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Promoting the “Public Welfare” in Wartime: Stanford University during World War II

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As with many U.S. colleges and universities during World War II, Stanford University responded to the demands of mobilization by increasing its commitment to technical training and adopting a defense research agenda. In a striking departure from this national trend, however, Stanford also established its School of Humanities in 1942. By examining such seemingly disparate pursuits, this study reveals the complexity of the challenges that confronted institutions of higher education throughout the war era. Stanford University’s simultaneous embrace of these programs illuminates broad concerns regarding the role of higher education in fostering civic-mindedness in a society defined by rapid technological advance and the perception of an ever-increasing threat to national security.

Throughout the twentieth century, U.S. colleges and universities consistently confronted institutional dilemmas resulting from wartime instability. During the First World War, according to historian Carol Gruber, institutions of higher education “relinquished their function as centers for the higher learning and dedicated themselves to serving the needs of the War Department,” while in the Vietnam era, college and university administrators struggled to maintain defense research commitments in the face of mounting student protests (1975, 214). The mustering of human and material resources in the United States following America’s entry into World War II also profoundly influenced higher education institutions. Wartime political, social, and economic forces required that colleges and universities both meet institutional challenges created by mobilization and weigh the benefits and costs of tapping into resource-rich opportunities generated by war-related demands (Rudolph 1962; Thelin 2004; Veysey 1965).

Although higher education administrators began planning for America’s involvement in World War II prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the lowering of the draft age to 18 in 1942 and the elimination of a broad

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deferral for college and university students decimated higher education enrollments, leaving colleges and universities without desperately needed tuition dollars (Kandel 1948, 160–61). As did many institutions throughout the United States, Stanford University responded by identifying alternative sources of revenue in wartime contracts with the federal government, the U.S. military, and defense industries. Defense research projects, the Engineering, Science, and Management War Training (ESMWT) program, and the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) are three of the most apparent examples of contractual programs that successfully alleviated Stanford's financial troubles throughout the war era.

By sponsoring war-related programs, Stanford administrators increasingly aligned the university's work with national defense priorities. This process was more complicated, however, than simply placing the university in service of the nation's war machine. Although university leaders justified Stanford's intention to advance America's military objectives by reinterpreting its institutional mission, many faculty members strove to maintain prewar obligations to undergraduate liberal education. In 1942, *Time* magazine placed Stanford in the national spotlight by announcing the establishment of the university's new School of Humanities, an event understood by many as running directly counter to wartime trends in higher education. "Last week," proclaimed *Time*, "as liberal arts colleges all over the nation rushed to accelerate the arts of war (mathematics and science), President Wilbur and trustees announced that Stanford, which has never had a liberal arts college, will start one next fall" (1942b, 60). Such seemingly dichotomous developments—Stanford's enthusiastic adoption of war-related programs and its dedication to establishing the School of Humanities—reveal the relatively unexplored complexity of the dilemmas that institutions of higher education encountered during the Second World War.

World War II heightened the emphasis that colleges and universities placed on technical training and applied curricula, a trend that transformed higher education research agendas throughout the United States. At Stanford, the passing of the presidency in 1943 from Ray Lyman Wilbur, a physician and administrator who desired that the university remain independent from contractual obligations, to Donald B. Tresidder, a businessman who strongly fostered Stanford's ties to industry, personified this development.¹ At the same time, the university identified itself as a strong proponent of the humanities, both as a result of Stanford's participation in a nationwide "reexamination" of liberal education begun prior to the war and because it embraced the

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notion that maintaining future peace required a commitment to conceptions of higher education that transcended the immediate national crisis.

The United States is once again experiencing the instability resulting from a national crisis. Although the characteristics of the so-called war on terror only slightly resemble those of the twentieth-century's "total" wars, military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as potential conflicts with Iran and North Korea, are significantly influencing America's central political, social, and economic institutions. By examining Stanford's experience during World War II, this study illuminates the influence of war on the role of higher education and the liberal arts in a society increasingly defined by rapid technological advance and the perception of an ever-present threat to national security. As a private university chartered to "promote the public welfare," Stanford struggled historically with competing conceptions of its institutional mission. World War II exacerbated that struggle in a particularly vivid way, leading university administrators both to reposition Stanford within the context of national and international developments and to reframe its institutional mission in order to significantly privilege the national interest.

Higher Education and National Defense

Historian John Thelin (2004, 205–59) characterizes the 1920s and 1930s as a period of "success and excess" for higher education institutions in the United States: "success" because of the dramatic increases in enrollments during the period, "excess" because "popular images" of campus life stood in direct contrast to the academic and intellectual missions to which most institutions were publicly committed. "If the colleges became famous between the world wars for their magnificent architecture and big-time sports," writes Thelin, "they also became notorious for the hedonistic behavior of their students and alumni" (211). To a considerable extent, Stanford University represented higher education's changing image. Founded in 1885 as a coeducational, tuition-free institution, Stanford was more affordable to working-class students than nearby University of California, Berkeley (Douglass 2000, 95). After imposing student fees in 1920, however, Stanford became heavily reliant on tuition dollars to finance its operations. While increased revenues permitted the university's expansion, student fees also narrowed Stanford's appeal to students of mostly middle- and upper-class backgrounds (Stallones 1999, 151). Before long Americans began thinking of Stanford as a "country club" institution, with *Time* magazine labeling the university a "rich man's college" (quoted in Stallones 1999, 152). Moreover, the onset of the Great Depression led Stanford enrollments to drop from 4,674 students in 1928–29 to 3,855 in 1933 (Stanford University 1929, 595; 1933, 615). Desperate to keep students

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registered, in 1934 the university's Academic Council agreed to end student dismissal on grounds of poor academic performance (Stallones 1999, 151). The university also altered its previous admission criteria by examining applicants' educational records from the prior three years of high school instead of four, in effect lowering Stanford's selectivity.²

As a result, Tresidder, president of the Stanford University Board of Trustees, believed that Stanford was "drifting into paths that could lead to hopeless mediocrity" (quoted in Kiester 1992, 39). Hoping to reverse this trend, Tresidder arranged a weekend meeting at the Awahnee Hotel in Yosemite National Park, beginning December 5, 1941. Guests included members of the faculty, the Board of Trustees, and wealthy alumni. Subjects of conversation involved acquiring contracted research projects as a way to improve both the university's financial status and its national reputation (Stallones 1999). As representatives of an institution closely associated with alumnus Herbert Hoover, participants initially shunned the idea of developing a lucrative relationship with the New Deal administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Instead, the group agreed to further the university's connections with private industry. As discussions commenced regarding how to accomplish this goal, news of the attack on Pearl Harbor abruptly ended the meeting (Kiester 1992, 38–39; Lowen 1997, 70).

From his experience during the First World War, Stanford President Ray Lyman Wilbur learned that war meant a decline in college and university enrollment. During World War II, therefore, he acted quickly to stem the potential tide of student withdrawal from Stanford. "It is not mere force that wins modern wars," Wilbur told students, "but force plus brains. . . . That means that the universities and the student bodies in the universities have become predominant in importance; that everybody with enough brains to go into such fields as physics, chemistry, biology, meteorology, medicine, engineering, etc, must not be tempted to go off and do something that other people can do" (Stanford University 1942b, 25). Wilbur's desire for students to remain on campus was initially satisfied, with undergraduate enrollments remaining fairly stable during the 1941–42 and 1942–43 academic years. Following the lowering of the draft age from 21 to 18 in November 1942, however, there was little Wilbur could do to slow the eventual exodus of predominantly male students and their financial support from the institution.³

Stanford was not remarkable in this regard. On January 3–4, 1942, the U.S. Office of Education and American Council on Education's "Higher Education and the War" conference brought college and university presidents together to discuss the impact of America's involvement in the conflict on their institutions' financial futures (American Council on Education 1942). Participants discussed how to resolve the problem of declining revenues, with several proposals urging the federal government and industry to award contracts that both employed universities in war-related research and supple-

mented the use of university facilities and personnel. As historian Rebecca Lowen (1997, 95–119) has demonstrated, Stanford's leaders desired to exploit the "wonderful opportunity" that wartime defense research contracts presented through increased reputation and financial resources. Having generally avoided contractual obligations under Wilbur's leadership, however, pursuing a defense research agenda led university administrators to reconsider Stanford's previously articulated institutional purposes. Paul Davis, for instance, Stanford's general secretary, asserted that by seeking out federal and industrial patronage the university was simply broadening its founding charter to "promote the public welfare" to include "High Service in all forms."⁴ According to Lowen, "Davis, as well as administrators at other universities, had eagerly sought to bring their universities to the service of the nation, and Davis recognized early on that such service conferred institutional prestige. He wanted Stanford to continue to play the role of a service institution after the war. . . . Tresidder . . . took seriously Davis' suggestions" (1997, 72).

Paul Hanna, a professor of education who was actively involved in promoting Stanford's wartime lobbying efforts, also urged a redefinition of the university's mission. Hoping to capitalize on Stanford's location in the western United States, Hanna outlined a vision that involved developing Stanford into a "regional university." Writing to Wilbur in 1942, Hanna proposed that faculty members focus on solving social problems stemming from wartime mobilization in the West, including "the development of water and electrical energy, improvement of schools and colleges, improvement of agricultural crops, . . . and improvement of municipal, county and state government, etc."⁵ Hanna reminded Wilbur that public institutions, including Stanford's local rival, the University of California, Berkeley, were compelled to focus on state issues to secure funding from legislators. He then suggested that as a private institution Stanford was free to "take the initiative and make itself ready to play the dominant role in the West in integrating the research and projecting the master plans as they will be called for by government and private enterprise."⁶ According to Hanna, "The next logical step is the creation of an institution to serve the region, and I cherish for Stanford University this role. Such a regional rootage would give our students more significant opportunities for service and would greatly increase the total good our University would render the people of this nation."⁷

Davis and Hanna were both greatly satisfied with what occurred at Stanford over the next several months. In December 1942, the university administration approved a plan to reorient "the Resources of Stanford University for Greater Public Service" by carrying out "a vastly augmented program of service on a contractual basis" that would bring "substantial additional income to the University."⁸ Although Stanford ultimately trailed behind institutions such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University in the total

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number of wartime research projects acquired, the university negotiated 25 contracts totaling over a half-million dollars with the federal Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) and National Defense Research Council (NDRC; Leslie 1993, 1–13; Lowen 1997, 57, 99). Moreover, what Stanford did not achieve fiscally in the area of contracted research it made up for by negotiating with the U.S. Office of Education to offer courses through Engineering, Science, and Management War Training and the U.S. Army to provide course work to military recruits through the ASTP (Cardozier 1993, 168–69; Keefer 1988, 30–31).

As early as 1939, many Americans acknowledged their nation's lack of necessary technical expertise for winning a war in which the United States might someday be involved. A study conducted in that year by the U.S. Office of Education, for instance, demonstrated that only one-tenth the number of engineers qualified to engage in defense production in the Pittsburgh area were currently available (Cardozier 1993, 169). In response to this perceived lack of brainpower, the U.S. Congress approved contracting with the nation's colleges and universities to offer course work through the Engineering Defense Training program (EDT; Cardozier 1993, 168–69; Keefer 1988, 30–31). Although EDT was initially designed to alleviate an engineering personnel shortage, the federal government quickly realized America's need for scientists and production supervisors to meet the growing demands of mobilization. As offerings in all three fields evolved, the program name changed to Engineering, Science, and Management Defense Training (ESMDT). After the United States declared war, the program name changed again, this time to Engineering, Science, and Management War Training (ESMWT). Public or tax-exempt colleges and universities offering four-year degrees in the necessary fields qualified for contracts with the Office of Education to provide ESMWT courses.

Selected as one of the approximately 230 institutions to participate in ESMWT nationally, Stanford offered 54 classes, with approximately one-third directed toward employees of specific defense plants or branches of the armed forces and the other two-thirds open to any individual meeting the necessary prerequisites.⁹ Thirty-seven of the 54 courses offered were in engineering, 16 in production supervision, and one in science. Only seven of the 54 were taught entirely by members of the regular faculty, with Stanford subcontracting for the services of non-Stanford professionals for the other 47.¹⁰ Women enrolled in many of these courses, with several designated solely for women, such as the full-time programs in engineering drafting and technical calculations (Stanford University 1942b, 255). In addition, Stanford's chemistry department offered "Chemical Analyst Training for Women" while the Graduate School of Business offered "Fundamentals of Industrial Management for Women."¹¹

Prior to termination on June 30, 1945, enrollment in ESMWT courses at

Stanford totaled 19,894 students, with 400 course sections offered and more than ten thousand different individuals enrolled.¹² In a summary assessment of the program, Stanford's ESMWT representative, Professor Eugene L. Grant, noted the contribution he believed the university made to the war effort through ESMWT, including "helping to meet acute shortages of technical and supervisory personnel through upgrading training" and introducing defense plants to "various new ideas and techniques" in industrial processes.¹³ For Stanford, Grant claimed an enrichment of future university instruction as the result of "closer contacts of many of the faculty with the changing problems of technology and industry."¹⁴ Moreover, Grant was especially enthusiastic regarding the financial advantages the program provided Stanford, including equipment purchased, alterations and improvement of buildings, and contributions to university salary and maintenance budgets.

It was in Stanford's enlarged and elevated reputation, however, that Grant believed Stanford made its greatest strides through ESMWT. He emphasized the positive effect on university public relations achieved through Stanford's participation and noted that this was "not only in relations with industries served and with trainees enrolled, but also through a general public knowledge of this contribution to the war and through the prestige gained in those fields in which we have done a particularly successful job."¹⁵ Impressed by what he perceived as the short- and long-term institutional benefits ESMWT generated, J. Hugh Jackson, dean of Stanford's Graduate School of Business, concurred. Jackson identified several prominent businessmen in the ESMWT courses offered through the business school, including a "Mr. Rath," whose company produced \$126 million in sales the previous year. Jackson suggested that Rath's new status as "alumni" of a Stanford program would permit the university to approach him and others like him for support in the future. "All in all," Jackson informed Tresidder, "I have become convinced that these ESMWT courses . . . represent one of the finest pieces of public relations work that is being done in the University at the present time."¹⁶

By acknowledging benefits to both the war effort and to Stanford, Grant and Jackson identified a lesson learned by many college and university administrators during World War II—serving the national interest equated with serving higher education's needs. The discovery of this powerful formula had a profound influence on the way that these administrators conceived of their institutions' purposes throughout the war and after. Another equally important contribution that ESMWT made to higher education, however, was identified in the program's final report. "ESMWT set a pattern," it noted, "for relationships between the Federal Government and the colleges in a federally sponsored educational program, which many observers feel has important implications for the future" (Horsby 1946, 64). Clearly visible at Stanford, ESMWT's adoption established a precedent for using university resources to "train" individuals actively involved

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in mobilization, whether civilian or military. Stanford administrators took a relatively small step, therefore, when they agreed to provide wartime instruction directly to military recruits through the ASTP

As with its First World War predecessor, the Student Army Training Corps, the ASTP was rooted in an assumption that it was in the national interest to educate America’s soldiers even while on active duty (Cardozier 1993, 41; Gruber 1975, 213–19). Until the ASTP was announced in December 1942, however, over a year following America’s entry into World War II, college and university administrators were uncertain as to whether the U.S. military would promote a program reliant on their institutions, as it had during World War I. When the program was finally announced, they delivered a cumulative sigh of relief. “The purpose of the Army Specialized Training Program,” reported Colonel Herman Beukema, director of the Army Specialized Training Division, “is to meet the need of the Army for specialized technical training of soldiers on active duty for certain Army tasks for which its own training facilities are insufficient in extent or character.”¹⁷ With great satisfaction, higher education leaders understood Beukema to mean that both the human and material resources of their institutions would be employed. Participating institutions anticipated receiving substantial compensation from the Department of War for their involvement.

Stanford University had strong programs in the ASTP’s three central training areas—engineering, foreign languages, and medicine. President Wilbur had good reason to believe, therefore, that his institution would be chosen to participate. Moreover, Beukema asked Wilbur to serve on a nine-person ASTP advisory committee.¹⁸ Wilbur accepted and attended the first committee meeting in February 1943.¹⁹ When, three weeks later, he received notice that Stanford had been selected as an ASTP site, Wilbur immediately set out to mobilize the campus.²⁰ He reaffirmed the university’s wartime operating schedule of four 12-week quarters, with four one-week vacations, and requested that faculty interested in teaching mathematics, chemistry, physics, engineering drawing, surveying, or engineering mechanics as part of the program identify themselves.²¹

Faculty taught an ASTP curriculum composed of a basic phase and an advanced phase. The former consisted of three 12-week quarters and was considered the equivalent of the first one-and-a-half years of university study. Although the basic curriculum included course work in mathematics, physics, chemistry, English, history, and geography, a focus on basic engineering was embedded in the program, including classes in “engineering specialities” such as surveying, internal combustion engines, and communications (U.S. Government 1945). The ASTP’s advanced phase opened with courses normally found in the second half of the sophomore year and usually lasted four quarters or less. It was a highly specialized program that included branches in foreign area and language; engineering; premedical, pre dental and preveterinary stud-

ies; and psychology. A central objective of the advanced phase was to ready military personnel to serve overseas prior to and immediately following the occupation of enemy territory. The foreign area and language studies branch, for instance, was described as providing the training necessary “for duty with all arms of the Army Ground Forces, and for duty with Military Intelligence Services, the Provost Marshall General’s Department, and the Signal Corps. A common interest of these arms and services is that the soldier be fluent in one or more modern foreign languages, know the area in which the languages are used, and have insight into the elements which favor or endanger relations between the Army of the United States and the people in that area.”²² At Stanford, this included training in the foreign language, geography, and history of European nations such as Germany and Italy, as well as Asian nations such as Japan.

Over the course of the war years, Stanford trained 11,928 military personnel as part of Army Specialized Training Units.²³ The technical training aspects of the program accompanied by the arrival on campus of literally thousands of members of the armed forces had the effect of militarizing the university. As reported by a United Press correspondent in October 1943: “The first Army-approved inspection of the program disclosed that these Soldiers—3,000 strong—have virtually taken over Stanford University. . . . The Stanford Quadrangle resounds with young soldiers going to class in formation, books and slide rules under their arms, shouting the ‘Hut-two-three-four!’ cadence, instead of the ‘Rah-Rah’ of former college days.”²⁴ With an average Stanford ASTP trainee age of 26, the characteristics of the university student population were dramatically transformed. During the 1943–44 academic year, for instance, the total number of military personnel present at Stanford was 3,726, easily outnumbering the 2,412 undergraduates (Stanford University 1945b). These soldiers used the athletic fields for drill, marksmanship, and in some cases artillery training, and they attended class sometimes as early as 7:30 a.m. and as late as 11:00 p.m. Even the fraternity houses and dormitories in which military personnel resided during their stay at Stanford were renamed in honor of presidents of the United States (Kiester 1992, 51).

The profound effects the ASTP and similar military programs had on Stanford’s institutional culture were equaled only by the financial benefits the university reaped through its participation. In May 1943, for instance, Stanford received a program “activation expense” that included \$18,935 for alterations to facilities, \$53,736 for required equipment (including anything from baking tins to furniture), and a 3 percent general administrative expense, for a total of \$74,851. Moreover, for the 2,827 trainees at Stanford between October 11 and November 8, 1943, Stanford’s reimbursements included \$13,439 for the use of facilities, \$96,360 for instructional expenses, \$96,892 for trainee texts and other equipment, \$3,259 for medical services provided to trainees,

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\$114,153 for trainee subsistence, and \$29,028 for maintenance and operation. Although the number of trainees at Stanford varied throughout the year, at this rate the military would have reimbursed the university for an estimated annual cost of \$4,237,572.²⁵ With gross expenditures of \$6,215,595 in 1943, Stanford relied heavily on the ASTP for its fiscal health (Stanford University 1943b). Indeed, given such lucrative arrangements, it is hardly surprising that the university’s financial vice president, Frank F. Walker, reported in December 1943 that, although Stanford had expected an operating deficit of \$174,000 by the end of 1943, the university budget was “actually in the black.”²⁶

As with the ESMWT program, the ASTP provided Stanford an opportunity to engage in positive public relations by claiming that it was directly supporting the nation’s military objectives. Indeed, by offering course work in so many of the ASTP’s training areas, Stanford distinguished itself among western colleges and universities. Of the 28 western institutions of higher education participating in the ASTP, only nine offered both the engineering and language and area studies programs. Stanford was one (Cardozier 1993, 31). Moreover, of all participating institutions, Stanford offered the broadest field of language instruction, including Dutch, French, German, Italian, Russian, Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese.²⁷

A testament to the enthusiasm with which Stanford’s leaders embraced promoting the national interest, the university’s adoption of ESMWT and ASTP nevertheless caused concern among some members of the faculty. Liberal and fine arts professors, in particular, were concerned that the university’s administration was departing radically from Leland Stanford’s founding desire for his institution to be one “where any person can find instruction in any study.”²⁸ The dramatic expansion of the university’s commitment to defense research and the sudden distinction of academic fields relating to technical and managerial training led some liberal and fine arts faculty to perceive their disciplines, and their departments, as losing broad support. Partially in response to this wartime attack on the liberal arts, Stanford University took a somewhat unusual and, in Wilbur’s words, “bold step . . . in the midst of a war where the emphasis is upon other phases of education and culture.”²⁹ In the fall of 1942, the university opened the School of Humanities.

The School of Humanities

Following the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, the esteemed novelist and essayist C. S. Lewis (1949, 43–54) delivered a sermon entitled “Learning in Wartime,” in which he addressed the seeming hypocrisy of continuing academic study while war raged in Europe. Wasn’t doing so analogous to “fiddling while Rome burns?” Lewis asked his students rhetorically, “How can you be

so frivolous and selfish as to think of anything but the war?" In response, Lewis suggested that the European conflict created no real new dilemma in students' lives but instead simply aggravated the already tenuous state of humanity, so much so that it could no longer be ignored. "Human life," said Lewis, "has always been lived on the edge of a precipice," yet unlike insects that first seek "the material welfare and security of the hive," humanity chooses to ignore the threats posed to it, pursuing truth in the face of extinction. He preached: "Plausible reasons have never been lacking for putting off all merely cultural activities until some imminent danger has been averted or some crying injustice put right. But humanity long ago chose to neglect those plausible reasons. They wanted knowledge and beauty now, and would not wait for the suitable moment that never comes" (43–45).

Lewis's lecture reflected some scholars' anxiety that the war crisis would undermine nontechnical disciplines. Their apprehension was well founded. "The immediate occasion of this book is the war," wrote Columbia University's Mark Van Doren (1943, vii) in his wartime defense of the liberal arts, "which in the United States has almost completely suspended liberal education." Van Doren did not overstate the case. When the *New York Times* reported on the formation of the ASTP, it headlined the announcement "New Plans Suspend Liberal Education" and quoted Secretary of War Henry Stimson as stating, "The immediate necessity is to win this war, and unless we do that there is no hope for liberal education in this country" (Shalett 1942, 1). *Time* magazine put the issue more simply: "War has," it reported, "violently discombobulated the teaching of the liberal arts" (1943b, 56).

As colleges and universities across the United States became increasingly militarized during the war years, liberal arts offerings were curbed dramatically. "In all sections of the country," noted *New York Times* reporter Benjamin Fine (1943, E7), "the emphasis now is upon technical training." In some cases, higher education administrators altered academic programs to meet perceived war needs, while in others student interest catalyzed curricular modifications. At the University of Wisconsin, for instance, *Time* reported that the "biggest change" on campus in 1941 was the decrease in students studying the humanities, down 33 percent, while engineering was up more than 25 percent (1941, 38). By 1943, Western Reserve University registered a 250 percent increase in freshman enrollments in science and technical courses, with chemistry enrollment registering its highest rate in the institution's 117-year history (Fine 1943, E7). At Colgate University, an institution with a traditionally strong liberal arts program, enrollments in physics rose 76 percent, in chemistry 60 percent, and in mathematics 100 percent (Fine 1943, E7).

Whether through administrative edict or student choice, humanities programs throughout the United States suffered from a perceived lack of relevance during World War II (Cardozier 1993, 121–22). One exception was the pro-

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posal that women increase their course taking in the liberal arts in an effort to balance the expected loss of liberally educated men in the postwar era (American Council on Education Studies 1941). Although, as historian Susan Hartmann has shown, wartime surveys indicate that the number of bachelor's degrees in sciences awarded to women increased by almost one-third, a large majority of women remained humanities students during World War II (1982, 103–5). At Stanford University, for instance, although women were provided the opportunity to complete a "wartime minor," such as "Engineering Aide," "Junior Chemist," "Nurses Aid," and "Secretary," university administrators urged female students to maintain a commitment to the study of the liberal arts so as to be "broadly educated for a lifetime" (Stanford University 1943e). As a result, although the number of bachelor's degrees Stanford granted to women increased from 305 in 1941 to 359 in 1948 to 462 in 1948, a large majority of those degrees continued to be in the humanities and liberal arts.³⁰

The issue of relevance was not unfamiliar to humanities scholars. Debates in the United States regarding the utility and practicality of the humanities long predated the attack on Pearl Harbor (Kandel 1948, 174–75). Yet during the First World War, humanities faculty were no less likely than scholars of scientific disciplines to offer their services to the state in return for extrinsic rewards. As Carol Gruber (1975, 110) has indicated, "Not only scientists but humanists and social scientists as well sensed in the war situation an opportunity to win confidence in their disciplines, to stimulate interest in them, and to accomplish necessary reorganization and reform." Historians, in particular, used wartime conditions to promote their field of study and establish newly defined "public" identities (Blakey 1970; Gruber 1975, 118–62). Although later criticized for their active participation in promoting government propaganda through organizations such as the National Board for Historical Service, historians nevertheless represented the zeal with which many humanists pursued supporting the nation's military aims (Barnes 1963, 277–90).

Faculty support of the Allied effort corresponded with an equally significant development in liberal arts education during World War I, the "Western Civilization Course" (Veysey 1965, 207–8). As historian Gilbert Allardyce (1982, 695) has demonstrated, the First World War fostered a shared sense of identity among the United States, England, and Western Europe as a "great Atlantic civilization, formed from a common history, challenged by a common enemy, and destined to a common future." This new conception of America, which contrasted dramatically with previous portrayals of the United States as a "pioneer" nation "formed by the frontier experience," combined with prewar ideas related to curriculum reform in higher education to give birth to a course in Western Civilization at Columbia University in 1919 (Allardyce 1982, 706). Eventually spreading to colleges and universities throughout the nation, including Stanford University, "Western Civ" became the central re-

quirement of many institutions' course offerings, bolstering the disciplines that contributed to the course and increasing the institutional investment in those departments (Allardyce 1982, 721).

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, liberal arts faculty at Stanford University initially seemed to follow the path of their First World War predecessors. Harold Chapman Brown, head of the Department of Philosophy, for instance, indicated the important contribution he believed his field might make to this new war effort by informing President Wilbur that "the Department does not consider itself as remote from service as the layman might be inclined to believe, for a part of our regular work is the investigation and clarification of ideologies lying behind political, ethical, and social conflicts."³¹ Yet unlike during World War I, when liberal arts faculty and their disciplines were rejuvenated, World War II put liberal education "on the defensive."³² As Gruber (1975, 159) notes, during World War II "the complexities of the relationship between intellect and power were exposed" when, among other instances, scholars resigned from positions in the Office of War Information (OWI) because "they were *not* permitted to tell the truth about the war as they saw it." As a result, Elmer Davis, head of the OWI, informed President Roosevelt that the "intellectual" conceived of OWI policies as "an intolerable limitation on his freedom of thought and speech" and that "you cannot do much with people who are convinced that they are the sole authorized custodians of Truth" (quoted in Gruber 1975, 159).

Concerned by these developments, among others, members of the Stanford faculty in the School of Letters, consisting of the departments of Classics, English, Germanic Languages, Religion, Romanic Languages, and Slavic Languages, joined with members of the departments of History, Philosophy, Music, Graphic Arts, and Speech and Drama to support the opening of a distinct undergraduate school dedicated to the study of the humanities.³³ At first glance, Stanford's establishing the School of Humanities during the war crisis seemed an anomaly. Indeed, *Time* magazine prefaced its announcement of the school by reporting that the university's "shrewd" president and trustees knew "how to take advantage of a trend by going against it" (1942b, 60). In actuality, the school's founding has a discernible history that was rooted in both prewar and wartime events and situated in a national context.

In 1943, the American Council of Learned Societies, an organization concerned with the "place of the humanities in education at all levels," published *Liberal Education Re-examined: Its Role in a Democracy* (Greene et al. 1943, vii). Issued in the midst of the war, the report declared the United States "urgently in need of liberally minded and well-educated teachers in charge of programs of study which offer students a sound liberal education as a preparation for responsible citizenship and human living" (115). Seemingly a defense of the liberal arts during World War II, *Liberal Education Re-examined* actually grew

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out of a symposium on humanistic studies held at the annual meeting of the council in 1936 (Kandel 1948, 172). Conference participants proposed a study inquiring into the status of humanities education in schools, colleges, and universities throughout the United States. The investigating committee was specifically directed *not* to develop a "defense of the humanities" but instead to make a "positive and constructive effort to develop the full values of the contribution that the humanities must make to education and life."³⁴

The conclusions drawn by the authors of *Liberal Education Re-examined* revealed the concern shared by many scholars prior to World War II that the United States had developed into an industrial bureaucracy plagued by a "lack of genuine culture" (Greene et al. 1943, 115). Proclaiming liberal education the only solution to the "superficiality of many of our standards, the poverty of many of our individual experiences, and the inadequacy of our social consciousness," the authors asserted that many "humanistic faculties have lost their way and forfeited public confidence" and that America's educational institutions were failing to preserve and transmit the nation's cultural heritage to succeeding generations (115, 118). This sentiment, when combined with an increasing concern over higher education's curricular direction (including, among other issues, the elective system and the rise of vocational and professional training), led many colleges and universities to reemphasize the importance of the humanities during the interwar period. In a 1940 survey of academic programs in higher education, for instance, Patricia Beesley of Columbia University indicated that colleges and universities throughout the United States had created more than 30 humanities courses between 1928 and 1940, a clear indicator for Beesley of what she labeled the "current revival of the Humanities in American education" (1940, 7, 71).

Conditions of war, then, beginning in Europe in 1939 and extending to the United States in late 1941, did not cause the nation to reexamine liberal education as much as it accelerated those discussions by posing an immediate threat to the study of the liberal arts in higher education. As with the American Council of Learned Societies, which began its work prior to the war, Stanford University's Board of Trustees voted to establish the School of Humanities on July 22, 1941, five months prior to America's declaration of war. And like the work of the council, the school was founded not to defend the humanities but as an assertion of their fundamental place in undergraduate education. Indeed, the rationale for the school's founding initially reflected a discernible detachment from wartime events.³⁵ "It is clear," noted Wilbur in explaining the origins of the school,

that some reasonable balance must be maintained in education between the pressure for early specialization and the need for a coherent view of human activities—the need also to train critical minds capable not

simply of acting but also of distinguishing that which is excellent from that which is second rate. The power to make enlightened choices will result from a coordinated curriculum in the liberal arts designed to train the student through guidance and personal supervision to think clearly and coherently; to have a many-sided grasp of the past development of our civilization and its relation to the philosophic, social, and cultural forces shaping the modern world. The interlocked and co-ordinated planning toward this end by the combined departments of the School of Humanities . . . makes possible a School program so synthesized as to be both comprehensive and unified. Its aim is the unified education of a man or woman. (Stanford University 1941a, 3)

Yet when *Time* magazine announced the opening of Stanford's School of Humanities several months later, it did not locate the school's roots in scholarly concerns over the nature of students' humanistic development. Instead, the magazine proposed that Stanford's leaders directly responded to wartime conditions, acting "on the belief" that future national security was wholly dependent on a liberally educated populace (*Time* 1942b, 60).

Time's allusion to the war's influence on the stated mission of the School of Humanities provided a first glimpse of the changes awaiting the school during the war era. As the development of a defense research agenda and programs such as ESMWT and the ASTP increasingly aligned Stanford's educational purposes with the nation's military objectives, university administrators reoriented the school's initial aims to reflect a greater war-related role. By the time it began enrolling students in 1942, Wilbur had modified his publicly stated rationale for the School of Humanities to reflect the importance of the humanities in relation to the war: "With the marked emphasis now given to technological education in our universities, due to the war, we are in danger of losing sight of the great importance of the humanities and the social sciences in the training of our men and women. We hope to win the war with technologically trained men, but certainly without the humanities and the social sciences, we are likely to lose the peace" (Stanford University 1942b, 37).

Wilbur's suggestion was hardly original. During and after World War II, American luminaries voiced concerns that a war won at the cost of liberal education would put democracy's future, and the future of peace, at risk. "The destruction of the tradition of the liberal arts at this crisis in our history," declared Wendell Willkie in 1943, "would be a crime comparable, in my opinion, with the burning of books by the Nazis. . . . Burn your books—or, what amounts to the same thing, neglect your books—and you will lose freedom as surely as if you were to invite Hitler and his henchmen to rule over you" (*Time* 1943a, 43). Harvard University's President James B. Conant (1943, 5, 37) echoed Willkie's sentiment, writing in the *New York Times*, "Those who

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express grave concern about the future of the country if the liberal arts were destroyed are entirely right. For there can be no question that the basis of a free society is the education which that society provides."

Appearing in a wide range of popular publications, statements such as these both reflected broad concerns over the decline of the humanities during World War II and fostered a national debate over the value of the liberal arts in American secondary and higher education (Kandel 1948, 172). Participants such as the Association of American Colleges appointed commissions to study how liberal education was being "blacked out" as a result of the war (Baxter 1943, 269–99). Private foundations conducted studies of the potential "rebirth of liberal education" following the war, such as the one produced by Fred B. Millett (1945) of Wesleyan University for the Humanities Division of the Rockefeller Foundation. At Harvard University, President Conant appointed a committee "to consider the infusion of the liberal and humane tradition into our entire educational system," resulting in the well-publicized *General Education in a Free Society* (Harvard Committee 1945, xv). And colleges and universities throughout the nation held conferences to investigate the war's influence on the study of the humanities. Stanford University served as the central site for these discussions in the western United States.

On May 7–8, 1943, Stanford held its first of a projected series of annual humanities conferences. Entitled "The Humanities Look Ahead," the conference attracted 175 delegates from throughout the western states, no small number given the travel restrictions in place during World War II (Stanford University 1943d, xv). Organized around the theme "The Humanities in the War and Postwar World," conference papers focused on the war period as a defining moment in the survival of the humanities in higher education. "If the speakers represent a fair sampling of humanists in America," claimed one observer, "it is clear that the present period of war has been interpreted as a call to attack, not to maintain a forlorn hope" (Stanford University 1943d, vi). One reviewer reported the conference as "characteristically American," with delegates engaged both in "self-criticism" of humanities programs in the United States and in asserting the necessity of American leadership in the postwar era (Mitrany 1944, 254). "Now that the arts, true science, and philosophy are all 'dislodged and beaten almost beyond surviving there in Europe and Asia,'" the reviewer quoted one delegate, the United States "had leadership in this field thrust upon her" (254). Although similar conferences were instituted in other regions of the country, some considered Stanford's the "most notable" effort to engage scholars in examining the role of the humanities in a democratic society and in a world devastated by war (Kandel 1948, 200–201). More important for the university itself, the meetings provided Stanford an opportunity to showcase its newest school's academic program.

When the School of Humanities opened, it offered course work for students

majoring either in the humanities or a “constituent department” (Stanford University 1942a, 164). Freshmen and sophomores were placed in the school’s “Lower Division” and introduced to a curriculum rooted in the “fundamental fields of human interest” (164). Lower Division courses were organized into three groups, “arts and letters,” “natural sciences and mathematics,” and “social sciences,” with students responsible for fulfilling requirements in each of these groups. Once they completed these requirements, students moved to the school’s Upper Division, where humanities majors began required course work offered by newly appointed humanities faculty. Grouped under the theme “the development of modern man,” the school’s first three upper-level courses, “The Nature of Man,” “The Nature of Civilization,” and “The Nature of Personality,” examined “the study of man as a rational and artistic being seeking to understand himself and the world in which he lives” (166).³⁶

To teach these courses, Stanford appointed four new faculty members in the humanities: Assistant Professors Arthur Bestor, Jeffery Smith, and Desmond Powell, and Professor Lewis Mumford (Stanford University 1942b, 308). Of the four, Mumford, a recognized historian, sociologist, urban planner, and architectural critic, provided Stanford with a nationally respected figure and defender of the role of the humanities in fostering democratic and humanitarian values. Proclaiming him “no intellectual opportunist,” *Time* (1942a, 62) quoted Mumford as envisioning at Stanford “a chance for me to put into practice the concept of education I have had for many years, which is that the humanities and science are not in inherent conflict but have become separated in the 20th Century. Now their essential unity must be re-emphasized.” Mumford both developed this theme in his courses and made it a central element in his description of the school: “The re-integration of the human personality and the re-establishment of our whole civilization on a stable co-operative basis are two co-ordinate parts of the same problem: they rest on our capacity, as educable human beings, to experience and understand life as a related whole. . . . In the light of this general statement, we are perhaps in a position to understand better the role of the new School of the Humanities at Stanford” (Stanford University 1942d, 3–6).

Although Stanford’s School of Humanities introduced courses detached from the war in curricular composition and received renown by appointing Mumford, a harsh critic of the war’s impact on higher education, Wilbur continued to realign the school’s publicly stated purpose to meet war-related demands. Following the military’s request that Stanford train recruits for service in occupied nations, Wilbur further modified his initial rationale for the school, replacing it with a more clearly war-focused justification: “There is a proposal now to train men to act as administrators of territories taken over from the enemy. This means peaceful organization and requires a knowledge of the language, literature, folklore, social customs, economic life, religion and

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government of the peoples involved. . . . Yet for the most part these subjects are now considered secondary, are classified as 'liberal education' which must step aside during the war period. As I see it, there has never been a more important period for Stanford to emphasize the humanities than the one that is just ahead of us" (Stanford University 1942b, 37).

What began as rhetoric relating to the humanities' contribution to the Allied cause quickly became reality. Increasing its emphasis on war-related studies, the School of Humanities began offering full-time, intensive Japanese courses "to supply more rapidly the demands of the government for persons able to use the Japanese language" (*Stanford Today* 1943, 1). In session six days a week, the course of study consisted of three hours of classwork in the morning, three hours of conversation drill in the afternoon, and a four-hour exam each Saturday (*Stanford Today* 1943). Moreover, the school's first dean, John W. Dodds, announced his intent to establish a "regional major" through which students might study the "language, literature, philosophy, art, history, religion, geography, social customs, governmental organization, and the cultural geography of one country or region."³⁷ Addressing a memo in November 1942 to humanities faculty, Dodds proposed the regional major as "a small part of Stanford's war effort," promoting it on the grounds that it could provide training for recruits to participate in the reconstruction of Axis nations.³⁸ "A regional major might well be defended merely as a valid major in general education," Dodds wrote, "but its point for young people today would be by way of preparation for service during the war and post-war period in occupied or liberated territories, as well as in other countries where there may be a need for Americans with a rich background in national cultures."³⁹

Justifying the School of Humanities' rapid alignment with war needs prior to his departure from Stanford's presidency, Wilbur wrote, "It was inevitable that the work of the school . . . should have been severely affected by the increasing pressures of war and the necessity of adapting university curricula and programs to the needs of the various Army training programs which have come to Stanford" (1943b, 244). Indeed, in his final report, Wilbur went so far as to revise the history of the school's founding. Ignoring the claim he issued two years earlier, that the university had established the school to educate students "to have a many-sided grasp of the past development of our civilization and its relation to the philosophic, social, and cultural forces shaping the modern world," Wilbur suggested that Stanford had actually anticipated the military's need to train recruits in foreign language and area studies and had devised a curricular program in the humanities primarily to meet this demand (Stanford University 1941a, 244).

Conclusion

In December 1944, Donald Tresidder issued his first presidential report. Breaking tradition with Wilbur's established format for the publication, Tresidder opened with an extensive letter to the Board of Trustees. "At the end of my first year as president," Tresidder wrote, "the activities and purposes of Stanford University revolve, as do those of all the nation, about the securing of a complete Allied victory. The preservation of our democracy depends upon our winning the war; so too does the preservation of freedom of teaching and research in our institutions of higher learning, for without victory there can be no such freedom. Until victory comes, then, Stanford will continue to devote its resources to the country's war effort" (Stanford University 1944a, 1). Tresidder had been a central proponent of increasing Stanford's ties to industry and the federal government, and his inauguration ushered in a renewed sense of urgency in reorienting Stanford's campus-wide operations toward serving the nation's military objectives. For the School of Humanities, this meant exploiting its location on the West Coast by developing a "Pacific-Asiatic-Russian" study program. Leading to a bachelor of arts degree in the humanities with a concentration in China, Japan, Russia, or Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the program was specifically intended to prepare military officers to govern occupied enemy lands (Stanford University 1945a, 128).

Stanford University's response to World War II was not unusual. Facing declining student enrollment and tuition, Stanford's leaders recognized the financial reward and institutional prestige associated with war service. University administrators negotiated adoption of the ESMWT program through the U.S. Office of Education and willingly sponsored the ASTP on Stanford's campus. The war, moreover, provided a catalyst for the university to expand its defense research agenda. Although by the end of the war Stanford's administrators had not obtained as many research contracts as they had initially planned, by 1945 the university was well positioned to broaden its defense research program.

The evolution of its School of Humanities, however, particularly the multiple objectives university administrators assigned to it between 1941 and 1945, reveals the complexity of the challenges confronting institutions of higher education during the war period. As a product of the nationwide reexamination of liberal education begun in the 1930s, the School of Humanities sought to reaffirm the importance of the humanities in fulfilling Stanford's prewar institutional mission. Yet almost immediately upon America's declaring war, Stanford's leadership began reconceptualizing the school's previously articulated purpose. At first, the university claimed, as did many in the United States, that winning the war while destroying liberal education would ulti-

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mately lead to democracy's defeat in the postwar era. As more practical wartime roles for specific disciplines within the humanities were delineated, however, rhetoric in support of liberal education shifted toward contributing directly to the war effort. Recruits were "trained"—not "educated"—in foreign languages, history, and geography with the explicit understanding that such training would prove beneficial in military positions abroad.

University leaders demonstrated the value they attached to war-related purposes in a bulletin issued by Stanford's external relations and development personnel. Entitled "Stanford and the War," the bulletin publicized work being conducted at Stanford and highlighted the university's many wartime achievements, dramatically claiming: "Stanford today is a university at war, training experts in a score of fields, including chemistry, biology, physics, engineering and medicine. Every few months another quota of these trained technicians leaves the campus to take a place in the civilian or military war service of the nation. That is one of our country's greatest needs in the technological war which we are fighting."⁴⁰

After reviewing the contributions being made by the Schools of Physical Science, Engineering, Health, and Law, the bulletin publicized the achievements of the School of Humanities, although in a manner that indicated institutional confusion over its exact wartime role. Emphasizing the humanities as "one of the outposts to keep alive an awareness of the civilization our country is fighting to defend," the bulletin proclaimed that "unless we can keep alive such fundamental American concepts, any military victory, however glorious, will be barren."⁴¹ In the very next paragraph, however, the bulletin proposed a strikingly different purpose for the school. "Meanwhile," it reported, "there is immediate need for young men and women trained in the much-neglected Japanese, Chinese and Russian languages, as well as in the better-known foreign languages, and we are therefore emphasizing that aspect of our program."⁴² The message to potential donors was clear; the university was actively engaged in national service by directly assisting the Allies in winning the war, and the School of Humanities was an important part of this undertaking. The final page of the publication solidified this ideal: "Gifts to Stanford, unrestricted or designated, serve the country's war effort as well as the university, for with strengthened resources Stanford will do an even better war job than it is now doing."⁴³

Ultimately, Stanford's unabashed correlation of victory in the war and support for the university gave birth to an important institutional legacy. What Tresidder set out to accomplish when he called a meeting in Yosemite the weekend of December 5, 1941, eventually came to pass.⁴⁴ Stanford developed into an internationally respected university in the postwar era, investing its human and material resources in federal and industrial research and acquiring millions of dollars worth of contracts during the cold war. By 1960, 39 percent

of the university's operating budget came from federal support. Eighty percent of that amount went directly to research in engineering and physics (Lowen 1997, 148). Resulting directly from university administrators' strategic efforts to tap into suddenly available wartime resources, the acquisition and distribution of these contracts transformed Stanford's institutional mission. Although at the time many conceived of serving the national interest as an inherently positive development, this legacy would return to haunt Stanford less than two decades later, as a new war forced the university's leadership to reconsider both its investment in national defense and the security-oriented institutional purpose it had adopted.

Notes

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1. Although Wilbur had set August 1941 as his retirement date, the Board of Trustees asked him to remain in the office of the president until a replacement was appointed. Wilbur assumed the title of chancellor in 1941 but continued to serve as president until Tresidder's inauguration in September 1943. See Mitchell 1958, 41.

2. "Minutes of the Committee on Admission and Advanced Standing," Registrars Office Records, 1891–1928, box 1, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

3. Stanford's undergraduate enrollment declined from 3,672 students in 1942–43 to 2,412 in 1943–44. See also Stanford University 1941b, 1942c, 1943c, 1944b.

4. "Planning and Development" and "Letter from Paul Davis to Dr. Donald B. Tresidder," November 20, 1942, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 125, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA; see also Stanford University 1971.

5. "Education, School of (Sept. to Feb.)," and "Letter from Paul Hanna to Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur," February 11, 1942, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 112, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

6. "Education, School of (Sept. to Feb.)," and "Letter from Paul Hanna to Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur," February 11, 1942, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 112, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

7. "Education, School of (Sept. to Feb.)," and "Letter from Paul Hanna to Chancellor Ray Lyman Wilbur," February 11, 1942, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 112, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

8. "Committee on University Services" and "Stanford University—Committee on University Services—the Organization of the Resources of Stanford University for Greater Public Service," Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 182, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

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9. Description based on a snapshot of ESMWT offerings in November 1943 (Horsby 1946).
10. "ESMWT—Correspondence—Sept. Oct. Nov." and "Letter from Eugene L. Grant, Institutional Representative, ESMWT, to Dr. Donald B. Tresidder," November 3, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131; and "E.S.M.W.T. Courses" and "Memo to Donald B. Tresidder from Eugene L. Grant, Institutional Representative for ESMWT," June 24, 1944, Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 183, all in Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
11. "E.S.M.W.T. Courses," "Fall 1943—Fundamentals of Marine Drafting and Chemical Analyst Training for Women," and "Summer 1943—Fundamentals of Industrial Management for Women," Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 183, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
12. "E.S.M.W.T. Courses," "Subject: Termination of ESMWT," May 5, 1945, and "Memo to Donald B. Tresidder from Eugene L. Grant, Institutional Representative for ESMWT," June 24, 1944, Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 183, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
13. "E.S.M.W.T. Courses" and "Memo to Donald B. Tresidder from Eugene L. Grant, Institutional Representative for ESMWT," June 24, 1944, Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 183, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
14. "E.S.M.W.T. Courses" and "Memo to Donald B. Tresidder from Eugene L. Grant, Institutional Representative for ESMWT," June 24, 1944, Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 183, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
15. "E.S.M.W.T. Courses" and "Memo to Donald B. Tresidder from Eugene L. Grant, Institutional Representative for ESMWT," June 24, 1944, Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 183, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
16. "ESMWT—Correspondence—Sept. Oct. Nov." and "Letter from J. Hugh Jackson, Dean, Graduate School of Business, to Dr. Donald B. Tresidder," October 20, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
17. "Old File—Dec. 1942–June 1943—A.S.T.P." and "Letter from Colonel Herman Beukema, Director, Army Specialized Training Division, to University and College Heads," January 5, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 130, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
18. "Old File—Dec. 1942–June 1943—A.S.T.P." and "Memorandum from Paul R. Hanna to Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur," January 5, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 130, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
19. "Old File—Dec. 1942–June 1943—A.S.T.P." and "The Army Specialized Training Division, Agenda, Meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Army Specialized Training Program," February 2–3, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 130, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.
20. "Old File—Dec. 1942–June 1943—A.S.T.P." and "Letter from Colonel W. H. Root, Director, Army Specialized Training Program, to Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur," February 25, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 130, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA. The Army Specialized program, although by far the largest military program adopted by Stanford during the war and considered "the principal military activity of the University," was only one of several. Other programs included a Navy V-12 program, a physical therapy training program for the Women's Army Corps, a Specialized Training and Reassignment Unit, a Civil Affairs Training School, a school of Naval Administration, and a Civil Communications Intelligence school. See Stanford University 1943b, 3; 1944a, 163–65.
21. "A.S.T.P. Curriculum, Tests, Etc.—Sept. Oct. Nov." and "Letter to Members

of the Stanford Faculty from Ray Lyman Wilbur, Chancellor," March 12, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

22. "A.S.T.P. Curriculum, Tests, Etc.—Sept. Oct. Nov." and "Army Specialized Training Program, Advanced Phase, Curriculum No. 0-2, Term 9L, Linguistics Fields," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

23. This total reflects all of the Army's military programs implemented at Stanford, with the ASTP by far the largest in number and presence (Stanford University 1945b, 155).

24. "A.S.T.P. Press Day" and "Press Release—HX38 by Nick Bourne, United Press Staff Correspondent," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

25. "Army Contracts Binder," "Training Unit Contract—War Department," May 3, 1943, and "A.S.T.P. Contract No. W-59-AST-(SC IX)-11," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 130, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

26. "A.S.T.P. Directors and Assistant Directors" and "Memorandum of Meeting of the AST Directors, with the President and Financial Vice President on Thursday, December 30, 1943," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

27. "A.S.T.P. Curriculum, Tests, Etc.—Sept. Oct. Nov." and "Memo from Colonel John R. Eden, Commandant to the President, Stanford University, California," December 1, 1943, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 131, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

28. Leland Stanford borrowed from Ezra Cornell, who issued a similar claim in defining the mission of his institution (Kimball 1905, 29–47).

29. "School of Humanities" and "Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur to President Raymond B. Fosdick of the Rockefeller Foundation," November 29, 1941, old box 123; "Humanities, School of" and "Draft of Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur to Newly Appointed Faculty," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 118, both in Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

30. During the 1943–44 and 1944–45 academic years, Stanford granted more bachelor's degrees to women than to men. See Stanford University 1941a, 1942b, 1943b, 1944a, 1945b, 1946, 1947, 1948.

31. Harold Chapman Brown to Samuel B. Morris, December 12, 1941, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 116; and "Defense—Stanford National Emergency Committee," Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

32. "Humanities, School of" and "Draft of Letter from Ray Lyman Wilbur to Newly Appointed Faculty," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 123, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

33. "School of Humanities" and "Organization of the School of the Humanities," Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 118, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

34. Greene et al. 1943, viii. Theodore M. Greene, professor of philosophy at Princeton University, chairman of the committee appointed by the American Council of Learned Societies in 1936 to "reexamine" liberal education, and primary author of the committee's report, served as a visiting professor in the humanities at Stanford during World War II.

35. "School of Humanities" and "Organization of the School of the Humanities,"

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Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 118, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

36. "Humanities, School of" and "A Report for the Rockefeller Foundation on the Activities of the School of Humanities, Stanford University, September 1942–September 1943," 11–12, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 123, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA; For its second year, the school modified these introductory courses, although the course objectives remained the same. Grouped under the theme "The Nature of Man," the three revised courses were entitled "Ancient Times," "Middle Ages and the Renaissance," and "Modern Times." See Stanford University 1943a, 163.

37. "Humanities, School of" and "A Report for the Rockefeller Foundation on the Activities of the School of Humanities, Stanford University, September, 1942–September 1943," 14, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 123, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

38. "Humanities, School of" and "Memorandum from John Dodds to Humanities Faculty," November 1942, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 123, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

39. "Humanities, School of" and "Memorandum from John Dodds to Humanities Faculty," November 1942, Ray Lyman Wilbur Presidential Papers, 1914–1951, old box 123, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

40. "World War II Misc. S.U. Printed Matter 1941–1945" and "Stanford and the War," Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 185, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

41. "World War II Misc. S.U. Printed Matter 1941–1945" and "Stanford and the War," Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 185, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

42. "World War II Misc. S.U. Printed Matter 1941–1945" and "Stanford and the War," Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 185, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

43. "World War II Misc. S.U. Printed Matter 1941–1945" and "Stanford and the War," Stanford War Records, 1917–1945, box 22, folder 185, Stanford University Archives, Stanford, CA.

44. To the shock of many, Tresidder himself did not live to see the results of this process. Struck down by a heart attack in 1948, Tresidder died in New York City while touring to promote the value of the university's resources, nationally and internationally (Kiestler 1992, 109–11).

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