Pericles

Policy recommendation and improved communication tools for law enforcement and security agencies preventing violent radicalization

Gap analysis on counter-radicalisation measures

Dominic Kudlacek, Matthew Phelps, Laura Treskow, Brendan Marsh, Stephanie Fleischer, & Maja Halilovic Pastuovic

Result Report

This report presents a gap analysis of current measures used for the prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation across European countries. It provides an overview of the various risk factors linked to radicalisation and analyses whether these have been ad-dressed in current prevention tools. The respective gaps between radicalisation and violent extremism and its prevention are presented.

Counter-radicalisation is still underdeveloped in Europe. Prevention measures targeting online-radicalisation, vulnerable groups and prison populations exist, but only on a small scale. In contrast, it has been identified that prevention tools significantly target the social, moral and cultural development of young populations.

The risk factors mentioned in the report are not recognised as single triggers of radicalisation and are to some extent interlinked with one another. Counter-radicalisation and measures to curtail violent extremism should develop tools and initiatives that target all pathways to radicalisation.

This report is the second of a sequence of three reports that together will produce policy recommendations for the prevention of radicalisation in Europe.

Authors:

Dominic Kudlacek	University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven
Matthew Phelps	University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven
Laura Treskow	Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany
Brendan Marsh	Trinity College Dublin, Ireland
Stephanie Fleischer	Criminological Research Institute of Lower Saxony, Germany
Maja Halilovic Pastuovic	Trinity College Dublin, Ireland

Coordinator:

Prof. Dr. Dominic Kudlacek
University of Applied Sciences Bremerhaven
An der Karlstadt 8, 27568 Bremerhaven, Germany
Mail: dominic.kudlacek@rub.de

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1 INTRODUCTION

The increasing prevalence of radical ideologies and terrorist attacks within Europe has provided the momentum for the development of numerous counter-radicalisation tools, which countries have used to help tackle extremist ideas and criminal acts. Governments across Europe have funded research projects and programmes to explore aspects of radicalisation and violent extremism, such as the understanding of risk and motivating factors, in order to better prepare prevention measures.

Research into both radicalisation and violent extremism has also received significant funding from the European Union. Although the actual figures for total EU and member state funding are difficult to state precisely, EC funds for counter-terrorism and radicalisation include the Horizon 2020 programme for the 2014-2020 funding period (European Parliament, 2015). Under such funding mechanisms, a number of research actions related to enhancing the understanding of various aspects of radicalisation and proposing tools to support LEAs and other relevant stakeholders are available. Several research projects on radicalisation, IMPACT Europe, SAFIRE and VOX-Pol to name a few, were launched under the seventh framework programme for EU research and technological development. These projects worked to improve understanding of the underlying drivers for radicalisation, as well as technologies to assess the effectiveness of the measures developed to address radicalisation.

Despite intensified efforts to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism, various practitioners and academics have identified clear research gaps both in knowledge of the phenomenon and in the specific instruments developed. This report nuances several risk factors associated with the radicalisation process and how prevention measures have been responded to specific gaps in knowledge. The report describes the various prevention measures and their gaps in accordance with the datasets of the project's first report. The report is structured in the following chapters:

The introduction in chapter 1 introduces prevention measures on a European level, the importance of the risk assessment process and its impact on radicalisation. The chapter shows how the information from a risk assessment helps to develop and select measures that best meet individual needs in order to maximise the impact of prevention and minimise risks. Chapter 2 describes the known research gaps in the literature on radical-

isation. A thematic analysis has been used to identify aspects of radicalisation that are currently the focus of prevention. The methodology of this report is described in chapter 3, particularly the steps taken to gather empirical evidence on the themes identified in the previous chapter. It discusses how the data were collected, including the barriers to research and the shortcomings of the data. Chapter 4 discusses the current changes in radicalization trends in relation to the following risk factors: Internet, vulnerable groups, contact with recruitment agencies, social background, educational level and prisons. Where appropriate, case files of offenders will be included to provide examples of how the above factors can influence radicalisation processes. Chapter 5 provides an overview of recent measures taken to combat radicalization in relation to the risk factors examined in this report. It shows whether the factors have been addressed through funded programmes and projects. It then identifies the gaps in order to provide useful insights for policymakers and others who are addressing aspects of radicalisation. This in turn provides a basis for designing future intervention strategies for the support initiatives needed to address these issues. Chapter 6 summarises the gaps and considerations that can be used to improve future actions to combat radicalisation. Wherever possible, the needs of the different groups are mentioned, thus identifying a focus for future research.

1.1 THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF COUNTER-RADICALISATION AND PREVENTION PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES

The landscape of counter-radicalisation efforts in the EU is extremely diverse (see Table 1. National and international sister projects).

Table 1. Examples of national and international projects on counter-radicalisation

PRACTICES Partnership Against Violent Radicalisation in Cities	• Reduce the risk of violent radicalisation and improve urban security in partner cities. • Empower and engage residents, and particularly the most vulnerable, and thus become more inclusive and diverse cities. • Create spaces for discussion and exchange between academic and social actors around understanding the phenomenon of radicalisation leading to violence.	• Surveys that provide broad background information into the beliefs, values and emotions of young Europeans. The survey was conducted with respondents aged 14-50. • Main macro (socially-related) and micro (individual-related) variables of 200 "pro-jihad" young people. • Collection of qualitative data on engagement processes of young people.
TRIVALENT	• To create a better understanding the root-causes of violent radicalisation.	• Policy recommendations on prevention measures and cooperative efforts. • Multi-dimensional model that will inform on the factors and steps leading to violent radicalisation.

Terrorism pReventIon Via rAdicaLisation countEr-NarraTive	• To work out instruments for the analysis of specific online contents and communication codes used by extremist groups. • To study and prevent youth radicalisation in the families and at schools.	• The analysis of violent/non-violent radical social media accounts using content, network, and behaviour analysis methods.
RED Alert REDALERT Real-Time Early Detection and Alert System	• Improve available building blocks and combine them with artificial intelligence (AI) in order to support the language, usability and privacy-preserving requirements of the RED-Alert solution. • Integrate all building blocks in a holistic solution with real-time collaborative capabilities and create a baseline system (development environment) for current and future use.	• A study of existing and proposed legislation both at supra-national and international level in the field of law enforcement. • The Machine Learning (ML) component where automatic learning algorithms are applied on meta-data related to machine learning experiments. • The use of efficient Natural Language Processing (NLP), Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Complex Event Processing (CEP) algorithms.
MINDb4ACT MINDb4ACT	• To implement 17 pilot projects to tackle violent radicalisation realized by LEAs, first-line practitioners and civil society actors. • To promote engagement as part of a broader collaboration with all relevant actors involved in P/CVE. including local authorities, institutions, local LEAs, community leaders, religious institutions, women and youths).	• Empirical data (practical knowledge) and evaluation tools to work with potential at-risk populations such as immigrants and unaccompanied minors. • Technology solutions (Big data and other intelligence tools) that combat online propaganda and hate speech. • Empirical data, risk and evaluation assessment tools and training of professionals for early detection. • Empirical data on early detection in schools and related professional centres.
TENSOR TENSOR	• To provide a powerful terrorism intelligence platform offering LEAs fast and reliable planning and prevention functionalities for the early detection of terrorist organised activities, radicalisation and recruitment.	• Information on efficient and effective searching, crawling, monitoring and gathering online terrorist-generated content from the Surface and the Dark Web. • Internet penetration through intelligent dialogue-empowered bots.
SAFRON SAFFRON Semantic Analysis against Foreign Fighters Recruitment Online Network	• To identify in a timely fashion both all internet activities of direct and indirect recruitment of Foreign Fighters and all signals (weak or strong) pointing at radicalisation of single individuals.	• Recent trends about recruitment of young European people by terrorist groups. • Online communication strategies of terrorist groups and social media campaigns to contrast their propaganda.
FIRST LINE FIRST LINE >>> PRACTITIONERS	• To develop effective and efficient approaches and services for fighting organised crime and terrorist networks.	• Knowledge on the presence of right-wing extremism online. • Potential success with anti- and de-radicalisation programmes.
DANTE DANTE Detecting and analysing terrorist-re-	• To deliver more effective, efficient, automated data mining and analytics solutions. • An integrated system to detect, retrieve, collect and analyse huge amount of heterogeneous on	• Knowledge on terrorist-related data in surface/deep Web, and dark nets. • Analysis and categorization of suspect terrorist related multi-language contents. • Large-scale temporal analysis of terrorism trends.

lated online contents and financing activities	multi-language terrorist-related contents.	• Summarization of multilingual and multi-media terrorist-related contents.
CoPPRa COPPRA EC through ISEC Community Policing Preventing Radicalisation & Terrorism	• The creation of practical user-friendly tools to support frontline police officers in detecting radicalisation and terrorism. • The development of a common curriculum for the training of first-line police officers in the use of tool. • The identification and exchange of good practices on measures to stop radicalisation spread.	• A collection of good practices in terrorism and radicalisation prevention. • A trainer's manual. • A guidebook on "Preventing Terrorism and countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: A Community Policing Approach". • Successful webinar on community policing in preventing radicalisation and terrorism.

A large collaboration with new actors from the field of counter-radicalisation is identified from growing relationships between diverse organisations, for example, grassroots organisations, law enforcement agencies, social workers, and academic disciplines. Despite calls for more interdisciplinary efforts, ongoing relations between different actors have led to unforeseen issues. A lack of empirical studies and quantitative evidence is a recurrent finding in counter-radicalisation, however, overly diverse research practices have compounded the possibility of strong academic results not being produced. A lack of clarity on certain definitions provides practical barriers to the interpretation of results, and the backgrounds of different actors produce a profoundly different understanding of various issues. The lack of consensus on how basic terminologies are defined, such as terrorism, counter-radicalisation, hinders the ability of practitioners to conduct research. There is also evidence of certain terms being borrowed from other disciplines without proper reflection of its meaning within counter-radicalisation, such as the business terms stakeholders and target groups. Scarcella et al. (2016) note that the complexity of extremism and terrorism means new perspectives are required from a diverse range of stakeholders in order to better consider how they can be prevented. However, law enforcement agencies, academics and other practitioners would be better able to research and discuss with each other if a common understanding was reached.

The landscape of counter-radicalisation policies in the EU is extremely diverse. A large degree of cooperation with new actors in the field of counter-radicalisation is identified from the growing links between different organisations, e.g. grassroots organisations, law enforcement agencies, social workers and academic disciplines. Despite the need for more interdisciplinary efforts, the ongoing relationships between different actors have led to unforeseen problems. A lack of empirical studies and quantitative evidence is a recurring feature of counter-radicalisation efforts, but too

diverse research practices have compounded the possibility that convincing academic results are not being achieved. A lack of clarity with regard to certain definitions leads to practical obstacles in interpreting results, and the backgrounds of different actors lead to completely different understandings of the various issues. The lack of consensus on the definition of basic concepts such as terrorism, counter-radicalisation, etc. hampers the ability of practitioners to carry out research. There are also indications that certain terms are borrowed from other disciplines without their meaning being adequately reflected in the context of combating radicalisation, such as the terms used by economic actors and target groups. Scarcella et al (2016) note that the complexity of extremism and terrorism requires new perspectives from a variety of stakeholders to better consider how to prevent them. However, law enforcement agencies, academics and other practitioners would be better able to research and discuss with each other if a common understanding were reached.

Other challenges that affect the cooperation between practitioners and researchers are the time frames in which the research activities are carried out. Rynes et al (2001) described how the conditions to which practitioners are subjected can dictate a certain mentality when approaching work, such as a greater focus on the completion of tasks. This contrasts with the work of academics who are more concerned with producing relevant and meaningful data, regardless of how long this may take. Instead, practitioners bring quality to the practical insights they bring and expertise in assessing how a particular measure would be applied in reality. What we need is not only improved relations between certain working groups, but also a working level where understanding and practical implementation are harmonised.

The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the gaps in certain areas of the fight against radicalisation. The information on the measures themselves is taken from the previous report, which is based on the prevention strategies of selected European countries, in particular Belgium, Bosnia, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In the next report, interviews with anti-racism practitioners will be carried out to further explore whether current prevention policies take into account practitioners' needs. Together with the gaps identified in this report, it will provide an overview of future research priorities and recommendations for the redesign of current policies.

1.2 THEORETICAL NEEDS ASSESSMENT

Undertaking needs, or risk, assessment is complex due to the wide range of terrorist and/or extremist ideologies and motivations, the varying social composition of different groups, and because of the many and varied roles within terrorist groups. Risk assessment can be defined as a "process involving the systemic gathering and interpretation of information pertaining to an individual in order to predict the likelihood that the individual will engage in the behaviour of concern" (Herrington & Roberts, 2012, as cited in Sarma, 2017, p.279).There have been a number of efforts by EU Member State Governments and EU funded research projects to improve procedures for identifying those individuals who pose a risk to societal security or who are at risk of becoming involved in extremist thought and actions. This section will first outline a selection of these procedures and methodologies, as well as some of the critiques that have been offered of their effectiveness. The section will then examine an important risk factor assessment paradigm from the field of criminology, and once again cover some of the most pressing critiques of this approach. Finally, some guidelines for developing coherent and applicable risk assessment tools are offered by one expert in the field.

The UK Government Vulnerability Assessment Framework is primarily used by staff in the education and health sectors, local authorities, and youth services to help them identify individuals at risk. The system considers vulnerability on three levels:

a. factors that promote engagement: including emotions and cognitions that leave the individual susceptible to recruitment from terrorism,

b. intent factors that indicate readiness to use violence: including dehumanization of those targeted by terrorists,

c. capability to cause harm: referring to individual skills and competencies and access to networks and equipment.

The Identifying Vulnerable People (IVP) system developed in UK presents a list of 'Red Flag' behaviours: membership of nonviolent radical groups, contact with known extremists, advanced military training, overseas combat experience, cultural and/or religious isolation, isolation from family, risk-taking behaviours, isolated peer group, hate rhetoric, political activism.

The European Union-funded Project SAFIRE developed the observable indicators of possible radicalisation guidance based on consultation with 28 individuals involved in counter-radicalization work. Twenty-one indicators are clustered under five thematic areas that are applicable to far-right

as well as Islamist terrorism and radicalisation. The thematic areas are: identity and identity seeking, in-group– outgroup differentiation, pro-violence social interactions, including distancing from friends and family, change in persona, association with radicalised or extremist groups and individuals.

Sarma (2017) criticises the various guideline outlined above on three specific grounds. First, he claims that the guidelines are non-specific about the risk being predicted. Second, there is a lack of theoretical coherence regarding the links between risk factors and terrorism, and the evidential base for identification of risk factors is underdeveloped. Finally, there is a risk of innocent individuals being categorised as being 'at risk' due to the broad and non-specific identifiers of risk.

VERA: Violent Extremist Risk Assessment

Pressman (2009) developed VERA and argues that standard violent risk assessment tools are not suitable for violent extremism. VERA is a structured professional judgement guide that includes a defined set of risk factors believed to increase the chance of future terrorism, and is therefore specifically for violent extremists.

VERA categories of risk factors (Beardsley & Beach, 2013)

- Attitude items: psychological factors relate to the motivation and ideology behind violent extremism, distinguishes terrorists from other criminals

- Contextual items: which focus on the influence of the environment and other people, which can offer support and validation of extremist beliefs

- Historical items: e.g. early experiences of violence that can increase an individual's susceptibility to terrorism

- Demographic factors: male, under 30, unmarried.

Roberts and Horgan (2008) argue that while tools such as VERA are a useful starting point, robust empirically tested needs assessment tools are urgently needed that can identify the role of Static and Dynamic Risk Factors.

Table 1: **Static and Dynamic Risk Factors**

STATIC RISK FACTORS (do not change over time)	DYNAMIC RISK FACTORS (subject to change and are, to some degree, under the control of the individual)
Nationality, ethnicity	Drug use
Childhood abuse experiences	Friendships and associations
Childhood family experiences	Emotions and perceptions favourable to radicalisation

Though not a perfect fit, there have been robust and methodologically sophisticated longitudinal studies of conventional criminal offending risk factors by criminologists that can offer some insights.

The Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm

Beginning in 1961, the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development followed 400 males in London from age 8 to 48. Study Aims: To identify the most important risk factors in the onset and progression of offending. A risk factor is defined as a variable that predicts a high probability of offending.

Methodology:

- Tests administered in schools by psychologists to assess a) intelligence, b) attainment, c) personality, d) impulsivity

- Detailed qualitative interview with participants

- Parents interviewed once per year until participants were of school leaving age

Results: "The most important factors that should be targeted in intervention research are impulsiveness, school achievement, child-rearing methods, young mothers, child abuse, parental conflict, disrupted families, poverty, delinquent peers, and deprived neighbourhoods" (Farrington et al, 2012, p. 48). Offending tends to be concentrated in families: by 1993, 405 of study males were convicted, as was 28 % of their fathers, 43 % of their brothers, 12 % of their sisters, and 9% of their wives.

Remarking specifically on violent offenders, Farrington (2012) states that the following are important risk factors that should be identified in a needs

or risk assessment: Large family size, harsh parental discipline, physical abuse by a violent parent, and poor parental supervision.

The findings of the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development were echoed by the Pittsburgh Youth Study, which followed 1500 young males for 12 years in Pittsburgh, USA (Farrington et al., 2012). Farrington (2012) concludes that both studies emphasised that far less is known about protective factors than risk factors, and risk (needs?) assessments should be designed that aim to identify protective factors in participant's lives. A protective factor is a variable that interacts with a risk factor to nullify its effects, or alternatively a variable that predicts a low probability of offending among a group at risk.

Although the Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm (RFPP) has been widely implemented in the criminal justice systems of the United Kingdom and United States, and beyond, for some time, the methodology is not without its critics. O'Mahony (2009, p.105) summarised and built upon these criticisms and argues that: "Risk-focused research on anti-social behaviour is often based on questionable measures such as self-reports or teacher, parent and peer reports, which are notoriously susceptible to subjective judgement and to the tendency either to exaggerate or deny".

O'Mahony also states that only a very small minority of people who engage in a wide range of criminal behaviour ever come to the attention of authorities and, therefore, we gain only a very limited insight into the correlates of criminal behaviour. Further, the type of crime that is the focus of RFPP is that committed by poor people and is often referred to as 'visible crime' due to the disruption it causes within communities. Corrupt businessmen and political figures, child sex abusers and drunk drivers, for example, are often conventional, socially acceptable and well educated individuals who experience adult onset criminality and share few of the childhood risk factors the type of individuals who are the focus of the RFPP. Regarding terrorist offences, O'Mahony perceptibly argues that these crimes are often perpetrated by otherwise non-violent people who believe that their actions are morally justifiable and even heroic. While O'Mahony does in effect state that the RFPP has value and is among the best risk factor assessment tools available, he is, at the same time, severe in his criticism. O'Mahony (2009, p. 112) argues that: "The failure of risk-focused research to deal with adult onset offending, such as domestic violence and white collar crime, and its failure to acknowledge the massive scale of hidden crime and the contested nature of some crime thoroughly undermine the RFPP's claim to be identifying the correlates, let alone the causes of crime".

Future Advances in Risk Assessment

In a recent important contribution to the field, and speaking from within the discipline of psychology, Sarma (2017) laments the lack of robust and evidence based risk assessment methodologies for involvement in terrorist and extremist behaviour. He offers guiding principles for consideration when reflecting on how best to develop such risk measurement tools, some of which are useful here.

Principle 1: Statistical Approaches cannot work.

Risk assessment should be carried out by an evaluator who works on an individual's case and makes a risk prediction. Such assessments can be informed by risk factors resulting from actuarial tools but must be part of a more comprehensive and holistic approach to the person.

Principle 2: Focus on Structured Judgement and Case Formulation

Evaluators work on a case-by-case basis with individuals at risk and are able to develop a coherent hypothesis regarding the link between the individuals' radicalised or extremist attitudes and social and personal factors in the person's life that may be considered risk factors.

Principle 3: Risk Assessment must involve Risk Specification

Assessments must be clear about what exactly they are trying to identify and predict, whether it be risk of involvement in terrorism or more specifically what role an individual may be likely to play once engaged in terrorist activity.

Principle 4: Harness Theories

Theories from various disciplines should be used to supplement the dearth of evidence in terrorism related studies.

Principle 5: Supervision and Training is necessary.

Evaluators and risk assessment professionals need training in order to adequately carry out their duties. Further, there should be a constant feedback and evaluation to improve practice.

2 KNOWN RESEARCH GAPS

2.1 PRACTITIONER AND ACADEMIC WORKING

The landscape of counter-radicalisation efforts in the EU is extremely diverse. A large collaboration with new actors from the field of counter-radicalisation is identified from growing relationships between diverse organisations, for example, grassroots organisations, law enforcement agencies, social workers, and academic disciplines. Despite calls for more interdisciplinary efforts, ongoing relations between different actors has led to unforeseen issues. A lack of empirical studies and quantitative evidence is recurrent finding in counter-radicalisation, however, overly diverse research practices have compounded the possibility of strong academic results not being produced. A lack of clarity on certain definitions provides practical barriers to the interpretation of results, and the backgrounds of different actors produce a profoundly different understanding of various issues. The lack of consensus on how basic terminologies are defined, such as terrorism, counter-radicalisation, hinders the ability of practitioners to conduct research. There is also evidence of certain terms being borrowed from other disciplines without proper reflection of its meaning within counter-radicalisation, such as the business terms stakeholders and target groups. Scarcella et al. (2016) notes that the complexity of extremism and terrorism means new perspectives are required from a diverse range of stakeholders in order to better consider how they can be prevented. However, law enforcement agencies, academics and other practitioners would be better able to research and discuss with each other if a common understanding is reached.

Other challenges impacting on the working between practitioners and academics are the time frames in which research activities are carried out. Rynes et al. (2001) presented how the conditions practitioners are subjected to can prescribe a certain mentality when approaching work, such as placing a bigger focus on the completion of tasks. This contrasts with the work of academics who are more concerned with the production of relevant and meaningful data irrespective of how long this might take. Practitioners instead introduce quality in the practical insights they bring as well as the expertise in judging how certain measure would be applied in reality. What is needed is not simply improved relations between certain working groups but also a level of working where understanding and practical implementation are harmonised.

2.2 Signs of extremist attitudes and behaviour

Various risks have been theorized of how individuals can become radicalised. How these risks are identified by relevant practitioners involves a string of complexities. The increased need for conducting risk assessments and the potential misuses and negative effects of risk assessments has placed practitioners in a quandary. In response to these practical issues, Stanley (2018) purports the need for practitioners to reflect on theories as the basis for their judgement. Not only does the use of risk theories construct a scientific practice that can be tested and verified with research, but it also enables risk to be constructed in a calculable way. The need for professionals conducting risk assessments to become well versed in relevant risk theories and applied research is a present challenge in counter-radicalisation. A further research gap is the limited efforts to establish the extent of the training practitioners receive in relation to risk work and their understanding of relevant theories.

Numerous risk assessment tools and vulnerability assessment tools are available to practitioners, such as the Extremism Risk Guidance (ERG22+), Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF), Violent Extremist Risk Assessment (VERA 2) and Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18). The main purpose of these instruments is to evaluate an individual's current engagement with certain risk factors, intent to commit extremist behaviour and their capability to do so. Although certain risk factors may overlap between the instruments, each is made up of their own unique combination of indicators that will be evaluated. Hart et al. (2016) identified three approaches that practitioners use in measuring risk, the unstructured clinical judgment approach (UCJ), the non-discretionary approach, and the structured professional judgment approach (SPJ). Despite the increased application of risk assessments in the field of counter-radicalisation, the methodology of risk assessment tools has been severely criticised for its unreliably predictive ability. The topic has been raised as to whether such predictive tools could ever be 100% accurate and whether this is even necessary in light of the instruments' purpose to assist the practitioner's judgment and not to be solely relied upon. Knudsen (2018) even questioned the use in measuring radicalisation on the basis of methodological weak risk assessment tools, unconfirmed validity of risk indicators, and unclear meanings as to the terminologies surrounding radicalisation. Although the potential usefulness of risk assessments are universally acknowledged, Knudson also warns of the dangers of developing new and more advanced risk assessments on the grounds of blurring between indicators that should and should not be measured, or to include target groups that move beyond what was originally intended.

Scarcella et al. (2016) provided a systematic review of various risk assessment tools used in counter-terrorism and counter-extremism. This research also suggested that an overall lack of quality was present in the instruments investigated particularly in regard to the indicators used to measure extremist and radicalisation potential, which lacked empirical evidence of its validity and reliability. Ethical issues surrounding the application of these tools and the results obtained, that is the potential incrimination of an individual based on current and future behaviour, thereby highlights the responsibility practitioners have when weighing up the value of potential extremist attitudes and behaviours identified from underresearched indicators.

2.3 THE RELEVANCE OF VULNERABILITY

Vulnerability has only recently been a focus in counter-radicalisation. Before, a culture of risk could be identified from aims to estimate an individual's risk of becoming extremist or radical, or the production of risk assessment tools. Research on risk factors is critical but presents only part of the challenge at hand. Investigating what brings about certain susceptibilities is important to conceptualise protective factors. However, Gielen (2017) cautions that research should not simply search for general factors to be used in broad interventions. Tailored made interventions are needed that are based on factors specific to individuals and groups and are to be used in certain circumstances. In their review of protective factors regarding violent extremism, Van Brunt et al. (2017) identified a total of ten potentially relevant factors that could be used to prevent individuals from being drawn to violent extremism; these are social connection, pluralistic inclusivity, nonviolent outlets, social safety, emotional stability, professional/academic engagement, global competence, empathy, resilience, and consequences of action. In a meta-analysis of over 2,000 pieces of literature, Lösel et al. (2018) identified thirty protective factors some of which were specific to well-established literature on youth violence. As risk assessments have long been explored in other areas of criminology, a research gap is presented here in the transferability of and sharing of findings with academics and practitioners researching other forms of violence. This will enhance understandings of violent extremism as a specific form of violence and facilitate the differentiation of factors from general forms of violence.

2.4 PATHWAYS TO RADICALISATION

Research into pathways of radicalisation suggest that no single pathway exists despite the number of models that have been developed suggestive

of a single process, such as the pyramid model. Campelo et al. (2018) outlined a three-level model explaining racialisation, which is based on empirical data retrieved from various studies within an eight-year gap. This unique model presents progress towards a quantitative-based modelling of the radicalisation phenomenon. The three levels represent individual risk factors inclusive of vulnerabilities, micro-environmental factors, such as the family and social groups, and macro-environmental factors, such as socioeconomic conditions and group polarisation.

Mental health problems represent specific factors that arguable influence processes of radicalisation. Controversial and inconsistent findings exist in this respect. Corner et al. (2016) could demonstrate a significant prevalence of mental health disorders in their sample of five different terrorist groups (lone-mass murderers, lone-actor terrorists, solo-actor terrorists, lone-dyads, and terrorist group members). For example, it was shown that a history of psychological disorders was prevalent on average in 27% of their sample. Such studies have led to increased discourses on the integration of medical staff and mental health services in prevention strategies. However, limited empirical studies are available, which creates the need for similar studies to focus on the link between mental illness and terrorism. Similar inquiries are required to establish exactly how health professional can be used without conflicting with the doctor-patient and therapist-patient relationships, and negatively influencing the primary responsibilities of certain professionals.

The role of families is widely held to be important in the prevention of violent extremism, but limited findings exist that highlight the extent of parental influence. Sikkenes et al. (2018) outlines how radicalisation processes influence the family, which presents a very interesting dynamic as the effects of the family on an individual becoming radicalised has usually been the focus. This study showed how the parenting style changes in response to developments in radicalisation. Increased feelings of hopelessness and uncertainty of the parent were seen to provoke a change in the parenting approach. This finding presents how further support programmes are needed to provide help to families affected by radicalisation. A research gap is presented here, as further studies are needed to establish the needs of such families and the types of support they desire.

2.5 PRISON COUNTERMEASURES

Discourses on prison management of radicalised individuals and those vulnerable to radicalisation is a prevailing issue. Here, academics have discussed the value of separating proponents of radical and extremist groups away from the general prison population to prevent the recruitment

of prisoners and spreading of ideologies (containment model). On the other side, the inclusion of radical inmates within a larger prison population (dispersal model) is also believed to possess value as radicalised individuals could change or normalise their attitudes by open conversing with regular prisoners. A combination of both (mixed approach) is currently believed to be the gold standard of managing violent extremist offenders (RAN, 2016). The application of risk assessments also provides a crucial measure for prison management. The general limitations of risk assessments, as mentioned earlier, are similarly applicable to prison contexts. Silke (2014) has further added that risk assessment measures used on terrorist prisons were often designed for entirely different populations. It was argued that applying risk assessments without proper validation of indicators that are specific to terrorist and extremist prisoners should therefore be avoided.

Addressing the individual competencies of prison staff, particularly prison officers, are needed to reinforce counter-radicalisation efforts. The building of positive relationships between inmates and staff are advantageous for the implementation of de-radicalisation programmes. Through an enhanced inmate-officer relationship, practitioners are better able to build trust and work on the cognitive and emotional dimensions of prevention. Reversely, inmate-officer relationships based on violence and abuse can be counter-effective to de-radicalisation work. Other prison management challenges include overcrowding, which is a particular challenge facing prisons across Europe. Lower staff ratios can harbour higher levels of individual strain and fatigue and can hinder the overall delivery of prevention, such as the provision of structured judgments on risk assessments. Moreover, a limited capacity and resources provides a more restrictive setting reducing the quality of supervision and individual support prisoners may need.

2.6 POTENTIAL VULNERABLE GROUPS

Research on particular vulnerable groups have attempted to establish whether certain social groups present higher or lower levels of risk and vulnerabilities to radicalisation than other groups in the general population. Young people are one group that is often targeted by prevention strategies whose aim is to typically increase resilience against risk factors and build knowledge of radical messages at an earlier stage in life. Refugees and forced migrants, however, provide a current research gap of individuals who potentially carry susceptibilities to radicalisation as a result of known vulnerabilities (for example, decreased physical and mental health). On the one side, refugees present a risk of introducing Islamist

militants and terrorists disguised as migrants. On the other hand, refugees themselves could demonstrate radicalisation drivers.

The migration-security nexus suggests the need for enhancing security measures as a response to increased levels of migration. Yet, it is also acknowledged that displaced individuals might also be compelled to commit acts of terror owing to their socioeconomic situation (poverty and restricted job possibilities) and psychological situations (post-traumatic disorders and depression). Eleftheriadou, M. (2018) provides a unique model of the potential factors unique to incoming refugee populations that could predispose them to sympathising with radicalisation. Although a general overlap was noted with other models of radicalisation, this research identifies important factors that have not been mentioned in other models, such as intentions to flee and previous contact to political organisations, that appear to be specific to refugees. Further research into other vulnerable groups are necessary to investigate unique radicalising factors and not simply factors that are potentially shared by all social groups. Vaisman-Tzachor (2018) explored the potential benefit of introducing psychological evaluations as a security measures in the immigration and asylum application process. Certain predictive factors were discussed, such as demographic characteristics and psychological disorders, that could raise the risk of employing anti-democratic behaviours but which are not to be used as an indication of becoming a terrorist. The implication is thus to explore security measures that are applied to certain societal groups for mitigating the level of risk of violent extremism.

2.7 MENTAL ILLNESS

Extreme acts of violence against non-state actors are a recurring theme, especially those terrorist movements that are considered politically motivated. Shocking incidents of extreme violence, such as the shooting of Marjory-Stoneman-Douglas High School in 2018 and Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, have given new impetus to research on possible causes of extreme violence. Processes that cause an individual to commit an extreme act of violence can be associated with mental disorders, social adversity or other adverse health conditions. Radicalisation is a catchword often used in combination with terrorist acts whose antecedents are not yet sufficiently known.

Recent attention has now shifted its focus to the potential role of mental illness on processes leading to violent extremism to measure whether the mental illness contributes to a certain level of vulnerability or risk. However, there are ethical difficulties involved in conducting research in this

filed that relate to the potentially unintended stigmatization or discrimination caused to the wider audiences who suffer from psychological distress and other adverse psychological profiles. It may also discourage people suffering from mental illness from seeking help for fear of being marked as a potential risk person for terrorism.

The investigation of the aspirations of persons linked to the terrorist network or terrorist files is limited to the availability of data-rich sources such as court records and interviews, which are themselves difficult to access. A biographical analysis of offender profiles is proposed in order to understand the profiles of terrorist offenders suffering from mental illness. For example, it is necessary to investigate how people with mental illness are influenced by their environment and social networks. In theory, it is possible to identify the potential vulnerabilities of a person suffering from a particular type of mental illness. However, not all mental illness can contribute to a higher risk of extremist violent behaviour. Certain metal disorders, such as schizophrenia, lead to potentially higher vulnerability because symptoms such as psychosis occur, which, when combined with a political or religious ideology, might lead to extreme loyalty because they are based on experiences of religious or spiritual awakenings that seem very real for the individual.

Preliminary studies have examined various terrorist population groups (group vs. lone warriors), but have been criticised for lack of comparison with the prevalence rates of certain mental disorders in the general population. This is aggravated by the fact that the diagnosis of mental illness associated with certain terrorist groups has been linked to a number of different mental disorders such as personality disorders, schizophrenia and autism disorders. For example, Sageman was able to show that four people (0.8%) in his sample of 500 terrorists showed signs of mental illness, suggesting that the incidence of mental illness differs significantly from the general population (Sageman, 2008). A study by Corner, Gill and Mason (2016) reported prevalence estimates that identified lone-actor terrorists as having mores diagnosable mental illness (43%) than other terrorist subgroups. Similar prevalence estimates were found in an earlier study that identified individual actors as having a higher prevalence of mental illness (31.9%) than among group actors (3.4%) (Corner, & Gill, 2015). In addition to the evidence showing different prevalence rates of mental illness within specific terrorist populations, the study by Merari et al (2009) could identify suicidal behaviour in 40% of imprisoned Palestinian suicide bombers as well as a broader range of symptoms that indicated depressive tendencies in 53.3% of the sample.

3 METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodological approach that was used to identify respective gaps in aspects of counter-radicalisation prevention as well as how the data was collected.

3.1 OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH

This report sets out to answer important questions that can be identified from the growing literature on radicalisation processes and governments' efforts on prevention in this field, namely:

1. Have vulnerabilities to radicalisation changed over time? and if so,

2. To what extent have government policies and intervention strategies addressed these transformations?

These questions were researched in two different steps. Firstly, certain risk factors of radicalisation were examined to find out whether developments have occurred in the way they enable individuals to radicalise. Secondly, an analysis of current prevention measures across Europe, based on datasets gathered on selected countries, was used to demonstrate whether these developments have been addressed.

3.1.1   Primary data collection using rubric

For analysing documents and information about preventive measures,[1] a standardised instrument is necessary. The rubric consists of eleven pages with themes in seven different parts. Part A focused on general information about preventive measures. Part B handles the content of the project or the programme, including the aims of the measures as well as the target group. Part C is based on information about the target group. This section concerns the group of people the preventive measure is intended to reach. The organisational structure of the rubric takes place in part D. Parts E and F address the methodological and the theoretical framework. Part G collected information all around the scientific evaluation of preventive measures.

The resulting dataset provides the basis for the results of this gap analysis. To identify potential gaps in preventive measures, an analysis of terrorism offenders is needed, inclusive of the background information of the identified offenders. This identified whether the trigger factors that lead to

terrorist act were being targeted by prevention efforts. As such, the construction of a standardised scheme detailing information on the offenders of terror attacks was necessary.

3.1.2 Standardised data collection instrument for identified offenders of terror attacks

The data collection for identified offenders of terror attacks was based on publicly accessible information. Accessible information was analysed and categorised according to a number of prominent themes, including education and family background, criminal record, ideology, organisational link, nationality, migration background, and several details about the conducted attack. The identified information was organised into a data set and built the basis for a statistical analysis. In order to get into the interpretation of the results, an overview of the recent attacks in Europe follows this chapter.

3.1.3 Obstacles to data collection

The data collection for this report was based on a web search of identified offenders and prevention measures in the field of radicalisation and violent extremism. Information collected was limited to that collected through this methodology. As an extensive search of all possible prevention measures and terrorist related offenders was neither feasible nor appropriate for this report, we recommend further research here to identify gaps across a broader array of prevention measures.

4 TRENDS IN RECENT ATTACKS

4.1 INTERNET

There are growing concerns on how much impact the internet has on the radicalisation process, particularly in relation to recruitment to terrorist organisations and the spreading of extremist propaganda. These fears are based, in part, on the observation that the internet is a powerful propaganda instrument that can encourage individuals from non-violent backgrounds to engage with violent political and religious extremism. Sophisticated on-line recruitment and mobilisation propaganda produced by ter-

rorist groups can facilitate the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals without any contact to off-line groups. Together with the easy availability of extremist material online, terrorist groups are able to foster the growth of extremist ideologies and followers but also generate contacts between affiliated groups and like-minded individuals. The section below outlines a series of case examples describing individuals for whom online radicalisation was a significant element of their descent into extremism.

4.1.1 The case of Arid Uka

The case of the Frankfurt jihadist Arid Uka illustrates the importance of the Internet for the radicalization and recruitment of Islamic terrorists. Uka, a 21-year-old Kosovar who grew up in Germany, carried out the first successful Islamic attack in Germany. On 2 March 2011, he killed two American soldiers at Frankfurt airport and injured two others. During interrogation, Uka claimed that he was not connected to any one terrorist organisation and had become radicalised over previous months through online social networks. He claimed that he was inspired to finally act on his radical beliefs when he watched propaganda videos produced by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IBU). In a video produced in Pakistani Waziristan that Uka watched the day before carrying out his attack, a spokesman detailed the rape of Afghan women by American soldiers and urged concerned Muslims to seek revenge against Americans. Uka told his interrogators that his actions were designed to deter future sexual attacks by American military personnel on Muslim women. As a part of his preparation for the attack, Uka repeatedly listened to jihadist battle propaganda that he accessed online, particularly the song "Mother will remain firm".

The Uka case illustrates the potential significance of the internet in radicalisation, recruiting and mobilising young individuals. It shows that the use of media, particularly movie clips, can be persuasive and effective in evoking resentment. Further, the technical and editorial proficiency of propaganda producers increases the emotional and psychological appeal of the videos message. Film sequences depicting true events, regardless of how distorted the facts or narrative, can appeal to individuals tendencies to protect their in-groups (Steinberg, 2012). Further, the motivational power of 'battle songs' that appeal to the very identity of the individual is evident in Uka's case.

4.1.2 The case of Abdul Basheer

Abdul Basheer was a 28-year-old Singaporean lawyer and polytechnic lecturer. Abdul became "self-radicalised" through radical Islamic content

on the internet. His case reinforces the finding that individuals can be vulnerable to radicalisation regardless of social status or educational attainment (Berrebi, 2007). Although his motives for leaving a successful career to pursue Jihadism are somewhat unclear, Abdul Basheer was on a quest to develop and establish a sense of religious identity. Through his search for religious and spiritual meaning he encountered radical Islamic beliefs. Basheer's case highlights the potential vulnerability to radicalisation of those individuals who are on genuine and personal mission to increase their dedication to their chosen faith. The prevalence of toxic and extremist propaganda on the internet can have a profound impact on individuals such as Basheer.

4.1.3   The case of Abdul Benbrika

The internet has been used to distribute instructions for making and using bombs and other weapons. In Australia, the radical Islamic cleric Abdul Benbrika was jailed for both organising attacks and also distributing instructional material via the web. At the turn of the millennium prospective bomb makers were often required to travel to terrorist training camps in countries like Afghanistan to receive instructions. Contemporary terrorists, however, can receive effective and sophisticated explosives instructions through forums and E-learning courses (Stenersen, 2013). This is a cause for grave concern as bomb attacks are the preeminent method of violent perpetration used by terrorists worldwide (Spaaij, 2010). Jihadists and lone wolf attackers can take advantage of available material and instructions without excursion to conflict areas.

4.2 VULNERABLE GROUPS

4.2.1   Results BKA survey about departees

Research results demonstrate that young adults are a particularly vulnerable group concerning radicalisation (Bundeskriminalamt [BKA], Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BfV] & Hessisches Informations- und Kompetenzzentrum gegen Extremisums [HKE], 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015). The search for identity, community and togetherness seem to be driving factors (Angus, 2016). The Federal Criminal Investigation (BKA) in Germany published results of an analysis about reasons and courses of radicalisation. The report focused on people who were ready to leave Germany to travel to Syria or Iraq to fight for ISIS (BKA, BfV & HKE, 2015).

Results demonstrate that mainly young men in the 18 to 30 age bracket are radicalised and ready to leave Germany to fight for ISIS. Nevertheless,

young women (21 %) are also interested in leaving Germany. Slightly less than 2/3 have a migration background, 36 % of these radicalised individuals have a higher educational background (the German Abitur) and 24 % have a middle school graduate (the German Realschulabschluss). Further, 8 % of the relevant group does not have any qualification.

The publicly accessible information about identified offenders of terrorist attacks of the previous years in Europe show a similar picture. Radicalised and violent individuals – regardless of their ideology or extremist attitude – are/were youth or young adults:

- Safia Schmitter, a 15-year-old girl who at the age of 8 already had contact with ISIS recruiters. In 2016, she attacked a police officer in Hannover, Germany. Her mother is from Morrocco. She is a pupil in the German Gymnasium (similar with highschool) (Ramelsberger, 2016).

- Anis Ben Othman Amri was born in 1992 in Tunisia. He attacked a German Christmas market with a truck in Berlin on the 19th of December (Biermann et al., 2016).

- The brothers Ibrahim and Khalid El Bakraoui (29 years and 27 years) attacked the metro and the airport in Brussels ("Ibrahim and Khalid el-Bakraoui: From Bank Robbers to Brussels Bombers," 2016).

- Salman Abedi (was born in 1994) perpetrated a suicide bomb attack against a concert of Ariana Grande in Manchester, England. The 22 years old man had contacts with a terrorist network and he was known as an extremist ("Das ist über den mutmaßlichen Attentäter von Manchester bekannt," 2017).

4.2.2   Permission Status

Needless to say, sacrificing one's home country and community to travel to another country, often under pain of death, is a traumatic and harrowing experience for many migrants. Therefore, many migrants have expectations of their host country and unfortunately these expectations are not always met or realistic. Experiences of discrimination and exclusion, and difficulties with integration, can increase the individual's identification with their ethnic or religious group and potentially make them susceptible to radicalised elements (Angus, 2016)

In the following cases from Germany, the migrant's application for permission to stay were declined.

- Riaz Khan Ahmadzai was a 17-year-old Syrian teenager, who arrived in Germany and sought asylum (Lohse & Wehner, 2016), however his attempts to gain asylum were unsuccessful. He sympathised with ISIS Ideologies and used an axe to attack passengers in a train near Wurzburg. He was shot dead by police during their operation.

- Mohammad Daleel (27) was a suicide bomber who attacked a music festival in Ansbach (Bavaria). He sought refuge in Germany and applied for residency in 2014. He unsuccessfully fought against his deportation to Bulgaria and was due to be deported a few weeks after his suicide attack on 24th of July in 2016 (Diehl & Sydow, 2016).

- Ahmad A. (26) was already identified as an Islamic sympathiser. He attacked eight people in a supermarket in Hamburg-Barmbek; one of the victims died. He was already in contact with the police and authorities of Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz) in Germany. Ahmad A. did not have permission to stay in Germany ("Ahmad A. soll Lkw-Attentat erwogen haben", 2017).

- Raed Jaser (35) is from the United Arab Emirates and came to Germany in the 1990s. Together with his parents, he applied for asylum in Germany. The application was declined. His family and Raed Jaser lived there for two years. They felt excluded and discriminated against. The whole family left Germany and arrived in Canada, where their applied for asylum were not accepted again. Raed Jaser were arrested before he could carry out an attack on a long-distance train (Michel, 2013).

- Anis Amri came from Tunisia to Germany. He was registered as a refugee in Italy and later arrived in Germany with forged papers. He was described as a frustrated man with a lot of anger towards German authorities. He attended several different mosques (between Hildesheim and Dortmund), and had become a prayer leader. On 19th of December, Anis Amri attacked the Christmas Market in Berlin with a truck (Amjahid et al., 2017). He killed 12 people, 55 were injured.

4.2.3   Traumatic experiences

Ferguson and Brinks (2015) state that 'witnessing violence against family and friends or the wider group individual identifies with, directly indirectly or vicariously could suggest that exposure to these events may cause trauma and possibly Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD)'. Indeed, feelings of separation and exclusion can result from such trauma and can

partially explain why people who have experience such devastating events are later attracted to radical causes.

In the case of Raed Jaser, the family experienced several traumatic events, which could provide a partial explanation for Jaser's plan to attack a train (Via Rail) in Canada.

- Raed Jaser and his family migrated from the United Arab Emirates to Europe in 1991. The family felt discriminated against and excluded from German society and were victims of various right-wing attacks. In Germany, they feared for their lives when they experienced an attack with Molotov cocktails against their apartment. That is why the family migrated to Canada two years later in 1993. The family described the experiences in Germany as traumatic (Michel, 2013).

- Michael Oluwatobi Adebowale (22 years) attacked British Army Soldier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, London. Adebowale and Michael Adebolajo attacked Rigby with a knife and a meat cleaver. Sometime before, he had been a witness to the murder of his friend Faridon Alizada. He was diagnosed with a post-traumatic stress disorder. Furthermore, he had mental health problems, hearing voices and suffering from delusions. He left his family after the murder of his friend and when he came back to his family, he had converted to Islam (Casciani, 2013).

4.3 CONTACT TO RECRUITING AGENCIES

It is a proven fact that friends and (radical/delinquent) peer-groups are an essential factor that fosters radicalisation (Eilers et al., 2015). Adolescents try to find social recognition and acceptance. If their family cannot or is not willing to provide this, the adolescents look elsewhere. Some will be prone to recruiting agencies, especially when these agencies promise what the teenagers dream of. However, there are peer groups that provide a delinquent or even radicalised environment or make contact to radical groups.

Research proves the link between radical/delinquent peer groups and radicalisation. However, there is little research on how the extremist got involved with the radical (peer) group. Sageman (2004) offers two possible ways on how the involvement could takes place: (1.) A group of friends radicalise together or (2.) the person is specifically looking for a radicalised group. Olsen (2009) is one of the few researchers who investigates the recruitment through recruitment agencies. He reports that most extremist are not recruited by a charismatic leader or an ideological preacher. They have already been in contact with sympathisers of the radical group or the former extremists visited meetings or events where

radicals participated (Olsen, 2009). The survey of BKA, BfV and HKE (2015) supports these results. The data shows that the contact to the Islamist/Salafist scene (e.g. contacts to radical mosques, distribution of the Koran) was an important step towards joining it. The study "Everyday experiences and settings of refugees in Lower Saxony", which was conducted by the Criminological Institute of Lower Saxony in 2016, examined whether and how often political or religious groups have tried to contact vulnerable groups. In this study, the respondents could distinguish if such groups have ever contacted them, and if they have been contacted on the way to Germany or in Germany. It was reported that 12.5 % of the respondents had been contacted by political or religious groups, with 1.2 % of the respondents having been recruited in Germany (own calculations).

However, the contact with recruitment agencies does not have to be offline all the time. The internet, social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) or blogs are one of the biggest spots where recruitment takes place. Propaganda, Islamist thoughts and ideas are spread easily and fast. The contact to sympathisers and the recruitment of new members (mostly vulnerable adolescents) is simple, straightforward and fast.

The following paragraph highlights the background of a few terrorists who radicalised by being in contact with a recruitment agency or by being involved in the Islamist/Salafist scene.

- Mohammad Sidique Khan was born in Leeds (UK) in 1974. He has three older siblings and grew up in Beeston. His father was one of the first generations of Pakistanis who came to Yorkshire. Sidique Khan finished high school and started to work in a youth project. Later he met an active recruiting member of the Jihadism network Hassan Butt. Sidique Khans contact to the Jihadism scene was intensified, why he was shown in a video with Aiman al-Sawahiri (Al-Qaeda) before he attacked the metro in London (Malik, 2007).

- Safia Schmitter was born in Hannover, Germany in 2001. She had contact to a Salafist preacher Pierre Vogel when she was seven years old. Later, she attacked a police officer with a knife in the central train station in Hannover, Germany, where she was arrested. She claimed to have acted in the name of ISIS (verdict: six years juvenile detention) ("Safia S.: Die Radikalisierung einer Jugendlichen," 2017).

- Khuram Shazad Butt, one of the three identified offenders of the London Bridge attack in June, 2017, stayed in contact during his radical-

isation process with Anjem Choudary, who has been linked to recruitment of terrorism suspects ("London Bridge attacker named as Khuram Butt", (n.d.)).

4.4 SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Bakker (2011) analysed the cases of 335 persons who had been involved in 65 terrorist at-tacks or attempted attacks in Europe between 2001 and 2009. He only considered cases where convictions had been secured or where attackers died during the attack. Bakker argues that studying the characteristics of the jihadi terrorists in the European sample leads to one obvious finding, that is, there is no standard jihadi terrorist in Europe. Bakker's sample included very young people as well as persons in their forties and fifties. Some have no education, while others finished university. Nonetheless, there are a number of, more or less, common traits. A clear majority were from Arab countries and have roots especially in North Africa (mainly Algeria and Morocco). Many of these first, second or third generation immigrants also came from the lower strata of society. A relatively high number of persons had a criminal record; at least a fifth of the sample. Finally, it should be noted that almost all jihadi terrorists in Europe are male, and that many of them relate to each other through kinship or friendship.

However, other researchers and commentators have been more insistent that recent patterns of terrorist recruitment in Europe do have, at least to some degree, a discernible pattern regarding the social background of new recruits. Basra et al. (2016, p. 26) state that "rather than in universities or among religious students, the Islamic state increasingly finds recruits in European ghettos, in prisons, as well as among the European 'underclasses' and those who have previously engaged in violence and other illegal acts". While it may seem contradictory that the jihadist narrative can at once offer redemption and at the same time legitimise crime, the influential radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki instructed his followers that stealing from enemies to further the cause of jihad is not only permitted but also obligatory. This instruction therefore offers the criminal redemption while encouraging their criminal behaviour. Another prominent example was Brussels based radical Khalid Zerkani, a street criminal who was also an Islamic State recruiter. He directed young Moroccan men in Brussels to commit crime and collected the proceeds to contribute towards extremist causes and activities. Zerkani is considered one of the most influential European based recruiters for Islamic State and was responsible for the mobilisation of 72 foreign fighters. Rather than jihadists actively targeting criminally involved people for recruitment, the rather more depressing truth is that both criminals and jihadists are recruited from the

same demographic milieu and often in the same places. Basra et al. (2016, p. 30) conclude that "many assumptions about radicalisation need to be reconsidered, e.g. that a pious person is not likely to be also a criminal or that someone 'acting like a gangster' cannot possibly be also involved in terrorism".

The far-right English Defence League (EDL) draws its support mostly from the deprived pockets of British society. Historically, the same pattern is evident in the support base of the British National Party, an older political grouping that has an explicitly racist agenda. Jackson and Feldman (2011) argue that ultra-nationalism and ultra-patriotism that scapegoats ethnic and religious minorities will only be reduced by empowering local politics to improve the economic and social conditions of disadvantaged communities. Further, there needs to be positive and productive attempts to allow inter-ethnic tensions to be worked out and conflict resolution.

4.5 Educational/professional background

Krueger and Maleckova (2003) posit that participation in terrorism may be positively related to an individual's education and income. Terrorism is a form of political action and engagement and more educated and privileged people are more likely to engage in politics. The time and energy of those at the lower end of the socio economic scale is focused on subsistence and handling the stresses of low income living, whereas more comfortable individuals have the time, resources and propensity to direct their focus to political matters. Krueger and Maleckova support this claim by stating that their findings support the hypothesis that terrorism is more likely when civil rights are suppressed, supports their stance that terrorism results from political rather than economic injustice. In addition, terrorist organisations prefer more educated operatives who are better able to understand instructions and mix with conventional society in order to successfully carry out operations. The authors argue that there is little direct connection between poverty or education and participation in terrorism. Citing research on Palestinian terrorists, they state that "members of Hezbollah's militant wing or Palestinian suicide bombers are at least as likely to come from economically advantaged families and have a relatively high level of education as to come from the ranks of economically disadvantaged and uneducated. Similarly, members of the Israeli Jewish Underground who terrorized Palestinian civilians in the 1970s and early 1980s were overwhelmingly well educated and in highly regarded occupations" (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p. 141).

Pantucci et al. (2016, p. 6) state that "while it is often assumed that terrorists and lone actors in particular are economically or socially disadvantaged, the literature offers no evidence to support this". Surveys however have demonstrated that the presence of previous convictions for criminality is significantly higher in lone actor terrorists than in those connected to terrorist organisations. However, while lone actors in particular enjoyed relatively high levels of education and originated from middle class families, their employment records were not too positive. Almost half were unemployed and only a fraction was considered professionals.

Wasmund (1986) studied the life histories of 227 individuals who had been active in the Red Army faction in Germany throughout the 1970s. He found that most were from upper middle class families, enjoyed above standard education, but only 35% had jobs. Amongst his study population there was a higher than normal rate of family breakdown and divorce, however the majority had regular and stable childhoods. Russel and Miller (1977, p. 29) examined the background of actors in 18 terrorist groups, including the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany, Red Brigades in Italy and the Peoples Liberation Army in Turkey, and found that: "The vast majority of those individuals involved in terrorist activities as cadres or leaders is quite well educated. In fact, approximately two-thirds of those identified terrorists are persons with some university training, university graduates or postgraduate students".

Lyall (2017) found that among British jihadists travelling to Syria, rates of pervious criminality were quite high at 22%, however educational attainment across his sample was also very high with a good representation of undergraduate and postgraduate students. To summarise this complex and diverse range of life histories, personal and characteristics, and motivations that characterise the landscape of modern terrorist actors, Bakker and de Graff (2011) make the following statement: "Al-Qaeda-related offenders were younger and were more likely to be students, seek legitimatization from epistemic authority figures, learn through virtual sources and display command and control links. They were less likely to have criminal convictions. Right-wing offenders were more likely to be unemployed and less likely to have any university experience, make verbal statements to friends and family about their intent or beliefs, engage in dry runs or obtain help in procuring weaponry. Single-issue offenders were more likely to be married, have criminal convictions, have a history of mental illness, provide specific pre-event warnings or engage in dry runs. They were less likely to learn through virtual sources or be depicted as being socially isolated".

4.6 Prison and spiritual welfare

Indoctrination of individuals into extremist and radical causes has been taking place in European prisons for some time and, indeed, actual operational planning has occurred in some cases (Basra et al., 2016). Prisons are environments where radicalised individuals often mix with conventional criminals—except for those in segregation units—and therefore the potential for recruitment, particularly among populations of Muslim male offenders, is significant. There are three salient dynamics at play within prison environments, which make them an ideal place to recruit new members to terrorist and extremist causes (Basra et al., 2016). Firstly, prisons are places of vulnerability where predatory recruiters and agitators can find many distressed and socially isolated young men who may be vulnerable to radicalisation. Incarceration removes the individual from communities of meaning and contact with family and other loved ones is usually very restricted. Many incarcerated offenders, especially first time prisoners, experience a personal crisis as the reality of prison life sets in. The often tense and dangerous prison environment can be (self) segregated along racial, ethnic or religious lines and therefore presents a hostile and tribal social space for the prisoner. New inmates are often both physically and psychologically vulnerable and therefore open to new associations and memberships of social groups as a method to ensure personal safety. In addition, the deep personal crisis of incarceration can make inmates more open to developing new identities and new belief systems, especially if such new ideas offer a redemptive narrative or theme. From the recruiter's perspective, the prison is an environment full of young and often angry young men who are, to some degree, already desensitised to violence and illegality. They have been in conflict with authorities, are often impulsive and are willing to take risks. Jihadist groups offer such people experiences of power, adventure, provide them with a strong identity, and a sense of rebellion and being anti-establishment. As Basra et al. (2016) state: "From the jihadist's perspective, prisons are the perfect 'breeding ground'".

Secondly, within prisons ordinary criminals and radicalised extremists often mix within the one population thereby creating opportunities for networking and skill transfers. Radical agitators and activists can use the resources of criminal knowledge and networks to gain access to weapons, forged documents, money and safe houses. Within prisons, the criminal and terrorist converge, often to the benefit of the extremists. Finally, reintegration into society, that is, finding employment and accommodation, is notoriously difficult for those individuals who have served prison sentences. The stigma of incarceration and criminal identities has been the subject of criminological research for many decades and the structural

obstacles to becoming a productive and law-abiding member of society are numerous and often extremely difficult to overcome. The paucity of services and social support within some jurisdictions, as well as a lack of legislative consideration (such as no 'Spent Convictions' law in Ireland) makes reintegration over the long term a difficult and often arduous process. Released individuals are therefore vulnerable to continued radicalisation by extremist groups who offer a sense of be-longing, practical social support, as well as a coherent narrative based on victimhood and resentment that explains their current predicament and offers opportunities for revenge.

- Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, two of the coordinators of the January 2015 attacks in Paris, met in prison a decade earlier. Coulibaly was a conventional criminal who was serving time for assault and theft offences, and was radicalised by Kouachi. The pair became solid friends and continued to engage in extremist activities and move in radicalised circles after their release from prison, culminating in the deadly Paris attacks (Chrisafis, 2015).

- The case of Omar el-Hussein is particularly interesting in light of his seemingly legitimate attempts to seek help from social services after his release from prison. Hussein had been a perpetrator of violent crime from his adolescence in Copenhagen and became involved with radicalised groups while incarcerated. He was released from prison in January 2015 but had no access to probationary support due to a legal technicality; he had an ongoing legal appeal against his convictions. He presented himself at a local municipal centre looking for accommodation and food but was refused assistance. In February 2015, Hussein was one of the principal attackers in the attacks on the Jewish Cultural Centre and Synagogue in Copenhagen (Smith-Spark & Robertson, 2015).

- One of the most high profile examples of the intersection of criminality and extremism is the case of Mohammed Merah who killed seven people, including three Jewish children, in Toulouse in March 2012. While pinpointing the exact moment of his radicalisation is difficult, Merah had a history of extreme violence since his youth, including blinding a teenage girl and severely assaulting his own family members. Merah had been incarcerated on a few occasions as a result of his violence and was a hardened criminal. He was also someone who, evidently, had evolved a moral capacity for brutality as well as a practical efficiency in the use of violence. If men like Merah, with

such a pronounced history of violence, are mixing with extremist recruiters in prison environments, the results can only be more proficient and capable terrorist offenders (Alexander & Govan, 2012).

5 PREVENTION

To counter radicalisation and terrorism, several approaches are implemented in prevention projects. Especially in the previous years, the prevention of radicalisation and counter terrorism has gained in importance. Several European countries developed targeted approaches to counter radicalisation in the various forms of violent extremism. The following description of the approaches, targeting, and direction of prevention projects gives an overview of the existing gap between the needs and the methods of prevention.

The following analysis presents data collected from 108 projects or programmes across Europe, which focused on extremism, counter radicalisation, and/or de-radicalisation. The analysis is partially presented within the context provided by the case studies in this report detailing the characteristics of offenders (chapter 3).

5.1 TECHNICAL DETAILS OF PREVENTION PROJECTS

To give an overview about the technical details of the projects, the following focused on a description of the implementation, funding institutions and the concepts. The most projects are implemented nationwide (37.0 %). Almost 1/3 of the analysed projects are implemented in cities (32.4 %) and 12.0 % in regions (n = 89). They received their funding from programmes and initiatives of Federal Ministries (43.9 %), the government (19.4 %), or other several institutions (36.7 %) (n = 98). Almost seven in ten projects (73.1%) focused an educational assessment in their approach (n = 105).

5.2 TARGETS OF PREVENTION PROJECTS

Diagram 1 shows the results of the analysis of the targets of approaches. The descriptions of projects and interventions demonstrate a pronounced focus on young people and young adults (49.1 %). In 1/3 of all cases, the projects focused especially individuals of non-specific group. The third

biggest target groups are professionals (30.6 %). The fourth biggest target group is the social environment. To the social environment are families, communities, and peer groups. The percentages vary between 8.3 % and 16.7 %. Radicals, prisoners and refugees, and cyberspace are focused in less than 6 % of all projects. The environment is not focused upon at all (0 %).

Diagram 1: Target of approaches of preventing radicalisation in percentages. Multiple choices possible. Own calculations (n = 108).

Target of approaches

Target	Percentage
Young people and young adults	49,1%
Individual	33,3%
Professionals	30,6%
Families	16,7%
Community	10,2%
Peer groups	8,3%
Radicals	5,6%
Prisoners	5,6%
Refugees	2,8%
Cyberspace	1,9%
Environment	0,0%

5.3 OVERVIEW OF AIMS OF PREVENTION PROJECTS

The most important aim of projects to prevent radicalisation is to raise the awareness of the target group (36.1 %). More than 1/3 of the projects seek to raise awareness by enlightening and explaining about risks of radicalisation and violent extremism. A further aim of prevention projects is to strengthening the youth development (33.3 %) by focussing on critical thinking and strengthening self-confidence. Less than 1/4 of the preventing projects have set themselves the goal to prevent radicalisation (23.1 %) or to de-radicalise affected people (23.1 %). An important part of the aims of the projects is to enhance the expertise of professionals (16.7 %). Professionals (e.g. social workers, street workers, teachers and law enforcement officials) are often educated in recognising the processes of

change that lead to extremism as well as how to react appropriately. Other common goals of the projects are tackling racism (16.7 %), strengthening of democracy (14.8 %) and the protection of vulnerable people (13.9 %). Furthermore, to have a critical view on the own ideology and to handle with or respect other ideologies is named as an aim in 13.0 % of all projects. Over and above that, preventing projects focused in less than 10 % the building of cohesive communities (8.3 %), improving competencies with media (7.4 %), the enhancement of tolerance (7.4 %), the prevention of violence in general (6.5 %), the enhancement of political participation (6.5 %), and the integration of minorities. Less than 5 % of all prevention projects follow the aims of enhancing informal networks (4.6 %), improving intercultural integration (3.7 %), strengthening the communication or exchange between different groups (2.8 %), mitigate identity issues (1.9 %), tackle anti-Semitism (1.9 %), strengthening competencies in general (0.9 %), and identify extremists (0.9 %). It is striking here that none of the projects analysed has formulated the aim of strengthening the effectiveness of local agencies, which could be confronted with the target groups of prevention projects (0 %).

Diagram 2: Aims of project/programme in percentages. Multiple choices possible. Own calculation (n = 108).

Aims of project/programme

Aim	Percentage
Raising awareness	36,1%
Strengthening youth development	33,3%
Preventing radicalisaiton	23,1%
De-radicalisation	23,1%
Enhancing expertise of professionals	16,7%
Tackling racism	16,7%
Strengthening democracy	14,8%
Protecting vulnerable groups	13,9%
Handle with ideologies	13,0%
Building cohesive communities	8,3%
Mitigate competencies with media	7,4%
Enhancing tolerance	7,4%
Violence prevention, general	6,5%
Enhancing political participation	6,5%
Integration	6,5%
Enhancing informal network (e.g. selfhelp…	4,6%
Improving intercultural integration	3,7%
Strengthening communication/exchange	2,8%
Mitigate identity issues	1,9%
Provide a national multiagency network	1,9%
Tackling anti-Semitism	1,9%
Enhancing civil courage	0,9%
Strengthening competencies	0,9%
Identifying extremists	0,9%
Enhancing community engagement	0,0%
Enhancing effectiveness of local agencies	0,0%

5.4 Ideologies addressed in prevention projects

Ideologies play a key role in the prevention of violent extremism. They dictate the whole strategy upon which prevention projects are based. In diagram 3, the focus of the prevention projects on left wing, right wing and religious extremist's ideologies is shown. The representation shows that mainly Islamism and right wing ideologies are addressed (70.4 % and 47.2 %). Many are focussed on Salafism and Jihadism (46.3 % and 46.3 %). Left wing ideologies are focussed in 12.0 % of the projects. Other ideologies (4.6 %) are described such as the prevention of racism and anti-democratic attitudes.[1]

Diagram 3: Ideologies addressed in prevention projects. Multiple ideologies could be addressed. Own calculation (n = 108).

5.5 Target groups

Prevention projects and programs are directed towards selected groups. This makes it possible for them to focus on the special requirements of the group and to orientate themselves accordingly. Furthermore, projects are not directed towards one single group exclusively, rather the social

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[1] The differentiation according to Islamism, Salafism and Jihadism exist because the prevention projects have made this classification of the addressed ideologies. The analysis therefore described the high diversity within one addressed ideology, especially, within religious extremism.

environment (e.g. families and peer groups). Diagram 4 presented the results of the analysis of the main target groups of preventing radicalisation.

Diagram 4: Main target groups of prevention projects in percentages. Own calculation (n = 108).

Target group

Diagram 4 shows that almost 45 % of the projects are directed towards youth and young adults. The second main group is the community (24.1 %). 'Community' includes the citizens and the general population of a region or country. Furthermore, almost every fifth project included the family as an important target group to counter radicalisation (19.4 %). Further target groups are criminal offenders (13.9 %), Muslims (10.2 %), women (5.6 %) and migrants (4.6 %). The group of "others" seem to be the second largest group (32.4 %), indeed, the high number show the high diversity in the targeting focus. In this group, for example, religious institutions and leaders, police, local authority staff, prison staff, health service staff, further and higher education staff, probation staff, mosques, relatives (not clearly described), sport clubs, foster care, residential care, youth clubs, were all summarised.[2]

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[2] The target groups have a high diversity. The main groups which could clearly be defined are presented in diagram 4.

6 RESULTS

6.1 THE ROLE OF INTERNET AND MEDIA

Despite an abundance of literature claiming the significance of the internet in processes of radicalisation into violent extremism, significant gaps are still present in the way the internet and media is addressed by prevention tools. The results show that only 1.9 % of prevention measures target the internet and media. As demonstrated in several of the case studies, the internet is being increasingly used by individuals not only to self-radicalise but also for recruitment and the dissemination of terrorist material. Therefore, it surprising to see that measures have not intensified in the way in which this is deterred. Moreover, programmes and projects often mentioned the importance of improving media literacy in order to raise awareness and empower individuals to deal with extremist views found online. In our sample of 108 interventions, only 7.4 % specifically developed a response that strengthened the resilience of individuals to online radicalisation.

Clearly more projects should explicitly address extremist narratives and provide the means to off-balance the availability of illegal terrorist material online. With advances technology and its increasing use from younger age groups, prevention measures should focus on developing media responsibility with children through education and online courses in order to safeguard individuals from extremist behaviour and beliefs online.

6.2 VULNERABLE GROUPS

Vulnerable groups are focused little on by prevention measures, particularly in the case of refugees (2.8 %). This could be partially because the ways in which individuals are being radicalised is still not fully understood. Refuges are seen as a vulnerable group given that most seek refuge from war zones, having experienced traumatic events such as the death of family members and friends (Wright & Hankins, 2016). The relationship between mental illness like post-traumatic stress and the risk of radicalisation remains relatively unexplored, despite evidence of this playing a role. We highlight the importance of further research on exploring mental illness as a potential risk factor of radicalisation.

Thus, we would argue that prevention measures should explore the improved collaboration with health care staff who are in the best position to

not only identify mental health vulnerability but also provide treatment, with the help of social workers.

6.3 CONTACT TO RECRUITING AGENCIES

There is little research on how former extremists get involved with radical groups or recruitment agencies. Olsen (2009) reports that most extremist have not been recruited by a charismatic leader or an ideological preacher. They have already been in contact with sympathisers of the radical group. Consequently, it is difficult for prevention projects to intervene. However, studies show that vulnerable people are attracted to extremist beliefs. Therefore, de-radicalisation projects should strengthen youth development, democracy and protecting vulnerable groups. A few projects realise these aims. For example, just 13.9 % of the examined projects focus on protecting vulnerable groups. Clearly, more projects have to address the mentioned aims.

However, peers are an essential factor that fosters radicalisation. Peer groups are very important during the process of growing. They provide recognition, acceptance and support. Furthermore, friends are usually the first persons who recognise whether a member of the group sympathise with radical/extremist ideas and thoughts or become radical. Therefore, friends are the ones who could and should intervene. Conversely, peer groups/friends could be bad company as well. For example if using drugs, justifying and using violence or having radical views are favoured within the group. Besides, friends could make contacts to radical/extremist groups. Consequently, prevention programmes should target peer-groups. Then, projects should support and educate peer groups by equipping them with the knowledge about democracy, extremism, religious identity and possible counselling services. Furthermore, peers should be educated on how to deal with radicalised peers or those at risk.

The analysis of the selected projects show that almost one-half focus on young people and young adolescents. However, just 8.3 % of the examined projects focus on peer groups in particular. There are definitively not enough projects. As mentioned before, peers are usually the first persons who recognise a change. In addition, the analysis of the project show that raising awareness and strengthening democracy are some of the main aims implemented by projects. However, these approaches are not meant for peers in particular. Besides, almost no projects focus on enhancing civil courage or strengthening competencies.

6.4 SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Previous research demonstrates that social background is one important factor for radicalisation. Bakker (2011), Basra et al. (2016) and Feldman (2011) summed up in the definition of social background as the strata in the society, the criminal record, the educational background, and the migration background. Thus, different impact factors have an influence on the radicalisation process. Therefore, one challenge of the prevention of radicalisation should be the identification of the individual social backgrounds of vulnerable people.

The description of targets of prevention approaches show, that only 1/3 of all analysed projects focus the individual level. More frequently (49.1 %), a general approach is adopted which is intended to address in particular the group of young people and young adults (see diagram 1). If it is assumed that the analysis of individual backgrounds should take a more important role in the prevention of radicalisation, prevention projects could strengthen the analysis of the individual level.

Furthermore, the focus on smaller individual groups (e.g. prisoners, refugees or radicals) could be identified in general as a gap in the prevention landscape. The analysed projects follow different approaches in which the individual background of prisoners (5.6 %) or other vulnerable groups (refugees: 2.8 %) remains almost unseen.

6.5 EDUCATIONAL/PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Promoting education is commonly mentioned as one of the best prevention measures to protect individuals, particularly young adults and teenagers, against the risk factors of radicalisation (Aly, Taylor & Karnovsky, 2014). Schools have a key role here given their opportunity at reaching masses of young people. Although education systems across Europe vary in structure, standards and national curriculums, academic and professional staff have equal possibilities in ensuring that common values are installed in pupils to prevent extremist and violent attitudes from emerging. In particular, teachers are well placed to be able recognise when pupils are behaving differently. Given their potential at recognising early signs of radicalisation, educators and educational organisation should be addressed in prevention measures.

Many policy approaches have developed projects and interventions that better equip the educator's ability at identifying radicalisation and in encouraging the cultural and social development of pupils, for example through lesson plans that explore different faiths and beliefs and that promote common and democratic values. This is well reflected in our results,

which indicates supporting youth development as the second highest aim (33.3 %) of prevention measures in our sample. This would suggest that existing tools recognise the importance of fostering a better understanding in young populations of how democracy works and building the resilience of young people to hate speech and discrimination, such as xenophobia and racism. As young groups were the highest targeted population (44.4 %), it would suggest that current prevention measures pursue strategies that create a progressive change through developing young individuals in their social and emotional capacity. Such long-term initiatives are critical in addressing those factors of radicalisation that build up over time. Considering as radicalisation is often seen a progressive change (King & Taylor, 2011), it could be argued that further programmes should address changing attitudes in a similar progressive form.

6.6 PRISON AND SPIRITUAL WELFARE

As radicalisation in prison systems is a new phenomenon, knowledge and data on how individuals are radicalised in prison is somewhat limited. Cases of prisoners becoming radicalised are finite and their exposure to extremist content is comparatively restricted. Given the relatively small occurrence of prisoner radicalisation, the same can be observed in the focus it has received in prevention measures. Results from our sample reveal that as little as 13.9% of prevention efforts are targeted towards the offender population, inclusive of the prison environment.

The prison population, however, is becoming increasingly recognised as a breeding ground for radicalisation and should therefore be sufficiently reflected in prevention programmes and interventions. For example, nearly 5 percent of all prisoners in Belgium are believed to pose a radicalisation threat as of 2017 (Counter Extremism Project, 2017). Although results show that prisons have to some extent been addressed by counter-radicalisation interventions, more developments in prevention are needed to lessen the threat of Islamic extremism in prison populations. Suggested approaches include the introduction of Islamic counselling to strengthen the spiritual identity of prisoners.

6.7 MENTAL ILLNESS

Extensive media coverage of well-known terrorists in Germany, such as Safia S. and Arid Uka, has raised awareness of possible common characteristics among terrorists that may influence the pathways leading to terrorist crimes. Common features shared by both perpetrators formed the

basis for an exploratory study of a larger dataset of terrorists to examine the similarities and differences between terrorist actors.

Figure 1. Offender analysis – Flow diagram

Two methods were used to collect information on terrorist offenders. Firstly, a prominent online terrorism database containing a recorded history of terrorist crimes was selected; a search of the professional database was combined with additional online data sources. Of the various online databases on terrorist incidents, the Global Terrorism Database (GTB) was used because, compared to other online terrorism databases, it provides comprehensive coverage of contemporary terrorist incidents (1970 to 2017). For example: Terrorism in Western Europe: Events Data (TWEED) and RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) cover shorter periods from 1950 to 2004 and 1968 to 2009 respectively. The first sample yielded 170,350 individuals who had become violent in some form. This included terrorist attacks in connection with

right-wing, left-wing and Islamist ideologies. The following inclusion criteria were applied to the sample: (1) the person was living in Germany at the time of the crime (N=703); (2) the person committed a crime; (3) the crime was committed between 1970 and 2017 (N=164); (4) the perpetrator was easily identifiable (N=27). The final sample comprised 27 offenders.

In a second step, publicly available sources, such as published and unpublished articles and information repositories, were used to search for detailed information about the perpetrators. The final sample included offenders who had either been arrested and charged with the commission of a terrorist act or had died as a result of the terrorist act. All of them had evidence that they had undergone a process of radicalisation either through their own activities or through the activities of an organised group. It is important to point out that although the search strategy resulted in a comprehensive amount of information, the use of publicly available information, especially news reports, does not guarantee credibility or complete accuracy. In particular, when reporting on mental illness, the sources of information did not necessarily refer to official forensic evaluations. The search strategy included keywords and topics that were identified in the literature as factors and vulnerabilities in processes of violent extremism. This information was compared between the terrorist actors in the final sample to examine how they relate to or differ from each other. Demographic characteristics were compared as well as the types of attack.

Table 2. Sample of German violent extremists (n = 27)

Offender	Known ideology	Known mental illness	Known professional intervention	Nationality
Ahmad A. Alhaw	Islamist extremism	No	No	Palestinian
Anis Amri	Islamist extremism	No	No	Tunisian
Arid Uka	Islamist extremism	No	No	Kosovar
Beate Zschäpe	Left-wing extremism	No	No	German
Christian R.	Right-wing extremism and xenophobia	No	No	German
Christian B	No	No	No	German
David Ali Sonboly	Right-wing extremism	Depression, social phobia	Psychiatric medication	Iranian

Felix K.	Right-wing extremism and xenophobia	No	No	German
Frank S.	Right-wing extremism	Personality disorder	No	German
Frank W.	Politically motivated	Adjustment disorder	No	-
Gundolf Wilfried Köhler	Right-wing extremism	No	No	German
Lars Christiansen	Right-wing extremism	No	No	German
Markus Gartmann	Right-wing extremism and xenophobia	No	No	German
Michael Peters	Right-wing extremism	No	No	German
Mohammad Daleel	Islamist extremism	Depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)	Psychological therapy	Syrian
Mohammed B.	Islamist extremism	No	No	-
Nino K.	Right-wing extremism and xenophobia	No	No	German
Paul H.	No	Bipolar disorder	Forensic psychiatry	German
Rafik Mohammed Yousef	Islamist extremism	No	No	Iraqi
Riaz Khan Ahmadzai	Islamist extremism	No	No	Afghan
Safia Schmitter	Islamist extremism	No	No	German
Samir F.	Left-wing extremism	No	No	-

Table 2. Cont.

Saleh Schmitter	Islamist extremism	Yes	Psychiatric treatment	-
Uwe Böhnhardt	Left-wing extremsim	No	No	German
Uwe Mundlos	Left-wing extremism	No	No	German
Werner S.	Right-wing extremism and xenophobia	Depression	Psychotropic drugs	German
Yusuf T.	Islamist extremism	Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)	Social worker	German

Table 3 provides information on the 27 offenders who met the inclusion criteria of the study. Under one-third of the offenders in the sample were affected by mental illness, as 30% of the sample had some form of mental illness. The previously presented empirical studies have pointed to higher rates within larger datasets of terrorist populations. While the percentage of mental disorders in our sample is estimated at 30%, the estimate is based only on offenders for whom information was available and therefore does not necessarily reflect all known and unknown terrorist attacks. However, the percentage of mental disorders is not low either, so that differences between terrorist actors with a history of mental illness can be studied.

Perpetrators with a diagnosis of mental illness include affective disorders (37.5%), trauma disorders (25%), disorders of neurological development (12.5%), bipolar disorders (12.5%) and personality disorders (12.5%). These results describe disorders observed in previous studies in terrorist populations, particularly schizophrenia, depression and personality disorders. The prevalence of co-morbidity in the sample was low, with two offenders reporting symptoms of more than one mental illness. This is not consistent with previous studies, which indicated a higher prevalence of co-morbidity among the terrorist population, particularly among the lone-wolf actors.

The majority of offenders with a mental illness received treatment or psychological support in the period before the terrorist act (75%). The types of interventions received by offenders were grouped either as psychological therapy or psychiatric medication. No previous studies have provided a retrospective analysis of the characteristics of the forensic treatment of

terrorist offenders, such as the weeks of the intervention carried out, the total number of sessions or the for-times treatment plan. Since all offenders in this sample who were treated continued to commit terrorist acts, more information on the treatment programmes of the offenders is needed to verify the appropriateness of the treatment criteria and the quality of the therapeutic climate.

Table 3. Characteristics of German violent extremists (%)

	With mental illness	Without mental illness
Sex		
Male	100	92.9
Female	0	7.1
Country of birth		
Germany	62.5	35.7
Non-Germany	37.5	64.3
Ideology		
Right-wing	37.5	35.7
Left-wing	0	7.1
Islamist	37.5	50
Other	12.5	0
Extremist subtype		
Lone wolf	87.5	57.1
Extremist group	12.5	42.9
Recorded primary diagnosis		
Affective disorders	37.5	-
Trauma and stressor-related disorders	25	-
Neurodevelopmental disorders	12.5	-
Bipolar and related disorders	12.5	-
Personality disorders	12.5	-

As shown in Table 3, offenders were almost all male (92.9%). There is a paucity of research concerning mental health and terrorism that has investigated potential differences among female terrorists. Particularly in terrorism, research has typically focused on male samples. Results presented here cannot be generalised to female terrorists. Further studies are needed to examine possible gender differences among terrorists with mental illness, for example, to investigate whether one gender is more likely to experience a metal disorder and, if so, the type of mental

illness. Such differences will help understand relevant vulnerability factors between the sexes and possible effects of gender roles in different cultures on mental illness.

Of the 27 offenders, slightly over a half were non-German citizens that were living in Germany at the time of the offence either as a refugee or as an asylum seeker. The other half were German citizens. Among the offenders with a mental illness, the large majority (62.5%) were German citizens. Offenders without a mental illness were, in contrast, largely non-German citizens (64.3%). From these results, once may suggest that German citizens involved in domestic terrorism are more likely to have a mental illness. Further, individuals without a mental illness who engaged in terrorism in Germany are more likely to be noncitizens.

Most of the offenders in our sample engaged in Islamist extremism (87.5%), followed by right-wing extremism (73.2%). Offenders engaged least in left-wing extremism (7.1%). Similarly, Islamist extremism and right-wing extremism were most frequently associated to offenders with mental illness than left-wing ideologies. The frequency distribution of extremist ideologies between offenders with mental illness and without mental illness is fairly even with no distinct group indicating a higher association with mental illness. This highlights that extremist attitudes are a characteristic of both mentally ill and non-mentally ill terrorist populations.

In addition, lone wolf offenders constituted 87.5% of those offenders in the mentally ill group, which is significantly higher than the number of offenders with mental illness associated to an extremist group (12.5%). This result is in line with previous studies suggesting lone-actors as having a higher prevalence of mental disorders than individuals who are members of an extremist group. However, such a significant difference was not observed in offenders that did not have a mental illness. In this group, lone wolf offenders contributed again to the highest frequency of extremist subtype (57.1%).

It should be noted that there are several limitations to the analysis. The information on the perpetrators was taken from a number of Internet sources, the accuracy of which may be questionable. Media reports may dilute the factuality or specificity of forensic reports, making it difficult to verify mental illness. To counteract this, retrospective analyses of violent extremist populations should be based on raw data obtained directly from case files and the forensic reports themselves. A more precise presentation of the individual diagnoses is then possible. The results of this study are also largely based on male perpetrators. Studies with samples that also include female offenders would be estimated when examining gender

differences as well as similarities in offenders with mental disorders. In addition, retrospective comparisons of violent extremist populations in different European countries will help to investigate potentially relevant local cultural differences in the rates of mental illness.

Attention should be diverted from the importance of mental health as an isolated factor that encourages violent extremism. According to current research, violent extremism is a culmination of factors that can be exacerbated when combined with mental vulnerability. Since terrorists come from a wide variety of social backgrounds and motivations, it appears that no single social group is attracted to violent extremism. Research should therefore be promoted to examine the impact of violent extremism and terrorism on all groups of the population, as this offers new dimensions to understanding the phenomenon and its impact, which is particularly important in the field of mental health. Applying a public health perspective to violent extremism provides a unique understanding of the well-being of individuals and the quality of life that leads to violent extremism. However, numerous studies have shown that the number of violent extremists with mental illness is too small a sample, making it difficult to justify the allocation of anxiety resources in counter-terrorism to deal with mental illness. Furthermore, the limited evidence available does not suggest that mental health intervention is essential or irrelevant.

Mental health problems are indeed an important issue, both a health and a social one, but it is argued here that mental health is best dealt with through public health and social policy rather than under the banner of an anti-terrorism policy. It is true that violent extremists with mental health problems are of interest both to governments and to health practitioners: Governments are inclined to prevent terrorist behaviour, as are medical practitioners in the provision of medical and mental health care. The problem, however, is when the two are linked, which, as mentioned earlier, can have serious consequences for those affected by mental illness in terms of social and political marginalisation.

The issue of terrorism and mental illness should be unravelled and addressed more subtly from a prevention perspective. As such, health services should not be entrusted with preventive tasks related to the fight against radicalisation, such as risk assessment tools, which are added to the daily clinical tasks. Nevertheless, health professionals can play an important and less direct role, as shown by the development of multiagency structures in different countries, for example in explaining how mental illness affects vulnerable groups, especially those already known to the police. There is no evidence that mental ill health is a risk factor for extremist violence or a measure of extremist tendencies. Persons with specific mental health problems, such as substance abuse, may increase the risk of

violence, but are unlikely to harm the general public. The perpetrators in our sample and in other studies have shown individual problems, often compounded and resulting in a certain vulnerability. Together with other vulnerable groups, mentally ill people are able to engage with extremist groups or develop a radicalised ideology on their own. However, addressing these vulnerabilities should not be included in plans to combat terrorism.

7 SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK

Countering online-radicalisation is still underdeveloped in Europe and is the explicit aim of only 1.9 % of prevention measures. Given the impact the internet has in all aspects of radicalisation, an increased number of prevention measures targeting online radicalisation should be established.

The relationship between mental illness and the risk of radicalisation requires further research. Improved collaborations with healthcare staff provide a potential key role in identifying risk factors of radicalisation.

Research has suggested that vulnerable groups are more susceptible to becoming radicalised and targeted by terrorist groups for recruitment. However, only 13.9 % of prevention measures in our sample were aimed at protecting vulnerable groups. In particular, only 2.8 % of the measures identified in our sample were aimed at refugees. More prevention measures targeting groups vulnerable to radicalisation and the factors affecting recruitment are required.

The predominant focus of approaches of prevention projects is prevention of radicalisation in general undetermined groups (young people: 49.1 %). Previous research has shown that the identification of specific grievances in individuals' social backgrounds can be an important factor in radicalisation processes and, therefore, more focus should be brought onto social background.

Promoting the development of young people was the second highest (33.3 %) aim and young populations were the most targeted group (44.4 %) in our sample. This would indicate that fostering democratic values and resilience has been recognised as an important approach to curbing the onset of radicalisation.

The threat of radicalisation within prison populations is growing. The number of extremist behaviours highlighted in prison systems are rather low, which is reflected in the limited focus it has received in prevention measures, which is 13.8 %. Challenging extremist behaviours is critical across all vulnerable populations and so increasing the amount of measures combating radicalisation in connection to prison populations should be reinforced.

Evidence is presented that only a small percentage of extremist offenders actually suffer from mental illness. However, certain mental disorders appear to reoccur among extremist offenders, such as depression, trauma, developmental disorders, bipolar and personality disorders. When looking closely at possible correlates among samples of extremists with mental illness, this study indicates a higher prevalence of mental illness among lone-wolf terrorism than in other extremist subtypes. Another key finding from the study was that the majority of offenders with mental illness received treatment or were receiving treatment before engaging in violent acts of extremism. This seems to indicate that potential offenders are already known to treatment providers. Yet a lack of evidence is presented for the efficacy of mental health treatments in our sample, as individuals then proceeded to engage in violent acts of extremism. The scarcity of studies examining mental health treatments among extremist populations, whether retrospective or transversal, means the efficacy of treatments cannot be evaluated. With no evidence-based data, medical health practitioners are unable to offer a uniform treatment for individuals with mental illness who may be radicalising.

APPENDIX

Table 4:   Overview of terror attacks (right-wing/left-wing/Islamism) in Germany

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
02.04.1968	Left-wing (RAF)	Arson	Warehouse	0	0	Horst Söhnlein
11.05.1972	Left-wing (RAF)	Explosive device	US-Soldiers	1	13	Gerhard Müller
24.05.1972	Left-wing (RAF)	Car bomb	US-Soldiers	3	5	Andreas Baader, Holger Klaus Meins, Jan-Carl Raspe, Gudrun Ensslin, Brigitte Mohnhaupt and other
05.09.1972	Palestinian terror organisation "Black September"	Hostage taking	Olympic Games in Munich	17	Unknown	Atef Bseiso, Abu Daoud, Jamal Al-Gashey, Mohammed Boudia, Ali Hassan Salameh
30.04.1977	Left-wing ("Rote Zora")	Explosive device	Building of the German Medical Association in Berlin	0	0	Andreas Baader
26.09.1980	Right-wing (Gundolf Köhler)	Explosive device	Oktoberfest in Munich	13	211	Gundolf Köhler
03.11.1982	Left-wing ("Devrimci Sol")	Firearms	Turkish Consul General in Cologne	0	0	Group "Devrimci Sol"
07.01.1984	Right-wing/catholic-fundamentalist	Petrol	Discotheque "Liverpool" in Munich	1	8	Wolfgang Abel, Marco Furlan
04./05.04. 1986	Unknown	Bomb	Discotheque "La Belle" in Berlin	3	> 200	Wolfgang Abel, Marco Furlan
01.03.1988	Left-wing (Action Directe)	Arson	Renault agricultural machinery branch	0	0	Unknown/Action Directe
17.09.-23.09.1991	Right-wing (500 persons)	different	Accommodation of refugees (Hoyerswerda)	unknown	32	Unknown
31.01.1992	Right-wing	Arson	Accommodation of refugees (Lampertheim)	3	unknown	3 young, unknown persons
14.03.1992	Right-wing (40 teenager)	Unknown	Accommodation of refugees (Saal)	1	unknown	40 young unknown persons

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUM-BERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUM-BERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
22.08.1992	Right-wing	Arson and other	Accommodation of refugees (Rostock-Lichtenhagen)	Unknown	unknown	Unknown
23.11.1992	Right-wing	Arson	Two houses of Turkish families	3	unknown	Michael P., Lars C.
27.03.1993	Left-wing (RAF)	Explosive device	Jail in Weiterstadt	0	0	3 unknown men and one unknown women
29.05.1993	Right-wing	Arson	Two family house	5	17	Four unknown youth persons
18.01.1996	Unknown	Arson	Accommodation of refugees (Lübeck)	10	unknown	Not explained
16.07.2000	Right-wing	Arson	Accommodation of refugees (Ludwigshafen-Oppau)	0	3	-
27.07.2000	Right-wing	Pipe bomb	Tram station	1	10	-
19.01.2001	Right-wing (NSU)	Explosive device	German-Iranian shop	0	1	Uwe Mundlos
09.06.2004	Right-wing (NSU)	Explosive device (nail-bomb)	Parade	0	22	Uwe Böhnhardt
31.07.2006	Islamic extrem-ism	Attempted bomb at-tacks	Two trains	0	0	-
06.01.2007	Right-wing	Molotov cocktails	Accommodation of refugees (Sangershausen)	0	3	-
02.02.2007	Right-wing	Assassina-tion with fire-arm	One Tunisian man in a supermarket	1	0	-
02.03.2011	Islamic-extrem-ism	Assassina-tion with fire-arm	US-Soldiers	2	2	-
17.09.2015	Islamic-extrem-ism	Knife attack	Police officer	1	1	-
07.10.2015	Right-wing	Knife attack	Politician (Henriette Reker)	0	1	Frank S.
26.02.2016	Islamic-extrem-ism	Knife attack	Police officers	0	1	Safia Schmitter
16.04.2016	Islamic-extrem-ism	Explosive device	Gurdwara (Sikh religion)	0	3	-
18.07.2016	Islamic-extrem-ism	Axe, knife	Train traveller	1 (assas-sin)	5	-

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
24.06.2016	(Islamic-extrem-ism)	Backpack bomb	Visitors of a festival	1 (assas-sin)	15	Ali S.
27.09.2016	Right-wing	Explosive devices	Mosque and inter-national congress centre	0	0	-
25.10.2016	Right-wing ("Reichsbür-ger")	Explosive devices	Syrian large family	0	12	-
19.12.2016	Islamic-extrem-ism	Truck, fire-arms	Visitors of the Christmas market	12	55	Anis Amri

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Table 5:   Overview of terror attacks (right-wing/left-wing/Islamism) in United Kingdom

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
12.01.1971	Anarchist com-munism	Explosive devices	House of govern-ment minister Rob-ert Carr	0	0	-
31.10.1971	IRA	Explosive devices	Post office tower	0	0	-
22.02.1972	IRA	Car bomb	Headquarters mess (British army base)	7	19	Noel Jenkins
19.09.1972	Palestinensien terror organisation: Black September Organisation (BSO)	Letter bomb Bombs posted in: Is-rael (14), London (8), Ottawa (6), Argentina (5), Vienna (5), New York (3), Geneva (3), Kinshasa (3), Paris (2), Montreal (1), Brussels (1),	Israeli embassy in London	1	0	unknown

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
08.03.1973	'Provisional' IRA	4 Car bombs, explosive devices	Outside the 'Old Bailey' and government's agriculture department headquarters	1	>150	unknown
10.09.1973	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London's King's Cross and Euston stations	0	21	unknown
04.02.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	a bus carrying British soldiers and several of their family members	12	38	unknown
17.06.1974	IRA	Explosive devices	Houses of parliament	0	11	unknown
05.10.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Guildford Pub,	5	65	unknown
22.10.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Brook's gentlemen club	0	3	unknown
07.11.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Pub in Woolwich (London)	2	28	unknown
14.11.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Coventry telephone exchange	1	0	James Patrick McDade
21.11.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Two pubs in Birmingham	21	182	Alleged perpetrator: Michael Hayes
18.12.1974	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Bristol's most popular shopping districts	0	17	unknown
27.08.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Pub, frequented by British military personnel	0	33	unknown
05.09.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	lobby of the Hilton Hotel	2	63	unknown
18.11.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Walton's restaurant	2	23	unknown
27.11.1975	'Provisional' IRA	Gun	TV presenter Ross McWhirter (North London)	1	unknown	unknown
06.-12.12.1975	'Provisional' IRA	-	IRA members barricaded themselves in a flat and held two occupants hostage	0	2	unknown
20.12.1975	Ulster Defence Association (UDA)	Explosive devices	Biddy Mulligan's pub (London)	0	5	unknown

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUMBERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUMBERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
17.12.1978	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Maggs department store	0	7	unknown
17.01.1979	-	Explosive devices	Texaco oil terminal on Canvey Island	0	0	unknown
17.02.1979	Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)	Explosive devices	Two pubs frequented by Catholics in Glasgow, Scotland	-	-	unknown
30.03.1979	Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)	Car bomb	Airey Neave (politician)	1	0	unknown
30.04.1980	Iranian Arab	Siege	Iranian Embassy in London	2	unknown	unknown
10.10.1981	IRA	Explosive devices	Outside Chelsea Barracks	2	39	unknown
26.10.1981	IRA	Explosive devices	Wimpy Bar, London	1	Unknown	unknown
14.03.1982	South African security police	Explosive devices	African National Congress (ANC) in London	0	1	General Johann Coetzee (former head), Craig Williamson, John McPherson, Roger Raven, Wybrand du Toit, John Adam, James Taylor and Eugene de Kock
20.07.1982	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	British military ceremonies	11	c. 50	unknown
17.12.1983	'Provisional' IRA	Car bomb	Harrods department store	6	90	unknown
12.10.1984	'Provisional' IRA	A long-delay time bomb	Grand Brighton Hotel	5	31	unknown
21.12.1988	*two Libyan nationals*	Explosive devices	Pan Am Flight 103	270	0	Unknown *(Gaddafi accepted responsibility and paid compensation)*
03.08.1989	Unknown	Explosive devices	Preparing a bomb	1	unknown	Mustafa Mahmoud Mazeh
22.09.1989	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Royal Marines base in Deal, Kent.	11	22	unknown
16.05.1990	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/car bomb	Minibus with passengers	1	1	unknown

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUM-BERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUM-BERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
01.06.1990	'Provisional' IRA	Gun attack	Lichfield City railway station, Stafford-shire	1	1	unknown
20.07.1990	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London Stock Ex-change	0	0	unknown
07.02.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	10 Downing Street, London	0	4	Unknown
18.02.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Victoria Station	1	38	Unknown
15.11.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	St Albans city centre	2	0	Patricia Black and Frankie Ryan
28.02.1991	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London Bridge sta-tion	0	29	unknown
10.04.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/truck bomb	Outside the Baltic Exchange building	3	91	unknown
07.06.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Gun attack	Routine traffic con-trol	1	0	Paul Magee
25.08.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Three fire-bombs/ Ex-plosive de-vices	Shoplatch, The Charles Darwin Centre and Shrews-bury Castle	0	0	unknown
12.10.1992	Unknown	Explosive devices	Toilet of a pub in Covent Garden	1	4	unknown
03.12.1992	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/car bomb	Central Manchester	0	65	unknown
20.03.1993	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Outside shops in Warrington, Chesh-ire	2	>50	unknown
24.04.1993	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/truck bomb	City of London at Bishopsgate.	1	>40	unknown
9./11./13.03. 1994	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Heathrow Airport	0	0	Unknown
26-27.07.1994	Palestinensien group	Explosive devices/car bombs	London	0	20	unknown
09.02.1996	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	London Docklands	2	>100	Unknown
18.02.1996	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices	Aldwych in central London	1	8	Edward O'Brien

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUM-BERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUM-BERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
15.06.1996	'Provisional' IRA	Explosive devices/truck bomb	Central Manchester	0	200	unknown
17./24./30./4. 1999	Neo-Nazi mili-tant/right wing	Explosive devices/nail bombs	Soho, Brixton and Brick Lane	3	139	David Copeland (Copeland, 24, a disaffected loner, sexually confused and driven by homophobia, Na-zism and deep-seated racism)
20.09.2000	Real Irish Re-publican Army (RIRA)	Rocket launcher at-tack	MI6 Headquarters, London	0	0	Unknown
04.03.2001	RIRA	Explosive devices	outside the BBC Television Centre in London	0	1	Unknown
03.04.2001	RIRA	Explosive devices	Ealing, London	0	7	unknown
04.11.2001	RIRA	Explosive devices/car bomb	Birmingham	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
07.07.2005	Islamist extrem-ists	Suicide bomb at-tacks	London	56 (incl. 4 bombers)	784	Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lind-say, Shehzad Tanweer
Jan.-Feb. 2007	Anti-authoritari-anism	A 7 letter bomb cam-paign	Various companies and agencies	0	8	Miles Cooper
30.06.2007	Islamist extrem-ists	Explosive devices/car bomb	Glasgow Airport	1	5	Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed
22.05.2008	Islamist extrem-ists	Explosive devices/nail bomb	Giraffe cafe and res-taurant in Prin-cesshay, Exeter	0	1 (at-tacker)	Mohamed Ab-dulaziz Rashid Saeed-Alim (Nicky Reilly)
29.04.-12.07.2013	Right-wing ex-tremist	Knife at-tack/explo-sive de-vices/nail bombs	Knife attack against outside a mosque in Walsall, a mosque in Wolverhampton, a mosque in Tipton	1	unknown	Pavlo Lapshyn (Ukrainian student and right-wing ex-tremist)
22.05.2013	Islamist extrem-ists	Attempted decapitation	Woolwich, Royal Borough of Green-wich	1	unknown	Michael Adebo-lajo and Michael Adebowale

DAY OF ATTACK	FORM OF EXTREMISM	APPLICA-TION	GOAL	NUM-BERS OF DEATH PEOPLE	NUM-BERS OF INJURED PEOPLE	IDENTIFIED/ POSSIBLE OFFENDER
05.12.2015	Islamist extrem-ists	Knife attack	Leytonstone Tube Station in East Lon-don	0	3	Muhaydin Mire
16.06.2016	Right-wing	Fire arm shoot-ing, stabbing	Market street, Bir-stall, West Yorkshire	1	1	Thomas Mair
22.03.2017	Islamist extrem-ists	Vehicle-ram-ming attack, stabbing	in the vicinity of the Palace of Westmin-ster in London,	6	49	Khalid Masood
22.05.2017	Islamist extrem-ists	Suicide bomb	Manchester Arena	22	250	Salmen Abedi
03.06.2017	Islamist extrem-ists	Vehicle-ram-ming attack, suicide at-tack	London Bridge and Borough Market area London	11	48	huram Shazad Butt, Rachid Re-douane, Youssef Zaghba
19.06.2017	Islamist extrem-ists	Vehicle-ram-ming attack	near the Muslim Welfare House	1 (of-fender)	10	Darren Osborne
15.09.2017	Islamist extrem-ists	underground attack	Parsons Green tube station, London	0	30	unknown

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