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The Sa sakya pa View of a *Yogin*'s Direct Perception, Based on Sa skya Paṇḍita's *Tshad ma rigs gter* and his Auto-Commentary, along with Go rams pa, Gyag ston, and Glo bo mkhan's Sub-Commentaries

Bruce J. Stewart *

Introduction

As is well known, there is extensive discussion within Indian religious/philosophical traditions concerning whether or not it is possible for an ascetic, sometimes referred to as a *yogin*, *siddha*, or *śrāmaṇa* to attain a valid direct perception into the nature of reality through mental cultivation or meditation (*bhāvanā*, *bsgom pa*). Within the orthodox Brahmanical Vedic traditions there are both proponents and detractors of the possibility of a *yogi* gaining a direct insight into the nature of reality. Among Brahmanical proponents, the prodigious Sāṃkhya scholar Patañjali includes in his *Yogasūtra* a number of aphorisms that delineate the extraordinary attainments of a *yogi* that result from his having attained higher levels of meditation (Franco 2009: 6-7). On the other hand, the Mīmāṃsā, considered one of the most orthodox of the Brahmanical Vedic traditions, and the materialist Cārvākas, categorically deny the possibility that the *yogin*'s perception can yield any special knowledge. Within the Codanāsūtra and Pratyakṣapriccheda sections of his *Ślokavārttika* the 7th century Mīmāṃsaka philosopher Kumāriḷa ardently puts forth arguments to demonstrate the inability of yogic perception yielding any special knowledge regarding reality; Kumāriḷa's efforts are directed to

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clearly indicate that it is only by means of scripture, as exemplified by the Vedas, that one can gain insight into *dharmā*.¹

Within the Buddhist epistemological tradition established by Dignāga (circa 480-540) and further developed by Dharmakīrti (6th or 7th century) it is held that there are two valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*) which are direct perception (*pratyakṣa*, *mngon sum*) and inference (*anumāna*, *rjes su dpag*). Further, it is stated that there are two valid cognitions because there are two distinct objects of valid cognition (*prameya*, *gzhal bya*). The object of direct perception is the individual characterized phenomena (*svalakṣaṇa*, *rang mtshan*), which is said to exist in the absolute sense (*paramārthasat*, *don dam du yod pa*) and the object of inference is the generally characterized phenomena (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, *spyi mtshan*) which is considered to exist in the conventional sense (*saṃvṛtisat*, *kun rdzob tu yod pa*).² Early in the ‘Direct Perception’ (*pratyakṣa*) chapter of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (hereafter *PS*) *Prat*, 3c (W/2d), Dignāga presents the defining characteristic of direct perception as “A direct perception which is free of conceptual thought” (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*, *rtog pa dang bral mngon sum*). In his *Pramāṇavārttika* (hereafter *PV*),

¹ For a full discussion of the Mīmāṃsakas rejection of yogic perception see McCrea 2009, 55-70.

² See Dignāga’s *Tshad ma kun las btus*, 1, 4-5: *mngon sum dang ni rjes su dpag / tshad ma’o mtshan nyid gnyis gzhal bya*. [There are two valid cognitions—direct perception and inference. The object of valid cognition is two characters.] This text is inputted by Sachan International in Kathmandu, Nepal (nd). This text is numbered 118 in ‘*Tshad ma*’ section. See Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Pratyakṣa* chapter verses 1a as cited by Shasrti 1968: 98 as well as Miyasaka 1971-72: 42: *mānaṃ dvividhaṃ meyvadvividhyāt* (verse 1a) / [There are two valid cognitions [literally ‘measures’] because the objects are two.] For the Tibetan of verse 1a see Miyasaka 1971-71: 43: *gzhal bya gnyis phyir tshad ma gnyis /*. While Miyasaka has ‘*meva*’, Shastri reads ‘*viśaya*’. And verse 3 as cited by Shastri 1968: 100 and Miyasaka, 42: (*arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇaḥ*). [The one that is capable of purposeful activity is here explained as existent in absolute sense, the other one is explained as existent in the conventional sense. The two are individual characterized phenomena and generally characterized phenomena, respectively.] For the Tibetan of verse 3 see Miyasaka 1971-71: 43: *don dam don (byed nus pa gang) / de ‘dir don dam yod pa yin / gzhan ni kun rdsob yod pa ste / de dag ran spyi’s mtshan nyid bshad /*.

Prat, 123a, Dharmakīrti follows the definition presented by Dignāga's *PS Prat*, 3c (W/2d); however, in his *Nyāyabindu* (hereafter *NB*) *Prat*, and *Pramāṇviniśaya*, (hereafter *PVin*) he includes an additional requirement that a *pratyakṣa* should be 'without error' (*ahrānta, ma 'khrul ba*).³

The possibility and role of the perception of the *yogi* figured prominently within the Buddhist epistemological tradition. It first was addressed by Dignāga in the 'Direct Perception' chapter of his *PS*, where he includes yogic perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa, rnal 'byor mngon sum*) as one of the four types of perception that are considered as a valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*).⁴ Dignāga, however, limits his description of the *yogin's* perception to a single comment in which he declares *PS, Prat*, 6ab [W/5ab] "The *yogin's* seeing only an unmixed object through the guru's instruction [is also a direct perception]." The other three types of direct perception delineated by Dignāga in his *PS* are (outer) sense direct perception (*indriya-pratyakṣa, dbang po mngon sum*); mental direct perception (*mānasa-pratyakṣa, yid gi mngon sum*); and self-

³ See Shastri 1968: 138 as well as Miyasaka 1971-72: 56 regarding *PV Prat* 123a, and Steinkellner 2005: 2 for Dignāga's *PS Prat*, 3c. Regarding Dharmakīrti's *NB* expanded definition see Dharmakīrti 1954: 8 and Scherbatsky, 1962 Vol. Two: 14, numbered as verse 4 and Vetter 1966: 40 for *PVin*. Regarding Dharmakīrti's expanded definition, it is interesting to note that Wayman 1977-78: 391 comments that Dharmakīrti was in fact reinstating the characteristic 'without error' from the earlier '*Hetuvidyā*' section of Asaṅga's *Yogācārbhūmi*: there the term used is *avibhrānta*. The in-text numbering of this *PS* verse is as cited by Steinkellner 2005 and Hattori 1968. It should be noted, however, that Wayman 1999: 127-129 presents a plausible argument for an alternate numbering of *PS Prat*, verses; Wayman numbers the verses cited above as *PS Prat*, 2d. See Stewart 2016: 75.n1 and Wayman 1999: 127-129 for a further discussion of this topic. Therefore, when reference is made to relevant *PS Prat*, verses, both the verse numbering of Hattori and Steinkellner as well as that utilized by Wayman are presented; Wayman's will be in brackets, i.e., [W/Xy].

⁴ For a discussion regarding whether or not Dignāga accepted three or four types of direct perception, see Stewart 2016: 84-86 in the section entitled: 'Self-cognizing Direct Perception as a Third Independent *pratyakṣa-cum-pramāṇa*'. The crux of the discussion focuses on whether Dignāga intended for *svasamvedana-pratyakṣa* to be an independent *pratyakṣa* or merely a sub-variety of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*. See Dreyfus 1997: 289=293 and Wayman 1999: XVI-XVII for a discussion of different Hindu [Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka], Jain, and Buddhist interpretations of the function of *pramāṇa*.

cognizing direct perception (*svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*, *rang rig mngon sum*).⁵ It should be noted that Dignāga's indirect follower Dharmakīrti who further developed the Buddhist epistemological tradition also presents the above four types of direct perception in his *NB, Prat*, verses 7 -11 (Wayman, 1999: 44-45). Thus the *yogin's* direct perception should be both 'free from conceptual thought' and 'without error.'

In addition to being 'free from conceptual thought' and 'without error' Dharmakīrti stressed that a *pratyakṣa* as a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), is a non-deceptive (*avisamvādi*, *mi slu ba*) cognition. When outlining the parameters of the *yogin's* perception in *PV Prat*, 281-286, Dharmakīrti states that as discussed previously [referring to *PV Sid*, 1a-c-which is addressed below] the cognition of the *yogi* is born from mental cultivation (*bhāvanāmaya*, *bsgoms byung*) and thereby dispels the net of conceptual thought (*vidhūtakalanājala*, *rtog pa'i dra ba rnam bsal ba*), and is vivid (*spaṣṭa*, *gsal ba*). Dharmakīrti cautions, however, just because a cognition is born from mental cultivation does not imply that the cognition focuses on a real (*bhūta*, *yang dag*) object, noting even a cognition born from mental cultivation of an unreal (*abhūta*, *yang dag min*) object can result in cognition that is vivid and free from conceptual thought. To illustrate his point concerning instances where unreal objects are perceived as real, Dharmakīrti notes that individual who are afflicted by desire, anguish, or fear and by dreams about thieves, etc., behold their objects as though they are present before them even though the object is unreal. When commenting on Dharmakīrti's statement, Manorathanandin indicates the [Four] Noble Truths, etc., (*āryasātyādi*) as an example of contemplating a proper object. In

⁵ See Steinkellner 2005 for Sanskrit of *PS Prat*, 4ab: *asādhāraṇahetutvād akṣais tad vyapadiśyate* / [That (*pratyakṣa*) is signified by a sense organ because of being the unshared cause (of each one)]; *Prat*, 6a-d: *mānasam cārtharāgādi svasamvittir akalpikā / yoginām gurunirdeśāvyavakīrṇārthamātradrk* / [Also, the mental [*pratyakṣa*] of the object as well as self-cognizing cognition of passion, etc., are without conceptual thought. [Also], the *yogin's* seeing only an unmixed object through the *guru's* instruction [is also a *pratyakṣa*]. Cf. *Tshad ma kun las btus*, 1, 7-10.: *thun mong min pa'i rgyu yi phyir / de yi tha snyad dbang pos byas / ... / yid kyang don dang chags la sogs / rang rig rtog pa med pa yin / rnal 'byor rnam kyis bla mas bstan / ma 'dres pa yi don tsam mthong /*

terms of meditative practices, Dharmakīrti points out that there are instances when certain Buddhist meditative practices utilizing unreal entities, such as disagreeable (*aśubhā*) entities and the whole of the earth, etc., can create a cognition that is vivid and free from conceptual thought by the force of mental cultivation; when commenting on *PV Prat*, 284, Monorathanadin presents examples such as meditating on a corpse turning blue (*vinīlaka*) or the putrid smell (*vipūyaka*) of a corpse or a corpse as an accumulation of bones (*asthisamkala*). Providing another seemingly cautionary note, Dharmakīrti states that while whatever one contemplates, whether real or unreal, results in a vivid and non-conceptual cognition (*dhī, blo*) upon the perfection of the mental cultivation, only a direct perception that is vivid, free from conceptual thought, and undecieving (*saṃvādin, slu ba med can*) is accepted [by us] as a valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*).⁶ As to what constitutes the

⁶ See Shasrti 1968: 184-185 as well as Miyasaka 1971-72: 78-80 for the Sanskrit of *PV Prat*, verses 281-286: *prāguktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ teṣaṃ tad bhāvanāṃ ayam /vidhūtakalpanājālm spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate* // [281] *kāmasōkabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ / abhūtān api paśyanti purato 'vasthitān iva* // [282] *na vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsītā / svapne 'pi smaryate smārtiṃ na ca tat tādr̥g arthavat* // [283] *aśubhā pṛthivī kṛtsnādyabhūtān api varṇyate / spaṣṭābhaṃ nirvikalpān ca bhāvanābalanirmītam* // [284] *tasmād bhūtān abhūtān vā yad yad evābhībhāvyaṭe / bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphuṭākālpadhīphalam* // [285] *tatra pramāṇaṃ saṃvādi yat prān nirnītavastuvat / tad bhāvanājam praṭyakṣam iṣṭam śeṣā upaplavāḥ* // [286]. Where Miyasaka's transliteration differed from Shastri's Sanskrit text, Shastri's Sanskrit text was followed. See Miyasaka 1971-72, 79-81 for the Tibetan of these verses: *rnal 'byor shes pa sngar bshad pa / de dag gi de bsgoms byung yin / rtog pa'i dra ba rnam bsal bas / gsal ba nyid du snang ba yin* // [281] *'dod 'jigs myang na gyis brlams dang / rkun po rmi sogs kyis bslad pas / mdun na gnas pa bzhin du ni / yang dag min pa 'ang mthong bar 'gyur* // [282] */rnam par rtog dang rjes 'brel ni / don gsal snang ba can ma yin / rmi lam na yang dran pa de / de 'dra'i don ldan min par dran* // [283] *mi gtsang zad par sa la sogs / yang dag min pa 'ang bsgoms pa yi / stobs kyi sprul pa rtog med dang / gsal bar snang ba can du mthong* // [284] *de phyi yang dag yang dag min / gang gang shin tu bsgoms gyur pa / bsgom pa yongs su rdogs pa na / de gsal mi rtog blo 'bras can* // [285] *de la sngar bshad dngon pa bzhin / slu ba med can gang yin de / bsgoms byung mngon sum tshad mar 'dod / lhag ma nye bar bslang ba yin* // [286]. Cf. Shastri 1968: 185 for Manorathanandin's comment concerning the Four Noble Truths in verse 285: *tasmād bhūtāmāryasatyādi abhūtamaśubhādi...*; as well as Monorathanadin's comment regarding contemplating unreal disagreeable objects such as a

‘undeceiving’ characteristic that qualifies a direct perception as a valid cognition, Dharmakīrti comments that this has been explained previously (*prāguktaṃ, sngar bshad pa*), referring to *PV Sid*, 1a-c, where he states that “A valid cognition is a non-deceptive (*avisamvādi*) cognition. Non-deception is the principle of a successful activity (*arthakriyāśhīti, don byed nus par gnas pa*).”⁷ Therefore, on the fundamental level the perception of a yogi like the other three kinds of direct perception needs to be ‘non-deceptive’ as well as ‘free from constructive thought and without error’.

To various degrees and assuming differing positions, other eminent Indian Buddhist scholars contributed to the discussion concerning the possibility and role of the *yogin*’s direct perception. As opposed to the epistemological tradition’s intensive focus on valid cognition, including that of the *yogin*’s direct perception, the Madhyamaka tradition founded by Nāgārjuna [circa 2nd/3rd century] through his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*) initially has relatively little to say on this subject, other than general comments in *MMK* 24.24 regarding cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the path (*mārga*). Rather than examining the possibility of developing insight into the true nature of reality born from mental cultivation (*bhāvanāmaya, bsgom byung*), the Madhyamaka, at least at the early stages, emphasized and fostered a more scholarly approach, clearing the way for a direct non-conceptual apprehension of the nature of the

corpse: *aśubhā vinīlakavipīyakāsthisaṃkalādikā*.... See also Eltschinger 2009: 192-196 for a discussion of *PV Prat*, verse 281-286.

⁷ See Shasrī 1968: 3 as well as Miyasaka 1971-72: 2 for the Sanskrit of *PV Sid*, verse 1a-1b-c: *pramāṇamavisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāśhītiḥ / avisamvādanam.../*. See Miyasaka 1971-72: 3 for the Tibetan of this verse: *tshad ma bslu med can shes pa /don byed nus par gnas pa ni / mi slu.../*. Regarding the term ‘principle of [a possible] successful activity’ (*arthakriyāśhīti, don byed nus par gnas pa*), in article entitled “Arthakriya” in *The Adyar Library Bulletin* 1967-68: 56, M. Nagatomi laid out a two-fold interpretation of this term as used by Dharmakīrti. On one side it has an ontological sense in terms of causal efficacy, in the sense being a condition of reality. Nagatomi refers *PV Prat*, 3ab stating “That which is able to perform a function exists ultimately.” Secondly, Nagatomi notes *arthakriyā*’s epistemological sense where it fulfills a practical purpose and refers to Dharmakīrti’s *Drop of Reasoning*: “Since correct cognition is a prerequisite for achieving all human purpose (*artha, don*), I shall explain it.”

phenomenal world.⁸ While not directly mentioning *yogin's* direct perception, the Madhyamaka scholar Candrakīrti (600-650 CE), at least likely in a partial response to the increasing influence of Dignāga's epistemological system, references preternatural cognitions (*mngon shes, abhijñā*). As noted by MacDonald [2009, 135], in *Madhyakāvātāra* 3.11 Candrakīrti states that the Bodhisattva who attains the third Bodhisattva stage (*sa, bhūmi*) "illuminating" sometimes called "Luminous" (*'od byed, prabhākai*), not only completely exhausts his desire and hatred but also perfects intensive meditative concentration (*bstam gtan, dhyana*) which results in his attaining preternatural cognition (*mngon shes, abhijñā*). In his *bhāṣya* on MA 3.11, Candrakīrti merely repeats the description of the five varieties of preternatural cognition as listed in the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* and has nothing to add.⁹ However, it should be noted that the Yogācāra-Mādhyamika scholar Śāntarakṣita (725-783) in his *Tattvasaṃgraha* as well as Kamalaśīla (740-795) in his *Pañjikā* on that text do support the idea of the *yogin's* direct perception as long as one is not hampered by obscuration of the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*) (Jha 1937, verses 3381–3389). In his *Madhyamakāloka*, Kamalaśīla qualifies his acceptance

⁸ Vetter 1982: 96, n21 as cited by See MacDonald 2009: 134.n.2 where the views of opponents are subject of analysis in *MMK*. See Jackson 2019: 138-139, when pointing out Tsong kha pa's insights in to the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, the need to employ 'a rational' approach is clearly evident when examining epistemological or soteriological issues. In terms of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka position regarding epistemology, Jackson notes that in Tsong kha pa view "it is not only legitimate but vital to employ the perceptual and inferential cognitions described by Dharmakīrti and other 'logicians' as a basis for understanding both conventional and ultimate phenomena. Although conventional phenomena are intrinsically empty and illusion like—indeed, they are mere nominal designations—they cannot simply be dismissed as unreal, and while ultimate reality is both empty and beyond rational comprehension it cannot simply be described as 'inconceivable' but must be investigated rationally." Also, see Jackson 2019: 406 for a discussion of various Gelukpa and Kagyüpa mahāmudrā masters' views on the role of analytical reasoning on the path to direct realization of reality.

⁹ MacDonald 2009: 134-135. See MacDonald 2009: 133ff and Dreyfus 1997: 451ff for an extensive discussion of Candrakīrti's outline of the cognitive process based on a Madhyamaka foundation. For further discussion of the five types of *abhijñās*, see the section below discussing 'Differentiation of the Yogins' Direct Perception in Terms of Its Nature' [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B.2].

of the *yogin*'s perception by noting that *yogi-pratyakṣa*, like the other *pramāṇas*, is accepted conventionally. Intriguingly, however, this does not prevent Kamalaśīla from stating that the superior *yogin* (*rnal 'byor dam pa*) comprehends the selflessness of all *dharmas*.¹⁰

A number of other prominent Buddhist philosophers not only addressed the issue of the *yogin*'s direct perception, but also wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti's writings. For instance, both Dharmottara and Vinītadeva wrote commentaries on Dharmakīrti's *NB*, an introductory work on Buddhist epistemology and logic, both titled *Nyāyabimdu-ṭīkā*; Dharmottara also wrote a commentary on the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* [*ṭīkā*]. Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta, among others, wrote substantial commentaries on what can be considered Dharmakīrti's foundational work, the *Pramāṇavārttika*. And finally, the issue of yogic perception remained a significant point of contention within the Indian epistemological tradition during the course of the first millennium, as is evidenced by Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980-1040), who as Franco (2009: 123) notes, is often considered one of last significant Buddhist philosophers in South Asia, and composed an entire work on this issue entitled *Yoginirṇaya*.

Root Text and Commentaries Utilized to Investigate the Sa skya pa View of *Yogi-Pratyakṣa*

Within the Tibetan Buddhist tradition there continued to be an intense examination of the *yogin*'s direct perception during the highly creative period between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries C.E. As would be expected, the Sa skya pa actively engaged in these investigations with their participation firmly based on Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga' rgyal mtshan's (1182-1251) [hereafter Sa paṅ] *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter* (*Treasure on the Reasoning of Valid*

¹⁰ See Keira 2004, for an extensive presentation of the process by which Kamalaśīla accepts the *yogi-pratyakṣa* conventionally while also maintaining that the direct perception of the superior *yogi* realizes the selflessness of all *dharma*. See also, Keria 2004: 49 for discussion of Kamalaśīla's position that the direct perception of a *yogi* understands the selflessness of all *dharmas*. Cf. also MacDonald 2009: 146-149.

Knowledge, [hereafter *TMRG*]).¹¹ Sa paṇ's intention in writing the *TMRG* was to correct what he perceived as misunderstandings of the Buddhist epistemological system developed by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti; Sa paṇ believed that foreign [non-Buddhist] elements had made their way into the teachings in Tibet.¹² As will be seen, Sa paṇ's criticism—as well as those of his commentators—regarding the views of other scholars are often directed at Phya pa (or Cha pa) chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) and those who followed him.

As in my earlier examination of the Sa sākya perspective on self-cognizing direct perception (*svasamvedana-pratyakṣa*, *rang rig mngon sum*), Sa paṇ's *TMRG* along with his auto-commentary, the *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi rang 'grel pa* [hereafter *TMRGRG*] will again serve as the basis for the current investigation of the Sa sākya pa view of *yogi* direct perception.¹³ In addition to Sa paṇ's auto-commentary, greater insight into the subtext and context of the Sa sākya pa position will be enhanced by utilizing the sub-commentary by the renowned Sa sākya pa scholar Kun mkhyen Go rams pa Bsod nams sneg ge's (1429-1489) [hereafter Go rams pa], *Sde bdun mdo dang bcas pa'i dgongs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel*

¹¹ For this examination the primary version of Sa sākya Paṇḍita's *TMRG* is the text inputted by Sachan International in Kathmandu, Nepal (nd). This text is numbered 132 in 'Tshad ma' section.

¹² See Stewart 2016: 77-78 for additional comments regarding Sa paṇ's early study of Buddhist epistemology and his travel to Chu mig ring mo circa 1204-5 to study with the great Kashmiri Paṇḍita Śākyaśrībhadrā (d. 1225?) in order to gain a true understanding of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's system. Śākyaśrībhadrā arrived in Tibet circa 1204 as a refugee after Muslim armies invaded India in the late 12th century; Śākyaśrībhadrā was the chief abbot at the well-known Buddhist university of Vikramaśīla when it was destroyed by the invading forces of Baktyar Khilji. Sa paṇ's studies with Śākyaśrībhadrā include their collaboration, around 1210, to retranslate Dharmakīrti's *PV*: this retranslation resulted in the *PV* superseding Dharmakīrti's *PVin* as the foremost logical/epistemological text in Tibet. See also Roerich 1976: 355; van der Kujip 1979: 409; Introduction Go rams pa 1975; Jackson 1987: 25; Rhoton 2002: 11; Stewart 2012: 54.

¹³ The primary version utilized in this undertaking is Sa sākya Paṇḍita's *TMRGRG* as inputted by Sachan International in Kathmandu, Nepal (nd). This text is number 133 in the 'Tshad ma' section. See Stewart 2016 for a detailed examination of the Sa sākya pas' view of self-cognizing direct perception.

pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed (Clarifying the Meaning of the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, which Unerringly Explains the Intention of [Dharmakīrti's] Seven Texts along with [Dignāga's] Sūtra) [hereafter *TMRGDG*].¹⁴ I also will refer to the works of two additional significant Sa skya scholars: Gyag ston sangs rgyas dpal's (1348-1414) [hereafter Gyag ston] *Sde bdun gyi dgongs 'grel tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi de kho nyid gsal bar byed pa rigs pa'i 'od stong 'phro ba (Radiating a Thousand Lights of Reasoning, [A Commentary] Illuminating the Real Essence of [Sa paṅ's] Tshad ma rigs gter, A Commentary on the Thought of [Dharmakīrti's] Seven Texts)* [hereafter *TMRGDK*] and Glo bo mkhan chen's (1456-1532) [hereafter Glo bo mkhan] *Tshad ma rigs gter gyi 'grel pa'i rnam bshad rigs lam gsal pa'i nyi ma (The Sun illuminating the Way of Reasoning, A Commentary on the Tshad ma rigs gter)* [hereafter *TMRGRN*].¹⁵ Finally, it is interesting that the renowned nineteenth century Rnying ma scholar 'Jam-mngon 'ju Mi pham rgya mstho (1846-1912) [hereafter Mi pham] composed a commentary on Sa paṅ's *TMRG* entitled *Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter mchan gyis 'grel pa phyogs las rnam par rgyal ba'i ru mstho (The Weapon Victorious in All Directions, An Annotated Commentary [of Sa paṅ's] Tshad ma rigs gter)* [hereafter *TMRGCG*]. Where Mi pham provides clarity, his comments will be included.¹⁶

While Go rams pa's influence on the Sa skya pa tradition is well known, the significant contribution and influence of Gyag ston and Glo bo mkhan has only been appreciated recently. Gyag ston's *TMRGDK* has been recognized as heightening interest in Sa paṅ's *TMRG* and causing other Sa skay pa scholars such as Rong ston Shes bya kun rig (1367-1449) and his disciple/student Go

¹⁴ In this undertaking primary use is made of Go rams pa 1975.

¹⁵ For Gyag ston's *TMRGDK*, the version of this text as inputted by Sachen International in Kathmandu, Nepal, (nd). The text is numbered 134 within the 'Tshad Ma' section. Glo bo mkhan's *TMRGRN* utilized Glo bo mkhan chan 1988.

¹⁶ This version of Mi pham's text was published 1970, Jun-be-si: s.n. and is available in Pecha Collection at Columbia University's East Asian Library, Kent Hall.

rams pa to focus on the *TMRG* and *TMRGRG*.¹⁷ Regarding Glo bo mkhan, Gene Smith points out in *Among Tibetan Texts* (2001: 111-116) that Glo bo mkhan's commentary on the *TMRG* provides a fresh and often thought-provoking perspective on Sa paṅ's treatise, and more recently, Jowita Kramer, in *A Noble Abbot from Mustang* (2008), has demonstrated the impact of Glo bo mkhan's life and works. Options regarding the extent and nature of the relationship between Glo bo mkhan and Go rams pa run the gamut from van der Kuijp, who includes Glo bo mkhan among Go rams pa's foremost students, to J. Kramer who repeatedly expresses her skepticism that the two scholars ever met. At various points along this continuum, there is G. Smith, who notes that it is possible that Glo bo mkhan may have studied with Go rams pa and J. Cabezón, who reports that Glo bo mkhan was writing at Go rams pa's monastery at Rta nag in 1481.¹⁸

Sa paṅ's auto-commentary, Go rams pa's *TMRGDG* as well as the commentaries of Gyag ston and Glo bo mkhan follow the initial division of the *TMRG* into eleven chapters (*rab byed*) which are divided into two overall sections; chapters one through seven are in the first section [1] entitled: 'To ascertain the general characteristics (*spyi ldog*) of knowable objects; and the remaining chapters are in the second section [2], entitled: 'To ascertain the essence of the valid cognition as the knower.' Specifically, the chapters within sections 1 and 2 of Sa paṅ's *TMRGRG* are as follows:

Section 1. Ascertaining the general characteristics of the knowable object, 1

1.A. Knowable Object (*shes bya'i yul, jñeya*) [Chapter 1, 1]

¹⁷ Dreyfus 1997: 24. Cf. also Cabezón and Dargyay 2007: 34 where it is noted that Go rams pa traveled to Nalendra Monastery in Central Tibet 1447 to study under Rong ston Shes Bya kun rig. However, by the time Go rams pa arrived Rong ston Shes bya was seriously ill, and died the following year. So, it is not likely that Go rams pa received much direct instruction from Rong ston Shes bya.

¹⁸ See van der Kuijp 1983: 16; Kramer 2007: 36 and 67; Smith 2001: 112; and Cabezón 2007: 269, n. 200. See also Stewart 2014: 141-154 for an initial evaluation of the relationship between Go rams pa and Glo bo mkhan as viewed through their respective commentaries on Sa paṅ's *TMRG*.

12 *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 22, 2021-22

- 1.B. To determine the perceiving cognition (*shes byed kyi blo*) [Chapter 2, 19]
- 1.C.1. The manner of realizing [the object by the cognition by means] of the general (*spyi, sāmānya*) and the specific (*bye brag, viśeṣa*) [Chapter 3, 34]
- 1.C.2. The manner of realizing [the object by the cognition by means] of appearance (*snang ba, pratibhā*) and elimination (*sel ba, apoha*) [Chapter 4, 46]
- 1.C.3. The manner of realizing [the object by the mind by means] of the signified (*brjod bya, vācya*) and the signifier (*rjod byed, vācaka*) [Chapter 5, 78]
- 1.C.4.A. The manner of realizing [the object by the mind by means] of relation (*'brel pa, sambandha*) [Chapter 6, 91]
- 1.C.4.B. Ascertaining the purpose of exclusion (*'gal ba, virodha*) [in terms of the mind realizing the object] [Chapter 7, 134]

Section 2. Ascertaining the essence of the valid cognition as the knower, 146

- 2.A. Presentation of the defining characteristics (*mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa*) [of the valid cognitions as the knower] [Chapter 8, 146]
- 2.B. Establishing the purpose of each illustration (*mtshan gzhi, lakṣman*), 208
 - 2.B.1. Direct Perception [Chapter 9, 208]
 - 2.B.2. Inference, 252
 - 2.B.2.A. Inference for oneself (*rjes dpag rang gi don, svārthānumāna*) [Chapter 10, 252]
 - 2.B.2.B. Inference for others (*rjes dpag gzhand gyi don*). [Chapter 11, 337].¹⁹

¹⁹ See *TMRGRG* as follows: Section 1, *shes bya spyi ldog nas gtan la dbab pa*; Chapter 1, 1: *shes bya'i yul*; Chapter 2, 19: *shes byed kyi blo dtag la dbab pa*; Chapter 3, 34: *blo des yul rtogs pa'i tshul*; Chapter 4, 46: *snang ba dang sel bas rtogs tshul*; Chapter 5, 78: *brjod pa bya dang rjod byed rtogs pa'i tshul*; Chapter 6, 91: *'brel pa'i tshul*; Chapter 7, 134: *'gal pa'i don nges par bya ba*; Section 2A., 146, *shes byed tshad mai'i rang bzhin nges par bya ba*; Chapter 8, 146, *mishad kyi rnam gzhas*; Section 2.B., 208, *mishan gzhi so so'i don*; Chapter 9, 208, *mngon sum*; Chapter 10, 252, *rang don rjes dpag*; Chapter 11, 337, *gzhan don rjes dpag*.

Sa bcaḍ

When initiating a particular subject under consideration in the *TMRGRG*, Sa paṅ includes a topical heading (*sa bcaḍ*) describing what will be discussed in the ensuing section. The topical headings are quite useful for navigating the text, and so will be included as needed in the present inquiry into the *yogin's* direct perception. Go rams pa and the other commentators for the most part follow the topical headings outlined by Sa paṅ, with some delineating the subject-matter in even greater detail. When describing the content of the *TMRG's* ninth chapter, investigating direct perception, Sa paṅ's *TMRGRG* lists three overall topics:

- 2.B.1.A. Correct Direct Perception (*mngon sum yang dag, samyak-pratyakṣa*)
- 2.B.1.B. Semblance of Direct Perception (*mngon sum ltar snang, pratyakṣābhāsa*)
- 2.B.1.C. Valid Cognition-as-Result (*tshad ma dang 'bras bu, pramāṇa-phala*)

Furthermore, Sa paṅ notes that the following three issues need to be addressed in order to adequately describe 'Correct Direct Perception':

- 2.B.1.A.1. The Defining Characteristics [of correct direct perception] (*mtshan nyid, lakṣaṇa*)
- 2.B.1.A.2. The Differentiation of What is Defined (*mtshon bya, lakṣya*)
- 2.B.1.A.3. The Significance of Each Illustration (*mtshon gzhi, lakṣman*) [i.e., each type direct perception]

After expending considerable effort to lay out the Sa skya pa understanding of the defining characteristics of a correct direct perception and its four varieties in sections 2.B.1.A.1. and 2.B.1.A.2., Sa paṅ proceeds to unpack in detail the *yogin's* direct perception in section 2.B.1.A.3., where he discusses the significance of each of the four varieties of direct perception: sense direct perception [2.B.1.A.3.A. *TMRG*, verses 9-16, 30, *TMRGRG*, 212], mental direct perception, [2.B.1.A.3.B. *TMRG* verses 17-36, 30-31, *TMRGRG*, 214], self-cognizing direct perception [2.B.1.A.3.C. *TMRG* verses 37-42, 31, *TMRGRG*, 218], and yogic

14 *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 22, 2021-22

direct perception [2.B.1.A.3.D. *TMRG* verses 43-129, 31-33, *TMRGRG*, 219].²⁰

The *Yogin*'s Direct Perception [2.B.1.A.3.D.]

Sa paṅ initiates his examination of the significance of the *yogin*'s direct perception by quoting an unidentified *sūtra* [*mdo las*, per Gyag ston's *TMRGDK*, 114], "Even the direct perception of the *yogi* is referred to by the Tathāgatas as 'the flawless and perfect eye of dharma towards all dharmas; it is pure, immaculate and without dust.'" He follows this by referring to Dignāga's *PS Prat*, 6ab (W/5ab) which states [the direct perception of the *yogi* is the] "yogin's seeing only an unmixed object through the guru's instruction," as well as Dharmakīrti's *PV Prat*, 281ab, "As previously discussed, the knowledge of those *yogins* is born of cultivation (*bsgom byung*, *bhāvanāmaya*)." Highlighting the direction the inquiry will take, Sa paṅ states that in order to determine the significance of these statements there are three areas that need to be addressed:

- 2.B.1.A.3.D.1. Pinpointing the nature (*rang bzhin*, *svabhāva*) [of the *yogin*'s direct perception]
- 2.B.1.A.3.D.2. The principle by which [the *yogin*'s direct perception] is a valid cognition towards an object (*yul*, *viṣaya*)
- 2.B.1.A.3.D.3. The reasoning (*tshad ma*, *pramāṇa*) which establishes [the perception of the *yogi*]²¹

²⁰ See Stewart 2012 for a detailed discussion of the Sa skya pa's understanding on the defining characteristics and variegations of direct perception (*mngon sum*, *pratyakṣa*) according to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's epistemological system. Further, see Stewart 2016 for an in-depth consideration of the Sa skya pa perspective on self-cognizing direct perception (*rang rig mngon sum*, *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*) as presented by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

²¹ See *TMRGRG*, 219, 3-8: *rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum yang bde bar gshegs pas chos rnam la chos kyi mig rdul med cing dri ma dang bral ba rnam par dag / ces gsungs pa dang / kun las btus las / rnal 'byor rnam kyis bla ma bsten / ma 'dres pa yi don tsam mthong / zhes gsungs pa dang / rnam 'grel las / rnal 'byor shes pa sngar bshad pa / de dag gi de bsgom byung yin / zhes gsungs pa'i don gtan la dbab na gsum ste / rang bzhin ngos gzung ba / yul la tshad mar gyur pa'i tshul / de sgrub byed kyi tshad ma'o /*. Regarding 2.B.1.A.3.D.3., Go rams pa has *rigs pa* instead of *tshad ma*, per *TMRGDG*, 149, 10. While speculative, Sa paṅ's quoting three different sources may refer to the 'three kinds of wisdom' (*tri-vidhāḥ prajñāḥ*, *shes rab rnam pa*

Here, I will focus on the first two topics within Sa paṅ's presentation of the direct perception of the *yogi*, namely, pinpointing the nature of the *yogin's* direct perception and the principle by which the *yogin's* direct perception is a valid cognition regarding an object. The third topic, i.e., the reason that establishes the perception of the *yogi* will be the focus of a future communication.

Pinpointing the Nature of the *Yogin's* Direct Perception [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.]

In order to pinpoint the nature of the *yogin's* direct perception, Sa paṅ highlights three areas to ponder:

- 2.B.1.A.3.D.1.A. The defining characteristic [of the *yogin's* direct perception]
- 2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B. The differentiation (*dbye ba*, *bhed*) [of the *yogin's* direct perception]
- 2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C. The cause (*rgyu*, *kāraṇa*) [of the *yogin's* direct perception]

In order to determine the defining characteristic of this type of direct perception [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.A], Sa paṅ first refutes others whom he believes have mistakenly characterized the *yogin's* direct perception, and second, he presents what he considers to be the correct characterization of this variety of direct perception. Quoting from his *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* verse 43 [repeat of *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* verse 9], *TMRGRG* states: “Having separated [direct perception and direct perception as a valid cognition, some Tibetan scholars] mistakenly established the defining characteristic [of direct perception as a valid cognition].”²²

gsum gyi ming la), i.e., quoting a *sūtra* refers to ‘wisdom born of listening’ (*śrutamayī prajñā*, *thos pa las byung ba'i shes rab*) and quoting Dignāga's *PS* and Dharmakīrti's *PV* represents ‘wisdom born of rational reflection’ (*cintāmayī prajñā*, *bsam pa las byung ba'i shes rab*) and ‘wisdom born of contemplation’ (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, *bsgom pa las byung ba'i shes rab*) respectively.

²² Sa paṅ utilizes this verse twice within the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter; first in Verse 9 immediately prior to initiating the examination of the definition of sense direct perception and second, in the current discussion of the definition of *yogi* direct perception. See *TMRG*, 30, 10 for verse 9 and 31, 8 for verse 43, and *TMGRG*, 219, 9: *phye nas mtshan nyid 'jog pa 'khrul* /.

Early in the ‘Direct Perception’ chapter, when discussing verse 9 [209, 2-6] regarding the general definition of direct perception, Sa paṅ initially points out that some Tibetan scholars [i.e., Phya pa (or Cha pa) chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169) and others as noted by Go rams pa TMRGDG 1975, 125, 4] differentiated between direct perception and direct perception as a valid cognition (*mngon sum tshad ma, pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*). Regarding verse 9, Sa paṅ remarks that those Tibetan scholars state that the definition of direct perception is an awareness that is ‘without error and free from conceptual thought’ (*rtog brel ma ’khrul pa, kalpanāpoḍhamabhrānta*). Sa paṅ has no objection to this definition of direct perception. However, Sa paṅ empathically states that the definition of a direct perception as a valid cognition put forth by Phya pa, et al., as an awareness that “eliminates superimposition (*sgro ’gogs, adhyāropa*) due to the immediate experience of a previously unrealized object,” is wrong. Sa paṅ asserts that this bifurcation is wrong for two reasons. First a two-fold division is not set forth in authoritative texts such as *PS* and *PV*. And second, it is not possible for a direct perception that lacks a ‘cognitive operation of exclusion’ to eliminate superimposition of a previously unrealized object, because that is an incompatible aspect of an actual direct perception. That is to say, by definition a direct perception is free from conceptual thought and therefore a ‘cognitive operation of exclusion’ that eliminates superimposition is incompatible with a ‘direct perception which is free from conceptual thought’.²³

Applying his earlier comments regarding the general discussion of the bifurcation of direct perception and direct perception as a valid cognition related to verse 9, when discussing verse 43 as it relates to a *yogin’s* direct perception, Sa paṅ restates that some Tibetans have once again (incorrectly) applied the two-fold differentiated, that is to say they differentiated the defining characteristic of a *yogin’s* direct perception and the defining

²³ *TMRGRG*, 209, 2-6: *bod rnams mngon sum dang mngon sum tshad ma tha dad du phye nas / mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid rtog bral ma ’khrul pa dang / de’i tshad ma’i mtshan nyid sngar ma rtogs pa’i don la myong stobs kyis sgro ’dogs gcod pa zhes zer ba mi ’thad de / gnyis su dbye ba gzhun las ma bshad cing sngar ma rtogs pa la rnam gcad med la sgro ’dogs gcod pa mngon sum gyi rang ldog pa mi srid par bshad zin to /*

characteristic of *yogin's* direct perception as a valid cognition. Sa paṇ notes that those Tibetans state the defining characteristic of a *yogin's* direct perception as an awareness that as “without error and free from conceptual thought regarding genuine reality (*yang dag pa'i don, samyang-artha*) arising from the repeated mental cultivation of immanent reality (*de kho na, tattva*) as its governing condition (*bdag khyen, adhiprati-pratyaya*),” while setting the defining characteristic of a *yogin's* direct perception as a valid cognition as an awareness “that eliminates superimposition (*sgro 'gogs, adhyāropa*) due to the force of experiencing genuine reality not previously realized, [arising] due to the mental cultivation of immanent reality as its governing condition.” Once again, Sa paṇ notes that the bifurcation is unacceptable, and as in the former instance regarding the other Tibetans' defining characteristic of direct perception, Sa paṇ has no issue with their defining characteristic of a *yogin's* direct perception. However, Sa paṇ notes that as in the earlier instance where other Tibetan scholars' definition of direct perception as a valid means was wrong, likewise in this case their claiming that a *yogin's* direct perception as a valid cognition eliminates superimposition is impossible. Because as noted in both the above instances a direct perception is free from conceptual thought and therefore a ‘cognitive operation of exclusion’ that eliminates of superimposition would constitute conceptual activity, and as such is incompatible with a ‘direct perception which is free from conceptual thought’.²⁴

²⁴ See *TMRGRG*, 219, 9 - 220,1: *bod rnams rnal 'byor mngon sum dang / de'i tshad ma'a mtshan nyid tha dad du 'byed de rnal 'byor mngon sum'i mtshan nyid bdag rkyen de kho na goms pa'i yid las skyes shing yang dag pa'i don la rtog bral ma 'khrul pa'o / rnal 'byor mngon sum tshad ma'i mtshan nyid bdag rkyen de kho na goms pa la brten nas / sngar ma rtogs pa'i yang dag pa'i don la myong stobs kyis sgro 'dogs gcod pa zhes zer ba 'ang gnyis su 'byed pa mi 'thad cing sngar ma rtogs pa la rnam bcaid med la sgro 'dogs gcod pa mi srid par sngar bshad pa bzhin no /*. Further to the point that Sa paṇ has no issue with other Tibetan scholars' defining characteristic of *yogin's* direct perception, it should be noted that Go rams pa's definition of *yogin's* direct perception is essentially identical with the definition Sa paṇ identifies as that of the scholar Phya pa. Cf. Go rams pa's *TMRGDG*, 149, 11-14: *rang gi thun mong ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen yang dag pa'i don la sgom byung gtso bor gyur pa'i ting nge 'dzing la brten nas yang dak pa'i don la ma 'khrul bai'ba'i rig pa'o /*. Regarding the ‘governing

As for the defining characteristic of the *yogin*'s direct perception according to the Sa skya pa view, Sa paṅ states in *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* verses 44-45: “[Our view regarding the defining characteristic of the *yogin*'s direct perception is a] direct perception without error born from mental cultivation (*bsgom byung*, *bhāvanāmaya*). Every [*yogi*'s awareness] imbued with error is a falsification (*ltar snang*, *ābhāsa*) [of direct perception].”²⁵

condition' (*bdag rkyen*, *adhipati pratyaya*), Go rams pa further elaborates, referring to it as a 'uncommon governing condition' (*thun mong ma yin pa'i bdag rkyen*, *asādhāraṇa adhitpati pratyaya*). Sa paṅ is clearly focused on rejecting the two-fold division between a direct perception and direct perception as a valid cognition; he includes the rejection of the two-fold division when discussing the other three types of direct perception as well. See *TMRGRG*, 212, 8-12 regarding sense direct perception (*dbang po'i mngon sum*, *indriya-pratyakṣa*); *TMRGRG*, 21, regarding mental direct perception (*vid kyi mngon sum*, *mānasa-pratyakṣa*); and *TMRGRG*, 218, 6-7 regarding self-cognizing direct perception (*rang rig pa'i mngon sum*, *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa*). For a further discussion regarding Sa paṅ rejection of the two-fold division see Stewart 2012: 59-60.

²⁵ See *TMRG*, 31, 8-9 and *TMRGRG*, 220, 1-2: *bsgom 'byun 'khrul med mngon sum ste / 'khrul pa can rnam ltar snang yin /*. The observant reader may note that here Sa paṅ does not include 'free from conceptual thought' when presenting the defining characteristic of the *yogin*'s direct perception. Where and when both 'without error' and 'free from conceptual thought' are utilized is an interesting issue that is beyond the scope of the current investigation. However, Sa paṅ and his commentators did address this issue early in 'Chapter 9.' Briefly, when commenting on *TMRG*, 30, 8, *Mngon Sum* chapter verse 2 [Direct perception is free from conceptual thought and without error] (*mngon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba*), Go rams pa's *TMRGDG* 1975: 127, 8-16 comments that both aspects of the defining characteristic of direct perception are employed when one is concerned with dispelling misunderstanding (*log rtog sel ba*). Otherwise, when one is concerned with eliminating dissimilar types (*rigs mi mthun sel ba*), 'a cognition that is without error' can be utilized as the defining characteristic of *pratyakṣa*. And at one point during the discussion of this issue in the *TMRGRG*, Sa paṅ insightfully notes that "in fact all conceptual thought is erroneous and therefore just by stating that a [cognition] is 'without error' also establishes it as 'without conceptual thought'." (*TMRGRG*, 210, 13-15: *des na yang dag par na rtog pa thams cad 'khrul pa yin pas ma 'khrul pa zhes brjod pa nyid kyis rtog brsl du 'ang 'grub/*.) For a detailed discussion regarding the Sa skya pa view concerning the two defining characteristics of *pratyakṣa* see Stewart 2012: 59-72. Cf. Wayman 1999: 275, who observes that Tsongkha pa includes both 'free from conceptual thought' and 'without error' when defining the *yogin*'s direct perception in his "Guided Tour Through the Seven Books of Dharmakīrti."

Clarifying his view, Sa paṅ further specifies that the defining characteristic of the *yogin's* awareness (*rnal 'byor gyi shes pa, yogijñāna*) is the direct awareness that occurs from the power of mental cultivation (*bsgom pa'i stobs, bhāvanābala*); while the defining characteristic of *yogin's* direct perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa*) is the non-erroneous insight (*shes rab, prajñā*) born from mental cultivation. Sa paṅ again reminds us that just this defining characteristic of a *yogin's* direct perception also includes a direct perception as valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*), so there is no bifurcation.²⁶ Gyag ston's *TMRGDK*, following Sa paṅ's distinction between the 'yogin's awareness' and the 'yogin's direct perception', states that realization (*rig pa*) born from the power of mental cultivation is the defining characteristic of merely the *yogin's* awareness and adds that the non-erroneous awareness born from the power of mental cultivation of genuine reality (*yang dag pa'i don, bhūtārtha*) is the defining characteristic of *yogin's* direct perception.²⁷

Concerning the 'mental cultivation of genuine reality', Glo bo mkhan's *TMRGRN* cites Dharmakīrti's *NB, Prat*, verse 11 stating, "And the *yogin's* awareness arisen from the highest degree (*prakaraṣaparyanata, rab kyi mtha'*) [attained by] the mental cultivation of genuine reality [is direct perception]."²⁸ Continuing, Glo bo mkhan comments that in the *Nyāyabindu-tīka* [hereafter *NBT*], *Ācārya* Vinītadeva describes the 'highest degree' as the supreme [mundane] attribute on the path of preparation (*sbyor lam chos mchog, prayoga mārga-agradharma*). Glo bo mkhan explains that at this point the *yogin* is not yet a Noble Person (*'phags pa, ārya*) and his awareness is not yet described as the *yogin's* direct

²⁶ See *TMRGRG*, 220, 2-3: *de la rnal 'byor gyi shes pa tsam gyi mtshan nyid ni bgoms pa'i stobs las snang ba yin / rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid ni bgoms pa las byung ba ma 'khrul ba'i shes rab bo / de nyid tshad ma 'ang yid no /*

²⁷ *TMRGDK*, 115, 7-10: *rang lugs ni bsgoms pa'i stobs las byung ba'i rig pa ni rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa tsam gyi mtshan nyid yin no / yang dag pa'i don bgoms pa'i stobs las byung pa'i ma 'khrul ba'i shes pa ni rnal 'byor mngon sum gyi mtshan nyid yin no /*

²⁸ *TMRGRN* in Glo bo mkhan chan 1988: 191, 7-8: *rigs thigs las / yang dag pa'i don bsgom pa'i rab kyi mtha' las byung ba rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa'o zhes gsungs pa ltar ro /*. Sanskrit of *NB, Prat*, verse 11 per Wayman 1999: 44: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣa-paryantajam yogijñānam ceti /*

perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa*). Therefore, Glo bo mkhan notes that Vinītadeva goes on to comment that the ‘highest degree’ attained by the mental cultivation of genuine reality, i.e., the supreme [mundane] attribute of the path of preparation, is the obtaining cause for the yogi to achieve the path of vision (*mthon ba'i lam, darśanamārga*): at which point the yogin gains access to a state of deep meditative absorption (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*), i.e., the yogin's direct perception. Thus, the yogin's direct perception comes at the conclusion of mental cultivation, which is the cause. The ‘supreme [mundane] attribute’ is the highest degree among four degrees conducive to penetration (*nges 'byed cha mthun, nirvedha-bhāgīya*).²⁹ A yogi on the Mahāyāna-mārga who is still an ordinary person (*so so skye bo, pṛthagjana*) continues practicing mental cultivation as he progresses up and through the four degrees conducive to penetration. It is only due to the highest degree, ‘the supreme

²⁹ TMRGRN in Glo bo mkhan chan 1988: 191, 8-10: *rab kyi mtha' ni sbyor lam chos mchog go zhes slob dpon dul ba lha bzhed la / 'dir ni 'phags pa ma yin pa la rnal 'byor mngon sum mi bzhed la / des na rab kyi mtha' ni mthong ba'i lam thob pa bya'o /*. Cf. NBT: When discussing Dharmakīrti's *NB Prat*, verse 11, Vinītadeva, 1907: 47, 3-12, explains ‘genuine reality’ as unmistakable reality (*phyin ci ma log pa'i don*), that is, the Four Noble Truths... And the ‘highest’ mental cultivation of genuine reality, i.e. the Four Noble Truths on the path of preparation, involves the application of mindfulness (*dran pa nye bar bzhag pa, smṛtyaupasthāna*) including the stages of development of meditative warmth (*drod pa, uṣma*), spiritual summit (*rtse mo, mūrdhāna*), and patience (*bzod, kṣānti*). The fourth and ‘highest degree’ of the stage of mental cultivation is the supreme [mundane] attribute (*chos kyi mchog, agradharmā*) of the path of preparation. (...*yang dag ni phyin ci ma log pa'i don te / 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi po dag go / ...de'i rab ni yang dag ba'i don bsgoms pa'i rab ste / dran pa nye bar bzhag pa dang / dro bar gyur pa dang / rtse mo dang / bzod pa'i nas skabs so / de'i mtha' ni yang dag pa'i don bgsoms pa'i rab kyi mtha' ste / mtha' ni chos kyi mchog rnamso*). The path of preparation (*sbyor lam, prayoga-mārga*) and the path of vision (*mthon ba'i lam, darśana-mārga*) are also the second and third paths, respectively within the five-path theory based on the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. The other three paths are: (1) the path of accumulation (*tshogs lam, sambhāra-mārga*); (4) the path of mental cultivation (*sgom lam, bhāvana-mārga*); and (5) the path beyond training (*mi slob lam, asaikṣa-mārga*). See also E. Obermiller, “The Doctrine of *Prajñā-pāramitā* as Exposed in the *Abhisamayālaṅkāra* of Maitreya,” *Acta Orientalia*, vol. XI, reprint, 1932 for a comprehensive discussion of the five-paths theory.

[mundane] attribute' on the path of preparation, that the *yogi*—after having generated the right mental disposition (*yang dag sems bskyed, samyagmanaskāra*) due to having attained four roots of virtue conducive to penetration [i.e., warmth, spiritual summits, forbearance, and supreme [mundane] attribute]—is propelled to the path of vision (*mthon ba'i lam, darśanamārga*), which is the first of the ten Mahāyāna stages (*bhūmi*), commonly referred to as the “joyful stage” (*pramuditā bhūmi, rab tu dga' ba*); now an *Ārya*, the *yogi* experiences *yogi-pratyakṣa*. As will be seen below when discussing the variations of *yogi-pratyakṣa*, in addition to *yogi-pratyakṣa* of the individual on the Mahāyāna-*mārga* it will be necessary to view those individuals following the Śrāvaka-*mārga* as well as those following the Pratyekabuddha-*mārga*.

Can A *Yogi* Experience a Falsification of Direct Perception?

When examining Sa paṅ's root text (*rtsa ba'i gzhung*) and auto-commentary (*rang 'grel*) discussing the *yogin's* direct perception or his later brief discussion of the ‘Falsification of Direct Perception’ (*mngon sum ltar snang, pratyakṣābhāsa*) [*TMRG*, 33, 10-12 and *TMRGRG*, 247, 6-248, 3, respectively] there is no explicit reference to a *yogi* experiencing a falsification of direct perception. Nevertheless, immediately after presenting the definition of *yogi* direct perception as accepted by the Sa skya pa in verse 44, Sa paṅ presents verse 45 which reads “*’khrul pa can rnams ltar snang yin.*”³⁰ While not directly stated it is reasonable to assume that Sa paṅ is referring to a falsification of perception experienced by the *yogi* of verse 44 and thus we can render the verse “Every [*yogi's* awareness] imbued with error is a falsification [of direct perception].” Gyag ston offers some assistance when commenting on Sa paṅ's verse 45. Gyag ston limits his reference to this verse with this single comment which [again assuming he is

³⁰ See *TMRG*, 31, 9 and *TMRGRG*, 220 2. It is interesting to note that *TMRG*, *Mngon Sum*, verse 45 [*’khrul pa can rnams ltar snang yin*] is basically an abbreviated version of *TMRG*, *Mngon Sum* verses 130-131 which are the first two verses of Sa paṅ's brief presentation of ‘Falsification of Direct Perception’ (*mngon sum ltar snang*) which read: *’khrul pa'i shes pa thams cad ni / mngon sum ltar snang nyid du 'dod /* [every erroneous awareness is accepted as just a falsification of direct perception.]

referring to a *yogi's* cognition] can be rendered as “every awareness [of a *yogi*] imbued with erroneous appearance born from mental cultivation is falsification of direct perception.”³¹ It should be noted that Gyag ston is the only one of our Sa skya pa commentators to address verse 45: even Sa paṅ does not elaborate on the situation. All the same, Gyag ston’s comment is worth noting because it demonstrates that merely because the fact that a *yogi* has a cognition that is born from mental cultivation does not ipso facto make it a valid direct perception. Therefore, although a *yogi* is practicing mental cultivation, if he has not yet attained the supreme [mundane] attribute of the path of preparation, which is the obtaining cause [for the *yogi*] to achieve the path of vision, he is still susceptible to having a falsification of direct perception (*mngon sum ltar snang, pratyakṣābhāsa*). As a brief aside, the modern Rnying ma scholar Mi pham rgya mstho (1846-1912) does make a direct reference to the falsification of *yogi*-direct perception when discussing verse 45 in his commentary on Sa paṅ’s *TMRG*, stating: “Although born from the power of mental cultivation, [the *yogin's*] mind (*yid, manas*) which is [mistaking what is] repulsive [for what is beautiful] and is non-abiding regarding its object, possessing erroneous appearances of skeletons, and so on, is a falsification of *yogi*-direct perception.”³²

Alex Wayman in an article entitled “A Reconsideration of Dharmakīrti’s ‘Deviation’ from Dignāga on Pratyakṣābhāsa,” postulated a potential alignment of the four types of direct perception accepted by Dignāga [*indriya, mānasa, svasamvedana, and yogi*] with the four types of falsification of direct perception outlined in Dignāga’s *PS Prat*, 8 cd- 9ab (W/6a-d), which states, “Falsification of direct perception [is of four types]: [1] delusive cognition, [2] cognition of conventional reality, [3] inference, and what is derived from inference, what is derived from memory and what is derived from belief, and [4] along with defect of sense-

³¹ See *TMRGDK*, 115, 10: *bsgoms byung 'khrul snang can gyi shes pa rnams mngon sum ltar snang yin no /*.

³² See Mi pham’s *TMRGCG*, 308.a, 5: *bsgom stobs las skyes kyang yul la mi gnas pa mi sngug pa 'il yid ngor keng rus snang ba sogs 'khrul pa rams rnal mngon ltar snang ba yin no /*.

organs.”³³ It can be noted that Dharmakīrti, *PV Prat*, 288, and Sa paṅ, *TMRGRG Mngon sum*, 248, also set forth the same four types of *pratyakṣābhāsa* as Dignāga.³⁴ Furthermore, looking to Dharmottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *NB*, Wayman points out that there are four causes of error (*vibhramakāraṇa*) regarding *pratyakṣa*, i.e.: cause of error in a sense-organ (*indriyagata*), the one found within (*ādhyātmagata*), the one found in the object (*viśayagata*), the one found in a place (*bāhyāśrayasthita*) (Wayman 1977-78: 393).

Wayman proceeds to evaluate the four causes of error in terms of *pratyakṣa* as he outlines a possible correspondence between each type of direct perception and a particular type of falsification of direct perception. At this time, it is not necessary to review each of the four types of direct perception and their corresponding falsification of direct perception and associated cause of the erroneous perception; we need only look at the *yogin's* direct perception. Wayman tentatively associates the cause of error found in the place with the second type of falsification of direct perception, i.e., the cognition of conventional reality that is the result of the superimposition of what is unreal upon the object. Commenting on this association, Wayman notes that he assumes that the second type of falsification of direct perception, the cognition of conventional reality, relates to the falsification of the *yogi's pratyakṣa* that results from the cause of error found in the place (Wayman 1977-78: 393-394).

Looking a bit closer at these associations it can be noted that both the textual and cultural traditions of India and Tibet encouraged the *yogi* to depart from their home in order to find a

³³ Wayman 1977-78: 388. See also Steinkellner 2005 for Sanskrit of *PS Prat*, 4ab: *bhrānti-saṃvṛtisaj-jñānam anumānānumānikam /smārābhilāṣikam ceti pratyakṣābhaṃ sataimiram //*.

³⁴ See Shastri 1968: 186 and Miyasaka 1971-72: 80-81 for Sanskrit of *PV Prat*, 288. When commenting on *PV Prat* verse 288, Manorathanandin refers to the four types of falsification outlined in *PS Prat* verse, 8cd-9ab. Cf. also Sa paṅ *TMRGRG*, 247-248, when after briefly discussing the four types of falsification of direct perception presented in *PS Prat*, 8cd-9ab, Sa paṅ concludes the discussion by quoting *PV Prat*, verse 288: / *mngon sum ltar snang rnam pa bzhi / rtog pa'i shes pa rnam gsum dang / rten bslad pa las byung pa can / rtog pa med pa gcig yin no /*.

place or location that would be conducive to their practice. If the *yogi* remained at home, they should at least have a special place in their home, for instance a separate room, where they can practice. If, however, the location selected is inappropriate this could affect their progress from the path of preparation towards the path of vision. And as noted above, while practicing on the path of preparation the *yogi* is still an ordinary person; as such, the *yogi* remained susceptible to certain propensities (*bag chags*, *vāsanā*) which could result in his awareness, even though arisen from mental cultivation, being a falsification of direct perception, i.e., ‘a cognition of conventional existence’ due to the continued presence of certain propensities causing the superimposition of what is unreal upon reality, i.e., an object. With this additional background, we would be justified to include ‘the cause of error found in the place’ as an additional qualifier regarding Gyag ston’s comment on verse 45 and can render it thus, “every [*yogi*’s cognitions] imbued with erroneous appearance born from mental cultivation is falsification of direct perception [due to practicing in an inadequate place]. These additional factors could also help to further clarify Sa paṅ’s verse 45 thus: “Every [*yogi*’s cognition] imbued with error is a falsification (*ltar snang*, *ābhāsa*) [of direct perception due to the cause of error found in a place].” So, based on the preceding it is clear that a *yogi* can indeed experience falsification of direct perception, due to not practicing in an appropriate place, traditionally sometimes identified as an isolated location, such as a cave or primitive hut. It is interesting to note that in the second volume of his *Trilogy of Rest* (*Ngal gso skor gsum*), entitled *Finding Rest in Meditation* (*Bsam gtan ngal gso*), the renowned 14th century Rnying ma scholar Klong chen Rab ’byams [Klong chen pa] devotes an entire section to discussing the importance of practitioners of all levels—from beginners to accomplished *yogis*—finding the proper locations to carry out their meditative practice.³⁵

Differentiation of the *Yogin*’s Direct Perception [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B.]

In order to differentiate (*dbye ba*, *vyavaccheda*) the direct perception of *yogis*, Sa paṅ notes that this is achieved by two

³⁵ See Longchen Rabjam 2018, *Trilogy of Rest*, Volume 2, *Finding Rest in Meditation*, 6-9 and 45-54.

means: the differentiation of the *yogin's* direct perception in terms of support (*rten, āśraya*), i.e., an individual with certain characteristics [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B.1.] and in terms of its nature (*ngo bo, svabhāva*) [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B.2.]. When differentiating the *yogin's* direct perception in terms of the individual, Sa paṅ directs the reader to *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* verses 46-47 which states: “Because there are three [types] of *āryas*, there are three [types of *yogic*] direct perception. In terms of ‘those [individuals] undergoing religious training’ and ‘those no-longer undergoing religious training’ there are five [types of *yogic* direct perception].”³⁶ In his *TMRGRG*, Sa paṅ explains the three types of *āryas* as: stream-entering (*rgyun tu zhugs, srotāpanna*) Hearers (*nyan thos, śārvaka*); Self-enlightened ones (*rang sangs rgyas, pratyekabuddha*); and the Mahāyāna *āryas* (*theg chen gyi 'phags pa*), i.e., Bodhisattvas. When referring to the stream-entering Śrāvakas, Sa paṅ uses the term “and so forth” (*la sogs pa*) which likely refers to three additional participants progressing along the Śrāvaka-*yāna*, i.e., ‘the once-returner’ (*lan cig phyir 'ong ba, sakrdāgāmin*), ‘the non-returner’ (*phyir mi 'ong ba, anāgāmin*) and the Arhat (*dgra bcom pa*).

Sa paṅ proceeds to align ‘those undergoing religious training’ (*slob, śaikṣa*) and ‘those no-longer undergoing religious training’ (*mi slob, aśaikṣa*) with the three types of *āryas*, which results in five pairings, as indicted in verse 47. While not

³⁶ See *TMRG*, 31, 9-10 and *TMRGRG*, 220, 5: ‘*phags pa gsum gyis mngon sum gsum / slob dang mi slob sgo nas lnga /*. Regarding Sa paṅ’s reference to “those no-longer undergoing religious raining,” according to all three systems, the path of those no-longer undergoing religious training (*aśaikṣamārga, mi slob lam*) is the fifth path that either the Śrāvaka, or the Pratyekabuddha needs to attain in order gain their final goal of becoming an arhat, or a Bodhisattva pursuing Buddhahood. The initial four paths are: the path of accumulation (*saṃbhāramārga, tshogs lam*); the path of application (*prayogamārga, sbyor lam*); the path of vision/seeing (*darśanamārga, mthong lam*); the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga, sgom lam*). In addition to the three types of *yogin's* direct perception (see Cabezón and Dargyay, 2007: 71 and 221) in his *Lta ba 'i shan 'byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer*, Go rams pa refers to the differentiation of attaining ‘any of three enlightenments’ and the attainment of ‘the enlightenment of any of the three vehicles’, respectively. Further, on 278.n7 Cabezón and Dargyay identify the *Abhisamayālamkāra* and its commentaries as an authoritative source for discussing the doctrine of the three forms of enlightenment, i.e., the enlightenment of a Śrāvaka, of a Pratyekabuddha and of a Bodhisattva.

extensively elaborating, Go rams pa directly follows Sa paṅ aligning the five types of āryas, i.e., Śrāvakas undergoing training and those no longer undergoing training, Pratyekabuddhas no longer undergoing training, and the Mahāyāna āryas undergoing training and those no longer undergoing training, i.e., Bodhisattvas and Buddhas.³⁷ In terms of the Śrāvaka, Sa paṅ points out that there are two types of direct perception: there is the *yogin*'s direct perception of the stream-entering Śrāvakas, and so forth who are undergoing religious training and there is *yogin*'s direct perception of the Śrāvaka no-longer undergoing training, i.e. Arhats, who are liberated from the two aspects—the hindrance due to afflictive emotions (*nyon mongs*, *kleśa*) and hinderance to meditative absorption (*snyoms pa*, *samāpatti*)—by reason of attaining a certain level of insight (*shes rab*, *prajñā*).³⁸

Anent the Self-enlightened ones, Sa paṅ points out that due to having their support on the fourth level of meditative concentration (*bsam gtan*, *dhyāna*),³⁹ the utter purity of awareness

³⁷ Go rams pa 1975: 149, 16-21: *gnyis pa la rten gyi sgo nas / nyan thos / rang rgyal / theg chen 'phags pa'i rnal 'byor mngon sum / de la slob mi slob gyi sgo nas lngar 'gyur te / nyan thos slob pa dang mi slob pa'i rnal 'byor mngon su gnyis / rang rgyal mi slob bas pa'i rnal 'byor mngon sum / theg chen slob pa dang mi slob pa'i rnal 'byor mngon sum gnyis rnam su 'gyur ba'i phyir ro l.*

³⁸ *TMRGRG*, 220, 5-7: *nyan thos rgyun tu zhugs pa la sogs pa slob pa'i mngon sum dang / shes rab dang gnyis ka'i cha las rnam grol te mi slob pa'i mngon sum ste gnyis so l.* Cf. *TMRGDG* in Go rams pa, 149, 17-18 and Gyag ston's *TMRGDK*, 115, 10-13 where a *yogin*'s direct perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum*, *yogi-pratyakṣa*) is employed, whereas Sa paṅ simply refers to the Śrāvaka's cognition as *mngon sum (pratyakṣa)*. See Cabezón and Dargyay, 2007: 333, n400, which refers to Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, *Grub mtha' chen mo*; note the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas are known as the two schools of the Śrāvaka. *Grub mtha' chen mo* states, “Because the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas accept only the *piṭaka* of the hearers, and because they advocate philosophical positions explained therein, they are called ‘śrāvaka [schools]’.”

³⁹ The four *Dhyānas* are: (1) the attainment of joy and happiness (*prīṭisukha*, *dga' ba dang dbe ba*) having discarded certain unwholesome thoughts such as desire, along with discursive thought; (2) the attainment of the cessation of discursive thought while joy and happiness remain; (3) the cessation of feeling joy while happiness remains in addition to the attainment of equanimity and mindfulness; (4) the cessation of all feelings of happiness, joy, pain, etc., only the utter purity of awareness and equanimity remains.

and equanimity, the Pratyekabuddhas traverse all the paths (*lam, mārga*) simultaneously, thereby simultaneously actualizing awakening. Thus, there is no *yogin's* direct perception of a Pratyekabuddha undergoing religious training; for the Pratyekabuddha there is only the *yogi-pratyakṣa* of those no longer undergoing religious training. Sa paṅ notes, however, that some members of the Vaibhāṣikas (*bye brag*) system accept that there are Pratyekabuddha Noble Ones undergoing religious training. Nevertheless, for Sa paṅ, even the *yogin's* direct perception of the Pratyekabuddha no longer undergoing religious training does not surpass that of the Śrāvaka or Mahāyāna *āryas*. For even among the Pratyekabuddhas not undergoing religious training, Sa paṅ notes that there are those of both sharp and dull (*rno rtul*) acumen.⁴⁰ As for the Mahāyāna *āryas*, the gnosis (*ye shes, jñāna*) of the ten levels of the Mahāyāna (*theg chen sa bcu, mahāyāna-daśabhūmi*) is the support for the *yogin's* direct perception of those Mahāyāna *āryas* undergoing training and the cognition of a fully awakened being is the support for those Mahāyāna *āryas* no longer training.

Given that the above are general distinctions (*thun mong gi dbye ba*) accepted amongst the three vehicles, Sa paṅ highlights a couple of instances where specific tenet systems (*so so'i grub mtha'*) make certain (usually negative) claims against another system regarding a distinctive characteristic they supposedly support. For instance, while likely referring to the Mahāyāna understanding that the unsubstantiality of the self is based on the negation qua emptiness of the aggregates (*phung po, skandhas*)—which goes further than the Śrāvaka understanding the emptiness which is the negation of the self of the person based on the

Cf. Thurman 1976:148; Rahula 2549 (2006): 48-49; and Megumu and Rahder 1968: 159.

⁴⁰ *TMRGRG*, 220,7-11: *rang sangs rgyas bsam gtan bzhi pa la brten nas lam thams cad cig car bgrod pas slob pa'i mngon sum med la grub mtha'i bye brag 'ga' zhig slob pa'i 'phags pa ' 'dod pa de dag gi 'ang nyan thos dang theg chen gyi 'phags pa gang rung las mi 'da'o / mi slob pa la dbang po rno rtul gnyis so / theg pa chen po pa'i slob pa sa bcu'i ye shes yin la / mi slob pa sangs rgyas kyi mngon sun yin pas lngar 'gyur rol*. See Gyag ston per *TMRGDK*, 115, 13-14, further describes the Pratyekabuddha as 'simultaneously actualizing awakening' (*gcig char byang chub mngon du byas ba*).

aggregates vice the aggregates themselves—Sa paṇ states that some Śrāvakas claim that due to the Mahāyāna view of the unsubstantiality of the self, among Bodhisattvas, Noble Ones (*'phags, ārya*) are non-existent, therefore the Mahāyāna claiming that there is *yogin's* direct perception of the Bodhisattva is unacceptable. In this case, the Śrāvakas turn the Mahāyāna position around, claiming that since there is no Bodhisattva to be found due to the emptiness of their aggregates, there is no *yogi* direct perception of a Bodhisattva. Furthermore, he states that some Mahāyānists claim that the Śrāvakas do not realize the selflessness of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairātmya*), hence according to the Mahāyāna, the *yogin's* direct perception of the Śrāvaka is not a genuine *yogi* direct perception.⁴¹ Sa paṇ notes, however, that preeminent philosophers (e.g., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) composed texts in accordance with the Sautrāntika tenet system, which established the view that the *yogin's* direct perception [initially] realizes the reality (*chos nyid, dharmatā*) of the Four Noble Truths (*bden pa bzhi, catur-satya*); and after that the *yogin's* direct perception acquires a direct realization of selflessness by engaging its object through the force of the thing itself (*dngos po stobs kyi zhugs, vastubalapravr̥tta*). Sa paṇ concludes his comments on this issue by observing that one should examine the *yogin's* direct perception of each of the five types of Noble Ones.⁴²

Glo bo mkhan attempts to explain why there are no Pratyekabuddhas undergoing religious training by asking rhetorically, “what is the reason that there are no Pratyekabuddhas undergoing religious training, what sort of special understanding is

⁴¹ TMRGRG 220, 11-13: *'di ni thun mong gi dbye ba yin la so so'i grub mtha' dang bstun na nyan thos 'ga' zhig byang chub sems dpa' la 'phags pa med pas rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum mi 'dod la theg pa chen po pa 'ga' zhig nyan thos la chos kyi bdag med mthong ba med pas rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum mtshan nyid pa med do zhes 'dod do /*. The idea of the Śrāvaka realizing the selflessness of the person but not the selfless of phenomena is addressed in more detail below. Also Cf. Cabezón and Dargay 2007: 221ff where Go rams pa also addresses these issues.

⁴² TMRGRG 220, 13- 221, 2: *'on kyang 'dir rtog ge ba rnams kyi gtsug gi nor bus mdo sde pa'i grub mtha' dang bstun te / bden pa bzhi'i chos nyid mthong ba la rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum du bzhas nas de nas dngos po stobs zhugs kyi bdag med pa la sbyor bar mdzad do /*.

present among the Pratyekabuddhas?” Somewhat cleverly he responds that among the Pratyekabuddhas, those undergoing training are not present. In the case when a practitioner is not manifestly self-awakened (*rang byang chub, svabodhi*), the nominal designation (*ming*) of Pratyekabuddha is futile. When a practitioner has actually become self-awakened, he is not deemed as one undergoing training.⁴³ For Glo bo mkhan, where the Pratyekabuddhas are concerned, the practitioner is either ‘is in’ or ‘not in’. When the practitioner is ‘not in’, i.e., not self-awakened, he is not referred to as a Pratyekabuddha. When the practitioner ‘is in’, i.e., self-awakened, he is not deemed to be undergoing training. Or to quote Ken Kesey, “You’re either on the bus or off the bus.”

Differentiation of the *Yogin's* Direct Perception in Terms of Its Nature [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B.2]

After completing the discussion in which he differentiates the five types of yogin’s direct perception based on the five types of *āryas*, Sa paṅ goes on to differentiate the *yogin's* direct perception in terms of its nature (*ngo bo, svabhāva*). He begins by referring to *TMRG Mngon sum* verses 48-49, which state: “When differentiating [the *yogin's* direct perception] of those [five types of *āryas* discussed above] in pairs according to whether they have appearance or they are without appearance, there are 10 varieties.”⁴⁴ Looking first at the Śrāvakas having appearance who

⁴³ *TMRGRN* 191, 14-17: 'dir 'di dpyad de / rang sangs rgyas la slob ba pa med pa'i rgyu mishan ni gang / rtogs pa'i khyad par ni ji lta bu zhe na / rang sangs rgyas la slob pa med de / rang byang chub mngon du ma byas par rang sangs rgyas kyi ming don med la / byas nas ni slob par mi 'gyur bas so /. It should be noted that Glo bo mkhan proceeds to undertake an in-depth examination of regarding the path of the Pratyekabudha and Śrāvaka, 191, 18-193, 24. During this examination Glo bo mkhan clearly demonstrates that his broad understanding of Buddhist texts and authors. He references Indian authors from Nāgārjuna (*klu sgrub*) [150-250C.E.], Aśaṅga (*thogs med*) [310-390C.E.], to Prajñākāgupta (using rgyan mkhan po rather than shes rab'byung gnas sbas pa) [740-800?], Bhāvaviveka (legs ldan 'byed) [8th century] and Haribhadra (seng ge bzang po) [8th century] as well as the Tibetan savant Bu-ston [1290-1364] and others. Glo bo mkhan's extensive discussion of this topic will be the subject of a separate communication.

⁴⁴ See *TMRG*, 31, 10 and *TMRGRG*, 221, 3: de dag snang bcas snang med kyi / dbye bas gnyis gnyis rnam pa bcu /.

are undergoing training, both Sa paṅ and Glo bo mkhan state that if the Śrāvaka attains a mind of contemplation (*bsam gtan*, *dhyāna*) as a principal practice, preternatural cognitions (*mngon par shes pa*, *abhijñā*) emerge, while if these Śrāvaka do not attain a mind of concentration the preternatural cognitions will not emerge.⁴⁵ Turning to those Śrāvaka having appearance who are no longer undergoing training, Sa paṅ states that even without the presence of the five preternatural cognitions, in terms of liberation from the perspective of wisdom (*shes rab*, *prajñā*), these Śrāvakas are liberated from both unpleasant aspects (*gnyis ka'i cha la rnam grol*, *ubhayatobhāgavimukti*), i.e., the hindrance due to afflictive emotions and the hindrance to meditative absorption.⁴⁶ Furthermore, regarding the three types of *āryas*-having-appearance—no longer undergoing training—Sa paṅ notes that Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and the Buddhas (*sangs rgyas*) realize the two- and three-thousand world realms (*'jig rten gyi khams*, *lokadhātu*) and innumerable world realms, respectively. Quoting Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* Sa paṅ reminds us that it is said “the disciples [i.e., Śrāvakas], the Rhinoceros [i.e., Pratyekhabuddhas] and Teachers [i.e., Buddhas] realize two

⁴⁵ TMRGRG, 221, 3-4: *snang bcas la ngan thos kyi slob pa ni / bsam gtan gyi sems thob na mngon par shes pa'char la ma thob na mi 'char.../*. Cf. TMRGRN, 194,1-2: *de dag la nyan thos kyi snang bcas la bsam gtan gyi dngos gzhi thop pa rnam la mngon par shes pa 'char la / ma thob na mi 'char zhing /...* In general, the five preternatural cognitions are: knowledge of magical powers (*ṛddhividhi-jñāna*, *rdzu 'phrul gyi shes pa*), divine hearing (*divyaśrotram*, *lha'i rna ba*), knowing the mind of other beings (*paracittajñāna*, *gzhan gyi sems shes pa*), remembering past lives (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛti-jñāna*, *sngon gyi gnas rjes su dran pa mkhyen pa*), and the divine eye (*divyacakṣus*, *lha'i mig*). Cf. Thurman 1976: 151 where the knowledge of the termination of defilements (*āsravakṣayajñāna*, *zag pa sad pa shes pa*) is included as a preternatural cognition, thus bringing the number to six. Without providing details, Thurman notes that scholars generally agree that the ‘knowledge of magical operations’ (*ṛddhividhi-jñāna*) is eliminated to bring the classification to five.

⁴⁶ TMRGRG, 221, 4-5: *...zhing mi slob pa la 'ang shes rab kyi cha las rnam par 'grol ba la mngon par shes pa lna med la gnyis ka'i cha la rnam grol .../*. According to the *Nithartha Dictionary*, “*gnyis ka'i cha las rnam par grol ba* is the complete liberation from the two aspects [arhat liberated from the obscuration [hinderance] of *kleśa* and the obscuration *snyoms 'jug*”]. That is to say, *nyon mongs kyi sgrib pa* (*kleśa-āvaraṇa*) and *snyoms 'jug gi sgrib pa* (*samāpatti-āvaraṇa*).

[thousand world realms], three thousand [world realms] and innumerable [world realms, respectively].” Sa paṇ notes that while he has not discussed Bodhisattvas at this point, it should be known that according to the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, Bodhisattvas [realize] ‘one hundred’, ‘one thousand’, ‘one hundred thousand’, etc., world realms according to their state of progress.⁴⁷ For his part, Glo bo mkhan comments that it is accepted that the Śrāvaka having appearance who is no longer undergoing training realizes the two thousand world realms. Anent the yogin’s direct perception of the Bodhisattva having appearance who is no longer undergoing training, Glo bo mkhan, like Sa paṇ, refers the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*; however, while Sa paṇ provides an abbreviated outline of what the Bodhisattva realizes at each stage (*sa, bhūmi*), Glo bo mkhan proceeds through each of the ten stages. While there is no need to delineate each stage, suffice it to say that a Bodhisattva on the tenth stage (*bcu pa la*) realizes Buddha-fields (*sangs rgyas kyi zhing, buddhakṣetra*) equal in number with ten hundred thousand immeasurable millions of atoms (*rdul phran, paramāṇu*).⁴⁸

Regarding *yogin’s* direct perception without appearance, Sa paṇ highlights the role of gnosis when addressing the Śrāvaka’s *yogin’s* direct perception without appearance. Thus, the gnosis of the Śrāvaka without appearance undergoing training realizes the unsubstantiality of the imputed (*kun brtags, parikalpita*) false view

⁴⁷ TMRGRG, 221, 6-9: ...rang sangs rgyas dang sangs rgyas kyis rim pa bzhin stong gnyis gsum dang grangs med kyi 'jig rten gyi khams rnam mthong ste / mdzod las / slob ma bse ru stong rnams kyis / stong gnyis gsum dang grangs med mthong / zhes gsungs so / byang chub sems dpa'i der ma gsungs mod kyi / 'ig rten gyi khams brgya dang stong dang 'bum la sogs pa mdo sde sa bcu pa nas ji ltar 'byung ba ltar shes par bya'o /.

⁴⁸ TMRGRN, 194, 2-10: [nyan tos] mi slob pa'i snang bcas kyis ni stong gnyis mthong bar 'dod do / byang chub sems dpa'i snang bcas kyis rnal 'byor mngon sum gyis mthong tshul ni / mdo sde sa bcu pa las /... / bcu pa la stong phrag bye ba grangs med 'bum phrag bcu'i rdul phran gyi grangs dang mnyam pa'i sangs rgyas kyi zhing mthong bar mdo sde sa bcu pa las bshad pa ltar shes par bya'o /. Cf. the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra* translated by Megumu and revised by Rahder in the Śata-Piṭaka Series, Vol. 74, 1968 for a complete description of the specific attainment of the Bodhisattva at each of the ten stages (*sa, bhūmi*) as follows: First stage (140); Second stage (153); Third Stage (163); Fourth stage (171); Fifth stage (181); Sixth stage (195); Seventh stage (209); Eighth stage (232); Ninth stage (251); and Tenth stage (276).

of self, while the gnosis of the Śrāvaka without appearance no longer undergoing training realizes the unsubstantiality of the innate (*lhan skyes, sahaja*) false view of the person.⁴⁹ Here Sa paṅ in essence addresses the Buddhist concept of ‘false view of self’ (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi, ’jigs tshogs la lta ba*). As noted by Eltschinger [2009: 172-173], many Buddhist schools, including the Yogacāra, the Sautrāntika, and epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti understand this false view of self to be of two kinds, imputed [Eltchinger uses ‘speculative’] and innate. The imputed false view of self, results from meditation on treatises of non-Buddhist systems such as the Sāmkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas. As for the innate false of self, Eltschinger points out that this is the view of self which is usual to worldly people and animals, and results from beginningless latent propensities (*vāsanā*).

As Glo bo mkhan sets out to address the method of realization by the *yogin*’s direct perception without appearance with respect to each of the three types of *āryas*, he refers to Dharmakīrti’s *PV Sid*, 270cd and 272ab, which according to the Sautrāntika perspective states, “[Due to the false view of self, resulting from nescience one superimposes the sixteen unreal aspects] such as ‘permanent’, ‘pleasant’, and ‘mine’ and ‘I’ on the Four Noble Truths; the right view [i.e., the view of unsubstantiality of self], well cultivated [for an uninterrupted long time] subdues desire and the accompanying [defilements of envy, etc.]” Thus, each of three types of *yogin*’s direct perception realizes the reality (*chos nyid, dharmatā*) of the Four Noble truths to various degrees depending on their respective paths.⁵⁰ Specifically, Glo bo mkhan

⁴⁹ TMRGRG, 221, 9-11: *snang med kyi ye shes kyis ni nyan thos kyi slob pas kun brtags kyi bdag med rtogs la/ mi slob pas lhan skyes kyi gang zag gi bdag med rtogs /*.

⁵⁰ TMRGRN, 194, 11-14: *snang med kyis mthong tshul ni/ slob dpon gyis mdo sde pa’i rjes su ’brangs nas / rnam ’grel las / bden pa bzhi la gtan pa dang / bde dang nga dang nga yir sogs / legs sgom yang dag lta ba yis / srid pa [sred pa] rjes ’’brang bcas ’joms byed / ces bden pa bzhi’i chos nyid mthong ba la rnal ’byor mngon sum du mdzad la /*. For Sanskrit of these verses cf. Miyasaka 1971/72: 38 (270cd and 272ab) and Sashtri 1968: 91-92 (272cd and 274ab): *sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetiyadi satyacatuṣṭaye / hanti sānucarāṃ tr̥ṣṇāṃ samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ subhāvitā /*. Note that Miyasaka has *sred pa* (272b) as opposed to TMRGRN’s *srid pa*; which conforms correctly with the Sanskrit ‘*tr̥ṣṇa*’. Cf. Shastri 1968: 92 where Manorathanandin, commenting on *PV Sid*, 274ab notes *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* refers to *nairātmyadr̥ṣṭi*.

reports that a Śrāvaka without appearance no longer undergoing training merely realizes the selflessness of the person (*gang zag, pudgala*). As for the Pratyekabuddha, Glo bo mkhan notes they realize the 'one and a half selflessness' (*bdag med phyed dang gnyis*). Sa paṅ reports that the Pratyekabuddha realizes the non-existence of inherent nature in apprehended phenomena (*chos kyi bdag bzung ba rang bzhin med pa*); adding the comment that they realize 'one and half',⁵¹ implying therefore, that Pratyekabuddhas realize the selflessness of the person (*gang zag gi bdag med*) as well as half the selflessness of phenomena (*chos bdag gi phyed*), i.e., they realize the selflessness of apprehended phenomena but not the remaining half, which is the selflessness of the apprehender of phenomena. (This can be viewed as something akin to the Cittamātra (*sems tsam*) 'mind only' view, where one understands the 'emptiness' of the of the object of consciousness but not perceiver, i.e., the perceiving mind. As for the Bodhisattvas and Buddhas, Glo bo mkhan, like Sa paṅ, states that Bodhisattvas realize both the selflessness of the person and phenomena and Buddhas also realize the two kinds of selflessness by means of abandoning both obscurations, together with habitual tendencies.⁵² Therefore, while each path of the three āryas requires the cultivation of the right view, i.e., the unsubstantiality of the self, in order to subdue desire, etc., the specific results of each of the paths varies depending on the length of time of the cultivation as well as the specific liberative means utilized; Sa paṅ and his commentators address these issues below per section, 2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.2.

Differentiation in Terms of Subsequent Attainment State and Meditational Equipoise State

It is interesting that when discussing the differentiation of the *yogin's* direct perception according to its nature neither Sa paṅ

⁵¹ TMRGRN, 194,14-15: *de yang nyan thos kyi gang zag gi bdag med pa tsam / rang sangs rgyas kyi bdag med phyed dang gnyis [rtogs pa] /*. TMRGRG, 221, 10-12: *mi slob pas lhan skyes kyi gang zag gi bdag med rtogs shing / rang sangs rgyas kyi chos kyi bdag bzung ba rang bzhin med pa ste phyed dang gnyis rtogs la /*.

⁵² TMRGRG, 221, 12-13: *byang chub sems dpas bdag med gnyi ga rtogs zhing / sangs rgyas kyi ni bag chags dang bcas pa'i sgrub pa spangs pa'i tshul gyis rtogs so /*. Cf. TMRGRN, 194: *byang chub sems dpas gnyis ka sangs rgyas kyi ni bag chags spangs pa'i tshul gyis gnyis ka rtogs pa'o /*.

nor Glo bo mkhan refers to *yogin's* direct perception in terms of the subsequent attainment state (*rjes thob, prasthalabdha*) or the meditative equipoise state (*mnyam gzhag, samāpatti*). However, both Go rams pa and Gyag ston do include these two conditions as a means of differentiating the *yogin's* direct perception. In addition to noting that the five types of *yogi* direct perception of the three Āryas undergoing training or no longer undergoing training are differentiated as ten in terms of either being 'with appearance' or 'without appearance', Go rams pa states, albeit succinctly, that each these five types of *yogin's* direct perception are also differentiated as the *yogin's* direct perception incorporated in the meditative equipoise state and the *yogin's* direct perception incorporated in the subsequent attainment state.⁵³ Elaborating further, Gyag ston states that when differentiating each of the five types of *yogin's* direct perception according to their nature there would be ten aspects due to differentiating each of the five types of *yogin's* direct perception in terms of (a) those having a subsequent attainment state (*rjes thob, prasthalabdha*) with appearance, which knows the qualities of all phenomena (*ji snyed pa, yāvad-bhāvikatā*) and those having a meditative equipoise state (*mnyam gzhag, samāpatti*) without appearance, which knows the absolute nature of all noumena (*ji lta ba, yathāvad-bhāvikatā*).⁵⁴ As will be noted below, Gyag ston again addresses the issues of the subsequent attainment state and the meditative equipoise state in relation to the causes of the two types of *yogin's* gnosis.

⁵³ TMRGDG, 149, 20-150, 1: *de la snang bcas snans med kyi sgo nas bcur 'gyur te / lng po re re la yang mnyam gzhag dang rjes thob kyis bsdus pa'i rnal 'byor mngon sum gnyis gnyis su yod pa'i phyr ro /*. Cf. Rhoton, 2002: 263, where Sa pan, in replying to questions from Rdo rje seng ge, a monk of the Bka' gdams pa order, notes the distinction between absorptive and post-absorptive states of a Bodhisattva.

⁵⁴ TMRGDK, 115, 16-17: *ngo bo sgo nas dbyed na / lnga po de dag la snang bcas ji snyed pa mkhyen pa rjes thob dang/ snang med ji lta ba mkhyen pa mnyam gzhag gi sgo nas dbyed bas gnyis gnyis te rnam pa bcu'o /*. Cf. Wayman 1978: 105 where Tsong kha pa, as translated by Wayman, defines *ji snyed pa* as "the phenomenon [that] is all the constructed, which is comprised in the five personality aggregates, all the natures comprised in the eighteen realms and in the twelve sense bases, and all the knowable entities comprised in the four (noble) truths: there is nothing beyond that," and *ji lta ba* as "the noumenon [that] is the reality and the thustness of those meditative objects, and is the goal demonstrated by the principle."

Pondering the Cause [of the *Yogin's* Direct Perception] [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.]

When pondering the cause of the *yogin's* direct perception, Sa paṅ highlights three topics:

2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.1. The cause of the [*yogin's*] two [types] of gnosis

2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.2. The time to accomplish [the two types of gnosis by the three *āryas*]

2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.3. The different kinds of results depending on the liberative means [utilized]

In order to address the first issue, the cause of two types of gnosis, Sa paṅ directs the reader to *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* verses 50-53 which state: “Well-practiced liberative means (*thabs*, *upāya*) and wisdom (*shes rab*, *prajñā*) mutually constitute the cause (*rgyu*, *kāraṇa*) and condition (*rkyen*, *pratyaya*) to attain the gnosis purely realizing things as they are (*ji lta ba*, *yathāvad-bhāvikatā*) [i.e., noumena] and [the gnosis realizing] things in [all] their multiplicity (*ji snyed pa*, *yāvad-bhāvikatā*) [i.e., phenomena].”⁵⁵ Sa paṅ explains that when various kinds of liberative means, such as contemplation (*bsam gtan*, *dhyāna*), aspiration (*smon lam*, *praṇidhāna*), and the like, constitute the substantial cause (*nyer len gyi rgyu*, *upadāna kāraṇa*), with wisdom realizing emptiness (*stong pa nyid*, *śūnyatā*), i.e., selflessness, as the cooperating condition (*lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen*, *sahakāri-pratyaya*), the *yogin's* gnosis experiences the radiance of all knowable phenomena (*shes bya thams cad*), that is to say, *ji snyed pa*. In order to indicate how the components and quality of a *yogin's* practice can affect the clarity of a the *yogin's* gnosis, Sa paṅ quotes the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra*, which compares the luster of a cloth to the clarity of the *yogin's* gnosis: “Just as the specific knots [of cloth determine] whether [the cloth is] either radiant or lusterless, like that, by means of its propelling force, [the *yogin's*] gnosis of liberation is clear or not.” Continuing, Sa paṅ notes that when on

⁵⁵ See *TMRG*, 31, 10-12 and *TMRGRG*, 221, 13-222, 1: *thabs dang shes rab legs sbyangs pa / phan tshun rgyu dang rkyen gyur pas / ji lta ba dang ji snyed pa'i lye shes gzigs pa 'grub par 'gyur /*.

the other hand, the wisdom realizing emptiness is the substantial cause and liberative techniques serve as the cooperative condition, the *yogin*'s gnosis purely perceiving things as they are (*ji lta ba*), i.e., noumena, clearly emerges. As a somewhat cautionary tale, however, Sa paṅ tentatively refers to Dharmakīrti's *PV*, which states: "Some [understand] that the mental cultivation of the selflessness of all that exists is what truly characterizes [the process] according to which [the *yogin*'s gnosis] directly perceives ultimate reality."⁵⁶ The intent appears to be to caution that wisdom cultivating the selflessness of all that exists alone is not sufficient to bring about the *yogin*'s gnosis. This criticism would appear to be directed towards those following the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha paths which emphasize the cultivation of selflessness without focusing on developing liberative means such as compassion. In a number of instances within the discussion of the *yogin*'s direct perception in both the *TMRG* and *TMRGRG*, Sa paṅ directly states that both wisdom (*shes rab*) and liberative means (*thabs*) are the two processes (*rim gnyis*) necessary for the *yogi* to attain the pure gnosis perceiving reality. Go rams pa specifically refers to 'great compassion' (*snying rje chen po*, *mahākaruṇā*) as one of the liberative means to be developed. In his *Sdom gsum rab dbye* as well, Sa paṅ repeatedly emphasizes that *shes rab* (*prajñā*) and *thams* (*upāya*) are both necessary for spiritual advancement; the cultivation of emptiness alone is not sufficient.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ *TMRGRG*, 222, 1-7: *bsam gtan dang smon lam la sogs pa thabs rnam pa sna tshogs kyis nyer len gyi rgyu byas shes rab stong pa nyid lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen du gyur na shes bya thams cad la bkra ba 'byung ste / mdo ste rgyan las / ji lta mdud pa'i bye brag gis / gos la tshon bkra mi bkra ba / de bzhin 'phen pa'i dbang gis na / grol ba'i ye shes bkra mi bkra / zhes gsungs pa ltar ro / shes rab stong pa nyid kyis nyed len gyi rgyu byas / thabs kyis lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen byas na ji lta ba'i ye shes la gsal snang 'byung ste / rnam 'grel las / 'ga' yis chos kun bdag med pa / goms pas te de yi bdag nyid du / 'gyur te dngos po mthong ba bzhin / zhes gsungs pa ltar ro /*. Cf. Bagchi, 1970, *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* IX 35: *yathā pāṃśuvaśād vaster raṅgacitrā vicitrā / tathā 'vedhavaśān muktau jñānacitrā vicitrā*. The *PV* quote cited by Sa paṅ: 'ga' yis chos..., it does not appear in Ernst Steinkellner's *Verse-Index of Dharmakīrti's Works (Tibetan Versions)*, Wien 1977.

⁵⁷ See Rhoton 2002: (88, 109, 143) for numerous instances where Sa paṅ emphasizes the need for both *shes rab* and *thabs* in order to attain the highest degree of spiritual advancement.

Go rams pa, Glo bo mkhan, and Gyag ston all follow Sa paṅ's evaluation of the respective causes and conditions generating the two types *yogin's* gnosis, i.e., *shes rab* as the cause and *thabs* as the cooperating condition results in the *yogin's* gnosis that knows the nature of all things (*ji lta ba*); and when *thabs* serves as the cause and *shes rab* as the cooperating condition, the *yogin's* gnosis perceives things in all their multiplicity (*ji snyed pa*).⁵⁸ Gyag ston, however, goes one additional step, correlating the subsequent attainment state (*rjes thob, prasthalabdha*) and the meditational equipoise state (*mnyam gzhag, samāpatti*) with the causes and conditions of the two types of *yogin's* gnosis. As mentioned above in the section examining the differentiation of the *yogin's* direct perception in terms of its nature [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.B.2], Gyag ston notes that the five types of *yogin's* direct perception are also subject to differentiation as ten in terms of those incorporated in a subsequent attainment state (*rjes thob, prasthalabdha*) with appearance which know the qualities of all phenomenon (*ji snyed pa, yāvad-bhāvikatā*) and those incorporated in a meditational equipoise state (*mnyam gzhag, samāpatti*) without appearance which know the absolute nature of all noumena (*ji lta ba, yathāvad-bhāvikatā*). Gyag ston highlights that each of the five types of *yogin's* gnosis (*ye shes, jñāna*) incorporated in the subsequent attainment state which knows the quality of phenomena with appearance and the five types of *yogin's* gnosis incorporated

⁵⁸ See *TMRGDG*, 150, 3-7; *TMRGRN*, 194, 18-21; and *TMGDHK*, 115, 18-21. Cf. also Mi pham's *TMRGCG*, 308b, 2-3 where Mi pham supports the same procedure, that is to say, *shes rab* as the *rgyu* and *thabs* as *rkyen* results in the *yogin's* gnosis purely realizing things as they, i.e., *ji lta ba*, while *thabs* as the *rgyu* and *shes rab* as *rkyen* brings about the *yogin's* gnosis purely realizing things in [all] their multiplicity, i.e., *ji snyed pa*. Go rams pa's presentation tends to indicate that the procedures are somewhat formalistic, *TMRGDG*, 150, 2-8 states: *ye shes gnyis kyi rgyu / ... bdad med rtogs pa'i shes rab des nyer len dang / thabs snying rje chen pos lhan cig byed rkyen byas pa la brien nas ji lta ba mkhyen pa'i ye shes 'grub cing / de las ldg pas ji snyed pa mkhyen pa'i ye shes 'grub ps in no l*. "The cause of the two [types of] gnosis... Having support on the material cause which is wisdom realizing selflessness and on the cooperative condition which is great compassion as the liberative means, establishes [the *yogin's*] gnosis that knows thing as they are (*ji lta ba*). And on the other hand, the reverse establishes [the *yogin's*] gnosis that knows things in [all] their multiplicity (*ji snyed pa*)." The reverse is *thabs* as the cause and the *shes rab* as cooperating condition, which establishes *ji snyed pa*.

in a meditational equipoise state which knows the nature of reality as it is without appearance, are subject to causes and conditions set forth above by Sa paṅ and the other commentators. Specifically, Gyag ston details how the various kinds of liberative means such as meditative absorption and the like serve as the substantial cause (*nyer len gyi rgyu, upadāna-kāraṇa*) and the wisdom (*shes rab, prajñā*) realizing emptiness (*stong pa, śūnyatā*) serve as the cooperating condition (*lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen, sahakāri-pratyaya*) and establish the enlightened gnosis incorporated in the subsequent attainment state knowing the nature of phenomenon with appearance. Alternatively, when the wisdom realizing emptiness assumes the role as the substantial cause with liberative means as the cooperative condition, the enlightened gnosis incorporated in the meditational equipoise state knowing reality as it is, i.e., noumenon without appearance is established.⁵⁹

The Time to Accomplish [the Two Gnosis the Three Āryas] [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.2.]

Sa paṅ states per *TMRG, Mngon sum* verses 54-55: “[The time required to complete perfection for those three āryas, i.e. Arhat, Preatyekabuddha and the Bodhisttava] is three lifetimes, one-hundred eons, and three incalculable lifetimes, respectively.”⁶⁰ Elaborating, Sa paṅ comments that the time for the three āryas to attain true and complete enlightenment (*mngon par rdzogs par rgya*) is as follows: the Arhat who is vigorous (*brtson 'grus, vīrya*) accomplishes perfection by the mental cultivation of selflessness of the person (*gang zag gi bdag med, pudgalanairātmya*) and the accumulation of merit (*bsod nams, puṇya*) for three lifetimes (*tshe, āyu*). The sharp-minded (*dbang po rnon po, tīkṣṇendriya*)

⁵⁹ See *TMRGDK*, 115, 16-21: *ngo bo'i sgo nas dbye na / lnga po de dag la snang bcas ji snyed pa mkhyen pa rjes thob dang / snang med ji lta ba mkhyen pa mnyam gzhas gi sgo nas dbye bas gnyis gnyis te rnam pa bcu'o / de la bsam gtan la sogs thabs sna tshogs kyis nyer len gyi rgyu byas / stong nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab kyis lhan cig byed pa'i rkyen byas pas ji snyed pa mkhyen pa'i ye shes gzigs pa 'grub la / stong nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab kyis nyer len gyi rgyu byas / thams kyis lhan cig byed rkyen byas pas ji lta ba mkhyen pa'i ye shes 'grub bo /*

⁶⁰ See *TMRG*, 31, 12 and *TMRGRG*, 222, 8-9: *tshe gsum bskal pa brgya dang ni / grans med gsum gyis de mthar phyin /*

Pratyekabuddha accomplishes perfection due to the mental cultivation of the one-and-a-half-selflessnesses (*bdag med phyen dang gnyis*) i.e., the selflessness of persons and half the selflessness of phenomena, and the accumulation [of merit] for one hundred eons (*bskal pa, kalpa*). And those imbued with the heart of compassion (*snying rje, karuṇā*), i.e., the Bodhisattva, attain complete and perfect enlightenment by cultivating emptiness (*stong nyid, śūnyatā*) and accumulating [merit] for three incalculable eons.⁶¹ Supporting this view, Sa paṇ looks to the *Abhidharmakośa*, which states: “Liberation is quickest [for the Śrāvaka] in three existences (*srid pa, bhava*), the Rhinoceros has a [preceding] cause of one hundred eons, [and] Buddhahood occurs after three incalculable eons.” All of the commentators are in agreement with Sa paṇ in his explanation of the time necessary for each of the three āryas to attain their respective true and complete enlightenment. Go rams pa and Gyag ston limit their commentary to simply citing the relevant *Abhidharmakośa* passage to which Sa paṇ refers regarding the time each ārya requires. Glo bo mkhan merely repeats the first couple of words of *TMRG* verse 54 [*tshe gsum*] of Sa paṇ's discussion in the *TMRGRG* [222.8] and the final word [*'dod do*], which ends the discussion [*TMRGRG*, 223.3], noting that Sa paṇ's explanation is easy to understand (*go bar sla*) and therefore he does not provide any further comments on the issue.⁶²

⁶¹ *TMRGRG*, 222, 9-11: *tshe gsum gyi bsod nams dang gang zag gi bdag med bsgom pas dgra bcom pa dang / bskal pa brgya tshogs dang bdag med phyed dang gnyis kyis rang sangs rgyas dbang po rnon po dang / bskal pa grangs med gsum gyi tshogs dang stong nyid snying rje'i snying po can gyis mngon par rdzogs par 'tshang rgya ste /*

⁶² *TMRGRG*, 222, 12-13: *mdzod las / myur ba srid pa gsum gyis grol / bse ru bskal pa brgya yi rgyus / de grans med gsum la sangs rgyas /*. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa*, Ch.VI, 24d: *kṣiprīm mokṣas tribhir bhavāiḥ /*; *Abhidharmakośa*, Ch.III, 94d: *khaḍaḥ kalpasatānvayaḥ /*; and *Abhidharmakośa*, Ch.III, 93d-94a: *tadasaṃkhyatrayodbhavam / buddhṭvam /*. Cf. Go rams pa's *TMRGDG*, 150, 7-16; Gyag ston's *TMRGDK*, 115, 21-116, 5, and Glo bo mkhan's *TMRGRN*, 195, 3; Glo bo mkhan basically quotes the beginning of verse 54 “*tshe gsum zhes*,” which initiates the topic and the final segment of the last sentence of the discussion, “*'dod do zhes*,” which he declares easy to understand (*go bar sla'o*). Cf. Mi Pham's *TMRGCCG*, 308b, 3-4 which provides further clarification: *ye shes de nam mthar phyin pa'i dus ni tshe gsum gyi tshogs gnyis nyi tshe ba la 'bad pas*

Before completing this discussion highlighting the role of realizing ‘selflessness’ in terms of spiritual attainment and in somewhat of a preamble to the next section, Sa paṇ takes a short but important look at that the differentiation of the ‘realization of selflessness’ among the general vehicles (*theg pa thun mong*), i.e., Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva. Sa paṇ comments that Śrāvaka and some Mahāyāna practitioners do not believe that there are different kinds of realization of selflessness among three kinds of Noble Ones: they believe that regardless of what path the practitioner follows, if they do not realize the key factor that is the fundamental reality of the Four Noble Truths (*bden pa bzhi, catursatya*) or the selflessness of all phenomena, it is not possible to realize the truth, i.e., ‘reality’. Nevertheless, it is accepted that there is a difference between superior and inferior realization of selflessness, depending on different kinds of liberative means such as compassion.⁶³

Attaining Different Results Depending on [Different] Liberative Means. [2.B.1.A.3.D.1.C.3.]

Following the above comments regarding the time required to attain the two types of gnosis, Sa paṇ turns to an examination of the different results depending on the various types of liberative means utilized. Sa paṇ’s *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* v. 56-59 states:

nyan thos kyi 'bras bu zad mi skye shes pa'i ye shes dang bskal pa brgya yi bse ru lta bu'i ye shes dang ni bskalpa chen grangs med gsum gyis sgrib gnyis spang ba sang rgyas kyis ye shes de mthar phyn pa'o /. (“The time to accomplish the gnosis of those [three āryas is as follows]: the arhat who cultivates the two accumulations [merit and wisdom] for the period of three lives perfects the gnosis which perceives the cessation of defilements and the gnosis which perceives that defilements are not recreated; and the gnosis of one who is like Rhinoceros, i.e., a Pratyekabuddha, is perfected in one hundred lifetimes; and the gnosis of a Buddha who has abandoned the two obscurations [obscuration to omniscience and obscuration of disturbing emotions] is perfected in three incalculable eons.) A period of at least 10 to the 60th power years is counted as an incalculable eon.

⁶³ *TMRGRG*, 222, 13-223, 3: *bdeg med rtogs pa'i dbye ba 'di theg pa thun mong gi yin gyi / nyan thos dang theg pa chen po 'ga' zhig 'phags pa la gsum la bdag med rtogs pa'i khyad par mi 'dod de / bden pa bzhi'i chos nyid dam / chos thams cad bdag med par ma rtogs na bden pa mthong ba mi srid pa'i phyr ro / 'o na khyan mchog dman gyi khyad par ni snying rje dang thabs kyi bye brag la ltos par 'dod do /*.

“Because there are inferior liberative means, there are the two types of liberation [i.e., first, that of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha and second, that of the Mahāyāna practitioner]. [Regarding inferior liberative means], due to possessing [karmic] habitual tendencies (*bag chags, vāsanā*) reality (*de kho nan yid, tattvam*) is not revealed. [On the other hand,] due to repeatedly practicing [superior] liberative means, all things are clear. On account of [the Bodhisattva] abandoning habitual tendencies, there is omniscience (*kun mkhyen, sarvajñā*).”⁶⁴ In order to highlight the significance of practicing liberative means, *TMRGRG* explains that because both the Śrāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas principally cultivate insight directed towards the selflessness of the person while not practicing liberative means, e.g., altruism, they merely attain a partial realization of selflessness of the person and half the unsubstantiality of dharmas. That is to say, Śrāvakas realize the selflessness of the person while Pratyekabuddhas realize the selflessness of the person (*gang zag gi bdag med*) plus one half of the selflessness of the dharmas (*chos bdag med gi phyed*). As noted previously, when discussing the different natures of the yogin's perception, Sa paṅ explains that the Pratyekabuddha realizes the ‘selflessness of person and a half’ (*bdag med phyed dang gnyis*), and remarks that the Pratyekabuddha realizes the absence of inherent nature of apprehended phenomena (*chos kyi bdag bzung ba rang bzhin med pa*). This implies that Pratyekabuddhas realize the selflessness of the person as well as the selflessness of apprehended phenomena (*gzung pa*), but not the remaining half, i.e., the selflessness of the apprehender of

⁶⁴ See *TMRG*, 31, 12-14 and *TMRGRG*, 223, 4-5: *thabs zhan pas na rnam grol gnyis / bag chags bcas phyir ston pa min / thabs la goms pas dngos kun gsal / bag chags spangs phyir kun mkhyen yin /*. Regarding *TMRG* v.56 which reads “*thabs zhan*”, a slight alternate reading as “*thabs gzhan*” is found in the *TMRG* root version contained within Sa skya Paṅḍita, 2005 as well as Sa skya Paṅḍita, 1976 *TMRG* root in Xylographic print from a block preserved at Simtokha. So, an alternative reading could be “because/when there are other/different liberative techniques, there are two liberations.” While both Go rams pa and Gyag ston comment on this topic as noted below, Glo bo mkhan, as he did in the previous section, simply notes where Sa paṅ's discussion in the *TMRGRG* begins [223.3] and ends [224.7], commenting again that they are easy to understand (*go bar sla*). Cf. Glo bo mkhan's *TMRGRN*, 195, 3-4: *gsum pa ni / thabs zhes pa nas / ma yin nam zhe na zhes pa'i bar te go bar sla'o /*.

phenomena (*'dzin pa*). Likewise, due to their not practicing such liberative means as the noble concern for others for a long time, the path of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas is similar to a practice lacking intuitive awareness, because their minds are unclear. Because they are not able to abandon habitual tendencies, neither Śrāvakas nor Pratyekabuddhas practice noble concern for others, i.e., altruism (*sems bkyed*).⁶⁵ Directly in line with Sa paṅ and demonstrating the significance of 'habitual tendencies' and 'liberative means' regarding one's efforts to traverse the path, Go rams pa notes that the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha Arhats' *yogi*-direct perception does not comprehend any knowable (*shes bya, jñeya*) as a direct perception because they have not overcome habitual tendencies of nescience (*ma rig pa'i bag chags, avidyavāsanā*), due to the fact that their liberative means is provided with weak compassion (*snying rje, karuṇā*).⁶⁶

Gyag ston utilizes a syllogistic (*sbyor ba, prayoga*) style to address the different kinds of attainment with respect to the liberative techniques of those three Āryas. *TMRGDK* states that if the complete liberation of the two Arhats, i.e., the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha, is the subject under discussion (*chos can, dharmin*), their revelation of imminent reality is not thorough (*mthar phyin pa, niṣṭhgāta*); because they have not practiced liberative means for a long time their minds are not clear regarding

⁶⁵ *TMRGRG*, 223, 5-11: *thabs la ma sbyangs par shes rab gtso bor bsgoms pas bdag med phyogs gcig phyed dang gnyis rtogs su zin kyang thabs yun ring du ma sbyangs pas ma goms pa'i rig pa ltar sems mi gsal ba'i phyir bag chags spong mi nus bas gzhan don chen po la nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas gnyis mi 'jug la /*. Mi Pham's *TMRGCG*, 308b, 4-5: offers the following clarifying comment: *des na thabs la ltos ba'i 'bras bu yang gang zag gi bdag med tsam gtso bor byas nas thabs sna tshog la goms pa zhan pas na nyan rang gi rnam grol gnyis ni / da rung bag chags bcas phyir spangs rtogs mthar phyin nas de kho na nyid mkhyen pa'i ston pa min /*. (Therefore, the results depending on the liberative means: Having principally [focused] on only the selflessness of the person, while inadequately practicing various liberative means, the complete liberation of both Śrāvakas and the Pratyekabuddhas does not reveal the essential nature (*de kho na nyid, tattvam*) because they still possess habitual tendencies even after having attained [what is to be] abandoned and [what is to be] realized.)

⁶⁶ *TMRGDG*, 150, 16-18: *nyon rang dgra bcom pa'i rnal 'byor mngon sum gyis shes bya thams cad mngon sum du ma rtogs te / des ma rig pa'i bag chags ma spangs pa'i phyir te / thabs snying rje dman pa'i phyir /*.

knowable phenomena (*shes bya, jñeya*), and thus their minds still possess the two hinderances (*sgrib pa, āvaraṇa*) along with their habitual tendencies. Continuing to employ a syllogism, Gyag ston states that if the complete liberation of the two Arhats remains the subject under discussion, they have not practiced incomparable altruism for others, because their compassion (*sbying rje, karuṇā*) is weak (*dman, hīna*).⁶⁷

On the other hand, Sa paṅ explains, due to practicing insight concerning the unsubstantiality of the person as well as the skillful liberative means of altruism, the Bodhisattva's practice cultivates reality as it is, because of having a luminous or enlightened mind. The Buddha/Bodhisattva's luminous awareness (i.e., gnosis), having abandoned even the subtlest hinderance of both types of habitual tendencies, understands all knowable phenomena (*shes bya thams cad, sarvajñeya*). Sa paṅ emphasizes that practicing for the benefit of others while endowed with compassion is the ultimate mark distinguishing the Buddha's realization from the liberation of both the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha.⁶⁸ Furthermore, Go rams pa highlights that all

⁶⁷ TMRGDK, 116, 4-7: *de dag la thabs la ltos nas 'bras bu'i khyad ji lta bu zhe na / rnam par grol ba nyan rang dgra bcom pa gnyis chos can / ston pa mthar phyin ma yin te / thabs la yun ring du ma sbyangs pas shes bya la thugs mi gsal zhing sgrib pa'i bag chags dang bcas pa'i phyir / chos can / gzhan don chen po la mi 'jug ste / snying rje dman pa'i phyir /*. The syllogism (*sbyor ba, proyoga*) utilized in this situation by Gyag ston consists of the following three basic elements: subject under discussion (*chos can, dharmin*); thesis to be proven (*bsgrub bya, sādhyā*); and the reason (*gtan tshigs, hetu*). Cf. Perdue 1992: 33 ff, and Wayman 1999: xiii-xxi.

⁶⁸ TMRGRG, 223, 8-11: *thabs la mkhas shing shes rab sbyangs pas na bzo gnas goms pa ltar thugs gsal ba'i phyir / bag chags kyi sgrib pa spangs pas shes bya thams cad mkhyen la thugs rje dang ldan pas gzhan gyi don la 'jug pa'i phyir grol ba gnyis dang sangs rgyas kyi khyad par de yin no /*. Again, Mi Pham's TMRGCG, 308b, 5-6: offers the following clarifying comment: *shes rab sbyangs shing thabs la goms pa mthar phyin pas sangs rgyas kyi rnal mngon gyis shes bya'i dngos kun gsal zhing ye shes de ni bag chags kyi sgrib pa phra mo yang spangs phyir rnam pa thams cad kun mkhyen pa'i ston pa mthar thug gam mtshan nyid pa yin no/*. (Having perfected the cultivation of liberative means while practicing insight, the yogic direct perception of the Buddha illuminates all reality. Because of abandoning even the subtlest hinderance of habitual tendencies, that gnosis [of the Buddha] which realizes all reality is the ultimate characteristic [of the Buddha's yogic perception].)

knowables are realized by the yogic direct perception of the perfectly accomplished Buddha (*rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas, saṃnyaksambudha*), because they have abandoned the habitual tendencies of nescience, and they have practiced liberative means imbued with great compassion (*snying rje chen po, mahākaruṇā*) for three incalculable eons.⁶⁹ As Blumenthal notes in his study of the *Madhyamakālamkāra*, Śāntarakṣita also highlights the practice of great compassion in differentiating the practice of the Bodhisattva from that of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha per verse 95, which states, “This ultimate, pure nectar is an attainment which belongs to none other than the *Tathāgata*, who is motivated by the causes and conditions of great compassion.” When commenting on this verse, Blumenthal notes that in this case Śāntarakṣita is demonstrating the superiority of the Mahāyāna path over that of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha: even though Śāntarakṣita holds that the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha realize selflessness, the primary distinction of the Mahāyānists from the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha is the role the Mahāyāna assign to great compassion (Blumenthal 2004: 172-173).

Adding clarity, Gyag ston comments that unlike the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha the fully accomplished and perfectly accomplished Buddha is omniscient (*kun mkhyen, sarvajña*), because he has overcome the two hindrances along with the habitual tendencies, i.e., the hindrance of disturbing emotions and the hindrance of the knowable. Without a doubt, the time required to attain this type of liberation is considerably greater than the time required for the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha's partial liberation. Gyag ston highlights how due to their cultivation of the various liberative techniques for three incalculable eons the Bodhisattva attains the perfect luminous, i.e., enlightened mind concerning all the points of discipline as to what should be accepted and rejected (*blang dor gyi gnas kun*): for example, due to accepting a practice including insight as well as skillful liberative

⁶⁹ *TMRGDG*, 150, 19-151, 1: *rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas kyi rnal 'byor mngon sum gyis shes bya thams cad mngon sum du rtogs te /des ma rig pa'i bag chags spangs pa'i phyir te / thabs snying rje chen po bskal pa grans med gsum du goms par byas pa'i phyir /*.

means, the Bodhisattva's practice cultivates reality as it is.⁷⁰ Therefore, while all three Āryas repeatedly practice insight regarding the unsubstantiality of the person, only the Bodhisattva also emphasizes the liberative means of great compassion. It is also significant that in addition to overcoming the hindrance of disturbing emotions and the hindrance of the knowable, the Bodhisattva abandons the habitual tendencies (*bag chags*, *vāsanā*), thereby preventing their reemergence, which is not the case for the other two Arhats.

To further demonstrate the distinction between the two Arhats and the Bodhisattva and the important role played by 'liberative means' and 'habit energy/habitual tendencies' in the Mahāyāna path undertaken by the Bodhisattva, Sa paṅ cites Dharmakīrti's *PV Sid*, v. 136.c -140.d, which states:

Virtues and faults (*skyon dang yon tan*, *guṇadoṣa*) [the cause of suffering, i.e., clinging to the false view of me and mine and the antidote to that, i.e., the view of selflessness] become perfectly clear to him [i.e., the Bodhisattva] due to practicing liberative means repeatedly for a long time in various aspects. Therefore, due to the sharpness of his mind [from the repeated practice] he is released from the habit energy which is the cause [of suffering, i.e., desire causing one to grasp to the false notion of self]. And just this [characteristic of practicing great compassion] distinguishes the great sage [i.e., the Buddha], who practices for the sake of others, from the Rhinoceros etc.

⁷⁰ *TMRGDK*, 116, 7-10: *rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas kun mkhyen yin te / sgrib gnyis bag chags dang bcas pa spangs pa'i phyir te / bskal pa grangs med pa gsum du thabs la goms pas blang dor gyi gnas kun la thugs gsal ba mthar phyin pa'i phyir / dper na bzo'i gnas goms pa bzhin no /*. Regarding the two hinderances (*sgrib gnyis*): *nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa/kleśāvaraṇa* (hinderance of disturbing emotions) and *shes bya'i sgrib pa/jñeyāvaraṇa* (hinderance of the knowable), Cf. Wayman, 1997: 129, discussing Vasubandhu on "Transmutation of the Support," notes that when commenting on Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasamgraha*, Chap I, Vasubandhu states "there must be the mind possessed of defilement (*nyon mongs pa can gyi nyid*) because that is why one endeavors to get rid of the hinderances of [both] defilement and the knowable (*kleśa-and jñeya- āvaraṇa*)." And again, Wayman, 1997: 130, reviewing the treatment of 'transmutation of support' in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā*, k. 29c-d, translates: "Transmutation of support is of two kinds of destruction of 'contamination'..." And as for the "two" kinds of destruction, Wayman notes that "Sthiramati's comment points to the hinderance of defilement and the hinderance of the knowable."

46 *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 22, 2021-22

[the Pratyekajinas and the Śrāvakas]. For that reason, precisely the repeated practice of liberative means is considered as an essential teaching (*ston pa, śāsana*).⁷¹

An important issue in terms of the practice of great compassion as an essential liberative means of the Buddha's teaching, is the fact that it is necessary for the compassionate Bodhisattva to first practice liberative means to eliminate his own discomfort before he can assist others. To highlight this factor and in accordance with Dharmakīrti's above statement, Sa pañ refers to *PV Sid*, v. 134. a-d which states: "The compassionate [Bodhisattva who wishes to calm the discomfort of others, first] undertakes liberative means for the purpose of relinquishing [his own] discomfort (*sdug bsngal, duḥkha*). For [him for whom] the goal and cause [to attain that goal, i.e., the path] are imperceptible, it is hard to communicate [the path to others]."⁷²

Go rams pa concludes the examination of the differing results of different liberative means by looking at the circumstances of the Śrāvaks and the Pratyekabuddhas who have not completely abandoned their habitual tendencies and the

⁷¹ *TMRGRG*, 223, 11-14: *de yang rnam 'grel las / rnam pa du mar thabs mang por / yun ring dus su goms pa la / de la skyon dang yon tan dag / rab tu gsal ba nyid du 'gyur / des na thugs kyang gsal ba'i phyir / rgyu yi bag chags spangs pa yin / thub chen gzhan don 'jug can gyi / bse ru sogs las khyad 'di yin / de don phyir na thabs goms pa / de nyid ston pa yin par 'dod /*. Sanskrit for *PV Sid*, v.138.c -140.d is found Shastri 1968: 51 and Miyasaka 1971-72: 21-22[v. 136c-138d]: *bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāśya ca / gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām / buddheś ca pāṭavād dhetor vāsanātaḥ prahīyate / parāthavrtteḥ khaṅgāer viśeṣo 'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ / upāy ā bhyāsa evāyaṃ tādarthyāc chāsaṇaṃ mataṃ/*. Regarding 'guṇadoṣa', Manorathanandin when commenting on *PV Sid*, v.139, 51, comments: *tatra duḥkhaḥetau tadvipakṣe ca guṇadoṣā...* Further, Manorathanandin, 51, discussing verse 140c notes 'evāyam' as *ayameva vāsanahānilakṣaṇaḥ*.

⁷² *TMRGRG*, 224, 1-2: *brtse ldan sdug bsngal gzhom pa'i phyir / thams rnams la ni mngon sbyor mdzad / thams byun de rgyu lkog gyur pa / de 'chad pa ni dka' ba yin /*. Sanskrit for *PV Sid*, v.134 is found Shastri 1968: 50 and Miyasaka 1971-72: 20[v.132]: *dayāvān duḥkhaḥānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate / paroḥsopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram/*. Manorathanandin, 50, comments that the compassionate Bodhisattva undertakes liberative means to relinquish his own discomfort [first]: *dayāvān bodhisattvaḥ paraduḥkhaṃ śamayitukāmaḥ duḥkhaḥānārthamātman upāyeṣu duḥkhaśamanopāyeṣvabhiyujyate /*.

Bodhisattva/Buddhas who have accomplished complete abandonment of habitual tendencies. Anent this distinction, Go rams pa looks to Dharmakīrti's *PV Sid*, v. 143.d-144.a-c, which notes: "'Remainder' is not a defilement or a disease, but is the imperfection of body, speech and mind, or lack of sharpness in expressing the path. This ['remainder'] is abandoned 'without remainder' from repeated practice."⁷³ Having not abandoned their habitual tendencies, the two Arhats continue to have 'remainder' left behind from their previous actions. Dharmakīrti highlights that these 'remainders' are not to be considered a defilement or a disease, but the 'remainder' left by habitual tendencies resulting in the three-fold imperfection of 'body, speech and mind'. And it is only by means of 'repeated practice'—incorporating both insight as well great compassion—that these habitual tendencies, along with both the hinderance of disturbing emotions and the hindrance of the knowable, can be abandoned 'without remainder'. Further, by attaining the abandonment of habitual tendencies 'without remainder', a Bodhisattva/Buddha is able to abandon his lack of sharpness in expressing the path (*mārgoktyapaṭutā, lam bshad mi gsal nyid*) to others.

The Principle [by which the Yogin's Direct Perception] is a Valid Cognition Towards an Object [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.]

After completing the first section of his discussion of *yogin's* direct perception, i.e., pinpointing the nature of the *yogin's* direct perception, Sa pañ turns to the principle by which a *yogin's* direct perception is a valid cognition towards an object, by noting that the following three issues will be addressed during this discussion:

2.B.1.A.3.D.2.A. Are all *yogin's* direct perceptions valid cognitions?

⁷³ *TMRGDG*, 151, 2-3: *nyon mongs med dang nad med dang / zhes sogs.../*. Go rams pa only cites one *pāda* of the verse. The entire verse reads: *lus ngag sems kyi gnas ngan len / nyon mongs med dang nad med dang / lam bzhad mi gsal gnas nyid lus yin / goms phyir ma lus spangs pa nyid /*. Sanskrit for *PV Sid*, v. 143.d-144.a-c is found in Shastri 1968: 52-53 and Miyasaka 1971-72: [141d-142c] 22: *śeṣamakleśanirjvaraṃ kāyavāgbuddhivaiguṇyaṃ / mārgoktyapaṭutāpi vā aśeṣahānamabhyāsād /*.

48 *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 22, 2021-22

2.B.1.A.3.D.2.B. The principle by which [a *yogin*'s] valid cognition engages and disengages

2.B.1.A.3.D.2.C. Examining the gnosis which knows the three times

Sa paṅ commences discussion of the first issue [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.A.] by interjecting a question, “if someone asks, is every *yogin*'s direct perception a valid cognition, or not?,” and immediately responding categorially that “every *yogi* direct perception is established as a valid cognition.” Following the question-and-answer exchange, Sa paṅ highlights *TMRG*, *Mngon sum*, verses 60-63, which state: “Both subsequent cognition (*bcad shes*, *paricchinna-jñāna*) and an ascertaining [awareness] are not direct perceptions because they are conceptual thought (*rtog pa*, *kalpanā*). Therefore, all *yogi* direct perceptions are established as a valid cognition because they are direct perception (*mngon sum*, *pratyakṣa*).”⁷⁴ In evaluating subsequent cognition and an ascertaining awareness, Sa paṅ explains that since they both function as conceptual thought it is not possible for them to have a common locus (*gzhi mthun*, *samāna adhikaraṇa*) with direct perception; in other words, both subsequent cognition and ascertaining awareness, and direct perception are mutually exclusive.⁷⁵ After presenting verses 60-63 along with the brief clarifying statement, Sa paṅ's *TMRGRG* notes that this issue has already been explained (*zhes bshad zin la*), referring to the second chapter of *TMRG*, entitled “The Perceiving Cognition,” where verses 4-5 state: “[Many Tibetan paṅdits incorrectly collect the following five mental states as non-valid cognitions,] the five are assumption (*vid dpyod*), inattentive cognition (*snang la ma nges*

⁷⁴ *TMRGRG*, 224, 2-5: 'o na rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum thams cad tshad ma yin nam ma yin zhe na / gnyis pa yul la tshad mar 'gyur ba'i tshul la gsum las dang po rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum thams cad tshad mar bsgrub pa ni / bcad shes dang ni nges pa gnyis / rtog pa yin phyir mngon sum min / des na rnal 'byor mngon sum kun / mngon sum phyir tshad mar grub /. Cf. *TMRG*, 31,14-32, 2, for verses 60-63. Sometimes *bcad shes* is referred to as *bcad ps'i yul can*, see *TMRGRG*, 27, 5.

⁷⁵ *TMRGRG*, 224, 5-6: *bcad shes dang nges pa gnyi ga rtog pa'i byed pas yin pas mngon sum dang gzhi mthun mi srid do* /. As explained previously, both Dignāga [PS Prat, 3c (W/2d) and Dharmakīrti (PV Prat,123a) include being ‘free from conceptual thought’ as a defining characteristic of a valid direct perception.

pa), subsequent cognition (*bcad shes*), false cognition (*log shes*), and doubt (*the tshom*).⁷⁶ While Sa paṇ merely notes that his criticism is directed towards some Tibetan paṇḍits, Go rams pa again specifically identifies the great Phya pa and others as targets of Sa paṇ's comments. Both *TMRG Mngon sum* chapter verses 60-63 and *Shes byed kyi blo* chapter verses 4-5 are directed towards Phya pa's typology of mind or mental states (*blo rigs*), which discusses five non-valid cognitions (*tshad ma ma yin*) and the two valid cognitions, direct perception (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) and inference (*rjes dpag, anumāna*). At this point, among the five non-valid cognitions, we need only look at subsequent cognition (*bcad shes*). In the section within the second chapter of *TMRGDG* when Go rams pa presents Phya pa's position regarding subsequent cognition, he closely follows Sa paṇ's critique. Go rams pa remarks that Phya pa and others define subsequent cognition as an awareness which functions to contradict false superimposition regarding an entire object previously comprehended. Go rams pa further notes that according to Phya pa et al., when a subsequent cognition is differentiated, there are two types: subsequent cognition of a direct perception (*mngon sum bcad shes*) and conceptual subsequent cognition (*rtog pa bcad shes*). According to Go rams pa, Phya pa regards the subsequent cognition of a direct perception to be similar to the second moment onwards of a direct perception which realizes, e.g., blue, and the conceptual subsequent cognition as similar to an ascertaining awareness (*nges shes*) arising after the direct perception, and the recollection of the universal arising after inference (*rjes dpag, anumāna*).⁷⁷

⁷⁶ *TMRG*, 4,11 and *TMRGRG*, 20, 3-4: *yid dpyod snang la ma nges dang / bcad shes log shes the tshom lnga /*. See Dreyfus 1997: 375ff. for a discussion of Phya pa [Cha-ba's] typology of mental states. See also Perdue 1992: 676 for a brief discussion contrasting *tshad ma*, which he translates as 'prime cognizer' and *bcad shes* (subsequent cognizer). Cf. also Wayman, trans. 1999: 271ff. for Tsong-kha pa's presentation of the five non-valid cognitions in his *Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gnyer yid kyi mun sel*. Tsong-kha pa's discussion appears to support Phya pa's division of five non-valid cognitions.

⁷⁷ *TMRGDG*, 15, 6-10 and 16, 8-12: *gsum pa la / dgag ba bzhag gnyis las / dang po la / 'dod pa brjod pa dang/ de dgag pa gnyis las / dang po ni / sngon gyi mkhas pa phya pa chen po sogs na re / tshad min gyi blo thams cad yid dpyod / snang la ma nges pa / bcad shes / log shes / the tshom dang lngar 'dus pa las /...bcad shes kyi mtshan nyid / sngar rtogs zin gyi byed pa*

Discussing the subtle differences among the five non-valid cognitions is quite technical and not pertinent to our focus. However, without going too far afield, we might observe that Sa paṅ and the Sa skya writers following him disagreed right from the outset with Phya pa and certain of his followers when they differentiated direct perception (*mngon sum*, *pratyakṣa*) defined as “an awareness (*rig pa*) which is free from conceptual thought and without error” and a direct perception as a valid cognition (*mngon sum tshad ma*, *pratyakṣa-pramāṇa*) as “[a direct perception which identifies its object by] eliminating superimposition (*sgro 'dogs*, *adhyāropa*) due to the power of the perceptual experience of an object not comprehended previously.” Both Sa paṅ and Go rams pa explicitly state that the separation is incorrect (*mi 'thad*), for two reasons. First, the separation it is not indicated in the authoritative texts (i.e., Dignāga’s *PS*, Dharmakīrti’s *PV*, etc.). Second, because a direct perception lacks a cognitive operation of exclusion (*rnam bcad*) regarding an object not comprehend previously it is not possible for the direct perception to eliminate superimposition due to its own exclusion (*rang ldog*).⁷⁸ Go rams pa’s first reason for discounting the separation seems correct, in that earlier Indian scholars such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti simply presented direct perception and inference as two types of valid cognition, without any further separation into direct perception as a valid cognition or inference as a valid cognition. Moreover, they did not present any

ma nyams pa'i don la / log phyogs kyi sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa'i rig pa / dbye na / mngon sum bcad shes dang / rtog pa bcad shes gnyis dang dang po ni / sngo 'dzin mngon sum skad cig gnyis pa man chad lta bu'o / gnyis pa ni / mngon sum gyi rjes su skyes pa'i nges shes dang / rjes dpag gi rjes su skyes pa'i dran shes lta bu'o /. Cf. *TMRGRG*, 27, 5-10.

⁷⁸ *TMRGRG*, 209, 2-6: *bod rnams mngon sum dang mngon sum tshad ma tha dad du phye nas / mngon sum gyi mshan nyid rtog bral ma 'khrul pa dang / de'i tshad ma'i mtshan nyid sngar ma rtogs pa'i don la myong stobs kyis sgro 'dogs gcod pa zhes zer ba mi 'thad de / gnyis su dbye ba gzhun las ma bshad cing sngar ma rtogs pa la rnam gcad med la sgro 'dogs gcod pa mngon sum gyi rang ldog pa mi srid par bshad zin to /*. Cf. *TMRGDG*, 125, 4, where Go rams pa specifically names Phya pa etc., as the targets of Sa paṅ’s criticism. Here both Sa paṅ and Go rams pa are commenting on *TMRG*, *Mngon sum* chapter, verse 1: *myong bas sgro 'dogs gcod pa 'khrul /* (Tibetans who claim direct perception as a valid cognition experiences [an object not previously comprehended by] eliminating superimposition are wrong). See also Stewart 2012: 59-72 for a complete discussion regarding the defining characteristics of direct perception.

of the five other mental states discussed by Phya pa and his followers as non-valid cognitions. Regarding Go rams pa's second reason for discounting the separation, a cognitive act of exclusion is a conceptual activity and thus cannot be present in *pratyakṣa* without violating the requirement that *pratyakṣa* is 'free from conceptual thought.'

Addressing the question whether 'all *yogi* direct perceptions are valid cognitions', Go rams pa notes that some scholars accept the first moment (*skad cig ma, kṣaṇa*) of the *yogi*'s omniscience (*rnam khyen*) as a valid cognition and the second moment as subsequent cognition. Go rams pa holds that this interpretation is wrong because every direct perception established as a cognition (*shes pa, jñāna*) devoid of conceptual thought and without error is established as valid cognition. Accordingly, this second moment of omniscience is also a valid cognition.⁷⁹ With this comment Go rams pa also nullifies Phya pa's additional criterion regarding a direct cognition as a valid cognition, i.e., that it cognizes an object not comprehended previously. In this case, Go rams pa refers to the fact that direct perception engages its object newly each moment due to the object continually changing; hence each additional moment after the first moment of the *yogi*'s direct perception is perceiving an object newly. In sum, according to Sa paṅ and Go rams pa, Phya pa and his followers are wrong when they maintain that only the first moments of a direct perception and inference are valid cognitions and the later moments that ascertain objects initially subject of direct perception or inference are subsequent cognition and ascertaining awareness. Without being specific, Sa paṅ directs his final comment on this topic at Phya pa, stating that a direct perception is not to be evaluated as to whether or not it is a valid cognition by evaluating whether or not it is able to induce certainty of an object.⁸⁰ Sa paṅ's point is that a direct perception is evaluated as being a valid cognition in terms of being devoid of conceptual thought and without error, not by whether or not it is

⁷⁹ TMRGDG, 151, 4-8: ...*kha cig / rnam mkhyen skad cig ma dang po tshad ma dang / gnyis pa bcad shes su 'dod pa mi 'thad de / mngon sum thams cad rtog bral ma 'khrul ba'i shes par grub pas / tshad mar grub pa bzhin du 'di yang tshad ma yin pa'i phyir ro /*

⁸⁰ TMRGRG, 224, 6-8: *des na mngon sum rang las nges pa 'dren nus mi nus dpyad par bya'i tshad ma yin ma yin dbyad par bya ba ma yin no /*

able to establish certainty by itself due to the first moment direct perception engaging its object. Furthermore, as noted previously, determining certainty (*nges pa, niścita*) of an object is a function conceptual thought and therefore impossible for a direct perception.

In supporting Sa paṅ's position on the issue of whether all *yogins'* direct perception are valid cognitions as presented in *TMRG, Mngon sum*, verse 60-63, Gyag ston, again utilizing a syllogistic style, states that if both subsequent cognition and an ascertaining awareness are the subject under discussion, then they are not direct perceptions, because they constitute conceptual thought. Still utilizing a syllogistic style, Gyag ston notes that for that reason, if every *yogi* direct perception (*rnal 'byor mngon sum, yogi-pratyakṣa*) is the subject under discussion, then all *yogi* direct perceptions are established as valid cognition, because they are direct perceptions.⁸¹

The Principle by which the *Yogin's* Valid Cognition Engages and Disengages [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.B.]

In order to present the principle by which the *yogin's* valid cognition engages and disengages (*'jug ldog*), Sa paṅ refers to *TMRG, Mngon sum*, verses 64-67 stating: "It is taught that the ordinary person's valid cognition engages and disengages due to just the certainty [of each perceptual experience. The perceptual experience of the] Noble Ones who are free from conceptual thought is said to proceed [by means of] meditative absorption (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*)."⁸² Sa paṅ comments that the ordinary person's self-centered valid cognition, conditioned by attachment, engages and disengages from each external appearance —i.e., each object, each person or place presently perceived— through an awareness providing continuity with what was previously experienced by direct perception. Furthermore, the valid cognitions of the Noble Ones who have not abandoned the unconscious

⁸¹ *TMRGKH*, 116, 14-16: 'o na rnal 'byor mngon sum thams cad tshad ma yin nam ma yin zhe na / bcaḍ shes dang nges gnyis chos can / mngon sum min te / rtog pa yin pa'i phyir / rgyu mtshan des na rnal 'byor mngon sum kun chos can / tshad mar grub te/ mngon sum yin pa'i phyir /.

⁸² *TMRG*, 32, 2-3 and *TMRGRG*, 224, 8-9: so so skye bo'i tshad ma ni / nges pa nyid las 'jug ldog byed / 'phags pa rtog pa bral ba rnams / ting nge 'dzin las byed par gsungs /

karmic propensities of conceptual thought (*rtog pa, kalpanā*) rival the ordinary person's valid cognition when in their natural states, i.e., not currently meditating. When, those same Noble Ones who have not abandoned the karmic propensities of conceptual thought dwell in formal meditative equipoise, their valid cognitions proceed through meditative absorption in the knowledge that arises through deliberate aspiration (*smon nas shes pa, praṇidhi jñāna*). And both Sa paṇ and Gyag ston state that the *Sūrangama Sūtra* and the *Ratnamudra Sūtra*, etc., taught that the valid cognitions of those Noble Ones who have abandoned the karmic propensities of conceptual thought, proceed by the power of supreme meditative absorption attained through noble aspiration (*smon lam, praṇidhāna*).⁸³

Go rams pa begins his discussion of this issue by presenting a supposed objection to Sa paṇ's final comment in the previous section, i.e., "a direct perception is not to be evaluated as to whether or not it is a valid cognition by evaluating whether or not it is able to induce certainty [of an object] by itself." The objection by a likely proponent of Phya pa's view, states that "if [as you claim] a direct perception [is not to be evaluated as to whether it does or] does not ascertain its own object [during the first moment], then it is not correct to say that [direct perception] engages the individual characterized phenomena (*rang mtshan, svalakṣaṇa*)

⁸³ *TMRGRG*, 224, 9-14: *so so skye bo'i tshad ma ni mngon sum gyis mthong ba myong ba mtshams sbyor ba'i dran pas so sor ngos nas 'jug ldog byed la / 'phags pa rtog pa'i bag chags ma spangs pa rnams rang bzhin du gnas pa na / 'jig rten pa dang 'dra la smon nas shes pa la mnyam par gzhang na ting nge 'dzin gyis byed do / rtog pa'i bag chags spangs pa de dag smon lam las grub pa'i dpa' bar 'gro ba dang rin chen phyag rgya la sogs pa ting nge 'dzin khyad par can gyi stobs kyis byed par gsungs so/*. See also *TMRGDK*, 116, 20-23: *'phags pa rtog pa'i bag chags spangs pa rnams ni smon lam las grub pa'i dba' bar 'dro ba dang / rin chen phyag rgya la sogs pa ting nge 'dzin khyad par can gyi stobs kyis 'jug ldog par mdo las gsungs so/*. Cf. Mi Pham's *TMRGCG*, 309a, 2-3: *'dzin pas bslad pa tshur mthong gi so so skye bo'i tshad ma ni mthong myong mtshams sbyor pa'i dran pas so sor nges ba nyid las 'jug ldog byed de tshad ma rkyang pas min no/*. (The ordinary person's self-centered valid cognition conditioned by attachment, engaging and disengaging [its object] due to merely ascertaining each [external appearance] through an awareness providing continuity of what was previously experienced by direct perception, is not a pure valid cognition without adulteration.)

and disengages the generalizing characterized phenomena (*spyi mtshan*, *sāmāyalaṅkāra*). And, therefore, [direct perception] may consist of conceptual thought.” Go rams pa holds that their view is free from this fault (*skyon med*). The valid cognition of ordinary people proceeds to engage and disengage the object by whatever means are suitable to ascertain its object, either by an inner-directed manner such as introspective direct perception or by other means such as sense direct perception and mental direct perception. And when the Noble Ones who have not abandoned propensities of conceptual thought abide in their natural state, i.e., when not in a meditative state, they engage and disengage the object like an ordinary person. When the Noble Ones who still possess propensities are abiding in meditative absorption knowing aspiration (*smon gnas mkhyen pa*), they proceed to engage and disengage their object by the power of the meditative absorption. As for the Noble Ones who have abandoned propensities, Go rams pa emphasizes that these Noble Ones engage and disengage solely by dint of meditative absorption, whether or not they are in a formal meditative session.⁸⁴

Examining the Gnosis which Knows the Three Times [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.C.]

Initiating the examination of the gnosis which knows the three times (*dus gsum*), Sa paṅ once again inserts a contrarian statement:

⁸⁴ *TMRGDG*, 151, 8-18: 'o na mngon sum gyis rang yul ma nges na / de rang mtshan yod med la 'jug ldog byed pa mi 'thad cing / des na rtog par 'gyur ro zhe na skyon med de / so so skye bo'i tshad mas rang stobs dang / gzhan stobs gang rung gis nges pa drangs pa'i sgo nas 'jug ldog byed cing / 'phags pa rtog pa'i bag chags dang ma bral ba rnams rang bzhin du gnas pa'i tshe / so skye dang 'dra la / smon gnas mkhyen pa'i ting nge 'dzin la sogs pa la gnas pa'i tshe / ting nge 'dzin gyi stobs kyis 'jug ldog byed pa yin la / rtog pa'i bag chags dang bral pa rnams / ting nge 'dzin kho na'i stobs kyis 'jug ldog byed pa yin no / . It should be noted that while both Sa paṅ and Gyag ston utilize the term *smon nas shes pa*, when refereeing to the *samādhi* of the Noble Ones who have not abandoned the karmic propensities, Go rams pa employs the term *smon gnas mkhyen pa*. Furthermore, in the phrase, 'de rang mtshan yod med la 'jug ldog byed pa mi 'thad cing', here 'yod med' is in contrast to 'rang mtshan' and represents *spyi mtshan*.

Well then, if the Buddha does not know the past and future (*'das ma 'ongs*), then it is not proper [to say a Buddha is] omniscient. But if [it is the case that the Buddha] knows [the past and the future] from their appearance, then that implies that the three times [past, future and present] are established as substantial entities (*rdzas, dravya*). If [on the other hand the past and future] are imperceptible, then it is not proper to say [they are perceived] with the Buddha eye of direct perception.

In a somewhat ad hominem response, Sa paṇ dismisses all three objections, quoting *TMRG, Mngon sum*, verse 68-69: “[An ordinary person] is unable to ponder [the enlightened] knowledge of those possessing incomprehensible gnosis.”⁸⁵ Sa paṇ explains that someone conditioned by torpor is unable to ponder the awakened mind. And because the common person's ordinary perception is conditioned by the apprehender and the apprehended (*gzung ba dang 'dzin pa, grāhyagrāha*), they are never able to ponder [the enlightened] gnosis of the transmutation (*gnas gyur pa, āśraya parāvṛtta*) of the basis of personal existence. Therefore, the *ārya's* gnosis of the transmutation of the basis of existence, which knows the three times as well as the thoughts of others, etc., is beyond the reach of the human intellect. In order to support his position, Sa paṇ presents Dharmakīrti's *PV Prat*, 532, which states: “And the discernment of the characteristics of what is apprehended according to the awareness of form, etc., concerns the profane mind. But the thorough realization of *yogins* is incomprehensible [to the profane mind].” Furthermore, Sa paṇ highlights that according to the *PVin*, this statement by Dharmakīrti concerns conventional valid cognition (*kun tu tha snyad pa'i tshad ma, sāmvyavahārikapramāṇa*); as one of two types of valid cognition, the other being the ‘absolute valid cognition’ (*don dam pa'i tshad ma, pāramārthapramāṇa*).⁸⁶

⁸⁵ *TMRGRG*, 224,14-225,1-3: *gsum pa dus gsum mkhyen pa'i ye shes dpyad pa ni / o na sangs rgyas kyis 'das ma 'ongs mi mkhyen na thams cad mkhyen par mi rung la mkhyen na 'ang snang nas mkhyen na dus gsum rdzas su grub par 'gyur zhing / mi snang na mngon sum gyi spyen can du mi rung ngo zhe na / bsam gyis mi khyab ye shes can / de yi mkhyen pa dpag mi nus /*. See *TMRG*, 32,3-4 for verses 68-69.

⁸⁶ *TMRGRG*, 225, 3-9: *gnyid kyis bslad pa tsam gyis kyang / sad pa'i blo dpag mi nus na gzung ba dang / 'dzin pas bslad pa'i tshu rol mthong ba'i so so skye bos gnas gyur pa'i ye shes dpag nus re skan / des na gnas gyur ba'i*

Sa paṅ concludes his discussion of the Buddha's gnosis knowing the three times by describing some additional incorrect views of unidentified Tibetan scholars, most likely Phya pa and his followers. Sa paṅ comments that some Tibetans incorrectly claim that "[the Buddha's gnosis] realizes the past and future as implied (*shugs*) from the present. And some [incorrectly] claim "[the Buddha's gnosis] realizes [the past and the future] by way of [inner] manifestations of images (*rnam pa*, *akāra*) of the past and future [which arise in the Buddha's consciousness]." And some claim that "because of the non-existence of gnosis [at the stage of buddhahood] there is no [enlightened] knowledge of the three times." While Sa paṅ tersely notes that these incorrect views merely indicate the activities of a 'well-tortoise' which are incompatible with scriptural authority and reasoning (*lung dang rigs pa*), Go rams pa counters each view specifically.⁸⁷

*phyir dus gsum dang pha rol gyi sems mkhyen pa la sogs pa bsam gyis mi khyab bo / de 'ang rnam 'grel las / gzugs sogs dang ni sems de ltar / gzung ba'i mtshan nyid dpyod pa 'di / ma dag blo can la yin gyi / rnal 'byor rtogs pa bsam mi khyab / ces bya ba dang / rnam nges las / 'di ni kun tu tha snyad pa'i tshad ma'i dbang du byas pa yin gyi zhes gsungs pa ltar ro / . See Shastri 1968: 253 and Miyasaka 1971-72: 110 for Sanskrit of *PV Prat*, 532: *rūpādeś cetasaś caivam aviśuddhadhiyaṃ prati / grāhyalakṣaṇacinteyam acintyā yogināṃ gatiḥ / . Cf. Eltschinger 2009, 188 and 200, commenting on 'transmutation of the basis [of personal existence]' as well as Wayman, 1997: 127-132, discussing Vasubandhu on "Transmutation of the Support". Regarding a further discussion by Dharmakīrti's *PVin* of the relationship between the conventional valid cognition and the absolute valid cognition, see Steinkellner 2007: 44: *sāṃvyaḥārikasya caitat pramāṇasya rūpam uktam / atrāpi pare mūḍhā viśaṃvādayanti lokam iti / cintāmayīm eva tu prajñāṃ anuśīlanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapāyī pāramārthika-pramāṇam abhimukhīkurvanti / . For the Tibetan translation see Vetter 1966: 100: 'di ni kun tut ha snyad pa'i tshad ma'i rang bzin brjod pa yin te / 'di la yang pha rol rmongs pas 'jig rten slu bar byed pa'i phyir ro / bsam pa las byung ban yid kyi shes rab goms par byas pas rnam par 'khrul pas dben zhing dri ma med la log pa med pa dan dam pa'i tshad ma mngon sum do byed do / . Cf. also Wangchuk 2009: 220-223, which refers to this *PVin* passage while discussing Mi pham's theory of two kinds of conventional valid cognition, i.e., *tshul rol mthong ba la brten pa kun tu tha snyad pa'i tshad ma* and *dag pa'i gzigs pa la brten pa kun tut ha snyad pa'i tshad ma*.***

⁸⁷ *TMRGRG*, 225, 9-12: 'di la bod kha cig da lta ba'i shugs las 'das ma 'ongs rtogs zer ba dang / 'das ma 'ongs kyi rnam pa snang nas rtogs zhes zer ba dang / kha cig ye shes med pa'i phyir dus gsum mkhyen pa med do zhes zer ba ni / lung dang rigs pa dang 'gal ba khron pa'i rus sbal gyi rnam par thar

Anent the issue of whether or not the Buddha's gnosis knows the past and the future, Go rams pa initiates the discussion by inserting—albeit less argumentatively—the query presented by Sa paṅ: “Does the gnosis of a Buddha know or not know the past and the future?” Go rams pa explains as follows: “Some earlier scholars said that the Buddha knows the present (*da ltar ba*, *vartamāna*) explicitly (*dingos su*) and the past and future implicitly (*shugs*). Some said [the Buddha's gnosis] knows [the past and future] by way of [inner] manifestations of images of both [the past and the future]. And some said the gnosis [of the three times] does not exist at the spiritual level (*sa*, *bhūmi*) of buddhahood.” Go rams pa states that these claims are wrong. Regarding the first issue, he simply notes that the view that directs perception realizes something by implication has already been rejected due to the fact that it would involve conceptual thought. As for the second proposal—that the Buddha's gnosis realizes the past and the future by way of inner manifestations of images of the past and future which arise in the Buddha's consciousness—Go rams pa notes that this is incorrect because if the past and the future confer their image in their own right, then they would be established as substantial entities (*rdzas*, *dravya*). He adds, furthermore, that if the image of the past and future arises by dint of propensities, then the perceiver, i.e., a buddha's gnosis, would entail conceptual thought. As for the final incorrect claim—that there is no enlightened knowledge of the three times because of the non-existence of gnosis at the level of buddhahood—Go rams pa, seemingly relying on doctrinal tenets, comments that this view derives from the fallacious claim of the non-existence of omniscient gnosis. Following Sa paṅ's position which is supported by Dharmakīrti *PV Prat*, 532, Go rams pa notes that the manner by which a gnosis of a buddha knows a knowable cannot be fathomed by the mind of an

pa ston par zad do /. Cf. also *TMRGDG*, 151, 19-152, 1; *TMRGDK*, 116, 22-117, 2; and *TMRGRN*, 195, 6-9. While referring to the work of scholars as merely the activities of a well-tortoise may seem a bit harsh, Cabezón and Dargyay (2007: 6) report that it was not uncommon for Tibetan scholars involved in polemics to use strong language when criticizing the views of those with whom they disagreed.

ordinary person, because the manner of knowing that knowable by that gnosis is beyond the reach of human intellect.⁸⁸

Supporting this position in a similar manner, Gyag ston states, “If ordinary people are the subject of discussion, then they are not able ponder the knowledge of the three times, etc., of those [*āryas*] possessing the gnosis of the transmutation [of the basis personal existence]; because [the gnosis of the *āryas*] transcends the realm of verbal description and ordinary awareness in every way, it is incomprehensible by the ordinary person’s [imagination].” To further substantiate this position, Gyag ston quotes Dharmakīrti’s *Santānāntara-siddhi*, stating “the realization of all things by the Transcendent Accomplished Conquerors (*bcom ldan’das, bhagavān*) is incomprehensible [to the ordinary person] because it transcends the realm of verbal description and ordinary awareness in every way.”⁸⁹

⁸⁸ *TMRGDG*, 151,18 - 152, 8: ‘o na sngas rgyas kyi ye shes des / ’das pa dang ’ongs pa mkhyen nam mi mkhyen zhe na / snga rabs pa kha ci / des da lta ba dngos su mkhyen cing / ’das ma ’ongs shugs la mkhyen pa yin zhes dang / kha cig / de gnyis kyi rnam par shar ba’i sgo nas mkhyen pa yin zhes dang / kha cig / sangs rgyas kyi sa na ye shes med pa yin zher zer / mi ’thad de / mngon sum shugs rtogs bkag zin cing / ’das ma ’ongs kyis rang ngos nas rnam pa gtad pa yin na / de gnyis rdzas su grub pa ’gyur zhing / bag chags kyi dbang gis rnam pa shar na yul can rtogs par ’gyur la / phyi ma ltar na thams cad mkhyen pa’i ye shes med par thal lo / des na des shes bya mkhyen tshul tshur mthong gi blos dpag par mi nus te / des de mkhyen tshul bsam gyis mi khyab par gnas pa’i phyir Here Go rams pa elaborates on Sa pañ’s initial criticism of the distinction between *dngos su mkhyen* (or *dngos su rtogs pa*), ‘to know or realize explicitly’ and *shugs la mkhyen pa* (or *shugs su rtogs*), ‘to know or realize implicitly’ is again directed towards Phya pa and his followers. ig

⁸⁹ Gyag ston’s *TMRGDG*, 117, 2-6: *so skyes rnams chos can / gnas gyur pa’i ye shes can de ’dus gsum mkhyen pa sogs dpag mi nus te / de khyod kyis bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i phyir te / de rnam pa thams cad du khyod kyis shes pa dang brjod yul las pa’i phyir / de skad du rgyud gzhan grub pa las / bcom ldan ’das rnams kyis don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste / rnam pa thams cad du shes pa dang brjod pa’i yul las ’das pa’i phyir ro / zhes gsungs pa’i phyir ro /*. Cf. also Mi pham’s *TMRGCG*, 309a, 5-6: *gnyid kyis bsalad pa’i sems kyis sad pa’i blo dpag mi nus na tshur mthong gis bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i ye shes can / sangs rgyas de yi dus gsum mkhyen tshul sogs kyi mkhyen pa ’di ltar bu’o zhes dpag mi nus kyang de yod pa tsam dpag go /*. ([The ordinary person’s] mind, which is conditioned by torpor, is unable to ponder the awaken mind. Ordinary perception possessing gnosis is beyond imagination. [Ordinary perception] is unable to

Since Glo bo mkhan believes that issues related to the above two sections, i.e., whether all *yogi* direct perceptions are valid cognitions [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.A.] and the principle by which [a *yogin's*] valid cognition engages and disengages its object [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.B] are easy to understand, he does not comment on either topic. However, when analyzing the Buddha's gnosis of the three times, Glo bo mkhan commences the discussion by quoting verbatim Sa paṅ's reference to an opponent questioning the Buddha's ability to know the past, present and future, which is presented above at the outset of this section [2.B.1.A.3.D.2.C.], i.e., "Well then, if the Buddha does not know the past and future, then it is not proper [to say a Buddha is] omniscient. But if [it is the case that the Buddha] knows [the past and the future] from their appearance, then that implies that the three times [past, future and present] are established as substantial entities. If [on the other hand the past and future] are imperceptible, then it is not proper to say [they are perceived] with the Buddha eye of direct perception." Like his fellow commentators and following Sa paṅ and Dharmakīrti, Glo bo mkhan reports that a reasonable (*'thad pa*) response to the opponent's objection is that an ordinary person's mind is not able to fathom the manner by which a buddha knows a knowable, because it is beyond the reach of human intellect. Glo bo mkhan notes, however, that it is indeed true that the opponent's objections are eliminated on the basis of authoritative texts that explain that the gnosis of the Buddha knows all three times simultaneously.⁹⁰

ponder what is referred to as understanding the manner of the Buddha knowing the three times, since [ordinary perception] ponders merely the present.)

⁹⁰ TMRGRN, 195, 5-11: *gnyis pa tshad mar 'gyur tshul la gsum las / dang po gnyis ni gcad shes zhes pa nas / gsungs so zhes pa'i bar te go bar slo' / gsum pa dus gsum mkhyen pa'i ye shes dpyad pa la / 'o na zhes pa nas / zad do zhes pa'i bar te / don ni sangs rgyas kyis 'das ma'ongs mi mkhyen na thams cad mkhyen par mi 'gyur la mkhyen na snang nas mkhyen na dus gsum rdzaas grub tu 'gyur la / mi snang na mngon sum gyi spyen du mi rung ngo zhe na / de'i lan la 'thad pa'i don ni sangs rgyas kyis mkhyen pa'i tshul ni bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i phyir so so skye ba'i blos dpag par mi nus so / de ltar mod kyi lung la brten nas gcig char du mkhyen to zhes 'chad par 'gyur ro /* Glo bo mkhan's reference to 'authoritative texts' is likely to Indian textual materials.

Continuing, Glo bo mkhan once again demonstrates his eclectic range of source materials, by presenting some additional views regarding the issue of the Buddha knowing the three times. He states, “Some Paṇḍits taught that impurities do not appear to the Buddha’s gnosis, which is to say, due to the principle that impure images of corpses, etc., do not appear to the Buddha’s gnosis of reality, they [impure images] are not perceived [by the Buddha’s gnosis]. In accordance with that, the idea that [the Buddha knows the] three-fold appearance of beautiful [appearances as well as impure appearances and experienced appearances] is not established.” Based on this, some Paṇḍits take the position that while beautiful appearances are visible to Buddha’s gnosis, impure images are not, so the Buddha is not omniscient; and hence the Buddha’s gnosis is unable to know the three times.⁹¹

Glo bo mkhan then looks to the Great Brahmin (bram ze chen po), referring to 11th Century Kashmiri scholar Śaṅkarānanda, who states that “Though [the Buddha’s gnosis] does not see external objects, [the Buddha’s gnosis] knows the minds of others.” In not seeing external objects, the Buddha’s gnosis would not know the present directly, and thereby would not know the past and future by implication. Countering the Great Brahmin’s position that Buddha’s gnosis does not see external objects, Glo bo mkhan refers to *Ācārya* Vinītadeva and others who held the position that at least some gnosers see external objects. Glo bo mkhan notes that Vinītadeva and others have stated that “from among the four [types of] pure gnosis, the mirror like gnosis (*me long ta bu’i ye shes, ādarśajñāna*) and the gnosis of equanimity (*mnyam nyid kyi ye shes, samatājñāna*) do not know conventional [appearance], but the

⁹¹ TMRGRN, 195, 12-14: *don ’di la paṇḍi ta kha cis na re / de nyid de yi ye shes la / mi gtsang ro sogs snang mi ’gyur / rig par mi ’gyur bdag nyid phyir / mi ’grub zla ba gsum gzugs bzhin / zhes sangs rgyas kyi ye shes la ma dag pa mi snang bar bzhed la /*. Cf. Jackson 2019, citing Virūpa’s discussion of “three appearances” in his *Vajra Verses (Vajrapāda)* which presents the “three appearances” that arise for afflicted being, yogis, and buddhas, respectively: impure appearance, experienced appearance, and pure appearance.” Glo bo mkhan may be referring to certain Paṇḍits who view this verse or some similar verse and misconstrue the meaning of the verse to indicate that the Buddha is not omniscient in that he only sees pure appearances while not seeing impure appearances and experienced appearances. Therefore, he is not able to know the three times.

discriminating gnosis (*sor rtog pa'i ye shes*, *pratyavekṣaṇā jñāna*) and all-accomplishing gnosis (*bya grub ye shes*, *kṛtyānuṣṭhānājñāna*) do know [conventional appearance],” seemingly including impure images. Since, according to the view that the discriminating gnosis and the all-accomplishing gnosis which know conventional appearances would likely be associated with conceptual thought, Glo bo mkhan comments that there are some scholars who do not agree with that position and notes that it has been said, “A pure mundane gnosis connected with conceptual thought is nonreferential, and is in fact a subsequent cognition.”⁹² Proceeding further, Glo bo mkhan reports that nonetheless, “Some Paṇḍits accept those gnosises of conventional appearance as possessing conceptual thought.” Glo bo mkhan identifies *Ācārya Dpal sbas* (Śrīgupta), a disciple and successor of Bhāvaviveka and proponent of the Svātantrika view, as supporting this view when stating, “The liberative means fulfilling the benefit of sentient beings is endowed with the gnosis of conceptual thought.” Glo bo mkhan points out that other scholars claim that conceptual thought does not play a role in liberative means, when they say, “[The liberative means benefiting sentient beings] is not aroused by the winds of conceptual thought, [but in fact], the benefit of [inhabitants of] every mundane world is due to the Muni's auspicious actions.”⁹³

⁹² *TMRGRN*, 195, 14-19: *bram ze chen po na re / phyi rol gyi don mi mkhyen kyang gzhan sems mkhyen zhes gsungs la / slob dpon dul pa'i lha la sogs pa dag ye shes bzhi las mi long ye shes dang mnyam nyid ye shes kyis kun rdzob mi mkhyen kyang / sor rtod ye shes dang bya grub ye shes kyis mkhyen zhes gsungs te / ji skad du / rnam rtog rjes su 'brel ba'i bdag / dag pa'i 'jig rten ye shes kyis / de bzhin du ni yul med kyang / phyis kyang rjes su shes pa yin / zhes bshad pa ltar ro /*. Cf. Almogi 2009: 253-256 for additional discussion of the four types of gnosis mentioned by Vinītadeva. Almogi, 254 includes a fifth type of gnosis, the gnosis of great emptiness (*stong pa chen po'i ye shes*) which he notes “serves as the base from which everything assumes the nature of the purified *dharmadhātu* (*rnam par dag pa'i ngang du ma gyur pa med pa'i rten byed*).” See also Wayman 1997: 565-568 for a discussion of the four and five types of gnosis in the Mādhyamika, Tantra, and Yogācāra traditions. Also, Wayman 1980: 222 n17 and 223 for an outline of the four types of gnosis as presented in Mkhas grub rje's *Rgyud sde spyi'i rnam par gzhas pa rgyas par brjod*.

⁹³ *TMRGRN*, 195, 19-23: *kun rdzob snang ba'i ye shes de dag kyang paṇḍi ta kha cig rtog bcas su 'dod de / dpal sbas kyis / sems can rnam kyis don 'grub thabs / rnam rtog ye shes mnga' bas na / zhes bshad ltar ro / gzhan dag rtog*

Finally, like Go rams pa, Glo bo mkhan directly addresses the three incorrect views of earlier Tibetan scholars regarding the issue of the gnosis which knows the three times highlighted by Sa paṅ. Regarding the Tibetans who claim that the past and future are known by implication from the present, since Glo bo mkhan was certainly aware of Go rams pa's *TMRGDG* and that Go rams pa had already noted that this view had been rejected due to the fact that it would involve conceptual thought, he simply notes this view without elaborating. As for the incorrect view that the Buddha's gnosis realizes the past and the future by way of inner manifestations of images (*rnam pa, akāra*) of the past and future which arise in the Buddha's consciousness, Glo bo mkhan identifies the 12th century scholar *Ācārya* Gtsang nag pa (a student of Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and author of *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i ṭika legs sgad bsdu pa*) as supporting this view. Having already focused on *Ācārya* Dpal sbas (Śrīgupta), a proponent of the Svātantrika position, Glo bo mkhan indicates his scholarly objectivity when discussing those earlier paṅdits who claim the Buddha does not have knowledge of the three times, because of the non-existence of gnosis at the stage of Buddhahood, stating, "Some confused and vain Prāsaṅgikas [wrongly] proclaimed that the Buddha does not know the three times due to the non-existence of gnosis." Glo bo mkhan quotes Sa paṅ's comment that these incorrect views "merely indicate the activities of a 'well-tortoise,' which are incompatible with scriptural authority and reasoning (*lung dang rigs pa*)." Glo bo mkhan concludes with a significant assessment, "Having explained the other untenable methods [regarding the Buddha's knowing the three times], it is explained [the Buddha's] [enlightened] wisdom regarding all knowable phenomena is due to the principle of the transmutation [of the basis of personal existence]. In this context, the meaning of the transmutation [of the basis of personal existence] is that after the decline of all incorrect impure images there arises only pure images."⁹⁴

pa med par 'dod de / kun rtog rlung gis ma bskyod kyang / thub pas 'jig rten thams cad kyi / don ni phun sum tshogs pa mdzad / ces bshad pa ltar ro /.

⁹⁴ *TMRGRN*, 195, 24-196, 5: *bod kha cig da ltar ba'i shugs las 'das ma 'ongs rtogs zer la/ slob dpon gtsang nag pa na re / 'das kyi rnam pa snang nas rtogs zhes gsung ngo / yang thal 'gyur bar rlom pa rmongs pa kha cig sangs*

Final Word

As noted at the outset, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge is often the subject of Sa paṅ's critical comments. Right from the first verse [verse 43] of the '*Yogin's* Direct Perception' section, Sa paṅ rejects the views of those Tibetan scholars like Phya pa who have separated the *yogin's* direct perception from the *yogin's* direct perception as a valid cognition. Additionally, other of Phya pa's theories—such as his typology of mental states, the requirement that a direct perception 'eliminate superimposition', as well as the idea that the Buddha knows the past and future by implication from the present—have been the subject of Sa paṅ's criticism. Similarly, as noted previously, when commencing his review of the other three types of direct perception, i.e., sense, mental and self-cognizing direct perception, Sa paṅ begins by criticizing Phya pa.

Unlike his presentation of the other three types of direct perception, Sa paṅ's discussion of *yogi* direct perception includes almost constant reference to Buddhist doctrinal terminology. Terms such as gnosis, (*ye shes, jñāna*), the Four [Noble] Truths (*bden pa bzhi, catur-satya*), wisdom (*shes rab, prajñā*), emptiness (*stong pa nyid, śūnyatā*), selflessness (*bdag med, nairātmya*), liberative means (*thabs, upāya*), and great compassion (*snying rje chen po, mahākaruṇā*), as well as Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva all are employed. Terms such as these are not often found in the discussion of sense, mental and self-cognizing direct perception.

Of considerable significance is the fact that the *yogin's* direct perception is 'born from mental cultivation'. During the above discussion there have been numerous references to the 'casual process' resulting in the *yogin's* direct perception. Just to highlight a few, first Dharmakīrti's *PV Prat*, 281ab implicates a causal process, stating, "the knowledge of those *yogins* is born of

rgyas la ye shes med pa'i phyis gsum mkhyen pa med do zhes zer ro / de dag ni lung rigs dang 'gal bas rus sbaḷ gyi rnam par thar pa ston par zad do / mi 'thad pa'i tshul gzhan du bshad zin to / des na gnas gyur pa'i tshul gyis shes bya thams cad mkyen par bzhad la / gnas gyur pa'i don yang skabs 'dir ma dag pa'i snang ba thams cad log cing nub nas dag pa'i snam ba kho nar shar ba la bya'o /

cultivation (*bsgom byung, bhāvanāmaya*).”⁹⁵ Furthermore, as previously noted, Dharmakīrti’s *NB Prat*, verse 11 states, “and the *yogin*’s cognition arisen from the highest degree (*prakarṣaparyanata, rab kyi mtha*) [attained by] the mental cultivation of genuine reality [is direct perception].” And *TMRG, Mngon sum* verse 44 also views mental cultivation as the cause of the *yogin*’s direct perception, stating “[Our view regarding the defining characteristic of the *yogin*’s direct perception is that it is a] direct perception without error born from mental cultivation (*bsgom byung, bhāvanāmaya*).” Also as highlighted previously, Sa paṅ *TMRG, Mngon sum* verses 50-53 directly refers to the causes and conditions producing the *yogin*’s direct perception, here referred to as gnosis, stating, “the liberative means (*thabs, upāya*) and well-practiced wisdom mutually constitute the cause and condition to attain the gnosis purely perceiving things as they are [i.e., noumena] and things in [all] their multiplicity [i.e., phenomena].” And finally, Gyag ston also includes the subsequent attainment state (*rjes thob, prasthalabdha*) and the meditational equipoise state (*mnyam gshag, samāpatti*) as each serving in turn as the substantial cause (*nyer len gyi rgyu, upādābhna-kāraṇa*) resulting in the *yogin*’s direct perception, differentiated from the perspective of whether the *yogin*’s gnosis experienced in the subsequent attainment state or meditational equipoise state knows the quality of phenomena or knows the quality of noumena, respectively.

However, regarding the *yogi* practicing ‘mental cultivation’, Sa paṅ points out and reiterates how vital it is for the *yogi* to develop and practice various liberative means in addition to practicing insight. Sa paṅ notes that because the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas principally cultivate insight while not practicing liberative means, their realization is not complete. Not including the practice of liberative means is like undertaking an uncultivated practice. And an uncultivated practice fosters an unclear mind, which in turn does not permit the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha to abandon habitual tendencies. One of the primary liberative means that Sa paṅ and his commentators emphasize is practicing great

⁹⁵ Eltschinger 2009: 198: Eltschinger notes that Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramānavārttikaabhāṣya*, 326.23-24 explains “born of cultivation” (*bhāvanāmaya*) as “caused by cultivation” (*bhāvanāhetu*).

compassion (*snying rje chen po, mahākaruṇā*). It is only through the Bodhisattva/yogi cultivating the insight realizing emptiness as well as practicing the liberative means of great compassion that the Bodhisattva/yogi is able to abandon habitual tendencies and attain omniscience. And finally, Sa paṅ highlights how compassionately practicing for the benefit of others is the ultimate feature distinguishing the Buddha's path of liberation from that of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha.

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68 *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies* 22, 2021-22

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Appendix

Herein is Sa skya Paṇḍita's *TMRG* (root text) presenting the two sections within the 'Direct Perception' chapter examined above, i.e., 'Pinpointing the nature of [of the *yogin*'s direct perception]' and 'The Principle by which [the *yogin*'s direct perception] is a valid cognition towards an object'.

2.B.1.A.3.D.1. Pinpointing the nature (*rang bzhin, svabhāva*) [of the *yogin*'s direct perception]

TMRG, Mngon sum verse 43: Having separated [yogic direct perception and yogic direct perception as a valid cognition, some Tibetan scholars] mistakenly established the defining characteristic [of yogic direct perception].

TMRG, Mngon sum verses 44-45: [Our view regarding the defining characteristic of the *yogin*'s direct perception is that it is a] direct perception without error born from mental cultivation (*bsgom byung, bhāvanāmaya*). Every [*yogi*'s cognition] imbued with error is a falsification (*ltar snang, ābhāsa*) [of direct perception].

TMRG, Mngon sum verses 46-47: Because there are three [types] of āryas, there are three [types of yogic] direct perception. In terms of 'those undergoing religious training' and 'those no longer undergoing religious training' there are five [types of yogic direct perception].

TMRG, Mngon sum verses 48-49: By differentiating [the *yogin*'s direct perception] of those [five types of Āryas discussed above] according to whether they have appearance of they are without appearance, there are ten paired varieties.

TMRG, Mngon sum verses 50-53: The well-practiced liberative means (*thabs, upāya*) and wisdom (*shes rab, prajñā*) mutually constitute the cause (*rgyu, kāraṇa*) and condition (*rkyen, pratyaya*) to attain the gnosis (*ye shes, jñāna*) purely realizing things as they are (*ji lta ba, yathāvad-bhāvikatā*) [i.e., noumena] and things in [all] their multiplicity (*ji snyed pa, yāvad-bhāvikatā*) [i.e., phenomena].

TMRG, Mngon sum verses 54-55: [The Arhat] accomplishes [the yogic direct perception] in three lifetimes, [the

Pratyekabuddha] in one hundred eons, [and the foremost Noble Hearted] in three incalculable eons.

TMRG, Mngon sum verse 56-59: When there are inferior liberative means, there are the two types of liberation [i.e., that of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha]. [Regarding inferior liberative means], due to possessing [karmic] habitual tendencies (*bag chags, vāsanā*) there is no indication [of reality. On the other hand,] due to repeatedly practicing [superior] liberative means all things are clear. On account of [the Bodhisattva] abandoning [both types of] habitual tendencies there is omniscience (*kun mkhyen, sarvajñā*).

2.B.1.A.3.D.2. The Principle [by which the *Yogin's* Direct Perception] is a Valid Cognition Towards an Object

TMRG, Mngon sum, verses 60-63: Both subsequent cognition (*bcad shes, paricchinna-jñāna*) and an ascertaining [awareness] are not direct perceptions because they are conceptual thought (*rtog pa, kalpanā*). Therefore, all *yogi* direct perceptions are established as a valid cognition because they are direct perception (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*).

TMRG, Mngon sum, verses 64-67: It is taught that the ordinary person's valid cognition engages and disengages [its object] due to the certainty [of each perceptual experience. The perceptual experiences of the] Noble Ones who are free from conceptual thought are said to proceed [by means of] meditative absorption (*ting nge 'dzin, samādhi*).

TMRG, Mngon sum, verses 68-69: [An ordinary person] is unable to ponder [the enlightened] knowledge of those possessing incomprehensible gnosis.