Journal of Applied Psychology

When Does Paternalistic Control Positively Relate to Job Satisfaction and Citizenship Behavior in Taiwan? The Role of Follower Expectation

An-Chih Wang, Chou-Yu Tsai, Sheng-Bin Wang, and Hong-Quan Dai Online First Publication, June 8, 2023. https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0001097

CITATION

Wang, A.-C., Tsai, C.-Y., Wang, S.-B., & Dai, H.-Q. (2023, June 8). When Does Paternalistic Control Positively Relate to Job Satisfaction and Citizenship Behavior in Taiwan? The Role of Follower Expectation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*. Advance online publication. https://dx.doi.org/10.1037/apl0001097



© 2023 American Psychological Association

https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0001097

When Does Paternalistic Control Positively Relate to Job Satisfaction and Citizenship Behavior in Taiwan? The Role of Follower Expectation

An-Chih Wang¹, Chou-Yu Tsai², Sheng-Bin Wang³, and Hong-Quan Dai³

Department of Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, China Europe International Business School

Bernard M. and Ruth R. Bass Center for Leadership Studies and School of Management,

Binghamton University, State University of New York

Institute of Human Resource Management, National Sun Yat-Sen University

Although prior research predicts mainly that followers expect leaders to exert less paternalistic control (such as emphasis on discipline, didactic instruction, and belittling followers), we argue that such an expectation may not be stable overtime or across settings. Based on the connectionist perspectives of implicit leadership theories, we propose a follower expectation model of paternalistic control, in which followers compare their perceived with expected levels of paternalistic control. Two inconsistent conditions—insufficient and excessive control—are identified, and the consistency between perceived and expected paternalistic control is predicted to relate to favorable follower outcomes. We examine this model by conducting two daily experience sampling studies in Taiwan. Our findings indicate that insufficient control is as unfavorable as excessive control in lowering followers' job satisfaction and citizenship behavior, and this pattern is particularly salient in terms of emphasis on discipline and the belittling of followers. A supplemental, qualitative analysis additionally demonstrated the conditions under which the expectation—perception consistency regarding belittling followers relates to favorable follower responses.

Keywords: authoritarianism, follower expectation, paternalistic control, paternalistic leadership, polynomial regression

Consistent with prescribed leadership roles, such as assertiveness, confidence, and competitiveness (Lord et al., 1986; Wang et al., 2013), paternalistic control, or assertion for absolute authority and demand for unquestionable obedience (Farh & Cheng, 2000; Takeuchi et al., 2020), can be widely observed across many cultures, particularly in Confucian Asian settings. Although leaders may deem their display of paternalistic control legitimate due to their representative role as organizational agent or crisis conditions encountered (Huang et al., 2015), research consistently shows the downsides of paternalistic control. Such control undermines followers' sense of self-determination when leaders accomplish organizational goals at a cost of their followers' psychological need for autonomy (Chan et al., 2013; X. P. Chen et al., 2014). As a result, although paternalistic control may effectively elicit task or firm performance in certain conditions (Huang et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2018), the literature consistently documents its negative effects on followers' job satisfaction and citizenship behavior (Farh et al., 2008;

An-Chih Wang https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4749-7865

The authors would like to thank Tingting Chen, Shelley D. Dionne, Jiing-Lih Farh, Guiquan Li, and Francis J. Yammarino for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article. The authors are grateful to Chang-Hung Chieh for the collection of supplemental qualitative data. An earlier version of the article was presented at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management, Boston, MA.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to An-Chih Wang, Department of Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management, China Europe International Business School, AC3-328, 699 Hongfeng Road, Pudong, Shanghai 201206, China. Email: wac@ceibs.edu

Hiller et al., 2019; Takeuchi et al., 2020). Paternalistic control thus becomes less likely to be welcome or appreciated (Y. Li & Sun, 2015; Zhang et al., 2015).

We challenge the commonly held assumption that paternalistic control may lead to suboptimal job satisfaction and lowered citizenship behavior on the basis of connectionist models of implicit leadership theories (D. Brown & Lord, 2001; Foti et al., 2008; Hanges et al., 2000; Lord et al., 2001). We argue that followers may not maintain a stable expectation that leaders should always show less paternalistic control. This may be particularly true in Confucian Asian settings; in this cultural context, leaders who, in general, secure superiority in a social hierarchy are expected to take the lead to discipline followers who do not behave properly or conform to behavioral norms (Ho, 1989, 1994; Takeuchi et al., 2020). To offer theoretical predictions that address such possibilities, we propose a follower expectation model of paternalistic control by comparing followers' perceived paternalistic control with the extent to which they expect their leaders to show controlling behaviors. Based on this model, we hypothesize that, when followers expect leaders to show strong paternalistic control, salient displays of paternalistic

¹ Developed inductively from non-Western (such as Confucian Asian) leadership phenomena, this construct is named *leader authoritarianism* or *authoritarian leadership* in the literature. The word *authoritarianism* is a direct translation from the Chinese character "wei" (威) (Cheng et al., 2009; Farh & Cheng, 2000; A. C. Wang, 2019). It does not, however, necessarily have the negative meaning of being authoritarian, for example, ruling based on tyranny or autocracy, in English. Because the main purpose of this article is to demonstrate the functional side of this leadership style, and the original term may cause negative feelings for readers who are not familiar with the Chinese language, we use the term *paternalistic control* as a synonym for leader authoritarianism.

control can lead to enhanced job satisfaction and increased citizenship behavior. In contrast, followers respond unfavorably to a lack of paternalistic control when follower expectations are elevated.

To verify this model, we target three specific forms of paternalistic control (i.e., emphasis on discipline, didactic instruction, and belittling followers) and conduct two daily experience sampling studies in Taiwan, wherein cultural values consistent with paternalistic control are prevalent (Farh & Cheng, 2000). We use polynomial regression with response surface analysis (Edwards, 2007; Edwards & Parry, 1993) to examine how the consistency between daily expected and perceived paternalistic control relates to followers' daily job satisfaction and daily citizenship behavior directed at both supervisors and clients. With these efforts, we are able to show the positivity of paternalistic control, contingent on the alignment of follower expectation. We then report a supplemental, qualitative investigation to address questions that cannot be properly answered by our quantitative design, such as when followers would expect leaders to show belittling behaviors and respond to them favorably.

This research makes the following contributions. In contrast to prior studies that primarily identified potential moderators of paternalistic control to interpret its inconsistent effects on follower outcomes (e.g., Chan et al., 2013; Tian & Sanchez, 2017), our proposed follower expectation approach responds to a recent call for a better understanding of the phenomenon (Takeuchi et al., 2020). Moreover, we identify not only excessive but also insufficient control as an unfavorable inconsistency for followers and assert that it is the perception-expectation consistency of paternalistic control that explains followers' responses to their leaders. Our work thus responds to calls for more follower-centric leadership theories, which focus more on how followers perceive and interpret leader behaviors rather than on the simple display of the behaviors (N. Li et al., 2013; Uhl-Bien et al., 2014). By proposing and testing a follower expectation model of paternalistic control, we also offer empirical support for the connectionist views of implicit leadership theories, which state that ideal leader prototypes may adjust in response to external environment changes (Shondrick et al., 2010).

Theory and Hypotheses

Paternalistic Control: A Review of Contemporary Literature

Leaders who emphasize paternalistic control rely highly on the position power that they possess in a social hierarchy to influence followers (Smither, 1993). Assuming followers' reliance on their authority, leaders are obligated to use their power to guide and protect their followers; in return, followers should comply with instructions from leaders and dutifully serve for the good of the collective (Farh & Cheng, 2000). With such a role obligation in mind, leaders assert tight control and strict discipline to maintain a functioning social system to which they belong and thereby accomplish collective goals effectively (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008; Smith, 1994). Leaders high in paternalistic control focus particularly on their control over tasks and objectives; they engage in controlling behaviors to offer directive instruction and demand for high performance (T. Chen et al., 2017). They may also extend their control to more person-oriented aspects, such as interacting with followers in a dignified manner, reprimanding them for failing to

meet requirements, and disciplining those who violate fundamental principles (Cheng et al., 2014). In addition, paternalistic control is likely to be manifested in dysfunctional ways, such as belittling followers' contributions and deliberately underestimating their competence (Farh & Cheng, 2000).

At the behavioral level, paternalistic control may have some overlap with directive leadership, which refers to leaders' dominant role in decision making (Muczyk & Reimann, 1987) and initiating structure or leadership behavior that involves specifying expectations and clarifying task responsibilities (Fleishman, 1973). The scope of paternalistic control, however, is greater than that of the other two; whereas leaders who show directiveness (initiating structure) focus on decision making (task execution) only, leaders high in paternalistic control emphasize their superior power status via exercising their authority. As such, these leaders are more sensitive to the maintenance of a stable hierarchy and its underlying mutual role obligations between leaders and followers. For example, to maintain absolute control in a social hierarchy, leaders who engage in paternalistic control may severely discipline rule breakers who do not show complete obedience. In contrast, due to their task-oriented focus, directive leaders concentrate more on communication that uses telling and persuading.

Research on leaders' use of paternalistic control has identified its major downsides. For example, Chan et al. (2013) noted that such leaders' emphasis on strict controls, rules, and procedures creates an impression that they do not fully trust and respect followers' capabilities. Paternalistic control thus tends to endanger followers' senses of competence, control, and achievement, which form the foundation of their self-esteem (Pierce et al., 1989). In addition, paternalistic control puts strong limitations on followers' development of intrinsic motivation because leaders' controlling behaviors introduce salient external pressure that confines followers' attention and effort in regard to assigned tasks and discourages followers from going beyond their assigned duties (X. P. Chen et al., 2014). Accordingly, paternalistic control serves as a salient external constraint on followers' intrinsic work motivation, which is essential to creative and extrarole performance at work (Gagné & Deci, 2005).

Our review indicates that leaders high in paternalistic control prioritize the accomplishment of work tasks at the cost of followers' self-determination; such leaders may exploit followers as useable resources when they attempt to achieve organizational goals. Hence, in general, followers do not expect leaders to show such control (Hiller et al., 2019). This theoretical argument, however, neglects the possibility that, in certain conditions, followers may consider leaders' engagement in controlling behaviors appropriate. To address this issue, a new theoretical lens that offers a more complete view is needed.

Follower Expectation: A Connectionist Perspective on Implicit Leadership Theories

In this research, we posit that follower expectation plays an important role when followers perceive and interpret their leaders' paternalistic control. Research on implicit leadership theories suggests that, based on cultural, societal, or familial influences as well as prior experiences, followers form a mental representation of what characterizes an ideal leader (Lord et al., 1984). When followers perceive leaders, they implicitly compare leaders with an ideal prototype to assess their match. The greater the match, the higher the prototypicality

of leaders, which makes followers attribute collective outcomes to leaders' prototypic characteristics and grant them higher power status (DeRue et al., 2015; Lord & Maher, 1991). In addition, because leadership claims can be further strengthened when followers bestow a leader identity upon those who make the claim (DeRue & Ashford, 2010), prototypical leaders tend to consolidate behaviors in accordance with the ideal prototype. As a result, interacting with leaders consistent with the prototype preserves follower expenditure of cognitive resources, which can then be applied to other tasks (e.g., discretionary behaviors; Maurer & Lord, 1991; Shondrick et al., 2010). Smooth leader–follower coordination as well as mutual trust and respect, which are often characteristic of a high-quality exchange relationship between leaders and followers (Liden & Maslyn, 1998), are more likely to occur.

Earlier theories held a view that implicit leadership theories are symbolic and abstract, which implies that the development of new, context-specific prototypes is less likely to occur (Shondrick et al., 2010). Later advancements to the theories, however, include a connectionist notion that external changes may cause real-time adjustments of ideal leader prototypes (D. Brown & Lord, 2001; Foti et al., 2008; Hanges et al., 2000; Lord et al., 2001; Shondrick et al., 2010). That is, the nature of ideal leader prototypes can be more sophisticated and dynamic than what scholars originally expected. Such prototypes may remain stable in the face of unchanging circumstances and sensitively vary in response to various contextual constraints. Among various contextual factors, culture serves as an essential factor that shapes followers' thoughts regarding how ideal leaders should act (Shondrick & Lord, 2010), and the aforementioned connectionist models add to the notion that culture-sensitive prototypes are activated only when salient cultural cues are present.

Following this logic, we argue that the extent to which followers expect their leaders to display paternalistic control may vary across different settings. Takeuchi et al. (2020) proposed that Chinese leaders have a hierarchical (rather than egalitarian) social exchange relationship with their followers. Influenced by authoritarian moralism (e.g., Ho, 1989, 1994), they are expected to play the "teacher" role and offer instruction and correction based on their expertise or experience whenever necessary (A. C. Wang, 2019). For example, if everyone coordinates smoothly and delivers error-free outcomes in a work unit, then a leader's active interference is not needed. In contrast, when somebody violates fundamental work principles, such a violation may trigger members' authoritarian moralism-based beliefs. Culture-embedded elements are thus added to followers'

implicit leadership theories, which make them expect the leader to discipline the violator and restore relational harmony for the unit. As a result, cultural factors shape follower expectations of how much paternalistic control leaders should display in a given context.

A Follower Expectation Model of Paternalistic Control

Using the perspective introduced above to understand the paternalistic control phenomenon, we propose a follower expectation model of paternalistic control (Table 1). We use a 2×2 matrix composed of high/low levels of expected and perceived paternalistic control to explain its effects on followers. We argue that the current literature on paternalistic control focuses primarily on the lower two cells in Table 1, assuming that followers expect leaders to show low levels of paternalistic control because followers would like to maintain their need for autonomy. Hence, the low–low combination (lower left cell) represents a low control and consistent status in which the perceived matches the expected paternalistic control. The low–high combination (lower right cell) is an inconsistent, excessive control status, wherein the extent of perceived paternalistic control is greater than the expected levels.

The proposed model, however, indicates that it is also worthwhile to discuss the upper two cells in Table 1 because follower expectation is not a constant determined mainly by stable factors, such as leaders' traits or individual differences. That is, when followers expect their leaders to show more paternalistic control to cope with situational changes (e.g., using position power to prevent individual rights from unexpected infringement when norms or regulations are absent; Farh & Cheng, 2000; Wang et al., 2017), the high–high combination (upper right cell) represents another consistent, high-control status. In addition, the high–low combination (upper left cell) refers to a different type of inconsistent status: insufficient control, whereby followers experience inconsistency because the extent of perceived paternalistic control is less than the expected levels.

Based on this model, we propose that it is not the absolute amount of perceived paternalistic control but, rather, the comparison between expected and perceived paternalistic control that affects follower outcomes. That is, followers tend to proactively evaluate (and reevaluate) the perception–expectation consistency across situations and time. Moreover, their responses to their leaders' paternalistic control may vary with changes in these dynamic evaluations. To better manage and respond to follower expectation, effective leaders should be able to adjust their display of paternalistic control flexibly; leaders who are reluctant to adjust are more likely to

Table 1Follower Expectation Model of Paternalistic Control

Expected paternalistic	Perceived paternalistic control							
control	Low	High						
High	Inconsistent: insufficient control	Consistent: high control						
	Insufficient control represents a discrepancy between actual behaviors and ideal leader prototypes and, thereby, affects followers unfavorably.	High control represents a match between actual behaviors and ideal leader prototypes and, thereby, affects followers favorably.						
Low	Consistent: low control Low control represents a match between actual behaviors and ideal leader prototypes and, thereby, affects followers favorably.	Inconsistent: excessive control Excessive control represents a discrepancy between actual behaviors and ideal leader prototypes and, thereby, affects followers unfavorably.						

be trapped in excessive or insufficient control. We thus argue that the earlier finding that paternalistic control negatively relates to followers' job satisfaction and citizenship behavior (Farh et al., 2008; Hiller et al., 2019; Takeuchi et al., 2020) may not be sufficiently nuanced to account for effects of follower expectation. Whereas followers who experience high-control consistency may enjoy increased job satisfaction and make extrarole contributions, those who suffer from insufficient control tend to be less satisfied with their job and more reluctant to perform citizenship behaviors.

According to our proposed model, both low- and high-control consistencies should lead to favorable follower outcomes in terms of job satisfaction and citizenship behavior because leaders' actual behaviors match ideal leader prototypes activated in the given context and maintain efficient, cost saving, and cognitive processing. When interacting with prototypical leaders and establishing a smooth collaboration relationship with them, followers tend to experience more satisfaction and save more resources for engaging in other work-related tasks. In contrast, excessive and insufficient control should be harmful to favorable follower outcomes because the misalignment between leaders' atypical behavior and followers' ideal leader prototype increases follower expenditure of cognitive resources. Followers are thus likely to be trapped in a low-quality relationship and become less satisfied due to cognitive overload and to withdraw from activities that may consume their constrained resources.

In the first study, to better capture the proposed varying nature of follower expectation, we choose to employ an experience sampling design, which allows us to examine the extent to which expected and perceived paternalistic control fluctuate on a daily basis. We also select daily job satisfaction and daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior as our outcomes because, according to the literature, negative work attitudes and decreased extrarole behaviors are the major sacrifices that followers have to make in exchange for the accomplishment of collective goals under leaders' exercise of controlling power (Farh et al., 2008; Hiller et al., 2019; Takeuchi et al., 2020). Choosing these two factors to be our outcomes better reveals the incremental validity of our follower expectation model than does the existing theoretical framework. In addition, these outcome variables particularly fit our daily experience sampling approach: Whereas task performance may be more difficult to be evaluated on a daily basis, job satisfaction and citizenship behavior have been proven to have considerable variation from day to day (Dalal et al., 2009; Ilies et al., 2009).

Hypothesis 1: The more followers' daily perceived align with their daily expected paternalistic control, the greater their (a) daily job satisfaction and (b) daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior.

Study 1

Method

Transparency and Openness

For both Studies 1 and 2, we described our sampling plan and all measures in the studies and adhered to the *Journal of Applied Psychology* methodological checklist. All data, analysis code, and research materials are available at https://osf.io/7r2pu. Data were analyzed using R programming (R Core Team, 2022) with the packages *multilevel* (Bliese, 2022), *car* (Fox & Weisberg, 2019),

nlme (Pinheiro & Bates, 2000), and rgl (Murdoch & Adler, 2022). This study's design and its analysis were not preregistered. We obtained research ethics clearance from the National Taiwan University Research Ethics Committee (study name "A revised model of paternalistic leadership," 201406ES052) and the China Europe International Business School Research Committee (study name "Authority assertion: Revised conceptualization and modified measure," AG20AAR).

Procedure and Sample

Our sample consists of working adults recruited from a part-time Master of Business Administration program of a university in Taiwan. A total of 58 volunteers who interacted with their immediate supervisors in person on a daily basis were asked to download to their smart devices an application (app) designed for our study. The app automatically sent messages to the respondents. Starting from the Monday after the respondents successfully submitted the first survey in regard to their background information, the app sent reminders and invited them to participate in our daily experience sampling for 10 consecutive working days. At 9 a.m. each day, the app asked them to briefly envision their major work assignments on that day and then to rate the extent to which they expected their immediate supervisor to show paternalistic control behaviors on that day. Then, the app sent reminders again, asking the respondents to rate perceived daily paternalistic control between 2 and 5 p.m. The third reminders were sent at 6 p.m., and the respondents were asked to provide evaluations for their daily job satisfaction and supervisor-directed citizenship behavior.

Among all respondents, 43 completed the experience sampling (response rate = 78%; on average, each respondent successfully completed 7.86 days). We thus obtained a data set across the within-individual (day, n = 338) and between-individual (person, n = 43) levels. The majority of the respondents were female (35), and the mean age of all respondents was 35.01 (SD = 5.96). Most held nonmanagerial positions (61%), and the mean company tenure was 5.90 years (SD = 4.90).

Measures

We used four items of Cheng et al. (2014) scale to measure daily expected and perceived paternalistic control ("brings his/her subordinates a lot of pressure when working together," "scolds his/her subordinates when they fail expected target," "very strict with his/her subordinates," and "disciplines subordinates for violating his/her principles"; $\alpha = .89$). For daily expected paternalistic control measured in the morning on each sampled day, we asked the respondents to rate, on a 6-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree, "Based on your understanding of your work tasks to be accomplished, how would you expect your immediate supervisors to demonstrate the following behaviors today?" For daily perceived paternalistic control measured in the afternoon on each sample day, the same scale was used but with a related question, "Based on your actual observation so far today, how did your immediate supervisor display the following behaviors?" ($\alpha = .88$).

² Because it is difficult to use full scales for daily experience sampling, for each variable, we asked our respondents to rate up to four items (as listed above). An independent sample was used to confirm that the total scores of the selected items were highly correlated with those of the full scales. Data are available upon request from the authors.

We changed the time reference of the three positive items of Ilies et al. (2009) scale to measure daily job satisfaction ($\alpha=.87$). On the same 6-point scale, the respondents rated each of the following: "I found real enjoyment in my work today," "I felt enthusiastic about my work today," and "I felt fairly satisfied with my job today." We modified four items from Dalal et al. (2009) self-reported scale to measure the respondents' daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior by adding the time reference to each item ("I went out of my way to be nice to my supervisor today," "I tried to help my supervisor today," "I defended my supervisor's opinion or suggestion today," and "I tried to be available to my supervisor today"). On the same 6-point scale, respondents rated the extent to which they conducted supervisor-directed citizenship behavior on the sampled day ($\alpha=.86$).

Controls

According to our model, both expected and perceived paternalistic control should vary across settings. To control for the alternative effect that the two escalate each other across days and establish a trend that stabilizes their daily levels, we include time in our regression models as Level 1 (i.e., the within-person level of analysis) dummy-coded variables. That is, nine dummies for the 10 days were created and entered into the models to detrend the time effect and better estimate the proposed relationships. This approach is quite common for management research at the macrolevel (e.g., Nyberg et al., 2010) and has been suggested by scholars in psychology (L. P. Wang & Maxwell, 2015).

Analytic Strategies

We applied polynomial regression with response surface analysis (Edwards, 2007; Edwards & Parry, 1993; Shanock et al., 2010) to test our hypotheses. We visualized a three-dimensional space of daily expected paternalistic control (X_1) , daily perceived paternalistic control (X_2) , and one of the outcomes (Y; daily job satisfaction or daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior) by predicting Y with X_1 (b_1) and X_2 (b_2), the squared term of X_1 (b_3), the cross-product of X_1 and X_2 (b_4), and the squared term of X_2 (b_5). Due to our nested data structure (i.e., days were nested in persons), we applied multilevel modeling to estimate polynomial regression (i.e., a multilevel polynomial regression model). All studied predictors were entered as fixed effects at the within-individual level (a person across different days) at Level 1, whereas we made the intercept random to allow a different intercept of each individual at Level 2. As noted, nine time dummies (DAY₂-DAY₁₀) were included as Level 1 covariates to detrend the time effect. In sum, we estimated the following equations:

$$Y_{ij} = b_{0j} + b_{1j}X_1 + b_{2j}X_2 + b_{3j}X_1^2 + b_{4j}X_1X_2 + b_{5j}X_2^2 + b_{6j}DAY_2 + \dots + b_{14j}DAY_{10} + e,$$
 (1)

$$b_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0i}, \tag{2}$$

$$b_{1j}$$
 to $b_{14j} = \gamma_{10}$ to γ_{140} . (3–16)

Equation 1 reflects our Level 1 model, and Equations 2–16 reflect the Level 2 models. Equation 2 indicates that each person's intercept is a function of a common intercept (γ_{00}) plus the random error (u_{0j}) for j person. Equations 3–16 indicate that the slopes of the five polynomial regression terms and the time dummies are fixed. The constructed response surface enabled us to test the slope and curvature along the

inconsistent ($X_1 = -X_2$) diagonal (as related to the height of Y), which were used to examine our hypothesis. Because the midpoint of the inconsistent diagonal (0, 0) also is on the consistent ($X_1 = X_2$) diagonal, this point can be used as a referent point of perfect consistency between X_1 and X_2 (Edwards & Cable, 2009). Hence, a significant curvature along the inconsistent diagonal captures how the degree of discrepancy between X_1 and X_2 may influence the outcome variable. Specifically, a significant, negative curvature indicates that the more X_1 and X_2 diverge (i.e., move away from the midpoint), the more Y decreases.

It is noteworthy that we scale centered the studied variables when establishing the polynomial regression models. Tsai et al. (2022) emphasize the importance of research design in determining the centering option for estimating polynomial regression and interpreting obtained response surfaces. In the present study, a single rater simultaneously evaluated two distinct targeted phenomena along the same scale; this design was aligned with that of classical person—environment fit research (e.g., Edwards & Parry, 1993). Moreover, although we had a cross-level data structure, the five terms of polynomial regression, including the squared or interaction terms, were all estimated at Level 1. Accordingly, Tsai et al. suggest the use of the scale-centering option (i.e., centering the two predictors by the middle point of a scale) to establish the same reference point for the two predictors in the response surface.

Results

Occurrence of Discrepancies and Construct Distinctiveness

Because it was possible that daily expected and perceived paternalistic control were highly correlated, we first determined how many respondents could be considered to have discrepancies between the two predictors. We followed the criterion suggested by Fleenor et al. (1996) to compute the standard scores for each predictor variable; any data point with a standardized score on one predictor variable that was half a standard deviation above or below the other was considered to have discrepant values. At least 10% of the data points with discrepant values justify the occurrence of discrepancies (Shanock et al., 2010). We found that 17% of the data points had a daily expected paternalistic control, whereas 18% of the data points had a daily expected paternalistic control score greater than that of daily perceived paternalistic control score discrepant values between daily expected and perceived paternalistic control.

Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables. A confirmatory factor analysis indicated that a four-factor model, which assumed construct distinctiveness among the variables at the within-person level, obtained acceptable fit indices ($\chi^2 = 229.09$, df = 80, root-mean-square error of approximation = .07, comparative fit index = .96).³ In addition, because we assumed that

³ Because we used the same scale to measure expected and perceived paternalistic control to ensure that the two predictors entered into our polynomial regression models were commensurate (Edwards, 2007), the residuals of expected/perceived daily paternalistic control in our measurement were not independent. To address this issue and obtain a better measurement model, we allowed the error terms of expected/perceived scores obtained from the same paternalistic control item to correlate with each other. Such modifications were determined based on the nature of our measures, rather than by a theoretical, data-driven modification indices.

Table 2 *Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Level 1 N = 338)*

Variable	М	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Daily expected paternalistic control	2.89	1.14	(.89)						
2. Daily perceived paternalistic control	2.85	1.18	.76**	(.88)					
3. Daily expected paternalistic control squared	9.65	7.27	.97**	.73**					
4. Daily paternalistic control multiplier	9.26	6.75	.91**	.92**	.92**				
5. Daily perceived paternalistic control squared	9.52	7.35	.74**	.97**	.74**	.94**			
6. Daily job satisfaction	3.25	1.20	.14**	.10	.07	.06	.03	(.87)	
7. Daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior	3.34	1.07	.27**	.36**	.21**	.27**	.29**	.37 ^{**}	(.86)

Note. Internal consistency values (Cronbach's α) appear in parentheses on the diagonal. Multiplier = expected multiple perceived. ** p < .01.

expected and perceived paternalistic control can be variable across time, we calculated the mean within-person standard deviation for daily expected and perceived paternalistic control. For daily expected paternalistic control, the mean within-person SD=0.55, with a range from 0.14 to 1.25; for daily perceived paternalistic control, the mean within-person SD=0.55, with a range from 0.18 to 1.30. The interclass correlation, ICC(1), for daily expected (perceived) paternalistic control was .71 (.73), indicating that nearly 30% of its variance existed at the within-person level. As shown, daily fluctuations of the expected and perceived paternalistic control were not dramatic but, indeed, possible.

Hypothesis Testing

Table 3 provides the results of our polynomial regression analysis used to predict daily job satisfaction. After the time dummies were controlled for, we entered the five predictors (i.e., b_1 – b_5) in our model and generated a response surface of the outcome (Figure 1). We obtained a ridge-shaped response

surface, in which the highest points on the surface were near the consistent $(X_1 = X_2)$ diagonal. Based on the work of Edwards (2007), we estimated the curvature of the inconsistent $(X_1 = -X_2)$ diagonal by calculating $(b_3-b_4+b_5)$. The estimate was significantly negative (curvature = -.62, p = .00), indicating an inverted-U-shaped pattern along the inconsistent diagonal. This finding was consistent with Hypothesis 1a, which predicts that the greater the alignment of followers' daily perceived with their daily expected paternalistic control, the greater their daily job satisfaction. We also estimated the slope of the inconsistent diagonal by calculating (b_1-b_2) ; Edwards, 2007) and obtained a nonsignificant slope of this diagonal (slope = .11, p = .41). This suggests that, whereas both insufficient and excessive control were suboptimal, none was significantly worse than the other. In sum, we obtained a nonlinear response surface, wherein the highest point was near the consistent diagonal, whereas the two inconsistent extremes had the lowest value of the outcome.


Table 3 also shows the polynomial regression models with daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior as the outcome. We also

Table 3Results for the Mixed-Effect Models in Study 1

	Daily job sat	isfaction	Daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior		
Predictor variable	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	
Fixed effect					
Intercept	3.82**	.19	3.76**	.16	
Paternalistic control expected (b_1)	.08	.08	02	.07	
Paternalistic control perceived (b_2)	03	.08	.19*	.07	
Paternalistic control expected squared (b_3)	17**	.06	09	.06	
Cross-product of paternalistic control expected and paternalistic control perceived (b_4)	.23**	.08	.15*	.08	
Paternalistic control perceived squared (b_5)	22**	.06	19**	.05	
Day dummies	Included		Included		
Surface tests					
Along the consistent diagonal					
Slope $(a_1 = b_1 + b_2)$.06		.17*		
Curvature $(a_2 = b_3 + b_4 + b_5)$	15**		13**		
Along the inconsistent diagonal					
Slope $(a_3 = b_1 - b_2)$.11		21		
$Curvature (a_4 = b_3 - b_4 + b_5)$	62**		44**		
Random effect					
Level 1 residual variance (σ^2)	.60		.58		
Level 2 intercept variance (τ_{00})	.68		.33		
ICC	.53		.36		
Pseudo R ²	.09		.18		

Note. Level 1 N = 338; Level 2 N = 43. All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. ICC = interclass correlation; SE = standard error. *p < .05. *** p < .01.

Figure 1
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Paternalistic Control (PC) in Predicting Daily Job Satisfaction in Study I




Note. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

used the five regression coefficients (b_1 – b_5) to produce a response surface of the outcome (Figure 2). Similarly, we obtained a ridge-shaped response surface, wherein the highest points on the surface are located near the consistent diagonal. The curvature of the inconsistent diagonal (curvature = -.44, p = .00) suggests that we had an inverted-U-shaped pattern along the inconsistent diagonal. Hypothesis 1b (i.e., the more followers' daily perceived align with their daily expected paternalistic control, the greater their daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior) thus received support.

The slope along the inconsistent diagonal was not significant (slope = -.21, p = .10), which indicates that the unfavorable effect of insufficient control was not worse than that of excessive control. Moreover, the slope along the consistent diagonal was significant (slope = .17, p = .03), whereas its curvature was negative (curvature = -.13, p = .00). Taken together, we had a ridge-shaped response surface, wherein the highest point of the ridge leaned toward the area of high control; the lowest points were again located at the two inconsistent extremes.

Figure 2
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Paternalistic Control (PC) in Predicting Daily Supervisor-Directed Citizenship Behavior (SCB) in Study 1



Discussion

Our findings, in general, offer support for the proposed follower expectation model of paternalistic control. As shown above, the simultaneous examination of expected and perceived paternalistic control offers a better understanding of the phenomenon of interest. In particular, insufficient control was as detrimental as was excessive control in terms of maintaining daily job satisfaction and eliciting daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior. Thus, our work reveals the importance of the differentiation between insufficient and excessive control and calls for more attention to insufficient control, which has been neglected in the literature.

We used supervisor-directed citizenship behavior as one of our outcome variables. Discretionary effort directed at leaders is, indeed, a major form of citizenship behavior, but focusing solely on it might be a limitation of this study. Paternalistic control was our primary focus, and it is likely that followers use supervisor-directed citizenship behavior not only as a means to engage in discretionary behavior that is good for leaders but also as a way to show their conformity to leaders who strongly assert their authority. Thus, examining other forms of citizenship behavior simultaneously may help us to understand citizenship behavior that is less conformity related. Considering the daily experience sampling design we used, we choose to add client-directed citizenship behavior to the following study and seek meaningful replications of our findings reported above.

Moreover, our choice of the paternalistic control measure was likely to constrain our findings. Despite its validity across several Eastern contexts, the Cheng et al. (2014) scale used in this study is a shortened scale that focuses mainly on leaders' emphasis on strict discipline when followers make mistakes or deviate from leaders' guidelines. Paternalistic control consistency in this specific domain is more about intragroup dynamics; other domains of paternalistic control, such as providing didactic instruction (T. Chen et al., 2017), may be more performance related and have distinct effects on followers. In addition, other person-oriented components of paternalistic control, such as belittling followers' performance, may be worth investigating because they are characteristic of hierarchical leader-follower exchange in Confucian Asian settings (Farh & Cheng, 2000; Takeuchi et al., 2020). Therefore, in the following study, in addition to extending our list of outcome variables, we further investigate the effects of a broader set of paternalistic control behaviors on the outcomes to hypothesize and identify critical differences among these effects. We also attempt to collect another sample with a larger sample size that enables tests with more sufficient statistical power (Gabriel et al., 2019).

Study 2

Further Examination of Paternalistic Control Components

Farh and Cheng's (2000) theoretical model identifies several major paternalistic control components, including asserting authority and strict discipline, instructing in a didactic manner, and belittling followers' competence. Based on this model, Cheng et al. (2000) developed a paternalistic control scale but found that this scale is strongly and negatively related to follower attitudes and outcomes due to the inclusion of dysfunctional components of paternalistic control, such as belittling followers. Cheng et al. (2004) then

developed a shortened version, wherein the deemed negative items were removed. A later revision (Cheng et al., 2014) concentrated further on leaders' assertion of strict discipline over rule breakers and norm violators.

Whereas belittling followers has received little attention since Cheng et al. (2004) exclusion of it in their scale, researchers have increasingly probed leaders' instructing behavior as another functional component of paternalistic control (Takeuchi et al., 2020). For example, T. Chen et al. (2017) used the term *directive-achieving leadership* to conceptualize Chinese leaders' juxtaposition of hierarchical control with a training/achieving focus. In their model, directive-achieving leadership has three dimensions; the controlling and regulating dimension shares considerable overlap with Cheng et al. (2014) scale, but the other two (i.e., training and instructing and demanding achievement and high performance) refine task-focused controls classified as didactic instruction in Farh and Cheng's (2000) framework.

Therefore, in Study 2, we follow the development of this line of research to identify emphasis on discipline and didactic instruction as two major functional components of paternalistic control. Similar to what we did in Study 1, we conceptualize and operationalize emphasis on discipline based on Cheng et al. (2014) work. We also adopt T. Chen et al. (2017) definition of training/ instructing and demand for achievement to depict leaders' didactic instruction. Moreover, we borrow from the abusive supervision literature (Tepper, 2000; Tepper et al., 2017) to better clarify the nature of belittling followers as a dysfunctional component of paternalistic control. The behavioral descriptions of Farh and Cheng's (2000) belittling followers dimension are similar to the definition of supervisory abuse or nonphysical behaviors that show leaders' hostility toward followers (Tepper, 2000). Indeed, a prior study found a positive relationship between paternalistic control and abusive supervision (Aryee et al., 2007). We thus conceptualize belittling followers as a specific form of supervisory abuse that utilizes hostile behaviors toward followers to obtain leaders' superior power status.

According to the follower expectation model that we proposed earlier, we argue that follower expectation of how much emphasis on discipline (didactic instruction) leaders should display varies across contexts on a daily basis. Again, it is the consistency between perceived and expected emphasis on discipline (didactic instruction), rather than the perception itself, that prevents followers from cognitive overload and saves cognitive resources for exerting extra effort. Followers who enjoy the daily emphasis on discipline (didactic instruction) consistency are more likely to experience job satisfaction and engage in supervisor- and client-directed citizenship behaviors on that day. Those under daily insufficient or excessive control conditions, in contrast, have suboptimal satisfaction levels and are less likely to display both forms of citizenship behavior.

Likewise, our follower expectation model predicts that follower expectations of the extent to which leaders show belittling behaviors are variable on a daily basis. Again, the perception–expectation consistency of leaders' belittling behaviors is cognitive-resource saving because perceived behavioral discrepancy is low. Such a decrease in the expenditure of cognitive resources should contribute to an increase in supervisor-directed citizenship behavior because it can be considered as a means to show conformity to a powerful authority. That is, when followers expect leaders to display high

levels of belittling behaviors and leader behaviors meet such an expectation, followers tend to activate behavior scripts, wherein leaders maintain a huge power distance with followers (Takeuchi et al., 2020), and become more submissive, as the scripts suggest. Although the same rationale also predicts that daily belittling consistency positively relates to either daily job satisfaction or daily client-directed citizenship behavior, these relationships are counterintuitive due to the dysfunctional nature of leaders' belittling behaviors. Here, we follow our proposed model to hypothesize the favorable effects of the daily belittling consistency but, as shown in the following, design a supplemental qualitative investigation to further probe when and in what forms the favorable effects may take place.

Hypothesis 2: The more followers' daily perceived align with their daily expected emphasis on discipline, didactic instruction, or belittling behaviors of leaders, the greater their (a) daily job satisfaction, (b) daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior, and (c) daily client-directed citizenship behavior.

Method

Procedure and Sample

We followed a similar procedure to recruit working adults from another Taiwanese part-time Master of Business Administration program. The same app was used to collect data three times a day during a 5-day⁴ interval. One of the major differences between the two studies was that, at 9 a.m. each day, the respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which they expected their immediate supervisor to show three types of paternalistic control (i.e., emphasis on discipline, didactic instruction, and belittling followers) on that day. Then, between 2 and 5 p.m., the app collected the three types of daily perceived paternalistic control. After 6 p.m., the respondents were asked to evaluate their daily job satisfaction as well as supervisor- and client-directed citizenship behavior. Among the 208 respondents invited, 136 completed the experience sampling (response rate = 65%, the mean days of successful completion = 4.79 days, within-individual n = 651days, and between-individual n = 136 persons). The majority of the respondents were female (61.76%), and the mean age of all respondents was 32.22 (SD = 6.00). Most of the participants held bachelor's (55.14%) and master's degrees (38.97%), and the mean company tenure was 2.53 years (SD = 3.29).

Measures, Controls, and Analytic Strategies

The scales used in Study 1 were employed again. Cheng et al. (2014) scale was used to measure daily expected and perceived emphasis on discipline ($\alpha=.89$ and .85, respectively). The α coefficients for the other scales directly adopted from Study 1 were as follows: $\alpha=.86$ for daily job satisfaction and .92 for daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior.

We also used the following scales, all rated on a 6-point scale, ranging from $1 = strongly \, disagree$ to $6 = strongly \, agree$, to measure the added variables: We measured daily expected and perceived didactic instruction with the six items of T. Chen et al. (2017) scale (sample items: "instructs subordinates how to get their job done in detail" and "rarely lowers pre-set performance requirements when subordinates cannot perform as expected"; $\alpha = .89$ and .90 for

expected and perceived didactic instruction, respectively). Daily expected and perceived belittling behaviors of leaders were measured with three items in Mitchell and Ambrose's (2007) abusive supervision scale ("ridicules subordinates," "puts subordinates down in front of others," and "tells subordinates they are incompetent"; $\alpha = .97$ and .95 for expected and perceived belittling, respectively).

Moreover, we modified the same items used to measure daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior by changing the target from supervisors to clients ("I went out of my way to be nice to my clients today," "I tried to help my clients today," "I defended my clients' needs today," and "I tried to be available to my clients today"; $\alpha = .94$). Again, we controlled for the time dummies (i.e., four dummies for 5 days) to detrend the studied variables. In addition, to further rule out the possibility that our outcomes would covary with some within-person variables that might cause transient emotions, we controlled for daily perceived role conflict with Bowling et al. (2017) scale (sample items: "In my job today, I often felt like different people were pulling me in different directions" and "Today I had to deal with competing demands at work"; $\alpha = .90$). We applied the same procedure as in Study 1 to run a polynomial regression with response surface analysis.

Our theoretical model did not predict different effects for the three paternalistic control components. Therefore, we tested Hypothesis 2 three times, one for each paternalistic control component. To address the concern about Type I error, we applied the Shaffer (1986) procedure to adjust the probability levels of our tests because the repetition of tests is not greater than three (Seaman et al., 1991). That is, for the tests of related hypotheses, the probability levels were listed in ascending order, and the first (i.e., the least) probability was multiplied by the total number of tests (i.e., three). The probability levels of the rest two hypotheses were multiplied by 1. Only tests with corrected probability levels below .05 were considered statistically significant.

Results

Occurrence of Discrepancies and Construct Distinctiveness

We again used Fleenor et al. (1996) criterion to determine whether enough discrepancies between the predictors existed in each polynomial regression model. For all three paternalistic control components, at least 10% of the data points had discrepant values: For emphasis on discipline, 19% had expected values less than perceived values; 22% had expected values greater than perceived values (total = 41%). For didactic instruction, 20% had expected values less than perceived values; 21% had expected values greater than perceived values

⁴ We did not follow Study 1 to conduct this daily experience sampling study during a 10-day (biweekly) interval because the total daily items that respondents were required to rate tripled in Study 2. Because, in Study 2, the daily experience sampling surveys could not be as short and straightforward as those in Study 1, survey fatigue became a major concern in terms of endangering the quality of our design (Fisher & To, 2012). After the questionnaires were finalized, the third author held several focus group discussions to evaluate participants' willingness to participate in our daily experience sampling. This author discovered that, for most participants, a 5-day (weekly) schedule was intuitive enough (cf. Jebb & Tay, 2017) and endurable. Participants also felt that it should be likely to capture at least one typical event that is relevant to paternalistic control within a 1-week interval. We hence chose to follow a 5-day (weekly) schedule.

(total = 41%). For belittling followers, 9% had expected values less than perceived values; 17% had expected values greater than perceived values (total = 26%).

Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among all variables. A confirmatory factor analysis conducted with the same procedure that we reported in Study 1 indicated that a nine-factor model, which assumed construct distinctiveness among the variables at the within-person level, obtained acceptable fit indices $(\chi^2 = 2727.98, df = 580, \text{ root-mean-square error of approximation} =$.08, comparative fit index = .92). In addition, the three paternalistic control components had reasonable values of within-person standard deviation: For emphasis on discipline, the mean standard deviation for expected values = 1.12 (range = 1.03-1.17) and the mean standard deviation for perceived values = 1.07 (range = 0.99-1.13). For didactic instruction, the mean standard deviation for expected values = 1.03 (range = 0.94-1.15) and the mean standard deviation for perceived values = 1.09 (range = 1.02-1.16). For belittling followers, the mean standard deviation for expected values = 1.14 (range = 1.10-1.20) and the mean standard deviation for perceived values = 1.08 (range = 0.97-1.21). The three components also obtained satisfactory ICC(1) values, suggesting that we detected at least 20% of the within-person variance in the leader behavior variables: For the emphasis on discipline, ICC(1) = .73 and .63 for expected and perceived values, respectively; for didactic instruction, ICC(1) = .64 and .59 for expected and perceived values, respectively; and for belittling followers, ICC(1) = .74 and .64 for expected and perceived values, respectively.

Hypotheses Testing

With regard to Hypothesis 2, we summarized the results of the polynomial regression analysis for using emphasis on discipline to predict (a) daily job satisfaction, (b) daily supervisor-directed citizenship behaviors, and (c) daily client-directed citizenship behaviors, as presented in Table 5. The same procedure of adding controls and generating response surfaces employed in Study 1 was used (see Figures 3–5, for the response surfaces), and we used the curvature of the inconsistent $(X_1 = -X_2)$ diagonal to test Hypothesis 2. For daily job satisfaction and daily supervisordirected citizenship behavior, the estimates were significantly negative (curvature = -.36, p = .00; curvature = -.18, p = .05, respectively), indicating an inverted-U-shaped pattern along the inconsistent diagonal, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. The patterns of these figures were similar to those of Figures 1 and 2 reported in Study 1. In contrast, the curvature of the inconsistent diagonal was not significant for daily client-directed citizenship behavior (curvature = -.07, p = .47), indicating a relatively flat response surface (Figure 5). Hypothesis 2 thus received partial support.

Table 4 *Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations (Level 1 N = 651)*

14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 15. Daily BF multiplier 16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily expected BF 19. Daily expected BF 20.	Variable	M	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
3. Daily expected EOD squared 4. Daily EOD multiplier 7.50 2.01 7.67** 7.58** 7.58** 8.3**	1. Daily expected EOD	2.47	1.07	(.89)									
4. Daily EOD multiplier 7. 50 2.01	2. Daily perceived EOD	2.69	1.12	.72**	(.85)								
4. Daily EOD multiplier 7. 50 2.01	3. Daily expected EOD squared	7.22	2.15	77**	60**	_							
5. Daily perceived EOD squared 6. Daily expected DI 7. Daily perceived DI 7. Daily perceived DI 8. Daily expected DI 8. Daily expected DI squared 9. Daily DI multiplier 13.48 1.49 9. Daily DI multiplier 13.48 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43 1.43	4. Daily EOD multiplier	7.50	2.01	67**	75**		—						
6. Daily expected DI	5. Daily perceived EOD squared	8.48	2.05	52**	- 68**	.66**	.87**	_					
7. Daily perceived DI 8. Daily expected DI squared 9. Daily DI multiplier 13.48 1.49 -1.0* -1.15** 2.0** 2.3** 2.2** -4.2** -3.1** - 10. Daily perceived DI squared 14.37 1.43 -0.9* -1.11** 12. Daily perceived BF 1.91 1.08 1.09* -1.11** 2.0** 2.3** 2.2** -2.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.2** -3.1** -3.10** -3.0** -4.8** -4.4** -3.5** -3.8** -2.1** -3.8** -3.10** -3.0** -3.10** -3.0** -3.10** -3.0** -3	6. Daily expected DI	3.48	1.09	.39**	.26**	40**	35**	28**	(.89)				
8. Daily expected DI squared 9. Daily DI multiplier 13.33 1.63 1.67 1.688 1.1289 1.1288 1.249 1.108 1.149 1.1098 1.1437 1.43 1.439 1.499 1.1188 1.2088 1.2488 1.2988 1.2488 1.2988 1.28888 1.288888 1.28888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.288888 1.2888888 1.2888888 1.2888888 1.2888888 1.28888888 1.288888888 1.288888888 1.28888888 1.28888888 1.28888888 1.28888888 1.288888888 1.2	7. Daily perceived DI	3.65	1.03	.32**	.37**	−.37 ^{**}	43**	40**	.68**	(.90)			
9. Daily DI multiplier 10. Daily perceived DI squared 11. Daily expected BF 11. Daily expected BF 12. Daily expected BF 13. Daily expected BF 14.37 15.37 15	8. Daily expected DI squared	13.33	1.63	16**	12**	.32**	.23**	.22**	42**	31**	_		
10. Daily perceived DI squared 11. Daily expected BF 11. Daily expected BF 12. Daily perceived BF 13. Daily expected BF squared 14.81 2.42 -6.67** -5.98** -6.44** -4.48** -4.40** 0.90** 1.15** -0.05* -1.12** -0.08 13. Daily expected BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Loss of the squared 19. Loss	Daily DI multiplier	13.48	1.49	10*	15**	.20**	.23**	.23**	22 ^{**}	32**	.71**	_	
11. Daily expected BF 12. Daily perceived BF 13. Daily expected BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 15. Daily BF multiplier 15. Daily IS 15. Daily BF multiplier 15. Daily SCB 16.	Daily perceived DI squared	14.37	1.43		11**	.20**	.24**	.29**	21**	29**	.55**	.77**	—
12. Daily perceived BF 13. Daily expected BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 15.	Daily expected BF	1.91	1.08	.74**	.60**	48**	44**	35**		.12**	08*	13**	10*
13. Daily expected BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily expected BF 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily expected BF 19. Daily Daily CCB 11. Daily expected BF 19. Daily Daily expected BF 19. Daily Daily CCB 11. Daily perceived BF 19. Daily Daily CCB 11. Daily perceived BF 19. Daily Daily Expected BF 19. Daily Daily Expected BF 19. Daily Daily CCB 11. Daily perceived BF 12. Daily perceived BF 13. Daily expected BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 15. C2 2.63	12. Daily perceived BF	2.08	1.14	.61**	.69**	−.44 ^{**}	48**	40**	.09*	.15**	05	12**	08
14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier	Daily expected BF squared		2.42	67**	59**	.63**	.58**	.51**	20**	21**	.22**	.21**	.20**
15. Daily BF multiplier 16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily SCB 11. Daily SCB 11. Daily SCB 12. Daily SCB 13. Daily SCB 14. Daily SCB 14. Daily SCB 15. Daily SCB 16. Daily CCB 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily SCB 11. Daily expected BF 19. Daily expected BF squared 19. Daily expected BF squa			2.45	63**	61**	.59**	.63**	.54**	19**	24**	.13**	.20**	.16**
16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily SCB 11. Daily SCB 12. Daily CCB 13. Daily SCB 14. Daily SCB 15. Daily SCB 16. Daily SCB 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily expected BF 19. Daily expected BF squared 19. Daily BF multiplier 19. Daily BF multiplier 19. Daily BF multiplier 19. Daily SCB 19. Daily SCB 19. Daily SCB 10. Daily SCB				57 ^{**}	62**	.56**	.60**	.57**	−.17**		.15**	.15**	.17**
17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 19. Daily CCB 11. Daily expected BF 11. Daily expected BF 12. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily expected BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily CCB 20. Saint and a conflict and a				.53**	.45**	41**	36**	33**	.13**		18**		21**
19. Daily CCB 4.41 0.81 04 00 .12** .11** .08* .12** .15** 01 00 07 Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 11. Daily expected BF 12. Daily perceived BF 13. Daily expected BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 14. Daily perceived BF squared 15. Daily BF multiplier 15. Daily SCB 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.07 25** 30** 30** 30** .11** .08* .12** .15** .15** .15** .16 .17 .18 .19 .19 .19 .19 .18 .19 .19				27**	31**		.26**	.24**	.10**				
Variable M SD 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 11. Daily expected BF 1.91 1.08 (.97)					20**		.19**	.17**	.16**				
11. Daily expected BF	19. Daily CCB	4.41	0.81	04	00	.12**	.11**	.08*	.12**	.15**	01	00	07
12. Daily perceived BF	Variable	M	SD	11	12	1	3	14	15	16	17	18	19
13. Daily expected BF squared 4.81 2.4280**67** 14. Daily perceived BF squared 4.84 2.4574**79** .85** 15. Daily BF multiplier 5.62 2.6357**80** .75** .87** 16. Daily role conflict 2.39 1.18 .51** .48**47**43**39** (.90) 17. Daily JS 3.92 1.0731**31** .26** .29** .28**37** (.86) 18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.0725**30** .29** .31** .30**21** .48** (.92)	11. Daily expected BF	1.91	1.08	(.97)									
14. Daily perceived BF squared 4.84 2.4574**79** 85** 15. Daily BF multiplier 5.62 2.6357**80** .75** .87** 16. Daily role conflict 2.39 1.18 .51** .48**47**43**39** (.90) 17. Daily JS 3.92 1.0731**31** .26** .29** .28**37** (.86) 18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.0725**30** .29** .31** .30**21** .48** (.92)	12. Daily perceived BF	2.08	1.14	.71**	(.95)								
14. Daily perceived BF squared 4.84 2.4574**79** 85** 15. Daily BF multiplier 5.62 2.6357**80** .75** .87** 16. Daily role conflict 2.39 1.18 .51** .48**47**43**39** (.90) 17. Daily JS 3.92 1.0731**31** .26** .29** .28**37** (.86) 18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.0725**30** .29** .31** .30**21** .48** (.92)	13. Daily expected BF squared	4.81	2.42	80**	67**	٠ –	_						
15. Daily BF multiplier 16. Daily role conflict 17. Daily JS 18. Daily SCB 18. Daily SCB 19. Daily SF multiplier 19. Conflict 19. Confl	14. Daily perceived BF squared	4.84	2.45	74**	79**	.8:	5**	_					
16. Daily role conflict 2.39 1.18 5.1** 4.8**47**43**39** (.90) 17. Daily JS 3.92 1.0731**31** 2.6** 2.9** 2.8**37** (.86) 18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.0725**30** 2.9** 3.1** 3.0**21** 4.8** (.92)	Daily BF multiplier	5.62	2.63	57**	80**	.7:	5**	.87**	_				
17. Daily JS 3.92 1.0731**31** .26** .29** .28**37** (.86) 18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.0725**30** .29** .31** .30**21** .48** (.92)	Daily role conflict	2.39	1.18	.51**	.48**	" –.4'	7** -	43**	39**	(.90)			
18. Daily SCB 4.34 1.07 25^{**} 30^{**} $.29^{**}$ $.31^{**}$ $.30^{**}$ 21^{**} $.48^{**}$ (.92)	17. Daily JS		1.07	31**	31**	.20	6**	.29**	.28**	37**			
				25**	30**	.29		.31**		21**	.48**		
19. Daily CCB 4.41 0.810100 .09* .10** .10*01 .29** .44** (.94	19. Daily CCB	4.41	0.81	01	00	.0	9*	.10**	.10*	01	.29**	.44**	(.94)

Note. Internal consistency values (Cronbach's α) appear in parentheses on the diagonal. EOD = emphasis on discipline; DI = didactic instruction; BF = belittling followers; multiplier = expected muliple perceived; JS = job satisfaction; SCB = supervisor-directed citizenship behavior; CCB = client-directed citizenship behavior.

p < .05. ** p < .01.

Table 5Results for the Mixed-Effect Models for Emphasis on Discipline (Study 2)

	Daily job sati	isfaction	Daily super directed citiz behaviors (zenship	Daily client-directed citizenship behaviors (CCB)	
Variable	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE
Fixed effect						
Intercept	3.84**	.10	4.02**	.11	4.26**	.11
EOD expected (b_1)	.05	.05	.03	.06	.01	.06
EOD perceived (b_2)	18**	.06	07	.06	.05	.06
EOD expected squared (b_3)	09**	.03	06	.03	06	.04
Cross-product of EOD expected and EOD perceived (b_4)	.16**	.04	.09	.05	.01	.05
EOD on perceived squared (b_5)	11**	.03	06	.03	00	.04
Role conflict	16**	.04	00	.04	04	.04
Day dummies	Included		Included		Included	
Surface tests						
Along the consistent diagonal						
Slope $(a_1 = b_1 + b_2)$	13		04		.06	
Curvature $(a_2 = b_3 + b_4 + b_5)$	03		01		06	
Along the inconsistent diagonal						
Slope $(a_3 = b_1 - b_2)$.23**		.09		05	
Curvature $(a_4 = b_3 - b_4 + b_5)$	36**		18*		07	
Random effect						
Level 1 residual variance (σ^2)	.38		.47		.53	
Level 2 intercept variance (τ_{00})	.53		.54		.54	
ICC	.58		.54		.51	
Pseudo R^2	.08		.01		.03	

Note. Level 1 N = 651; Level 2 N = 136. All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. EOD = emphasis on discipline; ICC = interclass correlation; SCB = supervisor-directed citizenship behavior; CCB = client-directed citizenship behavior; SE = 100 standard error. SE = 100 standard error.

Table 6 presents the results of our polynomial regression analysis for using didactic instruction to predict the three outcomes; we plotted the response surfaces in Figures 6–8. For daily job satisfaction and daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior, the curvatures along the inconsistent diagonal were not significant (curvature = -.02,

p = .78; curvature = -.05, p = .58, respectively); however, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the curvature was significantly negative for daily client-directed citizenship behavior (curvature = -.22, p = .02). This indicates an inverted-*U*-shaped pattern along the inconsistent diagonal (Figure 8); the highest point of the response surface was around

Figure 3
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Emphasis on Discipline (EOD) in Predicting Daily Job Satisfaction in Study 2





Figure 4
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Emphasis on Discipline (EOD) in Predicting Daily Supervisor-Directed Citizenship Behavior (SCB) in Study 2



Note. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

the center point of the surface, whereas the lowest points were, again, located at the two inconsistent extremes. These results, together with those for emphasis on discipline reported above, suggest that the perception–expectation consistency of the two functional components of paternalistic control had distinct effects on followers.

Table 7 provides a summary of the polynomial regression estimations, with belittling followers as the predictor variable, and Figures 9–11 present the estimated response surfaces. The curvatures along the inconsistent diagonal for daily job satisfaction, daily supervisor-

directed citizenship behavior, and daily client-directed citizenship behavior were all significantly negative (curvature = -.14, p=.03; curvature = -.18, p=.03; curvature = -.17, p=.03, respectively), indicating an inverted-U-shaped pattern along the inconsistent diagonal for each response surface (Figures 9–11); the highest point was around the center point of the response surface. Our findings above offered support for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the proposed expectation–perception consistency effect also held for the dysfunctional component of paternalistic control.

Figure 5
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Emphasis on Discipline (EOD) in Predicting Daily Client-Directed Citizenship Behavior (CCB) in Study 2




 Table 6

 Results for the Mixed-Effect Models for Didactic Instruction (Study 2)

	Daily job sati	isfaction	Daily super directed cities behaviors	zenship	Daily client-directed citizenship behaviors (CCB)		
Variable	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	
Fixed effect							
Intercept	3.85**	.09	3.98**	.09	4.10**	.09	
DI expected (b_1)	.05	.04	.16**	.05	.17**	.05	
DI perceived (b_2)	.09*	.04	.06	.05	.08	.05	
DI expected squared (b_3)	01	.03	06	.04	13**	.04	
Cross-product of DI expected and DI perceived (b_4)	.01	.04	.03	.04	.09*	.05	
ID on perceived squared (b_5)	01	.03	.04	.03	.00	.03	
Role conflict	22**	.03	03	.04	04	.04	
Day dummies	Included		Included		Included		
Surface tests							
Along the consistent diagonal							
Slope $(a_1 = b_1 + b_2)$.14**		.22**		.25**		
Curvature $(a_2 = b_3 + b_4 + b_5)$	01		.02		03		
Along the inconsistent diagonal							
Slope $(a_3 = b_1 - b_2)$	04		.10		.09		
Curvature $(a_4 = b_3 - b_4 + b_5)$	02		05		22*		
Random effect							
Level 1 residual variance (σ^2)	.40		.46		.52		
Level 2 intercept variance (τ_{00})	.50		.49		.45		
ICC	.55		.51		.46		
Pseudo R^2	.08		.05		.09		

Note. Level 1 N = 651; Level 2 N = 136. All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. DI = didactic instruction; ICC = interclass correlation; SCB = supervisor-directed citizenship behavior; SE = 100 standard error. SE = 100 standard error. SE = 100 standard error.

Supplemental Analysis

Our results suggest that our proposed follower expectation model works not only for the functional components of paternalistic control but also for that on belittling followers. Due to the dysfunctional nature of the latter, it is worthwhile to understand further when and in what form this perception—expectation consistency regarding

belittling followers occurs. We thus conducted a qualitative examination to determine the conditions under which followers might expect leaders to show high levels of belittling behavior. We recruited Taiwanese working adults online and sent them an email link to an anonymous online questionnaire. In the online questionnaire, we first presented the definition of paternalistic control, including emphasis

Figure 6
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Didactic Instruction (DI) in Predicting Daily Job Satisfaction in Study 2





Figure 7
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Didactic Instruction (DI) in Predicting Daily Supervisor-Directed Citizenship Behavior (SCB) in Study 2



Note. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

on discipline, didactic instruction, and belittling followers. We highlighted that, in Confucian Asian settings, paternalistic control may include abusive behaviors, such as belittling followers. We then asked respondents to recall an experience in which they *expected* their leaders to display paternalistic control. They were instructed to describe the incident in detail, including providing necessary background information, why they expected their leaders to display controlling behaviors, how their leaders demonstrated the behaviors, and the outcomes of the behaviors. We obtained 91 complete

written narratives, each of which described an incident of a leader who demonstrated expected belittling behaviors (average word count = 504). Respondents came from various industries, such as telecommunication, accounting, aviation, fashion, manufacturing, and medical services. Their ages ranged from 23 to 55 (average = 29), 58% were male, and they had a mean of 5.6 years of work tenure.

The first author and a research assistant first independently analyzed the narratives and sorted them into the three categories of paternalistic control (respondents might describe multiple types

Figure 8
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Didactic Instruction (DI) in Predicting Daily Client-Directed Citizenship Behavior (CCB) in Study 2




 Table 7

 Results for the Mixed-Effect Models for Belittling Followers (Study 2)

	Daily job sat	isfaction	Daily supe directed citi behaviors	zenship	enship citizenship behaviors		
Variable	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	Estimate	SE	
Fixed effect							
Intercept	3.77**	.12	3.87**	.13	4.17**	.13	
BF expected (b_1)	09	.06	08	.07	00	.07	
BF perceived (b_2)	16**	.06	06	.06	03	.07	
BF expected squared (b_3)	06	.03	07*	.03	06	.04	
Cross-product of BF expected and BF perceived (b_4)	.03	.03	.09*	.03	.07	.04	
BF on perceived squared (b_5)	05	.03	02	.03	04	.03	
Role conflict	16**	.04	.03	.04	.01	.04	
Day dummies	Included		Included		Included		
Surface tests							
Along the consistent diagonal							
Slope $(a_1 = b_1 + b_2)$	25**		14		04		
Curvature $(a_2 = b_3 + b_4 + b_5)$	08**		.06		03		
Along the inconsistent diagonal							
Slope $(a_3 = b_1 - b_2)$.07		02		.03		
Curvature $(a_4 = b_3 - b_4 + b_5)$	14*		18*		17*		
Random effect							
Level 1 residual variance (σ^2)	.39		.46		.53		
Level 2 intercept variance (τ_{00})	.52		.52		.53		
ICC	.57		.53		.50		
Pseudo R^2	.08		.04		.02		

Note. Level 1 N = 651; Level 2 N = 136. All entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. BF = belittling followers; ICC = interclass correlation; SCB = supervisor-directed citizenship behavior; SE = 100 standard error. SE = 100 standard error. SE = 100 standard error. SE = 100 standard error.

of paternalistic control in a single incident). They then discussed each narrative, reviewed the coding results, and resolved differences between each other's coding. Among all analyzed narratives, 62 (68%) mentioned emphasis on discipline, 49 (54%) described didactic instruction, and 29 (32%) noted belittling behaviors. This indicates that it was not unusual for the respondents to expect

their leaders to show belittling behaviors. Furthermore, two major themes were identified. Some respondents expected their leaders to show paternalistic control because they needed specific guidance to realize efficient learning without unnecessary trial and error. Others wanted their leaders to show paternalistic control because they had to rely on them to resolve injustices in the work context.

Figure 9
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Belittling Followers (BF) in Predicting Daily Job Satisfaction in Study 2






Figure 10
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Belittling Followers (BF) in Predicting Daily Supervisor-Directed Citizenship Behavior (SCB) in Study 2





Note. See the online article for the color version of this figure.

Interestingly, whereas the emphasis on discipline and didactic instruction appeared in both themes, belittling followers was found only in the latter.


Theme 1 (Efficient Learning)


One respondent, who worked in an accounting firm, wrote that she wished to be scolded when she made mistakes. She stated:

When I do tasks on my own, I seldom detect my blind spots. Moreover, a single miscalculation often leads to a series of mistakes. So, I really need my supervisor to step in. She always closely monitors every step of my calculations and tells me clearly what to do next. Sometimes, being scolded for an error makes me feel relieved because the potential damage has been controlled and because I know how to improve myself in the future.

Another respondent who has just begun his career in a hospital setting noted:

Figure 11
Response Surface and the Inconsistent Diagonal of Belittling Followers (BF) in Predicting Daily Client-Directed Citizenship Behavior (CCB) in Study 2





Mistakes are rarely tolerated in a hospital. Thus, I felt lucky to meet a very tough supervisor at the beginning of my career. With strict discipline delivered in a commanding way, I was able to quickly gear up on Day 1.

Similarly, a deputy store manager of a telecommunication company attributed his development and growth to his manager's strict control:

Everything had to follow my manager's instructions: store layouts, marketing campaigns, and document filing. Before the store officially opened, he asked us to rehearse, and he was angry with us for every mistake until we performed a perfect rehearsal. After we began to run the store, he disciplined employees who made mistakes but bought us drinks when we got things done correctly. I soon realized that, with his guidance, I made no mistakes, received zero customer complaints, and earned a large bonus.

As shown above, the major types of paternalistic control displayed by the documented leaders in this theme were emphasis on discipline and didactic instruction. One important feature of narratives in this theme is that the expected target of these two forms of paternalistic control was respondents themselves. In some cases, respondents struggled, having regrets over not receiving sufficient correction and guidance from their leaders. For instance, an engineer had been happy to report to a laissez-faire supervisor but soon became concerned about not learning enough of the new skills that his future work assignments might require: "When I realized that some of my colleagues had better domain-specific knowledge than I did because their supervisors required them to take after-work online courses, I started feeling dissatisfied."

Theme 2 (Injustice Correction)

Respondents also expected their leaders to hold the "bad apples" accountable. Whereas emphasis on discipline and didactic instruction also appeared in narratives in this theme, our analysis identified salient belittling behaviors, including reprimanding and punishing the violators, deliberately belittling their contributions, and keeping key information from them. In one representative narrative, a respondent who worked in a high-tech manufacturing company wrote:

The newcomers could not see the value of following the standard procedure; they completed tasks in their own way, which greatly increased the chance of making products with defects. One day, one of them made a mistake. My manager became unusually angry, asked all of the newcomers to stand up in front of us, and reprimanded them severely. Actually, I felt great when they were scolded. After that, my manager deliberately assigned trivial tasks to the newcomers and kept them away from key resources. This caused many of them to quit a month later. What a relief! My original healthy work environment was eventually back.

In these cases, our respondents tended to rely on their leaders to correct injustice rather than to regain a sense of fairness by themselves due to the lack of institutionalized ways to correct the injustice (i.e., formal rules, policies, or regulations). For example, a manufacturing engineer complained that a tardy project team member often slowed down the progress of the project, but he was reluctant to confront the colleague. He wrote:

After all, [the colleague] was from another department and did not report to me. I did not have the power to correct his tardiness. That's why I and other team members expected our project team leader to do

something and felt really happy when [the colleague] was eventually kicked off the team.

Another respondent also reported his comfort after his supervisor fought against the respondent's mistreatment from an unreasonable colleague in another department. He wrote:

I had completed the files and submitted all relevant materials to [the colleague]. I was sure that I followed the rules, but he deliberately placed obstacles in my path. My supervisor immediately called [the colleague], yelling at him on the phone: "How dare you? Who do you think you are? Just give him what he wants now!" And I got the document that I needed badly right away. Knowing that my supervisor is backing me at all times gave me a lot of strength, and I felt that there was an unspoken mutual understanding between him and me.

A major difference between the two themes was the target of paternalistic control. For the injustice correction narratives, the context was the rule of man (Farh & Cheng, 2000; Wang et al., 2017). In the face of insufficient institutional regulations, respondents did not expect their leaders to demonstrate belittling behaviors toward themselves but, rather, the "bad apples" who violated the behavioral norm. This finding complements our quantitative results by explaining why leaders' abusive, belittling behaviors may be expected. Because the items for belittling followers used in Study 2 did not specify the target of leaders' behavior, it is likely that followers' desire for holding transgressors accountable could at least partly explain our obtained response surface in regard to belittling followers.

Discussion

Whereas the previously proposed follower expectation model works, in general, to explain our Study 2 findings, further investigation of paternalistic control components offers a more sophisticated view of the phenomenon of interest. Using the same daily experience sampling design with another independent sample, we found that perception-expectation consistencies of different paternalistic control components had distinct effects on followers. Similar to our findings in Study 1, daily consistency regarding emphasis on discipline is positively related to daily job satisfaction and daily supervisor-directed citizenship behavior. Also as expected, the alignment between daily perceived and expected belittling behaviors of leaders predicted all three follower outcomes. Our quantitative results that perception-expectation consistency in terms of belittling followers had significant effects on follower outcomes, together with the supplemental qualitative finding, suggest that, particularly in injustice correction circumstances, it is reasonable for followers to expect belittling behaviors (toward norm violators) from their leaders. Again, the findings above suggest that follower expectation matters and that both insufficient and excessive control result in suboptimal outcomes.

Inconsistent with our hypothesis, however, followers' client-directed citizenship behavior remained stable, regardless of the alignment between daily perceived and expected emphasis on discipline. This finding could be seen as consistent with our previous speculation that emphasis on discipline focuses more on the recovery of a functional, smooth intragroup coordination, endangered by norm violations from certain group members (Cheng et al., 2014; Farh & Cheng, 2000). Followers tend to feel satisfied because leaders resolve problems that followers cannot address on their own in the context of hierarchical social exchange (Takeuchi et al., 2020).

Followers also prefer to repay leaders' intragroup-focused favor with supervisor-directed extra effort.

Another unexpected finding is that the alignment between daily perceived and expected didactic instruction is positively related to client-directed citizenship behavior only. In particular, we obtained a relatively flat response surface for daily job satisfaction. Regarding this, we suspect that leaders' offering of clear instructions and pursuing of unquestionable targets may be more prevention focused, shifting followers' attention to responsibilities and duties (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). Followers' enjoyment and enthusiasm may rely less on such an offering, even when leader behavior matches follower expectation. Consistent with the task-focused nature of didactic instruction, followers tend to use cognitive resources released by daily didactic instruction consistency in task-oriented domains, such as engaging in more client-directed activities.

General Discussion

Across the two studies, our findings highlight the importance of follower expectation when interpreting leaders' paternalistic control, particularly in cultural settings influenced by Confucian Asian traditions. Perception–expectation consistency, rather than perceived paternalistic control itself, determines when paternalistic control is appreciated, and different components of paternalistic control tend to have distinct effects when such consistency is achieved. Leaders need to be particularly cautious to not trap themselves in the condition of insufficient control, which may be as detrimental as excessive control.

Theoretical Contributions

Our follower expectation model of paternalistic control indicates that it is not the absolute amount of but the match between expected and perceived paternalistic control that better explains its influence on followers. Without considering this possibility, prior research made predictions inconsistent with earlier observations that paternalistic control serves as the foundation of effective leadership (Farh & Cheng, 2000). Most studies followed mainly the situational leadership paradigm (e.g., Hersey & Blanchard, 1982; Thompson & Vecchio, 2009) to predict that negative effects of paternalistic control on subordinate outcomes could be, at best, attenuated in certain conditions (Chan et al., 2013; Y. Li & Sun, 2015; Schaubroeck et al., 2017; Tian & Sanchez, 2017). By introducing a new, follower expectation-based conceptualization, our work shows the positivity of paternalistic control that previous studies failed to predict and better addresses why paternalistic control may still be prevalent, necessary, and even effective, particularly in Confucian Asian settings wherein the leader-follower exchange is hierarchical (Takeuchi et al., 2020).

In our model, we identify high-control consistency and insufficient control inconsistency, neither of which is fully understood in the literature on paternalistic control. Insufficient control was as detrimental as excessive control in our daily experience sampling studies. Such findings suggest that, when followers expect leaders to display paternalistic control, leaders' display of it can be responsible and dutiful; their lack of, rather than engagement in, controlling acts in such conditions becomes egocentric and selfish instead. Interestingly, taking forceful actions to correct followers who violate work ethics is also one of the essential parts of ethical leadership (see M. E. Brown et al., 2005). Without taking follower expectations into consideration, prior research consistently demonstrated a negative relationship between

paternalistic control and leader morality (e.g., Hiller et al., 2019). This relationship is worth reconsidering, based on our proposed model.

Moreover, in Study 2, we simultaneously examined the three paternalistic control components. Echoing the notion that the effects of paternalistic control are more complicated than other paternalistic leadership dimensions (Takeuchi et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2018), we found that our model better explains the effects of emphasis on discipline and belittling followers, the two components that are more person rather than task oriented. In addition, perception–expectation consistency in regard to each component affected follower outcomes differently. This suggests that future research may benefit from the separate examination of the paternalistic control components. For example, the finding that the perception-expectation consistency in terms of belittling followers was able to trigger favorable follower outcomes is novel because the literature holds the view that supervisory abuse, such as belittling behavior, is unlikely to evoke followers' job satisfaction and citizenship behavior (Tepper et al., 2017). Our findings may thus explain why abusive supervision may be more prevalent and harmless in Confucian Asian settings (Vogel et al., 2015). Leaders in cultural settings influenced by the rule of man tradition may justify their abusive behaviors by asserting that they utilize such behavior (toward the bad apples) to regain interpersonal justice. Still, leaders in such cultural settings should be cautious because they could be easily tempted to use what could be considered toxic controlling behavior: Although belittling followers is dysfunctional in many other aspects, it tends to help leaders benefit from leader-directed citizenship behavior and further exploit follower extra effort for the leaders' own good.

It is also noteworthy that, despite the functional nature of both, emphasis on discipline but not didactic instruction positively related to followers' job satisfaction when followers expected leaders to show these behaviors. Recent studies have argued that didactic instruction is more effective in eliciting favorable follower outcomes than is emphasis on discipline because it is a task-oriented form of control (T. Chen et al., 2017; Farh et al., 2008). This may be true in terms of improving performance levels, but our findings indicate that this favorable effect is less likely to extend to followers' positive attitudes at work. In contrast, the display of emphasis on discipline when followers expect, or actually need, leaders to engage in such an emphasis may better fulfill followers' need-supply fit (Muchinsky & Monahan, 1987) and, thereby, enhance their satisfaction levels. Future research is encouraged to pursue this direction and to better distinguish between the two functional elements of paternalistic control.

Finally, our research suggests that follower expectations of how much paternalistic control leaders should demonstrate can vary across days or on an event basis, as our supplemental qualitative analysis also suggests. This view is more consistent with connectionist models than with the traditional, symbolic premises of implicit leadership theory (Shondrick et al., 2010). Whereas earlier implicit leadership theory focuses on comparisons between subordinates' relatively stable cognitive knowledge and observed leader behaviors (e.g., Lord et al., 1984), our extended model of paternalistic control emphasizes followers' event-based, dynamic expectations that leaders should sensitively attend to as a means to effectively interact with followers and achieve favorable outcomes. Because the relatively new connectionist thoughts have been rather theoretical, we contribute to this literature by offering empirical support for them.

Showing the variability of follower expectation also better informs current paternalistic leadership theories by providing a reconsideration of why leaders choose to demonstrate paternalistic control. Adopting a cultural analysis perspective, Farh and Cheng (2000) argued that Confucian Asian leaders are inclined to show paternalistic control due to certain cultural traditions; this notion implies that trait-like beliefs mainly determine the display of this controlling behavior. Together with some recent studies (e.g., A. C. Wang, 2019), however, this research suggests that the display of paternalistic control may be more context dependent than what scholars previously expected. This perhaps explains why a previous study found that multiple paternalistic leadership profiles coexist (Chou et al., 2015), as it is reasonable for leaders to sensitively adjust their paternalistic control based on contextual needs. We thus recommend that future scholars identify major contextual antecedents of follower expectation regarding paternalistic control. Such an effort has the potential to further refine the current understanding of paternalistic control.

Practical Implications

In a less-centralized business world, leaders are often recommended to refrain from the use of paternalistic control. Even in cultural settings in which authority is widely respected, paternalistic control tends to be considered obsolete, as previous studies find that such control provokes negative follower outcomes and thereby undermines the legitimacy of a leader's authority. These conclusions, however, may be biased because they presume that followers expect leaders to refrain from authority assertion across all settings. Based on our findings, we challenge this conventional view and show that followers are likely to expect their leaders to show strong paternalistic control, at least due to the achievement of efficient learning or the desire for injustice correction. Moreover, not only excessive but also insufficient control leads to harmful effects in terms of decreased job satisfaction and citizenship behavior.

Thus, paternalistic control should not be treated as just a stable leadership style that remains the same across different settings. Instead, leaders should be sensitive to followers' malleable expectations and adjust their behaviors accordingly. As prior research suggests, when followers give priority to their autonomy at work, leaders should leave more room for followers and avoid excessive control. In contrast, our work indicates that, when followers expect leaders to show their control, leaders should proactively use their position power to emphasize strict discipline, provide a strong guidance, and insist on adherence to high standards. Whereas leaders should still be cautious when engaging in belittling behaviors (particularly with the presence of institutional regulation), simply abandoning the use of all kinds of paternalistic control without carefully considering follower expectations may not lead to desired follower outcomes.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

We conducted both studies in Taiwan, where Confucian values facilitate the display of paternalistic control (Farh & Cheng, 2000). Although this design warrants reliable effects of paternalistic control, future research is needed to verify the generalizability of our findings to other paternalistic or even nonpaternalistic cultural settings. In particular, cross-cultural approaches that several previous studies employed are recommended (e.g., Cheng et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2018). It would be interesting to draw a comparison between

excessive and insufficient control to determine whether the latter still has strong unfavorable effects in settings in which the leader—member exchange is less hierarchical. It also would be useful to empirically incorporate certain cultural values into the research design. For example, the extent to which beliefs in the rule of man (Farh & Cheng, 2000; Wang et al., 2017) or moral authoritarianism (Ho, 1989, 1994) may explain cross-national differences among different countries or regions should be empirically investigated.

In addition, we identified only three follower outcomes that were previously assumed to be negatively affected by paternalistic control, and all were measured with self-reported scales in our daily experience sampling studies. Perhaps by using regular cross-sectional designs and supervisor-rated scales, future studies could examine a larger set of outcomes, such as task performance, other forms of citizenship behavior, and employee creativity. In addition, future research is recommended to empirically test the underlying mechanisms relevant to our theoretical arguments based on implicit leadership theories, such as leader prototypicality (DeRue et al., 2015). Such an endeavor enables researchers to verify, refine, and extend the proposed follower expectation model of paternalistic control. Moreover, we estimated the intercept in each multilevel polynomial regression model as a random effect, but the sample size for Level 2 might not be sufficiently large enough, particularly for Study 1. Although we did not include any inferences from Level 2 in our models, we encourage researchers to collect larger samples to obtain more statistical power when replicating our results. Furthermore, replications that employ designs that enable causal inferences, such as field experiments, may enhance the theoretical rigor of our proposed model (e.g., Antonakis et al., 2010). Finally, our hypothesized model was at the individual level, but some recent studies (e.g., Huang et al., 2015) indicate that paternalistic control may relate to outcomes at higher levels, such as firm performance. Thus, the proposed effect of the match between expected and perceived paternalistic control may be useful in eliciting effectiveness at either the group or organizational level as well.

References

Antonakis, J., Bendahan, S., Jacquart, P., & Lalive, R. (2010). On making causal claims: A review and recommendations. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 21(6), 1086–1120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2010.10.010

Aryee, S., Chen, Z. X., Sun, L. Y., & Debrah, Y. A. (2007). Antecedents and outcomes of abusive supervision: Test of a trickle-down model. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(1), 191–201. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.1.191

Bliese, P. (2022). *Multilevel: Multilevel functions in R (2.7)*. https://CRAN .R-project.org/package=multilevel

Bowling, N. A., Khazon, S., Alarcon, G. M., Blackmore, C. E., Bragg, C. B., Hoepf, M. R., Barelka, A., Kennedy, K., Wang, Q., & Li, H. (2017). Building better measures of role ambiguity and role conflict: The validation of new role stressor scales. Work and Stress, 31(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/02678373.2017.1292563

Brockner, J., & Higgins, E. T. (2001). Regulatory focus theory: Implications for the study of emotions at work. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 86(1), 35–66. https://doi.org/10.1006/obhd.2001.2972

Brown, D., & Lord, R. (2001). Leadership and perceiver cognition: Moving beyond first order constructs. In M. London (Ed.), *How people evaluate others in organizations* (pp. 181–202). Taylor & Francis.

Brown, M. E., Treviño, L. K., & Harrison, D. A. (2005). Ethical leadership: A social learning perspective for construct development and testing.

- Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 97(2), 117–134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.03.002
- Chan, S. C. H., Huang, X., Snape, E., & Lam, C. K. (2013). The Janus face of paternalistic leaders: Authoritarianism, benevolence, subordinates' organization-based self-esteem, and performance. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 34(1), 108–128. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1797
- Chen, T., Li, F., & Leung, K. (2017). Whipping into shape: Construct definition, measurement, and validation of directive-achieving leadership in Chinese culture. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 34(3), 537–563. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-017-9511-6
- Chen, X. P., Eberly, M. B., Chiang, T. J., Farh, J. L., & Cheng, B. S. (2014).
 Affective trust in Chinese leaders: Linking paternalistic leadership to employee performance. *Journal of Management*, 40(3), 796–819. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311410604
- Cheng, B. S., Boer, D., Chou, L. F., Huang, M. P., Yoneyama, S., Shim, D., Sun, J. M., Lin, T. T., Chou, W. J., & Tsai, C. Y. (2014). Paternalistic leadership in four East Asian societies: Generalizability and cultural differences of the triad model. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 45(1), 82–90. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022113490070
- Cheng, B. S., Chou, L. F., & Farh, J. L. (2000). A triad model of paternalistic leadership: The constructs and measurement [in Chinese]. *Indigenous Psychological Research in Chinese Societies*, 14, 3–64. https://doi.org/10.6254/IPRCS
- Cheng, B. S., Chou, L. F., Wu, T. Y., Huang, M. P., & Farh, J. L. (2004). Paternalistic leadership and subordinate responses: Establishing a leader-ship model in Chinese organizations. *Asian Journal of Social Psychology*, 7(1), 89–117. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-839X.2004.00137.x
- Cheng, B. S., Wang, A. C., & Huang, M. P. (2009). The road more popular versus the road less traveled by: An "insider's" perspective of advancing Chinese management research. *Management and Organization Review*, 5(1), 91–105. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-8784.2008.00133.x
- Chou, W. J., Sibley, C. G., Liu, J. H., Lin, T. T., & Cheng, B. S. (2015). Paternalistic leadership profiles: A person-centered approach. *Group & Organization Management*, 40(5), 685–710. https://doi.org/10.1177/1059601115573358
- Dalal, R. S., Lam, H., Weiss, H. M., Welch, E. R., & Hulin, C. L. (2009). A within-person approach to work behavior and performance: Concurrent and lagged citizenship-counterproductivity associations, and dynamic relationships with affect and overall job performance. Academy of Management Journal, 52(5), 1051–1066. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.44636148
- DeRue, D. S., & Ashford, S. J. (2010). Who will lead and who will follow? A social process of leadership identity construction in organizations. *Academy of Management Review*, 35, 627–647. https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.2010.53503267
- DeRue, D. S., Nahrgang, J. D., & Ashford, S. J. (2015). Interpersonal perceptions and the emergence of leadership structures in groups: A network perspective. *Organization Science*, 26(4), 1192–1209. https:// doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0963
- Edwards, J. R. (2007). Polynomial regression and response surface methodology. In C. Ostroff & T. A. Judge (Eds.), *Perspectives on organizational fit* (pp. 361–372). Jossey-Bass.
- Edwards, J. R., & Cable, D. M. (2009). The value of value congruence. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 94(3), 654–677. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014891
- Edwards, J. R., & Parry, M. E. (1993). On the use of polynomial regression equations as an alternative to difference scores in organizational research. *Academy of Management Journal*, 36(6), 1577–1613. https://doi.org/10 .2307/256822
- Farh, J. L., & Cheng, B. S. (2000). A cultural analysis of paternalistic leadership in Chinese organizations. In J. T. Li, A. S. Tsui, & E. Weldon (Eds.), *Management and organizations in the Chinese context* (pp. 84–127). Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511590_5
- Farh, J. L., Liang, J., Chou, L. F., & Cheng, B. S. (2008). Paternalistic leadership in Chinese organizations: Research progress and future research directions. In C. C. Chen & Y. T. Lee (Eds.), *Business leadership in*

- China: Philosophies, theories, and practices (pp. 171–205). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753763.008
- Fisher, C. D., & To, M. L. (2012). Using experience sampling methodology in organizational behavior. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 33(7), 865–877. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1803
- Fleenor, J. W., McCauley, C. D., & Brutus, S. (1996). Self-other rating agreement and leader effectiveness. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 7(4), 487– 506. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(96)90003-X
- Fleishman, E. A. (1973). Twenty years of consideration and structure. In E. A. Fleishman & J. G. Hunt (Eds.), *Current developments in the study of leadership* (pp. 1–40). Southern Illinois University Press.
- Foti, R. J., Knee, R. E., Jr., & Backert, R. S. G. (2008). Multi-level implications of framing leadership perceptions as a dynamic process. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 19(2), 178–194. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2008.01.007
- Fox, J., & Weisberg, S. (2019). An R companion to applied regression (3rd ed.). Sage Publications.
- Gabriel, A. S., Podsakoff, N. P., Beal, D. J., Scott, B. A., Sonnentag, S., Trougakos, J. P., & Butts, M. M. (2019). Experience sampling methods: A discussion of critical trends and considerations for scholarly advancement. *Organizational Research Methods*, 22(4), 969–1006. https://doi.org/10 .1177/1094428118802626
- Gagné, M., & Deci, E. L. (2005). Self-determination theory and work motivation. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 26(4), 331–362. https:// doi.org/10.1002/job.322
- Hanges, P., Lord, R., & Dickson, M. (2000). An information-processing perspective on leadership and culture: A case for connectionist architecture. *Applied Psychology*, 49(1), 133–161. https://doi.org/10.1111/1464-0597.00008
- Hersey, P., & Blanchard, K. H. (1982). Management of organizational behavior: Utilizing human resources. Prentice Hall.
- Hiller, N. J., Sin, H. P., Ponnapalli, A. R., & Ozgen, S. (2019). Benevolence and authority as WEIRDly unfamiliar: A multi-language meta-analysis of paternalistic leadership behaviors from 152 studies. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 30(1), 165–184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.11.003
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1989). Socialization in contemporary mainland China. Asian Thought & Society, 14, 136–149. https://books.google.com.hk/books?id= S2ZtAAAAMAAJ&dq=editions:UOM39015048601218&hl=zh-TW&lr=
- Ho, D. Y. F. (1994). Filial piety, authoritarian moralism, and cognitive conservatism in Chinese societies. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 120(3), 349–365. https://hub.hku.hk/bitstream/10722/53184/1/2581.pdf?accept=1
- Huang, X., Xu, E., Chiu, W., Lam, C., & Farh, J. L. (2015). When authoritarian leaders outperform transformational leaders: Firm performance in harsh economic environments. *Academy of Management Discoveries*, 1(2), 180–200. https://doi.org/10.5465/amd.2014.0132
- Ilies, R., Wilson, K. S., & Wagner, D. T. (2009). The spillover of daily job satisfaction onto employees' family lives: The facilitating role of work–family integration. *Academy of Management Journal*, 52(1), 87–102. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2009.36461938
- Jebb, A. T., & Tay, L. (2017). Introduction to time series analysis for organizational research: Methods for longitudinal analyses. *Organizational Research Methods*, 20(1), 61–94. https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428116668035
- Li, N., Chiaburu, D., Kirkman, B., & Xie, Z. (2013). Spotlight on the followers: Neutralizing the effect of transformational leadership on subordinates' citizenship and taking charge. *Personnel Psychology*, 66, 225–260. https://doi.org/10.1111/peps.12014
- Li, Y., & Sun, J. M. (2015). Traditional Chinese leadership and employee voice behavior: A cross-level examination. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 26(2), 172–189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2014.08.001
- Liden, R. C., & Maslyn, J. M. (1998). Multidimensionality of leader–member exchange: An empirical assessment through scale development. *Journal of Management*, 24(1), 43–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0149-2063(99)80053-1
- Lord, R. G., Brown, D. J., & Harvey, J. L. (2001). System constraints on leadership perceptions. behavior and influence: An example of connectionist level processes. In M. A. Hogg & R. S. Tindale (Eds.), *Blackwell handbook* of social psychology: Group processes (pp. 283–310). Blackwell.

- Lord, R. G., De Vader, C. L., & Alliger, G. M. (1986). A meta-analysis of the relation between personality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71(3), 402–410. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010 71 3 402
- Lord, R. G., & Maher, K. (1991). Leadership and information processing: Linking perceptions and performance. Unwin Hyman.
- Lord, R. G., Foti, R. J., & De Vader, C. L. (1984). A test of leadership categorization theory: Internal structure, information processing, and leadership perceptions. *Organizational Behavior and Human Perfor*mance, 34(3), 343–378. https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(84)90043-6
- Maurer, T. J., & Lord, R. G. (1991). An exploration of cognitive demands in group interaction as a moderator of information processing variables in perceptions of leadership. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 21(10), 821–839. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1991.tb00445.x
- Mitchell, M. S., & Ambrose, M. L. (2007). Abusive supervision and workplace deviance and the moderating effects of negative reciprocity beliefs. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 92(4), 1159–1168. https://doi.org/ 10.1037/0021-9010.92.4.1159
- Muchinsky, P. M., & Monahan, C. J. (1987). What is person–environment congruence? Supplementary versus complementary models of fit. *Journal* of Vocational Behavior, 31(3), 268–277. https://doi.org/10.1016/0001-8791(87)90043-1
- Muczyk, J. P., & Reimann, B. C. (1987). The case for directive leadership. The Academy of Management Executive, 1, 301–311. https://doi.org/10.5465/ame.1987.4275646
- Murdoch, D., & Adler, D. (2022). *Rgl: 3D visualization using OpenGL* (R package Version 0.110.2). https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=rgl
- Nyberg, A. J., Fulmer, I. S., Gerhart, B., & Carpenter, M. A. (2010). Agency theory revisited: CEO return and shareholder interest alignment. *Academy* of *Management Journal*, 53(5), 1029–1049. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj .2010.54533188
- Pellegrini, E. K., & Scandura, T. A. (2008). Paternalistic leadership: A review and agenda for future research. *Journal of Management*, 34(3), 566–593. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206308316063
- Pierce, J. L., Gardner, D. G., Cummings, L. L., & Dunham, R. B. (1989). Organization-based self-esteem: Construct definition measurement and validation. *Academy of Management Journal*, 32(3), 622–648. https://doi.org/10.2307/256437
- Pinheiro, J. C., & Bates, D. M. (2000). Mixed-effects models in S and S-PLUS. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-0318-1
- R Core Team. (2022). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
- Schaubroeck, J. M., Shen, Y., & Chong, S. (2017). A dual-stage moderated mediation model linking authoritarian leadership to follower outcomes. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 102(2), 203–214. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000165
- Seaman, M. A., Levin, J. R., & Serlin, R. C. (1991). New developments in pairwise multiple comparisons: Some powerful and practicable procedures. *Psychological Bulletin*, 110(3), 577–586. https://doi.org/10.1037/ 0033-2909.110.3.577
- Shaffer, J. P. (1986). Modified sequentially rejective multiple test procedures. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 81(395), 826–831. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1986.10478341
- Shanock, L. R., Baran, B. E., Gentry, W. A., Pattison, S. C., & Heggestad, E. D. (2010). Polynomial regression with response surface analysis: A powerful approach for examining moderation and overcoming limitations of difference scores. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, 25(4), 543–554. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-010-9183-4
- Shondrick, S. J., Dinh, J. E., & Lord, R. G. (2010). Developments in implicit leadership theory and cognitive science: Applications to improving measurement and understanding alternatives to hierarchical leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 21(6), 959–978. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua .2010.10.004

- Shondrick, S. J., & Lord, R. G. (2010). Implicit leadership and followership theories: Dynamic structures for leadership perceptions, memory, and leader-follower processes. *International Review of Industrial and Organi*zational Psychology, 25, 1–33. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470661628.ch1
- Smith, R. J. (1994). China's cultural heritage: The Qing dynasty, 1644–1912.
 Westview Press.
- Smither, R. D. (1993). Authoritarianism, dominance, and social behavior: A perspective from evolutionary personality psychology. *Human Relations*, 46(1), 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1177/001872679304600103
- Takeuchi, R., Wang, A. C., & Farh, J. L. (2020). Asian conceptualization of leadership: Progresses and challenges. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, 7(1), 233–256. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-012119-045307
- Tepper, B. J. (2000). Consequences of abusive supervision. Academy of Management Journal, 43(2), 178–190. https://doi.org/10.2307/1556375
- Tepper, B. J., Simon, L., & Park, H. M. (2017). Abusive supervision. Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 4(1), 123–152. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062539
- Thompson, G., & Vecchio, R. P. (2009). Situational leadership theory: A test of three versions. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 20(5), 837–848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.06.014
- Tian, Q., & Sanchez, J. I. (2017). Does paternalistic leadership promote innovative behavior? The interaction between authoritarianism and benevolence. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 47(5), 235–246. https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12431
- Tsai, C. Y., Kim, J., Jin, F., Jun, M., Cheong, M., & Yammarino, F. J. (2022). Polynomial regression analysis and response surface methodology in leadership research. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *33*(1), Article 101592. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2021.101592
- Uhl-Bien, M., Riggio, R. E., Lowe, K. B., & Carsten, M. K. (2014).
 Followership theory: A review and research agenda. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 25(1), 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2013.11.007
- Vogel, R. M., Mitchell, M. S., Tepper, B. J., Restubog, S. L. D., Hu, C., Hua, W., & Huang, J.-C. (2015). A cross-cultural examination of subordinates' perceptions of and reactions to abusive supervision. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 36(5), 720–745. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.1984
- Wang, A. C. (2019). Developmental or exploitative? How Chinese leaders integrate authoritarianism and benevolence to cultivate subordinates. Academy of Management Discoveries, 5(3), 291–313. https://doi.org/10 .5465/amd.2018.0006
- Wang, A. C., Chiang, J. T. J., Chou, W. J., & Cheng, B. S. (2017). One definition, different manifestations: Investigating ethical leadership in the Chinese context. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management*, 34(3), 505–535. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-016-9495-7
- Wang, A. C., Chiang, T. J., Tsai, C. Y., Lin, T. T., & Cheng, B. S. (2013). Gender makes the difference: The moderating role of leader gender on the relationship between leadership styles and subordinate performance. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 122(2), 101– 113. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2013.06.001
- Wang, A. C., Tsai, C. Y., Dionne, S. D., Yammarino, F. J., Spain, S. M., Ling, H. C., Huang, M. P., Chou, L. F., & Cheng, B. S. (2018). Benevolence-dominant, authoritarianism-dominant, and classical paternalistic leadership: Testing their relationships with subordinate performance. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 29(6), 686–697. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.06.002
- Wang, L. P., & Maxwell, S. E. (2015). On disaggregating between-person and within-person effects with longitudinal data using multilevel models. *Psychological Methods*, 20(1), 63–83. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000030
- Zhang, Y., Huai, M. Y., & Xie, Y. H. (2015). Paternalistic leadership and employee voice in China: A dual process model. *The Leadership Quar*terly, 26(1), 25–36. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2014.01.002

Received June 27, 2020
Revision received January 2, 2023
Accepted February 22, 2023