

**INTERVENTION AND THE POLITICS OF INFORMATION:
US ATTENTION TO FOREIGN CIVIL CONFLICT**

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ABSTRACT

To improve scholarly understanding of the domestic drivers of third-party intervention in civil conflicts, this dissertation borrows a theoretical framework from the policy process literature. Specifically, I explain intervention through the lens of punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), a view which holds that the attention of government policymakers to most issues is persistently low but can be suddenly and dramatically mobilized. To apply this theory to the study of intervention, I collect data on US congressional speeches and US news coverage of foreign civil conflicts, 1946-1999. I then use the data to investigate the correlates of senior policymaker attention and its effects on intervention decisions. With respect to correlates, I find clear evidence that PET mechanisms motivate US congressional attention to civil conflict: I find that the distribution of change in attention to civil conflicts is leptokurtic, that civil conflicts are more likely to reach the attention of US senior policymakers if they have already reached the attention of actors lower in the policy process, and that congressional attention is subject to crowding effects. With respect to effects on policy, my findings are mixed. Congressional attention increases the likelihood of intervention when I look at all interventions but, when looking at only major interventions and controlling for prior US intervention, I find congressional attention has no statistically significant effect.

CHAPTER 1

Third-Party Intervention: The State of the Literature and a New Theoretical Explanation

Obama had written about how we should have intervened in Rwanda... But he also frequently pointed out that the people urging intervention in Syria had been silent when millions of people were killed in the Democratic Republic of Congo. "There's no way there would have been any appetite for that in Congress."

~Ben Rhodes, deputy national-security adviser for Barack Obama.

Politicians... may not have a fully analyzed and worked out logical theory on exactly what their position is on the Central African Republic, or exactly what they believe about the Rohingya in Myanmar. And the question of whether they're gonna be focusing this week on Yemen or this week on South Sudan may have nothing to do with the objective conditions on the ground in Yemen or South Sudan and may have a great deal more to do with what happens to be in the newspapers.

~Rory Stewart, British MP and International Development Secretary for Teresa May

Issues have a way of grabbing headlines and dominating the schedules of public officials when they were virtually ignored only weeks or months before.

~Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, in *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*

Some of the deadliest conflicts since the Second World War world have been civil wars which were internationalized through the intervention of external states. Scholars have analyzed many of the characteristics of these interventions and found that they have clear effects on conflict outcomes, duration, and fatalities. It is also clear that the likelihood of third-party intervention varies greatly across conflicts. However, while scholars have identified several correlates which affect the occurrence of third-party interventions, we do not generally understand states' heterogenous responses to civil conflict. I contend that one of the major weaknesses of this literature is that, with rare exception, it has not theorized about or empirically

examined the domestic processes which determine whether a third-party state intervenes in an ongoing civil conflict. The aim of this dissertation is, therefore, to improve scholarly understanding of the domestic determinants of state intervention in civil conflicts.¹

My contribution is to import insights from the policy process literature in public policy scholarship, specifically punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), into the study of civil conflict intervention.² PET explains policy outputs in terms of policymakers' information processing; the issues that states choose to address, including foreign conflicts, are the ones that senior policymakers spend their limited time and attention thinking about. In this dissertation, I argue that states are unlikely to intervene in a civil conflict if the conflict does not measurably occupy the attention of their senior policymakers but that, once a conflict has gained the attention of senior policymakers, strategic constraints will reduce the likelihood of intervention. I test this argument by analyzing the attention US policymakers pay to foreign civil conflicts and the policies the United States adopts regarding them. To this end, I use both large-N statistical methods and qualitative case studies.

The remainder of this chapter will summarize the state of scholarly knowledge about the correlates and causes of civil conflict intervention. I then review the ways in which scholars have incorporated the domestic politics of the intervener in explanations of intervention. Next, I discuss theoretical frameworks that could inform my study of the effects of domestic politics on intervention; I then introduce the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy change and use it to derive four tentative hypotheses. Finally, I describe the research methods and data collection

¹ States are not the only international actors that intervene in civil conflicts. International organizations such as the UN undertake a significant minority of civil conflict interventions (Regan 1996, 345). However, UN intervention and the extensive scholarly literature on it are outside the scope of this dissertation.

² The concept of punctuated equilibria—which was originally conceived in evolutionary biology—has been explored in many fields, including international relations. Diehl and Goertz (2000), for example, use it in their model of the initiation and termination of enduring rivalries. My emphasis, however, is on a specific theoretical framework, based on the concept, which developed within the policy process literature.

process that I use to identify the domestic correlates of intervention and provide a brief chapter outline.

Third-Party Intervention

There is a robust quantitative literature investigating the effects of third-party intervention on civil conflict dynamics (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004) and outcome (Regan 1996; Mason, Weingarten, and Fett 1999). Academic research on the subject has improved greatly in recent years with the recognition that scholars should treat conflict duration and outcome as conceptually unified (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Brandt et al. 2008) and that scholars should model the characteristics of combatant groups in addition to the characteristics of states in which civil conflict takes place (Cunningham 2006; 2010; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour 2012). Intervention scholarship has also been improved by quantitative studies on the correlates of third-party intervention. However, while these studies have advanced our knowledge, it remains the case that “comparatively little attention has been paid to explanations of why third-party states intervene in the conflicts of other states” (Stojek and Chacha 2015, 228; see also Aydin 2010, 47 and Aydin 2012, 5). The domestic drivers of intervention, in particular, remain under-examined. Aydin, whose book argues that states’ intervention behavior has domestic causes, claims that international relations scholarship “downplays state preferences and domestic imperatives in decision making” (2012, 9). Below, I discuss the current state of knowledge on the correlates of third-party intervention into civil conflicts. I organize my review into two sections, based on Findley and Teo’s (2006) distinction between phenomenon-centric and actor-centric research.

Phenomenon-Centric Explanations of Intervention

Research that treats civil conflicts as the unit of analysis is phenomenon-centric. Such research is poorly suited to explain “who intervenes, why, and on whose side” (Findley and Teo 2006, 828), since information about states that choose not to intervene does not appear in conflict-level data. Phenomenon-centric research is, however, well suited to ask when or under what conditions conflicts experience intervention—since these questions can be addressed at the conflict and conflict country level.

Conceptually, there are three ways that a conflict can draw outside states to intervene in it. First, if a conflict is relatively susceptible to influence, i.e., if outside action is likely to change the conflict’s development and outcome, then the decision to intervene is more attractive to outside states. Second, if there are substantial rents that an outside state can acquire by intervening, intervention is more desirable and therefore more likely. Third, if a conflict creates severe negative externalities, which affect an outside state, the state may decide that non-intervention is more costly than intervening.

Conflicts are significantly more susceptible to foreign influence when there is relative parity between rebel and government forces, i.e., when the rebel side is strong. Gent (2008) argues that, regardless of what a potential intervener’s preferences are for the outcome of a civil conflict, stronger rebels make its influence more significant. He theorizes that there is a selection effect at work. If a foreign power shares the preferences of the government side in a civil conflict, it will only need to intervene when the government side is seriously threatened. Since weak rebel groups, by definition, struggle to challenge the government for control of the state or its territories, they do not seriously threaten the survival of the government and the government may be able to defeat them without outside help. Likewise, a weak rebel group may not be able

to effectively challenge the government even if it does receive support from outside. When rebel groups are strong, however, it is both much more likely that a rebel-biased intervener can lead the rebels to victory and that a government-biased intervener will need to actively prevent rebel takeover of the state. Gent (2008) finds empirical evidence in support of these arguments; intervention is more likely in conflicts with strong rebels and support for strong rebels is more likely to lead to rebel victory. Other studies have arrived at similar findings (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016; Ives 2019).

Other characteristics of conflicts can render them less susceptible to foreign influence and, thus, deter intervention. Conflicts that involve numerous competing factions (Cunningham 2006, 2010), rebel bases in remote regions, irregular amounts of fighting, and the use of guerilla tactics (Walter 2009) tend to be intractable and long lasting. They are both more difficult to win through outright military victory and more difficult to settle through negotiations. However, Aydin (2010) argues that a civil conflict's general susceptibility to influence is not observable. Potential interveners, therefore, must review the history of a conflict and use heuristics—decision shortcuts based on prior experience—to determine their likelihood of intervention success. Conflicts that are protracted or that have seen numerous unsuccessful intervention attempts signal to potential interveners that they are difficult to influence. But, though Aydin finds support for this view, other scholars do not. Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris (2016) find that previous interventions have a positive effect on the likelihood of future interventions. Moreover, the effect that previous interventions have on the likelihood of future ones is conditioned by the actor-level relationships between prospective interveners, which I discuss in the following subsection.

Third-party states are also incentivized to intervene by more straightforward rent-seeking opportunities, such as access to natural resources—though there is some debate among scholars about the circumstances under which natural resources motivate intervention. Findley and Marineau (2015) argue that interveners loot natural resources both for their own enrichment and to finance rebel contestation of the state. They find that natural resources increase the risk of foreign intervention on the rebel side but not the government side of civil conflicts. Ross (2004) further claims that loot-seeking rebel-biased intervention can be the cause rather than result of conflict. Stojek and Chacha’s (2015) analysis, using oil exports, reaches a broadly similar conclusion about the likelihood of pro-rebel intervention. It also, however, finds that oil exports are associated with a minor increase in the likelihood of pro-government intervention. Both Klosek (2020) and Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris (2016) corroborate this, finding that prospective interveners with high dependence on the oil of a civil conflict state are more likely to intervene. Lutable natural resource arguments are contested, however. Aydin (2010) finds that oil production decreases the risk of foreign intervention, and Koga (2011) finds that the relationship identified by Findley and Marineau (2015) does not hold for democracies.

Finally, third-party states may intervene in a civil conflict to prevent significant negative externalities, such as refugee flows and contagion effects, that emanate from the conflict state. Kathman (2010) describes how the negative effects of civil conflicts can spill into the affairs of neighboring states. Refugees fleeing a conflict state can depress the economy and living standards of its neighbors; civil conflict itself can damage a regional economy; successful rebel groups can have a demonstration effect, providing an example for restive populations in neighboring states to follow; or, when an aggrieved minority is split between multiple states, rebel groups may collaborate across borders. Countries near a civil conflict state have good

reason to intervene if they expect that doing so will help mitigate these problems. Consequently, there is consistent evidence that refugee flows increase the likelihood of intervention, whether scholars measure the absolute number of refugees (Kathman 2010), or the presence of a refugee crisis (Regan 1998; Lemke and Regan 2004; Kathman 2011; Stojek and Chacha 2015). There is also fair evidence that contagion and the risk of contagion prompts states to intervene in foreign civil conflicts. Saideman (2002) finds that, in regions where many countries are experiencing civil conflict, rebel groups are more likely to receive support. Kathman (2010) creates a variable measuring the risk that each civil conflict in the international system has of infecting its neighbors and finds that contagion risk is correlated with third-party intervention. Other studies also find that regional refugee flows (Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) and contagion effects (Kathman 2011) increase the likelihood of intervention by states outside the immediate area.

Kathman (2011) also argues that states with high-casualty conflicts are more threatening to their neighbors and, thus, are more likely to experience intervention. He finds a positive relationship between conflict intensity and the likelihood of intervention, as do others (Gent 2007; Aydin 2010; Klosek 2020).³ This finding, however, is not consistent. Regan (1998) and Lemke and Regan (2004) both find that conflict intensity is associated with a reduced likelihood of intervention. Stojek and Chacha (2015) find that conflict intensity has no effect on aggregate intervention likelihood, though they do find that it increases the likelihood of rebel-biased intervention.

³ Aydin (2010) arrives at this result in contravention of her theoretical argument that interventions in high intensity conflicts are more costly and, therefore, less likely.

Actor-Centric Explanations of Intervention

An actor-centric approach to civil conflict intervention specifies dyads of potential interveners and civil conflict states as the unit of analysis. This makes it possible to evaluate the traits of all countries that *could have* intervened in a conflict and, in doing so, allows scholars to investigate the causal effects of intervener characteristics, intervener-conflict state relationships, and relationships between interveners. I discuss the most prominent of these explanations below, which include proximity, power, alliances, rivalries, colonial ties, ethnic ties, and regime type.

One of the most consistent findings in the literature is that states close to or contiguous with a state experiencing civil conflict are more likely to intervene (Khosla 1999; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Greig and Regan 2008; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Kathman 2011; Nome 2013; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016; Bove and Böhmelt 2019; Klosek 2020). The underlying reasoning for these results is that intervention is more difficult over greater distances, and that states have greater opportunities to intervene in the civil conflicts of their immediate or nearby neighbors. To my knowledge, only three studies find otherwise. One of these, by Regan (1998), operationalizes contiguity as a conflict level variable, the number of shared borders that a state experiencing civil conflict has, which, on its face, seems a less valid measure of proximity/contiguity than those used elsewhere in the literature. The other two (Yoon 1997; Goldman 2017), drop most of the variation in distance from their data. Yoon (1997) analyzes only the United States, while Goldman (2017) confines his analysis to politically relevant dyads⁴ and states that are observed to have intervened and only investigates rebel biased interventions as a dependent variable.

⁴ Politically relevant dyads, introduced by Lemke and Reed (2001), are the subset of state pairs that share a border or include a major power.

Investigation of power differentials between states has found similarly consistent results—and for similar reasons. Powerful states have greater opportunities to intervene in civil conflicts due to their greater monetary resources and military capabilities. Major powers are more likely to intervene in civil conflicts (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Kathman 2011; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016; Bove and Böhmelt 2019)⁵ and, more generally, so are third-party states that are powerful relative to the civil conflict state (Gent 2007; Kathman 2010; Stojek and Chacha 2015; Bove and Böhmelt 2019; Klosek 2020). Nome (2013), however, finds that this relationship is only true of interventions on the government’s side.

The literature also reliably finds that states intervene in civil conflicts out of a desire to help allies and punish rivals. Except for Kathman (2010), scholars have repeatedly found that alliance ties increase the likelihood of intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004; Fordham 2008; Kathman 2011, Klosek 2020), particularly government-biased intervention (Findley and Teo 2006; Stojek and Chacha 2015). Rivalries, inversely, increase the likelihood that a rival state will undertake a rebel-biased intervention (Findley and Teo 2006; Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; Goldman 2017). This effect is evident in the overwhelming evidence that interventions were more likely during the Cold War (Regan 1998; Lemke and Regan 2004; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Kathman 2010; 2011; Stojek and Chacha 2015; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016; Bove and Böhmelt 2019). Furthermore, as noted in the preceding sub-section, alliances and rivalries condition the effect that prior interventions have on the likelihood of future ones. Findley and Teo (2006) find that states are more likely to intervene in civil conflicts on the same side that an ally has intervened or on the

⁵ Goldman (2017) finds that major powers are less likely to intervene in support of rebel groups but, again, he confines his analysis to politically relevant dyads and states that are observed to have intervened, which likely affects his results for this control variable.

side opposite a rival, as does Ives (2019). Gent (2007) finds that states are more likely to intervene in civil conflicts when a state with divergent foreign policy preferences has done so first. Yoon (1997), Fordham (2008), and Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) all find that the United States follows this pattern, though Yoon notes that it does not apply when the prior intervention was undertaken by the Soviet Union.

Scholars have investigated the effects of other types of interstate relationships on intervention likelihood as well. Findings regarding some of these are contradictory. Colonial ties, for example, are found by several scholars to increase the likelihood of intervention (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Kathman 2011, Klosek 2020). But others argue that, once trade ties are controlled for, which themselves increase the likelihood of intervention, colonial ties have no effect (Stojek and Chacha 2015; Chacha and Stojek 2016). Another set of scholars, however, find the trade ties have no effect (Yoon 1997) or a negative effect (Kathman 2011).

The effect of ethnic ties, on the other hand, is seldom disputed. Ethnic ties have consistently been found to increase the likelihood of intervention (Saideman 1997; Carment and James 2000; Saideman 2002; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Fox, James, and Li 2009; Kathman 2010; Koga 2011; Nome 2013; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016; Bove and Böhmelt 2019), though there is some nuance to these findings and one recent study (Klosek 2020) finds that they have no effect. Saideman (2002) finds that ethnic ties increase the likelihood of third-party support for embattled ethnic minorities. Koga (2011) finds that they only increase the likelihood of rebel-biased intervention by democratic interveners. Nome (2013), however, finds evidence of a more universal effect: when either combatant in a civil conflict has ethnic ties in a neighboring state the neighbor is more likely to intervene, even when the neighboring state only

contains a marginal ethnic group without control of government. Some scholars suggest that the effects of ethnic ties are particularly strong for religiously based groups (Fox 2001; Fox, James, and Li 2009), though this is not a consistent finding (Saideman 2002), and Ives (2019) argues that only third parties where religious authority is institutionalized in the state are more likely to intervene.

A final variable, which requires an actor-centric perspective, is regime type. The most tested argument about regime type's effects on intervention is made by Hermann and Kegley (1996), who argue that democracies, while no less likely than autocracies to intervene in the affairs of other states, are less likely to experience intervention themselves. They contend that, since democracies value negotiation, mediation, and compromise, other states can solve disputes with them diplomatically and, therefore, do not need to resort to intervention or other extraordinary means of influence. Hermann and Kegley find support for this argument, as does later work by Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris (2016) and Bove and Böhmelt (2019). Lemke and Regan (2004), however, find that democracies are more likely to have third-party states intervene in their civil conflicts, while Kathman (2011) finds that democracies are more likely to intervene in the conflicts of others. Scholars considering regime type from other perspectives come to similarly contradictory conclusions. Aydin (2012) looks at the effect of joint democracy on different strategies of intervention, finding that it increases the likelihood of mediation attempts but lowers the likelihood of a biased intervention. Stojek and Chacha (2015), however, find that, while democracies have no special propensity for intervention, the interventions they do undertake tend to be government-biased interventions in fellow democracies. Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) corroborate Stojek and Chacha's results, but only look at the US.

Taking Stock

While scholars exploring the correlates of civil war intervention have come to a few consistent conclusions, most variables that are commonly included in the literature are sensitive to differences in model specification.⁶ The general consensus is that states are more likely to intervene in a civil conflict under the following conditions: when they are close to it, when they are more powerful than the belligerent parties, when they have ethnic ties to one of the belligerent parties, when one of their allies or rivals is involved in the conflict, and when the conflict is generating large numbers of refugees. However, there are some important issues with the state of research on the causes of intervention. First, some studies, especially the earlier ones, do not use actor-centric research designs and, therefore, omit or mis-specify important intervener variables (Hermann and Kegley 1996; Regan 1998; Saideman 2002; Fox, James, and Li 2009). Second, few studies conduct holistic theory building about the causes of intervention. Most advance narrow explanations based on their specific theory, be it rivalries, contagion, ethnic ties, or interest group politics (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Kathman 2010; Stojek and Chacha 2015; Nome 2013; Klosek 2020). Third, while the literature explores the *opportunity* to intervene quite well, discussions of states' *motivation* to intervene rely heavily on *homo economicus* assumptions of a narrowly self-interested utility maximizer (Ghent 2007; Aydin 2010; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016).⁷ While such assumptions can be a useful simplifying device, it is also beneficial for research to examine motivations empirically—in this case, by investigating the domestic processes that generate them. I review the extent of knowledge about the domestic drivers of intervention in the next section.

⁶ I would consider the following as belonging to this category: rebel group strength, previous interventions, lootable resources, contagion risk, conflict intensity, colonial ties, trade ties, and regime type.

⁷ The conceptual importance of considering opportunity and willingness in international relations scholarship is discussed at length by Most and Starr (1989).

Research on the Domestic Determinants of Intervention

A few scholars in the civil war literature have looked explicitly at the domestic politics of potential interveners as determinants of intervention, though this has been relatively infrequent and has not produced clear findings. Some of the domestic level factors which have been proposed to affect intervention likelihood are structural electoral constraints, diversionary tactics, war weariness, news media coverage, and domestic economic interests. Focusing on the United States, both Yoon (1997) and Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) hypothesize that electoral constraints will hinder intervention, suggesting that during the increased scrutiny of an election campaign or when an opposing party controls Congress, the president will be disinclined to act adventurously abroad. But, while Yoon finds that the US is less likely to undertake interventions in presidential election years, Mullenbach and Matthews find no evidence of this for either presidential or midterm elections. They do, however, find evidence that divided government decreases the likelihood of US intervention. Relatedly, Regan (2000b) finds that divided government reduces the likelihood of US policy change towards civil conflicts in which it is already involved. Evidence of diversionary tactics and war weariness is also scant. Diversionary tactics, as explained by Ostrom and Job (1986), are attempts by a leader facing an economic downturn, or other harmful development, to divert the attention of the public by deploying military forces. Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) find no evidence that civil war intervention serves this purpose, and Yoon (1997) finds that the US was *less* likely to intervene in civil conflicts during economic downturns. Neither study finds support for the war weariness argument either; the US was no less likely to use force after previous involvement in a protracted conflict. Indeed, Yoon finds that the US was more likely to intervene in civil conflicts in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.

News media coverage, unlike other domestic explanations of intervention, has received considerable attention, owing to extensive communication discipline scholarship on the role of news media in public life. Much of this research emphasizes humanitarian intervention, not civil war intervention, per se (Livingston 1997; P. Robinson 1999; 2000; Gilboa 2005; Balabanova 2010; Peksen, Peterson, and Drury 2014), but there is considerable overlap. There is a consensus that media coverage increases the likelihood of intervention, even when controlling for endogeneity (Bell, Frank, and Macharia 2013), but scholars disagree about why the relationship exists and the degree to which it is contingent. One line of argument, the “CNN effect”, holds that news media stake an independent position on foreign policy issues and, due to the power of real-time communications technology, can exert major influence on domestic audiences and policy elites (Livingston 1997). Another view, the manufacturing consent argument, holds that news media only focuses on issues and positions that have already been articulated by policy elites, and that their coverage largely serves to persuade the public of elites’ pre-existing views (Mermin 2004). A final view holds that the news media can exert an independent effect on policymakers but that the effect is context dependent. It predicts that news media will only influence policy when policy is uncertain, when news media are critical of government, and when their coverage empathizes with suffering people. P. Robinson (2000) and Balabanova (2010) both find support for the model through qualitative case studies, though Balabanova suggests that the relationship between news media and policy may not hold beyond western media outlets.

A final domestic level explanation of civil conflict intervention is articulated by Aydin (2012), who provides a thick description of the way domestic economic forces affect government decisions. She argues that the benefits of economic exchange in foreign markets are concentrated

within a subset of domestic economic actors. Intervention and other targeted security policies help these actors disproportionately. Thus, these actors organize to influence the state's intervention policies as well as economic ones. Aydin further argues that these pressures are contextual; domestic pressures vary in content and intensity based on the state's political institutions. Established democracies, she holds, follow the logic of selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999; 2002; 2003); their large winning coalitions prevent any narrow influence group from dominating policy. However, in new democracies, especially presidential ones, and in autocracies, especially personalist regimes and monarchies, elite interest groups can exert substantial influence over security policy.

Unfortunately, as Aydin recognizes, interest group influence is “less amenable to large sample empirical analysis” (2012, 51). She is only able to proxy the effects of interest group influence by investigating trade flows, foreign direct investment (FDI), and preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Conceptually, if trade and FDI are high between a civil conflict state and third-party and if PTAs have been signed, there are likely to be domestic economic interest groups which pressure the third-party to intervene. Aydin finds evidence that PTAs increase intervention likelihood overall and that FDI increases the likelihood of non-military intervention, though it decreases the likelihood of military intervention, but she does not find evidence that trade increases intervention likelihood. Klosek (2020), revisiting her arguments, finds that FDI does increase the likelihood of military intervention when using measures that specify the protection of existing investments rather than near term expansions of investment. He finds this process at work in arms sales as well; longstanding arms sales from a third-party to a conflict state increase the likelihood the third-party will intervene.

But while the domestic level explanations of civil conflict intervention explored by these scholars offer useful insights, they are greatly limited. Yoon (1997) and Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) conduct hypothesis testing but do not base it on an organizing theory, rather each study compiles a raft of testable hypotheses from the wider literatures on intervention and US politics. Aydin (2012) does devote significant effort to developing an organizing theory but does not directly test it. Finally, most studies of the effects of news media focus on humanitarian interventions rather than civil conflict interventions as a whole; many interventions into civil conflicts are not humanitarian. Consequently, there is need for an explicit, theoretically informed, exploration of the domestic drivers of civil conflict intervention.

In the next section, I briefly review the literatures in foreign policy analysis and public policy process to identify a suitable theoretical framework. I then discuss a framework, punctuated equilibrium theory, that I believe can inform further study.

Foreign Policy Analysis, Policy Process, and Punctuated Equilibrium

The foreign policy analysis (FPA) subfield of international relations is the first place to look for a theoretical framework that explains the generation of states' foreign policy. Where IR scholars have often treated international activity as taking place between states that are unitary actors, FPA is explicitly interested in domestic politics.⁸ It holds that all state behavior "is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups" (Hudson 2005, 1) and stresses that the characteristics of such actors are important predictors of states' international behavior. Several productive research programs have been developed in FPA scholarship, including

⁸ All the paradigmatic approaches to IR focus on unitary actors. See Kaarbo (2015, 192-3) for a discussion of how neorealism (Waltz 2010), neoliberalism (Keohane and Nye 2012), and constructivism (Wendt 2014) determined that the process of foreign policymaking was outside their scope.

poliheuristic theory (Mintz et al. 1997), prospect theory (McDermott 2001), bureaucratic politics (Allison 1969), operational code analysis (Walker 1983), the analogical reasoning approach (Dyson and Preston 2006), and others. However, FPA is eclectic; it contains few theoretical frameworks with sweeping explanations of foreign policy behavior. While FPA was at one time interested in producing a grand theory of comparative foreign policy (Rosenau 1968), no such theory has been realized and FPA has largely moved on to developing middle-range theory (Kaarbo 2003).

This is due to a fundamental difficulty with the study of policymaking: policy creation is complex, it involves many decision makers, and their actions are context dependent. Without falling back on simplifying assumptions, it is difficult to test policy creation hypotheses that do not require a herculean data collection project. Compelling FPA research agendas have been badly undermined by this issue. For example, the decision unit framework (Hermann and Hermann 1989) advanced a promising means of explaining foreign policymaking: it proposed that by identifying the type of actor that makes decisions in a policy area—individual, group, or multiple autonomous actors—scholars could apply the psychological and/or social characteristics appropriate to the actor’s study. However, this task would have required significant labor to identify the decision units governing different areas of foreign policymaking, and such work was never undertaken. Subsequent scholarship, in its absence, could not quantify decision units and undertook further research primarily through illustrative case studies.⁹ Difficulties with the study of policymaking are not, however, confined to FPA. Scholars of the public policy process have faced similar problems but, due to major data collection efforts, have had significant success.

⁹ See Volume 3, Number 2 of the *International Studies Review* for its issue on the decision unit framework. Except for Beasley et al. (2001), who use a non-representative sample of 65 instances of decision making regarding various foreign policy issues, all articles focus on theory building and/or rely on illustrative case studies.

Unfortunately, insights from this extensive literature have seldom been applied to research in international relations (Lentner 2006).

Policy Process Frameworks and the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

Public policy scholars have put forth several organizing frameworks to explain the policy process, including the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), the diffusion of innovations literature (DOI), the institutional analysis and development framework (IAD), the multiple streams framework (MSF), the narrative policy framework (NPF), the punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), the policy feedback theory (PFT), and the social construction framework (SCF) (see Schlager 2007; Nowlin 2011; Cairney and Heikkila 2014; Petridou 2014). All offer insights into the way that policies are selected to address problems. As I noted, however, it is difficult to study the totality of relevant political actors in a policy area. And not all policy process frameworks have seen this work done equally well. Of the eight listed above, PET has been the most consistent source of rigorous large-n empirical scholarship on state-driven policy change.¹⁰ It has had nearly 30 years of empirical and theoretical development and is underpinned by the Comparative Agendas Project (2018), a vast data collection enterprise, which records attention to 21 policy areas and 220 subareas, by executives, legislatures, media, political parties, and interest groups, across 21 countries, 2 US states, and the European Union.

The initial formulation of PET, developed by Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones in *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*, endeavors to explain a dynamic in US politics wherein policy change is gradual or non-existent during most periods but, contrary to the

¹⁰ ACF and MSF have both had a comparable history of active research but have seen considerably less large-n quantitative work and, in ACF's case, less application across diverse issues and national settings. See Jones et al. (2015) and Cairney and Jones (2015) for a discussion of the Multiple Streams Framework and its limitations, and Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen (2009) for a discussion of the Advocacy Coalition Framework.

expectations of then prominent gradualist scholarship (Lindblom 1959), is suddenly and unexpectedly mobilized in others. Baumgartner and Jones (1993/2009) argued that this process arises because most US policy is handled quietly, by issue-oriented policy subsystems, at a level below the attention of macropolitical institutions such as Congress and the presidency. Policy entrepreneurs who are unhappy with the status quo in an issue area can effect change by challenging the policy image—a combination of information and emotional appeals—that is prevalent in public discussion regarding their issue. They can also attempt to move their issue into another policy venue, since the United States is replete with jurisdictional overlap between its levels and branches of government. Using these strategies, policy entrepreneurs can sometimes circumvent a policy subsystem monopolized by one set of actors or policies and bring their preferred policy image to macropolitical attention. When successful, this leads to positive feedback effects and large-scale policy changes.

Jones and Baumgartner subsequently expanded on their research program by introducing the general punctuation hypothesis (Jones and Baumgartner 2005), which generalizes their US model to any arrangement “in which information flows into a policymaking system, and the system, acting on these signals from its environment, attends to the problem and acts to alleviate it” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 176). All such systems, they claim, will exhibit patterns of stability and punctuation in their attempts to translate informational inputs into policy outputs. There are two reasons. First, human cognition limits the amount of information that key decision-makers can pay attention to, absorb, and act upon in any policymaking system. Second, formal institutional rules, such as supermajority requirements or multiple veto points, inhibit policy action; this is generally called institutional friction (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Baumgartner, Foucault, and François 2006; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Epp 2015; Lam and Chan

2015). Change in policy occurs when gradually building pressure from informational inputs, which is largely neglected, builds to an explosive level that can no longer be ignored, or when, in more dramatic cases, a major event that vividly symbolizes what is wrong with current policy provokes action. Baumgartner et al. (2009) refer to the resulting pattern as stick-slip dynamics and to its cause as disproportionate information processing.

The general punctuation hypothesis, Jones and Baumgartner (2005) claim, predicts that the distribution of changes in policy will be leptokurtic, i.e., the distribution will be characterized by a high concentration of observations around the mean and fatter tails than a normal distribution. If policy change were incremental rather than punctuated, they argue, we would expect policy change to be normally distributed. This is because, in an incremental system of policy change, the degree of change between two periods would be the result of many independent factors, some positive some negative, and—as the Central Limit Theorem holds—the combination of large numbers of independent factors is normally distributed. Under incrementalism, then, policy change would be best characterized as a random walk over time. And, since the degrees of policy change that would result from a random walk are also normally distributed, we would expect incrementalism, given these assumptions, to be normally distributed. The general punctuations hypothesis, however, with its emphasis on drastic change, would suggest a greater proportion of very large changes than are found in a normal distribution, and a smaller proportion of medium sized changes, since issue areas in need of policy change are expected to be neglected for extended periods (Robinson et al. 2007). Empirical work on PET tests primarily for evidence of this expectation, using stochastic process methods to determine the kurtosis of change distributions in government policy and, especially, in public budgets.

Baumgartner and Jones's initial applications of PET explained policy change in the United States, and explored civilian nuclear power, pesticides, tobacco policy (Baumgartner and Jones 1993/2009) and the overall federal budget (Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998). In each case they observed numerous periods of minor change punctuated by a few periods with very large changes. This pattern has been repeatedly corroborated by further study. In the US, scholars have identified punctuated change distributions in the national budget (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Robinson and Caver 2006), state budgets (Breunig and Koski 2006), local budgets (Jordan 2003; Robinson 2004; Robinson et al. 2007), congressional hearings and lawmaking (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), state lawmaking (Boushey 2012), national executive orders (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), and national regulatory change (Workman, Robinson, and Bark 2017). PET has also been applied to other democracies, including Belgium (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2009), Canada (Pralle 2003; Jones et al. 2009), Denmark (Mortensen 2005; Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson 2006; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2009; Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010), France (Baumgartner, Foucault, and François 2006; Jones et al. 2009), Germany (Jones et al. 2009), and the UK (John and Margetts 2003; Jones et al. 2009; John and Jennings 2010; John et al. 2013), as well as to the European Union (Baumgartner, Foucault, and François 2012). Recent scholarship has also, increasingly used PET to explain policy change in autocracies and mixed regimes (Lam and Chan 2015; Chan and Zhao 2016; Baumgartner et al. 2017). In each case, results show that policy change exhibits the leptokurtic distributions expected by PET.

Insights from Punctuated Equilibrium Theory

So, how does punctuated equilibrium theory inform the study of civil conflict intervention? The first and most straightforward insight is that third-party governments' policies towards civil conflicts will follow the same pattern as policy activity in other domains. There will be long periods of equilibrium punctuated by brief periods of change; civil conflicts will grab headlines and dominate the schedules of public officials when they were virtually ignored only months before. Empirically, all civil conflict related policy outputs should have leptokurtic distributions of change. These outputs should become increasingly punctuated as they reach higher stages of policymaking. PET scholars have repeatedly observed that the outputs of actors which are closer to the production of policy have greater kurtosis (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Lam and Chan 2015). For example, the outputs of news media are leptokurtic, but congressional hearings are more leptokurtic, and changes in public budgets exhibit greater kurtosis still. Lam and Chan (2015) argue that this is because the outputs at higher stages of policymaking require greater coordination and are inhibited by greater levels of institutional friction, i.e., it is much easier to publish news stories or hold hearings than it is to pass budgets.

Second, a punctuation in the outputs of actors at lower stages of policymaking will likely lead to a punctuation in the outputs of actors at higher stages. This is not a frequent argument in the literature though it is made sometimes, as for example by Lam and Chan (2015). Hypothetically, any actor may take notice of informational inputs that pass a threshold level of salience. However, the actors at the lower stages will be more likely to react due to their lower costs of action and the lower demands exerted on their attention. The action of the lower level actors then provides further signals to senior policymakers about, in this case, the humanitarian

suffering, security risk, or spoils opportunities of a civil conflict, increasing their attention to it and the likelihood of intervention.

The PET literature also contains several more specific claims about the effects of news media. Boydston, Hardy, and Walgrave (2014) refine the measurement of these effects by showing that periods of sudden, high, and sustained media coverage of a topic, which they call “media storms,” have outsized effects on public awareness and perception of issues. Walgrave et al. (2017) further observe that media storms in US news outlets directly increase the number of US Congressional hearings. An alternate argument within the PET literature (Wolfe 2012), however, is that news media can “put the brakes” on policy change by mobilizing the attention of coalitions who do not want an issue to be addressed. Thus, increased news media attention to a civil conflict could decrease rather than increase the likelihood of intervention.

Attention to civil conflicts may also be driven by domestic circumstances which focus policymakers’ time towards other pressing issues—such as elections or economic downturns, and here PET scholarship offers a third insight. It would expect attention to be subject to crowding effects; since attention is a limited resource, attention paid to one issue cannot be paid to others. Jennings et al. (2011) provide an explanation of this process. They argue that policymaker attention is dominated by the core functions of government—defense, international affairs, the economy, government operations, and the rule of law—but that the salience of the core functions varies over time. At some times, one or more of the core functions of government are highly salient and crowd out other issues, at other times they are not, and attention is more diverse. I would interpret Jennings et al.’s argument to suggest that states are less likely to intervene in civil conflicts when public attention is dominated by the core functions of government.

Finally, though senior policymakers in a potential third-party intervener can be, and often are, keenly attentive to developments in an ongoing civil conflict and desire to act, they may still choose to do nothing. The findings of the intervention literature are instructive in this regard; many factors come into play in intervention decisions. A potential intervener may not have an opportunity to intervene effectively if it is far away or is unwilling to antagonize a powerful conflict state.

Research Goals, Methods, and Outline

The purpose of the preceding literature review has been to identify the limitations of scholarship on civil conflict intervention, and to show that PET is a promising theoretical framework for addressing them. In summary, I argued that the effect of domestic political processes on civil conflict intervention has been under-explored, and I proposed that investigating domestic information processing could help explain why we observe heterogeneous intervention behavior from third-party interveners. My goal in this dissertation is to determine empirically whether the attention of senior policymakers explains third-party states' intervention in civil conflicts, and to identify what motivates policymakers to pay attention to some conflicts but not others.

As I discussed in the preceding section, considering international behavior from a policy change perspective is fundamentally difficult and imposes a steep empirical burden. There is an overwhelming volume of information to know about a variety of actors and the contingent nature of their behavior. Thus, the first step towards satisfying the goals of this project is to identify a set of policymakers that is narrow enough to be manageable, while also being informative about the domestic policy processes that drive third-party intervention in civil conflicts. This section

identifies a set of policymakers—the United States Congress—and presents a research methodology and operationalization of its attention that allows me to test my hypotheses.

Finding a Manageable Set of Policymakers

PET literature often focuses on budgetary or similarly narrow changes in specific organizations (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Breunig and Koski 2006; Robinson et al. 2007), single countries (Jones and Baumgartner 2005; John and Bevan 2012; Baumgartner and Jones 2015), or, since the development of the Comparative Agendas Project, small numbers of countries (Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2009; Jennings et al. 2011). There are good reasons for this. PET proposes a complicated policymaking process, with relevant actors scattered across multiple organs of state, and with different issue areas having different sets of relevant actors. Making cross-national comparisons is not straightforward and, while doing so would be worthwhile in understanding third-party interventions, it is beyond the capacity of a dissertation project to accomplish. Consequently, I focus on a single country, the United States, and use a subset of the policymakers who are responsible for choosing which foreign civil conflicts it selects for intervention, US Congresspersons. While this represents a considerable reduction in the breadth of actors and cases available for analysis, it is also the best practical proxy of policymaker attention if my analysis is to be constrained to one country and one set of actors.

The United States has the capability to intervene in any country in the international system, which makes every extant civil conflict an intervention opportunity for it. Consequently, since 1945, the United States has been the most frequent intervener in civil conflicts; of the 1036 cases of intervention identified in Regan's (2002) third-party intervention dataset, 244 were

undertaken by the United States. This provides considerable variability for the key dependent variable. Another advantage of focusing on the United States is that the US government keeps detailed public records of its policymakers' actions and that these records have already been transformed into manipulable data¹¹—this greatly facilitates my data collection. A final benefit of focusing on the United States is that it allows me to make explicit comparisons with previous research. In both the civil war intervention literature and the PET literature, research that is not broadly cross-national focuses on the United States more frequently than any other country. Constraining my analysis to the United States, therefore, gives this dissertation project many relevant cases and broad comparability to earlier studies without imposing onerous data collection demands.

Research Methods and Data Collection

I use primarily large-n quantitative statistical methods, but the complexity of the policy-making process requires some recourse to more textured analysis as well. This dissertation, therefore, introduces its data alongside a short case study before moving to a two-part quantitative analysis of attention and intervention in foreign civil conflicts.

I measure US attention to foreign civil conflicts, which serves alternately as a dependent and independent variable, by quantifying the amount of discussion of them in the US Congress. To do so, I transform Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy's (2017) full text congressional speech data into an operational measure of congressional attention. I use simple keywords in context searches to identify when a conflict is being discussed and then count the number of speeches in each month that mention each conflict. I quantify media attention, which serves as an independent

¹¹ Prior scholars have digitized to the *Congressional Record* using automated coding in Python (Shaffer 2017) and R (Shoub 2018, Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy 2017). Each article provides detailed information on methodology.

variable in both quantitative chapters, by title searching *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Washington Post* articles in the *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* database. I then hand count the number of stories in each month that mention each conflict. I explain my rationale for using these data sources in detail in Chapter 2.

Chapter Outline

The preceding discussion has focused on three issues: (1) the limitations of IR literature in explaining the causes of intervention; (2) the utility of punctuated equilibrium theory, which explains state decision-making as a series of micro-level processes, for explaining intervention decisions; and (3), since PET is a positive theory, its empirical predictions and the methods I will use to test them. In summary, I will address the domestic politics gap in the civil war intervention literature by quantitatively identifying the determinants of policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts and the degree to which it drives state intervention decisions. I will do so in the four subsequent chapters:

In chapter 2, I introduce the data that I have collected about US policymaker and media attention to foreign civil conflicts. I describe in detail my data sources and coding methodology, present descriptive statistics and visualizations of the collected data, and use the dataset in a short case study that traces the development of the Somali Civil War and how events in the conflict generated US news coverage, congressional speeches, and intervention decisions.

In chapter 3, I conduct a quantitative study that explains US policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts. First, I use stochastic process methods to examine the distribution of change in policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts. I then use regression analysis to determine whether media attention and media storms increase the amount of congressional

attention that is paid to civil conflicts, and whether agenda crowding decreases it. In chapter 4, I use survival modeling to test whether US congressional and media attention increase the likelihood of US intervention in foreign civil conflicts, while controlling for other common explanations within the intervention literature.

In the fifth and final chapter, I summarize my findings, discuss the empirical support that each of my arguments has received, and discuss the dissertation's ultimate contribution to the civil war and punctuated equilibrium literatures.

CHAPTER 2

Measuring Congressional and Newspaper Attention to Civil Conflicts

In this chapter I present a new dataset which quantifies the attention that US policymakers and media outlets pay to foreign civil conflicts. Specifically, it counts the monthly number of times each war-level conflict recorded in the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset is mentioned in House and Senate floor speeches, and it counts the monthly number of stories about each conflict that were published by the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal*. Below, I describe my data sources and coding methodology, present descriptive statistics for the collected data, and use the dataset in a short case study that traces the development of the Somali Civil War and how events in the conflict generated US news coverage, congressional speeches, and intervention decisions.

First, it is necessary to restate what these counts are intended to measure. Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) (Baumgartner and Jones 1993/2009) holds that senior policymakers' responses to problems are driven by disproportionate information processing. They inevitably leave most issues—foreign civil conflicts in this case—to be handled at lower levels of policymaking while they pursue their specific priorities. Policy action, in these low salience areas, is characterized by stasis and bureaucratic inertia until a major event, often one driven by the accretion of minor events, demands attention. My aim is to identify when a civil conflict is being largely ignored and when it has captured senior policymakers' attention.

Data Collection, Congressional Speeches

Congressional attention, as measured by monthly Congressional speeches, is not itself a direct cause of US intervention in foreign civil conflicts. Congress has less control of foreign policy than the President or the bureaucracy. But Congress, the President, and the political appointees in the State Department consume similar information and are attentive to a similar agenda. Congressional attention is, therefore, meant to be a proxy of the attention of these actors, which, throughout this dissertation, I refer to as senior policymaker attention. Admittedly, as a matter of practicality, it is impossible to directly measure attention; the cognitive processes governing what policymakers notice and do not notice is not available to scholars. This is true of all actors, including Congress. The reason that I measure Congressional speeches rather than the statements of actors that more directly affect foreign policy is that Congress's public statements are a more useful proxy of attention due to their greater volume and regularity. Congresspersons speak consistently and at great length every day that Congress is in session.

By comparison, the President and senior foreign policy bureaucracy speak infrequently. At an earlier stage in this research project, I used documents from the American Presidency Project to code monthly Presidential statements regarding ongoing civil conflicts. Presidential statements are not made at a consistent interval, and they follow patterns that vary by president. For example, Ronald Reagan mentioned the troubles in Northern Ireland on every St. Patrick's Day of his presidency. He did not otherwise mention the conflict frequently in public and no other President commented on the Northern Ireland conflict in the same way. The frequency at which individual political appointees make public statements is similarly limited. Actors at lower levels of the foreign policy bureaucracy, which Baumgartner and Jones (1993/2009) would

consider a part of relatively more static issue-oriented policy subsystems, are also less suited to analysis as they are less likely to directly affect changes in policy.

Though Congressional speeches are not a standard measure of attention in PET scholarship, there is precedent for it via similar measures within the literature. PET scholarship has tended to focus on budgets, from US national, state, and local ones (Jones, Baumgartner, and True 1998; Robinson and Caver 2006, Breunig and Koski 2006; Jordan 2003) to those in other developed democracies (John and Margetts 2003, Baumgartner, Foucault, and François 2006, Jones et al. 2009), to those in developing (Baumgartner et al. 2017) and authoritarian countries (Chan and Zhao 2016), but some research has applied the PET framework quite broadly. Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) investigate 15 diverse datasets for punctuated processes of change, ranging from US executive orders to Dow-Jones Industrial Average returns.

But, more relevantly, this broad-ranging strand within the PET literature has frequently included US Congressional hearings among its measures (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Green-Pedersen and Wilkerson 2006; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Hegelich, Fraune, and Knollmann 2015). Congressional hearings are importantly different from Congressional speeches, as they are formally organized and attend to a specific issue, but they are also fundamentally similar in that they capture US Congresspersons' verbal attention. I prefer Congressional speeches due to the narrow issue focus of this project and more complete availability of data. Most PET scholarship concerns change in attention across the broad policy areas categorized as 'major topics' by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP), e.g. health, social welfare, defense.¹² That is an appropriate choice for such studies; congressional hearings fit well within the CAP's broad topic areas. Congressional hearings are less suited to an issue as

¹² The Comparative Agendas Project captures both committee and subcommittee hearings.

narrow as civil conflicts, however. As with presidential statements, I investigated congressional hearings in an earlier stage of this project, via the *ProQuest Congressional* database.¹³ I found that hearings about single foreign civil conflicts were quite rare, limiting variability in the data. Another issue with hearings, which I discuss further in the agenda crowding subsection of chapter 3, is that they are frequently unpublished and not publicly available, owing to sensitive or classified content, or simply because the chair chose not to have a hearing published. Committees do not need to justify a decision not to publish, and hearings often remain unpublished for several decades after they are held.

Ideally, an investigation of US policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts would incorporate multiple government institutions and a broad range of activities—Congressional hearings, Congressional subcommittee meetings, Presidential statements, Presidential State of the Union speeches, and reporting within the State Department—in addition to Congressional hearings. But that is beyond the capacity of this data collection effort. Given the limitations of other measures, Congressional speeches are the best available proxy of senior policymaker attention.

Coding Process

Both houses of Congress keep a detailed official account of their proceedings via the *Congressional Record*. It contains the full text of every debate and procedure that takes place while congress is in session. It also contains extensions of speeches, witness testimony, or outside publications which, though not stated in full on the floor of Congress, are read into the record at the request of Congresspersons. The United States Government Publishing Office

¹³ *ProQuest Congressional* also captures both committee and subcommittee hearings.

publishes these documents daily while congress is in session and, at the end of each session of Congress, collects, edits, re-paginates, and indexes the daily publications into the *Congressional Record Bound Edition*. The Bound Edition is currently available from 1873 through 2016.

Although the *Congressional Record* has been digitized into searchable pdf files, its sheer volume would make it unmanageable to code without computer automation. Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2017) have, however, produced a machine searchable corpus of the *Congressional Record Daily and Bound Editions*, 1873 through 2017. Using optical character recognition with HeinOnline scans of the print volumes, they create a series of plain text speech and metadata files. Their text processing procedure sorts each speech into its own observation using the *Congressional Record's* standardized identification of each new speaker to determine when one speech ends, and the next speech begins. It also standardizes punctuation and whitespace and removes non-speech text, i.e., headers, footers, section headings, etc.

To transform Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy's (2017) data—which consists of *millions* of observations of full text Congressional speeches¹⁴—into an operational measure of congressional attention, I use a simple method based on keywords in context searches to identify when a conflict is being discussed. I then count the number of speeches in each month that mention each conflict. To do this, I use the R software environment's Quantitative Processing of Textual Data package, or *quanteda* (Benoit et al. 2018). The process is conducted one conflict at a time in four steps:

First, I specify the date range of each conflict, as identified by the ACD, and remove all speeches that do not fall within the it. Second, I conduct a keywords in context search for the name of the country or region in which the conflict took place. For country names, I search for

¹⁴ The data contains 8,174,069 unique Congressional speeches between 1945 and 2000.

each name specified in Hensel’s ICOW Historical State Names Data Set. So, for example, I search for both Burma and Myanmar. For conflicts over specific regions, I use the territory name specified in the ACD. I specify each search so that it will also capture the demonym of a country or region, i.e., Burman, Burmese, and Myanmarese. For countries, these are listed in Hensel’s data. For regions, I use my best judgment based on the conflict descriptions in the UCDP’s online database. The keyword searches return one observation each time a conflict/region is mentioned in a Congressional speech and record the 20 words that appear before the keyword and 20 words that appear after it.

Third, I use R’s regular expressions functions to check whether each observation’s set of 40 adjacent words contains a conflict keyword—conflict, war, refugee, guerilla, killing, fighting, rebel, violence, strife, devastation, crisis, chaos, peacekeeper, or intervention. I specify alternate characters and allow multiple endings for each keyword to ensure that plural forms and other suffixes are captured, e.g., **crisis**, **crises**, and **peacekeeper**, **peacekeepers**, **peacekeeping**. I also, where necessary, require whitespace before or after keywords to prevent unwanted words from being captured, i.e. I want to capture war, wars, and **warfare**, but not **warm**, **award**, or **software**. If an observation does not contain any of the specified conflict keywords, it is removed.

Fourth, I survey the remaining observations for each conflict to ensure that they are not systematically including any noise which they should not be. In some cases, this catches false drops that are straightforward to address. Some examples: the country/region search term for “India” frequently captures the state “Indiana”, the “Naga” search term for India’s Nagaland conflict occasionally captures “Nagasaki”, and the search term for Myanmar’s “Kachin” conflict occasionally returns mentions of “Kachina dolls”. In each case, I specify a search exception for the term that is captured by the false drop. In other cases, the pattern of false drops is ambiguous

and requires careful judgment. The keyword “crisis” captures relevant speeches in some cases, i.e., a refugee crisis, but in other cases captures fiscal or currency crises—which it does, for example, during Argentina’s Peronist conflicts. If, on balance, it seems that a conflict keyword is capturing more noise than it does signal, I exclude it from the regular expressions function. In yet other cases, the pattern of false drops is clear but laborious to exclude. The civil conflicts in Chad and the Karen region of Myanmar, for example, cannot be distinguished from personal given names in an automated way. It was necessary for me to view the results of these searches to identify and remove the obvious false drops manually. I document issues with the searches for each conflict, my solutions, and the reasoning for them in the Appendix 1.

Finally, each conflict’s speech observations are appended and transformed into a monthly count. In cases where a conflict is mentioned many times within a single speech, I collapse all observations from the speech into a single observation before performing the count. The final Congressional attention variable is a count, by conflict month, of the number of discrete Congressional speeches in which the relevant country or region is mentioned in the context of conflict.

Admittedly, this coding method has some drawbacks. It does not distinguish between brief mentions and long speeches. A single sentence statement and a long pre-planned presentation are both counted as one speech. There is no straightforward way to account for this: given that conflicts are often raised as component topics within longer orations, or mentioned in lists, speeches cannot be weighted by length. Additionally, it does not capture the valence of speeches; Congresspersons could, for example, mention a conflict because they are arguing against intervention in it. While this a potential concern, it seems to occur very infrequently in practice. Having read thousands of speeches in the process of data collection, the only time I

observed comments of this nature were in discussions of the Yugoslav wars, when congresspersons occasionally accused the Clinton administration of hypocrisy due to its lack of interest in the Rwandan conflict. Finally, this approach collapses detailed and textured data into a much lower fidelity measure; though Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy collect chamber, date, speaker, word count, and other metadata I do not incorporate this information or any of the texture and detail of the speeches themselves into the final data due to the sheer volume of speeches and the scope of this project.

Data Collection, Media Coverage

I collect data on news media coverage to test whether the United States is more likely to intervene in a civil conflict if the conflict involves substantial policy activity at lower levels. Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) identify news media as the political institution at the lowest stage of the policy process, for whom changes in attention are easy and inexpensive relative to actors at higher stages. News media are, thus, the best institution to investigate to find strong evidence of this.

The convention in PET research is to measure media coverage via *New York Times* stories (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Jones et al. 2009; Walgrave et al. 2017). This is also a common tack in adjacent literatures, such as the communications scholarship on agenda setting (see Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006 for a meta-analysis). Counts or transformations of *New York Times* stories are also conventional measures of media coverage in the civil conflict and humanitarian intervention literature itself. Peksen, Peterson, and Drury (2014) count the number of *New York Times* articles concerning human rights, Regan (2000b) counts the number of column inches about civil conflict countries in the

New York Times Index, Bell, Frank, and Macharia (2013) count the difference between the number of times a civil conflict country appeared in *New York Times* headlines and the number of times it appeared in the preceding year's headlines.

There are, of course, many media outlets—print, radio, television, and online at the local, national, and international levels—and several, beyond the *New York Times*, are represented in policy and international relations scholarship. Literature on the “CNN effect”, for example, relies, as one might expect, on measures of CNN coverage (Livingston 1997; P. Robinson 2000). Other scholarship quantifies media coverage by the major US networks' evening news broadcasts (Wood and Peake 1998; Edwards and Wood 1999; Knecht and Weatherford 2006), international print coverage (Balabanova 2010), or alternate domestic print outlets (Peksen, Peterson, and Drury 2014; they use *Newsweek* as well as *NYT*).

Following prior research, I collect data on *New York Times* stories, but I also collect data from the *Washington Post* and *Wall Street Journal*. Rationale for using the *New York Times*—that it is well resourced, has consistent global coverage, uses international wire services, and is a paper of record¹⁵—apply to these newspapers as well. Importantly, these papers span multiple political perspectives and have different areas of interest in covering international affairs that are likely also reflected among their policymaker readerships. *Wall Street Journal* coverage of the Cuban Revolution, for example, was more attentive to US business interests in Cuba and shocks to sugar commodity prices than in specific episodes of political violence, as was the *New York Times*. Finally, as explained below, available databases make it feasible to collect *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Wall Street Journal* data in tandem without substantial additional time constraints.

¹⁵ These reasons are given by Bell, Frank, and Macharia (2013)

Coding Process

To quantify news media coverage of conflicts, I used the *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* databases for the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Washington Post*. Records from each database are available in full text from the 1800s through the early 2000s, with the *New York Times* available through 2018. The full text of articles can be as brief as a few sentences or as long as several pages, but they usually consist of multiple paragraphs on a single page. Since the databases are not straightforwardly amenable to automated coding methods, I coded them by hand using search keywords and recordkeeping processes that I will describe below. But, for context, I will first describe the tools and information that ProQuest makes available.

Searches of *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* return a results page that displays metadata for each news story and links to pdf images of each story. The metadata includes the title of the news story, sometimes including a subtitle, but sometimes including only the title of a long-running column. For example, the *New York Times* has a column called “Around the World”, which is sometimes listed without any further subtitle. The metadata also include the articles’ date, author, and an excerpt of up to three lines of from its body, usually lines that contain one or more search terms. In many cases, though, no author or lines from the full text are displayed. Finally, words in an article’s title or body metadata which match the search terms are highlighted but words in the full text pdf image usually are not.

Consequently, due to the way ProQuest’s search tools differ from my *Congressional Record* search procedure, I did not use keywords in context searches to find the relevant content. While ProQuest makes a search operator of this type available,¹⁶ the way that it presents results

¹⁶ The operator for this is NEAR/x, where “x” is the number of words to the left and right of a search term that ProQuest is instructed to check.

makes the operator difficult to work with. I coded close to half of the relevant civil conflicts using full text keywords in context searches and found that, frequently, the search results they returned did not provide enough information to reasonably conclude whether each news story concerned the relevant conflict or was returned as a false drop. Often, the searches returned articles with ambiguous titles, no excerpted body text, and no highlighted search terms. Though I could, in principle, verify each article by reading its full text, doing so is onerously time consuming. ProQuest does not reliably display where in each article a country/region keyword is found or what conflict term it is adjacent to. It highlights some conflict keywords in the full text pdfs, i.e., it highlights “war” but does not highlight “guerilla”, and only does so for articles published after 1990. Keywords in context searches are, therefore, untenable for data collection at this scale, despite the unfortunate loss of consistency in coding procedures.

I therefore replaced the keywords in context searches with title searches, the most similar feasible alternative. As with the congressional searches, I searched country and region names and a vector of conflict keywords. For conflicts fought over control of government at a national level I searched for country and demonym keywords in article titles and searched for conflict keywords in the body of articles. Searches are more complicated for conflicts fought at a regional level; because newspapers cannot expect their readerships to know where smaller regional conflicts are, they tend use region names in article titles less frequently. For region keywords, therefore, I used a more complicated search pattern. I specified for ProQuest to search simultaneously for two different patterns: 1.) a region keyword in the title, a country keyword in the body, and a conflict keyword in the body and 2.) a country keyword in the title, a region keyword in the body, and a conflict keyword in the body. This captures regional conflicts

whether or not newspapers consider them well-known enough to state the name of the sub-national region in the article title.

The results returned by the two search methods are not identical. Though a majority of the stories captured by the title searches overlap with those returned by the keywords in context searches, each method retrieves both relevant and irrelevant articles that the other method does not. Two examples of the types of articles lost by switching to title searches are as follows: 1.) Searches for the Nagaland conflict in India, using the search term “Naga”, captured several articles about “Betting Odds for Atlantic City Horse Racing”—one of the horses was named Naga and another horse, with its odds listed within 20 words adjacent to Naga, was named “War Copper”. The title search for the Nagaland conflict removes these false drops since the word Naga does not appear in any of the article titles. On the other hand, some clearly relevant articles are lost. Keywords in context searches for the Biafran Conflict in Nigeria returned multiple full-page ads which the Nigerian consulate took out in the *New York Times* to explain its position to the American public. Because ProQuest only titles these ads as “Display Ad 58 – No Title”, title searches do not retrieve them. In aggregate, though, the two search methods are not substantially different. The Pearson’s correlation of the counts generated by keywords in context searches and title searches is 0.926.¹⁷

As with congressional searches, I surveyed the results to ensure that searches were not systematically including noise which they should not be.¹⁸ Because of the high volume of news stories and the wider scope of a newspaper’s concerns, it is much more common for these searches to return non- or loosely relevant results. Most of the conflict terms have the potential to capture some pattern of non-conflict event. The keyword “killing”, for example, frequently

¹⁷ The subset of conflict-months for which I conducted keywords in conflict searches is 4,761 months out of 12,919.

¹⁸ Due to the vast scale of this task, I was helped by an assistant in surveying and coding these searches.

captures plane crashes because plane crash stories tend to be reported with a country name in the title and some form of “killing X people” in the full text. Similarly, the word “crisis” captures currency crises, debt crises, and the Iran Hostage Crisis as well as civil conflict-related coup, refugee, and humanitarian crises.

To ensure that this research is replicable and transparent, I did not exclude false drops from the count of news stories at the hand coding stage. Instead, when I identified a systematic pattern of non-relevant stories, I changed the search terms to exclude them. Returning to the above examples, I did not attempt to exclude stories about plane crashes. Most such incidents only appear in the search results once and, taken as a group, do not drastically change the magnitude or timing of coverage that is captured by any search. Some crises, however, do systematically affect coverage. The conflict between the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK)¹⁹ and Iranian government, Dec 1979-1982, is vastly overshadowed by the Iran Hostage Crisis. Most search results would capture stories unrelated to the conflict—and considerably inflate the count of stories—if I did not remove them.

How to change the search terms, though, is not obvious. Removing the term “crisis” from the MEK conflict search, for example, is not sufficient to eliminate all its false drops. In each case where this issue arises I, therefore, examine several alternate sets of search terms and judge which of them captures the most signal and eliminates the most noise. For the 1979-1982 MEK conflict, the set of search terms which captures the greatest number of stories that explicitly concern MEK while minimizing the number of stories about US-Iranian conflict includes three additional search terms, “Mujahideen”, “leftist”, or “Marxist”, and excludes the term “hostage.” However, even with these amendments, the 1979-1982 MEK search has a relatively lower

¹⁹ MEK was, during this period, a revolutionary Marxist as well as Islamist organization which carried out bombings and assassinations against Khomeini’s government.

fidelity than those of other conflicts in my data. I therefore take the further step of flagging it as a high noise conflict, so that it can be differentiated in quantitative analysis. News story search keywords for each conflict, exceptions to the standard keywords, and flags for high noise conflicts, are recorded in the Appendix 2.

Case Selection, Which Conflicts?

Considerable time and effort have been devoted to the identification of cases of civil conflict and what criteria scholars should use to distinguish them from other types of political violence, such as terrorism, politicide, organized crime, inter-communal violence, and interstate war. Small and Singer (1982), the founders of the Correlates of War (CoW) Project, defined wars in terms of their participants and level of violence. A civil war, in their definition, occurs between the state and a group within its borders, involves sustained conflict between organized armed groups, and passes a threshold of 1000 battle-related fatalities. Contributors to the Correlates of War Project (Sarkees and Shafer 2000; Sarkees and Wayman 2010), have subsequently refined and improved upon this definition, as have other scholars of civil conflict (Regan 1996; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Sambanis 2004) and, in particular, the contributors to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Pettersson et al. 2021).

However, there are several thorny issues which complicate the use of any operational definition of civil conflict. Sambanis contends that “it is not possible to arrive at an operational definition of civil war without adopting some ad hoc way of distinguishing it from other forms of armed conflict” (2004, 815). He identifies four operational issues which scholars have been trying to address since the CoW Project’s initial definition. First, it can be difficult to determine the ‘stateness’ of civil conflict’s participants; in cases such as Somalia no party can legitimately

claim to be the state or, in cases such as Sudan, the government outsources fighting to militias and does not directly participate in combat. Second, it is not clear what level of organized resistance is necessary for a civil conflict to be distinguished from one-sided state violence. Third, even without considering problems with unreliable reporting of battle-related fatalities, fatality thresholds will always exclude some ambiguous cases while including others based on inherently ad hoc criteria. Fourth, given that fighting in civil conflicts can pause for extended periods without a formal settlement, it is not straightforward to distinguish the end of a civil conflict from a protracted lull in combat operations. There is no one way to address these issues that is clearly correct.

In this dissertation, I use the list of civil conflicts created for the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version 19.1 (the ACD).²⁰ They define internal conflict²¹ as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties [...] results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” and where one side is a government, i.e. it controls the capital of the state, and the other side is one or more rebel groups (Pettersson et al. 2021). The ACD further distinguishes between internal conflicts and internationalized internal conflicts, which involve at least one foreign government’s troops—and I include both types here. This internal conflict definition is importantly organized by two-party dyad and by incompatibility, not by conflict country. It focuses on conflict actors, and

²⁰ Version 19.1 was current at the time I began data collection from the *Congressional Record*; the newest version of the ACD is 21.1. Though there are numerous changes between versions, most of them were made to observations outside the scope of this project—after 1999, to interstate conflicts, or to civil conflicts that never reached 1000 battle deaths. Only three sets of changes affected relevant data: six conflicts saw changes to the names of their rebel faction (SideB), the 1992 Tajikistan conflict was changed from an internal war to an internationalized internal war, and the 1992 Croatian conflict had its intensity level raised from 25-999 battle deaths to 1000 battle deaths. None of these changes alter my conflict case selection and only one, the change to Croatia’s intensity level, affects a variable that I use for quantitative analysis—and I have corrected for it.

²¹ The ACD language changed from “internal” conflict in version 19.1 to “intrastate” conflict in version 21.1; I use the common use words “civil conflict” interchangeably with these technical terms.

UCDP/PRIO goes to great effort to identify each participant in a conflict, though this can be difficult in some cases.

A civil conflict may involve many organizationally distinct rebel groups. The Syrian Civil War, for example, was judged by some observers to have seen the formation of as many as 6,000 distinct armed groups (Carter Center 2014). The ACD conceptualizes such multifarious groups by incompatibility, which can concern government or territory or both. A country can only have one incompatibility over government each year—all rebel groups that seek to oust the sitting government from power belong to this incompatibility. But a country can have multiple incompatibilities over territory if different rebel groups advocate the secession of different regions. So, returning to the example of Syria, the ACD does not specify a dyad between the government and each rebel group, it specifies four: 1.) Incompatibility over government with Syrian insurgents, the coalition of groups initially termed the Free Syrian Army;²² 2.) Incompatibility over territory with the Islamic State, which aimed to unify Syria with its holdings in Iraq; 3.) Incompatibility over territory with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) over Rojava Kurdistan; and 4.) Incompatibility with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) over Rojava Kurdistan and adjacent territories.

To maintain analytical continuity while recognizing that there are often prolonged lulls in fighting in civil conflicts, the ACD identifies conflict *episodes* as well as conflicts. For each incompatibility—which, again, to be included, must at some point provoke 25 battle deaths—the ACD specifies a conflict start date that, as precisely as possible, identifies the first battle death. Episodes within each conflict are then identified by the date when fighting first exceeds 25

²² In a rare instance, the ACD is unable to disentangle these groups and terms this faction as “Syrian insurgents.”

yearly battle deaths and continue for each year that 25 additional battle deaths are sustained.²³

Conflict over a given incompatibility can pause for decades but, if new fighting concerns the same incompatibility, it is recorded as a new episode rather than a new conflict. The ACD also tracks the intensity of each conflict—whether, in a given year, it surpasses the 1000 battle-related fatality threshold and whether, by the end of that year, the cumulative total of battle deaths since the start date of the conflict has reached 1000. For this dissertation project, to make the best use of limited coding resources, my case selection does not include ACD conflicts which never surpassed the cumulative 1000 death threshold. These short or very low intensity conflicts are less likely to capture the attention dynamics of interest to this project.

I differ from the ACD in adopting Regan's (2002) unit of analysis, conflict months. While most civil conflict research uses yearly data, months are the level of analysis most appropriate to this project. Investigating either intervention or policy-maker attention at a level larger than months collapses too much of the available data. On the other hand, investigating them at a daily level of analysis would treat the available civil conflict and intervention data as having a level of detail that is frequently unavailable. The start dates and end dates of conflicts are often ambiguous as are the dates of interventions. Using daily data would also eliminate most of the variation in policy-maker attention, since the modal amount of daily public commentary on any civil conflict is, reliably, no commentary. Conceptually, then, this choice treats each month of foreign civil conflict as an intervention opportunity for the United States and as a subject for the aggregate attention and public commentary of US policymakers.

²³ There are limitations to this method: it will record an observation if there are 15 fatalities in November and 15 in December but fail to record an observation if there are 15 fatalities in December and 15 in the following January.

Descriptive Statistics and Patterns

The collected data contains 12,919 conflict-month observations across 97 conflicts and 210 conflict episodes. It covers conflicts in 65 countries, most of which fought internal wars concerning a single incompatibility. A handful of large and ethnically fragmented countries, however, saw several incompatibilities. India had 6 incompatibilities, the most, while Ethiopia had 4, Indonesia had 5, Myanmar had 5, and Russia/the USSR had 4. The Indian government, for example, fought for control of government against a Maoist insurgency, for control of its northeast territories against Naga, Assamese, and Manipuri independence movements, for control of Punjab/Khalistan against Sikh separatists, for control of Kashmir against the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), and for control of Hyderabad against the Nizam of Hyderabad. One should note that these numbers only include incompatibilities which reached 1,000 cumulative battle deaths; India and several other conflict countries saw additional incompatibilities at lower levels of violence.

Figure 2-1 shows the number of ongoing conflicts across the period of study, 1946-1999. At the beginning of the post-war period the number of ongoing conflicts was relatively low, in the low teens or single digits. The number began increasing precipitously during 1960s decolonization,²⁴ continued increasing through the late 1970s, and then held steady at a number between 30 and 40 ongoing civil conflicts from 1980 to 1999. This increase in the number of ongoing civil conflicts does not reflect a large increase in the number of conflict onsets, but rather the accumulation of long intractable conflicts over time.²⁵ Figure 2-2 shows the number of

²⁴ The ACD v19.1 classifies wars between colonial powers and their dependencies as “extrasystemic” rather than internal wars. These extrasystemic wars frequently continue as internal wars after a colony attains independence as in Angola or East Timor, which partly explains the apparent increase in ongoing conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s.

²⁵ This pattern has long been known (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

conflict initiations 1946-1999. Though the 1990s did see an increase in the frequency of conflict onset, there is not a drastic change in onsets at any point in the data.

Figure 2-1. Number of Ongoing Civil Conflicts, by Year





Figure 2-2. Yearly Number of Civil Conflict Initiations



The total number of Congressional speeches mentioning these conflicts was 26,886 and the total number of *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* stories about them was 110,245. As shown in Figures 2-3 and 2-4, which indicate yearly Congressional and media conflict mentions 1946-1999, respectively, these indicators are quite noisy. Both, however, increase steadily from their low points in 1946 to their high points in the mid-1980s. This tracks loosely with the increasing number of ongoing civil conflicts, but the correspondence is not consistent.

Figure 2-5 overlays these time series to indicate their scale. As one would expect, there is always more US news coverage of foreign civil conflicts than there is Congressional attention to them. Congressional speeches peak at 1,557 civil conflict mentions in 1985, while newspaper stories peak at 4,149 civil conflict mentions in 1983. Also unsurprisingly, the two indicators follow a roughly corresponding pattern of attention. They are elevated from 1947 to 1949 during the Greek and Chinese Civil Wars. They both spike in 1964 with the deepening of US commitments in South Vietnam. They rise again in 1970-1971 as the Vietnam War spills into Cambodia. They reach a sustained peak in the period between 1982 and 1987 with the escalation of conflict in Nicaragua, conflict in El Salvador, and 1983 Beirut barracks bombing. Finally, they both spike in 1999 as the Kosovo Conflict explodes.

Figure 2-3. Total Yearly Congressional Mentions of Civil Conflicts




Figure 2-4. Total Yearly News Stories about Civil Conflicts





Figure 2-5. Total Yearly Congressional Mentions and News Stories about Civil Conflicts




Prior studies of the interaction between media and policymakers have observed that different states and regions are given varying levels of priority (Miklian 2008). Gonzenbach et al. (1992) claim that both the press and policymakers show a marked preference for addressing issues in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, and devote significantly less attention to Africa and Latin America. These differences are present, to a degree, in Figures 2-6 and 2-7 below, which display the lowest smoothed (Cleveland 1979) attention of Congress and the news media, respectively, to civil conflicts within five world regions—the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia/Oceania.²⁶ Both figures show *average* attention to each region, since the number of ongoing conflicts differs by region and over time, which is why the number of

²⁶ To identify these regions, I am using the loose regional groupings of the Correlates of War project, based on their numerical codes. The Americas are all ccodes below 200, Europe is ccodes between 200 and 399, Africa is ccodes between 400 and 629, the Middle East is ccodes between 630 and 699, and Asia/Oceania is ccodes 700 and above. Because my data contain no conflicts in North America or Oceania, they are not distinguished as separate regions.

mentions in these figures is smaller than in those above.


The difference in regional attention is much more pronounced in *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* coverage than it is for Congressional mentions. Media coverage is greatly higher for conflicts in the Middle East and Europe, moderate for conflicts in the Americas, and consistently low for conflicts in Asia/Oceania and Africa.²⁷ Congressional mentions are moderate for conflicts in the Americas from the mid-1970s to early 1990s and high for conflicts in Europe after 1990 but are otherwise generally low and not greatly different between regions. In part, this is an artifact of the averaging I used to create these figures; there were many low coverage conflicts in Asia throughout the period of observation, and the large increase in attention to Europe is due to the few but highly covered and discussed European conflicts in the Balkans.

Figure 2-6. Average Yearly Congressional Mentions of Ongoing Civil Conflicts, by Region



²⁷ Note that there are no African conflicts in the data before 1960.

Figure 2-7. Average Yearly Media Coverage of Ongoing Civil Conflicts, by Region



Patterns in Congressional and media attention are usually similar across conflicts, but some conflicts differ. Figures 2-8 and 2-9 below show yearly Congressional and Media attention to the conflicts in Cambodia and El Salvador. In each case, yearly attention matches closely between the two, with generally fewer Congressional mentions than news stories but punctuations in attention at the same points. Figure 2-10 shows monthly Congressional and media attention to the Kosovo conflict which follows a similar pattern. The correspondence is not this close for every conflict. Monthly attention to the Chinese Civil War, as shown in Figure 2-11, differs much more between Congress and the media, with media attention high but volatile throughout the conflict and Congressional attention increasing toward its end but punctuated in some of the same months.

Figure 2-8. Attention to the Cambodian Civil War




Figure 2-9. Attention to the Salvadoran Civil War




Figure 2-10. Attention to the Kosovo Conflict






Figure 2-11. Attention to the Chinese Civil War



One conflict which exhibits a notably distinct dichotomy in amounts of Congressional and media attention is the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. As shown in Figure 2-12 below, yearly coverage of the conflict in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* is consistently very high, sometimes approaching *half* of all conflict coverage.²⁸ Congressional speeches mentioning the conflict are far fewer and do not rise in the same years as media coverage does.

Figure 2-12. Attention to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict




Finally, it is important to note that many episodes of conflict are never or are very infrequently mentioned by either institution. Figure 2-13 shows yearly attention to the Rohingya Conflict in Myanmar, a conflict which, beginning in August 2017, post my observation, became

²⁸ This is partly a function of coding issues. It is difficult to construct a ProQuest search that separates the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict from other newspaper coverage of Israel without losing a substantial amount of conflict coverage. I erred on the side of including less relevant coverage but flagged the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict as a high noise conflict so that its eccentricity can be accounted for in the analysis chapters.

the subject of substantial attention. The conflict persisted above the ACD's 25 yearly battle death threshold continuously for the entirety of my period of observation, but was never mentioned in Congress and was mentioned, at most, 5 times a year the United States main newspapers of record.²⁹ This pattern is true of other conflicts similarly regarded as "peripheral" by the US Congress and media (Miklian 2008).

Figure 2-13. Attention to the Rohingya Conflict in Myanmar



²⁹ Burma seems to have captured the American imagination during World War II. Attention to Myanmar's five conflicts is highest in the early years of data and declines over time.

Case Study, Somalia


To investigate the interplay of conflict events, US media attention, and US Congressional attention in greater detail, I turn to the Somali Civil War. Somalia provides a key example of a “peripheral” conflict (Miklian 2008) which nonetheless prompted intense American attention. Moreover, the degree to which US media attention and public opinion drove US policy in Somalia has long been disputed (Livingston 1997, Mermin 1997, Gibbs 2000, Hildebrandt et al. 2012). This makes the Somali Civil War an ideal case for deeper examination.

Conflict for control of government in Somalia began with the 1978 failure of General Siad Barre’s war with Ethiopia over Ogaden. The defeat led to increased internal criticism of Barre, a failed coup, an influx of refugees from Ogaden, and a prolonged proliferation of rebel groups. Siad Barre was driven from Mogadishu in January 1991 by the United Somali Congress (USC), but the victorious warlords could not come to a power sharing agreement. The conflict therefore continued between USC factions led by Ali Mahdi and Mohammed Farrah Aideed, precipitating a major famine, and saw an abortive attempt by Barre to retake the capital (Wilson 2007).

The UN intervened with a humanitarian relief mission in April 1992 and, when it became clear that Aideed’s opposition was preventing the delivery of aid, the United States intervened in December. Aideed and Mahdi agreed to a settlement in March 1993, but it quickly broke down as Aideed stalled implementation. In October, an attempt by US forces to capture some of Aideed’s aides triggered the Battle of Mogadishu, which saw 18 US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis killed. The US withdrew from the conflict on the 31st of the following March, with the UN brokering another peace agreement between Aideed and Mahdi just 7 days prior. It too broke down, and UN military and police departed in 1995 (UCDP Somalia conflict page, conflict 337).

Fighting occurred at a relatively low-level of violence throughout the conflict. The ACD codes December 1982 as the first point that it passed the 25 battle death threshold, and codes a prolonged lull in fighting between December 1984 and March 1986. Figure 2-14 shows Congressional mentions and newspaper stories about this second episode of conflict, March 1986 through December 1996. It suggests that interest in Somalia was low for the majority of the conflict episode but that news coverage increased dramatically in December 1992 with the US intervention via Operation Restore Hope, and that both Congressional and news attention increased dramatically during the Battle of Mogadishu in October 1993.


Figure 2-14. Attention to the Somali Civil War



There is an obvious connection between the number of stories in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* and the deployment and engagement of American soldiers; the newspapers are, thus, covering the actions of US policymakers (broadly construed) not simply conflict events. For this reason, I will focus on the period prior to Operation Restore

Hope, March 1986 through November 1992, shown in greater detail in Figure 2-15. As I noted above, attention from both Congress and media is very low for most of the conflict. It escalates with the ouster of Siad Barre in January 1991, with 31 newspaper stories about the conflict. From that point, monthly newspaper coverage is sustained at middling single digit numbers and, for the first time, monthly Congressional mentions of the conflict exceed 2.

Figure 2-15. Attention to the Somali Civil War 1986-1992



There is heightened news coverage starting in November 1991 in response to escalating violence in Mogadishu, which drops briefly in March and April, and then begins rising drastically in June. Congressional discussion increases briefly in the months following Barre’s ouster but then returns to a minimal level until rising drastically to 28 mentions in August, 9 in September, and 19 in October, but then drops back to zero in November. This is the extent of detail that is available from the data I have collected. But returning to *ProQuest Historical*

Newspapers and the text of the *Congressional Record Bound*, I can look into these institutions' attention in greater depth

In June 1992, the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* published 8 stories about the conflict in Somalia, 2 about the world's general indifference to the suffering of Somalia and the remaining 6 about a ship of Somali refugees being detained off the coast of Yemen. July saw the papers publish 16 stories; more about refugees and general conditions in the country, but 8 concerned UN actions—the arrival of observers and a UN vote to increase aid. There were 35 stories in August, and they began to focus on the security impediments to the expanding UN relief mission. September saw 32 stories, 7 with headlines that were explicitly about the theft and looting of UN food aid. There were 24 stories in October, with 10 on the looting of food aid and the warlords deliberately preventing aid disbursement. There was a total of 36 stories in November but, on November 26, President Bush offered to send US troops to support the aid operation. Stories after that point principally concerned a potential US deployment and responses to it. Of the 15 stories prior to the November 26th announcement, 9 concerned the failures of the UN operation and warlord interference in it. The newspapers clearly insisted that the conflict was dire and that UN actions could not meet the challenge.

As of June 1992, there were only 2 mentions of the conflict in Congress and both were tangential: Senator Patrick Leahy mentioned Somalia offhandedly on the 10th in a speech about human rights abuses in East Timor and Congressman Dante Fascell mentioned the conflict during discussion of a bill about the General Accounting Office. Mentions remained low in July, only 4, but interest picked up at the end of the month, with Senator Nancy Kassebaum advancing

a concurrent resolution³⁰ on the 31st condemning the violence, praising the UN relief workers, and urging President Bush to help improve security. She and Senator Ted Kennedy spoke at length about the humanitarian crisis and read several news articles into the record, including one from the *New York Times* titled “The Hell Called Somalia.”

As previously noted, Congressional mentions rose dramatically in August, with many officials in both houses expressing support for the concurrent resolution. On August 10th, nine congressmen gave speeches in support of the resolution and had news articles from the *Washington Post*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Washington Times*, and *Los Angeles Times* read into the record. On August 12th, Congressman Dennis Hastert gave a long speech about the history of the Somali Civil War. August also saw repeated mentions of Somalia during Senate discussions of a possible intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina with, for example, Senator John Kerry arguing that the US should intervene in Somalia as well as Bosnia. This pattern of discourse continued into September and October, though with fewer mentions. On September 8th, for example, Senator Patrick Leahy advocated strongly for increased food aid, quoted from a *New York Times* article titled “Officials Say Somali Famine Is Even Worse Than Feared” and had a *Washington Post* article titled “Aideed: Warlord in a Famished Land” read into the record. The concurrent resolution had passed both houses by the 8th of October, which likely explains why mentions of Somalia temporarily ceased in the following month.

There are clear interconnections between congressional and media attention. Though the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* reacted to the events of the Somali Civil War earlier and to a greater degree than the US Congress, they were also quick to cover

³⁰ S.Con.Res.132 and H.Con.Res.370, respectively, “Concerning the humanitarian crisis in Somalia”; A concurrent resolution must be adopted by both houses but does not require the signature of the President and does not have the force of law. They are often used to express sentiments held by congress.

actions taken by US officials and, especially, US military activity. Likewise, Congress is clearly attentive to news media, considering the frequency with which they explicitly mentioned conflict coverage and the number of news articles they entered into the *Congressional Record*. But Congress also acted according to its own institutional processes. Congressional mentions of the Somali Civil War were made largely in context of the concurrent resolution and in thematically related Congressional actions.

It thus remains to be investigated how US policymakers and news media prioritize information about foreign civil conflicts and the degree of influence that media coverage has on policymaker attention and actions. Next, in Chapter 3 I use the data introduced above to examine the correlates of policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts. Then in Chapter 4, I use the newspaper stories and Congressional mentions data to determine whether such attention affects US decisions to intervene in foreign civil conflicts.

CHAPTER 3

News Media and Policymaker Attention to Civil Conflicts

In this chapter, I develop the first part of the argument advanced in Chapter 1—that US senior policymakers direct their attention to foreign civil conflicts according to observable patterns that are explained by the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy process. Specifically, civil conflicts are more likely to reach the attention of senior policymakers if they have already reached the attention of actors that are lower in the policy process; civil conflicts are especially likely to reach the attention of senior policymakers during “media storms”, periods of sudden, high, and sustained media coverage; and civil conflicts are more likely to reach the attention of senior policymakers when the government agenda is diverse, as opposed to when it is dominated by the core functions of government. I test these claims by conducting two quantitative analyses, first with stochastic process methods that examine the distribution of change in policymaker attention, and second with regression analysis that isolates the effect of agenda diversity and media storms on senior policymaker attention. I find evidence in support of each argument.

Literature and Hypotheses

Though I outline punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) in Chapter 1, it is important in this chapter that I build upon a clear foundation of PET literature and theory to develop the hypotheses that I test. This section therefore briefly reiterates the key ideas of PET. I then go into greater detail on the expansions and refinements of the theory, and their relevance to US policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts.

The key observation of punctuated equilibrium theory is that while government policy on most issues tends to change gradually or not at all—being monopolized by specialists and organized interests below public or elected officials’ attention—issues sometimes burst onto the agenda in periods of major policy change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993/2009). This pattern, PET holds, is driven by the disproportionate processing of information through policy systems. Governing systems, like individuals, can only pay attention to so many things at once (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 158). The US Congress, for example, is not in session for enough hours each day to debate every issue that is important to US security and prosperity. Moreover, institutional friction from constraints such as veto players or even simple scheduling limitations can inhibit policymakers from responding to new information promptly. As a result, policy is “sticky” (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003, 152), maintaining its equilibrium until a dramatic event provokes action or a gradually building pressure reaches a level that cannot be ignored.

Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993/2009) initial presentation of PET uses case studies of specific policy areas—nuclear power, tobacco, urban policy, etc.—to show this process of long periods of policy equilibria disrupted by sudden punctuations. Subsequent work, though, has tended to investigate the evidence for PET using large quantitative datasets (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Robinson 2004; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner, Foucault, and François 2006; Breunig and Koski 2006; Robinson and Caver 2006; Robinson et al. 2007; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Jones et al. 2009; Breunig, Koski, and Mortensen 2010; Baumgartner, Foucault, and François 2012; Lam and Chan 2015; Baumgartner et al. 2017). But where political scientists usually use statistical methods to make point predictions of outcome variables, this work has investigated distributions of outcome variables.

Jones and Baumgartner (2005), informed by Padgett (1980), argue that the shape of the distribution of policy changes is indicative of the decision-making process of policymakers. If policy change were incremental, we would expect policy changes to be normally distributed. They explain that this is because the traditional equation for incrementalism³¹ specifies that the degree of policy change between two periods is the result of many independent external factors. Some of these are positive and some negative and, as the Central Limit Theorem holds, the combination of large numbers of independent factors is normally distributed. Conversely, “any normal distribution of policy changes must have been generated by an incremental process” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 123).

But Jones and Baumgartner contend that due to the boundedly rational information processing of policy makers, the distribution of policy changes is not a result of independent external factors. Instead, policy makers use heuristics and overweight some indicators above others, or have ‘solutions searching for problems’ and are most attentive to the indicators that support their preferred policy. Jones and Baumgartner refer to this as disproportionate information processing. Further exacerbated by institutional friction, disproportionate information processing causes misinterpretation of information, leads to an accumulation of policy mistakes, and ultimately results in large and rapid policy corrections. The distribution that best describes the dispersion of these policy changes is a leptokurtic one rather than a normal one. A leptokurtic distribution is characterized by 1.) a sharp central peak—which captures the long periods of policymaker inattentiveness, institutional friction, and minimal change; 2.) fat tails—which capture the rapid policy reprioritization in response to major events or accumulating

³¹ $P_t = P_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$ —from Jones and Baumgartner (2005, 121)—the policy at time t is equal to the policy at time t-1 plus an adjustment term, ε , composed of many independent factors.

pressure; and 3.) weak shoulders—which capture the absence of proportionate moderate-sized policy changes.³²

Numerous studies have found evidence of leptokurtic distributions in public budgets, most using a collection of statistical tools and data visualizations called stochastic process methods.³³ The PET studies which are of greatest interest to this project, however, are those which have broadened their scope to other public outputs (though, of course, several of the studies below *also* look at budgets). Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003) apply stochastic process methods to American markets, elections, news coverage, congressional hearings, executive orders, and lawmaking. Baumgartner et al. (2009) duplicate this analysis of US institutions and broaden their study to Danish and Belgian public outputs, including parliamentary elections, radio and television news coverage, demonstrations, party platforms, parliamentary questions to government ministers, non-legislative debates, bills, and government reports. Walgrave and Nuytemans (2009) apply stochastic process methods to party manifestos in 25 OECD democracies, John and Jennings (2010) do so for the UK's annual speech from the throne, and Lam and Chan (2015) apply them to legislative deliberations and executive speeches in Hong Kong both before and after its 1997 handover from Britain to China.

These studies conduct hypothesis testing principally by comparing the distributions of different public outputs. Lam and Chan (2015), for example, argue that institutional friction is greater in authoritarian regimes than in democratic systems, and show evidence of this in the differential distributions of policy outputs across multiple stages of democratization in Hong Kong. But the most frequently tested theoretical development in this work is that policy outputs

³² The leptokurtic distribution was first used to identify PET processes by Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen (2003), but the most succinct explanation of it is given by Breunig and Jones (2011, 105).

³³ See Breunig and Jones (2010) for a thorough explanation of these methods.

become increasingly punctuated as they reach higher stages of policymaking. (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Lam and Chan 2015). The outputs of actors which are closer to the inputs of policy, i.e., the many normally distributed independent external factors which bear on policy decisions, are less punctuated than those that are further from them. For example, the outputs of news media—which are very close to policy inputs—exhibit some kurtosis, but the kurtosis of public budgets is far greater. Intuitively, it is much easier to publish news stories in response to an event than it is to pass a new budget in response to an event.

The face validity of this reasoning is abundantly evident in the context of civil conflicts. Though the events in a conflict are not independent—they trend in a direction: win, lose, or draw—the universe of conflict events, or any large enough sample of them, should be normally distributed around the trend. Despite this, many conflict events occur within the “fog of war”; offensives, tactical victories or defeats, human tragedies, and other events are obscured even from the combatants. Consequently, information about a conflict doesn’t update in real time. International news media, which are closer to events than any institution other than a potential intervener’s intelligence services, may be slow to recognize the importance of military engagements until they culminate in a major reversal of fortunes. But, even so, the institutional constraints of news media are minor, and they can update information quickly as it becomes known.³⁴ Senior policymakers, being further removed from the events of a civil conflict, need not only to overcome the fog of war but also to reprioritize their limited time and attention from other pressing public issues. In summary, conflict events (unobservable) are normally

³⁴ Baumgartner et al. (2009) rate media coverage, i.e., *New York Times* stories, Danish radio news, and Belgian TV news in their lowest institutional friction category, with Congressional hearings and Parliamentary questions in their middling category, and budget outlays in their highest friction category.

distributed, conflict coverage is moderately leptokurtic, and policymaker attention to conflicts is highly leptokurtic. Specified in a testable form, this is:

Hypothesis 3.1a: change in news media coverage of civil conflicts is leptokurtic.

Hypothesis 3.1b: change in senior policymaker attention to civil conflicts is leptokurtic.

Hypothesis 3.1c: change in senior policymaker attention to civil conflicts exhibits greater kurtosis than does change in news media coverage of civil conflicts.

Additionally, scholars have made several claims in this vein beyond the observation of leptokurtic change distributions. Since Baumgartner and Jones's (1993/2009) initial presentation of PET, there has always been the implication that news media are a key agent of change—the media triggers or amplifies the positive feedback effects that lead to policy punctuations—and, moreover, Baumgartner and Jones's research makes extensive use of media coverage as found in two indexes, the *New York Times Index* and *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. More recent literature has both upheld this view (Jones and Wolfe 2010) and complicated it (Wolfe 2012).³⁵ News media are a major element in Lam and Chan's (2015) argument that, in authoritarian regimes where information at lower stages of the policy process, i.e., elections and demonstrations, is blocked by deliberate government suppression, outputs at higher levels of the policy process are more punctuated than normal. Authoritarian regimes lack “even the information to reallocate policy attention” (Lam and Chan 2015, 552). This view of news media coverage as affecting punctuations at higher stages, and not just being associated with them, can be applied more broadly.

Similar to the flow of information at the lower levels of the authoritarian policy process, information about civil conflicts can be artificially depressed. In the US, there are fewer sources

³⁵ Wolfe (2012) argues that media can “put the brakes” on policy change. In addition to expanding the circle of potentially supportive policymakers that pay attention to an issue, media coverage mobilizes coalitions of hostile interests who do not want an issue to be addressed. However, this hostile mobilization affects the policy *outcomes* regarding an issue not *attention* to it—I therefore address her argument in chapter 4, not here.

of information available about countries regarded as “peripheral” than there are for those regarded as geostrategically important. Not only are fewer government resources devoted to understanding such countries, but news media, recognizing that there is limited demand for coverage of these places, devote fewer resources to them. For example, Miklian (2008, 406), documenting attention to the Nepalese Civil War, observes that only 7% of the sources in the Congressional Research Service’s 2006 Nepal report originated from within the US government—the rest came from international news sources. And, of those international news sources, only one major organization, Agence France-Presse, had *any* reporters based in Kathmandu that year—the others only sent their personnel there intermittently during crisis events. The US government’s limited information about peripheral countries, Miklian argues, leads to policy stagnation as well as giving the limited and unrepresentative coverage that does exert a greater than normal influence on policy. I therefore hypothesize that the divergent news coverage across civil conflicts will affect the attention of senior policymakers. Media inattention to civil conflicts should lead to policy stagnation while high amounts of media coverage should lead to surges in policymaker attention, as policymakers rapidly reassess and revise their policies.

Hypothesis 3.2: increases in media attention to a civil conflict lead to increases in policymaker attention to the conflict.

Beyond PET scholarship, of course, there is a vast literature on the agenda setting effects of news media. See, for example, Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) for a meta-analysis. Its findings about news media’s effect on government agendas have sometimes been contradictory, though newer work outside the US has more consistently shown news media to have a positive

effect on politicians' attention.³⁶ A key insight from the intersection of these literatures is that the agenda setting effects of media are non-linear. Boydstun, Hardy, and Walgrave (2014) show that “media storms”, periods of sudden, high, and sustained media coverage of a topic, meaningfully differ from normal coverage and have outside effects on public awareness and perception of issues. Walgrave et al. (2017) expand this to congressional hearings, finding that a media storm around an issue increases Congressional hearings about that topic *in addition to* the normal linear effects of increasing coverage. This observation yields hypothesis 3.3:

Hypothesis 3.3: increases in media attention to a civil conflict during a media storm lead to larger increases in policymaker attention to the conflict than do increases in media attention at other times.

Walgrave et al. (2017) also suggest that the attention environment is zero sum; when thinking about the attention that is paid to an issue of interest, it is important to consider other issues that compete for attention. They consider the zero-sum attention environment in terms of media congestion and public opinion, but here PET scholarship offers a further insight. Jennings et al. (2011) argue that policymaker attention is dominated by the core functions of government—defense, international affairs, the economy, government operations, and the rule of law—but that the salience of any of these core functions varies over time. At some times, one or more of the core functions of government are highly salient and crowd out other issues, at other times they are not, and attention is more diverse.³⁷ I would interpret Jennings et al.'s argument to suggest that policymakers are less likely to pay attention to foreign civil conflicts when the core functions of government have high salience.³⁸ This generates the following hypothesis:

³⁶ See Walgrave et al. (2017, 550) for a more complete bibliography of this work.

³⁷ See also Boydstun, Bevan, and Thomas (2014) for further discussion of the importance and measurement of agenda diversity.

³⁸ It's possible, though, that policy towards some civil conflicts could be considered a core function of government if it were central to a country's defense or international affairs goals. I address this issue in the data section.

Hypothesis 3.4: When the attention of senior policymakers is dominated by the core functions of government, policymakers are less likely to pay attention to foreign civil conflicts.

Data and Methods

To test the above hypotheses, I collected original data from the US Congress and from three nationally circulating US newspapers: the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. I measured the attention of these sources to every civil conflict recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's Armed Conflict Database between 1946 and 1999.³⁹ Chapter 2 of this dissertation includes a detailed explanation of my coding procedures for the data, but I will also reiterate my choice of measures below.

To measure senior policymaker attention to civil conflicts, I use the digitized corpus of *Congressional Record Daily* and *Bound Editions* collected by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2017). Their text processing procedure identifies distinct speeches using the *Congressional Record*'s standardized identification of each new speaker to determine when one speech ends, and the next speech begins. I operationalize senior policymaker attention to each foreign civil conflict by counting the number of US Congressional speeches in each month that mention a conflict keyword, i.e., war, conflict, violence, etc., within 20 words of the name of a region or nation where civil conflict is occurring.⁴⁰ The final *Congressional Mentions* variable is a count, by conflict month, of the number of discrete Congressional speeches in which the relevant country or region is mentioned in the context of conflict.

³⁹ These dates, 1946-1999, are the range of Regan's (2002) intervention data, which is used to construct the dependent variable in chapter 4 of this dissertation. For expedience, I only collected attention data that could be used in both chapters.

⁴⁰ See Appendix 1 for a complete list of conflict regions/nations and conflict keywords.

To quantify news media coverage of civil conflicts, I searched the full text records of the *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* databases for the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, and *Washington Post*. I use title searches, searching for the same list of country and region names and vector of conflict keywords which I search in the *Congressional Record*. The final *News Media Stories* variable is a count, by conflict month, of the number of newspaper articles about a country or region which discuss violent conflict.

While it would be ideal to analyze a broader set of actors across the institutional context of multiple countries, this set of actors—at both the higher and lower levels of the policy process—is an expedient compromise. The public commentary of the US Congress and of US major newspapers is prolific enough in regularity and volume that a potentially obscure topic such as the Nepalese Civil War has the opportunity to be mentioned. Simultaneously, focusing on this relatively narrow set of actors makes data collection efforts more manageable, whereas a broader analysis of US policymakers or an analysis of media and legislatures across multiple countries would be beyond my limited resources.

Media Storms

To test for the nonlinear effects of media coverage explored by Boydston, Hardy, and Walgrave (2014) and Walgrave et al. (2017), I derive an additional measure from the *News Media Stories* variable. Walgrave et al. (2017, 556) operationalize a media storm as a surge in attention to a topic that is 1) two-and-a-half times that of the previous week, which 2) captures at least 20% of the total front-page agenda, and 3) lasts for at least a week. Because my unit of analysis differs—I measure monthly coverage across each publication’s full text—I am not able to match their coding. Instead, I specify a *Media Storm* as occurring when a civil conflict is

covered by 50 or more news stories and covered by two-and-a-half times the stories of the previous month. *Media Storm* equals 1 if these conditions obtain and 0 otherwise.⁴¹ Admittedly, 50 news stories per month is an arbitrary threshold. I selected it because it necessitates that several days in the month would see two or more stories written about a conflict, and because 50 stories per month is an unusually high amount of conflict coverage—less than 5% of conflict-months saw 50 news stories. The criteria that a *Media Storm* must have two-and-a-half times the previous month's coverage is important because it adjusts for conflicts with persistently high coverage, such as the Chinese Civil War or Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Agenda Crowding

In their study of agenda crowding, Jennings et al. (2011) use individual policy statements from executive speeches. For the US, this was the President's annual State of the Union address. But, while this is a sensible approach in the context of their study, it is less well suited to my analysis. Using the State of the Union Address as a proxy to measure agenda crowding among US senior policymakers while using congressional speeches as a proxy to measure attention among US senior policymakers would give this analysis an unhelpful degree of conceptual abstraction. Presupposing that the two correspond could also be factually incorrect; the goals of the president are not necessarily shared by Congress and might instead be opposed, as under divided government. Additionally, a yearly statement of agenda is not granular enough for this analysis. Would, for example, agenda crowding effects be consistent 10 months after the State of the Union speech is given or would they have deteriorated or been upended by world events?

⁴¹ For example: If a conflict is covered by 80 stories in month t and 30 stories in month $t-1$ then I would code that conflict as *Media Storm*=1 for month t . The 80 stories in month t exceed the 50-story threshold and exceed $2.5*30$.

Therefore, I use Comparative Agendas Project's (CAP) US Congressional Legislative Hearings dataset to measure agenda crowding instead of following the precedent set by Jennings et al. The US Congressional Legislative Hearings data is collected from Congressional Information Service abstracts and ProQuest Congressional records spanning from 1946 to 2020. It consists of one observation for each hearing held by a committee, subcommittee, task force, panel, commission, or joint committees during that period, and codes each congressional hearing according to the 19 CAP policy content codes.

I transform the data in two ways to make it a theoretically appropriate measure that matches my unit of analysis. First, I identify the proportion of monthly hearings belonging to the CAP topic categories which Jennings et al. identify as core functions of government. These are macroeconomics, defense, international affairs, and government operations.⁴² Second, I construct a 6-month running average of this proportion. So, for example, the value of the agenda crowding variable in June 1999 is the proportion of June 1999 Congressional hearings that concern the core functions of government averaged with the proportions for the months of January through May 1999.

A significant issue with the CAP Hearings data is that it does not include hearings which are unpublished. The contents of hearings that concern national security, investigations of private persons, or other matters, at the discretion of committee chairs, may not immediately be made publicly available. Often, the contents of these hearings are published later, and the CAP adds them to the Hearings dataset marked as a being initially unpublished. For the period of interest to this study, nearly all hearings from the Senate have been published. However, the Congressional

⁴² Jennings et al. (2011) also identify law, crime, and family issues as a core function of government but, in their analysis, do not find it to have the same agenda crowding effects as the other topic categories. As a robustness check, I create and test an additional variable that includes this category. However, I do not find it to differ in sign or significance from the variable described here.

Information Service has only released House unpublished hearings through 1958. The CAP observes that the “topics with the greatest percentage of unpublished hearings are defense, public lands and water management, international affairs, and government operations”, i.e., three out of the four core functions of government topics. This means that my agenda crowding variable likely underreports the degree to which Congress’s agenda is dominated by the core functions of government—to the extent that there is bias in these finding, it is bias *against* my argument.

Another issue with the CAP Hearings data is that it may capture the same congressional speeches that my count of congressional speeches does. Speeches which mention foreign civil conflicts often take place in the context of hearings and, likely, in hearings which would fall under CAP’s international affairs topic coding. However, many speeches about foreign civil conflicts do not take place in hearings; rather, they are made by singular congresspersons who desire to raise the issue. And, likewise, many hearings within the international affairs topic coding are not about foreign civil conflicts. CAP assigned many international affairs hearings between 1946 and 1999 with subtopic codes that do not suggest foreign civil conflict: international finance (8%), international organizations (6.5%), and diplomats (5%). The most common subtopic code is for hearings about a specific country (35%), but these too tend cover a wide variety of topics, e.g.: Anglo-American financial agreements, Israeli airstrikes on Iraq, and North Korean denuclearization. There is certainly overlap between the two measures, but it is minor.⁴³

⁴³ As a robustness check, I create and test an additional variable that excludes every subtopic in the international affairs and defense topics that are likely to include mentions of foreign civil conflicts. I do not find it to differ in sign or significance from the variable described here either.

Control Variables

Though the question of interest in this chapter fits within the broader research on civil conflict intervention and punctuated equilibrium theory, its specificity leaves few precedents for theoretically relevant control variables. The domestic predictors of intervention identified in the civil conflict literature likely do not explain attention in the same way that they explain intervention. Likewise, because the PET literature explains policymaker attention across broad issue areas, it does not theorize why attention might vary across a topic as narrow as policymaker attention to specific foreign civil conflicts. These controls are therefore partly speculative, though I derive them from prior civil conflict scholarship.

Electoral Constraints. Prior studies of US intervention (Yoon 1997; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) hypothesize that, during the increased scrutiny of an election campaign, the United States will be disinclined to undertake interventions. But, even more simply, elections consume policymaker attention. While it is possible that congresspersons could use a salient foreign conflict as a campaign issue, they are more likely to focus on bread-and-butter issues which are more relevant to the lives of their constituents. Following Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) I construct two dichotomous variables indicating the presence of US elections, *Presidential Election* and *Midterm Election*. I code these variables as a 1 in the 12 months prior to an election and 0 otherwise.

Domestic Interest Groups. Aydin (2012) argues that a country's economic activity in foreign markets is concentrated within a subset of domestic economic actors. These actors, who benefit disproportionately from such markets, therefore organize to influence government policy, especially when their interests are threatened by civil conflict.⁴⁴ I anticipate that the lobbying

⁴⁴ However, Aydin (2012) does not expect established democracies, such as the United States, to be affected by this dynamic to the degree that new democracies or autocracies are.

efforts of these interest groups would materialize as a greater number of Congressional mentions of the civil conflicts which take place in countries where US domestic economic interest groups are numerous. I proxy this, as Aydin (2012) does, by investigating trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). For *Trade Flows*, I use smoothed total trade from the Correlates of War Trade Data Set. This measure sums the exports and imports between the US and each conflict country, in millions of US dollars, and smooths large spikes and dips in trade. For *Foreign Direct Investment*, I use a variable constructed in Bennett, Poast, and Stam's (2019) NewGene software, which indicates the total FDI stocks flowing from the US to each conflict country in millions of US Dollars.⁴⁵

Natural Resources. Civil conflict scholars have frequently investigated the availability of natural resources in conflict states, especially oil production, as a cause of intervention (Aydin 2010; Koga 2011; Findley and Marineau 2015; Stojek and Chacha 2015; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016). The main theoretical claim of this literature, Findley and Marineau's (2015) argument that outside countries sometimes intervene in civil conflict states to loot their natural resources, doesn't logically apply to activities short of intervention. But, if intervention in a civil conflict to secure access to strategic natural resources is something that states do, this is also likely something that policymakers discuss prior to intervention.⁴⁶ To measure *Lootable Natural Resources*, I use another variable constructed via NewGene which records conflict country's total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ NewGene is a collection of datasets compiled from other sources. This indicator (ind_total_OFI) comes from a dataset prepared and compiled by Benjamin Graham, The International Political Economy Data Resource, which is itself a collection of datasets compiled from other sources.

⁴⁶ Though looting of this nature is found by Koga (2011) to be uncharacteristic of democracies, colorful anecdotes such as US President Donald Trump's "We should have taken the oil" in reference to the US intervention in Iraq suggest that it is not entirely outside the scope of this project.

⁴⁷ This variable (natresource_r-I) is also from The International Political Economy Data Resource by NewGene. I use oil exports as an alternate specification of this variable (combinedoil_AE); the results are broadly consistent.

Conflict Intensity. If senior policymaker attention is, in essence, a lagging reaction to the frequency or severity of true events in a policy area, as PET holds, then it should correlate with indicators that show events are severe. For civil conflicts, the most straightforward such indicator is conflict intensity. Conflicts causing a high level of violence and destruction should *ceteris paribus* draw more attention than conflicts at a low level of violence. High intensity conflicts are more threatening to neighboring states and to international stability; civil conflict scholars have often found that conflict intensity increases intervention likelihood (Gent 2007; Aydin 2010; Kathman 2011) though that result is not consistent (Regan 1998; Lemke and Regan 2004). As an indicator of conflict intensity, I use the UCDP PRIO ACD's (2021) *Intensity Level* variable, which I recode as a dichotomous variable which equals 0 when a conflict has caused 25 to 999 battle deaths in a year and 1 when the conflict has caused 1000 or more battle deaths. My data are monthly, so this measure is not appropriately precise, but this is not as serious a limitation as it might appear. Most conflicts in the data are either low intensity for their entire duration or high intensity for their entire duration, such that imprecisely timed changes in conflict intensity rarely occur.

Proximity. Similarly, I would expect that senior policymakers pay greater attention to proximate conflicts. Conflicts that are contiguous or near to a potential intervener are objectively more important than distant ones since violence and destruction that occur nearby pose a greater threat. It is one of the most consistent findings in the civil conflict literature that conflicts are more likely to experience intervention from contiguous or proximate states (Khosla 1999; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Greig and Regan 2008; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Kathman 2011; Nome 2013; and Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016)—though unlike senior policymaker attention, this may be due to loss of force gradient, i.e., faraway states

lack the capacity to intervene. To measure proximity, I use *Minimum Distance*—the distance between two states’ nearest borders—as constructed by NewGene based on the CShapes dataset (Schvitz et al. 2022).

Power. Great power status and power differentials also figure frequently in the civil conflict intervention literature (Gent 2007; Kathman 2010; Nome 2013; Stojek and Chacha 2015). But where this literature finds interventions to be more common in the conflicts of weak states, since it is easier and less costly to exert influence over weak states, I would expect more senior policymaker attention to be paid to civil conflicts in powerful states and, especially, major powers. Not only are these conflicts likely to be more disruptive of international stability, they have more important outcomes. The Russian and Chinese civil wars, for example, were hugely consequential to world politics in a way that conflicts in smaller states never could be. I use the CINC score of each conflict country to capture *Conflict Country Power*, which is again acquired via NewGene.⁴⁸

Interstate Relationships. Considering power politics more broadly, states tend, in Homeric fashion, to help their friends and harm their enemies. The civil war intervention literature finds that interveners frequently back the government side in the civil conflicts of their allies (Findley and Teo 2006; Stojek and Chacha 2015) and the rebel side in the civil conflicts of their rivals (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Findley and Teo 2006). I anticipate that senior policymakers are more likely to be attentive to foreign civil conflicts in both cases—worried about ‘terrorist’ rebels toppling friendly governments and hopeful that ‘freedom fighter’ rebels will topple rival governments. I code *Alliance* dichotomously, as a 1 if the United States has a

⁴⁸ CINC, i.e., Composite Index of National Capability, scores, from Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972) are an average of six measures of states’ economic and military capacity—total population, military expenditure etc.—taken as a ratio of the world total. I also used conflict countries’ major power status and number of military personnel to measure power and, again, results are broadly consistent.

defense pact with each conflict country and 0 otherwise. I capture rivalry using Signorino and Ritter's (1999) weighted global S-score, which measures the foreign policy similarity between states based on the number of alliances, adjusted by ally military capability, which they share. An *S-score* of 1 indicates that two states have identical alliance portfolios, while a -1 indicates opposite portfolios, i.e., a rivalry. I collect both variables using Bennett and Stam's (2000) EUGene software. Additionally, I include a dichotomous *Cold War* variable to represent the environment of heightened rivalry and increased salience of peripheral civil conflicts prior to the collapse of the Soviet Bloc.

Prior Interventions. To account for Findley and Teo's (2006) 'actor centric' argument that third-party states react to previous interventions and, in particular, to interventions by rivals, I include several variables for prior intervention. The most precise available intervention data is Regan's (2002). He defines third-party economic and military interventions in civil conflicts as "convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces." However, Regan's data is difficult to use in that its definition of civil conflict differs from the UCDP PRIO ACD's. Most notably, Regan uses 200 battle deaths as the threshold for war rather than 1000. I matched each of the conflicts in Regan's data with its corresponding ACD conflict.⁴⁹ I then use three prior intervener variables *Prior Intervention*, *Prior Multi-Country Intervention*, and *Prior Communist Intervention*. Each variable is dichotomous, equaling 1 when there was any form of intervention in a month and 0 otherwise. *Prior Communist Intervention* includes interventions by all members

⁴⁹ This matching process is not straightforward. I explain its issues in greater detail in Chapter 4.

and observers of Comecon.⁵⁰ *Prior Intervention* indicates each conflict month that experienced a single non-communist intervention and *Prior Multi-Country Intervention* indicates months when multiple non-communist countries intervened. *Prior Intervention* and *Prior Multi-Country Intervention* are mutually exclusive, but both can occur in the same month as a *Prior Communist Intervention*. I would expect that senior policymakers in the United States are more attentive to conflicts where other states have already intervened and, especially, where rival Communist Bloc countries have intervened. And though, as Findley and Teo hold, a state might be less likely to intervene in a conflict when an ally has already done so, I would still expect the state's senior policymakers to pay greater attention.

Data Management Variables. There are two issues with the original data I have collected on news coverage and policymaker attention, which need to be accounted for in the analysis. First, countries undergoing multiple simultaneous civil conflicts are often discussed differently than countries experiencing a single conflict. Coverage of Myanmar, for example, often conceives of the conflicts of the Communist Party of Burma, Karen minority, Kachin minority, Rohingya minority, and Shan minority as a single conflict with multiple actors, mentioning these rebel groups in a list or alluding to conflict in the country in vague collective terms. I therefore attempt to control for the differing discussion of states with multiple conflicts using a dichotomous variable, *Multiple Conflicts*, which equals 1 whenever my data contain multiple observations with the same country code, year, and month. Second, as discussed in chapter 2, some conflicts are discussed by Congress or the news media in ways which make them difficult to capture with my standard search keywords. I therefore flag these conflicts using a dichotomous variable, *High Noise Conflict*, which equals 1 when my search strategy required

⁵⁰ In my data this includes Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Zambia, Iraq, the Yemen People's Republic, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, China before 1962, and Ethiopia after 1973.

substantial amendment. I record which conflicts are high noise and what search keywords I use to code them in Appendices 1 and 2.

Reverse Causality Issues

Though to this point I have asserted that news media attention affects policymaker attention, it is also possible—and has long been considered (Edwards and Wood 1999; Mermin 2004; Vliegenthart et al. 2016)—that the causal relationship could be the other way around. There is very likely some truth to this. Bell, Frank, and Macharia (2013), who assess the causal effects of news media on civil conflict intervention, find that, even though media coverage increases the likelihood of intervention, there are reciprocal effects; intervention also causes media coverage.

During the data collection for this project, it has been clear that news media cover US overseas military activity, as well as the introduction and passage of conflict-related legislation, and, on occasion, the remarks of congresspersons. But, for the most part, house and senate speeches are not important news events—far more dramatic and newsworthy incidents occur within conflicts themselves than in congressional discussion of conflicts. *Congressional Mentions* do not have a visibly large effect on *News Media Stories* to the degree that the reverse is true, whereby a substantial number of Congressional mentions of civil conflicts occur via Congresspersons reading news stories into the Congressional record.

I therefore address the effect that US interventions have on news coverage but not the effect that congressional attention has on news coverage. I do this in two ways. First, I create a variable for major US military interventions. Any intervention which Regan (2002) codes as using troops, naval forces, or air forces is included. Additionally, to capture uses of force which

Regan codes as UN interventions, but which nonetheless involved substantial US deployments, I add to his list the US interventions recorded in the Military Interventions by Powerful States dataset.⁵¹ I drop from the analysis all months occurring after one of these major military interventions. Second, I create an additional Intervention variable, *Prior US Intervention*, that equals 1 in any month that the US intervened at a lower scale, i.e., by providing loans, military equipment, foreign aid, and so on.

Stochastic Process Analysis

To test *Hypotheses 3.1a, 3.1b, and 3.1c*, I examine the distribution of monthly changes in *News Media Stories* and *Congressional Mentions*. PET Scholars (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, Baumgartner et al. 2009) tend to investigate change distributions in Congressional activity using a “percentage-percentage” method. That is, they convert the number of, for example, Congressional hearings about a topic into a percentage of the total number of hearings then identify the period-to-period changes in this percentage. Their method is not possible for this analysis because I do not have data on the total number of *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* stories in each month.⁵² Additionally, due to the high frequency of zero values in my data, which are not present in the budget data common to PET scholarship, neither am I able to examine percentage changes in counts. I, therefore, examine absolute changes in the monthly number of *News Media Stories* and *Congressional Mentions*.

Figure 3-1 displays the monthly changes in US *News Media Stories* about foreign civil conflicts as a histogram overlaid with a normal distribution curve that has the same mean and

⁵¹ I explain this composite US intervention variable at greater length in Chapter 4.

⁵² I do know the total number of Congressional speeches but, for comparability, I use the same measure for both change distributions in this section.

standard deviation as the data. I have truncated it at a positive and negative change of 50 news stories to maintain readability. In line with the expectations of **Hypothesis 3.1a**, the distribution of *News Media Stories* is characteristically leptokurtic. It has a sharp central peak—which captures the long periods of media inattentiveness to foreign civil conflicts with minimal change in coverage. It has thin shoulders—which indicate an absence of moderate-sized changes in coverage, i.e., when the situation on the ground in a civil conflict sees changes of moderate importance news media underreport them. It has fat tails that capture rapid and dramatic changes in coverage—which appear thin but contain numerous observations that fall *far* from the mean.

Figure 3-1. Monthly Change in *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* stories about foreign civil conflicts





Figure 3-2, in the same format as Figure 3-1, displays monthly changes in *Congressional Mentions* of foreign civil conflicts. It, likewise, matches the expectations of **Hypothesis 3.1b**, with a strong central peak, weak shoulders, and fat tails, though, again, the tails are only fat in the sense that they contain observations unusually far from the mean. This suggests that the US

Congress is mostly inattentive to developments in foreign civil conflicts but rapidly reprioritizes attention to them in response to major events or the accumulating pressure of small ones. Comparing the kurtosis values of the two distributions (printed in each figure) to evaluate **Hypothesis 3.1c**, change in *Congressional Mentions* has a kurtosis of 302.95, which is substantially greater than the kurtosis of change in *News Media Stories*, at 120.85. L-kurtosis, another measure of peakedness, which PET scholars (Baumgartner et al. 2009) prefer for its reduced sensitivity to outliers, is 0.56 for *News Media Stories* and 0.74 for *Congressional Mentions*.⁵³ A Gaussian distribution has an L-kurtosis value of 0.123, so both distributions are highly leptokurtic, with *Congressional Mentions* exhibiting greater kurtosis than *News Media Stories*. This supports **Hypothesis 3.1c**, suggesting that policy activity at lower stages of the policy process is less punctuated and, therefore, more sensitive to external inputs.

Figure 3-2. Monthly Change in US Congressional Mentions of foreign civil conflicts



⁵³ I find L-kurtosis values using *lmoments*, a STATA program written by Nicholas Cox, based on Hosking (1990).

Regression Analysis

To test my other hypotheses regarding the effects of news media, media storms, and agenda crowding on senior policymaker attention, I use a negative binomial regression model. Because the dependent variable, *Congressional Mentions*, is not a ratio measure—most observations are single digit integers, and relatively few values in the data exceed 100—a count model is more appropriate than OLS regression. *Congressional Mentions* is also overdispersed. The variance of Congressional Mentions is 96.6, which significantly exceeds its mean, roughly 2.1. This suggests that a negative binomial regression which models dispersion is more appropriate than a Poisson model which does not.

However, as I have noted above, *Congressional Mentions* are organized into conflict months. Observations are not independent across time, which violates standard regression assumptions. Since general use statistics software do not provide a method of estimating time-series cross-sectional negative binomial regressions, I adopt an alternate model specification using time-series cross-sectional Poisson regression with random effects. I also cluster standard errors by conflict episode in all models.

Finally, there is an important feature of Congressional Mentions which would seriously bias this analysis's results if not adjusted for: Congresspersons cannot give speeches when Congress is not in session. I address this in two ways. First, I create an additional covariate, *Houses in Session*, and include it in the negative binomial and time-series cross-section Poisson models. While the Senate and House of Representatives tend to go into recess at roughly the same times, their recess dates do not always overlap. I used the recess dates recorded on the websites of the Senate and House to identify any full months that one or both bodies did not meet. The final variable equals 0 when neither body met during a month, a 1 when either the

House or the Senate met for at least some fraction of a month, and 2 when both bodies met during the month. Second, I estimate a zero inflated negative binomial model, which predicts zeroes in dependent variable that are generated by a process separate from the other predictors in the count model. I use the *Houses in Session* variable described here as the only variable in the inflation model.

Findings and Discussion

I find consistent evidence in support of *Hypotheses 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4* across all models: Increases in *News Media Stories* lead to increases in *Congressional Mentions*; *Media Storms* lead to Increases in *Congressional Mentions*; and *Agenda Crowding* leads to decreases in *Congressional Mentions*. The signs and significance of each model's control variables, however, are largely inconsistent with my expectations—most are not statistically significant and a few, such as *Foreign Direct Investment*, are in the opposite of the expected direction. The results of the random effects Poisson, negative binomial, and zero inflated negative binomial models are summarized in **Table 3.1** below. Additionally—because count model coefficients report the effects of each independent variable on the log of the dependent variable, numbers which are not straightforwardly interpretable—I report exponentiated coefficients, also termed incidence rate ratios. They are displayed in **Table 3.2**.

Table 3-1. Effects of Media Coverage, Media Storms, and Agenda Crowding on Congressional Mentions of Foreign Civil Conflict

| VARIABLES | Model 1: | Model 2: | Model 3: | Model 4: | Model 5: | Model 6: |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---------------------------------|--|
| | Random Effects Poisson | Random Effects Poisson Excluding Major US Interventions | Negative Binomial | Negative Binomial Excluding Major US Interventions | Zero Inflated Negative Binomial | Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Excluding Major US Interventions |
| News Media Stories | 0.0126*** (0.00235) | 0.0139*** (0.00177) | 0.0493*** (0.0109) | 0.0478*** (0.0140) | 0.0497*** (0.0111) | 0.0482*** (0.0144) |
| Media Storm = 1 | 1.099*** (0.292) | 0.949*** (0.234) | 1.750*** (0.632) | 2.036*** (0.410) | 1.739** (0.681) | 2.073*** (0.408) |
| News Media Stories * Media Storm | -0.00605** (0.00282) | -0.00853*** (0.00174) | -0.0352*** (0.00763) | -0.0386*** (0.0106) | -0.0352*** (0.00753) | -0.0393*** (0.0111) |
| Agenda Crowding | -1.415** (0.565) | -1.854** (0.736) | -3.260*** (0.951) | -2.946*** (1.131) | -3.303*** (0.957) | -2.997*** (1.139) |
| Presidential Election | -0.0383 (0.0736) | 0.00365 (0.0683) | -0.0991 (0.0622) | -0.0958 (0.0681) | -0.0973 (0.0628) | -0.0939 (0.0688) |
| Midterm Election | -0.00542 (0.0656) | 0.0367 (0.0920) | -0.00618 (0.0567) | 0.00149 (0.0627) | -0.00657 (0.0581) | 0.00167 (0.0645) |
| Trade Flows | 4.16e-05 (2.82e-05) | 5.61e-05* (2.96e-05) | 6.37e-05 (3.89e-05) | 8.16e-05* (4.46e-05) | 6.30e-05 (3.90e-05) | 8.06e-05* (4.46e-05) |
| Foreign Direct Investment | -2.67e-05*** (8.87e-06) | -2.99e-05* (1.80e-05) | -3.88e-05* (2.01e-05) | -4.84e-05** (2.28e-05) | -3.86e-05* (2.01e-05) | -4.81e-05** (2.29e-05) |
| Lootable Natural Resources | -0.0116 (0.00795) | -0.00346 (0.00711) | -0.0167 (0.0102) | -0.0104 (0.0103) | -0.0172* (0.00989) | -0.0108 (0.00998) |
| Intensity Level | 0.315* (0.171) | 0.349** (0.159) | 0.970*** (0.256) | 0.918*** (0.290) | 0.969*** (0.256) | 0.915*** (0.289) |
| Minimum Distance | -2.46e-05 (3.09e-05) | -2.46e-05 (1.68e-05) | 1.89e-05 (7.65e-05) | 1.88e-05 (7.63e-05) | 2.10e-05 (7.66e-05) | 2.08e-05 (7.64e-05) |
| Conflict Country Power | -11.97 (72.14) | 2.362 (201.7) | -14.54* (8.640) | -16.90* (10.08) | -14.35 (8.753) | -16.64* (10.12) |
| Alliance | -0.501* (0.303) | -0.0458 (0.628) | 0.606 (0.825) | 0.586 (0.872) | 0.618 (0.824) | 0.604 (0.872) |
| S-score | 2.089** (0.956) | 1.017 (0.999) | 0.174 (1.316) | 0.425 (1.411) | 0.183 (1.322) | 0.423 (1.416) |
| Cold War | -0.160 (0.328) | 0.133 (0.345) | -0.528*** (0.246) | -0.626*** (0.243) | -0.523*** (0.246) | -0.619** (0.242) |
| Prior Intervention | 0.251* (0.144) | -0.169 (0.115) | 0.148 (0.205) | 0.316 (0.204) | 0.142 (0.206) | 0.316 (0.204) |
| Prior Multi-Country Intervention | 0.123 (0.481) | -0.385 (0.310) | -0.107 (0.310) | -0.127 (0.346) | -0.0970 (0.315) | -0.105 (0.350) |
| Prior Communist Intervention | 0.313** (0.128) | 0.586*** (0.182) | 0.981*** (0.212) | 1.276*** (0.202) | 0.994*** (0.211) | 1.278*** (0.203) |
| Houses In Session | 3.124*** (0.264) | 2.681*** (0.190) | 3.005*** (0.229) | 2.705*** (0.184) | -4.622***† (0.401) | -4.239***† (0.292) |
| Multiple Conflicts | 0.351 (0.317) | 0.450 (0.392) | -0.893*** (0.325) | -0.793** (0.326) | -0.892*** (0.325) | -0.793** (0.327) |
| High Noise Conflict | 0.309 (1.463) | 0.472 (1.157) | -0.0719 (0.332) | 0.0154 (0.362) | -0.0803 (0.332) | 0.00682 (0.361) |
| Prior US Intervention | 0.127 (0.240) | 0.233* (0.135) | 0.639*** (0.214) | 0.953*** (0.267) | 0.650*** (0.217) | 0.949*** (0.269) |
| Constant | -5.788*** (1.630) | -5.449*** (1.898) | -6.199*** (1.050) | -5.765*** (1.122) | -0.182 (0.926) | -0.344 (1.076) |
| Observations | 12,895 | 11,646 | 12,895 | 11,646 | 12,895 | 11,646 |
| Number of Conflict Episodes | 208 | 203 | 208 | 203 | 208 | 203 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † inflation model coefficients

Table 3-2. Effects of Media Coverage, Media Storms, and Agenda Crowding on Congressional Mentions of Foreign Civil Conflict, Incidence Rate Ratios

| VARIABLES | Model 1: | Model 2: | Model 3: | Model 4: | Model 5: | Model 6: |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|---|-------------------------|--|------------------------------------|--|
| | Random Effects Poisson | Random Effects Poisson Excluding Major US Interventions | Negative Binomial | Negative Binomial Excluding Major US Interventions | Zero Inflated Negative Binomial | Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Excluding Major US Interventions |
| News Media Stories | 1.013*** (0.00238) | 1.014*** (0.00179) | 1.051*** (0.0114) | 1.049*** (0.0147) | 1.051*** (0.0117) | 1.049*** (0.0151) |
| Media Storm = 1 | 3.000*** (0.875) | 2.584*** (0.605) | 5.755*** (3.637) | 7.660*** (3.142) | 5.690** (3.874) | 7.945*** (3.244) |
| News Media Stories * Media Storm | 0.994** (0.00280) | 0.992*** (0.00173) | 0.965*** (0.00736) | 0.962*** (0.0102) | 0.965*** (0.00727) | 0.961*** (0.0107) |
| Agenda Crowding | 0.243** (0.137) | 0.157** (0.115) | 0.0384*** (0.0365) | 0.0525*** (0.0594) | 0.0368*** (0.0352) | 0.0500*** (0.0569) |
| Presidential Election | 0.962 (0.0708) | 1.004 (0.0685) | 0.906 (0.0563) | 0.909 (0.0619) | 0.907 (0.0570) | 0.910 (0.0626) |
| Midterm Election | 0.995 (0.0653) | 1.037 (0.0955) | 0.994 (0.0564) | 1.001 (0.0628) | 0.993 (0.0577) | 1.002 (0.0646) |
| Trade Flows | 1.000 (2.82e-05) | 1.000* (2.96e-05) | 1.000 (3.89e-05) | 1.000* (4.46e-05) | 1.000 (3.90e-05) | 1.000* (4.46e-05) |
| Foreign Direct Investment | 1.000*** (8.87e-06) | 1.000* (1.80e-05) | 1.000* (2.01e-05) | 1.000** (2.28e-05) | 1.000* (2.01e-05) | 1.000** (2.29e-05) |
| Lootable Natural Resources | 0.988 (0.00786) | 0.997 (0.00709) | 0.983 (0.0101) | 0.990 (0.0102) | 0.983* (0.00972) | 0.989 (0.00987) |
| Intensity Level | 1.370* (0.235) | 1.418** (0.225) | 2.639*** (0.676) | 2.503*** (0.725) | 2.634*** (0.674) | 2.496*** (0.722) |
| Minimum Distance | 1.000 (3.09e-05) | 1.000 (1.68e-05) | 1.000 (7.65e-05) | 1.000 (7.63e-05) | 1.000 (7.66e-05) | 1.000 (7.64e-05) |
| Conflict Country Power | 6.32e-06 (0.000456) | 10.61 (2.140) | 4.85e-07* (4.19e-06) | 4.57e-08* (4.60e-07) | 5.89e-07 (5.15e-06) | 5.93e-08* (6.00e-07) |
| Alliance | 0.606* (0.184) | 0.955 (0.600) | 1.834 (1.513) | 1.796 (1.567) | 1.856 (1.530) | 1.830 (1.595) |
| S-score | 8.077** (7.725) | 2.764 (2.762) | 1.190 (1.566) | 1.529 (2.159) | 1.201 (1.589) | 1.527 (2.163) |
| Cold War | 0.853 (0.279) | 1.142 (0.394) | 0.590** (0.145) | 0.535*** (0.130) | 0.593** (0.146) | 0.538** (0.130) |
| Prior Intervention | 1.286* (0.185) | 0.844 (0.0972) | 1.159 (0.238) | 1.371 (0.279) | 1.152 (0.237) | 1.372 (0.280) |
| Prior Multi-Country Intervention | 1.131 (0.544) | 0.680 (0.211) | 0.899 (0.279) | 0.881 (0.304) | 0.908 (0.286) | 0.900 (0.315) |
| Prior Communist Intervention | 1.368** (0.175) | 1.797*** (0.327) | 2.668*** (0.566) | 3.584*** (0.725) | 2.703*** (0.571) | 3.590*** (0.728) |
| Houses In Session | 22.74*** (5.993) | 14.59*** (2.770) | 20.20*** (4.616) | 14.95*** (2.748) | 0.00983***† (0.00394) | 0.0144***† (0.00421) |
| Multiple Conflicts | 1.421 (0.450) | 1.569 (0.615) | 0.410*** (0.133) | 0.452** (0.148) | 0.410*** (0.133) | 0.452** (0.148) |
| High Noise Conflict | 1.362 (1.994) | 1.603 (1.854) | 0.931 (0.309) | 1.016 (0.367) | 0.923 (0.306) | 1.007 (0.364) |
| Prior US Intervention | 1.135 (0.272) | 1.262* (0.170) | 1.894*** (0.405) | 2.592*** (0.693) | 1.915*** (0.416) | 2.583*** (0.695) |
| Constant | 0.00307*** (0.00500) | 0.00430*** (0.00816) | 0.00203*** (0.00213) | 0.00314*** (0.00352) | 0.834 (0.772) | 0.709 (0.763) |
| Observations | 12,895 | 11,646 | 12,895 | 11,646 | 12,895 | 11,646 |
| Number of Conflict Episodes | 208 | 203 | 208 | 203 | 208 | 203 |

Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, † inflation model coefficients

In both sets of regression tables, models 1 and 2 display results for random effects Poisson, which mitigate temporal dependence, models 3 and 4 display the negative binomial regression results, which address the overdispersion of the dependent variable, and models 5 and 6 display the zero inflated negative binomial regression results. Models 1, 3, and 5 include all conflict months observed in my data, while models 2, 4, and 6 exclude all conflict months that occurred after a major US intervention, i.e., an intervention involving the direct use of troops, air, or naval forces. For the remainder of this section, I focus on the results of model 4 as I believe they are the closest approximation of the real world.


News Media Stories have a positive effect on *Congressional Mentions* that is significant at the 99% confidence level across all models. However, the substantive effect of *News Media Stories* is relatively small. In model 4, a one unit increase in *News Media Stories* leads only to a 4.9% increase in *Congressional Mentions*. However, because *News Media Stories* is part of an interaction term with *Media Storm*, this relationship is only true when *Media Storm* = 0, i.e., when there are less than 50 *News Media Stories* in a month.⁵⁴ The coefficient of *Media Storm* is positive and significant across all models, but because it only captures the effect of *Media Storm* when *News Media Stories* = 0, which is not a sensible value, this is not informative. I therefore present an interaction effect plot, Figure 3.3, which shows the effect of *News Media Stories* on *Congressional Mentions* both in the presence and absence of a *Media Storm*.

As Figure 3.3 shows, the effect of *News Media Stories* is relatively small in the absence of a *Media Storm* but increases substantially when a *Media Storm* occurs. It is difficult to observe at the scale shown in the figure, but the 95% confidence intervals of the pre-*Media Storm* effect of *News Media Stories* does not overlap with the post-*Media Storm* effect of *News*

⁵⁴ See Braumoeller (2004) for a more detailed explanation of interaction term interpretation.

Media Stories. Confidence intervals widen immensely at higher values of *News Media Stories* because, though the maximum value of *News Media Stories* is 396, there are few observations of *News Media Stories* above 50, less than 5% of all observations.

Figure 3-3. Effect of News Media Stories on Congressional Attention, Conditional on the Presence of a Media Storm. Interaction Effect Plot



This finding shows strong support for **Hypothesis 3.2**, that increases in media attention to foreign civil conflicts lead to increases in policymaker attention. In all models and across both levels of the non-linear relationship, *News Media Coverage* has a positive and statistically significant effect on *Congressional Mentions*. News media, rather than simply reacting to conflict events more smoothly than Congress does, has a direct effect on congressional attention. This finding also supports **Hypothesis 3.3**, that media storms amplify the positive effect of media attention on policymakers, and corroborates the arguments made by Walgrave et al. (2017).

Agenda Crowding also affects *Congressional Mentions* in the expected direction. In all models, it is negative and significant at the 99% confidence level. This means that, as Congressional attention becomes dominated by an increasingly large proportion of hearings about the core functions of government—macroeconomics, defense, international affairs, and government operations—Congress pays less attention to foreign civil conflicts. Moreover, the effect of *Agenda Crowding* is quite large: a one-unit change in *Agenda Crowding*, i.e., when Congress changes from holding *no hearings* about the core functions of government to holding *all hearings* about the core functions of government, Congress will mention a foreign civil conflict only 5.25% as many times—almost 95% less. It should be noted, however, that the range of the *Agenda Crowding* variable is 0.15 to 0.63; the effect of *Agenda Crowding* is not quite as large as Table 3-2 suggests.

To examine the effect of *Agenda Crowding* on *Congressional Attention* in greater detail, I simulate its substantive effects using STATA's user written Clarify package (King, Tomz, and Wittenburg 2000). Figure 3-4 displays the simulated effect of *Agenda Crowding* on *Congressional Mentions* when holding all other variables at their mean. The effect is statistically significant but not substantively large, which makes sense in that congressional attention to most civil conflicts in most months is very low. A change from the minimum to the maximum value of *Agenda Crowding* decreases the number of *Congressional Mentions* by roughly one mention.

Figure 3-4. Effect of Agenda Crowding on Congressional Attention, Mean News Stories Scenario





Figure 3-5 shows the effect of *Agenda Crowding* in a higher salience scenario. It displays the simulated effect of *Agenda Crowding* on *Congressional Mentions* in the presence of a *Media Storm* for a conflict which has exceeded 1000 battlefield fatalities, holding all other variables at their means. The substantive effect of *Agenda Crowding* is larger, reducing *Congressional Mentions* by 15 between its minimum and maximum values, but the 95% confidence intervals overlap, suggesting the effect is not statistically significant. Again, this makes some sense. In an environment where a militarily serious foreign conflict is being heavily covered by the media, congresspersons' attention cannot be entirely diverted from it by the core functions of government. Tentatively, these results show support for **Hypothesis 3.4**, that when the attention of senior policymakers is dominated by the core functions of government, policymakers are less likely to pay attention to foreign civil conflicts.

Figure 3-5. Effect of Agenda Crowding on Congressional Attention, Media Storm Scenario



Turning to the control variables, only four theoretically relevant variables are statistically significant in the anticipated direction: *Trade Flows*, *Intensity Level*, and *Prior Communist Intervention*. *Trade Flows* is only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level and only in models 2, 4, and 6, which exclude conflict months that occurred after major US intervention, providing weak evidence that, when civil conflict breaks out in a country that has strong trade ties with the US, congresspersons are more inclined to pay attention to it. *Intensity Level* is statistically significant across all models and its substantive effect is large. According to the results of model 4, when a conflict crosses the threshold from 25-999 battle deaths to 1000+ battle deaths, *Congressional Mentions* of the conflict increase by 250.3%. *Prior Communist Intervention* has a similarly large effect. It is statistically significant across all models and, in model 4, increases *Congressional Mentions* by 358.4%.

Several control variables are, however, statistically significant but signed in the direction opposite my expectations. Increases in *Foreign Direct Investment*, *Lootable Natural Resources*, and *Conflict Country Power* all decrease the number of *Congressional Mentions*. So does a US defensive *Alliance* with the conflict state, or the fraught geopolitical circumstances of the *Cold War*. However, few of these findings are consistent across all models and none are consistent across all models at the 95% confidence level. Only the counterintuitive results for *Foreign Direct Investment* are consistent across all models, suggesting that as FDI in a country increases US congresspersons are less attentive to conflicts occurring in the country. *Cold War* is negative and significant at the 95% confidence level or greater in four models, 3, 4, 5, and 6, suggesting that congresspersons were less interested in conflicts that occurred during the Cold War. This unexpected finding, though, is likely explained by the influence of *Prior Communist Intervention*: the variation in US congressional attention to civil conflicts pre- and post-Cold War is being subsumed by the measure that records actual communist interventions.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I argued that civil conflicts are more likely to reach the attention of senior policymakers if they have already reached the attention of actors that are lower in the policy process, that civil conflicts are especially likely to reach the attention of senior policymakers during media storms, and that civil conflicts are more likely to reach the attention of senior policymakers when the government agenda is not dominated by the core functions of government. My findings support each of these arguments, suggesting that the disproportionate information processing and punctuated policy activity which PET scholars have discovered in public budgets are applicable to the study of civil conflict intervention. US policymaker attention

to foreign civil conflicts seems to follow the same pattern of prolonged disinterest punctuated by frantic activity that is engendered in other broader policy areas. But the more important question remains to be answered: Does this process also drive intervention decisions up to and including the deployment of US troops? I endeavor to answer this question in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4

Effects of US Policymaker Attention on Civil Conflict Intervention

In chapter 3 I showed that, in the case of the United States, senior policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts is consistent with the expectations of punctuated equilibrium theory (PET). Civil conflicts appear more likely to reach the attention of US senior policymakers if they have already reached the attention of actors that are lower in the policy process. The more salient question, however, is whether these differences in policymaker attention affect the likelihood of direct intervention in civil conflicts. In this chapter, I therefore develop the second part of the argument advanced in chapter 1, that the US is more likely to intervene in foreign civil conflicts when US senior policymakers are attentive to them, but that attention is not a sufficient cause of intervention. Even if senior policymaker attention to a conflict is high, the US may choose to do nothing when its opportunity to influence the conflict's outcome is limited or highly costly.

This chapter proceeds first by discussing PET arguments about the domestic motivation for US intervention in foreign civil conflicts. I then argue that intervention decisions are inhibited by factors that limit US opportunity to both intervene and affect conflict outcomes. In the third section, I explain my data and statistical methodology. The fourth section presents results. And, in the final section, I discuss the insights and limitations of my findings and how they inform the civil conflict intervention literature.

How Information Processing Affects Intervention

PET scholarship conceives of policy change as a process “in which information flows into a policymaking system, and the system, acting on these signals from its environment, attends to the problem and acts to alleviate it” (True, Jones, and Baumgartner 2007, 176). But policy changes are not immediate or proportionate: policy is sticky. Boundedly rational policymakers are always confronted with more issues than they can feasibly address and must selectively ignore or deprioritize most issues. Similarly, institutional constraints and bureaucratic inertia impose friction on decisions which depart from the status quo. Policy, therefore, changes disproportionately to the severity of a problem. It occurs when pressure from informational inputs about the problem builds to a level that can no longer be ignored or leads to a singular dramatic event that demands a response. PET therefore expects that policy is held in equilibrium most of the time but is punctuated by brief periods of major change.⁵⁵

As several scholars in the PET literature have shown (Jones, Sulkin, and Larsen 2003; Baumgartner et al. 2009; Lam and Chan 2015)—and as I found in chapter 3 of this project—the punctuatedness of different policy outcomes varies by their proximity to informational inputs and the degree of friction they impose on decision making. Outputs such as news media stories, which are subject to minimal institutional friction, respond promptly to world events and other revelations of policy-relevant information. Change in news stories is therefore less punctuated than US congressional speeches, which are subject to moderate institutional friction, or US federal budgets, which are subject to high institutional friction.

⁵⁵ This is the general punctuation hypothesis of PET (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993/2009) initial presentation of the theory is more US-centric and conceptually and descriptively dense.

Scholars in this literature, Lam and Chan (2015) for example, argue further that policy actors close to the informational inputs of policy affect the behavior of actors higher in the policy process. My finding in chapter 3 that *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* stories are associated with an increase in Congressional mentions of foreign civil conflicts is consistent with this view. In chapter 4, I therefore expand this argument to decisions made at the highest levels of the policy process, in this case, unilateral interventions in civil conflicts. I expect that an intervention in a foreign civil conflict is more likely when the conflict receives a high degree of attention at lower levels of the policy process.

Hypothesis 4.1: increases in policymaker attention to a civil conflict lead to an increase in the likelihood of intervention in the conflict.

Hypothesis 4.2: increases in media attention to a civil conflict lead to an increase in the likelihood of intervention in the conflict.

An alternate argument within the PET literature (Wolfe 2012) is that news media can “put the brakes” on policy change. When new or increased media information about an issue disrupts the existing equilibrium, it has the possibility to generate a negative feedback loop instead of a positive one, since, in addition to expanding the circle of potentially supportive policymakers that pay attention to an issue, media coverage mobilizes coalitions of hostile interests who do not want the issue to be addressed. Consequently, increased news media attention to an issue may decrease rather than increase the likelihood of policy action. Wolfe’s (2012) research focuses on Congressional activity as the outcome variable, so it doesn’t address whether Congressional attention itself could mobilize hostile coalitions independent of media coverage doing so. My expectation is that it would not—that by the time a foreign civil conflict has reached Congress’s agenda, interest groups hostile to intervention would either already have attempted to exert their influence and failed, or would, at that late stage, be struggling for

influence in a crowded field with minimal effect. To accommodate this alternate argument, I include an opposed hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4.3: an increase in media attention to a civil conflict leads to a decrease in the likelihood of intervention in the conflict.

Opportunities for Intervention

This project's information processing explanation of civil conflict intervention has been an attempt to understand states' *willingness* to intervene—which, at the domestic level, is a relatively less developed area within the intervention literature. But, in keeping with Most and Starr's (1989) dichotomy, I must address *opportunity* as well as *willingness* to explain political outcomes. Even if a state desires to intervene in an ongoing civil conflict, it must also have the opportunity to intervene; both conditions are necessary “at *some threshold level*” (Most and Starr 1989, 41, emphasis theirs). And, with respect to opportunity, the literature has two clear findings. A potential intervener may not have an opportunity to intervene effectively 1.) if it is far away or non-contiguous and 2.) if it lacks military and economic power relative to the target.

Proximity

One of the most consistent findings in the literature is that states close to or contiguous with a state experiencing civil conflict are more likely to intervene (Khosla 1999; Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Gent 2007; Greig and Regan 2008; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008; Kathman 2011; Nome 2013; and Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016). States that are not neighbors with or in the immediate vicinity of a civil conflict state may not be able to intervene militarily. Even among states that can project force at great distances, the loss of force gradient will make intervention more difficult over greater distances. Similarly, states will likely

have diminished economic leverage to influence distant civil conflicts owing to lower levels of trade and investment interdependence between themselves and the conflict state.

However, the United States is unusual in the length of its military's reach and the degree of its overseas economic influence, so distance may affect the United States differently than it does other potential interveners. Prior studies of US intervention specifically have sometimes found evidence that proximity affects US intervention behavior (Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) and sometimes not (Yoon 1997). But conceptually, distance should inhibit US interventions, even if the effect is attenuated. The United States can, and recently has, intervened in conflicts geographically distant from it—but these interventions have been logistically complicated. US supply lines to Afghanistan through Central Asia via the Northern Distribution Network are on their face more complicated than supply lines to an intervention in the Caribbean would be. I therefore expect that an intervention in a foreign civil conflict is less likely when the conflict occurs in a distant state.

Hypothesis 4.4: an increase in distance between a civil conflict state and a potential intervener leads to a decrease in the likelihood of intervention in the conflict.

Power

The literature also consistently finds that states are more likely to intervene if they are economically and militarily powerful, either in absolute terms (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Kathman 2011; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016) or relative to a civil conflict state (Gent 2007; Kathman 2010; Stojek and Chacha 2015). Powerful states have greater opportunity to intervene in civil conflicts due to their greater resources and capabilities. They also have a greater opportunity to influence the outcome of a conflict when intervening in the affairs of a relatively weak state—if the government side of a conflict is strong enough that it

cannot be meaningfully threatened by the rebel side there is little incentive for a third-party state to intervene on either side (see Gent 2008, though his emphasis is on rebel group strength).

Because the United States is a major power, has the greatest GDP, and has the best resourced military during the period of study, my analysis necessarily focuses on the power of civil conflict states rather than that of the intervener. I expect that the United States is more likely to intervene in the conflicts of small and/or weak states, since the outcomes of their conflicts are relatively easier to influence. Inversely, I expect that the United States is unlikely to intervene in the civil conflicts of other powerful states—partly because powerful allies are strong enough not to need direct support and partly because the great powers of the post-war period have been nuclear armed, which makes intervention high risk in addition to being low utility. This generates the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4.5: intervention is more likely in civil conflicts that occur in less powerful states.

Data and Methods

To test these hypotheses, I use the original data I have collected from the US Congress, a modified version of Regan's (2002) third-party intervention data, and several academic datasets—principally from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and Correlates of War Project (CoW). Chapter 2 of this dissertation includes a detailed explanation of my coding procedures for the congressional attention data. The other data I explain below.

Case Selection and Unit of Analysis

For a list of civil conflicts, I use the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD). UCDP defines internal conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or

territory where the use of armed force between two parties [...] results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year” and where one side is a government, and the other side is one or more rebel groups (Pettersson et al. 2021). However, to maintain consistency with the availability of the congressional attention variable I collected, I do not include every conflict which meets this minimal battle death threshold. Instead, I include only the conflicts which the ACD records as reaching a cumulative total of 1000 battle deaths at some point in their duration.⁵⁶ This yields a list of 96 civil conflicts split across 209 distinct conflict episodes i.e., the First and Second Chechen Wars are separate conflict episodes but belong to the same conflict. I split each of these conflict episodes into conflict-episode-months to match the specificity of my congressional mentions and third-party intervention data.

Method of Analysis

Though congressional attention may have an instantaneous, near term, or lagged monthly effect on intervention, it also has cumulative effects on intervention likelihood over the longer term which cannot be captured via OLS or MLE approaches. I therefore use Cox proportional hazards models to determine the effects of US policymaker attention on the time to civil conflict intervention. I prefer the Cox semi-parametric model over parameterized models because I lack any theoretical grounds to assume that my covariates’ effects are monotonic.

The reason I do not use a competing risks model to account for the target of each intervention i.e., government side, rebel side, or neutral, is that doing so would not be an appropriate test of my hypotheses. Congresspersons know which side in a conflict they would like to support—but, unfortunately, that valence is not captured by my data. I do not consider it

⁵⁶ UCDP/PRIO records this information in the ACD’s *cumulative_intensity* variable.

appropriate to draw conclusions about the directional effects of congressional or media attention on intervention given that their preferences differ by conflict and that said preferences could—given sufficient resources—be measured. I specify my hypotheses accordingly, and Cox proportional hazards models are the appropriate test of them.

Dependent Variable, US Intervention

While multiple high quality intervention datasets are now available to conflict scholars, such as the UCDP External Support Dataset (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011) and the International Military Intervention Dataset (Pearson and Bauman 1993, Pickering and Kisangani 2009), I prefer Regan’s (2002) intervention data for its balance of detail and breadth. Regan defines third-party interventions in civil conflicts as “convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces.” and he records 1036 such interventions in 54 years of monthly data, 1946 through 1999. Regan includes both military and economic interventions as well as subcategories within these—whether, for example, military interventions were undertaken directly with ground troops or at a less invasive level such as the provision of military equipment.

However, the format of Regan’s data posed some significant difficulties for its use with this project. He creates his own list of civil conflicts using a 200 battle death threshold that differs from both the UCDP and CoW coding. But, while Regan’s data contains several variables to describe the nature of each conflict—rebel group names (frequently acronyms), rebel operational goals, linkages to prior conflicts—these fields are sometimes missing and are not always clear. As a result it can be difficult to definitively identify conflicts in Regan’s data,

especially in cases when a country's government was opposed by multiple rebel groups fighting over different territory or issues.⁵⁷

Consequently, when I collected the congressional mentions data for this project, I found that Regan's list of conflicts did not contain the thick descriptive information that I needed to parse between congressional mentions of specific civil conflicts and mentions of other conflict phenomena i.e., interstate wars, one sided violence, colonial wars, or different civil conflicts within the same state. Therefore, as outlined in chapter 2, I collected my data based on the list of civil conflicts in the UCDP ACD. This, however, required that I match the conflicts in Regan's data with those in the ACD, which I did with the aid of UCDP's encyclopedic country, conflict, and conflict actor records. Of the 151 conflicts in Regan's data, I matched 122 to ACD conflict episodes. Further documentation of this matching is available in Appendix 3.

In constructing the US intervention variable, I include all interventions in Regan's data that are recorded as having been undertaken by the United States. However, this leaves out some important cases. For example, Regan records Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia and Operation Allied Force in Kosovo as being UN interventions. Though these operations were undertaken under the auspices of an international organization, they nonetheless included substantial deployments of American soldiers. To ensure that I include these interventions and others that are absent from Regan's data—while avoiding arbitrary ad hoc coding decisions—I incorporate data from the Military Interventions by Powerful States (MIPS) dataset. MIPS records deployments of regular military personnel by the US, UK, France, China, and USSR,

⁵⁷ There are also a few cases with incorrect identifying information. For example, conflict 630 in Regan's (2002) data is listed as an ethnic conflict in the Republic of Congo from August 1998 to the end of the observed period in December 1999, but it lists its rebel groups as the MLC, RCD, and AFDL. Though there was a civil conflict in the Republic of Congo at that time, the start date and rebel group names are clearly those of the Second Congo War in the *Democratic Republic of Congo*. Regan's conflicts 620, 838, 866, and 972 are similarly confused between the Republic of Congo and DRC.

aimed at attaining “immediate-term political objectives” against “foreign adversaries,” 1946 through 2003. MIPS adds 6 civil conflict interventions to my data that are not captured by Regan.⁵⁸

Congressional and News Media Attention

To test the hypotheses 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 I use original data collected from the US Congress and from three nationally circulating US newspapers: the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, and the *Wall Street Journal*. I measure the attention of these sources to the civil conflicts recorded in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Armed Conflict Database between 1946 and 1999.

To capture senior policymaker attention to civil conflicts, I search congressional speeches in the digitized corpus of the *Congressional Record Daily* and *Bound Editions* collected by Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy (2017). I operationalize senior policymaker attention to each foreign civil conflict by counting the number of US Congressional speeches in each month that mention a conflict keyword, i.e., war, conflict, violence, etc., within 20 words of the name of a region or nation where civil conflict is occurring.⁵⁹ The final *Congressional Mentions* variable is a count, by conflict month, of the number of discrete congressional speeches in which the relevant country or region is mentioned in the context of conflict.

To avoid biasing *Congressional Mentions*, I include it with another measure *Houses in Session*, which equals 0 in months when neither house met, a 1 when either the House or the

⁵⁸ These are US support for the Greek Civil War counterinsurgency, Operation Southern Watch in Iraq, US intervention in the Lebanese Civil War, US support for the Laotian Government against the Pathet Lao, and the aforementioned Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force.

⁵⁹ See Appendix 1 for a complete list of conflict regions/nations and conflict keywords.

Senate met for some fraction of a month, and 2 when both houses met during the month.⁶⁰

Congresspersons cannot give speeches when Congress is not in session, even if a conflict remains at the fore of congresspersons' minds—and this could structurally depress the number of mentions I can observe. I use the recess dates recorded on the websites of the Senate and House to identify any full months that one or both bodies did not meet.

To capture news media coverage of civil conflicts, I conduct title searches in *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* using the same list of country and region names and vector of conflict keywords. The final *News Media Stories* variable is a count, by conflict month, of the number of newspaper articles about a country or region which discuss violent conflict. My coding methodology is explained at length in chapter 2.

Proximity

To test *Hypothesis 4.4*, I use *Minimum Distance*, a measure of the distance between two states at their nearest border. I obtain it from NewGene (Bennett, Poast, and Stam 2019), an automated dataset construction tool compiled from several academic data sources. The variable originates from CShapes (Schvitz et al. 2022), which is a GIS dataset containing historical maps of independent states and dependent territories. While CShapes carefully records the dates of all territorial changes, NewGene's data is yearly, and, as a result, my values of this variable across conflict-months are only accurate to the current year. But though the post-war period saw great upheaval, most states' borders most of the time do not change and changes in most state's borders will have only a minor effect on the measure relative to their distance to the United States.

⁶⁰ The Senate and House go into recess at roughly the same times, but their recess dates do not always overlap.

Power

To test *Hypothesis 4.5*, I use the CINC score of each conflict country to capture *Conflict Country Power*, which is again acquired via NewGene. CINC scores, or Composite Index of National Capability (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972), are an average of six measures of states' capability. They include a state's military power via measures of military expenditures and military personnel, its economic power via measures of iron and steel production and commercial fuel consumption, and its demographic power via measures of total population and urban population. The average of these measures is then transformed into a ratio of the world total to capture the relationship of each state's power to the power of other states.

An alternate variable that is frequently used in the literature is major power status, usually the major power status of the intervener (Lemke and Regan 2004; Findley and Teo 2006; Kathman 2011; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016). That approach is not appropriate here, as the intervener is always the United States. Moreover, the United States never intervened in a civil conflict in the territory of a major power during the 1946-1999 period. This is not due to pacific conditions within the major powers. China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom⁶¹ are all included in the UCDP ACD as having had one or more civil conflicts during that time. Tellingly, the United States did intervene in China during the Chinese Civil War—when China, according to CoW coding, was not a major power.

Reverse Causality Issues

I have, to this point, asserted that news media and policymaker attention increases intervention likelihood. However, it is also likely that there are effects in the opposite direction.

⁶¹ These countries are the only major powers that appear in my data—as coded by CoW and obtained via NewGene.

When the US intervenes in a conflict, especially when it does so with military forces, Congress and the media are far more likely to comment on the conflict. This has come across clearly in my coding of both and is observed in the wider literature. Bell, Frank, and Macharia (2013), for example, find that even though media coverage increases the likelihood of intervention, there are reciprocal effects; intervention also increases media coverage. I must account for this.

I attempt to do so using two different approaches. The first treats intervention as I have described it above; it treats all incidences of intervention as failure outcomes and then excludes observations that occur after the first intervention. With this approach, the model drops observations in which Congress or news media discuss US-centric conflict events such as US troop casualties. It also drops observations in which Congress or news media discusses an ongoing intervention, how it is faring, and whether to escalate or reduce assistance to the supported side—policy changes which would constitute additional instances of US intervention according to Regan’s (2002) coding.

For the second approach, I create an alternate outcome variable, *Major US Intervention*, that only treats interventions utilizing US military combatants as failure outcomes. It includes any intervention which Regan (2002) codes as using troops, naval forces, or air forces, or which I added from the MIPS dataset. For this approach, I include an additional control variable, *Prior US Intervention*, that equals 1 during every month after the US intervenes at a lower scale, i.e., by providing loans, military equipment, foreign aid, and so on. This approach, like the first, drops observations in which Congress or news media discuss US troop casualties. However, it retains observations that occur after lower scale US interventions, i.e., conflict-months in which Congress or news media are likely discussing the ongoing intervention, how it is faring, and whether to escalate. If *Congressional Mentions* and/or *News Media Stories* are driven by the

ongoing lower scale intervention and do not have an independent effect on the likelihood of *Major US Intervention*, then the *Prior US Intervention* variable should subsume their effects.

The difference between the two approaches in, for example, the conflict between the government of Peru and Peru's Shining Path guerrillas is as follows: The US first intervened in the conflict in July 1984, by providing a monetary grant to the Peruvian government. The US then intervened a second time in August 1985, by providing the government with air force support. In the first model, the intervention in July 1984 is coded as a failure outcome and is the last observation of the conflict. In the second model, the intervention in August 1985 is coded as the failure outcome—also the last observation—and *Prior US Intervention* is coded as a “1” for all observations July 1984 through August 1985, inclusive. Due to this difference in failure dates, the two models use different subsets of the data. The first contains 36 incidences of failure across 209 conflict episodes and drops 2,942 post-failure conflict-month observations of the 12,903 total observations. The second contains 22 incidences of failure and drops 1,227 post-failure conflict-month observations.⁶²

*Control Variables*⁶³

Elections. Prior studies of US intervention (Yoon 1997; Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) hypothesize that, during the increased scrutiny of an election campaign, the United States will be disinclined to undertake interventions. During elections, Presidents and Congresspersons are more likely to devote their time to campaigning than to pursuing major policy initiatives and are

⁶² Due to missing data, there are fewer observations and fewer incidences of failure in the final models than I report here. I include these numbers rather than the final ones to be more transparent about missing data issues.

⁶³ There are three sets of variables which are important in the literature—and which I discuss in Chapter 1—but that I do not include here: *Ethnic Ties*, *Refugee Flows*, and *Contagion Risk*. I neglected to include them because data were difficult to obtain and/or transform and because none of these variables is critical to the argument I am testing.

more likely to focus their policymaking on bread-and-butter issues which can directly improve the public's approval, rather than engaging in risky foreign policy actions. Following Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) I construct two dichotomous variables indicating the presence of US elections, *Presidential Election* and *Midterm Election*. I code these variables as a 1 in the 12 months prior to an election and 0 otherwise.

Control of Government. Another domestic political variable investigated in studies of US intervention is which parties control the Presidency, Senate, and House of Representatives and, specifically, whether said parties differ. If the President faces a Congress where one or both houses is controlled by the opposing party, he/she is less likely to intervene in a foreign conflict, either because Congress is more willing to exercise "checks and balances" on the president's use of force (Mullenbach and Matthews 2008) or because intervention—a risky policy choice with a chance of dramatic failure—has greater downsides when government is divided (Regan 2000). I code this variable, *Unified Government*, in the same way as Mullenbach and Matthews (2008) do. It is a dichotomous measure that equals 1 whenever the Presidency and both houses of Congress are controlled by the same party. I do so using records from the US House of Representatives website, "Party Government since 1857," (<https://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidents-Coinciding/Party-Government/>).

War Weariness. "Vietnam syndrome" appears as an explanation of US intervention in both the CNN effect literature (Livingston 1997) and the intervention literature (Yoon 1997, Pickering 2002, Mullenbach and Matthews 2008). In short, this view holds that, after major wars and especially after negative war outcomes, the public loses its appetite for further overseas interventions. None of these studies find empirical support for the argument and, interestingly, Pickering (2002) observes that states which suffer many military defeats are *more* likely to

undertake military interventions. I code *War Weariness* in the same way as Mullenbach and Matthews (2008); it is a dichotomous measure which equals 1 for 5 years after the conclusion of a major war—a category in which they include the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War.

Domestic Interest Groups. Aydin (2012) argues that a country's economic activity in foreign markets is concentrated within a subset of domestic economic actors. These actors, who benefit disproportionately from such markets, therefore organize to influence government policy, especially when their interests are threatened by civil conflict.⁶⁴ I anticipate that the lobbying efforts of these interest groups would result in a greater likelihood of US intervention in civil conflicts where their interests are at stake. I proxy this, as Aydin (2012) does, by investigating trade flows and foreign direct investment (FDI). For *Trade Flows*, I use smoothed total trade from the Correlates of War Trade Data Set. This measure sums the exports and imports between the US and each conflict country, in millions of US dollars, and smooths large spikes and dips in trade. For *Foreign Direct Investment*, I use a variable constructed in Bennett, Poast, and Stam's (2019) NewGene software, which indicates the total FDI stocks flowing from the US to each conflict country in millions of US Dollars.

Natural Resources. Civil conflict scholars have frequently investigated the availability of natural resources in conflict states, especially oil production, as a cause of intervention (Aydin 2010; Koga 2011; Findley and Marineau 2015; Stojek and Chacha 2015; Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016). The main theoretical claim of this literature is Findley and Marineau's (2015) argument that outside countries sometimes intervene in civil conflict states to loot or secure access to natural resources. And though looting of this nature is found by Koga (2011) to be

⁶⁴ However, Aydin (2012) does not expect established democracies, such as the United States, to be affected by this dynamic to the degree that new democracies or autocracies are.

uncharacteristic of democracies, it is also a frequently raised contemporary criticism of US foreign policy. To measure *Lootable Natural Resources*, I use another variable constructed via NewGene which records a conflict country's total natural resources rents as a percentage of GDP.⁶⁵

Conflict Intensity. Civil conflict scholars have often found that conflict intensity increases intervention likelihood (Gent 2007; Aydin 2010; Kathman 2011) though not consistently (Regan 1998; Lemke and Regan 2004). High intensity conflicts are more likely to cause negative externalities, such as conflict spill over, refugee outflows, or regional economic instability, especially for nearby states. Third parties are, therefore, inclined to intervene in hopes of preventing these effects. To measure conflict intensity, I use the UCDP ACD's (2021) *Intensity Level* variable, which I recode as a dichotomous variable which equals 0 when a conflict has caused 25 to 999 battle deaths in a year and 1 when the conflict has caused 1000 or more battle deaths. My data are monthly, so this measure is not appropriately precise, but this is not as serious a limitation as it might appear. Most conflicts in the data are either low intensity for their entire duration or high intensity for their entire duration, such that imprecisely timed changes in conflict intensity rarely occur.

Interstate Relationships. States, unsurprisingly, tend to help their friends and oppose their enemies. Concordantly, the civil war intervention literature tends to find that interveners back the government side in the civil conflicts of their allies (Findley and Teo 2006; Stojek and Chacha 2015) and the rebel side in the civil conflicts of their rivals (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005; Findley and Teo 2006). There is little reason to expect different foreign policy behavior by the United States—and, indeed, this is a sentiment I noticed quite frequently while coding

⁶⁵ This variable (*natresource_r-I*) is also from The International Political Economy Data Resource by NewGene. I use oil exports as an alternate specification of this variable (*combinedoil_AE*); the results are broadly consistent.

Congressional Mentions. Congresspersons are quite attentive to which countries are on the US's side and are discerning of their deservingness of support to the point that members of Congress *routinely* keep score of which countries vote for American resolutions at the UN.

I attempt to capture this outlook in three ways, by measuring rivalry, alliances, and accounting for cold war politics. I measure rivalry using Signorino and Ritter's (1999) weighted global S-score, which measures the foreign policy similarity between states based on the number of alliances, adjusted by ally military capability, which they share. An *S-score* of 1 indicates that two states have identical alliance portfolios, while a -1 indicates opposite portfolios, i.e., a rivalry. I code *Alliance* dichotomously, as a 1 if the United States has a defense pact with each conflict country and 0 otherwise. I collect both variables using Bennett and Stam's (2000) EUGene software. The *Cold War* variable is a hand coded dichotomous variable that equals 1 in all months prior to the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

Regime Type. The most tested argument about regime type's effects on intervention is that democracies are less likely to experience intervention than other states (Hermann and Kegley 1996, Lemke and Regan 2004, Bove, Gleditsch, and Sekeris 2016). As Hermann and Kegley (1996) contend, democracies value negotiation, mediation, and compromise, which enables other states to solve disputes with them diplomatically, thus avoiding intervention and other extraordinary means of influence. Findings are contested, however, and several other relationships have been theorized (Kathman 2011; Aydin 2012; Stojek and Chacha 2015). Unfortunately, because the intervener in my data does not vary, I am only able to investigate the effects of the regime type of the conflict state. To do this, I use the revised combined *Polity IV Score*, which is an interval variable ranging from 10 to -10, with 10 being a full democracy. As with several of the aforementioned variables, I collect *Polity IV Score* using NewGene.

Prior Interventions. To account for Findley and Teo's (2006) 'actor centric' argument that third-party states react to previous interventions and, in particular, to interventions by rivals, I include several variables for prior intervention. Here I again use Regan's (2002) intervention data, with which I construct three prior intervener variables: *Prior Intervention*, *Prior Multi-Country Intervention*, and *Prior Communist Intervention*. Each variable is dichotomous, equaling 1 when there was any form of intervention in a month and 0 otherwise. *Prior Communist Intervention* includes interventions by all members and observers of Comecon.⁶⁶ *Prior Intervention* indicates each conflict month that experienced a single non-communist intervention and *Prior Multi-Country Intervention* indicates months when multiple non-communist countries intervened. *Prior Intervention* and *Prior Multi-Country Intervention* are mutually exclusive, but both can occur in the same month as a *Prior Communist Intervention*. I expect that the United States is less likely to intervene in conflicts where other states have already intervened, due to the intractability of those conflicts, but more likely to intervene where Communist Bloc countries have intervened.

Results

Table 4-1 displays results for both modeling approaches: Model 1 shows the effects of covariates on *US Intervention*, while Model 2 shows the effects of covariates on *Major US Intervention* while controlling for *Prior US Intervention*. For transparency and ease of interpretation, I display both coefficients and hazard ratios. In the remainder of this section, I interpret at length the findings for each relevant variable in the table—many of which are counterintuitive. In brief: I find moderate but nuanced evidence supporting ***Hypothesis 4.1***, clear

⁶⁶ In my data this includes Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Zambia, Iraq, the Yemen People's Republic, North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, China before 1962, and Ethiopia after 1973.

evidence in support of *Hypothesis 4.2*, no evidence supporting the other hypotheses, and limited results conforming to the expectations of the wider literature.

Hypothesis 4.1, that an increase in Congressional attention leads to an increase in the chance of intervention in a civil conflict, is supported only in Model 1. When I specify the outcome variable as all *US Interventions*, each mention of a foreign civil conflict by a US Congressperson, results in a 4.8% increase in the risk of intervention over the baseline hazard rate. This result is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. However, when I specify the outcome variable as *Major US Interventions*, *Congressional Mentions* is not significant, though it still has a positive effect. This suggests that congressional attention does not presage large and costly interventions in the way that it does lower scale ones. Additionally, the inclusion of *Prior US Intervention* in this model, and its positive sign—significant at the 95% confidence level and increasing the hazard of intervention roughly 700%—suggests that some of Congress’ attention to conflicts is explained by existing US intervention commitments and, thus, does not have an independent effect on major military actions. For context, roughly one in three major US interventions was preceded by an intervention at a smaller scale. Alternately, this result may stem from the limitations of my chosen measure. Congress is not the decisive actor in US foreign policymaking; perhaps its attention is not a suitable proxy for the attention of US senior policymakers, generally.

Table 4-1. Effects of Congressional Mentions and Media Coverage on Time to Intervention

| VARIABLES | Model 1: US Interventions | | Model 2: Major US Interventions | |
|-------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | Coefficients | Hazard Ratios | Coefficients | Hazard Ratios |
| Congressional Mentions | 0.0464*** (0.0178) | 1.048*** (0.0187) | 0.0150 (0.0197) | 1.015 (0.0200) |
| Houses in Session | 0.759 (0.551) | 2.135 (1.178) | 0.629 (0.613) | 1.876 (1.149) |
| News Media Stories | 0.0248*** (0.00839) | 1.025*** (0.00860) | 0.0495*** (0.0114) | 1.051*** (0.0120) |
| Minimum Distance | -5.94e-05 (0.000104) | 1.000 (0.000104) | 2.88e-05 (0.000189) | 1.000 (0.000189) |
| Conflict Country Power | 10.85 (12.58) | 51,648 (649,940) | 28.84* (17.25) | 3.333e+12* (5.751e+13) |
| Presidential Election | -0.0806 (0.499) | 0.923 (0.460) | -0.0379 (0.738) | 0.963 (0.710) |
| Midterm Election | 0.375 (0.449) | 1.455 (0.654) | -0.348 (0.664) | 0.706 (0.468) |
| Unified Government | 0.287 (0.426) | 1.332 (0.568) | 0.502 (0.626) | 1.651 (1.034) |
| War Weariness | -0.877* (0.511) | 0.416* (0.213) | -1.377* (0.720) | 0.252* (0.182) |
| Trade Flows | -0.000164 (0.000191) | 1.000 (0.000191) | -0.000443 (0.000326) | 1.000 (0.000326) |
| Foreign Direct Investment | 7.05e-05 (9.57e-05) | 1.000 (9.57e-05) | 0.000186 (0.000146) | 1.000 (0.000146) |
| Lootable Natural Resources | 0.0173 (0.0348) | 1.017 (0.0354) | -0.0585 (0.0687) | 0.943 (0.0648) |
| Conflict Country Oil Exports | -0.0704 (0.0801) | 0.932 (0.0747) | 0.0206 (0.0611) | 1.021 (0.0624) |
| Intensity Level | 0.736* (0.401) | 2.088* (0.838) | 0.0224 (0.613) | 1.023 (0.627) |
| Alliance | 1.600 (1.305) | 4.954 (6.465) | 1.670 (2.217) | 5.312 (11.78) |
| S-score | -0.281 (1.794) | 0.755 (1.355) | -1.345 (3.202) | 0.261 (0.834) |
| Cold War | 0.999 (0.720) | 2.716 (1.956) | -1.391* (0.845) | 0.249* (0.210) |
| Conflict Country Polity Score | -0.0405 (0.0347) | 0.960 (0.0333) | -0.0396 (0.0546) | 0.961 (0.0524) |
| Prior Non-Combatant US Intervention | | | 2.080** (0.821) | 8.005** (6.571) |
| Prior Intervention | 1.260* (0.751) | 3.525* (2.646) | 0.778 (1.046) | 2.178 (2.279) |
| Prior Multi-Country Intervention | 2.283*** (0.771) | 9.809*** (7.565) | 0.747 (1.323) | 2.110 (2.792) |
| Prior Communist Intervention | -0.857 (1.159) | 0.424 (0.492) | -34.65 (2.181e+07) | 0 (3.26e-08) |
| Number of Subjects | | 198 | | 198 |
| Number of Failures | | 35 | | 21 |
| Observations | | 9,747 | | 11,462 |

Table displays coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Hypothesis 4.2, that an increase in *News Media Stories* about civil conflicts increases the US propensity to intervene in them, is supported by both models. In Model 1, each story results in a 2.5% increase in the risk of intervention over the baseline hazard rate and, in Model 2, each story results in 5.1% increase in risk. Both results are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. This corresponds to prior findings, such as Bell, Frank, and Macharia (2013), that news media influences intervention behavior, even in the presence of prior interventions' reciprocal effects. The opposed **Hypothesis 4.3**, anticipating that media coverage will mobilize opponents of interventions, inversely, does not find support.

Hypothesis 4.4, that the likelihood of third-party intervention in civil conflicts decreases as a function of the conflict states' distance, finds no support. It is negatively signed in Model 1, but contrary to expectations is positively signed in Model 2. However, *Minimum Distance* does not attain statistical significance in either model. This suggests that the US may, indeed, be unusual in its capacity and inclination to project force abroad.

Hypothesis 4.5, that intervention is more likely to occur in the conflicts of less powerful states, is not supported. In Model 1, *Conflict Country Power* is positive, but not statistically significant. In Model 2, however, *Conflict Country Power* is positive and also statistically significant at a 99% confidence level. This is unexpected, it suggests that the US has a higher chance of intervening in powerful countries rather than weak ones. However, my earlier observation should be noted again here: the United States never intervened in the civil conflict of a great power during the period of study. Moreover, the CINC scores of all but one of the conflict states in which the US did undertake a major intervention are below the mean CINC score value in the data.

I find few of the other included variables to be statistically significant. *War Weariness* has a negative effect on intervention, which is significant at the 90% confidence level in both models.⁶⁷ *Intensity Level* has a positive effect in Model 1 that is significant at the 90% confidence level; there is a 108.8% increased chance over the baseline hazard rate that the US will intervene in a conflict with 1000 or more battle deaths as compared to one with 25 to 1000 battle deaths. *Cold War* was negative and significant at the 90% confidence level in Model 2 but not Model 1, suggesting that the US was less likely to undertake interventions with combat forces during the Cold War but was not less likely to undertake less invasive interventions. Finally, *Prior Intervention* and *Prior Multi-Country Intervention* are positive and significant in Model 1 but not Model 2. I did not have strong expectations regarding the non-communist intervention variables; I interpret this finding as suggesting that the US wants to exert influence on civil conflicts that become internationalized but prefers not to risk its combat forces in doing so.

Conclusions

In this chapter, I have argued that the US is more likely to intervene in foreign civil conflicts when US senior policymakers are attentive to them and when there is attention to them at lower levels of the policy process—but that attention is not a sufficient cause of intervention. My results regarding these arguments are mixed. I find that attention among actors close to the informational inputs of policy i.e., national US newspapers, is consistently associated with an increase in US overseas interventions. I do not find such a clear relationship among the senior

⁶⁷ *War Weariness* likely attains significance due to bias from missing data. It does not attain significance in either model when *Conflict Country Polity Score* is dropped, which is the only variable with a large amount of missing data. Excluding it recovers 218 observations, one of which saw a major US military intervention (Yugoslavia).

policymakers I analyzed in this study. The attention of the US Congress is also associated with an increase in US overseas interventions but, when looking exclusively at US decisions to use ground, air, and naval combat forces overseas, Congress's attention is not so decisive. Even more unexpectedly, I did not find evidence that opportunity factors, such as loss of force gradient, inhibit intervention.

Overall, however, these results show that actors and actions nearer the informational inputs of policy do affect outputs at higher levels of the policy process—as anticipated in the PET literature—but that their effects are not as straightforwardly proportionate to their position in the policy process as my argument anticipated. The strong effects I find regarding media attention are noteworthy for their correspondence with longstanding “CNN effect” arguments, as well as their consistency with prior intervention studies which have investigated it. Though these results show the limitations of the data I have collected, I also believe they show promise for the importation of PET theory into civil conflict scholarship and, perhaps, other areas of international relations research.

CHAPTER 5

Conclusions, Limitations, and Contribution

Before proceeding to discuss my overall findings and the larger implications of this project, I should offer a brief review of what I have done in each chapter of the dissertation: In Chapter 1 I identified an area of weakness in the scholarship on third-party intervention in civil conflicts, namely that, beyond micro theories, it rarely explores the domestic factors which affect third party states' willingness to intervene. I proposed to import the insights of a theory of the policy process, punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), to shore up this weakness. In chapter 2, I introduced a new dataset, in which I collected records of US congressional mentions and US newspaper stories about overseas civil conflicts.

In chapter 3 I showed that, in the case of the United States, senior policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts matches the expectations of punctuated equilibrium theory. Civil conflicts appear more likely to reach the attention of US senior policymakers if they have already reached the attention of actors that are lower in the policy process. In chapter 4, I argued that the US is more likely to intervene in foreign civil conflicts when US senior policymakers are attentive to them but that, even so, the US may do nothing when its opportunity to influence a conflict's outcome is limited or highly costly. My evidence in support of Chapter 4's argument, however, was mixed. These chapters' findings tentatively suggest that US policymaker attention to foreign civil conflicts is consistent with the disproportionate information processing mechanisms PET scholars have discovered in public budgets, with periods of prolonged disinterest punctuated by frantic activity.

In this final chapter, I summarize my findings and discuss the dissertation's contribution to the civil conflict intervention and punctuated equilibrium literatures. There are, importantly, some weaknesses with this research project, both in terms of the data I collected and the research methodology I used. Therefore, in the interest of academic honesty, I proceed by reflecting on the complexities of third-party intervention research, broadly, and on my observations about the behavior of media and policymakers during the protracted data collection effort I undertook for the project.

The Complexities of Intervention Research

Intervention is a complicated phenomenon to study. Just as many earlier scholars were limited by phenomenon-centric research designs, my work is limited by large and theoretically important omissions. Interventions are heterogenous both in terms of the policy tools that are used to undertake them—soldiers, sanctions, monetary support, etc.—and their ultimate goals—defend/overthrow a government, mitigate human suffering, loot the target state, and so on. Third party interveners' choices between these policies and orientations toward these goals differ in theoretically important ways, which have been modelled in prior research and which are not addressed here. Moreover, I have ignored the large but related literatures on conflict mediation and international peacekeeping—policy tools that use different mechanisms, as they require consent from warring parties, but that are, from the perspective of US policymakers, very much substitutable with the forms of intervention analyzed here. Choosing to send soldiers and offering to mediate are part of the same decision calculus.

Finally, I have treated one of the most important elements of conflict dynamics, prior intervention by other third parties, in a relatively facile way, categorizing a given month's

intervention(s) as communist bloc, non-communist bloc, or multiple simultaneous non-communist bloc. This approach seems sensible on its face—the Cold War period has frequently been characterized as battle of “proxy wars” between the great powers—and is appropriate to my unit of analysis. However, prior interventions and who undertakes them, when, in what way, and on whose side, make up a large part of how conflicts are viewed, since they are nested within a broader geopolitical context. Using the data I collected, I am unable to differentiate between the prior interventions of, for example, South Africa versus Angola, or the interventions of many third parties at cross purposes, as in the DRC, versus multiple third parties acting in concert. The monthly nature of my research design makes it quite difficult to incorporate this important complexity.

The Nuance of Measuring Political Phenomena

Data collection in the social sciences is an onerous enterprise. The scale of political behavior in any domain is vast and the distinctions between different types of political phenomena can be quite ambiguous. So, of course, the data introduced in this dissertation has many limitations which doubtless affect my findings.

The most obvious limitation is the small set of policy actors for whom I have collected data. I make the case in Chapter 1 that, given my limited data collection resources, the US Congress is the best institution to analyze to measure the attention of senior policymakers to foreign civil conflicts. I argue that the United States is the country that has undertaken the most interventions, and that Congress is the organ of US government for which data has the greatest availability and variability. This, of course, leaves a lot of countries and policy actors out. In the US, it omits the President and executive branch’s foreign policy bureaucracy, which are usually

regarded as the country's main actors in foreign policy. Similarly, I use news media as a proxy for 'actors at lower levels of the policy process.' This too subsumes many different policy actors. And, even within media, it omits radio, television, and online news sources. These are, however, opportunities for future development rather than critical issues for the project.

The greater limitation, as I see it, is the way that policy actors tend to talk about international affairs. Having reviewed thousands of news stories and congressional speeches, I noticed, from my perspective, a frustrating tendency in their style of discourse. While political science scholars are very fastidious about defining phenomena, drawing clear distinctions, and sorting things into typologies, policymakers are not. In their public remarks, policymakers do not, as a group, make clear distinctions between civil wars, coups, terrorism, and violence carried out between substate groups. Sometimes, they mention organized anti-state violence in the same breath as an economic (Argentina) or refugee (Ethiopia) crisis or refer ambiguously to instability, potentially using this term in referring to either of the preceding two. They tend to talk about violence in different ways for different conflicts and in different decades.

This imposes uncertainty in my measures. I have conceptualized civil conflict as a coherent policy issue when, potentially, it may be bundled with other issues and/or allotted to different policy actors on an idiosyncratic basis. Social science is probabilistic, and this could simply be a stochastic process. But perhaps the way a conflict is discussed affects decisions about intervention beyond what could be captured via any control variable. Does it matter, say, that news stories and congressional mentions about the civil conflicts in Ethiopia were overshadowed by mentions of Ethiopia's refugee crisis, over and above the presence of the refugee crisis itself? Not all conflicts that generate refugee crises, after all, are discussed as such.

Summary of Results

Though I have reservations about the data and about my simplified modeling of third-party intervention, the findings of the project are mostly consistent with expectations. In Chapter 3, I find support for **Hypotheses 3.1a, 3.1b, and 3.1c**: both news media and Congress are characterized by long periods of inattention to foreign civil conflicts punctuated by rapid and dramatic changes in attention and, moreover, the attention of Congress is more steeply punctuated than that of news media. Also in chapter 3, I find consistent evidence in support of **Hypotheses 3.2, and 3.3**: increases in Media Coverage of civil conflicts lead to increases in congressional attention; these increases in congressional attention are heightened during “media storms”, periods of sudden, high, sustained coverage; and media storms themselves independently increase congressional attention. I also identify a condition that restricts congressional attention to foreign civil conflicts, finding support for **Hypotheses 3.4**, that said attention decreases when Congress’ agenda is crowded with higher priority issues, such as defense, macroeconomics, and government operations.

Likewise, in Chapter 4, I find support for my core arguments, though it is not quite as consistent. **Hypothesis 4.1**, that an increase in congressional attention to a civil conflict leads to an increase in the chance of intervention, finds mixed support, varying by model specification. **Hypothesis 4.2**, that an increase in *News Media Stories* increases the propensity of intervention, finds clear and consistent support (with the reversed **Hypothesis, 4.3**, that an increase in media attention to a civil conflict leads to a decrease in the likelihood of intervention in the conflict finding no support). In sum, this suggests that attention from policy actors makes civil conflicts likelier targets of intervention. Unexpectedly, however, I find no evidence that opportunity

factors affect intervention. Neither *Hypothesis 4.4*, that distance reduces intervention likelihood, nor *Hypothesis 4.5*, that weaker states are more prone to third-party intervention, finds support.

What conclusions is it reasonable for me to draw from these results? First, since I could not undertake an analysis of the intervention behavior of multiple countries or investigate more than two sets of policy actors within the United States, these results are inherently tentative. The strong relationship I observed between news media coverage and both US congressional speeches and material US interventions might be driven by an alternate causal process, as advanced in, for example, the *CNN effect* scholarship. It's also uncertain whether this relationship persists across different countries, into time periods beyond 1946-1999, or across other types of news media. Likewise, it is unknown whether my less consistent finding of a positive relationship between congressional attention and intervention likelihood applies to other US senior policymakers. The relationship could, perhaps, be stronger within the foreign policy bureaucracy or among the president and his/her senior advisors. What I believe my results do suggest, is that the PET arguments I have advanced are a reasonable potential explanation of third-party intervention in civil conflicts and may be worthy of further development.

Regarding my intervention opportunity hypotheses and insignificant findings for several of the theoretically important variables in the intervention literature, I must conclude that they represent, in part, the uniqueness of the United States as an intervener. The United States is a military and economic outlier during the period of observation, which likely reduces the impact of the opportunity variables I used. These results would, as with those above, benefit from being compared across countries. It is also possible that, if I had modeled conflict outcomes and actors in a different way, for example by articulating which side in each conflict the US and prior third parties supported, my findings might have been more consistent with prior literature. I therefore

regard these hypotheses findings' applicability to intervention research with a modicum of skepticism.

Contribution and Discussion

Though I am circumspect in drawing generalizations from my findings, I believe this project has, as intended, aided the development of an underexplored facet of the third-party intervention literature. I have advanced a more gestalt view of the domestic drivers of intervention than is commonly included in third-party intervention research, one which is theoretically informed by a deep body of public policy scholarship. I would not presently claim that punctuated equilibrium theory is superior to other domestic level explanations of intervention behavior, but I believe that I have demonstrated its potential utility. My strong findings in Chapter 3 and for news media in Chapter 4 indicate that there is some substance to the arguments I have articulated. There is potential for exploring them further through both more sophisticated research designs and further data collection efforts.

I have also contributed to the PET literature by applying the theory to a new domain. As I illustrated in Chapter 1, PET has been used broadly, across many countries, multiple institutions within countries, and across many policy areas. Despite this breadth, it is seldom used to study specific issue areas in foreign policy, and, to my knowledge, this is the first time it has been used in the study of third-party intervention in civil conflicts. Admittedly, I do not conceptually expand upon the theory, but I do test it in new ways as, for example, with hypothesis 3.4 on the attention constraining effects of agenda crowding. This, perhaps, shows the potential of applying PET insights to international relations research in other policy areas as well.

Finally, I would like to return to an observation I made in Chapter 1 about the foreign policy analysis (FPA) subfield of international relations. I claimed that compelling FPA research agendas had been stymied by the inherent complexity of policymaking; policy creation involves many decision makers taking actions that are context dependent, and it is difficult to test policy creation hypotheses without undertaking immense data collection projects. In this dissertation, I was able to draw upon an immense data collection effort, the Comparative Agendas Project, and to undertake my own limited but nonetheless expansive data collection.⁶⁸ In my view, this demonstrates both the promise and feasibility of ambitious data collection in the study of policymaking,

⁶⁸ I read, skimmed, spot checked, or otherwise reviewed the 26,886 congressional speeches and 110,167 newspaper stories which appear in my analysis dataset, along with the thousands of non-relevant or ambiguous speeches and stories which I excluded from my data along the way.

Appendix 1: *Congressional Record* Searches

I collected congressional speeches data from Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Taddy's (2017) machine searchable corpus of the *Congressional Record Daily* and *Congressional Record Bound Editions*. This appendix records the keywords in context searches that I conducted for each conflict episode using the *quanteda* text analysis package for the R statistical computing environment.

Conflict ID: The UCDP ACD numerical identifier for each conflict.

Episode ID: Though the UCDP ACD identifies separate episodes within conflicts, it does not assign identifiers to them. These are identifiers I created to distinguish between episodes. They consist of the ACD conflict code and, for episodes after the first, an arbitrary decimal value.

Country and Region/Faction: This is a common usage name of the country where a conflict was fought. For countries with multiple regional conflicts, I also include the name of a sub-region, faction, or group to help identify each conflict-episode.

Date Range: These are the dates of each conflict episode, as identified by the ACD, in YYYY-MM-DD format.

High Noise: Some conflict episodes are discussed by Congress or the news media in ways which make them difficult to capture with my standard search keywords. 1's in this column indicate conflict episodes I flag as High Noise in the regression analyses of chapters 3 and 4.

Speeches Found: Several of my searches did not capture any results. Either 1.) Congress did not meet on the days the conflict occurred, 2.) Congress did not mention the country or region during the dates of the conflict, or 3.) I determined by reading the returned results that the keywords were capturing something other than speeches about the conflict episode, i.e., "Kachina dolls" rather than Myanmar's "Kachin" conflict, and I could not devise an alternate search strategy that would capture speeches about the conflict. 1's in this column indicate that the search did return relevant results.

Location Keywords: This is a list of the terms for which I conducted keywords in context searches. For country names, I search for each name specified in Hensel's ICOW Historical State Names Data Set, i.e., I search for both Burma and Myanmar. For conflicts over specific regions, I use the territory name specified in the ACD. Each search is specified such that it will capture the demonym of a country or region as well as its name, i.e., Burman, Burmese, and Myanmarese. I use special characters for string manipulation where necessary, i.e., Burm[ae] to capture both Burman and Burmese. For countries, demonyms are listed in Hensel's data. For regions, I use my best judgment based on the conflict descriptions in the UCDP's online database. An "n/a" in this

category usually means that Congress did not meet on the days the conflict occurred and no search was possible.

Conflict Keywords: This is a record of the terms I searched within the 20 words before and 20 words after each mention of a conflict country returned via keywords in context search. For a “standard” search, the terms are: conflict, war, refugee, guerilla, killing, fighting, rebel, violence, strife, devastation, crisis, chaos, peacekeeper, or intervention. An “n/a” in this category usually means that Congress did not mention the relevant country or region during the dates of the conflict, but there are other reasons which I explain in the Notes column. Alternately, I specify the full list of search terms which I used. As with location keywords, I use special characters for string manipulation. A standard search is specified as: [Cc]onflict\\s[Ww]ar\\s\\s[Ww]ar[sf][Rr]efugee[Gg]uerrilla[Kk]illing[Ff]ighting|[Rr]ebel|[Vv]iolen|[Ss]trife|[Dd]evast|[Cc]ris[ei]s|[Cc]hao|[Pp]eacekeep|[Ii]nterven, where each “|” is the logical operator OR.

Additional Keywords: I survey the results of each search to ensure they are not systematically capturing noise they should not be. Where this column says something is “Removed”, I have dropped search results containing the listed terms. Where I note I “Require” terms, it means that I have dropped search results that do not contain the listed terms. In the few cases where I note that I “Recovered” terms, it means that, after several terms were removed, I subsequently searched within the observations that were removed for mentions I wanted to retain, adding what is returned back into my other search results.

Notes: This column elaborates on patterns in the results of different conflict episodes, quirks of searches, or why I modified a search in the way I did.

| Conflict ID | Episode ID | Country and Region/Faction | Date Range | High Noise | Speeches Found | Location Keywords | Conflict Keywords | Additional Keywords | Notes |
|-------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|------------|----------------|-------------------------|-------------------|---------------------|---|
| 200 | 200 | Bolivia | 1946-07-21 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 200 | 200.002 | Bolivia | 1952-04-09— 1952-04-12 | N | N | Bolivia | n/a | | |
| 200 | 200.025 | Bolivia | 1967-03-31— 1967-10-16 | N | Y | Bolivia | standard | | |
| 202 | 202 | China | 1946-12-31— 1949-12-08 | N | Y | Chin[ae] | standard | | |
| 203 | 203 | Greece | 1946-03-31— 1949-10-16 | N | Y | Gree[ck] | standard | | |
| 205 | 205 | Iran, Kurd | 1946-05-31— 1946-12-16 | N | N | Iran Persia Kurd | standard | | |
| 205 | 205.004 | Iran, Kurd | 1966-12-31— 1968-12-31 | N | N | Iran Persia Kurd | standard | | |
| 205 | 205.086 | Iran, Kurd | 1979-12-31— 1988-12-31 | N | N | Kurd | standard | | The search only captured speeches about the Iran-Iraq War |
| 205 | 205.165 | Iran, Kurd | 1990-07-10— 1990-08-17 | N | N | Kurd | standard | | |
| 205 | 205.18 | Iran, Kurd | 1993-09-12— 1993-11-11 | N | N | Kurd | standard | | |
| 205 | 205.218 | Iran, Kurd | 1996-07-28 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 209 | 209 | Philippines | 1946-07-31— 1954-12-31 | N | Y | Philippines Filipino | standard | | |
| 209 | 209.033 | Philippines | 1969-09-30— 1995-11-29 | N | Y | Philippines Filipino | standard | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|--|
| 209 | 209.244 | Philippines | 1997-11-23— 1997-12-30 | N | N | Philippines Filipino | n/a | | Congress only met on one day during this period, and none of the 53 speeches on that day mentioned the Philippines |
| 209 | 209.267 | Philippines | 1999-06-06— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Philippines Filipino | standard | Removed: [Ww]orld\s[Ww] ar | There is nothing relevant to the CPP conflict in this time period |
| 210 | 210 | Estonia | 1946-12-31— 1948-12-31 | N | N | Estonia Eesti Esthonia | standard | | Soviet annexation of Estonia is mentioned repeatedly, but no mention is made of local resistance |
| 212 | 212 | Lithuania | 1946-06-30— 1948-12-31 | N | N | Lithuania | standard | | Soviet annexation of Lithuania is mentioned, but no mention is made of local resistance |
| 213 | 213 | Ukraine | 1946-12-31— 1950-12-31 | N | N | Ukraine Ukrainian | standard | | There is no mention of Ukrainian rebels fighting against the Soviets |
| 217 | 217 | China, Taiwan | 1947-02-28— 1947-03-24 | N | N | Taiwan Taipei Formosa | n/a | | There are no mentions of this conflict |
| 220 | 220 | Paraguay | 1947-03-31— 1947-08-21 | N | Y | Paragua[iy] | n/a | | Partly hand-coded based on subjective judgment |
| 220 | 220.007 | Paraguay | 1954-05-05 | N | N | Paragua[iy] | n/a | | |
| 220 | 220.03 | Paraguay | 1989-02-03 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-----------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|---|
| 221 | 221 | Myanmar, Karen | 1949-01-15— 1992-11-22 | N | Y | Karen Kayin | standard | | Partly hand-coded to remove speeches with the women's name "Karen" |
| 221 | 221.21 | Myanmar, Karen | 1994-12-31— 1995-07-13 | N | Y | Karen Kayin | standard | | |
| 221 | 221.24 | Myanmar, Karen | 1997-02-23— 1998-07-14 | N | Y | Karen Kayin | standard | | Partly hand-coded to remove speeches with the women's name "Karen" |
| 222 | 222 | Myanmar | 1948-02-29— 1988-12-31 | N | Y | Myanmar Burm[ae] | standard | Removed: [Ww]orld\s[Ww] ar | |
| 222 | 222.165 | Myanmar | 1990-12-31— 1992-12-31 | N | Y | Myanmar Burm[ae] | standard | | Difficult to distinguish this conflict from others occurring in Myanmar |
| 222 | 222.215 | Myanmar | 1994-12-31 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 223 | 223 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1948-01-31— 1961-11-15 | N | N | Arakan Rakhin Rohingy | n/a | | |
| 223 | 223.056 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1964-12-31— 1978-12-31 | N | N | Arakan Rakhin Rohingy | n/a | | |
| 223 | 223.128 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1991-12-29 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 223 | 223.199 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1994-05-15— 1994-06-23 | N | N | Arakan Rakhin Rohingy | n/a | | |
| 225 | 225 | Costa Rica | 1948-03-03— 1948-04-20 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-------|---------------------------|---|---|-------|----------|--|--|
| 227 | 227 | India | 1948-09-18— 1951-12-31 | N | N | India | standard | Removed: Indiana Indian | The standard search for this conflict captures "Indiana" and "Indians" (i.e. Native Americans) and several speeches about World War 2. After reading 158 observations returned by the modified search, I determined that none were about this conflict. |
| 227 | 227.024 | India | 1969-12-31— 1971-12-31 | Y | Y | India | standard | Removed: Indiana Indian [Ww]orld\s[Ww]a r Pakistan | The standard search for this conflict captures "Indiana" and "Indians" (i.e. Native Americans) and several speeches about World War 2 and Pakistan. |
| 227 | 227.1 | India | 1991-07-16— 1994-12-02 | N | N | India | standard | Removed: Indiana Indian [Ww]orld\s[Ww]a r Pakistan | The standard search for this conflict captures "Indiana" and "Indians" (i.e. Native Americans) and several speeches about World War 2 and Pakistan. After checking the results of the modified search manually, I determined that none were about this anti-communist conflict |

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|-----|---------|--------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-----------|----------|---|---|
| 227 | 227.234 | India | 1996-04-03— 1999-12-31 | N | N | India | standard | Removed: Indiana Indian [[Ww]orld\s[Ww]a r Pakistan | See above |
| 230 | 230 | Yemen | 1948-03-15 | N | N | Yemen | n/a | | |
| 230 | 230.009 | Yemen | 1962-10-31— 1970-05-23 | N | Y | Yemen | standard | | These speeches disproportionately mention Nasser's intervention in Yemen, but they are clearly about this conflict |
| 230 | 230.091 | Yemen | 1979-03-31— 1982-05-31 | Y | N | Yemen | standard | | All the speeches captured by this search concerned Marxism in South Yemen and did not mention civil conflict in North Yemen |
| 231 | 231 | Myanmar, Kachin | 1949-01-15— 1950-05-05 | N | N | Kachin | n/a | | |
| 231 | 231.018 | Myanmar, Kachin | 1961-02-28— 1992-12-31 | N | Y | Kachin | n/a | Removed: Kachina | There are several speeches capturing "Kachina" dolls, about Hopi Indian traditions |
| 233 | 233 | Guatemala | 1949-07-18— 1949-07-19 | N | N | Guatemala | n/a | | |
| 233 | 233.014 | Guatemala | 1954-06-18— 1954-06-27 | N | Y | Guatemala | standard | | |
| 233 | 233.031 | Guatemala | 1963-07-31— 1963-12-31 | N | N | Guatemala | standard | | |
| 233 | 233.067 | Guatemala | 1965-12-31— 1995-12-31 | N | Y | Guatemala | standard | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-------------------|--|--|---|
| 234 | 234 | Israel | 1949-12-31— 1996-09-30 | Y | Y | Isra[ei] | [Tt]errori [Cc]onfli ct \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\ s[Ww]ar[sf] [Gg]u errilla [Kk]illing [F f]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[e i]s [Cc]hao [Pp]ea cekeep [Ii]nterven | Require: Palestini [Tt]error i [Rr]efugee [Gg] uerrilla | There standard search captures many speeches about conflicts other than the Arab Israeli one, which had to be excluded |
| 236 | 236 | China, Tibet | 1950-10-07— 1950-10-09 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 236 | 236.019 | China, Tibet | 1956-05-31— 1956-12-31 | N | Y | Tibet | n/a | | |
| 236 | 236.039 | China, Tibet | 1959-03-10— 1959-04-23 | N | Y | Tibet | n/a | | All the speeches returned by the location keyword concerned Chinese action in Tibet; there was no need to search by conflict terms |
| 237 | 237 | Indonesia, Moluccas | 1950-08-05— 1950-11-15 | N | N | Molucca Maluku | n/a | | |
| 240 | 240 | Thailand | 1951-06-30— 1951-07-01 | N | N | Thai Siam | n/a | | |
| 240 | 240.23 | Thailand | 1974-10-31— 1982-12-31 | Y | Y | Thai Siam | [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww] ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[s f] [Gg]uerrilla [Kk] illing [Ff]ighting [R r]ebel [Vv]iolen [S s]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [Ii] nterven | | Many of the speeches captured by the standard search concern Vietnamese refugees fleeing to Thailand, so I drop "refuge" from the list of conflict keywords |

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|-----|---------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-----------|----------|--|--|
| 242 | 242 | Cuba | 1953-07-26— 1953-07-27 | N | N | Cuba | n/a | | |
| 242 | 242.027 | Cuba | 1956-12-05— 1958-12-31 | N | Y | Cuba | standard | | The standard search captures several speeches about the Spanish American War, which I dropped by hand |
| 242 | 242.046 | Cuba | 1961-04-17— 1961-04-20 | N | Y | Cuba | standard | | The standard search captures several speeches about sugar imports and vague references to news stories about Castro, which I dropped by hand |
| 243 | 243 | Indonesia, Dar-ul Islam | 1953-12-31 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 243 | 243.029 | Indonesia, Dar-ul Islam | 1958-04-17— 1961-12-31 | N | Y | Indonesia | standard | | Some speeches captured by this search were not clearly about the conflict, but I chose not to modify the search |

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|-----|---------|-----------------|---------------------------|---|---|----------|----------|----------------------|---|
| 247 | 247 | Argentina | 1955-06-16— 1955-09-19 | N | Y | Argentin | n/a | | The speeches captured by this search are about religious freedom and dictatorship; there was no discussion of the coup because Congress was not in session when it happened in September. I have therefore dropped them |
| 247 | 247.034 | Argentina | 1963-04-02— 1963-09-22 | N | Y | Argentin | standard | | I removed by hand all speeches that were not about the failed coup/violence |
| 247 | 247.064 | Argentina | 1974-08-11— 1977-12-31 | N | Y | Argentin | standard | | I removed by hand all the speeches that were not about the fighting against Peron |
| 249 | 249 | Vietnam | 1955-04-30— 1964-12-31 | Y | Y | Vietnam | standard | | There is a clear issue with reverse causality in this conflict; Congress is commenting on the standing US forces in South Vietnam |
| 251 | 251 | India, Nagaland | 1956-12-31— 1959-12-31 | N | N | Naga | n/a | | There were no speeches apart from those containing "Nagasaki" |
| 251 | 251.05 | India, Nagaland | 1961-12-31— 1968-06-15 | N | N | Naga | n/a | Removed: Nagasaki | There were no speeches apart from those containing "Nagasaki" or other Japanese words |

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|-----|---------|-----------------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------------|----------|--|---|
| 251 | 251.085 | India, Nagaland | 1992-08-05— 1997-07-22 | N | Y | Nagas Nagaland | n/a | Removed: Nagas[ahk] | The standard search captures several speeches about Nagasaki but also some about the Nagaland conflict |
| 259 | 259 | Iraq | 1958-07-14— 1959-03-10 | N | Y | Ira[qk] | standard | | I removed speeches that were not about Qasim's coup by hand |
| 259 | 259.048 | Iraq | 1963-02-08— 1963-11-20 | N | N | Ira[qk] | standard | | |
| 259 | 259.066 | Iraq | 1982-08-01— 1984-12-31 | Y | N | Ira[qk] | standard | Removed: _[Ww]ar Require: [Gg]uerrilla [Rr]e bel [Ss]trife SCIRI [Ss]hi[ai'] | This search mostly captures speeches about the Iran-Iraq War but, even excluding them, I couldn't find any speeches about SCIRI |
| 259 | 259.152 | Iraq | 1987-12-31 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 259 | 259.16 | Iraq | 1991-04-24— 1996-10-25 | Y | Y | Ira[qk] | standard | Require: [Gg]uerrilla [Rr]e bel [Ss]trife SCIRI [Ss]hi[ai'] [Ss]ou th | I specified this search to capture rebel activity in the south but, though speeches mention rebels, they never mention SCIRI |
| 260 | 260 | Lebanon | 1958-05-15— 1958-07-31 | N | Y | L[ei]ban[eo] Lubnan | standard | | |
| 260 | 260.045 | Lebanon | 1975-09-09— 1976-10-21 | N | Y | L[ei]ban[eo] Lubnan | standard | | |
| 260 | 260.121 | Lebanon | 1982-09-01— 1986-12-31 | N | Y | L[ei]ban[eo] Lubnan | standard | | |
| 260 | 260.156 | Lebanon | 1989-03-14— 1990-10-13 | N | Y | L[ei]ban[eo] Lubnan | standard | | |

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|-----|---------|---------------|---------------------------|---|---|---------------------|----------|---|--|
| 262 | 262 | Laos | 1959-11-12— 1961-04-26 | N | Y | Lao[st] | standard | | |
| 262 | 262.054 | Laos | 1963-12-31— 1973-09-14 | N | Y | Lao[st] | standard | | |
| 262 | 262.108 | Laos | 1989-08-25— 1990-04-10 | N | Y | Lao[st] | standard | | |
| 264 | 264 | Myanmar, Shan | 1959-11-22— 1970-12-31 | N | N | Shan AND Shan\\s | n/a | | |
| 264 | 264.093 | Myanmar, Shan | 1972-12-31— 1973-12-31 | N | N | Shan AND Shan\\s | n/a | | |
| 264 | 264.11 | Myanmar, Shan | 1976-08-31— 1988-12-31 | N | N | Shan AND Shan\\s | n/a | | |
| 264 | 264.165 | Myanmar, Shan | 1993-07-16— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Shan AND Shan\\s | standard | | |
| 267 | 267 | Ethiopia | 1960-12-17 | Y | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 267 | 267.052 | Ethiopia | 1976-06-02— 1991-06-02 | Y | Y | Ethiopia | standard | Removed: Somali Ogaden C uba Soviet Eritr | This search captures a lot of mentions of other conflicts (war with Somalia, civil conflict in Ogaden, Cuban and Soviet intervention) than the EPRDF vs. government one; since there is no search that excludes this noise while keeping all the signal, I use the simplest solution |
| 269 | 269 | Nepal | 1960-02-29— 1962-12-31 | N | N | Nepal | standard | | |
| 269 | 269.063 | Nepal | 1996-08-23— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Nepal | standard | | |

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|-----|---------|-------------------|---------------------------|---|---|--|----------|----------------------------|---|
| 270 | 270 | France, OAS | 1961-04-22— 1962-06-30 | N | N | Fr[ae]nc[eh] | standard | | No speeches were about the rightist OAS rebels |
| 271 | 271 | Iraq, Kurd | 1961-12-31— 1970-03-11 | N | Y | Kurd | n/a | | I removed by hand all the speeches that were not about the Iraq vs. Kurd conflict; disturbingly, there were several speeches in which congresspersons blamed the Kurds for perpetrating the Armenian genocide |
| 271 | 271.09 | Iraq, Kurd | 1973-07-31— 1992-03-13 | Y | Y | Iraq AND [Kk]urd | standard | | |
| 271 | 271.201 | Iraq, Kurd | 1995-03-14— 1996-09-30 | Y | Y | Iraq AND [Kk]urd | standard | | |
| 275 | 275 | Ethiopia, Eritrea | 1964-03-15— 1991-05-31 | N | Y | Eritrea Erithrea Ertra Iritriya | standard | | |
| 282 | 282 | Sudan | 1963-12-31— 1972-01-31 | N | Y | Sudan Soudan | standard | | I removed speeches that were not about Sudan vs SSLM |
| 283 | 283 | DRC | 1964-01-31— 1965-12-31 | N | Y | Congo Zair | standard | Removed: [Bb]razzaville | The standard search captures stories about Congo-Brazzaville |
| 283 | 283.074 | DRC | 1967-07-05— 1967-11-05 | N | Y | Congo Zair | standard | | |

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|-----|---------|---------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------------|--|--|--|
| 283 | 283.082 | DRC | 1977-04-30— 1978-06-15 | N | Y | Congo Zair | Angola Shaba Cuba [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efuge [Gg]uerrilla [Kk]illing [Ff]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [Ii]nterven | | |
| 283 | 283.126 | DRC | 1996-10-19— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Congo Zair | Mobutu Kabila AFDL [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efuge [Gg]uerrilla [Kk]illing [Ff]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [Ii]nterven | | |
| 287 | 287 | Burundi | 1965-10-19 | N | N | Burundi | n/a | | |
| 287 | 287.072 | Burundi | 1991-11-27— 1992-04-14 | N | N | Burundi | n/a | | |
| 287 | 287.203 | Burundi | 1994-10-18— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Burundi | standard | | |
| 288 | 288 | Chad | 1966-07-31— 1972-11-24 | N | Y | Chad Tasad Tchad | standard | | I removed by hand speeches that were not about Chad vs First Liberation Army |

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|-----|---------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------------|----------|--|---|
| 288 | 288.105 | Chad | 1976-02-18— 1984-12-31 | N | Y | Chad Tasad Tchad | standard | Removed: Chadha Chada C hadwick Chadds | The standard search captures speeches with the name "Chad" as well as references to a "Chadha" court case |
| 288 | 288.152 | Chad | 1986-12-31— 1987-11-01 | N | Y | Chad Tasad Tchad | standard | Removed: Chadha Chada | See above |
| 288 | 288.159 | Chad | 1989-03-03— 1994-12-31 | N | Y | Chad Tasad Tchad | standard | Removed: Chades | See above |
| 288 | 288.236 | Chad | 1997-10-30— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Chad Tasad Tchad | standard | | |
| 289 | 289 | Colombia | 1964-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Colombia | standard | | Much of this discussion was about drug trafficking but, with Colombia's rebel groups financing themselves via cocaine, I chose not to modify the search |
| 291 | 291 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1965-07-28— 1965-12-31 | N | N | Papua | n/a | | |
| 291 | 291.074 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1967-12-31— 1969-12-31 | N | N | Papua | n/a | | |
| 291 | 291.088 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1976-12-31— 1978-12-31 | N | N | Papua | standard | | |
| 291 | 291.128 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1981-12-31 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 291 | 291.139 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1984-12-31 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 292 | 292 | Peru | 1965-08-03— 1965-12-31 | N | N | Peru | standard | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|----------|---------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|---|--|---|
| 292 | 292.074 | Peru | 1982-08-22— 1999-11-26 | N | Y | Peru Perou | standard | | I removed by hand speeches that were not about the Shining Path, mostly mentions of historical wars and debt crisis, but as with Colombia I kept the anti-drugs speeches |
| 297 | 297 | Nigeria | 1966-01-15— 1966-07-29 | N | N | Nigeria | standard | | |
| 298 | 298 | Namibia | 1966-12-31— 1988-08-08 | N | Y | Namibia | standard | | |
| 299 | 299 | Syria | 1966-02-23 | N | N | Syria | n/a | | |
| 299 | 299.075 | Syria | 1979-06-16— 1982-02-02 | N | N | Syria | standard | | |
| 300 | 300 | Cambodia | 1967-05-31— 1975-04-17 | Y | Y | Cambo[dj] Kampuchea Khmer | Rouge [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efug e [Gg]uerrilla [Kk]i lling [Ff]ighting [R r]ebel [Vv]iolen [S s]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [Ii] nterven | Removed: Viet [Oo]peration s [Ii]nterven [Ii]n va[ds] [Bb]order Nixon [Pp]residen t [Tt]roops [Aa]r my [Ff]orces [Ss] anctu [Ss]upply [Bb]ases [Ee]xtens ion [Ee]xpan[ds] [Ee]scalat [Bb]roa den [Ww]ide[nr] Tonkin \\sHo\\s Recovered: [Rr]ouge Sihanou k Lon\\sNol [Ww]ar\\sin\\s_ [Ww]ar\\sfor\\s_ | To exclude Vietnam War spillover from this search, I dropped references to Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but then, to avoid loss of signal, I recovered from the dropped speeches any that specifically mention the Khmer Rouge, Prince Sihanouk, or General Lon Nol |

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|-----|---------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------|----------|---|--|
| 300 | 300.116 | Cambodia | 1978-12-30— 1998-10-24 | N | Y | Cambo[dj] Kampuchea Khmer | standard | | Many of these speeches mention Vietnam but, unlike the prior episode in this conflict, they are appropriate to include due to the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia's civil conflict |
| 303 | 303 | Nigeria, Biafra | 1967-07-06— 1970-01-12 | N | Y | Biafra | standard | | |
| 308 | 308 | Philippines, Mindanao | 1970-08-20— 1990-08-02 | Y | Y | Mindanao | n/a | | |
| 308 | 308.179 | Philippines, Mindanao | 1993-02-09— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Mindanao | n/a | | |
| 309 | 309 | Sudan | 1971-07-22 | N | N | Sudan Soudan | n/a | | |
| 309 | 309.09 | Sudan | 1976-07-02 | N | N | Sudan Soudan | n/a | | |
| 309 | 309.12 | Sudan | 1983-05-17— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Sudan Soudan | standard | Removed: Ethiop Recovered: [Rr]efuge [Ff]ood [Ss]tarv [Ff]amin e [Cc]risis | There's a lot of overlap between the conflicts in Ethiopia and Sudan. I removed the earlier speeches that are about African food or refugee crises rather than violent conflict then recovered the speeches mentioning Sudan's conflict in the context of Ethiopian refugees |
| 312 | 312 | Pakistan | 1971-03-26— 1971-12-16 | N | Y | Pakistan | standard | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------|----------|-------------------------|---|
| 313 | 313 | Sri Lanka, JVP | 1971-04-30— 1971-06-09 | N | Y | Lanka Ceylon | n/a | | I removed by hand speeches that were not about the JVP |
| 313 | 313.095 | Sri Lanka, JVP | 1989-02-13— 1990-02-23 | N | N | Lanka Ceylon | standard | | None of the recovered speeches concerned the JVP, most mention Tamils |
| 314 | 314 | Uganda | 1971-01-29— 1972-09-20 | N | Y | Uganda | standard | | |
| 314 | 314.103 | Uganda | 1974-03-23 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 314 | 314.111 | Uganda | 1979-01-22— 1992-08-09 | N | Y | Uganda | standard | | |
| 314 | 314.206 | Uganda | 1994-02-21— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Uganda | standard | | |
| 315 | 315 | UK, Northern Ireland | 1971-08-31— 1991-11-26 | N | Y | Ireland Irish | standard | Require: [Nn]orthern | I searched for "Ireland" and required results to include "northern" because including UK or United Kingdom in the search only increases noise |
| 315 | 315.195 | UK, Northern Ireland | 1998-08-15 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 316 | 316 | El Salvador | 1972-03-25 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 316 | 316.102 | El Salvador | 1979-09-14— 1991-11-18 | N | Y | Salvador | standard | Require: El | Using El Salvador in the search causes issues with whitespace, but searching without "El" captures a lot of speeches mentioning the Spanish given name "Salvador" |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-------------------------------------|----------|---------------|---|
| 318 | 318 | Zimbabwe | 1967-09-05— 1968-12-31 | N | Y | Rhodesia | standard | | Several of these speeches capture "economic war" but that seems relevant to the conflict, so I do not exclude the term |
| 318 | 318.086 | Zimbabwe | 1973-04-04— 1979-12-21 | N | Y | Zimbabwe Rhodesia | standard | | |
| 322 | 322 | Bangladesh, Chittagong | 1975-02-28— 1991-12-31 | N | Y | Chittagong | n/a | Require: hill | There were very few speeches mentioning Chittagong, so I used a term which captures the one relevant speech |
| 325 | 325 | Pakistan, Baloch | 1974-12-31— 1977-07-05 | N | N | Baloch | n/a | | |
| 327 | 327 | Angola | 1975-11-11— 1995-12-24 | N | Y | Angola Portuguese West Africa | standard | | |
| 327 | 327.246 | Angola | 1998-05-02— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Angola | standard | | I removed by hand the speeches that mentioned Angola but were about other African conflicts |
| 329 | 329 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1964-01-11— 1964-12-31 | N | N | Ogaden | n/a | | |
| 329 | 329.07 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1976-10-31— 1983-12-31 | N | Y | Ogaden | standard | | Many of these speeches mention Ethiopia-Somalia conflict, but that is due to the Somali supported insurgency in Ogaden, so it is appropriate to retain them |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|----------------|--|------------------|--|
| 329 | 329.15 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1993-10-13— 1994-02-26 | N | N | Ogaden | standard | | |
| 329 | 329.226 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1996-08-09— 1996-12-31 | N | N | Ogaden | n/a | | |
| 329 | 329.259 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1998-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Ogaden | n/a | | |
| 330 | 330 | Indonesia, East Timor | 1975-07-12— 1988-12-31 | N | Y | Timor | n/a | | Timor is never mentioned outside the context of its conflict, so there is no need to use the conflict keywords |
| 330 | 330.165 | Indonesia, East Timor | 1992-12-15 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 330 | 330.213 | Indonesia, East Timor | 1997-05-31— 1999-09-22 | N | Y | Timor | n/a | | See above |
| 331 | 331 | Morocco, Western Sahara | 1975-11-04— 1989-11-16 | Y | Y | Sahara Sahrawi | [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efuge [Gg]uerrilla [Kk]illing [Ff]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [Ii]nterven Polisario | Require: Western | It is difficult to discriminate between speeches about this conflict and those about the conflict between Polisario and Mauritania |
| 332 | 332 | Mozambique | 1977-12-31— 1992-10-19 | N | Y | Mo[cz]ambi | standard | | |
| 333 | 333 | Afghanistan | 1978-04-27— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Afghan | standard | | |
| 336 | 336 | Nicaragua | 1977-10-10— 1979-07-19 | N | Y | Nicara[gh]ua | standard | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|----------------|---------------------------|---|---|-------------------|----------|------------------------|--|
| 336 | 336.13 | Nicaragua | 1982-04-17— 1990-04-15 | N | Y | Nicara[gh]ua | standard | | |
| 337 | 337 | Somalia | 1982-12-31— 1984-12-31 | N | Y | Somali Soomali | standard | | I removed by hand the speeches that were not about Somalia vs. SNM/SSDF |
| 337 | 337.152 | Somalia | 1986-03-03— 1996-12-20 | N | Y | Somali | standard | | |
| 338 | 338 | Iran, MEK | 1979-12-31— 1982-12-31 | Y | N | Iran Persia | standard | | I did not find any speeches about Iran vs. MEK |
| 338 | 338.146 | Iran, MEK | 1986-12-31— 1988-12-31 | Y | N | Iran Persia | standard | | See above |
| 338 | 338.165 | Iran, MEK | 1991-04-03 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 338 | 338.187 | Iran, MEK | 1993-04-09— 1993-12-11 | Y | Y | Iran Persia | standard | Removed: _ Gulf | Most speeches captured by the standard search were about the Gulf War, I removed them and also removed by hand the speeches that were not about Iran vs. MEK |
| 338 | 338.221 | Iran, MEK | 1997-02-18— 1997-11-02 | Y | Y | Iran Persia | standard | Removed: _ [GgC]ul[fl] | See above |
| 338 | 338.264 | Iran, MEK | 1999-11-25— 1999-12-31 | Y | N | Iran Persia | n/a | | |
| 341 | 341 | Liberia | 1980-04-12— 1980-04-14 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 341 | 341.135 | Liberia | 1989-12-26— 1990-12-31 | N | Y | Liberia | standard | | |
| 347 | 347 | India, Manipur | 1982-07-31— 1988-12-31 | N | N | Manipur | n/a | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|------------------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------------|--|-----------------------------------|--|
| 347 | 347.165 | India, Manipur | 1993-12-31— 1996-12-19 | N | N | Manipur | standard | | |
| 347 | 347.256 | India, Manipur | 1998-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Manipur | standard | | |
| 351 | 351 | India, Punjab | 1983-12-31— 1993-12-24 | N | Y | Punjab Khalistan | standard | | |
| 352 | 352 | Sri Lanka, Tamil | 1984-09-01— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Lanka | standard | | |
| 353 | 353 | Cameroon | 1960-01-31— 1961-12-31 | N | N | Camero[ou]n Kamerun | standard | | |
| 353 | 353.057 | Cameroon | 1984-04-06— 1984-04-09 | N | N | Camero[ou]n Kamerun | n/a | | |
| 354 | 354 | Turkey | 1984-08-15— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Turk[ei] | [Cc]onflict \s[Ww] ar\s \s[Ww]ar[s f] [Gg]uerrilla [Kk] illing [Ff]ighting [R r]ebel [Vv]iolen [S s]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [li] nterven | Removed: Iraq Require: [Kk]urd | Searching for "Kurd" doesn't work because it overwhelmingly finds speeches about the Kurds in Iraq; additionally, many of these speeches are about refugees unrelated to the Turkey vs Kurd conflict, so I exclude the "refuge" keyword from this search |
| 359 | 359 | Yemen | 1986-01-13— 1986-01-20 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-----------------|---------------------------|---|---|-----------|---|--|---|
| 364 | 364 | India, Kashmir | 1990-02-12— 1999-12-31 | Y | Y | Kashmir | standard | | This search for this conflict is very noisy, I captured some speeches about interstate war, some intrastate, some human rights; the discussion runs such that there is no easy way to refine the search |
| 365 | 365 | India, Assam | 1990-11-30 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |
| 365 | 365.184 | India, Assam | 1994-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | N | Assam | standard | | |
| 366 | 366 | Indonesia, Aceh | 1990-06-06— 1991-12-28 | N | N | Aceh | n/a | | |
| 366 | 366.198 | Indonesia, Aceh | 1999-06-01— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Aceh | n/a | | The two speeches captured by the location keyword are relevant, so no conflict keywords are necessary |
| 374 | 374 | Rwanda | 1990-10-03— 1994-07-04 | N | Y | R[uw]anda | standard | | |
| 374 | 374.229 | Rwanda | 1996-07-12— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | R[uw]anda | ALiR [Mm]ilitants [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efuge [Gg]uerrilla [Kk]illing [Ff]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]ea cekeep [Ii]nterven | | I added terms to this search so that it captures speeches about the Rwanda vs. ALiR conflict in addition to mentions of the genocide |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|--------------------------------|----------|-----------------|---|
| 375 | 375 | Senegal, Casamance | 1990-08-31— 1990-12-31 | N | N | Senegal AND Casamance | n/a | | |
| 375 | 375.185 | Senegal, Casamance | 1992-09-01— 1993-11-16 | N | N | Senegal AND Casamance | standard | | |
| 375 | 375.219 | Senegal, Casamance | 1995-04-27— 1995-12-01 | N | N | Senegal AND Casamance | n/a | | |
| 375 | 375.245 | Senegal, Casamance | 1997-03-18— 1998-11-02 | N | N | Senegal AND Casamance | standard | | |
| 382 | 382 | Sierra Leone | 1991-04-01— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Sierra _\\sLeone | standard | | |
| 385 | 385 | Yugoslavia, Croat | 1991-07-27— 1992-04-06 | N | Y | Croat | standard | | |
| 386 | 386 | Algeria | 1991-12-09— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Algeri[ea] | standard | Removed: Morocc | I removed by hand the speeches that were about Western Sahara rather than Algeria vs AQIM and GIA |
| 388 | 388 | Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh | 1991-12-30— 1994-07-15 | N | Y | Artsakh Nagorno Karabakh | standard | | |
| 388 | 388.23 | Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh | 1997-04-20— 1998-12-31 | N | Y | Artsakh Nagorno Karabakh | standard | | Some relevant speeches are lost after filtering by conflict keywords |
| 389 | 389 | Yugoslavia, Bosnia | 1992-04-30— 1995-12-31 | Y | Y | Bosnia Her[cz]eg | standard | | This conflict is difficult to distinguish from the Czech vs Bosniak and Czech vs Serb conflicts |
| 390 | 390 | Croatia | 1992-05-17— 1993-12-13 | Y | Y | Croat | standard | | I removed by hand the speeches that were not about Croatia vs Serbian Republic of Krajina |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|---|------------------------------|---|--|---|
| 390 | 390.222 | Croatia | 1995-05-01— 1995-09-06 | Y | Y | Croat | standard | | See above |
| 391 | 391 | Egypt | 1993-03-10— 1998-11-02 | N | Y | Egypt | [Tt]error [Cc]onflic t \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s [Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efu ge [Gg]uerrilla [Kk]illing [Ff]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eacekeep [li nterven | | It is difficult for searches to parse between speeches about this conflict, involving Egypt vs al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya, and terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict |
| 392 | 392 | Georgia, Abkhazia | 1992-08-17— 1993-11-29 | N | Y | Abkhazia | n/a | | The speeches captured by the location keyword are relevant, so no conflict keywords are necessary |
| 395 | 395 | Tajikistan | 1992-05-10— 1998-11-16 | N | Y | T[ao][io]k Tad[jz]ikistan | standard | | |
| 401 | 401 | Russia, Chechnya | 1994-11-26— 1996-11-08 | N | Y | Chech[en] | n/a | | The speeches captured by the location keyword are relevant, so no conflict keywords are necessary |
| 401 | 401.254 | Russia, Chechnya | 1999-08-11— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Chech[en] | n/a | | See above |
| 402 | 402 | Yemen | 1994-04-28— 1994-07-04 | N | Y | Yemen | standard | | |
| 404 | 404 | Pakistan, Karachi | 1990-02-11 | N | N | n/a | n/a | | |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-----------|----------|--|---|
| 404 | 404.174 | Pakistan, Karachi | 1994-05-03— 1996-09-04 | N | N | Pakistan | standard | | This search did not return any speeches about the Pakistan vs MQM conflict; most are about Kashmir |
| 408 | 408 | Republic of Congo | 1993-11-11— 1993-12-27 | N | N | Congo | n/a | | |
| 408 | 408.224 | Republic of Congo | 1997-06-06— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Congo | standard | | It is difficult to disentangle the Republic of Congo/Congo Brazzaville from the DRC; I removed by hand the speeches that are about DRC rather than Congo Brazzaville vs. Cocoyes/Ninjas/Ntsiloulou us |
| 412 | 412 | Serbia, Kosovo | 1998-03-06— 1999-11-21 | N | Y | Kosov[ao] | standard | | |
| 413 | 413 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1977-12-31— 1978-12-31 | N | N | Orom[io] | n/a | | |
| 413 | 413.128 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1980-12-31— 1981-12-31 | N | N | Orom[io] | n/a | | |
| 413 | 413.139 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1983-07-31— 1992-06-30 | N | Y | Orom[io] | n/a | | The single speech that is captured by the location keyword is relevant, so no conflict keywords are necessary |
| 413 | 413.204 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1994-12-31— 1995-12-31 | N | N | Orom[io] | n/a | | |
| 413 | 413.247 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1998-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Y | Orom[io] | n/a | | See above |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|-------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---|---|-------------------|--|------------------------|--|
| 426 | 426 | Lebanon | 1990-07-10— 1999-12-30 | N | Y | Lebanon | Israel Hezbollah [Cc]onflict \\s[Ww]ar\\s \\s[Ww]ar[sf] [Rr]efuge [Gg]ue[rilla [Kk]illing [Ff]ighting [Rr]ebel [Vv]iolen [Ss]trife [Dd]evast [Cc]ris[ei]s [Cc]hao [Pp]eace keep [li]nterven | | Speeches about this conflict, Israel vs. Hezbollah, are difficult to distinguish from ones about past Middle Eastern conflicts and about a hostage crisis in Lebanon |
| 428 | 428 | Mauritania, Western Sahara | 1975-12-19— 1978-12-31 | Y | Y | Sahrawi Sahara | standard | Require: [Ww]estern | It is difficult to discriminate between speeches about this conflict and those about the conflict between Polisario and Morocco |
| 11884 | 11884 | India, Hyderabad | 1947-06-30— 1948-09-18 | N | N | Hydera | n/a | | |

Appendix 2: ProQuest Searches

I collected news media stories from the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Wall Street Journal* using *ProQuest Historical Newspapers* searches. This appendix records the keywords and operators that I used for each conflict episode search.

Conflict ID: The UCDP ACD numerical identifier for each conflict.

Episode ID: Though the UCDP ACD identifies separate episodes within conflicts, it does not assign identifiers to them. These are identifiers I created to distinguish between episodes. They consist of the ACD conflict code and, for episodes after the first, an arbitrary decimal value.

Country and Region/Faction: This is a common usage name of the country where a conflict was fought. For countries with multiple regional conflicts, I also include the name of a sub-region, faction, or group to help identify each conflict-episode.

Date Range: These are the dates of each conflict episode, as identified by the ACD, in YYYY-MM-DD format.

High Noise: Some conflict episodes are discussed by Congress or the news media in ways which make them difficult to capture with my standard search keywords. 1's in this column indicate conflict episodes I flag as High Noise in the regression analyses of chapters 3 and 4.

Search Pattern: This column categorizes the type of search in the Exact Search Terms column. "Country" searches for a country name within the title field of each news article, i.e., ti(Bolivia*). "Country and Region" searches for one of two possible conditions 1.) a country name within the title field and a region or faction name within the body, or 2.) a region or faction name within the title field and a country name within the body, i.e., (ti(Iraq*) AND (Kurd)) OR (ti(Kurd) AND (Iraq*)). A "Special" search does not follow either pattern, and is explained in the Notes column.

Exact Search Terms: These are the fully specified searches which I entered in the search field of ProQuest. They include both country/region keywords and conflict keywords. For country/region keywords, I search for the country names specified in Hensel's ICOW Historical State Names Data Set and the territory names specified in the ACD. Each search is written such that it will capture the demonym of a country or region as well as its name, i.e., Burman, Burmese, and Myanmarese. For "Country" and "Country and Region" searches, I use the following conflict keywords: conflict, war, refugee, guerilla, killing, fighting, rebel, violence, strife, devastation, crisis, chaos, peacekeeper, or intervention. Asterisks are a truncation character, used to retrieve up to 5 unspecified characters, helpful for capturing plurals and other alternate word forms.

Question marks are a wildcard character that returns strings with any single character in the question mark's place.

Notes: This column elaborates on patterns in the results of different conflict episodes, quirks of searches, or why I modified a search in the way I did.

| Conflict ID | Episode ID | Country and Region/Faction | Date Range | High Noise | Search Pattern | Exact Search Terms | Notes |
|-------------|------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|------------|--------------------|---|--|
| 200 | 200 | Bolivia | 1946-07-21 | N | Country | ti(Bolivia*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR Cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 200 | 200 | Bolivia | 1952-04-09— 1952-04-12 | N | Country | ti(Bolivia*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR Cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 200 | 200.03 | Bolivia | 1967-03-31— 1967-10-16 | N | Country | ti(Bolivia*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR Cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 202 | 202 | China | 1946-12-31— 1949-12-08 | N | Country | ti(China* OR Chinese) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR Cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT (Fr?nc* AND Indo*) | |
| 203 | 203 | Greece | 1946-03-31— 1949-10-16 | N | Special | ti(Greece OR Greek) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Communis* OR Left* OR Red* OR EAM OR "National Liberation Front" OR ELAS) | The country search captures too many articles that mention World War 2 |
| 205 | 205 | Iran, Kurd | 1946-05-31— 1946-12-16 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (Kurd*)) OR (ti(Kurd*) AND (Iran* OR Persia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|--|
| 205 | 205 | Iran, Kurd | 1966-12-31— 1968-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (Kurd*)) OR (ti(Kurd*) AND (Iran* OR Persia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 205 | 205.09 | Iran, Kurd | 1979-12-31— 1988-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (Kurd*)) OR (ti(Kurd*) AND (Iran* OR Persia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 205 | 205.17 | Iran, Kurd | 1990-07-10— 1990-08-17 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (Kurd*)) OR (ti(Kurd*) AND (Iran* OR Persia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 205 | 205.18 | Iran, Kurd | 1993-09-12— 1993-11-11 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (Kurd*)) OR (ti(Kurd*) AND (Iran* OR Persia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 205 | 205.22 | Iran, Kurd | 1996-07-28 | N | Special | ti(Iran OR Persia OR Kurd) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Too few stories are captured by the country and region search |
| 209 | 209 | Philippines | 1946-07-31— 1954-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Philippine* OR Filipin*) AND (Huk[*9]) | Coverage is very noisy; "war" captures World War 2 and Spanish American War stories, and the Philippines has idiosyncratically high coverage |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------------|---------------------------|---|---------|---|---|
| 209 | 209.03 | Philippines | 1969-09-30— 1995-11-29 | N | Special | ti(Philippine* OR Filipin*) AND (huk[*9] OR "New People*" OR NPA OR CPP OR "Communist Party of the Philippines" OR "communist guerrilla*" OR "communist rebel*") | Coverage is very noisy; "war" captures World War 2, Vietnam War, and Spanish American War stories, "crisis" captures a debt crisis, and the Philippines has idiosyncratically high coverage |
| 209 | 209.24 | Philippines | 1997-11-23— 1997-12-30 | N | Special | ti(Philippine* OR Filipin*) AND (huk[*9] OR "New People*" OR NPA OR CPP OR "Communist Party of the Philippines" OR "communist guerrilla*" OR "communist rebel*") | Coverage is very noisy; "war" captures World War 2, "crisis" captures the Asian financial crisis, and the Philippines has idiosyncratically high coverage |
| 209 | 209.27 | Philippines | 1999-06-06— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Philippine* OR Filipin*) AND (huk[*9] OR "New People*" OR NPA OR CPP OR "Communist Party of the Philippines" OR "communist guerrilla*" OR "communist rebel*") | Coverage is very noisy; the Philippines has idiosyncratically high coverage |
| 210 | 210 | Estonia | 1946-12-31— 1948-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Estonia* OR Eesti* OR Esthonia*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 212 | 212 | Lithuania | 1946-06-30— 1948-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Lithuania*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 213 | 213 | Ukraine | 1946-12-31— 1950-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Ukrain*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 217 | 217 | China, Taiwan | 1947-02-28— 1947-03-24 | N | Country | ti(Taiwan* OR Taipei OR Formosa*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|--|
| 220 | 220 | Paraguay | 1947-03-31— 1947-08-21 | N | Country | ti(Paragua*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 220 | 220.01 | Paraguay | 1954-05-05 | N | Country | ti(Paragua*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 220 | 220.03 | Paraguay | 1989-02-03 | N | Country | ti(Paragua*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 221 | 221 | Myanmar, Karen | 1949-01-15— 1992-11-22 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Karen OR Kayin)) OR (ti(Karen OR Kayin) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 221 | 221.21 | Myanmar, Karen | 1994-12-31— 1995-07-13 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Karen OR Kayin)) OR (ti(Karen OR Kayin) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 221 | 221.24 | Myanmar, Karen | 1997-02-23— 1998-07-14 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Karen OR Kayin)) OR (ti(Karen OR Kayin) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|---|
| 222 | 222 | Myanmar | 1948-02-29— 1988-12-31 | N | Special | (Burm* OR Myanmar) NEAR/20 (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND Communist NEAR/10 (Burm* OR Myanmar OR Rangoon) NOT (Chin* AND Nationalist*) | The country search captures Myanmar's many ethnic conflicts, as well as Chinese Nationalist guerillas attacking Communist China from bases within Myanmar |
| 222 | 222.17 | Myanmar | 1990-12-31— 1992-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Burm* OR Myanma*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Communis* OR (Student* Democratic Front) OR ABSDF) NOT Movie | The country search captures Myanmar's many ethnic conflicts |
| 222 | 222.22 | Myanmar | 1994-12-31 | N | Special | (Burm* OR Myanma*) NEAR/20 (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR Cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |
| 223 | 223 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1948-01-31— 1961-11-15 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya*)) OR (ti(Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 223 | 223.06 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1964-12-31— 1978-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya*)) OR (ti(Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|-------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|---|--|
| 223 | 223.13 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1991-12-29 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya*)) OR (ti(Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 223 | 223.2 | Myanmar, Rohingya | 1994-05-15— 1994-06-23 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya*)) OR (ti(Arakan* OR Rakhin* OR Rohingya) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 225 | 225 | Costa Rica | 1948-03-03— 1948-04-20 | N | Country | ti(Costa) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 227 | 227 | India | 1948-09-18— 1951-12-31 | N | Special | ti(India*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Communist* OR Maoist* OR Naxal* OR Marxist*) NOT (Kashmir* OR Korea* OR Burm* OR Chin*) | Country searches are ineffective; they capture India's ethnic conflicts and India's involvement in conflicts elsewhere in Asia |
| 227 | 227.02 | India | 1969-12-31— 1971-12-31 | Y | Special | ti(India*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Communist* OR Maoist* OR Naxal* OR Marxist*) | Country searches capture a lot of false drops about India's conflict with Pakistan |

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|-----|--------|--------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| 227 | 227.1 | India | 1991-07-16— 1994-12-02 | N | Special | ti(India*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Communist* OR Maoist* OR Naxal* OR Marxist*) | Country searches are ineffective; they capture India's ethnic conflicts |
| 227 | 227.23 | India | 1996-04-03— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(India*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Communist* OR Maoist* OR Naxal* OR Marxist*) | See above |
| 230 | 230 | Yemen | 1948-03-15 | N | Country | ti(Yemen) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 230 | 230.01 | Yemen | 1962-10-31— 1970-05-23 | N | Country | ti(Yemen) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 230 | 230.09 | Yemen | 1979-03-31— 1982-05-31 | Y | Country | ti(Yemen) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search captures interstate North vs South Yemen conflict which is difficult to exclude |
| 231 | 231 | Myanmar, Kachin | 1949-01-15— 1950-05-05 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Kachin*)) OR (ti(Kachin*) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-----------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|---|
| 231 | 231.02 | Myanmar, Kachin | 1961-02-28— 1992-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Kachin*)) OR (ti(Kachin*) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 233 | 233 | Guatemala | 1949-07-18— 1949-07-19 | N | Country | ti(Guatemala*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 233 | 233.01 | Guatemala | 1954-06-18— 1954-06-27 | N | Country | ti(Guatemala*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 233 | 233.03 | Guatemala | 1963-07-31— 1963-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Guatemala*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 233 | 233.07 | Guatemala | 1965-12-31— 1995-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Guatemala*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 234 | 234 | Israel | 1949-12-31— 1996-09-30 | Y | Country | ti(Isra?l*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search captures many articles about wider Middle Eastern conflict; I tried several different search methods, but all of them drop a significant proportion of relevant stories |
| 236 | 236 | China, Tibet | 1950-10-07— 1950-10-09 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(China OR Chinese) AND (Tibet*)) OR (ti(Tibet*) AND (China OR Chinese))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|---------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|---|
| 236 | 236.02 | China, Tibet | 1956-05-31— 1956-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(China OR Chinese) AND (Tibet*)) OR (ti(Tibet*) AND (China OR Chinese))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 236 | 236.04 | China, Tibet | 1959-03-10— 1959-04-23 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(China OR Chinese) AND (Tibet*)) OR (ti(Tibet*) AND (China OR Chinese))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 237 | 237 | Indonesia, Moluccas | 1950-08-05— 1950-11-15 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Molucca* OR Maluku* OR Amboin*)) OR (ti(Molucca* OR Maluku* OR Amboin*) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Many news stories refer to this conflict by its location in Amboina Island |
| 240 | 240 | Thailand | 1951-06-30— 1951-07-01 | N | Special | ti(Thai* OR Siam*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT (refuge*) | The country search captures too many stories about refugees from Vietnam |
| 240 | 240.23 | Thailand | 1974-10-31— 1982-12-31 | Y | Special | ti(Thai* OR Siam*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT (refuge*) | Many of these stories are false drops about refugees from Vietnam, coups, or sports rather than the conflict between Thailand and its Communist Party |
| 242 | 242 | Cuba | 1953-07-26— 1953-07-27 | N | Country | ti(Cuba*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|----------------------------|---------------------------|---|---------|---|---|
| 242 | 242.03 | Cuba | 1956-12-05— 1958-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Cuba*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 242 | 242.05 | Cuba | 1961-04-17— 1961-04-20 | N | Country | ti(Cuba*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 243 | 243 | Indonesia, Dar-ul Islam | 1953-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Indonesia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 243 | 243.03 | Indonesia, Dar-ul Islam | 1958-04-17— 1961-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Indonesia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT (iraq* OR guinea) | |
| 247 | 247 | Argentina | 1955-06-16— 1955-09-19 | N | Country | ti(Argentin*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 247 | 247.03 | Argentina | 1963-04-02— 1963-09-22 | N | Special | ti(Argentin*) AND (conflict* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | The standard country search captures a lot of economic, oil, political, or cabinet crises; I tried several search methods, but they all capture a large amount of noise after the initial coup in April--this truncated list of conflict keywords performs the best without being overcomplicated |

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|-----|--------|-----------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|---|---|
| 247 | 247.06 | Argentina | 1974-08-11— 1977-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Argentin*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 249 | 249 | Vietnam | 1955-04-30— 1964-12-31 | Y | Country | ti(Viet*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Vietnam had very high coverage; spot checks suggest that most stories capture the communist insurgency, but it is time prohibitive to check every story |
| 251 | 251 | India, Nagaland | 1956-12-31— 1959-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Naga OR Nagas OR Nagaland)) OR (ti(Naga OR Nagas OR Nagaland) AND (India))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 251 | 251.05 | India, Nagaland | 1961-12-31—1968-06-15 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Naga OR Nagas OR Nagaland)) OR (ti(Naga OR Nagas OR Nagaland) AND (India))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 251 | 251.09 | India, Nagaland | 1992-08-05— 1997-07-22 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Naga OR Nagas OR Nagaland)) OR (ti(Naga OR Nagas OR Nagaland) AND (India))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 259 | 259 | Iraq | 1958-07-14— 1959-03-10 | N | Country | ti(Iraq*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|---------------------------|---|---------|---|---|
| 259 | 259.05 | Iraq | 1963-02-08— 1963-11-20 | N | Special | ti(Iraq*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT kurd* | In the standard country search, stories between the Feb. and Nov. coups are of dubious relevance; about 2/3 are about the Kurdish conflict with little or no mention of contestation over the Iraqi state |
| 259 | 259.07 | Iraq | 1982-08-01— 1984-12-31 | Y | Country | ti(Iraq*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | SCIRI's guerrilla campaign is nearly totally lost in the Iran-Iraq War coverage and Iraqi-Kurdish conflict coverage |
| 259 | 259.15 | Iraq | 1987-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Iraq*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 259 | 259.16 | Iraq | 1991-04-24— 1996-10-25 | Y | Special | ti(Iraq*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND shi* NOT kurd* | most stories captured by a standard country search are about the Gulf War, Gulf War refugees, nuclear weapons, or Kurds; this altered search still captures a lot of noise |
| 260 | 260 | Lebanon | 1958-05-15— 1958-07-31 | N | Country | ti(L?ban* OR Lubnan) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 260 | 260.05 | Lebanon | 1975-09-09— 1976-10-21 | N | Country | ti(L?ban* OR Lubnan) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 260 | 260.12 | Lebanon | 1982-09-01— 1986-12-31 | N | Country | ti(L?ban* OR Lubnan) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|
| 260 | 260.16 | Lebanon | 1989-03-14— 1990-10-13 | N | Country | ti(L?ban* OR Lubnan) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 262 | 262 | Laos | 1959-11-12— 1961-04-26 | N | Country | ti(Lao*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 262 | 262.05 | Laos | 1963-12-31— 1973-09-14 | N | Country | ti(Lao*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 262 | 262.11 | Laos | 1989-08-25— 1990-04-10 | N | Country | ti(Lao*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 264 | 264 | Myanmar, Shan | 1959-11-22— 1970-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Shan)) OR (ti(Shan) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 264 | 264.09 | Myanmar, Shan | 1972-12-31— 1973-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Shan)) OR (ti(Shan) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|---|
| 264 | 264.11 | Myanmar, Shan | 1976-08-31— 1988-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Shan)) OR (ti(Shan) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 264 | 264.17 | Myanmar, Shan | 1993-07-16— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Burm* OR Myanmar) AND (Shan)) OR (ti(Shan) AND (Burm* OR Myanmar))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 267 | 267 | Ethiopia | 1960-12-17 | Y | Country | ti(Ethiopia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See below |
| 267 | 267.05 | Ethiopia | 1976-06-02— 1991-06-02 | Y | Country | ti(Ethiopia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT china* | This country search captures Ethiopia's war with Somalia, the famine in Ethiopia, and Ethiopia's many ethnic conflicts, but there is no effective way to exclude them |
| 269 | 269 | Nepal | 1960-02-29— 1962-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Nepal*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT chin* | The standard country search captures many false drops; excluding China helps remove most of the irrelevant coverage |
| 269 | 269.06 | Nepal | 1996-08-23— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Nepal*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|--|
| 270 | 270 | France, OAS | 1961-04-22— 1962-06-30 | N | Country | ti(France OR French) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This conflict involves a rightist army coup in Algeria; there are many stories about it and the subsequent bombings in France, but there are also stories about the Muslim insurgency, World War 2, Vietnam, and the Bizerte crisis in Tunisia |
| 271 | 271 | Iraq, Kurd | 1961-12-31— 1970-03-11 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Iraq*) AND (Kurd)) OR (ti(Kurd) AND (Iraq*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 271 | 271.09 | Iraq, Kurd | 1973-07-31— 1992-03-13 | Y | Special | ((ti(Iraq*) AND (Kurd)) OR (ti(Kurd) AND (Iraq*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT (Ayatollah) | Coverage of this conflict gets subsumed into Iran-Iraq war coverage between 1981 and 1988, and the search captures some stories about Kurds in other areas |
| 271 | 271.2 | Iraq, Kurd | 1995-03-14— 1996-09-30 | Y | Country and Region | ((ti(Iraq*) AND (Kurd)) OR (ti(Kurd) AND (Iraq*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Several of these stories, particularly at the beginning of the conflict are about Kurds fighting the Turkish government |
| 275 | 275 | Ethiopia, Eritrea | 1964-03-15— 1991-05-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Eritrea* OR Erithrea* OR Ertra* OR Iritriya*)) OR (ti(Eritrea* OR Erithrea* OR Ertra* OR Iritriya*) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|---------------------------|---|---------|---|---|
| 282 | 282 | Sudan | 1963-12-31— 1972-01-31 | N | Country | ti(Sudan* OR Soudan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 283 | 283 | DRC | 1964-01-31— 1965-12-31 | N | Special | ti(congo* OR zaire*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT brazzaville | The standard country search captures too many stories about the similarly named Republic of Congo |
| 283 | 283.07 | DRC | 1967-07-05— 1967-11-05 | N | Special | ti(congo* OR zaire*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT brazzaville | See above |
| 283 | 283.08 | DRC | 1977-04-30— 1978-06-15 | N | Special | ti(congo* OR zaire*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT brazzaville | See above |
| 283 | 283.13 | DRC | 1996-10-19— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(congo* OR zaire*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 287 | 287 | Burundi | 1965-10-19 | N | Country | ti(Burundi*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 287 | 287.07 | Burundi | 1991-11-27— 1992-04-14 | N | Country | ti(Burundi*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|---------|---------------------------|---|---------|--|--|
| 287 | 287.2 | Burundi | 1994-10-18— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Burundi*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 288 | 288 | Chad | 1966-07-31— 1972-11-24 | N | Country | ti(Chad* OR Tasad* OR Tchad*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 288 | 288.11 | Chad | 1976-02-18— 1984-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Chad* OR Tasad* OR Tchad*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 288 | 288.15 | Chad | 1986-12-31— 1987-11-01 | N | Country | ti(Chad* OR Tasad* OR Tchad*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 288 | 288.16 | Chad | 1989-03-03— 1994-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Chad* OR Tasad* OR Tchad*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 288 | 288.24 | Chad | 1997-10-30— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Chad* OR Tasad* OR Tchad*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| 289 | 289 | Colombia | 1964-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Colombia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT ((drug* OR coca*) NOT (guerrilla* OR rebel*)) | The standard country search captures may war on drugs articles; this search helps remove some of them |
| 291 | 291 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1965-07-28— 1965-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Papua* OR Irian)) OR (ti(Papua* OR Irian) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | I added Irian as a search term because it is the Indonesian name for the island of New Guinea |
| 291 | 291.07 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1967-12-31— 1969-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Papua* OR Irian)) OR (ti(Papua* OR Irian) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |
| 291 | 291.09 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1976-12-31— 1978-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Papua* OR Irian)) OR (ti(Papua* OR Irian) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |
| 291 | 291.13 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1981-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Papua* OR Irian)) OR (ti(Papua* OR Irian) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |

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|-----|--------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| 291 | 291.14 | Indonesia, West Papua | 1984-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Papua* OR Irian)) OR (ti(Papua* OR Irian) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |
| 292 | 292 | Peru | 1965-08-03— 1965-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Peru) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 292 | 292.07 | Peru | 1982-08-22— 1999-11-26 | N | Country | ti(Peru* OR Perou*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 297 | 297 | Nigeria | 1966-01-15— 1966-07-29 | N | Country | ti(Nigeria*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 298 | 298 | Namibia | 1966-12-31— 1988-08-08 | N | Special | ti(Namibia* OR "South West Africa*") AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Namibia was sometimes called South West Africa at the time of the conflict |
| 299 | 299 | Syria | 1966-02-23 | N | Country | ti(Syria*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 299 | 299.08 | Syria | 1979-06-16— 1982-02-02 | N | Special | ((ti(Syria*) AND (Brotherhood*)) OR (ti(Brotherhood*) AND (Syria*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | The standard country search captures Middle Eastern conflicts other than Syria's conflict with the Muslim brotherhood |

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| 300 | 300 | Cambodia | 1967-05-31— 1975-04-17 | Y | Country | ti(Cambo* OR Kampuchea* OR Khmer*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Coverage of Cambodia is quite ambiguous due to its connection with the Vietnam War; the Khmer Rouge are often called "communists" making many stories mentioning them indistinguishable from stories about the Viet Cong |
| 300 | 300.12 | Cambodia | 1978-12-30— 1998-10-24 | N | Country | ti(Cambo* OR Kampuchea* OR Khmer*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 303 | 303 | Nigeria, Biafra | 1967-07-06— 1970-01-12 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Nigeria*) AND (Biafra*)) OR (ti(Biafra*) AND (Nigeria*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 308 | 308 | Philippines, Mindanao | 1970-08-20— 1990-08-02 | Y | Country and Region | ((ti(Philippin*) AND (Mindanao*)) OR (ti(Mindanao*) AND (Philippin*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This country and region search captures several stories about the CPP conflict instead of the MILF secessionist conflict |
| 308 | 308.18 | Philippines, Mindanao | 1993-02-09— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Philippin*) AND (Mindanao*)) OR (ti(Mindanao*) AND (Philippin*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|----------------|---------------------------|---|---------|---|---|
| 309 | 309 | Sudan | 1971-07-22 | N | Country | ti(Sudan* OR Soudan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 309 | 309.09 | Sudan | 1976-07-02 | N | Country | ti(Sudan* OR Soudan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 309 | 309.12 | Sudan | 1983-05-17— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Sudan* OR Soudan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 312 | 312 | Pakistan | 1971-03-26— 1971-12-16 | N | Country | ti(Pakistan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 313 | 313 | Sri Lanka, JVP | 1971-04-30— 1971-06-09 | N | Country | ti(Lanka* OR Ceylon*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This is the JVP conflict not LTTE; fortunately, a standard country search captures JVP stories and not Sinhala vs Tamil ones |
| 313 | 313.1 | Sri Lanka, JVP | 1989-02-13— 1990-02-23 | N | Special | ti(Lanka* OR Ceylon*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND "liberation front" | This is about the JVP ("People's Liberation Front") not the LTTE; additional terms are needed to exclude stories about the Tamil conflict |
| 314 | 314 | Uganda | 1971-01-29— 1972-09-20 | N | Country | ti(Uganda*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search captures several stories about political issues surrounding Asians in Uganda |
| 314 | 314.1 | Uganda | 1974-03-23 | N | Country | ti(Uganda*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|---------|--|---|
| 314 | 314.11 | Uganda | 1979-01-22— 1992-08-09 | N | Country | ti(Uganda*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 314 | 314.21 | Uganda | 1994-02-21— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Uganda*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 315 | 315 | UK, Northern Ireland | 1971-08-31— 1991-11-26 | N | Special | ti(Ireland OR Irish) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (north* OR ulster* OR belfast*) NOT (notre dame) | A standard country and region search captures more than 200 stories about Notre Dame's "Fighting Irish" football team |
| 315 | 315.2 | UK, Northern Ireland | 1998-08-15 | N | Country | ti(Ireland OR Irish) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 316 | 316 | El Salvador | 1972-03-25 | N | Country | ti(Salvador) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 316 | 316.1 | El Salvador | 1979-09-14— 1991-11-18 | N | Country | ti(Salvador) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 318 | 318 | Zimbabwe | 1967-09-05— 1968-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Rhodesia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|---------------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| 318 | 318.09 | Zimbabwe | 1973-04-04— 1979-12-21 | N | Country | ti(Rhodesia* OR Zimbabwe*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 322 | 322 | Bangladesh, Chittagong | 1975-02-28— 1991-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Bangladesh*) AND (Chittagon*)) OR (ti(Chittagon*) AND (Bangladesh*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 325 | 325 | Pakistan, Baloch | 1974-12-31— 1977-07-05 | N | Special | ti(Bal?ch*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | I used a more permissive search than the standard country and region one, since it captures few stories |
| 327 | 327 | Angola | 1975-11-11— 1995-12-24 | N | Country | ti(Angola*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 327 | 327.25 | Angola | 1998-05-02— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Angola*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 329 | 329 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1964-01-11— 1964-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Ogaden)) OR (ti(Ogaden) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 329 | 329.07 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1976-10-31— 1983-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Ogaden)) OR (ti(Ogaden) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|--|
| 329 | 329.15 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1993-10-13— 1994-02-26 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Ogaden)) OR (ti(Ogaden) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 329 | 329.23 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1996-08-09— 1996-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Ogaden)) OR (ti(Ogaden) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 329 | 329.26 | Ethiopia, Ogaden | 1998-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Ogaden)) OR (ti(Ogaden) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 330 | 330 | Indonesia, East Timor | 1975-07-12— 1988-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Timor OR Timorese)) OR (ti(Timor OR Timorese) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 330 | 330.17 | Indonesia, East Timor | 1992-12-15 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Timor OR Timorese)) OR (ti(Timor OR Timorese) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 330 | 330.21 | Indonesia, East Timor | 1997-05-31— 1999-09-22 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Timor OR Timorese)) OR (ti(Timor OR Timorese) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| 331 | 331 | Morocco, Western Sahara | 1975-11-04— 1989-11-16 | Y | Country and Region | ((ti(Morocc*) AND (Sahara* OR Sahrawi*)) OR (ti(Sahara* OR Sahrawi*) AND (Morocc*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | It is difficult to discriminate between coverage of this conflict and coverage of the conflict between Polisario and Mauritania |
| 332 | 332 | Mozambique | 1977-12-31— 1992-10-19 | N | Country | ti(Mo?ambi*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 333 | 333 | Afghanistan | 1978-04-27— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Afghan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 336 | 336 | Nicaragua | 1977-10-10— 1979-07-19 | N | Country | ti(Nicara?ua*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 336 | 336.13 | Nicaragua | 1982-04-17— 1990-04-15 | N | Country | ti(Nicara?ua*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 337 | 337 | Somalia | 1982-12-31— 1984-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Somali*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 337 | 337.15 | Somalia | 1986-03-03— 1996-12-20 | N | Country | ti(Somali*) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

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|-----|--------|-----------|---------------------------|---|---------|--|--|
| 338 | 338 | Iran, MEK | 1979-12-31— 1982-12-31 | Y | Special | ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (mujah?d* OR leftist* OR marx*) NOT hostage* | The standard country search captures too many stories about the Iranian Revolution and Iran Hostage Crisis; it needs to be focused on a specific group, the Mujahidin e Khalq, Marxist/leftist Islamists |
| 338 | 338.15 | Iran, MEK | 1986-12-31— 1988-12-31 | Y | Special | ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (mujah?d* OR leftist* OR marx*) | See above, but also Iran-Contras and Iran-Iraq War |
| 338 | 338.17 | Iran, MEK | 1991-04-03 | N | Country | ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Using the more complex pattern is unnecessary because of the episode's short duration |
| 338 | 338.19 | Iran, MEK | 1993-04-09— 1993-12-11 | Y | Special | ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (mujah?d* OR leftist* OR marx*) | See above, but also nuclear weapons and the Gulf War |
| 338 | 338.22 | Iran, MEK | 1997-02-18— 1997-11-02 | Y | Special | ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (mujah?d* OR leftist* OR marx*) | See above |
| 338 | 338.26 | Iran, MEK | 1999-11-25— 1999-12-31 | Y | Special | ti(Iran* OR Persia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (mujah?d* OR leftist* OR marx*) | See above |

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|-----|--------|----------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|---|
| 341 | 341 | Liberia | 1980-04-12— 1980-04-14 | N | Country | ti(Liberia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 341 | 341.14 | Liberia | 1989-12-26— 1990-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Liberia*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 347 | 347 | India, Manipur | 1982-07-31— 1988-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Manipur*)) OR (ti(Manipur*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 347 | 347.17 | India, Manipur | 1993-12-31— 1996-12-19 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Manipur*)) OR (ti(Manipur*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 347 | 347.26 | India, Manipur | 1998-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Manipur*)) OR (ti(Manipur*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 351 | 351 | India, Punjab | 1983-12-31— 1993-12-24 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(india*) AND (punjab* OR khalistan*)) OR (ti(punjab* OR khalistan*) AND (india*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search captures some mentions of the Kashmir and Assam conflicts, but not many |

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|-----|--------|---------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|--|
| 352 | 352 | Sri Lanka, Tamil | 1984-09-01— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Lanka*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) NOT ("liberation front" NOT tamil*) | This standard country search captures a handful of stories about the JVP ("People's Liberation Front") which need to be excluded |
| 353 | 353 | Cameroon | 1960-01-31— 1961-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Cameroon* OR Cameroun* OR Kamerun*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 353 | 353.06 | Cameroon | 1984-04-06— 1984-04-09 | N | Country | ti(Cameroon* OR Cameroun* OR Kamerun*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 354 | 354 | Turkey | 1984-08-15— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Turk*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Kurd*) | The standard country search captures coups and other regional violence |
| 359 | 359 | Yemen | 1986-01-13— 1986-01-20 | N | Country | ti(Yemen*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 364 | 364 | India, Kashmir | 1990-02-12— 1999-12-31 | Y | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Kashmir*)) OR (ti(Kashmir*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search partly captures conflict between India and Pakistan (particularly from May 1998), elections, and Hindu-Muslim violence |
| 365 | 365 | India, Assam | 1990-11-30 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Assam*)) OR (ti(Assam*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|--------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|--|
| 365 | 365.18 | India, Assam | 1994-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Assam*)) OR (ti(Assam*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 366 | 366 | Indonesia, Aceh | 1990-06-06— 1991-12-28 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Aceh*)) OR (ti(Aceh*) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 366 | 366.2 | Indonesia, Aceh | 1999-06-01— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Indonesia*) AND (Aceh*)) OR (ti(Aceh*) AND (Indonesia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 374 | 374 | Rwanda | 1990-10-03— 1994-07-04 | N | Country | ti(Rwanda*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 374 | 374.23 | Rwanda | 1996-07-12— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Rwanda*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |
| 375 | 375 | Senegal, Casamance | 1990-08-31— 1990-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Senegal*) AND (Casamance*)) OR (ti(Casamance*) AND (Senegal*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-----------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|--|--|
| 375 | 375.19 | Senegal, Casamance | 1992-09-01— 1993-11-16 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Senegal*) AND (Casamance*)) OR (ti(Casamance*) AND (Senegal*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 375 | 375.22 | Senegal, Casamance | 1995-04-27— 1995-12-01 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Senegal*) AND (Casamance*)) OR (ti(Casamance*) AND (Senegal*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 375 | 375.25 | Senegal, Casamance | 1997-03-18— 1998-11-02 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Senegal*) AND (Casamance*)) OR (ti(Casamance*) AND (Senegal*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 382 | 382 | Sierra Leone | 1991-04-01— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(Sierra Leone*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 385 | 385 | Yugoslavia, Croat | 1991-07-27— 1992-04-06 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Yugoslav*) AND (Croat*)) OR (ti(Croat*) AND (Yugoslav*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 386 | 386 | Algeria | 1991-12-09— 1999-12-31 | N | Country | ti(algeria*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|------------------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|---|---|
| 388 | 388 | Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh | 1991-12-30— 1994-07-15 | N | Special | ((ti(azerbaijan* OR armenia*) AND (artsakh* OR nagorno* OR karabakh*)) OR (ti(artsakh* OR nagorno* OR karabakh*) AND (azerbaijan* OR armenia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Because of Armenia's intervention in Nagorno Karabakh, many of these stories feature Armenia in the headline rather than Azerbaijan |
| 388 | 388.23 | Azerbaijan, Nagorno Karabakh | 1997-04-20— 1998-12-31 | N | Special | ((ti(azerbaijan* OR armenia*) AND (artsakh* OR nagorno* OR karabakh*)) OR (ti(artsakh* OR nagorno* OR karabakh*) AND (azerbaijan* OR armenia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |
| 389 | 389 | Yugoslavia, Bosnia | 1992-04-30— 1995-12-31 | Y | Country and Region | ((ti(Yugoslav*) AND (Bosnia* OR Her?eg*)) OR (ti(Bosnia* OR Her?eg*) AND (Yugoslav*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This conflict is difficult to distinguish from the Czech vs Bosniak and Czech vs Serb conflicts |
| 390 | 390 | Croatia | 1992-05-17— 1993-12-13 | Y | Country | ti(croat*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search captures Croat vs. Muslim violence in Bosnia in addition to the Croat vs. Serb conflict in Croatia |
| 390 | 390.22 | Croatia | 1995-05-01— 1995-09-06 | Y | Country | ti(croat*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search captures the Bosnian conflict in addition to the Croat vs. Republic of Krajina conflict in Croatia; it isn't possible to definitively distinguish the two conflicts |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|----------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|--|
| 391 | 391 | Egypt | 1993-03-10— 1998-11-02 | N | Country | ti(Egypt*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 392 | 392 | Georgia, Abkhazia | 1992-08-17— 1993-11-29 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Georgia*) AND (Abkhazia*)) OR (ti(Abkhazia*) AND (Georgia*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 395 | 395 | Tajikistan | 1992-05-10— 1998-11-16 | N | Country | ti(Tajik* OR Tadjikistan* OR Tadzhiestan* OR Tojokiston* OR Tojokistan*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 401 | 401 | Russia, Chechnya | 1994-11-26— 1996-11-08 | N | Special | ti(Chech*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | Including Russia in this search captures too many stories about other post-Soviet conflicts |
| 401 | 401.25 | Russia, Chechnya | 1999-08-11— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(Chech*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | See above |
| 402 | 402 | Yemen | 1994-04-28— 1994-07-04 | N | Country | ti(Yemen*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 404 | 404 | Pakistan, Karachi | 1990-02-11 | N | Special | ti(pakistan* OR karachi*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | I used a more permissive search than the standard country and region one, since it captures no stories |

| | | | | | | | |
|-----|--------|-------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------|---|--|
| 404 | 404.17 | Pakistan, Karachi | 1994-05-03— 1996-09-04 | N | Special | ti(karachi*) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | This search does not include Pakistan, as in a standard country and region search; doing so captures several Kashmir, nuclear weapons, India-Pakistan, and Pakistani elections stories that are not relevant |
| 408 | 408 | Republic of Congo | 1993-11-11— 1993-12-27 | N | Country | ti("congo") AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 408 | 408.22 | Republic of Congo | 1997-06-06— 1999-12-31 | N | Special | ti(congo OR brazzaville) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (sassou* OR nguessou* OR lissouba* OR kolelas*) | This conflict needed to be parsed from the DRC conflict that occurred concurrently |
| 412 | 412 | Serbia, Kosovo | 1998-03-06— 1999-11-21 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(serb* OR yugoslav*) AND (kosov*)) OR (ti(kosov*) AND (serb* OR yugoslav*))) AND (conflict* OR war OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 413 | 413 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1977-12-31— 1978-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Orom*)) OR (ti(Orom*) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 413 | 413.13 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1980-12-31— 1981-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Orom*)) OR (ti(Orom*) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

| | | | | | | | |
|-------|--------|----------------------------------|---------------------------|---|--------------------------|---|---|
| 413 | 413.14 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1983-07-31— 1992-06-30 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Orom*)) OR (ti(Orom*) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 413 | 413.2 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1994-12-31— 1995-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Orom*)) OR (ti(Orom*) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 413 | 413.25 | Ethiopia, Oromo | 1998-12-31— 1999-12-31 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(Ethiopia*) AND (Orom*)) OR (ti(Orom*) AND (Ethiopia*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |
| 426 | 426 | Lebanon | 1990-07-10— 1999-12-30 | N | Special | ti(L?ban* OR Lubnan) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) AND (Shia OR Shiite OR Hezbollah OR "south lebanese" OR "south lebanon") | Many of these stories cover Israel fighting Lebanese rebels, since Israel backed the South Lebanon Army against Shia rebels backed by Syria |
| 428 | 428 | Mauritania, Western Sahara | 1975-12-19— 1978-12-31 | Y | Country and Region | ((ti(Maur?tan*) AND (Sahara* OR Sahrawi*)) OR (ti(Sahara* OR Sahrawi*) AND (Maur?tan*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | It is difficult to discriminate between coverage of this conflict and coverage of the conflict between Polisario and Morocco |
| 11884 | 11884 | India, Hyderabad | 1947-06-30— 1948-09-18 | N | Country and Region | ((ti(India*) AND (Hydera*)) OR (ti(Assam*) AND (India*))) AND (conflict* OR war* OR refuge* OR guerrilla* OR killing* OR fighting* OR rebel* OR violen* OR strife* OR devast* OR cris?s* OR chao* OR peacekeep* OR interven*) | |

Appendix 3: UCDP ACD & Regan (2002) Conflict Listing

I collect intervention data principally from Regan (2000) but collect conflict dates and characteristics from the ACD. Because Regan uses his own coding scheme for civil wars, setting the threshold of battle deaths at 200 over conflict duration, his conflict records do not match one to one with the subset of ACD conflicts I have used—those which surpassed a 1000 battle death threshold. I have therefore matched each conflict in Regan’s data with the corresponding ACD conflict, to the best of my ability. This appendix shows all the matched conflicts. Those conflicts from Regan’s data which do not appear are predominantly very low intensity conflicts.

Ccode: The CoW numerical identifier for each country.

Country: This is a common usage name of the country where a conflict was fought.

Region / Faction: For conflicts that took place in a subregion, or where identifying the relevant group was important for matching conflict episodes between the ACD and Regan’s data, I include the name of a sub-region, faction, or group.

ACD Conflict ID: The UCDP ACD numerical identifier for each conflict.

Episode ID: Though the UCDP ACD identifies separate episodes within conflicts, it does not assign identifiers to them. These are identifiers I created to distinguish between episodes. They consist of the ACD conflict code and, for episodes after the first, an arbitrary decimal value.

ACD Years: These are the rough dates of each conflict episode, as identified by the ACD.

Regan Conflict ID: Regan’s numerical identifier for each conflict.

Regan Years: These are the rough dates of each conflict episode, as identified by the Regan.

Notes: This column elaborates on the differences between Regan and the ACD’s codings and/or lists the information in Regan’s data that I used to identify a conflict. If I observed errors in Regan’s conflict records, it is noted in here as well.

| Ccode | Country | Region / Faction | ACD Conflict ID | Episode ID | ACD Years | Regan Conflict ID | Regan Years | Notes |
|-------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------|-----------|-------------------|-------------|---|
| 700 | Afghanistan | | 333 | 333 | 1978-1999 | 901 | 1978-1992 | Afghan civil war; this one ends in Apr 1992 because that's when President Najibullah resigned |
| | | | | | | 977 | 1992-1999 | Afghan civil war continues between Hekmatyar and Dostum, these are one conflict in ACD--this one starts in Apr 1992 |
| 615 | Algeria | | 386 | 386 | 1991-1999 | 984 | 1992-1999 | Algerian Civil War (gov vs. Islamists) |
| 540 | Angola | | 327 | 327 | 1975-1995 | 897 | 1975-1991 | Angolan UNITA, FNLA, MPLA-government conflict, linked with 982 |
| 540 | Angola | | 327 | 327.246 | 1998-1999 | 982 | 1992-1999 | Regan lists this as UNITA vs. MLLP-LP |
| 160 | Argentina | | 247 | 247 | 1955 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Argentina in Regan's data |
| 160 | Argentina | | 247 | 247.034 | 1963 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Argentina in Regan's data |
| 160 | Argentina | | 247 | 247.064 | 1974-1977 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Argentina in Regan's data |
| 373 | Azerbaijan | Nagorno Karabakh | 388 | 388 | 1991-1994 | 962 | 1991-1999 | The Republic of Nagorno vs. New Azerbaijan Party-ruling party |
| 373 | Azerbaijan | Nagorno Karabakh | 388 | 388.23 | 1997-1998 | | | |
| 771 | Bangladesh | Chittagong | 322 | 322 | 1975-1991 | 884 | 1971-1998 | No groups listed, but this is a "2", an ethnic conflict, which mostly overlaps the ACD dates |
| 145 | Bolivia | | 200 | 200 | 1946 | 785 | 1946 | The other two Bolivia conflicts (200.002, 200.025) are missing from Regan's data |
| 145 | Bolivia | | 200 | 200.002 | 1952 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Bolivia one |
| 145 | Bolivia | | 200 | 200.025 | 1967 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Bolivia one |
| 346 | Bosnia Herzegovina | | 389 | 389 | 1992-1995 | 973 | 1992-1995 | This is the only Bosnia conflict, and its dates match ACD 346 |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|--------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|---|
| 516 | Burundi | | 287 | 287 | 1965 | -- | -- | Regan lists conflicts in Burundi in 1972 and 1988, but none in 1965 (1965 was a Hutu military uprising) |
| 516 | Burundi | | 287 | 287.072 | 1991-1992 | 970 | 1991-1992 | Dates match with ACD 287.072 |
| 516 | Burundi | | 287 | 287.203 | 1994-1999 | 610 | 1996-1999 | Dates match with ACD 287.203 |
| 811 | Cambodia | | 300 | 300 | 1967-1975 | 871 | 1970-1975 | Dates match with ACD 300 |
| 811 | Cambodia | | 300 | 300.116 | 1978-1998 | 908 | 1978-1991 | Dates match with ACD 300.116 |
| | | | | | | 991 | 1992-1998 | Dates match with ACD 300.116. These conflicts are bifurcated in Regan's data because there was a (unsuccessful) UN-brokered peace agreement in 1991 |
| 471 | Cameroon | | 353 | 353 | 1960-1961 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Cameroon in Regan's data |
| 471 | Cameroon | | 353 | 353.057 | 1984 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Cameroon in Regan's data |
| 483 | Chad | | 288 | 288 | 1966-1972 | 858 | 1965-1972 | Dates match with ACD 288 |
| 483 | Chad | | 288 | 288.105 | 1976-1984 | 903 | 1978-1982 | Dates match with ACD 288.105 |
| 483 | Chad | | 288 | 288.152 | 1986-1987 | 934 | 1983-1988 | Dates overlap with both ACD 288.105 and 288.152 |
| 483 | Chad | | 288 | 288.159 | 1989-1994 | 989 | 1991-1995 | Dates match with ACD 288.159 |
| 483 | Chad | | 288 | 288.236 | 1997-1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Chad one |
| 710 | China | | 202 | 202 | 1946-1949 | 784 | 1946-1950 | Chinese Civil War |
| 710 | China | Taiwan | 217 | 217 | 1947 | 788 | 1947 | Conflict between Nationalists and locals in Taiwan |
| 710 | China | Tibet | 236 | 236 | 1950 | -- | -- | A later Tibet conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 710 | China | Tibet | 236 | 236.019 | 1956 | -- | -- | A later Tibet conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 710 | China | Tibet | 236 | 236.039 | 1959 | 830 | 1959 | Chinese occupation of Tibet; the prior two episodes from the ACD are not in Regan's data |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|------------|--|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 100 | Colombia | | 289 | 289 | 1964-1999 | 802 | 1949-1965 | Dates match with ACD 289; this might be incorrect but the overlap has no interventions |
| | | | | | | 936 | 1984-1999 | Dates match with ACD 289 |
| 94 | Costa Rica | | 225 | 225 | 1948 | 793 | 1948 | Costa Rica vs National Liberation Army |
| 344 | Croatia | | 390 | 390 | 1992-1993 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Croatia in Regan's data after it broke away from Yugoslavia |
| 344 | Croatia | | 390 | 390.222 | 1995 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Croatia in Regan's data after it broke away from Yugoslavia |
| 40 | Cuba | | 242 | 242 | 1953 | -- | -- | A later Cuba conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 40 | Cuba | | 242 | 242.027 | 1956-1958 | 829 | 1958-1959 | Cuban Revolution; the dates don't match--in ACD they are 1956-1958 |
| 40 | Cuba | | 242 | 242.046 | 1961 | -- | -- | An earlier Cuba conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 490 | DRC | | 283 | 283 | 1964-1965 | 838 | 1960-1965 | No groups listed, ethnic conflict, not linked, start 7/60 end 11/65--this is a DRC conflict, the 1961 Congo crisis, which Regan has mislabeled as a Republic of Congo conflict |
| 490 | DRC | | 283 | 283.074 | 1967 | 866 | 1967 | Regional military faction, MPR-ruling party, ideological conflict, linked to 838, start 7/67 end 11/67--this is a DRC conflict, the 1967 Stanleyville mutinies, which Regan has mislabeled as a Republic of Congo conflict |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-------------|-------------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 490 | DRC | | 283 | 283.082 | 1977-1978 | 899 | 1977 | FLNC-opposite party, MPR-ruling party, ethnic conflict, ends in May 1977 so there is overlap with the ACD conflict--this is the Shaba I conflict; the ACD doesn't separate it from the Shaba II conflict |
| | | | | | | 902 | 1978-1979 | FLNC-opposite, MPR-ruling party, ethnic conflict, linked to 899, starts in May 1978 so there is overlap with the ACD conflict--this is the Shaba II conflict; the ACD doesn't separate it from the Shaba I conflict |
| 490 | DRC | | 283 | 283.126 | 1996-1999 | 620 | 1996-1997 | No group listed (there is a placeholder, "4444"), ethnic conflict, not linked, start 10/96 end 5/97--this is a DRC conflict, the First Congo War, which Regan has mislabeled as a Republic of Congo conflict (the interveners match) |
| | | | | | | 630 | 1998-1999 | MLC, RCD, AFDL, ethnic conflict, start 8/98 end 12/99--this is a DRC conflict, the Second Congo War, which Regan has mislabeled as a Republic of Congo conflict |
| 651 | Egypt | The Islamic Group | 391 | 391 | 1993-1998 | 978 | 1992-1999 | typeiden=1, religious; this is Egypt vs. Islamists |
| 92 | El Salvador | | 316 | 316 | 1972 | -- | -- | A later El Salvador conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 92 | El Salvador | | 316 | 316.102 | 1979-1991 | 910 | 1979-1991 | Dates match with ACD 316.102 |
| 531 | Eritrea | | 275 | 275 | 1964-1991 | 845 | 1962-1991 | No groups listed, ethnic conflict, linked to 948--this must be the one ACD codes as Eritreia. It's an ethnic conflict with the same end date (5/91) |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|----------|--------------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 366 | Estonia | | 210 | 210 | 1946-1948 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Estonia in Regan's data |
| 530 | Ethiopia | For control of gov | 267 | 267 | 1960 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Ethiopia one |
| 530 | Ethiopia | For control of gov | 267 | 267.052 | 1976-1991 | 948 | 1988-1991 | EPRDF, WPE-ruling, ideological conflict, linked to 845--this is the Derg/Communist conflict |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Ogaden | 329 | 329 | 1964 | 840 | 1963-1964 | Monarchy-ruling group, ethnic conflict, linked to 898--this seems to be the Ogaden conflict; the Ogaden Liberation Front launched an armed rebellion in 1963; in Regan, it starts 6/63 and ends 3/64 |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Ogaden | 329 | 329.07 | 1976-1983 | 898 | 1977-1986 | WSLF (Western Somali Liberation Front), COPWE (Derg/Communist), ethnic conflict, linked to 840--this is the Ogaden conflict |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Ogaden | 329 | 329.15 | 1993-1994 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Ethiopia/Ogaden one |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Ogaden | 329 | 329.226 | 1996 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Ethiopia/Ogaden one |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Ogaden | 329 | 329.259 | 1998-1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Ethiopia/Ogaden one |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Oromo Region | 413 | 413 | 1977-1978 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Ethiopia/Oromo one |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Oromo Region | 413 | 413.128 | 1980-1981 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Ethiopia/Oromo one |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Oromo Region | 413 | 413.139 | 1983-1992 | 981 | 1992-1999 | No groups listed, ethnic conflict, not linked to anything, begins 6/92 ends 12/99--this is probably the Oromo Liberation Front; they had a falling out with the EPRDF in June 1992 but were fighting Derg before that and fought in intermittent episodes after 1992 |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Oromo Region | 413 | 413.204 | 1994-1995 | | | |
| 530 | Ethiopia | Oromo Region | 413 | 413.247 | 1998-1999 | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------|---------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|---|
| 220 | France | OAS (Algeria) | 270 | 270 | 1961-1962 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in France in Regan's data |
| 372 | Georgia | Abkhazia | 392 | 392 | 1992-1993 | 993 | 1992-1994 | Abkhazia Secessionist, Free Georgia Coalition, CUG-ruling party, ideological conflict, not linked to anything, starts 1/92 ends 4/94--the ACD conflict is about the Abkhazia conflict specifically, not Ossetia |
| 350 | Greece | | 203 | 203 | 1946-1949 | 781 | 1944-1949 | Greek Civil War |
| 90 | Guatemala | | 233 | 233 | 1949 | -- | -- | Later Guatemala conflicts appear in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 90 | Guatemala | | 233 | 233.014 | 1954 | 817 | 1954 | Guatemala vs Forces of Carlos Castillo Armas |
| 90 | Guatemala | | 233 | 233.031 | 1963 | 863 | 1960-1995 | 233.031 and 233.067, which are Guatemala vs FAR I in 1963, and the Guatemalan Civil War 1965-1995, respectively |
| 90 | Guatemala | | 233 | 233.067 | 1965-1995 | | | |
| 750 | India | Communists | 227 | 227 | 1948-1951 | -- | -- | All Indian conflicts in Regan's data are ethnic or religious, and don't match this ACD one |
| 750 | India | Communists | 227 | 227.024 | 1969-1971 | -- | -- | All Indian conflicts in Regan's data are ethnic or religious, and don't match this ACD one |
| 750 | India | Communists | 227 | 227.1 | 1991-1994 | -- | -- | All Indian conflicts in Regan's data are ethnic or religious, and don't match this ACD one |
| 750 | India | Communists | 227 | 227.234 | 1996-1999 | -- | -- | All Indian conflicts in Regan's data are ethnic or religious, and don't match this ACD one |
| 750 | India | Naga Region | 251 | 251 | 1956-1959 | 818 | 1955-1964 | NNC (Naga National Council)-opposite, Congress Party-ruling, ethnic conflict, not linked to anything, start 3/55 end 8/64 |
| 750 | India | Naga Region | 251 | 251.05 | 1961-1968 | | | |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|-----------|------------------|-------|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 750 | India | Naga Region | 251 | 251.085 | 1992-1997 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this India/Nagaland one |
| 750 | India | Manipur | 347 | 347 | 1982-1988 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in India/Manipur in Regan's data |
| 750 | India | Manipur | 347 | 347.165 | 1993-1996 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in India/Manipur in Regan's data |
| 750 | India | Manipur | 347 | 347.256 | 1998-1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in India/Manipur in Regan's data |
| 750 | India | Punjab (Sikhs) | 351 | 351 | 1983-1993 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in India/Punjab in Regan's data |
| 750 | India | Kashmir | 364 | 364 | 1990-1999 | 994 | 1989-1999 | No groups listed, ethnic conflict, not linked to anything, start 12/89 end 12/99--this must be the Kashmir conflict; armed conflict with the JKLF first started in 1989 |
| 750 | India | Assam | 365 | 365 | 1990 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in India/Assam in Regan's data |
| 750 | India | Assam | 365 | 365.184 | 1994-1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in India/Assam in Regan's data |
| 750 | India | Hyderabad | 11884 | 11884 | 1947-1948 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data with dates matching this India/Hyderabad one |
| 850 | Indonesia | Moluccas Islands | 237 | 237 | 1950 | 805 | 1950 | No groups listed, religious conflict. Linked to 823, start 4/50 end 11/50--this must be the South Moluccas conflict, as there is no other date overlap; the Republic of South Maluku declared independence in April 1950 |
| 850 | Indonesia | Darul Islam | 243 | 243 | 1953 | 814 | 1953 | Moslem Dar-ul Islam, religious conflict. Linked to 823, start 9/53 end 11/53--this is an Islamist vs. central government conflict |

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|-----|-----------|----------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 850 | Indonesia | Darul Islam | 243 | 243.029 | 1958-1961 | 823 | 1956-1960 | no groups listed, ideological conflict. Linked to 814, start 12/56 end 12/60--I am not sure what conflict this is, this is a guess |
| 850 | Indonesia | West Papua | 291 | 291 | 1965 | -- | -- | By the process of elimination, none of the remaining Regan conflicts in Indonesia could be this one |
| 850 | Indonesia | West Papua | 291 | 291.074 | 1967-1969 | -- | -- | By the process of elimination, none of the remaining Regan conflicts in Indonesia could be this one |
| 850 | Indonesia | West Papua | 291 | 291.088 | 1976-1978 | -- | -- | By the process of elimination, none of the remaining Regan conflicts in Indonesia could be this one |
| 850 | Indonesia | West Papua | 291 | 291.128 | 1981 | -- | -- | By the process of elimination, none of the remaining Regan conflicts in Indonesia could be this one |
| 850 | Indonesia | West Papua | 291 | 291.139 | 1984 | -- | -- | By the process of elimination, none of the remaining Regan conflicts in Indonesia could be this one |
| 850 | Indonesia | Timor | 330 | 330 | 1975-1988 | 896 | 1975-1999 | End 10/99, start 12/75, Fretilin, Golkar-ruling, ethnic conflict, no linked conflicts--this is the East Timor conflict |
| 850 | Indonesia | Timor | 330 | 330.165 | 1992 | | | |
| 850 | Indonesia | Timor | 330 | 330.213 | 1997-1999 | | | |
| 850 | Indonesia | Aceh | 366 | 366 | 1990-1991 | 895 | 1975-1999 | The Free Aceh Movement, ethnic conflict, no linked conflicts, start 6/75 end 12/99--this is the conflict in Aceh, GAM declared an independent Aceh in December 1976 but not much happened until 1989 |
| 850 | Indonesia | Aceh | 366 | 366.198 | 1999 | | | |
| 630 | Iran | Kurdish Region | 205 | 205 | 1946 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/Kurds one |
| 630 | Iran | Kurdish Region | 205 | 205.004 | 1966-1968 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/Kurds one |

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|-----|------|----------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 630 | Iran | Kurdish Region | 205 | 205.086 | 1979-1988 | 963 | 1979-1982 | Iranian government, Kurds, ethnic conflict, not linked to anything, start 3/79 end 12/82 |
| 630 | Iran | Kurdish Region | 205 | 205.165 | 1990 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/Kurds one |
| 630 | Iran | Kurdish Region | 205 | 205.18 | 1993 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/Kurds one |
| 630 | Iran | Kurdish Region | 205 | 205.218 | 1996 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/Kurds one |
| 630 | Iran | MEK | 338 | 338 | 1979-1982 | 922 | 1981-1983 | No groups listed, ideological conflict, linked 904, start 6/81 end 4/83 |
| 630 | Iran | MEK | 338 | 338.146 | 1986-1988 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/MEK one |
| 630 | Iran | MEK | 338 | 338.165 | 1991 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/MEK one |
| 630 | Iran | MEK | 338 | 338.187 | 1993 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/MEK one |
| 630 | Iran | MEK | 338 | 338.221 | 1997 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/MEK one |
| 630 | Iran | MEK | 338 | 338.264 | 1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iran/MEK one |
| 645 | Iraq | SCIRI | 259 | 259 | 1958-1959 | 832 | 1959 | This is most likely Iraq vs. military faction (forces of Abdul Wahab al-Shawaf); it's the only one with fitting dates, also typeiden is "3" ideological so it's not the Kurdish conflict |
| 645 | Iraq | SCIRI | 259 | 259.048 | 1963 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iraq one |
| 645 | Iraq | SCIRI | 259 | 259.066 | 1982-1984 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iraq one |
| 645 | Iraq | SCIRI | 259 | 259.152 | 1987 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Iraq one |

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|-----|---------|----------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 645 | Iraq | SCIRI | 259 | 259.16 | 1991-1996 | 971 | 1991-1999 | This is uncertain; the best date overlap for a non-Kurdish conflict in ACD is Iraq vs. SCIRI (1991-1996), but Regan lists the groups as INA, SAIRI, and NPPF and the typeiden as "1" religious--it seems like they are the 1991 Iraqi uprisings that began in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, and then Regan has them running through to a SCIRI conflict |
| 645 | Iraq | Kurdish Region | 271 | 271 | 1961-1970 | 842 | 1961-1966 | No groups listed; this conflict is "linked" to conflict 832 but its typeiden is "2", ethnic, most likely it is Iraq vs KDP in Kurdistan--the opposition size and casualties are comparable to those listed in Wikipedia (UCDP doesn't have casualty numbers prior to 1975) |
| 645 | Iraq | Kurdish Region | 271 | 271.09 | 1973-1992 | 891 | 1974-1975 | This is Iraq vs PUK in Kurdistan; it has the closest date match in the ACD (1973-1992), typeiden is "2", i.e. ethnic, and it's linked to 842 |
| 645 | Iraq | Kurdish Region | 271 | 271.201 | 1995-1996 | 941 | 1980-1999 | This is also Iraq vs. PUK in Kurdistan (Regan has PUK listed explicitly), but it overlaps with both ACD 271.09 (1973-1992) and ACD 271.201 (1995-1996) |
| 666 | Israel | | 234 | 234 | 1949-1996 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Israel in Regan's data |
| 812 | Laos | | 262 | 262 | 1959-1961 | 841 | 1959-1962 | Laos vs. Pathet Lao (ACD 1959-1961) |
| 812 | Laos | | 262 | 262.054 | 1963-1973 | 850 | 1963-1973 | Laos vs. Pathet Lao (ACD 1963-1973) |
| 812 | Laos | | 262 | 262.108 | 1989-1990 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Laos one |
| 660 | Lebanon | | 260 | 260 | 1958 | 826 | 1958 | Lebanon vs Independent Nasserite Movement, matching dates |

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|-----|------------|----------------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 660 | Lebanon | | 260 | 260.045 | 1975-1976 | 882 | 1975-1999 | Typeiden is "1", religious (ACD says these were fought by sectarian militias), and it's linked to conflict 826. I think this is all ACD's subsequent Lebanon conflicts: 1975-1976, 1982-1986, 1989-1990 AND Israel vs Hezbollah 1990-1999 |
| 660 | Lebanon | | 260 | 260.121 | 1982-1986 | | | |
| 660 | Lebanon | | 260 | 260.156 | 1989-1990 | | | |
| 660 | Lebanon | Israel vs. Hezbollah | 426 | 426 | 1990-1999 | | | |
| 450 | Liberia | | 341 | 341 | 1980 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Liberia one |
| 450 | Liberia | | 341 | 341.135 | 1989-1990 | 997 | 1989-1991 | ULIMO, INPFL, NPFL, ethnic conflict, start 12/89 end 10/91--Regan has broken the conflict into two pieces, this piece is INPFL which disbanded peacefully in 1991--this one matches the ACD dates better, so I am matching it instead of the other |
| 368 | Lithuania | | 212 | 212 | 1946-1948 | -- | -- | there is no conflict in Lithuania in Regan's data |
| 435 | Mauritania | Western Sahara | 428 | 428 | 1975-1978 | 893 | 1975-1979 | This must be the conflict with Polisario in Western Sahara |
| 600 | Morocco | Western Sahara | 331 | 331 | 1975-1989 | 894 | 1975-1999 | This must be the conflict with Polisario in Western Sahara |
| 541 | Mozambique | | 332 | 332 | 1977-1992 | 913 | 1979-1993 | This is FRELIMO vs. RENAMO |
| 775 | Myanmar | Karen Region | 221 | 221 | 1949-1992 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Karen Region | 221 | 221.21 | 1994-1995 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Karen Region | 221 | 221.24 | 1997-1998 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |

| | | | | | | | | |
|-----|---------|-----------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|---|
| 775 | Myanmar | Communists | 222 | 222 | 1948-1988 | 869 | 1968-1980 | No groups listed, ideological, linked to 933, start 3/68 end 10/80--I think this is CPB, it seems like this starts from a 1968 new year's offensive by the CPB in the north with Chinese support--it ends around the time of the May 1980 unilateral government ceasefire |
| 775 | Myanmar | Communists | 222 | 222.165 | 1990-1992 | 933 | 1983-1992 | No groups listed, ideological conflict, linked to 869, start 2/83 end 12/92--this must be the CPB too; the CPB vs government conflict continued but these specific dates don't match anything I can find; it's possible this is the All Students' Democratic Front |
| 775 | Myanmar | Communists | 222 | 222.215 | 1994 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Myanmar one |
| 775 | Myanmar | Rohingya Region | 223 | 223 | 1948-1961 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Rohingya Region | 223 | 223.056 | 1964-1978 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Rohingya Region | 223 | 223.128 | 1991 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Rohingya Region | 223 | 223.199 | 1994 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Kachin Region | 231 | 231 | 1949-1950 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |

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|-----|-----------|---------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|---|
| 775 | Myanmar | Kachin Region | 231 | 231.018 | 1961-1992 | -- | -- | Regan might have combined this conflict with the contemporaneous Shan conflict, but there's no way to know |
| 775 | Myanmar | Shan Region | 264 | 264 | 1959-1970 | 799 | 1948-1999 | SSA (Shan State Army), KNN, NLM, ethnic conflict, linked to 869, start 9/48 end 12/99--this seems like catchall for all Myanmar's ethnic secessionist parties, but because Regan used two acronyms that I cannot find elsewhere, it's difficult to tell |
| 775 | Myanmar | Shan Region | 264 | 264.093 | 1972-1973 | | | |
| 775 | Myanmar | Shan Region | 264 | 264.11 | 1976-1988 | | | |
| 775 | Myanmar | Shan Region | 264 | 264.165 | 1993-1999 | | | |
| 565 | Namibia | | 298 | 298 | 1966-1988 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Namibia in Regan's data |
| 790 | Nepal | | 269 | 269 | 1960-1962 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Nepal one |
| 790 | Nepal | | 269 | 269.063 | 1996-1999 | 999 | 1996-1999 | Nepal vs. Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) |
| 93 | Nicaragua | | 336 | 336 | 1977-1979 | 907 | 1978-1979 | Dates overlap with ACD 336 |
| 93 | Nicaragua | | 336 | 336.13 | 1982-1990 | 928 | 1982-1990 | Dates overlap with ACD 336.13 |
| 475 | Nigeria | | 297 | 297 | 1966 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Nigeria one (it was a coup) |
| 475 | Nigeria | Biafra | 303 | 303 | 1967-1970 | 864 | 1967-1970 | Iko tribes, ethnic conflict, no links, start 7/67 end 1/70--I am matching this Regan conflict to the ACD one because the ethnic group name is a near match (should be Igbo not Iko) |
| 770 | Pakistan | | 312 | 312 | 1971 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Pakistan one |

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|-----|-------------|----------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|---|
| 770 | Pakistan | Baloch | 325 | 325 | 1974-1977 | 890 | 1973-1977 | United Democratic Front, Tamet Islam Party, National Awami Party, Pakistan People's Party-ruling party, ethnic conflict, linked to 880--this is the Baloch separatist conflict, the National Awami Party was the one that contested the central government, and the ACD records that they received support from Afghanistan |
| 770 | Pakistan | Karachi | 404 | 404 | 1990 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Pakistan one |
| 770 | Pakistan | Karachi | 404 | 404.174 | 1994-1996 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Pakistan one |
| 150 | Paraguay | | 220 | 220 | 1947 | 787 | 1947 | The other Paraguay conflicts (220.007, 220.03) are missing from Regan's data |
| 150 | Paraguay | | 220 | 220.007 | 1954 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Paraguay one |
| 150 | Paraguay | | 220 | 220.03 | 1989 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Paraguay one |
| 135 | Peru | | 292 | 292 | 1965 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Peru one |
| 135 | Peru | | 292 | 292.074 | 1982-1999 | 925 | 1982-1999 | Dates match with ACD 292 |
| 840 | Philippines | Huk Communists | 209 | 209 | 1946-1954 | 808 | 1948-1954 | Hukbalahaps (PKM), ideological conflict--this is the Huk Rebellion |
| 840 | Philippines | Huk Communists | 209 | 209.033 | 1969-1995 | 887 | 1972-1999 | CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines), NPA, NDF, ideological conflict, linked to 888, start 7/72 end 12/99 |
| 840 | Philippines | Huk Communists | 209 | 209.244 | 1997 | | | |
| 840 | Philippines | Huk Communists | 209 | 209.267 | 1999 | | | |
| 840 | Philippines | Mindanao | 308 | 308 | 1970-1990 | 888 | 1971-1999 | MILF, MNLF, NLF, ethnic conflict--the conflict with MILF in Mindanao |
| 840 | Philippines | Mindanao | 308 | 308.179 | 1993-1999 | | | |

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|-----|-----------------------|-----------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 484 | Republic of the Congo | | 408 | 408 | 1993 | 972 | 1992-1997 | No groups listed, ethnic conflict, not linked to the prior Congo or DRC conflicts, start 9/92 end 1/97--this must be the Republic of Congo post-election militia strife, but Regan has labeled it as DRC |
| 484 | Republic of the Congo | | 408 | 408.224 | 1997-1999 | 615 | 1997 | CMODID-pro government, FDP-opposition, UPADS-ruling party, ethnic conflict, not linked, start 6/97 end 10/97--UPADS is a Republic of Congo ruling party |
| 365 | Russia | Chechnya | 401 | 401 | 1994-1996 | 988 | 1994-1996 | First Chechen War, the second one must have been too recent for Regan, writing in 2000 |
| 365 | Russia | Chechnya | 401 | 401.254 | 1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Russia one |
| 517 | Rwanda | | 374 | 374 | 1990-1994 | 952 | 1990-1994 | The Rwandan Civil War |
| 517 | Rwanda | | 374 | 374.229 | 1996-1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Rwanda one |
| 433 | Senegal | Casamance | 375 | 375 | 1990 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Senegal in Regan's data |
| 433 | Senegal | Casamance | 375 | 375.185 | 1992-1993 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Senegal in Regan's data |
| 433 | Senegal | Casamance | 375 | 375.219 | 1995 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Senegal in Regan's data |
| 433 | Senegal | Casamance | 375 | 375.245 | 1997-1998 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Senegal in Regan's data |
| 345 | Serbia | Kosovo | 412 | 412 | 1998-1999 | 600 | 1998-1999 | KLM, SPS, ethnic conflict, not linked, start 1/98 end 6/99--the Kosovo Conflict |
| 451 | Sierra Leone | | 382 | 382 | 1991-1999 | 996 | 1991-1999 | This is the only Sierra Leone conflict, and its dates match ACD 451 |

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|-----|------------|-------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|---|
| 520 | Somalia | | 337 | 337 | 1982-1984 | 931 | 1982-1991 | SNM, SRSP-ruling party, ethnic conflict, not linked to anything, start 1/82 end 1/91 |
| 520 | Somalia | | 337 | 337.152 | 1986-1996 | 966 | 1991-1999 | SNA, SPM, USC-ruling party, ethnic conflict, linked 931, start 9/91 end 12/99 |
| 780 | Sri Lanka | JVP | 313 | 313 | 1971 | 883 | 1971 | No groups listed, ideological conflict, linked to 944, start 4/71 end 5/71 |
| 780 | Sri Lanka | JVP | 313 | 313.095 | 1989-1990 | 944 | 1987-1989 | No groups listed, ideological conflict, linked 934, start 9/87 end 12/89 |
| 780 | Sri Lanka | LTTE | 352 | 352 | 1984-1999 | 930 | 1981-1999 | LTTE-opposite, People's Alliance-ruling, ethnic conflict, linked 944, start 6/81 end 12/99 |
| 625 | Sudan | South Sudan | 282 | 282 | 1963-1972 | 853 | 1963-1972 | Anya-Nya, Sudanese Socialist Union-ruling, religious, linked 937, start 9/63 end 2/72 |
| 625 | Sudan | SPLM/A | 309 | 309 | 1971 | -- | -- | The later Sudan SPLM/A conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not--coup against Jafaar Nimeiri and SSU |
| 625 | Sudan | SPLM/A | 309 | 309.09 | 1976 | -- | -- | The later Sudan SPLM/A conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not--another coup against Nimeiri |
| 625 | Sudan | SPLM/A | 309 | 309.12 | 1983-1999 | 937 | 1983-1999 | SPLA, DUP, NIF-ruling group, religious conflict, linked 853, start 11/83 end 12/99--this matches the groups in ACD 309.12 |
| 652 | Syria | | 299 | 299 | 1966 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Syria in Regan's data |
| 652 | Syria | | 299 | 299.075 | 1979-1982 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Syria in Regan's data |
| 702 | Tajikistan | | 395 | 395 | 1992-1998 | 976 | 1992-1999 | This is the only Tajikistan conflict, and its dates match ACD 395 |

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|-----|----------|------------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 800 | Thailand | | 240 | 240 | 1951 | -- | -- | The later Thailand conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 800 | Thailand | | 240 | 240.23 | 1974-1982 | 861 | 1965-1985 | Thailand vs Communist Party of Thailand, the dates between ACD (1974-1982) and Regan don't match well |
| 640 | Turkey | | 354 | 354 | 1984-1999 | 967 | 1984-1999 | This is the only Turkey conflict, and its dates match ACD 354 |
| 500 | Uganda | | 314 | 314 | 1971-1972 | 881 | 1971-1972 | Supporters of Obotes, Idi Amin - Military Government, ethnic conflict, linked 862, start 1/71 end 10/72 |
| 500 | Uganda | | 314 | 314.103 | 1974 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this Uganda one--it was a failed coup |
| 500 | Uganda | | 314 | 314.111 | 1979-1992 | 995 | 1978-1979 | UNLF, Government (Idi Amin), ethnic conflict, start 10/78 end 6/79--this is the UNLF invasion that initiated major fighting in Uganda |
| | | | | | | 919 | 1981-1986 | URM, URA, UFM, UNLF-ruling party, ethnic conflict, not linked, start 2/81 end 1/86--Regan has broken this conflict into 3 parts--this one, I think, corresponds to a rebel split |
| | | | | | | 945 | 1986-1988 | UPDM, NRM, ethnic conflict, linked 919, start 8/86 end 6/88--Regan has broken this conflict into 3 parts--this one corresponds to an offensive launched by the UPDA in august 1986 |
| 500 | Uganda | | 314 | 314.206 | 1994-1999 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Uganda one |
| 200 | UK | Northern Ireland | 315 | 315 | 1971-1991 | 872 | 1968-1994 | Sectarian groups, INLA, IRA, RUC, religious conflict |
| 200 | UK | Northern Ireland | 315 | 315.195 | 1998 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in in Regan's data that matches this Northern Ireland one |

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|-----|------------|----------------|-----|---------|-----------|-----|-----------|--|
| 369 | Ukraine | | 213 | 213 | 1946-1950 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Ukraine in Regan's data |
| 816 | Vietnam | | 249 | 249 | 1955-1964 | 835 | 1960-1965 | Vietnam war, the dates don't match, in ACD they are 1955-1964, also note that 817 is South Vietnam |
| 678 | Yemen | North Yemen | 230 | 230 | 1948 | 790 | 1948 | No groups identified, ideological conflict, linked 847, start 2/48 end 3/48--North Yemen vs Royalists |
| 678 | Yemen | North Yemen | 230 | 230.009 | 1962-1970 | 847 | 1962-1970 | Royalist for king, military coup government, ideological conflict, linked to 943, start 9/62 end 4/70--North Yemen vs Royalists |
| 678 | Yemen | North Yemen | 230 | 230.091 | 1979-1982 | -- | -- | There is no conflict in Regan's data that matches this North Yemen one |
| 680 | Yemen | South Yemen | 359 | 359 | 1986 | 943 | 1986 | No groups listed, ideological conflict, not linked, start 1/86 end 1/86--preemptive government counter coup against YSP, Yemen Socialist Party |
| 679 | Yemen | North vs South | 402 | 402 | 1994 | 986 | 1994 | No groups listed, ideological conflict, not linked, start 4/94 end 7/94--Yemen (North Yemen) vs Democratic Republic of Yemen in South Yemen |
| 345 | Yugoslavia | Croatia | 385 | 385 | 1991-1992 | 964 | 1990-1992 | Serbia, JNA, Croatia, ethnic conflict, not linked, start 8/90 end 1/92 |
| 552 | Zimbabwe | | 318 | 318 | 1967-1968 | -- | -- | The later Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict appears in Regan's data, but this one does not |
| 552 | Zimbabwe | | 318 | 318.086 | 1973-1979 | 889 | 1972-1979 | PF (Patriotic Front), RF (Rhodesian Front)-ruling white group, ethnic conflict |

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