

Two Worlds Apart

The Divergence of National and Local Immigrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands

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Immigrant integration has become an intractable policy controversy in the Netherlands. One facet of this controversy involves the different ways in which immigrant integration has been framed by national and local governments. National government has formulated a “citizenship approach” to immigrant integration, whereas local governments often chose a more accommodative approach to migrant groups. In this article, the authors argue that this discrepancy originates from the divergent institutional logic of national and local integration policies. National integration policies have resulted from belief in strong central policy coordination, a sharp turn from depoliticization to politicization, responsiveness to a series of focus events, and mood swings during the past decades. Local integration policies, in contrast, are characterized by a considerable degree of pragmatic problem coping, in particular, the instrumental use of migrant organizations. As such, the divergent logics of national and local integration policies seem to represent two different worlds of problem framing.

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Immigrant integration has become a salient policy problem in many Western European countries during the past decades. International terrorist attacks, urban race riots, and high rates of unemployment and school dropouts have resulted in a search for more effective approaches for incorporating migrants into Western societies in many countries. Despite its significant impact on Western societies, immigrant integration thus far seems to have defied resolution, remaining a persistent source of controversy in the high politics of many nations. To accomplish immigrant integration, many Western European governments have adopted a so-called “citizenship

approach.” “Citizenship” with considerations beyond its legal definition has become a starting point, or even a policy paradigm, in designing integration policy. It signals an individualistic approach toward migrants and emphasizes the host country’s norms, values, and languages (Favell, 1998). In contrast, policies aimed at accommodating the needs of specific communities have become more and more unpopular (Sniderman, Carmines, Layman, & Carter, 1996), a trend that is apparent in many Western European countries (Joppke & Morawska, 2004).

The widespread turn toward a citizenship approach appears to have been not fully effective in addressing immigrant integration, given the contemporary problems that nation-states face. A citizenship approach implies that, once trickled down to the local implementation level where the actual integration is to be achieved, no policies or measures specifically aimed at certain communities of migrants should exist. In France, this citizenship approach is deeply rooted in the French republican model. However, the recent race riots in the *banlieues* of several major cities are a sharp reminder of the model’s limited effectiveness. In the Netherlands, just as in France, immigrants are framed as individual citizens of the national imagined community (Anderson, 1983), and group-specific measures have been abandoned because of their effects in terms of privileging specific groups and reifying group differences. This citizenship approach was considered the best approach to avert a “clash of civilizations.” However, local policy implementation is characterized by precisely such tailor-made approaches, which have proven to be remarkably resilient, reflecting the accommodative approach toward immigrant integration that had prevailed until the 1990s (Temporary Parliamentary Research Committee Integration Policy [TCOI], 2004).

This evokes a straightforward though rarely posed question: Why do local outcomes of immigrant integration policy diverge from national policy making in the Netherlands? Many authors have analyzed Dutch immigrant integration policies, examining how the history of pillarization paved the way for Dutch multiculturalism and offered opportunities for migrants to organize themselves (Entzinger, 2003; Koopmans, 2002; TCOI, 2004; Verwey-Jonker Institute, 2004) and resulted in unintended consequences (Rath, 2001; Scheffer, 2000). We add to the existing knowledge an analysis of the different logics of problem framing associated with different levels of government in Dutch immigrant integration policy.

The divergence between national policy formulation and local outcomes is not only a result of an implementation gap or unsuccessful transposition of nationally formulated policies into local policies. More importantly, we believe, it is a result of a divergent institutional logic on problem framing,

driving policies in a different direction at both levels of government. Moreover, the divergence between national and local policies seems to have a strong impact on current debates about the success or failure of Dutch policies in furthering the immigrant integration process. As national and local administrative levels perceive problems of immigrant integration differently, they have framed and approached this policy problem in varied or even conflicting ways. This creates difficulties in the evaluation of policies as either a success or a failure, as different actors tend to speak past each other rather than with each other, based on their own problem frames. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the ancient story of the Tower of Babel and the confusion of tongues associated with it. This could explain why the citizenship approach, which was invented on the national level, did not successfully trickle down toward the local level of government and why immigrant integration has become such an intractable policy problem during the past decades.

To address these divergent logics of problem framing, we first briefly theorize the difficulties at stake in framing and implementing complex and contested policies. We will build on the theoretical concept of wicked policy problems to develop our argument that different institutional logics of problem framing rooted in different levels of government hamper the development of coherent and consistent immigrant integration policies. Then, we will describe the rise of a citizenship approach in Dutch immigrant integration policy and its stagnation at the local level. Subsequently, we will analyze how divergent logics of problem framing on the Dutch local and national level of government may explain why this citizenship approach did not, or at least not fully, trickle down into policy practices on the local level. We will identify differences in problem framing and discuss how they have contributed to or resisted the citizenship approach. The study of the different logic behind problem framing is based on an analysis of national and local policy documents, a secondary analysis of the evaluation report, interview material provided by the Temporary Parliamentary Research Committee on Dutch Integration Policy (TCOI, 2004), and an additional case study of the city of Rotterdam, based on interviews with local administrators and civil servants. We selected Rotterdam because it was one of the four big cities included in the parliamentary evaluation study, and in this way, we could confirm or reject the results found by this parliamentary commission. In addition, Rotterdam's particular political coalition, including Pim Fortuyn's party Liveable Rotterdam, closely followed the recent national policy frame on integration policy. Findings indicating a specific or targeted policy approach in Rotterdam would be stronger than in cities that did not follow the recent national policy frames so closely (cf. Poppelaars, 2007). We will conclude by

discussing the effect of these divergent institutional logics on the evaluation of immigrant integration policy and its persistence as a wicked policy problem in the Netherlands.

Institutional Logics of Wicked Policy Problems

Some problems are “wicked” in the sense that they seem to defy definition and resolution (Durant & Legge, 2006). They not only involve constant debate about appropriate policy measures but also about how the problem is to be defined and related policy norms and values. Instead of gradually receding from the agenda as soon as appropriate policies are designed that are generally perceived as contributing to problem resolution, wicked policy problems keep popping up on the agenda, triggering debate about what the problem is and about how to determine which policy measures are successful or not (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Such problems have also been described as ill-structured problems (Dunn, 1994) or intractable policy controversies (Rein & Schön, 1994). They are characterized by complexity, uncertainty about the effects of policy interventions, and strong disagreement on the nature of the problems and adequate solutions (Rittel & Webber, 1973).

The origin of wicked policy problems has been attributed to the absence of a generally accepted problem “frame” (Rein & Schön, 1994) or the absence of a dominant cognitive framework “that governs the subjective meaning we assign to social events” (Goffman, 1974, pp. 10-11). Frames have a dual nature of “naming” the relevant aspects of a problem situation and “framing” these into a coherent, intelligible, and convincing whole (Rein & Schön, 1994). A “policy frame” rests on “underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation,” and serves as a “way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting” (Rein & Schön, 1994, p. 23). Wicked problems refer to situations in which there is a multiplicity of frames, each emphasizing different aspects of a problem situation that are often contradictory (Fischer, 2003). As such, different frames not only involve different perspectives on a problem situation but also different perceptions of reality or “reality shifts” (Fischer, 2003), inhibiting opportunities for critical dialog among different actors involved in problem framing.

Problem framing is a multiactor and a highly contextualized process. Consequently, frames generally have distinct institutional roots, reflecting the institutional context in which they are produced and the types of actors

involved. As Rein and Schön (1993) have argued, the institutional context of framing “may carry its own characteristic perspectives and ways of framing issues, or it may offer particular roles, channels and norms for discussion and debate” (p. 156). For instance, an issue can be expected to be framed differently in the context of intermediation with involved target groups than in the context of high politics or the involvement of independent experts.

Multilevel governance provides an illustration of situations where different levels of government are involved in the problem framing process. Political and administrative actors at different levels of government perceive reality, and thus the policy problems associated with it, differently as they are confronted with varied contextual factors, actors, and aspects of the policy problem at hand. The fact that policy does not always trickle down to the local level is not to the result of an implementation gap or administrative misfit. More fundamentally, different levels of government can induce different ways of problem framing. A local government official responsible for managing a culturally diverse city may have a differing perception of policy problems than a national politician responsible for voicing the wishes of the electorate. These different ways of problem framing result in government officials speaking past each other and can result in a mismatch between national policy making and local policy outcomes. In the next section, we will describe such a divergence of problem framing in immigrant integration in the Netherlands and unravel the underlying logic behind national and local problem framing.

Immigrant Integration Policy in the Netherlands: Frame Controversies

Although the Netherlands has long been celebrated for its successful multiculturalist policies, nowadays this multiculturalist approach is widely dismissed as a failure in Dutch public and political discourse. Dutch immigrant integration policies have shifted during the past decade toward a citizenship approach, stressing civic integration and “good,” “active,” and recently “common citizenship” of individual migrants rather than social-cultural emancipation of migrant groups. In this respect, the Netherlands follows a broader turn toward assimilationism than can be found in many Western European countries during the last decade (Joppke & Morawska, 2004). The Dutch exceptionalism stems not only from the radical way in which the Netherlands has turned from multiculturalism to assimilationism but also from the limited extent to which the turn in official policy discourse seems to have taken effect in concrete policy practices.

The evolution of national integration policies during the past decades has been marked by discontinuity. Different policy frames have succeeded each other during the past 30 years (Entzinger, 2003, 2005), thereby illustrating the wicked or ill-structured nature of the policy problem. Until the 1970s, the presence of immigrants was framed as a temporary phenomenon, as illustrated by their naming and framing as “guest workers.” The government proposed and implemented tailor-made measures for specific migrant groups, depending on the situation of these groups, such as migrant groups from former Dutch colonies (Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans) and groups of guest workers (Turks, Moroccans, Southern-Europeans). These measures have been described as “two-track policies.” On one hand, they were aimed at integration in the Dutch social-economic sphere but on the other hand, the measures were designed to retain the cultural identities and groups structures to accommodate the eventual return of immigrants to their countries of origin.

A growing awareness in the 1970s that most immigrants were here to stay finally led to a centrally coordinated *Minorities Policy* in the early 1980s. This policy had distinct multiculturalist traits; it focused on immigrants as individuals as well as groups. Its objective was to combat discrimination and social-economic deprivation and to support social-cultural emancipation (Department of Home Affairs, 1983). Immigrants were framed as members of permanent ethnic or cultural minorities in the Dutch multicultural society (Rath, 2001). Although integration was now the end goal of policy, immigrants enjoyed considerable leeway to preserve their cultural identities and group structures. This reflected the Dutch tradition of accommodating pluralism through “pillarism,” that is, the institutionalization of “sovereignty within the own sphere” for each national minority (Lijphart, 1968).

This multiculturalist Minorities Policy became subject to growing criticism by the end of the 1980s (Entzinger, 2003). Following a sharp politicization in the early 1990s, a new frame emerged, emphasizing citizenship as a core part of a welfare-state approach to integration. This meant that the group focus was replaced by a more individualistic orientation, defining individual immigrants as “citizens” of Dutch society. Promoting “good” or “active” citizenship now became the primary policy goal, stimulating individual migrants to live up to their civic rights as well as their duties and to become economically independent participants in society. To meet these goals, the national government developed the so-called *Integration Policy*. It entailed an intensification of general social-economic policy, such as labor, education, and housing, for immigrants as new citizens rather than a group-oriented policy for specific ethnic minorities (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1989). For example, various group-specific facilities were eliminated or

severely downsized, such as education in minorities languages. Additionally, the government developed civic-integration programs for all newcomers and intensified various labor market and education measures to achieve equal participation of immigrants.

This Integration Policy met growing dissent after the turn of the millennium. Two contradictory policy discourses emerged, one of which was to become dominant (Entzinger, 2005). On one hand, there were claims that this policy had been relatively successful, especially in social-economic areas (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2001). On the other hand, a national debate about the “multicultural tragedy” drew attention to alleged policy failures, particularly in the social-cultural domain (Scheffer, 2000). In fact, some argued that the integration process had been less successful in the Netherlands, especially in terms of ethnic segregation, than for instance in Germany, despite the fact that the Germans only recently adopted an integration policy (Koopmans, 2002, 2003). After the rise of the populist politician Fortuyn in the Dutch political arena in 2002, this latter mode of discourse became dominant. Controversy over policy success or failure, however, raged on. In 2003, Dutch parliament installed a parliamentary investigation committee to uncover why the Integration Policy had been so minimally successful thus far. When this committee concluded that policy had instead been “a total or partial success,” their conclusion was widely discarded as being biased and naïve, although many of its more specific recommendations were accepted eventually (Minutes of Parliamentary Debate, 2004, 63, pp. 4093-4150). Apparently, a new frame had emerged in public and political discourse from which the integration policy had to be evaluated as a failure.

In the years following Fortuyn and a series of dramatic events (such as the 11th September terrorist attacks in the United States), a gradual turn toward assimilationism was set in motion. This resulted in a so-called *Integration Policy New Style*. The citizenship approach was reframed to focus both on the social-cultural dimension and the social-economic dimension of integration. “Common citizenship” now became the central objective of government policy, with a focus on what citizens “have in common.” That is, being a member of “one society” and demanding acceptance of basic norms and values and apprehension of the national language (Treaties of Parliament, TK 29203, nr.1):

The Integration Policy has always put great stress on the acceptance of differences . . . There is nothing wrong with that, but it has often been interpreted as if the presence of allochthonous minority groups in itself would have been valuable, an enrichment tout court. One loses . . . sight that not everything that is different is also valuable. With the cultivation of the own

cultural identities it is not possible to bridge differences. The unity of our society must be found in what the members have in common. That is . . . that they are citizens of *one* society. Common citizenship for allochthonous and autochthonous residents is the goal of the Integration Policy. . . . Common citizenship involves that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to basic Dutch norms. (p. 8)

Despite these turning points and discontinuity in government policy discourse, more continuity can be observed in terms of concrete policy practices. Although immigrant integration policy is centrally coordinated by one department, its implementation is functionally and territorially decentralized within various policy departments, civic organizations, and local governments. These decentralized policy practices do not always seem to conform to central policy. First of all, earlier policy episodes such as the Minorities Policy of the 1980s had given rise to specific institutional practices that, once established, proved to be highly resistant to change. For instance, language classes in the mother tongue for migrant pupils continued to exist until recently, regardless of recurring criticism and proposals to abolish these classes. The vested interests of the involved parties were high as, among others, migrant organizations were strong proponents of maintaining these classes, which they saw as a means to preserve their cultural heritage. Instead of abolishing them and facing severe public resistance, government chose to continue these classes and found different ways to legitimize them (Lucassen & Köbben, 1992). An additional more pragmatic reason for government to continue these classes was that they did not want to “hand over these children to possible orthodox imams” as the government was convinced that mosques would take over such classes if it stopped providing them (TCOI, 2004, p. 116).

Moreover, at the local level of government, even more continuity in policy practices can be observed. In the context of a decentralization trend in the 1990s, Dutch municipalities became increasingly responsible for the implementation of various policy topics, such as welfare, education, and immigrant integration. From the arrival of guest workers in the 1950s and 1960s onward, city governments have been dealing with an increasingly heterogeneous and poorer population, a concentration of migrant communities in specific neighborhoods, and low participation rates (i.e., low employment and education rates). A series of studies have shown how local governments play an active role in designing specific projects to implement broad policy programs that address such backlogs in language, employment, and housing as well as high educational dropout and criminality rates among certain

groups within society (Duyvendak & Veldboer, 2004; Engbersen, Snel, & Weltevrede, 2005; Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2005).

However, in contrast to the race-, ethnicity-, and religion-blind citizenship approach of central government, local governments still regularly design tailor-made group-specific projects. Illustrative are projects such as the *Lus di Trafiko* project in the city of Rotterdam that was a concrete result of an administrative covenant between the so-called “Antillean Cities” or cities in the Netherlands with a relatively large percentage of young Antillean migrants (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2005a). This project sought to improve contacts between the Antillean population and the Dutch social service agencies and to establish durable networks among key figures from the community and Rotterdam’s organizations and agencies. Another example concerns the so-called Moroccan Neighborhood Fathers project in Amsterdam, in which, local Moroccan “fathers” patrol the streets, using informal social control as a means to prevent criminality (Engbersen et al., 2005; Van Gemert, 2002). Moreover, cities often still subsidize a myriad of community and migrant organizations, including mosque organizations, for conducting social-cultural activities (TCOI, 2004). Although long-term subsidies specifically aimed at migrant populations were abandoned (Association of Dutch Municipalities [ADM], 2003), these organizations still receive subsidies, albeit on a different timescale and under the aegis of general (ethnicity-blind) subsidy criteria. These projects all have in common that they are aimed at very specific (sub) populations in Dutch cities to address specific needs and problems. Clearly, local governments seem to have chosen a different approach to immigrant integration that is often at odds with the “tough on integration” discourse of national policies (ADM, 2003):

Municipalities see little points of departure . . . in the national debate about integration. This is because of fact that they often find the sharpness and toughness of the debate too extreme, but also because the local level is concerned with different topics. . . . Most municipalities choose for a more positive approach. There is attention for problems and differences, but in a more preventive way. . . . Thinking in terms of “us” versus “them,” amplifying the differences between immigrants and natives, is seen as something negative. (pp. 7-8)

So a growing gap or divergence can be found between national integration policies that adopt a citizenship approach and local integration policies that follow a more pragmatic approach involving group-specific programs and group intermediation. In the following, we will analyze the different institutional logics of problem framing that may explain this divergence and discuss how this may contribute to the ensuing frame controversy.

Logics of National Integration Policies: Central Coordination and Politicization

The way immigrant integration policy has been framed at the national level reveals several important characteristics. First, a centralized and unitary policy structure led to a strongly national and state-centrist mode of problem framing (Guiraudon, 1997). In many European countries, major cities were the first actors to formulate integration policies; however, in the Netherlands, integration policy has always been formulated and coordinated primarily from the national level (Penninx, Kraal, Martinello, & Vertovec, 2004). The Home Affairs Department has long been the central figure in this coordination because of its relatively “heavy” department for the interdepartmental coordination of policy programs and its central position in relation to local governments. Moreover, the unitary character of integration policy was sustained by the cooptation of involved actors, such as ethnic elites and experts (Guiraudon, 1997). The involvement of ethnic elites in policy development was institutionalized by a National Advisory and Consultation Council, reflecting the traditional Dutch politics of accommodation through elite negotiation (Lijphart, 1968). This revival of the pillarist legacy of elite accommodation was more a product of national political design than a consequence of the efforts of the involved elites, as the groups these elites claimed to represent were generally far too small, weakly organized, and too disjointed to form real pillars. Furthermore, a strongly institutionalized research-policy nexus played an important role in policy formulation, especially from the late 1970s to the early 1990s (Timmermans & Scholten, 2006). Expert institutes, such as the Advisory Committee on Minorities Research, the Scientific Council for Government Policy, and the Social and Cultural Planning Office, had great influence on policy frame-shifts in this domain. Rath (2001) considers this a “technocratic symbiosis.”

Second, from the early 1990s onward, immigrant integration policy was framed in an increasingly politicized context. Until this period, immigrant integration had been systematically depoliticized (Hoppe, 1993), in part because of a taboo on discussing the relation between migration and national identity (Vuijsje, 1986) as well as a “cordon sanitaire” against antiimmigrant parties who could “play the race card” (Penninx, 2005). There was a powerful gentleman’s agreement among the major political parties to keep integration a nonpartisan issue because they believed that political conflict would hamper the rationality of policies and could negatively affect on the position of minorities (Interview with Director of Minorities Policy Directorate). This “culture of avoidance” (De Beus, 1998) has been severely

criticized in the early 1990s and especially since 2001. In this period, a "silent majority" was awoken who had been weary of multiculturalism but felt "unable" to voice this dissatisfaction (Entzinger, 2003). In addition, Fortuyn successfully turned the failing integration process into a symbol of a failing political establishment in the Netherlands, operating in a nontransparent way and favoring cultural relativism against the odds. The rise of Fortuyn, in spite of his tragic death, marked a fundamental breakthrough in Dutch political culture. A more polarized and confrontational political culture now replaced the traditional politics of accommodation (Andeweg & Irwin, 2005). In response to the Fortuyn-inspired revolt, government and politics adopted a different approach toward immigrant integration, recently described as an "articulation function" (Verwey-Jonker Institute, 2004, p. 201). This meant that both government officials and politicians would have to be responsible for explicitly addressing problems of the masses and incorporating them in official policy discourse. Prins (2002) described this logic of problem articulation as "hyperrealism," with the objective of describing reality without taboos, but even more so to be able to say whatever one wants or feels.

A third trait of national problem framing concerns the responsiveness of national policy framing to media-saturated incidents or focus events. As early as the 1970s, a series of Moluccan terrorist acts provided a direct incentive for policy development. More recently, discourse on immigrant integration has been influenced by national and international events, such as the 11th September attacks on New York and Washington, the Iraq-war, the terrorist attacks in Madrid 2004 and London 2005, the rise and murder of Fortuyn, radical statements by a Moroccan imam (El-Moumni), threats from Islamic fundamentalists to Dutch parliamentarian Hirsi Ali, and the murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan terrorist. These focus events contributed to a discourse of "an alleged clash of civilizations" (Snel, 2003), by depicting these incidents as illustrations or metaphors for a growing gap between natives and aliens, especially between Islam and Western culture. The public and media debates surrounding these incidents were often highly symbolic, focusing for instance on Islamic Jihad, headscarves, and the refusal of Muslims to shake hands with women rather than on traditional social issues as labor market and education achievements of migrants or discrimination in Dutch society. Thus, national integration policy appears to have become more and more of a symbolic policy (Entzinger, 2005).

Finally, the framing of integration appears to have increasingly become a matter of redefining the "imagined national community" (Anderson, 1983) rather than primarily a matter of the involved immigrant groups. Immigrant

integration has been more and more connected to broader issues within national society. In the 1980s, a normative perspective on Dutch society as a multicultural society also meant that migrants were defined within one broad category of “ethnic minorities,” in spite of the many differences among migrant groups. In the 1990s, it was connected to the sustainability of the welfare state in a changing international and economic context. From the turn of the millennium onward, however, immigrant integration has been connected to a broad national debate about the norms and values of Dutch society (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2004). This debate was, and still is, a response to growing feelings of uncertainty about national identity in an era characterized by globalization, Europeanization, individualization, and migration. These broader societal developments seem to have had significant influence on national policy making in the area of immigrant integration policies, contributing to the growing stress on citizenship in the context of the nation-state and on the redefinition of “national” norms and values.

These traits of the institutional logic of problem framing on the national level—strong central and unitary policy coordination, a turn from depoliticization to politicization, responsiveness to focus events, and connection to broader issues in society—contributed to the rise of a citizenship frame in national policies. The highly centralized policy structure meant that national politicians and central administration were dominant actors in the policy framing of immigrant integration. Moreover, the sharp politicization since the 1990s established a strong connection to broader concerns on the national level, such as the viability of the welfare state and the redefinition of the national imagined community in an epoch of migration and globalization. The citizenship frame matched these concerns, as it stressed the bridging of migrants to their host societies and their bonding within the imagined national community. Moreover, the culture of problem framing on the national level was strongly normative and followed mainly an a priori mode of reasoning that concentrated on issues that were of symbolic importance in redefining the national imagined community rather than the position of migrants itself. In fact, immigrant integration policy had become a symbol for a government that was trying to regain popular legitimacy by articulating popular ideas and sentiments concerning cultural diversity.

On the national level, this logic led to a distancing from the multiculturalist approach. It was now believed that this group’s focus would have hampered rather than stimulated immigrant integration by inadvertently converting migrants into dependents of state care or “welfare categories” (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 1989) and would have contributed to a

further “ethnicization” of integration issues (Entzinger, 2005; Rath, 2001) and to rising criticism of the alleged perverse democratic effects of representing specific groups outside regular parliamentary democracy (Treaties of Parliament, TK, 2003-2004, 28689, nr.17, p. 34). However, as we have observed, targeted or accommodative approaches still seem to thrive at the local level, despite the drastic changes in policy framing at the national level, which involved a strong disapproval of group specific approaches.

Logic of Local Integration Policies: The Rationale of Building Bridges

Many cities adopted, to some extent, the common citizenship–approach of national government in their official discourse, especially after the murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November, 2004. Two of the four major cities in the Netherlands published policy memoranda emphasizing the nationally advocated common citizenship and the prevention of so-called radicalization, that is, (religious) fundamentalism (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2004; Municipality of Rotterdam, 2005b). During the last years, the city of Rotterdam followed the national “tough on integration” approach more closely than other major cities, mainly because of its political coalition, consisting of Christen-Democrats, the Liberal Party, and Fortuyn’s party, Liveable Rotterdam. Illustrative is the so-called Rotterdam Law (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2003), in which the city proposed measurements to restrict the inflow of certain groups of people in already deprived neighborhoods. The city has insisted on adequate measures for public housing policies for several years, in particular to avoid or deter the development of deprived neighborhoods. The Rotterdam administrators thus took advantage of the recent time frame in which tough measures on integration were advocated at the national level (TCOI, 2004). Local organizations in Rotterdam tried to prevent the Rotterdam Law from being adopted because of its potentially discriminatory nature (TCOI, 2004; interviews civil servants and representatives of migrant and antidiscrimination organizations), yet Rotterdam and various other cities have adopted equivalents of this Rotterdam Law.

Local immigrant integration policies, however, not only reflect the dominant national approach toward immigrant integration. There is more to local policies than the discourse of common citizenship advocated at the national level and approved of in local politics. Local immigrant integration policies also reflect, to a significant extent, a different rationale of problem

framing. The main reason for this seems to be that local problem framing is naturally much closer to the actual implementation of integration policy than is national policy framing. Using their discretionary power, local government officials tend to develop strategies and activities to cope with the daily practice of immigrant integration policies rather than to engage in high politics that characterizes national problem framing. An important aspect determining this different logic of problem framing is pragmatic problem coping induced by a necessity to balance various solutions to different social problems within municipal boundaries. Such mechanisms of coping behavior and decision-making processes associated with it have been extensively studied and are shown to largely determine policy outcomes (Barret, 2004; Lipsky, 1980; O'Toole, 2000; Wilson, 1989/2000). In other words, local problem framing is, at least partly, determined by pragmatic problem coping.

A local civil servant in Rotterdam aptly illustrates this pragmatic problem coping more generally as follows:

If you get a phone call from a refugee organization that they are heading toward the city with a school bus full of illegal immigrants, you better make sure that there is some decent accommodation for them, despite the fact that they are illegal. You simply do not want them to disturb the public order in the city. (interview Rotterdam civil servant)

Also the persistence of the education in migrants' languages courses was not only because of the severe resistance to abolishing them but also to a deliberate choice of the government to avoid outcomes conceived as undesirable. Administrators simply did not want to hand over children to mosques for education in their home country's language, but wanted to keep them as long as possible in public schools (TCOI, 2004). The *Lus di Trafiko* project mentioned earlier is another example of a pragmatic, though accommodative, approach rooted in the concern of rising juvenile delinquency among the Antillean population in various cities (Municipality of Rotterdam, 2005a). Thus, targeted projects seem very resilient when it comes to the implementation of immigrant integration policy (cf. De Zwart & Poppeaars, 2007). A former director of the immigrant integration coordination agency in Amsterdam formulates it as follows: "The answer to the question whether we should specifically accommodate those populations should not be driven by ideological concerns, but rather by considerations in terms of their effectiveness" (TCOI, 2004, p. 314). A targeted approach at the local level seems much more driven by efficiency, pragmatics, or, in

sum, an instrumental rationality. Thus, local problem solving, sometimes unintentionally, contributes to the persistence of accommodative policies, perceived as undesirable by national policy makers.

A very specific type of problem coping relevant to immigrant integration policy is a mechanism that can be seen as an instrumental use of migrant organizations. Local administrators and civil servants often engage in and maintain contact with migrant organizations, although this does not fit within the formal national citizenship approach of immigrant integration. Migrant organizations can be useful to local government as they can help with actually implementing such concrete projects as the above-mentioned ones. They can offer input on how to translate policy proposals into concrete projects and help to reach individual members of the different communities (interviews with civil servants in Rotterdam, cf. Poppelaars, 2007). A leader of a migrant organization in Rotterdam stated,

It is very difficult and time-consuming for the administration to reach members of our community. We know them better than they [government officials] do and are able to contact them individually with our staff. Besides, because of the specific cultural traits, the administration could easily design policy that has serious unintended consequences. (interview representative migrant organization)

This instrumental way of interacting with migrant organizations might even contradict the ideas of local political leaders. From 2002 to 2006, Rotterdam's city administration, in addition to the Christen-Democrats and the Liberal Party, consisted of *Livable Rotterdam* administrators, the heirs of Pim Fortuyn, who had a negative attitude about immigrant and especially Muslim organizations. Nonetheless, civil servants continued to maintain contacts and to work together with these organizations, simply to help implement concrete projects, such as public city debates about Islam and integration. A Liveable Rotterdam alderman insisted on avoiding the well-known migrant organizations and particularly Muslim organizations to organize the city debates. The civil servants that had to organize these debates, however, eventually did turn to these organizations, mainly because of pragmatic reasons; it took too much time to find other organizations, and additionally, these organizations could assist in organizing these city debates. Civil servants generally involved in Rotterdam's integration policy disapproved of the negative attitude because contacts with such migrant organizations were simply too useful now and in the foreseeable future (interviews with civil servants and migrant organizations in

Rotterdam). Therefore, most civil servants maintained contacts. So despite an obvious difference in political leadership, as the political coalition in Rotterdam from 2002 to 2006 was quite distinct from general local political coalitions in the Netherlands, civil servants' ways of interacting with migrant organizations remained very similar to those in other cities (TCOI, 2004; interviews civil servants).

Next to their utility for implementation, many officials report that such organizations are also important for acquiring knowledge of what actually happens among the diverse ethnic communities within their cities. Illustrative here is what a Tilburg alderman stated about providing accommodation to Somali people in Tilburg:

We want to arrange a meeting point for Somali people. Some see this as means of segregating activities. We, however, view this as a stepping-stone for these people. Also we want to provide them with a place to meet because we ourselves feel the need to have deliberation [among] partners from the community with whom we can do business with and arrange things. (TCOI, 2004, p. 427)

Migrant organizations thus function as a bridge to different communities in the cities.

This "bridging" mechanism becomes especially important during times of crisis or events that could disturb public order. As an administrator of a subcity council in Rotterdam argues, "Often those migrant organizations invite us to attend their activities. However, we often invite ourselves to see what is going on, especially after events such as the murder of Theo van Gogh" (interview). This argument applies to various cities and to diverse administrators with different political affiliations and offers a rationale for continuing to provide subsidies as a means of maintaining contacts with those organizations (Poppelaars, 2007).

This particular mechanism results in more divergence between local and national problem framing. The instrumental use of migrant organizations seems, quite paradoxically, to become inevitable given the contested nature of immigrant integration policy. The existence of multiple frames induces a tendency to avoid a clear-cut choice in policy formulation, and in this specific case, to avoid emphasis on ethnocultural differences. The result is that various tailor-made policy measures are banned (for instance, the immigrant minority language courses) and policy makers are inclined to opt for broad policy categories.

Such general policy categories seem to reinforce the instrumental use of migrant organizations. Policy formulation inevitably consists of defining

categories of eligible people. In the case of immigrant integration policies, those policy categories often overlap with ethnicity, nationality, or race (Brubaker, Loveman, & Stamatov, 2004; Lieberman, 2002). More generally, policy categories are political phenomena (Schneider & Ingram, 1993; Starr, 1992) and can become frameworks of incentives for people to mobilize. It is shown that the different ways European nation-states define citizenship significantly influence the way migrants organize themselves in different European countries (Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Soysal, 1994). When policy categories are defined too broadly or do not reflect social reality, individual civil servants experience difficulties in reaching individual members of such a broadly defined target population. They are likely to either stick to their existing routines that conveniently narrow the target population to manageable proportions or to rely on migrant and community organizations that serve as intermediaries to reach a too broadly defined target population (De Zwart & Poppelaars, 2004, 2007). A relevant example is the Dutch Neighborhood policy, a set of measures aimed at improving certain (inner-city) neighborhoods. Neighborhood policy regained attention simultaneously with the change in Dutch integration policy in the Netherlands during the 1990s (Scientific Council for Government Policy, 2005). It fits perfectly with the new general policy philosophy that did not address specific communities of people. Namely, almost everybody fulfills the definition of a neighborhood resident (De Boer, 2001). The underlying rationale is that local civil servants cannot address every resident within disadvantaged neighborhoods (De Zwart & Poppelaars, 2004), but instead, must rely on community or migrant organizations to address neighborhood issues. The national approach of common citizenship in the Netherlands seems to produce the same mechanism as the neighborhood policy, as it often induces the formulation of broad policy categories. A former alderman of Rotterdam illustrates, "I think that the relevance and importance of migrant organizations will increase these days. If we want to pursue the citizenship approach, we will definitely need those migrant organizations to do so" (TCOI, 2004, p. 495). As such, framing broad policy categories may only reinforce the instrumental use of migrant organizations, as this may help civil servants, also administrators, to target and reach the people to whom these broad policy categories indirectly refer.

In sum, the institutional logic of problem framing of immigrant integration at the local level seems to have been markedly different from the logic of problem framing at the national level. Local problem framing is associated with managing culturally diverse cities, and thus pragmatic problem coping largely determines local problem framing. The instrumental use of

migrant organizations is an important problem coping mechanism for local officials to implement immigrant integration policy. This mechanism seems only to be reinforced by the broad and vague nature of policy formulation associated with the current national problem framing. The citizenship approach that had become dominant in national policy discourse was therefore not, or only limitedly, effectuated in local integration policies, as it did not fit the problem orientation of actors involved in integration policies at the local level.

Conclusion

The divergent logic behind problem framing on the national and local level of government seems to have contributed to the evolution of controversy over immigrant integration policy in the Netherlands. Whereas a citizenship approach had been developed in the 1990s on the national level, this approach was only limitedly effectual in policy practices on the local level. On the national level, a logic driven by central policy coordination, politicization, responsiveness to focus events, and a connection to broader issues led to a framing of migrants as individual citizens of the imagined national community. Immigrant integration was framed as an issue of promoting common citizenship, furthering the social-economic participation and social-economic adaptation of individual migrants to national values, norms, and language. On the local level, pragmatic problem coping and, in particular, the instrumental use of migrant organizations as a specific problem coping mechanism resulted in a process of problem framing that often reinforced the group dimension of integration. This tendency to accommodate ethnic and cultural differences reflected the reality faced by local administrators. As the current mayor of Amsterdam stated, “we must keep things together” (Cohen, 2002).

The wickedness or ill-structured nature of immigrant integration policy in the Netherlands appears because, at least in part, of these conflicting frames and, most profoundly, diverging logics of problem framing associated with different levels of government. This has inhibited the development of coherent and consistent policies and contributed to controversy in terms of evaluating these policies either as successes or failures. On the national level, the evaluation of policies involves, in general, a positive view of ethnicity-blind citizenship, with its tougher tone and approach toward common citizenship. However, in terms of policy practice, this approach often fails to substantiate and address the specific needs of the administrators that face day-to-day

integration issues in urban neighborhoods. More specifically, the broad framing of citizenship only seems to have reinforced tailor-made projects and the instrumental use of migrant organizations. This local problem framing has thus, somewhat paradoxically, led to a more accommodative approach to immigrant integration. As such, national policies have an important symbolic value and can be positively evaluated in policy discourse, although they are only limitedly effective in policy practice. This could be summarized by Edelman's (1977) dictum "words that succeed and policies that fail."

In contrast, the evaluation of policies on the local level seems to turn Edelman's (1977) dictum upside down; "policies that succeed, and words that fail." On one hand, the local tailor-made projects and accommodative approach seem to have been rather successful in terms of "keeping things together," as is frequently observed in Dutch literature. Recent studies have shown that the integration process in terms of housing, education, and labor market participation, of which many elements have been decentralized, has been relatively successful, although disagreement persists about whether this has been thanks to or despite policy efforts (TCOI, 2004; Verwey-Jonker Institute, 2004). On the other hand, this local approach is assessed very differently on the national level. The pragmatic concerns of local governments, such as the instrumental use of migrant organizations and the interest in keeping things together, are often considered at odds with the national ethnicity-blind approach and the discourse of an alleged clash of civilizations. In terms of national policy discourse, the accommodative approach would have inadvertently contributed to group formation or "ethnicization," and thereby also to the erosion of national identity and social cohesion.

The result is a mismatch between local and national policy efforts and a misunderstanding in terms of what is considered successful or not. This is reminiscent of a traditional plea in implementation research: Designing integration policy should be responsive to (local) administrative practices and logics as well as to top-down ideological arguments. The challenge is thus to square the circle between ideological arguments and administrative mechanisms or to adapt the words to the policies that apparently succeed.

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