

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/226899836>

# Performing an environmental tax reform in a regional economy. A computable general equilibrium approach

Article in *The Annals of Regional Science* · June 2005

DOI: 10.1007/s00168-005-0231-3 · Source: RePEc

CITATIONS

81

READS

198

3 authors, including:



**Francisco J. André**

Complutense University of Madrid

70 PUBLICATIONS 875 CITATIONS

[SEE PROFILE](#)



**Manuel Alejandro Cardenete**

Universidad Loyola Andalucía

200 PUBLICATIONS 1,520 CITATIONS

[SEE PROFILE](#)

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:



Phd Thesis of J.A Valenciano: "Effects of the adoption of voluntary environmental certifications for companies in Costa Rica" [View project](#)



Social and Environmental Accounting [View project](#)

**XI Encuentro de Economía Pública  
Barcelona, 5-6 febrero de 2004**

**Performing an Environmental Tax Reform  
in a Regional Economy.  
A Computable General Equilibrium Approach<sup>1</sup>**

**Francisco J. André**

**M. Alejandro Cardenete**

**Esther Velázquez**

Universidad Pablo de Olavide and centra

---

<sup>1</sup> The first author thanks to research project SEC2000-0723. The second one thanks to SEC2000-0390 and SEC2003-05112/ECO. The last two authors thank to network grant XT2002-37. Finally, we thank V. Alcántara, X. Labandeira, M. Rodríguez, F. Sancho and the members of the Public Policy Group from centra for useful comments. All errors are our responsibility.

## ABSTRACT

A Computable General Equilibrium model is used to simulate the effects of an Environmental Tax Reform in a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain). The reform involves imposing a tax on CO<sub>2</sub> or SO<sub>2</sub> emissions and reducing the payroll tax of employers to Social Security or the Income Tax, keeping public deficit unchanged. This approach is capable of testing the so-called double dividend hypothesis, according to which, this kind of reform is likely to improve both environmental and non-environmental welfare. In the economy under analysis, an employment double dividend arises when the payroll tax is reduced and, if CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are selected as environmental target, a (limited) strong double could be also obtained. No double dividend appears when Income Tax is reduced to compensate the environmental tax.

**Keywords:** environmental tax reforms, computable general equilibrium, double dividend.

**JEL Classification:** D58, H21, H23.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Some economists have argued that an environmental tax reform (ETR henceforth) consisting of taxing polluting emissions and recycling the so-obtained revenue by reducing other distorting taxes, in such a way that public revenue remains unchanged, can give rise to the so-called *double dividend*, that is, to get an environmental improvement (*green dividend*) and reduce fiscal distortions (*blue dividend*) so that non-environmental welfare would also increase.

The relevance of a double dividend has to do with the practical implementability of an ETR. Any environmental policy is likely to have some economic costs by worsening the performance of some economic variables, such as production, employment, inflation, and ultimately (non-environmental) welfare. To make a decision, a benefit-cost analysis is needed, in order to compare the environmental benefits and the economic costs from such a policy. The most difficult part of this analysis is that of measuring environmental benefits, which do not usually have a market value. Nevertheless, if a double dividend exists, it is possible to improve the environmental quality without any cost in terms of non-environmental economic welfare. In this case, it can be argued that the fiscal reform is desirable even without an explicit valuation of the environmental benefits. Note that the environmental policy could be valuable by itself, even it has some economic costs, so that a double dividend exists is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition to justify an ETR.

According to Mooij (1999), there is a consensus among all the authors concerning the definition of the green dividend, but there exist different versions of the blue dividend. The so-called *weak double dividend* version states that the social welfare is superior when an environmental tax is compensated by reducing a distorting tax rather than by a lump-sum transfer. A *strong double dividend* exists if, apart from the environmental improvement, the non-environmental welfare is larger after than before performing the reform. Finally, an *employment double dividend* happens if the employment level increases after the reform, as compared with the situation before the reform.

Basically all economists agree that there exists a green dividend, and most of them also agree that a *double weak dividend* is also likely to exist, but there is a long controversial about the strong double dividend and the employment double dividend. The theoretical literature has not obtained so far clear-cut conclusions, but it suggests that the

possibility to obtain a double dividend is small and it is subject to very stringent conditions about tax recycling. Pearce (1991), Repetto et.al. (1992), Nordhaus (1993) or Grubb (1993) among others argue that it is possible to improve tax efficiency by means of an ETR, while others, like Bovenberg and Mooij (1994) argue that this is not true, in general, because environmental taxes are likely to increase, rather than reduce, previous distortions.

Parry (1995) points out the relevance of choosing a partial equilibrium or a general equilibrium approach to answer this question. Partial equilibrium models do not take into account the interactions between environmental taxes and previous distortions, and these effects tend to cause the double dividend to hold in partial equilibrium models but not in general equilibrium models. The reason is that the environmental tax ultimately falls on labour income, so that labour taxes and emission taxes distort the labour market in a similar way, but labour taxes are more efficient from the levying point of view because environmental taxes also distort the relative prices between polluting and non-polluting goods, which erodes the tax base. So, from a non-environmental point of view, emission taxes are likely to cause a larger excess of burden.

Notwithstanding, the economic literature also describes some mechanisms that may cause a strong double dividend, or an employment double dividend to happen in a general equilibrium framework. An ETR could help to achieve wage moderation and reduce labour market distortions in a situation in which imperfect competition has led to excessively high wages (Brunello, 1996; Carraro et.al., 1996). Bovenberg (1994) and Carraro and Soubeyran (1996) show that, if the initial tax system is suboptimal from a non-environmental point of view, an ETR can simultaneously reduce pollution and unemployment. For a survey on ETR and the double dividend, see Mooij (1999) or Goulder (1995).

Given the difficulties to obtain clear-cut theoretical conclusions, it makes sense to perform an empirical analysis to test the economic effects of a specific reform in a selected country or region, by means of a suitable applied model. A number of authors, like Bye (2000), Dessus and Bussolo (1998), Wender (2001), Xie and Saltzman (2000) or Yang (2001), have used Computable General Equilibrium (CGE henceforth) models to assess the economic effects of an ETR. These models perform a disaggregate representation of all the activity sectors and the equilibrium of all markets, according to basic microeconomic principles.

In Spain, Gomez and Kverndokk (2002), Manresa and Sancho (2002) and Rodríguez (2003) use CGE models to simulate the effect of environmental tax reforms in the national level. We are not aware of any application in the regional level. In this paper a CGE model is used to evaluate the environmental and economic effects of an ETR in a regional economic, that of Andalusia (Spain). Specifically, four simulations are made, combining the introduction of a tax on CO<sub>2</sub> or SO<sub>2</sub> emissions with a reduction in Income Tax (IT hereafter) or the payroll tax of the employers to Social Security (PT hereafter). We use an extension of the model by Cardenete and Sancho (2003), including polluting emissions and emission taxes.

The results show that an employment double dividend is likely to arise when the PT is reduced to compensate the environmental tax. In the case of the CO<sub>2</sub> tax, a strong double dividend also obtains for low values of the environmental tax. No (employment or strong) double dividend exists when the environmental tax revenue is recycled by reducing the IT.

The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 displays the most important features of the CGE model and the databases<sup>2</sup>. Section 3 presents and justifies the simulations performed, and specifically, the pollutants to be taxed and the selected tax combinations. Section 4 summarizes the results and offers some economic interpretation. Section 5 concludes.

## **2. THE MODEL AND THE DATABASES**

### **2.1. The model**

The model comprises 24 productive sectors, after aggregation of the 1990 Input-Output tables of Andalusia. The production technology is given by a *nested production function*. The domestic output of sector  $j$ , measured in euros and denoted by  $Xd_j$ , is obtained by combining, through a Leontief technology, outputs (including energy) from the rest of sectors and the value added  $VA_j$  which, in turn, obtains from primary inputs (labour,  $L$ , and capital,  $K$ ), combined by a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall output of sector  $j$ ,  $Q_j$ , obtains from a Cobb-Douglas combination of domestic output and imports

---

<sup>2</sup> In the Appendix the most important equations of the model are specified in detail. For further information about the model see Cardenete and Sancho (2003).

$Xrow_j$ , according to the Armington hypothesis (1969), in which domestic and imported products are taken as imperfect substitutes.

The government raises taxes to obtain public revenue<sup>3</sup>, gives transfers to the private sector,  $TPS$ , and demands goods and services,  $GD_j$ .  $PD$  gives the final balance (surplus or deficit) of the public budget<sup>4</sup>:

$$PD = R - TPS - cpi - GD_j - p_j \quad (1)$$

$cpi$  being the Consumer Price Index and  $p_j$  a production price index before Value Added Tax (VAT hereafter) referring to all goods produced by sector  $j$ . Tax revenue includes that raised from the environmental tax.

Let  $E_j$  denote polluting emissions from sector  $j$ , measured in CO<sub>2</sub> or SO<sub>2</sub> tons. Then, we have the following equation, which assumes a linear relationship between production and emissions:

$$E_j = \alpha_j Q_j \quad (2)$$

where  $\alpha_j$  measures the amount of pollution for every euro of output produced in sector  $j$ . The technical parameter  $\alpha_j$  accounts for the differences in pollution intensities across sectors. Typically, very energy-intensive sectors (and, specially fossil-fuels-intensive) are also very intensively pollutant (and hence display a high value of  $\alpha_j$ )<sup>5</sup>.

The government imposes a tax of  $t$  euros per ton of emissions. As a consequence, each sector  $j$  pays

$$T_j = t E_j \quad (3)$$

Note that the different pollution intensity across sectors causes that the same tax on pollution implies a different economic burden with respect to output. Substituting (2) into (3), the amount to be paid by sector  $j$  can be written as

$$T_j = \beta_j Q_j \quad (4)$$

---

<sup>3</sup> The appendix specifies how every direct and indirect tax in the model is computed.

<sup>4</sup> In this model, the *government* includes local and regional administrations, as well as those activities of the central government in the region and any institution that is more than half financed with public funds.

<sup>5</sup> Rodríguez (2003) uses a technically different (but conceptually similar) approach, by linking pollution to energy consumption and production, and modelling the energy use decision of the producers. With such an approach, the effect of the environmental tax happens through the energy use decision. In this paper, the environmental tax acts by providing incentives to increase the production of cleaner sectors and reduce that of dirtier (energy-intensive) sectors.

where  $\beta_j = t \alpha_j$  is the marginal and average tax rate of sector  $j$  in terms of euro paid per euro produced (see equation A.8 in the Appendix for the exact specification of the environmental tax in the CGE model).

There is a unique foreign sector, which comprises the rest of Spain, Europe and the rest of the world. The balance of this sector is given by

$$ROWD = \sum_{j=1}^{24} rowp IMP_j - TROW - \sum_{j=1}^{24} rowp EXP_j \quad (5)$$

where  $IMP_j$  denote imports of sector  $j$ ,  $EXP_j$  exports of sector  $j$  and  $TROW$  transfers from abroad for the consumer.  $ROWD$  is the balance of the external sector.

Final demand comes from investment, exports and consumption demand from households. In our model, there exist 24 different goods –corresponding to productive sectors- and a representative consumer who demands present consumption goods and saves the remainder of her disposable income. Consumer income ( $YD$  henceforth) equals labour and capital income, plus transfers, less direct taxes:

$$YD = wL + rK + cpi TPS + TROW - DT(rK + cpi TPS + TROW) - DT(wL - WCwL) - WCwL \quad (6)$$

where  $w$  and  $r$  denote input (labour and capital) prices and  $L$  and  $K$  inputs quantities sold by the consumer,  $DT$  is the IT rate and  $WC$  the tax rate corresponding to the payment of the employees to Social Security (ESS hereafter). The consumer's objective is to maximize her utility, which is given from consumption goods  $CD_j$  ( $j = 1, \dots, 24$ ) and savings  $SD$ , -according to a Cobb-Douglas utility function-, subject to her budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{maximize} && U(CD_1, \dots, CD_{24}, SD) = \left( \prod_{j=1}^{24} CD_j^{\alpha_j} \right) SD^{\beta} \\ & \text{s.t.} && \sum_{j=1}^{24} p_j CD_j + p_{inv} SD = YD \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

$p_{inv}$  being an investment price index.

Concerning investment and saving, this is a *saving driven* model. The closure rule is defined in such a way that investment is exogenous, savings are determined from the



consumer's decision and both variables are related with the public and foreign sectors by the following equation:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{24} INV_j p_{inv} = SDpinv + PD + ROWD \quad (8)$$

Labour and capital demands are computed under the assumption that firms minimize the cost of producing value added. In the capital market we consider that supply is perfectly inelastic. On other hand, in the labour market, we suppose that the supply is perfectly elastic up to the level of total labour endowment where it becomes inelastic. There is also a feedback between the real wage rate and the unemployment rate. This feedback somehow represents rigidities in the labour market that are related to unions' power or other friction inducing factors (see Kehoe et al. (1995)). We consider that the real wage satisfies the following feedback condition:

$$\frac{w}{cpi} = \left( \frac{1-u}{1-\bar{u}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \quad (9)$$

where  $u$  and  $\bar{u}$  are the unemployment rates in the simulation and in the benchmark equilibrium respectively, and  $\theta$  is an elasticity constant that represents the degree of flexibility of the real wage (as usual in similar studies, we set  $\theta$  equal to 1). This formulation is consistent with an institutional setting where the workers decide real wage taking into account the unemployment rate -according to equation (9)- and employers decide the amount of labour.

The activity levels of public and foreign sectors are fixed, while the relative prices and the activity levels of the productive sectors are endogenous variables.

The equilibrium of the economy is given by a price vector for all goods and inputs, a vector of activity levels, and a value for public income such that the consumer is maximizing her utility, the productive sectors are maximizing its profits (net of taxes), public income equals the payments of all economic agents, and supply equals demand in all markets.

This CGE model follows the basic principles of the walrasian equilibrium -as in Scarf and Shoven (1984), Ballard et al. (1985) o Shoven and Whalley (1992)-, enlarged by including both public and foreign sectors.

## 2.2. Databases and calibration

The main data used in this paper come from the 1990 social accounting matrix (SAM hereafter) for Andalusia (see Cardenete, 1998). Emission data are obtained from the 1990 environmental Input-Output tables for Andalusia (TIOMA90), made by the regional environmental agency<sup>6</sup>, which show real observed data on different air pollutants, released from 74 activity sectors, which were aggregated into 24 to match the SAM structure. There is a more recent SAM for Andalusia, specifically, from 1995. Unfortunately, there are no official pollution data by sectors, disaggregate enough, for any year after 1990, so we have decided to use the 1990 SAM for the sake of consistency.

The numerical values for the economic parameters are obtained by the usual procedure of calibration (see, for example, Mansur and Whalley, 1984). Specifically, the following parameters are calibrated: all the technical coefficients of the production functions, all the tax rates (except for the environmental tax) and the coefficients of the utility function. The environmental coefficients  $\alpha_j$  are obtained from equation (2), i.e., dividing the observed amount of pollution by the amount of output for every sector. The calibration criterion is that of reproducing the 1990 SAM as an initial equilibrium for the economy, which is used as a benchmark for all the simulations. In such an equilibrium, all the prices and the activity levels are set equal to one, so that, after the simulation, it is possible to observe directly the change rate of relative prices and activity levels. The amount of pollution for sector  $j$  is simulated by multiplying the output of such a sector by the calibrated value of the parameter  $\alpha_j$ .

The SAM comprises 24 industry sectors, two inputs (labour and capital), a saving/investment account, a government account, direct taxes (IT and ESS) and indirect taxes (PT, VAT, output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a representative consumer.

---

<sup>6</sup> Agencia de Medio Ambiente, Junta de Andalucía (1996).

### 3. SIMULATIONS PERFORMED

In the simulations performed in this paper, we assume that a tax is imposed on the CO<sub>2</sub> or SO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The revenue obtained from such a tax is recycled by reducing PT or IT, so that, four different policy combinations are simulated.

It is well known that Carbon and Nitrogen Oxides are among the main polluting substances released to the atmosphere. In Andalusia, more than one million tons of SO<sub>2</sub> and CO<sub>2</sub> are released every year (Consejería de Medio Ambiente, 2001), being industry and road transport the most polluting sectors.

CO<sub>2</sub> is chosen because of its known severe impacts on the ozone layer, global warming, and climate change, which have fostered some governments to impose taxes on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in order to cut them down (Bosquet, 2000). Given the global effects of this pollutant, a tax on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions is more likely to be set in the national rather than regional level, so the results concerning this pollutant can be interpreted as the likely regional effects of a hypothetical national tax reform. Regarding SO<sub>2</sub>, it is one of the main air pollutants in Andalusia and its local effects make it a suitable aim for a regional environmental policy. Chemical and energy industries are the main responsible, accounting for about 77 % of the overall SO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 1990<sup>7</sup> (Sociedad para el Desarrollo Energético de Andalucía, 1994-2000).

Regarding the taxes to be reduced for recycling revenue, we have selected the payroll tax (PT) and income tax (IT). RT is perhaps the one more widely analysed in the related literature (Bosquet, 2000), perhaps in part because of the concern about unemployment in Europe. We should remark that, according to the Spanish law, this tax only could be modified by the central Spanish government, and not by a regional government. So, as this paper focuses on the economic effects of a ETR in a regional economy, the results involving this tax can be interpreted, first, as measuring the regional effects of a hypothetical reform performed from the central government or, second, as measuring the potential gains for the regional economy if the local government received power to modify this tax in the future.

As for the IT, we have found very few empirical related references using this tax, despite the recommendations of the European Commission (Durán Cabré, 2001). Nevertheless,

---

<sup>7</sup> According to the Andalusian Energy Program, Andalusian industries are performing a big effort to cut emissions down. By the end of the nineties, Andalusian industry had cut its emissions down to the 56% of the overall polluting emissions in the region.

this tax is included in the analysis, first, because of its great relevance in the Spanish Tax System, and second, the regional governments do have (limited) ability to manage this tax, so that a reform involving IT is more plausible to be performed in a regional economy than one involving PT.

Combining both pollutants and both taxes, we obtain four possible ETR's. Among the four, the SO<sub>2</sub>/IT combination is the most plausible from a regional point of view, while the CO<sub>2</sub>/PT combination is the more plausible from a national point of view. The other two intermediate cases are also simulated for the sake of completeness. The (regional) economic effects of each one are simulated, focusing specially on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Disposable Income (YD) in real terms, Equivalent Variation (EV) as a measure of consumer (non-environmental) welfare, unemployment and inflation. This information allows us to discuss the existence of a (strong or employment) double dividend for the economy under study.

As noted by Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), an environmental tax is likely to introduce further economic (non-environmental) distortions. When another distorting tax is reduced as compensation, there are two opposite effects, which yield an ambiguous result, depending on how distorting the tax to be reduced is. If we reduce a very strongly (slightly) distorting tax, it is likely to provide a welfare improvement that could (could not) compensate the distortion introduced by the environmental tax, to give a final positive (negative) impact on non-environmental welfare. It can also work the other way round: if we observe that an ETR provides a positive (negative) overall effect on welfare, we can conclude that the tax that has been reduced is more (less) distorting than the environmental tax.

As the magnitude of both types of emissions is very different<sup>8</sup>, the value of the tax rates has to be set in sensible levels concerning the fiscal pressure they impose on the firms. Instead of performing the simulation for a single value of the environmental tax rate (as in other related articles), in order to obtain more accurate quantitative information concerning the sensitivity of different economic variables, we perform the simulation for a parametric range, with a minimum of  $\alpha=0,5$  and a maximum of 3 euros per unit of pollutant (tons for SO<sub>2</sub> and thousand tons for CO<sub>2</sub>). These values imply an average tax rate on sales ( $\beta$ ) that roughly ranges from 0,7% to 4% in the SO<sub>2</sub> reform and from 0,17%

---

<sup>8</sup> In fact, in the TIOMA90, SO<sub>2</sub> data are measured in tons, while CO<sub>2</sub> data are in thousand tons.

to 1.06% in the CO<sub>2</sub> reform. In every simulation, once the environmental tax rate is exogenously fixed, the compensating tax (PT or IT) is decreased with the criterion of keeping real public deficit unchanged. There is no minimum exempt, so that, firms have to pay from the first polluting unit.<sup>9</sup>

#### 4. RESULTS

Given the different magnitude of both substances, it is not appropriate to perform a precise quantitative comparison between the results concerning both pollutants. So, every reform is simulated separately, quantitative comparisons can be made for reforms on the same pollutant, and just some general qualitative comparisons can be made across different pollutants.

First, we focus on the reforms involving a tax on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Table 1 displays the main results, including the change rate (%) of emissions, real GDP, real YD, unemployment and Consumer Price Index (CPI hereafter) with respect to the benchmark situation, as well as EV with respect to the benchmark situation.

When the CO<sub>2</sub> tax is compensated with **PT**, emissions monotonically decrease with the tax rate, as expected. Nominal Output and Income decrease, but as prices also decrease, both GDP and YD increase in real terms. Nevertheless, while real GDP monotonically increase with the tax rate, YD reaches a maximum (0,03 % increment with respect to the benchmark value) when the environmental tax rate equals 1.5 euros per thousand tons, and decreases from that point on (although, it keeps above the benchmark level).

As a consequence of lower labour costs, unemployment rate monotonically decreases, reaching a reduction larger than 3%, so that an employment double dividend arises. Non-environmental welfare, as measured by EV, also increases monotonically for tax rates smaller on equal than 2.5, it reaches a maximum at this point and decreases for larger values. This event meets the definition of strong double dividend. In fact, this simulation is the only one that shows a (limited) strong double dividend result. These results are in the line with the evidence, obtained by several economists, concerning the

---

<sup>9</sup> Labandeira and López-Nicolás (2002) criticize the exempt minimum of 1000 tons per year, suggested by Durán and Gispert (2001) for being too high, so that, very few firms are subject to the tax. From an empirical point of view, a high exempt minimum reduces the effectiveness of the tax, while, from a theoretical point of view, it erodes the ability to restore the efficiency that was lost because of the environmental externality.

strongly distorting effects of labour taxes, and more specifically, the payroll tax in Spanish Tax System<sup>10</sup>. The reduction in this tax overpowers the distorting effects of the environmental tax.

Table1. ETR with CO<sub>2</sub> tax. Results summary. Change rate (%) with respect to benchmark levels.

| Tax rate | Compensated with | Emissions | Real GDP | Real YD | Unemp. rate | EV (*)    | CPI   |
|----------|------------------|-----------|----------|---------|-------------|-----------|-------|
| t=0,5    | PT               | -0.13     | 0.03     | 0.01    | -0.39       | 4275.6    | -0.20 |
|          | IT               | -0.36     | -0.17    | -0.17   | 0.77        | -70441.0  | 0.20  |
| t=1      | PT               | -0.25     | 0.05     | 0.02    | -1.16       | 7603.4    | -0.40 |
|          | IT               | -0.71     | -0.43    | -0.43   | 1.54        | -141208.4 | 0.50  |
| t=1,5    | PT               | -0.37     | 0.08     | 0.03    | -1.54       | 10011.1   | -0.60 |
|          | IT               | -1.06     | -0.60    | -0.60   | 1.93        | -212297.9 | 0.70  |
| T=2      | PT               | -0.49     | 0.08     | 0.02    | -2.32       | 11526.8   | -0.77 |
|          | IT               | -1.41     | -0.86    | -0.86   | 2.70        | -283706.0 | 1.00  |
| T=2,5    | PT               | -0.62     | 0.09     | 0.01    | -2.70       | 12174.7   | -0.95 |
|          | IT               | -1.75     | -1.03    | -1.03   | 3.47        | -355428.9 | 1.20  |
| T=3      | PT               | -0.74     | 0.10     | 0.01    | -3.09       | 11979.4   | -1.13 |
|          | IT               | -2.09     | -1.29    | -1.29   | 4.25        | -427463.2 | 1.50  |

Source: own elaboration from SAMAND90 and TIOMA90.

(\*): EV in thousand euros.

When the CO<sub>2</sub> tax is compensated by reducing Income Tax, no (strong or employment) double dividend follows. Emissions reduce, as expected, but all economic variables monotonically worsen: real GDP and YD decrease, CPI increases (with an inflation rate up to 1,5 %), as well as unemployment rate (with an increment up to 4,25%). In this case, we can conclude that the distorting effects of the environmental tax (which depress consumption and economic activity) overpower the incentive effect from reducing IT.

By comparing the economic effects of both reforms (figure 1), we can see that the most sensitive variable is unemployment, showing the highest change rate in absolute value (positive in the first reform, and specially negative in the second) among all the variables under study.


Note also that the emission reduction is larger in the IT reform (up to 2%) than in the PT reform (hardly 1%). To understand this difference, we can rationalize the final effect of the ETR on emissions, as being the result of combining two separate mechanisms that

<sup>10</sup> Sancho (1988), in a national-level study, and Cardenete and Sancho (2002), in a regional-level one, show the distorting effects of PT on output prices and sectoral competitiveness.

can be called *scale effect* and *substitution effect*. Regarding the former, given that pollution is a consequence of economic activity, any policy that fosters or depresses economic activity tends to increase or decrease pollutant emissions as a side effect. On the other hand, the environmental tax incentivates the activity of cleaner sectors and disincentivates that of dirtier ones, in such a way that, apart from changing the scale of the economic activities, their composition is altered as well (substitution effect). The latter effect is likely to be always negative (that is, to reduce emissions), while the sign of the scale effects is ambiguous because it depends on the impact on economic activity. In the IT reform, the decrease in the activity level induces further emission reductions, so both scale and substitution effects are negative, while the PT reform fosters economic activity and causes an indirect increasing effect on emissions (positive scale effect) which absorb part of the (negative) substitution effect.

We can conclude that the IT reform is more successful concerning environmental effects, but imposes higher economic costs, while the income tax reform has slighter environmental effects, but does not appear to have any cost in terms of non-environmental welfare.

Figure 1. ETR on CO<sub>2</sub>, involving a reduction in PT or IT. All variables in change rates.



Source: Own Elaboration

No strong double dividend arises when reducing PT compensates a SO<sub>2</sub> tax, as non-environmental welfare (as measured by EV) decreases. In this case, we get a significant relative reduction in emissions (larger than 6% for the largest scope of the reform) and a

reduction in prices but output and income decrease. As labour costs reduce, an employment double dividend is obtained (unemployment rate decreases up to 5%).

Finally, when a SO<sub>2</sub> tax is compensated by reducing IT, we obtain the worst results for all the economic variables. First, note that non-environmental welfare (as measured by EV) monotonically decreases with the tax rate, so that no strong double dividend exists. Regarding other economic variables, although nominal GDP and YD increase when the scope of the reform is small, this increment is overpowered by a high inflation rate (ranging from 1.2 to 7.9 %), so that both variables fall in real terms. Income and output fall even in nominal terms for larger values of the environmental tax rate. Unemployment rate also increases monotonically (up to a dramatic 21.24%), so that there is no an employment double dividend either. On the other hand, this reform achieves the largest emission reduction (reaching 10% for  $\alpha=3$ ), because the scale effect coming from the activity reduction adds to the substitution effect.

Table 2. ETR with SO<sub>2</sub> tax. Results summary. Change rate (%) with respect to benchmark levels.

| Tax rate | Compens. | Emissions | Real GDP | Real YD | Unemp. rate | EV (*)     | CPI   |
|----------|----------|-----------|----------|---------|-------------|------------|-------|
| t=0.5    | PT       | -1.22     | -0.25    | -0.32   | -1.54       | -101012.7  | -0.5  |
|          | IT       | -1.95     | -1.16    | -1.17   | 3.47        | -378046.8  | 1.20  |
| t=1      | PT       | -2.37     | -0.59    | -0.73   | -2.32       | -220379.1  | -0.90 |
|          | IT       | -3.80     | -2.30    | -2.34   | 6.95        | -764093.7  | 2.40  |
| t=1.5    | PT       | -3.46     | -1.03    | -1.25   | -3.47       | -355697.0  | -1.20 |
|          | IT       | -5.55     | -3.52    | -3.60   | 10.04       | -1157776.5 | 3.70  |
| t=2      | PT       | -4.50     | -1.47    | -1.77   | -4.25       | -505087.6  | -1.50 |
|          | IT       | -7.22     | -4.81    | -4.93   | 13.90       | -1558897.4 | 5.10  |
| t=2.5    | PT       | -5.50     | -2.01    | -2.39   | -5.02       | -667069.3  | -1.70 |
|          | IT       | -8.83     | -6.08    | -6.23   | 17.37       | -1967394.5 | 6.50  |
| t=3      | PT       | -6.46     | -2.66    | -3.12   | -5.41       | -840467.9  | -1.80 |
|          | IT       | -10.38    | -7.32    | -7.52   | 21.24       | -2383318.3 | 7.90  |

Source: own elaboration from SAMAND90 and TIOMA90.


(\*): EV in thousand euros.

When both reforms involving SO<sub>2</sub> emissions are compared (see figure 2), it is remarkable the bad behaviour of unemployment (which reveals itself again as the most sensitive variable) under the IT reform, jointly with a significant inflationary effect. Both of these variables improve under the PT reform, although in this case there is not a strong double dividend either. In return, as previously discussed, IT reform provides the largest reduction in emissions, which becomes now one of the most sensitive variables,



jointly with unemployment. The important role of SO<sub>2</sub> emissions in Andalusia helps to understand the proportional (environmental) success obtained by aiming the tax reform towards this pollutant.

Figure 2. ETR on SO<sub>2</sub>, involving a reduction in PT or IT. All variables in change rates.



Source: Own Elaboration.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, a CGE model is used to evaluate the environmental and economic effects of an ETR in the Andalusian economy, consisting of an environmental tax on CO<sub>2</sub> or SO<sub>2</sub> emissions compensated by reducing the payroll tax of employers to Social Security or the Income Tax. The results suggest the possibility to obtain an employment double dividend when any of the environmental taxes are compensated by reducing the payroll tax. In the case of the CO<sub>2</sub> tax, it is also possible to obtain a strong double dividend in the sense of increasing non-environmental welfare as well as improving other economic variables, including inflation, real income and output.

Some articles in the literature find evidence supporting the employment double dividend hypothesis when an ETR involving PT is performed (see Rodríguez, 2002; Bosquet, 2000). Our results are in the same line and we can also conclude that it is crucial the way to recycle the income generated by the environmental tax. When PT is selected it is possible to obtain an employment (or even strong) double dividend, while it is not possible when selecting the IT, which is the main direct tax in the Spanish Tax System.

From this point of view, our results show that PT seems to be a very strongly distorting tax, while IT is not, as compared with the environmental tax.

Concerning policy recommendations, our results show that an ETR involving a tax on SO<sub>2</sub> or CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and a reduction in the IT is likely to reduce pollution, and SO<sub>2</sub> emissions seem to be relatively more sensitive to such a reform. Nevertheless, this policy would probably generate significant economic costs, including a loss of non-environmental consumer welfare, real output and real income.

On the other hand, an ETR involving a tax on SO<sub>2</sub> or CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and a reduction in the PT is likely to get a more modest pollution cut, but will probably improve employment and, if the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are the target, a limited improvement in non-environmental welfare, economic activity (real output) and purchasing power (real income) can be expected.

Plausible future research lines include a more accurate analysis of the labour market and studying the dynamic effect of this kind of reform.

## References

- Agencia de Medio Ambiente, Junta de Andalucía (1996). "La tabla input-output medioambiental en Andalucía, 1990. Aproximación a la integración de las variables medioambientales en el modelo input-output". *Monografías de Economía y Medio Ambiente*, nº7. Dirección general de Planificación y Participación, Consejería de Medio Ambiente, Junta de Andalucía.
- Armington, P. S. (1969). "A Theory of Demand for Products Distinguished by Place of Production". *International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers* 16: 159-178.
- Ballard, C. L. et al. (1985). *A General Equilibrium Model for Policy Evaluation*. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Bosquet, B. (2000). "Environmental tax reform: does it work? A survey of the empirical evidence". *Ecological Economics* 34: 19-32.
- Bovenberg, L. (1994). "Green policies and public finance in a small open economy", *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 96: 343-363.
- Bovenberg, L. and R.A. de Mooij (1994). "Environmental levies and distortionary taxation" *American Economic Review* 94: 1085-1089.

- Brunello (1996). "Labour market institutions and the double dividend hypothesis: an application of the WARM model", in C. Carraro and D. Siniscalco (eds.), *Environmental Fiscal Reform and Unemployment*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Bye, B. (2000). "Environmental Tax Reform and Producer Foresight: An Intertemporal Computable General Equilibrium Analysis" *Policy Modelling* 22(6): 719-752.
- Cardenete, M. A. (1998). "Una Matriz de Contabilidad Social para la Economía Andaluza: 1990", *Revista de Estudios Regionales* 52: 137-154.
- Cardenete, M. A. and Sancho, F. (2002). "Efectos Económicos de Variaciones de la Imposición Indirecta sobre una Economía Regional", *Hacienda Pública Española* 162 (3): 61-78.
- Cardenete, M. A. and Sancho, F. (2003). "An Applied General Equilibrium Model to Assess the Impact of National Tax Changes on a Regional Economy" *Review of Urban and Regional Development Studies* 15 (1): 55-65.
- Carraro, C., M. Galeotti and M. Gallo (1996a). "Environmental taxation and unemployment: some evidence on the 'double dividend hypothesis' in Europe" *Journal of Public Economics* 62: 141-181.
- Carraro, C. and Soubeyran (1996b). "Environmental taxation and employment in a multi-sector general equilibrium model", in C. Carraro, ed., *Trade, innovation, environment* (Kluwer, Dordrecht).
- Dessus, S. and M. Bussolo (1998). "Is There a Trade-Off Between Trade Liberalization and Pollution Abatement?" *Journal of Policy Modelling* 20(1): 11-31.
- Durán, J.M. and Gispert, C. (2001). "Fiscalidad medioambiental sobre la energía: propuestas para España". Document de treball 2001/10. Institut d'Economia de Barcelona.
- Gómez, A. and S. Kverndokk (2002) "Can carbon taxation reduce Spanish unemployment?". Second World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists. Monterey (California, EEUU).
- Goulder, L. (1995). "Environmental taxation and the double dividend: a reader's guide" *International Tax and Public Finance* 2: 157-183.
- Grubb, M. J. Edmonds, P. ten Brink and M. Morrison (1993). "The cost of limiting fossil-fuel CO<sub>2</sub> emissions" *Annual Review of Energy and Environment* 18: 397-478.

- Kehoe, T.J., Polo, C. and Sancho, F. (1995) “An evaluation of the performance of an applied general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy” *Economic Theory*, 6: 115-141.
- Labandeira, X. and López-Nicolás, A. (2002). “La imposición de los carburantes de automoción en España: algunas observaciones teóricas y empíricas”. *Hacienda Pública Española* 160: 177-210.
- Manresa, A. and F. Sancho (2002) “Implementing a Double Dividend: Recycling Ecotaxes Toward Lower Labor Taxes”. Working Paper CREB 0204.
- Mansur, A. and Whalley, J. (1984). “Numerical Specification of Applied General Equilibrium Models: Estimation, Calibration, and Data”, en *Applied General Equilibrium Analysis*, H. Scarf and J. B. Shoven (eds.): 69-117.
- Mooij, R.A. (1999). “The double dividend of an environmental tax reform”, en J.C.J.M. van der Bergh (ed.) *Handbook of environmental and resource economics*. Edward Elgar.
- Nordhaus, W. (1993). "Optimal greenhouse gas reductions and tax policy in the 'DICE' model" *American Economic Review* 83: 313-317.
- Pearce, D. (1991). “The role of carbon taxes in adjusting to global warming” *Economic Journal* 101: 938-948.
- Parry (1995). “Pollution taxes and revenue recycling” *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management* 29: 64-77.
- Repetto, R., R. Dower, R. Jenkins and J. Geoghegan (1992). “Green fees: How a tax shift can work for the environment and the economy”, *World Resource Institute*, New York.
- Rodríguez, M. (2002). “Reforma fiscal verde y doble dividendo: una revisión de la evidencia empírica”. *Instituto de Estudios Fiscales*, Papeles de Trabajo 27/02.
- Rodríguez, M. (2003). “Imposición Ambiental y Reforma Fiscal Verde. Ensayos Teóricos Y Aplicados” (Environmental Taxation and Green Tax Reform. Theoretical and Applied Essays). Doctoral dissertation. Universidade de Vigo.
- Sancho, F. (1988). “Evaluación del Peso de la Imposición Indirecta en los Precios”, *Hacienda Pública Española* 113: 159-164.
- Scarf, H. and Shoven, J.B. (Eds.) (1984). *Applied General Equilibrium Analysis*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge.

- Shoven, J.B. and Whalley, J. (1992). *Applying General Equilibrium*. Cambridge University Press. New York.
- Sociedad para el Desarrollo Energético de Andalucía, S.A. (SODEAN); Consejería de Economía y Hacienda, Junta de Andalucía (1994). *Plan Energético de Andalucía, 1994-2000*. SODEAN.
- Wender, R. (2001). "An Applied General Equilibrium Model of Environmental Tax Reforms and Pension Policy", *Journal of Policy Modelling* 23: 25-50.
- Xie, J. and S. Saltzman (2000). "Environmental Policy Analysis: An Environmental Computable General-Equilibrium Approach for Developing Countries", *Journal of Policy Modelling* 22(4): 453-489.
- Yang, J. (2001). "Trade Liberalization and Pollution: A General Equilibrium Analysis of Carbon Dioxide Emissions in Taiwan", *Economic Modelling* 18: 435-454.

## APPENDIX

### PRODUCTION

Total production is given by the Cobb-Douglas technology

$$Q_j = \phi_j \left( Xd_j^{\sigma_j}, Xrow_j^{1-\sigma_j} \right) \quad (A1)$$

where  $Q_j$  is total output of sector  $j$ ,  $Xd_j$  stands for domestic output of sector  $j$ ,  $Xrow_j$  stands for foreign output of sector  $j$ ,  $\phi_j$  is the scale parameter of sector  $j$  and  $\sigma_j$  is the elasticity of domestic output.

Domestic production obtains from the Leontief production function

$$Xd_j = \min \left\{ \frac{X_{1j}}{a_{1j}}, \dots, \frac{X_{24j}}{a_{24j}}, \frac{VA_j}{v_j} \right\} \quad (A2)$$

where  $X_{ij}$  is the amount of commodity  $i$  used to produce commodity  $j$ ,  $a_{ij}$ , are the technical coefficients measuring the minimum amount of commodity  $i$  required to get a unit of commodity  $j$ ,  $VA_j$ , stands for the value added of sector  $j$  and  $v_j$  is the technical coefficient measuring the minimum amount of value added required to produce a unit of commodity  $j$ .

Value added in sector  $j$  is obtained from labour and capital according to a Cobb-Douglas technology:

$$VA_j = \mu_j l_j^{\gamma_j} k_j^{1-\gamma_j} \quad (A3)$$

where  $\mu_j$  is the scale parameter of sector  $j$ ,  $\gamma_j$  is the elasticity of labour,  $l_j$  represents the amount of labour employed in sector  $j$  and  $k_j$  represents the amount of capital used in sector  $j$ .

### CONSUMERS

The utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type

$$U (CD_j, SD) = \left( \prod_{j=1}^{24} CD_j^{\alpha_j} \right) SD^{\beta} \quad (A4)$$

where  $CD_j$  stands for consumption of commodity  $j$ ,  $SD$  stands for savings of the consumer and  $\alpha_j$ ,  $\beta$  measure the elasticity of consumption goods and savings.

## **PUBLIC SECTOR**

### **Indirect taxes:**

Taxes on output,  $R_P$ , are calculated as

$$R_P = \sum_{j=1}^{24} \tau_j \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n a_{ij} p_i Xd_j + \left( (1 + EC_j) wl_j + rk_j \right) VA_j \right] \quad (\text{A5})$$

where  $\tau_j$  is the tax rate on the output of sector  $j$  and  $EC_j$  is the Social Security tax rate paid by employees of sector  $j$ .

Social Security paid by employers,  $R_{LF}$ , is given by

$$R_{LF} = \sum_{j=1}^{24} EC_j wl_j VA_j \quad (\text{A6})$$

Tariffs,  $R_T$ , equal

$$R_T = \sum_{j=1}^{24} t_j rowp a_{rwj} Q_j \quad (\text{A7})$$

where  $t_j$  is the tax rate on all the transactions made with foreign sector  $j$ ,  $a_{rwj}$  represent technical coefficients of commodities imported by sector  $j$  and  $rowp$  is a weighted price index of imported good and services.

Environmental tax revenue,  $R_{ECO}$ , is given by the following equation:

$$R_{ECO} = \sum_{j=1}^{24} eco_j \left( 1 + \tau_j \right) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n a_{ij} p_i Xd_j + \left( (1 + EC_j) wl_j + rk_j \right) VA_j \right] + \sum_{j=1}^{24} eco_j \left( 1 + t_j \right) rowp a_{rwj} Q_j \quad (\text{A.8})$$

where  $eco_j$  is the environmental tax on sector  $j$ .

The Value Added Tax revenue,  $R_{VAT}$ , is given by

$$R_{VAT} = \sum_{j=1}^{24} VAT_j \left( 1 + \tau_j \right) \left( 1 + eco_j \right) \left( \sum_{i=1}^{24} a_{ij} p_i Xd_j + \left( (1 + EC_j) wl_j + rk_j \right) VA_j \right) + \sum_{j=1}^{24} VAT_j \left( 1 + t_j \right) \left( 1 + eco_j \right) rowp a_{rwj} Q_j \quad (\text{A.9})$$

where  $VAT_j$  is the tax rate *ad valorem* on (domestic and foreign) commodity  $j$ .

**Direct taxes:**

Social Security tax paid by employers,  $R_{LC}$ , comes from

$$R_{LC} = WC w L \quad (\text{A.10})$$

where  $WC$  is Social Security tax rate for employers.

Income Tax,  $R_I$ , is computed from

$$R_I = DT(wL + rK + cpi TPS + TROW - WC L w) \quad (\text{A.11})$$

where  $DT$  is the income tax rate,  $TPS$  stands for transfers from Public Sector to the consumer (pensions, allowances, social benefits, unemployment benefits, ...) and  $TROW$  stands for transfers from the rest of the world to the consumer.