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## Loan Syndication Trading Association Presentation- Challenges Facing CLOs...and the Loan Market

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## **Challenges Facing CLOs...and the Loan Market**


**Meredith Coffey, LSTA – Moderator** 

David Preston, Wachovia Joseph Rotondo, INVESCO Glenn Stewart, Bank of America



#### CLOs accounted for more than 50% of demand in the peak


#### Market share by lender type



- CLOs dominated institutional market through 2007
- In 2008, CLO activity slowed dramatically, banks became constrained



# **CLO** issuance buoys institutional loan growth Both markets stop in 2008





- Institutional market growth enabled by CLO growth
- Severe dislocation in CLOs and institutional loan market in 2008
- CLO issuance stops
- Ability to issue new loans ends
- These loans are outstanding... and will need to be refinanced

Note: institutional loan issuance includes refinancings; Net new issuance considerably lower



### There may be a significant refinancing shortfall





- Starting in 2011, there will be a large volume of loans that must be refinanced
- Because CLOs will be entering the end of their reinvestment periods, they will not be able to refinance these maturing loans
- In reality, CLOs will be far more constrained



### **The CLO Universe**

CLO: 559 Deals / \$261,323,121,992 Current Balance

Vintage	Deal #	WARF	Curr Bal (\$mm)	% Cash	% Issuers Mapped	% Rated Assets	% Assets Defaulted	% Assets Rated B3	% Assets Rated Caa1 - Ca	Deals w/ IC Failures	OC	Deals w/ Sr OC Failures
1997	1	4,321	51	0.0%	79.0%	83.4%	16.6%	64.0%	19.3%	1	1	1
1998	7	3,714	159	0.0%	96.0%	97.5%	11.1%	41.3%	12.3%	5	4	3
1999	5	4,378	470	2.5%	84.5%	96.8%	20.9%	14.8%	18.6%	2	3	0
2000	8	3,112	796	2.6%	93.1%	85.7%	6.8%	3.4%	13.5%	3	3	0
2001	9	3,069	2,997	2.1%	92.6%	96.9%	5.7%	9.7%	9.4%	1	1	0
2002	16	3,116	4,640	2.6%	93.7%	95.1%	6.4%	9.1%	12.5%	0	3	0
2003	31	2,985	10,680	2.0%	95.9%	90.4%	5.7%	10.7%	10.5%	1	25	4
2004	58	2,945	24,275	1.8%	96.4%	95.1%	5.4%	11.2%	10.7%	1	37	4
2005	91	2,805	44,368	2.2%	91.7%	94.0%	4.7%	11.1%	10.0%	0	46	8
2006	150	2,892	73,237	1.3%	90.3%	94.3%	4.9%	11.7%	10.9%	0	83	18
2007	154	2,983	85,848	1.5%	91.6%	91.1%	4.2%	14.1%	10.9%	0	83	15
2008	29	2,826	13,802	1.9%	96.0%	90.0%	2.8%	12.7%	9.9%	0	10	3
Total	559	2,922	261,323	1.7%	92.1%	92.9%	4.7%	12.3%	10.7%	14	299	56

"WARF" and "% Assets Rated B3" and "Rated Caa1-Ca" calculations only include Moody's rated assets.

Source: Intex, LoanX, Wachovia Capital Markets, LLC

as of 5/8/2009



## **CLO Overcollateralization details**

	VINT.	COUNT	MEDIAN	MEAN		VINT.	COUNT	MEDIAN	MEAN
	2003	31	117.4	123.0		2003	31	113.0	117.2
	2004	57	118.1	126.0	Sr OC	2004	57	112.0	119.6
Sr OC Value	2005	90	117.3	119.7		2005	90	111.9	113.7
(%)	2006	147	117.7	118.2	Test	2006	147	111.6	113.0
	2007	150	118.0	118.5	(%)	2007	150	111.9	113.1
	2008	28	126.6	126.9		2008	28	118.1	119.4
I	ALL VINT.	503 COUNT	118.0 MEDIAN	120.2 MEAN	-	ALL	503	112.0	114.5
Ī					-	ALL	503	112.0	114.5
i						ALL	503	112.0	114.5
Ī	VINT.	COUNT	MEDIAN	MEAN		ALL	503	112.0	114.5
Sr OC	VINT. 2003	COUNT 31	MEDIAN 4.0	MEAN 5.7		ALL	503	112.0	114.5
	VINT. 2003 2004	31 57	MEDIAN 4.0 5.7	MEAN 5.7 6.4		ALL	503	112.0	114.5
Sr OC Cushion (%)	VINT. 2003 2004 2005	31 57 90	4.0 5.7 5.8	MEAN 5.7 6.4 6.0		ALL	503	112.0	114.5
	VINT. 2003 2004 2005 2006	31 57 90 147	MEDIAN 4.0 5.7 5.8 5.8	MEAN 5.7 6.4 6.0 5.2		ALL	503	112.0	114.5
	VINT. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007	31 57 90 147 150	MEDIAN 4.0 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8	MEAN 5.7 6.4 6.0 5.2 5.4		ALL	503	112.0	114.5




## **CLO Downgrade details**

Orig. Rating	Aaa	Aa	$\mathbf{A}$	Baa	Ba	В	Caa	Ca	C	WR	NR
Aaa	844	20	11	3	4	0	2	0	0	4	39
Aa	0	517	11	6	2	3	0	1	0	0	10
A	0	1	23	228	272	5	4	2	0	3	15
Baa	0	0	0	21	197	293	15	6	0	3	15
Ba	0	0	0	0	14	158	197	12	1	0	11



#### How to address refinancing cliff?


#### Expected refinancing schedule



- Issuance boom from 2005-2007 will mature in 2011-2014
- However, loans will need to be refinanced a year earlier (2010-2013)




## Will the \$500B+ of non-defaulted loans in the S&P/LSTA index be refinance-able?






#### Reversal of fortune: Where does lev fin money come from?

Size of lev fin market (HY, bank, inst loans)



Share of lev fin market (HY, bank, inst loans)



- Lev fin market grew from \$200B in 2002 to \$675B in 2007
- Lev fin new issue fell 71% to \$192B in 2008

- Institutional share grew from 8% in 1997 to 57% in 2007, replacing both pro rata and HY bonds
- HY bond share declined from 40% to 20% in 2007

Source: S&P/LCD, Thomson Reuters LPC, Merrill Lynch

