horizontal movement, they gain new political ideas and adopt them in the villages or vice versa. Vertically, the bureaucratic elties associated with institutional decision-making are not permanently cut off from their relatives in the villages. As will be shown in Chapter Three, in the colonial period as much as today, the ideas and experiences these vertical mobile groups gained from the organised institutions, were used to run and influence ideas in traditional institutions and environment. Also, the established 'Progressive Unions' that act as socio-political sub-

systems in the urban and rural areas. They are indeed the embodiments of traditional and modern politics through which urban and rural environments in Nigeria converge. In general, the five categorical groups in different ways are associated with the convergence of traditional and modern politics both between and within the urban and rural environments. The essential structure of the convergence is based on their linkages to different formal and informal institutions and organisations in the urban and rural areas. Also, different network groups are linked to friends, relatives, schoolmates, parents etc. in these areas. It is these linkages that constitute important political communication networks in Nigeria and the structure of political communication is face-to-face or interpersonal oriented.

At this interpersonal level, Rogers and Kincaid (1981:81) have defined convergence as 'a process in which the participants create and share information with one another'. But in the consideration of two political environments, these participants are assumed to have different characteristics and attributes and these are reflected on the information they create and share. The kinship ties which bind different groups imply that at a given moment of political communication, its content has both formal and informal structures.

In this process, urban and rural political systems would start to converge. Katz (1966) points out that through the mass media, traditional and modern political systems can converge but he refused to state whether the rural or traditional groups were active or not. However, he points out that the two systems can converge through 'opinion leaders' who obtain information from the mass media and then use the information to influence or manipulate others in their interpersonal communication. He therefore suggested that the convergence model could be used in the study of political communication of two different systems. The main problem here is that Katz does not specify whether the two traditions are converging in the urban or rural areas or both. Furthermore, nor does he establish the premises of such convergence. At what period or through what events or elements are the two systems converging?

In Nigeria, the election period is an event in which urban and rural environments converge through the activities of communication networks and actors. Each of the groups by its own characteristics, is exposed to different communication processes to participate, be mobilised and vote in

the election. Some are more exposed to mass media than to informal communication, while others are relatively equally exposed to both. But the most important thing to be discovered is which ones influence the participants to vote. While the two political communication systems can mobilise urban and rural populations to participate in an election, they can also generate conflict, tension, competition and eventually usurp political violence to the extent that both rural and urban environments are adversely affected. Thus, convergence of political communication does not guarantee mutual sharing of political information for participation. At the individual level of communication, as sharing of information, different dimensions of mutualism can be identified: (1) Mutual understanding with agreement; (2) mutual understanding with disagreement; (3) mutual misunderstanding with agreement; and (4) mutual misunderstanding with disagreement (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981:56). But in a situation where different network groups from different political environments are involved in political communication processes, the term 'mutual' is problematic. In Nigeria where political communication either formal or informal, in the city or in the rural areas is characterised by conflicts, there is either direct confrontation with opponents or avoidance. Avoidance is more likely in the rural areas because of strong kinship ties that transcend political elections. In the cities, groups confront each other in direct face-to-face situations and at the same time, the mass media institutions owned and controlled by different political groups embark on similar activities.

From the convergence model discussed, the following points are important to bear in mind; there are two political environments that at one time in history existed politically independent of each other but have begun to converge as a result of socio-political changes within political territories.

Through them, village and urban politics converge. But at the national level there was political divergence because ethnic leaders could not mobilise political support from regions other than their own.

In recent years, the emergence of new political leaders within ethnic regions has created a paradigm of political communications networks for the mobilisation of political support. The structure and dimensions of this new political communication has become central in Nigerian politics.

NETWORK ANALYSIS

Convergence is the Premise of Network Analysis

By definition, the relationship between network analysis and the convergence model of communication network according to Rogers and Kincaid (1981:63) is that individuals are connected and linked by patterned flow of information. Such information-sharing over time leads the individuals to converge or diverge from each other in their mutual understanding of reality. Rogers and Kincaid (1981:77-78) presented different properties of communication network analysis. Crucial to their definition of convergence is the inclusion of social structure as a channel of communication. This takes place only when individuals in the system mutually share information. For the study of political communication in Nigeria, my concept of network and convergence differs in many ways from Rogers and Kincaid's. I propose that in Nigeria, there are two main levels of political convergence, (a) the level of socio-political environments i.e. the rural and urban, (b) the level of communication processes and channels. At the level of socio-political environment, the migrants from village to the city (as already seen above) bring with them social and cultural values in the natal home to the city. They often form voluntary associations which in many respects are similar in function to those in the village, i.e. they have multiple functions, social, economic, cultural and political (Meillassoux 1968:76; Lloyd, 1966:32-33; 1974:130-2). Consequently, the city becomes an extension of rural life. Also, many elements of city life which are introduced to or forced upon the migrants such as modern industrial and office administrations, trade etc. which are completely different from farming and hunting in the rural areas are associated with the migrants who have brought with them rural values.

In the socio-political environments, individual and group activities are influenced by certain leading actors - the urban elites and elders - in the city they are the key actors who manipulate rural and urban values to converge and be perpetuated.

"Among these West African peoples, ethnic associations are most strongly developed, one finds that membership is virtually obligatory for all members of the group concerned, irrespective of education or status ... the elite; executive officers are the

literate; but those who are eldest or who have lived longer in the town hold the presiding office. For the poor and semi-literate these associations provide the main sources of recreation and of social security in the town." (Lloyd, 1966:31-32)

The efforts of these elites and elders keep rural norms and values alive in the city. The growing new moderising elites gain more urban experience, earn sufficient money through industrial, administrative, business and trade activities, they more efficiently organise their group to extend moderisation to the rural or natal home.

"Urban men will involve themselves in affairs of their home community when there is money available, from local reserves or government grants, for rural development and when opportunities exist for manipulating its spending. The greater peasant wealth and the existence of local government councils distinguish West African societies from those elsewhere in this respect". (Lloyd, 1966:32).

Individuals/groups bring their ideas, wealth and knowledge to the village either during occasional visits or when they retire. Thus organisations/groups and individuals are agents of convergence of modernity and traditionalism in rural and urban socio-political environments in Africa. The hidden factors which are forcing rural and urban environments to converge are modern political development, education and economic and social changes. The term 'mutual' in the process of convergence of two traditions as used by Kincaid and Rogers, tends to hide some crucial elements of political, social and economic convergence in Nigeria. In particular to urban centres, intra and intergroup conflicts, opposition, stereotyping, nepotism, corruption which characterise the social and political systems can be omitted if 'mutual' processes of convergence used by Rogers and Kincaid is applied to the Nigerian situation.

At the level of communication processes and channels, we have seen that traditional communication and news from newspapers converge in the urban and rural areas through the elites (Omu 1978). That is, through the educated leaders who also share traditional values with the non-educated, modern politics, economics etc. reach the masses both in the city and in the village, the process of two-step flow of information, and the "aware elite, called opinion leaders ... pass on" information through interpersonal networks to village and urban members of the group (Golding, 1974:84; Lazarsfield, 1944). Communication between urban and rural areas are two way processes and cannot be studied and isolated to one environment, the two

environments simply co-exist.

The relationships between individuals who operate in the media and the political organizations have been shown in terms of formal and informal processes of political communication. The converging point yet again of the two organisations are the elites. In general, the mass media communication networks play major roles in bringing together national policies awareness to village and urban environments. But there are degrees of differences which are determined by levels of education, political articulateness, availability of radio, TV sets and newspaper circulations. Closely associated to these, is audience hours of exposure to them for political information and its ability to articulate mass media content!

SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES OF COMMUNICATION NETWORKS

The idea of network was an old concept which was rejuvenated and made attractive by sociologists (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981:91) and anthropologists (Laumann and Pappi, 1976:17-18). As early as 1902, Cooley analysed 'the social act' between two persons as 'a communication relationship' but his approach was not utilised because sociologists lacked adequate methodology to deal with 'dyadic relationship'. In 1934, Moreno developed a methodology to analyse network variables. His methodology was based on "socio-metric measurement techniques and the sociograms that resulted from his data-analysis afforded the graphic realisation of what Simmel calls a geometry of social relationship."¹⁹ Moreno's research, in particular, influenced the sociological approach to the study of network analysis in America. Within a group, the sociogram can be used to identify cliques, isolates and liaisons within the communication structure of a network.

Implicit in much experimental research in the 50s in America were several concepts of network. This is because most of the research was based on small groups in which horizontal, face-to-face communication, was the characteristic feature.

"In the early 1950s, organisational scholars at the University of Michigan launched a tradition of research on network analysis of organisation communication (Jacobson and Seashore, 1951; Wiess and Jacobson, 1955, 1956). In these investigations, a major thrust

was to computer-analyse interpersonal communication flows among the members of an organisation, in order to identify cliques, the liaisons and bridges linking these cliques and other aspects of the communication structure."²²

Most of these investigators discovered that when face-to-face (informal) 'communication structure' was superimposed on formal organisation structure hitherto 'inconsistences' between the two were divulged. Elizabeth Bott (1971:314) has identified different areas of network concept in American studies in the 1950s and the late 1960s, which have also been recognised by others including: (a) diffusion and communication flow - Katz et al (1963) and Mitchel (1969); (b) graph theory - Barnes (1969b) and Mitchell (1969); (c) kinship ties - Elizabeth Bott (1971); (d) friendship ties - Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954), Eisentradt (1956), Cohen (1961), etc.; (e) neighbourhood and friendship - Aexlrod (1956), Bell and Boat (1956-7), Adam (1967a), etc.; (f) social networks - Katz (1958, 1966), Cohen and Marriot (1958), Jay (1964) etc. In the 70s new interest in network analysis on organisational communication was heightened - MacDonald (1971), Shoemaker (1971), Allen (1970), Betty (1974), Rogers and Agar Wala (1976), Rogers and Kincaid (1981:96).

The work of Charles Kadushin (1966, 1968) was particularly interesting because of its relation to the works of British anthropologists which formed the bases of network studies in Africa. Kadushin's concept is of 'social circles' in which members of a group establish a stable relationship because they are bound together by common interest. Today, the sociological approach to network analysis has become very popular with varied interest by Americans. They range from the study of small villages, city slum areas, medical innovation and family planning to application of new agricultural techniques among farmers.

In Britain, network studies had also flourished in the 50s. John Barnes (1954) and Elizabeth Bott's (1955 and 1957) research initiated a new dimension in the study of communities in Britain. Bott (1955:316) acknowledged that she as well as Barnes was influenced by the work of the English anthropologist, Max Gluckman. It was Bott and Barnes' works, and that of Mitchell Clyde, which 'contributed to the resurgence of communication network analysis' in Europe and elsewhere but exclusively became the source of reference, directly or indirectly, for the 'Manchester School' (Rogers and Kincaid, 1981:95).

It was also from Manchester that the first African studies emerged. While "Max Gluckman is the 'point of source of network', it has been Mitchell himself who mobilised the use of the network idea in a variety of field situations, particularly in Africa". That the African studies drew on Barnes' concept of network was altogether an important development, because until this time South of the Sahara, the concept of network used by early anthropologists had been merely metaphorical.

"Several authors credit Barnes' (1954) article as the turning point in shifting the network concept from metaphor to analysis."²³

Historically, it is important to note that Boussevain from Leiden and Amsterdam Universities joined the Manchester scholars in the survey of small rural and urban communities in Africa, using Barnes/Bott tradition too. Their survey concentrated on micro network analysis of social relations to understand their respondents' network behaviour in "its totality, as part of an interrelated system of behaviour". Then, Rogers and Kincaid (1981:95) point out that 'unlike sociologists and social psychologists, the anthropologists were not so wedded to utilising individuals as units of analysis, or to using computers to handle quantitative data.'

While the studies in Africa by social anthropologists concentrated on kinship, friendship and neighbours within and between rural and urban communities, in Europe and the U.S.A., two network orientations were utilised: (a) group and formal organisational interaction as noted above which is characterised by face-to-face communication; (b) the use of mass media to link socio-political power structure with individuals, groups, organisations and communities. The media network was vertical and 'power' and 'influence', based communication. There were implicit and explicit concepts of the linear model involved in the communication structure.

Central to the Manchester approach is the contribution that we do not study network but we use network to understand human activities and behaviour (Jeremy Bussenvain (1968); Mitchell (1969); Rogers and Kincaid (1981); Bott (1971); Sanjek (1974). Once the two aspects are clarified, it would be possible to correlate group characteristics and attributes with available communication channels such as newspapers (requiring a moderate or high level of literacy), radio (requiring no formal education insofar as the receiver belongs to any of the language communities used for broadcasting),

TV (access to sets) and then face-to-face communication. The approach helps to assess how individuals/groups use these channels for socio-political, communication.

In contrast the metaphorical approach was beset by conflicting definitions. To escape from the problems the anthropologists suggested that the concept of network should be separated from other human activities such as kinship, politics and ritual. They favoured network analysis in the process of understanding human relationships within a given environment or condition, to see how relations influence behaviour. This is merely a study of network as human interaction. But what are the contents of interaction that influence behaviour? If network is separated from 'kinship', politics, and 'rituals', it means as Rogers noted, that individuals or groups involved in the interaction cannot be analytically utilised as units of analysis in order to determine changes in the relationship. The neglect of network content and concentration on shared communication interaction among members of a community was the core problem early anthropologists faced in Africa - a problem of structural/functional analysis in which network was characteristically applied. This metaphorical concept, Mitchell noted, was one of the characteristics of Radcliff-Brown's studies. The latter defined network as "actually existing social relationship".²⁴

A further weakness of the metaphorical use of social network and interaction was pointed out by Mitchell in terms of its inadequacy to explain:

"Social network as a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behaviour of the persons involved."²⁵

This concept of network using the individual as the unit of analysis, implies that in analytical terms, it is the characteristic of the linkage in the network system rather than the characteristic of individuals/persons or groups involved in the interaction that should be emphasised. There are two serious problems with the metaphorical use of network. It is a serious limitation in network studies if the characteristic of the linkage is emphasised at the expense of the characteristics of those involved in the linkages. This is a failure to note that individuals in a network are characteristically as dynamic as the linkages themselves. For instance, an individual can be linked to his kin in the village through ethnic unions and organisation, to his political party through friends, co-workers and the

mass media, while others in the system can do the same through one or two channels and not all available communication networks as a result of environmental, economic and social differences, e.g. education. Also there is a failure to realise that these individuals can be aggregated to form groups/systems based on their socio-demographic identity or dissimilarities, so as to study the wider communities and the wider network linkages between them.

But Clyde Mitchell argues that metaphorical concepts of network can be expanded into analytical usage when committed to the works of Barnes (1954); Elizabeth Bott (1955 and 1957).

"The relationship of the linkages in a network to one another is taken to be a salient factor in interpreting social action, ... is one of the steps whereby the metaphor of a social network is expanded into an analogy and made analytically useful."²⁶

This indeed, could be regarded as the major contribution of the 'Manchester School' in the study of network which was applied to African communities. Roger Sanjek (1974) points out that:

"a consensus is now established that network is an egocentric concept, referring to the interaction of a single person As an individual passes through the course of his life, he makes new relationships and ends or reactivates old ones, continuously allocating his time and resources to himself and others. In a total sense, the temporal bounds of a network are set by an individual's birth and death; the spatial bounds are set by his movement. In sociological terms, an ego's relationship with them, compose his total network."²⁷

Sanjek's criticism of the egocentric approach was made on Epstein's (1954) ethnographic study of Chanda's social network in Zambia. Epstein's approach to linkage has strong reference to a particular ego (Chanda) and his links with others in his community. In a community, a person has friends, some friends know each other and others are not connected by the same friends directly but through the friends' friend. Drawing on Barnes (1954), Epstein points out that:

"not every link in the network possesses the same density Chanda does not interact with everyone in the same network with the same degree of intensity. There are those around him with whom he has close ties and who are also more closely knit together than others. There are also others again with whom his ties are more or less close, but whom he sees less frequently and who are

strangers or have only tenuous links among themselves, for example. Thus, there may be a relatively high degree of connectedness amongst those with whom Chanda interacts in terms of social class, or amongst those he counts as kins, but as between the two categories themselves, the degree of connectedness may be slight the network may not be connected in its totality, but highly connected in its parts. Those people with whom Chanda interacts most intensely and most regularly and who are therefore also likely to come to know one another, that is to say that part of the total network which shows a degree of connectedness, I propose to speak of as forming the effective network: the remainder constitute the extended network."²⁸

This passage contains some important definitional innovations. 'density', 'intensity', 'closely knit', 'connectedness', 'total network', 'effective network', and 'extended network'.

These concepts enable us to study the flow of communication not only between different villages or towns but within a whole national context.

"The network as a whole therefore, provides a covert or informal structure composed of the interpersonal links which spread out and ramify in all directions, criss-crossing not only the whole of the local community, but knitting together people in different towns and country (Epstein, 1954).

It should be remembered that the individual participants, the networks of communication and indeed Nigeria itself are in a dynamic condition. Nigeria is constantly described as a society in transition and taken as an example of the conflict between traditional communal life, the village, the network of kinship, a participatory culture based on collective life, a non-linear view of time by which history and tradition co-exist with the modern industrial life based on money, private ownership, the nuclear family, bureaucratic control and the dream of personal success. The conflict has usually been described in a polarized monolithic way. But perhaps the extraordinary characteristic of the Nigerian situation is that it never becomes a matter of 'either/or', a loaded choice; change, the conflict between traditional and modern is lived in all its complexity and fragmentation.

The indigenous cultures defended themselves relatively against the onslaught of colonialism. The European missionaries, administrators and soldiers etc. could not overnight destroy their culture which in essence was not identified with architectural monuments, libraries or complex economic structures but with community relations and internalised everyday

activities. Nigerian culture survived at the village level most.

At the same time the variety of ethnic cultures in Nigeria has ensured that there has traditionally been a cosmopolitan as well as a village consciousness. The growth of industry and urban settlements both confirmed and contradicted this inheritance. The seduction of city life is the antithesis of the austere and regulated village life. Yet this excitement ties with sensations of alienation which keep alive the emotional need for continuing attachment to the home village. Thus as Nigeria changes, it does not change its pattern of community relationship, new networks link in with the old and the whole community, urban and rural, maintains the vibrant dynamic.

My analysis will not, then, concentrate on mapping the structure of channels of communication from the perspective of individual participants as though they were static but rather attempt a statistical 'snapshot' of the dynamics of communication. In order to do this, I intend to aggregate the individuals into mutually exclusive groups with respect to four variables (residence, age, occupation, and education). Ethnicity is excluded because the data were collected largely in one region of the country. As is often shown, the smaller the city e.g. Owerri the more likely most of the respondents in the survey would come from one tribe. The analysis of data will show the patterns of interaction between groups and the way in which they use the media. This is not unlike the approach of Barnes, of whom Mitchel says,

"To describe an order of social relationships which he felt was important in understanding the social behaviour of the Parishioners in Bremnes, such as groups based on territorial location or on occupational activities ... in the morphological features of the network itself and their implications for social behaviour rather than in the flow of communication through the network, through communication-flow is noted excluded by Barnes approach."²⁹

These kinds of groups, as Sheingold noted:

"constitute social structures which exist independently of the perceptions of discrete individuals. The information an individual receives, may emanate from others with whom he is not in direct contact and of whom he may not be aware."³⁰

In other words, as Clyde Mitchell (1969:16) points out, A is in direct contact with B and B is in direct contact with C, but A and C are not in direct contact. Yet, information about C reaches A through B and vice-versa. Hence, A and C are aware of each other but not in direct contact. Sheingold (1973:15) notes that attributes of the aggregate groups may be more important than individual attributes, in determining the likelihood of new information reaching an individual. This is the basis of Mitchell's network-concept of reachability which he described thus:

"the degree to which a person's behaviour is influenced by his relationship with others often depends on the extent to which he can use these relationships to contact him through these relations."³¹

(reachability is the same as 'mesh' in Barnes terminology).

In an open society such as Nigeria, during the election period, individuals/groups through the information they gather in their direct and indirect contacts, can state fairly accurately not only the political influence and effects face-to-face communication, mass media and other factors had on them but also similar impacts of these factors on other people in the community. Reachability also has an important analytic function as we shall see later, on the influence of relatives in the village on those in the city, even though temporarily they may not be in direct contact on a daily basis.

Harries-Jones in Mitchell (1969:329) looked at the attributes of individuals in a study of political organisation in Zambia. They stated that the 'particular qualities' of participants or 'actors' such as organising ability, closeness to recognised authority, or the ability to extend 'credit' to others, are more important in establishing a leader than a focal position of communication in any given neighbourhood.

Sheingold believes that distinction between participants and categories of communication systems are necessary and once individuals are aggregated, it is necessary to discover:

"under what circumstances and by what process can new social and political movements (or parties) reach potential supporters who are socially isolated and poorly exposed to the media?"³²

This is an important question in the context of political communication networks in Nigeria. The changes in socio-political movements also affect

the entire system, as noted in Chapter One. Consequently, social and geographical mobility become an important aspect of political communication where linkages between the rural and urban environments could no longer be the function of individual interactions in their socio-political movement but also the function of the mass media. Of course this raises a new question: what is the outer limit of a system of communication?

The matter was clarified by Mayer (1961), who in his study 'Red Migrant in African Townships', states that the limit of hypothetical network can be set on the basis of kinship among certain red migrants who 'encapsulate' into close network of interpersonal relationships to maintain network linkages with the tribal rural homeland. In this study, the organisation of ethnic unions in the cities among kin, are equivalent network structures that link village and urban participants in Nigeria. Thus, linkages between towns and villages are established even though the patterns between them are different.

The role of ethnic associations in the integration of rural and urban socio-political groups and organisations in Nigeria, particularly among the Igbos, was a remarkable political communication channel before the civil war. These ethnic or clannish socio-political and economic organisations spread out in all rural and urban areas. Today, the extent to which they are used politically - mobilisation and participation - during elections is becoming very ambivalent as a result of changing political relationships among the Igbos, as well as government's attitude towards them.

In the past, these ethnic unions constituted very important political communication networks of connectedness between cities and villages. Thus, in Igboland, there are three levels of linkages between the rural and urban politics: (a) the individuals through their socio-geographic mobility; (b) the mass media political broadcast; and (c) the ethnic voluntary organisations. While they link villages and cities, they also connect groups and individuals within the two environments to different political parties - a process that influences participation and voting behaviour.

Adrian Mayer in his studies of election campaigns in India and Africa (1962, 1963 and 1966) developed the term 'action-set' or communication-set, to describe the political activities of "temporary groups recruited through various channels to serve some short term end." In the more precise relationship between the 'communication-set' and the political candidates, Clyde Mitchell states that ...

"Adrian Mayer (1966:108), illustrates the diverse linkages of the 'action-set' of the candidate in the election. The links between the individuals (sometimes groups) are distinguished by their content, between one or more of the following: kinship, occupational, caste, state, economic, religious links, and so on. Mayer goes on to say that while the outgoing relationship may be diverse, the incoming links have all the same content - support for the candidate in the election."³³

Perhaps, one of the most important properties of 'action-set', is its 'content', which means that the role of an organisation can change from economic, social and cultural to political. This also applies to individuals and the mass media. The political content of the 'action-set' varies according to the extent the political candidate sees it as a potential linkage between it and the electorate for mobilisation of support, hence, its temporal nature to serve for election needs. But this need is overgeneralised by Bott (1968:317) who interprets Mayer's concept of 'action-set' as "a temporary group reunited through various channels to serve some short term end"

My view is that ethnic unions and mass media organisation transcend the election campaign. They can only be described, particularly ethnic unions, as 'action-sets' in the process of politicisation when their role becomes more political than socio-economic or cultural. In Nigeria, they are continuously political irrespective of election campaigns or not, but there is a balance between their political roles and other functions at an election period. The most temporary level of 'action-set' is the individual level, where party candidates recruit the unemployed young people for various political activities.

Harries-Jones in Mitchell's (1969:309) study of political communication among the Mikomfwa communities in Zambia, reported that when political activists formed a new action-set, they were dismissed from the U.N.I.P. party. The new group then embarked upon an underground political communication movement to set up their own party.

I have argued that the traditional rural communication system and the urban network systems are not discrete and opposing socio-political structures but that emerging networks of communication link traditional and urban environments. In a time of heightened political participation, as with a General Election, the interaction of these networks with and through the mass media may perhaps be best demonstrated through an analysis of particular social groups in the society.

First however, it will be helpful to take a closer look at some of the concepts which will be involved in its analysis: 'action-set', 'total network', 'density', 'linkages', 'connectedness', 'reachability', and 'rang'.

1 LINKAGES

Barnes (1954) makes a crucial point that groups are linked by lines and on the lines are actual people who initiate linkages. But Barnes does not tell us who these individuals are, their special characteristics and how we can distinguish them.

From our earlier discussions, linkages are 'nodes' or cliques within the same network. Their main function is to connect different individuals, groups or wider geographical environment to a political system. This is broadly the national political communication, network role of linkages. Narrowly, and within group political communication, linkages can become complex but mainly horizontal and face-to-face in character. There is a general involvement and everyone is linked directly to one another. Leaders can easily be distinguished from followers by the number of links between them and others in the system, while linkages between groups tend to be vertical and single-stranded. These are important in the analysis and interpretation of political communication activities and involvement which entails face-to-face access to political party, other rural and urban communities, other political leaders, the mass media institution, etc.

In Igbo communities, the egalitarian, individualistic and competitive nature of the communities should be viewed as an important factor that determines the effectiveness of linkages (nodes and cliques) during election time. For a wider community beyond small villages to be involved in a national leadership election in a transitional society such as Nigeria with a high percentage of illiterates, the mass media political broadcast cannot achieve nationwide political participation. The elders, emirs, obas, village councillors, club or ethnic union leaders, committee or all the members of voluntary associations could decide which other communities and organisations outside their own to link with, in order to mobilise political support for a particular political candidate. In the smallest socio-political unit in a patriarchal kinship system such as Imo state in Nigeria, parents and relatives constitute important linkages (nodes and cliques) to other

families in the communities to influence their children to vote for a particular political party candidate.

As we shall see later, with the two different interrelated political communication environments, village/city, the linkages can even become more important than the "total network" concept as it was used by Mitchell (1969); Barnes (1954); Bott (1957); Sanjek (1974:589); Howard, M. and Skinner, E. (1984:4); etc., because it is the linkage that maintains the relationships with an individual when he moves from the village to the city, city to city, or city to village. On another level, the linkage between ethnic organisations in the village and in the city forms an important political communication network which structurally reveals how particular ethnic groups and communities vote for a particular candidate.

Linkages, nodes and cliques, are 'ties' between environments and political participants, they are essential ingredients in the kinship political structure of communication. Its political implications in the maintenance of strong socio-political and economic ties between urban and rural African and other transitional political communities cannot be over emphasised. Friedl in her study of social interaction among Greeks, states that "the role of kinship ties as mechanism for maintaining urban, rural connections is extensive and permeating. Nor does a change in social status from poorer to wealthier Greek peasants, or to any other more prestige giving position result in the rupture of kinship ties and obligation."³⁵ Banton (1975) in his study of Freetown, West Africa made similar observations, and also Lucy Mair in her various studies in Nigeria.

Individuals on the 'line' as links are important political communication ties between village and urban population in Nigeria. This can be demonstrated with the pattern of interaction between relatives who live in the city and their kin in the village during election period. Frequency of visits between relatives and friends within and between cities and villages, vary widely but the movements are highly observable. When visits become more frequent, social, political, economic or cultural reasons are behind them. Thus, to understand the structure of communication, the linkage bears the content of the communication itself.

At another level, ethnic unions could perform similar individual linkage functions through their leaders, selected members or all the members. The socio-political role of ethnic unions formed the core investigation of

Audrey Smoch's (1977) study in Nigeria. She recognised the strong relationship between village and urban politics through ethnic/kinship ties.

"The evidence of the Ibo indicates that when all other factors are equal, the ethnic identity assumed in a particular situation is the most relevant for political participation."³⁶

On her investigation of the role of ethnic union with particular reference to Mbaise in Imo state, she discovered that in the rural areas, members of different villages "learned to co-operate with one another and to communicate on political matters when political unity provided the incentive." But beyond the rural level, Mbaise people who lived in a city such as Port-Harcourt (in former Eastern Nigeria) formed a single and strong Mbaise union which overshadowed the clan divisions that existed among them in the rural villages.

"Outside of the home area, the more inclusive Mbaise identity increased in importance, relative to the otherwise predominantly clan division. In the more complex, heterogenous political areas of Port-Harcourt and Eastern region, persons assumed the Mbaise identity. Just as the exigencies of political participation divided the clans in Mbaise, it united them in the larger arena, where Mbaise position as the largest cohesive community in Eastern region eliminated the necessity for joining a division alliance and thus conferred certain advantages."³⁹

This observation is a characteristic of all the Igbo communities. But at national political levels, their unions could emerge as the most important political linkage that mobilises support for a political party. For instance, before the Nigerian civil war, Igbo state union was more important in uniting all Igbos in various parts of the country in being N.C.N.C., in far greater effective ways than N.C.N.C. party or the mass media. Zik, in particular, benefited from the support of the Igbo State Union much the same way as the N.C.N.C. Indeed, nationally, the Igbo State Union and the N.C.N.C. were politically synonymous.

Unlike the observations of Gluckman (1962:8); and Barnes (1954:44); Frenkenberg (1966:257) states that in large urban areas, 'large numbers of single-stranded relationships' exist which make it difficult for people to meet and that their activities are therefore 'comparatively isolated' from each other, in Eastern Nigeria, e.g. Imo state, the formation of ethnic unions or voluntary associations not only eliminates clashes and divisions that might exist between villages, but also strengthens ties between members of the

same community in the city for socio-ecopolitical participation. The kinship tie which is the underlying structure, is essential in the understanding of political communication.

The danger in such large scale single union linking the political activities of ethnic rural and urban groups to a particular ethnic national political party is that one or two political leaders from either ethnic union or the ethnic political party e.g. Igbo State Union and N.C.N.C. (Zik), could use the organisations to dominate regional politics, intensify inter-ethnic political competition, weaken national political development and prevent the growth of a nation-state political system (perhaps some of the reasons why the government has checked the development of such Unions in recent years by law). Secondly, when another political leader with opposing views and tendencies emerges through union and party network linkages, the emergent leader is suppressed or illegally 'removed' from the political scene. The case of Harries-Jones (1969:309) studies cited above, is one example. But where the emergent new leader is powerful and among various communities charismatically equivalent to the dominant leader, ethnic unions would either be actively split into two in support of the new political leader or the old leader, or become politically passive by concentrating more on economic, social or cultural activities during elections, or they could completely disintegrate, die out and new ones formed. The Zik and Ojukwu factions, and the formation of Ikemba Front are in fact some of the most important factors of network of political communication underlying changes within ethnic politics in Nigeria during 1983 election. The effect within Igbo communities was dramatic and the consequence as will be empirically illustrated, was the split of Igbo electorates between NPN and NPP, championed by the two leaders in the last general election in Nigeria. This trend in political communication development, brings us to another important concept, that of 'Action-Set'.

2 ACTION-SET OR COMMUNICATION-SET

The concept of 'action-set' Mayer (1966:108) and Mitchell (1969:21) developed from Barnes (1954) as discussed earlier, has a major role in the understanding of recent and, in part, past political activities in Nigeria. Harries-Jones Zambia studies have shown that there is a direct and indirect association in the political mobilisation process between the political

candidate, and the action-set. Individuals or groups or organisations can act as communication-set. Their main function is to mobilise political participants behind a candidate. In Nigeria, where there are numerous party agents and organisations, the candidate could build up multiple or diverse linkages to mobilise political support. Mayer (1966) distinguished many features of action-set but the most important is that a wide variety of bases for linkage are involved. Indeed, major criteria are kinship, political party, religious sect, etc.

The most important feature of action-set in Nigeria unlike what many authors and observers have recorded elsewhere, is that it is both permanent and temporary. The temporary action-set or communication set are individuals or temporary groups such as the Ikemba Front formed during the election. From the individual recruitment, they formed bands of thugs and large numbers of them were young and active school leavers. High-way robbers were also employed by different political parties. It was reported that during the last general election, the number of reported armed robberies dropped dramatically. But after the elections, the trend began to rise again. The degree to which thugs could disrupt the election campaign in Nigeria could be so high that it was highly speculated that one of the reasons to expel illegal immigrants before the 1983 general election was to avert major disruptions.

At the organisational level, action-set is more permanent because the ethnic unions, clubs, etc., still carry out community projects for the rural and urban areas when the elections are over. They become 'action-sets' during elections to assist the political candidate to mobilise various communities for political support. The concept of action-set emphasises communication between political candidates and various levels of action-sets depending critically on reachability.

3 REACHABILITY

Most of the African studies have been restricted in the application of the concept of reachability to individual contacts with others in the network system. But as has been pointed out earlier in the discussion of linkages of urban and village political systems, characterised by vertical and horizontal communications, when the two environments (urban and rural

settings) are interrelated, the concept of reachability can be immensely useful. Its richness is its ability to assess quantitatively communication flow during election campaigns between and within towns and villages. In relation to this view, factors which influence reachability's usefulness, have been set out by Mitchell on the condition that:

"If a large proportion of the people in a network can be contacted within a relatively small number of steps then the network is compact in comparison with one in which a small proportion may be reached in the same number of steps."³⁸

In this process and in relation to the structure of horizontal and vertical communications, two types of political communications based on reachability in Nigeria can be constructed: (a) those who can reach each other more frequently, easily and directly without instrumental or human intermediaries, e.g. the media, and the opinion leaders and group leaders; (b) the specific use of the intermediaries such as the mass media, political actors, group leaders to reach the electorate as well as the political leaders, the political candidate, reaching the electors through intermediaries.

Here the concept of reachability brings about the process of two-way-flow or exchange of political communication and information between leaders and followers using the mass media, group leaders, individuals, etc. as intermediaries. On another level, the concept is an examination of political communication where the environment and participants are directly linked but political actors do not use the intermediaries. Reachability can be considered at various analytical levels, groups, organisations, cities and villages, individuals, as stated earlier, in the process of political information flow, "where A is in direct contact with B and B with C but not A and C". This hypothetical network structure is important in the understanding of the relationship between the parties, the action-set and the various communities (masses) and how voters are influenced by direct contact with the candidate and his agents as opposed to indirect contact with them through action-sets (individuals, organisations or the mass media). The way people in Nigeria, who live in the cities and the villages are reached during elections varies rather slightly.

Nigerians, particularly the rural poor, are not interested in political party and candidate manifestos and policies but the immediate financial rewards they can obtain. Also the politicians do not present the electors

with clear manifestos and policies because Nigerian politics is established on ethnic sentiments and alliances. Where immediate financial pressure is not put on the politicians, the second most important result of contact between the politician, action-set and the masses is the charisma of the politician. Mayer (1966) observed that in Africa, several competing charismatic figures and action-sets build up linkages within the same community for mobilisation of voters. By implication, the politician has direct contact with his electors and the mass media only to boost his political image among his people where he draws and can only draw his political support because of ethnic sentiment. During the last civilian government, members of the Federal House of Representatives were accused of neglecting their duties and spending most of their time outside the capital. A member of the House once interviewed by Radio Nigeria, Owerri, stated that some representatives could not stay in Lagos attending to official duties while others were in their local constituencies 'offering money' to the electorate to vote them into power again.

Some of the major problems in Nigerian politics begin to emerge when political leaders, the communication-set and the electorate are intensively localised for a national leadership election. There is a dramatic shift from the process of mass media reaching a wider geographical and heterogeneous community to the small homogeneous community where face-to-face communication predominates as the chief vehicle for political information.

Secondly, the emergence of several leaders, and action-sets with different party affiliations and interests and the fact that each leader and his action-set can reach their electorate in a few 'steps', leads to the use of illegitimate processes of election campaign. Effective political communication becomes the function of face-to-face contact rather than the use of organised mass media political information. This process has intensified corruption at election time in Nigeria. Both the urban and village electors through the direct contacts with politicians and their local agents can state fairly accurately the extent of corruption and in particular the use of money during elections to influence voters. My observations indicate that this could be the most important factor in the general elections in Nigeria in 1983.

The process generated considerable personal and group conflicts both in the cities and in the villages. Here again, we begin to recognise the distinctive characteristics between urban and rural networks which were

observed by Barnes (Network and Political Process, 1966), that the denseness of network relationships of friendship and strangers or even of patron and client that help to fill in the relatively sparse urban network. In Nigeria, elections are dotted with conflicts, thus friends are less reliable than relatives in the village, hence most people go back to participate more actively in their rural areas than in the city. This is particularly so in Igboland where city states did not develop before the colonial urban cities were created. This is in sharp contrast with Zaria, Kano, etc. in the north, Ibadan, Oyo, Benin, etc. in the west. The village/urban structures in Imo state are still very distinct in all respects. The nature of the conflicts thereupon compelled political participants/actors - leaders and voters to make choices between friends and relatives, city or village and mass media or free face-to-face communication and began to address itself to the dimension of what Barnes described as "total-network" to determine the extent of all political communication in all the systems - rural as well as urban.

4 TOTAL NETWORK

The original source of this term was Barnes (1954) in his study of Bremnes 'A Norwegian Island'. He sums up the Islanders socio-cultural activities thus,

"In Bremnes society, what is left is largely, though not exclusively, a network of ties of kinship, friends and neighbourhood. This network runs across the whole of the society and does not stop at the parish boundary. It links Bremnes folk with their kinsmen and friends in other parishes as well as knitting them together within the parish."³⁹

In Nigeria, the concept of 'total network', brings into focus the relationship between an individual or group who migrates from the village to the city and how relationships are maintained or developed in the two environments. Ties between migrants in the two environments are socio-political and eco-cultural. In the election period, the economic contents of the ties are closely associated with the entire political campaigning process. But the effectiveness of the total network depends on the social relationship between participants. That is, extended family structure as it prevails in Imo state, Nigeria, could become one of the most important

political communication factors or effective mobilisation of political support. In one total-network of political communication, parents, relatives, friends, co-workers, the media and money, all in varied and quantifiable degrees, influence the political behaviour of the participant.

In this process of political participation and mobilisation, we can distinguish what Mitchell has described as 'recognisable relationship' designed on a temporary basis to achieve certain goals e.g. political support and relationship based on recognised right and obligation. These are useful concepts which help us to understand the structure of political communication and influence in urban and rural politics in Nigeria where relationships and other factors of political influence are varied.

We should remember also that permanent linkages do not presuppose proximity. Mitchell (1962:25) points out that "there are many circumstances where an intense link with a person living some distance away can become an important factor in the behaviour of an individual". Also Srinivas and Beteille noted that "many of those who have left the village continue to influence its social life in a number of ways ... Several of them send remittance to relatives in the village every month."³⁸ Philip Mayer also reported that tribes (kinsmen) who live in the same town maintain an intense relationship. Similarly, Peace and Lloyd in their studies in Nigeria have recorded the same pattern of relationship among urbanites and villagers in Nigeria.

I have argued that the 'intensity' of political communication in Nigeria, can be analysed at two major levels, the level of group affiliation as illustrated by the study of Audrey Smoch within Mbaise and Ariba communities and at the level of the individual who constantly maintains links with relatives in the village and new friends; co-workers, social clubs, etc., in the city. In and between village and city, political communication processes can be fully examined through group or individual linkages.

Summary of the Major Propositions to be tested in the thesis

In Chapter One different definitions and analyses of classical conceptions of political communication were presented. Also, critical reviews of orthodox concepts of political communication based on industrial or

developed nations mass media research and studies were discussed.

In questioning the relevance of some of the concepts in relation to Nigerian political communication, I have proposed in Chapter Two, a new theoretical and methodological approach which which can help us to understand political communication processes in Nigeria. I have shown some differences between advanced nations and Nigeria. These differences call for different approaches to the study of political communication. The thesis will discuss the structure of changes in terms of what existed, what has changed, and what caused the changes and their impact on the new political communication system in Nigeria. The section on historical changes will examine the structure of political communication in the pre-colonial administration. Various factors which have affected the pre-colonial systems of political communication and how and why these old structures/systems persist despite the introduction of mass media will be discussed. The history and development of party politics and the mass media will be discussed and will focus on different groups in the country particularly the elite.

Nigeria as a transitional nation has two systems of political communication, the traditional and the modern mass media communications system. For political processes e.g. election campaign, the politicians and the political communicators use the appropriate combination of different channels of communication to reach the electorate. More often, different media are used to reach different categories of political audience.

In this thesis, I will attempt to discover how certain identified groups in the communities expose themselves to different communication systems. I will also compare the degree of exposure with the degree with which the audience participated and voted in the 1983 general elections as a result of media political information. I propose that in Nigeria, exposure to political broadcasts does not necessarily imply an effective impact or influence on the audiences' electoral behaviour.

In order to eliminate false assumptions on the influence of different channels of political communication in Nigeria, relational data analysis will be used to determine the actual relationship between different channels of political communication and different political participants. Besides different media channels, other factors of political influence peculiar to Nigeria such as kinship association, friendship, relatives, immediate financial reward, school/class mates will also be examined statistically.

These indeed are vital factors of the interpersonal network of political communication which if ignored in any investigation on how Nigerians politically communicate leave a hiatus to be filled by false assumptions.

The thesis shall demonstrate that modern mass media are more urban centred than the traditional pattern of political communication which is akin to rural village areas. The extent to which the mass media and traditional political communication systems form an appropriate mixture of political communication in the urban and rural areas in relationship with five mutually exclusive groups will be illustrated. In particular the dominant position of the elites in the sphere of mass media for political control and participation shall be compared with the same elites use of traditional communication networks to influence and mobilize the communities for political action. The bases in which the elites are inevitably compelled to use both traditional and modern media to participate and mobilize others to participate in Nigerian politics shall be fully explored. The vital roles and participation of the illiterate masses in rural and urban area make the processes of interpersonal, symbolic and traditional networks of political communication very important in Nigerian politics. The penultimate socio-political structure which defines, and determines the vital roles of interpersonal network of communication in Nigerian politics is the kinship structure and associations. It is this structure in regard to communication and politics which will be explored throughout this thesis.

Also the thesis will not ignore the roles of individuals e.g. local leaders, electors, etc. in the communities. Charismatic leadership based on kinship affiliation shall be emphasised. Some of the impacts of these leaders on the masses shall be discussed to show the nature of relationships between voters during election campaign. Participant observation of the 1983 elections will be used to show how the relationship between members of a community can be weakened or strengthened during elections depending on the roles played by local political leaders. At this level of political relationship, I shall show that kinship network ties rather than the mass media influence the pattern of the electorates' political behaviour. Other sources of political influence and participation other than kinship ties and the mass media will also be investigated.

On the basis of theoretical explorations and investigations, some conclusions will be drawn to represent a general structure of political communication in Nigeria particularly in Igboland in an election situation.

These will include the structure of the relationship between rural and urban areas and communication channels.

From the 1979 to 1983 general elections a few major changes in political communication in Nigeria will be revealed e.g. the role of ethnic unions, relationship with the different states etc. Statistical evidence that indicates the new pattern of politics particularly among ethnic groups will be used to access the new political tendency. The role of the mass media in the process of reinforcement of traditional patterns of political conflict in Nigeria will be shown.

The relationship between ownership of media reception facilities, exposure influence and voting will be examined and interpersonal political communication influence and corruption will be shown in its relationship to the networks of political communication and influence.

Some comments will be made on political personality and the role of the actual policies proposed by political groupings. The functions and relative importance of political communication in each of the five groups in the study will deserve some remarks before any suggestion and recommendations are made on the proper approach to the study of political communication in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER THREE

NETWORKS OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN PRE-COLONIAL NIGERIA

In the pre-colonial Nigeria, the political communication systems, in general, could be described as traditional. Economic, socio-cultural and religious activities were closely integrated with politics, and communication was characterised by oral and symbolic means. In correspondence with our definition in Chapter One, the political system was seen as a set of 'processes of interaction' or as a subsystem of the social system interacting with other non-political subsystems, such as economic, cultural and religious systems etc.

However, the forms of political communication between different pre-colonial communities in Nigeria were often distinct and sharp particularly between the three major tribes in the three major regions - Hausa/Fulani in the North, Igbos in the East and the Yorubas in the West. Within these regions, there are also numerous political communication cultures peculiar to their peoples. Some of the outstanding minority ethnic groups who have become important political groups in Nigeria today are the Tiv, Nupe, and the Kanuris in the North, the Ibibios, Efiks, and the Ijaws in the South-East; the Edoma and the Benins in the South-West. In the pre-colonial political communication systems, some were more advanced than others, such as the emirates of the North and the Oyo-Benin kingdoms in the West.

HAUSA/FULANI PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK SYSTEMS

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Muslim world, particularly around the Mediterranean and the Middle East, felt challenged by the rising power and influence of Christianity from Europe. Hence, spiritual consciousness began in the form of religious and political movements to re-establish the power and influence of Islam. Wahhabiyya of Arabia, Sanusiyya of Cyrenacia, Mahdiyya of Eastern Sudan and the three jihads leaders of Western Sudan in which Northern Nigeria constituted the largest part, Othman Dan Fodio, Hama Bari and Alhaji Umar were outstanding leaders of such

movement.

In the Western Sudan religious political movement, the jihads leaders were mainly Fulanis. There are many speculations to the origins of the Fulanis. Originally they were not a part of Northern Nigeria. C.I. Temple, once lieutenant governor of Northern Province of Nigeria, offered some tentative suggestions about their origin. He suggested that they came from North Africa particularly from the Hyksos, Egypt or elsewhere in the Middle East or the Canary Islands. The most accurate information about the origins of the Fulanis could have been obtained from the learned writers of Bello, the son of Dan Fodio. Curiously enough and despite his learning, he ordered the destruction of Hausa/Fulani records, which if kept intact today could have provided original and vital information about the history, origin and politics of the Fulanis in the nineteenth century. The fact however, that the Fulani leadership could read, write and keep records, meant that they were advanced in political information beyond the oral medium. Their penetration into Hausa city-states of the North accelerated political and religious movement beyond the original Hausaland.

The original Hausa political geography was believed to have spread over Sokoto, Kano, Zaria and Bauchi. Before the arrival of the Fulanis into the region, the Hausas remained more or less a distinct race. It was speculated that Hausaland consisted of seven states (city-states) of Kano, Rano, Zeg-Zeg (Zaria), Daura, Gobir, Katsina and Zomfara. Prior to the spread of Mohammedanism, the Hausa people were mainly pagans.

Between city states, mutual defence cooperation existed and administratively they were loosely confederated. They were relatively autonomously independent city-states but within the region and at any particular point in time, one state was reckoned to be more powerful than others through the rise of one in such pre-eminence but saw the decline of another previously holding such esteem. It was military supremacy that one city state became pre-eminent over others.

Burns (1978) noted that:

"Zaria conquered the pagan countries to the south and subdued the Bauchi, Gobir, fought and held at bay by the Nomad tribes of the Northern desert, while Kano fought without success against Bornu. From time to time armies overran Hausaland, while about the year 1513, Askia the Great, king of Songhia, conquered Katsina, Zaria and Kano and made them provinces of his empire."¹

The major political conflict between the Hausas and the Kanuris before the advent of the Fulanis in the region was slave raids, boundary disputes and little ideological differences between them.

The Fulanis were peaceful immigrants to Northern Nigeria and their entry into the region ushered in a new and revolutionary dimension in the city states, political, judicial and social communication in the region.

"A form of government grew up based on the doctrine of Islam, with well organised fiscal system and a highly trained and learned judiciary administering Mohammedian law with ability and integrity. Each states was ruled over by its king, assisted by the usual ministers of oriental government."²

James Coleman (1965) suggested that the Fulanis conquered the Hausas in two phases with two methods:

"A gradual infiltration of the Hausa kingdom over a period of centuries, and then military conquest. The Fulani imperial superstructure was loosely organised and highly centralised, and towards the later part of the nineteenth century, the emirates became increasingly independent. In certain respects, the Fulani overlords, like the Mandu dynasty of China, tended to become culturally assimilated to their subjects."³

So far, we can distinguish two political groups in Nigeria, the Fulanis who, characteristically, were learned and religious in Islamic doctrine. They entered the region from the outside, bringing with them their doctrine and knowledge. On the other hand, the native Hausas who were not literate but had an organised political system on city states criteria. Through 'gradual assimilation' the two socio-political systems converged but the natural one became a dominant political system. How did the Fulanis became assimilated into the Hausa communities over the centuries?

By occupation, the Fulanis were nomads while the Hausas were farmers. But with time and through the network of kinship and development based on marriage, the differences between them became more obscured. This was a situation which prevailed among the elite Fulanis and the agricultural peasant Hausas. The content of the network of communication was socio-economic and subsequently cultural. But as time passed by, the Hausa aristocracy began to utilise their education for political purposes. Many of them became teachers, judges, scribes and advisers to the Hausa aristocracy. The gradual proces of assimilation implied that most of the

Fulanis could speak Hausa as well. Yet another group of the Fulanis, decided to remain characteristically distinct and culturally tended to identify themselves with the old forms of Fulani cultural values, and did not intermarry with the Hausas either. The group claimed descent from the true Fulani stock. This descent consciousness is a form of quasi-city-state-consciousness which has some important implications in today's minority ethnic political identification in Nigeria, a factor which is considerably important in the agitation for 'more state creation'. Also within Hausa/Fulani political oligarchy, the 'national consciousness' is a part of the sentiment towards ruling class identity in the region.

The structure of political relationship in Hausa/Fulani communications at this time had assumed both vertical, horizontal and isolated network systems. The elite Fulanis were horizontally linked to the masses through the network of kinship ties (marriage etc.) while at the same time through their political administrative function in the Hausa aristocracy, they maintained institutional and vertical communication network with the authorities. The group that was totally isolated from the Hausa aristocracy were the cow-Fulanis, yet through Islamic religion, it was linked to the Fulani elite. This structure of network of relation between different groups in Hausa/Fulani communities is important in the understanding of the network of religious and political alliances which altered the Hausa political system before the British arrived.

For many years, the Fulanis remained a subject race within the Hausa aristocracy until the rise of Othman Dan Fodio and the jihad of 1804. In the communities, the different groups of Fulanis were aware of the practical problems of living together with the pagan Hausas and under the autocratic power of the Hausa aristocrats who were also pagans. Some ardent Fulani Muslims, thought they were educated and could still share political power in the Hausa political administration, rejected associations with Hausa aristocrats. They devoted much of their time to the ordinary Hausas, teaching and converting them to Islam. This group was called the Borroroje Fulani. But the Fulani Gidda, through their teaching and association with the masses, biased and instigated the latter's mind against the corrupt ruling class. The very nature of their face-to-face communication with the masses who were less educated, was an important communication network in which religion and socio-political justice were the main content of influence.

The effective network of communication between the Fulani Gidda and the converted and non-Muslim Hausas became so strong that in due time, the Hausa masses began an open confrontation with their Hausa rulers. Kinship and religious ties were the basis of unity among the Hausa peasants and the Fulanis.

"Muslims objected to the conscription into pagan armies to fight brother muslims; they hated the practice of selling muslims into slavery; they despised the sultants for their sacrifices and belief in spirits, for the luxury and sinfulness of court life as well as the severity demanded from the commons. They complained about the judgement in the courts, and bribery and corruption in appointments to office. Most important of all, the merchants disliked the heavy market taxes, while the nomads hated the tax on cattle."⁴

The scholars, particularly the 'wanderers', convinced and indoctrinated the masses that the Koranic laws were abused by the ruling Hausa aristocrats. Consequently, both practising and non-practising pagan Hausa joined in a mass movement against the ruling class. They asked for reforms from above and sorted leadership among themselves, which obviously came from the 'wandering' Fulani scholars. Among them was Othman Dan Fodio. He condemned corruption, unjust government and the oppression of the poor and the weak, socio-political ideology, which won him the support of the masses to carry out his political reforms. Under his command, the jihad was directed against the pagans, and also those who were lukewarm to Islamic doctrine. The jihad went beyond the justice and religious doctrine it advocated, but with easy conquests and victories won over a short period of time, the jihad became a territorial political and economic conquest mission of what became known as Sokoto Caliphate. Bornu, which was a Muslim state, was attacked and conquered in 1808 but later regained its independence under the military skill of Sarkin Muslami, El Kanemi. Many Hausas joined in the jihad for socio-political reasons and not religion.

In spite of the abhorring aristocratic behaviour of the Hausa ruling class by the masses, Fodio never advocated for the use of violence and he avoided bloodshed to achieve political and social justice. He idealised and advocated the rule of negotiations, discussion, meetings, dialogues and common agreement between the rulers and the ruled. The content of all communication and the decisions on just society was based on Islamic rule.

With the Sultan of Gobir, Bawa, Fodio negotiated for religious freedom,

release of Muslim prisoners and tax reduction for all the citizens in the emirate. At the death of Bawa, his son Nafata came to power and under the pressure from strong Hausa pagans, he withdrew all his father's agreement with Dan Fodio. The followers of Dan Fodio, including the already highly integrated network of Hausa peasants with the Fulani Gidda, rebelled against the Hausa ruling class and civil war erupted. This was the start of the jihad, a religious and political revolutionary civil war which has had remarkable political impact on Nigerian political systems till today.

By 1877, the entire Northern region including the powerful Yoruba city-state of Oyo and Ilorin in Western Nigeria, had come under the direct control and administration of these emirates. For instance, Bello aimed at strengthening his own position and limiting the influence and power of his army. Like his father Fodio, Bello emphasised the rule of law and order under the principle of Islam. While he tried to control the army who were largely Fulani scholars, through the Mallams, he made the public aware of their religious, political and social importance as the pillars of Islam who uphold the principles of Islam by their teaching. It was through this small group of elites that:

"the Fulanis were able to maintain their rule for a hundred years, a comparatively small number of aliens governing a subject people, is a proof of their outstanding ability among the West African tribes."⁵

Having conquered a vast region during the jihad, one of the major problems faced by the Sultan of Sokoto was how to develop a network of political communication in order to ensure effective control and administration. Checking the influence and power of the army made the military option a real and vital alternative. Besides, within Sokoto itself, Bello was confronted with internal divisions and problems; thus he decided to maintain good relationships with the emirs. This was a mutual understanding guided by Islamic principles. Relations with the Sultan of Sokoto was not a domination and exercise of power but religious alliance. This is one of the weaknesses of face-to-face communication where wide geographical areas cannot be reached effectively and on time, to regulate and control political behaviour through information flow.

In view of the problem, Bello created a confederation of states within the caliphate. Member states should not attack each other and when any member was attacked by an outside state, all members should come to her aid. All

the states of the confederation were united by loyalty to the Sokoto Caliphate. Tribute taxes were sent to Sokoto. Perhaps one of the most efficient systems developed by the administration was the tax collection system. It could have been one of the best in Africa at this time.

"Every form of handicraft had its special tax: smiths, dyers, weavers, leather makers, salt-makers, canoe-men, hunters, fishermen, ferry-men etc. In some places a liquor tax was imposed, in others each date palm or beehive paid its toll. Prostitutes, dancing-girls and gamblers were taxed by one or another chief. Sellers in the market had for the most part had to pay royalties on the weavers they sold. Traders paid toll at every town which they passed. To all these and many other taxes added the guisua or present which every man had to bring when he came to see his immediate superior, more especially at the periodical festivals, together with arbitrary levies in cash or kind, irregular times without trial, and forced labour for building the city walls or the houses of chiefs."⁶

At this point in time, Hausa/Fulani political system became overtly more stratified. Militarism was deemphasised, and legitimacy was based on loyalty to the authority according to the order of Islam. The power of the authorities was economically sustained by the masses' labour and there was no direct communication between the rulers and ruled except through the Malams who formed the block of local administrators and teachers of Islamic rules and law.

While the new political and social relationships were being established within and between the large empire of Sokoto Caliphate after the jihad, the jihad awakened new political consciousness in those states outside the Sokoto Caliphate. This was comparatively the same as the political consciousness inspired in the Germans and the English by the French Revolution. In the case of the jihad, those most affected were the Bornu empire, North East of the Caliphate, and the Yoruba kingdoms immediately south of the Niger. Bornu's years of commercial domination along the Benue and central Sudan was challenged. Border and territorial conflicts were intensified, yet among these Islamic states, the Sokoto's principle of Islam attracted great interest to its neighbours. For instance, Dan Fodio, Bello and Abdullahi wrote about 200 books and pamphlets which had great impact on their neighbours outside the confederation as much as it had on those within the Caliphate.

This was an advanced form of written communication which was not obtainable in any other part of pre-colonial Nigeria where oral and folk media were the

only basic political and social communication. The writings embraced a wide range of subjects including office administration, religion, policy and decision-making processes, judiciary and equity, law and order, agriculture, craft, etc. Written information therefore was responsible for the uniformity of law and order, religion and political practices in the North. Organised information system partly made it unique and ideal for Lugard to apply the system of indirect rule in the region. The flow of information was from the Hausa-Fulani superstructure to the masses, but the roles of educated Malams in the midst of the public was necessary to impart the written knowledge. In the political system, the Malams acted as the linkage, nodes and cliques in the network of association between the ruled and the rulers.

But Islam was a more important relationship between the socio-political Malams in the communication network than effective two-way flow of political communication which could not be maintained between two different classes, the ruling class and the masses. The actual power of the ruling Fulani after the jihad was unchallenged because the Fulani Malam has two important obligatory ties with the ruling class- (a) kinship and (b) religion. These two network ties between the ruling Fulani and the Fulani Malams (teachers) were lacking between the Fulani Gidda and the Hausa aristocrats before the jihad. Non obligatory relationship between them justified the Fulani Gidda mobilising the masses against their rulers who were overthrown through political but apparent religious movement - the jihad.

THE KANURI PEOPLES

Besides the Hausa-Fulani, another important and highly centralised government in the Northern Nigeria in the pre-colonial period was the Kanem or Bornu empire. It was mainly composed of the Kanuri tribe in the North East of Hausa-land. The influence of the empire was once felt by many tribes of Southern Sudan and Sub-Sahara regions. Most of its political traditions were similar to those practised in the Hausa-Fulani empire, and even more alike after the region adopted Islam.

"After the adoption of the Muhammedan religion in Bornu, the system of law and taxation closely approximated to that in force in Hausaland."⁷

It was not the Fulanis who brought the Muslim religion to the Kanuri people. The Kanuris became Muslims centuries before the advent of the Fulani in the North of Nigeria (Coleman 1965, Banton, P.A. 1913; Nisbet, 1905). The principles of Islam and its political culture was fully entrenched into the Bornu political system long before the revolutionary jihad movement began.

From this point of view, the centralised system of government in Northern Nigeria preceeded the Fulani jihad political culture. The Fulanis merely displaced the ruling class but did not alter the structure of political system. Thus, to describe the true structure of political communication system in the pre-colonial Nigeria, the era of Fulani domination or the Bornu Muslim system could only reveal a phase in the political development in Nigeria.

It will suffice to briefly describe the political system of some of the old city-states in Northern Nigeria before the advent of Islam in the region. One of the oldest Hausa states and one of the last to be affected by the Fulani jihad and the revolution was Zazzau (Zaria). It had a stratified socio-political culture. Broadly speaking, the city-state of Zaria was divided into two main classes, the 'free' and the 'unfree'. Within each of the main divisions, there were sub-divisions or categories of socio-political groups. For instance, in the 'free' socio-political group, three main subsystems could be identified:

- a) The royal class
- b) The bureaucratic class
- c) The commoners

This socio-political structure still exists in several communities in Northern Nigeria. At national and local government levels, they are described as 'traditional rulers'. The royal class is the aristocratic group and possesses the highest political power. They are the ruling class from where all the successive emirs to the throne are selected by inheritance. The bureaucratic class is composed of men with high official positions and they are often appointed by the emire and they include administrators and palace officials. The commoners are composed of the petty bourgeois - locally called 'Falakawa', the artisans, the farmers, the artists and petty traders etc. Socio-politically, these are less significant group but Hausa by birth. They were closely associated in their daily activities with the 'unfree' class made up of slaves and eunuchs who

were either traders or captives during the inter-tribal wars and slave raids.

The social stratification consequently, bears with it an ordered status and role allocation in the entire political system of Zaria city-state. Whether 'free' or 'unfree', every member of the society played a part in the political system. But the emancipated or the 'free', particularly the aristocracy undertake the more fundamental political, socio-economic decisions and their dominant roles are attached with honour and respect from the general public. The unemancipated categories were assigned to the more general and instrumental duties. Politically, or otherwise, Zaria society and power was very unevenly distributed to all classes and in most cases the ideological and major decision-making positions are held by the free class. Despite this unevenness of power distribution, the concept of power among Zaria peoples was relatively dynamic which implies that internal and external influence on the system could generate some observable changes over time. The structure of relationship between different classes allowed horizontal flow of information which could guarantee changes thus,

"one is little surprised to see a diffuse power structure in which the Malams, the chamber officials (composed of eunuchs and slave officials) feature."⁸

The 'diffused power structure' is located within different city-state apparatus for legitimisation of power. These included the police, the prison, the court, educational institutions, the religious organisations and the family itself. These institutions served cohesive and coercive roles for the maintenance of law and order within the city-state political system. The more coercive institutions such as the police and the army, were more closely associated with the royal class and themselves constituted an important part of the powerful class. The king (emire) was the head in the council of decision-makers who are drawn from all classes of Zaria society. Every decision is constitutionally made and the council does not operate on the principle of non-monarchical autocracy nor on one class consensus. The power of the constitutional monarchy is very crucial and essentially at different stages of decision process, set a balance with the state council of the city-state and this in turn generates a check on the other authorities within the council of the state and the centre of Zaria communities.

This structure of political relationship in pre-colonial city-states in Nigeria puts into the concept that in all traditional societies, political communication is informal. Some tend to use the term informal as disorganised, random engagement in political discussions and decisions between the rulers and the ruled. The Zaria pre-colonial political system clearly indicates that the society was well organised in its socio-political relationship. Decisions were selectively organised. But the ruling class engaged in face-to-face communication within formal organisation. This structure of political communication is identical to the lobby among MPs in modern day politics as well as decision-making among Cabinet Ministers on key issues. Information on these issues do not reach the public through the media but via oral communication. A more relevant characteristic of political communication in traditional society such as Zaria has been pointed out in Chapter One, in which Pye (1963:24) states "that communication is not systematically organised, there is a lack of professional commentators and participation is as a result of political position or social organisation and information flow according to the line of social hierarchy and individual and individual's relationship with others in the community." He further stressed that 'the process in traditional societies was not independent of either the ordering of social relationship or the content of the communication.'

By implication therefore, the flow of political information in Zaria society was from the ruling class decision-making group headed by the emire to the commoners and the 'unfree'. But at all levels, communication was characterised by face-to-face communication and there was a relative absence of professional communicators. The village head who was a member of the council, acted as a leading politician and a communicator to his community. Indeed, this structure in varying degrees constituted the pattern of political communication in all pre-colonial societies in Nigeria, both among the Yorubas, the Igbos and the minority ethnic groups.

THE YORUBA PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

The political headquarters of the Yoruba people was at Ile-Ife, which was perhaps a large and powerful empire. But Oranmiyan founded the new Oyo, while his father or grandfather Oduduwa was still the ruling king of Ile-

Ife. Ajaka succeeded Oranmiyan. It was during the reign of Shango that the headquarters were moved from Ile-Ife to Oyo but the latter still remained the spiritual centre of the Yoruba people under the spiritual custody of the Oni.

The king of Oyo is referred to as the Alafin and when Shango was the overlord of all the Yoruba chiefs, his authority was exercised as far as Accra, the Niger, and Dahomey. Like the Sokoto Caliphahte, Yoruba kingdoms were composed of numerous city-states. The states in time began to split and new states emerged from the old. This was as a result of a series of wars that broke out among the Yourbas. Fulani mercenaries were invited by different Yoruba clans, and the once powerful states of Yoruba kingdom broke up into several independent states. By the end of 1850, four new states, Ife, Ibadan, Ekiti, and Ilesha emerged. Ibadan gradually became very powerful and was able to check the further penetration of Hausa/Fulani soldiers into Yorubaland. Ibadan also spearheaded a new leadership in Yorubaland, a new political consciousness awakened by the jihad, in which the Yorubas were united to resist the influence of Hausa-Fulani.

The political systems of the Yorubas in the pre-colonial period in comparison to Hausa/Fulani system was semi-organised and differed from the latter in many respects. A description of one of them hopefully would reveal the major characteristics of pre-colonial Yoruba political system and the structure of communication within it. Oyo after the decline of the political power of Ife, became the most important political kingdom bearing all the significant characteristics of Yoruba pre-colonial political communication systems.

"Oranmiyan had chosen Oyo as his capital because it was a fertile sector of the Savannah belt, with good access to the Niger and caravan trails leading both from North and East to West. It was also strategically placed to defend the new kingdom against the neighbouring powers of Borgu and Nupe, and was one of the terminations of the caravan trails from the North ... the establishment of twin kingdoms, Oyo and Benin, which until the end of the nineteenth cnetury were to remain two of the most powerful kingdoms on the West coast ... an empire that controlled most of Yorubaland."⁹

The administration of the Yoruba political system was under the direct influence of the Alafin (the king of Oyo and the suzerin of all clans of Yoruba tribe). Like the Zaria city state, there was a council of state, made up of selected elders from all the Yoruba states. But unlike the

autocratic emire of Zaria, the Alafin was controlled by the council of elders. These elders till today are very powerful traditional groups in Yoruba politics. At the beginning of the 19th century the rule of primogeniture (eldest son inherits all) was encouraged but later was abandoned and replaced by very complicated and rather peculiar ritual processes of selection or appointment of kings. In addition, there were a number of chiefs or councillors of state, the ward heads of Oyo city, who were directly under the leadership of Bashorun - the Prime Minister. These had one type or the other influence on the king.

The complexity of the Yoruba political system lies on the peculiar structure of leadership. For instance, the prince who was the eldest son of the Alafin, at the age of eighteen would be persuaded to take his life by suicide and often he was forced to do so. This was enforced by the council of elders, chief councillors and the Prime Minister in order to safeguard the king from any plot by a son ambitious for the throne. Also, most of the senior army officers and commanders were slaves and eunuchs, because they had no legal right to rule nor anyone in their line to inherit the throne, hence they had no ambition for power. In general, suicide among the Yoruba was regarded as an honourable death. Thus not only the eldest son but several other members of the Alafin family were required to end their lives by suicide particularly at the death of the Alafin. Some took pride to die with the Alafin who 'was considered Ekeji Orisa-companion of the gods, as well as owner of the land and lord of life' (Peter M. Williams 1960:362).

However, the socio-economic and political administration of Oyo empire was virtually carried out by three eunuchs, the Osi Efu - of the left and minister of political affairs - who often died with the Alafin, the Ona Efa, the Eunuch of the centre and the minister of justice, Otun Efa, the Eunuch of the right who was the minister of religious affairs. Enforcement of suicide was not restricted to the members of the Alafin family. The cabinet ministers could be persuaded to do so including the Alafin himself, though he was regarded as holy, thus his subjects were not allowed to touch him. But if he refused to commit suicide, particularly when he became either too popular or unpopular with his subjects, then the Mesi of Oyo took measures to defy him and then eliminate him. The community could not regard the event as assassination.

"The main check on the power of the Alafin was held by the Oyo Mesi who, if they felt the Alafin had exceeded his powers, could

divine that all was not well between the Alafin and his spiritual double and force him to commit suicide by presenting him with an empty calabash or parrot's eggs, or more directly by informing him that he failed to conform to precedent. However, the Oyo Mesi were restrained from abuse of this power by the fact that one of their members had to die with the Alafin."

A late development to check the abuse of power of Alafin, the elders, the council of chiefs and the Mesi Oyo, was the introduction of a 'secret society' known as the 'Ogboni', a cult or socio-political club which has great influence on the political class in Yorubaland. We noted in Chapter One, that Lloyd, P.C. (1967:270,271) emphasised the importance of association and internal structure of organisation in the analysis of political system in Yorubaland. He maintained, unlike Brown and Fortes (1940:1-15), that it was through this organisation that the structure of political power and changes could be understood. It was also through this structure of organisation which defined the political system that the efficient network of political communication to operate the system was maintained. The communication process between the Alafin, the ministers and the communities of the Oyo empire involved different levels of network of relationship but each level of interaction was specifically characterised by face-to-face communication. There was complete lack of written information on politics and religion matters such as was found in the Sokoto Caliphate political system where Bello, Fodio, etc. provided such information in written form. The Malams then based their teaching to the communities on their writings.

While the emirs of the north built a network of communication between themselves and the public through the Malams, the Yoruba ruling class were linked to the public through the secret society - the Ogboni and other similar organisations. The historical development of such socio-political organisations have formed the basis of regional and ethnic political participation in modern Nigerian politics. It was the influence of such ethnic organisations that perhaps led the Igbo State Union as a 'back-up' if not the 'backbone' of the Igbo party, NCNC, before the civil war. Indeed, the basis of understanding Nigerian social organisation is the grasping of the essentials of her complex political communication process. Lloyd in his studies of Yoruba politics seems to grasp this fact.

Recently (1984:4) Professor B.O. Nwabueze in his famous 1985 lecture writes:

"the politics of modern Nigeria had produced a pan-Igbo organisation - the Igbo State Union. In the heady days of nascent ethnic nationalism, the birth of the Igbo State Union was a logical development. It had its counterpart in the Yoruba State Union (there were also other pan-Yoruba organisations like Egbe Omo Odulawa and Egbe Omo Yourba), Ibibio State Union, Idoma Tribal Union, Igbirra Tribal Union, Ijaw Progressive Union and Bornu State Union. All of these have lamentably suffered demise in 1966 along with the First Nigerian Republic. A decree of the Federal Military Government (FMG) in 1966 has dissolved and proscribed them specifically by name. Altogether twenty-six named tribal or cultural unions were so dissolved and proscribed."

However, going back to suicide and politics in the Yoruba empire, another important person who could be persuaded or forced to commit suicide was the Kakanfo of Oyo, the supreme military commander, often a slave or a eunuch. At any one time there should be only one Kakanfo in Oyo. If the empire (Oyo) was defeated in a battle, the Kakanfo was forced to commit suicide.

Different Kingdoms under the empire paid tribute to the king of Oyo as the emirs to the Sultan of Sokoto Caliphate. Different chiefs ruled over different small communities but for effective communication and control purposes, the Alafin appointed a number of Ajele, (the king's eyes) who were endowed by the king with power to control local chiefs for the king. The Ajele were proclaimed by the secret society (sango cult) as possessing the power to invoke the god of thunder and lightning to threaten the life and property of local chiefs who refused to pay tribute to the Alafin of Oyo. (Note here that in the Sokoto Caliphate, the emirs who refused to pay tribute to the Sultan of Sokoto faced the anger of being expelled from the confederation. When their city-state was attacked by non-members of the confederation, they did not receive assistance from others.) It was also a sign of disloyalty to the sultan and to Allah (God) who 'appointed' him Muslim leader. Here, the similarities were that the content of association between the chiefs/emirs and the king or sultan was economics, guided by two different types of religion, Muslim and Paganism. The content could be politicised by the deliberate decision to persuade a disloyal member to be killed by the gods or suicide or to be militarily defeated by members outside the confederation of the empire.

Some aspects of the complex network of political relationships in pre-colonial politics were observed by Crowder and illustrated with the Oyo empire.

"Government at Oyo was a delicate balance of power between the Alafin and his palace administration on the one hand and Oyo Mesi and the more representative Ogboni society on the other. The division of power in Oyo is nowhere better illustrated than in the composition of the army. The head of the army was Kakanfo, and was directly responsible to the Alafin, while the army was raised by the Oyo Mesi as wardheads. The Alafin himself was represented in the battle by the Osi Eka."¹¹

The importance of 'organisations' as observed by Lloyd (1967) in the political systems of the Yoruba was also noted by Crowder (1978:41), who pointed out that the 'various cult groups' or 'secret' societies, which flourished in most Yoruba kingdoms had a restraining influence on the abuse of power.

THE EDO PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

Another important and second most populous tribe of Western Nigeria are the Edo-speaking people, who occupy the South Eastern part of Western Nigeria and are heavily concentrated, particularly around the old kingdom of Benin. The original Edo tribe inhabit Benin city and speak Edo proper. The offshoots of Edo are Isoko, the Ishan, the Kukuruku and the Akoko. These are different small linguistic groups but are socio-culturally intertwined. Historically, there is a speculation that they were an offshoot of Yoruba stock and several of their existing socio-political institutions are similar to those of Yoruba. Some politicians or social leaders of Benin reject the notion that Edo people constitute an important part of the old Yoruba kingdom. A feeling exploited by the NCNC leaders to assist the leaders of Edo people to create Mid-West region in the 1960s. This weakened the political power of the Western Region at the federal level. Awolowo and his party have not forgiven the East for this. The creation of Mid-West had several important implications for the politics of Nigeria.

However, the pre-colonial kingdom of Benin was powerful and had advanced political organisation, arts, town or urban development, years before the Portuguese arrived there in the fifteenth century.

"Benin was a well organised kingdom and the government was thoroughly effective ... Oedo (Edo), the metropolis of Benin, was prodigious, large, taking up about six leagues of ground in

compass ... there are thirty very great street, most of them prodigious both in length and breadth, being twenty fathom wide ..." and when the Portuguese visted Benin at the end of the fifteenth century, they found a powerful kingdom. At that time the kingdom of Benin was the most centralised state on the Guinea Coast. It once included Lagos, ... smaller Edo-speaking sub-tribes ... and ... the Ika sub-tribe of the Igbo."¹²

The historical relationship between Benin and Oyo has been indicated above. The first dynasty of Benin was established in 1300 by Eweka I, son of Oranmiyan of Ile-Ife. Eweka appointed chiefs called Enogie who carried out the state socio-political and economic administration and there were chiefs in different villages. Besides the Enogie, there was the council of state made up of six hereditary members with such political power that they could defy the authority of the king. They were called Uzama (king makers). Under the reign of Eweka I, they were so powerful that when the king died, his son the Ewedo, Crower (1978:45) noted:

"decided to transfer the capital from Usama to its present site, so as to be rid of the councillors of state, whose powers were becoming almost as great as his own."

In Benin, he systematically tried to limit the powers of the king makers in the council state. In order to win the popular support of his subjects, he established a new political communication network through the Lyase (communication officers). Through these comunication officers, the king could mobilise the popular suppot of the masses against the king-makers and the power of the latter was gradually weakened as the king became more popular and powerful.

Ogun succeeded Ewedo but was overthrown by the Uwaifiokun but the latter was murdered by Ogun who took the title of Ewuare who renamed Benin, Edo, in remembrance of his faithful slave who saved his life from Uwaifiokun, his political adversary. After the reign of Ewuare, subsequent successors to the throne took the title of Oba of Benin. The ruling class were made up of the Oba and his royal family which is hereditary. The Eghaevo Ogbe (town chiefs) controlled by Lyase and the king's political and socio-religious advisors were non-hereditary. These groups could rarely enter into political confrontation with the Oba. Between them were the palace chiefs, completely loyal to the king who acted as buffers between the Oba and his political officals.

The state activities were divided into three broad divisions in relation to three general categories of political, social and economic activities. The royal family were directly in control of the military and essential political decision-making processes. The chiefs, Iyase etc. were involved in social and religious functions while the commoners were engaged in farming, slave raids, hunting and fishing. From the information Crowder obtained from a native of Benin, Mr. P. Igbafe,

"The Obas of Benin solved the problems of administering the outlying parts of the empire through chiefs without encountering the problems of disloyalty as did many other African kings. Chiefs were not given single blocks of territory, but a series of villages scattered in different parts of the empire, so that they could not build a coherent base for revolt."¹³

Socially, the Edo tribe is highly stratified, as much as its political organisation was hierarchically and highly centralised. The first social stratification is the ruling class and then, like most African states the societies, age group follows. Age ranking order starts from the youth (iroghae), the middle-aged (ighele) and the elders (odio). The initiation from one state to another takes several years and the initiations which is associated with particular social functions, mastering of cultural norms, values and consensus is the embodiment of Edo philosophy of personality and political leadership.

Edo villages are scattered as in most other tribes in Nigeria but the heaviest concentration of the population lives in the walled city of Benin. It is in the village that the rule governing the society in relation to age is emphasised. The elders hold both political and social position considered crucial for the existence of the society at any time. During the slave raids and inter-tribal wars, the villages were vulnerable to frequent and sudden attacks. The army under the military command of the 'Ighele' had great influence and power in the village.

The Ighele, despite his military power, would not challenge the authority of the village elder who was responsible for the appointment of Ighele from one generation of a family to the other. The Ighele would eventually become a village elder and a group of village elders were the village law makers. Decision making was the function of the elders and the village chiefs. In this case, influencing decision was dependent on the dominating personality of either a chief or an elder. These roles were fundamentally important

outside the city of Benin where the king and associated royal authorities could not make every decision or influence it directly. Elements of democracy exist in all groups of Edo society and the distribution of power and decision-making involved a large proportion of the population.

The majority formed the cultural masses and power resided with the elitist class, hereditary and non-hereditary chiefs. The political and social status of the Uzama was felt by all but he was, with others, loyalist and favourite of the king. The town chiefs and the village elders were ideological and institutional representatives of the power and they stood for the interest of the poor. The town chiefs could number about nineteen and were headed by four chiefs known as the "four pillars of Edo". The prime minister was chosen from among the four chiefs. He was influential and was fairly independent of the monarchical authority and must be popular with the masses. He was elected by the chiefs; his position as prime minister put a check on the institutional monarch. All members of the royal family as well as the traditional chiefs had great respect for the common people of Edo. All in power met when necessary at the Council of State and members consisted of the Usama, the Lyase, the Palace Chiefs, the town chiefs and the aristocrats, the king acted as the chairman. Laws, constitutions and major military and political decisions were made by the council under the supreme authority of the king.

The Edo of Benin historically is important as a pre-colonial stratified, centralised and aristocratic society in Nigeria. Despite its complex political structure, the Edo culture was relatively aesthetic and artistically very creative.

"Under Ewuare, carving in both ivory and wood was greatly encouraged. Indeed, his reign, the last before the arrival of the Europeans, is remembered in Benin as one of the greatest in its long history ... What is remarkable about Benin, and indeed Oyo, is that both of them were purely African states, whose growth was stimulated by contact with neither Islam nor Europe."¹⁴

In all these pre-colonial city states of Northern and Western Nigeria, there are clear distinctions between the cities and the villages in their environmental structure. They are described as kingdoms where the seat of the government was often located in one of the major cities. The King or Emire lived in them with the royal officials. But the surrounding population were connected to the city political system through an organised

network of chiefs and village elders. The royal families were kinship-based while their village representatives were selected by the king. The chiefs and elders were the principal communication network channels between the king and the people. At all levels of political communication network channels between the king and the people, face-to-face and symbolic rituals were used. Although the political systems were centralised and organised, there was a general lack of written or highly organised communication network whereby the authorities, e.g. the royalty, could communicate with the public without local representatives. Military and religious aspects of politics were important in the city-states in the pre-colonial organised or centralised political systems in Nigeria.

THE IGBO PRE-COLONIAL POLITICAL COMMUNICATION NETWORK SYSTEMS

The Igbos occupy the south east of Nigeria with dense evergreen, heavy equatorial rain forest. In the northern fringes, however, the dense tangled mass of vegetation begins to fade away into open, semi-savannah vegetation of Northern Wawalands in Anambra state. The climate and vegetation played an important role in the structure of socio-political organisations of the Igbos which was completely characterised by small village activities. The village-groups were the limit of political communication activities. But several villages, from eight to twelve, constitute what is known as rural towns. Some have pointed out that the vegetation and harsh humidity of the region prevented the penetration of the Hausa/Fulani in the region. Secondly, the Tiv warriors, north of Wawa, were too powerful for the Fulani/Hausa to conquer in order to have access to the interior of Igboland. The second largest ethnic groups in the region are the Ibibio and the Efik-speaking people on the far south-east border with the Cameroons. Also in the region are the Ijaws of the mangrove swamps and delta regions of the South-east coast.

The Igbos are a homogenous tribe in terms of language. But the language, Igbo, has peculiar dialectal varieties which are impossibly difficult to articulate by Igbos from the wider geographical distance e.g. an Igboman from Owerri may find it difficult to understand Wawa or Abriba. Some Onitsha and Ngwa people may find it easier to hold a conversation in English than in their common language because of dialectal problems.

In the pre-colonial period, the communities were very autonomous, with absolutely no centralised government, particularly the villages in the hinterlands. Onitsha and Oguta had quasi-centralised government which had some aspects of the Benin political system. In particular, the complex structure of Igbo pre-colonial and social systems was very problematic to early European anthropologists, in comparison to other tribes in Nigeria. It was its social organisation rather than the apparent lack of observable political system that constituted the problem. Indeed, Igbo politics, as shall be seen in this work, is submerged into its social structure. It makes no sense to study Igbo political behaviour independently of its social structure and behaviour. Early inadequate study of Igbo social organisation and structure and how the network of social or kinship system resisted external influence has resulted in some contradicting, if not extremely mixed attributes which have been associated with the Igbos of former Eastern Nigeria.

"In the Eastern region, the dominant people were the Igbos, for long ... savage and untameable, but extremely hardworking and intelligent, with a thirst for education, as soon as it came within their reach."¹⁵

Audrey Smock (1971) in her study of Mbaise and Abiriba in the hinterland of former Eastern Nigeria observed the complex socio-political arrangement in Igboland.

"The multiplicity of ethnic unions, formed to further the interest of villages, clans, and the whole of Mbaise, reflected the complex patterns out of which the fabric of Mbaise society was woven."¹⁶

Whatever view is held about the Igbos and their political behaviour, I believe that extended family and kinship structures are the fundamental element that shape Igbo political behaviour.

I will now attempt to describe these social arrangements so that various political and communication processes can be adequately located at different periods of time within the social structure. Structurally, several families of parents, brothers, sisters, cousins, nephews, uncles, etc. live together in a large compound. They are often referred to as a family. Most of these kinsmen who live together on one compound (premises) call each other brothers, sisters, mother, father. These are not strictly biological brothers, sisters, parents etc. They are what Mitchell (1969) referred to

as 'classificatory brothers', sisters, etc. The origin of such classificatory "brother, sister" nomenclature in the Igbo communities has been revealed by Nwabueze, B.O. (1985:12-13). He recalls that the "advent of the modern government in Igboland, slaves and their descendants formed a large element of the societies of most communities. They even outnumbered (and still do) the free borns in some of the river basin communities ...". When "slaves became cheaper" Isiclei, E. (1983:95) "the number of slaves increased vastly". Nwabueze (1985:13) concludes that as a result of large numbers of slaves in certain communities, the society became polarized. "For slaves were without any legal rights whatever, being the absolute property of their masters and as such subject to their power of control and disposition". They were oppressed, denied basic rights, humiliated, often used for sacrifices and could not intermarry with the free-born. "Over a period of time, the slaves and their descendants began to be assimilated into the lineage structure of the communities. The assimilation proceeded upon a social fiction whereby slaves and their descendants were regarded as having originated from the same ancestral stock as the free-born, so that terms implying kinship, such as "brother" and "sister" were used between them and the free-borns." A few compounds of about ten make up a kindred and about six to eight clans make up a village. The degree of obligation between members of a village varies from nuclear family to the clan level of relationship. The degree of obligation is highest at family and kindred level. The obligations are both social and economic and they form the basis of strong ties which define the durability of network linkages between individuals or groups when they move from the village to the city. The social and economic content of this linkage can be politicised during election period, even when those in towns are not in frequent face-to-face communication with those in the village.

The village is not the highest level of socio-political activities in the rural areas in Igboland but village-groups called towns. James Coleman (1956:30), and Green, M. (1947) were unable to distinguish between village and groups of villages that make up a town in rural areas.

"... the basic social unit among the Igbos and Ibibios has been a single extended family or a kindred composed of several such families and the largest political unit has normally been the village ... Although the Igbo nationality is the second largest in Nigeria, it is divided into 30 sub-tribes, 69 clans and some 500 fairly autonomous villages or village groups."¹⁷

'69 clans' and 'some 500 fairly autonomous villages' can be extremely misleading in the understanding of social structure in Igbo communities. It is inconceivable to assume that the entire Igboland is made up of only 500 autonomous villages. The village is not the largest political unit in Igboland, both in the traditional and modern political system. For instance, Ikeduru local government until Buhari takeover of the government in 1983, was made up of fifteen towns and each town is made up of several villages. Eziama is one of the smallest towns in Ikeduru and alone is composed of eight villages: Umuopa, Amaehi, Ogada, Amamba, Umuagwu, Owuzu, Umigwe and Unuchime. Each of the villages in turn is made up of several kindreds; for instance half of the kindreds of Umuopa is made up of Umumeka, Umuoporowoba, Umuikepuru. Note here that each of the kindred's name starts with the prefix 'Umu' (sons of), then the names of the great ancestors of that kindred: Meka, Oporowoba, Ikepuru. In all the fifteen towns in Ikeduru and in most Igbo communities, the structure of kinship organisations and system of nomenclature in relation to the great ancestors are the basic characteristics that distinguish one village from the other in Igboland. This has been politicized today in the process of states creation and new boundary formation. The Prefix in those areas where Igbo communities have been absorbed by non-Igbo speaking states, are changed.

"It is as well to note that some of the Igbo border communities in Benue State as well as those in and around Port Harcourt now strenuously disclaim their Igbo identity. The disclaimer is manifested in practical terms by the latter changes in the names of their villages by prefixing them with an 'R', so that Umuokoroshe becomes Rumuokoroshe, Umigbo becomes Rumigbo, Uninmasi becomes Rumumasi ... The intention is to make them not look or sound like Igbo names" (Nwabueze, 1985:4)

Since the Igbo society is kinship-based, the family is the most important centre of all activities. The political organisation and social relationship starts from the family and expands in magnitude via the kindred/village to the town level. The problem faced by some of the above mentioned writers, particularly Coloman, was that he failed to distinguish what Nigerians refer to as 'towns'. In the Nigerian context 'town' has two meanings: (a) towns made up of several villages such as Eziama, Amakohia, Amaimo, Okwu, Uzoagba, etc. which make up Ikeduru local government and (b) town which refers to urban, e.g. Lagos, Ibadan, Owerri, Port-Harcourt, Aba, Kano and Zaria etc. These are townships that lost their traditional village pattern and became, over a long period of time, centres for trade, commerce, industry, and administration. Some of these village towns are old traditional towns of Nigeria with very little change since colonisation.

In the study of the Igbo social and political organisation and culture, we must always distinguish between village towns and cosmopolitan towns. In the discussion of political and communication pattern of Nigeria and Igboland in particular, this structure of population composition plays an essential role in both historical and contemporary analysis of political participation. Many Western writers have often omitted this important structure of Nigerian social and political organisation and arbitrarily divide the society into village and urban population distribution. Once the essential social structure is misconceived, then the pattern of power structure within the society will be misplaced, control and circulation of information essential to power structure consequently follows the misconception of power structures. In order to correct the misconceptions, let us furthermore examine Coleman's study of Ngwa in Igboland.


"Even though the village has normally been the highest level of recognised common authority, there have been times when consciousness of wider unity existed, or could be awakened."¹⁸

Then he went on to explain this 'wider unity' which in practice is a county or district by the time he conducted his research. Today, Ngwa is divided into three local governments each as big as Mbatitoli/Ikeduru local government. The three local governments include Aba, Obioma Ngwa and Isialangwa local governments. Because Coleman failed to understand the pattern of social organisation in Ngwa, he could not distinguish and make clear what he meant by 'village groups' and 'villages'.

Most Ngwa clan (more than 100,000) is a case in point. Most Ngwas are united by a belief in a common ancestry. According to clan legends, the original Ngwas cross the Imo River and settled in a place called Ekelefor, which became thereafter the annual place of meeting for all senior Onye-mue ala's representing the 15 village groups and 215 villages into which the clan was fragmented."¹⁹

To start with, the 'villages' were not 'fragmented' but organised. What Coleman called the '15 village groups' are what I have referred to above as village towns and his '215 villages' were villages made of kindreds. A number of village units form a town. A diagram can illustrate the pattern more vividly:

Rural Community Organisation of the Igbos



The town in the pre-colonial era was effectively the highest political unit. Several towns then form a local government such as Ikeduru local government or Ngwa, mentioned by Coleman. Perhaps one of the main problems of Coleman in distinguishing villages from towns was the similarity in the geographical settings. In most rural populations in Nigeria, the geographical settings of villages and towns in the rural areas are virtually the same but their social and political organisations and functions are completely different.

The core of Igboland is made up of the present Imo state and Anambra state and both of them contain 44 local governments and on the average, each is made up of 12 towns, so it is impossible to state that Igboland is only 500 autonomous villages. since some of the Igbos, unlike the Hausa/Fulani and the Yorubas, lack centralised government, yet have a political culture based on social organisation, it is absolutely essential to have a detailed knowledge of the social structure.

The apparent lack of centralised government in Igboland does not imply that the form of socio-political authority for the maintenance of law and order is lacking as well. But there is a gradual diminishing pattern of authority relationship from the extended family to the village town level. Socio-political authority and degree of solidarity is highest at the family level. This is because the Igbo society is an egalitarian and comparatively individualistic society. But individualism does not exceed the extended family level.

The pre-colonial pattern and today's political communication systems within the basic structure of Igbo rural population has witnessed slow changes because of the emphasis on network of kinship ties and relationships. People of common ancestors live in the same villages as they did before the colonial period and their basic relationships have remained obligatory which tends to resist modern changes. Thus, an account of the old political system is a review of a historical kinship politics in the past and in the present. Where the government was centralised during the colonial period, colonial administration altered or modified it. The distribution of power shifted from the traditional rulers to colonial authority.

But in Igboland, the distribution of power has been strongest at the family level. Parents are the key to legitimate family authority and hard to question from outside. Next in authority are kinsmen of the same ancestor. The village also has important influence on its members. Political decision-making at this level remains very important. In every village, there are a group of elders who preside over the village council. Most of the members are the Oparas (first sons) of respective families. In the absence of the Opara, the son represents the family. Generally, these are the elders of the village who share collective power and their knowledge of the village history and the village towns in social, economic and politics in the past, is at their finger tips. Nothing about this is written but it is passed on to future generations through music, talk tales, moonlight stories etc. Their reference to the past in order to reach a compromise during serious discussions are expressed idiomatically and peculiar manipulation of symbols and gestures accompany the idioms and proverbs. But during political discussions, everyone is allowed to attend and make a contribution.

"The egalitarian power structure manifests its true nature in the decision making process. Important decision making begins with

the lineage which at once a reference to ... a political unit. The corporate lineage is represented by a meeting of all component families, the latter sending their seniors as delegates. Consent and consensus are the principle which animate the process and outcome of decision-making. Lineage meetings are headed by an 'Okpara' who only exercises normal ritual leadership symbolised by the Ofor." (Oha, O. 19 p.58)

The egalitarian, individualistic and libertarian ethos of an Igbo man which governs his social, political and economic behaviours have been noted by Nwabueze; who states that:

"His individualism is apparently a product of his social and political system in which the village-group was the largest political unit and in which within the village-group authority was diffused among the heads of the numerous families, lineages and the villages. The society was an egalitarian one in which everyone counted equally and was entitled to a say in public affairs. The Igbo was therefore very little inhibited by authority or by any stratification of society based on birth. Unlike the Hausa/Fulani, he was unhindered by a war religion and unlike the Yoruba, unhampered by traditional hierarchies." (Nwabueze 1985:7, Chinua Acheba 1983:46)

On occasions of very crucial socio-political decisions, the process of final decision can be very prolonged and argument can be very sharp. The attendants are given fair chance to express themselves before making a unanimous statement. They may even fail to agree. Oha made similar observations:

"After the symposium ends, village elders retire to deliberate on the village mood, the village disposition. On the return of the elders, a man chosen for his wisdom and eloquence presents the assembly's decision. If the assembly accepts it, the elders' interpretation is approved by acclamation. If otherwise, it disapproves by booing."²⁰

The 'assembly' is a composition of most men, women and children in the village. The leadership of the elders is devoid of an iota of authoritarianism. They must always make sure that whatever final decision they reach, it must be that generally accepted by most people in the village, otherwise they will be turned down and other groups such as younger men from organised age groups or women's assemblies would take over decision making processes where the elders fail to satisfy general opinion. There is no single authoritative figure or group in Igbo society.

When a village cannot resolve a political social or economic issue among themselves, the case goes a step further. This time to the town council which is made of elders from different villages. In the pre-colonial period, this was the highest political organisation in Igboland. In the town council such as Eziama town, each village is represented by two or three elders irrespective of size and population of the village. The town council is well organised, with a chairman as the head of council for a period of one year and an election would be conducted to change him and all his officials who worked with him during the period. He and his officials are allowed to stand for a re-election. The village representative elders are also changed after a period of one year.

In time of dispute when the village failed to resolve problems such as a land dispute between members of the same kindred, or between villages, the town council often intervenes at the appeal or invitation of the disputants. There is no individual who can claim that he has absolute power to preside and resolve the case. Every state in the process of reaching a solution entails unanimous agreement by all the members of the council who are also aware and sensitive to public opinion on the issue.

Within the council and also from the assembly of men, women and children who attended the meeting, an outstanding personality can emerge to dominate and influence the opinion of the public gathered there and thus the decision of the council officials. His knowledge, sincerity and outspokenness on the very matter in hand are essential prerequisites which give him the chance to dominate opinions. This does not mean that on another occasion when a different matter is being discussed, the same individual who dominated in the previous meeting would do the same, unless he provides the council with a leading and sound knowledge and judgement once again. But in Igbo society, it is often difficult to find one person dominating in this way. The spirit of competition, individualism and egalitarianism decentralises information and knowledge. Everyone acquires them in one way or the other without any central authority regulating the distribution which would confine them to certain groups or individuals. In centralised states, information is controlled and used for political and economic advancement by those who have access to them.

Also the selection of the elders by different villages make any individual's domination in the council difficult, because those selected to represent the village are acknowledged wise men who are quick witted, difficult to

dominate or manipulate.

The village which many have misleadingly regarded as the highest political unit in Igboland is a medium range political unit between the smallest political unit - family - and the largest - the town council. In the pre-colonial time the town council was called in Eziama, Ofor Asato (the gathering of the eight villages). Indeed the structure of the villages in relation to the town is sociologically and politically a form of confederacy and each confederate is composed of delegates of which the majority are the first sons of various families in the village. The town (Obodo) is the federation within which the highest political decision processes are carried out unanimously. Broadly speaking, any decision that is not unanimously agreed upon is unacceptable.

Another misleading approach to the study of Igbo political culture is the over-generalisation of the composition of Igbos, geographically and historically. The Igbos and the political system I have described so far are closely associated with the Igbos in the hinterland, that is those who live beyond the confines of the River Niger and the Oguta Lake basin. The over-generalisation about the Igbo political culture has classified the Igbos in terms of other tribes in Nigeria as stateless society which implies lack of any form of central political organisation. My attempt to divide the Igbo tribe into two groups is to argue that some Igbos have, long before the Europeans came to the area, organised central government. The Igbo with centralised government had a chieftaincy system while those without chieftaincy are relatively autonomous yet politically effectively organised.

The five cultural divisions set up by Forde and Jones can be a useful approach, but too broad to reflect in depth the two social and political systems in Igboland. Forde and Jones' divisions are Northern or Onitsha Igbo, Southern or Owerri Igbo, Western Igbo (Ika Igbo, on the western bank of the River Niger), Eastern Igbo or Cross River Igbo and the North-eastern Igbo - Wawa of Enugu Ngwa. This classification is ideal for detailed ethnographic and historical survey of Igboland but may distort facts in a study attempting to local historical and contemporary political and communication changes in a tribal society such as Nigeria.

Professor B.O. Nwabuezu identified two types of Igbo communities - the Igbo hinterland and the Igbo river basin areas.

Having described the autonomous village-groups' political organisation of the hinterland of Igboland, let us examine Igbo communities with kingship systems bordering the river basins. In Nzemiro's study, four such communities were identified - Oguta, Onitsha, Obomari, and Aboh. Awo-Idemili, with a quasi-kingship system, should be included in this group. Geographically these communities with some other smaller communities form part of what is known by most Igbos in the hinterland as 'Oru people' or specially 'Ndi Orumiri' (people who dwell near or along the river banks).

"They are small communities bound by a common riverine culture but politically autonomous, each constituting a small kingdom and resisting political domination by any neighbouring group."
(Nzemiro, 1972: 3-4).

These Igbo kingdoms, unlike the Yoruba kingdoms and Hausa/Fulani empires, were small, restricted and very autonomous politically. Their political system is similar to the Benin political kingdom. The Onitsha and Obomari people are believed to originate from Benin or the Igala who moved south-east from the present south-western part of Nigeria to inhabit the area along the Niger delta region. Legend holds that they left the old Benin kingdom as a result of internal conflicts and unrest. The Onitsha Igbos are believed to have common ancestors with the people of Benin (Nzemiro, 1972:7, Crowder, 1978:45-46).

Onitsha political organisation represents an ideal system common to all riverine - Ogbaru Igbos, modelled on Benin kingship. A brief account of Onitsha kingship, i.e. the Obi and his chiefs, will give us a clear picture of political systems in the riverine Igbo communities.

The Obi of Onitsha is derived from a common ancestor, remote to the throne. The Obi was head of the community who was endowed with the authority to distribute power and chieftaincy titles to his subjects as he pleased. His own power superceded that of everyone in the land and was politically, economically and spiritual the greatest. The Obi, relatively, was mythified to the level of gods and he was the ecopolitical and social focus of this subtribe of Igbos. His position was sacred, engulfed with myths and elaborate ceremonies and rituals.

His council of chiefs had no limit to the devotion they gave him which further shows the secular-political aspect of the kingship in Onitsha. The emphasis laid on the different aspects of the kingship varies from stage to

stage in the life span of a reigning king. This is important to reinforce in the minds of his subjects symbolically, the importance of the king as a representative of the values, norms, consensus and other traditions that hold the tribe together as a people.

In every respect, the Obi remained the absolute head of the tribe, the sole power distributor and the chiefs in the community were appointed and confirmed by him and the eldest son could only succeed him at his death. No matter how old he was, the Obi never abdicated for his son, for he was looked upon as a god; his physical qualities might be weakened by old age but his subjects believed his mental capacity remained active and productive. He commanded and received the highest honour in the society.

His royal symbolism buttressed his secular authority and this royal insignia could be classified into two main categories. The first category of insignia he benevolently shared with his chiefs to enable them to officiate in smaller localities on his behalf, particularly as the king was not allowed by tradition to appear in public very often. To maintain his aura as human-made-god, rare appearance in public consolidated these values. Other insignia to Obi was exclusive to himself which was essential to distinguish him from his chiefs and also to enable him to control every one of them, no matter how powerful.

The king received gifts and tributes from his subjects including the chiefs and other personalities within and outside his kingdom. He distributed honourable titles to his subjects who in turn paid fees for them. Groups, clans, and kindreds gave him various forms of tributes, some ritually symbolic of the clan/group in the forms of cows, rams, goats, sheep, leopards, etc. No form of tax was imposed on the subjects as obtainable in the Hausa/Fulani political culture in the pre-colonial period. In all the Igbo communities, there was a lack of institutional legal forces such as the police or prison as in the Fulani/Hausa emirates.

The general picture of the Igbo political culture in the pre-colonial period was based on and characterised by large or small numbers of autonomous communities. The basis of unity and group existence centred on cosmological practices and beliefs as well as respect for the elders who perpetuated the traditions.

In the Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani empires, the use of force was necessary. In Igboland, as I will quickly show, this did not occur but the great belief of most Igbo communities in cosmology reinforced their sociological and economic links between heaven and earth and held the communities together. Where one community was spiritually powerful, it used it to extend its authority over other neighbouring communities:

"The Nris or Aros may have wielded some authority over a considerable part of Igboland, but their authority ... was purely spiritual, not political. In matters of government, each village-group or clan existed and functioned as an autonomous entity, in no way subject to control by its neighbours." (Nwazueze, 1985:2)

In order to understand the process of Igbo cosmology and its social, economic and political implications in the communities, it is imperative to consider the Igbo traditional religion in some detail and relate the content of the discussion to Igbo pre-colonial politics in particular.

The Igbo cosmology attracted the attention of some early anthropologists, Basden, 1938; Meek, C.K., "The Igbo people", and Talbot, P.A., "The people of Southern Nigeria", 1926. In their studies, they revealed three main constituents of Igbo traditional religion - the supreme being, divinities and ancestors. Though these are the principal basic structures underlying most Igbo traditional religion, either in the centralised system or in the relatively autonomous villages in the hinterland, the practices and beliefs vary widely from place to place. (It is not my intention to go into details of the variations). The most important approach will be centred on pointing out the general relationship of Igbo political system characterised by several autonomous communities which are held together by heterogeneous religious practices and beliefs.

The impact of Christianity on traditional Igbo religions has been highly noticeable. In spite of the impacts in many communities, the basic characteristics of traditional African religion still persist, particularly among the older generations.

For instance, Eziama, like most Igbo communities, is totally patterned on the segmentary model of political organisation and ideally represents a typical Igbo hinterland community. Christianity since the colonial time, has imposed itself on the traditional religion of Eziama yet the old forms still linger. In this account, I am going to omit some of the features of

religious beliefs and practices in this community, which are not particularly important to understand the relationship between traditional politics and traditional religion.

Since a small number of the inhabitants of Eziama still practice traditional religion, I will use the present tense to describe and analyse religion in relation to politics.

The traditional religion as much as Christianity or any other religion, invariably in the minds of beholders creates internal strong feeling that they are invisible forces which determine the fate of all the human race. While men live, they are all the time subject to the control of invisible forces. These forces are spirits and there are good and bad spirits.

Within the relatively autonomous villages, there are smaller but important spirits to the natives, such as Ala and Umunne. They are very much loved and cherished by the community and kindreds or lineages because they are believed to be responsible for fertility, particularly Ala. Kinship ties are emphasised by common Umune - the spirit that binds all members of the lineage together. Strictly, Umunne forbids incest, murder, stealing, blackmail and falsehood and deceit among kinsmen. Those involved in the violation of Ala or Umunne rules have cursed themselves, for they may not have children, good yields from their farms, and are often plagued with incurable diseases. They die miserable and poor.

In an egalitarian Igbo society, where competition and social mobility are ingrained in the culture, people naturally conform to traditional law and cosmological order willingly which promote their individual and collective economic bargaining processes, social and political prestige. The use of human force to maintain civil obedience and order is rendered weak as the fear of the repercussion of the cosmological force far supercedes those of organised human forces.

Another spirit closely related to Ala is the Ahiajoku, the god of yam, cocoyam, una, cassava and all crops and vegetables grown in farms. Since the Igbos in the pre-colonial period were exclusively and entirely agriculturally-based communities, the god of farm became very important in the economic survival of the society.

Ahijoku makes the land fertile and guides the farm products. Anyone who steals from the neighbour's farm is punished by Ahijoku in many different and serious ways.

In every walk of life in Igbo society, the divinities operate and they are conceptualised to such a degree that everyone is very conscious of their existence and participation in whatever he does. The degree of individualism is reinforced by these beliefs and practices and everyone goes about his duty. His action is justified in the fear of the gods first, who see all he does, then the individual develops political, social and economic relationships with others in the community on the fear of the gods. This implies that cosmologically, the Igbos communicated with the spirits before establishing material relationships with other humans in the society. Ecopolitical and social linkages are twofold, with spirits and then with humans.

All the divinities are offered sacrifices at different times and the type of sacrifice varies widely in kind, quality and quantity. Some of them are offered daily sacrifice such as kola and wine to Ala and Umunne of a family. Others may be periodically and annually at great festivals. Great festivals are fixed by priests of the deities and they organise and lead in all the ceremonies.

In Igbo society, as described above, disputes and political decision-making processes involve wide community participation. When disputants - individuals or groups, fail to reach an acceptable decision on a matter, an oath often resolves it. The particular deity on which an oath-taking process is conducted is ritualistically invoked to dispose of the life of the person who swears falsely with a fixed date which varies from weeks to months, but normally within a maximum of one year. At times, the god is asked to punish anybody who swears falsely some other way than by death. If, at the end of the fixed period announced at the time the oath was taken, nothing happens to the person who took the oath, the accused proclaims his innocence or right over the disputed matter by a celebration. Most people in the village and his distant kin are invited to the celebration. Gifts and presents in cash and kind would be given to him but if he is wealthy, he gives (out) to the community part of his wealth. The celebration may be comparable to wedding or naming ceremonies in Igboland. But if the person dies within the fixed period, little sympathy is expressed over his death and everyone would blame him for taking his own life by false oath.

Ofar is an important instrument which has ritual power. It is the signature of the elders which endorses an oath and this is placed on the ground in front of the god (represented in carved wood) or shrine after an oath has been administered.

Another important spirit in the Igbos religious worship is the spirit of the ancestors. To them, the ancestors belong to both worlds of the living and the world of the spirits. And at all times like other spirits, they take an interest in human affairs but in their own case they are more concerned with their own families. Ancestors do not interfere in the affairs of other families because the Igbos believe that every ancestor is to defend and protect his own family. Particularly, ancestors intervene in the spirit world on behalf of their families to stop any wicked acts by gods. The ancestors in the mind of the Igbos ever remain the invisible head of the family or kindred and as such honoured. They are in time of need invoked to help the family and it is the head of the family who communicates with the ancestors of the lineage for good health, more children, long life, peace and prosperity. Some writers like Kopyloff have argued that Africans do not worship their ancestors:

"Ancestor worship is semantically inappropriate, analytically misleading, and theoretically unproductive."²¹

This is not true, but the difference is that, unlike the gods, the ancestors can be reprimanded for keeping aloof to lineage or family problems when they persist for a long time such as death of young children in the family, continuous poor harvest, illness, etc. The juju men may be consulted to find out what ails the ancestor when they become aloof to prolonged problems. They, like the spirits, require the lineage to offer them some sacrifices. Ancestors are also believed to reincarnate in babies born to the family and unusually one ancestor can reincarnate himself in many babies.

The Igbo cosmological philosophy in relation to the Supreme Being, divinities and ancestors are basically the same but the approaches of worship differ, particularly where a form of central government existed such as in the communities under the Obi of Onitsha. The differences are located within the ritual exercises rather than in beliefs.

In Onitsha, the myth of the sacredness of the king implies that he must not be unnecessarily exposed to danger, easily reached, and complicated protocols are essential in order to see the Obi in his palace. The kings of Onitsha, Obomari, Agboh, Oguta, Odola, should not weep, be angry or sorrowful for these are seen as weaknesses akin to ordinary man, they are deified and capable of communication with the gods and ancestor for their subjects' and communities' needs.

Sacred offerings are often made in the morning, periodically and in special annual festivals by the kings on behalf of their kingdoms. They are the only ones qualified and 'holy' enough to approach and communicate with the spirits - a gesture of their combined political and spiritual superiority. The subjects believe that the offering made by the king would be readily acceptable by the gods, their request heeded to, to alleviate their suffering in many ways.

"At Abo, the Obi offers annual sacrifices to the cults of Ikenga and Ofo on behalf of the past Obis. This is done at the Uje festival, his annual yam festival when he entertains the Onzele and members of the Igbo title association. Again, he must offer an annual sacrifice to the shrine of Isu Osimili, the goddess of the Niger. This sacrifice is offered in the presence of the Otu-Imese whose head is the Ikogwe, and who are delighted to officiate at this annual sacrifice. The shrine, located in the middle of the Niger, belongs to the goddess that guards the Abo water front."²²

The goddess can only accept the sacrifice through the hand of the noblest of all men in the society - the king - and this goddess also laid down rules which dwellers along the bank of the rivers she guides from overflowing must obey. The only person she communicates to directly to pass on her rules to the people is the king. Anyone who breaks the law would be heavily fined or punished by death sentence. These laws of the gods transmitted by the king are part of the society's legal constitution. The sacredness of the functional roles of the king lie in his power to make sure that these constitutions are complied with by all his subjects. As in the Igbo hinterland of relatively autonomous or segmentary social and political organization with no central authority, the invisible forces investigate the action of everyone and order is maintained without a recourse to the use of force. In Obi's communities, the kings are attributed with the mythical power and can discover a crime in the community.

"He is spiritually in communion with the past Obis of Onitsha, imploring them to guide him in leading the people. At the end, the Ada (senior daughter) purifies him (Ijucha Ahu) with a chicken and prepares him for the great annual festival which his people pay him homage."²³

The festivals, like in hinterland Igbo communities, are socially, politically and economically an integral part of the community. They consolidate the strength and the political power and spiritual leadership for the king. There are occasions when all the subjects pay respect and homage to their king whom they rarely meet or see. Association with the gods and ancestors are received by the ritualistic use of various cults and in all, the king presides as the head of all the functions and ceremonies.

"The festivals have specific political connotation which re-emphasise the role and importance of the king and his chiefs in the state."²⁴

The structure of political communication network in the pre-colonial political systems in Igbo communities was the direct and indirect linkage with the cosmological power. The invisible gods controlled the communities through the kings, elders and the Okparas of the family. Conflicts were resolved not on the basis of fear and legitimate power of the king to impose corrective laws on the offenders but by individuals' and groups' conceptualised fear of the invisible gods. The kings as much as their subjects, were all in fear of the anger of the gods if they broke the law of the land. Igbo individualism and egalitarianism are based on this fear of the gods. Politics and religion were closely allied and the basic forms of communication across the society and with the gods was oral and symbolic means.

The content of network of communication was not so much on the politics of regulation and control of legitimate power but symbolic religion. The extended family and network of kinship ties were the socio-political premises in which all forms of network of communication revolved. It is therefore, important to consider religion as politics in the integration of kinship network in pre-colonial political systems in Nigeria. Religion here implies both pagan and Islamic worships.

DISCUSSION

Despite the immense diversity in pre-colonial communities in Nigeria, certain salient similarities existed between the communities. Most of the communities engaged in agriculture and production was partly for subsistence and partly for small local community markets. Pagan and Islamic religions were predominant and trade has reached different advance stages in different regions.

However, religion was the most powerful unifying political element in all the pre-colonial communities, though in the North it was mixed and Islam was at a more advanced stage. But, before the Fulani entered Hausaland, the principal religion like in Yoruba or Igbolands was pagan religion but the system of centralised government was already in existence before the Hausas were Islamised.

"Kings and their machineries of government might appear to be Islamised, but the principles of Suanic royal power remain pagan ... In the last resort, the authority of a king, and the legitimacy of the force he could use to maintain his authority, derived from his acceptance by his subject as the descendant of the founding ancestor of the people. Thus the king, with the help of the priests associated with him, became the unique means of establishing, via ancestral spirits, a right relationship between the people and the supernatural forces on which the people's life was dependent."²⁵

Politically, religion plays two main roles (a) positive, cohesive and integrative functions and (b) negative, destructive and disintegrative forces.

The doctrine of Mohammedanism in Hausaland was a new doctrine of faith which was addressed to one group, the Hausas, by the Fulanis. But it is wrong to assume as many writers have done that all Fulanis were Muslims.

"The Pastoral Fulanis (boroje) were pagans." Fage (1978:77)

The Hausas, at whom Islam was directed, were not strictly homogeneous. In terms of political organisation and power structure, the society in the pre-Islamic period was already heterogeneous, i.e. class system had already been established between the ruling class and the peasant. But in terms of religion, it was a homogeneous society - all were pagans.

The important question is, how did Islam bring about integration in such politically heterogeneous class society? The core emphasis should be centred on the elements which created discontent between the political classes - before religion resolved these elements of discontent, and how the discontent was politicised.

The Fulanis as strangers in Hausaland, did not have much the desired social and political rights in the Hausa community particularly the settled farmers. They paid tribute and heavy taxes to Hausa rulers for grazing on their land. They got little remuneration from the Hausas whom they helped to fight their wars and educate their children. The Fulani boroje who were also pagans like the Hausas, were excluded from the ancestral cults because they were strangers. The Hausa peasants as already mentioned were oppressed by the ruling Hausa aristocrats and the wandering Fulani scholars maintained close network of association with the oppressed Hausa peasants and preached to and taught them. The instrumental approach of the Fulani elites was their law and knowledge of God. The law of God, according to their experience, emphasised social and political justice to all in the community. In this case, the starting point for integration was that all actions should be drawn and based on communion with Allah (God). This relationship superseded any conceivable interhuman relationship. In other words, the content of total network linkage in the community was religion.

This doctrine of Islamic faith was intensified with the oppressed group - the Hausa peasant pagans - and communication between the masses and the aristocrats became difficult. But communication between all the Fulanis, i.e. the boroje the wandering scholars and torodbe (Fulani Muslim clerical class) who were employed in the aristocratic palaces as clerks, lawyers, teachers and judges, was not severed. All the Fulanis were tribesmen and strangers who identified with each other irrespective of differences of occupation accepted. Those in palaces were able to associate themselves closely with those living with Hausa peasant farmers.

"They could ... communicate with those in their own language, yet some among the Fulani clerics became some of the most notable Arabic scholars of the Western and central Sudan. As such, they could also communicate with the Tuareg divines. These were also scholars born of, and living in, a pastoral society, one result of which was the spread of the Qadiriyya to the Fulani clerics."²⁶

Having developed vast network communication links with all classes in the society, the Fulanis set out to mobilize the support of the masses against the ruling class who had denied them full social and political rights and participation. In the context of Islamic doctrine, the Hausa autocratic aristocrats had no legal justification to rule and ought to be challenged and repalced so as to establish a just society where all in the name of Islamic brotherhood could enjoy equality in all respects.

"... in the boroje lay widely spread reservoirs of manpower, already accustomed to the use of force, whether in self defence or in the service of others. They were also free from contamination by the society the Fulani clerics wished to reform or destroy, and they were linked together by the same nexus of kinship, and by a common language that the clerics themselves could use for their effective mobilization."²⁷

Tension began to build up when the ruling class suspected the content of religious preaching of the Fulanis to the Hausa peasants. Initially, the intention of the preaching was less precise which resulted in greater tension between different classes.

For religious integration to take place in a society under the leadership of a small alien elite, such as the Fulanis, they must have formed a strict highly organised and well-disciplined network group. Reaction from outside should not shake the organisation to disintegrate from achieving its objective. A firm, solid and religious elite could then set out to achieve this purpose either by coercion or cohesion and surprisingly, the Fulanis achieved religious and political integration as described above through the combination of the two forces.

Over a long period, they established mutual and cohesive relationships with the peasant Hausa who were the main social political opponents of the ruling class. With the support of the peasants, the reserved army of Fulani nomads, who were particularly denied civic rights by the ruling Hausa for many years, the Fulani elites staged a jihad - a holy war.

However, one of the most important and salient instruments of the success of the jihad which many historians have ignored was printing. It has been estimated that the Fulani clergies such as Usman Dan Fodio, Abdullahi and Muhammad Bello wrote and published over 260 books and pamphlets on religion, law, philosophy, history, politics and poetry which were orientated towards Islamic principals. These did not only have a strong impact on the

immediate environment (subjects within the emirates of Hausa/Fulani) but also reached and influenced states outside the Caliphate.

Their writings in terms of communication and influence spread faster than the jihad itself. This situation was comparable to the writings of Martin Luther in German and Small, C. points out that:

"Whether or not the original 95 theses on indulgences which Luther nailed to the door of All Saints' Church in Wittenberg were handwritten, they were very soon in print ... and carried the igniting spark of the Reformation throughout Germany ... by a stroke of magic he found himself addressing the whole world."²⁸

Indeed, Usman Dan Fodio achieved similar doctrinal power in the name of Islamic religion through written communication and military conquest.

"In view of the piecemeal manner in which the empire initiated by Usman Dan Fodio had been constructed, and also of its vast size, it was a two months' journey to cross it from north to south and three to four months from west to east - its control and administration were not a simple matter. One thing was not in dispute, namely, that under God, supreme authority rested with Usman and his heirs, who bore the titles of Shehu or Shaykh, Sarkin Musulmi and Caliph."²⁹

One of the most important factors which helped Islam to penetrate into such a wide area by written communication was that Hausa and Fulani (the languages used in the publications) were widely spoken in the area. Many of the books also written or translated into Arabic were commonly used by the Muslims of Kanem empire in the north-east of Hausaland. They were the second largest ethnic group in this region and were most affected by the teaching of Usman Fodio. Like in Germany, Small, C. further remarked:

"Perhaps the most significant point about this series of events is that the theses, and many of the pronouncements that followed them, included the appeal to the Christian Nobility of the German nation which was the chief manifesto of the German Reformation, were printed in the vernacular - either translated from Latin or written from the start in German."³⁰

and through printing in local language, John Sleidan noted that 'German eyes' were opened and 'enlightened' knowledge was brought to the rest of the world and

"Each man became eager for knowledge, not without feeling a sense of amazement at his former blindness."³¹

Also the use of Hausa by both pagans and Muslims meant that the language was a sacred language which was used to convert them. The converts did not feel alienated in the doctrine they were persuaded to accept. They found the conversion natural in terms of language.

Doctrine has several integrating powers via communication processes. One of the most effective ways of communication is by the meaningful interpretation of the language used. Encoding of messages for persuasion must take precedence over all things but the experience of the group who were aimed at to decode the message.

In the pre-colonial southern societies of Nigeria, the political implication of cults cannot be over-estimated. The congregation of kinsmen, clans and tribesmen before the tombs of their ancestors - if known - and other symbolically dedicated places for their worship in the communities under the leadership of the elders, chiefs and kings, cannot be only dialectical imagination of cosmology and philosophical religious thought, but also vital political communication network systems in which the communities were indirectly linked to the gods through their leaders.

Leadership in spiritual worship has shown both in contemporary society and in historical times of the great Gnostic teachers - Shankara, Ramakrishna, Bodhicharma, Huineng, Duineng, Duishis and Honen, as illustrated by Pythagoras, Empedoches, Plato and Plato and Platinus, that religious teaching and authority were complementary. Leadership was also the most powerful political influence upon followers.

Today, several leaders have emerged both as religious leaders and political leaders. Outstanding among them is the present leader of Iran, Khomeini Ayatollah Ruhallah; the Sikh leaders of India have now taken up a political emblem rather than a spiritual banner. The Rev. Jesse Jackson's political popularity among Black Americans has its roots in religious leadership, while Pope John Paul II's religion has acquired for him - rather than having to ask for it - the power to intervene and neutralise political tension worldwide, e.g. in Poland and in South America.

Back to our traditional society, intellectual analysis of groups in a society often tends to separate people by class, tribe, caste and clan, etc. Once one traditional religion is established and remains pure of contamination from outside, the entire worshippers have a greater tendency to be united strongly under one leadership irrespective of class, caste and culture.

The consultation of far distance oracles and cults such as the Aro Chukwu or Igwe Ka ala of Umunoha united the worshippers of fairly diverse background, culture and dialects. Forms of cult worship integrated and developed inter-relationship, checked social differences and broke down class divisions into two - the masses and the spiritual leader who was also the political leader, such as the Oba of Onitsha, the Alafin of Oyo and the Oba of Benin. These leaders communicated directly to the spirits on behalf of, and for the well-being of, the society. Cults therefore bind and animate the masses via the kings or the elders.

Onitsha people would not believe that any sacrifice which was not offered by the Oba was acceptable to the gods. And in all the annual rituals and ceremonies, the Oba, the Obi, the Alafin or the elders led the ceremonies while they remained as legitimate political leaders. Furthermore, religious ceremonies did not represent a specific moment of existence of the tribes and their needs but the entire life and continuity of the group was believed to be determined by these rites.

Although some daily but minimum rites were common by individuals and groups, in more organised kingdoms of Onitsha, Benin or Oyo, the class structure and political leadership and power began to emerge as the more important ceremonies were carried out seasonally or annually. Complicated and elaborate annual cultic practices were reserved for kings, chiefs and elders who also held greater political power. In this case, the religious practices of the pre-colonial southern Nigeria tribes were not different from the ancient worships of Israel, Egypt, Japan, Italy and Greece, etc. The degree of religious function emphasised the extent of political power and influence of the leader.

As we have seen so far, in pre-colonial Nigeria, religion was everything.

It was difficult to draw a line between the social, political, economic and religious life of the people. In every respect, each supplemented the

other. The activities were highly interwoven. Perhaps, this was the common characteristic of all pre-colonial states in Africa and Jack Herbert Driberg carefully observed the life of the Lango, a tribe in East Africa.

"It cannot be too often emphasised that religion is a much more important factor in the secular life of primitive people than it is with civilised communities - indeed, it is the most important of all. It enters into all their family and social relations, into their most commonplace activities and their daily occupation, in short, there is no aspect of native life which has not its religious significance, and which is not more or less controlled by religious rites or prohibitions."³²

Thus, in the pre-capitalist but subsistence agric-economy of Nigeria, religion was the major integrating political factor and the main medium of expression of unity. Either in the city-states of the Muslim north, the kingdoms of Yoruba/Benin west, or autonomous communities in the east, religion symbolised the entire life of the people and the main content of all the total network in the system.

In pre-colonial communities religion transcended political power. For instance, a shrine for cultic rituals could represent and also form part of communities' property for wealth, social and political power. They were also subject to the rulers and sanctions laid down by religion over the community.

Though all these communities practised religion, enormous differences existed in the acts, hence their attitude towards the outside 'world', i.e. people outside their own communities, became overtly negative. Consequently, tribal resentment that has plagued Nigerian political and social institutions can be located in differences in religious practices.

Religion is an inner state or intrinsic factor which can be very subjective. Its political integrative value cannot be realised until the subjective values are made manifest in experience or communicative forms. Religious experiences take off effectively via communication channels. In traditional societies the predominant communication channels were immediate - oral and face-to-face communication, gestures, symbols and signs, printing in the case of Hausa/Fulani, and painting in the case of Benin works of art. All these could be articulated, substantiated and verified, through various cultural systems in the society. In the process of sharing religious experience via communication, specific attitudes by the communicating group

are developed towards the world and those outside the group. Every characteristic attitude developed by the group whose entire life revolves around the faith is constantly stimulated by religion from generation to generation. This attitude normally would be directed to the outside world - which may or may not share the same view. Views can only be made known at points of contact between different people. Attitudes through spirit of religion sharpen, determine, create and regulate communication of ideas, values, norms and consensus with other people.

As we have seen already, the jihad expressed a negative attitude towards non-believers in the doctrine of Islam in pre-colonial Nigeria. Thus, religious attitude was not only an indication of spiritual influence but also political movement.

Power structure and the development of modern historical philosophy has been pointed out in the works of Hegel, Baader, Kant, Schelling, and also Ernest Troeltsch who particular noted that:

"the attitude towards the 'world' which is determined and motivated by a characteristic religious experience influences men's appreciation of the basic concept of human existence and the form of human activity."³³

Also Max Weber has made a useful contribution through typological study of different religious attitudes to the 'world'. The varying degrees of conception, interpretation, appreciation - optimistic and cheerful evaluation of the 'world' or pessimistic and bleak view of it followed a differential attitude towards the society by the beholders of these views.

As the Islamic brotherhood in the north has persisted since the pre-colonial period by excluding those who are not Muslim 'brothers' and was less affected by colonial rule, as will be shown later, let us consider further the Igbo and Yoruba cosmology which was affected by the Christian religion during the colonial period. Indeed, the traditional Yoruba and Igbo religions have comparatively died out as a result of Christian religion and other Western influences, particularly education.

The cosmic order among the Igbos and Yorubas was well organised in a comprehensive mythology that embodied normative elements which transcended mere speculations. The cosmic, moral and ritual order placed binding network ties between the entire communities of Igbo and Yoruba lands. In

Igbo land particularly, the rules of cosmic relationship with communities were the only expression of political and social reality upon which the Igbos could secure themselves as a people and a political group as such. Normative systems - rules, legals, and aesthetics of every individual were regulated and revolved round the cosmological belief. Since, as pointed out earlier, there was no clear boundary between the social, political and religious life of the Igbos, cosmological association predominated in everything, thus as Hambly, W.D. Malinowski, William and Seagle have noted in their studies:

"Themis represented the order of the World as the gods desired it to be and thus developed into a binding social force. She personified the collective conscience, the social sanction, the social imperative which was at first diffused, vague, inchoate ... later crystallised into fixed conventions cut distinction between civil and criminal or between law and custom does not emerge until a later stage."³⁴

Like the Greek society, in Igbo and Yoruba political system "Law, indeed, was one aspect of religion." (Harrison, J.E. 1912:526; Granet, M. 1930:247)

The major differences in pre-colonial tribes of Nigeria were in social and political organisations. In communication terms, the only form of communication in Igbo and Yoruba societies was oral, immediate face-to-face communication.

"Given an equal mastery of the language, the oral exchange is intrinsically symmetrical. All individuals have an equal capacity to initiate exchange, an equal capacity to avoid and terminate exchange, an equal capacity to determine the content of the exchange and the terms of any discussion. There is also an equal capacity to store and retrieve information from past exchange. All individuals are equally exposed to such exchanges and have equal access to the means of operating them, since they required no more than a common language or code and normal physical condition of voice and ear."³⁵

In the Hausa/Fulani caliphate both written and oral communications were used and they had a wider and better organised political system. In the caliphate, social and political organisational structures were also more complex and each group did different tasks but all were consistent with common Islamic principles. However, the degree of religious and political participation and function were highly differentiated. Comparatively, with the Igbos at this period, there was a minimum of such differentiation and diversification of functions and political roles by members. Igbo

communities were simple, small and autonomous, but characteristically unique in structure and political and social systems.

In the Hausa/Fulani emirates, social and political division were vertical, while in the Igboland it was horizontal. The Yoruba/Benin organisation was second to Hausa/Fulani political organisation, but less autocratic because the powers of the kings were controlled by the people through the chiefs who could persuade the kings to commit suicide if their power was suspected of being too much or they became unpopular with their subjects due to acts of cruelty or tendency towards despotism.

In Igbo society, individual achievement and age determined political participation and status. In Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba/Benin, inherited position determined status and prestige and thus political power. And in these societies except the Igbo communities, traditionalism and hierarchical organisation 'froze' members at various strata of their society. Consequently, communication processes and information diffusion followed the vertical and hierarchical order and

"We can therefore expect the development of relations of communication which impose a ritual or juridical symmetry of use on intrinsically symmetrical means."³⁶

Therefore, different sets of values and information would be received and they were controlled for power in the society. The power structure here was similar to ancient Imperial Rome.

Contrary to Igbo society, power was extended as physical force, individual achievement, intellectual superiority, outspokenness for justice and

"... power, which is the ability to control, is free-floating in human society, and may become associated with any one of many distinguishing attributes with physical strength (Estimo), age (Adamanese) with being the first-born son of the first-born son (Polynesia), with knowledge (Zunis), psychic gifts, or valour in war, or with being born with a caul."³⁷

In the north, division of labour had already been advanced and differences in ranks established. The simple dichotomy of kings and rulers prevalent in the south were replaced in the north by the three or four social strata - the sultan, the emirs, the Malams and military peasants (farmers and artisans). The relative power of these strata were determined by the amount

of power each stratum had at its disposal to exert on the community. It is important to note that class stratification is always determined by internal structure and organisation of the society. Power, status and prestige acquired through heredity favours class stratification and in such a society, political stability would be more likely than in societies where the criteria for power and status/prestige are determined by individual achievement, strength and intelligence. Intrigues can be employed to oust those in authority. The hereditary systems are more conservative and autocratic and could be prone to dictatorship, while the former society (decentralised) is more radical and responsive to changes.

It is a too narrow approach to characterise pre-colonial societies in Nigeria and their political systems solely on religion. This will make the societies appear very static. Another common characteristic of the societies as mentioned earlier was agriculture, which is a very good indicator in stages of social, political and economic development. (We are not concerned with economic development and changes.) But in all the pre-colonial Nigerian societies, political communication was exclusively interpersonal directly or indirectly with religion as the principal linkage content in the network of relationship between kinsmen, the ruled and the rulers. Islam was and still is central to Hausa/Fulani politics, cults and oracle organisation was common to both the Igbo and the Yoruba political systems. Specifically, the Igbo communities were primarily concerned with the cosmological forces to regulate their socio-political relationship. The strongest socio-political force which regulated political power among the Yoruba was the spiritualisation of suicide. In all the systems, kinship network structure was the base on which all socio-political relationships were established.

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CHAPTER FOUR

COLONIALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SYSTEMS

In Chapter Two, I proposed that one of the processes of the convergency of traditional and modern political systems in Nigeria is at the level of political policies which affect both rural and urban areas. I also pointed out that this process is historical. The historical moment in which the two political systems converged was under the early administration of the British in Nigeria.

This dimension of convergence may not be crucial for the analysis of data in today's political communication network systems in Nigeria, but the background is important because it was the colonial administration that in particular initiated 'the coming together (convergence)' of two different political traditions in Nigeria. In chapter two, we have seen the structure of political communication in a purely traditional system in which religion and kinship subsystems constituted the major political communication content. With the exception of Hausa/Fulani kingdoms in the North where Islam and written information had advanced a stage ahead in political systems, other parts of Nigeria in the pre-colonial period did not converge with any new and different political system.

The apparent convergence of the traditional and modern system began in the late nineteenth century with the domination of the Royal Niger Company in the Niger Delta areas. The trading companies combined commercial, military and political administration in these areas. As European powers, particularly Germany, France, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, began to develop and expand economic interest to Africa at this period, Britain also began to encourage, in particular, the Royal Niger Company to expand its interest and influence to the North and West from the Niger Delta areas.

"While encouraging traders and missionaries to pioneer up the Niger, she took more active steps to secure the Yoruba rule by conquering Lagos in 1851 and formally annexing it in 1861. As the pressure of internal rivalry increased in the 1880s, Britain claimed three spheres of influence in: Lagos and Yoruba hinterland, the oil Rivers of the Niger delta, and the vast territories of the Islamic emirates in the North."¹

The influence of Sir George Goldie in the amalgamation of British trading companies in order to take effective economic, political and military control of Nigeria in the wake of European interest in the country was strengthened by Queen Victoria's 1887 charter. By this charter, the company was made responsible:

"for the government of the River basins and the whole of Hausaland."²

The processes in which modern systems were introduced in Nigeria under the British trading companies' administration encountered problems and resistance at two major fronts: (a) internal; (b) external. Internally, there were several uprisings, for instance, the company's well organised army which was disassociated with trade, were confronted in the South east of the Niger by the local army of Obi Anazonwu of Onitsha. The Obi also rejected the teaching of the missionaries and:

"a series of well-planned loots of missionary stations and trading factories"³

were carried out against the Goldie administration. Further north, Bida and Ilorin waged war against the trading Company. Goldie also faced the overwhelming task of suppressing the slave trading activities of the Fulani in the North.

In general, slave raids seriously hampered the free-movement of people and goods and, in particular, barred access to the flourishing market in the Borno kingdom. Thus, one of the initial problems of convergence of two traditions in Nigeria was horizontal communication in which geographical mobility, that created linkages between different people, was restricted. The most important factors of such linkage by those in authority were economic (trade) and religion (Christianity). Externally, the aggression of the French and the German forces, along with the internal confrontations, compelled the British on 1st January, 1900 to assume total control of Lagos colony and the protectorates. Militarily, the West African Frontier Force largely made up of Africans, was strengthened to protect the country against external aggression and also to suppress any internal uprising. Within the Nigerian context military, commercial, political and religion (Christianity) in the hands of alien powers, now began to be separated and defined to cope with the prevailing new situations. Thereupon, a new political arrangement

based on division of roles and duties began to emerge in contrast to the old systems where the chiefs, emirs, elders etc. were the social, political, economic and spiritual leaders. Between 1901 and 1906, the entire Sokoto Caliphate was conquered by the British but the emirs ruled the people directly while the victors ruled indirectly.

In the North, the process of apparent convergence of two political systems as early as 1906 were achieved first by what Ernest Gellner (1983:42) described as "a political group with military orientation and dedication". And this was "perpetuated by societies strongly committed to warfare, either because their tribal form of life includes a leading stratum committed to it or for such similar reason".

In the case of the British conquest of the region - which was the second phase of Hausa integration of a new political system, British interest was orientated towards industry and trade but maintained by 'military machine'. Hence, in the process of the convergence of a traditional and modern political system, one of the subsystems emphasised under the British rule was economics. The new economic subsystem generated new forms of political relation and struggle between the rulers and the ruled.

Another important aspect of the old system and the new system was religion - Christianity. It was a popular reason among certain strata of the Europeans to initiate a coming together between African and European traditions. Hugh E. Egerton (1855-1957) stated that:

"The motives which prompted the European nations to enter upon the field of colonisation were ... the desire to convert for the church, and the desire to win wealth for themselves. Unhappily, the missionary zeal soon exhausted. When it was found out that the unknown lands were peopled, not by civilised communities ... but by savages weak for the most part in body and in mind, the work of religion was left to the priest, and laymen more and more confined themselves to the material side of the conquest."⁴

Religion, as seen in Chapter Two, was fundamental in the African traditional political system and constituted an important aspect of the persistent belief by early Europeans "that peoples of tropical Africa were fundametrnally different from the rest of mankind."⁵

Generally, therefore, in the study of the convergence of two political traditions in Nigeria emerging specifically from the colonial period, were

economic, religion and, to a certain extent, military subsystems which became very important major characteristics and which also distinguished the two subsystems. These also can determine the political relationship between traditional and modern political systems.

Unlike the gradual assimilation and fusion of Fulani political tradition with the Hausa traditional system, the convergence of the Nigerian pre-colonial political system and the European modern political system was achieved by military force. The consequence was that behind the new political system, the old traditional pattern persisted more or less strongly through tribal and kinship networks. This military character of the Nigerian political system was not so much on the grounds that the British wanted to satisfy their trade ambition, the external (French attempts to occupy Bornu) and internal confrontation had to be militarily resisted, but because the prevailing situation in Europe and the character of individuals engaged in early colonial administration in Nigeria made military action inevitable.

Fage (1978:388) noted that military rule has had a formidable base in the politics of Nigeria because those who laid the foundation in Nigeria and Africa in what is known as civilised government, were generals of the 1914-18 war. The Victorian conquest of Africa at this period demanded Europeans with military experience to serve on the continent. Besides, after World War 1, there was a general demobilisation of soldiers who began to look for civil employment. Such experience, Fage (1978:388) points out, was a useful qualification for a colonial governorship. Fredrick Lugard was an example of such an ex-serviceman. In 1894, he came to Nigeria to assist George Goldie who was also an ex-military officer. When the British took over the administrative roles of the Chartered Royal Niger Company, Lugard was appointed the Commander of the colonial army and the governor of Northern Nigeria between 1907-12. For a couple of years he was in Hong Kong as a governor. He returned to Nigeria in 1914. In the same year he amalgamated the north and south of the country. Ajayi noted that the amalgamation undertaken was:

"... in the process of trying to establish effective rule over different peoples of Nigeria that the artificial nature of initial demarcations of territory became obvious."⁶

Implicitly, as with Nigeria, different political systems existed and in

addition to these an entirely different political system was imposed on the already multiple systems. Ajayi further commented that the amalgamation of different peoples and political, social, and cultural systems has "been one of the most crucial events in Nigerian history ... undertaken essentially for the convenience of the British administration and the Nigerian peoples were not consulted." (Ajayi, 1978:633). Bretton (1962:124), describes the amalgamation as "one of the greatest acts of gerrymandering in history."

In defence, Lugard argued that the amalgamation was necessary in order to reduce the cost of administration of the Northern and Southern protectorates and also to bridge the economic gap between the more flourishing southern coasts and the vast but less economically well off North. While the amalgamation was the apparent convergence of different political systems in Nigeria, Ajayi points out that the '.... interlocking chain of connections did not make Nigeria a united country'. The economic rather than political integration of the amalgamation was made clear by Lugard.

"The scheme of amalgamation adopted in Nigeria was designed to involve as little dislocation of existing conditions as possible, while providing for the introduction later of such further changes as were either foreseen, but not immediately necessary, or might be suggested by future experience."⁷

In the concept of convergence as defined in chapter two, our discussions so far in the early colonial administration show that different political systems existed independent of each other in Nigeria before the colonial era. The colonial system becomes a dominant political culture. The amalgamation was a crucial moment in which different traditional and modern European political systems converge, but more importantly each of the systems within the total political system in Nigeria potentially remained active and unaltered. Yet in their original state they were subject to changes which would only enhance economic growth within a fragmented political system. Here is the irony of political convergence under colonial administration where weak and disunited political groups were pressed together for economic expansion. A weak political system is prone to and exposed to both internal and external exploitation, culturally, economically and socially.

What is important in the 'convergence' of different political systems in Nigeria at the level of the 'amalgamation' is not amalgamation itself but the systems of rules operative under it which were dichotomised into direct

and indirect rules. Their application by the colonial authorities differed from one traditional political system to the other. Coleman states that:

"Although the British authorities vigorously pursued the policy of working through the developing traditional systems, there were great differences in its application. In general, the policy was most successful where there were identifiable traditional authorities commanding effective control over centralised structure of government considerable greater difficulty was encountered in the case of the dispersed tribal societies for here the traditional political system was less clearly articulated and political process much more subtle."⁸

The most important region in Nigeria where the Indirect Rule System could be efficiently adopted was in certain parts of the North predominantly dominated by Hausa/Fulani (in chapter three various traditional political systems have been fully described).

INDIRECT RULE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

In 1900 after the declaration of the protectorates, Lugard embarked upon a systematic method of ruling the Hausa/Fulani communities through their emirs. This was as a result of an efficient traditional political system which existed in the North before the advent of British colonisation. There was no better alternative political system which could be introduced to govern the vast region of the old caliphate which had embraced the Islamic faith, and

"Under its influence they had ... developed a well organised fiscal system, a definite code of land tenure, a regular scheme of local rule through appointed District Heads, a trained judiciary administering the tenets of the Mohammedan laws."⁹

In order to contain opposition, in communities where resistance was encountered during the conquest of the North, old leaders were replaced with new leaders, new laws were passed and carried out by the leaders. The new leaders could no longer exercise 'inherent' authority, but the colonial law enabled them to carry out responsibilities within the communities.

In 1903, the North was divided into 14 provinces and each had a Resident Officer with advisory capacity only and he was trusted by Lugard. Political communication was maintained through 'chains' or linkages between the Governor and the ruled. The absolute intermediaries were the Resident Officers and the local emirs. At the most local levels, the convergence of traditional and modern politics revolved round the level of political association between the Resident Officers and the emirs. But the emphasis on the relationship was economic rather than political. Lugard made it clear that the "basis of the whole system supplied the means to pay the Emir and his officials. The district and village heads are effectively supervised and assisted in its assessment by the British staff."¹⁰

Perhaps, it is not the overt non political content of the indirect rule and its great economic emphasis that should be considered most important, but the response of the people to the system. The concept of the 'Nigerian system' or 'Indirect Rule' based on social class overlooked the most abiding factor between leaders and followers - religion. The presence of Resident Officers who were not Muslims in the local communities, but 'lords' over the emirs, produced resentment by the masses. And in the city-states such as Kano, Sokoto, Zaria etc., where the supervision of the traditional rulers by the colonial authorities was most direct and overt, there was a new pattern of de-urbanisation. There was a trend in geographical mobility from the cities to the rural areas. Following this trend, the villages became the new administrative units.

"The village is the administrative unit 'and' it is not always easy to define, since the security to life and property which has followed the British administration has caused the exodus from cities and large villages, and the creation of numerable hamlets, sometimes only one or two huts, on the agricultural bands ... they reorganised the authority of the Emirs, and are ready to listen to the village head and the council of elders, on which the Nigerian system is based."¹¹

This new economic development had certain important political communication implications and economic consequences. The development of innumerable villages as a result of city/village migration and the continuous presence of Resident Officers in these remote villages intensified the rejection of Western values. The Islamic laws and values during the crusades had already equated these values with Christianity. Through the teaching of Fodio, Bello etc., the Muslims had rejected Western values before colonisation. Thus, traditional politics closely associated with a religion became more

entrenched in the indirect rule system, not because the colonial authorities found it the most attractive or encouraged it, but because the ruled rejected the new system.

The adherence to village heads and elders implied that under the new system, these heads remained the political, social, economic, cultural and spiritual leaders. Political communication as defined earlier consequently remained traditional.

In order that the colonial authorities might influence and change the village direct, without the necessity of expensive intermediaries such as the emirs and Resident Officers, the development of radio was encouraged despite the argument, as we shall see in chapter six, that radio stations in Africa were "a waste of money on an extremely expensive, relatively new invention" (Armour 1984:30). This was an application of the concept of linear model of the mass media on colonial Africa which failed because the network of kinship and obligatory religious ties which characterised the rural communities and the entire Muslim North remained powerful means of political communication.

The notion that once Europeans came into contact with Africans, the impact of their advanced political systems, social, cultural, etc., would have

"disintegrating effect on tribal authority and institutions, and on the condition of native life ... tribal system break-up ... nothing could infuse new life into it. And with the rapid changes the native character has deteriorated ... and the old village discipline and respect ... gone. The old order of tribal society is dead, dying or doomed"¹². This could be highly questionable.

The concept of the influence of Europeans on African socio-political life is similar to Morley's (1981:1) observation about the "loosing of traditional ties and structures" where people were "exposed to external influences, especially the presence of the mass propaganda of the powerful leaders". A concept which he pointed out was developed by the Frankfurt school of emigrants (Adorno, Marcuse, Horkheimer) to America during the 1930s, which formed the foundation of the historical development of the linear model of political communication. The socio-political and economic development studies of Schramm (1964), Lerner (1958), Pye (ed., 1963) were based on the same concept as shown in chapter one of this thesis. On the contrary, the indirect rule in Nigeria became direct rule by 'indirect means' in which the

economic interest of the colonial authorities strengthened the position and salary of the Emirs. They became absolute rulers among their rural subjects. The external influence of the colonial power had partial impact on the local heads. Bishop Tugwell maintained that through indirect rule in Nigeria, the lives of the masses were:

"robbed of all initiatives, or desire for progress - intellectual, social, moral, religious or political The Emir who is appointed by the government is the instrument of the Resident."¹³

Indirect rule only facilitated tax collection; political and social life of the people for many generations after the contacts with the Europeans remained unchanged. Ajayi (1980:633), therefore, stated that the

"basic idea of Indirect Rule was to preserve as many of the traditional institutions as possible and to use them as agents of colonial rule to maintain stability by discouraging social change and yet encourage just enough economic development to produce revenue to run the administration. It was a policy of expediency full of contradictions and difficult to maintain in practice."¹⁴

The tax system established in the North in the pre-colonial period was the most important factor that encouraged the development of the native authority system. By 1946, 116 native authorities and 59 treasuries were established in the region. Between 1953 and 1954, these treasuries collected over £5.7 million. The most important ones were Kano (£797,723), Sokoto (£513,324), Katsina (£437,243) and Bornu (£381,610). The large sum of money involved in the treasuries led to the appointment of supervision staff and rigid rules, which were only relatively relaxed by 1954, were imposed on expenditure. It was only after the availability of large sums of money that the economic motives of Indirect Rule or a Native Authority system in Nigeria became politicised. Political economy, similar to those of Western industrial systems applied in Lagos colony, started to be introduced in Northern Nigeria. The convergence of two political traditions began to show some apparent close similarities and association. The activities of traditional authorities and institutions which constituted the core of the Native Authority System began to be contradictory when the treasury funds were directed towards the establishment of modern schools, colleges, hospitals, printing press and public works. Departmental administrations were created to manage and control these activities. These divisions of labour in the development of modern economy brought about the separation of religious, social, economic and political leaderships

previously held by one person - the emir, the sultan, etc. in the community. The introduction of modern institutions such as education, mean that some of the important aspects of traditionalism could be eroded or give way to the new institutions. It was through these institutions that some degree of convergence was achieved. But the Islamic autocracy held the erosion in check for a long time.

Amongst the modern institutions, education played an important role in the convergence of traditional and modern politics in the region. Initially, the separation of native authority leadership and religious heads in the Hausa/Fulani community was impossible because the assignment to a position of authority within the system was based on inheritance, and the emirs virtually dominated the entire power structures. But as time passed by, appointments were based on merits. Education and experience in civil services became important criteria for political leadership in the communities.

Then institutions and political actors became elements of political convergence because these institutions and political actors were developed into representative institutions based on achievements and merits. Politically, between 1946 and 1953 three levels of political power structures could be identified in Northern Nigeria:

- a) The central colonial administration which was dominated by the colonial authorities with a greater tendency towards economic interest in the regions rather than political development. But the model of the central political system in Lagos colony became an important component of the convergence of traditionalism and modernism in Nigerian politics. Also it was because of the success of the colonial economic policy - taxation - that modern institutions and political elites were created.
- b) The ascribed native authority system dominated by religious leaders. As their authority in communities checked rapid development into political modernisation so also did the constitutional representative politics led by the new elites limit the power of the emirs.
- c) The representative party political group adopted the colonial political model but were for a long time excluded from the colonial decision making process.

Then, the understanding of the political convergence between these levels is dependent on the structure of network linkages between the political actor and the institutions involved. For instance, in the emergence of party politics in Northern Nigeria, a considerable number of Native Authority officials became members of the party - Northern Peoples Congress (NPC). As a result, the authority of the colonial powers was sought and in 1952 the Native Authority Ordinance, which previously endowed the emirs with considerable power and privileges, was amended. The so-called superior Native Authorities under the new amendment became chiefs-in-council and were able to abide by the majority decision of the party.

Most members were elected. Party policy became geared towards a decision-making process which guaranteed to represent popular opinion of members and the masses and not the authoritative view of the emirs. One important factor in the development is that most members of the Native Authority system were members of the political party. The convergence of the two models implies that the Native Authority system was structurally extended and broadened to include educated Northerners as well as the other tribes who were not Hausa/Fulani in the region. In 1953, the "Strangers" who lived in Sabo, Garis (strangers quarters) in various cities in the North formed their own representative councils.

While most of the party and council headquarters were located in the urban areas, members were elected from both rural and urban areas. The previous members of the Native Authority system such as the emirs, who were also important party leaders such as Sarduna of Sokoto, did not lose their power as traditional village and urban leaders in Sokoto province. Thus, such leaders became important linkages between rural and urban politics. In times of a general election within the new political structure, they were capable of creating an extensive network of political communication between the two environments for political mobilisation, participation and voting. In chapter five, we shall consider the relationship between NPC and the development of mass media for socio-political actions in the region.

INDIRECT RULE OR NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEM IN WESTERN NIGERIA

We have seen in chapter three that the traditional political system of the Yorubas was a combination of Hausa/Fulani and Igbo traditional systems. Technically, it could be an important system of a 'democratic socialism or restricted autocratic system.' Though the Obas, the Emirs or sultan of the North were a political class, the former, Hailey (1938:460) points out, did not

"possess the measure of personal command which the Fulani rulers had acquired and had been made effective through the agency of the District Heads who were their direct representatives throughout the territory. The subdivision of the Yoruba kingdom possessed a large measure of autonomy under the leadership of the hereditary families."¹⁵

The check on the powers of the Obas or the Alafin by his subjects as explained in chapter three, was a major setback in the introduction of a Native Authority system in Yorubaland. What was required was a re-organisation of the structure of political power in the traditional system. The power of the Obas over their subjects was recognised as absolute and endorsed by external power - the Royal Niger company in 1892 and 1893. Indeed, the earliest form of Native Authority system was introduced in the South by George Goldie. But while he legitimated the authority of the Oba so as to control his subjects in absolute terms, he excluded the Oba from eco-political decision-making in the Royal Niger company.

The advent of modern education in Western Nigeria by missionaries and the return of ex-slaves from America, had already provided a large number of elites before the official proclamation of the Native Authority system. This created an initial problem for the Native Authority system to function. Not because these elites confronted the colonial authorities, but on the grounds that the traditional rulers felt dissatisfied with those who legitimated their power and at the same time excluded them from economic and political decision-making in the region. Hence, the traditional rulers began to identify with the new political elites who wanted a representative system of government, based on merit at regional and federal levels. Therefore, indirect rule, in effect, unified the traditional and emerging new political elites against the colonial authorities. The impact of modern education to produce new political groups that would enter into political struggle for power with the traditional rulers was reduced by the introduction of Indirect Rule.

Another problem in effecting the Native Authority system was the lack of available sources of regular revenue to guarantee the salaries of the Obas. A direct taxation system in the North provided the means to pay Northern Emirs, but such a system of taxation did not exist in Western Nigeria.

In 1918, the Native Revenue Ordinance which was introduced in the North a year earlier, was extended to Western Nigeria. Instead of alleviating the problem, the Ordinance created a new conflict in which the separation of power at local level between the local authorities and the local traditional chiefs and Obas was impossible to define. This was because both the elites and the traditional rulers rejected the principles of a Native Authority system. The agitation of both for the replacement of a Native Authority system led to the establishment of the local government council system modelled on the British (local government) system. Politically, both the elites and the traditional rulers were elected or appointed to the local government system. Consequently, both the elites and the traditional rulers became more closely integrated at local level. At representative level, beyond local politics, the larger local governments became dominant political groups in the region.

Areas outside Yoruba main Provinces such as Warri, Asaba, etc. where previously there were no political leaders above family and clan level, councils of elders constituted an important political group. In these areas, the councils were in multiples of ten, highly fragmented and disproportionately scattered throughout the region. This was administratively expensive and difficult to run. In 1947, smaller councils scattered within the same geographical areas were grouped together and their treasuries accounted for large revenues. This process reduced the number of local councils from 137 in 1945 to 53 in 1951.

But, it was not until 1948 that the Colonial Office saw the need for the development of local government councils and then encouraged the system. They helped to appoint local chiefs as ceremonial heads and the colonial official inspected the political and financial activities of the councils.

By 1951, Lagos formed part of Western Nigerian Regional government but after 1951, it was directly administered by the central government which was divided into three Districts. Local chiefs helped in tax collection. Between 1953-4, Western Nigeria's total revenue expenditure was about £2 million and the Regional Treasuries' revenue was about £5,000 - £275,484.

The big cities such as Ibadan, Oyo, Benin, Egbu, etc., had the largest revenues. It was the availability of these revenues and the expansion in cocoa production that helped Western Nigeria to embark on rapid developments in local hospitals, roads, schools, colleges, electricity, water supply, etc. The expansion in education produced large numbers of elites and as the council members were elected, the majority of them were these educated men. In many respects, they overshadowed the ceremonial traditional chiefs in the Districts.

The slow development of the Western system of education in the North, on the contrary, meant that similar development in the North was dominated by traditional rulers. Also, Western Nigeria wholeheartedly embraced Western values, the urban centres that developed during and before the advent of colonialism were rapidly expanding. The process of migration was from the rural to urban centres hence the cost of running numerous small local governments scattered throughout the region, was reduced by the merging together of small ones. The localisation of politics and the mutual political activities between the elites and the traditional rulers within these councils, helped to produce a unique political leadership in the region. The development of a party political system proved to be beneficial for a political leader who required only to be linked to local government leaders and these in turn would mobilise the local communities behind the leader. Furthermore, the rapid urbanisation in Western Nigeria made the political mobilisation of Westerners by a political leader comparatively easy. The rural areas only responded to the trend of city political activities. Because of the long history of Yoruba cities before colonisation, traditional politics were already entrenched in them as much as in the village. During the colonial administration, these traditional values remained an important part of Yoruba politics. The elites maintained the kinship network system which were par to the urban politics and which were not required to be transferred from the rural areas through the network of rural/urban migrants. These elements combine to make the Yorubas the most 'traditionalist' tribe in Nigeria today.

In the sense we have defined convergence of two traditions geographically. In Western and Northern Nigeria where city-states or urban centres developed before the advent of colonialism, the convergence of two different political systems were between colonial metropolitan and city-states. The networks of convergence were colonial officials, local elites and the traditional rulers who participated in the various political activities. Awolowo's strong

tendency to develop modern mass media as early as possible in Western Nigeria is part of the political elite concept that the city audience could be reached directly and be manipulated by the mass media. The process of Native Authority and local government systems in Eastern Nigeria contrasts sharply with the Northern and Western, particularly with the former.

INDIRECT RULE OR NATIVE AUTHORITY SYSTEM IN EASTERN NIGERIA

While the aristocratic and explicitly traditional political system of Northern Nigeria provided the ideal system for the functioning of Indirect Rule, the democratic socialism or restricted autocratic traditional system of Yorubas only provide a partial success of the system. The extreme or the polar opposite of the Hausa/Fulani system in Eastern Nigeria totally rejected the system of Indirect rule. Alternatively, direct system of rule was tried. As described in chapter three, the social structure of Igbo communities made its success impossible. Green (1947) observed that:

"The social structure was marked by the absence not only of hereditary chiefs, but of all personalities who would claim an inherent right to the allegiance of any large group of people. Authority was usually distributed among kinship heads and the members of title-holding societies, and the group of people who were accustomed to look at a common source of authority was very often no wider than that inhabiting a small village."¹⁶

Though Green made a similar error as Coleman (1960) in that the highest political organisation in Igboland is the village rather than the village towns, the absence of a hereditary chief was a crucial factor that made indirect rule difficult in Eastern Nigeria. This applies most explicitly to the hinterland beyond the riverine areas of Niger Delta as described in Chapter Three. Onitsha and Oguta had a kinship system but did not develop any form of tax system.

Before 1906, most villages and towns in Igboland were extremely scattered and there were no cities comparable to Oyo, Benin, Zaria, Kano, Sokoto, etc., in other parts of the country from where a centralised authority exercised power over the rural areas. Igbo villages and towns were characterised by conflicts, slave raids and intertribal wars. This seriously restricted horizontal or geographical mobility which in turn

impeded communication between peoples. There was no local army, and no central administration that would require taxpayers' money to maintain - crucial odds for Indirect Rule. In spite of these, the colonial administration implemented the 1906 Ordinance No. 7 in Eastern Nigeria. The Ordinance provided for the establishment of councils or courts made up of appointed local heads but their authority was superceded by the District Officer or Commissioner. The egalitarian, individualistic and achievement orientation reflects a dominant leadership, the colonial authorities wisely considered these factors before appointing members of District councils.

"In many cases care was taken to choose ... men of good local standing; in others, however, more consideration was given to purely personal qualifications, such as experience of service under the administration."¹⁷

The appointment of men who were associated with colonial administration for local government councils could not cause much conflict because there were no traditional rulers to be displaced by the appointment. The convergence of the modern political system and the traditional type were realised through these men. The strict adherence to achievement which was the major characteristic of Igbo leadership, by the colonial administration ameliorates any early opposition to the introduction of the Native Authority system in the Region. Leadership structure was not considerably altered provided those appointed would not remain in power permanently.

Between 1925 and 1926, direct taxation was introduced and newly created Warrant Chiefs became tax collectors. Taxation encountered little opposition in the first year, hence it was extended to women. But Owerri and Calabar women expressed their anger riotously and great resentments were directed to Warrant Chiefs.

Furthermore, the fragmented nature of Igbo communities based on villages and small towns, as highest units of political organisation, made tax collection and the application of the Native Authority system very difficult. Between 1948 and 1956, there were 245 Native and subordinate Native Authorities in Owerri Province only.

The composition of local councils from 1948 of Warrant chiefs, village elders and large numbers of elites who were members of the 'Progressive Union' altered the structures of the Native Authority system in Eastern Nigeria. The first obstacle to the adoption of a Native Authority system in

Igboland and amongst the Ibibios in Eastern Nigeria was provided by the Progressive or ethnic unions. The elites within the council as well as members and leaders of the 'Progressive Unions' paralysed the functioning of the council which 'represented' the interest of colonial administration. The unions and their elite elements became principal agitators against the introduction of the Native Authority system. Because of their education, the elites were regarded as the leaders of their communities by the colonial authorities, and the communities also accepted them as such. Having become appointed by the authorities to the local councils which they opposed, they crippled it from the inside. The leader of the District commission who was an alien in the community was conveniently disregarded by the local leaders in the council as well as the Progressive Unions.

The political advancement and economic growth in Yorubaland was attributed by the Igbo to the rapid development in modern education. For the Igbos to meet the advancement of the Yorubas, education was given a very high priority and those who obtained it were recognised as local leaders. The elders appointed by the colonial authorities into the council were overshadowed by the elites. The council and not the unions were regarded as 'a symbol of imperialism from which every true African must seek release!' (Haily 1957:467). The emphasis on modern education and the role of Progressive Unions in promoting it, is not so much the consequence of Indirect Rule but the struggle of the Igbos to meet the Yorubas who have advanced far ahead socially, politically and economically as a result of the lack of it in Igboland. Thus, the convergence of the modern political system into the Igbo traditional system came from Western Nigeria. Also, Mackintosh (1966:213) noted that the unrepresentative nature of the Native Authority system was seen by the Igbos as a major factor that prevented them from catching up with the Yorubas in social, economic and modern educational progress.

In order to make progress, that character of the Igbo political system based on representation was emphasised in place of the Native Authority system. Between 1947 and 1950 legislation was passed to establish county councils, urban and rural districts. Membership to these councils was on elective basis only. The success of the legislation was shouldered by two main organisations:

- a) The national council for Nigeria and Cameroon
- b) The various Improvement and Progressive Unions

The most important of them was the Igbo State Union. The Unions were more traditional but had strong orientation towards modernisation while the political party was a symbol of a modern political organisation. In the convergence of modern and traditional politics to achieve economic progress in the Eastern Nigeria, the roles played by elites in these organisations were important. At the beginning of the Native Authority system, War (1967) observed that:

"It was difficult for young educated men to make their voices heard ... therefore they formed political groups in towns, sometimes tended to regard the chiefs and their grey-headed councillors as relics of the past and a brake on the country's progress. All towns in British West Africa were simmered with political activity; with clubs and discussion groups and embryo parties of all kinds."¹⁸

But in Eastern Nigeria, the network of kinship ties and the extended family networks of relationship between various groups made it possible for them to belong to the voluntary organisations which spread throughout the villages and towns. In both ethnic organisations (unions) and the political party (NCNC), the elites were the leaders. Also in the county councils and district councils which were now elective, the elites became the majority members. The dominant position of the elites in these institutions began to pose a major problem. The most important question was how to service these modern and quasi-modern socio-political institutions that require a good number of the educated class to run them.

With the fall of indirect rule, and the poor development of direct taxation, the colonial administration believed that:

"The ambitious schemes now in view for the expansion of education will in particular prove to be impossible of achievement without a drastic change in the system of local taxation."¹⁹

But to the surprise of the administration, other major ethnic groups, and some West African countries, educational and economic progress went on in Eastern Nigeria with amazing rapidity. The development of ethnic and voluntary unions and clubs provided not only financial support to potential individual students, but also provided funds to build schools, colleges, roads, bridges, hospitals and public health centres, etc. For instance, Smoch (1977) reported that Mbaise Ethnic Union in Eastern Nigeria:

"Originate the schemes for the creation of the Mbaise county secondary school and the Mbaise county joint hospital. At one time, it loaned money to students to finance university education. When it discontinued these loan scholarships, it instituted a secondary school scholarship programme. The county council awarded small grants to secondary schools in Mbaise managed by voluntary agencies."²⁰

Recently the considerable importance the Igbos attached to modern education has been summarised by B.O. Nwabueze:

"Perhaps the most outstanding quality of the Igbo is his innate receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change which, under the stimulus of Christianity and Western education imported into Nigeria by the modern government readily triggered in him an obsessive desire for self-improvement and modernity through education. Western education was the stepping stone to employment and political power. It opened a whole new vista of opportunities for the acquisition of wealth in commerce and industry. The Igbos were quick in grasping the value of Western education. The drive for education thus became the driving force in the Igbo society. A whole community would team up to build a community school and finance its courses, to institute a scholarship scheme for its sons and daughters, and even to establish a secondary school or college. A parent would slave and deny himself all comforts in life in order to send his child to school; his ambition was to make good in his child what he himself lacked. He might be a peasant farmer, a poor illiterate or semi-literate carpenter, or blacksmith, but his dream was to live to see his son become a cleric or even a lawyer, doctor or engineer. And once successfully trained, the child accepted it as a family obligation to train his brothers and sisters. (Nwabueze, B.O., Ahinjoku, Lectual, 1985:6)

There was in terms of economic roles a strong relationship between the ethnic unions and the local councils. This was because the elites within the two organisations influenced decisions in them. Besides, the need to develop local communities was the primary aims of both the unions and the councils, thus political differences and the need to levy taxes as directed by the colonial authorities were rendered weak.

These activities increased:

"the level of education in the communities ... and relative status positions of some groups altered sufficiently to effect a possible change in leadership."²¹

For political advancement, leadership in both council, union and NCNC at one level became integrated and Smoch (1977:186) further noted that 'the same

men ... who held office in the ethnic unions were likely to seek membership on local government councils. Even major politicians sometimes secured a place on the county councils, to augment their other base of influence'. Having confidently established political influence by direct membership and participation in rural and urban politics, the elites who dominated regional party politics produced the popular 1950 Eastern Nigerian local government Ordinance which in the view of Mackintosh (1966:214):

"... was a pioneer measure, which foretold the end of philosophies and practice that held the stage for nearly fifty years. Its repercussions outside Eastern Nigeria were considerable, for influencing later legislation in the Gold Coast (1951) and in Western Nigeria (1952)."22

At regional level, the dominant form of political communication within the union, council and NCNC was face-to-face interaction. But different unions, clubs and councils were linked by leaders and selected committees. The relationship between them was not only political but also social, cultural and economic. Thus, in the understanding of political communication in Igboland, the content of communication should be understood. It is sometimes very difficult to distinguish whether the communication content was political, economic or social. This is because memberships were based on kinship and leadership on merit. There was no limitation to leadership either for local economic development, e.g. Progressive Union or local government council based on election or political party representation. An individual in the community who fulfils the requirement by achievement could be the local community president for the Progressive Union, social club, local council leader, etc. One of the most important achievement criteria for leadership at various organisations and institutions in Eastern Nigeria was modern education and its impact Coleman (1966:115) writes that it:

"did not merely facilitate the emergence of a separate class, it endowed the individuals in the class with the knowledge and skills, the ambitions and aspirations, that enabled them to challenge the Nigerian colonial government and ultimately to wrest control over the central political power from it. By the latter achievement, the Western-educated elements place themselves above the traditional African authorities in the new Nigerian political system. Thus, within the short span of two generations, Western education made possible merely complete reversal in the status of Nigerian political leaders. The rapidity of upward mobility in this revolutionary transformation is possibly unparalleled in history."23

It is important to note that in Eastern Nigeria, the concept of traditional rulers in the strict sense of traditional politics exemplified above with the Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba systems, were totally absent in the hinterland areas. Meritocratic values based on education tended to be the absolute condition for new political status among the Igbos. Since the colonial period, it has become both an economic and political factor. The emphasis put on it has reinforced kinship and ethnic ties rather than weakening the system as many would expect. One of the strengthening ties between rural and urban population is the 'obligatory' duties among kin. Most parents and relatives, and not the government, educate their children. This strengthens the ties between them even when the young educated class move out from the village to the city, they are still linked to the relatives in the village by obligation. Also the unions exist both in the villages and the cities, and membership to them are based on kinship. Hence, urban and village politics can be linked through these voluntary organisations. We have discussed their roles above. In the study of Igbo political communication, these social structures are crucial in the understanding of the structure of political communication. Once their essence is lost, it becomes difficult to analyse Igbo political communication behaviour.

At the national political level, the system of native Authority was seen by the elites as an obstacle to progress (Ajayi 1983:633; Coleman 1965:114; Hickey 1985:3). Their agitation to it led to regionalisation of the political system and created a new dimension of network of political communication between the urban and rural areas. Because of ethnic political parties, mass media, as will be shown in chapters five and six, developed along the major ethnic parties in terms of ownership and control. Eco-political competition between ethnic groups at national level has also created immense political instability, nepotism and corruption. Political elites are generally accused of these. In the colonial period, they were councillors, party leaders and union leaders. Their corrupt behaviour became almost endemic. This is because the vast regions of Nigeria could not be adequately supervised by the colonial administration. There was no real political communication system that would reflect the structure of the society, hence,

"the councillors, after an initial period of correct behaviour embarked on corruption and nepotism. Voting themselves unreasonable allowances, placing contracts to their personal profit, ignoring the advice of their staff and in many cases dismissing them in order to replace them with their own relatives

or with 'sons of the soil', they deeply embarrassed their own government and brought an idealistic into disrepute."²⁴

Thus, obligatory kinship ties do not merely intensify political communication in face-to-face processes but also breed a high level of corruption, a system which in the case study of this thesis, shall be examined in detail. Because of the regionalisation of party politics and mass media development in a situation where the kinship network is particularly strong irrespective of 'class' (educated and non educated), or residence (urban or city), there is serious doubt as to the direct influence of the mass media as the main agents of politics. In Chapters Five and Six we shall discuss the development of mass media along party lines to see their relationship with the federal and regional governments in different political periods in Nigeria.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE PRESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PARTY POLITICS IN NIGERIA

In Chapter One I pointed out that structural changes in Nigeria generate a series of new political groups - rural and urban elite. Correspondingly, new political communication systems are centering on these elites. The question posed in Chapter One was the extent to which the new structure of political organisation, the new party system and the new forms of political communications are emerging.

In this chapter, the attempt is not so much to give a detailed historical account of the evolution of mass media and party politics, but to see in historical terms how the new systems are closely associated with a particular network system identified in Chapter Two. The question of the extent of their relationship for political participation requires empirical answers which will be provided in later chapters. Meanwhile, various aspects of convergence and network of political communication will be discussed in relation to the five network groups and political actors.

THE PRESS IN NIGERIA

One of the main and very important features of mass media as channels that link all network groups, both in the urban and rural areas, as anonymous and heterogenous committees, is their former organisational structure. As instruments of power - political, economic or social - those who initiate their set-up are always men in power and with certain authority.

For instance, the initiative to establish radio stations in colonial Africa, and in Nigeria particularly, was taken up by such authorities as:

Andrew Cohen, Assistant Under Secretary in charge of the African Section of the Colonial Office, who as Charles Armour pointed out, took the:

"limelight as the driving force among the officials drawing up the master plan for the co-ordinated political, economic and social development of the African colonies, but he was not a lone figure. He had his place in the top management hierarchy of the colonial office; above him were the joint deputy under secretaries of state - Sir Sydney Caine, and Sir Charles Jeffries."¹

Other media, e.g. TV or the press, from the initial stages of their set-up, the poor (which includes illiterate villages and the urban poor) were entirely excluded from the decision to establish radio stations. What is important in the new relationship between the organised media of political communication and network groups is that ownership and control rest with a specific elite group - the political elite. Also the development of political parties and their leadership is closely allied with the elite. The political elite determine the extent of the relationship between media particularly broadcasting and the state.

Many writers have illustrated that in Nigeria the development of political parties and press are uniquely entwined. One could not be accounted for completely in both historical and contemporary forms without the other. (Graham Mytton 1983:p.117; Nwakwo, R.L. and Kurian, 1982; William Hatchten, 1971:p.144; Duyile, D. 1979: pp.1-25; James Coleman, 1965: pp.227, 346-347, etc.)

The relationship between politics and the press or the media in terms of development is not my main concern. What I intend to show is that the relationship between the press, radio and TV, the political system, the political actors and the classified audience can be seen as a network of associations or relationships.

Though the press has been an important medium in Nigerian political development and changes, its characteristics - format, content, formal English style, overt critical tendency and uninvestigative journalistic presentation of 'facts' - orientates it towards a particular network group in Nigeria.

Early history indicates that the first newspaper (Iwe Irohin) in Nigeria was

published by Rev. Townsend, a missionary, in December 1859.² But the first printing press in Nigeria was "installed by the Presbyterian Mission when they arrived in Calabar in 1846" (Omu 1978:7). The historical background of the first printing press in Nigeria was closely associated with Exeter (a city in the south west of England) where the brother of Rev. Townsend was a newspaper publisher. It has been illustrated in the early chapters that the missionaries were involved not only in converting Nigerians to Christianity but also in educating them formally to read and write. The newspaper was subsequently introduced to inform the educated group about their own environment and the world beyond their small and large communities. Information about trade was common, and gradually the issue of slave trade abolition which the missionaries advocated featured prominently in the newspapers. The missionaries believed that the slave trade could be abolished "by means of evangelical Christianity, utilitarian civilisation and commercial development..." (Omu 1978:6).

We have noted earlier that intertribal wars, slave raids, and slave trade threatened to annihilate the entire population of certain Yoruba towns and villages. In the light of this perhaps, Abeokuta, which possessed a unique Yoruba language led Townsend to publish a newspaper in a native language. Thus the early Nigerian press informed different groups in the communities, using standard English, 'Pidgin' and vernacular. It was argued by some early newspaper editors that the education and information Africans received disorientated the elite from African culture and basic socio-political relationship with the rural and urban masses.

"Everything is conspiring to force upon the Anglicised African the necessity of re-aligning himself with his people from whom his training has divorced him. The past ... has abundantly shown that when divorced from his people his position is one of disqualification and ineptitude. The African with all his defects possesses a mind which is clear and unobstructed by visions of varying and conflicting interests by reasons of the simple life he lives ... He must know that no man said the last word for the world and it may be that the despised life customs of the African will after all prove to be the most potential good for man."³

It is wrong to assume that the first educated Africans were the mission elite and though missionaries began the first printing mission in Nigeria, early newspapers were not pro-European missionary education. The early newspaper attacks were not overtly political but on the effects of western education on African culture. It was not the Africans who were educated in Africa by the missionaries who realised the consequences of Western

education on African culture but the Black Americans who returned to Africa from South and North America after the abolition of slavery. The direct attack on mission education by Black writers and publishers such as John Payne Jackson who is acknowledged as the setter of African journalistic enterprise is important in the development of press and politics in Nigeria. Though I disagree with his overexaggerated view about the impact of Western education on Africans at the time of his writing, because his concept of African elite culture was parochial and devoid of clear understanding of kinship bonds between non-educated and educated Africans, he made the colonial authorities relax on the content of the influence of the press until it developed and became politicized.

When John Payne Jackson started his weekly Record newspaper in 1891, the tribal war in Western Nigeria, particularly Abeokuta, forced him and other Yorubas who were repatriated from Brazil and Sierra Leone to remain in Lagos. Also, the Abeokuta pagans' persecution of missionaries forced the latter to remain in Lagos. Thus Lagos became the hub of Nigerian incipient politics, commerce, trade, education, journalism and most important of all, cultural and political changes that would eventually penetrate the vast interiors of the country. Perhaps it was this historical importance of Lagos in the development of modern communication in the face of changing social, economic, cultural and political orders in Nigeria that made Turner-Byron in 1949 to recommend that broadcasting in Nigeria should be modelled on Lagos. Though agreed on the regional development of broadcasting, he nevertheless wanted it to be regionalised.

But in Lagos, the press created a network of relationships between classified groups of elites, such as those educated by the missionaries, who through religion and education deculturised Africans; these Africans were criticised by other groups of educated Africans outside the influence of the missionaries but with practical experience of political and religious practices akin to the West - from America. The potentially religious and political masses of the interior were excluded from what was discussed in the press. When the intertribal wars were checked by direct intervention of the colonial police and the army, the missionaries, traders, teachers, etc., moved from the coastal areas, particularly Lagos and Calabar, to the rural areas. The characteristics of the urbanised groups, their formal education and the characteristic of the dominant medium of information, the press, began to bear seriously on the rural socio-political, economic and cultural systems. The relationship between the urban and the rural population

constitutes an important aspect of the convergence of two models in the network of subsequent political communication in Nigeria.

We have noted that the first printing in Western Nigeria by the missionaries was started in Abeokuta - a city-state - in Western Nigeria in 1859. In terms of African urban development, Abeokuta was a mixture of urban and village communities, in tribal population, purely homogeneous, serving mainly Yoruban-speaking people with a few Europeans and missionaries; there were virtually no other tribes in the city-state of Abeokuta. The introduction of the press and the existence of traditional networks of communication as permitted by linguistic and socio-cultural homogeneity can be regarded as the start of convergence of two different communication systems in Nigeria. It was the civil disturbance there that shifted the press activities to Lagos.

We cannot talk about isolated individuals or groups directly influenced and changed by the exposure to the new medium because of the strong kinship ties and obligations which characteristically bind the groups together despite their differences in education (the press exposed only a small section to the new socio-political information system). The press also became an additional mode of communication for the emerging new elite group.

In Nigeria, the press forms the basic structure where the ideas of the mission-educated Africans and educated ex-African-slaves from America converged to resolve differences - mainly cultural - and to start a new network of relationships which made educated Africans aware of the nature of colonialism. The new network of relationships could not exclude the rural and urban masses during the nationalist movement at the time when the role of the press was essential. One of the principles of democracy is that the opinions and support of the masses must be mobilised for political power. Despite the economic interest of the British government in colonial Africa, this principle was entrenched in the system. Jackson, J., a moderate nationalist and comparatively pro-British journalist, writes:

"They were proving themselves by far the best colonizers." (R.W. July, 1968, p.351)

(he severely criticised the high-handedness of the French and the Germans in Africa)

"by extending to their subjects the full liberties and privileges of English democracy, the British government and its people had inspired the love and affection of the Negro everywhere through a uniformly kind and humane treatment and through the efforts of that great nation to dominate injustice imposed upon Negroes by other countries."⁴

While education was expanding from the coasts to the interior, the modern democratic system of government as introduced by the British followed its direction. The nationalists used the press to create militant and national consciousness, though early nationalist agitation against colonialism was not for immediate independence but for political participation and decision-making through representation.

"We are not clamouring for immediate independence ... but it should be borne in mind that the present order of things will not last for ever. A time will come when the colonies on the West coast will be left to regulate their own internal and external affairs."⁵

The Nigerian press in the period of European contacts, changes, etc. gained ground for many years in its format, and freedom to express social, cultural and political views before it actually became nationalistic and agitative of colonial practices and administration. This pattern of press politics began when colonial administration under Lord Lugard assumed more dictatorship, with severe and one-man control policies: various agitative, incisive newspapers emerged and most of them directly attacked the colonial system.

Though for various reasons several of these newspapers lasted a few months to a few years, Lagos Weekly, under different editorial chairmen, existed long enough to experience and actively participate in the political changes from 1891-1930. For instance, J.P. Jackson, though pro-British, alleged that the British, under the pretence of protecting the interest of native chiefs, by direct interference in the interior traditional politics and in disturbances, particularly in the south through direct rule, were trying to gain control of all the protectorate, so that eventually in 1914 the north, ruled indirectly, was amalgamated with the south, and ruled directly, to form what is known today as Nigeria. Once the two traditionally, culturally and politically different parts of the regions were amalgamated, colonial policies and practices became more confused and politically difficult to manage - common constitutional laws to govern the two regional groups were regarded by the southern elite as a mockery of Africans and African pre-colonial institutions.

It can hardly be said to be reasonable ... to take the laws of one set of people to define the laws of another set of people whose customs and usages are quite different, nor is it rational to set-up the law and its interpretation of one community as a standard by which the law of another community is to be governed."6

This was particularly in reference to British social and land tenure laws in 1912 and 1913.

The two most important newspapers before 1914 were the Lagos Weekly Record and the Lagos Daily News. From the editorials of J.P. Jackson, it can be inferred that he was a man who wrote on general matters and liable to flexibility in his opinion about the specific way British administration in Nigeria should be conducted. He internalised his admiration for western rationality and endorsed many aspects of British social values and justice. Though he criticised the deculturalisation of Africans through religion and education, he was a man of twin cultures and was consistently uncertain which one to accept. Thus frequent generality and unspecified goals characterised his editorials. He could best be described as a cultural nationalist who tried to link African family kinship networks to the form of government that should be ideal in Africa. He believed that Christianity and Islam should be Africanised. This pattern of editorialism is important in the development of press and politics in Nigeria. The tendency was to direct press content to the cultural conditions and needs, not only of the urban environment, but also of the rural population, where the culture is intact. The practical question is how to assess the degree of the impact of the early newspaper on different groups in Nigeria. Whether the press was produced, owned and consumed by a particular network group and how the newspaper information influenced different groups other than the elite in the urban centres remain important questions that will be answered in later chapters.

It was after 1914 that the political climate of Nigeria changed. The realities of British colonialisation in Nigeria became a thorn in the flesh for both the colonisers and the colonised. Newspapers, new journalists, new newspapers and larger readerships emerged as a result of the wider spread of Western education. The Nigerian Chronicle was launched in 1908, edited by Chris Johnson, The Nigerian Times and a host of others also emerged and all of them aimed at the colonial government and more particularly were critical of Lugard.

The crucial point here is to identify the cause of criticism of Lugard's administration by the African journalists. The North differed considerably from the South and Western education and culture had a greater influence on the Southerners than on the Northerners. The nationalist press was concentrated in the hands of the southerners and centered in Lagos or Calabar. There was cultural divergence between Lagos and Calabar, but while cultural divergence also prevailed in the South, education and religion obliterated the difference and unified the elites who used the press to attack the political systems.

To them Lugard was an embodiment of British colonialism and he was accused of views unsympathetic to African culture, of being cruel, uncompromising, a military dictator who frustrated every effort for negotiation or for a balance of power. But because of the long term existence of newspapers and their absolute control and ownership by Africans, it was impossible for Lugard to annihilate them. He simply described them as "scurrilous local yellow press" and "publishers of columns of venomous abuse often bordering on seditious or libel."⁷

There are two important questions here. Were the Nigerian 'journalists' right to think that Lugard was an embodiment of British colonialism with regards to press freedom? Secondly, was Lugard's counter-attack an expression of his weakness to deal with the press and thereby enhanced its power and public credibility? The press in Nigeria during the colonial period was a great opponent of the government. Though the less powerful group - the colonised controlled the press - any counter-attack on the press would perhaps enhance its power. By attacking the press in Nigeria, Lugard made it a vital organ of opposition for the nationalists. He endorsed its power, and the nationalists utilised it effectively.

However, on the question of embodiment of British colonialism, we must recollect that Lugard was an ex-serviceman, his rule was more or less 'dictatorial', characteristic of his training and profession. Even in modern-day politics, many people yet believe that ex-soldiers do not easily make good politicians.

"Mr. Alexander Haig, the four star general and former U.S. Secretary of State who declared yesterday he would run for President, is an experienced but headstrong military man who so far has yet to master the art of being a politician". (Lionel Barber, Financial Times, Wednesday, 25.3.87, p.3)

Lugard was 'headstrong' and at time ruled against the instructions of the Colonial Office in London and in particular to the dislike of the British liberal politicians and public. With regards to press freedom in Nigeria at this period, "... the Colonial Office ... would never tolerate any infringement of the right of the press to be as libellous and seditious as it pleases." (Perham 1960:591; Omu 1978:189). Thus the Chronicle on its attack on Lugard's amalgamation stated that a general attack would be mounted accordingly "we promise him that we shall do so fearlessly, consciously, constitutionally and with the power we possess" (Chronicle, 14.3.13, 3.9.13 in Omu 1978:205).

But Golding and Elliot (1979) have revealed that the pressure on Lugard not to impose more repressive measures on the Nigerian press was more insignificant from the Colonial Office than from liberal communities in Britain who put such pressure on the Colonial Office:

"In fighting the battle for the liberal freedoms the Nigerian press placed the local administration in a considerable dilemma. Aware that press liberty was in Junius' ringing phrase "the great palladium of the British freedoms", Nigerian journalists courted support from liberal British opinion, and the Colonial Office was forced to restrain the more repressive of its officers. In looking at the offences which led to the 1909 Seditious Offences Ordinance, one Colonial Office official was struck that much worse things are said and done in Ireland and no action is taken" (Golding & Elliott, 1979:29; Omu 1979).

African journalists were not fighting a battle of individual freedom but a "national freedom from colonial rule" (Wilcox,; 1974:76) which perhaps won them popular support from the liberal British population.

The Nigerian journalists - elites trained in different walks of life other than journalism - were aware of the conflicts between Lugard and the Colonial Office. They merely politicised the press by actively using it as the only political voice to mobilise local opinion and the support of more liberal communities in Britain. Lugard by attacking the press simply reinforced its political power and validity.

Secondly, that Lugard acknowledged that the Nigerian press had a 'monstrous freedom' was a clear psychological indication that he himself was powerless to check it. Omu (1978) points out that his powerlessness to control the Nigerian press was expressed by Lugard's speech on 16th October, 1913. Lugard thought that the education given to Nigerians was responsible for the pattern of press attack on the government.

"Stressing the need for character training in self discipline, self-control and truthfulness in Nigerian schools, he averred that education had not brought 'happiness or contentment to Nigeria if the performance of the newspapers was taken as a criterion. To his mind, it should be the aim of the education system "to train up a general who shall exchange this bitter hostility for an attitude of friendly co-operation." (Lugard, April 6, 1914, in Omu 1978:189).

But the Second World War offered Lugard an opportunity to impose restrictions on the Nigerian press. However, the impact was very limited because the Nigerian pressmen voluntarily imposed restrictions on itself, a wise decision which did not only please Lugard but also the British liberals at home. Many leading Nigerians and the general public were in full support of the British fight against Nazism and at the end of the war Nigeria pressed hard for independence.

We have seen above that Western education and the emergence of new African elites were very important results of colonisation. Colonialism made the African education system which in turn provided the Africans with the first indigenous elites. The elites and the nationalist press "formed both the weapon and the vanguard of the battle" (Omu 1978:227) for representative government and independence.

It was the need to change the political system which forced the elite from concentration on the cultural aspect of European influence on Nigeria to politicisation of the press, which began to take notice of the general public whose support would guarantee them the required political change. In

this light, Haratio Jackson's radicality and attack on the Governor General's administration when he assumed the post of Chief Editor of the Lagos Weekly Record is clearly and fundamentally political and a major change in Nigerian press attitude.

"Politically ... it will be our duty to educate or enlighten public opinion ... while a corresponding obligation is entailed to place continually before the eyes of the government ... so that mutual reapproachment between the governing body and the governed may be established, which is the keynote of a systematic and an enlightened form of government."⁸

It now appears that the colonial authorities, the Nigerian elite and the unclassified general public were linked through the press for political enlightenment, participation and change. But which groups of the 'public' were influenced by the press for these changes?

When the Nigerian press became political, ethnic differences, reinforced by the 'divide and rule' policy of the colonial power, could have rendered it ineffective. But another important network group did not remain passive to the political needs of Nigeria though their orientation was more on general African needs than any specific country.

In 1926 European businessmen based in Nigeria started the Nigerian Daily Times, in which the London-based Daily Mirror had a substantial share. The Nigerian Daily Times was mainly commercially oriented in content and tended, as one would expect, to be political neutral. But because the growth of the press from this time on was basically nationalistic, restriction to commercial-content-only and neutrality-to-pressing-issues, such as political change, could bring pressure to bear on its existence from the readership point of view. The Daily Times suffered as a result of its stand and content. This encouraged other newspapers to embark upon overt political expression which found favour with the reading public. Hence:

"The press in English-speaking West Africa grew up in a nationalist tradition: newspapers were the mouthpieces of emerging, campaigning, nationalist politicians."⁹

Nigerians who stood against colonialism and used the press to express their views constituted another important group that strengthened the press as an effective medium of political information. In fact, their papers reduced any tribal overtones during the early days of a nationalist movement. In

1932, for example, Duse Mohammed Ali, an Egyptian intellectual, started The Comet. In every respect The Comet was devoid of traces of ethnic reference but seriously and genuinely addressed the issue of colonialism and national and international problems in Africa without ethnic bias. Coker, 1968:19, noted that The Comet's international content influenced certain elite groups in Nigeria so much that the Lagos Youth Movement changed its name to the Nigerian Youth Movement. The Nigerian Youth Movement was a political group, its cause of liberation was encouraged by the United States' endorsement against colonialism, through organised political movement. Also, in London and other major European capitals and cities, decolonisation was advocated by Europeans. All these outside reports on world opinion about colonialism filled the papers such as The Comet. The editorials emphasised racial aspects of colonialism, which the Nigerian reading public abhorred. In this light, Awolowo concluded that:

"... and the end of the nineteenth century, the driving force of nationalism in Nigeria was not loyalty to Nigeria as such, but racial consciousness as Africans."¹⁰

The Comet, which carried considerable foreign news closely related to colonialism and racism was important in linking the urban elite with world views. The Comet brought "a wide experience in journalism, a sense of detachment and goodwill of his many readers and admirers throughout the world". It was "... an influence organ of international politics and a source of inspiration and challenge for the emerging new leaders of Nigeria who had visions of an independent nation which would occupy a proud place in the international community" (Omu 1978:68). But since as a result of colonial practice with its direct and indirect rule, the politics of Nigeria transcended the urban centres to local regions. What is important is to examine not only how the nationalist used the press to confront the colonial administration but how they used the information they had and the press to mobilise political support beyond the city to the interior regions of the country.

The most appropriate step was to form a centralised organisation which would link the cities and villages through processes and channels of political communication. I have noted elsewhere that in Nigeria:

"... as national consciousness began to grow, political parties began to emerge. Thus the first national political party of Nigeria was formed by students... In the spring of 1944, students

at Kings College Lagos struck in protest against the use of their dormitories by soldiers; seventy-five were expelled, and eight were drafted into the army. Thereupon, the Nigerian union of students, frustrated by the lack of a centralised organisation which could co-ordinate the political activity of the existed groups, called a meeting at Glover Hall in Lagos. At the meeting, on August 26th, 1944, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon was created ... the NCNC."¹¹

The emergence of a political party as clearly stated here supports the theory in Chapter Two that both the development of the press and political parties centred on the elite. I have stated elsewhere that the first president of the NCNC was Herbert Maculey and Zik the party's first general secretary. While the press, because of its political role, could overcome tribal splits, political parties which aimed at the sharing of actual power in a nation culturally, socially, religiously and traditionally, split could not endure together. The tribal differences which caused the split of the Nigerian Youth Movement formed in 1936 apparently became actual political splits when the NCNC was formed and Awolowo was excluded from the leadership role in it. It was the Youth Movement split that resulted in the formation of the Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo.

At this point in time two main political phases in the history of Nigeria can be distinguished:

- a) The separate ethnic military resistance (as recounted in Chapter Three) of native Nigerians against European traders and colonial officials. This aspect of military ethnic nationalism has not been thoroughly examined as an aspect of political growth. The efforts of men like Jaja of Obobo, Dior, Eleko and Samori to preserve the culture, tradition and political system of old Africa came under the heavy weight of European military superiority. They were virtually rooted out and brought under colonial control.
- b) The phase of press and political party nationalism in which the elite did not reject European political culture and value but through education and religion endorsed them. The problem they faced was that the system they accepted excluded them from participation and development in it.

The leaders of West Africa at an early stage of indigenous political party formation under the colonial rule, as W. July (1968:376-8) has shown,

displayed identical European educated characteristics - S. Williams, H. Carr, H. Macaulay in Nigeria, James Brew or C. Hayford in Ghana (then Gold Coast), S. Lewis of Sierra Leone, etc... They regarded European political systems and culture as superior to African, then sought to change them.

Indeed, it was the attitude of educated Africans towards traditional African political systems and cultures that induced the new political elite to exclude the traditional groups from the development of party politics in Nigeria. Most of these new political leaders used the press to popularise their political power. In particular, the persistent confrontation by Macaulay gained popular press attention - The Lagos Weekly Record, Nigerian Gazette Extra-ordinary, The Lagos Daily News, etc. ... all covered his arguments and popular support was behind him. July (1968:390) pointed out that Macaulay depended entirely on newspapers to make his case and arguments public.

The departure of Macaulay from Nigerian politics saw the emergence of a new nationalist political elite who meticulously incorporated the press and politics as integral and inseparable parts in Nigerian politics. As a journalist and a politician, Macaulay's newspaper approach to politics both in content and organisation was meant to link the educated, semi-educated, the poor and the rich to politics of national liberation. In addition he started the West African Pilot in order that he could use it to mobilise all sectors of Nigeria against colonialism. For him independence was beyond tribal sentiment and his slogan was that Africa must be liberated. With this ideology his newspapers were designed to be read nationwide. Jones-Quarley noted that the West African Pilot blossomed into every corner of the country as the champion of the common man ... the teacher, the trader, the clerks ...¹²

Even Zik's traditional political opponents publicly admitted the political mobilizing power and the inspiring political consciousness of Zik's newspapers. Anthony Enahoro acknowledged that the West African Pilot represented and expressed the political views of the poor, unlike newspapers before it that mainly served the interest of the intelligensia. Even more so his greatest political opponent, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, described the West African Pilot as:

"a fire-eating and aggressive nationalist paper of the highest order ... it was naturally very popular, the very thing the youth

of the country had been waiting for. Newspapermen in the employ (sic) of the 'West African Pilot' were better paid and they assumed a new status in the society. Civil servants, teachers and mercantile employees resigned good and pensionable posts to lend a hand in the new journalistic awakening."¹³

The style of the West African Pilot therefore shifted the political role of the press from representing the political views of the elite to those of other political groups nationwide. For a medium to be politically effective, its content should and must be realistic meaning-coded to reflect the view of the wider audience and most important, the generality of the audience should be capable of meaningfully 'decoding the message. Another aspect of the West African Pilot attracted people of different walks of life to 'lend a hand' in its political 'awakening'.

The prestige and status attributed to the West African Pilot workers and wider-national readership led to a formation of Zik's conglomeration of newspapers in major Nigerian cities from where they could be easily distributed to rural sub-regions. The Eastern Nigerian Guardian was established in 1940 at Port-Harcourt; in 1943 the Nigerian Spokesman and Southern Defender were set up in Warri - Western region. The Comet which was bought from Mohammed Ali, was moved to Kano in Northern Nigeria, making the paper the first Northern daily English newspaper in Nigeria. In 1949 Nothern Advocate was set up in Jos by Zik. Newspapers, by content and distribution, were now able to connect Nigerians horizontally and vertically for political action. The issues covered by most of them were national.

The popularity of Zik was assured in Ghana before he started the West African Pilot in Nigeria.

"With his popularity assured in a period of great opportunity provided by the absence of serious and respectable political newspapers, Azikive dramatically stirred the newspaper scene with a formula of striking techniques and rhetoric ... For the large population of the people in and outside Lagos who for years had yearned for an effective purveyor of popular views and sentiments, for a symbol of increased political awareness and sophistication, the eloquent and sensational tone of the Pilot and its pugnacious political journalism marked the beginning of a new era." (Omu 1978:240)

At this point, it is helpful to classify the different types of the media in Nigeria according to their content. Before the introduction of TV in 1959 there were:

- a) Radio (as we will soon see), owned and controlled by the colonial authorities as a political counter-medium against pressures, allegations, etc. made by the nationalist newspapers.
- b) The politically neutral or aloof newspapers, eg the Daily Times, the Daily Express owned by foreign agencies.
- c) The nationalist newspapers with immense anti-colonial political content but in specific terms addressed to a particular minority but politically powerful group - the intelligensia and urbanised.
- d) The nationalist newspapers, which addressed their political messages to all groups and all regions of the society irrespective of power, status, nationality, creed, colour, ethnology or race.

These differences were bound to create different problems for the newspapers and the radio as well as in national politics. In order that the radio could effectively refute the nationalist newspapers and mobilise political support, it had to increase broadcasting hours in hundreds of Nigerian languages, otherwise its listening audience would be too small. The colonial powers would have to make available in the market cheap radio sets, but considering the state and conditions for employment, most of these sets would be bought by the elite. Other problems such as actual gathering of information in the rural areas, where the majority of Nigerians live, and editing and broadcasting news in local languages would be delegated to natives. They could phrase and structure the news content in such a way that listeners would cast doubt on the content, and credibility of the medium would be destroyed by its broadcast. If broadcasting remained in English, the colonial powers would only be addressing the elite, who wanted them out for many reasons. Radio messages would not give what the listener wanted unlike newspapers. Cecil King who in 1947 bought the Lagos Daily Times at a cost of £46,000 believed that his success in Nigeria would rest on giving the reader 'what he wants'.

The financial cost at the time was heavy for the colonial administration to set up powerful short wave radio frequencies to cover the whole country. On August 11th, 1949, the colonial office agreed to allocate £295,000 to West Africa, out of £1 million set aside for the establishment of radio stations in British colonies. A substantial (and possibly the highest) amount was devoted to Nigeria. The technical contract, which was also expensive, was

taken up by the BBC, including the running of the organisation.

Because of various social, climatic and traditional factors, investigative reporting proved difficult for the colonial broadcaster beyond the cities, who had to depend on newspapers for information. Where such was lacking, radio broadcasting could be sketchy, speculative and haphazard.

The neutral newspapers faced the problem of readership because they were hesitant to take a stand on the burning issues of the day, such as political participation of Africans in the colonial administration, and eventual independence. As political consciousness rose among Nigerians through nationalist newspapers, the commercial exploitation by British privately-owned firms that owned the Daily Times and Daily Express were exposed.

The nationalist newspapers were not without problems. The West African Pilot and associated newspapers faced the problem of distribution and storage.

"His first business and printing premises were in one of the most congested corners of commercial Lagos, Market Street. Later he moved into slightly more suitable and spacious quarters in Broad Street, part of the property of Sir Adetok Umbo. Barrister Ademola complained that the operation of Zik's printing presses and other machines was a source of nuisance to him on account of constant noise and vibration."¹⁴

The nationalist journalist faced possible prison terms by the colonial authority but this had positive results in the end as it increased the anti-colonial movement. While the nationalists were barred from operating a wireless station, the government set up its own press. Opposing tribal parties and groups did the same. Nwankwo and George Kurian noted that:

"The mid-forties witnessed a growing challenge to the hold of the Zik's dailies as well as older newspapers. The government had established a press of its own with a clutch of newspapers in tribal languages and the Nigerian Citizen in English. The Action Group Party founded a new daily in Lagos called the 'Daily Service' which joined forces with the 'Nigerian Tribune' in Ibadan to form the Amalgamated Press of Nigeria. Thus, on the eve of independence Nigeria had three large newspaper chains, two private and one official."¹⁵

If we consider the relationship between the three main tribes, the three main parties, their political leadership and ownership of the press at this

time, we should not consider the Zik and Awolowo newspaper chains as private but as regional and tribal political parties' newspapers. The colonial and Northern government spoke with one voice in certain periods of the colonial rule. A situation which angered some Action Group ministers to a point of not associating themselves with the Northerners.

"We refused to associate ourselves with Africans who have not got the guts to speak their minds" said Brode Thomas. "I am not appointed as an imperialist minister to do the will of the imperialist agents in Nigeria" said S.L. Akintolla.¹⁶

Between 1943 and 1950, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NCP) was formed. It emerged as a political party through a series of changes. Its initial aim was not to fight for national independence but to withstand the political domination of the Southerners. The founders were Mallam Su'ud Zenger, Ammu Kamu, Tafawa Belewa and Sarduna of Sokoto - a descendant of Usman Dan Fodio.

After independence, ownership, control and the role of the press shifted dramatically from national political consciousness to regional ethnic political bias. The North in particular embarked upon a defensive mode of publication: the first Northern newspaper, the Gaskiya Ta Fikwabo (Truth is worth more than Penny) was particularly associated with defensive editorials. Mamman Daura, 1971:39, noted that its main purpose was to protect the interest of Northerners who were faced with the more politically and educationally powerful Southerners. Furthermore, Daura said that:

"The North believed in controlled modernisation and emphasised the need for changing society to adopt modern methods without destroying its own qualities. The South believed in an unthinking gallop towards everything European and Western without considering its relevance and its dangers to the community." (Darama Daura, 1971:39)

Though this statement bears some truth about the concept of modernisation in Nigeria as a whole, not specifically the South, ideological differences between the North and South were stronger in the late fifties and early sixties. If the south 'believed in an unthinking gallop towards everything European..' why did the nation embark on an image making project between 1975-81 when the North was predominantly in control of the economic and political systems in Nigeria?

However, I believe that the ideological differences which exist between the

North and the South were rooted in the differences in education, religion and various aspects of culture and traditional tendencies towards or away from the West or Arab States. In particular, political and communication modernisation between the North and the South and convergence of traditionalism and modernity in the federal political structure of Nigeria were very much the result of different understandings in the two regions as to how actually the Western media and political systems operate. The differences could have been rooted out or at least minimised if Lugard's administrative policies, as we noted in Chapter Three, had not reinforced and widened the differences.

The divisions between the regions (now states) have created problems of ideological commitment to all governments in Nigeria. The 1975 Constitution Drafting Committee found it difficult to deal with the problem of political ideology in the constitution. The then Head of State, General Murtala Mohammed admitted his inability to deal with it:

"Until all our people, or a majority of them, have acknowledged a common ideological motivation it would be fruitless to proclaim any particular philosophy or ideology in our constitution." (New Nigeria, January 22, 1976).

The comment shows how unreal Nigeria is as a result of the amalgamation of different peoples. The constitution is meant to organise Nigerians in one common purpose. The absence of a common ideology makes this vital aim impossible. Shehu Malami writes:

"There is really no organised society of human beings without an ideology. An ideology may be minimal or it may be comprehensive and total. It may be minimal in the sense of embracing only the most basic moral principles defining the reciprocal expectations in the behaviour of members of a given society, without which that group of people cannot live peaceably together." (Sunday Times, February 29, 1976).

This does not mean that Nigerians have no code of ideology but they are too different to be one. One of the major forces that pull them apart from the centre - briefly, there are three main ideologies prevailing in Nigeria today. Socialist ideology superficially equated with Orthodox Marxism in which the government should make socialism a sort of unchallengeable and all-encompassing political religion in Nigeria. Some have misunderstood the difference between national economic development and ideology. They regard 'ideology as a panacea to all the political and economic ills in the

society. The third school of thought do not want to talk about ideology, e.g. Murtala Mohammed as cited above. They oppose any ideology adoption in Nigeria but emphasise the need for:

"Social Welfare and development schemes programmes of injecting mobility into public life etc." (New Nigeria, January 22, 1976)

In fact, political changes and policies beyond the level of allocation of federal controlled resources were of low priority in Nigerian politics. This is because of regionalisation of political power and resources. The control of federal assets and resources and the policies and decision to allocate them through organised bureaucracy required a trained and highly educated manpower. It is at this point that the notion of galloping "towards everything European" associated with the South is no longer relevant. The real differences between the North and the South begins to surface. In self-contradiction, Daura writes:

"the then Northern government was subjected to pressure by the Northern elite not to let the North suffer ... the new Nigeria where paper qualifications were the primary criteria in the distribution of jobs, the North was at a great disadvantage. So a government paper, the 'New Nigeria' was necessary to: (i) get across the view of the Northern elites and mobilise them in order to achieve its goals; (ii) fight the Northern case in all disputes at the centre."¹⁷

The role of the media or the press meanwhile marked the beginning of a dangerous shift in the political communication in Nigeria, a shift in which the original function of the press was to mobilise the entire nation against colonial administration to regionalisation of the media, political leaders began to use the media to make national demands which only favoured their regional governments. The media at regional level played divergent political roles, not in the sense of rural/urban political communication processes but in the terms of regional interests agenda-setting.

In Chapter Three, I outlined the major differences between the three major tribes and suggested that these differences were sharp and thus condemned the Lugard's 1914 amalgamation of the North and the South as one political entity as irrational. The differences make a basis of unity difficult as Gowon once stated. The product of the amalgamation in Nigeria has also been described by a leading Nigerian politician as a mere geographical expression. These remarks may be questioned if we compare Nigeria with some stable nations in the world today who were once sharply divided by similar problems, e.g. Belgium, Switzerland, Russia, Britain, etc.

Many newspapers were very equivocal in their outright condemnation of Lugard's planned policy for amalgamation, Chronicle, 14 July 1909; Lagos Weekly Record, 5 May 1906; and after the amalgamation, the attack intensified, Lagos Weekly Record from 4, 14, 15 and 15 Feb, 1914; Lagos Standard, Nigerian Daily Times, etc.

"It would be fascinating to speculate on how the Nigerian press and people would have reacted to the amalgamation had it been carried out by a popular governor like Gilbert (after Lugard's position as the creator of the Northern System as an undesirable administrator in Lagos and yet as the chief amalgamator, helped to cast a shadow upon the amalgamation and to stimulate opposition to his administration which in the words of a newspaper was characterised by 'a multiplicity of laws which were not only depressing in their outlook and irksome in their provisions but were also intended to break the morale and discourage the legitimate aspirations of the natives for social expansion.'" (Lagos Daily Record, in Omu 1978:205)

On 23 May 1914, Lagos Weekly Record and other national newspapers mounted vigorous attacks against Lugard's amalgamation policy and described it as an attempt to "perpetuate that autocratic and despotic sway" (Omu 1978:207) "identified with the notorious Northern Nigerian System".

While the political roles of the press were obvious at this time, Nigerian newspapers performed other functions. The regional political parties development was a later development in the colonial administration in which the outcome was press and political growth in relation to the historical structure of ethnicism in the country. Though all newspapers in Nigeria appeared to have attacked Lugard's amalgamation of the North and the South of Nigeria, there were also major emphases on public enlightenment through the press on issues of industrialisation, commercialisation, modernisation, health and educational progress of Nigeria.

On 17th August 1929, Nigerian journalists assembled and formed the Nigerian Press Association. A resolution was passed in which there was an agreement that:

"the time has arrived for the formation of a Nigerian Press Association and that the principal objectives of such an Association should be to safeguard the interest of the local press, raise its tone, to develop political thought and direct opinion on lines that would lead to the industrial, commercial and educational progress of the country" (in Omu 1978:238).

But unfortunately, many historical and contemporary differences between the members of the Association, particularly their political biases resulted in the collapse of the Association in 1930, only shortly after its formation.

In the pre-colonial period, there were no existing newspapers in any form in the Southern part of the country. All forms of communication were either interpersonal or symbolic.

Early newspapers began when Nigerians came in contact with European traders and missionaries.

"African churchmen occupy a significant place in the history of the early newspapers. For not only were they some of the best contributors and columnists but also leaders of the Nigerian church movement founded and edited many important newspapers in our period. The Standard, Chronicle, Times of Nigeria, Yoruba News, Eko Akete, Eko Igbehin, Kleti Ofe, the Daily Telegraph and a few others were owned and edited by African Churchmen." (Omu 1978:256)

From 10th November 1880 when the Lagos Times was founded by R.B. Blaize, a wealthy businessman and edited by Dr. Mojola Agbebi and W.E. Cole, both associated with the Anglican Church in Lagos, about 80% of all the creative literature in Nigeria produced by 1920 was contributed by Churchmen. This was a reflection of the impact of mission education in Nigeria. Ironically, they were not all pro-missionaries, for many of them entered into printing and journalism to enlighten the public on the danger of cultural alienation emanating from the missionaries' negative attitude towards African culture. Their interest in the media was a 'revolt against new policies and practices introduced by the missionaries and the subjugation of Africans by imperial European forces'.

In the event, some early African churchmen became strong African cultural nationalists. Ajasa formerly Edward Macaulay dropped the latter names "under the influence of the cultural nationalism of the late nineteenth century" (Omu 1978:44). Also Gabriel Adeoye Thomas for similar reasons changed his names to Adeoye Denign in 1908. He was the owner and editor of New Age Herald (1910-1913-?). Kitoyi Ajasa was a lawyer by profession but started his own weekly newspaper, Nigerian Pioneer on 18 January 1914 to December 1936. His co-editor from 1915-25 was Irving. As we shall see shortly, "the first editors in Nigeria were hardly professional journalists" (Michael Echeruo 1973).

But some of the early newspapers they edited were more concerned with trade and commerce than with politics. Their content covered information on these both at local and international levels. Shipping forecasts were regularly covered and religious issues occupied some space. With the termination of the slave trade and raids, national security was improved, communication and transport expanded, "and the transformation from a restricted to a modern economy, the growth of pre-European Urban Centres was accelerated and the rise of new centres stimulated" (Coleman 1960:72). Thus newspapers began to circulate outside Lagos. In the 1920s and 1930s provincial newspapers began to appear in Port-Harcourt, Calabar, Enugu, Benin, Onitsha, Ibadan, Abeokuta etc.

Politically, the antithesis of colonialism began in most major Southern Nigerian cities when the educated class inspired the rise of nationalism. Their main discontent with the colonial administration was that the authorities denied them political participation in the colonial administration. Several of these agitators between 1920-34 were liberals in outlook and only made the moderate demand of a fair chance in the colonial administration.

Most of the newspapers between 1920-34 which made moderate attacks on the colonial administration could be associated with the Liberal Youth Movement - Nigerian Youth Movement. Some of the newspapers associated with this period were the Lagos Weekly Record, owned and edited by the Jacksons; Nigerian Pioneer, by K. Ajasa; J.B. Davies' newspaper, Times of Nigeria; African Messenger (1921-1928) by E.S. Ikoli; Eko Eketé, edited by Adeoye Deniga; Nigerian Daily Times; Nigerian Advocate; Iwe Irohia Osose; Nigerian Daily Telegraph; Nigerian Daily Mail; West Africa Nationhood and the Comet etc.

Outside Lagos, Aurora was published at Calabar by W. Coulson; Nigerian Herald at Onitsha. Between 22 May 1923 and December 1937 Dawn was published weekly at Aba, Calabar, Enugu and Port-Harcourt. Egba National Harper circulated on a weekly basis at Abeokuta; and at Port-Harcourt the Nigerian Observer was edited by R.L. Potts-Johnson. The Nigerian Echo at Aba, Nigerian Weekly Dispatch at Onitsha, etc.

From 1944-1950s the political ideology of the Nigerian elites changed from liberal nationalism to militant nationalism. The most dominant Nationalist in this philosophy was Azikiwe. The Militant Nationalism represented the

rise of positive nationalism (New Nigeria, April 19, 1977). From the 1940s the broad-based nationalism of African and West African began to narrow down to meet up with the national and local needs of Nigeria. The main concern was on the attainment of self-government and national political participation. The attack on the government policies became more severe by the press. Unfortunately, the Pilot, the leading nationalist newspaper, entered into a feud with the Daily Service and the confrontation between the newspapers weakened Nigeria's national political strength. A feud between the Pilot and the Daily Service was directly or indirectly a tribal feud between Yorubas and Igbos, or between NCN and AG or between Zik and Awolowo.

Political party and regional/ethnic tendencies began to generate a peculiar economic interest among the nationalists. Economic interest rapidly replaced the emerging spirit of national freedom.

"The nationalist bourgeoisie of the NCNC were afraid that the revolutionary upsurge of Zikist Nationalism could alienate them from the economic base, that is, that they could not establish their economic base by a political action which could offend the British whose economic class wanted an indigenous ally. The British therefore had to split the national bourgeoisie into hostile camps as it did in India and in Nigeria through the ethnic ties." (New Nigeria, April 19, 1977).

The South was the most affected in the split namely between the Yorubas and the Igbos whose leaders were the most active in the nationalist movement. This was the beginning of regional nationalism which persisted from 1947-1966. At this point, it is important to note that the colonial administration had a national newspaper behind it. Michael Echeruo (1973) writes that:

"When the Mirror-group bought up the Nigerian Daily Times in 1947, it was widely believed that the purchase had been engineered by the colonial office to counter the appeal of the Service and the Pilot as organs of nationalist political opinion. It is a good story to believe! The paper certainly had the kind of patronage in the 40s and 50s from government and from foreign commercial circles (through privileged news breaks and advertisements) that the Lagos Observer enjoyed in the 1890s."

While I Nzimiro (1977) believes that the British deliberately split the Nationalist, Omu (1978:247) maintains that S.L. Akintola contributed to the

regionalisation of nationalism and the crystallisation of intergroup tension and animosity which characterised Nigerian political development for a long time.

In my opinion, the regionalisation of nationalism and politics cannot be attributed entirely to the making of individuals or the colonial authorities. But ethnicity which is the basis of socio-political and economic relationships is an ideal situation for such a political tendency to develop. A situation which is politically so fragile that anyone seeking political power and control can exploit. Britain only exploited the situation to discourage a forceful militant nationalism. On the other hand, individual nationalist politicians also exploited ethnicity to enhance their regional political power. For instance, in the later case, the same elites who started the Nigerian Youth Movement were also the same people who started the Action Group political party and Yoruba nationalism.

Nzimiro (1977) points out that "They shifted their grounds just because they realised that they could not win political power through mass organisation because the NCNC philosophy had become the potent force which brought the people of Nigeria ... under one nationalist organisation."

Nzimiro does not only blame the British for the development of tribal nationalism but accuses the Action Group, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa Yoruba Methology and in particular, the Yoruba leader, chief Obafemi Awolowo. Nzimiro then emphasises that what was foremost for the Yoruba was their own regional unity, the protection of their own chiefs and interest so that future generations of the Yoruba will have a secure place in Nigeria.

We have seen earlier that from a cultural organisation the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC) emerged and represented all aspects of the Northern Feudalism. Like the Yoruba, NPC believed that its interest should overshadow the central government interest. Despite this concept, the NCNC under Zik continued to engage in militant nationalism but could not longer rely on the support of any Yoruba organisation. The Igbo State Union supported Zik and the NCNC party. Nigeria seemed to have stabilised into regional power structure relatively autonomous from the federal government. The federal government seemed almost dependent on the regional governments.

The 1951 legislation endorsed the power of regional governments to control political parties and administration. Similarly, the press became part of

this regionalisation:

"With few exceptions, the newspapers were owned or supported by the rival political parties (mainly the National Council of Nigerian Citizens [NCNC] and the Action Group [AG]) and it is one of the ironies of Nigerian history that in a crucial decade in the nation's development, a period which witnessed the taking of political and constitutional steps, which led inexorably to independence, the newspapers were completely immersed in the vortex of partisan politics and were in no position to prepare the people for the challenges of independence and national unity."
(Omu 1978:247)

Even on the eve of Independence, Omu noted that major newspapers associated with the three major tribes and parties. That is, the Pilot, the Daily Service and the Nigerian Tribune were engaged in a 'vicious combat and interpersonal communication'

We have noted above that 'party-led media system will produce a higher proportion of 'one-sided' political content, tending as a result to activate partisan role orientation among members of the audience as well as selective exposure mechanism'. In the Nigerian context the media, particularly the press, became an outlet for inter-ethnic conflict and confrontation in every respect. In the newspaper industry, the destructive role of the press under the control of journalists and editors who were checked by politicians knew no limits. The journalists themselves became instruments of disunity in Nigeria. But press maturity in party politics in the Nigerian context does not imply regional coverage of political issues where they are controlled, nor even setting the agenda for political participation. It simply emphasised political personalities against any other political question. The masses became disappointed and journalists are over constrained by political leaders. Golding (1977) reports that many Nigerian journalists "saw their future elsewhere in public relations, the civil service or commerce".

Indeed, entering and leaving Nigerian journalism from or for other professions is rather historical. Most of those who started the press industry during and soon after colonisation were men trained in professions other than journalism. Only Zik, Ernest Ikoli, James Bright Davies, and Thomas Horatio and a few others were exceptions.

In terms of this thesis, those involved in the development of the press in Nigeria were the elites and the elites who could be described as political elites. Some of them were wealthy businessmen such as John Payne, the Jacksons, Blaize, George Alfred, Adolphus Asurke and Blakall Benjamin. While others belonged to different walks of life by training and profession; some of them were also the owners and editors of certain newspapers. Robert Campbell was a printer and an educationalist; N.T. King a medical doctor; Owen Macaulay a printer, a linguist and an historian; Christopher Johnson was an economist and a lawyer and his brother and co-editor a Methodist minister; Adamu Animushau was the leader of the Jamat faction of Muslims in Lagos; Kitoyi Ajasa a lawyer.

This trend of non-professional journalists as editors of the early Nigerian papers continued after the 1922-3 Clifford's constitution when the press carried out more political propaganda against colonial policies. Dr. Richard Akimwande Savage, a medical doctor; Dr. J. Akulade Caulerick was also a medical doctor (surgeon) and politician; Herbert Macaulay a civil engineer and politician; Duse Mohammed Ali a playwright, actor and journalist; Awolowo a lawyer and politician, at a later date edited the Service. Though these were not professional journalists,

"Any student of the Nigerian Press scene over the 100 year is struck by the sharp discontinuities in the tradition of Nigerian journalism, by the fact that the newspapers of today cannot claim to be the organic successors to those of the 1860s, the 1890s, the 1920s or even the 1940s. For those decades were the high moments in the history of the Nigerian Press when newspapers and their editors staked out a place for themselves in the national life and acted as those who believed there was a purpose in having a Fourth Estate. Announcing his editorial policy on September 12, 1863, the editor of the Anglo-African declared: 'The Anglo-African was established to promote the interest and welfare of Lagos and its people, and not to serve those of any party, but in all questions to advocate the side of right - right, not in the estimation of this man or that, but in the estimation of its editor.'" (Echeruo 1973:49)

What is crucial in the current debate of the role of the media and politics in Nigeria is that strong regionalisation of the media weakens the centre by direct pressures from the regions to conform to their individual needs. And because the regions are distinctly different, messages cannot be meaningfully encoded and meaningfully decoded for generalised impact on the audiences. Cultural, political, social, etc. values are important in decoding media messages. These are the very ingredients upon which media agenda feed, i.e.

what they reinforced. The wider the differences in value attached to them, the more difficult it is for the media to represent the interest of the nation particularly in developing states.

For instance, the issue of setting up regional radio houses, which was opposed by Benson in 1961, generated opposition against him by all the regions and their parties. Between July 29th and August 2nd, 1961, Ian Mackay noted from the evidence produced by Benson, the minister of broadcasting in Nigeria, how difficult it was for the NBC to serve the three regions and different political parties. The NPC (press release of July 29th) the NEPU (press release of July 31st) NCNC letter from the Acting National Administrative Secretary to the NBC director-general of July 30th and the Action Group press release August 2nd (all in 1961) show that each of the parties accused NBC of partiality and partisanship. The NPC itself was even more vocal and more threatening.

"The Northern Peoples' Congress has expressed grave concern over the continued discrimination of the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation against the government of the North as well as the NPC. It is surprising to note that the Director-General of the BNC, who is strongly biased and deliberately allows discrimination to continue, is now coming to the North to bid farewell to the people of the Northern region."¹⁸

This is a clear indication of how regionalisation of political communication networks is capable of generating disproportionate ethnic politics in the different regions. The regional press - the Eastern Nigerian and the Nigerian Outlook established in 1955 represented the interest of that region, as well as its main political party, the NCNC. The federal government was represented by the NBC and the Morning Post (1961), the Sketch (1964), the Western Region and Action Group (AG), and the New Nigeria for NPC.

In this new process of media development, national interests were highly marginalised by editorial content. The general content of the press began increasingly to reflect and reinforce ethnic values and interests. But this process should not overshadow the fact that within each ethnic group, the press represented more accurately the views and aspirations of a particular network group - the elite - who had ambition for power and had to shape the content of the media in order to win the support of their own ethnic communities. Hence at regional level the media expressed one voice, one support for the politician: Nigerians usually call them political heavyweights. In the North, Saraduna of Sokoto represented the region

through the NPC, Dr. Azikiwe for the Igbos in the East through the NCNC and Chief Obafemi Awolowo for the Yorubas in the West through the AG. At the centre, there were different voices reflecting the views of each ethnic leader, with no substantial evidence of a concern for national unity and integration. At the centre, stereotyping conflicts, opposition, extreme divergences of opinion impoverished constructive politics. Worse still, each ethnic leader was extremely popular in the region of his origin but beyond this politically moribund.

The strong ethnic political interest also put pressure on the existence of a federal newspaper such as the Morning Post. Unlike radio, newspapers depend on readership to survive. Luke Uche claimed that the Morning Post became defunct in early 1973. Its circulation had fallen and the federal government was running it at a great deficit. The Nigerian audience of the Morning Post had eventually revolted against reading the federal government bulletins and press releases that overtly contained only pre-government news that became characteristic of the contents of the Morning Post. "The Post 'died' because it took its audience for a ride. It failed to recognise that it had a nationally based audience, hence an element of objectivity in news content was essential in presenting all sides to controversial issues that were quite sensitive when the nation was faced with a crisis of identity and legitimacy."¹⁹

Uche's comments here should be taken seriously, though he fails to tell us what type of government was in power when the Post 'died', but he did implicitly point out an important development in political communication and the media in Nigeria in recent years, the fact that the majority of those in power in 1973 when the Post 'died' were soldiers drawn from a particular region of the country - the North. 'Crises of Identity' are an important political communication issue in Nigeria. Those who control the centre, either civilian elite as the 1983 government showed or the military elite, have the greater tendency to represent the ethnic identity of their particular ethnic group. This is a political direction instituted by politicians when the English were still in Nigeria as the governing power. Many Nigerians believe that the direction has not changed even with the army, a 'reality' which has led to the development of a slogan stereotyping the army as civilians in uniform.

Events and new political developments such as the creation of states are further affecting the function of the press in Nigeria. Crises of political

identity are shown in the media as shifting from the federal level to state and local levels. In 1979 the civil government was shown to be in control of certain states and each state had its own radio, TV and press. Politically states under one party tended to agree on several political issues while those outside the ruling party not only attacked the federal newspaper views, but also opposed the views of those states under them. The media, therefore, tended to intensify regional/state conflicts, federal and state and vice versa. The regional/state political communication development tendency in Nigeria is historical and has virtually become endemic, eating deep into the marrow of the nation's political communication system. The historical moments in which this political communication orientation began in Nigeria shall be reviewed at the end of this section. This role of the media in recent times during election campaigns will be examined empirically in the case study of the 1983 general election in Nigeria in this thesis.

I feel that the political influence of the press in Nigeria has been somehow overstressed particularly in the voting behaviour of the electorates. In 1982 for instance, Electoral Act, section 120, became law and the National Advisory Council (NAC) was set-up to monitor government-owned mass media content because the authorities believed that the mass media were as powerful as "a bullet" and could directly influence the electorates' voting behaviour in the way and manner the originator of media messages desired.²⁰

This is the concept of the political influence of mass media in Nigeria which most of the political elite have come to accept. I seriously question it. In contrast, I propose that the influence of the media is marginal in electoral behaviour and voting in that country. The concept of the hypodermic model applied to Nigerian media and political influence is part of the transfer of Western communication model which is inadequately applied and wrongly imposed on communication structures in Nigeria.

Even though I have argued that the press influenced the nationalist movement the level of education in Nigeria was very low: between 10-15% of the total population could read or write and only one newspaper, the one most passive about the independence struggle, was written in the local language - Hausa. How could the press then mobilise the entire nation behind the nationalists to win independence?

Through selective exposure to the media, the media can influence the attitude of some of the 15% of Nigerian elites. In the words of Peter Golding (1974:84) already mentioned earlier, there is a process of "a 'two-step flow' of communication, in which media material is attended to most actively by an interested and aware elite, called opinion leaders, who then pass it on through networks of interpersonal communication. These interpersonal networks stabilise attitudes over time and act as filters for mediated information."

I believe in the Nigerian context, that it was through the network of interpersonal communication that the small number of the elite were able to influence their relatives, kin, friends and workmates, using the information they obtained from the press. Kinship ties between those in authority and the very poor rural population made a very important structural network of political communication that determined such popular support. My study has not examined the influence and direct effect of the press on the population during the nationalist movement, but the 1983 general election will help us assess the actual effect of the press and other media on the electorate.

Between 1979-83, several political leaders owned and controlled newspapers, eg Chief Abolisa - the National Concord; Chief Awolowo - the Nigerian Tribune; Jim Nwaobodo - Satellite, etc. They used these papers to attack or expose the negative aspects of their opponents. If the press had had a direct effect on the electorate, we would expect more Igbos voting for a Yoruba leader or a Hausa, or Yoruba for an Igbo or a Hausa leader. What is important about network analysis of political communication is that it throws light on the available and alternative channels of communication which compete through association to influence voting behaviour. In this study, we shall see how these alternative sources of influence - friends, relatives, money, etc. compare with mass media - radio, TV and the press.

Luke Uche and other leading Nigerian mass media scholars seem to endorse the hypodermic model. For instance, Uche writes:

"During the 1964 general elections, the mass media (radio, television, newspapers) of the federal and various regional governments announced false election result figures that favoured the political parties of the government they represented. This led to wide-spread rioting, thuggery and arson in the Western region of Nigeria."²¹

Would it be enough in any Nigerian city or village for people to hear a radio broadcast which did not favour their expectations and then embark on such violent action as above? The concept does not tell us about the rules of political leaders who were disappointed by the result of the elections. What is the ethnic composition of the rioters? What were the previous relationships between local political leaders, the ruling party and the rioters? Riots must start in a particular neighbourhood, city or village. Were they the first to obtain the information? Who received the information first? What is his position in the community and what interpretation did he give to the media message? All these and a host of other factors are neglected in the concept of direct effect of media.

In fact, the nature of political violence in Nigeria is entrenched in the system:

"Violence is close to the surface in all political campaigns in Nigeria, South as well as North. Four NCNC-NEPU supporters accompanying Dr. Azikiwe on his tour of the North attacked; seven NEPU men hospitalised following fight after the tour stops at Nguru; eleven democratic party of Nigeria and the Cameroon and NCNC men charged with breach of the peace at DPNC meeting in Enugu, Eastern Region following fighting and damage to Action Group helicopter. NPC member of the Northern House of Assembly (Alh. Cigari) sentenced to two years imprisonment for assault on Action Group organising secretary; Governor-General Robertson makes broadcast calling for an end to violence; all public processes banned in the Western region from November 26 to December 8 ..."²²

Long lists of such violent incidents were made by Schwartz in one election only. The North seemed in the pre-1966 election to have been more politically 'volatile'. From the Police Report 1959 Kurfi noted that "of the 27" disturbances and major incidents "during the year, 14 stemmed from conflicts between political parties, and of these, 12 were in the North".²³ It is wrong to assume that the press or radio at this time were solely responsible for the intensification of the conflicts between political parties. It is important to compare as we shall see in later chapters the various sources of political competition and conflicts in Nigeria during election period so that the degree of their differences can be stated to reduce speculation and over-generalisation of the role of the media in election campaigns. I have pointed out elsewhere in this thesis that one of the main problems of African politics is that those in power like to remain in power using all possible means to do so. Consequently, opposition groups also employ various means, legitimate and illegitimate to gain power so

that, as Kurfi, A (1983) illustrated with the 1959 and 1979 general elections in Nigeria, nobody - ie no political actor - acknowledges the legitimate power of a declared winner. What follows is that the loser employs violence to express his opposition. Kurfi pointed out in the 1979 general elections, Awolowo strongly believed he had won the presidential election and not Shagari. He appealed to the High Court but lost his case. As a leader of a major ethnic group, why did he not use violence as was the case in 1959 to oppose the NPN leadership? Kurfi correctly stated that violence, which characterises all Nigerian elections, was minimised in the 1979 general elections because the campaign:

"was carried out under the watchful eyes of the military rulers and was therefore much more restrained and almost devoid of rank violence. Furthermore, Nigerians appeared to have learned a bitter lesson in 1959, 1964 and 1965 when several lives were lost and valuable property damaged or destroyed and many people detested repeat performances of the ugly episodes of those years. The spirit of 'politics without bitterness' expounded by Al Haji Waziri Ibrahim, leader and presidential candidate of the GNPP, generally prevailed throughout the country."²⁴

Kurfi then buttressed his points by a particular observation made by Professor Jean Herskovits of New York State University who visited Nigeria during the 1979 general elections:

"During that (senatorial) and subsequent elections, a tour of the polling places revealed scenes of impressive order: queues, scarcely an argument, and, most of all, no violence ... Most striking was the contrast with the 1960s when thugs frequently broke-up political meetings, arson and murder were common, and intimidation was the context for voting itself."²⁵

In the 1979 general elections, Kurfi reported that only a few major incidents such as the stoning and smashing of the windshield of the helicopter carrying Chief Awolowo at Aba, Imo State (a repeat performance of a similar incident at Enugu in 1959) was reported and roundly condemned by most Nigerians. Another incident was reported in Plateau State where a party activist died as a result of a nail ... stuck in his skull ... On the whole the rules of the game were observed by most Nigerian politicians during the 1979 election campaign.²⁶

These conditions which prevailed in the 1979 general elections are crucial in the understanding of election campaigns in Nigeria. In terms of the role of the media, particularly in generating political conflict and violence, the

prevailing atmosphere controls and determines what the media reflect. They do not create political violence by simply reinforcing socio-political conditions which can lead to violence. They reinforce the action of political actors in their network of relationship with their different participation, voting and violence in Nigeria. Most political leaders in the 1979 and 1983 general elections had under their control more mass media network - press, radio, TV, telephone and journals - than in the 1959, 1964 and 1965 elections. Yet violence was greatly minimised as a result of socio-political conditions, not because the media set the agenda for the election.

As much as I have argued theoretically that the media do not create political violence during elections but reinforce the existing political mood of the nation, particularly that of political leaders, I shall empirically illustrate that in actual election participation and voting, the mass media, despite their control and ownership in Nigeria, do not directly influence voters. If they do, their direct influence is restricted to a particular sector of the population and only to a certain extent. Other alternative influences indicated above compete seriously with the media, particularly in the Imo State, Nigeria. Even so, not all the media have an equal amount of direct or indirect influence on a particular group. The role and development of the press, and other media from the time of nationalist and political party development in Nigeria can be exaggerated and lead to misleading theoretical conclusions if the structure of interpersonal relationship, social structure and political and economic conditions in Nigeria for a period of time are not accounted for.

In the next chapter, I shall account for the development of political radio and TV in Nigeria which, in many respects, has tended to the centralisation and regionalisation of state orientation.

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CHAPTER SIX

RADIO AND TELEVISION AND NIGERIAN PARTY POLITICS

A: RADIO

This chapter aims at demonstrating that radio, like the press, evolved from and centred around elite political communication needs.

At the time of its introduction into the political system of Nigeria radio was exclusively owned and controlled by the colonial authorities. Throughout the colonial rule in Nigeria, radio remained the most important medium in which the authorities communicated with the masses. Broadcasting in most African countries began as a service to settle communities, bring them news of the colonial homeland and establish valuable links within the communities ... Aware that external broadcasting services from Moscow were well ahead of Britain's, the Colonial Secretary appointed the Plymouth Committee to "consider and recommend what steps could be taken to accelerate the provision of broadcasting services in the Colonial Empire, to co-ordinate such services with the work of the BBC and to make them a more effective instrument for promoting both local and Imperial interest." (Colonial Office, 1937, p.1 in Golding & Elliott 1979:40). This was an important need which the colonial authorities followed up urgently as early as they could despite what was argued at the time by many officials in Britain and the colonies that setting up radio stations in Africa was a "waste of money on an extremely expensive, relatively new invention."¹ But a clear understanding of the medium's main characteristic as a network of communication which can penetrate different strata of a population and geographical boundaries pushed men such as Arthur Creech Jones (1946-1950), Andrew Cohen, Sir Sydney Caine, Sir Charles Jeffry, Ormsby Gore and Lord Plymouth, who were associated with the colonial office and the British administration at the time, to approve radio broadcasting in Africa regardless of the cost. Mass media professionals such as R. Foot, Oliver J. Whitley, J.B. Clark, Grenfell Williams, etc. of the BBC worked hard to establish radio broadcasting in Africa.

A few years later, Rosalynde Ainslie stressed the importance of radio in Africa, thus:

"In Africa, where rates of illiteracy are among the highest in the world, radio is practically indispensable to modern life. Newspapers may reach the educated in the cities and the towns, but few in the villages. Television, where it exists, may excite those within the radius of a transmitter, if they have access to a set. But for the mass of people, workers in the towns and peasants in the countryside, radio is the sure means of contact with the rest of the country, and with the outside world. Access to a radio station is thus, next to control of armed forces, the most urgent necessity of Government. Democratically, it is an instrument of power..."²

Ainslie's point is crucial in understanding radio as a powerful medium of political communication. Applying his notion of categorical audio audience to our network groups, identified in chapter two, every member of the Africa community who has access to a set would be directly influenced by radio broadcasts. But as I have argued elsewhere, it is not exposure to a medium that is important but the format of and the content of the broadcast themselves. The most important in this respect is the ability of radio to use various local African languages as well as standard English and other European languages, e.g. French, to broadcast in Africa at relatively little additional cost.

Katz and Wedell (1977:33) also point out that in Africa broadcasting is expected "to help in the fight against illiteracy, linguistic diversity, and regionalism in order to forge a shared national identity, a higher standard of living, a higher standard of social justice". In the Nigerian context, they noted that "Disquiet over the cultural goals of broadcasting has also begun to be discussed..." because the country's major problem since independence "has been to integrate the disparate regions and tribes that were combined for administrative purposes by Lord Lugard at the turn of the century."

In the network of political communication, it is this linguistic variety and long distance coverage of radio broadcast that makes it a great political mobiliser and agent of political information. "Radio networks have been expanded in almost every country and have overcome many of the problems of terrain and distance" (Katz & Wedell 1977). Ainslie concludes that:

"Radio is therefore an intensely serious affair, and not an entertaining luxury. In rural Africa, it is often the single means of receiving news - news of regional, national or world events, of government and policy decisions. It is also the main vehicle of social education: advice on health, on farming methods, on civic responsibilities and voting procedures."³

This second function of radio can be true when radio is compared with television and newspapers but may be theoretically and quantitatively questionable in comparison to oral communication in Africa - that is, I subscribe to the view that radio is the second main communication medium in Africa. But when we consider political communication from traditional rural pattern to urban political communication changes and development, radio holds the key to the process. In this light then, Ainslie argues that radio is "seen as an essential instrument of national development" and "is a comparatively new phenomenon".⁴

In comparing radio and television in terms of communication channels through which information can flow between government and the people to ensure national political integration, Katz ' Wedell contend that "the media must reach out to the whole population. In the case of radio, this coverage has been achieved to a considerable extent. In the case of television, it has hardly begun.

The basic similarities between the development of Radio and TV according to Golding (1974:32-33) is that "they arose after the Industrial Revolution and required the mass urban public and technological advances that industrialisation has induced. They have been unique, too, in that for a substantial period in broadcasting history the monopoly of production and distribution was held by a state-controlled body."

Historically, it was during the colonial period that essential instruments of new political orientation and development were ushered into African political system as I have pointed out in Chapter Three. The important direct relationship between the role of radio in the new political system and national development was that the new medium was generating the new political elite and at the same time confronting it. For instance, Armour, stating the importance of radio to the colonial authorities as well as the confrontation between political leaders/nationalists in Nigerian party politics, wrote:

"In October 1947, Grenfell Williams had written to Whitley at the colonial office: 'Nigeria, in spite of its problems, or perhaps because of them, will probably be almost the most important colonial area during the next few years and here, at all costs, Public Service radio should be established in preference to the commercial system.'"⁵

This implies that changing political circumstances immediately after the Second World War pressurised the colonial authorities to change the contents of radio broadcasting from those of cultural and social civilization and commercialisation of African communities to heavy political content. "After the war colonial authorities in Britain began to reconsider broadcasting in the light of growing restiveness in some areas" (Golding and Elliot 1979:41). The broader political awareness of Nigerians after the Second World War became converted into an intense demand for participation in the colonial administration and was fuelled by the activities of Nationalists through the press. Radio as the only voice of the government became heavily politicised as much as the press. Hence constitutional changes in the way that the Nigerian Radio Service operated were needed so that radio could cope with the new political situation. Armour noted that:

"From his arrival in Lagos in January 1951, Chalmers had intended to work towards the establishment of a broadcasting corporation modelled on the BBC. His fears about popular interpretation of the status of the Nigerian Broadcasting Service were enforced in March 1953 by the reactions to the refusal of the Chief Secretary Arthur Benson to allow Chief Awolowo to reply over the air to the Governor's broadcast following the constitutional crisis when the Action Group (AG) and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) members walked out of the House of Representatives in Lagos."

It was after this incident that the nationalists and their political parties began to press the colonial government to regionalise radio by setting up radio stations in the three major regions in Nigeria. The motion of Chief S.A. Adegbenro of the AG in March 1954 attracted popular support among political leaders in the Federal House of Parliament. He demanded that NBS should be changed to NBC, arguing that NBS was modelled on the BBC which did not reflect the course, aspirations and needs of Nigerians. On August 23rd, 1954, a bill was passed to this effect and on April 1st 1957, NBS became NBC (Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation). Besides this non-Nigerian cultural, political and economic content of NBS modelled after the BBC, a second argument which was put before the colonial authorities was that the NBS was accused by the nationalist press to be the mouthpiece of the central

government and in order to remove the press criticism the government should regionalise the radio.

But T.W. Chalmer stressed and recommended "that radio ... is the most potent mass disseminator of culture and information that the world possesses, and the object of bringing it to Nigeria is to assist in the development of the country in every possible way and in an orderly fashion. Our aim in broadcasting therefore must be to assist those processes that go towards the making of an enlightened democracy. One of the most powerful weapons in the radio armoury is impartial news and information programmes which must develop as rapidly as possible" (quoted in Mack, 1964:p.14; and in Golding and Elliot 1979:41).

Mackay (1964) noted that the intention was to form a Nigerian broadcasting corporation on the general model of the BBC but owing to the circumstances of Nigeria it is proposed to have three independent regional setups with regional autonomy subject only to the overall control of policy by the Broadcasting Corporation of the whole country.

But Peter Golding and Elliot (1979) state that the breakdown of the 1957 constitution and the assertion of regional autonomy could not allow for the adoption of radio development in Nigeria as recommended by Turner-Byron. However, Chalmers' recommendations were accepted and the Nigeria Broadcasting Service began in 1957.

From the above argument important facts about radio and political party development in Nigeria begin to surface. Radio, if the argument of changing it from NBS to NBC can be empirically represented as accurate, has not played a unifying political role in Nigeria because it did not reflect on the socio-political and cultural realities of Nigeria. As a medium capable of linking Nigerians to Nigerians irrespective of tribes, creed and residence, politically it failed. Nigerians were linked to the colonial authorities and then to the world outside Nigeria by radio (NBS).

Taking into consideration the regional differences in Nigeria, discussed earlier and restated by Mackay above, the NBC would be expected to play divergent, disintegrative political roles in Nigeria. My main argument would be that radio became orientated towards reinforcing regional political and social interests which are embedded in ethnic political nationalism in Nigeria. Because of the multiplicity of languages which characterised

different ethnic groups within the regions, radio created more political divergence. Unlike the press as Kurian and Nwankwo noted which used one language - English, "geographical location and circulation patterns influence the Nigerian press more critically than ownership". But the pattern of language structures, leadership and political party tendencies in Nigeria make radio an important regional political medium.

Besides the internal political shape of Nigerian radio during the colonial period, it was suggested that the British were anxious to control the influence of communism in Africa through the use of radio which could expose the 'dangers' of communism to all social and economic groups in Africa.

"For some time, we, in consultation with the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office, have been planning the measures which could be taken to combat the growth of communist influence, not only by direct counter propaganda but also and perhaps chiefly - by the positive projection both of the accurate appreciation of the democratic point of view and the principles upon which our civilization is based. Among these measures is the development of broadcasting in the colonies ... Broadcasting offers ... the best medium available for us for covering the ground; the press helpful though it may be cannot be used in quite the same way."⁹

Besides in the 1930s the Colonial Office was aware that Russian external services from Moscow were well ahead of the BBC's similar services (Golding and Elliot, 1979).

Basically, Nigerian and African radio broadcasting developed as much as the press as a confrontation medium in which the British could combat communism as well as counter internal nationalist political movements.

On the internal politics, having by law converted radio broadcasting "into a statutory corporation" to "devoid it of both government interference and the propagation of the views of the ruling political parties"¹⁰, NBC regional political function became an important political medium in Nigeria. The 1956 broadcasting ordinance stressed the political implications of broadcasting in Nigeria and emphasised the need for impartial coverage of political broadcasting by all the parties. Various guidelines were laid down to secure the national character of broadcasting in the nation to promote national unity and integration; most of these proposals ended in disappointments and frustration because the political parties in which radio became an important medium developed rigidly along ethnic and regional lines.

It was in the 1950s that it was anticipated that radio broadcasting would be established on the three main regions but not to be regionalised. But the idea was "gradually eroded by the facts of Nigerian political life". Eventually it became clear to the colonial authorities that "political and social development of the Regions will mean that regional broadcasting will play an even more important part than was originally anticipated" (Colonial Office, 1954:119, quoted in Golding and Elliott, 1979:42).

In addition, the content of the radio broadcast at regional level was stipulated by the broadcasting ordinance of 1956 to meet the requirements of different regions where the stations existed. A factor difficult to reconcile politically with the concept of Nigerian political unity and integration. Luke Uche points out that the "greatest setback to the concept of Nigerian unity occurred when each of the three regions of the federation established its own separate broadcasting system."¹¹ But it is the regionalisation of the content which so much caused the set back for it is from this aspect of the development that the domination of personalities in Nigerian broadcasting rather than political issues can be understood. The external relationship between the broadcasting and regional government was very fundamental. Peter Golding in Curran (ed. 1977:291) has emphasised that "... colonial history has enormous implications for analysis of the structure and role of the media in the Third World. Most importantly it means that accounts of the media in a single country which make no reference to an international context of the dependence are empirically and theoretically barren".

The validity of this statement becomes clearer in his later works in Nigeria when he demonstrated some of the implications of foreign jointly owned broadcasting stations in West Nigeria. Golding and Elliot (1979:41) showed that the colonial administrators were warned of "the readiness of manufacturers to extend their markets for both transmitting and receiving equipment to West Africa. While the BBC undertook to supervise the manufacture of its own equipment, "manufacturers were eager to secure export outlets, while hedging their bets by joining the campaign for a commercial second television service in Britain". Elsewhere, Golding has the close relationship between advanced nations and the Third World media developments in terms of the transfers of media professionalism, historical transfer, education, training and qualifications. All these often shape the content of broadcasting and structure of organisation of the media in Africa and other Third World countries. Schaller, H.I. (1970), Mattelart, A. (ed)

(1979), Katz and Wedell (1957) have made similar observations.

Commercial interest of the overseas partners seems over-riding and at times even to conflict. In West Nigeria such partnership was entered into between H.G. and Overseas Rediffusion Ltd. "Initially the venture was run in partnership with Overseas Rediffusion Ltd. who had been involved since 1952 in the development of NBC's wired radio service in the region. Increasingly the political objectives set for broadcasting by the regional government conflicted with the aggressive commercial ambitions of Rediffusion, and the government bought out the company in 1961." (Golding and Elliott 1979:43).

We have noted that each of the regions was dominated by one political party and political leader. The parties controlled the medium and the political leaders regarded it as the channel through which their ethnic group would know them and support them, a notion which led so many writers on Nigerian politics and media to conclude that without the mass media support, a politician in Nigeria stands to lose.

Other political implications of regionalisation of radio broadcasting can be revealed. We should recall, as stated in chapter three, that indirect rule in the North protected the interest of colonial administration against the nationalist influence of that region from the South.

Regionalisation of radio through a demand curiously made by the nationalist influence reinforce such interest. Since radio uses local languages broad national content of broadcasting would include various arguments put forward by nationalists and this would have 'direct' impact on the Northern masses. The consequence would result in faster destabilisation of colonial administration. We shall see later how the colonial authorities split the nationalist and increased antagonism between them through the media.

Experience has shown that in Nigerian urban centres where different ethnic and linguistic groups live and work, regionalisation of the content of the media, e.g. radio and TV, has led to political media impoverishment of the ethnic groups who come from outside the region. In the 1980s radio recording machines and cassettes from USA, Europe and India were very popular with the non-Hausa/Fulani speakers and cultural groups in Kaduna, because Northern broadcasting programmes did not satisfy their needs. They simply played their tapes. Ironically, these tapes bear Western values and not Nigerian.

Two explanations are possible: Western education has influenced Southerners so much that media entertainment has captured their interest towards the West.

Secondly, the lack of adequate facilities for producing video films locally gives no alternative choice.

Politically, the media having been regionalised, they integrate rural populations with a section of the urban population who have the same regional, cultural and linguistic characteristics. Radio in particular selectively links a particular ethnic urban group with its similar rural population while isolating other groups in the region. In the network of political connections, the role of radio and face-to-face communication in Nigeria become fused at the village level but sharply disintegrative in the city. The differences widen the further one moves from one's own urban centre and village to another.

Eventually as we shall see with the 1983 general election data, urban politics and rural political communication could not transcend ethnic geographical zones. Those politicians who, as the nature of Nigerian political system described in chapter three, offered no alternative but to base their political support on ethnic mobilisation and strength, therefore, utilised the regionalisation of the media, particularly radio, to perpetuate their own interest and shape Nigerian politics along ethnic participation and voting lines.

This structure of political media and their danger to political stability in Nigeria was stressed by Mackay before the 1966-1970 civil war:

"The sole responsibility of regional broadcasting is to radiate a regional image and that cannot encourage the artistic endeavours of Nigeria as a nation. The setting-up of regional corporation does not bring about the competition. That can only be achieved by setting-up a number of corporations having national coverage and offering a range of programme which would benefit the country. There is no sign of that in Nigeria. Whatever the benefits - and there are benefits - the cost is too high and the danger exists that divided control in a developing society may prompt regional feeling instead of encouraging the desire to live together and act together."¹²

Radio would therefore tend to intensify ethnic conflict by over-concentration on regional issues which politically do not attract the interest of various groups or individuals outside a tribe. Since Nigerian

politics is based on competition with immense conflicting interests and bitterness, regionalisation of issues in radio broadcasting which transcends ethnic boundaries generate ill feelings between ethnic groups, not only between the elites who define the media content and set the agenda, but also between the poor in cities and the village peasants. The young unemployed school leavers often justify their acts of thuggery on behalf of ethnic politicians who exploit the situation. An important understanding of the way in which political relationship between groups in Nigeria operate is seen in the statement of Obasango in his nationwide radio/TV broadcast in the 1979 elections that politicians should not exploit the feelings of the young.

This 'feeling' would be minimised if at the national level political parties competed with one another. The tendency would be for them to use radio to discuss national issues and problems, how best they could solve national problems. Personalities and ethnic party interests would therefore be de-emphasised because they would not appeal to the electorates. Thus radio would become an important channel of national political participation and voting. Individuals and groups would be exposed to different media by virtue of their different characteristics and attributes which enable them to understand media political messages.

The debate on regionalisation of the media in Nigeria, which is believed to contribute to the disorientation of political participation from the centre could be a weak explanation of the real nature of political communication in Nigeria. If political parties are ethnic-based and the kinship system persist as the most important determinant of political participation and voting, the role of the media could be less important than they are assumed to be in Nigerian politics. It would even be more difficult to envisage how centralised national radio/TV networks would represent the interest of all the region or states without complaints of media bias in representing those interests.

"... It is potentially dangerous if the NBC is used to stifle criticism, to voice only the thoughts and the aims of a particular group of people who, for the time being, are in political power. It may be all very well to have political control of broadcasting so long as one's party is in power. It is not so funny when one is not in power."¹³

This is a clear statement which illustrates the relationship between the

political party in power and the mass media since independence. In 1983, as will be seen later, the NPN, the ruling party, was seriously accused by other parties of exclusive use of federal radio/TV and press, both at federal and state levels. Such protest and accusation were noted by Mackay between July 29th to August 1961 by NPC, NCNC, AG and NEPU parties in various ways against NBC.

Under Gowon's regime the number of NBC stations increased from three to twelve corresponding to the twelve states created by him. It was under the Murtala/Obasanjo government that NBC was restructured to FRCN (Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria). Pressure was put on the government to allow advertising on the FRCN but the government resisted the pressure and argued that ads would disrupt the use of radio as a medium of government campaign for development. With various political changes in Nigeria, particularly the creation of states, radio broadcasting stations followed the same trend. By the time the first civil government took over power under PNC government in 1979 to 1983, there were 48 radio broadcasting stations and 19 state governments in Nigeria. By law, individuals or organisations are not allowed to own radio broadcasting stations, thus all of the 48 stations were owned either by the federal government or by the state government. The ownership and control of these broadcasting houses has been summed up by Luke Uche, thus:

"The FRCN, which is owned and controlled by federal government ... has its own state stations in each of the nineteen states of the Federation. At the same time each of Nigeria's nineteen states has its own radio broadcasting station. This is totally independent of the FRCN affiliate in each state ... For political reasons, all the radio stations are located at both the federal and state capitals."¹⁵

This structure of governments' (federal and states) radio is important in the understanding of the role of radio in Nigerian politics.

Luke Uche clearly states that:

"The Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) is undoubtedly one of the most powerful political and social institutions of Nigerian society. It has played a role that is second to none in the political leadership power struggle of the country."¹⁵

Uche's comment sounds plausible and falls in line with other media theory assumptions in most African studies. However, there is evidence to

substantiate these assumptions have not exceeded speculations and where the statement bears some relationship to the political realities in Nigeria, it is based purely on the media institutions and their relationship with political leaders and parties. We have noted in this chapter that the primary aim of the colonial office in establishing radio broadcasting in Nigeria and elsewhere was political and social in order to inform the masses of decisions concerning them and to enable them to participate in the system. These aims were not by the regional/state and federal governments after independence. In fact, the most important expected role of the media is to mobilise the masses for political support during the election period and beyond.

Since the audience is the target, statements about the political importance of the media in relation to the political leaders without reference to the responses, impacts or influence of the masses, who decides, who rules in a democratic system may be only theoretically valid. The characteristics of radio as I have argued earlier makes it an important medium for political participation in Nigeria.

The ownership of radio stations by federal and state governments and the relationship between different states and the ruling party, NPN, who controlled federal stations in Lagos/Abuja and other states provide very curious political communication in the last general elections. The curious phenomenon is embedded in the constitutional requirements of the Nigerian type of 'presidential' system.

The constitution states that in each of the 19 states, the candidate who should be the nation's president must secure at least 25% of the votes - a requirement which generated a lot of obscure debates on what is 25% of the votes. However, the importance of this in political communication and the role of radio is that the president must be at least 25% effectively popular among all different sections and tribes of Nigeria. From my observation, it is difficult to produce such a political personality in Nigeria.

Concentrating on Imo state, where the fieldwork was conducted, this is what prevailed:

The handover of FRCN stations to state governments was a great problem to the NPN who aimed to capture at least 25% of Ibgo votes in Imo state. Imo state proves an interesting case because it illustrates how the media and

other alternative sources of influence and political mobilisation between two national parties, NPN and NPP, operated in Nigeria.

In view of the authorities awareness of the power of radio, before the 1983 general elections, the ruling party established a new FRCN station at Owerri to compete with IBS (Imo State Broadcasting Service) which was acquired by the state according to the military decree. IBS was broadcasting constantly news which were overtly pro-NPP and direct attacks were made on NPN policies and personalities. Ironically and by law, IBS during major national news broadcasts relayed the federal news bulletin. Some of the news and news talks relayed by IBS were contradictory to IBS original views and comments about politics in Nigeria. The majority of Igbo listeners in the city and village I spoke to were not confused by the two. They were able to distinguish the different news broadcasts. This is because IBS would make it clear where the news was coming from. This ability of the locals to distinguish sources of radio information made it more important for the ruling party to set up FRCN stations in those states that were not controlled by it. The purpose politically was to employ locals who would understand local issues concerning the local communities, so that news, comments, news talks, magazine programmes etc. would attract their interest and attention as much as those of the state-owned network.

My interview with Chidikabo Abarikwu in the News & Current Affairs, Radio Nigeria Owerri, and a number of staff at IBS Owerri revealed that most staff of the IBS made up the Radio Nigeria Staff Owerri. This localisation of federal radio at the same level as the state radio in terms of workers and the audience the two stations addressed on political matters, particularly in an election period, constitute an important phenomenon in the understanding of politics in Nigeria. It is difficult to explain the relationship between media institutions, the political content of their information and the nature and characteristics of the local audience from an institutional level only.

Here political communication involves virtually everything the communities believe and do. For instance, the drift of IBS workers to build up Radio Nigeria controlled by an opposition party led by a Hausa/Fulani leader cannot be explained in terms of political ideology. It is assumed that attractive wages, working conditions, etc. offered by the federal government were the main factor in the drift. Similarly, Federal Press, TV (NTA) at Aba and Owerri were serving the same purposes using local employees. This

localisation of mass media in every respect and the split of Igbo leadership noted earlier are very important facts which can only be explained in terms of network of connectedness between individuals in the community and between groups and individuals to the available media.

From my particular observation, communication at all levels in the urban and rural areas, was characterised with overt conflicts and competition because media and politics were so localised that everyone was involved for political, social and economic reasons. Every available system of political communication was employed because every category of individuals and groups was involved.

In such an environment of political communication, it is important to discover how the masses react to the media networks.

Since within one ethnically dominated state, different media organisations were controlled by two different political parties NPN and NPP and both of them employed the same tribal or ethnic group, from the masses viewpoint, we should discover the actual role of the media. The roles during election campaigns would include the creation of more ethnic, class and social conflicts which as we have seen surface strongly in all Nigerian elections. Furthermore to avoid over-generalisation, as I believe that different media have different characteristics which enable the different groups I have identified in this study to be directly or indirectly influenced by them, it is necessary then to find out which medium, radio, TV, newspaper or word of mouth resolves or intensifies the conflicts.

As politics and the media are especially localised, the masses through direct involvement and participation can have access to sources of media political information and, hence, are able to dispute it. The relationship between them and the journalists and the editors through kinship system discussed in chapter two are close, thus their audience have as much access to information as the broadcaster. Here then, political information by the media can be assessed in terms of reliability as reported by the audience and not only by the broadcaster.

Exposure to these media is also important during an election period. In Nigeria a number of factors influence it, eg ownership of a radio set and TV for instance may not explain exposure to them. The reason is that kinship allows for communal viewing, sets were provided by individual members of a

family. Hence, there may be a small number of radio sets, TV sets but a large number of viewers. A newspaper bought by a relative can also be circulated among many.

Under these circumstances, the relationship between organised media and informal political communication are close. Much of what happens during an election campaign depends on inter-related socio-political and economic structures. The role of radio, other media and alternative factors of political influence can then be distinguished and described.

In the next sub-chapter (Six B) I will look at the development of TV as part of the problem of political change and development in Nigeria. The relation in the development is tied to regional, ethnic or 'states' politics that have become localised. The impact of television will be assessed in relation to its main characteristics and the characteristics of the audience who consume it.

B: TELEVISION

THE EVOLUTION OF TELEVISION AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA

While radio ownership and control in Nigeria diverged from the centre (federal) to the three major regions, the evolution of television in Nigeria began from the regions and spread to the centre.

"The regional governments were always ahead of the federal administration in the prestigious race to establish television. Spurred on by eager European and North American companies, many African states had television services very early in the development of the broadcasting systems. Based in Ibadan, the Western Nigerian government's television service proudly bears the motto 'First in Africa'. In fact the television service in that region actually started before the radio service, the former in October 1959, the latter in May 1960". (Golding and Elliot, 1979:43)

The reasons for such an unusual development of a medium which is assumed to be politically powerful have been based on two different ideas. Dymna Edoaga-Ugwuoju sums the reasons up thus:

"... Western Nigeria, in 1959, decided to set up its own regional broadcasting. The reasons for this decision vary. Some describe the development to the allegation that Awolowo, the leader of the region, was denied an opportunity to respond to an attack on him by a colonial officer."

(details already noted in Chapter Five). The second reason was a political and Ugwuoju notes that:

"... according to the Minister of Information, television was needed as an aid to education."¹

But Awolowo refused to state his reason for starting TV broadcasting in Western Nigeria in 1959. The silence made the political implications more obvious. We noted in chapter four that Western Nigeria through the boom sales of cocoa in the world market in the pre-independent period was the richest region in Nigeria. Its economic strength gave more political bargaining power to the region. The allocation of national revenue and resources favoured her tremendously. To enhance further the wealth of the

region taking advantage of, urbanised areas in the west very close to Lagos, regional TV would yield to a party that owns it with immense revenue from advertising in which TV has a greater advantage than radio or newspapers. On this commercial debate, Edoga pointed out that industrial growth was in evidence; in addition, there was a market to be exploited by commercial broadcasting.²

The environment in Western Nigeria provided opportunities for TV commercialisation as well as political broadcasting and propaganda in heavily urbanised centres. Typical of Third World areas, "... a split between the 'public service' and commercial forms of organisation, between government and advertising financial support, and between carrying degrees of state control began to show in the West and other parts of Nigeria in media institutions.

In terms of both radio and TV, the content of a Western Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation (WNBC) at Ibadan was more commercial than even political:

"The Ibadan-based services continued to be more commercially sophisticated than other Nigerian services, employing popular programming and market research to a far greater degree than elsewhere. As is usual in smaller broadcasting organisations the news department is common to radio and television, and is one of the six departments in the corporation. The relationship to the regional, Western State, government was analogous to that of NBC" (Golding and Elliott, 1979).

Through UNESCO's promotion of the use of TV for academic purposes could easily lead other regions to believe that the pioneer WNBS-TV established in Ibadan in October 1959 was for educational purposes, as the then Minister of Information of that region stated. For this reason, education as the strongest elite base for political leadership and participation in Nigeria was bound to generate similar interest in other regions, particularly the Eastern region.

Edoga believes firmly that if the reasons were only educational and commercial, too much politics would eventually be introduced into political television in Nigeria.

Other regions rapidly followed suit: Eastern region under NCNC established a TV station at Enugu in 1960, NPC at Kaduna in 1962. The last to join the

race was the federal government who in 1962 set up a television station in Lagos. Two years later, in November 1964, to reinforce the importance of television as a new medium for African education, UNESCO organised a conference in Lagos on "The Introduction and Development of Television in Africa". Delegates from several African countries attended. Rosalynde Ainslie summarised the recommendations of the conference thus:

"... that television in Africa should be used as a force for national unity, for social and economic development; ... it should regard its education role as a priority and make its resources available to schools, for the training of teachers, for literacy programmes, and for programmes on national development projects. Use should be made not only of studios, but of videotape recording and film units in order to portray the life of the people throughout the country; ... teachers should be adequately trained both to use education television and to take part in planning education programmes."⁴

Ainslie, then, reported that by 1965 twenty-one countries in Africa had started television broadcasting. From UNESCO's recommendation, television emerged in Africa as a multipurpose medium in rapidly changing communities from 'primitive' ways of doing things to modernisation processes. Nigeria being an outstandingly extraordinarily complex country in Africa which totally embraced such changes, the impact of television since 1959 on the society varies from one aspect of the changes to another.

From personal observation, I have a greater tendency to repudiate the notion that television has revolutionised Nigerian politics. As a powerful medium of communication, because of its combined visual and verbal structures, its political influence in multilinguistic, culturally diverse, higher proportion of illiterate population and rapidly urbanising communities, TV's political impact can be misplaced. The view that TV can directly change people has led to the high politicisation of television in Nigeria. My argument on the political role of TV in Nigeria is that, like radio and the press, "every power-seeker wants to control" it.⁴ Its political influence on participation and voting in comparison to radio or newspapers is the least strong, particularly in Igboland where there is a strange phenomenon of more activities political active in the rural areas during election periods than in the cities. Television as an urban-centred medium would not be very effective in such an environment. For the nation as a whole, we should realise that, though TV has existed in Nigeria for more than two decades, it has only once been effectively used for a political campaign and that was in 1983. This is not enough to demonstrate its political power. I

regard the statement that the 1979 election was a "television election" as an unqualified exaggeration of facts, because different factors which have been outlined above shaped the outcome of that election and reduce the characteristically violent nature of Nigerian politics. Television's most important function could be no more than that of influencing the audience to participate, in terms of surveillance, vote guidance, reinforcement and excitement.

The main reason for this is that the long period of military rule in Nigeria has strongly shaped the content and orientation of television in Nigeria towards commercial and entertainment uses. Originally most of the TV programmes in Nigeria were imported programmes from Britain and the United States, and this has been statistically demonstrated.⁵

"The content of the imported programs is often alien to the values and imagery of the importing country. When programs from Europe and the United States are imported by developing countries the gap in values and imagery can be unbridgeable. It is this consideration that has caused the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation to raise its own production to 70 percent of its own output..." (Katz and Wedell, 1977:156-157).

Gradually indigenous programmes, which reflect the interests and cultural values of different states and ethnic groups, began to replace imported programmes. Most of these indigenous programmes are not overtly political. Thus TV, like the film industry in Nigeria, may have more impact on culture and social life than on political life.

In view of these facts, the rapid expansion of expensive colour television stations throughout the states for political use in the 1983 general election could be irrational and a waste of resources.

By 1983 there were 34 television stations in Nigeria, possessing more than half of the local number of stations in the Black Africa (62 TV stations). Of these 34 TV stations, 24 were owned by the federal government, under the auspices of the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA). The remaining ten were owned and controlled by the state government. Particularly those states that were not controlled by the NPN ruling party during the 1979-1983 civilian rule.

"In a multi-party situation under the short-lived presidential system (1979-83), the TV stations were used for propaganda

purposes, which tended to undermine national unity in a federal set-up. Allocation of frequencies had generated acrimony and bitter rivalry among various political groups, authorities or interest camps."⁶

The argument for the development of radio and press in Nigeria after independence and their relationship to political parties is much the same as TV. But the 'bitter rivalry' in the establishment of TV is made more complex by the structure of state creation in Nigeria. The way TV may now run counter to national unity is so much generated by the states ownership of TV and the way in which a particular party, which is dominated by one ethnic group, dominated the use of federal TV stations.

When Gowon created the 12 states, each was distrustful of the other and bent on establishing its own TV station. Edoja noted that this was a way to get out of the larger ethnic groups' domination.⁷ We noted earlier that states were created out of ethnic groups. Owning and operating TV at state level is the basis of bitter rivalry. Through TV, Nigeria's fragmented political, cultural and social life becomes more fragemented and fractured. In 1976, seven more states were created and the TV expanded along this line. Also in 1976, the military governemnt became more seriously concerned with the handing over of government to civilian rule. Decree 24 in practice only permits federal and state governments to establish TV stations, but under the military, all NTA stations were under the control of federal government. The military regime maintained that it has to control TV networks in order to "fulfill national needs rather than partisan or sectional interest, to foster unity and assist general education."⁸

When the NPN government took over power in 1979 under Shehu Shagari, the fulfilment of 'national needs' through NTA became fulfilment of interests and needs of the NPN party. They controlled NTA stations in Lagos as well as those in the states. To the other four political parties that registered in 1979, they were convinced that federal mass media controlled by the NPN had become effective propaganda machines for the ruling party at the expense of the others.

Before the general elections of 1983, those states which were not controlled by the NPN ruling party had established their own TV broadcasting stations. Anambra state was the first to establish state TV broadcasting stations in 1981, then others such as Lagos, Bendel, Borno, Kano, Ondo, Ogun, Plateau, Imo, Kaduna and Oyo states followed.

The period between 1981-83 was a time of television explosion in preparation for the 1983 general elections. In the process of the development each state had two TV stations: one federal and another one state owned, a situation which in the 'allocation of frequencies generated acrimony and bitter rivalry'. Since section 36 (2) of the Nigerian Constitution states that only federal and state governments could establish and operate radio/TV stations, their political content during the election period is bound to be full of biased ethnic political content. Individual or privately owned newspapers may report objectively on political issues without bias. The competition between state-owned broadcasting stations and federal government's merely generates tensions, conflicts and political disunity. Because of local broadcasting, as shown with radio, the communities' ability through their network of connectedness to validate broadcasting messages could rate TV as a politically important medium.

In reference to the 1983 general elections, it is therefore important to discover empirically the extent in which TV intensified political conflicts, how reliable TV was in political information and that enabled voters to participate in the election. Length of exposure to TV during election periods may not be directly related to ownership of sets nor with the amount of influence it would have on viewers because of the phenomenon of communal viewing, and the entertainment orientation of TV in Nigeria. Other factors of political influence, such as parents, schoolmates, club, unions, friends, relatives, financial needs will be compared with the political influence of TV.

It is from these findings that the explosion of TV networks and their costs to federal and state governments during the 1983 general elections can be evaluated.

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14. but the military before the civilian take over of power decreed that all the federal government controlled FRNC stations with their 'bona fide' property should be handed over to each of the 19 stations. A policy which the NPN party regretted so much during the last civil rule, particularly during the 1983 general election. It was believed that these stations were used as effective campaigning stations against the ruling party.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

THE FIRST MEDIA ELECTION IN NIGERIA, 1979

"... Judging from subsequent events, it would appear Anuforo was merely trying to put the Brigadier where he could be easily held. His decision to stay in undisclosed private lodging, on 12th of January, 1966, may have contributed to the postponement of the date of the coup."¹

Three days later, on 15th January, 1966, a group of young majors struck and the under six-year old First Republic of Nigeria was overthrown. Political corruption, tribalism, etc., were stated as the underlying factors which led to the coup.

"Our enemies are the political profiteers, swindlers, the men in high and low places, those that seek to keep the country permanently divided so that they can remain in office as ministers and VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists."²

This does not imply that within the military organisation, there were no discontents among the rank and file. As much as the young army officers "wanted to get rid of rotten and corrupt ministers, political parties, trade unions and the whole clumsy apparatus of federal system"³, they hated their top ranking army officers. What were seen as ills of Nigerian society were all embracing from the civilian political systems to her military organisation.

The discontent, and tribalism within the army was voiced by Major Okafor, who was buried alive during the counter-coup. He, once, feared that he would be dismissed from the army by Brigadier Zadkari Maimalari because he punished "a Northern Nigerian soldier who went absent without leave". Also Major Anuforo condemned Colonel Yabubu Pam, the Adjutant General and a Northern from Jos for being brutal to TIV rioters of Northern Nigeria while he was in charge of operations there, as commander of the Third Battalion ... an officer who had caused the death of so many people should be punished.⁴

The important point so far is that tribalism and nepotism, etc. are not the characteristics of the civilian circles in Nigeria only. The army bears the

same 'symbols'. Both civilian and military rules in Nigeria, since independence, face the same problems, but the ways in which they solve them are defined by the structure of the two different organisations. This does not imply that the masses, who are highly connected through the cultural and social systems of Nigeria, are not aware of their common relationship and practices.

The junior officers' coup of 1966 was regarded as a success. The exclusion of senior army officers from the coup planning committee and elimination of some of them along with top ministers was a clear indication that there were strong links between the two army ranks and ministers in the way the country was run. The 'alliance' between the two would imply that corruption could remain unchecked without a revolution. Unfortunately, the 1966 revolution was a 'representative revolution' by a handful of junior army officers and not by the masses. It could not be the masses as we have seen in Chapter Three that the nation (Nigeria) is historically divided by social, cultural, geographical and economic differences. The handful of young officers were easily rounded-up and power fell into the hands of the old enemies of unity and integration. The Nigerian crisis intensified and the nation was torn further apart by bitter civil war in which civilians played important roles.

As in the case of Indonesia, observed by Karl Jackson and Lucian Pye:

"the chief power-holders under Guided Democracy were the president, top minister and the army ... power resides with the president or minister who modulates the competition for power in both civilian and military bureaucracies."⁵

In such a political and bureaucratic network, ties between top military and civilian authorities to the exclusion of junior army officers, excessive abuse of power and office can prevail to create permanent political instability. The junior army officers who form the majority in the organisation, like the masses, would always view either the military or civilian rule with discontent.

When Buhari came to power in Nigeria in 1983, he pointed out that he took over power to avert a bloody coup from junior officers. The second point was that the civilian regime from 1979-83 was corrupt and inefficient. Then, why were those regarded as most corrupt in the civilian regime allowed to escape from the country before the 1983 coup? The undemocratic and unconstitutional relationship between top military and civilian ministers

cripple the principles of democracy in Nigeria. The situation is reinforced by personal networks of communication between kin, friends and tribesmen in power. Those outside these circles, not so much colleagues in terms of profession, rank and status, are excluded from the network. Apparently, networks of kin and tribesmen in power make it difficult for journalists to penetrate the network and expose corruption. This is one of the reasons for the lack of investigative journalism in the country. The failure of most Western writers on Nigerian and African political and communication systems has led to the unfavourable comments that African media reporters lack investigative journalism. Some think the over generality of issues is a result of lack of professional training while others conclude that it is very expensive for African journalists to embark on investigative reporting. Attempts to represent investigated and factual reports can lead to loss of job, imprisonment or even death, e.g. Delewa.

However, what was popularly believed in the 1966 coup and its popularity as 'The Morning Post' argued, was that the common man was completely disregarded in Nigeria by those in power. The nonchalant attitude of the federal government over the political crisis in Western Nigeria was another reason for the junior officers' intervention.

The new Head of State and Commander of the Nigerian Armed Forces, General Ironsi, in his speech of 24th May 1966, introduced a unitary system of government. He divided the regions into provinces and announced that a unified national civil service had been introduced. Most important of all, political parties and tribal organisations were banned. These measures were not taken kindly by the leaders of Northern Nigeria. The nation was thrown into confusion by street demonstrations in the North. Shortly afterwards a counter-coup was staged, the Head of State killed. Also thousands of his tribesmen living and working in the Northern part of the country were killed, large numbers were wounded and others returned safely to their regions in the Eastern part of the country. They returned with little which they had acquired in property after long years of service to the nation in the North; in some cases this amounted to nothing. In 1967, a civil war erupted and ended in 1970. The military remained in power for 13 years and in 1978, the ban on political parties was lifted followed soon in 1979 by a general election in which Nigerians went to the polls to elect a new president.

This thesis does not intend and has no space to discuss the civil or other military governments' activities besides those connected with the handover of the government to civilians in 1979.

After the civil war, General Gowon promised to hand over power to those he described as "duly elected representatives of the people", once it had attended to the unsolved problems "which during his regime had assumed a different domestic and international magnitude". D. Graf remarked that "like civilian government before it, the military regime of Gowon was founded in a morass of inaction, corruption and inefficiency."⁶

However, in the October 1st 1974 independence celebration nationwide broadcast, Gowon disclosed to the nation that the date of military handover to civilians had become indefinite. Both the civilian population and some sections of the army were disappointed by his speech and responded coldly to the indefinite postponement of civilian rule.

On July 29th 1975, Gowon was overthrown and Muratela Mohammed took over power in a bloodless coup. Brigadier Olusegun Obsanjo was appointed Chief of Staff Supreme Headquarters, Brigadier Theophilus Dunjuma, the Army Chief of Staff.

The short-lived regime of Muratela Mohammed was regarded by most Nigerian as the most radical and rapidly decisive regime in Nigerian military history. It aimed to seriously control corruption and abuses of power. Such ills have been closely associated with top military and civil servants in Nigeria and with them Mohammed began the 'purging' exercise as Austrian radio put it in 1975. He dismissed all former state military governors and appointed new ones who were directly accountable to Lagos Supreme Headquarters. All military officers above the rank of Brigadier were retired and about 10,000 civil servants and a number of university professors, police, state administrators and judges were forced to retire or were dismissed. Almost every sector of government apparatus was affected by the forced retirement or dismissal exercise.

Before Mohammed came to power, the strength of the Nigerian armed forces was about 250,000 and by 1979 it dropped to 180,000. Under Obasanjo, who virtually continued every policy adopted by Mohammed, a tribunal was set up which discovered corruption in high places and for the first time committees, or what were called Public Complaints Commissions (PCC) were set up at state

and national levels for the common man to hear his grievances, opinions on government policies and actions.

All these measures were taken not only to eliminate corruption but also to enable citizens to participate in nation building through exchange of information and views.

The implication of the massive retirement and dismissal of top military and civil servants was very ironic. This irony lay in the economic condition of Nigeria in the 1970s. In 1976, when oil exports, which constituted 95% of Nigerian export revenue, stood at 6,322.7 million Naira, rising to 7,969.2 million in 1977, and oil production rose from 758.1 in 1976 to 765.5 million barrels a day in 1977.⁷ With the promulgation of "Indigenization Decree", the conversion of foreign owned companies to domestic control where, at least, the managing directors should be Nigerian, meant that experienced Nigerian citizens would be needed.

These civil and military officials who were dismissed or forced to retire did not only find themselves holding more financially rewarding posts in the private sectors, but also were able to take advantage of the oil boom economy to set up their own businesses, a situation which enriched those regarded as 'corrupt and power drunk'. Most of these people belonged to or organised 'social clubs' and soon after the ban on political parties was lifted, they emerged as active party leaders, agents or organisers.

As former top military and civil servants, they had built up a network of friends, colleagues, tribesmen within and between the various administrative units which they headed or controlled before they were dismissed or forced to retire. Also, they had built up international connections during their periods of service, a situation which helped them to organise various financial 'arrangements' and to run local elections. They were particularly able to organise and win national, state and international business contracts through colleagues or those they employed in various state organisations before they retired. They acted as trusted colleagues who agreed behind the scenes on various terms for awarding government contracts. The basis of corruption and 'kick-back' was thus broadened.

Although it is believed that the 'clean up exercise' in the civil service, the judiciary, the army and the universities was apparently laudable, the process of dismissal or forced retirement by the military government has been deemed to be:

"... unable to devise a just mechanism for implementation. Too often dismissals were made solely on the advice given to the military by heads of institutions. Where the head of the institution was himself corrupt, insecure or inefficient, the system failed, merely eliminating rivals or potential rivals. There was a resultant loss of morale in the various civilian institutions in the country. Government work, hitherto seen as a secure and safe career, was now seen as a high risk occupation. With its relatively low salaries (compared to those in the private sector), government service began to lose people to the private sector and was failing to attract high-quality young recruits."⁸

This situation had a drastic effect on the entire urban village population. The fundamental and historical role of formal education beyond primary school level began to be seriously questioned and its value in the 1970s and early 1980s began to be questioned by the younger generation who wanted to get rich quick. The quality of secondary education began to drop because young people depended on what they called 'expo' to pass their First School Certificate, i.e. they were able to buy question papers before exams. Private business sectors were expanding rapidly; young school leavers and graduates began to set up their own businesses, and unfortunately, most of these businesses were import oriented, which greatly drained the nation's foreign reserves. This is because the educated group in the society clearly understood that the Nigerian population had been prone to consumption of Western made goods. Besides, they also clearly understood how inefficient Nigerian bureaucracies function; they manipulated the system so well to further their selfish interest that, within a very short period of time, untold pressure was put on Nigerian foreign exchange reserves to pay for huge imports, coupled with the drop in the price of oil. Graf commented that within this short period, most of these top well known upper echelon figures became millionaires with both huge foreign bank savings and local bank accounts.⁹

In Britain, the idea of encouraging talented men and women into government employment has been historical, for instance, the civil service and government policies. The 'Brain Drain' from Britain, particularly in the 1960s, was somehow checked. More recently Margaret Thatcher made a controversial move when she increased the salaries of top civil servants considerably to match those of their counterparts in the private sector. She argued that it was a preventive measure to stop talented civil servants leaving for more financially rewarding private sectors of the economy.

In Nigeria, the drift of the administrative and bureaucratic elite to the business and trading sector, which was previously occupied by illiterates and semi-educated groups, implies that Nigerian political, bureaucratic and private sectors are now occupied by corporate groups of elites. Consequently, corruption in high and low places became difficult to check, and pressure was put on semi-educated businessmen, traders who could no longer compete with the elites in the 'free enterprises' of Nigeria. Some of the semi-educated businessmen and traders who acquired wealth, before the elites were attracted into the sectors, still remain strong in business but, having been in the profession for a long time they employed more crude, complicated illegitimate practices in order to stay in business. The weaker groups were completely muzzled out of business and they either became exploited employees of the elite businessmen, or they remained as the army of unemployables in the city; some of them joined armed robbers, others drifted back to the villages. Before the general election of 1979, there was already a high proportion of displaced traders, unemployed young school leavers, large numbers of the so-called illegal immigrants who constituted a great danger to political campaign in a nation which, as we shall see, was characterised by political election violence.

However, the overthrow of Gowon continued to generate tension within the army. Some soldiers, claimed to be his tribesmen, eg General Bisalla and Lt. Col. B.S. Dimka, etc. on 13th February, 1976, attempted a coup d'etat in which the Head of State, Murtala Mohammed, was assassinated. The New African Year Book reported that the officers "from Benue and Plateau States ... felt they had lost power to an audience of Hausa-Fulani and Yorubas".¹⁰ Note here that the Igbos as a major tribe are not mentioned as power holders. As usual, the plotters of that coup were executed and 37 of them were involved. However before the Head of State was assassinated, he had announced that a military hand-over of power to the civilians would not exceed "a date later than October 1st, 1979". He was succeeded by his second - a Yoruba - Lt. General Obasanjo, and Brigadier Shehu Yar-Adua became second in command. They carried out all the policies laid down by Mohammed. Under them, the 49 Constitution Drafting Committee, who were appointed in September 1975, produced the first ever Nigerian Constitution after 15 years of independence - an indication of the long and lasting impact of colonialism and military intervention in Nigeria soon after independence. The Constitution was heavily criticised by a large group of the elite in Nigeria. Graf noted that by September 1976 the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) had produced a two volume report this stimulated intellectual discussion, which

he stressed:

"... immediately formed the basis for lengthy newspaper articles, television debates, expensive analysis in learned journals and heated discussions among citizen groups."¹²

In December of the same year, local government elections were conducted as a prelude to constitutional democracy in Nigeria after 13 years of military rule. Then the crucial and long awaited moment came on 21st September 1978, when the military government lifted its ban on political activities. Now the ban on political activities should not be taken to imply that political groups and activities were not going on behind the scenes. Graf observed that soon after the ban was lifted, political life in Nigeria again resumed with a vengeance; within days several political parties had been formed and by December 18th no less than 53 parties were dying for lack of support.

The facts behind the rapid formation of political parties soon after the ban was lifted have been clearly explained by Amadu Kurfi (1983:91). He believed that the formation of actual political parties began in 1970 at the end of the civil war, when Gowon promised civilian rule by 1976. He even considered that party political activities were going on during the civil war and that 'political groupings' were 'clandestinely' organised "under various guises such as leaders of thought, conferences, religious charity meetings, development associations, etc."¹⁴ Outstanding among these disguised political parties, under names of various voluntary associations, was 'Club 19' which was believed to have been made up by tycoon businessmen and women. It was believed that the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) announced its party and leadership a few hours after the ban was lifted. Although many parties were announced and registered, only five were recognised and allowed by the Federal Electoral Committee (FEDECO) to participate in the 1979 political contest. Even leaders of these parties were chosen by the Federal Electoral Committee, a decision which aims to make political parties in Nigeria more national than tribal.

One of the important implications in our study of political communication in Nigeria is its approach; this is able to reveal the structure and functioning of ethnic voluntary associations, clubs and unions as disguised or dichomatic organisations that are both political and social as different needs and situations demand in Nigeria. The empirical relationship between clubs such as the Old Igbo State Union and the NCNC before the civil war was

strong. The rural and urban networks of political communication in Igboland converge under the auspices of ethnic organisations and unions. The formation of political parties, within hours and days after the ban on political activities was lifted, emphasises the strength of the networks of communication and tribal ties in Nigerian political and social life. What is important, shown empirically in this study, is the criteria for membership of these voluntary organisations and the extent to which they form the bases for political participation and voting in a particular tribal or geographical part of Nigeria.

It is true that the army was aware of the political activities of the above mentioned voluntary organisations. We should not doubt that some top and low ranking army officers belonged to them. Most leaders of these clubs were prominent figures in the 1960-66 civilian government. The decision of the Federal Electoral Committee that "the first President of the 'new' Nigeria will be chosen from among five leading politicians of the First Republic"¹⁵, explains the influence of the older leaders in Nigerian communities under the military regimes. Such influences were maintained through ethnic social clubs. Their reinstatement as leaders of the new Nigeria effectively eliminated more radical groups of young men who would like meaningful changes in Nigerian political systems. As I shall argue later, it was tribal leadership rather than political manifestoes and party policies which formed the basis of political participation and voting in the 1979 general elections. If this was the case, and under the military government, national leadership still came from among the leaders overthrown in 1966 as 'corrupt', 'nepotic', 'swindlers', 'political profiteers', etc., it means that the cost of the military intervention, particularly the civil war, taught Nigerians few lessons. Besides the leaders of the First Republic were accused of being tribalistic, a fact which has kept Nigeria divided in many respects. This was particularly manifested by these leaders during the First Republic. There are two important levels of debate here. Either that the army, during the 13 years rule, had become as corrupt as the leaders they overthrew in 1966 and shared the same political thought and concepts, or the army had realised that 'there was no basis for unity' as Gowon disclosed, because of sharp ethnic differences, then continued to pay lip service to the notion of political unity and integration in Nigeria.

If any of these arguments hold true, it means that in the 1979 general elections the army knew to whom they were handing over power and the pluralistic ignorance of the public (masses) led them to believe that a

democratic process was taking place in Nigeria. The army handover of power from the restrictive policies of FEDECO was perhaps an experimental exercise in which they wanted either the former political leaders to have a second chance, or they knew that the names Zik, Awolowo, Aminu Kanu and the Shehu Sharagri, for Saduna of Sokoto, were ethnic political symbols that could only command political response along ethnic rather than national lines. Once these leaders were reintroduced as new political leaders in the 'new' Nigeria, the pattern of participation and voting in 1959 reoccurred in the 1979 elections. The army knew this well in advance. Kurfi (undated) on empirical comparison of the 1959 and 1979 general elections concluded that:

"There was a strong ethnic bias or block voting during both 1959 and 1979 elections, though in both years some political parties managed to achieve a breakthrough by securing an appreciable number of votes and parliamentary seats outside their traditional strongholds;"

He further discovered in that study

"that there was a close association between the political parties that contested the 1959 elections and those that emerged to contest the 1979 poll, such 'nexus' being provided by certain individuals that were prominent in the 'affairs' of the 1959 political parties and their alleged off-shoots in 1979;"

In conclusion, Kurfi stated:

"that despite the national integrative provisions of the 1977 Electoral Decree, or any other legal or administrative stipulations, ethnic voting persisted in the country."

Similarly, NJM Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson's "Five Elections in Africa", 1960 showed statistically that elections in Nigeria are influenced by ethnic support and sentiments.

Although the above statements reveal a pattern of political participation in Nigeria - ethnic politics - it fails to tell us what political changes occur or are likely to take place with a unique ethnic group in Nigeria. Often, the study of ethnic politics in Nigeria does not exceed the level of confrontation between major tribes and the roles of minority ethnic groups within them. Earlier, I have argued that changes in the socio-economic system have a direct effect on the political system, e.g. education, vertical and horizontal labour mobility, modern social organisations, etc.

Both the major and minor tribes contain elements of these socio-economic changes which affect the new political system. Until we understand how different groups, in any given tribe or community, utilise these elements to shape the contemporary political system in Nigeria, our understanding of political participation and voting patterns and of political analysis will remain static and engulfed with ethnic generality. In looking at communication system, we transcend ethnic analysis to groups political participation so that when two powerful political leaders emerge from one ethnic group, such as Ojukwu vs Zik in Igboland, we begin to understand political changes in terms of different groups' support.

For instance, the argument that FEDECO guided the parties' activities and the election of 1979 was based on the Committee's strict rules which stipulated the new constitution regarding general elections. Yet in this basic framework, it only reflected the political, social and economic interest of one section in the community - the elite group. Ofonagoro et al citing Oni write:

"O. Oni argues that the report of the Constitution Drafting Committee is elitest oriented. Also ... Dr. Adele Jinadu argues that 'the CDC's espousal of a mixed economy is nothing more than to say that it is incumbent on the state to provide a socio-economic and political environment favourable to the propertied and entrepreneurial class. Like Hobbe's Leviathan, the state then becomes an agent of this class whose business interest it must promote and protect. All talk (politics) social objectives and fundamental rights is embellishment, mystification.'"¹⁶

Two important political forces in Nigeria have emerged beyond the transitional conception of tribal politics:

- a) the new economic social systems, particularly the role of education has produced a new elite class with a new orientation to politics;
- b) a national constitution has been established which legitimates both the military and civil elite classes. Particularly, with the civil elite, the constitution protects their interest.

These new forms, nevertheless, do not remove ethnic political forces in Nigeria. But all of them influence politics, participation and voting.

As we have seen in chapter 4, the mass media developed along ethnic political party lines which, in turn, have been dominated by the political elites.

Because of the combined impact of ethnic association, elite interest, social relationships on political participation and voting, it is difficult to discuss the impact of a general election such as the first TV election (1979) in terms of the role of media only. Other factors should be considered as well.

In the 1979 general elections we do not have enough data to compare the relationship between communication networks and the identified network groups. We should only therefore, in this chapter, study the tendencies of the 1979 general elections and consider briefly what were the factors that influenced and shaped them in relation to communication networks or channels. From the theoretical discussion so far presented in this thesis, it appears that mass media and communication are an essential part of Nigerian politics. In particular, the 1976/77 Nigerian constitution virtually guaranteed the independent roles of the media, particularly the press. Freedom of movement, of social, economic and political relationships, freedom of speech were fully guaranteed - important aspects of human political communication. Richard Adeniyi noted that:

"One of the good things that the 1979 constitution did was the separation of powers between the executive, the legislature and judiciary. It detailed the functions and roles of public departments, the bureaucracy, the police, the military etc. It defined the obligations, duties and limitations of individuals and institutions - the press, the political parties, religion, etc. But the conduct of persons who made up these bodies is another matter."¹⁷

Adeniyi has made some crucial points here. The constitution, law and order, bills, etc. may set out some sound principles, but the ways in which they are practically applied in the society are different as determined by the actors (a process which in the Nigerian context demands that clear relationship between individuals or groups and the institutions be defined). It is their definitions and separation that help us to understand the structure of communication and relationships between them. Adeniyi's view also implies that, though the constitution separates these power structures so as to allow free political information, participation and decision making processes, the Nigerian presidential system was more of an experimental exercise. Its meaning and function as a political system stops at certain individual or group political needs. Corruption, in other words, is the central weakness of the Nigerian political system and its practices. He, then, laments that:

"The first major scandal against the presidential system was the alleged disappearance of 2.8 billion oil revenue. This allegation generated a lot of controversies but at the end was squashed by the authorities themselves."¹⁸

Hence, the weakness of the nation consequently undermines the effectiveness of its institutions, particularly the mass media and communication in politics. The role of the media in the 1979 general elections has been exaggerated by many Nigerian and foreign writers. It is possible that some of the inaccuracy could have originated from problems of access to data.

My own attempts to collect data in 19783 from the 1979 elections were met with difficulties.

- a) I was told that there was no space to store past broadcasts material.
- b) Because of shortage of funds, video and radio cassettes, tapes etc. were wiped and used again.
- c) I had to obtain special permission from the Minister of Information before I could obtain what was available - although he could not be reached, however. Different broadcasting houses/institutions gave different reasons for not providing these items.

However, the 1979 election, despite the important roles of radio and press, was generally named the TV election. As we have discussed the development of TV in Nigerian in earlier chapters, we shall now evaluate its role in that election.

A special studio was set up at Tafawa Belawa Square, Lagos, 'code named' "Verdict '79" at a cost of about N50,000 (about £45,000). According to one commentator, the actual cost of the election coverage by the media during that election was never made known to the public! All the same, the main objective of "Verdict '79" was to ensure impartial election coverage to all the five parties involved.

"The committee charged with the arrangement resolved to ensure objective coverage, enhanced television credibility by balanced and impartial treatment of issues."¹⁹

'The Nigerian Times' noted that while the political parties were extraordinarily busy organising themselves, the mass media and television, in particular, were preparing the public to participate in elections quite

different from the ones that took place before the 1966 coup. In my preliminary study of that election, I observed that television ...

"... employed a variety of programmes to keep the public abreast with all the political changes and development."²⁰

I noted that what was most impressive about TV coverage of the 1979 general election was that most of the political programmes were created in cheap news and current affairs format. Experts in different walks of life were invited to speak on special programmes, such as 'Toward Civil Rule', 'Hot Seat', etc. These were forms of political education and socialisation by a viable medium. Media professionals and politicians assumed that after 13 years of military rule, the public had lost its sense of political democracy. We recall from chapter one that one of the main factors of change in Nigeria since 1966 is increased urbanisation and huge population growth. Thus, for the first time, the highest percentage of the population were expected to go to the polls. Both those who had participated in the pre-199 coup election and the new participants in elections had to learn about the new system from the audio/visual medium. Counting on these factors, media professionals and politicians assumed the all importance of TV for the 1979 general elections.

However, whether these views could justify the huge amount spent on TV for these general elections remains a critical question to investigate. Ikwan U. Erotu has argued that:

"The political culture of Nigerians generally cannot be said to be impressive. The apathy which every average Nigerian has for politics has its off-shoot from the manner the game of politics is played by its practitioners in Nigeria ... political education and enlightenment was more positive and successful during colonial days. Political emancipation and independence, being the one and only goal, has been attributed to be the underlying factor for the general political awareness in Nigeria especially in the South in those days."²¹

Erotu's 'average Nigerian' refers to urban and rural elites in our categorical network group, the elite I have previously argued are mainly city dwellers. It is this group who also can afford to own television sets. If the group who own TV sets are apathetic to politics in Nigeria, it is difficult to support the view that TV has a strong political impact on Nigerians. Another important remark by Erotu is on the relationship between politics in Nigeria in the colonial days and today. By implication, what

Erotu is pointing out is that, since independence, Nigerians have been misled by the ruling political elites on what should be understood by politics and political participation. He states clearly then that the educated class - he called 'campus politicians' - did not register for voting because they knew what was happening. In his words:

"Our privileged social class cannot be exonerated from political lethargy and indifference which has entrenched itself in the entire populace."

On the basis of political indifference by the Nigerian articulate elites, because of the way the game is played, greedy and selfish political elites have taken an upper hand in the game. This group relatively exploits both the urban and rural politically ignorant. Erotu went on to explain that the politically ignorant cannot see the "difference between the capitalist - NPN and the self styled socialist - UPN, the Welfarist - NPP"²² and believes that PRP has no revolutionary politics. If this is true of Nigerian politicians and the electorate, what is the latter's incentive for political participation and voting? Erotu provides some of the answers. He argues that the political elites and the information directorates in Nigeria prefer public ignorance in politics so that the masses would not understand and question party manifestos and policies. He maintains that politicians have been quite contemptible in their ignoble role of selling to the public the most unpopular government policies and vindictive actions against political opponents. The ordinary man in the street is never told how a particular government policy will affect him.²⁴ He correctly argues that it is the role of the media to educate the public but he unfortunately forgets that the media, particularly radio and TV, are controlled by the same greedy political elite as much as he fails to note that the poor or the masses cannot organise themselves without the leadership of those 'campus politicians' who are apathetic to Nigerian politics. Some of the educated class do not want to take risks in their own country in order to make it a better place. They may be as discredited as the greedy and corrupt political elites.

Erotu notes that the 1979 general elections brought in a new dimension to Nigerian political communication and advocated that young graduates and school leavers, who are unemployed and frequently move from village to city or between cities, should help to educate the masses on political issues. This, indeed, is a clear insight into relation and interaction in Nigeria

where interpersonal communication is a crucial element in the dissemination of political information. The Nigerian Youth Corps Service should plan a long term programme of rural and urban political education by graduates - a process that would eliminate corrupt political campaigns and ethnic based politics.

The suggestion by Erotu is that the media coverage of the 1979 general elections relatively separated rural from urban political participation in its election coverage. This is because the programmes, such as 'Towards Civil Rule', 'Hot Seat' and other debates exclusively covered by 'Verdict '79' in Lagos could not reach all parts of the country. Radio could broadcast such programmes to remote villages, but the effectiveness of the campaign by the media could be covered by interpersonal communication if similar radio and TV broadcasts could be directed to the rural population through organised youth and school leavers. This stops certain politicians using relatives and kinship networks of relationship to exploit the masses by misrepresenting the issues of the general elections.

It was noted in the 1979 general elections that broadcasters were neutral to TV political debates, and the politicians obeyed the rules 'laid down by TV men'. This is more indicative of the domination of the army in that election than anything else. The political sphere that granted the media effective neutrality was, therefore, the military government which was operating relatively differently from the media and the political party system. Edoaga-Ugwuoju strongly stated this point that:

"The 1979 electoral campaigns and the elections were relatively fairly covered ... because the army was still in control and ... because of the uncertainty about which party would win control, equal time was given to all registered political parties by the Nigerian Television Authority. This even-handed coverage obtained in the state radio corporations."²⁵

This is a situation similar to S. Hall et al's observation with British politics that in media coverage of political issues, their role "... is determined in the long run or last instance by the political apparatus, operating through another level of the state."²⁶

As we shall see with the 1983 general elections, as soon as the level of political party and media control for political broadcast were submerged, partisan and sectional political interest dominated network broadcasts.

Edoga noted that, in the first year of Shagari's government, federal-controlled media became a propoganda tool for NPN. He went on to say that this fact was evident not only in the content of the news but in its slant. Adversaries were either blocked out of the news or given the type of coverage that did little to enhance their image. In some instances, advertising space was even refused to political adversaries by the Nigerian Television Authority.²⁷

However, my viewpoint about that election is not so much the impartiality of the coverage, but the extent to which the general Nigerian public participated in it through media broadcasts. The balanced programmes and debates only catered for the few urban citizens. What TV did was what Anthony Smith observed in the 1974 British general election's coverage that the:

"discussion programme or debate, which is presumed to present a balanced presentation of argument, carried with it an aura of having been transported from the real scene of political battle into the studio."²⁸

Similarly, the Nigerian in the 1979 general elections, the New Times commented, did relish watching live the heated and rousing arguments which many political party representatives strained their nerves to present. Even the occasional cool-headed presentation of party programmes gave the audience a feeling of being present at election campaigns, especially when pictures of rallies were also shown.²⁹

I have observed elsewhere (Mgbemere, 1982) that NTV Lagos particularly presented 'actuality' and documentary films that showed slums, housing and transport problems in Lagos, which drew the attention of the viewers to problem areas that required political actions. I pointed out, therefore, that the media role in this sense was to enlighten the public on social, economic problems which could only be solved through political decision and policies. Further suggestions were made that such issues could be a major content of party political manifestos and policies to attract voters. The actual programmes made the debate that accompanied them real political drama and the audience were captivated.³⁰

Nevertheless as a drama, it was only politically entertaining, or for watching or self identification among the urban population. The actual reports were persistently centred on city matters while the problems of the

rural population, which constituted the higher percentage of the Nigerian electorate, were not reported by the television. This is a common problem of television coverage of political and social issues, where too much coverage is given to urban questions and world events, because of their appeal to elites who own TV sets and live and work in the city and not in the rural areas.

Even to the city audience, it is argued that time constraints on TV structure and broadcasting not only give the audience a generalised view of the political system, the politicians themselves and how they govern. The constraint on TV imposes a high degree of impartiality which in turn could be a constraint upon the ability of the viewer or the electorate to understand clearly the political events that were for the first time going on through television. I have argued that this constraint is also reflected in the neglect of coverage of rural problems, which kept the urban, as well as rural populations, unaware of existing socio-political problems in other parts of the nation. In this sense, television helped to create pluralistic political and social ignorance because of time constraints. More coverage of world events in news and current affairs divert citizens away from more domestic pressing needs.

In particular with the 1979 general election, I observed that some of the political debates and 'actuality' programmes were slotted together. The verbal and visual images at various interpretative levels were anchored together. This could have been immensely confusing and politically incomprehensible to large numbers of the Nigerian audience who were not familiar with political television. In such a situation, Anthony Smith explains that:

"The expectation of impartiality as a pressurised constraint within broadcast content might itself affect the audience's willingness to vote or not to participate in the electoral process. An audience cannot be influenced by a medium which is visibly constrained; it can be entertained and informed, but it is less likely to be persuaded if it is constantly reminded that the forms in which communications occur are somehow pre-arranged precisely to prevent the audience feeling the full impact."³¹

In Nigeria, quite unlike the observation made by Anthony Smith in the British political audience, the latter would not refrain from participation "in the electoral process" because alternative means of political relationship and information flow exist based on tribal or kinship systems.

The audience would, in TV political broadcasts, fail to grasp the apparent aim of the political programme, political speeches, policies, manifestos, etc., which could be evaluated to form the basis of demand on the politicians by the electorate. Amidst the confused visual and verbal TV presentations, the political programmes become a mere medium of entertainment. The Nigerian city audience would then resort to pre-1966 motives for political participation, tribal sentiments, characterised by personality identification rather than on political issues. In this case, the political effect of TV broadcasts on the urbanites would be no different from the effect on the rural population who neither owned TV sets, nor watched it for political information. Their tribal political leaders represented to them the same type of identification as to the urbanites. Consequently, the voting patterns of the urban dwellers and villages follow the ethnic line. In other words, the network groups, in terms of their differences and the way the media covered the election issues, could not vote differently. Political issues were badly presented so that they could not appeal to different network groups to influence their voting behaviour.

Roger and Kincaid (1981:312) have argued that, in network studies, attempts are made to discover communication network stability, i.e. the degree to which a network link occurs at two or more points in time. In the TV network of political broadcast, the content should link different groups in different political environments, rural and urban, so that participation would be based on the content of the broadcast, either as direct effect, or mediated effect via opinion leaders, bridges or 'liaisons'. It is in this process that different responses and reactions to issues are presented by the political leaders to influence groups. In so doing, the influence of the leader and his support base solely on the ethnic understanding of political issues would be minimised. What would stand out to be crucial was the leader's convincing presentation of his manifestos and policies which could sound sufficiently meaningful and convincing enough to solve certain socio-economic and political problems if elected to power.

I concluded in reference to the 1979 so-called 'first television election' that it was the failure of politicians to present their package, as argued above, and the inability of the media profession to create such formats that would compel politicians to present their election package that partly contributed to ethnic voting. I asserted that television was used only for information which, politically in terms of voting, was ineffective. Its main function was for entertainment and identification restrictively in the cities.

The cost of temporary studio for 'Verdict '79', was about £45,000; the other 19 stations throughout the federation also cost state and federal governments dear; the politicians themselves knew that their impact on the population would be much less. They had to exploit the traditional voting based on ethnicity.

"In the campaign preceding the 1979 general elections, the Nigerian's Peoples Party was portrayed as representing the interest of the Igbo-speaking peoples of Nigeria within the Nigerian body politic. The winning argument then was that if the Igbos, of the country's three major ethnic groups, were to be freed from the political, economic and bureaucracy emasculation which had resulted from the civil war, then it was of overriding importance for all the people to join together and present a powerful pressure group who could negotiate successfully on their behalf at the federal level."

The argument further states that:

"The propaganda was that the Unity Party of Nigeria was a Yoruba party, while the Great Nigerian Peoples Party, the ... National Party of Nigeria, and the Peoples Redemption Party were all Hausa/Fulani parties."³²

The appendix below shows how different states voted for the 1979 general elections. The figures show that the relationships between political parties, ethnic groups and actual voting in the presidential elections were very strong. In this situation, therefore, we should agree with Harrison, particularly in the network of political communication where alternative networks, outside the media, are operative, that:

Television may inform or reinforce attitudes, but it rarely converts."³³

However, this table does not show us, as I have argued above, whether there were differences or not in the way the urban media audience and the rural audience voted as a result of media political content. The similarity between the urban and rural voting, despite differences in the amount of exposure to media, particularly TV in the cities, is shown below. I have chosen four states from three different regional and tribal groups. In each, a major city and a rural population is chosen. Similarly, the pattern of voting in cities and villages tend strongly towards ethnic lines.

If this was the case with the 1979 general elections, as statistics have supported, what were the merits of mass media and, in particular, televisions's claim to be the medium that governed these elections?

In my opinion (Mgbemere, E., 1982:9), the format and regulations imposed on TV by the military government contributed to the apparent merit of TV in these elections. I reported that in these elections all TV stations were required by the Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) to stay open on the days of any of the five elections until the final results were broadcast. There were immediate 'on the spot' reports in the form of news about elections, events, 'facts and figures' and names of candidates who won or lost. Brief comments were made, the results were given. Still photographs of the candidates in question were displayed and some of the candidates who lived near Lagos and who could reach there on time by air or road were invited to make some guided comments about their victory. Care was taken not to provoke the losers.

Another TV broadcasting format, again cheaply produced, in these elections was the current affairs programme in which the election panorama, with the seemingly familiar news characteristics of impartiality, balance and objectivity prevailed. In news and current affairs, the majority of Nigerians could not distinguish the differences. In the election period, the audience was more interested in the results of the election. In these elections too, it was observed that TV programmes on news and current affairs were concerned with probation and the exploration of the basic aims of the military government's attitude to the hand-over of power to civilian rule. In all mass media networks, this basic idea of the military remained the central concern. As we shall see from the summaries of some news talks from Imo State Broadcast (ISB) now IBC - the Imo Broadcasting Corporation - in 1979, there were only warnings and recapping of the 1966 events.

The 'aims' of the military were imposed on the media professionals; time constraint was another limiting factor. The pressure for impartiality on media professionals, who were already biased with their semi-skilled and unskilled professionalism to cover presidential elections for the first time via TV in a system different from what has ever been obtained in an African state was an 'immensely painful task'.

In a highly advanced political system, the process of impartiality in a general election has never been achieved. In the British general election

of 1974, Anthony Smith observed that:

"Of course, great pains are taken to separate news bulletins from the strict application of the rubric of impartiality; comment is a deliberately balanced set of 'values', but the total machinery of broadcasting has now become so important to electoral activity that distinction tends to be obliterated under the sheer weight of the overall necessity to balance."³⁴

In the 1979 general election, impartiality, balance and objectivity by the media were psychologically out of party political and physiological system and the media profession and institution, but with the army.

Such control and constraint extended to radio and some of the broadcasts of the 1979 elections, obtained during the fieldwork in Imo State, are presented to support the argument (see Appendix 5).

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PART TWO

THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS:

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO IMO STATE

CHAPTER EIGHT

METHODS OF STUDY

1. INTRODUCTION

My method in this study is innovative in comparison with other recent political communication studies in Nigeria. Foremost in all the methods I used was active participant observation before, during, and after the 1983 General Election in both rural and urban environments. This is a process I regarded as essential in the analysis of political communication in a transition society where traditional and modern systems are seemingly converging.

2. THE CHOICE OF METHOD

The aim of the research is to discover the structure of political communication in contemporary politics in Nigeria with particular reference to the 1983 general elections. But in examining contemporary political communication, there is often a tendency to concentrate heavily on mass media. Consequently, the role of rural political communication systems with inherent traditional features is often treated partially or totally ignored. In my view, such an approach would leave a lacuna in Nigerian political communication studies.

Thus my investigation, in order to fill the gap, took cognisance of the two different environments acting upon the national general elections. The method therefore investigates the total-systems in both urban and rural areas. Though it presents peculiar problems, the approach offers an immense and rare chance to gain insight into the actual political communication structure in Nigeria. Its uniqueness lies in the opportunity it offers to assess the importance, strength, weakness and validity of formal, informal, modern and traditional institutions, organisations and communication channels in Nigerian politics at the election period.

3. GENERAL PREPARATION FOR THE FIELDWORK

Before my first trip to Nigeria in the early part of 1983, for preliminary investigations, I decided to renew contacts by correspondence with several institutions, individuals, organisations, friends and relatives who helped me during my survey of the 1979 general elections in Nigeria. I informed them about my current research orientation and also requested their advice. My previous experience in fieldwork in Nigeria and many discussions with Dr. J.B. Ford and Dr. R.A. White helped me to decide in which part of Nigeria to carry out the investigation.

4. THE CHOICE OF GEOGRAPHICAL LOCALITIES FOR THE FIELDWORK

During my M.A. fieldwork studies, most of the institutions and individuals I contacted for the information I needed came from Imo State, particularly at Aba and Owerri. Very little investigation was carried out in the villages - a serious gap between that work and this study. In other words, some one-sided urban centred information and materials on political communications in Nigeria had already been accumulated prior to the 1983 fieldwork.

Owerri (the capital of Imo State) and Eziama (a town with a rural population from eight villages) seemed the most suitable sites for the study:

- a) Owerri is a typical urban centre with a population of about 409,464 (population of Imo State by Localities 1976-1984). It fulfills all the major criteria of a heterogeneous urban population in Nigeria and with all the necessary formal and informal organisations and institutions. All the major ethnic groups, though in widely different proportions, are represented. State and Federal controlled media institutions are established in Owerri, and the seven political parties had their offices in the city.
- b) On the other hand, Eziama, with a population of just over 5,000 people, is a typical hinterland Igbo rural town. Several of its traditional institutions still exist. However, modern institutions and organisations have gradually gained entrance into the community since the colonial period and their impacts have left unmistakable marks. Some of these establishments are schools, colleges, different Christian denominations, clinics, police station, Federal Government

post office. Modern transport systems connect the town with other towns in Ikeduru and with Owerri township - which is only twelve miles west of the town. From the town, TV broadcasts from Owerri ITV and NTA are also clearly received.

Perhaps the most important advantage of the choice of Eziama and Owerri for this study is my 'natural' or natal membership of the communities, particularly the former. It was there that I grew up and received my primary education and all the generations of my family have always lived in one of the villages in this town (Umuopara). At Owerri I received part of my secondary education and many of my relatives, friends and school-mates live and work there. Thus my environments for the research in all respects are familiar grounds.

In political communication research the fieldworker could encounter untold difficulties if he chose an unfamiliar ground to study in Nigeria. It is necessary for him to belong to the linguistic and cultural communities he wishes to investigate. Where otherwise, the researcher in Nigeria tends to avoid rural populations and concentrate on urban systems. I did not intend to fall into this trap.

5. ENTERING THE FIELDWORK WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESEARCH

With my past experience and 'natural' membership of the research locality, Dr. White and Dr. J.B. Ford suggested that I should do more background reading, attend seminars and lectures on political philosophy, communications and research methods. I also spent several hours a week at the BBC External Audience Research Unit in London where I obtained current information on the preparation for the general elections in Nigeria. Dr. G. Mytton allowed me access to the Summary of World Broadcasts Part 4: The Middle East, Africa and Latin America which contained major summaries of daily radio broadcasts from Nigeria. Also other information arrived regularly from friends, relatives, etc. in Nigeria.

I also opened contacts with The Nigeria Daily Times, The National Concord, The Punch, etc. offices in London where I collected various Nigerian dailies. Other sources of information about the election preparation and the mood of the Nigerian public were exploited, so that before I left for Nigeria I was well informed about the elections.

While I was there I was constantly in touch with Dr. J.B. Ford through letters (and a few telephone calls) to seek her advice on various issues arising on fieldwork. She was kept aware of the problems on a regular basis. Most of the problems were precipitated by the division between Igbo leaders, which affected various institutions in the urban and rural areas. Even personal relationships were equally affected. The conflicts created widespread suspicions which I found most embarrassing, even among old friends and close relatives. Under these circumstances, formal institutions such as Radio, TV and daily newspapers made it very difficult for me to collect data from the establishments. I offered several explanations, authenticated my words with "To Whom It May Concern" letters from J.B. Ford, International Student's Identity Card, and yet not all the authorities in these institutions were willing to co-operate.

I resisted the temptation to identify myself with any political party or groups actively involved in politics, despite pressures from relatives and friends to do so. If I had done so, people's suspicions as to the aim of my research would have been justified, and I would have found it impossible to obtain information from individuals, organisations or institutions who belong to, or are identified with, the opposite political camp. I was in a very difficult position in this respect. My family in the village, and relatives and friends who live in the city, were divided between NPP and NPN. Thus I could afford to remain a political party neutralist yet obtained the necessary information about political activities freely from friends and relatives.

6. THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF THE FIELDWORK

Most of the early part of the days were spent in the city and I returned to the villages later in the day. This was because people in the city and the villages are involved in different activities. The best time to capture political campaign activities in the villages in Igboland is in the evening when most people return from the farm. Within this period, I noted that many villagers have become very sensitive to political matters and even tended to resent their close kinfolk who had sympathy for another party. I had now found myself investigating the most sensitive, emotional and conflict-ridden election campaign ever in Igbo politics. Consequently I minimized overt political identification with any person, group or organisation in the village. I visited many people in their homes, spending

the evening together in their 'compound'. Our conversations began with social and economic issues which I deliberately raised, but gradually shifted entirely to politics. I knew that this would be the case and often I allowed them to lead the conversation towards this direction, but I made sure that I shaped the content of the conversation so as to obtain the crucial aspect I wanted - the pattern of political information flow.

Most people in the village were interested to hear stories about Britain and I was rather glad to tell them, at the same time concentrating on politics and communication in Britain during elections and how people are influenced to vote. In the light of this conversation, people revealed abundant and vital information on how they participated and also how others did in various villages during the 1983 elections. The information helped me considerably to design my questionnaire. In order to minimise suspicion, I visited the families with a group of young people and while we moved from one village to another, our number moderately increased. I made sure that those who had very strong political party affiliation did not join us. Their presence might create tension within the group and at the same time upset those we visited. Also I contained the size of the group to a number that would not be an embarrassment to our hosts - always between four and six. The majority came from the host village.

We were offered 'kola' and drinks and allowed to stay with each family for as long as we wanted, but bearing in mind the purpose of the visit, I made sure we did not overstay our welcome. Often we were invited to come again. A few villages were invited in turn to my 'compound'. Before we dispersed, I instructed the group to explain to the men, women and young people in their village the purpose of my research, emphasising that I had no particular political party interest. I was simply trying to write a book about Nigerian politics which our future generations would read. Within a short period of time the news about my project spread throughout the villages and many people invited me to their 'compound' to tell me stories about Nigerian politics. The response was amazing. Some of the villagers, particularly the moderately-educated, were very shrewd and wished to know with which political party I shared my sympathy. But I simply explained to them that a political communication writer should not identify with any party, otherwise he would not produce an objective report which could help solve some of the community or national problems. They agreed. In addition my mother, as a leader of a moderately large number of village women, helped to inform her group that among her children and other close relatives, I was the only one

who had not shown interest for any particular party. She pointed out that she had failed to persuade me to join her party, and indeed it was so. Soon the news of my political party neutrality was no more in doubt in the villages and I became an arbitor between friends, relatives, etc. from my village and the other villages whose relationships have been badly affected by the election. This was another important position I just acquired during the fieldwork which not only offered me a wealth of deep knowledge into the heart of the matter, but enriched my understanding of Igbo politics.

Furthermore, the close-knit structure of relationships in the villages which I clearly understand made it very easy for me to verify information. Every, or rather most, of the people approached were by now confident that any information about the political activities of the people would not be used by me to the detriment of anyone. My leadership as the President of Eziama Students Union before I left for Britain for further education also began to yield some positive results. People understood that I have always identified myself with the course of the twon and therefore felt confident and free to speak to me about the elections and gave vital information which otherwise would have been difficult to guess.

7. SOME MARGINAL COSTS FOR THE INFORMATION OBTAINED

There were four main levels of direct information gathering in the villages:

- a) From those I visited in their homes
- b) From those who specially invited me into their homes
- c) From those who visited me at my home
- d) From those I came across on a daily basis.

The major cost in obtaining political information from a community so homogenous and firmly established on close-knit relationships is time. There was a very strong tendency to move from political discussion to details about the social, cultural and economic situation of the individual and the whole community. Some even, particularly the older people, went on and on to tell me stories about my great grandparents, whom I never saw.

With some people it was nearly impossible to eliminate all traces of suspicion about the motive of my research. Some would not understand why I had come from London to do fieldwork in the villages. They thought it was

unimportant and too expensive an exercise. Others wondered why I could not do it in Lagos or other big cities where these 'big' men and politicians should tell me what they were doing. I had to work through secondary and university students to do more explanations to the villagers about my research. Fortunately, these students were on 'short break' at this time. In return I paid them money, some requested that I should pay for their correspondence courses in the UK because of foreign exchange problems, others requested some text books which were not available in Nigeria, while the majority asked for nothing at all but were all too happy to help.

A different approach was used to obtain information in the city (Owerri) mainly because of the nature of human socio-political activities akin to city life. Meetings were formal and mainly within organised institutions.

8. SOME MAJOR RESEARCH PARADIGMS - DATA COLLECTION

The prevailing political situation in Nigeria required some specific approaches to data collection. Though I had varieties of options as a member of the community I was investigating, nothing had to be taken for granted. Rigorous investigation was called for at every stage of the fieldwork.

Major tools of data collection ranged from the socio-anthropological method to the development of phases for the collection, which were conceptualised in terms of the changing attitude and situation in Nigeria during the election. Also I left open alternative sources of data collection should any 'unusual', e.g. army take-over, or other 'unexpecteds' occur during and immediately after the elections, so that the research which had cost so much at this stage would not be drastically altered or abandoned altogether.

A socio-anthropological approach was central to my participant observation. This was not strictly the same as those used by anthropologists and ethnographers such as Malinowski, Mead, Bott, Mitchell, etc., through continuous residence with the communities under study for a reasonable length of time. Mine, however, was in line with theirs in terms of recording events as they occurred and some active participation in the communities' involvements. Bearing in mind that my research is network orientated and that the basic frame is that modern and traditional systems are converging, active participant observation in order to understand the structure of

interactions remained crucial at all stages of the fieldwork. In particular, the underlying factors of influence for participation and voting by the electorate would only be understood by the fieldworker through participant observation.

The dramatic and unexpected changes in people's attitudes, intergroup and intragroup alliances, tension and conflicts, formed the core of the political communication. Thus it was difficult to design a fixed or prearranged mode of observation. My membership of the community gave me unlimited opportunity to establish different territories of participant observation on a daily basis. In different situations I was able to discover different facts about how Nigerians particularly communicate at election time. Indeed, it was during this fieldwork that I realised that networks of kinship, friendship and group or club alliances are paramount in the understanding of political communication in Nigeria - an approach strongly recommended by Dr. White before I departed for the fieldwork.

While I took particular interest in how families, relatives etc. interact during an election period, I also renewed my membership of different clubs and voluntary organisations in my village and in the town. The 'Udo Nna' of Eziama club which was founded on Jan 1st 1982 had disintegrated amidst the prevailing political conflicts. Within its short life it was the most elegant, most powerful, most attractive and foremost, the most elitist union in the above town. I was one of the founders and I had every opportunity to discover why it had disintegrated. By interviewing its members, I discovered that the unity of the club was in serious jeopardy as a result of different political party identification by its members. I extended my investigation to other clubs, unions and voluntary organisations in the villages and Owerri, and discovered that they were equally affected by the political conflicts. Hence organisations such as these became an important dimension in this network of political communication research.

9. ADMINISTERING THE FIRST QUESTIONNAIRE

From experience gained so far in the field, the new pattern of political communication in Igboland became abundantly clear.

The first questionnaire was divided into five sections:

- 1) Demographic
- 2) Social
- 3) Political
- 4) Communication and mass media
- 5) Issues of concern and major influence

The trial questionnaire encountered major problems. Large numbers of the respondents avoided the open-ended and overtly political questions. Also there were a considerable number of missing observations in the demographic section, presumably because the respondents did not want to report about themselves, their families and other personal background because of widespread suspicions surrounding the election campaign. Also because many villagers are not educated, they were prepared to say much about the election, as long as I did not write down what they said about politics.

However, when they saw the questionnaire papers, there were rumours that I was employed by one political party or the other, or the British government, to investigate the election. Some concluded that I was paid a lot of money to do the job and therefore I must pay them something if they answered any question. If I had done so their rumour would have been justified. At this time I withdrew the questionnaires and began to concentrate on scheduled interviews with government officials, top businessmen, club leaders, media professionals, recording radio and TV political broadcasts, and collecting newspapers and other journals about the election.

Scheduled interviews encountered even more problems than the questionnaire administration in village and city. Those I approached for interview refused to make comments that could be substantiated with political communication realities as I observed them. With some, appointments were confirmed for interviews but when I went to see them, they were either out and others simply told me that they had thought about my request and had changed their mind. At this time fieldwork had become a most frustrating and an agonizing venture.

Under this situation I organised a large number of students from different villages to carry out another phase of propaganda on my behalf. While I was concentrating more in the city, they were busy convincing their relatives that my intention was a genuine one. This was essential for the second administration of the questionnaire which would be the most important data for the research. In the city some institutions, however, responded well

after Dr. J.B. Ford sent official and personal letters to them. By the middle of June, I returned to London for personal consultation with my supervisors. Details of the problems encountered in the field were discussed and special attention was paid to the prevailing conflicts, suspicions, corruptions, and absolute media bias in the election campaign.

Under these circumstances, I was instructed not to stay away from Nigeria but to return and take up more active participant observation on the whole process. As people were unwilling to be interviewed, and unsatisfactorily filled in the sample questionnaire, institutional and organisational authorities became less co-operative in allowing me access to official documents, I embarked on informal political discussions which at this time had been explored in detail but authenticating materials were badly needed.

After the two major elections - Presidential and State Governorship (Gubernatorial) - were over, the nature of the vote results clearly indicated a major disturbance or return to military rule. I decided to return to the UK in August 1983, after seven months and I was confident that my past experiences and participant observation were enough to analyse political communication in Nigeria.

As I correctly suspected, the military came back soon after the election. As usual, the public rejoiced and voiced their condemnation of Shagari's government as the most corrupt civilian rule. Now another opportunity had come, more conducive to questionnaire administration. But on the other hand, many institutions were probed by the military and in the early part of the probation and military take over, these establishments destroyed some essential broadcasting documents and particularly tapes. In general, the probing exercise by the army made data even more difficult to collect in formal institutions but relatively easy among individual respondents because everyone was particularly critical of the civilian government.

10. ADMINISTERING THE SECOND AND POST ELECTIONS QUESTIONNAIRE

Shortly after the 1983 military take-over I returned to Nigeria. The second questionnaire was designed from the wealth of experience gained during the election campaign. There were 153 cases which were distributed in the city and villages. Among the eight villages in Eziama, at least 8-10 people were interviewed from each. They were selected in order to give a good spread on

age, education and occupation. In the city a similar method was adopted but care was taken not to concentrate on one area of the city. Federal and State Ministries were chosen to represent the ethnic composition of the city. 'Quarters' in the city where minority ethnic groups live were investigated.

In order to avoid elitist data collection in the city, I also interviewed market women, men and street hawkers. Self-employed men and women outside the marketing occupation were also interviewed. By this method I was able to obtain representative data of the five network groups theoretically described in chapter two.

"When the research design moves from pictures of mass communication to inquiry into the relationship between people and mass communication ... the researcher is obliged not only to describe the survey results, but also to describe the survey sample and its relationship to the population from which it was drawn."¹

Indeed, it was during my fieldwork that I fully realised that pools of mass media theories developed over the years in industrialised societies to explain the political communication are too vague to explain African political processes. Unfortunately most African scholars have wrongly adapted these theories in the African situation.

Some factors may be responsible for this theoretical misconception in the study of African political communication. This is closely associated with the training of media professionals in the Third World which according to Peter Golding (1977) has taken three forms:

"The attachment of experts from the industrialised countries to media in the Third World, courses and attachments in industrialised countries, and courses and training centres in the Third World". He showed that "nearly 60 BBC staff were seconded to the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation alone between 1950 and 1960. Naturally their work was more than advisory, it was executive, exemplary and authoritative."²

We have earlier noted that the training of media professionals and other students in the other disciplines have had great impact in them. "Those that return take with them not only skills, but values and attitudes and not least a receptivity to the men and machines they have learned to work with."³

The above observations have also been recognised by authors such as Katz and Wedell (1977); Gibbons (1974); Seymour (1974); Quarmyne and Bebey (1967); etc. In terms of political communication research, I believe that one of the answers to the problems is for most Third World students training in industrialised countries to spend at least a year or more in their own country for their fieldwork. They should be encouraged to select carefully from media theories developed in the advanced nations to analyse their data. Most important of all, they should develop their own theories which they think could best explain communication processes in their country. Often African research students in Europe and America depend on materials sent to them by relatives and friends from home. After many years in Europe or America they lack adequate perspectives to appreciate changes in their own countries, thus they tend to theorize and analyse issues in terms of Western ideology and conceptions. It is also important for African students to rely on the experience of Europeans who have carried out some research studies in that continent. They tend to see African social problems from anthropological points of view which could be very useful and valid for theory and data analysis in African communication research.

When I finally returned to the UK in April 1984 I began to redevelop my early theories in order to create a new model which could explain the data in the context of Nigerian political communication realities. A convergence model within the premises of network analysis became my best theoretical model to address and explain Nigerian political communication processes. A conference held at the London School of Economics on 'Network' in the early part of 1984 further reinforced my orientation toward network approach to the study of political communication. It was there that I met for the first time Clyde Mitchel, whose ideas further attracted my interest. I phoned him a few times, we discussed and he recommended a few books. In contrast to the International Association for Mass Communication Research held in Prague a year earlier, most of the papers and seminars concentrated heavily on Western mass media research theories. Even a few African scholars who attended the conference presented papers which I feel did not speak eloquently on the actual communication problems in Africa. However, I clearly understand the problem African scholars face in writing about African problems in an international gathering such as the Prague Conference. I benefited immensely from speaking to a few eminent scholars in the field of communication, especially Elihu Katz (who was particularly helpful in suggesting new theoretical approaches in the study of political communication in Africa: Jersey Pormoski, Brenda Dervin, Jorg Becker, Paul

Ausah, France Oguajah, Cecs Hanclink, Johane Saltung, Karl Nordentreng etc.)

11. CODING THE DATA FOR COMPUTER ANALYSIS

Learning the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) computer programming and the redevelopment of theory were done concurrently. It is unimportant to explain the system here. But the basic format was fixed and the general output was a series of crosstabulation tables which produced relational data. There were different stages in which recording and editing operations were carried out.

12. GROUPING RESPONDENTS BY COMPUTER INTO NETWORK CATEGORIES - THE FORMATION OF THE FIVE NETWORK GROUPS AS UNITS OF ANALYSIS

The most important format created from the computer was the logical statements by which all the respondents in the survey were grouped into distinct categories called 'network groups' or systems. The logical statements were entirely based on the five mutually exclusive groups outlined in Chapter Two.

The basis of classification of the groups' distinctiveness or exclusiveness involved the utilisation of the respondents attributes and characteristics to preform the logical statements. At the same time, critical importance was attached to the observational relationship between the respondent and the entire social structure that must be incorporated, because as David Knoke et al have pointed out:

By ignoring the social structural context within which actors are located, a purely attribute-based analysis loses much of the explanatory potential that relational analysis can offer. The ultimate advance of the social scientific knowledge requires combinations of both types of data and the creation of measurement and analysis methods capable of incorporating them."⁴

13. RESPONDENTS' 'INTRINSIC' QUALITIES

In this study, attributes and characteristics are 'intrinsic' qualities that inherently belong to each respondent in the survey. They are varieties and

aspects of such qualities, but for analytic reasons specific ones were chosen for the logical statement (statements which help to group respondents into categorical groups). These include occupations, last education, mobility and age. These are attributes common to all the respondents but in differing degrees, hence they form important bases for classification. I deliberately omitted ethnic origin because the network groups were drawn from one geo-ethnic region - Imo state.

The survey was carried out within two separate boundaries which were specified as urban and rural, and I have argued in chapter two that the two environments are inter-related. Thus a factor which best accounts for such inter-relationship in terms of network connectedness must be incorporated. In Nigeria, the relationship characteristic between the urban and rural population is the geographical mobility factor. The intensity of such mobility is highest among the unemployed.

Justification for aggregating the individuals into categorically, mutually exclusive, groups

I have stated that this research attempts to combine modern and traditional political communication processes to discover how Nigerians, particularly, communicate in a general election. Different people in the communities - urban and rural - use different communication channels to do so and this is entirely dependent on the abilities and resources of the individuals to use different channels effectively for political information.

The use of respondents' occupation, last education, geographical mobility and age are important grouping criteria in the Nigerian context because:

- a) Occupation often reflects the level of education, social, economic and community leadership status of Nigerians. But this may not in every case be true because (as already discussed) in certain stages in the lives of Nigerians, education is independent of jobs or occupations. Large numbers of former urban elites who held prestigious occupations often retire to the village at old age, where most of them continue farming for the rest of their lives. Thus the educated and the illiterate share a common occupational criterion. In the same environment, they use both mass media and traditional channels for political information and participation.

b) Last education This specifically attempts to correct, with statistical evidence drawn from the elite group, the misconception that the African educated 'class' are highly urbanised, culturally alienated, and have cut off links with their natal-rural homeland. It has also been suggested that in their political participation, they depend entirely on the mass media information. I maintained that in the Nigerian political situation, the elites use both traditional and modern mass media systems for political purposes. Also because of strong kinship ties between Nigerian elites and village communities, most elites may even have a greater tendency and attachment to traditional channels of political communication than to the mass media.

Last education of respondents also helps us to associate mutually exclusive groups with particular media: that is the characteristic of the media - radio, television or newspapers - shall enable the respondents to expose themselves to them according to their educational standard.

c) Geographical Mobility We saw earlier that Africans spend part of their lives partly in the village and partly in the city (Pearce, 1977:32; Lloyd, 1974:122; Meillassoux, 1968:74-79). The mobility pattern helps us to know which group in the communities are most mobile horizontally, at what age and why (Lloyd, 1984:74,76). Most importantly, the essential kinship networks of communication, linkages or ties between urban and rural areas are accomplished by the mobility structure of the respondents - frequency of visits between relatives in the village and the city.

d) Age This is important in relation to the time the respondents leave the village for the city and also the age they finally return to the village to settle for the rest of their lives. Also age can be associated with the level of last education, occupation, horizontal mobility and most important, it helps to aggregate those respondents who are most dependent on others in the community for accommodation and job finding - a situation in which the youths can be used by the older kinsmen to enhance their social and political image both in the urban and village areas after rendering such help to young migrants to the city. We have also seen that most of those mobilised by political candidates as action-sets or communication-sets were mainly young

people. Generally, the age of the respondents helps us to assess different political participants in Nigeria and to associate them with different political activities, behaviour and communication patterns.

Indeed, grouping respondents under these criteria limits generalisation not only within the theoretical framework but also in the data analysis and research conclusion. By this approach we are able to know exactly who is who in the survey and how they communicate in the community. Peter Lloyd in his study of traditional Yoruba communities states that the:

"individual's personal network is largely confined within his town or village..." Thus "the individuals in the network can be classified almost entirely in terms of kinship, age and occupation. The dominant social groups are defined by descent and age, the latter being composed of symmetrical relationships, the former of asymmetrical relationships expressed in age ranking."⁶

Using age, occupation and kinship criteria among the traditional Yoruba population, Lloyd was able to identify different groups of the communities as the poor and the rich in order to establish the network of relationship between them. Basic differences between them were de-emphasised because of obligatory kinship network among his respondents. Kinship almost entirely formed the basis of interpersonal network ties among his respondents.

In Chapter Two I show theoretically that different political participants exist within and between urban and rural areas. Major characteristics and attributes (demographics) of the respondents are statistically illustrated in chapter nine. I proposed in Chapter Two that it would be possible to correlate the respondents' demographic factors with available communication networks. I argued in Chapter One that the "introduction of a mass communication system has not destroyed the traditional communication network based upon personal relations. It simply means that a new network has been introduced which greatly expands the physical area of communication. What cannot now be communicated by face-to-face contact can be communicated through the mass media." Unfortunately, because of differences in income, residence, literacy etc. not all in a transitional society like Nigeria can afford access to the modern mass media for political information and participation. In Nigeria, therefore, there are different political participants based on certain attributes and characteristics as well as different communication systems. The communication systems are the linkage systems between participants and the political system. On the basis of

this, I argued that it would be "a serious limitation in the study of political communication networks if the characteristics of the linkages are emphasised at the expense of the characteristics of those in the network linkage". Both should be taken into consideration.

There are two ways in which I can consider the relationships between them. The egocentric or individual approach, in which we can correlate the individual's association with the political system through different communication networks. With sociometric questions a direct communication link between the individual and the political system can be operationalised. With a computer, different variables can be cross-tabulated to show the degree of intercommunication. In Chapter Two I rejected the egocentric approach in this study because of the complex structure of the political communication processes involved. In the first instance, the study deals with urban and village political communication processes. Different groups in the communities are involved. All existing media channels - radio, TV, and the press - are incorporated in the study. Face-to-face communication, in which the interaction between participants is not limited to interpersonal communication but also the use of different social organisations as channels of political communication are also introduced into the study. Collecting and analysing data in a situation such as this is not so straight-forward. Even where collection of data and analysis is based on one person's network linkage, it has prompted criticisms. Roger Sanjck (1974) criticised the work of Epstein (1954) in Zambia based on an individual's (Canda) social network over five days as only a 'presentation' of an operational (and rapid) way for collecting network data.

The quantitative data obtained for this study in terms of social, political and communication patterns of the respondents have very broad 'context width' in which case many respondents are given the chance to provide data about their socio-political and communication links, which deals with concrete rather than abstract questions in Nigerian politics. This was an attempt to make the questions yield more meaningful sociometric data (Moreno 1934). But one consequence of this approach is that with large numbers of respondents, exceeding a hundred individual cases, questions with broad 'context width' will not only yield expensive variables but numerous variable labels (Appendix 3 shows the number of variables and variable labels in this study).

Once large numbers of variables and variable labels are produced, some of the traditional problems associated with egocentric or sociometric network analysis begin to emerge. Where, as in this study, different communication channels are involved, the actual structure of communication began to vanish because as the number of cells is increased the number of cases in each diminishes, sometimes to zero. Particularly in Nigeria, where the last general elections in Imo State created abundant intra-group conflicts, hatred, tension etc. and after the election when it was more conducive for me to collect the second data "every Igbo turned informer against his brother ..." (Nwabueze 1985:47-48) many respondents could not respond to overtly open-ended political questions. On the basis of this, egocentric data will certainly produce a large number of empty cells. This problem was encountered by Bruan (1975, 1976) in his sociometric survey in Colombian villages and also by Morett-Lopez' (1979) 'Mexican slums and Korean villages'.

Another problem is that egocentric analysis and crosstabulation of large variables with numerous variable labels are not easy to organise in order to achieve systematic data analysis, that is using a variable(s) to determine demographic, social, economic, political and communication patterns. There seem to be endless crosstabulations of one variable against others in order to achieve a clear structure of political communication processes and participations in Nigerian politics which are influenced by so many factors.

In order to overcome some of the problems of data analysis, the questionnaire was designed to reflect the general, down to the specific or particular practical communication behaviours, of the respondents. The most general was the respondent's demographic characteristics and social organisational activities. The data then begins to focus more specifically on the political and communication activities of the respondents, which is dealt with in chapters 11, 12, 13 and 14. In these chapters, particular political parties, mass media networks and interpersonal communication were associated with the respondents. Other factors of political influence were specifically mentioned and analysed in relation to the respondents' and Nigerian political communication system.

Most important of all, in order to overcome the problem of very many 'holes' or non-data in the data-matrix or cells, I decided to aggregate the respondents into groups according to their selected major attributes and characteristics. The second justification for doing this is also to tie

theory in with analysis. In Chapter Two I argued that the five categorical groups have a basis in sociological reality. This group analysis approach has been used by many resarchers: Nosanchuk (1963); Berlo et al (1972); Kadushin (1976); Guimaraes (1972); Betty (1974); Zaltman et al (1973); Rachim (1976); Davis (1961); Park et al (1976); etc. In particular Sheingold (1973:714-715) maintains that once distinctions between participants and categories of communication system are made, individuals can be aggregated and then we can discover "under what circumstances and by what process can new social and political movements (or parties) reach potential supporters who are socially isolated and poorly exposed to the media."

In this study, categorical groups will be held constant and other variabels cross-tabulated against them to discover how each group differently or similarly participates in Nigerian political elections through social organisations, kinship ties, radio, TV, the press, and oral communication. We must not deny the potential power of individuals' approach to network analysis particularly when "network variables (like opinon leadership) are measured at the individual level", in individual voting and media consumption etc. Pool (1973); Migram (1967); Roistach (1974); Moreno (1934); Lavine (1972); and more recently the work of William D. Richards, Jr (1976) applying NEGOPY network analysis procedures have shown how effective individual network analysis can be. Besides individual and/or group/system/network analysis, other levels of analysis include:

- 1) dyads, in which the structure of communication between two individuals in a system can be examined in relation to the two who are linked,
- 2) personal network such as that carried out by Epstein on the individual in Zambia
- 3) cliques.

It is perhaps desirable to maintain one level of analysis in any given study in order to achieve consistency in theory and analytic conclusions.

However, I shall now show some examples of the individual approach and then carry out the rest of the data analysis on the group level. To select a few examples, individual respondents' places of residence - urban or rural - can be cross-tabulated with the political parties for which the respondents cast their votes.

Table 1:8

Individual Respondents and Political Parties For Which They Voted

Respondents Residence	NPN	UPN	PRP	NAP	NPP	Total	
Village	(27)	(3)	-	(1)	44	(72)	(62%)
	36.0	4.0		1.3	58.7	100	
City	(13)	(10)	(1)	(1)	(21)	46	(38%)
	28.3	8.3	2.2	2.2	45.7	100	
Column Total	(40)	(13)	(1)	(2)	(65)	(121)	
	33.1	10.7	0.8	1.7	53.7	100	

This presents a general picture of the voting pattern between village and urban respondents in the survey. Votes were nearly almost split between two political parties: the NPN 36% (27) and 58.7% (44) for NPP in the village. Only 4% voted for the UNP and 1.3% for NAP. In the city a similar voting pattern was maintained: NPN 28.3%, down by 7.7%; the UPN more than slightly doubled their gain 8.3% - up by 4.3%, NAP just doubled their score, NPP was down by 13%.

The religion of the respondents can be associated with their voting pattern by a cross-tabulation of religion by party for which the respondents cast their votes.

More Catholics and Protestants voted for the NPN and NPP - Catholics 29.6% for the NPN and 58.6% for the NPP, similarly 22.2% of the Protestants voted for the NPN and 66.7% for the NPP. But in the survey as a whole, there are more Catholics than Protestants - 87 (73.7%) and 18 (15.3%) respectively. 77.8% of the Muslims voted for the NPN and only 11.1% voted for either the UPN and the PRP. None at all voted for the NPP and NAP.

Table 2:8

Individual Respondents' Religion and Parties For Which They Voted

Religion	NPN	UPN	PRP	NAP	NPP	Total	
Roman Catholic	(26)	(10)	-	-	51	87	(73.7%)
	29.6	11.5			58.6	100	
Protestant	(4)	(2)			(12)	(18)	(15.3%)
	22.2	11.1			66.7	100	
Non-Denominational	1			(2)	(1)	(4)	(3.4%)
	25.0			50.0	25.0	100	
Muslim	(7)	(1)	(1)			(97)	(7.6%)
	77.8	11.1	11.1			100	
Column Total	(38)	(13)	(1)	(2)	(64)	(118)	
	32.2	11.0	0.8	1.7	54.2	100	

I have argued that in political communication between urban and rural areas, the geographical mobility of the participant is an important linkage between the two environments. With individual analysis, we can show the pattern of such mobility. When people are seeking job employment, movement from village to city is more obvious (Lloyd, 1974; Peace, 1979; Meillassoux, 1968; Mitchel et al, 1969). Using the respondents' labour, unemployment frequencies and geographical mobility we can show the pattern of migration from city to village, village to city, city to city or the respondent's decision to stay at the same place as the individual's labour needs and circumstances compel him.

Generally people who are never unemployed visit their relatives in the city frequently. The highest number 53 (39.3%) do so once a month. Only a small number, 5 (3.7%) and 7 (5.2%) respectively, never or only visit their relatives once a year in the city. From this table (3.8), the majority of the respondents whether very often unemployed, rarely or never unemployed, visit their relatives at least once a year; 22 (16.3%) once a month; once a week 24 (17.8%) and more than once a week 24 (17.8%). Thus the linkage

between individuals in the networks and their relatives in town is strong with the greatest intensity at once a month frequency.

Table 3:8

Individual Respondents' Frequency of Visit to Relatives in the City

Respondents Frequency of Visits	Very Often	Rarely	Never	Total	
Never	(2) 40.0	(1) 20.0	(2) 40.0	(5) 100	(3.7%)
Less than once a year	(1) 14.3	(1) 14.3	(5) 71.4	(7) 100	(5.2%)
Once a year	(3) 13.6	(6) 27.3	(13) 59.1	(22) 100	(16.3%)
Once a month	(8) 15.1	(14) 26.4	(31) 58.5	(53) 100	(39.3%)
Once a week	-	(12) 50.0	(12) 50.0	(24) 100	(17.8%)
More than once a week	(3) 12.5	(8) 33.3	(13) 54.2	(24) 100	(17.8%)
Column Total	(17) 12.6	(42) 31.1	(76) 57.3	(135) 100	

But when these respondents are not employed 34 (25%) stay in the same city, 37 (27.2%) go back to the village, 10 (7.4%) go to another city, while 55 (40.4%) stay in the same place whether city or village. Therefore, while people in Africa migrate from the village to the city, they equally return to the village at the time of unemployment (Peace 1968, LLoyd 1974).

Respondents were asked to indicate whether their employment was permanent or temporary and their answer was cross-tabulated against their frequency of visits to their relatives in the village.

Table 4:8

Individual Respondents Visits to Their Relatives in the Village
Whether Their Jobs are Permanent or Temporary

	Permanent	Temporary	Total	
Never	(1) 100	-	(19) 100	(0.7%)
Less than once a year	(2) 100	-	(2) 100	(1.4%)
Once a year	(11) 54.4	(10) 47.6	(21) 100	(4.6%)
Once a month	(31) 79.5	(8) 20.5	(27) 100	(27.1%)
Once a week	(32) 91.4	(3) 8.6	(35) 100	(24.3%)
More than once a week	(35) 78.1	(11) 24.0	(46) 100	(32.0%)
Column Total	(12) 77.8	(32) 22.2	(144) 100	

As in the respondents' visits to their relatives in the city, a large number of the respondents visit their relatives in the village very often, irrespective of whether they are permanently or temporarily employed or not. There is a balance in the mobility pattern between respondents in the village/urban and urban/village movements.

The respondents were asked to state whether in their interpersonal network of political interaction they thought radio political broadcasts had an important or unimportant effect on the people in the community in the way they voted for different parties. The table below shows their response.

Table 5:8
Voting Behaviour As Influenced by Radio Broadcasts

Political Parties	Important	Unimportant	Total	
NPN	(23)	(13)	(36)	(33.3%)
	63.9	36.1	100	
UPN	-	(13)	(13)	(12.0%)
		100	100	
PRP	(1)	-	(1)	(0.9%)
	100		100	
NAP	(2)	-	(2)	(1.9%)
	100		100	
Column Total	(54) 50	(54) 50	(108) 100	

The respondents were equally divided in their opinion as to the effect of radio political broadcasts on the voting behaviour of the people in the community. But among NPN voters, radio had more effects than not. According to the respondents, radio did not have any effect on those who voted for the UPN. NPP voters were equally divided.

On the other hand, the effect of newspapers on the voting behaviour of the community was more unimportant than important. There were 104 responses to that question, only 31.7% (33) said that newspaper political messages had an important effect on the voting behaviour of the people. Two-thirds of the respondents said that it had no important effect. This pattern was

consistent with the NPN and NPP voters. The respondents' views on the effects of newspapers on the voter was almost the same as the effect of television on them.

On the contrary, the most important factor which the respondents thought affected the voting behaviour of the electorate was money.

Table 6:8

The Effect of Money on the Voting Behaviour of the Electorate

Political Parties	Important	Unimportant	Total	
NPN	(29)	(9)	(38)	(33.6%)
	76.4	23.7	100	
UPN	(11)	(2)	(13)	(11.5%)
	84.6	15.4	100	
PRP	(1)	-	(1)	(0.9%)
	100		100	
NAP	(2)	-	(2)	(1.8%)
	100		100	
NPP	(50)	(9)	(59)	(52.2%)
	84.8	15.2	100	
Column Total	(93)	(20)	(113)	
	82.3	17.7	100	

In comparison with the media, particularly newspapers and television, money had a far greater effect on the voting behaviour of the electorate. The effect of television and newspapers combined are less than the effect of money alone. Buying voters cards was an open secret during the 1983 general elections. On 23rd May, 1983, reading a news talk from Imo State broadcasting station in Owerri, entitled "The need for free and fair elections in the 1983 polls", Dr. A. C. Ogunna asked whether "it is possible

for Nigeria to be a democracy when a lot of the electorates are politically ignorant and are easily bought by money?" He points out that a Nigerian newspaper had published an article that in "[Rivers State] 1983 general election voters registration cards" were "allegedly bought by the NPN supporters for N150-N200". Before Nigeria introduced the two-tier monetary system this amount was nearly £180.

In a country, says Ozidi (1/7/83) where "the people are hungry ... most of them have no shelter, their businesses are virtually ruined, there is a scandalous mass unemployment rate ..." N200 would be an attractive sum which could make the electorate not think about anything else about the election, but to sell their cards and get the money.

Furthermore, the respondents were asked to indicate which of the channels of political communication were most reliable in their political information. Respondents' places of residence were cross-tabulated against media reliability.

Table 7:8
Which Media Are Most Reliable In Their Political Broadcasts?

Respondents Residence	Radio	TV	News- paper	Word of Mouth,	Total	
Village	(51)	(6)	(17)	(12)	(86)	(58.1%)
	59.3	7.0	19.8	14.0	100	
City	(18)	(11)	(21)	(12)	(62)	(41.9%)
	29.0	17.7	33.9	19.4	100	
Column Total	(69) 46.0	(17) 11.5	(38) 25.7	(24) 16.2	(148) 100	

Slightly more than half of the people in the village reported that radio was politically more reliable than either television (7%), newspapers (19.8%) or word of mouth (14%). On the contrary, far less people in the city believed that radio (29%) was more reliable than newspapers (33.9%) in comparison with the opinion of those in the village. Similarly, more people in the

city (17.7%) than in the village (7%) reported that TV was more reliable. Opinion about the reliability of word of mouth between village and urban residents was equally divided. Perhaps this is a reflection on 'reception facilities' more than anything else.

Finally, respondents were asked to indicate the number of hours they spent per week on radio, TV or press - 1-10 hours, 11-12 hours, or 21-30/ hours.

Table 8:8

Respondents Hours of Exposure to Radio For Political Information

Respondents Residence	1-10 hrs	11-12 hrs	21-30 hrs	Total	
Village	(42)	(11)	(30)	(83)	(58.0%)
	50.6	13.3	36.1	100	
City	(32)	(17)	(11)	(60)	(42.0%)
	53.3	28.3	18.3	100	
Column Total	(74)	(28)	(41)	(143)	
	51.7	19.6	28.7	100	

Half of the respondents in both village and city listened to the radio between 1 - 10 hours a week for political information. But on long hours (between 21-30 hours a week) radio attracted more people in the village than in the city. This is because people in the vilalge are less active than those in the city and also the former are more restricted in the alternative reception facilities available to them than those in the city. In general, radio attracts a large number of listeners.

Exposure to television has a similar pattern to radio but more people (68.6% - 70) watched television for political information between 1 - 10 hours a week from the village and the city. The number of people from both areas are equally divided - 35 each. Seven people (14.6%) in the village watch TV between 11-20 hours a week and more people - 20.4% (11) - did the same in the city. 13.7% (14) spent 21-30 hours a week watching TV for political information from the city or the village.

The number of people who spent 11 - 30 hours a week reading newspapers in the village is greater than in the city. But those who spent between 1 - 10 hours on newspapers in the city (84.9% - 45) are greater than those in the village. Long hours spent by those in the village also indicate that respondents in the village have more idle time to spend and some of them use it reading newspapers, particularly the former city elites who have retired from active urban life to the village.

14. TWO DIFFERENT BUT CONVERGING SOCIAL STRUCTURES AS BASES FOR THE EMPIRICAL BOUNDARY SETTING

As I am considering two interacting geographical entities their attributes should be incorporated with relational data, that is, analysis should focus on the relations between groups in the two environments. Here a 'relation' is not an intrinsic characteristic of either environment "taken in isolation, but is an emergent property of the connection or linkage between units of observation." (Knoke & Kuklinki 1982) .

Having specified boundaries of investigation, the levels of observation and data collection become more obvious and clear. Within the boundaries, the five groups - Traditional, Young School Leavers, Urban Poor, Urban Elites and Rural Elites, are drawn. But it is also important to note that the two environments from which our network groups have emerged represent the basic socio-economic structures in Nigeria which in many respects define the structure of political associations in the country. They are inter-related as much as the different individual and groups in them. Structures include kinship system, voluntary organisations, political parties, religions and mass media systems. These are important channels of linkages between urban and rural environments.

Thus, using these targets, Owerri (city) and Eziama (village town), the 'small world' of the 'large world' of Nigeria is captured in its seeming major structural characteristics and attributes where the political communication behaviour of the categorical network groups constitute the core of the analysis. It should be emphasised that the need to set a representative boundary is to overcome the problem of endless ramifications of linkages in the network which can prevent substantive conclusions.

15. LEVEL OF EMPIRICAL DATA ANALYSIS

In Chapter Two I rejected egocentric network analysis as used by Mitchel et al (1969) in their network studies in Africa because it was too micro in dimension to explain the rural/urban political communication in Nigeria - but I accepted their general model. I have not either advocated the dyadic level of network analysis because it deals with relation as a function of the joint characteristics of the pair, for example the degree of similarity of the attribute profile (Laumann, Verbrugge and Pappi 1976:145-161, Knoke & Kuklmski 1982:17). Neither have I chosen the triad mode of analysis, which only examines the relationship between siblings who interact on the basis of shared sentiments and obligation. Those who do not fulfil the basic membership criteria of the group are 'mutally' excluded. Nigerian political communication is far beyond this level of network association. However, triad analysis comes very close to 'complete network' analysis. In relation to the theoretical framework developed in chapter one, complete or total-networks provide a more adequate and powerful analysis of structures of network of communicain in a system because:

"complete network uses the complete informatino about patterning of ties among all actors to ascertain the existence of distinct positions of roles within the system and to describe the nature of relations among these positions. Although the sample may consist of N nodes and (N^2-N) possible dyadic ties of given type, these elements ... add up to only a single system."⁵

Thus egocentric data analysis could become a tool in network analysis if individuals so sampled could be aggregated into groups according to their attributes, characteristics and relationships to target geographical boundaries.

16. LOGICAL STATEMENTS, AGGREGATION AND THE FORMATION OF FIVE EMPIRICAL NETWORK SYSTEMS BY SPSS

General SPSS Input Format Used:

```
Fixed (F3.0, 1X, 25(1X,F2.0)/4X,25(1X,F2.0)/  
4X,25(1X,F2.0)/4X,25(1X,F2.0)/  
4X,25(1X,F2.0)/4X,25(1X,F2.0)/  
4X,25(1X,F2.0)/4X,12(1X,F2.0)
```

By using 'if' statements, the computer can aggregate the respondents into specific network groups according to their attributes, characteristics and relationships to the two target geographical boundaries. For example,

- a) 'if' variable 2 (respondents place of residence) equals 1 (staying in the village) and variable 46 (respondents' place of residence when unemployed) equals 1 or 3 (goes from village to city) V200 (geographical mobility of the respondents when unemployed) is equal to 2, ie the respondent moves from village to city.
- b) 'if' V2 equals 9 (staying in the city) and V46 equals 2 (moves from village to city) V200 is equal to 3 (goes from city to village) (See Appendix 3 for chain of logical statements based on the 'if' command).

Similarly, 'if' command statements were continued until five distinct mobility patterns for group analysis were obtained. The respondents' mobility between and within villages and cities which constitute important linkages between the target boundaries were achieved by this operation. I assumed that the unemployed period is the most important time which characterises this movement. Thus the following movements are specified for analysis:

- 1) Stays in the village
- 2) Moves from village to city
- 3) Moves from city to village
- 4) Stays in the same city
- 5) Moves from city to city.

Note here that there is no statement for movement from village to village. This is on the understanding of the socio-economic and cultural behaviour of the Igbos conditioned by patriarchal norms, that is, male lineage system dominates the rural system and males only inherent from their ancestral village. They cannot move to another village to live, even on a temporary basis.

Thus, geographical mobility which only helps us to establish network of communication linkages between villages and cities is restricted to environmental relations. It has very serious analytic limitations if the mobility structure is not incorporated within the attributes of the five

network groups identified in the study. This problem brings us to a second level of 'if' statement.

Hence, with the aid of SPSS 'if' logical command statements, respondents' attributes and relational data obtained from the target boundaries are uniquely combined for the analysis of political communication in Nigeria with particular reference to the 1983 general elections. Here we come to grasp the meaning of Mitchell's (1969) concept of network as a specific type of relation linking a defined set of persons, objects, organisations, varieties of variables relevant to the understanding of particular ways Nigerians communicate in the election period which is evaluated and explained in terms of political communication (see Appendix 3).

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CHAPTER NINE

CHARACTERISTICS AND ATTRIBUTES OF THE NETWORK GROUPS

The aim of this chapter is to establish empirically that the categorical network groups do actually exist and that they have different background characteristics. The extent to which these backgrounds differentiate them in their social relationships and the different ways in which these characteristics intervene in determining their political communication behaviour will be assessed. The network groups and their characteristics will form an important point of reference in subsequent chapters.

One of the critical characteristics differentiating Nigerian voters is their socio-political and economic environment. As we have noted earlier, the two main environments are the village and the urban areas.

Table 1:9
Respondents Places of Residence

Groups	Village	City	Total	
Traditional	(49)	(0)	(0)	(36.8%)
	100	0.0	100	
School leavers	(4)	(9)	(13)	(9.8%)
	30.8	69.2	100	
Urban poor	(4)	(7)	(11)	(8.3%)
	36.4	63.6	100	
Urban elite	(8)	(34)	(42)	(31.6%)
	19.0	81.0	100	
Rural elite	(18)	(0)	(18)	(13.5%)
	100	0.0	100	
Column Total	(83)	(50)	(133)	
	62.4	37.6	100	

The data show a significant number of respondents from both rural and urban communities. All (49) of the respondents who belong to the traditional group come from the village. Similarly, 100% (18) of the respondents of the rural elite live in the village. Focusing on the rural elites, it was stated earlier that during the colonial period the missionaries penetrated the hinterlands, particularly in the south of Nigeria, to set up schools and colleges. After independence, these institutions continued to exist and expanded and, as we shall see later, most of these rural elites are teachers by occupation.

The urban elites constitute the highest number of educated people in the city. A small number of them live in the rural areas, but 81% (34) are based permanently in the city. Some of the urban poor live in the village, but 63.6% (7) live in the city. Among the young school leavers, 30.8% (4) live in the village, and 69.2% (9) have already migrated to the city or went to school there.

There are few explanations of the residential distribution of different groups in Nigeria. Those who live in the city visit the village regularly, particularly during the weekends. This is increasingly so if the village of origin and city where one works are within easy travelling distance. Some workers commute from the village to the city on a daily basis, while others spend half of the week in the village and half in the city, depending on their various circumstances. The development of roads, rural pipe-borne water supplies, electricity and good housing have encouraged village/urban commuting on a daily or weekly basis.

In certain difficult circumstances, the urban migrant might go back to the village temporarily before returning to the city once again.

"He returns, ..., to his family and will spend several months, sometimes several years in the village. After a while, the original problem of finding a rewarding job comes up again, and again the same expedients are used to find one's way to the capital. In a few instances, a migrant may return to his village three times or more before settling ... in the city." (Meillasoux, C., 1968:767)

The figures presented above for the groups are based on gross percentages and do not indicate the actual relationship between village and urban residence. A comparison of row and column percentages between different groups illustrates more clearly their degrees of relationship.

Table 2:9

Relationship Between Village and Urban Residence of the Respondents
Expressed in Row and Column Percentages

Groups	Village	City	Village	City
		Row %		Column %
Traditional	100	0	59	0
School leavers	31	69	5	18
Urban poor	36	64	5	14
Urban elite	19	81	10	68
Rural elite	100	0	22	0

This table, demonstrates that all of the traditional and rural elite network groups live in the rural areas in Nigeria. While some proportions of young school leavers, urban poor and urban elites live in the village for socio-economic reasons, nevertheless, higher proportions of them live in the city.

Residence in the city or village does not strictly indicate the place of birth. The period of time spent in the city or village has a direct relationship with socio-political and economic behaviour. The emphasis on primary or secondary political socialisation is indirectly an attempt to ascertain the extent to which environment has influenced political attitudes and communication patterns after moving from one political and social environment to another. It will be hypothesised that primary political socialisation and communication behaviour involving networks of kins and relatives are some of the characteristics of rural political communication network systems while secondary political communication networks involving friends, workmates and the mass media are the major characteristics of the urban environment.

It is worth examining statistically the period of years each of the five groups have lived in the two political environments. Using total cell percentages, the breakdown in the survey is as follows: 27.8% (37) of the traditional network respondents have never lived in the city while only 4.5% (6) and 2.3% (3) have lived in the city between 10-15 years and 16-20 years respectively. Only 2.3% (3) lived in the city for more than 30 years.

Young school leavers are equally likely to have spent their life in the city or in the village, a factor that tends to broaden their network of connectedness which in turn enhances their political information

capacilities. Only 2.3% (3) have not lived in the city at all, while 3.8% (5) and 3.0% (4) lived in the city between 16-20 years and 21-30 years.

Table 3:9
Years in the City/Years in the Village

No. of Years	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	
1-10	3 6.1	5 38.5	2 18.2	20 47.6	5 27.8	35 26.3
10-15	7 14.3	4 30.8	2 18.2	12 28.6	3 16.7	28 21.1
16-20	10 20.4	4 30.8	2 18.2	6 14.3	0 0.0	22 16.5
21-30	4 8.2	0 0.0	1 9.1	4 9.5	4 22.2	13 9.8
31-40	10 20.4	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	5 27.8	15 11.3
41-50	5 10.2	0 0.0	4 36.4	0 0.0	1 5.6	10 7.5
51-60	5 10.2	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	5 3.8
61-70	2 4.1	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 1.5
70+	3 6.1	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	3 2.3
	49 100	13 100	11 100	42 100	18 100	133 100

When the young migrants arrive in the city, they come in contact with others in two ways:

"Either they are friends from pre-migratory days, particularly ex-school friends who have preceded or followed him to Agege, or they are fellow townsmen encountered at Agege since two men from the same place of origin but with different circles of friends, will make a point of filling the gaps in each other's spheres of acquaintance." (Peace, A., 1979:28)

Of the 8.3% (11) urban poor group, 2.3% (3), 3.0% (4) and 1.5% (2) have lived in the city between 10-30 years. As Mitchell et al (1969) have reported in Zambia, Africans after a certain age, particularly the uneducated ones who fail to get reasonably well paid jobs, return to the village. At this time, between the ages of 30-40, they go back to farming as a source of living for themselves and their families. Only 1.5% (2) live in the village but work in the city.

On the contrary, urban elites have spent a number of years in the city. Of these, 6% (8) have lived in the city under 10 years, and 17.3% between 11-40 years, none have spent all their lives in the city. They are a well urbanised group in sharp contrast to the traditional network group.

Among the rural elites, 75% (10) have spent most of their lives in the villages. From the colonial period until the present time schools have been controlled by local government education authorities or church parishes. This implies that teachers under any local authority or parish are transferred from one village to the other. This is where village to village occupational mobility on a narrow but regular basis occurs in Nigeria. Only 6.1% (8) have spent some time in the city.

Most traditional network groups have spent their lives in the village, but the highest percentage of the respondents in this group have spent between 10-40 years - 5.3% (7) 10-15 years and 15% (20) 16-40 years. There are two other important implications of these figures both in the urban and rural populations. The majority of the traditional and urban elite networks have lived in the two environments for between 10-40 years, this is supported by the observation of Ojetunji Aboyade that in Nigeria children below 15 years of age comprise more than 40% of the population and persons over 50 years of age form about 8%, so the dependency ratio is very high.¹ This also shows that the life span in Nigeria both in the villages and the cities is relatively short, with averages ranging from 45-55 years. The high dependency ratio has important political implications in the networks in terms of personal influence as well as corruption and nepotism in various institutions. In a network of interpersonal relations, a high level of dependency reinforces the obligation to members of a group and connected members are "less able to withdraw from one another, and so the potential degree of influence or control of each individual over the other is greater."² Rogers and Kincaid further remarked that "in India, where the advantages of nepotism are widely understood, the president usually appoints

his closest relative (such as a son or younger brother) to be his treasurer; the possibility of financial misbehaviour is thus minimised."³ On the other hand, where the company or ministry is state owned, nepotism can pave the way for embezzlement of government funds and aggravate tribal tension, as in Nigeria.

These young people who depend on their parents and relatives often spend the first part of their lives in the village, where some of them receive their primary and secondary education before migrating to the city. It is in the city that they start their secondary socio-political, economic and communication readjustment which in many respects are different from the village pattern. Even when young people migrate to the urban centre, they are still indirectly under the influence of their parents through close relatives or friends who live in the city.

"... a migrant's parents are of course especially concerned about their son's welfare in Lagos: to most of them it seems an extremely hazardous place. Accordingly they do not grant their sons permission to move southwards until an older host has been arranged. This role is filled either by a kinsman already resident at Agege or by a personal friend of a migrant's father or older relative. It is the availability of such a host which in part influences why a migrant arrives at Agege ...". (Peace, 1979:26-32).

A similar observation was made by Lloyd (1984:75) as shown in chapter two above. The survey shows that more than half the number of the young school leavers, 6.8% (9), lived in the village between 1-15 years, while 3% (4) lived in the village between 16-20 years. Thus no school leaver spent his whole life in the city.

A total of 13.5% (18) of rural elites were identified. The number of years they have spent in the village were evenly spread between 1-40 years - 3.8% (5) 1-9 years, 2.3% (3) 10-15 years, 3.0% (4) and 3.8% (5) between 21-30 years and 31-40 years respectively. Some of the rural elites who have lived in the village for about 40 years or more were the third generation of teachers trained by the missionaries in town and posted to teach in the village or their local parishes.

It is striking from the above figures to note that among all the groups only the traditional group has respondents who have lived in the village more than 50 years. In the village there were 7.4% (10) between 51-70+ years of

age and only 0.8% in the city between the age of 51-60 years. This statistic supports the view expressed earlier that most Nigerians (Igbos) at old age retire to the village and everyone who lives in the city has his own traditional homeland, the village. This life-time link between individuals who live in the city and their rural homeland forms the basis of my argument that Nigerians are not completely urbanised and that they do not completely abandon village norms, values and socio-political order while they are in the city. We saw earlier that through networks of interpersonal relationships, ethnic voluntary associations, the migrants have made the city an "expression of rural life" (Mellassoux 1968:76; Lloyd, 1966:32-33; 1974:130-132).

I have shown that most urban migrants are young (Peace, 1979:10-13; Mellassoux, 1968:81) and still maintain ties with the parents in the village (Lloyd, 1984:74,76). Besides, parents make arrangements for the stay in the city at the early stage of migration (Peace, 1979:26-27). In Nigeria, educated sons are a great investment to parents and the former take care of the latter at old age (Lloyd, 1967:135,143). This relationship is important in the political relationship between the two.

Later in this study, I will propose that in networks of political communication in Nigeria, parents have a very important influence on the voting behaviour of their children above the age of 18. Meanwhile we should examine statistically the relationship between respondents and their parents before we can consider how this relationship influences political participation during election periods in Nigeria.

Early anthropologists have argued that marriage is a form of communication and economic exchange which can unify opposing groups. Tribal societies such as Nigeria, and other African states, have been the main focus of such studies. In my view it is the social characteristics of the groups that are more important in influencing the breakdown in ethnicity in Nigeria than marriage as a form of interchange and communication between different ethnic groups. The more traditional a section of Nigerians are in terms of culture and religion, the more exclusive and homogenous they are in their kinship network of relations. Such societies Rogers and Kincaid (1981) described as ones where a homophilous flow of new information is restricted. Within the family, parents therefore tend to control the flow of information which they use to influence their children. Through a kinship network, one individual can therefore influence the political opinion of others.

In the survey, 85.0% of the respondents indicated that their fathers are Igbo but all the respondents in the traditional network groups have Igbo fathers. 6.8% are Yoruba and 5.3% of them belong to urban elites, 3.8% Hausa/Fulani and 4.5% other tribes. Statistics for mothers follow a similar pattern.

This trend is very important in the understanding of political participation in Imo state and in particular it indicates that parentage and family structure in Nigeria have historically remained ethnic and kinship networks can be an important political influence. This basic social structure propagates and regenerates social political relations that in many ways characterise political communication networks in Nigeria. This will be demonstrated later.

Nigeria, as a patriarchal society, maintains a fairly rigid ethnic marriage pattern for several cultural and traditional reasons. The most important of these is the fact that everyone belongs to a tribal homeland, especially the Igbo. In practice, the son inherits his father's land, which is usually located in the village. The persistence of this structure and its unchanging political influence is a channel through which members of a family can be influenced politically. The influence of parents on their children during an election will be compared with that of other political communication network influences in the last general election in Nigeria.

The level of education among respondents is an important fact in political communication in Nigeria. Table 4.9 shows the different levels of respondents' education in the different groups.

A high proportion, 42.9%, of the traditional network group have no formal education at all while a further 30.6% have none above primary level, thus nearly three-quarters of the group (73.5%) have no post-primary education. However, in many of the urban poor, the level of formal education is much lower as 100% of the group have no education above primary level and 72.7% have none at all. In contrast, neither the urban nor rural elite groups contain any respondents with no formal education, 69% of the former and a striking 88.9% of the latter being educated beyond primary school and among the rural elite over half (55.6%) have secondary education.

Table 4:9
Respondents' Educational Background

Groups	None at All	Elementary or Primary School	Secondary School	Post or University	Total	
Traditional	21 42.9	15 30.6	11 22.4	2 4.1	49 100	36.8
School Leavers	0 0.0	0 0.0	7 53.8	6 46.2	13 100	9.8
Urban Poor	8 72.7	3 27.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	11 100	8.3
Urban Elite	0 0.0	13 31.0	14 33.3	15 35.7	42 100	31.6
Rural Elite	0 0.0	2 11.1	6 33.3	10 55.6	18 100	13.5
Column Total	29 21.8	33 24.8	38 28.6	33 24.8	133 100	100

It is important to note that 31% of urban elites reported that their highest level of education was primary school. This can be explained in terms of the period they received their formal education. In the colonial period, primary education was high enough to offer job opportunities as colonial clerks, etc. The condition which attributes them the status of urban elite is often based on long service in ministries, large companies and private sectors from the late colonial period when primary education well completed was regarded as more important educationally than secondary school education is in Nigeria today.

The small proportion among the rural elite (11.1%) who had no schooling above primary level is a reflection on the nature of the educational mobility structure at the time they received. Many people were employed as primary school teachers in the late 50s and 60s after they had successfully completed their primary education. We have also seen earlier that a shortage of teachers in Nigeria compelled institutions and government to award scholarships to students who were then bonded by the institution to teach in the same institute that awarded the scholarship (Lloyd, 1974:98).

Obligatory relationship and education have important political relationships in Nigeria. In general there are a number of individuals or bodies that are responsible for an individual's education, including parents and relatives, local communities, the church, the government or the self. In particular, the responsibility of parents to educate their children and the consequent political meaning of this obligation can not be over-emphasised in the Nigerian setting.

Table 5:9
Respondents' Parents Education and Sponsorship

	Parents	Relatives	Village Comm- unity	Church	Self	Total	
Traditional	8 66.7	4 33.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	12 100	20.3
School leavers	7 70.0	1 10.0	1 10.0	1 10.0	0 0.0	10 100	16.9
Urban poor	3 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	3 100	5.1
Urban elite	20 74.1	5 18.5	0 0.0	1 3.7	1 3.7	27 100	45.8
Rural elite	5 71.4	1 14.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 14.3	7 100	11.9
Column Total	43 72.9	11 18.6	1 1.7	2 3.4	2 3.4	59 100	

Of the respondents in all the groups 72.9% reported that their fathers were educated by their grandparents, 74.4% of the mothers by their grandparents, while 85.4% of the respondents themselves were educated by their parents. About half of the respondents received their education in the village (48.2%) and half in town (51.8%).

But it is among the urban elites that parents received the highest formal education, 45.8%. This is generally the background of many elite families in Nigeria since the colonial period. In the early period of colonisation, most educated Nigerians had illiterate parents who were either poor traders or farmers. Even as late as 1967:

"Very many of the elite in Nigeria have come from humble homes." Lloyd et al (1967) in their survey of Ibadan reported that "Two fifths of those men with post-secondary education have fathers who never attended school and who were, in consequence, farmers or poor craftsmen; only one quarter have fathers who received post-secondary education. These latter fathers were, of course, the elite of their own generation - the chief clerks, the primary school headmasters, the clergy, etc. Between two thirds and three quarters of the mothers of these present-day elite men are illiterate; only five per cent received post primary education. Very few parents have given their sons less education than they themselves received; thus the number of the old elite tended to give all their sons a good education." (Lloyd, 1967:135).

According to my own data above, it is evident that there is a sharp increase in the number of educated parents who have in turn given their children similar or better education. A number of factors account for this increase: rapid expansion in schools and colleges and economic, political and social growth demanding semi and highly educated manpower, increasing government expenditure on education. Many parents, relatives etc. can now better afford to educate their children than two decades ago.

Table 6:9
Respondents' Fathers' Religion

	Traditional	School	Urban	Urban	Rural	Total
		Leaver	Poor	Elite	Elite	
Roman Catholic	26 57.1	9 75.0	4 36.4	4 64.1	15 88.2	81 63.3
Protestant	8 16.3	2 16.7	1 9.1	6 15.4	2 11.8	14 14.8
Non-Denominational	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 2.6	0 0.0	1 0.8
Muslim	2 4.1	1 8.3	2 18.2	3 7.7	0 0.0	8 6.3
Pagan	9 18.4	0 0.0	4 36.4	3 7.7	0 0.0	16 12.5
Do not Believe	2 4.1	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 2.6	0 0.0	3 2.3
Total	49 100	12 100	11 100	39 100	17 100	128 100
	38.3	9.4	8.6	30.5	13.3	100

Religion and politics are closely associated, particularly in the Muslim communities of the north. There is a thin line separating them even today, despite the introduction of modern political democracy and education. In the survey, 75.2% of the respondents in all the groups are Catholics, 63.3% and 67.7% of their fathers and mothers respectively are also Catholics. Some percentage of the respondents (15.51%) belong to the Protestant church, and 14.8% of their fathers and 15.5% of their mothers belong to the same Christian religion. There is a sharp drop in the number of pagans in both the urban and rural areas of Imo State and the drop increases from one generation to the next. Of the respondents' fathers 12.5% were pagans, 8.7% of their mothers were also pagans, but only 0.8% of the respondents were pagans.

Table 6:9
Respondents' Religion

	Traditional	School	Urban	Urban	Rural	Total
		Leaver	Poor	Elite	Elite	
Roman Catholic	41 85.4	9 75.0	6 54.5	26 63.4	15 88.2	97 75.2
Protestant	7 14.6	1 8.3	2 18.2	9 22.0	1 5.9	20 15.5
Non-Denominational	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 9.1	3 7.3	1 5.9	5 3.9
Muslim	0 0.0	1 8.3	2 18.2	3 7.3	0 0.0	6 4.7
Pagan	0 0.04	1 8.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	1 0.8
Total	48 100	12 100	11 100	41 100	17 100	129 100
	37.2	9.3	8.5	31.8	13.2	100

Similarly, 2.3% of the respondents' fathers did not believe in any form of religion and the same with 1.6% of their mothers, but most of the respondents believe in one religion or another. The number of Muslims in Imo State is comparatively low, 4.79%, but 6.3% of their parents are Muslims. The number of non-denominational church members is low but since the end of the Civil War in Nigeria their number is on the increase. The

percentage of the respondents' parents who belonged to non-denominational congregations was 0.8%, while respondents themselves in this congregation were 3.9%. Before the Civil War most schools and colleges were run by Protestant and Catholic Churches and they were reluctant to admit non-members of their denominations into these institutions. With the state take-over of the schools and colleges at the end of the Civil War, young people were free to join any religious body and still receive education.

The above pattern of religion is not true of other parts of Nigeria, but it does point out clearly that the Imo State is predominantly Catholic. A similar survey in Northern Nigeria would show that the region is predominantly Muslim. Later we shall associate religion with political participation in order to determine how religion as an individual or group characteristic influences political behaviour, particularly voting. Religion, it might be suggested, has an important influence on Nigerian politics and that this influence tends to pass from one generation to the next, the tendency being more consistent with the father's religion. These hypotheses will be quantified later, but meanwhile we should state in more detail the importance of religion in Nigerian political systems.

As explained on the theory of missionary education, in Eastern Nigeria the early influence of Catholic missionaries in the region established a solid ground for Catholics, both in the rural and urban areas. The missionaries did not only embark on the conversion of pagans to Christianity but also offered effective education to the convert which (in my opinion) had more effect on the western-orientation of Igbos than the doctrine of religion itself. Most of the Catholic educational institutions were exclusively for Catholics. Despite current changes in the educational system in Imo State the data indicates a consistent relationship between respondents' education and religion and that of their parents.

The expansion of missionary activities in the rural areas, as explained earlier, meant that the missionaries, unlike the colonial commercialists, did not limit their activities to the urban coast, but penetrated inland. The data reflects this trend - 57.1% of traditional and 88.2% of the rural elite respondents' fathers were Catholics, while 62.5% and 94.1% of their mothers in the same group categories were also Catholics.

But the importance of the Catholic religion in Imo State cannot be over-emphasised, nor can the Muslim religion in the North. The Catholic religion

seems to be comparatively exclusive in Imo State, as the data reveals when figures are compared with the next most important Christian religion in the state, Protestant.

Table 8:9

A Comparison of Catholics and Protestants in the Survey

	Dichotomic Total/Column %	
	Catholic	Protestant
Respondents' fathers	(81) 63.3%	(19) 14.8%
Respondents' mothers	(86) 67.7%	(19) 15.0%
Respondents (selves)	(97) 75.2%	(20) 15.5%

The impact of these sharp differences on politics in Nigeria will be related to the media broadcasts during the last general election in relation to religion and education. The concessions promised to Catholics by a Protestant state governor who took consideration of the number of Catholics in the state will further be analysed in terms of these differences. Also why a Protestant rather than a Catholic came to a leadership position in the state dominated by Catholics, if religion does play such a crucial role in Nigerian politics, shows the importance of Zik - a Protestant - in Igbo politics.

In general, however, religion and the kinship or tribal system are closely associated in Nigerian politics. As demonstrated, the influence of parents and relatives is considerable in kinship structures within different groups and regions in Nigeria. If ethnicity is the basis of political participation, kinship and associated networks of social relationship and structure reinforce it. I should therefore propose that the basis of political interaction or communication should be thoroughly examined within these structures rather than exclusively on external structures, but relatively functional, such as the imported electronic mass media election campaign format. My central argument is in favour of the convergence model within which various network systems are constructed, so that the new structure of communication in a rapidly changing society can be clearly

revealed. This argument applies elements of Rogers and Kincaid's concept of communication network analysis, in which individuals or groups in the communication structure are identified while the communication structure itself in a political system is the arrangement of the differentiated elements that can be recognised in the patterned communication flows. One objective of communication research using network analysis is to identify this communication structure and thus to understand the "big picture" of human interaction in a system. This research objective is holistic, in marked contrast to the study of communication effects on individuals.⁴ The "big picture" of human interaction in a system is linked by a patterned information exchange, which is frequently determined by the structure of individual or group relations. The shape of this association as defined by kinship and religion is vital in Nigeria's various communities.

The more similar people in Nigeria are in their kinship and religious beliefs, the more likely it is that they are actually related together in a pattern of political communication. The extent to which these relationships are effectively utilised in place of other alternative influences should be examined in depth. Consequently, it is necessary to examine other demographic features of the network groups - the determinants of the respondents that will broaden our perceptions of how various groups participate in politics in Nigeria.

In Nigeria and elsewhere, the direct effect of education is that the higher the educational attainment of an individual the higher his/her chance of obtaining a high status job. We have noted earlier that educated Nigerians are the decision-making elite. But the desire to become a political decision-making elite is not the main motive for seeking education in Nigeria. Also, we have seen above that parents and relatives bear the financial burden. The political importance of this cost of education in Nigeria is that strong ties are maintained between the elite and their parents and relatives who may live in the village or city. The financial support of the elite for their relatives is a crucial political influence.

In the survey, the following occupational groups were distinguished: unemployed, traders/businessmen, artisans, teachers and professionals. For our purposes, professionals will include civil servants, doctors, engineers, bankers and others with a special training. Teachers are considered separately because of the political dimension which their profession has taken in Nigeria, particularly in the last general elections. The terms

'traders' and 'businessmen' are used interchangeably in Nigeria. Most traders call themselves businessmen and in their response to the questionnaire they represent themselves as such. What is important here is to state statistically which of the five groups are dominant in the various occupations.

Table 9:9
Respondents' Occupations

	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	Total
Unemployed	8 16.3	9 69.2	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	17 12.8
Traders or Businessmen	2 4.1	0 0.0	4 36.4	13 31.0	0 0.0	19 14.3
Artisan	8 16.3	2 15.4	4 36.4	0 0.0	0 0.0	14 10.5
Farmer	31 63.3	2 15.4	3 27.3	0 0.0	0 0.0	36 27.1
Teacher	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	10 23.8	14 77.8	24 18.0
Professional	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	19 45.2	4 22.2	23 17.3
Total	49 100	13 100	11 100	42 100	18 100	133 100
	36.8	9.8	8.3	31.6	13.5	100

In all the five groups 27.1% (36) are farmers but 86.1% (31) are from the traditional group, only 5.6% (2) and 27.3% (3) of young school leavers and urban poor are farmers. This is the dual residence and occupation which has become evident in Nigeria during the rapid economic development when roads and cheap transport made it easy for the inadequately paid, either in the public or private sector, urban poor or young school leavers to go to the village to farm or rent land to grow food crops. It is important to note that the urban elite and rural elite are completely disassociated from farming. There is no association between traditional, young school leavers and urban poor groups with teaching and professional occupations in the survey. Those occupations are exclusively for the urban and rural elites -

teaching 18.0% (24) and professional 17.3% (23). 77.8% of the rural elites are teachers, while 22.2% are professionals. Professionals other than teachers in rural areas are all doctors who work in the rural area hospitals. It is also important to note that 3% of the urban elites and 36.4% of the urban poor are traders or businessmen. Here we begin to see a development of common occupation between the highly educated and the poorly or completely uneducated in Nigeria (this development is both political and economic).

The bloodless coup of July 29th 1975 brought Brigadier Murtala Mohammed to power, who embarked on the elimination of corruption. As we noted earlier, "Some 10,000 civil servants, including not a few well known upper echelon figures in the universities, police, statutory corporations, judiciary and state administration, were thus retired or dismissed ... Even in the army, all officers above the rank of brigadier were retired ... By early 1979 the army's strength had ... dropped to some 180,000".⁵ The strength of the army at the end of the Civil War stood at 250,000.

We observed in earlier chapters that in the pre-Nigerian Civil War period, political power rested in the hands of politicians at regional levels. The military take-over of power in 1966 drastically altered the power base in Nigeria and in the words of William D. Graft:

"... the war ... fundamentally altered the balance of power among the regions, and between the regions and the central government ... political power was pre-empted from regions to the centre. The regional blocs had already been broken up into twelve states, and the individual states, now administered by military governors and civil servants responsible to the federal government, were deprived. Civil servants, rather than politicians, moved into the areas of policy-making, resources allocation and administration. Central powers were further enhanced after 1969 by a massive increase in oil revenues, which by 1972 constituted half of all government revenue by 1976 a full 93% of export earnings."⁶

From the above quotation and in relation to our data, under the military system of government the traditional, young school leavers, urban poor and teachers are excluded from decision-making bodies in Nigeria. This is essentially because of their low level of education and subsequently their occupation. Also not all the professionals were engaged in political decision-making, 10,000 civil servants were dismissed and all soldiers above the rank of brigadier were forced to retire. The military demobilisation ushered into the Nigerian labour market some 70,000 ex-servicemen. At the same time the Nigerian economy was booming as a result of oil revenues.

The retired elites went into business or trade, and the Nigerian urban poor were further displaced from this sector of the economy. During the elite terms in office they built strong links with the civil servants who awarded government contracts on the "kick-back" basis - a process that intensified corruption in Nigeria. The effect of having large numbers of ex-soldiers released into the economy was a rise in unemployment, increased pressure on public welfare services and an increase in crime, especially armed robbery.⁷

Certainly the Mohammed/Obasanjo policy of civil servants' decision-making and accountability to the Federal Government could not be very different from the military system of government introduced by Ironsi (which was bitterly opposed by the North and then a counter coup was staged in which Ironsi was killed and his administration changed).

This new arrangement had important implications among various groups. Under Mohammed and Obasajo's rule the number of states increased from 12 to 19; reforms were effected in the sphere of local government, a committee on the establishment of a federal capital also reported back to the military government, and a binding decision was made in favour of the more centrally located Abaja.⁸ Having realised the decision-making power endowed on civil servants, the network of political communication was centred exclusively on the military and the civil servants. Research which aims at understanding this relationship should therefore study politics as a specific decision-making network. Since bureaucratic institutions of decision-making are formal organisations, their structural network of relationship is strongly status-based and characteristically hierarchical in order. Communication is therefore more stratified and secrecy prevails. In most cases, the lower ranks are excluded, so that not only the urban poor, rural elites, traditional and young school leavers are excluded in the network but also low rank civil servants as well. Hence autocratic leadership was the practice of the system. In this process, enormous power was given to the highest bureaucratic decision-making bodies, particularly permanent secretaries. It was generally believed that during the above-mentioned administration's rule, six to eight permanent secretaries ruled Nigeria.

Another level of looking at this relationship between civil servants and the government in Nigeria is the level of power sharing between the three major tribes. Before the Civil War many civil servants, or what I call in this study professionals, were the Igbos and the Yorubas. The block of non-commissioned army officers were Hausa/Fulani, but the Igbos constituted the

majority of the commissioned and commanding officers. The competition between the Igbos and the Yorubas, because of their comparable Western education, for civil service jobs was frequently intense. With the incidences of 1966, the Igbos were forced to create their own government, Biafra. This led to a rapid rise in the ranks in the army among Hausa/Fulani and in the civil sector various posts left by the Igbos were occupied by the Yorubas. This arrangement seemed to have created mutual power-sharing between the Hausa/Fulani, who controlled the political system, and the Yoruba, who made bureaucratic decisions that were related to the central policy. Yet again easy oil money made the relation more rewarding for both. However, the return of the Igbo to politics in Nigeria began to reshape this relationship in various ways.

Going back to our original concept of convergence and network analysis, we have noted that 100% of the rural elite respondents live in the village, while 81.0% of urban elite respondents live in the city. All the traditional group live in the rural areas, so do 63.6% of the urban poor. There is therefore close proximity in terms of residence between urban elites, urban poor and traditional network groups.

The role of teachers (rural elites) in particular is an important factor which links the rural population to urban communication networks, eg mass media. I have drawn attention to network linkage to show how links based on common rural origin, kinship and proximity are used to establish the "grassroots organisation of a political party"⁹ in Nigeria. The obligatory relationship and friendship impact on individuals who are linked in the political system will be statistically stated, statistics which will show whether the concept, that elite Africans are disassociated from the masses, is accurate or not: (a) because the obligatory relationship in Africa; and (b) several military interventions in Nigerian politics have discouraged well-meaning elites from political participation - they are more concerned with social relationships with their kinsmen and friends in the cities and villages. What generally obtains in Igboland as well as in other communities is a generic type of network, in which bonds indicate role relationship among family and kinship members irrespective of differences in education and occupation.¹⁰ Several forces exact themselves on the elites to maintain strong links with the poor in their communities. We have already seen that many Nigerian elites come from humble backgrounds. Lloyd (1974) in his study of Yoruba communities teased out the main reasons why the elite associate themselves with their communities.

For an elite to be respected by his social equals, he:

"... ought to be active in promoting the interest of one's community for the man who envisages a political career, mass support in his home area is a prerequisite of success, for it is only in this area, effectively that he can stand for election. Others recognise that local popularity will enable them to get the desired plot of building land at a reasonable price, to hear of commercial opportunities ... Thus there are strong pressures on the city dweller to identify with his home town or village."

Socially, the network linkage or connections between the poor and rich from the same tribal origin in the city are enhanced by special occasions and celebrations in which:

"... the participants at these celebrations are to a large extent ethnically defined, and ethnic cohesion is thus enhanced. Again, weddings, funerals and the like bring men and women into renewed contact with their more distant kin, their erstwhile school and age mates, who have remained in the community. By a simple greeting the successful emigrant recognises his origins whilst the home dweller affirms his relationship with the emigrant. Those migrants who have built houses in their home town may furthermore spend the whole weekend there, returning to the city early on Monday morning; their interaction with their home community is thus increased." (Lloyd, 1977: 122-123)

The fact that rural elites (teachers) and traditional network groups interact freely, because the social structure in the village and the extended kinship network transcends village level to encompass urban areas is fully illustrated by Epstein in his African research (1961). He uses Elizabeth Bott's concept of 'closed' and 'open' networks in which 'local elites' interactions with 'non-elites'. Rogers and Kincaid (1981) discuss similar concepts in terms of proximity, strong and weak ties in network communication. They argue that:

- "1) The degree of proximity in communication dyads is negatively related to their information-exchange potential.
- 2) The degree of heterophily in communication dyads is positively related to their information-exchange potential."

As we have seen statistically, our two political environments, rural and urban, are well served by elites who can read newspapers, listen to the news in English by radio broadcasts and own and watch TV with relatives. The social structure permits a high degree of interpersonal communication between all network groups. Also as Mitchell et al (1969) have noted, most

African elites, despite distances separating them from their rural folk, support them financially, a process which reduces physical distance and reinforces social and political influences on each other. It is therefore difficult to apply Rogers and Kincaid's model in Africa. There is no homophileous community in Imo State; education, teaching, and other professions, transport facilities, press, radio and TV have created communities of immense interchange of political information. The role of teachers (rural elites) as well as urban elites who were concerned with their local communities in political mobilisation during the last general election will be analysed later.

One of the main problems in assessing the social and geographical mobility of Nigerians is that nobody has tried to state the frequency of unemployment and the permanency of jobs in relation to the different categories of the working population.

Labour mobility is an important aspect of political communication processes, particularly in a society where extended kinship systems do not stop at the village boundaries but extend and are reinforced by new socio-political and economic needs in the cities. Nigeria, like other African societies, is 'a kin-bound'¹² society, and in the cities and in the villages tribal unions, clubs etc. are formed to perform similar roles for members of the same village in the cities. Earlier, I have speculated on how these social clubs are utilised by group leaders, politicians and general members of the organisations for political mobilisation. People who are not engaged in permanent jobs often take active parts in the running of these village/ethnic clubs. Before we examine these clubs statistically as collective political communication channels, we should illustrate qualitatively which groups in our five categories are less permanently employed, and how frequently they are unemployed and how frequently they visit their relatives in the villages and the cities. This will help us to determine the degree of connectedness between villages and towns through respondents network of interpersonal relationships, a factor which is very important in understanding political information exchange, both within and between villages and cities.

In all the groups, 80% of the respondents are in permanent employment and only 20% are not. Using row percentage the relation between permanently employed and temporarily employed persons in each cell can be clearly identified.

Table 10:9

Row % (Of Whether Permanently Employed)

Groups	Permanent	Temporary	Total
Traditional	88.6 (39)	11.4 (5)	35.2 (44)
School Leavers	27.3 (3)	72.7 (8)	8.8 (11)
Urban Poor	81.8 (9)	18.2 (2)	8.8 (11)
Urban Elite	83.3 (35)	16.7 (7)	33.6 (42)
Rural Elite	82.4 (14)	17.6 (3)	13.6 (17)
Total	80.0 (100)	20.0 (25)	10.0 (125)

It seems an over-simplistic approach to understand only the extent to which various network groups are permanently or temporarily employed. To pin down our arguments, and analyse subsequent data with the view of understanding clearly how demographic factors influence the way particular groups communicate, we should know the frequency of unemployment in different groups. This has a direct effect on how often unemployment forces Nigerians to move geographically from village to city, city to village, village to village (a rare labour movement in Imo State because of the exclusive role of kinship ties within any village in Igboland), or in the case of teachers (rural elites) who are transferred from one village to another. City to city mobility is common and some stay in the same place to look for a new job.

The degree of difference in the frequency of unemployment can be expressed as often unemployed, rarely and never unemployed. This will enable us to determine statistically the differences in permanent unemployment in a format which can later be related to the degree of geographic mobility between different groups and the frequency of their visits to their relatives who live in the towns and villages. When these visits become more frequent, such as during election campaigns, they can be associated with different groups and the data will be explained politically in terms of the relationship.

Table 11:9

Respondents' Frequency of Unemployment

Groups	Very often Unemployed	Rarely Unemployed	Never Unemployed	Row Total
Traditional	(8) 17.8%	(13) 28.9%	(24) 53.3%	(45) 36.6%
School Leavers	(3) 30.0%	(2) 20.0%	(5) 50.0%	(10) 8.1%
Urban Poor	(1) 9.1%	(2) 18.2%	(8) 72.7%	(11) 8.9%
Urban Elite	(1) 2.5%	(16) 40.0%	(23) 57.5%	(40) 32.3%
Rural Elite	(3) 17.6%	(8) 47.1%	(6) 35.3%	(17) 13.8%
Column Total	(16) 13.0%	(41) 33.3%	(66) 53.7%	(123) 100%

Number of missing observations = 30

From these figures it is clear that those who are frequently out of work are young school leavers or those who are yet trying various jobs to make ends meet. As we noted in chapter two, jobs for school leavers are not readily available in the rural areas where large numbers of them received their formal education. The problem is historical, the missionaries advanced the growth of education in the interior of Nigeria south of the Benue and Niger rivers, the government of the time could not match or make any attempt to establish industries in these areas to absorb these young people. The tendency has been village/urban migration. Their geographical mobility through and from the village is an important mechanism of information exchange.

It may be striking to note that 88.6% of traditional network groups are permanently employed, but we should remember that their occupation is subsistence agriculture. Most early writers, particularly anthropologists, believed that African small-scale farmers are seasonally employed. This is an over-generalisation of the farming activities in Africa. In Igboland farmers are almost continuously engaged in farming and its related industries such as continuous fencing of barns (often destroyed by termite ants), domestic animals, etc., clearing and burning of bush for planting,

marketing some harvests in order to buy new ones to plant, food and clothes, then the actual planting season are all part of farming activities. After planting the farmer is not just merely waiting to harvest his crops which takes about four to five months to mature. He is constantly engaged in weeding the grass which grows with amazing rapidity in the tropical equatorial heavy rain belt of south eastern Nigeria. In view of these facts, any Igbo farmer would correctly regard himself as a full-time farmer.

The rural elites, urban elites and urban poor are more constrained and institutionally regulated once they are employed either in the public or private sectors. The only group who are characteristically mobile are the young school leavers. I shall show statistically that the idea that these young people only migrate from village to cities is wrong. There is also homeward (city to village) migration when hopes of jobs fade away in the cities. They are a reserve labour force who are readily available to be used in different ways by politicians for a short time during the election campaign both in the villages and in the cities. Their characteristic network of political communication during elections as party agents in both political environments will also be explained in terms of the available figures.

Generally, 13.0% of the respondents are very often unemployed. In all 33.3% are rarely unemployed, and 53.7% are never unemployed. In Imo State many people are self-employed. A high proportion, 72.7%, of the urban poor respondents reported that they were never unemployed. This is because most of them are traders and artisans, occupations in Nigeria which are usually self-employed occupations. They do not therefore consider unemployment as an important political question. Since the media reinforce social beliefs and are owned and controlled by the state, they systematically avoid unemployment and other political issues. How much some pressing social issues are ranked in degree of importance by the respondents will be related to, and compared with, what the media and the press in particular carried as 'headlines' during the period of the 1983 election. Interpretation of what emerged shall be given in terms of these relationships.

Those who are self-employed during political campaigns have more opportunity to be more mobile between the village and city. The data indicate that the number of respondents who are self-employed is nearly equal to those who are employed by the government or other agencies. A high proportion of traditional and urban poor are self-employed, 78.3% and 81.8% respectively.

On the contrary, the highest state employed group is the rural elite, 94.8%, and secondly, urban elites, 67.5%. This clearly supports, in quantitative terms, the argument that education is the basis on which the state recruits its work force, and also that bureaucracy is dominated by the elites in Nigeria.

Table 12:9

Row %

Respondents Self-Employment Pattern

	Yes	No	Total	
Traditional	(36) 78.3	(10) 21.7	(46) 100	36.5%
School Leavers	(2) 15.4	(11) 84.6	(13) 100	10.3%
Urban Poor	(9) 81.8	(2) 18.2	(11) 100	8.7%
Urban Elite	(13) 32.5	(27) 67.5	(40) 100	31.7%
Rural Elite	(1) 5.2	(15) 94.8	(16) 100	12.8%
Column Total	(61) 48.4	(65) 51.6	(126) 100	

Number of missing observations = 27

We have seen that there is a high correlation between education and gainful employment in government establishments, eg educational institutions, etc. On the other hand, there is a high correlation between low standards of education and/or none at all educational attainment with self-employment. Government employment with its associated high level of educational prerequisites carries a high social and economic status.

In terms of political communication, what is important in occupational status is the way individuals who possess such status utilise it to influence others and seek political support and leadership in their communities. The elites and government employees, in their personal networks, help their kinsmen to obtain jobs in the city. We have seen the case of the Igbo office clerk who wrote to his relative in the village about a vacant post in the North where he worked. In Western Nigeria Lloyd states that "the educated man or woman who comes to Ibadan to assume a new

post finds himself surrounded by countless friends and acquaintances - near and distant kin, school and college friends..." Some of these he would accomodate and help to find jobs. The poorly educated save their initial earnings and with additional financial support from parents, friends and relatives, start on their own as a trader or craftsman - occupations regarded as more secure in life than working for the governemnt or others. With increasing numbers of more educated people from colleges and university, the poorly educated stand little chance of staying in office jobs to retirement age. We must recall our argument earlier that the emerging new political elites in African societies were the products of the colonial situation. The importance of elite status has a direct relationship with the colonial situation. Goldthorpe has noted that in the colonial period:

"With the first establishment of administration and business there comes a demand for the services of clerks and other junior officals and managerial staff which it is uneconomic to meet by bringing in expatriates ... the activities of Christian missions have come to include the establishment of schools and the provision of education ... a pattern in which mission schools are seen as the avenue to the white-collar jobs of 'fonctionnaires' and professional men."

Hence the term "'the magic of literacy'. Paper qualifications became an end in themselves. Mission-educated clerks, officers, fonctionnaires, et al., embrace a Western way of life." 'Western way of life' here is not only cultural but also political systems.¹³

While education created this elite status class, another important group emerged as a result of the new economic system introduced by the colonialist money economy. Indigenous businessmen, traders, artisans, cash crop farmers, shopkeepers etc. began to employ labour.

From the above explanations, it is clear that the illiterates and poorly educated are self-employed and thus employ other people and the eudcated are employees of government, and do not employ others. However, while the self-employed may employ a high number of labourers, the educated elites, though employed by the state, also employ labour in their private farms, shops or others as chauffeurs etc. Goldthorpe agrees that in Africa:

"members of the elite become farmers and businessmen part-time and in retirement."¹⁴

It is reasonable to hypothesize that employers both in state (public) and private sectors interact with their employees while employees interact among themselves and may be influencing each other politically. Before we can consider qualitatively the political influence of workmates on various network groups, it is important to establish the statistical relationship between employees and different network systems.

Table 13:9

Respondents' Number of Employees

Groups	1-10	21-30	51-60	Total	
Traditional	23 85.2	3 11.1	1 3.7	27 100	52.9
School Leaver	2 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 100	3.9
Urban Poor	10 100	0 0.0	0 0.0	10 100	19.6
Urban Elite	10 100	0 0.0	0 0.0	10 100	19.6
Rural Elite	1 50.0	1 50.0	0 0.0	2 100	3.9
Column Total	46 90.2	4 7.8	1 2.0	51 100	100

Number of missing observations: 102

In the survey, 90.2% (46) of the respondents reported that they employed a labour force of between one to ten people. Of these, half are from the traditional network group. Only 4.3% (2) are school leavers, while the remainder are from the urban poor and urban elites (21.7%) each and rural elites 2.2% only. Beyond this number 1-10, only 3 in the traditional group employed 21-30 people and one employed 51-60 workers. One rural elite also employed 21-30 workers. At this stage and with these data we cannot determine the political relationship between workers themselves and their employers. To do so would be sheer speculation. The political influence that exists between them will be examined later. But, statistically, it is evident that in Nigeria the traditional group, though the least educated, are the highest employers of labour besides the government and large private enterprises. Also rural elites and urban elites, though employed by the state, employ a few people. It is important to point out that the

traditional employer depends for his employees on members of his family and kin who are made up of wives, children and other relatives. Some distant village labourers are employed during planting and harvesting periods and are paid on a daily basis. Relatives may or may not be paid, but often children and wives are not paid. The strong African kinship system prevalent in the countryside transcends economic relationships and is also expected to create strong political ties where the influence of parents and relatives predominates.

Another important demographic characteristic of the groups is the relative differences in geographical mobility during times of unemployment.

The differences in the mobility of different groups during periods of unemployment is important in the general geographical mobility of unemployed Nigerians. When people are unemployed in a society where unemployment benefit does not exist, they are compelled by economic needs to move from one place to another in the search for work. The importance of this geographical labour movement cannot be over-emphasised in network analysis. This movement is not always exclusively economic, it can have social and political implications. Earlier I have argued against Rogers and Kincaid's notion of network homophily in terms of information circulation with any particular community in Nigeria because of the presence of elites, radio, TV and newspapers in the village, which make every community heterophilous in political information. But on the basis of individual linkages to heterogenous communities, labour migration in Nigeria can accommodate the concept of heterophily or homophily. In the village, because of the homogenous character of the population, most people are closely tied to members of their kin. The basic pattern of political communication influence would be expected to be based on kinship where elders and parents have the greatest impact. In the urban areas, an individual is now linked to new patterns of social relationship based on a heterogenous population. The influence of friends, workmates, and the mass media may become more important in political participation and voting. Here also Epstein's (1961) study of "the network and urban social organisation" in a small administrative African rail post - Ndola - applied the concept of 'closed' and 'open' social networks used by Bott in 1957 to explain interaction between local elites and non-elites in urban situations. Here we may equally argue that people who are occupationally tied to their village communities are governed by norms of kinship in a communication relationship which is 'closed' while those who migrate to the cities are governed by

extended or 'open' networks in order to obtain new information for jobs etc. .

In order to relate labour mobility to homophily or heterophily networks of connectedness, it is important to identify the particular pattern of mobility within each of the identified network systems.

In most literature on African migration, the concept of village to urban migration has been over-generalised. This thesis so far has increasingly tended toward this direction. At this stage the concept should be statistically represented and geographical mobility will be pinned down to the particular identifiable network groups most involved in the process. As people move from village to city they also move back to the village, or to another city, or from one part of the same city to the other (Mitchell, ed, 1969; Southall, ed, 1959; Peace, 1979; Meillassoux, 1968; Lloyd, 1967, 1974, 1984; Peil, 1972). There are various reasons for this movement which have been explained earlier; meanwhile we are concerned with such mobility during periods of unemployment.

All of the traditional network group stay in the village when they are unemployed. My earlier argument is that most of the farmers who are occupationally associated with traditional network groups regard themselves as fully employed because all year round they have to attend their farms, with varied intensity of labour. As a result of this total labour confinement to the traditional kinship network characteristic of the village, we should assume that the network of connectedness is homophileous. But how this demographic characteristic affects political participation and voting behaviour differently from other network groups in our study has yet to be determined.¹⁵

The urban poor are more evenly spread out during periods of unemployment. 36.4% move from village to city. Only 9.1% go back to the village, while another 45.5% stay in the same city. 9.1% go to another city. As we have noted earlier, most people in this network are self-employed, therefore they find it difficult to move to another city because of the cost of starting anew. Secondly, unlike the young school leavers, they have young families and the accommodation problems in a new city would further discourage city to city movement. Peace (1979) and Lloyd (1984) showed that migrants' kinsmen such as elders and the educated 'class' prefer to accommodate unmarried or single kinsmen migrants because of the cost involved by 'their elders' who "frequently provide invaluable mentors in helping them to manage

difficult situations which emerge in the setting of the Town". In terms of the extended network of connectedness, they are heterophileous as they are no longer tied to their village kin exclusively.

Table 14:9
Respondents' Geographical Mobility When Unemployed

Groups	Stay in Village	Village to City	City to Village	Same City	City to City	Total	
Traditional	49 100	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	49 100	36.8
School Leaver	0 0.0	4 30.8	3 23.1	6 46.2	0 0.0	13 100	9.8
Urban Poor	0 0.0	4 36.4	1 9.1	5 45.5	1 9.1	11 100	8.3
Urban Elite	0 0.0	8 19.0	7 16.7	23 54.8	4 9.5	42 100	31.6
Rural Elite	18 100.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	18 100	13.5
Column	67 50.4	16 12.0	11 8.3	34 25.6	5 3.8	133 100	

Number of missing observations = 20

Of the urban elites 19.0% leave the village for the city during unemployment, while 16.7% return to the village. One of the contributory factors in city to village migration of this group is old age, voluntary retirement or forced retirement as we have noted during the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo regime, and recently by the deposed Buhari regime. A higher percentage of this network group stay in the city, 54%, during an unemployment period, while 9.5% go to other cities in search of new jobs. Unlike the urban poor or young school leavers, urban elites are better qualified and have gained a greater number of years work experience and perhaps have saved enough money to sustain them independently of friends and relatives if they move to other cities seeking jobs. Statistically, therefore, it is the urban elites who are both geographically and socially most mobile within the urban environments. By implication, they have the most extensive network of linkages and connectedness in the horizontal and vertical communication processes within and between cities.

All the rural elites stay in the village during a time of unemployment. Their unemployment is not like other network groups. We have noted that the majority of them are teachers by occupation. After the completion of their teacher's training, they stay in their village of origin to wait for deployment to other villages of their own. During the vacation period, some of them still report to their stations for light duties and they do not go to the cities to look for jobs unless they have formally resigned from teaching. There are twenty missing observations, which are those who refused to indicate where they go and what they do during periods of unemployment. Those engaged in dubious activities are more likely to avoid the question.

In Chapter One I disputed the idea that educated Africans are cut off from kin and tribesmen. Goldthorpe (1959) argues that the relation between class (elite) and kinship makes it difficult for the Western concept of social class separatedness to apply in Africa, where he noted that one of the chief personal problems of educated Africans is the avalanche of poor relations who descend on them as soon as they get their first salaried job.¹⁶ Leith Ross (1955); Peace (1979); Peil (1972); Meillassoux (1968); Lloyd (1967, 1984) have made similar observations on the relationship between educated and non-educated Africans. Early in this chapter it has been statistically demonstrated that Nigerian children are educated by the efforts of their parents and relatives rather than by the government. It is this obligatory kinship responsibility that cements networks of relationships in Nigeria. Not all in the family are educated, those who receive it do so through unified family contributions and they are obliged to assist those who do not have it.

Leith-Ross comments on the elite in Nigeria from a family point of view that:

"the family is not the unit of parents and children but the extended family which looks for financial help or moral support to whatever member has made good. The minister has a 'sister' selling cassava in the market; the successful doctor has a 'brother' working as a Public Works Department labourer. The family bond linking rich and poor, literate, influential and insignificant, militates against any idea of a strictly isolated 'class'. It also prevents the group, though increasingly Westernised, from being cut off from its origins."¹⁷

Table 14:9

Frequency of Respondents' Visits to Relatives in the City/Township

Groups	Never	Less than once a year	Once a year	Once a month	Once a week	More than once a week	Total	
Traditional	4 3.1	5 3.8	11 8.4	23 17.6	1 0.8	3 2.3	47 100	35.9
School Leaver	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 1.5	5 3.6	3 2.3	3 2.3	13 100	9.9
Urban Poor	1 0.8	0 0.0	0 0.0	3 2.3	2 1.5	5 3.8	11 100	8.4
Urban Elite	0 0.0	1 0.8	6 4.6	12 9.2	15 11.5	8 6.1	42 100	32.1
Rural Elite	0 0.0	0 0.0	2 1.5	10 7.6	3 2.3	3 2.3	18 100	13.7
Column Total	5 3.8	6 4.6	21 16.0	53 40.5	24 18.3	22 16.8	131 100	

Number of missing observations = 22

The most direct ways of statistically representing the maintenance of relationship between rural and urban networks through human interactions in Nigeria is by evaluating frequency of visits between them. Indeed, this is fundamental to my method of analysis. Only 3.8% in all the five groups had never visited their relatives in the city, 3.1% (4) of these come from the traditional network group and only 0.8% (1) from the urban poor. There are two possible interpretations of this: (a) some respondents in the traditional network are very old and cannot travel to the city to visit relatives, but their relatives in the cities visit them - when they were young there were bad roads, many cities were located near the coast and too far from home; (b) slave raids limited horizontal movement and when slavery was stopped, the modern transport that was introduced perhaps proved too expensive for them to afford. For the urban poor (one person) who never visited relatives in the city, he could be a trader who finishes his buying and selling in the city on a daily basis and returns to the village.

In the traditional network the rest of the respondents visit their relatives in the city fairly frequently, 80.8% do so at least once a year, 48.9% once a month and 8.5% weekly or even more frequently. The most modal period of

visits according to this table among traditional network groups is once a month. In Chapter One we argued that village/urban migration was a quest for jobs and better wages to support relatives - mainly the young, women and old in the village. We have also seen that parents educate their children so that they may support them later in life financially. It was in view of this that Goldthorpe made his remark about "the avalanche of poor relations". But this demand is a continuous demand. In Africa, and in Nigeria in particular, most workers are paid at the end of each month. This may throw some light on the monthly visits to wage earners! Most Nigerians respond to this family obligation with pride. Similar visits of urban dwellers to their relatives in the villages, the urban elites, who constitute the highest waged or salaried group in the cities, also scored the highest of their visiting period once a month: 45.2% if relatives in the village could not visit them, returning home briefly with goods and money. The strength of links between relatives in the city and village in terms of monthly visits should become clearer if we compare the column percentage of the two polar network groups in our survey, the traditional network and the urban elite.

There are strong ties between urban elites and their rural relatives illustrating that the concept that African elites are cut off or 'isolate' themselves from their rural poor relatives is misleading. The political importance of this network link between the predominantly urban group and the predominantly traditional rural networks group during an election period will be examined in terms of political communication influences and voting behaviour in the last general election.

Since this network of connectedness between relatives both in the cities and villages is important in deepening understanding of political communication in Nigeria, other intermediary network groups in this study should be rigorously examined in relation to the two political environments - village/urban systems.

Visits to relatives in the city among the young school leavers group is evenly spread from once a year to more than once a week. The highest cell total percentage is 38.5% and this yet again takes place at once a month periods. There is nobody in this group who visits his relatives less than once a year. The urban poor regularly visit their relatives in the city once a month, 27.3%, once a week, 18.2%, and more than once a week, 45.5%. Of the urban elites, 35.7% visit relatives in town once a week, 28.6% once a

month, 19% more than once a week and only 16.7% once a year.

The visits could be individual or collective, and the visit here is both within and between relatives living in the town and in the village.

"Educated brothers and sisters are in many cases living in Ibadan. All have cars and they can visit one another frequently. It is much more difficult to measure the social distance between the elite and their non-educated siblings working in their home towns as farmers and craftsmen. All the elite visit their homes at least once a year; many go monthly if parents still live there and if the distances are short - not exceeding a hundred miles each way. News from home is also carried by other kinsmen. Thus one may have a considerable knowledge of the affairs of one's close kin at home, whatever one's affective relationship with them."
(Lloyd et al 1967:144)

When relatives visit each other once a month, in Igboland, important collective action is taking place. As we shall see later, every Igbo adult - male or female - belongs to a social organisation, club or union. They hold what is popularly known as 'monthly' meetings once every month in the village or in the city. Criteria for membership of these organisations vary from members of ethnic, village, religious, age group, etc. to any Nigerian citizen. Other reasons could be behind the visit at this once a month period.

I have argued in chapter one that social clubs in the village are extended to cities where members of the same kins continue their traditional relationship in various ways such as economic assistance to each member, helping to find jobs for relatives who arrive from the vilalge, etc. We also noted in chpater two that Smoch, A.C. (1977), argued with illustrative case studies from Mbaise and Abiriba in Imo State, that these unions existed both in villages and in the city (eg Port Harcourt) as the political and economic base of the group. How much these organisations are used by any of the five identified network groups in the towns or villages for political participation during the 1983 general election in Nigeria will be considered in detail in the next chapter.

Meanwhile, having examined quantitatively the frequency of visits among all the network systems to their relatives in the town, a similar analysis should be applied to network groups visiting relatives in the village. This is a necessary approach since we have maintained that in studies of convergence and networks of political communication attention should be paid

to the understanding of communication as the interchangeable, two-way flow of information at every level between participants in the system. The flow of information between the rural population and urban dwellers, to a certain extent, is consistent with the principle of a convergence model.

In all the groups, most people visit their relatives in the village, and in the traditional network group the frequency of visits rises from 14.3% once a month to 32.7% once a week and cumulates at 51.0% of more than once a week. The regularity of interpersonal communication in the traditional kinship group may be significantly more important in influencing members politically either in a negative or positive way than high intensity of interpersonal interaction in the modern city. This is because, in rural areas, kinship network carries a high rate of obligatory values while in the city friendship has less obligations. Meanwhile, our data cannot tell us how politically important are the regularity of the visits in both environments.

The young school leavers in their visits to relatives in the town also make regular visits to their relatives in the village. This clearly indicates that the young school leavers, previously believed to have abandoned the village for the city, maintain regular visits to the village in such a manner that it would be possible to reconsider them as both city and village dwellers.

Table 15:9

Frequency of Respondents' Visits to Relatives in the Villages

Groups	Never	Once a year	Once a month	Once a week	More than once a week	Total	
Traditional	4 8.5	11 23.4	23 48.9	1 2.1	3 6.4	47 100	35.9
School Leaver	0 0.0	2 15.4	5 38.5	3 23.1	3 23.1	13 100	9.9
Urban Poor	1 9.1	0 0.0	3 27.3	2 18.2	5 45.5	11 100	8.4
Urban Elite	0 0.0	6 14.3	12 28.6	15 35.7	8 19.0	42 100	32.1
Rural Elite	0 0.0	2 11.1	10 55.6	3 16.7	3 16.7	18 100	13.7
Column Total	5 3.8	21 16.0	53 40.5	24 18.3	22 16.8	131	100

Number of missing observations = 22

The urban poor also maintain the same pattern of visiting relatives in the village as the young school leavers. Like their urban elite counterparts, in terms of residence only, their highest visiting time of 45.5% is once a month, when they fulfil similar obligations to kin as the urban elites do in the village. We have already considered above the urban elites' visits to relatives in the village. However, because of the nature of their duties, 19% (8) of them visit their relatives in the village more than once a week. This does not mean, as Mitchell (1969:2, 29), and Reader (1964:22), both noted that close kinsmen whom one does not meet frequently are less important in one's social and political networks than workmates and friends from the town. Political influence among kin and friends, despite differences in their geographic proximity, may have a direct bearing on this. Half of the rural elites visit their relatives in the village once a week to once a year, while the other half visit their relatives more than once a week. Table 16.9 indicates clearly the balance of flow of interpersonal network of relationship between residence of the two different but interrelated political communication environments which form the structural basis of our convergence model.

Table 16:9

Total Column Percentages of Both Village and City Visits by Respondents

Total Column %

	Never	Less than once a year	Once a year	Once a month	Once a week	More than once a week	Total
Town	(5) 3.8%	(6) 4.6%	(21) 16.0%	(53) 40.6%	(24) 18.3%	(22) 16.8%	(131) 100%
Village	(1) 0.8%	-	(15) 11.3%	(37) 27.8%	(33) 24.8%	(47) 35.3%	(133) 100%

This chapter has established strong empirical evidence of the existence of networks of connectedness and linkages between and within rural and urban networks in our sample. The bases of these linkages are exclusively drawn from the demographic characteristics of the respondents in the sample. The idea that Africans individuals' different characteristics are set apart by social differentials is void, as it is clear that kinship forms the key to the network.

In both village and urban areas all the five groups are found, but a high proportion of the respondents live in the rural areas. However, as pointed out in chapter one, in any given region in Nigeria one ethnic group forms the majority of the population in both village and rural areas. For instance, in Agege Lagos,

".. a large proportion" of the urban emigrants "are from in and around Abeokuta, the capital of Igboland, which is less than a couple of hours by road from Agege and even more distance places of origin such as Oshogbo, Ilesha, Ado Ekit, can be reached within three or four hours, so most Agege residents can retain close contact with their places of origin, thus in part obviating the need for ethnic associations." (Peace, 1979:22)

In this case, the Igbos are the dominant tribe in the two different areas studied - rural and urban. Most of the respondents have at one time or another spent some part of their lives in the village or in the city.

Statistically only some of the traditional and urban poor have not had any formal education while the urban elites, rural elites and young school leavers had the highest level of formal Western education.

Sponsorship of formal education in all the groups is almost entirely (85.4%) the responsibility of parents and relatives. The government's role in the sponsorship of formal education is very marginal (1.0%). The dedication of parents to the education of their children is an important obligatory commitment which cements, with an abiding socio-economic force, the relationship between elites and non-elites in Igbo society. The obligation passes from one generation of parents to another, thus perpetuating the kinship obligation from the viewpoint of the modern education system which in modern political systems is a major criterion for political leadership. Of the respondents 72.9% reported that their parents were educated by their grandparents.

Christianity, especially Catholicism (63.3%) and Protestantism (14.5%), is the main religion. Paganism is fast dying out from 12.5% among the parents of the respondents to only 0.8% among the respondents themselves. Most of the respondents take on the religion of their parents, with an increasing number of those whose parents are pagans becoming Christians.

Different occupations other than agriculture are now wide-spread, particularly in the cities. The most professional groups are the urban

elites and rural elites, while the traditional group are predominantly farmers. The majority of the respondents (80%) consider their occupation as permanent. A high proportion of young school leavers mainly take up temporary employment.

When some of the respondents are unemployed, they move from vilage to city. Only traditional and rural elites stay in the village until they become occupationally active again. The most mobile groups geographically during period of unemployment are the young school leavers, urban poor and urban elites. Their directions of mobility are from village to city, city to village and city to city. This geographical mobility in the quest for jobs constitutes an important linkage between urban and village communities in Nigeria.

Furthermore, when people are settled in their jobs there is a widespread tendency for those in the village to visit their relatives in the city and vice versa.

Our next chapter will examine the importance of some of these linkages and ties in the formation of social organisations in the cities and villages in Imo State. Unions, clubs and organisatons, as I have argued above, are a major historical basis for political participation in Nigeria.

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15. The agreement of multiplexity of network as used by Srinvas and Beteille (1964:167) which was cited early in the theoretical chapter could be relevant here. They maintained that traditionally the village lived in a narrow world where the ties of locality, cst, kinship and hereditary service led back and forth ebtween the same set of persons. Relations were multiplex in charcter and the circuit of relations had a tendency to become closed. Barnes (1954:44) called it 'tight mesh'. Gluckman (1955:19) saw the network of relationship as 'complex'.
16. GOLDTHORPE, J.E., op cit, p.151
17. SYLVIA LEITH-ROSS Stepping Stones: Memoirs of Colonial Nigeria 1907-1960, (ed), M. Crowder, London, 1983, also cited by GOLDTHORPE, op cit, p.151, INCIDI, 1956, pp. 181-2. BALANDER, 1955, p.161 made similar network of kinship relations among Brazzaville elites, ruling class and their poor relatives.

NETWORK GROUPS AND SOCIAL ORGANISATIONS

We have noted in chapter two that Mitchell (ed), 1961, argued that Africans move from city to city and village to city, and as they do so they form kinship networks which help them to maintain their rural norms, values and identity. I also showed theoretically from the work of Banton (1957) in Freetown, Briedl (1959:31), Eric R. Wolf in Banton (ed, p.15) that these network ties based on kinship, friends etc. have strong socio-political and economic implications in urban and rural political communication in Africa.

In particular to: "the mode of the associations in Nigeria" Lloyd stressed the point that:

".. the association is concerned with conditions in the home area. Urban members, having rather more experience of the world, intervene in local politics, perhaps suggesting models of local development. Money is collected to finance the building of a new road to link the village with the highway, or of a primary school." (Lloyd, 1984:79)

Personal network ties remain important in the process of network links between urban and village areas:

"... the purchase of cheap consumer goods, home-town-visits, and running of small clubs are the main ways in which recent migrants dispose of their income surplusses." (Peace, 1979:43)

In West Africa this pattern of village/urban linkage seems to be a common practice. When migrants leave the village for the town they form associations. In Bamako, Meillassoux (1968:62) showed that:

"Four associations were created by foreign migrants: two from Senegal, one from the Ivory Coast and one from Upper Volta". With a map, Meillassoux made "a comparison ... of the the places of origin of Bamako inhabitants" which "shows that most migrants were represented in town through one association (except the Gunieans, whose associations apparently were not registered)."

In Chapter Nine we saw that there is a strong empirical relationship between demographic characteristics and the five identified groups. The study of Smoch, A.C., (1977) on the specific rural areas Mbaise and Abiriba and the

township Port-Harcourt, in former Eastern Nigeria, illustrated the importance of ethnic unions for political support and economic and social co-operation among members of the same local communities who live and work in the city. I then argued that such village/urban ethnic unions and clubs which Audrey Smoch observed among Mbaise and Abiriba communities in Port-Harcourt were characteristic not only of these communities but most of the others in Nigeria, and Igbos in particular. I also stated that the Igbo Union, which was formed actually when Zik returned from the USA to support other Igbos who were studying abroad, was the largest single ethnic union behind the NCNC before the Civil War in Nigeria. In all these studies, quantitative statements on the nature of organisations, clubs, unions and associations in terms of their membership, age of clubs, etc., criteria for membership, systems of leadership election in the clubs, decision-making, frequency of meeting, channels of information circulation among members, numbers of such organisations to which one belongs, methods of problem-solving, relationship with other organisations, etc. have yet to be presented by media political scientists in particular.

I believe that an empirical study of the nature of social organisations in terms of these structures will help us to grasp the ethnic integration in the city and the entire socio-political relationship between village and city as an essential prerequisite in understanding the validity of convergence and network of connectedness in Africa.

If the network structures of the clubs are represented empirically, it would be convenient to utilise them for further qualitative application of the theories of ego-political candidates, eg Zik, Awolowo, Ojukwu, etc., who use these community and ethnic unions which exist in both villages and urban areas as 'action-sets' or 'communication-sets' (Adrian Mayer, 1966:108; Harris-Jones, 1969:309; Barnes, 1955; and Bott, 1955). Then we can argue that because these unions are based on friendship, neighbourliness and kinship, the basis of Barnes' analysis of effective network, they are important political bases in Africa. In this respect, the argument of Mitchell (1969:20) of anchorage, density, reachability, range of directedness, durability, intensity and frequency of interaction becomes valid in understanding political communication behaviour in Nigeria. A split in leadership, i.e. when two competing political candidates emerge from one single large ethnic group whose background rural/urban political mobilisation is based on these clubs, can alter national body politics.

Meanwhile, we must statistically determine the nature and characteristics of these unions in the survey. The majority of Nigerians, particularly the Igbos, belong to one social club or more. Membership provides possibilities of "economic assistance, kinship obligation, religious co-operation or ... simply friends"¹. In brief, Caplow (1955) referred to these as 'ambience'². In a society with intense ethnic competition for jobs etc., no member of the society, particularly in the city, would like to be isolated from his group. Lloyd has emphasised the importance of group ties in the urban areas from the very time the migrant arrives in the city:

With or without prior warning, and in most cases, makes immediately for the house of his closest relatives ... the host acknowledges an obligation to provide board and lodging and to help the newcomer to find employment and a permanent place in which to live. Not unnaturally, he is anxious to see his lodger independently established as soon as possible and, to this end, he exploits his own network to the full." Lloyd also showed that "the migrant is thus quickly drawn into an established network consisting most immediately of his close kin in the city and then other members of the same home area. His reliance upon them in his first weeks in the city creates a reciprocal obligation, so that he in turn must both help those who have helped him and also aid later immigrants." But this new pattern of urban network of association does not in the least terminate relationship with those in the village, rather Lloyd points out "his relationships with those in the rural areas" are not ruptured "his affective ties with his parents and siblings still living there are maintained; they may be sending him presents of foodstuffs, while he sends home cash or gifts from the city markets". (Lloyd 1984:75-76)

In the city, members of such network ties who help each other to 'survive' have been described by Peace (1979:35) as 'urban brothers' network.

In general, 88.5% (115) of the respondents belonged to one form of social organisation or another. Only 11.5% reported that they did not belong to any social clubs. 23 respondents did not give any answer. Those who understood the political importance of social clubs in Nigeria and who also did not want to disclose their political identity could either report that they did not belong to any social organisation or avoid the question altogether. The differences between positive and negative responses to social organisation membership can best be shown in each group by row percentages.

Table 1:10

Respondents' Membership Of Social Organisations

Groups	Yes	No	Total
Traditional	(42) 89.4	(5) 10.6	(47) 100
School Leavers	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100
Urban Poor	(10) 90.9	(1) 9.1	(11) 100
Urban Elite	(35) 85.9	(6) 14.6	(41) 100
Rural Elite	(17) 94.4	(1) 5.6	(18) 100
Column Total	(115) 88.5	(15) 11.5	(130) 100

Number of missing observations = 23

Table 2:10

Respondents' Membership Of Social Organisations In Towns and Villages

Groups	Yes	No	Total
Traditional	(34) 72.3	(13) 27.7	(97) 100
School Leavers	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100
Urban Poor	(8) 80.0	(2) 20.0	(10) 100
Urban Elite	(27) 67.5	(13) 32.5	(40) 100
Rural Elite	(15) 88.2	(2) 11.8	(17) 100
Column Total	(95) 74.8	32 25.2	(127) 100

Number of missing observations = 26

Though the majority of the respondents belong to social organisations, we are uncertain of the percentage that belongs to clubs or organisations having branches in the city as well as the village. In order to support the argument raised earlier, that they exist in both places, the data must

therefore show that social clubs, whether modern or traditional, are strong group linkages between rural and urban areas through which effective political network of mobilisation can be assumed to take place.

From all the groups, 74.8% of the respondents stated that their social organisations either exist in the city or the village. It is now evident that the majority of social clubs in Imo State have branches both in the villages and in the city, which supports our theoretical arguments in Chapter Two that the ethnic union forms the basis of extension of extended family, tribal and kinship network from the rural to modern urban areas. Among the Igbos, Margaret Peil (1972:175) has even noted that outside Nigeria, they have a great tendency to form unions, for instance in Ghana. We should assume that the content of the village/urban network through social organisations is political, social, economic and cultural, but we shall later determine the content statistically.

An important characteristic of these social organisations is their age. The older the clubs, the more they are predominantly oriented towards traditional values and thus their mode of in-group communication and political behaviour are confined to traditional village ways of life. Also the age of the clubs is clearly indicative of social change in Nigeria.

Table 3:10

The Age of Respondents' Of Social Organisations

Groups	1-10	11-20	21-30	31-40	41-50	51-60+	Total	
Traditional	(16) 37.2	(4) 9.3	(11) 25.6	(0) 0.0	(3) 7.0	(9) 20.9	(43) 100	38.1
School Leaver	(6) 54.5	(3) 27.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 18.2	(11) 100	9.7
Urban Poor	(4) 40.0	(1) 10.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(5) 50.5	(10) 100	8.8
Urban Elite	(18) 54.5	(7) 21.2	(5) 15.2	(1) 3.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 6.1	(33) 100	29.2
Rural Elite	(9) 56.3	(2) 12.5	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 12.5	(3) 18.8	(16) 100	14.2
Column	(53) 46.9	(17) 15.0	(16) 14.2	(1) 0.9	(5) 4.4	(21) 18.6	(113) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 40

If modern political systems should use the social clubs for political support and mobilisation, it is imperative that the majority of the clubs should be modern in terms of their network content and linkage, leadership and orientation.

Generally, 49.9% of the clubs are only 1-10 years old, 15% and 14.2% are 11-20 and 21-30 years old respectively. An interesting comparison here is between the traditional group and the urban elite group. These two groups are the polar opposites in the system, and the two extremes of years of the clubs' existences can be associated with these groups to show different group orientations.

From this table, too, it is both the traditional and urban elite groups who belong to the same type of youngest or newly formed clubs and indeed the urban elites are increasingly dominating new social organisations. This supports the hypothesis that modern clubs are founded oriented towards the needs of modern socio-political and economic needs, both in the city and the village. The conflict between modernism and traditionalism in these processes, in which the modernising elites dominate in the city and in the rural areas, has its basic foundation in social organisations and changes. They are now organised in such a way that the roles of the elders, traditional chiefs (though the modernising and political elites today take the titles of traditional chiefs, eg Zik (Owolo of Onitish), Ojukwu, now Chief Ojukwu, Barrister Mbakwe - former governor of Imo State (now Chief Mbakwe), Awolowo (Chief Awolowo). Thousands of Nigerian political leaders today have taken the title of traditional chiefs as well as traditional religious leaders of the North, where there is no clear demarcation between political leadership and religious (Islamic) leadership.

Earlier, I have argued that this process in which African, particularly in Nigeria, elites are taking up the titles, roles and duties of traditional chiefs, elders and emirs is rapidly eroding the traditional values in Nigeria. It also makes them dominate in the rural as well as in the city political and economic activities.

The close association between modern social organisations and the traditional group and urban elite group is crucial in understanding political communication network based on kinship and tribal connectedness and linkages in Nigeria. We have seen in this study that the majority of Nigerians live in the rural areas. Table 1:9 supports this statement,

particularly when Eziama is compared with Owerri which is predominantly Igbo, where the study was conducted.

There are two main implications of this association. Most political leaders in Nigeria seek and mobilise the greater number of their political supporters from their ethnic origins. Since by democratic rule the number of votes decides who gains political power, a campaign outside one's own ethnic, even local government area, is deemed a waste of time and money by politicians, no matter how much media coverage they obtain. In order to secure firm local support, they displace traditional chiefs and make themselves one. They often reside in the cities but appoint some henchmen to run everyday undefined 'traditional chiefs' roles for them. They occasionally come to the village to distribute food, drink and money to some poor local people to enhance their prestige. In the cities, because of the close link between local rural communities and the communities through social club, the 'elite-traditional chiefs' also exercise enormous influence in the urban and rural areas. The relationship between them and their communities is economic obligatory such as finding jobs, providing housing and car allowances, contracts awards, scholarships for tribesmen. They do so only when they have control over government resources. I argued earlier that the obligatory help which the elders and elites in the city offer their young ethnic migrants enhance their popularity in the town and in the city among their tribesmen. This popularity in turn is exploited for economic and political power by the 'benefactors'.

The second implication as illustrated by the survey is that the old organisations between 51-60+ are dominated by the traditional network group (42.9%) and only 9.5% of the urban elites belong to such organisations. These old organisations are heavily traditional and their contents do not reflect the modern political and social systems but uphold those values such as yam festival, age group ceremony, etc. Their foundations are becoming strongly shaken by Europeanisation in some respects. They are greatly pressured to become economically conscious, particularly by the way money is now used on an individual basis to influence voting.

However, we must note that in Nigeria social clubs are all-embracing socially. They have different purposes, intents and needs by those who belong to them. To some extent their names implicitly designate their roles. If a club is identified as 'social' it could have constantly shifting values (core and peripheral) in terms of social or political. For

Club 19, for instance, in a time of military rule it was implicitly political (peripheral value) but in a time of civil rule social (explicit or core value); this depends on the characteristics of those who form the majority of the social club.

The stronger the ethnic network ties through clubs and social organisations, the more likely it is that a political candidate in the organisation would use it as a unique organisation to mobilise political support within the whole ethnic group, extending from village to city and between cities and villages. A quasi-political group could emerge from it for effective political communication network. The role of quasi-political groups can become so pressurising that tension builds up between ethnic groups, in the city and to a certain extent between villages as was the case in the last general elections in Nigeria. One noticeable role of the action-set and its emergent quasi-political group is the general political participation it generates within the community. Its role makes it impossible for anyone to be classified as an 'isolate'. Characteristically, the action-set and quasi-political groups, eg the Ikemba Front, disappear as overt political groups after elections.

We should now identify different organisations and also consider how they are politicised.

Social organisations in Nigeria, as I pointed out earlier, may involve specifically social relationships between members but in general they are traditional, religious, political and economic in character. It is their character, therefore, that determines their content. Content here is important in interpersonal communication within the group. Indeed, it is communication that is the main purpose of the link between participants in the social network.

In the survey, respondents were asked to name their social club, union, etc. In Nigeria, names of social organisations can to some extent indicate the character of the association. But it requires participant observation to know exactly the content of the member's relationships.

Generally, 60.2% in all the groups reported that their group organisations were 'social', 23.9% religious, 9.7% economic, 5.3% traditional and only 0.9% political. The total number of respondents was 113 and 40 refused to indicate the names of their clubs. But it is important to understand the

relationship between these unions and the different network groups so that we can evaluate them in terms of political association or whether they are used as such during an election period. The data below shows that the majority of the clubs are social.

Table 4:10
Respondents' Different Types of Social Organisations
Expressed in Row Percentage

	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	Total
Social	(23) 53.5	(10) 90.9	(6) 66.7	(21) 63.6	(8) 47.1	(68) 60.2
Traditional	(4) 9.5	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 6.1	(0) 0.0	(6) 5.3
Religious	(14) 32.6	(1) 9.1	(3) 33.3	(6) 18.2	(3) 17.6	(27) 23.9
Political	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 3.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 0.9
Economic	(2) 4.4	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 9.0	(6) 35.3	(11) 9.7
Total	(43) 100	(11) 100	(9) 100	(33) 100	(17) 100	(113) 100

There are various interpretations of this. Since political parties exist in Nigeria, it is unusual to find an organisation outside the existing parties that is overtly political. If this happens, there will be conflicting views and opinions between ethnic unions and parties which draw their memberships from both social and political party organisations. For instance, the Igbo Union before the Civil War was the strongest national Igbo ethnic union from which NCNC mobilised a network of ethnic political support. Similarly, at a more local level, the Mbaise and Abiriba unions studied by Audrey Smotch, also supported NCNC. We can now see why there is near zero association between groups and social organisations that are overtly political.

It was the politics of Nigeria during the colonial period and between 1960 and 1966 that encouraged the development of a pan-Igbo organisation - the Igbo State Union. Other ethnic groups had similar ethnic organisations for political and cultural reasons - Egbe Omo Odudwa, Igbirra Trade Union, Ijaw Progression Union, Idoma Tribal Union, Bornu State Union (Nwabueze 1985).

But the Public Order Decree by the Federal Military Government (FMG) dissolved and proscribed these ethnic unions. The ban on political parties as well as ethnic unions by the military indicates that both political and social organisations carry out in some respects similar functions in Nigerian politics.

In the last civilian government, the Igbo were still desperate to organise themselves not through political parties but through an ethnic Union similar to the pre-1966 Igbo State Union. Thus 'a new pan-Igbo organisation' by the name Ohaneze formed after the 1979 restoration, was hijacked by the politicians of the Second Republic and thereby prevented from growing as a pan-Igbo platform. It too is now also proscribed by a 1984 Decree of The Federal Military Government which, without specifically mentioning particular tribal or cultural associations by name, as did the 1966 Decree, dissolves "all movements and organisations (howsoever known or designated) established for the creation of more States or local governments in Nigeria or for boundary adjustment or otherwise meet to promote ethnic difference or likely to destroy or disrupt the Unity of the Federal Republic of Nigeria" (Nwabueze, 1985:4; Political Parties (Dissolution) Decree 1984). Practically, each time the military dissolves political parties, they also do the same to major ethnic organisations.

Therefore it would be a gross misinterpretation to draw a sharp line between the political and social roles of organisation in Nigeria. For most of them, they are the only body in which a local community can reach a decision on how to embark on community projects, support other communities in similar ventures, settle disputes between individuals and villages in the community. Though traditional town councils exist, they are more or less part of the social organisations in the village. This is because local government authorities have no control over how these town councils are run in the village.

The value of several social organisations transcend political activities, particularly during national election periods. Though they could be used by political candidates, unlike 'action-sets' which disappear after national elections, social clubs continue their general function. The most active modern participants in social clubs are the young school leavers, 90.9% belonging to social clubs. This again supports the view that quasi-political groups can emerge during an election period from the social clubs but soon after the election the emergent group disappears and becomes

reabsorbed into the mainstream of their social clubs.

Another important revelation in the data is the sharp difference between social and traditional unions. Except in the traditional and urban elite networks, there is no correlation between groups and traditional social organisations. But there is a danger in interpreting the relationship as a complete breakdown in traditional values in Eastern Nigeria. The word social club in Nigeria generally has a very ambiguous meaning. We should not be led to conclude that modern social clubs have displaced traditional ones. Conversely, what the data is really indicating is that there is a shift in emphasis of cultural values which are influenced by Christian values and modern education as the elite groups are actively involved in them. Yet, traditional values remain important in the interaction between members of a club.

As we shall see shortly, the traditional importance of these social clubs will be revealed when we examine membership criteria of these different 'social' organisations. We have noted that the most important characteristic of ethnic or tribal group systems is the kinship network system. The more that kinship constitutes the principal criterion for membership, the more likely that traditional values are embedded in the content of network of the relationship.

In the survey, religion is the second most important association. We also found that the majority in the state are Catholics (75.5%). Their 'clubs' have not been very actively involved in the past in politics, but during the last civil government they were actively involved, particularly because of the state take-over of Catholic schools and colleges.

Economic association is not an insignificant issue in Nigeria. Though it scores a lower percentage than religion and 'social' associations, it may be the most important underlying factor in political participation, either at individual or group level. In this data, the stronger relationship between rural elite network and economic association is historical. Teachers who make up the majority of the rural elite network were very poorly paid before the Ude-Ochi Award.³ But to maintain their prestige as an educated group, they formed organisations exclusively of teachers' who make monthly 'contributions' to its members to supplement low wages. The non-payment of teachers salaries for several months during the last civil government reactivated such organisations. At this stage, we cannot state

qualitatively the roles of these social organisations during the last general elections in Nigeria until later. Meanwhile, we should determine statistically the relationship between different groups and criteria for membership of social organisations.

In Nigeria there are a few criteria which qualify a person or group of persons to be accepted into a social organisation. These include members of the same kin or village community, ethnic group or state, men and women of the same profession, members of the same religion, interested Nigerians, Nigerians and foreigners.

On the basis of the strong relationship so far observed between different groups and demographic variables akin to kinship, my hypothesis is that kinship is the most important criterion for social organisations' membership in Imo state.

In the survey the respondents were asked to state from a list of criteria which ones are the basis for membership of their unions or clubs. The table below shows the absolute number and percentage score for each criterion.

Table 5:10

Frequency of Respondents' Visits to Relatives in the City/Township

Groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Traditional	(19) 14.3	(4) 3.0	(4) 3.0	(1) 0.89	0 0.0	(16) 12.0	(3) 2.3
School Leavers	(5) 3.8	(2) 1.5	(1) 0.8	(0) 0.0	(2) 1.5	(0) 0.0	(2) 1.5
Urban Poor	(5) 3.8	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(4) 3.0	(1) 0.8	(0) 0.0
Urban Elite	(13) 9.8	(2) 1.5	(3) 2.3	(0) 0.0	(5) 3.8	(9) 6.8	(4) 3.0
Rural Elite	(3) 2.3	(4) 3.0	(6) 4.5	(0) 0.0	(3) 2.3	(3) 2.3	(1) 0.8
Total	(45) 33.8	(12) 9.0	(14) 10.5	(1) 0.8	(14) 22.6	(30) 12.0	(16) 7.5

- 1 - members of the same kin
- 2 - members of the same state
- 3 - members of the same profession
- 4 - members of the same street
- 5 - members of the same religion
- 6 - interested Nigerians
- 7 - Nigerians and foreigners

Statistically the two most important unions in the survey are kinship (33.8%) and religion (22.6%). These two social elements have been dominant social factors to date. Indeed, their persistent dominance should reveal something about the structure of political communication networks in Nigeria.

In Chapter Two I argued that, within the three major tribes in Nigeria, numerous minor ethnic groups exist, and in the cities they are united by their tribal social organisations.⁴ In the light of the elite and elite formation debate, I pointed out that leadership struggles among them have taken both local and national dimension. Politically, this development led to the breakdown of ethnic unions as supporters of one single ethnic leader. Ethnic support may not be weakened but a split occurs as a result of competing elites within a community. Individuals could still participate in politics without seriously involving ethnic unions. But I stressed that, in regions where religion and politics cannot be separated, individuals and groups could find it difficult to participate in politics without belonging to and using religion as the basis of political support and mobilisation.

In various ways, the above table supports this argument but this will become more explicit in later sections, where I shall show the relationship between 'social' organisations and the network groups' political participation. Since kinship and religion are the two most important factors that separate Nigerians and also form the most important criteria for group integration, political integration which draws its strength from ethnicity and religion is still very weak in Nigeria. The state creation in Nigeria was a political attempt to give the minority ethnic groups a say in Nigerian decision-making. It was also designed as an effective means of weakening the strength of the Igbo during the Biafran struggle. In many respects, the state structure reflects ethnic/kinship structures in Nigeria. The data indicates that 10.5% of the respondents' criteria for social club membership is based on state origin. This state criterion for membership was deliberately separated from kin membership so that we shall be able to pinpoint the groups who are most involved in such organisations. In Nigeria today the term statism is rapidly replacing tribalism. The highest (4.5%) membership of such an organisation is the rural elite group. The state's, particularly Imo State's, non-payment of teachers' salaries and severity with which the teachers' strike in 1982/3 was handled by the state government pushed teachers to unite through unions against the government. These unions had important political effects during the 1983 general

elections in Imo state.

Besides this point, therefore the 10.5% for state should be added to kins membership making the total score 44.3%; other criteria put together scored 20.75%, besides religion which in Nigeria has strong correlation with ethnic groups.

Membership of 'social' organisations based on the state of origin becomes important when Nigerians live in states outside their own, particularly among the urban poor who depend on such organisations for economic support information, and socialisation. In the survey, 3.8% of the urban poor maintain that kinship is the principal condition for club membership, but none showed state membership was important. The explanation is that the sample was taken in Owerri - Imo State - where the majority of the urban poor come from nearly rural areas which are not ethnically different from Owerri itself. Owerri, in terms of Igbo population, is ethnically homogeneous so that the poor would often tend towards village associations, primarily kins.

Similarly we saw from Peace's study of Agege Lagos that the closeness of most Yoruba Agege residents to their home town helped them to "retain close contact with their places of origin, thus in part obviating the need for ethnic associations." (Peace, 1979:22).

Members of the same street do not any longer count as important criteria for group association. From personal experience, such association was very important during the early part of the civil disturbance, particularly in the major cities in Eastern Nigeria - Biafra. The aim was to check enemy 'infiltrations' by those who lived in the same street. Individuals who were suspected of harbouring unfamiliar faces were quickly spotted and the civil guards informed. From the data, such street association for community protection and information to authorities has died out. None of the groups (except by chance one traditional group) reported that street membership was a criterion for associational membership. The slogan 'Biafra Be Vigilant' created such associations at all geographical and social quarters in the region. It was indeed a very effective information network and group identity during the crisis.

The importance of religion in group formation and association can be over-exaggerated if we do not interpret its importance in terms of different

groups - which indeed is one of the primary aims of the use of network systems as units of analysis. If we consider the total number of respondents from each group, the urban elites are the least concerned with religion as the basis for membership of the group association. Only in general terms as indicated by this data does religion seem to reinforce ethnic identity in Nigeria, specifically Imo State. The elite are gradually breaking away from religion more than from kinship as an influence in their 'social' association. As already made clear above, social life and relationships in Nigeria have strong implicit economic rewards in all levels of society. Even when economic needs are unnecessary, members in the network reshape circumstances to their advantage.

The elite in Nigeria have the best access to wealth and power at national level. Since Muslims dominate political power and its distribution from the centre, the elite in the south who aspire to power tend to be associated with organisations that are open to all Nigerians. In the survey, elites scored 3.0%, the highest in all the groups. From this club, information about jobs, government contracts (Federal and State), promotion schemes, the sale of government property, eg used cars, import and export licences, etc. are exchanged. The needs for economic information do not presently take precedence over religion because, as I argued in chapter three, they were disoriented from the Nigerian context and realities by the colonial administration. This point was very strongly stressed by Okwudiba Nnoli (Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, 1978, pp.124-127).

If the colonial policies had allowed for the integrative development of economics, religion and ethnicity, most Nigerians could have had close business associations, a phenomenon the Nationalist movement could have in time modified and incorporated into the body politic of the nation during colonial and pre-colonial times. This development could have encouraged leadership co-operation to minimise ethnic conflict which is orchestrated by pockets of networks of ethnically exclusive social organisations. The problem of political integration which has acutely confronted Nigerian political stability is the problem of kinship associations, which are a strong basis for political mobilisation and support.

The Civil War and the oil boom, have resulted in the domination by two of the three major ethnic groups. Political, bureaucratic and economic systems in Nigeria since the counter-coup of 1966 have compelled those excluded from the decision-making and power-sharing of the system to enter into economic

rather than real political relationships with those in power. This interpretation may upset those involved in the game in Nigeria, but it is a hard political fact. Nigeria cannot expect political stability by excluding a major group or even minority groups in its politics. Nor can stability be achieved by the excessive urge for personal economic gain from the game. Nigeria has failed to address its policies to her real problems and that is why there is persistent eco-political instability.

The influence of economic and kinship/ethnicity association in influencing political participation and voting in Nigeria will be weighed against other influences, e.g. friends, the mass media etc. It is clear from an earlier statistical table that kinship/ethnic associations are very strong network criteria and the extent to which they are channels for political mobilisation, support and voting in an election will be assessed.

If these strongly ethnic and religious organisations are to be used as effective networks of political mobilisation, members of them must be politically aware of the potentials of their organisation. Political awareness is a function of political socialisation. 'Social' organisations are secondary sources of political formation after primary political socialisation in the family and at school. Within the group, horizontal socio-political communication is functionally effective. Members are aware of how decisions are made and executed, leaders elected or appointed; other processes similar to, in miniature form, the national political system, takes place within these organisations.

Respondents were asked, as a test of their knowledge of mini-group political or social leadership selection, to indicate how their leaders were selected. Two choices were given: (a) by election; (b) by appointment. 76.3% (87) said by election and 23.7% (27) said by appointment. There were 39 missing observations. Even in the traditional system, where it might be expected that ascribed values might influence leadership selection, 73.8% of leadership is by election. This particularly supports the hypothesis established in Chapter Three that Igbo society, where most of the data was collected, is at all levels an egalitarian, relatively individualistic meritocratic society.

This table also indicates that through political socialisation - strictly in the sense of understanding basic political processes through membership of clubs, unions, etc. - a micro-political environment has been created. What

is crucial is to understand how the micro-political social network systems can be tapped either by individual members of the group, or the group as a whole, to participate in a broader macro national political leadership election. The utility of the group for political communication and linkages involves internal networks of connectedness and linkages and similar processes externally.

Table 6:10

Respondents' Methods of Leadership Selection

Groups	By election	By Appointment	Total
Traditional	(31) 73.8	(11) 26.2	(42) 100
School Leavers	(8) 72.7	(3) 27.3	(11) 100
Urban Poor	(7) 70.0	(3) 30.0	(10) 100
Urban Elite	(26) 76.5	(8) 23.5	(34) 100
Rural Elite	(15) 88.2	(2) 11.8	(17) 100
Column Total	(87) 76.3	(27) 23.7	(114) 100

Number of missing observations = 39

As we have seen in Chapter Two, frequency of contact among people in a personal network⁵ has been important in the interpretation of social behaviour. And when a social organisation has the potentiality for political utility, such frequency becomes more crucial as the political action of the urban and rural branches of the same organisations must be co-ordinated.

A clear understanding of the potential of ethnic unions in Igboland as political communication networks that connect village and cities led Audrey Smoch to stress the point thus:

"The effectiveness of government depends to some extent on the amount and quality of information available to the governors. The structure of the ethnic unions provided a communication link between the community at home and the emigrants residing in other

areas of Nigeria. Branches submitted certain kinds of information at the request of the central unions in Abiriba and Mbaise and usually forwarded proposals from their members. Annual conferences to which each branch sent delegates allowed for direct communication among members."6

Table 7:10

Respondents' Frequencies of Meetings in Their Clubs, Unions

Groups	None	Once a week	Once a month	Less than three times a year	Once a year	Total	
Traditional	(0) 0.0	(19) 43.2	(21) 47.7	(1) 2.3	(3) 6.8	(44) 100	37.6
School Leaver	(1) 8.3	(3) 25.0	(6) 50.0	(2) 16.7	(0) 0.0	(12) 100	10.3
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(5) 50.0	(4) 40.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 10.1	(10) 100	8.5
Urban Elite	(0) 0.0	(10) 29.4	(17) 50.0	(5) 14.7	(2) 5.9	(34) 100	29.1
Rural Elite	(0) 0.0	(2) 11.8	(13) 76.5	(2) 11.8	(0) 0.0	(17) 100	14.5
Column Total	(1) 0.9	(39) 33.3	(61) 52.1	(10) 8.5	(6) 5.1	(117) 100	

Number of missing observations = 36

Respondents were asked to state how often their unions met. A list of frequencies was given: none; once a week; once a month; less than three times a year; and then once a year. The table above shows that in all the networks, 33.3% met once a week, 52.1% once a month, 8.5% less than three times a year, and 5.1% once a year. There were 117 observations and 36 missing ones.

But this generality does not allow an analytic interpretation of the differences in the frequencies of union meetings amongst different network groups. Of the 36.6% in the traditional group, meetings for the union members are nearly equally distributed between once a week (43.2%) and once a month (47.7%). Rural and urban elites meet less often for union occasions with a mode at once a month.

As pointed out earlier, monthly meetings of unions and clubs, particularly for important discussions, decisions, etc., are more popular among monthly salaried elite groups in Nigeria. It is at this time that most of them can afford to pay their monthly levy or contributions, both in the towns and villages. Amongst the traditional group who are predominantly villagers and by occupation farmers, such financial needs associated with elite group clubs are less emphasised. Members of traditional group meet more regularly to discuss not so much how to finance high-cost local projects, but how to run the local community, clean the market-square and village roads and squares, resolve conflicts between kin and villages, e.g. land disputes etc.

Meetings can be called at any time by sounding the talking drums and gongom, to repair a widow's house damaged by heavy rain, to bury the deceased in the village, visit a newly-born baby and mother in the clinic, arrange marriages. Religious organisations such as the Legion of Mary League, St. Jude, Boys' Brigades, meet once a week, either on Saturdays or Sundays to clean the church premises and to pray.

This frequency of meeting among villagers irrespective of which organisation they belong to can become an important communication asset for political candidates. From our basic theoretical conceptions in Chapter Two, the political importance of such social group networks can be enormous:

- a) Most members are of the same kin. Harries-Jones (1969) noted that social organisations which form the basis of political associations originating from the lowest level of the community can be utilised to build up action-sets from a common kinship tie.
- b) Mitchell (1969:18) therefore stated that the implication of such dense networks makes the 'whole network' relatively compact and relatively few links between them need to be used to reach the majority.
- c) Such a network intensifies face-to-face communication between members of the unions and party representatives in the community.
- d) The cost of travelling, distribution of political leaflets, and the heavy cost of media political broadcasts are reduced.

But the dangers can also render these advantages meaningless. Personality rather than issues and policies are more important for the electorate,

tribal politics become intensified, corruption can rock the fabric of the society, the traditional rural population can become antagonistic to each other. If two candidates emerge from the same community, at the same time contesting an election through different political parties, different action-sets can penetrate and divide these ethnic unions strongly built on kinship criteria. Political conflict can embrace both national politics as well as the family, as was the case during the 1983 general elections, a situation which resembled what happened in Britain during the miners' strike in 1984, particularly in Yorkshire, with cases of bitter hatred between father and son, even a wedding ceremony postponed as a result of the strike.

We must note that the data have shown that these unions have leaders and they elect or appoint them; therefore leadership within the group as noted in Chapter Two provides an intermediary network. Through the leaders dangers of splits are minimised, two-way flow or exchange of political communication between national authorities, who control violence during elections, are maintained so that troublesome action-sets are controlled.

In this light, therefore, decision-making becomes important so that group social organisation can transcend political election campaigns, which most Nigerians treat as very rapid passing events. In the communities, because class differences are a recent phenomena and are obscured by kinship patterns, social leadership helps us to understand within these unions who are leaders and who are followers. In most Nigerian communities, decision-making processes involve three categories of people: (a) the leaders; (b) selected committee members; and (c) the rank and file.

In the survey sample 29.9% (35) reported that decisions are made by their leaders, 17.9% (21) said that selected committees make important decisions, while 50.4% (59) stated that decisions in the social organisations are democratically made by all the members.

However, leadership prevails over democratic decision-making processes in the traditional group, 51.1% and 37.8% respectively. The popularity of leadership and democratic decision-making in the traditional group reflects the nature of the social organisations there. We have noted that kinship organisations and religious unions are predominant, particularly in the villages. In Chapter Three I pointed out that the egalitarian Igbo communities made their decisions in the village squares and market-places democratically. This data supports the hypothesis. Equally, religious

organisations are more concerned with prayer and the welfare of their members and therefore can easily delegate their leaders to make crucial decisions. This also reflects the hierarchical order of authority of most Christian churches and in particular Catholicism, which is the main religion in the region of the survey.

Among the young school leavers, leadership decision-making is relatively lacking (only 9.1%). This is because the group is the most socially and geographically mobile group in the society. Steady leadership in the group to make decisions for the members whose characteristics allow for rapid occupational, residential and status changes is not easy. They are very contemporary and dynamic in their activities and therefore delegate members to make decisions or take on-the-spot decisions to solve their immediate problems.

The urban poor seem to be settled in their occupations and residence. They are comparatively less mobile geographically and socially than the young school leavers. We noted earlier that more of the members of this group belonged to older social organisations than the young school leavers. The older the social organisation in Nigeria, the more they tend to establish a leadership structure in their decision-making processes. For instance, leadership decision-making in the urban poor is 11.8%, with young school leavers only 9.6%.

One important point to be noted here is that the relative lack of leadership decision-making among the younger school leavers makes their organisation vulnerable to political uses, either at group level or at individual level. Their lack of strong leadership, rapid geographical mobility, lack of permanent job and residence make them a favourable group for the political candidates communication-set to be used during an election campaign to mobilise support during an election period and be discarded soon after elections. I argued in Chapter Two that lack of employment among young school leavers increased highway robbery in Nigeria and during the elections the number dropped sharply. This is because the members of this group, in contrast to other groups in this study, lack the formal organisations to make effective political demands. They are collectively or individually used. The young West African immigrants into Nigeria also constitute a high proportion in this group. Thus they lack leaders, form organisations to make political demands and are used as thugs by politicians in Nigeria. One of the main arguments for the expulsion of illegal immigrants just before

the 1983 general election was based on the fear of the extent of disturbances and political unrest these young and floating groups could cause. This concern was the preoccupation of the politicians, and how this issue was regarded as important to the public will be considered later.⁷

For the same reasons attributed to leadership decision-making among the urban poor, the urban elite and rural elite groups depend to a certain extent on their leaders. But there is a striking difference here. As I argued earlier, 'social' organisations in Nigeria have several but ambivalent functions. Thus the urban elite and rural elite have higher concentrations of group decision-making based on selected committee and all-members democratic decision-making processes. The latter for the urban elite, 70.6% and 64.7% for the rural elite.

One interpretation of the high concentration of democratic decision-making among these two networks is that each member has behind him some urge for economic and political interest in matters affecting his organisation. In such matters, representative decision-making could deny some members their eco-political needs, i.e. decisions made in a way that would not be conducive to his private desires. The more decisions that are democratically made, the more each member somehow gets what he wants, and members can proceed to other 'needs'. It has been generally known that, in Nigerian socio-political representation at all levels, when leaders or committee groups are delegated to represent their members, the representatives put their personal interest first. This statistical representation is very important in understanding the content of political communication networks of connectedness in Nigeria. It reveals some aspect of network content (economic rewards) which can be concealed in sheer allegations and superficial confrontations among leaders when they only disagree on how to share the national cake. At club level, those who are denied certain needs through representative decision-making often break away from the existing clubs, not so much on the basis of different political ideological reasons but on the economic benefit of the association or 'social' relationship.

Beyond the social club's network of association, the elites who constitute the bulk of political representation in Nigeria have expressed, and on several occasions shown, their political and economic greed. Lai Joseph has made close observations of this argument and it is worth quoting him in full:

"By their own acts, the politicians are effectively teaching the Nigerian electorate that the politicians, regardless of their party alliance, are not worth dying for because invariably they think of their interest first and foremost ... without any debate, the House of Representatives on Thursday, March 26th, 1981, approved a sum of 24 million for the maintenance of their housing units."⁸

Quoting newspaper coverage on this issue, Lai Joseph goes on:

"HOUSE OF REPS APPROVES 24 MILLION WITHOUT DEBATE". House of Representatives yesterday approved some items for the 1,004 housing units at the legislators quarters on Victoria Islands, Lagos. The amount was approved by the House without debate during its consideration of the 1981 appropriation Bill."⁹

Theoretically, I have argued in Chapters One and Two, that the more complex a society becomes the more various advanced means of communication channels are devised or introduced into the society to reach its members. The use of tom-tom, gong-gom or the talking drum etc. in the villages as channels of communication has proved inadequate to serve the information needs in the urban areas. This appropriate mixture of modern and traditional communication systems became inevitable in the communities.

We have empirically established in this study that in Nigeria, at least in an Igbo-dominated rural and urban population, there is a very strong social tie based on kinship between rural and urban networks. This inevitably has imposed a new demand on the socio-political communities for modern communication systems. This is apparently another level of looking at the appropriateness of the convergence model of socio-political relationships.

As in modern politics, communication and information flow are vital to inform members on dates of meetings, where and when it takes place, the agenda or agendum for the meeting, implementation of decisions reached in previous meetings etc. To circulate information to members who live in the cities and in the villages requires at least the following means of communication:

- 1) Letters
- 2) Oral information
- 3) Broadcasts via the radio, TV and the press
- 4) Telephone.

My hypothesis is that the more a group is educated, the more it uses modern means of mass information systems. A high percentage of rural and less educated groups are associated with traditional means of communication and in-flow exchange between their members. The table below illustrates this relationship.

Table 8:10

Channels of Information From Between 'Social' Club Members

(Calculated from Row Total)

Groups	Letters	Oral and Symbolic means	Radio	TV	Press	Telephone
Traditional	(2) 26.0%	(37) 54.4%	(4) 18.2%	0 0.0	(1) 20%	0 0.0
School Leavers	(10) 13.0	(7) 10.3	(4) 18.2	0 0.0	(2) 40.0	0 0.0
Urban Poor	(6) 7.6	(7) 10.3	(2) 9.0	0 0.0	0 0.0	0 0.0
Urban Elite	(26) 33.8	(13) 19.1	(8) 36.8	(1) 50.0	(1) 20.0	(1) 100
Rural Elite	(17) 18.2	(3) 5.9	(4) 18.2	(1) 50.0	(1) 20.0	0 0.0
Column Total	(76) 100	(68) 100	(22) 100	(2) 100	(5) 100	(1) 100

Letters are important means of information exchange between distant members of organisations in Nigeria. Members do not need to be all educated in order to use letters as a means of communication. Often the organisation's secretary reads the letter and translates it into the local ethnic language. Letters are either posted or sent by hand to members in the city or in the village. Usually a single letter is sent to the branch chairman or secretary, who calls a formal or emergency meeting to discuss the content.

In the survey, 26% of the traditional group communication with their members through letters. This is a significant percentage when we consider that a high percentage of this group cannot read or write, a point which supports the view that the few educated members in the organisation translate the letters to others.

A small number of the urban poor depend on letters for information exchange between its members, another important reflection on the level of educational attainment among this group.

There is a strong relation between the traditional group and the use of face-to-face communication and symbolic means for information circulation among its members - 54.4%. This implies that slightly more than half of the respondents in the survey at social organisational level within a specific group use traditional means of communication for information circulation among its members. This is a more important reason why the study of political communication in Nigeria should not ignore the face-to-face and symbolic communication processes. Virtually every group in the survey makes substantial use of this medium in its 'social' interaction among its members. The use of face-to-face communication for information circulation within an organisation is a structurally horizontal pattern of communication.

On the contrary, information via radio, TV and the press are vertical. Accessibility reflects the pattern of power relationship in the society. The use of radio for information circulation among members is dominated by the urban elite. Urban environments no longer permit the use of gong-gom, tom-tom, talk drum or the circulation of information by word of mouth. Hence the group makes extensive use of radio, which is an instant circulation medium capable of reaching members in the cities and villages at very short notice. But the cost of air time is often too high for the poor groups to afford.

A small number of people use radio for information in the rural or traditional group. This is not mainly because of cost but as a result of the structure of socio-political relationships in the village, which in itself facilitates information as efficiently or more so than radio. Despite the use of local language for radio broadcasting, Nigeria's use of the medium for information among groups is not as popular as the use of face-to-face communication.

TV is a new medium of information in Nigeria, and most stations, as we have seen, are owned by the state. Access to it is exclusively to the political decision-maker. The sets are expensive. To buy air-time can prove too expensive even for the urban elite group of organisation. But we also saw that the majority of these social organisations are kinship-based, and the

second largest is the religious organisation. These are not rich enough to afford the cost, consequently only one each in the urban and rural elites reported that they used TV for information circulation among members.

The press has not, as the data show, been an important medium for information exchange among all the social groups. The use of the telephone seems to be out of the question among all the network groups.

In general the data supported our hypothesis that traditional media are more predominant among the less educated group. The only medium which has a relatively strong relationship among all the groups, including the urban elite, is radio. Other electronic media networks, TV, telephone and the press, indicate an insignificant statistical relationship with all the groups as media for information circulation among social club members.

This reflects accurately the conclusion of Golding and Eliot (1979:186) that in Nigeria, as in most developing countries, "radio is the major medium in terms of audience size, and probably influence. Television is a minority medium, however elite and influential its small audience. Newspapers, less closely controlled by the government, are seen by many journalists to offer greater licence for the exercise of professional skill and discretion."

The issue here is that in the history of mass media development in Nigeria the structure and functional developments have not allowed for the mass, cultural, social, economic and political participation through the media.

State control of the media has led to mass alienation from the media and lack of knowledge of how they could use them for social participation in groups.

This alienation of the masses from the use of the media for their 'social' activities can also affect their understanding of the use of the media for political participation. The relationship between social participation and information flow through the media among club members can be relevant to the masses' use of the media for political participation. To use the media to inform club, union, etc. members about club activities is not so much different from using them to inform them on political issues, e.g. voting. The main difference is in content rather than direction of flow of information. At times the formats used can be exactly the same. Later we shall examine in the network relationship context the association between

various groups and their degrees of participation in the last general election through traditional media and electronic media.

The need to use the media for social or group information exchange is very important in Nigeria because most Nigerians belong to 'social' organisations in the villages and towns. In the survey 83 respondents belonged to different clubs. Some belong to between 1-5 clubs that are set up in the town, while 95 respondents belonged to similar clubs social organisations that exist both in the villages and in the cities. This is a clear indication that through 'social' organisations villages and towns are strongly linked.

The relevance of this village/urban linkage through 'social' organisations in political communication is that 'unions' constitute an important level with which we can apply convergence models in Nigeria. Secondly, it helps us to reveal the structure of political communication which is the basis of network analysis, particularly if these clubs, unions, etc. were to be used politically by the political candidates to mobilise political support in the villages and in the cities. Thirdly, the pattern of horizontal, i.e. group interpersonal communication and the way group leaders link individual organisations in order to mobilise nation-wide political support for the candidate. Fourthly, in attempting to reach wider national audiences and group support, the group leaders invariably use the mass media - a process in which formal organisations use formal communication institutions for political purposes.

However, before we can statistically establish whether these unions were effectively used as a medium for political support, participation and voting in the last general election in Nigeria, it is important to assess further how members of the group interact. Group interaction is more overt when members wish to solve their common problems. The levels of interaction between members indicates who are the leaders and who are followers. Those in the group who are relied upon more than others tend to be closely associated with leadership roles. Are problems solved by members' general participation, or left in the hands of a selected committee or the President? Whichever method is used, the process is similar to election of leadership for a small community, a big city or a nation. In different political systems, leaderships are chosen either by general political participation (democracy), or by hereditary (feudal system), or by select committee (communism); military dictatorship is self-imposed. Members'

participation in problem-solving within their small group organisation is a prerequisite to a general understanding of how national political systems function.

Considering the structure of Igbo society as described in Chapter Three, and more importantly the strong relationship between different groups and their kins which form the basis of group formation in cities and villages, my hypothesis is that most unions solve their problems democratically or by select committee.

The strength of relationship between systems of organisational problem-solving and different network groups can best be seen in the table below:

Table 9:10

Club/Unions Problem-Solving Methods Expressed In Column Percentage

Groups	Members Discuss Problems	Selected Committee solves the problems	The President decides how to solve them	Total
Traditional	(36) 80.0	(9) 20.0	(0)	(45) 100
School Leavers	(6) 54.5	(4) 36.4	(1) 9.1	(11) 100
Urban Poor	(8) 80.0	(2) 20.0	(0) 0.0	(10) 100
Urban Elite	(22) 66.7	(10) 30.3	(1) 3.0	(33) 100
Rural Elite	(15) 88.2	(2) 11.8	(0) 0.0	(17) 100
Column Total	(87) 75.0	(27) 23.3	(2) 1.7	(116) 100

Though we have seen that traditional channels of communication and the radio are the most important media of information flow between members of a union, this could be only one aspect of political communication participation through social processes. But it is through actual participation of members of the group in solving unions' problems that the individual becomes politically socialised.

In the survey, 87 people reported that in their unions problems are solved by all the members' participating, while only 27 reported that a representative committee attends to a union's problem. The number who reported that their chairman or presidents solved their problems were only two.

In all the groups members overwhelmingly use decision-making as a democratic process: social systems in Igboland are participatory activities. Thus, if these patterns of decision-making, problem-solving and network of connectedness in social groups formation should bear any practical relationship to the political systems and practices, we could anticipate that Nigerians within the Nigerian political context are very articulate. If also this remains consistent with other socio-political relationships, the role of media as a major political instrument of influence should be questioned.

So far we have demonstrated that kinship is linked with membership of social organisations. Religion is the second most important relationship. The processes of communication in groups are related to the kinship system and radio, owing to its characteristics, is an important medium of information circulation among members of the club. We have found out that these clubs exist in the cities and villages. This is a rather over-generalised statement which would render analysis of political communication vague if at any stage in this study social clubs constitute an important analytic base in national political participation. The geographical level, i.e. village, city, divisional, state, national and international levels, in which these clubs, unions etc. exist constitute an important level in which political candidates and their communication-sets can mobilise political support through unions etc. This will help us to test some of the theories of networks established in Chapter Two, such as proximity, obligatory relationship, density, kinship, friendship and acquaintance in political mobilisation processes.

We shall now associate these political activities with different groups in order to examine the level of political participation through the clubs. From the table, it is evident that social clubs in all the groups exist at the levels in Nigeria where one would expect national political activities to operate during national elections for leadership selection. In the past, general elections in Nigeria were influenced by tribal organisations so that wherever Nigerians lived within the country, they voted according to their

'homeland' in support of a particular ethnic leader.

There is an important relationship in the groups revealed by the data. The number of respondents who reported that their clubs have international links are higher in the traditional group and young school leavers group than in the urban and rural elite group.

Table 10:10
Respondents' Levels of Social Organisations

Groups	Village	City	Divisional	State	National	International
Traditional	(39) 50.0	(25) 42.4	(14) 41.2	(12) 36.4	(12) 30.8	(4) 33.3
School Leavers	(8) 10.3	(8) 13.6	(2) 5.9	(1) 3.0	(6) 15.4	(3) 25.0
Urban Poor	(7) 9.0	(7) 11.9	(2) 5.9	(1) 3.0	(1) 2.6	(2) 16.7
Urban Elites	(18) 23.1	(15) 25.4	(11) 32.4	(13) 39.4	(11) 28.2	(2) 16.7
Rural Elites	(6) 7.7	(4) 6.8	(5) 14.0	(6) 18.2	(9) 23.1	(1) 8.3
Column Total	(78) 100	(59) 100	(34) 100	(33) 100	(39) 100	(12) 100

We have noted already that religion was an important group association in all the groups, particularly among the traditional network group. The universality of modern religions was reflected in this data. In the Catholic Church, religious unions such as Legion of Mary, Sacred Heart, Knights of St. John, etc. have as much international association as the Catholic Church itself. Also non-denominational churches have strong links with several Evangelical European and American church movements. Historically, Islam has strong ties with the Arab world in their ever-increasing tendency towards Islamic brotherhood. The political importance of organisational relationship at international level is relevant in the study of international political communication networks, which is not our concern in this thesis.

Another important relationship in the data is the difference between the two elite groups to national clubs and international clubs. The urban elites

scored 28.2% (11) for national level and only 16.7% at international level. This shows that elites are not interested in religious organisations but on national organisations, for which the criterion for membership is professionalism, that excludes the most vulnerable group, the urban poor. The table shows that at both state and national levels the urban poor scored only 3% and 2.6% respectively. The numbers of the rural elites were evenly spread at all levels, rising sharply at national level but dropping very sharply to 8.3% at international level, which is associated with religion. However, the highest level of association is the village level, once again emphasising the strong relationships between all the network groups and the rural environment.

The political importance of this national link with villages is reflected in the high percentage of traditional groups, 30.8%, who reported that their clubs operate at national level. This is because village leaders, for political mobilisation reasons, are accepted into national clubs, e.g. Club '19' which is a club of implicit socio-political movement at national level. As I argued in Chapters One and Two, the elites who worked in the cities belong to these clubs and when they retire to the villages also continue to be members. We have yet to see how these associations were used as a basis for political participation in the last general election in terms of network of connectedness.

If these clubs etc. were to be efficiently used to mobilise political support for local, state and national politics, leaders of different groups or committees or all the members must be linked. Group alliance for social economic, political or cultural activities are the functions of this linkage process. In Chapter One I argued in terms of Clyde Mitchell's view that social network is a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons (or group). Their linkages, he argues, have certain characteristics as a whole which could be used to interpret the socio- or political behaviour of persons or groups involved. This concept implies that, in networks of communication, linkages are crucial. The importance of linkage in network has been emphatically stressed by Rogers and Kincaid, thus:

"link is a communication relationship between two units (usually individuals, although the nodes may be groups, or organisations, nations, etc.) in a system. The link is the basic datum in any type of network analysis. Without knowing the existing links among the units/members in a system, no type of network analysis is possible."¹⁰

As our unit of analysis is on group or system networks with similar basic characteristics, the characteristics of their linkage are: individuals (nodes, leaders), groups (selected committee members); organisational (all the members of the club). The table below shows the characteristics of the links in relation to different network systems in the survey:

Table 11:10

Structure of Linkage Between Social Organisations

Groups	1	2	3	Row Total
Traditional	(23) 53.5	(12) 27.9	(8) 18.6	(43) 100
School Leavers	(6) 54.5	(3) 27.3	(2) 18.2	(11) 100
Urban Poor	(5) 55.6	(2) 22.9	(2) 22.9	(9) 100
Urban Elite	(14) 42.4	(10) 30.3	(9) 8.0	(33) 100
Rural Elite	(12) 70.6	(3) 17.6	(2) 11.8	(17) 100
Total number	(60)	(30)	(23)	(113)
Total column %	53.1	26.5	19.8	100

1 = the leaders

2 = selected members

3 = all the members

We have seen earlier that most of the clubs etc. were spread throughout the villages and cities in Nigeria. As organisations most of them stated the presence of leaders within them. In general, one of the principal functions of leadership in social clubs in Nigeria is to link one organisation with others for such activities as cultural dances, celebrations etc. Social, economic and political activities are important in inter- and intra-group relationships. If the leaders do not initiate such relationships, delegated members of all the members do so. Some of the links, as pointed out in Chapter Two, are direct or indirect links through intermediaries, eg leaders.

In the survey, 53.1% (60) of the respondents reported that their leaders determine external relationships with other organisations. In all groups, except the urban elite, over half of the respondents reported that relations

with external organisations are determined by the leaders, this rising to 70.6% for the rural elite. This implies that leaders act as intermediaries between clubs in Nigeria. This indirect linkage between leaders is very important in political influence and alliances in Nigeria. The implication here is that the majority of the illiterates, who make up a large proportion of the network group, can be exploited by their leaders during an election period. The members are always given second-hand information concerning other unions, particularly those outside the villages. In the process of socio-economic changes, the majority of these clubs in the villages have changed from the traditional type to modern or a combination of both. This high proportion of leadership linkage in the village reinforces the theoretical argument in Chapter Two that status in Nigeria are positions in traditional terms, but not all positions are status, chiefs, Obias, emires and elders. All status are important positions of linkages in the traditional, modern or contemporary village/urban political and social communication networks. In particular, the elites in the cities occupy important positions in the network structures. As 'important' politicians, they connect others directly or through their action-set etc. I have argued earlier that in recent years the majority of these political elites have assumed the roles of traditional chiefs, emirs, Alhajis, Obias, elders etc. Thus the strong network ties between the urban elite group and the kinship-based organisation in the cities and villages have dual positions in the society's traditional and modern political activities. David Knock and James Kuklinkski (Network Analysis, 1962, pp. 18-19) have argued that in network analysis a position or socio-political role within a subgroup is an identifiable linkage point between one group or another.

These leaders who link their social groups form cliques. Between them there are 'strong ties' and between their followers in separate groups there are 'weak ties' (the concept of direct and indirect ties in network analysis in the Nigerian context). This process of clique formation in social organisations represents a particular way Nigerians communicate during an election period. To understand the way cliques communicate with political leaders, and the way both cliques and politicians manipulate the masses through kinship and religious organisations, is to understand the complexities of Nigerian political conflicts. The analysis of Nigerian politics on an ethnic basis has involved the realities of the structure of political behaviour and relationships there. Leaders and their cliques exaggerate ethnicity so as to exploit the masses. I have shown earlier how leaders agree quickly on how to increase their wages and allowance without

debates. It is the cliques, the elites, all those with status and position, who collaborate at all levels to include the use of the media to manipulate the masses for their own political ends.

The high percentage of linkages to external groups etc. by leaders tend to emphasise that linkages take place through structural equivalent positions of group leadership. But because of the strong relationship between all the groups through kinship and religion, equivalent positions should not stress the importance of class or highly stratified equivalent positions such as emirs-to-emirs, Obias to Obias, elders to elders, elites to elites. The dual position which political elites assume in Nigeria today makes such relationships difficult.

In contrast to decision-making and problem-solving within the organisation, where all members and selected committees score higher than leadership, direct communication between social groups in Nigeria favours the leaders. Only 26.5% and 19.8% in all the groups reported that they were linked externally by a selected member or by all the members respectively. If therefore most Nigerian leaders either in social or political roles are recognised or accepted by their own tribes, and upon this their status - positions for further powerful positions - are built, it means that most clique formation via group leadership would be ethnic in character and their mobilisation of socio-political support will be characteristically ethnic. What network analysis does is to help us identify in the society those who are specifically in this pattern of socio-political network of connectedness and why.

This analysis reduces theoretical generalisation so that particular political communication problems can be focused on a particular group in the society to solve the problem of ethnicity, political integration etc. On the basis of this revelation, it must be argued that those political leaders who have taken the title of traditional chiefs should not take part in elective and national or state representative government, so that new forms of network linkages are built away from ethnic and religious-based criteria. This is a process in which national political leaders can link with their colleagues, irrespective of tribes, on the basis of policy, ideology and national political consensus. The major problem of Nigerian political instability and corruption is this network of ties based on religion and kinship, in which leaders form cliques whose socio-political interests are self centred.

I shall now statistically examine the statement that modern political leaders have increasingly taken dual leadership titles in Nigeria and by so doing displaced the power of traditional chiefs in the rural areas. This is a process which gives them position and status in the towns as well as in the villages, with larger populations in order to win general support. The questionnaire asked whether the respondents felt that their 'clubs' or 'social' organisations are traditional, modern or a combination of both. A total of 11.6% (13) reported that their clubs are traditional, 6.3% (7) and 4.5% (5) from the traditional and urban poor respectively constitute part of the 11.6% total.

Table 12:10

The Nature of Social Organisations in the Survey

Groups	1	2	3	Total
Traditional	(7) 17.1	(16) 39.0	(18) 43.9	(41) 100
School Leaver	(0) 0.0	(4) 36.4	(7) 63.6	(11) 100
Urban Poor	(5) 50.0	(3) 30.0	(2) 20.0	(10) 100
Urban Elite	(1) 3.0	(16) 48.5	(16) 48.5	(33) 100
Rural Elite	(0) 0.0	(8) 47.1	(9) 52.9	(17) 100
Column Total	(13) 11.6	(47) 42.0	(52) 46.4	(112) 100

1 = traditional 2 = modern 3 = combination of both

There is a total of 42% (47) in all the groups who reported that their organisations are modern while yet more, 46.3% (52), said that their social organisations are both modern and traditional in nature.

Two cells are very important in this table, traditional and urban elite groups. Also the relationship between column 2 (modern) and column 3 (combination of both) are important.

Only 17.1% of the respondents from the traditional group reported that their

clubs were purely traditional, and among the rural elite none do so. In both these groups more or less half the respondents characterise their clubs as both traditional and modern (43.9% and 52.9% respectively). But a considerable proportion, 39% and 47.1% respectively, actually reported their clubs to be purely modern. Among the urban elite only 3% report that theirs are purely traditional clubs, while the remainder are equally divided between a purely modern and a modern and traditional interpretation. This finding does not only support the idea of dual roles of ruling political and bureaucratic elites in Nigeria, but also has several social, economic and political implications.

In all the network groups, except in the urban poor group with its nearly uniform spread of membership of different clubs, there was a strong tendency towards organisations which embody traditional and modern functions and roles. Since the elites with strong economic, social and political powers share membership with the poor, less educated and less well-off, leadership positions will certainly fall on the former's shoulders.

Another important feature of social organisations in Nigeria is the way they are financed. Elites tend to demonstrate publicly their economic power over the old traditional chiefs by huge donations and levies on their members. The economic strength of the elites has in many respects rendered the worth of traditional rulers less attractive to the masses of Nigerians, who have in recent years become disoriented. Those possessing wealth count, no matter how they achieve it! Consequently, those who are poor are excluded from the club because they cannot afford the cost of membership. Secondly, though they are 'clubs', they are sources from which political leaders are recruited and financed. The club members 'lobby' together to obtain federal and state contracts in which costs are over-estimated. Donations and the resultant 'kick-backs' are made available to political parties. In the last two general elections, it was stated that each party should not spend more than 1-10 Kobo per vote, but the cost of the elections could not be calculated.

The table below shows the financing of clubs by voluntary donation, general levy, village collection, state government subsidy, federal government subsidy and all of those.

The bases under which the elites tend to dominate socio-economic and political organisations in Nigeria cannot be disassociated from the colonial

influence and introduction of education - missionaries in particular - the money economy and new political and ideological relationships.

Table 13:10

The Finances of Social Organisations

Groups	1	2	3	4	5	6
Traditional	(17)	(34)	(6)	(0)	(0)	(3)
School Leavers	(7)	(8)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Urban Poor	(4)	(7)	(2)	(0)	(0)	(0)
	8.9	7.3	22.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Urban Elites	(14)	(30)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)
	31.1	31.3	11.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rural Elites	(3)	(17)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)
	6.7	17.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total number	(45)	(96)	(9)	(0)	(0)	(3)
Column %	100	100	100			100

- 1 = voluntary donation
- 2 = general levy
- 3 = village general collections
- 4 = state government subsidy
- 5 = federal government subsidy
- 6 = all of these

Consequently, African social institutions that were formally sustained by shared norms, values and consensus began to depend increasingly on money for their existence. Besides these financial needs, ideological pressures were put on the traditional leaders and the entire communities by emerging new elite groups. The old social organisations were not eroded by radical shifts or changes but by gradual absorption and assimilation of new ideas from the elites.

The data shows that 45 respondents reported that their organisations are supported financially by voluntary donation, 96 by general levy, and only 9 by village general collections. There is no government - federal or state - support to clubs. Thus the strength of the clubs rests on the financial ability of their members. Those clubs where members are poor will tend to be less important in social, political and economic decisions in the communities. Leaders of more financially powerful clubs will tend to

influence leaders of the poorer clubs and their followers.

The old tradition of village general collection is rapidly dying out and only 6 reported that their unions are supported by such collection. There is strong relationship between the traditional network group and sources of supporting their clubs by voluntary donation, 37.8%, and general levy, 35.4%. Urban elites showed a similar association on these sources, 31.1% and 31.3% respectively. This relationship shows that the urban elites form the core of the traditional network unions and clubs. The political implication of this data will be shown later on, how money influences political participation as a result of network of association between the rich and the poor through kinship-based voluntary organisations.

In conclusion, it was easy for members to assume that their unions were non-political but leaders through linkage exploited the association for their political ambition. The political climate in Nigeria since independence does not permit overt expression of clubs as political, but by implicit intent they are political.

Social organisations (unions and clubs) are an important level of political communication linkage between the rural and urban population in Nigeria. In the survey, 85.5% of the respondents belong to such organisations. Large numbers of these organisations (74.8%) exist both in the village and in the city communities. These organisations are either social (62.2%), religious (23.9%), economic (9.7%) or traditional/cultural (5.3%). Only 0.9% are said to be political.

The high proportion of social organisations which exist in both villages and cities supports the point made earlier that social organisations in Nigeria can be highly politicised because they form the largest channel for the mobilisation of various communities in general election campaigns.

The democratic process of leadership, particularly in Igbo communities, is demonstrated by the pattern of leadership in these organisations. For instance, 76.3% of the respondents reported that their leaders are chosen by election, while 3.7% stated that their leaders are chosen by appointment. When the organisations are faced with problems, members generally discuss them to provide solutions, and problems are not left in the hands of leaders or small groups of members to solve.

Different network groups use different means to communicate with their members in urban and rural areas. Oral communication is the basic form of information flow between traditional network group members. Urban elites circulate information to their members through letters. In general, 148 respondents used face-to-face interaction to circulate information, 76 of the respondents do so by letters, while 22 use radio and only 5 newspapers, 2 television. None at all use the telephone to communicate with their members.

These organisations spread from village to cities and some of them encompass members who live in different parts of the country, and outside it. Naturally, when those voluntary organisations are politicised their members who live in different parts of the country tend to vote for one particular leader or party.

The organisations are traditional/cultural (11.6%), modern (42%) or both (46.4%). A large number of them (96) are maintained through general financial levy on the members, while 45 of the social clubs are supported by members' voluntary donations. Some of the clubs in the village (9) are supported through village 'money collection' a process which involves male and female adults only. Three of the clubs are financed by the combination of all the above means.

In the next chapter we shall analyse the relationship between different network groups and their political behaviour and participation during the last general elections in Nigeria, taking into consideration the demographic characteristics and structure of social relationship of the clubs, unions etc. discussed in this and the previous chapter.

REFERENCES

1. MITCHELL, op cit, 1969, p.20
2. Cf. MITCHELL, op cit, 1969, p.20
3. Mr. Udeochi was a teacher who resigned and became an influential politician. In the early 70s he reviewed teachers' salaries and improved their standard of payment and conditions of service considerably. The gap between them and civil servants was bridged. Besides he improved the power of Nigeria's Union of Teachers (NUT) as an important bargaining power for teachers.
4. For statistical analytic reasons, I have reduced tribal and ethnic groupings to kins membership. Indeed the former is an extension of the latter.
5. MITCHELL, 1969:29, and READER, 1964:22
6. SMOCH, A., op cit, p.188
7. This fear of election violence was expressed thus: "After the expiration of the quit order notice on the aliens, the Federal Government announced that about 1.5 million illegal aliens had so far left the country. The Internal Affairs Minister further disclosed that the crime wave in Lagos had dropped by 55 per cent since the illegal immigrants were expelled from Nigeria. Incidence of crime was one of the reasons advanced by the Federal Government for the expulsion of the immigrants." Mac Alabi (ed), Elections 1983: A Daily Times Publication, Lagos, 1983, p.7
8. JOSEPH, L., Nigeria's Elections: "The Bitter Truth", Lagos, 1981, p.124
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10. ROGERS, M.R. & KINCAID, D.L. Communication Networks: Towards a New Paradigm for Research, MacMillan, London, 1981, pp.96-97

NETWORK GROUPS AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Chapter Ten saw statistically that formal voluntary associations are wide spread in Nigeria. They are not formal political associations but could provide important areas in the society in which political participation and relationships could be established. In the pre-1966 period, ethnic unions particularly in Igboland constituted very important organs of political parties. Audrey Smoch in her study of Igbo politics writes:

"Channels of communication between political representatives and the community ran through the ACIU (Abiriba Communal Improvement Union) rather than through the NCNC. Emole (the Abiriba representative in the Eastern House of Assembly) reported through ACIU general conferences and at meetings with branches in urban centres, as did the Federal Representatives. The Abiriban community gained another line of communication with the House of Assembly when, after an Abiriban was elected in 1961 to represent an urban area near Port-Harcourt, the Union members made him their president in order to benefit from his prestige and possible political influence."¹

In Chapter One I argued that when an ethnically-based voluntary association acts as an intermediary between a community, such as Abiriba, and a political organisation, eg the NCNC, it functions as a node as much as an individual who links a community and a political organisation. The importance of ethnic unions in a political communication network lies in its ability to be conveniently used by a single political leader to mobilise an entire community for political support. In the national election, the linkage of several communities through multi-ethnic unions or a single ethnic union becomes very crucial in the understanding of political communication networks in Igboland.

Before the Civil War, the Igbo State Union was an outstanding ethnic union through which a single ethnic leader (Zik) dominated (without regional opposition) the politics of Eastern Nigeria. Smoch noted that "the Igbo State Union claimed to be the representative of 'all the Igbos' at the regional and federal levels". The political importance of the Igbo State Union was so crucial to local communities that "theoretically ... every branch of all Igbo ethnic unions" was included in the Igbo State Union but a considerable number of them never paid the annual dues and registration fee.

Throughout Eastern Nigeria one man dominated the politics through a party. The NCNC Party drew its strength from a tribal union, but, if the pattern of leadership altered, the ethnic unions which supported a single party and its leadership will also be altered.

In Chapter One I pointed out the danger that in the use of a single large, ethnic union as a means of linkage and of political mobilisation at local, regional and national levels, any initiative taken by another leader for changes both in leadership and political ideology and philosophy would be quickly suppressed. Besides, opposition is met with dismissal either from the ethnic union or from the political party. Harries-Jones (196:309) also supported this view, stressing that in the network of politics in Mikomfwa-Zambia political activists who formed a new action-set (here action-set is equivalent to ethnic union as a linkage in the socio-political systems in the community) were dismissed from the UNIP Party.

This situation resembles the struggle of leadership between Azikiwe and Ojukwu in Igboland during the last general election. The split between these leaders and their consequent local and individual identification sharply altered the pattern of Igbo politics in Nigeria. The situation was not so much the formation of a new party in Igboland but the identification of different popular leaders with different existing parties in the country.

My hypothesis is that when two strong competing egos (political candidates) emerge from one ethnic community in the struggle for local or national political leadership, the action-sets, or communication sets, will also split, and the community in which the action-set mobilises for political support to the ego will also split its roles between the two leaders.

However, where the communication-set or union has more historical and social relevance than a temporary political or a rapidly passing event such as leadership elections, the union may cease altogether to function as a political mobilising centre for any of the leaders, particularly during the election period. Tension between members who identify with different leaders can be reduced by temporarily closing down the club or union during the election. Individuals who identify with different ethnic leaders and parties but one from the same locality will shift from using the formal ethnic unions for political mobilisation networks to using friends, relatives and families. In these processes, political communication networks will seriously affect relationships at all levels of the human

institutions, particularly the family. The effectiveness of interpersonal political communication network linkages and the influence of the distant mass media can then be compared according to the respondent's own view of what influenced him to participate and to vote. Tension rocked the fabric of Igbo society so much that people who actually participated in politics, under the pressure of friends and relatives, refused to acknowledge in public that they were at all interested in politics or that they identified with any party.

In the survey, respondents were asked whether in the last civil government they identified or belonged to any political party. A list of the seven political parties was given to them and they were asked to tick one only. It is assumed that the party a respondent ticked was the party she/he voted for. It was impossible to ask direct questions such as "Which party did you vote for?" Many Igbos, as a result of tension and family conflicts during the election, would not give any answers, particularly local teachers who were more-or-less political scapegoats because of their political identification during the last general elections. The table below shows such identification and voting during the elections.

TABLE 1:11

Respondents and Parties For Which They Voted

Groups	NPN	UNP	NAP	NPP	Total	
Traditional	(12) 30.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(28) 70.0	(40) 100	36.7
School Leaver	(6) 54.5	(1) 9.1	(0) 0.0	(4) 36.4	(11) 100	10.1
Urban Poor	(2) 25.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(6) 75.0	(8) 100	7.3
Urban Elite	(9) 26.5	(9) 26.5	(1) 2.9	(15) 44.1	(34) 100	31.2
Rural Elite	(7) 43.8	(2) 12.5	(1) 6.3	(6) 37.5	(16) 100	14.7
Column	(36) 33.0	(12) 11.0	(2) 1.8	(59) 54.1	(109) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 44

Though there were seven registered political parties, only three, according to this table were significant in attracting votes from the respondents.

They were NPN, UPN and NPP. They were the three parties seen above which represent the three major tribes in Nigeria - Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba and Igbos.

Generally, in all the groups 33.6% voted for NPN, 11% voted for UPN and 54.1% voted NPP. In the traditional network group, votes were split only between the two parties, namely the NPN 30% and the NPP 70%. Most members in this network group, therefore, did not vote for any other party in Nigeria. In the young school leavers, 34.5% voted NPN and 36.4% NPP. In this group there is a greater tendency towards identification with NPN than NPP. In the urban poor network group 25% vote NPN and 75% NPP. Several commentators and writers have described the NPN as the party of the rich and without looking at the elites' network group, particularly the urban elites characteristically associated with economic, social and political power in Nigeria, one could jump to such a conclusion. None in the urban poor group voted for UPN or NAP.

In the elite group votes were equally split between UPN and NPN (26.5% each). But a higher percentage of 44.1% voted NPP. There are several interpretations to this pattern of voting among the urban elites. If the rich and the powerful exclusively identified with NPN a considerable number of the urban elites in this network group could have cast their votes for NPN rather than NPP. What tended to prevail in the NPN party was that the majority of its leadership was associated with wealth in the most corrupt manner. They were men, in fact, who had no concern for political change, stability and the general welfare of the public. In general, this stability is characteristic of Nigerian politics. The majority of the elites who see Nigerian politics as a risk-taking venture try as much as possible to stay clear of it, and stay even further from the government in power. Some of them seriously criticise the system, but do not take against to correct it. It has been noted that many elites in Nigeria do not even vote in Nigerian elections. Another important interpretation of the data on the urban elite is that the majority of the elite were state-employed and the NPP was an opposition party to the ruling party, NPN. Thus urban elites would naturally vote for the state ruling party.

The rural elites cast slightly more votes to NPN, 43.8%, than to NPP, 37.5%. The most effective propaganda carried by NPN against NPP during the election concerned non-payment of teachers' salaries by the NPP state government of Imo State. The hopes of most teachers were raised by the NPN by the promise

of rapid changes that would take place in their pay conditions if they voted NPN. Such propaganda, through the media and through informal networks of friends and relatives, worked efficiently among rural elites. After the election in which the NPP remained in power in Imo State, thousands of teachers were transferred away from their own villages to the remotest villages in the state. This made life difficult for a few weeks since most teachers disliked moving their families to stations where they had to teach in fear of armed robbery. We noted also in Chapter Nine that most teachers engage in dual occupations: teaching, but also farming on their ancestral lands to eke out their living when salaries are not forthcoming. When they are transferred away from home, securing a piece of land for agriculture becomes difficult. As soon as the army took over the government again in December 1983 those affected by this massive transfer rejoiced. This is one of the main reasons for the army's popularity at the beginning of the Buhari regime. Other factors which contributed to such popularity were the elimination of corruption and the detention of politicians.

One of the serious limitations of the network system analysis based on group characteristics such as occupation, education, mobility, residence, etc. is that it tends to conceal the effect of ethnic politics which dominate Nigerian politics. If individual characteristics and attributes are the major classificatory criteria we cannot illustrate statistically the shift and changes in ethnic politics without temporarily resolving our level of analysis from network group to ethnic groupings.

Consequently we should examine the relationship between respondents' ethnic origin and the parties for which they cast their votes. We have seen in Chapter Four that the political party development in Nigeria was shaped by ethnic groupings and even by the creation of states after the Civil War. This pattern of political development has remained the same. The table shows the relationship between respondents' ethnic origin and the parties for which they voted.

There are two important cells in the table - the NPN and the NPP under the Igbo column. There were 122 respondents who actually voted. 102 were Igbos and this shows that the urban and rural areas where the data was collected were predominantly Igbo communities. 33 (27%) of Igbo respondents in the survey voted for NPN while 66 (54.1%) voted for the NPP. If these figures are compared with the 1979 general elections as shown in Chapter Seven, and other previous general elections in Nigeria, for the first time in the

history of Nigerian politics a quarter of Igbos voted for a party other than an Igbo dominated party.

Table 2:11

Respondents' Ethnic Origins and the Parties For Which They Voted
Expressed in Row Numbers

Political Parties	Igbo	Yoruba	Hausa/ Fulani	Other Tribes	Row Total Number	Row Total Percent
HPN	33	1	5	1	40	32.8
UPN	1	8	1	3	13	10.7
PRP	0	0	1	0	1	0.8
NAP	2	0	0	0	2	1.6
NPN	66	0	0	0	66	54.1
Total Column	102	9	7	4	122	100

I argued earlier that once there is a split in leadership within an ethnic group the ethnic communities are bound to split along the same line. It was the conflict between Zik who was the leader of the NPP and Ojukwu who identified with Hausa/Fulani NPN that divided the Igbo communities in their party identification. The pardon and return of Ujukwu from exile after the fall of Biafra altered the pattern of politics in Nigeria, especially among the Igbos.

Another important relationship between ethnically homogeneous villages and the cities in Imo State is that the majority of communities are Catholic. In addition, most of their social institutions or clubs are kinship-based (in Chapter Nine we saw that 75.2% of the respondents are Roman Catholics, and in Chapter Ten 33.8% of the membership of 'social' clubs is based on kinship and 22.6% on religious criteria). Another important factor is that decision-making within most social organisations in Igbo communities is democratic. These are all conditions which facilitate a rapid network of political communication.

In the first instance, sub-groups in the communities are based on socio-cultural and religious cohesion. As shown earlier, broader sub-groups, both

in Igbo villages and other cities in Nigeria are strongly linked by branches of kinship unions. Therefore, in many respects, we should expect a homogeneity of attitude and behaviour in political participation and voting. Through to our analysis on linkages between different 'social' organisations and ethnic unions, we discovered that 55.1% of all external linkages in all the network groups are carried out by leaders. This is relevant to the earlier debate about clique formation and political mobilisation.

In network analysis, the crucial point made by Barnes, as noted in Chapter Two, should be examined. He maintained that groups are linked by lines and on the line are actual people who initiate linkages. The linkages or nodes are important in network analysis. My criticism of this point was that he failed to identify these individuals on the linkage lines in terms of their distinguishing characteristics and attributes, taking for granted the why and when of most frequent group linkages.

In developing the social network concept of analytic and operational networks of political communication, I call the linkages group leaders. These leaders are not essentially political leaders but, as Audrey Smoch noted in her study of Igbo politics, they are professional politicians, such as Emole in the Abiriba local community study, who became a 'social' club or ethnic union chairman so that his political position and influence would render benefits to the group. Emole, in turn, linked the union to his political party so that through the ethnic union the entire ethnic group, rather than the political party, would vote for Emole and his party. This two-way flow of political communication can be relevantly applied to the theory established in Chapter Two, that in network groups communication and linkages are complex and horizontal, and that there is a general involvement in which everyone is directly linked to others in the group, while linkages between groups tend to be vertical and 'single stranded' (structural equivalents relationship and clique formation).

The principal political actors during the 1983 general elections in Igboland were Zik and Ojukwu. Under Zik's influence Jim Nwaobodo and Sam Mbakwe won the governorship of Anambra and Imo States respectively. The NPN performed poorly in these states. The new constitution states that for any political candidate to become a President of the Federal Government in Nigeria he must win 25% of the votes in each of the states. This is an attempt by Nigeria to establish a symbolic political leadership with which all Nigerians will emotionally identify, irrespective of tribes and religion. To achieve this,

the leader must in turn satisfy the needs and expectations of 25% of all the different ethnic groups in Nigeria. This is another point which indicates that Nigerian states are established on the basis of ethnicity. With this new demand, ex-President Shagari pardoned and recalled Ojukwu from the Ivory Coast. The disagreements between Zik and Ojukwu and the defection of the former to Nigeria during the Civil War left Ojukwu very bitter. During the Civil War, Ojukwu was as much a popular leader among the Igbos as was Zik before the Civil War. Hence, unlike other sections of Nigeria, the Igbos could identify with two important leaderships.

In network analysis therefore, the two egos (political candidates), Zik and Ojukwu, in their political leadership struggle, began to put pressure on the political 'action-set' and the ethnic unions which characterise urban and village communities in Nigeria.

The leaders of these ethnic groups sharply identified with the two leaders. The Ikemba militant group (action-set) was effectively mobilised to oppose NPP sub-groups and leaders within Amanbra State. In Imo State, the influence of Dr. Michael Okpala, who was fighting for the creation of Ibiam State under NPN, further divided the Igbos between the NPN and NPP. Since the Igbo communities in their social, cultural and religious organisations are relatively homogeneous, division among cliques, structural equivalents or the liaisons would gradually divide the voting patterns of the communities. According to my data, one of the major explanations of the 33% votes gained by NPN in Imo State, is that the 33% is primarily a result of emergent ego (Ojukwu) in the political leadership in Igboland. In addition, the popularity of Zik as Igbo leader is eroding with the emergence of many powerful leaders who tend increasingly to identify with the Northern dominated ruling party (NPN). Various reasons are given for the alliance, such as offering the Igbos another chance after the Civil War, to enter into the national main stream of decision-making in politics and the economy.

A total of 11% voted for the UPN, of whom none were from the traditional network. Three quarters of all who voted for the UPN came from the urban elite. A cross-tabulation of ethnic origin and respondents party identification earlier revealed the ethnic origin of those who voted for the party. (We saw that of the thirteen (10.7%) who voted for UPN, eight (6.6%) were Yorubas, three were from other tribes, and only one Igbo man voted UPN. This party gained only one vote from the Hausa/Fulani tribe. Similarly, no other tribe voted NPP except the Igbos).

The table shows that in the survey there were 8 Yoruba respondents and all of them voted for the UPN. All the eight also belong to the urban elite group. Only one Igbo voted for the UNP. This shows that the Igbos and the Yorubas are more politically disintegrated than the Igbos and Hausa/Fulani, both in terms of leadership association and of the masses of the two ethnic groups. The Igbos bitterly resent what the Yoruba leadership - Awo - did to the Igbos during and after the Civil War. Ojukwu capitalised on this resentment during the 1983 general election and in his speech published by New Nigeria, Tuesday, 7th June 1983, he told the Igbos at Enugu:

"In a sudden change of tone which held the crowd spellbound, Chief Ojukwu told them to reject the UPN leader, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, because he was responsible for their problem. This is the man that goaded us into war and then abandoned us. Lest we forget, this is the man that boasted that starvation was a legitimate weapon of war. Lest we forget, this the man that gave us twenty pounds for every fortune that we had acquired... This is the man that brought indigenisation when we were destitutes and could not benefit thereof. Lest we forget, this is the man for whom we founded and maintained the UPGA and who repaid us with bullets in war. This is the father of tribalism in Nigeria, lest we forget this is the man that prevented us from a single legislative seat in Lagos State."²

At this time, under the auspices of NPP and UPN, led by Zik and Awo and other minority ethnic parties, the leaders decided to form PPA. Ojukwu described the move as a political alliance which "brought two strange bed-fellows together". His attack on Awolowo effectively reminded the Igbos of the past, and they turned down any form of 'good' gesture during the election campaign by Awolowo.

Though the number of Hausa/Fulani and other non-Igbo ethnic groups living in Owerri were small, none of them voted for the Igbo-dominated NPP party. Most of them voted for UPN or NPN. Despite their close proximity with the Igbos in terms of housing, working and social relations, the non-Igbos in the community voted for their own ethnic party. Here the argument raised by Harries-Jones in the study of the copperbelt town, that links based on common rural origin, kinship and proximity are used to establish the 'grass roots' organisation of a political party in the copperbelt town, is relevant.³ Though this may be a general characteristic of most multi-ethnic cities in Africa, the most important factor is that the rural origins of the ethnic groups in the city are strongly linked through unions and cliques with the rural social institutions, so that the impact of friends,

workmates, and neighbours is minimised (Peace 1979). Thus Mitchell concludes as we have seen in Chapter Two that:

"Face-to-face interaction is not a necessary condition for the obligations entailed in a relationship to be honoured. There are many circumstances where an intense link [in terms of geographical proximity, eg housing, work and neighbourhood] with a person living some distance away may be an important factor in the behaviour of an individual."⁴

There are also other factors besides ethnicity which influence Nigerians to vote. It is the interpretation of these other factors which will enable us to assess actual changes in political relationships in Nigeria. Concentration on ethnicity has over-shadowed various major political changes such as the division of Igbo communities between the NPN and the NPP during the last general elections. These other factors include party leader/ chairman's popularity, party policy/manifesto, party's national achievement, ethnic origin, parents' influence, friends' influence, club membership, or other reasons. Respondents were asked which of these factors had made the respondent join the party. The table below illustrates the scores of each network group:

Table 3:11

Reasons Why Respondents' Voted For a Particular Party

Based on Total Row Percent

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Traditional	(10) 55.6	(15) 25.4	(15) 50.0	(3) 27.3	(1) 50.0	(0) 0.0	(8) 80.0
School Leavers	(1) 5.6	(6) 10.2	(1) 3.3	(2) 18.2	(1) 50.0	(1) 100	(0) 0.0
Urban Poor	(3) 16.7	(2) 3.4	(1) 3.3	(2) 18.2	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Urban Elites	(3) 16.7	(24) 40.7	(9) 30.0	(4) 36.4	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 20.0
Rural Elites	(1) 5.6	(12) 20.3	(4) 13.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Total number	(18)	(59)	(30)	(11)	(2)	(1)	(10)
Total percentage	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

1 = voted because of leadership; 2 = voted because of policy; 3 = voted because of party achievements; 4 = voted because of ethnicity; 5 = voted because of friends; 6 = voted because of clubs; 7 = none of these

Leadership

In terms of sample sizes in all the network groups, the traditional and urban elite groups are significantly important. Leadership is an important influence in deciding party membership and voting among the traditional network group. It was generally believed that Mbakwe and Jim Nwaobodo won the governorships in Imo and Anambra States because they came under the umbrella and political shelter of Zik, who was an almost legendary political figure of the Igbo, particularly the conservative rural population. In my study of the 1979 general election (1982), I statistically illustrated that:

"Chief Charles Abangwuo, an Igbo, but UPN candidate 'polled 6,960 votes (1%) against Mr. Jim Nwobodo, also an Igboman, an NPP candidate who polled 772,061 votes (76%) ... Chief Awolowo himself had 7,063 (0.76%) in Anambra State and 7,335 (0.65%) in Imo State."⁵

I also noted that in the Western State, Yoruba candidates who stood for the NPP registered as many low votes as the Igbo UPN candidates in the Eastern states of Igboland.

Though I have argued that division among leaders could lead to division by a community voting for different leaders, this is also true if the sub-group political candidate identifies with a leader who is relatively popular in the communities. It is somehow problematic to generalise on this point until we are able to show statistically which combination of party alliances could lead to political stability in Nigerian politics (according to the view of the survey respondents).

Only 7.5% of the elites (3) and 5.9% of the rural elites reported that leadership was a contributory factor in their voting and political participation. These low figures in these groups support the notion earlier established that Nigerian elites, particularly bureaucratic elites, are not much impressed by political leadership in Nigeria. Urban elites (teachers), in particular, felt that political leaders use them during the election period for campaign purposes, particularly when it comes to long-standing arrears of their salaries. Most of them were convinced that their salaries were used to finance businessmen who openly supported political parties, and for election campaigns. Because of the constitutional law, civil servants could not take part in politics as openly as businessmen.

Party Policy

Considerable numbers of all the groups voted because of party policies. The most important group in this respect are urban elites, 40.7% (24), rural elites, 20.3% (12), and young school leavers, 10.6% (6). Only 3.4% (2) of the urban poor were influenced by party policies in casting their votes. 25% (15) of the traditional group were influenced by policy and should be regarded comparatively as a low score because of the size of this traditional group in the survey.

The implication of these scores in relation to different networks lies in the way party policies are communicated to electorates in Nigeria. Most party policies and manifestos are broadcast in formal and highly standardised English on the radio and television. Often when they are distributed in leaflets and published in newspapers they become more exclusive to the literate group networks. Those least able to understand the contents - the traditional and urban poor - are not influenced by party manifestos and policies. When these policies are broadcast in local languages, they are presented, as I argued in Chapter Two, as a summary of the English language broadcast. When political leaders are invited to make political speeches, or be interviewed on their policies, they completely embark on the use of formal English. This means that party policies on various media channels are always addressed to the elite 'class' who can meaningfully decode the message and decide how relevant these policies are in the context of Nigerian socio-political problems.

Party Achievements

The achievements of parties did not command much influence on the voting behaviour among all the groups. The traditional group recorded a comparably higher figure, 25.4% (15). This is because the electrification of rural areas, pipe-borne water supply, road and bridge constructions in the rural areas were deceitfully speeded up by the state governments during the election campaign - the ruling government making direct gestures to the rural areas. Both governments made more empty promises of what they would do if elected to power. The elites were aware how empty the promises were and were less influenced by them. They also knew that politicians used corrupt means to enrich their pockets and made very little improvement in the political and economic development of the nation.

The impact of ethnicity, friends and clubs were statistically insignificant, large numbers of voters not being influenced by them in their voting behaviour.

Table 4:11

Whether Respondents' Social Organisations Were Active During The Elections

	Yes	No	Row Total	
Traditional	(13) 31.0	(29) 69.0	(42) 100	36.8
School Leaver	(5) 45.5	(6) 54.5	(11) 100	9.6
Urban Poor	(3) 33.3	(6) 66.7	(9) 100	7.9
Urban Elite	(10) 27.8	(26) 72.2	(36) 100	31.6
Rural Elite	(5) 31.2	(11) 68.8	(16) 100	14.1
Column Total	(36) 31.6	(78) 68.4	(114) 100	100

Various studies in Nigerian politics and other West African studies, A. Lewis (1965), J. Coleman, (1965), Jan J. Milewski (1975), O. Nnoli, (1978), Audrey Smoch (1971), have shown in different ways that groups within major ethnic groups constitute important political party supporters. Audrey Smoch in particular demonstrated with examples from Mbaise, Abiriba and Port-Harcourt in what was formerly Eastern Nigeria that the ethnic union of what I term clubs were the backbone of ethnic politics. Even beyond the Nigerian experience, Michael Parenti ("Ethnic politics and the persistence of ethnic identification", American Political Science Review, LXI [Sept 1967], p.724, Wolfinger, 1964), speaking of "the development and persistence of ethnic voting" strongly stressed the importance of ethnic organisations in the voting behaviour of Americans. The underlying factor in their studies of a network of connectedness in political participation via ethnic unions is that, at both local and national politics, where the composition is of different ethnic groups, unions constitute important channels through which groups participate in politics.

What most of them ignored in the study of ethnic unions as channels of

political participation was the structure of leadership, both within the ethnic unions and political parties in the nation. The study of A.L. Epstein in Zambia in Luanshya copperbelt revealed the importance of leadership among Malawi, Bozi and Benba where splits in leadership amongst ethnic immigrants also caused splits in the group.

When Zik was the most important and absolutely dominant political personality in the Igbo-dominated former Eastern Nigeria, the strength of ethnic union as a powerful organisation was expressed thus by Smoch:

"Divisions of ethnic unions operated as political sub-groups within the NCNC to maximise positions and nomination for their members. The intensity of the political conflict was mitigated by the common NCNC allegiance and by the need even for divisional groups to co-operate with similar units to gain their political objectives. If ethnic unions prompted ethnic competition and confrontation, they also induced political compromise and accommodation. Ethnic unions commonly traded support from one another for a specific political goal ... participation in politics through the more inclusive divisional union, rather than through the primary village or clan unions actually increased the ability of groups to compromise and accommodate."

This is a view in which ethnic unions is seen as more institutionalised than a political party.

In this study, I propose that when leadership splits in terms of party identification, the role of ethnic unions as an ordering force for political identities also shifts accordingly. Often the ethnic unions may become politically passive channels or remain paralysed during election campaigns. Individuals participate in politics without going through their unions.

In the survey, 31.6% (36) said that their unions during the general election of 1983 were active in politics. On the other hand, 68.4% (78) reported that their clubs were not involved actively in politics. There were 114 respondents and 39 did not give any answer when asked whether their clubs were active or not in politics. This shows that ethnic unions in Nigeria, particularly in Imo State, are no longer powerful channels through which entire ethnic groups "compromise" their political beliefs and identification. This is an important development in Nigerian politics which can no longer be ignored. Ethnic politics is changing direction, not as a result of the influence of the mass media which seems currently over-exaggerated, but by the pattern and influence of shift in ethnic leadership,

particularly in Imo State. Such leadership began to emerge in Igboland in the 1960s when the Independent Party led by Chiko Obi, an Igbo, slowly began to weaken the strength of the Igbo State Union. The influence of Zik, the NCNC leader, far exceeded that of Chiko Obi who was regarded as a good mathematician and could best serve as a university lecturer, not an Igbo political leader. It was popularly known that he jumped into a conference hall through the window and when ordered out he explained that the window was the shortest point to his seat in the conference and since he was late he could not take the door entrance!

Ojukwu, who reshaped Igbo politics, was a popular leader of the Igbos during the Nigerian crisis and his popularity was equivalent to Zik's during the pre-Civil War period. Earlier I have argued that for two action-sets to have effective impacts on a political community the egos (political candidates) on whose behalf action-sets, unions, clubs, etc. mobilise the masses for political support, must have equivalent political status. Zik and Ojukwu are political equivalents and equally exerted strong influence on the entire Igbo communities. In the North the influence of Ameno Kanu, leader of the People Redemption Party (PRP), and Alhaja Ibrahim Waziri, leader of the Greater Nigeria People's Party (GNPP), were particularly important in reshaping Hausa/Fulani politics. The political leadership in the North is slightly different from that experienced in the East between Zik and Ojukwu. The last two have different political philosophies, but are historically Igbos by origin. Their differences during the Civil War culminated in a long standing political bitterness, only to be exploited by non-Igbo political leaders so as to create more division and bitterness between them, a situation which rationally affected the entire Igbo communities.

The Northern leadership division was an aspect of historical division between the original Hausas and the Bornu races who were conquered militarily and ideologically by the migrant Fulani during the Jihad. Ameno Kanu stood for radical change, though his followers Alhaji Abba Musa Emi (Kaduna) and Alhaji Mohammed Abubaker Remi (Kano) maintained different approaches to Hausa politics. In principal, the NPN, strongly rooted in Sokoto-dominated Northern politics was in many respects a continuation of the NPC Party whose powerful leader, the late Saduna of Sokoto, gave the North what they wanted in Nigeria and firmly united them as a Muslim political group. Saduna's death weakened one man regional political control and brought about the emergence of new political leaders. In the 1983 general election five out of seven registered parties came from the Hausa/Fulani north.

The most dominant and most powerful tribal political leader in Nigeria to remain unchallenged by his own people is chief Awolowo. Though the Yorubas have produced eminent personalities in different walks of life, none has been powerful enough to challenge Awolowo politically as much as Ojukwu has challenged Zik to reshape tribal politics in Western Nigeria. It is this weakness of the indigenous Yoruba to produce a political equivalent to Obafemi Awolowo which makes Yoruba politics most tribalistic. The effort made by Chief Abola (as noted in chapter four) to use his popular newspaper, The National Concord, to demystify the power of Awo failed because he was not nominated the NPN Presidential candidate according to the zoning arrangement of the party. As no one from Yorubaland, through a different party other than the UPN, confronted the influence of Chief Awolowo, the network of political communication remains unique along one line, structured by one leader, one party, one ego, and one action-set all of whom sequentially influence an entire tribal or ethnic community, the Yoruba. The notion of party discipline in the UPN is the function of this one leadership dominance. The voting behaviour of the tribe is also a reflection of this structure of leadership. The withdrawal of Awo from politics during the last few years of military government that handed over to civilian in 1979 was a cover-up to run the new party, UPN, formerly AG (Action Group) in the name of the social club exclusively made up of Yorubas. When in September 1979 the ban on political parties and the National State of Emergency were lifted, Awolowo within a few hours announced the formation of the UPN Party. By 18th December 1979 about 53 parties had forwarded applications to the Federal Electoral Committee, but only five were approved, of which three were a continuation of the pre-1966 political parties. A large number of these parties continued to exist under the military regime as social clubs, without changing their criteria for membership.

The political activities of these clubs varied widely. Their interests range from local infrastructural development to national semi-political activities. Some of them are active during election periods, some all the time irrespective of elections, but the majority of them tend not to be politically active at any time. This does not mean that those non-active political clubs are not used by their leaders as political mobilisation channels.

In the survey, the table below shows that only 21.9% of respondents reported that their social clubs are most active during an election period. More

than half of these come from the traditional group. Only 8.7% from the young school leavers, 4.3% from the urban poor, 26.1% from the urban elite and 8.7% of rural elites stated that their social clubs were active during an election period.

Table 5:11

Respondents' Social Organisations and Their Activities
Or Otherwise During Election Periods

Groups	Most Active During Election Period	Active all the time	Never active in politics	Row Total	
Traditional	(12) 28.6	(10) 23.8	(20) 47.6	(42)	(40.0)
School Leavers	(2) 22.2	(3) 33.3	(4) 44.4	(9)	(8.6)
Urban Poor	(1) 10.0	(2) 20.0	(7) 70.0	(10)	(9.5)
Urban Elite	(6) 20.0	(6) 20.0	(18) 60.0	(30)	(28.6)
Rural Elite	(2) 14.3	(2) 14.3	(10) 71.4	(14)	(13.3)
Column	(23) 21.9	(23) 21.9	(59) 56.2	(105) 100	(100)

These figures represent important network group relationships to politics through social organisations in Nigerian, and in particular Imo State. During the election periods several of the elite clubs in Imo State were sharply divided in their political supports to either NPN or NPP. The reasons are related to points raised above on the concept of splits in leadership and subsequent clubs division along different ego (political candidate) identification. An illustrative example of an elite club divided and almost paralysed from its noble start in 1982 is the Udo Eziana Association, a town made up of eight villages where most of the rural raw data for this thesis was collected. The club is exclusively made up of the most educated, the wealthiest and most respected personalities of the town. A brief statement from a letter which the secretary of the association, Mr. N.A. Iwunwah, Vice-Principal Eziana Commercial Secondary School, circulated to members of the association after the 1983 general elections is presented

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below. The intention was to remind the members of the association that elections were over and that they should once again come together and act as one body, one organisation, to achieve some of their goals. He concluded the letter by pleading gently, thus:

"Let us re-examine ourselves in the light of the present and dedicate ourselves anew to Udo Nna before the clouds gather over us. We can make it if we will. Eziana is our only indigenous town. We have no better place than home. Long live Udo Eziana Association.

Long live Eziana.

Long live Nigeria."⁷

This letter reveals the important political communication network in the villages during the election. Members of the more elite clubs became members of different clubs to collect information which they then used to mobilise political support on behalf of different political candidates. Most of these elite members could not influence their fellows in the same club because they shared different political views and interests. Their own clubs, therefore, tended to be relatively indifferent to politics, particularly in the rural areas. On the other hand, those associations strongly based on village kinship systems and religious organisations became more important political targets where different elites concentrated to mobilise political support. The traditional groups constituted the majority in the associations exploited by the elites. During the 1983 general elections different small village organisations confronted one another politically, spearheaded by two or more members from the the non-active elite associations such as the Udo Nna Association. The traditional groups did not only organise themselves as political wings but also as pork-barrel associations to receive the 'essential commodities' - rice, stockfish, sugar etc. - artificially made scarce by the ruling party during the elections. As Awolowo declared during the Nigerian Civil war that starvation was a weapon of war, so did the artificial scarcity of essential commodities during the election period become an important means of political mobilisation. Essential commodities reached the poor through the elites in the villages. Prior to the election, it was widely believed that NPN businessmen and politicians were granted import licences for these basic commodities, which they then hoarded. Existing rural associations were dissolved and then reconstituted in conflicting groups. Basic commodities and money were used to buy votes.

"In the Bendal State the UPN Government is exploiting this difficulty to the hilt and more than one NPN candidate has accused the Party of encouraging the hoarding of basic commodities so as to be able to accuse the NPN of pushing up prices."⁸

Higher prices indeed meant higher marginal profit for the hoarders who were directly or indirectly associated with ruling parties at state or national level. Surplus profits earned by those who were granted import licences by the ruling parties were ploughed back into the party for the campaigning process. The practice was parallel to the aware of contracts to party members mentioned earlier.

The economic pressure put on the traditional network during a political campaign compelled the traditional group to actively re-organise themselves into groups, in order to benefit from the event. The poor farmers, with the widespread drought of 1983, could no longer ask what the political leaders and their parties could do for them if they voted for them, but only how much money, rice, sugar, stockfish, etc. the farmers could get. Though, generally, party manifestos and policies do not reflect Nigerian politics, under the prevailing conditions in the 1983 elections, the traditional network group would be the least likely to examine party manifestos. To the group, party manifestos are irrelevant. The close associations and interpersonal networks of the traditional rural population made the latter clearly aware of the nature of Nigerian politics. There were widespread allegations of bribery and corruption as fundamental means of political mobilisation and participation in Nigerian politics. The degree of impact of corruption in Nigeria as stated by different groups will be quantified later. Whether it is corruption or the media that influence voters' political behaviour will be empirically assessed.

However, on the clubs, the data indicate no difference in the political activity of the social organisations between election and non-election times. But it is important to note here that the word 'politics' is all-embracing in Nigerian daily life. In rural areas associations such as the Udo Nna of Eziama are constantly engaged in socio-political and economic activities, irrespective of whether or not there is a national election. The association stressed that one of its main objectives was "to foster a sense of direction and communal development in our country". By implication this would involve leadership, decision-making, a rural community constitutional approach to problem-solving, and most important of all, communication links between members of the association and the entire

community, so as to mobilise them to support their various developmental projects.

On the other hand, nearly two thirds of the respondents (65.2%) reported that their organisations are never involved in politics. There are two main interpretations of this high percentage. First, as we noted in Chapter Nine, that religion was the second most important criterion for membership of organisations in Imo State. The religious organisations carry on their activities in more or less the same way at all times, with very minimal political involvement. This does not mean that individuals in religious organisations are not members of other organisations which are politically active. Religious organisations such as the Legion of Mary, St. Jude etc. are purely apolitical but during election periods members can influence each other privately outside the organisation to support a political party. More so the priest can visit these different church organisations during weekly prayer meetings and make indirect suggestions to them as to which way to vote. He may avoid a split in his parish by totally keeping politics out of his Sunday sermon because a hugh parish Sunday congregation is made up of different party supporters.

Secondly, some non-religious organisations are too traditional to be involved in national politics, for example age group associations, village elders, palm wine associations, etc., but they can form groups to mobilise support for a political candidate. It is striking to note from the data that eighteen out of thirty respondents from the urban elite groups and ten out of fourteen from the rural elite groups reported that their organisations are never involved in politics. This can be interpreted as not being involved in national politics rather than local politics, or that the elite did not want to implicate themselves politically. This reflects on the structure of community relationships in the communities where kinship ties (as we have sen earlier) bind the elite and non-elites together through group associations.

One of the most important functions of these associations is not to act as only a convenient channel through which a leader can link different groups to mobilise support for a political candidate(s) but also to develop groups' understanding of political organisations through their own involvement in it. We noted in the earlier chapters that different political systems have operated in Nigeria. The public tend to generalise the systems into two main categories: the civil rule and the military. To understand the system

helps groups to make demands on the government.

Table 6:11

Respondents' Knowledge of the Political System in Nigeria

Groups	Parlia- mentary	Presid- ential	Auto- cratic	Combina- tion of all of these	Row Total	
Traditional	(2) 4.1	(44) 89.8	(3) 6.1	(0) 0.0	(49) 100	37.4
School Leaver	(0) 0.0	(11) 91.7	(1) 8.3	(0) 0.0	(12) 100	9.2
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(10) 90.9	(0) 0.0	(1) 9.1	(11) 100	8.4
Urban Elite	(2) 4.9	(32) 78.0	(3) 7.3	(4) 9.8	(41) 100	31.3
Rural Elite	(0) 0.0	(15) 83.3	(2) 11.1	(1) 5.6	(18) 100	13.7
Column Total	(4) 3.0	(112) 85.5	(9) 6.9	(6) 4.6	(131) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 22

In the survey, respondents were asked to state the type of political system that operated during the 1979-1983 periods in Nigeria. 3.1% (4) said it was parliamentary, 85.5% (112) presidential, 6.9% (9) autocratic, and 4.6% (6) a combination of these systems. Strikingly, 31.% (4) from all the groups which said that the last civilian government in Nigeria was a parliamentary system, were exclusively from traditional and urban elite groups. The 6.9% (9) who reported that the system was autocratic came from all groups but mainly from traditional and urban elites. More ironically, 4.6% (6) who stated that the system was the combination of all the systems mentioned above came from all groups except from the traditional least educated group, whose background would make it difficult for them to understand the prevailing political system in Nigeria. This reveals that political ignorance, contrary to many theoretical arguments concerning rural and urban politics in Nigeria, is not restricted to the rural village farmers who make up the block of our respondents in the traditional group.

The relatively close associations between the urban population and rural population via active social clubs based on kinship and religious criteria have brought political awareness and knowledge into the rural population. Secondly, the politicisation of small village groups, where a large number of the Nigerian electorates live, helps members in the traditional group to understand the type of political system at any time. It is very strange to note from the data that it is within the urban elite, the most enlightened group, that a higher percentage of political ignorance prevails. There are two possible reasons for this: first, the older generations in this group who have lived in the city for a long time are aware of detailed changes in the political system. Secondly, the few (9.8%) of the urban elite who reported that the last civil government in Nigeria was a combination of both systems could have said so in the light of what they regarded as the nature of Nigerian politics. Many elites in Nigeria believe that quasi, haphazard, undefined aspects of various political systems operate in Nigeria. Thus, a combination of various weakly applied aspects of these systems operate in Nigeria. The systems which have been under the authority of the Muslim North, either in the military or civilian governments, can easily be described as aspects of these systems. However, a large proportion of the respondents stated precisely that the last civil rule in Nigeria was the presidential system (85.5% or 112 out of 131 respondents). Twenty-two respondents, perhaps for personal reasons, avoided giving replies to any overtly political questions.

The most important network linkages between the urban political environment and the rural network of interpersonal communication are the roles and functions of active political actors, who participate in politics in both rural and urban areas at election periods. In chapter two I argued that one of the serious limitations of early social network studies in Africa was the concentration on individual linkages which restricted the study to very localised analysis. Though Mitchell et al (1969) have been credited in such studies for their ability to shift network analysis from the metaphorical to analytical level, they could not transcend the egocentric level of analysis.

Crucial to my debate is that individual characteristics are as dynamic as the network linkages between them, in this respect the socio-political relationship between the village and urban population characterised by network linkages based on clubs, unions, and organisations. The binding force of the two networks is kinship and religion, as statistically demonstrated above. We would still remain at the individual level of

analysis of individuals, as I have already argued in Chapter Two, are logically aggregated to form groups or systems based on their identical and characteristic similarities and attributes, so that wider communities could be studied involving more complex relationships, beyond kinship, friendship and neighbourhood political networks.

Careful consideration of carefully the political activities of different network groups in the villages and towns is a practical attempt to elevate egocentric analysis to group analysis. It is worth recalling the statement of Mitchell et al (cited in chapter two) that "the relationship of the linkages in a network to one another is taken to be a salient factor in interpreting social action is one of the steps whereby the metaphor of a social network is expanded into an analogy and made analytically useful". My system or group network approach looks at broader political activities in a network of leadership election.

Table 7:11

Where (Rural or Urban) Were the Respondents Most Politically Active
During the Election

Group	The City	The Village	Both Places	Row Total	
Traditional	(4) 11.4	(22) 62.9	(9) 25.7	(35) 100	39.8
School Leaver	(2) 22.2	(4) 44.4	(3) 33.3	(9) 100	10.2
Urban Poor	(2) 33.3	(0) 0.0	(4) 66.7	(6) 100	6.8
Urban Elite	(4) 16.7	(10) 41.7	(10) 41.7	(24) 100	27.3
Rural Elite	(0) 0.0	(10) 71.4	(4) 28.6	(14) 100	15.9
Column Total	(12) 13.6	(46) 52.3	(30) 34.1	(88) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 65

In the survey, 13.6% (12) of all the groups reported that they were only politically active in the city. Perhaps it is surprising that 11.4% (4) out of the traditional group said they were active in the city. It is important

to explain this odd phenomenon. Although most people who belong to traditional network groups, as we have seen in Chapter Nine, live in villages, 11.4% of the respondents during a political campaign are active in the city, not in the village. In the Nigerian context, and Igboland in particular, we have shown that people who live and work in the city retire to the village in old age to spend the rest of their lives there. During the last general election some of these people clearly grasped the implications of the split between the Igbo leadership and the way it affected family relationships in the village. They also understood that the 'pork-barrel' exercise (benefitting from the political event) was more rewarding in the cities than in the villages. Their long years in the city offered them the advantage of interacting with old friends in the city to obtain political information and share in the distribution of basic commodities as a reward for unassessed political campaigning in the village for a party or parties. They got what they needed - goods and money - and returned to the village as passive participants.

Similarly, 16.7% (4) of the urban elite group were only active in the village, while equal numbers were active both in the village and the city. In the traditional group, 62.9% (22) were active in the village, while 25.7% (9) were active both in the village and city. A high proportion of young school leavers, 44.4% (4), were active in the village only, with 33.3% (3) active in both the and village and the city.

This statistical relationship between different groups and political participation in urban and rural politics in Nigeria shows that there are strong ties between different social groups in Nigerian politics. One's political participation is not restricted by residence and because of kinship ties one has more tendency towards native or natal-homelands' active participation than in the city where one lives. The urban elite group is a clear illustration of this point. Though the majority of its membes live in the city, only 16.7% said they were only politically active in the city, compared with 41.7% who said they were active in the village, and 41.7% (10) who reported that they were politically active both in the village and in the city.

Rural elites were not involved in active politics in the city at all. A high percentage of them, 71.4%, concentrated their political activity in the village. In chapters two and four I argued that teachers are the main political opinion leaders in the village and are leaders of community

associations and therefore constitute important political intermediaries. In the last general election the restrictions imposed on the overt active political participation of civil servants and teachers limited teachers' community political activity to rural areas. From participant observation, I noted that most teachers decided to form strong cliques which visited various people at night to persuade them to vote for a particular party. Party agents sent the names of various teachers to state headquarters and when the NPP won, in the state of Imo, most of the teachers who campaigned underground for other parties were transferred to the remotest villages, especially to where there were no natural streams, or pipe-borne water supplies. Also, during the election, school supervisors and headmasters were instructed to keep records of teachers' attendance so that none of them had time to go to the nearest city for political contact.

A small number of teachers, 28.6% (4), were politically active both in the city and in the village. These were those, according to my own participant observation, who visited party leaders or agents in the city in the night or immediately after school hours to obtain information, exchange views and make necessary arrangements for the 'basic commodities' to go to for village voters.

However, as I have noted elsewhere (E. Mgbemere, 1982) the role of teachers as rural political leaders and opinion leaders is a historic one originating in the breakdown of the traditional chiefs' and elders' political roles, as a consequence of colonialism and emergent nationalism. It was the teachers, I noted, who read newspapers and used the information to influence local populations to support nationalism.

In terms of the present study, the above table reveals that in all groups more than half of the respondents (52.3%) have strong tendencies towards village political participation rather than city politics. This tendency is consistent with earlier kinship membership criteria for social and economic organisation. It also reflects upon the theoretical framework established in Chapter Two, which showed that the political implications of kinship ties, which maintain strong socio-political ties between the urban and rural African communities, cannot be over-emphasised. Supporting this view, [Friedl, E. (1959:31); Banton, M. and Eric R. Wolf (1957); Peace (1979); Meillassoux (1968); Lloyd (1968, 1974, 1984); Peil (1972)], Chapter Two stressed that the "role of kinship ties as a mechanism for maintaining urban/rural connections is extensive and permeating". Similarly, Friedl

illustrated with the Greek urban/village socio-political and economic situation that changes in social status from poorer to wealthier, result in the rupture of kinship ties and obligations. This applies as much to the Greek peasant as to his social superiors.

In Imo State, the political importance of kinship network ties is partly reflected on the networks' intensive political participation in the village where most relatives live. The data also support Audrey Smoch's view, as quoted in chapter two, that the Igbos in the village and in the city "learned to co-operate with one another and to communicate on political matters when political utility provided the incentive".

The most important implication of the political communication network data is that the majority of communication constituents are close kin and distant kin. Therefore political persuasion and influences predominate in the traditional network of face-to-face communication. Through networks of kin the political products of the media are mediated.

Only certain people, particularly local teachers and civil servants banned from active political participation, communicated their view to relatives whom they trusted would not betray them. In the city, friends and co-workers or employers are trusted the least, hence the urban elites tendency to participate actively in the village as well as in the city. The bureaucratic elites could not risk their job by active politics in the city. Politically this fear of retribution by the authorities towards a group in society during elections makes elections as a whole unfree and unfair. While the elites bore the constraints of economic retribution, the poor, the unemployed, the village farmers were constrained by:

"bribes ... offered by candidates and those who campaign for them and accepted by officials, voters, middlemen of various kins and even by some of the candidates themselves."⁹

Furthermore, a small number 13.6% (12) of all the groups' political activities in the city reflects the point made in chapter two as stated by Gluckman (1962:8), Barnes (1954:44), Frankenberg (1966:275ff), that in large urban areas, large numbers of single-stranded relationships exist which make it difficult for people to meet. The activities are, therefore, comparatively isolated from each other. Applying the concept of 'reachability' by Mitchell and Barnes, 'density' in political communication

networks, we can conclude that network groups as political intermediaries are characterised by face-to-face communication in their political relations between urban and village environments at 13.6% urban only, 52.3% village only, and 28.6% city and village. Thus as stated theoretically in Chapter Two, political information circulated very fast among relatives in the village. As leadership in the last general election was divided between the Igbo political 'heavyweights' at state and national levels, corrupt means of political influences were extensively used. According to the theory of reachability and density within the communication network, large proportions of the rural community were contacted through face-to-face communication. The influence of money and relatives constituted the most important factors during that election and will be compared with other recognised influences later.

As a higher percentage of the respondents active political participation in Imo State during the general election took place within the village, it appears that political campaigns and traditional interpersonal networks of communication are important features in Nigerian politics. The split in Igbo leadership between two different political parties, NPP and NPN, implies that competition for local support was strong among different party supporters.

Table 8:11

Assesing Whether Different Parties Competed for Local Political Information in the Village

Groups	Yes	No	Row Total	
Traditional	(31) 79.5	(7) 20.5	(38) 100	36.4
School Leaver	(11) 91.7	(1) 8.3	(12) 100	11.2
Urban Poor	(8) 100	(0) 0.0	(8) 100	7.6
Urban Elite	(24) 72.7	(9) 27.3	(33) 100	30.8
Rural Elite	(13) 86.7	(2) 13.3	(15) 100	14.0
Column Total	(87) 80.3	(20) 19.7	(107) 100	100

The extent of the competition between party supporters in the village was reported by the respondents who were asked whether their parties competed strongly in the village. There were 107 respondents to the question and 46 missing observations, namely those not interested in answering directly related political questions. In all the networks, 81.3% (87) confirmed that their parties competed very strongly in the village and only 18.7% (19) said that their parties did not compete with other parties in the village. Each of the groups' members scored between 72.7% and 100% 'yes' to the question, while only 0 - 27.3% reported that their parties did not compete in the village.

But the question does not tell us the content of the competition, which consequently would determine the content of the political communication networks in the village. In network analysis there is no restricted meaning to content. Clyde Mitchell, as we noted in chapter two, defined as the "links in a person's network ... where the content ... among other possibilities include economic assistance, kinship obligation, religious co-operation or ... simply friendship". He stressed that "the actors and the observer ... are able to understand the behaviour of those involved because it is accorded a meaning in terms of the norms, beliefs and values which they associate with this behaviour".

At this stage the structure of political communication is kinship-based. The resources utilised to win local support include government funds, private donations, influential local people, social clubs, traditional chiefs, local councillors or all of these as resources of political mobilisation. The extent to which these resources constituted important political mobilisation factors in the villages are illustrated quantitatively in the table 9:11 below.

There are a total of 168 scores for the seven resources but each respondent was allowed to tick more than one, thus on average the score for each resource is 12.92 (13) namely 168/153 cases or respondents in the survey.

The three most important resources for which different parties competed in the election through networks of traditional communication were government funds, as reported by 34 respondents, private donations as reported by 42 and local influences, as reported by 25.

Table 9:11

Resources Competed For By Network Groups Based on Row %

Groups	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Traditional (49)	(49) 58.8	(2) 50.0	(21) 50.0	49 33.3	41 66.7	(3) 47.1	(6) 47.1	(8) 34.5
School Leavers (13)	(3) 8.8	(2) 4.8	13 10.7	(3) 10.7	(2) 22.2	(2) 22.2	(3) 17.6	(2) 6.9
Urban Poor (11)	(1) 2.9	(1) 7.1	(3) 3.6	11 11.1	(1) 5.9	(1) 5.9	(0) 0.0	(1) 13.8
Urban Elite (42)	(7) 20.6	(10) 23.8	42 21.4	(6) 21.4	(2) 22.2	(0) 0.0	(3) 17.6	(10) (34)
Rural Elite (18)	(3) 8.8	(3) 14.3	(6) 14.3	18 11.1	(4) 11.1	(1) 11.1	(1) 11.8	(2) 10.3
Total	(34) 100	(42) 100	(28) 100	(9) 100	(9) 100	(17) 100	(29) 100	168/ 153

1 =	Parties competed for	government funds
2 =	"	private donations
3 =	"	local influentials
4 =	"	social clubs
5 =	"	local chiefs
6 =	"	councillors
7 =	"	all of these

During the Nigerian political campaign government funds covered a variety of meanings. It could imply the use of teachers' salaries for election campaigns, or the award of huge and very expensive contracts to party supporters with half of the money ploughed back into the ruling national or state party by the contractors, to be used for campaigning. Election campaigns in a huge and complex nation like Nigeria, are so expensive that only the ruling party and the main opposition parties can afford to compete. Private donations featured as the most important competitive resource for all the political parties. If kick-backs from contracts were to be made, these were generally done in the form of private donations by party supporters. Again, only the government party could get big donations as it was the government which awarded the contracts. Some donations were made in the anticipation that if the party won the donors would obtain either promotion or more contract awards.

Donations and contract awards were strongly linked with influential local people who already possessed existing resources with which to influence their different communities to support a particular party. Social clubs, and local chiefs did not feature as important resources for which parties competed in local mobilisation. We noted above that because of the division in Igbo leadership social clubs were not conducive to group political activity. The emergence of new local elites who, by virtue of their education, commanded better salaries and socio-political status, displaced the importance of the traditional chiefs. Local councils and councillors were not used as extensively as social clubs in the pre-Civil War period in Nigeria. To a certain extent the split in Igboland made local councils, whose functions transcend contemporary leadership elections in national politics, an unsafe place to mobilise political support for any one of the two different political leaders from the same Igbo ethnic group. 29 respondents reported that all the above-mentioned resources were competed for by different parties.

The competitive approaches adopted by different party supporters were in many respects illegal. Those parties that had no strong local representatives were excluded and in practice only the NPP, the ruling state government, and the NPN, the ruling national party, were able to compete for resources in Imo State. The rootlessness and bitterness with which the local agents competed for these resources put unbearable strain and stress on the voters to the extent that family relationships began to break down. The reality of the leadership election was overshadowed by bribery and corruption and money became the only effective campaign force. No mention, regard or attention was paid to the validity of party policies and manifestos. As we shall see later, through dense networks of political communication between friends, relatives and neighbours, electors understood the influence of money in election participation.

Politically, resources are essential in democratic political leadership election campaigns. But were these resources competed for in ways that could yield free and fair elections? The extent to which the last general election in Nigeria was free and fair will be statistically answered using empirical statements by the respondents.

Amadu Kurfi (1983:230) argues that what constitutes a free and democratic election has been debated by many political scientists, and that some of them believe:

"that elections are inevitably undemocratic - a procedure allowing the cleverest and most powerful to make the 'sovereign' people yield power to them in an acceptable way ... the distinction between classical elections thought of as free and competitive and their unfree and non-competitive variants becomes blurred, as both are said to rely on manipulation of the people's will."

The extent to which NPN leaders fought hard to win the last general election using all the national resources at the NPN's command led the BBC to comment that the Shagari government was heading towards a one-party system in Nigeria. The desire of all African leaders to stay in power once voted in is typically associated with the illegal ways in which they distribute of power and resources so as to force lasting loyalty from the electorates and opposition parties.

In such complicated political activities, the networks of communication were dominated by conflicts and compromises between friends, associates. The local political intrigue was so convoluted that only careful participant observation could reveal the structure of the networks of political communication at the interpersonal community level. In the survey, 78 respondents admitted that their political parties, namely the NPP and the NPN, competed for government funds and for private donations from rich businessmen etc. An additional 28 noted that the parties competed for the membership of local influential people. Once Igbo leadership was split between two opposing parties, the leaders of the social clubs and other organisations were also split, and political candidates and their local agents inevitably had to compete for support from different split groups.

The traditional groups were the main beneficiaries of the parties' funds and donations. In return, the groups gave up any interest in party manifestos and party policies. They gave up their right to know what policies were being offered in exchange for their votes. This is peculiar to the historical development of politics in Nigeria and Igbo communities in particular. Though the Igbos as an egalitarian society "had a participant orientation towards politics, they perceived this participation more in a group context than as an individual activity."¹⁰ During the last general election this pattern of group political participation under a leader persisted, but in immensely localised and ever-fragmented units. Leaders shifted their party identifications erratically and their followers followed suit. Once there was discontent with leaders over the amount of money or basic commodities which the groups had obtained, the groups cross-tabulated.

Sometime a leader would be unsatisfactory sharing out the rewards by giving some members of his association more than others, or by appropriating the surplus of it himself. His followers would then abandon him for another group or party. This process increased the flow of donations and strengthened the influence of local leaders group who could ensure the unified voting of each small group. Donations were also used to buy over opposing groups, through their leaders.

Attitudes which had prevailed within regional and national politics before 1966 were still important in Nigerian attitudes towards the national political system. Audrey Smoch noted that:

"most participants viewed the political system primarily as a distributor of political goods rather than as an instrument to regulate or change society."

Competing parties were no longer judged on their political merits regardless of dominant ethnic or tribal groups, but on the basis of what the candidates offered and what the electorate obtained from the parties through local leaders. Only those parties which had secured the support of local leaders could compete in such local communities. Parties which historically or as a result of contemporary social or political issues lost the confidence of local leaders would not feature in political support and voting in the area. The case of UPN, and the role of Awolowo during the Civil War, which was emphasised by Ojukwu in his speech at Enugu quoted above, are both clear examples.

The dominance of the NPN and the NPP in Igbos political activity in Imo State during the last general election demonstrated how far both national and local leadership had become politicised. Interpersonal relationships, rather than the distribution of money or commodities, became the main means whereby political influence was exerted within given rural communities. Thus to a considerable degree, as shall be seen later, networks of interpersonal political communication replaced the political communication role (influence) of the media. It might be postulated that the media under the prevailing circumstances would merely reinforce existing opinions by emphasising issues unrelated to national political realities, and by dwelling heavily on promotion and stereotyping of local and national political leaders. Their rural political networks' contacts could be more influenced by material goods than by the actual media content of the

election campaign. The media could be extensively used but their influence as a politically persuasive mirror to the political world of Nigeria remains questionable.

From the above data, it is clearly evident that during the 1983 general elections, the Nigerian political struggle descended from broadly national ethnic politics to rural political identification between the two main parties, namely the NPP and the NPN. Should we therefore conclude that ethnic politics is beginning to decrease in Nigerian political life? I should advocate that a reservation be imposed on any answer to this question because the election did not address the main issues confronting Nigeria, nor did its political contents reflect either the needs for normative political values or the political realities of the country.

In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to answer 'yes' or 'no' as to whether or not the last civil administration was strongly ethnically oriented. From the five groups 69% (89) of the respondents believed that ethnic politics were very strong in the last civilian government, while only 31.1% (30) reported that the administration was not influenced by ethnic considerations. 129 people responded to the question and 24 did not. 47 out of 49 people who were identified as members of the traditional group responded to the question. 75.5% (35) said the last civil rule was strongly ethnic, and 29 (69%) of the elites agreed that the last administration was ethnically oriented.

Statistically, there is a close relationship between the structure of ethnic political awareness within the predominantly rural population and that within the predominantly urban population. The same pattern of awareness is recorded among the rural elites and the urban poor groups. In contrast, all 13 respondents identified as belonging to the young school leavers network replied to the question and nearly half the number decided that the last civil administration was strongly ethnic - 42.6% (6) said it was ethnic, while 53.6% (7) reported that it was not.

The similarities in response by the traditional and urban elites indicates that political awareness in Nigeria is a relatively horizontal equivalent to a certain extent. This is primarily as a result of strong socio-political links between elites and non-elites in Igboland, particularly through the interpersonal communication network structured by kinship and religious criteria association. Secondly, as we have noted statistically, and

theoretically stated by Smoch, "In an environment of economic scarcity and high demands" particularly during the austerity measures which characterised the part of the Shagari administration, "competitive localism has more pernicious consequences than in more economically developed political systems."¹³

Thirdly, while the more settled network group have the greater tendency to see Nigerian politics as the continuation of old regional ethnic politics within the structure of interstate political co-operation, and participation in it as such, the younger generation have relatively balanced opinions about the role of ethnicity in Nigerian politics. Perhaps this is because politics is not widely thought about or taught in secondary schools in Nigeria, and this constitutes the highest political experience of this group. Secondly, most of them are too young to draw from their personal experience in order to distinguish between classical Nigerian ethnic politics, state politics and superficial party identification and political alliances. For the fact that slightly more than a quarter of Igbos believe that the last civil administration was not strongly ethnic is relatively indicative of a slight breakdown in ethnic politics in Nigeria. But this breakdown is too apparent to be real, because the political alliance between the Igbos and the Hausa through the NPN only involved political leaders and not the masses.

But the content of the breakdown is what is crucial. Is the breakdown between all the ethnic groups or between the Igbos and certain ethnic minorities or majority tribes? Ojuku's statement that the Igbos have been excluded from Nigerian politics since 1966, which was necessary to get them back into the mainstream of Nigerian politics, is an essential factor in the content of the seeming breakdown in the ethnic politics in Nigeria. Most Igbo leaders and communities are well aware that Nigerian politics and the power have been dominated by the Hausa/Fulani North. Their population strength has ever guaranteed them this position in Nigerian politics. The meritocratic values attached to bureaucratic top and middle positions in the civil service, businesses, etc. left the Igbo and Yorubas in severe competition. The Biafran question guaranteed the Yorubas absolute control of the bureaucracy in Nigeria. They have a fair share in the system! This does not mean that young Yorubas are not keen to see an equitable distribution of power and justice for all in Nigeria.

Members of the Igbo elites believe that Nigerian politics are primarily concerned with the sharing of resources rather than with constructive political changes and development. In order to get back into the mainstream of politics from which bureaucratic changes can be effected, the Igbo allied themselves with permanent political leaders. This was evident in the NPN/NPP accord which the Yoruba leadership within the NPN silently disliked and worked to destroy. Briefly, the basis of the NPN/NPP accord was the 'unity, peace, stability and progress' of Nigeria. On September 27, 1979, President Shehu Shagari invited all the political leaders to join him in the new civil administration. All other political parties except the NPP turned down the offer. If it is true that the NPP was Igbo dominated, then the party's readiness to accept joint administration with the NPN, whose victory in the 1979 general elections was questioned by most opposing parties, implies that the Igbo leadership was anxious to get back into mainstream Nigerian politics. Indeed the NPN might have won the Presidential election, but could not without the alliance with the NPP form an overall majority power which could enable the ruling party to effect policies through the National Assembly and the Senate.

Specifically, the accord on October 1979 spelt out the sharing of crucial powers at the National Assembly between the two parties. President of the Senate went to (Hon) Dr. Joseph Wayas and the Deputy President went to Ibrahim, both members of the NPN. The NPP provided the Deputy President of the Senate, Mr. John Wash-Pam, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The accord was on an equal footing between the two parties at Federal level only. There were no junior and senior partners to the accord.

However, soon after the accord, in November 1979, disagreements began to surface between the NPP Senate leader, Senator Jaja Wachukwu and Chief Richard Akinjide, a Yoruba who was nominated Minister of Justice. Jaja Wachukwu opposed the nomination because he regarded Akinjide as a tribalist.

Gradually other events accumulated which dissatisfied the NPP and often led to its members voting for other parties outside the accord against the President's bills. For instance, President Shagari's appointment of Presidential Liaison Officers in every state was opposed by all the parties and paved the way towards 'progressive' governors' alliances. Tension between the two parties reached its climax in 1980 when the NPN Revenue Allocation Bill was opposed by the NPP who, along with the other parties,

opposed it. The opposition by the NPP was so strong that a NPP governor for Anambra State, Jim Nwaobo, took President Shagari to court. In February 1981, at a press conference at Enugu the national leader of the NPP, Dr. Njamdi Azikiwe, outlined some of the weaknesses of the accord and accused the NPN of adopting measures calculated to undermine the success of the accord. He emphatically condemned the impeachment of the governor of Kaduna State, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, on 7th May 1981 and his eventual removal from office on June 24th 1981 "the impeachment of governor Musa is calculated to impugn the integrity of our highly respected judiciary and our cherished belief in the rule of law was thus debauched."¹⁴

The removal of Musa from office was regarded as an intrigue which could seriously undermine the unity of Nigerian politics, an important aspect of the accord. The NPP believe that the decision to impeach Musa was made by the NPN without consultation with the NPP. Dr. Obi Wali thought that it would be best for the NPP to be dissociated from the NPN, particularly as the Kaduna Governor's impeachment was generally seen by Nigerians as unjust and unlawful.

The accord posed several questions: Why did the NPN enter into a separate and secret accord with the PRP, which was dominated by Muslims from the North, when the only party that honoured the NPN invitation for joint sharing of power was the NPP? Why, in particular, should the secret alliance between the NPN and the PRP take place only three months after a formal accord with the NPP? One possible answer is that Northern parties are connected by entrenched Muslim religious doctrine and belief. Alliances with the Southern parties are vague and based on contemporary problems, and, once the problems are attempted or solved, alliances fall apart.

It is important to note that during the alliance period two Yoruba leaders, Adeniran Ogunsanya of the NPP and Chief Akinloye of the NPN, showed great interest in what was happening in the alliance. In terms of parties' majority members, the NPN was Hausa/Fulani dominated, while the NPP was Igbo-dominated. Politically, if the principles of the accord succeeded, they would imply a strong political alliance between the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani to the exclusion of the Yoruba who dominated the UPN party.

On July 6th, 1981, Chief Ogunsanya in a press conference announced that the accord had been placed on conditional trial for six months, and that if conditions were not improved the accord might be terminated. To see the

party happily ended Chief Akinloye announced three days later that the NPN had "no alternative but to accept the termination with immediate effect". A large number of NPN members opposed the termination announced by the national party's chairman, Chief Akinloye. The relationship was stage-managed and Yorubas within the parties played a crucial part in ending the accord. There were some parts of the accord which would threaten the political security of the Yorubas if the accord succeeded. Why should a party (NPP) that did not even come second in the 1979 election have equal power-sharing with the NPN Party which won without a majority? The phrase in the accord that "no junior or senior partner existed" was a gross understatement of Nigerian political realities, particularly under the experimental Presidential system. Also, why should the accord be limited to the Federal level of joint decision-making rather than extending their policies to the state level? One thing becomes obvious: the allocation of national revenue became centralised during the Civil War to the benefit of two main regions, the North and the West, and at the expense of certain sections of the East. We noted in earlier chapters that revenue allocation was regionalised before the 1970s oil boom. During the depression of the 1930s, 1950s and the later 1960s, cocoa made the Western region one of the richest, and therefore particularly strongest, regions in Nigeria. Awolowo, particularly, refused to centralise revenue allocation. In both historical and contemporary politics in Nigeria, revenue allocation has had a very conflicting and confusing impact on policies and party alliances, for instance:

"The 1963 census was simply declared invalid and revenue allocation, State creation, etc. were instead based on the ... somewhat dubious 1963 census."¹⁵

Most Nigerians clamoured for the return to civil rule, not so much with the intention of changing policies and political development, but because oil brought unprecedented wealth to the nation. William D. Graf particularly observed that:

"Gowon ... altered the previous system of revenue allocation, by means of channeling oil and other revenues through the Federal Government treasury, so as to distribute the vastly increased national income more evenly among the individual states."

He continued to stress that:

"the preservation of national unity, the process of national reconciliation, the sudden windfall of oil revenues, a popular awareness of being part of development and nation building, a burgeoning business sector - all of these factors concealed an auspicious situation for a rapid return to civilian rule."¹⁶

How well the distribution of increased national income among the individual states, which was effected in Nigerian military or civil rule through the policies of revenue allocation, requires extensive investigation. This remains a crucial aspect of political alliances. The governor of Imo State, Chief Sam Mbakwe, was stereotyped "the crying governor" and such stereotyping is closely associated with the pattern of revenue allocation in Nigeria. During the 1983 election campaign the Imo State government was accused of borrowing extensively from overseas to service state projects. In this respect, the politics of party alliance and revenue allocations in Nigerian politics, moves from local or national politics to international politics - an important aspect of Nigerian politics which should be researched further.

However, restricting ourselves to local politics, one essential question emerges: are Nigerians or certain sectors of the population aware of any sort of inter-ethnic political development during civil government or the election period?

Table 10:11

The Respondents' Opinion About Inter-Ethnic Co-Operation During
The Last Civil Rule In Nigeria

Groups	Yes	No	Row Total	
Traditional	(41) 85.4	(7) 14.6	(48) 100	37.2
School Leavers	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	10.1
Urban Poor	(9) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(9) 100	7.0
Urban Elite	(36) 87.8	(5) 12.2	(41) 100	31.8
Rural Elite	(16) 88.9	(2) 11.1	(18) 100	14.0
Column Total	(113) 87.6	(16) 12.4	(129) 100	100

In the survey, 87.6% (113) of the respondents from all the five groups believed that during the last general elections in Imo state, there was a

greater tendency towards inter-ethnic co-operation. Only 12.4% (16) did not believe that there was any tendency towards inter-ethnic co-operation during the elections. There were in all 129 respondents to the question and 24 non-respondents. In each of the five groups a high number of respondents believed that there was a greater tendency towards inter-ethnic co-operation, namely: 84.4% of the traditional group, 84.6% of the young school leavers, all the urban poor, 87.8% of the urban elites and 88.9% of the rural elites. Thus the five groups are all positively aware of new ethnic political identification and co-operation in Nigeria. But the extent to which the respondent understood the hidden agenda of inter-ethnic co-operation in Nigerian politics remains an open question.

In Chapter Four I laid emphasis on the adverse effect of colonial economic policies on Nigerian 'ethnic politics'. I argued that the orientation of individual regions' economics away from each other but towards the metropolitan towns of colonial authority was a great weakness in Nigerian political relationships among the tribes. It seriously divided the nation.

In this study, from the statistical argument on the NPN/NPP accord and the revenue allocations, economic motivation can be seen to erect a political basis upon which different ethnic groups could maintain mutual understanding. Individual political interest and the associated corrupt practices could envelope the political reality that is emerging from the economic base in Nigeria. The alliance between parties is not new in Nigerian politics but the political identification and alliances of 1979 and 1983 between the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani are different. They are different in the sense that, unlike the pre-1966 alliance, political parties and political leaders were the sole creators of the alliances, which they maintained or terminated without the masses' participation. In 1983 the identification between parties and the alliances generated by the split between two leading Igbo political leaders ushered in this new political participation of the rural and urban masses, as shown by the data in the survey. It is important to point out here that the split in leadership and identification did not only affect political leaders. The peculiar way in which business contracts were awarded in Nigeria, particularly during the Shagari government, attracted a huge number of Igbo businessmen to identify with the NPN national ruling party. On the other hand, the smaller businessmen, who could not bargain for such 'deals' at national level, descended to state level to identify with the opposition NPP party, which further intensified party competition, bitterness and verbal warfare in the

East during the elections.

However, sticking to our best alternative - network analysis - what tends to happen in Nigeria is that once political and business leadership linkages are established between different ethnic groups, shared economic interest sustain the network of relationships. In terms of Mitchell's network content, political communication in Nigeria puts greater emphasis on economics than on political policies. This is not basically bad in itself because, as I argued earlier, it was what exactly was missed out in Nigerian political development as a result of colonial administration and economic interest.

Once ethnic leaders establish economic interest through their overt political networks, ethnic ties gradually start to give way to inter-ethnic eco-political ties within which a certain mutual political culture emerges, designated as typical of the way Nigerian political networks operate.

We have noted statistically that Nigerian political groups are characterised by kinship and religion. Also we have empirically established that leadership is the major principle in the group linkages between these kinship and religious dominated network groupings at rural, urban and national levels. In terms of communication, leaders can conveniently reach the masses through their organisations. As political leaders are closely associated with economic power in Nigeria, they would use their economic influence to change the political attitudes and behaviour of the masses who were already organised in quasi-political groups within in the village and urban communities.

The problem is that Nigerians vaguely interpret the economic relationship between leaders as political co-operation, but once they become politically involved they begin to grasp the economic implications. Often they abandon political issues and recklessly follow their economic interests, which generally make more sense than the alien system of government which even the leaders themselves do not always understand. Another danger is that if the strongest and most meaningful interests were economic no adequate political policies would be developed to solve Nigerian economic problems such as revenue allocation, urban deprivation, unemployment etc. Again, a ruling party which has access to national revenue and resources in the interpersonal network might illegally distribute power and resources to amass political support, and then Nigeria would move towards a one-party

state. If political order were not developed and constitutional methods of mobilising support established, there would be no legal opposition to the ruling party. Finally, there is the danger of the emergence of economic classes which would also exploit the masses if there were no developed political constitution that protects the masses. These tendencies showed themselves during the four years of civilian rule when the term 'democracy' was regarded - particularly by the non-political elites in Nigeria - as an insult to the masses. Fela, in his controversial music, called democracy in Nigeria 'Demo-crazy' - madness.

These are generalisations about the inter-ethnic tendency in the last general elections in Imo State. We need to be more statistically specific so as to know the actual direction of the tendency and why. In early chapters we identified three major ethnic groupings, the Igbos, Hausa/Fulani and the Yorubas. Political stability, unity and integration have all been questioned within Nigeria. The inter-ethnic tendency towards or away from each of these dominant groups is crucial to the establishment or otherwise of such political stability, unity, and integration within Nigeria.

Generally, we cannot under-estimate the political importance of ethnic minorities in recent political changes in Nigeria. The creation of states, their relative autonomous administrative characteristics, the zoning systems introduced by the NPN ruling party, the 2/3% which a President must win to become nationally accepted as the President of the Federation have triggered off a new form of inter-ethnic political co-operation and alliance. These changes notwithstanding, the three big tribes, the Igbos, Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba, still dominate Nigerian politics. It is difficult to see a political stable Nigeria when any one of these three - particularly the Hausa/Fulani - does not hold some of the highest posts in Nigerian government. The instability of Nigeria as a result of major tribal alliances is an open question among all sectors of people in the country. In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate which of these three major ethnic or tribal groups they thought could form a more lasting political alliance for political stability in Nigeria. A range of tribal groups and their possible political alliances was provided for the respondents to choose from. The possible tribal alliances could be Hausa/Fulani and Igbos, as in the case of the NPN/NPP accord discussed above, Yoruba-Hausa/Fulani, or Igbo and Yoruba, each controlling a separate party with no alliance, or all allied in a one party system.

Table 11:11

Respondents' View on Ethnic Political Alliance and
Nigerian Political Stability

Groups	Hausa/ Fulani + Igbo	Igbo + Yoruba	Each In Separate Parties	All in one Party	Yoruba + Hausa/ Fulani	Total	
Traditional	(24) 50.0	(3) 6.3	(2) 4.2	(4) 8.1	(15) 31.3	(48) 100	36.9
School Leaver	(8) 61.5	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(2) 15.4	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	10.0
Urban Poor	(4) 44.4	(1) 11.1	(0) 0.0	(2) 22.2	(2) 22.2	(9) 100	6.9
Urban Elite	(16) 38.1	(4) 9.5	(5) 11.9	(7) 16.7	(10) 23.8	(42) 100	32.3
Rural Elite	(8) 44.4	(2) 11.1	(0) 0.0	(3) 16.7	(5) 27.8	(18) 100	13.8
Column Total	(60) 46.2	(11) 8.5	(7) 5.4	(18) 13.8	(34) 26.2	(130) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 23

There were 130 replies to the question, 23 missing observations. 46.2% from all five groups reported that political alliance between the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani tribes would ensure some lasting political stability in Nigeria. In contrast only 8.5% (11) believe that an Igbo and Yoruba political alliance would create any lasting peace in Nigeria. Very few (5.4%) believed that politics with any form of alliance between the major tribes in Nigeria would result in political stability. On the other hand 26.2% (34) conceived that Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani alliance would result in political stability - this happened during the Civil War and until 1979.

This table represents an important current political belief among the urban and rural population in Igboland which warrants a more detailed consideration of the data from group cells. Many respondents answered the question, which implies that the question was of interest to them. In the traditional group, 50% (24) of the 48 respondents believe that an Igbo and Hausa/Fulani alliance would create political stability in Nigeria. A high percentage of young school leavers (61.5%) took the same stand. Among the

rural elite, this was shared by 44.4% while the number of those in favour of such an alliance drops slightly among the urban elites, to 38.1%. The urban poor maintain a similar percentage, 44.4% to the rural elite.

There are two main interpretations of this fairly high score in favour of Igbo and Hausa/Fulani political alliance. The current division between Igbo leadership and the large number of Igbos in sympathy with the NPN/Hausa/Fulani party gave the masses, in particular the traditional village network group, the impression that the Igbo and the Hausa/Fulani alliance would improve the life of the rural population. Such improvements might include the supply of water-pipes, rural electrification financed by the Federal Government (which would come about more quickly than state-financed electrification) the building establishment of local roads by the Federal Government rather than the poorly constructed, often unfinished ones undertaken by the state government and the establishment of Owerri Airport to facilitate trade and transport. All these possibilities were important propaganda spread through the village by NPN supporters. There was great emphasis on teachers' salaries which were not paid by the state government under the NPP. Teachers were highly influenced by the NPN propaganda that the Federal Government would immediately alleviate their problems by paying all their salaries if the party won the Presidential election in the central government and the gubernatorial election in the state government, through the teachers' votes. The effectiveness of this propaganda compares favourably with the earlier statistics on the rural elite network voting behaviour, where 43.8% (7) out of the 16 respondents from the network voted for the NPN. Here again 44.4% (8) were in favour of an Igbo and Hausa/Fulani political alliance for stability in Nigeria.

The promises of the NPN candidates in Imo State, such as airport construction, rural electrification, etc., meant the creation of jobs for the unemployed, namely the young school leavers. This group was particularly influenced by this propaganda. In the young school leavers group we noted that 54.6% (6) out of 11 respondents voted for the NPN, while only 36.4% (4) voted for the NPP in the last general election. Asked their opinions about tribal alliances for political stability, 61.5% (8) out of the 13 respondents favoured an Igbo-Hausa/Fulani alliance and only 7.7% (1) and 15.4% (2) thought that an Igbo/Yoruba or Yoruba-Hausa/Fulani alliance would create political stability.

In terms of political propoganda, the rural elites and young school leavers in Imo State were more influenced by the NPN than by the NPP money - could have played a role and the NPN had more to spend. Their attitude to political alliance and voting behaviour is not a true reflection of political reality in Nigeria, but of political behaviour and opinion shaped by individual economic needs. Though 50% (24) of the traditional group were in favour of an Igbo and Fulani/Hausa political alliance, only 30% (12) of the respondents voted for the NPN, while 70% (28) voted for the NPP. With this network group, political voting and political concepts were different from those of rural elites and young school leavers. The underlying factor is that their economic needs were different. While their subsistence farming economies did not permit them to look beyond local or state politics, the floating network group - school leavers and the dispirited teachers, disillusioned by the delay or non-payment of salaries - could look beyond the state for help through political identification. Again, among the traditional group, the effect of propoganda can be neutralised by effective kinship network where pressures are put on individuals to side politically with the majority of his kin, for fear of isolation and social discrimination. This minimised the interpersonal or group conflicts which characterised the elections. The rural elites and young school leavers are exposed to various other influences, such as the mass media and interpersonal networks other than kinship.

The urban elites tend to understand the implications of using ethnic alliances to exclude one of the major ethnic groups from Nigerian politics. Of the 42 respondents, 16 (38.1%) reported that a Hausa/Fulani-Igbo alliance would make Nigeria politically stable. Proportionately not many of them were in favour of the Igbo-Hausa/Fulani alliance because the breakdown of the accord and reasons behind it were known to them. Also, the number that supported such an alliance could think about it as the best alternative to get the Igbos back to the 'mainstream of Nigerian politics' and therefore a high proportion voted for the NPP. This is because the majority of those members of the elites who were interviewed were state employed in regularly paid and secure jobs. Unlike the teachers and young school leavers, NPN propoganda that the Federal government would intervene to improve their working conditions was irrelevant. Many Igbo elites believe in working within their own states. The question of abandoned property during the Civil War, the constant and discriminatory transfers from one state to another by the top Federal bureaucracy, controlled by other tribes, hurt them. So did the fact that when they are transferred to other states they

have to serve under less qualified, more junior persons. Because of this, a lot of Igbo members of the urban elites resist Federal government appointments. Many of them also believe that the constant transfers affect the education of their children and they therefore prefer to engage in private or independent business or serve under their own state government with less salary and less good working conditions. The rural elites (teachers) are not faced in their profession with similar problems because the primary and community secondary schools that employ them are controlled by state governments and therefore they cannot be transferred to other states, where the wanted experience, effects similar to those of the members of the professional urban elites. On the part of the young school leavers, if the Federal government injects more money into the state economy, the general nepotism practised in employment in Nigeria would enable them to get jobs in their own state. Their voting behaviour cannot be similar to urban elites until they are in the first instance employed.

The Igbos, through experience, are less in favour of political alliance with the Yorubas and they show this both in their political concepts and voting behaviour. Similarly, though the number of Yorubas in the survey was comparatively smaller, because of the geographical location of the areas surveyed, they have as much a tendency towards identification with the Yoruba dominated party as the Igbos have with the Igbo dominated party. In the survey 1% of the Igbos voted UPN (Yoruba party) while 64.7% voted for the NPP (Igbo party). In addition, 32.4% of the Igbos voted for the NPN, only 11.1% of the Yorubas voted for the NPN, and 88.9% of the Yorubas voted for the UPN and none voted for the NPP. In the survey too, 71.4% of Hausas and Fulanis voted for the NPN, 14.3% voted for the UPN and another 14.3% voted for the PRP, while none at all voted for the NPP. Other tribes besides the three main tribes - Igbos, Yorubas, Hausa/Fulani - split their votes between the NPN and the UPN: 25% voted for the NPN and 75% voted for the UPN. The UPN captured more votes from the minority tribes in the south because of the Cross Rivers' presence in Imo State, the mid-west etc., who tend to identify with the UPN rather than with either the NPP or NPN. In the northern regions, the minority group tend to identify with the NPN rather than the UPN. From this survey, the Igbos are comparatively more inclined to other parties, specifically to the NPN which is not Igbo dominated, than are other tribes in Nigeria. The minority tribes are disinclined to join the Igbos. Politically therefore the Igbo are an abandoned majority group. This is due to the lost power of the Igbos in Nigerian politics as a result of the Civil War. Whether or not they may

regain such power as they had before the 1966 coup is a critical question in Nigerian politics today.

Table 12:11
Nigerian Political Instability As The Result Of Tribalism
According To Respondents

Group	Yes	No	Total	
Traditional	(43) 91.5	(4) 8.5	(47) 100	36.7
School Leaver	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	10.2
Urban Poor	(7) 77.8	(2) 22.2	(9) 100	7.0
Urban Elite	(39) 95.1	(2) 4.9	(41) 100	32.0
Rural Elite	(18) 100	(0) 0.0	(18) 100	14.1
Column Total	(118) 92.2	(10) 7.8	(128) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 25

In the process of ethnic political identification, Nigerian politics are constantly experiencing a dramatic tendency towards disintegration, disunity, and serious if not endemic instability. Whether the nation's politics reflect the realities of these problems is another important question which should be investigated.

Respondents were asked whether they thought that tribalism was responsible for political instability in Nigeria.

There were 128 replies to the question, and 25 missing observations. Out of these respondents, 92.2% (118) agreed that Nigerian political instability was the consequence of ethnic politics. Each of the five identified groups scored high percentages in favour of ethnic politics as the main cause of political instability. 91.5% (43) of the traditional group reported that ethnic politics was responsible for political instability, while 84.5% of young school leavers agreed, as did 77.8% of the urban poor and 95.1% of the

urban elite. This statistical opinion representation of the causes of political instability as reported by various identifiable socio-political and economic groups, irrespective of their ethnic backgrounds, indicates that ethnicity in Nigeria is still strong and alive. The Igbo political tendency towards the Hausa/Fulani dominated NPN Party during the last general election should not be interpreted as a serious breakdown in ethnic politics in Nigeria. The tendency may lead to it only after a long but slow change in attitudes. The true nature of ethnic politics, with all the pseudo-alliances and accord, is understood by the urban and rural elites. In this survey 95.1% of the members of urban elites believe that ethnic politics remains and causes political instability, and all of the rural elites maintain a similar stand.

One of the major consequences of ethnic politics is not just the broad political instability but the immense social, economic, political and cultural conflicts it creates between ethnic groups, different 'classes' and interest groups in the country. Indeed, it is under the whims of these conflicts that political instability becomes apparant or real. In the survey, respondents were asked to answer 'yes' or 'no' as to whether they thought that ethnic politics create conflicts in Nigeria.

Table 13:11

Respondents' View About Ethnicity and Political Conflict

Groups	Yes	No	Total	
Traditional	(44) 91.7	(4) 8.3	(48) 100	37.2
School Leavers	(13) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(13) 100	10.1
Urban Poor	(8) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(8) 100	6.2
Urban Elite	(37) 88.1	(5) 11.9	(42) 100	32.6
Rural Elite	(18) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(18) 100	14.0
Column Total	(120) 93.0	(9) 7.0	(129) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 24

A nearly equivalent number of respondents who considered that ethnic politics create political instability also maintained that it creates various political conflicts between different groups. 93% (12) answered

'yes' to the question. The young school leavers, the urban poor and rural elite groups all reported unanimously that ethnic politics in Nigeria create conflicts. 91.7% (44) of the traditional group and 88.1% of the members of the urban elites agreed. All in the rest of the groups agreed. The dissenters are a minority group in Nigeria who think that politics is essentially a struggle between individuals over who controls national resources and determines their distribution. Irrespective of politicians' ethnic origin, their primary concern is to enrich themselves out of the public money. Of course such an opinion is linked with the idea that the basis on which an individual politician legitimates his power to control and distribute national resources is ethnic popularity and support, without which he gains no power at all.

I have been arguing that the context in which political instability, conflict, ethnic political participation, network groups' political identification and voting in the election campaign take place can be seen as a communication network event. In the next chapter, this discussion will be empirically related to the role of the mass media and communications in Nigeria, and specifically to the 1983 general elections.

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CHAPTER TWELVE

NETWORK GROUPS AND THE MASS MEDIA

We have seen that historically, the mass media have been an important part of political development in Nigeria, a development marked by varying degrees of conflict. In Chapter Six in particular, we saw that under the NPN, Shehu Shagari's government monopolised NTA for the interest of his ruling party. I noted that before the 1983 general elections, those states not controlled by NPN established their own TV broadcasting stations. These added to the existing radio stations and newspapers owned by each of the states. The implication I stressed was that each state had two TV, radio stations and newspaper publishing houses - one owned by the state, the other by the Federal government. The situation therefore created acrimony, bitter rivalry and conflict. I also argued that the localisation of the media in terms of content and locally-born media professionals in both Federal-owned and state-owned broadcasting brought home to the electorates the real nature of mass media and politics. There was intense competition between the mass media owned by the states and those controlled by the Federal Government during the 1983 general election.

In the survey, different network groups perceive the conflicts differently. The media intensified and sometimes resolved political conflicts during the election campaign. They acted as channels whereby different parties and leaders attacked each other. In the election 100% (30) of the traditional groups' respondents reported that radio was better in handling and resolving political differences. Most of the other groups similarly favoured radio as a medium that resolved problems (school leavers 100% (6), urban poor 85.7% (6), urban elites 88.2% (15) and rural elites 100% (9)). A remarkable 100% of the respondents in other networks believed that television did not help resolve political problems. The table (1:12) shows that similar reports are attributed by the respondents from the different network groups to the press and to face-to-face political communication.

When the respondents were asked to indicate which of the media intensified political conflicts during the general election only 37.5% (3) in the traditional group believed that radio intensified political conflict. These respondents held a similar opinion about TV and political conflict. The rest of the respondents reported that television did not intensify conflict.

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Table 1:12

Respondents' Opinion About Media and Oral Communications
Intensifying And Resolving Political Conflicts

Media resolves conflicts:

Groups	Radio (V114)		TV (V115)		Press (V116)		Oral (V117)	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Traditional	(30) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 27.3	(8) 72.7	(1) 11.1	(8) 88.9	(3) 33.3	(6) 66.7
School Leavers	(6) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100.0
Urban Poor	(6) 85.7	(1) 11.8	(0) 0.0	(2) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100.0	(0) 12.5	(2) 100.0
Urban Elite	(9) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(4) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 100.0
Missing observations:	84		126		118		130	

Media intensifies political conflict

	Radio		TV		Press		Oral	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Traditional	(3) 37.5	(5) 62.5	(3) 37.5	(5) 62.5	(3) 50.0	(3) 50.0	(2) 9.1	(20) 90.9
School Leavers	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0	(1) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(4) 100.0
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 50.0	(1) 50.0	(1) 12.5	(7) 87.5
Urban Elite	(0) 0.0	(6) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(6) 100.0	(12) 92.3	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(14) 100.0
Rural Elite	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0	(3) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0
Missing observations:	129		129		128		100	

It is important to note here that apart from the 27.3% of the traditional group who reported that television resolved conflicts, the rest of the respondents in all the network groups could not say that television resolved political conflict. The score for television reflects the fact that television is politically a new medium. Television was first introduced in 1959 in Western Nigeria and its first political coverage was that of the 1979 general election until then the army had dominated the Nigerian

political scene, which means that the mass of the people still find it difficult to understand how television functions as a political medium. Most Nigerians understand and are influenced by entertainment and advertising programmes. Even members of the urban elite, who are more familiar with this medium, stated that television did not resolve political conflict. This is a very serious reflection on what is assumed to be the role of television in Nigerian politics. These responses indicate that the political role of television is completely uncertain.

Either this is the case or, as I argued in the discussion of the role of television in the 1979 general elections, known as 'the First Television Election', viewers were confused by the formats. I emphasised that verbal and visual images, when used together at various interpretative levels, could have an immensely confusing and politically incomprehensible effect on a Nigerian audience not familiar with political television. Anthony Smith (1978:85) says that such a medium can entertain or inform but is less likely to persuade the audience to vote. The fact that the respondents, particularly the elite, were uncertain whether television intensified or resolved political conflicts in Imo State, where the battle between the NPP and the NPN was hottest because of the split in Igbo leaders, put a big question over the political role of television. Constraints, as noted earlier, could be one limiting factor in the understanding of the political role of television in Nigerian politics. Later we shall evaluate the relevance of this data by examining television's influence on different groups to participate and actually vote in the 1983 general election.

The scores by all the groups on whether or not newspapers intensify political conflicts show no significant patterns. There is one exception, the urban elite, of whom 92.3% (72) believed that newspapers intensified political conflicts in Nigeria during the general elections. When compared with television the trend tends to confirm that television as a new political medium is not yet seen as having much political importance except by the urban elite themselves. The essence of Nigerian politics is conflict generated by tribal politics. The tribal structure of Nigeria, as we have seen, has defined and determined the party politics of the nation. The press and the mass media have all been developed, controlled and owned by regional (now state) governments and parties. The press remains a very powerful voice for different parties, expressing bitterness, opposition and ethnic political conflict. This political role of the press was examined in earlier chapters.

In addition, the role of face-to-face communication in Nigerian politics is defined by the kinship networks, which form the basic structure of tribal politics. In the survey 33.3% (3) of the respondents from the traditional group reported that political conflict could be resolved by word of mouth, but in the other groups it was believed that this neither resolved nor intensified political conflict during the election.

There are two possible interpretations of this data. In Imo State where the data was collected, many families were divided in their support of different parties, mainly the NPP or the NPN. Most people understood that participation was based on how much an individual could get from party agents in terms of money or basic goods. Therefore, while confrontation between close friends and relatives was low, it was high in the open village squares and market places. Thus, large numbers of the respondents felt that face-to-face political communication between opponents did not resolve political conflicts because in rural areas, opposing groups from towns and villages engaged in verbal confrontation. On the other level, face-to-face political communication did not intensify political conflicts among relatives who, though divided in their party political support, knew the election was a passing event which must not interfere with their more lasting kinship relationships which, although politicised, transcended national politics. Again, face-to-face communication could not intensify political conflict between parties at state and national level because newspapers, radio and television were used to express national politics.

Further interpretation of this data, for example that taken from radio, is that it is not the contents of the different media that determine the degree to which they can be assessed by the audience as resolving or intensifying political conflicts, but that such assessment depends on the ability of different network groups to decode media political messages. In general, radio uses local languages to broadcast political messages - this made radio a popular medium for the colonial administration - and has power to reach the remotest areas. Thus, as the data shows, both the rural and urban network groups have more objective views on the way in which the media intensify or resolve political conflict. These views do not show the rural and urban network groups to be better politically informed than the rest of the population.

Some of the conflicts, as expressed by the media in Nigeria, are genuinely aimed at checking or redressing some of the political evils in society

rather than generating more ethnic conflict, which is the basis of the political system. Opinions vary as to which of the channels of political communication gave reliable information. The table below demonstrates respondents' views as to the reliability of different media and communication channels.

Table 2:12
Respondents' Opinion On the Reliability of
Different Communication Channels

Groups	Radio	TV	Newspaper	Word of Mouth	Total
Traditional	(31) 66.0	(4) 8.5	(5) 10.6	(7) 14.9	(47) 100
School Leavers	(4) 30.8	(1) 7.7	(4) 30.8	(4) 30.8	(13) 100
Urban Poor	(6) 54.5	(1) 9.1	(1) 9.1	(3) 27.3	(11) 100
Urban Elite	(11) 26.2	(8) 19.0	(16) 38.1	(7) 16.7	(42) 100
Rural Elite	(6) 37.5	(1) 6.3	(8) 38.1	(1) 6.3	(16) 100
Column Total	(58) 45.0	(15) 11.6	(34) 26.4	(22) 17.1	(129) 100

Number of missing observations = 24

A total of 45% (58) of the respondents from all groups reported that radio was a reliable medium of political information in the 1983 general elections. Newspapers came second as a reliable source of information with 26.4% (34), while word of mouth ranked third at 17.1% (22), with television remaining as the least reliable source of political information.

It is striking that among the traditional group radio far exceeded word of mouth (66% (31)) compared with 14.9% (7)) as a reliable channel of political information. The reason for this relates to the tension and conflicts that built up among Igbo communities during the election. The split in leadership, as I have already made clear, resulted in splits between communities, villages and families. Locals no longer trusted what others did or said about the election. Another important factor which made such

word of mouth unreliable was the political corruption of the election campaign, with party agents allegedly buying voters' cards with large sums of money in the villages. People deliberately refused to talk about why they would support NPN or NPP candidates. Often what they said in public was different from what they actually did. Radio remained an important and reliable medium because it was heavily localised in its political content. Locals were able to compare and validate radio information, which was based on local political events, in which both the broadcaster and the audience had access to sources of information.

Nearly half of the respondents who thought that the newspaper was a reliable source of information during the election came from the urban elite. This again supports the earlier concept that newspaper sources of political information were largely restricted to the urban elite. About half of the rural elite network group also reckoned that newspapers were a reliable source of information. Radio was a less popular source of political information among members of the urban elites (26.2% (11) and 38.1% (16)). This is because, as I observed during the field work, radio stations depended on newspapers for their information. Some of them summarised newspaper headlines and editorials for broadcasts of news and current affairs. The summaries were comparatively more detailed in English than in any of the major local languages. In addition only a few stations, IBS, Radio Nigeria and FM Stereo Rivers State, could be clearly received in Imo State. The Federal government of Nigeria has been very reluctant to grant to many state governments the right to operate their radio stations on FM frequencies. This has important political implications. Without FM frequencies, a state radio station is geographically limited to an area which often includes the state's satellite communities. Most states in Nigeria are ethnically homogenous. Thus news items from one state do not reach other states. In political news items the broadcast often tends to reinforce the political views of the audience, a reflection which in the Nigerian context is no more than ethnic political philosophy centering around ethnic leadership.

The Federal, Kaduna and Port-Harcourt stations can be received in most parts of the nation. Broadcasting items from these areas can be used to destabilise other communities and bias the minds of their own communities against other states. The victimised states cannot retaliate in kind. The verbal warfare between Imo State and Rivers State is a good example of this. IBS Owerri could only reach peripheral communities in River State, while FM Stereo Port-Harcourt was able to penetrate all parts of Imo State. The opponents of NPP in Imo State used NPN propaganda from Rivers State to intensify the division within the Imo State electorate during the election campaign. On the other hand, members of the elite read detailed information from a wide range of newspapers with very contrasting views. This helped them to validate the accuracy of political information by presenting both local and national viewpoints.

54.5% of the urban poor responded in favour of radio as a reliable source of information, while only 9.1% thought the newspaper was reliable. This is a point which shows us the danger of generalisations about the influence of mass media on the audience. The urban poor, as I have shown, are characterised by little or no education and therefore could not read newspapers even though newspapers were an urban medium that circulated where they lived and worked. In contrast to the urban poor, the rural elite, which lived and worked in the rural areas where newspaper circulation was poor, scored highly - 50% said that newspapers were a more reliable political communication channel than radio (37.5%). This clearly indicates that the characteristics of the media are directly related to the characteristics and attributes of the different groups which use the media to obtain political and other information. It is clear from the above table that television is the least popular and reliable medium for political information in all the network groups. Several factors contributed to the unpopularity of television as a source of political information during the election. Party supporters went about providing lorries and offering money to voters who attended political rallies, even if they did not support the party in question. Where the gathering was very small, phototricks were employed, such as the superimposition of political candidates onto photographs of the Pope's crowd during the latter's visit to Nigeria. Most Nigerians clearly identified the false pictures. The television broadcasters deceived the public in the formats they created for political broadcasting. Many people did not believe what they saw on television. Also Nigerians are not familiar with television political formats. As television is now widely available throughout the country, the public

consume it for entertainment and for commercial advertising. The political situation - militarism - has not allowed it to develop as a powerful political medium.

In contrast with newspaper development in Nigeria, which was inspired by nationalism at home and the libertarian theory of the mass media abroad (Golding & Elliot 1979:29), television in Nigeria emerged at a time when the social and political view was to accept the media philosophy of presenting a balanced and unbiased account of issues. In Nigeria the balanced and impartial account of television or radio reflect the thinking of the political leaders who own them and control their content. With newspapers, the libertarian theory emphasises a political philosophy in which the media are also the channels through which truth can be determined. In this case, therefore, newspaper journalism has a sound editorial tradition of presenting impartial accounts. On the other hand, ownership and control have rendered the television editorial tradition weak, while constantly restraining the professional skills and opinions of the television broadcaster. From these differences, it becomes important to discover the truth from the media which could influence the political behaviour of Nigerian voters.

As well as this, attempts were made during the survey to find out from the respondents which media they considered politically unreliable during the elections. The table below shows the responses.

Table 3:12
Respondents' Opinion On The Unreliability of
Different Communication Channels

Groups	Radio	TV	Newspapers	Word of Mouth	Row Total	
Traditional	(13) 27.1	(3) 6.3	(7) 14.6	(25) 52.1	(48) 100	37.5
School Leaver	(4) 30.8	(1) 7.7	(3) 23.1	(4) 38.5	(13) 100	10.2
Urban Poor	(4) 44.4	(2) 22.2	(0) 0.0	(3) 33.3	(9) 100	7.0
Urban Elite	(8) 19.0	(7) 16.7	(5) 11.9	(22) 54.2	(42) 100	32.8
Rural Elite	(3) 18.8	(4) 25.0	(0) 0.0	(9) 56.3	(16) 100	12.5
Column Total	(32) (25.0	(17) 13.3	(15) 11.7	(54) 50.0	(128) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 25

From the five groups, 25% believed that radio was an unreliable medium for political information (compared with 45% above, who said it was reliable), 13.3% said television was unreliable. The same applied to newspapers (11.7%), and word of mouth (50%). The scores for the unreliability of each medium varied from one group to another. From the traditional network group 27.1% (13) said that radio was unreliable, in sharp contrast to 66% in the same group who believed that radio was reliable. 6.3% said that television was unreliable, while 14.6% said that newspapers were. 52.1% said that word of mouth was unreliable, in sharp contrast to 14.9% who had previously said that face-to-face political communication was reliable.

For the young school leavers, scores for the unreliability of different media in the political coverage of the 1983 general election remained comparatively the same as for their reliability. In each case television scored the lowest, 0.8%. The urban poor gave a similar response to the young school leavers, but note that the urban poor did not mention that newspapers were unreliable and only 9.1% had earlier believed that newspapers were an unreliable channel of political communication. The low score here should be considered in terms of the groups' demographic attributes and characteristics, as well as those of the medium. There is a 'natural' imposed avoidance.

From the urban elite and rural elite groups, more important differences begin to emerge. Only 19% of the urban elite believed that radio was unreliable; 16.7% of them maintained that television was unreliable. There is a noticeable contrast in estimates of the reliability of newspapers in this group - 11.9% (5) unreliable and 38.1% (16) reliable. This showed that the majority of the elite, who were more or less exclusively associated with political press readership, believed that newspapers were a more reliable channel of political communication than all other media, even radio, in Nigeria.

The reason for the credibility of newspapers as a reliable source of political information in Nigerian politics is understandable. First, we have noted that, historically, newspapers developed from private ownership by men who believed in telling the truth about their social, political and economic environment. Chronicle, 14 July 1909, Lagos Weekly Record, 5 May 1906; Omu (1978:205) and the principal aims of the development of the press were outlined by the short-lived Nigeria Press Association, formed on 17th August, 1929 (cf Omu, 1978:23). It was truth that made the newspaper

credible and hence attracted the attention of the most politically articulate group in the communities - the elite. Second, The decree/legislation which debarred ownership of radio and television from private organisations or individuals, except by permission of the Federal government, reduced the credibility of these two media. This is because party politics in Nigeria are developed and entrenched within tribal politics and nationalism. The relationship between the different political parties is characterised by blackmail, false accusations, stereotyping, slander, and so on. Through the different media, controlled exclusively by the political parties, this disinformation is disseminated among the people.

Among the rural elite 37.5% believed that radio was reliable and 18.8% unreliable. But there was some contrast about television, 25% saying it was unreliable and only 6.3% saying it was reliable. Nobody indicated that the newspapers were unreliable. This has more to do with the environment than with neutrality of opinion as expressed by the data. Most of the rural elite, as we have seen, live and work in the villages where the distribution of newspapers is limited to a few local ones, often owned by the states. In terms of exposure to different newspapers owned by individuals, the states and the Federal government, the rural elite are restricted in contrast with their urban counterparts. Hence radio, the press and television provide for members of the rural elites the same version of political news and information. The most unreliable medium for political messages or information in the last general elections in Nigeria was face-to-face communication (word of mouth). The most important figure in this regard is 56.3% of members of the rural elite although the traditional group has 52.1%, school leavers 38.5%, urban poor 33.3%, and members of the urban elite 52.4%.

The reasons that more than half of the rural elite's respondents believed that word of mouth was an unreliable political communication medium are set out below. First, most of them lived in the rural area where face-to-face political communication predominated. Second, the respondents acted as the nodes and linkages between the rural population and the political leaders. Although they were banned from active political leadership during the election, and because they felt ill-treated by the state government of Imo, they campaigned very hard against it through what they called their 'underground campaign movement' (most of their campaign exercise took place at night, as I pointed out earlier). Third, because they carried out this type of campaign through the traditional network of relationship in the

communities, their activities became known through interpersonal contacts. As already stated, the rural communities were, for the first time in Igboland, split between NPN and NPP supporters. Therefore, many of the politically active teachers were betrayed by others, or told lies to. The teachers treated others in much the same way. As we shall see later, everyone was directly or indirectly interested in money, which the corrupt political leaders were circulating in the villages: different opinions were expressed in public than in private. Similar behaviour was found among other groups, but to a lesser extent.

In general, the fact that 50% of the respondents believed that word of mouth was an unreliable medium of political communication firmly supports my earlier observation that the split in Igbo leadership in the last general election affected the fabric of rural Igbo communities. We have seen that the rural and urban communities are linked by social and religious organisations. Membership of these organisations, particularly social traditional ones, are based on kinship. Within these associations not only the elite and non-elite are linked, but urban and village socio-political, economic and cultural life converge. The main communication process is horizontal, face-to-face interaction. Once the communities became split in their political identification, the information circulated between friends and relatives both in the cities and in the villages became infested with falsehoods, stereotyping and so on, as the data clearly indicate. The fact that 52.4% of the urban elite believed that face-to-face communication was unreliable during the election also supports the argument that the elite, through kinship networks, are strongly linked with the rest of their communities.

The high score of unreliability given to face-to-face political communication has a direct effect on the credibility of mass media information. The basis of all political information is initially word of mouth or direct symbolic observation. The radio, newspapers and television journalists, who were localised in Imo State, obtained their reports from what they saw or heard from people during the election. If the oral information was false, the political messages, which had been ideologically reconstructed and edited as secondary information by the media, could be more unreliable than face-to-face communication.

In my opinion, because of control and ownership, media messages are a lot more constrained than face-to-face political communication. Thus the latter

becomes less reliable. The majority of media audiences, no matter how localised the information, cannot reach the source of the information, and is therefore forced to accept it as true. Hence we should not conclude that the respondents' statements about the last election were the absolute truth. Another important point is that most relationships in both cities and villages in Imo State were strained by different party identifications which led many respondents to respond to the question with certain emotions which, from my cultural experience of Igbo communities, were due to the 'natural' relation rather than to politics. Here opinion, experience and participant observation should be used to moderate any extreme views and interpretation of data.

The question is, why do people in semi-industrial and largely rural communities vote at all, if they believe that most of what they hear is false? One of the concerns of this thesis, therefore, is to find empirical evidence which will uncover sources of political influence other than the media and face-to-face communication.

Table 4:12
Respondents' Media Ownership (Reception Facilities)

Groups	Radio	TV	Tele- phone	Radio + TV	All of these	Row Total	
Traditional	(34) 77.3	(1) 2.3	(3) 6.8	(6) 13.6	(0) 0.0	(44) 100	35.5
School Leaver	(9) 69.2	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(4) 30.8	(0) 0.0	(13) 100	10.9
Urban Poor	(8) 88.9	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 11.1	(0) 0.0	(9) 100	7.3
Urban Elite	(17) 41.5	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(22) 53.7	(2) 4.7	(41) 100	33.1
Rural Elite	(8) 47.1	(2) 11.8	(0) 0.0	(7) 41.2	(0) 0.0	(17) 100	13.7
Column Total	(76) 61.3	(3) 2.4	(3) 2.4	(40) 32.3	(2) 1.6	(124) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 29

An individual's exposure to political information depends on his access to a particular medium, such as a radio set. This depends on various factors: first, the ability to buy it, and second, the ability to use it effectively - that is, the ability to use the political information supplied by the medium to reach the decision to vote for a political candidate(s). The medium may be used just to reinforce one's own existing opinion or to modify it but rarely, as we have seen, will it change it. I have already referred it to the summary of 'main' findings of research on the media and election campaign reported by Golding (1974:79-83).

In the survey table 4:12, 61.3% in all groups own a radio set, while only 2.4% own a television, and only 2.4% own a telephone. 32.3% own both. The radio owners comprise 77.3% of the traditional group; 69.2% of the school leavers; 88.9% of the urban poor; 41.5% of the urban elites; and 47.1% of the rural elite. While the two elites scored the lowest in radio ownership, the majority of elite members own both radio and television sets: 53.7% (22) of the urban elite and 41.2% (7) of the rural elite. Of the 40 who reported that they own both radio and television sets, 29 are from the elite group. The least likely, in the survey, to own both radio and television sets are the urban poor (11.1%); the traditional network (13.6%); and young school leavers (30.8%). Only the urban elite (4.9%) owns both radio and television sets, as well as a telephone, (see Table 4:12).

In general, private ownership of radio and television sets in Imo State is widespread, with radio far exceeding the rest. Ownership of both is concentrated in the hands of the elite, both in the cities and villages. Most people in Nigeria, irrespective of residence, occupation, standard of education, and so on, are exposed to radio and therefore to its political influence. This exposure may further explain why radio was ranked as an important reliable medium for political information. There is a weak relationship between ownership and exposure. While fewer people own a medium such as a television, more people watch it - a factor governed by social ties.

Hours of Exposure to Political Media

The extensive use of the media during the Nigerian election campaign and the considerable amount of time people spend listening to political broadcasts and also talking politics, is worth examining in detail. Anthony Smith

(1978:96) has argued that too much coverage of politics by the media during an election campaign leads to 'overkill' which makes the audience indifferent to political broadcasts. Others have argued against this point by saying that the period of political campaign and voting are so short in comparison with other national activities that media coverage of the events cannot be described as 'overkill'. Furthermore, an election period is regarded as an exciting moment in the history of a nation because it determines what goes on thereafter. The problem with Smith's assessment of media election campaign 'overkill' in the 1974 British General Election is that he concentrated too much on television coverage.

In Nigeria, the amount of time people spent on television, radio, and newspapers, or in talking about politics varied according to the type of media, and its availability within particular groups. We cannot talk about overkill in Nigerian communication and politics because the network of socio-political and economic relations links different groups to different media networks. Contact between groups varies widely and participation in politics is not absolutely dependent on the media presentation of political information. The nature of an industrial society such as Britain allows for such dependency on the media. In turn, media professionals exploit such dependency.

Table 5:12

Respondents Hours Of Exposure to Radio

Groups	1-10 Hours	11-20 Hours	21-30 Hours	Row Total	
Traditional	(23) 53.5	(5) 11.6	(15) 34.9	(43) 100	34.4
School Leaver	(6) 61.5	(2) 15.4	(3) 23.1	(13) 100	10.4
Urban Poor	(5) 45.5	(4) 36.4	(2) 18.2	(11) 100	8.8
Urban Elite	(22) 53.7	(10) 24.4	(9) 22.4	(41) 100	32.8
Rural Elite	(9) 52.9	(4) 23.5	(4) 23.5	(17) 100	13.6
Column Total	(67) 53.6	(25) 20.0	(33) 26.4	(125) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 28

Table 6:12

Respondents' Hours Of Exposure to Television

Groups	1-10 Hours	11-20 Hours	21-30 Hours	Row Total	
Traditional	(16) 66.7	(4) 16.7	(4) 16.7	(24) 100	27.4
School Leaver	(8) 66.7	(1) 8.3	(3) 25.0	(12) 100	13.8
Urban Poor	(3) 60.0	(1) 20.0	(1) 20.0	(5) 100	5.7
Urban Elite	(23) 67.6	(7) 20.6	(4) 11.8	(34) 100	39.1
Rural Elite	(10) 83.3	(1) 8.3	(1) 8.3	(12) 100	13.8
Column Total	(66) 69.0	(14) 16.1	(13) 14.9	(87) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 66

Table 7:12.

Hours Spent Reading Newspapers For Political Information By the Respondents

Groups	1-10 Hours	11-20 Hours	21-30 Hours	Row Total	
Traditional	(17) 68.0	(5) 20.0	(3) 12.0	(25) 100	26.0
School Leaver	(10) 76.9	(2) 15.4	(1) 7.7	(13) 100	13.5
Urban Poor	(4) 80.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 20.0	(5) 100	5.2
Urban Elite	(32) 86.5	(5) 13.5	(0) 0.0	(37) 100	38.9
Rural Elite	(12) 75.0	(2) 12.5	(2) 12.5	(16) 100	14.7
Column Total	(75) 78.1	(14) 14.6	(7) 7.3	(96) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 57

Table 8:12

Respondents' Hours Of Involvement In Face-To-Face Communication

Groups	1-10 Hours	11-20 Hours	21-30 Hours	Row Total	
Traditional	(18) 50.0	(11) 30.6	(7) 19.4	(36) 100	37.9
School Leaver	(5) 41.7	(2) 16.7	(5) 41.7	(12) 100	12.0
Urban Poor	(1) 14.3	(4) 57.1	(2) 28.6	(7) 100	3.4
Urban Elite	(11) 40.7	(7) 25.9	(9) 33.3	(27) 100	28.4
Rural Elite	(7) 53.8	(4) 30.8	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	13.7
Column Total	(42) 44.2	(28) 29.5	(25) 26.3	(95) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 58

From all the five groups, 53.6% (67) spent from one to ten hours a week listening to the radio about politics, 69% (60) spent similar hours watching television, and 78.1% (75) spent the hours reading newspapers. Only 44.2% (44) had face-to-face political communication for between one and ten hours a week.

Beyond ten-hours-a-week exposure to political information the number of the audience dropped sharply. In all the five groups 20% (25) listened to political information the radio for between eleven and twenty hours a week, while only 16.1% (14) did so for television, and 14.9% (6) for newspapers. Face-to-face communication slightly increased to 29.5% (28). The number who exposed themselves to these media and communication channels from twenty-one to thirty hours a week remained within the same range as those who spent between eleven and twenty hours a week on them: for radio 26.4% (33) spent between twenty-one and thirty hours a week listening for political information; 14.9% (13) watched television for political information between twenty-one to thirty hours a week, while only 7.3% (7) did so for newspapers. 26.3% (25) were involved in face-to-face communication for the same purpose.

A close look at the tables above will reveal that majority of the respondents spent between one to ten hours a week on different communication channels for political information. Although radio was the most popular, and sets are owned by the majority of the respondents, most of the respondents did not give it more time than other media. But it is important to note from the data that 34.9% (15) of the traditional group spent between twenty-one to thirty hours a week listening to radio. This is the longest period spent by any group on any one of the four means of political communication in the survey. In effect this obliterates the lower 53.6% of the network groups' exposure to radio for between one and ten hours a week (compared with 69% for television and 75% for newspapers for between one and ten hours a week).

The high percentage for newspapers of between one and ten hours a week is largely a result of the urban elite's exposure to them. Of the total of 37 respondents of the urban elite who read newspapers for between one and thirty hours a week, 32 respondents spent only one to ten hours a week, while nobody spent between twenty-one and thirty plus hours a week on it.

Another important relationship in the data is that between the traditional group (twenty-one to thirty hours spent on face-to-face political communication per week) and that of the urban elite within the same twenty-one to thirty range: strictly, 19.4% (7) of the traditional network group spent twenty-one to thirty-one hours a week on face-to-face political communication while 33.3% (9) of the urban elite did the same. We noted earlier that face-to-face communication is more akin to the traditional group in village communities while mass media communication is associated with the urban elite. In the political campaigning process, the urban elite is more actively engaged in face-to-face communication than the traditional group. Even so the urban elite spent less time reading newspapers, listening to radio and watching television than talking politics to friends and relatives.

Earlier, we noted statistically that a higher percentage of respondents from the urban elite were active in politics during the election period in the villages than in the cities. In Chapter One I pointed out that both the urban elite and the rural elite were the opinion leaders, political persuaders and active political agents in the villages. They are also the leaders in the small ethnic organisations which have branches both in the cities and in the villages. Linkages with other similar ethnic

organisations are made possible through these leaders or select committee members. These leaders also act as points of convergence between urban and rural politics.

The long hours of face-to-face communication among the urban elite and the traditional group imply that face-to-face political communication in Nigeria is a dynamic process. Political communication between two groups, for example, the elites and the traditional village groups, is not so much a process of sharing information among equals but a didactic flow of information shared by two groups. The relationship between the rural and urban populations during the election period in Igboland was peculiar in an African context. In chapter two I stated that the Igboland region was the last to be conquered by the British because of its scattered village structure in the bush. Unlike the northern or the western part of the country, in the pre-colonial period city-states did not develop in the east (predominantly Igbo), hence everyone belonged to a village. The city was a colonial creation. In the election period a large number of the Igbos living in the cities returned to their villages to vote. It was during this time that members of the elites were involved in constant face-to-face political communication with their kin and relatives in the villages.

Another important relationship between the different network groups and the media times of exposure is that between television and the traditional group, and television and the urban elite. The data on ownership of sets show that a far larger number of members of the elites own television sets than do members of the traditional network groups. But the data indicate that 66.7% of the traditional network group watch television for political information for between one to ten hours a week, and that 66.7% of the urban elite do the same.

The interpretation here is that the majority of the traditional group do not own sets, but that because of the structure of kinship relations and network association, one television set owned by a relative is watched by a large number of kin and relatives. Hence non-ownership of television sets, is independent of respondents' exposure to them owing to the structure of social relationships in Igboland.

TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS: AUDIENCE RESPONSE IN IMO STATE

We have examined the relationship between the states, the Federal Government, political parties and media ownership. The states within former Eastern Nigeria are: Anambra, Imo, Cross River and Rivers States. Each has a NTA station and a state station. In the last civil government Rivers and Cross River States were controlled by the NPN, while Anambra and Imo States were under the NPP. The NTV Aba/Owerri is at Aba (Imo State), NTV Enugu, Anambra State at Enugu, NTV Port-Harcourt, Rivers State at Port-Harcourt. During the election, Channel 59 was established at Owerri by NPP to counteract the political propaganda put out by NPN through the NTV stations in the region. In the survey, the respondents were asked to rank in order the frequency with which they watched different channels. The ranking was from 1 to 3.

Table 9:12

Respondents' Exposure to Different TV Channels

Groups	<u>First Choice</u>					Total	
	6	8	10	11	59		
Traditional	(5) 18.5	(1) 3.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(21) 77.8	(27) 100	27.6
School Leaver	(5) 41.7	(0) 0.0	(1) 8.3	(0) 0.0	(6) 50.0	(12) 100	12.2
Urban Poor	(1) 14.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 14.3	(5) 71.4	(7) 100	7.7
Urban Elite	(21) 53.8	(2) 5.1	(1) 2.6	(0) 0.0	(15) 38.5	(39) 100	39.8
Rural Elite	(3) 23.1	(0) 0.0	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(9) 69.2	(13) 100	13.3
Column Total	(35) 35.7	(3) 3.1	(3) 3.1	(1) 1.0	(56) 57.1	(98) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 55

35.7% (35) watched Channel 6 TV (NTV Aba); only 3.1%, watched Channel 8 (Enugu) and Channel 10 (Port-Harcourt). This was because these stations are far from Imo State and pictures from them are often blurred. A higher

percentage of the respondents made ITV Owerri (Channel 59) their first choice - 57.1% (56). Two factors are responsible for this: first, the station represented the interest of the Igbo in the political campaign of the 1983 general elections; second, from Owerri, the capital of Imo State, ITV pictures can be clearly received by television sets in the urban and rural areas. In addition, it was a new station which emerged during the 1983 election campaign. Most aspects of its programmes centred heavily on the election and were created essentially from the very local environment which the NPP campaigned hard to retain. The programme contents were very familiar to the audience who watched them.

Table 10:12
Respondents' Exposure To Different TV Channels
Second Choice

Channels	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	
1	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
2	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
6	(19) 67.9	(5) 45.5	(5) 71.4	(15) 39.5	(9) 75.0	(53) 55.2
7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 2.6	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
8	(2) 7.1	(0) 0.0	(1) 14.3	(4) 10.5	(1) 8.3	(8) 8.3
9	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 2.6	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
10	(1) 3.6	(5) 45.5	(1) 14.3	(7) 18.4	(1) 8.3	(15) 15.6
12	(1) 3.6	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
59	(3) 10.7	(1) 9.1	(0) 0.0	(10) 26.3	(1) 8.3	(15) 15.6
Total	(28) 100 29.2	(11) 100 11.5	(7) 100 7.3	(36) 100 39.6	(12) 100 12.5	(96) 100 100

The second most popular channel among Imo State electorates in the last general election was Channel 6 - 55.2% (53) of the respondents marked it second to ITV. Channel 10 and Channel 59, both 15.6% (15), remained their second choice.

The third important channel was Channel 10, which 61.1% (55) reported as their third choice. Channel 8, was the third choice for 12.2% (11), as was Channel 59 (also with 12.2% (11)). Two respondents showed that they watched other channels for political information. Most of these channels cannot be received in Imo State where the survey was carried out. The respondents watching these outside channels were people who moved from one part of the country to the other during election time. The respondents could be traders or unemployed school leavers seeking employment in different towns.

Table 11:12

Respondents' First Newspaper Choice For Political Information

Newspaper	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	
Daily Sketch	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 5.1	(0) 0.0	(2) 2.1
Daily Times	(5) 20.8	(2) 15.4	(1) 25.0	(7) 17.9	(2) 13.3	(17) 17.9
The Guardian	(0) 0.0	(1) 7.7	(1) 25.0	(4) 10.3	(1) 6.7	(7) 7.4
National Concord	(8) 33.3	(3) 23.1	(0) 0.0	(12) 30.8	(8) 53.3	(31) 32.6
New Nigeria	(1) 4.2	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(2) 5.1	(1) 6.7	(5) 5.3
Nigerian Statesman	(5) 20.8	(5) 38.5	(2) 50.0	(8) 20.5	(3) 20.0	(23) 24.2
Nigerian Tide	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 5.6	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.1
Nigerian Tribune	(2) 8.3	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(3) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(6) 6.3
The Punch	(3) 12.5	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 3.2
Total	(24) 100	(13) 100	(4) 100	(39) 100	(15) 100	(95) 100

The first choice, National Concord was the most important newspaper read by the Imo State electorate 32.6% (31) during the election. The Nigerian Statesman, which is Imo State's newspaper, came second with 24.3% (23), while the Daily Times, the Federal government's paper, was third choice.

One of the reasons for the popularity of the National Concord during the election was the political stand of Abiola, the owner of the newspaper. Before the renomination of Shagari as the flag bearer of the NPN, Abiola hoped, on the basis of the zonal system of that party, that he would become the next flag bearer of NPN. In other words he believed that Shagari would step down for him. While he hoped for such leadership he made a series of serious political attacks on Chief Obafemi Awolowo, accusing him of corruption and capitalism while deceiving the Yoruba people and the nation with his political campaign of pragmatic socialism. Abiola's constant disclosure of Awolowo's practices in connection with the Muruko land deal attracted the attention of many newspaper readers in Imo State. Abjala used the press to attack Awo, the most serious attack on Awo by a fellow Yoruba in recent years. The principal aim of Abiola was to demystify the power of Awo, whom most Yoruba people believed to be politically faultless in a corrupt political system. The press attack on Awo could be equated with Ojukwu and Zik's conflict in the East.

But, unfortunately, while the quarrel between Zik and Ojukwu's factions continued during the elections, the failure of the NPN party to appoint Abiola as the party's flag bearer for the Presidency quickly led him to change his political attack on Awo, and Abiola turned against the NPN leadership and the Hausa/Fulani domination of that party. The many readers of the National Concord could see it as a fearless newspaper ready to disclose the ills of the society.

In addition, Abiola, being a millionaire in Nigeria during the civil rule, could do and say anything with his press and get away with it. Any paper that disclosed the faults of Awo, particularly if that paper was owned by a fellow Yoruba, would find favour with the Igbos. As well as this, the bitter political conflicts between the NPN and the NPP in Imo State during the election coincided with the period when Abiola was disappointed by the NPN. His criticism of the party and those connected with it also found favour with the majority of the Igbos who were opposed to the NPN in Imo State.

The tables show that the Imo State electorate's second most important newspaper was the Daily Times with 33.7% (33), followed by the National Concord with 27.6% (27), and the New Statesman with 12.2% (12). The Daily Times was popular because it covered political issues beyond the state level. It also covered international and world news better than the other national dailies did. This was important for the elite whose quest for information transcended local issues.

Table 12:12

Respondents Second Newspaper Choice For Political Information

Newspaper	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	
Daily Sketch	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 2.6	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
Daily Star	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 6.3	(1) 1.0
Daily Times	(10) 38.5	(2) 15.4	(2) 50.0	(11) 28.2	(8) 50.0	(33) 33.7
The Guardian	(5) 19.2	(3) 23.1	(0) 0.0	(3) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(11) 11.2
National Concord	(7) 26.9	(4) 30.8	(1) 25.0	(12) 30.8	(3) 18.8	(27) 27.6
New Nigeria	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 2.6	(1) 2.6	(0) 0.0	(2) 2.0
Nigerian Herald	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 2.6	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
Nigerian Statesman	(3) 11.5	(2) 15.4	(0) 0.0	(5) 12.8	(2) 12.5	(12) 12.2
Nigerian Tide	(0) 0.0	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
Nigerian Tribune	(1) 3.8	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 1.0
The Punch	(0) 0.0	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(5) 12.8	(2) 12.5	(8) 8.2
Total	(26) 100	(13) 100	(41) 100	(39) 100	(16) 100	(98) 100

The third most popular newspaper was the Nigerian Statesman 20% (19), followed by the National Concord 18.9% (18), followed by the Punch, and the

Daily Times, each with 16.6% (16). Of the Nigerian Statesman's readers 20% (19), were from the urban elite.

Much of the press coverage of political events in Imo State was just a repetition of what was also broadcast on the radio and television. Members of the urban elite were therefore attracted to reading newspapers other than those of Imo State so as to broaden their political horizons, and follow other issues as well.

THE EFFECT OF THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTION ON PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN IMO STATE

Many factors, as shown in this study, contributed to political conflicts in the 1983 Nigerian general election. One of the basic arguments in favour of a network study of political communication is that it reveals the underlying structure of interpersonal relationships, and political participation, and makes plain the role of communication within the total system. It has been made clear that kinship networks constitute an important aspect of political identification and participation in Igboland, and that the division in Igbo political leadership created political conflicts both in the cities and in the villages. Also, the localisation of mass media within each of the states for the 1983 general election created another dimension of political conflict. In my own participant observation, many people decided which party to vote for not so much on ethnic grounds, party manifestos and politics, nor even according to how much money or 'basic commodities' they received from party leaders and agents, but on psychological grounds. A small quarrel or misunderstanding between relatives and friends during the election quickly led them to identify with and vote for different parties, the NPP or the NPN. The more hatred intensified, the more they identified with different parties. In other words, personal relationships became politicised. This became so widespread, particularly in the villages, that within certain families people became identified as NPN or NPP members rather than as members of a particular kin group. Consequently, I decided to use the survey to find out the degree of such unusual political conflict in Igbo communities.

In the survey, respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought that the last general affected election their relationship with other people, such as parents, relatives, friends, co-workers or other ethnic groups, in

good or bad ways.

The data shows that in all the five groups 88.2% (82) of the respondents reported that their relationship with their parents during of the general election was good. In the demographic analysis of the kinship network I discovered that the majority of the respondents who attained any level of education were educated by their parents. I argued that the importance attached to education from the colonial period made education such a valued thing that most parents made a major sacrifice in order to educate their children. Next, using Mitchel et al, (1969), I maintained that 'obligatory kinship relationship' forced city dwellers to identify with their village kin, particularly parents, during an election period. Kinship ties at parental level transcend politics, and it is difficult to alter this.

Table 14:12

The Effects Of The General Election On Personal Relationships
Of The Respondents With Their Parents

Groups	Good	Bad	Total	
Traditional	(28) 87.5	(4) 12.5	(32) 100	34.4
School Leaver	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	14.6
Urban Poor	(8) 88.9	(1) 11.1	(9) 100	9.7
Urban Elite	(25) 86.2	(4) 13.8	(29) 100	31.2
Rural Elite	(10) 100.0	(0) 0.0	(10) 100	10.8
Column Total	(82) 88.2	(11) 11.8	(93) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 60

In Igbo communities, siblings are the most important kin, after the parents, in the socio-political system. If the relationship with parents were to any extent affected by the election, we would expect relationships with siblings to be even more adversely affected.

In all the groups, quite a high level of respondents had a bad relationship with their relatives irrespective of their class, education, occupation and residence. In the traditional group 35% (14) of the respondents reported a bad relationship. If a third of the respondents from the traditional group - whose social structures are completely based on kinship networks - had a bad relationship with their kin during an election, the situation was likely to be worse with the other groups.

Table 15:12

The Effects Of The General Elections On Personal Relationships
Of The Respondents With Their Relatives - Siblings and Primary Kin

Groups	Good	Bad	Total	
Traditional	(26) 65.0	(14) 35.0	(40) 100	38.5
School Leaver	(8) 61.5	(5) 38.5	(13) 100	12.5
Urban Poor	(6) 66.7	(3) 33.3	(9) 100	3.7
Urban Elite	(16) 60.0	(12) 40.0	(30) 100	28.8
Rural Elite	(7) 58.3	(5) 41.7	(12) 100	11.5
Column Total	(65) 62.5	(34) 37.5	(104) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 49

In the young school leavers group 38.5% (5) of the respondents reported bad relations. A third of the urban poor reported bad relations with others. In the urban elite the corresponding figure was 40%. The fact that the urban elite drifted back to the villages during the election period so as to campaign affected their relationships with their relatives even more. The effect of the election on personal relationships with relatives among the rural elite (teachers) was even more adverse because of the double role resulting from the pressure put on them by government regulations. The urban elite could get away with such a regulation - non-active political participation - because after work their co-workers do not know what they

did with the rest of their time. In the village where teachers live and teach, the close network of kin and relatives makes known the activities of teachers and makes it easy for others to dictate to them. Some of them were reported to the authorities by their relatives - a situation, as pointed out earlier, which led to the massive transfer of teachers to remote villages where there was shortage of water and rarely any good roads, by the NPP government at the end of the election. However, 100% (10) of the rural elite respondents maintained a good relationship with their parents. When the military took over power soon after the 1983 general election, all the teachers were returned to their former stations before the massive retirement exercise by that government began to hurt them more than the harsh transfers did.

In the survey, only 49.5% (30) in all the five groups reported that their relationship with friends remained good. According to Mitchell et al (1969), friendship in Africa does not carry as strong an obligation as kinship relationship. In Agege Lagos relatives in Peace's survey described themselves as brothers. While kinship is the basis of 'urban brothers' ties, the manifest content which enhanced the relationship in the city is the economic relationship between them. "If you treat your brothers like other townspeople (in relation to debt) then you will be quickly lost. Brothers are the only people you can trust in Agege and if you are not generous with them, then you will not survive" (Peace, 1979:35). Thus, in an election period, disagreement with friends can lead to more irreconcilable breaches in relationships than would occur with with relatives or 'brothers'. Here, bad relationship increased, from relatives, 37.5%, to 50.1% with friends - an increase of 12.6%.

In the traditional group 53.8% (21) of the respondents said that relationships with friends were bad. Among young school leavers 53.8% (7) also said they were bad. It was among the urban poor that nearly 100% good relationships were maintained with friends - 85.7% (6) said these were good and only 14.3% (1) of the respondents said these were bad. A possible explanation of this is that for the urban poor, in the growing hardship of Shagari's austerity measures, life in the city was becoming very difficult. They had to work long hours to make ends meet. In the affluent society which Nigeria is rapidly becoming, the poor support each other in time of difficulties, thus solidifying their friendship. But in Nigeria such urban poor solidarity is much stronger among kin than with friends (Peace 1979, Lloyd 1974). Most films of the 1930s in America illustrate such support

among the poor. Even American wealthy families lost their 'good time' friends and depended on black servants for friendship and companionship. This situation could trigger off mass revolution if members of the elite behaved in the same way. But kinship ties make revolution in Nigeria a mere dream because the poor, who should revolt, depend directly or indirectly on the rich for financial and other personal supports.

The elite, in their network, had more linkages in their interpersonal relationships because of their horizontal horizontal and vertical mobility. They had a very high proportion of bad relationships with their friends. Only 41.9% (13) reported that relationships with friends were good. This is because members of the urban elite were more involved in persuading people from the villages and in the cities to vote for either the NPN or the NPP, thereby damaging their friendships. They were leaders of small groups and once the groups were divided in their support of either of the two main competing parties, the leaders shifted to attack individuals within the group who caused the split. This led to bad relationships. Also, in the city, relationships are based more on friendship than in the village, and the urban elite are more likely to have friendly relations, which carry relatively less obligations than kinship relations. These can easily go bad. More than half of the rural elite maintained good relationships with their friends (63.6%), while 36.4% had bad relationships with their friends. Here the explanation lies within the environment in which they live and work. Most teachers faced the same problem during the civilian government. For several months they were not paid salaries and they depended on a small group's monthly financial contributions to support one another. But some of them, for personal reasons, perhaps because their relatives were in top government posts, decided to support the NPN to upset fellow teachers. This contributed to bad relationships. We have seen earlier that the majority of the rural elite voted NPN in the 1983 elections. The NPN propaganda to improve teachers' salaries was effective.

Another important network of personal relationships which was affected during the 1983 general election was between co-workers. In fact, the relationship between friends is not unlike the relationship between co-workers. The main difference is that the friendship relation has a broader base than that of the co-worker, which is restricted both environmentally and hierarchically, according to the different grades of workers in the office, factory or administration.

One of the main characteristics, if not the main feature, of urbanisation is the formal labour organisation. This does not demand one particular type of labour force, such as relatives engaged in subsistence farming in the villages, but a labour force of mixed skills, age and sex. Thus the labour force is heterogeneous. Also the ethnic composition of workers is heterogeneous: as we have seen from the demographic characteristics of the respondents, the city has a far more heterogeneous population than the village. The respondents' statistical evidence supports our theoretical view, drawn from Barnes' concept of network, that the 'characteristic of the principal formal difference between simple, primitive, rural, or small-scale societies as against modern, civilised, urban or mass societies is that the latter is large and complex' (Barnes, 1954:45; Shrinivas et al 1964:167; Gluck, 1955:19).

In Nigeria the nature of ethnic conflict and the size of the society has imposed a more cautious and ordered type of relationship at work places in the cities. Differences in education have furthermore required a hierarchical order of association, which hitherto placed further constraints on interpersonal relationships between co-workers. The implication of overt political support, particularly among civil servants in the last general election, could lead to several problems. Again much depended on whether the employers were under the Federal or State concerns. Formality tends to prevail between workers. Political differences are played down and the stereotyping of personal relationships protects them from political damage. Thus relationships between co-workers suffered less damage than did relationships between friends during the 1983 general elections.

In all the five groups, 60.2% (50) of the respondents said that their relationships with co-workers were good. The argument that relationships at work are formal, hierarchical, and stereotyped, is supported by 61.5% (16) of the urban elite who reported that their relationships with co-workers were good. The latter come from junior workers whose political stand would not be as important as that of the top decision-making group. 50% (4) of the urban poor and 64.3% (9) of the rural elite said their relationships were good, while 35.7% (5) said they were bad - figures which nearly correspond with their friendship relationships and require some explanation. Some of the young school leavers who were temporarily employed, 36.4% (4), said that the relationship was good; but because they were more actively involved in politics as party agents, thugs and party fans, 63.6% of them reported that relationships with their co-workers were bad.

In the traditional group 70.8% (17) of the respondents said that their relationships with co-workers were good. There should be no contradiction in the use of the term co-workers. In the rural areas where occupations among the traditional group are predominantly agricultural (an important reason in the network studies for separating the rural population into different groups, such as rural elite so as to allow for theoretical development and for sound analytical conclusions) co-workers do not exist in the sense that they do in the city. But as much as modern education brought about the development of the elite in the rural areas, so did modern economic development bring about the use of the term co-workers in the rural areas. Another factor of convergence between the two traditions was modern economic developments, including water projects, road construction, modern building works, rural electrification and so on. All these employed large numbers of local as well as other ethnic groups, but the projects were highly politicised. Because of such development in the rural area, the homogeneity of the labour force in the rural areas is breaking down and the term 'co-workers' has began to mean the same as in the city. But the formal relationship between workers in the city and those in the rural projects is not quite the same. The workers in the rural projects are not highly differentiated. There may be a few highly skilled workers to direct the project but the majority of the workers fall within the same category. Many of them come from the same locality and have some blood relationship. They may be classified as kin in local government projects. Hence, relationships between co-workers in the traditional network group during the election campaign were comparatively 'good' rather than 'bad'.

It is very clear from this chapter that Nigerian politics can no longer be discussed and understood in terms of ethnic politics only. This does not imply that the disease of ethnic politics has died out. In many respects it is still very strong. In times of election the conflicts between the ethnic groups frequently lead to disastrous effects at national level.

In the survey, it was discovered from the network groups that 43.8% (35) of the respondents said that relationships with other ethnic groups were good. From the individual network groups 46.1% (12) in the traditional group said that their relationships with other ethnic groups was good. What we should distinguish here is the difference between psychological ethnic differences as a result of historically entrenched bias, and politicised and actual bad relationships as a result of direct contact with others in the city. The urban elite satisfy the second condition, as 46.2% (12) said that their

relationships with other ethnic groups were good. In the city we have observed that the population is ethnically heterogenous. Here different ethnic groups compete for jobs, housing, power, and other opportunities. The basis of real hatred is more obvious than in the village, yet the traditional group in the village is badly disposed towards other ethnic groups which they have not met. Another possible cause of hatred or bad relations between the rural traditional group and other ethnic groups could be the media, particularly in radio coverage of issues concerning other ethnic groups. Media influence can lead to bad relationships - we shall discuss some of the reasons later.

However, other network groups reported some varying degrees of good and bad relationships with other ethnic groups during the election. In the young school leaver group only 36.4% (4) reported that relationships with other ethnic groups was good. The high percentage of bad relationships between the young school leavers and other ethnic groups during the elections can be explained in terms of the nature and characteristics of this network group. First, most of them were unemployed and it was from them that thugs, and so on were hired. Thus, they were bound to clash with youths of other ethnic groups during the election campaign. Second, their horizontal and social mobility are still flexible and they are often exposed to various groups in the nation, some of whom have opposing views that can lead to clashes. Third, they are exposed to different media, which bias their minds against other ethnic groups during an election period. 44.4% (4) of the rural elites reported that their relationships with other ethnic groups were good. For the rural elite, mass media and psychological hatred of other ethnic groups could be responsible for such bad relationships.

Though there is no existing data on Nigerian mass media political communication with which to compare the extent of good and bad relationships between ethnic groups during the election period, it is very encouraging to note that across all the groups of the respondents there is a relatively good relationship with other ethnic groups during the last general election. This is a trend that points out clearly that Nigerian politics are shifting from ethnic bias to 'class' struggle, but that the 'class' struggle is constrained by the obligatory kinship ties between different groups in the communities.

In Nigeria, as in other societies, the basic form of political communication is the interpersonal relationship with parents, relatives, friends or

neighbours, co-workers and/or members of other ethnic groups. These are indeed the conditions under which face-to-face communication can take place. Communication between these groups is an informal and two-way process of sharing and exchanging political information. We have seen that in the last general election relationships between groups varied. Because the relationships were considerably worsened in face-to-face political communication processes, we can see why 50% of all the five network groups reported that during the election word of mouth (face-to-face communication) was unreliable as against 25% who thought that radio was unreliable, 13.3% who thought the same of television, and 11.7% who thought that newspapers were.

I have argued earlier that often the mass media in a political environment do not change an audience's political opinions and attitudes but merely reinforce the existing situation. How much the different communication channels contributed to the 'bad' and 'good' relationships that prevailed during the 1983 general election has been stated by the respondents themselves.

Table 16:12
Respondents' Good Or Bad Relations With Others
As Influenced By Radio Broadcasts

Groups	Good	Bad	Total	
Traditional	(8) 40.0	(12) 60.0	(28) 100	33.9
School Leaver	(3) 60.0	(2) 40.0	(5) 100	8.5
Urban Poor	(3) 42.7	(4) 57.1	(7) 100	11.9
Urban Elite	(11) 61.1	(7) 38.9	(18) 100	30.5
Rural Elite	(8) 88.7	(1) 11.1	(9) 100	15.7
Column Total	(33) 55.9	(26) 44.1	(59) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 94

From all the five groups 55.9% (33) said that radio political broadcasts helped them to maintain good relationships during the election with other people. But the influence of radio on good or bad relationships varied from one network group to the other. 40% (8) of the traditional group respondents said that radio contributed to a positive relationship with others. In other words, 60% of the traditional group felt that radio gave them a negative view of their parents, relatives, friends, neighbours, co-workers and other ethnic groups. Though radio ranked as the most reliable political medium, it tended to be more popular among the traditional group who used it considerably to reinforce the existing conflicts which characterised the 1983 general elections. Should radio then be held responsible for politicising ethnic hatred, which 53.8% of the traditional network group reported to be rife during the election period? This may depend very much on the station they listened to most. The conflicts between IBS of Imo State under NPP must have contributed to this feeling. More traditional villages listened to IBS than Radio Nigeria Owerri, and the former was overtly critical of Shagari's government. For the purpose of apparent National Unity, Radio Nigeria Owerri was more moderate. The attack on Imo State was by the Igbos who belonged to the NPN. This was not seen as tribalistic at all. But a few months before the general election the question of Igbo abandoned property in Rivers State in particular brought into crisis the ethnic relationship between the Igbos and the Rivers State's peoples. IBS and FM Radio Port-Harcourt were the channels that conducted the "war of the mouth". This must have affected the views of the villages about other tribes in Nigeria. Some of the events recalled villages' bitter experiences of the civil war, which injured the feelings of many of the rural Igbo populace, particularly those who had lost relatives during the war.

60% of the young school leavers thought that radio broadcasts made relationships with others 'good'. 42.9% of the urban poor agreed, as did 61.1% of the urban elite, who felt that it made a positive contribution. Also the contribution of television to the 'bad' and 'good' relationships among respondents falls nearly within the same range as radio. 59.5% (22) from the five groups reported that television broadcasts had a good effect on their relationships with others.

70.6% (36) of the respondents from the five network groups reported that press coverage had a good effect on their relationships with others. The largest consumers of newspapers for political information, as seen above,

are the urban and rural elites. The report on the effect of newspapers on their relationships with others during the campaign is more significant. 75% (12) of the urban elite said that newspapers' political reporting made their relationships with others appear good. 88.9% (8) of the rural elite agreed.

The importance of discovering which medium contributed how much toward 'good' or 'bad' relationships between people during the election is that in Nigeria commercial viewing or listening to political broadcasts is very common. From participant observation, opposing groups can engage in very serious political debate on events of the day for a long time in market squares, homes and so on. Often the group will wait for a major newscast to resolve the debate. News items often form the basis for political arguments. Certain newspapers, radio and television stations are believed to be telling lies, and these create more misunderstandings between friends, relatives, and others who listen to such broadcasts communally.

Frequently, if no mass media broadcast content can resolve the differences, these arguments result in clashes between different party supporters. In the survey 73.4% (80) of the respondents from the five network groups said that bad relationships between them and others during the election were due to face-to-face communication. Such a high percentage of respondents stating that face-to-face communication resulted in bad relations indicates how much face-to-face communication is involved in political activities in Nigeria. Such involvement is not restricted to the rural population, as many writers on political communication in Africa think (a thought which led to the massive and expensive development of television, in particular, for political campaigning). A comparison of the traditional group, which represents the village system of political communication, with the urban elite, who are associated with mass media political culture, shows that both have high involvement in face-to-face political communication. Among the traditional group, 73.9% (34) said that bad relationships with other people during the campaign were due to face-to-face communication. Similarly, 73.4% (21) of the urban elite agreed that bad relationships with other people were due to arguments. Here we see that the two polar-opposite network groups in this study were equally affected in their relationships with other people by face-to-face communication. Thus to ignore the impact of face-to-face communication in Nigerian politics is to fail to understand the nature of political conflict, particularly during an election period in the country. Rather, it is evident empirically that the convergence of

urban and rural political communication in Nigeria owes more to face-to-face communication than to the mass media's homogenising effect.

1983 GENERAL ELECTION: FREE AND FAIR?

An election campaign which is characterised by conflict, both at individual and group levels, local and national, is difficult to conduct fairly and freely. Amadu Kurfi in his study of the 1959 and 1979 elections in Nigeria made the following observations:

"To the Nigerian politicians, and it is believed, to most Third World political practitioners, an election is free and fair only when one's party or candidate wins it. It is rigged or unfree and unfair if the election is lost. This was particularly true of the 1979 general elections when allegations of 'rigging' or manipulating the elections were made by all the political parties. Each claimed that the elections were rigged in the areas where it failed woefully to win seats. For example, the NPN and NPP were unanimous in their allegations that the UPN rigged the election in Lagos, Oyo, Ondo and Ogun States where the UPN swept the polls, the NPN and UPN accused the NPP of rigging the election in Imo and Anambra States, the NPP's strongholds, the UPN, NPP and GNPP accused the NPN of rigging the election in Benue, Sokoto, Niger, Kwara and other states where the NPN won, the PRP and GNPP were in turn accused of rigging the election in Kano and Borno States respectively, where these parties scored victory over other parties.

Thus in Nigeria, an election is 'free and fair' or 'massively rigged' depending on the fortunes at the election of the candidate or party making the allegation. In the best of circumstances it is extremely difficult, even for political scientists, to define what constitutes a free and fair election."¹

In Kurfi's observation, each of the parties mentioned won in its own state or tribal region. In other words, free and fair election is associated with tribal patterns of voting. When other parties fail to vote outside their own tribal group, they accuse the winning party of vote 'rigging'. The point here is that Nigerian politicians do not accuse any ethnic group of tribalism in their voting behaviour but the political parties. Nigerian politicians have failed constantly to present to the electorate realistic manifestos and party policies for solving Nigeria's socio-political and economic problems, but have only used the mass media and communication process to attack each other on issues unrelated to people's problems. Hence, each tribe has voted on personality grounds rather than on issues, policies and party manifestos.

Though Kurfi's observation is theoretically valid in terms of what seems to obtain in Nigeria, his conclusion is drawn from the view point of the politicians rather than the voters. If the electors voted on the basis of tribal sentiment, as in the case of the 1959 and 1979 general elections, accusations of vote 'rigging' are seen as part of those unreliable political messages which the electorate notices are common in the media owned and controlled by the political parties.

In this study, I am approaching the issue of free and fair elections regarding the 1983 general election from the point of view of the electorate, based on the five categorical network groups. In the survey, the respondents were asked to tick 'yes' or 'no' if they thought that the 1983 general elections were free and fair. A total of 129 responded to the question, while 24 gave no answers. Out of these, an overwhelming 85.3% (110) reported that it was not free and fair. Thus, Kurfi's observation of the 1979 general elections was from the point of view of politicians, while my data are representations of the 1983 general elections from the point of view of the electorates. Both are in agreement, although his was a theoretical statement and conclusion while mine is an empirical statement.

In terms of network analysis I shall examine in more detail the relationship between fair and free elections as expressed by different network groups. In the traditional group 77.1% (37) of the respondents said that the elections were not free and fair. If we compare this figure with another major network group, the urban elite, we find that 90.5% (38) reported that it was not free and fair. Pressures have always been put on rural populations to vote along ethnic lines. The name Zik symbolised for an Igbo villager a political leader who led the Igbos against the Yorubas under the leadership of Awolowo. Most villagers who voted for the leadership of Awolowo, also those villages who voted for the NPP, did so because the name Zik was associated with the NPP. That the NPP won in Imo State showed that the election was fair and free. However, large numbers of the traditional network group, 77.1% (37), believed that the election was not fair and free because they understood that a lot of villagers were bribed to vote.

The opinions of the other network groups concerning the 1983 general elections are not different from the rest of the network. Of the young school leavers, 96.6% (11) reported that the election was not free and fair. 90% (10) of the urban poor agreed and 88.2% (15) of the rural elite confirmed that it was not free and fair.

It was this general acceptance by the majority of the electors, that the 1983 general elections were not fair and free, and the resultant tensions that were building up, that led to the military take-over of government soon after that election in 1983. As we have seen, particularly with reference to the Imo State elections campaign, free and fair elections should not be thought of in terms of ethnic politics, but in terms of what the electorate thought made the election unfair and unfree.

In the survey, I listed a few elements which were considered to have caused the 'ills' of the 1983 general election. These included corruption, tribalism, vote rigging, media lies or all of these.

Table 17:12

Respondents' Views On What Caused The 'Ills' Of The 1983 Elections

Groups	Corruption	Tribalism	Vote- Rigging	Media Lies	All of These	Total
Traditional	(9) 18.4	(2) 40.1	(3) 14.3	(0) 0.0	(31) 63.3	(49) 100
School Leavers	(1) 7.7	(2) 15.4	(2) 15.4	(0) 0.0	(8) 61.5	(13) 100
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(5) 50.0	(1) 10.0	(4) 40.0	(10) 100
Urban Elite	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(14) 33.3	(1) 2.4	(27) 64.3	(42) 100
Rural Elite	(0) 0.0	(1) 5.9	(2) 11.8	(0) 0.0	(14) 82.4	(17) 100
Column Total	(10) 7.6	(5) 3.8	(30) 22.9	(2) 1.5	(84) 64.1	(131) 100

The data show that in the five groups, 7.6% (10) of the respondents believed that corruption was a problem in the 1983 general elections. Nine out of these ten respondents came from the traditional group. This is because the villages were the areas where the competition for political support between the NPN and the NPP was strongest, and each party employed every corrupt means to win local supporters. 3.8% (5) said that tribalism was responsible for the 'ills' while 22.9% (30) believed that vote-rigging was responsible. Nearly half of the respondents who thought that vote-rigging caused the failure of the 1983 general election came from the urban elite, 10.7% (14).

In fact, when we consider what happened in Anambra State, vote-rigging by the NPN was difficult to check. The activities of the NPN in Oyo State were another overt vote-rigging exercise in the 1983 general elections. The high percentage of the urban elite who commented on this matter should be taken seriously because they are the network group most associated with the modern political system, and they understand how vote-rigging is practised in Nigerian elections. Only 1.5% (2) from all five groups believed that the mass media contributed to the 'ills' of the 1983 general elections. That the media scored such a low figure in contributing to Nigerian political problems tends to suggest that voters do not pay great attention to political media in order to discover how to vote. None of the respondents were influenced by the political contents of the media - a point which should compel us to discover alternative influences on political participation in Nigerian politics.

However, in the survey as a whole, 64.1% (84) of the network respondents stated that corruption, tribalism, vote-rigging, and media lies contributed to the failure of the 1983 general election. Hence vote-rigging should not be regarded as the major but not the only factor which led to the breakdown and failure of the Nigerian general election.

Another important factor in establishing the 'ills' of the Nigerian general election concerns those responsible for allowing these factors to impinge upon electoral processes in the country.

In the survey, respondents were asked to tick only one of the following: Politicians; Civil Servants; Students; Christians; Muslims; The Media; Farmers; Clubs; Everybody; and Every Organisation. 131 respondents from the five network groups responded to the question and 22 observations were missing. Out of these, 86.3% (113) reported that politicians were responsible for the breakdown of the 1983 general election. Only 3.8% (4) accused civil servants, one said students, two said Christians. 3.1% (4) accused the media (2.3% (3) of those who accused the media came from the urban elite and one person from the rural elite). Again among those asked how mass media contributed to the political breakdown in Nigeria, only one person from the urban poor reported that businessmen contributed to the ills of the 1983 general elections, while two people said that everybody was responsible for the failure, and another two believed that all organisations in Nigeria contributed to the breakdown of the 1983 general elections.

Table 18:12

Respondents' Views On Those Responsible For
Political Malpractices In Nigeria

	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	
Politicians	(47) 95.9	(8) 61.5	(9) 90.0	(36) 85.7	(13) 76.5	(113) 86.3
Civil Servants	(1) 2.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 4.8	(2) 11.8	(5) 3.8
Students	(0) 0.0	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 0.8
Christians	(1) 2.0	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 1.5
Muslims	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0
Mass Media	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 7.1	(1) 5.9	(4) 3.1
Businessmen	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 10.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 0.8
Everybody	(0) 0.0	(1) 7.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 5.9	(2) 1.5
Every Organisation	(0) 0.0	(2) 15.4	(0) 0.0	(1) 2.4	(0) 0.0	(3) 2.3
Total	(49) 100	(13) 100	(10) 100	(42) 100	(17) 100	(131) 100

The striking thing about the failure of the 1983 general elections is that the politicians accused each other of corruption, vote-rigging and so on, but from this study it is clear that 86.3% of the respondents from different network groups blamed the politicians irrespective of party affiliation, ethnic origin or other factors. In other words the majority of the masses approved the army re-take-over of government from civilians soon after the 1983 general elections.

Despite the masses' accusation of politicians as corrupt, and responsible for the political breakdown, a large number of Nigerians went to the polls to vote them to power. A point which clearly confirms that the poor depend

on the rich, making revolution a difficult achievement in Nigeria. In the next chapter we shall discover which people and organisations influenced respondents and which ones the respondents themselves influenced to participate in the 1983 general election. Here also, the influence of these elements on the respondents will be compared with the influence of the mass media in the election campaign.

REFERENCES

1. KURFI, A., op cit, p.236

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

CRITICAL FACTORS AND ISSUES IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS

In the above chapters, I hope to have demonstrated that different network groups are politically associated with different environments, people, organisations and mass media. In this chapter I will examine the relative degree of influence which mass media, face-to-face communication and other factors had on the respondents in their voting behaviour. First, however, I will recap:

Crucial to the theory of political influence during election periods in Nigeria is an understanding of the structure of social relationships in the communities. Mitchell carefully distinguished between 'recognised relationships' designed on a temporary basis to achieve certain goals, eg political support, and relationships based on 'recognised right and obligation'. In Chapter Two I stressed that this is a valid point in the understanding of the structure of political communication and influence in the network systems where rural and urban politics converge. Based on these two types of relationship. stated by Clyde Mitchell, I proposed in Chapter Two that the influence of parents and relatives (kin) are more important political influences than those of friends, co-workers or the media in political participation and voting in Nigeria, particularly in Imo State. I explained that this is as a result of strong extended family relations that still prevail in most Nigerian communities, which tend to weaken the strength of political party membership and identity. But since political parties in Nigeria are heavily based on ethnic criteria, a situation which has matured through the regionalisation of politics in the colonial period, the influence of parents and relatives in political participation and voting at one level becomes blurred.

Since the absolute influence of mass media on Nigerian electorates in the 1979 and 1983 general elections has been taken for granted by Nigerian media professionals and writers, but seriously questioned in this study, questionnaires were designed to discover the real factors of influence in the 1983 elections.

In particular, the respondents were asked to state in ideal rank of importance how the following factors influenced their political views and

participation: school/college/university mates, clubs, unions, etc., friends, radio, relatives, TV, immediate financial gain and newspapers.¹ But as I have indicated in chapter two, that linear model and its derivatives that emphasise sources, message, channel and audience are unable to explain the structure of political communication in a combined rural and urban political system. One of the derivatives of the linear model is the concept of opinion leaders mediating the influence of the mass media in changing beliefs and attitudes of the audience. Stycos' (1952, 1963) studies of Rural Greek Village, Ruhadkar (1958), Agricultural Innovators in India and Harik (1971), Village Leaders in Egyptian Rural Communities, have concluded that if the mass media had any 'influence' it was mediated by certain individuals who exposed themselves to the mass media. These are conclusions drawn from the two-step flow concept propounded by Merton (1949); Katz and Lazarsfield (1955). Others such as Lipset, Coleman and Trow (1956) supported 'The People's Choice' approach. This concept was challenged by Rogers and Shoemaker (1972) who argued that different leaders are involved in different social, political and economic situations.

Politically, as shown in Chapter Two, in Igbo rural communities, no one group or individual controls information. Yet Winer (1955), Stinchombe (1968), Meadow (1980) state that those in power have access to and control of information which increases their power because they use it to influence others. This is again similar to the opinion leadership and political influence in the two-step flow process. The work of Troldhal (1966) is one of the contributions that revised the two-step flow to one-step flow. But he could not specify which groups in the society are directly influenced by the mass media output, though he noted that there are various sources of information in the highly literate community and the direct influence of the mass media is limited. This is an important approach to the study of mass media and communication in relation to political influence so that other 'various sources' of influence such as those indicated above can be compared with the media influence in relation to different political participants in any community.

From the two-step flow and one-step flow models, the multi-step flow approach emerged. In industrial nations' research has concentrated on leaders' reception of information from the media, and on how, through interactive communication, the leaders and the undecided voters exchange information. Within small groups, information flows from leaders to leaders and from leaders to followers. This latter model is close to the network

approach to political communication.

In my view it is through networks of interpersonal communication that participants in election campaigns and voters know how others were influenced to vote, not only by the mass media, but also by other sources of political influence in the community. The questionnaire was designed to enable us not only to assess how different network groups were influenced in their participation and voting behaviour by parents, friends, relatives, etc., during the 1983 Nigerian general elections, but also what effects or impacts these factors had on others. It was not possible to determine what influence the respondents had on the mass media because of the structure of ownership and control, so they were asked to state what influence politically, and particularly during the election campaign, they themselves had on other people. Starting with the influence of the parents on the respondents' political behaviour, 46.3% (56) reported that this is an important factor.

But specific to each of the five groups, 31.8% (14) of the traditional group reported that parents had an important political influence on them. I have argued earlier that kinship ties are important political influences in Igboland and parents constitute the centrality of such ties. Ironically, in the traditional group, only 31.8% said that parents' influence was important in their voting behaviour. Besides, earlier, it was seen that only 11.8% (11) had a bad relationship with their parents during the 1983 general elections, yet 68.2% of the respondents were not influenced by their parents. There are two interpretations to this response:

- a) The majority of the traditional group members are older than any other group in the survey; it was from this group that 11.4% (15) of the respondents were aged 51-70+ years. Thus they could not be influenced by the parents, who were dead.
- b) In Igboland, as I pointed out earlier, parents educate their children so that at old age they look after them (Lloyd 1967:143; Peace 1979:43). This relationship may explain why children influence their aged parents more than they are influenced by them. Thus in the same network group, 75.6% (31) said that they had an important influence on their parents during the 1983 general election.

Table 1:13
Respondents' Influence

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(14) 38.8	(30) 68.2	(44) 100	(36.4)
School Leavers	(8) 66.7	(4) 33.3	(12) 100	(9.9)
Urban Poor	(4) 50.0	(4) 50.0	(8) 100	(6.6)
Urban Elite	(20) 50.0	(20) 50.0	(40) 100	(33.1)
Rural Elite	(10) 58.8	(7) 41.2	(17) 100	(14.0)
Column Total	(56) 46.3	(65) 53.7	(121) 100	(100.0)

This supports the views of Meadow (1980:90), cited in Chapter One, in his community study that an important group of people exists in any community who do not have coercive resources, but have substantial influence. The family, he stressed, and kinship ties are among the most important factors. Within that structure, influence is based on love, affection, devotion, roles or duty; people frequently respond to the wishes (ie preferred outcomes) expressed by family members. This is similar to Mitchell, Harries-Jones (1969) Obligatory Relationship in African communities. Earlier I pointed out that these obligatory kinship ties in Africa transcend politics and political identification.

From table 1:13 above, it can be seen that 66.7% (8) of the young school leavers said that their parents had an important influence on their political participation and voting. Indeed the young school leavers are those most influenced by parents during the election. We saw that in Agege young people who left the village for the city (Peace 1979) did it with their parents' permission and the latter also arranged for their accommodation and feeding with relatives and friends in the city. I stressed that this was an important aspect of parents' influence on the young immigrant to the city. The main reason is that most of this group are young, unemployed and often totally dependent on their parents for economic support; hence their political influence on them during the election. This does not imply that a higher proportion of these young school leavers would

not influence the political attitude of their parents. The less educated the parents, the more they depend on their children for political information.

The urban poor and the urban elites are equally split in their opinion on the degree of influence their parents had on them during the election. 50% of the urban poor respondents said that parents had an important influence on them during the election. Similarly 50% (20) of the urban elites said that parental influence was important, 58.8% (10) of the rural elites equally maintained the same position. In general, therefore, the political influence of parents on the participation and voting attitude of the electorate in Imo State during the 1983 general elections was strong but slightly weaker among the traditional group, as a result of age, but slightly stronger among the young school leavers and rural elites because of youth and dependency, while in the urban poor and rural elites, about half claimed to be influenced by their parents.

In contrast the influence of school, college and university mates on the respondents during elections was not great: only 32.2% (38) saw it as important.

Table 2:13

The Extent To Which Respondents Were Influenced By Their Schoolmates

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total
Traditional	(11) 24.4	(34) 75.6	(45) 100
School Leavers	(5) 38.5	(8) 61.5	(13) 100
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(7) 100.0	(7) 100
Urban Elite	(15) 38.5	(24) 61.5	(39) 100
Rural Elite	(8) 47.1	(9) 52.9	(17) 100
Column Total	(39) 32.2	(82) 67.8	(121) 100

The rural elites recorded the highest percentage, 47.1% (8) on important influence by school friends, etc. than any other group. The interpretation is that most rural elites in Nigeria are teachers. They often attend the same training colleges, are employed by their own local government and teach in the same local government. Thus, after formal education, they still maintain strong ties. More so as their economic plight - non-payment of salaries noted above - were the same, they were more linked than other groups during the election. In particular, the non-payment of teachers' salaries was highly politicised during the election and the pressure and consequences were heavy on teachers with large families. Stinchcombe (1968), and Meadow (1980:55) have argued that political information can be influential when there is a high probability that messages are accurate and are widely disseminated so that all members of the community are aware of them. Stinchcombe then emphasised that it is largely a matter of publicizing important messages that enhances 'influence'. Here is another important use of the network concept in understanding the way participants influence each other on the grounds of their common circumstances. Also the environment in which the teachers worked helped them to create conducive communication networks to mobilise others to participate in the election to cast their vote against the NPP in Imo State.

All respondents of the urban poor group reported that the influence of school, college or university mates was unimportant in their voting behaviour. In the demographic chapter, we noted that only 27.3% (3) of the urban poor had primary school education and 72.7% (8) had no education at all. Among those who had primary education, two left school between 21 to 40 years ago, thus they could not maintain links (unlike the rural elites), to influence each other during the 1983 elections. A number of school leavers and urban elites are influenced by their school friends because they have recently left school, college or university and could still be in contact. The 24.4% (11) in the traditional group are young school leavers who are educated in the villages and are still there waiting to migrate to the city or go onto further education. Their network of connectedness is 'dense' and they use it to influence each other politically, primarily because their school-friends have not yet migrated to various parts of the country.

In general there is a sharp difference between groups in the importance of this factor.

Another key factor of political influence on participation and voting in Igboland is the voluntary associations such as clubs, unions, etc. Earlier we have discussed Audrey Smoch's research on the political functions of voluntary associations in Igboland. Her main emphasis was on the Mbaise and Abiriba ethnic unions. She illustrated vividly how the Igbo State Union constituted the core voluntary association that mobilised all Igbo communities behind the NCNC. Ethnic voluntary associations can be created as a temporary body 'action-set or communication-set' to assist an individual to solve his social and economic problems. We saw from the study of Lloyd in Ibadan that "in the case of a dismissed Igbo worker two action-sets were activated - his workmates and the trade union office in order to fight for his reinstatement, and the members of his ethnic group to find him alternative employment (Lloyd 1974:134). The formation of such quasi-groups based on kinship and friendship circles is a common phenomenon in Nigerian communities. In election times action-set formation tends to be more erratic and wide-spread, particularly when two favoured political candidates emerge from the community. I argued that in the 1983 election the development of the two political candidates, Zik and Ojukwu, created different communication-sets in Igbo communities. The two different factions (action-sets/communication-sets) mobilised the electorate for the NPN and NPP. The numerous ethnic organisations consequently could not act together as a unified political force to mobilise the electorate for one party. The strength of one single ethnic union such as the Igbo State Union, as pointed out earlier, was weakened and could not constitute an important channel of communication in the 1983 general elections.

We noted that the two most important criteria for membership of these voluntary associations were kinship and religion. We have also seen that kinship in particular carries strong obligatory relationships among kin which transcends national politics, especially leadership elections. Consequently the majority of the people in Igboland did not utilise their unions for political campaign and mobilisation. Relatives willingly decided to keep their networks of social ties out of contemporary politics. In the survey, the respondents were asked to indicate what influence these voluntary associations had on their political participation and voting during the 1983 general election.

Over all the groups, only 26.3% considered voluntary associations important. Among the traditional group 25.6% (11) felt that their voluntary associations were important in influencing their political participation and

voting. In this group, small voluntary associations formed important political action groups in the villages. The intense competition between the NPP and NPN supporters in the last election rendered these unions politically ineffective organs for party support.

Some aspects of the concept of reachability in networks of communication are empirically manifested within the young school leavers and rural elite network groups as seen in Table 3:13. These scored highest on the influence of voluntary organisations. 41.2% in each of these two groups reported that the influence of club members was important in their political participation.

Table 3:13
The Influence of Voluntary Organisations
In The Voting Behaviour Of The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(11) 25.6	(32) 74.4	(43) 100	36.4
School Leaver	(5) 41.7	(7) 58.3	(12) 100	10.2
Urban Poor	(1) 12.5	(7) 87.5	(8) 100	6.8
Urban Elite	(7) 18.4	(31) 81.6	(38) 100	32.2
Rural Elite	(7) 41.2	(10) 58.8	(17) 100	14.4
Column Total	(31) 26.3	(87) 73.7	(188) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 35

In relation to the concept of reachability discussed in chapter two, and in terms of Mitchell and Barnes' postulations, there are two interpretations of the scores of young school leavers and rural elites. Barnes used 'density' to mean the same thing as Mitchell's 'reachability'. The former was concerned with communication network between kins and siblings in the rural environment while the latter was interested in communication between friends at their place of work. In such environments, as I argued in Chapter Two,

political communication is characterised by face-to-face interaction which friends and siblings can use to influence each other very fast when the need arises.

We have noted earlier that a high proportion of our respondents belonged to some form of social club, 88.5% (115); and in particular 94.4% (17) of the rural elite belonged to such clubs. Most of the respondents who reported that their voluntary associations were formed for the financial support of members were the rural elites. This does not only support the view put forward earlier that the non-payment of teachers' salaries put pressure on them to form unions for financial support, but also an association from which they shared political information about the 1983 general election. The strict monitoring of their activities by the state government and other party agents during the election made them eliminate intermediary political information sources and influence. Also I have explained that most teachers were trained in the same schools and colleges and employed by local government within the same geographical boundary.

Thus: (a) within their club there was immediate horizontal interpersonal political communication between members who have know each other for a long time; (b) the nature of their profession has proved an environment of elites who would contact each other directly or through an intermediary source. An intermediary was a political candidate, who used a few teachers, eg school headmasters to mobilise other teachers' political support for the NPN or NPP during the election. (c) Teachers, having been united in their political attitude through forces of economic needs, became politicised by the media. The media therefore became another important intermediaries between different local government teachers in linking wider parts of the state and the national political attitude within this group was unique.

The young school leavers' higher percentage score for club influence can be explained in terms of their freshness from school where the majority of them could still reach each other through voluntary social associations during the election. Reachability here reflects Mitchell's concept of the term. Secondly, their unemployment condition made them readily available to be organised as a temporary political avant-garde. The process I observed reflects Jones-Harries' concepts of ego and action-sets in political mobilisation during elections. In chapter two I illustrated these concepts with the formation of such action-sets as the 'Ikemba' during the election. The groups were largely made up of young school leavers who supported the

political candidate, Ojukwu of the NPN, against Zik's faction, the NPP. The young school leavers, through these factions, influenced each other's political participation and voting immensely during the election.

Other groups strongly felt that social clubs and unions had a negative influence on them - traditional group 74%, urban poor 87.5%, urban elites 81.6%.

In Africa, friends are those individuals who came in close contact and developed relationships in cities, in public places such as the market, church, school, college, recreation clubs and general work-places. Usually friendship does not carry such strong obligations as kinship. But as a result of the weakness of voluntary unions for political support among unified Igbo communities, the split in the clubs led to some members influencing each other politically as close friends. Also the tensions between certain families compelled certain individuals to be influenced more by their friends.

Table 4:13

The Political Influence Of Friends On The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(26) 57.8	(19) 42.2	(45) 100	37.5
School Leaver	(6) 50.0	(6) 50.0	(12) 100	10.0
Urban Poor	(5) 62.5	(3) 37.5	(8) 100	6.7
Urban Elite	(15) 38.5	(24) 61.5	(39) 100	32.5
Rural Elite	(6) 37.5	(10) 62.5	(16) 100	34.3
Column	(58) 48.3	(62) 51.7	(120) 100	100

From the network groups, 48.3% (58) reported that they were influenced by their friends while more of them said that the influence of friends was unimportant for their political participation and voting. In the traditional group a slightly higher percentage, 58.8%, said that the

influence of their friends was important. This is the group in Igboland where political ties and identification are based on kinship; once it was disturbed by the political conflicts and tension described earlier, members began to expose themselves to friends from other villages and towns for political information and influence.

The political influence of young school leavers on each other is balanced between important and unimportant at 50% each. There is a higher influence of friends on the urban poor, 62.5%. The urban elites are naturally exposed to the urban environment where relationship is more on friendship than kinship. It is likely that friends who influence others are more sophisticated urban neighbours than their social equals. The urban elites tend to influence more people than they are influenced by, thus only 38.5% said that the influence of friends during the election was important. (I am not suggesting that the elites in Nigeria influence political attitudes on the basis of their politically rich information; rather on the basis of their economic and social position and the linkages through which politicians 'influence' communities by interpersonal communication).

The second most important obligatory network of relationship in Africa after parents are relatives. Relatives range from brothers and sisters to the classificatory extended family of 'brothers' and 'sisters', including cousins. All these have important obligatory relationships, as we noted in Chapter Two, and they could be used as important networks of political mobilisation.

Table 5:13

The Influence Of Relatives On The Political Behaviour Of The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(21) 48.8	(22) 51.2	(43) 100	36.1
School Leaver	(6) 50.0	(6) 50.0	(12) 100	10.1
Urban Poor	(4) 50.0	(4) 50.0	(8) 100	6.7
Urban Elite	(15) 38.5	(24) 61.5	(39) 100	32.8
Rural Elite	(8) 47.1	(9) 52.9	(17) 100	14.3
Column	(54) 45.4	(65) 54.6	(119) 100	100

The political conflict which affected various levels of kinship relation during the election also affected relatives. In the survey, 45.4% (54) of the respondents in all the five groups said that the influence of relatives was important in their political behaviour. In the urban elites only 38.5% rated this as important. Other groups were nearly or equally balanced between the important and unimportant influence of relatives. For the young school leavers it was 50% for and against; the same applied to the urban poor, of whom 47.1% reported kin to be important. The notion that the urban elite influence relatives and friends more by socio-economic position than in their political behaviour is consistent with this data. Also it was among relatives in the villages that the effectiveness of the campaigning battle between the two action-sets of the NPP and NPN was centred. In their actual voting behaviour we noted that the Igbo voters were split along the line of two opposing parties, so also the influence of relatives in the voting behaviour of the respondents in the four most vulnerable groups was split. The implication of the data is that relatives influenced each other's vote for or against either of the two main parties - NPN or NPP.

Earlier, I mentioned some psychological aspects of voting behaviour among participants during the elections. Some relatives identified with and voted for different parties on the basis of previous animosities that existed between them. Outsiders orchestrated the minor differences between relatives in order to buy their votes. The influence of relatives on each other in their election behaviour and participation was not so much a matter of persuasion but more one of psychological revenge and breakdown in interpersonal communication characteristic of relatives and kin in both village and urban environments in Nigeria. From participant observations, there was little dispute among relatives on party politics, manifestoes, and important political issues. The mass media dealt with them vaguely, thus electorates were influenced by personalities.

The fact that people relied more on radio than word of mouth for political influence reflects the political practices in Nigerian election processes. In Chapter Two I argued that, where leaders in their personal relationship divided the electorate at national and local levels between two parties using illegitimate means of political influence to persuade people to vote, networks of interpersonal political communication would be severed. Rationality, therefore, would begin to prevail among the adult electorate who consider their life-long relationship before and after national leadership elections as more important. As the election continued, I

observed the continuing tension between different electorates. During the election a large number of people relied on radio for political information rather than face-to-face interaction. This was an important way to avoid continued damaging relationships between kin, friends, relatives etc. Secondly, illegitimate practices made more people suspicious of each other thus radio, which was heavily localised in its political content, became one of the important sources of political influence and information among various political groups.

Table 6:13

The Influence Of Radio On The Political Participation
And Behaviour Of The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(24) 54.5	(20) 45.5	(44) 100	35.1
School Leaver	(7) 58.3	(5) 41.7	(12) 100	9.8
Urban Poor	(4) 40.0	(6) 60.0	(10) 100	8.2
Urban Elite	(21) 53.8	(18) 46.2	(39) 100	32.0
Rural Elite	(7) 41.2	(10) 58.8	(17) 100	13.9
Column Total	(63) 51.6	(59) 46.4	(122) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 31

Indeed the most important illegitimate political practice in Nigeria during the 1983 general election as briefly mentioned earlier, was the use of money to buy the electorate's votes. I stressed that in the rural areas as well as in the city, the general awareness that money was the greatest instrument of political influence rather than the use of mass media to influence voters, in contrast to media political impact on voters in Western Europe and the USA, renders media and political research in Nigeria problematic. I furthermore hypothesised that the political candidates (egos) and their action-sets (different party supporters on a temporary basis) emerged for the first time in Igbo national politics, leading to diverse network linkages. This was in contrast to the pre-1966 election: one large ethnic

union which mobilised Igbo communities behind one party, the NCNC. The press and radio in particular reflected this political structure in their contents. In the 1983 general elections, micro-units of political supporters rallied behind different political power seekers from virtually every local community in Imo State. I concluded that, as a result, everybody became involved in politics not by the media mobilisation process, but because of members of the communities' identification with one party or the other as a result of network linkages. The force behind the mobilisation and linkage was the content of political communication - immediate financial reward - a political situation I described as a 'pork-barrel' exercise.

Table 7:13

Influence Of Money On The Participation And Political Behaviour
Of The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(10) 26.3	(28) 73.7	(38) 100	33.6
School Leaver	(5) 41.7	(7) 58.3	(12) 100	10.6
Urban Poor	(1) 12.5	(7) 87.5	(8) 100	7.1
Urban Elite	(4) 10.5	(34) 89.5	(38) 100	33.6
Rural Elite	(4) 23.5	(13) 76.5	(17) 100	15.0
Column Total	(24) 21.2	(89) 78.8	(113) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 40

The respondents were asked to indicate how much they thought money influenced them to participate and vote in the 1983 general elections. Only 21.2% (24) reported that money was an important influence. Among these 26.3% (10) came from the traditional group and 41.7% (5) from the young school leavers group. The higher percentage in these two groups who openly acknowledged the influence of money on them during the election should be differently interpreted. For the traditional group, the majority of them,

as we have seen in the demographic chapter, are poor illiterate farmers who do not understand what modern political practice require except the immediate financial reward they can gain from it. They know that traditionally, Nigerian elections are characterised by a period of time when politicians give out their wealth and they are willing to accept the offers and acknowledge it. This is particularly so with the old men and women in the village who openly asked for such offers. At the same time, lack of money as a result of unemployment among young school leavers compelled some of them to identify with any political party that offered them enough money. Many of them regard it as a temporary employment period to earn some money. Also if the party they supported won, it could lead to full-time employment in the future.

While the majority of the respondents denied that money had any important influence on them, the respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought that money had an influence on others in the community.

Table 8:13
Respondents' Opinion To The Degree Of The Effect Of Money
On The Political Behaviour Of Others In The Community

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(43) 91.5	(4) 8.5	(47) 100	38.5
School Leaver	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	10.7
Urban Poor	(6) 66.7	(3) 33.3	(9) 100	7.4
Urban Elite	(31) 86.1	(5) 13.9	(36) 100	29.5
Rural Elite	(14) 82.4	(3) 17.6	(17) 100	13.9
Column Total	(105) 86.1	(17) 13.9	(122) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 31

While, as we have seen, 78.8% of the respondents denied the influence of money on them, their view of the influence of money on others was very high. In fact, the percentage of each group who reported that money had an

important influence on others was higher in all the network groups, from the lowest of 66.7% up to 91.5%.

These two tables illustrate clearly the problem of assessing respondents' reporting on political issues in Nigeria without a clear understanding of how Nigerians communicate in elections and what essentially influences them. We shall come back to the impact of money as a major influence on political participation and voting in the 1983 general election. Meanwhile, we should look at the influence of TV and newspapers on the respondents themselves so that we can compare the different influences of the media and other elements of political communication.

Table 9:13

Influence Of TV On The Political Behaviour Of The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(7) 21.9	(25) 78.1	(32) 100	32.0
School Leaver	(3) 27.3	(8) 72.7	(11) 100	11.0
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(7) 100.0	(7) 100	7.0
Urban Elite	(14) 40.0	(21) 60.0	(35) 100	35.0
Rural Elite	(6) 40.0	(9) 60.0	(15) 100	15.0
Column Total	(30) 30.0	(70) 70.0	(100) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 53

In the earlier chapters, I have argued against emphasis which has been placed on media professionals and politicians - particularly in reference to the so-called 'First TV elections in Nigeria', the 1979 general election. I did not dispute the theoretical claims that socially, culturally, and economically TV has had great influence on Nigerians. But with regard to its impact on participation and voting during elections a lot of misconceptions have been applied.

In my survey 70% (70) said that its political impact on them was not important. Of the 30% who said it was an important medium of influence, more than half are from the elite groups - 40% (14) from the urban elite and 40% (6) from the rural elite. Only 21.9% (9) of the traditional and 27.3% (3) of the young school leavers said it was important. None at all from the urban poor reported that TV had an important political influence of them, in fact 100% of the urban poor respondents said it was unimportant.

In chapter seven I disputed the description of the 1979 general election as a 'TV election' on the grounds that it was an over-exaggeration of the role of TV in Nigerian politics. In the early chapters there is clear statistical evidence that TV is an urban medium. It is also important to note that the two different network groups who are predominantly associated with urban environments are the urban poor and urban elite. To eliminate possible over-generalisation of the relationship between TV networks, sets, etc. and urban population, our network system helps us to separate the urban population and then various aspects of the medium are related to the different urban populations.

Between the two urban populations we noted that 53.7% (22) of the elites in the survey owned TV and radio sets, 41.5% (17) owned radio sets only, while 4.9% (2) owned both radio, TV and telephone. In contrast, within the same environment, 88.9% (8) of the urban poor in the survey owned only radio and none owned TV only, but 2.5% (1) owned radio and TV. None in this group has a telephone in his home. Thus, though it is true that TV is an urban medium, in Nigeria about 99% of the ownership of TV is exclusively associated with the urban elite. However, ownership of a medium is not necessarily a prerequisite for exposure to it. In chapter seven I stated that there is a weak relationship between ownership of a TV set and TV watching because of the structure of social relationships in Nigeria that guarantees communal viewing. Statistically, this concept was supported by only 2.5% (1) in the survey among the urban poor who reported that he owns a TV set. At the same time from the same network, 60% reported that they view TV from 1-10 hours a week for political information, and another 40% said that they did so between 11-30 hours a week. In sum, though only 2.5% (1) of the group owns a TV set, 97.5% (5) watch it for political information.

This is not peculiar to urban environments, but the weaker relationship between ownership of TV sets and exposure to them is more akin to the rural environment in Nigeria than the urban because of kinship network ties. The

polar opposite of the urban elite environment in the survey is the traditional group of rural areas. In the latter group, it was seen that only 15.9% (7) owned a TV set. Independent of this thin ownership of TV sets in rural areas, 66.7% (16) in the traditional group reported that in the 1983 general election they watched TV from 1-10 hours a week for political information, 16.7% (4) did so from 11-20 hours, and 84.3% (40) view TV from 20-30 or more hours a week for the same purpose. In this group there is a sharper contrast between the level of ownership and that of exposure to TV for political information, not so much as a result of public communal viewing, but the network of kin viewing communally at home. But the crucial point here is not the importance of TV ownership nor the subsequent exposure to it, but how the TV political content influenced the respondents in their participation and voting in the 1983 election. In relation to the figures on ownership and exposure above, while 2.5% of the urban poor owned TV, 97.5% of the group were exposed to TV political coverage, but none from the same group was influenced by TV political content to participate or vote in the elections. Similarly, 15.9% (7) of the traditional group owned TV, 84.3% were exposed to it for political information but only 21.9% said that they were influenced by TV political broadcasts to participate and cast their votes.

Even among the urban elites, who are characteristically closely associated with TV, the relationship between ownership of sets, exposure and important political influence of TV is weak. 63.7% (22) of them owned TV sets, 67.6% (23) exposed themselves to it for political information between 1-10 hours a week, 20.6% (7) between 11-20 hours and 11.8% (4) between 21-30 hours a week, only 40% (11) said that its political content influenced their participation and voting behaviour in the election, 60% (21) reported that its political content had no influence on them at all.

These figures indicate that, though quite a small number of the Nigerian population own TV sets, a greater proportion view TV for political information, yet very few report that they are influenced by the TV political broadcasts in their political participation and voting. In Chapter Seven I offered some explanation for this association, reviewing some of the theoretical merits of TV in the 1979 general election. I pointed out that TV was politically unimportant in the elections.

Perhaps the low political influence of TV on the Nigerian electorate could be an indication of the audience's inability to differentiate between television "show business and political activities"² which the British audience, because of their level of literacy, were able to distinguish in contrast to the majority of Nigerian political TV audiences.

The actuality reports, such as those reflecting on the urban decay of Lagos, dominated some of the programmes; no similar rural problems were shown. Contents excluded the experience and problems of the sector whose votes determine the outcome of an election in terms of their members. Contents shift from urban questions to world events; thus only the urban elites could decode the political message and these are the smallest group of the electorate in Nigerian politics. Besides the urban elite are the least interested in voting in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the structure of media ownership and control in Nigeria, as illustrated in the early chapters, generates a constraint on TV political broadcasts. Crucial to the political TV programmes of 1979, which became more localised and widespread in the 1983 general election, was the combination of verbal and visual images at various interpretative levels, which most viewers found confusing and incomprehensible.

Television can transmit complex political information in nonverbal and symbolic forms, communicating them with an intensity that could be unparalleled by radio or newspapers. Always this nonverbal information is visual and motional, which must be viewed at a 'single sitting': the information may not be repeated and the viewer may not have access to a broadcast recorder in order to refresh his mind and understand the significance of the messages which were not understood the first time. This problem creates more problems in the audience and weakens TV political influence on the viewers.

In Chapter Seven I therefore asserted that, because alternative sources of political influence and information flow existed in urban and rural areas, the electorate resorted to these alternatives and most of them were compounded in the network of linkages between kin, relatives, friends, co-workers, etc. Over-concentration on personalities rather than issues during the election made the impact of TV on political behaviour of elites and the non-rural elites virtually the same because both the urban and rural population in any given region or ethnic group in Nigerian politics are

represented by the same political leaders. As argued in Chapter Two in terms used by Rogers and Kincaid (1981:312) the role of TV in Nigerian "politics as regards personality emphasis, only reinforces tribal political communication network stability".

Another important explanation for the weak association between TV ownership by the respondents, their exposure to it and the actual political influence of the medium content on the voting behaviour of the audience is related to the long years of the military in government since the introduction of TV in Nigeria. This has stopped the media professional Nigerian politician from creating a TV political format which would reflect the realities and problems of Nigerian election campaigns. The persistent military rule has led to the development of TV along the lines of entertainment, particularly imported European and American programmes. In this case, a study of the impact of Western culture through TV in Nigeria would show a stronger relationship than political impact. The period of the oil boom saw a boom in national wealth (another important source of the cultural invasion rather than political influence of TV on the population).

In Chapter Five I showed that the newspaper was the earliest and the most important medium in party political developments in Nigeria. It was even stressed that the history of politics in Nigeria is also the history of the press. The press began as an urban medium that linked all network groups, directly or indirectly, in both urban and rural areas as anonymous and heterogenous communities. In terms of convergence of two political environments and tradition, the press remains crucial in Nigerian politics. This is not only because of its characteristics on information details, but because, unlike radio and TV, large numbers of dailies in Nigeria are not owned and controlled by the state and federal government, hence it does not have the same political constraints as the electronic media.

In Chapter Five, after reviewing political relationships between the press and the audience, I stated that the empirical problem about the impact of newspapers in Nigeria is to assess the degree of influence of their content on different groups in Nigeria and how in particular their contents influence the electorate. Though we know that urban elites are the most available audience for newspapers, we must statistically find out how newspapers influence them and the rest of the audience.

Table 10:13

Political Influence Of Newspapers On The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(11) 25.6	(32) 74.4	(43) 100	37.1
School Leaver	(5) 41.7	(7) 58.3	(12) 100	10.3
Urban Poor	(1) 14.3	(6) 85.7	(7) 100	6.0
Urban Elite	(19) 50.0	(19) 50.0	(38) 100	32.9
Rural Elite	(10) 62.5	(6) 37.5	(16) 100	13.8
Column Total	(46) 39.7	(7) 60.3	(116) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 37

In the survey less than half, 39.7% (46), of the respondents stated that newspapers had an important influence on them in their political participation and voting. More than half of the respondents who were influenced by newspapers were urban elites, 16.4% (19), and rural elites, 8.6% (10). The influence of newspapers on political decisions of the respondents was most insignificant among the urban poor, 0.9% (1). The urban poor and those involved in urban politics are poorly associated with the press and television. This is not only because the characteristics of these media require a certain level of formal education in order to decode their political message, which the urban poor lack, but because financially they are expensive. If they watch communally, their own ideas can be influenced by others in the group viewing.

As in radio and TV, exposure to newspapers (readership for political information) does not guarantee that the political content would have the desired effect on the consumer. In the survey the association between newspaper political influence in the 1983 general elections and exposure to it is weak in all the groups, even among the urban elites. In the traditional group 26.0% (25) said that they read newspapers from 1-30 or more hours a week for political information, but only 9.4% (11) said that

the political content influenced their decision. Similarly, 13.5% (13) of the young school leavers did the same, but only 4.3% (5) were influenced by them. An even smaller number of urban poor, 5.2% (5) read newspapers for political information, and only 0.8% (1) was influenced by it. A high proportion of the urban elite respondents actually read newspapers for political information between 1-20 hours a week, 38.5% (37), but only 16.4% (19), just half, said that they were influenced in their political decisions by the press political content. A similar proportion of rural elites were exposed to newspaper politics between 1-30 hours or more a week, 16.7% (16), but only 8.6% (10) said that they were influenced by it politically.

Thus exposure to media networks, and their political influence on the voting behaviour of Nigerians, have wide relationships and this varies from one group to another. The gap is narrower among the urban and rural elites and widest among the urban poor, despite their exposure to the urban political environment from where the mass media political contents are drawn. These self-reporting data on the influence of the media on the respondents show that the high rate of exposure of various political participants to media political messages has been wrongly concluded by media professionals and politicians as having political impact. It is this concept of media influence on the audience, consistent with the hyperdemic or linear theory, that I have insisted to be inadequate to explain political communication problems in Nigeria. The second problem, which the recognition of a weak relationship between exposure to media and media effects tends to resolve, is the methodology problem in social and political researches in Nigeria.

During my field work, as I pointed out in chapter eight, I was asked by some elites I consulted to distribute my questionnaires only to schools, colleges and various private and government offices. This would have eliminated the traditional and urban poor network groups from the survey and at the end presented us with the three elite groups: the urban and rural elites and the young school leavers. The data would show a moderately strong relationship between media political coverage exposure and influence. Thus in the 1979 election as 'the first TV election', media professionals and politicians either reached conclusions on the impact of TV on the electorate on the basis of exposure without looking at actual impact, or their research, if any was conducted, was in the media setting and exclusively among the urban elites. Much of the effect of the media on the 1979 audience, however, was theoretically speculative, based on the hyperdemic model.

Another negative effect of the media on the electorate in the 1979 general election is reflected in the ethnic pattern of voting illustrated in Chapter Seven with the computation of electoral results of the Presidential election. The voting behaviour of the electorate according to the table did not depart from ethnic participation, in sharp contrast to the military government's aim to shift the nation's politics from ethnicism. The military erroneously installed the old ethnic political leaders, Awolowo, Azikwe, Amino Kanu and Shagari to power, thus generating strong ethnic political identification which obliterated any non-ethnic political content effect of the media on the audience.

The table below is a summary of the influence of the media, interpersonal communication factors and money as reported by the respondents themselves.

Table 11:13
Factors Of Influence On Respondents

Factors of Influence	Important	Unimportant	Respondents	
			Total No.	%
Parents	46.3% (56)	53.7% (65)	(121)	100
School, college /uni. mates	32.2% (39)	67.8% (82)	(121)	100
Social, unions etc	26.3% (31)	73.7% (87)	(118)	100
Friends	48.3% (58)	51.7% (62)	(120)	100
Radio	51.6% (63)	48.4% (59)	(122)	100
Relatives	45.4% (54)	54.6% (65)	(119)	100
Money	21.2% (24)	78.8% (89)	(113)	100
Newspapers	39.7% (46)	60.3% (70)	(116)	100
Television	30.0% (30)	70.0% (70)	(100)	100

From the above table the three most important factors of political influence on the respondents in all the five groups, as reported by the respondents themselves, are radio, friends and parents. Money is the least important influence on the respondents according to them. Television ranked next to last, after social clubs, unions and other voluntary organisations.

From the reporting of the influence of money on the respondents, as stated by them, in certain circumstances such as the illegitimate use of various factors to influence the electorate in an election, it is unsafe to arrive at conclusions on an issue based on an answer provided by the respondents about themselves. Direct influence associated with linear models favour such conclusions.

In my own analysis attempts have been made not only to assess the influence which the media and other factors have on the respondents, but also what influence they thought the media and other factors had on others. In Chapter Two, we have shown from the various researches conducted in Africa south of the Sahara edited by J. Clyde Mitchell (1969) that the network of kins, friends, neighbours, co-workers and school-mates influenced one another in political, social and economic relationships.

Recently Meadow, R.G. (1980:103) argued against opinion leadership and the two-step flow of information derived from the hyperdermic model. He writes:

"A new, multi-flow of communications [has] emerged, with a variety of permutations and combinations ... Information flows to leaders through the mass media. At the same time, it flows from the media to the less attentive. It also flows from the leaders to the less attentive, and vice-versa. And, of course, within groups it flows from leader to leader and from the less attentive to others who are equally inattentive. Thus, there are a variety of possible information and opinion sources, and the two-step flow no longer universally applies." (Meadow, R.G., 1980:103)

In fact, Meadows' inattentive category can be substituted for our distinctive network category of followers in relationship to group leaders in Chapter Two. 'Opinion sources' are the equivalent of our factors of influence.

In Chapter Two also, I cited Rogers and Kincaid (1981:76) as saying that the effect of communication between sender and receiver was easier to study with the mass media than with interpersonal communication. But the network of communication analysis, "information flows occurs among participants", each of whom are both "transmitters and receivers", communication in network analysis is "truly a process of mutual information-exchange". They concluded therefore that "convergence model and network analysis fit so well together" where "theory and method complement one another more adequately than in the case of effect research based on a linear model".

Having illustrated the influence of mass media, along with other socio-political influences, on the respondents in order to evaluate the strength of the network of political communication based on sharing of information rather than one-way flow of information and influence, we should examine what effect the respondents thought the media and other factors had on others and what influence they (the respondents) had on others in their interpersonal networks.

The respondents were asked to indicate what effects they thought parents had on their children in the voters' political participation and voting behaviour during the 1983 general election.

Table 12:13

Effects Parents Had On Voters' Participation According To The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(26) 61.9	(16) 38.1	(42) 100	35.9
School Leaver	(9) 69.2	(4) 30.8	(13) 100	11.1
Urban Poor	(6) 75.0	(2) 25.0	(8) 100	6.8
Urban Elite	(32) 86.5	(5) 13.5	(37) 100	31.6
Rural Elite	(14) 82.4	(3) 17.6	(17) 100	14.5
Column Total	(87) 74.4	(30) 25.6	(117) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 36

From the five network groups 74.4% (87) said that parental influence had important political effects on the political participation and voting attitude of their children. In all the groups, the percentage who reported that parental influence was important was high, ranging from 61.9% (26) in the traditional group to 86.5% (32) in the urban elites. The traditional group scored a lower percentage in this factor than the other groups. This can be explained in terms of strength of social relationships in rural communities rather than political association itself. This is a case where

social relations can be politicised to achieve an effect. The explanation offered in the earlier chapters about obligatory relationships in Igboland becomes critical here and the demographic characteristics of respondents reported in Chapter Nine, which showed the relationships between parents and their children, can help to explain this phenomena. We noted that in all the five groups, 85.4% of the respondents were educated by their parents and explained that at old age these children in turn take economic and social care of their parents. We also saw that old people, women and poor farmers, make up a large percentage of the traditional group. Their experience of how the new political system operates is vague, hence they cannot to a large extent influence their more educated off-spring, in the way they vote. Politicisation of socio-economic relations lies in the economic power of the younger generations to support their parents financially. Overt and covert influences of this economic support compel parents in rural areas to accept the political views of their children. But a stronger and more important explanation can be drawn from participant observation than from the data. The tension between relatives, friends, etc. during the election debarred large numbers of respondents from knowing that parents influenced their children and the effect it had on the voting behaviour. The network of interpersonal relations was strictly restricted to protect the interests of members of a family.

However, there was a considerable contrast between the influence respondents thought parents had on them (46.3%) and on other people (74.4%).

Respondents were also asked to indicate what effect they thought school, college and university mates had on the political participation and voting of their associates. 47.7% (51) said it was important.

The rather narrow difference of 15.5% between the importance of the influence which respondents thought that school-mates had on them (32.2%) and the effect of such influence on other people (47.7%) might suggest that in the personal network of the respondents on the political influence of school, college, etc. was fairly accurate. It might be supposed that the narrower the percentage difference between influence of a particular factor on the political participation and voting of the respondents themselves and others in their network the more accurate is the report. But consideration should be given to the difference between the network groups.

Table 13:13

Effects School-Mates Had On Voters' Political Behaviour
According To The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(18) 52.9	(16) 47.1	(34) 100	31.8
School Leaver	(5) 38.5	(8) 61.5	(13) 100	12.1
Urban Poor	(3) 42.9	(4) 57.1	(7) 100	6.5
Urban Elite	(14) 38.9	(22) 61.1	(36) 100	33.6
Rural Elite	(11) 64.7	(6) 35.3	(17) 100	15.9
Column Total	(51) 47.7	(56) 52.3	(107) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 46

According to our theories in chapter two, kinship rather than friendship characterises African rural social and political relations. Once the network of kinship was disrupted by intense competition between political parties in rural areas by unconstitutional means of influencing relatives, some people would resort to old friends in other villages and outside the villages for political information and influence.

The two most important urban network groups in the survey are the urban poor and the urban elites: with them strong network ties are developed with friends. Nevertheless, the ties do not supersede obligatory kinship ties with distant relatives in the village. In election periods, friends in the city influence each other in their political participation and voting. In the survey, 77.8% of the urban poor maintained that friendship had an important effect on the voting behaviour of the electorate. Similarly, the urban elite reported a related high importance of friends - 61.5%.

We saw that the effectiveness of clubs and unions as organs of political mobilisation and support was neutralised and weakened by the split in Igbo leadership during the 1983 general election. In the survey, 38.9% (37)

considered that the influence of voluntary associations had an important political effect on the voting behaviour of the electorate. The difference between this and the figure for influence on themselves is very small.

Table 14:14
Effects Of Friends On The Political Behaviour Of Voters
According to the Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(25) 59.1	(18) 41.9	(43) 100	36.4
School Leaver	(4) 36.4	(7) 63.6	(11) 100	9.3
Urban Poor	(7) 77.8	(2) 22.2	(9) 100	7.6
Urban Elite	(24) 61.5	(15) 38.5	(39) 100	33.1
Rural Elite	(8) 50.0	(8) 50.0	(16) 100	13.6
Column Total	(68) 57.6	(50) 42.4	(118) 100	100

One of the most exciting experiences during the fieldwork was the communal viewing of political broadcasts on television, particularly in the village. It involved kin, relatives, etc. who belonged to and strongly identified with different parties - NPP or NPN. Often viewing was interrupted by sharp arguments between relatives and an elder member of the family would stand up to calm disputants down until news, current affairs etc. concerning the elections were over. Then debates, arguments, and opinions about the programmes and issues about the elections in general followed. Some of the debates would turn into big jokes about the elections, and Nigerian leaders. Through these debates, arguments and interactive expressions of views about TV broadcasts between relatives, kins and friends, viewers were able to predict or state fairly accurately how much influence and effect TV content would have on the political participation and voting behaviour of their political opponents or allies.

Table 15:13

The Effects Of TV On The Voters According To Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(12) 37.5	(20) 62.5	(32) 100	34.0
School Leaver	(5) 45.5	(6) 54.5	(11) 100	11.7
Urban Poor	(0) 0.0	(5) 100.0	(5) 100	5.3
Urban Elite	(15) 46.9	(17) 53.1	(32) 100	34.0
Rural Elite	(6) 42.9	(8) 57.1	(14) 100	14.9
Column Total	(38) 40.4	(56) 59.6	(94) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 59

In sum 40.4% (38) believed that TV had an important effect on the political participation and voting attitudes of other people.

Communal viewing was more common in villages than in towns. Thus the number of respondents who thought that the TV political content had an important influence on their voting behaviour rose in the traditional group from 21.9% (7), to 37.5% (12) on other people. In the urban elite and young school leavers groups the influence which the respondents thought TV had on themselves and the observations they made about TV's effect on others remained comparatively thin. But there is an absolute similarity between the influence of TV on respondents and the effect the respondents thought TV political broadcasts had on other people. There was none in the urban poor, and in the more educated groups respondents' opinions were nearly equally divided. The absolute and near absolute similarities between the influence of TV on respondents and the effects respondents thought it had on others suggest that through this method the actual impact of mass media on the audience in an election campaign can be obtained. The complete political non-impact of TV on the urban poor, who could not understand different interpretative levels of TV political messages, as reported by the respondents themselves and similar non-impact on others in the same network group, illustrates the importance of the approach used in this study.

Relatives remain an important network of political communication influence which has a crucial effect on voting and participation in Nigeria. When respondents reported the effect of relatives on the political participants, 52.2% (60) believed that relatives' influence had an important effect on the voting behaviour of other people. The difference between the influence which all the respondents thought relatives had on themselves and others in their network is only 6.5%. Among different networks the sharpest contrast was within the urban elite, 51.4% (19) of whom said that the influence of relatives had an important political influence on voters, but in the same group 38.5% (15) said that the influence of relatives had no influence on their own political participation and voting. A possible explanation is that most people in this group had the economic, social and political knowledge and power to influence their relatives. In their urban interaction and association, they are aware of how each of them influence their relatives, both in the city and the village, who tend to rely on them for various reasons and needs.

Table 16:13

Effect Of Newspaper On Voters According To Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(8) 20.0	(32) 80.0	(40) 100	36.4
School Leaver	(6) 50.0	(6) 50.0	(12) 100	10.9
Urban Poor	(2) 28.6	(5) 71.4	(7) 100	6.4
Urban Elite	(17) 48.6	(18) 51.4	(35) 100	33.8
Rural Elite	(6) 37.5	(10) 62.5	(16) 100	14.5
Column Total	(39) 35.5	(71) 64.5	(110) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 43

The effect of radio and newspapers on their political participation and voting behaviour as reported by the respondents is nearly the same as their reported proportion of other people's political behaviour. 55.2% (64) said that radio had an important effect on others and 51.6% (63) on themselves. With newspapers, 35.5% (39) of the respondents also believed newspaper political coverage influenced them much the same. The narrow differences suggest that with the mass media, participants were able to assess in their

network media impact on the electorate in their various communities. Tables 16:13 and 17:13 show the effects of radio and newspapers on the electorate as reported by the respondents.

Table 17:13

The Effect Of Radio According To Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(28) 62.2	(17) 37.8	(45) 100	38.8
School Leaver	(9) 69.2	(4) 30.8	(13) 100	11.2
Urban Poor	(4) 50.0	(4) 50.0	(8) 100	6.9
Urban Elite	(14) 42.4	(19) 57.8	(33) 100	28.4
Rural Elite	(9) 52.9	(8) 47.1	(17) 100	14.7
Column Total	(64) 55.2	(52) 44.8	(116) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 37

Table 18:13

Influence Of Money On The Respondents' Political Behaviour
According to the Respondents Themselves

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(10) 26.3	(28) 73.7	(38) 100	33.6
School Leaver	(5) 41.7	(7) 58.3	(12) 100	10.8
Urban Poor	(1) 12.5	(7) 87.5	(8) 100	7.7
Urban Elite	(4) 10.5	(34) 89.5	(38) 100	33.6
Rural Elite	(4) 23.5	(13) 76.5	(17) 100	15.0
Column Total	(24) 21.2	(89) 78.8	(113) 100	100

Number of missing observations = 40

The influence of money on the voting and political participation of the electorate as reported by the respondents has very important implications in political communication and influence in Nigerian politics. Earlier I have compared the differences between the influence which the respondents said money had on their own political participation and voting and the effect it had on other people in various rural and urban communities.

Table 19:13

Effects Of Money On Other Voters According To The Respondents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(43) 91.5	(4) 8.5	(47) 100	38.5
School Leaver	(11) 84.6	(2) 15.4	(13) 100	10.7
Urban Poor	(6) 66.7	(3) 33.3	(9) 100	7.4
Urban Elite	(31) 86.1	(5) 13.9	(36) 100	29.5
Rural Elite	(14) 82.4	(3) 17.6	(17) 100	13.9
Column Total	(105) 86.1	(17) 13.9	(122) 100	100.

Number of missing observations = 31

A detailed comparison of these two tables shows that there is a wide gap between the influence which respondents reported that money had on their own political participation in the 1983 election and the effect it had on others in their communities - rural and urban. The crucial question is, who were the participants so much influenced by money other than the respondents themselves? By implication, money, as it shows such a wide gap of influence and effect on the respondents and respondents' "others" in the community - who were none else but themselves - had the most important political influence and effect on the communities. The game of politics and the expansion of the media coverage of the elections could not be compared with the effectiveness of money to influence individuals and communities to participate in the election.

It is quite clear from my own observation that money was used to link, mobilise and persuade people to vote. The media in various ways reinforce these on-going political practices during the election. From various

broadcasts, media professions, interviewers, interviewees, politicians, electorates, etc. were very vocal about the use of money to buy electorates in the villages and cities to vote.

It was through the linkages of friends, relatives, neighbours, etc. that money was used to mobilise political support. The process endorsed face-to-face communication, the most important political communication during the election. It was the most important because it produced an effective outcome, ie through it money was used to persuade voters rather than mass media political broadcasts. The mass media are constitutional and legitimate organisations but money, as it was used to persuade the voter, was completely unconstitutional but effective. It was the nature of Nigerian politics rather than the media and the money themselves that was wrong. The 1983 general election was characterised by conflicts and immense distrust between friends, relatives, neighbours, clubs or social organisational units, etc. We noted earlier that when respondents were asked to indicate which of the means of political communication intensified the conflicts and which was the most unreliable 50% (64) said that word-of-mouth or face-to-face communication was the most unreliable, 11.7% (15) thought that newspapers were unreliable, and 13.3% (17) attributed such to TV and 25% (32) to radio.

Thus the characteristic feature of the 1983 Nigerian general election was by 50% associated with face-to-face political communication in both urban and rural areas. This makes it clear and that any study of political communication in Nigeria that neglects the roles of face-to-face communication will fail to reveal the particular way Nigerians communicate in an election period and the structure of political communication media and factors of their effect of influence on "others" as reported by the respondents.

In general, respondents tend to believe that these factors of influence during the 1983 general elections had more effect on others than themselves. The sharpest contrast is with the effect of money (for reasons already explained). But in both cases, the influence of television and newspapers on the respondents and others in their networks are low. Clubs, eg Igbo State Union, which in the pre-1966 crisis was an important channel of political communication, has a low score both for the respondents and for respondents 'others' in influencing political participation and voting.

Table 20:13

Factors Of Influence On Others According To Respondents

Factors of Influence	Important	Unimportant	Respondents	
			Total	%
Parents	74.4% (87)	25.6% (30)	(107)	100
School Mates	47.7% (51)	52.3% (56)	(107)	100
Clubs	38.9% (37)	61.1% (58)	(95)	100
Friends	57.6% (68)	42.4% (50)	(118)	100
Radio	55.2% (64)	44.8% (52)	(116)	100
Relatives	52.2% (60)	47.8% (55)	(115)	100
Television	40.4% (38)	59.6% (56)	(94)	100
Money	86.1% (105)	13.9% (17)	(112)	100
Newspapers	35.5% (39)	64.6% (71)	(110)	100

However, this form of analysis of political communication does not create distinct boundaries between senders and receivers of a message, in particular with face-to-face communication, it emphasises sharing and exchange of information. This will not be completely meaningful if we do not know what influence our respondents had on others. We have seen that electronic media are exclusively under the control and ownership of the federal and state governments, so the respondents could not influence their content, nor the political behaviour of the media professionals who shape the content of media political output.

In terms not only of political communication networks but also in social structures of Nigeria, and Imo State in particular, the respondents can influence their parents, school, college and university mates, club-mates, children, relatives and co-workers in their political participation and voting.

In Chapter Two I argued that, in political communication, network linkages can become more important than the 'total network' itself, because it is the linkage that maintains the relationship when an individual moves from village to city or city to city etc. In Chapter Ten, it was shown that only 3.8% (5) never visited their relatives in town and 3.1% (4) came from the traditional group. I explained that these are old people who no longer

travel outside the village, but their relatives visit them from cities. 4.6% (6) visit their relatives in the city at least once a year, 16% (21) more than once a year, 40.5% (53) once a month, 18.3% (24) once a week and 16.8% (22) more than once a week. Variations occurred and were explained in Chapter Nine in terms of individual network group's differences.

We also noted in Chapter Ten that those in the village paid similar visits to their relatives in the village. Only one person from the traditional group never visited his relatives in the village increasing to 11.3% (15) visited relatives in the village at least once a year, 27.8% (37) once a month, 24.8% (3) once a week and 35.3% (47) more than once a week.

From the above figures, it is abundantly clear that there is a strong network of communication between rural and urban populations in Igboland. We assumed that the content of linkage between rural and urban populations was economic and social in relationship to our argument on obligatory relationship and kinship systems.

But in the election period the relationship can be politicised, that is the content shifts from socio-economic to political persuasion and influence. Thus, in Chapter Two I emphasised that in an election period the frequency of visits and information flow between network groups or individual networks are essential criteria in assessing group or individual political participation, influence and mobilisation through network linkages. Specifically Meadow (1980:87,88) maintains that while parents influence their children in their political behaviour, the latter also influence their parents later in life. He also discussed the 'scope of influence' at the workplace and between friends in a political situation.

My respondents were asked to list people or groups they could influence politically and particularly during election campaigns. They were also asked to rank them according to the order in which they thought they influenced them. Here, the content of communication between relatives, friends, etc. is specifically political. Political communication linkages embrace both rural and urban populations in this case.

From all the groups 80.7% (96) thought that they had an important political influence on their parents. There is a sharp contrast between the 46.3% (56) who report being influenced by their parents and the 80.7% (96) who claim to have had an influence on their parents.

Table 21:13

Respondents Political Influence On Their Parents

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total
Traditional	(31) 75.6	(10) 24.4	(41)34.5 100
School Leaver	(9) 75.0	(3) 25.0	(12)10.1 100
Urban Poor	(7) 87.5	(1) 12.5	(8)8.7 100
Urban Elite	(37) 90.2	(4) 9.8	(41)34.5 100
Rural Elite	(12) 70.6	(5) 29.4	(17)14.3 100
Column Total	(96) 80.7	(23) 19.3	(119)100 100

Number of missing observations = 34

In each of the groups, the influence which respondents thought they had on their parents' political behaviour during the election was high. In the traditional group 75.6% (31) maintained that their influence on their voting was important or very important.

Even among the young school leavers, 75% (9) said that they had an important political influence on their parents. This shows that in Igboland it is not economic power but knowledge that determines influence between kin. As I argued in chapter three, in the traditional Igboland open market or village square decision-making, men, women children, etc. gather and everyone is given an opportunity to express his or her view, irrespective of wealth, age or sex. Once an individual is equipped with knowledge and facts concerning an issue at hand and is capable of using them to solve a community's problem, he dominates. Once parents have educated their children they proudly depend on them for accurate political information and when they gain employment they also depend on them for financial support, particularly if parents are farmers or retired people.

Yet even in the urban poor group 87.5% (7) thought they had an important political influence on their parents. Even though their earning power is weak and educationally poor, their influence over their parents in an

election period may still be critical. I pointed out earlier that the kinship system in Igboland transcends politics in Nigeria. Most parent/children relationships are hardly affected by an election. Old parents adhere strongly to the opinion of their children, particularly if the latter live in cities and return home occasionally and at the time of an election.

The strongest influence on parents during the elections was by the urban elites, 90.2% of whom believed that they had an important political influence on their parents during the 1983 general elections. This contrasts sharply with the rural elites who said that parental influence was an important influence on their own political behaviour. Here a combination of factors are important: social status, economic power and political knowledge. As I pointed out, these do not weaken their ties with their kin but also increase their obligatory duties to parents, their own children and relatives. In election time, they use these associate values to influence the voting behaviour of their parents and other kin. In Chapter Ten we saw that 83.3% visit home at least once a month. The visits enhance their popularity in the natal home and they become more familiar with local social and political issues.

Also among the rural elites, 70.6% (12) reported that they had an important political influence on the behaviour of their parents, while 58.8% (10) reported that they were influenced by their parents. Political influence between respondents and their parents tend to be balanced.

In contrast the influence which the respondents had on their school, college or university mates was generally low in the last general election.

Across all the five groups, only 24.8% (29) believed that they had an important political influence on their school mates, etc. A noticeable difference which is difficult to explain exists in the rural elite where 12.2% (2) said that they had an important influence on their school-mates yet we saw that 47.1% (8) believed that these school-mates influenced them. Among young school leavers 45.5% (5) said that they had an important influence on the voting behaviour of their school-mates, while 38.5% (5) believed that their friends influenced them.

Table 22:13

Respondents' Influence On Their School/College-Mates

Groups	Important	Unimportant	Total	
Traditional	(11) 26.8	(30) 73.2	(41) 100	35.0
School Leaver	(5) 45.5	(6) 54.5	(11) 100	9.4
Urban Poor	(2) 25.0	(6) 75.0	(8) 100	6.8
Urban Elite	(9) 22.0	(32) 78.0	(41) 100	35.0
Rural Elite	(2) 12.5	(14) 87.5	(16) 100	13.7

Number of missing observations = 36

The general low influences by and on school-mates may indicate a breakdown in horizontal interpersonal linkages or communication. Here reachability and connectedness among old school friends is hampered by horizontal geographical movement to various parts of the country after formal education.

On the other hand a high proportion 42.5% (51), thought that they had an important political influence on their clubmates. Thus, despite the weakness of the one large ethnic union such as the Igbo State Union, clubs functioned an important networks of communication through which members influenced one another, particularly among elite social clubs.

In the cities where the nature of social ties are instrumental and work seems to define the character of the relationship which does not carry specific obligations, it is more difficult to politicise the relationship. In contrast to kinship ties, only 22.9% (25) believed that they had any important political influence on the voting behaviour of their co-workers.

My own observations of the 1983 general election in Nigeria revealed 'games' of betrayals and blackmails between friends, particularly in the elites. Co-workers who belonged to different parties tried to hide their political sympathy to avoid betrayal by co-workers. Besides, the Igbos have a

peculiar mode of political participation and voting. The majority vote and play more active roles in the village of their origin than in the city where they live and work. We noted earlier that those most actively involved in city life and politics are the urban elites. Strikingly, in the survey, only 12.5% (5) believed that they had an important political influence on their co-workers. In sharp contrast, 78.0% (32) of the urban elites reported that they had an important influence on their relatives. A higher percentage of workers' relatives live in the village than in the cities. Either in terms of 'light mesh' (Barnes, 1954:54), 'multiplex' relationship by Gluckman (1955:19), or the 'density', range or reachability in network elaborated in Chapter Two, Mitchell (1969) made an important observation about African socio-political relationships. He writes:

"The importance of looking at the structural as well as the interactional aspects of network links is that the influence through several links of dissimilar content may be traced."

He then went on to illustrate the point by saying that:

"the fact that A is linked to B in terms of kinship and B to C in terms of occupational ties, may or may not affect the extent to which A can enlist C's service for some purpose or other."
(Mitchell, 1969:24)

In a work situation, Mitchell proposed that an employer/employee relationship might easily constitute a link in personal networks; it might not be reciprocated and the degree of influence of one person on another differs according to the direction of the interaction. In figure one I showed the direction of interaction and political influence between groups. The village is the environment in which relatives are concentrated. The dominant group is the traditional one and they and those other groups are influenced most particularly by the elites. In Nigeria, most workers would not discuss politics with their boss. Since the number of such posts are few, small numbers of them would influence their workers in their political behaviour. Co-workers at lower levels may interact frequently but the nature of the 1983 elections inhibited them from attempting to convert others to their political views.

Hence workers in the city engaged in their political persuasion and influence through their recognised obligatory networks of kins and relatives. Mitchell confirms that:

"these recognised relationships may be utilised for a specific purpose - to achieve some object, to acquire or pass on some information, to influence some other person in a desired direction. The recognised rights and obligations are potential links in an action or communication-sets which may come into being for a specific object and disappear again when that object is attained or frustrated. But the underlying consciously appreciated expectation which people have concerning other identified people obviously persists over a longer period than an action-set or communication-set, and may last, as in the case of kinship, for a person's life." (Mitchell, J.C., 1969:26)

A point I have earlier stressed is that contemporary politics and in particular leadership elections in Nigeria cannot and have never transcended kinship ties and obligations, a view which was supported in chapter three with the concept of 'intensity' in network links where 'individuals' are prepared to honour obligations, or feel free to exercise the rights implied in their links, to some 'members' of their close or extended families.

"The intensity of a person's relationship with a close kinsman is likely to be greater than that with a neighbour or co-worker. The 'strength' of ties which bind person to person, the willingness with which the parties are prepared to forgo other considerations in carrying out the obligations associated with the ties."

"Face-to-face interaction is not a necessary condition for the obligations entailed in a relationship to be honoured. There are many circumstances where an intense link with a person living some distance away may be an important factor in the behaviour of an individual." (Mitchell, 1969:28; Reder, 1964:22)

It is this intensity or the strength of the ties in personal networks in Igbo communities that calls for re-evaluation of the role of the mass media in politics in Nigeria. Since we reject the direct influence of mass media, and data from this survey support the arguments, it seems that face-to-face political communication networks when analysed in relation to the social structures reveal more about politics and communication than considerations based exclusively on mass media.

In sum, I have considered political influence in terms of several factors such as parents, relatives and children that constitute elements of kinship and these have been shown to be more important than non-kin, such as - co-workers, club and school-mates etc.

Table 23:13

Respondents In General And Their Perceived Influence On Others

	<u>Respondents</u>			
	Important	Unimportant	Total	%
Parents	80.7% (96)	19.3% (23)	119	100
School-mates	24.8% (29)	75.2% (88)	117	100
Club-mates	42.5% (51)	57.5% (69)	120	100
Children	74.1% (80)	25.9% (28)	108	100
Relatives	74.4% (90)	25.6% (31)	121	100
Co-workers	22.9% (25)	77.1% (84)	109	100

Here the bedrocks of kinship relation and political affiliation, identification and influence - parents, relatives and children - are indicated by high percentages, while co-workers and school-mates have low percentages.

Evidently, the impacts of the mass media on voters' behaviour were marginal in comparison with other factors examined in this chapter. Of all the mass media networks, radio played a fairly considerable part in influencing the voting attitude of the electorate whilst television was the least important. Thus my data serve to detract from the speculative importance of the impact of the mass media, particularly television, in the Nigerian general elections of 1979 and 1983. The importance of face-to-face communication through networks of kin, relatives, friends, etc. have featured prominently as essentials of political communication in Nigerian elections. Moreover, in the 1983 general election the use of money as an illegitimate 'democratic' campaign factor was outstandingly important.

Amongst the elites in Nigeria, it is generally believed that the impact of the mass media on political participation and voting behaviour is weak because of ownership and control, over-centralisation in the state and federal governments. In chapter four, the historical development of political parties and their relationship with the growth of mass media, ownership and control, were accounted for in detail.

A final point often made about the political weakness of Nigerian mass media is that they place too much emphasis on political personalities - a reflection of party ownership and control - rather than on issues that concern the electorates. This has been stated by many writers but has not

as yet been examined statistically. In this research, attempts have been made to state what these issues are in contemporary Nigerian politics. The issues are then related to different political network groups to see which ones would have greater impact on their political behaviour if the media were to shift from heavy concentration on personalities to issues. In the 1983 general elections, certain newspaper headlines, radio and television broadcasts are examined and associated to the the same issues which might concern the electorate.

This chapter has proved that by our definition of characteristics and attributes, all the five hypothetical network groups were statistically well represented. Considerable numbers of the respondents have had both urban and village experience with constant geographical or horizontal mobility between the two areas. The social and cultural ties between village and urban populations in Imo State are historical and obligatory. The relationships transcend temporary political changes and development and create strong foundations for kinship network or relationships.

It is upon these relationships that the social, economic and political life of the people depends. The mass media only reinforce the life rather than determining it, particularly in the political activities of the communities. Certain major factors, such as the education of children by their parents, do not only strengthen the ties between urban and rural populations but also the relationship between the elites and the traditional village network groups and other members of the community. For instance, 85.4% of the respondents disclosed that their parents were responsible for their education. Relatives ranked second, while only 1.0% reported that the government (state) was responsible for his/her education. The obligation which parents and relatives owe to their younger generations has tremendously weakened national consciousness. Even individuals' relationships are affected by this obligation. For instance, those who live in the city tend to comply with the demands and political pressure from relatives who live in the villages rather than similar pressures from neighbours and the mass media in the city. Mitchell (1969) remarked that most African communities are characterised by this kind of relationship which constitutes an important political influence.

The need now is to explore the empirical relationship between socio-economic and political issues and our five categorical groups and also to determine the degree to which media broadcasts were centred on personalities rather

than on the issues which were of primary concern to the electorate. We shall deal with these problems in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FOURTEEN

PERSONALITIES, PARTICIPATION, AND THE MEDIA

A number of socio-political and economic issues have emerged in Nigeria as a result of developments, industrialisation and cultural changes. Some of them have become acute political questions which are either played down or unnecessarily overstated for political reasons. I have already stated that in Nigerian politics, political personalities feature more prominently in the media coverage than political issues. This does not mean that the electorates are not aware of the neglected issues but because they do not have access to the media to make political demands these issues are not politicised to catch votes.

In the survey, the respondents were asked to indicate in ranking order which of the listed issues would have important political influences on them. The list of issues were: maintenance of traditional socio-political values, economic security for local communities, rural economic development, eg electrification, free education, more urbanisation, political integration, more state creations, elimination of corruption, etc.

The changes in Nigeria over the years as discussed in the early chapters of this thesis, have eroded major traditional values. In Igboland, the shifting local political decision-making from the village elders to the emergent elite group has been remarkable. The power of traditional chiefs have been checked. Both urban and rural elites are now taking the titles of traditional chiefs. I pointed out that some political elites, eg Barrister O. Mbakwe the former governor of Imo State, took the title Chief Mbakwe; others include Chief Obafemi Awolowo, UPN leader, Zik the Owelle of Onitshal - leader of the NPP, and a host of others. The domination of the elites in the traditional chieftaincy as well as the modern political party system is near to political totalitarianism and would need political action to check its development. It is an issue that could form a package for party policy and manifesto during election periods.

Only 9.8% (13) of the respondents considered as a whole ranked traditional values as an issue which would have an important political influence on them if it were to be maintained. Even the traditional group (who gave the highest ranking for the factor) 38.9% (42) regarded traditional values as of

no importance.

The low percentage for the maintenance of traditional socio-political values and for the support of traditional authorities as a political question, does not only illustrate the impact of modern education in Igboland but clearly supports our theoretical arguments in chapter two that the Igbos lack centralised local authority. Where pre-colonial traditional chiefs did not exist, it is difficult to institute as an important vote-catching issue.

During the oil boom, development and industrialisation were concentrated in the cities. Also in the 1970s and 80s, Nigeria saw the most rapid expansion of urban areas fed constantly by huge migrants from the villages. Besides, other emigrants from African, and West African countries in particular, came to Nigeria to live and work. The majority of them settled in the urban centres. The huge village/urban migration had serious economic consequences on the rural economy. Agriculture, which was the basic industry of Nigeria, was completely neglected. Only old men, women and children were left behind in villages - who were the least able to cultivate the land. Hence in Igboland for instance yam, cocoyam, palm products (Nigeria before the oil boom was the second world net exporter of oil palm produce after the Phillipines) declined to the point where Nigeria became a net importer. Cocoyam has completely disappeared in certain Igbo communities such as Ikeduru/Mbaitoli, Mbaise, Orlu, Okigwe, etc. As a result, the economic security for the local communities was seriously threatened. In view of this fact, Shagari in his regime launched the 'Green Revolution'. This was an important political policy for the NPN. Respondents in the survey were asked to indicate how the reactivation of economic security for local communities would influence their political participation and voting.

Table 1:14

Respondents And Local Economic Security As Important Political Issues

Factors ranked	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	Row Total
First factor	(10) 55.6	(2) 11.0	(1) 5.6	(5) 27.8	(0) 0.0	(10) 100
Second factor	(14) 58.1	(1) 4.2	(0) 0.0	(7) 29.2	(2) 8.3	(24) 100
No impact	(25) 27.5	(10) 11.0	(10) 11.0	(30) 33.0	(16) 17.6	(91) 100
Column Total	(49) 36.8	(13) 9.8	(11) 8.3	(43) 31.6	(18) 13.5	(132) 100

For the respondents as a whole only 13.5% (18) ranked local economic security as their first most important issue that would influence their voting behaviour. More than half of the respondents (55.6%) who regard economic security for the rural areas as a very important political issue come from a traditional group. This clearly indicates that they are the group most affected by the issue and would like some positive political decision to restore economic confidence in them. In the other groups, however, they are seeing this factor as having no impact and they form an overwhelming majority, ranging from 71.4% among the urban elites to 90.9% among the urban poor.

Another important issue which was prominent during Shagari's government was rural development, particularly electrification. 41.4% (55) of the respondents considered as a whole saw rural electrification as the most important issue that would influence their political attitude in the election campaign. 27.1% (36) said that it would be the second most important factor of influence in their voting behaviour whilst 31.6% (42) said that it would have no impact on them at all.

Table 2:14

Respondents And Rural Developments As An Important Political Issue

Factors	Traditional	School Leaver	Urban Poor	Urban Elite	Rural Elite	Row Total
First factor	(23) 41.8	(4) 7.3	(4) 7.3	(14) 25.5	(10) 18.2	(55) 100
Second factor	(12) 33.3	(5) 13.9	(2) 5.6	(14) 38.9	(3) 8.3	(36) 100
No impact	(14) 33.3	(4) 9.5	(5) 11.9	(14) 33.3	(5) 11.9	(42) 100
Column Total	(49) 36.8	(13) 9.8	(11) 8.3	(42) 31.6	(18) 13.5	(133) 100

For the rural elites, this factor is relatively more important than for the other groups. This is because their job was not affected by village/urban migration. A decline in agricultural products would even benefit local teachers who combined their teaching profession with agriculture. They could sell farm produce to the nearby cities at reasonable profit margins. In general, all the network groups were more interested in rural development and electrification than in economic security for the local communities.

The Igbos generally show a great tendency towards horizontal and vertical labour mobility. They have been the largest ethnic group, as previous studies have shown, to move out of their local communities to other parts of Nigeria in the quest for new opportunities. Thus, they tend to favour economic growth not only within their own region but for the nation as a whole. In the survey 46.6% (62) believed that they would be influenced by a political policy which emphasised economic growth at national level as an issue, 12.8% (17) regarded it as the second most important factor, while 40.6% (54) considered it as not important in their political attitude and voting.

Modernisation of Nigeria seemed to be an unpopular political issue among all the groups. Only 7.5% (10) considered it as the most important influence, 9.8% (13) ranked it as a second factor of influence while 82.7% (110) said that it couldn't have any political impact on them at all.

Some writers have believed that decision-making in governments in Africa should be in the hands of the people. Local communities should decide on how to organise their political and economic life, and power should not be concentrated in the hands of the few political and military elites. These theories on the political structure and philosophy sound plausible. However, in the survey only 3.8% (5) thought that participation of voters in the democratic process in Nigeria was the most meaningful campaign issue that could influence their voting behaviour. 82.7% considered it the second influence factor, while 88% (17) said it would not have any impact on them.

Nigeria has been regarded as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. It has been a widespread national problem and in this study the effect of money in influencing voters behaviour by politicians and their agents has empirically demonstrated the magnitude of corruption in election campaigns. Different Nigerian governments have been confronted with the problem of corruption, which cannot be fully discussed in this thesis - because in itself it is an interesting area of research investigation.

In the survey there was a general concern about corruption. 37.6% (50) of the respondents said that the elimination of corruption in Nigerian society would be the foremost political factor that would influence their political participation and voting behaviour. Another 22.6% (30) ranked it as the second most important factor of political influence in their voting, while 39.8% (53) believed that the elimination of corruption in Nigerian society

would not have any political impact in the voting.

We have seen in Chapters Three and Four that education has played a very important role in the economic, industrial, political and socio-cultural developments and changes in Nigeria.

In the 1979 and 1983 general elections, it formed almost exclusively the most important election campaign issue for the UPN - free education at all levels. The non-payment of teachers' salaries, particularly in Imo State, was an important aspect of education as a campaign issue.

In the survey, 47.4% (63) ranked free education as the first most important factor of political influence on them. Another 21.1% (28) believed it could be the second most important issue for them. But 31.6% (42) considered free education for all unimportant as a political influence. From personal interviews, many respondents believe that free education for all cannot be achieved in Nigeria because of corruption. Some said that when free primary and secondary education was introduced in Imo State, parents paid more money, levies and annual contributions, to schools and colleges than ever before.

Another important and very disturbing issue in Nigeria today, and during the civilian government, was the growing rate of unemployment, particularly in the urban centres. In the survey, 43.6% (58) of the respondents stated that policies to increase employment opportunities would be the first most important issue to influence their voting behaviour. 33.1% (44) ranked it as the second political issue that could influence their voting behaviour. Only 23.3% (31) could not regard it as an important issue to influence their votes.

More urbanisation did not feature well among all the groups as an important issue in the campaign. Only 6% (8) ranked it first and another 5.3% (7) considered it the second most important factor, while 88.7% (118) said it would not have any political impact on them.

The austerity measures by NPN, in the face of fast declining oil revenue, to control the import of consumer goods in Nigeria was capitalised on by opposition parties. They interpreted it as a deliberate attempt by NPN to starve the poor. The message for the control of the importing of consumer goods seemed to have filtered through to all sectors. In the survey, 13.5%

(18) from all the five groups ranked more importation of consumer goods as a primary factor of influence in their political participation and voting in the 1983 elections. 16.5% (22) ranked it second while 69.3% (93) ranked it as of no political impact on their voting attitude.

During the civilian rule and shortly before the general elections, fears of the presence of illegal migrants, already discussed in chapter seven, were amplified. The government took drastic measures to expell all 'illegal' immigrants in Nigera, most of them West Africans. The move brought sharp criticism upon Nigeria by the world press. As a political and vote catching measure by the NPN, respondents in the survey were asked to indicate how the policy affected their voting and political attitude. Only 3.8% said it was of primary importance, 13.5% ranked it as the second important issue in their voting behaviour, while 82.7% said that it would not have any political impact on their participation and voting in the general elections. Here, it appears that the attempt to create a 'moral panic' was counter-productive as a vote-catching measure for the NPN.

Other important issues in contemporary politics in Nigeria are the old problem of political integration and more state creations. Many Nigerians seem to despair at the hope of political integration among different ethnic groups. The survey reflects this situation.

From all the five networks, only 3.8% ranked political integration of various ethnic groups in Nigeria as the most important issue that could influence their voting behaviour and 20.3% ranked it second, while 75.9% rejected it as of no impact on them.

Similarly, more state creation was not a popular political issue among the respondents. Across all groups, 3.8% ranked it as the most important political issue to them, 29.3% thought it would be the second most important issue of political influence, while 66.9% thought it would not affect their political behaviour.

From the above statistical representation of issues of influence, it is clear that in terms of the first factor of influence for political participation and voting in the 1983 general elections, respondents considered rural development, national economic growth, elimination of corruption, free education for all and at all levels, and increased employment opportunities as factors of importance in their participation and

voting.

Having established empirically the relationship between contemporary political issues and our respondents in the survey, the next crucial stage is to find out the relationship between these issues and the mass media coverage of issues of policy during the elections. This will enable us to answer quantitatively the question of whether the mass media neglected the concerns and worries of the electorate or concentrated on other matters such as personality which reinforces ethnic politics.

NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO (SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCAST (SWB))

In the survey, 316 daily newspapers in Nigeria were collected and their major headlines were examined in relation with the above issues discussed. 99.7% (316) were issued in 1983 and only 0.3% (1) was a 1982 newspaper. Out of 316 newspapers 51.3% (162) did not deal with any of the above issues on their front page headlines.

Less than half, 48.4% (153) carried headlines which are connected with our 16 different issues. But their coverage of the issues differed considerably, just as much as our five network groups concern about these issues differed immensely. The most widely covered issues by the papers was economic security for the local communities - 4.7% (15). In terms of absolute number, this makes sense when we consider that 13.5% (18) of the respondents stated that the same issue would be the first factor to influence their political behaviour and participation. On the contrary, in terms of rural needs 41.4% (55) of the respondents maintained that policies of rural development such as electrification would be the most important factor to influence their election participation and voting, only 1.3% (4) of the newspapers reflect this in their headlines. Thus the concern of a large number of electorates about rural development was poorly covered by the press and radio.

For national economic growth as a whole 6.6% (4) of the newspapers carried headlines about it, contrasting with 46.6% (62) of the respondents who regarded it as a primary factor of influence in their election participation and voting. This issue could be said to be well covered by the press if the circulation of newspapers was efficient enough to reach readers in the urban and rural areas, and the audience listened to the broadcast.

Table 3:14
Social Political Issues And Newspaper Headlines

	Issues	Row Total
0	No issue	(162) 51.3
1	Traditional Values	(3) 0.9
2	Traditional Authority	(8) 2.5
3.	Local Economic Security	(15) 4.7
4	Rural Development	(4) 1.3
5	National Economic Growth	(21) 6.6
6	Modernisation of Nigeria	(6) 1.9
7	Voters Political Participation	(7) 2.2
8	Elimination of Corruption	(50) 15.8
9	Free Education At All Levels	(3) 0.9
10	Improvement in Employment	(3) 0.9
11	More urbanisation	
12	Importation of consumer goods	(4) 1.3
13	Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants	(3) 0.9
14	Political Integration	(20) 6.3
15	Social Security Development	(1) 0.3
16	Creation of More States	(6) 1.9
Total		(316) 100

The topic with the highest newspaper coverage on their headlines was corruption, 15.8% (50). This compares well with 37.6% (50) of the respondents from the five groups who reported that elimination of corruption

would be a major and most important issue to influence their voting behaviour. However free education, which 47.4% (63) of the respondents considered as the first factor of influence in their election behaviour, was poorly covered by newspapers - 0.9% (3). One important explanation of this is that UPN was a very unpopular party in Imo State where the party politics were dominated by either the NPP or the NPN, whose policies on free education were assured. For instance, the three major parties talked about free education in their manifestos but with different tunes. The most committed to it was Chief Awolowo, lead of the UPN. In an interview with New Nigeria the interviewer stated that free education policy had made Awolowo popular in certain quarters. But the interviewee replied that it was 'not in certain quarters' but that free education had made him famous in all quarters. 'Quarters' here refers to certain regions or states which were the Yoruba states under the UPN.

In an interview with the same body - New Nigeria - Shagari remarked that free education "in the language of the UPN is poor education because we have seen it before. This is not the first time. In the days of the Action Group they introduced what they called Universal Free Primary Education and it was universal poor education that they produced". Shagari believed in what he described as qualitative education, which was by implication more expensive and should involve sacrifice by parents and state. When Zik, the leader of the NPP was asked by New Nigeria what was his view "on the issue of free education?" he replied:

"The constitution is quite clear on this matter and we'll provide whatever the constitution says. If it says we should provide free education then we do so. But you see there is no saving clause. It's qualified. Chief Awolowo talks about it but he has forgotten the qualification. I don't think it is fair to the taxpayers of this country to tell them we are going to give them free education. The constitution says subject to the availability of funds."²

Thus, as these two parties, the NPN and the NPP, were the two contesting parties in Imo State, newspaper coverage of their election campaign strategies did not emphasise free education as a major vote-catching issue.

Political integration was fairly covered as an important political issue by a number of newspapers, 6.3% (20). Newspapers headlines on political integration were higher than the number of respondents, 3.8% (5), who thought that media coverage of it would be the most important issue to

influence their political participation and voting. We saw earlier that the problem of national unity and stability in Nigeria has been an acute historical and contemporary political problem. Graf (1979:45) noted that the only problem, and hence issue, is that regionalism, ethnicism or tribalism, and statism still play an active part in the lives of Nigerians. The over-coverage of it as an issue demonstrates that it is a critical question in the life of a nation, its importance transcends a temporary election campaign period. However in time of elections it can become so over-emphasised by the media that it becomes what we have described in chapter seven as 'over-kill' which makes the audience less attentive to an issue, which is very important. Even in non-election periods, the press from time to time carry extensive reports and articles on the problem of political integration in Nigeria. For instance, Dr. Omo Omoryi in the Sunday Observer of 1st March, 1978, wrote on the 'regional tendencies in Nigerian society and politics':

"Progressively the peoples of Nigeria were divided into Northerners, Westerners and Easterners and it became impossible for anybody to participate in politics outside the area in which he was born. An Efik resident in Ibadan had to go home to stand for election. Between 1951 and 1959 it was more attractive for any ambitious politicians to be at the region instead of being at the centre." (Graf, 1979:44)

In the 1983 general elections, political leaders went to their native villages and towns to vote. Zik voted for himself at Onitsha, Shagari did so at Ngawa, Malamari Police station in Sokoto. Mbakwe, the governor of Imo State and other leading politicians in the state went to their local villages from the state capital, Owerri, to vote. This pattern of political participation and voting supports the theoretical concept that rural and urban politics in Nigeria converge through network linkages of groups or individuals who play active roles in urban politics as well as in the villages or rural homeland. In Chapter Three, the historical background behind the political disunity, regional political tendency, in Nigeria was explained in terms of colonial rule and policies.

Other issues were peripherally covered by the press during the elections and most of them are below 3.0%.

The weakness of this table and its data analysis is that it does not tell us which of the 15 dailies in Nigeria covered these issues. Nor does it say anything about the exact time of the year in 1983 when these issues were

extensively covered. If we are examining these issues in relation to the 1983 general elections, it is important to associate the issues to the particular period of the year when the election took place. We argued in chapter five that general elections are so brief that within a short period many political changes can take place. Then in chapter eleven we discovered that the most important newspapers read by the respondents were the Daily Times, the Guardian, the National Concord (the most popular) - 32.6% chose it as their first political information newspaper, Nigerian Statesman, the second most important newspaper read by the respondents - 24.2% (23) in the first choice order. A few also read Nigerian Tribune. A very insignificant number paid attention to the Punch, Nigerian Tide or the Daily Sketch. The same was applicable to Nigerian Herald, Nigerian Observer, etc. A fair number read the Satellite. Thus, in Nigeria during an election period, the most popular newspaper in Imo State was a privately owned newspaper, the Nigerian Concord by Chief Abiola. The federal owned press, the Daily Times, was popular and at state level the Nigerian Statesman was widely read. The popularity of Abiola's newspaper clearly indicates that if radio and TV are privatised in Nigeria, a large number of the electorates would turn to private stations for political information and influence rather than the state's and federal government's stations.

This table shows that most of the newspapers of the 1983 general elections were collected from the beginning of the campaign in May, 10.8% (34), to October, 11.1% (35), when the President started his second term of office, 17.5% (55) in June, 20.3% (64) in July, August 14.2% (45), September 11.4% (36) and October 11.1% (35). It was during this period that most of the serious issues which the newspapers covered became prominent headlines. For instance, the elimination of corruption features as newspaper headlines in May to October. The same was applicable to the issues on local economic security, national economic growth, and political integration. A few were collected in November, 2.1% (7) and December 5.4% (17). Only one in January, 0.3%, but 2.5% (8) in March and 4.4% (14) in April. General elections in Nigeria are always big events which carry considerable amounts of speculations, and fears because of the violence and unpredictable consequences that accompany them. The mass media start in time to talk about it and often carry on matters of the election well beyond it. The 1983 election was not an exception. In Imo State in particular, the hatred and resentments it generated among members of local communities took a long time to heal. The State government's attitude towards teachers who voted against it was more overtly displayed months after the election and some

Nigerian newspapers were very vocal about it. I therefore spread the collection of newspapers throughout 1983 but concentrated most in the months of the elections to capture the core of press coverage of the elections.

In Nigerian politics where issues are vaguely covered by the media for political campaign, personalities or political party candidates are emphasised to attract votes. In the survey, various important political names appeared on the main newspapers that circulated in Imo State and these issues also tend to be associated with political personalities.

Table 4:14

Newspaper Headlines And Political Personalities

ISSUES	NONE	SHAGARI	ZIK	NWOBOD	WAZIRI	WAYAS	MBAKAWA	COWAN	BRATHWAITE	OJUKWU	AKU	UMORO	DIKKO	OTHERS	TOTAL
0	(82) 50.6	(18) 11.1	(14) 8.6	(3) 1.9	(0) 0.0	(3) 1.9	(6) 3.7	(3) 1.9	(2) 1.2	(3) 1.9	(1) 0.6	(1) 0.6	(26) 16.0	(162) 100	
1	(2) 66.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 33.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100	
2	(5) 62.5	(2) 25.0	(1) 12.5	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100	
3	(13) 86.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 13.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(15) 100	
4	(2) 50.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 25.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 25.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(4) 100	
5	(19) 90.5	(2) 9.5	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(21) 100	
6	(5) 83.3	(0) 0.0	(1) 16.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(6) 100	
7	(6) 85.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 14.3	(7) 100	
8	(41) 82.0	(1) 2.0	(1) 2.0	(2) 4.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(2) 4.0	(50) 100	
9	(2) 66.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 33.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100	
10	(2) 66.7	(1) 33.3	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100	
11	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0)	
12	(4) 100	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(4) 100	
13	(3) 100	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(3) 100	
14	(14) 70.0	(1) 5.0	(4) 20.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 5.0	(20) 100	
15	(1) 100	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(1) 100	
16	(5) 83.3	(0) (0)	(1) 16.7	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(0) 0.0	(6) 100	
Total	(206) 65.4	(25) 7.9	(23) 7.3	(7) 2.2	(1) 0.3	(3) 0.9	(8) 2.5	(3) 0.9	(2) 0.6	(6) 1.9	(2) 0.6	(2) 0.6	(28) 8.9	(316) 100	

Surprisingly, Awolow did not appear as prominently as other leading politicians in Nigeria on the headlines. Of those newspapers that circulated in Imo State, none patronised Awo as much as his education programme did not. Also because he was the leader of the UPN party, which most leaders and communities in Imo State could not identify with, and the press and radio in Imo State reinforced this attitude by equally excluding the party's leadership from the headlines. The two far-reaching contenders were the NPP and the NPN leadership and they featured prominently on the headlines. Though Abiola left the NPN, he did not want to patronise Awolowo with his National Concord newspaper either. In fact among all the National Concord newspapers collected during the survey only the 24/11/83, well after the elections, carried a headline on Awo. "Awo's aim is to serve Nigerians - party replies Obasanjo", and the article goes on to say "Chief Obafemi, UPN leader, plans to continue, says party's organisational directorate". Where a political leader appeared less than twice on the newspaper's headlines, he was grouped with the 'others' which made up the 8.9% (28) in the survey.

The most prominent candidates on the headlines of the newspapers were Shagari, 7.9% (25), and Azikiwe, leader of the NPP 7.3%. Their most important followers among the Igbos during the elections were the governor of Imo State, Samuel O. Mabakwe, 2.5% (8), and Ojukwu, NPN senatorial candidate, 1.9% (6). Another prominent follower of Zik in Igbo communities was the NPP governor of Anambra State, Jim Nwobodo, 2.2% (7). His newspaper, The Satellite, featured him most, while the Daily Times carried headlines on Ojukwu and Alhaji Shehu Shagari. The Statesman carried headlines on Zik and Mbakwe and these were the most important NPP leaders in Imo State.

One important aspect of the table is that some of the issues are directly associated with the political personalities or leadership. They were either for or against the issues. For instance, only the name of Ibrahim Waziri, leader of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) appeared on the Guardian newspaper of 13th August, 1983 "GNPP plans economic war against Japan - Waziri wins Presidency". In this article, Waziri was quoted to have been in favour of traditional values in order to promote indigenous industrial growth.

Both Azikiwe (NPP) and Shagari (NPN) were concerned with the issues of traditional authority. On the 5th of July 1983 National Concord reads:

Surprisingly, Awolowo did not appear as prominently as other leading politicians in Nigeria on the headlines. Of those newspapers that circulated in Imo State, none patronised Awo as much as his education programme did not. Also because he was the leader of the UPN party, which most leaders and communities in Imo State could not identify with, and the press and radio in Imo State reinforced this attitude by equally excluding the party's leadership from the headlines. The two far-reaching contenders were the NPP and the NPN leadership and they featured prominently on the headlines. Though Abiola left the NPN, he did not want to patronise Awolowo with his National Concord newspaper either. In fact among all the National Concord newspapers collected during the survey only the 24/11/83, well after the elections, carried a headline on Awo. "Awo's aim is to serve Nigerians - party replies Obasanjo", and the article goes on to say "Chief Obafemi, UPN leader, plans to continue, says party's organisational directorate". Where a political leader appeared less than twice on the newspaper's headlines, he was grouped with the 'others' which made up the 8.9% (28) in the survey.

The most prominent candidates on the headlines of the newspapers were Shagari, 7.9% (25), and Azikiwe, leader of the NPP 7.3%. Their most important followers among the Igbos during the elections were the governor of Imo State, Samuel O. Mbakwe, 2.5% (8), and Ojukwu, NPN senatorial candidate, 1.9% (6). Another prominent follower of Zik in Igbo communities was the NPP governor of Anambra State, Jim Nwobodo, 2.2% (7). His newspaper, The Satellite, featured him most, while the Daily Times carried headlines on Ojukwu and Alhaji Shehu Shagari. The Statesman carried headlines on Zik and Mbakwe and these were the most important NPP leaders in Imo State.

One important aspect of the table is that some of the issues are directly associated with the political personalities or leadership. They were either for or against the issues. For instance, only the name of Ibrahim Waziri, leader of the Great Nigerian Peoples Party (GNPP) appeared on the Guardian newspaper of 13th August, 1983 "GNPP plans economic war against Japan - Waziri wins Presidency". In this article, Waziri was quoted to have been in favour of traditional values in order to promote indigenous industrial growth.

Both Azikiwe (NPP) and Shagari (NPN) were concerned with the issues of traditional authority. On the 5th of July 1983 National Concord reads:

"RE-INTRODUCE HOUSE OF CHIEFS - Zik NPP presidential candidate suggests reintroduction of House of Chiefs to increase traditional rulers participation in execution of constitution."

Similarly, but in different perspectives, Alhaji Shehu Shagari advocated for the rights and duties of traditional rulers and authorities to prevail particularly in an election period. In a Nigerian radio broadcast in Lagos 11/9/83, printed in the BBC SWB 13/9/83, reads, "NIGERIAN PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS ABOUT THE 1983 ELECTIONS"

"Report of circumstances surrounding elections, condemnation of violence (esp. Ondo & Oyo) and steps taken to ensure security and relief (NERA). 'Our religious leaders and traditional rulers must play a fatherly role in reminding competitors for political office that they are all from one family ... they ... have a duty to continue that fatherly role. They should not relent in their efforts to maintain a channel of communications with all their children, so as to ensure at all times that differences in the pursuit of political office do not degenerate into the types of (word indictment) events recently experienced in Ondo and Oyo states."

This text clearly illustrates the essentials of a network of political communication which has been our primary concern in the understanding of the structure of communication in Nigeria, the linkages, Shagari's 'channels of communication', between traditional rulers, local leaders and their 'children' used in the sense of African extended family network system as well as 'classificatory' network of relationship between older and younger generations in Nigerian communities. The maintenance of linkages ensures adequate political communication. As a shared face-to-face communication, an effective non-violent election campaign is guaranteed in all rural communities in Nigeria.

Shagari was well aware that it is competition between different parties at local areas that often leads to the violence which, as we have seen, characterises Nigerian general elections. In view of this fact, I asked the respondents whether their parties competed very strongly with other parties at village level for information and resources. The respondents were asked to tick 'yes' or 'no' only.

The responses were listed including traditional chiefs (see questionnaire no.46). There were only 9 respondents who said that their political parties competed for traditional chiefs, and 144 missing observations. This large number of missing observations indicates that chiefs are not an important

political influence in Igboland. Most of them only exist in villages; thus 66.7% (6) of the respondents were from the traditional group, 22.2% (2) young school leavers and 11.1% (1) urban elite and none from the urban poor and rural elite groups.

Shagari's understanding of different network groups in Nigeria led him to comment, in the SWB report that:

"The fusing together of very diverse groups in Nigeria into one political party is totally impracticable and in the Nigerian situation can never work. The objective of our federal system of government is to achieve unity in diversity."

While this passage has further meaning for our network of political communication, it could also be interpreted as a radio broadcast in which the leader of a ruling party, the NPN, and the President of the nation, was trying to make a defence against the accusation that the NPN and its policies and zoning system was pushing hard towards a one party system in Nigeria. British press and American networks held this view fairly strongly during the civilian rule.

In terms of networks of political communication, 'unity in diversity' has an important relevance only to be fully grasped through our historical review of different political groups on the regional/ethnic basis found in Chapter Three of this thesis. That the Yorubas have an historically established chieftaincy in the urban and rural areas was recognised by Shagari. Though he made known his views on the role of chiefs in a political campaign through the electronic medium, this was inadequate for effective results in Nigerian political communication. The audience could not be moved by this broadcast. Thus on the 2/6/83, federal radio Lagos, SWB 4/6/83 announced that "National Party of Nigeria Launches Election Campaign".

"It was revealed that President Shagari visits the Oba of Lagos at the start of presidential campaign and says tradition and traditional rulers will not be relegated to background, the young must be taught respect for these."

Through radio, leaders reach an anonymous and heterogenous audience but the sharing of communication and information takes place through leaders for effective political participation and mobilisation. Since the Yorubas maintain a strong system of chieftaincy, their leaders had been involved in the early part of the political campaign. Both Zik and Shagari are

traditional leaders as well as national political leaders. This is an important political phenomenon in which modern and traditional politics converge through political leaders.

Jim Nwobodo, the NPP, the governor for Anambra State, was concerned with local economic security while Shagari applied the need for national economic growth. In view of this policy issue, just a few days before his government was overthrown by the military, the National Concord 31/12/83 carried a headline:

"Federal government still for IMF loan - Shagari negotiations proceeding for balance of payments loan and structural adjustment loan from World Bank - President announced to NA (National Assembly)" but Zik, Sunday Times advocated for modernisation of Nigeria with particular reference to Niger state.

Several of the leaders were associated with the elimination of corruption: Shagari, Radio Nigeria 22/10/83 - SWB 24/10/83, Jim Nwobodo, Daily Star 9/6/83, Zik (Azikiwe) Nigerian Statesman, 17/6/83, Ojukwu, SWB 29/9/83, but in Radio Nigeria 19/9/83. In all these cases, the above political leaders directly or indirectly condemned corruption in Nigeria and sought various ways to control or eliminate it.

Political leaders Shagari, Daily Star 3/6/83, SWB 13/9/83, Zik Sunday Post 5/6/83, Nigerian Statesman 9/4/83 and 11/4/83 - the week of political campaigning in Cross River States, and Ojukwu Radio Nigeria, Lagos 19/9/83 tentatively preached political integration in Nigeria. In all their manifestos, radio and newspaper broadcasts, none of these political leaders had any clearly defined consistent policies towards issues that concerned the nation and the common people. Issues were more or less treated in their political campaign as though they did not exist in Nigeria. In passing, Shagari (NPN) mentioned five of the sixteen issues, Azikiwe (NPP) 5, Nwobodo (NPP) 2, Mbakwe (NPP) 1, Ojukwu (NPN) 2, Aper Aku 1, Umaru Dikko (NPN) 1 and all other politicians put together, 2.

Political personalities patronage and attacks featured strongly in most of the papers.

POLITICAL PERSONALITY

<u>Personality</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Total</u>
	2214	21	51	316
	(77.2)	(6.6)	(16.1)	(100%)

ISSUES

<u>Issues</u>	<u>None</u>	<u>Against</u>	<u>For</u>	<u>Total</u>
	199	17	100	316
	(63.0)	(5.4)	(31.6)	(100%)

From the table above, more than half the media coverage about political candidates were in support or patronage of the leaders. A significant number, 21 (6.6%) were broadcasts or publications that directly or indirectly discredited opponents. For instance, on the 28/7/83 the Satellite carried a headline: Bloodbath at Nkpor: Assassination Bid on Governor Nwobodo fails, persons wounded

"Emeka Ojukwu and the Ikemba Front ambushed Anambra Governor, failing to set him on fire, they attacked members of his entourage."

A few days later the same newspaper 2/8/83 writes: Ojukwu a Gambler of Lives - Chike Obi Nigeria's foremost mathematician condemns Emeka Ojukwu in documentary on Anambra Television.

Earlier in the year, 25/5/83, the Trumpet in a headline writes:

"You are a disgrace - Okpara tells Jim and Mbakwe. "Former president of defunct Eastern Nigeria describes NPP governments in Imo and Anambra States a 'total disgrace to the Igbo race'".

Attacks such as these overtly or covertly characterised a number of news headlines but the majority of them were image patronising, through the media owned and controlled by political parties.

While 117 news headlines were concerned with issues supporting or opposing them, only 29 of these headlines were associated with the view of political leaders on the issues. Both these issues and personalities were well covered by the media but a considerable number of them were neutral in opinion because of the lack of an authentic source of information - Nigerian journalists are grossly lacking in investigative journalism. Also the shakey political climate in Nigeria, over-control and censorship, tend to keep most of the media professionals neutral about issues.

However, some of the Nigerian dailies have their recognisable characters. For instance, the Satellite often describes violence in terms of NPN leaders and associated its supporters with thuggery. When there was any intra-party split with NPN, the paper highlighted it. The paper sees Zik as the perfect answer to many of Nigeria's problems and very biased towards NPP and rather breaks down complex political issues into a very simplistic version. Its crucial failure as a political medium during the 1983 election is the overt concentration on personalities involved in the issues discussed.

The Guardian was fairly impartial and in particular regarded Zik as a good political leader. The Daily Times was strongly pro NPN and its leadership - Shagari - whose speeches the paper reported with enthusiasm. Like the Satellite, it very much looks at personalities. The National Concord was very concerned with national economic issues, rather than intra- and inter-party wrangling. Personalities were marginally treated but it looked at Nigeria in terms of global politics and economy. It also looks at domestic developments and causes of major setbacks and often makes useful suggestions as to the solutions to the problems. During the elections, the paper did not appear openly to be supporting any party. After the departure from NPN of its owner, the paper did not appear critical of Shagari.

The Nigerian Statesman, very much concerned with national economic issues, tried to examine government corruption in context, particularly irregularities in government policies. It expresses a desire towards political integration as a solution to a number of inter-party disputes. In the run up to gubernatorial elections (especially in August) its coverage and reports were in favour of the state governor, Sam Mbakwe, but it was otherwise not too concerned with political personalities.

However, despite the different characteristics of the newspapers in Nigeria, the diversity of needs in Nigeria both in terms of population and regions

makes it difficult for the newspapers or the mass media and party leaders to plan election campaigns in the light of issues that would appeal to different groups. Thus, the New Nigeria 15th November 1978 writes:

"... is enough to pen the eyes of political leaders to the necessity of devising campaign strategies which will ensure that the programmes which they offer the people will have genuine relevance to their needs. They will have to choose between finding collective issues which have relevance for specific groups in the electorate. For example, if free education is the most important issue in Ogun State, and good roads are the most vital need of the River State, a political party could make each of these its major campaign issue in each of the States respectively."

Then the paper recognised the practical problem and goes on to say:

"that such single issue campaign methods will not only weaken national unity and collective sense of direction but will also lead to contradictions in the party's final blueprint."³

Besides the acute problem of rejection of political leaders in Nigeria outside their own ethnic communities, the short period for election campaign, the heavy cost involved etc. compelled the politicians and the media professionals to concentrate on easy options rather than hard pressing issues.

Another point of the newspaper as a political communication medium is that its contents meet the needs of small groups in the society, the elites. Even so, as the data above has shown, a few of the elites were not influenced by the newspaper political messages. The lack of indigenous languages in the print media in Nigeria renders the press inadequate to cater for the political information of different groups in the communities.

RADIO

In chapter seven I considered in some detail the circumstances which reduced the possibilities of political violence in the 1979 general elections that previously characterised Nigerian elections. Both the army and civilians sought a peaceful transition of government from military to civilian rule.

This was achieved. The content of the mass media reflected this mood. In particular some of the texts of Imo State broadcasts were reviewed in brief. Similar newstalks on the 1983 general election were collected during the investigation period. In terms of issues, the 1979 radio broadcasts were restricted to peaceful transition and political integration. The voting attitude of the electorates was strongly ethnic.

Very often newstalks in Nigerian radio stations during election periods were written by elites outside the media profession and read in the studios. They wrote on important and specialised social, political and economic affairs of Nigeria which could help the electorates to decide on which party to vote for if the issues were part of the party's manifestos. Ironically, they broadcast in standard English which again directs the content to the elites. A brief review (see Appendix 5) of some of these broadcasts from IBS during the 1983 general election illustrates some of the points more vividly and also helps to contrast the broadcasting contents of the 1979 general elections.

Most of these broadcasts contain recurring themes of electorates' increased political awareness, problems of political corruption exclusively associated with politicians who are regarded as selfish, inefficient and generally neglect the needs of the masses. The broadcasts tend to treat the issues superficially and it is assumed that the masses are now well aware of the issues. They fail to educate the public on how to use the issues to make demands on the political aspirants. Broadcasters implicitly want the politicians to get away from slanging matches' and concentrate on issues etc. But conversely, the people are told by the same broadcasters to look at the characters of the political candidates and not concentrate solely on political issues. Information to the electorate on how to assess the character of the political aspirants was vague, undefined and suffers from over-generality.

Since the colonial, independence and post-independent periods, considerable socio-political and economic changes have occurred in Nigeria. These changes have particularly generated new political demands for the electorates but unfortunately ethnicity as the structural base of Nigerian politics has enveloped the realities created by these changes. Worse still, the domination of political personalities in Nigerian politics has furthermore rendered issues obsolete in Nigerian political election campaigns. The electorates, though, are aware of the changes and major social and political

issues in the communities but they do not know how to sue them to make political demands. The development of the mass media could have been a great source of public information on issues as important elements of political demand but the structure of ownership and control of the media in Nigeria relegates issues to the background in all mass media political agenda.

In this survey, the most important social as well as political issue of concern to the voters was corruption. The majority of the electorate favoured its elimination. Most of the respondents associated corruption with politicians. If corruption as a major issue of concern is associated with the decision-makers, it becomes difficult to include it as a serious political agenda by the same group who perpetuates it!

Other important political issues reported by the electorates include local economic development, check on unemployment of young people, national economic growth, and political integration. The expulsion of illegal immigrants, which the government timed to correspond with the election to win popular support, was reported by the majority of the electorate as an issue of little political importance to them.

Some of the Nigerian dailies showed concern over these issues. Equal concern was shown on corruption by newspapers and respondents. There is no doubt that the newspapers which carried on their headline articles about corruption were reinforcing public opinions about corruption rather than guiding the public to use it as a political demand on the politicians who needed their votes. There was less evidence to show that politicians (though some of them mentioned these issues in their campaign), presented issues as important campaign factors. The most popular newspaper read by the political audience during the election campaign was the National Concord. Ethnic unions were a weak base for political action in the 1983 general elections, in contrast to what Audrey Smoch's studies showed among the Igbos in the pre-1966 military political system of Nigeria. We have drawn heavily on IBS network material. It was not possible to obtain such items from Radio Nigeria, Owerri, but radio and video tapes are appended to this thesis with brief comments on their relevance to our theoretical arguments and survey data.

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

CONCLUSION AND SOME CAUTIOUS PROPOSALS

Nigerian political communication systems can be described as transitional. There is clear evidence to support this claim. Since the colonial period, changes in the pattern of political communication have occurred which have affected the traditional systems. The introduction of mass media and the development of party politics are important phases in the transition. There are now professional politicians and communicators who are involved in systematically organised political communication. Participation is no longer as a result of political position. A crucial characteristic of the transitional political communication systems in Nigeria is the relatively autonomous existence of village and urban areas. The village is characterised by traditional political communication and the urban area is dominated by modern political communication. The basis of the unity between the two areas is the participation by their population in the one common political system of the nation. Both rural and urban populations use the mass media and traditional network systems to participate in the political systems.

In the survey, all the traditional groups more closely associated with the use of traditional communication system for political participation live in the village. Also all the rural elites in the survey live in the village. In the city, 81% of the urban elite who are associated with organised political communication live in the city, but 69.2% of the urban poor who share similar attributes with the traditional group live in the city (cf table 1:9). Both the urban poor and the urban elite participate in modern politics in the city and all use the mass media and traditional communication systems to do so. Voluntary organisations which are completely traditional or are involved in both traditional and modern activities are found in the cities. Membership of them demands at least a common kinship descent. They are important channels of political communication. These interminglings of traditional and modern political institutions among different categories of a city population are clear indicators of a society in its transitional stage.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN AREAS AND COMMUNICATION CHANNELS

The two target areas in the study are rural and urban environments. The convergence of traditional and urban political communication systems is apparently achieved not so much as a consequence of the homogenising effect of the mass media but through network linkages. This study has demonstrated that the urban area is characterised by both traditional and modern political communication channels. Equally the rural area possesses both systems. It is unquestionable that centralised and formal political communication channels are more related to the urban area. On the other hand, the predominant mode of political communication in the rural area is face-to-face or interpersonal communication. The fact that both traditional and modern communication exists within and between the two environments made it imperative to adapt the network approach to the study of political communication in Nigeria. That both environments and their populations were activated by the two systems of communication to participate in one event - National General Elections - furthermore strongly justifies the network approach.

A particular elite group who mobilised the environments' populations has access to both traditional and mass media channels for political influence. Its access to traditional systems is endorsed by and made very effective by the strength of kinship ties between it and the rural and urban population. Its access to modern mass media is the reward of its orientation and acquired Western knowledge, its economic advantage and its manipulative ideological power.

Since independence, Nigeria has not been able to advance beyond the transitional political communication system to the nation-state model. The emerging structures of political elites, party politics and mass media are shown in Chapter Four - Six. In particular, Chapter Three showed how the colonial policies encouraged the political elite to mobilise political support along ethnic lines using both traditional and modern communication channels to achieve such support - the outcome of constitutional regionalisation of politics. Thereupon, ethnic politics only emphasise the kinship and extended family/political culture, an orientation which has checked the development of a nation-state political communication system in Nigeria. Despite this particular problem, major change in political communication in the pre-colonial period and in contemporary politics in Nigeria has occurred. This is the emergence of elite groups and the

development of urban centres particularly in Igboland where there were no city-states or highly centralised government before the advent of colonialism. But the new and the old systems have not been separated from the structure of social and cultural ties.

THREE MAIN DIMENSIONS OF NETWORK TIES BETWEEN RURAL AND URBAN POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS

Network ties between urban and rural political environments have been theoretically and empirically studied and analysed in three major dimensions: first, at the level of individuals, who were aggregated into groups, according to their major attributes and characteristics, in order to transcend egocentric analysis which has inherent limitations (explained in Chapters Two and Seven). The advantages of 'group' or system analyses as an effective approach to understanding the structure of political communication in Nigeria were illustrated.

The second level was the full consideration of the roles of voluntary organisations, clubs, unions etc. as channels of political communication. These two dimensions constitute network linkages between urban and rural areas. Statistically, it was established that, through flexible horizontal mobility of urban and rural populations, there is a strong interdependency between the two relatively autonomous environments. Also, modern and traditional voluntary organisations exist both in the village and in the city. The two major criteria for membership of these organisations, clubs, etc., irrespective of the environments, are kinship and religion. Thus the relationships between the populations are kinship-based with manifest or latent social, cultural, religious, political and economic content. I have maintained that these two dimensions are the premises in which effective interpersonal political communication takes place in Nigeria and they help us to understand the peculiar way Nigerians communicate.

The political elites, by the virtue of their 'natural' membership of the systems and the strength of kinship ties, reinforced by the pattern of the Nigerian political communication set up, politicise these relationships within and between rural and urban environments, especially in an election period. Network analysis explains the structures of the relationships and

political behaviour during an election time.

The third dimension of linkage between urban and rural populations are the mass media. Ownership of radio and television sets is widespread in both rural and urban areas. While there are more television sets in the urban areas, exposure to television is higher in the rural areas than in the city. Again exposure to television is associated with kinship relationship - where one TV set owned by a relative is watched by several members of the extended family. The presence of rural elites in the village makes the demand for newspapers printed in the urban area high in the village. Radio is a universal medium consumed by both the rural and urban population. Its characteristics make it readily accessible to the traditional group who would otherwise be totally cut off from the use of modern means of political information and communication in Nigeria.

ARGUMENT AGAINST THE LINEAR MODEL

The theory that the cities in Africa are closely associated with the rapid development of the mass media and are used for political campaigns is strongly supported by this study. But a thick cloud hangs over the relationship between the existence of mass media institutions and their effectiveness to influence the electorate in their voting behaviour in Nigeria - a major African state.

The Federal and State governments have been persuaded by mass media professionals to believe rather firmly that the mass media are all powerful, particularly during elections: that they have the ability to change the passive and the undecided voters and audience exactly the way the politicians want. This conception of media political power, I believe, led the ruling National Party (NPN) during the last civil rule between 1979 and 1983 to monopolise all the NTA stations in the Federation. In reaction, those states which were not controlled by the NPN established their own TV stations for completely political reasons. All the media installations are located in the Federal and State capitals. But most of their political agendas and their professionals were so localised during the elections that they merely reinforced local political attitudes and behaviour, which were best understood and placed into political communication context through

face-to-face communication.

This was a situation that the elite clearly understood and believed to be directly influenced by the mass media. This study in Chapters Ten, Eleven and Twelve demonstrated that most of the elites have strong ties with their relatives in the villages and cities; they are influenced by their relatives in the rural areas as much as they influenced their relatives' political behaviour. In Chapter Twelve in particular it was seen that the elite engaged more in face-to-face communication than the traditional group. Also the majority of the urban elite participated more actively in the 1983 general elections in the village (where communication is interpersonal) than in the city (where impersonal communication predominates). If the linear model were to be applied in the analysis of political communication in this study, the role and development of the mass media and interpersonal communication would be obscured.

MAJOR CHANGES IN AND ROLES OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AS EVIDENCED BY 1979 - 1983 CIVILIAN RULE AND GENERAL ELECTIONS

Though ethnic organisations still exist in most communities, they were less important in the mobilisation of political support in the 1979 and 1983 general elections. The civil war, the creation of states and the emergence of several new political parties and leadership have weakened the effectiveness of a regional (geographical) ethnic organisation such as the Igbo State Union to mobilise a region to support one leader and one party.

In particular, with reference to Imo State, this study indicates a new pattern of political communication in which there was more interchange with the Igbos and the Hausa/Fulani through leadership. While inter-ethnic party political co-operation took place at leadership level, political conflicts which characterised Nigeria's election campaigns shifted from the regional and national levels to the local communities. Imo and Anambra States were typical areas where local conflicts were high in the 1983 elections.

The emergence of new political egos (candidates), Ojukwu and others who confronted the pre-independence and post-independence Igbo political leader, Zik, and his NPP followers, radically altered the Igbo's political

participation and voting in the 1983 elections. This study has shown that through this new pattern of political development, the Igbos, for the first time in the history of Nigerian politics were deeply divided in their voting behaviour between an Igbo-dominated party, NPP, and a Hausa/Fulani-dominated party, NPN.

There may be cautious optimism, but it should not be concluded prematurely that ethnic politics is threatened. Ojukwu, as former leader of Biafra, is poised to be a political equivalent of Zik, who dominated Igbo politics since the colonial era. That Ojukwu identified with a non-Igbo political party was merely a leadership shift to get the Igbos to break into the mainstream of Nigerian politics as before the civil war. The hidden political philosophy of the shift and identification was a rational one - "if you cannot beat them, join them". But the 'join' is politically too superficial to be true. What is shifting is not the masses' ethnic political attitude but that of the leadership. This research also shows that the Igbos are increasingly beginning to feel that a more permanent political alliance between them and the Hausa/Fulani would create a stable political system in Nigeria. My own experience suggests that this does not imply that the Igbos would not co-operate with the Yorubas to create a stable Nigeria, but generally the Igbos may dislike the Yoruba leadership in the person of Awolowo.

Generally the Igbos have a great and natural tendency to like other people anywhere they live. They have been long advocates of Nigerian unity and preached it and 'fought' for it before the civil war.

"Until 1966, Nigeria Unity had indeed been an article of faith with them ... 'The Igbos had nurtured the idea of common citizenship with all people among whom they lived. To enquire into the precise identity of an Igbo was to insult his sense of fraternity with other Africans in Nigeria. Being an Igbo was a private affair, perhaps a source of pride; but the public image was Nigeria.'

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo, is acknowledged by the generality of Nigerians as the founder of Nigerian Nationalism. His able lieutenants were of course drawn from all over Nigeria, but the most outstanding among them included many Igbos - Mazi Mbonu Ojike, Dr. K.O. Mbadiwe, Dr. Nwafor Orizu, Mokwongo Okoye, Obita Agwuna, Dr. M.I. Okpara, Ikenna Nzimiro ..."

If these were the spirits of the Igbos for the unity of Nigeria, their recent detachment from Yoruba leadership is a part of their resentment of

Awolowo's betrayal shortly before the civil war, as well as his part in the starvation of Biafra during the civil war. At the end of the civil war, it was claimed that he made life more difficult for the Igbos. In Ojukwu's political speech, cited earlier, he reminded his audience at Enign of the sufferings they had to undergo as a result of Awolowo's role in Nigeria during and after the civil war.

Since the charismatic influence of Nigerians' leaders tends to dictate the pattern of political development, it would be therefore advisable for other ethnic groups to develop their political participation along the lines of the Igbos in the 1983 general elections. The argument against such development might be that the circumstances of the Igbo since the civil war are different from other major ethnic groups in Nigeria. But what Nigeria needs is the development of a nation-state political system and not ethnic politics. If politically powerful leaders emerged from other ethnic groups and these new leaders identified with political parties not dominated by their ethnic group, the Nigerian electorate, who are influenced by charismatic leadership, would develop a tendency to identify and vote for parties other than those dominated by their different ethnic groups.

STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN THE SURVEY THAT INDICATED THE NEW PATTERN OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN NIGERIA

I maintain that once new action-sets or communication-sets are created within local communities, new patterns of political communication networks and voting behaviour would emerge. In the survey, 70% of the respondents believed that the last civil government was ethnically biased, 87.6% maintained that there was evidence of inter-ethnic co-operation, 92.2% confirmed that ethnic politics is still alive and well in Nigeria, and a slightly higher percentage, 93%, concluded that ethnic politics remains the bedrock of conflicts in Nigeria. However, a major development is that a moderate percentage, 46.2%, of the respondents who believed that a political alliance between the Igbos, Hausas and Fulani would reduce political conflicts and create stability in Nigeria. This feeling generally reflects the actual voting behaviour of the Igbos during the election particularly to the NPN which won 33.2% of the Igbos vote.

We should be very cautious of interpreting this new pattern of political development in Nigeria, particularly among the Igbos. The Igbos were voting for leadership rather than the NPN as a Hausa/Fulani dominated party. If those Igbo leaders, such as Ojuku, M.I. Okpara etc., admired by the Igbos did not join the NPN party, their voting attitude could have been different from what it was in the last general elections. If anything, in terms of the breakdown of ethnic politics in Nigeria, the Igbo tendency towards identification with a non-Igbo-dominated party is purely a pseudo political movement, but how real this development could be in the future if allowed to continue remains an important ethnic political question.

Most of the Igbos are not in favour of an Igbo/Yoruba political alliance. Only 8.5% thought that an alliance between them and the Yorubas would help Nigerian political development in the right direction. 26.2% favoured a political alliance between the Yoruba, Hausa and Fulani, 13.8% opted for a one-party system and a low 5.7% favoured separate political party existence for the different tribes. From these figures, the evidence is clear that the charismatic leadership and the emergence of a new political ego (Ojukwu) and his action-set (eg Ikemba front etc.), however ideological, produced within a short period a political behaviour among the Igbos which was new in the history of Nigerian general elections. The general negative attitude of the Igbos towards a political alliance with the Yorubas reflects both their dislike for Yoruba leadership as well as the complete lack of a single popular Igbo leadership joining the UPN party. Equally, Yorubas have no tendency to ally with the Igbos politically.

The states in the table are the hearts of major different ethnic groups in Nigeria. In the 1979 Presidential election voting, the pattern was exclusively ethnic - 66.58% of the Hausa/Fulani in Sokoto voted for the NPN and 26.61% voted for GNPP. Only 0.95% voted for the NPP and 2.52% for the UPN.

In 1983, the Hausa/Fulani maintained a similar voting pattern as in 1979. 91.85% voted for the NPN, those who voted for the GNPP declined to a low 1.65%. There was a slight improvement in the number who voted for the NPP from 0.92% in 1979 to 2.23% in 1983. Hausa/Fulani votes in Sokoto for the UPN remained almost the same in 1979 and 1983.

Table 1:15

Presidential Elections in 1979 and 1983

1979

State	Ethnic Group	GNPP Awulziri	NPN Shagari	PRP Aminu Kano	NPP Zik	UPN Awolowo
Borno	Kanuri (N.East)	384278 (54.04%)	246778 (34.71%)	46385 (6.5%)	9645 (1.35%)	23885 (3.35%)
Imo	Igbo (East)	34616 (5.00%)	101516 (8.80%)	10252 (0.59%)	999636 (86.6%)	17335 (0.64%)
Ondu	Yoruba (West)	3561 (0.26%)	57361 (4.19%)	2500 (0.18%)	11756 (0.86%)	1294666 (94.51%)
Sokoto	Hausa/ Fulani (N.West)	35902 (26.61%)	898994 (66.58%)	44977 (3.33%)	12499 (0.92%)	34102 (2.52%)

1983

Borno	Kanuri (N.East)	179265 (24.96%)	348974 (48.60%)	26996 (3.76%)	26992 (3.76%)	120138 (16.73%)
Imo	Igbo (East)	52364 (3.29%)	398463 (25.07%)	18370 (1.16%)	1064436 (66.99%)	22648 (1.48%)
Ondu	Yoruba (West)	6874 (0.54%)	438128 (3.4%)	4449 (0.35%)	5022 (0.40%)	1198033 (95.00%)
Sokoto	Hausa/ Fulani (N.West)	46752 (1.65%)	2605935 (91.83%)	24280 (0.85%)	63238 (2.23%)	75428 (2.66%)

A major Yoruba state - Ondo - contrasts more sharply in its voting pattern in both elections. In 1979 95.51% of the Yorubas in Ondo voted for the UPN. Only 4.19% voted for the NPN and a mere 0.86% for the NPP. In 1983 their vote for the NPN remained the same, the NPP dropped to 0.40% and the UPN remained at the level as in 1979 at 95%. In 1979 Igbos in Imo State cast the majority of their votes for the NPP, 86.6%, 8.80% voted for the NPN and only 0.64% for the UPN. In 1983 the UPN had only a small increase but the NPN made a substantial gain of 25.07%, which affected the numbers of votes for the NPP from 86.6% in 1979 to 66.99% in 1983.

One major problem with table 1.15, Appendix 1 and 2 is that we cannot say that the small percentages of votes for other parties in a State are people of the same state or immigrants from outside the State. In my survey, an attempt was made to resolve this problem. A cross tabulation of ethnic origin and political parties for votes cast in Imo State showed who voted for whom in the 1983 general elections.

Table 2:15

A Crosstabulation of Ethnic Groups and the Political Parties for whom the Respondents Voted in Imo State during the 1983 General Election

Tribe	No.of Respondents	<u>Imo State</u>					
		GNPP	NPN	PRP	NPP	UPN	NAP
Igbos	102 (83.6%)	-	33 (27.0%)	-	66 (54.1%)	1 (0.8%)	2 (1.6%)
Yoruba	9 (7.4%)	-	1 (0.8%)	-	-	8 (6.6%)	-
Hausa/ Fulani	7 (5.7%)	-	5 (4.1%)	1 (0.8%)	-	1 (0.8%)	-
Other Tribes	4 (3.3%)	-	1 (0.8%)	-	-	3 (2.5%)	-
Total	122 100%		40 (32.8%)	1 (0.8%)	66 (54.1%)	13 (10.7%)	2 (1.6%)

Of the 83.6% of the Igbo respondents who voted, 27% (33) voted for the NPN and 54.1% (66) voted for the NPP. Only 0.8% (1) voted for the UPN. In the survey there were 9 Yorubas, only one person voted for the NPN. The rest voted for the UPN and none at all for the NPP. The same was applicable with Hausa/Fulani who lived in Owerri, none voted for the NPP, 5 for the NPN and only one for the UPN.

Despite the Igbo tendency towards the NPN in the 1983 elections, Nigerian politics is still strongly ethnic. The fact that Hausa/Fulani, Yorubas and other tribes who live in Imo State could not cast a single vote of theirs to an Igbo-dominated party where they lived and worked clearly indicated that tribalism in Nigeria knows no social, economic, cultural or geographical boundaries. This may also show that the 0.92% in 1979 and 2.23% in 1983 in Sokoto who voted for the NPP were Igbos or people from Plateau State who

live in Sokoto. Similarly 0.86% in 1979 and 0.40% in 1983 in Ondo State who cast their votes for the NPP were non-Yorubas. These figures are worrying in themselves and clearly show that ethnicity is a major factor in Nigerian politics.

In our study of traditional politics in Chapter Three, the social structure and the political organisation of the Igbos were coherent, that is the society is a plural one made up of sub-groups and "the relationship between the members of a village or village-group, and between one village-group or clan and another are marked by social discord. They are always disputing over one issue or the other - land, water, ceremonial rites, traditional offices and titles etc. None is prepared to accept the leadership of the authority of the other. Everyone is king unto himself. The quarrels are embittered by the poverty of the traditional Igbo society."²

After the amalgamation, the development of party politics, regional and federal structures of government, the Igbos, through ethnic ties and organisations which are common to all Nigerians but in different patterns, brought with them their characteristics into Nigerian politics. The Yorubas' traditionalism and 'obsequiousness' make them loyal to and controllable by their traditional chiefs and elders while 'the submissive humility' of the Hausa/Fulani, which is an aspect of Muslim doctrine, puts them under the autocratic leadership of their religious heads who are often their principle political leaders too. It is widely believed that the Sauna of Sokoto between 1960-1966 ruled Nigeria from Sokoto through Tafawa Bellewa. With the Northerners, religion is an inseparable part of politics. The uniqueness of their politics is based on this philosophy.

Except in a common language dotted with diverse dialects, the Igbos have no common political thought but have:

"inbred propensity for intra-group quarrelsomeness. Within the group, unless you are able to get them all in one political party, partisan politics of the modern Nigerian state is, in the tradition of that of the traditional community, approached in the spirit of a feud, which is fought with vehemence, with no quarters given on either side."³

Disheartened by this state of affairs among the Igbos, Nwakneze sadly points out that:

"... everybody acknowledges that the Political feud of the Second Republic was more vehement and bitter in Imo State and Anambra than in any other state. Igbos in different political camps were at each others' throats, with frequent clashes between their organised armed gangs which left in their trail considerable casualties in human lives and property. There was in particular the sad case of the Igbo Governor of Anambra State 'NPP' locked in hateful political feud with the Igbo Vice-President (NPN) of the country, also from the same State. And when the Second Republic was eventually overthrown by the military, every Igbo turned informer against his brother, writing endless petitions to the authorities."⁴

A point I have stated earlier which led to the massive transfer of teachers and the forced retirement of teachers and some civil servants.

Catholicism and Protestantism as dominant religions in Imo or Anambra States have the peculiar characteristics of individualism, achievement-orientation and discontent with traditionalism. Thus the Igbos have a religion which cannot be a base for a political front. Besides, the universal leaders of the Catholic and Protestant churches from Rome and Canterbury respectively forbid local church leaders from involvement in active politics.

Generally, the Igbos lack everything which holds other tribes in Nigeria together in their political attitude and behaviour. Their 27% (according to table 2:15) vote for the NPN is an aspect of this 'inbred propensity for intra-group quarreling rather than a genuine approval of another party's policies and benefits derived from them during the civil rule. Lack of strong leadership can be blamed for this situation:

"The real problem with the Igbo since Independence is precisely the absence of the kind of central leadership which their competitors expect from them. This deficiency has left them open to self-seeking, opportunist, leaders who offered them little help in coming to terms with a new Nigeria in which individual progress no longer depends on the rules set by a fairly impartial colonial empire.

The lack of real leaders in Igboland goes back, of course, to the beginnings of colonial administration. Once the white man had crushed Igbo resistance it was relatively easy for him to locate upstarts and ruffians in the community who would uphold his regime at the expense of their own people. From those days the average Igbo leader's neutrality has not been entirely free of the collaborating warrant chief syndrome."⁵

The alliance favoured by the Igbos for political stability is not an alliance of political parties in order to form a majority party only after

an election, but an alliance governed by the actual voting of the people. The shift in the political attitude of Igbos, if allowed to develop, might in the long run provide some of the answers to Nigerians' ethnic political problems. But this is problematic because the position of the minority ethnic group can not be determined, which can cause major problems in political alliances between two major tribes only.

THE MASS MEDIA REFLECTED AND REINFORCED THE PATTERN OF POLITICAL CHANGES AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Any change and development in the political behaviour of a society is reflected and reinforced by the mass media. In the localisation of political conflicts in the 1983 general elections, a high proportion of the respondents believed that radio was the most important medium that resolved the conflicts. Different groups understand media messages differently. The way the Nigerian mass media reinforced political conflicts during the elections was also perceived differently by the respondents. A low percentage of 27.3%, mainly from the traditional group, stated that TV did not intensify political conflicts. 93.3% of the elites believed that newspapers did so. Other groups remained uncertain whether newspapers intensified political conflicts in the elections or not. Most of the respondents reported that face-to-face communication did not particularly intensify political conflicts but confirmed that interpersonal, face-to-face communication was the most unreliable channel of political communication during the elections.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OWNERSHIP OF RADIO AND TELEVISIONS SETS, NEWSPAPERS ETC. AND EXPOSURE TO POLITICAL INFORMATION AND VOTING

The research provides evidence that there is a weak relationship between ownership of radio and television sets and exposure to them for political information. 61.3% own a radio but only 53.6% use it for political information between 1 to 10 hours a week. In sharp contrast, only 2.4% own TV sets and another 23.5% own both TV and radio sets but 69% viewed

television for political information during the elections between 1 to 10 hours a week and 31% did so between 11 to 30 hours a week. This sharp difference between ownership of TV sets (low) and exposure (high) is the result of communal viewing among members of the same family and kin in both rural and urban areas.

Because of the local divisions between friends, and relatives, and the distrust people had for word-of-mouth political information, less people than expected were engaged in face-to-face political communication for information. For example, 44.2% reported that they engaged in face-to-face communication for political information between 1 to 10 hours a week in comparison with 78.1% to newspapers, 69% TV and radio 53.6% for the same period of time.

Generally the number of respondents who exposed themselves to different channels of political information between 1-30 hours a week are as follows:

Radio	125 respondents
TV	87 respondents
Newspapers	96 respondents
Face-to-face communication	95 respondents

But the relationship between exposure to and influence of the media, interpersonal communication and the voting behaviour of the respondents was not a strong one. Particularly, TV was the channel of least political influence which indicates that the influence of TV in Nigeria (as generally claimed with the 1979 general elections) was either presumptuous or a generalisation taken to absurd extremes. In this study radio rather than TV or newspapers was the most important medium both in terms of exposure and influence.

Since radio is more widely used in the rural areas and the research indicates that it is the most important medium both in terms of exposure and influence for political information and voting, it is out of place to conclude that the mass media political influence is only associated with the cities in Nigeria. Besides, we have noted that the elite are the highest consumers of newspapers' political information, yet the majority of the elite participated more actively in the rural areas than in the city, where newspapers are widely used politically. In the light of this discovery, I would suggest that empirical research based on the five categorical groups and their exposure to the media should also be carried out at non-election

periods so that we can determine Nigerian's social, economic and cultural communication processes.

The critical question is then, why do politicians attach such great importance to the mass media when it is of little political influence on the electorates' voting behaviour? The development tends to reflect the propaganda interests of the politicians and does not reflect or articulate public opinion or the political needs of the people. The mass media in the way they are owned and controlled by the State and the Federal governments, generally intensifies conflicts at local and national level. Furthermore, the belief by politicians that the media are powerful, leads them to conform to the dominant power structure in order to get access to the media. Gaining access to the media in Nigeria is different to getting access to the media by politicians in Western Europe and North America. To get access to the media by Nigerian politicians is to get power which helps them to decide where to set up the radio, TV and press at State or National level. They therefore decide who works there, and indirectly influence the mass media's political agenda and content. The establishment of ITV channel 59 by the NPP state governor, Sam Mbakwe, during the 1983 election campaign is an example of this situation. The mass media were used by the politicians to further their own interest, career and local popularity. In the 1983 general elections, the mass media political agenda did not reflect on the political realities of Nigeria, such as socio-political and economic issues. The dominant use of interpersonal interaction for effective political communication did not only make interpersonal networks the basis of political participation and voting, but also encouraged various corrupt practices.

THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL CORRUPTION FROM THE POINT OF INTERPERSONAL NETWORKS OF COMMUNICATION

In political communication terms, the influence of parents, school-mates, voluntary organisations (clubs), friends and relatives operates through interpersonal interaction especially when money constitutes an important factor of political influence. In chapter twelve it was seen that 86.1% of the respondents reported that electorates in their communities were influenced by money to vote for any party. This was only carried out

through interpersonal communication. Thus, the dominant mode of political communication and influence in Nigeria is face-to-face and not the mass media. The strong relationship between the social and cultural ties of the electorates and their political behaviour makes it absolutely imperative to study and understand the structure of political communication in Nigeria within a network frame of analysis. This structure of relationship cuts across village and city environments.

Most of the respondents in the survey lived both in the village and in the city. This remains an important geographical mobility that justified network linkages between urban and rural political communication. The relationship at individual group, or voluntary organisations' levels are often obligatory, but based on the kinship system. During an election campaign the kinship based relationship is politicised. In turn, it weakens National Political consciousness and intensifies ethnic politics - a factor that shifts media political content far away from national issues to personality issues. Once this happens, the politicians only use the local mass media institutions already under their control to further their career. But as the communities are strongly linked by kinship networks, the corrupt politicians, who are far richer than the rest of the population, utilise the network to buy voters with money. A high proportion of the respondents reported that the failure of Nigerian political elections was caused by the corrupt means used by politicians, and most of them believed that the most corrupt citizens of Nigeria are politicians. Furthermore, the allegiance and obligations which parents and relatives fulfill in the community, such as the education of their children instead of the state, strengthens kinship ties rather than an allegiance to the state. For instance, in the survey 85.4% of the respondents reported that their parents were responsible for their education. Only 1.0% stated that the state provided it. The importance attached to Western education, and the roles of those who have it in the political system in Nigeria, makes it an important factor which enhances the linkage between the elite in the city and their relatives in the village. The elite association with the corrupt political system and ties with urban and rural population through a network of kinship, makes corruption a widespread phenomenon between the two areas. This situation is characteristic of many African societies, and as Mitchel (1969) emphasised, constitutes an important political influence between urban and rural areas. Voluntary organisations exist in village and urban areas, which also implies that the two environments are linked at another important political communication level. Through voluntary organisations such as the Igbo State

Union an entire ethnic region could be politically mobilised. Many of them (33.8%) are based on the kinship criterion for membership and their leaders are the educated among the kin. They initiate external relations with other organisations within and outside the communities. If the elites are corrupt, their leaderships of various voluntary organisations make corruption spread across cities and villages. This survey, however, in contrast to Audrey Smoch's studies of the strength of the Igbo State Union in mobilising political support for the NCNC before the civil war, does not show that ethnic unions were a strong base for political participation and voting. Multiple action-sets which existed in villages and cities in support of the two parties, the NPP and the NPN, rendered large ethnic Unions ineffective political communication channels in support of any one party.

POLITICAL PERSONALITY VS POLITICAL ISSUES IN THE 1983 GENERAL ELECTIONS

Political personality and socio-political and economic issues are in conflict in Nigeria. The former predominates in the mass media political agenda. The social, economic and political issues which have influenced the Nigerian electorate since the colonial period have changed in relation to structural changes in the country. These changes have produced new problems. Yet Nigerian politicians do not use the mass media in their election campaigns to discuss solutions to these changes and the problems. These changes and problems constitute major national political issues. Because these issues are neglected, politicians use corrupt means to promote themselves and to achieve their political ambition. In the survey, the most important issue of concern to the public was the elimination of corruption. This was directly associated with politicians by the respondents. Also they conclude that politicians and corruption form the basis of political instability in the country. Other important socio-political and economic issues which the respondents noted were local economic development, national economic growth and political integration. The expulsion of illegal immigrants, which was highly politically motivated and which also attracted considerable world attention and criticism before the 1983 general elections, was surprisingly of very little actual political importance to the respondents. The expulsion order was effected so that the NPN could win the support of the large unemployed city population, particularly in Lagos.

Other reasons might be justified by the timing of the expulsion makes it obvious that vote-catching was the main reason.

NEWSPAPER HEADLINES AND COVERAGE OF THE ISSUES

Newspaper headlines on corruption and the other major issues mentioned above, and the respondents degree of concern about them, are proportionately the same, a situation which supports the hypothetical argument made earlier that the localisation of the mass media both in content and professionalism merely reinforces the public's attitudes to contemporary issues. But radio and television, which were directly owned and controlled by the State and Federal government, put less emphasis on these issues. The most important newspaper the respondents read and which talked about these issues in its headlines was the National Concord. Much of the paper's political position and concern for the national issues was the attitude of the owner, Abiola. His attack on the UPN, NPN leadership made him not only criticise political leadership in Nigeria as a whole, but also drew the attention of the public through his paper to the critical national issues which had been ignored by the political leaders in their election campaign.

THE FUNCTIONS AND RELATIVE IMPORTANCE IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION OF EACH OF THE FIVE NETWORK GROUPS

This study has shown statistically that rural populations in Nigeria in any given region are ethnically and religiously homogenous but only relatively heterogenous in the urban areas. That is, in any given region in Nigeria one particular ethnic group is predominant in the city and more exclusively so in the rural areas. This condition makes Nigeria a fertile ground for the study of network of communication systems, where for instance one ethnic leader can only mobilise political support from his own region in both rural and urban areas through a network of kinship and organisations. The mass media are used to boost the image of the politicians within a region. They do not act as strong alternatives to kinship network ties for political participation and voting.

To study network of political communication at the regional level without identifying different political participants within the region presents a serious problem in terms of changes in the socio-economic structures. The identification of five different groups does not only help us to correct the generalisations of the ethnic politics but it also helps us to know exactly the political behaviour of different groups in a local community. The differences are then compared and explained in terms of the groups' different attributes and characteristics.

For example, we now know that all the traditional groups and rural elites with different characteristics and attributes live in the villages. A higher proportion of urban poor and urban elites with sharply different attributes live in the city. The young school leavers are the most mobile group between and within cities and villages. Their relationship in the use of different political channels is different. Most of the elites are associated with newspapers; all the groups watch TV, and radio is widely used by all the groups particularly the traditional group. While it was noted that all the network groups are exposed to different media, they were not very much influenced by the content of the media in their political participation and voting. Also where changes occurred over time, we are able to associate them with different groups in the community. Consequently, problems which emerge as a result of the changes can also be solved in relation to different groups, particularly to those most adversely affected by the changes.

Early theories about mass media and political communication have considered the role of the media exclusively in terms of the urban elites' close association to them. It was believed that the elites were engaged in mass media information for their political information and participation. By the development of analysis of network, based on the five groups, we discovered that the urban elites are more actively engaged in face-to-face communication than the traditional group. Also the majority of the urban elite in Imo State participated more actively in the 1983 general elections in the rural areas than in the city. This means that elites' and the traditional groups' political communication channels (interpersonal) are the same.

Through network groups, we can now study Nigerian political communication within any local (urban or rural) community to determine how different members of the community participate in an election. The localisation of

the 1983 general elections in Imo State and the conflicts it generated among the Igbos themselves makes the need to identify different political participants imperative.

SOME SUGGESTIONS

This research suggests that emphasis should be laid on network theory and analysis in the study and understanding of political communication in Nigeria. This is because it has the power to reveal abundantly the structure of political communication in both urban and rural areas, which distinctively characterise Nigerian society. The linear model gives a false picture of what is going on in political communication in Nigeria, particularly during an election period.

The Federal and State governments should re-evaluate their policies on mass media development, particularly on the expensive media such as colour television stations. The government can reinstate some traditional socio-political institutions that promote kinship ties in the village and in the city, and use the mass media as effective channels of political information, socialisation and education between different ethnic groups in Nigeria.

A combined and organised application of modern mass media and traditional networks of communication will reduce costs for the training of media professionals as well as the cost of broadcasting and office equipment.

IN the first place it seems economically irrational for Nigeria, or another country in Africa, to use colour television for broadcasting. Colour TV tends to be concentrated in the urban areas and often the political and social content of the TV broadcast is aimed at the rural population. Many writers have questioned the rationality of colour TV development in Nigeria. Peter Golding (1977) regards it as a prestige project:

"... in a country where, as elsewhere in the developing world, even a black and white set costs as much as a farmer's annual income. Emphasis is often on production or transmission rather than on reception facilities."

While he draws our attention to the arguments of alternative technology and different assumptions on the standard of media professionalism, Golding warned that:

"All consideration of alternatives or appropriateness must be aware of the context of cultural dependence, of the ways in which professionalism ensures the reproduction of institutions and practices from the advanced industrial societies."⁶

He then contrasted the views of Shils (1963:67,71) and explained that the media professionalism is in effect 'media imperialism' and is part 'of a broader cultural dependence'.

Nigeria is already trapped in both media technological and professional problems. To alleviate the problems, political, social and economic activities should no longer be 'studio-bound' but taken out to the people using locals as crews for the productions. In this way costs will be reduced, the contents will reflect the deeper aspects of the real life of the people - which in turn could influence their attitudes.

Government resources for media development can then be diverted from expensive technology, elaborate studios and high costs in the training of media professionals to meet world standards to making reception facilities cheaper for the poor to purchase.

Even within media institutions in Nigeria, the problem of media equipment creates intense and bitter relationships between staff from different departments:

"Where resources are minimal this problem can be acute. In Nigeria the film crews were invariably over-stretched by competing demands from news and programmes, and only a few were allocated exclusively to a news department. It was a common complaint that cameramen had been poached by a programme's producer or had their services unduly monopolised by other television departments. Studio facilities were also a subject of contention. No separate news studio was available at NBC TV, while the radio studios were in constant demand for rehearsal and programme preparation, film editing and processing, viewing rooms, the use of graphic artists, all have to be fought for competitively with the inevitable consolidation of a 'news versus the rest' view of interdepartmental relations."⁷

While television programme production should be outdoor orientated to alleviate these problems, Nigeria should start to utilise some of the civil

war time experiences of Biafra in the development of her radio broadcasts. The fact that Biafra used cheap mobile radio stations to carry out some of the most powerful and effective war time propaganda in the history of broadcasting should encourage Nigeria to employ this system to reduce costs. The oil-boom which made the nation embark on 'prestige projects' is over. Simpler but effective broadcasting methods such as mobile radio stations should start to replace the complex studios.

The voluntary ethnic unions can be used to promote the process of educating the members and the public on how to make political demands on issues, rather than bending to the will of politicians. They should be encouraged to reject money offered to them by politicians during an election. Because of the structure of networks in the community, the organisations stand a better chance than the media to correct the evils of corruption. But one big danger is that an organisation may itself become another continuous base for ethnic politics, thus itself perpetuating one of the evils of Nigerian politics, corruption and ethnicity. The development of different political candidates and their action - or communication - set identifying with the different national political parties should be encouraged. This will check ethnic politics and enhance the process of eliminating corruption, and promote national unity and integration - a direction towards nation-state development in Nigeria. National issues would prevail rather than personalities.

The mass media can play an important role in this process if they can be freed from the direct control of the political parties and politicians. Local radio stations, completely free from any political party, should be developed to give rural populations a say in national and local politics. This is because radio is the most popular mass medium used by various classes of people in Nigeria. But the crucial and the most pressing problem is how to meet the cost of development and maintain the stations technically and professionally. There is no easy answer to this problem. Meanwhile, local and national organisations should be reactivated as Nigeria's indigenous primary channels for political communication. To understand the effectiveness of different channels of communication for political influence and participation both the traditional and modern mass media should be studied together in the city and rural areas.

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**TEXT BOUND
INTO
THE SPINE**

FEDERAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION (Computation of Electoral Results of the Presidential Elections)

APPENDIX 1

1979

NAME OF STATE	ETHNIC	REGION	NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTES	TOTAL VOTES CAST	NAME OF PARTY	NAME OF PARTY	NAME OF PARTY	NAME OF PARTY	NAME OF PARTY
ANAMBRA	IGBO	EASTERN	2606663	12099038	G.N.P.P. 20228 (1.67%)	N.P.N. 16316414 (13.50%)	P.R.P. 14500 (1.20%)	N.P.P. 1002083 (82.00)	U.P.N. 9063 (0.75%)
BAUCHI		NORTHERN	2096162	998683 (100%)	-CANDIDATE IBRAHIM WAZIRI 154218 (15.44%)	-CANDIDATE SHEHU SHAGARI 623989 (62.48%)	-CANDIDATE AMINU KANO 143202 (14.34%)	-CANDIDATE NNAMDI AZIKIWE 47314 (4.74%)	-CANDIDATE OBAFEMI AWOLOWO 29960 (3.00%)
BENUE	IKA IBO/ BENIN CITY	WESTERN	2355023	669511	8242 (1.2%)	242320 (36.2%)	4939 (0.7%)	52629 (8.6%)	356381 (53.2%)
BENUE		NORTHERN	1629571	538879	42993 ()	411648 (76.381%)	7277 (11.350%)	63097 (11.700%)	13864 (2.572%)
BORNO	KANURI	NORTHERN			384278 (54.04%)	246778 (34.71%)	46385 (6.52%)	9642 (1.35%)	23885 (3.35%)
CROSS RIVER	IBIBIO/ EFIK	EASTERN	2464184	661103	100106 (15.14%)	425815 (64.40%)	6737 (1.01)	50671 (7.66%)	77775 (11.76%)
CONGOIA		NORTHERN							
					34610	201516	10252	990676	17335

NAME OF STATE	ETHNIC	REGION	NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTES	TOTAL VOTES CAST	G.N.P.P	N.P.N	P.R.P.	N.P.P	U.P.N
	HAUSA/ FULANI	NORTHERN		1382712	IBRAHIM WAZIRI (13.80%)	SIHEHU SHAGARI (43.0%)	AMINU KANO (31.0%)	NNAMDI AZIKIWE (5.0%)	OBAFEMI AWOLOWOI (6.68%)
KANO	HAUSA/ FULANI	NORTHERN	5226598	1195136	(1.54%) 20251	(19.94%) 190142	(76.41%) 2367	(0.91%) 1830	(1.23%) 140006
KWARA		NORTHERN	1108029	354605	(5.71%) 3943	(53.62%) 59515	(0.67%) 3874	(0.52%) 79320	(37.48%) 681702
LAGOS	YORUBA	WESTERN		838709	(0.48%) 63273	(7.18%) 287072	(0.47%) 14555	(9.57%) 4929	(82.30%) 14155
NIGER		NORTHERN		383347	(16.50%) 3974	(74.88%) 46358	(8.79%) 2338	(1.11%) 2343	(3.69%) 689655
OGUN	YORUBA	WESTERN	1663608	744668	(0.53%) 3561	(6.23%) 57361	(0.31%) 2500	(0.32%) 11752	(92.61%) 1294666
ONDO	YORUBA	WESTERN		1384788	(0.26%) 8029	(4.19%) 177999	(0.18%) 4804	(0.86%) 7732	(94.51%) 1197983
OYO	YORUBA	WESTERN	4534797	1396547	() 37400	(12.75%) 190458	(0.34%) 21852	(0.55%) 269666	(85.78%) 29029
PLATEAU		NORTHERN	1748868	548405	(6.82%) 37400	(34.72%) 190458	(3.98%) 21852	(49.7%) 269666	(5.29%) 29029

APPENDIX 2

1983 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

STATE	TOTAL VOTES CAST	N P N		U P N		N P P		P R P		G N P P		N A P P	
		VOTES	%	VOTES	%	VOTES	%	VOTES	%	VOTES	%	VOTES	%
ANAMBRA	1,158,275	385,297	33.26	23,851	2.06	669,316	57.79	16,103	1.39	36,165	3.12	27,511	2.38
BAUCHI	1,782,122	1,507,111	84.57	98,974	5.55	65,258	3.66	54,564	3.06	37,203	2.09	18,979	1.07
BENDEL	1,099,851	452,776	41.17	566,035	51.46	53,306	4.85	7,358	0.67	11,723	1.06	6,653	0.79
BENUE	652,795	384,045	58.83	79,690	12.21	152,209	23.31	6,381	0.98	19,897	3.05	10,573	1.62
BORNO	718,013	348,974	48.60	120,138	16.73	26,972	3.76	26,996	3.76	179,265	24.96	15,698	2.19
CROSS RIVER	1,285,710	696,592	54.18	506,922	39.43	46,418	3.61	8,229	0.64	16,582	1.29	10,967	0.85
FCT (ABUJA)	135,351	127,372		1,102		4,156		641		1,103		977	
GONGOLA	735,648	282,820	38.44	160,720	21.85	118,055	16.13	81,205	11.04	25,530	3.47	37,318	5.07
IMO	1,586,975	398,463	25.07	22,648	1.48	1,064,436	66.99	18,370	1.16	52,364	3.29	32,694	2.06
KADUNA	2,097,398	1,226,894	59.28	225,878	10.57	225,919	10.58	300,476	14.02	80,862	3.80	37,369	1.75
KANO	1,193,050	383,998	32.19	48,494	4.06	274,102	22.98	436,997	36.63	35,252	2.95	14,207	1.19
KWARA	608,422	299,654	49.25	275,134	45.22	16,215	2.66	3,693	0.61	7,670	1.26	6,056	1.00
LAGOS	1,640,381	126,165	7.69	1,367,807	83.38	119,455	7.28	6,570	0.40	11,748	0.72	8,636	0.53
NIGER	430,731	272,086	63.17	15,772	3.66	112,971	26.23	8,736	2.03	12,984	3.01	8,182	1.90
OGUN	1,261,061	43,821	3.4	1,198,033	95.00	5,022	0.40	4,449	0.35	6,874	0.55	2,862	0.23
ONDO	1,828,343	366,217	20.03	1,412,539	77.26	20,340	1.11	7,052	0.39	11,629	0.63	10,566	0.58
OYO	2,351,000	885,125	37.65	1,396,226	59.39	34,852	1.48	9,174	0.39	15,732	0.67	9,891	0.42
PLATEAU	652,302	292,606	44.86	38,210	5.86	280,803	43.05	11,581	1.77	16,612	2.85	10,490	1.61
RIVERS	1,357,715	921,664	67.88	251,825	18.55	151,558	11.16	4,626	0.34	12,981	0.96	15,061	1.11
SOKOTO	2,837,785	2,605,935	91.83	75,428	2.66	63,238	2.23	24,260	0.85	46,752	1.65	22,152	0.78
TOTAL	25,414,958	12,007,648	47.25	7,885,426	31.02	3,534,633	13.91	1,037,481	4.08	640,928	2.52	308,842	1.22

IF (V2 EQ 1 AND V46 EQ 1 OR 3) V200=2
 IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 2) V200=3
 IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 1) V200=4
 IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 4) V200=4
 IF (V2 EQ 1 AND V46 EQ 2) V200=1
 IF (V2 EQ 1 AND V46 EQ 4) V200=1
 IF (V2 EQ 9 AND V46 EQ 3) V200=5
 IF (V2 NE 1 AND ((V16 LE 20) AND (V31 LT 50)))V400=3
 IF ((V200 NE 1) AND (V16 GE 30) AND (V10 LE 2))V400=2
 IF (((V200 NE 1) AND (V16 GE 20)) AND (V31 EQ 20 OR GE 50))V400=4
 IF (V200 EQ 1 AND V31 LT 50)V400=1
 IF (V200 EQ 1 AND V31 GE 50)V400=5

V2 = Respondents place of residence: (1) village; (9) city

V46 = (1) Stay in the city; (2) Go to the village; (3) Go to another city;
(4) Stay in same place;

V200 = Respondent mobility when unemployed

LE = Less than

GE = Greater than

EQ = Equal to

NE = Not equal to

THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE RESPONDENTS AND THE FORMATION OF CATEGORICAL NETWORK GROUPS FOR RELATIONAL DATA ANALYSIS

- a) 'if' V200 is not equal to 1 (as above), and V16 (respondents' last education) is equal to V20 (a trader), and V31 (respondents' education) is less than 50 (teacher), V400 (categorical network group/system) is equal to 3 (urban poor).
- b) 'if' V200 is not equal to 1 and V16 is greater than 30 (artisan), and V10 (age) is less than 2, V400 equals 2 (young school leavers).

- c) 'if' V200 is equal to 1 and V16 is greater than 20 and V31 is equal to 20 or greater than 50 (teacher) V400 equals 4 (urban elite).
- d) 'if' V200 is equal to 1 and V31 is less than 50, V400 equals 1 (traditional group).
- e) 'if' V200 is equal to 1 and V31 is greater than 50, V400 equals 5 (rural elites).

- V400 = Mutually exclusive network groups: (1) traditional group; (2) young school leavers; (3) urban poor; (4) urban elites; (5) rural elites.
- V16 = Respondents' last education: (10) none at all; (20) elementary or primary school; (30) secondary school; (40) post secondary or university.
- V31 = Respondents' occupation: (11) unemployed; (20) trader or businessman; (30) artisan; (40) farmer; (50) teacher; (60) professional.
- V10 = Age: (1) 10-20; (2) 21-30; (3) 31-40; (4) 41-50; (5) 51-60; (6) 61-70+

APPENDIX FOUR

A brief review of some of the broadcasts from Imo Broadcasting Service (IBS) will illustrate some points more vividly and also help to contrast the broadcasting contents of the 1979 and 1983 elections, outlined in chapters seven and fifteen.

23/5/83

'The Need for Free and Fair Elections in the 1983 Polls'¹

Text:

Ogunna suggests that if Nigeria would have a democracy, the political leaders must bow to the electorates. He refused to state what demands the electorates had to make to compel the political leaders to bow to them. However, he goes on to say that the political parties would be engaged in tough electioneering campaigns and "violence and provocative utterances would be expected". This is already indicative of a contrast with the 1979 general elections. Indirectly, he began to hint at what he implies by "aspirant leaders must bow to the electorates" by asking crucial questions: 'is it possible for Nigeria to be a democracy when a lot of the electorate are politically ignorant and are easily bought for money?' - a point which stresses the importance of money in Nigerian political participation and voting rather than the influence of the mass media. Bowing to the electorates should be understood clearly in terms of money: politicians pay to buy voter's cards. Thus a Nigerian newspaper writes:

. Voters card sells N150

"(Rivers state) 1983 general election voters registration cards allegedly bought by NPN supporters for 150 - 200".

200 is an equivalent of about £180, an attractive sum to any village or urban poor, unemployed young school leaver, unpaid salaried rural elite teachers, even to the urban elites whose salaries were cut.

The impact of money was so strong that the media political broadcast would have very marginal effects in the political behaviour of the electorates.

The reality of Ogunna's statement can be seen in many activities during the 1983 elections. Besides, while his article was read in the studio on the 23/5/83, the newspaper headline of the above quotation appeared on the 26/5/83. The two are closely reported to be different in an election, despite possible rapid changes that might occur during the campaign.

Ogunna therefore believes that the illegitimate use of money in an election destroys the chances of free and fair elections. If any one does not follow the rules than any government may lose legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of the Nigerian population. Illegitimate government has no justice, he confirms, a point relevant to the response of the majority of the respondents in the survey. 86.3% stated that politicians were responsible for the political ills in Nigeria and then at the same time 84.3% (10) of the respondents maintained that the 1983 general election was not free and fair.

Ogunna in that article proposes that if the government is legitimated by free and fair elections, then "... the political system promises compatibility of public goals with private values and needs". Therefore, this is the time we can talk about issues as important political influences through the mass media. Definitely Nigeria is still far away from such a political process. Ogunna then said that people will accept government decisions if the system is based on justice. When elections are free and fair, the military tend to respect civil authority and any coup is prevented. He maintains that free and fair elections are threatened by "low cognitive orientation of the electorate and lack of independent and critical judgement about public issues. They are ignorant of political questions and civil duties."

He then points out a similar problem we noted earlier about mass media coverage of issues, eg the TV coverage of the urban question and the complete neglect of rural needs. The news talk concludes that 'free and fair elections' are threatened by such negative forces as ethnic, religious, sectional and monetary considerations. In our network of political communication, identification with these 'negative forces', which operate effectively through face-to-face communications and the mass media, only reinforces the process rather than changes it.

Ogunna encouraged that for free and fair elections to be achieved, much depends on:

1. electoral commission and their agents
2. co-operation of party leaders etc. to observe the rules
3. impartiality of police
4. impartiality of the media
5. objectiveness of the electorate.

In this article, Ogunna looks at more specific reasons why free and fair elections might not happen, plus more general issues as to which Nigeria should have free and fair elections.

18/1/83

Building an Ethnical society Through Electoral Process³

Text:

Chioma argues that the theory of law and punishment exists because there is nearly always evil in every society. Therefore people must be persuaded to be self-controlled etc. - otherwise they will be punished. On the scale of civilisation, norms, values, morality, etc., Nigeria is pretty low down. Everyone is concerned. He points out that the situation is worse in high political circles, where corruption and materialism prevail. The trend must stop and encouragement must be given so that ethical revolution starts with the 1983 general elections - a revolutionary election politics in which the electorate must only vote for candidates with honest records - but how do we know them remains the critical question.

Chioma's specific issue is that the ethical level of society can be determined by how the electorates vote. For him, personalities should be voted for irrespective of their party and ethnic origin. This is a newstalk which sounds good to the ear but has no applicability in real political practice in Nigeria.

27/1/83

The Ideal Party System for Nigeria⁴

Text:

Ibe forecast that in the 1983 general election there would be no landslide victory for any one political party. In Imo State, this was a recognition of the effect of the split in Igbo leadership between the NPP and the NPN. This split that consequently divided the Igbo electorates between the two

parties made it difficult for any one party to achieve a landslide victory over the other. Ibe was in favour of a two-party system for Nigeria and thought that dictatorship could still be avoided. He imagined that the two factions of the GNPP and PRP (Peoples' Redemption Party) were going to run under NPP leadership in the 1983 elections. Mergers would ultimately promote national unity and ensure a peaceful political atmosphere. The Progressive Peoples Party (PPP) is seen as Nigeria's only answer and alternative to the NPN.

This is a specific issue of political integration or unity in which two party systems form the base. Ibe would believe that the system could enhance Nigeria's economic prosperity and political stability.

2/2/83

The Case of the Presidential Quit Order on Illegal Aliens⁵

Text:

Chigbokwu Okenze was in favour of the expulsion of illegal immigrants. He points out that the quit order was expected on 1/2/83, but postponed until 28/2/83. He expresses the view that this is seen as something good done by the Shagari administration for its economic security and has moral implications. He thought that the order would provide more jobs for unemployed Nigerians. But he forgets that at Lagos in particular, jobs done by some of the aliens were rejected by Nigerians either because of the nature of the work or the wages attached to them. He accused the illegal immigrants of causing troubles in Nigeria, eg Maitatsine religious disturbances in the North, and the smuggling of contraband goods and armed robberies in the country. He believes that some unpatriotic Nigerians collaborated with aliens to sabotage the economy, e.g. over foreign exchange reserves. Some aliens, he believes, help to plan coups. He insists that expelling them may aid ethical revolution, and that foreign prostitutes, gamblers, and drug takers will be halted. He disagreed with critics of the illegal immigrant expulsion.

Okenze addressed the problem with a totally biased and racist view. He looks at illegal immigrants as all bad and Nigerians all perfect and good people, only to be corrupted by aliens. The broadcast lacked objectivity

and balance.

28/2/83

Political parties and the Choice of Candidates for the 1983
General Elections⁶

Text:

Some senators and legislators have fulfilled their tasks well since the 1979 elections. Others set their goals far too high. Some just squandered money. Some officials divided communities by suggesting autonomous states. He added that some of the politicians would pay for their second term of office by their failure. But this is where Mr. Anayawu fails to understand the power of money in political campaigns in Nigeria, where those who neglected their duties in pursuit of personal gains used their ill-acquired wealth to buy voters' cards at all costs and got elected again. The good ones ironically paid the 'price'. He thought that Nigerian electorates were more enlightened in the 1983 elections than in the 1979 election and that the electorates were able to choose candidates on individual merits. He thus advised political parties to be careful in choosing their flag bearers for the 1983 elections.

He generalised on a few political issues but considered all of them narrowly in the context of personality character.

12/5/83

The FEDECO and the Search for Peace In Nigeria⁷

Text:

The success of the election depends most on FEDECO, according to some people. If they do their job properly, the election should be free and fair. An election commission should be like a referee in a game of politics but also, more importantly, must have credibility.

Kalu addresses the issue of free and fair elections exclusively in terms of how FEDECO conducted them. This is another narrow view of a successful election in Nigeria, where many and often predictable factors can affect and alter the shape of the elections.

4/7/83

Zik's Exemplary Approach to the Election Campaign⁸

Text:

Power should lie in the hands of the people, but in Nigeria (and the rest of Africa - almost) some politicians have abused it. This leads to bad traits. But there are some selfless politicians who are not over-ambitious and do not want to abuse their power. For example, Ekenasi continues, Shagari described Zik and Awolowo as 'blind mice' when he [Shagari] launched the NPN Presidential Campaign in Benue State - 'Gboko '83'. It was the same Shagari who awarded the two highest honours in the country. Also Shagari accused Mbakwe of creating a huge state debt. Zik, on the other hand, concentrated on issues not on personalities - other politicians should copy him, the article concluded.

This is the radio patronage of a political leader, in which his deeds are seen as perfect and must be copied by other politicians. But the author fails to tell listeners what the issues were and how relevant they were to their needs.

9/7/83

Choice and Performance in a Presidential Democracy⁹

Text:

If the electorates are enlightened, politically conscious and literate, it should be easy for them to make their best choice at the polls. But these factors are not always so - he then blames the highest level of illiteracy in the country. In other words, for Iheakaram, the illiterate group in Nigerian communities do not make politically rational choices. Another impediment he points out is that the electorates have the difficulty of choosing from six candidates. In my view this is of little effect on the voting behaviour in Nigeria because each of the six leaders for the Presidency comes from one of the larger ethnic groups. The leaders pull their largest political supporters from their different ethnic groups. The electorates do not have any problem in choosing between Presidential Candidates. He then goes on to advise that voters should not consider the political party of a candidate but concentrate on the honesty of the leader.

He points out that politics is a big business in Nigeria where money from oil and taxes make politicians more wealthy than if they were outside politics.

Iheakaram was very eloquent on the effect of money in Nigerian politics:

"Those who won party nominations for the 1983 elections to the national and state assemblies do not hide the fact that they spent between forty and fifty thousand naira to do so. Now that these candidates face inter-party opponents, only heaven knows how many thousands of naira they will lavish on the electorate. On their part, the voters do not see why these politicians should not win or lose by paying through their nose, since in less than four years both elective and appointive political office holders enrich themselves with oil and taxpayers money ...

They acquire in a few years what they would not in their lifetime outside politics. ... Experience has shown that a materialistic electorate vote overwhelmingly for an obviously wrong candidate. When an electorate sells its conscience by accepting a gift from the wrong candidate, it cannot have the courage of its convictions to point out his poor or non-performance and inadequacies."

This radio broadcast clearly illustrates my argument and data findings that money is the most important factor of influence in Nigerian politics both on the politicians - during party nomination - and on the electorate during elections.

The 'materialistic voter' is the elite, but in our survey the urban poor, the unemployed young school leaver and the traditional villagers are even more prone to accept bribes from the politicians. The electorates voting 'overwhelmingly' for the wrong candidate implies that the mass media and political issues are comparatively irrelevant in influencing voters' participation and voting.

He then concludes: electorates should now be better informed about what makes a 'good candidate'. The journalist and the media are the key to truthful information.

15/7/83

A Guide on How to Avoid Rigging during the General Election of 1983¹⁰

Text:

Everyone should follow FEDECO 1979 presiding officers, and polling clerks and party agents should set out clearly. Also

checks should be made that voters would not vote twice, discuss their voting, vote by proxy, etc. Supervision of counting should be strict, honest and trustworthy. The police should be involved in a responsible way.

Awuzie's concern was for a fair and free election.

1/7/83

A Good Government and its People¹¹

Text:

Good administration means clear cut objectives and a coherent programme. Imo State has the best record of all of these, except perhaps Lagos State. Imo State's success is due to the NPP leader, Chief Sam Mbakwe and his assistants. Their success is even greater when compared with the harsh former military government leader, General Obasonjo, who did not help Imo State at all. Even now, the President does very little for Imo State but promises and does much for other states. Ozidi demands that the federal government should assist in the development of education in Imo State by spending more money on it. Some people believe that the federal government has done a good job, but Ozidi thinks it is a 'value judgement'.

He conclude "the people are hungry. Most of them have no shelter. Their businessness are virtually ruined. There is a scandalous mass unempolyment rate in the country."

12/7/83

The Nigerian Police and the 1983 General Elections

Text:

Issues of law and order are very important to the public. The success of the elections depends on how prepared the police and the FEDECO are. 'The role of the police is to ensure fair and free elections'. This is crucial, especially as the election hots up. Increased political thuggery compelled Shagari to make the 17/5/83 speech and to hold a meeting with the Council of States.

The Imo State governor, Sam Mbakwe said that "free and fair elections could only be assured if members of the police force

were disciplined, patriotic and committed to the preservation of the sovereignty of Nigeria." A similar statement was made by the Bendel State governor, Alli. The police were also committed towards ensuring free and fair elections in 1983, for instance, the Ogun State commissioner of police, Alabi Adeyemi and Imo State police commissioner, made it clear that they were committed to eradicate thuggery and political violence before and during the elections.

The text considers that it was the responsibility of the police to ensure fair and free elections in 1983.

13/7/83

The Austerity and its Effects on the Lives of Nigerians¹³

Text:

The National Assembly decision in April 1982 to let Shagari have a free hand in improving the economic situation nearly led to disaster. Only a few people were able to be involved in foreign trade. Foreign goods became very hard to get, including raw materials for the industries. Thus domestic industries were hard hit. Okibedi then called for a halt to austerity measures or else the nation would face a catastrophe. After 22 years of independence, he said, hunger, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, political violence, and strikes abundantly prevail in Nigeria. Agriculture is poor and business in general fast declining. High import duties make it more difficult for the economy to expand. All these have contributed to smuggling and the black market, which in turn increases inflation. An unhealthy economy also leads to heightened political tension. Shagari must do something - restore importation of essential commodities and jobs.

The Okibedi radio broadcast was an attack on Shagari's austerity measures. In his view, austerity measures had failed, and caused great hardship, hitting normal citizens and businessmen, and led to a large black market which made things worse and therefore must be changed.

19/7/83

The Politicians and the Electorates Demands¹⁴

Text

There are a lot of election promises, says Igwe, but what good are they? Do political aspirants think that the electorates believe their wild promises?" He suggested that the Nigerian electorate may not be that politically mature but they are not all that stupid either. He points out that it is the same politicians who cause the huge rises in food prices which led to a large number of families unable to afford to feed themselves.

A good government provides welfare for the masses, but the problem with Nigerian politicians is that they would not face up to the problems - they were always looking for scapegoats - what I call 'easy' political options'. Despite some autonomous economic action by State governments, the Nigerian federal government controls the major part of the economy and therefore should be responsible for the masses.

He approaches the failure of the federal government from a very narrow issue based on non-provision of welfare to the masses. He does not look at specific reasons why the federal government does not provide welfare to the masses.

Summary

3 main questions:

- i) What was the major cause of the demise of the First Republic?
- ii) Were the crises in the '60s avoidable by looking at political theory and practices?
- iii) What lessons from the elections?

Text:

In 1960, Nigeria promised an era of democracy, good government and rapid national development, but in reality there was a 'rape of democracy, maladministration, political unrest and civil war'.

These were mainly due to selfish interests, ambition for political power, etc. Also, the elections were never fair and free. Both federal and regional elections were rigged, gross irregularities and thuggery prevailed. The Nigerian Electoral Commission was incompetent. Thus, resultant social unrest and political confusion led to military intervention.

Whenever elections are not free, the newstalk maintained that the government lacks legitimacy to create favourable political climate. Revolt and political unrests follow. Therefore the experience of the First Republic warns us to be very careful during forthcoming 1979 elections. Politicians, electoral officers and voters must, therefore, observe new rules in order to make elections free and fair, which would determine other developments.

The text mainly stressed that elections must be free and fair, otherwise it is impossible to have a legitimate government. Politicians, electoral officials and voters must all be honest.

Summary of Broadcast:

Outcome of election will depend on officials. The failure in the pre-1966 elections was largely due to the partisan politics of electoral officials who employed various types of malpractices. All these malpractices led to disillusionment in electoral processes. General Murtala Muhammed's speech addressing Constituion Drafting Committee on October 8th, 1975 stated the basic requirements of the committee - to make the election fair and free. The text's general emphasis once more was on how important honest electoral officials should be in establishing civil democracy in Nigeria.

July 7th, 1979 - Election 1979 - The role of the voters³⁷

Text:

Today, first of the five elections to usher in a civil and democratic elected Nigerian Governemnt after 13 years of military rule. Everyone can vote, irrespective of religion, class or position, etc. If you are an eligible voter, you have a privilege, obligation and responsibility to vote. Proper vote would ensure democracy in Nigeria. By voting, the voter overthrows evils in Nigeria - injustice, unemployment, nepotism, bribery, etc.

Voters should not be blinkered by religious bigotry, or by ethnic-bias etc. Only good candidates should be voted for. Mainly a call for those aged 18 and above to vote.

July 8th, 1979 - Election 1979 - The winner and the loser³⁸

Text:

General Obsango asked party leader in December 1978 to be 'sporting' if they lose the election. To the winners, victory carries responsibility - the election promises 'humility and magnanimity in victory' and no arrogance etc. must be shown. While taking part in election you should have developed the spirit of 'sportsmanship' - be able to 'take your defeat

gallantly'. The general call to politicians was sportsmanship and accepting defeat gracefully and victory without being arrogant. Similar spirit encouraged by Aminn Kano in 1983 - 'Politics Without Bitterness'.

July 9th, 1979 - Election 1979 - The correct meaning of leadership³⁹

Text:

Those to be elected will be the founding fathers of new style of government (presidential). Hopefully this will lead to peace for Nigeria. Interpretation of leadership in Nigeria has been wrong - it does not mean lordship and position for amassing wealth without anybody questioning it or being in an ivory tower. Rather it means 'to guide in direction, course, action, opinion, etc.'

Some accompanying practices are questionable. Ordinary Nigerians want leadership candidates to reassess themselves. Citizens do not want selfish and arrogant leaders but hard working, humble, just and honest. Election promises - good roads, pipe-borne water, health services, free education - are basic rights of citizens and any money supposed to go to such projects must all go to them. When awarding contracts, the new leaders should be more careful than previously. The text brought together many issues, then a general call to leaders (and political aspirants) to be honest, fair and just.

July 13th, 1979 - Election 1979 - A post-mortem of the first round⁴⁰

Text:

Last week's senatorial elections gave courage to those standing in future elections. Problems of FEDECO and political parties should now be identified and hopefully remedied. Only 45 million out of 48 million registered voters voted in the first round. The Public Enlightenment Committee was blamed for failing to educate urban and rural dwellers on how to vote. It concentrated too much on mass media, forgetting that most rural dwellers have neither radio nor TV. The Public Enlightenment

Committee should have gone to the villages to give in depth instructions. (This broadcast showed a clear need for a network of political communication so that large numbers of people would turn up at the poll). The broadcast points out other factors that led to confusion in the 13th July 1979 first round of elections. Too much emphasis on personality of presidential candidate - Zik, Awo, Amno Kano, Shagari, etc. A lot of people knew nothing of the functions etc. of senators. Therefore, voting was based on party choice rather than on the individual senators. In the forthcoming elections, candidates should make themselves known to the electorates and not just chiefs and local government chairman (another important point in relation to the relationship between ego (political candidate), action-sets and the voters in our concept of political communication network of links within African context and Imo State in particular).

Consequently, the broadcast concluded that the actual siting of polling stations led to confusion, leading many voters to go home after a number of unsuccessful attempts to vote. Also a number of electoral officials did not turn up. It points out that politicians and media should properly educate the electorate to promote more participation.

July 14th, 1979 - Election 1979 - The second round⁴¹

Text:

Keeps stressing how it is the voter's civil responsibility and right to vote. some of the problems voters had to encounter - finding the right polling statinos, delays by officials, rain, sun etc. ... were named. The peaceful atmosphere was taken as indicative of political maturity and Nigerians' commitment to a democratic government. (This is a concept proved wrong by the civil government 1979-83. This is a failure to note that the peaceful atmosphere was the result of army control of these elections). The text postulates by rejecting the theory of collective political bargaining where "state, class or ethnic origin transcend the good of the nation". There was, as usual, a general call for voters to vote.

In 1975, General Murtala Muhammed announced a five-point programme to ensure smooth transition to civil rule, namely:

- i) the settlement of more states creation (from 12 to 19 states) and the appointment of 49 members Constitution Drafting Committee.
- ii) Reorganisation of local government system and establishing constituent assembly.
- iii) Ban on political activities lifted.

- iv) & v) 2 elections

The text mentioned that despite assurances from FEDECO that rigging of the 1979 election is impossible, there are allegations of it, eg in Lagos, the President of the Electoral Commission, Mrs. Yetunda Gbadebo, ordered the arrest of a polling officer on the election day in connection with electoral malpractices. Three ballot boxes reported missing at the end of senatorial election. There was a heavy plea to all involved to make the election fair, warning that otherwise results will be disastrous for Nigeria.

In all these broadcasts, there was a total absence of direct attack on an individual or particular political parties or groups. There was expressed anxiety for peaceful elections, so that the army would leave power for the civilians. The need not to provoke vengeful reaction through the media was one of the implicit early requests by the military. Similar broadcasts on the 1983 general elections will be examined and their content compared. As the political atmosphere changed, so did media content on general elections. The next chapters will use available data to analyse the relationship between different network groups, the political system and the media in reference to the 1983 general elections.

APPENDIX FIVE

QUESTIONNAIRE

A. Please write on the dotted line or put a tick in the box for each correct answer like this: ✓

7. What is your marital status? (Tick one)

Single, unattached

Engaged or going steady

Married but no children

Married with children

1. Where do you live?(State whether village or town and give name): (Tick one)

Village Town Name
.....

8. How many brothers and sisters have you got? (State number in box)

Brothers

Sisters

2. What is your state of origin? (Give the name on the dotted line below)

.....

3. How long have you lived in the village or town? (Tick as appropriate)

	<u>Town</u>	<u>Village</u>
10-15 years
16-20 years
21-30 years
31-40 years
41-50 years
51-60 years
61-70 years
70+

4. What is the ethnic origin of your parents and yourself? (state below):

<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Self</u>
.....

5. What is your sex?

Male Female

6. How old are you? (Tick one box)

10-20 <input type="checkbox"/>	21-30 <input type="checkbox"/>
31-40 <input type="checkbox"/>	41-50 <input type="checkbox"/>
51-60 <input type="checkbox"/>	61-70+ <input type="checkbox"/>

The following set of questions is related to your education, religion and occupation; Tick one box in each column for each answer:

9. What type of educational institution did your parents and yourself last attend?

	Father	Mother	Self
Elementary/primary school	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Post secondary or University	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
None at all	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

10. When did your parents and you as well leave the last academic institution?

	Father	Mother	Self
1-10 years ago	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11-20 " "	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21-30 " "	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31-40 " "	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41-50+ " "	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

11. Who was responsible for your parents' education and yours too? (Financially)

	Father	Mother	Self
Parents	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Relatives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Village/community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Region/State	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The Church	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Federal gov't	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Foreign state/organisation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Self	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

12. Where did your parents and you receive part of your education?

	Father	Mother	Self
Village	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Town	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Britain	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
USA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
France	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
W. Germany	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Canada	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Elsewhere in Africa	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Elsewhere in Asia	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Elsewhere in S. America	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Elsewhere in Europe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

13. What is your parents' and your religion?

	Father	Mother	Self
Roman Catholic	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Protestant	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Non-denominational	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Muslim	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Pagan	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Do not believe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

14. What are your parents' and your own occupations? If your parents are not working or retired, what were their last full-time occupations. Same applies to you:

Parents:	Father	Mother
Job
Grade
Industry

15. What is your occupation?

Job

Grade

Industry

16. Are your parents' jobs and your job permanent?

	Father	Mother	Self
Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

17. How often are your parents or you out of work?

	Father	Mother	Self
Very often	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Rarely	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Never	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

18. Are your parents or yourself self-employed?

	Father	Mother	Self
Yes	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
No	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

19. If your parents or you are self-employed, how many employees under them or you?

	<u>Father</u>	<u>Mother</u>	<u>Self</u>
1-10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21-30	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31-40	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
41-50	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
51-60	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
61-70	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
71-80	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
81-90	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
91-100+	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

20. When your parents or you are out of work, where do they or you stay?

	Father	Mother	Self
Stay in city	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Go to the village city	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Go to another city	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Stay at the same place	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

21. How often do you visit your relatives, friends, etc. in other towns and villages?

	<u>Town</u>	<u>Village</u>
Never	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Less than once a year	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Once a year	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Once a month	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Once a week	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
More than once a week	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

THE FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS IS RELATED TO YOUR SOCIAL LIFE

22 Do you belong to any social organisation such as club, union, society, religious organisation, etc.?

Yes No

23 Has your club got branches in the village as well as in the cities?

Yes No

IF YOU TICK 'NO' TO QUESTION 22, GO STRAIGHT ON TO QUESTION 40.

24 How old is your social club, union, etc.?

1-10 11-20
 21-30 31-40
 41-50 51-60+

25 What is the name of your club, union, etc.?

Name.....

26 What are the membership criteria?

Members of the same kindred

People from the same village

People from the same ethnic group

26 People from the same state

People of the same profession

Any interested Nigerian

Nigerians and foreigners

27 How are your club leaders chosen?

By election

By appointment

28 How often do you hold meetings?

Never Less than 3 a year

Once a year Once a month

Once a week

29 Who makes major decisions in your club, union, etc.?

The leaders

The Committee

30 Is there any time when meetings become more frequent than usual?

Yes No

If you answered 'Yes' to question 30

31 When is this?

National election period (political)

When there is a major on-going project

No special time

32 How do you get information when meetings are to be held?

Through letters

" word of mouth

" radio

" TV

" Press

" Telephone

33 How many of these clubs do you belong to and where are they?

	<u>No</u>	<u>Town</u>	<u>Village</u>
1-5	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5-10	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11-15+	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

34 when there is a major problem in your social organisation, how do you solve it?

A meeting is called and all members discuss the problem

Only committee members look into the problem

Only the chairman or the president decides what to do

35 Do your clubs, unions, associations; etc. establish any relationship with other similar organisation at the

Village level

Township level

Divisional level

National level

International level

36 Who has the most important position within the club in determining relations with outside organisation? (Tick one)

The leaders

Selected members

All members

37 Do you think that your social organisation is:

Traditional

Modern

Combination of both

38 How is your club, association etc. financed?
Voluntary donation

General levy

Village general collections

State government subsidy

Federal government subsidy

All of these

39 In the last civil government, did you belong to any political party? (Tick one)

NPN NPP

UPN GNPP

PRP PPA

NAP

40 What made you join this party?
Party leader/chairman's popularity

Party's policy/manifesto

Party's national achievement

Ethnic reason

Parents' influence

Friends' influence

Your club membership

None of these

41 Do you think your club played active political roles during the civilian rule?

Yes No

42 When are these roles most active?

Election period

All the time

Never

43 Was the last civilian government (Tick One)

Parliamentary system

Presidential system

Autocratic dictatorship

A combination of all these

44 Did you participate actively in politics in:

The city

The village

Both places

45 Did your party compete very strongly with other parties at village level for information and resources? (tick one only)

Yes No

46 What were these resources?

Government fund

Private donations

Influential locals

Social clubs

Tradition chiefs

Local council support

All of these

47 Was the last civil government strongly ethnic oriented?

Yes No

48 Was there any tendency towards inter-ethnic cooperation between parties during election period?

Yes No

49 Which of these three major ethnic groups do you think can form a more lasting political alliance for political stability in Nigeria? (Tick one only)

Hausa/Fulani and the Ibos

Ibo and Yoruba

Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani

Each controlling a separate party

All in one party

50 Do you think that tribal politics is responsible for political instability in Nigeria?

Yes No

51 Do you think that ethnic politics create conflicts in Nigeria?

Yes No

IN THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS, WE ARE MAINLY CONCERNED WITH YOUR VIEW OF THE MEDIA AND HOW YOU USED THEM

52 Do you think the mass media help to create more ethnic, class and social conflicts in Nigeria?

Yes No

53 Which of these means of communication help to resolve political conflicts in Nigeria? (Tick as many as apply)

Radio No
 Newspapers
 Word of mouth

54 Which of these means of communication help to intensify the conflicts? (Again tick as many as apply)

Radio TV
 Newspapers Word of mouth

55 Which of these means of communication is the most reliable for political information? (Tick one only)

Radio TV
 Newspapers Word of mouth

56 Which is the most unreliable medium? (Tick one only)

Radio TV
 Word of mouth Newspapers

57 Do you own any of these? (Tick as many as apply)

Radio TV
 Telephone

58 How many hours a week do you read papers, watch TV, listen to radio or discuss politics with other people?

	1-10 hours	11-20 hours	21-30+ hours
Radio	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
TV	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
News/papers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Conversations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

59 Below is a list of TV channels. Please rank these in order of the frequency with which you choose them: '1' beside the one you use most, '2' for the second, '3' for the third, etc.:

Channel 1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 4 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 5 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 3 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 14 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 8 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 15 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 9 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 16 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 10 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 17 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 11 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 18 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 12 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 19 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 13 <input type="checkbox"/>	Channel 20 <input type="checkbox"/>
Channel 59 <input type="checkbox"/>	

60 Which are the three most important Nigerian newspapers you read for political information(news)? Write their names below in the order of their importance to you:

(a)

(b)

(c)

61 Do you think that the last general election affected your relationship with other people in good or bad ways?

	<u>Good</u>	<u>Bad</u>
Parents	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Relatives	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Friends	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Co-workers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other ethnic groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

62 Was this good or bad relationship due to:

	<u>Good</u>	<u>Bad</u>
Radio broadcast	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
TV "	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Newspaper news	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Word of mouth	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

63 Do you think that the last general election was free and fair? (Tick one)

Yes No

64 What do you think was particularly wrong with the 1983 general elections? (Tick one)

Corruption Tribalism
 Vote rigging Media lies
 All of these

65 Who made things go wrong? (Tick one)

Politicians Business people
 Civil servants Farmers
 Students Clubs
 Christians Muslims
 The media Everybody
 Every organisation

66 Which parties were the most popular and unpopular. One for each column only.

	<u>Popular</u>	<u>Unpopular</u>
NPN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
UPN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PRP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NPP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
NPA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
PPA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GNPP	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

BELOW WE HAVE LISTED SOME PEOPLE, ORGANISATIONS WHICH MIGHT HAVE INFLUENCED YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS AND REASONS FOR PARTICIPATION. PLEASE RANK EACH FACTOR IN TERMS OF THE EFFECT YOU THINK IT HAS HAD ON YOU, BY TICKING ONE BOX FOR EACH FACTOR.

	<u>Factors</u>	<u>Rank of importance</u>				
		Very important	Important	Neutral	Not very important	Unimportant
67	Parents					
68	School/College university mates					
69	Clubs, unions, etc.					
70	Friends					
71	Radio					
72	Relatives					
73	TV					
74	Immediate financial gain					
75	Newspapers					

76 Now please rank each factor in terms of the effect that you think it has on most other people;

<u>Factors</u>	<u>Rank of importance</u>				
	Very important	Important	Neutral	Not very important	Unimportant
77 Parents					
78 School/College university mates					
79 Friends					
80 Clubs, unions, etc.					
81 Tv					
82 Relatives					
83 Radio					
84 Immediate financial gains					
85 Newspapers					

86 Below is a list of people or group you can influence politically and particularly during election campaigns. Please rank them according to the order in which you think you can influence them by writing a '1' in the box beside the group you can most influence, a '2' by the second and so on until '6'.

Parents

School, college/university mates

Relatives

Social club mates

Co-workers

Your children

87 Please read through the following issues, and then put a '1' beside the one which you think had most influence on you and a '2' beside the second most important factor, and so on up to '6'

ISSUES

Maintenance of traditional socio-political values

Support for traditional authority

Economic security for the local communities

Rural economic development, e.g. electrification

Economic growth for Nigeria as a whole

Modernisation of Nigeria

Participation of voters in the democratic process

Elimination of corruption

Free education for all

Increased employment opportunities

More urbanisation

More importation of consumer goods

Expulsion of all illegal immigrants

Political integration

Development of Social Security

More state creations

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Sociology of Mass Media and Politics2.1 Social Research Methods and Some Content Analysis Texts

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