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Implementing joint ambitions for redevelopment involving cultural heritage: a comparative case study of cooperation strategies

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ABSTRACT

Urban redevelopment projects at brownfield sites are challenging, especially when heritage conservation needs to be integrated into urban development plans. In these processes, close cooperation between various actors is essential to develop and implement plans. However, many projects seem to fail or opportunities are missed. This paper sheds light on the barriers and drivers in the planning process of these projects and shows that cooperation and interaction strategies might enable actors to implement joint ambitions. Therefore, we conducted a comparative case study of 10 urban redevelopment projects involving cultural heritage buildings in the Netherlands. Our results show that there is no standard strategy. Various cooperation arrangements and interaction types are effective in dealing with complicating contextual factors and conflicts in the planning process.

KEYWORDS

Planning process; negotiation; brownfield projects; cultural heritage

Introduction

Planners and developers are increasingly confronted with industrial or military sites that have been decommissioned due to technological, economic or social developments. Many of the industrial or military buildings on those sites are considered to be of cultural-historical value (Janssen et al. 2014). Without a new use, these buildings will fall into decline and cultural-historical value might be lost. To prevent this, heritage conservation needs to be integrated with urban development. Planners, conservationists, private developers and other stakeholders seem to agree on the value of cultural heritage for urban development, but often dispute how to materialize these plans. Finding an optimum cost–benefit balance seems to be difficult in practice.

Nevertheless, close cooperation between various actors is essential to develop and implement plans, as urban redevelopment projects are embedded in dynamic network environments in which different governmental agencies, commercial actors, not-for-profit organizations and residents depend on each other to reshape urban areas (Taylor 2007; Wagenaar 2007; van Meerkerk, Boonstra, and Edelenbos 2012; De Bruijn and Heuvelof 2008; Samsura, Van der Krabben, and Van Deemen 2010; Bult-Spiering, Blanken, and Dewulf 2005). Together, the actors involved have to make decisions about their abilities to act and commit to future actions that will satisfy their interests (Forester 2006). However, actors have various, possibly conflicting, interests (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Shmueli, Kaufman, and Ozawa 2008). This may hinder effective collective action, resulting in impasses and conflicting forms of action (van Rijswick and Salet 2012; Provan and Milward

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2001). Hence, actors must find a way to deal with those conflicts in order to realize the urban redevelopment projects while preserving their heritage.

Collaboration in planning processes is a central theme in urban planning literature. Most scholars emphasize the increasing importance of joint decision-making, communication, collaboration and interaction, aiming for better consensus-building processes (Minnery 2007; Susskind 2008; Innes and Booher 2010; Pløger 2004; Ruming 2012; Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002b; Connelly and Richardson 2004; de Roo and Silva 2010; Healey 1997; Innes 1995, 2004; Innes and Booher 1999). Planning scholars recognize actor differences, interdependency, and the need for resources, skills and careful process design to craft joint decision-making with abilities for implementation (Shmueli, Kaufman, and Ozawa 2008). However, there are little empirical data about what types of strategies in network settings matter the most (Klijn, Steijn, and Edelenbos 2010). Especially for urban redevelopment projects, there are few studies that compare interaction processes that work to those that do not (Lange and McNeil 2004; Shmueli, Kaufman, and Ozawa 2008; Blokhuis et al. 2012). Therefore, the aim of this paper is to give insights into the project and process characteristics that serve as barriers and drivers of urban redevelopment projects including reuse of cultural heritage objects. Furthermore, the paper aims to identify cooperation and interaction strategies that might enable actors to implement joint ambitions in this setting. These insights are based on a comparative case study of 10 urban redevelopment projects with buildings of cultural-historical value in the Netherlands.

In the paper, we first discuss the characteristics of urban redevelopment projects involving cultural heritage and identify the possible barriers and drivers that include context and project characteristics. Second, we reflect on how actors could deal with the complexity of the projects and their conflicting interests according to approaches derived from planning theory. This results in a basic framework used to analyse the case studies, which we first discuss together with our research methodology. In the fourth section, we introduce the 10 cases by describing the perceived challenges, which actors were involved, how they organized the cooperation, the interaction among actors and the expected impact of those strategies according to the problem owners. In the final section, we provide a discussion and conclusions.

Challenging and easing characteristics of redevelopment projects where cultural heritage is concerned

Urban redevelopment projects at brownfield sites are challenging. These areas have been used before, and may now be vacant, derelict and contaminated. A brownfield site is not available for new uses without physical intervention (Glumac, Han, and Schaefer 2015). Site-specific characteristics, such as contaminated soil, fragmented ownership, inadequate infrastructure and high remediation costs, might complicate urban redevelopment projects at brownfield sites (Otsuka, Dixon, and Abe 2013). Projects are often delayed or unsuccessful due to the necessity to deal with physical, legal and financial aspects simultaneously (Glumac, Han, and Schaefer 2015). Government intervention to assemble land and install essential infrastructure might help to make the sites economically viable for private developers and to start the redevelopment (Davison and Legacy 2014). This is especially prevalent in projects that also involve the adaptive reuse of cultural heritage buildings. Heritage conservation can act as inspiration or catalyst for urban redevelopment and become a strategy for place-making and economic development (Su 2010; Thorkildsen and Ekman 2013; Murzyn-Kupisz 2013), but also adds to the complexity of the project. For example, because investments in heritage preservation are high (Shipley, Utz, and Parsons 2006) and the economic context of decision-making regarding heritage is often unclear, projects may be unattractive for many developers who expect a return on their investments (Elsorady 2014).

To overcome financial difficulties, governments usually subsidize the preservation of cultural-historical objects, as an incentive to start urban redevelopment projects (Alfredson and Cungu 2008). However, governments have been facing shrinking public budgets and public entities are

increasingly dependent on private capital to fund their spatial ambitions. Additionally, financing spatial and development plans has become harder, as economic growth is no longer taken for granted since the economic crisis in 2008 (Janssen et al. 2014). Hence, public and private actors are searching for alternative ways to fund heritage preservation and implement joint ambitions.

Due to the financial, organizational and technical complexity of the project, resources from various actors are needed. There are four crucial resources: authority, finances, land ownership and specific knowledge and skills (De Kort 2009; De Bruijn and Heuvelof 2008; Walter and Scholz 2007). Actors possessing these resources are important for decision-making and can be seen as key stakeholders in a project (Albrechts 2013). Albrechts (2013) further argues that the way actors are excluded or included in planning processes and the way the relationship between actors is organized are of crucial importance in planning. Roles and responsibilities may differ per project. Successful support of and interaction with actors is crucial for the successful implementation of joint ambitions (Ogu 2000; De Graaf and Dewulf 2010). Moreover, the actor who takes the initiative is important since a process needs leadership to get started; someone has to have the idea and ability to engage other leaders and find resources to fund ambitions (Innes and Booher 2010). The leading actor has the power to involve others and – indirectly – influence roles and responsibilities.

Dealing with the contextual challenges in planning and negotiation processes

The characteristics of urban redevelopment projects of cultural heritage significance require cooperation between planners, conservationists, private developers and other stakeholders. Decision-making in this context is difficult, as the projects involve multiple interrelated issues (Samsura, Van der Krabben, and Van Deemen 2010; Shmueli, Kaufman, and Ozawa 2008). Furthermore, planning issues are often fuzzy, full of uncertainties and complications throughout the various stages of the planning processes (de Roo, Hillier, and Van Wezemael 2012). Actors face situations where their different individual goals may come into conflict with common goals, interests and values. For example, actors perceive the value of heritage buildings differently: private developers emphasize the economic value, conservationists the cultural-historical value, the aesthetic quality or the community identity and citizens often focus on the attractiveness for the neighbourhood. In such a setting, conflicts between actors are likely to occur. Finding ways to deal with these conflicts is crucial in order to bring a planning process forward and implement spatial plans.

Dealing with conflicts, complexity and uncertainty is a central theme in planning literature. Some schools of planning focus on land-use decisions while others are more concerned about the decision-making process than about the decisions themselves (Connell 2010). Traditionally, spatial planning had a strong focus on the physical planning result. Emphasis was on the development of an extensive spatial blueprint plan (Healey 2003). Nowadays, planning approaches focus more on the interaction, participation, mutual learning, communication and interaction of various stakeholders involved in the planning process (Allmendinger and Tewdwr-Jones 2002a; Connelly and Richardson 2004; de Roo and Silva 2010; Healey 1997; Innes 1995, 2004; Innes and Booher 1999). Proponents of communicative planning argue that conflicts and power differences are resolvable through empowerment, inclusion, open and fair dialogue, trust and mutual learning (Healey 1997; Innes and Booher 1999). Others assume that power, persuasion and strategic behaviour intrinsically form part of the relationship between actors in a network environment and that interaction is an exercise of power using strategic arguments and debate (Flyvbjerg 2002; Flyvbjerg and Richardson 2002; Fox-Rogers and Murphy 2014; Pløger 2004; Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998; Hillier 2003; Sager 2013). These two planning perspectives are often presented as incompatible. However, dialogue for consensus and debate on conflicts can also be seen as two sides of interaction that are both needed to implement joint ambitions. Actors must learn, in part from each other, what is jointly possible and desirable, and at the same time, they must seek to advance their individual interests. This process can be seen as a negotiation process (Lax and Sebenius 1986). Negotiations differ from dialogue or debate. Through negotiation, actors seek agreement upon practical action, while through dialogue,

actors only seek understanding and meaning and through debate, actors try to get what they want (Forester 2008). Hence, the focus is on negotiation interactions that contribute to an implementable plan. In a negotiation process, actors need to deal with the intertwined processes of, on the one hand, competition between actors and their conflicting values, and, on the other hand, a more cooperative process of mutual learning. The cooperative process, also referred to as integrative negotiation or a strategy focusing on creating value, is the mutual process of discovering the other actors' interests, developing new and often wider problem definitions, employing problem-solving behaviour and searching for ways to increase the total benefit (Der Foo et al. 2004; Leeuwis 2000; Sebenius 1992). In contrast, competitive process, also called distributive negotiation or claiming value strategy, refers to dividing or apportioning scarce and fixed resources among the negotiators (Sebenius 1992; Thompson, Wang, and Gunia 2010). Balancing cooperation with competition processes might result in a mutually beneficial agreement that satisfies both collective and individual interests.

Several scholars argue that it is worth paying more attention to these conflict and negotiation dynamics in planning practice (Blokhuys et al. 2012; Fuller 2011; Ruming 2012; Shin 2010; Shmueli, Kaufman, and Ozawa 2008). Ruming (2012) argues that negotiation is essential in realizing development gains and public interests, as the implementation of plans seems to depend on successful negotiations. Also, Forester (2009) argues that if actors are in conflict, negotiation can provide a strong basis for implementing plans and satisfying individual and collective interests. Forester (2009) argues that working carefully to identify underlying interests and to satisfy diverse actors' interests can protect against the risk of 'good process, bad outcome' because together actors can focus on the achievable outcomes and compare them to their best alternatives. If actors do not expect the outcome to be superior to their personal preferred alternative, then interactions might reach an impasse and actors might use their power to block the process (van Rijswijk and Salet 2012). Susskind (2008) argues that agreements will only be strong enough to be implemented when parties feel that their core interests have been met, the process has been fair and everything possible has been done to maximize joint gains. For successful implementation, actor satisfaction is crucial to keep actors committed to the joint ambitions and prevent opting out or even blocking the process. Literature on network management explains that multi-actor processes should be evaluated in actor-specific or process-oriented terms (De Bruijn and Heuvelof 2008; De Kort 2009; De Graaf 2005). Hence, a careful design of cooperation and negotiations is important to deal with the challenges of implementing joint ambitions in urban redevelopment projects involving cultural heritage.

Building on Forester (2009) and Susskind (2008), we studied the impact these negotiation processes have on the implementation and the satisfaction of interests. Outcomes of these negotiation processes are agreements, arrangements of formal cooperation aspects and distributions of costs, benefits and risks. Furthermore, since the thrust of this study is to analyse the redevelopment of heritage projects, we paid specific attention to what extent heritage was safeguarded. Besides these formal outcomes, we build on Forester (2009) and Susskind (2008) by analysing the extent to which interests were safeguarded.

To summarize, contextual, project-related and process characteristics impact the successful implementation of joint ambitions. Based on the discussed literature, we developed a framework that allows us to focus on these outlined characteristics and to understand and interpret certain actions. In other words, it serves as guidance for prioritizing in data collection and data analysis (Hutjes and van Buuren 1992; Yin 2003), but is not meant to condition the research in any way (Eisenhardt 1989). In Figure 1, our framework for data collection and analysis is summarized.

Research method

To study the impact of the negotiation strategies on the project outcomes, we undertook a comparative case study of 10 projects, including analysing the context, project characteristics and cooperation and negotiation strategies. As most projects were still in the planning or construction phase, we were not able to assess the final outcomes. Hence, we focused on the implementation of a joint ambition.




Figure 1. Framework.

Outputs of the planning process are the (formal) cooperation agreement and the cost/benefit balance. Besides, we asked the problem owner, as initiator of the planning process, if he was satisfied with the agreement. Because our focus was on cultural heritage projects, it was also important to analyse the importance of the reuse of heritage in the final agreement. Using multiple case studies makes it possible to gain insights in the different cases and capture the complexity, and to produce some level of generalization (Rihoux 2006).

Case selection

To understand the barriers and drivers in urban redevelopment projects with heritage concerns, it is important to clarify the deeper causes behind related problems and consequences. As random samples are seldom able to produce this kind of insight, it is appropriate to select cases chosen for their validity (Flyvbjerg 2006). Eisenhardt (1989) indicates that linkages between qualitative variables or indicators can be achieved using a cross-case analysis of 5–10 case studies. We therefore selected 10 urban redevelopment projects with heritage concerns in the Netherlands. Case selection was based on the following criteria: (1) redevelopment of an entire area instead of a single building; (2) one or more buildings in the area are considered to be of cultural-historical value, and transformation of these buildings is considered desirable; (3) development for multiple new uses; (4) located in an urban area and (5) the project is at the end of the planning stage or in the active realization stage. Side conditions were access to relevant documentation and the willingness of interviewees to cooperate.

The Dutch cases are of interest, as cooperation between public and private actors has become increasingly important in planning projects. Roles are changing due to the decrease in public finances and increase of development risks in recent years. The public sector has always been very dominant

and active in planning practice (Gerrits, Rauws, and de Roo 2012; Heurkens and Hobma 2014). Traditionally, municipalities were pro-active as initiators, coordinators and risk-bearing investors in greenfield and brownfield development, and regulated land through detailed land-use plans (Van der Krabben and Jacobs 2013; Van der Krabben and Needham 2008). However, today, public bodies increasingly depend on private capital to fund their spatial development ambitions. This had led new actors to search for new strategies to cooperate, finance and implement spatial plans.

Data collection

For each case, we interviewed the project manager of the leading organization in the urban redevelopment project in 2011. The leading actor is defined as the one that took initiative for the redevelopment interventions and actively obtained land and/or heritage buildings in the area. This stakeholder will be most affected if planning processes fail and no (financial) agreement is made to implement plans, as they will have to invest without fully counterbalancing their expenses or accept the decline of the heritage buildings and the area. Furthermore, they take the initiative to shape the cooperation. Besides, an extensive document analysis was executed. Among other documents, master plans, decision-making documents of the city council, studies of the cultural-historical elements and progress reports were studied for each project. The interviews were semi structured, following the building blocks of our framework: project characteristics process and implementation of joint ambitions. For the project characteristics, we asked about the site specifics, cause and objective of the project and difficulties experienced. Furthermore, we focused on the key actors involved: their roles, perceptions, and resources and formal organization structure. To gather insight into whether the process was integrated or distributive, we asked: what was striking and typical in the cooperation, interaction and attitude of actors; the extent to which actors were willing to learn, share information, communicate openly, hold on to positions, search for new solutions and were willing to take risks. The last part of the interview focused on the impact of the negotiation processes by asking to what extent objectives were achieved, and more specifically the role of the heritage concerns. If the problem owner was satisfied on the agreements on costs and benefits and how costs, benefits and risks were distributed. We then triangulated the interview results with the outcomes of the documentation analysis.

Data analysis

We first conducted a within case study for each project, coding the data of the interviews and documents and summarizing this qualitative data in a table that included the context, project, process and outcome characteristics of our framework. We categorized each project as either generally 'integrative' or 'distributive'. If the interviewee described the process along the lines of 'working together/ having a shared aim/ open communication/ sharing information/ learning/ willing to change perceptions/ mutual trust', then we indicated the level of negotiation as generally 'integrative'. If the process was described by the interviewee as being focused on 'self-interests/ hard communication/ limited sharing of information/ holding on to own perceptions/ non-flexible/ not willing to learn or change/ distrust', we labelled the process as 'distributive'. Second, in order compare the 10 projects, we simplified the table by summarizing the data of the building blocks in a few words. Such analysis details the specific conditions under which a finding will occur and it also helps to form more general categories of how conditions may be related (Miles and Huberman 1994). Third, we looked at possible relations among the various building blocks in our analytical framework, to give a first insight into what might work to implement joint ambitions.

Context, project and process characteristics of the 10 urban redevelopment projects

The case analysis is presented in Table 1. A short description of the case study is described in this section.

Table 1. Project characteristics.

		Project characteristics											
		Key stakeholders + role				Negotiation process				Implementation of joint ambitions			
Project complexity**	Actor	Role	Responsibility (costs & risks of..)	High level of sharing	Conflicts	Type of negotiation	Indicated process drivers by interviewee	Cooperation agreement?	Balancing costs and benefits?	Reuse heritage important?	Problem owner satisfied?		
Enka Ede	High	Municipality Private developer*	Advisor Landowner, developer	- Total development, including reuse of heritage	No	Changing starting points Financing reuse of heritage preservation Detailing masterplan	<i>Distributive</i> holding on to positions, distrust, not sharing information openly	Clear arrangements on content and process Individual drive to succeed and political commitment High ambitions Search for creative solutions Clear responsibilities	Yes	No	Partly	Partly (ambition level not achieved)	
Roer-delta	High	Municipality Private developers*	Initiator, landowner at start project. Contracted private developer and sold land Landowner, development real estate	Public park Development of real estate	No	Financing ground sanitation Finding new use and financing reuse of heritage buildings Amount and density of housing	<i>Integrative</i> shared ambition, problem-solving, trust	Clear ambition Search for creative solutions Collaboration with various actors (with different expertise) Willing to take risks Political commitment	Yes	No	Partly	Yes	
Dru Industriepark	High	Municipality* Heritage developer Housing corporation Private developer	Initiator, landowner Owner of heritage buildings Reuse of heritage buildings Real estate development	Redevelopment of total area Transformation of some heritage buildings Transformation of some heritage buildings Real estate development	Yes	Changing starting points Distribution of costs and benefits Reuse of the heritage buildings	<i>Integrative</i> shared ambition, flexible, searching for new solutions, trust	Clear ambition Search for creative solutions Collaboration with various actors (with different expertise) Willing to take risks Political commitment	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	
Indië-terrein	Low	Private developer*	Initiator, land-owner, developers	Total area redevelopment	No	Reuse of heritage buildings	x passive municipality	Clear responsibilities Flexible collaboration with various actors Temporary use Involving more actors Having a clear ambition to guide quality Take time and temporary use	No	Yes (1 owner)	Partly	Partly (ambition level not achieved)	
Scheldewijk	High	Municipality* Several private developers and housing corporation	Initiator, land-owner Advisor for revised vision, real estate development	Total area redevelopment Parts of real estate development	No	Financing reuse of heritage buildings Finding new uses for the buildings Changing masterplan (flexibility vs. control)	<i>Integrative</i> trying to be flexible, cooperative	Clear responsibilities Involving more actors Know and respect each others interests Temporary use	No	No	Yes	Partly (ambition level not achieved)	
Strijp 5	Med	Municipality* Private developer* Housing corporation	PPP: both 50% landowner and responsible for 50% of development Owner of heritage buildings	Area redevelopment Reuse heritage buildings	Yes	Balancing costs and benefits Authority and roles of actors Detailing masterplan (flexibility)	<i>Distributive</i> -> <i>Integrative</i> holding on to positions, distrust -> search for new solutions, flexible	Clear responsibilities Involving more actors Know and respect each others interests Temporary use	Yes	Yes (PPP)	Yes	Partly (ambition level not achieved)	

(Continued)

Table 1. Continued.

		Project characteristics				Negotiation process			Implementation of joint ambitions			
		Key stakeholders + role		Responsibility (costs & risks of...)	High level of sharing	Conflicts	Type of negotiation	Indicated process drivers by interviewee	Cooperation agreement?	Balancing costs and benefits?	Reuse heritage important?	Problem owner satisfied?
Project complexity**	Actor	Role										
De Hallen	Low	Municipality (1)	Initiator, landowner	Area redevelopment	No	Ambiguous starting points	<i>Distributive -> Integrative</i>	Clear responsibilities Community involvement Cooperation based on trust, decisiveness and openness	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
		Community foundation* (2) Private developer	Leaseholder, developer Developer	Reuse of heritage buildings Real estate development		Balancing costs and benefits						
NDSM	High	Municipality*	Initiator, landowner, developer	Area redevelopment	No	Changing real estate strategy	<i>Integrative</i>	Temporary use: creating liveliness Political commitment	Yes	No	Yes	Partly (progress disappointing)
		Several private developer	Developers, lease-holders	Real estate development, reuse of heritage buildings		Dealing with uncertainty						
Over- hoeks	Low	Municipality*	Landowner, management	Area redevelopment	No	Dealing with uncertainty	<i>Integrative -> Distributive</i>	Temporary use	Yes	No	Partly	Partly
		Private developers	Developer	Real estate development		Sharing risks						
Stads- houders- park	Low	Municipality*	Landowner	Real estate development	Yes	Changing masterplan and realization	<i>Integrative & Distributive</i>	Flexibility in plans Clear ambitions Continuity of involved experts	Yes	No	Partly	Partly (ambition level not achieved)
		Private developer Housing corporation Leading actor*	Real estate development Real estate development	Real estate development Real estate development		Real estate development Real estate development						

High: 3 / 4 'yes' out of ...

Med: 2 'yes' out of ...

Low: 0/1 'yes' out of ...

... following questions: area size >25 ha; soil heavily polluted?; many heritage buildings?; poor maintenance of buildings?

Enka Ede involves the redevelopment of an area formerly used by an artificial silk manufacturer, built around 1922. The 42 ha site is located between the city centre of Ede and the nature reserve 'de Veluwe'. In 2002, the factory closed down, leaving the premises disused and the ground heavily polluted. In 2003, a private developer bought the site with the aim of realizing a multi-functional residential development of 1400 houses. A year later, some of the buildings were listed – with support from the municipality – and others were protected by a covenant, which implied that the private developer also had to consider appropriate redevelopment of the heritage buildings present on the site. This had a large impact on the estimated for land development costs, causing a delay in the planning process. In 2009, a masterplan that both the private developer and the municipality agreed upon was formulated. A cooperation agreement was signed, which determined the mix of housing 'types', the finances and responsibilities of the open spaces and infrastructure, and the planning process itself. No alternatives to this masterplan were discussed. Conflict ensued between the private developer and municipality about how to finance the redevelopment of cultural heritage buildings occurred leading to a high level of distrust. As the actors were primarily focused on safeguarding their own interests, the case embodied a compromise between conflicting interests and can thus be characterized as 'distributive'.

The *Roerdelta (ECI)* project involved the redevelopment of a 54 ha large area between the city centre of Roermond and the river Maas. One large complex, including a hydroelectric power station of a former chemical industry company, is located at the centre of the site. The complex has been vacant since 1970. The municipality bought the area with the ambition of developing it for residential use. In 2011, a private developer was selected to develop the area at its own risk, but the municipality remained involved, as they were responsible for the rezoning. The municipality negotiated on the density and type of housing. Large parts of the site were found to be heavily polluted, which was one of the main difficulties to overcome. The costs associated with the decontamination necessary to transform the buildings into residential housing were too high, so the municipality decided to instead develop a city park. This change in plans had a large impact on the possible return on investment, which complicated the project. After tough negotiations, the municipality agreed to cover the shortfall in budget. A cooperation agreement was signed, and in 2011, the transformation of the ECI complex and the pre-selling of the houses started. After this period of distributive negotiation, the process became more integrative as actors searched together for new solutions and the level of trust among partners increased. The ambition was to realize a green residential area, with a large park and a cultural and creative meeting point in the ECI Complex.

Dru Industriepark is located in Ulft, a village surrounded by green. From 1850 to 2003, the 14 ha area was used as an iron foundry for bathtubs, stoves and casseroles. In 1999, the buildings did not meet production standards anymore and in 2003, the factory closed down, leaving the soil heavily polluted and the buildings in poorly maintained state. This was one (again) of the main project difficulties to overcome. Nonetheless, the municipality started to launch redevelopment plans and bought the area. The buildings were considered to be of cultural-historical value by the community and relevant experts, and seven buildings were listed as heritage buildings in 2002. The main aim shifted from the demolition of the old buildings and new development to preserving and reusing the seven heritage buildings, in order to realize an area in which to live, work and play. However, finding a suitable new use for each building that would cover the restoration costs was another big challenge. As a solution, the buildings were sold for 1 euro to a specialized heritage developer who proceeded to transform the heritage buildings. In 2004, a cooperation agreement between the partners was signed. In general, the cooperation went well, although conflicts arose due to the change in starting points: the municipality demanded lower density of housing, creating a deficit in the land estimate. The others responded by claiming that the municipality should cover the shortage in the budget. Overall, the negotiation process can be considered as integrative since the partners shared a common vision and the process was open and transparent. This led to an agreement and high level of satisfaction among the different parties involved. The heritage buildings were rescued.

The *Indiëterrein* in Almelo is an area of 23 ha located near the city centre. The area was formerly used by a textile company. Production at the site peaked in the 1970s but dropped swiftly after. The remaining buildings, dating from around 1920, were not listed but were considered to be of cultural-historical value. While some of the buildings were still in use by textiles-related companies, a private developer bought the site. Their aim was to realize a new green city quarter with housing and working possibilities and reuse some of the former industrial buildings – such as the water tower, arched buildings and saw tooth rooftop buildings – for a distinctive character. This was laid down in a general masterplan, with the flexibility to adjust details to the current need. The municipality was not actively involved, only acting as an authority and testing the plans. The developer was confronted with stagnation in the real estate market, and a consequent increase of the financial risk. A temporary use of the buildings by individuals or small companies was seen as a solution. Due to the passive role of the municipality, no agreement has been signed and the ambition was only partly reached.

Scheldekwartier (KSG) is a former shipbuilding yard of 32 ha between the city centre of Vlissingen and the harbour. Since 2000, the shipbuilding activities have been relocated to the eastern side of Vlissingen and the yard has been disused. Several large buildings were demolished; however, four buildings, the docks and a crane were listed as important heritage structures. Plans for redevelopment started in 2003 when the municipality bought the site. The municipality's ambition was to create a new city district with a unique waterfront and mixed use, including cultural activities in the heritage buildings. The area was divided into several subareas. For one of these subareas, the municipality selected a private developer to build private residences and aimed to contract others for the development of the remaining subareas. However, progress stagnated due to falling prices real estate market. Private developers were no longer willing to invest. Because finding new uses for the heritage buildings was such a challenge, temporary uses and cultural activities were encouraged, as the municipality hoped that this would act as a boost for future redevelopment. However, the high ambitions appeared too hard to achieve and the municipality was forced to revise the masterplan. In order to do so, they consulted several private developers and a Housing Corporation to create a more flexible plan. The municipality was open and flexible to new solutions. The process was generally integrative but has not yet resulted in an agreement. Although the ambitious plan has not been realized, the problem owner was satisfied.

Strijp S concerns the redevelopment of a former industrial area of 27 ha in the city of Eindhoven. The area consists mainly of large industrial complexes built around 1928, which were formerly used for the manufacturing of radios and televisions. Seven of these large buildings are listed as heritage buildings. In 2001, the company Philips wanted to sell the site to a private developer who planned to move their business activities there. However, the municipality wanted to be actively involved and together with Philips, they selected a private developer through a European competitive tender. The private developer and municipality established a joint venture in 2002. Both are 50% landowners and have 50% responsible for the development of the area. Together, they drew up a masterplan to transform the site into a new, dynamic and creative urban district to live, work and play. A third party, a housing cooperation, bought some of the heritage buildings and facilitated their reuse – sometimes temporarily – for cultural activities and small offices. Two other buildings were transformed into lofts and working spaces. The heritage buildings were first perceived as a threat by the private developer, but were ultimately the key to a successful development, making temporary use possible and adding to the attractiveness of the area. The economic crisis led to many conflicts regarding the balancing of costs and benefits. First, the various parties stuck to their positions leading to a distributive negotiation process. However, as it progressed, the project shifted towards a more integrative process with partners searching jointly for new solutions, sharing information and being willing to compromise. The masterplan was revised, with more flexibility in its stipulations. Although progress slowed down, the project continued and the area became a popular place to live, work and play in Eindhoven. *Strijp S* is a clear example of a PPP where partners shared both costs and benefits of the project.

The De Hallen redevelopment includes the transformation of a former tram depot and maintenance place, and the creation of 400 houses in the western part of the city of Amsterdam. In total, the area is 16 ha. The former tram depot is characterized by large halls of around 100 m long with saw tooth roofs. In 1996, the area was abandoned and handed over to the municipality. Separate from planning for these halls, a private developer was selected to develop a new area of housing. For the halls, several redevelopment plans were made by various actors over the years, but due to political changes and financial shortcomings, none was implemented. Negotiations were distributive. In 2011, the municipality started a new process, giving new clear boundaries and starting points, resulting in a more integrative process. This led to an agreement and a satisfied solution. The municipality selected a community foundation that had ambitions to reuse the heritage buildings as a lively meeting place in which food and handicrafts played an important role. They leased the land and were responsible for the redevelopment.

The *NDSM* yard – of 43 ha land and 25 ha water – is the former location of the shipbuilding company NDSM at the Northern IJ-bank in Amsterdam. In 1984, NDSM went bankrupt and the yard became unused. Since this time, many plans have been made for the site, all of which aimed to preserve its heritage listing, including for the ensemble of large halls – built between 1920 and 1957 –, cranes, slips and docks. High investments costs, due to the heavily polluted ground and deteriorating buildings, hindered implementation. Nonetheless, buildings were temporarily used by artists, creative entrepreneurs and small companies. In 2003, a new plan to redevelop the site was presented by the municipality, which aimed to transform the area into a creative and cultural hotspot, with mixed uses, giving opportunities to all kind of private initiatives. The municipality led the plans and leased the land to new users. MTV Networks was the first company to move into one of the heritage buildings. This was in 2007. Other buildings were temporarily used for indoor-skating, bars and small offices for creative entrepreneurs. Despite the process being heavily steered by the municipality, which acted as the regulator, developer and legislator, the process can be characterized as integrative, and it led to an agreement. The municipality was satisfied by the end result, but was disappointed about the slow progress.

Overhoeks is an area of 27 ha located at the Northern IJ-bank in Amsterdam. Oil Company Shell used the area for research and office space. They clustered their activities and sold most of the area to the municipality, including their former head office in a large architectural distinctive tower. Except from the tower on the site, all buildings were planned to be demolished. A private developer was contracted by the municipality for the development of the area and to lease the land. The private developer contracted a housing corporation and real estate investor to purchase houses. The aim was to create a mixed-use area with private and rental housing, office space, shops, restaurants and bars. The declining real estate market increased uncertainties, and complicated the cooperation, as all were not willing to take more risks. This slowed progress and negotiations became more distributive, as each actor strongly held to their own position, not willing to change or become more flexible. As a temporary solution, some of the buildings were transformed into offices for creative entrepreneurs. The early phases can be characterized as integrative but changed into a more distributive process. An agreement was eventually signed, but some heritage buildings were demolished and the problem owner was only partly satisfied.

Stadhouderspark Vught (38 ha) concerns the redevelopment of former military barracks and the surrounding terrain in the northern part of Vught. In 2000, the barracks closed and the municipality bought the site from central government. The ambition was to transform the site into a green and spacious residential area of approximately 650 houses, including various facilities such as a school, a bar and a health centre. Various buildings of the former barracks were considered to be of cultural-historical valuable and were transformed into rental apartments. Others were demolished based on their location and limited possibilities for redevelopment and use. In 2006, the municipality contracted a private developer and housing corporation for the real estate development. Despite a declining real estate market, the parties involved showed little flexibility which made the cooperation between actors hard and distributive. Nevertheless, the parties

came to an agreement and the first phase has been realized. But, other parts of development plan were postponed due to the stagnating real estate market leading to dissatisfaction about the progress of the project.

In Table 1, the project characteristics related to the complexity, the process characteristics and outcomes are summarized.

Cross-case analysis

The outcomes of the various processes were more or less similar. In almost all projects – except for Indiëterrein and Scheldekwartier – public and private actors signed a cooperation agreement that arranged ambitions, responsibilities, roles and the distribution of risks, costs and benefits. The reuse of the heritage buildings and the distribution of costs and benefits were an integral part of the agreements. The balancing of costs and benefits was limited in the projects, except for Strijp S with a joint venture and Indiëterrein with one owner. Costs and benefits were not transferred between various elements of the urban redevelopment project. Each actor developed their own part of the project – housing, heritage, public spaces – at their own costs and risks. Consequently, high investments for the redevelopment and use of heritage buildings were not counterbalanced through the distribution of new housing profits. Nonetheless, almost all interviewees indicated that they were satisfied so far, and they expected the projects to succeed, although certain conditions still needed to be fulfilled, such as selling the houses. The lack of counterbalancing costs and benefits or type of process did not seem to affect the satisfaction of the problem owner. The need to redevelop the area and prevent deterioration of the heritage buildings and the area appeared to be more important than counterbalancing costs and benefits and apparently, no attractive alternative existed. Furthermore, heritage building preservation was a precondition for the urban redevelopment as one or more buildings were listed (in each case). Moreover, in many cases, the key stakeholders also committed themselves to preserving non-listed cultural-historical buildings. Often, the municipalities invested in heritage buildings, even though a sound business case for the heritage buildings was hard to make. For them, heritage preservation outweighed the necessity to counterbalance investments. Private parties only seemed motivated to invest in heritage when preservation led to higher real estate prices. The variety of interests and goals gave rise to many differences of opinion during the process.

The nature of the conflict was similar in all projects, and related to the project complexity caused by ground pollution, the poorly maintained state of the heritage buildings, difficulties in finding suitable new uses that cover the high initial investment needed to redevelop the heritage buildings, and uncertainty about future revenues in a changing/declining real estate market. In most cases, the interviewees indicated that financing the decontamination of the soil and preservation of the heritage buildings were the main topics of conflict between key stakeholders – who pays for what, and who benefits? Other main topics of conflict were related to e.g. changing circumstances, ambiguous preconditions and the need to revise the initial masterplan. For example, in one project, the buildings of cultural-historical value were listed after a private developer bought the area with the intention of demolishing the old buildings and building new houses. The original plan and cost estimates had to be changed, causing an unforeseen deficit in the project finances. In addition, during the planning stage of all projects, political and economic circumstances changed. Former expectations on real estate sales and prices did not match the changed reality and actors had to revise and renegotiate redevelopment programme and financial arrangements. Revising the masterplans created a financial deficit in most projects. Debates took place on who should accept the loss and how plans could be adjusted without detrimentally affecting the quality of the redevelopment.

How actors dealt with these conflicts during negotiations varied. In half of the projects, the negotiation processes can be indicated as integrative, and in the other projects, as more distributive. A description of integrative negotiations was given by one of the interviewees as:

Most decisions and ideas are not written down, but all actors are keeping their promise and are committed. [...] They are willing to change their perceptions and slightly change the plan if needed. They come up with new ideas. It's not laughed at but elaborated on, and others will offer their help.

Despite conflicting interests, shared ambition guided the process, and actors were open to new ideas as well as the ideas of others. However, in some projects, individual interests remained paramount, and stakeholder acted strongly competitively, resulting in distributive negotiations. An interviewee described this along the lines of: 'Some people search for new opportunities, but many hold on to their own ideas and perceptions. Especially in the discussion towards finding new uses for the heritage'.

Although in some projects the negotiation seemed more integrative or distributive (or vice versa), in all projects, the negotiation processes had both distributive and integrative characteristics. Cooperative and competitive elements manifested themselves in the process, as actors aimed at satisfying both shared and individual interests. One interviewee stated: 'Everybody was dedicated to working together. However, at the same time it was very clear what the individual interests were. And that's a barrier, but it also makes sense.' Especially when context changed and plans had to be revised, individual interests guided actions.

In conclusion, the cross-case analysis did not show a clear relation between the negotiation strategies and the expected success of project implementation. Despite similarities in terms of contextual and project characteristics, processes were organized quite differently and emerging conflicts were overcome by both integrative and distributive negotiation strategies. The findings do not suggest that the negotiation strategy affects any of the criteria used for the (expected) success of project implementation. However, when asked directly, interviewees indicated that knowing and respecting the interest of others, willingness to cooperate and bring the project forward, mutual trust and listening were essential drivers in the process of negotiation.

Conclusion and discussion

The redevelopment of urban areas involving the reuse of cultural heritage objects is considered valuable from various perspectives. However, these projects are challenging and many seem to fail or opportunities are missed. Therefore, we aimed to give insights into project and process barriers and drivers in this particular type of urban redevelopment project. Furthermore, we sought to identify which cooperation and interaction strategies might enable actors to move from joint ambitions to a plan implementation.

The findings showed that contextual characteristics like soil pollution and poor maintenance conditions significantly complicated implementing redevelopment ambitions. Initial investments were high and coming to agreement on the related costs and benefits appeared to be one of the main topics of conflict, as financial revenues were uncertain, partly due to economic crisis and the declining real estate market. Adapting to changes in circumstances was a key topic in all processes. It called upon the flexibility and creativity of actors to find new solutions and ways to finance and implement the projects. In some projects, the involvement of a third party was the key, bringing in new ideas, resources, knowledge and skills. To create maximum value and joint gains, Lax and Sebenius (2002) argue that it is important to use the 'power of differences' since it is between the differences the opportunity exists to realize joint value. However, involving more actors also implies more pushing and pulling on the demands and interests that need to be included in the ambition. Furthermore, changing plans was hard due to previously made binding agreements among actors, including high ambitions laid out in masterplans. The inherent tension between various interests of the involved actors meant that actors had to make trade-offs between one interest and another, for example, between safeguarding substantive interests such as heritage preservation and the associated costs. Finding a balance between being flexible and at the same time controlling quality standards and ambitions is a struggle in planning (Tasan-Kok 2008). But, flexibility is increasingly important and negotiations are inevitable (Ruming 2012).

The projects did not show a standard strategy to deal with conflicts. Despite the similar context and project characteristics, cooperation and interaction strategies varied. Both public and private actors took leading roles, and cooperation was arranged from informal to formal public private partnerships. Some negotiations were more integrative and others more distributive, depending on what happened at a certain moment and with whom actors dealt. But, in all projects, the negotiations were dynamic and both integrative and distributive negotiations were needed to deal with challenges in the project and to overcome conflicts. In general, it seems that actors balance between making 'hard' deals to safeguard their individual interests, and 'soft' cooperation, by means of trust, willingness to share and be open to new ideas, to make sure that the collective plan is realized. The findings support the idea that negotiation in planning processes is valuable to implement plans and that planning is neither solely about finding consensus, nor about a powerplay and maximizing personal benefits. In reality, interaction in planning processes seems to lie somewhere in the middle. It appears that it is the dynamics of integrative and distributive processes that count and how flexible actors are to adapt to the changing – contextual – circumstances. The results suggest that the sequence of events is essential in understanding the negotiation processes in heritage projects in detail. Since negotiation will become increasingly relevant in an uncertain context, there is a need to study these processes more in depth and longitudinally.

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