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THE HALIFAX IMPLOSION:
A CASE STUDY OF THE HALIFAX 2014
COMMONWEALTH GAMES BID (2005-2007)

(Spine Title: The Halifax Implosion: Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid)

(Thesis Format: Monograph)

by

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Graduate Program in Kinesiology

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies
The University of Western Ontario
London, Ontario, Canada

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ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS

In the summer of 2005, Commonwealth Games Canada called for applications from Canadian cities to bid for the right to be Canada's candidate city in the international competition to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Five cities declared interest and contested the domestic phase of the bid: Toronto, Ottawa, Calgary, Hamilton and Halifax. On December 15th, 2005, Commonwealth Games Canada announced that Halifax would represent Canada in the international phase of the bid.

The Halifax Regional Municipality, the Province of Nova Scotia, and specifically the Halifax 2014 bid committee began preparing their bid that would ultimately be judged against the other two international bids from Glasgow, Scotland and Abuja, Nigeria. Before Halifax would even be judged, their bid was withdrawn on March 8th, 2007.

This thesis was a case study of one Canadian sport mega-event bid that went awry for a multitude of factors. Through document analysis and interviews with some of the key players of the bid, it was determined that the short timeframe and the political and leadership forces at play were the two biggest factors in the bid's demise. Themes and lessons for future Canadian sport mega-event bids were exposed, and recommendations for future study provided.

Keywords: Halifax, Province of Nova Scotia, Commonwealth Games, Mega-Events, Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid, Commonwealth Games Canada

DEDICATION

To my coach, mentor, and friend, Dr. Volker Nolte.

You taught me a lot of things about sport,
but it is what you taught me about life that I will always remember.

You taught me to be a leader.
You taught me to persevere.
But, most of all, you taught me to be a good person.

“Big Boy,” I dedicate this thesis to you.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAUC	Amateur Athletic Union of Canada
ACOA	Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
BRC	Bid Review Committee
BRS	Bid Review Specialists
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CGAC	Commonwealth Games Association of Canada
CGC	Commonwealth Games Canada
CGF	Commonwealth Games Federation
CFL	Canadian Football League
CIS	Canadian Interuniversity Sport
CSTA	Canadian Sport Tourism Alliance
EIA	Economic Impact Analysis
FIBA	Fédération Internationale de Basketball
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HRM	Halifax Regional Municipality
IOC	International Olympic Committee
MP	Member of Parliament
PNS	Province of Nova Scotia
STEAM	Sport Tourism Economic Impact Model
UBC	University of British Columbia
VANOC	Vancouver Organizing Committee for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games

CHAPTER 1 – Introduction

Introduction

When speaking of Canada's participation in international multi-sport festivals, involvement in the Olympic Summer Games is a likely point of departure. It is by far the most recognized and celebrated multi-sport event in the world, and a major event on the contemporary world calendar every four years. Countless athletes from around the world train with extraordinary passion and dedication to represent their country at the event; similarly, cities from around the world contest fierce battles to host the Games, sometimes beginning upwards of a decade before the event is even scheduled to take place.

While Canada has been an active participant in the Olympic movement for over a century, more recently it has also participated in many of the other smaller international sport festivals including the Pan American Games and the Francophone Games. Canada has played host to such festivals in a number of different cities; however, with few exceptions, and certainly recently, major Games hosted in Canada have taken place solely in western Canada. Only once since 1930 has Ontario hosted an event (and it was the relatively small Jeux de la Francophonie in 2001), and Atlantic Canada has yet to do so. In total, Canada has hosted ten major international multi-sport events in its history, and is on the eve of hosting its eleventh when the Olympic Winter Games travel to Vancouver in 2010 (see Table 1).

Among the smaller multi-sport events in which Canada competes is the Commonwealth Games, a sport festival attended by countries of the former British Commonwealth. Canada has hosted the Commonwealth Games four times, including the

inaugural event in Hamilton in 1930, and subsequent meetings in Vancouver, Edmonton, and most recently, Victoria. In 2005, Canada once again began to prepare a bid, this time to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games in the Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM).¹ By the spring of 2007, the bid was well underway when the municipal and provincial governments from the HRM and the Province of Nova Scotia (PNS) respectively, suddenly and unexpectedly withdrew their support. In the period of time that lapsed from the beginning of the bid process to its final days a little under two years later, many significant events occurred.

Year	Event	Host City
1930	British Empire Games	Hamilton, ON
1954	British Empire and Commonwealth Games	Vancouver, BC
1967	Pan American Games	Winnipeg, MB
1976	Olympic Summer Games	Montreal, QC
1978	Commonwealth Games	Edmonton, AB
1983	Summer Universiade	Edmonton, AB
1988	Olympic Winter Games	Calgary, AB
1994	Commonwealth Games	Victoria, BC
1999	Pan American Games	Winnipeg, MB
2001	Jeux de la Francophonie	Ottawa, ON / Hull, QB
2010	Olympic Winter Games	Vancouver, BC

Table 1: Canada's Sport Mega-Event Hosting History

Before a critical analysis of the Halifax Commonwealth Games bid can be undertaken, a brief history of the British Commonwealth and a look forward to its future was necessary. Subsequently, both a broad history of the Commonwealth Games movement and a specific look at Canada's involvement as a 4-time host of the festival was examined. Halifax was then briefly investigated in order to establish a context for the case study at hand. Important literature pertaining to the hosting of sport mega-events

such as the Olympic and Commonwealth Games was then scrutinized along with a summary of Sport Canada's sport mega-event hosting policy. Similarly, a critical review of scholarly works dealing specifically with the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid was undertaken, which enabled conclusions from these works to be scrutinized throughout this research.

Finally, as an outcome emerging from this contextualizing information, was the gap in the literature that demonstrated the need for scholarly research to improve and strengthen future Canadian Commonwealth Games bids. It was intended that an analysis of the failed Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid would accomplish this goal.

The British Empire and the Commonwealth of Nations

A historical review is necessary when investigating anything to do with the Commonwealth Games precisely because the Games are of the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth exists only in a historical context.² At its peak, the British Empire was recognized as the largest empire the world had ever known, and its foremost power. By 1900, it covered one-fifth of the globe, governed 400 million subjects of diverse faith and ethnicity, and was the hub of trade, financial services, communications, migratory patterns, naval and military power.³ Thus, it is understandable why Britain was considered "the centre of the world," and why sentiments like "the sun never sets on the British Empire" were so commonplace during this period.

Beginning with the trade of slaves in the mid 16th century, and eventually with the founding of colonies and dominions in places like Canada, the United States, Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and India, the British Empire maintained its political, social,

economic, religious, and cultural stronghold by spreading its influence and ideals through imperialist endeavours. God, glory, and gold were undoubtedly a driving force behind many British conquests, but more than anything else it was:

...their absolute sense of superiority – their conviction about their superior institutions, political structures, economic system, God, skin colour, race and way of life. This, in many ways, caused them to stretch out a kind of strange, misguided helping hand to the world...The English Imperial mind of the time actually thought it was helping those wherever it went.⁴

Centuries later, British influence can still be felt in the judicial, governmental and educational systems, as well as in the economic and military practices, and philosophies of former colonies. Most noticeably it is seen in the widespread use of the English language.

More appropriate to the purposes of this research is the link between British sport and that of their conquests and dominions. In Britain, sport and sportsmanship ideals were at the very heart of the British national identity.⁵ It was argued that British sport produced the ideal soldier by developing and strengthening character and comradeship, which was essential to maintaining colonial order.⁶ Through their imperialism, the British brought their sports with them wherever they descended and games like cricket acted as "...the umbilical cord of Empire linking the mother country with her children."⁷

In the Canadian example, nineteenth-century Manitobans:

...played and promoted manly games, not only because they were certain these activities revealed and nurtured many desirable qualities, but for another reason...the sense of duty they felt to establish and maintain the British culture in their new, still only semi-civilized part of the world.⁸

In the decades following World War Two, many of the former British territories became independent states. Most of these states went on to join the Commonwealth of Nations, a free association of independent states that was instituted by the British political

leadership "...to comfort those in Britain who keenly felt the loss of Empire, and to provide a surrogate for colonial rule: an instrument to replace the Empire with a British sphere of influence covering a quarter of the world's surface."⁹ However, it was found that "over time, the new Commonwealth was seen to have little more in common with the United Kingdom than with the United States or even the Soviet Union."¹⁰ Furthermore, "it is rare indeed to find the Commonwealth capable of joint action in a common cause that is of contemporary relevance."¹¹ Consequently, it can be argued that the Commonwealth Games served as one of the few remaining unifying entities in which members of the former British Empire come together over a common and acceptable objective. Of all the legacies of British imperialism, including the fact that many of the most problematic and violent contemporary political trouble spots share a colonial British history,¹² sport is perhaps the happiest and most popular.¹³

There is no doubt that the Commonwealth is declining in significance as each successive decade passes, especially with the United Kingdom's recent entry into the European Union. Some would argue that the Commonwealth Games are one of the last vestiges of a brutal, imperialistic time period. Be that as it may, at the time of writing they are still a significant sporting event on the contemporary world sport calendar.

History of the Commonwealth Games

The Commonwealth Games are distinctive from all other international sport festivals as a consequence of one significant feature: the composition of their membership. While their counterparts, like the Olympic Games, Pan American Games or Asian Games, are founded on geographic or climactic premises, the Commonwealth

Games are based on a purely historical construct in that they are inclusive to only those countries once colonized by the British Empire, now simply referred to as members of the Commonwealth. Today, this collection of developed and developing nations contains over two billion people, makes up almost a third of the world's population, and comprises many faiths, races, languages, and cultures.¹⁴

Just as the modern Olympic movement had Panagiotis Soustos, Evangelos Zappas, William Penny Brookes and most notably Barron Pierre de Coubertin, the Commonwealth Games movement also had its share of evolutionary contributors.¹⁵ J. Astley Cooper, a British Reverend, was the first documented individual to propose that sport be contested in Pan-Britannic contests.¹⁶ On October 30th, 1891, in a letter to the *Times of London*, Cooper advocated for:

...a common periodical representative gathering of the English people and the establishment of a national Festival, probably every four years, as a means of increasing goodwill and good understanding of the Empire... a periodical gathering of the race in a festival and contests of industry, athletics, rowing and cricket.¹⁷

Cooper's proposal gained momentum when it attracted the attention of Richard Coombes, the long time President of the Amateur Athletic Union of Australia, who in turn directed much of his energies to underlining the value of such an endeavour.¹⁸ After much discussion and debate, in 1911 the commencement of a "Festival of the Empire" took place to commemorate the coronation of George Vth in London, England and a featured component of the celebration was the Festival of Empire Sports Meeting. Among the sports contested by South Africa, Canada, Great Britain and Australasia¹⁹ were athletics, swimming, boxing, and wrestling. The latter three countries were victorious, each earning nine medals, but Canada, by virtue of having won the most gold medals, was

awarded the Lonsdale Cup as overall champion.²⁰ Although this spectacle was the first definitive example of a Pan-Britannic sport event, Commonwealth Games history does not mark the official start of the movement for another 19 years after to the conclusion of this event.

World War One interrupted the development of the Commonwealth Games movement, but following its conclusion in 1918, a Canadian sport administrator by the name of Norton Hervey Crowe once again contemplated the idea of a Pan-Britannic sport contest. As his nine year career as secretary of the Amateur Athletic Union of Canada (AAUC) drew to a close, Crowe used his final address on September 25th, 1924 as a platform to reaffirm his position that an all-British sporting championship should be held in the years between the Olympic Games.²¹ Two days later, the AAUC approved Crowe's idea, marking a major turning point in Commonwealth Games history. Crowe's successor at the AAUC, John Howard Crocker, was equally committed to the idea but recognized some salesmanship and pizzazz were needed to finally carry the idea over the top.²² With this in mind, Crowe approached M.M. Bobby Robinson, the manager of the 1928 Canadian Olympic athletics team and sports editor of the *Hamilton Spectator*, who was very well connected in the sport community. Robinson took the idea to both the Hamilton Olympic Club and the city of Hamilton, both of whom he managed to enthuse about the possibility of hosting the inaugural Pan-Britannic sport festival.²³

After promoting the idea at the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics, initially to a cold reception, and subsequently to British officials in 1930, the idea finally began to take hold. At first it was believed by many officials that "...an effort was being made to supersede Olympic competition with a purely Empire show."²⁴ Eventually though,

Robinson won over his detractors and the first of many Pan-Britannic Games, officially named the British Empire Games, were going to take place. As some have argued, was it not for the "...unbounded enthusiasm and persistency of Mr. Robinson, this cycle of Empire and Commonwealth Games would almost certainly never have started."²⁵

Although there were many others involved in the evolution of the games before him, Robinson should be referred to as the "Father of the Commonwealth Games," the one who finally pushed others' efforts over the top, much like Pierre de Coubertin did for the Olympic movement.²⁶

Initially, the Games were to remain confined to England and Canada;²⁷ however, this decision did not hold true. At a meeting of Empire representatives in Los Angeles, California in August of 1932, the decision to form the British Empire Games Federation was made. Among the responsibilities of this newly formed federation was to select the host city of the Games every four years. The first notable alteration to the organization came after the 1950 British Empire Games when Auckland, New Zealand played host.²⁸ For the 1954 edition of the Games, the festival was renamed the "British Empire and Commonwealth Games." Under this new title, four more cities played host. Another change to the title followed the 1966 festival when they were renamed the "British Commonwealth Games." Finally, in time for the 1978 edition, the name currently in use today, "The Commonwealth Games," was adopted. As time passed, the changing name of the Games reflected the rapidly evolving relationship between Britain and its former empirical possessions.²⁹

From its inauguration up to and including the 1994 edition in Victoria, British Columbia, only individual sports were included on the program of the Commonwealth

Games. The 1998 Games in Kuala, Lumpur marked the introduction of team sports to the Games program. The current constitution of the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF)³⁰ denotes that a Games' program will consist of at least 10 sports, up to a maximum of 17, of which no more than four are to be team sports. Of the possible sports, the following 10 sports are recognized as core sports and are to be contested regardless of where the Games are held: athletics, aquatics (swimming and diving), badminton, boxing, field hockey, lawn bowls, squash, weightlifting, women's netball, and men's rugby sevens. The host city, in conjunction with the organizing committee, may select up to seven additional sports to be contested including: archery, basketball, cycling (road and/or mountain bike and/or track), gymnastics, judo, shooting, table tennis, triathlon, and wrestling.³¹

In 2000, the CGF introduced the Commonwealth Youth Games for athletes under the age of 18. They provide an opportunity for young aspiring Commonwealth athletes to be exposed to the Commonwealth Games movement.³² The inaugural Youth Games were held in Edinburgh, Scotland in 2000 and the 2011 edition will be held on the Isle of Man.

Disabled athletes are also recognized and celebrated by the Commonwealth Games movement. In contrast to the Olympic movement that has acted somewhat indecisively on the issue by including some wheelchair sports as non-medal exhibition events, and creating the Paralympic Games as an alternative championship, the Commonwealth Games movement has met the issue head on. At the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester, England, for the first time at any major multi-sport Games, events for athletes with a disability were contested and celebrated as full

medal disciplines. The upcoming 2010 Games in India will also feature several events for athletes with a disability.

Often referred to as the “Friendly Games,” the Commonwealth Games are the envy of many of the other regional Games mainly because of the reputation they have established. In Australia, television audiences for the Commonwealth Games regularly outnumber viewers of the Summer Olympic Games while similarly, in Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) has historically offered extensive coverage of the Commonwealth Games.³³ The Games maintain a unique feature in that the competing athletes all speak the English language and as a result socializing and interacting with fellow competitors is made easier than at other large international events. Another interesting dimension of these Games is the inherent understanding that participating countries “compete as vigorously on the athletic field as do countries at the Olympics, but a friendly rivalry persists...a type of rivalry that, were it to exist at the Olympics, could not help but improve them.”³⁴

The Canadian Commonwealth Games Hosting Experience

Canada has played host to the Commonwealth Games on four occasions, essentially once every 25 years since their inauguration. Each successive Canadian event has experienced growth in both the number of countries, and competitors participating in the Games.³⁵ Several examples indicative of the distinctiveness of the Games can be found in reviewing Canada’s four experiences as host. The following section highlights some of the major events at each of the Commonwealth Games held in Canada. This review was essential to the study as it provided insightful, contextual and background

knowledge on some of the experiences of Canadian Commonwealth Games host cities.

British Empire Games: Hamilton, Ontario (1930)

In 1930, athletes representing Australia, Bermuda, British Guyana, Canada, England, Northern Ireland, Newfoundland, New Zealand, Scotland, South Africa and Wales participated in the first British Empire Games in Hamilton, Ontario. Competitions were held in athletics, swimming, rowing, boxing and wrestling.³⁶ Although some of the events were severely undersubscribed (both a Canadian wrestler and rowing crew won gold because they were the only entries in their events), there were other notable performances and occurrences.³⁷

In the men's 100-yard dash, New Zealander Allan Elliott false started twice and as a result, was ejected. True to the spirit of the "Friendly Games," the crowd reacted with unexpected and deafening noise, so much so that the starter could not command any attention, and eventually succumbed and allowed Elliott back into the race.³⁸ Canadian sprinting phenomenon Percy Williams went on to win gold in the event, despite tearing a thigh muscle with 30 yards remaining.

These Games are often described as utilitarian because they were not sensationalized, nor were they an overly commercialized spectacle event. Some have argued these Games set the standard of excellence for future host cities by demonstrating extravagance does not necessarily mean a better Games.³⁹ In light of the success of these Games, acknowledgement and approval that Pan-Britannic contests were a worthwhile sporting endeavour emerged. The future of the Commonwealth Games may have been

different had Hamilton failed as a host city. Some contended that it would have marked the end of the Pan-Britannic sport movement.⁴⁰

British Empire and Commonwealth Games: Vancouver, British Columbia (1954)

The Vth British Empire and Commonwealth Games were held in Vancouver, British Columbia between July 30th and August 7th, 1954. Twenty-four countries participated sending a total of 662 athletes and 127 officials to the Games to contest nine sports, including athletics, boxing, cycling, lawn bowls, rowing,⁴¹ swimming and diving, weightlifting and wrestling.⁴² Awarding the Games to Vancouver was the culmination of two years of hard work by an enterprising group of civic leaders, initially spearheaded by Mayor Charles E. Thompson.⁴³ In attempts to capture the attention and support of the city, the slogan attached to these Games was, “Seven days you’ll remember for a lifetime.”⁴⁴ Games organizers could not possibly have realized just how memorable the 1954 Vancouver Games would turn out to be.

There were many notable events at the 1954 Vancouver Games. Athletes were accommodated together in the athlete’s village at the University of British Columbia (UBC). The Empire Games Pool was built outdoors at UBC,⁴⁵ despite Vancouver’s reputation for rain. The organizers took a notable risk in making this decision, but luckily the weather cooperated and the swimming events went off without any problems. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the cycling events. Held at the Empire Oval that was built in China Creek Park, the competition was ripe with judging controversy. At one point, several Australian cyclists even withdrew in livid protest of the competition. Fortunately for the Vancouver organizing committee, this event was

quickly overshadowed by the many incredible sporting feats displayed at the Games. Hometown hero Doug Hepburn won the heavyweight weightlifting title,⁴⁶ Emmanuel Ifeajuna of Nigeria became the first black athlete representing an African nation to win a Commonwealth Games gold medal,⁴⁷ and England's Jim Peters displayed valiant character in his attempt to finish the marathon despite running into the stadium for the final quarter mile looking "...like a drunken sailor."⁴⁸ The most significant story of these Games is that of the epic clash between Roger Bannister and John Landy, commonly referred to as "The Miracle Mile." According to some, this race "...completely overshadowed the sports carnival of which it was supposed to be just a one small part."⁴⁹

Several months before the Games, in May of 1954, England's Roger Bannister was the first man to break the elusive 4-minute mile barrier with a time of 3:59.4. His celebration was short lived as only 6 weeks later John Landy of Australia ran even faster, clocking a new world record of 3:58.0. These two performances set the stage for an epic dual between the two runners on August 7th, 1954 at the Vancouver Commonwealth Games. The pre-race hype was comparable to the anticipation of "...a heavy-weight championship fight, not a foot race between hitherto unknown amateurs."⁵⁰ The race did not disappoint. Landy took the pace out quickly, but Bannister eventually ran him down. On the final corner, just as Landy glanced over his left shoulder to see how close Bannister was, the English runner attacked around Landy's opposite side. Bannister went on to win the race by 5 yards, both runners once again eclipsing the 4-minute barrier that was once thought impossible. A bronze statue depicting the two runners, at the exact moment of Landy's now infamous glance, stands at the entrance to the Pacific National Exhibition as a lasting tribute to both this epic race and the 1954 Games.⁵¹

In a geopolitical context, the 1954 Vancouver Games marked a triumph for Vancouver over its neighbour to the east, Toronto. As Jason Beck noted in his extensive review of the spectacle:

A tinge of annoyance and jealousy is obvious in the public opinions of many eastern figures who were antagonized by the smug provincialism exhibited by their counterparts in British Columbia. Perhaps it was because Ontario, as the self-proclaimed center of Canada, was being upstaged by a city in its periphery with an event that would undoubtedly garner worldwide attention, whereas British Columbians were proudly aware of the coup they had achieved.⁵²

Overall, the Games earned Vancouver and Canada a place on the world sporting stage. While England handily won the overall medal count,⁵³ these Games were celebrated and acknowledged for featuring memorable sporting moments, outstanding entertainment and technical innovation.⁵⁴ They were also credited with establishing new standards in organization and presentation excellence, not only for the hosting of Commonwealth Games, but of all multi-sport Games of the time.⁵⁵

Commonwealth Games: Edmonton, Alberta (1978)

When the XI Games opened on August 3rd, 1978, it was clear that Edmonton would provide a refreshing sporting and organizational experience compared to the 1976 Montreal Summer Olympics debacle that had taken place only two years earlier. A total of 1,475 athletes and 504 officials participated in the Games in Edmonton.⁵⁶

The building of the 42,500-seat Commonwealth Stadium was completed on schedule and on budget, costing about \$20 million dollars. This was a relief as fears of financial burdens were still left over from the Montreal Olympic Stadium - "the Big Owe,"⁵⁷ which encumbered taxpayers for decades to follow. The organizers walked "...a careful tightrope..."⁵⁸ in the months leading up to the Games to ensure that there was no

repeat of the African nations' boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympics. In the end, Nigeria was the only country not to attend the Games and although their presence was missed, a sense of ease was felt that it was only one country compared to the 28 countries that boycotted the Olympics only two years prior.⁵⁹

Of the 10 sports contested at the Games in Edmonton, athletics, boxing and gymnastics proved to be the most exciting. The men's marathon was an especially enthralling race, with a 19-year-old Tanzanian stealing the show. At the 13 mile mark, Gidemas Shahanga was more than a minute off the pace, running in about 15th place. As the race wore on, he closed the gap on his fellow competitors, and even passed some of them. Suddenly and unexpectedly, he worked his way into medal contention and was soon challenging the leader of the race. As the runners entered the stadium, Shahanga overtook Canadian Jerome Drayton, won the race, and went on to run his victory lap "...looking fresh as a daisy."⁶⁰ Even more remarkable was at the post-race press conference when the young runner revealed that he had run the Pan-African Games marathon only two weeks earlier in 110 degree Fahrenheit heat. What is more, Shahanga announced these were only his 2nd and 3rd marathons ever. Disbelief and awe over these accomplishments were expressed by many, including Canadian silver medalist Drayton who was sitting beside Shahanga at the press conference, and was so shocked that he literally almost toppled backwards out of his chair.⁶¹

Since gymnastics was not a particularly strong Commonwealth sport, its inclusion in the Edmonton Games was troublesome to many. Many worried that the gap between top competitors and those from countries who did not regularly participate in gymnastics would be too wide, even embarrassing. In the case of Bangladesh's Ahmedur

Rahman Bablu, a newcomer to the sport who arrived at the Games without a coach, the difference in skill level was indeed great. It was noted, "...[he] was so far out of his depth that he was drowning,"⁶² but by the end of the Games, after being adopted by an unnamed Edmonton high school teacher with a gymnastics background, Bablu completed a basic, beginner's routine. The gymnastics venue erupted in appreciation of his efforts and thus demonstrated that the spirit of "The Friendly Games" was certainly alive in Edmonton.

The Edmonton Games were deemed a financial success, albeit by their Organizing Committee President Dr. Van Vliet. He supported this assessment by noting the mutual trust between the organizing committee and the three levels of government, well-researched budgets, and the participation of over 10,000 volunteers.⁶³ Adding strength to the positive undertones of these games was the fact that Canada topped the medal count for the first and only time to date at an official Commonwealth Games.

Commonwealth Games: Victoria, British Columbia (1994)

When the XVth Commonwealth Games opened on August 18th, 1994, it marked the fourth time that the festival was held in Canada and also Canada's most recent experience with hosting the Commonwealth Games. With the South African apartheid era having just ended, South Africa was included in the festivities for the first time since the 1958 Games in Cardiff, Wales. In total, 63 nations sent 2,557 athletes and 914 officials to participate in the Victoria Games.⁶⁴

Both the opening and closing ceremonies were held at Victoria's retrofitted Centennial Stadium on the University of Victoria campus, which was temporarily

expanded to 30,000 seats to serve as the main stadium of the Games. Ten sports were featured at these Games including athletics, aquatics (diving, swimming & synchronized swimming), badminton, boxing, cycling, gymnastics, lawn bowls, shooting, weightlifting and wrestling. While a description of each of the events would be beneficial, there is little written historical information available on these events.

Australia, a perpetual sport powerhouse, led the medal tally. Canada finished second, in front of third place England. Nigeria announced its presence at the Games by finishing 4th and claiming more gold medals than both New Zealand and India. Hong Kong competed for the last time at the Commonwealth Games in Victoria as it became a part of the People's Republic of China in 1997.⁶⁵

This cursory examination of Canada's Commonwealth Games hosting background demonstrated some of the interesting aspects of the festival, some organizational facets, and in general provided an idea of what Halifax could have expected if the bid had gone through.

Halifax – An Overview

Situated on Canada's eastern coast in the Maritime region⁶⁶ and the Province of Nova Scotia, Halifax is positioned on a small inlet from the Atlantic Ocean. While the Province of Nova Scotia itself is the "...undisputed star of Canada's Atlantic Coast," its capital city of Halifax "...is a relative financial and cultural powerhouse compared to the rest of the hamlets scattered throughout Eastern Canada..."⁶⁷

The city of Halifax has a definitive historical link to the British Commonwealth. It was officially founded in 1749 when 14 ships carrying over 1,000 families made the

voyage from England to Nova Scotia, specifically for the reason of setting up a British outpost.⁶⁸ George Montague Dunk, the Earl of Halifax (hence the name Halifax), was in charge of moving citizens from the overcrowded but familiar confines of England, to the foreign expanses of the Nova Scotia.⁶⁹ Halifax's natural advantages including a well-protected harbour and its proximity to major fishing grounds and shipping lanes eventually allowed it to progress from a colonial backwater to a major port and military base.⁷⁰ In 1848, Nova Scotia, with Halifax as its capital, became the first self-governed colony of the British Empire and it stayed that way until 1867 when it joined the Confederation as a province of Canada. Halifax was home to the Royal Navy until 1906, and subsequently acted as a launching area for Canadian soldiers in World War I. Halifax harbour was also the site of one of the most infamous events of Maritime history, if not Canadian history, when two ships collided in 1917 and subsequently exploded, levelling much of Halifax and changing the city forever. More recently, and much less infamously, Halifax was the site of the 21st G7 summit in 1995.⁷¹

Halifax has recently gone through a major transition period. In 1996, the Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) was created with the amalgamation of the cities of Halifax and Dartmouth, the town of Bedford and the municipality of the County of Halifax. The HRM is now made up of 23 municipal districts and encompasses approximately 5,577 square kilometres, which is larger than the area of Province of Prince Edward Island.⁷² Of the 900,000 people in the entire Province of Nova Scotia, upwards of 350,000 reside in the HRM (40 percent of the total population of Nova Scotia),⁷³ and the majority of people trace their roots back to the British Isles.⁷⁴

The HRM includes everything from seaside villages, to farming communities, to

suburban neighbourhoods, to urban centers. The population of the region increased 26 percent from 1971 to 2001 with the greatest percentage of this growth being experienced just outside of the urban core, in the region's suburban and rural commuter-shed areas. The HRM is the fastest growing region in Nova Scotia, and research projects that up to 100,000 new residents will live and work in the HRM by 2028.⁷⁵

Halifax is the major economic centre of the Atlantic coast, with the biggest private sector businesses of eastern Canada coast calling the city home. Agriculture, fishing, mining, forestry and natural gas extraction are major resource industries but the largest employer is the government, with both provincial and federal governments having many of their local operations based in Halifax.

In the HRM, one regional Councillor represents each of the 23 municipal districts in the HRM Council, and the Mayor is elected-at-large. At the time of writing, Peter Kelly is serving in his third term as Mayor of the HRM after being re-elected by comfortable margin over his competitors in October of 2008.⁷⁶ At the provincial level, the Progressive Conservative party currently holds a minority government with Premier Rodney MacDonald at the helm. In the last provincial election contested in 2006, MacDonald narrowly claimed victory over the New Democrats by a two seat margin (22-20). Of note is the fact that only 2 out of a possible 17 seats in the HRM were won by MacDonald and the Progressive Conservative party. On the other hand, the New Democrats were extremely successful in the HRM and claimed 13 of the possible 17 seats.⁷⁷ Prior to MacDonald being in power, Dr. John Hamm, a fellow Tory, held a minority government before announcing his resignation in 2005.

The HRM has hosted several major sporting events, including the 2003 World

Junior Hockey Championship, the 2003 Nokia Brier, the 2004 Women's World Ice Hockey Championships, the 2007 World Indoor Lacrosse Championship, the 2008 FIBA Americas Under-21 Basketball Championship, and the 2008 Men's World Ice Hockey Championships.⁷⁸ From 1984 to 2007, Halifax was home to the Canadian Interuniversity Sport (CIS) Men's Basketball Championship, but the tournament was moved to Ottawa starting in 2008. The Canada Summer Games were held in Halifax back in 1969, and city is now poised to play host to their winter counterpart in 2011.⁷⁹

With its proximity to water, Halifax is also well known for its water sports. There are many rowing and paddling clubs dispersed throughout the region. Lake Banook, located in the district of Dartmouth, hosted the World Junior Canoe Championships in 1989, the World Senior Canoe Championships in 1997, and the World Marathon Canoe Championships in 2001. Continuing on in this tradition, at the time of writing preparations are in the final stages to host the 2009 World Senior Canoe Championships in August of 2009.

Halifax is also home to the Quebec Major Junior Hockey League's Halifax Mooseheads, as well as a semi-professional rugby team and basketball team. The HRM boasts a number of universities and colleges, most notably Dalhousie University and St. Mary's University, who each field CIS sanctioned sports teams in a variety of sports.

Although none of the sport undertakings listed above are on the scale of Commonwealth Games, they do require significant organization, management, and coordination of resources. More importantly they demonstrated a significant association between sport and Halifax, and an appetite from at least some portions of the population to bring significant sporting contests to their community.

Purpose of Study

Canada as a country has made the decision that, all things being equal, sport mega-events are a desirable and worthwhile endeavour. Commonwealth Games Canada (CGC) recently announced that it will continue to bid for future Commonwealth Games.⁸⁰ Therefore as a result, it is essential that a thorough, critical, and objective account of the events and issues surrounding the Halifax 2014 bid be completed, analyzed, and published for others to read. Upon undertaking this research, there was no such detailed scholarly account available.⁸¹ As a result, this case study filled a gap in the literature on Canadian sport mega-event bidding. More broadly, it was intended to aid future Canadian bids for sport mega-events by providing lessons and recommendations that arose from the case study at hand.

The purpose of this case study was to uncover and critically analyze the events that led up to the withdrawal of support of the bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. This objective was accomplished in two ways. First, it was necessary to lay the groundwork by telling the story of the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid. A detailed review of the Halifax bid was conducted and is representative of multiple perspectives and standpoints. It was intended that an outcome of this review would be to allow other scholars the foundation needed to apply different theoretical perspectives to the events that unfolded, and perhaps to draw further conclusions and recommendations. Second, by examining the major issues and themes that arose from the bid, insights and recommendations for future bids were made.

Method

Two qualitative research strategies were possible for studying the failed Halifax bid: a history or a case study. While the history strategy is primarily employed for examining events from the past when no relevant people are alive to report on what occurred, and when primary documents, secondary documents and other artifacts are the main sources of information, it is also sometimes employed when examining contemporary events. The case study strategy is preferred for contemporary events, and utilizes the same techniques as a history, but also offers the option of utilizing direct observation and systemic interviewing in order to gain more complete insights into events.⁸² Therefore, because it was possible to contact and interview many of the people who were involved with the Halifax bid process, the case study method was employed.

A qualitative case study seeks to describe a particular subject "...in depth and detail, holistically, and in context."⁸³ Moreover, the researcher undertook a holistic approach to the case study because it assumed "...that the whole is understood as a complex system that is greater than the sum of its parts. The analyst must search for the totality or unifying nature of particular setting – the gestalt."⁸⁴

In order to support this approach, it was important that viewpoints of the events were sought from the numerous organizations involved with the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid process. The author utilized a multi-method approach by collecting documents, archival records, newspaper articles, and any other forms of pertinent written material available as well as by conducting interviews with representatives from each pertinent organization listed in Table 2. A combination of numerous sources of data was relied upon to test the credibility of the information gained

in this study.⁸⁵

The author utilized a purposive sampling protocol in order to gain participants for the interviews. This form of nonprobabilistic sampling whereby the investigator determines the selection of any person from the population, was used in order to shed light on the questions under study and to provide greater insight and understanding to the overall research.⁸⁶ Whereas probability-based random sampling would have allowed more confident generalization to a larger population by controlling selectivity errors, purposeful sampling yielded in-depth understanding of the specific case.⁸⁷

Organization	Participant #1	Participant #2
Halifax Regional Municipality	Peter Kelly <i>(Mayor)</i>	Sue Uteck <i>(Deputy Mayor)</i>
Province of Nova Scotia	Duff Montgomerie <i>(Assistant Deputy Minister of the Department of Health Promotion and Protection)</i>	Tracey Williams <i>(Executive Lead of the Games Secretariat in the Department of Health Promotion and Protection)</i>
Commonwealth Games Canada	Dr. Andrew Pipe <i>(President)</i>	Thomas Jones <i>(CEO)</i>
Commonwealth Games Federation	Bruce Robertson <i>(Vice-President)</i>	-
Canadian Federal Government	Tom Scrimger <i>(Director General of Sport Canada)</i>	Élaine Harvey <i>(Director, Major Games and Hosting Division of Sport Canada)</i>
Halifax 2014 Bid Committee	Tony Holding <i>(Senior Director of Strategic Relations)</i>	Patrick Jarvis <i>(Senior Director)</i>
The Chronicle Herald	Dan Leger <i>(Director of News Content)</i>	-

Table 2: Pertinent Organizations and Interview Participants

Qualitative, in-depth,⁸⁸ semi-structured interviews were conducted with each of the individuals listed in Table 2 in person whenever possible, and by phone as a second

option. An interview guide was developed with insights generated from academic and non-academic literature, as well as from thoughts and areas that the author believed could be of importance. In adopting the semi-structured format, there were a set of questions to cover, but each was rephrased to suit the respondent, and the interviewee was probed further depending on their response.⁸⁹ The probes were used to "...deepen the response to a question, increase the richness and depth of responses, and to give cues to the interviewee about the level of response that [was] desired."⁹⁰ Furthermore, the interview style was "...conversational, flexible and fluid, and the purpose [was] achieved through active engagement by interviewer and interviewee around relevant issues, topics and experiences during the interview itself."⁹¹ As a whole, this interview format allowed the author to gain "...contrasting and complementary talk on the same theme or issue."⁹²

The first portion of the interviews was used to gain demographic information on the subject including name, current position and organization, and the position and organization that were occupied during the time period under review. The second portion was directed at uncovering how each organization listed in Table 2 was involved in the evolution of the bid from the time it was started until its final withdrawal. The last portion of the interview was used to gain reflections on how a similar bid could succeed in the future. The complete interview guide for this case study is provided in Appendix I. It was tested and verified for its effectiveness by a panel of experts, which was also the researcher's advisory council.

Once the interviews were complete, the information was transcribed into a word processor verbatim. Both the interview transcriptions and the documents obtained were then analyzed using content analysis, a process referring to the "...qualitative data

reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative material and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings.”⁹³ Inductive analysis, the practice of discovering patterns within the data rather than using a pre-determined framework with which to examine the data, was used throughout the analysis process. Information to tell the story of the bid was reported chronologically, combining responses gained from the different sources of data, in order to gain a holistic view of the events that occurred. Recurrent themes and issues were then analyzed.

Historically, the case study method of qualitative scientific research has been often criticized. Donald Campbell, one of the more direct in his characterization of case studies stated, “[Such] studies have such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value...Any appearance of absolute knowledge, or intrinsic knowledge about singular isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis.”⁹⁴ However, more recent academic literature noted that when the objective is to gain as much knowledge about a specific phenomenon or event, specifically, an atypical or extreme event as in the case of the Halifax bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, a case study will clarify the deeper causes behind a given problem more than will a representative sample.⁹⁵ Also contradictory to the conventional wisdom on case study research, “One can often generalize on the basis of a single case, and the case study may be central to scientific development via generalization as a supplement or alternative to other methods.”⁹⁶ While studying a critical case, specifically one that is particularly information-rich as was the case under study, logical generalizations can be made based on the weight of evidence produced.⁹⁷ Moreover, confidence in generalizations to other cases depends on

their proximal similarity in treatments, settings, populations, and outcomes with respect to the original case.⁹⁸

All research seeks to be credible and meaningful. Credible research strategies require the researcher to adopt a neutral stance, and not to begin the study to prove a certain perspective or to manipulate the data towards any predetermined conclusions. Qualitative inquiry, largely because of its inherent human component, requires the investigator to carefully reflect on, deal with, and report all potential sources of error.⁹⁹ Systemic data collection procedures, multiple data sources and triangulation, each aided to increase the researcher's neutrality and therefore the credibility and neutrality of this case study. Researcher pre-dispositions and biases are discussed in the limitations of study section.

Limitations of Study

The case study of the 2014 Halifax Commonwealth Games bid was limited in several ways. Document retrieval was a barrier encountered in attempts to analyze the bid. As some documents were not available to the public and unpublished, gaining access to primary and secondary resources was challenging. Also, some documents were found to be incomplete or inaccurate. Further, the author encountered individuals who were not willing to share private and possibly sensitive organizational information with the researcher, and eventually the public. In some instances, as the author forged a relationship with the participant this barrier was minimized, in others it was an ongoing concern.

Another limitation was encountered in the interviews. Some individuals were

more willing to speak openly and freely on the subject than others, for a variety of reasons. The purposive sampling technique utilized in this study allowed the researcher to somewhat alleviate this limitation as participants able and willing to speak on the subject were actively sought.

In addition, there were instances when different participants gave conflicting information and testimony. To a certain extent, multiple data sources and triangulation helped to alleviate this problem, but on the few occasions where information from two different sources was directly conflicting, it limited the possible understanding gained of the events.

Admittedly, the researcher held an optimistic view of both sport and the effects of sport mega-events on the communities that hold them, assuming they are organized with proper due diligence and a future legacy outlook. With that being said, the purpose of this research was not to debate the inherent values of sport mega-events, it was to investigate one specific bid for a sport mega-event, and what lessons for future bids could be gleaned from it. For that reason, this was not a major limitation to the study.

Delimitations of Study

Yin defined a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and in which multiple sources of evidence will be used.”¹⁰⁰ Other definitions further qualify what is meant by the term. Cresswell specified that a case study must be bounded by time and place, and that the context of the case must be situated within its physical, historical, social and/or economic setting.¹⁰¹

Using these definitions, this case study was delimited in several ways. Temporally, the study was defined from when Halifax officially indicated interest in contesting the domestic bid phase of the bid process on April 18th, 2005, to when the HRM and the PNS withdrew their support for the bid on March 8th, 2007. A contextualization of circumstances leading up to the bid and a limited analysis of the immediate fallout after the bid was withdrawn was also undertaken.

Since there were so many different groups and organizations involved in the bid process, interviewing every member of each of the organizations was impossible and unrealistic given the timeframe for the completion of this project. Therefore, the research was delimited to include interviews with a minimum of one and ideally two of the most prominent individuals from each of the pertinent organizations outlined in Table 2 (page 23). Information obtained from the different sources was collected and cross-referenced for reliability and accuracy.

Chapter 1 - Endnotes

¹ Halifax, the Halifax Regional Municipality and the HRM are used interchangeably in this thesis.

² Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990* (Victoria, Canada: Orca Book Publishers, 1994), 1.

³ Robert Johnson, *British Imperialism* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.

⁴ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 5.

⁵ These ideals are still seen in the Commonwealth Games or the “Friendly Games.”

⁶ Robert Johnson, *British Imperialism* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 210.

⁷ J. A. Mangan, *The Games Ethic and Imperialism* (New York, NY: Viking, 1986), 153.

⁸ Morris Mott, “The British Protestant Pioneers and the Establishment of Manly Sports in Manitoba, 1870-1886,” *Journal of Sport History* 7, no. 3 (1980), 29.

⁹ Krishnan Srinivasan, *The Rise, Decline and Future of the British Commonwealth* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 127.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 143.

¹² Philippa Levine, *The British Empire: Sunrise to Sunset* (Harlow, UK: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 207.

¹³ Robert Johnson, *British Imperialism* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1.

¹⁴ Commonwealth Games Federation, *What is the Commonwealth*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/faq/faq3.asp> (accessed June 20, 2008).

¹⁵ A Greek poet named Panagiotis Soutsos first made mention of a revival of the Olympic Games in his poem *Dialogue of the Dead* in 1833. Evangelos Zappas was a Greek businessman and philanthropist who, inspired by the writings of Soutsos, funded several Olympic meetings in Greece between 1859 and 1875. Dr. William Penny Brookes was an English physician who founded the Wenlock Olympian Society in 1860, and organized annual “Olympian Games” in his small town of Much Wenlock, England. After visiting one of these meetings in 1890, Baron Pierre de Coubertin founded the modern Olympic Movement in 1894, and served as its President from 1896-1925.

¹⁶ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 7. Cooper's vision was for these contests to feature military and literary contests in addition to sport.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 7. The Games Cooper proposed definitely did not include the coloured people of the Empire. There is little doubt that Cooper would not think much of the multiculturalism that is inherent of today's Commonwealth Games. In fact, as documented by Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 8, in the June 1908 edition of *the Nineteenth Century*, Cooper lamented the fact that the Olympics were such a multicultural event. He called them "a hybrid, babel gathering."

¹⁸ British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada, *Canada's Part in the British Commonwealth Games: Official Report of the British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada 1970-1974* (Montreal, Canada: British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada, 1974), 8.

¹⁹ Australasia was a combination of Australia, New Zealand, and Tasmania.

²⁰ Presented by the Earle of Lonsdale, the cup stood 2ft. 6 in high and weighed 340 ounces. It was kept in Canada until 1934 when with the approval of both the Earle and Canada, it was melted down into one principal cup and is now held by the Commonwealth Games Federation in London, England.

²¹ British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada, *Canada's Part in the British Commonwealth Games: Official Report of the British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada 1970-1974*, 10 and in Bruce Kidd, *The Struggle for Canadian Sport* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 71. Unfortunately, Crowe died on September 14th, 1929, just under a year before the first British Empire Games took place in Hamilton, Canada.

²² Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 9.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 10.

²⁶ *Ibid.* As Dheensaw wrote, "What can you say about the nerve, pluck and resolve of Bobby Robinson? Nothing, except welcome to de Coubertin-like status, Bob."

²⁷ British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada, *Canada's Part in the British Commonwealth Games: Official Report of the British Commonwealth Games Association of Canada 1970-1974*, 15.

²⁸ Like the Olympic Games, the Commonwealth Games Movement were interrupted by World War II.

²⁹ Rich Baka and David Hoy, "Political Aspects of Canadian Participation in the Commonwealth Games: 1930-1978," *Canadian Association for Health, Physical Education and Recreation Journal* 44 (1978), 6.

³⁰ The Commonwealth Games Federation is the world governing body that promotes the Commonwealth Games movement. It is the Commonwealth Games equivalent of the International Olympic Committee.

³¹ Commonwealth Games Federation, *Commonwealth Games Federation Constitution*, November 2007, <http://www.thecgf.com/about/constitution.pdf>, p.14 (accessed June 1, 2008).

³² Commonwealth Games Federation, *The Story of the Games*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/games/story.asp> (accessed June 1, 2008).

³³ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 10-11. This was not the case for the most recent Melbourne Games however; perhaps this is a sign of the declining relevance of the Commonwealth Games in Canada.

³⁴ Ivor Dent, *Getting the Games* (Canada: Ardent Enterprises, 1977), 7.

³⁵ Halifax 2014, *Canada at the Games*, 2006, www.2014halifax.com/canadagames.html (accessed June 2, 2008). At the inaugural Games in 1930, only 11 countries and 400 athletes were present. At the 1954 Vancouver Games there were 22 countries represented and 662 athletes competing, and at the 1978 Edmonton Games there were 46 countries represented and 1,475 athletes competing. At the 1994 Victoria Games, 63 countries and 2,446 athletes were present.

³⁶ Commonwealth Games Federation, *1930 British Empire Games*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/games/intro.asp?yr=1930> (accessed June 5, 2008). Women competed in only the swimming events.

³⁷ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 16-17.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 18.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Rowing was a prominent feature of the athletic program at the early Commonwealth Games. In fact, it was contested in 6 of the first 7 Games up until 1962, but then left off the program until the 1986 Games in Edinburgh, and at the time of writing, had not been contested since. Although rowing is a sport often associated with Britain, and certainly with the other prominent members of the Commonwealth like Australia, New Zealand and Canada, clearly the logistics and equipment necessary to develop and contest rowing at an international level are inhibitory for many of the smaller and less affluent nations in the Commonwealth family. As an alternative, the Commonwealth Rowing Association was formed in 1986, and has since organized Commonwealth Rowing Championships each quadrennial as single-sport events, outside of the Commonwealth Games. Championships were held in London, Canada in 1994 and 1999, in Nottingham, England in 2002, and at Strathclyde Park, Scotland in 2006.

⁴² Commonwealth Games Federation, *1954 British Empire & Commonwealth Games*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/games/intro.asp?yr=1954> (accessed June 8, 2008).

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 56.

⁴⁵ Jason Beck, "The Forgotten Games: Fifth British Empire and Commonwealth Games, Vancouver, 1954," *Sport History Review* 35, (2004), 53. There was a lot of discussion and anger about building the pool in Point Grey (at UBC) rather than at a more accessible location for the entire Vancouver population. It was clear that Vancouver residents were concerned about the legacy effects of the Games. In the end, the pool was built at UBC because of a lack of alternatives and a looming deadline.

⁴⁶ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 54.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 51. Ifeajuna, who was a 168cm, 19 year-old medical student from Nigeria, won the competition by jumping 206cm. Unfortunately, he was later executed in Biafra for plots against the military.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 48. As is mentioned in Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 49, "Instead of being the gallant, strong runner people expected to bolt into the stadium, this figure looked pathetic – almost like a rag doll – as he tottered and wobbled down the ramp on bony legs that were about to buckle." He was suffering from extreme dehydration and heat exhaustion by the time he reached the stadium, and made a heroic effort to finish the last 385 yards. Falling and picking himself up upwards of ten times, he eventually made it across what he thought was the finish line and collapsed into English team trainer Mick Mayes. Unfortunately it was only the finish line for the mile, the finish line for the marathon was on the other side of the track over 200 yards away. Officially, Peters was disqualified because he received assistance from Mayes. His effort to overcome when all is lost was a spectacle that was referred to as both revolting and inspiring.

⁴⁹ Jim Kerney, *Champions: A British Columbia Sports Album* (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre Ltd, 1985), 94.

⁵⁰ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 44.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁵² Jason Beck, "The Forgotten Games: Fifth British Empire and Commonwealth Games, Vancouver, 1954," *Sport History Review* 35, (2004), 50.

⁵³ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 57. England won the medal count with 67 medals, to Australia's 48. Canada was 4th with 35.

⁵⁴ As Jason Beck described in, "The Forgotten Games: Fifth British Empire and Commonwealth Games, Vancouver, 1954," *Sport History Review* 35, (2004), 44, these Games featured the first cinder track in Canada (generally regarded as the best in the world at the time), walkie-talkies and megaphones employed by the judges, and electronic timing.

⁵⁵ Commonwealth Games Federation, *1954 British Empire & Commonwealth Games*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/games/intro.asp?yr=1954> (accessed June 8, 2008).

⁵⁶ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 121.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Commonwealth Games Federation, *1978 Commonwealth Games*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/games/intro.asp?yr=1978> (accessed June 9, 2008).

⁵⁹ Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 122.

⁶⁰ Noel Stuart and A.A. Ryan, *An Official History: The Friendly Games: the XI Commonwealth Games, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Aug 3-12, 1978* (Edmonton, Alberta: Stuart Brandle Printing Services Ltd., 1980), 44.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 43. Another interesting occurrence at these Games was in the light-welterweight boxing final. Only 30 seconds into the 1st round of the fight, Jimmy Douglas of Scotland collapsed to the canvas near his corner, of an ailment totally unrelated to the match. His opponent Winfield Braithwaite of Guyana stepped back very confused, and even the referee Trevor Hill was confused for a brief second. It was later determined that Douglas was suffering from a severe stomach cramp. Hill kneeled beside him to count him out and just as the cramp subsided, Douglas jumped back up to his fighting stance. Unfortunately it was just a few seconds too late. Braithwaite was awarded the gold medal, in the easiest bout he ever fought.

⁶² Cleve Dheensaw, *The Commonwealth Games: The First 60 Years 1930-1990*, 134. [Brackets mine.]

⁶³ Noel Stuart and A.A. Ryan, *An Official History: The Friendly Games: the XI Commonwealth Games, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, Aug 3-12*, 17-18.

⁶⁴ Commonwealth Games Federation, *1994 Commonwealth Games*, n.d., <http://www.thecgf.com/games/intro.asp?yr=1994> (accessed June 9, 2008).

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ The Maritimes consist of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island. Contrary to popular belief, the Province of Newfoundland is not part of the Maritimes.

⁶⁷ Paul Karr, *Frommer's Nova Scotia, New Brunswick & Prince Edward Island*. 6th ed. (Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley Publishing, 2006), 10.

⁶⁸ Lesley Choyce, *Nova Scotia – Shaped by the Sea* (East Lawrencetown, Nova Scotia: Pottersfield Press, 2007), 96-97.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁰ Paul Karr, *Frommer's Nova Scotia, New Brunswick & Prince Edward Island*. 6th ed., 86.

⁷¹ For more information, see Halifax Summit, *Halifax G7 Summit 1995*, June 17, 1995, <http://www.chebucto.ns.ca/Current/HalifaxSummitG7/> (accessed January 3, 2009). The G7 is the meeting of the finance ministers from the following 7 industrialized nations: France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. It was a major event in Halifax's history to be awarded this economic congress.

⁷² Halifax Regional Municipality, *Regional Planning*, August 25, 2006, <http://halifax.ca/regionalplanning/Region/region.html> (accessed December 23, 2008).

⁷³ Statistics Canada, *Community Profiles: Halifax*, December 22, 2008, <http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/profiles/community/Details/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=CSD&Code1=1209034&Geo2=PR&Code2=12&Data=Count&SearchText=Halifax&SearchType=Begins&SearchPR=12&B1=All&Custom=> (accessed December 23, 2008).

⁷⁴ Colleen Abdullah, ed., *Nova Scotia*. 7th ed. (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Formac Publishing, 2007), 11.

⁷⁵ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Regional Planning*, August 25, 2006, <http://halifax.ca/regionalplanning/Region/region.html> (accessed December 23rd, 2008).

⁷⁶ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Kelly wins 3rd term as Halifax mayor*, October 19, 2008, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/nova-scotia/story/2008/10/18/hrm-municipal-election.html> (accessed January 11, 2008). Elections occur every leap year (once every four years).

⁷⁷ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Nova Scotia Votes 2006: District Profiles*, June 13, 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/nsvotes2006/ridings/> (accessed January 9, 2008).

⁷⁸ The 2008 World Ice Hockey Championships were shared between Halifax and Quebec City.

⁷⁹ Atlantic Canada has hosted many editions of the Canada Summer Games and the Canada Winter Games. In addition to those mentioned with reference to Halifax, the Canada Summer Games have been hosted by St. John's (Newfoundland) in 1977, St. John (New Brunswick) in 1985, and will be hosted in 2009 by the Province of Prince Edward Island as a whole. The Canada Winter Games have been hosted by Sydney (Nova Scotia) in 1987, by Charlottetown (Prince Edward Island) in 1991, by Corner Brook (Newfoundland) in 1999, and by Bathurst/Campbellton (New Brunswick) in 2003.

⁸⁰ Commonwealth Games Canada, *CGC Intends to Bid for Future Commonwealth Games*, May 30, 2008, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/Corporate/index_e.aspx?articleID=1508 (accessed June 9, 2008). Commonwealth Games Canada CEO Thomas Jones mentioned in the interview for this research, "We want to learn, and do it better next time." Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁸¹ Commonwealth Games Canada commissioned their own independent review by the Public Policy Forum, a not-for-profit organization "aimed at improving the quality of government in Canada through better dialogue between the public, private and voluntary sectors." The study was conducted in the fall of 2007 and completed in January 2008. Commonwealth Games Canada, *The Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games: Building on the Halifax Experience*, n.d., http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/Corporate/index_e.aspx?articleID=1575 (accessed March 17, 2009).

⁸² Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1989), 19.

⁸³ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 55.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

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- ⁸⁶ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* 3rd ed., 230.
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Erik Rasmussen, Per Ostergaard and Suzanne Beckmann, *Essentials of Social Science Research Methodology* (Odense, Denmark: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2006), 99. The authors suggest that the lower time limit is 30 minutes for such an interview in order to treat the subject with adequate depth.
- ⁸⁹ Judith Green, "Qualitative Interviewing," in *Principles of Social Research*, rev. ed., ed. Judith Green and John Browne (Berkshire, England: Open University Press, 2005), 54.
- ⁹⁰ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* 3rd ed., 372. [Brackets mine.]
- ⁹¹ Jennifer Mason, "Qualitative Interviewing: Asking, Listening, and Interpreting," in *Qualitative Research in Action*, rev. ed., ed. Tim May (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 225. [Brackets mine.]
- ⁹² Tim Rapley, "Interviews," in *Qualitative Research Practice*, rev. ed., ed. Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 18.
- ⁹³ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* 3rd ed., 453.
- ⁹⁴ Donald T. Campbell and J.C. Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), 6-7. [Brackets mine.]
- ⁹⁵ Bent Flyvbjerg, "Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research," in *Qualitative Research Practice*, rev. ed., ed. Clive Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium and David Silverman (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004), 425.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid.
- ⁹⁷ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* 3rd ed., 237.
- ⁹⁸ William R. Shadish, "The Logic of Generalization: Five Principles Common to Experiments and Ethnographies," *American Journal of Community Psychology* 23, no.3 (1995), 424.
- ⁹⁹ M. Patton, *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods* 3rd ed., 51.

¹⁰⁰ Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1989), 23. Also contained in Robert K. Yin, "The Case Study Crisis: Some Answers," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 26, (1981), 58-59.

¹⁰¹ John W. Cresswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among the Five Traditions* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1998), 61.

CHAPTER 2 - Review of the Literature

Preamble

Before undertaking a case study of the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid, a review of relevant scholarly literature was warranted. First, it was necessary to qualify the term mega-event, and to explain how the Commonwealth Games fit into this definition. Beyond this contextualization, it was important to analyze why cities wish to host sport mega-events such as the Commonwealth Games, and how cities go about achieving this outcome. Next, a review of relevant sport mega-event literature was undertaken, followed by an examination of two specific works produced on the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid. Finally, Sport Canada's *Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events* (2000) was examined to describe how the Government of Canada supported cities that bid to host a sport mega-event.

Mega-Events – A Definition

“Mega-events,” otherwise referred to in the literature as “hallmark events” or “special events,” are discussed in a wide variety of academic fields and contexts. Roche defined them as:

...large scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance. They are typically organized by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organizations and thus can be said to be important elements in ‘official’ versions of public culture.¹

They are major fairs, festivals, expositions, cultural and sporting events that are held on either a regular or one-off basis.² The Commonwealth Games certainly fit these definitions, as do the much larger and more widely discussed, Olympic Games.

Sport mega-events can be divided into three categories. “First order” events include only the Olympic Games and football’s World Cup. In comparison, “third order” sport mega-events are regional or continental in scope, and include the Asian and Pan American Games, the African Cup of Nations and the America’s Cup. “Second order” mega-events fall somewhere in the middle, still very international in scope but with a lower participation level and profile than the first order events. Cornelissen noted that the World Cups of Cricket and Rugby, and more importantly to this research, the Commonwealth Games, are considered second order sport mega-events.³

Mega-events affect both people at a personal level, and countries as a whole. Personally, people use mega-events as temporal and cultural markers within their lives,⁴ thus showing that there is a significant impact from either witnessing or somehow being a part of these events. Moreover, “...the staging of international mega-events was and remains important in the ‘story of a country’, a people, a nation,” and “...their national historical importance can be gauged by the fact that...mega-events have occurred in all periods of a modern nation’s history, from the good times to the bad times.”⁵

The Mechanics and Reasoning Behind Hosting a Sport Mega-Event

The hosting of a sport mega-event is the result of a process involving a local bid committee, local and national politicians, and national and international sport governing bodies. There is usually a domestic bid phase in which the national sport body, in this case Commonwealth Games Canada, having decided that it would like to bring the specific mega-event to its country, calls for bids from cities across the country and eventually chooses one city. This winner of the domestic bid phase then competes in the

international bid phase against other cities from around the world. The winner is chosen by the international sport governing body, in this case the Commonwealth Games Federation. Throughout both the domestic and international bid phases, the local bid committee and politicians play an integral role in “championing” the bid both at home and abroad.

The desire to host mega-events is often controversial because they are normally an extremely expensive endeavour. To make up the gap between monies earned during *the hosting of the event and the actual cost of staging the event*, there are four possible funding sources: the local government and the city itself, the regional or provincial government, the national government, and the private sector. Mega-events like the Olympic or Commonwealth Games can be funded exclusively by the public or private sectors, or through a mix of both. Costs are usually shared to a certain extent between the different levels of government, but are usually primarily funded by the taxpayers; therefore, it is very important for such undertakings to be well supported by the local residents. If politicians proceed in allocating tax dollars for a mega-event that is not supported by their electorate, it is likely that those same politicians could pay a hefty price in the next election.

Easton’s analysis of a political system explains the interactions between the various stakeholders involved in the bidding process of mega-events (see Figure 1). The environment, both residents and sport governing bodies, have demands that drive the political machinery. In the context of a sport mega-event, if the political system and bid committee produce the output of a sport mega-event (or as in the case study at hand, they don’t), the environment notices the output through the feedback loop, and then supports

or does not support the very same political system. In essence, if the demand-stimulus leads to a satisfying response-outcome from the political institutions, the environment will continue to support the political system.⁶




Figure 1: Simplified Dynamic Response Model of a Political System Source⁷

The Olympic Games have demonstrated a wide variety of funding arrangements,⁸ the most noteworthy being the 1984 Los Angeles Games. When the citizens of Los

Angeles refused to take on the financial burden associated with the festival, Games organizer Peter Ueberroth established a corporate entity to do so. Proponents of mega-events often cite the financial windfall experienced by this corporate group, and ultimately by the City of Los Angeles, in order to sell their city on hosting a major Games.

It has been argued that regime theory helps to explain why cities pursue mega-events in the first place. An urban regime is defined as the "...informal arrangement by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions,"⁹ and Burbank, Andranovich and Heying argued that the pursuit of mega-events is largely inexplicable outside of regime theory.¹⁰ The theory stated that a key motivation for the power elite, the corporate leaders and the politicians of a city, to pursue such an event is the desire to make their city world class, capable of hosting an event of massive scope and magnitude. Events like the Olympics (and the Commonwealth Games to a smaller extent) promise short-term tourism revenue, but more importantly, "...national and international recognition for the city in an increasingly global competition for investment capital."¹¹ Indeed, hallmark mega-events have been often credited with mobilizing corporate elites and local politicians in profitable alliances that not only helped the local construction, retail, and tourist industries, but also successfully landed substantial infrastructure funding from higher levels of government.¹²

Preuss has often written on cities' objectives of bidding for the Olympics. The main reasons cited were economic goals through increasing international awareness of the city, creating a positive image, maximizing short-term profit, promoting the municipal economy or improving urban infrastructure. He argued that if a city is only

interested in promoting its positive image, and short-term profit, the investment could be relatively cheap; on the other hand, if the aim is more long term, of promoting the economy and bringing about infrastructure improvements, it can only be achieved with a significant investment, one that is not likely covered exclusively through revenue of the Games.¹³ Indeed, objectives set out in long-term urban development plans can be achieved within comparatively short periods of time with the help of the Olympic Games,¹⁴ and by extension, the Commonwealth Games.

Relatively little academic research has investigated the intricacies of successful sport mega-event bids. Westerbeek et al. have attempted to bridge this gap in the literature by undergoing empirical research and subsequently developing a list of eight factors that were deemed critical to the bidding process (in decreasing order of importance): ability to organize the event, political support, infrastructure, existing facilities, communication and exposure, accountability, bid team composition, and relationship marketing. Of note is the fact that the four most important factors on the list (ability to organize the event, political support, infrastructure, existing facilities) are all operational aspects of an event and are likely to be relatively comparable from bid to bid assuming that there is a sufficient financial commitment from the bidding city. The bid intangibles represented in the remaining four factors on the list (communication and exposure, accountability, bid team composition, and relationship marketing) are likely to be the differentiating factors between bids and to produce a competitive advantage for one of the bidding cities. The implications of such research are important for bid organizers, and should be treated as a first point of reference when preparing bids.¹⁵

As a result of the increasingly monstrous scale of first order sport mega-events, and the limited number of global cities capable of hosting them, the competition for second and third order events has been increasing.¹⁶ Cities bidding for these smaller sport events are either smaller jurisdictions for whom these lesser events are all can be reasonably aspired to (Halifax, Glasgow, Edmonton etc...), or they are emerging cities and countries using the smaller event as a springboard for future Olympic or World Cup of football bids (Kuala Lumpur, New Delhi, South Africa).¹⁷ Despite the increasing number of bids for these smaller events, there still remains a fairly limited base of scholarly literature devoted to anything other than first order sport mega-events. With that in mind, the body of knowledge with respect to the “Goliaths” of sport mega-events can be used as a base for the discussion herein; although, in certain instances may need to be moderated to fit the “David” that is the Commonwealth Games.

Sport Mega-Event Literature Review

In his 2003 examination of the effects of the 1988 Olympic Winter Games on the city of Calgary, Church suggested that historically there have been two primary avenues for the study of mega-events¹⁸: one that centers on their anthropological or cultural significance,¹⁹ and another that focuses on them from a tourism management viewpoint.²⁰ Furthermore, Church noted that while much of the early academic literature on mega-events solely addressed potential economic costs and benefits, more recently an increasing number of authors have attempted to address their full impact to the host city and its citizens. To this day, Church’s observations remain accurate and the following

section will explore relevant academic literature in order to provide a basis for the case study on the most recent Canadian bid to host the Commonwealth Games.

Sport tourism is a concept that has received considerable attention in recent years with respect to mega sporting events.²¹ Defined as "...a social, economic and cultural phenomenon arising from the unique interaction of activity, people and place,"²² it is often mentioned as one of the positive outcomes of hosting a major Games. More specifically, "Olympic tourism" was once thought to solely comprise those who visit the host city during the Games (e.g. coaches, athletes, officials, spectators), but it has now been established as those who visit the city as a result of its Olympic associations from the time the city wins the bid, to potentially 10-15 years after the fact.²³ When major Games tourists return home, stories of their experiences trigger a multiplier effect of visitors by motivating others to travel to that country.²⁴ One could assume that such impacts are also present after the Commonwealth Games, but likely to a smaller extent.

Either while bidding for major Games or as a post event wrap-up, economic impact assessments of the Games are often used to legitimize public spending. In Canada, the Sport Tourism Economic Impact Model (STEAM) is the most commonly used model. It calculates the provincial and regional economic impacts of sport tourism on the basis of capital and operating expenditures for goods, services and employee salaries, and tourist spending within a designated tourism sector. The model was used to deem the 2006 Brandon Special Olympics Canada Summer Games a success as a result of it producing an increase in economic activity of nearly \$2.1 million throughout the Province of Manitoba, of which nearly \$1.3 million occurred in Brandon.²⁵ Such assessments have often been criticized for their methodology, with some authors arguing

that their use results in inflated benefit estimates for the host city.²⁶ Some have noted that a better understanding of visitor demographics of the particular mega-event will enable a better estimation of economic impact.²⁷ Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter noted:

Mega project development today is not a field of what has been called 'honest numbers'. It is a field where you will see one group of professionals calling the work of another not only 'biased' and 'seriously flawed' but a 'grave embarrassment' to the profession. And that is when things have not yet turned unfriendly.²⁸

In addition to the direct initial tourism generated for the host city, major Games are said to have a long-term cultural effect on the image of the city to tourists and investors, both domestically and internationally. Some have argued that such benefits are usually only short lived,²⁹ and difficult to prove;³⁰ however, "in the modern global economy, in which major world cities compete for investment, the Olympics represent a unique publicity platform and opportunity for place marketing."³¹ For example, awareness of the city of Seoul and its improved infrastructure following the 1988 Olympic Summer Games both stimulated foreign industry and increased the sales of national products on foreign markets.³² It has been concluded that of utmost importance for a host city is to manage the single impact a Games provides to change its structure and provide a basis for further impacts in order to trigger a self sustaining process.³³

Recently, the potential for business leveraging has been more widely discussed with respect to sport mega-event hosting.³⁴ O'Brien discussed the Business Club of Australia, a unique initiative launched in conjunction with the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games for business networking and international trade facilitation. The fact that individuals from this organization have been recruited to lead other similar initiatives at subsequent mega-events, and the fact that more of such initiatives are being undertaken,

was seen as a possible paradigm shift on the part of mega-event organizers towards more sustainable economic benefits for host cities of the events.³⁵ O'Brien concluded:

Integrated strategic leveraging recognizes that the event itself is not the intervention, but rather represents a temporally limited set of opportunities to foster and nurture longer-term outcomes. Indeed, mega-events and the opportunities they present are merely the seed capital; what hosts do with the capital is the key to realizing sustainable longer-term legacies.³⁶

Sport mega-events often act as a catalyst for urban change and renewal, perhaps the best example of which was the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Summer Games, or more recently the 2002 Manchester Commonwealth Games.³⁷ In the case of Barcelona, the city was hit hard by economic recessions in the decades prior to the Games, and used the Olympics as a way to reinvent itself. Transformations for the Games involved redeveloping certain areas, modernizing transportation systems, and re-designing landscapes that will affect all future growth of the city.³⁸ Olympic Games held since 1960 have increasingly been used as a catalyst for urban change and renewal through the provision of new stadiums, road systems, public transport, air terminals, urban renewal, tourist and cultural facilities and the beautification of local parks and landscapes.³⁹ Many of these projects would have happened anyways, but the Olympics and other mega-events were used as an opportunity "...to fund and bring forward long-term plans which would otherwise remain in the pending file for many years. In this way, the Olympics may be said to accelerate change rather than initiate it."⁴⁰

The creation of volunteer opportunities has been often cited as an outcome of hosting mega-events, and many authors have examined the subject in mega-event literature.⁴¹ For example, as part of the legacy for the 2002 Manchester Commonwealth Games, a pool of potential volunteers within the northwest region of the United Kingdom

was developed. These Games in particular encouraged people who had never volunteered to do so for the first time.⁴² The uniqueness and excitement of the event, and the association with sport were all cited as motivations for volunteering. Moreover, the results suggested that helping the community also played a strong factor in motivating volunteers.⁴³ The Post Games Volunteer Project was established with the knowledge that volunteerism makes a positive contribution to citizenship and communities.⁴⁴ Overall it was concluded that there was "...strong evidence that a large-scale sports tourism event can act as a catalyst to recruit and develop community oriented volunteering, as well as build capacity in the volunteering sector which can be engaged in later events tourism," if planned for and managed correctly.⁴⁵

Mega-events in relation to the broad topic of globalization has also seen increased discussion in the literature as of late. As they are controlled by economic interests, and reinforce many cultural and ideological signifiers, mega-events are simultaneously driven by globalization and promoting globalization.⁴⁶ They address, at least in theory, two of the major challenges facing regions, states and communities with respect to globalization: the need to adapt to external pressures for global competitiveness, and the reinforcement of a sense of collective unity and pride in one's home country and city.⁴⁷ Some have argued that the pursuit of major sporting events has become a politico-economic strategy of "...increasing, almost irresistible appeal for [some cities] under conditions of globalization," and called for more scrutiny and systematic research into the benefits of these sport mega-events.⁴⁸

When a mega-event is hosted in a "peripheral" or regional city like Halifax, in addition to bolstering national identity and pride, it is also an opportunity for

proclamations of civic and regional identities and to signal the emergence of a regional city on to the national and global economies.⁴⁹ The success of mega-events, beyond the profit or loss shown in the accounting figures, is whether the event succeeded at repositioning the once peripheral city as a global one, and in attracting the international tourism and investment that such a status implies. The historical experience on this seems to be mixed.⁵⁰

Preuss described the winners and losers of an Olympic bid. He outlined the winners as the local politicians who reallocated the money flowing into their city treasury to their political priorities, the construction industry and the city's general population, many of whom benefited from the general upswing in economic activity. He noted that losers of bids are usually the poor, because hosting the Games means that other social projects can be crowded out and because facilities for the Games are usually constructed in areas of lower income housing.⁵¹ Some governments use the Olympics as a chance to dispel socially disadvantaged groups from the city as they contradict the image that the city wishes to portray of a tourist destination.⁵²

A successful mega-event can create "psychological income" such as feelings of pride and unity both locally and nationally,⁵³ but many still argue against mega-events citing that their hosting runs the risk of deepening social polarization in the city.⁵⁴ In the end, whether a city is suitable to bid for a sport mega-event depends primarily on the amount of infrastructure required and whether this infrastructure is in line with the city's long-term development plans.⁵⁵ The debate over the net worth of sport mega-events for Canada is likely to continue for some time to come, especially as Canada prepares to host the 2010 Olympic Winter Games.

***Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events:
Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games***
by James Wildsmith

James Wildsmith, while studying at Dalhousie University in Halifax, completed his Master of Development Economics by publishing his thesis work in September of 2006. Of particular interest to him was to uncover and critically analyze the debate surrounding the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid. It was the first piece of scholarly literature released on the Halifax Commonwealth Games bid, and was published just over six months before the bid was officially withdrawn. Given that timeframe, Wildsmith had no idea that the bid was in any kind of peril. In trying to determine if hosting the Games would have benefited the city, he mentioned:

It takes a large outlay of resources to successfully host the Games. This massive use of resources has caused the polarization of residents into those that support the Games and those that do not. Those that support the Games often cite from a long list of benefits that are associated with hosting a major sporting event for their justification. Examples of such benefits are a boost to the economy and tourism, infrastructure improvements, urban regeneration, improved city image and social benefits. They usually back this justification with a dollar figure that quantifies the benefits. On the other hand, those that oppose hosting such a major sporting event tend to talk about the allocation of resources and the other possible uses of finances. Those that oppose hosting of a major sporting event tend to accuse the bid committee of understating the cost of an event and overstating the benefits.⁵⁶

Wildsmith's thesis critiqued the economic model most often used by bid committees to quantify the benefits associated with the Games, the Economic Impact Analysis (EIA) method. This method indicates, "...how projects like the construction of new facilities, or activities like tourism, directly and indirectly affects demand for different goods. However, they (EIAs) neither attempt to estimate the value or benefit of what is produced, nor the economic cost of producing it."⁵⁷ An EIA analysis "traces spending through an economy and measures the cumulative effects of that spending."⁵⁸ It

does not take into account the fact that economic impacts, which are seen in the hosting of major Games, "...may simply change the regional and sectoral mix of economic activity in the province."⁵⁹ This redistribution would result in a positive economic impact for the region in question, but would not take into the account the opportunity cost lost in other areas.⁶⁰ In addition, this model does not include any costs incurred once the organizing committee is disbanded (i.e. it does not take into account the continuing operating costs associated with the infrastructure produced) and treats spending as a benefit. According to Wildsmith, it seems that bid committees prefer this method because it overstates the economic benefits of hosting a major Games.

On the other hand, Wildsmith suggested that the cost/benefit assessment approach is superior because "it allows for the evaluation of many options at the same time, including a broad range of factors and gives a clear answer to the question of whether a project is expected to deliver net benefits."⁶¹ This method takes into account the opportunity costs of a particular outlay of resources, thus painting a broader picture of the expected implications for the entire lifespan of the project (i.e. from the original bid to the legacy effects) for a particular investment. The other main difference is that it treats spending as a cost rather than a benefit.

Of major importance, is that the two methods of project appraisal explained by Wildsmith result in different evaluations of the same projects,⁶² mainly because of the differing definitions of the terms cost and benefit. According to Wildsmith, the cost/benefit analysis would be much more appropriate for the evaluation of a major Games' potential effects, but he acknowledged that such an assessment is virtually impossible to conduct because of the amount of data required, and the long-term term

timeframe that the assessment must take into account.⁶³ As a result, he proffered that a different method of determining the viability of hosting the Commonwealth Games is needed and contended that such an analysis should include an investigation of urban regeneration, urban agglomeration, investment, tourism, social benefits, distribution of benefits, and employment.⁶⁴

Wildsmith also reviewed the STEAM model used in the domestic stage to calculate Halifax's economic benefits.⁶⁵ As a form of the EIA, he noted it is "...plagued by the same inherent errors..." whereby costs are treated as benefits and opportunity costs are ignored, and gross spending is used in place of net change.⁶⁶ By using a visitor profile to determine visitor spending and combining this with capital and operational expenditures to produce an overall expenditure profile, the STEAM model generates an estimated output for total expenditure, new net economic activity (GDP), wages, salaries and taxes, but does not provide a method of determining whether the project is worth undertaking.⁶⁷ The STEAM model used in the domestic phase of the Halifax bid estimated that the 2014 Commonwealth Games would have generated \$2 billion dollars worth of benefits for Halifax, but at the time of Wildsmith's writing, the entire study had not been released for public scrutiny.⁶⁸ Despite this, in knowing the apparent flaws in the EIA, Wildsmith concluded that the \$2 billion benefit claimed by the study was significantly overstated (it would actually be closer to \$498 million), and that the Games would not generate additional economic impacts, rather it would simply shift where and when they would take place.⁶⁹

Finally, Wildsmith compared Halifax's 25-year plan to the infrastructure investments required to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games. According to the expected

growth in population within the next 25 years, the proposed athlete's village in the downtown Shannon Park area and the transportation improvements to the downtown core are consistent with Halifax's long-term plan; however, the stadium and aquatic centre were not. A stadium built with a 25,000-50,000 seating capacity in mind would be only suitable for large concerts or as the home of a Canadian Football League (CFL) franchise. Although there was the option to reduce the scale of the stadium by making it with mostly temporary seating, thereby reducing its capacity to 3,400-7,500, such a plan would have put it in direct competition with St. Mary's University Stadium. As far as aquatic centres, Halifax already had a sufficient existing number and the development of a new one was likely to result in the others becoming economically unviable.⁷⁰

Wildsmith suggested that perhaps there was an ulterior motive for entering a bid: the formation of an Eastern National Training Centre in Halifax.⁷¹ Although this would have benefited elite athletes from the Maritimes, Wildsmith argued that a better method to achieve such ends would be to re-invest in the facilities that already exist in the Halifax university district than to build costly new ones. Overall, Wildsmith found that the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid was ill advised. He concluded:

The cost of the Games coupled with the probable failure of many legacy effects to materialize and the inappropriateness of some of the infrastructure is more than enough to offset what benefits Haligonians may see. The city would be best served if the effort were directed at hosting smaller events, such as the World Student Games, which is on a scale that would allow for the development of sporting facilities more suitable to Halifax and the construction of fewer major sporting venues.⁷²

The argument that Wildsmith frequently relied upon with respect to the fact that the funds allocated for these games could be better used elsewhere is not a valid one at least on a micro-perspective. A majority of those funds would not have come into the

city if it were not for the Games.⁷³ If taken from more of a macro-perspective, it is obviously feasible for the funds granted from the federal and provincial governments to be used elsewhere, perhaps on the development of another city, or a completely different type of project altogether. Herein lies the reason why many cities vie for major Games, each would like a chance at available money from provincial and federal levels of government for development of their city.

As for his contention that it may be better for Halifax to pursue smaller events like the World Student Games, Wildsmith was misinformed. The event to which he referred, known as either the Summer or Winter Universiades (of which Halifax could only legitimately host the Summer Universiade due to a lack of downhill skiing terrain), are contested by both more countries and more competitors than are the Commonwealth Games.⁷⁴ The Summer Universiade has arguably grown to the second biggest multi-sport event in the world behind only the Summer Olympics. The Commonwealth Games, and perhaps the Pan American Games, are the biggest multi-sport Games that Halifax could reasonably aspire to host.

For the most part, Wildsmith's assessment of the Halifax bid was inconsequential to the case study at hand because it was completed based on figures and plans from early on in the bid. By the time the bid was withdrawn, the majority of these plans and figures had changed in one way or another. Furthermore, a second and much more in depth economic impact analysis was conducted after the publication of his thesis, and rendered many of his more specific economic impact conclusions insignificant.⁷⁵

Dreaming Big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization by David Black

David Black, the Director of the Centre for Foreign Policy Studies and an associate professor in political science at Dalhousie University in Halifax, released this paper in July of 2008, over a year after the bid was officially withdrawn. The article examined the growing attraction of governments to the hosting of second order sport mega-events, as he argued, in response to conditions of globalization.

After citing the appeals and risks associated with hosting a sport mega-event (both of which have been discussed at length in the main review of literature), it became clear that Black's opinion on the subject of hosting second order mega-events was skeptical at best (although he did acknowledge the theoretical possibility of their inherent worth). He noted:

In general, a review of the scholarly literature shows that the tangible benefits of major games are routinely overstated, while their costs and risks are understated or obfuscated. This is not to say that there are no significant benefits – both tangible and intangible – to be derived from these events. Rather, it is simply to say that there are predictable patterns of hyperbolic promotion, collective gullibility and underappreciated opportunity costs and distributional impacts that deserve much closer attention from responsible policy-makers than they typically receive.⁷⁶

Black went on to quote Whitson and Macintosh on whether they believed second order events hosted in Canada can bring forth long-term benefits to the local tourism market:

The Canadian experience of hosting the smaller games – the Commonwealth Games in Victoria, the Pan-American Games in Winnipeg, the Commonwealth and World Student Games in Edmonton – suggests that unless a city has an established tourist trade (as in the case of Victoria), it is a mirage to think that a substantial tourist economy can be constructed on the back of such events alone. The imaging effect is too small and the competition is too great.⁷⁷

Specifically on the subject of the Halifax bid, Black contended that Halifax was always “in tough” due to its population, lack of infrastructure and hosting experience of

major international events, and the fact that it was devoid of any real political angle (for example, the Abuja bid was “Africa’s bid”). He stated, “... the Halifax bid raised the question whether such localities at the ‘periphery of the centre’ can be successful in the emerging world of international sporting politics...”⁷⁸ Black asserted that perhaps “...such events are increasingly moving beyond the grasp of such regional or second-order cities.”⁷⁹

Black also discussed what he viewed as the downfalls of Halifax’s bid. First, the fact that the bid committee “...chronically resisted substantial transparency lest signs of dissent should become visible and thus compromise the bid’s prospects.”⁸⁰ Second, that the costs were always extraordinary, and that by the time they reached CDN \$1.7 billion,⁸¹ became unviable. Third, Black heavily questioned the idea put forth by bid promoters that the 2014 Commonwealth Games would benefit not only the city, but the region, province, and nation as a whole.⁸²

Although some of his overall themes are absolutely correct, including the fact that cities need to be extremely careful when bidding for major games, that the Halifax bid withdrawal was “precipitous,” and that the Games likely would have further concentrated wealth and resources into Halifax, many of his other arguments showed a lack of understanding and forward thinking. In mentioning the lack of infrastructure in Halifax as a weakness for the bid, Black either overlooked or was not aware that one of the major reasons for Halifax pursuing the Games was to leverage that very infrastructure.⁸³ As for the argument that the Games’ price tag of \$1.7 billion was too large, it will be shown that this was not necessarily what the Games needed to cost.

Sport Canada's Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events

With respect to the perpetual debate over whether sport mega-event hosting is a worthwhile endeavour, the Canadian government has taken the proponents side. This was evident in the fact that monetary support was offered for the hosting of major international Games, and that there was a division of Sport Canada⁸⁴ devoted solely to major games acquisitions. The Canadian government believed that, “The hosting of international sport events offers Canada the potential to bring direct and significant benefits across a broad range of government priorities and can act as a catalyst for the achievement of other federal objectives.”⁸⁵

In January of 2008, Sport Canada released *The Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events*. At the time of its release, it was the most recent policy document available; however, it was not in place as the events surrounding the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid unfolded. Its predecessor was released in 2000, and identically titled. Its objective was to serve as a “...decision making framework for determining federal involvement in the hosting of international sport events...[It also] clarifies the federal government’s role in hosting and provides a transparent decision making tool for the government to assess proposals against strict criteria.”⁸⁶

Furthermore, “The federal government is interested in supporting the hosting of a reasonable number of international sport events, provided that a number of principles and conditions are met.”⁸⁷ The policy outlined two principles that were to be adhered to in order to gain federal funding. First, the potential to accrue net benefits, defined as those events that can (1) advance national policy objectives; (2) bring about significant net sport, economic, social and cultural benefits to Canadians; and (3) ensure significant

legacies. Second, to secure federal funding, the fiscal reality of the Canadian government during the time period is taken into account. Regardless of all the necessary criteria being met, financial support was dependent upon the available funding and Cabinet approval.⁸⁸

In addition to these principles, several conditions were to be met in order to be eligible for federal financial support. These conditions included: seeking federal support before the bid to the international franchise holder is made, designing a specific strategy for the provision of legacies, recognizing that the federal government would not undertake deficit funding of the event, and understanding that the event must have abided by federal standards such as (but not limited to) the Official Languages Act. Furthermore, the document stated that the federal government would not undertake more than 35 percent of the total event costs and no more than 50 percent of the public sector costs, and that proposals must indicate significant community support and sound management.⁸⁹

Sport Mega-Events: Conclusions and a Look Forward

Whether their overall impacts are positive or negative will be forever debated with valid and spirited arguments presented on both sides of the issue. It must be kept in mind that sport mega-events are usually conceived and produced by powerful elite groups, with little democratic input from the citizens of the area. In addition, those citizens are expected to graciously accept the Games, be ready to volunteer, and pay for tickets to attend as spectators.⁹⁰ That is not to say that some citizens are not willing to

accept major Games into their backyard, and that major Games do not bring significant life and vitality to an otherwise ordinary city.

When bidding for a mega-sport event such as the Commonwealth Games, the possible positive and negative outcomes must be weighed, measured and re-measured. In theory, the outcomes for hosting such an event can be extremely positive and enriching for the city; however, an example of mismanagement and misdirection will be omnipresent for Canadians ever since Montreal's foray into Olympic Summer Games hosting in 1976. The contemporary bid and organizing committees of all sport mega-events must learn from those who have come before them so as to not repeat the same mistakes.

With a sport mega-event contextualization and literature review completed, the case study of the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid can now be undertaken.

Chapter 2 - Endnotes

¹ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: The Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1.

² Colin M. Hall, *Hallmark Tourist Events: Impacts, Management, and Planning* (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 1.

³ Scarlett Cornelissen, "Sport Mega-Events in Africa: Processes, Impacts and Prospects," *Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development* 1, no.1 (2004), 40-41.

⁴ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: The Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*, 5.

⁵ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: The Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*, 5.

⁶ D. Easton, *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York, NY: Wiley and Sons, 1965), 159.

⁷ Holger Preuss and Harry Arne Solberg, "Attracting Major Sporting Events: The Role of Local Residents," *European Sport Management Quarterly* 6, no. 4 (2006), 394, Figure 1. This model was adapted from D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965), 112.

⁸ Bob Stewart, *Sport: Funding and Finance* (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2007), 35.

⁹ Matthew Burbank, Gregory Andranovich, and Charles Heying, *Olympic Dreams: The Impact of Mega-Events on Local Politics* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 20.

¹⁰ Ibid., 28.

¹¹ Ibid., 28.

¹² Helen Jefferson Lenskyj, *Inside the Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and Activism* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), 96.

¹³ Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 286.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Hans M. Westerbeek, Paul Turner and Lynley Ingerson, "Key success factors in bidding for hallmark sporting events," *International Marketing Review* 19, no. 3 (2002), 320.

¹⁶ David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 468.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Anthony Church, *The Sacred Cow: Calgary and the XV Olympic Winter Games* (Ph.D. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario, 2003), 2.

¹⁹ Paul Close, David Askew, and Xu Xin. *The Beijing Olympiad – The Political Economy of a Sporting Mega-Event* (New York: Routledge, 2007); J. MacAloon (ed.), *Rite, Drama, Festival, Spectacle: Rehearsals Toward a Theory of Cultural Performance* (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues Press, 1984); J. MacAloon, "Anthropology at the Olympic Games: An Overview," in *Olympic Games as Performance and Public Event: The Case of the XVII Winter Olympic Games in Norway*, rev. ed., ed. A. Klassen (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), 9-26; Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: The Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Xin Xu, "Modernizing China in the Olympic spotlight: China's national identity and the 2008 Beijing Olympiad," *Sociological Review* 54, no.2 (2006), 90-107; Maurice Roche, "Mega-events and modernity revisited: globalization and the case of the Olympics," *Sociological Review* 54, no. 2 (2006), 27-40.

²⁰ H. Hughes, "Olympic Tourism and Urban Regeneration," *Festival Management and Event Tourism* 1, (1993), 157-162; J. Ritchie and M. Lyons, "Olympulse VI: A Post-Event Assessment of Resident Reaction to the XV Olympic Winter Games," *Journal of Travel Research* 28, no. 3 (1990), 14-23; J. Ritchie and B. Smith, "The Impact of a Mega-event on Host Region Awareness: A longitudinal study," *Journal of Travel Research* 30, (1991), 3-10; Glenn James McCartney, "Hosting a recurring mega-event: visitor raison d'être," *Journal of Sport Tourism* 10, no. 2 (2005), 113-128; Dogan Gursoy and K.W. Kendall, "Hosting Mega Events – Modeling Locals' Support," *Annals of Tourism Research* 33, no.3 (2006), 603-623.

²¹ For an overview, critique and outlook on the literature produced in the sport tourism area, consult Mike Weed, "Sports Tourism Research 2000-2004: A Systematic Review of Knowledge and a Meta-Evaluation of Methods," *Journal of Sport & Tourism* 11, no. 1 (2006), 5-30. Following a systemic review of sport tourism literature since the turn of the century, Weed concluded that although the area is lacking methodological diversity, more authors tended to be embedding their discussions within a clear theoretical framework, which was beginning to build the body of knowledge. It was still suggested that authors need to build on rather than repeat previous research while paying attention to methodological and epistemological concerns in constructing their research.

²² Mike Weed, *Olympic Tourism* (Oxford, UK: Elsevier, 2008), 7.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008*, 46.

²⁵ Canadian Sport Tourism Alliance, *2006 Special Olympics Canada Summer Games: Economic Impact Assessment*, March 2008, 11. The Canadian Sport Tourism Alliance (CSTA) is an organization that comprises over 200 members including 95 municipalities, 55 national sport organizations and a variety of product and service suppliers. Its mission is "To increase Canadian capacity to attract and host sport tourism events."

²⁶ James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games* (MDE. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2006), 74.

²⁷ Holger Preuss, Benoit Seguin and Norm O'Reilly, "Profiling Major Sport Event Visitors: The 2002 Commonwealth Games," *Journal of Sport & Tourism* 12, no 1 (2007), 21.

²⁸ B. Flyvbjerg, N. Bruzelius, and W. Rothengatter, *Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-2.

²⁹ Helen Jefferson Lenskyj, *Inside the Olympic Industry: Power, Politics, and Activism*, 105.

³⁰ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: The Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*, 140.

³¹ Stephen Essex and Brian Chakley, "Olympic Games: Catalysts of Urban Change," *Leisure Studies* 17, (1998), 201.

³² Stephen E. Roulac, "Place Wars and the Olympic Games," *Futurist* 27, no.6 (1993), 18.

³³ Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008*, 290.

³⁴ Laurence Chalip, "Beyond Impact: A General Model for Host Community Event Leverage," in *Sport Tourism: Interrelationships, Impacts and Issues*, rev. ed., ed. B. Ritchie and D. Adair (Clevedon: Channel View Publications, 2004), 226-252; Laurence Chalip and A. Leyns, "Local Business Leveraging of a Sport Event: Managing an Event for Economic Benefit," *Journal of Sport Management* 16, (2002), 132-158; Danny O'Brien and Sarah Gardiner, "Creating Sustainable Mega Event Impacts: Networking

and Relationship Development through Pre-Event Training,” *Sport Management Review* 9, (2006), 25-47.

³⁵ Danny O’Brian, “Event Business Leveraging – The Sydney 2000 Olympic Games,” *Annals of Tourism Research* 33, no.1 (2006), 257.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 258.

³⁷ Kevin Ward, “Entrepreneurial urbanism, state restructuring and civilizing ‘New’ East Manchester,” *Area* 35, no. 2 (2003), 116-127.

³⁸ Stephen Essex and Brian Chalkley, “Olympic Games: Catalyst of Urban Change,” *Leisure Studies* 17, (1998), 198.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 201. As is mentioned in David Whitson, “Bringing the world to Canada: ‘the periphery of the centre,’ ” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004), 1216, the introduction of television to mega sporting events, first seen on a large scale at the 1960 Rome Olympics, allowed sport events to act as the carriers of messages: first and foremost commercial messages, but increasingly messages about cities and nations.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 203.

⁴¹ Diann Eley and David Kirk, “Developing Citizenship Through Sport: The Impact of a Sport-Based Volunteer Programme on Young Sport Leaders,” *Sport Education and Society* 7, no. 2 (2002), 151-166; Sharon Kemp, “The Hidden Workforce: Volunteers’ Learning in the Olympics,” *Journal of European Industrial Training* 26, no. 2/3/4 (2002), 109-116; Chrysostomos Giannoulakis, Chien-Hsin Wang, and Dianna Gray, “Measuring Volunteer Motivation in Mega-Sporting Events,” *Event Management* 11, no. 4 (2008), 191-200.

⁴² Rita Ralston, Les Lumsdon and Paul Downward, “The Third Force in Events Tourism: Volunteers at the XVII Commonwealth Games,” *Journal of Sustainable Tourism* 13, no. 5 (2005), 511.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 513.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 514.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 515.

⁴⁶ John D. Horne and Wolfram Manzenreiter, “Accounting for Mega-Events: Forecast and Actual Impacts of the 2002 Football World Cup Finals on the Host Countries Japan/Korea,” *International Review for the Sociology of Sport* 39, no. 2 (2004), 200.

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- ⁴⁷ David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 471. Of note is that Black mentioned that adapting to external pressures for global competitiveness "...often exacerbate[s] societal disruption and inequality."
- ⁴⁸ David R. Black and Janis Van Der Westhuizen, "The allure of global games for 'semi-peripheral' polities and spaces: a research agenda," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004), 1196. [Brackets mine.]
- ⁴⁹ David Whitson, "Bringing the world to Canada: 'the periphery of the centre,' " *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004), 1222.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1230.
- ⁵¹ Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008*, 22-24.
- ⁵² Helen J. Lenskyj, "When Winners are Losers. Toronto and Sydney Bids for the Summer Olympics," *Journal of Sport & Social Issues* 20, no.4 (1996), 395.
- ⁵³ Dennis R. Howard and John L. Crompton, *Financing Sport*. 2nd ed. (Morgantown: Fitness Information Technology, 2005), 161.
- ⁵⁴ Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008*, 25.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 284.
- ⁵⁶ James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games* (MDE. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2006), 4.
- ⁵⁷ Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (Vancouver, BC), *Olympic Costs and Benefits: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Proposed Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games*, by Marvin Shaffer, Alan Greer, and Celine Mauboules, (Vancouver, 2003), 7.
- ⁵⁸ James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games*, 15.
- ⁵⁹ Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, *Olympic Costs and Benefits: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Proposed Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games*, by Marvin Shaffer, Alan Greer, and Celine Mauboules, (Vancouver, 2003), 12.

⁶⁰ James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games*, 15.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 16.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 21.

⁶⁵ Wildsmith reviewed an initial economic impact assessment conducted by Halifax officials in the domestic portion of the bid, not the Canmac Economics Limited report that is later discussed and that used a more refined STEAM model.

⁶⁶ James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games*, 60.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 76.

⁷³ Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008*, 292.

⁷⁴ The 2007 Summer Universiade was held in Bangkok, Thailand and included close to 10,000 athletes (very close to the same number as a Summer Olympic Games). In contrast, the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games featured only about 4,500 athletes.

⁷⁵ Canmac Economics Limited, *HRM Bid Proposal 2014 Commonwealth Games Economic Impact Assessment*, March 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/H2014EconomicImpactAssessmentMarch292007.pdf> (accessed March 20, 2009).

⁷⁶ David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 472.

⁷⁷ David Whitson and Donald Macintosh, "The Global Circus: International Sport, Tourism, and the Marketing of Cities," *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 20, no.3 (1996), 288.

⁷⁸ David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 474.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 475.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸¹ The fact that the total cost was pegged at \$1.7 billion was contested, and this issue will be discussed in greater depth later in the case study.

⁸² David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 476.

⁸³ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

⁸⁴ Sport Canada is the federal government agency that deals with all matters related to elite sport, and is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Heritage. Its mission is to "...enhance opportunities for all Canadians to participate and excel in sport. This is achieved by enhancing the capacity and coordination of the Canadian sport system, encouraging participation in sport and enabling Canadians with talent and dedication to achieve excellence in international sport."

⁸⁵ Canadian Heritage, *The Policy for Hosting International Sport Events*, November 2000, <http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/accueil-host/Hosting%20Policy%20Dec%202000%20Eng.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2008), 1.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 2. [Brackets mine.]

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁹⁰ Maurice Roche, *Mega-Events and Modernity: The Olympics and Expos in the Growth of Global Culture*, 126.

CHAPTER 3 – The Domestic Bid Phase

A Prelude

As a bid city for the Commonwealth Games, Halifax was a seasoned veteran. The city had bid twice before, for the 1994 and 2010 Games, both times losing out in the domestic phase of the process.

Many years before Victoria hosted the 1994 Commonwealth Games, a major fiasco occurred in the domestic phase of the bid. Nine Canadian cities were vying to be Canada's representative in the international bidding stage: Ottawa, Hamilton, Edmonton, Richmond, London, Windsor, Thunder Bay, Victoria, and Halifax. At the conclusion of the domestic competition in late 1987, Commonwealth Games Canada (CGC)¹ announced Victoria as the winner, but it was by no means that simple. The CGC appointed selection committee had actually recommended to the CGC Executive Board to select Halifax as Canada's representative for the international portion of the bid. The CGC Executive Board went against this recommendation and announced Victoria as the winning city. Outraged, Halifax bid chairman Peter Green called for a judicial inquiry into the whole affair.²

Although the federal government noted at the time that they had no power to overturn the CGC decision itself (CGC as exclusive Canadian rights holder to the Commonwealth Games brand could ultimately choose whichever city they wanted to), they did have the power to withhold the \$50 million grant promised to Victoria if it was felt that the selection process was in any way unfair. The federal government called in Richard Pound, at the time a Vice-President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), to head an official review of the selection process.³ In the end Pound declared that

choosing Victoria was well within CGC's rights, and that it was likely chosen over Halifax as a result of a personality conflict between Halifax bid chairman Peter Green and CGC chairman Ivor Dent. Dent said at the time that Victoria was chosen because it showed a greater willingness to work with CGC.⁴ This controversial decision is still remembered by many Haligonians, especially since Victoria went on to win the international portion of the bid and then stage the most recent Commonwealth Games to be hosted on Canadian soil.

In the 2010 Commonwealth Games domestic bid, Hamilton beat out Halifax to represent Canada in the international phase against New Delhi, India, the only other bidding city. Hamilton went into this two-city race with an advantage but as the November 13th, 2003 vote neared, the race tightened significantly, so much that New Delhi was seen as the favourite going into the vote. Hamilton's bid was projected to create 10,000 new jobs, and an economic impact of \$1.4 billion. It would also have left several sport infrastructure legacies for the city of Hamilton including a new 42,000-seat stadium, a new aquatics center, and a new 7,000-seat athletics stadium for McMaster University.⁵ The final vote tallied 46-22 in New Delhi's favour, a convincing win to be sure. It marked only the third time that the Commonwealth Games would be held in a developing nation (the other two were in Jamaica in 1966 and Kuala Lumpur in 1998). According to the Indian Olympic Association President Suresh Kalmadi, "The people felt it was high time India got the Games...It means a lot to us. We feel this will change the whole perception of the Commonwealth."⁶

The vote was not without controversy however, with many accusations of foul play being leveled against the Indian bid. New Delhi made a \$100,000 US offer (\$7.2

million USD total) to each of 72 Commonwealth Games member associations for athlete training, including Commonwealth Games Canada, as part of their final bid package. Much to the chagrin of the Hamilton bid committee President, Jagoda Pike, this tactic may have been the deciding factor in the final vote, “I think at the last minute, to have introduced \$100,000 per voting country makes the whole process feel dirty.”⁷ India did not agree with the skepticism, and contended they were just following Canada’s lead, and to a point they were. The Hamilton bid included \$5 million that would have been directed to needy countries for training funds for athletes and coaches. To the objective eye, the Indian across-the-board “donation” reeked of simply paying for votes and at the time the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) did not have any rules preventing last minute cash incentives. According to Pike, “The burning question at this point will become how the federation is going to deal with this...They certainly need to do something about this for future bidding processes.”⁸ As the bidding process for the 2014 Games began, changes had yet to be made.⁹

The Beginnings: Halifax 2014

On April 18th, 2005, Commonwealth Games Canada received a letter from Fred MacGillivray, Chair of the 2010 Halifax Bid Committee,¹⁰ noting that those involved with the 2010 bid had continued to meet since losing out to Hamilton, and that they now stood ready to bid for the 2014 Games or the next Games that CGC decided to bid for.¹¹ MacGillivray asked that the letter be accepted as a formal declaration of his group’s interest.¹²

In order to gauge the appetite of the local politicians both at the municipal and

provincial levels for such an endeavour, MacGillivray met with representatives from both levels of government early in the spring of 2005. From the province were Duff Montgomerie, then a senior policy advisor to Premier John Hamm, and Scott Logan, a former member of the 2010 bid society and then the Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department of Health Promotion.¹³ Following this meeting, Montgomerie briefed both Minister Rodney Macdonald of the Department of Health Promotion, and Premier Hamm as to the pros and cons of going forward with such a bid. They arrived at the conclusion that there was an infrastructure deficit in Nova Scotia, specifically in the context of major competitive sport infrastructure, and "...saw this as an opportunity to possibly leverage some of that."¹⁴ Mayor Peter Kelly saw the bid in a similar light:

There was a desire to try to increase the infrastructure or fulfill some of the infrastructure requirements here and we thought this would be a good way to achieve some of those goals. So, from the onset, we knew we would be taking a stab at this one...we were very much engaged and very much supportive of this initiative.¹⁵

Having made the decision to move forward, Premier Hamm designated Montgomerie, Logan, and Jamie Ferguson (Chief Executive Officer of Sport Nova Scotia) to represent the province on the 2014 domestic bid executive committee.¹⁶ HRM Council later did the same with the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of Halifax, George McLellan, and the Deputy CAO, Dan English.¹⁷ Halifax was not yet completely sure that it would enter the contest, but the decision was made to at least continue to examine the possibility.

A few months later, CGC officially declared that it would pursue the 2014 Commonwealth Games. This announcement occurred on June 23rd, 2005 following consultations with the federal Minister of State for sport, Sport Canada officials, and CGC's international partners and key funding supporters.¹⁸ Upon approaching Stephen

Owen, the Minister for Sport, and Peter MacKay, a Nova Scotia Member of Parliament (MP), CGC was reassured that the Government of Canada would support a 2014 Commonwealth Games bid. Establishing that there was in fact this base of support was a priority for the bid throughout this period of time.¹⁹ Furthermore, CGC noted:

We have enough connections at our board level to also do informal inquiries at higher levels [of government], to see whether or not there is an appetite there because some of it is insuring that people in government at high levels are comfortable with using sport as a means of expanding Canada's influence and whether or not the timing is good for all of that. The read we got was it was a good time. [Canada] had just secured a 2010 Winter Olympic Games bid, and that summer sport was something [that] really needed a bit of a boost. In terms of infrastructure, the deficit was there. All around, the conditions seemed to be quite ripe for a Commonwealth bid.²⁰

Considerations other than domestic support were important to CGC when deciding to put forth this bid. Internationally, "There is almost a cycle of an 'it's your turn'..."²¹ In addition, it is important to look at the other countries likely to bid. If any of these bidding countries are considered to be "a lock" on political or compassionate grounds, as South Africa would be when they decide to bid, it may not be wise to bid against them. Since Canada had not hosted the Games since Victoria did so in 1994, and there were no countries expected to bid that were "sure things," the 2014 Commonwealth Games were an appropriate event to pursue.²²

The official call for Canadian cities interested in bidding for the Games came on July 8th, 2005 and stated that the deadline for letters of intent outlining their interest, capacity, and reasons for wanting to host the Games were to be received by CGC, along with a non-refundable deposit of \$5,000, by July 22nd.²³ Right from the start, it was to be a quick process that definitely favoured those cities that had bid before. For a summary of all the notable events of the bid, see Appendix II.

Throughout the same time period there was a definite excitement developing in Halifax, especially amongst those who were promoters and supporters of sport and major public events in Halifax.²⁴ Halifax resident and businessman Fred MacGillivray²⁵ led the charge on this front for many years. He was the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Trade Centre Limited,²⁶ a Province of Nova Scotia (PNS) crown corporation responsible for the management of the World Trade & Convention Centre, the World Trade Centre Atlantic Canada, the Halifax Metro Centre, Events Halifax, and Exhibition Park. Since becoming President and CEO of Trade Centre Limited in 1994, MacGillivray won numerous awards for his community involvement and served as chair for the 2003 World Junior Hockey Championship, 2004 World Women's Hockey Championship, 2004 FIBA Under 21 Tournament of the Americas, the 2005 CFL Exhibition Game, and the 2008 Men's World Hockey Championships.²⁷ In his desire to pursue the Commonwealth Games, he recognized the economic impact that they could have on Halifax, and also how they could elevate Halifax's status.²⁸

Events Halifax,²⁹ a subsidiary of Trade Centre Limited that provided services to groups looking to host major events in Nova Scotia, acted as a secretariat for the domestic bid process. MacGillivray assumed the chair position of the domestic bid executive committee, and was joined by Montgomerie, Logan, and Jamie Ferguson from the PNS, English and McLellan from the HRM, Ken Bagnell (President of the Atlantic Canadian Sport Centre) as a representative for sport, and John Knubley (VP Nova Scotia for ACOA) as a representative of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA).³⁰ Some members of this group were also involved in the 2010 bid process and thus a lot of the enthusiasm from this project was carried over into the 2014 bid. Those involved

believed in the power of sport, the difference it could bring to a community, and "...knew they had the opportunity to perhaps hit the home run this time."³¹ This group, through Events Halifax, acted as the voice of the Halifax 2014 bid in its infancy.³² Mayor Kelly and Premier Hamm were honorary co-chairs and were present at major press conferences.³³

Despite losing to Hamilton in the domestic portion of the 2010 bid, the Halifax team learned from the process. Following the 2010 bid, a review of each of the bids by CGC took place. The report stated that the 2010 Halifax Games bid fell short due mainly to the lack of sports infrastructure in Halifax.³⁴ A review of the bid document conducted more recently by an advisor to the 2014 bid committee found that overall the bid was quite sound, but as with any project, there were areas to improve. One was the fact that the 2010 bid was lacking a compelling vision, a reason why the Games should go to Halifax over other cities. Expanding on this, the motto "Leaving a Legacy" was deemed too neutral. In addition, it was judged that Halifax's strengths as a city were not used to differentiate itself enough from the other domestic bid cities.³⁵ All of these comments were constructive for the 2014 bid committee as it attempted to reverse its fate from prior efforts at hosting the Commonwealth Games.

The Domestic Competition Begins

When the call went out in June of 2005 for Canadian cities that intended to contest the domestic portion of the 2014 Commonwealth Games bid, Mayor Kelly and Halifax were still musing about whether or not to enter the competition. "I think there will be a review of where we stand and what may be possible, so I wouldn't exclude [us]

from being part of this process,” stated Kelly.³⁶ By the beginning of July 2005, HRM Council unanimously supported submitting the letter of intent, despite a few skeptical Councillors at the outset.³⁷ The PNS and the HRM agreed to split the \$750,000 cost of putting together the domestic bid.³⁸ A report produced by HRM staff and presented at a HRM Council committee meeting on August 9th was the first estimate of the total cost for the Games. The report pegged the endeavour at approximately \$500 million.³⁹

Four other cities in addition to Halifax indicated interest: Calgary, Ottawa, York Region, and Halifax’s arch-nemesis, Hamilton. In response to five cities expressing their desire to host, CGC Chief Executive Officer Thomas Jones commented, “We are thrilled with the level of interest. It is a testament to both the growing importance and the high profile of the Commonwealth Games on the international sporting stage, and to the significant economic, social and cultural benefits which accrue to a host city.”⁴⁰ To Mayor Kelly, all the cities were worthy competitors, but he perhaps feared Hamilton the most as they had prevailed in the 2010 domestic bid.⁴¹ Some put Halifax as a bit of an underdog in the group of cities that included the economic powerhouse York Region, and the dynamic sport city of Hamilton.⁴²

Commonwealth Games Canada was not surprised that Halifax was bidding once again; in fact, there was an ongoing knowledge within CGC ranks that Halifax was interested in having the Games.⁴³ According to CEO Thomas Jones:

I always sensed from talking to folks from the Halifax area, that if there was an opportunity to bid again they probably would. So, immediately upon launching a request for interest, Halifax, through Fred, was instantly involved and made us aware that they would be keen to go again.⁴⁴

Commonwealth Games Canada did not go into the domestic bid process with any targeted city or area in mind, nor did Sport Canada direct them towards choosing any

city.⁴⁵ They recognized Halifax would likely put together a solid bid, as CGC President Andrew Pipe noted:

Knowing that they had bid unsuccessfully in 2010, and that the process of reviewing those bids was a good one, and due diligence was given, and good feedback was given, I thought this bodes well. Here's a city that quite dramatically has demonstrated its interest in hosting these Games. It's had the experience of being an unsuccessful bidder twice before, it's poised to bid again for the 2014 Games. Presumably, it will have benefited from its experience in the past, and addressed the issues [that] were seen as shortcomings in previous bids. Clearly from a national geopolitical kind of perspective, we have an absolute dearth of any really significant sporting infrastructure in Eastern Canada, so this is a wonderful opportunity to address that.⁴⁶

Initial feelings towards the Halifax 2014 bid from other organizations were for the most part also very positive. According to Mayor Kelly, "It had all the attributes that a community would ever desire to have when moving forward," and, "When we went into it, we thought we were in a range of affordability."⁴⁷ Dan Leger, Director of News Content for *The Chronicle Herald*, displayed reserved optimism towards the bid, "I felt it was a good idea, but one that had to be managed carefully." He went on to say:

I knew the organizers quite well and I had a very high degree of confidence in their ability to do this and pull it off. After all, every single one of the previous projects they had undertaken had come out well. Things like the Brier, the World Skating Championships...I felt that they were a good team and they had very wisely taken on larger and larger projects...There has been a lot of these fairly major sporting events here. I think each one of them contributed a lot to the understanding of the group that was doing it, and I was of the view that they were ready to make a bid for something like the Commonwealth Games.⁴⁸

Patrick Jarvis, an advisor to the Halifax domestic bid team, thought a bid from Halifax was an excellent idea, especially from a holistic Canadian sport perspective:

I instantly leaned towards a bid and Games taking place on the East coast to diversify and broaden the sport continuum across Canada...I knew there would be some challenges in terms of the scope and scale of the city and the area and the province, but within those challenges I saw some unique opportunities to rescale the Commonwealth Games.⁴⁹

Legacies

The main reason for putting forth any kind of meaningful mega-event bid, at least from a responsible long-term perspective, are the many legacies that are possible beyond the two-week festival. These legacies are a key component for Sport Canada in their decision of whether or not to support the initiative, and to their satisfaction the Halifax bid was sufficiently legacy-driven:

Whenever you have new facilities in which the programming will be addressed to high performance athletes and community based...I think its got significant legacy...Halifax, even though you had very few facilities, what they were proposing in their bid package would have left some significant legacies for not only sport in Halifax but for sport in this country.⁵⁰

Opinions were consistent from all of the organizations involved as to the fact that the proposed legacies warranted undertaking a bid to host the Games, although many noted that they knew there were going to be challenges associated with achieving such outcomes:

...the biggest challenge was going to be the capital budget in terms of convincing local governments and also the local population of that investment, but we recognized with some very strategic and well thought out plans, that there would be some genuine physical legacies [from the Games].⁵¹

In contrast to many of the smaller facilities that were proposed (pools, field houses, etc...), the stadium received mixed reviews. Some questioned the need for such a stadium in Halifax, "Having a large outdoor stadium, obviously they are helpful for rock and roll shows and things like that...but there had to be a better case made for perhaps something like that."⁵² Others were of the opposite opinion, "There are political, but not legitimate, reasons why Atlantic Canada is the only region of the country without a sports stadium."⁵³

Most important to the bid process was that both the municipal and provincial

leadership felt that the money spent would leave a lasting and worthwhile legacy on Halifax and Nova Scotia. At the time, Mayor Kelly was absolutely in agreement with this premise. He was excited that the new stadium, and other refurbished sport infrastructure, would have allowed the city to bid for other mega-events such as a Universiade, Pan American Games or other international sport competitions. Furthermore, he recognized that hosting the Commonwealth Games would have been a significant investment into summer sport in a city that had historically concentrated primarily on winter sport.⁵⁴ At both the municipal and provincial level, the need to remedy the sport infrastructure deficit in Halifax drove Council and the PNS to move forward with the project.⁵⁵ Leger described best what the facilities would have meant to the region:

Halifax is a diverse place economically and it thrives because of that. It doesn't boom and bust. It tends to be a place that is a centre of commerce, a regional centre of government, and it is a non-polluting kind of place. There are no factories in Halifax. It's a service based, and administration based type of economy. I felt that the centre of gravity of that kind of thing revolves around cultural opportunities and that sort of stuff. You would have had the opportunity to use these facilities as well to bring people to your community, the kind of progressive and well-educated knowledge worker - the so-called 'creative class' or whatever you want to call it – the knowledge worker who would help to continue this transformation of our community here. So, it's not just a seaport, it's much more than that here and I thought those would have been great facilities for that.⁵⁶

The Domestic Competition

On August 17th, 2005, Commonwealth Games Canada announced the appointment of Eric Savard as Bid Director for the domestic phase of the bid process.⁵⁷ His role was described as advising and assisting CGC in coordinating and leading the

Canadian bid process, and working closely with the still to be selected Bid Review Committee (BRC) and the Canadian bid cities.⁵⁸

A few weeks later on August 31st, the five bid cities took part in a 90-minute afternoon conference call over the internet, hosted by CGC. This call gave the cities a chance to find out more about the selection process. The Calgary bid team asked the most questions, and according to MacGillivray and the Halifax bid team, “There wasn’t really much we wanted to ask, or had to ask.”⁵⁹ A workshop web conference then took place a week later on September 7th, and once again the cities learned more about what was expected in their final entry. Once again Halifax did not have many questions having gone through the process before.⁶⁰ With the knowledge coming from these sessions, it was then up to each bid to begin putting together their bid book (also known as the bid application forms). By the time these documents were to be handed to CGC on November 1st, each city would address the following categories: background information, support and partnership, sports program, facilities, organizing committee, strategic planning and governmental relations, finance and human resources, marketing and communication, operations, venue management, legacy, guarantees and commitment, proposed international bid committee, and “winnability” of the international bid.

Calgary was never much of a factor and their bid was withdrawn on September 13th, 2005. The Calgary bid team likely realized that because there was already a lot of money going to western Canada for the 2010 Olympic Winter Games, they would be unlikely to garner a lot of federal money in support of their bid.⁶¹

In the Halifax bid, the two levels of government had a fairly integrated approach throughout the domestic bid phase. Specifically the provincial and municipal finance

departments, but other departments as well, were deeply engaged in preparing the domestic bid.⁶² In addition, more so than would be seen later in the international phase, there seemed to be a lot of political support for the bid.⁶³ Commonwealth Games Canada felt that it was not just Halifax and Nova Scotia that were behind their bid, it was all of Atlantic Canada.⁶⁴ This was especially evident on October 12th, 2005 when the four Atlantic Premiers of the time indicated support for the bid and noted "...that the development of sport and youth activity through such an event will have a beneficial impact throughout the region."⁶⁵

On October 25th, 2005, Commonwealth Games Canada announced the BRC membership. The committee was responsible for the review and assessments of all bid books submitted by bidding cities, and ultimately were to make a recommendation to the CGC Board of Directors as to the winning city based on the submitted bid books, and the final presentations from each city's bid committee. The BRC was comprised of 6 members: Kim Browning, Suzanne Coffey, Claire Carver Dias, James Ingram, Timothy Page and Wayne Hellquist. Said Thomas Jones:

These individuals have tremendous experience and expertise with major Games and unite the right mix of organizational, business, and consulting skills needed to recommend the best city to represent Canada. With these individuals at the helm, CGC will be able to choose the ideal city to compete at the international level, then win and host the XXth Commonwealth Games.

"Our sole objective is to oversee a fair and transparent process, the outcome of which is to have the best city recommended to host the 2014 Games," noted Wayne Hellquist, chair of the Committee.⁶⁶

Up until October 26th, 2005, the bulk of the plans being developed by the Halifax bid team were kept secret in order not to "...tip their hand in public," thus giving the other bid cities an advantage. As Mayor Kelly mentioned, "We are working...to try to

make sure that we don't lose an opportunity... We're trying to keep our (proposal) intact, and we will release what we can."⁶⁷ Very early on in the domestic phase, MacGillivray attempted to address this important issue of secrecy versus openness. He described in HRM Council, "There's no reason for us not to be completely transparent with all of these (Games)... discussions or the bid document, and we will continue to share that information with council." He went on to say, "But... at the end of the day... I don't think I'd want to make 100 per cent of our bid document public," before the final selection of the winning city by CGC.⁶⁸ Herein lies a recurring problem for bid committees: the need to balance keeping enough details secret so as to not sacrifice the competitiveness of the bid, while at the same time remaining accountable to the very public who are paying for the event through their tax dollars. This problem would surface again in the international bid phase and became a major factor in its ultimate demise.

Over the next few days, more of the Halifax plans did become public. Bid organizers were proposing clustering all of the venues in Shannon Park, a 40-hectare area in north Dartmouth owned by the federal Department of Defence that at the time was only home to some abandoned military buildings. It was proposed that the area would feature most of the venues including the main stadium, the aquatic centre, the fieldhouse, and the athlete's village. The site was located on the harbour as well as a local highway, which would have made transportation very easy. It was also a great location because it meant that during the festival the athletes would be able to walk to most of the venues from the village. This "venue clustering" was a special trait of the Halifax bid that other cities would be hard pressed to match; MacGillivray called it Halifax's "winnability factor." Legacy plans for the area included the 40,000-seat stadium being scaled back to

25,000 seats, and the athlete's village being transformed into a mixed residential community with a variety of housing styles.⁶⁹

On October 27th, a rally for the bid was held in downtown Halifax. Over 2,000 people came out to join Mayor Kelly, Premier Hamm, MacGillivray and other community leaders, sports organizers and local athletes in officially launching the regional municipality's bid. Will Njoku, a Haligonian and former NBA basketball player who was an athlete representative on the bid team, captured the moment best by announcing to the crowd: "It's time." He went on to say:

Halifax has the reputation of being a very modest city...But we don't need to be modest anymore. It's time for the world to see that Halifax has got it going on. It's time for people to experience the greatest hospitality they'll experience or will ever experience.⁷⁰

MacGillivray, on behalf of the entire bid team, remarked at the time, "We are really pleased with the level of co-operation we have seen on this effort to date. There has been strong support from the public and private sectors, government, the Atlantic Canadian region and the community at large."⁷¹

The Short List

Leading up to November 1st, each of the four bidding cities were required to submit their bid books including signed bid city agreements and the remaining \$50,000 of their bid application fee.⁷² On November 16th, the BRC released its short list of the cities that had correctly and sufficiently completed their bid books and paid the necessary fee. All four bid cities had complied with the process and remained in the running to be Canada's representative for the 2014 Commonwealth Games bid.⁷³

Each city was then visited between November 16th and 25th by 10 bid review

specialists (BRS) from a variety of different fields related to bidding for major Games.⁷⁴ Each provided feedback to both the bid committees and the BRC and following these reports and recommendations, the bid cities had a few weeks to adjust their bids before the BRC came to judge each city between December 9th and 12th.⁷⁵

On December 13th and 14th, all four of the bid committees traveled to Toronto to make official presentations to the BRC. Along with the Halifax team was the provincial Minister of Health Promotion Rodney MacDonald, and Mayor Kelly. Representatives from Hamilton presented on the first day and Mayor Larry Di Ianni and bid chairwoman Jagoda Pike were visibly pleased with how it went. They made it clear that they believed their bid was significantly different the 2010 version, “We’re taking the best of 2010 and taking it up a whole bunch of notches,” said Pike. Mayor Di Ianni felt that their advantage lay in the technical aspects of their bid as well as in the international experience gained in the 2010 process.⁷⁶

On the eve of the Halifax presentation, MacGillivray and his team’s goal was simple: “Our objective is to leave them with no doubt that Halifax is their best partner to move forward internationally.”⁷⁷ At this point, the Games were still being reported by the media as costing \$500 million with a projected \$2 billion in economic spin-offs,⁷⁸ and Events Halifax had received polling numbers showing 90 percent support for the Games in Halifax (although this was not known to the public).⁷⁹

“It’s time”

All of the submitted documents, site visits, and presentations were then taken into account as the BRC tallied the final score for each bid. The city with the highest score

was then recommended by the BRC to the CGC Board of Directors for ratification.

Halifax was quietly confident about their chances, “I feel very strongly that Halifax has left nothing off the table,” said MacGillivray.⁸⁰

In an announcement made in a press conference on December 15th, 2005, Commonwealth Games Canada announced that Halifax had won the right to be Canada’s candidate city for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. “All the bids represented excellent candidates but only one can be chosen...Canada has a fantastic reputation for hosting international events. We’re confident that Halifax can be added to that long list in 2014,” said Thomas Jones of CGC.⁸¹

Not surprisingly, the announcement that Halifax had beaten the three other Canadian cities sent those who put the Halifax bid together into hysterics. Reporters at Arcadian Court in downtown Toronto immediately circled MacGillivray as the rest of his team high-fived, hugged and huddled in their matching blue dress shirts complete with Halifax’s bid logo. “They obviously listened to us and believed in us,” noted Mr. MacGillivray, with Halifax Mayor Peter Kelly and provincial Minister Rodney MacDonald at his side.⁸² Indeed Pipe noted, everyone involved in the domestic bid was ecstatic, from the municipal government, to the provincial government, to those from Trade Centre Limited.⁸³

Commonwealth Games Canada was absolutely convinced that Halifax was the correct choice because of how rigorous the process was,⁸⁴ and did not find it surprising that either Halifax or Hamilton came out on top as a result of their previous bidding experience.⁸⁵ Sport Canada was equally unsurprised by the result, especially because their appointed observers of the process attested to its fairness, transparency, solid

criteria, and analysis.⁸⁶

Mayor Kelly took nothing for granted going into the final vote, “You go into it with your eyes wide open. Everyone is a strong competitor, everyone has their own niches, and everybody is taken extremely seriously.”⁸⁷ The PNS was equally reserved going in, but as Montgomerie acknowledged, “We were confident that we had a solid bid. We were confident that probably where we had an advantage over Ontario was that the Premier of Nova Scotia was a co-presenter around the bid.”⁸⁸

Ottawa and York Region both put together relatively solid bids in a short amount of time, and both showed very good potential; however, they both lacked the polish and credibility gained only with prior experience.⁸⁹ More specifically, both lacked the necessary political support, Ottawa did not do enough to capitalize on their inherent strengths, and York Region “...just couldn’t get their proverbial ducks in a line.”⁹⁰

For a variety of reasons, Hamilton and Halifax were the definitive frontrunners in this domestic contest. As a result of the short time frame the two cities certainly had a head start on the others having both bid in 2010,⁹¹ and having many of the same key individuals still involved (MacGillivray in Halifax, and Jagoda Pike in Hamilton) was also helpful.⁹² These advantages meant that many assumed correctly that they would both put forth solid bids.⁹³ Hamilton, despite contending otherwise, seems to have rested on their laurels from 2010, and to have been playing on the fact that they were cheated out of the Games the last time. By some accounts, their bid changed little from the process for the 2010 Games.⁹⁴

On the other hand, Halifax learned from its mistakes in the 2010 domestic bid. This time around it had more prominent political support from all three levels of

government.⁹⁵ The bid itself was also improved, particularly with reference to the Shannon Park site where almost all of the activity was to take place.⁹⁶ All in all, it appears that a somewhat laissez-fair attitude from Hamilton, and a proactive Halifax bid, reversed the two city's fortunes this time around.

Reactions from the organizations involved ranged from mild and pleasant surprise,⁹⁷ to no surprise at all.⁹⁸ None of those interviewed were shocked by the decision. According to Jarvis:

I thought the team had pulled together extremely well in a short timeframe and put together a very appealing bid... In terms of people trying to come in and put their finger on the pulse of a bid in a short time frame, I felt that we were able to 'box above our weight class' so to speak. We presented a very strong case and went toe to toe with the other bids.⁹⁹

Mayor Kelly remarked, "We did a very good presentation. We had community support. We had Atlantic Canada support."¹⁰⁰ Commonwealth Games Canada was also quite impressed with the Halifax bid, and were sure of their decision to choose Halifax:

When we entertain bids, we are asking for a certain level of detail, which becomes much more refined as the city is actually chosen... When we first saw the Halifax bid, I think everyone was very impressed... We liked just about everything about the Halifax bid, unlike what some might tell you, in hindsight we never thought the size of the city was going to be a significant impediment to it. We thought it was actually quite a right size city if you could get the budget numbers right. It has Commonwealth links, it would be the biggest show in town, it would bring legacy in terms of facilities, but also in volunteer and human legacy as well. It was an opportunity, and this is how they sold it in many ways, it was an opportunity for a region of the country that was under-serviced, that had never hosted a large event like this, to really make their name. And that was a lot of what their message was, 'this is our chance to not only host a great Games and contribute to the Commonwealth, but it is economically and regionally a way for us to get our message out there that we want to be players.' And that's what the front people, particularly Fred, pitched it as, and they did a really effective job. So in terms of legacies, they met or exceeded all of our requirements for venues. They really demonstrated that they were the right city to host the Games.¹⁰¹

It was now up to Halifax to proceed on to the international phase of the bid where they would have to begin to cater to the CGF.¹⁰² As Jones noted, “We didn’t want them to start from square one. We wanted the winning city to hit the ground running, having been reviewed, having had feedback, having had expert advice. When we chose Halifax, we knew what we were in for.”¹⁰³ Famous last words Mr. Jones.

Chapter 3 - Endnotes

¹ At the time, Commonwealth Games Canada was referred to as the Commonwealth Games Association of Canada (CGAC). At the time of writing, the association is referred to as Commonwealth Games Canada (CGC) in everyday use, although its official legal name remains the CGAC. For the sake of consistency, CGC was used throughout this thesis.

² “Roundup: Athletics,” *The Globe and Mail*, 18 November 1987, p. D05.

³ “Roundup: Games selection process probed,” *The Globe and Mail*, 10 December 1987, p. C12.

⁴ Canadian Press, “Minister questions decision as Victoria wins Games bid,” *The Globe and Mail*, 24 December 1987, p. D03.

⁵ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Hamilton anxiously awaiting Commonwealth Games fate*, November 13, 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/story/2003/11/13/commonwealth_bids031112.html (accessed January 23, 2009).

⁶ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *New Delhi tops Hamilton for 2010 Commonwealth Games*, November 14, 2003, <http://www.cbc.ca/sports/story/2003/11/13/commonwealthgames031113.html> (accessed January 23, 2009).

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ By November 2006, this situation was remedied by the CGF. As documented in Michael Lightstone, “It’s one year and counting for who gets the Games,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 November 2006, p. B4, no further enhancements can be made to any proposal in the last month before CGF members cast their votes.

¹⁰ The 2010 Halifax Commonwealth Games Society, according to the Nova Scotia Registry of Joint Stock Companies, included: Fred MacGillivray, George Maclean, F.A Tony Martin, Ron L’Esperance, Nina Kressler, Ken Bagnell and Scott Logan. This list is available at Province of Nova Scotia, *Registry of Joint Stock Companies*, n.d., <http://www.gov.ns.ca/snsmr/rjsc/> (accessed January 19, 2009).

¹¹ MacGillivray mentioned a possible 2014 Commonwealth Games bid in the local media many times between the end of the 2010 bid and the official beginning of the 2014 bid. One of which was reported in Laurie Bodley, “CFL: Good for business in HRM,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 25 January 2005, p. F2. He mentioned that a CFL team, and its stadium, “...could help Halifax land major sporting events like the 2014 Commonwealth Games.”

¹² Chris Taylor (Commonwealth Games Canada Office Assistant), to Peter McClelland, E-mail, *Re: Halifax Bid* (23 January, 2009). Although the letter was not provided to the researcher, Taylor described its contents at length.

¹³ As of February 2006, this department was renamed the Department of Health Promotion and Protection.

¹⁴ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. At this time in the bid, Duff Montgomerie was the Director of Community Relations for the Premier's Office. In February of 2006, he moved to take the vacant position of Assistant Deputy Minister in the Department of Health Promotion and Protection. Then in March of 2007, he was appointed to Deputy Minister of the same department. He had significant administrative and health promotion experience. Specifically, he was Chair of the Premier's Council on Canadian Health Awareness, a senior Policy Advisor at Treasury and Policy Board, and a former Executive Assistant to the Minister of Health.

¹⁵ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. Mayor Peter Kelly began his political career in 1985 when he was elected a Councillor of Bedford, Nova Scotia. He later became the town's Mayor, and when the town was amalgamated in 1995 with the HRM, he became its Councillor. He was then elected Mayor of the HRM in 2000 and re-elected in 2004 and 2008.

¹⁶ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009, and Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole - 2014 Commonwealth Games – Domestic Bid*, 9 August 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/2014CommonwealthGamesBid.pdf>, p.3-4 (accessed March 17, 2009).

¹⁷ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole - 2014 Commonwealth Games – Domestic Bid*, 9 August 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/2014CommonwealthGamesBid.pdf>, p.3-4 (accessed March 17, 2009).

¹⁸ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Canada to Bid for 2014*, June 23, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailId=784 (accessed January 23, 2009).

¹⁹ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. Of note is the fact that according to Tom Scrimger, at this point Sport Canada had limited knowledge of the cities that were interested in hosting the Games, but knew that CGC as a member federation was interested in bidding. Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. Tom Scrimger was the Director General of Sport Canada from 2003-2008.

²⁰ Ibid. [Brackets mine.] Thomes Jones was a seven-year member of the Canadian volleyball team and earned a bronze medal at the 1979 Pan American Games, a silver medal at the 1982 World University Games, and finished 4th at the 1984 Los Angeles

Olympic Games. His professional career included working in government for the British Columbia Sport Ministry, where he had the opportunity to be involved in many aspects of the 1994 Victoria Commonwealth Games. He was named as Commonwealth Games Canada's Chief Executive Officer in January of 2005.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. The President of Commonwealth Games Canada, Dr. Andrew Pipe graduated from Queen's University and was the Medical Director of the University of Ottawa Heart Institute Prevention and Rehabilitation Centre, and a professor at the University of Ottawa. He served as the Chief Medical Officer to Canada's 1992 Summer Olympic Team in Barcelona and was the physician for Canada's national men's basketball team for many years. He is a member of the Canadian Olympic Hall of Fame, and served as Chair of the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport from 2003-2009.

²³ Commonwealth Games Canada, *2014 Call for Bids*, July 8, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=792 (accessed January 23, 2009).

²⁴ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008. Director of News Content and a columnist for *The Chronicle Herald*, Dan Leger was an award-winning writer and broadcaster. He appeared regularly on the CBC's political panel, and on other TV and radio programs. He spent six years as a member of the Parliamentary Press Gallery, where he specialized in politics, defence and diplomacy. As senior political writer for *The Canadian Press*, he covered dozens of election campaigns and conventions. Leger joined *The Chronicle Herald* in 2005 after 15 years at CBC Television as a producer, on-air presenter and executive producer. He was the recipient of a Gemini Award for producing CBC Newsworld's live coverage of the Swissair disaster.

²⁵ MacGillivray is a native of Halifax and an alumnus of St. Mary's University. He began his career in the grocery industry before moving to Trade Centre Limited in 1994 and was well known for his dedication to the community through his leadership and volunteer activities. He was the recipient of the Canadian Progress Award, Atlantic Canada Plus Distinguished Service Award, Governor General's Medal Commemorating Canada's 125th Anniversary, Rotary International Paul Harris Fellowship Award, Sport Nova Scotia's Chairman Award, Queen's Golden Jubilee Commemorative Medal, 2003 Crystal NS Tourism Award of Excellence, Canadian Association of Professional Speakers Award, and was selected as one of Atlantic Canada's Top 50 CEO's in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008.

²⁶ According to its website, "Trade Centre Limited, through our operating business units, is a leader in the Atlantic Canada business, hospitality and entertainment industry. We host approximately 750 events every year in our facilities and welcome about 800,000 visitors." Trade Centre Limited, *Welcome to the Trade Centre Website*, n.d., <http://www.tradecentrelimited.com/en/home/default.aspx> (accessed January 20, 2009).

²⁷ Canadian Sponsorship Forum, *Fred MacGillivray*, May 4, 2008, http://www.canadiansponsorshipforum.com/2008/bio_popup.aspx?id=15 (accessed January 23, 2009).

²⁸ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009 and Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. As a competitive swimmer, Bruce Robertson won a silver and a bronze medal at the 1972 Olympic Games. He then went on to win a gold and bronze medal at the 1973 World Aquatic Championships and a total of six medals at the 1974 Commonwealth Games. In recognition of his athletic accomplishments, Robertson was named Canada's Male Athlete of the Year in 1973 and was awarded the Order of Canada in 1974. When his athletic career was over, Robertson was involved with CGC for almost 20 years as a member-at-large, treasurer, Vice-President and President of the Commonwealth Games Foundation of Canada. In his professional career, he was a systems consultant. At the time of interview, he was a Vice-President of the Commonwealth Games Federation and an ex-officio member of the CGC Board of Directors. He was also the Chair of the CGF Marketing Committee and Chair of the CGF Coordination Committee.

²⁹ According to its website, Events Halifax promotes Halifax and Nova Scotia as an event destination within Canada and around the world. They conduct initial research regarding an event to determine its viability, prepare economic evaluations using the STEAM tool, support the development of the bid and bid materials, provide consultation on the governance structure of the organizing committee, assist the event organizer on accessing government funds, and provide consultation during the planning and execution phases on operational issues. Events Halifax, *What We Do*, n.d., <http://www.eventshalifax.com/en/home/abouteh/whatwedo.aspx> (accessed January 17, 2009).

³⁰ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole - 2014 Commonwealth Games – Domestic Bid*, 9 August 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/2014CommonwealthGamesBid.pdf>, p.3-4 (accessed March 17, 2009).

³¹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. Patrick Jarvis competed at the 1992 Paralympic Summer Games in Barcelona. In his professional career Jarvis worked in the petroleum industry, but volunteered for many sport organizations such as the International Paralympic Committee, and the Canadian Paralympic Committee. With reference to the Halifax bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, he acted as a bid specialist and consultant throughout the domestic phase of the bid, and in the international phase was hired as a Senior Director.

³² Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

³³ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole Minutes*, 9 August 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/cw050809.pdf>, p. 4 (accessed January 17, 2009). MacGillivray also mentioned to Council in these

proceedings that no other bid city has the support of its Mayor and Premier as co-chairs on the bid. This statement will seem quite ironic after reading this case study.

³⁴ Michael Lightstone, "Games bid review process in works," *The Chronicle Herald*, 7 August 2005, p. A1. Although the actual document could not be released by CGC, many newspapers quoted that the lack of infrastructure in Halifax was the main downfall of the bid.

³⁵ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009 and contained in Patrick Jarvis, *General Critique of 2010 Domestic Bid Submission*, 11 August 2005, Unpublished document, 1.

³⁶ Barrey Dorey, "Should Halifax pursue the 2014 Commonwealth Games?" *The Chronicle Herald*, 24 June 2005, p. F3. [Brackets mine.]

³⁷ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole Minutes*, 5 July 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/cw050705.pdf>, p.6-7 (accessed January 29, 2009). Also outlined by Bill Power, "Halifax sets its sights on 2014 Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 6 July 2005, p. B4.

³⁸ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole Minutes*, 9 August, 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/cw050809.pdf>, p.5 (accessed January 23, 2009). Although these minutes just indicated that the HRM would be paying \$375,000 of the total fee or half, the PNS agreed to pay the other half in provincial meetings where no minutes were recorded.

³⁹ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole - 2014 Commonwealth Games – Domestic Bid*, 9 August 2005, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/2014CommonwealthGamesBid.pdf>, p.3-4 (accessed March 17, 2009).

⁴⁰ Commonwealth Games Canada, *5 Cdn. cities compete to host 2014*, July 26, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=795 (accessed January 23, 2009).

⁴¹ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁴² Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁴³ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁴⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁴⁵ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. She also noted that Sport Canada usually goes by the rule that in order for a city to begin bidding for major Games, it must

have 40 percent of the necessary major infrastructure already in place. Although it was known by Sport Canada that Halifax did not have this necessary threshold, she remarked, "... we are also aware that there is a significant infrastructure gaps in this country," and that if going solely by such a benchmark, many cities would never have a chance. It is for this reason that Sport Canada employed a case-by-case analysis strategy in deciding how to support a specific bid.

⁴⁶ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. Jones remarked, "My first impressions of the Halifax Bid was that they were a strong bid last time, and that they would come back with either an equally strong bid, or a stronger bid this time around." Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

⁴⁷ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁴⁸ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁴⁹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009

⁵⁰ Éline Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. Éline Harvey was the Director of the Major Games and Hosting Division in Sport Canada during the time the Halifax bid was unfolding. Before moving to the federal government, Harvey was the Director of Athletics for Laval University for 13 years. She also served as Interim Director of Programs and Events and Operations and Development for the Canadian Interuniversity Athletic Union.

⁵¹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. [Brackets mine.]

⁵² Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁵³ Chris Cochrane, "Jumping hoops old N.S. sport," *The Chronicle Herald*, July 28, 2005, p. E1.

⁵⁴ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁵⁵ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

⁵⁶ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁵⁷ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Eric Savard as 2014 Bid Director*, August 17, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=802 (accessed January 25, 2009). Leading up to this appointment, Savard was involved in the co-ordination of more than 150 events, and at least 45 major gatherings at the international level. He also served as an advisor to over 35 different organizing committees and was in charge of over 80 events as the General Manager or Coordinator of specific activities. Some of his more recent projects included the Edmonton 2001 IAAF World

Championships in Athletics, and the Sherbrooke 2003 IAAF World Youth Championships in Athletics. He was also the Chief Executive Officer of Organisports, a major sports event business consulting group specializing in sport events bidding, strategy and planning.

⁵⁸ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Eric Savard as 2014 Bid Director*, August 17, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=802 (accessed January 25, 2009).

⁵⁹ Michael Lightstone, "HRM checks out Games competition," *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 September 2005, p. B2. Mayor Kelly did not participate in the conference as he was on holiday.

⁶⁰ Amy Pugsley Fraser, "HRM gets seminar on Games entry," *The Chronicle Herald*, 8 September 2005, p. B4.

⁶¹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009 and Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁶² Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

⁶³ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. However, he contended that even then, "I do not think that the city elected officials truly grasped the scope and scale of what this could mean to the city of Halifax."

⁶⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. Jones also noted that although the Premiers from the rest of Atlantic Canada pledged support in the domestic phase, they were nowhere to be seen when the Halifax bid began to hit roadblocks in the international phase.

⁶⁵ The Council of Atlantic Premiers, *Communiqué*, October 12, 2005, <http://www.cap-cpma.ca/default.asp?id=190&pagesize=1&sfield=content.id&search=303&mn=1.62.5.29> (accessed January 25, 2009). This meeting was chaired by Premier Pat Binns (P.E.I.) and attended by Premiers Bernard Lord (New Brunswick), Danny Williams (Newfoundland and Labrador) and John Hamm (Nova Scotia). No monetary support was provided for the project by the other Premiers, just the aforementioned political endorsement.

⁶⁶ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Bid Review Committee Chair and Members*, October 25, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=857 (accessed January 25, 2009).

⁶⁷ Michael Lightstone, "Shannon Park could be home to Commonwealth Games stadium," *The Chronicle Herald*, 26 October 2005, p. A1. In addition, within the Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Minutes*, 25 October 2005, p. 5, it was

actually passed unanimously that the report on the bid itself would not be released until the successful bid city was announced in December 2005.

⁶⁸ Michael Lightsone, "MacGillivray: Games process will be open to council, the public," *The Chronicle Herald*, 10 August 2005, p. B2. The fact that MacGillivray said the bidding process would be transparent is contained within Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Committee of the Whole Minutes*, 9 August 2005, p. 5.

⁶⁹ Barry Dorey, "Shannon Park only games site," *The Chronicle Herald*, 28 October 2005, p. B1.

⁷⁰ Steve Bezanson, "Let the bidding begin," *The Chronicle Herald*, 28 October 2005, p. B1.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² The initial \$5,000 paid by each city was to fund the informational and educational seminars put on for the bid cities throughout the domestic phase of the bid. The additional \$50,000 that was due on November 1st, 2005 with the submission of the bid book, and was used to cover the expense of the various things such as accommodations and travel costs of the BRC and BRS while reviewing the bid cities. In total, it costed each of the cities \$55,000 to bid for the Games, except for Calgary who only paid the \$5,000 before withdrawing in September.

⁷³ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Short List Release*, November 16, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=878 (accessed January 25, 2009).

⁷⁴ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Short List Release*, November 16, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=878 (accessed January 25, 2005). The BRS visited each city on separate days: York Region on November 17th, Hamilton on November 18th, Ottawa on November 19th, and Halifax on November 20th. The members of the team were from the following areas: venues, Games operations, budgets, technical, marketing, sport technical, elite athletes with a disability, TV, and athletes village.

⁷⁵ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Short List Release*, November 16, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=878 (accessed January 25, 2005). The BRC was to visit Halifax on December 10th, but because of a snowstorm was unable to do the visit until December 11th.

⁷⁶ Gordie Sutherland, "The winner is? Games bid choice to be revealed today," *The Chronicle Herald*, 15 December 2005, p. B1. *The Hamilton Spectator* reported that organizers estimated the cost of putting on the 2014 Games in Hamilton at \$835 million. The federal and provincial governments would have each picked up \$292 million, the city

of Hamilton would have put in another \$100 million and McMaster University would have contributed \$25 million. The other \$126 million would have come from commercial revenue.

⁷⁷ Gordie Sutherland, "Halifax puts on its Games face for Commonwealth committee," *The Chronicle Herald*, 14 December 2005, p. A1.

⁷⁸ Chris Cochrane, "The prize worth one more shot," *The Chronicle Herald*, 13 December 2005, p. C1.

⁷⁹ This poll result was first noted publicly by MacGillivray in Gordie Sutherland, "The winner is? Games bid choice revealed today," *The Chronicle Herald*, 15 December 2005, p. B1. No specifics on the poll such as sample size or accuracy were cited at the time. In Michael Lightstone, "Poll: Slight dip in support for Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 10 March 2006, p. B1, it was revealed that poll was conducted by Omnifacts Bristol Research and that the 90 percent number was made up of people who supported or mostly supported the Games bid. It asked 479 metro residents: "To what extent would you support or oppose the Commonwealth Games being hosted here in HRM?" It was considered accurate within 4.5 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

⁸⁰ Gordie Sutherland, "The winner is? Games bid choice to be revealed today," *The Chronicle Herald*, 15 December 2005, p. B1.

⁸¹ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Halifax Wins Right To Be*, December 15, 2005, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=920 (accessed January 25, 2009).

⁸² Gordie Sutherland, "Hurray for Halifax!," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2005, p. A1.

⁸³ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. Pipe also mentioned the provincial government was really enthusiastic about what the Games might mean for the Maritimes. Pipe recognized that not only were the city and province fully supportive of the bid in its infancy, the Premier and Mayor saw fit to become part of the governance structure of the bid as honorary co-chairs.

⁸⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁸⁵ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁸⁶ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. Sport Canada was involved in the process only as observers in order to make sure the process was transparent and fair. According to Harvey, the Government of Canada made every effort to never be seen as being partial to a specific bid city throughout the domestic bid process despite the fact that their contributions to the project depends largely on where the Games are to be held.

⁸⁷ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁸⁸ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. The Premier of Ontario, Dalton McGuinty, was not a co-presenter of any of the Ontario bids, likely because he could not openly support one of his province's bids over another.

⁸⁹ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁹⁰ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

⁹¹ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹² Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁹³ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹⁴ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009 and Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹⁵ Chris Cochrane, "It will be 23 months of waiting," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2005, p. E1.

⁹⁶ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹⁷ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008 and Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

⁹⁸ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁹⁹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁰⁰ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

¹⁰¹ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹⁰² According to Bruce Robertson, throughout each country's domestic bid phase, if in fact there is one, the CGF remains neutral towards each of the cities involved in the process; however, in general the CGF viewed the Halifax domestic bid as a very legitimate one, as they would of any bid originating from Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, or New Zealand. Where they do try to help is in being available to answer any questions and to help educate cities on the nature, scope, requirements, costs, and resource commitments required to stage the Commonwealth Games. In the early fall of this particular domestic phase, the CGF made an offer to CGC to make a presentation to all four cities involved in the domestic bid phase. Commonwealth Games Canada turned

down the CGF's offer because of the tight timeframe of this domestic phase. Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁰³ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

CHAPTER 4 – The International Bid Phase and Withdrawal of the Bid

There was unabashed joy Thursday about the future of historic Halifax, as municipal officials loudly celebrated finally winning the domestic race for the Commonwealth Games. Euphoric politicians and city hall staff hollered, embraced one another and shook hands after Commonwealth Games Canada selected Halifax to represent this country in the international contest for the 2014 sports spectacle.

- Michael Lightstone, The Chronicle Herald, 16 December 2005¹

We, as a country, had the opportunity to host the 2010 [Olympic] Winter Games and the 2014 [Commonwealth] Games. So within a four year span to host two major international Games that delivered infrastructure...and we gave that up, not because we lost, but because we chose not to go after it...The disappointing part is that we thought everybody was in it with the same amount of will and desire that we were when we made the move to bid. To have done it in a way that would suggest that somewhere along the line someone lost their will or changed their mind and didn't talk about, that's the hardest part.

- Thomas Jones, CEO of Commonwealth Games Canada, 8 October 2008²

A New Phase

The international bid phase, for all intents and purposes, began for the Halifax 2014 bid team as soon as Claude Bennett, President of Commonwealth Games Canada (CGC), announced Halifax as the winner of the domestic bid phase on December 15th, 2005. Before returning home, the victorious bid committee met with CGC and was

informed that the Commonwealth Games Federation (CGF) had elevated the amount of detail required in the international bid submission. As Duff Montgomerie noted, “They were now telling us that they had basically adopted Olympic standards...a higher template...” Commonwealth Games Canada then asked if Halifax and the Province of Nova Scotia (PNS) were still willing to make the bid under those conditions.³ The Halifax Bid Committee decided to press on, and signed a host city agreement with CGC that same day.⁴

Back in Halifax, another group of bid supporters gathered in a ballroom at the World Trade and Convention Centre to listen to the CGC announcement via an internet webcast. In attendance were civic politicians, senior Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) staff, Sport Nova Scotia officials, and military personnel. Local reporters who arrived to cover the announcement made from Toronto were told the gathering was a private function and were only permitted entry moments after Halifax was announced as the winner. A Trade Centre Limited official said they would have been let inside even if Halifax had not won the bid, but this did little to quell the disapproval from the local media.⁵ As Dan Leger noted:

Literally from the day that Halifax was announced as the bid city, there was a big red flag...They announced the bid, but they excluded the press from the room where the bid was being announced. From a media point of view, you want the picture of everyone jumping up with their arms in the air, you know, ‘we win,’ that is a money shot...The media was wondering why something so simple couldn’t be covered. It immediately set up a very bad and almost hostile tension track between the two.⁶

Shortly after Halifax was announced as the winner, some interesting facts were made public. According to Jagoda Pike, chair of the defeated Hamilton bid, CGC made an offer to Hamilton to be Canada’s candidate city for the 2014 Commonwealth Games

in November of 2004. Allegedly, officials from Hamilton met with two CGC directors, including the President Claude Bennett, and accepted the offer.⁷ Commonwealth Games Canada, neither denied nor confirmed this story, but did say that they decided to conduct a domestic phase after consultation with their funding partners from Sport Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company.⁸ Pike noted, "Obviously, we were unhappy initially, as you could imagine. Then we decided, for the good of the Commonwealth Games movement and for the good of Hamilton, if we wanted to try to bring the Games back again we had to refocus and get our bid going." Surprisingly, this information did not surface until December of 2005 after the domestic bid phase was complete, and was initially reported by the *Hamilton Spectator*, of which Pike was the publisher.⁹

A New Beginning

Initially, those involved with the victorious Halifax domestic bid stepped back and regrouped. Very quickly though, they realized that the task would now become much more onerous and therefore demanded a much more focused effort.¹⁰ The international bid book that the Halifax team needed to prepare required a much higher level of costing and preparedness than any other Commonwealth Games bid before it.¹¹ There was much work to be done, and a relatively short timeframe to do it in.

Outside of the bid team itself, other organizations were involved to help facilitate the process. The CGF was open to meeting with bid cities to answer questions and clarify technical requirements.¹² The federal government, and its Major Games and Hosting Division within Sport Canada, acted as a guide to the local bid committee in preparing the necessary information for federal Cabinet so that decisions on support

could be made.¹³ Finally, the provincial and municipal governments contributed personnel to help build the technical elements of the bid.¹⁴

Other organizations were not quite so helpful, although still working within their job descriptions. Almost immediately after winning the domestic phase, a few select writers at *The Chronicle Herald* newspaper began to call for the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee¹⁵ to release all of the bid details from their domestic bid book. One of these columnists contended, “Yes, it may be good strategy to keep the numbers secret, but it’s more important that this bid have the solid support of Nova Scotians. The only way to determine that support is to provide the numbers on cost and who will pay what portion of the bill.”¹⁶ To these outcries Fred MacGillivray replied, “Everything we do publicly now, Nigeria and Scotland will be looking at us every day, the same as we’ll be looking at them every day. . . . The more information you give publicly, the more information you’re giving your competition.”¹⁷ Furthermore he noted:

There has to be [considerable trust from the public]. In the initial piece for the domestic bid, I had several provincial appointees sitting with me who are responsible for the finances of the province. I had several municipal people sitting with me through the process who are responsible to the municipality for the process. Council and Cabinet saw much of what we did privately. We will do the same thing on the international piece, we will have provincial, municipal and now federal government officials involved in the bid because they’re our financial partners. There’s not a group of people like myself and a few others sitting privately making all these decisions without the public’s input through the proper process.¹⁸

The CGF monitors press stories related to all of the bids to ensure the bidding process is fair to all parties. Although it was noted that there were some negative press stories related to the Halifax bid, it was not seen as an unusual occurrence. General impressions at the CGF were that there was good community support in Halifax, and that the federal government was supporting the bid. As Bruce Robertson noted, “From the CGF’s

standpoint, it appeared as if the bid was coming along well.”¹⁹

Despite trying to maintain an element of secrecy from the other bid cities, the Halifax team released one of the elements of the domestic bid submission. At a news conference on January 20th, 2006, Halifax 2014 announced that the domestic budget, submitted to CGC as part of the bid book back on November 1st, was \$750-\$785 million (including inflation), up from the originally reported figure of \$500 million. On the increase MacGillivray commented, “I ... said that the number would not be dissimilar to [the] 2010 Games, and that number was \$500 million...I said if you took inflation in place, and factored it in, the number would not be far off.” Moreover he said, “Now that we were awarded the domestic bid . . . that’s why I came out today and gave [reporters] the number.”²⁰ Mayor Peter Kelly mentioned that while it was still too early to say what portion Halifax would need to pay, he pledged that the Games would not be a financial burden to the HRM. Moreover, he noted that some of the things needed to be constructed for the Games, such as an expanded commuter ferry system and recreation centres, were already built into their city budget and planned for. These things could now be partially financed from other sources if the bid was won.²¹

On January 26th, 2006, Mayor Kelly and Premier Hamm co-authored a column in *The Chronicle Herald* called *The Commonwealth Games: moving forward together*. Perhaps in response to an increasing number of calls for financial prudence in the local media, they noted:

For Nova Scotia and for Halifax Regional Municipality, the 2014 Commonwealth Games represent an opportunity to showcase our people, our history, and our accomplishments to the world. Indeed, if these Games are awarded to Canada — with HRM as host city — the event will leave a legacy that would pay dividends to the municipality, the province, the region and the nation for generations to come.²²

Early in the international phase, through media releases such as this one, the political leadership of the HRM and the PNS showed they were squarely behind the bid. This stands in stark contrast to the latter stages of the bid process.

Over a month after winning the domestic phase, the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee organizational structure was still to be determined. During this time, Commonwealth Games Canada worked with the Halifax group to set up a bid society and to select its leader.²³ Then on January 30th, 2006, Halifax 2014 named its CEO, Scott Logan. Logan was involved with the domestic bid as a representative of the PNS and was then seconded in order to take over the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee. Premier Hamm noted at the time:

Scott brings a terrific breadth of management and sport experience to the bid development process. He will be a strong asset for the bid team. His presence in this leadership role enhances my confidence that we will be able to bring these Games to Halifax, for the benefit of all Atlantic Canadians.²⁴

For Patrick Jarvis, the naming of a CEO was long overdue. One of the last things he recommended to the Halifax domestic bid team in the final days before it won in December, was to have a plan to announce the CEO the day after the domestic bid winner was announced (assuming that Halifax won). This obviously did not happen, and over six weeks were spent with the organization in structural and leadership limbo.²⁵ Upon the organization finally being more formally set up, three initial goals were developed: (1) to procure the international vote, (2) to build the bid, business case and budget, and (3) to run the organization as an entity.²⁶

Duff Montgomerie, the senior provincial government representative on the Halifax 2014 bid team, filled Logan's former role as the Assistant Deputy Minister of Nova Scotia Health Promotion and continued to represent the PNS on the bid committee.²⁷ The initial relationship between the three integral entities in this bid, the

HRM, the PNS and Halifax 2014, and especially between the city and the province, was exceptional. Montgomerie explained, “We really worked hard to get Scott and his team up and running to be able to perform.”²⁸

Then came a major change in the Canadian political landscape. Conservative Stephen Harper ousted Prime Minister Paul Martin from office on February 6th, 2006, amid cries of Liberal corruption and the release of the Gomery report.²⁹ This change meant that suddenly Nova Scotia native Peter MacKay took a seat in the federal Cabinet. MacKay, originally from New Glasgow, Nova Scotia and then an MP for Central Nova, was named Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA). With his affinity for sport and his allegiances to his home province, this was a major development for the Halifax Commonwealth Games movement. Soon after coming into this office, MacKay stated, “ACOA will be a huge player in the bid process and hopefully, more importantly, in the funding of the actual Games when we win the bid.”³⁰ From that point on, the PNS briefed MacKay’s office on everything Games related.³¹

On February 21st, 2006, HRM Council received an in-camera report on the required letter of intent as well as a presentation from Halifax 2014 at both the in-camera and regular Council session. The presentations outlined what the annual cost of financing the municipal share of the Games venues might be. Director of Finance and Administration for Halifax 2014, Dale MacLennan, advised Council that it would be between 0.8 and 3 percent of the municipality’s total yearly combined operating and capital budget, depending on how long they established the financing period to be. She noted, “You can’t simply look at costs when you’re evaluating the benefit of this - it must

be based on what the net benefits to the communities are.”³² Following the presentation, Council unanimously approved a letter of intent to file an international bid to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games.³³ The only other cities to lodge bids with the CGF by the February 24th, 2006 deadline were Abuja, Nigeria and Glasgow, Scotland.³⁴

The first major activity for these three official candidate cities was to travel to Melbourne for the 2006 Commonwealth Games in order to make presentations to the CGF, take part in an observers program required by the CGF of all bid cities to study and learn from the organizers of the 2006 Games, and perhaps most importantly, to lobby for votes. Just before the Halifax delegation departed for Melbourne however, there was a change in the provincial political dynamic, one that could potentially have a large effect on the Halifax bid. On February 26th, 2006, Premier John Hamm retired, and fellow Progressive Conservative Rodney MacDonald took his place.

Even with the political change, it was important for the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee to bring as influential a delegation as possible to Melbourne, which they attempted to do by including representatives from the municipal and provincial governments, and Commonwealth Games Canada. Of note in the delegation in addition to bid committee members Fred MacGillivray and Scott Logan, were former Premier John Hamm, Barry Barnet (PNS Minister of Health Promotion and Protection),³⁵ Duff Montgomerie (PNS), Mayor Peter Kelly (HRM), Thomas Jones (CGC), Claude Bennett (CGC), and Andrew Pipe (CGC).³⁶ It was well known that the trip would not be cheap, potentially costing upwards of \$500,000, but as Logan noted, “We’ve really got our eye on the bottom line and are certainly trying to do this as inexpensively as possible...But... what it costs is what it costs.” Furthermore, he deemed the trip one of the most important

events of the international bid process, and that the substantial investment was justified.³⁷

Asked what he thought of the elaborate and expensive process of procuring votes, Logan replied:

It doesn't sit well with me, that whole side of it. But the fact of the matter is to run with these guys that we have to convince . . . to vote for us, it takes a certain degree of playing that game. I'm not saying it's right. But that's the world we're in. As a sports guy I'd sooner see all that money go to athletes.³⁸

Halifax 2014 at the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games

Very quickly upon arriving in Melbourne, one thing was obvious to the Halifax 2014 bid team: the 2006 Commonwealth Games were a monstrosity. They were much larger than anything that the Halifax team envisioned. As Logan noted, "I don't think there is a sense that we should match these games in a size context...Right-sizing is more important than over-sizing. A full stadium provides a great athlete experience, whether it is 100,000 or 30,000 people."³⁹

As expected, the Halifax team was hard at work before the Melbourne Games got underway. They presented to both the Commonwealth Games Federation's Executive Board and to the Federation's 71-member General Assembly.⁴⁰ As MacGillivray noted, "The whole idea of being here was to help people recognize that Halifax and Canada are serious about our bid for 2014, to let people know who we are, a little bit about what the city looks like, and meet the people we'll hopefully be partners with."⁴¹ The Halifax officials also ran a hospitality suite in downtown Melbourne in order to meet with as many representatives from the 71 Commonwealth nations as possible. Logan noted, "We don't have all the answers and we need to do a lot of listening...It's a very diverse number of nations and territories and we need to find out what is important to them in the

Commonwealth Games.”⁴²

The other two cities undertook similar lobbying strategies while in Melbourne, and both made the required presentations to the CGF. Following Glasgow’s presentation to the CGF general assembly, Scottish papers declared its bid the front-runner. This was buoyed by the fact that in a surprise move, Scotland’s first minister Jack McConnell made the presentation to the Commonwealth Games Federation General Assembly. According to Louise Martin, chairwoman of the Commonwealth Games Council for Scotland, “We think it’s a coup to have the first minister involved, which is why we’ve kept it quiet.”⁴³ Glasgow also set up a downtown hospitality suite where they served specially commissioned “Glasgow 2014” bottles of Whyte & Mackay whisky. The Nigerian group on the other hand, although some 80 strong, showed up 2 hours late for their presentation to the CGF, spoke for just one minute, and then showed a video for the remaining time of their allotted 10 minutes.⁴⁴

While still in Melbourne, and the 2006 Games in full swing, the Halifax 2014 Bid Society Board of Directors (see Table 3), and the Executive Committee of the Board of Directors (see Table 4), were officially created at a meeting on March 17th, 2006.

Overall, the trip was very positive. As Montgomerie noted, “We had countries come up to us, like New Zealand and others, and saying, ‘make sure you right-size these Games,’” in essence meaning that the Commonwealth Games were growing too big, and out of the reach of many of the smaller countries.⁴⁵ The Halifax contingent felt like they made solid progress while in Melbourne and that good relationships were established with other Commonwealth associations.⁴⁶ According to Mayor Kelly, “The feeling was should we desire the Games, the feeling was that they were possible.”⁴⁷

Name	Organization / Sector
Fred MacGillivray (chair)	Public
Claude Bennett	Commonwealth Games Canada
Andrew Pipe	Commonwealth Games Canada
Thomas Jones	Commonwealth Games Canada
Suzanne Coffey	Commonwealth Games Canada
Joan Duncan	Commonwealth Games Canada
Dan English	Halifax Regional Municipality
Wayne Anstey	Halifax Regional Municipality
Duff Montgomerie	Province of Nova Scotia
Howard Windsor / Robert Fowler	Province of Nova Scotia
Ken Bagnell	Sport
Jamie Ferguson	Sport
Vacant	Corporate
Vacant	Corporate
Lloyd Johnson	First Nations
Trevino Betty	Athlete
Scott Logan (ex-officio)	Halifax 2014 CEO
Eric Savard (ex-officio)	CGC Bid Director
John Knubley / Mel Coombs (observers)	Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
Trice Cameron (observer)	Sport Canada

Table 3: Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid Society Board of Directors⁴⁸

Name	Organization / Sector
Fred MacGillivray	Public
Joan Duncan	Commonwealth Games Canada
Thomas Jones	Commonwealth Games Canada
Dan English	Halifax Regional Municipality
Howard Windsor / Robert Fowler	Province of Nova Scotia
Ken Bagnell	Sport
Scott Logan (ex-officio)	Halifax 2014 CEO
Eric Savard (ex-officio)	CGC Bid Director

Table 4: Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid Society Executive Committee⁴⁹

What impact witnessing the massive and lavish 2006 Melbourne Games may have had on some of the members of the delegation, specifically the governmental representatives, is a question that will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The Other Bids

Two other cities bid for the 2014 Games: Glasgow, Scotland and Abuja, Nigeria. Like Halifax, Glasgow is a port city. It has about 630,000 citizens and a similar climate to Halifax. Scotland has twice played host to the Games, both times in Edinburgh. This time around, Glasgow was selected in 2004 over Edinburgh to be Scotland's candidate city, and in August of 2005, the Scottish government announced it would support the city's bid with substantial funding if it was successful. Glasgow already had three soccer stadiums, the smallest of which had a capacity of 50,000 people.⁵⁰ A factor not in Glasgow's favour was that the Commonwealth Games had just been in Manchester in 2002, and if the cyclical nature of the Games was to hold true, it could have been seen as too soon for a return to the United Kingdom.⁵¹

All considered, Glasgow had a very sound all around bid,⁵² and from most perspectives was going to be the biggest competition to the Halifax bid.⁵³ It was well organized, had a head start of almost a year and a half on the Halifax bid which gave them a visible advantage,⁵⁴ and was guided by a strong vision.⁵⁵ Glasgow also had more existing sport infrastructure and better computer graphics to demonstrate what they planned to construct.⁵⁶ As Montgomerie noted, "We always saw Scotland as the one to overcome."⁵⁷

On the other hand, the bid from Abuja, Nigeria was seen almost exclusively as the "darkhorse" of the three bids,⁵⁸ although it did garner support from some influential

people like Ron Walker, chairman of the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games.⁵⁹

Abuja is a city of over a million people, is the capital of Nigeria, and is situated inland near the middle of the country. It can be extremely hot in the summer with temperatures routinely reaching 40 degrees Celsius.

Africa has never hosted the Games, despite the fact that there are 18 African countries in the Commonwealth Games Federation, more than from any other singular region of the Commonwealth. In this particular bid, there were reports that the Nigerian government asked Canada and Scotland to voluntarily drop out of the race so that an African nation could host the Games.⁶⁰ However, despite the growing amount of literature and sentiment for an African city to host a major international sport festival,⁶¹ and the fact that the Abuja bid "...played the Africa card very hard,"⁶² Tony Holding contended:

The Commonwealth Games movement is much more sophisticated than that. They know at the end of the day that the Games have got to be able to be run, they know that they've got to be safe, that their athletes are in a good environment, and the reality is that most of the Commonwealth Games movement, even back then through the bid period, was dealing with the reality with having elected Delhi [for 2010]...they could see that there were problems coming down the line and they didn't want to have to deal with that again.⁶³

Holding's sentiment was that unless Abuja could put together an incredible technical bid, they were not going to be in the running to host the Games.⁶⁴ As Robertson noted, this did not happen:

The Abuja bid was generally very poor. Although the city has a number of existing sport stadia, and very good ones at that, it was clear that they had not been put to much use since the All-Africa Games for which they were built. The tours of the venues and the city were very poorly organized. They couldn't answer the most basic operational questions that were posed to them.⁶⁵

Despite these shortfalls, the decision would ultimately come down to a vote, with

each country holding only a single ballot. As Andrew Pipe noted, although Abuja was:

...a place fraught with political, security, infrastructure, competency, credibility issues...[It] was a country with a command and control governance government, with access to sums of money beyond the dreams of the average; therefore, an ability to funnel sums of money to the Games in a variety of ways to make their bid attractive. What did that mean, particularly given our experiences in the past? It had to be respected.⁶⁶

Élaine Harvey of Sport Canada went one step further. While still believing that it was Canada's race to lose, she saw it as a race between Halifax and Abuja for the Games.⁶⁷

Mayor Kelly made it clear that although it is unwise to ever underestimate anyone and that all three cities were in contention, in talking to representatives of other Commonwealth countries, they liked what they saw with the Halifax bid and that Halifax stood a very good chance to win.⁶⁸ Pipe noted:

Abuja was a wildcard, almost a longshot. There is no doubt at some point that Africa will host a Games, more likely in South Africa than anybody else. But here was a bid from a continent that had never hosted the Games before, and everybody, not unlike the Beijing hosting for the first time, everyone was saying Africa needs to host one day...It was a big worry. The thing that we always fell back on was that, Africa will win one day, but it probably won't be Nigeria because of all the human rights issues, and the risks and dangers... You don't want to be negatively talking about your opponents, but in our view, it wasn't the right place to go. I mean, we would have trouble taking our athletes to Nigeria if they won because there are just too many risks there... We never really needed to raise this issue on the road because people would say 'Well its between you and Glasgow, because we would never go to Nigeria.'⁶⁹

Moving Forward

The Chronicle Herald funded an official scientific poll in February of 2006 to examine how the citizens of Halifax felt about the Commonwealth Games bid. Results of the poll were released in early March 2006 and judging by the majority of articles written by *Chronicle Herald* columnists on the secrecy and perceived exorbitant costs of the Games, the newspaper likely expected to see different results. Of the 401 respondents

from Halifax, 75 percent completely or mostly supported Halifax hosting the event.⁷⁰ How to interpret these results correctly, especially in comparison to the poll conducted in the domestic phase showing 90 percent support for the bid, then became a major question. Bruce DeVenne, a major opponent of the bid who even went as far as setting up an anti-Games website, said the poll meant, "...that our efforts in educating people about the real dangers of these Games are working, and an informed population will not support the Games."⁷¹ Supporters of the project noted that the 90 percent approval rating previously recorded was bound to come down, and that 75 percent was still an extremely high level of support.⁷²

Regardless of the poll numbers, the bid committee responded to the many criticisms tossed around in the media. Logan stated that the best current estimate that the bid committee had at the time was still \$785 million and that the number would most likely change as the requirements of the bid became known in the months ahead. Moreover, he noted, "The Halifax 2014 Bid Committee will be undertaking a very detailed process of due diligence in order to determine the final estimate of the cost of the Games," and that:

Negotiations among these partners to determine the exact funding levels for each will take place over the next seven to nine months. Prior to the submission of Halifax's final bid document next year, the Games' cost estimate will be ratified and approved by the three levels of government. Our bid cannot and will not be more than we, as a municipality, a province and a country, can manage.⁷³

In late April 2006, the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee and Board of Directors made a few very important decisions. The vision, mission, values, guiding principles and goals developed in strategic planning meetings with stakeholders throughout April were recommended by the Executive Committee and approved by the Board of Directors.⁷⁴

The vision for the bid committee was established as, “A Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games where the Commonwealth Family gathers for greatness to celebrate sport and culture in the Atlantic gateway to Canada.” The committee’s mission was established as, “Halifax 2014 exists to prepare a winning proposal for the right to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games.”⁷⁵

Also in these meetings, it was reiterated that the CGF bid submission requirements were elevated since the domestic phase, and that this in conjunction with the fact that the federal government required all requests for funding to be submitted only once, necessitated the provision of greater detail in the business plan they were beginning to prepare.⁷⁶ Therefore, the Halifax 2014 bid budget, the cost to build the business plan (and the Games budget contained within it) and to procure votes, was “...prepared in rigorous detail in order to take all of these requirements into consideration,” and necessitated a higher cost than previous Canadian bid budgets. The bid budget was completed by late April, and then submitted to the three levels of government for analysis.⁷⁷

Logan, MacLennan and Montgomerie, on behalf of Halifax 2014, visited HRM Council on May 2nd to give an update on the progress of the bid and to answer questions from Councillors. After reviewing the recent accomplishments of the committee in Melbourne, sharing the newly established mission and values, the committee representatives took questions from Councillors. Most questions revolved around the timing and release of bid and Games budget information. Halifax 2014 officials made it clear that the bid budget could not be made public until all three levels of government reached an agreement on their individual contributions and until it was determined that

there would be no impact to the competitiveness of the bid. The Games budget on the other hand, continued to be developed and likely would be ready in late fall or early spring to begin negotiations with the federal government.⁷⁸ Shortly after this Council meeting, an interim contribution of \$1.5 million toward the bid budget was passed by HRM Council.⁷⁹

About a month later, Peter Spurway of Halifax 2014 once again addressed the seemingly continual accusation that columnists of *The Chronicle Herald* levelled against the bid committee of deliberately and unnecessarily withholding information. Spurway stated, “There are questions being asked, the answers to which are simply not known right now – questions for which answers are currently being developed.” One example of which he cited was the question of what it will cost to host the Games. To this question he replied:

Today, that number is estimated at \$785 million. The bid committee is currently reviewing the thousands of details needed to refine the Games cost estimate. It’s questionable that either Scotland or Nigeria can accurately answer that question, either. There are simply too many details left unsettled at this point.⁸⁰

Spurway also reiterated the idea that not all details could be unveiled because they would tip-off the two rival cities. He noted that parts of the proposal would be unveiled as the May 2007 deadline for submitting the entire bid neared, but that not all of essential details would be released until after all three cities submitted their bid books to the CGF.⁸¹ Minister Barnet supported this premise, sometimes even against others in the provincial legislature. “What I fail to understand is why it is that we need to focus on issues that will actually weaken our position...And I really believe that if we provide too much information to our competition, it will weaken our position,” he said one day to his provincial political counterparts.⁸²

On the other hand, Mayor Kelly seemed to slowly be withdrawing his backing for the bid. At a public event in June 2006, he announced, “We cannot mortgage the future of our children or our grandchildren... We can’t go to the \$1.1 billion spent by Manchester, the \$1.3 [billion] spent by Melbourne or what looks like \$1.5 billion in New Delhi. If that’s where we’ve got to go, we won’t be at there at the other end [*sic*].”⁸³ To this statement, Kelly received praise from bid detractors and censure from bid backers.⁸⁴

The month of July once again brought the Halifax 2014 committee to Melbourne, this time for an orientation session.⁸⁵ A 10-member delegation from Nova Scotia attended meetings with representatives of the CGF and officials from the Abuja and Glasgow bids. The meetings were for gathering crucial information that went toward preparing a competitive proposal. “The Melbourne Games’ organizers learned a lot about what they did well and where they would have done things differently – and we’re keen to learn from their experience,” said Logan.⁸⁶ Through these sessions and the CGF’s Games technical manuals, the CGF ensured that all three bid cities “...were well aware of what was required of them.”⁸⁷

Small Victories and Larger Setbacks

Back at home, the debate over the alleged secrecy and cost of the bid cooled somewhat in the local media. According to one journalist from *The Chronicle Herald*, it may have either resulted from other distractions in the summer months, or that people were simply growing bored with the issue. In addition, many of the top Halifax 2014 officials were occupied traveling around the world to various Commonwealth countries promoting the Halifax bid, which meant less chance for interviews and the subsequent

newspaper stories the next day.⁸⁸ The bid committee noticed this trend of declining negative press and attributed it to the efforts of its communications staff.⁸⁹

This small step forward for the bid was quickly followed by a larger step in the opposite direction. In August, the Venues & Operational Planning Department of Halifax 2014 revealed that there was not enough room in Shannon Park for the proposed Commonwealth Games stadium and athlete's village. According to one of their consultants:

An Athletes Village in Shannon Park would be severely compromised. To overcome these inadequacies would require extending the Athletes Village area very significantly into the Sports Park which would restrict the available land for those facilities. The concept of the Sport Park and the Village on the same area of land (Shannon Park) is not feasible and is likely to attract significant criticism from and possible rejection by the CGF and the Bid Evaluation team...⁹⁰

For Montgomerie and the PNS, this was the first issue to raise major concerns.⁹¹ In order to resolve the problem, the first proposal was to keep all of the originally planned sport venues in Shannon Park, but to move the athletes village to an adjacent piece of land called Ocean Breeze.⁹² This area already had an existing private residential development, but the decision was made to pursue the land nonetheless, and to look for other available land elsewhere as a fallback.⁹³ This information was not divulged to the public at the time.

Meanwhile, other venue plans continued to be developed and received a vote of confidence in October by the Commonwealth Games Federation's CEO Mike Hooper. On a visit to Halifax by top CGF officials, Hooper described the plans as "...totally consistent with what is required for a modern Commonwealth Games - the clusterization [of potential venues], the close proximity to the city [and] the close proximity to the village for the athletes."⁹⁴ Artist renderings of many of the facilities were presented to

the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee in November; the main stadium, the centrepiece of the Games, was now to include 50,000 seats, half of which would be removed after the Games to leave a permanent stadium with a capacity for 25,000 people.⁹⁵ Concurrently, talks were ongoing with the owner of the adjacent Ocean Breeze land.⁹⁶

At one point, some previously unreleased information on venues was obtained by a journalist at *The Chronicle Herald*. A junior reporter who happened to be in one of the local university's school of architecture⁹⁷ came across plans and drawings for the stadium and other facilities, all of which were based on certain cost parameters. The reporter gathered up the information, totalled up the cost, and it came out to roughly 1 billion dollars. *The Chronicle Herald* then went to Halifax 2014 with this newly acquired information and asked for their comment. According to Leger, the organization would neither deny nor confirm any facts of the story and that, initially anyways, they just declined to comment whatsoever.⁹⁸ When the story was released, it noted that Halifax's pitch for the 2014 Commonwealth Games included a \$97-million stadium, \$40.7-million aquatic centre and \$25.6-million badminton facility.⁹⁹ Halifax 2014 then broke its silence to confirm that \$97 million was the expected price tag for the 40,000-seat stadium that was proposed in the domestic bid but that since the proposed facility was now up to 50,000 seats, its new cost was still unknown. According to Leger:

This was the kind of damaging story that we had to run because we did it through a perfectly defensible journalistic process, it was not denied, in fact when the actual documents were released, we were almost bang on... People who were inside the process who were so frustrated with this silence, that they started calling us off the record and things like that, and giving us more details, all of which supported the story that we had done.¹⁰⁰

Announcements Are Made

The united front that was presented by HRM Council throughout most of the early stages of the bid was definitely not present when the international bid budget was released to the public in late November. Unanimously approved by Council on November 28th,¹⁰¹ the budget outlined \$14.3 million dollars to be divided between private-sector corporations (\$3.7 million), the federal government (\$3.5 million), the provincial government (\$3.5 million), the municipal government (\$3 million), and lottery sales and merchandising (\$580,200). Expenditures included things like consultant fees, marketing and communication, travel, and office expenses.¹⁰² One Councillor in particular, Gloria McCluskey of Dartmouth Centre, said the \$3 million HRM portion, "...was a lot of money," and that the event itself was too expensive for local taxpayers. Although she stopped short of pulling her support for the Games, she did say she would not sit through any more Council meetings where financing for the planned event was discussed in secret. She remarked:

I'm disturbed by the whole thing... If I'm in that [future closed-door] meeting, I'm making it known that nothing that I hear in there is going to be kept a secret. This is ridiculous, and the only reason it's being done is so the general public will not hear the real news.¹⁰³

Concurrently, concern was growing within Sport Canada about what the final cost of the Games would be. In addition, Sport Canada officials also believed that the municipal and provincial representatives on the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee shared those concerns.¹⁰⁴ Then on November 30th, 2006, Minister of Sport Peter Van Loan announced that the federal government would contribute half of the total public funding or up to 35 percent of the total Games cost, up to a maximum of \$400 million (inclusive of their \$3.5 million dollars towards the bid budget).¹⁰⁵ The only problem with

this announcement was that the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee had yet to finish the business case for the project. It had even been explicitly asked in a letter back in August from Logan to Tom Scrimger, Director General of Sport Canada, for Sport Canada not to finalize its contribution until it received Halifax 2014's business plan (inclusive of its Games budget).¹⁰⁶ Even more dauntingly, Minister MacKay noted at the time that Ottawa's contribution would remain firm at this level.¹⁰⁷ As Logan noted after hearing of the offer, "It's a very nice gesture on the federal government's part, but our efforts will be around ensuring that we've done a very thorough business plan [to] present [to] all levels of government."¹⁰⁸ Deputy Mayor Sue Uteck was equally unimpressed at Ottawa's seemingly impulsive contribution, "[They] asked for a true accounting of the entire bid, so let the bid committee come back and show you the true cost."¹⁰⁹ To say the least, officials at CGC were confused:

It would have been nice for [the federal government] to actually link their contribution to a budget, to an analysis...It was based on, I have no idea, on a cap, or on what they thought was appropriate for the project but with no analysis, there was nothing quantified at all...we got no rationale at all.¹¹⁰

From the provincial government's perspective, the federal government releasing this \$400 million cap indicated that the Prime Minister was worried about the cost overruns occurring in the lead up to the Vancouver 2010 Olympic Games, a project that he thought was an over-expenditure of federal funds. According to Montgomerie, Prime Minister Harper kept saying with reference to the 2014 Commonwealth Games bid, "You've got to keep your eye on that this doesn't run away on you."¹¹¹ In response, PNS officials said that when they came to the federal government, they would come with a well developed business case and that they would argue for the federal government's engagement in the project based on the merits of that business case. Throughout the bid

that is what Montgomerie (who as of October 2006 was the sole funding partner liaison with Sport Canada¹¹²) communicated to senior bureaucrats at Sport Canada, what Minister Barnett communicated to the Minister of Sport, and what Premier Hamm and Premier MacDonald communicated to the Prime Minister.¹¹³ For whatever reason, Prime Minister Harper decided not to wait for the business case to be completed before capping the federal contribution at \$400 million. Said Mayor Kelly:

I think we were hoping that these being federal Games, Canada's Games...that they would certainly pay the lion's share, and \$400 was good to hear, certainly at that point in time. But when they put the caveat, 'that's it,' it brought concern, because the question is, who pays the difference?¹¹⁴

Once the Harper government released this number, private discussions between the PNS and Sport Canada officials occurred revolving around the idea that the bid team still wanted a chance to make their case to the government. The PNS conveyed that they thought it was unfair that the federal government would make a contribution, and a capped contribution no less, without looking at the business case first, but according to Montgomerie, "Obviously it was a decision that was out of their hands."¹¹⁵ He went on to say, "Whether you like the decision the Prime Minister made or not, he made it based upon I assume what he felt was 'ok we don't want to have a multi Games event that's going to just cost the taxpayers all kinds of money and be out of control.'"¹¹⁶

Another opinion poll was conducted between November 21st and December 1st, 2006. The results indicated that 81 percent of Nova Scotians supported Halifax's bid and 77 percent said they supported or strongly supported funding for the Games coming from all three levels of government.¹¹⁷ This support did not carry over to all those at City Hall however. Councillor McCluskey continued to oppose the bid in its entirety, and in stark contrast to some of his earlier positions, Mayor Kelly also began to ask for more

disclosure, “I have had concerns with the lack of communications...I would like more to be given to the public.”¹¹⁸ To these outcries, Logan said the bid committee is prepared to meet with Councillors at any time to answer questions and that, “This is not an issue about hiding dollar figures...There’s no budget at this point in time. There have been no numbers discussed. That’s the work that we’re doing.”¹¹⁹ He continued to urge patience in waiting for his team to finish the budget before releasing incomplete information that could jeopardize the city’s bid. Deputy Mayor Uteck stood in opposition to Councillor McCluskey and the Mayor, “I’m disappointed with some members of council...I’m puzzled why people who vote unanimously for something would go out the door and trash it,” she said.¹²⁰

To counter those coming out against the bid, local business leaders and brothers Don and Jim Mills founded “Bring on the Games” in December 2006.¹²¹ In an opinion piece published in *The Chronicle Herald* on December 15th, the Mills brothers condemned the newspaper’s coverage as “...nearly universally negative in tone and editorial content,” and pointed out that “...there has been an unnecessarily narrow – almost obsessive – focus on the eventual cost of the Games, while failing to examine the overall value the Games would bring to the region.”¹²² They went on to say:

As co-chairs of this broad coalition of community organizations and companies, we fully accept and understand the need for fiscal responsibility in relation to this initiative. We also support the process that the bid committee and its funding partners have undertaken to ensure that the Games are affordable. Like any other investment, the Games must be affordable, with the benefits far outweighing the risks associated with such a major undertaking. We also accept and understand the need for confidentiality in a competitive situation and believe the Commonwealth Games bid committee will present the full details of its bid as promised in May, a bid that must be affordable to the citizens of the province.¹²³

Chronicle Herald columnist Roger Taylor condemned the newly founded organization

because it was jointly led by Don Mills, President and CEO of Corporate Research Associates Incorporated, the same market research firm conducted a poll with favourable results for the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee.¹²⁴ This was obviously a legitimate argument and perhaps unnecessarily put into question some of the favourable poll results that the bid received. Nevertheless, at the initial meeting for “Bring on the Games,” nearly 60 people attended and listened to a presentation by Logan on the aims of the bid committee for fiscal responsibility, a solid business plan, long-term sustainability, and legacy.¹²⁵

A New Year

The three Halifax 2014 Bid Committee objectives of building a winning, reliable and affordable bid that would be supported by all of the funding partners were laid out early on in the bid process. These principles were then revisited in December of 2006 at a Halifax 2014 Executive Committee meeting,¹²⁶ and by late January 2007, the bid committee came to a point where they believed they had achieved them. With that accomplished, they submitted their business plan to the various levels of government on January 26th, 2007. Contained therein was the much talked about Games budget, which declared that the overall expenditures would be \$1.359 billion, or \$1.599 billion with inflation.¹²⁷ The document was submitted with the expectation that it would then be negotiated and subject to change,¹²⁸ and that it would, “Enable partners to provide feedback to the society, which [would] allow the budget to be brought to the Board [of Directors] for inclusion in the candidature file (bid book) at a later date.”¹²⁹ For nothing other than information’s sake, the Glasgow Games budget, submitted to the CGF on the May 9th, 2007, was \$2.398 billion (without inflation).¹³⁰

Following the completion of the business case and the Games budget, Logan continued to be asked publicly what the event was going to cost. He replied, “How much will it be at the end of the day? At this point in time, it’s in the hands of the three funding partners because they’ll tell us what they’re prepared to pay.”¹³¹ The bid committee did release some other information on the bid, however. An endowment fund to help maintain the new athletic facilities was included in the budget, which was a large departure from many of the prior major Canadian Games (with the exception of the 1988 Calgary Olympics) in that they had usually just depended on the actual event producing a surplus, which would then in turn become an endowment fund. The Halifax 2014 Games budget actually specified an amount that would be invested to generate interest revenue to cover any arising shortfalls in the new facilities.¹³² Logan noted at the time:

A big part of what we’re trying to do here is host a Games that are scaled to Halifax but at the same time maintains the quality of the experience for all the Commonwealth... If we can do that, a lot of countries are going to look at Canada and say, ‘Wow, that’s the new model. That’s the way you want to go’... It’s contingent upon us to do this in a cost-effective way, a realistic way, and ensure the quality but not go beyond our means.¹³³

Also released were the sports that would be contested at the 2014 Games should Halifax have been announced as the winner. On hand for the release were Thomas Jones (CGC), Frank Garner (Director of Sport for Halifax 2014), and Joanne Mortimore (CEO of Athletics Canada) and several Canadian high performance athletes.¹³⁴ The sports chosen supposedly on CGF guidelines, participation and standards of performance within the Commonwealth, gender equity, marketing appeal, and cost were: aquatics, athletics, basketball, boxing (men), badminton, cycling, gymnastics, hockey, lawn bowls, netball (women), rugby 7s (men), shooting, squash, table tennis, triathlon, weightlifting and wrestling. MacGillivray said at the time, “Halifax 2014 has chosen individual and team

sports that are operationally feasible, will generate spectator interest, and provide opportunities for post-Games use and legacy in Nova Scotia.”¹³⁵ Curiously missing from the program was Halifax’s beloved sport of paddling.

Although not a core sport at the Commonwealth Games, paddling (canoe and kayak) was added to the list of optional sports that could be contested at a particular Games at the discretion of the host city.¹³⁶ It was clear that many members of the bid committee were partial towards including paddling, which made its absence even stranger.¹³⁷ Unfortunately, for reasons unknown, the CGF would not allow paddling to be added to the Halifax 2014 sport program, and also told the Halifax 2014 team that they were not to indicate to the media that the CGF had intervened in this way.¹³⁸

Montgomerie indicated, “[Having paddling in the 2014 Halifax Games] would have impacted Nova Scotia more than anything else, and the feeling of our citizens here...paddling obviously with its routes that it has here in Nova Scotia would have been a huge boost.” He also said “I think the CGF needs to be vigilant around what an international federation is able to say to an organization...If they don’t want paddling, they should say that to the world.”¹³⁹ There was obviously more to the story than the politics of obtaining international votes as some media reports described.¹⁴⁰

While all these announcements were being made publicly, behind closed doors the various levels of government examined the submitted business plan and Games budget. The provincial government continued to ask the public for patience so as to not give a competitive advantage to the other cities, and to give them the necessary time to analyze what was proposed. Barnet said at the time, “What I’m asking Nova Scotians is to provide a little faith and some trust that at some future time, not too far off, we’ll be

able to disclose the figures for hosting [these] Games.”¹⁴¹ The Premier continued to petition the Prime Minister for more money,¹⁴² but his efforts continued to be in vain. Strangely, *The Chronicle Herald* reported on February 8th, that Mayor Kelly said he heard the cost of the Games could be close to \$2 billion.¹⁴³ As it is unlikely that almost two weeks after the business plan and Games budget were submitted that the Mayor would not have seen the actual number, his reasons for over-estimating the budget in public must be judged with some scrutiny.

Overall, initial responses from the funding partners to the proposed budget were not enthusiastic. Montgomerie noted at the February 14th Executive Committee meeting that if the bid were to stay as it was submitted, the PNS did not feel as if it had the capacity to go forward.¹⁴⁴ However, it was also noted at the meeting that there was no appetite to get out of the bid at the present time, “...just a need to get it to the right place.”¹⁴⁵ One fact that those at Halifax 2014 knew very well, perhaps too well, was that if any level of government decided to withdraw their support, the bid was over.¹⁴⁶

On both February 22nd and March 2nd, Logan and MacGillivray received letters as a follow-up to the Executive Committee meeting on February 14th. The letters were sent by fellow Executive Committee members Fowler and English who were acting in their governmental roles of Deputy Minister to the Office of the Premier and Chief Administrative Officer of HRM, respectively. The essence of the first letter was to say that as the municipal and provincial funding partners continued to conduct their due diligence in having the budget and business plan reviewed by two consultants, and before Cabinet and Council even looked at the estimates provided, Fowler and English wanted to provide a sense of how they were likely to react. One line in particular read, “This

correspondence is intended to provide you with an early indication that we have significant concern that there will be a funding gap that provincial and municipal partners will be unable to close.” Based on the submitted estimate which they quoted at \$1.6-1.7 billion, and the \$600 million proposed revenue stream of federal money and Games revenue (\$400 and \$200 million respectively), the letter noted an amount of approximately \$1 billion that would need to come from municipal and provincial sources. It was proposed that Halifax 2014 reduce the budget to take into account a total municipal and provincial contribution of \$500-600 million and to provide options for these reductions with implications on the bid’s “winnability,” legacy, and bid cost impact at the upcoming Executive Committee meeting on March 7th.¹⁴⁷ English and Fowler were thus strongly suggesting that the bid committee reduce the total cost to approximately \$1.1 billion (to include the \$400 million from the federal government, \$600 million from the municipal and provincial governments, and \$100 million from other sources). The second letter, dated March 2nd, asked the Halifax 2014 team to respond to several specific questions and concerns arising from the consultant’s reports which had by then been analyzed by the municipal and provincial representatives.¹⁴⁸ Up until these letters, no direction was provided to Halifax 2014 as to what number should be considered an upper limit. Holding contended that the funding partners, through their representatives in the Halifax 2014 governance structure, knew for a long time leading up to the submission which range the Games budget would be in, and definitely that it would be over \$1 billion.¹⁴⁹

The consultant reports to which the letter alluded were produced by McMahon Consulting and PricewaterhouseCoopers. The McMahon report as it came to be known,

was commissioned by Sport Canada in January of 2007 to investigate the key issues and inherent risks with hosting the Commonwealth Games in Halifax.¹⁵⁰ The PricewaterhouseCoopers report was commissioned by the PNS, in collaboration with the HRM and federal government, as a high level capital review of the plan to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Halifax.¹⁵¹

Meanwhile, the trouble at Halifax City Hall continued, and even got worse. Several Councillors said that they would not support the bid if it totalled more than the originally quoted \$785 million. Councillor Bob Harvey noted, “I’m disappointed that before we even get to the day when we are supposed to get the information laid before us, that people are taking hard and fast positions.” He continued, “I just hope that a lack of political courage by council doesn’t mean we’ve sent the committee and Scott Logan’s group on a fool’s errand for a year. Because I think that’s totally out of line.” Sarcastically he even suggested, “We can vote now... We don’t have to wait for the information at all, we can make a political decision now that we don’t have the courage to go on with this and move on with other business that seems simpler to us, like putting up a few street lights.”¹⁵²

March 7th, 2007

On March 7th, the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee met in what was no doubt an incredibly tense meeting. After taking care of some comparatively minor business, MacGillivray asked the funding partners representatives to comment on the Games budget.¹⁵³

Montgomerie started the discussion by noting that communications with the

federal government continued to affirm that the \$400 million offer would not be increased, and that the PNS were prepared to suggest to their Cabinet a contribution of \$300 million. English indicated that municipal representatives were ready to take a proposed contribution of \$250 million to HRM Council for ratification, but that even when combined with the \$300 million offered by the PNS, there remained a funding gap of \$600 million. As a result, English reported beginning to devise an exit strategy.¹⁵⁴

MacGillivray and Pipe, obviously taken aback from the revelation that an exit strategy was already in motion, stated that there should be a discussion on whether the Games could be put on for \$1 billion. In response, Montgomerie cited the two consultant reports that spoke to the financial risks of the project, and English raised concern about the ability to bridge the funding gap in the time available.¹⁵⁵ Pipe noted in retrospect:

It became quite clear to me early in that meeting, that the provincial government representatives in particular, weren't really interested in doing anything. They were going to bail. To me, that was a precipitate decision. And I think that the wisdom of hindsight, in retrospect what you had was a perfect storm developing here. You had a provincial government with a new Premier, who was now being criticized quite publicly for his inability to make decisions and to meander around various things. You had a Mayor... whose perspectives were more parochial and local than broader, and who had an aversion to the publicity of cost overruns... which is laudable, but I think whose leadership, whose vision, was very local. Now you've got this kind of storm. You've got people who are making decisions for the province, who I think are making those decisions for partisan political reasons...¹⁵⁶

Despite recognizing by this point that the government representatives were quite set on withdrawing, Halifax 2014 presented the possible budget reduction options and answered the specific questions posed of them in the two letters received from English and Fowler. The reductions to capital costs, operating costs, and government value in kind totalled \$249.1 million and reduced the total budget of the Games to \$1.350 billion (including inflation) from the original estimate of \$1.599 billion.¹⁵⁷ Changes to the bid

included reducing the scope of the main stadium and multiplex, among other things.¹⁵⁸ This did not fully satisfy the request in the letters to reduce the budget to \$1.1 billion, but would have given another number with which to continue the bargaining process between the funding partners and Halifax 2014.

Halifax 2014 staff also raised the point that both reports on which the funding partners were relying, the McMahon Consulting report and the PricewaterhouseCoopers report, were in draft format and that Halifax 2014 was supposed to have been given a chance to ensure there were no technical inaccuracies contained in them prior to their use in the decision making process.¹⁵⁹ This opportunity was guaranteed to them in the March 2nd letter from the funding partners.¹⁶⁰

Pipe then reminded the funding partners that at the February 14th executive committee meeting, and in the pursuant letters, the funding partners conveyed concern over the cost estimate and directed the bid team to reduce the projected cost of the Games. In response, the Halifax 2014 team indicated they could change the budget to fit within the resources available. According to Pipe, it seemed short sighted not to allow that process to continue and to make an informed decision.¹⁶¹ Through it all, the fundamental question asked of the HRM and the PNS representatives was whether they wished Halifax 2014 to continue working towards achieving a budget within the given parameters or whether the bid was indeed over. At 11am, and before an answer to this all important question could be given, the meeting was adjourned to allow the HRM and the PNS representatives to participate in a conference call with municipal, provincial and federal government representatives.¹⁶²

When the meeting reconvened at 3pm, Montgomerie indicated that the federal

ministers once again confirmed that the \$400 million offer would not be increased, and that HRM Council would decide the following day whether or not Halifax 2014 should continue to tweak the budget.¹⁶³ MacLennan made it clear that the facility plans were at such a level of detail that it would be possible to remove elements with reasonable cost reliability, and that Halifax 2014 was confident they could accomplish this and be ready to present it a week later on March 16th, at which point the funding partners could make an informed decision as to whether or not they wished to continue forward. The meeting concluded with the municipal and provincial representatives saying they would advise Halifax 2014 on how to proceed following the HRM Council meeting the next day.¹⁶⁴

In the interview for this research, Montgomerie stated that provincial Cabinet officially withdrew their support at some point on March 7th after a senior inter-departmental team of provincial staff confirmed what was contained in the two consultant reports, and after coming to the conclusion that the business plan contained too much risk for the PNS.¹⁶⁵ It is not clear whether this withdrawal of support happened before, or after this executive committee meeting, but it is now known that the move towards withdrawal started a long time before this particular day, and in concert with Mayor Kelly. In addition, statements made by Mayor Kelly in the media immediately following the withdrawal of the bid and in his interview for the purposes of this research, are somewhat incongruent.

The Chronicle Herald reported that throughout the day on March 7th, provincial officials were in touch with their municipal counterparts, and that evening Premier MacDonald called Mayor Kelly, and according to Kelly, said, “You should advise regional council about the [budget] numbers, and the issues around those numbers, and

get their direction.”¹⁶⁶ In an interview conducted for the purposes of this research, Mayor Kelly told quite a different story, one that was set in quite a different timeframe. “I approached the Province. I said we need an exit strategy... Two weeks before hand I said to [the Premier], unless you guys have more money, we need to start developing an exit strategy.”¹⁶⁷ He also noted that once he saw the numbers beginning to rise, he went to the Premier and said, “We have to find an exit strategy and along the way we have to make sure that we do it together and that we take a definitive stance before it gets too far along and go for the final process of the international bid.”¹⁶⁸

At some time amongst these discussions a few weeks before March 8th, Kelly recalled one conference call in particular, involving among others, Peter MacKay, Minister Barnett, and Montgomerie. The purpose of the call was to see if the federal government would increase their \$400 million offer for the Games. Federal government representatives indicated that they wanted Halifax to continue the process, to which one of the Halifax or PNS representatives replied, “Mr. Minister, if we stay into this process, will there be any more money from the feds?” The answer came back, “no.” Further on into the discussion, they tried again, “Mr. Minister, you’re asking us to stay into a process that may exceed these costs, and I have to ask again, if the costs go up, is there going to be any more money from Ottawa?” Once again, the reply came back as “no.”¹⁶⁹

Depending on which version of the story is the correct one, of note is the fact that the first letter sent to Halifax 2014 depicting concern over the cost was dated February 22nd, almost exactly two weeks prior to the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee meeting on March 7th. Upon further review, both letters from English and Fowler very well could have been sent with full knowledge that the Games were not going to be pursued any

further by the political leadership at both the municipal and provincial level, and even could have served as the beginning of the exit strategy thereof; in essence the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee may have been sent on a “fools errand” to try and appease the requests in the letters.

What is definitively clear is that going into the March 8th emergency Council meeting, Mayor Kelly was aware that the provincial Cabinet had withdrawn its support, but that city Councillors were not privy to this information. Montgomerie said the PNS wanted to give the Mayor a chance, without provincial influence, to make the case to the Councillors that he felt HRM should withdraw.¹⁷⁰ According to Montgomerie, the arrangement was if Council decided to withdraw in that meeting, Minister Barnet and Mayor Kelly would go directly to a press conference and make the announcement. If HRM decided not to withdraw, only the Mayor would go to a press conference and the province would announce later in the day that they were withdrawing.¹⁷¹ At least one of those interviewed for this research, Deputy Mayor Uteck, believed that other arrangements were made to make sure that Council would not have the opportunity to make the latter scenario a reality.

March 8th, 2007

The next morning, HRM Council met for an emergency in-camera meeting at Halifax City Hall to discuss the Commonwealth Games bid.¹⁷² Peter Kelly put a motion on the floor to cancel the Games due to cost and had another Councillor second it.¹⁷³ Councillor Younger wanted to delay the vote so Councillors could make a well-informed judgment about the Games; although they had some of the financial information in front

of them, they had not had the chance to review the municipal reports that Mayor Kelly said confirmed the fact that Halifax should withdraw.¹⁷⁴ It is now clear that Councillors were not presented with the most recent Halifax 2014 budget estimates that put the new total cost at \$1.350 billion, but instead were only shown the original budget estimate of \$1.599 billion.¹⁷⁵

Deputy Mayor Uteck, who learned during the in-camera meeting that the bid committee was asking for another week to lower their budget estimate, went against the motion put forward by Mayor Kelly. To Mayor Kelly's argument that the bid could not be sufficiently changed with any sort of reliability in a week, Uteck replied, "Well that's not your decision, that's the decision of Council." She then tried to gather the necessary support from other Councillors to give the bid committee the one week requested, and was successful in convincing 18 of the 24 Councillors of this course of action.¹⁷⁶ The general idea behind the plan was that, there was nothing to lose by waiting a week, as she remarked, "If we had to pull out after a week, so be it."¹⁷⁷ The other benefit to her plan was the chance to persuade the federal government to commit more money to the project:

Our strategy was, and I urged the Council to support me, you hold a press conference every day for [the following] week...this will become a national thing. Invite Stephen Harper every day at 4 o'clock to come here and cancel Canada's games and tell the people of Nova Scotia why we are not as good as the people of Vancouver.¹⁷⁸

Throughout the in-camera meeting there was another person in addition to the municipal Councillors and representatives present in the room, Duff Montgomerie of the PNS. According to Uteck, he kept leaving the room for some reason that was not understood to her at the time, but became quite clear afterwards. According to Uteck, he was in "...full panic mode..."¹⁷⁹ Not known to all of those in the room at the time except

the Mayor and Montgomerie, was the press conference that was already planned for 11:30am, where Montgomerie and the Mayor wanted to announce the joint withdrawal of the province and HRM.¹⁸⁰ Deputy Mayor Uteck's efforts were now putting this plan in serious jeopardy.

Even at this point, representatives at *The Chronicle Herald* already knew something big was going on. Leger started getting phone calls from provincial political contacts and a particular ex-politician throughout the morning of March 8th. News began filtering back, and rumours built for half an hour in the news office. At the time, Leger was surprised, "I really just thought they were cruising along. I knew there were political issues, that there was shock over the overall large number that they had come up with for the bid, but I didn't realize how bad it was."¹⁸¹

The next step for Deputy Mayor Uteck in pushing her agenda forward would have been to take a vote with the Councillors in the room, but before she could make a motion to this effect, everyone in the room received a very interesting press release on their personal digital assistants (their BlackBerrys), especially considering the way deliberations were headed. Officially sent out to the media outlets at 11:31am was a press release from the PNS that read:

The province of Nova Scotia and the Halifax Regional Municipality today, March 8, announced their respective intentions to formally withdraw their support from the bid to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The two levels of government reached their decision based on the outcomes of the independent reviews which were conducted on the operating and capital budgets submitted to the funding partners at the end of January 2007. The bid budget, with inflation factored in, is close to \$1.7 billion.¹⁸²

The release essentially "...yanked the rug out from under council." Several Councillors stormed out of meeting, and did not return.¹⁸³ Just before angrily leaving,

Councillor Debbie Hum remarked, “This is embarrassing and I am ashamed.”¹⁸⁴ Mayor Kelly had his own slant on how things happened:

Being optimistic that Council would understand the financial ramifications and the understanding that this was too rich for our blood and financially unaffordable, I felt that they would be supportive. Ultimately, they were. Would it have been different if [the release] didn’t come out before [the end of the meeting], I don’t think so...¹⁸⁵

Montgomerie later claimed that the release was unintentional and should not have gone out until the PNS communications department was notified to do so. He remarked, “We were totally embarrassed by that and felt incredibly bad for the Mayor because that was not our intent.”¹⁸⁶ In retrospect, he said:

I think our pushing the button made it easier for the Council... They will blame the province, they’ll say they forced us, but I mean that gave some Councillors the opportunity to do that, but unfortunately it didn’t allow for the more thoughtful discussion... it caused emotions to go fairly quickly.¹⁸⁷

According to Pipe:

Even on the day that they bailed, you saw a certain degree of ineptitude... The province is calling a press conference and announcing that the bid is over and that they’re pulling with the city, before the city has even finished discussing it in their Council chambers that morning. It was ludicrous.¹⁸⁸

Uteck believed that rather than ineptitude, it was a deliberate tactic. She believed the PNS communications department was told to release the notice of withdrawal, and that Montgomerie was the one who ordered them to do it as a result of the way he saw the in-camera meeting developing. She is adamant that, “They didn’t want a week, they wanted out, and to me... [the release] was deliberate and no one can tell me otherwise.”¹⁸⁹

The in-camera meeting ended, as by that point taking a vote to give the bid committee an extra week was essentially a moot point. Mayor Kelly and Minister Barnet then proceeded to deliver the news at the pre-determined press conference. When

Regional Council convened for an open session at 12:30pm, only 15 of the 24 elected officials were present. Many of those who left the in-camera session had not returned.

Pursuant to the discussions in-camera, Mayor Kelly moved:

Given that the three government funding partners cannot collectively close the significant funding gap, as would be required to successfully host the 2014 Commonwealth Games; Halifax Regional Council advise the H2014 Board of Directors, CG Canada and the CG Federation that HRM is not prepared to fund the cost of hosting the Commonwealth Games in 2014 and further advise the H2014 Board of Directors to discontinue the bid process; and that Halifax Regional Council authorize the Mayor to communicate this message formally to the affected agencies and publicly prior to ratification at Regional Council.¹⁹⁰

The vote tallied 12-3 in favour, and the motion was passed.¹⁹¹ Councillor McCluskey, a perpetual and extremely vocal critic of the bid argued, “The figures were more than we could afford...That’s what went wrong.”¹⁹² Following the decision, Deputy Mayor Uteck was extremely critical of the Mayor in her comments to the media. “No vision, no passion, no leadership,” she said.¹⁹³ She was furious with the way things unfolded and criticized the Mayor for his handling of the entire Commonwealth Games file. She also stated publicly at the time that she felt as if Council was set up, although the details provided on how this set up occurred were not substantial. She noted, “This council is like a pack of lemmings that went off a cliff this morning.”¹⁹⁴

In retrospect, Jarvis did not think the city Councillors acted in a strong enough fashion. In his opinion, knowing that the decision had already been made between the Mayor and the Premier without their input, he would have expected a vote of non-confidence to be called.¹⁹⁵ Furthermore, he admitted:

It may or may not have been the best decision for Halifax...However, the decision making process, and how they went through that, was incredibly flawed and I would question the democracy of it. I think it went totally against what it should be in a democratically elected government.¹⁹⁶

Hearing of the withdrawal, MacGillivray was distraught, “What a dark day for Halifax, what a dark day for Nova Scotia, what a dark day for Canada.” He called the decision premature because there was still two months before the bid book was due to the CGF. He was also heavily critical of the McMahon report which the municipal and provincial representatives relied upon a great deal because it was written by a former consultant for the Hamilton bid, which had opposed Halifax in the domestic bid competition. “We beat them out...To have an individual who put together the bid for 2014 Hamilton critique our bid doesn’t make a whole lot of sense to me,” he remarked.¹⁹⁷ Don Mills, another bid supporter and co-chair of Bring on the Games, blamed Premier MacDonald and Mayor Kelly for how it all turned out. “We didn’t have strong enough leadership to stand up and talk about the positive aspects...Both the premier and the Mayor will wear this as part of their legacy,” he said.¹⁹⁸

The Premier publicly denounced the bid committee’s main argument that it could have reduced the figure to a more palatable number. He stated, “You are not going to go another week or two weeks and have a number that’s significantly different than what has been presented.”¹⁹⁹ Mayor Kelly echoed the Premier, “Now the fact is, do you have trust in those numbers? That’s the issue. Let’s go back and you can change numbers all you want...but when you look at the studies, clearly they were overly optimistic.”²⁰⁰ He went on to note that:

There was no way in good faith that I could have had the confidence in those numbers and said to the taxpayers I have the confidence and I just couldn’t go blindly down that path knowing my gut feel that this was wrong. I couldn’t do it, wouldn’t do it, no matter what the outcome, even if it meant being chastised or being critiqued or criticized for stepping back. I was prepared to do so because I wasn’t going to have the taxpayers disadvantaged financially and operationally for years to come. For them, their children and their grandchildren, because it would have taken over twenty years to pay down that debt if we’d gone in that

direction, and it would have cost thousands and thousands of dollars every year...²⁰¹

As all of this unfolded, the CGF had to sit idly by. Robertson cited, “The CGF has to take a ‘hands off’ attitude. The CGF would have provided help, advice or information if invited, but without an invitation, the CGF stays out of individual bids and domestic issues.” In addition, they had little idea that there were any major concerns because the press stories leading up to March 7th and 8th gave no hints of what was to come.²⁰²

As is now clear, there were only a few people in Halifax that knew of the bid’s impending doom in the days and weeks leading up to March 8th, 2007. Those same people sat idly by while others continued to work wholeheartedly towards bringing the Games to Halifax, not knowing that their efforts would all be for not. For a summary of all the notable events of the bid, see Appendix II.

The Aftermath

After the events that unfolded, many people were left wondering what happened. With the 2014 Commonwealth Games no longer a possibility, the earmarked PNS and federal government contributions of \$300 and \$400 million respectively, were no longer on the table for the HRM.²⁰³ Some, like Deputy Mayor Uteck, called for a public inquiry into the bid. Others, like Mayor Kelly, said it wasn’t necessary and it was time to move forward.²⁰⁴ No public inquiry was ever conducted.

Some of those that were intimately involved in the bid were called to testify in front of the provincial Public Accounts Committee. This committee, with equal provincial political representation, was concerned with the economy and efficiency of

government programs,²⁰⁵ and conducted three sessions between March 28th, 2007 and April 11th, 2007 to examine the Halifax Commonwealth Games bid. Some of the bid's largest players, specifically English, Montgomerie and Logan, each took a turn answering questions posed by members of the committee.

For better or for worse, the bottom-line was that the bid to bring the Commonwealth Games to Halifax was over.

Chapter 4 - Endnotes

¹ Michael Lightstone, "City had its Games face on," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2005, p. A4.

² Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

³ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. As Jarvis explained, the CGF adopted an IOC approach in regard to the level of detail required in the bid books. This did not mean that the CGF adopted Olympic size specifications for the Games, just that it's requirements for detail were now at Olympic standards. Such a level of detail required more work to be done in the bid process, and necessitated a more expensive bid process. Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. Montgomerie found this a bit unfair, and did agree with the CGF changing the requirements in the middle of a bid period. Jarvis contended that later on in the international phase some politicians used the argument that the Games were Olympic sized in order to legitimize their withdrawal of support. According to Jarvis, "We were talking a capital budget of less than \$600 million. How is that Olympic size? That to me was naive, politically expedient, and misdirected to ever get into the argument that it's an Olympic sized Games."

⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁵ Michael Lightstone, "Private celebration of public triumph prompts complaints," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2005, p. A4.

⁶ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁷ Steve Bruce, "Games behind the Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 17 December 2005, p. A1.

⁸ Chris Taylor (Commonwealth Games Canada Office Assistant), to Peter McClelland, E-mail, *Halifax 2014 Bid Question* (1 April 2009).

⁹ Steve Bruce, "Games behind the Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 17 December 2005, p. A1. In the same article was the scoring breakdown from the domestic bid as reported by the *Hamilton Spectator*. Apparently Halifax scored first in 10 of the 14 categories and second in the other four. Hamilton placed first in 6 categories (there were 2 ties), second in 5 and third in 3. Although Pike didn't confirm those figures, she did mention, "The only thing I'll tell you for sure is we have been talking about the winnability factor. . . . Hamilton did actually score on top in that one."

¹⁰ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

¹¹ As previously discussed, this point was often confused and misquoted. The CGF was not requiring Olympic sized facilities to be part of the bid submission, just the level of detail about the facilities to be as in-depth as in an Olympic bid book.

¹² Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹³ Elaine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

¹⁴ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008. For example, the municipality was developing plans for transportation, and the PNS was developing the plans for policing. On an operational level, with both organizations, the relationship was very good, and this was the case throughout the bid. Holding remarked, “Even when [the bid] died, I really don’t believe that the operational staff who had been involved actually understood what was going on behind the scenes.” [Brackets mine.]

¹⁵ “Bid Society” and “Bid Committee” are used interchangeably in this thesis. From the CGF perspective, the official name for the group organizing the Halifax bid was the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Candidate City. For the purposes of this report, this group is most often referred to as “Halifax 2014.”

¹⁶ Chris Cochrane, “We need to hear numbers,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 21 December 2005, p. D1.

¹⁷ Chris Cochrane, “Answers to Games queries,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 20 December 2005, p. C1.

¹⁸ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁹ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

²⁰ Michael Lightstone, “Commonwealth Games in Halifax could cost at least \$750 million,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 21 January 2006, p. A1. [Brackets mine.]

²¹ Ibid.

²² John Hamm and Peter Kelly, “The Commonwealth Games: moving forward together,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 26 January 2006, p. A7.

²³ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

²⁴ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Halifax 2014 CEO*, January 30, 2006, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=944 (accessed February 9, 2009). Logan was active at both the federal and the provincial levels in a wide variety of sport management and development roles since 1982. At the time he was seconded, he was the Assistant Deputy Minister with Nova Scotia Health Promotion.

²⁵ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

²⁶ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008. Tony Holding was a Senior Director for Halifax 2014. Before assuming that position and coming to Canada, Holding served in many different sport roles in his native Australia including the Deputy Chief Executive for the Melbourne 2006 Commonwealth Games bid, Special Projects Manager for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games, and Manager of Planning and Reporting for the Melbourne Commonwealth Games. Following the Halifax bid, Holding took a position as a Senior Consultant for Event Knowledge Services.

²⁷ “Ex-community relations director takes over health post,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 2 February 2006, p. B3.

²⁸ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

²⁹ The Gomery report was the result of the Gomery Commission, headed by retired Justice John Gomery. The commission investigated the sponsorship scandal and allegations of corruption within the Canadian Liberal government. The sponsorship scandal arose when it was divulged that the sponsorship program, originally commissioned by the Liberal Party of Canada to raise awareness of the Government of Canada’s contributions to Quebec industries and other activities, was found to have extreme misuse and misdirection of public funds. The issue came to a head in early 2004 after the federal auditor general examined the program and then enlisted Justice Gomery to conduct a public enquiry into the matter.

³⁰ Amy Smith, “Grits: Pete ain’t playin’ Games,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 26 March 2006, p. A5. MacKay later said in Chris Lambie, “Commonwealth Games in bag, MacKay says,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 3 April 2006, p. B3, “We’re going to win the Commonwealth (Games) bid... Then we’re going to get a CFL franchise and it’s going to be shared between Moncton and Halifax... The Atlantic Schooners has a nice ring to it.” The drive for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, and the potential for a CFL team in Halifax, were often closely tied.

³¹ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

³² Michael Lightstone, “Council hears of Games costs,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 22 February 2006, p. B1. Council was also briefed on other plans. Not all the venues planned for the Games would be brand new. Existing sites proposed included: Dalhousie University, the Halifax Forum, Citadel Hill and Saint Mary’s University. MacLennan also noted that the revised cost for the domestic bid was \$733,000. This number was down from \$750,000, and was split evenly between the PNS and the HRM. Logan mentioned to Council that more than \$500,000 had been collected in corporate donations up to that point. According to Michael Lightstone, “Cost of Games trip under budget, group says,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 19 July 2006, p. B2, this trip ended up costing \$454,228, and was therefore under budget by \$47,372.

³³ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Minutes*, 21 February 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/c060221.pdf>, p.6 (accessed February 19, 2009).

³⁴ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. With this registration was a 60,000 British pound fee that was due by March 10, 2006. That fee was non-refundable and was used by the CGF to run the bidding process (bid city seminars, CGF bid evaluation visits and reports, etc).

³⁵ New Premier Rodney MacDonald asked former Premier Hamm and Minister Barnett to attend the Games on behalf of the PNS.

³⁶ Monty Mosher, "Delegation set for Melbourne Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 4 March 2006, p. D.3. Also in the delegation were Ken Bagnell (Halifax 2014 Executive Committee/Canadian Sport Centre Atlantic President), Mike Labrecque (Halifax 2014 chair for Games operations and venue development), John Crace (Halifax 2014 consultant), Dale MacLennan (Halifax 2014 director of finance, HRM), Dan English (Halifax 2014 executive committee/CAO of HRM), Peter Spurway (Halifax 2014 director of communications and partner relations), Rick Emberley (Halifax 2014 communications and marketing consultant), Sean Williams (Halifax 2014 communications and marketing consultant), Frank Garner (Halifax 2014 executive director), Betty Lou Killen (Halifax 2014 project manager), Sharon Gouthro (Halifax 2014 project coordinator) and Louann Scallion-Morine (Halifax 2014 assistant to the CEO).

³⁷ Michael Lightstone, "Games team to make trip Down Under," *The Chronicle Herald*, 2 March 2006, p. B4.

³⁸ Chris Cochrane, "Lobbying a part of the Games game," *The Chronicle Herald*, 5 March 2006, p. C1.

³⁹ Michael Lightstone, "Bid team: N.S. games would be smaller than Australia's," *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2006, p. B7.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Lori Ewing, "Picture this in Halifax," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 March 2006, p. A1.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. He went on to say that the Commonwealth Games were trying to be too much like the Olympics, when from a competitive point of view they were quite far from it.

⁴⁶ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 30 March 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesMar30_06.pdf, p.5 (accessed February 16, 2009).

⁴⁷ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁴⁸ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 17 March 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesMar17_06.pdf, p.1 (accessed February 5, 2009). Trevino Betty was added in Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesApr29_06.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 20, 2009). Lloyd Johnson was added in Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 14 June 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesJun14_06.pdf, p. 2 (accessed February 5, 2009). Robert Fowler officially replaced Howard Windsor on the board in Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 7 September 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesSep07_06.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 9, 2009). Dan English and Wayne Anstey, CAO and Deputy CAO for HRM were appointed by Council in Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Agenda – Additions and Deletions*, 7 March 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/060307add.pdf> (accessed March 19, 2009). As per Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 17 March 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesMar17_06.pdf, p.2 (accessed March 19, 2009), board members from respective partner organizations could attend meetings on executive members' behalf when executive members were unavailable. The corporate positions on the Board of Directors were never filled. Eric Savard was hired by the CGC and put into the Halifax 2014 organization because according to Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008, CGC felt that it was important to have an experienced person on the ground in Halifax. Jarvis essentially served to represent CGC in the day-to-day activities of the bid team, and reported back to CGC on a regular basis.

⁴⁹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 17 March 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesMar17_06.pdf, p.1 (accessed February 5, 2009).

⁵⁰ Michael Lightstone, "Three bids, three cities vie for one Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 18 December 2005, p. A5.

⁵¹ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. In addition, although not directly related, London was already confirmed as host of the 2012 Olympics by this point in time, so this may have contributed to this sentiment as well.

⁵² Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁵³ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008; Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009; Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008; Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009; Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008; Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁵⁴ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. The fact that Glasgow was a year ahead in their preparations was also mentioned as a major factor by Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008 and Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

⁵⁵ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

⁵⁶ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁵⁷ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

⁵⁸ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008; Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009; Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008; Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009; Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008; Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁵⁹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 9 August 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesAug09_06.pdf, p.3 (accessed February 23, 2009).

⁶⁰ Michael Lightstone, "Three bids, three cities vie for one Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 18 December 2005, p. A5.

⁶¹ Scarlett Cornelissen, "'It's Africa's turn!' The narratives and legitimations surrounding the Moroccan and South Africa bids for the 2006 and 2010 FIFA finals," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004), 1293-1309; Scarlett Cornelissen and Kamilla Swart, "The 2010 Football World Cup as a political construct: the challenge of making good on an African promise," *The Sociological Review* 54, no. 2 (2006), 108-123; Heinrich R. Bohlmann and Jan H. van Heerden, "Predicting the economic impact of the 2010 FIFA World Cup on South Africa," *International Journal Sport Management and Marketing* 3, no. 4 (2008), 383-396; Kamilla Swart and Urmilla Bob, "The seductive discourse of development: the Cape Town 2004 Olympic bid," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 7 (2004), 1311-1324; Scarlett Cornelissen, "Sport Mega-Events in Africa: Processes, Impacts, and Prospects," *Tourism and Hospitality Planning & Development* 1, no. 1 (2004), 39-55. According to Andrew Pipe, this bid needed to be respected because

of the eventual desire of the Commonwealth Games to go to Africa, but this was tempered by the overwhelmingly bad experience of the All-Africa Games in Abuja in 2003. Mayor Kelly echoed the idea of Abuja possibly being more worthy of consideration simply because it was an African bid. Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008 and Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁶² Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

⁶³ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁶⁶ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

⁶⁷ Élaïne Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. Of all those interviewed for the purpose of this research, Harvey was the only one to describe Abuja as having a chance to win.

⁶⁸ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁶⁹ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁷⁰ Michael Lightstone, "Poll: Slight dip in support for Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 10 March 2006, p. B1. Corporate Research Associates Incorporated conducted the poll by phoning randomly selected households in Halifax between February 14th and 28th, 2006. After providing a preamble, background information, and pro and con statements, the poll asked, "All things considered, do you completely support, mostly support, mostly oppose, or completely oppose HRM hosting the Commonwealth Games in 2014?" Results were considered accurate within 4.9 percentage points, 95 times out of 100. Twenty-two percent of respondents mostly or completely opposed Halifax hosting the Games. Two percent didn't know or didn't answer, and one percent said it depended on the cost to Halifax Regional Municipality.

⁷¹ Jennifer Stewart, "Let the Games not begin Poll shows support slipping," *The Chronicle Herald*, 17 March 2006, p. B1.

⁷² Chris Cochrane, "New poll boosts 2014 Commonwealth Games' bid," *The Chronicle Herald*, 12 March 2006, p. C1.

⁷³ Scott Logan, "Commonwealth Games bid: investment and benefits," *The Chronicle Herald*, 6 April 2006, p. A7. In early April, Dale MacLennan, originally Director of Finance for the HRM was seconded to the Halifax 2014 Bid Committee and took on the role of Senior Director of Finance and Administration.

⁷⁴ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesApr29_06.pdf, p. 2 (accessed February 19, 2009).

⁷⁵ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting - Presentation*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommPresApr29_06.pdf, p.7 (accessed February 22, 2009).

⁷⁶ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesApr29_06.pdf, p.2-3 (accessed February 19, 2009). According to Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 30 June 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesJun30_06.pdf, p.1 (accessed February 24, 2009), Tom Scrimger of Sport Canada reiterated this fact in late June.

⁷⁷ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesApr29_06.pdf, p.2-3 (accessed February 19, 2009). The bid budget is what it costs to build the plan to host the Games, whereas the Games budget is what it will actually cost to put on the Games (venues and programs).

⁷⁸ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Minutes*, 2 May 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/c060502.pdf>, p. 9 (accessed February 7, 2009).

⁷⁹ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Minutes*, 30 May 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/c060530.pdf>, p.15-16 (accessed February 9, 2009).

⁸⁰ Peter Spurway, "Games bid: questions and answers," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 May 2006, p. A7.

⁸¹ Michael Lightstone, "Games bid officials keeping details under wraps," *The Chronicle Herald*, 2 June 2006, p. B4.

⁸² David Jackson, "Commonwealth Games costs confidential Barnet," *The Chronicle Herald*, 12 May 2006, p. B1.

⁸³ Steve Proctor, "Yes to Games, but not at \$1 billion, Kelly says," *The Chronicle Herald*, 22 February 2006, p. A1. [Brackets mine.]

⁸⁴ In a seemingly rare occurrence in *The Chronicle Herald*, one of its writers condemned the Mayor for his statements against the bid. In Marilla Stephenson, "Mayor's gripes give boost to rival Games bid," *The Chronicle Herald*, 27 June, 2006, p. B1, she noted, "A mayor who should be leading the charge to win the Games for Halifax is pandering to

a negative campaign because votes in the next election mean more to him than the long-term future of this city... In fact, he has crossed a line by undermining the hard work done by city and provincial officials for months. If he does not have confidence in their work, how are taxpayers expected to do so?"

⁸⁵ According to Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008, the CGF contracted out the managing and facilitating of these sessions to a company called Event Knowledge Services whose expertise lay in organizing major events.

⁸⁶ Michael Lightstone, "Games bid committee gleaning Aussie details," *The Chronicle Herald*, 13 July 2006, p. B5.

⁸⁷ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁸⁸ Chris Cochrane, "Destined for parts unknown," *The Chronicle Herald*, 25 July 2006, p. E1. According to Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008, Commonwealth Games Canada helped with this international advocacy effort by providing insight into the GCF as a whole, the voting process, and even by having some staff visit various national federations to discuss and promote the Halifax bid.

⁸⁹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 2 August 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesAug02_06.pdf, p. 5 (accessed February 16, 2009).

⁹⁰ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting Presentation 2 - Halifax 2014 Venues & Operational Planning Department and Society's Architect - Shannon Park SWOT Analysis*, 9 August 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommVOPSPresAug9_06.pdf, p.14 (accessed February 22, 2009). The presentation stated that the quote came from a report done by John Lade, an Athlete's Village expert, on August 6th, 2006.

⁹¹ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. This information was not made public until March of 2007 in Michael Lightstone, "Games group faces real estate squeeze," *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 March 2007, p. A1.

⁹² Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 9 August 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesAug09_06.pdf, p. 2 (accessed February 23, 2009). This land was located directly beside Shannon Park, on the other side of the A. Murray MacKay Bridge.

⁹³ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting Presentation 2 - Halifax 2014 Venues & Operational Planning Department and Society's Architect - Shannon Park SWOT Analysis*, 9 August 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommVOPSPresAug9_06.pdf, p.17 (accessed February 22, 2009).

⁹⁴ Michael Lightstone, "Let the guessing begin," *The Chronicle Herald*, 22 October 2006, p. A1. [Brackets mine.]

⁹⁵ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 1 November 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesNov01_06.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 28, 2009).

⁹⁶ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting - VOPS Presentation*, 1 November 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/index.html>, p.27 (accessed February 9, 2009)

⁹⁷ The university was unspecified.

⁹⁸ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁹⁹ Laura Fraser, "Games facilities could top \$163.3m," *The Chronicle Herald*, 25 November 2006, p. A1. According to Michael Lightstone, "Mayor wants stadium with reusable roof," *The Chronicle Herald*, 26 November 2006, p. A1, it was imperative for Mayor Kelly for the stadium to have a roof so that it could be used all year round and be available for as many different events as possible.

¹⁰⁰ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹⁰¹ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Halifax Regional Council Minutes*, 28 November 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/c061128.pdf>, p.11 (accessed February 18, 2009).

¹⁰² Michael Lightstone, "Salaries top list of Games bid costs," *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 December 2006, p. B1. In contrast, Halifax put forward a \$2.5-million proposal to bid for the 2010 Commonwealth Games in 2003. As an aside, Logan noted that if Halifax were to lose, the money would not be wasted as the region would benefit from the branding, and all of the research into such things as potential regional transportation grids, and recreation and sport facilities.

¹⁰³ Michael Lightstone, "Salaries top list of Games bid costs," *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 December 2006, p. B1. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁰⁴ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. The timeframe for the international bid phase was way too short according to both Harvey and Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. They suggested that 24-36 months would be a more appropriate timeframe to conduct the international phase of the bid for a major Games.

¹⁰⁵ Laura Fraser, "Billion dollar baby?," *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 December 2006, p. A1.

¹⁰⁶ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 2 August 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesAug02_06.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 16, 2009). It was again noted in Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 19 October 19 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesOct19_06.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 18, 2009), “Given that the Province of Nova Scotia and Halifax Regional Municipality have been committed to a fiscally responsible approach to the bid, and given that the federal government has signaled its similar approach, that the federal government be encouraged to allow Halifax 2014 to make its business case in December and January to go forward exclusive of a fixed Games budget amount.”

¹⁰⁷ Michael Lightstone, “Politicians promise legacy of facilities, not debt,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 December 2006, p. A2. As noted by Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008, this was the single largest fund ever earmarked by the federal government to any Maritimes project and the federal government was quite clear about drawing a line in the sand about how this commitment would remain firm at \$400 million.

¹⁰⁸ Laura Fraser, “Billion dollar baby?,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 December 2006, p. A1. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁰⁹ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009. [Brackets mine.] Sue Uteck was a Councillor that represented the residents of Northwest Arm-South End Halifax since winning a by-election in the fall of 1999, after her husband, Deputy Mayor Larry Uteck, resigned due to his struggle with Lou Gehrig’s disease. She was re-elected in October 2000, October 2004 and again in October 2008. She served as Deputy Mayor from November 2006 until November 2007 in the depths of the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games bid.

¹¹⁰ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹¹¹ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹¹² Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 19 October 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesOct19_06.pdf, p.1 (accessed February 16, 2009).

¹¹³ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹¹⁴ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

¹¹⁵ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Sherri Borden Colley, “Poll: Most Nova Scotians support Games bid,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 7 December 2006, p. B4. This poll was conducted by Omnifacts Bristol

Research. It used a representative sample of 499 Nova Scotians aged 18 years or older. The results were considered accurate to within plus or minus 4.2 percentage points, 19 times out of 20.

¹¹⁸ Jeffrey Simpson, “Fed up with Games secrecy,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 8 December 2006, p. A1.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Don Mills was President and CEO of Corporate Research Associates Incorporated. Jim Mills was President and CEO of Office Interiors Group.

¹²² Don Mills and Jim Mills, “Bring on the Games: voice of support,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 15 December 2006, p. A13.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Roger Taylor, “Pollsters fail to see their own conflict of interest,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2006, p. C1.

¹²⁵ Tom Peters, “Business group supports Games bid,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 20 December 2006, p. C3.

¹²⁶ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting Presentation*, 21 December 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommPresDec21_06.pdf, p.5 (accessed February 17, 2009).

¹²⁷ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *The XX Commonwealth Games Business Plan*, 26 January 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/Halifax2014BusinessPlanWithAppendices.pdf>, p.13 (accessed March 3, 2009). The total budget number contained in this document was \$1.3478 billion. This number was later adjusted to \$1.359 billion in Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Briefing note – Phone Conversation – briefing for funding partners re: Games budget process*, 6 March 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BriefingNote.pdf>, p. 3 (accessed March 3, 2009). For simplicity’s sake, \$1.359 billion was used as the initial submission number.

¹²⁸ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 24 January 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesJan24_07.pdf, p.2-3 (accessed February 17, 2009). A few key factors of the bid that were heavily debated were whether or not there should be a roof on the stadium, and what number of seats the stadium would have. The decision was made at this meeting for the stadium to

have a roof (both for legacy reasons and for “winnability” of the actual bid), and for the stadium to have 50,000 seats for the Games.

¹²⁹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 26 January 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesJan26_07.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 17, 2009). [Brackets mine.]

¹³⁰ Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games Candidate City, *Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games Candidate City File*, 9 May 2007, http://www.thecgf.com/media/games/2014/G2014_CCF_Vol1-3.pdf, p. 49 (accessed March 18, 2009). This number was derived by adding the Organizing Committee (OC) Budget of £344.089 million, and a portion of the Non-OC Capital Investments. In the latter category, Competition Venues (£238.900 million), Training Venues (£30.300 million), Commonwealth Village (£228.658 million), and Other (£205.000 million) were counted. The Roads and Railway estimate of £2,045.000 million was not added because roads and railway upgrades were not included in the Halifax 2014 budget estimate. The included amounts totaled £1,046.947 million. In order to convert this to Canadian dollars, the exchange rate for April 2nd, 2007 obtained from the Bank of Canada website (Bank of Canada, *Rates and Statistics*, March 19, 2009, <http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/en/rates/exchform.html> (accessed March 19, 2009)) of 2.29 (Pounds Sterling to Canadian Dollars) was used.

¹³¹ Michael Lightstone, “Games costs likely to climb,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 7 February 2007, p. B1. The “funding partners” were the three levels of government (the HRM, the PNS, and the federal government).

¹³² Steve Bruce, “Games will create legacy – Logan,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 February 2007, p. A1. Up until December 31st, 2007, the bid committee spent \$457,000 on travel to more than 30 of the 71 Commonwealth countries and territories that held a vote. Details of travel costs to the many countries that were visited to promote Halifax, and salaries of bid committee members were also released at this time.

¹³³ Steve Bruce, “Games will create legacy – Logan,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 February 2007, p. A1.

¹³⁴ Commonwealth Games Canada, *Critical Milestone for H2014*, February 12, 2007, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=1322 (accessed February 19, 2009).

¹³⁵ Commonwealth Games Canada, *2014 Sport Program*, February 16, 2007, http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/corporate/index_e.aspx?DetailID=1326 (accessed February 19, 2009).

¹³⁶ Steve Bruce, “Commonwealth Games adds to required sports,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 30 November 2006, p. D1. At the time of writing, paddling was no longer an optional sport for host cities.

¹³⁷ Gordie Sutherland, "Garner wants to see canoe-kayak in Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2005, p. E1 and Steve Bruce, "Paddling up a creek," *The Chronicle Herald*, 30 November 2006, p. A1. Two members of Halifax 2014, Frank Garner and Scott Logan, both have significant histories with the sport. Logan is a former 12-time national champion in the sport and competed internationally for Canada. Garner is a former head coach of Canada's national paddling team.

¹³⁸ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹³⁹ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁴⁰ Chris Cochrane, "Paddling sacrificed to win bid," *The Chronicle Herald*, 17 February 2007, p. D1.

¹⁴¹ Amy Smith, "Minister on costs of Games: Trust us," *The Chronicle Herald*, 8 February 2007, p. B4. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁴² Amy Smith, "Premier, PM talk equalization, Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 10 February 2007, p. A5.

¹⁴³ Michael Lightstone and Amy Smith, "Games cost all over map," *The Chronicle Herald*, 8 February 2007, p. B1.

¹⁴⁴ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 14 February 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesFeb14_07.pdf, p.1 (accessed February 19, 2009).

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p.2. Also mentioned at this meeting was that negotiations for the Ocean Breeze properties were ongoing but that Halifax Regional Council was prepared for the possible need to expropriate the land. This was no doubt of little consequence when compared with the much more serious discussions of whether the bid was going to move forward at all.

¹⁴⁶ Michael Lightstone, "Bid boss: Games not my call," *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 February 2007, p. A1.

¹⁴⁷ Robert Fowler and Dan English, *RE: Follow-Up From February 14, 2007, Executive Committee Meeting*, 22 February 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/070327cai7.pdf>, p.13-14 (accessed March 1 2009).

¹⁴⁸ Robert Fowler and Dan English, *RE: Follow-Up to letter sent February 22, 2007, 2 March 2007*, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/LetterFromFundingParters_Mar0207.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009).

¹⁴⁹ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹⁵⁰ Canada. Canadian Heritage. International and Intergovernmental Affairs and Sport, *Analysis of the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Candidate City Society Business plan : final report*, by McMahon Consulting ([Gatineau, Quebec: International and Intergovernmental Affairs and Sport, Department of Canadian Heritage], 2007).

¹⁵¹ PricewaterhouseCoopers, *Province of Nova Scotia Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games High Level Capital Plan Review*, 5 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/CommonwealthGamesReport_Final032707_1.pdf, p.2 (accessed February 27, 2009).

¹⁵² Amy Pugsley Fraser, "Too early for 2014 Games sticker shock, Harvey says," *The Chronicle Herald*, 27 February 2007, p. B1.

¹⁵³ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 7 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesMar07_07.pdf, p.1 (accessed February 27, 2009).

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.2.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008 and Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹⁵⁷ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Proposed Games Budget Options*, 7 March 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecutiveCommitteeProposedGamesBudgetOptions.pdf>, p.3 (accessed February 23, 2007). Each of these numbers includes inflation.

¹⁵⁸ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹⁵⁹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 7 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesMar07_07.pdf, p.3 (accessed February 27, 2009).

¹⁶⁰ Robert Fowler and Dan English, *RE: Follow-Up to letter sent February 22, 2007*, 2 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/LetterFromFundingParters_Mar0207.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009).

¹⁶¹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting*, 7 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommMinutesMar07_07.pdf, p.3 (accessed February 27, 2009).

¹⁶² Ibid., p.4.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p.4-5.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Michael Lightstone, “So, how did our bid fall off the rails?,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A4. It was also noted that Mayor Kelly only knew about the PNS’s stance on the issue on March 7th, 2007 by Kristen Lipscombe, “Mayor says he wants Games information released to public Games,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 12 March 2007, p. B1. Mayor Kelly was quoted in this article saying, “If I didn’t take it (to them) the next day, I would have been accused of holding it off even more, so I guess I was ‘darned if you do and darned if you don’t.’” [Brackets mine.]

¹⁶⁷ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹⁷¹ Ibid. Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008, confirmed that this strategy was developed with officials from the PNS, even some people in the Premier’s office.

¹⁷² “In-camera” is a commonly used expression to mean a closed meeting.

¹⁷³ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Lightstone, “Councillors cut out of the loop,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A3. According to Uteck, they have yet to see those reports, even as this thesis was written.

¹⁷⁵ Halifax Regional Municipality, *In camera presentation - Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid Council Presentation*, 8 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014/archives/Documents/HalifaxRegionalCouncilMarch8_2007Halifax2014CommonwealthGamesBidCouncilPresentation.pdf, p. 2 (accessed March 3, 2009).

¹⁷⁶ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. In Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008, the Mayor noted that when the bid committee asked for a chance to lower the budget estimate, they (the provincial representatives, and the municipal representatives involved in the bid) did not have faith that the bid committee would be able to lower the estimate with any sort of reliability.

¹⁸¹ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008

¹⁸² Halifax Regional Municipality, *2014 Commonwealth Games Bid Update, March 8, 2007*, 27 March 2008, <http://www.halifax.ca/mediaroom/pressrelease/pr2007/0703082014CommonwealthGamesBidUpdate.html> (accessed February 26, 2009). The Health Promotion and Protection department of the PNS released this document at 11:31am on March 8th, 2007.

¹⁸³ Michael Lightstone, "Councillors cut out of the loop," *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A3.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁸⁶ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁸⁹ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁹⁰ Halifax Regional Municipality, *Special Halifax Regional Council Minutes*, 8 March 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/documents/c070308.pdf>, p.3 (accessed February 27, 2009).

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Amy Smith and Jeffrey Simpson, "Games over," *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A1.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Michael Lightstone, "Councillors cut out of the loop," *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A3.

¹⁹⁵ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid. Jarvis's involvement in the process is worthy of note. Although he was hired in April of 2006 to work from his home in Calgary a few days per month, mostly in a consultant role, he was hired full time on March 1st, 2007. Upon arriving in Halifax on March 7th, where he would now be taking up permanent residence, he received an email from fellow bid committee member Tony Holding saying, "Are you here yet?" This set off some internal alarm bells as he had known as early as January that the financial implications were challenging and decision makers were poking holes in the budget estimates publicly. He noted, "Call it naive, or optimistic, or pragmatic, I thought we had more time." Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008, remarked that it was ironic that Jarvis was hired as an international relations expert, and on the day he arrived, the bid was pulled because of domestic relations.

¹⁹⁷ Amy Smith and Jeffrey Simpson, "Games over," *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A1.

¹⁹⁸ Jeffrey Simpson, "Boosters: Decision looks bad on us," *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A4.

¹⁹⁹ Amy Smith and Jeffrey Simpson, "Pairing cost was not practical – premier," *The Chronicle Herald*, 10 March 2007, p. A3. This was echoed by Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. Montgomerie also noted, "The consultants reports really confirmed what we felt on the particularly the risk factor around the athletes village, expropriation of land, all those things, we weren't as confident at all once we had those folks look at that piece, as [Halifax] 2014 might have been."

²⁰⁰ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

²⁰³ Amy Smith and Jeffrey Simpson, "Pairing cost was not practical – premier," *The Chronicle Herald*, 10 March 2007, p. A3.

²⁰⁴ Kristen Lipscombe, "Mayor says he wants Games information released to public Games," *The Chronicle Herald*, 12 March 2007, p. B1.

²⁰⁵ Province of Nova Scotia, *Mandate of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC)*, n.d., <http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/committees/addmandatepa.html> (accessed March 16, 2009).

CHAPTER 5 – Themes, Lessons, and Recommendations

Would The Halifax Bid Have Won?

If the Halifax bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games was not withdrawn, whether or not it would have won the vote in November of 2007 is, if nothing else, an interesting question. Perhaps predictably, those intimately involved with the bid each believed that the vote would have gone in Halifax's favour. Andrew Pipe said it quite succinctly, "These Games, I said then and I would say now, were Canada's to lose."¹

Bruce Robertson of the CGF explained how he thought the bid might have gone.

He commented:

My sense was that it was going to be very close. My sense of how the international vote would play out was a very close first ballot evenly split between the three cities, maybe only a difference of 4 or 5 votes between them. Abuja would likely have received many of the African votes. If Glasgow or Halifax was eliminated on the first ballot then I think the survivor would have won. If Abuja was eliminated on the first ballot, then I think Halifax would have beat Glasgow by 5 or 6 votes.²

The Chronicle Herald reported in May of 2007 that an unnamed member of the CGF Executive Committee told Louise Martin, chairwoman of the Glasgow bid, that if Halifax had stayed in the race it would have won the Games on the first vote.³ Thomas Jones, CEO of Commonwealth Games Canada, attended the vote in Sri Lanka. He painfully reminisced:

When we went to the actual meeting where Glasgow was chosen, the number of people that came up and said 'We can't believe you pulled out because we know so many people that would have voted for you.' We didn't need to hear that at that stage, but that's what people said.⁴

This evidence was interesting when juxtaposed with Black's assertion that

"...such events are increasingly moving beyond the grasp of such regional or second-

order cities.”⁵ Although it was clear that the size of the Commonwealth Games was increasing (and the 2006 Melbourne Games were a perfect example), there were many within the Commonwealth movement that seemed to be resisting this trend. Those people and nations wished Halifax to win simply to bring the Games to “the periphery,” and away from the “centre,” for nothing other than showing other small cities that the Games need not be an Olympic-sized event. It will be interesting to see if any smaller locales, like Halifax, bid for the upcoming 2018 Commonwealth Games.

Implications Arising for the CGF

As an event, the Commonwealth Games are in a tough spot. Normally, they take place in the same summer as football’s World Cup, which impacts on television revenue significantly. Host countries are usually responsible for 92 to 98 percent of the financing for the Games, and corporate sponsorship is minimal in comparison with the Olympics.⁶ Mayor Peter Kelly was quite adamant that CGF standards and expectations for the Games were too high. He remarked:

I think they are heading down a dangerous path...If they want this to be a very high level social club, and only a select few in the Commonwealth will be able to afford, you continue to go ahead. But if you want to make it affordable, you are going to have to scale this back, you are going to find a way to make them more opportunistic for the smaller areas because the higher the standard and the higher the expectation, and to be thinking the Commonwealth [Games] is the Olympics, or should be comparable to the Olympics, or should be applying the same rules as the Olympics, is a very unrealistic approach if it’s your intent to be inclusive.⁷

In contrast, from the Halifax 2014 and CGC perspective, the CGF criteria were seen as appropriate.⁸ Jones noted:

I think the criteria give you enough guidance, and then you need to make your own decisions as a country as to what the other things that impact on your budget,

such as popularity, and legacy, and post Games usage. If you make the wrong call on that, it's not the CGF that made you do it.⁹

Robertson, Vice-President of the GCF, recognized the need to not price themselves out of the market but also reaffirmed that the CGF technical manuals contained suggestions rather than hard and fast guidelines on many of the technical elements of hosting a Games. In addition, the CGF strategically limited each Games to 17 sports, with a certain degree of flexibility to suit the sporting needs of each host country.¹⁰

Despite these efforts, it was recognized that the number of countries willing and able to host the Games was diminishing,¹¹ and therefore the CGF should remain vigilant to strategies that can bring the Games to more countries around the Commonwealth. In this vein, although the issue of why paddling was not allowed to be included in the Halifax bid was not fully flushed out, it raised an interesting point. More cities would likely bid if they were able to include one of their prominent local sports. It would also give an interesting flavour to the Commonwealth Games to have a new sport being contested every four years.

The ultimate demise of this particular Commonwealth Games bid was due to the confluence of many factors, some larger than others, all of which will now be discussed. Throughout the research for this project, some of the factors were seen as important by some of the organizations, while others saw them as only mildly significant. Many of the factors were intertwined and combined to produce an additive effect that ultimately led to the withdrawal of the bid. That being said, two factors stood out above the rest: the time constraints of the entire bid process, and the lack of political support exhibited. All of the factors, big or small, were important and should be carefully considered by bid cities and bid committees launching future efforts for major Games.

The Effects of Vancouver 2010

One question that arose, albeit largely at the discretion of the researcher, was how, if at all, the fact that Vancouver was already confirmed to host the 2010 Olympic Games affected Halifax's bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games. The feeling from most of those who commented on the question was that there was little or no direct relation between the two.¹²

One respondent felt otherwise. According to Pipe, "I think it meant that the [federal government] were even more determined that their line in the sand, was a line in the sand," he said in relation to the \$400 million capped contribution to the project.¹³

However, Tom Scrimger remarked:

The decision about the level of funding was made given the financial circumstances of the Government of Canada at the time, and not the fact that they had already [made] commitments in to the Vancouver Games. I think what the Vancouver Games and the experience that they went through, because this new government went through a significant escalation of construction costs just prior or during the bid phase actually, is it made them increasingly aware of the level of diligence that is required in order to ensure that you've got a solid business case. And so I think there was a sensitivity around the need for a very strong business case and there were a lot of lessons learned...¹⁴

Also worthy of note is that the 2010 Olympics somewhat reduced the Halifax bid's ability to attract the best people to staff their organization because many of them were already employed in various positions for the Vancouver organizing committee (VANOC).¹⁵ That being said, Tony Holding noted that in terms of infrastructure costing and security budgeting, the model used by VANOC was helpful to Halifax 2014.¹⁶

The Domestic-International Bid Phase Transition Period

The beginning of the international phase, or more specifically the transition between the domestic and international phase, was “awkward and slow.”¹⁷ Patrick Jarvis admitted, “[Halifax 2014] probably got caught up in celebrating a little too much on the domestic side, and did not have our game plan ready to deliver.”¹⁸ This got the international phase of the bid off to a poor start, and essentially wasted the period of time between December 15th, 2005 and January 30th, 2006 when Scott Logan was named as CEO. Granted, it took time for Logan to be seconded from the PNS and for many other personnel and logistical elements to be worked out, but the fact still remains: all of this should have been worked out beforehand. Jarvis contended that coming into the vote on December 15th, 2005, Halifax 2014 should have had a plan for exactly how it wanted to proceed upon winning the bid. Ideally this plan would have been put into effect starting as early as December 16th, 2005.¹⁹

One problem that arose during the 6-week “honeymoon period” was that the initial goodwill and excitement achieved in winning the domestic phase was not capitalized on. Instead, there was a shortage of positive stories being released because there was no communications team in place for Halifax 2014, and in this media vacuum, negative stories took hold. In the end, to “right the ship” and bring coverage of the bid back to the positive side became a gargantuan task. Ultimately, it was not accomplished.²⁰

Future bid committees should have continuation plans fully in place before going into domestic evaluations, so should they end up winning, scarcely a beat will be missed.

Halifax 2014 and the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games

There is no question about it, the 2006 Melbourne Commonwealth Games were massive in every respect. They were almost as big as the Olympic Games in many facets, and made it difficult for any city wishing to follow them, especially if the city wished to host a Games more the size of a traditional Commonwealth Games.²¹ Jarvis noted that upon arriving in Australia, “I think that the bid team was kind of overwhelmed in terms of what exactly the scale and scope of the Games [were supposed to be]. They got I think a bit of the ‘deer in the headlights’ when they saw the size of the Melbourne Games.”²²

Both of those interviewed from Halifax 2014 hypothesized that the 2006 Melbourne Games may have adversely affected some of political representatives who traveled “down-under” to witness them.²³ Indeed, Duff Montgomerie stated to the Public Accounts Committee that as a result of taking in the Games in Melbourne:

Both Mayor Kelly and Minister Baret began questioning Commonwealth Games Canada officials, our own bid staff, ourselves, and consultants as to whether or not we could host such a Games - from those discussions came the direction...to ensure that the Games were right-sized. Not only do they have to be fiscally responsible, a sound business plan, they also have to be right-sized for HRM and Nova Scotia, but also for the Commonwealth as a whole.²⁴

Holding theorized that as a result of this trip, and the shock and awe experienced on it, it might have been only a matter of time until the circumstances allowed the political powers to withdraw their support.²⁵ According to Jarvis, “The question is, when was the genesis of that thought of ‘how do we extricate ourselves from this situation?’” He believed, “At some point between having arrived in Melbourne and that summer of [2006], things were already in place as to ‘how do we derail this and get out of it looking like heroes.’”²⁶

Jarvis also contended that the size of the Melbourne Games should not have

dissuaded anyone from the Halifax group in the slightest. Instead, he argued the 2006 Games should have been taken with the caveat that Melbourne was simply trying to outdo the 2000 Sydney Olympics, and that the group should have seen the opportunity for Halifax to put on completely different sized Games.²⁷ Although Montgomerie alluded to recognizing this fact in his quote to the Public Accounts Committee above, the Province of Nova Scotia's actions later on in the bid put this understanding into question.

To what level the HRM and PNS representatives and politicians were affected by the 2006 Commonwealth Games is unclear, although it is evident that the Melbourne Games were, at the very least, a part of the additive effect that ultimately led to a lack of political support for the Games, and ultimately brought the Halifax bid to its end. Either way, as Scrimger noted:

I think the Commonwealth Games Federation has a long term strategic choice to make about where they are going to place the bar around the affordability of the Games...If their desire is to keep the Games at the standard we saw in Melbourne...you're going to have the Games rotate amongst four or five [countries].²⁸

The Consultant Reports

The consultant reports produced by PricewaterhouseCoopers and McMahon Consulting are another matter of discussion. As Montgomerie said, "The three levels of government made sure there were two major studies done to help ensure that our finance staff, policy board staff and others had good data to work on the business plan."²⁹ The McMahon report put the entire Halifax Commonwealth Games proposition under the microscope. Everything from the budget, the business plan, and financial risk were examined. The PricewaterhouseCoopers report focused on the capital plan for the

Games. According to Montgomerie, these studies, in conjunction with the input of those at the PNS, led to the withdrawal of their support. He explained:

The consultants reports really confirmed what we felt on particularly the risk factor around the athletes village, expropriation of land, all those things. We weren't as confident at all once we had those folks look at that piece, as [Halifax] 2014 might have been.³⁰

The problem with how these studies were used lay in the fact that Halifax 2014 was not given the chance to validate the assumptions and evidence used to construct them. The government partners guaranteed Halifax 2014 this chance in their March 2nd correspondence. Specifically, the letter said, "We are aware that you have not yet received draft reports from the consultants, however, we understand you will receive these reports early next week in order for your team to ensure there are no technical inaccuracies contained therein."³¹ Both levels of government then proceeded to use the unverified reports to support their decision to withdraw before Halifax 2014 even had a chance to fully examine the reports, or defend themselves. Both reports were only finalized in the weeks after the official withdrawal.

According to Holding, the PricewaterhouseCoopers report didn't identify anything that was fundamentally flawed, just that there were risks associated with the endeavour.³² Robertson remarked that the McMahon report was incorrect in its assessment that the CGF expectations were too high for the Halifax bid to meet because all of the stipulations in this respect were only guidelines, rather than hard and fast rules.³³ Jones commented that, quite liberally, only the most negative facts were pulled from both reports, and in some instances were even taken out of context by those who used them at the HRM and the PNS.³⁴ He also noted:

The reports in many ways weren't even factual. Even though [the decision was made to withdraw], we went back and provided feedback [to McMahon Consulting and PricewaterhouseCoopers] to say here is where your reports aren't even factual. They were put out in draft form, they were used in a certain way, and then they were corrected afterwards when it is all said and done. If I were to do it again and ask the feds to do something differently, or the province, I would say do these reports in a timely way, use the information honestly, and have a process where these things can be validated by the people who are in positions to do it.³⁵

Another point worth mentioning is that there was another independent study that evaluated the bid, and upon which Logan later argued in front of the Public Accounts Committee that there was indeed a business case for these Games. It was conducted by Canmac Economics Limited specifically to investigate the economic impact of hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games, and was commissioned by all three levels of government.³⁶ It used the previously discussed STEAM model in conjunction with a statistics Canada input-output model to further validate its results.³⁷ The study concluded that although the Games had risks, the originally submitted \$1.359 billion budget estimate would have produced a boost of \$2.4 billion in industry output, \$1.0 billion in GDP, \$752 million in household income, and employment of 17,900 person years for the PNS.³⁸ For some reason, this report was not relied upon nearly as much by the government officials. After questioning Tracey Williams of the PNS on the issue, she said, "It was certainly analyzed and reviewed as well."³⁹ Montgomerie proceeded to explain that this particular study did not weigh heavily in their decision because it was just about the economic impact of the event, whereas the others were on the bid's effects on daily life. Overall, the revenue opportunities of the Games were seen as minimal, and the risks too high.⁴⁰ For that reason, and it seems largely subjective, the proposition put forth by Canmac Economics Limited of a \$1.359 billion investment bringing a return of

\$2.4 billion was largely disregarded in the decision making process in favour of the other two more critical studies.

In response to many of the concerns brought up by the reports, and, in time, relied upon by those who made the decisions, Jarvis quoted a highly placed Olympic official who once said, “Bid books are often great pieces of fiction.”⁴¹ In essence, Jarvis was suggesting to first win the bid, all the while knowing that the plans you win the bid with are not necessarily final. They can be adjusted after the fact to better realize potential legacy effects for the community.⁴² He explained, “I think that’s what people never grasped or understood. You know what, we didn’t have it perfect. We did not have the exact or the best answer for Halifax by March 7th [2007].”⁴³ Jarvis acknowledged that while it wouldn’t be prudent to be out in public repeating that the bid is just being “glossed up” to win and would be adapted to a better community fit afterwards, this fact must be known internally. The concept is to make the decision of best fit at the time, and make changes as information changes later. According to Jarvis, the decision makers, specifically the politicians, need to understand this element of bidding for major Games. “This is the best fit at the time, we are going to put this forward. We understand internally that it’s not likely to change, it will change.”⁴⁴

This concept, although likely to aid in pushing a bid through both domestically and internationally, is not ideal because it could contribute to increasing costs leading up to the Games. As Black commented, “...it is important to make the political point that once a ‘Games train’ has left the station, there is an almost irresistible incentive to spare no expense to ensure success, because the costs of failure become ‘too ghastly to contemplate.’”⁴⁵ With the very well documented propensity for cities to fall into this

trap, the tactic that Jarvis explained above must be used very sparingly and carefully. Moreover, it does not coincide with the diligent approach undertaken by the financial staff at Halifax 2014 that will now be discussed. Ideally, the timeframe of a bid should allow for sufficient planning so as to not have to resort to this type of tactic; however, in a tight timeframe, when the overall benefits of a Games are deemed as sufficient, and with the proper political support, such a tactic could be employed to better realize legacy effects, hopefully with only minor effects on the bid's bottom line.

The Business Case and Games Budget

Throughout the entire bid process, both in the domestic and the international bid phase, Halifax 2014 was hard at work putting together the business plan for the Games, and within it, the Games budget. In the domestic phase, the Games budget was put together in the eight weeks leading up to the November 1st, 2006, CGC bid book submission deadline. This timeframe did not allow for an in-depth cost analysis.⁴⁶ The estimate that came out at the end of this process was the \$750-\$785 million, which was released to the public in late January 2006. As Jarvis noted, "I would suggest that we knew it was very low," but he contended that it was not a "foot-in-the-door" tactic, but rather an initial costing before the scope and scale of the project changed.⁴⁷

According to Jones, following Halifax being named as Canada's candidate city in December 2005, representatives from the PNS argued that rather than withholding the previously submitted budget number from the public, it was important to be transparent and that the public would understand if the estimate went higher.⁴⁸ Montgomerie corroborated this account by saying that CGC, and specifically Jones and Savard, did not

wish to release the domestic budget estimate and that as a result, the media started to become suspicious.⁴⁹ In retrospect Jones noted, “[Releasing the budget estimate] wasn’t fully transparent because it wasn’t a real number.” He argued that the Halifax 2014 Board of Directors, of which CGC was a part, should not have allowed this number to be released because it was prepared in haste and not properly costed.⁵⁰

When the provincial Cabinet decided to go forward with the bid, they did so around the figure of \$785 million. “Given what we’d seen and heard,” commented Montgomerie, “...we thought it was very doable. Could there be slippage? Yes. We would examine that slippage in the context of the overall business plan.”⁵¹ Montgomerie and Premier MacDonald assumed, “...as you get more and more in depth, you are going to uncover more and more challenges, and obviously that figure will rise.” At the time, there was no upper contribution limit discussed by provincial officials, just that the business plan needed to make sense for the PNS.⁵²

When the international phase got going, Halifax 2014 staff went to work on further refining the budget. The decision was made early to do as thorough and as detailed a job as possible, partly at the request of the PNS and HRM representatives on the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee,⁵³ but also because of the new more detailed CGF requirements and the reality of only being able to ask the federal government once for a contribution to the project.⁵⁴ For those reasons, it was decided that the Games budget would be re-done using a bottom-up cost estimate method that would build the budget from detailed operation plans. While the downside of this method is that it is a very intensive process, and therefore more time consuming and costly, the benefits include it

being a lot more precise and allowing for changes to parts of the budget to occur later in the process while retaining a high degree of cost predictability. As Logan remarked:

What is typical in the bidding process is that incomplete data is used to arrive at costing information in the bidding phase and, as a result, there is a shock after a city or province is successful in being awarded the Games and soon after, when they do a more detailed analysis of costs, find out that the numbers are, in fact, a lot greater than had been anticipated. So the required detail that the Commonwealth Games Federation expected of Halifax 2014 caused us to do a lot more work than would normally have been the case.⁵⁵

When this model (see Figure 2) was first presented and discussed in April of 2006 at the Halifax 2014 Board of Directors meeting, representatives from the HRM and the PNS, specifically English and Montgomerie, were in attendance.⁵⁶




Figure 2: Approaches to Building a Major Games Budget⁵⁷

Especially after seeing how big the Games were in Melbourne, the PNS and the HRM directed Halifax 2014 to proceed in preparing as detailed a budget as they could. Montgomerie noted:

Basically what the funding partners were saying to the 2014 committee, which they clearly understood, go do your work. Go develop a business plan for these games. Keep in mind the business plan has to be fiscally responsible in the context of HRM and the province. Go do that. When you are ready, come to us. When you come to us, we will take that information away, we will do our due diligence as funding partners, we will have a discussion as to whether we think the amount is appropriate, whether we think there should be more money, whether we think there is not enough. That is an important dynamic to remember. That piece was always there, that at the end of the day it was the funding partners that had to review the business plan.⁵⁸

When the federal government released their capped contribution of \$400 million on November 30th, 2006, it changed the landscape of the bid significantly. The federal government gave an amount based on the domestic bid process, and anticipated what the final bid package would look like.⁵⁹ Based on Sport Canada's policy of contributing a maximum of 35 percent toward the total cost of hosting any international sport event,⁶⁰ it makes sense that the federal government assumed that the final budget number would be in the area of \$1.2 billion.⁶¹ Jones remarked that, at the time, Halifax 2014, inclusive of the HRM and the PNS representatives on the Board of Directors and Executive Committee, might not have realized just how fixed this contribution was.⁶² This proved to be a costly error.

According to Scrimger, the contribution was made given the financial circumstances of the Government of Canada at the time.⁶³ He noted:

That was a decision made by Cabinet to indicate federal support. It was based on our best knowledge of what the costing of the Games were to be. I think it provided that very clear indication that the federal government was squarely behind the bid...In an ideal situation, making that commitment with a much more developed business case would have been better.⁶⁴

In actuality, how this particular level of support was derived, and why the contribution occurred before receiving the full business plan from Halifax 2014, will never be fully known as it occurred behind the closed doors of the federal Cabinet. Holding conjectured

that perhaps if the HRM and PNS officials were indeed frightened by the scale of the 2006 Melbourne Games to the point of wishing to withdraw, and if the federal government wished them to continue the process, perhaps putting the \$400 million on the table was the federal government's way of stopping them from withdrawing.⁶⁵

Either way the contribution coming before the business plan and Games budget were complete was a major stumbling block in this process and should have marked a changing point in the directives given to Halifax 2014. Both the PNS and the HRM should have directed Halifax 2014 to work towards a \$1.2 billion level rather than instructing them to continue in the direction of \$1.599 billion; however, Montgomerie argued that the funding partners wished to know the true cost of the Games, and establishing a cap would not have allowed Halifax 2014 to find this out.⁶⁶ Logan agreed:

On one hand, perhaps it may have made the job easier but, on the other hand, perhaps important information would not have been scoped out. Again, it's often important to understand what you would be doing, but also what you would not be doing, and to have the opportunity to go through a process to decide what we should include in the Games budget and what we'd make a conscious decision not to do would be fully documented. You know, in one way, yes, it would make the job easier to have a number to work for, but it may not be the most prudent way to understand fully how to prepare a budget.⁶⁷

Halifax 2014 proceeded to complete their business plan (inclusive of the Games budget), and submit it to the three levels of government on January 26th, 2007. The Games budget was \$1.359 billion, or \$1.599 billion with inflation included. This was a massive increase from the originally estimated \$750-\$785 million, but represented a more detailed and a more accurate assessment of what Halifax 2014 believed the Games would cost, if put on in the certain way.

Pursuant to concerns from the funding partners expressed at the February 14th Halifax 2014 Executive Committee meeting, came the letters from Dan English and

Robert Fowler to Scott Logan and Fred MacGillivray in late February and early March 2007. As discussed, up until that point, no direction had been given as to an upper budget limit to build the bid around.⁶⁸ It is here that this strategy truly broke down. As a specific example, Mayor Kelly mentioned in his interview for this research that the breaking point for him was once the bid got beyond \$1 billion;⁶⁹ through the HRM representatives on the various committees of Halifax 2014, this limit should have been communicated. There is absolutely no sense having a bid committee spend time, energy, and money building a fantasy budget, only to let them know afterwards that all along there was a certain number that absolutely could not be exceeded.

Nevertheless, Halifax 2014 set to work to accommodate the requests in the two weeks between receiving the letters and the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee meeting on March 7th. As a result of the budget being so precisely costed, originally at the request of the HRM, PNS and federal government representatives, the budget number was reduced with confidence to \$1.350 billion (inflation included) and presented to a group of political representatives who were clearly already set on withdrawing. Even when Halifax 2014 said they could reduce the budget even further to meet whatever funding was available, the HRM and the PNS were not responsive. They did not believe that the budget could be reduced that quickly with any sort of cost certainty,⁷⁰ despite the fact that each level of government had representatives at the meeting when the model and its benefits were first discussed. Montgomerie noted, “To reduce it by 40 per cent within a week, down to \$1 billion, I could not, and I’ve said this publicly, I and others, could not go to my minister, go to our Cabinet, with any confidence that that’s a route we should

take.”⁷¹ Logan fundamentally disagreed, but did note there would be effects on the product by making substantial changes. He argued:

...we could go away and do re-costing based on the work that had been done in the ten months prior. So in other words we have all this information, we have options, we have choices; however, once you do that reprioritization, selecting of certain options, deleting of others, you start to change the Games significantly. So there comes a point that if the governance body of the society wished us to go in that direction, we could definitely come back with a different style of Games. It would have been very, very different - and come back to why we got into this in the first place. We were looking at legacy, we had to obviously fit to the Commonwealth Games Federation standards, and we had to, and we wanted to, look at how the Games would profile Halifax and Nova Scotia and various other things. Well, through that process, would we still be able to retain those things? Maybe, maybe not, we don't know.⁷²

The point is that the chance was never given to investigate exactly what the \$1 billion level would include, something that Halifax 2014 contended they had all of the information to do very quickly.

In the final analysis, the funding partners thought that the business case for the Games was weak. According to Montgomerie, the Premier did not believe that it warranted even approaching Prime Minister Harper again:

I believe if our Premier felt strongly that there was a business case and he was prepared to make the case directly to the Prime Minister, or certainly directly to Mr. MacKay as well...and Sport Canada felt the same way we did, I think there would have been a chance to move those yardsticks. But that's pure hypotheticals [*sic*].⁷³

Indeed, the federal government could have chosen to increase its support depending on the political will.⁷⁴ For whatever reason, this political will was not present.⁷⁵

One *Chronicle Herald* article released the day after HRM Council officially withdrew their support read:

If you went by their respective press conferences Thursday, the sides appeared to be working with different sets of numbers. The two levels of government cited an estimated Games budget, with inflation, of almost \$1.7 billion, which their

consultants warned could grow to \$2 billion. That was far above the total government contribution from all levels of approximately \$900 million. But the Games bid backers said their 2014 budget, presented to government earlier this week, totalled \$1.3 billion, including inflation. The bid committee said they were prepared to cut that even further, but weren't given the opportunity. Have these two sides even been regularly talking?⁷⁶

The article highlighted a few very important facts. Firstly, what started as a collaborative effort between the politicians and those commissioned to bring the 2014 Commonwealth Games to Halifax, somehow deteriorated into a “politician-versus-bid committee” scenario. More relevant to the present discussion were the numbers the two sides were using, and they were indeed very different. Often in the media, and even during interviews with Montgomerie and Mayor Kelly for the purposes of this research, the Games were quoted as being estimated at \$1.7 billion.⁷⁷ Although not a huge difference, relatively speaking anyways, Halifax 2014 never budgeted the Games at costing more than \$1.599 billion (inflation included). This number could be correctly rounded up to \$1.6 billion, but not up to \$1.7 billion as many of the key political players seemed to do.

Another point of discussion was the expected cost of security for the Games. The estimated number of \$67 million included in the January 26th, 2007 budget estimate of \$1.359 billion⁷⁸ (non-inflated, after the adjustment from \$1.348 billion), included all of the contract security and equipment needed at all venues during the Games.⁷⁹ Although what exactly was included in the VANOC security budget is not public knowledge, it is safe to say that things like the need to defend against a large-scale terrorist attack are part of what caused it to balloon to close to \$900 million;⁸⁰ the \$67 million contained in the Halifax budget did not include these measures. Also of relevance is the fact that for many major Canadian Games, including Vancouver 2010, the federal government has simply agreed to cover the cost of security, in its entirety, in addition to their other

contributions.⁸¹ Some internal Halifax 2014 discussions revolved around using this precedent as a negotiation point when discussing security with the federal government (in the Halifax bid, security was seen as the same as any other expense by the federal government and thus was to be covered in their \$400 million).⁸² It can be said for certain that the \$67 million figure would have risen, but according to Scrimger, to what level would not be known until closer to the Games, depending on the threat level of the time.⁸³ What level of government would have paid for this increase, how much the increase would have been, and many of the other details were yet to be determined when the bid was withdrawn.⁸⁴ This was a definite area of risk for the endeavour that was never fully flushed out.

Another subject of interest is the escalation of the budget estimate. As Scrimger noted, “Games have had increasing cost, but even in the Vancouver experience, they haven’t doubled.”⁸⁵ Essentially, the bid team had eight weeks in the domestic phase to construct a budget, versus ten months in the international phase. Logan noted:

...we always knew that the domestic estimate was purely that, an estimate. That’s the term we always used. We knew that there was not nearly enough due diligence put into that number to be accurate and we knew that it would change significantly. We didn’t know how much it would change, but we knew it was going to change. So as the process went along, we provided opportunities for the funding partners to get a sense of the scale and the scope and the growth in that number. Again, that was for those parties to do what they had to do in their particular decision-making process. As you would expect, the funding partners, which would represent their own particular governments, municipal, provincial and federal, as information would become made aware, that would provide information for discussion privately among those parties and ultimately whatever that might cause in terms of thoughts around the bid and where it’s going would be brought to the executive table.⁸⁶

With that being said, the \$750-\$785 million budget estimate that came out of the domestic process was not even close. Once that number got into the media, especially

already as an escalation to the \$500 million figure that was often initially reported, it created very poor optics for the bid later on. Given the fact that Halifax 2014 knew that this number was very low, an alternate strategy should have been used. Either the number should not have been released to the public, or it should have been released to the public with the caveat that it would rise significantly, and why it would do so. Perhaps even releasing a graph like that shown in Figure 2 (page 170) so that the public could better understand what was being done would have been helpful. In this case, when the number then rose to \$1.599 billion, and even worse to the often-espoused (and incorrect) estimate of \$1.7 billion, the escalation must have seemed huge to the common Haligonian.⁸⁷ The escalations may have also struck fear into politicians, who might have also anticipated there to be further escalations in cost leading into the Games as a result of not understanding the new model being used. Also at play might have been the dynamic that some of the politicians were neither accustomed to, nor comfortable dealing with such large projects, like some have suggested of Mayor Kelly.⁸⁸ As Mayor Kelly stated, "...it just became unthinkable, unaffordable, undoable,"⁸⁹ perhaps so much so, that even as the budget numbers were lowered, it made no difference. Fault for these escalations lies largely with CGC for not getting the domestic bid started in time for the bidding cities to have sufficient time to properly prepare a realistic first estimate. Some fault must also be assigned to the funding partners for not better communicating their limits to Halifax 2014 throughout the bid.

Halifax 2014 chose to build a budget that was rigorous and thorough up front, while still in the bidding phase. Pipe acknowledged this decision, "With perhaps characteristic Presbyterian rectitude, if I can use that term, the folks in Nova Scotia did a

wonderful job in terms of being absolutely meticulous in terms of looking at their cost implications. That was to come back and bite them.”⁹⁰ As Holding commented:

We were chartered to build a budget, we were chartered to go and win the bid. I believe that on the bid side, we were well on the way to do it. Whether people love or hate the approach we took, that’s all hindsight now... We built the budget. Obviously that budget to some people was not going to be palatable, but no one had given us any range to work within.⁹¹

In retrospect, Pipe remarked, “Ironically, the very thing that in some ways sank the bid in the eyes of those who looked at the data, or looked at the figures, and then made the decisions that they did, could be seen as one of the strengths.”⁹² In essence, Halifax 2014 might have been better served, in terms of bringing the Games to Halifax anyways, to have taken the approach of so many former major Games organizing committees and to have developed a cursory budget, won the bid, and suffered through increasing costs all the way up to the Games. Instead a different approach was taken, and was described at length by Logan to the Public Accounts Committee following the bid’s withdrawal:

The drive to determine the true cost of hosting the Commonwealth Games now, not later, was extremely important to me and my entire team. It is nothing I will ever regret in this process. It was the right and responsible thing to do, and the province and city should be complimented on their desire to do the same thing. The process was designed to ensure that all costs were determined, in detail, ahead of time. It was also designed to ensure that if cuts were made, everyone would know exactly what was being cut based on that detailed work, and to ensure people knew exactly what they were getting and what they were not getting - it was about options. I believe any business person would concur that if the proper work is done upfront on a cost estimate, cutting that cost estimate to fit a budget, while requiring work and effort, is feasible and more reliable. As an example, because of the work on estimating and planning done upfront, we knew in detail the stadium would cost \$121 million to construct. So when cuts would inevitably be required, we also knew for example that to remove the roof from the stadium would save \$23 million - it was about enabling informed decisions to rightsize the Games to fit Halifax as the process unfolded. Again, to the credit of our government partners, we understood they did not want to win the Games at any cost and to worry about the financial implications later. The kind of

estimating and planning performed by my team, which has been described by others previously in this room as exhaustive, realistic and perhaps more detailed than has ever been seen before, would have played a major role in preventing cost overruns in the future.⁹³

From all of the data, it seems as if the approach to building a budget, and the due diligence put into the process, was a new approach to hosting major Games in Canada. But further research to validate this conclusion is warranted. If the Games were won with contributions from the various levels of government that they were each comfortable with, and the model held true, there would have been little cost increase leading up to the Games in 2014. This model seems to be a good example for future Canadian bid committees to use, with the caveat that the bid must have adequate support from politicians who understand the costing model being used, along with all of its implications. As stated, more research is necessary.

As a more general comment, it was very hard for Halifax to have to build all of the necessary infrastructure to host the Games in one lump sum effort.⁹⁴ According to Robertson, “The project was running from behind. It was trying to load 20 or 30 years of infrastructure costs into one event, which made it just too expensive for the province and city.” He went on to note:

The federal and provincial governments should get together to form a twenty or thirty year hosting strategy, but it is important to start now... This includes events like the Canada Games, FISU Games, Commonwealth Games, Pan American Games, World Championships and Olympic Games.⁹⁵

Governance Structure

Another common theme that arose in the research was the issue of the governance structure utilized by Halifax 2014. Jarvis described it as awkward and dysfunctional, especially with reference to the fact that there were representatives from so many

different organizations within the staff, board of directors and executive committee. Right from the start, he described there being significant fractionalization within the organization. “I don’t think that the bid team ever had the unconditional support and the collaborative structure that was required. I think too many agendas were brought forward and too many people coming at it from their [own] perspective rather taking a look at the collective,” he said.⁹⁶ Jarvis believed that both the bid city and province should be represented in any bid governance structure, but not with their senior staff members, as they were in this case. Instead, he suggested that the province and the city should appoint outside representatives to join the organization on their behalf.⁹⁷ In stark contrast, Mayor Kelly believed that the bid got too far away from the leadership at the HRM, and if he were to do it again, he would personally wish to have a formal place in the bid leadership.⁹⁸

Another issue for some was the decision to make Montgomerie the sole representative to deal with Sport Canada. Jones described this as an effort to give the bid one voice, but because it curtailed the use of many of CGC’s normal avenues of communication with Sport Canada, he has since seen it as a mistake.⁹⁹ Moreover, he now deemed it a conflict of interest for Montgomerie. Jones remarked:

And at the end of the day, the guy that delivered the message to us that [the province] was going withdraw, was this guy [Montgomerie]. The same guy that was speaking on behalf of the bid society [to the federal government], coming to the bid table saying ‘oh by the way, the province has decided to pull their money, and we are pretty sure the city is going to pull too.’¹⁰⁰

Jones argued, “With so much public sector funding there, you have got to have a handle on the currents because if there is a risk to your monies, you better be aware of that, and early.” He suggested having an influential member of the federal government more

directly involved in the bid, and possibly even directly on the board of directors, like Peter MacKay or his chief of staff, would have helped this bid immensely.¹⁰¹

Pipe remarked that he is still puzzled as to how with representation in the governance structure from the HRM and the PNS, the bid ever got to the point where the government partners withdrew their support to the surprise of all the others in Halifax 2014.¹⁰² Indeed, in such a governance structure, concerns over the progression of the bid could and should have been voiced much earlier than they were. As Pipe noted, “Considerations perhaps need to be given to the degree to which local politics or local political forces and factors may have intruded on these decisions.”¹⁰³

From Halifax 2014’s perspective, there wasn’t enough trust from CGC in the local bid team. The main example given to this effect was CGC’s decision to implant Eric Savard, a senior CGC official, into the Halifax 2014 staff (it was nothing to do with Savard himself, but rather the act of inserting any outsider into this position). According to Jarvis, “That came with a whole bunch of baggage, and history...I realize that it was their brand that they are looking to protect, but it struck me as a very strange model and rife with difficulties...”¹⁰⁴ He also noted, “If you’re seen as an outsider or as another party, there is always that concern of...who’s best interest you are looking out for. That was the problem, it just set up a confrontational situation.”¹⁰⁵ In the future, CGC must be very vigilant of this issue.

Media Coverage, Perceived Secrecy and Public Opinion

In the time period from when the bid started in 2005 to a little under two years later when both the PNS and the HRM withdrew their support, the bid was a mainstay in

The Chronicle Herald. Dan Leger, Director of News Content for the major Halifax newspaper said:

We regarded our job as being, in the normal way of media, to keep an eye on public expenditures and public policy matters. We provided a sounding board, as we always do, through our letters to the editor...the bid itself attracted a really virulent opposition almost immediately. People who predicted it would be a financial disaster, who said the money should be spent on something else, and all this kind of stuff. So we were reflecting that.¹⁰⁶

Throughout the domestic phase, the stories echoed both the “David vs. Goliath” battle that Halifax was immersed in, and the process itself. For the most part, the stories were fairly neutral. When Halifax won the domestic phase, the focus shifted to what the Games would cost taxpayers and the fact that Halifax 2014 was not readily releasing all of its work to the public. Very quickly *The Chronicle Herald’s* coverage turned to a more negative, untrusting, and pessimistic tone.¹⁰⁷ That’s not to say it was entirely negative, a few of the columnists cast the bid in a positive light. One remarked:

A Commonwealth Games is an exciting enough event in and of itself, highlighting as role models the athletes who live the sort of healthy lifestyle we are trying to encourage among our children. The big bonus comes not only from having, for a change, decent athletic facilities for our region, but also from the golden opportunity to have those facilities constructed with significant and enthusiastic multi-government funding participation, most particularly from Ottawa. This is our chance. Think big, people, think big.¹⁰⁸

Overall though, most of the stories written cast the bid, and those driving it forward, in a negative light.¹⁰⁹ Many of the stories portrayed a citizenry divided over whether or not hosting the Games was good for Halifax, which failed to be demonstrated in the repeated polls that showed incredible support for the Games.¹¹⁰ In fact, all of the official polls conducted to determine HRM citizenry support for the bid demonstrated at least 72 percent in favour of the Games, and in the domestic phase as high as 90 percent support.¹¹¹ The sole poll taken that was representative of Nova Scotia showed 81 percent

support for the bid.¹¹² These polls must be taken with at least some caution though, because as was pointed out several times in *The Chronicle Herald*, some people involved with taking the polls also had a vested interest in the success of the bid.¹¹³ Halifax 2014 should have been more vigilant of this issue, and commission polls by firms completely divorced of any possible conflicts of interest.

Nonetheless, led by business columnist Roger Taylor,¹¹⁴ columnists at *The Chronicle Herald* continually chastised the bid and its practices. Taylor once wrote, “Nova Scotia is not a wealthy province despite what some people believe, and there is such a thing as living beyond one’s means.”¹¹⁵ Leger noted:

We ended up covering the machinations of the bid committee because of their strange behaviour and their secretiveness, instead of covering the Commonwealth Games story. It’s one of those things, news moves into vacuum areas. If you’re not saying anything about what you’re doing, you just have to expect that the media will find something to write about because people are still interested in it. So we were then focusing on the critics, or on the politics of it or on the dynamics that were going on among the various levels of government. I don’t think any of those things were particularly helpful for the overall bid. As a matter of fact, I think they were quite damaging.¹¹⁶

As Halifax 2014 tried to build the business plan and the Games budget, they released little to the media. This, Leger said, was a major problem:

In media, words fill vacuums. If there is a vacuum on one side of a given debate, the other side tends to become extremely loud. The bid people became frustrated and angry with us we were giving voice to this, I thought a loud but fairly small minority, who were against the whole notion of it, didn’t want any money spent on it and just saw it as a big boondoggle. Those people got, I thought, disproportionate coverage not just in the Herald, but in many media outlets around in the region.¹¹⁷

Only a few days before the bid collapsed, Logan commented on how he believed the media influenced the bid process:

The media frenzy here, the constant striving to find some kind of dirt or blood or something wrong here . . . to find scandal in everything we do, has made it very

difficult on the politicians and made it very challenging on the bid committee ... The difference is that Glasgow, and Scotland, in a nation-building context, is very proud of their bid and very supportive and so they are not under the scrutiny we are.¹¹⁸

Leger conceded that while his newspaper was doing what everyone expected it to do by being a watchdog and uncovering information, that perhaps *The Chronicle Herald* was a bit too negative towards the bid and that a vocal minority received too much press:

Some of us who were in favour of it, certainly myself, we were trying to maintain journalistic objectivity and not sound like cheerleaders. In some ways that's the way you have to operate if you're in modern media but at the same time, I don't think that enough positive things came out.¹¹⁹

As an aside, it is interesting that Mayor Kelly was so adamant in the latter stages of the bid that Halifax 2014 should release all of the information possible to the public. He noted for the purposes of this research, "We were trying to be supportive of the committee, although [it was] veiled in secrecy which caused many problems and concerns publicly. This protectionist approach to me was not the best approach. I think that was part of the demise."¹²⁰ This was quite an about-face turn from his earlier stance on the issue. Back in the domestic phase of the bid, when asked why taxpayers wouldn't learn the contents of the bid book until it was presented to CGC for review in December of 2005, he replied that they didn't want to tip off their competitors, "We are working . . . to try to make sure that we don't lose an opportunity... We're trying to keep our (proposal) intact, and we will release what we can."¹²¹ Even in the international phase the Mayor noted, "When Hamilton went for the international component [for the 2010 Games], [released information] came back, in part, to be used against them in their bid."¹²² Evidently the Mayor changed his mind on this issue as the bid wore on.

From the perspective of Halifax 2014, the major problem was that they did not anticipate getting so much bad publicity at home. They were so intently concentrated with their image abroad and with garnering international votes that their domestic relations strategy suffered. As Jarvis put it, “In the military term, our rearguard was terrible. We were getting eaten alive by local media and local community members.”¹²³

Jones commented:

You conceive of a communications program as being proactive and getting the message out there and trying to shape and work with opinion. Whereas this communications project seemed to be very reactive... There was a consideration I think of, ‘We are in a competitive environment here and we can’t give too much information’ and ‘we don’t have a budget that’s completely finished yet so we can’t let that information out there’. The media responded by saying, ‘you’re not telling us the full story here’... They turned a little bit on the bid, and the bid became even more reactive, and anytime there was a crisis they spent all the time on the crisis, not on leading opinion or on giving new information. In hindsight, that was probably not the right approach, certainly not in that market. It is a very suspicious media out there.

An important lesson to be learned from this bid, as pointed out by members of Halifax 2014 and CGC, is that domestic relations are just as important to the success of a bid as the international relations are.¹²⁴ This was a major problem throughout the Halifax bid.

How to handle the media and public relations issues more effectively in the future is a difficult question to answer. Despite calls for complete openness and transparency,¹²⁵ it simply doesn’t make sense for a bid committee to be releasing information that is constantly changing, as the Games budget was until it was submitted to the funding partners in January of 2007. It is possible that the number could have been released at that point, but even then the number was subject to change. Not until after the amount was approved by the funding partners, which never happened in this case, would it truly have made sense to release it for public consumption. According to

Holding, the plan was that once a final number was approved by the various levels of government, Halifax 2014 would have been able to go to the community and describe exactly what citizens would be getting for their tax money.¹²⁶

Holding explained that a better way to handle domestic relations in the future would be to use the media to sell the vision at first, everything from city rejuvenation to great facilities, while building the business plan and Games budget in the background.¹²⁷ This would ensure that there wouldn't be the media vacuum that Leger described (which was also related to the poor transition by Halifax 2014), and then when the numbers are more robust and finalized, they could be released to the public on top of the already sold vision of the Games.¹²⁸ One large part of this is having one leader of the bid travel the world to procure international votes, while another stays at home to push the positive stories of the bid.¹²⁹ The problem with the bid under review was that the vision was not effectively sold to the public throughout the international phase because the leaders of Halifax 2014 were too busy selling the Halifax Games to distant Commonwealth countries, and because as Jarvis argued, neither the Mayor or the Premier were willing to step into the fray and help turn the negative stories into positive ones. Instead "...they just stepped back and if not detracting, were very neutral."¹³⁰

Time Constraints

One of the two most important factors that caused the demise of the bid was the timeframe, and more specifically, the lack of time that was available in which to put the bid together. Both of the Sport Canada representatives interviewed, Tom Scrimger and Éleine Harvey, and Duff Montgomerie from the PNS, were adamant that time constraints

were the biggest and most influential factor to the bid being withdrawn.¹³¹ Scrimger remarked:

It wasn't anything to do with politics, it wasn't anything to do with quality of the bid...Major games, be it Commonwealth, and I'll say the same thing for World University Games and or Pan-Am Games, is the bid committees, and governments, and everyone involved, underestimate totally the amount of time needed to build the business case around the bid. You do not walk into what are now multi-billion dollar enterprises and build a business case for it in five or six months.¹³²

Montgomerie was even more to the point. "In retrospect, the timeframe was ridiculous," he said.¹³³

There were a few factors as to why Canada decided to seek the Games quite so late in comparison to the other countries. Jones cited that CGC waited to see if South Africa was going to bid, because if they had, Canada likely would not have. In addition, Jones said his organization was still reeling from losing to New Delhi in the 2010 bid.¹³⁴ Not mentioned by Jones was the fact that CGC was reportedly originally just going to make Hamilton Canada's representative in the international phase before deciding to undertake a domestic bid process. This indecisiveness proved to be one of the two major factors in the downfall of the Halifax bid.

As Canada will undoubtedly pursue other major Games, Sport Canada needed to address the issue of bidding timeframe, and establish a clear policy for all bidding cities to abide by. They did so pursuant to the new Sport Canada hosting policy that was released in January of 2008.¹³⁵ A minimum of two years will now be required from the time the domestic phase of a bid is complete until the international bid book must be submitted.¹³⁶ Scrimger noted:

Commonwealth Games Canada or the bid committee is asking a series of orders of government to make a business decision worth hundreds of millions of dollars

and if you were the person sitting on hundreds of millions of dollars, what kind of detail and understanding would you want to have around the business case before you invested hundreds of millions of dollars? There is no question, and it's going to be even further exacerbated by the current financial situation of the country, it's going to require a good sound knowledge of what the business case is.¹³⁷

The bottom line for Scrimger, and for Sport Canada was, "It all comes back to simply you've got governments who have a desire to host that has to be balanced with financial responsibility and fiscal responsibility, and you ran out of time."¹³⁸

Indeed, it became clear through this research that time constraints put pressure on every other facet of the bid. The short domestic phase meant a hasty original costing of the Games and perhaps not enough time for the HRM and PNS officials to conduct their due diligence and make sure they were truly on board with the project. This was followed by an international phase that would have benefited immensely from an extra six months.

Despite this short timeframe, the politicians involved chose to not even use it to its full extent. Taken even further, the various government contributions did not even really need to be finalized by the May 9th CGF deadline. Conceivably, the budget could have been taken to a place that was reasonably palatable for the funding partners in time for the CGF submission, and then fully researched in the summer of 2007 to make sure that the new level provided sufficient benefits to warrant going forward. If it was felt that the goals were not met at the new reduced level, the bid could have been scrapped at that point. Moreover, a plebiscite could have been conducted in the extra time to determine true citizen support once more of the plans were more finalized and released to the public, similar to what happened in Vancouver in 2003 before the 2010 Games were ever awarded to Canada.¹³⁹

The bottom line is that although the timelines were tight, the withdrawal was still premature. The researcher, and no doubt many Haligonians, will always wonder what could have been accomplished between the day the bid was withdrawn and when the decision truly needed to be made.

Politics and Leadership

Representatives of Halifax 2014, Commonwealth Games Canada, and *The Chronicle Herald* each cited politics and leadership, and often the intersection of the two, as a major factor in the demise of the bid.¹⁴⁰

At the federal level, it is clear that Prime Minister Harper was not overly enthusiastic about the bid, which was seen in his contribution to the project before even receiving a business plan. The fact that he only held a minority government at the time may have played a role in this decision, as might the fact that the Vancouver Olympics were beginning to show signs of escalating costs. Unfortunately, the real reasons and discussions from behind federal Cabinet doors will never be known. What is clear is that the PNS did not have much leverage over the Harper government as seen in their repeated and inconsequential attempts to re-open the contribution file.¹⁴¹

Minister MacKay's involvement in the bid was also an intriguing political dimension to the story. As an integral part of the Harper Cabinet, and an advocate of sport and support of any kind for Maritime projects, one would think that Minister MacKay would have been an influential supporter of this project. Indeed, Harvey mentioned that a strong Minister like MacKay is always helpful for a Sport Canada project because he would add a supportive voice for the project at the Cabinet table.¹⁴²

Montgomerie stated, “Minister MacKay was incredibly supportive and incredibly helpful.”¹⁴³ Unfortunately for the bid, Pipe remarked there were:

...constraints that were placed upon a regional Minister who was, as we I think quite reasonably know, very supportive of this bid, and indeed who worked hard to try to actually see what he could do. I mean I think he was a force behind the scenes trying to get the province and the city to get their act together.¹⁴⁴

When things did start to go sour, MacKay was not overly active in the public sphere.

Pipe believed, “...he was probably absent because he wasn’t able to make the kind of public statements that no Minister in the Harper government was ever able to make. But certainly I know that, I think he expended considerable energy trying to keep this on the road.”¹⁴⁵ Harvey’s understanding was that MacKay was supportive of the bid

throughout, and that he was very disappointed when it fell through.¹⁴⁶ Montgomerie agreed, “He’s a sport nut anyways. He certainly got the infrastructure deficit piece, but at the end of the day, his Prime Minister made a decision. And obviously he wasn’t able to change that decision.”¹⁴⁷

Pipe pointed blame for the demise of the bid squarely on the shoulders of both Premier MacDonald and Mayor Kelly, by remarking:

I don’t think there was the requisite insightful, visionary leadership from the province or from the city. I think, had that been there, things would have been very different...And when I say that...I’m not saying...just barge ahead and go along with what was developed, but I mean I think political leaders who could think as far ahead as 2014, and see what this might mean for us in terms of a whole array of [things]: facilities, tourism, economic development, municipal and urban renewal. They would have said, ‘this is too good of an opportunity to miss’... You had ineffectual political leadership.¹⁴⁸

Mayor Kelly was in office for the entirety of the process, but according to his former Deputy Mayor, Sue Uteck, “The guy can’t dream. He was a nervous participant from the get-go.”¹⁴⁹ Jarvis always questioned why Mayor Kelly didn’t take on more of a

leadership role once Halifax won the domestic bid. He remarked, “To me, the political leadership, i.e. the Mayor, should have stepped to the plate and led [the bid] visually and optically for HRM.” Instead of championing the bid, there was a lot of hesitation and public questioning which sabotaged and took away faith in the bid organization.¹⁵⁰

Rightly or wrongly, Mayor Kelly was definitely not comfortable with the amount of money that would have been put towards the Games:

We’re not crazy, we’re not fools. We may be eager to get things but we’re not going to do it at the detriment of taxpayers, and our residents, and our children, and our grandchildren. That would have been the most asinine decision that we would ever have made if we had gone in that direction.¹⁵¹

At the level of the Premier, the change in leaders may have also affected the bid.

While Montgomerie stated that both Premiers supported the bid equally,¹⁵² members of the Halifax 2014 disagreed. Jarvis praised former Premier Hamm for his support and noted, “To me, that contrasted dramatically with [Premier] Macdonald who became almost invisible.”¹⁵³ He also remarked that Premier MacDonald, “...certainly did not seem to have the compelling vision or drive or desire to promote the bid that the previous Premier had.”¹⁵⁴ For whatever reason, the bid for the Commonwealth Games did not seem to be a priority for MacDonald, and thus he did not often publicly endorse it. This is especially interesting considering MacDonald holds a degree in Physical Education from St. Francis Xavier University.¹⁵⁵

The question of why Mayor Kelly and Premier MacDonald were ultimately not supportive of the bid is a major question to arise from this research. According to Mayor Kelly, and Montgomerie on behalf of Premier MacDonald, it was purely because the economics of the proposition didn’t make sense.¹⁵⁶ Scrimger noted:

That's some of the tough part of being a politician or a senior official in government. You've got to make either the recommendation or the call sometimes with relatively limited information about what the right thing is to do. The fact that Nova Scotia and Halifax chose the path of what they felt was proper fiscal responsibility, I don't think anybody can suggest that they made the wrong decision.

Leger pointed out, "They obviously started to get cold feet. They were worried about this noisy anti-group that would warn of financial disasters to come and would talk about the Montreal Olympics and things like that, ignoring more successful bids for other multi-lateral events around the world."¹⁵⁷

But there seems to have been much more at play, especially because of how the bid was squashed in its closing weeks and days without fully exploring all available possibilities. At the provincial level, the Halifax bid put Premier MacDonald in a difficult position politically. As Leger explained, in a provincial context, 44 percent of the GDP, 40 percent of the workforce, and 70 percent of the taxpayers were from Halifax. In essence Halifax was paying the provincial bills, while at the same time the rural areas were overrepresented politically. These same rural areas were largely responsible for garnering MacDonald his political livelihood; twenty of MacDonald's twenty-two seats in the provincial legislature were garnered in outlying areas (while the New Democrats and Liberals held the overwhelming majority of seats in the HRM). Leger went on to explain that there was a tension between rural residents who thought that all the money and job opportunities went to Halifax, and there was a view that this was happening once again with the Commonwealth Games. The rural residents, and the minority-elected Premier, largely supported by these same rural residents, were being asked to back a relatively large and expensive initiative in downtown Halifax. It is quite conceivable that MacDonald feared he would lose his rural political power base if he supported the

Games. According to Leger, the bid was definitely a political concern for MacDonald,¹⁵⁸ and Holding noted that this provincial political dynamic was an ongoing worry for those at Halifax 2014.¹⁵⁹ In retrospect Holding noted:

So long as a minority government stayed in play, actually organizing the Games were probably going to be an absolute nightmare. Really, when you look back now, because they would have always had some of those negative issues to deal with. If they had a majority government and a strong leadership, they probably would have overcome them.¹⁶⁰

As for the Mayor, the question of whether the economic proposition itself was the sole dissuasion from supporting the bid is not as easily answered. One must wonder if his support simply waned from the time he co-authored the supportive article in *The Chronicle Herald* with former Premier Hamm, or if he was indeed an unwilling participant even then, as argued by Deputy Mayor Uteck.¹⁶¹ Perhaps there was a reluctance right from the start, that was further exacerbated by seeing the scale of the Games in Melbourne to the point that he began to worry about the cost to the taxpayers, and as Uteck noted, to worry that the bid would hurt his chances of being re-elected.¹⁶²

English said to the Public Accounts Committee, "...given that the three government funding partners could not collectively close the significant funding gap, Halifax Regional Council approved a motion to advise the Halifax 2014 Board of Directors to discontinue the bid process."¹⁶³ Although fundamentally true, this statement does not describe how the process actually played out, as the evidence suggests that the majority of the Councillors were moving towards giving the bid a stay of execution. Whether or not the infamous, and flawlessly timed, press release from the PNS was deliberate will likely continue to be a subject of intense debate. Adding fodder to this discussion is the question of why it was so important for Councillors to make the decision

that quickly, and why they were not presented with the most recent and reduced budget estimate from Halifax 2014.

From Holding's perspective, by the end of the bid, both leaders realized they couldn't politically sell the Games and used the rising costs as ammunition to bring the bid to a halt.¹⁶⁴ Deputy Mayor Uteck believed that the PNS committed money to the project that they then realized they didn't have, at which point they began to find a way out of the bid.¹⁶⁵ Perhaps, it was just that both political leaders were not willing to take the risks associated with the Games and instead decided to take the conservative line on the issue. That would explain why both "...became more like watch dogs,"¹⁶⁶ than champions of the bid. Whatever the reasons, Leger's telling commentary on two leaders he described as having little worldly experience is quite revealing:

Neither one of them are people who engage in [political] tactics. They are reactors. Both are managers, they are not visionary types. There are not people to take your game to the next level or win the gold medal for you, they are guys who make sure that the lights are on and that the roads are paved. It's harsh to say that, but that's exactly how I feel about both of them. And the Commonwealth Games is the perfect example.¹⁶⁷

A Proposal

Returning to the domestic phase, there were three other cities that competed intently for the right to be Canada's candidate city going forward. Halifax won this right, and then the various political leaders decided upon further review that it wasn't right for Halifax. With that decision, not only were the 2014 Commonwealth Games not going to be held in Halifax, they were also not going to be held in Canada. As Pipe recounted, "One of the most heart-ringing things that happened in the course of the 24 hours, the day of [the withdrawal], were the phone calls I was getting from Toronto and Hamilton, 'we

can do this, just tell us how to switch it on.”¹⁶⁸ Unfortunately it was way too late for any of the other cities. As Jarvis said, “...there was some real resentment from some of the other cities from the opportunity they lost. Halifax’s win and then subsequent withdrawal was a real slap in the face to the municipalities of Ottawa, York and Hamilton.”¹⁶⁹

This type of situation must be avoided in the future. Commonwealth Games Canada must qualify that a city is indeed interested and that they have the capacity, competence, and desire to carry a bid through to completion. Moreover, when bidding in the domestic phase, cities must be equally confident in those facets. As Pipe remarked, the problem lies with, “How do you evaluate or quantify the maturity of the political leadership. And those are the things that are the imponderables...there isn’t a process you can do.”¹⁷⁰ As sad as it is true, the only thing that would truly guarantee that bidding cities are sincere in their desire to pursue a major event like the Commonwealth Games, and that they have done their due diligence beforehand to understand why it is they wish to do so, is to make bidding cities “put their money where their mouth is.”

This would not be an overly complicated addition to what is currently in place. Cities interested in bidding for the Games would enter the domestic portion of the bid and build a bid book, exactly as it was done by the four cities in this particular bid. The difference would be that when the winning Canadian city is announced at the end of the domestic phase, it would need to post a significant monetary bond to CGC,¹⁷¹ and to enter into a contractual agreement with CGC. The bond would be returned following the announcement of the host city by the CGF, inclusive of interest, and would only be forfeited if the city withdrew at some point during the international phase for illegitimate reasons such as failing to do their due diligence before bidding in the first place (which

would be described and outlined in the legal contract). As noted by Preuss, from an economic and urban development perspective it only makes sense to bid for an Olympic Games, or by extension a Commonwealth Games, if the long term city plans are in line with those needed for the particular mega-event.¹⁷² Whether the Games match such long term plans would be an appropriate starting point for the proposed due diligence. That way, issues with proposed facilities not completely fitting into long term city plans, as discussed by Wildsmith,¹⁷³ would not be an issue later on in the bid.

Such a proposal also necessitates another factor. The timeframe of the domestic bid must be sufficient to permit the local political leadership to have their due diligence complete and to be satisfied that they are in a project that they wish to see through to completion. This responsibility falls on the rights holder, in this case Commonwealth Games Canada, to make sure that the process is started in the appropriate amount of time. This was definitely not the case in the bid under review.

Not surprisingly, this proposal drew mixed reviews from those interviewed. Those from Halifax 2014, CGC, and *The Chronicle Herald* saw the benefits of the proposition.¹⁷⁴ “I think people would have felt right from the get go, that there were implications for pulling,” said Pipe.¹⁷⁵ On the other hand, Harvey and Mayor Kelly both disagreed. Harvey stated, “The fact that Halifax pulled... it’s irrelevant. They’ve done the job that they had to do to win the domestic bid.”¹⁷⁶ Mayor Kelly cited that Halifax did commit money to go through the process of bidding for the Games. “People think we’re embarrassed about this. I have no embarrassment whatsoever. I’m pleased. We are financially responsible and we can be pointed to that [we] had the fortitude to stand up to this process and say, its unaffordable,” he said.¹⁷⁷ This, however, is not the point.

Discovering or deciding that hosting a major Games is unaffordable, not consistent with long term plans, or not politically prudent is fine, but when a city and its province make this realization is key. One would hope that from now on this decision is made before the opportunity is taken away from other cities that are sure they can host the Games, as it seems in this case others were.

Conclusions

All that remains of the bid to bring the 2014 Commonwealth Games to Halifax are the memories, both for those personally involved, and for those who watched it unfold, or more appropriately fold, in the unrelenting Halifax media. It was clear in researching this bid that for some of those involved, specifically Scott Logan and Fred MacGillivray, the weight of what came to pass is still carried in some way, as was evident by both of their decisions to not be interviewed on the subject. Differences in opinion will continue to be present on the events that occurred throughout the process, and over whether the final decision made by the HRM and the PNS was the correct one.¹⁷⁸ Hopefully, this research has brought the important events and recurrent themes of the bid to the forefront both for the benefit of future Canadian sport mega-event bids, and for the residents of the HRM and the PNS to make their own educated decisions on the outcome. Going back to Easton's *Simplified Dynamic Response Model of a Political System Source* (see Diagram 2 on page 41), as a result of this thesis in essence becoming a part of the feedback loop, Halifax and Nova Scotia residents may have a different level of support for the politicians that were involved.

Coming out of this episode, Mayor Kelly noted that in terms of Halifax once again vying for the Commonwealth Games, “I’m sure we will be evaluated more than most should we go after this again, but we have done very well elsewhere in terms of world events.”¹⁷⁹ According to Jones, it is not out of the question for Halifax to bid again sometime in the future:

I have nothing but good things to say about the city, and the concepts as to why we chose them. Things like the layout, the size, the location... This could have been great. The stuff that would have happened there, and the feelings that we had early on of what this could do for Halifax and for the people of the region was just going to be phenomenal. I wouldn’t rule out [selecting Halifax as a domestic bid representative again] in the future. I don’t rule any city out, but I think we would be more strategic next time in determining early on what the level of commitment was financially and a whole bunch of other things. We would be much more demanding of, to the degree that we can influence, the public sector agencies to put in the money. We would try and get as much as we possibly could early in terms of commitment. And, we need to start earlier.¹⁸⁰

Unfortunately and realistically, this was likely the last opportunity for Canada to host the Commonwealth Games for a long time. At the time of writing, Vancouver is gearing up to host the 2010 Olympic Winter Games. Meanwhile, Edmonton is immersed in bidding for the 2015 Summer Universiade and likewise Toronto for the 2015 Pan American Games. If either bid is successful, which will be determined by May of 2009 and October of 2009 respectively, it would officially preclude any bid for the Commonwealth Games until at least 2022 according to Sport Canada’s most recent *Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events*.¹⁸¹ Even if both bids are unsuccessful, the timeframe would likely be too tight to enter the race for the 2018 Commonwealth Games, especially if more than one Canadian city expresses interest. Given the lessons learned from the events outlined herein, and specifically the importance of a bid having an adequate timeframe, it would not be wise for CGC to vie

for the 2018 Games. Nonetheless, at the time of interview in October of 2008, Jones and CGC had yet to rule out bidding for the 2018 Games.¹⁸²

Given these realities, the 2022 Games are the next edition that CGC could sensibly pursue. When making this decision, officials will need to consider whether or to bid for these Games, or to hold off in favour of vying for the 2030 Games. A bid for the latter, specifically by the city of Hamilton, would likely be well supported internationally considering it will be the centennial celebration for Commonwealth Games, which of course were first hosted by Hamilton in 1930. The detrimental effects to the Commonwealth Games brand in Canada of not hosting an event since 1994 will have to be duly considered when choosing whether to bid for the 2022 Games, or waiting until the 2030 Games.

Looking back on the Halifax bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games, interestingly enough, one of those who fought to bring the Games to Halifax reflected that possibly the right decision might have been made. “In retrospect, was it the right decision? Well, it possibly was the right decision, however, it was the way it was all done,” said Holding.¹⁸³ Indeed, throughout the examination of this important piece of Canadian sport mega-event history, failures of the process stood out more than the final decision itself. Everyone involved, from Halifax 2014, to CGC, to the HRM and the PNS, is to a certain degree responsible for these breakdowns.

The HRM and the PNS should have provided Halifax 2014, their agency, with a specific funding range to build the Games budget, especially after the federal funding cap was announced in November. In addition, the HRM and the PNS should have used all three consultant reports, ideally the final versions, to evaluate their decisions rather than

just the two reports that supported their already forming opinions (opinions that began to appear as early as the 2006 Melbourne Games). Finally, HRM Councillors should have been presented with the correct information and been allowed to come to their own conclusions and decisions on the closing days of the bid, if for nothing else than democracy's sake.

Halifax 2014 should have transitioned seamlessly between phases and put together a much more aggressive domestic communication strategy to be implemented in the beginning of the international phase. Moreover, they should have utilized the very interested and engaged Halifax media that were yearning to cover the bid, in order to sell to the public (and as it turned out, the politicians) what the Games were going to mean for the area. Finally, Halifax 2014 should have reacted more strongly to the \$400 million contribution from the federal government, and further probed, perhaps even demanded, that they be given a framework within which to work from the HRM and the PNS.

All of the organizations involved should have collaborated more within the established governance structure. Teamwork was needed, and instead mixed messages were sent, some sent messages were not heard, other messages that should have been sent were not sent at all. The bottom line is the governance structure did not work and everyone was at fault for this failure.

Given all of these shortcomings, two additional failures stood out more than the rest: the inadequate timeframe provided by CGC for the bid, and the fact that neither the Mayor nor the Premier saw fit to champion the bid. If the reader happens to be in favour of the bid, it may or may not be comforting to know that if either the timeframe, or the

political will was sufficient, the bid may have stood a chance. With both as they were, there was never a hope.

With respect to the inadequate timeframe, it is something that both Sport Canada and more importantly CGC must be cognizant of in the future.¹⁸⁴ In this particular case with the CGF deadline date still over two months away, and even more time available beyond that deadline, withdrawal at the time that it happened did not make sense, which is perhaps why the bid was terminated in the peculiar fashion that it was. After investing over \$7 million into the process,¹⁸⁵ Halifax and the Province of Nova Scotia were, to use the poker expression, “pot committed.” In essence, the amount of time, energy and tax money already put into the project necessitated that every avenue and possibility be explored to make the Games possible, palatable, and appropriate in the time that remained, even if it was indeed felt by those in positions of power that there was little chance of completing the necessary tasks in time. If in the end all of the choices were exhausted, time truly ran out, and a decision really had to be made, the political leaders would have been justified in taking whichever route they deemed appropriate because in the end, that is what they are elected to do. That was not the case.

That is where the final factor came to play, politics and the all-important issue of leadership. Perhaps author Laura Mac Donald’s description of Halifax, or at least of its leaders, rang true in this case, “...Halifax’s conservative atmosphere – its tolerance and liberal university, its preference for history over risk, and its rigid class structure – was less suitable to entrepreneurship than to politics.”¹⁸⁶ Leger agreed:

There is a very old fashioned Nova Scotian reticence to take on risk. You don’t get hedge fund flame-outs in places like Halifax... There is a lot of old money here, and very cautious and patient money... But there was certainly a tension between two kinds of ways of seeing the community and its future.¹⁸⁷

Be that as it may, the political leaders should have seen what was on the line, specifically the opportunity to unlock \$400 million of federal money to the benefit the Halifax Regional Municipality and the Province of Nova Scotia. It will be years, decades, maybe even generations before Halifax, Nova Scotia, and Atlantic Canada have a chance at that kind of federal money for a similar project. The opportunity deserved to be fully explored.

Had this been done, and the decision to withdraw still been made, there would likely still be debate on the issue. It comes down to a matter of opinion and depends on if you are happy with the status quo or if you would like to see Halifax and Nova Scotia take a step forward. As one writer at *The Chronicle Herald* put it, “The landmark facilities that become iconic centerpieces of city life are never achieved without political risk and visionary leadership.”¹⁸⁸ Both the Mayor of Halifax, Peter Kelly, and the Premier of Nova Scotia, Rodney MacDonald, made a precipitate decision to maintain the status quo and thus avoid any risk, before even looking at all the options on the table. In contrast, those at Halifax 2014 were trying to bring the community forward. They represented change and progression and came up against two leaders, who for better or worse, did not have such a forward looking viewpoint. Either way, the fact that Halifax 2014 did not even get the chance to fully display their work was a terrible shame, and as Deputy Mayor Uteck said, “I think it was unfair and Scott Logan deserves better, and surely Fred MacGillivray did [as well].”¹⁸⁹ Leger noted:

My own perspective, as I said, having dealt with MacGillivray and the group, was that I have to feel that these guys really knew what they were doing, that they would make mistakes, there would always be the occasional stupid thing done...but I still felt at their core, I had a lot of confidence in Fred and I had a lot

of confidence in the group he had working with him, and I really thought they would pull it off.¹⁹⁰

As Robertson remarked, “Sport in this country...has to figure out how to be part of the economic and public policy strategy, and how to sell that value proposition.”¹⁹¹ With that in mind, and the old adage that “hindsight is 20/20,” if this bid were to have gone through, it would have been perfect for the current economic climate: a major government spending initiative for infrastructure and sport facilities that would have put thousands of people to work. In addition, Haligonians could have enjoyed and benefited from the upgrades to their city for decades to come at an incredible bargain thanks to the federal and provincial government contributions. Furthermore, any unaccounted upgrades that arose in the lead up to the Games could likely have been funded through monies currently being liberally doled out by the federal government for so called “shovel ready projects,” giving local taxpayers an even better return on investment.

Irrespective of the final decision, the implosion of Halifax’s bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games will serve as an object lesson and a building block for future successful Canadian sport mega-event bids. Even as someone who knew next to nothing about Halifax upon beginning this research, it is impossible to not think of what might have been. Perhaps Holding said it best, “[Halifax] is a great city. It needed to become a colourful city.”¹⁹² In the opinion of the author, given his predispositions, hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games would have done just that.

Recommendations for Further Study

This research has illuminated a few specific areas that are ripe for future academic research. From a business perspective, delving deeper into the business case and Games

budget prepared by Halifax 2014 would be an extremely interesting exercise, especially if compared directly to the budget from another major Games hosted by Canada. The main question that would be answered through this type of study would be if indeed the business plan and approach to developing a budget taken by Halifax 2014 is an entirely new and beneficial approach that should indeed be replicated by bid committees in the future.

Another area warranting further study is the governance structure proposed and employed by Halifax 2014. It is clear that in this case it did not function properly, as evidenced by the many communication breakdowns among all of those represented on the Halifax 2014 Board of Directors and Executive Committee. What is unclear is if the fault lies with the governance structure itself, or if the problems were merely a factor of the personalities and situations inherent in this particular bid. More research into the organizational dynamics of a bid needs to be undertaken in order to determine what governance structure is the most conducive to producing the collaborative effort so important for this type of endeavour.

Chapter 5 - Endnotes

¹ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. Pipe said that all the messages that CGC was getting from respected people in the Commonwealth Games community was that Halifax was in the lead. Holding noted, "I do believe that Glasgow were always the ones going to be seen as the frontrunners, but I actually think with the general mood of the Commonwealth, it was actually Halifax's to lose." Jarvis also believed Halifax would have prevailed, more specifically in a close, two-round vote. Jones noted, "We had some new ideas that were getting copied by the Glasgow. I mean our presentations were copied, the way we set up all our venue clusters was copied, probably for the right reasons. But you could see they were reacting to what we were doing..." A month after the funding was withdrawn, Jarvis was in London, England when two very highly placed people in the Commonwealth movement said "What the heck are you doing, it was yours!" Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009 and Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

² Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

³ Michael Lightstone, "Report: We would have won Games bid," *The Chronicle Herald*, 12 May 2007, p. A1.

⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁵ David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 475.

⁶ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

⁷ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

⁸ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009 and Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

⁹ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008

¹⁰ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. Robertson commented that in some cases, sports on the Games program are not relevant for the host country (e.g. netball is one of the 7 mandatory sports but is virtually non-existent in Canada). If this is the case and there is no legacy value for one of the mandatory sports, the host city must be creative and build facilities that will be transferable to other uses after the Games (e.g. netball courts could be shifted to basketball courts after the Games).

¹¹ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹² Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008; Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008; Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

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- ¹³ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]
- ¹⁴ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.
- ¹⁵ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.
- ¹⁶ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.
- ¹⁷ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. [Brackets mine.]
- ¹⁸ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.
- ²² Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. He also said, “I think that them going to Melbourne may have just put the doubt of fear in their ability to deliver the Games.” [Brackets mine.]
- ²³ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.
- ²⁴ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 28 March 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007mar28.htm, p.10 (accessed March 26, 2009).
- ²⁵ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.
- ²⁶ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. He believed that one way leaders were trying to extricate themselves was using strategies of “mis-messaging” and negative messaging. [Brackets mine.]
- ²⁷ Ibid. Jarvis used the comparison of how London 2012 was positioning itself with respect to Beijing 2008.
- ²⁸ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]
- ²⁹ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.
- ³⁰ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]

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- ³¹ Robert Fowler and Dan English, *RE: Follow-Up to letter sent February 22, 2007*, 2 March 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/LetterFromFundingParters_Mar0207.pdf (accessed March 1, 2009).
- ³² Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.
- ³³ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.
- ³⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.
- ³⁵ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]
- ³⁶ Halifax Regional Municipality, *2014 Commonwealth Games Economic Benefits Plan*, 1 August 2006, <http://www.halifax.ca/council/agendasc/documents/10-1-9CWG.pdf>, p.5 (accessed March 19, 2009).
- ³⁷ The model used by Canmac Economics seemed to take into account some of the shortcomings of the STEAM model as brought up by James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games* (MDE. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2006). Specifically it accounted for opportunity cost much more than was one done in the initial economic impact analysis. A deeper look into comparing the two estimates by someone with the requisite expertise is warranted.
- ³⁸ Canmac Economics Limited, *HRM Bid Proposal 2014 Commonwealth Games Economic Impact Assessment*, March 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/H2014EconomicImpactAssessmentMarch292007.pdf>, p. 36-38 (accessed March 20, 2009). The analysis did not account for inflationary effects, and stated that construction bottlenecks could cause cost overruns.
- ³⁹ Tracey Williams, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. The recipient of a graduate degree in Social Work (policy), and with almost 30 years of service in government, Williams was the Executive lead for the Games Secretariat at the Province of Nova Scotia. She was responsible for managing all phases of the Province of Nova Scotia's interests and investments in large multi-sport events including the 2014 Commonwealth Games bid, the 2010 Olympic & Paralympic Games, and the 2011 Canada Winter Games. When interviewed, Williams spoke very little in comparison to Duff Montgomerie, who fielded the overwhelming majority of the questions for the Province of Nova Scotia.
- ⁴⁰ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.
- ⁴¹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. He did not reveal who the Olympic official was that he quoted.

⁴² Ibid. To prove his point, Jarvis cited that only one of the facilities that were planned for the 1988 Calgary Olympic Games in the bid phase were actually used, every other facility was changed. Also cited were the Vancouver 2010 Olympics, and specifically how the speed skating oval was moved from Simon Frasier to Richmond in order for the post-Games legacy effects to be better realized.

⁴³ Ibid. Jarvis went on to note that they could have had the bid perfect by that point, but the slow transition between the domestic and the international phase hampered this process. [Brackets mine.]

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 472.

⁴⁶ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

⁴⁷ Ibid. Leger argued that it was indeed a "foot-in-the-door" tactic. Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁴⁸ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁴⁹ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

⁵⁰ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

⁵¹ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

⁵⁴ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. Harvey noted, "I think the key lessons learned from [Vancouver] 2010 was 'do it right'... With 2010 being now on the books, I think it was very important for this government and Sport Canada and PCH to get it right. So we told the bid society a number of times, we're not going to go twice and three times and four times [to Cabinet] to ask for more money, so you have to make sure that you are providing us with as much accurate information as you can. The amount of money, I don't think it would have been a factor at all. To us, I don't think it would have been a big difference between \$400, \$500, \$600 million because of the 2010 Games. I think a key for us is getting the due diligence done to make sure that we had the right information with the due diligence so that we could recommend to the Ministers."

⁵⁵ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 11 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr11.htm, p.7 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁵⁶ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardMinutesApr29_06.pdf (accessed March 19, 2009).

⁵⁷ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Board of Directors Meeting - Presentation*, 29 April 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/BoardPresApr29_06.pdf, p.20 (accessed March 19, 2009). The author titled the figure, and added different symbols to the legend.

⁵⁸ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 28 March 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007mar28.htm, p.11 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁵⁹ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

⁶⁰ Canadian Heritage, *The Policy for Hosting International Sport Events*, November 2000, <http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/sc/pol/accueil-host/Hosting%20Policy%20Dec%202000%20Eng.pdf> (accessed June 4, 2008), 3.

⁶¹ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

⁶² Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

⁶³ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008. Holding readily admitted to having no precise evidence to back this up, but contended that one never knows how the politics are played behind closed doors.

⁶⁶ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 28 March 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007mar28.htm, p.15 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁶⁷ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 11 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr11.htm, p.6 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁶⁸ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008. As was quoted from Amy Pugsley Fraser and Amy Smith, “What might have been,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 27

March 2009, p. A1, Scott Logan also said it was “really the first time in this entire process that a specific envelope was spoken to.”

⁶⁹ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁷⁰ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009 and Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁷¹ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 28 March 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007mar28.htm, p.16 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁷² Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 11 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr11.htm, p.22-23 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁷³ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

⁷⁴ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

⁷⁵ Jarvis believed that if the HRM and the PNS increased their contributions in the final days of the bid, the federal government would have eventually done so as well. Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

⁷⁶ “Bitter end to a dream,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 9 March 2007, p. A10.

⁷⁷ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009 and Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁷⁸ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *The XX Commonwealth Games Business Plan*, 26 January 2007, <http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/Halifax2014BusinessPlanWithAppendices.pdf>, p.13 (accessed March 3, 2009).

⁷⁹ Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *The XX Commonwealth Games Business Plan*, 26 January 2007, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/H2014_BusinessPlan_.pdf, p. 87-88 (accessed March 19, 2009).

⁸⁰ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Olympic security estimated to cost \$900M*, February 19, 2009, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/british-columbia/story/2009/02/19/bc-olympics-cost-colin-hansen.html> (accessed March 22, 2009).

⁸¹ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 11 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr11.htm, p. 30 (accessed March 25, 2009).

⁸² Halifax 2014 Bid Society, *Executive Committee Meeting – Presentation 1*, 11 December 2006, http://www.halifax.ca/halifax2014archives/Documents/ExecCommPresDec11_06.pdf, p.24 (accessed March 24, 2009).

⁸³ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. “You can’t do security seven years in advance. You can estimate what it will cost assuming a certain threat level is in place, but as you approach those Games if that threat level changes, your costs are going to change.”

⁸⁴ For lack of a better expression, comparing the \$67 million budgeted by Halifax 2014 to the most recent estimation of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic security of \$900 million, would be like comparing apples to oranges. Halifax 2014 did not include nearly as many security services in their number as the VANOC team did. Either way, the \$67 million was incredibly low in comparison. The Halifax security estimate would have risen, with the caveat that a Commonwealth Games did not require nearly as much security as did the Olympic Games.

⁸⁵ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

⁸⁶ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 11 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr11.htm, p.22 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁸⁷ Interestingly though, if the cost escalation did shock the general public, it did not seem to particularly hamper the support for the bid demonstrated in the various opinion polls.

⁸⁸ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009 and Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

⁸⁹ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁹⁰ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹¹ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

⁹² Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹³ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 11 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr11.htm, p.5-6 (accessed March 26, 2009).

⁹⁴ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. According to Mayor Kelly, this was a major factor that made the Games unaffordable. In addition, Mayor Kelly condemned the federal government for what he considered to be a lack of support. He argued, “Yes, [major Games] are good for the bid city and the bid province but ultimately

these are Canada's Games, and they've got to put more than 30 percent on the table." He also argued, "If they want to be in this realm of competition for elite sport, then put your money where your mouth is. If you don't want to be there, don't play the game, don't waste time...don't expect more from the host province or municipality than what you are prepared to put on the table. It is not right." For comparisons sake, he cited that the Glasgow bid was 80 percent federally funded. He suggested a suitable number for major Canadian Games would be two-thirds federally funded. Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. On the other hand, Robertson considered the Canadian federal government's proposed contribution to the project as generous and appropriate. Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹⁵ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

⁹⁶ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. [Brackets mine.]

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

⁹⁹ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid. For comparison's sake, Jarvis indicated that this was not a usual practice at the Olympic or Paralympic level. There were commissions and liaisons, but no one was embedded directly into the organization as a staff member. He thought this may have arisen from both what happened with losing at the last second to New Delhi for the 2010 Games, and also that there might not have been enough trust from CGC for the local bid committee for some unknown reason.

¹⁰⁶ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹⁰⁷ Harvey noticed this trend and said that it was a result of the secrecy by the bid committee. Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

¹⁰⁸ Marilla Stephenson, "Games bid represents our chance to shine," *The Chronicle Herald*, 17 December 2005, p. B1.

¹⁰⁹ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008. He also said, “Initially, we were trying to cover it as a news story, just a straight up news story. Our columnists were allowed to say whatever they thought, as always. It turned out that most of the people writing opinion commentary in the Herald ended up being very mistrustful of the bid and the organizers and I think over the long period of time our coverage was probably critical more than positive.”

¹¹⁰ According to Ralph Surette, “The Games delusion begins,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 24 February 2007, p. A13, despite the continual rumors of escalating costs late in the bid process, the poll showed 72 percent of Haligonians supported the Games. This poll was the last one conducted before the bid’s demise and still showed a high percentage of people in support of the bid. Jones believed that public support was present initially, but then eroded away somewhat. While it is true that the original support of 90 percent was not present at the end of the bid, 72 percent is still an incredibly high approval rating. Holding agreed that there seemed to be a lack of media support for the event, rather than a lack of public support for the event. Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008; Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹¹¹ The various polls are outlined in Chapter 3 and 4 of this research. Interestingly enough, Leger of *The Chronicle Herald* noted in his interview for this research that there was a lack of grass roots support for this bid. Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008. This did not mesh with the available poll results.

¹¹² This pole is outlined in Chapter 4 of this research.

¹¹³ These conflicts are outlined in Sherri Borden Colley, “Poll: Most Nova Scotians support Games bid,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 7 December 2006, p. B4 and in Roger Taylor, “Pollsters fail to see their own conflict of interest,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2006, p. C1.

¹¹⁴ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹¹⁵ Roger Taylor, “Stop the bandwagon, I want to jump off,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 16 December 2005, p. C1.

¹¹⁶ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Amy Pugsley Fraser, “Local media’s carping makes Games bid tougher, Logan says,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 5 March 2007, p. A1.

¹¹⁹ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008. Robertson said the media coverage was typical of most bids, and for the most part it was fine. Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹²⁰ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹²¹ Michael Lightstone, "Shannon Park could be home to Commonwealth Games stadium," *The Chronicle Herald*, 26 October 2005, p. A1.

¹²² Michael Lightstone, "Council holds Games update in private," *The Chronicle Herald*, 18 January 2006, p. B4. [Brackets mine.]

¹²³ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹²⁴ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008; Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. Jarvis pointed to the VANOC strategy as an appropriate one in this regard. While John Furlong (CEO) was on the road promoting the bid, Jack Poole (Chairman of the Board of Directors) remained in Vancouver to deal with any domestic issues and to continue promoting the bid aggressively at home. In contrast, Halifax 2014's top leaders, MacGillivray and Logan, were often both out of the country concentrating on international relations.

¹²⁵ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008; Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008; Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008; David Black, "Dreaming big: The pursuit of 'second order' games as a strategic response to globalization," *Sport in Society* 11, no. 4 (2008), 475.

¹²⁶ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹³⁰ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. The one major exception to this was in January 2006 when Mayor Kelly and Premier Hamm co-authored a news story in *The Chronicle Herald* called *The Commonwealth Games: moving forward together*. Premier MacDonald, and Mayor Kelly later on the bid, fit into Jarvis's description very well.

¹³¹ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008; Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008; Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. Robertson believed that the timeframe was a factor, but not the biggest factor. Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹³² Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

¹³³ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹³⁴ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹³⁵ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. Unfortunately Canada's most recent major Games bids for the 2015 Pan American Games and 2015 Universiade were still under the old policy and thus may still be affected by time constraints in their bidding process.

¹³⁶ Tom Scrimger, Personal interview, 31 October 2008. The new policy established that two years is the minimum amount of time needed for the international phase of a bid so that the federal government can work through all of its due diligence including both the business plan and the expected cost to Cabinet, as well as determining and outlining the role of the many other federal agencies (meteorology, security, health etc...) that would be involved in staging a major Games. This is not written directly into the policy, but is more of an internal Sport Canada policy.

¹³⁷ Ibid. Scrimger also noted that the size, complexity, and dollar value assigned to the Commonwealth Games has probably increased tenfold since the last time Canada hosted in 1994 and that as a result the business diligence has also increased exponentially, and that more coordination and more time are needed for each bid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, *Vancouver votes on Olympics*, February 23, 2003, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/story/2003/02/20/vancouver_olympics030219a.html (accessed March 29, 2009).

¹⁴⁰ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009; Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008; Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008; Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. In contrast, Holding mentioned that the Glasgow bid did have politicians publicly supporting the bid and it helped them immensely.

¹⁴¹ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹⁴² Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

¹⁴³ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. This was echoed by Jones who called MacKay a champion "who had a lot of experience and qualities that really help sell a bid." Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹⁴⁴ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Elaine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

¹⁴⁷ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009.

¹⁴⁸ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. While overall he was definitely unimpressed with the political leadership, Pipe acknowledged the context of the events, “To give the politicians in Nova Scotia their due, they were dealing in an environment in which daily there were new stories about ‘geez the cost of security for the Vancouver Games has gone through the roof’ . . .if you’re already a bit trembly about what’s going to happen, that doesn’t help you.” [Brackets mine.]

¹⁴⁹ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009.

¹⁵⁰ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁵¹ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

¹⁵² Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. He remarked, “Any conversation I had with the Premier, when he was Minister as well, was typical of conversations I would have had with Premier Hamm: ‘all I want is the best information you can give us, so we can make a good decision.’”

¹⁵³ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Province of Nova Scotia, *About the Premier*, August 2, 2006, <http://www.gov.ns.ca/premier/about.asp> (accessed March 8, 2009).

¹⁵⁶ Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009 and Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

¹⁵⁷ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁶⁰ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹⁶¹ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009.

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 4 April 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007apr04.htm, p.4 (accessed March 26, 2009).

¹⁶⁴ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008. Holding also believed that as a result of this, Montgomerie and the other PNS and HRM representatives did not act in good faith (though he did acknowledge that they were in a difficult environment). Jarvis remarked, “I would have liked a great deal more of integrity and honesty from the political leadership.” Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁶⁵ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009.

¹⁶⁶ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁶⁷ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁶⁸ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁶⁹ Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009.

¹⁷⁰ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁷¹ The amount of a “significant monetary bond” is open to discretion. It must be an amount that cities would not easily part with, and would cause them to make sure that they were fully on-side with project before entering the international phase. Something in the area of \$5-10 million dollars seems appropriate.

¹⁷² Holger Preuss, *The Economics of Staging the Olympics: A Comparison of the Games 1972-2008* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2004), 265.

¹⁷³ James W. Wildsmith, *Uncertainty and the Economic Impact of Major Sporting Events: Assessing the Halifax Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games* (MDE. Dissertation, Dalhousie University, 2006), 68.

¹⁷⁴ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008; Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008; Patrick Jarvis, Personal interview, 15 January 2009; Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008; Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008. Robertson of the CGF was also supportive of the idea, but not as something that the CGF would impose; he believed that it was something that CGC should consider implementing in the future. Jones noted that although he liked the idea, there is a fine line between making it too onerous to bid and putting in such a withdrawal clause or penalty. Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁷⁵ Andrew Pipe, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁷⁶ Éleine Harvey, Personal interview, 31 October 2008.

¹⁷⁷ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁷⁸ At the time of writing, the two sides were still entrenched in their decisions. Mayor Kelly said the decision was made, “Without a hint of regret.” Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008. Similarly, Montgomerie contended, “This was the right decision for the Province of Nova Scotia, full stop.” Duff Montgomerie, Personal interview, 9 January 2009. A proponent of the other side, Leger said, “If they’d gone ahead with the bid, Halifax definitely would have pulled it off. We definitely would have gotten all the facilities built, all those people would have come, they would have had a safe festival of youth and sport and it would have been a great and a life changing event for thousands of people around here.” Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹⁷⁹ Peter Kelly, Personal interview, 7 November 2008.

¹⁸⁰ Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁸¹ Government of Canada, *Federal Policy for Hosting International Sport Events*, January 2008, http://www.pch.gc.ca/pgm/sc/pol/acc/2008/accueil-host_2008-eng.pdf, p. 3 (accessed March 20, 2009). Only two major international Games are supported in any ten year period.

¹⁸² Thomas Jones, Personal interview, 8 October 2008.

¹⁸³ Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008.

¹⁸⁴ This is seen in Sport Canada’s change to its hosting policy and in the CGC’s own admission that time constraint was a major factor in the demise of the bid. Commonwealth Games Canada, *The Bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games: Building on the Halifax Experience*, n.d., http://www.commonwealthgames.ca/Corporate/index_e.aspx?articleID=1575 (accessed March 17, 2009).

¹⁸⁵ Province of Nova Scotia, *Committee on Public Accounts – Commonwealth Games Bid*, 4 April, 2007, http://www.gov.ns.ca/legislature/hansard/comm/pa/pa_2007_apr04.htm, p.16 (accessed March 26, 2009). It was estimated by English to the Public Accounts Committee that up until that point, about \$7.7 million was spent by Halifax 2014 on bidding for the Games. This money was to come out of the \$3.5 million given by the federal government, \$3.5 million given by the PNS, and the \$3 million given by the HRM (the other \$4.3 million, to make up the total \$14.3 million bid budget, was committed by corporate sponsors and was to be returned to them).

¹⁸⁶ Laura M. Mac Donald, *Curse of the Narrows – The Halifax Explosion 1917* (Toronto, Ontario: HarperCollins Publishers, 2005), 8. Both Leger and Holding also noted the reality that Halifax is a fairly conservative and not particularly visionary city, and that this likely had an effect on the bid.

¹⁸⁷ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹⁸⁸ Marilla Stephenson, “Seems the idea for a stadium now has legs,” *The Chronicle Herald*, 1 November 2005, p. B1.

¹⁸⁹ Sue Uteck, Personal interview, 27 February 2009. [Brackets mine.]

¹⁹⁰ Dan Leger, Personal interview, 6 November 2008.

¹⁹¹ Bruce Robertson, Personal interview, 7 October 2008.

¹⁹² Tony Holding, Personal interview, 24 November 2008. [Brackets mine.]

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

Interview Guide

General Information

Name:

Age:

Current Position and Organization:

Position/Organization between July of 2005 and March of 2008:

Involvement in the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid:

Section 1 – Domestic Bid Phase

1. At what point were you aware that Halifax was going to bid for the 2014 Commonwealth Games?
2. When you were aware that Halifax was going to bid, why did you or did you not think it was a good idea?
3. Do you believe that the legacies that were promised from the Games matched the long term plan for the city of Halifax enough to warrant starting the bid process?
4. How did your organization support or oppose the domestic phase of the bid?
5. In your mind, who were the other main contenders in the domestic bid phase, and why?
6. Were you surprised that Halifax won the domestic bid phase? Why or why not?

Section 2 – International Bid Phase

7. How was your organization involved in the initial time period after Halifax won the domestic bid phase?
8. How did your organization support or oppose the international phase of the bid?
9. How did you perceive the contribution of the other organizations (all other categories) in the international bid phase?
10. What did you perceive as the Halifax bid's strengths and weaknesses?

11. How did you perceive the other international bids?
12. Was there a point during this phase when you believed that Halifax was the leading contender to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games?

Section 3 – The Withdrawal of the Bid

13. At what point were you aware that the bid might be withdrawn?
14. Looking back on the bid period, is there anything that you would have wished your organization had done differently?
15. Looking back on the bid period, is there anything that you would have wished other organizations had done differently?
16. When the bid was withdrawn on March 8th, 2007, were you in favour or not in favour of Halifax hosting the 2014 Commonwealth Games? (YES/NO)
17. At that same point, what was your major argument for or against the bid?

Section 4 – Reflections

18. What do you believe were the major factors and/or events in the demise of the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid?
19. Do you believe that the fact Canada was hosting the 2010 Olympic Winter Games had any effect on the ultimate demise of the Halifax Commonwealth Bid?
20. Do you believe that the expectations of the CGF for host cities are too high?
21. Do you feel that there needs to be some sort of accountability on the bidding city's behalf built into the agreement for once it is chosen as the domestic representative to bid at the international level?
22. What recommendations can you provide to aid future Canadian Commonwealth Games bids?
23. Is there anything else that you would like to mention on the subject of the 2014 Halifax Commonwealth Games Bid?

APPENDIX II

Notable Events in the Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid

Date	Organization	Event
June 23, 2005	CGC	CGC officially declared it would be pursuing the 2014 Commonwealth Games. Calgary, Toronto, Ottawa, Hamilton and Halifax indicated interest. The domestic phase began.
September 13, 2005	Calgary Bid Committee	Calgary withdrew its bid.
November 1, 2005	Each City's bid committees	Each city submitted their bid books to be reviewed by the CGC bid review committee.
December 9-12, 2005	CGC Bid Review Committee	BRC visited each of the bidding cities and reviewed their plans to host the Games.
December 13-14, 2005	Each City's bid committees	Each city's bid committee made one final presentation to CGC in Toronto.
December 15, 2005	CGC	The announcement was made that Halifax was the winner of the domestic phase.
January 20, 2006	Halifax 2014	MacGillivray revealed that the Games cost included in the domestic bid book was an estimate of between \$750-785 million.
January 30, 2006	Halifax 2014	Logan named as CEO of Halifax 2014.
February 6, 2006	Federal Government	Stephen Harper replaced Paul Martin as Prime Minister.
February 26, 2006	PNS	Premier John Hamm retired and was replaced by Premier Rodney MacDonald.
March 2006	Halifax 2014	A Halifax delegation of bid committee members and politicians traveled to Melbourne to take in the 2006 Commonwealth Games, make presentations to the CGF, and lobby for votes.
August 9, 2006	Halifax 2014	Bid committee learned that both the athletes village and all of the proposed sport facilities would not fit into Shannon Park as previously thought.
November 28, 2006	HRM Council	International bid budget of \$14.3 million dollars (\$3 million from HRM) was unanimously approved by Council, but with noticeable dissent from some Councillors.
November 30, 2006	Federal Government	Minister of Sport Peter Van Loan announced a total capped contribution of \$400 million from the federal government.
January 26, 2007	Halifax 2014	The business plan (inclusive of the proposed Games budget) is submitted to the three levels of

		government for review. The proposed budget was \$1.599 billion with inflation.
February 14, 2007	PNS	At a Halifax 2014 Executive Committee meeting, Montgomerie noted that the cost of the Games would likely need to be reduced.
February 22 and March 2, 2007	PNS and HRM	As representatives of PNS and HRM respectively, Fowler and English sent letters to Logan and MacGillivray outlining the need to reduce the total cost of the Games to approximately \$1.1 billion, and to answer specific questions arising from independent consultant reports. Also in this time period, according to Mayor Kelly but unknown to Halifax 2014 at the time, the decision to pursue an exit strategy was made by both himself and the PNS.
March 7, 2007	Halifax 2014	At the Halifax 2014 Executive Committee meeting, Halifax 2014 staff came prepared with the requested answers and a reduced budget of \$1.350 billion (including inflation). The HRM and PNS representatives made it clear that an exit strategy was already underway. Halifax 2014 asked for one week to further reduce the cost of the Games. The final decision of whether or not to withdraw was left up to HRM Council the next day.
March 8, 2007	HRM	HRM Council held an emergency in-camera meeting to discuss whether or not to withdraw their support. Mayor Kelly moved to withdraw, but most Councillors disagreed and were moving towards voting to give Halifax 2014 one more week (18 of the 24 councillors agreed with this course of action). Midway through the meeting, the PNS released a statement saying that both they and the HRM had withdrawn their support. This premature press release “yanked the rug out from council” and effectively marked the end of the bid. HRM Council then voted 12-3 (with 9 Councillors absent) to officially withdraw their support.

Appendix III

Ethics Approval



Office of Research Ethics

The University of Western Ontario
 Room 4180 Support Services Building, London, ON, Canada N6A 5C1
 Telephone: (519) 661-3036 Fax: (519) 850-2466 Email: ethics@uwo.ca
 Website: www.uwo.ca/research/ethics

Use of Human Subjects - Ethics Approval Notice

Principal Investigator: Dr. D.M. Semotiuk

Review Number: 15370S

Review Level: Full Board

Review Date: August 8, 2008

Protocol Title: A Case Study: The Halifax 2014 Commonwealth Games Bid (2005 - 2007)

Department and Institution: Kinesiology, University of Western Ontario

Sponsor:

Ethics Approval Date: October 8, 2008

Expiry Date: January 31, 2009

Documents Reviewed and Approved: UWO Protocol, Letter of Information and Consent.

Documents Received for Information:

This is to notify you that The University of Western Ontario Research Ethics Board for Non-Medical Research Involving Human Subjects (NMREB) which is organized and operates according to the Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Humans and the applicable laws and regulations of Ontario has granted approval to the above named research study on the approval date noted above.

This approval shall remain valid until the expiry date noted above assuming timely and acceptable responses to the NMREB's periodic requests for surveillance and monitoring information. If you require an updated approval notice prior to that time you must request it using the UWO Updated Approval Request Form.

During the course of the research, no deviations from, or changes to, the study or consent form may be initiated without prior written approval from the NMREB except when necessary to eliminate immediate hazards to the subject or when the change(s) involve only logistical or administrative aspects of the study (e.g. change of monitor, telephone number). Expedited review of minor change(s) in ongoing studies will be considered. Subjects must receive a copy of the signed information/consent documentation.

Investigators must promptly also report to the NMREB:

- changes increasing the risk to the participant(s) and/or affecting significantly the conduct of the study;
- all adverse and unexpected experiences or events that are both serious and unexpected;
- new information that may adversely affect the safety of the subjects or the conduct of the study.

If these changes/adverse events require a change to the information/consent documentation, and/or recruitment advertisement, the newly revised information/consent documentation, and/or advertisement, must be submitted to this office for approval.

Members of the NMREB who are named as investigators in research studies, or declare a conflict of interest, do not participate in discussion related to, nor vote on, such studies when they are presented to the NMREB.

Chair of NMREB: Dr. Jerry Paquette

Ethics Officer to Contact for Further Information			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Grace Kelly	<input type="checkbox"/> Janice Sutherland	<input type="checkbox"/> Elizabeth Wamboldt	<input type="checkbox"/> Denise Grafton

This is an official document. Please retain the original in your files.

cc: ORE File

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