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### Citi Review of the Current Environment

David Bushnell

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
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# ***Review of the Current Environment***

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***Dave Bushnell  
CAO and Senior Risk Officer***

***October 30<sup>th</sup>, 2007***






# Historical Perspective

- ▶ Over the past several months, markets have experienced a significant dislocation, prompting comparison to other significant market events in the last twenty years.
- ▶ 1987 Stock Market Crash
- ▶ 1994 Bond Market Collapse
- ▶ 1997/1998 Asian Crisis and Long-Term Capital Management Collapse

## Largest Two-Month Market Movements during Financial Crises




**The 2007 market dislocation has some similarities to previous events but is not as widespread and is focused on credit markets, thus far.**




# Market Size

**U.S. Residential Mortgage Market**  
**\$10 Trillion Outstanding**




As of March 31, 2007

**U.S. Leveraged Finance Market**  
**\$1.6 Trillion Outstanding**



As of June 30, 2007

**Global Commercial Paper Market**  
**\$2.9 Trillion Outstanding**



As of June 30, 2007


# Leveraged Finance: Background



## How did Leveraged Finance come about?


- ▶ Leveraged buy-outs began in the 1980s
- ▶ Since 2000, significant inflow of capital to private equity funds
  - Private equity becomes major source of M&A activity (6% in 2000 to 29% in 2007 YTD)
- ▶ Excess liquidity drives demand for higher yields
- ▶ Structured credit products created to meet demand from yield-hungry investors. Loan originators decoupled from loan holders.
  - Contributes to loosening of underwriting standards
  - Aggressive competition on covenant and pricing terms
  - Leverage multiples rise substantially
- ▶ The top 5 underwriters of high yield bonds and leveraged loans have been Citi, JPMorgan, Credit Suisse, Bank of America and Deutsche Bank.

Leveraged Loan Investor Base





# Leveraged Finance Market Events



LCDX\*

\*Definition of the LCDX - The LCDX Index is a portfolio CDS product composed of 100 Loan Only CDS referencing Syndicated Secured 1st Lien Loans

# Leveraged Finance: Outlook

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## ▶ Near-Term Implications:

- Mark-to-market losses on financing commitments and trading positions
- Fewer large private equity transactions; Tighter covenants, pricing flex and MAC clauses
- Increase in size of banks' and broker-dealers' balance sheets

## ▶ Lessons Learned from a Business / Risk Perspective

- Business models that rely on distribution of risk to highly-leveraged investors must be tightly monitored and managed.
  - Move Leveraged Finance distribution exposure metrics away from 'outstandings-based' credit risk metrics to spread- and interest rate-based market risk metrics
- Market, credit and liquidity risks can come together quickly when there is a dislocation in the markets – risk metrics need to encompass this 'convergence' risk.
  - Convergence Risk Management team

## ▶ Outlook



# Conduits / SIVs: Definitions

## What is a Multi-Seller Conduit?

- ▶ **Off-balance sheet financing vehicle that provides financing to a wide variety of companies**
  - Companies sell assets (auto loans, trade receivables, mortgages, etc.) to conduit
  - Conduit issues Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) to investors to achieve lower cost funding
- ▶ **ABCP is typically liquidity back-stopped by a commercial bank**

## What is a Structured Investment Vehicle (“SIV”)?

- ▶ **Vehicle that owns a highly rated, diverse pool of debt securities, which is funded through the issuance of Prime-1 CP, Aaa Medium Term Notes and lower rated Capital Notes (Equity)**
- ▶ **Creates returns for equity investors by generating a positive spread between the yield on assets and cost of funding**

## What is Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (“ABCP”)?


- ▶ **Form of senior secured short-term borrowing offering low cost financing to companies that otherwise could not borrow directly in the CP markets**
  - In contrast to corporate commercial paper, which is directly issued by a single corporation





# Commercial Paper Spreads

ABCP cost increases significantly as investors suddenly back away from structured credit products



Example of impact from higher funding costs: downward revaluations of Interest Only (“/O”) strips at credit card companies

(1) Spread of mid (of bid offer) ABCP and 1 month LIBOR sourced from Bloomberg. (Through October 26, 2007.)



# ABCP / CP Market Data

## Multi-Seller Conduit ABCP (A1+ rated)

- 9/17/07: *Libor + 15-50bps*
- 10/29/07: *Libor + 0-10bps*

## Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV's)

- 9/17/07: *No market*
- 10/29/07: *No market, few one-off trades.*

## Extendibles

- 9/17/07: *No market with few exceptions (see below)*
- 10/29/07: *No market with few exceptions (see below)*
- *Two exceptions: Citi Dakota and BoA Emerald credit card programs*

## A1/P1 Corporate unsecured CP

- 9/17/07: *Libor – 25bps*
- 10/29/07: *Libor – 25bps to -20bps*

*Current environment: More liquid markets. Anything that is unrated or not backed by 100% liquidity is not selling, in addition to non-bank sponsored programs.*



## **Conduits / SIVs**

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### ▶ **Near-Term Implications**

- Investors have backed away from conduit-issued CP
- Liquidity support is being drawn on
- CP costs increase dramatically
- SIV market has disappeared

### ▶ **Lessons Learned from a Business / Risk Perspective**

- Market, credit and liquidity risks can come together quickly when there is a dislocation in the markets – risk metrics need to encompass this ‘convergence’ risk.
  - Convergence Risk Management team
  - Independent Risk Management coverage of contingent liquidity facilities
- Move credit structuring warehouse exposure away from spread- and interest rate-based market risk metrics to ‘outstandings-based’ credit risk metrics
  - Orient the Independent Risk Management framework more by risk factor


### ▶ **Outlook**



# Sub-prime Mortgages: Consumer / Capital Markets

## How did sub-prime mortgages come about?


- ▶ Unusually low interest rate environment fueled significant home purchase activity
- ▶ Lenders funded riskier sub-prime loans, particularly in 2005 and 2006, supported by the presumption of rising home prices



## How did CDOs come about?


- ▶ Excess liquidity over the past few years has driven lower yields on fixed income investments
- ▶ Financial intermediaries pooled mortgages and 'tranching' the cash flows into structured securities, offering a range of risk and returns
- ▶ CDOs separate the originator from the holder of the mortgage, which has resulted in a decline in loan underwriting standards
- ▶ Since 2000, sub-prime as a percentage of the \$6 trillion mortgage-backed securities market increased from 4% to 25%

US CDO / CLO Issuance Trends






# Sub-Prime Market Events



— ABX Index 06-HE2 AAA      — ABX Index 06-HE2 BBB-




# Total Consumer\* reserve trends



\* Disclosed 'Consumer', includes GCG & GWM.




# GCG cost of credit: 3Q'07 vs. 3Q'06





# Peer Comparison – Reserves/Annualized NCLs

NA Consumer Credit Reserves / NA Consumer Annualized NCLs



Citi GCG NA
  JPM Consumer
  WFC Consumer
  BAC Consumer

Source: Financial Supplement and 10-Q/K



# ***Sub-Prime Mortgages***

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## **▶ Near-Term Implications**

- Consumer Real Estate: Increased credit costs
- Capital Markets:
  - Mark-to-market losses
  - Lower securitization volume
  - Increase in size of bank and broker balance sheets

## **▶ Lessons Learned from a Business / Risk Perspective**

- Aggregate risk more effectively across Citi.
  - ‘Risk Threats & Issues’
  - Orient business and risk management more by underlying risk factor, and less by business or trading desk.
- Retain balance between judgment and methodology in credit reserving practices

## **▶ Outlook**



## ***Lessons Learned***

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- ▶ **Enhance risk management practices in light of increasingly complex products, inter-related markets, and evolving risks.**
  - Risk aggregation
  - Risk metrics
  - Risk management