

“Put a Little Love in Your Heart”: Acceptance of Paternalistic and Ally Political Discourses Both Predict Pro-Roma Solidarity Intentions Through Moral Inclusion

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The way politicians talk about minorities institutes the normative context of intergroup relations. We investigated how endorsement of different political discourses predicts donation and collective action intentions by majority members toward the Roma in five European countries. The survey was conducted online using samples demographically similar to the populations of Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, France, and Ireland (N = 5,054). First, results showed that accepting paternalistic discourse versus discourse promoting allyship were not distinguishable; both promoted higher moral inclusion which in turn predicted higher prosocial intentions. Second, donations (i.e., immediate relief) and collective action (i.e., social change action) were driven by identical factors. Third, acceptance of openly hostile political discourse neither predicted moral exclusion, nor lower prosocial intentions. In summary, our research provides important evidence that when it comes to Roma—non-Roma relations, the previously established distinction between solidarity intentions that aim to solidify status relations versus bring about social change is completely blurred, presumably because of the social context in which any positive message communicates moral inclusion challenging the hostile status quo.

KEY WORDS: anti-Gypsyism, moral inclusion, political discourse, Roma, donations, collective action

“It is not merely a question of discrimination or human rights how Roma people live in Hungary, but also an economic and social challenge ... the Gypsy community is currently not strong enough to find work in the labor market on its own, therefore, we need to introduce ‘aiding devices’” (excerpt from V. Orbán’s speech, Prime Minister of Hungary at a Roma Conciliation Council meeting, MTI, 2013). The way politicians talk about minorities influence the normative context of intergroup relations: They carry information about deservingness and moral considerations about them. However, messages are not always simply positive or negative that either facilitate prosocial or hostile behaviors; like the above example shows, they can be ambiguous in the sense that they promote prosociality, while also solidifying unequal status relations. In the current article, we investigate the connection between, on the one hand, accepting hostile, paternalistic, and ally political discourses, and on the other hand, different prosocial intentions. We do so in the context of moral inclusion of the Roma in five European countries using representative samples of the general population.

Political Discourse Can Create Norms of Moral Inclusion

Moral inclusion and exclusion refer to the tendency to draw a line between those who deserve our moral regard from those who do not. Those within this boundary are considered entitled to our help and personal sacrifices, as well as fair treatment (Opatow, 1990, 1993). People in our moral ingroup fall within the scope of justice, which means that they can expect that our behavior toward them would be governed by fairness (Deutsch, 1973; Opatow, 1990) and by a prosocial orientation (da Silva et al., 2021). In other words, when members of our moral ingroup are in need, we would offer them help, and in the face of injustice, we would stand up for their rights.

Moral exclusion prevents people from offering the same type of support to those outside our moral ingroup. People do not feel a moral responsibility toward them, which results in the absence of helpful and prosocial behavior (Hadarics & Kende, 2018; Lima-Nunes et al., 2013; Opatow, 1990). It can lead to the so-called intergroup empathy bias found among competing groups (i.e., feeling pleasure at the pain of the other, Cikara et al., 2014). Although moral exclusion has mainly been studied in the context of extreme conflicts, such as genocide, it exists in the context of structural inequalities without direct conflict (for a summary, see Passini, 2010), such as in the case of Roma and non-Roma relations (see Hadarics & Kende, 2019).

Moral exclusion and inclusion are two sides of the same coin. They are dynamic processes affected by decisions of deservingness. The moral exclusion of some people and groups is justified, for example, by a representation of them as threatening to the individual's or the ingroup's well-being. They can become subjects of various forms of hostility because such a response would be considered adequate defense against a perceived threat (see, for example, da Costa Silva et al., 2019; Rutland et al., 2010). For example, the presence of dehumanizing rhetoric and inhumane treatment of refugees can be justified as a proportional response to the perceived threat of migration (as shown by Esses et al., 2013). However, moral exclusion can also emerge when psychological distance obstructs identification and empathy with outgroup members, due to, for example, perceiving irreconcilable cultural differences between the groups (e.g., Bowen, 2010; Hadarics & Kende, 2019; Lima-Nunes et al., 2013) or belief in ingroup supremacy (Leite et al., 2019).

Political discourse has the potential to create the basis of moral exclusion. By political discourse, we refer to texts and speeches produced by politicians and public figures in the realm of politics (in line with the description of Van Dijk, 1997). For example, an experimental study in Norway has shown that disgust-eliciting messages in the media can lead to dehumanization (a direct outcome of moral exclusion), which in turn increased support for the deportation of Roma people (Dalsklev & Kunst, 2015). Politicians sometimes deliberately use language that leads to the moral exclusion of some groups in line with an ideology, tradition, or simply for short-term political gain (for an analysis of racist language in six European countries, see Wodak & van Dijk, 2000). This happens not only on the political right but also among liberal or left-wing politicians who often employ a disclaimer to reinforce their positive ingroup image, such as stating their tolerance or egalitarianism, as a form of legitimizing their message of social and moral exclusion (Wodak, 2008).

Political discourse can also reflect and give rise to moral inclusion either as a mainstream message accepted by the majority or as an alternative voice within a generally hostile normative context. Moral inclusion is supported by political messages highlighting similarity and empathy (e.g., see Germany's response to the 2015 refugee crisis: Zehfuss, 2021) or by messages of recognition of cultural autonomy and empowerment in societies with strong egalitarian values (as described by Taylor, 1994). In hostile contexts, political discourses of inclusion can come from a bottom-up process, such as, for example, in the case of DREAMers in the United States (i.e., children affected by the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors legislation) where activists managed to achieve both discursive and legislative change despite the overall hostile, discriminatory, and dehumanizing political context (Nicholls, 2013). Conversely, messages of inclusion can emerge from a minority voice among political groups or politicians (see Levine & Kaarbo, 2001; Smith & Diven, 2002). Thus, political discourse can promote the moral inclusion and exclusion of some groups both within supportive and hostile contexts.

Political discourse—reflecting existing norms or creating new ones—can encourage people to act in line with their attitudes according to the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991; see, for example, far-right mobilization relying on widespread anti-Gypsyism: Varga, 2014). This can theoretically lead to higher hostility but also facilitate prosocial intentions, depending on the valence of preexisting attitudes (i.e., personal level of anti-Gypsyism). In other words, we can expect that people would be more likely to act in hostile ways toward a social group that they consider to be outside their scope of justice if they receive encouragement for such behavior through corresponding political messages. Conversely, we can expect that they would be more likely to offer help or stand up for the rights of outgroups if they receive encouragement by political discourse promoting moral inclusion if this is in line with their preexisting positive attitudes.

In line with these predictions, Healy et al. (2017) identified moral exclusion as the mediator in the connection between the endorsement of polyculturalism and prejudice toward refugees and LGBTI people in Australia. Their study suggests that the endorsement of a particular political ideology regarding intergroup relations predict prejudice via moral exclusion. Passini's (2010) work on moral reasoning suggests that intergroup prejudice—evoked by, for example, different ways of reporting crimes—can predict moral exclusion. Social-representations theory identified discursive depersonalization, delegitimization, and dehumanization as sources of moral exclusion (see Tileagă, 2007). Therefore, in the current article, we investigated whether the connection between endorsing different types of political discourses and pro-Roma action intentions was mediated by moral inclusion (or exclusion).

Allyship and Paternalism as Two Forms of Prosocial Intentions

Prosocial intentions can be driven by a broad range of factors and lead to different outcomes for both advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Specifically, prosocial behavior does not automatically entail change in existing status relations. Advantaged group members sometimes help disadvantaged groups for selfish reasons (see van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010), to improve their moral image (Brambilla et al., 2013; Hopkins et al., 2007), to maintain the existing status hierarchy (see intergroup helping relations as power relations theory, Nadler, 2002) or because they hold paternalistic attitudes (Becker et al., 2019).

Importantly, selfish helping intentions can be reflected in the type of help advantaged group members offer. Dependency-oriented help refers to the type of assistance that offers solutions rather than tools, keeping members of disadvantaged groups in continued need of assistance (Nadler, 2002). This type of helping can be recognized in many charitable actions, donations, and volunteerism, which aim to offer immediate relief, but neither strive for social change nor empowerment of the disadvantaged groups (for a distinction between benevolent and activist support, see Thomas & McGarty, 2018). In contrast, autonomy-oriented help is about offering tools for disadvantaged groups to solve problems on their own in a more empowering way. Ideally, this type of helping is realized in ally collective action, the main goal of which is to achieve change in the existing social hierarchies (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). In short, prosocial action can be driven by a genuine desire for social change and the improvement of the situation of the outgroup (Kutluca et al., 2020), but not all forms of prosocial intergroup action serve this purpose.

Although the distinction seems straightforward, there are many reasons to suspect that in real-life situations the difference is more blurred. First, involvement in social-change-oriented collective action as allies can be just as gratifying as involvement in charity action,

serving similar egoistic motivations (Droogendyk et al., 2016). Second, there are situations in which charities, donations, and low-threshold volunteering are equally or more adequate responses than engagement in political action, and therefore, charitable actions may be driven by politicized motivations for social change (Kende, Lantos, et al., 2017). Third, some groups suffer from multiple forms of disadvantages, hence in order to improve their situation they need both direct material help (i.e., donations, charity, and volunteering) and political allyship to stand up against injustices that they experience (Lantos et al., 2020). Finally, the dominant perception and treatment of some minority groups is not characterized by acceptance and the prerogative of acting in nonprejudiced ways, that is, the normative context is predominantly negative (see Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017). In these hostile normative contexts, positive messages and actions—regardless of whether they are about offering dependency-oriented help in the forms of charity and donations or social-change-oriented allyship—can challenge the hostility of the status quo. In line with this, we expect that the distinction may be less pronounced when it comes to the Roma minority, affected by poverty, discrimination, the violation of their human rights, and a lack of political representation, blurring the distinction between charitable actions and allyship.

In summary, based on the literature on political discourse about intergroup relations, moral inclusion, and intergroup solidarity action, we presume that endorsement of political discourse that communicate moral inclusion would predict prosocial intentions toward Roma people both in the area of charitable actions and politicized collective actions. We argue that moral inclusion may offer the explanation that is currently missing from the literature as to why in the case of Roma people (and potentially other economically and politically deprived groups), paternalism may lead to donations as well as to social-change-oriented collective action (Lantos et al., 2020), blurring the difference between genuine egalitarianism and paternalism (Estevan-Reina et al., 2021). Therefore, our study aims to contribute to the literature on intergroup solidarity: On the one hand, this study will supplement previous research on the conditions of intergroup prosocial behavior, specifically how the endorsement of different political discourses can predict moral inclusion and prosocial intentions (in line with e.g., Healy et al., 2017). On the other hand, using the specific context of Roma and non-Roma relations in six European countries, this research can refine our understanding about the distinction between endorsing paternalistic versus ally political discourses and their connection with charitable-action intentions versus social-change-oriented action intentions (see e.g., Becker et al., 2019; Thomas & McGarty, 2018). Importantly, our focus is not about revealing the connection between attitudes and action intentions, but rather the acceptance of different political discourses to show that political context matters in how groups of unequal status live together.

Discourses About the Roma

Hostile Discourse

Political discourse regarding the Roma is almost unanimously negative across Europe. Political and public discourse are dominated by hostile, discriminatory, and dehumanizing language (Bigazzi, 2012; Marcu & Chrysochoou, 2005; Tremlett et al., 2017). Social representation theory suggests that Roma people are not simply discriminated against, but they are considered through the logic of ontologization, which means that in the nature versus culture distinction they are associated with nature (Moscovici & Perez, 2005). Openly hostile discourses that depict the Roma as a financial burden on society with a culture of criminality reinforce the perception of Roma people

as a threat to the ingroup (Loveland & Popescu, 2016) and dehumanizing language which positions the Roma outside the boundaries of our scope of justice (e.g., Dalsklev & Kunst, 2015) both clearly create the basis of moral exclusion.

Paternalistic Discourse

Alongside the openly hostile and dehumanizing discourse, there is also the language of “Roma inclusion” (Rostas et al., 2015), which is characterized as patronizing and often labeled as double discourse. The catch of this seemingly positive and benevolent discourse is that it promotes prosocial intentions of the advantaged group, while denying the structural oppression of Roma people (Kóczé & Rövid, 2017). It suggests that members of the majority and its institutions need to help the Roma, revealing a paternalistic posture. It appears as positive and gratifying for the advantaged group but attributes low competence to the disadvantaged group. This paternalistic discourse shows neither a need, nor an intention for changing the status quo and fits with the low competence attributed to Roma people (Bye et al., 2014; Durante et al., 2013; Szekeres, 2020). Paternalistic discourse may not promote social change, but it communicates deservingness, which may serve as the basis of moral inclusion.

Ally Discourse

Occasionally, politicians, civil activists, and journalists present counternarratives and critical reflections on anti-Gypsyism condemning the human rights violations, hate crimes, and discrimination against Roma people (Rostas, 2017). This type of discourse fits with the concept of allyship which is defined as action by members of advantaged groups to achieve social change and improve the situation of members of a disadvantaged group (see Droogendyk et al., 2016; Kutlaca et al., 2020). Discourses of allyship directly promote moral inclusion by suggesting that it is the duty of members of the majority to stand up for the rights of Roma people, that is, promote their place within the moral ingroup.

Research Question and Hypothesis

Identifying a gap in the literature, our research question is whether the endorsement of different forms of political discourses predicts or prevents prosocial intentions through moral inclusion and exclusion. Specifically, we hypothesized that:

H1: The acceptance of hostile discourse would predict lower intentions to engage in donations and politicized action.

H2: Acceptance of paternalistic discourse would predict higher donation intentions, but not necessarily higher collective action intentions.

Predictions regarding collective action remained exploratory in connection with the paternalistic discourse, as previous evidence is contradictory. The literature on benevolent helping would suggest that acceptance of paternalistic discourse should be associated with lower collective action intentions (see Thomas & McGarty, 2018), but research on action intentions regarding economically and politically disadvantaged groups, and specifically Roma people, suggests otherwise (Lantos et al., 2020). We hypothesized that:

H3: Accepting the political discourse of allyship would predict higher intentions toward both types of prosocial action.

Furthermore, we predicted that the connection between the acceptance of different types of political discourses and prosocial intentions would be mediated by moral inclusion and exclusion, that is, the acceptance of hostile discourse would predict stronger moral exclusion, which in turn would predict lower prosocial intentions. In contrast,

H4: Accepting either the paternalistic or ally intentions would predict higher moral inclusion, which would positively predict prosocial intentions.

Although based on previous research, we could expect that the direct connection between acceptance of paternalistic versus ally discourse and different action intentions may be different, we had no reason to expect that the acceptance of these two pro-Roma political discourses would differ in terms of predicting moral inclusion, therefore, we had identical hypotheses for these two predictors.

Research Contexts

The Roma minority is estimated to be the largest ethnic minority of Europe, consisting of 10 to 12 million people, living in all European countries (European Commission, 2019). The umbrella-term “Roma” refers to culturally, linguistically, and ethnically diverse groups, such as Roma, Sinti, Boyash, and Travelers. About two-thirds of the Roma population live in East-Central Europe, where they comprise about 5% to 10% of the population. Despite vast differences in the societal contexts in which they live, in all countries they are disproportionately affected by poverty, discrimination, and segregation. Dehumanization, hate crimes, and discrimination against Roma people are common not only in East-Central, but also in Western European countries, despite their otherwise stronger democratic, multiculturalist, and egalitarian norms (e.g., Jenne, 2019). For this reason, we conducted the research both in countries of East-Central and Western Europe. We considered our hypothesis valid across contexts based on previous research about the psychological constructs included in the study and based on research suggesting that the situation of Roma people and intergroup relations are similar overall in Europe.

Our research was conducted in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, France, and Ireland. In all of these countries, anti-Gypsyism has been used as a mobilizing tool for various, mainly far-right political parties, and the overall social and political context is hostile toward the Roma. In Hungary, a far-right party, Jobbik, emerged in 2006 and gained strong support in a short time mainly by using anti-Roma rhetoric (Varga, 2014). The governing party of Fidesz from 2010 has also made a number of discriminatory, hostile, and dehumanizing statements but tried to maintain the overall image of supporting Roma integration (Tremlett & Messing, 2015). In Slovakia, anti-Gypsyism is expressed either in openly hostile and dehumanizing or subtle and patronizing ways in political discourse (Lášticová & Popper, 2020), especially since the right-wing party Kotleba-ĽSNS has made its way into the Slovak parliament in 2016. In Romania, Roma people and Roma issues are mainly ignored by mainstream politicians. Roma people are practically only mentioned when reporting events involving Romanian Roma immigrants in Western Europe with the intent to save face for Romania (Țepordei & Cărelaru, 2020).

In France, most traditional Roma groups are accepted by members of the majority, whereas recent immigrants from Eastern Europe receive openly hostile treatment (Gagnon, 2018). The Roma are not often the subject of political discourse, but when they are, the content is both hostile and paternalistic (Fassin, 2015). Irish Travelers are a recently recognized indigenous minority ethnic group. Although Travelers make up a relatively small proportion of the Irish population, they experience extreme disadvantage in terms of employment, housing, and health, and they face strong levels of prejudice (Drew & Keaney, 2013). Although there are also ethnically Roma people living in Ireland, our study focused on Irish Travelers as the target group, and the word “Traveler” was used throughout the questionnaire.

Participants

We relied on samples that are demographically similar to the overall society (for details see Table 1); however, we did not use weights in the analyses to report results as representative, as our questions were not sociological. We aimed to recruit $N = 1000$ for each country based on calculations from previous opinion poll surveys using representative samples (see <https://pollofpolls.eu/>). We removed self-identifying Roma participants from the analysis because we wanted to understand the psychological routes to collective action by members of the non-Roma majority of each country. Final sample sizes were: Hungary: $N = 1,039$, Slovakia: $N = 1,033$, Romania: $N = 1,007$, France: $N = 975$, Ireland: $N = 1,000$.

Procedure

Data was collected online with the help of opinion poll companies in June and July, 2019, using the Qualtrics platform following the IRB approval of Eötvös Loránd University. Data collection lasted two to three weeks in each country, without notable events regarding Roma people during data collection. The scales were first created in English and translated to the respective languages of the participating countries and back-translated by independent translators. Ambiguities in the back-translated versions were resolved by the first author together with the original translator of

Table 1. Demographic Information About Participants

		Gender	Age	Education (%)			Settlement	Roma participants
	<i>N</i>	(% men)	(<i>M</i> , <i>SD</i>) in years	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		(removed from analysis)
Hungary	1039	47	48 (15)	3.4	56.7	39.9	Capital: 17% Other city: 53% Village: 30%	0.30%
Slovakia	1033	47	44 (16)	8.5	72.6	18.9	Large city: 14% City: 27% Smaller town: 28% Village: 14%	0.80%
Romania	1007	50	42 (17)	6.0	33.6	65.8	Urban: 66% Rural: 33%	1.50%
France	975	45	42 (13)	5.3	44.8	49.9	N/A	0%
Ireland	1000	49	45 (16)	9.9	51.8	38.3	City: 28% Suburban: 21% Small town: 21% Village: 30%	0%

the scale. Data was collected as part of an omnibus survey; we present all data relevant to testing the hypotheses of this article. The complete databases and the full questionnaire are available at https://osf.io/78e2u/?view_only=fe29108414f2490e9d00c78a3091d8de.

Measures

We tested *acceptance of different types of political discourses* by three single-item measures prepared for the purpose of the current article based on previous research about political discourses (e.g., see Kóczé & Rövid, 2017). The instruction was the following: “Politicians and public figures talk about the Roma in different ways. In the following we will list some of the typical ways Roma people are mentioned by politicians and public figures (both in the government and in the opposition). To what extent do you find the following ways of speaking about the Roma personally acceptable?” The statement for hostile discourse was the following: “They make negative statements about the Roma regarding criminality and work ethics”; the item for paternalistic discourse was “They suggest that we need to help the Roma in all areas of life (housing, education, employment, health and family matters), because they cannot solve their own problems”; and the item of ally discourse was: “They propose that non-Roma <nationality> should join the Roma in their struggle against discrimination.” Throughout the study, we used 7-point scales from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 7 (*completely agree*), unless otherwise indicated.

Moral inclusion was measured by three items using Opatow’s (1993) scope of justice/moral exclusion scale and adapted to the context of the Roma outgroup (“I believe that considerations of fairness apply to Roma people too”; “I am willing to make personal sacrifices to help or foster Roma people’s well-being”; and “I am willing to allocate a share of community resources to Roma people.”)

Prosocial action intentions consisted of six items, three measuring donations and three collective action intentions. Scale items were generated based on similar research (see e.g., Lantos et al., 2020, see the appendix). To establish whether the two dimensions of prosocial intentions (donation and collective actions) are statistically distinguishable, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis, and checked for configural, scalar, and metric invariance across the samples as outlined by Vandenberg and Lance (2000). We ran a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis (MCFA) across the five samples. Table 2 shows that configural and metric invariance (based on model fit indices) were both met. Model fit indices are satisfactory for scalar invariance, except for the RMSEA criterion. The full-uniqueness invariance, however, was not achieved; therefore, we refrain from direct comparison of means across the samples. We can conclude that the two dimensions of prosocial intentions (donation and collective actions) are statistically distinct.

As control variables we measured *political orientation* by self-placement on a 7-point left-to-right scale and *anti-Gypsyism* using an updated version of the Attitudes Toward the Roma Scale (14 items, adapted from Kende, Hadarics, & Lášticová, 2017, for the items,

Table 2. Fit Indices of the Invariance Tests for Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the Prosocial Behavior Intentions. Donations and Collective Action Comprised the Two Subscales of the Model

Model	χ^2	<i>df</i>	CFI	RMSEA	SRMR	AIC	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	<i>p</i>
Configural (1 factor)	653.23	45	.97	.12	.03	103,588.923			
Configural (2 factors)	251.16	40	.99	.07	.02	103,196.85	402.072	5	<.001
Metric	399.69	56	.98	.08	.05	103,313.39	148.534	16	<.001
Scalar	816.09	72	.96	.10	.06	103,697.79	416.401	16	<.001
Full uniqueness	1592.20	112	.92	.11	.12	104,393.89	776.106	3	<.001

Note: *p*-Values refer to the difference between each model compared to the previous one.

see the appendix; for additional analysis and validity testing see the [online](#) supporting information).

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics, scale reliability information, and correlations are shown in [Table 3](#). Correlations between the three types of political discourses indicated that the acceptance of paternalistic and ally discourses were strongly positively associated with one another, but acceptance of hostile discourse was either not or weakly negatively correlated with both.

Anti-Gypsyism was moderately to strongly correlated with all study variables.

Hypothesis Testing

Using Mplus software, version 8 (Muthén & Muthén, 2017), we built a model where acceptance of allyship, paternalistic, and hostile discourses were the independent variables and collective action and donation tendencies were entered as dependent variables. Next a mediation model was built by adding moral inclusion as a mediator. In this model, we controlled for the effects of age, gender, education, political orientation, and anti-Gypsyism. The model was bootstrapped with 1,000 resamples to obtain 95% confidence intervals. Because we did not have latent variables, the models were saturated and fitted the data perfectly. [Figure 1](#) presents the path coefficients from the three forms of political discourse to the two forms of pro-Roma behavioral intentions, mediated by moral inclusion. To rule out that a reversed mediation model would show a better fit to the data, we compared our original model with an alternative model where the three forms of discourses were treated as mediators and moral inclusion as the independent variable. The results indicated that our hypothesized model fit the data better than the alternative model (for details, see [the](#) online supporting information).

The direct paths between accepting paternalistic discourse and the two types of action intentions were positive and significant in all samples, suggesting a similar endorsement of the two types of discourses as well as the two types of action intentions; however, in the Irish sample, the connection between accepting paternalistic discourse and collective action was very weak as a direct path. Hostile discourse was only very weakly or not at all connected to either form of actions.

The results of the mediation analysis showed that while acceptance of allyship discourse and paternalistic discourse significantly predicted moral inclusion across all samples, acceptance of hostile political discourse significantly predicted moral inclusion only in the Romanian sample. Moral inclusion in turn significantly predicted both donation and collective action tendencies in all samples. Moreover, as presented in [Table 4](#), the mediating effect of moral inclusion was significant across all samples with regards to the effect of allyship and paternalistic discourse on the two forms of behavioral intentions. However, the relationship between hostile political discourse and the two pro-Roma behavioral intentions was significantly mediated by moral inclusion only in the Romanian sample.

Discussion

The aim of our study was to identify a possible psychological mechanism that explains how acceptance of different political discourses can predict people's prosocial intentions. We tested for both the intentions to help members of the Roma minority through donations and to stand up

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics, Scale Reliability and Correlations Between the Study Variables

	Mean	SD	α	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
<i>Hungary</i>										
1. Hostile political discourse	4.10	1.62	–	–.29**	–.22**	–.37**	–.30**	–.34**	.53**	.18**
2. Paternalistic political discourse	3.53	1.75	–	–	.59**	.63**	.61**	.60**	–.64**	–.16**
3. Ally political discourse	3.73	1.68	–	–	–	.54**	.51**	.50**	–.54**	–.14**
4. Moral Inclusion	3.54	1.35	.79	–	–	–	.72**	.68**	–.73**	–.17**
5. Donations	3.25	1.53	.84	–	–	–	–	.78**	–.67**	–.21**
6. Collective action	2.97	1.55	.86	–	–	–	–	–	–.64**	–.24**
7. Anti-Gypsyism	4.51	1.11	.90	–	–	–	–	–	–	.25**
8. Political orientation (left to right)	4.10	1.80	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<i>Slovakia</i>										
1. Hostile political discourse	4.34	1.58	–	–.11**	–.13**	–.17**	–.14**	–.18**	.34**	–0.03
2. Paternalistic political discourse	3.26	1.71	–	–	.57**	.57**	.58**	.52**	–.51**	0.04
3. Ally political discourse	3.29	1.63	–	–	–	.58**	.57**	.55**	–.58**	.01
4. Moral Inclusion	3.54	1.31	.73	–	–	–	.67**	.57**	–.60**	.07*
5. Donations	3.39	1.39	.81	–	–	–	–	.73**	–.58**	.05
6. Collective action	3.15	1.32	.78	–	–	–	–	–	–.55**	.04
7. Anti-Gypsyism	4.69	0.91	.84	–	–	–	–	–	–	–.03
8. Political orientation (left to right)	3.95	1.59	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<i>Romania</i>										
1. Hostile political discourse	4.19	1.88	–	–.37**	–.43**	–.47**	–.48**	–.48**	.58**	–.07*
2. Paternalistic political discourse	3.54	2.02	–	–	.61**	.60**	.61**	.54**	–.57**	.01
3. Ally political discourse	4.02	2.04	–	–	–	.66**	.66**	.66**	–.67**	.02
4. Moral Inclusion	3.45	1.53	.75	–	–	–	.75**	.67**	–.7**	.04
5. Donations	3.83	1.86	.88	–	–	–	–	.74**	–.69**	.03
6. Collective action	3.50	1.78	.86	–	–	–	–	–	–.68**	.05
7. Anti-Gypsyism	4.56	1.19	.88	–	–	–	–	–	–	–.05
8. Political orientation (left to right)	3.54	1.94	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<i>France</i>										
1. Hostile political discourse	3.42	1.64	–	.08**	.06	–.05	.03	.01	.27**	–.15**
2. Paternalistic political discourse	3.28	1.70	–	–	.70**	.60**	.62**	.62**	–.50**	.27**
3. Ally political discourse	3.23	1.64	–	–	–	.61**	.58**	.61**	–.51**	.26**
4. Moral Inclusion	3.09	1.53	.83	–	–	–	.67**	.68**	–.63**	.35**
5. Donations	2.98	1.61	.87	–	–	–	–	.85**	–.57**	.29**
6. Collective action	3.09	1.64	.89	–	–	–	–	–	–.60**	.31**
7. Anti-Gypsyism	4.09	1.10	.89	–	–	–	–	–	–	–.42**
8. Political orientation (left to right)	3.93	1.64	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<i>Ireland</i>										
1. Hostile political discourse	3.49	1.74	–	.00	–.10**	–.20**	–.12**	–.14**	.36**	.13**
2. Paternalistic political discourse	3.75	1.72	–	–	.59**	.46**	.46**	.42**	–.40**	.01

(Continues)

Table 3. (Continued)

	Mean	SD	α	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
3. Ally political discourse	3.83	1.71	–		–	.55**	.56**	.57**	–.52**	–.04
4. Moral Inclusion	3.96	1.50	.81			–	.63**	.63**	–.65**	–.13**
5. Donations	3.47	1.65	.83				–	.79**	–.59**	.01
6. Collective action	3.44	1.68	.85					–	–.61**	–.04
7. Anti-Gypsyism	4.10	1.04	.84						–	.14**
8. Political orientation (left to right)	3.97	1.30	–							–

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$.




Figure 1. Path model with standardized coefficients. FR, France; HU, Hungary; IRE, Ireland; ROM, Romania; SK, Slovakia. The numbers in the brackets refer to the coefficients calculated in the direct model.

for their rights in the face of injustices. We tested moral inclusion as the mediator in this connection, because on the one hand, politicians often use messages that directly communicate moral exclusion, for example, through dehumanizing language (Esses et al., 2013), and more rarely, but importantly, highlight intergroup similarity and the importance of compassion (Zehfuss, 2021), and on the other hand, because moral inclusion is necessary for people to act fairly, responsibly, and in a prosocial manner toward members of other groups (Deutsch, 1973; Opatow, 1990). However, to the best of our knowledge this connection has never been directly tested before, and no research has been conducted about this question concerning Roma–non-Roma relations. We tested our hypotheses on large community samples that were demographically similar to the populations of five European countries to offer strong external validity and show replicability. Overall, the pattern investigated in this research is highly similar across contexts.

Apart from demographic variables, we also controlled for anti-Gypsyism and political orientation in our analysis to more clearly demarcate the role of moral inclusion. The absence of prejudice is an important prerequisite of expressing solidarity toward outgroup members (e.g.,

Table 4. Indirect Effects of the Three Types of Political Discourses on Pro-Roma Action Intentions Through Moral Inclusion With the Following Control Variables: Age, Gender, Education, Political Orientation, and ATRS

Indirect Pathway	Indirect Effect	<i>p</i>	LLCI	ULCI
<i>Hungary</i>				
HOST → MINC → CA	-.002	.87	-.02	.02
PAT → MINC → CA	.08	<.001	.05	.11
ALL → MINC → CA	.05	<.001	.03	.07
HOST → MINC → DON	-.002	.87	-.03	.02
PAT → MINC → DON	.09	<.001	.06	.13
ALL → MINC → DON	.06	<.001	.03	.08
<i>Slovakia</i>				
HOST → MINC → CA	.001	.90	-.01	.01
PAT → MINC → CA	.06	<.001	.04	.08
ALL → MINC → CA	.06	<.001	.04	.08
HOST → MINC → DON	.001	.90	-.02	.02
PAT → MINC → DON	.09	<.001	.07	.12
ALL → MINC → DON	.09	<.001	.06	.12
<i>Romania</i>				
HOST → MINC → CA	-0.02	.01	-.03	-.004
PAT → MINC → CA	0.05	<.001	.03	.08
ALL → MINC → CA	0.06	<.001	.04	.09
HOST → MINC → DON	-0.03	.01	-.05	-.006
PAT → MINC → DON	0.08	<.001	.06	.11
ALL → MINC → DON	0.09	<.001	.06	.12
<i>France</i>				
HOST → MINC → CA	.01	.40	-.007	.02
PAT → MINC → CA	.07	<.001	.04	.10
ALL → MINC → CA	.08	<.001	.05	.11
HOST → MINC → DON	.01	.400	-.008	.03
PAT → MINC → DON	.08	<.001	.05	.11
ALL → MINC → DON	.08	<.001	.05	.12
<i>Ireland</i>				
HOST → MINC → CA	.01	.62	-.01	.02
PAT → MINC → CA	.05	<.001	.03	.07
ALL → MINC → CA	.08	<.001	.05	.11
HOST → MINC → DON	.01	.62	-.01	.03
PAT → MINC → DON	.05	<.001	.03	.07
ALL → MINC → DON	.08	<.001	.05	.11

Note: The indirect effect coefficients are standardized.

Abbreviations: ALL, ally discourse; CA, collective action; DON, donation; HOST, hostile discourse; MINC = moral inclusion; PAT = paternalistic discourse.

Fingerhut, 2011), but we were interested in identifying the connection beyond the influence of individual attitudes. Political orientation can play a role in finding certain types of discourses acceptable depending on with whom the specific discourse is typically associated (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).

We found partial support for our hypotheses. Importantly, we found no evidence that acceptance of hostile discourse would predict lower intentions to engage in donations and politicized action across all samples (H1). Although the connection was significant in some cases, only the Romanian sample showed a clear and direct negative connection between the acceptance of hostile political discourse and lower donations and collective action intentions. In all other samples, the connection was nonsignificant, suggesting that there is no direct connection between finding hostile political discourse acceptable and withholding help and collective action. The lack of connection may be related to the fact that rejecting hostile

discourse did not mean acceptance of the other two (or vice versa) as the weak or no correlations indicated. In France, the two variables were very weakly, but positively, connected. This positive connection seems to contradict all previous evidence from the intergroup relations literature. We believe this may have been an outcome of the low means on both scales, suggesting a connection between rejecting both the hostile political discourse and acting in prosocial ways. We interpret it as a sign of indifference.

Accepting paternalistic discourse predicted both higher donation intentions and collective action intentions (in support of H2). The path between paternalism and collective action is particularly important because it clearly suggests that participants in Hungary, Slovakia, and France and to a lesser degree in Romania and Ireland perceived paternalistic political discourse positively, even though it portrayed Roma people low in competence and helpless. Acceptance of paternalistic discourse predicted higher intention even for social-change-oriented action. This finding contradicts previous research about the negative impact of paternalism based on the stereotype content model, but it is in line with Lantos et al.'s (2020) findings, that in the face of both economic and political hardships (that are typical to the situation of Roma people across Europe), these different forms of actions, as well as the motivations behind them, are not distinguishable. Our third hypothesis about the connection between political discourse of allyship and higher intentions for both types of prosocial action (H3) was supported by the data in all samples.

Our hypothesis (H4) about mediation was only partially supported. The connection between hostile discourse and action intentions was not mediated by moral inclusion. This suggests that acceptance of hostile discourse may be directly associated with lower moral inclusion based on the correlational evidence, but it does not predict lower action intentions either directly or as a result of moral exclusion. However, we identified the mediating role of moral inclusion in the connection between accepting paternalistic and ally discourses and action intentions. This finding fits with previous research on moral inclusion as a prerequisite of prosocial orientation toward outgroup members, and it also supplements previous research on social norms and political discourse in identifying the key role of moral inclusion. It shows that even if acceptance of a political discourse does not directly promote social change, moral inclusion can predict such action intentions. Our research revealed the mechanism by which paternalistic discourse regarding the Roma can actually promote positive intentions (both donations and collective action) by identifying the mediating role of moral inclusion. This explanation has been missing from previous research, which already identified that in case of Roma people (and other economically and politically disadvantaged groups), prosociality is distinguishable from hostility, but paradoxically, paternalism can contribute to social change (see Lantos et al., 2020).

Limitations and Future Directions

Given the limitations of survey length, we relied on single items to capture acceptance of different types of political discourses. We found that the association between acceptance of paternalistic discourse and allyship were relatively strong ($r > .59$), which can reflect their genuinely close connection in people's perception and suggest that they are both considered positive and therefore acceptable or unacceptable. This interpretation would underline the finding that when it comes to Roma people, even a paternalistic statement is counternormative and perceived supportive rather than hostile. Finally, it is possible that our results emerge because participants could not express their genuine and nuanced opinions when answering such a simplified scale. An alternative solution could have been to use actual statements and ask participants to rate

their acceptability. Although this approach may have offered a more accurate insight into what types of discourses people find acceptable, this would have required a larger number of items to create subscales of types of discourse that we were unable to include in the omnibus survey.

Importantly, we measured how the acceptance of various political discourses predicted different outcomes, and not directly how exposure to these discourses affect people. While this is a limitation of our method, politicians can influence norms and present discourses as acceptable; therefore, we are convinced that they can be treated as proxies for the influence of the presence of these discourses in mainstream politics. Nevertheless, this was not directly tested in this article and should be investigated using experimental methods.

The survey format only allowed us to measure behavioral intentions and not actual behavior. This is a common, but nonetheless serious limitation. In order to keep the model simple, we used anti-Gypsyism and political orientation as control variables and did not include them in the model. This approach did not allow us to investigate their role in predicting action intentions, although they were strongly correlated with our study variables and therefore important elements of the revealed connections.

Finally, our study focused on the non-Roma majority in each country and did not analyze the effect of different political discourses and moral inclusion from the perspectives of Roma and Traveler people, which would be necessary to clearly understand the potentials for social change. Future research should include the perspective of Roma people when investigating these connections. Nonetheless, our research provides important first evidence that the endorsement of different types of political discourses predict different degrees of solidarity action intentions among non-Roma people, especially if these discourses promote moral inclusion, rather than the more commonly present communication of moral exclusion.

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Supporting Information

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web site:

Table S1. Fit Indices of the Invariance Tests for Multigroup Confirmatory Factor Analysis of ATRS Items. Blatant Negative Stereotyping, Undeserved Benefits and Cultural Recognition Comprised the Three Subscales of the Model

Table S2. Model Fit Information for the Hypothesized Mediation Model and a Mediation Model in which Moral Inclusion is Considered the Input Variable and Endorsement of Political Discourses the Mediators

Table S3. Descriptive Statistics, Information on Scale Reliability and Correlations between the Subscales of the Updated Attitude Toward the Roma Scale and Other Variables in the Samples from Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and France

Appendix

MEASURES OF PROSOCIAL INTENTIONS

Instruction: Imagine that a poor Roma family moves into your neighborhood from a countryside village. They are not welcome by some of your neighbors and members of the local school. These people consider various forms of actions to make sure the Roma people do not stay in their new home. How likely is it that you would engage in the following activities related to this situation?

Donations subscale

- I would donate clothing, school supplies or toys for Roma families.
- I would do some kind of volunteer work for an organization that helps Roma people.
- I would motivate others to donate for the Roma.

Collective action subscale

- I would participate in some form of action (e.g. signing a petition) defending the rights of the Roma.
- I would publicly express my concern about racism against the Roma by posting on social media or in other ways.
- I would motivate my friends and acquaintances to participate in actions for the human rights of Roma people.

Updated Attitudes Toward the Roma scale (used as a single scale in the current study; for more information, see the online supporting information).

Blatant Negative Stereotyping

- Roma people do not make more criminal acts than other people. (reversed)
- There are very little proper or reasonable Roma people.
- Roma people do not have a positive relationship to work, they are lazy.
- The growing Roma population threatens the security of society.
- Roma people usually have a lot of children, for which they do not give enough care.
- It is not right that there are still clubs where Roma people are not allowed to enter. (reversed)

Belief in Undeserved Benefits

- The real damage is caused by organizations which offer an undeserved advantage to Roma people.
- Roma people get given less government money than they should be given. (reversed)
- Roma people in this country are given preferential treatment in certain aspects.
- Roma people should be offered more support than they currently receive. (reversed)
- The only racial discrimination in Ireland these days is in favor of Roma people.

Cultural Recognition

- The Roma can be proud of their cultural heritage.
- Roma people have rich artistic traditions.
- There is nothing special about the cultural heritage of the Roma. (reversed)