

A Blessing or a Curse?

An Anatomy of the Republic of Cyprus Energy Program

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Meaning
CS	Continental Shelf
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EU	European Union
EUGS	EU Global Strategy
ENR	Bureau of Energy Resources
FIR	Flight Information Region
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IL	International Law
IR	International Relations
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NSS	National Security Strategy
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
RAM	Rational Actor Model
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
SAR	Search and Rescue
SOPs	Standing Operating Procedures
TRNC	Turkish Republic of North Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNCLOS	UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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ABSTRACT

After the Republic of Cyprus announced its intention to proceed to oil and gas exploration and exploitation research activities back in 2011, it entered a transition period during which it has been transformed from an almost exclusively energy consumer to both an energy producer and an energy hub. This transition has already brought (geo)political and economic benefits, but it has also caused the development of a new field of confrontation between the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkey/Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) axis. This latest confrontation has raised the question if the exploitation of hydrocarbons can be considered a blessing or a curse for the Republic of Cyprus, at least before the final settlement of the Cyprus issue.

This thesis aims to contribute to the discussion related to the energy security of the Republic of Cyprus in the aftermath of the decision to proceed to exploration and exploitation researches and, more precisely, during the period between 2013 and 2018 and also, how it has impacted the state's foreign policy crisis management mechanism. To do so, the researcher has based the theoretical context of the thesis on Neoclassical Realism and has used two methods of analysis. With reference to the two methods of analysis, this study has based the collection and analysis of the data required to analyze the thesis research question on Political Discourse Analysis (PDA) and Semi-Structured Elite Interviewing.

Key Words: Energy Security, Foreign Policy Crisis Management, Neoclassical Realism

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

“Kuwait produces oil and Cyprus produces olive oil.”

This study does not claim the originality of this statement, as it is the, unofficial, answer given by a US diplomat, accredited in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) to one of the author’s professors during his postgraduate studies, when he posed the question:

“Why the members of the UN Security Council had a rapid response when Iraq invaded Kuwait in contrast to the case of Cyprus, where the conflict between Cyprus and Turkey is still going on?” Following the statement, it can be assumed that after the RoC announced that Noble Energy consortium would proceed to exploitation research for oil and gas in 2011 (The RoC Ministry of Energy¹, 2017), the international community would have used its influence to ensure that the bilateral relations between the RoC and both Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would improve.

Conversely, though, the discovery of national gas reserves within the RoC Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), instead of contributing to the settlement of the tension between the two sides known as the “Cyprus problem²” it has added a new area of confrontation. More precisely, after 2011, and the RoC intention to proceed to exploitation researches, the confrontation with the Turkey/TRNC axis, apart from the land, has also been extended to include the maritime area, and in particular, in the area that the United Nations (UN) has considered, since the late 2000s, as the RoC EEZ.

With this intensification of the conflict between the two sides as a starting point, the researcher has begun to wonder whether the exploitation of hydrocarbons will finally be a blessing or a curse for the RoC. Konte (2012) and Ploeg (2011) have expressed the opinion that newly discovered energy

1 The full name is Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism and the Ministry’s section dealing with the RoC energy policy is called “Energy Service”. However, given the fact this project focuses on energy related issues strictly for simplification reasons the Ministry will be referred to as “the Ministry of Energy” and the Minister “Minister of Energy”

2 The RoC officials are referring to the tension with Turkey and TRNC as the "Cyprus problem." The researcher, in his intention to lessen the impact both his nationality and profession, may have on the project he has decided to use the term "Cyprus issue."

reserves can be either of these two as each case study is different. They have also argued that the non-ability of new energy producers to use their reserves to increase their welfare and their position in the international arena is primarily linked to domestic factors. Governmental corruption and bribery, deindustrialization and poor economic growth are among the factors that they have presented to prove their argument.

Concerning the RoC, in 2018, when the state's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Nikos Christodoulides, was asked to express his viewpoint on the research question, whether the discovered natural resources can be either a blessing or a curse for the particular state, he appeared certain that it can only be a blessing. He has based his argument on the current and future economic and diplomatic benefits, particularly the gradual regional and international upgrade, that the RoC enjoyed since the first exploitation research in 2011 (OXYgono, 2018). However, at least so far, the heightened tensions between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis contradicts Dr. Christodoulides' argument. The conduction of seismic surveys from this axis within the RoC EEZ and also in 2018, the blocking of an Italian research vessel from conducting exploitation surveys on the sea block 3 are among the facts which demonstrate the increased tensions between the two sides.

Based on the aforementioned, the problematique driving this thesis stems from the contradiction between the statements referring to the economic and diplomatic upgrading of the RoC in the aftermath of the discovery of the energy reserves and the subsequent intensification of the, already tense relations, between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis. Thus, this thesis seeks to act as an alternative reading of the RoC energy program by focusing exclusively on its impact on the state's foreign policy. However, for reasons presented in the upcoming pages, instead of focusing on the RoC energy program as a whole, the author has decided to limit his analysis particularly to energy security and instead of foreign policy in the long-term, or as presented often in literature, the "grand-strategy", to focus particularly on crisis management. Thus, the central research question of the thesis is:

“How has energy security impacted the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy crisis management between the 24th of February 2013 and the 31st of June 2018?”

Also, it is worth mentioning that this thesis rests on two arguments. Firstly, since the announcement of the first exploitation research of the RoC EEZ, there is a link between energy and foreign policy. This argument is based on a plethora of statements made by government officials and analysts (Cyprus Agency, 2018; Christodoulides, 2018 and Anastasiades, 2014). Also and as presented in the third chapter it is an opinion that the majority of the interviewees share. Secondly, like any other foreign policy issue, crisis management is a fluid and rapidly changing thematic module comprising a broad set of variables with their impact differing not only between states, but also even from case to case. The lack of a commonly, or at least widely, accepted theory/model/framework/paradigm acknowledged both by academics and analysts to be able to provide answers to the majority of foreign policy crises has led the author to the conclusion that each case has unique limitations and particularities that we need to take into consideration.

On the other hand, with reference to the reasons for the decision to focus on the RoC energy related issues from 2013 and onwards and not to begin the analysis from 2011, when the first exploitation research took place on the state's EEZ; there are three reasons. Firstly, as presented in the sixth chapter, the majority of agreements, both with states and oil/gas enterprises³, took place between 2013 and 2018. According to the former RoC Ministry of Energy, George Lakkotrypis, until 2011, there was only one license for exploitation, given to Noble Energy enterprise for the sea block 11. Nevertheless, between 2013 and 2018 the RoC has given six exploitation licenses and 18 exploitations took place in the EEZ (RoC Ministry of Energy Hydrocarbon Service, 2019).

Secondly, between 2013 and 2018, we have witnessed a differentiation of the RoC strategy concerning the link between energy and the Cyprus issue.

³ In this project when there is a reference to enterprises activated in the RoC EEZ the research will refer to them as oil/gas enterprises as none of those who have signed contracts with the RoC are activated in one of the two sectors.

In the subsequent chapters the researcher presents data showing that between 2013 and 2015 the RoC governmental officials were applying a similar negotiating strategy as the previous governments. More precisely, even though they were proceeding to exploration and exploitation researches they were using the future energy profits as a means to add pressure both to Turkey and the TRNC to curb their claims on the negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus issue. However, since 2015, we have witnessed the application of a new strategy as the RoC officials tend to separate the Cyprus issue and the state's energy program. More specifically, the RoC officials have decided to proceed to exploitation activities regardless of the opposition, the threats and the proclamations expressed by the Turkey/TRNC axis..

Thirdly, with reference to the end date of the thesis, it was selected due to the fact that on this particular date the Turkey/TRNC axis succeeded to halt, even temporarily, an exploitation research taking place by the ENI enterprise in the sea block 3. The researcher considers the actions and the reasons that have led to this halt to be a point of reference for the subsequent course of the particular energy program.

1.2 The study's originality

Smith (2014) has characterized the contribution to the existing knowledge as the most important concept of a PhD thesis. He has argued that it is the concept that students find the most difficult to understand, and it causes them worries and uncertainty throughout their studies. Thus, Smith has tried to adjust this term with reference to the needs and PhD thesis level. More precisely, he has stated that a PhD candidate must be able to present a study to the committee that has elements to distinguish it from a master's degree dissertation. By the same token, a PhD thesis builds on the existing knowledge by presenting some new findings that someone with higher-level expertise in the field than the candidate, including the examiners, will find interesting and learn something new by reading it. Finn (2005) has referred to specific ways a

thesis can contribute to the existing knowledge. The first, and less probable, is by developing something pioneering, in other words, something that nobody has talked about in the past. The second way a PhD thesis can contribute to the existing knowledge is by finding a gap, either theoretical or empirical, and contributing to 'shrinking' the gap. The third way is by either 'improving' or rejecting the findings of an existing project/theory/paradigm.

This thesis aims to contribute to the existing knowledge through its case study and not its theoretical context. More precisely, this study aims to extend our knowledge of the RoC foreign policy and energy security crisis management. Thus, we have sought to provide an empirical contribution to the existing knowledge through this study.

The first contribution/issue is related to the RoC foreign policy decision-making procedure. As presented in the next chapter, if we exclude the Cyprus issue, not much has been written about the RoC long term foreign policy and even less about the state's crisis management mechanism. This study aims to add to the existing knowledge by explaining how the RoC decision-making mechanism operates, who makes the decisions; who are the people and/or the governmental bodies impacting the decision-maker(s) and the alternatives which they have in front of them when they deal with a foreign policy-related crisis.

Secondly, as this study investigates how the RoC crisis management has been changed between 2013 and 2018, it will also discuss the two strategies that the RoC governmental officials followed in dealing with the opposition by Turkey/TRNC to the former's energy program. As we explain in chapters five and six, until 2015, the RoC governments, led by Christophias and Anastasiades, tended to link the negotiations for the Cyprus issue with the state's energy program. However, since 2015 we observe a tendency to separate the two issues. Following this decision, a debate has arisen between those who consider the division between the two issues necessary and those opposing it (Kyprianou, 2019). As this thesis focuses on a period in which both strategies have been used, we aim to extract conclusions and assess the two strategies in this study.

The third issue in this study which aims to enhance our understanding is directly related to the thesis research question. More precisely, the thesis clarifies how the RoC foreign policy crisis management has been differentiated between 2013 and 2018. We base our analysis on clarifying which parameters have changed during these five years due to the RoC new energy security-related facts. The decision to apply this strategy has been made after the researcher has asked the RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs to clarify and scale the impact of the factors that the Council of Ministers consider before taking either a foreign policy or an energy security-related decision. The Minister replied that each case is examined separately, and there is no predetermined set of parameters or predetermined scaling (OXYgono, 02 July 2018⁴). Based on the Minister's statement, this study has sought to contribute to the discussion by presenting the factors that, based on this study, impact the RoC foreign policy crisis management with the emphasis on energy security-related crises.

Last but not least, even though this thesis aims to base its originality on empirical facts, there is an issue related to IR theory that we consider worth researching. This issue is related to the application of Neoclassical Realism (NcR) on analyzing foreign policy and energy security-related issues. Česnakas (2010) has argued that even when energy security is considered primarily a foreign policy issue, many scholars base the theoretical evidence of their analysis on historical and empirical assumptions. According to our research in the case of the RoC, we have a similar case with the works of Kontos (2020), Adamides (2020) and Tziarras (2020, 2019) being among the exceptions. Thus, this thesis seeks to add to this relatively small body of literature by using IR theory to analyze the RoC energy security-related issues.

1.3 Indicating the thesis limitations

Walt (2018, 1998) has stated that each foreign policy-related case is a complex, fluid, and challenging endeavour, including different parameters

⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qK2gAKyGsn0> (in Greek, available between 1:47:00 and 1:48:55)

stemming from the state's domestic and regional/international environment. Similarly, Hudson (2005) has argued that the complexity and fluidity governing foreign policy analysis requires establishing a set of limitations directly related to the examined case study. Based on the above, this thesis is subject to four limitations.

First of all, it considers that the state decision-makers have two characteristics. At first, as Valerie Hudson (2005: 8) has argued, a state's decision-maker is a "tabula rasa⁵", meaning is not born with pre-existing, innate knowledge, as the knowledge acquired through their academic education, their personal experiences, and their perception of significant issues impact their decisions. Secondly, the decision-maker, especially during a crisis, is a person/group of people which comprise the core of the decision-making procedure; thus, their role is essential for analyzing a particular case (Allison and Zelikow, 1999).

Secondly, a state's foreign and energy policy is primarily self-interested and has as its main goal to safeguard its domestic interests. At least in the case of the RoC, the state's President, Nikos Anastasiades, during a speech at the University of Athens, has confirmed this statement. Anastasiades has, verbatim, said, "even though our [the RoC] intention is to settle all our disputes based on the provisions of the International Law, unfortunately, there are cases where the national interests⁶ outweigh the international law" (Kathimerini, 24 February 2016).

Thirdly, this thesis considers the RoC energy security, at least primarily, a foreign policy issue. In the upcoming chapters, the researcher quotes public statements, non-classified governmental documents, and the results from the interviews showing why this statement is not arbitrary.

Fourthly, it is accepted that public statements, especially those made by high-level governmental officials, are a crucial source of information. At the same time, even the literature accepts that there are issues not discussed in

5 The exact translation of this Latin phrase is "scraped tablet"

6 The researcher is fully aware of the fact that there are different meanings of the term "national interests" and he intends to discuss this issue in the upcoming chapters

public, especially on crises, unless it is either pre-agreed or necessary (Knech, 2010). Also, while interviewing governmental officials, the author has confirmed that often the public statements are prepared by supporting staff, and that the officials make a cross-check to ensure that the statement reflects the government's general policy.

Apart from the limitations mentioned above, there are two additional points that we should discuss. One is related to the language and the other to the data used. Concerning the former, as this project consists of partial fulfilment of the requirements for a doctoral degree at an English based University, the sources used, at least the vast majority of them, must be written in English. Therefore, the researcher has included primary sources written in other languages, mainly in Greek, only in cases where there was no other choice. However, additional sources were used, like public statements and newspaper articles written in English, confirming the original statement even in those cases. Also, through the interviews, there are comments which can confirm, at least partially, the credibility of the statements found only in Greek.

The second additional limitation focuses on the researcher's access to data. It has already been mentioned that the access behind 'the governmental closed doors' is not easy. Thus, confidential agreements between states and the politico-economic bargaining between states and oil/gas enterprises are issues that the author could not access. Moreover, when the interviewees were asked to discuss such issues, the vast majority did not want to answer or tried to avoid answering. Also, some interviewees have answered, but they did not want their answers to be included in the interview form. In the first two cases, the author has already explained that he could not do anything, but in the third, he has tried to confirm the statements through open sources so that the information is not wasted.

1.4 The research strategy and the applied methodology

1.4.1 The thesis research design and the stated objectives

Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016) have argued that a usual order when making an NcR based analysis includes specific actions. At first, they highlighted the importance of identifying the appropriate research question(s) and selecting and applying the proper research methods. Concerning the latter, the three scholars have stated that software can contribute to exploring the extracted data. Another issue on their research strategy includes discussing practical issues related to the examined case as identifying the key actors impacting the contested case study. Lastly, they consider equally important selecting, among the factors NcRs believe that impact the determination of the world politics, those worth discussing on the examined case study.

Based on the research design described by Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016) , we have determined four objectives for answering the study's central question. At first, regarding the identification of the thesis research question, we have already explained the reasons this study aimed to address the following research question:

"How has energy security impacted the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy crisis management between the 24th of February 2013 and the 31st of June 2018?"

The second objective is to select the method/methods we consider the most applicable for collecting and analyzing the data needed for answering the study's research question. This issue is discussed in the upcoming pages of this section. As a third objective, this thesis seeks to investigate the key actors, both people and governmental organs, in terms of the RoC foreign and energy policy with the emphasis on crisis management procedure. The fourth and final objective includes the determination of the factors impacting the examined case study after taking into consideration the particularities of the RoC foreign policy and crisis management due to the new, energy security-related facts since 2013.

1.4.2 Methods of analysis

1.4.2.1 Political Discourse Analysis: A tool to 'filter' the RoC foreign and energy policy related statements

Gray (2017) and Saunders (2011) have argued that there three groups of methods we can use to collect and analyze data. The first is the mono-method, meaning the application of a single method with the selected process being either qualitative or quantitative based. The second is the multi-method, meaning the simultaneous use of at least two methods, and those methods are either qualitative or quantitative based. The third is called the “mixed method” approach and in contrast to “multi-method,” requires the simultaneous use of both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) have argued that a mixed methods research does not aim to replace either the quantitative or qualitative approaches but to take advantage of their strengths and to minimize their weaknesses.

As all three groups include the application of at least one method, the author intends to begin his analysis by presenting the reasons for the decision to apply Political Discourse Analysis (PDA). We recall that according to this thesis, the RoC energy security is an area of study gradually increasing but still underdeveloped, and consequently, the existing, peer-reviewed literature is still relatively weak. Simultaneously though, and in contrast to the academic/secondary sources, there is a respected number of primary sources, including public statements and official documents, focusing on the RoC energy security and its link to foreign policy. Thus, the lack of secondary and the relative abundance of primary sources has led us to the decision to apply a method of analysis focusing on discourse and more specifically on the statements made by the people having an impact on the RoC foreign and energy policy.

With reference to the decision to use political discourse and not any other method of discourse analysis, Schaffner (1996) has claimed that political discourse is a sub-category of general discourse analysis used for analyzed

political statements. Larsen (1997:23) has argued that “political discourse analysis can provide explanations regarding the way actors act and may provide an analysis deeper than the analysis of materialist structures.” To do so, Larsen has described language as a tool. In particular, he has expressed the opinion that “language a transparent medium as it is the closest, we can come in meaning. Whether we make a structuralist or a poststructuralist analysis, the ideas and meanings are always mediated through language” (Larsen, 1997: 14).

Teun A. van Dijk (2003) has taken Larsen’s findings a step further by expressing the view that even though discourse and context can provide data concerning both domestic and foreign policy decisions, the core of political discourse analysis is about the text and talk particularly of the elite people. Based on this, van Dijk has argued that the analysis of the language used both by individual politicians and the political institutions can provide answers on political issues related both to the domestic and foreign policy. However, in contrast to Larsen considering PDA as a method having at its core the linguistic analysis of speeches and documents van Dijk bases his analysis on answering three questions: “Who gives the talk?”, “when was the talk made?”, “which texts and speeches shall we look at?”. This thesis is fully aware of the fact that such an approach might, at least at first glance, seem quite descriptive, however, there are two reasons that have led us to base the study’s analysis on van Dijk’s approach.

Firstly, we share the same view with van Dijk that we need, at least primarily, to concentrate on the discourse and writings of the elite people and political institutions. However, this study takes van Dijk’s argument further, and apart from the elite and the institutions we decided to include in the analysis also the members of the governmental mechanism having a proven impact on the decision-making procedure, as for example, the Head of the Central Intelligence Agency. Secondly, the relative abundance of primary sources related to a state’s energy-related issues, as for example the RoC, can cause an information overload and lead any researcher into false conclusions (Shahsavarani and Abadi, 2015). Thus, this study has sought to apply PDA as

a method that, apart from analyzing the sources can also act as a “filter” so that we can focus exclusively on those sources that can be useful for this thesis. Thus, Van Dijk’s PDA approach bases its analysis on three elements: the context, the time, and the person who gives the talk. To do so, as already mentioned, he has based the selection of sources on answering three questions⁷.

Regarding the first question, “Who gives the talk?”, Teun A. van Dijk (2003) has argued that PDA must begin by clarifying all the actors who are having an impact on the examined case study. Of course, by this, he does not refer to the political actors’ as individuals, but to their statements. Concerning the RoC this article mainly, but not exclusively, focuses mainly on speeches, interviews and public statements made by the President of the RoC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Energy. For the President himself, it is not necessary to explain the reasons this study has focused on his statements. When it comes to the other chosen people, he takes for granted that their public comments reflect the beliefs, strategy, and the goals of the President. Concerning other states, for example, the Republic of Turkey, the author has focused his research on equivalent rank governmental officials with the limitation that also their statements reflect the decision-makers goals of foreign and energy policy objectives and expectations.

Regarding the question, “when was the talk made?”, Van Dijk (2003) had argued that answering questions such as “when” and “to whom”, a politician gave the speech can always be helpful. Driven by the fact that this project focuses on the RoC energy security in the aftermath of the first licensing round for exploitation of hydrocarbons, the vast majority of the texts and statements analyzed in this article are after 2011.

When it comes to the third and final question, “which text or speeches shall we look at?”, through the context of the politicians’ statements and writings, we can appreciate their understanding of different foreign policy issues but also their norms and their political ideology. For the needs of this study, sources

⁷ A sample of the analysis is presented in the Appendix 6

were selected which limited their discussion either exclusively or mainly to the RoC foreign and energy policy. The personal perspectives of the President, the domestic factors determining the RoC foreign policy and energy goals and the role of other states and international organizations, are the main topics that the sources needed to address to be included in this project. Moreover, in the introductory chapter, the researcher has presented the reasons for writing the project in English. Thus, the sources cited must also be written in English, and it has already been stated that an exception is made only for a limited number of sources, written in Greek with the pre-condition that those sources have two particular characteristics. Firstly, they are too important to be ignored, as for example, a speech made by the President of the RoC at the University of Athens where he makes a statement regarding his understanding of world politics. The second characteristic is the lack of availability of sources in English which refer to the same issue, for example, the speech given by the RoC Minister of Defense at the 15th Economic Summit in Nicosia, in 2018, where he has presented the main pillars of the state's defense and security policy.

At the same time though, as with any other method of discourse, there are scholars who question both the credibility and its applicability to foreign policy analysis. Among others, Isabella and Norman Fairclough (2012) have highlighted the lack of a clear distinction between political and other types of discourse analysis. Even though, they share the same opinion with Larsen (1997) that a common view on political science can help, they have expressed the view that this, is not an easy matter. Similarly, Henrik Larsen (1997) has characterized political discourse as a foreign policy structure. However, he has expressed the opinion that there are foreign policy decisions that cannot be explained by applying this structure. Similarly, he has characterized the existing abstraction in foreign policy decision-making too high and has suggested a more in-depth analysis of other factors, such as perception and domestic bargaining, as more applicable.

The weaknesses mentioned above have left the researcher with a dilemma; either trying to conceal the weaknesses of PDA or applying simultaneously a second method. This study has applied a second method and

through it tries to verify or reject the findings originating from PDA. This second method is usually presented in the literature as “semi-structured elite interviewing” (Galleta 2013).

1.4.2.2 Semi-structured elite interviewing

By definition, this is a method of interviewing which bases its analysis on the information collected and analyzed by leading experts on significant themes. Rathbun (2008) has characterized it as a unique method because it has allowed the researchers to ask elite people exactly the questions, to which they wanted to have answers. He has even characterized it as the most direct and targeted method in qualitative based methodology.

According to Wilkinson and Birmingham (2003), this form of interview is applied when other research tools seem inappropriate. At the same time, though, they have highlighted the fact that this method is far more resource-intensive than others, as this type of interview requires the researcher to elicit information from respondents on a one-to-one basis. Also, it usually lasts longer than any other form of interviewing and can produce vast amounts of data. Moreover, it gives the researcher more of an insight into the meaning and significance of what is happening

Also, it requires an acceptable level of knowledge on the topic that the researcher intends to discuss with them. We share Creswell's (2009) view that data gathering, and analysis is a procedure that can begin on different stages of the project and can last until the very late stages. However, this study has led to the conclusion that interviewing must begin when the researcher has developed an acceptable level of knowledge both in theoretical and empirical issues related to the experts' field of expertise.

Moreover, the questions must, indeed, be semi-structured. Through the questions, the experts must have the opportunity to talk about issues they have in mind. At the same time, though, the questions must be structured in a way that will not allow them to lead the conversation to discussions that are out of the scope of the project. Also, the researcher needs to be aware that the

interviewees set the limits of the discussion. In a previous section, it has been mentioned that even though the members of an elite group can provide beneficial information at the same time though it is much more challenging to make them discuss an issue that they do not want to cover. If you try to push them beyond the limits they have on their mind, there is a high/real chance that they will stop the interview, and they can ask you to erase everything you have written in your form of notes.

Through this method, the author has sought to verify, validate, improve, or even reject his findings that originate from primary and secondary sources. Also, he has sought to strengthen the credibility of the findings that stem from primary and secondary sources and are analyzed under the PDA. As presented in the Appendixes, the topics/themes that this study intends to discuss with the interviewees are the RoC foreign and energy policy, the Turkey/TRNC foreign and energy policy, Greece, Egypt, and Israeli understanding of their bilateral relations with the RoC, including the limits of their cooperation. The last theme discusses the role that the oil/gas enterprises have in the RoC energy security.

For the needs of the study, twelve interviews have been conducted. All of them are considered experts on at least one of the themes presented above. To conduct these interviews, the researcher has applied Wilkinson and Birmingham's (2003) five-stage strategy.

Concerning the first stage, the author, after taking into consideration the aims to fulfill the findings from analyzing primary and secondary sources and also the thesis research question, decided to base his research on the four themes mentioned above, and at the same stage, to include the development of the "Protocol." Its development was proven necessary, as it has strengthened the consistency of the interview and helped the researcher during the "ice-breaker" stage. As one can see in Appendix "2", the Protocol involves a brief presentation of the aims and objectives of the thesis and also the reasons for addressing the interviewee. Moreover, in the last part of the Protocol, the author in his effort to make the interviewees more comfortable concerning the information they will provide through answering his questions, has included an overview related to the precautions in place to safeguard the notes he has

taken during the interviewing procedure.

The second stage has been divided into two substages. In the first section, both the questions and the list with the interviewees were given to two independent reviewers: an academic specializing in foreign policy and a middle-level diplomat. Apart from their opinion on the questions, the author has received feedback regarding the limits of discussion with high-rank governmental officials.

In the second substage, the researcher has proceeded with three pilot interviews: one with an academic, one with an ambassador, and one with the former governmental spokesperson. All three interviews took place in the RoC in February 2018. The pilot interviews investigated whether or not high-rank politicians and technocrats can be approached. Also, whether through the questions, the data needed to fulfill the predetermined tasks could be extracted.

In the third stage, the researcher has compiled a list with the research participants. A crucial stage for the compilation of the list was the "rapport." Sue Knight (2010) has defined the rapport as the ability to connect with others in a way that creates a climate of trust and understanding. It is also the ability to appreciate other's opinions, to understand and accept other's feelings. As already mentioned, especially with elite political and technocratic experts, it was vital to create a climate of trust so that they can provide the information needed for the project. A small number of interviewees were either family friends or former academics during the researcher's postgraduate studies. Some of these interviewees have also contributed to the completion of the study by introducing the researcher to others. For example, the active Ambassador of the RoC in Egypt has introduced the researcher to the Permanent Secretary of the RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In all the cases, the researcher has tried to make the first contact in a place where the interviewees felt comfortable. For example, concerning the academics, he decided to attend conferences where they were participants or to attend lectures they have given. However, for other people, it was not possible to have the first meeting in person; and the first contact was made through LinkedIn. The author has chosen LinkedIn and not any other social media network (e.g., Facebook, Instagram) because it is a professional

network through which someone can present information related to your professional and academic status. The last section of this stage has included the submission for approval to "The Ethical Advisory Committee of the Middlesex University." Both the list of interviewees and the questions were approved in June 2018.

The fourth stage includes conducting the interviews, and it has been organized in the course of several short trips to the RoC and a week trip to Athens. Even though the majority of the interviews took place between the second semester of 2018 and November of 2019, the data collection and analysis were a procedure that finished two months before the project's final submission.

The fifth and final stage consists of the data analysis. McMillan and Schumacher (2008) have stated that the data are mainly presented as quotations of participants' language, citing field notes and interview transcripts. Moreover, two aspects of study are presented as data: the context and the quotations of the participants' language. The actual statements of the people observed and interviewed represent the meanings they give to situations and events. The researcher's task is to arrange these views in a logical manner by making participants meanings unmistakable and clear to a reader. The present stage is divided into data organizing and data analysis.

Concerning the former, the researcher has decided while interviewing the experts to pick up handwritten field notes and at the soonest possible opportunity, usually within the next 48 hours, to copy them on MS Word sheets. This stage also has included the data categorization based both on date and context. Moreover, it is necessary to mention that to safeguard the credibility of his findings on each theme he has interviewed at least two experts. Moreover, concerning the bilateral relations with the other states in the region, the researcher has decided to receive feedback from different sides.

Concerning the data analysis, according to Neumann (2012), the context analysis can be done either by hand or by using software. McMillan and Schumacher (2008) have stated that the reports of the interviews originating from any form of interviews and can be presented either as references within

the thesis, as a separate subchapter where the researcher reports all the findings or as a combination of the above, and in this study the third method has been applied.




Chart 1: The project's interviewing strategy

On the other hand, this project bases the data analysis on the NVIVO software. According to Bazeley and Jackson (2013) the NVIVO software can contribute to the completion of a project by managing data, including organizing and keep tracking/keeping track of a considerable amount of "messy" data. Also, by managing ideas, to organize and provide access to conceptual and theoretical knowledge generated from the project. Moreover, through NVIVO we can query data, to ask in simple terms, complex questions stemming from the data and provide straightforward answers on the same issues, report from data and visualize them even through charts.

Apart from all the strong points presented above, and also the fact that

NVIVO is mentioned in a considerable number of articles and books as a reliable software for qualitative data analysis, the researcher has decided to apply the particular software for an additional reason. Middlesex University has provided NVIVO to the researcher for free and has also provided him with both class and online training.

1.4.3 Data related to the thesis limitations

Neuman (2007) has argued there are two ways to analyze and present data, either compiled together in a single section/chapter or in different parts of a study. This study has decided to choose the second approach, and in this section, we focus on the results either confirming or rejecting the thesis limitations presented in a previous section. By confirming or rejecting the limitations directly related to the examined case study, we seek to clarify how our understanding of the state's foreign and energy policy conforms or contrasts to the view of the state's government officials. This confirmation or rejection is considered necessary to avoid misperceptions and consequently into irreversible errors in the upcoming chapters.

Thus, we have decided to analyze and report the data by using the given capability by NVIVO software. To begin with and as presented in Appendix "2," interviews have been conducted with 12 people, considered experts in at least one of the five themes presented in Appendix "1". As can be seen in Appendix "3," the first question of each theme has sought to clarify the experts view on a series of statements stemming among others from the study's limitations. However, we have come up against something that can even be characterized as a paradox from the first interviews. It has already been explained that while interviewing elite people, 'the two most prominent dangers' were that the interviewees either would not answer the stated questions or begin saying things that can be irrelevant to the actual core of the particular project. The paradox is that most of them have limited their discussion merely by agreeing or disagreeing with the statements.

To begin with, the first question discusses one of the arguments

highlighted on the first pages of the study, the consideration of energy security as a foreign policy issue. Even though there is a series of public statements made by governmental officials sharing this view, this study attaches so much importance to this issue that it was necessary to ask the interviewees to comment on it. As presented in the following summary table, (Table 1) all the interviewees have stated that the RoC energy security is, at least, primarily considered a foreign policy issue. Ellinas has taken this argument further by stating, "The RoC energy security is primarily a foreign policy issue, even though it should have been at least primarily an economic issue." Another important conclusion stemming from this question contradicts how the RoC officials understand the state's energy security compared to the view of the oil/gas enterprises. Out of the four interviewees who were asked to discuss the enterprises understanding, all of them assured the researcher that for the oil/gas companies, energy security is primarily an economic issue, and they have no intention of intervening in the bilateral relations/tensions between states. Kiourtsoglou has also stated that the enterprises, if they realize their economic interests are threatened due to a crisis between states, have no problem stopping or even cancelling an energy deal.

Regarding the experts' view concerning the role of the RoC President in the foreign policy, including the energy, decision-making procedure in general and the crisis management in particular, 9 out of the 12 interviewees have agreed that the President can be considered the central player in the RoC decision making procedure. The three interviewees who have expressed their opposition to this statement have stated that the President and the Cabinet are the central players.

With reference to the President's impact on the RoC energy security crisis management procedure, all the interviewees have characterized the role of Anastasiades as supervisory. More precisely, the interviewees have argued that the President of the RoC gives the governmental officials who are responsible for dealing with a crisis a general framework of action and supervises the entire procedure that goes according to his guidance. Moreover, Lt. General Pentaras and Ms Michael have characterized Anastasiades "as a

charismatic leader who uses the role and authorities conferred on him by the state's Constitution in all types of crises, including the energy security-related ones."

The following two questions discuss the relations between the RoC and other states in the region since 2013 and the former's decision to proceed to exploitation research activities. Whether the exploitation of hydrocarbons can be either a blessing or a curse for the RoC, more than 70% of the interviewees have expressed the argument/view that it can be either of the two. Moreover, as presented in the results in Appendix "3", the rest of the interviewees have characterized it as a blessing while no one has argued that it can be only a curse. This thesis must also mention that we have been surprised by the fact that the view of the RoC Minister of the Foreign Affairs contradicts that of other advisors of the President . More specifically, the Minister has argued that the exploitation of hydrocarbons can only be a blessing. In contrast, the member of the RoC Geostrategic Council, Dr Adamides, the members of the RoC energy policy Council, Prof. Poullikas and Prof. Boustras, the former Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, Lt Gen. Pentaras and the current Head of the President's Diplomatic Office, Ambassador Kouros have all expressed the opinion that a series of different factors will determine whether it can be a blessing or a curse.

When the interviewees were asked to express their views of whether the RoC energy program may increase the tension in the Eastern Mediterranean region, very few, 2 out of the 12 respondents have indicated that the RoC energy program will not increase the tension in the region. However, of the 2 , they both believed that the Eastern Mediterranean is a traditionally geopolitically unstable region; thus, the RoC energy program can act only as an additional means for significant states to safeguard their foreign policy goals.

Additionally, the experts were asked to comment on the relations that two states must have before one of them proceeds to exploitation research. The majority of participants (75%) have expressed that the relations between the states must be at least neutral. A standard view amongst interviewees who have expressed this view was based on the fact that a possible differentiation in the

existing energy security balance can more probably contribute negatively than positively to the bilateral relations between states. Dr Adamides was among the 12 experts who have supported this view. He has even referred to an article he has written in 2015⁸ where he has discussed the reasons, which led him to this conclusion. On the contrary, Dr Ellinas has argued that the economic benefits from the exploitation of energy resources can act as a means for the improvement of the bilateral relations between states, including the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis.

Statement	Researcher's view	Percentage sharing the same view with the researcher
The RoC energy security is primarily?	A foreign policy issue	100%
The President of the RoC can be considered the central player on decision making procedure on foreign and energy policy issues	Yes	75%
The role of the President during an energy security related crisis	Based on the provisions of the Constitution	100%
	Supervisory	100%
The RoC energy program can add tensions in the region	Yes	84,6%
The RoC energy program can contribute to the bilateral relations	Their prior relations are at least neutral	75%

8 Adamides and Christou (2015)

The East Med states have as primary goal to safeguard their national interests	Yes	100%
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Table 1: Comparison between the view of the researcher and that of the interviewees on the study's limitations

The researcher has left for the end, a statement that all the interviewees have shared the same opinion. As shown in Table 1, there is a unanimous agreement that the RoC has its primary foreign policy goal to protect its national interests like any other state in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The most striking result to emerge from the data is that the interviewees share the same view with the President of the RoC, claiming that "in most cases, national interests often outweigh the International Law" (Anastasiades, 2014). However, even though there was a unanimous agreement, the interviewees, excluding those who come from the IR related academia, have avoided defining the term and based their understanding on a descriptive context. As presented to the word tree (Figure 1), those interviewees have considered national interests a subjective term based on the decision-makers viewpoint, and they have sought to contribute to increasing the prestige of the state in the international arena. Notably, for the RoC, the interviewees have limited their discussion by saying that the fulfilment of the national interests is based on the seamless implementation of the energy program and the Cyprus issue.




Figure 1: The interviewees view on the RoC national interests.

Summarizing the above, comparing the results stemming from the interviews with the researcher's view, reveals a significant positive correlation. More precisely, in Table 1, , at least 75% of the interviewees share the same understanding with the author on the issues they were asked to discuss and have been considered the limitations of the thesis . Thus, and as presented on the previous pages, this study considers the stated limitations non-arbitrary and can act as a starting point for analyzing the RoC foreign and energy policy.

1.5 Outline of the thesis structure

This first chapter, following a brief introduction and overview has sought to present the originality of this thesis. Briefly, we recall that this study seeks to make an empirical contribution to knowledge by presenting how the RoC foreign and energy decisionmaking mechanism operates, which are the parameters taken into consideration and the impact both domestic and external actors have in the decision-making procedure. The section1.3 is dedicated to the thesis limitations and how the researcher seeks to overcome the difficulties stemming from them. Section 1.4, discusses the thesis research strategy, including, but

not limited to, the methods used for collecting and analyzing data. In the same section, the researcher presents a series of conclusions based on the interviewees opinion on issues related to the thesis limitations. Also, in Chapter 1 and in order to avoid any misperceptions that can lead this study to false results the researcher restated that his view on fundamental issues related to the RoC foreign and energy policy, for example, who makes the decisions, are in line with those of the interviewees.

The second chapter focuses on the RoC foreign policy and gives an overview of the RoC foreign policy in the post-1974 era and how it has gradually been transformed from "Cyprus issue centric" to that described by both Kasoulides (2018) and Christodoulidis (2018) as "multidimensional" foreign policy. Following this overview, the chapter examines how the RoC foreign policy decision-making procedure operates with an emphasis on crisis management. The role of the state's President, the structure of the governmental mechanism, and the domestic players impacting the decision-making procedure are among the main points of discussion. Then, the thesis discusses the particularities of the decision-making procedure during a foreign policy crisis and the alternatives that the decision-makers have in front of them while dealing with this type of crisis.

The third chapter is dedicated to the study's theoretical background. It discusses four issues: foreign policy crisis management; the IR theory that the researcher considers most applicable to the examined case study; energy security, including energy security crisis management, and the last section focuses on the applicability of NcR on energy security issues. Following the introductory section, there is a general overview of foreign policy analysis followed by an analysis of the aspects differentiating long term foreign policy from crisis management. Section 3.3 discusses NcR with the emphasis given to the factors separating it from the other Realist paradigm, why the researcher considers it the most suitable for this project and how he seeks to overcome the theory's limitations to apply to this study. Section 3.4 focuses on energy security, emphasizing the unique characteristics of 'relatively small power but energy-consuming island states' existing within geopolitically unstable regions.

The section 3.5 is dedicated to the use of NcR in analyzing energy security-related issues by emphasizing the parameters impacting these issues.

The fourth chapter focuses on the RoC energy security and begins by explaining why this thesis has focused on energy security and not on energy policy and also why the focus is on crisis management and not on long term foreign policy. Also, the lack of a clear-cut definition explaining the energy security of the state has led this study to propose a working definition referring mainly to the RoC energy security. The following section emphasizes the RoC energy security-related decision-making procedure. As in the second chapter, the emphasis is given to the President's role, the players consisting of the decision-makers inner circle, and which sectors of the governmental mechanism participate in this procedure. The last section focuses mainly on the RoC energy security crisis management, and clarifies the impact the aforementioned actors and structures have on the crisis management procedure, and presents the alternatives that they have in front of them when dealing with this type of crisis.

The fifth chapter is dedicated to the regional/international actors referred to in the literature as having an active role in the RoC energy program. The chapter begins by presenting how the exploitation of hydrocarbons has affected the bilateral relations with the US and Russia and continues by investigating how the EU as a Union and particular states individually, mainly France and Italy, have dealt with the opposition of Turkey/TRNC to the RoC energy program. Section 5.7 gives an account of the regional actors who have expressed their willingness to support the RoC energy program, including the Republic of Greece and the Arab Republic of Egypt. The following subsection investigates the role that gas enterprises have played in the dispute between the RoC and Turkey/TRNC axis, while the subsection 5.7.2 focuses exclusively on the Turkey/TRNC axis and why they consider the RoC energy program a threat to their interests.

In the sixth chapter, the author discusses the RoC capabilities, with the Section 6.2 focusing on the economic and diplomatic and informational capabilities that the state has developed since 2013. Section 6.3 focuses on

the state's military capabilities and how those have been differentiated, particularly after 2015. The last subsection discusses one of the issues that this project seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge, the limits of support regional states, the US, the EU, and the oil/gas enterprises that want and/or can provide to the RoC in its energy security-related dispute against the Turkey/TRNC axis.

The seventh chapter is dedicated to two issues. The first section analyzes the RoC energy program by focusing on the three licensing rounds, the enterprises involved in the particular program, and the alternative ways and routes discussed for transferring the reserves to the EU market. The last section focuses on the RoC energy security-related facts that took place between 2013 and 2018. The bilateral agreements, the crises that took place within the RoC EEZ with the Turkey/TRNC axis, and both the successful and failed attempts of the Turkey/TRNC to halt the energy program of the RoC EEZ are among the main points of discussion in this chapter.

The eighth and last chapter begins by presenting a series of concluding remarks and continues with the contribution of this thesis to the existing knowledge, while the following section is dedicated to answering the thesis research question. Briefly, the answer is based on examining the differentiation of the variables which were presented in the third chapter that impact the states foreign policy behavior and how those have been differentiated during the period 2013-2018, which is the focus of this thesis . We also present a series of actions that this study believes should be undertaken by the RoC officials to increase the state's foreign policy crisis management capabilities. The last section includes a set of theoretical and empirical issues that are recommended for further research.

Revisions in Chapter 1

1. Revision the examiners asked:

“The originality of your thesis will come from your case study rather than trying to invent your own unique theoretical approach. As you said in the viva, not much has been written theoretically about Cypriot foreign policy, so a more straightforward analysis of how energy has affected this- drawing on IR theory- will still be interesting and original”

Revision made

The researcher has changed the section referring to the thesis contribution to the existing knowledge (pp.15-18) by explaining that this study seeks to make an empirical-based contribution to the existing knowledge. Briefly, we have explained that the thesis originality stems from the analysis of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) foreign policy. In fact, the researcher has based the thesis originality on the limited peer-reviewed literature which focuses on the state’s foreign policy both in the long term and crisis management, excluding the Cyprus problem [issue]. Also, as the available literature discussing the RoC foreign policy is even more limited and usually sporadically this is another area on which this study bases its originality . Moreover, according to the researcher’s findings energy security, even when considered a foreign policy issue, is usually analyzed under the scope of empirical and historical assumptions, while the application of IR theory is somewhat limited. The third issue this study seeks to contribute to the existing knowledge by explaining how Neoclassical Realism can be used for analyzing the RoC crisis management on energy security related issues.

2. Revision the examiners asked:

“The thesis needs to be written in a way that takes the reader through the work in a readily understandable and logical manner that makes sure that

appropriate information is presented at the right moment. At the moment, much of this information is already there. However, it is presented in a very disjointed manner that is very hard to follow for anyone who does not know Cyprus well.”

Revision made:

The thesis was rewritten almost from scratch. As presented in the section outlining the thesis structure (pp. 35-41) the second chapter makes an overview on the RoC foreign policy between 1974 and 2018, the third is the discusses the thesis theoretical background and the fourth the RoC energy security between 2013 and 2018. The fifth chapter discusses all states, organizations and enterprises having an impact on the RoC energy security while the sixth chapter focuses on the capabilities the RoC has developed between 2013 and 2018, subject to its energy program. Also, in the same chapter two sections are dedicated to the limits of support states, organizations, and enterprises can/want/seek to provide to the RoC on case of a military escalation due to energy security related issues with the Turkey/TRNC axis. The seventh chapter is dedicated to the energy security-related events on the RoC EE between 2013 and 2018. In the last chapter (chapter 8) of the thesis, the researcher answers the study’s research question, makes some concluding remarks, and presents some issues that he believes need further research .

3. Revision the examiners asked:

“Stylistically, the work also needs some refinement. At the moment, it sometimes comes across more like a policy report than a Ph.D. thesis. For example, while bullet points can be a good explanatory tool when used sparingly, they are used far too much. Likewise, diagrams should be used only when necessary.”

Revision made:

All bullet points have been removed.

No diagrams in this chapter

4. Revision the examiners asked:

“Abandon the eclectic approach and look to examine the whole thesis through one theoretical perspective”.

Revision made:

This study has been formed on way basing its theoretical background on a single IR theory, Neoclassical Realism.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND:

The RoC Foreign Policy

(1974-2018)

2.1 Introduction

In the introductory chapter, we have stated that one of the thesis objectives is to determine the key actors and how the RoC foreign policy operates by emphasizing on crisis management. The key actors, their impact on the decision-making procedure and the governmental mechanism organs involved are among the main topics of discussion in the chapter. However, there are two additional reasons why this study has dedicated a chapter to this issue.

Firstly, this study is not addressed exclusively to people with a high level of expertise on the RoC foreign policy. Thus, we consider it necessary to begin our analysis by outlining the traditional directions of Cypriot foreign policy and by explaining how the state's formal foreign policy decision-making mechanism is structured. This analysis sets out the essential information required to make sense of the analysis that comes later in the thesis.

Secondly, this study shares the view given by Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann (2009) that there has been very little severe and sustained work done on the process of political development in Cyprus, with the work published in English being even more limited. They have taken their argument further by expressing the view that most of the writings discussing the RoC politics focus their efforts on analyzing and explaining the Cyprus problem [issue]. They have characterized such studies as overdue, given the profound changes following the accession to the EU. The author shares their view and seeks to evaluate their observation through an additional point. The available literature that focuses, at least mainly, on the RoC foreign policy decision making procedure in general and crisis management, in particular, is even more limited. The works of Tziarras (2019), Kasoulides (2018), and Efthymiopoulos and Tziaras (2014) are among the very few sources we have found.

Thus, before proceeding further, the researcher dedicates this chapter describing his understanding of the RoC political system and particularly how the foreign policy crisis management mechanism operates. To do so, this chapter is divided into three sections. The upcoming section focuses on the RoC foreign policy strategy, and how it has been transformed between 1974

and 2018. The section 2.3 focuses on the people responsible for the RoC foreign policy, emphasizing the decision-making procedure. The next section is dedicated to foreign policy crisis management and discusses who are the people and the governmental organs having an impact on the crisis management procedure.

2.2 The RoC foreign policy: From the “Cyprus-issue centric” traditional direction to the new “multidimensional” strategy

It is accepted both among scholars and government officials that the Cyprus issue has massively determined the state's domestic politics and the relations with other states since 1974. In fact, this study believes that the Cyprus issue until 2004, had almost monopolized the state's foreign policy and, consequently, the peer and non-peer reviewed literature. However, since the state acceded to the EU, we have gradually witnessed a differentiation of what this study calls "Cyprus issue centric" foreign policy. More precisely, this study believes that from 1974 until 2018, the RoC foreign policy can be divided into the following three periods:

- From December 1974 until 1 May 2004,
- From 1 May 2004 until the February of 2013 and
- From February 2013 and onwards.

Concerning the first period, the researcher quotes it from the date the constitutional legitimacy was restored in the territory controlled by the RoC in the aftermath of the military operations that took place on the island between the Greek Cypriot and the Greek armed forces on the one side and the Turkish armed forces together with the Turkish paramilitary forces on the other. This thesis sets the 7th of December 1974, as a starting date, because this was the date that the state's elected President, Archbishop Makarios III, returned to office. It is beyond the scope of this study to focus on this period; thus, we limit the discussion to saying that during this period, the state's foreign policy was aiming to internationalize the Cyprus issue by accusing Turkey of invading the

island and by aiming to secure a series of UN Resolutions (Michael, 2009). Subsequently and especially after Makarios's death on 3 August 1977, all the Presidents who have succeeded him followed a similar strategy and simultaneously proceeded to direct negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots through UN-sponsored intercommunal talks.

When it comes to the second period, the study believes it begins on 1 May 2004, the date that the RoC achieved its accession in the European Union. However, the transition from the first to the second phase was not so immediate and for the first years after the accession, the RoC foreign policy strategy continued to remain "Cyprus issue centric" even within the EU institutions. According to Kasoulides (2018), it was common practice during the early years of the EU accession for the representatives of the RoC in all the Union's fora to limit their discussion only to the issues related to the negotiations for the accession of Turkey in the Union focusing their effort to add diplomatic and economic pressure to the former. However, at least so far, for reasons analyzed in the fifth chapter, the EU, both as a Union but also as independent states, consider Turkey too valuable to act as the pre-expected catalyst for resolving the Cyprus issue (Diez, 2000; Stavridis and Kassimeris, 2013). As a matter of fact, during the early years of the EU accession, the Union's support remained as a rhetorical discourse with the Union often 'hiding' behind the UN-led intercommunal negotiations (Stavridis, 2008).

Of course, it should be mentioned that the RoC has won some 'diplomatic battles'. More precisely, even though the negotiations for Turkey's accession to the Union are still ongoing, according to the researcher's view, the most significant achievement of the RoC diplomacy during this period was to freeze, after a joint request with France, a number of chapters considered necessary for a state to become a full member of the EU. Also, it is worth referring to the 21st of September 2005 EU counterstatement. In this counterstatement, among other issues referring to the Ankara Protocol we highlight two issues. Firstly, it makes clear to Turkey, that both the European Community and its Member states recognise only the RoC as a subject of international law (IL) in the island. In other words they do not recognise the TRNC as a sovereign state. Secondly,

Turkey does not recognize the RoC as a sovereign state with all the rights it has as a subject of the IL. Thus, through this counterstatement the EU reminds Turkey that the recognition of all the member states of the Union is a necessary component for the accession process.

However, especially after 2008, we have witnessed a gradual turning of the RoC strategy within the EU, and an attempt to have an active involvement in the Union's institutions (Kasoulides, 2018). Even though this new strategy has appeared in public during the Anastasiades presidency and, more precisely, during a lecture he gave at the LSE in 2014, it would be an omission not to mention that the first steps were made during the presidency of Dimitris Christophias, between 2008 and 2013. To prove this argument, we quote two statements made by senior governmental officials during the period mentioned above.

The first statement was made by the, then, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Markos Kyprianou, during an International Conference titled: "The Mediterranean and the new-euro Mediterranean perspective" on 9 October 2009. As Kyprianou stated: "The aim of the revamped "partenariat" is the more practical implementation of the cooperation among Mediterranean partners...Only through cooperation we can attain a synergy of our efforts for the common economic, social and political development" (PIO, 2020) The second statement was made by the governmental spokesperson, Mr. Stefanos Stafanou, on 3 April 2009 when he was asked to comment on the relations between the RoC and the Obama presidency. More precisely, Mr. Stefanou quoted: "We have said that the RoC and especially this government is interested in developing relations with various states based on the International law and especially with powerful states like the US, which can contribute to the Cyprus problem [issue] as well as to the development of other fields of cooperation between the two states." (PIO, 2020)

Through the statements quoted above, the researcher has concluded that the RoC after 2008, has gradually sought to have a more active role in the Mediterranean region and to improve its relations with the United States. A generalization of these conclusions shows the state's intention to acquire a

more active role in the region, including the EU member states, and its relations with particular states, the often referred to in the literature as "superpowers" (Jackson and Sorensen, 2007). This new approach makes the author believe that it has acted as a bridge for the transition from the traditional "Cyprus issue centric" approach of the previous four decades to the third and current subperiod of the RoC foreign policy.

According to the current Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Anastasiades presidency, from February 2013 and onwards, the RoC has gradually entered a period of a polythematic foreign policy strategy often referred to by governmental officials as "multifaced strategy" (Christodoulides, 2020). According to Kasoulides (2018), changing the strategy was a one-way solution after understanding that both within the EU and when contacting other states regionally, they all started to show their dissatisfaction with the RoC approach of relating all discussions to the Cyprus issue. Through the new approach, the RoC seeks to upgrade its role in the international arena and gain multi-area benefits, including the Cyprus issue (Christodoulides, 2016). According to Christodoulides (2020 and 2018) and Anastasiadis (2014), this new RoC foreign policy strategy is based on four pillars.

First of all, finding a solution to the Cyprus issue. What changed during this period was that, from the only topic of discussion on the state's foreign policy agenda, the Cyprus issue has gradually been transformed into the first issue on the agenda. Secondly is enhancing the RoC bilateral relations with the states comprising the Eastern Mediterranean and the states in both the Middle East and the Gulf. According to Christodoulides (2020), the RoC built its bilateral relations by developing shared interests in different areas, including energy security. The third pillar includes the more active involvement of the RoC within the EU. According to Kasoulides (2020), the RoC, after assuming the Presidency of the EU, has worked methodically to have a more active role in the Union's decision-making procedure in different areas. The active involvement in the EU Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the enclosure in the Union's energy security strategy, as a prospective energy producer, are issues that the researcher seeks to discuss in the upcoming

chapter and indicates that indeed the RoC aims to have a more active role in the EU. The fourth pillar is related to strengthening relations with the five permanent members of the UNSC and other players both in the region and globally. Following a similar strategy as with other states, the RoC officials have sought to build their relations with the five states on joint interests and not limit the discussion exclusively to the Cyprus issue. It is important to note that energy has contributed to improving the relations between the RoC and particularly the US and France. However, this is an issue this study aims to discuss widely in the upcoming chapters.

At the same time, this study indicates that the RoC geostrategic location, at a crossroad of three continents, and its energy program are the main drivers on which the RoC has based its willingness to change the traditional "Cyprus issue centric" to a polythematic foreign policy. Within the scope of shared interests with particular states and organizations as presented in the previous chapter, the RoC has sought to use the two means to increase its position in the international arena.

Concerning the geostrategic location, this study cites / a speech given by the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Erato Kozakou Markoulis, in Washington DC at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars think tank titled: «Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean: Strategic location, strategic opportunities» on 20 December 2011. Briefly, the Minister has argued that, throughout the centuries the Cypriots have suffered due to the island's geostrategic location at the crossroad of three continents as it has always attracted the interests of the Great powers in the struggle for influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, she has also argued that the island's location can increase the peace, security, and stability in the region, especially after the RoC accession in the EU (Wilsoncenter, 11 December 2011). It is worth noting that this speech was among the first public statements made by governmental officials with reference to the hydrocarbons existing on the state's EEZ. Briefly, Dr. Kozakou – Markouli has expressed the view that energy can be used to solve the Cyprus issue, which was the position presented by the governmental officials either directly or indirectly until 2014.

About energy and its contribution to the development of the state's new foreign policy strategy, the study recalls two statements made by the RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009 and 2010 after two meetings with the then, US Secretaries of state. The first statement was made by the RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Markos Kyprianou, on 9 April 2009 in Prague. The Minister has stated: "Of course we have talked about the Cyprus problem [issue]... there are also other important bilateral issues that we have discussed and how the RoC can contribute to regional issues as an EU member state" (PIO, 9 April 2009). Two years later, after a meeting with Ms. Hilary Clinton, Dr. Kozakou – Markoulis has stated: "We have discussed among other issues the prospects as regards exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves in the Republic's [RoC] Exclusive Economic Zone" (PIO, 12 December 2011).

The date on which the Minister made the second statement combined with the fact that two months before, September 2011, Noble Energy has begun its exploitation activities in the sea block 11 in the RoC EEZ, makes the author believe if we need to be more specific about the time frame that the RoC foreign policy has transited from the second to the third period, we can determine it between 2011 and 2013. Another reason the researcher believes it strengthens his argument is the fact that during the same period, we have the first signs of the development of a new area of confrontation between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis, meaning the maritime area encircling the island of Cyprus. More precisely, between the aftermath of the military operations in the summer of 1974 and 2011, there is very little evidence to show the intention of the Turkey/TRNC axis to use the particular maritime area to add pressure to the RoC government. However, as we present in the upcoming pages ever since , the particular area has gradually transformed into an area of constant confrontation between the two sides. However, this is an issue which the study discusses later on as it is a priority to determine the peculiarities of the RoC energy policy in general and energy security in particular, which is the main point of discussion in the following section.

2.3 The RoC foreign policy decision-making: Key actors and governmental structure

The RoC has a presidential democracy system of government with the President, who is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term, accompanied by the Council of Ministers exercising the executive power. Even though this is not a law-based study, the author believes the reference to particular provisions of the state's Constitution can help us have a better understanding of the role that the President, the Council of Ministers, and other domestic actors have on the determination of the RoC foreign policy, both in the long term and in a period of crisis.

First, the formal powers of the people executing the state's executive power are mainly defined in Part III of the RoC Constitution, between articles 36 and 60. Article 36 states: 'The President of the Republic is the Head of the State and takes precedence over all persons in the Republic.' Also, as Article 37 articulates, the President represents the Republic at all events and receives foreign dignitaries.

According to Article 47, the President can both designate and terminate the Council of Ministers appointment, convene the Council's meetings, and take part by presiding over Council meetings. According to the same article, the President has the right of final veto on the Council's decisions concerning foreign affairs, defense, and security issues.

Based on Article 50, the President maintains the right to veto laws and decisions⁹ made by the House of Representatives related to the state's foreign affairs, defense and security issues, including, but not limited to, the conclusion of international treaties, conventions, and agreements. However, at least based on the author's research, the only President who has exercised this right was Dimitris Christophias in February 2011, when the majority of the Parliamentary

⁹According to the Constitution the Vice President has also the right to veto all the decisions. However, since 1963 the Turkish Cypriots have withdrawn from the RoC, at first into enclaves and since 1983 proceeded to the establishment of the TRNC. Thus, since 1963 the President of the RoC is the only one who keeps the rights provided from the Constitution.

parties (DISY, DIKO, EDEK, and EUROKO) adopted a decision calling the President to apply for the accession of the RoC to the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The President vetoed the Parliamentary decision by arguing that the application for membership in the PfP was not included in his Governmental program (GreekNews, 28th February 2011). Under the same article, the President has the final call on declaring war or signing peace with other states and on the composition and the size of the armed forces (kypros.org).

About the executive power the Council of Ministers exercises, at least regarding the foreign policy, security, and defense-related issues, are articulated in Article 54. According to this article, it is responsible for the general direction and control of the government and the state's public policy. Even though it is beyond the scope of this section, it is necessary to mention that among other responsibilities under the article's provisions, the Ministerial Council is responsible for all the actions related to the exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbons found in the RoC EEZ (RoC Secretariat official website, 2018). Secondly, the Council is responsible for the direction of the state's foreign affairs and the defense and security related issues. Also, it is responsible for considering bills and the Republic's budget to be introduced to the House of Representatives for approval.

Based on the above, this project has concluded that the President's impact on the executive authority is higher than is believed at first sight. More precisely, there are rights provided by the Constitution that upgrade the President's role in a way that cannot be considered as one of the 12 people comprising the RoC Ministerial Council. The right to appoint and terminate the term of office for all the members of the Council combined with the right to veto their decisions, at least on security and foreign policy issues, are factors which lead this study to believe that the President is the central player in the state's decision-making procedure (Ker Lindsay, 2006). Of course, it can be readily understood that constant vetoing of the Council of Ministers' decisions and profligate changes of ministers could reduce the credibility and the trust that the public has in the government in general and the President in particular. Both the current and former Head of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Head of

Crisis Management center, even though they have characterized the current President as a strong personality, have agreed that he avoids vetoing the Council's decisions. According to the Head of Crisis Management Center, if the President was vetoing the decisions regularly or exercising the Constitutional right to terminate the appointment of the members of the Council every time, they showed their opposition to his view that would have caused tensions within the government. Moreover, the former Head of the Central Intelligence Agency has stated that it is common practice before an issue comes in front of the Council for voting, that the responsible Minister sends the file to the Presidency and discusses its provisions with the President.

The questions posed are:

- "Do all the Ministers have the same impact on the decision-making procedure on issues related to the state's foreign policy?"
- "Are there any other additional bodies, groups or individuals, who have an impact, either directly or indirectly, on the state's foreign policy decision making?"

However, before discussing the questions mentioned above, it is important to note that the President has a supporting staff called "the state's Presidency." According to the official website of the Presidency, its mission is "the provision of all those modern, efficient and effective supporting tools that will make possible the vision of the President as well as the Council of Ministers on the national issue [Cyprus issue], the state's foreign policy and domestic governance." Moreover, on the organizational chart (Figure 2) the Presidency is a structure based on the functions of particular actors, called "officials." Those individuals, including the group of people they supervise, assist the President by acting as the supporting staff required to facilitate his work. According to the current Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Head of Central Intelligence Agency, among the officials presented on the organizational chart (see Figure 2) those having the most critical role in the state's foreign policy are the Head of the President's Diplomatic Office and the Special Advisers of the President, depending on the issue. As the researcher considers the Head of the Diplomatic Officer among the people impacting the state's decision-making procedure, he

seeks to refer to this position on the upcoming pages. Concerning the special advisors, their role differs from case to case; thus, the researcher focuses on those related to energy issues later on.




Figure 2: The Organizational Chart of the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus (Source: The official website of the Republic of Cyprus Presidency)

Concerning the question of whether significant bodies, groups, or individuals have a greater impact on the decision-making procedure, the author shares the same view with Morton Halperin and Princila Clapp (2006), claiming that a President's advisors can be divided into two circles according to the access they have to him/her. The first category includes the people who have both direct/physical and regular access to the President. They have characterized the people included in this group as the President's "inner circle." The second category includes the people and the groups within a state's governmental mechanism and their access to the decision-maker is mainly

limited through the governmental mechanism. In their view, these people are included in the President's "outer circle."

When it comes to the case of the RoC, at least for the period of this study, the author has included, within the inner circle, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is responsible for the state's foreign policy. He has also included the Governmental Spokesperson, the Head of the President's Diplomatic Office, and the Head of the Central Intelligence Agency within the inner circle.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for accomplishing the President's tasks for issues related to the state's bilateral and international relations. More precisely and according to the Ministry's official website, the Minister is the main actor responsible for the exercise of the state's foreign policy, and his/her mission is the safeguarding and promotion of the interests and rights of the RoC and its citizens, as well as the Republic's contribution to international efforts to promote peace, stability, and security. As presented on the organizational chart below, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is divided into four sectors. The "A" sector deals with the RoC relations with the EU both as a union and all the states within the European region. The "B" sector focuses on relations with Turkey. However, a brief observation of the Ministry's organizational chart, (see Figure 3) and as presented in red color, this sector has a sub directorate focusing on the RoC energy policy, the B2 department. The enclosure of a subsector dealing with the state's energy policy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is additional proof that energy is primarily a foreign policy issue for the RoC. The "C" sector deals with bilateral relations with the other states outside the EU. Finally, under the Permanent Secretary is the Crisis Management Center, a center on which the researcher seeks to focus in the upcoming pages.




Figure 3: The Structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs official website)

Concerning the Governmental Spokesperson, the RoC Public Information Office (PIO) official website has stated that "is responsible for expressing the Government policy on the Cyprus problem as well as on issues of internal public policy; is mainly entrusted with the task of interpreting and promoting the policy of the government and coordinating the enlightenment activities of the Press and Information Office." Between 2013 and 2018, the Governmental Spokesperson was Dr. Nikos Christodoulides, a former academic, and diplomat. At first glance, the issues related to the state's foreign policy, besides those related to the Cyprus issue, are not included in the Spokesperson duties. However, as the particular spokesperson was also the Head of the President's diplomatic office, we could not exclude him from our

analysis. At the same time and as this project investigates a particular period, between 2013 and 2018, the author has decided to include the Governmental Spokesperson in the President's inner circle also because he has escorted the President on all the official visits and after Nikos Anastasiades re-election to the Presidential office in 2018, he was appointed as the state's Minister of Foreign Affairs.

The Head of the Central Intelligence Agency is directly accountable to the President of the Republic concerning state security matters. The Head of the Agency deals with the collection, evaluation, and utilization of information related to the state's security. During the period this project focuses on, two individuals have run the Agency. From 2013 till 2015, Major General (Ret.) Andreas Pentaras and since then Dr. Panikos Kourros¹⁰.

The latter, since 2018 and after Dr. Christodoulides' appointment to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acts simultaneously as the Head of the Diplomatic Office (Philenews, 2018). Thus, given that both of the Heads of the President's Diplomatic office during the period that this project focuses on, had dual duties, the project finds it unnecessary to focus further on its impact on the decision-making procedure. Thus, the author limits his discussion to mentioning that it is a position developed after Tasos Papadopoulos ran the office in 2003. The current Head of the Central Intelligence Agency has stated that it is a position that Papadopoulos developed because the Minister of Foreign Affairs was a member of the political party (e.g., AKEL) that supported Papadopoulos to be elected as the RoC President and not a member of the party that he led (e.g., DIKO). Since then, the Head of Diplomatic office acts as an additional advisor to the President in foreign policy-related issues.

On the other hand, the researcher has contained, in the outer circle, all the groups and individuals supporting the President and the Council of Ministers on foreign policy issues. More precisely, one Minister and two groups have been included in the outer circle

¹⁰ <https://www.linkedin.com/in/kyriacos-kouros-59201244/>

At first, in the President's outer circle, the researcher has included the Minister of Defense. The Minister "is responsible for putting into effect the Government Policy regarding Cyprus's security and territorial integrity. In the framework of this policy, the Ministry of Defense has promoted a series of measures which aim at strengthening the defense forces and the capability of the Republic to thwart any foreign threat and at the same time boost its negotiating ability" (Ministry of Defense official website).

Secondly, the author has included the Cyprus Center for Crisis Management, in the President's outer circle. It has already been mentioned that the Center is a sector of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. More precisely, it "holds the responsibility for the risk evaluation in possible crises, as well as to provide recommendations to the Permanent Secretary, regarding the proper actions for the best management of every crisis. In the possibility of a large-scale crisis, then the Crisis Management Department functions exclusively under the chair of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry". The researcher's reference to the Center as separate from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is mainly related to the thesis decision focus on crisis management. More specifically, due to its responsibilities, the Center is always a member of the crisis management procedure independent of whether other departments of the Ministry are involved in a particular crisis.

Thirdly is the state's Parliament. According to the RoC constitution, the House of Representatives exercises the state's legislative power through its 56 members. Even though it is beyond the scope of this thesis scope, it is important to note that a quorum of members of Parliament must be 80. However, the remaining 24 are Turkish Cypriots who do not participate in the Parliament's works since the inner state conflict in 1963 and their withdrawal from all the state's authorities and services, including the Parliament. As it has already been mentioned, the President maintains the right of final veto on the House of Representatives' laws or decisions concerning foreign affairs, defense, and security. Based on this article, someone may assume that the Parliament's role is rather advisory on these issues (Ker Lindsay, 2006). Even though such a conclusion is accurate in general terms, two reasons have led

the study to avoid excluding the Parliament from the decision-making procedure. Firstly, under Article 44, if the President is accused of betrayal or is not capable, due to health reasons, to exercise the executive power duties, the President of the House of Parliament replaces the outgoing President until the elections. Secondly, even though the Parliament does not directly impact the decision-making procedure, it has a role in the mobilization and the development of the state's capabilities. More specifically, according to the House of Representatives' official website, the Parliament approves or rejects the President's proclamation of taking measures in an emergency or a war. If it is not approved and the President proceeds with its application, the proclamation is not legal. Also, and even more importantly, the state's annual budget is approved by the House of Parliament, a procedure that can be tricky if the party/parties in the government do not have the Parliamentary majority.

Apart from the people and groups comprising the inner and outer circles, see Figure 4, both the President and the Ministers have additional advisors. According to open sources, the President has ten advisors, apart from the special advisers referred to as supporting staff on state's Presidency. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has one and the Minister of Defense has two advisors (Philenews, 16th September 2018). However, as the researcher was unable to find details on each of those advisors' roles, the discussion is limited by saying they need to be included in an additional group outside of the two (inner and outer) circles.




Figure 4: The proposed structure of the RoC decision making mechanism

Additionally, Nikos Anastasiades, in 2013, established three independent advisory boards. The Economic Council specializes in economic issues, especially in the economic recession, the Geostrategic Council, focusing on foreign policy and geopolitical issues, and the Energy Policy Council focusing on energy policy, energy security, sustainable development, and energy infrastructure protection issues. The President's Representative on all three councils from 2013 till February 2018 was Head of the President's Diplomatic Office. However, it can be understood that the National Economic Council deals exclusively with the state's economic issues and the Energy Policy council with energy-related issues. As the former consists of an organ that discusses issues mainly out of the scope of this thesis and the energy-related issues are discussed on the upcoming pages in this section, the study aims to limit its discussion on the Geostrategic Council and its role in the RoC foreign policy decisionmaking procedure. The Council's member, Dr. Constantinos Adamides, has confirmed the quotes of both the Cyprus Mail and "The Reporter" about its role. More precisely, Dr. Adamides has explained that the Council aims to elaborate the government's position on the Cyprus issue concerning broader geopolitical changes. He has also stated that the Council provides, both as a body and as smaller groups, advice to Ministries, including

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other services of the state, including the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Guard. To do so, the Council is authorized to ask for information from any state service, including the Central Intelligence Agency, in its attempt to prepare its policy reports. Another issue the author finds worth mentioning is that one of the Geostrategic Council members, Theodoros Tsakiris (see Table 2), has hydrocarbon geopolitics as his field of expertise. The author believes that this is additional proof that the RoC officials consider energy an issue directly linked to the state's foreign policy.

Rank and Expert's Name of the Members of the Geostrategic Council	Field of Expertise
Prof. Michael Attalides	Foreign Policy expert (Rector at the University of Nicosia)
Mr. Petros Zarounas	International Relations expert
Dr. Kalliopi Agapiou Iosifidou	Assistant professor political science (University of Cyprus)
Dr. Constantinos Adamides	Assistant Professor of International studies (University of Nicosia)
Dr. Theodoros Tsakiris	Assistant Professor in Geopolitics of hydrocarbons (University of Nicosia)
Dr. Antonis Stylianou	Lecturer of Law, Head of the Law Department (University of Nicosia)
Mr. Christos Iakovou	Head of the Cyprus Centre of Studies;
Dr. Nicos Moudouros	Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies expert
Dr. Elena Stavrou	Middle Eastern studies expert
Dr. Niyazi Kizilyurek	Assistant professor, Turkish Studies (University of Cyprus)

Dr. Marios Efthymiopoulos	Assistant professor in security studies, (American University Emirates)
Prof. Costas Constantinou	International studies expert, Head of the Sociology and Political studies Department (University of Cyprus)
Dr. Christodoulos Pelagias	Political studies and law expert
Dr. Michalis Kontos	IR expert
Dr. Manouk Yildidjian	Turkish studies expert

Table 2: The members of the RoC Geostrategic Council (Source: The Cyprus Mail)

On the other hand, people with little knowledge of how the RoC political system operates would wonder why the researcher has not included in any of the circles mentioned above, the so-called "National Council" (NC). In 1975, President Makarios established the NC as an advisory capacity while negotiating the Cyprus issue. In 1988 it was agreed that within the NC would participate, apart from the President, the party leaders whose parties were represented in the House of Representatives and those who do not have Parliamentary representatives but polled at least 5% in the most recent presidential elections. It would have regular monthly meetings, behind closed doors, with the President maintaining the right to convene additional meetings whenever he/she finds it necessary. Also, on the NC, participating as observers, would be the former Presidents of the Republic, the President of the House of Representatives, the General Attorney, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Government Spokesperson, and the Secretary to the President. Thus, unlike institutions with a similar name, such as the US National Security Council, the RoC NC, if we exclude the Cyprus issue, has a minimal impact on the state's decision-making procedure, even as an advisory board (Katsourides, 2013).

Summarizing the above, the author believes that in the RoC foreign policy, the groups and individuals impacting the decision-making procedure can be presented according to the Figure 5 on the next page. In the proposed

structure, the President of the RoC stands at the center (core) of the decision-making procedure. Simultaneously, the people and groups having direct or indirect access to the President have been included in advisors' inner and outer circle. Concerning the additional advisors not included within the governmental structure, the researcher has included the Geostrategic Council and the independent advisors that both the President and the Ministers have. Concerning the NC, the researcher recalls his view that apart from the Cyprus issue, its role is minimal for having an impact on the decision-making procedure, and that is why it is not included in the proposed structure.




Figure 5: The RoC governmental structure while dealing with foreign policy issues

2.4 The RoC foreign policy crisis management

Devlen and Ozdamar (2009) have argued that even though the people comprising the executive power of a state usually have equal responsibility in long term foreign policy and crisis management, their level of involvement in crisis management differs from case to case. Simultaneously, this study shares the same view with Janine Gross (2012) claiming that all the alternatives a

decision-maker can use to deal with in a foreign policy related crisis, can be grouped into certain groups. As we seek to discuss the issue of alternatives in the upcoming pages, we limit the discussion to saying the available choices are summarized to the "Do nothing option," the use of diplomatic/legal means, the application of economic measures, and the use, or threat to use, military means.

When it comes to the case of the RoC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Head of the Crisis Management Center, and the Head of the Central Intelligence Agency have all confirmed that the alternatives mentioned above apply to the examined case study. At the same time, they have acknowledged it is a common practice not to follow a strict order on the application of means, as no one commits the leader to omit or to use any of the alternatives in a different order.

Based on this statement and after considering Berridge's (2015) argument that usually, at the early stages of a crisis, the states seek to deal by using their domestic capabilities, this study proposes a two-stage approach to explain the RoC foreign policy crisis management mechanism. Thus, according to Figure 6, in the first stage, the RoC will try to deal with the appeared crisis by using its domestic capabilities exclusively. More specifically, in the first stage, the researcher has included two alternatives: the "Do Nothing option" and the application of diplomatic demarches. The "Do nothing" option usually includes also a series of public statements, mainly used for reducing the domestic discomfort for not taking additional measures. Concerning the impact that public statements have on the RoC foreign policy this study shares the same opinion with Christophorou et al. (2010), claiming that it is an area of study that remains underdeveloped. However, as it is out of the scope of this thesis to focus on this issue, the researcher limits the discussion on the Head of the Central Intelligence Agency argument that both the media and public opinion have a minimum impact on the determination of the RoC crisis management strategy. Dr. Kouros has also stated that on issues vital for the state's security, the media in the RoC are cautious with the content that they publish, and quite often, they avoid publishing statements before notifying the government.




Figure 6: A proposed schematic representation of the RoC levels of escalation

Regarding the application of diplomatic measures, including demarches, public statements show the diachronic tendency of the RoC to try to internationalize both the Cyprus issue and any other crises that appear with the Turkey/TRNC axis by asking for support from the UN and the EU. In the majority of cases, at least based on the author's research, the RoC officials base their arguments on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions, with the

most commonly referred being the 541¹¹ (1983) and 550¹² (1984). Concerning the EU, apart from the reference to the 2005 EU counterstatement and the recall to the UNSC Resolutions, the RoC asks the Union's member states support by recalling the non-exercise of sovereignty by the RoC authorities in the north part of Cyprus, even though the island has entered the Union as a whole¹³. Among other issues, the RoC accuses Turkey of not allowing the RoC ships and aircraft to land on its ports and airfields as it does not recognize the former as a sovereign state.

The second stage includes four alternatives, divided into two groups. In the first group are included the military choices that the RoC can apply based, at least at the beginning, on its own capabilities, and in the other group the alternatives it can apply while supported by other states and/or organizations.

Concerning the first group, the researcher has included the application of military means under the scope of the act of self-defense, as there is always the possibility that the RoC may find itself in a situation with no other choice than to apply military means. The RoC officials have repeatedly mentioned their intention to solve all disputes with the Turkey/TRNC axis under the auspices of International Law (Anastasiades, 2014). Thus, before proceeding to an armed confrontation, the RoC will try to ensure international legitimacy through the right of self-defense. Even though it is out of the period that this thesis focuses on, to prove the argument that the application of military means is an alternative that the RoC government has in mind diachronically, the study quotes a conversation made between the Greek Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, and the

11 According to the provisions of the Resolution, published on the 18th of November 1983, the Security Council has stated that the TRNC decision to declare independence is legally invalid. Moreover, it has called the RoC and the TRNC to cooperate with the Secretary-General while at the same time it urged other UN member states do not recognize the TRNC as a sovereign state and recognize only the RoC being the sole authority on the island of Cyprus (United Nations Security Council, 1983).

12 The 550 UNSC resolution published on the 11th of May 1984 and through it the Security Council has called on the other member states not to recognize the TRNC, condemn the exchange of ambassadors with Turkey, and also consider all attempts to interfere with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in contrary to Security Council resolutions (United Nations Security Council, 1984).

13 The EU has recognized the right of the RoC exercising sovereignty in all the island through the ? missing text

RoC President Glafkos Clerides in 1997, during the so-called "S-300" crisis. The dialogue was published in 2018 by the back then, Minister of Defense Yiannakis Omirou in a Greek Cypriot newspaper, as follows (Philenews, 23rd December 2018):

"Prime Minister Simitis: What will happen if the Turks send planes to fly over Nicosia as a response for the deployment of the S-300 batteries?

President Clerides: We will report them to the Security Council.

Prime Minister Simitis: Will your tourism not be affected?

President Clerides: We will endure it. Our economy is strong.

Prime Minister Simitis: What if the Turks launch a land operation to seize territory?

What is going to happen?

President Clerides: There will be a war!"

Regarding the choices that the RoC has while supported by other regional and international actors, this study limits the discussion to four alternatives. These alternatives are: the application of military means either as part of a generalized escalation in the region or an escalation in the relations between Greece and Turkey; the use of diplomatic means, and the imposition of economic sanctions.

With reference to the application of diplomatic means, it can mainly be applied within the EU and presupposes the support and cooperation by the rest of the EU member states. Through the diplomatic demarches, the RoC aims to increase the diplomatic pressure on Turkey. The author finds it necessary to mention that apart from Greece, based on the public statements, the state which has supported the RoC more actively within the EU is France. Among other statements, the study recalls French President Emmanuel Macron's rhetoric during the Summit of the South European States in Malta. More specifically, Macron has stated: "Turkey must stop its illegal activities in the [RoC] EEZ, and the EU must show no weakness in this issue" (Cyprus PIO, 2019).

The second alternative is the imposition of economic sanctions. The difference in the economic size between the RoC and Turkey and the fact that the two states have not signed any bilateral agreements, as the Republic of

Turkey does not recognize the RoC as a sovereign state has led this study to the conclusion that the RoC cannot harm the Turkey/TRNC directly through the imposition of economic sanctions, but only through the EU. Under the same alternative, the researcher includes the possible sanctions that the EU can apply against oil/gas enterprises and individuals who contribute to the Republic of Turkey energy program within the RoC EEZ.

The third alternative, is the application of military means, not as an act of self-defense. More precisely, this study believes that a military escalation is possible in two cases (Papasavvas¹⁴, 2018). Firstly, as part of a generalized conflict in the region. As the researcher seeks to present in the upcoming pages, since the early 2010s, we have witnessed a gradual tension in the Turkish bilateral relations both with Israel and Egypt and simultaneously a gradual improvement in the relations between the two states and the RoC. The significance of the trilateral agreements and the common aeronautical and Search and Rescue (SAR) exercises executed between the RoC and the aforementioned states are among the reasons making the author believe his argument is not arbitrary. Thus, in case of an escalation in the relations between Greece and Turkey, the study considers the involvement of the RoC a remote but not an impossible scenario. Secondly, in case there is an escalation in Greece and Turkey's relations, that led to a military conflict between the two states. The researcher has already explained why he considers that the relations between the RoC and Greece go beyond the limits of an alliance. Thus, in case of an escalation between Greece and Turkey for the Aegean Sea it can cause an armed conflict also between the Turkey/TRNC and the RoC.

¹⁴ Given the fact the referred article was not in an academic journal and consequently not peer-reviewed, the researcher has asked three experts to comment on the scenarios presented. Prof. Joe Grieco, the Ambassador of Israel in Cyprus, Mr. Michael Harari, and the former Head of the Republic of Cyprus Central Intelligence Agency, have stated that all three scenarios are applicable to the case of the RoC.

2.5 Conclusions

The researcher has determined as a top priority to ensure that all the readers of this study know how the RoC foreign policy operates and how it has been evolved since 1974. This intention has driven the researcher's decision to write this chapter and even to position it in the thesis before discussing the study's theoretical background. Thus, this chapter has begun by making an overview of the RoC foreign policy strategy between 1974 and 2018. The main topic of discussion in this section was to present how the RoC foreign policy has been transformed from a Cyprus- issue centric to that Anastasiades (2014), Christodoulides (2018) and Kasoulidis (2018) called a multidimensional foreign policy. The following sections, focused particularly on the state's domestic mechanisms and, more precisely, have sought to present the President and the Cabinet's role in the decision-making procedure in foreign policy-related issues by emphasizing crisis management. Also, in the last section, we present the alternatives the aforementioned key actors have in front of them while dealing with a foreign policy crisis. Some may believe that before discussing anything related to the case of the RoC, we should have presented a theoretical overview of crisis management and how these alternatives are presented in the literature. As a response, the researcher quotes that he has considered it more essential to provide an overview of the RoC foreign policy to ensure that all readers know this issue. However, he acknowledges the importance the theoretical context has for the rest of the thesis; thus, the next chapter is dedicated particularly to it.

Revisions in Chapter 2

1. Revision the examiners asked:

"The work also needs one, or perhaps two, service chapters. This will set out the essential information required to make sense of the analysis that comes later in the thesis".

Revision made:

This is the first among the two service chapters, and through it, the researcher seeks to clarify how the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy is structured and how it operates.

2. Revision the examiners asked:

"Outline the traditional directions of Cypriot foreign policy."

Revision made:

In the first section (pp.44-50), the researcher analyzes the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy from 1974 until 2018. In his analysis, explains how, gradually, and especially after 2008, the Republic of Cyprus governmental officials have shown an intention to abandon a "Cyprus issue centric" foreign policy and proceed to a new "multidimensional strategy" based harmonizing the state's interests with those of other states in the region.

3. Revision the examiners asked:

"Explain the political system and the formal foreign policy decision-making structures... this will also set the scene for a presentation of the new energy decision-making structures and how these relate to the traditional foreign policy ones."

Revision made:

In the next two sections (pp. 50-67), are dedicated to explain how the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy system operates, who make the decisions and who are the domestic actors impact the decision making procedure on foreign policy-related issues, both in the long term and in crises.

In particular:

a. The subsection 2.2.3 present's an overview of the foreign policy decision-making mechanism. It discusses the structure (Presidency, Council of Ministers, National Council, Parliament), the main actors (President, Ministers, Head of Diplomatic Office, Head of Central Intelligence Agency, Ministers) and their role in the decision-making procedure.

b. Subsection 2.2.4 focuses, particularly on foreign policy crisis management. The impact each of the actors mentioned in the previous section has on the decision-making procedure and how the governmental mechanism operates are among the main discussion points. In the same subsection, the researcher presents how the President of the Republic of Cyprus understands world politics. Also, how both the acting and diachronically Presidents understand the application of military means as an alternative to deal with a foreign policy crisis with Turkey (pp.103-104).

4. Revision the examiners asked:

"Stylistically, the work also needs some refinement. At the moment, it sometimes comes across more like a policy report than a PhD thesis. For example, while bullet points can be a good explanatory tool when used sparingly, they are used far too much. Likewise, diagrams should be used only when absolutely necessary."

Revision made:

Apart from two all bullet points have been removed.

All diagrams have been removed

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL CONTEXT

3.1 Introduction

Finn (2005) has stated that both the determination and the clarification of the theoretical basis are fundamental for a Ph.D. thesis. Similarly, Verna and Beard (1981) have stated that a Ph.D. candidate can summarize the existing information and guide their future course of action through theory. According to Karen Mingst (2008), each theoretical approach helps us see IR cases from different viewpoints. Similarly, Walt (1998) has stated that no approach can capture all the complexity of world politics and that finding the theory/paradigm that best suits, at least based on the researchers view, on each case study is necessary.

Regarding this thesis and based on the question it seeks to answer, this study focuses on two issues in terms of theoretical perspectives: foreign policy decision-making with the emphasis on crisis management, and energy security. Concerning foreign policy decision-making, attention has focused on presenting different views related to how decisions on how foreign policy-related issues are taken. Also, the researcher has emphasized on who makes the decisions, how a state decision-making mechanisms are structured, and the alternatives the state leaders can apply to deal with foreign policy crises.

The section 3.3 focuses on NcR and how it can contribute on understanding foreign policy decision making. At first, the researcher makes an overview of the particular paradigm and highlights what differentiates it from other forms of realism. Secondly, on the same section we focus on the limitations of the particular paradigm and also the main oppositions to the paradigm. The third part of this section is dedicated to how NcRs apply to foreign policy crisis management.

Regarding energy security, as with any other foreign policy issue, it has certain particularities that we need to consider. Thus, the Section 3.4 is dedicated to present an overview of how energy security has become a foreign policy issue. Also, on the same section we present a grouping of the 104 different definitions existing in the literature. This grouping will be used as a

starting point in an upcoming chapter so that the researcher can propose a working definition, particularly for the RoC.

The section 3.5 of this chapter focuses on how NcR can link energy security and foreign policy crisis management. As with any foreign policy issue apart from the main parameters governing each case, we need to focus on certain particularities. Thus, in this section, the researcher seeks to use NcR to clarify those particularities and adjust them to energy security crisis management.

3.2 Foreign Policy Decision Making and Crisis Management

Devlen and Ozdamar (2009) have divided the states' foreign policy into two broad categories: the long-term foreign policy, often referred to literature as grand strategy, and foreign policy crisis management. According to Mintz and Derouen (2010), in both cases, foreign policy decision-making consists of the choices that state leaders, groups and coalitions make and have an impact on a state's position on the international stage. They have also claimed that there is no general rule on clarifying who is the decision-maker as it can be either a person or a group of people, and each case must be examined separately. Before proceeding further, the researcher should clarify how this thesis understands the term "foreign policy crisis."

Hermann (1969:72) was among the first to define the term, as he observed a lack of agreement among scholars and policymakers. Thus, he has portrayed a foreign policy crisis as "a situation, where at least one of the actors is a state and has three characteristics. It threatens high priority goals as the state's decision-makers have determined them; restricts the amount of time available for a response before the situation is transformed; and surprises the decision-makers when it occurs".

Based on Hermann's definition, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997:3) have defined a foreign policy crisis as "a situation with three sufficient and necessary conditions deriving from a change in the internal and external environment. The three conditions consist of a threat to one or more basic values of the state, a

finite time for response to the value threat and a heightened probability of involvement on military hostiles". They have made it even more apparent that their definition differs from that of Hermann's in six significant points. In particular, they have determined the omission of surprise as a necessary condition to have a crisis, they have replaced Hermann's "short" time with "finite" time, and they have expressed the view that a crisis threatens the state's "high priority goals." Moreover, they have stated that a crisis generates from a state's domestic/internal and external environment while it is a situation where the probability for a military confrontation is higher than usual.

Regarding the choices that a government has to make during a foreign policy related crisis, at first, they seem limitless and are always related to the crisis. This project bases the statement mentioned above on the fact that each case study is unique and subject to different parameters, for example: the time, the place, and the reasons behind the apparent crisis. However, according to this project, the vast majority of the available choices can be divided into particular groups.

The first group refers to the so-called "do nothing" option. Although a "do nothing" solution might seem quite allegoric at first, national experts have repeatedly introduced it as an alternative on various occasions. This project recalls the early stages of the Cuban Missile crisis, where according to Allison and Zelikow (1999), one of the alternative solutions that came in front of the President of the United States was not to proceed to any actions as a counter-response to the deployment of Soviet ICBM missiles in Cuba. The second alternative includes the application of diplomatic means. Especially in the early stages of a crisis, these are the most commonly applied means. The main reason is that it is accessible to all states against all countries (Berridge, 2015). Thirdly is the application of economic measures. Handel (1990) has argued that economic sanctions can be used either in favor or against a state. Especially the states with a lack of military power compared to their opponents, they usually try to use their economic capabilities to lessen that gap. The following alternative includes the use of military means. Even Thucydides (416 B.C) raised the effectiveness of military means to exercise foreign policy. There are

occasions when even the threat of using military means can act as a 'mean' during a crisis. Finally, another category includes all of the other means that cannot be included in the previous groups, but cases prove their application as alternatives. As presented in the upcoming chapters, such an option applied by the RoC was using legal means against individuals and oil/gas enterprises that have supported the Turkey/TRNC exploitation program.

Gross Stein (2008) has tried to put the alternatives groups mentioned above in a logical order by proposing what she has called "a ladder of escalation." Based on its name and as shown in Chart 2, she has presented the alternative options in a staircase form. However, numerous examples show that it is not always necessary for the decision-maker to either walk the ladder to the top step or not to skip particular steps. As it is out of the scope of this project to refer to the cases in which the decision-makers have not adopted the Gross Stein ladder, the author limits the discussion by saying that during both "The Cuban Missile Crisis" and the crisis taking place in the RoC EEZ, the decision-makers did not take every step on the ladder to the top for different reasons.




Chart 2: A schematic representation of Janine Stein's (2012) "ladder of escalation"

However, even though we can mainly include the possible solutions within five groups, the question remains: "what drives the decision-makers to act in a particular way during a crisis?" Foreign Policy Analysis, Realpolitik, and

the majority of the IR theories are among the theoretical and empirical paradigms that scholars and analysts have used throughout the years in their attempt to answer this question. This thesis seeks to base its analysis on a form of Realism referred to in the literature as Neoclassical Realism (NcR). Its application to foreign policy crisis management is the main point of discussion in the next section.

3.3 Neoclassical Realism and Foreign Policy Crisis Management: Theory and Limitations

Rose (1998) has introduced NcR as the 'newest' member of the Realist family in IR literature to explain the states' foreign policy behavior, following Structural Realism's inability to predict the outcome of the Cold War. To do so, Rose has introduced an alternative understanding of two of the factors which comprise the core of all Realist paradigms: anarchy and security.

Concerning the anarchy as most Realists, the NcRs consider anarchy to be a fundamental element for understanding the relations between states within the international system. However, Baylis and Smith (2012) have claimed that, in contrast, both to Classical and Structural Realists, NcRs do not consider anarchy as an axiom in international politics. In particular, for Baylis and Smith (2012: 74), NcRs consider the states "individual units and not, just, part of the anarchic international system," and they link anarchy to the relative power. In other words, the NcRs, even though they acknowledge the anarchic nature of the international systems the states try to use it to their advantage by increasing their resources and capabilities so that they either maintain or improve their position in the international arena.

Regarding security, NcRs link the state's security with the regional and international environment. In particular, they promote cooperation with other states to increase their influence in the international system and, consequently, increase their security (Zakaria, 1998). Based on this understanding, one of the main differences between the Structural and Neoclassical Realists is their understanding of how a state can maintain security. More precisely, the

Structural Realists have linked the state's security to upgrading their military capabilities. In contrast, NcRs consider security having a supportive role especially in the medium and long term. In the upcoming chapters, the author will try to present the applicability of this understanding to the case of the RoC by presenting a series of reasons to explain why RoC officials consider military capabilities as a supporting mean that they will use only under particular circumstances to maintain the state's security; something which makes the researcher believe that NcRs view on security is closer to the RoC understanding on world politics, thus more applicable for this thesis.

Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016) have characterized NcR as the logical extension of the realist tradition. However, they have highlighted four parameters/limitations that they believe the Structural model has, and which NcR has sought to overcome.

The first limitation is related to the role that the leaders have in a state's foreign policy. NcR and Structural Realists share a similar view that the states determine their foreign policy according to the existing threats and opportunities arising in the international system. However, the NcRs separates their view from the Structural Realists by considering that the states do not necessarily instantly/mechanically respond to the changes in the global system but respond more to the leaders' view and ability to perceive systemic stimuli correctly. As leaders are human beings, they often make errors, for example, how they process information, power correlation, and the alternatives and consequences of their decisions.

The second limitation is related to the lack of clarity in the international system. According to Structural Realists, the lack of a central authority governing the international system is the main reason behind the states' challenges and opportunities to increase their position in the global arena . On the contrary, for NcR, both the challenges and the opportunities that arise in the international system are not so clear as they are subject to three components: (1) the degree to which threats and opportunities are readily discernable, especially in crises, (2) the time horizons require accurate knowledge of adversary capabilities and intentions, (3) the clarity of the available options, as

in most cases the international system cannot give clear evidence about the optimal policy responses in a given situation. (Goldman, 2011)

The third limitation is related to the problem of rationality. For Structural Realists, the states act in a unitary rational way and respond optimally to systemic pressures. On the contrary, NcR does not take for granted that the leader will decide that value-maximizing, as they consider both miscalculation and the leaders being driven from other factors possible. Also, for NcR, the characterization of a leader as rational or irrational is not so straightforward. To prove this argument, the researcher quotes Fareed Zakaria's interview with the US Commander of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, in 2008. When Zakaria asked Dempsey whether he considers the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad actions, to be irrational, the latter has replied that after years of research, the US intelligence services have concluded that Ahmadinejad's actions are rational, in a different way than the one that the American analysts are used to determine rationality.

The fourth limitation deals with the difficulty of any state mobilizing all the available domestic resources at any time and place. Structural Realists take for granted that the states will mobilize all the available resources to overcome an appeared crisis. However, for NcR, particular economic/legal and reasons related to the states governmental/bureaucratic structure must be dealt in a certain way so that the available resources being mobilized (Ripsman, Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016).

Following the above, we can easily understand that when NcRs discuss a state's foreign policy behavior apart from the international environment, which like all realists, consider as having the highest impact, they also emphasize the states microlevel, meaning paying attention both to the leaders and domestic constraints. To do so, NcRs base their analysis on three groups of variables: the independent, the dependent, and the intervening.

Regarding the former, for NcRs, the independent variable on every analysis must be the international system. Rose (1998:146) has stated, "the ambition and the scope of a state's foreign policy is first and foremost driven by its place in the international system." For NcRs, the international system is

primarily state-centric, thus for them, the states have the leading role both in the regional and the international arena. According to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016), the NcR's, like all other Realists, consider the states to be in a constant struggle to increase their power and consequently their position in the international arena.

Rose (1998:149) has defined state's power as "[a state's] ability to extract or mobilize resources as determined by its institutions." To do so, they seek to control as many resources as possible. It is useful to note that one of the most important issues that differentiate NcR from the rest of Realists is their understanding of the term power. In particular, there are two points that are worth mentioning. Firstly, in contrast to other realists, NcRs do not take for granted that a state's leader can mobilize at any time all the available resources and capabilities. In other words, they acknowledge the necessity of investigating whether "the leaders having the freedom to direct the state's resources in the direction found necessary" (Zakaria, 1998:16). Secondly, and in contrast to Structural Realist the Neoclassicals do not believe that power is linking to world order. More precisely, NcRs, even though they have believed that power correlation between states is significant for understanding their behavior in the international arena, they do not link world peace to the relative power between any group of states (Ripsman; Taliaferro and Lobell, 2016 and Rose, 1998).

Regarding the intervening variables, according to Kitchen (2010), for NcRs, it is an amalgam of factors related to the leader/decisionmaker image, the governmental/domestic institutions, the strategic culture, and the state-society relations. Regarding the leaders ideas, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016 and 2009) have argued that it affects their perception and understanding of how both regional and international players operate. Also, it impacts their judgment regarding the more relevant resources being mobilized on a particular case. However, what separates NcR from other forms of realism is the fact that the former considers the state's decisions originate not from the leader's imperfect, human nature but from their perception (Rose, 1998). According to Holsti (1970), three cognitions can help us to understand how a leader receives stimuli from the international system: their personal beliefs on how world politics

operate, which strategies are best to achieve the interests of their states, and how they understand both the enemy and their selves [meaning the states they lead].

About strategic culture, NcRs consider that it is a set of factors that influence how the state perceives and adapts material-related stimuli originating from the international system. The moral restraints on the use of military power and the rules determining the use of weapons of mass destruction are among the norms that impact a state's strategic culture. By analyzing such means, we can have insights regarding the boundaries that their strategic choices have. According to Kupcham (1994), strategic culture can change a state's grand strategy; thus, it is an issue which exceeds the scope of this study.

On the other hand, the domestic relations within a state are among the factors consisting in the core of NcR. Ripsman, Taliafero, and Lobell (2016) have defined this relation as the interaction between the state's governmental institutions and economic and societal groups. They have even expressed the view that the more the two are in harmony, the easier it is for the leader to mobilize the available capabilities. The political leader's understanding of world politics can also be linked to the relation they seek to have with their domestic supporters, both voters and particular people/groups who support them financially.

Concerning the domestic institutions, the less harmonious is the relation between them and the society, the more the leader needs them to mobilize both resources and capabilities during a crisis. Factors such as who can contribute to policy formation, who are the domestic players with a veto on governmental decisions, and the decision-making procedure must be considered. In other words, the most extensive authority that the decision-makers have in their hands, the higher their impact on the decision-making procedure. (Ripsman, 2008)

When it comes to the dependent variable NcRs, consider it to be a state's foreign policy behavior in any case study. By focusing on the states' foreign policy behavior, NcRs explain how the states react in the short, medium, and long term. In the short term, they seek to describe the state's political choices

and how they have corresponded to an appeared challenge, for example, a crisis with another state. In the medium term, NcRs focus on grand strategy adjustments, while in the long term, this paradigm mainly focuses on how the policy choices of the great powers affect the international system and consequently the world order.

However, based on the project's research question, the researcher believes that both the medium and the long-term issues are out of its scope. Therefore, it is necessary to focus mainly on short-term foreign policy behavior. Even though Ripsman, Taliafero, and Lobell (2016) have stated that any proposed time frame to separate the short from the medium term is not a rule, they have argued that it is usually considered a period lasting up to few months. NcRs take for granted that the international system is more or less fixed within a few months. However, the three scholars have also stated that there is always a possibility of changes in economic development and expansion of military capabilities originating from previous research on new military technologies, but it is considered the outcome of a pre-determined goal, subject to the state's grand strategy. Moreover, in the short term, we may witness a temporal matching of interests between states who can, and want to, intervene in particular regional events. Simultaneously, though, the few months' time limit is not enough to clearly see whether the matching of interests can lead to the gradual development of a new full-scale alliance.

On the other hand, this study considers as limitations, the issues that can matter when discussing the RoC foreign policy behavior, and NcR pays little or no attention to them. By representing NcR limitations, the researcher aims to explain why he believes he can base the project's theoretical background on this particular paradigm.

Ripsman, Taliafero, and Lobell (2016) have stated that NcRs focus on particular and not general international phenomena. More precisely, even though NcR can explain why a war between two states occurred, it will not be equally successful when explaining why conflicts arise. In other words, NcR follows an inductive approach, meaning moving from the particular to the

general. Because this project focuses on a particular state, the RoC, during a determined, 5-year period, NcR can be applied to this case.

Under the same scope, and like any other realist approach, NcR is state-centric. Thus, its analysis regarding non-state actors' behavior can be debatable or not well documented (Elman and Jensen, 2014). As this is an energy security-related project, some may argue that this inability of NcR should discourage the researcher from using it in this thesis, as non-state actors and, more precisely, the oil/gas enterprises play an essential role in these cases. As a response, the researcher argues that in other cases, maybe that could be a parameter that could discourage him from using NcR. However, for reasons presented in the upcoming chapter in the case of the RoC, at least during the period on which this project focuses, the role of the oil/gas enterprises is heavily linked to the states' behavior.

Thirdly, the researcher has already stated that NcR discusses a wide range of variables covering, apart from the international system also the micro-level of domestic politics. However, according to Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016: 167), "NcR analysis on explanatory variables of structural change as technology, democratic growth, and unexpected catastrophic events" are either descriptive or not available. However, in the examined case, at least based on the author's research, none of those variables appear thus they will not affect the stated aims and objectives of the thesis.

Fourthly NcR as a state-centric paradigm, does not emphasize the intergovernmental organizations and their role in the International arena. As presented in the upcoming pages, the development of an active and multi-dimensional foreign policy within the EU (Anastasiades, 2014) is among the RoC foreign policy's main pillars. However, several reasons have led the researcher to conclude that he could surpass this limitation of NcR. As it is beyond the scope of this chapter, the researcher will limit the discussion by saying that even though NcR does not focus on the organizations as a body, the emphasis is on the sovereign states existing at its core. Thus, the analysis of those states' particularities has led the researcher to conclusions regarding

the limits of support that both the UN and EU can provide to the RoC energy program.

It is worth mentioning that Fordham (2009) has highlighted another limitation of NcR . More precisely, he has argued that even though NcRs emphasize the leaders' understanding of world politics, their motives remain underdeveloped. Following this, he has proposed two alternatives to solve this issue: (a) develop or even assume a fixed list of motives that apply to most cases, (b) consider each case study separately. We have decided to use the second alternative and try to determine how the President of the RoC understands world politics through public statements and interviews.

Following this, the researcher considers NcR to be in line with his understanding of world politics, at least in the examined case. The role of the leader, the governmental structure, the relative power, and the relations with other states are among the factors which comprise the core of NcR and based on the author's research, as presented in the following chapters, are also among the factors having an impact on the RoC foreign and energy policy. Moreover, given that this project focuses exclusively on the RoC crisis management and neither its grand strategy nor the possible changes in the international system, the researcher should clarify the factors included within the three groups of variables on which he seeks to base his analysis .

The thesis independent variable consists of the regional and the international system. More precisely, as for NcRs, the world is mainly state-centric in the upcoming chapters; the researcher seeks to focus on the regional and international players impacting the RoC energy program. However, apart from the states, it is important to discuss the impact both the European Union and the oil/gas enterprises activated in the RoC energy program have on the state's crisis management mechanism.

Regarding the intervening variables presented above, this project shares the same view with Ripsman, Taliafero, and Lobell (2016), claiming that among the four factors considered to be at the core of NcR on a crisis related project, the governmental/domestic institutions and the leaders understanding of world politics are the main factors on which to focus . The researcher recalls that the

differentiation of a state's strategic culture is either a medium or a long-term task subject to its grand strategy and the changes in the international system. With reference to the relation between the state and society, the three scholars have expressed the view that can impact all periods. However, they have also stated that in crises, the governmental institutions have the mechanisms to act whenever necessary, even in cases when the majority of the state citizens, at least at first, are not in favor of their decisions.

Finally, with reference to the state's dependent variable, the crisis management-centric analysis that this thesis aims to provide has led the researcher to the decision to limit its discussion of the RoC foreign policy behavior of the possible crisis management groups presented in the previous section. Briefly, the researcher recalls that the leader of the group of people making the decisions during a crisis considers the following as possible alternatives: the "Do Nothing option," applying diplomatic means and applying economic measures either in favor or against a state. Also, the application or the threat of applying military means and other means, such as legal measures against individuals, organizations, and enterprises, is the rest of the group of alternatives that they can use to deal with a foreign policy-related crisis.

3.4 Energy Security on, relatively, small power but energy consuming island states: Concept and Definitions

Özdamar (2014) has stated that a turning point for energy in states' national security was the decision made by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, during World War I, to use petroleum instead of coal for the British battleships. Besides its effect on the outcome of the war, Churchill's decision led the Allies to the decision to intensify their efforts to control the oil-rich territories in the Middle East. The modern concern of energy security was revealed with the ending of the Arab–Israeli war in 1973 and as the aftermath of the Israelis' victory in the so-called "Yom Kippur War," the decision of both the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to impose an oil

embargo. This oil crisis has triggered a rethinking of the concept of energy in international politics as it has shown the vulnerability of the economies of the major states to the changes in the supply and price conditions of the oil trade (Gapern, 2013).

Thus, the relationship between energy and national security has gradually started to become closer as the years have gone by, and the states have begun to consider energy security as a core issue for their national security. The link between the two has also contributed to changing the analysts' understanding of the term "energy security." Until recently, many analysts tended to link the states' energy security with their ability to supply their wealth to the global market. Shadrina (2010) has taken this view a step further by embracing the states' energy security in three dimensions: the security of demand, the security of supply, and transport safety.

Concerning the former, Minullin and Schrattenholzer (2008) have argued that the security of demand must be calculated based on two factors. The first one is the production of resources, meaning the amount of the resource left for consumption given by the annual consumption, and the second factor is the equity, meaning the ratio of the average GDP per capita in developing regions. On the other hand, the IEA (2007) has stated that the security of supply depends on different factors, such as the type of fuel and the nature and the size of the disruption. Gheorghe and Muresan (2008) have defined energy demand as the countries intention to continue operating in the energy market at regular and stable rates. Moreover, it is important to mention that the two scholars have made a significant reference to natural gas producers and how crucial it is to secure the long-term demand due to the high cost of both exploitation infrastructures and the means of transfer.

Concerning transport security, Barton et al. (2004: 72) have defined it as "the ability of a state to transfer via sea, land or air its resources to the international market." Concerning the transfer of natural gas, Dennis Babusiaux (2007) has argued that a producing state's decision unit, before transferring natural gas in markets, needs to consider both geopolitical and technical factors. Moreover, he has expressed the view that the impact of those variables varies from case

to case.

On the other hand, the researcher's argument considering each state's energy security as a unique case study is strengthened by the lack of a clear-cut and commonly accepted definition describing energy security. Ang, Choong, and Ng (2015) have argued that the academic literature covers 104 energy security studies, and 83 of them provide different definitions. The three scholars have argued that among the existing 83 definitions, there is a series of shared ideas. Gregory Papanikos (2015) has taken this observation by presenting the main modules that refer to the existing definitions. The modules and their percentages are presented in Table 3 below.

Module	Percentage in the energy security definitions
Energy availability	99%
Infrastructure	72%
Energy prices	71%
Social effects	37%
Environmental effects	34%
Governance	25%
Energy efficiency	22%

Table 3: The modules and the percentages in the existing definitions (Source: Papanikos (2015))

Natalya Esakova (2013) has declared that it is possible to divide the existing definitions into three groups: the economic, the strictly political, and the "umbrella" definitions. As the researcher has already set a limitation for this project to consider energy security, it is primarily a foreign policy issue and he believes a purely economic definition could not be applicable. Thus, he has decided to focus exclusively on the other two groups, the strictly political and the umbrella terms.

Concerning the former, Natalya Esakova (2013) has characterized as strictly political the definitions focusing on the state's governance and their physical control over the areas of exploitation being purely political. For the supporters of this group of definitions, energy security means more than the provision of cheap energy, and some of them seek to link energy security with the states' power capabilities. Under this scope, Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005:32) have defined energy security as "the ability to access energy resources required for the development of national power."

On the other hand, Esakova (2013) has included those definitions under the umbrella terms, including simultaneously political, economic, and environmental factors. Under this scope, World Economic Forum (2016) has defined energy security as "an umbrella term that covers a range of issues linking energy, economic growth and political power, such as the security of energy supply, the level and quality of access and uncertainty over prices."

Based on the above, the author of this study believes that the lack of a clear-cut definition makes it very important to propose a working definition which is applicable to the case of the RoC . However, he has also considered it equally problematic, to try to develop a definition from scratch, to describe the RoC energy security.. Thus, and as presented in the upcoming chapters, this study has decided to use one of the existing definitions, and more precisely Esakova's proposed term, strictly as a starting point to define the RoC energy security.

3.5 Neoclassical Realism as a link between Energy Security and Foreign Policy Crisis Management

Over the last decades, several attempts have been made to link energy with the state's security and clarify their position both in the regional and the international arena. Much of the existing literature discussing this issue can be divided into three groups. In the first group, we can include those studies that seek to base their analysis on empirical data and historical assumptions. According to Česnakas (2010: 35), "in most cases, the descriptive method or historical analysis dominate the discussion of the role energy resources play in

foreign policy." In the second group, we can include those projects within the scope of energy geopolitics. As it is out of the range of this thesis to theorize on this issue, the researcher limits the discussion by saying that it can be defined as "the effect that location of resources has on the politics of states" (Skeet, 1996: 265). A considerable amount of literature focusing on energy geopolitics is mainly informed by classical or critical geopolitics. The third group of readings have at their core one or more IR theories. Shaffer (2010) has argued that IR theory has started to emphasize material resources, including energy, throughout the years. The question posed here is: "Why has the researcher decided to use NcR to link energy security with foreign policy crisis management?" The researcher bases his answer on two reasons.

Firstly, even though Brenda Shaffer (2010) has acknowledged the growing interest of the IR scholars on how material resources impact world politics, at the same time she has expressed the view that the application of IR theory to explain energy security and how they impact the states foreign policy both in the short and long term is an area which remains underdeveloped. Thus, the researcher believes that there is still room for further discussion. Concerning the RoC, the application of IR theory remains even more underdeveloped. The works of Adamides (2020) and Tziaras (2019) make the author of this thesis believe that his argument is not arbitrary.

Secondly, this study shares the same view with Bathily (2009), claiming that the materialistic nature of energy makes any form of Realism a good starting point for investigating a state's energy policy in general and energy security in particular. Taliaferro (2009) has argued that a state's ability to extract domestic resources and convert them into power capabilities consists of the core of the paradigm. Thus, the researcher believes the application of NcR can contribute to answering this study's research question.

Thus, in his attempt to link energy security with foreign policy crisis management, the researcher has decided to focus on the variables presented in the previous sections, that comprise the core of NcR when discussing crisis management-related issues. More precisely, he seeks to examine them within the scope of energy in general and energy security in particular.

First, it has already been mentioned that NcR views international politics as a never-ending struggle among states for power and influence in a world of finite resources and uncertainty. Moreover, they believe that every state's external behavior is shaped first and foremost by actions that can increase its position in the international system. According to Taliaferro (2009), increasing their access to material resources from a particular state can change the capability correlation in the regional network and, consequently, change both the regional and international 'hierarchy' in the arena of states.

Secondly, the researcher recalls that one of the factors separating NcRs from the rest of Realists is their view on the term power. More precisely, it has already been mentioned that for NcRs, power consists of two segments, the correlation with allies and opponents and the leaders' ability and willingness to mobilize the capabilities synthesizing a states' power.

Concerning the correlation with allies and opponents, it has already been mentioned that energy is a means that can contribute to increasing the states' power capabilities. Brenda Shaffer (2009) has argued that energy in general and effective energy security, in particular, can be part of the state's policy arsenal and can contribute to changing the state's capabilities in areas like economy, military power, and diplomacy. Moreover, when a state tries transform from an energy consumer to an energy producer or/and an energy hub, as is happening with the RoC, the period that this project focuses on can differentiate the power correlation with other states. Thus, in its attempt to safeguard its position both in the regional and international arena, we must have in mind that the other side would try to mobilize its capabilities to maintain the pre-exploitation power correlation. This willingness can lead to tensions between the two sides that can either exclusively or partially target the newly developed energy capabilities. Thus, a state which intended to prevent differentiation in the power correlation may target the other state's energy security.

Regarding the political elites' ability to mobilize the state's capabilities, as with any other issue with energy security, it is mainly related to the constitutional/legal framework and the examined state's governmental

structure. Also, the political bargaining between the governmental officials, who are possible veto players, and the impact significant players have on the leader's decisions on crisis management may contribute to the leaders' willingness to mobilize particular capabilities. The effect of each of the parameters mentioned above is examined within the scope of the case of the RoC in the upcoming chapters.

About the state's foreign policy behavior, this study, due to its research question, focuses exclusively on the short term, as it seeks to discuss the RoC political choices to manage a foreign policy-related crisis related to its energy program. Of course, there may be questions about the researcher's view to consider this project as a short-term case study by focusing on five years. As a response, this project bases this decision on two factors. At first, as the researcher seeks to discuss in more detail in the upcoming chapters he intends to divide these five years into two subperiods and from there divide them further into multiple sub-sub periods with none of them lasting more than a few months. Secondly, Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell (2016) have stated two parameters as a precondition for determining a short-term period position. The first parameter is the existence balance on the regional/international system and the second is lack of changes in the great powers interests. During the examined period as presented in the upcoming chapters, there is a fixed regional/international system, at least on the energy security issues. Also there is not a rapid change in the interests of particular states. More precisely, even though both great and regional powers have shown the willingness to intervene in the RoC energy program, there are still specific limits of support that prevent them from increasing their relations with the RoC. Also, the actors having an impact, either negatively or positively, on the examined case can be divided into three groups: the states, the regional/international organizations, and an energy security-related project, the oil/gas enterprises.

Last but not least, the project has repeatedly mentioned that the fundamental difference between NcR and other Realist paradigms is the importance that the NcR gives to the state's domestic environment. For NcRs, the leader's perception, strategic culture, the domestic institutions/organizations

having an impact on the decision-making procedure, and the relation between the government and the state's citizens are the factors already mentioned at the core of NcRs analysis when discussing foreign policy-related cases. Moreover, in a previous subchapter the researcher has expressed the view that in crises, the governmental/domestic institutions and the leaders' understanding of world politics are the factors on which we need to focus. In relation to the leaders this study has already explained why in crises, their perception determines how he/she understands the regional/international politics and, consequently, decides which of the available resources will mobilize. By the same token, during an energy security incident, we need to focus mainly on how the particular leader understands the regional and international environment and which capabilities to mobilize.

Regarding the domestic/governmental institutions, as it can be easily understood, each case study differs. Thus, an analysis must be an amalgam of legal/institutional provisions and references showing who the people are and the groups/organizations impacting the decision-making procedure. This is an analysis of the researcher on the section discussing the RoC foreign and energy crisis management procedure.

Factors at the core of NcR		The factors application to Energy Security issues
Regional Environment	Leader's ability to mobilize capabilities	As with any other foreign policy issue differs from case to case
	The correlation with allies and opponents	For state allies and opponents can be considered: Other states Regional/ International organizations Oil/gas enterprises
Foreign Policy Behavior	How the leaders/political elite react during a crisis.	Five groups of alternatives

Domestic Environment	Leader/decision-maker's image	Perception regarding the regional and international system
	Governmental/domestic institutions	Legal/Institutional Parameters Veto Players Leader's advisors

Table 4: Linking Neoclassical Realism with Energy Security

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the main aspects of synthesizing the theoretical background of the thesis. Following the discussion of foreign policy analysis and the differences between long term and crisis management, we have explained the reasons driving the theoretical context of the thesis which is based on Neoclassical Realism and present all the factors that its founders take into consideration to explain a state's behavior. The Section 3.4 is dedicated to energy security and begins by providing insights concerning energy security and the researcher's understanding of the term. In the last section, the author has presented his view on how NcR can explain energy security-related issues. Following the theoretical background of the thesis, the next chapter is dedicated to the thesis research strategy, including the methods applied for collecting and evaluating the data needed for answering the thesis research question.

Revisions in Chapter 3

1. Revision the examiners asked:

"Develop a much simpler theoretical framework. Abandon the eclectic approach and look to examine the whole thesis through one theoretical perspective".

Revision made

The eclectic approach is abandoned, and the thesis bases its theoretical background on one theory, Neoclassical Realism. Also, in this chapter discusses how Neoclassical Realism can be used for explaining a state's foreign policy behavior when it comes to energy related issues (pp. 86-91)

2. Revision the examiners asked:

"This [much simpler theoretical framework] does not mean that this one perspective will have to satisfy you in all the areas that you discuss. You can reflect on how relevant the approach is and what are its limitations (where it works and where it does not)

Revision made

The researcher has discussed Neoclassical Realism's limitations and presented his view on how he seeks to deal with those limitations (pp. 74 -83).

3. Revision the examiners asked:

"Stylistically, the work also needs some refinement. At the moment, it sometimes comes across more like a policy report than a PhD thesis. For example, while bullet points can be a good explanatory tool when used sparingly, they are used far too much. Likewise, diagrams should be used only when absolutely necessary."

Revision made:

All bullet points have been removed.

All diagrams have been removed

CHAPTER 4

THE RoC ENERGY SECURITY (2013-2018)

4.1 Introduction

Following the determination of the particularities of the RoC foreign policy decision-making procedure and the analysis of the thesis theoretical background, this chapter is dedicated to the RoC energy security. As presented in the first chapter, this study considers energy security primarily a foreign policy issue. After considering the thesis limitations stated in the introductory chapter, we consider the RoC energy security, as any other foreign policy issue, a unique case study, and we seek to treat it as such. This is the main reason driving the decision to dedicate this chapter particularly to the RoC energy security and not to include it in the second chapter referring to the state's foreign policy decisionmaking in general.

Thus, the second section of this chapter, discusses the theoretical context of energy security, including the parameters separating it from other foreign policy issues. Also, as presented in the same section, there is a lack of a commonly accepted definition in the literature discussing energy security. So, we propose a working definition that applies to the examined case study. The third section is dedicated to the RoC energy security crisis management and discusses the particularities of the RoC energy security decision-making procedure during crises. Who makes the decisions, who are the actors contributing to the decision-making procedure and which are the alternatives the aforementioned actors can use to deal with an energy security-related crisis are the primary points of discussion in this section.

4.2 The RoC energy security: Theoretical Background and a proposed working definition

The researcher begins this section by clarifying why this study focuses exclusively on the RoC energy security and not on the state's energy policy in general. This project has already referred to the RoC

Minister of Energy argument that "the energy policy of [the Republic of] Cyprus is fully harmonized with the energy policy of the European Union¹⁵". Thus, according to the EU Parliament fact sheets, the European energy policy's core consists of two pillars: an integrated energy market and energy security¹⁶. Moreover, the European Commission has asked the IEA experts James Simpson and Keiran McNamara (2011) to discuss this issue. Thus, the two experts have taken the argument a step further by including, apart from the two pillars, also the environmental protection into a triangle scheme. As presented in Figure 7 , on the left side, energy security, economic growth, and environmental protection are the three pillars 'surrounding' the EU energy policy. However, even though the RoC is continually attempting to be fully harmonized with the EU energy strategy and thus bases its energy policy on the same pillars, we need to consider the fact that since 2011 the RoC is still in a transition period as it tries to transform from an almost exclusive energy consumer to both an energy producer and an energy hub. According to Stambolis (2013), this transition period will last at least until the mid-2020s as the most optimistic plans show that the exploitation of the RoC hydrocarbons will not materialize before this period.

Based on the above, we conclude that the RoC still does not enjoy the economic profits of an energy-consuming or an energy hub state. In this project the author has sought to present notable agreements that the RoC has already signed both with states and oil/gas enterprises that have brought economic profits to the state. However, these profits are not big enough to cause massive changes in the state's budget and consequently differentiate the pillar of economic growth in the state's energy policy. On the other side, environmental policy, in general, and environmental protection in particular are beyond the scope of this study.

15http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/dmlenergyservice_en/dmlenergyservice_en?OpenDocument

16http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.7.1.html

It is necessary though to mention that the RoC officials have repeatedly stated their willingness to contribute to the EU sustainable development and climate change policy (Lakkotrypis 2016).




Figure 7: IEA experts' view on the pillars of the EU policy (left side) and the researcher's understanding on the RoC energy policy between 2013 and 2018 (right side)

When it comes to energy security Ang, Choong and Ng (2015) have confirmed the existence of, at least, 104 energy security definitions in the academic literature. Also, in the third chapter the researcher has referred to Papanikos (2015) analysis and the shared ideas and the main modules consisting of those definitions. Moreover, in the same chapter Esakova (2013) has presented his view on dividing the existing definitions into three groups: the economic, the strictly political, and the so-called "umbrella" definitions. Given this fact, and as this thesis has already set a limitation considering the RoC energy security, primarily a foreign policy issue; we believe a strictly economic definition could not be applicable. Thus, this study has decided to focus on the other two groups: the strictly political and umbrella terms.

Concerning the former, Natalya Esakova (2013) has characterized as strictly political the definitions focusing on the governance of a state and physical control over exploitation areas. For the supporters of this group of definitions, energy security means more than cheap energy,

whereas some of them aim to link energy security with the states' power capabilities. Within this scope, Kalicki and Goldwyn (2005:32) have defined energy security as "the ability to access energy resources required for the development of national power." Regarding the umbrella terms, Esakova (2013) has explained that only those definitions considering, simultaneously, political, economic, and environmental factors can be included in this group. Within this scope, World Economic Forum (2016) has defined energy security as "an umbrella term that covers a range of issues linking energy, economic growth and political power, such as the security of energy supply, the level and quality of access and uncertainty over prices."

However, none of the aforementioned definitions is commonly accepted by the majority of scholars and experts. Thus, the researcher has come to the conclusion that proposing a definition from the existing ones to describe the RoC energy security can be both problematic and debatable. Moreover, he has also considered it equally problematic, trying to develop a definition from scratch. On the contrary though, as this study considers it essential to present how the RoC governmental officials understand the term energy security, the researcher has decided to use Esakova's umbrella term as a starting point to define the term.

Of course, anyone may wonder why, even though this study has clearly stated that it considers all of the RoC energy issues as primarily foreign policy-related, the researcher has not used a strictly political definition, at least as a starting point. As a response, the researcher quotes Baumann's (2008) view that energy security is a multidimensional issue, based on different groups of factors, including but not limited to domestic governance, geopolitical, and economical parameters. The RoC Minister of Energy has a similar view, and states that "all energy-related issues are multidimensional; thus, the state's [the RoC] energy policy-related issues are discussed under the scope mainly of geopolitical

factors, but also economical and technical factors." Based on the above, the researcher has come to the conclusion that a strictly political definition is possible leaving aside crucial parameters related to the RoC energy security.

Thus, the author has decided to explain the RoC energy security under the scope of an umbrella term instead of a strictly political one. In particular, Esakova (2013: 184) has defined energy security as "an umbrella term that covers many concerns including energy, economic growth, and political power and, consequently, requires a multifaceted approach comprising a broad range of different issues." Simultaneously, and based on Papanikos' (2015) research, the researcher would consider it an omission trying to explain the RoC energy security without including the relationship between the supply and demand. However, another reason has led the researcher to the decision, including in his working definition, this relationship. In particular, his decision also stems from the fact that most interviewees, when they were asked to present their view on the RoC energy security, have begun their analysis by referring to the relationship between supply and demand. Also, this study considers it an omission, not to include in the proposed definition, the protection of critical infrastructures. According to Boustras (2019) and Adamides (2019), the RoC is already working on plans to protect its future energy infrastructures, but this process is still at an early stage. Thus, the researcher has concluded that it can be excluded from a working definition, but at the same time, its impact on the RoC energy policy is not among the issues of discussion in this thesis.

Based on the above, this study defines the RoC energy security as "an umbrella term linking the political leaders' foreign policy agenda in relation to energy, the availability of resources from exploitation to consumption, and the state's ability to protect its critical infrastructures." In other words, this study considers the RoC energy security as an amalgam of different factors related to the state's foreign policy, the

economic parameters of the state's energy policy through the relationship between supply and demand, and the domestic ability to protect its infrastructures.

However, the researcher, in his attempt to understand how the RoC officials consider the state's energy security, he has asked nine foreign and energy policy experts to present their view on the issue. More precisely, he has asked them to comment on four definitions and to express their view on which of them is the most applicable to the examined case study. As presented in Table 5 , the researcher has asked them to discuss a strictly economic, a strictly political, and two umbrella terms. The first umbrella term is the definition stated by Esakova, and the second is the study's proposed definition.

Group the definition included	Definition
Economic	Energy Security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price
Political	Energy security is the ability to have access to energy resources required for the development of national power.
Umbrella (Esakova)	Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth, and political power and, consequently, requires a multifaceted approach comprising a broad range of different issues.
Umbrella (Papasavva)	Energy security is an umbrella term linking energy resources with energy availability, from the exploitation to the consumption, the state's ability to provide physical protection to critical infrastructures and the decision makers foreign policy agenda in relation to energy.

Table 5: The list of definitions the interviewees were asked to comment

According to the results presented in Appendix "4", 75% of the interviewees consider an umbrella term more applicable for the case of the RoC. Moreover, 50% of the interviewees have agreed that the researcher's proposed definition applies to the case of the RoC. Also, the interviewees' view is in agreement with Lakkotrypis (2017 and 2016), claiming that all the RoC energy issues, including energy security, consist of a sum of different parameters.

4.3 The RoC energy security crisis management

In a similar way to any other foreign policy issue, the RoC energy policy in general and energy security, in particular, is governed by specific rules and limitations related to the applied strategy and the people making decisions both in the long term and crisis management. In the previous pages, the researcher has explained why he considers the President of the RoC as the main actor in the state's foreign policy decision making procedure. He has also presented his view on the people who impact the decision-making procedure and also how the governmental mechanism contributes to this procedure. He has also discussed the role that both the Parliament and the National Council have in the state's foreign policy. Lastly, the researcher has presented an overview of the RoC foreign policy crisis management, including the group of choices that the state has available to overcome an appeared crisis.

As with any other foreign policy crisis and after taking into consideration the proposed definition regarding the RoC energy security, a crisis in a particular sector seeks to harm the state's existing relation between energy supply and demand and also to threaten the energy-related critical infrastructures. Moreover, it engages the state's policymakers at the highest level because it poses a threat to the state's foreign policy agenda and causes a higher than usual probability for a military confrontation.

Concerning the role of the President in the crisis management procedure, the researcher has already stated he shares the same view with scholars claiming the determination of the role that the political elite has during a crisis is "crucial in shaping the outcomes." (Garrison; Redd and Carter 2010: 34). The thesis recalls that all the interviewees have agreed that the President exercises the powers conferred on him by the Constitution in all foreign policy-related issues. When it comes to the energy security-related crises in the RoC EEZ between 2013 and 2018, the researcher has asked four foreign policy and four energy policy experts to discuss the role of the President. In particular, as presented in Appendix "2" he has asked them to choose whether the President's role was:

- Maximizing, meaning that he had the absolute control of all decisions and the coordination of all the plans executed till the de-escalation
- Supervisory, meaning that he was giving the general framework of action and was supervising the entire crisis management procedure
- Minimizing, meaning he has given the competent Ministers and pre-established crisis management groups, like the Center of Crisis Management, the absolute control of the situation.

According to the findings presented in Appendix "4", most interviewees have characterized the President's role in all the energy security-related crises as supervisory. Also, Ms. Panayi has stated that the President was in constant communication with the people dealing with the majority of the energy security-related crises between 2013 and 2018, and on certain occasions, he was present at the Center of Crisis Management. However, he had avoided intervening when he realized that the process was going on based on the general framework that he had pre-approved.

With reference to the the people impacting the state's foreign policy decisionmaking, apart from the President, the study recalls the findings of Chapter 2 showing that the Head of the President's diplomatic office, the Head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs comprised the core of the decision-making procedure. However, when it comes to energy security-related issues, the study believes that apart from the aforementioned in the President's inner circle of advisors, we should also include the Minister of Energy who, under duties, has an active role in the RoC energy security decision-making procedure. According to the Ministry of Energy official website, the Minister "is responsible for the formulation and implementation of Government policy on matters of energy, in such a way that it will contribute positively towards the further development of the Cyprus economy and the well-being of the population of the island. The Ministry's administration handles the general policy and directs and coordinates all the departments and services of the Ministry for its effective implementation." In particular, the Minister is responsible for monitoring and coordinating the supply and availability of sufficient energy capacity for domestic needs. Also, for monitoring and participating in the formation of the European Policy for energy issues. Thirdly the Minister suggests ways to implement the European Acquis and assist in the preparation of Laws, Regulations, Rules and implements programs for their promotion. Fourthly the Minister is responsible for preparing and implementing programs for energy conservation, the promotion of Renewable Energy Sources (RES) and the development of technologies for the utilization of RES. Finally, the Ministry assists the Government in forming the national energy policy for the RoC in coordination with all other bodies involved.

At the same time and independent of the statutory responsibilities, there are additional reasons which make the study believe that Giorgos Lakkotrypīs must be included in the President's inner circle of advisors. The fact that some of the interviewees have confirmed the correctness of

the researcher's views about the importance that the Minister had in determining the state's energy policy during the Anastasiades presidency; gives an additional reason making this argument not arbitrary. According to Morton Halperin and Priscilla Clapp (2006), the more a person enjoys the decision-makers trust, the closer is to him/her. Regarding Lakkotrypīs, when the political party to which he belonged decided to leave the government on the 10th of March 2014, the President of the RoC offered to retain him in his office. The President's willingness to maintain him in his duties shows the trust Lakkotrypīs enjoys, and it is an additional reason that has led the researcher to the decision to include him in the President's inner circle.

Concerning the actors comprising both the outer circle and the independent groups and individuals advising either the decision maker or his advisors, the study believes that in energy security-related issues, the Minister of Defense, the Parliament, and the Center of Crisis Management have a similar impact as in any other foreign policy issue. Regarding the Minister of Defense, the researcher intends to dedicate a separate chapter on the military dimension of the RoC energy security, but for now, he limits the discussion to saying that since 2015 we have witnessed a gradual upgrade in the role of the armed forces in general and the Minister in particular in the RoC energy-related issues.

About the Parliament, it has similar responsibilities as with any other foreign policy issue. However, the researcher finds it useful to refer to the Parliament on two occasions contributing to the state's energy policy. The first is related to the so-called "hydrocarbons fund." More precisely, it established this fund as a result of the RoC attempt to increase the level of security of the Turkish Cypriots and show its willingness to have an equal sharing of the profits after the solution to the Cyprus issue.. Briefly, the fund was based on the Norwegian model, and all revenues from hydrocarbons would be deposited and used for the future generations of all the citizens of the RoC, both Greek and Turkish

Cypriots. The fund was established and approved through the House of Parliament on 01 March 2019 (Kathimerini, 2019). The second issue took place on 02 April 2004 when the state's Parliament voted a law proclaiming the state's marine borders, including its EEZ, is in full accordance with the UNCLOS's legal provisions¹⁷. According to this law, the state's EEZ's delimitation with the surrounding coastal states would be delineated under the provisions of the "median line agreement" or as it would be agreed with each state separately. As the study seeks to present in the upcoming chapters, this law was, and still is, the starting point on which the RoC bases all its argument for its maritime borders' delineation with all the states in the region.

On the other hand, in the previous section, the researcher has made a reference to the National Council (NC) and its impact on the RoC foreign policy. The study recalls that this council focuses strictly on issues, either directly or indirectly related to the state's strategy on the Cyprus issue. Thus, apart from those issues linking the relations between the RoC energy security and the Turkey/TRNC axis, the council does not have a role in the state's energy policy. Moreover, as the council can be considered a forum for exchanging ideas between the state's political leaders, the only role the researcher can attribute to the NC on energy security-related issues is to show the entanglement and consensus in the general context with the strategy followed by the government. However, such a role does not enable the NC to be included in the actors having an active role in the state's energy policy. To prove this argument, the researcher quotes the governmental spokesperson's statement after the NC meeting on 04 October 2019. According to the spokesperson: "All the political parties strongly condemn the new provocative, illegal intervention by Turkey in the RoC EEZ" (Euro News, 04 October 2020).

¹⁷http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/cyp_2004_eez_proclamation.pdf

Concerning the group of advisors to the President that are not included in the two circles, the researcher has already explained why he considers that the Geostrategic Council has an impact on the decision-making procedure. Moreover, the study has already referred to the establishment of the so-called "Energy Policy Council." The Council member, Professor George Boustras, has described the council as "a purely consultative body aiming to provide the President with the necessary expertise before the President makes decisions on energy policy issues." According to Boustras, the Geostrategic and the Energy policy boards operate independently from each other. However, a brief analysis of the areas of specialization of the members of the two groups leads the researcher to conclude that both have specialists on foreign policy and energy security issues. Thus, both councils can provide suggestions on energy security-related issues. For example, Dr. Odysseas Christou specializes in Governance, International Law and International Relations and participates in the Energy Policy Council (see Table 6). Based on the above, the researcher has decided to include both Councils in the proposed governmental structure presented in Figure 8..

Rank and Expert's Name of the Members of the Energy Council	Field of Expertise
Prof. Andreas Poulikkas	Power Systems
Dr. Giorgos Georgiou	Assistant Professor Energy Sustainability
Dr. Odysseas Christou	Assistant professor of Governance, international law and IR
Dr. Avraam Georgiou	Senior Lecturer Computer Science and Information Systems

Dr. Georgios Boustras	Dean of Business Administration Department
Dr. Marios Valiantis	Head of Centre for green energy

Table 6: The members of the RoC Energy Policy Council (Source: The Cyprus Mail)




Figure 8: The RoC governmental structure while dealing with energy security issues

The study has already proposed a two-stage framework in its attempt to explain the alternatives that the RoC can apply to deal with a crisis situation. Even though energy security is a foreign policy issue, the proposed structure has significant particularities that differentiate it from other foreign policy issues, and this is why the researcher has decided to discuss it separately.

The first issue is related to the diplomatic means the RoC can apply to deal with a crisis. In the second chapter while discussing the RoC crisis management choices and in particular, in the second stage of

the proposed framework, the researcher has stated that the diplomatic demarches, accompanied or supported by other states or organizations, are among the means included in the RoC "diplomatic arsenal." Regarding the energy security related tensions with the Turkey/TRNC since 2019, the RoC, within the EU, has also included the application of legal measures targeting oil/gas enterprises and individuals providing technological and other forms of support to the Turkey/TRNC energy program. More specifically, on the 15th of October 2019, the EU announced its intention to proceed with sanctions targeting enterprises and individuals activated/active in the Union, due to the technological support they have provided to the Turkish oil enterprise TPAO activated in the RoC EEZ.

The second issue is related to the economic measures that the RoC can take against Turkey. The lack of economic relations with Turkey and the also the fact that Turkey is a member of the G-20 while the RoC has a relatively small economy, and so can impose sanctions only through the EU. However, at least so far, it is an alternative that the EU, has shown a minimum willingness to adopt. In July 2019, and only after Turkey proceeded to exploitation drillings on sea blocks sited within the RoC EEZ, the EU announced a total amount of the imposed sanctions not exceeding 150 million euro (Euronews, 02 October 2019). The author believes these sanctions are somewhat symbolic if we bear in mind that Turkey's annual GDP is approximately 800 billion US dollars (Countryeconomy, 2019), and the reasons for this symbolic act are discussed in the next chapter. Within the same scope, it is important to mention that the RoC can also benefit from sanctions that other states, mainly the so-called "superpowers" such as the US, can impose on Turkey for their interests. For example, there is much discussion lately about the sanctions the US seeks to impose on Turkey as a response for buying the S-400 anti-aircraft missile system from Russia. However, as this is an issue that goes beyond the scope of this thesis apart from the

reference mentioned above, the researcher does not find it necessary to discuss further.




Figure 9: A proposed framework of the RoC energy security crisis management choices

Finally, the researcher shares the same view with Brecher (1996) claiming that between democratic regimes, it is rather unlikely for a crisis to escalate and lead to such acts of violence as a military confrontation. However, there are numerous examples in history, proving that the reality in international politics is far more complicated. Thus, it is important to recall that in the case of the RoC, the state's officials have expressed their willingness to avoid a military escalation to solve energy security-related disputes. However, the researcher recalls the findings in the

second chapter showing that a military escalation is possible for specific reasons: as part of a general escalation in the region, as an act of self-defense, and as an act to support Greece during a military escalation with Turkey. The question posed here is whether and how the RoC can expect support from the regional powers and the EU in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis. These issues are discussed in the next two chapters.

4.4 Conclusions

This chapter has presented an overview of the RoC energy security between 2013 and 2018. More precisely, it has discussed how the state's energy policy decision-making procedure operates, the President's role, and the people/groups' impact on the decision-making procedure. Also it has presented the possible alternatives that the RoC officials can use while dealing with an energy security-related crisis, both by depending exclusively on the state's capabilities and simultaneously with other regional actors. Based on all the above, the study believes that now it can present the domestic and the external drivers of the RoC energy security-related, which are the main topics of discussion in the following two chapters.

Revisions in Chapter 4

1. Revision the examiners asked:

“The work also needs one, or perhaps two, service chapters”

Revision made:

This chapter is the second service chapter the committee asked to be included. This chapter is dedicated to and has focuses on its particularities compared to other foreign policy issues. The section 4.2 (pp. 96-102) focuses on the role the state’s President, the Cabinet and other domestic actors have in the energy security decision making procedure. The next section (pp.102-111) makes an overview on the energy security crisis management procedure, clarifies the role each of the players mentioned above has and present’s the alternatives they can use to deal with these types of crises.

2. Revision the examiners asked:

"Reconsideration of the research question."

Revision made:

The section 4.2 begins by explaining why this project focuses mainly on energy security and not energy policy in general (pp. 96-98).

3. Revision the examiners asked:

“Stylistically, the work also needs some refinement. At the moment, it sometimes comes across more like a policy report than a PhD thesis. For example, while bullet points can be a good explanatory tool when used sparingly, they are used far too much. Likewise, diagrams should be used only when absolutely necessary.”

Revision made:

Apart from one bullet points have been removed.

All diagrams have been removed

CHAPTER 5

THE EXTERNAL DRIVERS OF THE RoC ENERGY SECURITY

5.1 Introduction

In line with the NcRs understanding, the researcher considers external the actors who have an impact on the RoC position in the international system and do not originate from the state's domestic environment. Due to the study's research question, we have focused on those regional and international actors impacting the RoC energy security. The relations both with the so-called "great" powers and particular regional states and the contribution of the oil/gas enterprises are among the chapter's main points of discussion.

According to the President of the RoC, Nikos Anastasiades (2014:2), since 2013, the RoC has shown the intention to reorient its relations with other states "based on a comprehensive and extrovert approach". First of all, the RoC has shown its willingness to upgrade its bilateral relations with the USA and UK without affecting Russia and China's existing relations negatively. Secondly, to improve the state's bilateral relations with other states in the region (e.g., Egypt, Israel). Thirdly, the need to develop bilateral relations with other states both in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the Middle East in general. Fourthly, Anastasiades has considered it equally essential to enhance the RoC participation in all EU pillars, including becoming an integral part of the European Security and Energy Security System. Last but not least, the RoC President has set as a primary goal of the state's foreign policy to increase cooperation at the bilateral level with significant EU states such as France.

In 2015, Anastasiades expressed the opinion that this new approach in the relations with other states has been proved to be successful as "it safeguarded and reinforced the excellent relations with traditionally friendly countries, while, at the same time, managed to restore, to enhance and deepen relations with countries that play a leading role at the international political level (The Republic of Cyprus

Presidency, 2015)." However, the author believes that apart from the positive impact, this new strategy has also resulted in the development of two new challenges.

The first challenge is the insecurity caused to neighboring states, notably Turkey. More precisely, and even though the President of the RoC has expressed the intention that the newly established, multi-dimensional foreign policy, would not raise the other states' level of insecurity in the region, this is not something he can guarantee. Given that all the states in the Eastern Mediterranean region are self-interested, Anastasiades could not neglect the fact that the signature on new bilateral agreements may contradict the interests of neighboring states and entities as Turkey and the TRNC, and therefore, cause new tensions in the area. To make this argument more precise, the author recalls that before the exploitation of hydrocarbons in 2011, the RoC and Turkey/TRNC axis's crises were limited, almost exclusively, to the island's land space. Since 2011, the exploitation of hydrocarbons and the application of this new foreign policy strategy have contributed to the tensions between the two sides and to being transferred to the maritime area of the ROC.

The second challenge is also related to a possible clash of interests, but this time with a traditional ally. A possible clash of interests with the interests of Greek foreign policy is a challenge the Cypriot President has to take into consideration. The RoC and Greece have a collective national identity that makes their relationship much closer than a simple alliance (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016). While interviewing Nikos Christodoulides, even though he has confirmed this 'special relationship' between the two states, he has admitted there are occasions when the two states have a different perspective on particular foreign policy issues, especially within the EU. However, a similar clash of interests with Greece in other foreign policy and energy-related issues can be a challenge that the President of the RoC needs to bear in mind.

Based on the above, after considering the majority view of the interviewees that the exploitation of hydrocarbons can be either a blessing or a curse, this chapter is dedicated to presenting an overview of the relations that the RoC has gradually developed. Even though the emphasis is on the period between 2013 and 2018, the researcher, has decided to go beyond this period whenever it is necessary ; in his attempt to provide better insights regarding the impact that the RoC energy policy in general and energy security, in particular, has on the relations with regional and international actors.. Thus, in the upcoming sections, the project, gives an overview of the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean region and their link to the RoC energy program. Then it focuses on the energy security-related relations between the RoC and the so-called "great powers," regional players and also with the oil/gas enterprises activated within the state's EEZ.

5.2 The RoC resources and their link to the regional energy security system

Hill (2003: 47) has defined resources as the "elements derived from the history and geography that determine the limits of a state's impact on the world." Under this category, he has included the states' geographical location, the territory they cover, the population, and the natural resources existing within their jurisdictional area (both in terrain and maritime). He has also expressed the opinion that the loss of any resource usually takes somewhere between decades and centuries to be replaced or regained. By the same token, NcRs consider geography, natural resources, and military technology among the main factors that can change a state's position in the international system.

Concerning the geographical location, as presented on Map 1 on the next page, the island of Cyprus is located at the crossroad of three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa. Due to its location, the island has


had geopolitical importance for the regional powers over the last 2000 years. Leo Paul Dana (2008:72) has characterized the RoC "harmless for the region's security" and he has also stated that it maintains good economic and political relations with all the states in the area, apart from Turkey. Given this fact, the researcher has already referred to the tensions between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis related to the Cyprus issue and given his intention to explain the energy security-related issues between the two sides in the following pages; he limits his discussion on two statements that he believes shows the importance the island has for Turkey in general. According to Thomas Diez (2002), the island's geographical position explains its importance to Turkey, as it is located under its "soft belly," and whoever has it under its control can reduce the geopolitical area that Turkey influences in the region. Similarly, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu (2001: 347) has highlighted Cyprus's geostrategic importance by quoting that "even if there was not a single Turk in Cyprus, we should have found one."



Map 1: The Eastern Mediterranean Region (the island of Cyprus is within the black circle) (Source: emersonkent.com)

When it comes to the link between the RoC geographical location and energy, there are two issues we need to discuss. At first, it is probably apparent that the RoC's geographical location is responsible for the energy resources within its maritime borders. According to the existing evidence, the energy reserves discovered in the RoC EEZ consists of close to 9 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas (Stergiou and Karagianni, 2020).

On the other hand, the RoC's intention to be transformed to an energy hub by taking advantage of its geographical location can be discussed under the scope of two parameters. At first and as presented in the maps (2a and 2b), Cyprus's island is relatively neighboring on four out of the eight most important "maritime energy chokepoints." According to Kalicki and Glodwin (2012), a maritime energy chokepoint can be defined as "a narrow sea channel along widely used global sea routes from where energy reserves are transit to different markets from energy-producing regions." According to the US Energy Information Administration (2017), the importance of the chokepoints to the world energy security and, more precisely, to the relation between supply and demand is such that in case the tankers are unable to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, that can lead to substantial delays and higher shipping costs followed by an increase in the world energy prices. Thus, as presented on the map 2a, the RoC is far away: 750km from the Turkish Straits, 470km from the Suez Canal, 2400 km from the Babel-Manbed, and 2600 km from the Strait of Hormuz. As it can be easily understood, whoever controls the island can impact a significant part of the energy transit via the sea routes.



Map 2a (left side): The distance between the capital of Cyprus and the four closest oil/gas chokepoints (Source: Sketched by the author by using the “Google Earth 2020” software)

Map 2b (right side): Petroleum transit volumes through select maritime routes (Source: US Energy Information Administration, 2017)

The second issue is related to the existing and the under-construction pipeline network linking the Middle East with the EU market. Anyone can see on Map 3 that most of the pipelines linking the Middle East oil/gas resources to the EU market are neighboring Cyprus's island and as the project seeks to present on the following pages some of the most crucial pipelines cross Turkey. Thus, it can be understood that a possible transformation and transition of the RoC into an energy hub threatens the Republic of Turkey's energy security, and this is an issue that the researcher seeks to discuss in-depth later on. The question posed here is related the impact that the so-called "great powers" the regional players and the oil/gas enterprises aim to have on this transition. This is the main point of discussion in the upcoming section.



Map 3: Selected Oil and Gas Pipeline Infrastructure in the Middle East

5.3 The “great powers” and their role in the RoC energy security

5.3.1 The US energy interests and the RoC energy security

According to the U.S. Department of State and more specifically the Bureau of Energy Resources (ENR)¹⁸ in energy-related issues, the U.S. national security is threatened when the U.S. allies lack reliable access to affordable energy or diversity of choices, the foreign energy markets shut out U.S. companies and poor governance prevents market-based energy solutions. By the same token, the competition for energy

¹⁸ <https://www.state.gov/e/enr/>

leads to conflict while terrorists and rogue regimes seek to exploit energy resources to fund violence and destabilizing activities.

Based on these threats, the ENR is in constant cooperation with all the states including the producers, the consumers, and the transit actors who may have an impact on U.S. energy security. In particular, the ENR seeks, through significant actions, to promote energy diversification among U.S. partners and allies; and also, to ensure that energy resources are used for economic growth, regional cooperation, political stability, and to prevent conflict¹⁹. For the successful fulfillment of the tasks mentioned above, the U.S. government takes significant measures that can safeguard both its own energy security and also its allies.

When it comes to the bilateral relations between the U.S. and the RoC since 2014, we have observed a gradual improvement. Even though the researcher does not share the rating of the Cyprus Mail newspaper that has characterized the RoC government being "U.S. - friendly" (Evripidou, 2014), at the same time, significant facts prove the gradual improvement in the bilateral relations between the two states. To strengthen this argument, the project quotes two facts. The first is the official visit of the U.S. Vice President, John Biden, to the RoC in 2014 (Warner, Lovell, & Kontos, 2016). John Biden was the first Vice President making an official visit to the RoC since 1962. The second fact is the participation of the U.S. aeronautical forces in various military exercises on the RoC EEZ and also on various SAR exercises since 2014. The project highlights the annual participation of the U.S. Navy forces in the most prominent multinational exercise the RoC Ministry of Defense named "The Argonaut."

Regarding the energy-related issues, we have also witnessed a gradual improvement in the relations between the two states. The author bases this argument on two facts. The first is related to the active

19 <https://www.state.gov/e/enr/c80061.htm>

involvement of US-based oil/gas enterprises, to the exploitation program of the RoC. More specifically, the first license for exploitations given by the RoC ministerial council was to the US-based oil/gas enterprise, Noble Energy. At a later stage, another US-based enterprise, Exxon Mobil, has reached an agreement for exploitations on another sea block consisting of/within the RoC EEZ. Secondly, this project shares the same opinion with Emmanuel Karagiannis (2015), claiming that the RoC hydrocarbons can become a part of the U.S.–E.U. Planning for reducing the latter's energy dependency on the Russian Federation. According to the Intelligence Community's assessments of threats to U.S. national security (2018²⁰ and 2017²¹), the E.U. energy dependency on the Russian Federation energy reserves is referred to as a threat to national security in general and the U.S. and the E.U. energy security in particular.. According to the ENR Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mary Warlick²² (2015), the safeguarding of the E.U. energy security must be based on three pillars: the supply sources, the fuel types diversification, and the delivery routes. Based on this statement, it can be understood that the hydrocarbons discovered within the RoC EEZ can contribute to increasing the E.U. energy security as the particular state can act both as an energy producer and also as part of an energy hub network including Israel, Greece, and Italy.

However, the possible role the RoC may contribute to the E.U. energy security can develop excessive expectations regarding the means that the U.S. is ready to use in favor of the particular state in case of an energy security-related crisis with Turkey. The author believes there are certain limits to the intervention of the U.S. in such a crisis as we must always bear in mind the geopolitical importance Turkey has for the U.S.

20 <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%20-%20Final.pdf>

21 <https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA---Unclassified-SSCI.pdf>

22 <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ime/useuropeanmediahub/271961.htm>

in the region (Salmi & Durgun, 2005) and the steadily waning influence of the U.S. on Turkey during the last years (Kasoulidis, 2018).

Following the above, the researcher believes there is vagueness in U.S. statements regarding the right of the RoC to proceed with its energy program. Even though the U.S. Department of State spokesperson has stated that "the U.S. policy on Cyprus's EEZ is longstanding and has not changed as the United States recognizes the right of the RoC to develop its resources in its EEZ"²³ the researcher bases his argument for the existence of vagueness on two facts.

Firstly, this project considers it unclear whether the U.S. recognizes the right of the RoC to proceed with the development of its resources across the island. As presented in the upcoming pages, the RoC, at least during the period on which this project focuses, has deposited coordinates to U.N. for the delimitation of its EEZ only for the south part of the island. Thus, we are not in a position to know whether the U.S. will support a possible attempt by the RoC for declaring rights to the northern part of the island.

Secondly, at least based on the author's research, the U.S. does not reject the Turkish claims that the TRNC has equal rights to the exploitation of the hydrocarbons discovered on the RoC EEZ. Thus, we are not in a position to know whether the U.S. would try to halt any exploitation researches in the North part of the island or even in its southern part by the Turkey/TRNC axis.

Thus, the question posed is: What are the limits of the U.S. support to the RoC during energy security-related crisis with the Turkey/TRNC axis? In the third chapter, the researcher has discussed this issue and in fact he has stated that even though he has asked four experts on the RoC to answer this question all of them have limited their answers by saying "no one [state] is going to begin a war with Turkey for our

23 <https://ahvalnews.com/cyprus/exclusive-united-states-backs-cyprus-rights-gas-exploration>

interests." The author intends to discuss the issue of cooperation between the RoC and all the actors analyzed in this chapter in the last one. Thus, he limits his discussion by saying that he takes for granted that Turkey will not try to halt the RoC energy program by bombarding a U.S. exploitation platform and at the same time the U.S. does not consider the application of military means against Turkey among its choices for supporting the RoC energy program.

5.3.2 The Russian Federation and its role in the RoC energy security

Korteweg²⁴ (2018) has argued that the Russian Federation uses its energy resources as a tool for gaining economic benefits, maintaining, increasing and exerting its political influence in its perceived sphere of influence, the so-called near abroad and exerting political pressure on end-consumers. Over the last two decades, significant incidents make the author believe that, at least in the case of the European Continent in general and the EU in particular, Korteweg's argument is not arbitrary. The author bases the argument on a series of crises we have between the Russian Federation and the EU during the last 15 years, and they have ended up having an impact on the energy security of the EU. Among other incidents, the researcher recalls the Russian Federation's intention to use energy, as a means for safeguarding its interests is the case of the Czech Republic in July 2008. In particular, even though the Russian Federation officials insisted that the flow of oil to the particular state has stopped due to technical reasons, many analysts had a different opinion. Andrew Kramer (2008) was among the analysts who have expressed the opinion that the main reason for stopping the energy

24 The paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs

flow was the Czech Republic's decision to host a new technology US anti-radar system.

When it comes to the Eastern Mediterranean region since the early stages of the Syrian civil war, Russia has a more active presence both in the state in particular and the region in general. This project shares the same opinion with Olga Ermolaeva (2017), claiming that Russian's intervention is highly motivated by its intention to maintain the status of a "Great Power." Through this status, Vladimir Putin seeks to gain benefits in the domestic and the external political environment. However, this project believes there is an additional reason the Russian Federation has to interfere so actively in the case of Syria. As Pasquale De Micco (2014) has argued; Russia, aims to dominate the Eastern Mediterranean gas market so that it can safeguard the EU energy dependence on its energy reserves. To do so, Russia has taken the following particular actions: firstly, through Gazprom, Russia has signed a multi-year deal to market LNG extracted from Israel's Tamar basin (Gazprom, 26 February 2013). Secondly, Russia has been actively involved in the exploitation of the hydrocarbons from the Leviathan basin in Israel EEZ (Topalov, 2017), and simultaneously has signed agreements both with the Syrian and the Lebanese government for future exploitation of oil and gas found in the Syrian EEZ (Katona, 2018). Thirdly, the Russian Federation has provided the know-how in Turkey to build a nuclear power plant in Akkuyu area (World Nuclear News, 2018). Fourthly, it has exported natural gas from the Zohr basin in Egypt EEZ (Graeber, 2017).

Concerning the bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the RoC, we have witnessed diachronic support by the former in different foreign policy issues, including the Cyprus issue (Melakopides, 2016). To strengthen this argument, the author quotes a statement made by the Russian Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev during an official visit by the President of the Republic of Cyprus in Moscow (23rd of October 2017). During this visit, Medvedev has referred to the Republic of Cyprus

as “an important and reliable partner to Russia” (Psyllides, 2017). At the same time, we have observed an intention from the RoC to use its influence within the EU so that the economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, following the Crimean conflict would be reduced (Larrabee, Pezard, & Radin, 2017).

At the same time, though the bilateral relations that the Russian Federation gradually develops in the Eastern Mediterranean region and especially with Turkey may cause significant issues in the relations with the RoC. The pipelines pass through Turkey and connect the Russian resources with the EU market; the nuclear power plant was built in Akkuyu by Russian experts, and no Russian based enterprise participates in the RoC energy program are the facts that make the author believe his statement is not arbitrary.

However, at least between 2013 and 2018, the Russian Federation has tried to keep equal distances in the energy security-related dispute between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis. To strengthen the argument, the author quotes two statements made by Russian officials on different occasions.

The first statement was made in the aftermath of the meetings between the Republic of Cyprus and Russian Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Moscow on the 27th of April 2018. Even though a crisis in the Republic of Cyprus EEZ was ongoing, the Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs made a statement on this issue (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018).

Sergey Lavrov made the second statement on the 24th of December 2017 in an interview in the Greek newspaper “Simerini.” During this interview, Lavrov was asked about future cooperation between the RoC and Russia in the area of energy. The Russian Minister replied that there are discussions on areas such as renewable energy, energy efficiency, and green technologies. Thus, once again trying to

avoid mentioning possible cooperation in the area of the exploitation of hydrocarbons (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017).

5.4 The European Union: The Union, the states and the RoC energy security

Igor Taranic (2016) has argued that since the mid-2000s, the EU has been on a continuous procedure to redefine its energy security strategy. As presented in Figure 10, Giannakopoulos et al. (2016) have argued that until the mid-2000s, the Union aimed to have energy cooperation with Russia. However, since then, we have witnessed three energy crises between the two sides. The first two crises contributed to the EU states starting to reconsider the necessity of being so dependent on the Russian resources (Kauert & Léonard, 2013). However, it was not until the 2014 conflict in Crimea that the Union started to intensify its efforts in this direction.




Figure 10: The timeline of the EU energy security initiatives (Source: Giannakopoulos et al. 2016)

According to the EU Energy Security Strategy (European Commission, 2014), the Union aims, by 2030, to have reduced its energy

dependence on Russia. However, we have observed a gradually increasing interest from the EU in the Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves, only after February 2015. Even in March 2014, the Director-General for Energy on the European Commission Dominique Rostri expressed the opinion that the political instability in the Eastern Mediterranean region and the uncertainty about the quantity of gas reserves were the main reasons for the EU not to include the reserves of the specific geographic area in its leading priorities. However, the next year, under the new Commissioner Sevcovic, we have witnessed a rapid change in considering this issue. More specifically, in February 2015, the Eastern Mediterranean was included on the EU list with the new diversification options for EU natural gas supplies. This rapid change has unavoidably increased the interest of significant EU states for the reserves in the region.

Concerning the EU energy policy and its link to the Eastern Mediterranean energy reserves, Giannakopoulos et al. (2016) have presented their view schematically. As shown in the scheme presented in Figure 11, the particular analysts consider the East Med pipeline as an infrastructure that can contribute to the diversification both of the reserves and the routes transferring energy to the EU market. Given the fact that the researcher aims to discuss the East Med pipeline in the upcoming/following pages, he limits his discussion to saying it is a project through which Israel, the RoC, and Greece seek to transfer their energy reserves to the EU markets.




Figure 11: The EU energy policy triangle and its relevance to the Eastern Mediterranean (Source: Giannakopoulos et al. 2016)

With reference particularly to the RoC, this project has already explained that the Ministry of Energy has set as a goal the full harmonization to the EU energy policy and contributing to the implementation of the EU energy security strategy. For the successful accomplishment of the two tasks the RoC Ministry of Energy has drawn up a strategy based on safeguarding the healthy competition in the market, securing the supply of energy and fulfilling the energy demands of the country, with the least possible burden on the national economy and the environment.

A brief overview of both of Giannakopoulos et al. (2016) energy triangle and the pillars set by the RoC Ministry of Energy has led this project to the conclusion once again that the RoC seeks to harmonize its energy policy to the EU strategy. Also, the RoC minister has taken this argument further by stating that the RoC is making a constant effort to align its energy interests with those of other states in the region (Egypt, Israel), the members of the UNSC (mainly US and UK), the EU and the oil/gas enterprises who have demonstrated the intention to become active in the RoC energy program.

Regarding the limits of support, that the EU would provide to the RoC during an energy security-related crisis with Turkey/TRNC axis; we have to divide it into two groups: the support provided by the EU as a Union and the support provided by individual states. About the former, even though we have witnessed a gradual increase of interest in the RoC exploitation program, EU support, at least so far, is limited to diplomatic declarations supporting the right of the particular state to proceed unaffected with its energy program and, as the researcher has stated, to symbolic economic sanctions. To prove his argument, the researcher quotes two issues.

At first, the European Parliament resolution of 13 November 2014 on Turkish actions creating tensions in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus (RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). On the particular resolution, the EU calls the Republic of Turkey to avoid any actions within the RoC EEZ and to respect the provisions of the International Law. Moreover, requests that the European External Action Service and the Commission closely follow Turkey's activities within the EEZ of the RoC and report back to Parliament.

The second is the 14th of October 2019 decision to freeze pre-accession assistance to the tune of 146 million euros, the suspension of negotiations on the Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement and a halting of high-level dialogues in the fields of economy, energy, transport and agriculture as well as the suspension of lending activities of the European Investment Bank. Also, the EU leaders have ordered the Union's organs to prepare a list of additional measures targeting individuals and companies involved in Turkey's illegal drilling activities in the RoC EEZ (Varvitsioti, 2019)

Based on the above, the researcher believes that, gradually, the EU will intensify its involvement in the RoC energy-related issues. However, he does believe this involvement will be limited to diplomatic demarches and economic sanctions. Concerning the latter, the author

believes they will be mainly targeting individuals and enterprises supporting the Turkish energy program. In other words, this project believes that the application of economic sanctions that will cause a modest cost to Turkey or even more, the mobilization of a battle group to contribute to the security of the RoC EEZ is not among the options the EU leaders even want to discuss. The researcher bases this argument on three reasons.

The first reason is related to the stance of the RoC on the main EU issues, at least, until 2013. According to Christodoulides (2018) the main reason the President of the state has set as a foreign policy goal “the enhancing of the participation in all EU pillars and policies ... and establishing a credible presence and cooperation with the EU member states”, was the so called “single dimension policy²⁵” applied by the previous governments. In particular, according to Christodoulides, the previous governments made the mistake of limiting, almost exclusively, the RoC participation within the EU on the Cyprus issue without aiming to have an active role in the other challenges that the Union faces. Thus, the state was always giving the impression it became a member of the EU only to safeguard its interests against Turkey, something that harms its relationship within the Union.

Secondly, there is a clash of interests among international organizations. Although the RoC is a member state of the EU, the Republic of Turkey is a member of NATO. Even though the EU is a “unique and essential partner for NATO” (Stoltenberg, 2014) and twenty-two out of the twenty-nine countries of the EU are members of NATO, the RoC is not among them (NATO Official Website, 2019). This situation makes the application of economic sanctions and military actions against Turkey problematic, even in cases of disputes with a member of the Union.

²⁵ This statement has been made in Greek. The researcher has translated it verbatim

The third reason is related to the EU-Turkey immigration agreement. On the 18th of March 2016, the European Council and the Republic of Turkey reached an agreement aimed at stopping the flow of irregular immigrants via the latter to the European Union member states (EU Parliament, 2016). As the flow of immigrants in the EU is among the main problems facing the member states during the examined period this project does not believe the EU will cause any tension with Turkey that will make the Turkish President execute his threat and “open the gates for immigrants to enter Europe” (Independent, 2016).

On the contrary, the fact the involvement of the EU as a Union is limited to the diplomatic demarches and the symbolic economic sanctions, particular member states of the Union have significant interests in being more actively involved in the RoC energy program. This intention to be involved stems from the fact they have oil/gas enterprises of their interests that have signed agreements for exploitation agreements with the RoC but also with other states in the region. At least so far, the EU member states having this prominent involvement in the RoC energy program are France, with TOTAL, and Italy with ENI.

Concerning France , at least so far, it has showed greater willingness to safeguard its home-based enterprise, TOTAL, exploitation program by providing it with the necessary coverage with its naval forces so that it can proceed to fulfill its obligations as described on the agreement signed with the RoC. On the other hand, the Italian government, at least so far, was either unable or unwilling to help ENI in a similar way. The inability of the Italian government was such that Kasoulides (2018) has expressed thoughts whether ENI should remain on the RoC energy program. Two of the interviewees, who want to remain anonymous, have also expressed their opposition to give an exploitation license to ENI. Their opposition stems not from the inability of the enterprise to execute the drilling program but on the capabilities of Italy to guarantee the seamless contract of research. As of today, there is no

evidence for an Italian willingness to support the ENI exploitation program more actively. This could be the reason behind the CEO of ENI stating that the particular enterprise would not proceed to researches if there are naval forces close to the platforms (Philenews, 2019).

5.5 The oil/gas enterprises and their role in the RoC energy security

According to the Natural Resource Governance Institute (2017), 45 out of the 58 countries exploiting hydrocarbons have state-owned gas enterprises. Similarly, Brenda Shafer (2009: 84) has stated, “[the state] energy companies owned about 85% of the world oil reserve and 70 – 80% of the natural gas reserve.” Alhajji (2007) has argued that the impact natural gas has on the determination of the relations between enterprises and states is an area that remains underdeveloped. He bases this argument on the fact that the energy security relations between two sides are mainly limited to oil, as it is still considered the key to the energy security of energy importing countries. Dorian et. al (2006) have argued that even though both states and enterprises take into consideration geopolitical, economic and technical factors while dealing with energy-related issues, at the same time the fact that each state defines energy security differently while the majority of enterprises, consider their relations with states to be primarily economic related, it causes additional difficulties in their relations.

Concerning the impact oil/gas companies have on the states' foreign policy, the Natural Resource Governance Institute (2017) has expressed the opinion that enterprises often play a role in the state's governance. However, the precise impact differs from case to case and Vivola (2010) has argued it is based on which are both the home governments and the host countries.

When it comes to the home governments, Brookstone (1976) has argued that the companies may have direct access to policymakers in multiple ways, such as the funding of political parties, the recruitment of vital governmental experts and policymakers, lobbying, bribes and joint ventures with governments. Vivola (2010) has stated that the bigger an oil company is, the more influence it has on the home government. Stokes (2007) has taken this view a step further by claiming that in case the decision-maker(s) considers a particular country's energy security to be primarily an economic issue, then the impact of the enterprises on the states' foreign policy is increasing. The liberation of markets, especially after the 1980s, has contributed to improving the relations between the home governments and the oil/gas enterprises. At the same time, though their interests are not always mutual (Skinner, 2006) as there are occasions where their interests contradict, and in those cases, the enterprises tend to keep a neutral position on particular issues. Vivola (2007 and 2010); in his attempt to prove this argument, he has recalled the case of Iraq in 1991. More specifically, the trade sanctions imposed under the UN Security Council Resolution 648 (1991) the Anglo-Americans were locked out during a period they were desperately looking for access to new energy reserves. At the same time the Russian, Chinese and French companies were ready to negotiate with the Iraqi government under the 'oil-for-food' program that was not bound by sanctions. Moreover, Wells (2005) has argued that the host government's prestige in the international arena is always a safety for the companies and it contributes to the negotiations with the prospective host states.

Concerning the host countries, even though there are no tense relations with the home government and this contributes to the negotiations with the enterprises Vivola (2010:3) has argued that the discussion between the two sides is mainly limited to economic and technical issues and domestic issues rather than foreign policy related. He has even characterized the existing literature on this issue, "primarily

anecdotal in nature, or based on personal conjecture and extemporaneous theorizing.” He bases this lack of evidence on the fact that the access behind closed doors while the governments and the companies discuss these issues ranges from very limited to none existing/non-existent as the relevant data remain private from both sides (Haris and Browning, 2003). Thus, when it comes to the case of the RoC, the researcher aims to discuss the impact the oil and gas enterprises have empirically by presenting statements and facts that took place during the period on which this project focuses.

Thus, the researcher believes there are two factors we need to consider to clarify the impact the oil/gas enterprises have on the RoC energy security crisis management. At first and based on the RoC willingness to involve as many players as possible in its energy program, by harmonizing its energy security with their interests, we need to consider those players in terms of their willingness, ability, and intention to be involved in favor of the RoC in case of an energy security-related tension with the Turkey/TRNC axis. However, this is an issue the project seeks to investigate in the following chapter, where he discusses the specifics governing foreign policy relations with all the states in the region, including the home states of the oil/gas enterprises.

Secondly, we need to clarify the enterprises outsourced and the possible impact the oil/gas enterprises may have on Turkey. To do so, the researcher has decided to focus on two parameters. At first, to see whether those enterprises have also signed contracts with Turkey. As already mentioned, the RoC officials consider energy security primarily a foreign policy issue. In contrast, both secondary sources and the interviewees have stated that for the oil/gas enterprises, energy security is primarily an economic issue, mainly subject to the relationship between supply and demand. Thus, this project considers it important to discuss the economic relations the oil/gas enterprises have with Turkey following the President of Turkey's warnings during the 22nd World Petroleum

Congress "not to proceed to sign agreements with the RoC as they can be excluded from contracts in Turkey" (Cyprus Mail, 10 July 2017). The second parameter is to clarify which of those enterprises are considered among the world-leading ones as the more prestigious an enterprise is, the higher the possibility is to impact states' relations to safeguard its interests. Also, the researcher considers it important to determine whether the oil/gas enterprises activated in the RoC EEZ are state-owned and, in case they are, to investigate which is the home government.

Thus, and based on Table 7 , two out of the five global leading enterprises (Parra, 2014) have signed contracts with the RoC. Three companies have their headquarters in two of the UN Security Council member states (US and France) and one in an additional EU member state (Italy). An additional company has its headquarters in Israel, a state with advanced military capabilities and tense bilateral relations with Turkey. Five out of nine, including the two major companies, are active/activated both in Turkey and in the RoC, something that means that they can both influence, under the parameters mentioned above, the host countries during an energy security crisis.

Company Name	Home Nation	Among the top World companies (Source: Parra, 2014)	State Owned	Contracts in Turkey
Exon Mobil	USA	YES	No	YES
Shell	Dutch	YES	No	YES
Total	France	No	YES (Partially)	YES
KOGAS	South Korea	No	YES	No

Qatar	Qatar	No	YES	YES
Petroleum				
ENI	Italy	No	No	YES
Noble	USA	No	No	No
Delek	Israel	No	No	No
Avner	Israel	No	No	No

Table 7: The companies activated in the Republic of Cyprus EEZ and the licensing rounds awarded an exploration license contract (Source: Republic of Cyprus Ministry of Energy official website)

On the other hand, the researcher considers it essential to refer to the RoC Council of Ministers' procedure when deciding which enterprise/consortium would outsource each licensing round? As it has already been mentioned, both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Energy have admitted that the Council of Ministers in all energy-related issues considers geopolitical, technical, and economic parameters. The importance this project gives to this issue makes the researcher try to clarify whether those factors are present on the licensing rounds.

To begin with, according to the RoC Ministry of Energy official website (2019), all the activities related to hydrocarbons, including prospecting exploration and exploitation, in the RoC EEZ are subject to the Hydrocarbons Law 4(1)/2007 and the two regulations made under this law. Additionally, the Council of Ministers is responsible, under the law, for any action related to the exploitation, prospecting, and exploration of hydrocarbons within the jurisdictional area of the RoC. However, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, energy is under mere competence with the EU. Thus, all the actions made by the RoC are subject to control to the EU. However, both the willingness of the RoC to be harmonized with the EU energy policy and in its attempt to avoid future problems it has already transposed EC Directives into national laws.

Regarding the specific criteria that each enterprise should fulfil to be eligible to participate to any licensing round, the RoC Ministry of Energy has announced them in the Official Journal of the EU. The established criteria are the applicants' technical and financial ability and how they intend to carry out the activities specified in the license. Also, the financial consideration that the applicant offers to obtain the permit and any lack of efficiency and responsibility the applicant has shown under previous license or authorization in any country comprises the core of the factors the RoC has determined on its licensing rounds announcement. Moreover, the RoC officials have made clear their intention taking into consideration the above criteria only in case they are "without prejudice to the application of the provisions regarding national security," as described on EC Directive 94/22. According to that Directive²⁶ 'the ownership of hydrocarbons wherever they are found in Cyprus, including the Territorial Waters, the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic, shall be deemed to be and always to have been vested in the Republic'.

Following the above, the RoC has made clear its intention: the enterprises/consortium that will outsource each exploitation round must have the technical expertise and provide the economic profit the RoC seeks to have from each exploitation. However, and without any intention to reduce the severity of the mentioned terms, the researcher seeks to focus on national security. David A. Baldwin (1997) has referred to different definitions seeking to explain "national security." However, he has made clear that most of those definitions have at their core, the protection of the state's interest both from domestic and external threats. Given that the RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs when interviewed by the researcher has expressed the same view, the researcher has decided to use Baldwin's view as a starting point. Thus, concerning "the provisions


26 Section 3, Paragraph 1

regarding national security," this project believes the RoC officials are referring to any domestic and external threats that may cause delays or even a halt to the state's energy program. The researcher has already explained that, at least between 2013 and 2018, the RoC energy program's main threat is the Turkey/TRNC opposition for the reasons analyzed in the next section. Thus, the researcher believes the RoC will not discuss the involvement of a Turkish interest enterprise (e.g., TPAO²⁷) before the settlement of the Cyprus issue. Also, the fact that the RoC has set as a prerequisite to discussing the economic and the technological parameters of each enterprise/consortium to fulfill the parameters related to the state's national security makes the author believe that the statements made by the two Ministers are not arbitrary or for domestic/political reasons. Thus, and as presented both in Table 8 and Map 4, the RoC has divided its southern and eastern waters into 12 sea blocks, whereas between 2010 and 2018, the RoC has proceeded to three licensing rounds and has given the authority for prospection, exploration, and production to nine companies and consortiums.

Name of Company	Number of Sea Block	Licensing Round	Year
Noble/Shell/Delek/Avner	No.12	1st	2008
TOTAL Group	No.11	2nd	2012
ENI/KOGAS	No. 2, No.3 and No.9	2nd	2012
ENI Cyprus/TOTAL	No. 11	2nd	2012
	No.6	3rd	2017
Exxon Mobil/Qatar Petroleum	No. 10	3rd	2017
ENI Cyprus	No.8	3rd	2017

Table 8: The natural gas enterprises activated in the RoC EEZ between 2013 and 2018

²⁷ TPAO is the acronym for the Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, meaning Turkish Petroleum Corporation, which is Turkish oil/gas enterprise founded in 1954.



Map 4: The Republic of Cyprus Offshore exploitation blocks (Source: The Republic Cyprus Ministry of Energy Official Website)

5.6 The “resurgent regional alliances” and their link to the RoC energy security

NcRs highlight the lack of a supranational institution capable of controlling the international system. In response to this lack, the states in their attempt to safeguard their interests tend to build alliances with states sharing mutual interests. In 2019 and during the EMSI conference that took place in the capital of the RoC, Nicosia, the Greek Ambassador Fotopoulos has expressed the view that the trilateral agreements between the RoC, Greece, and Israel are based on their mutual interests. He has even argued that on issues where the three sides do not have mutual interests, they are just out of the discussion.

This section focuses on the bilateral relations the RoC has developed during the period on which this project focuses. However, the phrase “bilateral relations” is broad and can include almost any kind of

cooperation between states. Thus, the author focuses only on those areas of cooperation that have an impact on the RoC energy security. In particular, this section tends to concentrate on the bilateral relationships states and organizations have with the RoC in two sectors, economy, and energy, while in an upcoming chapter the focus is exclusively on the defense related issues.

However, before proceeding to the analysis and even though this thesis is not legally based, the researcher considers it important to refer to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and how it has contributed to the RoC energy policy. The researcher's decision to dedicate a section to this issue stems from the RoC officials' statements expressing the willingness to solve all the maritime and energy-related issues of the RoC under the auspices of the UNCLOS (europarl.europa.eu, 08 October 2014). An additional reason for considering this analysis necessary is that the RoC has signed particular agreements with Israel, Egypt and Lebanon for the delimitation of their maritime and consequently their energy research borders. Thus, before analysing the RoC relations with the regional actors, the researcher considers it necessary to make an overview of the position of the RoC regarding the delimitation of the sea borders and how it has contributed to its relations with the other states in the region.

5.6.1 The UNCLOS and its link to the RoC regional conflicts

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is an international treaty concluded at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea signed on 10 December 1982. Given that the UNCLOS is a legal agreement including multiple provisions, the researcher intends to focus only on those provisions that contribute to providing a clear view on the facts taking place within the RoC EEZ and are related to the exploitation of hydrocarbons. The researcher's decision to begin this chapter by

analyzing those provisions lies in the fact the President of the RoC and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Energy have repeatedly expressed the opinion that all the disputes related to the RoC foreign and energy disputes must be settled according to the International Law (Newsroom / CNA, 2019).

The UNCLOS was established as a UN attempt to provide a mechanism for settling disputes among states without further escalation, leading to armed conflicts (UNCLOS,1982). Among other provisions, the UNCLOS determines the marine space between states and clarifies the rights and obligations that each state has within them. Ayla Gürel et al. (2013) have argued that more than 160 states have ratified the UNCLOS, whereas the US, Turkey, and Israel are among the states that are not still part of it. However, Gürel has complemented provisions within the UNCLOS that are acquired as part of the customary International law status; thus, the agreement's non-significance does not make a state, automatically, exempt from its provisions.

In Figure 12, according to the UNCLOS provisions, the marine space within the limits of the national jurisdiction of the coastal state is divided into four zones. Within each zone, both the coastal state but also the other states have significant rights and obligations. More specifically, there are four marine zones.

The first zone is the so-called "territorial zone." This area extends from the midpoint of the coasts up to 12 nautical miles²⁸. Within this area, the sovereignty extends to the water column, the airspace above, the seabed and the subsoil. These rights, besides the territorial sovereignty, extends to the rights on the fishery, using the wind and the waves for power plant production, but also exploiting the energy resources existing in the subsoil (UNCLOS, 1982).

28 1 nautical mile equals, approximately, to 1,85 kilometer (km)




Figure 12: The Maritime Zones and Rights under the UNCLOS (Source: The Economist)

The second is the so-called "contiguous zone." As presented in Figure 12, this area extends between 12 and 24 nautical miles. Within this area, the coastal state maintains the same rights as within the territorial area. In particular, the coastal state has the right to enforce its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws and to punish infringement of these laws committed within its territory and the territorial sea (Art. 33). Simultaneously, the coastal state has the obligation not to forbid the right for the vessels' "innocent passing"²⁹. According to the provisions of the UNCLOS (1982:26), a passage is defined as innocent when "as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and with other rules of international law".

The third is the so-called Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). It

29 (UNCLOS, 1982: 26)

extends from 24 to 200 nautical miles, and for setting this Zone, the coastal state needs to proclaim the UN. In case the distance between two coastal states is less than 400 nautical miles, meaning they cannot extend their EEZ up to the 200 nautical miles, they determine their maritime jurisdiction under the principle of "the middle line" or with any other form of bilateral settlement between the parties involved.

The fourth Zone is the maritime Zone called "the Continental Shelf." According to Articles 76-85 of the UNCLOS, the continental shelf extends from the territorial waters to the point where the steeper descent to the deeper ocean floor begins or to a distance of 200 nautical miles, whichever is greater. In any case, though the continental shelf cannot exceed 350 nautical miles from the point, the territorial sea is measured. In this area, the coastal state has jurisdictional rights to the seabed, the subsoil but not to the water column above. Thus, in case a coastal state's Continental Shelf is extended up to the 350 nautical miles, between the 200 and the 350 nautical miles, the particular country can proceed with exploitation research but would have no rights to use living resources in the extended part.

When it comes to the case of the RoC, it had ratified the UNCLOS in 1988. Moreover, the researcher should highlight five facts related to the state's maritime border.

Firstly it is important to mention the declaration of the territorial waters on the 12 nautical miles followed the RoC independence in 1960 (UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, 1960). Those having a more profound knowledge of the political issues in Cyprus can raise a question regarding the territorial waters of the British Bases located on the south part of the island. It is beyond the scope of the present thesis to analyze the status and the sovereign rights of the British bases in Cyprus. Thus, the researcher limits the discussion to saying that the United Kingdom has abandoned, any possible right for exploiting natural resources within the Republic of Cyprus maritime


borders, in line with its declaration at Appendix O to the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. More specifically, the Appendix O concerns the Declaration by Her Majesty's Government regarding the administration of the Sovereign Base Areas claiming among others that the bases are exclusively operating as military bases and not as colonies.

Secondly, on the 2nd of April 2004, the RoC parliament voted a law proclaiming the marine borders of the state, including its EEZ³⁰, is in full accordance with the legal provisions of the UNCLOS. According to this law, the delimitation of the state's EEZ with the surrounding coastal states would be delineated under the provisions of the "median line agreement" or as it would be agreed with each state separately.

Based on the above proclamation on the 20th of April 2004, the RoC and the Islamic Republic of Egypt deposited the geographical coordinates determining the median line between the two states. This was the first agreement the RoC has signed with a neighbor state in its attempt to determine its maritime borders and consequently the area it can proceed to exploration and exploitation research, see Map 5.


Fourthly, in January 2007, the RoC reached the first agreement with Lebanon's government for the delimitation of its sea borders with Lebanon. As with all the other agreements, it was based on Article 74 of the UNCLOS provisions. However, then for reasons presented below, the Parliament of Lebanon has not yet approved this agreement.

³⁰http://www.un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/cyp_2004_eez_proclamation.pdf



Map 5: The RoC EEZ boundaries, as agreed with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel (Source: Gürel et al., 2013)

Finally, on the 17th December 2010, the RoC signed an agreement with Israel to delineate the median line between the two states. However, there are two issues this project should raise. The first issue is, the fact that the state of Israel has not ratified the UNCLOS, the agreement was based on the provisions of the customary law related to the EEZ's delimitation between neighboring coastal states. The second issue is related to the fact that the agreements between the Republic of Cyprus/Israel and the Republic of Cyprus/Lebanon have an overlap. As shown on Map 6, the brown-colored triangle area is contested between Lebanon and Israel. It is out of the scope of the thesis to focus on the Lebanon - Israeli maritime dispute, and the author limits the discussion to saying that there is a provision in the agreements the RoC have signed with both states for a possible future delimitation in case the dispute is settled.



Map 6: The contested area between Israel and Lebanon (Source: Meier, 2013³¹)

5.6.2 The state of Israel

During the 1980s and the 1990s, the defense agreements signed between the State of Israel and Turkey caused significant concerns to the RoC. Tsakiris (2014) has mentioned that the state of Israel played an essential role in the outcome of the cancellation of the purchase of the long-range air –to– air missile system of Russian origin and manufacture called “S-300”. More specifically, Israel has used its influence on the US government to increase the diplomatic pressure on the RoC and has also provided additional training to the Turkish pilots in case the particular state has decided to bombard the batteries upon their deployment on the island (Tsakiris, 2014). However, less than 15 years later, the world has witnessed a crisis between Turkey and Israel, followed by the first official visit of an Israeli prime minister to the RoC. The researcher can

31 <http://www.lebanesestudies.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/10/maritime.pdf>

summarize and trace this transformation in the relations between the three states to three incidents.

The first is related to the constant support that the Turkish governments provided to the Palestinians in Gaza in their dispute with Israel (Prontera, 2017). In 2004 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the Prime Minister of Turkey. According to Ahmet Davutoglu (2010), in the context of the redefinition of Turkey's foreign policy, the Republic of Turkey should support all Muslims without excluding the Palestinians. According to Mujib Alam (2015), upon Erdoğan's visit to Israel in 2005, he has offered himself as "the Middle East peace mediator." This action was followed by the banning of Israel from the annual aeronautical military exercise taking place in Turkey called "Anatolian Eagle" and Erdoğan's criticism of Israel during the proceedings of the World Economic Forum in Davos. All the previous activities have caused, on the 5th of March 2009, secret reconciliation talks at the highest level to get the Israeli-Turkish relations back on track (Haaretz, 2009). However, instead of putting their relations back on track, they have become worse, especially after the "Mavi Marmara" incident.

In particular, the so-called "Mavi Marmara crisis" took place on the 31st of March 2010. That night a flotilla of 6 ships organized by "the Free Gaza Movement" and the Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms tried to break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip and delivery of humanitarian aid. The Israeli Prime Minister ordered a team of Special Forces to board the ships. When the commandos landed on the "Mavi Marmara" boat, the Israeli report claims that a group of 40 people attacked them with knives. According to Migdalovitz (2010), nine activists were killed, and ten Israeli commandos were injured. This incident caused a severe crisis between Turkey and Israel that ended in 2016. At the same time and albeit the RoC had no active involvement in the "Mavi Marmara crisis," the support provided to Israel was the spark that caused the warming up of the two states' bilateral relations. In January 2010,

during an official visit of the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs in the RoC, he had stated that Israel would have far more problems without the cooperation of RoC during the particular crisis (Kasoulides, 2018).

This tension in its relations with Turkey, combined with the temporary cancellation of the 20-year deal with Egypt in the aftermath of the rising of the Arab Spring, has led the state of Israel to search for alternatives for safeguarding its energy security (Dessi, 2012). This alternative route came through the RoC EEZ and the East Med pipeline. After negotiations which lasted more than four years, on the 15th of June 2017, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Israel, together with the President of the RoC, signed a trilateral agreement, which among other issues, has included the funding of the East Med pipeline.

However, the improvement of the bilateral relations between the two states is not limited exclusively to their common intention to proceed with the development of the East Med pipeline. Since 2012 the state of Israel has shown its willingness to help the RoC in different areas, with the author limiting his analysis on two significant areas.

At first, during the period of economic recession in the RoC between 2013 and 2016, the state of Israel has economically supported the RoC through tourism. According to the RoC Ministry of Finance (2016), in 2014, there were approximately 60000 Israeli tourists in Cyprus, whereas in 2016 there were more than 120000. For a state like the RoC, depending for more than 10% of its GDP on tourist services, this was a great support during a period of constant recession.

Secondly, the state of Israel has contributed to the existence of a military counterweight to the Turkey/TRNC axis in the Eastern Mediterranean region in general and the RoC EEZ in particular. Since 2014, Turkey has intensified its presence on the RoC EEZ through a series of actions. Among these actions was the Turkish naval forces' proceeding to the commitment of areas within the RoC EEZ without prior permission. At the same time, the lack of the necessary aeronautical

means capable of halting the Turkish actions was partially covered by the Israelis. In particular, the Israeli Armed Forces have pledged areas for military exercises within the RoC EEZ. Those areas were either neighboring or even partially covering the Turkish ones. Moreover, the Israeli fighter aircrafts carried out air defense suppression exercises with the RoC National Guard within the territory of Cyprus (Cyprus Mail, 2014). During the next years, the military exercises between the two states were both intensified and executed at least twice a year and covered the maritime, the terrain, and the First Information Report (FIR) area of the RoC (The Jerusalem Post, 2017).

Summarizing the above, since 2012, we have witnessed a gradual improvement in the bilateral relations between the RoC and Israel. Since 2013 we have witnessed the RoC enjoying both economic and military support from Israel. Concerning the limits of cooperation between the two states, the author shares the same opinion with Tziarras (2015), claiming that Israel sees its ties in a possible crisis between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC exclusively driven by its national interests. However, this is an issue discussed in a later chapter.

5.6.3 The Arab Republic of Egypt

Similar to Israel over the last decade, we have witnessed a gradual improvement in the relations between the RoC and the Arab Republic of Egypt. In particular, between 1978 and 2003, the diplomatic ties between the two states were in tension. The crisis between the two states started in 1978 after the attempt of Egyptian commandos to raid a terrorist attack that took in Cyprus on the 19th of February 1978.

Briefly, according to the Washington Post (1978) on the 18th of February, two Palestinians invaded the “Hilton Hotel” in Nicosia during the meeting of the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization and captured two Ministers of the RoC and nine Egyptian officials. Then they

have asked the Cypriot President to be transferred to the airport and be evacuated to Libya. However, the plane did not get permission to land either in Libya or Saudi Arabia and returned to Cyprus, and new negotiations took place. During the talks, an Egyptian plane landed at the airport, and when the Cypriot officials realized the aircraft was transferring a Special Forces unit, they ordered them not to depart and go back to Cairo. The Egyptians did not obey the orders and launched an assault to capture the plane. As a response, the RoC troops started exchanging gunfire. The Egyptian aircraft was destroyed, and more than twenty Egyptian commandos were either killed or injured and the diplomatic relations between the two states remained tense until 1981 (Daily News Egypt, 2016).

Only after 2003, we have witnessed a significant improvement in the states bilateral relations. More specifically, on the 17th of February 2003 (UN, 2003), the states have signed an EEZ delimitation agreement. Also, in Cairo on April 2009, the representatives of the two states have signed an agreement for increasing the states collaboration in several areas, including the energy sector (RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Due to the topic of this thesis, the author has decided to limit his discussion to three agreements related to the RoC energy security.


The first agreement concerned the development of a cross-median line connecting the two states' hydrocarbons reserves. Even though this agreement was signed in 2012, there was a provision claiming that "a more detailed agreement specifying cross-median line cooperation between both parties shall follow" (Cylaw, 2012). Thus, on the 31st of August 2016, the two sides reached an agreement that was signed by the Ministers of Energy of the two states in the presence of the RoC President and the Egyptian Prime Minister. Briefly, through this agreement, the two countries have agreed to exchange information related to the cross-median line hydrocarbons reserves, develop pipelines connecting their hydrocarbons reserves, and take all the

necessary means to secure the navigation and safety on the median line. The same day the two ministers announced that the governments of the two states have decided to speed up talks for the construction of a pipeline linking Cyprus with Egypt. As presented in Map 3 (in Chapter 5), through this agreement, Egypt has confirmed that it recognizes the RoC as the only authority having the right to exploit hydrocarbons on the blocks 10,11, and 12. With reference to the political context of this agreement, the author considers it crucial for three reasons.

The first reason is related to the fact that the particular recognition can be considered as a sequence of the delineation agreement signed between the two sides on the 17th of February 2003, see Map 7. According to the RoC Minister of Energy, this is the most significant agreement between the two states as it safeguards that, independently, from who is the leader either the RoC or the Arab Republic of Egypt, the RoC is recognized as the only state having maritime borders with the Arab Republic of Egypt.

The second reason is related to the fact that it has given the RoC an alternative route to export its future reserves. More specifically, by the time Egypt has recognized that the RoC has the right to exploit hydrocarbons, it has given the two states the opportunity to investigate a future transfer of gas resources to EU markets via the liquefaction facilities in Egypt. This agreement was signed on the 30th of August 2016, and the natural gas exploited from block 11 will be transferred to Egypt for liquefaction (Reuters, 2016). By the same token, it has strengthened their relations through bilateral and trilateral declarations in various areas, including energy security (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

The third reason is related to the impact this agreement has on the constant attempts of the Turkey/TRNC axis to stop the RoC energy program. As it can be understood, the agreement questions the rights that both Turkey and TRNC claim to have on the blocks 10,11, and 12. The author thinks that this the main reason we had an immediate response both from the Republic of Turkey and the TRNC on the particular agreement.



Map 7: The RoC exploitation blocks, including the Median Line between the Republic of Cyprus and Egypt (Source: Cyprus Ministry of Energy official website, the thick line was drawn by the author)

At the same time, the two states have signed a series of military agreements. As these agreements will be further discussed on the upcoming chapter the author seeks to limit the discussion to the most recently signed on the 24th of August 2017. The RoC Ministry of Defense has announced, “in the context of strengthening military co-operation and following the visit of the Minister of Defense, a military delegation from the Egyptian Ministry of Defense held a three-day visit to Cyprus. During their visit, the Egyptian representatives had contacts with the RoC Defense Ministry officers, and on the 23rd of August, a Military Co-operation Program was signed , in the areas of Search and Rescue

(SAR) and Naval Cooperation for the years 2017-18” (RoC Ministry of Defense, 2017). Of course, anyone may question the importance of a bilateral agreement in SAR missions for the RoC energy security. Even though this is an issue that the author seeks to discuss in the upcoming subsection; briefly, their importance is based on the fact the RoC uses SAR missions with different states (e.g., Egypt, Greece, France, US) as a means for cancelling the Republic of Turkey NOTAMs announced within its EEZ.

At the same time, one may wonder why the Arab Republic of Egypt has decided to turn in favor of the RoC. Both in the introductory and the second chapter the author has explained the reasons he believes that the states in the region have serving their national interests as their primary foreign policy goal. Based on this, one may argue that the economic, military, and geopolitical imbalance between Turkey and the RoC could be enough for Egypt to turn in favor of the former. However, two reasons make this project believe that Egypt considers cooperation with the RoC safeguards its interests in a better way.

The first reason is the tension between the Republic of Turkey and the Arab Republic of Egypt. This tension has also been transferred at the Presidential level and in particular, between the Presidents of the two states, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi³², and Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The tension in their relations began after the active involvement of Al Sisi in the military coup that caused the removal of Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood from the office in 2013. According to Ozken Octav (2018), both Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood were patronaged both from Turkey and Qatar; thus, the tension with their successor was unavoidable. This tension is still, ongoing, and this project quotes two

32 This project is fully aware of the fact that there are scholars, like Cambanis (2015), calling Al Sisi a “dictator.” However, in his attempt to maintain a negative positionality, this project seeks to avoid such a term and use the one applied by the diplomatic offices of the states in the Eastern Mediterranean region when referring to Al-Sisi, “The President of the Islamic Republic of Egypt.”

statements to prove this argument. At first, the project quotes Al Sisi's statement made during the 2017 crisis between the Gulf states. In particular, Al Sisi asked for the Gulf boycott against Qatar to be also expanded to Turkey (Yeni Şafak, 2017). The second is Recep Tayyip Erdogan's unwillingness to accept an offer to join a dinner with the US President Donald Trump when he saw the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi accompanying him (Middleast Monitor, 2019). As it can be understood, inevitably the tension between the two leaders has a considerable impact on the relations between the two states. Also, due to the researcher's view that energy resources can only strengthen the existing, at least neutral, relations between states make him come to the conclusion that at least during the Sisi and Erdogan combined administration, the Egyptian interests are closer to the RoC than those with Turkey.

The second reason is related to the difficulty of the Arab Republic of Egypt to back down from the signed agreements. It can be readily understood that the Egyptian government, based on its current interests, has signed a series of energy-related agreements with the RoC. Thus, if, in the future, the Arab Republic of Egypt will decide its energy interests are not harmonized with those of the RoC, it has to take/accept the cost of backing down from the signed agreement. For example, since 2003, the two sides have signed a "Delimitation Agreement" through which the RoC and Egypt have stated the limits of their EEZs based on the principle of the median line (RoC Official Journal, 2012). Thus, if Egypt expresses the willingness to back down from this agreement, it can cause it issues both in the relations with the RoC but also with other states in the region. With reference to this tension with other states in the region; more specifically, one of the experts interviewed has argued that Al Sisi's intention is to solve the Egyptian state disputes with Saudi Arabia and particularly their dispute for the Tiran Sanafir islands, under the provisions of the International Law. It is beyond the scope of the present


study to focus either on the bilateral relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia or on the particular dispute. Thus, the researcher limits the discussion to saying that the 24th June 2017 agreement ceding the two islands to Saudi Arabia has contributed to the improvement of the states' bilateral relations. Many Egyptians have accused Al Sisi of this decision, but he has replied by saying that "Nations are governed by constitutions and laws and legitimate rights, not whims or emotions" (Middle East Eye, 2019). Similarly, in the case of the RoC, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs has stated that there is not a matter of discussion with reference to backing down from the "Delimitation Agreement" with the RoC as it conformed to international laws and was listed by the UN as an international agreement (Soliman, 2018).

Concerning the limits of cooperation between the two states, for example, in the case of Israel, the EU, France, and the US, the interviewees have expressed the view that if their interests are not threatened, they "will not fight for us [the RoC]." Thus, the question posed here is which actions can be considered a direct threat to Egyptian energy-related interests. Following the RoC foreign policy intention to link its energy interests with those of other states in the region, this project considers that the agreement the particular state has signed with the Arab Republic of Egypt is vital for the development of pipeline transporting natural gas from the RoC "Aphrodite field³³" to the Idku terminal, east of Alexandria (Soliman & Scipione, 2019). Thus, any attempt either from the Turkey/TRNC axis or any other state or entity to halt this transfer can be considered a threat for the Egyptian energy interests in particular and national interests in general. However, this is an issue further discussed in the upcoming chapter.

33 Sea block 12

5.6.4 The Republic of Greece

Charles Ellinas (2016) has claimed that the Republic of Greece is so preoccupied with its many problems, such as the economic recession and the migration crisis, that the development of its hydrocarbons does not appear to be a top priority at present. Also, such a development has as the main precondition solving its EEZ boundary issues with Turkey. These boundary issues are often mentioned in the literature as the “Aegean dispute” (Bölükbaşı, 2012) and, briefly, consist of a set of interrelated matters related to the sovereignty rights both of Greece and Turkey in the area of the Aegean Sea. This dispute brought the two states to the brink of war twice in the last 30 years, in March 1987 and in January 1996. Among other issues, the dispute concerns the delimitation. This lack of delimitation between the two states has an impact on the Republic of Greece energy policy. Map 8 is according to the UNCLOS (1982) and is based on the particular convention, the EEZ of the Republic of Greece is shown in blue, the EEZ of the Republic of Turkey is shown in red and the EEZ of the RoC in green. Based on this delimitation the Republic of Turkey does not have any rights to the exploitation of the hydrocarbons found in the RoC EEZ but also those believed to exist in the south of Crete (Conofagos, 2017) one of the two states, EEZ and the use of the continental shelf.



Map 8: The Eastern Mediterranean Exclusive Economic Zones based on the UNCLOS 1982 (Source: Stylianou, 2014)

On the other hand, the Republic of Turkey is among the states who have not signed the particular convention, and it does not recognize the right of the Greek island named “Kastelorizo³⁴” to have its own EEZ. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to clarify the reasons why Turkey does not recognize this right of Kastelorizo, but in case the Republic of Turkey manages in the future to reach a bilateral agreement with Greece stating that the island of Kastelorizo is not allowed to have its EEZ it will bring significant changes in the region (Salapatas, 2014). As shown in Map 9 , based on the viewpoint of the Republic of Turkey, in such a case, the Turkish EEZ is the one included in the middle of the map, then the trilateral agreements the RoC and Greece signed with Israel and Egypt are cancelled or at the minimum, are under revision, with Turkey becoming part of the deal. Also, there is no link between the EEZ of Greece and the RoC. The lack of this link will cause difficulties for Greece in a possible crisis to provide military support to the RoC. By the same token, the Republic of Turkey can claim the ownership of the blocks 4,5,6

34 Is also referred to literature as Megisti (Siousouras and Chrysochou, 2014)

located in the Republic of Cyprus EEZ, but this is an issue the researcher discusses in the next subsection.



Map 9: The Eastern Mediterranean EEZ division, based on the Republic of Turkey viewpoint (Source: <https://www.apopseis.com/yypothesis-ergasias-ke-pragmatikotites-gia-to-erevniko-programma-tis-kyprou/>)

Regarding the relations between the Republics of Cyprus and Greece, this project has already explained that the collective national identity they share makes them to be something more than just allies. Concerning the area of energy security, this “special” relationship can be verified by three facts. At first, the Republic of Greece is an active member in all the trilateral agreements that the Republic of Cyprus has signed with other states. Secondly, on the 31st of March 2018, it was decided that the two states would proceed to the development of a transnational council “Superior Council of Cooperation.” According to the *Phileleftheros* newspaper, the idea belongs to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, and it seeks to contribute to better coordination between the two states at a ministerial level on different issues including foreign policy and energy security related issues. Thirdly, the two states are energy hubs and, future, energy producers (Conofagos, 2017 and Karayiannis, 2014). Their geographical location, the one after the other

towards the EU market, makes them share collective energy security related interests.

Concerning the limits of support that Greece may provide to the RoC based on the evidence presented so far, this project assumes that the RoC enjoys the full support of Greece inside the EU and every regional and international forum in imposing diplomatic and economic sanctions on Turkey. At the same time, it causes tensions within the former's EEZ. The question posed here is whether Greece is ready to support the RoC militarily in case of an escalation with the Turkey/TRNC.

Before answering this question, the researcher should mention that when he has asked the Cypriot interviewees' views on this issue, all of them, apart from two, have answered that they do not know. The other two have replied by saying, "Go ask the Greek Prime Minister or the Greek Ambassador accredited in the RoC." Even though this is an issue this study discusses extensively in an upcoming chapter, the researcher wants to make a small reference in this section. Thus, after receiving the answer mentioned above, he has tried to arrange an interview with the Greek Prime Minister's National Security Advisor; however, this was not possible, and he has based his answer to this question on Greek experts' statements. Based on the existing situation, the researcher divides the military support that Greece can provide into three categories. At first, it permits the RoC Commander of General Staff to use the Greek military forces stationed on the island during a military dispute with Turkey. Secondly, support the RoC with aeronautical means and thirdly transfer additional troops on the island.

Dokos (2016), claims that since 2011 and the economic recession that followed, the Greek governments seek to avoid a military confrontation with Turkey, as the state needs both time and all the available resources to recover. At the same time, though, he has expressed the view that it is always possible for the Republic of Greece to proceed to a rapid military response if Turkey tries to change the

existing status quo. However, during the period that this project focuses on, the facts make the author believe that when Dokos has referred to the "existing status quo," the reference was not for the Eastern Mediterranean region but Greece. In particular, he has referred to the Aegean Dispute in general and the island of Kastellorizo. In the subsection focusing on the incidents that took place within the RoC EEZ between 2013 and 2018, maps and data show that France, Egypt, and Israel had a more active presence with vessels and aircraft in the RoC EEZ and FIR compared to Greece. Also, the three states have participated in a more significant number of military and SAR exercises than Greece. However, the researcher believes that if the military escalation is inevitable between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis, the Republic of Greece has the most significant possibility of intervening in favor of the RoC. Apart from the shared identity, an issue that is beyond the scope of this project, the researcher bases his argument on the fact that the two states have mutual interests in ensuring that the maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean region, at least on its western side, remain as they are. Previously, the researcher has presented maps showing that a possible differentiation in the existing maritime borders may significantly impact both states' energy security.

5.7 The RoC regional “opponents” and their impact on its energy security

5.7.1 The Republic of Turkey energy security and its link to the RoC energy program

If this project had to use a single phrase to describe the bilateral relations between Turkey and the RoC, it would characterize it as a “frozen conflict.” Mary Alice C. Clancy and John Nagle (2009: 73) have defined as frozen, a conflict “in stasis where formalized combat is halted,

but the underlying causes of the conflict still exist without a permanent peace treaty or agreed-upon political framework towards reconciliation.” As presented in the introductory chapter the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis are in ongoing negotiations, since 1974, for the settlement of the Cyprus issue, something which makes the researcher believe that characterizing the relation between the two sides as a frozen conflict is not arbitrary.

In Chapters 1 and 2, the researcher has presented evidence showing that the willingness of the RoC to proceed to the exploitation of hydrocarbons has caused additional tensions in the relations with Turkey. The question posed here is: “why Turkey is so negative to the Republic of Cyprus energy program?” For the period on which this thesis focuses, the researcher seeks to base his answer on two reasons.

The first reason is based on an argument made by Adamides and Christou (2015) claiming that the exploitation of energy resources imposes cooperation in case it fulfills a minimum requirement. The precondition the two analysts have referred to is that the relations between the two sides, before the beginning of the exploitation research, must be at least neutral. Thus, concerning the examined case study, this project has already explained the reasons why the RoC and Turkey have tense relations before the decision of the former to proceed to exploitation research. Thus, the particular energy program could act only as an additional factor to worsen the relations between the two states.

The second reason is related to the foreign and energy policy goals of the Republic of Turkey. According to the Center for Turkish Studies (2016), safeguarding possible energy insecurity is among the main goals of Turkish foreign policy. Mert Bilgin (2015) has already taken this argument further by stating that Turkey’s energy security is mainly based on the availability of resources at affordable prices, the state’s geographical reliance on energy imports and its ability to secure the pipelines delivering natural gas against militant activities. By the same

token, Vedat Yorucu and Ozay Mehmet (2017) have argued that among the primary goals set by the government for the upcoming years is Turkey becoming a regional and gradually, till 2025, an international energy hub. Thus, it can be understood that the discovery of natural gas reserves in the RoC EEZ combined with the island's geographical position, the energy companies' growing interest, and also its intention to become an energy hub makes the particular energy program a threat to the Republic of Turkey energy security.

Before proceeding further, it is important to mention that Yorucu and Mehmet (2017) have significant similarities with the view of the interviewees specializing in the Turkey/TRNC foreign policy and energy issues. More specifically, and as presented in Appendix 4, the Cypriot experts on Turkey/TRNC foreign policy have stated that it sought to use energy as a political means to increase its prestige in the international arena of states. The Turkish experts have taken this argument a step further by including additional variables in the way that the Republic of Turkey governmental officials consider energy security by including it under an umbrella definition.



Map 10: The Turkish Oil and Gas Pipeline network (Source: IENE)

Thus, in its attempt to secure its interests, the Republic of Turkey has proceeded to significant actions to halt or even cancel the RoC energy program. The author has divided those actions into two groups: those targeting exclusively the RoC and those targeting other actors (states, organizations, enterprises) having a role in the RoC energy program. In the next subsection, the researcher presents all the actions the Republic of Turkey has undertaken within the RoC EEZ; thus, in this section, he seeks to focus on those actions that the particular state has taken or tried to take in its attempt to isolate the RoC from significant actors. The researcher has already explained that under the term “actors”, he considers all the states, organizations, and enterprises having a role in the RoC energy program.

The first action the Republic of Turkey has taken to isolate the RoC was to offer the state of Israel the construction of a pipeline that can transfer the natural reserves of the “Leviathan basin” through Turkey to the EU market. Through this proposal, the Republic of Turkey has aimed to lessen its energy dependency on Russia, Iran and Azerbaijan. Also, an agreement between the two sides would make the East Med pipeline unsustainable. Boustras, Ellinas, Poulikkas, and Adamides have all agreed that the East Med pipeline can be viable if it can transfer at least 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. After taking into consideration, the RoC governmental officials’ intention to transfer the state’s energy reserves to the market through multiple routes, including the East Med, in case the state of Israel backs down, there is possibility that the project would become unsustainable.

By the same token, the transfer of the Israeli energy reserves to the EU markets through Turkey would probably exclude the RoC energy program from the EU energy security strategy priorities. In the previous pages, the researcher has stated that since 2015, the RoC energy reserves are part of the future resources the EU can use to lessen its energy dependence on Russia. However, in case that the East Med

pipeline becomes unsustainable, and the Israel energy reserves are transferred to the EU via Turkey the particular energy program can lose its importance for the Union's energy security.

Lastly, a financially better agreement between them would probably cause Israel to back down from the trilateral agreements signed with Greece and the RoC. More specifically, the Turkish proposal includes the construction of a pipeline passing through the east end of the RoC EEZ, which is the maritime area the TRNC claims is within its EEZ, and extends into Turkey. Such an action would inevitably cause ties on the trilateral agreement signed between Greece, Israel, and the RoC, as the particular pipeline will be constructed without the permission of the RoC. At the same time, this action will show that the state of Israel debates the rights of the RoC on its EEZ. The President of the RoC has stated in the case of this scenario, the state would try to react. However, this project believes that there are very few things the RoC can do about it, mainly due to the power correlation and the status that the two states, Turkey and Israel, enjoy in the international arena. According to the Center for Turkish Studies, in the best case, the RoC can only delay the development of this pipeline. So far, the state of Israel rejects the construction of this pipeline without the agreement of the RoC. The Israeli Minister of Energy, Yuval Steinitz, on the sidelines of the 22nd World Petroleum Congress in Istanbul, has quoted, "we want to build a pipeline stretching from Israel to Turkey to able to export natural gas from Israel to Turkey." He added, however, that such a deal would entail agreeing on the sea boundaries, and without the involvement of Cyprus, Turkey could not sign (Hazou, 2017).

Secondly, the Republic of Turkey has tried to, physically, isolate the Republics of Greece and Cyprus over the issue of their maritime borders in the Aegean dispute. The researcher has already stated that Turkey has, at least so far, showed no willingness to resolve the Aegean dispute under the provisions of UNCLOS and that it has repeatedly


announced any unilateral action from Greece on this issue constitutes of an act of war. Since 2016, there is a constant talk between the RoC, Greece, and Egypt to deposit their shared maritime coordinates and determine their common maritime borders but the non-willingness/unwillingness of both Greece and the RoC to escalate their relations with Turkey has contributed to the, at least so far, limited progress (Karyotis, 2016).

Thirdly, the Republic of Turkey tries to cause delays to the exploitation research so that it makes the RoC look an unreliable partner. Favennec (2011) has argued that the oil/gas enterprises base the contracts they sign on maintaining and even strengthening their economic validity in the global market, thus if the progress of the program is delayed, Turkey contributes to the oil/gas enterprises considering it non-sustainable and so abandon it. More specifically, when an area of exploitation is presented as non-safe for exploitation, the companies consider it as a high-risk investment, and they try to avoid investing there. At the same time, through political statements made from Turkish high-rank governmental officials, the oil/gas companies have been warned they can be excluded from future energy agreements with Turkey in the case that they have an active involvement in the RoC energy program.

5.7.2 The TRNC “problematic” statehood and its link to the RoC energy program

The Montevideo Convention on Statehood was signed in 1933, and it was the first step in setting the rules that determined when an entity can be called a state. According to this convention, an entity can be called a country; the state as a person of international law, should possess four qualifications: a permanent population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states (Warbrick, 2006). Given the fact the TRNC has a permanent population, approximately

300000 citizens (World Population Review, 2018), a defined territory, (see Map 11), an elected government and bilateral relations with at least one state (e.g., Turkey), the question posed is: “why this project considers the TRNC recognition as a sovereign state problematic?”



Map 11: The island of Cyprus since 1974 (Source: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1671778.stm>)

To answer this question, the researcher begins his analysis by referring to a debate in International Law related to the Montevideo criteria. According to Joshua Castellino (2000), several analysts debate whether the fulfillment of the Montevideo criteria is enough for an entity to be called a state. This debate has contributed to the development of two different views: the declaratory and the constitutive theory of Statehood.

The supporters of the declaratory theory have argued that when an entity fulfills the Montevideo Convention criteria, it automatically becomes a state. In practice, though, there are different entities that de facto satisfy the requirements of the Montevideo convention, and at the same time, they lack the general recognition. Consequently, they do not enjoy the

benefits of being a sovereign state, including the right to have EEZ and exploit the natural resources, included within it. Apart from the TRNC a similar case is the area of Transnistria, which is recognized by Russia as a sovereign state, but it lacks international recognition. A similar case is the TRNC (Council of European Union, 2009).


On the other hand, the supporters of the constitutive theory have set out that recognition by other states and international organizations is the primary criterion that makes an entity a sovereign state. Although through this theory we could explain why “Transnistria” is an entity and not a sovereign state, at the same time it fails to explain why entities enjoying recognition by several countries are not recognized as sovereign states.

Regarding the Cyprus issue, the RoC has taken advantage of this controversy in international law and has succeeded in the adoption of two resolutions by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The first, is known as the 541 resolution, and was approved by the UNSC on the 18th of November 1983 (United Nations Security Council, 1983). Through this resolution, the Security Council has stated that the TRNC decision to declare independence is legally invalid. Moreover, it has called the RoC and the TRNC to cooperate with the Secretary-General while at the same time it urged other UN member states not to recognize the TRNC as a sovereign state and to recognize only the RoC as the sole authority on the island of Cyprus. The second is the 550-resolution approved on the 11th of May 1984 (United Nations Security Council, 1984). Through this resolution, the Security Council has called on the other member states not to recognize the TRNC, and condemns the exchange of ambassadors with Turkey, and also considers all attempts to interfere with the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus as contrary to Security Council resolutions.

Following the above, the researcher believes the non-recognition of the TRNC as a state is more a political than a legal issue. According

to Art.6 of the Montevideo Convention, each state has the right to recognize an entity as a state concerning their bilateral relations. More specifically, according to the article “the recognition of a state merely signifies that the state that recognizes it accepts the personality of the other with all the rights and duties determined by international law. The recognition is unconditional and irrevocable”. Thus, in theory, there is no precondition concerning the number of states needed for an entity to be recognized as a sovereign state. In practice though, the researcher believes the recognition is related to the willingness of significant states to recognize a particular entity. More specifically, he believes an entity can be considered a sovereign state if it enjoys the recognition of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

To prove this argument, he quotes the cases of Israel and Palestine. According to the UN official website neither Israel (161 states) nor Palestine (137 states) are recognized as sovereign states by all the member states of the UN. However, the state of Israel is a member of the UN, whereas Palestine is only an observer. Based on the researcher’s view the fact that all the permanent members of the UN Security Council have recognized Israel as a sovereign state whereas Palestine is recognized only by Russia and China contributes to this.




Map 12: The TRNC claimed EEZ (areas in letters). The blocks E, F and G overlapping the Republic of Cyprus 1,2,3,8,13 blocks (Source: Moshe Dayan Center)

Regarding the TRNC, even though it cannot be considered a sovereign state, at the same time, the researcher cannot consider it as a part of the RoC. The main reason for this inability lies in the fact that the RoC government cannot exercise its sovereignty in the area controlled by the TRNC. Therefore, for the needs of this thesis, the author has considered the TRNC as a separate entity with a permanent population, a government, and a defined territory but without statehood recognition by the international community, but only by particular states. This non-recognition as a sovereign state has caused the TRNC significant problems in various areas. Apart from others it is deprived of the right to announce an EEZ and to exploit the natural resources existing in it (UNCLOS, 1982). Moreover, even if it proceeds to a unilateral announcement, it would cause chain reactions in the international community and, probably, can discourage the oil/gas enterprises from taking the risk to proceed with research in this particular area.

The RoC Minister of Energy's has expressed his surprise at the support the TRNC officials provided for the Turkish actions to halt the exploitation of research within the RoC EEZ. The author recalls that the Minister has based his argument on two reasons. At first, the maritime area Turkey merits to include within its EEZ needs to be excluded from the EEZ of the island of Cyprus. As presented on Map 13, , the west side (red-colored) area after a possible settlement of the Cyprus issue will be excluded from the state that the Turkish Cypriots will be part of; thus, the TRNC has no interest in supporting Turkey on seeking this maritime area. Secondly, the TRNC merits the energy resources being shared between the two communities before solving the Cyprus issue. However, according to the RoC Minister of Energy, this willingness shows an intention to proceed to a two-state solution. The RoC in its attempt to increase the level of security of the Turkish Cypriots and show its willingness to have an equal sharing of the profits after the solution to the Cyprus issue, has proceeded to the establishment of the so-called

“hydrocarbons fund.” Briefly, the fund is based on the Norwegian model, and all revenues from hydrocarbons will be deposited to be used for the future developments for the upcoming generations of all the citizens of the RoC, both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. During the period 2013 – 2018 which is the focus of this thesis the law for the hydrocarbons fund was in the House of Parliament for approval. The law was finally approved on the 1st of March 2019 (Kathimerini, 2nd of March 2019).



Map 13: The Republic of Turkey and the TRNC claims in relation to the island of Cyprus EEZ. (Source: The RoC Ministry of Energy, 2019)

On the contrary, though, the researcher believes that the TRNC support for the Turkish actions is something that the RoC governmental officials should have expected. The author bases this view on the fact that the TRNC officials consider the RoC energy program a threat that goes beyond their energy security interests mainly due to two reasons.

The first reason is related to the “multi-area dependency” (Gorgulu, 2014) that the TRNC has on the Republic of Turkey. This dependency is mainly related to military and financial means but also on the resources the TRNC needs to survive in the international arena. When it comes to the latter this project author highlights two areas.

The first is the electricity power supply dependency. Mehmet Emre Gorgulu (2014) has argued that the lack of antagonism, due to the isolation of the TRNC from the international community, has caused the energy dependency on Turkey. This isolation has led over the last years to negotiations for a cable electricity power connection between Turkey and the TRNC (RoC Public Information Office, 2016). Inevitably, such an development will increase the TRNC dependency even more with all the negative consequences for its foreign policy.

The second is the water supply dependency. The so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus Water Supply Project" is a pipeline providing the TRNC with drinkable water from the southern coasts of Turkey. According to Zulfikar Dogan (2016), Turkey has used the water supply as a means against the political opposition in TRNC in various foreign policy issues, including the Cyprus issue. The lack of desalination stations in the area controlled by the TRNC combined with the inadequate rainfall on the island increases the water dependency on Turkey. It can be easily understood that water dependency has an impact both on the state's economy but also on the citizens' everyday life.

At the same time, the isolation of the TRNC from international markets has caused the economic dependency on Turkey's financial support. According to Senem Aydin-Düzgit (2014), the TRNC debt to Turkey exceeds 80% of its GDP. As it can be easily understood, the economic dependency of TRNC on Turkey is such that the latter can add pressure to the TRNC for enjoying its continuing support on foreign and energy policy issues.

When it comes to the military dependency of the TRNC, since 1974, the Republic of Turkey has stationed two fully equipped mechanized divisions and one armored division in the area controlled by the TRNC. At the same time, both the military and the police forces of the TRNC are equipped with arms either bought or produced in Turkey (Aristotelous, 2017). Thus, it can be understood that the Turkish armed

forces safeguard the TRNC in case of a military confrontation with the RoC.

Moreover, and apart from the factors synthesizing the TRNC dependency on Turkey, the TRNC has additional interests in the RoC energy program being halted, at least until the settlement of the Cyprus issue. Even though since 2015 the RoC officials have repeatedly expressed the intention to separate the state's energy program and the Cyprus issue, the exploitation of hydrocarbons inevitably increases the negotiating position of the RoC for the settlement of the Cyprus issue. The new alliances and the economic development that the energy program can bring to the Greek Cypriots and also the support that the states enjoy from the EU as part of its energy security system are just some of the factors that can provide additional negotiating capabilities. Thus, this project believes that this is the main reason we have witnessed a constant attempt from the TRNC officials to link the Cyprus issue with the exploitation of the hydrocarbons and at the same time, to continue to support the efforts of Turkey to halt the RoC energy program.

5.8 Conclusions

Based on the project's theoretical background, this chapter is dedicated to making an overview of the actors, including states, organizations, and enterprises, impacting the RoC foreign policy with the emphasis on energy security. Regarding the state-actors, this project has focused on two of the so-called "grand/great powers," the US and Russia, and many regional players, including Israel, Greece, and Turkey. Also, the Cyprus issue's peculiarities make the analysis of the TRNC and its link to the RoC energy security inevitable. Regarding the organizations, the project considers worth mentioning that apart from the United Nations and, more specifically, the resolutions making the recognition of the TRNC as a sovereign state problematic, the emphasis is on the EU. More

precisely, the RoC energy program since 2015 is part of the Union's energy security strategy and is characterized as a prospective energy producer. Also, apart from the EU as a Union, particular states are interested in the RoC energy program and this project has focused on France and Italy as there are home-based enterprises that these states activated on the particular program. However, the researcher has avoided referring to the limits of the support that those actors can provide to the RoC in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis. The analysis of those limits and the contribution of the RoC armed forces to the state's energy security are among the main topics of discussion in the next chapter.

Revisions in Chapter 5

1. Revision the examiners asked:

“Stylistically, the work also needs some refinement. At the moment, it sometimes comes across more like a policy report than a PhD thesis. For example, while bullet points can be a good explanatory tool when used sparingly, they are used far too much. Likewise, diagrams should be used only when absolutely necessary.”

Revision made:

All bullet points have been removed.

All diagrams have been removed

CHAPTER 6

THE RoC CAPABILITIES AND THE EXTERNAL ACTORS' LIMITS OF SUPPORT

6.1 Introduction

It has already been explained that when NcRs seek to measure a state's power, their analysis is primarily based on its resources, capabilities, and the decision-makers' understanding of regional/international politics which also include the political elite ability and intention to mobilize significant capabilities. This project has already discussed the RoC energy security-related resources and how they have impacted its position in the international/regional arena. Also, in a previous chapter, this thesis has presented an overview of how the RoC foreign policy crisis management mechanism operates, with an emphasis on energy security issues. Moreover, in Chapters two, four and five we have discussed how the President of the RoC understands the relations between states, why the Turkey/TRNC axis opposes the particular energy program and an overview of the people and governmental sectors impacting the state's decision-making procedure. This chapter focuses on the RoC capabilities and, as analyzed in the previous chapter, the limits of support that the external actors can and want, (at least based on the existing evidence), to provide to the RoC in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis on energy security-related issues.

Regarding the RoC capabilities, the researcher recalls that for NcRs, their impact on the state's crisis management must be investigated as a relative and not an absolute factor. More precisely, the decision-makers do not consider only the capabilities they can mobilize but more a correlation with the possible opponent(s) during the case they have in front of them. This chapter aims to focus on the RoC diplomatic, economic, and military capabilities and how those have been differentiated since 2013 due to the state's energy program.

With reference to the military capabilities, the researcher's decision to dedicate a section particularly to them stems from two reasons. Firstly, the impact of RoC military capabilities is an area of study

that, at least on peer review sources, remains underdeveloped. Secondly, at first glance and based on the RoC governmental officials' intention of avoiding confrontations with other states in the region (Anastasiades, 2015, Kasoulidis, 2015 and Christodoulides, 2018) assume there is no need to focus on this capability. However, a series of empirical observations presented on the upcoming pages make us believe this capability deserves a more in-depth analysis.

Finally, and as referred to in the previous chapter, the project seeks to contribute to the discussion related to the limits of support both international and regional actors intend to/can provide to the RoC in case of an energy security crisis with the Turkey/TRNC axis. Thus, this chapter has set as one of its objectives to give an overview of the main actors presented in the previous chapter and their contribution to increasing the RoC military capabilities when there are indications for a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis, strictly on energy security issues.

6.2 The RoC capabilities

Hill (2003:47) has defined capabilities as "recognizable elements of modern government responsibilities for which separate departments might exist and where decisions may hope to be able to affect." He has continued by stating that a state's primary capabilities are its armed forces, its GNP, technology, information and diplomatic means.

The first capability we seek to focus on is the RoC economy. At first glance, one could limit the discussion to argue that the exploitation of hydrocarbons impacts the state's economy in areas such as investments, trade, and shipping (Lakkotrypīs, 2017). However, the President of the RoC has proceeded further by expressing the opinion that these areas can help the state to develop financial agreements with oil/gas enterprises, other states in the region for liquefaction, selling, transiting natural gas, and the EU. (Cyprus Mail, 2018). By the same

token, the Minister of Energy has argued there are additional areas that the exploitation of hydrocarbons indirectly can and have already started to contribute to the state's economic development. More precisely, he has highlighted three areas.

The first area, the Minister has referred to is the development and upgrading of port infrastructures able to dock ships carrying natural gas. Even though there is no evidence on this project showing the intention of the RoC proceeding rapidly to the upgrading of its existing ports, the European Commission (2014) has referred to a master plan for upgrading the ports of Limassol, Larnaca, and Vasilikos. Secondly, Lakkotrypis (2017) has referred to the liquefaction facilities that the RoC aims to develop in close cooperation with leading enterprises in its attempt to transform to both an energy hub and an energy producer. According to the RoC Hydrocarbon Service official website (2019), there will be four oil/gas-based industry zones comprising the phase 1 oil storage – including “VTTV” and “Petrolina” oil storage facilities. Under this project, Lakkotrypis (2017) has mentioned the state's intention to cooperate with the UK authorities and extend those facilities in the British-controlled area. Thirdly is the knowledge base the RoC aims to develop through its energy program. The Minister has explained that he envisions the development of a knowledge base that will provide the know-how in all areas related to energy. From energy technology to sustainability development, to energy law and energy security. Thus, in the future, he has argued that his vision is the RoC being able to sell this knowledge to other states.

Another issue related to the RoC economic development to which both the President and the Minister of Energy have referred is the support that states have provided to the RoC during the recession period. This support is the outcome of improving their bilateral relations based on the shared energy security interest. As presented in a previous chapter, the gradually shared energy security interests with Israel and

Egypt have contributed to improving the states' relations. Within this scope, the RoC has signed agreements with the two states in different areas, including tourism. According to KPMG (2017), one of the significant factors contributing to the economic recession that followed the collapse of the RoC banking system in 2013 was tourism and, more precisely, the tourists from Israel. More precisely, KPMG has argued that we have a 50% rise of the Israeli tourists from 2014 to 2016, which contributed to increasing the income to an equivalent of 1% on the state's GDP.

The second capability this study seeks to discuss is the diplomatic means that the RoC has developed between 2013 and 2018. These capabilities are directly related to the diplomatic agreements signed between 2013 and 2018, both with regional players and the US. According to Kasoulidis (2018) and Christodoulides (2017), the RoC uses energy as a means to increase its diplomatic capabilities by trying to synchronize its energy security with the energy security of the other states. It has also been mentioned that strengthening the state's bilateral relations with other countries in the region and the permanent member states of the UN Security Council is among the main pillars of the state's new National Security Strategy (Christodoulides, 2018). Thus, the RoC has sought to increase the involvement of regional and international actors in its energy program. In the next section we discuss how the relations with each state have been formed separately.

Regarding the RoC capabilities to collect and analyze information, as presented in the chapter discussing the project's theoretical background, NcRs consider the leaders' perception an important parameter for explaining a state's foreign policy behavior. Under this scope, both Kitchen (2012) and Jervis (1976) have argued that accurate information decreases the leaders' misperception. However, as the RoC capabilities to collect and analyze information is an area of study which is very underdeveloped, the researcher has decided to base his

arguments strictly on the data originating from the interviews with the former and current Heads of the Central Intelligence Agency. More precisely, as presented on the word tree, Figure 13, there are three types of means that the RoC Central Intelligence Agency uses to gather information, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT). Both the former and the current Head of the Agency have agreed that the RoC SIGINT and the ELINT informational capabilities have been upgraded over the last years. However, they have also agreed that there is always space for further improvement in the existing capabilities. However, the RoC in its effort to shrink this gap, the two officials have stated that a good, temporary, solution that the RoC already uses is to continue developing its cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies and receiving information from their means.

Similarly, they have argued there is space both for technological and personnel upgrades apart from the Agency's sectors responsible for collecting and analyzing information. Moreover, when they were asked whether they have issues with information linkages in the media, they have both stated that fortunately, in issues related to National Security, the media avoid publishing information before notifying the government. Finally, when the two officials were asked to discuss whether there was a lack of information during energy security-related crises between 2013 and 2018, they have both agreed that in all cases, their Agency had both accurately and on-time information stemming/originating from all of the three types of the aforementioned informational means.




Figure 13: The interviewees view on the RoC information capabilities.

On the other hand, the researcher has repeatedly mentioned that the energy relations with regional and international actors have caused a differentiation in the RoC military capabilities. This change and its impact on the RoC crisis management procedure are the main points of discussion in the upcoming section.

6.3 The military capabilities acting as a 'middle ground' factor for the RoC energy security

The researcher intends to begin this section by explaining why he characterizes the RoC military capabilities as a 'middle ground' factor. First, as any other realist paradigm, NcR highlights the impact military

capabilities have on determining the states' foreign policy both in short term/crisis and long term/ grand strategy (Zakaria, 1998). The military technology (Rose, 1998), the state's nuclear and conventional weaponry (Ripsman, Taliafero, and Lobell, 2016), the military budget (Ücbas, 2014), and the willingness of the leaders/political elite to mobilize the particular capabilities (Kitchen, 2012) are among the most commonly used parameters that NcRs refer to when they seek to discuss the military capabilities and their impact on the state's foreign policy. It can be understood that the parameters mentioned above are mainly related to domestic parameters, and this is the main reason that various NcRs consider it. However, in the case of the RoC, the reasons that make this project believe that apart from the domestic, there is also an equally important dimension related to the state's foreign policy. The researcher has characterized the military capabilities as a two-pillar dimension, and as such he has found it inappropriate to include it, either as part of the strictly domestic or the external level of analysis.

To prove this argument, the author quotes the RoC Minister of Defense's speech, Savvas Aggelidis, on 4 November 2019. The Minister has mentioned that the RoC's intention to transform from an energy consumer to both an energy producer and an energy hub has caused changes to the state's energy security, which has inevitably contributed to the differentiation of the defense priorities. More precisely, the Minister has stated that the RoC bases its defense priorities on three pillars:

1. The development of the necessary defense capabilities to safeguard the state's security and create the necessary deterrence level in any form of threat against the state's territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty.

2. The active involvement in the EU Defense and Security Policy. The RoC intends to upgrade capabilities in maritime surveillance, early warning, cyber defense, and situational awareness mainly through its participation in the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

3. Defense Diplomacy includes further development and the creation of new bilateral relations with regional and non-regional states.

The Minister has argued that the mutual energy security interests with the other states consist of the primary means for making regional and global actors take a more active role in the Eastern Mediterranean region in favor of the RoC energy program.

Regarding the first pillar, we conclude that the RoC tends to use its economic capabilities, among other issues, for buying new armaments and upgrading its military arsenal. However, and as presented in the next chapter, this was not the case until 2015. More precisely, during the first two years of Anastasiades presidency, the RoC has not bought any armament or proceeded to upgrade its arsenal, including its military facilities (Aristotelous, 2015). However, the lack of domestic military industry and the lack of domestic high- and low-tech military technology capabilities make the development of its defense/deterrence abilities also based on external actors. More precisely, the RoC has proceeded, at least those announced in public, to the six agreements.


Firstly, a lifting of the US arms embargo has been announced. Even though the Senate made the final adoption of the law in 2019, the processes had started earlier. Since the 1980s, the United States had imposed an embargo on selling military equipment and transferring military technology to the RoC. On 26 July 2019, the Senate approved an amendment introduced by Democratic Senator Bob Menendez in the final FY20 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (S 1790). Based on its provisions, the US government is authorized to negotiate the selling of armaments, the transferring of military technology, and the RoC officers' participation in training courses with US troops. Simultaneously, it authorizes the government to halt the selling of the F35 fighting aircraft to Turkey. Secondly, the RoC has bought Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). According to the Israel Homeland Security official website, "the RoC has proceeded to purchase 4 UAVs for 13 million US dollars and

will be used to monitor economic zones where energy companies are searching for natural gas". Thirdly, in 2016, the purchase an Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) has been announced, with the provision to buy another three from Israel. Even though the RoC has bought the OPV for SAR missions, it is optional to be equipped with anti-vessel missiles. Fourthly, there is an agreement with the French Republic to install a new French origin radar station at Troodos for better surveillance (Efthymiou, 2019) and also to cooperate with the upgrading the "Evangelos Florakis" Naval Base and the "Andreas Papandreou" Air Base (Efthymiou, 2019).

Regarding the RoC participation in PESCO, the researcher believes that the RoC, at least on strictly military terms, seeks to gain access to high-tech technology through this program. As the RoC is not a member of a strictly military regional/international organization (e.g., NATO) and does not have the economic capabilities to develop such technology from scratch, it seeks to upgrade its conventional armament capabilities by participating in the PESCO. According to Angelides (2018) the RoC is participating in three PESCO programs. The first is the European Battlefield Missile System, which deals with the development of a new generation of European missile systems beyond visual range. The second is the EU Intelligence School which aims to educate and train the EU's military and civilian personnel in the information industries in cooperation with the Member States and the EU Information and Security Services and NATO Centers of Excellence. The third one is the Deployable SOF Tactical C2 Command Post (CP) – for Small Joint Operations (SOCC)) for the development and operation of a small-scale and Interstate-Specialized Small Operations and Control (e-Kathimerini.com, 22 November 2018).


On the other hand, the Ministry of Defense has introduced its main pillars, the term "Military diplomacy." It is beyond the scope of this project to theorize on the term. Thus, the researcher limits the discussion by saying that through military drills, including SAR, the RoC seeks to

increase other states' presence both on its terrain and in its EEZ. Under this scope, especially in periods of tension with the Turkey/TRNC axis due to its energy program, the RoC seeks to organize multiple exercises with neighboring and other states. When it comes to the execution of joint exercises between the RoC armed forces, and with Israeli, French, Egyptian, and Greek armed forces, apart from the obvious operational benefits, the researcher finds it more important to focus on another dimension, namely, the presence of this regional power in the maritime area where the Turkey/TRNC axis debates the rights of the RoC. Among other exercises, the researcher focuses on two showing that the statement mentioned above is not arbitrary. Thus, as presented on Map 14, between 31 October and 1 November 2016, the RoC has executed aeronautical exercises with the Israeli air force (green colored area) and the French navy (purple colored area). Through such exercises, the RoC aims to cancel any claims originating from the Turkey/TRNC axis that particular maritime areas are not part of its EEZ.



Map 14: Aeronautical Map of the exercise “Onisilos – Gedeon 2016” (Source: Onisilos: 2016)

Similarly, Map 15 presents an approximate representation of the Turkish and Israeli air force presence within the RoC EEZ in 2016. It can be seen that the Israeli air force activities (yellow colored area) have restricted the Turkish aviation activity (red-colored activity) to the eastern part of the RoC EEZ.



Map 15: Comparative Aeronautical Map of the Israel-Turkey aviation activity within the RoC EEZ (Source: Onisilos: 2016)

In March 2019, the French Navy announced a series of naval exercises with the RoC naval forces in the areas presented on Map 16. Even though the RoC Ministry of Defense has characterized them as SAR exercises, it can be understood that the RoC has sought to fulfill similar goals as those mentioned above with the joint exercises with the Israeli armed forces. Between 2013 and 2018, similar exercises have been executed with the participation of the US Navy, the Israeli armed forces on the terrain of the RoC, the Egyptian Navy, and the Greek armed forces.



Map 16: The areas the French navy announced it intends to proceed to SAR and naval exercises with the RoC armed forces (Source: Onisilos 2019)

As the researcher has already discussed, the RoC decision-making framework and the decision maker's ability to mobilize the state's military capabilities must be discussed within the scope of correlation. In the second chapter, the researcher has explained the term and has referred to the fact that it is among the parameters that separate NcR from other forms of Realism. More precisely, this project has stated that the former does not consider power as a general term but more as a comparable size between possible opponents in the international arena. Also, he has explained a lack of a widely accepted method for calculating the states' power, without the area of military capabilities being an exception. As it is beyond the scope of this to theorize on the power calculation, this project has adopted the view of Białoskórski, Kiczma, and Sułek (2019) in its attempt to present a military power comparison of the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis.

In their attempt to measure the states' power, the three analysts have taken into consideration fifty different variables and used a mathematical equation to calculate them. Their findings have ranked the states according to their economy, military, and geopolitical power. As shown in Table 9, in terms of military power, they have ranked Turkey

twenty-second (22) and the RoC hundred and fourth (104) globally. On the other hand, they do not present any data for the TRNC in any category. Even though there is a lack of shared agreement on the parameters and their precise accuracy, this project is fully aware that analysts can question the credibility of the findings. However, the military and geopolitical gap between RoC and Turkey are so big that an alternative methodology would not differentiate massively from the data presented in Table 9 .

	Economic Power and (Ranking)	Military Power and (Ranking)	Geopolitical Power and (Ranking)
Turkey	10.990 (17)	7.701 (22)	8.797 (20)
TRNC	N/A	N/A	N/A
RoC	0.248 (134)	0.338 (104)	0.308 (109)
Greece	2.274 (57)	3.685 (34)	3.215 (43)
Israel	2.577 (48)	7.773 (21)	6.041 (27)
Egypt	5.093 (30)	4.066 (31)	4.399 (30)
France	20.977 (8)	21353 (7)	21288 (8)
Italy	15.880 (13)	11.810 (14)	13167 (14)

Table 9: The 2019 power rankings (Source: National Power Rankings of Countries 2019 (Source: Białoskórski, Kiczma and Sułek (2019)

Thus, the data presented in Table 9 us to the conclusion that the RoC on its own could not compete with Turkey and also could not safeguard its energy security interest without the support of other states in case of a military escalation. This project is led to the conclusion that inevitably the RoC had to develop alliances and collaborations with regional and global actors to safeguard its energy security interests. However, the question posed here is: "What are the limits of support that the regional actors can and want to provide to the RoC in case of a

military confrontation with the Turkey/ TRNC axis?" This is the main point of discussion in the next section.

6.4 The external actors' limits of support

In the second and the fourth chapter, the researcher has shown that a state's crisis management alternatives can be divided into five groups. The project recalls that those alternatives are: "do nothing," diplomatic demarches and statements, economic measures, including sanctions, legal measures, and the application or threat of application of military means. Under the last alternative, this project also includes increasing the presence on a particular area to add pressure to a possible opponent. American fleets in the Hurmuz strait and Okinawa island show that the statement is not arbitrary. Thus, when it comes to the limits of support that other states and organizations can provide to the RoC against the Turkey/TRNC axis, this project limits its discussion to the alternatives mentioned here. As it has already been described, these groups of alternatives include dozens of operational level actions. However, their discussion is more of a technocratic/governmental issue and goes beyond the scope of this project.

The researcher has repeatedly highlighted the lack of evidence concerning the states' willingness, mentioned in the previous sections, to use their military capabilities either in favor or against the RoC in case of a military conflict with the Turkey/TRNC axis on energy security issues. According to the interviewees, all the regional states have their foreign policy axiom to safeguard their interests. However, apart from Greece, no other state will, at least based on the existing evidence, fight in favor of the RoC. A similar view is shared by the former Greek Minister of Defense, Apostolakis (Alpha News, 2019), and the former Commander of General Staff and Former Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Kostarakos (Difernews, 2019), who have expressed the view that in case

of military conflict against Turkey, Greece and the RoC are on their own.

However, the interviewees have presented particular alternatives that can differentiate the current facts and cause regional and international actors' active involvement in such a struggle. Under the same scope, they have expressed the conviction that their own foreign and energy policy interests are under such serious threat that they may intervene in favor of one side. Also, they have argued that the states will secure, with all possible means, the exploitation facilities, including the platforms, against a possible naval or airstrike and the states having citizens working on the exploitation facilities in the RoC EEZ, like the US and France, will secure their evacuation in case of a military conflict.

Thus, the researcher, by using the interviewees' view as a starting point, has sought to contribute to this discussion by trying to provide some insights on the limits of support that each player has in case of a military confrontation between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis, strictly on energy security-related issues. The US, the EU, particular regional actors, and the oil/gas enterprises activated on the RoC energy program are the factors that this section focuses on.

6.4.1 The US and the EU

Concerning the US, apart from restrictions referred to in the NATO/Article Five, not allowing any NATO state to turn against another member of the alliance, the gradual improvement of Turkey, Iran, and Russia has also led the US into a dilemma. On the one hand, if the US proceeds to severe economic sanctions or even provides military support to the RoC, it will lose a traditional ally in the region (Askerov, 2018). At the same time, though, the increasing interest in the RoC energy program, especially after the Noble Energy involvement, makes the US unable to avoid providing significant support. Following the above, this study believes that the US support is and will be limited to diplomatic

statements supporting the right of the RoC to proceed to exploitation research, joint military exercises both in the terrain and maritime area of the RoC, selling off US armaments, and upgrading facilities, training the RoC military personnel and low impact economic sanctions.

When it comes to the EU, this study believes that, at least as a Union, its support to the RoC is limited to diplomatic statements and economic sanctions targeting enterprises and people participating in the Turkish energy program in the Eastern Mediterranean region and not Turkey as a state. The study bases this argument on four reasons. The first is the refugee crisis, following the war in Syria, and the dependency the EU has so that Turkey controls the flows. In the fourth chapter, the author has already explained this parameter, so he will limit the discussion to saying that Turkey hosts more than 3 million refugees waiting to be transferred to the EU through the Greek and Bulgarian borders. The second reason is related to the large Turkish minorities that exist in different EU member states. Among others, the author recalls that more than 2,5 million Turks live in Germany (3,2% of the state's population); more than 1,2 million Turks live in France (2,2% of the state's population), and more than 400000 Turks live in the Netherlands (0,6% of the state's population). Following this, it can be understood that the application of any sanctions targeting the state of Turkey directly will, among other issues, cause domestic problems for the EU member states. These possible domestic issues also make the application of military means even more unlikely. The third reason is related to a contradiction between the EU article 42(7) and the NATO article 5. According to the former ", if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, per Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States" (EUR-Lex, 2019). Similarly, according to NATO article 5, "an

attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all of its members."

Given that the majority of the EU member states are also members of NATO, the application of military means against another member of the organization, in this case, Turkey, is a remote scenario as it will create much traction within NATO. The RoC Minister of Defense has also highlighted this problem with the application of Article 42 (7), and he has stated that there are discussions within the EU to overcome the current difficulties (Aggelidis, 2019). The fourth reason is related to Turkey's economic, financial agreements with enterprises which have as their home governments members of the EU, and especially the majority of the Unions member states have the greater geopolitical importance. As can be seen in Figure 14 , Germany (1st), Italy (3rd), France (6th), Spain (7th), and Netherlands (8th) are among the top 10 trading partners of Turkey. Also, Germany (3rd), Italy (5th), and France (9th) are among the top 10 states exporting goods to Turkey. As it can be easily understood, the economic relations between the states as mentioned above and Turkey make the application of economic sanctions that can harm Turkey very difficult.




Figure 14: Turkey's top 10 trading partners (left figure), the top 10 states with more exports in Turkey (right side) (Source, Foreign Affairs, The Hellenic Edition, 2020)

6.4.2 The regional actors

At the same time, apart from Greece, Italy and France are interested in the RoC energy program as the French TOTAL and the Italian ENI enterprises have signed exploitation contracts with the RoC. However, at least so far, the two states have shown they have different limits of support to the particular energy program. When it comes to Italy, between 2013 and 2018, it has been found either unable or unwilling to respond to the Turkey/TRNC actions. The temporary halt of the ENI exploitation research on RoC sea block 3 proves the statement's credibility. The former RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kasoulidis (2019), has openly expressed his worries about whether the Cabinet has made the right decision to give an Italian enterprise an exploitation license. At least so far, Italy's support to the RoC energy program is limited to diplomatic support within the EU organs and the execution of joint SAR exercises.

On the contrary, France has a more active involvement in the RoC energy security issues. However, apart from the case of an accidental or on-purpose action by the Turkish armed forces that can harm the lives of the French citizens working on exploitation facilities, the researcher believes military interference is a remote scenario. Thus, support through diplomatic demarches, the application of economic sanctions through the EU against Turkey, and the execution of joint exercises with the RoC armed forces determine the limits of support the particular state may provide to the former's energy program. As anyone can see in Table 10, apart from the interviewees who have avoided answering, the rest have stated that the limits of support include upgrading the presence of the French forces in the region by executing joint military exercises.

Organization/ State	Proceed to military escalation in favor of the RoC	Limits of Support	Scenario for differentiating the existing situation
US	No	Diplomatic Support to the RoC Economic Sanctions Sell US armament to the RoC	Rapid differentiation of the bilateral relations between the two sides. An accidental or on purpose action by the Turkish fleet that may cause loss of life to the people working on the US interest exploitation infrastructures.
EU (Organization)	No	Economic Sanctions	Solving the refugee problem Amendment either of the EU Art. 42(7) or the NATO Art. 5
France	Possible (If national interests threatened)	Diplomatic support within the EU Selling French armament to the RoC Joint exercises	An accidental or on purpose action by the Turkish fleet that may cause loss of life to the people working on the TOTAL platforms, drilling ships or other exploitation facilities Intention to upgrade its geopolitical influence in the region
Italy	No	Diplomatic support within the EU Joint exercises	(----

Table 10: States and organizations, outside the Eastern Mediterranean region actors, involved in the RoC energy program and their limits of support

On the other hand, the states located in the Eastern Mediterranean region, mainly Israel and Egypt, have shown the highest interest in the RoC energy program. Apart from the trilateral and the quadrilateral agreements signed with the RoC, the joint military exercises, and the cooperation on different security areas make the project support this view.

Notably, Israel is more likely to have an active involvement in the

case of a military confrontation between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis. The author bases this view on the already tense relations between Israel and Turkey, following the Mavi Marmara incident presented in a previous chapter. Also, Israeli energy security is the most linked with the RoC energy program as the East Med pipeline construction gives Israel an alternative route that bypasses Turkey and transfers its reserves to the EU market. As the researcher considers the regional actors' support relatively crucial for this study, he has decided to compare his view with the interviewees. As one can see on the charts in the Appendixes, the interviewees were asked to discuss the limits of support Israel may provide to the RoC during an energy security crisis. The majority of the interviewees (14 out of the 19) have expressed the opinion that Israel will intensify its presence in the RoC. However, it will not provide any support in case of a military conflict unless its government believes that the conflict's outcome will harm its interests. In that case, it is possible to intervene either in favor or against the RoC to change the outcome. The researcher believes that the involvement will probably favor the RoC as in any other case, Israel already has an offer to pass its reserves to the EU markets through Turkey.

Concerning Egypt, an armed confrontation with another Muslim state, like Turkey, would bring further domestic problems. However, the researcher believes in case Turkey tries to cause damage to any part of the facilities transporting natural gas reserves from the RoC sea block 12 to the Egyptian "Idku" terminal; there is a serious possibility that Egypt would consider it a direct threat to its energy security. When it comes to the interviewees, 14 out of 19 have stated that for Egypt, the culmination of support is limited to the deployment of military forces to the terrain and the maritime area of the RoC for joint exercises. Moreover, when they were asked to discuss the possibility of Egypt providing military support to the RoC in case of a military escalation with Turkey, they ruled out this possibility. In particular, they have stated that, as with Israel, the

Turkey/TRNC axis will avoid threatening Egypt's national interests to such an extent that it will lead them to the application of military means as a counter-response.

The majority of the interviewees have stated that the Republic of Greece is the only state in the region which has the possibility to support the RoC during a military conflict. However, according to the chart in Appendix 5, there is a dispute over why the Republic of Greece would interfere. More specifically, 9 out of the 18 (50%) interviewees have linked Greece's support to the Turkey/TRNC actions in the Aegean dispute. Additionally, 5 out of the 18 (27,7%) have stated the view that Greece would support the RoC with the ground forces already deployed in the RoC jurisdictional area independently from the Aegean dispute's existing situation. However, they have expressed doubts whether it would use its aeronautical forces either to support the RoC or to develop a second front; for example, in Thrace to force Turkey to either withdraw or not use other forces against the RoC apart from those already deployed on the island.

Organization/ State	Proceed to military escalation in favor of the RoC	Limits of Support	Scenario for differentiating the existing situation
Egypt	Possible (If national interests threatened)	Diplomatic support Economic Support Joint exercises	Halt the transport of gas reserves from the sea block 12 to the Idku terminal
Israel	Possible (If national interests threatened)	Selling Israeli armament to the RoC Joint and Individual military exercises Joint exercises	Any action that can threaten its national interests

Greece	Possible	Aeronautical and Ground Forces Support	Escalation on the Aegean Sea Escalation on the RoC EEZ
Oil/Gas Enterprise	No	Support through their home governments	(----)

Table 11: The Eastern Mediterranean region actors involved in the RoC energy program and their limits of support

6.5 Conclusions

Summarizing the above, the RoC energy program and, more precisely, the attempt to harmonize its energy security interests with those of other states in the region has contributed to increasing its capabilities. Economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities have been increased. Particularly for the RoC military capabilities, it is a parameter that has mainly entered the equation after 2015 under three pillars: the upgrading of the state's weaponry and operational facilities, the active involvement in PESCO, and military diplomacy mainly through joint exercises with other states in maritime areas disputed by the Turkey/TRNC axis.

This project has stated that at least at the strategic level, the RoC has mainly accomplished the tasks mentioned above. Simultaneously, the non-willingness of the regional states and the EU to further increase their support makes this project believe the RoC has almost saturated the other states' limits of support. The researcher has used the term "strategic level" to discuss the highest political level choices and not the operational alternatives as those are more or less limitless. For example, in France's case, the limit of support has been determined by the joint aeronautical exercises with the RoC without determining the place these exercises will take place. For example, the execution of joint exercises in a sea block where the Turkey/TRNC axis has a simultaneous presence either with drilling ships or any other vessels has a different value than

the execution of exercises in any other part of the RoC EEZ. However, the selection of the exercise area is primarily operational and not a strategic level issue.

CHAPTER 7

THE FIVE-YEAR CRISIS (2013- 2018)

7.1 Introduction

In the third chapter, the researcher has determined one of this project's last objectives, presenting the primary energy security-related facts impacting the RoC energy program. Even though the majority of the facts presented in the upcoming pages took place during the period 2013 - 2018 which is the focus of this project , the researcher has, on occasions, included a brief overview of facts that took place either before or after this period in his effort to provide a better understanding of the examined case.

However, before proceeding to the presentation of the facts, it is necessary to dedicate a section to an issue which is considered essential and has not yet been discussed ; the transferring sources to the market. As the researcher repeatedly mentioned, the RoC, since 2011, is in a transition period to become both an energy producer and an energy hub. In both cases, the exploited reserves must be transferred to the EU market, either via ships or pipelines. The following section focuses mainly on this issue, presents the routes, and analyzes the geopolitical, economic, and technological pros and cons of each alternative.

7.2 The RoC alternative routes for transferring natural gas to the EU market

The researcher has already explained that the energy reserves discovered within the RoC EEZ are limited to natural gas, at least so far. Vivek Chandra (2006:8) has explained that natural gas "consists of hydrocarbons that remain in the gas phase, not condensable into liquids, at 20 degrees and atmospheric pressure". Denis Babusiaux (2004) has argued that natural gas, together with petroleum, are the most commonly used hydrocarbons. According to IEA (2006), the states mainly use natural gas for residential and commercial needs, industrial heating, and power production.

In the second chapter, the researcher has referred to the fact that the oil market has significant differences compared to natural gas. The representation of these differences will shed light on the RoC energy program's significant limitations and particular challenges stemming from those limitations. Nataliya Esakova (2012) has explained that those differences are mainly related to and based on two factors: the interdependence between states or/and organizations and the transportation means.

Concerning the level of interdependence, it is much higher in natural gas compared to the oil market. In particular, the difference in interdependence lies in the gas market's regional nature, the long-term nature of gas supply contracts, and the high costs of constructing the necessary infrastructure. According to Gheorghe and Muresan (2008), the absence of a global natural gas market has made regional interdependence very important.

Regarding the transportation means, there are two principal ways to transfer natural gas to the markets: through pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). IEA (2008) has claimed that natural gas transportation is costly and usually represents a significant share of the overall cost of gas delivered to consumers. Thus, the smaller the distance between the producer and the buyer, the more profitable the deal will be.

However, apart from similarities, the two means of transportation have significant differences that this project needs to raise/consider. Concerning the transportation via pipelines, Natalya Esakova (2012) has claimed that they are costly, have longevity, and at the same time, they are low maintenance investments, have strict capacity limits, connected to the diameter and the pressure at the inlet and outlet points. Finally, she has argued that the energy supply via gas pipelines has technical and geopolitical particularities that need to be considered. More specifically, due to the distance between gas consumers and gas buyers, the transfer via pipelines may cause political conflicts with the states they cross

through or the states that they bypass. Thus, the signed contracts need to secure the benefits for both the producer and the consumer. Also, due to the high risk after signing an agreement, it is difficult for any side to withdraw.

On the other hand, Helm and Hepburn (2007) have explained that LNG has a higher security level than pipeline transportation. The ability of the LNG ships to change their route makes them independent of significant choke points. Also, he has stated that the bigger the distance between the producer and the market, the more secure transportation is via LNG compared to the pipeline's transportation. However, even though the LNG is safer, it is more costly, as its price is affected both by the effective cost of the vessels and the liquefaction terminals. This high cost has discouraged the players from signing long-term contracts. Also, the LNG is heavily dependent on domestic and not regional political stability. The majority of the largest LNG consuming areas are located in traditionally unstable regions, such as the Middle East and North/Central Africa (Budhwar and Mellahi, 2016). However, it can be easily understood that finding alternative routes to transfer LNG to the market is less costly than developing a new pipeline network every time the energy producer has intrastate conflicts with a transporting state.

Based on the above, the RoC had to decide whether it should proceed to constructing a pipeline or proceed to the construction of liquefaction facilities. According to Charles Ellinas (2014), the state's officials have discussed all the existing alternatives to export the discovered reserves to the market. Due to the willingness to harmonize the RoC energy interests with those of other states in the region, they have concluded that the alternatives for transferring the energy reserves to the market need to involve the inclusion of the state into a regional network and avoid having a single alternative.

Since 2008, all the governments have set the energy supply issues as a high priority in their discussions with other regional states

(Christodoulides, 2015). Apart from the support the RoC seeks to receive to solve energy security crises with the Turkey/TRNC axis, it also aims to accomplish three tasks. At first, it becomes a reliable producer for the EU states by securing long-term supply. In particular, the RoC will transfer its resources to consumers via the shortest route, in continuous flow, and with pre-determined prices. This ability is essential for investing in natural gas. Secondly, being in a position to execute a long-term development of infrastructures and transportation plan. The development of LNG infrastructures is very costly; thus, the state's ability to carry its natural gas to the market regularly is necessary. Thirdly, to reduce the cost of the infrastructures' physical security. The less problematic is the state's relations with its neighbor states, the more effective and more manageable is the security of these facilities. In such a case, the percentage of the state's GDP spend, and all the rest of the state's capabilities needed to mobilize for securing these facilities can be reduced. Also, a reduced need for physical security also reduces the risk for the oil/gas companies, and they could feel more confident to invest in the RoC.

This project has already mentioned that the RoC Council of Ministers considers three groups of parameters for energy-related issues, without the case of the alternative routes being an exception. The author recalls that there three groups of parameters taken into consideration. The first is the geopolitical parameters. According to Christodoulides (2015), even though the variables differ from case to case, the Turkey/TRNC opposition, the alliances with other states, and the energy-related mutual interests between the RoC and other states in the region are among the main geopolitical factors taken into consideration at least on the vast majority of the energy-related issues coming in front of the Council. Moreover, the Minister has admitted this group of variables are the first the Council takes into consideration. The second set of factors are the economic ones. Without a doubt, economic validity is another

issue the Council of Ministers takes into consideration. However, while interviewing Ellinas and Kiourtsouglou have both argued that the economic validity of these projects is the first factor the oil/gas enterprises consider. The more costly the construction and the maintenance of a route, the higher the risk and, consequently, the lower the enterprises' possibilities. The third group of factors includes all the technical parameters that need to be taken into consideration. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to focus on this issue, and it limits the discussion to saying the geographical relief of the area combined with its seismogenic trend are factors taken into consideration both by the enterprises and the RoC officials while making a feasibility study for a gas pipeline, as the East Med.

Following the above, both primary sources and the interviewees have confirmed that the alternative options, at least so far, for transferring the RoC reserves to the market are four. As presented in table 12, page 213, the first is a pipeline to Egypt and the gas is liquified at the Egyptian facilities (Lakkotrypis, 2018). The second is a pipeline passing through Turkey (Karakasis, 2017). The third alternative is the "East Med" pipeline (Petasis, 2016), and the fourth is the construction of an LNG terminal in the RoC jurisdictional area. While interviewing Charles Ellinas, he has admitted that the construction of a liquefaction terminal was discussed as an alternative option, but mainly because of the small profit, the plan remains on paper. However, Lakkotrypis (2018) has argued that both TOTAL and Qatar petroleum have not entirely abandoned the plan.

Regarding the first alternative Charles Ellinas (Flame Conference TV, 2014) has mentioned that the RoC can transfer its natural gas to the market through the Egyptian liquefaction terminal. Although it goes beyond the period that the present thesis focuses on, the author finds it necessary to mention that this is the alternative the Council of Ministers decided to choose. More specifically, on the 19th of September 2018, the RoC and Egypt have signed an agreement for transferring the natural gas

exploited from the sea block 12 “Aphrodite” through a pipeline to the Egyptian shores and then to the Egyptian LNG plants in Idku. However, as Lakkotrypis (2018) notes, the RoC aims to have alternative routes of transferring its energy reserves to the market in its attempt to avoid future energy security-related problems due to the possible changing of the current geopolitical environment in the region. Thus, the researcher presents the geopolitical, economic, and technical characteristics of this alternative but not the rest of the alternatives presented above. Concerning the geopolitical characteristics, the improvement of the relations with Egypt over the last years makes this alternative a low risk. Similarly, the short distance between the RoC sea block 12 and the Egyptian coasts makes it a technically low-risk project. Concerning the economic parameters, the Egyptian network is very high risk; thus, other producers may lower their prices and make the RoC natural gas less sustainable.

Regarding the construction of a pipeline passing through Turkey, while interviewing Andres Poulikkas he has agreed it has low technical difficulties. However, the existing situation between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis makes it the highest geopolitical risk among all the other alternatives. It can be easily understood that the RoC by linking its energy security interests with those of a state where they have an ongoing conflict would cause multiple problems, including the absorption of the RoC natural gas by Turkey and, consequently, its energy isolation from the EU. At the same time, this alternative also has an economic risk as the amount of the Russian energy reserves passing through Turkey is so high that the former can compete with any possible antagonism regarding the prices. More specifically, Russian enterprises can lower the prices and make the RoC energy reserves unsustainable. In such a case, the RoC could end up with “a hole in the bottom of the sea” (Ellinas, 2014). This alternative has also caused, at least publicly, political debates within the RoC government. More specifically, we witnessed a contrast

of statements between the government officials and the President of the state. Thus, while Christodoulides (2018) has expressed the opinion that a pipeline passing through Turkey is out of the discussion till the settlement of the Cyprus issue, President Anastasiades has expressed the opinion that, in the future, the two states can discuss this possibility. In particular, he has mentioned “the prospect of using some of the fuel lying beneath the seabed off the island’s shores to cover a large part of Turkey’s energy needs and transform the country into a regional energy hub could convince Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to make the concessions needed for a reunification deal to be achieved” (Kathimerini, 12 October 2016).

Alternative Routes	(Geo) Political Risk	Economic Risk	Technical Risk
Turkey	High Risk	Medium Risk	Low Risk
East Med	Low	Medium to High	High
Transfer to Egypt	Low	Medium	Low
Liquification in Cyprus	Medium (Still on paper)	Low to Medium (Still on paper)	Low (Still on paper)

Table 12 : Schematic representation of the level of risk of each alternative route

When it comes to the “East Med” pipeline, it has already explained that through it, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, and Greece seek to transfer their current and future energy reserves to the EU market According to IGI Poseidon (2017), the “East Med” project relates to an offshore/onshore natural gas pipeline, directly connecting East Mediterranean energy resources to Greece via Cyprus and Crete and can enhance Europe’s gas security of supply via diversification of counterparts, routes, and sources. In April 2017, during the Ministerial Summit in Tel Aviv, the

Ministers for Energy of Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel signed a Joint Declaration to reaffirm their support for this project.



Map 17: The East Med Pipeline and Possible Connections

However, the energy experts interviewed have all expressed the opinion that the East Med project, a possible route is presented to the Map 17, is by far the most technically challenging among the alternatives the Cabinet has in front of it to review. The seismogenic trend and the depth of the area the pipeline must pass through are the main factors on which they have based this argument. At the same time, the foreign policy experts interviewed have characterized the East Med as the alternative having the highest geopolitical profits as it fulfills the stated goal of the RoC to identify its energy security interests with those of other states in the region. Concerning its economic risk the intention of the EU to support its construction by up to 50% reduces the initial risk and makes it more valid for the enterprises (EU, 2019).

Summarizing the above, the RoC exploitation program has significant peculiarities the decision-makers can avoid taking into

consideration. Political, economic and technical parameters need to be considered before selecting an alternative route for transferring the exploited natural gas to the markets. The question posed here is: “Which are the steps made so far on the particular energy program?” The answer to this question will be given in the next section as part of the representation of the main events, related to energy, which took place in the Republic of Cyprus EEZ between 2013 and 2018.

7.3 The RoC energy security related facts between 2013 and 2018

The researcher has presented the Turkey/TRNC axis intention to halt the RoC energy program in a previous section by applying a three-pillar strategy. The first pillar is based on a series of actions the Turkey/TRNC axis has applied in its attempt to isolate the RoC from its regional partners/allies, by proposing alternatives that can be considered more profitable both politically and economically. Within this scope, the researcher recalls the proposal Turkey made to Israel for the joint construction of a subsea pipeline linking the latter's energy reserves to Turkey's existing network and from there transferring it to the EU market. The second pillar targets the oil/gas enterprises either by threatening them to be isolated from future energy contracts in Turkey or by causing delays to their exploration and exploitation research in the RoC EEZ and, consequently, increasing the economic risk of their investments. The third pillar targets particularly the RoC by questioning its ability to safeguard its maritime area and consequently reducing its credibility to the international arena and thus, presenting it as an unreliable partner for the enterprises, their home governments and the other states in the region.

Given that the events and actions related to the first and second pillar have already been discussed in the fifth chapter, this section seeks

to focus on the events related to the third pillar. However, this study in its intention to provide a more transparent view of all the RoC energy-related events between the 24th of February 2013 and the 31st of June 2018, does not limit the discussion exclusively to the Turkish actions but also includes the actions taken by other actors either in favor or against the RoC.

Before proceeding further, the researcher notes four issues related to the facts presented on the upcoming pages. Firstly, George Lakkotrypis, the RoC Minister of Energy after a 7 year tenure, handed over his duties on 7th July 2020 and gave a public presentation including the facts regarding the state's energy program. Those facts are summarized into figure is presented in Appendix 6 . However, as this project discusses the RoC energy security particularly, this section focuses mainly on those facts directly or indirectly related to this issue. Secondly, the RoC has signed several bilateral, trilateral, and quadripartite agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Greece, France, and the US. As this thesis focuses on crisis management and not on grand strategy in this section, the researcher refers only to those agreements signed during an energy security crisis between RoC and the Turkey/TRNC. All the rest of the agreements can be found in Appendix 6. Based on the same reasoning, this chapter limits the discussion only to those exercises (aeronautical, terrain, joint, SAR) that responded to the Turkey/TRNC axis moves, causing an energy security crisis. Additional exercises have been mentioned in the fifth chapter

Following the above, someone may consider the first date the author should mention is the 24 February 2013 and this date is essential and of note as the President of the RoC,, Nikos Anastasiades, won the elections and was announced as the seventh President of the Republic of Cyprus (Sigmalive, 24 February 2013). However the study focuses on a date a month before the election of Anastasiades . More precisely, on the 24th January 2013, under Dimitris Christofias' Presidency, the RoC

government, as part of the energy program, had reached an agreement for exploration and exploitation research with the consortium ENI/KOGAS for the sea blocks 2,3 and 9 (Sigma live, 25 January 2013). The researcher, should also mention this date for an additional reason related to the state's energy security. As discussed in the fourth chapter, the intention of the RoC decision makers to involve as many actors as possible to its energy program has started before Anastasiades Presidency. However, in the fifth chapter when discussing the external drivers of the RoC energy security, the study has expressed the opinion that the impact of the oil/gas enterprises during an energy security crisis is directly related to the willingness of their home state governments to interfere in favor of the one side or the other. In the case of the RoC, Italy, at least so far and as presented in the next pages, apart from some public statements supporting the RoC has not shown the willingness to intervene to safeguard the interests of the consortium .

The second date the researcher should mention is the 21st of May 2014. This is the date, the former Vice President and current US President Joe Biden visited Cyprus. The visit lasted two days and the researcher considers it worth mentioning because it was the first official visit of a US Vice President in the RoC since 1974 and has shown the willingness of the US government to have an active role in the energy-related issues taking place in the island.

As a response, later the same year and more specifically on the 1st of September, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has made his first official visit to the TRNC since he was elected in 2003. This project considers that the date was chosen not by accident, as it was announced after the ENI enterprise stated its intention to proceed to exploitation activities with the drilling ship called "SAIPEM 10000" in the RoC sea block 9 on the 3rd of October 2014. Through this visit, the Turkish President, on the one hand, wanted to show his support to the acting TRNC government and on the other hand to renew his intention to safeguard the Turkish Cypriots

energy interests, as based on the maps presented in previous chapters, sea block 9 is in the area to which Turkey claims the TRNC has exploration and exploitation rights.

To prove the arguments mentioned above, the researcher reminds us that 15 days later, on the 20th of October 2014, the Turkish research vessel named “Barbaros,” escorted by a flotilla of supporting ships and a Turkish navy frigate, entered the northern part of the RoC EEZ before proceeding to exploitations in the sea blocks 2 and 9, see Map 18. Also, we need to mention that ten days earlier, Turkey has asked and received permission from the TRNC to proceed to those researches by claiming that Turkey does not recognize any jurisdictional rights to the RoC on that maritime area.

As a response, Anastasiades, with the backing of the RoC National Council and supported by the Greek government, has withdrawn from the talks for the settlement of the Cyprus issue after calling Turkey to annul its NAVTEX and withdraw its vessels from the RoC EEZ (Cyprus News Agency, 2017). This move has shown the RoC leader's willingness to continue the strategy followed by the Christophias administration linking, even indirectly, the energy program to the Cyprus issue. As presented in the fourth chapter, this was the strategy applied by the previous government as there are statements indicating that Christophias was calling Erdogan to solve the Cyprus issue as soon as possible so that both sides enjoy the benefits/profit stemming from the exploited oil/gas reserves.

However, a few months later, we saw the first signs from the Anastasiades government to apply a new strategy to separate the two issues. To prove this argument, the researcher recalls three facts. More precisely, on 8th November 2014, and while the Cyprus issue negotiations were frozen, the RoC proceeded to the first trilateral Summit with Egypt and Greece. On the Summit's sidelines, the Egyptian and the RoC President, together with the Greek Prime Minister, have made a


Joint Declaration highlighting the historical bond between the three states. During the same period, the RoC has permitted other states to execute aeronautical exercises with live firing either on the areas of the aforementioned sea blocks or those neighboring/adjoining them. The researcher also highlights a joint aeronautical exercise with live firing between Russia and Israel that took place in the sea block 9 between the 20th and the 22nd of October 2014 and an Israeli aeronautical exercise in an area neighboring the sea block 9 between the 22nd and the 26th of October (tanea. gr, 18 October 2014).

On the 28th of March 2015, Turkey announced the shipping of the first drilling ship of Turkish origin and manufacture. The same month the ENI/KOGAS has announced the results of the second exploratory drilling in the sea block 9. This drilling, combined with the one in 2014, led the companies to the conclusion that the amount of gas existing in the particular sea block is perhaps not exploitable. However, in January 2015, TOTAL had expressed the willingness to proceed into new exploitation drills.

On the 31st of March 2015, the NAVTEX Turkey has announced that the area consisting of the RoC sea blocks 2,3, and 9 was terminated and both the exploration ship "Barbaros" and the flotilla escorting it returned to the Turkish coasts. Less than two months later, Anastasiades has agreed to return to the negotiations to settle the Cyprus issue. The negotiation procedure began again on the 15th of May 2015 with the President of the RoC, the leader of the TRNC and the Special Advisor of the UN stating their willingness to speed up the negotiations.

As the last event of 2015, the author believes that it is worth discussing the grand opening of the pipeline supplying the TRNC with water from Turkey on the 15th of October 2015. Even though at first glance, it is not an issue related to energy, the researcher has explained in the fifth chapter why this project considers water infrastructure related, among other issues, to energy. The researcher briefly recalls that this

water pipeline which was constructed due to the low rainfall on the island, and the lack of desalination facilities in the area controlled by the TRNC, increases the economic dependency on Turkey. This dependency inevitably decreases any possible opposition within the TRNC government against any action of the Turkish government in the Eastern Mediterranean region to safeguard its energy security by halting the RoC energy program.



Map 18: The Barbaros research activity between 2013 and 2017 (Source: Charalambides, 2017)

In 2016 there were five events this project considers worth referring to. Firstly, in January 2016, the RoC Minister of Energy announced that Shell enterprise participates with 35% in the consortium making exploitation research in the sea block 12. Also, on 21st January, the Prime Ministers of Greece and Israel and the President of the RoC have signed a joint declaration promoting joint energy projects between the three states, which will contribute to the energy security of all the three

countries, as well as to the diversification of EU energy sources (Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016). Thirdly, on 6 April 2016, the third licensing round was completed and on 21 December it was announced that Exxon Mobil, ENI, TOTAL, and Qatar Petroleum gained licenses for the sea blocks 6,8, and 10 (RoC Ministry of Energy official website, 2016). Fourthly, on 31st August 2016 the first of the three transnational agreements was signed, the agreements were needed for the RoC to transfer the gas reserves found in the sea block 11 to the Egyptian liquefaction terminals in Isku (Kathimerini, 1 September 2016). As a response on 12th October 2016, the TRNC and Turkey have signed an energy cooperation agreement giving the right to TPAO to proceed to exploitation research in all the sea blocks that the TRNC government consider to be part of its EEZ both in the north and the southern maritime area of the island. Also, this agreement included the undersea electricity power supply from Turkey to the TRNC. As with the water pipeline connection, this was an additional step to increase the TRNC's dependency on Turkey.

The first date in 2017 the project considers worth mentioning is 7th March 2017. Qatar Petroleum, accompanied by Exxon Mobil, signed the exploration and production-sharing contract with the RoC for the sea block 10. Secondly, on the 7th July 2017, the UN-sponsored negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus issue held in the Swiss Alps for ten days were brought to a halt after the negotiations broke down. Following this halt and on 21st November 2017, we have a trilateral meeting in Nicosia between the leaders of the RoC, Egypt, and Greece. Four days later, we have an official statement from the former Turkish Cypriot negotiator for the settlement of the Cyprus issue expressing the opinion that the exploitation of hydrocarbons must be part of the negotiating procedure and that the trilateral agreements that the RoC signed with other states in the region are neither valid nor affecting the Turkey/TRNC energy program. On 16th December, we have witnessed the signing of the memo

of common understanding to construct the EAST Med pipeline between Greece, Israel, Italy, and the RoC.

The six months of 2018 that this thesis focuses on were mainly governed by the tension caused in the sea block 6. More precisely, the presence of the Turkish navy has forced ENI enterprise to halt its energy activities in the particular sea block. More specifically, on 8th February 2018, ENI has announced a lean gas discovery in sea block 6. According to the official statement, "the well, which was drilled in a water depth of 2,074 meters reaching a final total depth of 3,827 meters, encountered an extended gas column in rocks of Miocene and Cretaceous age" (ENI, 2018). However, on 10th February, a Turkish navy ship halted the drilling ship "SAIPEN 12000" belonging to ENI. The halting of "SAIPEN 12000" continued until 30th June 2018, the date the ship was ordered to sail to the shores of the Moroccan coast. During this period, the Italian government has limited its support to the RoC by making statements regarding the right of the RoC to research in the particular maritime area.

7.4 Conclusions

This chapter has discussed the RoC energy security between 2013 and 2018. The first sections provided a general overview of the RoC energy program by focusing on certain particularities. Moreover, in the same section, the researcher has discussed the available options the RoC Council of Ministers have for transferring the energy reserves to the EU market by highlighting each alternative's geopolitical, economic, and technological difficulties. In the last section, the author has made a review of the main issues and events in the Eastern Mediterranean region and their impact on the RoC energy security. Trilateral agreements, military exercises, and the signing of contracts with oil/gas enterprises are among the facts this section has summarized/focused on. Even though the presentation of the majority of these events was descriptive,

the researcher believes that their chronological sequence provides the reader with a clear view of the progression to the existing situation.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

8.1 The thesis contribution to the existing knowledge

This study consists of seven chapters, excluding this one, and has two starting points. The first is the late 2000s decision made by the Christophias administration to transform the state from an almost exclusively energy consumer to an energy producer/hub. The first actual evidence showing the implementation of this decision appeared in 2011 when the Noble Energy consortium did/made the first exploitation research in the RoC EEZ. The second point is the opposition the Turkey/TRNC axis has expressed to this energy program and applying different means, including military, to halt or cancel this program. Our understanding of this new area of confrontation between the two sides may oppose the view of the RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Christodoulides, that the state's energy program will bring diplomatic and economic benefits to the state. Thus, this study set out to determine whether the new energy facts and, more precisely, the new energy security facts of the RoC has contributed to dealing with bilateral crises more effectively. More precisely, this thesis was designed to address the following question:

“How has energy security impacted the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy crisis management between the 24th of February 2013 and the 31st of June 2018?”

We have already explained that, independently from fact, the Noble-energy consortium proceeded to the first exploitation activity in the RoC sea block 11 in 2011; we have decided to consider February 2013 as the starting date for this thesis because all the other research took place between that date and 2018. On the other hand, the end date was selected because it was the first time since 2011 that the Turkey/TRNC opposition paid off, and an exploitation activity the RoC signed with an oil/gas enterprise was halted, at least temporarily,.

This chapter is dedicated to summarizing the thesis's findings, suggesting implications, and making recommendations for future research. The following section discusses whether and how this study has fulfilled the determined objectives related to the thesis originality, while in the third section, we answer the thesis central question. The fourth section makes some recommendations on how the RoC can increase its effectiveness while dealing with foreign policy crises. The section 8.4, apart from some concluding remarks, lists and clarifies the thesis recommendations for further research.

8.2 The thesis contribution to knowledge

The introductory chapter explained that the study's originality stems from its empirical and not its theoretical context. In this section, we seek to clarify whether we have fulfilled the objectives set in the first chapter regarding its originality and consequently its contribution to the existing knowledge by providing new insights to academics and governmental officials with high-level expertise in foreign and energy policy.

Regarding the study's contribution to the RoC foreign policy, we have explained that our belief that we can contribute to knowledge in this area stems from the fact that this study has confirmed the findings of Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann (2009). They have found that the literature focusing on this case, if we exclude the Cyprus issue, is underdeveloped, independently from the new facts caused by the state's accession to the EU. Thus, through its findings, this study has sought to enhance our understanding of how the RoC foreign policy operates, especially during a bilateral crisis. This study dedicated the second chapter to overview the RoC foreign policy behaviour from 1974 until 2018. It is briefly reminded that according to our research, the RoC has gradually changed its foreign policy strategy from a "Cyprus issue centric" to a "multi-dimensional"

foreign policy based on shared interests with the regional and international actors activated in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf. Even though studies discuss the transformation of the RoC foreign policy throughout the years (Adamides, 2020, Tziarras 2019, Christodoulides 2020), we have found it necessary to begin this chapter with the analysis mentioned above to safeguard that all the readers have a level of knowledge regarding the RoC foreign policy. The importance of this issue has led the researcher to include this chapter after the introductory chapter. He has even set it before the chapter dedicated to the theoretical background of the thesis. The following two sections were dedicated mainly to the RoC foreign policy decision-making mechanism. More precisely, we have explained the role the President and the Council of Ministers have in the state's foreign policy, the role of the Parliament, and we have presented several governmental organs (e.g. the Central Intelligence Agencies) and advising bodies (e.g. the Geostrategic Council) and their role in the decision-making procedure. Also, we have sought to investigate the impact each of the actors above has on the decision-making procedure. For example, we have presented the reasons that confirm why the President is the central player in the decision-making procedure and not just the Chairman of the cabinet. Also, in this study, we have presented evidence that makes us believe that not all Ministers have the same impact on the decision-making procedure, as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence have a more upgraded role than, for example, the Minister of Labor. Also, we have highlighted the role the Minister of Energy has on the energy security related issues even though they are still considered foreign policy issues for the RoC government. Finally, the last section discussed the state's crisis management mechanism particularly. Apart from the actors mentioned above and their role in the decision-making procedure, the study introduced a two-stage framework, including the possible

alternatives that the RoC officials have when they deal with foreign policy crises.

The second issue this study believes that provides additional evidence in the existing knowledge is related to the decision of the RoC officials after 2015, differentiating its strategy and separating the Cyprus issue from the state's energy program. As presented in the fourth and sixth chapters, both the Christophias and Anastasiades administrations have sought to link the two-issues hoping that both Turkey and the TRNC would not oppose the RoC energy program due to the economic benefits they could have. The differentiation of this strategy and the continuation of the RoC energy program independently of the negotiations to the Cyprus issue has caused domestic debates to express whether this is the right approach. This study has gone some way towards enhancing our understanding of the debate by presenting the reasons behind Turkey and the TRNC opposition to the RoC energy program. As presented in that chapter, the actual reasons have very little to do with the rights of the Turkish Cypriots to the particular energy program. Briefly, we recall that Turkey consists of/represents a threat for its energy security as the RoC can gradually be transformed into a hub linking the Middle East and Gulf states reserves to Egypt or directly to the EU market via the East Med pipeline. As can be understood as Turkey is the central hub linking the EU market with the regional reserves; such an act will threaten its energy security interests. Also, the more active the RoC becomes in the 'energy game', the harder it becomes for Turkey to cancel the former's EEZ all the negative impact on its so-called "strategic depth" (Davutoglu, 2010). For the TRNC, the fact that the RoC can strengthen its position in the international arena through the economic and diplomatic benefits that it can gain from its energy program makes it want to stop this program as soon as possible. The TRNC officials are afraid that by increasing its position in the international arena, the RoC can also gain benefits in the negotiations to settle the Cyprus issue. Of course, it can be argued that

this is a strategy that increases the tension between the two sides with all the adverse effects for the RoC. In the last section, we suggest a series of measures the RoC can take to deal more effectively with the energy security-related crises with the Turkey/TRNC axis.

The third issue we have presented in the introductory chapter that we seek to base this thesis originality on, is the application of NcR to the analysis of the RoC foreign policy crisis management. We recall the researcher's statement that the available literature discussing energy policy, even as a foreign policy-related issue, is usually based on historical and empirical assumptions and not on the theoretical context stemming from IR theory or foreign policy analysis. We have also stated that in the case of the RoC, the available literature follows a similar pattern and the exceptions are relatively limited. This study has sought to add to the relatively small body of available literature by testing whether an IR theory, Neoclassical Realism, can be used as a theoretical base for answering the thesis central question. Even though this study believes that the paradigm's ability to investigate simultaneously domestic and external parameters when analyzing a state's foreign policy behavior, either in the long term or during a crisis, makes it applicable for this study, there is always ground for criticism, which we believe can contribute to providing insights to the existing knowledge.

This thesis aims to enhance our understanding by determining and analyzing the RoC crisis management factors, emphasizing energy security-related situations. We recall that the decision to clarify those factors has been made after the researcher has asked the RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs to determine and scale the parameters the RoC executive authorities take into consideration before taking either a foreign policy or an energy security-related decision. The Minister replied that each case is examined separately, and there is no predetermined set of parameters or predetermined scaling. Following this answer, we have come to the conclusion that investigation into this issue is necessary.

However, in the introductory chapter, we have presented the intention of answering the thesis question based on the parameters that have been differentiated between 2013 and 2018 due to energy security-related issues. Thus, our contribution to the existing knowledge on this issue is discussed in the next section.

8.3 Answering the thesis research question

Before answering the project's research question, the researcher considers it important to briefly review why he has decided to focus particularly on the RoC energy security and not on energy policy in general. Also, why he has decided to investigate the impact energy security has on the state's foreign policy crisis management and not on long term foreign policy.

Regarding the former, the thesis has stated in the third and fourth chapters that this study considers the EU states energy policy consists of three pillars: energy security, sustainable development, and economic growth. Thus, by focusing exclusively on energy security, this study aims to provide a more in-depth analysis. Also, the fact that the RoC is a prospective energy producer and future energy hub has led to the conclusion that, at least for the period this project focuses on, sustainable development and economic growth have a relatively minimal impact on determining the state's energy policy.

On the other hand, the thesis focuses exclusively on foreign policy crisis management and not on long term foreign policy for two reasons. The first reason is related to the researcher's intention to provide a more in-depth analysis. According to Berridge (2015), long-term foreign policy is a multi-sector political procedure including but not limited to public, economic and cultural diplomacy. On the contrary, though the other major area of foreign policy, crisis management is not multi-sector but is impacted by parameters differing from case to case (Hudson, 2005).

Thus, by focusing exclusively on crisis management, we believe that we can provide a more thorough analysis. Secondly, the RoC energy security crisis management is a relatively new area of research that has started gradually to develop, both in academia and in the governmental mechanism, after the exploitation researches that the Noble Energy consortium made on the RoC Sea block 11 in 2011. Thus, a more thorough analysis of energy security crisis management can attract the interest both of members of academia and government experts.

The answer to the thesis research question is based on a strategy aiming to investigate whether energy security has differentiated the factors that this study has presented in the second, third, and fourth chapters and the impact on the RoC foreign policy crisis management. Before the determination and the comparative analysis of the parameters, this strategy confirmed that the RoC energy security is primarily a foreign policy-related issue. To prove this argument, the researcher, apart from collecting and analyzing public statements confirming it, also asked the interviewees to confirm it. The research has given such importance to this issue related to the study's theoretical framework and the study's contribution to knowledge. More precisely, if it has been proved that the RoC energy security is not primarily a foreign policy issue, it would probably not be possible to analyze it by using 'theoretical tools' to explain such cases. Thus, the thesis theoretical context could be debatable as we would try to link an economic issue with a state's foreign policy by using a paradigm, Neoclassical Realism, its founders have developed to explain the states (geo)political relations. Also, this criticism of the study's theoretical background could impact negatively on the researcher's intention to enhance our understanding of how NcR can explain energy security-related issues.

As presented in the table 12, page 241, the thesis research question summarises the study's findings regarding how and which parameters have been differentiated during the period between the 23rd

of February 2013 and the 30th of June 2018; this study has observed differentiation in five parameters.

At first, when it comes to the leader's ability to mobilize significant capabilities, we have decided to focus on three issues. The first issue is who mobilizes the RoC capabilities, secondly whether the available capabilities have been differentiated, and thirdly whether the leader(s) ability to mobilize them have been changed.

When it comes to the person or the group of people mobilizing the RoC capabilities, as presented in chapters two and four, either on foreign policy issues in general, or issues related to energy security crisis management in particular, it is the Council of Ministers who are responsible for the mobilization of the state capabilities through the competent minister. However, as also presented in the chapters two and four, the RoC President has an upgraded role in the decision-making procedure compared to other members of the Cabinet. Briefly, we recall that he can appoint and dismiss the members of the Council of Ministers, he can veto their decisions, and he is responsible for declaring war and/or signing peace agreements with another state. Also, he is the only member of the Cabinet who can veto the decisions of the Parliament on security, defence and foreign policy issues. Following the above, this thesis recalls that the central player in the RoC foreign and energy crisis management procedure is the President and not the Cabinet. Secondly, this study has not observed any changes in the constitutional/legal framework which cause changes in the rights and responsibilities either of the President or the Cabinet regarding the mobilization of the state capabilities. Of course, there are operational plans which aim to speed up the implementation of the crisis management procedure, such as the development of Ministerial crisis management teams, based on the appeared/actual crisis, but this is an issue which goes beyond the objectives of this thesis.

When it comes to the possible differentiation of the state

capabilities, in the fifth chapter, we have divided the RoC capabilities into three groups: the economic, the diplomatic/legal and the military. When it comes to the economy, the exploitation of hydrocarbons has led to direct and indirect investments in the RoC. Concerning the direct investments, the researcher has referred to the agreements that the RoC has signed with the oil/gas enterprises activated in its EEZ. In contrast, indirect investments are agreements signed with other states in the region due to the increased cooperation on the energy sector, such as the agreements with Israel and Egypt in the tourism industry. Moreover, it would be an omission not to refer to the RoC officials' plan to use the energy program to produce and subsequently extract knowledge on various energy-related issues such as protecting critical infrastructures, cybersecurity, and energy legislation. Regarding the diplomatic/legal capabilities, we seek to discuss this sector in the following pages .

On the other hand, this study has observed a gradual willingness, particularly after 2015, for the RoC to proceed to make significant changes in its defence policy and its defence capabilities to deal with the challenges that lie ahead due to the state's energy program. More precisely, and in contrast to what the government officially states that it intends to avoid military escalations, in the sixth chapter, we have presented the statement from the Minister of Defence claiming that the armed forces' mission is to secure the state against any perceived threat to both its terrain and its maritime area. To prove this argument, the researcher quotes the RoC attempt to increase its aeronautic capabilities, the execution of military exercises with other states in the region and the willingness to increase its involvement in the PESCO movement, presented in chapters five and six.

The second factor we find necessary to discuss is the leader's perception. As presented in the second chapter, both perception and misperception is at the core of NcR and, according to its founders' view, contributes to how the leaders understand the international arena and

how they deal with the upcoming crises. In the examined case study, this factor is mainly related to the viewpoint of both the President of the RoC and the members of his inner circle regarding the limits of the actions the Turkey/TRNC axis may undertake to interrupt and to halt the RoC energy program and the limits of support that other players may provide to the RoC. At first, we recall Anastadiades (2014) that the states' interests often outweigh International Law. However, as Kasoulides (2015) admitted, until 2015, the RoC was unprepared to counter-response to possible Turkish seismographic research within its EEZ.

Regarding the limits of support that other states, organizations (e.g. the EU), and oil/gas enterprises can and want to provide to the RoC during an energy security-related crisis; we seek to discuss three issues. At first, we have witnessed a gradual 'demystification' by the governmental officials and public opinion of the RoC. More precisely, following the support the US government provided to the Noble Energy consortium in 2011, this study believes that both members of the government and even more the public opinion believed that by harmonizing the energy interests of the state with regional and international players activated in the region the RoC energy program will run independently from the Turkey/TRNC opposition. As presented in the following pages, this thesis believes that the RoC has successfully harmonized its energy interests with important players in the region. However, the successful attempts of the Turkish navy to escort Turkish seismographic vessels in the RoC EZZ between 2014 and 2018 and the successful halt of the ENI research in sea block three/3 has shown that the situation is far more complicated. In chapters four and five, this study has explained why the situation is complicated and the limits of support all leading players have in supporting the RoC energy program.

The third parameter is the governmental structure and how it has been differentiated. This study has already explained why there are no major differences in how the decisions are made both in foreign policy

and energy security-related issues in the RoC. However, the new energy security facts are among the reasons that have caused significant differences in the state's governmental structure, and this thesis focuses on three particular facts. At first, since the late 2000s, we have witnessed the Minister of Energy, Commerce, and Agriculture having an upgraded role. According to the official website of the Republic of Cyprus, the particular ministry is ranked 7th out of the 11 on the state's hierarchy (RoC Presidency, 2019). However, the majority of the interviewees have acknowledged its upgraded role and the enclosure/inclusion of the Minister of Energy to the President's inner circle, at least on issues related to the state's foreign policy, excluding the Cyprus issue. Also, since 2013 we have witnessed the establishment of the two advisory councils: the Geostrategic and the Energy policy, which both have experts on energy-related issues. In addition, the RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs has established a department focusing on Maritime and Energy issues, the so-called B2 Department. Another issue directly related to the governmental structure is that, apart from the President, no other domestic actors can exercise the veto to decisions, either of the Cabinet or the Parliament in foreign policy issues. By the same token, even though the President is the central player in the decision-making procedure; in the second and the fourth chapter, we have explained why his/her role is usually supervisory during a crisis. Regarding the current President, we recall the interviewees' statement claiming that during a crisis, his involvement is limited to inspecting/ensuring that the competent ministers and governmental officials deal with the crisis within the framework decided with his consent by the Cabinet.

The fourth parameter is the RoC foreign policy strategy/behavior. We recall the findings of the second chapter stating that the RoC between 2008 and 2018 has gradually transitioned from a Cyprus issue centric to a multidimensional foreign policy strategy. Through this new foreign policy behavior the RoC seeks to integrate its relations with actors

influencing the regional and the international arena, with its energy program contributing to this intention. In particular, the RoC officials have admitted their intention to link the state's energy security with the interests of Egypt, Israel, Greece and the US. Also, they have expressed the intention of linking energy security to the energy interests of the EU market by acting both as an energy producer and a hub. This effort has been intensified since 2015 when the RoC has been included in the EU energy security strategy as a potential energy provider. This inclusion has also contributed to the gradual improvement of bilateral relations with significant EU member states having oil/gas enterprises activated in the RoC EEZ, like France and Italy. Under the same scope, this strategy also includes harmonizing the state's foreign policy interests with the interests of the oil/gas enterprises activated within its EEZ. We have already discussed the demystification of the RoC officials regarding the limits of support these actors can provide. However, excluding those limits of pressure both states and enterprises want and can exercise on the Turkey/TRNC axis, we must not downgrade their contribution to the successful continuing/continuation of the RoC energy program. To prove this argument, the researcher quotes two statements.

At first, Wikileaks had published an email from Jay Solomon to Jake Sullivan saying that Hillary Clinton, when she was the Secretary of State, was very blunt to the Turkish Prime Minister regarding the naval demonstrations that took place close to the Noble Energy exploitation platform in 2011. In particular, Jay Solomon has said, "Jake—Wanted to run something by you. Was told the Secretary was pretty blunt with Davutoglu that the U.S. would not sit back as Turkish warships enter Cypriot waters and harass Americans working for a U.S. energy company, Noble Energy. Made it clear that the safety of Americans citizens was at stake. Want to make sure I'm not off base. Best, Jay³⁵".

35 <https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emails/emailid/26618>

Secondly, when the "West Cappella" drilling ship, rented by TOTAL, arrived at the RoC EEZ on the 11th of July 2017, the same day, the French armed forces intensified their presence in the region. In particular, French frigates arrived in the broader area where the drilling ship planned to proceed to exploitations. A week later, the French Minister of Defense, Florence Parly, made an official visit to the RoC to meet with the RoC Minister of Defense, and in a symbolic act, the meeting was not at the Ministry but at the National Crisis Management Center named "Zenon"³⁶. During her visit, she has also visited the French frigates docked in the RoC port of Larnaca city.

Under the same scope and presented in Table 12, , the RoC foreign policy behavior during a crisis is in line with the alternatives presented in the literature. More precisely, the five options presented in the second and third chapters according to the public statements and the interviewees are those the RoC governmental officials have in mind when dealing with a foreign policy or particularly an energy security-related crisis. However, as presented in the second and the fourth chapter, instead of the ladder of escalation, the RoC crisis management strategy can be summarized in two stages. The first stage includes the actions that the state can undertake on its own and the second stage includes those that the state can take either on its own, or, in case the measures of the first stage does not accomplish a de-escalation, supported by other regional and international actors.

Also, this new foreign policy strategy has positively impacted the study's opinion that an important parameter related to the RoC ability to deal with foreign policy crises is access to accurate and on-time information. According to Burrige (2015), the bilateral agreements

36 According to the official websites the "The "Zenon" Coordination Centre between its development and 2019 it has contributed on the management of 22 possible crises. Apart from the fixed installed systems, additional mobile surveillance and identification systems, such as the long-range thermal imaging and the unmanned aerial vehicles transfer real time picture to the Center.

related to exchanging classified information do not have the publicity that other agreements have. In fact, this thesis did not draw attention to these agreements before interviewing the former Head of the RoC Central Intelligence Agency, General Pentaras. According to Pentaras, something the researcher confirmed later on, since 2013, the RoC signed agreements with various states, including Israel, Egypt and Germany and has gained access to classified information stemming/originating from SIGINT (SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE) and ELINT (ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE) systems like satellites and strategic radars and long-range reconnaissance drones. These agreements are considered very important for the RoC for three reasons. At first, it has given its analysts access to information they could not have accessed before due to the lack of means like satellite systems. Secondly, the analysis of this information has allowed the RoC analysts to be prepared and learn how to use those means when and if the states finally buy them. For example, the RoC had access to information originating from drones before buying its own in 2019. Thirdly, the access to classified information has given the RoC analysts the ability to present to the decision-maker a more accurate analysis during an appeared/existing or an upcoming crisis and consequently to reduce the possibility of misperception during the decision-making procedure. Thus, when we asked both the former and current Heads of the Central Intelligence Agency to comment whether the RoC President had a lack of information during any of the energy security crises, both were certain that there was no such issue.

The fifth and last factor we seek to discuss is the correlation with allies, partners and opponents of energy security-related issues. This study has repeatedly referred to the intention of the RoC to harmonize its energy program with the energy security interests of regional and international players in the Eastern Mediterranean and, of course, with the interests of the oil/gas enterprises. In chapters five and six, we have explained why the RoC has, at least for the period this study discusses,

achieved this goal with Israel and Egypt. Also, we have explained the peculiar relation between the RoC and Greece that goes beyond either an alliance or an energy partnership based on shared interests. On the other hand, we have seen that the US has been active in the RoC energy program not just through the participation of the Noble Energy consortium in the program but also as part of its global energy security program aiming to lessen the EU dependency on the Russian reserves for reasons explained in chapter five.

Moreover, this study has explained that its analysis for the EU has been based on two pillars. On the one hand, it has discussed how the EU, as a Union, has contributed to the RoC energy security, mostly through public statements expressing its support to the program, through the willingness to support the East Med pipeline financially and by proceeding to 'low-level and cost' sanctions against enterprises and people having an active role in the Turkish energy program in the RoC EEZ. On the other hand, the study has focused mainly on France and Italy as they have individual interests in the particular energy program through TOTAL and ENI enterprises. We briefly recall that in chapters five and seven, we have explained that at least so far, France has shown a greater intention to protect TOTAL's researches compared to Italy. To prove this argument, we recall the findings in the previous chapter showing that on both occasions, the Turkish navy were successful in interrupting or halting the exploitation research activities of the ENI. Moreover, we recall Kasoulides (2018) statement expressing his doubt whether ENI was the optimal choice for assigning contracts in the RoC EEZ. This doubt stems not from the abilities of the enterprise to proceed to exploitation and exploration activities but from Italy's unwillingness or inability to safeguard the means and interests of the enterprise in the RoC EEZ. We have also explained the reasons the Turkey/TRNC seek to halt the RoC energy program regarding the opponents in this section. Also, in chapters five and six and briefly in the present one, we have

explained why this study believes the particular energy program represents a threat for the aforementioned axis.

Factors Consisting in the core of NcR		The factors application to Energy Security issues	The RoC energy security crisis management
Regional Environment	Leader's ability to mobilize capabilities	As with any other foreign policy issue differs from case to case	There are no changes on the RoC President ability to mobilize them. There is an upgrade on the diplomatic, economic and legal capabilities. Since 2015 there is an upgrade on the military capabilities. Their use is limited on four cases.
	The correlation with allies and opponents	Allies and opponents can be considered: States Regional/International organizations Oil/gas enterprises	Allies → Greece Opponents → Turkey/TRNC Partners with shared energy interests → Israel, Egypt, France, Italy (?) Energy deals → US, oil/gas enterprises
Foreign Policy Behavior	How the leaders/political elite react during a crisis.	Five groups of alternatives	New foreign policy behavior The alternatives divided into two groups New information capabilities

Domestic Environment	Leader's image	Perception how the regional and international system operates	National Interests outweigh international law The RoC must harmonize its energy security interests with those of other players Limits of support.
	Governmental/domestic institutions	Legal/Institutional Parameters	President's role is vital but supervisory
		Leader's advisors	Inner – Outer Circle (Upgrade role of Minister of Energy) Two advisory Councils Department B2, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
		Veto Players	No veto players (apart from the President)

Table 12: The schematic representation of the factors impacting the RoC foreign policy crisis management due to energy security related facts

Based on the above, if the researcher has to state a three-sentence answer to the thesis question it could be the following: “Yes, energy security had a two-way impact on the RoC foreign policy crisis management between 2013 and 2018. On the one hand it has contributed to the, in general, positive differentiation of the parameters determining the state’s foreign policy crisis management procedure. On the other hand, though it has contributed to the development of new challenges for the RoC through the establishment of a new area of confrontation with the Turkey/TRNC axis.”

8.4 Concluding Remarks and recommendations for further research

The researcher believes the findings of this study have a number of important implications for future practice. Therefore, this last section is dedicated to providing some insights concerning further research we believe must be carried out related to the RoC foreign policy and energy security.

First of all, it is recommended that further research be undertaken to apply IR theories and foreign policy models/paradigms to energy security-related issues. As has already been mentioned, this is an area of research that remains underdeveloped. This study considers energy security a complex, dynamic, and discursive procedure. Thus, this thesis believes that IR theories, with all their limitations, can explain energy security-related issues.

Secondly, further trials should assess the impact each parameter has on a crisis management procedure. One of the reasons this study believes each case study is unique is that even when the same variables impact two studies, there is a severe/serious possibility of at least one factor having a different impact on the one case compared to the other. This thesis believes finding a commonly accepted method of measuring

the impact of each variable on different cases can contribute to this discussion. Even though a considerable number of scholars tried to base their research on the quantification of such variables by proposing different equations (Mazis and Darras, 2014 and Davutoglu, 2010), several questions remain unanswered, and more work will need to be done.

Thirdly, further research is also needed to verify whether the RoC and the regional and international players understand their cooperation in the same way. The Minister of Foreign Affairs has admitted that the RoC has used its energy program to improve its bilateral relations with the other states in the region. He has taken his argument further by stating that the RoC seeks to harmonize its energy interests with other actors to gain their support. The question posed here is whether the other states' interests are harmonized with those of the RoC, or through their cooperation, they seek to increase their influence in the region? Thus, a further study could assess the long-term relations between the RoC and those states. Of course, one may argue that such operational plans are usually taking place behind closed doors. As a response, the author reminds us that there are a considerable number of different approaches discussing the relations between states in the literature and believes that a good starting point could be the investigation of bandwagoning and balance of interest approaches.

Another rather practical, but the researcher believes, important implication is related to the ability of the RoC to continue linking its energy security interests with those of other regional actors. More precisely, this thesis believes there are grounds for further research on how the RoC shall proceed with its energy security relations with the EU, France, Israel and Egypt.

Concerning the former, the RoC ability to maintain the active involvement of the EU in the "East-Med" project until the pipeline is constructed is an issue worth investigating. According to Ellinas (2018),

the technological challenges and the relatively low price of the natural gas reserves are the main factors that reduce the East-Med pipeline's viability. This study has already explained the East-Med's importance for the RoC as a geopolitical mean, as through it seeks to link even further its energy security with the EU energy security. At the same time, though, we have also presented several reasons why the interests of individual member states of the EU may cause some unwillingness to be involved in this project as it is an area of confrontation between the RoC and the Turkey/TRNC axis. Thus, examining "if and how" the RoC can convince the EU to have an active involvement throughout the project, especially in the construction phase, is worth discussing.

When it comes to France, the gradual improvement of the bilateral relations with the RoC, especially in the post-BREXIT era, is an issue worth discussing. McShane (2015) has stated that the UK withdrawal from the EU will inevitably leave a geopolitical and defence gap in the Union, while Baciu and Doyle (2019) have expressed the view that both Germany and France will try to fill it. In the case of the RoC, the French aeronautical forces have the most active presence in the state's EEZ. Even though this study believes the French navy presence will be further intensified after the upgrading of the Mari naval base on the south coast of the RoC, the determination of the limits of support the particular state can provide and seeks to provide in case of a confrontation with the Turkey/TRNC axis is an area that remains uncertain.

Under the same scope, the RoC must take the necessary measures not to be affected by the BREXIT. Given that the BREXIT negotiations have finished, there are possibilities for the UK to apply a new foreign policy strategy concerning its relations with Turkey. Kasoulidis (2018) has already highlighted a possible danger for the RoC energy program by expressing the appreciation that the British government may add pressure to the RoC to differentiate its energy

planning as a part of a new bilateral relation with Turkey in the post BREXIT era.

When it comes to Israel and Egypt, there are new areas of energy security and defence policy that are worth further research. Concerning the former following the agreement between Egypt and Israel transferring the latter's exploited natural gas from the Sea block 11 to the Egyptian liquefaction facilities, it is worth investigating whether the RoC can also participate as a third member to this agreement, either as an energy consumer or an energy hub. Concerning the defence dimension of the three states bilateral relations, this research believes the RoC must determine the limits of support both Egypt and Israel can and want to provide to the RoC in case of a confrontation with Turkey. As presented in the previous chapters, the similar terrain the RoC has with areas in Iran and the plethora of Russian manufactured weapons serving in the Cyprus Armed Forces provide operational and tactical benefits to the IDF. These are the main reasons the IDF have intensified their presence in the RoC terrain and maritime area. Moreover, the two states discuss the terms under which the IDF can deploy fighter aircraft on the Paphos airbase in case of an emergency. Even so the use of the RoC airbase is a benefit that can deepen the relations between the two states. However, this study believes technocratic/operational details need to be taken into serious consideration so that they do not harm the RoC energy-related relations with other states in the region. For example, this thesis believes there must be an explicit provision for the non-concession of the Cyprus airbase facilities in case of a crisis between Israel and Egypt.

On the other hand, more research is needed to understand better the role of deterrence on the RoC energy security. In the fourth and fifth chapters, we have stated that since 2015, the RoC has initiated a program to upgrade its military capabilities by signing agreements for buying new military equipment. The author has presented a series of agreements signed both with Israel and France in a previous section.

However, most of those agreements refer to military equipment that has a supportive role in military operations, such as UAVs, radars and improvement of military facilities (Naval Base). Thus, considerably more work will need to be done to determine how the RoC governmental officials understand deterrence and how the armed forces can contribute to the government's planning, both on the strategic and operational levels.

Further work also needs to be done to establish whether the RoC energy security must be separated from the Cyprus issue. The researcher has already presented the reasons for believing it is beneficial for the RoC to separate the two. However, as the debate is still in the academic and political fora, this study believes further research must be done. It is worth mentioning that since 2019, the Greek Cypriot left-wing opposition party named AKEL has expressed its willingness to link the negotiations for the Cyprus issue with the state's energy program. Since AKEL is the second largest political party and the former Presidential party, there is always the possibility of re-election. Thus, we believe there are both academic/literature and practical implications of this issue that are worth discussing .

Last but not least, an area in which the RoC governmental officials must start to develop a strategy to deal with the upcoming challenges is the protection of natural gas critical infrastructures either that exist or that will exist in its terrain and maritime area while the particular energy program proceeds. The interviewees have stated that the physical protection of critical infrastructures are at the core of the RoC energy security. They have also admitted that it is an issue that remains underdeveloped. This limited development can raise/increase the risk of any investment in the RoC with all the negative impacts on the further involvement of major oil/gas enterprises in the RoC energy program.

Following the above, we believe the RoC officials will soon come to a crossroads, and they must select whether they intend to become

primarily, an energy producer or an energy hub . Even though this dilemma initially seems a bit weird, the RoC officials' decision will contribute to the strategy they will follow during the energy policy negotiations with the other states in the region and the oil/gas enterprises. For example, if the RoC chooses that it is primarily an energy producer, it will not include in its negotiations with the Israeli government either a co-exploitation or a concession of the maritime area, the "Aphrodite" deposits.

Overall, the findings of the thesis have sought to offer an alternative reading of the RoC energy security and how it contributes to the state's foreign policy crisis management. The abandonment of a monothematic policy within the EU organs, the development of new bilateral agreements with regional states and the partial restructuring of the organs supporting the President during the crisis management procedure are among the actions made towards the right direction. However, given the fact that the Turkey/TRNC axis still considers that it is to their advantage to halt the RoC energy program, there are still challenges ahead. We must bear in mind that:

- The RoC has not signed the final agreements related to the exploitations' financial provisions in all the sea blocks.
- The East – Med pipeline is still on paper
- Turkey upgrades its, independent, exploitation technology
- There is not a clear view regarding the total amount of natural gas existing within the Republic of Cyprus subsoil
- Greece and the RoC have not determined the limits of their neighboring EEZs.

Based on the above, we come to the conclusion that the exploitation of hydrocarbons has both developed new opportunities and also new challenges for the RoC governmental officials. The successful handling of the new threats and the appeared opportunities will determine whether the RoC energy program will end up being a blessing or a curse.

LIST OF APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: List of the interviewees and the themes discussed

Name	Position	Place of the interview	How was approached	Themes of discussion				
				1	2	3	4	5
Dr. Nicos Christodoulides	Former Governmental Spokesman and Current Former Minister of Foreign Affairs	Presidential Palace (Nicosia, Cyprus)	LinkedIn	+	+			
Ambassador Tasos Tzionis	Permanent Secretary of the RoC Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Introduced by Ambassador Haris Moritsis	+				
Ms. Elena Panayi	Head of the Crisis Management Center	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Introduced by Cpt Samoutis Paris	+				
General (Ret.) Antreas Pentaras	Former Head of the Central Intelligence Agency	My house (Nicosia, Cyprus)	The researcher's father served under his command	+	+		+	
Ambassador Dr Kyriakos Kouros	Head of the Central Intelligence Agency and the President's Diplomatic Office	His Office (Nicosia, Cyprus)	Introduced by a friend	+	+			
Dr. Constantinos Adamides	Member of the Republic of Cyprus Geostrategic Council	University of Nicosia (Nicosia, Cyprus)	Former Lecturer of the Researcher	+	+			

Name	Position	Place of the interview	How was approached	Themes of discussion				
				1	2	3	4	5
Dr. Charles Ellinas	Former Head of the Cyprus Hydrocarbon Enterprise (KRETYK) and Former Employee of the Mott McDonald Group	Skype	LinkedIn		+		+	
Dr. Georgios Boustras	Assistant Professor and Member of the Republic of Cyprus Energy Council	European University (Nicosia, Cyprus)	Introduced by Lt Col Antoniou		+		+	
Dr. Poulikkas Andreas	Professor, Head of the Republic of Cyprus Energy Council	His office (Nicosia, Cyprus)	Introduced by Dr. George Boustras		+		+	
Mr. George Kiourktsoglou	Senior Lecturer and Former employee of Shell enterprise	His office (London/UK)	LinkedIn				+	
Dr. Zenonas Tziaras	PRIO Cyprus Senior Researcher	His office (Nicosia Cyprus)	Friend	+		+		
Ambassador Haris Moritsis	Ambassador of the RoC accredited to Egypt	Nicosia	LinkedIn	+				+
Ambassador Michael Harari	Former Ambassador of Israel accredited to the RoC	Nicosia, Cyprus	Met him at a conference					+

Remarks

The five themes of discussion are:

1: The RoC foreign policy

2: The RoC energy policy

3: The Turkey/TRNC foreign and energy policy

4: The role of the oil/gas enterprises

5: The bilateral relations between significant states and the RoC, including the limits of their cooperation

Appendix 2: The questions the interviewees were asked

THEME 1: THE RoC FOREIGN POLICY	
Number	Question
1.	Please read and comment the following statements:
	a. The President of the RoC, at least on energy-related issues, can be presented as “the central player in a bargaining game called politics”
	b. Foreign policy crisis management is unique for each state. Thus, models and frameworks which are either presented in literature or being applied in the past from other states can act only supporting to the case of the RoC
	c. The finding of new energy resources in a region traditionally geopolitical unstable can be either a blessing or a curse
	d. Energy can only improve the already, at least neutral, bilateral relations between states
	e. The RoC new energy security data brings crisis in the region
	f. The RoC energy security is primarily a foreign policy issue and secondary an economic/management or a technical issue
	g. The RoC, as any other state in the region, has as its primary foreign policy goal safeguarding its national interests
	h. On the last three pages of the questionnaire you can find a number of frameworks. Please comment on them
2.	What is the contribution of the Central Intelligence Agency in the RoC energy security crisis management?
3.	How would you characterize the role of the President of the Republic of Cyprus during the energy security crises that took place on the Republic of Cyprus EEZ between 2013 and 2018?
	a. Maximizing: Had the absolute control of all decisions and the coordination of all the plans executed till the de-

	escalation
	b. Supervisory: Was giving the general framework of action and was supervising the entire crisis management procedure
	c. Minimum: Given the fact the Council of Ministers was in charge for making decisions the President had no participation to the decision-making procedure and had given the Ministers the absolute control
4.	<p>Please, present your view concerning the limits of support the following states may provide to the RoC during an energy security crisis, including a military escalation, with Turkey. Egypt Greece Israel <u>Note:</u> As limits this project considers the maximum support the particular states may provide.</p>
	a. Diplomatic Support in regional and international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE)
	b. Imposition of economic sanctions: either through unilateral cessation of trade with Turkey or as a member of an organization
	c. Conducting Search and Rescue in maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.
	d. Conducting other military exercises in terrain areas of the RoC and maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.
	e. Support the RoC in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis either with ground or aeronautical forces
5.	It is considered that the RoC has achieved since 2015 to separate its energy program from the Cyprus issue. Do you agree with this statement? Apart from the Turkey/TRNC axis are there any other organizations or states that do not want such a separation?
6.	You used to be a member of the Republic of Cyprus Geopolitical Council for more than four years. Could you provide some information regarding its structure and its purpose?

7.	What is the role of the Cyprus Crisis Management Center in relation to energy security crises?
8.	Which are the upcoming challenges for the Republic of Cyprus energy security sector?
9.	Is there any other issue you would like to discuss?

Remarks

1. The second question is addressed exclusively to the former and the current Head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

2. The seventh question is addressed exclusively to Ambassador Tasos Tzionis, Ambassador Haris Moritsis and Ms. Maria Michael

THEME 2: THE RoC ENERGY SECURITY	
Number	Question
1.	Please read and comment the following statements:
a.	The RoC tries to harmonize its energy security with the EU energy security
b.	The RoC energy security is primarily a foreign policy issue and secondary an economic/management or a technical issue
c.	Energy- security related crisis management, are unique for each state. Thus, models and frameworks which are either presented in literature or being applied in the past from other states can act only supporting to the case of the RoC.
d.	The President of the Republic of Cyprus, at least on energy-related issues, can be presented as “the central player in a bargaining game called politics”
e.	Like any other state in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the RoC has as its primary goal to safeguard its interests.
f.	The RoC new energy security data brings crisis in the region
g.	The finding of new energy resources in a region traditionally geopolitical unstable can be either a blessing or a curse
h.	Energy can only improve the already, at least neutral, bilateral relations between states
2.	Please, read the following definitions and express your opinion on which of them is closer to the way the RoC officials understanding to the term energy security:
a.	Energy Security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.
b.	Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth, and political power and, consequently, requires a multifaceted approach comprising a broad range of different issues.
c.	Energy security is the ability having access to energy resources required for the development of National power.
d.	Energy security is an umbrella term linking energy resources with energy availability, from the exploitation to the consumption, the state’s ability to provide physical protection to the infrastructures and the decision makers foreign policy agenda.

3.	The Republic of Cyprus energy security is linked to the energy security of other states in the region? If yes can you make a reference both to negative and positive links
4.	You used to be a member of the Republic of Cyprus «Energy Policy Council» for more than four years. Could you provide some information regarding its structure and its purpose
5.	How would you characterize the role of the President of the Republic of Cyprus during the energy security crises that took place on the Republic of Cyprus EEZ between 2013 and 2018?
a.	Maximizing: Had the absolute control of all decisions and the coordination of all the plans executed till the de-escalation
b.	Supervisory: Was giving the general framework of action and was supervising the entire crisis management procedure
c.	Minimum: Given the fact the Council of Ministers was in charge for making decisions the President had no participation to the decision-making procedure and had given the Ministers the absolute control
6.	Which are the upcoming challenges for the Republic of Cyprus energy security sector?
7.	Is there any other issue you would like to discuss?

THEME 3: THE TURKEY/TRNC FOREIGN AND ENERGY POLICY	
Number	Question
1.	Here is a series of statements this project considers essential for understanding the Turkey and the TRNC foreign and energy policy. Please, discuss them:
a.	To analyze the Republic of Turkey foreign policy someone needs to make a simultaneous analysis of different factors. Those factors must be both material and ideological ones.
b.	Each state's foreign policy analysis is unique and cannot be analyzed, exclusively, by copying models, structures and agencies from other states. At the same time, you can take those models and structures and adapt them to the examined state
c.	As every state in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the Republic of Turkey has as its primary goal to secure its interests. If yes can you clarify how the Turkish officials understand the term «national interest»?
d.	The Republic of Turkey energy security must be considered, at least primarily, as a foreign policy issue and secondary as an economic issue.
e.	The RoC new energy security data brings crisis in the region
f.	The finding of new energy resources in a region traditionally geopolitical unstable can be either a blessing or a curse
g.	Energy can only improve the already, at least neutral, bilateral relations between states
2.	Please, read the following definitions and express your opinion on which of them is closer to the way Turkey and TRNC officials understand the term energy security:
a.	Energy Security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.
b.	Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth, and political power and, consequently, requires a multifaceted approach comprising a broad range of different issues.
c.	Energy security is the ability having access to energy resources required for the development of National power.
d.	Energy security is an umbrella term linking energy resources with energy availability, from the exploitation to the consumption, the state's ability to provide physical protection to the infrastructures and the decision makers foreign policy agenda.

3.	What is the impact of the exploitation of the hydrocarbons found on the Republic of Cyprus EEZ to the Republic of Turkey energy security?
4.	Do you believe the Republic of Turkey aims to link the exploitation of the hydrocarbons found in the Republic of Cyprus with the solution to the Cyprus issue? If yes do you believe it is among its capabilities to achieve this goal?
5.	How would you, mainly, characterize the foreign policy and energy security decision-making procedure in Turkey and in the TRNC, "agency or structure based?"
6.	How would you characterize the role of the President of Turkey and the TRNC during the energy security crises that took place on the RoC EEZ between 2013 and 2018?
a.	Maximizing: Had the absolute control of all decisions and the coordination of all the plans executed till the de-escalation
b.	Supervisory: Was giving the general framework of action and was supervising the entire crisis management procedure
c.	Minimum: The President had no participation to the decision-making procedure and had given the Ministers the absolute control
7.	If the Republic of Cyprus agree the exploited hydrocarbons go to the EU markets through Turkey do you believe it will be a step towards a PERMANENT improvement on the relations between the particular state and both Turkey and the TRNC?
8.	What is the impact of the exploitation of the hydrocarbon found on the Republic of Cyprus EEZ to the TRNC foreign policy and energy security?
9.	If the Republic of Cyprus agree share the profits from the exploited hydrocarbons with the TRNC do you believe the Republic of Turkey will be back down from its claims on the eastern part of the RoC EEZ?
10.	What are the prerequisites for Turkey to proceed to a military escalation to overturn the RoC energy program
11.	Is there anything more you would like to comment regarding the Turkey/TRNC foreign and energy policy?

THEME 4: OIL AND GAS ENTERPRISES	
Number	Question
1.	Please comment on the following statements:
	a. Energy Security is an amalgam of political, economic and technical factors.
	b. The oil/gas enterprises consider each case study unique cannot be analyzed, exclusively, by copying models, structures and agencies from other states.
	c. Energy exploitation can bring tension on the relation between states?
2.	Based on your experience, the oil/gas enterprises consider energy security, at least primarily, as a geopolitical or an economic issue?
3.	Please, read the following definitions and express your opinion on which of them is closer to the way oil gas enterprises understand the term energy security:
	a. Energy Security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.
	b. Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth, and political power and, consequently, requires a multifaceted approach comprising a broad range of different issues.
	c. Energy security is the ability having access to energy resources required for the development of National power.
	d. Energy security is an umbrella term linking energy resources with energy availability, from the exploitation to the consumption, the state's ability to provide physical protection to the infrastructures and the decision makers foreign policy agenda.
4.	Does the oil/gas enterprises have a political/geopolitical department of analysts?
5.	A considerable number of scholars quite often considering the oil/gas enterprises as actors who can contribute to the settlement of an energy security crisis between states. Do you think that an enterprise has such capabilities?

THEME 5: THE BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE RoC AND SIGNIFICANT STATES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING THE LIMITS OF THEIR COOPERATION													
Number	Question												
1.	<p>Please read and comment the following statements:</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; width: 5%;">a.</td> <td>Energy Security is an amalgam of political, economic and technical factors.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">b.</td> <td>For (naming the state) energy security is primarily a foreign policy issue and secondary an economic/management or a technical issue</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">c.</td> <td>Like any other state in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the (naming the state) has as its primary goal foreign policy goal to safeguard its interests.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">d.</td> <td>Energy can only improve the already, at least neutral, bilateral relations between states</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">e.</td> <td>The (naming the state) energy security interests are gradually getting harmonized with those of the RoC</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">f.</td> <td>The finding of new energy resources in a region traditionally geopolitical unstable can be either a blessing or a curse.</td> </tr> </table>	a.	Energy Security is an amalgam of political, economic and technical factors.	b.	For (naming the state) energy security is primarily a foreign policy issue and secondary an economic/management or a technical issue	c.	Like any other state in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the (naming the state) has as its primary goal foreign policy goal to safeguard its interests.	d.	Energy can only improve the already, at least neutral, bilateral relations between states	e.	The (naming the state) energy security interests are gradually getting harmonized with those of the RoC	f.	The finding of new energy resources in a region traditionally geopolitical unstable can be either a blessing or a curse.
a.	Energy Security is an amalgam of political, economic and technical factors.												
b.	For (naming the state) energy security is primarily a foreign policy issue and secondary an economic/management or a technical issue												
c.	Like any other state in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the (naming the state) has as its primary goal foreign policy goal to safeguard its interests.												
d.	Energy can only improve the already, at least neutral, bilateral relations between states												
e.	The (naming the state) energy security interests are gradually getting harmonized with those of the RoC												
f.	The finding of new energy resources in a region traditionally geopolitical unstable can be either a blessing or a curse.												
2.	<p>Please, present your view concerning the limits of support (naming the state) may provide to the RoC during an energy security crisis, including a military escalation, with Turkey. <u>Note:</u> As limits this project considers the maximum support the particular states may provide.</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="text-align: center; width: 5%;">a.</td> <td>Diplomatic Support in regional and international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE)</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">b.</td> <td>Imposition of economic sanctions: either through unilateral cessation of trade with Turkey or as a member of an organization</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">c.</td> <td>Conducting Search and Rescue in maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">d.</td> <td>Conducting other military exercises in terrain areas of the RoC and maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="text-align: center;">e.</td> <td>Support the RoC in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis either with ground or aeronautical forces</td> </tr> </table>	a.	Diplomatic Support in regional and international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE)	b.	Imposition of economic sanctions: either through unilateral cessation of trade with Turkey or as a member of an organization	c.	Conducting Search and Rescue in maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.	d.	Conducting other military exercises in terrain areas of the RoC and maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.	e.	Support the RoC in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis either with ground or aeronautical forces		
a.	Diplomatic Support in regional and international organizations (UN, EU, OSCE)												
b.	Imposition of economic sanctions: either through unilateral cessation of trade with Turkey or as a member of an organization												
c.	Conducting Search and Rescue in maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.												
d.	Conducting other military exercises in terrain areas of the RoC and maritime areas within the RoC EEZ committed by the Turkey/TRNC they are part of their EEZ.												
e.	Support the RoC in case of a military escalation with the Turkey/TRNC axis either with ground or aeronautical forces												

3.	<p>Please, read the following definitions and express your opinion on which of them is closer to the way the (naming the state) officials understand the term energy security:</p> <p>a. Energy Security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price.</p> <p>b. Energy security is an umbrella term that covers many concerns linking energy, economic growth, and political power and, consequently, requires a multifaceted approach comprising a broad range of different issues.</p> <p>c. Energy security is the ability having access to energy resources required for the development of National power.</p> <p>d. Energy security is an umbrella term linking energy resources with energy availability, from the exploitation to the consumption, the state's ability to provide physical protection to the infrastructures and the decision makers foreign policy agenda.</p>
4.	Which are the upcoming challenges for the Eastern Mediterranean region concerning the energy security sector?
5.	Is there any other issue you would like to discuss?

Appendix 3: Interview Results

Question: The RoC energy security is primarily?			
	A: Economic issue	B: Foreign Policy issue	C: Technological issue
RoC Foreign Policy Experts	0	4	0
RoC Energy Policy Experts	0	3	0
RoC experts in both themes	0	5	0

Question: The exploitation of hydrocarbons is for the RoC?			
	A: Either of the two	B: Only a blessing	C : Only a curse
RoC energy policy experts	3	0	0
RoC experts in both themes	4	1	0
RoC foreign policy experts	4	0	0

Question: What was the role of the RoC President during an energy security crisis?			
	A : Maximizing	B : Minimum	C : Supervisory
RoC energy policy experts	0	0	3
RoC experts in both themes	0	0	5
RoC foreign policy experts	0	0	4

Question: The RoC President can be considered “the central player into a bargaining game”		
	A : The central player	B: NOT the central player
RoC foreign policy experts	2	2
RoC experts in both themes	4	1
RoC energy policy experts	3	0

Question: Energy can contribute on the relations between states if they prior were?		
	A : At least neutral	B : All relations
RoC foreign policy experts	2	2
RoC experts in both themes	4	1
RoC energy policy experts	2	1

Question: Define the Republic of Cyprus energy security?				
	A : Umbrella definition (Papasavvas)	B : Umbrella definition (Esakova)	C : Political definition	D : Economic definition
RoC energy policy experts	3	0	0	0
RoC experts in both themes	4	0	0	0

Question: The RoC foreign policy goal has as its main goal?		
	A : Others	B : National Interests
RoC foreign policy experts	0	4
RoC experts in both themes	0	5
RoC energy policy experts	0	3

Question: Define how the oil/gas enterprises consider energy security?				
	A : Umbrella definition (Papasavvas)	B : Umbrella definition (Esakova)	C : Political definition	D : Economic definition
Oil Gas experts	0	0	0	4

Question: Define the Republic of Turkey energy security?				
	A : Umbrella definition (Papasavvas)	B : Umbrella definition (Esakova)	C : Political definition	D : Economic definition
Cypriot experts in the Turkey/TRNC axis	0	0	2	0
Turkey and TRNC experts	1	1	0	0

Question: Define the TRNC energy security?				
	A : Umbrella definition (Papasavvas)	B : Umbrella definition (Esakova)	C : Political definition	D : Economic definition
Cypriot experts in the Turkey/TRNC axis	2	0	0	0
Turkey and TRNC experts	1	1	0	0

Question: Which are the limits of support the Islamic Republic of Egypt shall provide to the RoC during energy-security related crises?						
	A: SAR exercises in the EEZ	B: Military support during an escalation	C: Military Exercises in the RoC terrain and maritime area	D: Imposition to economic sanctions	E: Diplomatic Support	F: No answer
Turkey and TRNC experts	0	0	2	0	0	0
RoC foreign policy experts	0	0	4	0	0	2
RoC energy policy experts	0	0	3	0	0	0
Israel experts	0	0	1	0	0	0
Greece experts	0	0	2	0	0	0
Egypt experts	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in Israel	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in the Turkey/TRNC axis	0	0	2	0	0	0
Sums per alternative	0	0	14	0	0	5

Question: Which are the limits of support the Islamic Republic of Greece shall provide to the RoC during energy-security related crises?							
	A: Diplomatic Support	B: SAR exercises in the RoC EEZ	C: Military support independently from the outcome of the Aegean dispute	D: Military support linked to the Aegean dispute	E: Military Exercises in the terrain and Maritime area of the RoC	F: Imposition of economic sanctions	G: No answer
RoC foreign policy experts	0	0	0	3	2	0	1
RoC energy policy experts	0	0	0	2	1	0	0
Israel experts	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
Greece experts	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
Egypt experts	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Turkey and TRNC experts	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Cypriot experts in Turkey/TRNC	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
Sum per alternative	0	0	1	9	5	0	4
			10				

Question: Which are the limits of support the state of Israel shall provide to the RoC during energy-security related crises?						
	A: SAR exercises in the RoC EEZ	B: Military Support during an escalation	C: Military exercises in the terrain and maritime area of the RoC	D: Imposition of economic sanctions	E : Diplomatic support	F: No answer
RoC foreign policy experts	0	0	4	0	0	2
RoC energy policy experts	0	0	3	0	0	0
Israel experts	0	0	0	0	0	1
Greece experts	0	0	2	0	0	0
Egypt experts	0	0	1	0	0	0
Cypriot experts in Israel	0	0	0	0	1	1
Cypriot experts in Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	1
Turkey and TRNC experts	0	0	2	0	0	0
Cypriot experts in the Turkey/TRNC axis	0	0	2	0	0	0
Sum per alternative	0	0	14	0	0	5

Question: Which are the limits of support the French Republic shall provide to the RoC during energy-security related crises?						
	A: SAR exercises in the RoC EEZ	B: Military support during an escalation	C: Military Exercises in the RoC terrain and maritime area	D: Imposition to economic sanctions	E: Diplomatic Support	G: No answer
RoC foreign policy experts	0	0	4	0	0	2
RoC energy policy experts	0	0	3	0	0	0
Israel experts	0	0	1	0	0	0
Greece experts	0	0	2	0	0	0
Egypt experts	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in Israel	0	0	0	0	0	1
Cypriot experts in Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	1
Turkey and TRNC experts	0	0	2	0	0	0
Cypriot experts in the Turkey/TRNC axis	0	0	2	0	0	0
Sums per alternative	0	0	14	0	0	5

Appendix 4: Interview Consent Form

Research Project Title: A blessing or a curse? A “dual anatomy” of the Republic of Cyprus energy security

Research Investigator: Savvas Papasavvas

Research Participant: (Name of the interviewee)

Email:

Dear (name of the interviewee)

First of all, I 'd like to thank you for the honor you have done to me to spend some of your precious time for the needs of my research. Given the fact you are one of the leading experts on the area of studying this thesis focuses on I am sure you will provide me with a series of information I can use to make my project better.

The ethical procedures for research undertaken under UK institutions requires your agreement on how the information contained on this interview will be used. This consent form will ensure you have understood your role in this research, and you have agreed to the terms of participation.

Thus, prior to proceeding to the interview I 'd like to provide you with some additional information related to this research:

- This interview will last approximately 45 minutes
- It is a semi-structured interview, which means it focuses on a set of essential themes. However, in contrast to structured interviews you are allowed to express your opinion openly on those themes as the main aim is new ideas to be brought up through the interview and shed light on issues, which are difficult to be analyzed in depth through other methods of analysis. Even though I don't believe there are any risks associated with your participation, in any case, you have the right to withdraw from the interview any time you want.

- This project investigates the role of energy security in the determination of the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy crisis management between 2013 and 2018. Due to the fact you are an expert on (specifying

the area) this interview will focus on the following themes (see Annexes III and V for the themes and Annex IV for the questions and the list of the interviewees on each theme). Of course, if you are interested in page 4 of the documents in front of you there is a list with all the themes of the project, and please feel free to discuss any of them.

- To safeguard the information, you will give me I intend to apply the following measures:

- Only my supervisor and I have access to the notes taken from this interview. Even the members of the viva committee can have access to the records only upon request and without knowing the identity of the interviewee. To do so, each interviewee shall have a code. Yours is (code number)

- There won't be any recording, but I will keep written notes. You can have full access (read them, request a copy, etc.) on those notes anytime you want. In any case and for avoiding any misunderstandings I intend to read my notes to you before closing this interview.

- After leaving your office I intend to keep the notes in my office, located in a military camp and more specifically in a safe box accessible only by me.

- After the successful approval of my thesis, I intend to burn all notes, and to inform you about by e-mail.

- All or part of your interview may be used in: (a) academic and nonacademic journals, (b) projects, (c) conference presentations, (d) printed or electronic press.

- You must not expect payment or benefits from your participation in this research.

- This research has been reviewed and approved by the Middlesex University Research Ethics Board. If you have any further questions or concerns about this study, please contact:

Name: Savvas Pappasavvas (savvaspap83@hotmail.com)

Address: 15th Verenikis Str., Nicosia, Cyprus

Tel: 00357-97786156

- In case you still have concerns about this research you can contact Dr. Tunc Aybak (T.Aybak@mdx.ac.uk)

If you want to ask me anything more, I am at your disposal to

Appendix 5: Sample of the how the PDA method of analysis is applied

ADDRESS

BY H.E. **MR NIKOS CHRISTODOULIDES**

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

14TH CYPRUS SUMMIT – ECONOMIST

“ENERGY SECURITY AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS: EAST MEDITERRANEAN IN SEARCH OF STABILITY”

2 November 2018, Hilton Park Nicosia

Source: Public Information Office, 2018 (www.pio.gov.cy)

Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear friends,

It is with great pleasure that I participate today in the Economist’s Cyprus Summit. The interaction and exchange between such esteemed participants, is both timely and appropriate.

My effort during today’s discussion is three-fold:

- First, to make the case for the Eastern Mediterranean, far beyond its undeniable challenges, and more about its remarkable promises and prospects, which have the potential, if realized, to have a ripple effect that extends beyond the region’s geographical boundaries.
- Second, to present how Cyprus has embarked on a journey of transforming its geographical position into an asset, as a reliable, stable vessel for promoting its vision to make the region a frontier of stability through multilateral cooperation.
- And third, to argue that the key to what might at first appear as an elusive search for stability in the region lies in building a strong web of regional cooperation.

Dear friends,

Despite the fact that our corner of the world, more often than not makes headlines for the deep challenges that no one can deny it faces, I choose to focus my presentation on the region’s promises. This is not so much because I am by nature an optimist, but because I strongly believe that the international

community needs to seize the moment and the region's emerging opportunities as a medium to advance prosperity and stability.

Let me start by outlining why I believe that the present juncture is different and merits action. A crucial parameter to this proposition is found in the sea that surrounds the countries of the region, and more specifically, the recent discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean sea. At a time when demand for natural gas is expected to rise and inter-regional supply is expanding significantly all over the world, but also at a time when Europe has placed energy security and diversification of routes and sources at the frontline of its priorities, the recent discoveries certainly merit special attention.

Numbers often speak louder, and clearer than words, so let us consider the following. According to assessments by the United States Geological Survey, the total quantities of natural gas in the Levantine Basin and the Nile Cone in the Eastern Mediterranean are estimated to be about 9350 billion cubic meters. In the last decade the discoveries made in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Cyprus, Egypt and Israel are approximately 2500 billion cubic meters. For comparison purposes, let me just mention that the natural gas reserves of Norway are estimated at 1856 bcm, while the annual needs of the EU in natural gas are currently about 540 bcm.

What do these numbers tell us? Firstly they reveal that the Eastern Mediterranean region holds huge quantities of natural gas and oil. It is also clear that the discoveries of hydrocarbon reserves can contribute towards the transformation of the Eastern Mediterranean into an area of sustainable economic development. Moreover, the discoveries have the potential of providing countries of the region with sufficient and stable energy supplies in natural gas at affordable price, while at the same time they can contribute to Europe's energy security.

Let me now pass to the second component of my presentation, which is how Cyprus has embarked in the last five years on a journey of transforming its unique geographical position into an asset and projecting its vision for the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to fulfil this vision Cyprus has had to utilize two important parameters:

Firstly, its historically close and friendly relations with all its neighbours - with the one sole exception that we hope in the near future will decide not to be the exception any more - coupled with the fact that our partners in the region see Cyprus as a trustworthy, moderate voice between them and Europe.

And secondly, its reliance, full observance and active promotion of the only credible and viable framework of regional and international cooperation, namely, international law.

With these two elements as its solid basis, Cyprus decisively directed its efforts towards building a web of cooperation in the region. Energy became the clearest starting point for our efforts. Cyprus proceeded with the conclusion of three agreements – with Egypt, Israel and Lebanon – delimiting our respective exclusive economic zones, based on the median line principle, fully in line with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is worth recalling that the 1982 Convention has secured global recognition, and is considered as part of customary international law, which means that it is binding on all states, irrespective of whether they have acceded to it or not.

The delimitation of our seas has created a new regional dynamic and a new diplomatic framework. First, it has created greater transparency based on international law. Second, it has created a new economic border structure. And third, and perhaps most importantly, it set up a new framework for dialogue around a concrete shared goal.

The delimitation agreement with three of our neighbours was a first, crucial step taken, which created the necessary legal and economic security that attracted major oil and gas companies to invest and do business in the Eastern Mediterranean. Giant oil and gas companies have signed Production Sharing Contracts with Cyprus, they are present in our exclusive economic zone and they carry out exploratory drillings and development activities. These developments constitute the clearest message and vote of confidence both to the prospects of new hydrocarbon discoveries but also a vote of confidence to Cyprus and countries of the region.

Needless to say that any challenge to the delimitation agreements Cyprus has concluded is a challenge to all countries in the region, but also to rule-based international order. Cyprus is a defender of rule-based international order, of international law, including the law of the sea, and in this spirit we are ready to negotiate delimitation agreements with *all* countries in the region, without any exception, always in accordance with international law, including UNCLOS.

Beyond the delimitation agreements we have concluded, there have been many other steps during the course of the last years. Let me refer to the very recent signing of the Intergovernmental Agreement with Egypt, the first of its kind in our region, concerning the construction of an underwater pipeline to export natural gas to Egypt.

At the same time, Cyprus has worked methodically within the EU to make the case for the energy potential of the region and the significant impact it can have in Europe. That is why the EU has stepped up and is supporting Cyprus's efforts, both by repeatedly stressing its support to the exercise of our sovereign rights in our exclusive economic zone but also, beyond political rhetoric, by participating in the EastMed pipeline project, which the European Commission adopted as a 'Project of Common Interest'.

Dear friends,

The re-drawing of the energy map in the Eastern Mediterranean, coupled with our conviction that the region's natural resources can be used as a tool for cooperation and a platform for synergies, triggered the development of multilateral cooperation in the region that has gradually become a driver of change. This is the third component of my presentation.

The trilateral cooperation partnerships that Cyprus established together with Greece and neighboring countries are a prime example of this multilateral cooperation, at a time when multilateralism in international relations is under attack. They constitute a fitting example of what can be achieved when countries with shared concerns and common interests join powers, instead of isolating themselves.

The central tenets of these cooperation mechanisms are that they are inclusive in nature and are not directed against any third country. On the contrary, they are an instrument for promoting cooperation in the region and beyond, and are open to all countries who share the vision, and most importantly, respect international law.

We believe that the trilateral mechanisms are a first promising step towards a regional, institutionalized cooperation mechanism. In fact, Cyprus has consistently maintained that hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean can become what the coal and steel was for the European Community, in a new regional context; we have seen this in practice, with trilateral cooperation mechanisms starting from the field of energy but constantly expanding in new fields.

Moreover, the added value of this cooperation has drawn the attention of other countries and announcements towards this direction should be expected soon.

In fact, we believe that just as the creation of the European Union from the ashes of World War II became a driver and a consolidator of peace in Europe, the cooperation developed in our region can facilitate our efforts to reunite our country through a viable settlement that will allow Cyprus to maintain its role as a stable, reliable honest broker in the region. A pre-requisite for this is that Turkey realizes that it has much more to lose than gain from the current status quo, which prevents Ankara from participating in the web of cooperation in our neighbourhood, and not only.

Dear friends,

In concluding, I wish to underline my core belief that the answers we seek – for the region, the EU and beyond – can only be found if we look outwards not inwards; if we work collectively, through enhanced cooperation, and by fostering more synergies.

Cyprus is determined to continue utilizing its geostrategic location in this direction. I am convinced – in part because I have had the privilege to observe and participate in its development from the beginning - **that the cooperation we have constructed in the Eastern Mediterranean, has led to conditions of stability and security.**

Whether through bilateral cooperation with countries of the region or through the trilateral mechanisms – the ones already established and others that are in the making – there is now a framework that shapes the political environment in our neighbourhood. The recent decision taken to establish a permanent secretariat in Cyprus is an important step in the further development of multilateral cooperation, and also sends an important message of the participating countries' commitment to taking forward our common vision for the Eastern Mediterranean.

Ladies and gentlemen,


Countries in the region have an obligation to strengthen their ties, because the stronger our bonds are, the stronger we all are in building a more prosperous, peaceful future. Cyprus, together with other countries who share this vision, can become hubs of cooperation in the middle of multiple layers of instability. We call other neighbouring countries not yet part of this transformative cooperation, to share our vision and join us.

Thank you.

Analysis based on PDA

- Who gives the talk? (The answer in the text in green color)
 - The RoC Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is considered a person included on the RoC President inner circle of advisors.
- When was the talk made? (The answer in the text in red color)
 - 02 November 2018. The talk was made a few months after the end of the period that this project focuses. Even though it goes out of the period this project focuses on it because it has significant issues related to that period that are worth mentioning.
- Which talks and texts shall we look at? (The answer in the text is highlighted in yellow)
 - Energy security and
 - The RoC bilateral relations related to its energy program

Appendix 6: The main activities on the RoC EEZ between 2007 and 2019, as presented by the state's Minister of Energy on the day he handed over his duties (7th of July 2020). The translation made by the researcher



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