The Nature Of Popular Nationalist Sentiment Across Sub-State Territories

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Contents

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Chapter 6: Crosscutting cleavages? Investigating the association between popular nationalism and political attitudes in sub-state territories

Abstract

What is the nature of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories? Researchers discuss the impact that nationalism can have on politics regularly, yet their approaches to studying nationalism tend to differ greatly. Many scholars of nationalism focus on political elites, particularly when it comes to analysing sub-state territories. This is an issue for two reasons. First, there is no guarantee that individuals will echo the positions of elites. Second, nationalism can emerge prior to their mobilisation by elites. Attempts to address this either focus on micro-interactions that are difficult to generalise or operationalise (state-level) nationalism in a narrow (often exclusive) sense. Some scholars now attempt to bridge this gap by taking an inductive approach to capturing nationalism. However, these scholars tend to focus on the state and there is no guarantee that state-level analyses will apply within specific sub-state territories. There are several scholars who examine sub-state territories, but these analyses tend to focus on relative state/sub-state identities, rather than nationalism. It is this gap that I fill here.

Consequently, the principal contribution of the thesis an investigation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. Through this, I introduce a novel operationalisation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. I then use this approach to answer three related research questions. How stable is popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories? What characteristics of a sub-state territory associate with the presence of popular nationalist sentiments? Does popular nationalist sentiment associate with other political attitudes within sub-state territories? Each of these questions relate to important debates within the existing literature on nationalism, and I demonstrate that my approach is a viable method of investigating them within sub-state territories. As a result, my thesis has important implications for how researchers investigate popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories.

Declaration

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About the Author

Prior to starting the PhD, I completed an undergraduate degree (Philosophy, Politics, and Economics - 2016) and a Master's degree (Political Science - 2018) at the University of Manchester. Alongside the PhD, my research experience includes working as a Research Assistant and Research Associate for the British Election Study. In addition, I am currently employed as a Research Associate at the Welsh Election Study, which is a part of the Wales Governance Centre at Cardiff University. My research interests include nationalism, identity politics, elections, voting behaviour, and survey methodology.

1. Introduction

Competition between state and sub-state advocates has long been a feature of politics research. Famously, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) claimed that competition between the centre (state) and the periphery (sub-state) was one of the key cleavages separating political actors. Over 50 years later, and this is often still the case. Independence continues to be the primary issue separating Scottish politics (Johns 2021, McMillan and Henderson 2021), Catalonia experienced widespread unrest after the Spanish Government's imposition of direct rule in 2017 (Cetrà and Harvey 2019),[1] new and old sub-state parties are prevalent in Quebec (Stokes 2022), and support for independence is growing in Wales (Griffiths 2021).

The importance of state/sub-state competition was particularly clear during the COVID-19[2] pandemic. Confusion over devolved competencies led to uneven handling of the pandemic across sub-state territories in Spain and Italy (Vampa 2021), while Conservative politicians have attacked devolution in the United Kingdom because of the implementation of different policies to handle the pandemic in England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales (e.g. Lord Frost 2022).

How should we analyse the competition between state and sub-state advocates within contemporary politics? One common method is to examine competing 'nationalisms.' Historically, Tilly (1994) built on Lipset and Rokkan (1967) to argue that nationalism separates into two forms: state-led (those who promote the homogenisation of the state

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[1] The imposition of direct rule followed the Catalan Parliament's declaration of independence after a (contested) referendum in 2017, which was the second referendum held on Catalan independence (with the previous taking place in 2014). Both were declared illegal by the Spanish government after being challenged in the Constitutional Court and were ultimately ignored (Cetrà and Harvey 2019).

[2] The pandemic led to other expressions of nationalism across the globe. In some instances, this was constructive, such as mask-wearing becoming a marker of national solidarity in some Asian countries like China, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Vietnam (Goode et al 2021). In others it was actively destructive, such as the vaccine 'nationalism' of rich countries hoarding supplies for their own citizens (Singh 2022)

around one culture) and state-seeking (those who seek independence to protect their distinct culture). Recent research moves away from this dichotomy to argue that there are different varieties of state and sub-state nationalism. For example, Cetrà and Swenden (2021) argue that there are different varieties of state nationalism, separated by the degree of sub-state autonomy and 'national' recognition of the sub-state territory that they are willing to permit. Similarly, Massetti and Schakel (2013, 2016) argue that sub-state nationalism separates into multiple different forms, depending on the level of decentralisation that they support.

Currently, the existing studies of 'nationalism' within sub-state territories tend to focus on political elites. While there is a lot to learn from elite behaviour, prioritising elites has limitations for understanding nationalist sentiment more broadly. Individuals may have different priorities to nationalist elites (Deschouwer 2013), or they may attach private meanings to nationalist discourse that diverge from the messaging offered by nationalist elites (Goode 2021). Consequently, elite-led expressions of nationalism may not reflect those present among the masses (Whitmeyer 2002). If elite-mass divergence is possible then it is important to ask: what is the nature of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories?

There is space in the territorial politics and popular nationalism literatures for addressing this question. While several scholars analyse individuals within sub-state territories, this research tends to focus on national identities (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a), and fewer scholars focus on nationalism specifically. I elaborate on the difference between these two terms later in this chapter, but to summarise: national identities are a necessary but not sufficient component of nationalism. Addressing my research question requires building on existing territorial politics research, and then connecting it with research that focuses on popular nationalism specifically.

There are two bodies of research that focus on popular nationalism, each with their own limitations for addressing my research question. Some scholars focus on expressions of nationalist sentiment within daily interactions (e.g. Billig 1995, Goode et al. 2021), but these studies are difficult to generalise beyond specific contexts (see Goode and Stroup 2015). Other researchers treat nationalism as an ideology that can be measured repeatedly (e.g. Ariely 2012, Lubbers and Coenders 2017, Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019), but these studies often either focus on restrictive definitions of nationalism (see Bonikowski 2016)

and/or they prioritise state-level[3] nationalisms (see Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002, Tatham and Mbaye 2018).

Given these limits, there is space for a generalisable investigation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories that does not privilege restrictive and/or state-level narratives. I address that gap within this thesis, with the principal contribution being an investigation into popular nationalist sentiment across sub-state territories. Through this investigation, I introduce a novel operationalisation of nationalisms within sub-state territories, which I then use to examine the stability, prevalence, and political implications of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories.

My investigation focuses on popular nationalist sentiment in sub-state territories that are located within established democracies in North America and Europe. I am not claiming that sub-state politics is only important in these locations. However, the political context facing sub-state movements is very different in territories that belong within non-democratic states, such as Hong Kong, and including cases from such different contexts might limit the comparability of my results. Indeed, Leerssen (2006 p559) warns that broadening their study to include territories outside Europe means comparing territories "with other phenomena including anticolonial movements and modernisation processes elsewhere in the world [which] would add an unworkable overload of variables." Similarly, in their study of secessionism in advanced democracies, Sorens (2005 p306) states "a global sample can be inappropriate when the effects of certain variables change depending on some other factor such as regime type." As a result, I shall not explore nationalism in unrecognised states, like Transnistria or South Ossetia, nor in sub-state territories found in non-consolidated democracies, like Chechnya, Kurdistan, or Tibet. Instead, the claims located within my thesis will relate exclusively to nationalist sentiment in sub-state territories located within established democracies within North America and Europe.[4] Future research can explore whether the results found within my study have broader applications beyond these contexts.

I separate my approach into five further chapters. To begin, I investigate existing approaches to analysing individuals within sub-state territories, which tend to focus on relative state/sub-state identities (chapter 2). I highlight their limitations, and then discuss what is needed to

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[3] Lubbers and Coenders (2017) include one sub-state territory (Flanders), but the other 19 cases are at the state-level. Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) label the tendency to focus on states as 'methodological nationalism,' which I discuss in greater detail later in this chapter.

[4] Alongside the conceptual problems, the relative lack of comparable individual-level data also undermines my ability to examine territories outside of Europe and North America.

capture 'nationalism' in sub-state territories. Following this, I take an inductive approach (using data from England, Scotland, and Wales) to account for the possibility that popular conceptions of nationalism may differ from those taken by elites (chapter 3). I find three distinct forms of popular nationalist sentiment (minority, autonomism, and statism), which extends existing elite-level analyses that separate sub-state nationalist parties in this way (e.g. Massetti and Schakel 2013) to the masses.

I then use an approximated[5] version of my operationalisation to investigate three further pertinent debates within the nationalism literature. In chapter 4, I examine the stability of popular nationalist sentiment over time. There is extensive debate over whether ethno-national ties are stable (e.g. Kasfir 1979, Smith 1995, Chandra and Wilkinson 2008) and whether individuals respond to political events (e.g. Vallée-Dubois et al. 2017, Fieldhouse et al. 2019). I find that each form of popular nationalist sentiment tends to be stable for most individuals over time, but political events like the 2016 EU referendum can have a demobilising effect on some of those on the poles of the approximated nationalism measure (i.e. statist and minority nationalism).

In chapter 5, I examine the structural factors that associate with the presence of different forms of nationalist sentiment across sub-state territories. Existing (elite-focused) debates[6] discuss the influence of cultural, economic, institutional, and geographic factors in the development of nationalism within sub-state territories (e.g. Rokkan and Urwin 1983, Massetti and Schakel 2016, Dalle Mulle 2017, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021). I explore whether these explanations also apply to the individual-level, as the perspectives of individuals are often absent from these institutional and structural arguments. I focus on 15 sub-state territories from Belgium, Canada, Spain, and Britain. My results provide a (tentative) challenge to the applicability of extending some existing elite-level accounts to individuals (i.e. the importance of geographic distance, regional authority, and relative economic prosperity).

Finally, I investigate the association of nationalist sentiment with political attitudes across sub-state territories in chapter 6. Researchers regularly attempt to understand the implications that nationalism has for other areas of political life. Within this body of research, scholars often separate nationalist movements into civic-ethnic (e.g. Kohn 1944, Keating 1997, Larsen

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[5] I elaborate on this approximation later in this chapter.
[6] I elaborate on this topic later in this chapter.

2017), inclusive-exclusive (e.g. Bieber 2018), or left-right forms (e.g. Erk 2005, 2010, Massetti and Schakel 2015), which are terms I elaborate on later in this chapter. I focus on six sub-state territories (Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, England, Scotland, and Wales). I find that popular nationalist sentiment in sub-state territories tends to associate with left-right self-placement (albeit in different directions in different territories), but there is less systematic division over ethnic-civic markers and specific economic and social attitudes.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the context necessary for investigating popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. I do this in five sections. First, I discuss how I define nationalism. I elaborate on the existing approaches mentioned earlier, and then discuss how my approach bridges the gap between 'everyday' and 'ideological' approaches. Second, I elaborate on the limits of existing studies of national identities in sub-state territories for my purposes. Third, I discuss how I operationalise my approach to nationalism and discuss its advantages. Fourth, I elaborate on the three additional debates surrounding popular nationalism within sub-state territories that I set out above (the stability of nationalist sentiment, where nationalist sentiment emerges, and how it associates with other political positions), and I demonstrate why it is important to address them. Finally, I conclude this chapter by briefly discussing the preliminary conclusions of this thesis, and the implications that they have for researchers of nationalism and territorial politics.

1.1. Defining nationalism

1.1.1.   What is a nation?

The first step in analysing nationalism is to define what is meant by a 'nation.' Some (primordial) scholars argue that nations are the manifestation of longstanding descent-based ethno-cultural ties within groups of people (Smith 1995). However, such definitions do not account for how groups, their identities, and their boundaries can change over time (Eller and Coughlin 1993, Wimmer 2013, Coakley 2018). Instead, many scholars argue that nations are 'socially constructed' entities, which are constructed by their members who believe that they have a connection with other people who share 'their' territory. Two famous examples of this are Renan's [1882 (1996), p42] claim that the nation's existence is a "daily plebiscite" and Anderson's (1983) claim that nations are imagined communities. In both cases, nations 'exist' as perspectives on how the world is organised (Brubaker 2002), which continue to 'exist' because their members tacitly agree that they do.

It is important to differentiate 'nations' from 'states.' States are territorial, political, institutional, and legal entities (Connor 1978), whose boundaries may contain several nations[7] (Walby 2003). Despite the existence of multi-nation states, there is often a tendency to conflate the terms 'nation' and 'state' (Walby 2003), with many researchers focusing their analyses on supposed 'nation-states' (Tatham and Mbaye 2018). Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002) argue that researchers who do this commit a form of "methodological nationalism," as they treat the nation-state as the "natural social and political form of the modern world" (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002 p302). While they made this point 20 years ago, more recent researchers continue to discuss how researchers often focus on 'nation-states' (see Henderson et al. 2014, Tatham and Mbaye 2018).

Methodological nationalism is problematic because imposing state-level analyses onto sub-state politics can mask significant differences between territories. For example, Schakel and Jeffery (2013) found that voters treat sub-state elections[8] differently depending on whether they reside within territories that are powerful, contain non-state-wide parties, or have the potential to signal changes in state-wide governments. Similarly, Henderson et al. (2021) found that national identities associated with distinct patterns of voting behaviour in the 2016 EU referendum in England to Scotland and Wales. Consequently, ignoring sub-state territories may lead researchers to inaccurate conclusions about the politics of multi-national states, which is especially problematic when the politics of sub-state territories can have significant influence beyond their borders.[9]

However, while a state may contain several sub-state territories, not all these territories will be 'nations.' Determining whether a sub-state territory is a nation or a region is often a matter of (contested) perspective (Guibernau 2004, Maxwell 2018). For example, perspectives on Spain range from it being a unitary nation to a state containing distinct 'nations' of Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia (Keating and Wilson 2009), and the promotion of these perspectives can change over time (Basta 2018). Given the inherently subjective nature of this distinction, I do not attempt to resolve this debate within my thesis and use 'sub-state territory' as an inclusive alternative.

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[7] The boundaries of a 'nation' may also overlap those of multiple states (Walby 2003).

[8] Schakel and Jeffery (2013) make this point in their argument against the wholesale application of 'second-order' election theories to sub-state territories. Reif and Schmitt's (1980) second-order election theory contends that some elections are less important to voters, who thus use them as an opportunity to protest against the central government.

[9] see Tatham (2018) on Walloon politics holding up a trade deal between Canada and the European Union.

As discussed, the classic framework for understanding sub-state polities has been through Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) centre-periphery cleavage. Scholars have often found this framework useful, but I endeavour to avoid framing sub-state politics entirely in this way because the notions of 'centre' and 'periphery' do not apply evenly across all sub-state territories. To elaborate, centre-periphery framework is less effective within territories that lack effective sub-state representation – either formally due to the lack of explicitly sub-state institutions or informally due to the close connections between the identity of a sub-state territory and the state as a whole.[10] The most obvious example here is England, where close political, legal, and historical ties lead to the regular conflation of Englishness with Britishness (see Kumar 2010). Determining what is the 'centre' and what is the 'periphery' is rather difficult when the identities and institutions are often related closely.

Similarly, the centre-periphery framework is limited when there is disagreement over what level of government is the 'centre' of politics. The assumption of the classic framework is that the 'state' level represents the centre because it is often the dominant level of government. Yet, in some sub-state territories, this is not how individuals view things. For example, Henderson et al. (2023) found that the proportion of Scottish individuals that consider the Scottish Government to be more important than the UK Government has been increasing progressively over the last 20 years. Consequently, the traditional approach of considering the state as the 'centre' and the sub-state territory as 'periphery' may misrepresent how individuals understand political competition within these areas.

Instead of using the centre-periphery frame, political competition in sub-state territories may be better understood through the notion of 'small worlds.' The phrase 'small words' originates from a collection of essays edited by Elkins and Simeon (1980), and the underlying premise was that 'regions' can have distinct political cultures that differentiate them from other parts of the state (see Henderson 2010a for a summary). The existence of distinct political cultures within these small worlds can help explain regional differences in political attitudes (Henderson 2010b), and also the cultivation of region-specific party-political systems (Hepburn 2010) – two factors that further differentiate the sub-state territory from the rest of the state.

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[10] For discussion of the latter point, see the literature on the different perceptions of identity compatibility observed between majorities and minorities within a state (e.g. Staerkle et al. 2005, Elkins and Sides 2007, Staerkle et al. 2010).

When may these 'small worlds' emerge? Henderson (2010a) points to two potential explanations: composition and socialisation. First, sub-state territories may contain different levels of certain demographic groups, each with their own political outlooks, and the level of these groups contributes to the aggregate-level differences between the territories. Composition-based arguments have historically been used to explain differences between sub-state territories. For example, early analyses of unique patterns of voting behaviour in Scotland and Wales focused on the relative proportion of working- and middle-class individuals within these territories compared to other parts of Britain (Blondel 1963, Butler and Stokes 1969).

Second, the presence of distinct sub-state institutions may serve to socialise people into understanding politics through the lens of their sub-state territory. In this approach, experience with territory-specific education systems, a territory-specific government, and a territory-specific media (potentially communicating in a territory-specific language) creates a sense that said territory is distinct from the rest of the state (Breton 1964, Harty 2001). As people view their territory as distinct from the rest of the state, they have different expectations over what is required from government to suit their territory compared to the rest of the state. These different expectations, and their interaction with political elites who aim to represent them, then leads to the formation of distinct political cultures within these sub-state territories. In any case, rather than following the centre-periphery framework, the notion of 'small worlds' can help researchers understand how elites and voters can construct their political lives in different ways to the rest of a state.

1.1.2. <u>What is nationalism?</u>

Nationalism research is a broad and often contentious topic, which researchers approach in several different ways. Bonikowski (2016) argues that scholarly definitions of nationalism are split along two dimensions: elites (politicians, political actors) versus individuals (the public) and ideology (a set of ideas) versus practice (a way of viewing and acting in the world). I display these dimensions within Table 1.1.

Under this framework, there are two bodies of elite-focused literature. The first set of elite-focused literature analyses how elites use nationalism as a tool for justifying their policies or mobilising support (e.g. Freeden 1998). Examples of this include the UK Conservative party, who have shifted between mobilising Englishness (see Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a) and promoting more unitary conceptions of Britain post-Brexit (Kenny and Sheldon 2021)

depending on their policy goals. Another example is the Popular Party in Spain, who resist calls for another Catalan independence referendum by promoting a mono-national conception of Spain (Cetrà and Harvey 2019).

Table 1.1. Dimensions of nationalism research

	Focus on elites	Focus on individuals
Ideology	Nationalism as a set of principles held by elites that drive their actions	Nationalism as a set of beliefs held by individuals that drive their actions
Practice	Nationalism as a tool that elites use to achieve their political goals	Nationalism as something that individuals express and participate in during their everyday lives

Source: Adapted from Bonikowski (2016 p430).

The second set of elite-focused literature treats nationalism as an ideology expressed by political elites. By ideology, Bonikowski (2016 p430) argues that these researchers treat nationalism as a "narrow set of ideas." For example, Gellner (1983 p1) argues that nationalism represents "a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." These principles may then drive the behaviour of political elites and the policies that they promote.

Conceptualising nationalism as either the practice or ideology of elites is obviously ideal for researchers who wish to understand elite behaviour and its implications. For example, Massetti and Schakel (2015) investigate the left-right economic positions of nationalist elites, while Ko and Choi (2022) explore how the rhetoric of nationalist elites associates with immigration policies. Questions like these are of particular importance to researchers who view nationalism as an elite-driven process. For example, Miley (2007) argues that Catalan nationalism was an 'elite-driven' movement because elites were more likely than the general population to identify as 'Catalan' and see Catalonia as a 'nation.'[11] For these researchers, popular expressions of nationalism are ultimately driven by elites. These include Tilly (1996 p304), who argued that state elites "generated bottom-up nationalism" by alienating "political

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[11] Miley's (2007 p18) argument rests on the claim that "if Catalan nationalism were a "common project," springing up from the "grass roots," then we should find roughly the same rates and patterns of recognition of Catalonia's status as a nation among elites as we do among masses."

brokers who had strong investments" in the sub-state territory, who in turn then "rallied supporters in the name of oppressed and threatened nations." In general, this body of research argues that nationalist elites lead the public.

The widespread availability of data on political elites assists researchers in conducting these analyses. For example, Massetti and Schakel (2016 p59) were able to create an original dataset that covers "11 countries, 49 regions, and 78 parties for the 1940s-2000s." Other comparative datasets that include information on sub-state territorial parties include the Comparative Manifestos Project (Volkens et al. 2021), the Regional Manifestos Project (Alonso et al. 2015), and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017). These are often more widely available than comparative datasets on individuals within sub-state territories, which either do not exist or contain very small sub-samples of specific territories like the International Constitutional Values Survey (Schakel and Brown 2021).[12]

However, there are risks to privileging the behaviour of elites. Researchers have long argued that public attitudes can diverge from those of political elites (e.g. Converse 1964), and it is likely that nationalism is no different. For example, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that researchers often privilege 'categories of analysis' (i.e. understandings of identities that they impose on their subjects) and overlook the forms of nationalism that are expressed among the population (categories of practice). As a result, privileging elite conceptions of nationalism may lead researchers to separate the world into distinct groups, but there is no guarantee that social actors understand the world in this way (Brubaker 2002). Consequently, Cohen (1996) argues that focusing on elites may lead researchers to inaccurate conclusions over the nature of nationalist sentiment within a territory.

Why may elite-mass divergence occur? Whitmeyer (2002) points to two potential reasons. First, individuals may not respond to nationalist elites.[13] For example, Hjerm and Schnabel (2010) argue that elite rhetoric had little influence on the intensity of nationalist sentiment in 21 European states. Second, popular nationalism can emerge prior to elite mobilisation. For example, contemporary English nationalism was regularly criticised by elites before its eventual mobilisation by UKIP and then the Conservatives (Hayton 2016, Mann and Fenton

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[12] 6000 respondents from 142 territories (Schakel and Brown 2021).

[13] This is not to say that elites play no role. Whitmeyer (2002) argue that political elites cannot create nationalist sentiment within a territory, but they are able to alter how nationalism is expressed. Helbling et al (2016) provides evidence for this view, as they find that exclusionary elite rhetoric encourages individuals to adopt exclusionary conceptions of national identity. My argument is that existing research focuses on elite conceptions of nationalism, which do not tell the whole story.

2017, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). In addition, it is possible that individuals may have different priorities to political elites. For instance, Deschouwer (2013) found that the salience of institutional reform among political elites in Flanders and Wallonia was not matched by the public in either territory. Similarly, individuals may have different visions of the national community to elites. In this vein, van der Zwet (2015) found that members of the Scottish National Party had different visions of who belonged to the Scottish national community than political elites. Any of these reasons may lead to differences between individuals and elites.

Consequently, understanding potential differences between individuals and elites requires investigating popular nationalism specifically. According to Bonikowski (2016), there are two dimensions of nationalism research that focus on non-elites: everyday nationalism and nationalism as an ideology (see Table 1.1). I mentioned these two approaches in the introduction to this chapter, and now I elaborate on them here.

The first set of scholars focus on expressions of nationalism in everyday practice. One of the most famous studies in this field is Billig (1995), who coined the phrase 'banal nationalism' to represent how people invoke the nation in their daily interactions, practices, and routines[14] to the extent that they become 'banal' (i.e. taken for granted). Conceptualising nationalism as an everyday practice allows researchers to investigate different questions to those who focus on elites. For example, Goode and Stroup (2015) argue that everyday nationalism approaches can help researchers investigate how national attachments persist during times of low salience and how 'official' expressions of nationalism are replicated among the masses (among other questions).

Understanding these 'everyday' expressions of nationalism requires focusing on the daily behaviour of individuals. For example, Goode et al. (2021) analyse expressions of nationalism in Vietnamese music videos, flyers for street parties in Britain, and images of panic buying online. Studies like this can provide researchers with rich qualitative information about how individuals understand and participate (potentially unknowingly) in nationalism. The downside is that the research is often very granular, and thus difficult to generalise beyond very specific situations and contexts (Goode and Stroup 2015). Indeed,

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[14] Examples include news segments that separate 'home' from 'foreign' stories, weather reports that focus on 'the country,' and the waving of flags at sporting events (Billig 1995). In each case, the existence of the nation is assumed implicitly.

some scholars criticise everyday nationalism for being too "micro-analytical and descriptive" (Smith 2008 p567).

The second dimension of non-elite nationalism research (according to Bonikowski 2016) is that which treats nationalism as an ideology. The main body of research that understands nationalism as an ideology tends to view it as the belief that one's nation is better than others. For example, Kosterman and Feshbach (1989 p271) define nationalism as the "perception of national superiority and an orientation toward national dominance." This approach is prevalent within a large proportion of quantitative sociological and psychological research (e.g. Green et al. 2011, Ariely 2012, Satherley et al. 2019), which separates national pride (patriotism) from a belief in national superiority (nationalism).

1.1.3. Nationalism-patriotism and civic-ethnic nationalism

The literature on nationalism and patriotism has developed extensively from Kosterman and Feshbach's (1989) initial definition, with the literature proposing several distinct forms of patriotism – each building on the belief that patriotism represents the "love of country" (Schildkraut 2014 p454). One example is symbolic patriotism, which combines pride in the nation with a sense of pride in the symbolic representations of a nation[15] – such as the flags, anthems, and perceived values tied to that nation (see Parker 2010). A further two forms of patriotism were introduced by Shatz et al. (1999): blind (unquestioning positive allegiance) and constructive (loyal but open to criticism of current practices).[16]

While the distinction between nationalism and patriotism has been a fertile area of research, there are three ambiguities surrounding this debate that discourage me from following this definition of nationalism. The first ambiguity concerns the analytical distinction between nationalism and patriotism, which is sometimes questionable. Despite being considered separate concepts, measures of "pride" and "national superiority" often correlate positively with one another (Huddy and Khatib 2007), with many people often holding 'nationalism' and 'patriotism' in unison[17] (Roccas and Berlin 2016, Satherley et al. 2019, Ariely 2020). These connections may not always be evident (see Gries et al. 2011), but the potential for

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[15] To complicate the conceptual distinctions further, the focus on symbols like flags and anthems is similar to what Billig (1995) defines as 'banal nationalism.'

[16] There are several other definitions of patriotism (see Huddy and Khatib 2007, Mußotter 2022), but this is not the place to list them exhaustively.

[17] There are empirical problems with disentangling the connection between the two terms, as scholars often operationalise nationalism and patriotism in different ways (with a variety of measures). This tendency led Mußotter (2022 p2192) to claim that "scholars have primarily measured national attitudes via a concept that they have failed to study in a systematic fashion."

close connections to exist between nationalism and patriotism measures have led scholars, like Bonikowski (2016), to dispute whether there is a clear analytical distinction between the concepts in practice.

The second ambiguity concerns the political implications of patriotism and nationalism respectively. The common designation of nationalism as the belief in national superiority inherently conflates nationalism with exclusive social attitudes and authoritarianism – whereas patriotism is perceived to be far more inclusive (Schatz et al. 1999, Huddy and Khatib 2007, Green et al. 2011, Osborne et al. 2017). Some scholars may argue that this conflation is acceptable because nationalism (as they define it) *is* exclusive.

However, this conflation is problematic in practice because it precludes the existence of potentially inclusive forms of nationalism, which can be open to minority groups. The potential for such forms of nationalism has long been espoused by proponents of 'liberal nationalism' in theory (see Miller 2019). In practice, the inclusive cultural policy positions (and particularly pro-migrant positions) taken by many sub-state nationalist elites (see Bradbury and Andrews 2010, Jeram 2014) suggests that nationalists can also take inclusive positions towards some out-groups. Indeed, some of these sub-state nationalist elites make great efforts to define themselves against the perceived racism and xenophobia of elites in state institutions (see Sobolewska and Ford 2020).[18] Conflating nationalism with exclusion thus risks mischaracterising sub-state nationalist movements.

In addition, the supposedly inherent 'inclusive' character of patriotism is empirically problematic because it is often context dependent. For example, Li and Brewer (2004) found that patriotism correlated with intolerance of out-groups when respondents were primed with the concept of a 'common essence' of being American. Similarly, Esqueda and Schlosser (2021) found that constructive patriotism only associated negatively with anti-immigration attitudes when there was no 'realistic' or 'symbolic' threat to the respondent. The importance of context is emphasised further by the potential for nationalism and patriotism to mean different things in different places. For example, in their study, Gries et al. (2011 p16) conclude that "patriotism and nationalism should not be assumed to have the same meaning or consequences" in the USA and China. Consequently, the ambiguity in the analytical

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[18] One may challenge my argument and claim that that this is merely a matter of semantics – that these 'liberal' forms of nationalism are instead expressions of symbolic or constructive patriotism. However, to claim that a member of a sub-state party like the Scottish *National* Party, who advocates for sub-state autonomy and the promotion of Scotland on the world stage while also supporting civil rights and opposing anti-migrant policies from Westminster, is somehow not a 'nationalist' seems incoherent.

distinction and political consequences of the nationalism-patriotism debate discourages me from applying this approach across sub-state territories.

At this point it is important to discuss another common method of separating nationalist movements – the ethnic-civic dichotomy. This method of defining nationalist movements focuses on the characteristics that they claim a person requires in order to belong to the nation. These are either expressed by political elites (e.g. Kohn 1944, Keating 1997) or by individuals (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010, Larsen 2017). Such studies separate movements that prioritise voluntary markers of national belonging like respect for institutions (civic nationalism) from movements that prioritise inherited markers like ancestry (ethnic nationalism).

The ethnic-civic dichotomy has been particularly relevant for research into sub-state nationalisms. While conventionally seen as 'ethnic' due to their focus on protecting national cultures (Hobsbawm 1990), some scholars argue that sub-state movements (i.e. elites) have become more 'civic' by shifting towards emphasising voluntary markers of nationhood (e.g. Keating 1997). There is overlap between the nationalism-patriotism and the ethnic-civic literatures – with 'nationalism' tied to ethnic and 'patriotism' tied to civic conceptions of the nation (see Mußotter 2022). Like the nationalism-patriotism debate, the ethnic-civic forms of nationalism are regularly perceived to correlate political attitudes – with civic nationalism being far more inclusive of out-groups than ethnic nationalism (Hjerm 1998, Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011).

While the ethnic-civic dichotomy has (at times) been a useful tool for understanding the different characteristics of nationalist movements, it also suffers from the same two issues that emerge within the nationalism-patriotism debate. First, the empirical distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism is often questionable. Conventionally, researchers described whole 'nationalisms' as either ethnic or civic – starting with Kohn's (1944) distinction between Eastern-ethnic and Western-civic nationalisms. Scholars have long recognised the limits of this approach, as ethnic and civic markers can be prioritised by different individuals within the same territory. Yet, some researchers still characterise entire movements as 'ethnic' or 'civic,' such as Calzada (2018) who argues that sub-state movements are 'civic' and state-focused movements are 'ethnic.'

Designating whole movements as civic or ethnic is problematic because individuals often hold both positions in tandem. Indeed, many researchers have found that people who value

supposedly 'civic' forms of nationalism often tend to also value 'ethnic' forms of nationalism (Kiss and Park 2014, Ariely 2020, Paul 2020). The combined prioritisation of ethnic and civic markers is also present even when political elites focus on civic markers. For example, van der Zwet (2015) found that members of the Scottish National Party could be separated into those that prioritise solely civic markers and those that prioritise civic *and* ethnic markers of Scottishness. Thus, as with nationalism-patriotism, ethnic-civic markers may be conceptually distinct, but researchers have found that they are often difficult to separate analytically.

The analytical ambiguities with the ethnic-civic dichotomy are complicated further by the lack of consistency in designating specific markers as ethnic or civic across studies (Brubaker 2004). The best example is citizenship, which is labelled 'ethnic' by Kunovich (2009) and Helbling et al. (2016), 'civic' by Shulman (2002) and Kiss and Park (2014), and indeterminate by Reeskens and Hooghe (2010). One explanation for the different designations is that markers can have different meanings in different territories, which would then make it difficult to distinguish between the concepts *a priori* in practice. In any case, if researchers disagree on what constitutes ethnic or civic nationalism, then it becomes difficult to conclusively distinguish between them in practice.

Alongside the analytical ambiguities, the second ambiguity surrounding the ethnic-civic dichotomy is that the supposed inclusivity of civic markers is also questionable. This problem is very similar to that which I discussed for patriotism. Researchers have found that 'civic' forms of nationalism associate with more inclusive positions to outgroups (Hjerm 1998, Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011), but recent research emphasises that this connection is not universal. For example, Fozdar and Low (2015) found that individuals in Australia use traditionally 'civic' markers, such as respecting laws and institutions, to justify the exclusion of Muslims from the nation on the basis that they are culturally incapable of satisfying this 'civic' criteria. Similar results have been found for countries across Northwestern Europe, where prioritising civic markers associates with anti-Muslim attitudes (Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020). The tendency for civic markers to hide exclusionary attitudes is not limited to attitudes towards Muslims, as Zhuravlev and Ishchenko (2020) found that the Euromaidan, which encouraged a civic sense of nationhood in Ukraine, sometimes also legitimated the ethnic 'othering' of its perceived opponents. Consequently, as with patriotism, if the implications of 'civic' nationalism are unclear, then it becomes difficult to understand what we are capturing when we measure them.

It is important to note that I am not trying to argue that there is never an analytical distinction between nationalism and patriotism or between ethnic and civic nationalism. Scholars have, at times, found that the concepts can be separate and that they can have independent effects on politics (see Roccas and Berlin 2016, Reeskens and Hooghe 2010 for summaries). My argument is that the ambiguities surrounding the current debates, and their difficulties explaining the existence of 'inclusive' sub-state nationalist movements (whose members can still prioritise 'ethnic' markers of nationhood), limits their potential as frameworks for understanding nationalism across sub-state territories.

The difficulties applying either framework for understanding nationalism is complicated by the tendency for political elites to use them as rhetorical tools. In the case of nationalism and patriotism, political actors often attempt to differentiate between 'our' good patriotism and 'their' bad nationalism (Billig 1995). The implication behind this rhetoric is that "nationalism has to be curtailed …, whereas patriotism is promoted as a civic virtue" (Mußotter 2022 p2177-8). In sub-state terms, this rhetoric is often employed by state elites who pit "(state) patriots against (substate) nationalists" (Cetrà & Brown Swan 2020 p2). For instance, many party elites across the political spectrum in Spain and the UK promote 'patriotic' positions that claim that the nation-state is something democratic, inclusive, and superior to the comparatively 'divisive' sub-state nationalism (Brown Swan & Cetrà 2020).

Likewise, several political actors differentiate between 'their' bad ethnic nationalism and 'our' good civic nationalism – leading scholars to argue that this dichotomy is often normative in nature (Brubaker 2004). For example, pro-state elites in Spain regularly attack Catalan nationalists for being a xenophobic 'ethnic' movement, despite their being little evidence to support these claims (Vergés-Gifra and Serra 2020). Combined with the analytical ambiguities surrounding both the nationalism-patriotism and ethnic-civic debates, the colloquial rhetorical difficulties distinguishing between the concepts makes them difficult frameworks for understanding nationalism within sub-state territories. Consequently, I take a different approach, which I detail now.

1.1.4. How do I define nationalism?

Despite the limits of existing conceptualisations, there are advantages to treating nationalism as an ideology. Researchers who treat nationalism as an ideology often capture nationalist sentiments through survey methods, which allow researchers to produce findings that can be

generalised to whole populations[19] (Bonikowski 2016). The potential for replication allows researchers to capture nationalist sentiment in the same terms across different contexts, which facilitates comparative and longitudinal analyses. For example, scholars may wish to investigate how nationalist sentiment associates with policy preferences across territories (e.g. Green et al. 2011, Ariely 2012). Treating nationalism as an ideology allows researchers to address research questions that require focusing on whole territories rather than specific instances.

Currently, there is little overlap between the literatures on everyday nationalism and those who treat nationalism as an ideology. I use a definition of nationalism that helps bridge the gap between them. Thus, I follow Bieber's (2018 p520) definition of nationalism as a:

> *"Malleable and narrow ideology, which values membership in a nation greater than other groups (i.e. based on gender, parties, or socio-economic group), seeks distinction from other nations, and strives to preserve the nation and give preference to political representation by the nation for the nation."*

Another way of phrasing this is that nationalism is a 'thin-centred' ideology, which conveys no further ideational commitments beyond those central to the ideology itself (Freeden 1998). Some scholars, like Freeden (1998) or Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2019), explicitly dispute the view that nationalism is an ideology – instead arguing that it is better understood as a rhetorical tool used by elites to legitimise other political positions (like conservatism or liberalism). While this can sometimes be the case, I disagree that this is the case universally. The promotion or preservation of the nation is an ideological goal in and of itself for nationalist movements in sub-state territories, whose primary priority is traditionally the protection of their national culture, territory, and community (Rokkan and Urwin 1983).

In addition, understanding nationalism as purely a political tool does not account for the durability of national ties over time (see Antonsich 2009, Bieber 2018). According to Bonikowski (2016), visions of nationalism as a thin-centred ideology tend to be the property of political elites, but I argue that both elites and individuals can hold such understandings of nationalism. Taking this approach allows me to build on existing methods of capturing popular nationalism, as I can produce generalisable research without presupposing an exclusive form of nationalism. I shall now elaborate on how I do this throughout my thesis.

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[19] This is not to say that survey methods do not have their own limitations, particularly when it comes to the limited availability of measures and the quality of survey samples, as Bonikowski (2016) acknowledges.

1.2. National identity and nationalism

Alongside research of popular nationalism, my research also connects with studies of political attitudes within sub-state territories. These studies tend to focus on relative state/sub-state identities. For example, some scholars investigate how national identities associate with constitutional preferences, including attitudes to independence (Serrano 2013, Guinjoan 2021) or devolved authority (Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, 2021b, Schakel and Brown 2021). Other scholars examine the association of national identities with political attitudes, like left-right self-placement (Dinas 2012, Strijbis and Leonisio 2012, Galais and Serrano 2019) or attitudes towards Europe (Henderson et al. 2021). Others investigate the association of sub-state identities with political behaviour like electoral turnout (Henderson and McEwen 2015). Studies like these go a very long way to help us understand the politics of sub-state territories.

Yet, existing work often focuses on national identities, and my focus is on nationalism. While national identity is a prerequisite for nationalism, it is important to stress that the two are separate. National identity reflects a sense belonging to one's nation (Connor 1978). However, there is no guarantee that those who acknowledge their membership of a national community are enthusiastic about it (see Fenton 2007). Even among those who value their national identity, strong identification alone is not enough to be a nationalist. According to Bieber's (2018) definition, a nationalist must prioritise their national identity over their membership of other groups. These groups could range from their social class to their gender, to being a parent or the political party that they support (Chandra 2012).

Prioritisation of one's national identity may be more common among those with strong national identities (see chapter 2), but the concepts are not interchangeable. Individuals may report strong identity with a group that they do not consider central depending on the circumstances they find themselves in (Chandra 2012). Indeed, many individuals take their national identity for granted until it is threatened (Billig 1995) or referenced explicitly, such as during national celebrations or sporting events (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). Consequently, it is not conceptually possible to capture popular nationalism by focusing on national identity alone, as such measures would fail to capture whether someone prioritises the nation over their other social identities.[20] I elaborate on this discussion in chapter 2 and 3.

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[20] It is important to stress that prioritising the nation does not mean that a person does not have other strong identities, just that the nation is one that they tend to prioritise.

Why focus on nationalism instead of national identity? One reason is that there are empirical limitations with focusing on just national identity within sub-state territories. Conventional relative territorial identity approaches use the Linz-Moreno scale (Moreno 1995), which separates individuals based on whether they identify as (for example): only Spanish, more Spanish than Catalan, equally Spanish as Catalan, more Catalan than Spanish, or only Catalan. Contemporary researchers now tend to move away from this measure because it overstates dual identity (Guinjoan and Rodon 2016) and has problems capturing identity intensity (see Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). The latter problem is particularly important because the association between national identity and political attitudes can differ depending on the strength of the national identity (Miller and Ali 2014). Researchers now tend to use measures of relative territorial identity, which subtract state identity (measured on a scale) from sub-state identity (measured on a separate scale) (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, 2021b). However, I argue that these approaches still have issues with identity intensity within the centre of the distribution (see chapter 2).

Thus, I investigate the association between relative territorial identities and identity centrality[21] in chapter 2. Overall, I find that existing measures struggle to capture the nuanced relationships present between relative state/sub-state identities. Existing measures struggle to capture the relative importance that people place on their state and sub-state identities, which does not change in a linear or symmetrical fashion with relative identity strength. Furthermore, existing measures are unable to capture the substantive differences between those with weak-but-equal and strong-but-equal state and sub-state identities. Finally, I examine the comparability of 'attachment' and 'identity' scales. Some scholars implicitly treat attachment and identity as equivalent in their analyses (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019, Guntermann et al. 2020), but I illustrate that survey respondents do not treat them as equivalent. Failing to capture this complexity is a problem because it may lead researchers to inaccurate analyses, so researchers should move beyond singular measures of territorial identities.

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[21] Identities that are fundamental to how a person describes themselves (Cameron 2004).

1.3.Nationalism within sub-state territories

So, how should researchers capture nationalism within sub-state territories? And what forms of nationalism may be present within sub-state territories? As discussed, much of the literature on nationalism within sub-state territories focuses on elite-level expressions of nationalism. Due to the potential for divergence between elites and individuals (discussed earlier in this chapter), and the relative lack of information on popular 'nationalism' specifically, I advocate for taking an inductive approach that allows for the construction of nationalist 'groups' without *a priori* information. I take this approach in chapter 3, which allows me to introduce a novel operationalisation of nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories.

I use data from wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP, Fieldhouse et al. 2021), which contains a set of original survey instruments that allow me to explore the forms of nationalism that emerge within majority (England) and minority (Scotland and Wales) sub-state territories. I separate individuals within each nation into categories using latent class analysis, which is an inductive method of separating individuals into categories based on patterns in observed data (Vermunt 2010). I use four variables to operationalise Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism: their state (British) identity, their sub-state national identity (English/Scottish/Welsh), their constitutional preference (support independence, devolution, centralisation, or don't know), and identity centrality (whether individuals think their state or sub-state identity is central to their sense of self or not).

Overall, I argue that individuals can be separated into five 'ideal type' categories, three of which I label as 'nationalist' (see Table 1.2). The first category I label 'minority nationalists,' as they tend to conform to the description of sub-state (peripheral) nationalists in the conventional literature (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Tilly 1994, Kymlicka and Straehle 1999). These individuals report strong sub-state identity, tend to prioritise their membership of the sub-state nation, and often (but not always) support sub-state independence. The second 'nationalist' category also exhibits strong sub-state identity and prioritises their membership of the sub-state nation, but the members oppose independence from the state. Henderson (2007) and Massetti and Schakel (2013) use similar terminology for elites that take similar positions to this this (autonomists), so I apply the same term to these individuals.

Table 1.2: Nationalism classification

	Constitutional preference	Nation-state identity	Sub-state identity	Identity centrality	Designation
Minority	Independence (mostly)	Weak	Strong	Sub-state	Nationalist
Autonomist	Devolved authority	Moderate to strong	Strong	Sub-state	Nationalist
Statist	Divided (devolved or centralisation)	Strong	Weak to moderate	State	Nationalist
Dual Identifier	Divided	(Moderate to strong but **equal**)		Neither	Non-nationalist
Indifferent	Divided	Weak to moderate		Neither	Non-nationalist

The third 'nationalist' category contains those individuals who express strong identification with the state (and relatively weaker identification with the sub-state territory) and prioritise their membership of the state over that of other social groups. As a result, these individuals represent the opposite side of the territorial cleavage to minority nationalists, so I label them 'statists.' Consistent with Cetrà and Swenden's (2021) work on state nationalist elites, some statist individuals support devolution over centralisation. However, I do not disaggregate this category further, despite their differing constitutional preferences. Unlike autonomists and minority nationalists, the members of the 'statist' category report very similar levels of state identity, sub-state identity, and identity centrality. Consequently, I argue that the differences are not large enough here (empirically or substantively) to warrant separating pro-devolution statists and the pro-centralisation statists into different categories.

The final two categories are non-nationalists: indifferent identifiers and dual identifiers. The first category I label indifferent identifiers because they do not tend to prioritise their national identification. Indifference does not mean ignorance, as members of this group often report moderate levels of national identity. Instead, this group aligns with Fenton's (2007) argument that some individuals do not place great importance on their national identity. The final category are dual identifiers: those whose identification with the state is equal to that of the sub-state territory, and thus do not have the prioritisation required to be 'nationalist' under

Bieber's (2018) definition. I uncover four dual identity categories in England, which I separate into two forms: those with strong-but-equal identities and those with moderate-but-equal identities in England. These results support my findings in chapter 2 and emphasise that researchers should avoid treating dual identifiers as a single category where possible.

1.4. Investigating further debates within the nationalism literature

Once I have introduced my operationalisation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories, I then use it to address three other important debates within the nationalism literature. These relate to the stability of popular ethno-national ties over time, the types of territories where nationalism is most prevalent, and the political attitudes that associate with popular nationalist sentiment. I discuss each of these debates in turn now.

1.4.1. The stability of nationalism within sub-state territories

Is popular nationalist sentiment a stable trait among individuals? Currently, there is little research that addresses this question directly. Instead, researchers tend to focus on the stability of national/ethnic identities. For example, primordial scholars like Gil-White (1999) argue that individuals tend to see ethno-national identities as fixed characteristics that someone inherits from their parents. In this case, national identities are perceived to be entirely stable over the course of someone's life. Alternatively, van Evera (2001) acknowledges that national identities are constructed (in that they are not naturally occurring phenomena), but that once someone has a national identity is becomes very difficult to change.

Primordial arguments face regular criticism from scholars of national identities, particularly from constructivist scholars who argue that national identities can emerge, collapse, or change over time (e.g. Wimmer 2013). However, there is little consensus in the constructivist literature on how much identities change over time. Some scholars, like Kasfir (1979), believe that identities are never stable because they change from one moment to the next depending on the circumstances that we find ourselves in. Others, like Chandra and Wilkinson (2008), argue that some identities are stable in the short-term, but can change in the long-term. If this is the case, then the question becomes how to define 'short' and 'long' term periods (Bayer 2009).

Alternatively, some researchers argue that identities are often stable, until some event forces them to re-evaluate their position. Social movement scholars emphasise the role that salient

events (and their politicisation by political elites) can have on mobilising individuals to support particular positions (e.g. Birkland 1998, Boin et al. 2009). These events may also influence a person's national identities or constitutional preferences. For example, Vallée-Dubois et al. (2017) argue that reactions to events, like the rejection of the Meech Lake Accord,[22] played the largest role in changing preferences for Quebecois sovereignty between 1985 and 2012.

Other events may include changes to the institutional status quo. For example, Skey (2012) argues that the introduction of devolution in the United Kingdom made some in England feel disadvantaged, which encouraged them to prioritise their English identity.[23] The importance of events is consistent with Fieldhouse et al.'s (2019) work on electoral shocks, which discusses the cumulative impact that a series of critical events had on political behaviour within Britain (particularly between 2004 and 2017). The purpose of exploring these dynamics is to examine why (if at all) individuals move towards (or away from) nationalism, which has important implications for how researchers understand the mobilisation of nationalism by political elites.

To explore the stability of popular nationalist sentiment, I introduce an approximated version of my categorisation. Such an approach is necessary because most surveys do not contain the identity centrality measures that represent a core component of my inductive approach in chapter 3. Thus, I attempt to approximate it using relative identity strength and constitutional preference only. In doing so, I create my approximated nationalism measure (ANM) (Table 1.3), which I validate by comparing the proportion of the original categories that are found within the new categories. I relabel the 'minority nationalist' category as 'secessionist' given that my approximation relies on independence support, and that this was not a necessary condition for being a 'minority' nationalist in in the previous chapter (something I elaborate on in chapter 3).

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[22] Vallée-Dubois et al. (2017 p353) provide a summary: "The Meech Lake Accord was a proposition of renewed federalism negotiated in 1987 … One of the goals of the Accord was for Quebec to join the federation 'with honour and enthusiasm', following the repatriation of the constitution without the province's approval in 1982." The accord was not adopted by the Canadian government due to a delay caused by the Manitoban government, which prompted support for Quebecois sovereignty to surge.

[23] Those who identify as English (not British) are also the most likely to oppose devolution (see Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a).

Table 1.3: Approximated nationalism measure

	National Identity	Independence
Secessionist	Prioritise Sub-State	Support
Autonomist	Prioritise Sub-State	Oppose
Moderate dual identifiers	Equal State and Sub-State (Mid-point and above but not the highest value on the identity scales)	-
Strong dual identifiers	Equal State and Sub-State (Highest value on the identity scales)	-
Statist	Prioritise State	Oppose
Indifferent	Low State and Sub-State (Both below mid-point on the identity scale)	-

Using these new categories, I explore the stability of nationalist sentiment over time. I use waves 1 to 11 of the BESIP (February 2014 to May 2017), which has data for Scotland and Wales for a number of these waves. This period is ideal because it allows me to explore changes in nationalist sentiment before and after two significant electoral shocks: the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 EU referendum. I explore both the aggregate-level stability (changes in the overall size of the categories) and the within-individual stability (changes in someone's categorisation over time). For the latter analysis, I conduct a latent growth model, which allows me to capture the average level of change within my categorisation over time (Masyn et al. 2014).

Overall, I find that nationalist sentiment tends to be stable at an aggregate-level between 2014 and 2021 and for most individuals between 2014 and 2017. These results are consistent with Chandra and Wilkinson's (2008) claim that ethnic identities are stable in the short-term. However, nationalist sentiment does change for some groups, particularly after the 2016 EU referendum in Scotland. Those who said they would vote Leave or identified with the SNP were less likely to be secessionists after the referendum, while those who said they would vote Remain or identified with the Conservatives before the vote were less likely to be statists after it. Consequently, there is some evidence that a salient political issue may crosscut the territorial cleavage and prompt people to re-evaluate their territorial positions.

1.4.2. Nationalism across sub-state territories

Where are different forms of nationalism prevalent? So far, my research has only focused on sub-state territories within Britain. As one of the advantages of my approach is the potential for producing generalisable research, I need to explore whether it has applications in sub-state territories across several states. Consequently, I use my approach to explore where the different forms of popular nationalism are most prevalent in chapter 5. I do this by examining the presence of nationalist sentiment across 15 territories (the three 'British' territories, plus 12 further sub-state territories from Belgium, Canada, and Spain).

When attempting to understand the emergence of nationalist sentiment, many researchers have focused on the structural and institutional characteristics of territories. For example, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) suggest three dimensions that may separate sub-state territories from the state: difference, dependence, and distance. Under this approach, sub-state identities and a desire for self-governance are more likely to develop among political elites within territories with a distinct culture, that are less reliant on the state, and that are geographically distant from the capital of the state (see Massetti and Schakel 2016, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021). Currently, far fewer researchers explore the characteristics of sub-state territories that associate with the presence of popular nationalist sentiments. I contribute to existing research by investigating whether the same factors that supposedly influence elite-level conceptions of nationalism also influence individuals.

When building on Rokkan and Urwin (1983), there are four factors that researchers associate with elite-level sub-state[24] nationalism in sub-state territories: economic dependence, cultural differences, geographic distance, and institutional dependence. First, economic nationalism arguments point to the importance of relative prosperity. In line with Rokkan and Urwin (1983), these arguments posit that economically prosperous territories may be less dependent on the state. For example, sub-state advocates in Catalonia, Flanders, and Northern Italy have criticised the central state for restricting the economic power of their nation and redistributing it to poorer areas of the state (Dalle Mulle 2017). Thus, advocates in prosperous territories may favour secession to stop the redistribution of 'their' wealth.

Second, cultural differentiation may play an important role in promoting sub-state nationalism. The preservation of a national culture was seen to be the primary goal of sub-

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[24] Fewer studies focus on state nationalism in this instance.

state nationalist movements within conventional accounts (Laitin 1992, Tilly 1994). This may explain why religious and linguistic differences between a sub-state territory and the rest of the state associate with the relative success (Jolly 2009) and secessionist tendencies (Massetti and Schakel 2016) of sub-state parties.

Third, geography may play a role in the development of nationalism within a territory. For example, Rokkan and Urwin (1983) argue that the geographic distance of a territory from the capital of the state within which they are located encourages the development of sub-state identities. This may occur because territories that are further away may be more likely to retain a distinct culture (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021). The relative size of a territory within the state may also influence the forms of nationalism present within it. Dominant groups within the state are more likely to be in control of the institutions, culture, and language of the state (Staerkle et al. 2005), so their members are more likely to associate the characteristics of their subgroup with that of the state (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). Consequently, the sub-state advocates from territories like these may be less likely to seek independence from state, as they see little need when their culture faces little challenge from the status quo.

Finally, the institutional arrangement of a state may influence the forms of nationalist sentiment that develop within its sub-state territories. For example, Massetti and Schakel (2016) argue that higher levels of decentralisation within a territory led to stronger support for secession among territorial parties. One reason for this may be that sub-state territories that lack sovereignty are less able to distinguish themselves from the state. According to Hechter (1975), elites in such territories struggle to protect their culture and create distinct national economies, which in turn serve to make them dependent on the state within which they are located. Indeed, Harty (2001) argues that the preservation of cultural and legal institutions in Catalonia[25] helped protect the sense of a distinct Catalan identity. Thus, secessionism may be more common within territories with a history of institutional independence.

Thus, I investigate the factors that associate with the relative size of each category of the ANM measure. Based on the existing literature, I focus on four dimensions: geographic/demographic position within the state, economic position within the state, cultural distinctness, and institutional authority. I compile a dataset using information from Eurostat

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[25] Alongside the Bourbons inability to introduce consolidated Spanish institutions in their place.

(2016), the OECD (2020), Statbel (2014), Statistics Canada 2021a, 2021b), the Regional Authority Index (Rokkan Index, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021), Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Polk et al. 2017, Bakker et al. 2020), the Office for National Statistics (Park 2020, Fenton 2022), the Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2021), and the Regional Manifesto Project (Alonso et al. 2015).

Overall, there are two key contributions from this chapter. First, the ability to separate individuals into different forms of nationalism across multiple sub-state territories supports the applicability of my classification beyond Britain. Second, these results provide tentative challenges to applying some elite-level analyses to individuals, as I do not find an association of sub-state nationalist sentiment with 'relative' economic prosperity. Instead, I find that cultural differentiation and absolute economic prosperity appear important (but not sufficient) conditions for the presence of secessionism. In addition, the statist category is largest when the sub-state territory represents a large proportion of the state or when the territory is geographically proximate to the capital of the state (with the opposite true for autonomism), which provides some support for extending Rokkan and Urwin's (1983) categories of difference and distance to the individual-level.

1.4.3. Nationalism and political attitudes in sub-state territories

Is there a link between popular nationalism and political attitudes? Classic arguments like Lipset and Rokkan (1967) view centre-periphery competition as independent of other cleavages (i.e. class, religion, urban-rural), yet there are often associations between contemporary nationalist movements and broader political issues (Alonso et al. 2015). Sub-state advocates may then use perceived differences in values between the state and sub-state territories to mobilise support for further decentralisation or independence (Massetti 2018, Sobolewska and Ford 2020). Thus, investigating this question is important because the connection between popular nationalism and political attitudes may place further strain on constitutional settlements. In addition, investigating this question represents an ideal opportunity to test whether my approach can address some of the substantive issues with identity-focused approaches that I highlighted in chapter 2.

When attempting to understand the relationship between nationalism and other cleavages in politics, researchers often tend to examine the ethnic-civic nature of nationalism (e.g. Hjerm 1998, Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011). Consequently, I begin by using my ANM measure to examine the association of popular nationalism with ethnic-civic markers of nationhood in

England, Scotland, and Wales. I find that most individuals are very unlikely to prioritise 'ethnic' markers (i.e. ancestry), but some are more likely to prioritise 'civic' markers (i.e. respecting laws and institutions) when asked about their preferred identity (i.e. statists on Britishness in all three territories, plus secessionists on Scottishness in Scotland). The main exception are secessionists in England, who are equally likely to prioritise civic or ethnic markers.

However, as discussed earlier, there are significant limitations with relying on civic-ethnic markers for understanding the inclusive-exclusive content of nationalism. Indeed, many contemporary researchers now focus on the connection between nationalism and specific political attitudes instead. According to van Deth and Scarbrough (1998 p32), individuals have a set of "underlying orientations" (values) that reflect how they believe the world ought to be, and then have attitudes about specific issues that are consistent with these values. In existing research, the most prevalent method of capturing these general orientations is through placement on a left-right scale. Conventionally, left and right indicate how an individual views the economy, with 'left' indicating a preference for income equality and state intervention and right representing support for the deregulation and free market economics (Whitefield et al. 2007).

However, economic issues are not the sole dimension of political competition. Kriesi et al. (2006) argue that cultural issues (notably immigration and European integration) related to the progress of globalisation now separate those who benefit (younger, educated, and metropolitan) from those who do not (older, less educated, and non-metropolitan). These cultural issues have grown in salience, serving to challenge the importance of traditional class-based (left-right) voting (van der Waal et al. 2007, Ford and Jennings 2020, Sobolewska and Ford 2020). Consequently, any study of nationalism and political attitudes will need to explore how the former associates with economic and cultural positions.

Thus, I examine left-right self-placement, redistributive preferences, and immigration attitudes in Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, England, Scotland, and Wales. I find significant associations between ANM and left-right self-placement, with those on the sub-state being more likely to identify as left-wing in territories where dual identity is less common (Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, Wales), with the opposite true where dual identity is more common (England and Flanders). In contrast, the association of ANM with redistributive preferences and immigration attitudes is far weaker. Finally, I compare the positions taken by

elites (according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey) with those taken by individuals, and I argue that individuals are less polarised than elites on other issue dimensions.

Taken together, these results suggest that left-right self-placement may represent a marker of nationalist identity rather than a reflection of specific views among individuals. This conclusion is consistent with the work of Dinas (2012) who argues that nationalist individuals are more likely to identify as 'left-wing' in the Basque Country and Catalonia (even when they do not support redistribution etc.) because 'the right' is seen as the enemy of decentralisation. These results have important implications for the mobilisation of nationalism within sub-state territories, particularly when attempting to understand how movements portray themselves. Furthermore, the regular presence of significant differences between secessionists and autonomists (and moderate dual identifiers and strong dual identifiers) emphasises the substantive advantages of my approach.

1.5. Preliminary conclusions

The principal contribution of this thesis is an investigation into the nature of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. Providing this investigation entailed introducing a novel operationalisation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. My approach then allows me to investigate the stability of nationalist sentiment (and the circumstances where it may change), the factors that associate with the presence of different forms of nationalist sentiment, and the association between nationalist sentiment and other political attitudes.

Taken together, there are three further contributions from this thesis. First, I highlight how expressions of popular nationalism can differ from those found in elite-level analyses, and the benefits of incorporating individual-level accounts into our analysis. Second, I bridge the gap between three sets of literature that focus on the public (everyday nationalism, nationalism as ideology, and relative state/sub-state identities in sub-state territories), but often do not interact with one another. I demonstrate that it is possible to develop generalisable conceptions of nationalism within sub-state territories that still capture perspectives from the bottom-up. Third, I suggest methods of addressing some of the limitations of existing studies of individual-level analyses of sub-state territories.

While I elaborate on the implications of my research in detail within my conclusion chapter (chapter 7), there are four important points to mention briefly here. First, the differences in nationalist sentiment in England to those in Scotland and Wales reiterates the need to separate

'dominant' and 'minority' territories in future analysis. Second, my analyses suggest that nationalism tends to be stable for most people, but that salient political events can demobilise some of those on either side of the state-sub-state territorial cleavage. These results point to the potential effect of crosscutting events on the mobilisation of nationalist sentiment.

Third, the factors that associate with popular secessionism and statism do not align with some of the elite-level explanations (i.e. relative prosperity). These results provide a tentative challenge to the applicability of the economic nationalism literature to the individual-level. Finally, I find that nationalist sentiment associates with left-right self-placement far more than it does specific economic or political attitudes. These results are important because they suggest that the ideological differences along the state v sub-state territorial cleavage are greater in perception than reality. Nationalism continues to be a potent force within politics, and these implications are important for how researchers analyse its origins and ongoing influence.

2. Scrutinising Existing Approaches

<u>Abstract</u>

Relative state/sub-state identities are a regular feature of territorial politics research. Conventionally, researchers capture relative national identities through the Linz-Moreno question, but previous research demonstrates the limitations of this measure. Many researchers now use Relative Territorial Identity (RTI) as an alternative. However, the potential limitations of this approach are yet to be explored. I provide that examination here. After reiterating the limits of the Linz-Moreno question, I use data for England, Scotland, and Wales to highlight that RTI has similar issues with capturing linearity, intensity, and dual identity as the Linz-Moreno question. Following this, I use data from Flanders and Wallonia to demonstrate the limits of conflating attachment and identity when using RTI, as respondents treat the concepts differently. Overall, these results highlight the limits of existing measures of relative identity, which have important implications for how researchers examine sub-state territories.

National identity represents the first component of Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism. Consequently, it is crucial to understand what national identity is and how best to operationalise it within sub-state territories. Connor (1978 p379) defines national identity as a "psychological bond" to a nation. According to Citrin et al. (2001), national identity has three dimensions: identification as a member of the nation (self-categorisation), identification with the nation (affection), and what this membership means (its normative content). While some researchers examine more than one dimension (e.g. Miller and Ali 2014, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015), it is common for researchers to focus on only self-categorisation (e.g. Henderson et al. 2021), attachment (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019), or the normative content (e.g. Haesly 2005) when operationalising national identity.[26]

Once captured, scholars regularly use these measures of national identity to understand its impact on politics within sub-state territories. While some researchers examine the markers of state and sub-state identities (e.g. Haesly 2005, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015), others examine the political implications of relative state/sub-state identities themselves. Some scholars examine how national identities can create a perception of unity among the population of a territory (Henderson and McEwen 2005) or associate with turnout in elections (Henderson and McEwen 2015). Others focus on the association of national identities with other political attitudes, such as constitutional preference, left-right self-placement, or European integration (Serrano 2013, Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021, Guinjoan 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). Some scholars even use relative state/sub-state identities to designate individuals as 'nationalist' (e.g. McCrone 2013). In this chapter, demonstrate that there are significant problems with doing this when using existing measures of capturing relative state/sub-state identities.

Researchers employ a variety of measures for examining identities, but surveys represent the "backbone" of political behaviour research (Abdelal et al. 2006 p4). Conventionally, the most common survey measure for capturing relative state/sub-state identities has been the Linz-Moreno scale (Moreno 1995). Despite its popularity, Guinjoan and Rodon (2016) argue that the measure has some critical problems with capturing both identity intensity and the trade-off between state and sub-state identities, and that it overstates the size of the (ambiguous) dual identity category. Consequently, many researchers now use Relative Territorial Identity (RTI) measures as an alternative (e.g. Henderson et al. 2014, Galais and Serrano 2019,

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[26] Potentially due to academic interest in a single dimension or possibly due to data limitations

Henderson et al. 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). To create RTI measures, researchers capture state and sub-state identities on separate scales, and then subtract the former from the latter to create a scale that ranges from 'only identifies with the state' to 'only identifies with the sub-state territory.'

Despite its growing use, researchers are yet to examine the limitations of RTI in detail. Such an investigation is important for my thesis and future researchers, who may use these existing measures to capture national identity. Consequently, I provide an evaluation of RTI measures in this chapter, which I do in three steps. First, I reiterate the problems of the Linz-Moreno measure. Second, I explore whether RTI has similar issues (using data for England, Scotland, and Wales) by examining its association with identity centrality (i.e. whether someone prioritises their territorial identity over their other group identities). Third, as some researchers treat identity strength and attachment scales as interchangeable when creating RTI scales, I explore whether this is the case (using data for Flanders and Wallonia).

The principal contribution of this analysis is to highlight that the relationship between state and sub-state identities is more complex than is captured by existing measures of relative identity. Not capturing this complexity can result in incomplete and/or inaccurate conclusions about the drivers of important events in multi-nation states, such as Brexit or potential independence bids in sub-state territories like Scotland or Catalonia. First, I find that the likelihood of considering a state or sub-state identity 'central' to how one defines themselves does not change in a linear or symmetrical fashion. Second, I argue that future researchers should not treat 'dual identity' as a singular category, because those who report strong-but-equal state and sub-state identities are very different (in both identity centrality and political attitudes) to those with weak-but-equal identities. Finally, I find a statistically significant difference between responses on attachment and identity scales, and thus suggest that future researchers should avoid conflating the two in in their analyses where possible. Consequently, these results have important implications for how future researchers (as well as the rest of this thesis) should treat relative state/sub-state identities.

2.1. What are national identities?

According to social identity theory, individuals belong to several distinct social groups, such as their race, class, and gender (Tajfel 1981). However, group membership is not enough to denote an identity. Individuals may claim (or be assigned) membership of some of the groups available to them (Chandra 2012), and those that a person consciously accepts represents an

identity (Brewer 1991). These chosen group memberships may then become labels that a person uses to define themselves and others (Henderson 2007). The nation represents one such group.

Why do people select social identities? While there are several theories, Hogg et al. (2008) argue that the core motivation is uncertainty reduction – i.e. identities provide people with the tools to understand and navigate the world. According to Hogg et al. (2008 p1274), "some uncertainty can be exciting – a challenging opportunity to grow. However, too much is uncomfortable." Social identities can help reduce this uncertainty because they introduce 'prototypes' for group members (Turner et al. 1987). Prototypes represent "fuzzy sets of attributes that define one group and distinguish it from relevant other groups" (Hogg et al. 2008 p1273). These prototypes give individuals a guide for how group members should be, how they are distinct from members of other groups, and how they should think/act/behave as a member of the group (Hogg et al. 2008). Consequently, group membership provides short-cuts for understanding how one should feel and behave in different circumstances (Hogg et al. 2004).

If the nation is one of many social groups, do people place great emphasis on it? Some scholars, like Billig (1995), argue that people do not tend to think about their national identities often – instead, they are taken for granted until they are challenged. However, other scholars have demonstrated that, when asked, people tend to place great emphasis on their national identities relative to their other social identities (see McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). The regularity with which people invoke national identities has long been recognised, particularly by advocates of other identity categories. For example, Karl Marx, in a letter from 1870, decried the prevalence of national identities in England because they served to alienate English and Irish workers – thus preventing them from mobilising around their shared class identity (in La Botz 2013).

Why may people prioritise their national identities? To answer this question, it is important to understand why people may prioritise one identity over another. One explanation for this question comes from Brewer's (1991) model of optimum distinctiveness. This model argues that individuals have two competing desires – to be their own person and to belong to a wider group. According to Brewer (1991), being too distinct leaves one open to being shunned or insulted, whereas being too indistinct leads to people feeling ignored or unable to set themselves apart.

Optimally distinct groups allow individuals to be "the same and different at the same time" (Brewer 1991 p477). The feeling of similarity comes from the existence of group prototypes, which lead people to feel closer to the members of the in-group than they do to members of the out-group – even when the differences between them are minimal in practice (Brown and Adams 1986). Yet, prototypes also provide the feeling of difference by delineating who belongs and who does not (and why that is the case), which provides individuals with the opportunity to differentiate themselves from wider society. Consequently, Brewer (1991 p475) argues that social identity will be "strongest for those self-categorisations that simultaneously provide for a sense of belonging and a sense of distinctiveness."

National identities can fulfil these dual needs. First, national identities can provide individuals with "a sense of security, a feeling of belonging, and prestige" (Druckman 1994 p44). These feelings come from connecting members of the nation via the (perceived) routines and practices that associate with being a member of the nation – especially in a world that has become more interconnected (Skey 2010). Second, national identities can differentiate individuals into 'members of the nation' and 'non-members.' In some cases, explicit criteria like birthplace or citizenship are used to invoke membership of a national community (see Shulman 2002). However, these distinctions can be blurry and there may be times where people disagree on who specifically 'belongs' to the nation (see McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). Yet, even when the boundaries are fuzzy, the belief that 'our' nation is different to 'their' nation is a common trope. For example, Scottish nationalists regularly invoke the view that Scotland is different to England because the latter is dominated by the Conservative party and is (supposedly) more right-wing (see Sobolewska and Ford 2020). Thus, national identities can simultaneously satisfy the need for belonging and distinctiveness, which (according to optimal distinctiveness theory), may help explain why they are often prioritised.

This is not the only possible explanation. Another, put forward by Stern (1995) is that national identities can tap into the same emotional connections as 'family' identities. Families are often among the first groups that a person belongs to and provides them with security as they grow up (see Aviram 2018). Consequently, the connections that develop between family members tend to be strong (and there is evidence that people do often prioritise their family ties over other groups – see McCrone and Bechhofer (2015)). Stern (1995) argues that national leaders may be able to tap into the same emotional response by framing the nation in familial terms (i.e. motherland, brothers-in-arms, etc.), and there is some evidence that

individuals also project familial relationships onto the nation – which makes them more likely to sacrifice (and even die) for it (Swann et al. 2014). Determining explicitly why people select into national identities is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is important to illustrate that people regularly do.

2.2. Capturing national identity

Currently, large-scale comparative surveys that cover more than one dimension of national identification tend to focus on the state-level. For example, the 2013 International Social Survey Programme defines 'national' identities as attachments to the country, by which they mean state (ISSP Research Group 2015). The 'state' focus is consistent with the 'methodological nationalism' (Wimmer and Glick-Schiller 2002) that I discuss in the introduction. However, it is important to reiterate that privileging state-level identities is problematic because there is no guarantee that state-level narratives will apply to sub-state territories (Schakel and Jeffery 2013), especially as sub-state identities can play an important role in influencing political attitudes and behaviours (see Henderson and McEwen 2015, Henderson et al. 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). Thus, ignoring sub-state identities or relegating them to 'regional' identities may lead researchers to inaccurate conclusions when examining multi-national states.

While sub-state identities are important, capturing them in isolation is not enough. In many sub-state territories, individuals often hold both state and sub-state identities to some degree (Mendelsohn 2002, Henderson et al. 2021). Understanding how these identities interact is important for two reasons. First, the political implications of these 'dual' identities can differ across territories. For example, Henderson et al. (2021) found that relative state/sub-state identities had a different effect on vote in the 2016 EU referendum in England than they did in Scotland or Wales. Second, 'dual' identities may have different political implications when held in different combinations. Onuch and Hale (2018 p91) discuss (but do not test) this possibility, stating that treating identities as mutually exclusive may lead researchers to "overlook the possibility that people of "dual nationality" might behave distinctly in ways that do not simply reflect a mid-point" between the two identities. Onuch and Hale (2018) leave this question for future research, so I address it here.

2.3. Linz-Moreno measure

Conventionally, the Linz-Moreno measure has been the most popular question for capturing relative national identities within sub-state territories (see Guinjoan and Rodon 2016 for

further discussion), and it remains a popular measure among contemporary researchers (e.g., Serrano 2013, Rodon and Guinjoan 2018, Guntermann et al. 2020, Guinjoan 2021). The measure asks respondents to indicate the extent to which they identify with both the state and the sub-state territory simultaneously (see Table 2.1 for an example).

Table 2.1: Results for Linz-Moreno scale within the 2021 Welsh Election Study (post-election wave)

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?	
	%
Welsh not British	17.94
More Welsh than British	20.62
Equally Welsh and British	23.05
More British than Welsh	12.84
British not Welsh	19.42
Other	6.13

Source: 2021 Welsh Election Study (post-election wave). N: 3984. Data weighted.

Guinjoan and Rodon (2016) argue that the Linz-Moreno measure has three key issues: linearity, intensity, and dual identity. The first two they test together, arguing that the Linz-Moreno measure struggles to capture the trade-off and relative intensity of state and sub-state identities. Capturing the relative intensity of national identities is important because individuals may report a national identity without feeling enthusiastic about it (Fenton 2007), and identities of different intensities can have vastly distinct political implications (see Miller and Ali 2014). The third issue is that the dual identity category is ambiguous, particularly as it contains many respondents who report stronger state identity than sub-state identity (on the identity scales).

To support these claims, I use data from the 2021 Welsh Election Study (WES, Wyn Jones et al. 2022). The WES was collected around the 2021 Senedd Cymru/Welsh Parliament election (6th May), and it contains three waves (pre-election, campaign, and post-election). The post-election wave (N: 4087) includes the Linz-Moreno question (above), and it also asks individuals how they would describe the extent that they think of themselves as Welsh or British on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very strongly).

Previous research has found that the survey protocol, question order, and language may influence responses (see Cussó et al. 2018). The survey was collected online, which may help limit the awkwardness that some people feel when responding about their identity to another person. The identity scales are placed before the Moreno question, which should avoid priming respondents to treat the identities as competing. Finally, the survey was administered in English, which (given the connections between Welsh nationalism and the Welsh language) may avoid inflating or underestimating Welsh sentiment.

Figure 2.1: Mean Strength Of Welsh And British Identities In Each Category Of The Linz-Moreno Scale

Source: 2021 Welsh Election Study (post-election wave). N: 3958. Weights applied.

Overall, the trade-off in the intensity of state and sub-state identities is not linear (Figure 2.1). British identity is far stronger among the 'more Welsh' group than Welsh identity is among the 'more British' group. Furthermore, those who report a singular identity still tend to have some degree of dual identity, which is particularly evident among the 'Welsh not British.' These results are consistent with Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a) who found that those who report a singular 'English' identity on the Linz-Moreno scale still tend to report a moderate sense of Britishness on the 0-10 scale. Thus, the Linz-Moreno question may obscure asymmetrical identity intensity across the scale.

In addition, the 'equal' category is ambiguous. The majority of those within the 'equal' category do report the same level of Welsh and British identity on the identity scales in the 2021 WES (59.61 per cent), but the intensity of this dual identity is unclear (see Table 2.2). Overall, 39.3 per cent of those within the 'equal' category report very strong identity (10/10) on both scales, but this still means that 60 per cent of this category report a variety of other

identity configurations. Consequently, one cannot infer the strength of someone's dual identity from the Linz-Moreno scale alone.

Table 2.2: Percentage Of Members Of 'Equal' Identity Category With The Same Level Of Welsh And British Identity Of Different Strengths (On Identity Scales)

Identity strength	N	%
10-10	360	39.28
9-9	50	4.75
8-8	57	6.38
7-7	39	4.14
6-6	15	1.72
5-5 or lower	31	3.33

Source: Welsh Election Study (2021) N: 925. Weights applied.
Note: Values do not sum to 100% as several individuals within the 'equal' category do not report the same level of state and sub-state identity on the identity strength scales.

2.4. Relative territorial identity

Considering these issues, many contemporary researchers now use Relative Territorial Identity (RTI) as a replacement for the Linz-Moreno scale (e.g. Henderson et al. 2014, Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, 2021b). To create RTI measures, researchers require state and sub-state identity to be captured separately on scales that ask respondents to position themselves somewhere between low and high identity (see Sinnott 2005 for more on identity scales). Researchers then subtract a respondent's score on the state identity scale from their score on the sub-state scale, which creates a new scale that ranges from 'only state' to 'only sub-state.' The benefit of RTI is that it supposedly avoids the overestimation of dual identity found within the Linz-Moreno scale (see Guinjoan and Rodon 2016).

The aim of this thesis is to capture 'nationalism,' and one of the components of Bieber's (2018) definition is the prioritisation of one's national identity over their other identities. While RTI may capture identity strength, it may not necessarily capture the importance that someone places on an identity.[27] Someone may state that they have a strong national identity when asked in a survey, but this does not mean that this is their primary identity (Rosie and

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[27] Identity strength and identity centrality do associate positively with one another. However, not all individuals with very strong national identity consider it to be central to how they define themselves, particularly among state identifiers (see appendix 1 – Table A4 and Table A14).

Bond 2008). Individuals identify with numerous groups, and some of these groups will be more important to their sense of self (Chandra 2012). Those identities that are among the most important identities are considered 'central' to a person's self-conception (Cameron 2004). Previous research (Rosie and Bond 2008, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015) has found that state and sub-state identities tend to be some of the most selected markers in Britain. Capturing this relative importance of national identities is crucial for operationalising nationalism.

Thus, I examine the relationship between RTI and identity centrality in the constituent nations of Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales). I focus on Britain because it allows for the examination of majority (England) and minority (Scotland, Wales) territories, which is important because majority groups tend to have different relationships with the state than minority groups (Staerklé et al. 2010). Indeed, previous research has found that Englishness and Britishness align more closely with one another than Britishness does with either Scottishness or Welshness (see Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a), which may be due to the close political, cultural, demographic, and institutional connections between 'England' and 'Britain' (Kumar 2010). Consequently, a thorough examination of RTI requires exploring how it performs in different kinds of sub-state territories.

I use data from wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP, Fieldhouse et al. 2021). The BESIP is an online panel survey (conducted in English) that contains 21 waves (at time of writing), with the most recent collected in May 2021. The BESIP regularly includes identity scales (but not a Linz-Moreno question), which it measures on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly).[28] Wave 20 (June 2020) is the only wave to include identity centrality questions, which were the first question of an original battery fielded at the end of the survey to sizeable samples from each nation (6637 from England, 2730 in Scotland, 1804 from Wales).[29] Like previous research (e.g. Rosie and Bond 2008, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015), I capture identity centrality by asking individuals to indicate the three markers of their identity (from a list of 15 whose order was randomised) that they consider to be the most important when describing themselves. The full list is available in appendix 1 – Table A2.

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[28] Question wording in appendix 1 (Table A1). There are few substantive differences between how someone responds on the WES's 0-10 scale to how they respond on the BESIP's 1-7 scale (see appendix 1 – section A.1.).

[29] All residents could respond, with around 95 percent of those who respond being born in the United Kingdom (see appendix 1 – Table A3).

In the previous studies of data from the early 2000s, respondents were asked to pick their top three identities (in order) over three separate questions. Unfortunately, I was unable to replicate this approach because of survey space restrictions, which necessitated the condensing of these three questions into a single survey item. I chose to focus on the 'top three' rather than the single most important identity, as the previous studies (e.g. Rose and Bond 2008, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015) pooled the responses to the three questions in their analysis. The key limitation with this approach is that the cut-off of 'top three' may appear arbitrary (i.e. what is the difference between thinking of a national identity as first, second, third, or even fourth?). Given the limits of my data, I cannot address this problem within this thesis, which makes it an important area for future research.

I examine the association between RTI and identity centrality via two separate logistic regression models (one for state and one for sub-state centrality) in each territory. I treat the identity centrality measures as the dependent variables in these regression models, and I recode them to indicate whether someone chose the identity or not (chose another identity or don't know). I do not exclude the "don't know" responses to avoid inflating the proportion of people who select either national identity category in a territory.

Overall, national identities are among the most selected identities in England, Scotland, and Wales. As discussed, one may expect families to be among the most selected identities because they are often the first group to which a person belongs (see Aviram 2018). Indeed, being a parent is often the most selected identity within a sub-state territory, both in the early 2000s (Rosie and Bond 2008, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015) and in 2020. Yet, alongside being a parent, national identities are some of the most selected identities. As discussed, there are competing theories explaining why there is a propensity for individuals to select national identities, but it is not possible to determine precisely why this trend occurs here.

These results also indicate that those in Scotland and Wales are more likely to prioritise their sub-state identities than those in England (Table 2.3). Determining precisely why this pattern occurs is beyond the scope of this thesis, but Brewer's (1991) optimal distinctiveness theory may provide one possible explanation. To briefly recap, under this framework individuals want to belong to groups (so that they do not feel isolated), but they do not want to belong to too large groups (so that they cannot differentiate themselves). Brewer (1991) argues that groups that constitute a numerical majority struggle to provide people with a satisfactory level of distinctiveness (i.e. it becomes difficult to use this identity to differentiate yourself

from others). In contrast, Brewer (1991) states that it will be easier for minority groups to mobilise in-group loyalty because these identities provide a greater sense of distinctiveness. Given the relative sizes of the nations, this model may help explain why Scottish and Welsh identities are held by a larger proportion of their nation than is the case for Englishness in England – although further research is required to make this claim with greater confidence.

Table 2.3: Identity Centrality In England, Scotland, And Wales

Percentage who selects an identity as one of their top three markers (rather than selecting another identity or responding don't know)

	England	Scotland	Wales
	%	%	%
Being British	24.28	18.23	25.19
Being English/ Scottish/Welsh	26.35	50.75	39.08
Being a parent	37.81	36.32	40.61
Being a partner/spouse	29.96	30.06	33.37
Your gender	25.84	22.43	21.42
Your occupation	24.38	20.82	18.74
Your age group	24.22	20.83	23.1
Your social class	8.34	7.75	10.2

Note: other options (religion, ethnicity, being a Leaver, being a Remainer, sexuality and other) all below 10 percent in all three countries, so are not displayed here. See appendix 1. Table A2 for full list.
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 6637, Scotland N: 2730, Wales N: 1804).

I create three RTI scales by subtracting a respondent's score for Britishness from their score for Englishness/Scottishness/Welshness, which I present in Figure 2.2.[30] These results emphasise that 'dual' state and sub-state identity is most prevalent within England. I include square and cubic functions to account for possible non-linear effects. Each logistic regression model controls for age (interval variable), gender (male, female), education (university degree or not), social grade (ABC v DE), ethnicity (white British or not), and religion (Catholic, other Christian denomination, other religion, no religion). I weight each analysis by the BESIP's weighting variable.

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[30] I treat these measures as continuous indicators in the model, as is the standard in the literature (see Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021). As a robustness check, I run separate models where RTI is treated as an ordinal indicator (i.e. each level on scale is treated as a separate category), and the results are virtually identical (see appendix 1 – Figure A1).

Figure 2.2: Distribution Of Relative Territorial Identity In England, Scotland, And Wales

England

Scotland

Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel (England N: 6417, Scotland N: 2654, Wales N: 1768)

Overall, these results highlight that RTI suffers from the same problems as the Linz-Moreno question. First, RTI has large problems with linearity. Despite reflecting the strength of one identity relative to another, moving along the scale does not associate with a consistent change in identity centrality (Figure 2.3). For all three sub-state identities (and Britishness in England), the proportion of those who say that their identity is central increases dramatically 1-point around the equal identity category. On either side of this flux point, the changes in identity centrality are far smaller. One surprising result is that the proportion who say 'being

English' is central falls among those with the most singular English identities, although it is possible that this is due to the very low number of responses within this category. There are some linear effects for Britishness in Scotland and Wales, but even these only emerge partway along the scale.

Figure 2.3: Predicted Probability Of Considering A National Identity One Of The Three Most Important Markers Of Your Identity (i.e. Central) By Relative Territorial Identity In England, Scotland, And Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 5,528, Scotland N: 2323, Wales N: 1534).

Second, individuals on either side of the RTI scale place different levels of importance on their preferred national identity. Those at the relative state/sub-state extremes are the most likely to say that their state/sub-state identity is central in all three territories, even despite the lower level of sub-state identity centrality in England. However, outside of the most extreme

values, British identity centrality is lower among those who prioritise their British identity than sub-state identity centrality is among those who prioritise their English/Scottish/Welsh identity. Thus, the relationship between RTI and identity centrality is not entirely symmetrical.

Such patterns may emerge because these individuals are either not responding to the centrality question or are selecting another identity. Overall, non-response on the identity centrality question fluctuates across the RTI scale in all three territories (see appendix 1 – Table A5). In England, those with equal English and British identity are slightly more likely to say 'don't know' on the centrality measure, but there is no consistent pattern in Scotland or Wales. In either case, RTI scales do not acknowledge the asymmetrical levels of importance that state and sub-state identifiers place on their identities.

Third, dual identity remains ambiguous when using RTI. As with the Linz-Moreno scale, RTI collects dual identifiers into one category. Equal state/sub-state identity is the most popular RTI category in all three territories (see Figure 2.2), although it is by far the most prominent in England. The issue here is that this 'equal' category includes a wide range of identity strengths. I explore this by dividing equal identity into four levels: low (1-1, 2-2, 3-3, and 4-4 combined due to low sample size), 5-5, 6-6, and 7-7. Around half of equal identifiers report 'very strong' identities in all three territories, but 20 per cent report moderate to weak (scale mid-point or below) identities (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4: Levels Of Equal Identity In England, Scotland, And Wales

Equal identity on 1-7 scale	England		Scotland		Wales	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
1-1 to 4-4	750	20.04	122	20.1	83	21.39
5-5	555	14.55	78	9.84	62	12.92
6-6	773	18.83	123	18.26	66	15.01
7-7	1893	46.59	314	51.8	218	50.68

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20.

Note: 1-1, 2-2, 3-3, and 4-4 recoded together due to low sample size in Scotland and Wales.

The failure of RTI to capture this variation is an issue if there are differences between those with equal-but-strong or equal-but-weak identities. I explore this in two steps. First, I use identity centrality as the dependent variable in separate logistic regression models for each

level of equal identity in each territory. I limit the analysis to dual identifiers only, and I treat dual identification as an independent variable in my models. Second, I test the association of dual identity with left-right self-placement and vote in the 2016 EU referendum. I focus on left-right self-placement and EU referendum vote because previous researchers have used RTI to explore the association between relative identity and both of these issues (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021). I use vote in the 2016 EU referendum (0: Remain, 1: Leave) as the dependent variable in separate logistic regression models for the three territories, and then left-right self-placement (0: left, 10: right, normalised between 0 and 1) as the dependent variable in separate OLS regression models. I use the same independent variables as the previous models (excluding RTI).

Overall, the designation of those who report the same level of state and sub-state identity strength as 'equal identifiers' appears questionable. In Scotland and Wales (but not England), the proportion of equal identifiers who consider 'being Scottish/Welsh' to be central increases drastically as the strength of their equal identities increases (Figure 2.4). In contrast, the changes for 'being British' are far less pronounced. As a result, over 60 per cent of those with very strong dual identity consider their Scottish/Welsh identity to be central, which is approximately double the amount that consider their British identity to be central. Thus, even though these individuals reported the same (very strong) level of British and Scottish/Welsh identity, many of them ultimately prioritise the latter.

In addition, those with weak equal identities appear to have different political attitudes to those with strong equal identities. First, Leave voting increases with the strength of dual identity in England and Wales, but not Scotland (Figure 2.5). All these differences are statistically significant in England, which suggests that we may generalise them to the population. Only the difference between weak dual identifiers and very strong (7-7) dual identifiers is significant in Wales, which is likely due to the lower sample size. Second, different levels of dual identity also associate with ideological self-placement in all three territories, albeit to a lesser degree than Brexit vote. The differences between the weak and the very strong dual identifiers in their left-right self-placements are significant in all three territories. Why these patterns emerge is beyond the scope of this chapter, but these results emphasise that RTI obscures substantive differences among a large proportion of respondents.

Figure 2.4: Predicted Probability Of Considering A National Identity Central By Level Of Dual Identity

England

Scotland

Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 5,528, Scotland N: 2323, Wales N: 1534)

Figure 2.5: Dual Identity And Political Attitudes In England, Scotland, And Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 4,474 (Left-Right) 4,878 (Brexit), Scotland N: 1,937 (Left-Right) 2,075 (Brexit), Wales N: 1,242 (Left-Right) 1,362 (Brexit))

2.5. Relative territorial attachment versus relative territorial identity

A further issue with current applications of RTI is that some researchers use measures of 'attachment' when attempting to capture 'identity.' For example, Galais and Serrano (2019) and Guntermann et al. (2020) discuss 'identity' but use measures of 'attachment.' As discussed, Citrin et al. (2001) argue that national identification includes three different components: identification as (self-categorisation), identification with (affection), and normative content (meaning). In this context, the difference between 'identity' and 'attachment' measures is that identity measures capture our acknowledgement of group membership, whereas attachment measures capture the affection we feel towards the group (Knez 2005). These concepts may correlate, but they are not identical. For example, it is conceivable that someone may move to Scotland from elsewhere, become attached to Scotland, but never consider themselves Scottish.

Previously, Mendelsohn (2002) argued that attachment and identity are not identical by examining aggregate-level data. I build on this work by exploring whether the same individuals respond differently to attachment and identity scales. Unfortunately, neither the WES nor BESIP measure attachment. Consequently, I analyse data for Flanders and Wallonia from the 2014 Belgian National Election Study (Bol et al. 2017), which asks respondents to place themselves on two separate identity (0: very weakly, 10: very strongly) and attachment (0: not at all attached, 10: very strongly attached) scales. The survey was conducted online, and, to my knowledge, it is the only dataset that measures both identity and attachment in two representative samples of sub-state territories (Flanders N: 1017; Wallonia N: 1018).[31] Unlike the BESIP and WES, the questionnaires for Flanders and Wallonia are in different languages (Dutch and French respectively), which reflects the monolingual nature of these territories.

Overall, responses on these scales do correlate positively with one another (Table 2.5), so people who identify with the state/sub-state also tend to feel attached to it. To explore the differences between responses on the attachment and identity scales, I conduct a set of paired t-tests. I subtract an individual's score on the identity scale from their score on the attachment scale, and then determine the extent to which these differences are distinct from zero (i.e. no difference between the responses on either scale). I do not weight the analysis because the

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[31] There is data for Brussels, but I do not include it due to the different level of analysis (city versus region/nation).

purpose is to compare specific responses on two scales. I display these results in Tables 2.6 and 2.7.

Table 2.5: Correlations Between Attachment And Identity Scales In Flanders And Wallonia

		Belgian Attachment	Sub-state Attachment
Flanders	Belgian Identity	0.6893	
	Flemish Identity		0.6395
Wallonia	Belgian Identity	0.7269	
	Walloon Identity		0.5834

All values p<0.001

Source: 2014 Belgian National Election Study (Flanders N: 954 (Belgian) 953 (Flemish).

Wallonia N: 952 (Belgian) 948 (Walloon)).

Table 2.6: T-Test Results Comparing Identity And Attachment In Flanders

Flemish			Belgian		
	Mean	SD		Mean	SD
Attachment	7.38	0.08	Attachment	6.81	0.08
Identity	6.93	0.09	Identity	7.06	0.08
Difference	0.45	0.07	Difference	-0.25	0.06
T = 6.38	Prob (At < Id)	1.00	T = -3.84	Prob (At < Id)	0.00
DoF = 952	**Prob (At not = Id)**	**0.00**	DoF = 953	**Prob (At not = Id)**	**0.00**
N = 953	Prob (At > Id)	0.00	N = 953	Prob (At > Id)	1.00

Source: 2014 Belgian National Election Study

Table 2.7: T-Test Results Comparing Identity And Attachment In Wallonia

Walloon			Belgian		
	Mean	SD		Mean	SD
Attachment	7.43	0.08	Attachment	8.02	0.08
Identity	6.40	0.10	Identity	8.54	0.07
Difference	1.03	0.08	Difference	-0.53	0.06
T = 12.4291	Prob (At < Id)	1.00	T = -9.24	Prob (At < Id)	0.00
0.DoF = 947	**Prob (At not = Id)**	**0.00**	DoF = 951	**Prob (At not = Id)**	**0.00**
N = 948	Prob (At > Id)	0.00	N = 952	Prob (At > Id)	1.00

Source: 2014 Belgian National Election Study

In both Flanders and Wallonia, sub-state attachment is higher than sub-state identity. In contrast, Belgian attachment is lower than Belgian identity. These differences are largest in Wallonia, but they are statistically significant in both territories. Consequently, if the goal is to measure 'identity' then it seems that attachment measures underestimate state identity and overstate sub-state identity. The differences in the mean may not appear large in isolation, but they correspond to large differences in the distributions of relative identity and relative attachment (Table 2.8). For example, individuals are far less likely to prioritise 'Belgium' when using attachment measures. The equal category is also far larger, particularly in Wallonia. Thus, attachment measures appear distinct to identity measures, and using them as interchangeable may lead researchers to understate state identities.

Table 2.8: Differences In Relative Identity And Relative Attachment Scales In Flanders And Wallonia

	Attachment			Identity		
		N	%		N	%
Flanders	Prioritise state	183	18.89	Prioritise state	318	32.78
	Equal	377	38.91	Equal	315	32.47
	Prioritise sub-state	409	42.21	Prioritise sub-state	337	34.74
Wallonia	Prioritise state	330	34.3	Prioritise state	556	57.74
	Equal	483	50.21	Equal	331	34.37
	Prioritise sub-state	149	15.49	Prioritise sub-state	76	7.89

Source: 2014 Belgian National Election Study (Flanders N: 954 (Belgian) 953 (Flemish). Wallonia N: 952 (Belgian) 948 (Walloon)).

2.6. Conclusion

Overall, this study emphasises that existing measures of relative state/sub-state identity are not enough to capture the complex relationship between state and sub-state identities. Researchers regularly use relative identities as instruments in their analyses of political behaviour. Failing to capture identities accurately is an issue because it may lead us to form inaccurate conclusions about how these identities relate to politics in multi-nation states. This is of particular importance to this thesis, where capturing national identity is crucial for analysing (and operationalising) nationalism within sub-state territories.

While researchers now use RTI measures as a replacement for the Linz-Moreno scale, this approach has some critical limitations. First, given the non-linear association between relative identity strength and identity centrality, RTI measures do not necessarily capture the linear trade-off between state and sub-state identities that some researchers may expect. The relationship between relative identity and identity centrality is not symmetrical either, as those who prioritise their state identity are less likely to say that this identity is central. Going forward, future researchers seeking to measure territorial identities may account for this by broadening the measures of territorial identities that they include in their surveys.

In addition, the dual identity category remains poorly operationalised. Equal state and sub-state identity is the most popular category in England, Scotland, and Wales. However, there are large differences between those with weak-but-equal identities and those with strong-but-equal identities in both identity centrality and political attitudes. Those with very strong (but equal) state and sub-state identity in Scotland and Wales are more likely to consider their sub-state identity central, which suggests that identity scales may be obscuring the tendency for individuals to prioritise one territorial identity over another (something Onuch and Hale 2018 suggest in their study). Similarly, those with strong-but-equal state/sub-state identities are far more likely to have voted Leave in 2016 and report right-wing self-placements than those with weak-but-equal identities, especially in England.

It is important to acknowledge that around half of respondents who report 'dual identity' on the identity scales in England, Scotland, and Wales tend to report being 'very strong' on both state and sub-state identities. The tendency for individuals to report strong dual identity does limit the consequences of RTI pooling dual identifiers. However, due to the existence of significant and substantive differences between the levels of dual identity, particularly in England where the majority of respondents report some level of dual identity, I argue that future researchers should endeavour to investigate the differences between those with weak-but-equal identities and those with strong-but-equal identities.

Finally, existing operationalisations of RTI that use attachment measures may underestimate the strength of state identities. In both Flanders and Wallonia (but particularly the latter), Belgian 'attachment' was significantly lower than Belgian 'identity,' while the opposite was then true for sub-state attachment versus identity. As a result, relative territorial 'attachment' scales appear to potentially privilege the sub-state territory, while the reverse is true for relative territorial 'identity.' These results stress that identity and attachment are not identical

terms to survey respondents. Future researchers should be careful to avoid conflating the two concepts in their analyses.

For the wider literature, understanding the limitations of existing measures of relative territorial identity is important because scholars continue to use these measures. If researchers are aware of these issues, they may be able to account for them in their analyses or devise new measures of national identity that resolve them. Both solutions have a downside as they potentially limit the potential for researchers to compare contemporary results with those in the past. However, this is the cost of producing more accurate measures of national identities.

For this thesis, understanding the limitations of existing measures of national identity is crucial for operationalising nationalism with quantitative data. This is particularly important for later comparative studies in this thesis (chapters 5 and 6), where data limitations make the use of both 'attachment' and 'identity' measures an issue that is impossible to avoid. Given the limitations found in this chapter, operationalising Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism may require including additional dimensions of identification in our analyses.

One of the most important measures to include is how individuals prioritise their identities. Previous research demonstrates that there are multiple competing understandings of the meaning of state and sub-state identities. For example, Cussó et al. (2018) discusses how 'Spanish' can refer to the geographic location, official designation (i.e. citizenship), or the 'nation.' Such distinct understandings of a label may help explain why individuals report equal identity, yet ultimately prioritise one over the other. Admittedly, this is difficult to explore in the short-term because few surveys include such measures. One alternative may be to include identity centrality and constitutional preference, which can serve as (imperfect) proxies for how a person views the position of the sub-state territory within the state.

Thus, this chapter emphasises that the way different dimensions of relative identity fit together requires further analysis, particularly as individual-level conceptions of identities may differ from those expected by researchers (Abdelal et al. 2006). One method for capturing these unexpected associations is to take an inductive approach. Inductive methods, like exploratory factor analysis or latent class analysis, allow researchers to examine how responses on an array of variables fit together without presupposing their configuration. Such inductive approaches often feature within theory building. For example, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) use latent class analysis to separate individuals in the United States into four 'nationalist' categories based on four different dimensions of their national identity.

These techniques are more complex, but the results in this chapter emphasise that single measures often fail to capture the nature of relative identities accurately. In the following chapter, I shall demonstrate how taking a broader approach and focusing on 'nationalism' may represent one avenue for improving our analyses.

3. Identifying Popular Nationalisms Within A Multi-Nation State.

Abstract

Sub-state nationalist movements challenge state stability across Europe. Conventional researchers often focus on the competition between state and sub-state nationalist elites. However, there is no guarantee that the positions of individuals will match those of political elites. To address this, I introduce a novel categorisation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state nations, which challenges Gellner's (1983) claim that nationalism is inherently associated with a desire for sovereignty. Focusing on England, Scotland, and Wales, I analyse original data collected within wave 20 of the British Election Study. I use latent class analysis to separate individuals into categories based on their nation-state identity, sub-state national identity, identity centrality, and constitutional preference. Through this, I separate individuals into three 'nationalist' (statists, minority, and autonomists) and two 'non-nationalist' (indifferent identifiers and dual identifiers) categories. I then compare the socio-demographic characteristics of each category, which emphasise the distinctions between them. Overall, the introduction of this classification demonstrates both the complexity of nationalism within multi-nation states and the importance of examining the individual-level, which has key implications for future research in this area.

What is the nature of nationalism within sub-state territories? Investigating this question requires reiterating how previous researchers have approached it, which I discuss in greater detail in the introduction. Conventionally, researchers separate nationalism into two forms: state-led versus state-seeking (Tilly 1994). State elites supposedly desire the homogenisation of the state around one central culture, while sub-state elites resist the assimilation of their culture by seeking independence (Connor 1972). However, Keating (2017) argues that the widespread growth of sub-state autonomy complicates this dichotomy, which means that pursuing statehood is no longer the dividing line between nationalist and non-nationalist sub-state actors. Instead of a dichotomy, more contemporary classifications separate state/sub-state nationalists into multiple different forms based on the sub-state autonomy they permit/pursue (e.g. Dandoy 2010, Massetti and Schakel 2016, Cetrà and Swenden 2021).

The more recent research on nationalism in sub-state territories tends to focus on political elites. Is this a problem? It may be if the positions of individuals diverge from those of elites. Researchers have long emphasised that the positions taken by individuals may not align with those of elites (Converse 1964). Popular expressions of nationalism may not reflect those of elites, either because their priorities differ (Deschouwer 2013), their perceptions of the national community differ (van der Zwet 2015), individuals do not respond to elite rhetoric (Hjerm and Schnabel 2010, Boonen and Hooghe 2014),[32] or because popular nationalism emerged prior to elite mobilisation (Whitmeyer 2002). Consequently, accounts of nationalism that do not acknowledge individual-level variation may be "misleading" (Cohen 1996 p805).

How do existing researchers examine investigate popular nationalism within sub-state territories? When it comes to 'nationalism', researchers often tend to characterise nationalism as either a 'banal' set of national cues and idioms like flags and anthems (Billig 1995) or a sense of national superiority (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989). These approaches do not tend to interact, and both have their limitations, which I discuss in the introduction.[33] When it comes to sub-state territories, several scholars produce generalisable individual-level research (e.g. Schakel and Brown 2021, Schakel and Smith 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, 2021b), which is highly valuable but tends to focus on relative state/sub-state identities, which has its limitations for my purposes (see chapter 2).

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[32] Both found that elite rhetoric did not increase the intensity of nationalist sentiment among their supporters.
[33] 'Everyday' nationalism scholars (e.g. Billig 1995) struggle with generalising beyond specific contexts, and 'nationalism as ideology' scholars (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989) struggle with both methodological nationalism and relying on a restrictive definition of nationalism.

Recently, some scholars have taken an alternative (inductive) approach to capturing nationalism (e.g. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016, Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020, Aichholzer et al. 2021). Inductive approaches do not presuppose the nature of nationalist sentiment, which means they avoid the issues of imposing elite-level conceptions of nationalism onto the public. By analysing surveys with representative samples, an inductive approach may also produce 'bottom-up' operationalisations of nationalism that can be generalised to the population. As a result, these methods may help bridge the gap between 'categories of analysis' imposed by researchers, and the 'categories of practice' expressed by the masses (Brubaker and Cooper 2000).

I contribute to this debate by providing a novel operationalisation of popular 'nationalist' sentiments within sub-state territories. I focus on England, Scotland, and Wales, using original data from wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (June 2020). I adopt an inductive approach (latent class analysis) to operationalise Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism as a thin-centred ideology, using state identity, sub-state identity, identity centrality, and constitutional preference. To my knowledge this chapter is the first to utilise LCA to categorise nationalist sentiment within multiple sub-state territories.

Through this approach, I separate individuals into five categories. Three of these are nationalist: minority sub-state, autonomist sub-state, and statist. The presence of 'autonomist' individuals, who prioritise the sub-state territory but do not support independence, supports the existing elite-level research that challenges the conventional conflation of nationalism with total sovereignty (e.g. Gellner 1983). I also highlight the presence of two non-nationalist categories (indifferent identifiers and dual identifiers), which challenges the viability of existing approaches that tend to group 'dual identifiers' into one collective category. Following categorisation, I examine the socio-demographic characteristics of each category, which show clear differences between the categories. Overall, these results support the introduction of my novel operationalisation of nationalism within sub-state territories.

3.1. Capturing nationalism

Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism indicates four clear criteria: (1) identification with a nation, (2) the prioritisation of this identification over other identities, (3) the desire to preserve the nation's status as a distinct from others, and (4) support for political representation for the nation. I discuss the first two dimensions of Bieber's (2018) definition

of nationalism in the previous chapter (national identity and prioritising it over other identities), but it is worth reiterating the discussion here.

3.1.1. National identity

To begin, national identity is the first component of Bieber's (2018) definition. I discuss the motivations for a person opting into a national identity in the previous chapter, but it is important to reiterate that - along with being one of the primary tools for investigating sub-state politics – researchers also use relative state/sub-state identities to categorise individuals in sub-state territories. For example, Alvarez-Galvez et al. (2018) uses relative identity to separate individuals within the Basque Country and Catalonia into three categories: central (i.e. state), dual, and peripheral (i.e. sub-state) identifiers. Similarly, McCrone (2013) separated individuals in Scotland into four categories based on relative identity strength: 'non-identifiers' (low Britishness, low Scottishness), 'statists' (high Britishness, low Scottishness), 'dualists' (high Britishness, high Scottishness) and 'nationalists' (high Scottishness, low Britishness).

However, (also in the previous chapter) I discussed how strong relative identity is not enough to categorise someone as 'nationalist.' Individuals may report strong national identities, but this strength may only be transitory (Chandra 2012). At some point, collective national identities may crystalise into a strong sense of group identity (Brubaker and Cooper 2000), but many people take their national identities for granted until they are activated or challenged (Billig 1995). For example, the salience of one's national identity increases in some instances, like during a national celebration or during international sport competitions, but decreases in others, like when they are shopping or paying taxes (Henderson 2007, Chandra 2012, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015).

3.1.2. Identity centrality

Thus, the second dimension required to capture 'nationalism' is whether an individual prioritises the nation over their other identities (like their gender, race, or class). Critics of Bieber's definition (2018) may point to the ambiguity surrounding what it means to 'prioritise' the nation over other identities – i.e. how often, to what extent, and with what intensity does someone need to prioritise their national identity to be a nationalist? Bieber (2018) does not elaborate on this point in their study. One possibility is that a person must *always* prioritise the nation, but this is likely too strong given that many researchers argue that the prioritisation of identities changes in response to circumstance (Henderson 2007,

Chandra 2012, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). Yet, if a person only needs to prioritise the nation *sometimes* then this definition may be too porous and allow vast amounts of people to be designated nationalists. Consequently, it is important to determine what it means to prioritise an identity over another.

According to the social psychology literature, there are two main ways in which to prioritise a social identity. The first form refers to the regularity by which someone calls upon an identity – described as 'salience' (Stryker and Serpe 1994). People call upon identities to guide their behaviour and those that are regularly called upon are 'salient.' However, identities can change in salience if they are "situationally accessible" (Hogg et al. 2004 p255). What this means is that a person might not consciously consider a particular identity to be important to how they define themselves but, depending on the circumstances, said identity may still guide their actions in "the immediate situation" (Hogg et al. 2004 p254-5). I argue that it is salience that researchers are referring to when they discuss the potential for different identities to be important at different times, such as when paying taxes or at national sporting events (e.g. Henderson 2007, Chandra 2012, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). Ashmore et al. (2004) argue that people may not be aware that their prioritisation is changing in response to circumstance, so defines this type as implicit importance.

However, there is another way in which someone can prioritise an identity. These are identities that a person consciously appraises to be important to how they describe themselves, which Ashmore et al. (2004) define as explicit importance. Rather than depending on specific circumstances, these identities are "chronically accessible in memory" because they are part of a person's self-concept (Hogg et al. 2004 p254). As a result, these identities have also been described as psychologically *central* to a person's sense of self (Stryker and Serpe 1994). These identities may not always be the most important identity at every moment – although in practice there is a positive relationship between the two forms of importance (see Ashmore et al. 2004). Instead, what distinguishes 'central' identities from 'salient' identities is that the former are *consciously* considered to be important to a person's self-definition.

For my operationalisation of Bieber's (2018) definition I focus on self-reported centrality. Salience is very complicated to capture – a person's environment changes regularly, and it is exceptionally difficult to account for all the different environmental factors that may lead to one identity being prioritised in the one moment ahead of another. Instead, I capture whether

someone reports that a particular identity is at the core of their self-definition relative to the other identities that they could claim. It may not be the most salient identity at every moment, but it is one that they consciously emphasise when describing themselves.

Capturing centrality requires asking respondents to explicitly state the identities that are most important to them when defining themselves. Measuring the strength of identity is not enough because an individual may have numerous strong identities. Strong identifiers may be more likely to consider an identity central,[34] but not all strong identifiers will consider said identity to be at the core of how they define themselves. What separates nationalists from those with (just) strong national identities is that the membership of the nation is (consciously) central to how they think of themselves.

One criticism of the focus on centrality may come from scholars who believe that individuals are willing to change their identities if they stand to materially benefit from doing so (see Posner 2017).[35] For example, the opportunities for employment and social mobility offered by the industrial revolution gave Welsh individuals an incentive to prioritise their British identity (see Mann and Fenton 2017). If people are willing to regularly change the identities that matter to them based on instrumental considerations, then centrality might be as fluid (and thus difficult to measure) as salience.

Yet, identities are not purely instrumental. In some cases, individuals continue to prioritise their national identifications even when doing so is actively detrimental to their prospects (Wimmer 2013). Indeed, Stern (1995 p223) argues that "people resist changing their national identities, even when they can expect to benefit." For instance, some individuals attempt to retain markers of their sub-state identity (like languages) in the face of oppression from the state, as occurred in Catalonia during Franco's dictatorship (Cetrà 2019). Instrumental arguments struggle to explain why individuals strive to retain identities in such repressive contexts.

Understanding why national ties may override self-interest is beyond the scope of this thesis. According to Druckman (1994), membership of important groups becomes critical for a person's self-worth, which leads them to defend said identities when the group is threatened. One explanation for why national identities generate this feeling is put forward by Stern

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[34] See appendix 2 – Table A4 and Table A14.

[35] One limit with Posner's (2017) argument that is particularly relevant to sub-state territories is that they state that an individual selects one identity from each relevant category (i.e. one national identity), which is too restrictive for application in multi-nation states where dual national identities are common.

(1995), who argues that national identities can invoke the same strong emotional connections as families, which tend to be the first group (see Aviram 2018) and among the most important groups (see McCrone and Bechhofer 2015) that a person belongs to. Nationalist leaders often frame their calls on members of the nation in familial terms – discussing a 'brotherhood' or 'motherland' (Stern 1995). Consequently, if individuals see members of a national community as like family, and if family ties are among the strongest that an individual can have, then national identities may be likely to persist under pressure (although further research is required to elaborate on this possibility).

3.1.3. Constitutional preference

The third and fourth dimensions of Bieber's (2018) definition are a desire for national distinctness and political representation. Critics of this approach may say that the inclusion of a need for political representation means that this definition solely refers to 'political' forms of nationalism, and thus excludes proponents of 'cultural' forms of nationalism. According to Woods (2016 p1), the difference between the two forms is that "if political nationalism is focused on the achievement of political autonomy, then cultural nationalism is focused on the cultivation of a nation." To elaborate, political nationalists pursue demands in the name of the national group (Breton 1964), with the primary goal conventionally considered to be sovereignty (Gellner 1983, Hechter 2000). In contrast, cultural nationalists' primary goal is the generation (or regeneration) of the nation as a community (Hutchinson 1987). They pursue this goal through methods like poetry and songs about the nation (Breton 1964), rather than by making any formal demands for political control. By including a need for political representation, Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism may exclude individuals who are 'nationalists' in a cultural sense but do not make demands for political autonomy – thus leading to 'false negatives' in any categorisation of nationalist sentiment.

For many 'classic' scholars, this possibility would not be a problem because they perceive nationalism to be inherently political. Indeed, some classic scholars of nationalism downplay, or outright reject, the importance of culture when studying nationalism. Barrington (1997) recognises that cultures often unite nations, but then claims that nationalism entails the pursuit of territorial control. Similarly, Breuilly (1982 p11) views nationalist movements as inherently "political movements" that focus on achieving state power. In a sub-state context,

Hechter (2000) associates 'nationalism' with a pursuit of political representation,[36] which aligns with Gellner's (1983 p1) famous definition of nationalism as "primarily" concerned with sovereignty. Gellner (1983 p124) even argued that culture is "hardly worth analysing" when attempting to understand nationalism.

Rather than claiming culture is unimportant, other scholars have claimed that it precedes the political ambitions of nationalist movements. This position is best encapsulated by Hroch's (1985) three phase model for the development of nationalist movements in Europe. In this model, activists first promote the concept of the nation and what it embodies without calling for political autonomy (phase A). Following this, activists make political demands (i.e. autonomy) invoking the 'nation' as created before (phase B). Finally, nationalism spreads to the public and becomes a mass movement (phase C). Consequently, in this model, cultural activists "lay the foundation for those with political ambitions" (Wood 2016 p4).

There are at least two key problems with a linear model for the development of nationalism. First, the assumption that political elites disseminate nationalism to the public precludes the potential for 'nationalisms' to emerge among the masses before their political mobilisation. For example, public expressions of English nationalism were regularly disavowed by political elites before its adoption by UKIP and (later) the Conservatives (Hayton 2016, Mann and Fenton 2017, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). Second, there is some evidence that Hroch's (1985) designation of cultural nationalism as chronologically prior to political nationalism is flawed. For example, Hutchinson (1987) argues that cultural expressions of Irish nationalism emerged and re-emerged episodically even after the establishment of a 'nation-state.' Thus, while conceptually distinct, in practice cultural and political nationalisms can coincide and reinforce one another (Breton 1964).

Consequently, I argue that a desire for national distinctness (cultural nationalism) and a desire for political representation (political nationalism) are often related. Historically, discussions of a desire for national distinction focus on the ambitions of sub-state elites to protect their national culture (e.g. Laitin 1992). Nationalist movements in territories like Catalonia, Flanders, and Wales (among others) are associated historically with a desire to preserve their distinct cultural identity, either through the preservation of their language (Conversi 1990, Blommaerts 2011, Mann and Fenton 2017, Cetrà 2019) or through the preservation of

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[36] Although they argue that the only movements that qualify as 'nationalism' are those that pursue independence (i.e. total sovereignty for the territory), which is not a claim I, or many contemporary researchers (e.g. Tierney 2005, Keating 2017), endorse.

cultural and legal institutions (Harty 2001). Yet, a desire to protect a national culture often coincides with a desire for political representation. Without autonomy, sub-state actors are unable to resist the state's cultural and economic policies (Hechter 1975).[37] Acquiescing to these policies means that individuals who identify with the sub-state may struggle to differentiate themselves from the state (Laitin 1992) – leading sub-state advocates to pursue autonomy so that they can protect their distinct nature.

Given the regular connection between cultural motivations and a desire for autonomy, I argue that Bieber's final two criteria will often coincide in practice. What this means is that those who desire to keep the nation distinct will also tend to desire political representation for the nation. Conceptually, it is possible that combining the two criteria will mean that some 'cultural' nationalists (who do not support autonomy) will be mischaracterised as 'non-nationalists.' I argue that these false negatives will be limited in practice, due to the connection between cultural preservation and autonomy demands in many sub-state territories – determining whether this approach leads to significant mischaracterisations is an important avenue for future research.

Yet, it is important to note that there are strong disagreements over the level of 'political representation' required for a person to be considered a nationalist. Conventional accounts claim that sub-state advocates pursue this autonomy by seeking independence from the state (e.g. Tilly 1994, Kymlicka and Straehle 1999). Support for independence is then often used to separate sub-state advocates into nationalist and non-nationalist groups. Such a distinction is clear in Gellner's (1983 p1) often cited definition of nationalism as the belief that "the political and the national unit should be congruent." Under this interpretation, sub-state advocates who do not support independence are then demoted from nationalist to 'regionalist' (Hechter 2000).

However, contemporary sub-state advocacy challenges the assumption that support for independence is sufficient to distinguish 'nationalism' from 'regionalism.' According to Keating (2017), the increased presence of devolved authority in recent years has meant that sub-state actors no longer need to advocate for independence to obtain autonomy.[38] While

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[37] Hechter (1975) argues that cultural marginalisation and the introduction of specialised and extractive economic systems could have been resisted with national protections (like tariffs). In the 1999 reprint, Hechter acknowledges that these arguments apply more to Wales and Ireland than Scotland, where there was a degree of institutional independence.

[38] Keating (2017) offers the term 'regional nationalist' for sub-state movements, but the difficultly in empirically distinguishing between 'region' and 'nation' remains under this definition.

sub-state institutions are not new,[39] sub-state autonomy has certainly grown in the last 70 years. Hooghe et al. (2010) found that devolution has grown drastically since 1950, with 29 states (of the 42 studied) devolving powers to sub-state bodies in this time. Indeed, 43.5 percent of those living within the European Union in 2017 resided within a sub-state territory that had its own legislative body (Tatham and Mbaye 2018). These changes appear popular, as Schakel and Brown (2021) found that most individuals (from 142 territories) support the presence of some degree of sub-state authority.

There is some evidence that sub-state advocates are aware of the opportunities that devolved authority provides. Tierney (2005) argues elites who recognise this possibility adopt more complex attitudes to autonomy. More recent research emphasises that this continues to be the case. For example, Massetti and Schakel (2013) separate sub-state nationalists into two forms: those who support independence (secessionist) and those who do not (autonomist). These authors would later extend this distinction further to disaggregate autonomism into federalist (maximum self-governance) and protectionist (minimal autonomy to protect culture) actors (Massetti and Schakel 2016). Such views conflict with traditional concepts of sub-state autonomy as entirely depending on the establishment of a state.

In addition, another flaw with using independence to distinguish between 'nationalism' and 'regionalism' is that opposing independence does not mean that sub-state advocates see their territory as a 'region.' For example, Moon (2016) argues that Welsh Labour and their supporters have tended to oppose independence[40] (and the label nationalist), but they would baulk at the suggestion that Wales is not a nation – especially as they emphasise both the distinctness of Welsh culture and their desire for representation within the United Kingdom.

Alongside the rise in devolved authority, another point complicating the relationship between 'sovereignty' and nationalism is that not all sub-state territories conform to the conventional depiction of a 'periphery.' Some sub-state groups are dominant within a state, and their increased power and control can blur the boundaries between their group and the state as a whole (Staerkle et al. 2005, Elkins and Sides 2007, Staerkle et al. 2010). For example, Kymlicka (2003 p52) argues that Castilian elites use their dominant position in Spain to pursue "policies that promote Castilian interests – such as privileging the use of the Castilian

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[39] Scotland, for example, has had some degree of administrative independence since the Act of Union in 1707 (Tierney 2005, Mann and Fenton 2017).
[40] Although many independence supporters now vote for Welsh Labour (Griffiths 2021).

language, or centralising power in Madrid" in the name of defending 'Spanish' identity. Similarly, England's dominant position within the United Kingdom led to the regular conflation of Britishness with the national symbols, institutions, history, and culture of England (see Kumar 2010, Mann and Fenton 2017, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a).

However, a close association between a sub-state territory and the state as a whole does not prevent sub-state nationalism from emerging. For example, Cetrà and Brown Swan (2020)[41] discuss the presence of 'majority nationalists' in England (among other territories), who prioritise the interests of the majority or dominant group within a state. These individuals may identify with the state (as is the case in England – see Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a), but that does not mean that they do not advocate for their nation within it. Alternatively, some sub-state advocates may advocate for both their sub-state territory and their state simultaneously. For example, Lega Nord (Northern Italy) and Lega Dei Ticinesi (Ticino, Switzerland) adopt a 'dual frame' of advocating for both state and sub-state interests (Mazzoleni and Ruzza 2018). Similarly, the (defunct) Welsh Defence League claimed to defend both the culture of Wales and Britain's liberal democracy (Alessio 2015). Consequently, not all forms of sub-state nationalism may take oppositional stances against the state.

Another challenge to conventional arguments is that not all contemporary state nationalists desire the total centralisation of culture or political authority. Some state elites recognise their state as multi-national and do not perform explicit centralisation policies (Kymlicka 2003). For instance, Cetrà and Swenden (2021) separate state nationalist elites in India and Spain into four forms (dominant, integrationist, composite, and plurinational) depending on how much self-rule, shared-rule, and symbolic acknowledgement (of sub-state territories as nations) that they permit. Some state advocates may even do this to protect the position of their sub-state territory within the state. For example, Zabaltza (2019) discusses movements in Navarre and Valencia who combine their sub-state identities with pro-state identities and opposition to Basque/Catalan nationalism (respectively). Consequently, attempts to capture contemporary forms of nationalism need to account for the potentially complex understandings of sub-state representation found within a population.

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[41] As well as the other articles contained within the issue.

3.2. Methodology

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the types of nationalism that are present within sub-state territories. Currently, there is a lack of robust comparative data for sub-state territories. To account for this, I take a case study approach and focus on the constituent nations of Britain. The United Kingdom is a multi-nation state, with one particularly dominant territory (England). As understandings of the state can differ among majority/minority groups (Staerkle et al. 2005), examining the constituent nations of Britain allows me to explore the varieties of nationalism in both majority/dominant (England) and minority (Scotland and Wales) sub-state nations.[42] When examining multiple sub-state territories, some researchers pool respondents from the different territories together (e.g. Aichholzer et al. 2021), which can miss important differences between the territories. Consequently, I analyse each nation separately.

3.2.1. Data

For this investigation, I use original data collected within wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP, Fieldhouse et al. 2021). The British Election Study is a non-partisan study of political behaviour in Britain, which began in 1964. The BESIP is an internet panel study that has run since 2014 and includes representative samples of England, Scotland, and Wales. I designed an original set of instruments, which were fielded to a random sub-sample of England (n: 6637), alongside the entire Scottish (n: 2730) and Welsh (n: 1804) [43] samples in June 2020.

3.2.2. Latent class analysis

Given the difficulties present in extrapolating elite-level analyses to the individual-level (as discussed in the introduction), I take an inductive approach. To do this, I use latent class analysis (LCA) via Mplus v.8.0 (Muthén and Muthén 2017). LCA is a method of constructing a typology by measuring patterns within observed variables (Vermunt 2010, Oberski 2016). Respondents are separated into subgroups (classes) that report a similar pattern of responses on observed indicator variables (Bakk et al. 2013). Overall, LCA represents a more robust method of categorising individuals than some alternatives used in

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[42] Northern Ireland is excluded because it is not included in the British Election Study.
[43] 500 represents a minimum for a latent class analysis, while 1000 is more typical (Vermunt 2010).

existing research[44] as it reduces some of the subjectivity surrounding model selection and misclassification (see Magidson and Vermunt 2002).

I take a three-step approach (see Bakk et al. 2013), where I fit multiple standard models with an increasing number of classes, decide on the optimum number of classes, and then explore the association of these classes with external variables (in chapter 4). Once I have decided on the optimum number of classes, I include sociodemographic covariates (detailed below) into the model. Each model includes the BESIP's weight variable as excluding sampling weights can bias the estimates present in the latent class model (Asparouhov 2005).

3.2.3. Indicator variables

I use four variables to operationalise Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism: state identity, sub-state identity, identity centrality, and constitutional preference.[45] For both state and sub-state identity strength, I use the BESIP's seven-point identity scales (1: not at all …; 7: very strongly …). I exclude the very few respondents that respond 'don't know' as I require their identity to measure this dimension.

One limitation with identity scales is that they may allow individuals to mask their identity preferences by allowing them to select middle options (Onuch and Hale 2018). Measuring identity centrality should capture these preferences. Here, I adapted a measure from Cameron (2004) and McCrone and Bechhofer (2015), which asks respondents to indicate the three identities that are most important to them when describing themselves (from a list of 15).[46] The BES records each identity as separate variables, which I recode into a four-category variable that indicates whether a respondent selected 'being British' only, 'being English/Scottish/Welsh' only (depending on the territory), both identities, or neither identity. Given the need to know whether someone prioritises the nation over other groups, I exclude non-respondents.

One possible limitation with this approach is that my identity centrality item captures the 'top three' most important identities to a person's sense of self. Bieber's (2018) definition requires that a person prioritises their national identity over their other social identities, and this item

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[44] For example, Alvarez-Galvez et al (2018) categorise individuals through K-means clustering.
[45] Question wording is present in appendix 2 – Tables A10-A12.
[46] To avoid priming respondents, this question was asked at the beginning of the identity battery of wave 20. One limitation with this measure is that I am unable to determine whether an individual believes their national identity to be the first, second, or third most important marker of their sense of self. However, survey space limitations required condensing the question.

does not allow me to determine whether their national identity is their single most important identity. As discussed in the previous chapter, the top-three approach was necessitated by survey space limitations. This is a problem because it means I cannot test for the difference between a person's 1st, 2nd, and 3rd most important identities, nor can I test whether top three is an appropriate analytical cut-off. Unfortunately, this is the only available measure that explicitly measures any form of identity centrality in contemporary Britain. Addressing the limitations with this item's use as a method for operationalising Bieber's (2018) definition is an important point that will need to be addressed in future research.

Finally, I include a measure of constitutional preference to capture the final two dimensions (distinctness and representation). Respondents were asked to indicate whether they support sub-state independence (inside or outside of the European Union), a sub-state parliament (with or without tax-raising powers), or centralisation. Due to a low number of responses in the 'independence outside Europe' and 'parliament without tax-raising powers' categories, I collapsed constitutional preference into four categories: independence, devolution, centralisation, and don't know.

I include don't know as a separate fourth category because I expect nationalist sentiment to associate negatively with uncertainty on constitutional issues. When the nation is central, I argue that it should frame the thoughts of an individual more consistently than when it is not central. Consequently, nationalists should be more aware of their position on constitutional issues than non-nationalists, which prompts differential levels of non-response. If this is the case, then excluding non-responses on constitutional preference questions risks biasing the model by reducing the number of non-nationalists in the sample. The presence of a negative association between both identity strength and centrality with non-response[47] supports this argument. Treating the data in this way leaves me with sample sizes of 5961 for England, 2454 for Scotland, and 1663 for Wales.

There are some limitations with the constitutional preference measure that need to be acknowledged. In particular, the measure may appear rather crude. First, the measure used in this paper does not account for differences between those who support autonomy. People may support sub-state autonomy but may want different degrees of sub-state control. For example, Massetti and Schakel (2016) discuss different types of commands for autonomy among elites, splitting them into those who want to maximise self-control (federalists) and those who want

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[47] Tables located in appendix 2 – Tables A15-A16.

minimal self-control to protect their national culture. Second, the measure used in this paper covers preferences for self-rule (autonomy), but it does not include attitudes to shared-rule (cooperation in state-level decisions). Individuals do distinguish between these concepts (see Schakel and Brown 2021), but data limitations prevent exploring this further here.

The use of these items to capture 'nationalism' does differentiate my research from other recent quantitative studies of nationalism, which include measures of national pride, chauvinism, and the criteria for belonging to the nation (e.g. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016). I have chosen my variables to operationalise Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism. One possible extension was to include the criteria that a respondent prioritises when determining if someone belongs to the nation, as a method of capturing how an individual wants to keep the nation distinct. Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) use ethnic-civic markers of nationhood to distinguish between 'restrictive' and 'creedal' (inclusive) nationalists. However, I addressed the significant ambiguities surrounding the civic-ethnic dichotomy in the introduction, and I shall discuss them further in chapter 6. I exclude these items due to the possible lack of clarity over their meaning and political implications.

3.2.4. Model selection

I select the optimum number of classes in each nation by fitting several models with an increasing number of classes.[48] I decide on the optimum based on how well the model fits the data and how meaningful the distinction is between classes (Oberski 2016). Nylund et al. (2007) recommends using BIC to determine model fit because it avoids selecting too many unnecessary classes. Eger and Hjerm (2021) challenge the reliance on BIC, suggesting that alternative methods (absolute fit and bootstrap likelihood ratio tests) are required for model selection. However, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2021) argue that BIC is a more appropriate measure for establishing model fit than those proposed by Eger and Hjerm (2021), and that relying on absolute model fit alone fails to recognise the importance of parsimony, interpretability, construct validity, and external validity. Other studies, like Chen et al. (2017), also support the appropriateness of BIC, particularly when sample size is large (i.e. over 3200 – as is the case in England). They also find that other measures of fit, like the

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[48] One limitation with LCA is that it may settle on 'local' solutions rather finding the overall ('global') best solution. Oberski (2016) states to re-fit the model with at least 50 different starting values to be reasonably certain that I had found the 'best' solution. Consequently, I fit the model with many different random starting values (4000 initial iterations followed by 1000 final stage iterations).

Lo-Mendell Rubin test tend to over-extract classes when sample sizes exceed 630 (as is the case in all three territories that I study here). Consequently, I use BIC here.

Table 3.1: Model fit statistics for England, Scotland, and Wales

	England			Scotland			Wales		
		BIC	Entropy	LL	BIC	Entropy	LL	BIC	Entropy
1	-34217.6	68591.6		-14131.9	28404.4		-9886.9	19907.2	
2	-32100.5	64522.7	0.81	-13054.9	26398.7	0.77	-9219.7	18713.7	0.90
3	-31215.7	62918.2	0.89	-12645.2	25727.5	0.83	-9015.7	18446.7	0.85
4	-30865.1	62382.2	0.92	-12365.1	25315.5	0.84	-8890.1	18336.4	0.82
5	-30545.5	61908.1	0.86	-12247.9	25229.5	0.85	-8830.5	18358.2	0.81
6	-30303.9	61590.2	0.87	-12200.2	25282.4	0.84	-8785.1	18408.3	0.82
7	-30155.1	61457.6	0.82	-12164.7	25359.7	0.84	-8753.5	18485.9	0.80
8	-30062.5	61437.7	0.83	-12138.9	25456.4	0.82	-8725.1	18570.0	0.82
9	-30011.5	61500.9	0.84	-12113.2	25553.3	0.83	-8704.5	18669.7	0.80

Overall, the best model fit in England, Scotland and Wales is for the 8-class, 5-class and 4-class solutions respectively (see Table 3.1). However, I choose the 7-class solution in England because the 8-class solution introduces a very small category (< 3 percent of the sample), so including it would not introduce an analytically meaningful category.[49] I also include the entropy of each model. Entropy indicates the misclassification present in each model and ranges from 0 to 1, with values closer to 1 indicating that the classes are separated more clearly (Collins and Lanza 2010). The probabilities are consistently above 0.75, suggesting relatively low misclassification.[50]

3.2.5. Covariates

After model selection, I include covariates in the model. Covariates can reduce misclassification in a LCA model. However, Nylund-Gibson and Masyn (2016) have found that including covariates prior to model enumeration can lead to the overextraction of classes, thus they recommend deciding on the number of classes in each nation based on the independent (i.e. without covariates) models. I follow their approach. I include a range of sociodemographic variables: age (interval),[51] gender (male, female), highest level of education achieved (GCSE and below, A-levels, undergraduate degree or higher), ethnicity

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[49] As mentioned, class enumeration needs to be based on a combination of model fit and the meaningful distinction between classes (see Oberski 2016).

[50] There are significant bivariate residuals between state and sub-state identity in each model, which may indicate some model misfit. However, these residuals tend to be between empty cells, which are very difficult to avoid due to the extremely skewed nature of the national identity strength variables.

[51] Age is scaled between 0 and 1 for ease of use in Mplus.

(identify as white British or not), social grade (AB, C, DE)[52], and religion (belong to a particular religion or not) in each category.[53]

I also include measures of political party support. Comparing the categories with support for 'nationalist' parties is a useful measure of examining the external validity of my approach. I use propensity to vote (PTV) measures for the Conservatives, Labour, Brexit Party, Scottish National Party (SNP, Scotland only), and Plaid Cymru (Wales only). I use PTV measures because they allow respondents to indicate how likely they are to vote for a party on a 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely) scale. Unlike discrete measures of party support like party identification or vote choice, PTV allows respondents to indicate the strength of their support for multiple parties (van der Eijk et al. 2006).

I include the Conservatives and the Brexit Party due to their high 'nationalism' scores in the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2020).[54] On the other side of the territorial cleavage, I consider the SNP and Plaid Cymru to represent minority nationalist parties. I also include Labour as they are the main opposition party in Westminster, but also because the Welsh arm has been very successful in positioning itself as a 'Welsh' party (Moon 2016, Rawlings 2022). One possible issue is that these PTV measures do not distinguish between voting for the state-wide and sub-state arms of a party, which is a problem because individuals do distinguish between them at the ballot box (Wyn Jones and Scully 2006). However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to address that issue here. I exclude all non-respondents on covariates, which gives me a sample of 4924 for England, 2101 for Scotland, and 1346 for Wales in the final model.

3.3. Categorising nationalist sentiment

3.3.1. Nationalist categories

Overall, I argue that five distinct categories emerge across England, Scotland, and Wales, although variants within these five categories do emerge. Of these five categories, I designate three as 'nationalist,' (statist, minority, and autonomist), whereas two represent 'non-nationalist' categories (dual identifiers and indifferent identifiers). Statists, autonomists, and

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[52] Definitions of social grade present in appendix 2 – Table A13.

[53] Other variables, like parentage, media consumption, language, and urban-rural residence may be important for identity and constitutional preference (Serrano 2013, Alvarez-Galvez et al 2018, Calzada 2018), but such variables are not present for all three territories within wave 20 of the BESIP.

[54] The 2019 CHES surveys 421 political scientists about the ideologies of political parties, and the results are in appendix 2 – Table A17. There are problems with their 'nationalism' measure because it contrasts 'nationalist' with 'cosmopolitan,' which leads to both sub-state nationalist parties receiving low scores.

indifferent identifiers are present in all three nations. Minority nationalists are only present in Scotland and Wales, while dual identifiers are only present in England. I argue that dual identifiers should also be separated into two sub-categories in England (moderate and strong). These results are summarised in Table 3.2.

The first category is present in all three nations, but it is largest in Wales.[55] Members of this category are distinct in that they tend to report strong British identity, prioritise 'being British,' and are very unlikely to favour sub-state independence. As a result, I label these individuals 'statists,' which is a term used by McCrone (2013) and Calzada (2018). The results in Figure 3.1 show the predicted probability of someone in this group selecting a particular item in each variable. For example, 73 per cent said that their British identity was central to how they define themselves in England and Wales, compared to 60 per cent in Scotland. The tendency to prioritise British identity makes this category unique, as it is significantly higher than what is present in the other categories. These individuals also report the strongest state identity (albeit less so in England). These individuals tend to report weaker sub-state identity than state identity, although the trends are different in the three nations (weak in Wales, moderate in England, strong in Scotland). Understanding why these differences occur within the statist category is an area for future research.

Members of the statist category are the most likely to favour centralising political authority in Westminster, which is consistent with conventional depictions of nation-state nationalists. However, support for centralisation is not universal among statists. Indeed, it is a minority preference among statists in England, where half favour some form of devolution. A higher proportion of this category support centralisation in Scotland and Wales, but over 40 percent support some form of devolution. The support for devolution among statists is a challenge to the conventional dichotomy, but this is consistent with Cetrà and Swenden's (2021) work on how state nationalist elites can differ in the level of recognition and autonomy that they award to sub-state territories. However, while their constitutional preferences may differ, statists are still very similar on the other variables.

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[55] The relative sizes of this category may reflect the higher concentration of English-born residents in Wales (Mann and Fenton 2017). Wyn Jones (2022) found that there are large differences between 'British' identifiers who were born in England and those born in Wales, but the BESIP does not separate respondents by birthplace within the United Kingdom so I cannot expand on this here.

Table 3.2: Summary of categories found in England, Scotland, and Wales

Category name	State identity	Sub-state identity	State identity 'central'	Sub-state identity 'central'	Constitutional Preference	Location	Percentage$_a$ (%)	Nationalist?
Minority	Weak	Strong	No	Yes	Independence	Scotland	32.3	Nationalist
						Wales	23.0	
Autonomist	Moderate to Strong	Strong	No	Yes	Devolved authority	England	18.3	Nationalist
						Scotland	23.0	
						Wales	23.9	
Statist	Strong	Weak to Moderate	Yes	No	Divided: Devolved authority or centralisation	England	9.7	Nationalist
						Scotland	15.6	
						Wales	28.4	
Dual Identifier	Moderate	Moderate	No	No	Divided	England	44.44$_b$	Non-nationalist
	Strong	Strong	No	No	Divided	England	24.1	Non-nationalist
Indifferent Identifier	Weak to Moderate	Weak to Moderate	No	No	Divided	England	7.6	Non-nationalist
						Scotland	13.8	
						Wales	24.8	
	Moderate to Strong	Weak to Moderate	Divided: British or None	No	Devolved authority	Scotland	15.3	Non-nationalist

a: Proportions may not equal 1 due to rounding
b: This is spread over three categories. Their relative sizes are 13.4 (4/7 on the 7-point scale), 12.7 (5/7), and 18.3 (6/7).

Figure 3.1: Predicted probability of a member of the 'statist' category selecting each response for every variable

The next category is only present in Scotland and Wales (Figure 3.2). These individuals are very likely to report very strong sub-state identity, are very likely to consider this sub-state identity to be central to their sense of self (around 90 per cent in both nations), and they are the category with the highest likelihood of supporting sub-state independence in both nations. These individuals then combine these traits with an exceptionally low likelihood reporting strong and/or central state identities. Thus, these individuals represent the opposite pole of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage to statists, so reflect many of the traits of conventional elite-level characterisations of "minority" nationalism (e.g. Kymlicka and Straehle 1999).

Figure 3.2: Predicted probability of a member of the 'minority' category selecting each response for every variable

Scotland
Size: 33.3 percent

Wales
Size: 23.0 percent

However, while the general patterns are similar in Scotland and Wales, there are three important national differences. First, this category is larger in Scotland, which may reflect the greater salience of independence there than in Wales. Second, moderate British identification is higher among minority nationalists in Wales, with 60 per cent reporting either 4 (the mid-point) or higher on the 7-point British scale, compared to only 35 per cent in Scotland. These results are consistent with recent recruits to Welsh independence tending to report stronger British identity than the more longstanding supporters (see Griffiths 2021). Third, support for independence is stronger within this category in Scotland (97 per cent) than in Wales (67 per cent). Conventional researchers may challenge the 'nationalist' label for those who do not

support independence (e.g. Hechter 2000), but almost all these individuals support independence or devolved authority for Wales (87 per cent, the rest uncertain), so I posit that they still fulfil the representation criteria in Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism.

Unlike the preceding categories, the third category is present in all three nations, and it does not conform to the conventional state-led v state-seeking dichotomy. I present the results for this category in Figure 3.3. Members of this category are highly distinct from statists because they tend to report very strong sub-state identity (particularly in England), it is very likely that they will consider their sub-state identity to be central to their sense of self, and they tend to desire sub-state autonomy (in the form of strong support for devolved authority within the territory). Their tendency to prioritise the sub-state also distinguishes them from Zabaltza's (2019) sub-state anti-nationalists (who often prioritise the state).

However, these individuals are also distinct from minority nationalists. State identity is far stronger among these individuals than among minority nationalists, with this being particularly evident in England and Wales. Furthermore, very few members of this category support independence. Values are lowest in Wales (7 per cent), but they are still relatively low in Scotland (15 per cent) and England (26 per cent). Furthermore, members of this category in Scotland and Wales are slightly less likely to report a central sub-state identity than their minority counterparts (and the likelihood of reporting a very strong sub-state identity is lower in Scotland).

Currently, there is little academic consensus on how to label sub-state advocates that identify with the state and oppose independence. As discussed, conventional accounts would demote them to 'regionalism,' but this does not hold given they meet the criteria for nationalism set out by Bieber (2018) due to their strong national identity, prioritisation of the nation, and desire for sub-state representation. Some researchers have characterised sub-state nationalism in England as a form of 'majority' nationalism (e.g. Cetrà and Brown Swan 2020), but the presence (and increased size) of a similar category in Scotland and Wales suggests that this may be too narrow. Others may argue that these individuals are both sub-state and state nationalists simultaneously (e.g. Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a), but I disagree due to their clear prioritisation of the sub-state and the very low probability of seeing their state identity as central. An alternative is to focus on the scope of their demands, with Dandoy (2010) differentiating between protectionist, decentralist, and secessionist parties. Similarly, Massetti and Schakel (2016) label sub-state advocates who do not support independence as

'autonomist,' which I propose is reflective of their aims and applicable within both minority and majority nations.

Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of a member of the 'autonomist' category selecting each response for every variable

Why may individuals with similar sub-state identities have very different constitutional preferences? Given the data available, it is difficult to answer this question conclusively. Yet, one possible explanation is that these individuals differ in their perception of whether the state represents a threat to their sub-state group. Conventional studies argue that the belief that the state is a threat to the distinct nature of the sub-state territory is a key driver of support for independence among elites (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Connor 1972, Tilly 1994). Among individuals, Sindic and Reicher (2009) found that support for secession in Scotland was strongest among those that combined their strong Scottish identity with the belief that the union with England undermined a 'Scottish way of life.' However, while threat associates with support for independence, there is no guarantee that all individuals with

strong sub-state identities believe that the state is a 'threat' – something that Sindic and Reicher (2009) also found to be true among Scottish individuals. Thus, these differing perceptions of 'threat' among sub-state identifiers may explain the differences in constitutional preference.

There are at least three possible explanations for why individuals may have different perceptions of the state as a threat to the sub-state group. The first, put forward by Sindic and Reicher (2009) is that a nation's way of life is perceived to be incompatible with that of the rest of the state. The belief that territories are inherently distinct in some way is a common theme of nationalist discourse. Indeed, members of the Scottish nationalist movement regularly cite the (perceived) different values of England as motivation for independence (Sobolewska and Ford 2020). There are survey items that test whether individuals believe their sub-state group has different values to the rest of the state, but they are unfortunately not present in this BESIP wave. Future researchers can explore the viability of this explanation in more detail.

The second possible explanation is that individuals may organise their identities differently. Some individuals may see their state and sub-state identities as competing (i.e. you can be one or the other) or nested (i.e. the sub-state group represents a sub-group of the wider state) (Medrano and Gutiérrez 2001). Those with 'nested' identities may then be less likely to believe that the state threatens their sub-state group. Due to a lack of data testing how people understand their identities, I cannot test this possibility here. However, autonomists have stronger state identities than minority nationalists – so appears less likely that they see them as competing.

Finally, individuals with the same sub-state identity may have different levels of concern about the instrumental benefits of secession. For example, perceptions of the economic benefits/risks of Scottish independence associated strongly with vote choice in the 2014 referendum in Scotland (Kopasker 2014). Alternatively, risk-aversion may be important. Liñeira & Henderson (2021) found voters with higher risk-aversion were more likely to vote No in the Scottish Independence Referendum, even when accounting for party identity and perceptions of party leaders. Instrumental concerns or risk aversion may help explain why individuals with similar sub-state identities have distinct constitutional preferences, and thus separate into autonomist and minority nationalist categories. I lack the items to investigate further here, but this question represents an important avenue for future research.

3.3.2. Non-nationalist categories

Unlike the preceding three categories, the final two are non-nationalist. The first of these is present in all three nations (Figure 3.4), but it is largest in Wales. Unlike the three nationalist categories, almost none of the members of this category consider either national identity to be central. Similarly, members of this category are less likely to report strong national identities. This is particularly true in England, where these individuals are very unlikely to report somewhat strong state or sub-state identity. Consequently, these individuals do not fulfil the strong and central national identity criteria for designation as nationalist. Instead, these individuals appear to acknowledge their national identity, but they do not consider it to be strong or an important part of how they think of themselves. Fenton (2007) labels such individuals in England as 'indifferent' about their identity, and I adopt this label here.

Figure 3.4: Predicted probability of a member of the 'indifferent' category selecting each response for every variable

One consistent pattern is that uncertainty on constitutional issues is the highest among indifferent identifiers in each nation.[56] In England, 36 per cent of this category choose 'don't know,' with 14 per cent in Scotland and 11 per cent in Wales doing the same. In contrast, constitutional uncertainty is far lower among the three nationalist categories of in all three nations (albeit to a lesser extent in Wales). Uncertainty is consistently higher in England, which may reflect how constitutional issues are of less salience. However, the inconsistent positions and higher levels of uncertainty support my proposition that indifferent identifiers are less likely to have a defined position on constitutional issues. As a result, researchers need to be careful how to treat uncertainty on constitutional issues in the future.

Figure 3.5: Predicted probability of a member of the pro-devolution category selecting each response for every variable (Scotland only)

In Scotland, there is an additional category that is somewhat difficult to label, but that I argue is closest to the 'indifferent' group (Figure 3.5). A higher proportion of this category consider 'being British' central than those in the main 'indifferent' categories, so there is a slight case for locating them alongside statists. However, a majority do not consider either national identity to be central, which makes it difficult to argue that most individuals within this category satisfy Bieber's (2018) 'prioritisation of national identity' criterion. Indeed, very few of them have strong national identities, with many reporting moderate levels of both Scottishness and Britishness. Instead, what characterises this category this that the majority support devolution. Consequently, these individuals tend to be 'indifferent' about their identity, but they represent a mid-point between the other indifferent category and statists.

The final four groups are present in England (Figure 3.6). However, I argue that these four groups represent different levels of the same category, which includes most English respondents. The main distinctive characteristic of members of each of these categories is that they tend to report the same level of state and sub-state identity. Consequently, the members of each of these categories are 'dual identifiers' of different strengths, corresponding to those selecting 4, 5, 6, and 7 on both scales. Given that they do not tend to prioritise one identity, this category fails the prioritisation criteria of Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism.

There are clear differences between those with moderate-but-equal identities and those with strong-but-equal identities. Those who report 'very strong' dual identity in England often consider at least one identity to be central (albeit at much lower levels than what is found in the 'nationalist' categories). However, the proportion of individuals selecting 'neither' English nor British increases as the strength of dual identity decreases, ranging from 31 per cent in the 'very strong' category to 88 per cent of those in the 4/7 dual identity category. The 'very strong' category is the only one where a majority do not consider neither national identity central, which differentiates it from the other three dual identity categories (which I label as 'moderate'). These results emphasise the limits found with treating dual identity as a single data-point, as discussed in the previous chapter.

Figure 3.6: Predicted probability of a member of the 'dual identity' category selecting each response for every variable (England only)

3.3.3. Demographics and party support

Currently, existing researchers argue that there are socio-demographic divides along the state v sub-state territorial cleavage. For example, Alvarez-Galvez et al. (2018) argue that individuals who position themselves closer to the state are older and less educated than those who prioritise their Catalan or Basque identity. Similarly, Calzada (2018) claims that statists are among the 'left-behind,' which represent "older, working-class, white voters with few educational qualifications" (Ford and Goodwin 2014 p277). I address these debates by examining the demographic characteristics of these nationalist categories.

I begin to address these debates by adding covariates to the LCA model. LCA includes covariates in the form of a multinomial logistic regression model, with membership in a category being the dependent variable. In such a model, one category is held as a reference and the results indicate the effect of each covariate on membership in a group relative to this reference category. I use indifferent identifiers as they are a non-nationalist category that is present in each territory. To ease interpretation, I report the demographic composition of each category based on these models (Tables 3.3-3.5), with the full results present in the appendix (appendix 2 – Tables A18-A20).

To begin, there is some evidence that the minority and statist categories attract the same type of individuals in Scotland and Wales. When compared to the other nationalist categories, minority nationalists tend to be younger, are more likely to have a degree, and are less likely to be Christian in Scotland and (particularly) Wales. In addition, minority nationalists in both territories tend to report far weaker support for the Conservatives and far stronger support for the SNP/Plaid Cymru[57] than statists and autonomists in both nations. The similarities between Scotland and Wales then extend to statism. Statists tend to be older and are less likely to be male in Scotland and Wales (and are more likely to be Christian in Scotland). These results suggests that there may be some common process[58] attracting individuals to minority and state nationalism in Scotland and Wales – albeit in different directions for the two forms of nationalism.

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[57] The one major area of difference between minority nationalists in the two countries is that those in Wales are far more likely to vote Labour. Many independence supporters vote for Labour in Wales (Griffiths 2021), which may be due to Welsh Labour's strong support for devolution limiting the appeal of Plaid Cymru (Moon 2016).
[58] Determining what this common process is precisely is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Table 3.3: Demographic results for England

	Autonomist	Dual 4-4	Dual 5-5	Dual 6-6	Dual 7-7	Statist	Indifferent
Age (Mean)	53.6	30.6	31.5	40.3	49.4	39.2	30.4
Female (%)	43.9	52.1	62.8	53.2	54.3	34.4	45.7
White British (%)	99.8	79.6	86.8	95.9	96.0	90.9	47.0
Soc: DE (%)	22.8	13.7	13.6	15.7	23.0	15.7	10.5
Degree (%)	27.5	63.1	54.4	47.4	35.3	61.8	64.8
Catholic (%)	5.0	8.9	6.5	5.9	6.6	5.2	14.8
Christian (%)	44.5	14.2	19.9	32.9	46.5	35.2	14.0
Other (%)	1.2	10.2	6.5	4.2	3.8	6.2	10.6
Con PTV (0-1)	0.73	0.21	0.36	0.52	0.59	0.55	0.16
Lab PTV (0-1)	0.19	0.71	0.53	0.43	0.34	0.46	0.59

Table 3.4: Demographic results for Scotland

	Minority	Autonomist	Pro-devolution	Statist	Indifferent
Age (Mean)	42.2	51.1	45.4	58.0	35.7
Female (%)	53.0	57.8	51.2	39.2	53.0
White British (%)	98.6	100.0	95.2	98.6	78.5
Soc: DE (%)	20.4	21.9	14.1	23.4	15.6
Degree (%)	53.6	48.6	68.4	43.0	71.6
Catholic (%)	12.0	6.6	7.0	4.5	12.4
Christian (%)	20.1	39.2	28.3	61.9	7.8
Other (%)	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.7	5.1
Con PTV (0-1)	0.03	0.33	0.44	0.81	0.05
Lab PTV (0-1)	0.34	0.49	0.50	0.26	0.57
SNP PTV (0-1)	0.91	0.38	0.29	0.01	0.68

Table 3.5: Demographic results in Wales

	Minority	Autonomist	Statist	Indifferent
Age (Mean)	32.9	50.2	54.3	35.4
Female (%)	40.3	46.4	51.6	54.0
White British (%)	98.6	98.9	99.5	79.0
Soc: DE (%)	26.6	29.2	27.7	23.8
Degree (%)	49.0	29.4	43.1	52.6
Catholic (%)	5.4	4.8	4.5	9.1
Christian (%)	15.2	41.4	44.4	15.1
Other (%)	5.5	4.7	3.8	14.2
Con PTV (0-1)	0.10	0.52	0.61	0.18
Lab PTV (0-1)	0.60	0.47	0.32	0.60
Plaid PTV (0-1)	0.64	0.34	0.19	0.40

However, the process attracting people to statist nationalism appears different in England. In England, statists are younger, are more likely to be male, are far more likely to have a degree, and are less likely to be Christian. The differences between this category in England to those in Scotland and Wales suggest that there is no state-wide process attracting people to statist nationalism in Britain. Instead, these results are consistent with existing research that demonstrates that British identity works differently in England to Scotland and Wales (Henderson et al. 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021). One explanation for this may be that the dynamics attracting people towards state nationalism are different in majority (England) versus minority (Scotland and Wales) territories.

Yet, the existence of minority-majority differences does not extend to autonomism. Overall, the demographic composition of the autonomist category tends to be rather similar across the three nations. It is important to note that there are some important differences in Scotland when compared to England and Wales, as autonomists in Scotland are more likely to be female and degree educated than those in England and Wales. These results suggest that the common processes attracting people towards nationalism in minority versus majority nations may be confined to minority and statist nationalisms – although further research is required to determine this conclusively.

It is important to note that, despite their demographic similarities, the autonomist categories in England and Wales are very different in terms of their party support. Autonomists are far more likely to vote for the Conservatives in England than they are in Scotland or Wales. These results may reflect how the contemporary Conservatives have attempted to mobilise English identity and grievances within said union (Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a), whereas the Conservatives have long had an image issue in Scotland and Wales – where they are seen as the 'English' party (Wyn Jones et al. 2002). Consequently, even though the autonomist groups may contain similar people in England and Wales, their voting behaviour diverges according to the party that is best able to represent their interests.

Outside of the nationalist categories, one area where there does appear to be a UK-wide trend is within the indifferent identifier categories. Across the three nations, there are similarities in age, education, and religion across the indifferent identifier groups in the three nations. In addition, indifferent identifiers in all three nations are unlikely to support the Conservatives

(and are more likely to support Labour).[59] Furthermore, indifferent identifiers are more likely to identify as not white British[60] than any of the nationalist categories, which are almost universally white British in the three nations. This is particularly true in England, which has a higher proportion of ethnic minorities than Scotland or Wales. Consequently, there appears to be a state-wide nature to who feels indifferent about their national identities in Britain.

The tendency for ethnic minorities to feel indifferent about their national identities builds on existing studies of Britain, which tend to argue that there are differences between the constituent nations. Ethnic minorities in England have been found to be more likely to claim a British identity, with Englishness instead being tied to being white (Modood et al. 1997, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). In contrast, there is evidence that minorities are more willing to think of themselves as Scottish in Scotland (Modood et al. 1997, Saeed et al. 1999).[61] While these patterns may be evident in identity strength, the results of this study indicate that ethnic minorities are far less likely to consider both British and English/Scottish/Welsh identities as central to their self-conception.[62]

Finally, there are sizeable differences between those with moderate-but-equal and strong-but-equal dual identities in England, which are consistent with the results from chapter 2. Moderate-but-equal dual identifiers are closest to indifferent identifiers in terms of their identity centrality, with each dual identity group becoming more similar to autonomists in England as the strength of their dual identity increases. These patterns are also replicated in the demographic composition and party support of each dual identity category, which suggests that there is a progressive connection between each and identity strength/centrality. Those with moderate-but-equal identities are more likely to be younger and university educated, and they are less likely to identify as Christian or white British, than those with

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[59] Interestingly, despite their lack of 'nationalism,' indifferent identifiers are still quite likely to support either the SNP or Plaid in Scotland and Wales, possibly due to the left-wing or inclusive platforms promoted by the parties.

[60] Due to low sample size, I am required to focus on 'white British' versus 'not white British.' Such a comparison is problematic because there is evidence that the endorsement of British identity differs between ethnic minority groups (see Maxwell, 2009). Future research should aim to disaggregate ethnic groups further, where data will allow.

[61] Less work is present for Wales.

[62] Understanding why this trend emerges is beyond the scope of this study, but it may be that ethnic minorities are more likely to prioritise different identities. For example, Modood et al. (1997) found that South Asians often tended to consider religion as something of personal importance, unlike white British respondents. Alternatively, there is some evidence that ethnicity plays an important role in the acceptance of individuals into national identity categories by the majority (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015), and the potential for rejection may discourage ethnic minorities from placing either state or sub-state identity at the centre of their self-conception. Future research on the identity centrality of ethnic minorities may investigate this possibility in more detail.

stronger-but-equal-dual identities. Party support also changes progressively according to the strength of someone's dual identity. In general, those with very strong dual identity are far more likely to support the Conservatives (and far less likely to support Labour) than those with moderate-but-equal identities. Consequently, these results emphasise that dual identity should not be treated as a homogeneous category because moderate and strong dual identifiers are very different people.

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have introduced a novel categorisation of nationalist sentiments within England, Scotland, and Wales. Alongside the two non-nationalist categories, I separate individuals into three distinct nationalist categories. The first two nationalist categories conform to those on either side of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage (statists and minority nationalists). Statists in all three nations exhibit strong nation-state identity, prioritise their state identity over others, and oppose independence (although do not necessarily support centralisation). In contrast, minority nationalists in Scotland and Wales prioritise their strong sub-state identity and (tend to) support independence.

However, I find another nationalist category that deviates from the conventional dichotomy: autonomists. These individuals satisfy the criteria for sub-state nationalism, but they are distinct from minority nationalists due to their moderate to strong nation-state identification and lack of support for independence. These differences are also reflected in their proximity to statists in terms of their demographics and support for parties that defend the constitutional status quo. Consequently, the presence of this category represents a direct challenge to conceptions of nationalism that rely on a desire for total sovereignty (e.g. Gellner 1983, Hechter 2000).

The presence of the autonomist category in all three nations is interesting for researchers who compare 'majority' and 'minority' sub-state territories. For example, the presence of this category in England is consistent with Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a), who found that those who prioritise their English identity still retain their (often strong) British identity, and express dissatisfaction with the constitutional status quo through support for solutions that treat England as a distinct entity within the state. Their results often suggest that those who prioritise their Scottish and Welsh identity are distinct to their English counterparts, which the presence of the autonomist category in Scotland and Wales (and their similarities in terms of identity, demographics, and party support) suggests may not always be the case.

The demographic composition of the groups found in these three territories suggests that the processes guiding their formation may be category specific. The similar demographic composition of the minority and statist nationalist groups in Scotland and Wales suggest that there is some common process attracting individuals to these categories across these nations. The composition of the statist categories is distinct in England, which suggests that state nationalism may attract different groups in majority versus minority nations in the state. The results are more complicated for autonomists. This category has a distinct gender and education profile in Scotland, and despite their demographic similarities their party support is very different in England and Wales. The only category where there appears to be a clear UK-wide trend is the indifferent identifier category, although indifferent identifiers are more likely to be ethnic minorities in England (where the ethnic minority population is larger).

There are some limitations with this study that are important to acknowledge. First, it focuses on data from a single time-point. Existing research suggests that some of the component pieces of nationalism may change over time, such as constitutional preference and national identity (Hierro 2012, Serrano 2015, Griffiths 2021). If this is the case, then nationalist sentiment may also change over time. Second, this study focuses on data from three sub-state territories within a single multi-nation state (i.e. the United Kingdom). It is possible that configurations of nationalist sentiment may be different within different multi-nation states. These are two questions that I shall address within the next two chapters.

Despite these limitations, this chapter has several further implications for future researchers. One of the most important is to reiterate the limitations of treating dual identity as a single entity. Existing individual level approaches that focus on identity (e.g. McCrone 2013, Alvarez-Galvez et al. 2018, Henderson et al. 2021) tend to collect dual identifiers together. However, the results above highlight that dual identification is not a homogeneous category and looking at identity scales alone masks these important differences. I explore how these differences influence the associations between nationalism and political attitudes in chapter 6.

In addition, uncertainty over constitutional issues is associated negatively with nationalist sentiment. Members of nationalist categories exhibit far lower non-response when asked about constitutional issues than non-nationalists do. Such uncertainty may be expected among indifferent identifiers, but non-response is also high among 'very strong' dual identifiers in England. Given the prevalence of uncertainty across all three nations, these results stress how researchers need to be careful when analysing constitutional preference in multi-nation states.

Finally, these results emphasise the importance of taking the position of the nation within the state into account. Dual state/sub-state identity is far more common within England, which aligns with Staerkle et al. (2005) who argues that individuals within dominant territories will have closer ties to the state. However, an interesting challenge to this argument is that statists in Scotland and Wales exhibit stronger British identity than statists in England, while sub-state identity is also stronger among those in England. It may be that statists within the 'dominant' territory do not see their sub-state identity as a challenge to their state identity, whereas those in 'minority' territories do consider them more contradictory (and thus identify more strongly with the state and less so with the sub-state).

Overall, these results emphasise that the meaning and advocates of state identity can differ across sub-state identities, which is consistent with the work of researchers like Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a). Furthermore, these results build on contemporary elite-focused analyses in stressing that popular nationalist sentiment is also more complex than the conventional elite-focused dichotomy between state and sub-state nationalism. Instead, I stress that the elite-level split between autonomists and secessionists (e.g. Massetti and Schakel 2013) appears present among individuals, even in territories where this is not reflected in the nationalist parties available to voters. Consequently, this chapter emphasises the advantages of incorporating individual-level accounts of nationalism, which may diverge from researchers' expectations in some instances.

4. How stable is nationalism? Exploring the stability of nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories

Abstract

The stability of national sentiment is often alluded to in existing research. While some scholars view ethno-national identities as stable traits among individuals (Smith 1995, Antonsich 2009), others believe the components of nationalism (i.e. national identity and constitutional preference) shift in response to political events (Hierro 2012, Serrano 2015). I address this debate here by investigating the stability of popular nationalist sentiment within two sub-state territories (Scotland and Wales). Using data from the British Election Study Internet Panel, I introduce an approximation of my approach from the previous chapter. Overall, I find that each form of nationalist sentiment (secessionist, autonomist, statist) tends to be stable both at an aggregate-level (between 2014 and 2021) and for most individuals (between 2014 and 2017). However, Brexit vote has a clear demobilising effect on some of those on either side of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage in Scotland. These results have important implications for the mobilisation of political identities in response to partisan cues and electoral shocks.

The stability of nationalism is an important source of debate within existing research. Despite claims that increased trans-border economic activity and the presence of supranational institutions would undermine the nation (see Ohmae 1995, Hobsbawm 2007), nationalism remains an important part of contemporary politics. Indeed, in recent years the importance of nationalist politics has surged in Europe and North America (Bieber 2018). Yet, many researchers have found that changes in the salience of nationalist politics have not been accompanied by similar changes among individuals (Antonsich 2009, Davidov 2011, Bieber 2018, Coenders et al. 2020, Hadler et al. 2021). Consequently, the next step of the thesis is to examine the over-time stability of nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories.

Existing debates on this topic tend to focus on ethno-national 'identities' rather than 'nationalism.' However, this research is still relevant for my approach because national identities are a core (but not sufficient) component of Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism (as discussed in the previous chapter). There are some (primordial) scholars who believe that ethno-national identities do not change over someone's life (e.g. Gil-White 1999, van Evera 2001). These positions are disputed regularly by constructivist researchers who point to how ethno-national identities can grow, develop, and change over time (e.g. Barth 1969, Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983, Wimmer 2013).

Yet, a question remains: how much change? Addressing this question is important for scholars who wish to research nationalist sentiment and ethno-national identities. Some constructivist researchers argue that identities are fluid, and that individuals frequently prioritise different identities (e.g. Kasfir 1979). If this was the case, then it may be difficult to determine how specific identities affect politics when using methods that measure them in a single moment like surveys. Other scholars disagree, and argue that ethno-national identities are stable in the short-term but are changeable in the long-term (e.g. Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). The problem here is that ambiguity remains on how to define 'short' and 'long' term (Bayer 2009). It may be that nationalist sentiment tends to be stable and only tends to change in unsettled times (i.e. when facing an external shock like institutional change or political unrest). Examining the stability of nationalism thus facilitates analysis of what induces it to change.

To investigate the stability of popular nationalist sentiment, I introduce an approximated version of my approach from the previous chapter, using relative identity and independence support. I focus on the stability of nationalist sentiment within Scotland and Wales. Both

territories faced a significant political event during this period (the 2016 EU referendum), while an additional shock took place in Scotland in 2014 (the Scottish independence referendum). Competitive electoral events can serve as a trigger for 'ethnic' conflicts (Cederman et al. 2013), and Fieldhouse et al. (2019) discusses how these events can represent 'electoral shocks.' Focusing on these territories during this period allows me to examine how popular nationalist sentiment responds to such major political events. In addition, the BESIP contains adequate samples with the required information for both territories (but not for England), which facilitates my approach.

Overall, the principal contribution of this chapter is that I investigate the stability of popular nationalist sentiment over time. Each form of nationalism shows aggregate-level (overall size) and individual-level (within-individual) stability over this period. These results are consistent with state-level analyses that suggest that nationalist sentiment is a stable characteristic for many in a territory. However, at some points, nationalist sentiment does change for some of those who may be receptive to partisan messages on independence (supporters of sub-state nationalist parties) or those on either side of an electoral shock (Leave/Remain voters in the 2016 EU referendum in Scotland). Consequently, these results have important implications for the mobilisation of political identities in response to partisan cues and political events.

4.1. The stability of nationalist sentiment

While nationalist politics may have increased in prevalence in Europe and North America in recent years, many researchers have argued that different dimensions of popular nationalist sentiment are stable over time. Bieber (2018) found that trust in other nationalities, pride in one's nationality, and welfare chauvinism[63] show few consistent changes since 2004 across the globe. Similarly, Coenders et al. (2020) found that chauvinism (often called 'nationalism' within psychological and sociological research) was stable within Europe between 1995 and 2013, while Davidov (2011) found that the meanings of chauvinism and pride remained static between 1995 and 2003. In addition, national attachment has not increased systematically in Western Europe between 1982 and 2013 (Antonsich 2009, Hadler et al. 2021). Thus, the (predominantly) state-level research suggests that facets of popular nationalism may be stable over time.

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[63] The preference for prioritising people from 'your' nation when redistributing welfare.

However, there are two problems with this research. First, some of these researchers focus on forms of chauvinism assume a particular (exclusive) view of nationalism. Existing studies that account for the possibility of inclusive forms of nationalism (e.g. Bonikowski and DiMaggio 2016) do find that levels of popular nationalist sentiment in a population can change over time. Second, this research primarily focuses on aggregate-level change. While it is possible to examine changes in societies with this data, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the individual-level from aggregate-level data because it can mask significant individual-level variation.[64]

Why may popular nationalist sentiment be stable? As mentioned, researchers tend to focus on national/ethnic identities, rather than nationalism per se. One option put forward by 'primordial' scholars is that the nation represents a set of longstanding ethnic and cultural ties (Smith 1995). The view that nations represent 'ancient' groups is a common trope invoked by nationalist elites (Breuilly 1996, Coakley 2018). For primordial scholars, these ties are inherited from one's parents (Gil-White 1999). The view that these ties are then fixed becomes part of how individuals view them in practice. For example, Gil-White (1999) found that Mongolian individuals believed that a child born in Kazakhstan is 'Kazakh,' even if the child was unaware of it itself. Fearon and Laitin (2000 p848) termed such beliefs "everyday primordialism." If primordial arguments are accurate, then nationalist sentiment would be **completely stable** over time.

However, primordialism is maligned regularly within existing research. The primary reason for this is that it does not account for the changes that occur within identities over time (Eller and Coughlin 1993, Coakley 2018). For example, Wimmer (2013) highlights how some national identities emerge through incorporating pre-existing sub-state identities into the core (e.g. 'French' after the French Revolution), while others emerge via the promotion of a national identity that sits atop pre-existing ethnic and/or regional divisions (e.g. 'Swiss' after the 1848 civil war). Those who hold pre-existing territorial identities may resist these new national identities (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Tilly 1994), but some may acquiesce and attempt to join the new national community if the national majority accepts them (Wimmer 2013).

Furthermore, researchers who focus on 'everyday' primordialism do not acknowledge (or do not accept) that inherited markers are not the only source of ascribing nationhood. Indeed,

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[64] Known as the ecological fallacy.

there is a long-established literature on the prevalence of civic markers of nationhood, which represent more voluntary markers like respecting laws and institutions (Kohn 1944, Shulman 2002). These civic markers of nationhood are prevalent across many states and sub-state territories (McCrone and Bechhofer 2015, Larsen 2017, Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020), and their relative importance to nationalist elites is not static over time (Keating 1997). There are problems with relying on markers of nationhood (see the introduction and chapter 6), but they do emphasise that not all individuals prioritise 'inherited' markers.

Instead, most researchers tend to focus on 'constructivist' accounts of identity. By 'constructed' researchers understand identities as social categories, "whose membership rules, content, and valuation are the products of human action and speech" (Fearon and Laitin 2000 p847). Individuals belong to many of these social categories, such as their race, class, and nation (Tajfel 1981). Some of these categories will be more important to an individual than others are (Brewer 1991, Chandra 2012), and prioritising the nation represents one of the core components of Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism.

The prioritisation of certain markers may change over time, depending on the circumstances (Kasfir 1979, Henderson 2007, Chandra 2012). It is possible to overlook this point when operationalising national identities. Chandra (2001a) argued over two decades ago that, even as researchers acknowledge that identities are fluid and multiple, they treat them as fixed in their analyses. Focusing on identity within a single time-point may make this same mistake. Some scholars have made attempts to include constructivist ontologies into their analyses. For example, Onuch and Hale (2018) found that individuals in Ukraine prioritised different identities and their markers in different locations (i.e. in the workplace or at home), and that these then had different consequences for political behaviour. If this is the case more broadly, then nationalist sentiment may exhibit some degree of instability over time and place.[65]

But how much instability? Some constructivists, like Kasfir (1979), believe that identities are **completely instable.** Here, identity prioritisation changes as the context around us changes. For example, some identities are more important to us when we are shopping than when we are at a sporting event (Henderson 2007, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015). If this was the case, then individuals who prioritise their nation at one point (i.e. nationalists) may prioritise

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[65] I focus on stability over time. Addressing potential changes in nationalist sentiment over place/location is beyond the scope of this thesis, and thus represents an avenue for future research.

something else almost immediately after measurement, which would make it very difficult to separate the effect of one identity category from another (Bayer 2009).

Other scholars argue that identity change may be slower. For example, Chandra (2012) argues that changes in identity are limited by our physical, social, and economic characteristics. Some of these you cannot change (your place of birth), some are very difficult to change (your skin colour), and some can change more quickly (learning a language). Some of these identities are also more fundamental to how we view ourselves, and thus are more likely to remain important over time (Chandra 2012). In this situation, changes in identity categories may be small and tend to accumulate over time (Burke 2006). Due to the incremental nature of this process, Chandra and Wilkinson (2008) argue that identities may be **stable in the short-term, but changeable in the long-term.** However, Bayar (2009) does highlight one important limitation with this view, which is that the terms 'long-term' and 'short-term' are ill-defined within this literature. I aim to address this gap within this research.

4.1.1. When does nationalist sentiment change?

If nationalism is stable in the short-term, what causes it to change? Within conventional research, changes in national identities occur slowly due to structural changes within a territory. Many researchers stress the importance of industrialisation for changing nationalism, either by encouraging the development of a central language (Gellner 1983) or by changing the meaning of nationalism within a territory (Keating 1997, Erk 2010). Alternatively, Anderson (1983) stresses the importance of the development of the printing press in encouraging collective identities to develop, while Hierro (2012) argues that exposure to Catalan and Spanish media continues to influence identity prioritisation in Catalonia. In these circumstances, identities may slowly change to reflect the new reality people find themselves in.

However, these processes do not have to be structural, and instead nationalist sentiment may change quickly in response to specific circumstances. For example, some researchers argue that individuals respond to the actions of political elites (Kasfir 1979, Fearon and Laitin 2000, Wimmer 2013). Under this framework, the rhetoric political elites shapes nationalist sentiment within the population (Helbling et al. 2016, Hadler and Flesken 2018), so if the rhetoric changes then so may popular nationalist sentiment. However, the role of political elites is not uncontentious, with some researchers outright questioning their ability to drive

nationalist sentiment (e.g. Hjerm and Schnabel 2010, Boonen and Hooghe 2014). Consequently, further research is required to understand the connection between elites and popular nationalist sentiment.

Alternatively, individual-level positions may only shift in response to some important events. Birkland (1998 p54) describes the types of events that prompt change to the status quo as focusing events, which represent events that are "sudden, relatively uncommon, can be reasonably defined as harmful," whose harm is concentrated in a particular area or group, and is known to both political elites and the public. In a similar vein, Fieldhouse et al. (2019) define such critical events as electoral shocks. They define these shocks as events that "1) represent a sharp change to the status quo outside the normal course of politics; 2) are highly salient and noticeable over prolonged time periods, and 3) are relevant to party politics" (Fieldhouse et al. 2019 p32).

These shocks are not necessarily short-term events with short-lived effects – instead they are events that restructure political competition (Fieldhouse et al. 2019). Shock events are too large for political elites to ignore or avoid blame by portraying an event as an 'act of God' (Birkland 1998), which allows their opponents to promote their preferred solution (Boin et al. 2009). When successful, these shocks can change the relevant dimension of debate – such as the increase in the salience of immigration after the enlargement of the EU in 2004 (Fieldhouse et al. 2019).

What events qualify as 'shocks?' Under Fieldhouse et al.'s (2019) definition, any event that does not satisfy their three criteria does not qualify as a shock. It may be difficult to predict a shock in advance, as we may not know the impact, salience, and politicisation of an event before it happens. This is made even more difficult by the tendency for the change that accompanies shocks to be "unanticipated" (Fieldhouse et al. 2019 p2), and the events themselves often arise from "external factors or contingencies that could not be foreseen" (Fieldhouse et al. 2019 p32). Making predictions about such events may then be very difficult in advance.

However, in some circumstances, it may be possible to predict whether an event will be a shock (or not) if we have clear expectations of whether it will satisfy Fieldhouse et al.'s (2019) three criteria. One clear example is the death of Queen Elizabeth II. Fieldhouse et al. (2019) state the death of a monarch in Britain was highly likely to be salient (it was) and represent a change to the status quo (it did), but it was unlikely to be politicised by political

parties (it was not). Here, Fieldhouse et al. (2019) were able to predict correctly whether an event would be an 'electoral shock' or not in advance, which suggests that it may be possible in the presence of clear expectations about an event.

Currently, the literature on the impact of events on politics does not relate directly to changes in popular nationalist sentiment. The social movement literature focuses on policy formation (Birkland 1998), whereas Fieldhouse et al.'s (2019) study aimed to understand voter volatility in British elections. Neither of these areas inherently relate to popular nationalist sentiment. However, there is some evidence that events can relate to nationalist sentiment because some 'shocks' have led people to change their identities. For example, Labour identifying Yes voters changed their partisan identities to align with their constitutional preferences after the 2014 Scottish independence referendum (Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018, Henderson et al. 2023).

So, why may events influence popular nationalist sentiment? I posit that there may be three potential explanations. First, events may lead to a change in popular nationalist sentiment if they give individuals an incentive to change. The potential for identities to change in response to instrumental considerations has long been proposed by some constructivist scholars (Barth 1969, Wimmer 2013). Indeed, Posner (2017) argues that individuals prioritise the identity that allows them to attract the greatest number of resources from the state. If the incentives change, then so will the identities. For example, Hadler et al. (2021) found that European identity in post-communist countries dropped by 2003, which they argue is caused by a sense of frustration among individuals in these territories that the perceived benefits of EU membership had not materialised.

However, the argument that individuals adapt their identities in line with the perceived benefits of an institution is questionable. As discussed earlier in this thesis, individuals often "resist changing their national identities, even when they can expect to benefit" (Stern 1995 p223). For example, there were no differences in European identity between so-called 'debtor' and 'creditor' countries (Risse 2014), which may be present if individuals were responding to the perceived benefits of the EU. Similarly, Hempel (2004) found that perceiving an identity to be advantageous for obtaining economic goods only had a limited effect on identification.[66] Identities are not purely instrumental, and as a result instrumental

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[66] Instrumentalism affects different groups to different degrees, even if they have similar beliefs about the effectiveness of their identity in obtaining resources (see Hempel 2004).

considerations will not always enough to drive individuals to change either their identities or their nationalist sentiment.

Instead, nationalist sentiment may change in response to the outcome of specific events. For example, in their study of Canada and Britain, Anderson and McGregor (2016) found that the supporters of parties sometimes changed their national identity in response to general election results. In Canada, the supporters of the Liberal party in Canada became 'less' Canadian after their party lost a general election, whereas supporters of the Labour party in Britain became 'more' British after their party won a general election. In these circumstances, being on the 'winning' side an election may encourage someone to feel more enthusiastic about the nation that their group now represents, whereas 'losing' an election may make someone feel like they are less well represented within that nation (and thus distance themselves from it).

The effect of 'winning' or 'losing' in events is important because national identities can sometimes associate with sides of an event. For example, supporting Scottish independence associated popularly with prioritising a Scottish identity over a British one, and opposing independence associated with the reverse (Bond 2015, Henderson et al. 2023). Similarly, Brexit vote associated with national identities in Britain, albeit in different ways in the constituent nations (Leave – English in England, British in Scotland and Wales; Remain – British in England, Scottish/Welsh in Scotland and Wales) (Henderson et al. 2021). Consequently, if an event associates with a particular national identity or constitutional position, then individuals may move towards (or away from) those national identities or constitutional positions according to their position on the event.

Finally, nationalist sentiment may change in response to an event if it concerns the symbolic recognition of a sub-state territory. In their study, Basta (2018) argued that support for secession rose when the state government recognised the distinct character of a sub-state territory because this created a backlash among state nationalist elites, which in turn alienated members of the sub-state territory and pushed them to secession. Two events where this occurred include the rise in Québécois identity and support for secession in the aftermath of the failure of the Meech Lake Constitutional Accord[67] in 1990 (Mendelsohn 2002, Vallée-Dubois et al. 2017, Basta 2018), and the rise in a singular Catalan identity and support for

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[67] I discuss this in an earlier footnote.

secession after the undermining of the Statue of Autonomy[68] in 2010 (Serrano 2015). Under this view, nationalist sentiment will change when the distinct nature of the sub-state territory becomes a salient topic of conversation.

To my knowledge, there is little research that examines the locations that are particularly vulnerable to volatility in popular nationalist sentiment in response to events. However, it is possible that 'shocking' events may have different effects in different locations. According to Fieldhouse et al. (2019), 'electoral shocks' have had a greater influence on voter volatility because of increased partisan dealignment in Britain. One tentative possibility may be that polities will experience greater volatility in popular nationalist sentiment if people are less committed to their national identities or constitutional preferences. For example, it is feasible that shocks may have less ability to shift nationalist sentiment if people are very committed to their national identities, or if constitutional issues are salient and polarised. Investigating this possibility in the future will require treating territories separately to account for different levels of commitment.

4.2. Approximating my classification

Overall, there is still a great deal of debate surrounding the relative stability of national ties. To examine the stability of nationalist sentiment, I first need to create an approximated version of my classification from the previous chapter. To do this, I use data from the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP, Fieldhouse et al. 2021). The BESIP is an internet panel study of over 100,000 respondents over 21 waves that cover February 2014 to May 2021. Each individual wave contains around 30,000 respondents, with large subsamples for Scotland and Wales. Many of these respondents take multiple waves (see BESIP documentation for further details). In the previous chapter, I used wave 20 to create my classification, so I use that here to create my approximated measure. The constitutional preference questions in wave 20 were asked to a sizeable subsample of England (n: 6,994), as well as the whole Scottish (n: 2730) and Welsh (n: 1804) samples.

Unfortunately, identity centrality measures are rare within existing surveys.[69] As a result, I need to create an approximation of my classification that does not use them (summary in

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[68] The Statute of Autonomy was proposed by the Catalan parliament to the Spanish Congress in 2005, which recognised Catalonia's position as a nation within Spain and was undermined by the Constitutional Court in 2010 (see Serrano 2015 for more).

[69] To my knowledge, the last time they were asked in England, Scotland, and Wales simultaneously was 2001 (see McCrone and Bechhofer 2015).

Table 4.1). I recreate the three nationalist categories by separating individuals based on their state/sub-state identities and their constitutional preferences (excluding non-respondents). I separate individuals into groups based on whether they prioritise their sub-state identity and support independence, those who prioritise their sub-state identity and oppose independence, and those who prioritise their state identity and oppose independence.

Table 4.1: Summary of the approximated classification

Category	Identity	Constitutional preference
Secessionist	Prioritise Sub-State	Support Independence
Autonomist	Prioritise Sub-State	Oppose Independence
Moderate Dual Identifier	Equal (Mid-point and Above)	N/A
Strong Dual Identifier	Equal (Maximum Value on Scale)	N/A
Statist	Prioritise State	Oppose Independence
Indifferent	Low State and Sub-State	N/A

Note: I exclude those who prioritise the state yet support independence because such attitudes are conceptually incoherent and are likely to be measurement error.

One limitation with this method is that constitutional preference questions are not consistent between England and Wales (multiple-choice) and Scotland (binary referendum) in the BESIP.[70] This is a problem because support for independence can be much higher when using a binary referendum question in the place of a multiple-choice question (see Griffiths 2021).[71] The difference between the questions limits the possibility of making direct comparisons of category sizes across territories. However, I argue that focusing on independence support/opposition is a flexible method of recreating my classification because it allows these distinct constitutional preferences to exist within the dual identity and statist categories, as they did in the previous inductive classification. This approximation captures sub-state and state nationalism broadly using as few variables as possible to allow widest application, and supplementary analysis can then examine the varieties that exist within them (data availability permitting).

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[70] Questions in appendix 3 – Table A21.
[71] Surprisingly, this was not the case in Scotland when examining results from wave 20 of the BESIP.

I recreate the non-nationalist categories via state and sub-state identity alone. Dual identifiers are those who report the same level of identity on the state and sub-state identity scale. However, in England, I found that those with 'very strong' (maximum value on the identity scale) dual identity were distinct from those with weaker levels of dual identity in terms of identity centrality, party support, and demographics (see chapters 2 and 3). To account for this, I separate individuals into 'strong' and 'moderate' dual identity groups here. Strong dual identifiers are those who report the maximum value on both identity scales, while moderate dual identifiers are those who report the mid-point or higher (excluding the maximum) on both identity scales.

Finally, I attempt to approximate the 'indifferent' category by categorising those with weak (less than the mid-point) state and sub-state identities together. It is important to note that constitutional preference is not a defining characteristic of dual and indifferent categories in the categories illustrated in the previous chapter. Consequently, I do not exclude non-respondents on constitutional preference questions in these categories to avoid limiting the size of these categories due to their greater likelihood of non-response (see chapter 3).

I explore the proportion of those within the original categories that are found within each of the new categories,[72] using Mplus v.8.0 (Muthén and Muthén 2017). I account for possible misclassification in the original latent class model via the inclusion of BCH weights (see Bolck et al. 2004), which is a necessary requirement of comparing class membership with variables external to the model (see Bakk et al. 2013). Overall, this measure is an adequate approximation of the classification of the previous chapter (see Table 4.2). To begin, it is a very good approximation of the statist category. Nearly all the members of the original statist category in England and Wales are found in the new statist category, although it is somewhat less effective in Scotland (possibly due to the presence of the non-nationalist pro-devolution category).

The approximation is also an effective, but not perfect, approximation of the minority nationalist category. The approximation is particularly successful in Scotland where 97.9 per cent of the original category are found in the new one. The approximation is somewhat less effective in Wales (75.7 per cent), which appears to be because not all minority nationalists support sub-state independence in Wales (and thus are found in the new autonomist category

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[72] To calculate these proportions, Mplus requires researchers to create binary dummies and examine the mean score for these dummies in each latent class, which translates to the proportion of that group who belong to the new group.

here). The reliance of this measure on support for independence means that it captures **'secessionism'** rather than the minority nationalism of the previous chapter, so I change the label accordingly.

Table 4.2: Percentage of 'original' category found within the corresponding 'new' category in England, Scotland, and Wales

		England %	Scotland %	Wales %
Minority/Secessionist		.	97.9	75.7
Autonomist		43.0	60.0	48.1
Moderate Dual	(4-4)	52.3 (4-4)	.	.
	(5-5)	82.2 (5-5)		
	(6-6)	88.4 (6-6)		
Strong Dual	(7-7)	100.0 (7-7)	.	.
Statist		100.0	58.0	86.8
Indifferent		###	20.4	21.2

Note: In England, there are three moderate dual identity categories (4-4, 5-5, and 6-6 on the 7-point identity scale). I present the range of those in these original categories found within the new 'moderate' category. There was also no minority category in the original England model, nor a dual category in the original Scotland or Wales model. The model did not run for the 'indifferent' category in England.
Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20

In addition, the new measure is an effective approximation of the original autonomist category in Scotland. The effectiveness is lower in England and Wales, as many of the original autonomists are found within the new 'strong dual identity' category.[73] These differences reflect some of the issues of identity scales. As shown in the previous chapters, many of those who report strong dual identity actually consider their sub-state identity to be central and were thus categorised as autonomists in the original model. Finally, this measure also serves as an adequate approximation for the dual identity categories in England. The approximation is most effective among those with the very strong but equal identity, albeit less so among those in the moderate but equal identity.

One a key limitation is that this approach fails to categorise many members of the original 'indifferent' category within the new category in Scotland and Wales, with only around 20 percent categorised accordingly in both nations. The lower level of categorisation reflects the limitations of identity scales. Very few people in Scotland and Wales report weak state and sub-state identity, even though many do not consider these identities important.

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[73] See chapter 2 for a discussion of the tendency of those with 'strong dual identity' to prioritise one identity over another when it comes to reporting centrality.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to account for these differences without the inclusion of identity centrality measures. Despite these issues, this simple measure still serves as an adequate (albeit imperfect) approximation of most of the categories found in the previous chapter.

4.3. How stable are the nationalist categories?

4.3.1.   Aggregate-level nationalism

So, how stable are these categories over time? I explore this in two steps, first exploring aggregate-level stability in these categories over time and then moving to within-individual change. Examining these steps requires the same survey instruments (identity scales and constitutional preference questions) to be present over multiple time-points. The BESIP includes identity scales and a binary referendum question for Scotland at least once per year since it began in 2014. While the BESIP regularly includes identity scales for Wales, it only includes a constitutional preference question in the early waves, which covers 2014-2017. Fortunately, the Welsh Election Study contains the same constitutional preference question (and identity scales[74]) in their 2019 and 2021 surveys. The questions for England only cover 2014-2016, so does not allow me to explore the effect of the 2016 EU referendum – so I exclude England here.

Overall, aggregate-level changes in the sizes of these categories in Scotland and Wales are minor between 2014 and 2021 (Figure 4.1). The main source of fluctuation in Scotland is within the secessionist category around the 2014 referendum vote, which increases immediately after the referendum before returning to its pre-referendum level. This is consistent with the growth of independence support during the referendum campaign (Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018). In Wales, the secessionist and autonomist categories have rose since 2016, although the former remains a minority.[75] These results do suggest that there have been slight moves toward the sub-state in Wales after 2019, as the statist and strong dual identity categories have also declined in size. Thus, there do appear to be some changes, but these tend to be small.

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[74] The identity scales are on different dimensions in the BESIP (1-7) and the WES (0-10), which I address in chapter 2.

[75] Support for independence is higher when using a binary independence referendum question in Wales, but not in Scotland, which may reflect the relatively softer support for independence present within Wales.

Figure 4.1: Size of each category in Scotland and Wales between 2014 and 2021

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel W1-W21 (2014-2021). Results weighted by relevant variable. I do not report those who prioritise their state identity but are pro-independence because they are an incoherent group that is consistently small and are likely measurement error (see appendix 3 – Tables A22-23), but I do not recode them as missing here.

4.3.2. Individual-level nationalism

While the categories may exhibit little instability over time on an aggregate-level, it is important to explore whether the positions of individuals are also stable over time. I compare categorisation in waves 1 (Feb-March 2014), 7 (April-May 2016), and 11 (April-May 2017). These waves to give myself the largest number of measurement instances for Scotland and Wales, without compromising on sample size. These waves contain all the requisite variables for this analysis, and this period covers two of the largest events in recent British political history: the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 2016 EU referendum. Examining this period provides a unique opportunity to examine the within-individual stability of the approximated nationalism measure during a time of electoral shocks (as defined by Fieldhouse et al. 2019).

One important limitation with such longitudinal analysis is that not every individual takes each wave of the BESIP. I have performed listwise deletion, meaning that I delete any case where data is not available for any wave that I analyse. If non-response does not occur at random then analyses may produce biased estimates that do not reflect the population of study (Huque et al. 2018). I conducted sensitivity analyses, and while the missingness is not

random, there are few large differences in age, gender, education, party support, or nationalist categorisation between the included and the missing (see appendix 3 – Section A3.1). Furthermore, similar analyses of change in identity over time do not consider limited representativeness to be an issue when the primary focus is on within-individual change (e.g. Hierro 2012, Egan 2020). Consequently, I do not expect listwise deletion to bias my results.

I compare the stability of the nationalist categories with party identification. Previous studies have found that party identity tends to be very stable within individuals across Britain, Canada, Germany, and the United States (Schickler and Green 1997, Green et al. 2003). One limitation with this is that partisan dealignment is a growing phenomenon within Britain (Fieldhouse et al. 2019) and Western Europe over the last 60 years (Garzia et al. 2022). However, it is important to provide a benchmark to compare against nationalist sentiment, and this is a conventional 'stable' position in existing research.

The BESIP includes two variables, one that asks if people see identify with a particular party and another that asks those who said no whether they feel closer to a party. I combine these variables and create separate dummies for those who identify or feel closer to each party (No party, Conservatives, Labour, the Scottish National Party (in Scotland), Plaid Cymru (in Wales), and 'other' parties[76]). I recode those who said don't know both times as missing, and I limit my analysis of party identification to those present in the nationalist categorisations so that I am comparing responses made by the same individuals. I do not weight this analysis because the purpose is to examine whether specific individuals give different responses over time.

I begin by using Egan's (2020) method for establishing the stability of a category over time. Of those in a particular category in 2016[77], I capture the number of individuals within this category in 2014 and 2017 (a), those within it in 2014 but not 2017 (b), those within it in 2017 but not 2014 (c), and those within it in neither 2014 or 2017 (d). Calculating $\frac{b+c+d}{a+b+c+d}$ then gives me a value between 0 (no respondents moved category – total stability) and 100

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[76] I recode the small number of individuals who identify with other parties into a singular 'other' category.
[77] I compare changes in specific nationalist categorisation between wave 1 (February-March 2014), wave 7 (April-May 2016), and wave 11 (April-May 2017). The time difference between waves differs, but the wave-on-wave patterns tend to be very similar regardless (see appendix 3 – Tables A24-A27).

(every respondent moved category - total instability), which represents the percentage of those located within a category in 2016 that were not there in either 2014 or 2017 (or both).

Similar patterns emerge within Scotland and Wales (Table 4.3). In both territories, the secessionist and statist categories are the most stable. Most of those who belonged within the statist category in 2016 were also statists in 2014 and 2019. The stability of this category is comparable to that of Conservative and Labour identification (Table 4.4). The same is true for secessionists in Scotland, while instability is higher in this category in Wales. Instability is particularly high among the moderate dual identifiers. There is less instability among autonomists (in Scotland) and strong dual identifiers, but many of those in these categories in 2016 were not in the same category in either 2014 or 2017 (or both). These results would suggest that the poles of the approximated nationalism measure tend to be more stable than the positions between them.

Table 4.3: Percentage of respondents in each category that were not in same category in either 2014 and 2017 (or both) as in 2016

	Secessionist		Autonomist		Dual (Mod)		Dual (Str)		Statist	
	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Scotland	**21.4**	523	**57.2**	145	**75.2**	240	**52.5**	153	**30.1**	355
Wales	**40.0**	60	**44.2**	226	**74.7**	158	**48.7**	79	**24.8**	420

Note: I do not present indifferent identifiers or the very small group who prioritise the state but favour independence (likely measurement error), but I do not code them as missing so as not to bias the analysis

Table 4.4: Percentage of respondents whose party identity was not the same in either 2014 and 2017 (or both) as in 2016

	Conservative		Labour		SNP/Plaid	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Scotland	**21.6**	310	**27.0**	352	**30.6**	490
Wales	**18.1**	243	**20.3**	355	**39.2**	74

However, one difficulty in longitudinal analysis is separating 'real' change from measurement error. I follow Green et al.'s (2003) method for separating stability from measurement error. When a variable changes over time but is measured perfectly, then the

correlation between the first response and the third response (R_{13}) will be the product of the correlation between the responses given in the first and the second wave (R_{12}) and the correlation between responses given in the second and the third wave (R_{23}).[78] In contrast, when a variable is stable but measured with error, then the correlation between the responses in the first and third wave (R_{13}) will be equal to the correlation between the responses in the first and second waves (R_{12}). Anything in between indicates that the variable does change somewhat, but that it is also measured with some error. I present an example of this that builds on Green et al. (2003) in Table 4.5.

Table 4.5: Example of how to identify the presence of stability with measurement error

	Waves 1 and 2 (R_{12})	Waves 2 and 3 (R_{23})	Waves 1 and 3 (R_{13})
Stable, but measured with error	0.5	0.5	0.5
Changing, but measured perfectly	0.5	0.5	0.25

Adapted from Green et al. (2003)

Thus, I examine both the actual and the predicted tetrachoric correlations between nationalist categorisations in waves 1 and 11 in Scotland and Wales (Table 4.6). The predicted correlation represents the correlations between waves 1 and 7 multiplied by the correlations between waves 7 and 11. Overall, there are some instances where the categories do not appear entirely stable, as the values are somewhat in between the previous and predicted correlations (secessionists in both territories, autonomists in Wales, and statists in Scotland). However, in each instance, the actual correlations between the categorisation in wave 1 and wave 11 are higher than what we would expect if these categories were changing but measured perfectly. The results for party identification are similar in Wales (Table 4.7), although those in Scotland are far closer to the predicted correlations (thus suggesting that they are changing). As a result, each category in the ANM measure appears somewhat stable, but these categories are measured with varying degrees of error.

Measurement error appears largest in the autonomist, strong dual, and moderate dual identity categories. Overall, the vast majority of wave on wave switching to/from the autonomist category is from/to the dual identity categories (see appendix 3 – Tables A24-A27), and the

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[78] Meaning $R_{13} = R_{12} \times R_{23}$.

boundary between the autonomist and dual identity categories appears slightly more porous in Scotland. These results are consistent with many of the original 'autonomists' now being placed in the strong dual identity category (as per the approximation). However, these results are distinct to what Hierro (2012) found in Catalonia where dual identifiers were the most stable category. Including identity centrality measures reduces the measurement error in these categories dramatically (see appendix 3 – Section A3.2), but without them the identity scales will obscure identity prioritisation. This is a limit of identity scales (and thus this approximation), but it is unavoidable without the presence of centrality measures.

Table 4.6: Tetrachoric correlations between waves 1 and 7 and waves 1 and 11 in Scotland and Wales

	Scotland			Wales		
	Previous correlation	Predicted correlation	Actual correlation	Previous correlation	Predicted correlation	Actual correlation
	W1 and W7	W1 and W11	W1 and W11	W1 and W7	W1 and W11	W1 and W11
Secessionist	0.962	0.928	0.941	0.940	0.880	0.916
Autonomist	0.811	0.673	0.777	0.861	0.745	0.800
Strong dual identifier	0.763	0.649	0.769	0.782	0.696	0.772
Moderate dual identifier	0.571	0.379	0.599	0.616	0.466	0.563
Statist	0.924	0.888	0.905	0.906	0.876	0.904

Table 4.7: Tetrachoric correlations between party identity in waves 1 and 7 and in waves 1 and 1 in Scotland and Wales

	Scotland			Wales		
	Previous correlation	Predicted correlation	Actual correlation	Previous correlation	Predicted correlation	Actual correlation
	W1 and W7	W1 and W11	W1 and W11	W1 and W7	W1 and W11	W1 and W11
Conservative	0.959	0.929	0.923	0.967	0.937	0.949
Labour	0.904	0.859	0.868	0.945	0.914	0.935
SNP/Plaid	0.916	0.880	0.890	0.922	0.887	0.908

4.4. Is there a trend in within-individual change over time?

4.4.1. Latent growth analysis

Another method of examining within-individual change is latent growth analysis (LGA). LG models estimate the average level of within-individual change in a variable over time (Curran et al. 2010), which assumes that the observed outcomes are the product of unobserved (i.e. latent) variables. I present a labelled example in Figure 4.2. In a LG curve model, there are two (fixed) latent growth variables (factors): an intercept and a slope. These represent the average of the observed variable in the first time-point and the average difference in the observed variable from one period to the next respectively (Mehta and West 2000). These models also include the random effects, which represent the variance of individuals around the overall intercept and slope (Curran et al. 2010).

Figure 4.2: Latent growth model with 3 time-points and categorical observed variables

Source: Adapted from Lee et al. (2018 p298).

I conduct this analysis in Mplus, and I expand my use of the BESIP to include six waves that cover February 2014 to May 2017[79] (see Table 4.8). To conduct the LGA, I recode the nationalist categorisation in Scotland and Wales. Attempting to capture these shifts requires treating my categorisation as an ordinal variable, which I describe in Table 4.9. An alternative was to treat each category as a dependent variable in its own analysis. However, as these categories represent the approximated nationalism measure, doing so would not allow the model to capture whether there were any general shifts in one direction (i.e. to the sub-state or to the state) over this period. I include these results in appendix (Tables A33-34).

Table 4.8: Waves of the British Election Study Internet Panel included in the latent growth model

Wave	Description	Date started	Date finished
1	Scottish independence referendum pre-election wave	20th February 2014	9th March 2014
3	Scottish independence referendum post-election wave	19th September 2014	17th October 2014
4	Pre-2015 local elections wave	4th March 2015	30th March 2015
7	EU referendum pre-election wave	14th April 2016	4th May 2016
9	EU referendum post-election wave	24th June 2016	4th July 2016
11	Pre-2017 local elections wave	24th April 2017	3rd May 2017

Table 4.9: 'Ordinal' Variable for Latent Growth Curve Model

Category	Recoding
Secessionist	Prioritise Sub-State and Support Independence
Autonomist	Prioritise Sub-State and Oppose Independence
Dual Identifier	Moderate and Strong Dual Identifiers Combined
Statist	Prioritise State and Oppose Independence
Indifferent identifiers	Dropped[80]

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[79] Data was also present for waves 17 and 21 but including these waves would have limited the sample sizes drastically. Information was not present for wave 9 in Wales, so I regress the outcomes in wave 11 on those in wave 7 instead.

[80] The purpose was to test shifts in one direction or another, and it is impossible to place these individuals in an ordinal variable. I include the analysis of this category in isolation in the appendix.

The presence of the two dual identity categories complicates this procedure, as it is very difficult to position them on either side of this continuum. While this is important, my aim here is to examine whether there are shifts across the approximated nationalism measure in one direction or another. As a result, the distinction between dual identifiers is not the focus, so I recode both categories into a singular dual identity category[81] to facilitate my analysis. I examine moderate and strong dual identifiers separately in the appendix (appendix 3 – Table A34). Given the very small size of indifferent identifiers in my approximation, alongside the difficultly placing them on either side of the cleavage, I exclude them here.[82] I also exclude the very few individuals who support independence but prioritise the state, as this category is incoherent and very likely measurement error.

When using categorical observed variables, the observed variables are assumed to represent a "discretized form of an underlying continuous latent response variable, y*" (Masyn et al. 2014, p2017). Somewhere along the distribution of this latent response variable someone becomes more likely to belong within one category over another, which is known as the *threshold* (Lee et al. 2018). When someone is more likely to belong to a category over others (i.e. the category is larger), then the distance between the thresholds will also be larger. I hold the intercept at zero to allow me to relax the thresholds over time (Masyn et al. 2014),[83] to account for the possibility that the size of the categories may change over time. As my aim is to capture the level of within-individual change, I focus on the slope factor and report the thresholds in the appendix 3 – Table A34.

Latent growth models allow for the inclusion of two types of covariates: time-invariant and time-variant. Time-invariant covariates are those that remain the same at any point in time (like year of birth), whereas time-variant covariates are those that can change, such as levels of anxiety or vote (Curran et al. 2010). While time-invariant covariates (Z) need to be applied as predictors of the growth factors (the intercept and slope) directly, time-variant covariates (X) can be treated as predictors of the response variables over time (Masyn et al. 2014).

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[81] The alternative would be to run the analysis twice, swap the position of the moderate and strong dual identifiers, and see if there are any important differences between the two models.
[82] This is also an issue for treating the variable as ordinal, but there are very few – fewer than 5 percent in Scotland and Wales.
[83] For further discussion of the model specification decisions, see appendix 3 – Section 3.3.

Table 4.10: Covariates in the latent growth analysis in Scotland and Wales

Type of variable	Variable	Coding
Time invariant	Year of birth	2014 minus age in wave 1, normalised between 0 and 1
	Gender	0: male, 1: female
Time variant	Age someone left education[84]	0: before 20 or still studying 1: after 20
	Social grade	0: ABC 1: DE
	Party identity	Combined both party identity variables, as before. Dummies for Conservative, Labour, SNP (in Scotland), Plaid Cymru (in Wales). All other party identities collapsed into an "other" category. Those with no party identity used as the reference category.
	EU referendum vote intention	Two dummies for Remain and would not vote/don't know. Leave voting the reference category.

I include two time-invariant covariates (year of birth and gender) and four time-varying covariates (social grade, age someone left education, party identity, and vote intention in a prospective EU referendum), with further details in Table 4.10. Non-responses are excluded, apart from for EU referendum vote intention to account for people shifting to/from uncertainty. Here, I include a dummy for those who said that they would not vote or did not know prior to the 2016 referendum (waves 1, 3, 4, and 7[85]). Including these individuals allows me to examine the behaviour of those who were undecided prior to the referendum and avoid reducing the sample sizes. After list-wise deletion of missing data, the sample sizes for this period were 763 for Wales and 926 for Scotland, which is well above the minimum required for these models (Curran et al. 2010).

4.4.2. Within-individual stability

Overall, the results do not indicate the presence of any systematic change in a person's place along the approximated nationalism measure between 2014 and 2017 in Scotland and Wales

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[84] Level of qualifications had a much higher level of non-response, so I chose this variable. This variable is not present in wave 3, so I regress wave 4 options onto responses in wave 1.

[85] There were very few non-responses for this variable in wave 9 (the post-EU referendum wave), so the not/don't know variable was excluded here.

(Table 4.11). In both territories, the slope coefficient is not statistically distinct from zero, which means that (on average) there is no change significant change in the within-individual approximated nationalism measure in Scotland or Wales. Consequently, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis that there is no systematic change (on average) over this period.

Table 4.11: Model results for the latent growth model in Scotland and Wales

		Scotland (N: 900)	Wales (N: 742)
		Probit coefficient (SE)	Probit coefficient (SE)
Growth factors	Intercept (I)	Fixed at 0	Fixed at 0
	Slope (S)	0.004 (0.010)	0.001 (0.009)
Residual variance	S	0.000**** (0.000)	0.000****
	I	4.685**** (0.654)	4.617**** (0.783)
Model Fit	RMSEA	0.013	0.019
	CFI	0.998	0.998

* = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.005 **** = p<0.001

There is no residual variance in the slope, which suggests that all individuals (on average) have the same overall trajectory (Curran et al. 2010). This would be consistent with the lack of systematic change over time. There is a large degree of variance in the intercept, which is consistent with there being a great deal of difference in initial categorisation. Both models seem to fit the data well, with a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) below 0.08 and a Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of above 0.95, which Hu and Bentler (1999) argue indicate good fit.

One possible limitation may be that I am removing variance through my recoding. To test this possibility, I repeat the analysis for national identities (British and sub-state) and independence support in both territories (see appendix 3 – Tables A33-A34). I find no significant systematic within-individual change for Scottishness in Scotland, nor for Britishness and independence support in either territory. This is not to say that people do not change, as a small number do, it is just that the models suggest that this change tends not to be statistically distinguishable from zero. I find a slight positive effect for Welshness, which suggests that the intensity of Welshness is increasing over this period. However, this effect is very small.

There are few significant effects from the lagged covariates, so I include those in the appendix (appendix 3 – Tables A31-A32). Age has a very strong effect on the intercept in Wales, meaning that older people are far more likely to place themselves closer to the state in 2014, but there is no similar effect in Scotland. Those who left education later in wave 9 are more likely to place themselves to the state in wave 11 in Scotland, but education has no effect elsewhere in either territory. Gender and social grade have no significant effects.

However, there are some important significant effects for party identity and attitudes towards Europe (Tables 4.12 and 4.13). First, there are inconsistent effects for party identity. Those who identify with the SNP and Labour in Scotland in 2015 were more likely to identify with the sub-state in 2016, when compared to those with no party identity. Similarly, Labour and Plaid identifiers are more likely to position themselves closer to the sub-state between waves 3 (2014) and 4 (2015), but not at any other point.

Table 4.12: Probit coefficients for EU referendum vote intention and party identity in Scotland

N: 900	W3 on W1	W4 on W3	W7 on W4	W9 on W7	W11 on W9
	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)
Leave vote intention	.	.	.	.	.
Remain vote intention	-1.24** (0.45)	0.32 (0.45)	-0.05 (0.48)	-0.08 (0.84)	-1.31*** (0.38)
Not vote or don't know EU ref vote intention	-0.67 (0.50)	-0.27 (0.51)	0.47 (0.53)	-0.73 (0.57)	.
No party identity	.	.	.	.	.
Conservative identity	-0.26 (0.72)	0.212 (0.81)	-0.66 (0.77)	0.52 (0.85)	0.35 (0.67)
Labour identity	-0.40 (0.67)	0.39 (0.73)	-1.60* (0.74)	1.15 (0.13)	-0.44 (0.60)
SNP identity	-0.80 (0.69)	-1.51 (0.78)	-2.09** (0.75)	0.200 (0.741)	-2.85**** (0.63)
Other party identity	0.32 (0.62)	-0.17 (0.62)	-0.78 (0.66)	0.33 (0.65)	0.09 (0.53)

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.005 ****p<0.001

Second, Remain/Leave vote intention does not associate with categorisation prior to the EU referendum, but it has a significant effect immediately after the referendum in Scotland. The results indicate that those who voted Leave in the 2016 EU referendum in Scotland were less likely to identify with the sub-state in 2017, when compared to those who voted Remain.

While the same effect is not present in Wales, these results do suggest that 'electoral shocks' may cause some groups to reconsider their position on the approximated nationalism measure.

Table 4.13: Probit coefficients for EU referendum vote intention and party identity in Wales

N: 763	W3 on W1	W4 on W3	W7 on W4	W11 on W7
	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)
Leave vote intention	.	.	.	.
Remain vote intention	-0.117 (0.523)	-0.374 (0.664)	0.397 (0.506)	-0.451 (0.385)
Not vote or don't know EU ref vote intention	0.152 (0.511)	-0.464 (0.651)	0.351 (0.638)	-1.069 (0.564)
No party identity	.	.	.	.
Conservative identity	1.267 (0.748)	-1.037 (0.857)	0.978 (0.819)	-0.157 (0.762)
Labour identity	0.719 (0.600)	-1.601* (0.786)	0.119 (0.765)	-0.638 (0.638)
Plaid Cymru identity	-0.069 (0.670)	-2.498*** (0.758)	-0.855 (0.907)	-1.553 (0.921)
Other party identity	1.125* (0.531)	-1.050 (0.644)	1.227 (0.724)	-0.353 (0.645)

*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.005 ****p<0.001

Yet, while these results show that party identity and Brexit vote can have significant effects on nationalist sentiment in the following wave, they do not indicate which side of each issue is moving. For party identity, these results may reflect how voters realigned their party support with their constitutional preferences after the 2014 referendum (see Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018). For Europe, the SNP campaigned in support of Remain (Carrell 2016), which may make Scottish independence a more attractive proposition to Remainers. In contrast, Brexit associates with the Conservatives, who also claim to protect the union (Kenny and Sheldon 2021), which may encourage Leavers to move closer to the state.

To aid the interpretation of my results, and ensure their robustness, I run a series of lagged ordinal logistic regression models using the same waves as the previous model. I use the ordinal ANM measure as my dependent variable, with lagged independent variables from the prior available wave. I use the same independent variables as the previous analysis. I do not limit the sample to those who took every wave, which increases the sample size in each model and will help rule out the possibility that my results are an artefact of the missing data in my previous model.

Figure 4.3: Probability of being in each category based on Leave/Remain vote in the previous wave in Scotland and Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel

Scotland (N) – W3 on W1: 3808, W4 on W3: 3615, W7 on W3: 2937, W9 on W7: 2667, W11 on W9: 2219

Wales (N) – W3 on W1: 2281, W4 on W3: 2263, W7 on W4: 1884, W11 on W7: 1415

Figure 4.4: Probability of being in each category based on party identity vote in the previous wave in Scotland and Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel

Scotland (N) – W3 on W1: 3808, W4 on W3: 3615, W7 on W3: 2937, W9 on W7: 2667, W11 on W9: 2219

Wales (N) – W3 on W1: 2281, W4 on W3: 2263, W7 on W4: 1884, W11 on W7: 1415

The results in Figure 4.3 shows the probability of being in each ANM category based on whether the person said that they would vote Leave or Remain in the previous wave. Similarly, Figure 4.4 shows the probability of being in each ANM category based on a person's party identity in the previous wave. As the aim here is to generalise out to the population from my results, I weight the analysis by the weighting variable from the lagged wave (i.e. wave 1 in the first instance, wave 3 in the second etc.).

Overall, the results here corroborate those in the LTA model. I start with Leave/Remain vote. While there are no significant differences in Wales,[86] there are clear effects in Scotland. Prior to the referendum, there are no significant differences between Leavers and Remainers in any of the ANM categories. Immediately after the referendum, those who said that they would vote Leave in May 2016 instantly became less likely to be secessionists. Remainers were slightly more likely to consider themselves secessionists, but the increase is not statistically significant. These results suggest that the referendum did not drive Remainers to secession, which is consistent with Curtice and Montagu's (2020) argument that the vote had little effect on independence support immediately after the referendum. Instead, the referendum alienated some Leavers from secession.

The opposite trend was then present on the other side of the approximated nationalism measure. Those who said that they would vote Remain in May 2016 were significantly less likely to be statists after the referendum, while those who voted Leave were more likely to be statists (but their increase was not statistically significant). These differences persist into 2017, as Remainers continue to be less likely than Leavers to be statists (with the reverse true for secessionists). These results help clarify the relationship between Brexit vote and nationalist sentiment found in the LTA model, which appears to have had an alienating effect for those on either side of the vote (with respect to the extremes of the approximated nationalism measure).

One explanation for the alienating effect of Brexit is that the pro-independence and pro-union parties took different positions on Europe (Remain and Leave respectively). It may be that the vision of Scotland inside the EU made Leavers question their commitment to secession, while the referendum result made statist Remainers question their commitment to the union. Consistent with this argument, I uncover similar patterns for party support in Scotland

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[86] Those who voted Remain in the 2016 EU referendum were slightly more likely to be autonomists and slightly less likely to be statists in 2017, but the differences were not statistically significant.

(Figure 4.4), although these differences are far more modest. Those who identified with the SNP in May 2016 were less likely to be secessionists after the referendum, while those who identified with the Conservatives before the referendum were slightly less likely to be statists after it (although the latter change is not significant). There are few significant changes in Wales over this period, although those who identified with Plaid Cymru prior to the 2016 EU referendum were slightly less likely to be secessionists in 2017. Plaid Cymru also campaigned for Remain, so it is possible that we are seeing a similar effect for their supporters here. However, this argument requires further research.

4.5. Conclusion

Overall, there are three main contributions of this chapter. First, I introduced an approximation of my original operationalisation of nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. Due to the lack of identity centrality measures across existing surveys, such an approximation is necessary if I wish to continue investigating popular nationalist sentiment in sub-state territories. I validate my approximation by examining how well it captures the original categories found in the previous chapter. While imperfect, the approximation is an adequate substitution given the items available.

Second, I examine the stability of nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories, which allows me to contribute to the debates over the stability of ethno-national identities. While there are notable exceptions, there appears to be little systematic within-individual change for most individuals. These results are consistent with research that argues that ethno-national identities tend to be stable for most individuals over short periods of time (e.g. Chandra and Wilkinson 2008). Indeed, it appears that each of the nationalist categories tends to be stable for most people, although they are measured with varying degrees of error due to the absence of the centrality measure.

Third, I contribute to the literature on social movements and their ability to mobilise support in response to events. While some researchers argue that major political events allow actors to mobilise support for their goals (e.g. Birkland 1998, Boin et al. 2009), I find something slightly different. Rather than mobilising support for changing the status quo, I find that the 2016 EU referendum alienated some individuals on either side of the approximated nationalism measure. Leave voters became less likely to be secessionists immediately after the referendum, while Remainers became significantly less likely to be statists immediately after the vote. These results appear to align with Anderson and McGregor's (2016) claim that

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national identities can change in response to electoral events. However, the event of this effect appears to be confined to individuals distancing themselves from the identity associated with the 'other' side of the vote – rather than moving towards the side associated with theirs.

These results raise an obvious question – what type of political events cause popular nationalist sentiment to shift? I discussed three potential explanations: instrumental considerations, the symbolic representation of a nation, and response to the outcome. The instrumentalist literature focuses on material wellbeing, and it may be that those who changed their nationalist sentiment did so because they felt that the 2016 EU referendum had changed what was in their (material) interests – but I lack the items to test this possibility here.

However, the results in this chapter do not provide much support for the symbolic representation argument. According to Basta (2018), the effect of political events on state/sub-state nationalism depends on whether the event ties explicitly to the symbolic recognition of a sub-state territory as 'distinct,' with change not occurring when this symbolic recognition is absent. However, I find changes in popular nationalist sentiment in Scotland after the 2016 EU referendum, despite the United Kingdom being treated as a singular entity during the vote.

Instead, individuals who reconsidered their nationalist sentiment may have been responding to the crosscutting nature of Brexit. There is some evidence that individuals align their Brexit positions with their constitutional attitudes after 2017 (see Johns et al. 2020). However, in the initial aftermath, the nationalist sentiment of Leavers and Remainers on opposite poles of the approximated nationalism measure does appear to change. Consequently, these results build on existing research that emphasises the importance of elections and electoral shocks as triggering events (Cederman et al. 2013, Serrano 2015, Anderson and McGregor 2016, Fieldhouse et al. 2019), and is consistent with researchers who stress the effect that crosscutting events can have on party identities (e.g. Fieldhouse and Prosser 2018).

While I do not find similar effects for Wales here, there is some evidence that Remainers moved towards independence after 2016 (Griffiths 2021), during a period where the Conservative government began to adopt a form of 'muscular' unionism that threatened sub-state autonomy (Kenny and Sheldon 2021). The Internal Market Bill was one clear

example.[87] It may be that individuals did not connect Brexit with questions of sub-state autonomy in Wales until after the Conservatives took muscular unionist positions, which then moved people towards independence. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this here, especially as extending the analysis beyond 2017 places great strains on the sample size available for both territories. However, investigating the effect of different types of political events on nationalist sentiment does represent an important avenue for future research.

There are some limitations with this research. First, some measurement error is present in my approximation, particularly among moderate dual identifiers. However, it is unavoidable when measures of identity centrality are lacking within existing datasets. Second, my approach may underestimate the number of secessionists nationalists in Wales by focusing on independence, as support is lower when using a multiple-choice versus binary constitutional preference question. Again, data availability issues make this unavoidable. Third, existing research suggests that independence support changes in both territories outside of the time-points under examination here (see Curtice and Montagu 2020, Griffiths 2021). As discussed, addressing this potential change is an area for future research.

Despite these potential limitations, this paper does make important contributions to the debate on the stability of popular nationalist sentiment. Nationalism is stable for most individuals over time, which is consistent with Chandra and Wilkinson's (2008) view of ethnic identity as stable in the short-term (in this case 3 years for the within-individual analyses). However, it is important to stress that the apparent stability of nationalism does not indicate support for the primordialism view, as ethno-national identities do not remain the same (i.e. fixed) for all people at all times. Indeed, nationalist sentiment can change for those who support a sub-state nationalist party or experience a crosscutting electoral shock. Electoral shocks appear to de-mobilise those on either side of the territorial cleavage, as some Leavers moved away from secession and some Remainers moved away from statism. These results have important implications for the mobilisation of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories.

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[87] The UK Government introduced the Internal Market Bill in response to the United Kingdom's exit from the European Union. According to Hunt and Wincott (2020 p4), the primary purpose of the Bill was to introduce the concept that "a product or service that is lawfully marketed in any one of its parts can, without any additional requirements, also be marketed across the Internal Market" (i.e. the rest of the United Kingdom). There were concerns over the Bill's impact on devolution. For example, "the Senedd could introduce rules banning in Wales the sale of chlorinated chicken, or GMO containing products, [but] this may only apply to Welsh producers/importers. If regulations in any other part of the UK recognised these products as lawful, they would have access to the Welsh market" (Hunt and Wincott 2020 p13).

5. Where is nationalism present? Exploring popular nationalist sentiment across sub-state nations.

<u>Abstract</u>

The previous chapters examine popular nationalist sentiment within a single state (the United Kingdom), which is a problem for the wider applicability of my approach because nationalist sentiment may differ across sub-state territories. Thus, I broaden my approach to include other territories, which I do in three steps. First, I examine how my approach separates individuals within twelve further sub-state territories. These results emphasise the applicability of my approach outside Britain, which provides researchers with a consistent method for separating individuals across sub-state territories. Second, I determine whether these categories are 'nationalist' according to Bieber's (2018) definition by comparing support for decentralisation across the ANM measure. Third, I investigate the characteristics of a territory (economic, cultural, institutional, and geographic) that associate with the presence of each form of nationalist sentiment. Contrary to elite-level economic nationalism arguments, the relative prosperity of a territory does not appear to associate with secessionism (although absolute prosperity does). Furthermore, the presence of a distinct culture associates often, but not always, with secessionism in a territory's population. Finally, statism is strongest within territories that are geographically proximate to the capital of the state (with the opposite true of autonomism). These results provide a tentative challenge to the applicability of some elite-level explanations for understanding the emergence of popular nationalist sentiment.

While my nationalist categorisation may be stable for most in Scotland and Wales, my analysis has only focused on territories from Britain to this point. Investigating the types of nationalism present across sub-state territories is important because there are large differences in the economic, cultural, geographic, and institutional character of territories. Some territories are prosperous like Catalonia and Flanders (Dalle Mulle 2017), while others are poorer like Wales and Wallonia (OECD 2020). Other territories hold a culturally dominant position within a state like England and Castile (Kymlicka 2003), while some represent a minority within a wider state like Quebec and Catalonia (Dupré 2018). In addition, institutional arrangements differ across sub-state nations, ranging from federalism (e.g. Quebec), to devolution (e.g. Scotland and Wales), to no official representation (e.g. England) for the sub-state territory (Keating and Laforest 2017). Given their differences, the forms of nationalism present across sub-state territories may differ greatly, which leads to this research question: where are the different forms of nationalist sentiment most prevalent?

I investigate this question in this chapter. Currently, researchers who explore the structural factors that associate with nationalism across sub-state territories tend to focus on political elites. These include the role of relative prosperity (e.g. Dalle Mulle 2017), linguistic differentiation (e.g. Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021), levels of decentralisation (Massetti and Schakel 2016), and geographic distance (e.g. Rokkan and Urwin 1983). I contribute to these debates by exploring whether these arguments hold on an individual-level, which is important because (as discussed earlier in the thesis) the positions of individuals may differ from those of elites. There have been some attempts to categorise individuals based on their relative state/sub-state identities (e.g. McCrone 2013, Alvarez-Galvez et al. 2018), but those with strong national identities are not necessarily 'nationalist' (as discussed in chapter 3). Thus, I build on these two areas of research to provide an individual-level account of nationalism across sub-state territories.

I split this chapter into three sections. First, I begin by exploring the types of nationalist sentiment present within twelve sub-state territories across three states (Belgium, Canada, and Spain), using the approximated classification that I introduced in Chapter 4. Second, I explore whether the secessionists, autonomists, and statists can be considered 'nationalist' according to Bieber's (2018) definition. I do this by exploring the levels of support for decentralisation in the categories in Belgium and Spain. While autonomists oppose independence, these individuals tend to support decentralisation and thus satisfy both the identity prioritisation and national representation criteria of Bieber's (2018) definition.

Finally, I explore the structural (economic, cultural, geographic, and institutional) factors that associate with the presence of each category in the classification. These results provide tentative suggestions that secessionist sentiment associates (imperfectly) with the presence of a territorial language, a history of independence from the state, and absolute economic prosperity. In contrast, geographic and demographic factors do not tie to secessionism. Instead, statist categories are largest within categories that are geographically proximate to the capital of the state or where the sub-state territory represents a large proportion of the state in terms of population size. The opposite patterns emerge for autonomism. Overall, this paper emphasises both the applicability of my classification beyond Britain, and how this classification can be used to investigate the differences between sub-state territories.

5.1. Categorising popular nationalisms across sub-state territories

While I have introduced a method of capturing popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories, data limitations make it difficult to replicate it within many other datasets. Many large-scale comparative datasets (e.g. European Social Survey, Eurobarometer, World Values Survey) do not contain representative samples of sub-state territories. In addition, centrality measures are very rare within existing datasets outside Britain, and constitutional preference questions often differ across datasets to reflect the local context. These problems make it difficult to capture nationalism as I did in chapter 3 (inductively, with those variables) in sub-state territories more broadly.

I introduced an approximation of my classification in England, Scotland, and Wales in chapter 4. However, it is important to acknowledge that Britain is a rather unique case, especially when it comes to the dominant political, cultural, and demographic position of England (see Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). The purpose of this chapter is to explore whether the different forms of nationalism are present across other distinct sub-state territories in other states.

How may sub-state territories be distinct? Rokkan and Urwin (1983) suggest three dimensions that separate sub-state territories from the state: dependence, difference, and distance. Under this approach, sub-state identities and a desire for self-governance are more likely to develop within territories with a distinct culture, that are less reliant on the state, and that are geographically distant from the capital of the state (Massetti and Schakel 2016, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021). Often touching on similar themes, further elite-focused literature often focuses on four factors that may encourage the development of sub-state nationalism:

economic dependence, cultural difference, geographic proximity, and institutional dependence.

First, economic nationalism arguments suggest that the relative prosperity of a sub-state territory influences the attitudes of sub-state elites towards the state. In line with Rokkan and Urwin (1983), these accounts suggest that economically prosperous territories may be less dependent on the state. For example, sub-state elites in Catalonia, Flanders, and Northern Italy have criticised the central state for restricting the economic power of their nation by redistributing their wealth to poorer areas of the state (Dalle Mulle 2017). Thus, those in richer sub-state territories may see the state as an economic threat to their territory, while those in poorer territories may desire to secure the financial transfers that they receive while a part of the state. Consequently, one may expect to find secessionists within richer sub-state territories, and autonomist within poorer territories.

However, relative economic prosperity may not be enough to promote sub-state nationalism. For example, Jolly (2009) found little connection between the economic profile of a sub-state territory and the development of sub-state nationalism. In addition, Ansolabehere and Puy (2022 p5) found that economic assessments did not have a systematic effect on support for sub-state parties in the Basque Country or Catalonia between 1998 and 2016. Consequently, there are question marks over the connectivity between sub-state nationalism and the economy.

The second dimension that elite-focused researchers explore is cultural differentiation. The existence of a unique sub-state culture (relative to the rest of the state) may serve to bind members of the sub-state territory, while also establishing clear boundaries between the territorial in-group and state out-group (see Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021). When discussing 'culture,' researchers often point to religious or linguistic differences (e.g. Jolly 2009, Massetti and Schakel 2016, Galais and Serrano 2019, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021). Religion has associated with some sub-state movements, such as Catholicism in Flanders and Quebec (Erk 2005, 2010), while linguistic protection has long been a core motivation for many sub-state elites, such as those in Wales (Mann and Fenton 2017), Catalonia and the Basque Country[88] (Conversi 1990), Flanders (Blommaerts 2011), and Quebec (Barker 2010). There is some evidence that these issues also influence individuals. For example, Ansolabehere and

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[88] The originator of Basque nationalism, Sabino Arana (1865-1903), mainly focused on racial differences between the Spanish and Basque communities in the 19th century (Conversi 1990). Basque nationalists have since regularly disavowed these positions, focusing on language instead (Conversi 1990, Jeram 2014).

Puy (2022) found that language was an important predictor of support for sub-state nationalist parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia when they pursue secession. Consequently, secessionism may be stronger when the territorial religion or language differs to that of the rest of the state.

Alternatively, the importance of cultural differentiation may depend on the relative position of a sub-state community within the state. Rokkan and Urwin (1983) have discussed the role of geographical distance in encouraging sub-state sentiment. For example, Cussó et al. (2018) claim that people who live on the Canary Islands may not call themselves Spanish because of the belief that that label applies only to people from the Iberian Peninsula. Other researchers corroborate the importance of geographic distance, arguing that it associates with cultural differentiation (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021) and pro-secession positions among sub-state parties within regional elections (Massetti and Schakel 2016).

However, cultural differentiation may diminish when a sub-state group has a dominant[89] position within the state. I discuss this in chapter 3, but it is important to briefly reiterate here. Dominant groups within the state are more likely to be in control of the institutions of the state, which allow them to control the culture and language of said state (Staerkle et al. 2005, Elkins and Sides 2007, Staerkle et al. 2010). As a result, dominant groups then tend to associate the characteristics of their group with the whole state, and project their sub-state culture onto the 'state' culture (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). Kymlicka (2003) discusses how Castilian elites used their dominant position in Spain to privilege both the Castilian language and Madrid's authority in the name of 'Spanish' identity, while many scholars highlight the connections between Englishness and Britishness that emerge due to England's dominant position within Britain (e.g. Kumar 2010, Mann and Fenton 2017, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). Thus, explicit sub-state advocacy may be less likely to develop within dominant territories.

Finally, institutional arrangements may associate with nationalist sentiment. Sub-state territories have different levels of autonomy, which range from those with no representation, to those with devolved authority, to federal systems where sub-states have constitutional and legal protections (Keating and Laforest).[90] How these institutional arrangements relate to

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[89] Not all dominant groups represent a demographic majority (see Kaufmann and Haklai 2008), so researchers should also account for relative demographic and institutional power.

[90] In practice, the distinction is sometimes unclear, which Keating and Laforest (2017) discuss in detail for Canada and the United Kingdom

nationalist sentiment is not an area of consensus within existing research. For some scholars, decentralisation is a useful tool for limiting demands for certain forms of nationalism (namely secessionism) because it provides sub-state groups with political and cultural representation without stripping them of state resources (Stepan et al. 2010). However, Massetti and Schakel (2016) have found that higher levels of decentralisation associate with stronger support for radical reforms (and ultimately secession) among sub-state political parties.[91] If this also occurs for individuals, then one may expect levels of decentralisation to associate with nationalist sentiment by encouraging different constitutional demands.

The direction of any relationship between decentralisation and nationalist sentiment is another source of debate. For some scholars, states decentralise because of a sense of difference that is mobilised by political elites. Some states contain cultural diversity, and in some instances this diversity is territorially concentrated (Stepan et al. 2010). According to Rokkan and Urwin (1983), cultural groups that are territorially concentrated will find it easier to mobilise – particularly when this group has a language that is distinct to the rest of the state. Under this framework, the perception that the sub-state territory is 'different' encourages a desire for self-government among sub-state elites – meaning the relationship moves from nationalism to decentralisation.

For another group of scholars, decentralisation encourages sub-state nationalists to pursue their goals. Formally, autonomous sub-state institutions can institute economic and cultural protective policies, which can help them resist the homogenisation efforts of the state (Hechter 1975). Informally, the existence of sub-state institutions can provide a space where culture and politics is focused on the sub-state arena (see Lecours 2012). Interactions with these sub-state institutions may then help generate (or sustain) the perception that a territory is distinct or has a distinct identity from the rest of the state (Breton 1964, Harty 2001). Consequently, for these scholars, decentralisation can encourage the development of sub-state nationalism.

Rather than relating to specific levels of decentralisation, other scholars emphasise the importance of symbolic recognition in encouraging nationalist sentiment. Recognition of a sub-state territory as a 'nation' is regularly contentious because the distinction between region and nation is ill-defined and relies on personal perception (Guibernau 2004, Maxwell

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[91] Massetti and Schakel (2016) suggest that state-wide parties introduce devolution to undermine the electoral prospects of sub-state parties, which works at a state-level. However, these reforms prompt sub-state parties to take even more radical positions in order try to attract voters.

2018). As a result, some sub-state territories find their claims of nationhood to be more contentious than others do. For instance, state elites in Spain often reject the 'national' status of sub-state territories like Catalonia, whereas Westminster elites have traditionally been more willing to accept the multinational status of the United Kingdom (Brown Swan and Cetrà 2020). Such recognition can have important impacts on the development of sub-state nationalist sentiment. For example, when policy has recognised the 'national' status of a sub-state community, opposition from state nationalist elites has served to encourage separatist sentiment in both Quebec and Catalonia (Basta 2018). Thus, I posit that nationalist sentiment may be more evident within territories where the 'national' character of said territory is actively disputed.

5.2. Data and Methods

To begin, I use my approximated approach to explore nationalist sentiment within sub-state nations across three states (Belgium, Canada, and Spain). As discussed, not all multi-nation states are like the United Kingdom. As I shall elaborate on later in the chapter, including sub-state territories from each of these states allows me to examine relatively rich (e.g. Flanders, Catalonia, Basque Country) and relatively poor (e.g. Andalusia, Extremadura, Wallonia) territories, demographically large (e.g. Flanders) and small (e.g. Basque Country) territories, those with a distinct language to the rest of the state (e.g. Galicia, Valencia) and those without one (e.g. Castile-La Mancha), as well as those inside and outside (i.e. Quebec) Europe.[92] Taking such a broader approach is required to explore the types of sentiment that emerge across different types of sub-state territories.

To take this broader approach, I use data from multiple sub-state specific election studies (displayed in Table 5.1). While such a step poses problems for making direct comparisons across datasets, it is necessary because there are very few cross-national surveys that include representative samples of sub-state populations. Case selection is complicated by the conceptual and empirical difficulties present in distinguishing between sub-state 'nations' and 'regions.' Some of these territories have been characterised as containing minority 'nationalisms,' like Basque Country, Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland and Flanders (Kymlicka and Straehle 1999), whereas others, like Wallonia, have been characterised as containing

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[92] One area where there is little variation is on sub-state autonomy. Except for England, all the sub-state territories in each of these four states has a legislative body with some degree of autonomy (Shair-Rosenfield et al 2020). Data limitations prevent further extension here but expanding this to analyse territories with different degrees of autonomy (like Massetti and Schakel 2013, 2016 on an elite-level) is an area for future research.

'regionalisms' (Moscovitz 2018). As it is not possible to avoid this issue, I do not attempt to delineate between the two and include a sub-state territory if the survey for that territory includes all the requisite information.[93]

Table 5.1: Dataset information

State	Territory	Sample size	Year	Organisation	Dataset
Belgium	Flanders		2014	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Belgian National Election Study
	Wallonia		2014	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Belgian National Election Study
Canada	Quebec		2012	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Quebec Provincial Election Study
	Quebec		2015	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Canadian Federal Election Study
Spain	Andalusia		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Basque Country		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Canary Islands		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Castile and Leon		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Castile-La Mancha		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Extremadura		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Galicia		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Valencian Community		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Catalonia		2012	Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas	Barómetro Autonómico (III)
	Catalonia		2012	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Catalan Regional Election Study
	Catalonia		2014	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Spanish European Election Study

To begin, I use the same approach as in the previous chapter to categorise individuals within these territories, separating them into 6 categories based on their relative territorial identity (RTI) and support for independence. I create an RTI scale by subtracting a respondent's self-

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[93] For those included in the CIS, I exclude a territory if their survey lacked a weighting variable. For those covered by MEDW, I exclude a territory if their survey did not contain a constitutional preference question. MEDW do provide a dataset for Madrid and Brussels, but I exclude these due to the potential difficulties distinguishing between the 'city' and the 'region.'

reported score on a state identity scale from their score on a sub-state identity scale. I then use this, alongside support for independence, to separate people into classes (see Table 5.2).[94]

Table 5.2: Summary of the approximated classification (from previous chapter)

Category		Identity	Constitutional preference
Secessionist		Prioritise Sub-State	Support Independence
Autonomist		Prioritise Sub-State	Oppose Independence
Dual Identifier			
	Strong	Equal (Maximum value on scale)	N/A
	Moderate	Equal (Mid-point and above, but not the maximum)	N/A
Statist		Prioritise State	Oppose Independence
Indifferent		Low State and Sub-State	N/A

Note: I exclude those who prioritise the state yet support independence because such attitudes are conceptually incoherent and are likely to be measurement error.

My approach represents an approximation of my original classification, which I obtained by separating individuals into categories inductively via latent class analysis (chapter 3). Unfortunately, data limitations prevent me from replicating this inductive approach in these 12 territories. However, I have demonstrated that this method is an adequate (and stable) approximation of my original categorisation in Britain (chapter 4). The purpose of replicating this classification outside Britain is to determine whether it can help separate sub-state territories based on the types of nationalism that emerge within their borders.

One limitation with this approach is that the indicators differ across each survey, with some surveys containing multiple comparable indicators. For instance, measures of constitutional preference differ across each dataset. While some surveys do include degrees of autonomy (those collected by CIS in Spain)[95], others only ask a respondent to indicate whether they

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[94] Dual identity and indifferent identifiers only depend on identity so I should only categorise them based on identity (i.e. do not need to select only those that give a valid answer on constitutional issues, especially as moderate and indifferent identifiers are much more likely to report 'don't know' on constitutional issues). Selecting only from those who give a valid constitutional answer reduces the size of these groups (1081 lost in England, 66 in Scotland and 54 in Wales).

[95] A further limitation of the CIS constitutional preference variables is that they ask the respondent about their preferred arrangement for Spain, rather than what their preferred arrangement would be for the sub-state territory (as in the MEDW Catalan surveys). The difference in focus may be a problem as it is conceivable that a respondent may want to live in a state where territories can become independent, while also not desiring for their specific territory to become independent. However, the overwhelming majority of independence supporters favour greater sub-state autonomy (results in appendix 4 – Table A40), which suggests they meet the 'representation' criteria.

support sub-state independence (Canadian Federal Election and Belgian National Election Studies). Some, like the Spanish European Election Study, contain multiple measures of constitutional preference, which allows me to compare how they relate to one another directly.

Furthermore, the measures of 'identity' differ across each dataset. The datasets collected by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) focus on 'identity,' whereas the datasets collected by Making Electoral Democracy Work (MEDW) all ask about 'attachment' (although the Belgian National Election Study asks about both). These terms are often used interchangeably, but I show that respondents do treat them differently (see chapter 2). As a result, models that include 'attachment' may be less effective in capturing the explicit territorial identification that is required under Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism. When multiple measures are present, I analyse each to explore their impact on the classification. I include the results in the appendix (appendix 4 – Table A37). However, for consistency across datasets from the same origin, I present the 'attachment' measures for the MEDW datasets and 'binary' referendum questions when multiple measures are present.

5.3. Categorising individuals across sub-state territories

Overall, these results emphasise the benefit of separating sub-state identifiers based on their constitutional preference. Territories appear to either have a prominent secessionist category or not, with little variation in between (Figure 5.1). While four territories (Catalonia, Basque Country, Flanders, and Quebec) have a sizeable secessionist group, 8 of the 12 sub-state territories have a secessionist category that contains fewer than 5 percent of respondents. However, the lack of a secessionist category does not mean that sub-state sentiment is lacking in these territories. Indeed, many contain a large autonomist category, with the most notable being the Basque Country, Castile and Leon, the Canary Islands and Galicia. While autonomists do tend to report higher state identity than secessionists (see appendix 4 – Tables A38-A39), separating individuals in this way makes for a clear distinction between the types of sub-state identifiers. Such differences are not possible to capture in approaches that rely on relative identity (e.g. McCrone 2013, Alvarez-Galvez et al. 2018).

On the other side of the approximated nationalism measure, the statism category is largest within three territories that lack a prominent secessionist and autonomist presence. The statist category is largest within Castile-La Mancha, the Valencian Community, and Wallonia. Each of these territories lacks a secessionist or autonomist category that exceeds 15 percent of

respondents. These results are consistent with Zabaltza's (2019) work on the prioritisation of the state among anti-nationalists in Valencia. However, it is important to acknowledge that the statist category is also sizeable in Flanders and Quebec, two territories where the secessionist category is larger. In each territory, statists tend to report the lowest sub-state identity, but their sub-state identity is often far higher than the corresponding state identity among secessionists (see appendix 4 – Tables A38-39).

Figure 5.1: Category size across twelve sub-state territories

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológica and Making Electoral Democracy Work

Moving to the non-nationalist categories, very few people are indifferent about their territorial identities across the 12 territories. These results are like those for England, Scotland, and Wales, which emphasises that individuals tend to have at least one (moderate to strong) national identity (be it state, sub-state, or both). In contrast, dual identification (both strong and moderate) is prominent across all 12 territories. In general, dual identification is strongest within territories where secessionism is the weakest. A lack of secessionism may indicate that there is little challenge to the compatibility of state and sub-state identities in these territories, which encourages dual identification. While this conclusion is tentative, this

argument is something often attributed to England, where the perceived similarities between Englishness and Britishness does not encourage individuals to choose between the two identities (Kumar 2010, Mann and Fenton 2017, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a).

In terms of demographics, there are few consistent differences between the nationalist categories across the twelve sub-state territories (see appendix 4 – Table A43). The lack of consistency across territories does not support the presence of common processes attracting people to each type of nationalist and non-nationalist sentiment within states or across territories. Instead, it seems that the demographic composition of these categories is more territory specific. For example, I found that secessionists in Scotland and Wales tend to be younger than autonomists and statists, and I observe similar differences in the Basque Country but not elsewhere. Similarly, statists are among the oldest categories in Scotland and Wales, but they are among the youngest in Castile La-Mancha, Castile and Leon, and Galicia (as they are in England). There are fewer age differences between the categories in the other territories.

The lack of consistent differences between the categories extends to education, urban-rural residence, and gender. Secessionists and autonomists are among the most educated in Basque Country and Catalonia (in the CIS dataset), whereas statists are more educated in Quebec (like England). There are few consistent urban-rural differences, although autonomists tend to be less urban in Wallonia, Castile La-Mancha, Extremadura, and Quebec (in 2015 only). Similarly, there are few gender differences, although sub-state identifiers are more female in Wallonia but more male in Flanders.

There are some very large differences in religion between the categories, but again these differences are not consistent across territories. In Flanders and Quebec, sub-state identifiers are more likely to be Catholic, which is consistent with the historic connections between Flemish and Québécois nationalism and the Catholic church (Erk 2005, 2010). The opposite pattern is found in Wallonia, which is also consistent with the weaker role that Catholicism had in the advocacy of this territory (Erk 2005). Secessionists are also less Catholic in the Basque Country[96] and statists are less religious in Castile and Leon and Castile La-Mancha, but there are few differences elsewhere.

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[96] In some cases, secessionists in Catalonia are less likely to be religious. However, this is not consistent across survey waves, which limits what can be said about this category.

Taken together, these results suggest that there are no clear state-wide or cross-national processes underpinning the formation of these groups (i.e. in that the same people are attracted to the same positions across territories within the same state), nor do they support the existence of category-specific processes (i.e. in that the same people are attracted to the same positions across territories). Instead, it seems that the attraction of individuals to territorial positions may depend on territory-specific factors – although further research with a wider range of sub-state territories (data permitting) may be required to make this claim with greater confidence.

5.3.1. Are these individuals 'nationalist?'

An important question to answer is whether these categories, which I am labelling 'nationalist,' conform to Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism. Data limitations (i.e. the lack of centrality measures) make this difficult, but one area for exploring this is constitutional preference. According to Bieber's (2018) definition, one of the requirements for nationalism is a desire for national political representation. One limitation is that, by focusing on independence, the approximation above does not display whether autonomist and statist individuals support sub-state autonomy. Such a focus is difficult to avoid, due to the lack of multiple-choice constitutional preference questions in many of the available datasets.

However, there are some measures of decentralisation preferences within the Belgian National Election Study and nine of the CIS datasets. Starting with Flanders and Wallonia, the Belgian National Election Study asks respondents to place themselves on a scale where 0 means the transfer of competences has already gone too far, 5 means the current transfer of competences is satisfactory, and 10 means the transfer of competences should be taken further. I report the mean support for decentralisation in each category in Figure 5.2, excluding non-responses.

Overall, my approximated measure is capable to capturing the trade-offs in support for decentralisation among the nationalist categories in Flanders. To begin, secessionists in Flanders are the most likely to favour further decentralisation. Support for decentralisation declines for autonomists, but they are still in favour of the status quo. Statists are the least likely to favour decentralisation, but they are still quite favourable towards the status quo. However, my approximated measure is less able to differentiate between decentralisation preferences in Wallonia. The approximated measure is meant to capture the interaction between relative state/sub-state identity and autonomy preferences, and the different results

for Flanders and Wallonia suggest that it is better/worse at doing this in different territories. One explanation may be that independence is a less salient issue in Wallonia, which may mean that the focus on independence in my measure makes it less able to capture the trade-off in support for autonomy within the population. This is a limitation with my measure, but it is one that is difficult to address given the lack of widely available alternative measures of constitutional preference.

Figure 5.2: Mean level of support for decentralisation within each category of the ANM measure in Flanders and Wallonia

Source: 2014 Belgian National Election Study. Flanders (N: 807). Wallonia (N: 816).

Do I observe similar results in Spain? Nine of the CIS datasets ask respondents about their preferences for decentralisation. Respondents positioned themselves on a scale ranging from maximum centralisation (0) to maximum decentralisation (10). I present the mean decentralisation position within each category in Table 5.3, excluding non-responses.

Overall, the results for sub-state territories in Spain are similar to those for in Belgium. Like in Flanders, the ANM clearly differentiates between decentralisation preferences in the 'historic nations' of the Basque Country and Catalonia. Secessionists are clearly the most

supportive of decentralisation, which is consistent with their support for independence. Support for decentralisation declines among autonomists, then dual identifiers, and finally statists – who have the weakest support for decentralisation.[97]

However, like the results for Wallonia, it is important to note that the variation in decentralisation preferences across the categories (outside of the Basque Country and Catalonia) is far smaller. In defence of the approach, it does capture that statists are the least likely to support decentralisation and that autonomists are the most likely to support decentralisation, which means that it is able to determine whether a group satisfies the 'representation' criteria of Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism. However, it is important to acknowledge that, when combining the results for Belgium and Spain, these results indicate that the ANM is more effective at differentiating decentralisation preferences in 'historic nations' where independence is a more salient conversation. As mentioned, addressing this limitation is difficult because there are very few available measures for constitutional preference, but it is something that needs to be taken into consideration.

Table 5.3: Mean position towards decentralisation in ANM categories in 8 Spanish sub-state territories

	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist
Andalusia	.	4.90	4.75	4.56	3.85
Basque Country	9.06	7.39	5.41	5.96	.
Canary Islands	.	4.55	4.16	3.56	.
Castile-La Mancha	.	.	4.15	3.79	3.51
Catalonia	8.87	7.23	5.77	5.67	4.18
Extremadura	.	4.90	4.33	4.08	3.18
Galicia	.	5.23	4.47	4.47	.
Valencia	.	4.98	4.46	3.67	3.69

Source: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológica
Andalusia (N: 1030), Basque Country (N: 335), Canary Islands (N: 275), Castile-La Mancha (N: 364), Catalonia (N: 1104), Extremadura (N: 325), Galicia (N: 404), Valencia (N: 691)
Note: I do not display categories which contained fewer than 30 respondents.

There are other measures that are important to mention here. The CIS also includes another measure of constitutional preference, asking respondents whether they favour more, less, or

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[97] However, support for centralisation is not total, which suggests that even these state nationalists do not favour the total centralisation of classic accounts (e.g. Tilly 1994).

an equal amount of autonomy for the sub-state territory. Overall, the results are very similar[98] to those for the decentralisation scale, so I include them in the appendix for brevity (Table A68). In addition, there are self-reported 'nationalism' scales for 4 territories across the MEDW and CIS datasets. Autonomists tend to report lower levels of sub-state 'nationalism' than secessionists, but they do not tend to fully reject the term. However, given that 'nationalism' is often a loaded term,[99] it is possible that people may conform to the definition 'nationalist,' even if they avoid the term itself. One clear example comes from Bavaria, where the leading Christian Social Union express 'nationalist' positions, but they avoid the term 'nation'[100] due to its connections with Nazism (Hepburn 2008). Similarly, Welsh Labour express a 'soft' nationalist position, but their supporters often distance themselves from the label 'nationalist' (Moon 2016). Consequently, I do not rely on self-definitions for capturing nationalism. I discuss these results further in appendix 4, section A4.1.

5.3.2. Structural factors associated with the presence of nationalism.

Yet, what is it about these territories that contributes the presence of a particular form of nationalism? To explore this, I examine the structural factors associated with the presence of nationalist sentiment within a sub-state territory. To provide the highest number of cases, I reintroduce England, Scotland, and Wales to this analysis alongside the other 12 sub-state territories. As discussed, existing research suggests that secessionist sentiment is stronger when the state represents a threat to the sub-state territory, which in turn is more prominent within territories that are (economically or institutionally) independent, culturally different, and distant (Rokkan and Urwin 1983). I explore these dimensions through a range of measures (summarised in Table 5.4).

First, I include measures of proportional size and distance from the capital of the state to explore whether territories that are smaller and more distant are more inclined towards secessionist sentiment. Second, I include measures of absolute prosperity (territory's GDP per capita), relative prosperity (territory's GDP relative to the state), and contribution to the wider state (proportion of state's total GDP provided by the sub-state territory) to explore

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[98] Autonomists tend to report stronger support for sub-state autonomy than dual identifiers and statists, with most autonomists favour retaining (or even extending) sub-state autonomy. The one outlier is Castile and Leon, where the large autonomist category is more divided on sub-state autonomy.

[99] I discuss this in the introduction, but 'nationalism' is often conflated with exclusionary positions, particularly by political actors who wish to separate 'our good patriotism' from 'their bad nationalism' (Billig 1995).
[100] Hepburn (2008) argues that the party uses 'heimat' as the replacement for 'nation.'

whether territories that are in a stronger economic position are more inclined towards secessionist sentiment.

Table 5.4: Summary of structural factors and their indicators

Dimension	Indicator	Values	Measure	Source
Geographic	Proportion of the State	0-1	Population of territory divided by the population of the state in year data was collected	Statbel, Statistics Canada, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Office for National Statistics
	Distance from the centre	Kilometres	Kilometres from State Capital to Sub-State Capital	RAI_Rokkan (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021)
Economic	GDP per capita	€	GDP per capita of the territory, standardised into Euros	
	GDP relative to the state	€	GDP per capita of the territory minus the GDP per capita of the state, standardised into Euros	Eurostat, Statistics Canada, Office for National Statistics
	Proportional contribution to state's GDP	0-1	Proportion of the state's total GDP that is provided by the sub-state territory	
Cultural	Linguistic differences	Index from 0-3	In the Rokkan dataset, territories were coded from 0-2 depending on whether "a majority speaks a mother-tongue that differs from a majority in the country" or "a majority speaks a single mother-tongue that differs from the majority in the country." Additional point for index added if territorial a territorial language is present within the territory at all.	RAI_Rokkan (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021) and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe 1992)
	Religious differences	Index from 0-3	Territories coded if a minority in the territory attest to the state religion (if there is one), a majority of the territory attest to a single religion that is not the state religion, or a majority of the territorial population attests to a religion that is different to the majority religion in the country (when there is no state religion).	RAI_Rokkan (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021)
	Territorial differences	SD of 0-1 scale	Represents the standard deviation of the RTI scale for each territory, which is an approach followed by Galais and Serrano (2019). Higher values indicate that there is greater deviation in relative state/sub-state identity (i.e. more polarisation along the scale), whereas lower values indicate lower deviation (i.e. greater homogeneity in responses along the scale).	Each individual dataset.
Institutional	Institutional authority	Index from 0-30	Regional authority is captured via an index from 0-30 of self-rule (authority over those who live in the territory) and shared rule (authority exercised by a territorial government in the country as a whole).	RAI_V3 (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021)
	Historic dependency	Index from 0-2	Historic dependency is captured via an index from 0-2. One point is awarded if a territory includes the 'core' of a former state (This means a territory was part of another state for 30+ years since 1200 A.D., encompasses the core/capital of a prior state, and at least half of the territory was part of the prior state). Another point is awarded if it had experience of early overarching governance (at least 30 years) prior to colonisation or becoming part of the state by 1600 A.D.	RAI_Rokkan (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021)
	Attitude of central government to decentralisation	0-100	Proportion of the party in central government's manifesto that is devoted to support for decentralisation.	Comparative Manifesto Project (Volkens et al. 2021) – includes manifestos closest to date of survey

Third, I include three measures of cultural differentiation: linguistic difference (territorial language index), religious difference (territorial religion index), and territorial differentiation (as a proxy for polarisation on territorial dimension within the territory). Finally, I capture the institutional circumstances within a territory via measures for the level of authority located within the sub-state territory (index 0-30), the historic institutional circumstances of a state (index 0-2), and the attitude of the current party of central government towards decentralisation (measured via support in their manifesto).[101]

Overall, it appears that cultural factors often associate with the presence of secessionist nationalist categories (Table 5.5). First, linguistic differentiation appears to link with secessionist sentiment. All the six territories with a prominent (above 10 percent) secessionist category contain a minority or territorial language. There is differentiation within this group, with secessionist individuals being present in Wales and Scotland[102] despite the lower prevalence of the minority languages within these territories than in Flanders, Quebec, Basque Country, and Catalonia, where linguistic differentiation is more widespread. These territories stand in contrast to those without a prominent secessionist nationalist category, as five of the nine lack a distinct territorial language, which supports the link of language difference and sub-state sentiment (Jolly 2009, Massetti and Schakel 2016, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021).

However, some linguistically distinct territories (according to Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021) lack a prominent secessionist category (Wallonia, Galicia, Valencia). Wallonia is rather unique here as French has a longstanding historical association with the Belgian state (Blommaerts 2011), which differentiates it from the other territories with a 'distinct' language. However, the lack of a secessionist movement in the others suggests that linguistic difference alone may not be sufficient for secessionism to develop within a population. Due to the low number of cases, it is difficult to explore this link robustly here, which makes it an avenue for future research.

Second, territories with a history of governmental independence appear more likely to contain a secessionist category. For instance, four of the six territories with a prominent

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[101] This measure will often change as parties shift their positions or new parties enter central government. As a result, exploring the effect of statewide political parties and elites may require further longitudinal analysis.
[102] While the index scores for Scotland and Wales are identical, the linguistic circumstances and ties to nationalism are very different, with Welsh being more widespread and tied more closely to the nationalist party (Plaid Cymru) than is the case for the Scottish National Party.

secessionist category contain the core of a former state (since 1200 A.D.) and have experience of early overarching governance prior to becoming members of their current state (Flanders and Basque Country are the exceptions). In comparison, these characteristics are only applicable to two of the nine territories without a prominent secessionist category (those two being Andalusia and Valencia). The reverse is true for the statist category. Of the five territories with the smallest statist categories, three have a history of governmental independence (Catalonia, Andalusia, Galicia), while only one category among the top five has this history (Wales). Thus, these results support the association of historic dependency with sub-state sentiment (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021).

Table 5.5: Cultural and Institutional factors for all 15 territories

State	Territory	Linguistic Difference	Historic Dependency	Institutional Authority
Belgium	Flanders	3	1	25.5
	Wallonia	3	1	25.5
Canada	Quebec	3	2	24.5
Spain	Andalusia	0	2	23.5
	Basque Country	3	1	21.5
	Canary Islands	0	1	23.5
	Castile and Leon	1	1	23.5
	Castile-La Mancha	0	1	23.5
	Catalonia	3	2	23.5
	Extremadura	0	1	23.5
	Galicia	3	2	23.5
	Valencian Community	3	1	23.5
United Kingdom	England	0	.	0
	Scotland	1	2	20.5
	Wales	1	2	19.5

Unlike the other dimensions, institutional authority does not appear to be associated with the presence of any category, as institutional authority is high across all the territories included within this research. There are some differences, with the index of self- and shared-rule ranging from 19.5 (out of 30) in Wales to 25.5 in Flanders, but secessionist categories are present within both of these territories. There are also differences between territories with the same level of regional authority, such as in Spain. Thus, these results do not provide support for the link between regional authority and attitudes towards decentralisation that Massetti and Schakel (2016) found at the party-level.

In contrast, the results for economic factors appear to be somewhat mixed. Overall, there is little association between categorisation and GDP relative to the state (Figure 5.3). There does appear a slight decline in strong dual identity and statism as relative prosperity increases. However, the economic nationalism literature suggests that relative prosperity will associate with secessionism, something I find little evidence for here overall. For instance, secessionist categories are prevalent within territories within a positive (Flanders, Basque Country, Catalonia) and negative (Quebec, Scotland, Wales) relative GDP. Similarly, there is little association between proportional contribution to the state's GDP and secessionism (see appendix 4 – Table A47). Taken together, these results provide a tentative challenge to the role of relative prosperity in promoting secessionism among a population.

Figure 5.3: Association between category size and relative GDP per capita (in €)

Yet, when looking at GDP per capita alone, it appears that secessionist sentiment is more prominent within wealthier territories and weaker in poorer territories (Figure 5.4). For instance, the secessionist category is relatively large within Flanders, Quebec, Basque

Country, Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales, which have higher GDP per capita than the territories with the weakest secessionist sentiment like Castile-La Mancha, Extremadura, and Andalusia (with England representing a notable exception).

Figure 5.4: Association between category size and GDP per capita (in €)

Interestingly, the opposite trend appears to be present for strong dual identifiers, where the category is largest within the territories with the lowest GDP per capita (Andalusia, Extremadura, Galicia, and Castile La-Mancha) and smallest in wealthier territories like Scotland, Wales, Flanders, Castile and Leon, and Catalonia (again, with England as a notable exception). Consequently, these results appear to suggest that individuals who identify with territories that have weaker economic positions (in absolute terms) position themselves closer to the state. These results are consistent with Hechter's (1975) argument that economic dependency fosters the development of a collective state identity within sub-state territories, as individuals identify with the sources of resource access and prosperity. However, this would need to be tested in more detail in the future.

Furthermore, there appears to be a slight association between geographic factors and autonomism and statism (Figure 5.5). Autonomist categories are slightly larger within

territories that contain a smaller proportion of the state's population, like Castile and Leon, the Canary Islands, the Basque Country, and Galicia (see appendix 4 – Table A47). Autonomist sentiment is smallest within Wallonia, Castile-La Mancha, Quebec, Flanders, and England, which represent some of the most populous territories covered within this chapter (except for Castile-La Mancha). Statist categories appear to be slightly larger within territories that are geographically proximate to the capital of the state. On average, the territories with a large statist category (Wallonia, Castile-La Mancha, Valencia, Wales, and Flanders) are closer to the state core than those with smaller statist categories are (i.e. Canary Islands, Galicia, Basque Country, Andalusia, and Catalonia). These differences are not large, and the line of best fit is skewed by the Canary Islands, but they do appear to offer small support to the ethnic asymmetry hypothesis that suggests larger groups feel closer to the state (Staerkle et al. 2005).

Figure 5.5: Association between category size and the distance of the territory from the capital of the state (in KM)

Distance from state capital to sub-state capital (in KM)

In contrast, secessionism is common within some territories that are more geographically distant from the state, but the small secessionist category within the most geographically

distant territory (Canary Islands) suggests that distance is not a sufficient condition for encouraging secession. Consequently, these results represent a tentative challenge to the influence of geographic distance, as per Rokkan and Urwin (1983).

For the remaining measures, there is a lack of differentiation in terms of territorial religion and centre party attitudes to decentralisation (noted in appendix 4 – Tables A48-A49). As a result, it was not possible to test for an association between these factors and nationalist sentiment here. As data availability is limited, future research should endeavour to increase the number of viable cases to test whether these factors have an influence more broadly.

5.4. Conclusion

Overall, these results highlight the ability of my classification to separate territories based on whether they include secessionist, autonomist, (strong or moderate) dual identified, or statist individuals. As discussed, several researchers challenge the conventional view that sub-state nationalists must call for independence and that state nationalists must desire centralisation (e.g Tierney 2005, Keating 2017, Cetrà and Swenden 2021). The results in this chapter extend this argument to the individual-level, as autonomism is prevalent in many territories and there is little strong opposition to sub-state autonomy among many statists. Including these individual-level analyses may help researchers understand the differences between territories where secessionism is popular (e.g. Basque Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Scotland) and territories where many prioritise their sub-state identity but do not combine this with support for independence (e.g. Castile and Leon, Galicia, and Valencia).

The introduction of this categorisation represented an opportunity to explore the structural factors that associate with the presence of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories. Overall, these results provide some tentative challenges for some existing theories on the presence of nationalist sentiment. First, there is some support for the importance of Rokkan and Urwin's (1983) criteria of difference, but the results for distance and dependence are less clear. Both language and historic independence from the state appear to associate with secessionism in many territories, but they do not appear to be sufficient conditions because there are several territories that contain a language that is separate from the rest of the state but do not contain a large secessionist category.

Second, there is some challenge to economic nationalism arguments because relative contribution to the state (and GDP relative to the state) does not associate with secessionism, despite the rhetoric of many sub-state nationalist elites. In contrast, absolute prosperity does

somewhat associate with secessionism. The lack of a connection between relative economic position and secessionism is a challenge to both Rokkan and Urwin's (1983) notion of dependence discouraging secessionism and the viability of extending elite-level economic nationalism arguments (e.g. Dalle Mulle 2017) to the individual-level. In addition, geographic proximity associates with statism, with the opposite being true for autonomism. While these results are tentative, the analysis of my classification represents an opportunity to explore where different forms of sub-state and state sentiment emerge in sub-state territories.

It is important to acknowledge the limitations with my approach, which are related mainly to issues of data availability. First, the lack of the identity centrality measure continues to be a problem. I have attempted to validate the classification of certain groups as 'nationalist' (according to Bieber's (2018) definition), but these variables are not present for all the relevant territories. While I do find that sub-state autonomy preferences do differ within the groups that I create (in accordance with the criteria Bieber sets out for qualifying nationalism), my attempts to validate this classification suggest that my approximated measure is better at discriminating between decentralisation preferences in 'historic nations.' One explanation for this may be that 'independence' is a salient dimension that intertwines with national identity in these nations, and there is certainly some evidence that this is the case in territories like Catalonia and Scotland (Serrano 2013, Bond 2015). In other sub-state territories, where independence is a less salient or divisive issue, then it may be that it correlates less consistently with national identity – and thus my approximation is less able to discriminate between preferences for sub-state autonomy in these locations. Unfortunately, the lack of a range of consistent measures across surveys covering sub-state territories make this a limitation that is impossible to address further within this study.

The second limitation present is that the size of categories in the categorisation appears sensitive to the measures used to capture it. Both identity/attachment and independence/autonomy questions alter the shape of the classification in a territory (see appendix 4 – Table A37), which emphasises that future survey research must be careful when capturing national sentiment. Finally, it is difficult to determine the extent of an association between structural variables and categorisation with such a low number of cases, which means my conclusions are tentative. Unfortunately, these limitations are very difficult to avoid as the solution entails improving the quality and quantity of quantitative data for sub-state territories across the world.

There are some studies who do explore the relationship between relative identity and constitutional preference with detailed quantitative measures, such as Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a) and Schakel and Brown (2021). These studies go a long way in exploring these topics, but few surveys contain as detailed constitutional preference measures. The introduction of this categorisation builds on this work by allowing for the investigation of sub-state territories where such detailed information on constitutional preference is not available. Given that there is little movement between these categories over short periods of time (see chapter 4), separating individuals in this way may also help researchers highlight other clear distinctions between them (see the following chapter).

Finally, the levels of decentralisation were very similar across the territories covered in this chapter, which makes it difficult to understand anything meaningful about the relationship between decentralisation and nationalist sentiment. This leaves several questions unanswered – is there a link between decentralisation and popular nationalist sentiment? If so, what is the direction of any relationship between them? As discussed, this is a source of debate. Some scholars argue that the relationship moves from a sense of difference driving a desire for decentralisation (Rokkan and Urwin 1983), whereas others argue that decentralisation can help cultivate sub-state nationalism by providing a locus for political competition and sub-state identities (Breton 1964, Harty 2001, Lecours 2012). Others argue that it is not the level of decentralisation, but whether it can change in response to shifting demands that determines the relationship between institutional arrangements and the nature of sub-state nationalist sentiment (Lecours 2020). Without data on a larger number of territories it is not possible to speak to these debates within this thesis, which makes them important questions for future research.

However, despite these limitations, the results in this chapter do suggest that there are advantages to taking my approach instead of focusing on relative identity alone (e.g. McCrone 2013, Alvarez-Galvez et al. 2018). Sub-state sentiment may be strong in many territories, but this categorisation helps highlight how individuals in some territories are different from those in another – especially when comparing different types of dual and sub-state identities. Introducing this classification provides an opportunity to capture these differences in a replicable manner.

6. Crosscutting cleavages? Investigating the association between popular nationalism and political attitudes in sub-state territories

Abstract

Conventionally, state v sub-state territorial issues are seen to crosscut other ideological cleavages, yet nationalist movements often take positions on other issues. Currently, popular nationalist sentiment in Europe and North America is often linked with the radical right and exclusionary social attitudes, but this work focuses predominantly on the state-level. Existing party-level research suggests there is no inherent connection between sub-state nationalism and political attitudes, but little research explores whether this holds on an individual-level. I address this by exploring whether there is a link between popular nationalism and political attitudes across sub-state territories. I focus on six cases (Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, England, Scotland, and Wales) and use a mixture of existing and original survey data to explore the civic-ethnic, economic, and social attitudes held by nationalist individuals within these territories. I use my ANM measure, which I demonstrate has substantive and empirical advantages over existing relative identity approaches. Overall, I find that nationalist sentiment associates strongly with left-right self-placement, but the link tends to be far weaker for specific economic and social attitudes. Thus, left-right may represent a marker of nationalist identity rather than a reflection of specific political attitudes. In addition, statists report the most exclusionary social attitudes in Scotland and Wales despite being the group most likely to prioritise 'civic' markers of British nationhood, which emphasises the ambiguities surrounding the civic-ethnic dichotomy.

Nationalism does not exist in a vacuum, and researchers are often interested in understanding how nationalist sentiment relates to other dimensions of political competition. According to Bonikowski (2017), existing research regularly conflates (ethno-)nationalism with authoritarianism, the radical right, and populist rhetoric. These connections are common among studies that focus on state-level expressions of nationalism in Europe and North America, which either discuss the rhetoric of elites like Le Pen in France or Trump in the United States (e.g. Miller-Idriss 2019) or analyse the voting behaviour of individuals across several states (e.g. Lubbers and Coenders 2017, [103] Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019).

As discussed throughout this thesis, focusing on the state may obscure important differences between sub-state territories (see Schakel and Jeffery 2013, Henderson et al. 2021). When examining the sub-state, conventional elite-led research argues that state v sub-state territorial issues are independent of other ideological cleavages within a territory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Yet, in practice, sub-state nationalist elites take positions on issues that extend beyond their territorial ambitions (Alonso et al. 2015). Some researchers argue that these connections are not consistent across territories, with sub-state nationalist parties taking left-wing and right-wing economic positions (Massetti and Schakel 2015) and inclusive and exclusive social positions (Jeram 2014).

Most studies of sub-state nationalism are elite focused, but there are some researchers who investigate the link between national identity and political attitudes, with many focusing on left-right self-placement (e.g. Dinas 2012, Strijbis and Leonisio 2012, Galais and Serrano 2019). However, there are two issues with this approach. First, chapters 2 and 3 emphasise the limits of focusing on national identity alone. Second, the link between left-right self-position and specific political attitudes is contentious (see Whitefield et al. 2007), particularly within sub-state territories (see Dinas 2012, Strijbis and Leonisio 2012). Consequently, a question remains: is there a link between popular nationalist sentiment and political attitudes across sub-state territories?

Understanding the relationship between nationalism and political attitudes in sub-state territories is important because of the strain that sub-state movements can place on existing constitutional settlements. The perception of distinct 'national' values and political culture can strengthen the ties between members of a nation, who use this to distinguish themselves

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[103] Lubbers and Coenders (2017) do include results from one sub-state territory (Flanders). However, the rest of their cases (nineteen) concern state-level nationalism.

from others (Henderson and McEwen 2005). Some sub-state advocates then use the perceived differences in 'their' national values from those of the rest of the state (or the largest territorial/political component of the state) to attract (or mobilise) supporters (Massetti 2018, Sobolewska and Ford 2020). Exploring how nationalist sentiment and political attitudes relate with one another may improve our understanding of how individuals in sub-state territories interact with the rest of the state.

The primary contribution of this chapter is to extend the analysis of how popular nationalist sentiment associates with political attitudes in sub-state territories. I do this in three steps. First, based on its continued prevalence within nationalism literature, I use original data to examine the prioritisation of ethnic and civic markers of nationhood in each category of the ANM measure in England, Scotland, and Wales. I discuss ethnic-civic distinctions in the introduction and chapter 3, but to reiterate 'markers of nationhood' represent the characteristics that someone must possess to be seen to belong to a national community. Ethnic markers are inherited like ancestry, while civic markers are supposedly voluntary like respecting laws and institutions (Shulman 2002). Ethnic markers supposedly denote 'exclusive' social positions, while civic markers supposedly indicate 'inclusive' positions (Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011). I find that ethnic markers are not popular among any group, and that some individuals prioritise 'civic' markers for their preferred identity (i.e. statists do so for Britishness in England, Scotland, and Wales, while secessionists do the same for Scottishness in Scotland).

Second, I explore whether nationalist sentiment associates with more specific political attitudes in six sub-state territories: Catalonia, Flanders, England, Scotland, Wales, and Quebec. I do this by analysing general orientations (left-right self-placement), economic preferences (redistribution), and social attitudes (immigration). I find that popular nationalist sentiment associates with left-right self-placements far more than it does with redistributive or immigration attitudes. Secessionism associates with left-wing self-placements in territories where polarisation in relative state/sub-state identity is high (i.e. dual identity is lower: Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and Wales), while the opposite is true in territories where polarisation is lower (i.e. dual identity is higher: England and Flanders). These positions do not conform with the supposed ethnic (exclusive) and civic (inclusive) positions of nationalist individuals, which is a further challenge to the usefulness of this dichotomy. In addition, there are large differences between secessionists and autonomists and between strong and

moderate dual identifiers, which demonstrate the substantive advantages of my approach over identity-focused measures.

Finally, I demonstrate the robustness of my results by exploring how they align with nationalist party positions. I compare my results for individuals with those for elites, measuring the latter with data from the 2014 and 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) (Polk et al. 2017, Bakker et al. 2020). I find that individuals are not as polarised as political elites on economic/cultural issues. These results have important implications for the mobilisation of other political positions by nationalist parties within sub-state territories.

6.1. Nationalism and political attitudes

How does popular nationalism connect with political attitudes? I discuss this question in my introduction, but there are some important points to reiterate here. For Freeden (1998), correlations between nationalism and political attitudes emerge because nationalism represents an extension of more comprehensive 'host' ideologies (like conservatism). However, I argue that this may not apply to nationalists, as the nation represents the 'core' of their ideology (Rokkan and Urwin 1983, Bieber 2018). Instead, nationalist sentiment may overlap broader political attitudes as these individuals tie their perceptions of the nation to different values. Values reflect general "underlying orientations" about how the world ought to be, which then relate to specific attitudes that are consistent with these perceptions (van Deth and Scarbrough 1998 p32).

These orientations may depend on one's social group. Individuals claim (or are assigned) membership of identity groups, which relate to some characteristic that they possess like their race, social class, parenthood, or political party support (Tajfel 1981, Brewer 1991, Chandra 2012). Membership of these categories may also correlate (or be perceived to correlate) with things that are not intrinsic to the identity itself, such as particular behaviour patterns, principles, or socioeconomic positions (Hale 2008, Onuch and Hale 2018). For example, Flemish identity overlaps with speaking Dutch (Erk 2005, Blommaerts 2011).

Why does group membership come to associate with other political attitudes? Over time, perceptions of similarity and shared fate within a group may encourage members to develop a sense of solidarity with other members of said group (Hechter 1975, Onuch and Hale 2018). As a result, group members may adopt positions that they feel are consistent with their membership of the identity category. The connection between a group and a position may become so strong that said position becomes incorporated into the prototype for the group

identity. For instance, industrial changes in Wales led to the fusion of Welsh identity with a working-class consciousness (Mann and Fenton 2017). Individuals wish to be close to the group prototype within groups that are important to them (Hogg et al. 2004), and as a result may change their attitudes (or even their other identities) to conform (see Egan 2020). Members of identity groups may then use this perception of shared positions to distinguish their group from others (Henderson and McEwen 2005),[104] further entrenching the connection between group identity and the position.

Yet, individuals belong to multiple different social identity groups and, in some cases, the preferences of one group may compete with those of another (Chandra 2001b). As a result, individuals who belong to the same groups may take different positions depending on how they prioritise their multiple identities (Onuch and Hale 2018). Such competition makes it impossible to achieve full convergence across several issues within any group (Chandra 2001b).

When facing a conflict, I posit that people may prioritise the preferences that associate with the identities that are more important to them. If an individual cares about an identity group, then it may become an important part of their self-identity and their self-worth – prompting them to desire to defend the group (Druckman 1994). However, individuals will not leap to defend every identity group to which they could belong. As discussed earlier in this thesis, some identities are more fundamental to how someone thinks of themselves, and thus may be more likely to frame their thoughts over time (see Ashmore et al. 2004). Indeed, according to Leach et al. (2008 p147), "the more central the in-group, the more individuals should defend this in-group against threat; an unimportant group is not worth defending." For nationalists, the nation is their priority (Bieber 2018), so they may be more likely to prioritise the positions that correlate with their perception of how the nation ought to be.

So, what political attitudes may associate with nationalist sentiment within a multi-nation state? When exploring the political connotations of nationalism, conventional research often focuses on whether they are 'civic' or 'ethnic' (Kohn 1944, Larsen 2017). Such research is common for sub-state territories, with researchers exploring the shifting civic-ethnic nature of

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[104] The connection between the identity category and other behaviours/characteristics/attitudes may then be reinforced in the opposite direction. For example, left-wing individuals in Scotland who feel alienated by the presence of a right-wing Conservative government in Westminster may identify increasingly as Scottish due to the perception of Scotland as 'left-wing' (Sobolewska and Ford 2020). The purpose of this paper is to establish the presence (rather than the direction) of any association, but the directionality issue represents an avenue for future research.

sub-state movements in territories like Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland (e.g. Keating 1997, Calzada 2018). Despite the prevalence of this dichotomy, the ability for it to serve as a proxy for specific political attitudes is limited because the distinction between the two is often ambiguous (as I discuss in the introduction). In practice, many individuals prioritise both ethnic and civic markers (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010, McCrone and Bechhofer 2015, Ariely 2020), and the "inclusive" nature of civic markers is questionable as they can hide exclusionary social attitudes (Fozdar and Low 2015, Simonson and Bonikowski 2020, Zhuravlev and Ishchenko 2020).

Instead, I propose that researchers should focus on specific policy positions when aiming to capture the positions tied to nationalism. The first possible dimension is a respondent's position on the economic cleavage, reflected in their position on the left-right scale. Traditionally rooted in an individual's socioeconomic position, left-right is a prevalent measure within political research that originally separates support for income equality and state intervention (left) versus deregulation and the free market (right) (Whitefield et al. 2007).

Within existing research, there are two main arguments for how left-right and state v sub-state territorial positions intertwine. To begin, Massetti and Schakel (2015) argue that the left-right positions of sub-state elites depend on regional prosperity. Here, those who identify with poorer territories will favour left-wing policies like redistribution from the state to improve the wellbeing of their citizens, whereas those who identify with richer territories will resent the state for extracting their wealth to subsidise poorer territories (so will take right-wing positions like anti-redistribution). Should this be the case, we would expect secessionists to take right-wing positions in relatively rich territories like England, Catalonia, Flanders, but take left-wing positions in relatively poorer territories like Wales.[105]

Alternatively, left-right self-placement may not represent specific economic attitudes within a territorial context. For example, Dinas (2012) and Strijbis and Leonisio (2012) have found that left-right positioning reflects preferences for decentralisation and traditional party positions in Catalonia and the Basque Country. In these cases, the 'left' is seen to support decentralisation, while the 'right' is seen to oppose it. Galais and Serrano (2019) extend this

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[105] Here I consider relatively rich territories to be those with a higher GDP per capita than the state as a whole, whereas relatively poor territories are those whose GDP is lower (table in the appendix 5 – Table A58).

to argue that, when the territorial cleavage is salient, [106] those who identify with the sub-state will take left-wing positions due to their desire for change to the status quo, with the opposite true of those who identify with the state. However, the existence of right-wing (economically) sub-state nationalist movements in territories like Catalonia and Flanders (see appendix 5 – Table A67) suggests that this link of the 'left' with support for decentralisation is not universal. Instead, there may be a connection between left-right and decentralisation preferences, but this may instead differ be territory-specific.

Yet, left-right is not the only cleavage separating contemporary societies. Sociodemographic shifts, such as the expansion of higher education, increased immigration, ageing populations, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan geographic divides have increased the salience of cultural issues in Europe and North America (Ford and Jennings 2020, Sobolewska and Ford 2020). In recent years, these cultural issues are represented by a 'globalisation cleavage,' which manifests in attitudes towards immigration and European integration in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006). These issues have dominated traditional economic class-based voting (van der Waal et al. 2007), with citizens split between those who benefit from the changes – the young, educated, and metropolitan – and those who do not – the elderly, less educated, non-metropolitan (Kriesi et al. 2006).

As nationalism entails the prioritisation of national identities and the protection of national sovereignty/culture, then it might seem logical to assume that nationalism will also entail opposition to the social changes that potentially threaten their sovereignty/culture. As discussed, state-level research often connects 'nationalism' with exclusive (authoritarian) social positions (see Bonikowski 2017). The prevalence of this connection leads to the perception that nationalism is an inherently exclusive phenomenon. Such conflation is compounded by methods used to measure elite-level nationalism, exemplified by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2020) which pits 'nationalism' as the direct opposite to both 'cosmopolitanism' and 'green, alternative, libertarian' positions.

Historically, the conflation of nationalism with exclusive cultural positions has also appeared in research of sub-state elites. The conflation comes from the perceived focus of sub-state elites on cultural preservation (e.g. Laitin 1992, Tilly 1994). Migrants will influence the cultural composition of a territory as they interact with existing members (Hechter 1975), and

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[106] Galais and Serrano (2019) measure territorial polarisation via the standard deviation in relative state/sub-state identity in a territory, which I repeat here (results in appendix 5 – Table A54). Territorial polarisation is highest within Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, and Wales.

sub-state advocates may be concerned that these changes will "dilute the identity of the 'nation without a state' and weaken national feeling" (Poggeschi 2015 p137). These concerns may be particularly relevant for sub-state advocates when the incomers are more likely to identify with the state.[107] Consequently, some researchers argued that cultural preservation will inherently entail exclusive social positions, particularly towards migrants (e.g. Hobsbawm 1990).

However, more recent scholars, like Bieber (2018) and Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016), argue that nationalism should not be associated with exclusionary social positions inherently. The potential for 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' nationalisms is clear when comparing the immigration policy positions taken by different sub-state nationalist elites. For example, Jeram (2014) discusses that while some contemporary sub-state parties have taken inclusive positions towards immigration and multiculturalism (e.g. the Partido Nacionalist Vasco in the Basque Country), some are hostile (e.g. Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria and Vlaams Belang in Flanders), and others have been ambivalent (e.g. Convergència i Unió in Catalonia).

Why may some nationalist movements take more inclusive positions than others? One potential reason may be the relative position of the sub-state culture within a sub-state territory. Posner (2005) argues that ethnic groups are willing to cooperate and compromise to be on the winning side (i.e. achieve their goals), but wish to limit the number of partners in an alliance to avoid weakening their own position. In national terms, compromise may entail the acceptance of external groups.

When a sub-state culture is 'dominant' within a territory, then sub-state advocates may be more able to mobilise support by focusing on this specific culture (Dupré 2018). Dominance may mean the presence of a demographic majority that conform to the sub-state culture like in England and Quebec (Mann and Fenton 2017, Dupré 2018), or the presence of institutional protections for the sub-state culture like in monolingual Flanders (Blommaerts 2011). If Posner's (2005) framework applies, then one may expect sub-state advocates in territories like these to favour excluding those who deviate from the sub-state culture. Hogg et al. (2004) argue that dominant groups have an incentive to exclude those who do not conform, as

[107] Poggeschi (2015) argues that migrants face an incentive to integrate into the larger 'state' culture (e.g. Spain) rather than the sub-state (e.g. Catalonia), which is a concern for sub-state advocates. For example, elites in Quebec opposed migration in the 1960s because they believed migrants may be more likely to adopt Anglophone culture (Barker 2010).

accepting them changes the composition of the dominant group and dissolves the subordinate group – "effectively abolishing the comparison group that makes the dominant group appear relatively superior" (Hogg et al. 2004 p258). Indeed, this appears consistent with the tendency for Quebec's immigration policies to favour French-speaking migrants (Barker 2010). For sub-state advocates in territories like these, the risk of including 'outsiders' that deviate from the sub-state culture (in terms of undermining the culture's dominant position in a territory) may outweigh the advantages.

In contrast, some sub-state territories contain a culture/language that is not dominant within that specific territory, such as Catalonia or Wales (Mann and Fenton 2017, Dupré 2018). When a sub-state culture is more vulnerable (i.e. held by fewer people within a territory), the Posner (2005) framework suggests that sub-state advocates will be less successful if they focus solely on their sub-state culture, so these advocates must attempt to convince those who deviate from the sub-state culture to support their goals (Dupré 2018).

There is some evidence that sub-state elites are aware of this requirement. Indeed, Rodon and Franco-Guillén (2014 p669) argue that sub-state elites often "construct and disseminate a tolerant and inclusive national image," which may encourage a broader community to feel welcome in the nation. For example, Plaid Cymru engage with inclusionary social policies, which aim to broaden both their appeal and the definition of 'Welshness' (Elias 2009, Bradbury and Andrews 2010). Similarly, Dupré (2018) argues that Catalan nationalists are cautious not to promote policies that will alienate Spanish speakers,[108] which some supporters of Catalan independence credit with attracting support for independence from traditionally 'Spanish' groups (see Byrne 2020). If this framework applies to the individual-level, then we may expect sub-state advocates in majority/dominant contexts to take exclusionary positions, while those in minority contexts take inclusionary positions. My research shall speak to these existing debates.

6.2. Data

Currently, large-scale comparative surveys do not contain representative data for sub-state territories. Instead, researchers need to focus on specific national election studies. This approach limits the potential for direct comparisons, but it does allow researchers to explore whether similar trends emerge across territories. First, I use national election studies

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[108] Although as mentioned, some Catalan elites do take more ambivalent positions towards international migration (Jeram 2014).

compiled by Making Electoral Democracy Work (displayed in Table 6.1), who collected information on 27 territories across five states between 2010 and 2015, alongside several 'special' standalone studies of sub-state territories within Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden. From this selection, I choose three cases: Catalonia, Flanders, and Quebec (Bol et al. 2017, Cross et al. 2017, Lago et al. 2017).

These three cases are the only cases from the previous chapter where the required information was present (unlike the CIS datasets).[109] Data is present for Wallonia, but the secessionist category only consists of 36 respondents (when using attachment measures) or 5 respondents (when using identity measures). As the purpose of this chapter is to examine the association between all the nationalist categories and other political attitudes, I exclude Wallonia because there are too few respondents to compare secessionists and autonomists. However, I do include the results for Wallonia in the appendix 5 – Table A62.

In addition, I use data from wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) to add three other cases from Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales). The British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al. 2021) has conducted surveys of political attitudes since 1964, with each wave of the internet panel (starting February 2014) surveying around 30,000 British respondents.[110] Wave 20 was collected in June 2020, and it includes an original set of instruments to capture constitutional preferences in all three nations (a subset of England and the whole Scottish and Welsh samples – as discussed in earlier chapters), which is the only wave to include this information.

Table 6.1: Sub-State Territory Data Sources

Sub-state territory	Data source	Dataset	Year	N
Catalonia	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Spanish European Election Study	2014	985
Flanders	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Belgian National Election Study	2014	1,017
Quebec	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Canadian Federal Election Study	2015	1,849
England	British Election Study	Internet Panel (Wave 20)	2020	6,637
Scotland	British Election Study	Internet Panel (Wave 20)	2020	2,730
Wales	British Election Study	Internet Panel (Wave 20)	2020	1,804

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[109] Many datasets collected by the CIS for Spain include identity scales and constitutional preference questions but not political attitudes, whereas others include policy preferences but measure relative identity via Linz-Moreno scales alone. Given the significant limitations with the Linz-Moreno scales (see chapter 2), these datasets do not contain comparable information.

[110] Northern Ireland is not included in the British Election Study.

6.2.1. Capturing approximated nationalism measure in multi-national states

As in the previous chapters, I use my ANM approach to capture nationalism within each territory. To reiterate, I use RTI and support/opposition for sub-state independence[111] to separate individuals into five categories (displayed in Table 6.2). Unfortunately, the measures of identity and constitutional preference are not consistent across these datasets (full question wording in the appendix 5 – Tables A50-A51). I discuss the different measures in more detail in chapter 5, but to summarise: the BESIP includes measures of 'identity' for all three sub-state territories, whereas the MEDW datasets only include measures of 'identity' for Flanders. Instead, MEDW includes measures of 'attachment' in all three territories. While often treated as interchangeable, the results in chapter 2 suggest that they capture different things.

Table 6.2: Approximated Nationalism Measure

Category	Criteria	Nationalist
Secessionist	Prioritise sub-state identity and support independence	Yes
Autonomist	Prioritise sub-state identity and oppose independence	Yes
Moderate Dual Identifier	Equal state/sub-state identity, mid-point to one-point below the maximum score on the scale	No
Strong Dual Identifier	Equal state/sub-state identity, state/sub-state at maximum on scale	No
Statist	Prioritise state and oppose independence	Yes
Indifferent	Low state and sub-state identity (both < scale midpoint)	No

In addition, the constitutional preference questions are multiple-choice in the BESIP, with MEDW only including a similar measure in Catalonia. Instead, MEDW includes three territory-specific questions that ask respondents whether they support independence or not (in different ways – see appendix 5 – Tables A50-A51). The association between national identity and political attitudes may differ depending on the indicators used (Miller and Ali 2014), so these differences are problematic. To address this, I ran models for each of the available combinations of measures in the MEDW datasets. Overall, the same patterns appeared regardless of the indicators used across each territory (see appendix 5 – Tables A59-

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[111] I exclude non-respondents (i.e. don't know) for those who prioritise one identity over another, but not for dual identifiers or indifferent identifiers due to their differential non-response (see chapter 3). I discuss the need for this in chapters 3 and 4.

A63). For consistency and brevity, I only present the results for the attachment and binary independence questions when there are multiple measures included in a dataset.

6.3. <u>Nationalism and marker of nationhood in sub-state territories</u>

Given the prevalence of the civic-ethnic debate within conventional nationalism literature, I start by investigating whether there is a link between nationalist sentiment and markers of nationhood. I use original survey instruments included for England, Scotland, and Wales[112] within the BESIP. Given that the United Kingdom is a multi-nation state, I look at the markers of state (British) and sub-state identity in each territory. Respondents were asked to indicate the two most important markers of both British and sub-state identity separately from a list of 9 and 8 markers respectively.[113] These lists were based on previous measures included within wave 11 of the BESIP. Based on previous research (Reeskens and Hooghe 2010, Wright et al. 2012, Ariely 2020), I treat 'respect for laws and institutions' as the 'civic' marker and 'ancestry' as the 'ethnic' marker. I recode this variable into a binary variable, which indicates whether someone selected this marker (1) or not[114] (0).

After recoding, I run two separate logistic regression models (one for British identity and one for sub-state identity) in all three territories. I control for age (interval variable), education (university degree or not), gender (male or female), and income (low, medium, high, no answer).[115] I exclude non-responses for each variable, except for income as non-response is high and excluding them would limit the power of my analysis dramatically. All models are weighted by the most comprehensive sociodemographic weight variable available in the respective dataset.[116] Unfortunately, other important factors like urban-rural residence (Calzada 2018), ethnicity (Sobolewska and Ford 2020), language (Cetrà 2019), and parentage (Rico and Jennings 2016) are not present in every dataset, so I exclude them to keep the models consistent.

Overall, individuals across the ANM measure seem more likely to prioritise respecting institutions than ancestry when asked about British identity (Figure 6.1). The likelihood of prioritising the civic marker for Britishness increases as someone becomes more British, with

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[112] There are no equivalent questions for Catalonia, Flanders, or Quebec, hence their exclusion.
[113] The additional marker for British identity is citizenship. As England, Scotland and Wales do not have their own state, this marker would not make sense for sub-state identities.
[114] This includes both those who selected another marker, with non-respondents (i.e. don't know) excluded.
[115] The specific values differ for each that I cover in this chapter, with the full information present in the appendix 5 – Table A57.
[116] These were POST_WEIGHT3B in the MEDW datasets and wt in the BESIP.

statists among the most likely to prioritise respect for laws and institutions in all three territories. In contrast, the trends for sub-state identities differ by territory. In England, the trends for Englishness are like those for Britishness, with secessionists being the only group equally likely to prioritise ethnic and civic markers of nationhood. These results are likely due to the strong connections between Englishness and Britishness (Kumar 2010).

Figure 6.1: Mean Predicted Probability of Selecting Ethnic and Civic Markers of National Identity Associated with Approximated Nationalism Measure

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (Original Data).
British: England (N: 5095), Scotland (N: 2057), Wales (N: 1391).
Sub-State: England (N: 4961), Scotland (N: 2157), Wales (N: 1381).

In contrast, the opposite trends are present for Scottishness in Scotland, where individuals become more likely to prioritise 'civic' markers as they move closer to the sub-state side of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage. These results are consistent with the 'civic' markers of the pro-independence SNP, but not with the greater 'ethnic' tendencies of their members, as found by van der Zwet (2015). Finally, there are few significant differences on either the

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ethnic or the civic dimension in Wales. Consequently, the differences in the prioritisation of ethnic-civic markers are not consistent across territories.

6.4. Nationalism and political attitudes in sub-state territories

While there may be differences between some of the categories in terms of ethnic-civic nationhood, this does not necessarily tell researchers much about the political attitudes held by nationalist individuals. It is not possible to tell why people are selecting ethnic or civic markers from the previous analysis. It could be that they are choosing these markers because they believe in them, or it may be that 'ethnic' markers have a bad reputation and individuals are hiding their exclusionary preferences behind supposedly 'civic' markers (as discussed in the introduction). To address this, I explore whether there is a link between nationalism and specific political attitudes across sub-state territories.

To explore this, I start with left-right self-placement, which is measured on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Overall, a person's placement on the approximated nationalism measure associates with left-right self-placement, but not in a consistent way across all territories. These results are displayed in Figure 6.2. In Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, and Wales, secessionists report more left-wing self-positions, while statists are far more likely to position themselves on the right. In three of these cases (Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales), secessionists identify as notably more left-wing than autonomists, which supports separating the two sets of sub-state identifiers. These results are in line with existing research on the connection between these two dimensions within these territories (Erk 2010, Galais and Serrano 2019, Sobolewska and Ford 2020), and the view that the 'right' is sometimes seen as the opponent of sub-state autonomy (Dinas 2012).

However, the opposite patterns are present within Flanders and England, where right-wing self-placements increase as individuals move away from the state (and are particularly strong among secessionists). Such results are consistent with existing characterisations of Flemish (Erk 2005) and English (Winlow et al. 2017) nationalism as right-wing. The differential patterns provide support for Erk's (2010) party-level claim that there is no inherent link between sub-state nationalism and left-right self-positions.

What may separate these territories? Territorial polarisation (i.e. variance in relative state/sub-state identity) is high in Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and Wales, while polarisation is much lower in England and Flanders (see appendix 5 – Table A54). Consequently, these results do provide some initial support for Galais and Serrano's (2019) claim that sub-state

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identity will associate with left-wing self-placements within territories that contain high degrees of polarisation in relative territorial identity. However, this does not explain why territorial polarisation matters for the left-right positions of nationalist movements. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer this question here, but it represents an important question for future research.

Figure 6.2: Mean predicted left-right self-placement for each group in six territories

Note: Red line indicates the mid-point of the scale. 0: Left, 10: Right

England (N: 4227). Scotland (N: 1758). Wales (N: 1006). Flanders (N: 801). Quebec (N: 1313). Catalonia (N:856).

While existing studies of sub-state territories use left-right self-placement (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019), some researchers do point to potential analytical ambiguities with this measure. Despite conventionally being an indicator of economic preferences, existing research has found left-right often conflates with social policy positions (Huber and Inglehart 1995, Whitefield et al. 2007), with the level of conflation changing over time (De Vries et al. 2013). Left-right has also been found to correlate with decentralisation preferences within Catalonia and the Basque Country (Dinas 2012, Strijbis and Leonisio 2012) – although it is

important to point out that the association of the right with anti-decentralisation attitudes is not universal, particularly in territories like Flanders (see Erk 2005). In any case, the potential for left-right to serve as an expression of decentralisation preferences (even if the direction of that expression is territory-specific) complicates the meaning of these self-placements.

Due to this ambiguity, I also include additional models to determine whether popular nationalism ties to specific economic and social attitudes. The BESIP and MEDW[117] include two measures for economic preferences: redistribution (0: support, 10: oppose) and taxation/public-spending (0: support higher taxes for public spending, 10: favour reducing taxes for public spending). The results for both measures are very similar, so I display the results for redistribution below and include those for taxation/public-spending in appendix 5 (Figure A6) for brevity. In addition, there is one consistent measure for social attitudes present in each of the datasets: attitudes towards immigration. The BESIP measures these attitudes on a scale from 0 (allow many fewer) to 10 (allow many more), while the MEDW datasets measure attitudes on a scale from 0 (very favourable to more immigrants) to 10 (very favourable to fewer immigrants). For consistency, I recode the BESIP scale so that higher values indicate opposition to migration.

Starting with economic positions, I find that similar connections are present between ANM and redistribution as there were for left-right. Those closer to the sub-state side of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage are more likely to support redistribution in Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales (Figure 6.3). Secessionists in Quebec are also more pro-redistribution than autonomists and statists, but the differences are smaller. The prevalence of left-wing self-placements among secessionists in relatively rich territories like Catalonia[118] represents a challenge to the viability of extending party-led economic nationalism arguments (e.g. Massetti and Schakel 2015) to the individual-level.

What about immigration? As with left-right self-placement, the relationship is not consistent across all territories (Figure 6.4). There are differences in five territories, with there being little divergence in attitudes across the ANM measure in Quebec. In England and Flanders, those closer to the sub-state (secessionists and autonomists) take more exclusionary positions than those closer to the state (statists). The opposite is true for those in Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales, where secessionists are among the most inclusive. These results suggest there

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[117] Question wording in the appendix 5 – Tables A52-A53.
[118] A table with the GDP per capita of the sub-state territory relative to the state is located within the appendix 5 – Table A58.

may be some overlap between left-right self-placement and inclusive-exclusive social positions within these territories.

Figure 6.3: Mean predicted redistribution preferences for each group in six territories

Note: Red line indicates the mid-point of the scale. 0: Support, 10: Oppose

England (N: 4776). Scotland (N: 1957). Wales (N: 1116). Flanders (N: 854). Quebec (N: 1564). Catalonia (N: 895).

It is important to note that these results challenge the viability of using civic-ethnic markers as a proxy for inclusive-exclusive positions. Even though state nationalists have similar understandings of British identity in England, Scotland, and Wales, the political connotations are not the same. As discussed, statists are the most likely to prioritise the civic marker of British identity in all three nations. Yet, statists hold more exclusive positions in Scotland and Wales than they do in England. As a result, these results support recent research that stresses how the political connotations of Britishness are not the same in England as they are in Scotland and Wales (Henderson et al. 2021, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a).

Figure 6.4: Mean predicted immigration attitudes for each group in six territories

Note: Red line indicates the mid-point of the scale. 0: More, 10: Fewer

England (N: 4956). Scotland (N: 2039). Wales (N: 1149). Flanders (N: 882).
Quebec (N: 1578). Catalonia (N: 905).

A further interesting finding is that adding ANM to the model often explains far less variance in redistribution and immigration preferences than it does for left-right self-placement. I demonstrate this by comparing the change in the adjusted R^2 that comes from adding the ANM measure to the model with only the sociodemographic controls (Table 6.3). The adjusted R^2 represents the proportion of variance that the model can explain in the dependent variable. Across every territory, ANM explains more variance in left-right self-placement than redistribution preferences – although particularly in Catalonia, Scotland, and Wales. Similarly, the relationship between nationalist sentiment and left-right is stronger than that of nationalist sentiment and immigration preferences in Scotland, Wales, Catalonia, Quebec, and Flanders. The one exception is England, which may be due to the strong link between Englishness and anti-migrant sentiment (Henderson & Wyn Jones 2021a) – although this may need further research. Overall, given the often stronger connection to self-reported left-right,

these results support Dinas's (2012) argument that left-right self-placement often represents an expression of nationalist self-identity, rather than a reflection of their economic or cultural policy preferences.

Table 6.3: Change in Adjusted R^2 from adding ANM measure to model with only controls

	Left-Right	Redistribution	Immigration
Scotland	0.188	0.102	0.098
Wales	0.119	0.074	0.084
Catalonia	0.148	0.035	0.037
Quebec	0.068	0.034	0.007
England	0.065	0.020	0.092
Flanders	0.040	0.000	0.018

6.4.1. Nationalism or national identity?

Is my approach an improvement on existing RTI measures? As discussed, existing approaches tend to focus on the relationship between relative territorial identity and political attitudes (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021). These approaches treat RTI as an independent variable in their OLS regression analyses, which often produces linear relationships between relative identities and political attitudes. As an example, I present the relationship between left-right self-placement and RTI in Wales (using the same control variables) in Figure 6.5.[119] Overall, the results above point to two clear substantive advantages of the ANM measure, relating to the differences between the two sub-state nationalist categories and the variants of dual identity.

First, the issue with treating the relationship between relative territorial identity and political attitudes as 'linear' is that secessionists in Scotland and Wales take far more left-wing and inclusive immigration positions than autonomists. The opposite is then true in England, while the differences are more muted in Catalonia and Flanders. These results suggests that there is something particular about 'secessionist' (rather than just 'sub-state') sentiment in the British territories that connects it with left-wing self-placements and inclusionary positions.

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[119] I include this figure purely for demonstration purposes. I include the relationship between RTI and left-right self-placement, redistributive preferences, and immigration attitudes for all six territories in the appendix (Figure A9). Each shows a linear relationship between RTI and the dependent variable, which reflects how existing researchers (e.g. Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson et al. 2021) treat RTI in their models.

Figure 6.5: Relationship between RTI and left-right self-placement in Wales

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel (N: 1331). Scale 0: Left, 10: Right.

One explanation for the closer connections between autonomists, dual identifiers, and statists is that these groups have similar levels of dual identity. However, this is not the case in many territories. Autonomists do tend to report higher levels of state identity than secessionists do (see appendix 4 – Tables A38-39), but this category regularly represents a mid-point between secessionists and dual identifiers when it comes to their relative identity (Table 6.4). If the link between these categories and political attitudes were purely down to relative identity, then we would expect to see autonomists represent a mid-point between secessionists and dual identifiers, which is often not the case.

As a robustness check for this argument, I explored the correlations between RTI and independence, and repeated the models for left-right self-placement with an interaction between RTI and independence support replacing ANM (results in appendix 5 – Figure A7). In four of the territories (England, Scotland, Wales, and Flanders), both independence support and relative identity had an independent effect on left-right self-placement (while relative

identity alone had a significant effect in Catalonia and Quebec).[120] Thus, focusing on relative identity alone may underestimate the differences between secessionists and autonomists in some territories. The ANM approach can account for these differences.

Table 6.4: Mean Position on RTI Scale (and Standard Deviation) Across Approximated Nationalism Measure

	Secessionist	Autonomist	Statist	Indifferent
England (N: 5918)	0.69 (0.13)	0.65 (0.11)	0.31 (0.12)	0.48 (0.06)
Scotland (N: 2488)	0.82 (0.15)	0.67 (0.11)	0.23 (0.15)	0.52 (0.06)
Wales (N: 1614)	0.79 (0.15)	0.67 (0.12)	0.21 (0.15)	0.48 (0.06)
Catalonia (N: 936)	0.83 (0.14)	0.59 (0.07)	0.33 (0.12)	0.51 (0.04)
Flanders (N: 906)	0.68 (0.14)	0.58 (0.06)	0.35 (0.12)	0.50 (0.04)
Quebec (N: 1675)	0.77 (0.15)	0.62 (0.09)	0.33 (0.13)	0.51 (0.04)

Note: Due to the different scales, RTI was normalised between 0 and 1 to aid comparison. Values below 0.5 indicate prioritisation of sub-state and values above 0.5 indicate prioritisation of the state. Source for Catalan data: 2014, binary independence question. Source for Quebec data: 2015 federal election. For consistency across MEDW datasets, I use the 'attachment' measure in Flanders.

The other substantive advantage of my approach is that it can capture the differences between moderate-but-equal dual identifiers and strong-but-equal dual identifiers. For example, strong dual identifiers tend to be far less supportive of immigration than moderate dual identifiers (and indifferent identifiers) in the five territories where there is a relationship between ANM and immigration. There are also differences between strong and moderate dual identifiers when it comes to left-right self-placement in England, Scotland, and Wales (with smaller differences present in Flanders and Quebec). Currently, RTI measures like the ones in Figure 6.5 combine dual identifiers into a single point, and thus misses the substantive differences between moderate-but-equal and strong-but-equal dual identifiers. These results provide further support for how different types of 'equal' identity can have different political implications and should thus be treated separately.

6.5. Popular nationalism and nationalist party position

Do nationalist individuals reflect the positions taken by nationalist parties? As discussed, existing research often focuses on the political attitudes expressed by nationalist elites within sub-state territories, which is a problem if individuals diverge from elites. Some existing

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[120] It may be that relative identity and constitutional preference are more intertwined within these two territories. Yet, while the correlations between relative identity and independence support are highest here, the correlation is similar in Scotland where independence support has a significant effect.

research suggests that individual-level political attitudes do not diverge from elites. For example, Adams et al. (2012) found evidence of 'partisan sorting' among the supporters of 'niche' parties (communist, green, or radical right), who altered their left-right positions when the party they support shifted its position. Similarly, Hadler and Flesken (2018) argue that party supporters will adopt restrictive conceptions of nationhood when the party they support expresses 'ethnic' rhetoric.[121] If this is the case, then one may expect nationalist individuals to support a political party based on their approximated nationalism measure, and then mirror their other positions so that those are consistent with said party.

To explore whether this is the case, I compare the mean predicted redistributive and immigration positions taken by nationalist individuals (according to the models above) with those expressed by nationalist political parties within each of these territories. I use data from the 2014 and 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) (Polk et al. 2017, Bakker et al. 2020). The CHES surveys political scientists (337 in 2014, 421 in 2019) who specialise in political parties on the ideological positions of political parties across Europe (thus, it excludes Quebec). The dataset includes measures for redistribution and immigration,[122] which are measured on a 0-10 scale (0: support, 10: oppose), making it ideal for comparing with the individual-level dependent variables. To match the individual-level data available, I use the 2014 CHES data for Catalonia and Flanders, and the 2019 CHES data for England, Scotland, and Wales. I plot redistribution and immigration positions in Figure 6.6.[123]

Unfortunately, the CHES does not distinguish between statewide and sub-state arms of political parties. These distinctions may be important as sub-state arms can exhibit large policy deviations from their statewide counterparts. For example, Welsh Labour's 'soft-nationalist' position often separates them from their UK counterpart (Moon 2016). Consequently, I only include 'nationalist' parties in these figures.

I designate a party as 'nationalist' if it has been given a 'nationalism' score above 7 in the CHES or was considered a sub-state nationalist party by Massetti and Schakel (2016).[124] This dual process is required as the CHES contrasts nationalism with cosmopolitanism, which means it often fails to characterise explicitly sub-state nationalist parties (like the SNP or Plaid Cymru) as 'nationalist,' possibly due to their left-wing and liberal nature (or due to the

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[121] One limitation with this study is that it relies on cross-sectional data, which means it is not possible to rule out the possibility that parties are moving to exploit available ideological space in a territory.
[122] Question wording in the appendix 5 – Table A68.
[123] Results for tax/spend preferences in appendix 5 – Figure A6.
[124] Tables in appendix 5 – Table A64.

implicit state focus relegating these parties to 'regionalist'). The cross-sectional nature of this research means it is not possible to determine whether voters are responding to party positions (or vice versa) here. This is an important question, and one that future research should explore, but the aim of this analysis is to examine whether nationalist individuals match the positions taken by nationalist parties.

Figure 6.6: Mean predicted positions for nationalist categories and the mean position for nationalist parties (in CHES) in five territories

Overall, these results highlight that nationalist parties do not always occupy the same ideological space as nationalist individuals. For example, statist parties in England, Scotland, and Wales (i.e. the Brexit Party, Conservatives, and UKIP) take more anti-immigration and anti-redistribution positions than the average statist individual, while the PP takes more anti-

redistribution positions than statist individuals do in Catalonia (although their immigration positions are closer).

Gaps are also present between sub-state nationalist elites and individuals. For example, CiU in Catalonia and N-VA in Flanders are far more anti-redistribution than the secessionist or autonomist categories within these territories. The opposite is then true for the ERC in Catalonia, who are closer to the sub-state nationalist individuals in their redistributive preferences but are far more liberal in their immigration policies. The gaps in ideological space are smaller between secessionist individuals and the SNP (in Scotland) and Plaid Cymru (in Wales), but these parties are still far more liberal on immigration. One exception is VB in Flanders, who are like sub-state nationalist individuals in their economic and social positions. However, overall, these results do not suggest that nationalist individuals always mirror the broader policies of nationalist elites.

Such results are in line with existing research of identity and decentralisation, which argues that nationalist political elites take more extreme positions than nationalist individuals do. For example, Martínez-Herrera and Miley (2010) found that Basque and Catalan political elites expressed stronger opposition to the 1978 Spanish Constitution than Basque and Catalan individuals, who were more supportive of the constitution between its enshrining and the mid-2000s. Similarly, Miley (2007) and Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel (2017) found that Catalan elites were more likely to define themselves as Catalan than the public in Catalonia, while Catalan party activists were somewhere in between the elites and the public (between 1996 and 2012). Thus, my results suggest this pattern of extremity can be extended to broader political attitudes as well. These results are tentative, and further research is required, but they do suggest that researchers should not focus solely on the positions taken by nationalist parties when aiming to understand the broader positions tied to a nationalist movement.

6.6. Conclusion

Overall, the strongest connection between popular nationalist sentiment and political attitudes is between nationalism and left-right self-placement. However, these positions depend on an individual's position along the approximated nationalism measure. In territories where territorial polarisation is strongest (Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, Wales), secessionists not only report more left-wing self-positions than dual identifiers or statists, but also autonomists (despite being closer in terms of their relative identity). The connection moves in the opposite direction within Flanders and England, where the variation in relative identity is far lower.

Consequently, these results offer some support for Galais and Serrano's (2019) argument that a sub-state-left, state-right, association will emerge when territorial polarisation is high.

One explanation for left-right self-placement associating with ANM more strongly than economic/social attitudes do is that left-right self-placement is linked to how someone identifies as a 'nationalist.' Statist nationalist individuals may identify with the right in some territories due to their support for the status quo (Galais and Serrano 2019). In contrast, secessionist individuals in these territories may attempt to distance themselves from the state (who they see as opponents of decentralisation) by identifying as left-wing (Dinas 2012). Such claims are strengthened by the comparative lack of connection between popular nationalism and specific economic attitudes across these territories.

In particular, the connection between the ANM measure and specific economic policy preferences is far weaker than what is present for left-right self-placement across all six territories. These weaker connections are further support for the view that the connection between popular nationalism and left-right self-placement is a marker of identity, rather than a reflection of specific attitudes. The mechanism underpinning these connections requires further research, particularly when it comes to understanding why this trend works in the opposite direction in some territories (e.g. Flanders and England). However, the prominent gaps between secessionists and autonomists on some of these political attitudes, which do not align perfectly with their relative identities alone, suggest that researchers focus on the variety of ways in which identity categories interact.

While still weaker than left-right self-placement, there are some notable connections present for a person's placement along the approximated nationalism measure and their immigration preferences. Secessionists reported the most exclusionary positions in England and Flanders, with the opposite true of secessionists in Scotland and Wales. Further research is required to explore how these differential positions connect to sub-state nationalist sentiment across different territories. However, these results do emphasise that researchers need to avoid conflating nationalism within exclusionary social positions, which is often the case for measurement at a party-level.

Furthermore, I argue that civic and ethnic markers of state and (particularly) sub-state identity are not a useful method of determining the inclusive-exclusive character of nationalist groups within a sub-state territory. There were some differences between the categories, as statists were the most likely to prioritise the civic marker of British nationhood in all three nations.

However, statists were the most exclusive (anti-immigrant) category in Scotland and Wales. These results support existing research that questions the 'inclusive' character of those who prioritise civic markers (e.g. Fozdar and Low 2015, Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020), and research that emphasises how British identity can have different meanings and political implications in England to Scotland and Wales, which is consistent with the work of Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a) and Henderson et al. (2021). Future researchers should take both of these points into account.

There are some limitations with this chapter. First, it only covers six cases, and the indicators present for national identity/attachment and constitutional preference differ over each dataset. Data limitations prevent extending the scope further, but these differences do not appear to have a large effect on the association between ANM and political attitudes within the available territories (as displayed in appendix 5 – Tables A59-A63). However, future researchers should be careful when attempting to capture both national identity and nationalist sentiment.

Second, there are some limitations with the redistribution and immigration variables. Berwick (2019) found that strong sub-state identifiers will express weaker support for redistribution or increased public spending when the state is at the heart of the process (either due to a sense of solidarity with their sub-state community and/or their relative distrust of the state) than if they were asked about redistribution within the sub-state territory. Consequently, attitudes towards redistribution may depend on your perception of who should be performing the redistribution, which these measures cannot capture. In addition, the immigration measure does not distinguish between different migrant groups, who can invoke different perceptions of threat (see Hellwig and Sinno 2017). For example, attitudes towards migrants in England appear to depend on race and historical geo-political connections[125] (Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). There is also some evidence that secessionists and statists will respond differently to immigration from different locations in Wales (see appendix 5 – Figure A8). Data limitations prevent exploring this in more detail, but future research should explore the consequences of the ambiguities within these measures.

Yet, despite these limitations, this paper has two main contributions. First, I have tested a new approach for capturing popular nationalist sentiment within multi-nation states. I argue

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[125] Evaluations are more positive within majority-white territories where the UK has a colonial connection (Australia and Ireland) than among other EU members (France and Romania), or non-white territories (Syria and Pakistan).

that the ANM approach offers a more nuanced measure of a person's placement along the state v sub-state territorial cleavage, as it accounts for differences between secessionists and autonomists those with strong/moderate dual identities. Second, this investigation has important implications for understanding the attitudinal associations of nationalist sentiment, which appear to be more of a matter of identity than of specific economic or social attitudes. This is not to say that these differences are unimportant. Perceptions of difference may be a useful tool for mobilising support for nationalist parties and causes, even if these perceptions do not tie to specific positions. Consequently, these results emphasise that researchers need to examine the association between nationalist sentiment and political attitudes carefully, to separate the real from the rhetoric.

7. Conclusion

The primary purpose of this thesis was to investigate the nature of popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories in Western democracies. Researchers often focus on political elites when attempting to examine nationalism in multi-nation states, both in conventional (e.g. Tilly 1994, Hechter 2000) and contemporary literature (Massetti and Schakel 2013, 2016, Basta 2018, Cetrà and Harvey 2019, Cetrà and Swenden 2021). While understanding elite behaviour is important, there is no guarantee that the masses will replicate their positions (Converse 1964, Whitmeyer 2002, Deschouwer 2013). Divergence between elites and individuals (particularly when it comes to nationalism) may create opportunities for political actors to mobilise opposition to the status quo, as was the case for UKIP and English nationalism in the early 2010s (Hayton 2016, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a).

To address the potential for elite-mass divergence, my thesis focused on the forms of nationalism found among individuals within sub-state territories. Conducting this investigation required addressing four separate research questions. These were 1) what types of nationalism are present within sub-state territories? 2) how stable is popular nationalist sentiment within sub-state territories? 3) where are the different forms of popular nationalist sentiment most prevalent? And 4) is there a link between popular nationalist sentiment and other political attitudes across sub-state territories?

In addressing these research questions, the primary contribution of this thesis was the introduction of a novel operationalisation of the popular nationalist sentiments found within sub-state territories in established Western democracies. Through this approach, I categorise individuals in these territories into three distinct forms of 'nationalism:' 1) minority

nationalist who prioritise the sub-state, (mostly) reject the state, and often (but not always) support independence, 2) autonomists who also prioritise the sub-state but still report strong state identities and oppose independence in favour of devolved authority, and finally 3) statists who prioritise the state and oppose independence, but are split when it comes to centralisation or devolution. I also find two forms of non-nationalism (moderate/strong dual identifiers and indifferent identifiers).

I argue that these results emphasise the limitations of conventional elite-focused characterisations of nationalism as inherently associated with sovereignty (e.g. Gellner 1983, Hechter 2000). Instead, this research builds on contemporary elite-led analyses that recognise the complex opportunities provided by devolved authority (Tierney 2005, Keating 2017). These include those who attempt to differentiate between sub-state advocates who promote independence and those who do not (e.g. Massetti and Schakel 2013, 2016), and those who emphasise the differences among state nationalists when it comes to sub-state autonomy (Cetrà and Swenden 2021). I highlight that these similar nuances are present among individuals in sub-state territories.

Alongside building on elite-level accounts, a key benefit of my approach is that it also helps connect three distinct bodies of literature: 1) those which investigate popular nationalism, but focus on 'everyday' interactions (Billig 1995, Goode et al. 2021), 2) those which investigate popular nationalism, but treat it as an ideology (Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, Ariely 2012), and finally 3) those which examine the attitudes of individuals within sub-state territories (Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, 2021b).

Starting with nationalism research, my approach connects 'everyday' and 'nationalism-as-ideology' researchers, who do not tend to interact. Everyday nationalism scholars provide detail but struggle with generalisability, while those who treat nationalism as an ideology often conflate (state-level) nationalism with chauvinism (see the introduction for further discussion). My approach bridges the gap between these bodies of research by utilising survey data with large samples for sub-state territories. I introduce a generalisable operationalisation of nationalism like the 'ideology' literature, while still providing the 'bottom-up' approach found within 'everyday' nationalism research.

My approach also connects the nationalism literature with scholars that examine the attitudes and behaviours of individuals within sub-state territories. Those who examine individuals within sub-state territories tend to focus on relative state/sub-state identities, particularly in

terms of their association with political attitudes (Galais and Serrano 2019, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, 2021b) and voting behaviour (Henderson et al. 2021). While such research goes a long way in aiding our understanding of the politics of sub-state territories, I highlight that there are limitations with focusing on relative identities alone (i.e. the differences between minority/secessionists and autonomists, and the treatment of dual identifiers of different strengths). My approach captures these differences, and as such I argue that it represents an opportunity to build on existing individual-level research.

The purpose of this conclusion is to discuss how I addressed my research questions, how my research could be improved and the implications that my results have for future researchers. Consequently, I split this chapter into three sections. First, I discuss each chapter in turn. I reiterate the research question, how I addressed it, and my findings. Second, I discuss the limitations within my research, and how I could address these in future research. Finally, I elaborate on the lessons that my research has for future researchers.

7.1. Investigating popular nationalism within sub-state territories

Why did I focus on 'popular' nationalism? As mentioned, my categorisation builds on existing elite-led research that separates state/sub-state nationalists into multiple forms based on the level of sub-state autonomy that they permit/pursue (Massetti and Schakel 2016, Cetrà and Swenden 2021). However, as I have discussed throughout the thesis, there are limits to focusing on political elites. To reiterate, the positions held by the masses can differ greatly from those promoted by elites in many instances (Converse 1964), and this is certainly true for nationalism. Indeed, it is possible for distinct forms of nationalism to develop prior to elite mobilisation (Whitmeyer 2002, Hayton 2016). The potential for elites to create 'nationalist' sentiment within a population is challenged within existing research (see Hjerm and Schnabel 2010, Boonen and Hooghe 2014), and there is no guarantee that the priorities of elites match those of individuals (see Deschouwer 2013). Consequently, investigating the forms of nationalism held by individuals may help researchers understand the mobilisation strategies that are available to political elites.

7.1.1. <u>Are there limitations with existing approaches for analysing individuals within sub-state territories?</u>

Currently, existing research into public attitudes in sub-state territories tends to focus on national identities. It is important to stress that such research goes a long way to aiding our understanding of the associations between state/sub-state identities and constitutional

preferences (Serrano 2013, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a, Guinjoan 2021, Schakel and Brown 2021) or other political attitudes – like those towards Europe (Henderson et al. 2021) or self-professed ideological self-placement (Galais and Serrano 2019).

However, there are limitations to focusing on national identities alone, which I address in chapter 2. I began by asking how researchers capture national identities in sub-state territories. Traditionally, the Linz-Moreno measure was the standard approach for capturing relative state/sub-state identities. Guinjoan and Rodon (2015) showed that this measure has significant issues with capturing the intensity of the relative state/sub-state identities, the trade-off between them, and the nature of dual identity in Catalonia. Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a) built on this research and demonstrated that many individuals report significant levels of Britishness in England, even when they claim to reject said identity via the Linz-Moreno measure (i.e. say they are 'English, not British').

As an alternative, many scholars now use relative territorial identity (RTI),[126] but the limitations of this measure were yet to be explored. Understanding the possible limitations of RTI is important because they may influence the accuracy of our analyses. I conducted this exploration here, focusing on the association between RTI and identity centrality[127] in England, Scotland, and Wales. Overall, I found that RTI struggles to capture the complex relationship between state and sub-state identities.

First, RTI has issues capturing the relative importance that people place on their state or sub-state identities. Outside the most extreme values, those who prioritise their 'state' identity are far less likely to consider their preferred identity 'central' than those who prioritise the sub-state. Second, despite capturing a linear trade-off in identity strength, the trade-off in importance is not linear along the RTI scale. Both of these results suggest that those who prioritise their state (i.e. British) identity treat their national identity differently to those who prioritise their sub-state (i.e. English/Scottish/Welsh) identity. RTI is unable to capture these differences by treating relative identities as a single scale.

Furthermore, dual identity remains ambiguous. Given RTI's method of subtraction, it reduces all of those with 'equal' state and sub-state identities into a single data-point. As a result, it treats those with 'strong-but-equal' identities as identical to those with 'weak-but-equal'

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[126] As a recap, this measures state and sub-state identities on separate scales and the subtracts a persons score on the state scale from their score on the sub-state scale.
[127] The prioritisation of an identity over the others that one can claim.

identities. This is a large problem because these individuals are not the same. First, those with 'strong-but-equal' identities in Scotland and Wales do not appear to be 'dual' identifiers at all. Instead, they are far more likely to report prioritising their sub-state identity when asked to report those identities that they consider most important to their self-definition. Second, those with 'strong-but-equal' identities tend to report more right-wing and pro-Leave positions than those with 'weak-but-equal' identities in England, which is a problem because 'dual' identifiers occupy nearly 60 per cent of the sample.

Alongside these problems with RTI, I also investigate the methods that researchers may use to create RTI scales. Currently, many researchers treat 'attachment' and 'identity' as functionally equivalent when creating RTI scales. Previous aggregate-level research from Mendelsohn (2002) suggests that this may not be a viable assumption, which I test within-individuals here. I do this by comparing responses to both state/sub-state identity scales and state/sub-state attachment scales in Flanders and Wallonia. In both territories, there is a statistically significant difference between the responses on the identity and attachment scales. These differences are most prevalent in Wallonia, but in both territories the identity scales tend to privilege the state (i.e. Belgian), while attachment scales privilege the sub-state (i.e. Flemish and Walloon).

7.1.2. What forms of nationalism are present within sub-state territories?

Addressing these limitations is difficult within existing survey-based research. Very few surveys contain multiple measures of national identity, and even fewer contain multiple measures of state/sub-state identities with a representative sample of a sub-state territories. In addition, very few surveys contained 'centrality' measures when this study began. One alternative that I propose is to include measures of constitutional preference as an imperfect proxy for how a person views the position of their sub-state territory within the state. However, this option does not address the possibility that state and sub-state identities may interact in ways that existing researchers do not anticipate (and that existing measures may obscure). Consequently, I propose an alternative in two steps: 1) focus on 'nationalism' rather than national identity, and 2) take an inductive approach. I do this in chapter 3.

The principal contribution of chapter 3 was the introduction of a novel operationalisation of nationalism within sub-state territories, which I argue addresses some of the limitations of existing identity-focused approaches. The first question was how to define 'nationalism,' particularly considering the tendency for existing research to focus on national identity.

While national identity is a pre-requisite for nationalism, it is not an identical concept. National identity entails a recognition of membership within the national community, a sense of affection for that community, and some understanding of what that membership means (Citrin et al. 2001). However, there is no guarantee that someone will be enthusiastic about their national identity (Fenton 2007). Individuals belong to numerous identity groups (like their race, their class, their gender) and the nation is one of them (Tajfel 1981, Brewer 1991, Chandra 2012). Under Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism, nationalist individuals prioritise their membership of the national community over their other (potential) identities.

I discuss how I operationalise Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism within chapter 3, but to reiterate: I use a combination of identity scales, measures of identity centrality, and constitutional preference. I capture the first dimension (national identity) via identity scales, while I capture the second dimension (prioritising the nation over other groups) through a measure of identity centrality. I combine the final two dimensions (a desire for national distinctness and political representation) together because I argue that the desire to preserve the distinct nature of the nation often entails a desire for political representation. A lack of political representation means that sub-state advocates are unable to implement policies to protect the distinct economic or cultural nature of the nation (Hechter 1975), and the presence of distinct cultural institutions can serve as a vehicle for promoting a distinct sense of sub-state identity (Harty 2001). Thus, I capture these two dimensions via a measure for constitutional preference (i.e. independence, devolution, centralisation, or don't know).

Overall, I find five distinct categories across England, Scotland, and Wales, three of which I argue qualify as 'nationalist.' In the first category, which is present in all three nations but largest in Wales, are those who prioritise their British identity, prioritise 'being British' and are very unlikely to oppose sub-state independence. I label these individuals 'statists.' While the members of this category are the most likely to support the centralisation of political authority, and thus conform to conventional characterisations of state nationalism (e.g. Tilly 1994), a significant proportion support devolved authority. These results are consistent with Cetrà and Swenden's (2021) argument that state nationalist elites can differ in the level of sub-state autonomy that they are willing to permit.

The second category represents the opposite pole of the approximated nationalism measure: the 'minority' nationalists in Scotland and Wales. These individuals report very strong sub-state identity, tend to consider this identity central, and combine these positions with the

weakest levels of state identity present in any category. However, there are three key differences between this category in Scotland and this category in Wales: the category is larger in Scotland, these individuals are far more likely to support independence in Scotland, and British identity is weaker in Scotland. These results emphasise the importance of taking an inductive approach, as this allows me to capture the substantive differences between 'minority' nationalists across these two territories. However, despite these differences, the members of this category still fulfil the criteria for 'nationalism' in Wales (particularly as those who do not support independence overwhelmingly support devolution).

The third group (and final nationalist category) are those who do not conform to the conventional state-led v state-seeking (Tilly 1994) dichotomy. These individuals report very strong sub-state identity and tend to prioritise the sub-state over other social groups (like minority nationalists). However, they also report strong state identity and tend to oppose sub-state independence (like statists). These individuals are closer in their characteristics to the 'autonomist' political elites discussed by Massetti and Schakel (2013, 2016). The presence of this category emphasises that the relationship between nationalism and sovereignty is also not straightforward among individuals.

The final two groups are 'non-nationalist.' The first non-nationalist group is present in all three nations. These individuals do not tend to report strong state or sub-state identities, and they are very unlikely to consider either 'national' identity central to their sense of self. Consequently, I label these individuals "indifferent" identifiers. While similar in the ways outlined here, there are some differences between indifferent identifiers in England, Scotland, and Wales. First, the size of this category is considerably larger in Wales than it is in Scotland and (particularly) England, which may be due to the presence of additional categories in the latter two territories. Second, constitutional preferences within this group vary dramatically across each territory. In Scotland, the vast majority support independence, while in Wales they support devolution. There is no clear plurality in England, which may reflect the relative lack of salience of constitutional issues in this territory. The lack of coherence on constitutional preferences may reflect how such issues are of less importance to those who are indifferent about national issues. Further support for this argument is found in the levels of non-response on the constitutional preference questions within this category – those who are 'indifferent' are far more likely to report saying 'don't know' when asked about their constitutional preferences.

Another difference is that there is another form of 'indifferent' identifier within Scotland. These individuals do not tend to report very strong state or sub-state identities and fewer than half of the members of this category consider either their British or Scottish identity to be central (although the proportion is higher for British identity). In contrast, between 60 and 70 per cent of those in three 'statist' categories consider their 'British' identity to be 'central,' while this value exceeds 85 per cent for autonomists in England (and 70 per cent for those in Scotland and Wales) and around 90 per cent for minority nationalists in Scotland and Wales. Consequently, I do not believe that this category should be considered 'nationalist,' when one of the core criteria is the prioritisation of one's national identity over that of other groups. Instead, I posit that they represent another variant of indifference, who are closer to Britain and support devolution, but fall short of being 'nationalist.'

The final category is the 'dual identifiers.' These individuals are distinct in that they report equal levels of state and sub-state identities. A range of dual identity categories appear in the models for England, but not in the models for Scotland and Wales. There are several individuals who report 'dual' identity in Scotland and Wales, but most of them tend to prioritise their sub-state identity (as I address in chapter 2). The prevalence of dual identity in England is a feature of previous research (Henderson et al. 2021). I find four different forms of dual identity: those who report the mid-point on the scale (4-4) and then each point up to the maximum (7-7). The members of these categories increasingly differ in their identity centrality and their party support based on the strength of their dual identity, and those with 'very strong' dual identity are particularly distinct. These results emphasise the limitations of existing approaches that treat dual identities as one category.

7.1.3. <u>Is popular nationalist sentiment stable over time?</u>

The first step in extending my approach is to explore whether it remains stable over time. In chapter 3, my operationalisation of popular nationalism relied on data from a single time-period, which is a potential problem because there is no guarantee that nationalism will remain static over time. Researchers often discuss how the characteristics of sub-state nationalist elites change over time (Keating 1997, Massetti and Schakel 2013), but researchers have also examined the stability of ethno-national identities and constitutional preference within sub-state territories (e.g. Serrano 2015, Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2017, Vallée-Dubois et al. 2017, Basta 2018, Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021a). I built on this research by examining whether my operationalisation of nationalism is stable over time.

Investigating the stability of popular nationalism also allows me to contribute to debates over the stability of ethno-national identities and the mobilising effect of political events. There are several competing perspectives on ethno-national identities. While some scholars argue that individuals view their ethno-national identities as entirely stable (Gil-White 1999), others argue that these ethno-national identities change from moment to moment (Kasfir 1979). Others argue that ethno-national identities are stable in the short-term but able to change in the long-term (e.g. Chandra and Wilkinson 2008), but there is no consensus on what 'short' or 'long' term mean (Bayer 2009). In addition, social movement scholars often discuss how political events create the opportunity for political elites to mobilise support for particular positions (e.g. Birkland 1998, Boin et al. 2009, Vallée-Dubois et al. 2017). These studies do not tend to focus on nationalism specifically, which is where my research contributes.

To address these debates, I introduced an approximation of my categorisation. This was necessary because very few surveys have identity centrality measures. Through this, I created the approximated nationalism measure (ANM) measure, which separates individuals based on their relative state/sub-state identity and constitutional preference. I validated this measure by comparing the original categories with the new ones, and then relabelled my 'minority' nationalist category as 'secessionist' to reflect that the approximation relied on independence support. After introducing the operationalisation, I explored the stability of nationalist sentiment in Scotland and Wales between 2014 and 2017. Focusing on this time-period allowed me to focus on how popular nationalist sentiment responds to an electoral shock like Brexit.

Overall, I found that secessionism, autonomism, and statism tend to be stable (once accounting for measurement error) for most individuals over time. However, Brexit appears to have had a demobilising effect on some individuals. Some secessionists who said they would vote Leave in the 2016 EU referendum moved away from secession immediately after the vote, while some statists who said they would vote Remain moved away from statism simultaneously. These differences persisted into 2017. Similarly, Leavers were less likely to identify with the (pro-Europe) SNP after the referendum than they were before, while Remainers were less likely to identify with the (pro-Brexit) Conservatives. There were similar effects for Plaid Cymru support, but the results were not significant. Brexit appears to have crosscut the independence debate in Scotland, and the referendum caused some those on either pole of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage to reconsider their territorial position. These results have important consequences for social movement scholars, as it suggests that

crosscutting salient events may serve to demobilise some nationalists on either side of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage.

7.1.4. <u>Where are the different forms of nationalism most prevalent?</u>

The next step in validating my operationalisation of nationalism was to ensure that it could be utilised across sub-state territories. A key issue with the original and approximated operationalisations is that they relied on data from Britain alone. The next step was to explore whether my approach can be used to separate individuals within sub-state territories found in other multi-nation states. I addressed this possibility in chapter 5. Investigating the presence of nationalism across multiple sub-state territories provided me with the opportunity to answer a further question: where are the different forms of nationalism most prevalent?

Research into the types of territories that are susceptible to nationalism continues to be a salient debate among researchers who focus on political elites. Researchers often argue that the different structural characteristics of a territory associate with the presence of sub-state nationalism. Rokkan and Urwin (1983) point to three: difference, dependence, and distance, which suggest that sub-state nationalism will develop within territories with a distinct culture, that are less reliant on the state, and are geographically distant. Building on these three themes, four different dimensions emerge in existing research: cultural difference, economic dependence, institutional dependence, and geographic distance. My contribution to this discussion was to explore whether the factors that apply to political elites also apply to the masses.

Cultural differentiation is the conventional argument that researchers ascribe to sub-state nationalists. Resisting homogenisation into the state was the core motivation for the 'periphery' in Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) centre-periphery cleavage, and this drive was considered central by Laitin (1992) and Tilly (1994). Similar arguments are present among contemporary scholars, who point to the importance of a distinct culture (often meaning religion or language) within a territory encouraging sub-state elites to support secession (e.g. Massetti and Schakel 2016).

However, other scholars focus on economic or institutional 'dependence.' Some scholars argue that a lack of economic dependence on the state encourages sub-state elites to promote secessionism in relatively prosperous territories like Catalonia, Flanders, and Northern Italy (Dalle Mulle 2017). Other scholars point to differences in a territory's institutional dependence on the state. Massetti and Schakel (2016) argue that greater decentralisation of

autonomy in a state encourages secessionism among sub-state elites, while Harty (2001) and Hechter (1975) argue that the presence of sub-state autonomy makes it possible for sub-state elites to enact policies that resist cultural and economic homogenisation into the state. Others, like Lecours (2020), argue that dynamic levels of autonomy limits calls for secession in territories like Flanders and South Tyrol, while static levels of autonomy (e.g. in Catalonia and Spain) does not.

Finally, some scholars focus on the role of 'distance,' which Rokkan and Urwin (1983) understood in geographic terms. Geographic distance from the capital of the state may make elites within those territories less likely to identify with the 'central' culture (Shair-Rosenfield et al. 2021) and thus support secession (Massetti and Schakel 2016). In contrast, members of sub-state territories that are dominant within a state may be more likely to feel close to the state. Elites from this group are more likely to be in control of the institutions of the state (Staerkle et al. 2005), which means that it is more likely that these individuals will be able to project the traits of their group onto those of the state (Mummendey and Wenzel 1999). This may not happen in every instance, as multi-national conceptions of the state may arise within populations, which then sit on top of existing cultural differences (Basta 2020).

Focusing on fifteen sub-state territories, I explored whether these factors also applied to the presence of popular nationalist sentiment. I did this by first extending my approach and determining the presence of each form of nationalism within twelve further sub-state territories (within Belgium, Canada, and Spain). After this, I created a dataset containing information on the structural characteristics of each territory. The dataset contained information on the geographic (relative population size of the territory, distance from the capital of the state), economic (absolute GDP per capita and GDP per capita relative to the state), cultural (presence of a distinct language or religion), and institutional (level of sub-state autonomy and state elites' attitudes to decentralisation) nature of each territory.

Overall, these results provide some tentative challenges to imposing elite-level arguments onto the masses. First, the relative economic prosperity of a territory appears to play little role in encouraging secessionist sentiment among individuals (although absolute economic prosperity does slightly). Second, secessionism is evident in territories with a language that is different from the rest of the state. However, the presence of a separate language is not a sufficient condition for developing secessionism, as there are some territories that have a

separate language that do not have large secessionist categories (e.g. Valencia[128]). Third, geographic distance appears to associate with autonomism and state nationalism. Indeed, the statist category is largest within territories that either represent a large proportion of the state or are geographically proximate to the capital of the state, while the opposite is true for autonomists. Thus, the primary contribution of this chapter was to suggest that the factors that apply to elites may not apply to individuals.

7.1.5. Is there an association between popular nationalist sentiment and political attitudes within sub-state territories?

The final step in my approach was to explore the connection between popular nationalist sentiment and political attitudes. While conventional scholars like Lipset and Rokkan (1967) believed that state v sub-state competition crosscut other cleavages in society (i.e. class, religion), many scholars now recognise that there are often associations between nationalist movements and other political issues. Indeed, some researchers now argue that there are strong connections between some sub-state nationalist elites and other political positions (see Massetti and Schakel 2015), and that these (perceived) differences are central to the mobilisation strategies of sub-state nationalist elites (Massetti 2018, Sobolewska and Ford 2020). However, despite the presence of these elite-level analyses, there is currently little investigation of how nationalism associates with political attitudes among individuals within sub-state territories. I address this gap in chapter 6 by examining the association of nationalism with civic-ethnic markers of nationhood (over three territories), left-right self-placement, redistribution preferences, and immigration attitudes (over six territories).

First, I examine the connection between popular nationalism and civic-ethnic markers of nationhood in England, Scotland, and Wales. I discuss this dichotomy within the introduction (chapter 1), but it is important to reiterate some points here. Those who express 'ethnic' forms of nationalism are conventionally considered to be more exclusionary, with the opposite true of those who take 'civic' positions (Hjerm 1998, Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011). However, despite the widespread use of this dichotomy, it is difficult to separate the two terms in practice because many individuals hold ethnic and civic markers simultaneously (Kiss and Park 2014, Paul 2020). In addition, civic markers may not be as inherently

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[128] Castile and Leon also has a protected minority language (Asturian-Leonese) according to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Council of Europe 1992), but this is endangered according to UNESCO's Atlas of the world's languages in danger (Moseley and Alexandre 2010). As a result, it is likely spoken by a very small number of people, which may mean that it is comparable to Scotland where issues surrounding minority languages are less salient.

'inclusive' as researchers assume (Fozdar and Low 2015, Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020, Zhuralev and Ishchenko 2020), and those with mixed ethnic-civic conceptions of nationhood tend to be ambivalent towards migration (Lindstam et al. 2021).

Given these issues, I argue that researchers should focus on the association of popular nationalism with specific political attitudes. One method for examining these attitudes is to focus on left-right positions. Researchers conventionally treat left-right as a measure of economic preference, which separates those who prefer state intervention and income equality from those who prefer deregulation and free market economics (Whitefield et al. 2007). However, many scholars also stress the importance of cultural issues (van der Waal et al. 2007, Ford and Jennings 2020, Sobolewska and Ford 2020), which tend to emerge as attitudes towards immigration or European integration in Europe (Kriesi et al. 2006).

Thus, I use the ANM measure to examine the connection between nationalist sentiment and political attitudes (economic and social) across six sub-state territories (Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, England, Scotland, and Wales). Data is available for each of these territories, which allows me to investigate the association between nationalism and political attitudes in different types of sub-state territory (i.e. rich/poor, large/small). Such analysis is important because it allows me to explore whether my approach can address the substantive issues present in existing identity-focused approaches, which I discussed in chapter 2.

There are five important findings from this chapter. First, I find that the association between popular nationalist sentiment and political attitudes tends to divide individuals along the state v sub-state territorial cleavage, but that the direction of this relationship is not consistent across territories. When territorial polarisation is high (i.e. variance in relative state/sub-state identities is high, as dual identity is less common), those close to the sub-state were more likely to report left-wing self-positions (Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, and Wales). The opposite is then true when territorial polarisation is lower (i.e. dual identity is higher), as those closer to the sub-state were more likely to report right-wing positions (England and Flanders). Why this occurs is somewhat unclear, and it requires further research.

Second, ANM explains less variance in specific economic or socio-cultural positions than it does for left-right self-placement. There are some notable exceptions, such as the support for redistribution among secessionists in Scotland and Wales or the opposition to immigration among secessionists in Flanders and England – but the differences tend to be smaller than those for left-right self-placement. These results suggest that left-right is more of a marker of

how nationalist's like to think of themselves rather than a reflection of economic or social attitudes. These results are consistent with previous researchers who argue that identifying as 'left' or 'right' represents a marker of a nationalist's identity (Dinas 2012, Strijbis and Leonisio 2012), although the specific direction of this relationship differs across territories.

If left-right is a marker of nationalist identity, why does the association move in different directions in different territories? In some states, the 'right' is known as the opponent of decentralisation (Dinas 2012, Galais and Serrano 2019), but this is clearly not universal because there are territories where sub-state nationalists (who support decentralisation) identify as right-wing (e.g. England and Flanders). Another explanation may be that this connection depends on the relative prosperity of the territory, as there is some evidence that sub-state elites take more right-wing positions in more affluent territories (Massetti and Schakel 2015). However, the presence of a connection between sub-state nationalism and feeling left-wing in Wales (a relatively poor territory) and Catalonia (a relatively rich territory) seems to suggest that this argument may not apply to the individual level. Other potential explanations may include the history of the territory, its relative size or political power within the state, or the political context within the state (particularly in terms of the perceived relative ideological leaning of the sub-state territory compared to the rest of the state). Addressing this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it represents an important avenue for future research.

Third, prioritising civic markers of nationhood does not necessarily correspond to inclusive social positions in Britain. There are slight differences in the prioritisation of civic-ethnic markers of nationhood in England, Scotland, and Wales. Ethnic markers are unpopular among most groups, but those who are closer to the state (and especially statists) are more likely to prioritise civic markers of British identity. However, statists in Scotland and Wales are among the most opposed to further migration. The exclusive nature of statists, despite their likelihood of prioritising civic markers of Britishness, is further support for existing research that argues that the political implications of civic markers are ambiguous (e.g. (Fozdar and Low 2015, Simonsen and Bonikowski 2020, Zhuralev and Ishchenko 2020). Consequently, researchers who are interested in the political implications of nationalism should avoid using markers of nationhood.

Fourth, I uncover clear substantive differences among the non-nationalist categories (those with weak identity, moderate dual identity, and very strong dual identity). Existing research

tends to treat 'dual' identity as a singular category (see chapter 2), and there tends to be little examination of those with low national identity. I find that indifferent identifiers tend to take some of the most left-wing, pro-redistribution, and inclusive immigration positions in each of the six territories. Furthermore, there are often clear differences between those with moderate-but-equal identities and strong-but-equal identities. Strong dual identifiers are more likely to oppose redistribution in England, Scotland, and Wales, but are more (slightly) likely to be supportive in Catalonia and Quebec. There are also differences on immigration attitudes in five of the six territories (not Quebec), where those with strong dual identities are more likely oppose further immigration than those with moderate dual identities. Such results support my approach of separating these individuals and emphasise that future researchers should do the same.

Finally, I use my approach to explore whether individuals are merely reflecting the political attitudes taken by their preferred political elites. I do this by comparing the predicted average position of each group on immigration and redistribution in each territory with those taken by political elites (according to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey). Overall, I find that nationalist parties do not always occupy the same ideological space as nationalist individuals, and nationalist parties are often more extreme. For example, the Conservatives and Brexit Party are more extreme on both immigration and redistribution than statists in Scotland and Wales, while the PP and N-VA are far more anti-redistribution than statists in Catalonia and secessionists in Flanders respectively. As a result, I build on existing research that argues that political elites tend to take more extreme decentralisation positions than their supporters (Martínez-Herrera and Miley 2010, Barrio and Rodríguez-Teruel 2017), by suggesting that this may also be the case for their other political positions.

7.2. Limitations and opportunities for future research

These findings leave questions open for further exploration, and thus represent only the beginning of a larger possible program of study. I have introduced my approach and sought to validate it over time, validate it across territories, and validate its usefulness as an explanatory tool alongside the existing identity-focused approach. However, given the vast nature of nationalism research and the relatively limited nature of a thesis, there are inevitably several questions that remain. These questions represent exciting opportunities for me to extend my research in the future, which I shall detail below.

7.2.1. <u>Extending my operationalisation of nationalism</u>

When introducing my conception of nationalism, I discussed two potential sources of ambiguity within Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism: what it means to prioritise the nation and whether nationalism requires a demand for political representation. With respect to the first point, scholars may argue that the identities that people prioritise change regularly depending on the circumstances that people find themselves in – thus creating a question over how often someone must prioritise the nation to be a nationalist.

Based on the social psychology literature (e.g. Ashmore et al. 2004), I argued that there are two forms of prioritising an identity. The first refers to the identities that people (often unconsciously) use to guide their behaviour from moment to moment, which reflects the salience of an identity. The second refers to extent to which someone believes an identity to be important to how they define themselves, which reflects the centrality of an identity. My interpretation of Bieber's (2018) definition is that a nationalist must consider the nation to be central to their sense of self, rather than have it salient at every moment. The salience of an identity may change according to the circumstance, but central identities tend to be chronically important to people over time (Ashmore et al. 2004) – even if they are not the most important at all times (given changes in circumstance). Other scholars may disagree with my approach to capturing identity prioritisation, but any attempts to further refine this point would require further research beyond this thesis.

The second potential source of ambiguity refers to the difference between 'political' and 'cultural' nationalism. Bieber's (2018) definition of nationalism necessitates a demand for political representation. Classic scholars like Gellner (1983), Breuilly (1982), or Hechter (2000) may argue that this is because nationalism inherently requires political demands. Yet, other scholars like Hutchinson (1987) point to the existence of 'cultural' forms of nationalism, which focus on the cultivation of a national identity without explicit calls for political autonomy. Some scholars may argue that focusing on political representation may lead to 'false negatives' in my categorisation – where cultural nationalists are coded as 'non-nationalists' due to their lack of demands for autonomy. However, these two forms of nationalism are often related in practice, and the pursual of cultural preservation often coincides with calls for (limited) political representation (see Massetti and Schakel 2016). Consequently, I have argued that a focus on political representation will capture the different demands of nationalist individuals in sub-state territories. Other scholars may argue that this

is not enough, and that some cultural nationalists will still be mischaracterised as non-nationalists. However, addressing this potential problem requires further research (likely with a range of survey items that are not widely available) to determine whether there are instances where 'cultural' nationalists have been ignored.

As mentioned, addressing these limitations empirically is difficult because of the data limitations. In particular, my first operationalisation relies on limited measures for Britain, where individuals select their 'top three' identities rather than indicating their top one. While this approach was necessitated by survey space limitations, it is possible that it may obscure important differences between those who believe the nation is their first most important identity and those who believe it is their second or third (or fourth) most important identity. In addition, the surveys for sub-state territories outside Britain lack centrality measures entirely, which makes it difficult to explicitly field my full operationalisation in these areas. Indeed, it is possible that I may find different categories if I were able to field my full operationalisation in sub-state territories outside Britain. As I discuss in chapter 3, several current surveys lack the items to explore these points in more detail, so any attempts to explore it will require the introduction of more survey items – something that it not quickly or easily resolvable.

Beyond the explicit conceptualisation, I also believe that there is further scope to investigate some of the categories in more detail outside this thesis. Particularly, researchers should further investigate the nature of popular statist nationalism within sub-state territories. In my approach, I treat 'statists' as a single category. There is a growing elite-focused literature on the varieties of state nationalism (e.g. Basta 2020, Cetrà and Swenden 2021), which point to differences in sub-state recognition among state elites. I do not disaggregate the statist category, although some individuals do support devolution instead of centralisation. I do not consider these differences sufficient to warrant separating statists in my approach. The latent class analysis suggests separating minority nationalists from autonomists, but not separating statists.[129] Statists who disagree on constitutional preference still report similar levels of state and sub-state identity and identity centrality in England, Scotland, and Wales – while autonomists differ from minority nationalists in their state identity, their identity centrality, and their constitutional preferences. Consequently, I argue that while the latter two categories

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[129] There is a small separate category in Scotland where some prioritise their Britishness and support devolution. However, less than half of this category consider their British identity to be 'central,' and as a result I do not believe that it is credible to classify this group as 'nationalist.'

represent different forms of nationalism (with very different conceptions of how the sub-state territory should exist within the state), statism represents a singular branch of nationalism with different variants within it (support autonomy or not).

Yet, validating this argument, particularly considering the existing elite-level research, requires further analysis. Doing this would require examining the attitudes of those who prioritise the state in greater detail than the data available here allows. Some scholars have already begun to examine such attitudes at an individual-level, such as Henderson and Wyn Jones's (2021b) work on 'subjective unionism.' This research goes a long way to understand different perspectives on the union in Britain, but their identity dimension relies on relative territorial identity. Given the issues present with this measure (chapter 2), I would seek to build on their research by investigating whether there are significant differences within my 'statist' category when it comes to the perceived economic, social, and equitable visions of the state.

7.2.2. Stability beyond 2014-2017

It is important to acknowledge that the stability chapter (chapter 4) only focuses on two sub-state territories during one three-year period (for the within-individual analysis). My conclusion was that nationalist sentiment tends to be stable for most people, but that political events can have demobilising effects on some individuals at the poles of the approximated nationalism measure. While I do not find any demobilising effects in Wales between 2014 and 2017, there is some suggestion that there have been changes since then, as support for independence (a key component of the ANM measure) increased after 2016 (Griffiths 2021). The lack of constitutional preference measures in the BESIP for Wales makes it very difficult to extend my analysis beyond 2017 in this instance, as doing so would reduce the size of my samples drastically. Further longitudinal analysis would help researchers understand the stability of nationalist sentiment (when it changes, why it changes), but this requires the availability of much more repeated data on sub-state territories. Some studies are taking these steps, such as the British Election Study Internet Panel, Scottish Election Study, and Welsh Election Study, which will help facilitate further research on this subject.

7.2.3. The structural characteristics that associate with the presence of popular nationalist sentiment

I do acknowledge within chapter 5 that I only look at a limited number of territories (15) across four states. As a result, I focus on far fewer sub-state territories than some other

existing analyses of elites (Massetti and Schakel 2016) or individuals (Schakel and Brown 2021). My justification for this is that few datasets contain the required information for me to introduce my categorisation of nationalist sentiments (namely identity scales and constitutional preference). The relatively low number of territories means it is difficult to examine the relationship between some concepts, such as decentralisation, and nationalist sentiment due to a lack of variation within my available cases. Due to these limitations, my results are tentative (as I claim in the chapter). Exploring why certain forms of nationalism develop is an important avenue for future research. However, it is one that would require extensive analysis that is beyond the scope of this thesis, and it would likely require intensive archival research.

One quantitative option may be to use the International Constitutional Values Survey (Schakel and Brown 2021), but this dataset also has problems – namely that it includes very small samples of each sub-state territory (i.e. 6,000 respondents over 142 regions). Without a representative sample of each specific sub-state territory, it may not be possible to determine the size of each form of nationalism within each territory. As a result, this dataset may not be suitable for examining the factors that associate with the presence of each form of nationalism.

7.2.4. The direction of the association between political attitudes and popular nationalism

As with the previous chapter, the reason why different forms of nationalism associate with different political attitudes is something that eludes my analysis here. My focus was on examining the presence of an association between nationalism and political attitudes, and whether my approach was able to address the substantive limitations present with existing analyses. I argue that it was able to do this. However, why secessionists/statists are left/right-wing in some territories, but the opposite in others is not something I am able to determine in chapter 6. It is a very large question, one that is beyond the scope of my thesis. Determining the connection between nationalism and political attitudes would require extensive analysis of the structural characteristics of several territories, their political history, and their party competition over time, as well as how each of these factors relate to individual-level attitudes. Providing this analysis would require a separate project, something that is too vast for me to include here. As a result, it represents an avenue for me to extend my research in the future.

A final limitation is that the measures I use for political attitudes are quite general in nature, which may obscure their different meanings for different nationalist individuals. As discussed

in the chapter, Berwick (2019) argues that redistribution attitudes may depend on whether it is the state or sub-state authority doing the redistributing. Similarly, Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a) find that the origin of migration matters when capturing popular attitudes in England, and I find that this also appears to be the case in Wales (appendix 5 – Figure A8). Consequently, the relatively limited association between nationalist sentiment and specific political attitudes that I uncover may be a product of the 'general' measures that are present in existing surveys. Addressing this requires further investigation with more detailed survey instruments that separate 'who' is doing the redistribution and 'who' are the migrants, which will hopefully provide more detailed accounts of how nationalist sentiment associates with political attitudes.

7.2.5. Other sub-state identities within sub-state territories

In my study of nationalism within sub-state territories, I have focused on two different levels of identity – state and sub-state nations/regions. These sub-state nations/regions (described as 'sub-state territories' throughout the thesis), refer to historic nations or large territorial units within the state. However, it is important to note that there may be other sub-state identities even within those sub-state territories. For example, some sub-state territories may contain important (for want of a better term) 'regional' or 'local' identities. England is a notable example, as it contains several 'regional' identities such as Scouse in Liverpool, Cornish in Cornish, and Yorkshire in Yorkshire. These identities have received far less coverage that the nationalisms present in historic nations, possibly due to the relatively weak performance of the political parties that represent them.

These 'regional' or 'local' identities are important for my categorisation of nationalist sentiment because they can relate to identification with larger territorial units. For example, Deacon (2009) discusses the prevalence of Cornish identities within Cornwall, and they point to research that demonstrates that a sizeable proportion of respondents felt either singularly Cornish (24 percent) or more Cornish than they were English (18 percent). These individuals may be categorised as 'non-nationalists' in my approach (if they do not prioritise either their British or English identities), but this designation appears inconsistent if the identity that they prioritise is 'Cornish.'

However, other scholars question whether some of these 'regional' identities are separate from identification with larger territorial bodies. For example, Jeffery (2021) questions the extent to which Scouse and English identities are truly separate from one another in

Liverpool. Similarly, supporters of Yorkshire First tend to prioritise their Yorkshire identity, but they often combine it with a sense of feeling Northern, English, and British – suggesting that these 'regional' or 'local' identities are "not perceived as being exclusive or exclusionary" with respect to other identities in England (Giovannini 2016 p597). Understanding how these regional/local identities relate to other territorial identities is an interesting area for future research.

Unfortunately, it is currently very difficult to examine sub-state identities beyond the level of 'historic nations' or 'large regions' quantitatively because there is little data available. I have discussed the limitations with existing surveys when it comes to including data on the largest sub-state territories, and these problems become even more prevalent for examining any identities within smaller territorial units. While I have discussed some studies of specific areas, there is little comparative quantitative data available beyond them. If scholars wish to understand identities that relate to smaller territorial units (and how they relate to other territorial identities within a state), then there will need to be an expansion in the data that seeks to capture them specifically.

7.3. Recommendations and closing remarks.

The politics of sub-state territories continues to have important implications beyond their boundaries, be that in terms of changing the borders of a state, challenging trade deals of supranational organisations, or in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. Researchers have long argued that the state v sub-state territorial cleavage is one of the key issues separating politics, and my approach is an extension of this debate. My primary contribution has been the introduction and validation of a new operationalisation of nationalism within sub-state territories. Through this approach, I have several recommendations for future researchers.

7.3.1. Include further individual-level analyses of popular nationalist sentiment

First, researchers should continue to incorporate individual-level perspectives alongside those of elites in sub-state territories. My research emphasises that researchers should be careful extending elite-level arguments to the masses, as there are key areas where individuals appear to differ. These include the structural characteristics of a territory and their association with nationalist sentiment, and the intensity of broader political attitudes.

One area where my research aligns with contemporary elite-level research is on the separation of secessionists from autonomists. While conventional literature may not make

such a distinction, I have discussed how recent researchers do recognise that the relationship between sub-state nationalism and sovereignty extends beyond simply supporting independence. My research emphasises that this is also the case among individuals. In many cases, there are large differences between the locations where secessionism and autonomism are prevalent, and the political attitudes taken by these individuals. Failure to capture these differences may limit our ability to understand the nature of sub-state nationalism, which can lead to inaccurate analyses.

7.3.2. <u>Include further inductive analyses of popular nationalism within sub-state territories</u>

Second, researchers should not focus on relative state/sub-state identity in isolation. I have discussed their limitations at length in this thesis, but existing measures struggle with capturing the intensity of state/sub-state identities, their trade-off, and the differences among dual identifiers. I demonstrate that these differences are important throughout the thesis, particularly when it comes to the political attitudes of dual identifiers and the differences between secessionists and autonomists. These results represent direct support for Onuch and Hale's (2018) suggestion that separate 'national' identities will have different political implications depending on how they interact, which may not reflect the expectations of researchers.

To account for these issues, I have argued that researchers should focus on popular nationalist sentiment instead. As discussed, existing studies of nationalism within sub-state territories tend to focus on elites, and it is possible for individuals to diverge from elites. To account for these possibilities, I have argued in favour of an inductive approach to capturing popular nationalist sentiment. Inductive approaches allow categories to form from the data without presupposing their nature, which assists researchers in uncovering categories that they did not expect and in locating unsuspected differences within the categories that they did expect.

7.3.3. <u>Avoid methodological nationalism</u>

Finally, researchers should examine sub-state territories separately. I am certainly not the first researcher to make this point, as it is something that Henderson et al. (2021) and Henderson and Wyn Jones (2021a) stress. However, it is worth reiterating. The types of nationalism that emerge within sub-state territories can differ from one to the next (chapter 5), and the political implications of nationalist sentiment may differ across territories (chapter 6). Even in territories where similar categories emerge, important differences can be present. This is notable when comparing independence support among minority nationalists in Scotland and

Wales in chapter 3, or when comparing the political attitudes across sub-state territories in chapter 6. Focusing on the state will obviously fail to capture these differences, but so will pooling sub-state territories together (e.g. Schakel and Brown 2021). By treating every sub-state territory as the same, pooling territories risks missing key differences between specific types of territories that may prove crucial to understanding our object of interest. Understanding these differences, why and how they emerge, and their political implications is crucial for analysing the politics of sub-state territories in the future.

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9. Appendices

Table A1: Identity Scale Question Wording In 2021 Welsh Election Study And British Election Study Internet Panel

Survey	Question wording	Bottom boundary	Top boundary
WES	Here is a scale that we would like you to use to describe to what extent you think of yourself as Welsh, British or English. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means 'Not at all' and 10 means 'Very strongly', where would you place yourself?	0: Not at all	10: Very strongly
BESIP	Where would you place yourself on these scales?	1: Not at all	7: Very strongly

Table A2: Percentage That Said An Identity Was One Of The Three Most Important Markers Of Their Identity In England, Scotland, And Wales

	England %	Scotland %	Wales %
Being British	24.28	18.23	25.19
Being English/ Scottish/Welsh	26.35	50.75	39.08
Being a parent	37.81	36.32	40.61
Being a partner/spouse	29.96	30.06	33.37
Your gender	25.84	22.43	21.42
Your occupation	24.38	20.82	18.74
Your age group	24.22	20.83	23.10
Your religion	8.82	8.21	6.95
Your social class	8.34	7.75	10.20
Your ethnicity	8.31	4.73	5.85
Your sexuality	7.22	6.95	6.59
Being a Remainer	7.59	8.55	7.05
Being a Leaver	6.65	3.39	6.46
Other	9.95	9.71	9.07

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 6417, Scotland N: 2654, Wales N: 1768).

Table A3: Country Of Birth In England, Scotland, And Wales

	England	Scotland	Wales
UK	92.85	93.92	95.48

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel wave 20 (England N: 6417, Scotland N: 2654, Wales N: 1768)

Note: BESIP does not disaggregate the United Kingdom

Table A4: Proportion Of Each Response On The British And Welsh Identity Scales That Report 'Being British' Or 'Being Welsh' As Central (Respectively) In The 2021 Welsh Election Study (Post-Election)

Identity Strength	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Being British	0	2.8	0.97	7.30	3.07	9.04	8.85	12.32	23.16	33.79	52.00
Being Welsh	0.26	2.17	1.94	5.17	6.03	6.13	9.73	11.39	38.25	58.14	76.49

Figure A1: Predicted Probability Of Considering A National Identity Central Along The RTI Scale, When Treating RTI As An Ordinal Predictor Variable

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 5,528, Scotland N: 2323, Wales N: 1534)

Note: Predicted Probabilities Cannot Be Calculated When Cells Are Empty. These Empty Cells Emerge When Nobody Selects An Identity, Which Occurs At Some Extreme Points Of The Rti Scale. As Such, I Treat These Points As Blank Entries At Zero.

Table A5: Percentage Of Each Level Of RTI That Respond 'Don't Know' On The Identity Centrality Question

	Only British	-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	1	2	3	4	5	Only Sub-state
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
England	2.95	4.97	7.66	5.22	7.28	7.76	8.58	9.72	7.82	2.66	4.67	5.82	3.68
Scotland	5.10	9.90	11.91	5.40	9.56	22.82	12.76	5.13	9.05	6.13	9.12	9.17	10.08
Wales	9.17	6.59	9.91	5.63	8.26	7.79	7.91	2.34	7.81	3.86	10.92	15.82	2.41

Source: British Election Study Internet Panel Wave 20 (England N: 5,528, Scotland N: 2323, Wales N: 1534)

Table A6: Distribution Of Identity And Attachment Scales In Flanders And Wallonia In The 2014 Belgian National Election Study

	Flanders				Wallonia			
	Belgian Identity	Belgian Attachment	Flemish Identity	Flemish Attachment	Belgian Identity	Belgian Attachment	Walloon Identity	Walloon Attachment
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
0 (Not at all)	3.73	4.55	4.89	2.63	2.31	2.93	7.38	3.24
1	1.12	0.92	1.96	1.06	0.72	0.78	1.81	1.07
2	1.59	2.14	2.48	2.13	0.89	0.89	2.97	1.24
3	2.16	2.95	2.26	1.73	0.9	1.53	4.56	1.72
4	2.73	3.1	2.54	1.62	0.64	1.9	3.39	2.89
5	11.63	12.1	12.12	9.66	6.24	6.75	16.57	9.51
6	11.12	10.55	9.43	6.1	3.21	3.36	8.71	6.73
7	15.24	17.74	12.32	15.66	6.15	11.13	10.18	14.45
8	17.23	21.12	18.27	24.16	10.36	15.32	14.89	18.71
9	9.97	10.68	13.04	18.31	12.36	18.35	6.9	14.85
10 (Very strongly)	23.48	14.15	20.69	16.93	56.23	37.06	22.65	25.6

Table A7: Descriptive Statistics For Belgian And Sub-State Identity And Attachment In The 2014 Belgian National Election Study

	Flanders				Wallonia			
	Belgian Identity	Belgian Attachment	Flemish Identity	Flemish Attachment	Belgian Identity	Belgian Attachment	Walloon Identity	Walloon Attachment
Mean	7.16	6.81	6.98	7.39	8.58	8.05	6.49	7.49
SD	2.54	2.51	2.73	2.33	2.30	2.41	3.00	2.47

A.1. Different Identity Scales

Some surveys, like the Welsh Election Study (WES), use 0-10 identity scales. Other surveys, like the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP), use 1-7 scales. The 2016 WES represents an opportunity to examine the impact of these different scales. The 2016 WES was conducted after the National Assembly for Wales election on 5th May 2016. Wave 8 of the BESIP was conducted at a similar time, between May and June 2016. It is the campaign wave for the EU referendum. The 2016 WES includes the BESIP codes for their respondents that took both surveys. Each survey has an identity scale for British, Welsh, and English identities. After excluding non-responses, this leaves 1231 respondents that responded to both scales. Using these codes, I merge the two datasets. After this, I normalise the two identity scales between 0 and 1 to facilitate direct comparisons between them. I do not weight the analysis in order to compare specific responses on the scales.

Overall, the distributions of these two scales are virtually identical (Figures A4 and A5). The same is true of their means and standard deviations (Table A7). There is also a very strong correlation between the scales from each dataset (Table A8). Interestingly, the correlation is stronger for Welsh identity. The same pattern appears when looking at the correlations between responses on the identity scales in wave 7 (April-May 2016), wave 8 (May-June 2016), and wave 9 (June-July 2016) of the BESIP. These results suggest that individuals are either more consistent in their Welsh identities over time, or there is less measurement error for Welsh identity. However, the similarities between the responses on the 1-7 and the 0-10 scales suggests that the different scale ranges do not influence how individuals position themselves on an identity scale.

Figure A2: Identity Strength Distribution In Wales In The 2016 Welsh Election Study

(N: 3106 for Welsh, 3118 for British)

Figure A3: Identity Scale Distribution In Wales In The British Election Study Internet Panel (Wave 8)

(N: 2571)

Table A8: Descriptive Statistics For Identity Scales In The British Election Study Internet Panel (Wave 8) And The 2016 Welsh Election Study (Post-Election)

	British Election Study Internet Panel		Welsh Election Study	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
British (0-1)	0.758	0.281	0.765	0.288
Welsh (0-1)	0.626	0.393	0.610	0.402

N: 2552 for BESIP, 3106 for Welsh in WES, 3118 for British in WES

Table A9: Correlations Between Identity Scales In The British Election Study Internet Panel (Waves 7 To 9) And The 2016 Welsh Election Study (Post-Election)

	Welsh		British	
	N	Correlation	N	Correlation
2016 WES and W8	1227	0.907	1231	0.724
W7 and W8	2003	0.924	2006	0.823
W7 and W9	1929	0.918	1926	0.798
W8 and W9	2091	0.921	2093	0.812

Note: Correlations unweighted to test association between the specific responses that each respondent gave on each scale. All results p<0.001.

Appendix 2

Table A10: Identity Importance Question

People differ in how they think of themselves. If you had to pick **three** things from this list to describe yourself – things that are very important to you when you think of yourself – what would they be?

Order of list was randomized

1	Your social class
2	Being British
3	Being English (if respondent in England)
4	Being Scottish (if respondent in Scotland)
5	Being Welsh (if respondent in Wales)
6	Your gender
7	Your occupation
8	Being a parent
9	Being a spouse/partner
10	Your age group
11	Your religion
12	Your ethnicity
13	Being a Leaver
14	Being a Remainer
15	Your sexuality
16	Other
9999	Don't know

Table A11: Identity Scales

Where would you place yourself on these scales?	
Order of list was randomized	
1: Not at all British	7: Very strongly British
1: Not at all English	7: Very strongly English
1: Not at all Scottish	7: Very strongly Scottish
1: Not at all Welsh	7: Very strongly Welsh
9999	Don't know

Table A12: Constitutional Preference Question

	Which of these statements comes closest to your view?
1	[Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK **and** the European Union
2	[Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK **but** part of the European Union
3	[Nation] should remain part of the UK, **with** its own elected parliament which has **some** taxation powers
4	[Nation] should remain part of the UK, **with** its own elected parliament which has **no** taxation powers
5	[Nation] should remain part of the UK **without** its own elected parliament
9999	Don't know

Table A13: Definition of social grades

A	Higher managerial, administrative and professional occupations
B	Intermediate managerial, administrative and professional occupations
C1	Supervisory, clerical and junior managerial, administrative and professional occupations
C2	Skilled manual workers
D	Semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers
E	State pensioners, casual and lowest grade workers, unemployed with state benefits only

Source: National Readership Survey (www.nrs.co.uk/nrs-print/lifestyle-and-classification-data/social-grade)

Table A14: Percentage of those who chose each national identity category among those who consider their national identity to be central

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Britishness	England	0.41	1.36	2.47	6.69	15.31	29.23	42.93
	Scotland	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.58	12.48	29.55	53.07
	Wales	0.00	0.00	0.51	5.15	12.94	28.00	52.05
Sub-State	England	1.32	0.70	1.10	3.11	11.43	25.97	50.53
	Scotland	0.00	2.30	2.47	6.19	22.79	57.64	76.98
	Wales	0.00	1.11	0.36	3.49	17.46	55.38	78.55

Table A15: Percentage of respondents who chose 'don't know' when asked about their constitutional preference by identity strength

		Low (1-2)	Medium (3-5)	High (6-7)
Britishness	England	35.27	31.24	23.24
	Scotland	7.35	16.12	8.64
	Wales	12.09	18.31	15.00
Sub-State	England	30.47	31.78	23.63
	Scotland	15.83	12.96	10.46
	Wales	18.15	16.96	14.24

Table A16: Percentage of respondents who chose 'don't know' when asked about their constitutional preference by identity centrality

		Not central	Central
Britishness	England	31.68	21.97
	Scotland	14.98	3.92
	Wales	20.20	8.91
Sub-State	England	32.36	20.84
	Scotland	17.47	8.58
	Wales	19.74	13.63

Table A17: 'Nationalism' Scores in the 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey

0: Cosmopolitan	10: Nationalist
United Kingdom Independence Party	9.25
Brexit Party	8.80
Conservative Party	7.76
Plaid Cymru	4.73
Scottish Nationalist Party	3.88
Labour Party	3.00
Liberal Democrat	1.80
Green Party	1.31

Table A18: Covariate results converted to probabilities in England, with indifferent identifiers as the reference category

		Auto	Dual 4	Dual 5	Dual 6	Dual 7	Statist
Demo-graphics	Age	0.947*	0.437	0.349	0.666	0.903*	0.633
	Male Female	0.516	0.592	0.705*	0.615*	0.612*	0.414
	Not White British White British	0.996*	0.843*	0.894*	0.961*	0.952*	0.924*
	No degree Degree	0.235*	0.495	0.426	0.379*	0.290*	0.522
	ABC DE	0.715*	0.600	0.599	0.643	0.717*	0.677
	No religion Catholic	0.298*	0.417	0.331*	0.337	0.394	0.320
	Christian (other)	0.668*	0.499	0.542	0.653*	0.741*	0.704*
	Other religion	0.364	0.666	0.600	0.616	0.631	0.677
Party support	Cons	0.971*	0.808*	0.902*	0.952*	0.953*	0.967*
	Lab	0.235*	0.791*	0.572	0.582	0.485	0.687

*p<0.05

Mplus reports the results in logits, but I have recoded these into probabilities for ease of interpretation (Tables A18-A20). For the interval variables (e.g. age and propensity to vote for a party), the results reflect probability that someone with the maximum score (oldest, most likely to vote for a party) belongs to a particular category instead of the indifferent category (compared to the youngest, least likely to vote for a party). For the other categorical variables, these results now indicate the probability that a respondent with a particular characteristic belongs in one category instead of the reference category. For example, the probability that a woman (compared to a man) belongs to the statist category rather than the indifferent category in England is 0.41 As this value is below 0.5, it indicates that women are less likely to be statists than indifferent identifiers in England. However, this difference is not statistically significant, which indicates that we cannot generalise this result to the population.

Table A19: Covariate results converted to probabilities in Scotland, with indifferent identifiers as the reference category

		Minority	Auto	Pro-Devolution	Statist
Demo-graphics	Age				
		0.411	0.965*	0.906*	0.979*
	Male				
	Female	0.476	0.652*	0.590	0.483
	Not White British				
	White British	0.966*	1	0.846	0.930
	No degree				
	Degree	0.328*	0.267*	0.428	0.193*
	ABC				
	DE	0.547	0.508	0.426	0.583
	No religion				
	Catholic	0.654	0.353	0.343	0.363
	Christian (other)	0.765*	0.827*	0.757*	0.922*
	Other religion	0.422	0.402	0.374	0.470
Party support	Cons	0.236	0.985*	0.993*	0.999*
	Lab	0.098*	0.615	0.700	0.678
	SNP	0.981*	0.091*	0.052*	0.000

*p<0.05

Table A20: Covariate results converted to probabilities in Wales, with indifferent identifiers as the reference category

		Minority	Auto	Statist
Demo-graphics	Age	0.203	0.946*	0.977*
	Male			
	Female	0.379	0.449	0.522
	Not White British			
	White British	0.960*	0.928	0.962*
	No degree			
	Degree	0.532	0.270*	0.420
	ABC			
	DE	0.583	0.557	0.548
	No religion			
	Catholic	0.538	0.416	0.341
	Christian (other)	0.507	0.734*	0.725*
	Other religion	0.356	0.338	0.219
Party support	Cons	0.176	0.939*	0.930*
	Lab	0.250*	0.633	0.434
	PC	0.926*	0.487	0.174*

*p<0.05

Appendix 3

Table A21: Question wording for national identity and constitutional preference questions in the British Election Study Internet Panel

Variables	Question	Responses
National identities	Where would you place yourself on these scales? Britishness, Englishness, Scottishness, Welshness	1: Not at all 7: Very strongly 9999: Don't know
Constitutional preference (Wales)	Which of these statements comes closest to your view?	1: There should be no devolved government in Wales 2: The National Assembly for Wales should have fewer powers 3: We should leave things as they are now 4: The National Assembly for Wales should have more powers 5: Wales should become independent, separate from the UK 9999: Don't know
Constitutional preference (Scotland)	As you may know, a referendum on independence will be held in Scotland on 18th September 2014. Voters will be asked, "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Do you think you will vote "Yes" or "No"? (Wave 1)	0: Will vote "No" 1: Will vote "Yes" 2 "Will not vote" 9999 "Don't know"
	And how did you vote in the independence referendum? (Wave 3)	0: I voted "No" (Scotland should not be an independent country) 1: I voted "Yes" (Scotland should be an independent country) 9999: Don't know
	If there was another referendum on Scottish independence, how do you think you would vote? (Wave 4 onwards)	0: I would vote "No" (stay in the UK) 1: I would vote "Yes" (leave the UK) 2: Would not vote 9999: Don't know

Aggregate-level stability

Table A22: Aggregate-level size of the categories in Scotland

Wave	Year	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State-Pro Ind
W1	2014	35.55	14.44	9.61	17.62	20.36	0.95	1.48
W3	2014	41.93	13.32	8.56	16.46	16.55	1.17	2.01
W4	2015	43.61	8.53	6.72	19.83	17.79	0.83	2.68
W7	2016	36.62	14.48	9.48	15.44	18.97	2.3	2.71
W9	2016	38.49	15.67	8.3	14.87	16.51	1.71	4.46
W11	2017	33.03	16.02	10.02	17.19	18.06	3.14	2.53
W14	2018	33.66	15.55	10.93	16.96	18.33	1.81	2.74
W15	2019	36.85	15.3	11.02	15.32	17.69	1.9	1.93
W16	2019	37.55	15.54	10.4	13.56	17.64	2.98	2.33
W17	2019	38.75	13.93	9.92	15.39	18.14	1.47	2.39
W20	2020	36.27	18.11	8.51	15.41	17.38	1.94	2.38

All data from the British Election Study's Internet Panel

Table A23: Aggregate-level size of categories in Wales

Wave	Year	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State-Pro Ind
Wave 1	2014	5.6	25.56	10.72	18.95	36.71	1.68	0.78
Wave 3	2014	4.99	27.10	10.33	18.66	36.89	1.73	0.30
Wave 4	2015	4.77	25.68	8.13	21.55	37.27	2.19	0.41
Wave 7	2016	5.46	24.46	9.34	17.86	39.39	2.81	0.69
Wave 11	2017	5.71	27.19	9.04	16.46	36.81	3.92	0.88
WES	2019	7.57	23.33	9.57	18.86	36.09	2.95	1.63
WES	2021	12.47	23.28	5.95	14.02	38.48	3.49	2.31

Data prior to 2019 from the British Election Study Internet Panel. Data from 2019 and 2021 is from the Welsh Election Study

Table A24: Percentage of respondents in wave 1 who were found in each category in wave 7 in Scotland

	Wave 1 Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State Pro-Ind	N
Wave 7	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Secessionist	91.90	18.29	12.10	12.24	1.09	15.91	11.32	881
Autonomist	2.74	53.31	10.89	10.97	2.36	0.00	0.00	242
Moderate Dual	1.87	10.89	41.94	11.22	9.45	0.00	9.43	248
Strong Dual	2.24	13.23	15.32	55.36	8.55	0.00	1.89	355
Statist	0.37	3.50	15.73	9.69	75.45	11.36	16.98	518
Indifferent	0.37	0.00	0.40	0.51	1.64	65.91	7.55	48
State Pro-Ind	0.50	0.78	3.63	0.00	1.45	6.82	52.83	54
N	802	257	248	392	550	44	53	2346

Analysis limited to those who took waves 1, 3, 4, 7, and 11

Table A25: Percentage of respondents in wave 1 who were found in each category in wave 7 in Scotland

	Wave 7 Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State Pro-Ind	N
Wave 11	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Secessionist	87.23	8.04	13.62	4.62	0.83	21.28	13.79	768
Autonomist	6.90	63.39	13.15	10.40	0.41	0.00	1.72	263
Moderate Dual	2.04	12.05	42.25	6.65	6.83	10.64	17.24	204
Strong Dual	2.94	15.18	15.49	69.08	5.80	0.00	3.45	359
Statist	0.13	0.89	14.55	8.67	83.64	0.00	13.79	476
Indifferent	0.38	0.45	0.47	0.00	1.04	59.57	5.17	41
State Pro-Ind	0.38	0.00	0.47	0.58	1.45	8.51	44.83	43
N	783	224	213	346	483	47	58	2154

Analysis limited to those who took waves 1, 3, 4, 7, and 11

Table A26: Percentage of respondents in wave 1 who were found in each category in wave 7 in Wales

	Wave 1							
	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State Pro-Ind	N
Wave 7	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Secessionist	73.33	2.88	3.01	2.95	0.00	3.85	0.00	99
Autonomist	17.14	73.40	16.87	20.25	1.21	15.38	0.00	335
Moderate Dual	1.90	6.41	35.54	5.06	5.14	7.69	0.00	129
Strong Dual	4.76	13.46	10.84	61.60	6.81	0.00	0.00	256
Statist	0.95	2.88	28.92	10.13	84.57	34.62	61.54	658
Indifferent	0.00	0.64	2.41	0.00	1.82	38.46	0.00	28
State Pro-Ind	1.90	0.32	2.41	0.00	0.45	0.00	38.46	15
N	105	312	166	237	661	26	13	1520

Table A27: Percentage of respondents in wave 1 who were found in each category in wave 7 in Wales

Wave 11	Wave 7 Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State Pro-Ind	N
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	
Secessionist	71.95	5.99	0.00	0.95	0.17	0.00	11.11	82
Autonomist	21.95	73.82	20.18	16.67	2.08	0.00	0.00	322
Moderate Dual	2.44	5.36	47.37	3.33	3.65	0.00	33.33	104
Strong Dual	3.66	10.09	8.77	73.33	3.47	0.00	0.00	219
Statist	0.00	3.47	16.67	5.71	88.37	21.43	44.44	561
Indifferent	0.00	1.26	4.39	0.00	1.56	78.57	0.00	40
State Pro-Ind	0.00	0.00	2.63	0.00	0.69	0.00	11.11	8
N	82	317	114	210	576	28	9	1336

A3.1. Missing data sensitivity analysis

As with all longitudinal analysis, the BESIP panel study suffers from respondents dropping out of the survey (attrition). Prior to the exclusion of non-responses on covariates, the data for Scotland represented 12.04 percent of the total number of Scottish respondents who took each of the six waves included in this analysis. This number is slightly higher in Wales (15.88), but data is only available for five waves. Such attrition is an issue if it is not random, as it can bias the analysis by over representing certain groups (Rubin 1976). To examine whether there are differences between those included and those not, I compared the sociodemographic characteristics of those who were included in the analysis and those who were excluded from wave 1.

Table A28: Sociodemographic characteristics of those included and excluded in the longitudinal analysis in Scotland and Wales

	Scotland		Wales	
	Excluded	In	Excluded	In
Age (Mean)	48.75	54.86	50.47	56.71
Left education under 20, still studying or can't remember (%)	60.16	60.05	65.36	61.08
Left education over 20 (%)	39.84	39.95	34.64	38.92
Female (%)	49.57	41.73	53.25	40.92
Social grade D (%)	11.45	8.36	12.78	8.02
Social grade E (%)	11.85	13.35	15.06	14.98
No party identity (%)	12.69	8.63	16.13	9.67
Conservative identity (%)	14.5	21.17	20.28	25
Labour identity (%)	30.51	27.14	33.12	37.26
SNP/Plaid identity (%)	27.13	28.11	8.92	8.37
Other party identity (%)	15.18	14.95	21.55	19.69
Remain vote intention (%)	53.65	54.33	42.94	50.36
Leave vote intention (%)	29.73	34.88	37.79	39.69
Not/DK (%)	16.62	10.79	19.23	9.95

All sociodemographic data from wave 1.

Party identity includes squeezed identity, as it does in the paper above

Overall, there are some differences, but few are particularly large (Table A7). Levels of education were virtually identical and social grades were very similar. Those who were included in the analysis tend to be slightly older than those who were excluded, and the latter group are also slightly more likely to be male. The excluded are slightly more likely to say that they have no party identity, and are more likely to say that they would not vote (or don't know) in an EU referendum. The results are very similar for Scotland and Wales, with the only difference seeming to be that the included are slightly more pro-Remain in Wales, but they are slightly more pro-Leave in Scotland. Thus, the lack of large substantive differences between those who were included and those who were excluded means that the attrition should have a limited effect on the interpretability of my results.

A3.2. Does including identity centrality measures reduce measurement error in the categorisation?

Here, I examine whether identity centrality measures reduce measurement error. Identity centrality measures are only present in wave 20 of the BESIP, so I compare data for wave 17 (November 2019), 20 (June 2020), and 21 (May 2021) in Scotland (data not available for Wales). To include these measures, I moved those who reported a strong or moderate dual identity but considered 'being Scottish' central into to the autonomist category in waves 17, 20, and 21. Those who reported strong or moderate dual identity but considered 'being British' central were moved to the statist category in the same waves. Those who considered both (or neither) central remained where they were originally.

As a result, measurement error decreases in every category that is altered (Table A9). The decrease is most prominent in the autonomist category, which is now similar to both the statist and secessionist category in its stability over time. Error is much lower within the moderate dual category, but both remain slightly less stable over time than the three nationalist categories. Consequently, these results suggest that secessionist, statist, and autonomist sentiment are very stable over time (albeit measured with varying degrees of error).

Table A29: Tetrachoric correlations between categorisation in waves 17 and 20 and in waves 17 and 21 in Scotland with and without identity centrality

	Without identity centrality			With identity centrality		
	Previous correlation	Predicted correlation	Actual correlation	Previous correlation	Predicted correlation	Actual correlation
	W17 and W20	W17 and W21	W17 and W21	W17 and W20	W17 and W21	W17 and W21
Secessionist	0.965	0.922	0.961	0.965	0.922	0.961
Autonomist	0.778	0.624	0.823	0.912	0.819	0.918
Strong dual identifier	0.787	0.663	0.802	0.805	0.676	0.775
Moderate dual identifier	0.693	0.491	0.744	0.821	0.678	0.804
Statist	0.887	0.783	0.903	0.956	0.917	0.969

One issue here is that I have assumed that identity centrality is fixed over time, which may not be the case. While very few surveys contain identity centrality measures, this has started to change. In recent years, these measures have been included in wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel, the 2021 Welsh Election Study, and the 2021 Scottish Election Study. In each survey, respondents were asked to indicate the three most important facets of their self-description from a select list. The presence of these measures in the first two datasets provides an opportunity for some (limited) comparisons.

To do this, I combined the 2016 WES, which contains BES respondent ID codes, with the 2021 WES. I then merged this file with wave 20 of the BESIP. Overall, this gave me a total number of 340 respondents in Wales who had answered this question in both surveys. Unfortunately, the question wordings, number of options, and option labels change across both surveys, which does complicate the comparisons. As a result, I only compare those categories where the response options were identical (Table A10). I recode the variables so that 1 corresponds to "did select identity" and 0 corresponds to "did not select this identity." Don't knows are excluded, leaving a sample of 307.

Table A30: Correlations between identity centrality responses and identity scales between wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel and the 2021 Welsh Election Study

	Tetrachoric correlation		Spearman's rho
Being British	0.707	Britishness (N: 334)	0.646
Being Welsh	0.889	Welshness (N: 332)	0.898
Being a parent	0.816		
Being a spouse/partner	0.681		
Your religion	0.922		
Your sexuality	0.846		
N: 307			

Overall, correlations between the two responses are strong, but these results indicate that not all respondents give the same response in the BES in 2020 that they then gave in the WES in 2021. Responses differ the most between the 'being British' and the 'being a spouse/partner' categories, and the correlations are strongest within the religion and 'being Welsh' categories. These results are similar to the correlations between the Welsh and British identity scales present in the BES and the WES (non-responses excluded and normalised between 0 and 1), which suggests that centrality may be no more stable than strength. It is not possible to tell here whether the differences are due to change or measurement error, and the results are based on a small subsample, but they do suggest taking caution in interpreting the stability of identity centrality.

A3.3. Further details on the latent growth model specification

It is important to note the specific distance between waves because in order to generate the growth curve, researchers need to specify the loadings for both the intercept and the slope. The intercept is fixed at zero when estimating a latent growth model with ordinal observed variables (Masyn et al. 2014); while the slope factor is fixed at zero for the first period of measurement in order to centre the analysis on this point (Grimm and Liu 2016). If the time between waves was equal, it is possible to specify a linear growth model by fixing the slope factor loadings for the 6 waves as 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. As this is not the case for the BESIP, I fixed the slope loadings as 0, 2, 12, 26, 28, and 38 to reflect the number of months in between waves.

One requirement when using ordinal observed variables is that Mplus requires using the theta parameterisation, which fixes the residual variance of the first measurement variable to one. The theta approach is the "standard probit model specification" (Lee et al. 2018 p302). It has no effect on the fit of the model and the alternative (delta) parameterisation, which sets the scale factors to 1 at all occasions, is unsuitable for longitudinal data (Grimm and Liu 2016). Consequently, I take a probit regression approach and use the theta parameterisation.

In addition, researchers must select an estimation technique. Maximum likelihood (ML) approaches can produce estimates with low standard errors (Edwards 2010), but this approach was designed for continuous outcome variables. Mplus includes an alternative in weighted least squares means and variances (WLSMV). Salari et al. (2017) show that WLS methods produce better fit statistics than ML methods when using categorical variables with a low number of categories (e.g. three categories) over few time-points (e.g. four time-points). As my data has four categories and five/six time-points, I choose the WLSMV estimator.[130] For a more extensive discussion of these estimation techniques see Grimm and Liu (2016), Salari et al. (2017) and Holtmann et al. (2016).

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[130] Bayesian estimation is an alternative, but Holtmann et al (2016) show that Bayesian estimation only outperforms WLSMV when the former includes strongly informative priors, which can themselves severely bias the results of the model if they are inaccurate.

A3.4. Effects of time invariant and time variant lagged covariates in latent growth models

Table A31: Probit coefficients of covariates in Scotland (N: 900)

Time-invariant covariates		S Coef. (SE)				
	Female	-0.005				
	Year of birth	0.047				

Time-variant covariates		W3 on W1 Coef. (SE)	W4 on W3 Coef. (SE)	W7 on W4 Coef. (SE)	W9 on W7 Coef. (SE)	W11 on W9 Coef. (SE)
	Left education before 20 or still studying	.	.	.	.	.
	Left education aged over 20	0.607 (0.570)	-0.302 (0.563)	0.231 (0.582)	-1.528 (0.823)	1.840* (0.879)
	Social grade A, B, or C	.	.	.	.	.
	Social grade D or E	0.137 (0.964)	0.411 (0.830)	-0.603 (0.441)	-0.434 (0.397)	0.758 (0.613)
	Leave vote intention	.	.	.	.	.
	Remain vote intention	-1.243** (0.453)	0.318 (0.445)	-0.051 (0.477)	-0.082 (0.837)	-1.311*** (0.377)
	Not vote or don't know EU ref vote intention	-0.669 (0.502)	-0.267 (0.511)	0.474 (0.532)	-0.725 (0.566)	.
	No party identity	.	.	.	.	.
	Conservative identity	-0.255 (0.718)	0.212 (0.807)	-0.658 (0.769)	0.523 (0.847)	0.351 (0.671)
	Labour identity	-0.404 (0.674)	0.391 (0.730)	-1.602* (0.739)	1.153 (0.126)	-0.441 (0.604)
	SNP identity	-0.799 (0.694)	-1.514 (0.775)	-2.088** (0.749)	0.200 (0.741)	-2.851**** (0.634)
	Other party identity	0.324 (0.621)	-0.170 (0.620)	-0.779 (0.660)	0.327 (0.650)	0.088 (0.534)

* = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.005 **** = p<0.001

Table A32: Probit coefficients of covariates in Wales (N: 763)

Time-invariant covariates		S			
		Coef. (SE)			
	Female	0.016*			
	Year of birth	0.139****			
Time-variant covariates		W3 on W1	W4 on W3	W7 on W4	W11 on W7
		Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)	Coef. (SE)
	Left education before 20 or still studying	.	.	.	.
	Left education aged over 20	0.969 (0.824)	0.652 (0.726)	0.136 (0.944)	0.015 (0.546)
	Social grade A, B, or C	.	.	.	.
	Social grade D or E	-0.956 (0.713)	-0.114 (0.859)	0.409 (0.492)	0.478 (0.427)
	Leave vote intention	.	.	.	.
	Remain vote intention	-0.117 (0.523)	-0.374 (0.664)	0.397 (0.506)	-0.451 (0.385)
	Not vote or don't know EU ref vote intention	0.152 (0.511)	-0.464 (0.651)	0.351 (0.638)	-1.069 (0.564)
	No party identity	.	.	.	.
	Conservative identity	1.267 (0.748)	-1.037 (0.857)	0.978 (0.819)	-0.157 (0.762)
	Labour identity	0.719 (0.600)	-1.601* (0.786)	0.119 (0.765)	-0.638 (0.638)
	Plaid Cymru identity	-0.069 (0.670)	-2.498*** (0.758)	-0.855 (0.907)	-1.553 (0.921)
	Other party identity	1.125* (0.531)	-1.050 (0.644)	1.227 (0.724)	-0.353 (0.645)

* = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.005 **** = p<0.001

Table A33: Slope coefficients and thresholds for each individual model in Scotland

	S (SE)	Threshold
Secessionist	-0.028 (0.045)	3.048
Autonomist	-0.005 (0.029)	2.115
Strong Dual	0.000 (0.018)	3.440
Moderate Dual	0.006 (0.015)	2.022
Statist	0.009 (0.017)	0.863
Britishness	0.004 (0.004)	-
Scottishness	-0.002 (0.003)	-
Independence	-0.207 (0.817)	6.962

$* = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.005 **** = p<0.001$

Table A34: Slope coefficients and thresholds for each individual model in Wales

	S (SE)	Threshold
Secessionist	-0.039 (0.055)	2.722
Autonomist	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.403
Strong Dual	0.045 (0.022)	3.058
Moderate Dual$_a$	.	.
Statist	-0.007 (0.022)	4.642
Britishness	-0.002 (0.004)	-
Welshness	0.008* (0.004)	-
Independence	-0.079 (0.817)	4.271

$* = p<0.05 ** = p<0.01 *** = p<0.005 **** = p<0.001$

$_a$Standard errors of model parameter estimates could not be computed for the moderate dual model, so the model was not identified.

Appendix 4

Table A35: National Identity Questions

State	Organisation	Question	Lower Value	Upper Value
Belgium	MEDW	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
		Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means very weakly and 10 very strongly, how the following identities apply to you?	0: Very weakly	10: Very strongly
Canada	MEDW	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
Spain	CIS	All people feel more or less bound to the land in which we live but some of us are more tied to one of our areas than to others. To what extent do you feel identified with the [x] where you live? To answer use a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means that you feel "not identified" and 10 that you feel "very identified"	0: Not identified	10: Very identified
	MEDW	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
United Kingdom	BESIP	Where would you place yourself on these scales?	1: Not at all	7: Very strongly

Table A36: Constitutional Preference Questions and Recoding

State	Organisation	Question	Responses	Recoding Note: Values not mentioned coded as missing
Belgium	MEDW	Many people talk about the future of Belgium. Please rank the following four scenarios in order of preference (1 to 4)	1: A united Belgium 2: An independent Wallonia, an independent Flanders, and an independent Brussels-capital region 3: An independent Wallonia and an independent Flanders including the Brussels-capital region 4: An independent Wallonia including the Brussels-capital region, and an independent Flanders 9: Don't know	1: Ranked any independence option first. 0: Ranked 'A united Belgium' first
Canada	MEDW	If a referendum was held today that would ask if you want Québec to become independent, would you vote 'Yes' or would you vote 'No'?	1: Yes 2: No 9: Don't know	1: Yes 0: No
Spain	CIS	I am not going to present you with some alternative formulas for state organisation in Spain. Please tell me which one you agree more with?	1: A state with a single Central Government without autonomies 2: A state in which the Autonomous Communities have less autonomy than at present 3: A state with autonomous communities as in the present 4: A state in which the autonomous communities have greater autonomy than at present 5: A state in which autonomous communities are recognised as having the possibility of becoming independent states 8: N.S 9: N.C	1: A state in which autonomous communities are recognised as having the possibility of becoming independent states 0: Responses

	MEDW	As far as relations between Catalonia and Spain are concerned, do you think Catalonia should be a region of Spain, an autonomous community of Spain, a state within a federal Spain, or an independent state?	1: A region of Spain 2: An autonomous community in Spain 3: A state within a federal Spain 4: An independent state 9: Don't know	1: An independent state 0: Responses 1-3
	MEDW	And if a referendum was held today asking about Catalonia's independence, what would you do?	1: I'd vote for it 2: I'd vote against it 3: I wouldn't vote 9: I don't know	1: Vote for it 0: I'd vote against it
United Kingdom	BESIP W20	Which of these statements comes closest to your view?	1: [Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK and the European Union 2: [Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK but party of the European Union 3: [Nation] should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers 4: [Nation] should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers 5: [Nation] should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament 9999: Don't know	1: Responses 1 and 2 0: Responses 3-5
	BESIP W1-W4, W7 (England)	Some UK laws only affect England because some policies are decided in Scotland and Wales. How do you think laws that only affect England should be made?	1: By the UK Parliament, with all MPs having a vote 2: By the UK Parliament, but with only English MPs having a vote 3: By a new, separate parliament for England, but with England remaining part of the UK	1: Response 4 0: Responses 1-3

		4: By a new, separate parliament for England, and with England becoming independent from the rest of the UK 9999: Don't know	
BESIP W1-W4, W7, W9-W10, W14-W20 (Scotland)	As you may know, a referendum on independence will be held in Scotland on 18th September 2014. Voters will be asked, "Should Scotland be an independent country?" Do you think you will vote "Yes" or "No"? (W1-3) And how did you vote in the independence referendum? (W3) If there was another referendum on Scottish independence, how do you think you would vote? (W4 onwards)	Wave 1-3: 0: Will vote "No" 1: Will vote "Yes" 2: Will not vote Wave 3: 0: I voted "No" (Scotland should not be an independent country) 1: I voted "Yes" (Scotland should be an independent country) Wave 4 onwards 0: I would vote "Yes" (leave the UK) 1: I would vote "No" (Stay in the UK) 2: Would not vote 9999: Don't know	1: Response 1 0: Response 0
BESIP W1-W4, W7, W17 (Wales)			1: Response 5 0: Responses 1-4

Table A37: Size of categories in additional twelve territories

Territory	Type	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent	State Pro-Ind
Quebec	2012	28.48	13.13	18.07	17.07	17.57	5.51	0.16
Quebec	2015	25.33	10.09	23.25	14.11	21.28	5.12	0.82
Flanders	Attach	22.95	15.63	30.32	8.49	16.19	5.41	1.00
Flanders	Identity	20.87	11.70	24.28	10.09	27.09	3.01	2.96
Wallonia	Attach	3.07	11.34	26.59	21.67	30.03	6.08	1.23
Wallonia	Identity	2.27	4.60	13.86	20.24	51.85	4.14	3.04
Catalonia	Multiple 2014	33.75	17.64	19.60	5.72	13.87	8.91	0.52
Catalonia	Binary 2012	42.74	7.48	21.01	6.14	12.64	9.55	0.44
Catalonia	Multiple 2012	33.08	19.61	17.92	9.06	12.98	7.01	0.34
Catalonia	Binary	44.35	6.14	19.08	9.65	12.25	7.46	1.07
Basque	CIS	25.32	31.92	22.44	11.08	7.38	1.58	0.29
Galicia	CIS	2.43	28.85	33.15	26.56	5.25	3.50	0.26
Ext	CIS	0.50	19.21	20.19	41.84	17.25	0.77	0.25
Cyl	CIS	0.42	63.04	18.32	10.55	4.46	3.03	0.17
CVAL	CIS	1.59	14.49	14.75	29.08	34.45	4.75	0.88
CLM	CIS	0.24	7.60	22.59	32.62	34.44	2.51	0.00
Cat	CIS	32.87	19.65	16.34	14.23	13.06	2.82	1.03
Can	CIS	2.62	43.79	13.98	33.02	5.00	1.31	0.27
And	CIS	0.59	19.72	26.95	39.18	11.79	1.54	0.22

Table A38: Mean state identity in each category

		Secessionist		Autonomist		Moderate Dual		Statist		Indifferent
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean
Quebec	2012	0.26	0.24	0.57	0.22	0.72	0.14	0.93	0.09	0.1
Quebec	2015	0.37	0.26	0.59	0.2	0.72	0.15	0.9	0.13	0.15
Flanders	Identity	0.47	0.26	0.62	0.18	0.70	0.15	0.88	0.13	
Flanders	Attachment	0.50	0.26	0.67	0.16	0.71	0.14	0.88	0.12	0.17
Wallonia	Identity			0.62	0.23	0.71	0.15	0.94	0.11	0.11
Wallonia	Attachment	0.398	0.269	0.712	0.157	0.754	0.138	0.911	0.112	0.167
Cat 2014	Multiple	0.22	0.22	0.51	0.21	0.67	0.15	0.86	0.15	0.17
	Binary	0.25	0.24	0.60	0.18	0.67	0.15	0.86	0.15	0.17
Cat 2012	Multiple	0.28	0.26	0.52	0.23	0.67	0.15	0.84	0.16	0.13
	Binary	0.32	0.26	0.60	0.21	0.67	0.15	0.85	0.15	0.13
Basque Country		0.24	0.25	0.52	0.23	0.69	0.12			
Galicia				0.60	0.18	0.76	0.12			
Ext				0.67	0.20	0.78	0.13	0.92	0.12	
Cyl				0.55	0.21	0.70	0.14	0.71	0.13	0.07
CVAL				0.60	0.19	0.73	0.13	0.86	0.15	0.23
CLM				0.61	0.19	0.74	0.15	0.88	0.14	
Cat		0.29	0.25	0.52	0.19	0.71	0.14	0.87	0.16	0.18
Can				0.63	0.17	0.72	0.15	0.88	0.17	
And				0.65	0.18	0.75	0.12	0.87	0.13	

Table A39: Mean sub-state identity in each category

		Secessionist		Autonomist		Moderate Dual		Statist		Indifferent
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean
Quebec	2015	0.93	0.11	0.85	0.14	0.72	0.14	0.58	0.24	0.14
Quebec	2012	0.9	0.12	0.83	0.12	0.72	0.15	0.57	0.26	0.16
Flanders	Identity	0.89	0.11	0.84	0.12	0.7	0.15	0.46	0.27	
Flanders	Attachment	0.868	0.116	0.829	0.113	0.712	0.138	0.578	0.248	0.164
Wallonia	Identity			0.86	0.17	0.71	0.15	0.53	0.25	0.11
Wallonia	Attachment	0.759	0.165	0.853	0.135	0.754	0.138	0.659	0.193	0.159
Catalonia	2014 Multiple	0.919	0.106	0.791	0.148	0.671	0.153	0.493	0.26	0.18
Catalonia	2014 Binary									
Catalonia	2012 Multiple	0.926	0.118	0.864	0.134	0.668	0.148	0.458	0.277	0.139
Catalonia	2012 Binary	0.918	0.12	0.856	0.16	0.668	0.148	0.478	0.271	0.139
Basque		0.926	0.105	0.888	0.136	0.689	0.117			
Galicia				0.859	0.146	0.763	0.115			
Ext				0.867	0.135	0.78	0.128	0.68	0.198	
Cyl				0.9	0.134	0.696	0.137	0.501	0.215	0.154
CVAL				0.822	0.164	0.727	0.127	0.562	0.248	0.218
CLM				0.811	0.143	0.735	0.147	0.544	0.224	
Cat		0.932	0.111	0.87	0.145	0.711	0.141	0.516	0.25	0.247
Can				0.931	0.114	0.719	0.147			
And				0.865	0.128	0.753	0.121	0.65	0.216	

Table A40: Percentage of each category supporting different levels of autonomy in Spain

Galicia	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		33.62	18.31	14.44		
Less		25.67	28.67	33.18		
Equal		40.71	53.03	52.38		

Ext	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		40.34	20.56	22.91	26.63	
Less		22.08	28.13	28.19	41.08	
Equal		37.58	51.31	48.9	32.29	

Cyl	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		17.86	13.39	17.44	32.15	
Less		48.75	44.78	34.34	26.5	
Equal		33.38	41.83	48.22	41.35	

Cval	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		40.53	30.44	13.2	15.3	35.06
Less		28.39	39.48	50.92	48.61	41.68
Equal		31.08	30.08	35.87	36.1	23.26

CLM	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		13.63	26.37	15.06	18.9	
Less		20.4	39.84	37.39	54.39	
Equal		65.97	33.79	47.55	26.71	

Cat	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More	99.45	84.04	55.19	56.16	18.85	57.78
Less	0	1.38	10.92	10.91	34.39	13.3
Equal	0.55	14.58	33.89	32.93	46.76	28.92

Table A40: Continued

Can	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		38.77	34.02	31.96		
Less		20.8	33.91	23.45		
Equal		40.43	32.07	44.59		

And	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More		29.02	23.1	23.19	15.66	
Less		20.15	26.8	21.83	42.61	
Equal		50.83	50.1	54.98	41.73	

PV	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
More	95.43	63.21	15.26	26.54	16.56	0
Less	0	1.43	1.31	6.98	19.33	24.1
Equal	4.57	35.37	83.43	66.47	64.11	75.9

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Table A41: Mean levels of support for decentralisation in 10 territories

		Secessionist		Autonomist		Moderate Dual		Strong Dual		Statist		Indifferent	
Wallonia	Identity			4.15	1.87	4.67	2.46	2.24	2.52	4	2.4	3.81	2.95
	Attachment			4.2	2.46	4.51	2.37	4.49	2.42	3.62	2.35	3.28	2.61
		Secessionist		Autonomist		Moderate Dual		Strong Dual		Statist		Indifferent	
Flanders	Attachment	7.37	2.74	5.47	2.12	5.33	1.54	4.63	2.73	4.31	2.08	3.93	2.78
	Identity	7.29	2.86	5.6	2.25	5.52	1.71	5.23	2.73	4.47	1.96		
Basque		9.06	1.55	7.39	1.46	5.41	1.54	5.96	1.51				
Galicia				5.23	2.23	4.47	1.96	4.47	2.17				
Ext				4.9	2.52	4.33	2.7	4.08	2.43	3.18	2.37		
Cval				4.98	2.23	4.46	2.75	3.67	2.46	3.69	2.58	4.9	3.03
CLM						4.15	2.38	3.79	2.54	3.51	2.34		
Cat		8.87	1.62	7.23	2.12	5.77	2.23	5.67	2.56	4.18	2.45	7.02	2.51
Can				4.55	2.73	4.16	2.73	3.56	2.26				
And				4.9	2.15	4.75	2.13	4.56	2.61	3.85	2.66		

Table A42: Levels of self-reported nationalism across 4 territories

Sub-State		Secessionist		Autonomist		Moderate Dual		Strong Dual		Statist		Indifferent	
Cat 2012	Multiple	8.66	1.65	6.26	2.28	3.94	2.48	4.35	3.13	1.54	2.4	2.61	2.74
Cat 2012	Binary	8.36	1.82	5.06	2.28	3.94	2.48	4.35	3.13	1.06	1.61	2.61	2.74
Flanders	Identity	7.86	1.91	6.23	2.14	5.36	2.15	5.92	2.87	2.54	2.42		
Flanders	Attachment	7.87	1.89	5.68	2.39	4.46	2.39	4.83	2.98	2.42	2.59	3.93	3.24
Wallonia	Identity			6.51	2.65	5.39	2.38	6.1	3.13	4.01	2.56	1.62	2.78
Wallonia	Attachment			6.08	2.74	4.89	2.44	5.38	3.11	3.68	2.55	3.34	3.39
Galicia	CIS			4.93	2.59	4.3	2.17	4.23	2.51				

State		Secessionist		Autonomist		Moderate Dual		Strong Dual		Statist		Indifferent	
Cat 2012	Multiple	1.25	1.75	2.95	1.98	4.6	2.4	5.02	2.78	6.21	3.16	2.97	2.88
Cat 2012	Binary	1.58	1.84	3.39	2.04	4.6	2.4	5.02	2.78	6.3	3.24	2.97	2.88

Table A43: Demographic characteristics of each category

Sub-state	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
Basque						
N	92	123	103	42	29	
Age	45.07	48.88	47.94	55.2		
Female	46.79	54.19	49.34	53.86		
F.P.	26.08	18.29	22.05	21.64		
Medios universitarios	7.74	6.23	3.91	12.9		
Superiores	23.99	20.78	15.47	12.9		
Under 2000	4.43	7.13	8.5	2.58		
100-400	34.67	33.53	48.37	16.75		
Catholic	33.39	69.98	66.57	74.39		
Other	2.29	0	3.24	0		
None	64.32	30.02	30.19	25.61		
Catalonia						
N	388	227	191	165	150	33
Age	44.98	48.98	45.27	53.31	46.16	40.24
Female	47.36	52.43	49.75	48.87	60.51	45.95
F.P.	25.27	22.34	18.35	18.42	17.62	21.89
Medios universitarios	10.91	10.65	8.67	2.47	8.59	3.12
Superiores	18	10.79	7.22	3.92	11.51	23.96
under 2000	7.26	5.2	5.17	2.27	0.45	8.26
100-400	13.16	21.02	20.75	28.22	23.93	18.81
1m+	25.36	23.47	16.28	21.19	25.81	18.87
Catholic	50.16	62.75	66.85	75.52	75.39	26.99
Other	2.34	3.2	2.77	5.76	3.45	3.14
None	47.5	34.05	30.38	18.71	21.17	69.87
And						
N	8	268	367	536	160	21
Age		42.84	44.41	49.54	43.56	
Female		37.49	47.78	49.06	56.11	
F.P.		16.68	15.31	14.46	15.54	
Medios universitarios		7.84	6.04	6.14	11.24	
Superiores		6.37	10.28	3.51	21.32	
under 2000		3	3.28	4.99	1.88	
100-400		16.78	21.76	24.49	16.63	
400-1m		29.74	8.5	8.65	23.33	
Catholic		73.55	78.97	86.55	74.22	
Other		0.75	2.2	2.65	1.26	
None		25.7	18.84	10.8	24.52	

Table A43: Continued

Canaries						
N	10	166	53	125	12	5
Age		42.69	44.23	50.51		
Female		48.75	52.8	54.42		
F.P.		17.94	19.15	20.15		
Medios universitarios		7.29	22.53	4.05		
Superiores		6.15	3.67	4.71		
under 2000		6.02	11.12	9.71		
100-400		52.61	47.59	47.22		
Catholic		87.14	86.59	88.86		
Other		0.59	1.87	1.61		
None		12.27	11.54	9.53		
CLM						
N	2	38	112	147	167	11
Age		42.81	45.67	52.96	43.35	
Female		38.37	55.42	56.52	46.33	
F.P.		22.91	16.43	10.05	17.82	
Medios universitarios		8.25	3.11	4.59	10.1	
Superiores		8.25	8.36	5.78	15.19	
under 2000		25.15	12.94	19.31	11.32	
100-400		11.09	17.72	1.94	7.34	
Catholic		83.06	81.68	90.15	76.93	
Other		0	0.94	2.24	3.35	
None		16.94	17.38	7.61	19.72	
Val						
N	12	109	111	219	262	36
Age		43.49	45.54	52.7	45.27	40.73
Female		50.39	48.62	51.64	49.22	52.96
F.P.		17.5	10.86	15.58	11.79	24.94
Medios universitarios		4.54	5.47	7.64	7.65	16.71
Superiores		14.6	16.32	5.44	8.93	17.04
under 2000		3.52	5.47	6.84	2.95	5.35
100-400		15.32	5.08	19.83	16.57	13.24
400-1m		19.53	24.67	15.29	11.34	31.24
Catholic		74.67	71.05	86.67	76.24	45.14
Other		2.81	4.57	1.81	3.15	0
None		22.52	24.39	11.52	20.61	54.86

Table A43: Continued

CYL

N	4	505	135	87	32	31
Age		51.53	43.94	46.92	38.78	40.17
Female		51.68	47.36	52.9	42.82	19.12
F.P.		18.05	15.49	16.84	25.61	23.7
Medios universitarios		10.84	6.91	5.62	6.2	9.12
Superiores		7.93	13.92	6.71	31.19	8.5
under 2000		26.28	21.66	32.76	11.34	21.41
100-400		29.8	30.62	41.26	49.13	24.96
Catholic		82.25	79.12	73.93	47.88	68.98
Other		1.39	2.11	4.46	0	0
None		16.35	18.77	21.61	52.12	31.02

EXT

N	2	76	80	165	68	3
Age		46.65	44.99	52.69	41.77	
Female		44.73	42.52	58.18	48.47	
F.P.		14.36	11.24	9.62	7.34	
Medios universitarios		9.24	2.52	6.64	16.14	
Superiores		8.01	14.97	5.39	8.84	
Under 2000s		29	15.07	20.76	16.34	
100-400		5.22	18.62	17.37	7.27	
Catholic		71.87	82.45	87.82	80.58	
Other		2.72	0	1.22	0	
None		25.41	17.55	10.96	19.42	

Galicia

N	14	171	178	150	29	19
Age		46.62	52	54.57		
Female		53.59	50.07	56.59		
F.P.		17.2	10.85	18.4		
Medios universitarios		15.81	6.11	8.65		
Superiores		13.11	10.14	7.62		
Under 2000		9.23	2.5	7.46		
100-400		18.43	23.14	30.27		
Catholic		74.81	90.8	89.04		
Other		0	1.02	0.77		
None		25.19	8.18	10.19		

Table A43: Continued

Quebec 2012						
N	283	128	152	137	161	31
Age	48.41	48.03	47.2	48.5	43.52	37.89
Female	48.23	59.95	49.14	44.89	51.31	55.38
Some university	7.35	6.33	4.32	7.48	11.86	18.95
Bachelor's	14.1	12.19	11.16	10.59	25.24	1.25
Masters	5.64	6.03	4.9	4.74	10.17	10.45
Doctorate	0.51	2.21	1.14	1.3	0.5	2.06
Big city	32.91	27.64	39.73	33.99	32.73	47.38
Village	5.95	7.38	6.92	5.68	9.17	2.15
Countryside	4.04	6.59	6.75	12.39	5.7	5.09
Christian Other	7.31	8.37	9.36	20.56	22.09	15.15
Catholic	61.22	69.58	59.8	63.06	42.99	43.2
Other	0.8	0.87	2.82	2.32	8.07	16.66
None	30.67	21.18	28.01	14.06	26.85	24.99
Quebec 2015						
N	451	173	369	257	349	62
Age	48.28	42.96	46.23	55.34	44.7	40.94
Female	52.07	59.28	57.01	55.48	43.29	46.27
Some university	6.06	5.98	7.52	8.85	8.03	6.88
Bachelor's	13.85	14.64	13.77	12.78	20.49	7.21
Masters	5.51	4.47	3.72	5.75	9.85	9.29
Doctorate	0.72	2.66	1.52	2.19	1.65	0
Big city	25.59	22.93	35.41	36.97	35.82	34.48
Village	9.36	15.42	7.15	4.8	3.88	3.63
Countryside	11.2	4.71	8.44	5.99	5.29	7.55
Christian Other	7.15	6.82	15.6	10.18	19.85	13.51
Catholic	59.2	62.55	63.89	63.15	43.62	51.14
Other	0.96	2.19	4.99	7.44	11.31	0.52
None	32.69	28.44	15.53	19.22	25.23	34.84
Flanders Attach						
N	218	141	267	69	151	50
Age	50.24	46.46	45.91	52.7	47.47	41.14
Female	41.13	49.26	52.48	59.49	52.62	56
Etudes supérieures 1	28.43	23.8	27.31	10.66	26.29	21.79
Etudes supérieures 2	10.96	8.39	10.21	6.31	18.93	5.66
Doctorat	3.74	2.37	0.37	2.14	1.29	3.17
Big city	18.53	18.38	13.55	24.42	17	27.63
Village	16.59	17.91	19.57	19.86	15.95	12.76
Christian Other	13.33	26	22.82	15.35	15.87	18.08
Catholic	54.05	44.35	36.33	49.24	33.19	26.48
Other	3.99	4.03	2.42	0	6.12	9.96
None	28.64	25.62	38.44	35.41	44.83	45.48

Table A43: Continued

Flanders ID					
N	199	107	215	81	248
Age	49.97	44.04	46.62	48.69	47.68
Female	39.89	38.74	51.15	67.56	54.74
Etudes supérieures 1	28.96	26.73	22.24	13.76	27.35
Etudes supérieures 2	12.43	13.05	6.99	1.37	15.47
Doctorat	4.65	2.14	0.73	2.19	1.46
Big city	19.63	14.45	15.51	17.28	19.63
Village	16.95	17.66	17.75	16.39	21.04
Christian Other	12.65	18.45	21.09	22.51	20.99
Catholic	53.46	47.85	44.37	46	33.19
Other	3.95	3.27	2.29	0.88	4.72
None	29.93	30.43	32.25	30.61	41.1

Wallonia Attach						
N	36	101	243	197	299	56
Age	48.3	47.4	47.45	49.83	47.07	47.39
Female	64.04	61.05	62.69	57.68	46.96	52.05
Etudes supérieures 1	28.92	28.41	25.38	25.39	26.66	16.55
Etudes supérieures 2	4.37	12.03	9.64	6.44	19.15	9.36
Doctorat	2.86	0.69	2.3	1.51	2.68	2.35
Big city	7.25	15.7	9.56	11.06	13.14	14.25
Village	25.61	30.5	36.8	27.88	26.39	25.66
Countryside	26.1	7.36	9.05	15.87	10.9	15.54
Christian Other	4.93	5.83	9.06	11.14	5.91	9.16
Catholic	39.8	39.7	48.67	50.85	51.07	37.98
Other	10.46	0.71	2.95	0.51	2.08	4.68
None	44.8	53.77	39.33	37.5	40.94	48.19

Wallonia ID						
N	27	39	134	174	498	39
Age		46.37	44.67	46.58	49.02	40.08
Female		49.62	66.94	65.84	52.07	52.04
Etudes supérieures 1		22.37	30.51	23.02	27.6	23.97
Etudes supérieures 2		21.73	4.94	4.63	15.74	11.19
Doctorat		1.72	0.6	0.28	2.89	6.51
Big city		11.72	15.18	16.76	11.29	7.09
Village		38.59	33.74	23.24	29.96	23.9
Countryside		7.36	9.18	15.25	11.5	0.79
Christian Other		7.27	6.08	11.85	6.96	12.59
Catholic		32.5	46.12	47.64	51.1	48.2
Other		1.72	3.14	0.56	2.35	2.78
None		58.51	44.65	39.96	39.6	36.42

Table A43: Continued

Catalonia 2012						
N	374	187	160	72	103	57
Age	46.46	46.36	44.18	46.94	41.94	39.71
Female	48.07	53.18	57.95	69.5	44.53	43.77
Some college or university	44.93	45.69	46.96	30.87	44.92	49.26
Graduate 2-year	23.71	27.75	29.08	28.51	20.02	12.93
Graduate 4-year	11.93	8.87	8.68	12.45	8.86	5.33
Advanced degree	6.55	5.67	3.6	1.6	7.65	9.32
Big city	35.41	43.04	43.42	47.28	45.89	41.57
Village	29.56	26.03	23.65	21.05	14.7	29.74
Countryside	2.03	0.96	0	0	0	4.85
Catholic	44.11	50.24	56.82	47.34	52.15	28.75
Other	2.05	3.94	4	9.19	3.96	9.19
None	53.84	45.82	39.18	43.47	43.89	62.06
Catalonia Ind 2012						
N	458	56	160	72	93	57
Age	46.24	48.96	44.18	46.94	42.32	39.71
Female	46.97	59.96	57.95	69.5	48.68	43.77
Some college or university	45.2	40.27	46.96	30.87	42.34	49.26
Graduate 2-year	25.03	26.28	29.08	28.51	23.69	12.93
Graduate 4-year	11.28	17.93	8.68	12.45	7.17	5.33
Advanced degree	5.67	6.07	3.6	1.6	8.63	9.32
Big city	37.98	42.51	43.42	47.28	47.33	41.57
Village	28.29	21.45	23.65	21.05	15.26	29.74
Countryside	2.1	0	0	0	0	4.85
Catholic	47.18	56.06	56.82	47.34	53.08	28.75
Other	1.93	5.48	4	9.19	0.95	9.19
None	50.89	38.46	39.18	43.47	45.97	62.06
Catalonia 2014						
N	376	167	165	47	109	68
Age	48.7	48.11	42.84	47.16	45.98	42.53
Female	54.26	52.65	55.03	50.98	49.57	61.67
Diploma	24.76	26.55	22.59	26.17	25.43	21.99
Licenciatura	28.27	25.33	24.19	6.74	28.82	26.8
Postgrad	7.49	11.09	7.47	3.36	3.95	11.77
Big city	35.54	55.67	39.9	38.94	46.81	51.73
Un pueblo	25.51	16.65	16.15	29.16	23.9	23.39
En el camp	2.72	0.47	2.39	3.61	0.78	0
Catholic	36.29	57.16	47.88	68.29	68.84	29.79
Other	1.73	1.58	7.95	3.72	4.71	4.4
None	61.97	41.26	44.17	27.99	26.44	65.82

Table A43: Continued

Catalonia Ind 2014						
N	446	53	165	47	96	68
Age	48.53	48.12	42.84	47.16	46.72	42.53
Female	53.12	53.42	55.03	50.98	47.17	61.67
Diploma	25.81	21.76	22.59	26.17	23.95	21.99
Licenciatura	26.74	26.65	24.19	6.74	33.37	26.8
Postgrad	8.71	8.16	7.47	3.36	5.18	11.77
Big city	36.78	58.87	39.9	38.94	50.23	51.73
Un pueblo	25.69	10.83	16.15	29.16	17.8	23.39
En el camp	2.51	0	2.39	3.61	0.92	0
Catholic	38.44	73.28	47.88	68.29	73.83	29.79
Other	1.12	0.53	7.95	3.72	3.82	4.4
None	60.44	26.19	44.17	27.99	22.34	65.82

Table A44: Territorial party coding

State	Election	Territorial Parties	Source
Flanders	Federal and Regional	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	Federal and Regional	Vlaams Belang	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Wallonia	Federal and Regional	Front Democratique des Francophones	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Quebec	Federal	Bloc Québécois	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	Provincial	Parti Québécois	Massetti and Schakel (2016) and Belanger and Pedersen (2014)
	Provincial	Qubec Solidaire	Massetti and Schakel (2016) and Belanger and Pedersen (2014)
	Provincial	Option Nationale	Belanger and Pedersen (2014)
Basque Country	General	Amaiur (coalition of EA, Alternatiba, Aralar, and independents)	Massetti and Schakel (2016) and Gomez Fortes and Cabeza Perez (2013)
	General	PNV	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	Autonomous Community	Partido Nacionalista Vasco	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	Autonomous Community	Aralar	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	Autonomous Community	Eusko Alkartasuna	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Canary Islands	General and Autonomous Community	Coalicion Canaria	Massetti and Schakel (2016) and Tunon (2010)
	Autonomous Community	Nueva Canarias	Tunon (2010)
Catalonia	General and Autonomous Community	Convergencia i Unio	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	General and Autonomous Community	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
		Solidaritat Catalana per la Independencia	Rico and Lineira (2014)
Galicia	General and Autonomous Community	Bloque Nacionalista Gallego	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Valencia	General and Autonomous Community	Coalició Compromís	Simón (2021)
Scotland	General and Scottish	Scottish National Party Scottish Greens	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Wales	General and Welsh	Plaid Cymru	Massetti and Schakel (2016)

Table A45: Percentage vote for parties across Quebec and Flanders

Quebec	2015	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
Conservative Party of Canada		5.85	11.79	20.33	23.06	25.08	23.66
New Democratic Party of Canada		26.61	38.71	25.34	22.85	18.64	29.48
Liberal Party of Canada		10.48	27.13	45.09	44.95	53.42	36.37
Bloc Québécois		54.31	19.63	6.88	7.46	0.24	7.67
Green Party of Canada		1.16	2.73	1.78	1.04	2.62	2.82
Other Party		1.59	0	0.58	0.64	0	0

Quebec 2012	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
Quebec Liberal Party	2.19	16.2	40.15	61.59	63.54	20.1
Parti Québécois	74.28	23.95	14.04	5.15	0	29.66
Quebec Solidaire	10.65	6.75	7.12	2.93	1.23	10.77
Coalition avenir Quebec	9.02	50.06	32.58	27.33	32.98	13.53
Option nationale	3.67	2.76	3.21	0	0	0
Green Party of Quebec	0.19	0.28	0.78	0.24	1.69	25.92

Flanders Identity - Federal Election	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
N-VA	73.86	38.28	24.44	28.14	9.02	
CDandV	7.22	13.82	25.22	25.64	23.58	
Open VLD	5.48	12.39	15.08	8.24	24.29	
SP.A	2.25	15.71	16.8	17.1	23.59	
VB	5.82	9.12	3.08	8.54	0.42	
Groen	1.08	4.99	9.28	6.01	10.61	
LDD	1.76	0	1.22	0	0.59	
PVDA+	2.04	5.69	4.47	2.54	3.71	
Pirates	0.48	0	0	0	1.14	
Lijst Dedecker	0	0	0.41	0	0	
Other	0	0	0	3.79	0.34	
FDF	0	0	0	0	2.22	
ROSSEM	0	0	0	0	0.5	

Table A45: Continued

Flanders Attachment - Federal Election	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
N-VA	71.55	31.26	22.4	21.42	3.84	
CDandV	8.12	18.11	26.4	18.38	24.08	
Open VLD	4.41	14	14.54	26.36	24.79	
SP.A	3.37	15.8	20.56	11.04	26.07	
VB	7.14	3.55	2.97	3.22	13.57	
Groen	1.59	7.47	7.44	10.67	4.15	
LDD	1.57	0	1.3	0	0	
PVDA+	1.82	7.54	2.75	5.08	4.15	
Pirates	0.43	0	0.4	3.83	0	
Lijst Dedecker	0	0	0.34	0	0	
Other	0	2.28	0	0	0.56	
FDF	0	0	0.89	0	2.12	
ROSSEM	0	0	0	0	0.81	

Table A46: Percentage party support in the remaining territories

Sub-state	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
Basque						
PP	0.1	0.55	1.59	1.42		
EH Bildu	5.53	2.91	0.92	0.91		
EAJ/PNV	4.71	5.12	1.69	3.14		
Catalonia						
PP	0.15	0.67	1.32	1.92	2.71	0.45
CiU	5.03	4.61	2.66	3.24	1.32	1.84
ERC	5.06	3.04	1.12	1.5	0.52	1.81
And						
PP		2.13	3	2.94	3.91	
Canaries						
PP		3.2	4.54	4.27		
CC		3.5	2.55	3.27		
NC		2.26	1.97	2.6		
CLM						
PP		3.03	3.38	4.12	3.15	
Val						
PP		2.97	2.68	4.43	3.46	0.78
CompBloc		3.52	2.13	0.94	1.72	3.21
CYL						
PP		4.4	3.9	4.97		
UPL		0.88	1.11	1.52		
EXT						
PP		3.43	3.48	4.06	4.54	
Galicia						
PP		3.05	4.09	4.92		
BNG		2.77	2.2	1.78		

Table A46: Continued

Quebec 2012						
Lib	1.29	3.61	4.71	5.99	6.1	2.05
PQ	7.65	4.27	2.8	2.75	1.05	2.05
QS	5.89	4.07	3.3	2.21	1.52	2.45
CaQ	3.74	6.39	5.04	6.09	4.48	2.09
ON	5.05	3.2	2.8	1.81	1.13	
Quebec 2015						
Con	2.14	3.44	4.2	4.62	4.44	2.56
NDP	5.19	6.33	5.7	5.76	5.66	3.58
Lib	3.48	5.28	5.35	6.04	6.28	3.06
BQ	7.4	4.8	3.67	2.49	1.57	2.7
Flanders Attach						
VB	4.38	3.06	2.55	2.5	0.92	2.45
NVA	7.92	5.35	4.25	3.95	1.74	2.98
Flanders ID						
VB	4.28	3.3	2.77	3.43	1.25	
NVA	7.96	5.54	4.6	4.69	2.47	
Wallonia Attach						
MR	3.47	5.32	5.25	5.84	4.65	2.8
FDF	4.03	4.15	4.06	3.26	3.58	3.14
PP	3.09	2.77	2.53	2.13	1.94	2.27
Wallonia ID						
MR		5.68	4.73	5.37	5.16	3.14
FDF		3.69	3.72	3.32	3.79	2.95
PP		1.35	2.99	2.17	2.23	1.97
Catalonia 2012						
PP	0.39	1.04	2.68	2.83	4.05	0.77
CiU	6.61	4.72	2.81	3.04	2.07	1.64
ERC	6.89	4.41	2.4	2.22	1.15	1.93
Catalonia Ind 2012						
PP	0.55	0.83	2.68	2.83	4.6	0.77
CiU	6.49	3.13	2.81	3.04	1.76	1.64
ERC	6.66	2.88	2.4	2.22	0.96	1.93

Table A46: Continued

Catalonia 2014						
PP	0.31	1.26	2.47	1.74	4.01	0.65
CiU	5.92	4.29	2.99	2.94	1.59	1.56
ERC	7.33	4.6	2.74	1.93	0.93	1.66
Catalonia Ind 2014						
PP	0.34	1.79	2.47	1.74	4.45	0.65
CiU	5.76	4.41	2.99	2.94	1.64	1.56
ERC	7.12	4.19	2.74	1.93	0.94	1.66

Table A47: Aggregate-level characteristics of sub-state territories

		Geographic		Economic			Cultural		
		Proportion of State	Geographic Distance	GDP per capita	GDP relative to state	GDP proportion of state	Linguistic Difference	Religious Difference	Territorial Differentiation
			KM from State Capital to Sub-State Capital	€[131]	€	%	Index (0-3)	Index (0-3)	SD of RTI
	Flanders	0.57	1	36,400	500	58.26	3	0	0.39
	Quebec	0.23	378	32,564	-6561	19.06	3	1	0.37
	Basque Country	0.05	323	29,500	6900	6.09	3	0	0.37
	Catalonia	0.16	506	26,400	3800	18.79	3	0	0.41
	Scotland	0.08	534	33,200	-3300	7.54	1	0	0.51
	Wales	0.05	211	26,300	-10200	3.5	1	0	0.51
	Wallonia	0.32	54	26,200	-9700	23.35	3	0	0.31
	Andalusia	0.18	391	16,900	-5700	13.42	0	0	0.16
	Canary Islands	0.04	1746	19,400	-3200	3.85	0	0	0.22
	Castile and Leon	0.05	162	21,400	-1200	5.13	1	0	0.26
	Castile-La Mancha	0.04	68	18,200	-4400	3.62	0	0	0.23
	Extremadura	0.02	281	15,400	-7200	1.61	0	0	0.16
	Galicia	0.06	487	19,800	-2800	5.19	3	0	0.20
	Valencian Community	0.11	303	19,600	-3000	9.3	3	0	0.25
	England	0.84	1	37,506	1006	85.94	0	0	0.26
Sources	Belgium	Statbel	RAI (Rokkan)	Eurostat			RAI (Rokkan) and European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages		MEDW
	Canada	Statistics Canada		Statistics Canada					MEDW
	Spain	INE		Eurostat					CIS
	United Kingdom	ONS		ONS					BESIP

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[131] Rounded to nearest whole €

Table A48: Percentage of manifesto devoted to positive mentions of decentralisation among the major state-wide parties in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

State	Election	Party name	Vote in election %	Positive mentions of decentralisation %
Canada	2015 Federal Election	New Democratic Party	19.71	5.468
		Liberal Party of Canada	39.47	4.447
		Conservative Party of Canada	31.90	1.101
Spain	2011 General Election	Partido Popular	45.24	0.784
		Partido Socialista Obrero Español	29.13	1.735
		Izquierda Unida	7.02	0.491
United Kingdom	2019 General Election	Conservative Party	43.59	2.206
		Labour Party	32.05	2.35
		Liberal Democrats	11.54	4.221

Note: 'Major' defined as the three state-wide parties with the highest percentage of votes in the relevant election, found in the CMP. Belgium's political system divides between the two sub-state territories, which means that there are no state-wide parties, and that the central government is composed of sub-state political parties

Table A49: Percentage of manifesto devoted to positive mentions of decentralisation among the sub-state parties in Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

State	Election	Party name	Vote in election %	Positive mentions of decentralisation %
Canada	2015 Federal Election	Bloc Québécois	4.66	25.532
Spain	2011 General Election	Izquierda Unida	7.02	0.491
		Geroa Bai	0.18	16.841
		Amaiur	1.39	43.103
		Coalició Compromis	0.52	1.427
		Convergència i Unió	4.24	18.754
		Foru Asturies	0.41	0.592
		Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea/ Partido Nacionalista Vasco	1.35	16.279
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	1.07	14.714
		Coalición Canaria	0.6	19.246
		Bloque Nacionalista Galego	0.77	14.009
United Kingdom	2019 General Election	Plaid Cymru	0.48	7.15
		Scottish National Party	3.88	5.322

A4.1. Do individuals see themselves as nationalists?

There is evidence of some sub-state advocates rejecting the label nationalism (see Moon 2016), even if they conform to the definition itself. The label 'nationalist' is sometimes treated as a negative (Billig 1995), which may influence the willingness of some people to self-define in these terms. I explore this through levels of self-reported levels of sub-state nationalism within each category. Such measures are present for Flanders, Wallonia, Galicia, and Catalonia (CIS and MEDW in 2012). Here, respondents were asked to indicate their level of sub-state nationalism on a scale from 'minimum nationalism' (0) to 'maximum nationalism' (10).[132] I display the mean results for each group in Figure 4. For brevity, I only present the 'identity' approach in Flanders and Wallonia.

Overall, sub-state nationalism is strongest among secessionists, as one may expect. Statists report far stronger levels of Spanish nationalism in Catalonia, which also supports their designation as state nationalists. In contrast, autonomists are less likely to report high levels of sub-state nationalism, and are not too dissimilar to strong and moderate identifiers (although their scores tend to be higher than statists and indifferent identifiers). These results are consistent with the rhetoric of Welsh Labour in Wales, who disavow the nationalist label due to the connotations that come with it (see Moon 2016). Thus, while these individuals may qualify as 'nationalists,' they may not be entirely supportive of that label themselves.

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[132] Similarly, Bavarian advocates avoid using the terms 'nation' or 'nationalism' due to their connotations to Nazism and instead use alternative terminology (heimat) when expressing arguably 'nationalist' sentiments (Hepburn 2008). Thus, the presence of negative connotations surrounding the label 'nationalist' may limit self-identification as a nationalist, which provides further support for taking a broader approach.

Figure A4: Levels of self-reported sub-state 'nationalism' in each category (where data is available)

Figure A5: Levels of self-reported Spanish 'nationalism' in each category in Catalonia (2012, MEDW)

Furthermore, 'nationalist' individuals are the most likely to support the nationalist parties on their respective side of the state v sub-state territorial cleavage (see appendix – Tables A45-A46). As expected, statists consistently have the highest support for state-wide nationalist parties (when they are present). There are some territories where no state-wide parties are present (i.e. Flanders and Wallonia), but statists here still exhibit relatively weak support for sub-state nationalists parties (as they do in Spain and Canada). Secessionists and autonomists more likely to support sub-state parties, but this support is significantly higher in some territories (Basque Country, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec) than others (Valencia, Canary Islands, Castile and Leon, Galicia). Thus, these differences in party support provide external validity for the designation of these individuals as nationalists.

Thus, these results show that the prominence of state and sub-state nationalism can differ drastically across sub-state territories. Dual identity (both strong and moderate) is common across sub-state territories, while very few individuals are indifferent about both their state and sub-state identities. Secessionist categories tend to be larger within the conventional 'minority nations' of Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, and the Basque Country. Many territories contain a prominent autonomist category, but this is largest in Castile and Leon, Galicia, the Canary Islands, and the Basque County. The statist categories are largest within Castile La-Mancha, Valencia, and Wallonia, which are three territories with close historic ties to their states (see Kymlicka 2003, Blommaerts 2011, and Zabaltza 2019). Members of these three categories meet Bieber's (2018) criteria for nationalism, even if autonomists may refute this label.

Table A50: Constitutional Preference Questions and Recoding

State	Organisation	Question	Responses	Recoding Note: Values not mentioned coded as missing
Belgium	Independence	Many people talk about the future of Belgium. Please rank the following four scenarios in order of preference (1 to 4)	1: A united Belgium 2: An independent Wallonia, an independent Flanders, and an independent Brussels-capital region 3: An independent Wallonia and an independent Flanders including the Brussels-capital region 4: An independent Wallonia including the Brussels-capital region, and an independent Flanders 9: Don't know	1: Ranked any independence option first. 0: Ranked 'A united Belgium' first
Canada	Independence	If a referendum was held today that would ask if you want Québec to become independent, would you vote 'Yes' or would you vote 'No'?	1: Yes 2: No 9: Don't know	1: Yes 0: No

Table A50: Continued

Spain	Multiple-Choice	As far as relations between Catalonia and Spain are concerned, do you think Catalonia should be a region of Spain, an autonomous community of Spain, a state within a federal Spain, or an independent state?	1: A region of Spain 2: An autonomous community in Spain 3: A state within a federal Spain 4: An independent state 9: Don't know	1: An independent state 0: Responses 1-3
	Independence	And if a referendum was held today asking about Catalonia's independence, what would you do?	1: I'd vote for it 2: I'd vote against it 3: I wouldn't vote 9: I don't know	1: Vote for it 0: I'd vote against it
United Kingdom	Multiple-Choice	Which of these statements comes closest to your view?	1: [Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK and the European Union 2: [Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK but party of the European Union 3: [Nation] should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers 4: [Nation] should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers	1: Responses 1 and 2 0: Responses 3-5

Table A50: Continued

		5: [Nation] should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament 9999: Don't know	
Independence (Scotland Only)	If there were another referendum on Scottish independence, how do you think you would vote?	<0> I would vote "No" (stay in the UK) <1> I would vote "Yes" (leave the UK) <2> Would not vote <9999> Don't know	1: Yes 0: No

Table A51: National Identity Questions

State	Question	Question	Lower Value	Upper Value
Belgium	Attachment	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
	Identity	Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means very weakly and 10 very strongly, how the following identities apply to you?	0: Very weakly	10: Very strongly
Canada	Attachment	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
Spain	Attachment	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
United Kingdom	Identity	Where would you place yourself on these scales?	1: Not at all	7: Very strongly

Table A52: Dependent variable question wording in British Election Study Internet Panel

	Left-Right	Redistribution	Tax-Spend	Immigration
British Election Study Internet Panel (England, Scotland, and Wales)	In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on the following scale?	Some people feel that government should make much greater efforts to make people's incomes more equal. Other people feel that government should be much less concerned about how equal people's incomes are. Where would you place yourself and the political parties on this scale?	Using the 0 to 10 scale below, where the end marked 0 means that government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services, and the end marked 10 means that government should raise taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services, where would you place yourself on this scale?	Some people think that the UK should allow *many more* immigrants to come to the UK to live and others think that the UK should allow *many fewer* immigrants. Where would you place yourself and the parties on this scale?
	0: Left	0: Government should try to make incomes equal	0: Government should cut taxes a lot and spend much less on health and social services	0: Many fewer
	10: Right	10: Government should be less concerned about equal incomes	10: Government should increase taxes a lot and spend much more on health and social services	10: Many more

Table A53: Dependent variable question wording in Making Electoral Democracy Work

	Left-Right	Redistribution	Tax-Spend	Immigration
Quebec (Canadian Federal Election Study 2015)	Q30A. In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place yourself on a 0 to 10 scale where 0 means 'far left' and 10 means 'far right'? 0: Far left 10: Far right	Q30C. Some people favour the redistribution of wealth from rich to poor, others oppose it. Where would you place yourself on a 0 to 10 scale? 0: Favour redistribution 10: Oppose redistribution	Q30B. Some people favour reducing taxes, other people favour improving public services. Where would you place yourself on a 0 to 10 scale? 0: Favour reducing taxes 10: Favour improving public services	Q30E. Some people believe that we should have more immigrants, others believe that we should have fewer. Where would you place yourself on a 0 to 10 scale? 0: Favour more immigrants 10: Favour fewer immigrants
Flanders (Belgian National Election Study 2014)	Q30A. Où vous situeriez-vous sur une échelle allant de 0 à 10, où 0 signifie l'extrême-gauche et 10 l'extrême-droite? 0: Extrême gauche 10: Extrême droite	Q30C. Où vous situeriez-vous sur une échelle de 0 à 10, sur laquelle 0 signifie être très favorable à la redistribution et 10 signifie être très opposé à la redistribution? 0: Très favorable à la redistribution 10: Très opposé à la redistribution	Q30B. Où vous placeriez-vous sur une échelle de 0 à 10 dans laquelle 0 signifie être très favorable à réduire les impôts et 10 signifie être très favorable à améliorer les services publics? 0: Très favorable aux réductions d'impôts 10: Très favorable à l'amélioration des services publics	Q30E. Où vous situeriez-vous sur une échelle de 0 à 10 sur laquelle 0 signifie être très favorable à avoir plus d'immigrés et 10 signifie être très favorable à avoir moins d'immigrés? 0: Très favorable à plus d'immigrés 10:Très favorable à moins d'immigrés

Catalonia (Spanish European Election Study 2014)	Q30_A. Cuando se habla de política se utilizan normalmente las expresiones de izquierda y derecha. ¿En qué casilla situaría Ud. a los siguientes partidos compitiendo en las elecciones Europeas: Q30A. Y siguiendo con la misma escala, ¿Dónde se ubicaría usted? 0: Extrema izquierda 10: Extrema derecha	Q30C. ¿En qué casilla se situaría Ud. en una escala de 0 a 10 en la cual el 0 significa ser muy favorable a la redistribución y el 10 oponerse a la redistribución? 0: Favorable a la redistribución 10: Opuesto a la redistribución	Q30B. ¿En qué casilla se situaría Ud. en una escala de 0 a 10 en la cual el 0 significa ser favorable a la reducción de los impuestos y el 10 ser favorable a mejorar los servicios públicos? 0: Favorable a reducir los impuestos 10: Favorable a mejorar los servicios públicos	Q30E. ¿En qué casilla se situaría Ud. en una escala de 0 a 10 en la cual el 0 significa ser favorable a tener más inmigrantes y el 10 ser favorable a tener menos inmigrantes? 0: Favorable a tener más inmigrantes 10: Favorable a tener menos inmigrantes

Table A54: Mean and Standard Deviation of Relative Territorial Identity in Each Sub-State Territory

	Attachment	Identity
England	.	0.49 (0.13)
Scotland	.	0.60 (0.25)
Wales	.	0.47 (0.25)
Catalonia 2012	0.61 (0.21)	.
Catalonia 2014	0.62 (0.21)	.
Flanders	0.53 (0.14)	0.49 (0.19)
Quebec 2012	0.59 (0.20)	.
Quebec 2015	0.55 (0.18)	-

RTI normalised onto 0-1 scale to account for the different scales in each dataset (1-7 in BESIP, 0-10 in MEDW)

Table A55: Level of Support for Independence based on Approximated Nationalism Measure

| | | Moderate Dual | Strong Dual | Indifferent |
		%	%	%
England	Multiple	13.29	21.1	23.52
Scotland	Singular	27.88	16.21	68.05
	Multiple	31.83	16.18	64.79
Wales	Multiple	26.1	16.38	41.38
Catalonia 2012	Singular	21.2	22.63	38.51
	Multiple	10.11	11.51	32.34
Catalonia 2014	Singular	27.64	27.96	26.35
	Multiple	18.06	20.4	16.72
Flanders Attach	Singular	16.55	22.77	37.77
Flanders Identity	Singular	24.7	30.23	17.14
Quebec 2012	Singular	8.25	4.45	28.48
Quebec 2015	Singular	11.52	12.04	38.29

For the referendum/multiple-choice values, I use the ANM that is created when using this measure.

All exclude don't knows.

Table A56: Level of Support for Devolution based on Approximated Nationalism Measure Using Attachment Approach in MEDW Datasets

	Secessionist	Autonomist	Moderate Dual	Strong Dual	Statist	Indifferent
	%	%	%	%	%	%
England	0	83.54	59.75	61.54	59.73	45.00
Scotland Singular	1.75	74.29	55.63	56.79	59.69	30.98
Scotland Multiple	0	88.16	55.63	56.79	63.92	30.98
Wales	0	82.23	52.23	47.29	55.93	42.68
Catalonia Singular 2012	21.54	95.00	76.28	72.28	63.51	56.80
Multiple 2012	0	96.73	76.28	72.28	65.94	56.80
Catalonia Singular 2014	14.51	84.03	77.36	47.48	74.47	56.31
Multiple 2014	0	93.92	77.36	47.48	74.05	56.31

Results for England, Scotland, and Wales refer to those who say their nation should have a sub-state parliament, but not those who say it should be independent or that power should be centralised. Support for devolved authority is taken as those who say Catalonia should be an autonomous community or state within a federal Spain, but not that it should be a 'region' of Spain or independent.

No results for Flanders and Quebec as their constitutional preference questions pertained to independence only.

All values exclude don't knows.

Results for the 'singular' measure indicate the proportion of respondents in each category who support devolution when asked the multiple-choice constitutional preference question. These results highlight that some individuals will vote for independence in a binary referendum, but they would prefer devolution if it is on offer (as discussed in chapter 2).

Table A57: Income categories in each sub-state territory

	England	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Flanders	Quebec
Low	£0-£19,999 per annum			€0-€1750 per month	€0-€19,999 per annum	0-39,999 CAD per annum
Medium	£20,000 - £39,999 per annum			€1750-€3250 per month	€20,000 - €39,999 per annum	40-69,999 CAD per annum
High	£40,000+ per annum			€3250 + per month	€40,000+ per annum	70,000 CAD+ per annum

Note: Non-response is very high for these variables, so responses like don't know where collected into a fourth category and retained in the model in order to avoid reducing the statistical power of the models drastically.

Table A58: Economic Position of Sub-State Territories

Sub-State Territory	GDP per capita	GDP per capita relative to state	GDP proportion of state
	€[133]	€	€
England	37,506	1006	85.94
Scotland	33,200	-3300	7.54
Wales	26,300	-10200	3.5
Catalonia	26,400	3800	18.79
Flanders	36,400	500	58.26
Quebec	32,564	-6561	19.06

Sources: Eurostat, Statistics Canada, ONS

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[133] GBP converted into Euros for comparability. Values rounded to nearest whole €.

Table A59: Mean Predicted Positions in Scotland Using Binary Independence Question

	Left-Right N: 1705	Redistribution N: 1903	Immigration N: 1969
Secessionist	3.33 (0.07)	2.97 (0.10)	4.36 (0.10)
Autonomist	4.70 (0.13)	4.01 (0.17)	5.91 (0.15)
Moderate Dual	4.59 (0.15)	4.03 (0.21)	5.37 (0.20)
Strong Dual	5.49 (0.13)	4.98 (0.19)	6.16 (0.17)
Statist	5.80 (0.11)	5.61 (0.16)	6.59 (0.15)
Indifferent	3.29 (0.23)	2.97 (0.32)	3.51 (0.32)

Table A60: Mean Predicted Positions in Catalonia in 2014 Using Multiple-Choice Constitutional Question

	Left-Right N: 886	Redistribution N: 918	Immigration N:
Secessionist	3.30 (0.10)	2.98 (0.15)	6.67 (0.14)
Autonomist	4.02 (0.14)	2.77 (0.21)	6.46 (0.19)
Moderate Dual	4.84 (0.14)	3.66 (0.20)	6.52 (0.19)
Strong Dual	4.75 (0.27)	2.91 (0.37)	8.15 (0.34)
Statist	5.40 (0.17)	4.14 (0.25)	7.68 (0.22)
Indifferent	3.65 (0.21)	2.25 (0.32)	6.20 (0.28)

Table A61: Mean Predicted Positions in Flanders Using Identity Question

	Left-Right N: 816	Redistribution N: 863	Immigration N: 890
Secessionist	6.92 (0.14)	4.66 (0.21)	8.64 (0.17)
Autonomist	5.80 (0.20)	4.58 (0.28)	8.34 (0.23)
Moderate Dual	5.47 (0.14)	4.60 (0.20)	7.51 (0.16)
Strong Dual	6.32 (0.23)	4.48 (0.32)	8.97 (0.26)
Statist	4.71 (0.13)	4.30 (0.18)	6.69 (0.15)
Indifferent	4.47 (0.38)	4.83 (0.57)	6.11 (0.48)

Table A62: Mean Predicted Positions in Wallonia Using Attachment Question

	Left-Right N: 868	Redistribution N: 917	Immigration N: 935
Secessionist	.	.	.
Autonomist	5.08 (0.21)	3.28 (0.28)	8.44 (0.25)
Moderate Dual	5.11 (0.14)	4.19 (0.18)	7.48 (0.16)
Strong Dual	4.81 (0.16)	3.03 (0.20)	7.94 (0.18)
Statist	5.61 (0.13)	4.33 (0.17)	7.91 (0.15)
Indifferent	4.91 (0.30)	3.45 (0.38)	7.23 (0.34)

Table A63: Mean Predicted Positions in Wallonia Using Identity Question

	Left-Right N: 861	Redistribution N: 917	Immigration N: 931
Secessionist	.	.	.
Autonomist	5.18 (0.33)	3.16 (0.44)	7.98 (0.38)
Moderate Dual	5.15 (0.20)	4.24 (0.26)	7.26 (0.22)
Strong Dual	5.13 (0.17)	3.08 (0.21)	8.51 (0.19)
Statist	5.26 (0.11)	4.01 (0.13)	7.78 (0.11)
Indifferent	4.97 (0.39)	3.95 (0.48)	7.11 (0.41)

Table A64: Territorial nationalist parties coding

State	Election	Territorial Nationalist Parties	Source
Flanders	Federal and Regional	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA)	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	Federal and Regional	Vlaams Belang (VB)	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Catalonia	General and Autonomous Community	Convergencia i Unio (CiU)	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
	General and Autonomous Community	Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
Scotland	General and Scottish	Scottish National Party	Massetti and Schakel (2016)
		Scottish Greens	
Wales	General and Welsh	Plaid Cymru	Massetti and Schakel (2016)

*Parties only listed if they are present in the relevant Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2014 for Flanders and Catalonia, 2019 for Scotland and Wales)

Table A65: 'Nationalism' Scores in the Chapel Hill Expert Survey

Territory	Party	Score
	0: Cosmopolitan, 10: Nationalist	
United Kingdom (2019)	**United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)**	9.25
	Brexit Party	8.80
	Conservative Party	7.76
	Plaid Cymru (Wales only)	4.73
	Scottish National Party (Scotland only)	3.88
	Labour Party	3.00
	Liberal Democrat	1.80
	Green Party	1.31
Catalonia (2014)	**Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya** (ERC)	8.3
	Convergència i Unió (CiU)	8.1
	Partido Popular (PP)	7.2
	Podemos	6
	Unión, Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)	5.25
	Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds (ICV)	5.1
	Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE)	4.3
	Izquierda Unida (IU)	3.8
	Ciudadanos (C's)	5
Flanders (2014)	**Vlaams Belang (VB)**	10
	Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA)	9
	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CDandV)	5.25
	Open Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Open Vld)	3
	Socialistische Partij Anders (SP.A)	2.25
	Partij van de Arbeid van België (PVDA+)	1
	Groen	1

Scores over 7 considered 'nationalist' (parties in bold).

Table A66: Variable question wording in Chapel Hill Expert Survey

	Redistribution	Tax-Spend	Immigration
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2014	Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. 0: Fully in favour of redistribution 10: Fully opposed to redistribution	Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes 0: Fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services 10: Fully in favour of cutting public services to cut taxes	Position on immigration policy 0: Fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration 10: Fully in favour of a restrictive policy on immigration
Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2019	Position on redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor. 0: Strongly favours redistribution 10: Strongly opposes redistribution	Position on improving public services vs. reducing taxes during 2019 0: Strongly favours improving public services 10: Strongly favours reducing taxes	Position on immigration policy 0: Strongly favours a liberal policy on immigration 10: Strongly favours a restrictive policy on immigration

Table A67: Mean Party Positions from Chapel Hill Expert Survey

2014 CHES

Party	Left-Right (General)	Redistribution	Tax/Spend	Immigration
	0: Left 10: Right	0: Support 10: Oppose	0: Raise tax 10: Cut tax	0: Liberal 10: Restrictive
N-VA	7.8	7.4	9	7.6
VB	9.2	5	5.2	9.6
PSOE	3.8	2.4	2.5	3.6
PP	7.3	7.6	7.6	8.1
CiU	6.2	6.5	6.5	6.666667
ERC	3.666667	2.9	3.5	3.666667
C's	5.555555	5.75	5.125	6.25

2019 CHES

Party Name	Left-Right (General)	Redistribution	Tax/Spend	Immigration
CONS	7.117647	6.647059	6.235294	7.588235
SNP	3.5	3.125	2.875	2.333333
PLAID	3.090909	3.090909	2.818182	2.444444
BREXIT	8.2	6.375	6.6	8.6

Table A68: Percentage of respondents who favour retaining an equal level of sub-state autonomy or extending sub-state autonomy in 9 Spanish sub-state territories

		Autonomist	Moderate dual	Strong dual	Statist
Andalusia	More	29.02	23.1	23.19	15.66
	Equal	50.83	50.1	54.98	41.73
Basque Country	More	63.21	15.26	26.54	
	Equal	35.37	83.43	66.47	
Castile and Leon	More	17.86	13.39	17.44	32.15
	Equal	33.38	41.83	48.22	41.35
Castile-La Mancha	More	13.63	26.37	15.06	18.9
	Equal	65.97	33.79	47.55	26.71
Canary Islands	More	38.77	34.02	31.96	
	Equal	40.43	32.07	44.59	
Catalonia	More	84.04	55.19	56.16	18.85
	Equal	14.58	33.89	32.93	46.76
Extremadura	More	40.34	20.56	22.91	26.63
	Equal	37.58	51.31	48.9	32.29
Galicia	More	33.62	18.31	14.44	
	Equal	40.71	53.03	52.38	
Valencian Community	More	40.53	30.44	13.2	15.3
	Equal	31.08	30.08	35.87	36.1

Category excluded in N<30

Full table in the appendix 4 – Table A40.

Figure A6: Mean Predicted Tax/Spend Preferences For Each Category in Six Territories [Red line indicates mid-point of the 0-10 scale]

Figure A7: Predicted Left-Right Self-Positions When Interacting Relative Territorial Identity And Independence Support

Figure A8: Predicted probability of opposing further immigration from different origins in Wales

Source: Welsh Election Study 2021, post-election wave

The 2021 WES asked respondents whether they felt that the overall level of immigration into Wales from foreign countries should be increased and whether they felt that immigration from the UK should be reduced. Each of these questions was asked on a Likert scale (strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, strongly agree). I recode the overall level variable into disagree (1) and the others (0), excluding non-responses. I do the reverse for the UK level variable (1: agree, 0: others), which means that both variables indicate an opposition to further immigration into Wales.

Overall, attitudes towards immigration differ depending on the level of immigration in question. First, most groups are far more likely to oppose increasing the overall level of immigration into Wales. Second, secessionists are the only group who are more likely to oppose further immigration from the rest of the UK. The difference between the two forms of immigration is largest among the statist category, which is likely due to the large proportion of English born respondents within this category. Given the unionist positions of many of these individuals, it is possible that they do not see moving from elsewhere in the UK into Wales as 'immigration.' Instead, these individuals may associate the term 'immigration' with those who move from other states. Going forward, these results should encourage researchers to ask more specific questions when aiming to capture immigration preferences in the future.

Figure A9: Mean Predicted Attitudinal Positions For Six Territories Using RTI Approach

These results show the relationship between political attitudes and territorial identities across the six territories when using RTI measures.