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Smuggling and the Dawn of the Filibuster Era in Texas

BY JAMES A. BERNSEN

On October 15, 1808, Spanish Army Sergeant Pedro de la Garza Falcón led a patrol through the Louisiana/Texas borderlands between the Angelina and Neches Rivers, where he surprised a party of smugglers. The Spaniards killed one and captured four more, rounding up nearly 200 illegally exported horses and mules destined for the United States¹

Four years later, on August 7, 1812, a force of 150 Anglo Americans invaded in what would be the first – and most successful – filibuster against Spanish Texas. The Gutiérrez-Magee expedition saw a private army of American “volunteers” partnering with Tejano rebels to seize Texas on behalf of the Mexican Republic, before they were ultimately defeated by the Spanish Army at the Battle of Medina.

What do these two events have in common? As it turns out, quite a lot, because in a very real sense, the expedition – indeed, the entire filibustering era – began on that fall day on which Falcón’s men broke up an otherwise forgotten smuggling ring in East Texas.

Most historians of the late Spanish era focus on Béxar, but from a strategic point of view, the real center of action was Nacogdoches. At the time, the town had a population of 655, the second largest in the province, 300 miles from the capital. Isolated as it was, it was impoverished and starved for both necessities and luxury goods alike.

The Spanish operated their empire under the mercantilist system and decreed that any non-sanctioned trade with Spain’s neighbors was illegal. This had been true when Louisiana had been French, but this ban was even continued after Spain took control of that province after the Seven Years War. This is because it still had a foreign population and foreign influences the Spanish did not want to allow to penetrate into New Spain.²

Nacogdoches was forced instead to route all trade through Mexico, where the nearest fair was at Saltillo (650 miles) and the nearest port for anything imported or exported was Veracruz (1100 miles). Manufactured goods imported from Mexico cost as much as four

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times their original price after transportation costs were factored in. Meanwhile, only 90 miles away was the town of Natchitoches, Louisiana, which after the American takeover in 1804 was relatively awash with goods, food and trading opportunities. But it lay on the far side of the forbidden border.³

For citizens of Nacogdoches, this meant a subsistence only economy, and even that was often at risk. Adjutant inspector Francisco Viana wrote in 1808, “The poverty which this post of Nacogdoches has always suffered is well known – the loss of this year’s crop and the inability to provide for itself from that capital [Béxar] because of like scarcity there” made starvation a serious threat. He appealed to his superiors to allow him to journey to a small Spanish town orphaned on the wrong side of the border. “[Residents] are begging me to go to Bayou Pierre because there [they have] corn and flour, so they may bring some for their sustenance. Should I permit them, or should I see them suffer...? These are the matters that come up and which nobody believes I have orders from a government as mild and Catholic as the Spanish, to prohibit.”⁴

But he did have such orders. Residents were even subjected to being spied upon, and their goings were reported to the governor, as in the case of one Nieves Perez. As the garrison commander wrote: “It was said that they did introduce goods, and that in the month of December, Nieves’s wife was known to be making at home some skirts of fine India lawn [woven textile], with small green flowers and other colors.”⁵

While poor Señora Perez could not import her India lawn without drawing the prying eyes of Spanish officials, the Spanish Indian agent *did* have dispensation to travel to Natchitoches to purchase textiles and other goods there. These were *not* for the long-suffering Spanish subjects however but were trade goods destined for the natives. It was how Spain bought the peace from hostile tribes like the Apache and Comanche. One can only imagine the bitterness of the dutiful Spanish subjects dressed in ancient rags, upon seeing Indian chiefs contentedly leaving town with the newest fabrics from abroad.

Given such dire want, smuggling was endemic among the population of east Texas. Even one early governor secretly maintained his own network; more frequently, it was ordinary citizens involved. But

the character of the trade changed after 1803, when the United States assumed control of Louisiana. Not only did the availability of goods begin to increase, but the profits to be gained by smuggling did as well, as well as the background of the smugglers involved.⁶

The smugglers

On that fall day in 1808, Sergeant Falcón led his patrol along the Louisiana/Texas borderlands between the Angelina and Neches Rivers near a place called Las Plasetas, searching for runaway slaves and contraband, when they discovered the tracks of a large herd of horses. Soon, they spied the herd, and several men. Falcón ordered his men to prepare weapons and they rode forward. As soon as they saw the soldados, all but one of the smugglers bolted back on foot to their camp. Three of them stood their ground, while one leapt on a horse and rode off. The Spanish soldiers gave chase, and in a dramatic encounter, shot him dead from his horse. The other men were cornered in their camp. They offered to bribe the soldiers. Falcón played along, but once their guard was down, his men seized them all.⁷

The key smugglers arrested by Sergeant Falcón and his men in October 1808 were all Spanish citizens: Enrique Kuerkue, José Magui and Juan Macfarson. Of course, that's only what the Spanish called them. They were really Henry Quirk, Joseph Magee, and John McFarlan, among three dozen Anglo Americans (though two of these three were actually Irish-Americans) who lived in Spanish Texas when Stephen F. Austin was a mere child. Henry Quirk had legally settled in Texas in 1798, McFarlan in in 1799 and, Magee sometime after 1801.⁸

John McFarlan, 43, had been one of the earliest foreigners to settle in Spanish East Texas. The 1801 census of Nacogdoches listed him as a native of Virginia, but he was by some accounts more Scots-Irish than he ever was American. He lived in the vicinity of Nacogdoches with his wife, Sarah Sanders and his father-in-law. His occupation was listed as a farmer, but he was also known to travel as a hunter, frequently ranging far from his farm to the east of Nacogdoches, hunting buffalo on the plains, but catching mustangs as well, ostensibly for trade within Texas.⁹

McFarlan, along with another Anglo-Spaniard, Juan Pedro Walker, was employed by the government from 1803-1804 in constructing

a new church in Nacogdoches, hiring several native Tejanos for the project. However, supplies for the construction being impossible to find in Texas, McFarlan and Walker were authorized by local officials to travel to Louisiana to purchase the necessities, and even on occasion, bring in skilled workers to assist the locals. As part of their contract, the two were allowed to legally export horses in lieu of cash payments. This localized exception to trade restrictions was the sort of practical deal to which the authorities in Nacogdoches occasionally resorted, but the Spanish governor rejected the arrangement, as did the Commandant of the Internal Provinces.¹⁰

The Nacogdoches garrison commander, Miguel Músquiz, intervened on behalf of the men, writing to the governor that McFarlan and Walker “have performed all their appointments, and have been working with nine men daily...” The work on the project was “far advanced, and it appeared to me agreeable,” Músquiz wrote. He proposed a compromise: continue to pay McFarlan and Walker in horses, but instead of exporting them, the men would “receive them here and keep the same here for their benefit.” It was a clumsy solution and practically begged for the legitimate trade to be resumed as illegitimate, since there was no large market for horses in East Texas. It remains unclear if McFarlan had been a smuggler before, but he was now.¹¹

Henry Quirk’s turn towards crime was much less surprising. He was a 47-year-old native of Virginia, who had come to Texas in 1798 and was living on the ranch of his elder brother Edmund, who had come the year before. In March of 1808, Spanish Lieutenant José María Guadiana had been on the trail of a band of smugglers, and the clues had led him to the Quirk Ranch near the Sabine. Riding to the ranch, the Spanish Lieutenant narrowly missed the herd of smuggled animals, which had departed across the river. Basing his conclusions on testimony from an informer known as “Negrito,” Guadiana wrote in his journal, “There is no doubt that Henry Quirk, brother to Edmund Quirk, Sr. is the one who exported this livestock.” Not just Henry was implicated in the crime, but Edmund too, since he owned the land, a large ranch called Tiguitana on Ayish Creek near modern San Augustine. Guadiana searched the property and his home and found evidence of contraband trade. He arrested the latter’s son, Edmund Jr.,

leaving Edmund's distraught wife Anna Alsop Quirk and two younger children behind. The older Edmund Quirk and his brother became fugitives. Now, six months later, Falcón and his patrol had finally captured Henry, who confessed to the crime of smuggling and gave as his excuse the necessity of aiding his impoverished mother in Kentucky. Edmund remained on the loose.¹²

The consequences of the arrests would continue to escalate – and implicate – over the course of a two-year investigation which practically obsessed Spanish authorities. In 1810, the Spanish confiscated incriminating papers, including Joseph Magee's account book, which listed his customers and the goods he had sold them. They were mostly foreign residents, but also Tejanos as well. Other arrests included an Irish American settler in the small town of Trinidad de Salcedo, Miguel Quinn, who was implicated as having sold the horses for the smugglers to export. It also led the Spaniards to expel dozens of possibly innocent foreigners living in Nacogdoches.¹³

The Neutral Ground and the Rise of the "Banditti."

In 1806, during a war scare over the nebulous border between Louisiana and Texas, American General James Wilkinson and Spanish Colonel Simón Herrera negotiated a deal to declare a "neutral ground," where neither army could go, until the two governments settled on a permanent border. Historians have long noted "the swarm of outlaws that quickly congregated there." In fact, they did not do so for a full *two years* after the agreement. It was only in the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the smuggling ring that these "banditti" – as they are often called – arrived.¹⁴

In November 1808, an unknown party of Americans in the Neutral Ground seized an official Spanish trade caravan to Natchitoches. Spanish Governor Manuel María Salcedo recognized the connection right away. They had assembled "for the purpose of extricating the smugglers that you are holding for such crime," he wrote to his superiors.¹⁵

Their numbers too small to launch any kind of rescue, these banditti resorted to simply waylaying Spanish caravans. That the banditti were lawless there is no doubt, and on occasion their predations would touch Americans too. But the clear target of their raids was the

Spanish government. One can look at this in three ways, which are not mutually exclusive. On the one hand, being tied to the smugglers, they were targeting the competition. Also, by interdicting trade goods destined for the Indians, their predations had the effect of wrecking Spanish efforts to buy off the peaceful dispositions of otherwise hostile tribes. But most importantly, their activity effectively amounted to an economic blockade of Texas.

Whether they realized it or not, these banditti had already become a revolutionary force on the border. And the evidence strongly suggests that they indeed *did* know what they were doing. The Spanish peninsular crisis would deepen that same year, when Napoleon turned the Iberian nation from cowed hostage to conquered province, installing his brother Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish throne. This would precipitate independence movements throughout the Americas over the next few years, and this growing political unrest would transform the banditti even on the obscure Texas frontier.

Broader Networks

Another accomplice implicated in the ring was an American, Joseph McLanahan. Spanish sources indicate he had been lurking in the Neutral Ground in August 1808, two months before the smugglers were arrested. McLanahan and a party of four traveled by boat from New Orleans to explore the area, making maps of the territory and its crossings, for smuggling purposes – or perhaps something bigger. Indeed, the person their intelligence was most likely destined for was a nefarious frontier schemer, serial duelist, former Burr conspirator and prospective filibuster from Missouri named John Smith T.¹⁶

The curiously-named Smith T – the T stood for “Tennessee” and distinguished him from the many other John Smiths on the frontier – was an ambitious mining and land speculator from Missouri, where he was the mortal enemy of another miner named Moses Austin. He was a relative of the scheming general Wilkinson and had been involved with him in a plan to march on Santa Fe as part of the Burr affair. New Mexico, like Texas, was starved for trade under mercantilist restrictions, but unlike Texas, had gold and silver to pay for goods.¹⁷

On December 20, 1809, a “trading expedition” was launched to Santa Fe. As an article in the *Louisiana Gazette* reported, “About the

20th...Capt. R. Smith, Mr. M'Lanehan and a Mr. Patterson set out from the district of St. Genevieve upon a journey to St. a Fee...We presume their objects are mercantile; the enterprise must be toilsome and perilous...altogether through a wilderness heretofore unexplored." It was most likely sponsored by Smith T, as the expedition's leader was his younger brother Reuben Smith. Joining him was the same Joseph McLanahan who had been lurking on the Texas frontier a year before. McLanahan would later write to the Missouri governor, explaining their mission. They had undertaken the journey well aware Spain's mercantilist history, but he hopefully wrote, "it is well known to your excellency that a new era has taken place," since Spain itself had been conquered, and "the spirit of change and consequent amelioration" had reached Spanish America.¹⁸

Was this mission, launched in the dead of winter truly a peaceful trading venture, or perhaps a scouting party for a filibuster? The distinction is near irrelevant. For Americans, free trade was part and parcel of their republican revolution against the old world. When it came to New Spain, there *could* be no free trade with an insular, mercantilist nation without forcing a change in government. What Smith T and possibly even small-time smugglers like McFarlan, Quirk and Joseph Magee realized was that extending trade to the Spanish empire *implicitly required* separating that empire from European control. Thus, trade to Spanish lands, whether they be in Venezuela, Chile, Santa Fe, or Nacogdoches, was an inherently revolutionary act.¹⁹

McLanahan and Smith's hopes were not realized, and the traders were captured and imprisoned in Chihuahua. Now there were *two* groups of Americans held by Spanish authorities for smuggling, and both had partisans in the United States who wanted to set them free. That the Missourian Smith T already knew of the smugglers on the Texas frontier is likely given his connection to McLanahan. He may have even been their patron. In any event, by 1810, he *had* assumed this role, his efforts had clearly merged with those of the friends of the Texas smugglers McFarlan, Quirk and Magee.

Moving Closer to Revolution

Driven by complaints on both sides of the border – Spanish authorities who could not trade and American businesses losing revenue

– the two nations approved a joint patrol to clear the Neutral Ground of bandits. The American party was led by a newly arrived young officer, Lieutenant Augustus Magee (no relation to the smuggler Joseph Magee), with orders to expel all but a few authorized residents, burn their homes and drive off their livestock. The Spanish contingent was led by Alfarez José Maria Guadiana. The area was cleared for a time, but the grievance remained, and so the bandits would keep coming until it was removed.²⁰

Mexico by now was moving closer to revolution itself, and potential rebels in Texas and American Burrites, who had long dreamed of aiding their neighbors' cause, began to experience a convergence of interests. In November 1809, Orleans Governor W.C.C. Claiborne wrote of "certain persons in this Territory [who] are associating and confederating together" with the purpose of "the rendering of Mexico and the Interior provinces independent of Spain." That same month, he personally investigated an American soldier from Natchitoches, married to a Spanish woman from Texas, for allegedly writing two letters in which he revealed a plot among army officers, in league with Spanish rebels, to revolutionize Mexico.²¹

The revolution finally arrived in September 1810, when Father Hidalgo issued his "Grito" in Mexico. That same month in Nacogdoches, Miguel Quinn, who had been arrested in the Spanish dragnet, escaped confinement and joined the reforming bandits in the Neutral Ground. Under his leadership, they began to communicate with discontented Tejanos through the medium of a spy – Edmund Quirk, the brother of the captured Henry Quirk. Since the escape of Quinn, the smugglers had been transferred to Béxar and imprisoned in the Alamo, but their friends continued to prowl the frontier, their goals had gone far beyond rescuing the smugglers.²²

Meanwhile, in January 1811 Béxar itself was rocked by the Casas Revolt, which overturned royalist authority. For several months, Nacogdoches effectively became a rebel town. The Spanish commander fled to the United States, and authority was seized by his deputy, the same Alfarez Guadiana who had ridden in the joint patrol with the American Lieutenant Magee. Now he was a rebel and was apparently coordinating with the efforts of the spy Edmund Quirk. The rebels also had another ally in Nacogdoches, to whom witnesses referred to

as "The Fat Father." The latter was none other than Father José María Huerta, the Nacogdoches parish priest.²³

Smith T, visiting Natchitoches, sent a letter to Huerta through the hands of Quirk, making the offer of assistance that would ultimately culminate in the Gutiérrez-Magee Expedition. He wrote: "I will lead thousands of men in an uprising and place them around your banners and help you to defend the cause that so justly you have begun to defend." He said that Huerta was like "a father and protector of the people" and should embrace the revolution. The Mexicans, he added, had the right to abolish the government and enact laws that "are in favor of humankind." Smith T promised that "here there are a considerable number of men ready to march to your aid and defense; and if it were necessary to send more, more would come with the utmost brevity to unite with us." Smith T's plans were not just idle chatter, and it is very likely he was corresponding with others far beyond Nacogdoches. Word of his plans even reached the rebel commandant general of the northern provinces, Mariano Jiménez. This leader spread a rumor that the filibuster army, 1,200 strong, had already entered Texas and captured Nacogdoches. He even used it to boost Mexican rebel morale.²⁴

But the royalists had regained the upper hand in Texas in March 1811, under a coup led by José Manuel Zambrano, which arrested the rebel Casas and reestablished royalist control in B́exar. By the summer, they had reasserted authority in Nacogdoches as well, and arrested Huerta and the Spanish officer-turned rebel Guadiana. With the royalists back in power, the time had come to reassert their trading monopoly. With trade to central Mexico blocked by revolution, the Spanish royalists turned their eyes towards America. Zambrano now personally led a caravan through the Neutral Ground with \$20,000 in cash to re-open the route through the Neutral Ground. The banditti, under Quinn, struck first and actually captured him. The success was fleeting: a quick response by both American and Spanish forces turned the tables and freed Zambrano. Now the Spanish captured several bandit leaders, including the elusive spy Edmund Quirk.²⁵

The Spanish, who by now were aware of the letters from Smith T to Huerta, interrogated Quirk, asking him if "the said Smith, or others of his party had been invited by some of this village, in order that with their factions, they will aid" the intruder government (Casas). Subse-

quent interrogations show how smuggling had merged into revolution. The attack on Zambrano was not designed to kill, or even necessarily to rob him, but to *stop the Spanish trade*.²⁶

By the fall of 1811, the bandits, rebels and filibusters were clearly unified. A witness, Miguel Crow, testified that “Quinn, who is in Natchitoches, was the one who was supplying them what these American bandits were needing,” but that Father Huerta was promising Tejano credit for the venture. More accurately, he was promising to seize the Spanish government coffers to pay Quinn and the Americans. Crow informed his interrogators that the purpose of this cabal was “in order to raise a revolution in this village [Nacogdoches],” then afterwards insinuating themselves in the kingdom.

The Spanish asked Crow how Smith was attempting to raise a revolution, and with whom was he depending for the effort. Crow did not know how these details but said “that this revolution was for commercial purposes.” Crow elaborated on this connection between trade and revolution: During the Casas revolt, Father Huerta and Lieutenant Guadiana had conspired to seize the latter’s superior officer, Commander Don Christóbal Domínguez, which they did. Crow explained the plan had been a joint one between Mexican rebels and Americans, who targeted Domínguez “because if he came to command at this village, he would not allow them to trade...”²⁷

The Spanish interrogators scoffed at the idea that only a dozen or so men could lead a revolution. Crow said the Americans “understood that people would come from the interior to aid them; and that from Kentucky he knows that three hundred men are going through Santa Fe with the same end...” John Smith T had indeed begun raising just such an army in March. The recruits to his filibuster were to rendezvous at the junction of the Canadian and Arkansas rivers, near modern Fort Smith, Arkansas. (Which by the way, is named after his brother) Their mission was “to effect the release of the men and to bring back what gold they could conveniently seize.” If they could not release the men, they would push through and join Hidalgo.²⁸

Those of the bandits who had escaped the Spanish counterattack that had captured Edmund Quirk made their way back to Natchitoches, where they began to talk of invasion. The American parish judge, John C. Carr, learned of it. “I am informed that some of the scoundrels have

declared since their return from the Sabine, that they will raise a force of 2 or 300 men and take Nacogdoches," Carr wrote to Governor Claiborne. Smith T was already well advanced towards raising this force, but in his preparations, he had been too vocal, his plans too public. Partly on the basis of accounts such as Carr's, U.S. government leaders threatened all who were involved with arrest under the Neutrality Act of 1794. Smith T ceased active organizing, though the men who had signed up were clearly available should the circumstances change.²⁹

This was the state of the frontier, in late 1811, when a ragged Mexican rebel, José Bernardo Gutiérrez de Lara arrived in Natchitoches, narrowly avoiding Spanish capture with little more than the shirt on his back. His mission was to travel to Washington to gain official American support of the Mexican Revolution, though he was met at every turn by Westerners who urged him to dispense with official support and launch a private invasion instead. He decided to split the difference. While he ventured to Washington, he left an aide, José Menchaca, to gather what forces he could, seize rebel-friendly Nacogdoches, and open up a beachhead for American support.

We know little about Menchaca's brief filibuster. He entered Texas with from 200-300 volunteers in late November or early December 1811. Surprised by the Spanish, Menchaca defected, and the Americans slipped back across the border without an engagement. The timing and the similarity in numbers, suggests that these men were the same men whom Smith T had recruited and promised to Father Huerta eight months before. But the Missouri mining magnate ceased his own efforts not long afterwards when his own cause was removed.

In April 1812, his brother Reuben, Joseph McLanahan and their party, were finally released. Despite their promise upon their arrival in Natchitoches to return to Mexico "in arms" they never did. But their tale of a Mexico in the chaos of revolution, and the excitement it raised on the frontier, had their effect on Gutiérrez, who returned to Natchitoches the exact same day they had passed through the town. In Washington, the Mexican rebel had only received moral support from the administration, but no actual promise of aid. But back in Natchitoches, he was once again showered with offers to lead a non-official filibuster, and he began putting one together, almost certainly with the aid of Miguel Quinn if not Smith. He recruited Augustus Magee

to command it and volunteers began to rally in the Neutral Ground to his cause.³⁰

At the core of the effort were the smugglers and the banditti, around whom the army would coalesce. John McFarlan, who had been among the smugglers captured in October 1808, had subsequently been paroled by the Spaniards. He actively recruited for the army in Louisiana, then joined the expedition as its chief scout and liaison with the Texas Indians, whom he knew well from his days as a horse smuggler. He and another smuggler, the banditti leader Miguel Quinn would later appear on the rolls of the expedition as captains. Others, including James McKim and Louis Latham, would join them as well. Though the notorious John Smith T was not involved in the 1812 invasion, he later reappeared on the Texas frontier to promote revolution in 1814.³¹

What had started as an illicit effort to satisfy the needs of the citizens of Nacogdoches for trade had become, in time, an invasion. The first filibuster into Spanish Texas, the Gutiérrez-Magee Expedition of 1812-13, had in fact been organized in embryo before either Bernardo Gutiérrez or Augustus Magee had arrived on the frontier. The pathfinders were in fact the smugglers. They had exposed a need for Tejano trade, while Americans, fueled by a potent mix of republican zeal and capitalist lust, were lured into the romance of the filibuster.

The smugglers' networks and the filibuster they spawned had for the first time united Tejanos in a cause with Anglo-Americans from beyond their borders, establishing a shaky alliance which would reassert itself across two generations of rebels. And it set Texas on the path of conflict and rebellion that it would continue to travel down for the next 30 years.

NOTES

- 1 Report of the Opinion of the Judge, Béxar Archives, Robert Bruce Blake Translations Volume 70: 89.
- 2 Felix Almaráz, *Tragic Cavalier: Governor Manuel Salcedo of Texas, 1808-1813* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1971), 20.
- 3 Jesús F. de la Teja, "Economic Integration of a Periphery: The Cattle Industry in 18th Century Texas," *Texas Papers on Latin America*, (Austin: Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Texas at Austin, 1991), 7-11.
- 4 Francisco Viana to Governor Cordero, April 1, 1808, BA, RBB S6: 218.
- 5 José Jóaquin Ugarte to J. B. Elguézabal, January 28, 1805, BA, RBB S 5:6.
- 6 Mattie Austin Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801-1821*. (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1976), 52-53.
- 7 "Declaration of the First Witness Sergeant Don Pedro de la Garza Falcón," BA, RBB 33:135, 141, 144, 155-6. Gov. Antonio Cordero to Nemesio Salcedo, December (31), 1805, BA, RBB S5:191.
- 8 "Declaration of the First Witness," BA, RBB 33:135. Hatcher, Appendix 2.
- 9 "Journal of Operations, etc., Nacogdoches," July 1802, January 1803, and April 1803, BA, RBB Vol. 20:52-53, 105, 137, 155. RBB S4: 208-09.
- 10 Miguel Muzquí to Elguézabal, May 6, 1803, RBB S4: 199. Nemesio Salcedo to the Governor of Texas, June 20, 1803, RBB 75: 168.
- 11 "Journal of Operations, etc., Nacogdoches," July 1802, January 1803, and April 1803, BA, RBB Vol. 20:52-53, 105, 137, 155. RBB S4: 208-09. Miguel Musquí to Governor J. B. Elguézabal, July 12, 1803, BA, RBB S4: 221.
- 12 "Diary of Expedition by José María Guadiana," March 4-6, 1808, BA, RBB S6:122-124, "Confession of the Defendant Henry Quirk," [January 1809], BA, RBB Vol. 33: 189. "Edmund Quirk," RBB 35: 270.
- 13 "Diary, July 1808," BA, RBB S6:252. "Government vs. Michael Quinn and John Magee," May 2, Oct. 3-4, 1810, BA RBB 70: 88-103, 180-5.
- 14 T.R. Fehrenbach, *Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans*, (New York: Collier Books, 1968), 120.
- 15 "Communication of the Commander of Texas to that of Nacogdoches..." Nacogdoches Archives, RBB S15: 141-154.
- 16 RBB S70:155, 163. "Government vs. Michael Quinn and John Magee," BA, RBB 70: 183. José María Guadiana to Gov. Antonio Cordero, August 18, 1808, BA, RBB S6: 258.

17 Dick Steward, *Frontier Swashbuckler: The Life and Legend of John Smith T.* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000), 2, 6, 34-42. Max L. Moorhead, *New Mexico's Royal Road: Trade and Travel on the Chihuahua Trail* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 58.

18 *Louisiana Gazette*, December 28, 1809, and Joseph McLanahan to Governor Benjamin Howard, June 12, 1812, in Thomas James, *Three Years Among the Indians and Mexicans* (Saint Louis: Missouri Historical Society, 1916), 286-289.

19 Gordon S. Brown, *Latin American Rebels and the United States, 1806-1822*, (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company, 2015), 24.

20 Augustus Magee to Charles Wollstonecraft, August 14, 1810, LRSWRS, M221 Roll 35; Diary of J.M. Guadiana, August 6, 1810, BA, RBB S7: 228.

21 W.C.C. Claiborne to Col. Hopkins, Nov. 10, 1809, and Newman Statement, Nov. 24, 1809, in Dunbar Rowland, ed. *Official Letter Books of W.C.C. Claiborne*, Vol. 5 (Jackson, Mississippi: State Department of Archives and History, 1917), 7, 18-21.

22 "Communication of the Commander of Texas to that of Nacogdoches..." NA, RBB S15: 141-154. "4th Declaration – of José Miguel Crow," RBB S7:334.

23 Testimony of Thomas McKinnon, July 6, 1811, Béxar Archives. RBB S7:341-4. The identification of Huerta as "the Fat Father" is in the testimony of Miguel Crow, "Expediente on Plots Against the Government," RBB S7: 331-32.

24 It is unclear why Smith T. believed Huerta was in favor of the revolution. The most likely answer is that Quirk had told him he was. Huerta actually turned over the damning letter to Spanish authorities, but this may have been a way of pretending innocence after he deemed discovery certain. The Spanish officials investigated the case under the presumption of his guilt, and the evidence of some witnesses lends credence to this view. Hatcher, 213. Smith to Huerta, April 29, 1811; *Béxar Archives*. "Extraordinario," January 11, 1811 (Numero 6), *El Desperator Americano, Correo Politico Económico de Guadalajara*. Available at <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/downloadPdf/el-desperator-americano-correo-politico-economico-de-guadalajara-6/> (Accessed May 7, 2020).

25 Testimony of Encarnacio Chirino, Testimony of Thomas McKinnon, and Testimony of Edmund Quirk, in "Expediente on Plots Against the Government," RBB S7: 325-44.

26 Testimony of Encarnacio Chirino, "Expediente on Plots Against the Government," June 5, 1811, BA RBB S7: 325; Testimony of Thomas McKinnon, July 6, 1811, RBB S7: 341-4.

- 27 Testimony of José Miguel Crow, *Expediente on Plots Against the Government, June 5, 1811*, BA RBB S7: 331-37.
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 John C. Carr to Claiborne, July 4, 1811, in Clarence Edwin Carter, *The Territorial Papers of the United States Vol. IX*, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1910), 943. John Sibley to Unknown [Probably Secretary of War William Eustis], Feb. 9, 1811, in Julia Kathryn Garrett, "Dr. John Sibley and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier, 1803-1814," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Apr., 1945), pp. 547-549. Steward, 105.
- 30 Shaler to Monroe, May 2, 1812, William Shaler, William Shaler Letterbooks, Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History, New York Historical Society, 50.
- 31 Some sources claim the army's agent to the Indians was a Richard McFarlan, but other sources, such as Henderson Yoakum, make it clear it was John McFarlan. Wollstonecraft to Unknown [probably Wilkinson], August 6, 1812, LRSWRS, M221 Roll 49. Claiborne to Unknown, August 18, 1812, CL 6: 166. Baker, 228. Henderson K. Yoakum, *The History of Texas From Its First Settlement In 1685 To Its Annexation To the United States in 1846*, Vol. 1 (New York: Bedfield, 1856), 153-65. "Report of the Anglo American Companies in the Northern Mexican Army at San Antonio de Bexar, April 9, 1813," Samuel Sexton file, U.S. National Archives Record Group 76, 1839 and 1849 U.S.-Mexico commissions, National Archives.