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
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<u>Report</u> West Point Undergraduate Historical Review





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Report

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LETTER FROM THE EDITORS

Dear Reader,

On behalf of the West Point Department of History, I am honored to present the 2023 edition of *Report*. Following a competitive selection process, the editorial team settled on a cohort of papers that exceeded our high expectations and fit within our vision for this year's edition. Featured throughout the edition are papers covering topics across the spectrum of American, international, and military historical research from democracy and imperialism in ancient Athens to Rhodesian political strategy during the Bush War.

In line with West Point's civilian-military relations academic theme of the year, set by Brigadier General Shane R. Reeves, Dean of the Academic Board, this edition also showcases papers that underscore the importance of studying this subject. We are confident that the extensive effort our authors and editorial team invested throughout the publishing process will help shape ongoing historical conversations.

Deviating from pre-existing publication methods, we are also proud to join the West Point Press in its inaugural year. Partnering with the West Point Press will expand *Report's* undergraduate academic and intellectual footprint.

Finally, thank you to our authors, editors, faculty advisors, and the Department of History. It was a pleasure working closely with my team of exceptional editors to produce a praise-worthy edition. To our faculty advisor and the West Point Department of History, thank you for your continued mentorship throughout the publication process. And our authors, thank you for your undergraduate research; we look forward to seeing your further contributions to history.

Enjoy! Go Army and Beat Navy!

Sapienta Per Historiam, Anthony C. Marco Editor-in-Chief

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Democracy and Imperialism: Characterizations of the Athenian Empire

Sheherzad Jamal

Given that the periods in which Athenian democracy developed (following the Athenian Revolution of 508/507 B.C.) and the empire reached its further extent overlapped in the fifth century, the extent to which the empire was a product of the democratic system or vice versa has been the subject of vigorous scholarly debate.¹ While certain scholars, such as Josiah Ober, considered one of, if not the foremost scholar of Ancient Greek political theory, argue that it was Athenian imperialism which supported the structure of democracy and its institutions, others, especially Kurt Raaflaub, note that imperialism would not have been possible without the increased political participation and sanction of the demos.² In order to understand why they come to such divergent conclusions, it is important to recognize that both Athenian democracy and imperialism were constantly evolving in response to external stimuli, both within Athens and abroad. In particular, the experiences of the Persian Wars (the events of 490 and 480-479 B.C.) and the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) directly influenced how the Athenian citizenry viewed the democratic system and its empire. Moreover, democracy and imperialism were not static categories but consisted of multiple components and manifestations. For instance, democracy could be understood both

² Josiah Ober, "Golden Age of Empire, 478–404 BCE," in *The Rise and Fall of Classical Greece*, 191–222 (Princeton University Press, 2015), 204,

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¹ Josiah Ober, "Chapter 4: The Athenian Revolution of 508/507 B.C.: Violence, Authority, and the Origins of Democracy," in *The Athenian Revolution: Essays on Ancient Democracy and Political Theory*, 34–52 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt13x0q7b.15; Kurt A. Raaflaub, "Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens," in *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstitution of American Democracy*, edited by J. Peter Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober, 103–46 (Cornell University Press, 1994), 125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctv2n7ghj.7.

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as a set of values and the institutions which concretized and lent structure to those values. Similarly, imperialism, as a descriptive category, could also be further divided into the soft imperialism of ideology and the hard imperialism of military and economic conquest. This is further complicated by the way in which democracy and imperialism existed as parallel realities which could not be easily delineated. Therefore, when Ober, Raaflaub, and other scholars analyze the relationship between Athenian democracy and imperialism, they are not always referring to the same aspects of democracy or empire. By comparing the way in which they understand both ideas, it is possible to shed light on how the democratic and imperialist systems of the Athenians in the fifth century were interdependent on each other. The aim of this paper is to both explore how Athenians themselves approached the problems of government and imperial ambition as well as how scholars perceived these interactions. This paper is divided into two sections: the character of Athenian democracy and imperialism, which crystallizes in primary sources, and how scholars interpreted these ideas in relation to each other, particularly the extent to which their views can be understood as illuminating different features of the same systems.

In terms of how ancient texts approached the question of Athenian imperialism and its relation to democracy, it is worth examining how these writers viewed the empire as a whole. To this end, the works of Pseudo–Xenophon and Thucydides (the Melian dialogue, the Mytilenean debate, and the speeches of Pericles, particularly his Funeral Oration) are significant because they explore the consequences of empire both with regard to its economic and military benefits as well as its effect on the attitude of the Athenian state and by extension, the people. First, let us consider the economic and military facets of imperialism. Both Pseudo– Xenophon and Thucydides recognized that Athens, and its democratic institutions, were heavily dependent on the empire and that many government positions, such as magistracies, were

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'salaried and domestically profitable' because of imperial conquest abroad:

The first major enactment...was the institution of jury–pay...the system rapidly expanded into peacetime pay for the Navy, for holding public office, for membership in the boule...Aristotle noted that payment of officials by the state is one of the essential features of a 'radical' democracy and that its adoption by the Athenians allowed the lower two classes to play a greater role in government.³

In his *The Constitution of Athens*, Pseudo–Xenophon also described, at length, the ways in which the Athenian system utilized its authority as a hegemonic power to force its 'allies', particularly within the Delian League, to 'sail to Athens for judicial proceedings.'⁴ He argued that this was enormously beneficial to the city because it was:

from the deposits at law [that] they receive their dicastic pay through the year. Then, sitting at home without going out in ships, they manage the affairs of the allied cities; in the courts they protect the democrats and ruin their opponents...the people at Athens profit in the following ways...first, the one per–cent tax in the Peiraeus brings in more for the city; secondly if anyone has lodgings to rent, he does better, and so does anyone who lets out on hire a team of animals or a slave; further, the heralds of the assembly do better when the allies are in town.⁵

Moreover, the various architectural projects, commissioned during the Age of Pericles (c. 461–429 B.C.), were made possible by the

Timothy J. Galpin, "The Democratic Roots of Athenian Imperialism in the Fifth Century B.C," *The Classical Journal* 79, no. 2 (1983): 107, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3297244.

³ Pseudo–Xenophon, Book I.1–20, in *The Constitutions of the Athenians*, 477;

⁴ Pseudo-Xenophon, Book I.1-20, 485.

⁵ Ibid.

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funds of the Delian League (formed in 478 B.C.).⁶ A dependency which most likely influenced Pericles' decision to shift its treasury from Delos to Athens. Plutarch noted that these programs were a serious insult to members of the League and demonstrated how:

...with her own enforced contributions for the war, [Athenians] are gilding and bedizening our city, which, for all the world like a wanton woman, adds to her wardrobe precious stones and costly statues and temples worth their millions.⁷

In this regard, imperial resources were essential for the development of Athens as a city, ensuring civic engagement and maintaining crucial democratic institutions and offices. However, it is worth noting that the empire also provided certain benefits for its subjects: "first, internal peace and unity; second, freedom from tyrannis; third, democratic government; and fourth, independence from the Persians."⁸ Additionally, the empire allowed other city–states direct access to a regulated market, despite the financial burden of having to pay a fixed tribute.⁹ Therefore, despite the overwhelming benefits it brought to the Athenians, it was tolerated by other city–states because it fulfilled certain requirements of theirs.

Throughout his account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides explores how Athenians dealt with the city-states which had come under their domination. In particular, the Melian dialogue and the Mytilenean debate provide useful case studies to understand how imperial conquest affected the character of Athenian democracy. On the one hand, in the Mytilenean example, the Athenian *demos* are shown to be reasonable and choose to accept

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⁶ Andrew Liu, "Athens: Cruel Imperial Power or Falsely Maligned?" *Discentes: Penn's Classical Studies Publication*, March 20, 2021,

https://web.sas.upenn.edu/discentes/2021/03/20/athens-cruel-imperial-power-or-falsely-maligned/.

⁷ Plutarch, "Pericles," In *Plutarch's Lives*, 37.

⁸ Galpin, "The Democratic Roots of Athenian Imperialism in the Fifth Century B.C," 103.

⁹ Ibid., 104–105.

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Diodotos' proposal of a proportionate response, rejecting Cleon's more violent demands for the execution of all adult Mytilenean males and the enslavement of their women and children. Diodotos notes that this would establish a dangerous precedent, whereby loyal citizens in other city states which revolt would hesitate to come forward, "you having foreshown them by the example that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment."¹⁰ On the other hand, in the case of the Melian dialogue, the Athenians are less willing to compromise and allow the continuation of a neutral Melian state. Here, the notion of justice is given less priority and the Athenian negotiators favor a more ruthless policy. They argue that "the powerful exact what they can, while the weak yield what they must."¹¹ Additionally, "those who preserve their freedom owe it to their power."¹² The primary similarity in both cases is that imperial policy is shown to be guided by a practical approach to politics. In the Melian case, the Athenians argue that "your hostility does not injure us so much as your friendship; for in the eyes of our subjects that would be proof of our weakness, whereas your hatred is proof of our power."¹³ In this sense, Thucydides depicts the Athenian state as having a pragmatic, if ruthless, approach to imperial policy. However, it is interesting that, despite this, in the Mytilenean case, the Athenians grapple with the idea of justice. In this sense, while they act in accordance with practical considerations, they seem to be concerned with what the empire represents as an outward projection of the Athenian demos, and consequently, its values.

Thucydides explored this concept of the empire, not just as a physical conquest, but as a projection of Athens in the realm of the imagination. In his last speeches, particularly the Funeral Oration,

¹⁰ Thucydides, "Book III. 36–50," in *The History of the Peloponnesian* War, translated by Thomas Hobbes, 47,

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=thuc.+3.36.1.

¹¹ Thucydides, "Book V. LXXXIV–CXVI," In *The History of the Peloponnesian War*, 159.

¹² Thucydides, "Book V. LXXXIV–CXVI," 163.

¹³ Ibid., 161.

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Pericles notes that the Athenian empire is in and of itself an indication of Athenian exceptionalism among other Greek states:

Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves...the Lacedaemonians do not invade our country alone, but bring with them all their confederates; while we Athenians advance unsupported into the territory of a neighbor, and fighting upon a foreign soil usually vanquish with ease men who are defending their homes...in our enterprises we present the singular spectacle of daring and deliberation, each carried to its highest point.¹⁴

In this regard, Pericles views the empire as having ideological as well as economic or military components and acknowledges its significance as a historiographical project. He asserts that:

> ...the admiration of the present and succeeding ages will be ours, since we have not left our power without witness, but have shown it by mighty proofs; and far from needing a Homer for our panegyrist, or other of his craft whose verses might charm for the moment only for the impression which they gave to melt at the touch of fact, we have forced every sea and land to be the highway of our daring, and everywhere, whether for evil or for good, have left imperishable monuments behind us.¹⁵

Through the character of Pericles, it becomes clear that the Athenians view their imperial policies not merely in terms of the tangible benefits they bring but as simultaneously an outward extension *and* an affirmation of the unique character of the *demos*. Its tyrannical aspects, enumerated by Cleon, are justified, in Thucydides, by allusion to political pragmatism as is evident when

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¹⁴ Thucydides, "Thucydides (c.460/455–c.399 BCE): Pericles' Funeral Oration from the Peloponnesian War (Book 2.34–46)," in *Internet Ancient History Sourcebook*, Fordham University,

https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/ancient/pericles-funeralspeech.asp.

¹⁵ Thucydides, "Thucydides (c.460/455–c.399 BCE): Pericles' Funeral Oration from the Peloponnesian War (Book 2.34–46)."

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Pericles argues that Athens must preserve its imperial domination, or it will suffer at the hands of those it dominated:

Do not think that you are contesting over one thing only, slavery or freedom, but also over the loss of empire and the danger from the hatred incurred in it. We cannot step away from our empire, even if out of fear in the present circumstance some grandstander with apolitical naïveté made a display of doing so. You have held it for a long time as a tyranny. To have taken it was, it seems, unjust; to let it go perilous.¹⁶

In these texts, it becomes clear that the Athenians themselves did not have a homogenous approach to their empire but had a complex relationship with it. While they recognized the practical benefits the empire rendered by enabling the apparatus of democracy and the development of the city, they were also aware of its tyrannical elements, despite the economic advantages and protections it offered to its subjects. However, the Athenians also took pride in their imperial conquest as a legitimation of the Athenian *demos* as an exceptional and powerful political entity, capable of extending its influence over vast tracts of territory. Consequently, they grappled with how to balance power and justice because both were crucial to the image of the Athenian state they sought to project outward. As such, the Athenians continuously evaluated and reevaluated their conception of empire in light of their evolving political circumstances.

Scholars like Ober, Raaflaub, and their contemporaries acknowledge the contradictions and multifaceted nature of Athenian democracy but give weight to different features of the system. In his essay, "The Golden Age of Empire, 478–404 BCE," Ober delves into the democratic system's dependency on empire. A considerable portion of his argument is concerned with the empire as a kind of

¹⁶ Thucydides, "Book III. 36–50," 37; Thucydides quoted in Stephen V. Tracy,

[&]quot;Thucydides' Portrait of Pericles III: Plague, Last Speech, and Final Tribute,"

In *Pericles: A Sourcebook and Reader*, 79–95 (University of California Press, 2009), 85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt1pp19x.12.

political contract between Athens and other Greek city states. He argues that the Delian League's activities against the Persians were a '*nonexcludable public good*' even as they facilitated Athenian hegemonic impulses, including towards those states who were not its members.¹⁷ As such, "residents of weak states were relatively better off, all things considered when they paid a reasonable and predictable level of protection money to a stable hegemon with relatively long time horizons."¹⁸ To the Athenians, the League, as an extension of their political interests, also provided them with increased military experience in 'naval operations, siegecraft, and logistics' making conquest possible in a practical sense.¹⁹ Moreover, these military operations meant that ordinary citizens became more and more involved in the politics of imperialism because they were directly affected by them. Ober enumerates the benefits of empire and how these influenced the *demos* itself:

The Athenians themselves, of course, benefited most of all. Athenians benefited directly, as rentiers. Elite Athenians reaped rewards from military leadership positions, especially when, as was often the case, military operations resulted in booty. Nonelite Athenians had the chance to raise their socioeconomic status by sharing rents from distribution of goods, notably when agricultural land was confiscated from a subject state that had failed fully to grasp the rationality of acquiescence. Confiscated lands were divided among Athenian "cleruchs"...Other Athenians benefited from the imperial revenues that were plowed back into the Athenian economy: Athenian rowers, marines, and infantrymen were relatively well compensated for military service on the annual naval patrols in the Aegean and for garrison duty among potentially restive subjects. Yet other Athenians, of all classes, benefited from pay for government and legal service and from a surge in public building.²⁰

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¹⁷ Ober, "Golden Age of Empire, 478–404 BCE," 196.

¹⁸ Ibid., 201–202.

¹⁹ Ibid., 196.

²⁰ Ibid., 204.

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Therefore, major aspects of the democratic system were connected to the empire. In most cases, it was either a source of revenue or an avenue for gaining prestige. Pericles notes this in his last speech, "emphasiz[ing] how each Athenian's private interests were inextricably conjoined to the collective fate of the Athenian state."21 However, Ober does not really delve into the extent to which democracy, as an ideology, influenced how citizens conceived of their imperial ambitions. His view of the psychology of empire is limited to its profit as a rational economic enterprise that was essential for the maintenance of the institutions of the state. Robin Osborne, takes a similar approach, noting that Athenian democracy was contingent on certain economic provisions for the less wealthy members of the demos which made "it possible for them to maintain that they all were equal, and all equally had an active role to play in sustaining democracy."²² However, Ober does allude to the general importance of ideology with regard to empire. Comparing the Athenian empire to the Persian empire, he notes that the similarities between Hellenic city-states allowed the Athenians to control and govern, in relative terms, a more homogenous territory. While he concedes that a weakness of the Athenian empire was that it did not have "a legitimating ideology that could stand in for the Great King's claim to have a special relationship to a great god," he does not consider democracy as capable of fulfilling this purpose.23

In contrast, Raaflaub, in his chapter "Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth–Century Athens," locates the growth of empire as dependent on the democratic system and the kind of citizen it produced in the fifth century. To him, there was "a close connection between an interventionist and imperialist foreign policy on the one hand and, on the other, a politically active and involved citizen body" precisely because Athenian democracy was "not

²¹ Ibid., 209.

 ²² Robin Osborne, "Chapter 2: The Economics and Politics of Slavery at Athens," in *The Greek World*, edited by Anton Powell, 27–43 (London: Routledge, 1995), 37.
 ²³ Ober, "Golden Age of Empire, 478–404 BCE," 199.

merely a 'constitution' in the sense of a set of norms or laws but an integrated social and political system, a specific way of life...[which] required a specific type of citizen who typically promoted a specific type of foreign policy."²⁴ He notes that Athenian expansion and increased democratization meant that the political and social tendencies of the demos were constantly evolving. "Thus, politics pervaded all aspects of private and communal life...an exceptionally large share of Athenian politics dealt with power and empire."²⁵ Raaflaub focuses specifically on the idea of power and the way it came to be interpreted by the Athenians themselves:

Just as the polis was capable of maintaining its liberty only by being powerful and, preferably, ruling over others, so within the community the demos could be free only by controlling power and participating in government. Democracy as institutionalized rule by the people thus guaranteed the liberty of all citizens. In Athens the two aspects of this concept eventually were conflated: the two–sided rule of the demos in the polis and over the empire was linked with its two–sided freedom to form a new and superior type of "liberty through power" – a privileged status that was available only to the members of the imperial democracy at the height of its domination.²⁶

Therefore, the notion of liberty became increasingly connected to the idea of power because the level of minimally acceptable liberty expanded as the empire expanded. "The empire made democracy possible by initiating the indispensable social changes and mental adaptations and by providing the necessary impulses and the financial resources, without which such an unprecedented system could not have been realized."²⁷ This approach to power and empire is also evident in the conduct of the Athenians in the Melian and

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²⁴ Raaflaub, "Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens," 104.

²⁵ Ibid., 119.

²⁶ Ibid., 125.

²⁷ Ibid., 133.

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Mytilenean dialogues. In both cases, they were motivated by changing conceptions of how they viewed their empire. Moreover, given their familiarity with and involvement in matters of the state and empire, their attitude toward imperialism crystallized in an environment where they simultaneously recognized the economic necessity of empire but also had an idealized conception of it as symbolic representation of the power of the *demos*. To some extent, the power and uniqueness of democracy provided a mechanism for the Athenians to justify their conquests. As Galpin notes:

The pride of the Athenian *demos* must be kept in mind; equality among its citizens Athens carefully distinguished from equality among all men. That there was opposition to imperialism seems clear, but this opposition was also clearly a minority. Indeed, the expansionistic sentiment of democratic Athens may be considered analogous to America's perception of its 'Manifest Destiny' in the 1850s, with its emphasis on extending the sway of democracy.²⁸

Therefore, the success of democracy, and its rhetoric of justice, provided Athenians with a legitimating ideology for continuing their internal policies. To Raaflaub, "economic motives played an important but probably not primary role."²⁹ Throughout his article, he emphasizes that the spread of democratic values served as an ostensible justification for empire and continued to influence how the Athenians reconciled domination with ideals of justice. This preoccupation with the idea of justice in the Melian and Mytilenean debates highlights that the Athenians were deeply concerned with the kinds of values they wanted the empire to represent. Efraim Podoksik recognizes this preoccupation with the empire and its relation to democratic values, noting that Thucydides locates the decline of the Athenian state in its attitude toward empire:

²⁸ Galpin, "The Democratic Roots of Athenian Imperialism in the Fifth Century B.C," 108.

²⁹ Raaflaub, "Democracy, Power, and Imperialism in Fifth-Century Athens," 134–135.

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For Thucydides, as for Pericles, the Athenian way of life meant not the rule of majority over the rest but a true adherence to the civic ideal by all citizens. But when democratic revolutions were instigated in other cities, what came out of them was merely more discord and violence. Oligarchic revolutions produced a similar result...The democratic rhetoric, then, lost its connection with the ideal driving it, becoming merely an empty justification for anything.³⁰

According to this framework, Thucydides considered the ideals of democracy to have direct consequences on the empire.

In conclusion, having considered the approaches of recent scholarship, typified by Ober and Raaflaub, it becomes clear that when they use terms like 'democracy' or 'imperialism,' they are referring to very different ideas. In Ober's case, his argument is focused on democracy as the structures and institutions of the Athenian state. To him, imperialism is largely physical conquest, enabled by increased Athenian military expertise, which provided Athens with tangible economic benefits. As such, his view that democracy was dependent on empire is informed by the extent to which the empire constituted an economic necessity for the functioning of certain democratic offices and so on. In contrast, Raaflaub defines democracy largely as the embodiment of the values and impulses of the demos. His writing considers whether imperialism could be understood as an ideological, as well as military, project directly influenced by how the demos viewed itself as a uniquely powerful political entity. He notes that there is a circularity to this view because this image of the self was encouraged by the social and material changes brought about by imperialism. This interdependency between democracy and imperialism is also evident in primary sources, particularly

³⁰ Efraim Podoksik, "Justice, Power, and Athenian Imperialism: An Ideological Moment in Thucydides' 'History,'" *History of Political Thought* 26, no. 1 (2005): 36, <u>http://www.jstor.org/stable/26221725</u>.

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Thucydides, Pseudo-Xenophon and Plutarch. There are contradictions in the approach figures like Pericles, and by extension, the Athenian state adopt toward their empire, ranging from a pragmatic assessment of its value to more abstract discussions about the role of justice. The Athenians themselves grappled with the tension which emerges between democracy's dependence on empire and democratic values as a legitimization of the imperial project. As such, it becomes clear that it is difficult to delineate the two systems because of the extent to which they justify and support each other. In the case of scholarly approaches, we can see that their divergence in where they locate dependency is influenced to a great detail by the aspects of democracy and imperialism they prioritize. Therefore, their approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive but stem from the different vantage points from which they approach the Athenian political system and the concerns of the *demos*.

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Roman Gaul and Germania (350-353 CE) in the Inter-Political System: The Potential of IR Theories for Historical Research Using the Example of Magnentius

Simon Ossadnik

Introduction: The Knowledge Gap

Sources do not tell much about Magnentius' usurpation in 350 and the war that followed, but what they do tell is dramatic: in 353, when Magnentius saw the war was lost for himself and committed suicide, not only he but also a legitimate Roman emperor were dead.¹ Constantius II had outlived his brothers and was now the sole ruler of the empire, over fifty thousand soldiers had died in the battle of Mursa alone, and a decade of usurpation had begun.² After 350, six men were to claim to be *augustus* or *caesar*, and only the last of this line, Julian Apostata, was to stop the trend after his formal recognition as the legitimate *augustus*.³ The usurpation of Magnentius and the ensuing three-year war are not historical footnotes, but events central to the Roman Empire in the fourth century. The source material, especially for the Roman West outside of Italy and Illyria, is especially thin, and the causes of many events in the context of the war are difficult to reconstruct.

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¹ Zeev Rubin, "Pagan Propaganda during the Usurpation of Magnentius 350-353," *Scripta Classica Israelica* 17, 1998, 124. The episode about Magnentius is a "historiographic wasteland".

² Ioannis Zonaras 13.8 puts the number of dead at 54,000. See Ioannis Zonaras, "Epitome Historiarum" in: *The History of Zonaras: From Alexander Severus to the death of Theodosius the Great*, lat.-engl. ed. and trans. by Thomas Banich and Eugene Lane, (London: Routledge, 2009). Drinkwater recently considered this estimate plausible and estimates that about 13% of the entire Roman army perished in the Battle of Mursa. See John F. Drinkwater, "The Battle of Mursa, 351: Causes, Course, and Consequences," *Journal of Late Antiquity* 15, 1, 2022, 56.

³ Dietmar Kienast, *Römische Kaiser Tabelle: Grundzüge einer römischen Kaiserchronologie* (Darmstadt: WBD, 2004), 219-223.

When dealing with the events of 350-353, historians are confronted with knowledge gaps that cannot currently be closed with classical historiographical source work and traditional source criticism.

The research field of International Relations (IR) has produced a colossal body of literature in recent decades, which from the beginning has mainly focused on the systematization and theoretical embedding of interstate conflicts, wars, and security policy decisions.⁴ Historical research took little notice of this. In the last decades, only Arthur Eckstein undertook a systematic application of neorealist IR theory to gain historical knowledge.⁵ However, especially when, as in the case of the armed conflict between Magnentius and Constantius II. much is still unclear and can hardly be explained by the sources, it seems sensible to consult theories that are supposed to explain such armed conflicts. By applying neorealist theory to the inter-political system of the Western Empire from 350-353, I pursue two goals in this paper: First, in doing so, I seek to promote a better understanding of the causes of Magnentius' usurpation and the course of the ensuing war with Constantius II in Gaul and the Germanic provinces. Secondly, I will raise the question of what knowledge historical research can gain from the application of IR theories.

In the following, therefore, the usurpation of Magnentius and the course of the war will first be constructed as the ancient sources allow, highlighting the major problems of current historiographical understanding. I will then go into more detail on the relationship between historiography and IR, as well as present the main aspects of neorealist theory according to its originator, Kenneth Waltz. I have chosen the neorealist theory, firstly, to be able to follow Eckstein, secondly, because it is the most prominent IR theory, thirdly, because IR realism, still seeks the closest connection to history and, fourthly, because it can be applied with

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⁴ Jürgen Hartmann, *Internationale Beziehungen* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, 2009), 10.

⁵ Arthur M. Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

relative ease.⁶ This will be done subsequently, focusing on the problems of understanding highlighted prior. Finally, I will discuss explanatory approaches that lie outside of neorealist theory to evaluate the heuristic potential of IR theories for historiography.

The Usurpation of Magnentius and the War Against Constantius II, 350-353

On 18 January 350, Marcellinus, the comes rei privatae, i.e. the private treasurer of Emperor in the Roman West, Constans, invited several high military and civil officials to the Gallic city of Autun under the pretext of celebrating his son's birthday.⁷ Magnus Magnentius, the commanding officer of the *Iovani* and *Herculani*. was also present. Around midnight, Magnentius left the celebration and returned in imperial garb.⁸ Here, however, the sources contradict each other: Zonaras provides an alternative version of the event, in which not Marcellinus, but Magnentius himself held the celebration.⁹ This detail has considerable influence on the question of the scope of the conspiracy and how strong the initial acceptance of Magnentius was among Roman elites. While the result is the same in all versions - Magnentius is proclaimed *augustus* by those present at the celebration, later by the inhabitants of Autun and the soldiers stationed in the region - the quality of the usurpation is different in each case.¹⁰ The ancient sources express different views when, on the one hand, they point to Constans' poor standing among the acceptance groups central to his rule, and, on the other hand, seem to find the reason for the

⁶ Hartmann, 10.

⁷ "Consularia Constantinopolitana," in *Chronica Minora saec. IV. V. VI. VII, MGH Scriptores, Auctores Antiquissimi 11*, ed. Theodor Mommsen, (Berlin: 1892), s.v. 350; D. S. Potter, *The Roman Empire at Bay, AD 180-395* (London: Routledge 2014), 467.

⁸ Zosimus, *Neue Geschichte*, trans. Otto Veh, (Stuttgart : A. Hiersemann, 1990),
2, 42, 2-4; *Epitome de Caesaribus*, ed. F. Pichlmayr, (Leipzig: 1911), 42, 22.
⁹ Zonaras, 8, 5.

¹⁰ Zosimus, 2, 42, 6-8; Zonaras, 8, 5.

usurpation mainly in Magnentius' personal efforts and motives.¹¹ The research on Magnentius also moves along this line.¹² Ultimately, this touches on the question of why Constantius II decided not to recognize Magnentius' usurpation but to wage war against him. When the quality of the usurpation changes, the quality of Constantius' adversary changes. After all, it would have been quite possible for Constantius to recognize Magnentius as *iunior augustus*, and Magnentius had actively sought this recognition.¹³ Why Constantius decided against this, however, is unclear.

Constans, after being informed of the usurpation of Magnentius, tried to flee towards Hispania. On his flight he was murdered by followers of Magnentius.¹⁴ This event severely destabilized the empire. In Rome, Nepotianus, a relative of Constantius II, had briefly elevated himself to *augustus*, but Magnentius removed him after a few weeks.¹⁵ Constantius II,

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¹¹ Zosimus, 2, 42, 1-3; Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Die römischen Kaiser*, ed. and transl. K. Groß-Albenhausen and M. Fuhrmann (Zurich: Artemis & Winkler, 1997), 41, 23f.; Eutropius, *Abrégé d'Histoire Romaine*, ed. and trans. J. Helleguarch (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1999), 10, 9, 3; Sokrates,

[&]quot;Kirchengeschichte" in *Socrate de Constantinople: Histoire ecclésiastique*, German to French, ed. and trans. Pierre Périchon and Pierre Maraval (Sources Chrétiennes 493) (Paris: Cerf, 2005), 4, 1; Zonaras, 8, 5.

¹² For the usurpation of Magnentius as directed against Constans, see e.g. John Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius (350-353), and the Rebellion of Vetranio (350)," *Chiron* 30, 2000, 131-159; for the usurpation of Magnentius due to his personal motivation e.g. Jill Harries, *Imperial Rome AD 284 to 363: The New Empire* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), 196.

¹³ Joachim Szidat, Usurpator tanti nominis: Kaiser und Usupator in der Spätantike (337-476 AD), Historia Einzelschriften 210 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 153-157; John Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 137.

¹⁴ Zosimus, 2, 32, 9; Zonaras, 8, 5; *Epitome de Caesaribus*, 42,23; Eutropius, 10, 9, 3-4.

¹⁵ Zosimus, 2, 43, 2-4; Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Die römischen Kaiser* 42, 6-9; Eutropius, 10,11; Sokrates, 2,25; Sokrates 4,1; *Epitome de Caesaribus*, 42, 3.

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augustus in the East, could not react immediately, as he was at war with the Sassanid Empire at the time.¹⁶ Meanwhile, in Illyria, the officer Vetranio had been proclaimed *augustus*, but he surrendered without resistance when Constantius left the East and took on the situation in the West.¹⁷ Magnentius, too, decided not tolerate Constantius as an equal. On 28 September 351, the armies of Magnentius and Constantius met at the Pannonian city of Mursa.¹⁸ The battle led to painful losses on both sides, but more so for Magnentius.¹⁹

The ancient sources portray the battle of Mursa as the climax of the conflict. However, the war against Magnentius could not have ended until he took his own life on 10 August 353 after the final battle at Mons Seleucis in southern Gaul.²⁰ This period is usually ignored by the sources. Nevertheless, there are references to two incidents in the West between 351 and 353 that are connected to the war but do not sufficiently explain themselves.

Several sources prove that barbaric Alamanian groups crossed the Rhine River and invaded the empire from 351 onwards. According to Ammian, in one battle the Alamanian *rex* Chnodomar defeated Decentius, whom Magnentius had appointed as *caesar* for Gaul.²¹ This is significant since the Roman-Alamanian border had been relatively stable since the late 3rd century – now, however, from 351 onwards, the regions near the Rhine, and from 352/53 also the Moselle valley, found themselves as victims of repeated attacks and plundering by Germanic

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¹⁶ Zosimus, 2, 44, 1; Zonaras, 13, 7, 1-12.

¹⁷ Zosimus, 2, 43, 1-2, 44, 4; Eutropius, 10, 10f.

¹⁸ "Consularia Constantinopolitana," s.v. 351.

¹⁹ Zonaras, 13, 8; Zosimus, 2, 50, 1-2, 53, 1.

²⁰ Sokrates, 4, 7, 2 ; "Consularia Constantinopolitana," s.v. 353.

²¹ Ammianus Marcellinus, "Post hunc damnatorum sorte Poemenius raptus ad supplicium interiit, qui (ut supra rettulimus) cum Treveri civitatem Caesari clausissent Decentio, ad defendendam plebem electus est.," in Roman History, Volume 1, ed. and trans. by J. C. Rolfe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 16, 12, 5; Kienast, 220-221.

groups.²² Ancient sources see the reason for this in Constantius II, who, waging war against Magnentius, is said to have incited the Alamanni to invade the areas controlled by Magnentius.²³ Although these sources tend to be hostile towards Constantius, scholars are divided as to whether the allegation of conspiracy with the Alamanni should really be rejected.²⁴

Ammian alone records another event that must have taken place during the war. In the context of the convictions of Silvanus' allies in 355, a certain Poemenius was also executed. When the city of Trier had closed its gates to *caesar* Decentius, said Poemenius had been chosen to defend its people. Ammian alludes here to a time that must have been more significant than this marginal note makes it appear since he explicitly points out that he had already dealt with the events elsewhere in his report (*ut supra rettulimus*).²⁵ This account, however, has not survived, nor has any

²³ Libanius, *Selected Orations*, Volume 1, ed. and transl. by A. F. Norman, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969), 18, 33f; Zosimus, 2, 53, 4.
²⁴ Libanios expresses the accusation against Constantius in a panegyric on Julian Apostata, who, as is well known, competed with Constantius, and Zosimus, who was inclined towards the pagan cults, even sees the Constantinian dynasty as the trigger for the downfall of Rome. See Zosimus, 2, 7, 5; For example, Zotz exonerates Constantius. See Zotz, "Die Alemannen in der Mitte des 4.
Jahrhunderts nach dem Zeugnis des Ammianus Marcellinus," in *Die Franken und die Alamannen bis zur 'Schlacht von Zülpich*' (496/97), ed. Dieter Geuenich, (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1998), 384-406, 391. In contrast, Martin and Drinkwater hold to the accusation. See M. Martin, "Alemannen im römischen Heer-eine verpasste Integration und ihre Folgen," in in *Die Franken und die Alamannen bis zur 'Schlacht von Zülpich*' (496/97), ed. Dieter Geuenich, (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1998), 411; and John Drinkwater, *The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: Caracalla to Clovis*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 202.

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²² John Drinkwater, *The Alamanni and Rome 213-496*: Caracalla to Clovis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 200; David G. Wigg, *Münzumlauf in Nordgallien um die Mitte des 4. Jahrhunderts A.D.: Studien zu Münzfunden in der Antike 8* (Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1991), 101; Heinz H. Heinen, Trier und das *Trevererland in römischer Zeit* (Trier: Spee-Verlag), 1985, 234.

²⁵ Marcellinus, 15, 6, 4: "Post hunc damnatorum sorte Poemenius raptus ad supplicium interiit, qui (ut supra rettulimus) cum Treveri civitatem Caesari clausissent Decentio, ad defendendam plebem electus est."

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other written source about this event. It is not even clear in which year it took place. The few scholarly works that have dealt with this episode have so far produced little consensus regarding the dating and nature of this revolt.

Due to the thin source material, three events in the context of the usurpation and the civil war are, despite all efforts of historians, still unclear to us in their causes and course: (1) the usurpation itself and the outbreak of the war, and specifically in Gaul and Roman Germania (2) the background of the Alamanni attacks from 351 onwards and (3) the revolt of Trier against Decentius. In the following, I will introduce the neorealist theory of IR in order to discuss its heuristic potential for historiography in the rest of the paper.

The Neorealist IR Theory as a Methodological Alternative: IR and History

The IR research field has existed as part of political science for decades but has had little influence on historiography. The disinterest between historiography and the IR is not reciprocal, for hardly any introductory literature on the IR resists historical analyses of, say, the Peloponnesian War, the Peace of Westphalia, or other global historical classifications.²⁶ Eckstein has pointed out the shortcomings of such historical outlines, yet it is precisely the dominant realist wing of the IR that clings to Thucydides as its intellectual ancestor.²⁷ Conversely, few historiographical works

²⁶ See, for example, the historical outlines in A. Jeschke, "Eine Einführung" in International Relations (Tübingen, 2017), 1-51; Jürgen Hartmann, Internationale Beziehungen, 13-19; H. Zimmermann and M. Elsinger, Fundamentals of International Relations: An Introduction (Stuttgart, 2019), 21-39.

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²⁷ Arthur M. Eckstein, *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*, 7, esp. footnote 10; K. Meister, *Thukydides als Vorbild der Historiker: Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart*, (Leiden: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2013), 225-239; critically on the reception of Thucydides, L. M. Johnson, "The

have referred to the IR. Eckstein's 2006 attempt to use the explanatory potential of IR realism for the 2nd Roman-Macedonian War has at least been conceded a certain innovativeness by scholars, however, his approach has not developed into a *turn* in historical methodology – as was the case with other novel historiographical approaches.²⁸ Nevertheless, the question of how great the heuristic value of IR theories is for historical scholarship has not yet been answered.

Basic Assumptions of Neorealism

"The national realm," according to Kenneth Waltz, the founder of the neorealist wing, "is variously described as being hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and contrived; the international realm, as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive."²⁹ In his characterization of the international domain, Waltz described the program of the neorealism he outlined in the 1970s. Classical realism, from which neorealism emerged, is a product of World War 2. It is a psychologizing theory: in realism, states are understood as unitary entities and endowed with human

Use and Abuse of Thucydides in International Relations," *International Organization* 48, no. 1, 1994, and D. A. Welch, "Why International Relations Theorists Should Stop Reading Thucydides," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 3, 2003.

²⁸ M. Tröster, review of *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of* Rome, by Arthur Eckstein, *Gnomon* 81, no. 1, 2009; Phyllis Culham, review of *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*, by Arthur Eckstein, *American Historical Review* 113, no. 2, 2008; Andrew Erskine, review of *Mediterranean Anarchy, Interstate War, and the Rise of Rome*, by Arthur Eckstein, *Journal of Roman Studies* 98, 2008; Nevertheless, there have been some other attempts to make IR theories useful for historical scholarship, most recently by Overtoom. See Nikolaus Leo Overtoom, *Reign of Arrows: The Rise of the Parthian Empire in the Hellenistic Middle East* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

²⁹ Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), 113.

characteristics. States act according to their national interest. The intention to assert their interests in the medium to long term is fundamental and non-negotiable. To enforce these interests, they seek to accumulate power. The concept of power is often operationalized in realism as military clout. According to realists, a peacekeeping international order cannot function for this reason. States only participate in such orders as is opportune for the assertion of their interests.³⁰

With neorealism, Waltz offered a reinterpretation of classical realism. States accumulate power to enforce their interests not because they are intrinsically motivated to do so, but because the structural conditions of the international system force them to provide for their own security.³¹ Central to neorealism is the concept of anarchy. Unlike at the national level, there is no superior ruling authority in the international system that could enforce collectively binding rules. The international system is a self-help system: states must provide for their own security.³² For this reason, international relations are fundamentally characterized by mistrust. Since states can never assess the means of power of their competitors without uncertainty and must assume that in an emergency the competition will want to assert its interests against the interests of others, a pressure to arm arises, which in turn fuels mutual distrust. This phenomenon is what neorealism calls the security dilemma.³³ At the same time, Waltz retains the unitarist element: States always act as a whole. Domestic political processes

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³⁰ Classical realism synthesizes the views of some of its founding fathers, including Edward Hallett Carr, Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr. For a concise account of realist theory, see Jürgen Hartmann, *Internationale Beziehungen*, 21-28.

³¹ Martin Kahl and Bernhard Rinke, "Frieden in den Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen" in *Handbuch Frieden*, eds. H. J. Gießmann and B. Rinke (Wiesbaden: Springer Verschlag, 2019), 67–68.

³² Waltz, 104-105.

³³ Ibid., 102; Kahl and Rinke, 68-69.

are irrelevant for the behavior of a state in the international system. All states act rationally.

Waltz's conception of the international system is, as Hartmann puts it, "an affair free of domination, but by no means free of power."³⁴ The international level is anarchic, but states try to order it hierarchically according to their interests.³⁵ As they do so in competition with each other, power can balance itself in different polarities. Waltz worked in 1979 in the context of a bipolar order of states, in which the structure of the international system was determined by two states of roughly equal power. Waltz also differentiates a state order of multipolarity, in which there are many equally powerful states, and therefore no clear center of power, and unipolarity, in which one strong state constitutes a clear center of power and all other states are relatively weak. In the latter case, the neorealists speak of hegemony.³⁶ Smaller states are left with two options to fulfil their basic security interest: either they subordinate themselves hierarchically to a strong state, but are rewarded for this with relative opportunities for advancement and security guarantees (bandwagoning) - which, as follows from the theory itself, however, only ever exist as long as it is opportune for the stronger state – or they try to change the polarity of the international order by arming themselves or entering into alliances with which the states can free themselves from the oppressive influence of the power poles, but acquire powerful competition and unstable partnerships (*balancing*).³⁷

Having established these necessary fundamentals, the following section applies and specifies the theory in the context of the events in the Roman West 350-353 problematized above.

³⁴ Hartmann, 29.

³⁵ Waltz, 109.

³⁶ Waltz, 161-170.

³⁷ Ibid., 125-127.

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Application

Before the application can proceed, it is necessary to make general adjustments to neorealist theory for ancient conditions. IR operates in a context in which the territorially delimited state is taken for granted and in which the concept of state and nation can be operated with ease. An uncritical transfer of the notion of what IR researchers, not unproblematic from a historical perspective, call the 'Westphalian state,' would be anachronistic.³⁸ To avoid discussions of the concept of state and nation in antiquity, which are important but not useful for this work, in the following, the actors central to IR, formerly states, are understood as political entities and their interaction is characterized as inter-political rather than international. In this way, Roman partial empires, rebellious empire territories, and barbarian groups can be conceptually equated as political units, which is indispensable for the application of the theory. At the same time, the areas of power of Magnentius and Constantius are identified by the names of their leaders in the following. This is not intended to insinuate an absolutist model of the principate but merely serves to differentiate the respective spheres of power.

The Usurpation of Magnentius and the Start of the Civil War

Neorealism's fixation on the international level and its programmatic ignorance of domestic developments seem to complicate its application to civil wars. In fact, since the 1990s, political science scholars have increasingly interpreted this fact as a weakness of Waltz's theory.³⁹ However, a line of argument has developed that emphasizes that the structural assumptions of

³⁸ Hartmann, 15-16.

³⁹ Nicholas Sambanis, "A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the Quantitative Literature on Civil War," *Defense and Peace Economics* 13, no. 3, 2002, 225-226; Steven David, *Internal War: Causes and Cures, World Politics* 49, no. 4, 1997, 560-562.

neorealism do apply to civil wars. If the formerly legitimate government loses its monopoly on the use of force – for whatever reasons neorealism leaves open – the domestic state resembles international anarchy, and if individual groups no longer see their need for security fulfilled, they will militarize.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, there is still no *opinio communis* on this.

The course of Magnentius' uprising alone says something about its extent, at the same time about Constans' government. He could not crush the usurpation; he no longer had any military power, so he had to flee and was murdered a week later.⁴¹ Magnentius, who had himself proclaimed augustus in the Gallic city of Autun, seemed to have his center of power in Gaul and the Germanic provinces. He experienced no opposition there, so with the usurpation he had neorealistically filled a power vacuum that Constans had left. These regions were also exposed to strong external, barbarian security risks. They probably did not see their security interests satisfied by Constans. It does not seem coincidental that Magnentius' center of power coincided geographically with the 'Gallic Empire', which split from the Roman Empire in 260-274, aiming to effectively protect the previously unstable Rhine frontier from barbarian incursions.⁴² Until after the Battle of Mursa, there is no evidence that Magnentius' control over this core area diminished; in large part, his rule there was secure long beyond.⁴³ The logic behind this is

⁴⁰ David, 556-559; Sambanis, 226.

⁴¹ Zosimus, 2, 42, 5, which names a Gaiso as the murderer of Constans. The Chronograph of 354 lists Gaiso for the year 351 as Magnentius' colleague in the consulship. See "Chronographus anni CCCLIIII" in *Chronica Minora saec. IV. V. VI. VII. (MGH AA 11)*, ed. T. Mommsen (Berlin 1892), 10, s.v. 351.

⁴² Thomas S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians: 100 B.C.-400 A.D.* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 260, 282.

⁴³ This was not the case in Italy (see T.D. Barnes, "An Urban Prefect and His Wife" in *The Classical Quarterly* 56, no. 1, 2006). The connection between the usurpation of Magnentius and the security concerns on the Rhine border has already been speculated on by Kulikowski and Szidat, admittedly without

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not new to historiography – Kulikowski speaks of an 'iron link' between barbarian invasions and usurpation in the context of the third century – and it seems to be confirmed by neorealist security concerns in this case as well.⁴⁴

Those security interests may have mobilized enough power for Magnentius to secure Gaul and Germania, but not all regions formerly ruled by Constans wanted to join him. Constans' death created a power vacuum in those areas for which the Rhine frontier posed less of a threat. In Rome, notably far from the border, another *augustus*, Nepotianus, who belonged to the Constantinian dynasty, rose to power.⁴⁵ Although his uprising was probably not concerted with Constantius II, it was primarily directed against the rule of Magnentius, before the latter crushed the uprising in Rome after a few weeks.⁴⁶ Magnentius' power did not reach into Illyria either. In the east, his territorial ambitions initially ended at the Julian Alps, possibly to facilitate an agreement with Constantius II, whose recognition he still hoped for.⁴⁷ In Illyria, Roman troops filled the power vacuum left by Constans' death by proclaiming one of their own, Vetranio, *augustus*.⁴⁸ Magnentius apparently

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neorealist vocabulary. See Michael Kulikowski, *Rome's Gothic Wars: From the Third Century to Alaric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 103 and Joachim Szidat, *Usurpator tanti nominis: Kaiser und Usupator in der Spätantike 337-476 AD, Historia Einzelschriften 210* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2010), 227.

⁴⁴ Michael Kulikowski, "Constantine and the Northern Barbarians" in *The Cambridge Companion to the Age of Constantine*, ed. Noel Lenski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 354.

 ⁴⁵ Zosimus, 2, 43, 3f; Eutropius, 10, 11, 2; Sextus Aurelius Victor, 42,7.
 ⁴⁶ Ehling 2001.

⁴⁷ John Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 148-149.

⁴⁸ Bleckmann argues against the historiographical tradition that saw Vetranio as a satellite of Constantius and thus characterizes his elevation as an authentic proclamation by his troops. See Bruno Bleckmann, "Constantina, Vertranio, and Gallus Caesar" in *Chiron* 24, 1994, 29-68. Drinkwater follows this line of argument but emphasizes that Vetranio's sympathies lay rather with Constantius,

accepted this and, together with Vetranio, lobbied Constantius for a division of the empire according to the triarchic model. ⁴⁹

Constantius did not agree. Neorealistically, the events can be conceptualized as a *power-transition-crisis*: The collapse of Constans' position of power abruptly changed the inter-political status quo. Magnentius had emerged as a new actor. Such questioning of the inter-political hierarchy causes irritation among the political units, which provokes action.⁵⁰ His decision not to recognize Magnentius as *augustus* results neorealistically from the rational consideration of whether war or recognition held the greatest security risks for Constantius' part of the empire. The distrust was too great for Constantius to accept giving Magnentius permanent access to the resources of a partial empire as a legitimate augustus. Constantius seemed to have considered the war against the regionally limited Magnentius to be winnable from the onset. Priority was initially given to the ongoing war against the Persians. From a security point of view, he must have feared a Persian advance, which he would allow by focusing on West, more than anything he thought Magnentius could do. For the year 350, Constantius was able to hold out against Magnentius: His power was too regionally limited, he was still trying to enter into negotiations with Constantius, and Vetranio's sphere of power still lay as a buffer between Magnentius and Constantius.⁵¹ Nevertheless, Magnentius had brought about the death of an emperor, he seemed to be able to evoke a certain acceptance even among those elites who had followed the Constantinian dynasty,

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who, however, was still fighting the Persians in the spring of 350 and could not subordinate Illyria to his rule. See John Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 146-151.

⁴⁹ J. Šašel, "The Struggle between Magnentius and Constantius II for Italy and Illyricum" in *Zant* 21, 1971, 208-209.

⁵⁰ Daniel S. Geller, "Power Transition and Conflict Initiation" in *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 12 (1), 1992.

⁵¹ Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 150.

and with Trier Magnentius controlled a military and economic powerhouse that possessed a mighty propaganda tool in the form of a mint by minted gold, silver and bronze coins for Magnentius, spreading Magnentius' portrait into the breadth of Roman society.⁵²

The Alamanni Attacks from 351

The incidents from 351 onwards, when Alamannic groups, allegedly at the request of Constantius, invaded the Magnentius' realm, are commonly described as 'Alamannic invasions', which relates to the ethnic composition of these groups. However, from the early 4th century onwards, Alamanni had already fought in the Roman army.⁵³ These Alamanni who were (partially) integrated into the empire are not meant in the following. The focus is on Alamannic groups that are to be understood as independent political units outside the empire. Libanios vividly describes their attack as very devastating. An offer from Constantius had been the reason for the invasion: if the Alamanni moved into the territory controlled by Magnentius, they would be allowed to take as much land as they could.⁵⁴

The strategic advantage of such an arrangement in a war situation would be obvious. Magnentius, or his *caesar* Decentius, thus had to assert himself on two fronts from 351 onwards. Constantius approached from the south-east via Illyria, where he was to inflict a military defeat on Magnentius at Mursa in September of the same year, from which the latter never

⁵² Rebecca Usherwood, Political Memory and the Constantinian Dynasty (Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland AG, 2022), 226-228; Heinen, 215, 232-234.

⁵³ M. Martin, "Alemannen im römischen Heer-eine verpasste Integration und ihre Folgen," in in *Die Franken und die Alamannen bis zur 'Schlacht von Zülpich*' (496/97), 407-410.

⁵⁴ Libanius, 18, 33-34; Zosimus, 2, 53, 4.

recovered.⁵⁵ Alamanni now entered the empire from the north-east, unexpectedly posing a remarkable challenge. Probably in 352, the Alamannic rex Chnodomar defeated Decentius in a battle 'aequo Marte' – under equal conditions – and thereupon plundered Gaul without resistance.⁵⁶ The academic debate on the alleged collusion between Constantius and the Alamanni is primarily concerned with the question of whether Constantius would have voluntarily allowed barbarians to raid Roman land.⁵⁷ Here, however, lies the danger of projecting the further bloody development of Roman-Alamanni relations of the 350s back to the possible alliance in 351. Constantius' possible decision to involve the Alamanni from 351 onwards must be considered in the temporal context. The associated security concerns neorealist theory emphasizes are quite useful as an explanatory model for a pact between Constantius and the Alamanni, both for the Constantinian and Alamanni perspectives.

Although Constantius saw no need to take immediate action against Magnentius in 350 due to his regional containment, he was nevertheless a considerable security risk in the medium term, as explained above. At the same time, the interests of Constantius and the Alamanni collided: Constantius wanted to conquer Magnentius' territory; the Alamanni probably wanted to settle there.⁵⁸ In inter-political anarchy, distrust is systemic, so Constantius had to take into account the risks the Alamanni would pose to his own rule. The risk seemed less to him than leaving Magnentius' core territory untouched. Barbarians were often fought and defeated by Constantius' predecessors in office, but usurpers could overthrow rulers. In neorealism, alliances between

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⁵⁵ On the long-term aftermath of Mursa, see Humphries, 171-176.

⁵⁶ Drinkwater, *The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: Caracalla to Clovis*, 201; Marcellinus, 16, 12, 5-6.

⁵⁷ Zotz, 391; Drinkwater, *The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: Caracalla to Clovis*, 202-203.

⁵⁸ That is the content of the agreement according to Libanius, 18, 33-34.

political entities are communities of convenience.⁵⁹ Such an alliance also makes sense from the Alamanni perspective. The behavior of the Alamanni is characterized in the neorealist conception as *bandwagoning*. They allied themselves with Constantius at little cost to themselves and with the prospect of their own gains.⁶⁰

The problem with this explanation, however, is that although neorealism makes the alliance between Constantius and the Alamanni theoretically plausible, it does not provide any valid evidence. For the academic argument of the opposing side, that the Alamanni had invaded the territory of Magnentius because he had withdrawn the troops stationed on the Rhine to fight Constantius. can just as easily be made plausible in neorealist terms: In this scenario, too, a rational security policy consideration took place.⁶¹ Barbarians would not destroy his empire, but Constantius was an existential threat to Magnentius. The added value of neorealist theory lies more in the fact that it provides a conceptual framework for considerations of security policy and foreign policy risk assessment. However, it cannot clarify the concrete facts for historians.

The Revolt of Trier

The episode, known only through a half-sentence by Ammian, in which Trier denied *Caesar* Decentius entry into the city as it was defended by a certain Poemenius, is sometimes mentioned only in passing by historians. The generally accepted account is that in 353, towards the end of Magnentius' reign, the city of Trier chose a certain Poemenius to lead the city's revolt against Decentius.⁶²

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⁵⁹ Waltz, 163-170.

⁶⁰ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In" in International Security 19, no. 1 (1994), 93. ⁶¹ Zotz. 391.

⁶² See e.g. Humphries, 164; R. M. Frakes, "Some Hidden Defensores Civitatum

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Relying on Ammian's choice of words, however,

Overbeck/Overbeck succeeded in demonstrating with substantial arguments that Poemenius was only elected after the revolt. "He had been elected to defend the people" (*ad defendam plebem electus est*) – that should not be understood here as an election in which the Trier people chose their military leader, but as the selection of a person who would legally defend the Trier people after the revolt. This is central to the classification of the revolt, as it means that Trier must have been retaken by Magnentius or Decentius.⁶³

It is possible that this episode can be classified by Zosimus when he writes that Magnentius experienced resistance in Gaul after the Battle of Mursa.⁶⁴ In this case, the battle of Mursa serves as the *terminus post quem of* Trier's revolt. Holt also sees numismatic evidence for placing the revolt late, since he dates a coin series minted for Constantius in Trier at this time, which on the one hand has symbolism unusual for Constantius and was therefore probably not officially authorized, and on the other hand differs so clearly in its weight and dimensions from the Magnentius coins minted in Trier that it would not be plausible for the production to switch back to the Magnentius after the reconquest.⁶⁵ It would be possible to synthesise the numismatic findings of Holt and the philological findings of Overbeck/Overbeck in such a way that Magnentius/Decentius had

in the Res Gestae of Ammianus Marcellinus," 529-530.; Drinkwater, *The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: Caracalla to Clovis*, 5; K. J. Gilles, "Die Aufstände des Poemenius (353) und Silvanus (355) und ihre Auswirkungen auf die Trierer Münzprägung," 384; W. C. Holt, "Evidence of the Coinage of Poemenius' Revolt at Trier,"; Heinen, 233.

⁶³ M. Overbeck and B. Overbeck, "Die Revolte des Poemenius zu Trier – Dichtung und Wahrheit," in *Humanitas: Beiträge zur antiken Kulturgeschichte, Festschrift für Gunther Gottlieb zum 65. Geburtstag*, eds. P. Barceló and V. Rosenberger, (Munich: E. Vögel, 2001), 238-242.

⁶⁴ Zosimus, 2,53,4.

⁶⁵ W. C. Holt, "Evidence of the Coinage of Poemenius' Revolt at Trier," 67-72.

retaken Trier late after the revolt, but the city could not issue any more coins until the end of the civil war.

There is also a neorealist argument for dating the revolt at the earliest after Mursa, but rather late. As the imperial residence, Trier was the center of Roman rule north of the Alps.⁶⁶ The city's importance is made clear by the fact that Magnentius had made it his first task after his elevation to enforce his rule in Trier.⁶⁷ From a neorealist perspective, this may have two reasons: Firstly, the expectation of fiscal resources to help him expand his military power, and secondly, the strategic location of the city in the Moselle valley close to the Rhine frontier. Especially if, from a neorealist perspective, the legitimation of rule is fed by the satisfaction of the need for security, it must have been of central importance for Magnentius to secure the Rhine border in the turmoil of the collapse of Constans' rule. At the same time, Magnentius/Decentius cannot have been satisfied with the loss of the city because of its importance, which confirms the theory of the reconquest. The dating of the revolt is related to its reason, which, although not proven neorealistically, can probably be plausibly deduced. Trier was also badly hit by the Alamanni invasions.⁶⁸ Decentius, who as *caesar* for Gaul probably resided in Trier, is known to have been unable to oppose the Alamanni. At this time, Trier probably did not see its security interests satisfied. However, it needed clearer signs of political decay, namely those described by Zosimus, to rationalize the revolt in neorealist terms.⁶⁹ Trier may have been dissatisfied with its rulers, but as long as they were militarily potent, a revolt would have violated the city's elementary security interests. In the model of rational actors, armed conflicts presuppose that those who start them consider them winnable in

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⁶⁶ Thomas S. Burns, *Rome and the Barbarians: 100 B.C.-400 A.D.*, 312; Heinen, 309-310.

⁶⁷ Pierre Bastien, *Le monnayage de Magnenc, 350-353* (Wetteren, Belgique: Éditions cultura, 1964), 11.

⁶⁸ Heinen, 233.

⁶⁹ Zosimus, 2, 53, 4.

principle. For this reason, dating the revolt to the time when Magnentius/Decentius were already having problems asserting their rule even in Gaul only makes sense. That Decentius briefly reconquered the city is quite possible, but the numismatic evidence suggests that this situation could not have existed for a long time.

Alternative Explanatory Models

At this point, the neorealist *black box* ought to be opened and the explanatory models from the previous section critically questioned. In doing so, the domestic political discourses programmatically ignored by neorealism will be given special consideration.

The ancient sources are very unanimous in their view of the cause of the usurpation. With astonishing uniformity, they report on Constans' unpopularity and his vicious personality.⁷⁰ Zosimus describes him as tyrannical, and the consensus of the historiographical sources seems to be that Constans' personal wrongdoings destroyed his relationship with the most important acceptance group of the exercise of rule: the military.⁷¹ This

⁷⁰ Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Die römischen Kaiser* 41, 23, 4: Constans was "*per aetatem cautus parum atque animi vehemens, adhuc ministrorum pravitate exsecrabilis atque praeceps in avaritiam despectumque militarium.*"

Furthermore, Aurelius Victor accuses him of practising homosexual acts with captive barbarians: "Quarum obsides pretio quaesitos pueros venustiores quod cultus habuerat, Ilbid.ine huiuscemodi arsisse pro certo habitur." The essence of these accusations is found in the same way in Sokrates 10, 9, 3; Zonaras 13, 5-9; Zosimus, 2, 42, 1-2.

⁷¹ Zosimus, 2,42,1; Joachim Szidat, Usurpator tanti nominis: Kaiser und Usupator in der Spätantike (337-476 AD), 289-290; Alan E. Wardman,
"Usurpers and Internal Conflicts in the 4th Century A.D." in *Historia* 33, no. 2, 1984, 226; Mark Hebblewhite, *The Emperor and the Army in the Later Roman Empire AD 235-395* (New York: Routledge, 2017), 1; E. Flaig, "Für eine Konzeptionalisierung der Usurpation im Spätrömischen Reich," in Usurpationen in der Spätantike: Historia Einzelschriften 111, eds. F. Paschoud and J. Szidat, (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 16-17. I do not follow Woudhuysen's speculation that Constans' image was shaped by rumors spread by Magnentius

finding is important because the historiographical sources only partially confirm the neorealist interpretation of the usurpation set up above, that Magnentius had channelled the lack of a sense of security in a region close to the border to proclaim augustus, since Ammian and Aurelius Victor attested to at least Constans' early success on the Rhine border.⁷² In the 340s, however, Constans had withdrawn from Gaul and had not visited the north of his domain for years.⁷³ In conjunction with the neorealist findings, the usurpation of Magnentius can thus certainly be explained by security concerns. These were probably not acute, but Constans had already decisively lost acceptance in Gaul by this time. Constans' rule had thus collapsed in the area – he could no longer help with riots on the border, but the power vacuum had to be filled. Constans' entire apparatus of government and power in Gaul had passed to Magnentius.⁷⁴ The fact that Magnentius' rule in Rome was not as strongly consolidated as in Gaul, although Constans is also said to have behaved ignorantly towards Rome, seems to confirm the influence of security concerns.⁷⁵

Taking the domestic political discourse into account, Drinkwater sees an explanation for Constantius' refusal to recognize Magnentius in Magnentius' origins, which, however, was overstretched into the unreal in Constantius' propaganda.⁷⁶ The early texts close to the court characterized Magnentius as a barbarian, from which, however, later historiography distanced

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⁽Woodhuysen 2018, 180). The rejection of him seems too broad for that; the characterization of Magnentius too negative.

 ⁷² Marcellinus, 27, 8, 6; Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Die römischen Kaiser*, 41, 23, 5.
 ⁷³ Mark Hebblewhite, 19.

⁷⁴ Szidat, 215: Such a court revolution, in which the usurpation itself does not require a military confrontation, had otherwise not occurred in the 4th century. It is worth emphasising again that while the usurpation of Magnentius was followed by a war with Constantius II, the usurpation, however, was directed solely against Constans.

⁷⁵ Harries, 190-193.

⁷⁶ Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 138-140.

itself and, while not denying a barbarian ancestry, relativized it.77 Drinkwater assumes Magnentius' origin in northeastern Gaul, which could form the argumentative basis for Constantius' accusation. The insinuation of barbarian origins was not actually a practice used by augusti to compromise their political rivals, allowing us to assume that there was some truth to the accusation.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, his origins must have been acceptable enough for Roman soldiers and elites to proclaim him *augustus*.⁷⁹ The portrayal of Magnentius as a barbarian – and, according to Drinkwater, just as fictitiously, as a pagan – gave Constantius a new level of legitimacy to wage war against Magnentius: It was not a civil war anymore but a war against external enemies.⁸⁰ Without speculating on further personal motivations, Magnentius' modest origins may reinforce Constantius' neorealist systemic mistrust, which stood in the way of a peaceful outcome to the usurpation.

The characterization of Magnentius as a barbarian also serves a second function, as this accusation insinuates that Magnentius, not Constantius, was to blame for the barbarian invasions.⁸¹ In fact, Zosimus notes that Magnentius had employed barbarians in his army.⁸² In this, however, he differed as little from

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⁷⁷ Themistios, *Staatsreden*, gr.-dt. ed. and trans. Hartmut Leppin and Werner Portmann (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1998), 3, 43A; Julian, *Orations*, gr.-engl. ed. and trans. W.C. Wright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913), 1,34D; Sextus Aurelius Victor, 41, 25; Zosimus, 2, 54, 1; *Epitome de Caesaribus*, 42,7.

⁷⁸ Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 144.

⁷⁹ Underwood, 215; Szidat, 257-261 on the general eligibility for princeps pretender in the 4th century.

⁸⁰ Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 145; Julian 1,42; A. D. Lee, *Warfare in the Roman World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 110.

⁸¹ Drinkwater, "The Revolt and Ethnic Origin of the Usurper Magnentius, 350-353, and the Rebellion of Vetranio, 350," 142.

⁸² Zosimus, Neue Geschichte 2, 51, 1.

Constantius as from his predecessor Constans.⁸³ This shows above all that in the mid-4th century the binary coding of

Roman/Barbarian existed perhaps in ideological propaganda, but not in reality, and that there must have been gradations between these poles.⁸⁴ Possibly this also calls into question the neorealist conceptualization of the Alamanni tribes as independent political units from the Alamanni who were (partially) integrated in the empire, since even research has not ruled out the possibility that there was something like an Alamanni solidarity, i.e. loyalties that transcend the boundaries of the unitary actor and thus complicate the notion of the military conflict between *the* Alamanni and Magnentius.⁸⁵ To better understand this aspect, no differentiation and relativization of both poles is sufficient regarding the Roman-Barbarian relationship, but rather a novel, better conceptualization of the relations.

Along with its strategic and fiscal importance, Trier also had an ideological importance. By the mid-4th century, Trier's status as the most important northern Alpine city had long been established. The chronograph of 354 ranks Trier as the fourth city of the Empire behind Rome, Alexandria and Constantinople.⁸⁶ With its elevation to the imperial residence with Diocletian and later under Constantine I, Trier underwent two major building and reconstruction programs that resulted in numerous magnificent buildings.⁸⁷ The Roman aristocracy in Gaul gathered in Trier.⁸⁸

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⁸³ Burns, 333.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 14; Mischa Meier, *Geschichte der Völkerwanderung. Europa, Asien und Afrika vom 3. bis zum 8. Jahrhundert n.Chr.* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2017), 341-343.

 ⁸⁵ Affirmatively Zotz, 392-393.; negatively Drinkwater, *The Alamanni and Rome 213-496: Caracalla to Clovis* 2007, 206f.; also Marcellinus, 16,10,6-7.
 ⁸⁶ Chronographus anni CCCLIIII 2.

⁸⁷ Heinen, 285.

⁸⁸ Caillan Davenport, "The Dynamics of Imperial Government. Collegiality and Regionalism" in *The Sons of Constantine, AD 337-361: In the Shadows of Constantine and Julian*, eds. Nicholas Baker-Brian and Shaun Tougher (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 227.

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Magnentius must therefore have been aware of what the capture, and later also the loss, of Trier meant to other Romans. Taking this into account, one could make a further argument for the dating of the revolt by referring to Zosimus 2, 53, 2-3, placing the battle for Trier at the beginning of the disintegration of Magnentius' rule in Gaul. The loss of Trier for Magnentius could therefore have led to a collapse of acceptance for the usurper in Gaul. As long as this argument cannot be further substantiated – the sparse sources on the revolt are not optimistic in this respect – this proposed dating once again becomes pure academic speculation.

Conclusion

This paper has pursued two goals: First, it has attempted to fill the knowledge that remains about the Roman West in the context of the usurpation of Magnentius by applying neorealist IR theory. At the same time, this work evaluates the heuristic potential of IR theories in historical scholarship. The result is ambivalent in the first case. Neorealist theories offer a plausible explanatory model for the geographical extent of the usurpation and the resistance to Magnentius in the Western Empire. The security considerations associated with neorealism might also explain Constantius' nonrecognition of Magnentius without recourse to personal beliefs. Regarding the Alamanni invasions and Trier's revolt, the theory offers little new insight. In the research debate about the alleged alliance between Constantius and the Alamanni, both scenarios can be rationalized by neorealism, and the revolt of Trier is so poorly documented in sources that the application of theory could only produce tentative, not valid results. Thus, the most fruitful application of neorealist IR theory was in the case where an established historical situation had to be interpreted. Only based on classical historiographical craft and traditional source criticism could the neorealist theory unfold its heuristic potential.

The application of a simplistic explanatory model is counter-intuitive for historians who think multicausally. A theory

that seeks explanatory potential in macro-structures alone programmatically ignores the detailed questions that are central to ideographic research. This is no longer uncontroversial even in IR. Regarding IR theories, when Buzan/Little claim that the central question is not "which of these [theories] are right, but what kind of configuration of all of them produces," then they call for a multi-perspectival theory culture in which the numerous IR theories do not compete for interpretive sovereignty, but complement each other.⁸⁹ If one denies the theory's claim to be the only valid one, neorealism introduces a perspective into the academic discussion about Magnentius that emphasizes power and security interests. The ideas associated with this are not necessarily innovative and can already be found in their essence in some existing literature. However, neorealist theory conceptualizes and specifies these ideas and gives them a standardized academic vocabulary. In this sense, the potential of IR for historical scholarship, precisely because of its theoretical diversity, is potentially enormous.

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⁸⁹ Barry Buzan and Richard Little, "Why International Relations has Failed as an Intellectual Project and What to do About it" in *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 1 (2001): 38. Even Eckstein had acknowledged this and never completely submitted to neorealist theory, but always understood the application of theory as the introduction of a new perspective. See Eckstein, 35.

Empires on Credit: A Second Military Revolution

Baird Johnson

Michael Roberts coined the term "Military Revolution" when describing the sea change in European warfare which took place in the century between 1560 and 1660.¹ His seminal article has sparked a lively and enduring debate on the nature of military change in early modern Europe.² One dominant (and interdisciplinary) thread of commentary concerns the impact of Roberts' military revolution on the development of the modern state.³ Indeed, there has been near universal agreement among

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¹ Michael Roberts, "The Military Revolution, 1560-1660," in *The Military* Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 13-35. ² Geoffrey Parker, for instance, essentially confirms Roberts' main claims but believes the military revolution began some decades earlier in Renaissance Italy and that Roberts should have discussed sieges at greater length; Geoffrey Parker, "The 'Military Revolution,' 1560-1660 - a Myth?" The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 2 (June, 1976): 195-214. Clifford Rogers, while also amenable to Roberts' thesis, argues that military developments during the Hundreds Year War (1337-1453) were just as significant as those between 1560 and 1660 and attributes the rise of the West to a series of military revolutions occurring in response to one another; Clifford Rogers, "The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War," The Journal of Military History 57, no. 2 (April, 1993): 241-278. For a compilation of the first forty years of debate, see Clifford Rogers ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). ³ See, for example, Michael Duffy, ed., *The Military Revolution and the State*, 1500-1800 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1980); Nicola Gennaioli and Hans-Joachim Voth, "State Capacity and Military Conflict," The Review of Economic Studies 82, no. 4 (October, 2015): 1409-1448; John Lynn, "Clio in Arms: The Role of the Military Variable in Shaping History," The Journal of Military History 55, no. 1 (January, 1991): 83-95; I.A.A. Thompson, "Money, Money, and Yet More Money!' Finance, the Fiscal State, and the Military Revolution: Spain 1500-1650," in The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 273-298.

historians that a primary result of the military revolution was the creation of increasingly efficient taxation systems and bureaucratic administrations to support armies of unprecedented size.⁴ A larger military and centralized administration, the argument goes, both require and are able to collect more taxes; these taxes are promptly invested in an even larger military and the bureaucracy; on and on the cycle goes until the creation of the modern state.⁵

As interesting as this may be to one interested in the relationship between governments and peoples, the focus on taxation is rather misleading to those interested in the development of warfare. While the problem of funding increasingly large and well-equipped armies is correctly identified, taxation was not a viable solution. The financial burden wrought by Roberts' military revolution required changes in finance far beyond even the most efficient taxation, and the creative financial solutions developed in the Netherlands and perfected in England (approximately 1600-1715) constitute another military revolution. These solutions included the assumption of debt by a national and permanent entity with an interest in credibility (as opposed to a monarch), the creation of central banking institutions, the inauguration of a massive and essentially permanent public debt on which the government is expected only to pay annual interest payments, and the creation of a secondary market for government debt. They should be considered a military revolution for at least five reasons. First, they allowed for further increases in army size and equipment. Second, they allowed for increases in the geographical scope of war, extending European conflicts into the Americas, Asia, Africa, and both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Third, they dramatically increased naval capacity and gave rise to navalcommercial empires, facilitating European conquests around the world. Fourth, they allowed economies and investment to thrive

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⁴ Thompson, "Money," 273; Thompson dissents from this view.

⁵ John Lynn, "The Growth of the French Army During the Seventeenth Century," *Armed Forces and Society* 6, no. 4 (Summer, 1980): 580-581, note 43.

during war time despite massive expenditures. Fifth, they shifted the political and power balance in Europe from monarchical, landbased powers (France and Spain) to more republican, sea-based powers (the Netherlands and England).

Before discussing how Amsterdam and London were able to solve the issue of financing early modern warfare, it is worth mentioning just how intractable the problem was. The 180 years between 1530 and 1710 featured a ten-fold increase in European army size.⁶ This was a continent-wide phenomenon. The Spanish army doubled in size from 1550 to 1640, the French army increased at least seven-fold (and possibly as much as fourteenfold) during the 1600s and would more than triple again in the early 1700s, the Dutch army quintupled in the same period, the Swedes increased their forces from 15,000 men in the 1590s to 100,000 by 1700, and England's armed forces tripled in size from 1550 to 1700, and the Russian army nearly quintupled in size from 1630-1710.⁷ These increases, remarkably, tend to underestimate the added financial burden. Not only did armies balloon in size, but the cost to field an individual soldier increased and forces became more permanent and therefore in need of constant maintenance.⁸ Understandably, skyrocketing army size coupled with the construction of more (and more expensive) fortresses and

⁷ Colin Jones, "The Military Revolution and the Professionalisation of the French Army under the Ancien Régime," in *The Military Revolution and the State, 1500-1800*, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1980), 30; Simon Adams, "Tactics or Politics? 'The Military Revolution' and the Hapsburg Hegemony, 1525-1648," in *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe*, ed. Clifford Rogers (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 254; Martin Van Creveld, *Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 5-6; Lynn, "Growth of the French Army," 578; Gennaioli and Voth, "State Capacity," 1413; Parker, "Military Revolution," 206.

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⁶ Parker, "Military Revolution," 206.

⁸ Duffy, *Military Revolution 1500-1800*, 1; Thompson, "Money," 273. These increases were noted at the time as well; see Parker, "Military Revolution," 211, note 37.

burgeoning navies led to tremendous increases in the cost of war.⁹ European wars cost millions of pounds in the 1500s, tens of millions in the late 1600s, and hundreds of millions after the rise of Napoleon.¹⁰ Accounting for inflation, Spain's total expenditures increased four-fold with military funding accounting for more than ninety percent of the total.¹¹ Spain's situation was typical on the continent. State budgets multiplied throughout Europe with military budgets dwarfing all other expenditures.¹²

The cost of war became unbearable to near universally disastrous effect. No state in Europe was equipped to afford these newly expensive conflicts.¹³ Spain, despite enormous success exploiting the New World, went bankrupt no fewer than ten times from 1557 to 1662 and would not recover from the debt which caused their first default for more than two hundred years.¹⁴ This disrupted troop payments and led the Spanish army to mutiny forty-six times from 1572 to 1607, often with catastrophic consequences for nearby civilians. While Spain's condition was particularly dire (they would fade from great power competition due to financial collapse near the end of the 1600s), the rest of the continent faced similar issues.¹⁵ No country proved consistently able to supply their troops, and "[u]nable to feed their troops,

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⁹ Petri Talvitie and Juha-Matti Granqvist, "Introduction: Military Maintenance in Early Modern Europe The Northern Exposure," in *Civilians and Military Supply in Early Modern Finland*, ed. Petri Talvitie and Juha-Matti Granqvis (Helsinki: Helsinki University Press, 2021), 1.

¹⁰ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1998), 77.

¹¹ Rogers ed., *The Military Revolution*, 6; Thompson, "Money," 274.

¹² Talvitie and Granqvist, "Military Maintenance," 4; Thompsom, "Money,"273.

¹³ Duffy, *Military Revolution 1500-1800*, 2.

 ¹⁴ These bankruptcies occurred in 1557, 1560, 1575, 1596, 1607, 1627, 1647, 1652, 1660, and 1662. All this occurred despite the fact that Spain was the richest country of the era. Thompson, "Money," 286; Creveld, *Logistics*, 8.
 ¹⁵ Christon Archer et al., *World History of Warfare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 250-251; Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 71.

commanders were also incapable of keeping them under control and of preventing desertion.¹⁶ Seventeenth century armies were notorious for neglecting honor, orders, military objectives, and national interest in order to plunder even friendly civilians.¹⁷ This obviously limited military effectiveness, but the costs could be even more dire.

Government responses to funding issues not only failed to pay the exorbitant costs of war, but they also inaugurated a host of new issues. Massive tax increases, most state's favored method of paying for war, risked widespread societal unrest. France's most significant tax "increased 400% between 1632 and 1648 despite a period of currency deflation," and tax burdens sparked "endemic" popular revolts across the country.¹⁸ While the French were able to crush these rebellions, British monarchs were not so lucky. Charles I's efforts to unilaterally squeeze funding for the royal navy from a hostile populace helped spark a civil war which, ironically, found the navy opposing the crown due to chronic shortages of pay and food.¹⁹ Charles would emerge from the conflict headless. Other desperate attempts to solve the problems of military finance included, defaulting on debts, debasing currency, and launching new conquests in hope of capturing natural resources more valuable than the costs of acquiring them.²⁰ Finally, there was no

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¹⁶ For a more complete discussion of logistics during the military revolution, see Creveld, *Logistics*, 5-39.

¹⁷ Jones, "French Army," 33-34.

¹⁸ Lynn, "Growth of the French Army," 582.

¹⁹ Michael Duffy, "The Foundations of British Naval Power," in *The Military Revolution and the State*, *1500-1800*, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1980), 50.

²⁰ The Portuguese (similar to the Spanish) unsuccessfully attempted to maintain an empire through conquest. This created an inescapable cycle necessitating constant expansion which continued until the empire was stretched too thin to survive and was supplanted by the Dutch and British. For a detailed account of Portugal's imperial problems of finance, see Malyn Newitt, "Plunder and the Rewards of Office in the Portuguese Empire," in *The Military Revolution and*

safe opting out of state-threatening levels of spending; countries which failed to keep up militarily "were likely to be plundered and have their economy destroyed by more powerful states."²¹ It would require another military revolution to resolve Europe's financial problems.

The revolution would begin in an unlikely place: the Spanish-controlled Netherlands. Spain's catastrophic financial situation made them a poor investment, and the monarchy found itself shut out of familiar credit markets. Charles V turned to provincial estates in the Netherlands to compel wealthy citizens to purchase government debt guaranteed by the revenues of specific tax increases. As Spain's need for funds continued to grow, however, local assemblies in the Netherlands were able to extract significant concessions from the Spanish. They gained control of both taxation and local expenditures. Beginning in 1553, the Estates of Holland ended the practice of compelled debt. Instead, they marketed entirely voluntary loans to lenders in and outside of the province.²² With increased financial independence, the Estates of Holland were able to establish themselves as reliable debtors, allowing them to borrow with unprecedentedly low interest rates.²³ Where monarchs forced loans onto unwilling lenders and frequently defaulted on their debts (sometimes imprisoning or assassinating those lobbying for repayment), the Netherlands proved that a democratic assembly could not only be a safe but also a profitable investment.²⁴ Indeed, the first key aspect of this

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the State, 1500-1800, ed. Michael Duffy (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1980), 10-28. Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 72.

²¹ Duffy, *Military Revolution 1500-1800*, 6.

²² David Stasavage, *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and Great Britain, 1688-1789* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 55-56.

²³ Stasavage, *Public Debt*, 57.

²⁴ The Netherlands was particularly well-suited to illustrate this point. Wealthy merchants and investors often constituted a majority of Dutch assemblies. Indeed, a main argument of Stasavage's work is that the ability of creditors to

military revolution was the assumption of public debt by representative institutions. This advantage quickly materialized militarily when the Dutch revolted against Spanish rule in 1572. Spain waged, and eventually lost, an eighty-year war attempting to subdue the tiny Netherlands. The cause of this victory, rather than military might, was the Netherlands' consistent ability to outborrow Spain and the ease with which they paid relatively tiny interest rates.²⁵ Despite their size, they were able to outlast the mightiest power of the era.

In addition to surviving particular invasion attempts, the unparalleled ability of the Dutch to finance their military provided more general benefits. The most important of these was the ability to pay for the first modern navy. While the offensive effectiveness of the Dutch navy can be overstated, it provided the Dutch with a key advantage in resisting invasion and facilitated the development of an immensely profitable maritime trade network.²⁶ When the

influence assemblies is a key aspect of democratic credibility. While this surely works to the advantage particular legislatures, and assemblies can repudiate creditors (late eighteenth-century Rhode Island being a prime example), Stasavage understands the innate advantages of legislatures over (especially absolute) monarchs. While state wealth is often treated by the monarch as personal, it is far more difficult to single elected members of a larger body to do so. Additionally, the transition of power from one monarch to another poses an extreme threat to government obligations; there is no similar period for assemblies. For the seminal article on credibility differences in democracies and monarchies, see Douglass North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," *The Journal of Economic History* 49, no. 4 (December, 1989): 803-832. James Lacey, *Gold, Blood, and Power: Finance and War Through the Ages* (Carlisle Barracks: United States Army War College Press, 2015), 43-44; Stasavage, *Public Debt*.

²⁵ Lacey, *Gold, Blood, and Power*, 43-44; Stasavage, *Public Debt*, 57.
 ²⁶ These elements of the Dutch navy informed one another rather than being paradoxical. A main reason for the limitations of Dutch offensive naval capabilities was that their focus was primarily on protecting merchant fleets and promoting commerce rather than establishing military supremacy. W.J.R. Gardner, "The State of Naval History," *The Historical Journal* 38, no. 3

Dutch East India Company conquered Portuguese Malacca in 1641, the Dutch established themselves as easily the most powerful force in the Pacific; they simultaneously enjoyed a significant trading empire in the Atlantic world and possessed commercial and naval supremacy in Europe.²⁷ Inaugurating a system the British would later perfect. Dutch financial credibility, naval primacy, and commercial success formed a positive feedback loop: the stronger the Dutch navy became, the more profitable Dutch commerce became, the more of a reliable investment the Dutch government became, the more money was available for naval expansion... The significance of joint-stock companies, a peculiar innovation of commerce-focused republics, should not be understated. Much of the Dutch maritime empire was secured and defended by the semistate and semi-corporate Dutch East India and Dutch West India companies. These companies proved far superior to either state funded military expeditions or the plundering exploits of ambitious captains seeking personal wealth and glory more than the maintenance of a sustainable empire.²⁸

Dutch financial reforms led to other indirect advantages. First, they facilitated the rise of the financial sector in the Netherlands; Amsterdam became a key center of global finance, and the credit markets and investment opportunities available to the Dutch extended globally to increase all of the advantages

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⁽September, 1995): 696-697. For the tremendous success of Dutch military maritime trade expansion, see Engel Sluiter, "Dutch Maritime Power and the Colonial Status Quo," *Pacific Historical Review* 11, no. 1 (March, 1942): 29-41. For the limits of Dutch naval prowess, especially in offensive state to state conflict, see J.R. Jones, "The Dutch Navy and National Survival in the Seventeenth Century," *The International History Review* 10, no. 1 (February, 1988): 18-32.

²⁷ Sluiter, "Dutch Maritime Power," 41.

²⁸ This provided the Dutch, and later the British, empire with distinct and insurmountable organizational advantages over both the Spanish and the Portuguese. Throughout the seventeenth century, the Dutch East India Company exceeded the combined power of France and Portugal in and around India. Sluiter, "Dutch Maritime Power," 32; Duffy, *Military Revolution 1500-1800*, 2.

detailed above.²⁹ Second, beginning at the dawn of the seventeenth century, shares of the Dutch East India company created a thriving secondary capital market by providing high-reward, low risk, and easily transferable opportunities for speculation.³⁰ While this advantage was not fully exploited, it echoed the (to be discussed) development of a secondary bond market in Britain a century later. Third, Dutch reliability normalized the existence of permanent public debt, decreasing pressure from investors for repayment during difficult times and enabling the Dutch to borrow significantly more than they could immediately pay back.³¹ The Dutch, however, represent only the first step of the military revolution. For various reasons (a small population, an inconvenient and eminently invadable geographical location, competition with allied British merchants, etc.), the Dutch faded from maritime and financial dominance.³² The British, by replicating Dutch reforms and adding important innovations of their own, would complete the military revolution.

In 1688, the British Crown was assumed by William Prince of Orange and Mary II after James II fled Dutch advances in the Glorious Revolution.³³ Almost immediately, the British replicated Dutch financial practices.³⁴ This began with Parliament's assertion

³¹ Kennedy, Great Powers, 78.

³⁴ Commentators are universal in deeming this an intentional imitation; this was also recognized at the time. There has recently been interesting research suggesting that the British had laid significant groundwork in emulating Dutch

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²⁹ Kennedy, Great Powers, 78.

³⁰ While exact details of Dutch capital markets fall outside of the purview of this investigation, they are discussed at great length in Oscar Gelderblom and Joost Jonker, "Completing a Financial Revolution: The Finance of the Dutch East India Trade and the Rise of the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1595-1612," *The Journal of Economic History* 64, no. 3 (September, 2004): 641-672.

³² Kennedy, Great Powers, 87-88.

³³ Despite the enduring moniker, Dutch forces were prepared for the revolution to be far less glorious, arriving with 20,000 men, 5,000 horses, and a fleet four times the size of the Spanish Armada. Julian Hoppit, *A Land of Liberty? England 1689-1727* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15.

of its ability to prevent the Crown from borrowing money.³⁵ Doing so both prevented monarchs from taking on risky loans they were unlikely to repay and made Parliament a guarantor of public debt similar to the Estates of Holland. Parliament approved loans quickly came to dominate British public finance, constituting nearly three quarters of the Crown's annual income during the first three years following the Glorious Revolution despite hovering around five percent under the late Stuarts.³⁶ Benefitting from this new credibility, the British government gained access to far more credit, and, despite adding a constitutional check to borrowing money, increased borrowing more than ten-fold by 1697.³⁷ Contributing to Britain's newly booming financial situation was the creation of the Bank of England. Initially created as a war-time measure in 1693, the bank exceeded all possible expectations.³⁸ Prior to the creation of the bank, Britain had borrowed exclusively using short-term loans (early modern loans of this type were subject to nearly fifty percent annual interest); from zero in 1693, its long-term debt "increased to £1,200,000 in 1695, £4,100,000 in

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finance during its brief time as a republic in the 1650s. See, for example, Jonathan Scott, *How the Old World Ended: The Anglo-Dutch-American Revolution 1500-1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2019), 121-138. For two examples of attributing British financial reforms to Dutch inspiration, see Jerome Roos, *Why Not Default? The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 95; Stasavage, *Public Debt*, 5. ³⁵ Gary W. Cox, "Was the Glorious Revolution a Constitutional Watershed?" *The Journal of Economic History* 72, no. 3 (September, 2012): 568. ³⁶ Cox, "Constitutional Watershed," 578.

³⁷ This borrowing would increase the public debt from less than a million pounds to more than nineteen (a third of national income). These trends would extend well into the eighteenth century. Stephen Quinn, "The Glorious Revolution's Effect on English Private Finance: A Microhistory, 1680-1705," *The Journal of Economic History* 61, no. 3 (September, 2001): 593; North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment," 805.

³⁸ The direct connection between the Bank and Britain's wars is obvious. Not only was the purpose of the Bank specified, but a director of the bank was killed by stray fire while joining the army during a siege. Lacey, *Gold, Blood, and Power*, 45; Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 80.

1705, and £29,600,000 in 1715." After Parliament proved a reliable debtor, Britain was able to borrow at consistently falling interest rates.³⁹ By 1715, they were charged less interest than even the Dutch.⁴⁰ The bank was able to further increase Britain's credibility as it was authorized to (and did) use government revenues to repay public debt without prior approval from the government.⁴¹

Even more importantly, the bank facilitated the creation of a permanently funded debt.⁴² In so doing, it allowed Britain the ability to borrow far more than they could possibly hope to pay back at a particular time; indeed, Britain needed only to be able to cover annual interest payments. Because investors could profit from their investment and were sure of the bank's theoretical ability to pay them back, Britain, in practice at least, never had to repay the principal.⁴³ In this way, debt did not threaten Britain in 1713 despite being six times larger than national revenue.⁴⁴ The final aspect of the military revolution, also allowed by the bank, was the creation of a secondary bond market. Because government debt was permanent and (eventually) uniform, it could be sold at market rates. This made holders of national debt, generally the wealthiest Britons, much more liquid. This both facilitated further investment by ensuring that debt could be sold to cover the losses of risky speculations and prevented money invested in the state from leaving circulation in the economy. Put succinctly, "Britain no longer was forced to rely on storing vast treasuries so as to

³⁹ Cox, "Constitutional Watershed," 581-584; Stasavage, Public Debt, 53.

⁴⁰ Stasavage, Public Debt, 5.

⁴¹ Stasavage, *Public Debt*, 75.

⁴² David R. Weir, "Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688-1789," *The Journal of Economic History* 49, no. 1 (March, 1989): 95.

⁴³ Lacey, Gold, Blood, and Power, 48.

⁴⁴ Stasavage, Public Debt, 77.

wage war. Rather, its entire financial wealth could remain working within the economy."⁴⁵

These financial reforms (the assumption of debt by a reliable representative body, the creation of central banks, the funding of a permanent public debt, and the creation of a secondary bond market) transformed warfare. First, they solved the crisis of funding created by Roberts' military revolution. By the end of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648), no European country could afford to pay its troops — no European army, that is, except for the Dutch.⁴⁶ Britain became able to fund war on an "unimaginable scale," spending far more in the beginning of the eighteenth century than the burdens which had proved unbearable to all just decades before. They could already spend France into exhaustion with 49 million pounds during the Nine Years War (1688-1697), but by the Napoleonic Wars, Britain could spend nearly twice that amount *per year*.⁴⁷ Despite facing occasionally significant strain, Britain was never again forced to default or impose economically destructive taxes on its people.⁴⁸ In 1693, probably to the shock of soldiers used to having their pay treated as optional, Parliament doubled the salary of its serving naval officers and increased the pay of demobilized officers during peacetime.⁴⁹ More remarkable given the horrific state of European finances during the seventeenth century, by 1800 Britain was able to afford not only its own army but was also capable of funding its allies.⁵⁰ More shocking still, Britain was better able to fund early eighteenth century wars more effectively than other European nations even though army size stopped increasing across the

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⁴⁵ Lacey, Gold, Blood, and Power, 49-50.

⁴⁶ It is perhaps not coincidental that one of the key outcomes of the struggle was the Dutch achievement of independence. Creveld, *Logistics*, 8.

⁴⁷ Kennedy, Great Powers, 81.

⁴⁸ Lacey, Gold, Blood, and Power, 45-46.

⁴⁹ Duffy, "British Naval Power," 62.

⁵⁰ Lacey, Gold, Blood, and Power, 50.

continent and Britain was forced to maintain a navy ballooning in cost and size.⁵¹

In addition to funding previously unfundable (and larger) militaries, Dutch-Anglo financial innovations allowed for an incredible increase in the geographical scale of European warfare. As previously discussed, the Dutch were able to assault Spanish and Portuguese colonial possessions simultaneously in the Caribbean, Africa, India, and the East Indies while maintaining a war with Spain in Europe.⁵² Eighteenth century wars took on a distinctly global character. The War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) which, as may be self-evident, was fought to determine the next ruler of Spain spanned five continents and was waged across the world's oceans. This was repeated during the Seven Years War (1756-1763), which also left only Australia and Antarctica untouched and contained significant maritime elements. Recalling that no European country was able to supply troops stationed on the continent as recently as 1650, this is all the more significant.

This military revolution massively increased naval power and enabled the capture and maintenance of naval-commercial colonial empires. It is, obviously, no coincidence that the two financial innovators created Europe's two most powerful navies. The most obvious cause was the availability of funds. While armies were near impossible to fund, navies were even more difficult. They require significant initial investment to build ships and frequent repair work.⁵³ Plunder on its own was a poor way to fund land armies, but it eased the burden on governments; navies, however, could not possibly live off the land.⁵⁴ In spite of these extensive costs, the British were able to not only maintain, but

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⁵¹ The British navy consisted of 50 ships in 1633, 173 in 1688, 320 in 1756, and over 1000 in 1810. Duffy, "British Naval Power," 55, 82.

⁵² Sluiter, "Dutch Maritime Power."

⁵³ In fact, "even the smaller ships in the English navy of the 18th century cost more than the largest industrial companies had in capital." Gennaioli and Voth, "State Capacity," 1414.

⁵⁴ Adams, "Tactics or Politics?" 284.

significantly expand their navy following the Glorious Revolution. This stood in stark contrast to other European powers, whose navies stagnated in part because of the financial problems they created.⁵⁵

The creation of larger and better funded navies facilitated the creation of immensely profitable empires based on trade. We have already seen the effectiveness of the Dutch fleet in promoting and protecting commerce and colonies overseas. The British navy, while more militaristic in character, was similarly effective. During war, the British navy proved both capable of allowing British trade to continue relatively unmolested and of strangling enemy commerce.⁵⁶ Nearly as important as the sheer amount of funds available was the secondary bond market. Even during peace, trans-oceanic voyages were risky endeavors, and mercantile fleets were in need of insurance. With the increased danger of enemy attack during war, insurance became absolutely essential for the continuance of maritime trade.⁵⁷ Insuring large merchant voyages, however, required large amounts of liquid funds. Without the ability to quickly offload bonds, the wealthiest Britons would have had to choose between lending money to the government or ensuring the merchant fleet. Due to the military revolution, however, private British wealth could be employed twice to promote the war effort while remaining in circulation. This "double use of capital" was integral to Britain's commercial and naval supremacy and played a decisive role in their victory over Napoleon.⁵⁸ On the broadest scale, Britain's Empire (made possible by these reforms) would exert tremendous impact on

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⁵⁵ Duffy, "British Naval Power," 55.

⁵⁶ Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 80-83.

⁵⁷ Adrian Leonard, "Marine Insurers, the City of London, and Financing the Napoleonic Wars," in *Money and Markets: Essays in Honour of Martin Daunton*, ed. Julian Hoppit, Duncan Needham, and Adrian Leonard (Rochester: Boydell & Brewer, 2019), 69.

⁵⁸ Leonard, "Marine Insurers," 55-56.

nearly every inhabited region on earth over the next two hundred and fifty years.

The secondary bond market and increased state credibility assisted more than just naval insurance. The liquidity of government bonds meant that the British economy, in stark contrast to contemporaries, did not decline in war time (it also, incredibly, was not subject to serious inflation).⁵⁹ While investment in the French government discouraged economic growth, investment in the British government encouraged it.⁶⁰ This facilitated a revolution in transportation. Private investment in public infrastructure projects increased with government credibility, using money already available for military spending due to the purchase of government bonds; this led to, among other things, a boom in road and canal construction.⁶¹ More importantly, the secondary bond market lubricated private capital markets, thus promoting the accumulation of capital which spurred Britain's incredible economic growth during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and helped make it fertile ground for the sparking of the industrial revolution.⁶²

Finally, this military revolution shifted the balance of power in Europe from monarchical land powers to maritime republican ones. While some military advantages of finance reform

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⁵⁹ North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment," 823.

⁶⁰ Charles Kindleberger, *A Financial History of Western Europe* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 163-164; Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 82-83.

⁶¹ Dan Bogart, "Did the Glorious Revolution Contribute to the Transport Revolution? Evidence from Investment in Roads and Rivers," *The Economic History Review* 64, no. 4 (November, 2011): 1073-1112; North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment," note 55; Cox, "Constitutional Watershed," 590.

⁶² A discussion of the impacts of the industrial revolution, or of exactly how direct the connection between it and finance reforms was, warrants a piece of its own. It is clear, however, that Britain's terrific financial situation was a significant contributor. North and Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment," 825-828; Kindleberger, *Financial History*, 158; Duffy, "British Naval Power," 81; Weir, "Tontines," 95-96; Jones.

have been touched on throughout the paper, more are worth making explicit. The most basic advantage was in the seemingly endless and unmatchable amount of money Britain and the Netherlands could pour into a conflict. Lacey puts it well: "No matter how hard the tax collectors of other nations tried, they always had to deal with a basic economic fact: there was only so much wealth that could be taxed away from an agricultural-based economy before the economic base was destroyed."⁶³ The British avoided this problem entirely, and while they could wage war with relentless endurance, the French (their primary rival) were repeatedly driven to financial catastrophe prior to surrender.⁶⁴ Britain and France fought no fewer than seven major wars following this military revolution, and the former, despite its smaller size, was able to generally emerge victorious because of a superior ability to bear the financial costs of conflict.⁶⁵ Indeed, despite more lucrative and efficient systems of taxation and Britain's heavier reliance on debt. France was forced into bankruptcy (multiple times) by the Seven Years War and Britain was not. Without Dutch-Anglo financial reforms, France had to pay far higher interest rates.⁶⁶ The American Revolution is a particularly telling example. Despite helping accomplish the political goal of securing independence for thirteen of Britain's North American colonies, France incurred a debt comparable to Britain but was forced to pay twice the interest rate.⁶⁷ These exorbitant rates combined with the already shaky state of French finance to spark the French Revolution.⁶⁸ The devastating impacts of France's attempts to keep up with British spending would

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⁶³ Lacey, Gold, Blood, and Power, 49.

⁶⁴ This dynamic mimics well the aforementioned conflicts between Spain and the Netherlands a century earlier. Kindleberger, *Financial History*, 159.

⁶⁵ Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 76-83.

⁶⁶ Stasavage, *Public Debt*, 88-95; Jones, "French Army," 45.

⁶⁷ Kennedy, *Great Powers*, 84.

⁶⁸ Lacey, *Gold, Blood, and Power*, 47; "French Army," 45-47; Lynn, "Growth of the French Army," 581-582.

continue into the new regime and be a significant problem at least as late as $1815.^{69}$

Financial reform also provided the British tactical advantages over both the French and Spanish on the seas. Due to ever-present money concerns, Britain's enemies were extremely reluctant to engage in naval battles – they simply could not afford to replace or repair ships. This allowed the British to easily overcome both administrative and technological inferiority. While French ships were faster individually, the British enjoyed advantages in both speed and maneuverability in formation due to huge disparities in training stemming from their willingness to fight. When forced into undesired battles, French and Spanish ships proved nearly helpless in the face of better trained and more aggressive British forces.⁷⁰

In summary, Dutch-Anglo financial reform fundamentally altered the scale and scope of warfare during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Its impacts stretched far beyond the military realm, clearly altering the international balance of power (both between states and regime types) as Britain and the Netherlands were able to succeed at the expense of both absolutist European rivals and expand lasting empires across the world. These reforms also, at the very least, set the stage for industrialization and a century of British economic dominance over the rest of the world. These reforms clearly constitute a military revolution.

⁶⁹ White also recognizes the importance of debt in sparking the revolution. Eugene Nelson White, "The French Revolution and the Politics of Government Finance, 1770-1815," *The Journal of Economic History* 55, no. 2 (June, 1995): 227-255. France's post-revolutionary wars have been attributed to the burdens of past ones. Lynn, "Clio," 87.

⁷⁰ Duffy, "British Naval Power," 80.

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The *Maine*, the Media, and the American Mind: Exploring the Outbreak of the Spanish American War

Joseph D. Ostrowski

In the days following the disaster of February 15, a nation cried out "Remember the Maine" and vowed to avenge the tragedy in Havana Harbor against whomever carried it out. This is the narrative surrounding the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine told throughout the United States today. Modern historiography about the Spanish-American War depicts a vulnerable American public and government falling victim to the sensationalist influence of the media. While this perception of the American public in 1898 is rooted in some truth, it does not tell the full story. The study of newspaper sources both before and after the sinking of the Maine in Havana Harbor shows a misrepresentation of the American public by modern scholars. They describe a fervently pro-war population but do not acknowledge the large conservative population in America who remained less outspoken, more rational, and less reactive to the sinking of the Maine. Because it oversimplifies the impact of the explosion of the Maine and the impact of media on American society, modern historiography ultimately fails to encapsulate the public perception of the Spanish-American war.

A few sources sum up the current field of literature regarding the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Hyman Rickover's book *How the Battleship Maine Was Destroyed* takes a unique point of view in the historiography of the *Maine* through its explanation of the sociopolitical inner-workings before the war's outbreak. One of the *Maine*'s biggest impacts on society and government in America was the long, elaborate investigation into the events that transpired that day. Experts agree that the sinking was caused by an explosion from either the inside or outside of the hull, but conflicting testimonies and evidence could not produce a definitive answer. While the investigation trudged along for weeks,

"McKinley had an impatient Congress to contend with," a Congress pushing for a quick and timely decision, but ready and willing to move forward with military action. Sensationalist journalists already began speculating about the potential findings of the investigation, drawing conclusions about the inevitability of war and telling stories of "how the 'perfidious' Spanish had destroyed the *Maine*."¹

The war and the sinking of the Maine, however, trace their roots back to the 1840's, a time during which British abolitionists saw Cuba as a hub for slave trade and activity, and desired to extend their antislavery influence on the island. The H.M.S. *Romney*, a British vessel set on freeing slaves and curtailing the slave trade through Havana harbor, moored itself in the harbor from 1837-1845. In "The *Maine*, the *Romney*, and the Threads of Conspiracy in Cuba," Paul Ryer goes into depth about 'the Year of the Lash', a year which saw whippings, banishments, executions, and imprisonments of thousands of slaves accused of conspiring against the Spanish government in a slave uprising. Many Spanish officials believed a small group of British government officials to be the ring leaders of a conspiracy centered around agitating Spanish colonial order, all as part of England's movement for emancipation of Cuban slaves.²

The literature or historiography on this conspiracy, called *'La Escalera*,' is sparse, despite the conspiracy's fifty years of profound influence in Cuba on race relations, struggles to end slavery, and a struggle for independence.³ The *Romney*, for instance, in addition to being a safe haven for slaves, acted as a symbol of British influence over the anti-slavery movement on the island, and was therefore viewed by Spanish loyalists as a threat to

¹ Hyman Rickover, *How the Battleship Maine was Destroyed* (Washington, D.C.: Naval History and Heritage Command, 1976), 61-62.

² Paul Ryer, "The Maine, the Romney and the Threads of Conspiracy in Cuba," *International Journal of Cuban Studies* 7, no. 2 (2015), 200-211.

³ Ryer. "The Maine, the Romney and the Threads of Conspiracy in Cuba," 204.

Spanish sovereignty on the island, even up to the birth of the Cuban rebellion in 1895.

While Americans see the *Maine* as an isolated event of the Spanish American War, they miss out on the deep historical context with regard to international diplomacy that took root in Havana Harbor during the previous fifty years. These diplomatic actions produced skepticism among Spanish loyalists in Cuba towards international powers encroaching on their colonial territory. The *Maine*'s trip to Havana Harbor, whether it posed an actual military threat or not, presented a perceived threat to Spanish sovereignty. Because of the United States' potential interests in encouraging the Cuban independence movement, this, to the Spanish, was the history of *Romney* repeating itself.

The historical context of the *Maine*'s sinking, therefore, affected the public reaction to the sinking of the *Maine* in 1898. To the American public, the sinking was an affront to American sovereignty and is believed, according to Rickover, to have produced a wide ripple of patriotism, fervent calls to war, and disdain towards Spain from the American public and government. Ryer explains that it does not matter what factually happened to the ship, because the myths and stories that arose from its sinking were more important in the larger historical context than the facts. The fact that the ship sank at all is what mattered to the Americans, who believed it was perpetrated by the Spanish.

Many Cubans, however, held a different view of both the *Maine* and its explosion. They did not see the explosion as an attack on American sovereignty, but conversely saw the presence of the *Maine* in Havana harbor as an attack on Spanish sovereignty because of their memories of the *Romney* and British intervention in the Cuban slave trade. Many of them, according to Ryer, "believed that the *Maine* was deliberately blown up in Havana's harbor by the Yankees themselves as a pretext for intervention." This conspiracy sounds fabricated and baseless to Americans but is objectively similar to the conspiracies created by Americans about

the explosion at the time.⁴ Thus, the historiography of the nineteenth century Cuban independence movement played a significant role in the public's reaction to the *Maine*'s explosion and their perception of the war. Without any historical perspective, Americans failed to see the implications of the *Maine*'s approach into Havana Harbor.



Figure 1, "Holding the Watch on Him" (March 21, 1898), Source: Charles Bartholomew, *Cartoons of the Spanish-American War* (Minneapolis: Journal Printing Company, 1899), 35.

Nonetheless, the *Maine* certainly provided a potential pretense for American intervention in Cuba. In fact, one political cartoon represents McKinley's predicament, as described by Rickover, particularly well. Figure 1 depicts the president with a loaded gun, symbolizing his immediate ability to engage in war with Spain, while Uncle Sam "holds the watch" on him, as though

⁴ Ryer, 206.

provoking him. According to Rickover, as the investigation pushed on and results became more and more contentious, President McKinley could not wait for the completed inquiry before taking steps in preparation for war. Government leaders believed that the navy's job would be easier if he declared war and set manpower and equipment in place before the Spanish would be able to get gunboats across the Atlantic and fortify Havana Harbor. The complexity of the investigation forced the navy and the American media's hands in expeditiously preparing for war in Cuba.

Rickover also speaks in depth about the state of Congress and other bureaucratic and naval organizations at the time of the Cuba Libre movement. While Cuba withstood revolts in the past, American businesses had made increasingly "sizable investments on the island, particularly in sugar" by the time the 1895 rebellion broke out, and the American economy would be threatened just enough by this new rebellion to present a conflict of interest. Furthermore, Rickover speaks about the "new spirit" of romanticism and nostalgia that swept American society at the end of the nineteenth century. It prevailed primarily among the military class who fought in the Civil War, but also with young Americans seeking glory and a sense of masculine identity. New naval developments like Alfred Thayer Mahan's new writings on sea power, which produced a profound sense of confidence in the newly mighty American navy and its leaders, gave Americans an excitement towards war and a desire for dominance overseas.⁵

The establishment of the Naval War College in 1884 also created a class of senior naval officers with years of experience in wargaming and strategy, often with case studies like Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. This new officer class saw that "the proximity of Cuba gave the United States a great advantage" and believed that "the Americans should welcome an engagement, but not go out of their way to seek one." Rickover's book argues that the American government, public, and military leaders held a pre-

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⁵ Rickover, How the Battleship Maine was Destroyed, 7-8.

existing openness to war and in many ways sought an event, like the *Maine*, to launch the United States into a conflict.

Bonnie Miller, in the book *From Liberation to Conquest*, takes a different perspective on the reasons for a call to war in America. She joins an extensive existing field of literature that attributes the outbreak of the Spanish-American War to American media and yellow-journalism, as opposed to Rickover's description of bureaucracy and government pressure as the war's primary catalyst. Miller focuses her study of the war on the "sensory and psychological enticements of patriotic media surrounding US actions." ⁶ This book outlines the literary and visual mechanics used by journalists early in the war, and how they created the narrative of an unjust oppression of Cubans.

Imagery, for instance, played a large role in the effectiveness of American media. Devices like the feminization of the Cuba Libre movement depicted the Cuban rebels as damsels in distress waiting for the strong American military, a manly figure, to save the day. According to Miller and the many sensationalist political cartoons of the era, the feminized Cuban "victim" is portrayed as an Anglo-woman, with the Spanish portrayed as a "butcher".⁷ Depictions of Uncle Sam in American media also appealed to patriots and created a sense of American unity. To Miller, the importance of such devices came from their ability to increase American enlistment numbers and to shift public opinion in favor of going to war.

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⁶ Bonnie M. Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011), 1.

⁷ Miller, *From Liberation to Conquest*, 38.

Report, 68



Figure 2: Only a Question of Time (April 8. 1898), Source: Charles Bartholomew, *Cartoons of the Spanish-American War* (Minneapolis: Journal Printing Company, 1899), 40.

Miller's book argues that the American call to war in Cuba was driven primarily by a sensationalist movement among journalists. She portrays media in the United States as a competition which could often be taken out of hand by newspapers and a deep analysis of political cartoons of the pre-war years supports her claims. Figures 2 and 3, in particular, sternly advocate for war despite their lack of basis or reasoning for going to war. Figure 2 displays a hawkish sense of excitement for war with its illustration of Uncle Sam's cocked fist, the removal of his jacket, and a sinister-looking Spaniard standing over the wreckage of the Maine. This cartoon operates on multiple assumptions. Firstly, the United States is eager for and fully prepared to go to war and secondly, the only thing holding the country back is a direct order from the commander-in-chief. The cartoon is an effective propaganda source because it paints all of these assumptions as truths for the American public.

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Figure 3, "Blowing up Spain" (April 16, 1898), Source: Charles Bartholomew, *Cartoons of the Spanish-American War* (Minneapolis: Journal Printing Company, 1899), 47.

Figure 3 takes a similar stance towards the war, insinuating that the only thing holding the United States back is a gridlocked and lazy Congress without enough nerve to use military force against the Spanish. The tagline reads "If talking could settle it, our Senate would make short work of this war," implying that Americans were frustrated by the lack of military action taken against the Spanish. However, one prominent writer who emerged during this time and became a household name with yellow journalism is Joseph Pulitzer. According to Pulitzer's biography, the very nature of yellow journalism and these sensationalist pieces of literature is to make money, not to reflect the views of the American people.⁸ While the American public was certainly

⁸ George Juergens, *Joseph Pulitzer and the New York World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 48.

influenced by the media, and still is today, Miller's argument in *From Liberation to Conquest* is weakened by the fact that pro-war imagery and sensationalism writing from men like Joseph Pulitzer provide no evidence that the American public also believed these sentiments.

George Juergens, the author of Pulitzer's biography, outlines the reasons for Pulitzer's rise to fame and the reasons his name is still associated with yellow journalism. After all, Pulitzer, Hearst, and other household names were not the first of their kind to employ sensationalism in their reporting. Juergens argues that they simply did so at the perfect time for this kind of writing to catch the eye of the public on a wide scale. "Men who purchased their papers each morning at a station newsstand were more likely than subscribers to be influenced by a front page either startling, or shocking, or bright."⁹ With a growing urban population and an intriguing, yet still mysterious, backdrop of the *Maine*, Cuba Libre, and conflict with the Spanish, Pulitzer and other writers jumped at the opportunity to compete for daily media dominance through bold, but still baseless, political rhetoric in favor of war.

These media tactics were effective, but do not tell the full story. When it comes to the idea of 'jingoism', or extreme patriotism in the media, Juergens provides an explanation to why the media seemed so overwhelmingly in favor of war when this was not necessarily the case in all of America. Pulitzer, while described as "scholarly and judicious", could also "not afford the luxury of contradicting his audience." In the United States, there were two sides to the war debate, but the path of 'jingoism' provided less resistance to journalists like Pulitzer and Hearst, giving them an avenue to argue in favor of war and retribution for the sinking of the Maine.¹⁰

With the idea of vulnerability of the American public in mind, Kristin Hoganson writes *Fighting for American Manhood*.

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⁹ Juergens, 48.

¹⁰ Juergens, Joseph Pulitzer and the New York World, 212.

This book takes an opposing view to Miller's argument that the media was responsible for the call to war after the sinking of the *Maine*. Hoganson instead argues that the shift away from American neutrality and towards a more aggressive foreign policy was not driven by journalism, but by the American post-Civil-war male identity.¹¹ The Civil War and the tales of its heroics created a romanticized view of American manhood. Men saw war as a rite of passage for their generation and ignored the destructive loss of life and unity that war brings.

A shift in the industrial revolution towards a more whitecollar workforce also changed the idea of how Americans viewed the new generation of men. A male population lacking any experience at war combined with decreased demand for manual labor and an increase in white collar jobs, American society struggled with its masculine identity and sought out a chivalric pursuit outside of America's borders to revive this lost identity. Americans sought to "forge a new generation of martial heroes."¹² According to Hoganson, public support for the war was more so a product of romanticized memories of the Civil War and a fractured masculine identity than a product of media influence.

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¹¹ 'Post Civil War Male Identity' refers to American men's views of war as a central rite of passage into manhood and a prime opportunity to display their bravery and chivalry. Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 202.

Report, 72




Figure 4, "The Boys of '76 and '61 Pass on "Old Glory" to the Boys of '98" (May 30, 1898), Source: Charles Bartholomew, *Cartoons of the Spanish-American War* (Minneapolis: Journal Printing Company, 1899), 79.

To be sure, Hoganson does acknowledge American media as one of the mechanisms perpetuating this masculine crisis. Much like the imagery Miller describes in *From Liberation to Conquest*, journalists depicted Cuba as a damsel in distress through their illustrations of the Cubans as Anglo-women and Americans as a strong warrior. This imagery capitalized on the "chivalric standards" that men sought to revive, as they saw the war in Cuba as a perfect opportunity for gallantry and for the Spanish to be held accountable for their lack of honor. In fact, Figure 4 accurately depicts this same idea and its prevalence throughout American history. In the cartoon, men who are labeled as "the boys of '76" and "the boys of '61", named after the fighters of the American Revolution and Civil War, pass along an American flag to the "boys of '98." This cartoon not only provides evidence for Hoganson's argument, but also identifies the idea that these

"chivalric standards" are not new to American men. However, even with the influence of media on the American public, Hoganson still believes that America's struggling masculine identity was the main factor that pushed the United States to war.

One glaring weakness of Spanish-American War historiography, especially when it comes to the study of pre-war American society, is exploration of the anti-war argument. Piero Gleijeses, in his article "1898: The Opposition to the Spanish-American War", provides a sense of what currently exists about anti-war sentiments within both the media and the American public. A few Chicago newspapers give their perspective on the matter. The *Chicago Chronicle* argues that although the American public operates under the perception that the Spanish forces are weak and undisciplined, the same thing was said about the South during the American Civil War. Others argue that the war, from a utilitarian perspective, is not worth the money and manpower.¹³

While sensationalist journalists depicted a supportive attitude towards the war across America, Gleijeses describes antiwar papers as "less sanguine." He explains that they "had little confidence in the rebels" and believed the rebels "avoid all encounters' with Spanish troops, and 'confine their operations to the paralysis of all agricultural industry and the dynamiting of trains."¹⁴ Gleijeses brings an important idea to mind: not everyone in the nation believed that war with Spain in Cuba would be over quickly or without a significant toll on human life. In fact, many major news sources advocated against the war, warning that while an invasion of Cuba seems one-sided, the reality of the situation would naturally be met with more resistance than expected. Anti-war sources at the time brought up points of friction like the rough terrain, inexperience of American troops, and even yellow fever in

Report, 73

¹³ Piero Gleijeses, "1898: The Opposition to the Spanish-American War," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003) 695, accessed October 11, 2022, https://www.jstor.org/stable

¹⁴ Gleijeses, "1898: The Opposition to the Spanish-American War," 695.

order to diffuse the claims that this war would be quick and onesided.

The American news media at the time, however, suggests that one event in particular inspired a wave of changing and polarizing opinions. The outbreak of the Spanish-American War sees a distinct pivot point with the sinking of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor and the examination of primary sources like newspapers, correspondence, and cartoons both before and after the event suggest that a very dramatic shift occurred that day.

One example of this shift is a pair of articles published by the Baltimore Sun on different dates. The first, published on January 17, 1898, a month prior to the tragedy in Havana Harbor, is entitled "The Cuban Situation" and describes a peaceful situation in Cuba while the North Atlantic squadron departs towards "southern drill grounds" for routine operations. This article provides a uniquely pacifist approach to the Cuban independence movement compared to other media sources, but there are still a few conditional statements. For example, intervention is not justified in Cuba "until it has been proved that Spain is unable to restore peace or to conquer her rebellious subjects" and that Consul-General Lee has been given "broad discretion" to send a warship to Havana in the event that a situation may "justify defensive action."¹⁵ According to this article, the Baltimore Sun is not concerned with the war in Cuba, but still gives criteria for which war would be acceptable.

The second article was published on February 28, 1898, two weeks after the tragic sinking of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor. This article takes on a vastly different tone. "War of Heinous Kind" emphasizes the severity of war against Spain and acknowledges the massive loss of life that it would bring. "War is hell," proclaims Baltimore Rev. J. Woods Elliot, "But there is war of the most heinous kind, wherein 85,000 people are dying by the

Report, 74

¹⁵ "The Cuban Situation," *Baltimore Sun*, January 17, 1898, accessed October 13, 2022, https://www.proquest.com/hnpbaltimoresun

slow torture of starvation, rapine and murder, and we, as a nation, calmy stand by and pray that our people will not get excited." ¹⁶ To be sure, the article does not explicitly advocate for war, but it does provide a very thin line over which the United States is willing to cross at a moment's notice. The sinking of the *Maine*, while it did not necessarily transform the *Baltimore Sun* into an advocate for war or change its initial pretenses for which it believed war would be justified, evidently shifted its tone to hostile and defensive. Although the *Baltimore Sun* is an anti-war newspaper, it was still subject to the shock in American society propagated by the *Maine*'s sinking.

The *Chicago Daily Tribune* is also a good example of this pivot. An article entitled "Our Country at the Mercy of a Foreign Foe" in January of 1898 outlines a conservative approach to America's foreign policy, especially when it comes to naval operations. The article speaks about 'if' rather than 'when' the United States would go to war against Spain and assumed that up-and-coming naval superpowers like Germany and Japan were anti-American and would jump at the opportunity to use the Cuban conflict as a pretext for encroaching on American territory. All in all, the article takes a pessimistic and unpatriotic approach to US foreign involvement. It also suggests a lack of confidence of the American public in its military strength.¹⁷

For evidence on this stance, the *Chicago Tribune* cites the relative size and armament of the United States Navy against the aforementioned powers. The US is criticized for having a fleet that is not only small in numbers but also lacking the size and firepower necessary to be a threat outside its own waters. While the United States excels in coastal defense by employing small

Report, 75

¹⁶ "War of Heinous Kind," *Baltimore Sun*, February 28, 1898, accessed October 13, 2022, https://www.proquest.com/hnpbaltimoresun

¹⁷ "Our Country at the Mercy of a Foreign Foe," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, January 2, 1898, accessed October 13, 2022,

https://www.proquest.com/hnpchicagotribune

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torpedo boats and cruisers, it lacks a major battleship class that can rival most of the world's other naval superpowers.

Another significant shift brought by the *Maine*'s sinking on February 15, 1898 is the polarization of American media. The media experienced a particularly strong shift in its rhetoric from January into February of that year. One article, written less than two weeks after the *Maine*'s sinking, is entitled "If War Should Come" and once again paints the Cuban conflict as a purely naval one. It suggests that only two military actions are necessary in defeating Spain in the war against the Cuban rebels. A blockade of Spanish ships, with their troops and provisions unable to pass through to the island, would paralyze the Spanish ground forces and render them ineffective on land. For this approach, the author takes a surprisingly optimistic stance in favor of the navy's ability to fare against the Spanish navy. The article also cites past battles by Cuban rebels, saying that even without proper weapons, they are able to hold their own against the Spaniards:

"If without such munitions and with the immense risk and difficulties they incur in securing scanty supplies from the feeble filibustering expeditions [the Cuban rebels] not only hold their own against Spain but actually imprison the Spaniards in their forts and cities. It is obvious that possessing war appliances... they will exterminate all the Spanish columns daring to leave their fortified places." ¹⁸

This author believes that the only other missing piece in a war with Spain would be the armament of the Cuban rebels.

Religious Americans across the nation also became bolder and more patriotic after the sinking of the Maine. Reverend R. A. White cites sermons from four Chicago ministers in the *Chicago Daily Tribune*: W. E. Danforth, P. S. Henson, J. H. Boyd, and J. Q. A. Henry. Each of these men ultimately took a stance towards

¹⁸ "If War Should Come," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 26, 1898, accessed October 13, 2022, https://www.proquest.com/hnpchicagotribune

peace and the protection of human lives in the Cuban independence movement, both of which were consistent with traditional Christian beliefs. All four men, however, also speak about fervent patriotism as a way to achieve that peace and to mourn the losses of American lives. Rev. J. H. Boyd, for instance, says that "there are many of us who feel that the loss of that splendid ship and of those brave sailors was the price America and Americans have been called upon to pay for the procrastinating policy of those at the head of our nation, who have failed to deal honestly and courageously on behalf of an oppressed people."¹⁹ Even within American religious circles, there were men and women who viewed the sinking of the Maine as a non-negotiable and irrefutable call to war. While still not all Americans advocated strongly towards war, a strong majority became more passionate towards the subject, less indifferent towards the war, and more patriotic, as evidenced by both the statements of these ministers and the sentiments of the Chicago Tribune after the Maine's sinking. According to the Chicago Tribune, this event had a polarizing effect on the pre-existing beliefs of American society, forcing Americans to abandon their skepticisms and indulge their patriotism.

The *Washington Post* presents a different twist to this argument about the polarization of American media after the Maine's sinking. The *Post* is best characterized at the turn of the century as a conservative newspaper which focuses its articles on events and speeches, while generally avoiding editorials altogether. "As the Matter Stands in Cuba," an article written on January 15, 1898, makes no reference to war as a possible option in Cuba, stating that Spanish outbreaks in Cuba "are directed against autonomy and not against either Spain or the United States."²⁰ The

¹⁹ "Man and the Nation," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, February 21, 1898, accessed November 14, 2022, https://www.proquest.com/hnpchicagotribune

²⁰ "As the Matter Stands in Cuba," *The Washington Post*, January 15, 1898, accessed November 16, 2022, https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost

Washington Post takes a strictly neutral stance towards the Cuban conflict.

The *Washington Post* in the weeks following the sinking of the *Maine*, however, takes one of the most fervent anti-war stances out of any news source examined, being very skeptical about the true cause of the tragedy and refusing to make any definitive claims. In this way, the sinking of the *Maine* actually had a very minimal effect on the *Washington Post*'s coverage of the war.

"Spirit of American Press," a *Washington Post* article from February 25, not only criticizes sensationalist, or 'jingoist', newspapers in America for their quick rush to judgment about the explosion in Havana harbor, but it also claims that these kinds of newspapers fail to truly represent the sentiments of the American public. The subtitle reads "Representative Newspapers Deprecate Jingoism and Urge the Public to be Calm," insinuating that the only truly "representative" newspapers at the time were ones like the *Baltimore Sun, Richmond Times*, and *Boston Herald*, who urged the public to patiently await results of the *Maine* investigation and remain impartial in the meantime. These sources also share certain similarities when it comes to their conservatism.

Firstly, they all advocate for the public to reserve judgment and threats until the investigation is complete. Many conservative papers accuse the 'yellow' journalists of spreading fake stories about the events which took place on February 15. Called a "war scare" by the *New York Tribune* and the product of "cranks, fanatics, agitators, and alarmists" by the *Kansas City Journal*, the insinuation by sensationalist media that the sinking of the *Maine* is essentially a call to war is seen as ludicrous to conservative media.²¹ One claim by the *Indianapolis News* effectively sums up their criticism and attempts to diffuse the sensational arguments floating around: "Belligerent feelings evoked by the loss of the *Maine* have almost disappointed. Freak politicians like Senator

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²¹ "Spirit of American Press." *The Washington Post*, February 25, 1898, accessed November 14, 2022, https://www.proquest.com/hnpwashingtonpost

Mason are still breathing forth threatenings and slaughter. Freak newspapers still pretend to be excited... A few newspapers have been doing their best to create a demand for war. They have set about this task by lying on a large scale."²² This *Washington Post* article is so intriguing because it challenges the popular historiographical norm that the *Maine* disaster is the turning point in the public perception of the war by praising the patience and rationality of the American people in the wake of the sinking of the Maine. It depicts a society in which the sensationalist media represents a minority of the population but a strong majority of the public voice.

Furthermore, most sources also evoke a doubt as to whether or not war will come at all as a result of this catastrophic event. Sources like the *New York Tribune* describe war as ill-advised, arguing that the US Navy is not prepared to fight a far superior Spanish Navy and that the war would be a "wild and desperate scramble to do in a day what should have been done years ago." ²³ These sources represent a major conflict with modern historiography that suggests that the Spanish-American war is a product of overwhelming public support, sensationalist media, and romanticism of the Civil War. The newspapers of the time, however, suggest that the US government held far less support from the public than anticipated, and this illusion was nothing more than an attempt by yellow journalists to make more money.

The confusion between media sensationalism and the illusion of public support calls to mind a popular anecdote cited throughout American history. The credibility of the anecdote is heavily debated but produces the same effect either way. When the journalist William Randolph Hearst employed Frederic Remington, a famous painter and sculptor known for his scenes of the American West, to send sketches of the 1896 rebellion in Cuba back to him, Remington reported back that everything was quiet,

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²² "Spirit of American Press."

²³ "Spirit of American Press."

saying "There will be no war. I wish to return." Hearst is claimed to have replied "Please remain. You furnish the pictures, and I'll furnish the war."²⁴ This famous sentence exists today as a catch-all phrase to illustrate the many shortcomings of the media by claiming that much of their purpose is to sell stories, not to sell the truth. True or not, this quote lays a groundwork for plenty of media skepticism in the Spanish-American war. It also supports the claim that the narrative of widespread public support for the Spanish-American War that Miller, Hoganson, and Rickover describe is simply an illusion. Journalists like Pulitzer and Hearst, seeking money through their sensationalist rhetoric, were the creators of this illusion of public support.

To examine this bias, John Maxwell Hamilton, Renita Coleman, Bettye Grable, and Jaci Cole conducted a quantitative study on the prevalence of certain topics of the Cuban conflict in the American media in "An Enabling Environment." They also investigate the extent to which conservative, 'yellow', and mixed news sources are either pro-Spain or pro-Cuba. This spectrum from 'yellow' to 'non yellow' with mixed news sources in between, qualitatively defines how sensationalist a newspaper source was, with 'yellow' being the highest on the scale. The study examines 789 randomly selected articles from 10 different news sources, determining which biases are prevalent throughout different types of newspapers.

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²⁴ Joseph W. Campbell, *Getting it Wrong: Ten of the Greatest Misreported Stories in American Journalism* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2010),
9.

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Frame	All Types (%)	Conservative (%)	Yellow (%)	Mixed (%)
Spanish Internal Politics	44.0	42.4	38.9	50.0
US Politics & Diplomacy	30.7	32.5	25.2	30.4
Cuban Independence	19.4	17.3	27.7	18.7
Spanish Conflict	14.8	13.6	16.0	16.5
Cuban Internal Politics	13.0	10.1	8.5	21.2
Cuban Conflict	11.8	8.3	19.1	14.3
Spanish Humanitarian Abuses	11.8	3.7	38.2	12.1
Internatonal Politics	6.1	2.3	21.4	0.5
US Economic Interests	2.8	2.5	3.1	3.1
Cuban Humanitarian Abuses	0.5	0.2	0.8	0.9
Spanish Independence	0.3	0.5	0	0

Source: John Maxwell Hamilton, Renita Coleman, Bettye Grable, and Jaci Cole, "An Enabling Environment" in *Journalism Studies* 7, no. 1 (2006): 78–93, Table 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500450368.

The study proves its hypothesis that every type of newspaper presented stories sympathetic to Cuba and against Spain, that these newspapers were all biased towards Cuba and against Spain, and

that each of the newspapers gave significant coverage to Cuba.²⁵ Most surprisingly, as evidenced in Table 1, conservative newspapers ran more than double the number of stories about the war in Cuba as the yellow sources, and roughly 50 percent more than mixed sources. From those stories, however, yellow sources produced 23.8 percent more stories in support of Cuba and produced nearly the same number of stories in support of Spain. While yellow sources produced a lesser quantity of stories, they proved to be much more densely opinionated when it came to furnishing support for or against the war.

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²⁵ John Maxwell Hamilton, Renita Coleman, Bettye Grable, Jaci Cole, "An Enabling Environment," *Journalism Studies* 7, no. 1 (2006), 86.

Table 2: Frequencies and Average per day of Stories About CubaReport, 83
Percentages of Pro-Cuba Valence and Pro-Spain Valence Stories

Newspaper	Total No. of Stories	Average no. of Stories Per Day	Pro-Cuba (%)	Pro-Spain (%)
Conservative			14.7	6.0
Washington Post	112	8.0		
Los Angeles Times	131	9.4		
Seattle Post- Intelligencer	102	8.6		
New York Times	89	6.4		
Mixed			26.8	5.0
Atlanta Constitution	88	6.2		
St. Louis Post- Dispatch	48	3.5		
Chicago Tribune	88	6.3		
Yellow			38.5	6.2
Denver Post	47	3.4		
New York World	21	1.5		
New York Journal	63	4.5		

Source: John Maxwell Hamilton, Renita Coleman, Bettye Grable, and Jaci Cole, "An Enabling Environment" in *Journalism Studies* 7, no. 1 (2006): 78–93, Table 1, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616700500450368.

While Table 2 answers the extent to which each of these sources may be biased or opinionated, Table 1 represents the specific topics each news source chose to speak more about than others. This table emphasizes two major points of focus in all of America's newspapers: Spanish internal politics and US politics and diplomacy. Conservative, yellow, and mixed newspapers all focus on these two political mechanisms fairly equally. The yellow newspapers, however, speak about the issues of Spanish humanitarian abuses, international politics, and Cuban military conflict more than twice as frequently as any other newspapers. This means that yellow journalists are more concerned with outlining the positives of Cuban rebellion, while exposing the negatives of Spanish sovereignty in Cuba. Yellow sources are bound to be more pro-war because of their stronger support for Cuba and disdain for Spanish rule than any conservative news sources.

All in all, American historiography and the current field of literature describes a vulnerable American public and government falling victim to the sensationalist influence of the media. Authors like Bonnie Miller describe a creative class of journalists who fabricate a narrative of Spanish aggression through their use of imagery like the evil Spaniard, the Cuban damsel in distress, or Uncle Sam's loaded rifle and ticking clock for war.

Hyman Rickover also tells a story about a class of senior military leaders and government officials with significant personal interests and eagerness in going to war against Spain. The American economy and the future of its young navy saw an opportunity for growth and expansion and gave many Americans a strong desire to push for Cuban independence and dominate the Spanish military. With opportunity, however, also came vulnerability. Rickover and Hoganson both describe an American public with such a romanticized view towards war and need for a collective masculine identity, both of which are the products of the Civil War, that war seemed new and exciting.

Thus, current literature on the Spanish-American War provides proof that the *Maine*'s sinking, romanticism of the Civil War, a struggling masculine identity, and sensationalist media in 1898 played a role in increasing public support for the war. After all, the breaking of more than a hundred years of American neutrality required not only the support of government and senior military leaders, but also the public and the media, as these are the mechanisms which ultimately influence politics in America.

Spanish-American War era newspapers, however, do not fully support this historiographical narrative. For instance, the *Washington Post* criticizes sensationalist, or 'jingoist', newspapers in America for their quick rush to judgment about the explosion in Havana harbor. It claimed that these newspapers fail to truly represent the sentiments of the American public. Dozens of mainstream newspapers around the country advocated against intervention, while remaining calm about the catastrophe until the investigation was completed. They suggested the presence of a less well-known, conservative population in America who remained less outspoken, more rational, and less reactive to the sinking of the *Maine* than their 'jingoist' counterparts.

To be sure, sources like the *Chicago Tribune* and *Baltimore Sun* do see a considerable shift in their tone after the tragedy in Havana Harbor. Media sources like these were emboldened by the Maine's unifying, 'rally 'round the flag' effect. The one thing that both modern historiography and newspapers at the time agree on is that the sinking of the *Maine* changed the way many Americans thought about the war. The *Maine*, however, did not turn Americans from anti-war into pro-war overnight, but made their pre-existing opinions more bold. Neutral sources like the *Washington Post* would become even more neutral and push away from war, while yellow sources like the *New York Journal* would become even more pro-war.

Furthermore, the study in "An Enabling Environment" by Hamilton emphasizes that it is important to not only acknowledge "what" each newspaper is saying, but also "how" they are making these points. For example, while conservative newspapers produced more articles per week, sensationalist newspapers tended to be considerably more densely opinionated with words and phrases in support of Cuba and against Spain.

The current historiography of the Spanish-American War favors the narrative of a gullible American public and government exploited by the sensationalist influence of the media. While this perception of the American public in 1898 is rooted in some truth,

it does not tell the full story. The study of newspaper sources both before and after the sinking of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor shows a misrepresentation of the American public by modern scholars. They describe a 'jingoist,' pro-war population but do not account for the large conservative population of Americans who were less outspoken and reactive to the sinking of the *Maine*. Modern historiography therefore fails to encapsulate the broader public perception of the Spanish-American war through its oversimplification of the impact of the *Maine*'s explosion in Havana Harbor.

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Building an American: The United States Army and the Carlisle Indian Industrial School

John Thomas

Wisdom through History: this mantra compels individual soldiers, as well as the entire army, to examine the past and challenge traditional narratives in order to meet the challenges of today and build the army of the future. For an all-volunteer force exiting one conflict and facing one far greater in scale and complexity, it is now more important than ever to understand how the army has navigated civil-military relations throughout its history. Perhaps nowhere are the ethical challenges of civil-military relations clearer than in the tangled relationship of the United States with the Native American tribes.

In the 1870s, the federal policy towards Indigenous Americans turned from removal and destruction to assimilation and citizen-making. The primary medium for this mission of "Americanization" was the Native American Boarding School. Although not traditionally considered military history, the United States Army made an unmatched impact on the story of the boarding schools: the army designed the schools, funded their beginnings, and sought to define within their walls what it meant to be a good and successful American. The case study of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School provides the army of today an unparalleled and underappreciated perspective of its past as the fingertips of Washington's foreign policy, as a vehicle for minority social mobility, and as an essentially moralized institution tasked with defining what it is to be an American. The army can also learn much from the failures of Carlisle and the schools built in its image to redefine how it approaches education, access to American civic life, and the ethics of civil-military relations writ large.

The US Army has always been the primary tool for the United States' policy towards its most immediate neighbors: the Native American tribes to the west. In *American Foreign* Relations, Walter Hixson asserts that a series of disorganized frontier interactions, typically violent clashes and bloody reprisals over competing land claims, comprised America's "first foreign policy." This "settler colonialism," wherein "settlers drove indigenous populations from the land in order to construct their own ethnic and religious national communities," was followed and secured by the actions of state militia and federal forces.¹ Following 1783, "western expansion and Indian removal was believed to be vital to the security of the new republic," and despite the sympathy of some Americans concerning the frontier brutality, many "advised Indians to remove voluntarily... or face the wrath of the settlers."² Bloody cycles of retribution against Native Americans were the primary formative experiences of the post-Revolution US Army. After the total defeat of American forces by the Shawnee and Miami peoples in the 1791 Battle of the Wabash, which Hixson calls "the worst defeat the army ever suffered in battle with Indians," General Anthony Wayne mobilized "an infantry of 2,200 men backed by 1,500 Kentucky volunteers" in a campaign of revenge.³ The 1794 Battle of Fallen Timbers brought the defeat of the Delaware, Miami, Piankashaw, Shawnee, and Wea peoples, opening Ohio to waves of settlers.⁴ Although driven by settler expansion and acquisitive treaties wherever possible, the US government met resistance with "exterminatory violence" and "indiscriminate warfare" in a continent-spanning "campaign of removing Indians from the American frontier."5 The US Army was everywhere involved with this, to include the ethnic cleansing of the Cherokee and other peoples in the infamous Trail of Tears. One Soldier recounted accompanying the Cherokees as "the execution of the most brutal

⁵ Ibid.

Report, 88

¹ Walter Hixson, "The First Foreign Policy," in *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 2.

² Hixson, "The First Foreign Policy," 20–21.

³ Ibid., 22.

⁴ Ibid., 24.

order in the History of American Warfare," marked by Cherokees "driven at the bayonet point into the stockades."⁶

The US Army facilitated the broad and overwhelming expansion of American settlers and businesses into Indigenous territories. In his 1996 analysis of US Army combat operations in Texas, Thomas Smith noted that "army combat operations and the destruction of buffalo" as well as "the inexorable tide of Western settlement" across three decades effectively erased the combat power of the Plains tribes, one of the final Indigenous opponents to American expansionism.⁷ Once the United States reached the Pacific and there was nowhere else for the Native Americans to go except for reservations, the question of what to do with the Natives arose once again; except crucially, these peoples were now the wards of the United States government. The army which had battled these tribes now found itself in the first forays of a new field of civil-military relations.

With the shift to reservations, the treatment of Native Americans turned from foreign policy to domestic, and the United States had to find a new answer to the Native American question. Here again, the US Army was the solution. As the United States continued to expand rapidly and occupy Native territory, the western tribes were progressively relegated to smaller, semiautonomous "reservations" that existed in a liminal space within the United States borders. In *American Foreign Relations*, Hixson called this process "internal colonialism." Seeing Native Americans as "a pre-modern obstruction to commercial expansion," the people of the United States generally believed they "had either to be removed from the desired land or face

Report, 89

⁶ Ronald N. Satz, "The Cherokee Trail of Tears: A Sesquicentennial Perspective," *The Georgia Historical Quarterly* 73, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 459.

⁷ Thomas T. Smith, "US Army Combat Operations in the Indian Wars of Texas, 1849-1881," *The Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 99, no. 4 (April 1996): 529–30.

extermination."8 The US Army was the main actor in forcing Indigenous peoples into controlled reservations.⁹ Informed by his experience in the army and the rising humanitarian reform movement, President Grant announced a "Peace Policy" that in reality "terminated treaty making with Indians, who henceforth would be approached exclusively as a subjugated minority population" warned to comply or face "a sharp and severe war policy."¹⁰ While missionary elements of the United States had long experimented with "reforming" and "educating" Native Americans, "from 1819 till 1870 the process of civilizing the native was" generally left to private religious groups.¹¹ However, by 1880, "the earlier policies of removal had now reached their logical conclusion in the form of the Indian reservation" and time had run out – as census figures reflected a catastrophically shrinking Native population, "policymakers moved aggressively to assimilate the Indian into the mainstream of American life."12 Adams quotes Annie Beecher Scoville, missionary to the Sioux, as describing the Native American school as "the slow match. [Uncle Sam] lights it and goes off whistling, sure that in time it will blow up the old life, and of its shattered pieces he will make good citizens."¹³ However, these on-reservation schools reported that the daily education had a fleeting influence at best. As told by contemporary sociologist Frank Blackmar in 1892, "the tribal inspiration and the tribal influence" meant that a student would return at the end of each day "to his home in the native tribe, where

¹³ Ibid.

Report, 90

 ⁸ Walter Hixson, "Preserving the Union, Taking the West," in *American Foreign Relations: A New Diplomatic History* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 93.
 ⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 94.

¹¹ Robert L. Brunhouse, "The Founding of the Carlisle Indian School," *Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies* 6, no. 2 (April 1939):
72.

 ¹² David Wallace Adams, "Fundamental Considerations: The Deep Meaning of Native American Schooling, 1880-1900," *Harvard Educational Review* 58, no.
 1 (February 1988): 3.

he finds himself surrounded with all the influences of the camp life" and his education "is literally thrown away."¹⁴ The solution to this problem came from an unlikely corner: an army captain, seventy-two Native American prisoners, and a fort in St. Augustine, Florida.

In the US Army, Richard Henry Pratt found inspiration, opportunity, and resources to pursue a radically different idea of inclusion. As the founder of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School, Pratt has long been a complicated figure in the history of Native American oppression. He is infamous for his 1892 statement "that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man."¹⁵ However, he viewed his crusade for educating and assimilating Native American children as a humanitarian endeavor: his words, terrible as they are, were said at the "National Conference for Charities and Corrections," and were followed with a call to "cease to teach the Indian that he is less than a man" and to "recognize fully that he is capable in all respects as we are, and that he only needs the opportunities and privileges which we possess to enable him to assert his humanity and manhood."¹⁶ The historiographical treatment of Pratt has evolved with the times, and an ethical understanding of Carlisle must begin with his complex example.

To clarify an image of a man so central to the story of Native American boarding schools and the United States Army, it is appropriate to take a short look at Pratt's life and military career. Lomawaima and Ostler's 2018 article in the *Journal of American Indian Education* sought to develop a more "multidimensional portrait of Pratt," drawing a personal narrative to contextualize the

¹⁴ F. W. Blackmar, "Indian Education," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 2 (May 1892): 88–89.

¹⁵ Richard Henry Pratt, "The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites," *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction* 19, no. 1 (1892): 46.

¹⁶ Ibid., 58–59.

founding of Carlisle in his eyes.¹⁷ Born in New York, Pratt struggled to provide for his family as a young tinsmith's apprentice after the sudden death of his father. In 1861, he enlisted in the United States Army and fought in the Civil War, leaving the army as a captain in 1865.¹⁸ Shortly after the war ended, he rejoined the army and served as "a cavalry officer and commander of Indian scouts' on the Western frontier" from 1867 to 1875; Pratt credited this part of his life with "engaging his interest in the two races" – Native American and white – "and guiding his commitment to an inclusive US citizenship."¹⁹ In 1874, Captain Pratt was charged with taking 72 Native Americans "believed to be the ringleaders" of retaliatory violence against treaty violations to imprisonment in Fort Marion at St. Augustine, Florida.²⁰ In Florida, Pratt found the opportunity to put his ideas into practice.

As a result of their capture, incarceration, and eventual training by the US Army, Captain Pratt's seventy-two prisoners became the proof of concept that led to the founding of Carlisle. During their incarceration, Pratt began to experiment with education as a means of "civilization," renting the prisoners "out to work in the various industries about the town" and teaching them English within the fort.²¹ Four months after arrival, Pratt found his program to be such a success that he advanced to military education, organizing "a company to guard the fort," rearming his prisoners, and dismissing the garrison detachment.²² Pratt "lobbied federal authorities to allow him to enroll the prisoners at Hampton Institute in Virginia," administered by General Samuel Chapman

Report, 92

¹⁷ K. Tsianina Lomawaima and Jeffrey Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," *Journal of American Indian Education* 57, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 82.

¹⁸ Brunhouse, "The Founding of the Carlisle Indian School," 74.

¹⁹ Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural

Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 83.

²⁰ Brunhouse, "The Founding of the Carlisle Indian School," 74.

²¹ Brunhouse, 75; Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt:

Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 83.

²² Brunhouse, "The Founding of the Carlisle Indian School," 75.

Armstrong, but found Hampton's "ladder of races" model, designed to "inculcate in southern Blacks the merits of subservient domestic and field labor for White employers," completely counterproductive to citizenship and inclusion.²³ For "the prejudice on both sides [to] be destroyed," Pratt argued "it was necessary for the Indian to associate and to compete directly with the white man," seeking and earning approval from the Secretary of War and later Congress to begin a new school in the army barracks in Carlisle, Pennsylvania.²⁴ This would be the first off-reservation school for Native American children run by the government, and it was wholly the US Army's in invention, leadership, and funding. Other government non-reservation schools would follow, and "Carlisle was the model on which they were patterned."²⁵ As noted in 1892, the education of Native Americans was "the only national education system that we have outside of the naval and military schools."²⁶ In this way, the Native American boarding schools represented an experiment in civil-military relations, not just by Pratt but by the United States federal government. The Carlisle school was uniquely US Army, both in values and in practice.

Influenced by his army career, Captain Pratt explicitly and implicitly used his boarding schools as a venue to communicate what an American ought to believe and ought to be. Pratt often expressed pain and anger at the idea of an "inherited hierarchy" of races with no possibility for advancement.²⁷ Pratt compared Native Americans to white immigrants: in his original words, "we invite the Germans to come into our country... and the result is immediate success. Why not try it on the Indians? ... Transfer the savage-born infant to the surroundings of civilization, and he will

²³ Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 83.

²⁴ Brunhouse, "The Founding of the Carlisle Indian School," 76.

²⁵ Ibid., 85.

²⁶ Blackmar, "Indian Education," 103.

²⁷ Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 85.

grow to possess a civilized language and habit."28 Although radically against the racial views of some of his contemporaries. Pratt was a lifelong, diehard proponent of the moral and cultural superiority of American civilization to that of Indigenous tribes. His goal, articulated through Carlisle, was to stand "against colonizing Indians, and in favor of individualizing them" - cutting their hair and forcing them into military uniforms and Western clothing to break them of a community-centric culture and create "first-class workmen and workwomen."29 The dimensions of militaristic patriotism and capitalist work ethic were joined with the concept of property ownership; at Carlisle, Pratt bragged that "what they earn is theirs... they are taught to save," with many of the students having personal bank accounts.³⁰ Through extreme military discipline, industrial training, and complete control over the students' modes of dress and communication, Captain Pratt and other boarding school leaders created a high-pressure environment meant to rapidly advance the indigenous children "across 'the dreary chasm of a thousand years of tedious evolution" in a single generation.³¹ The influence of the army was as clear in Pratt's vision as it was in the eventual reality of Carlisle.

The methodology of the Indian School at Carlisle was thoroughly militaristic and set a precedent that all Native American boarding schools would follow. The army was seen then as it is now: a path to virtuous citizenship, combining value education with service to the nation. Discipline was considered "among the first principles of citizenship," and the army was "an occupation which offers protection on the one hand and restraint on the other" – in sum, a controlled path, "the first and best road to selfgovernment."³² Through this philosophy, elements of military life

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²⁸ Pratt, "The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites," 56.

²⁹ Pratt, 57.

³⁰ Ibid., 57.

³¹ Adams, "Fundamental Considerations: The Deep Meaning of Native American Schooling, 1880-1900," 11.

³² Blackmar, "Indian Education," 105.

diffused broadly throughout the boarding school experience. A system of "uniforms, mass drill, and rigorous discipline" enabled relatively few employees to effectively "control large numbers of students."³³ The daily regime was frequently sounded off by bells: the Navajo school at Fort Defiance recorded in 1903 that "23 bells began at 6:00 a.m. and ended at 8:00 p.m."³⁴ Students were organized by "military and school uniforms," segregated "by gender and age" and under constant and "extraordinary surveillance."³⁵ The native students were paraded in "patriotic rituals" that often achieved significant publicity, such as President McKinley's 1901 visit to the Phoenix Indian School, where 700 students "performed a highly disciplined marching routine before lining up in front of the President." At the sound of a bugle, they chanted: "I give my head and my heart to my country; one country, one language, and one flag."³⁶ In punishing the students, Carlisle and the schools in its image also employed military lessons. The response to offenses like running away or disobedience ranged from hard labor, having "to work hard on a long tunnel under the mess hall," sometimes "on a ball and chain;" humiliation, young men being "dressed for weeks in girls' clothes;" and peer or group punishments, like crawling through "a 'belt line' consisting of two rows of students with belts" who whipped the offender.³⁷ Within the walls of Carlisle existed an engineered environment of military discipline. The intended result of such brutality: the pacification of tribes resisting being trapped on reservations, the creation of many thousands of "model Americans" ready for faithful military service

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 ³³ Jon Reyhner, "American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What Is Going Right?," *Journal of American Indian Education* 57, no. 1 (2018): 66.
 ³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 86.

³⁶ Adams, "Fundamental Considerations: The Deep Meaning of Native American Schooling, 1880-1900," 9.

³⁷ Reyhner, "American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What Is Going Right?," 66–67.

or private labor, and the sparing of future Native Americans the treatment of the previous centuries.

The students of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School drew lessons from their experiences, which varied as much as their backgrounds, and their accounts serve as judgment for the school. Over the past decade, historians and governments have sought to uncover the realities of the many schools like Carlisle across the United States and Canada. These efforts have frequently uncovered dark findings. In July 2022, the US Army announced "the completion of the fifth round of the Army's ongoing initiative to excavate the remains of Native American children who died at the school... and repatriate them to their closest living relatives."³⁸ With this fifth round, "a total of 28 successful repatriations have occurred," with "over 150 graves" to go - often unmarked and containing the remains of multiple children.³⁹ The disciplinary methods applied to strip the often captive indigenous children of their cultural identity were brutal. Scarcity was rampant. Students often "washed in icy water in an unheated washroom," lacked food beyond "bread and molasses, coffee, meat and gravy," and suffered from "starvation diets" and the "shoddiest of shoddy' clothing."40 However, the reservations from which they were taken were widely "sites of endemic poverty, starvation," and stricken with "impacts of deadly disease" - sometimes the scant boarding school resources were still an improvement.⁴¹ Various tribes that were historically separated were able to "meet each other, intermarry,

from-carlisle-indian-school-returned-to-families.html.

³⁹ Ibid.

Report, 96

³⁸ Zack Hoopes, "Army Says Seven Sets of Remains from Carlisle Indian School Returned to Families," News, PennLive, July 8, 2022, https://www.pennlive.com/news/2022/07/army-says-seven-sets-of-remains-

⁴⁰ Reyhner, "American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What Is Going Right?," 61; Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 87.

⁴¹ Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 85.

and develop a multi-tribal identity" that carried back to their homes, finding resilience in solidarity.⁴²

Many graduates found their education to have equipped them to follow a variety of ambitions. Jim Thorpe, the first Native American Olympic gold medalist and All-American football player, attended Carlisle.⁴³ Luther Standing Bear wrote prolifically after graduating to explain native and boarding school experiences to non-native audiences, becoming "a forceful advocate for the value of native cultures in a modern world."44 An eloquent proponent of Native American cultural pluralism and "strong critic of federal Indian policy," Standing Bear still called Pratt "a man of 'high principles'" and readily praised him for seeing "the humanity of Indian people."⁴⁵ Many graduates joined the army, like Lieutenant Long Lance, whose letter home was featured in the New York newspaper "The Sun" in February of 1917. Lance, a graduate of Carlisle, wrote not to his parents or his friends, but to his former teachers: "Kind remembrances and best wishes for the New Year. I've just come out of the trenches... manners 'Made in Germany' aren't quite what you and I were taught." Long Lance was appointed to West Point by President Wilson but did not accept.⁴⁶ That a young indigenous man could go through such abusive education, enter a society that considered him a lower type of human, and receive the honor of an appointment is emblematic of the complexity behind Carlisle. Lieutenant Long Lance's story, incredible as it is, stands as but one of a long history of exceptional service by Native Americans to a country that wronged them for hundreds of years.

⁴² Reyhner, "American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What Is Going Right?," 70.

⁴³ Ibid.

 ⁴⁴ Lomawaima and Ostler, "Reconsidering Richard Henry Pratt: Cultural Genocide and Native Liberation in an Era of Racial Oppression," 90.
 ⁴⁵ Ibid., 94.

⁴⁶ "American Indian Is Fighting for Allies," *The Sun*, February 12, 1917.

The Carlisle School and similar institutions impacted the students that walked through their doors in ways that have rippled through successive generations. In the face of this complex trauma, Native American tribes have also developed long-standing traditions of honorable service in the Army. To Pratt, Carlisle was a humanitarian intervention to save the Native Americans from inevitable destruction. To many of its students, Carlisle was the next chapter in the loss of their people – this time, a cultural rather than a physical destruction. Today, "poverty pervades many US Indian reservations and Canadian reserves," resulting in no small part from "the loss of valuable lands and forced removal, now called ethnic cleansing." Additionally, many graduates of the boarding schools grappled with losing the acceptance of their tribal homes without having truly equal and unfettered access to white society, being forced into a liminal space between identities.⁴⁷ Studies have named this education as contributing to the spectrum of societal challenges facing reservations today, including much higher suicide rates and gang activity than comparable offreservation populations.⁴⁸ The role of Native Americans in the United States has never been a simple story, and this includes boarding schools; "some students were crushed by the experience, some soldiered through and survived it, and some thrived."49 The pipeline of reservation to Carlisle to the army is also only one element of a longer and complicated story of service.

The Carlisle School as a tie between the US Army and the Native American tribes is contextualized by deployment of Native allies dating back to before the Revolution. MG George Crook attested that in his "campaign against Apaches in Arizona… 'every successful encounter with the hostiles was due exclusively to the

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⁴⁷ Reyhner, "American Indian Boarding Schools: What Went Wrong? What Is Going Right?," 72.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 72–73.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 72.

exertions of Indian scouts."50 Parallel to the development of Carlisle were attempts to enlist Native Americans as infantrymen. which sought "graduates of the Indian schools, who were fluent in English, as sergeants within the Indian units" for their leadership training and translation abilities.⁵¹ After the height of the boarding schools in the 1890s and early 1900s, Native Americans continued to serve with distinctive valor: those like Lieutenant Long Lance "volunteered for the most perilous missions" in World War I, leading to Native Americans "losing about 5 percent of those who served compared to the 1 percent loss for US troops overall."⁵² The Navajo code talkers of World War II are famous to this day for their critical role in the war of intelligence. In the Korean War and afterwards, Native Americans have served in "the upper echelons of the Army," such as Major General Hal Muldrow Jr., a Choctaw.⁵³ Simply put, the story of Native Americans is the story of America, and it is the story of the United States Army. The students that walked through the doors of Carlisle experienced its pain and promise differently, and the Carlisle Indian Industrial School is but one entry in the much longer history of Native Americans serving honorably in the US Army. However, it deserves the same full consideration that other chapters of our country's military history have received. We may yet stand to benefit from greater attention in this direction, as individuals and as an Army.

To pass final judgment on the ethical nature of the Carlisle Indian Industrial School is far beyond the scope or capacity of this article. However, its story has been shown to be uniquely and thoroughly one of the United States Army. At all points – inspiration, foundation, conduct, and aftermath – the army was heavily involved. The implications of this involvement have

⁵³ Ibid.

Report, 99

⁵⁰ David McCormick, "A Novel Proposition: Indian Regulars in the US Army in the 1890s," *Army History* 114 (Winter 2020): 9.

⁵¹ Ibid., 8.

⁵² Ibid., 15.

flowed through our organizational thought patterns in ways that are hard to fully grasp. Today, the former site of the Carlisle boarding school shares space with the Army War College. Education is a core component of the military mission today, far beyond the halls of West Point and the War College. Counterinsurgency efforts in Vietnam and Afghanistan often included education - looking to Carlisle, how might our institutional legacy of "reforming" other cultures affect the values and behaviors we implicitly impress upon civilian populations? Carlisle is one of the deepest roots of military obedience being defined as a publicly educated American civic virtue; its militarization of young students brought out success in some, but certainly not all. ROTC programs accept thousands of cadets every year who have already been prepared for service as teenagers in JROTC. What could Carlisle's example tell us about the military education in JROTC today? There are no clear answers to these ethical dilemmas. However, it is incumbent upon every army professional to scrutinize the history of our institution in all its complexity, that we may better understand our impact on the world today and create a better world tomorrow. Carlisle and all of the boarding schools that followed its example are integral parts of our army's history and deserve to be researched and understood as such. For leaders today, there are several potential benefits of further research into the ethics of this complicated institution.

Perhaps nothing in this story illustrates better the potential of an individual Soldier to change the army and the nation than the ultimate force behind the Carlisle School, Richard Henry Pratt. From a poor tinsmith's apprentice enlisting in the deadliest conflict of American history to a captain whose complex moral beliefs were propagated across the continent for a century, the force of Pratt's personality left an impact still felt today, for better and for worse. His school's story refuses a simple explanation, and reminds us that all in the army must seek relentlessly to be selfcritical and ethical leaders of character; who knows how your example will be followed.

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Earhart's Final Hours: Life, Disappearance, and Legacy

Alexandra Carmack

Introduction

On July 2, 1937, Earhart took off in her Lockheed Electra for the last time from Lae, New Guinea, leaving for the last leg of her circumnavigation of the globe. Her navigator, Fred Noonan, was tasked with ensuring that they made it to their next destination, Howland Island.¹ It would be dark at their expected arrival time, so, it was imperative that their calculated route flew them close enough to the island to see the lights of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter, the Itasca, which would be awaiting their arrival to guide them in and ensure a safe landing on the small, uninhabited island.² In an unexpected turn of events, Earhart and Noonan would never arrive at Howland, prompting a massive search-and-rescue mission for the missing persons. Eventually, the U.S Navy released a report stating that the aviators' cause of death was drowning, after assuming that they ran out of fuel and subsequently crashed into the ocean.³ Since the release of the report, there has been mass speculation and debate regarding Earhart and Noonan's true cause of death. The looming question is: what really happened to Amelia Earhart? One argument states that Earhart and Noonan crashed into a remote, nearby island called Nikumaroro (Gardner Island at the time) where they lived out their final days. These theorists cite

¹ "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937," Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1875-2006 in *World War II Action and Operational Reports, December 7, 1941-1946*, Record Group 38, National Archives at College Park, MD, https://catalog.archives.gov/id/305240. ² Randall Brink, *Lost Star: The Search for Amelia Earhart* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994).

³ "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937," 1-2.

decades of accumulated archeological and analytical evidence.⁴ The other side argues in favor of the contents of the initial Navy report: Earhart and Noonan crashed into the Pacific Ocean and drowned, and any argument to the contrary is nothing more than a baseless conspiracy. This paper will examine each side of this historical debate, and ultimately determine which thesis holds more merit based on their claims, evidence, and logic.

Ocean Crash Theory

The original, most commonly accepted theory is that Noonan and Earhart crash-landed into the Pacific Ocean after failing to find Howland Island and running out of fuel, as was reported by the United States Navy and Coast Guard. This theory revolves around one central concept: the other side simply does not have evidence to prove that their theory is true, so this one must be true. For example, the radio transmissions, said to have been broadcast by Earhart after the estimated time of the crash cannot be traced back to her with complete certainty. In the days following the crash, reports of "carrier waves" (radio signals) in the vicinity of Howland island arose, as reported by the US Coast Guard. Additional SOS messages were picked up, centering around the Phoenix group of islands southeast of Howland, which is in the direction of Nikumaroro. This is also the direction that friends and colleagues of Noonan knew he would head in the event of an emergency. Despite how promising these leads were, by the time the search reached this area there was no evidence found of the Electra, Earhart, or Noonan being there.⁵ According to Long:

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⁴ Thomas F. King, "The Archaeological Context of the 1940 Nikumaroro Bones Discovery." *TIGHAR*, November 2017: 1-4,

https://tighar.org/Projects/Earhart/Archives/Documents/BonesForensicAnalysis/05ArchaeologicalContext.pdf.

⁵ Carol A. Pearce, *Amelia Earhart* (New York: Facts On File Publications, 1988), 146-147.

"...the incessant calls of the *Itasca*, calling KHAQQ and Earhart by name, were being broadcast indiscriminately to most of the Pacific and a good part of the world. Dozens of people, having just heard the name 'Earhart' or 'KHAQQ' over their receiver, sent reports of having heard her. Some even claimed to have messages sent in Morse code by Earhart or messages of her reported position where no land or island existed."⁶

According to supporters of this argument, it is impossible to know if a true radio broadcast from Earhart was heard, and the reports were likely just the result of frenzied aviation enthusiasts, no more than conspiracists. Further, when questioned by the crew of the Itasca, residents of two nearby islands, Arorai and Tamana, claimed that they neither heard nor saw the plane come down.⁷ Therefore, it is not likely that Earhart and Noonan ended up on the islands in the direct vicinity of Howland.

A strong supporting factor of this argument is that government-reported strong headwinds, heavy weather, and low visibility would have made it extremely difficult for Earhart and Noonan to 1) make it to Howland Island without running out of fuel, which would be drained from fighting headwinds, and 2) spot the island when/if they finally did arrive. According to the US Navy's report, the most likely courses that Noonan would have taken in an event of predicted early-morning low visibility from the east were either overcorrecting southward running up a morning longitude through the target or overcorrecting northward to run down a morning longitude through Howland Island. Both of these options would have placed the aviators over the open ocean if they overshot their target, which would be catastrophic in the event of a premature gas shortage.

If there truly were strong headwinds and heavy weather as the Navy reported, they would have few other pieces of land to retreat to if they could not find Howland. In fact, Navy Lt. Warren

⁶ Elgen M. Long and Marie K. Long, *Amelia Earhart: The Mystery Solved*, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 216.

⁷ "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937," 6.

W. Harvey stated that "If Miss Earhart entered the storm, she hadn't¹⁰⁴ a chance."⁸ The Navy's report claims that Earhart and Noonan experienced stronger headwinds than expected and estimated that the pair flew at an average of about 110 knots. The recommended speed for the flight was approximately 130 knots, which would have the pair arrive soon after the sun had come up but after the immediate daybreak to avoid visibility problems.⁹ Earhart and Noonan were slightly behind schedule, but it is unlikely that this caused any major concerns regarding fuel, since they were just short of the recommended speed. However, if the pair spent too much time searching for the island, it is possible that fuel became a concern.

In fact, researchers know for certain that Earhart and Noonan were concerned about running out of fuel; she said so herself in her last hour of broadcasting.¹⁰ According to Long and the Charter Report from Lae, New Guinea, Earhart's plane was filled with 1,100 US gallons the day before takeoff.¹¹ However, it was 88-degrees Fahrenheit and sunny in the daytime, which affected the 87-octane fuel's density and caused an estimated reduction by expansion and venting to an equivalent 1,092 standard 6-pound US gallons (fuel expands and weighs less per gallon at higher temperatures). So, the calculation of flight endurance based on a standard 6-pound gallon may have been skewed.¹²

An hour and a half after Earhart's correspondence with Captain Thompson regarding her concern over fuel, he sent a message to the San Francisco division saying, "EARHART CONTACT 0742 REPORTED ONE HALF HOUR FUEL AND NO LANDFALL . . ."¹³ The *Itasca* departed to search to the northwest on line 157 337° a half hour later. Earhart's last transmission to the ship at 0843 had stated that they were traveling up and down line

⁸ W.C. Jameson, *Amelia Earhart: Beyond the Grave* (Lanham: Taylor Trade Publishing, 2016), 78.

⁹ "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937," 7.

¹⁰ Long and Long, 29.

¹¹ Ibid., 189.

¹² Ibid., 232.

¹³ Ibid., 232.

157 337, which runs northwest to southeast through Howland Island, in an attempt to find land and the *Itasca*.¹⁴ Nikumaroro (then called Gardner Island) also sits on this line. Not only does this mean that Earhart was very much still aloft a full hour after Thompson reported her claiming to only have a half hour of fuel left, but it also presents Nikumaroro as a very real possibility for an emergency landing site, lying directly on the path she and Noonan were traversing. This is cause for the suspicion leading to the second theory.

Nikumaroro Theory

The other, more hopeful side of the historical debate regarding Earhart and Noonan's ultimate whereabouts believes that the two landed on Nikumaroro, a small coral atoll southeast of Howland, rather than crashing into the sea. Earhart was not known to give up, and Fred Noonan's wife even stated that he would turn back if in doubt rather than ditch the Electra in the sea.¹⁵ According to Earhart's close friends, she claimed that if she could not find Howland Island, then she would attempt to land on a nearby island with fresh water on it.¹⁶ Subscribers to this theory argue that Earhart and Noonan were attempting to find Howland Island, but struggled due to early-morning visibility problems. So, they ultimately elected to land on another island along the line that they were traversing, 157 337.

As to the claim of adverse weather conditions, there is littleto-no evidence that there was any sort of storm or heavy weather upon Earhart's arrival to the area surrounding Howland Island, nor did she mention this in her transmissions.¹⁷ Researcher Rollin Reineck even goes so far as to claim that the story of serious weather problems was completely fabricated by the navy to explain Earhart

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¹⁴ Jameson, 65.

¹⁵ "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937."

¹⁶ Pearce, 143.

¹⁷ Jameson, 78.

and Noonan's disappearance. Additionally, the University of Hawaii's meteorological reports near Howland Island at the time showed that conditions were suitable for flying, and Jameson even goes so far as to claim that "Harvey's descriptions of snow, sleet, and ice in the area were incorrect. He was either provided with this information to broadcast or ordered to manufacture it himself."¹⁸ So, there is a great deal of doubt surrounding the argument of adverse weather conditions. While there is no evidence supporting why Lieutenant Harvey would fabricate weather data, there is also no other confirmation claiming that said extreme weather conditions indeed existed. As for visibility concerns, Leo G. Bellarts, chief radio broadcaster on the *Itasca*, said that no such problems existed, claiming, "As to the weather, there were puffy clouds to the northwest but plenty of blue in between them. Other than that, it was a very clear day."¹⁹

Another point on the position of an emergency landing on Nikumaroro is that there was simply no evidence pointing toward the theory that the plane crashed into the water surrounding Howland Island. Further, Nikumaroro was not searched because it was not in the radius of the Navy and Coast Guard's search and rescue. The search team focused their efforts toward the southwest of Howland based on wind and sea current directions since they assumed the aviators would be in the water, but Nikumaroro is southeast of Howland.²⁰ This search turned up no evidence of a downed plane, oil slick, crash debris, etc. According to Jameson, "there exists no evidence that points to the notion that Earhart and Noonan were anywhere near Howland Island when they came down."²¹ If the plane had come down in the open water as the first theory suggests, it would have remained largely undamaged. The fuel tanks were purposefully engineered as a flotation device to keep

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¹⁸ Ibid., 78.

¹⁹ Ibid., 78.

²⁰ "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937," 7.

²¹ Jameson, 78.

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the plane afloat in the event of a water landing.²² So, it is likely that the plane would still be visible and spotted by searchers in the hours and days following the crash. However, in the instance of a crash landing on an Island such as Nikumaroro, the Electra likely would have taken substantial damage, causing the fuel tanks to be punctured and allowing for the plane to sink if carried out to sea.²³ Just offshore of Nikumaroro are massive underwater cliffs, which, if the plane was carried out by the coral atoll's dramatic tide changes, could allow for the plane to be swept away deep and far out into the ocean. So, this could be an explanation for the disappearance of the plane, which the Navy was searching for. If they didn't spot a plane, they would likely rule the area out as a crash site and fail to search the land for castaways. Further, if Noonan and Earhart did in fact find land, it is unlikely that they abandoned this position to make themselves more visible to search parties; this would make them more vulnerable and they may have not been able to find their way back to the island and the Electra. Rather, they more likely sought shelter and waited to be rescued.

Additionally, the Navy reported that "the plane's radio power supply was so located that it could not have been used with [the] plane on the water."²⁴ So, considering the numerous reports of transmissions and carrier waves from Earhart after her disappearance, it is unlikely that she was broadcasting from the water. If Earhart and Noonan had crash landed into the ocean as the original theory suggests, it would not have been possible for her to continue broadcasting on her radio, and it is proven that she did just that. On the other hand, if the plane, which stood at 3.0734 meters tall, landed in the atoll of Nikumaroro Island, it would remain perched above the water even at the maximum predicted tide of 1.934 meters.²⁵ In this case, it would be possible that the radio

²² "US Navy Report of the Search for Amelia Earhart, July 2-18, 1937," 10.

²³ Ibid, 10.

²⁴ Ibid, 4.

²⁵ "L-10 Electra," National Naval Aviation Museum, Naval History and

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remained usable to Earhart (especially accessible at low tide, when almost all of the transmissions were recorded) until the Electra was ultimately swept out to sea.

Another compelling set of evidence supporting the Nikumaroro theory is the archaeological excavation conducted by TIGHAR (The International Group for Historic Aircraft Recovery). They found a great number of artifacts on Nikumaroro Island strongly implying that "a woman from the United States lived and died [there] in the late 1930s."²⁶ The artifacts found included, but were not limited to, a compact mirror with early 20th-century rouge consistent with one Earhart is shown holding in photographs, a small jar containing mercury-based freckle fading cream (Earhart was known for her freckles), and a snap fastener consistent with those which would have been part of a Tabloid first aid kit, which was documented to have been aboard the Electra. Additionally, a US zipper pull was found, and after examination it was determined that it was made between 1933 and 1936. This put to rest claims that the belongings were those of a victim of the SS Norwich City shipwreck, which crashed into Nikumaroro in 1929. Also among the findings was a heel from a woman's shoe which Earhart was known to wear, along with a "tiny piece of aluminum foil with lettering on it that, while sparse, is consistent with that of an American signal torch."²⁷ Lastly, a wooden, dovetailed sextant box was found. According to King, Noonan used a nautical sextant similar to the one found as a backup instrument when navigating Pan American or Pacific routes. A photo of the navigation room in a Pan Am Clipper

https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/museums/nnam/explore/collection s/aircraft/l/1-10-electra.html; Randy Jacobson, "Recorded Tide Data for Nikumaroro," TIGHAR: The Earhart Project, March 11, 1999. ²⁶ King, "The Archaeological Context of the 1040 Nilumerers Papers

²⁶ King, "The Archaeological Context of the 1940 Nikumaroro Bones Discovery," 4.

Heritage Command, accessed May 16, 2023,

²⁷ Ibid., 4.

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Noonan served on shows a Brandis sextant box, the same kind that was found on Nikumaroro. 28

Arguably the most supportive piece of evidence toward the Nikumaroro theory is the set of bones found on the island. In 1940, a set of skeletal remains were found on Nikumaroro Island under a "Ren" tree.²⁹ Seventy-seven years later, forensic dogs part of a 2017 expedition "alerted on the ground under a fallen Ren tree and nowhere else in the vicinity," indicating that this could well have been the initial discovery site of the bones.³⁰ After their discovery in 1940, the bones were immediately sent to and examined by Dr. D. W. Hoodless in Fiji and determined to be those of a stocky male, initially ruling out the possibility that they belonged to Amelia Earhart. The remains were subsequently lost during World War II; Fiji was a British colony at the time and under severe threat of Japanese invasion, most of the island's attention was focused toward militarization.³¹ In the decades following, people have questioned Hoodless' arguably outdated methods of determining the sex of the remains. At the time of the analysis, "forensic osteology was not yet a well-developed discipline," and more modern analyses of his recordings have shone further doubt upon Hoodless' original assessment. In 2018, Richard Jantz conducted a statistical study using the measurements taken by Hoodless of the bones and compared them to Earhart's measurements. He then crossreferenced these with the average measurements of other possible individuals that could have stumbled upon Nikumaroro Island. Of the sample population, Jantz found that "2,758 (99.28%) individuals have a greater distance from the Nikumaroro bones than Earhart, but

²⁸ Ibid., 2.

²⁹ Richard L. Jantz, "Amelia Earhart and the Nikumaroro Bones: A 1941 Analysis versus Modern Quantitative Techniques," *Forensic Anthropology*, 1, no. 2 (2018): 83–98.

³⁰ King, "The Archaeological Context of the 1940 Nikumaroro Bones Discovery," 1.

³¹ Ibid., 1.

only 18 (0.65%) have a smaller distance."³² So, he concluded that "the Nikumaroro bones are at least 84 times more likely to belong to Amelia Earhart than to a random individual who ended up on the island."³³ Earhart was more similar to the bones than the majority of random individuals. It is possible that Hoodless mistook the robust tibia and narrow hips he was presented with as those of a stocky male without considering that they might have belonged to a tall, narrow-bodied female such as Earhart.³⁴ The bones may have truly appeared male to Hoodless, but he simply did not have the technology to analyze it correctly. Jantz concurs:

"From a forensic perspective the most parsimonious scenario is that the bones are those of Amelia Earhart. She was known to have been in the area of Nikumaroro Island, she went missing, and human remains were discovered which are entirely consistent with her and inconsistent with most other people. Furthermore, it is impossible to test any other hypothesis, because except for the victims of the *Norwich City* wreck, about whom we have no data, no other specific missing persons have been reported."³⁵

If the bones did not belong to Amelia Earhart, they belonged to someone very similar to her; Jantz's analysis "reveal[ed] that Earhart is more similar to the Nikumaroro bones than 99% of individuals in a large reference sample."³⁶ Despite the fact that the bones were lost, the fact that they once existed and were scientifically evaluated is a very strong piece of evidence supporting the theory that Earhart landed on Nikumaroro Island and lived out their final days there. Though Jantz's study involved assumptions

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³² Jantz, 13.

³³ Ibid., 13.

³⁴ Ibid., 1-2.

³⁵ Ibid., 14.

³⁶ Ibid., 1.

made about Earhart's measurements, they are still extremely promising. Jantz used a variety of credible methods to make his estimates, including photographs, the sizing of her clothing, Mahalanobis distance, et cetera, so his estimates were at least very close to her true measurements. As for Noonan's whereabouts, no evidence has been found beyond the discovery of a navigational sextant similar to the one that he would have carried. However, there are many possible explanations for the absence of his remains, including his body simply washing out to sea like hypothesized of the Electra.

Evaluation

The original theory that Earhart and Noonan crashed into the Pacific after running out of fuel searching for Howland Island mostly argues that the converse side simply does not have enough evidence to be true. However, it is clear from the findings of this paper that the Nikumaroro theory actually has more tangible evidence than previously thought and claimed by opposers. The strongest piece of evidence toward the ocean-crash argument involves using the radius in which the crew of the Itasca would be able to clearly hear Earhart's transmissions and comparing this with the estimated amount of remaining fuel the Electra would have had. This would give them an idea of how far she could have gotten from Howland Island before having to make a crash landing nearby or ditching the plane into the ocean. This was used to create a search radius for Noonan and Earhart after their appearance. However, the only other island within this radius was Baker Island, which was searched but contained no evidence of a crash. So, the search team continued hunting the ocean in the opposite direction of Nikumaroro Island, which was outside of their search radius (400 miles away from Howland). However, there is no way of knowing for certain how much gas was left in the Electra, as shown by Earhart transmitting on her radio a full hour after Captain Thompson reported that she

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had only a half hour of fuel remaining. Additionally, uncertainty regarding the amount of fuel remaining in the Electra has arisen from weather-related reduction by expansion estimates and possible strong headwinds which required the use of more fuel to keep up speed. Lastly, claims of storms and adverse weather conditions which are heavily used to support the ocean-landing theory have also been disproven. However, even if there were stormy conditions, this would not rule out an emergency landing on Nikumaroro in the event that Earhart and Noonan could not spot Howland Island, their target. Certainly, the pair would elect to land on whatever land source they came across in the event of an extreme emergency weather crisis. All in all, the theory that Earhart and Noonan crashed into the Pacific Ocean is merely speculation based on the most likely outcome in the absence of initial tangible evidence pointing to the contrary. But, as more evidence and analysis has emerged supporting the Nikumaroro theory, it must be regarded as a real possibility.

Logically, those supporting the original ocean-crash theory argue that their claims must be the more likely option since there was not much proof at the time backing the Nikumaroro theory. However, this has become untrue in recent years as more evidence has turned up: archaeological findings consistent with items that would have been on the Electra, bones which have been proven extremely similar to Earhart's measurements, et cetera. Evidence to the contrary is far less tangible and largely based on assumptions: if the Navy didn't find the Electra on land, then it must have sunk into the ocean as a result of a crash water-landing. The evidence that is used by adopters of the original theory is often shaky: adverse weather conditions, fuel shortages, and the original bone analysis claims have all had logical holes poked in them. There is little tangible evidence pointing toward an ocean landing (no oil slicks seen on the open water during the search, no floating Electra spotted), but there is palpable evidence supporting an emergency landing on Nikumaroro.

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The Nikumaroro theory uses deductive reasoning based on evidence to produce logical claims. For example, the presence of a lifeboat and oars on the plane means that it is very likely that Noonan and Earhart would have gone for these items in the case of a water landing, especially since the plane would have been floating, as backed by evidence of the buoyancy engineered into the fuel tanks of the plane. In this case, the pair would have been found by the US Navy and Coast Guard, especially since the ocean-crash theory suggests that Earhart and Noonan were within a closer radius to Howland Island which was being searched. However, the fact that this was not the case contradicts the ocean-crash theory, further heightening the probability that the Nikumaroro hypothesis was reality. The presence of concrete evidence of physical artifacts makes the Nikumaroro theory far more attractive than its counterpart.

Conclusion

Arguably the most famous aviator of her time, Amelia Earhart's disappearance shook the world. In the years following, analysis supporting a new cause of death sparked massive contradictory discourse. One side argues in favor of the Navy's initial report: Earhart and Noonan ditched their plane into the sea after running out of fuel searching for Howland Island. The other claims that they ended up on Nikumaroro Island, where they lived out their final days. A detailed analysis found that there is far more tangible evidence pointing toward Earhart being on Nikumaroro Island than there is of her not. Additionally, the evidence pointing to the contrary (a crash landing into the ocean) is ambiguous, easily challenged, and based mainly on assumptions rather than hard, concrete evidence. The Nikumaroro argument is logically stronger and better supported, with Jantz's 2018 bone analysis providing groundbreaking affirmation. The mysterious and tragic disappearance of Amelia Earhart may remain unsolved, but her

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influence on aviation and women's rights cannot be overshadowed by the enigma and chaos of her demise.

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"To greet the dawning after night:" Examining Creative and Intellectual Expression in the Holocaust to Rethink Jewish Historiography

Robert Coleman

"He doesn't know the world at all / who stays in his nest and doesn't go out. / He doesn't know what birds know best / Nor what I want to sing about, / That the world is full of loveliness. / When dewdrops sparkle in the grass / And earth's aflood with morning light, / A blackbird sings upon a bush / To greet the dawning after night. / Then I know how fine it is to live. / Hey, try to open up your heart / To beauty; go to the woods someday / And weave a wreath of memory there. / Then if the tears obscure your way / You'll know how wonderful it is / To be alive."

- "Birdsong," a poem by an Anonymous Prisoner of Theresienstadt

On December 14, 1941, the highly educated and musically gifted Michael Flack arrived at the Theresienstadt ghetto in Czechoslovakia. Famine, disease, and unpredictability were the norm in this unique and wretched location. The threat of deportation and uncertainty of survival loomed over the heads of Flack and the rest of these unfortunate prisoners, as their lives became wrought with the dehumanizing conditions orchestrated by the Nazis. Miraculously, however, Flack found himself immersed in Theresienstadt's rich and vibrant culture of artistic and intellectual expression. Sounds of classical and folk music permeated the ghetto as a professor gave a lecture on medieval Judaism in one of the barracks while artists were painting their souls in another. Flack participated in one of Theresienstadt's several orchestras and even wrote a play that was performed there. While motivations varied, Flack and other prisoners displayed their humanity and resilience in the face of persecution and

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dehumanization by engaging in art, music, literature, and scholarship.¹

However, if one traveled one hundred ninety miles south of Theresienstadt to the Mauthausen concentration camp in Upper Austria, they would have seen music and art being used by the Nazis to torture, degrade, and dehumanize the Jewish prisoners. As the Nazis ruthlessly beat Joseph Drexler to the point of unconsciousness, he was forced to sing the church hymn "Jesus blood and wounds."² Hans Bonarweitz, who was executed after attempting to escape his confinement, was forced to listen to the Jewish camp orchestra play music as he walked to his death, humiliating Bonarewitz and making the orchestra members feel complicit in his death.³ These stories highlight the simultaneously empowering and tragic effects of creative expression during the Holocaust on the Jewish prisoners.

An analysis of creative and intellectual expression during the Holocaust shows that the history of the Jews is both one of oppression and power. Music, art, literature, and scholarship served many functions throughout the duration of the Holocaust. On one hand, the Nazis used music and art as a form of torture, destruction, propaganda, and humiliation in order to demoralize and dehumanize the Jewish prisoners in ghettos and concentration camps. On the other hand, prisoners used various modes of creative expression to resist the degrading effects of their persecution. Thus, it is important to view creative and intellectual expression in the Holocaust as both an act of resilience and a pragmatic reaction to dehumanization and genocide. Examining creative and intellectual expression in the Holocaust shows that, in order to provide an accurate and humanizing portrayal of Jewish

¹ RG-50.934.0023, Oral history interview with Michael Flack, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collection, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC.

² Guido Fackler, "Music in Concentration Camps 1933-1945," *Music and Politics* I, no. 1 (January 2007): 1-25.

³ Ibid., 9.

history, scholars must emphasize themes of persecution and empowerment simultaneously.

Scholars of Jewish history have traditionally portrayed the story of the Jews as one that is heavily lachrymose or antilachrymose. In other words, they have sought to emphasize themes of oppression or empowerment (rather than both) when depicting the story of the Jews. In 1963, Salo W. Baron, arguably the most notable and influential Jewish historian, writes in his article *Newer Emphasis in Jewish History*:

> All my life I have been struggling against the hitherto dominant 'lachrymose conception of Jewish history' a term which I have been using for more than forty years - because I have felt that, by exclusively overemphasizing Jewish sufferings, it distorted the total picture of the Jewish historic evolution and, at the same time, it served badly a generation which had become impatient with the 'nightmare' of endless persecutions and massacres.⁴

Essentially, Baron criticized historians like Heinrich Graetz and Simon Dubnow, who were pioneers of Jewish history and of the previous generation, for placing too much emphasis on the oppression, persecution, and dehumanization of the Jewish people. While Baron focused primarily on medieval Jewry, his antilachrymose approach has almost been universally accepted by scholars. A heavily lachrymose conception of Jewish history simplifies the story of the Jews to a narrow construct that does not capture the complexities, nuances, and humanity of the Jewish people. Baron argues that Jewish history should not be defined solely by suffering, oppression, and dehumanization.

However, contemporary historians such as Adam Teller and Benjamin Gampel have criticized Baron's anti-lachrymose approach by claiming that Baron downplayed the suffering of Jewish people throughout history. They argue that Baron's work

⁴ Salo W Baron, "Newer Emphases in Jewish History," *Jewish Social Studies* 25, no. 4 (October 1963): 235-248, 240.

does not accurately reflect the reality of the Jewish historical experience. Gampel and other scholars have claimed that "awareness" and "a willingness to accept" Jewish lachrymosity is just as important as anti-lachrymosity. Gampel further argues that Baron's approach is "not useful either for a way of understanding Jewish history or even for Jewish life today."⁵ Similarly, Teller advocates for a reinsertion of lachrymosity in the discussion of Jewish history in order to fully understand "normal" Jewish life and not downplay Jewish oppression and persecution.⁶

Moreover, Alexandra Zapruder, the author of Salvaged Pages: Young Writers' Diaries of the Holocaust, implicitly rejects Baron's approach and embraces lachrymosity. Using diaries and journals from young victims and survivors of the Holocaust, Zapruder argues against an approach that glorifies and celebrates the power and courage of the authors. These literary initiatives, according to Zapruder, cannot be seen as noble examples of the unvanguished and imperishable human spirit that defies overwhelming evil because it misrepresents the reality of their tragic situation and provides false contextualizations. These works, and other creative or intellectual pursuits, were produced in response to genocide, dehumanization, and evil. They were created, Zapruder argues, in an environment of erasure where diarists attempted to retain a place in the world. Representing these works as triumphant or courageous is misleading and does not reflect the annihilistic reality of the diarists' situations.⁷ Diaries, journals, and other personal memorializations must be seen as responses to suffering and genocide, not "to rescue individual writers from death, to rescue a generation from oblivion, or to

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⁵ Benjamin Gampel, "Reembracing the Lachrymose Theory of Jewish History" (lecture, Columbia University, New York City, NY, October 30, 2018).

⁶ Adam Teller, "Revisiting Baron's 'Lachrymose Conception': The Meanings of Violence in Jewish History," *AJS Review* 38, no. 2 (November 2014): 431-439, 439.

⁷ Alexandra Zapruder, *Salvaged Pages: Young Writers' Diaries of the Holocaust*, Second (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2015), 9.

rescue ourselves from confrontation with the final, disconsolate truth of genocide."⁸

Ideas of agency in the context of the Holocaust have been a heavily contested topic of concern for historians. Historians such as Lawrence Langer and Michael Foucalt claim that Jewish inmates did not have the capacity to exercise agency. In other words, these historians take on a lachrymose conception of Jewish history by arguing that prisoners were not capable of making their own choices or decisions during their imprisonment. However, Anna Hajkova argues in an anti-lachrymose fashion that just because prisoners of the Holocaust did not survive, that does not mean they lacked agency. Many cases in these prisoner societies point to instances of choice, such as decisions concerning who should be transported and acts of resistance. In fact, according to Hajkova, many inmates of the Theresienstadt ghetto survived due to their behaviors, actions, and choices in the ghetto.⁹

This paper seeks to create a more accurate and humanizing depiction of Jewish history by finding a balance between an emphasis on empowerment and persecution of the Jewish people and their complex stories. It demonstrates that the history of the Jews is one of resilience in the face of oppression and dehumanization without downplaying the grim reality of much of Jewish history. Understanding this balance is significant because it allows us to acknowledge and analyze the nuances and complexities of Jewish history, giving us a more accurate and human depiction of the Jewish people and their stories. By striking a balance between lachrymosity and anti-lachrymosity, scholars can write a history that empowers the Jewish people while not downplaying the persecution, oppression, and dehumanization that they have faced.

⁸ Zapruder, Salvaged Pages, 12.

⁹ Hájková Anna, *The Last Ghetto: An Everyday History of Theresienstadt* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 6.

The sources for this paper primarily come from oral histories in the form of Holocaust survivor testimonies from the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Yad Vashem, and the USC Shoah Foundation. It will also consult oral histories from the documentary films Terezin Diary and Paradise Camp, where survivors of the Theresienstadt Ghetto (and other concentration camps like Auschwitz) relay their experiences and perspectives during their imprisonment. While oral histories may present issues of reliability and accuracy, they nonetheless provide varied and nuanced perspectives that allow us to conceptualize the Theresienstadt ghetto and the Holocaust in elaborate ways. Additionally, this paper consults a multitude of documented creative initiatives such as musical scores, poetry, drawings, play scripts, diaries, and official records that will be used as evidence for the forced and voluntary artistic environment in which the prisoners engaged.

Many of the sources for this paper come from the Theresienstadt ghetto (also referred to as Terezín in Czech) due to its uniquely vibrant culture of creative and intellectual expression. Theresienstadt, which was located in Czechoslovakia, opened on November 24, 1941, and liberated on May 9, 1944. It was a melting pot of Germans, Czechs, and Austrians whose ethnic and national backgrounds marked Theresienstadt's hierarchical and cultured society. For example, German Jews frequented cultural events that featured German classics while Czech Jews attended soccer matches.¹⁰ Also, prisoners of this ghetto inadvertently showcased the simultaneous lachrymose and anti-lachrymose functions of art, music, and literature during their imprisonment.

The Nazis' use of the ghetto changed throughout its history. Theresienstadt was a transit ghetto, an advantage ghetto (for groups considered exceptions such as the elderly), a location to hold Jews for exchange, and a propaganda ghetto.¹¹ This last

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¹⁰ Ibid., 4.

¹¹ Ibid., 7.

function was incredibly significant, as Theresienstadt was a model camp to deceive the outside world into thinking that the Jews were flourishing and the Nazis were not engaging in any wrongdoing. In fact, the Nazis used Theresienstadt to film the 1944 propaganda film that successfully fooled the outside world (including the Red Cross) that the Jews in Nazi-occupied territories were being treated humanely and were thriving.

Conditions inside the Theresienstadt ghetto were relatively better than other ghettos and concentration camps primarily because of its role as a model camp. However, the conditions were still abhorrent as illness, hunger, and transports were defining experiences of Theresienstadt.¹² With scarce food supplies and inhumane living conditions, the Jews in Theresienstadt struggled to survive. Norbert Troller, a survivor, remembered:

> "Our rations were shortened to such an extent that hunger weakened and absorbed one's every thought. It took three to four months until one reached a plateau where the pangs of hunger were less apparent ... it seems that the human organism can get used to hunger as well."¹³

Even more detrimental was the constant threat of deportation to concentration camps, like Auschwitz, where they would likely face death. One survivor describes the trepidation surrounding deportations in Theresienstadt, reporting that "the whole air was shivering because everybody was so nervous and waiting for the transports because nobody knew who would be in it."¹⁴ According to Michael Barenbaum, a Rabbi and scholar of Holocaust studies, "Some 144,000 Jews were deported to Theresienstadt; of those,

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¹² Ibid., 132.

¹³ Norbert Troller, *Theresienstadt: Hitler's Gift to the Jews* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 94.

¹⁴ Paul Rea, Paradise Camp, YouTube, 1986,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNdOydrWDmc.

33,000 died there and 88,000 were deported to Auschwitz. By the war's end, only 19,000 were alive."¹⁵

From 1941 to 1942, the Nazis forbade creative and intellectual expression in Theresienstadt, prompting a secret culture of improvisation and adaptation. Prisoners engaged in art, music, and literature in hidden locations around Theresienstadt, such as the attics of barracks.¹⁶ Artists who wanted to depict the grim realities of Theresienstadt hid their works in attic lofts or hollowed-out walls. Musicians were forbidden to possess sheet music or instruments and had to rely on memories from their past lives to perform. They could only engage in music by solely using their voices or adopting materials from the ghetto and transforming them into musical instruments. Zdenêk Ornest, a survivor of Theresienstadt, discusses how Jews creatively manifested these artistic initiatives, reporting:

"These performances took place almost anywhere. In lofts, in the barracks. They made the sets from anything they could find. They used something called 'heraklit' and other construction materials. The costumes were made of underwear and T-shirts, simply using whatever was around."¹⁷

Then, at the end of 1942, the Nazis decided to legalize and normalize a free and vibrant cultural life for the prisoners. This most salient reason for this policy change was that the Nazis believed that Theresienstadt could be used to deceive visitors from the Red Cross and neutral countries and convince them that Jews were thriving under Nazi rule. In other words, the Nazis used Theresienstiadt's cultural life to enhance the facade of a

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4X0O79WImc&t=258s.

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¹⁵ Michael Berenbaum, *In Memory's Kitchen: A Legacy From the Women of Terezín*, ed. Cara De Silva, trans. Bianca Steiner Brown (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aranson Inc., 2006), x.

 ¹⁶ David Bloch, "Hidden Meanings: Musical Symbols in Terezin," *India International Centre Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (2006): 110-124, 114.
 ¹⁷ Terezín Diary (The Terezín Foundation, 1989),

"privileged" ghetto.¹⁸ By showcasing Theresienstadt as a place of flourishing Jewish culture to the outside world, the Nazis believed that they could get away with genocide.¹⁹ It is unclear as to why the Nazis prohibited cultural expression in the beginning of the ghetto's existence since they were never concerned with Theresienstadt's cultural life.²⁰ Thus, a combination of propaganda and indifference accounts for the Nazis behavior towards cultural life in Theresienstadt.

Drawings and paintings served paradoxical functions in the Theresienstadt ghetto. On one hand, the Nazis forced prisoners to create idealized and false depictions of Theresienstadt for propaganda. It was the job of many prisoners to create images that falsely represented the ghetto by depicting Theresienstadt as a productive, organized community of Jews who were thriving and self-ruling. Most of these works do not portray individuals or scenes in immense detail. Instead, these drawings and paintings were kept generalized (for example, depicting faceless individuals) so that viewers would not be provoked to raise suspicion or ask questions about the Jews' well-being under Nazi occupation. The goal of these works was to reassure the outside world that the Jews in the Nazis' concentration camps and ghettos were self-ruling and being treated fairly and humanely.²¹ For example, one drawing by Jo Spier depicts a bank run by Jews in Theresienstadt. Spier was a survivor of Theresienstadt who was compelled to create idealized depictions of Theresienstadt. This work is a false idealization of Theresienstadt which was intended to fool the outside world into believing that the Nazis were not engaging in any wrongdoing.²²

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¹⁸ Hájková, The Last Ghetto, 172.

¹⁹ Marjorie Lamberti, "Making Art in the Terezin Concentration Camp," *New England Review* 17, no. 4 (1995): 104–11, 105-107.

²⁰ Hájková, The Last Ghetto, 172.

²¹ Ibid., 172-173.

²² "The Jewish Self - Administration's Bank -- a Drawing by Jo Spier, an Internee in the Terezin (Theresienstadt) Ghetto," Ghetto Fighter House

On the other hand, artists in the ghetto created illegal and secret drawings and paintings that reflected the grim reality of the ghetto. Many show highly detailed and dejected figures suffering from Theresienstadt's horrid conditions. Their works are a clear marker of their attempts to display and retain their humanity and resilience while desperately seeking to maintain their place in the world in the face of suffering and erasure. These works, as mentioned before, were illegal and kept hidden from the Nazis. However, the Nazis found many of these works and sent the artists to Auschwitz, where most of them died.²³ Figure 1 shows a drawing by Bedrich Fritta, an artist from Theresienstadt who died in Auschwitz. He draws crestfallen and distorted figures in their barrack, representing the despondent atmosphere of Theresienstadt.²⁴

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Archives, accessed December 29, 2022,

https://www.infocenters.co.il/gfh/notebook_ext.asp?book=110928&lang=eng, 1. ²³ Paul Rea, *Paradise Camp, YouTube*, 1986,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNdOydrWDmc.

²⁴ Samuel Gruber, "Blogger," *Blogger* (blog), September 19, 2014,

http://samgrubersjewishartmonuments.blogspot.com/2014/09/remembering-terezin-artist-bedrich.html, 4.



Figure 1, Bedrich Fritta. *Dwelling of the Feeble Minded*. 1942-1944. Pen and Ink Drawing.

The Theresienstadt ghetto provided the Jewish prisoners with a voluntary culture of intellectual and artistic expression. There were several motives for prisoners to engage in such activities during their persecution. Michael Flack was a musician and playwright in the Theresienstadt ghetto, and his survivor testimony is representative of the experiences of many other prisoners. Michael Flack explains that, by engaging in art, music, literature, and scholarship, he was "feeding [himself] with normalcy."²⁵ Before the war, Flack explains how he and his family surrounded themselves daily with music and art in Czechoslovakia. Music, according to Flack, played a significant role in his adolescence and pre-war life. A skilled violinist, Flack was a member of various orchestras, including the Brno Symphony Orchestra. In short, Flack engaged in music and art in the Theresienstadt ghetto, because it was normal for him to do so in

²⁵ RG-50.934.0023, Oral history interview with Michael Flack, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Collection, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC.

his pre-war life. Flack coped with the tumultuous situation and chaotic conditions that surrounded his everyday life in Theresienstadt by doing what he felt was normal: engaging in music and art. Thus, creative expression allowed Flack to resist the degrading and dehumanizing effects of Nazi persecution and gain a sense of normalcy. As Anna Hájková states:

"For the prisoners it could establish a connection to the past, giving them a sense of agency, meaning, or self-assurance. Music, moreover, is an activity that feels deeply intimate and familiar, a pursuit in which people can reconnect with their sense of individuality, humanity, and dignity."²⁶

Children's art in the Theresienstadt ghetto also exemplifies the use of creative expression as a coping mechanism and maintaining a sense of normalcy. Many of the drawings and paintings that children created show scenes of life before their imprisonment. Marianna Langová was from Prague and was deported to Theresienstadt on July 2, 1944. As seen in Figure 2, Langová painted a watercolor landscape with a house at the center, a garden in the foreground, two girls standing at the front of the house, and a mountain in the background. Its vibrant colors and decorous composition highlight Langová's joyfulness and appreciation toward her home in Prague. Langová's painting is a physical manifestation of her coping with persecution and suffering and longing to return home to life before the war. She paints normalcy to cope with the surrounding chaos and to maintain a sense of normalcy. Langová died on October 6, 1944, in Auschwitz²⁷

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²⁶ Hájková, The Last Ghetto, 177.

²⁷ Hana Volavková, *I Never Saw Another Butterfly: Children's Drawings and Poems from Terezín Concentration Camp, 1942-1944.*, trans. Jeanne Nêmocová (New York City, NY: Schocken Books, 1978), 51.

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Figure 2, Marianna Langová. *House with Garden*. 1944. Watercolor on shiny red paper.

Before the war, many children engaged in art as a form of leisure. They drew or painted what they saw or scenes of current events. And so, just like Flack did, children responded to suffering by going back to what they knew to be normal. They painted what they saw every day in Theresienstadt: the streets, the people, the landscape. Sonja Waldsteinová was a trained and talented pupil who painted a Theresienstadt barrack in watercolor in immense detail. As seen in Figure 3, the barrack is large and imposing, dominating the composition while the colors are muted and dull, possibly expressing Theresienstadt's despondent atmosphere. Painting or drawing was a normal activity that many prisoners engaged in and allowed them to cope with and resist the Nazi's dehumanizing efforts. Waldsteinová chose to cope with the chaos surrounding her by doing what she felt was normal.²⁸ Acting to retain a sense of normalcy and cope with suffering and persecution allowed Jewish prisoners to display their resilience and humanity and defy the Nazi's dehumanizing efforts.

²⁸ Hana Volavková, I Never Saw Another Butterfly: Children's Drawings and Poems from Terezín Concentration Camp, 1942-1944., trans. Jeanne Nêmocová (New York City, NY: Schocken Books, 1978), 11.

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Figure 3, Sonja Waldsteinová. *Terezín Barracks*. 1943. Detail of watercolor on tinted paper.

Creative and intellectual expression in the Holocaust also served as a mechanism for prisoners to retain their humanity and preserve their mental state. Prisoners who engaged in music, art, literature, and scholarship were constantly expressing and affirming their humanity. This rich cultural activity created a medium of release from the misery of their current situation, enabling prisoners to display incredible resilience. Felix Kolmer, a survivor of Theresienstadt, reports that "This cultural resistance was really a fight for the self-preservation of the inmates [and] for the improvement of their mental state."²⁹ Creative and intellectual expression allowed prisoners to resist the process of dehumanization and counter the Nazis' attempts at mental degradation. The famous Czech composer Raphael Schacter and his choir bravely and covertly condemned the Nazis by performing Verdi's "Requiem" in Latin. The lyrics expressed the resilience of

²⁹ *Terezín Diary* (The Terezín Foundation, 1989), https://www.uoutube.com/watch?u=v4X0Q70W/me%t=??

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4X0O79WImc&t=258s.

the Jews, as one verse proclaims that "Whatever is hidden shall be revealed and nothing shall remain unavenged."³⁰ The Nazis could never achieve their ultimate goal, the complete dehumanization of the "Jewish race," because prisoners in the Theresienstadt ghetto were constantly affirming their humanity by engaging in an exceptionally vibrant cultural and artistic atmosphere.

This cultural resistance as a mechanism of prisoners expressing their humanity and resilience was showcased in the performance of a children's opera called "Brundibar" by Hans Krása. Originally written in 1938 for a government competition, which was canceled due to Nazi occupation. Krása and his cast reconstructed his musical based on memory in Theresienstadt. "Brundibar" became the most popular performance in the Theresienstadt Ghetto largely due to its symbolic message. "Brundibar," tells the journey of children who have to deliver milk to their sick mother. However, their voyage is thwarted by an evil organ grinder named Brundibar. Eventually, the children defeat Brundibar and deliver the milk to their sick mother. The themes of Krása's works, good triumphing over evil and the ability to maintain strength despite hardship, greatly appealed to the Jewish audiences in Theresienstadt and explains its popularity.³¹ Zdenêk Ornest describes what the musical meant to the Jewish prisoners:

> The story of Brundibar ends like this: "Brundibar is defeated. We have beaten him. Play the drums. We have won. We have won because we did not give in because we all sang our happy song." And these words, they were not only about Brundibar, they were not. And that is why even the grown-ups who came to see it took it to mean that, someday, good will prevail over

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³⁰ Susan King, "Defiant Requiem': Nazi Prisoners Found Humanity in Music. This Concert Keeps the Message Alive," *Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles Times*, April 10, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/arts/la-et-cm-defiant-requiem-20190410-story.html, 6.

³¹ Jennifer Blackwell, "Brundibar in Terezin: Music as Spiritual Resistance during the Holocaust," *Nota Bene: Canadian Undergraduate Journal of Musicology* 4, no. 1 (2011), 18-19.

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evil and prevail over this evil Brundibar. And that is why it was such a huge success and why it was performed so many times until all were gone.³²

In other words, "Brundibar" was so popular because the Jewish prisoners used the messages in the musical and recontextualized it to their situation under Nazi oppression.³³ Just like how the good children triumphed over the evil Brundibar, the good Jews will eventually triumph over the evil Nazis. "Brundibar" provided an outlet of hope for the prisoners and expressed their resilience and willingness to never give up despite their persecution and suffering. It was an artistic manifestation of Jews retaining their humanity and displaying their determination to survive. One survivor, interviewed in the 1986 documentary *Paradise Camp*, describes:

The only thing I still see in my mind is the main figure, which was a little boy, fantastic actor, with a little mustache looking like Hitler, acting like Hitler, but like the crazy Hitler. So he absolutely ridiculed Hitler and they ridiculed the system. How they could perform it, how they dared to perform it, and how they got away with it, it is still a puzzle for me.³⁴

Performers of Brundibar outwardly resisted the Nazis by mocking Hitler while triumphantly expressing that the Jews will defeat the Nazis. One must bear in mind that it was young children performing and taking on a physical embodiment of hope, resilience, power, and humanity.

Class position, ethnicity, and gender defined the character of Theresienstadt's cultural life. One's place in Theresienstadt's social hierarchy, their role or impact on cultural life. For example,

³² Terezín Diary (The Terezín Foundation, 1989),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4X0O79WImc&t=258s.

³³ Blackwell, "Brundibar in Terezin," 19.

³⁴ Paul Rea, Paradise Camp, YouTube, 1986,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNdOydrWDmc.

young Czech Jews, who occupied the highest status in Theresienstadt, could gain access to tickets to performances to events like operas, which were particularly popular in the ghetto. Also, all three of the Elders of the Jews, who were a part of Theresienstadt's Jewish self-administration, gave talks in lecture series because doing so allowed them to gain status and publicity. Additionally, different cultural activities affirmed ethnic affiliations. Typically, Czech Jews attended soccer matches and Czech theater, cabaret, and operas. They rarely attended German and Austrian dramatic productions. Some Czech Jews even expressed disdain for German theater. On the other hand, German and Austrian Jews tended to attend chamber music concerts and participated in education, which was particularly significant to their culture before the war. However, Theresienstadt also offered a space for interethnic interactions. For example, most groups attended performances that played music from Mozart. Additionally, on rare occasions, German Jews would attend Czech musical productions. Still, these interethnic encounters were rare as different ethnicities in Theresienstadt tended to define cultural life for themselves based on their pre-war lives. Finally, even though women rarely participated in Theresienstadt cultural life, gender still was key for cultural production in the ghetto, as female figures in performances saliently established ties to an ethnic entity. Thus, social hierarchies, gender, and the interconnectedness of ethnicity and class played important roles in the character of Theresienstadt's artistic and intellectual environment.³⁵

Physical resistance during the Holocaust was incredibly rare. The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943 was the largest and perhaps most significant example of physical resistance during the Holocaust when Jewish prisoners took up arms and fought the Nazis for nearly one month. Although 13,000 Jews perished, Marek Edelman, the only survivor from the Jewish Combat Organization, explains that they resisted in order to prevent "the

³⁵ Hájková, The Last Ghetto, 175-200.

Germans alone to pick the time and place of our deaths."³⁶ In Theresienstadt, some young prisoners planned physical resistance as well. While an armed rebellion never occurred due to the unlikeliness of success, their plans for one show the spirit, humanity, and resilience that remained within the prisoners. However, instances of physical resistance should also be looked at as desperate attempts at survival in an annihilistic context as Felix Kolmer describes:

In Terezín, the young people, in particular, did not want to accept their situation as it was. So there were acts of resistance which while not resulting in an armed uprising, were preparations for one. I, myself, was a member of that resistance. My assignment was to find escape routes from Terezín, because under the ramparts there were many underground passages that led out of Terezín. Although I knew about them, I did not tell about them because it was nonsense to escape from Terezín in those years. It would have been impossible to survive on the outside until the war's end. There was no uprising. The idea had been that in case the SS were to liquidate the camp we did not want to be slaughtered like sheep. We wanted to fight. And if we died, we would take a few SS men along and hope they end up in hell.³⁷

On the other hand, the Nazis forced prisoners of Theresienstadt to engage in art, music, literature, and scholarship as a mode of propaganda. In September 1943, the Nazis planned to deport thousands of Danish Jews to Theresienstadt, Auschwitz, and other ghettos and camps. However, the Nazis were met with heavy resistance from the Danish population and top officials. A few

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³⁶ Michael . Kaufman, "Marek Edelman, Commander in Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Dies at 90," The New York Times (The New York Times, October 3, 2009),

https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/03/world/europe/03edelman.html#:~:text=% E2%80%9CIt%20was%20a%20defensive%20action,home%20and%20Polish%20at%20work, 2.

³⁷ *Terezín Diary* (The Terezín Foundation, 1989), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4X0O79WImc&t=258s.

days before the transports were scheduled, the Danes managed to send 7,000 Danish Jews to neutral Sweden to safety. However, approximately 500 Danish Jews were sent to Theresienstadt. The chaos surrounding these deportations and the growing rumors of extermination camps prompted the Danish Red Cross to petition for a visit to Theresienstadt to observe the Jews living under Nazi rule. The Danes and the rest of the outside world placed substantial pressure on the Nazis to grant this petition. Then, in the spring of 1944, the Nazis permitted the Danish Red Cross to visit Theresienstadt in order to expel these "rumors." Adolf Eichman, head of the Jewish Affairs and Evacuation Affairs, and the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (Reich Security Main Office) were put in charge of organizing this visit. They realized that if they prepared Theresienstadt to look like a fantastical paradise for the Jews, they could fool the Red Cross and the outside world and eliminate rumors that it was an extermination camp. In other words, by transforming Theresienstadt into a utopian facade for the Jews, the Nazis believed that they would get away with genocide.³⁸

Before the Red Cross visit to Theresienstadt, the Nazis forced the prisoners to "beautify" the ghetto by repairing streets, tearing down abandoned buildings, and converting barracks into refined shops, libraries, or grocery stores. This beautification program, led by SS commander Karl Rahm, converted the town square into a park with a music pavilion, cafe, and a children's playground. And perhaps most tragic, to alleviate overcrowding, around 7,500 Jews were deported to Auschwitz.³⁹ During the visit, the Nazis showcased Theresienstadt's vibrant artistic and intellectual culture as delegates toured. They showed them art that the Jewish prisoners created that depicted an idealized and false

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³⁸ Lucy S. Dawidowicz, "Bleaching the Black Lie: The Case of Theresienstadt," *Salmagundi* 29 (1975): 125-140.

³⁹ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. "Theresienstadt: Red Cross Visit" Holocaust Encyclopedia.

https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/theresienstadt-red-cross-visit. Accessed on 12/20/22.

depiction of Theresienstadt. Additionally, the Nazis forced Jewish orchestras to perform music for the delegates.⁴⁰ Jewish functionaries were responsible for preparing these cultural events while the Nazis had no information on the details.⁴¹ As historian Lucy S. Dawidowicz wrote, Theresienstadt became a "dazzling fantasy, while the misery would persist unchanged behind the false front."⁴²

Also, following the visit, the Nazis filmed a propaganda movie that fooled the outside world that, under Nazi rule, Jews were happy and flourishing. It was called "Theresienstadt: A Documentary from the Jewish Settlement Area"⁴³ and included clips of an orchestra performance, prisoners reading in a library, and a lecture. Figure 5 shows a clip of an orchestra performing in a music hall while Figure 6 shows a clip of Jews playing an organized soccer match with spectators surrounding the perimeter of the field. "Brundibar" was also performed for the delegates and included in the propaganda film.⁴⁴ Helga Kinsky, a survivor of Theresienstadt and Auschwitz, reports that "nothing [about the film] was true. They opened coffee shops; they flew in roses from Holland to plant on the main square; they built a stand for the orchestra to look like if we were living in a spa."45 The Nazis' plan to deceive the Red Cross and the outside world worked.⁴⁶ In their report of the visit, the Red Cross commented that they "were astonished to find out that the ghetto was a community leading an almost normal existence, as we were prepared for the worst."⁴⁷ Thus, the creative environment forced upon the Jewish prisoners in

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⁴⁰ Lamberti, "Making Art," 107.

⁴¹ Hájková, *The Last Ghetto*, 173.

⁴² Dawidowicz, "Bleaching the Black Lie," 134.

⁴³ Hájková, *The Last Ghetto*, 10.

⁴⁴ Blackwell, "Brundibar in Terezin," 19.

⁴⁵ Terezín Diary (The Terezín Foundation, 1989),

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4X0O79WImc&t=258s.

⁴⁶ Dawidowicz, "Bleaching the Black Lie," 139.

⁴⁷ Adler Hans Günther, *Die Verheimlichte Wahrheit* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck Verlag, 1958), 355-357.

Theresienstadt intended to depict a false reality of the ghetto in order to reduce any suspicion that the Nazis were dehumanizing and exterminating the Jewish population fooled the Danish Red Cross.



Figure 5, "Orchestra performance," Kurt Gerron and Ivan Fric, Hitler Gives the Jews a Town, 1944.



Figure 6, "Soccer match," Kurt Gerron and Ivan Fric, Hitler Gives the Jews a Town, 1944.

The Nazis played music over loudspeakers in several camps to reeducate prisoners and later, demoralize them. In the early stages of the concentration camp system, the Nazis played propaganda speeches and German music over radios and loudspeakers to reeducate prisoners deemed political opponents of the regime. In Dachau, German national music from the anti-Semtic composer Richard Wagner was played to garner support for Nazism from political opponents. In later years, Nazis used loudspeakers to demoralize prisoners and destroy their desires to resist the regime. Victory announcements, even false ones, from German radio stations were played to create a sense of hopelessness among prisoners that they cannot defeat the Nazis. For instance, loudspeakers in Ravensbrück informed female prisoners of a failed attempt on Hitler's life, followed by martial march music. This display of strength and virtual immortality of the Nazi regime was meant to crush the spirits of the prisoners.⁴⁸

In concentration camps like Mauthausen and Auschwitz, the Nazis used music in particular in order to dehumanize, weaken, torture, and humiliate Jewish prisoners. Guido Fackler identifies several ways in which the Nazis sought to use music as a means of destruction. Most commonly, prisoners were forced to sing on command in various scenarios, including during labor, while marching, and to provide background music for punishments. The types of songs prisoners were forced to sing included German folk songs, anti-Semitic songs such as "Judenlied" ("Jews' Song"), and other songs intended to demoralize and dehumanize prisoners.⁴⁹ Eberhard Schmidt, a survivor of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp, reported that:

The SS made singing, like everything else they did, a mockery, a torment for the prisoners... Anyone who did not know the song was beaten. Anyone who sang too softly was beaten. Anyone who sang too loud was beaten. The SS men lashed out

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⁴⁸ Fackler, "Music in Concentration Camps," 6.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 2-6.

wildly... The SS men always found a reason... when in the evening we had to drag our dead and murdered comrades back into the camp, we had to sing. Hour after hour we had to, whether in the burning sun, freezing cold, or in snow or rain storms, on the roll call plaza we had to stand and sing of... the girl with the dark brown eyes, the forest or the wood grouse.⁵⁰

Thus, for many prisoners who were forced to sing on command, music became a means of humiliation and destruction that weakened them physically and mentally.

Forced singing was commonly used by the guards as a tool of collective humiliation and asserting absolute power over the prisoners. Guards would frequently demand that prisoners sing in the prison yard after a day of hard labor. Wolfgang Szepansky, a survivor of Sachsenhausen, reports his damaging experiences with forced singing, recording:

Whenever it struck his fancy, the camp commander would demand a song. Then a step-ladder would promptly be found for the conductor. He would climb up, announce the title of the song, and then raise his baton. [...] The most popular songs were "Haselnuss" and "Fröhlich sein." In spite of the cheerful text and jaunty melody, it sounded more like a dirge when from the raw throats of tired men the slow and tortuous line would issue forth: "Then let us sing and be cheerful." The eerie sound would carry through the air all the way to Oranienburg. And if it was not found satisfactory, then the group would be interrupted and the song would start again from the beginning.⁵¹

The emotional and physical effects of forced singing were incredibly damaging. Singing in the prison yard in often cold and rainy conditions drained the inmates' last bit of physical strength

 ⁵⁰ Eberhard Schmidt, Ein Lied - ein Atemzug. Erinnerungen und Dokumente. Gesprächspartner und Herausgeber Manfred Machlitt (Berlin, 1987), 130.
 ⁵¹ Wolfgang Szepansky, *Beitrag zur Dokumentation der Geschichte des KZ Sachsenhausen: Manuskript über seine Häftlingszeit im KZ Sachsenhausen* (Berlin, without date, Arbeiterlied Archiv, Sign. 10, 8).

which was crucial for survival. Many prisoners collapsed, sometimes fatally, due to the exhaustion from forced singing compounded by hard labor, disease, and lack of food and water.⁵² The survivor Hans Haase explained "How often [the SS guard Gustav] Sorge tortured us in the evenings for hours with singing or saluting by doffing our caps. It isn't possible to count how many men died of hunger, cold and wet weather, or illness."⁵³

Forced singing during the Holocaust represents a transformation of the traditional functions of collective singing. Normally, collective singing was, and still is today, a medium of self-expression and leisure. It was a form of pleasure, culture, and recreation that connected people to pleasant experiences. However, in the context of pain, suffering, and oppression, collective singing took on torturous functions for the prisoners. The prisoners were forced to sing cheerful songs that were completely dichotomous to their emotions of suffering and agony. This produced mental anguish as music was remodeled by the prisoners as a form of destruction, torment, and humiliation. Music for prisoners became an experience of violence and torture. In the most basic sense, music was transformed from a positive force to a negative, traumatic influence. As historian Juliane Brauer writes, "Pleasure had been replaced by pain, the sense of enjoyment by despair, the feeling of familiarity by fear."54

Additionally, the Nazis utilized camp orchestras called Lagnerkapellens that served a multitude of purposes. Shirli Gilbert writes that Lagnerkapallens assisted in the extermination process by helping maintain discipline and order in the camps.⁵⁵ Consisting of amateur and professional musicians, members of the

⁵³ Hans Haase, Zeugenmeldung an die Staatsanwaltschaft (Bonn: Februar 1956, Archiv Sachsenhausen, Oranienburg, Sign. JD 2/3), 84.

⁵² Juliane Brauer, "How Can Music Be Torturous?: Music in Nazi Concentration and Extermination Camps," *Music and Politics* X, no. 1 (2016): 1-41, 12.

⁵⁴ Brauer, "How Can Music Be Torturous?," 13.

⁵⁵ Shirli Gilbert, *Music in the Holocaust: Confronting Life in the Nazi Ghettos and Camps* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), 145.

Lagnerkapallen were generally considered "privileged," giving them a better chance of survival. However, their emotional survival was still vulnerable to destruction. Lagnerkapallens performed during punishments, executions, and the selection process. At the Monowitz concentration camp, the trumpeter Herman Sachnowitz described how the captured man who tried to escape would be forced to shout the words 'Hurra, hurra, ich bin wieder da!' (Hurrah, hurrah, I am back again!) while marching to his execution while the orchestra performed parade music.⁵⁶ This humiliated the captured victim while subsequently causing some survivors to accumulate feelings of guilt and depression that would persist throughout their lifetimes.⁵⁷

Furthermore, Lagnerkapallens performed music during the selection process, particularly in Birkenau. Here, the fate of newly arrived prisoners was determined, as the Nazis selected prisoners to either perform hard labor or go to their death. Esther Bejarano, a survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau, writes "We knew that all the people who streamed out of the wagons were going to the gas chambers. And we had to play pleasant music for them."58 Lagnerkapallens played during this process in order to deceive the newly arrived prisoners and make them believe that they were in no danger. They functioned to deceive prisoners and maintain a sense of order and diminish uncertainty and chaos. This made the players feel complicit in the extermination process. Halina Opielka, a Polish musician, records that many newly arrived prisoners "listened eagerly to the music" and were given a false sense of "courage and hope that this place where they had just arrived could not be too terrible if they were being 'greeted' by an orchestra."⁵⁹ Members of these Lagnerkapellens suffered greatly,

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⁵⁶ Gilbert, *Music in the Holocaust*, 176.

⁵⁷ Fackler, "Music in Concentration Camps," 10.

⁵⁸ Esther Bejarano, "Man Nannte Mich Krümel": Eine jüdische Jugend in den Zeiten Der Verfolgung (Hamburg: Curio-Verlag, 1991), 23.

⁵⁹ Gabriele Knapp, *Das Frauenorchester in Auschwitz: Musikalische Zwangsarbeit und ihre Bewältigung* (Hamburg: von Bockel, 1996), 229.

especially since the meaning and functions of music for them shifted from a positive mode of self-expression to a medium of deception and torture. 60

Scholars of Jewish history must find a balance between lachrymose and anti-lachrymose conceptions. When scholars advocate for an emphasis on one or the other, they fail to reflect the nuances and complexities of the story of the Jews. They further fall short of relaying an accurate conception of Jewish history. Examining the functions of creative and intellectual expression during the Holocaust allows us to show the resilience and power of the Jews without downplaying their suffering. The Theresienstadt ghetto was a place where Jews could voluntarily and almost freely respond to their suffering and persecution by engaging in art, music, literature, and scholarship. By engaging in creative and intellectual expression, the Jews showcased their humanity. The Nazis could never fully dehumanize the Jewish people because they still had a clear and innate drive to perform and express themselves. On the other hand, the Nazis used music and art to torture, humiliate, and dehumanize the Jewish people. Forcing prisoners to sing on command and participate in camp orchestras created a lingering sense of guilt and depression that persisted throughout survivors' lifetimes. It also made prisoners feel complicit in the suffering and deaths of their fellow prisoners. Therefore, scholars must seek to retell moments and periods in Jewish history through a simultaneous lachrymose and antilachrymose lens. They must show that the Jewish people have retained their humanity and displayed incredible resilience in times of crises without downplaying their suffering and oppression. Doing this will create more accurate, elaborate, and human conceptions of the Jewish people and their complex stories.

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⁶⁰ Brauer, "How Can Music Be Torturous?," 13.

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Challenging the Narrative: Rhodesian Political Strategy Supporting Military Success During the Bush War (1965-1979)

Max Kohmetscher

On November 11, 1965, the British colony of Rhodesia unilaterally declared independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom.¹ In the words of the self-proclaimed nation's Prime Minister Ian Smith, Rhodesia's declaration had "struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization and Christianity" against the Communists and Afro-Asian Bloc.² Despite the high-minded rhetoric of Smith, he himself privately stated the opinion of many of Rhodesians that "The white man is the master of Rhodesia. He has built it and intends to keep it."³ The newfound nation, built on the principle of white-minority rule, faced seemingly insurmountable strategic odds from its inception. Internationally the Rhodesian decision was almost universally condemned. Britain, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations all deemed the UDI illegal, with the UN implementing economic sanctions on Rhodesia, a first in UN history.⁴ Ghana, Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, the Soviet Union, China, and other states began to support the black nationalist movements

¹ "Unilateral Declaration of Independence," *The Government of Rhodesia, Wikisource*,

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence (Accessed April 21, 2022).

² Michael Evans, "The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-80." *International Journal of Phytoremediation* 18, No. 2 (2007): 181.

³ Eddie Michel, "'This Outcome Gives Me No Pleasure. It Is Extremely Painful for Me to Be the Instrument of Their Fate': White House Policy on Rhodesia During the UDI Era (1965-1979)." *South African Historical Journal* 71, No. 3 (2019): 443.

⁴ "Unilateral Declaration of Independence," *The Government of Rhodesia, Wikisource*,

https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Unilateral_Declaration_of_Independence (Accessed April 21, 2022).

in Rhodesia by offering arms, training, and advisors. The population of minority-ruled Rhodesia in 1965 was about three million, of which only about eight percent were white.⁵ Yet Rhodesia's white minority managed to hang onto power until 1979 all the same.⁶

Most modern scholars point to the end of Rhodesia as inevitable. According to historian Matthew Preston, popular scholarship surrounding the war believes that while security forces fought an innovative and highly effective counter-insurgency campaign, failures on the political front led inevitably to ultimate defeat.⁷ Historian Michael Evans summarizes these widely held views by writing "In the annals of the modern history of small wars, Rhodesia is probably the best example of a counterinsurgency campaign rendered ineffective by an almost complete lack of a realistic political strategy to complement an efficient military effort."8 Yet this oft-repeated argument fails to address how the 250,000 white Rhodesian's held back the tide of history for fourteen years. Against such odds, a "complete lack of a realistic political strategy" seems utterly insufficient to the task. This narrative also unjustifiably separates Rhodesia's military successes from its political strategies under the assumption Rhodesia's foreign policy only weakened its military effort. However, contrary to Evan's popular narrative, I believe Rhodesia's political strategy was realistic and successfully supported its military campaign. During its tenuous existence from 1965 to 1979, Rhodesia used effective political strategies rooted in the global Cold War to fuel its counter-insurgency efforts, enabling

⁵ Peter A. Kiss, "Rhodesia, 1962–1980: Tactical Success, Operational, Strategic, and Political Failure", In *Winning Wars Amongst the People* (Potomac Books, 2014), 55.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Matthew Preston, "Stalemate and the Termination of Civil War: Rhodesia Reassessed," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, No. 1 (2004): 71-72.

⁸ Evans, "The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-80," 191-192.

the strategically unstable, militarily weak, and politically isolated state to survive an implausible fourteen years.

During this fourteen-year conflict, Rhodesia's greatest challenge was gaining foreign support. Due to its pariah status internationally, Rhodesia could never expect widespread foreign recognition and open support, but Rhodesians did believe they could build enough support from similarly minded countries, political movements, and foreign leaders to support their war effort. Only in South Africa and Portugal, fellow white-minority governments in southern Africa, was this support easily found. However, relations between Pretoria, Lisbon, and Salisbury were often fraught and the regimes' interests were not necessarily congruent, resulting in cooperation being mostly limited to trade, arms, and intelligence sharing.⁹ While a short-lived tripartite alliance known as ALCORA was created, it was not a formal defense pact and collapsed following the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal that overthrew its authoritarian pro-colonial government.¹⁰ The Communist and Third World blocs were both firmly against Rhodesia but divided in their goals for the country, with the rebel group ZAPU supported by Angola, Cuba, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and the ZANU rebels supported by Tanzania and China.¹¹ This left the democratic West and particularly the United States as Rhodesia's best hope for major foreign support in its war against insurgents. Using a combination of effective political strategies, Rhodesia was able to get a large amount of support from a publicly hostile West, a major

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⁹ Gary Baines, "The Arsenal of Securocracy: Pretoria's Provision of Arms and Aid to Salisbury, c.1974-1980," *South African Historical Journal* 71, No. 3 (2019): 424.

¹⁰ Ibid., 425.

¹¹ "Fidel Castro's 1977 Southern Africa Tour: A Report to Honecker (excerpt)," dated April 03, 1977, DY30 JIV 2/201/1292; document obtained by Christian F. Ostermann; translated by David Welch with revisions by Ostermann, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Berlin, Wilson Center Online Digital Archive.

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accomplishment that runs contrary to the narrative of an unrealistic Rhodesian foreign policy.

Politically, Rhodesia's main strategy toward the West was to position itself as a bastion of Western values against the spread of Communism in southern Africa. There was certainly some truth to this argument, as shown in a 1977 meeting between East German leader Erich Honecker and Fidel Castro, in which Castro tied Rhodesia in with ongoing Cuban-backed conflicts in Angola, Mozambique and Zambia as part of a grand communist strategy in southern Africa to gain power in the region over the West.¹² The vehemently anti-communist statements of the Rhodesian government, whether sincere or for political gain, resonated across Vietnam-era America, and many American conservatives were angered by US hostility towards a Western-oriented anticommunist stronghold in southern Africa. The Rhodesian offer to send soldiers to Vietnam further reinforced the conservative view of Salisbury as an ally in the global fight against communism.¹³ The Rhodesian UDI also occurred at a key point in US political history, allowing Rhodesia to turn its internationally "unacceptable" racial policies into a strength. Many of Rhodesia's most vocal supporters, such as Senators James Eastland, Strom Thurmond, and Jesse Helms, supported Salisbury on racialist grounds and feared that if the "White Redoubt" were to collapse in southern Africa this could spell the end of white supremacy in Dixie.¹⁴ As a result of its racial and anti-communist policies, Rhodesia created enduring tangible support in the US domestic political scene throughout the tumultuous 1960s and 70s that translated into weakened US resolve against Rhodesia.

Though "official" US policy toward Rhodesia from 1965-1979 is summed up by President Lyndon Johnson's 1966 statement

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¹² Ibid.

 ¹³ Michel, "'This Outcome Gives Me No Pleasure. It Is Extremely Painful for Me to Be the Instrument of Their Fate': White House Policy on Rhodesia During the UDI Era (1965-1979)," 445.
 ¹⁴ Ibid. 446

¹⁴ Ibid., 446.

to the Organization of African Unity that the US hoped to "open full power and responsibility of nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia-not just 6 percent of them," Rhodesia's anti-communist rhetoric led to a very different approach behind closed doors.¹⁵ In a 1966 memorandum to President Johnson written by presidential advisor John P. Roche, Roche stated an intervention in Rhodesia and other anti-communist African states would be "completely contradictory" to America's general posture towards the communist world and "at best useless, at worst counterproductive."¹⁶ This statement shows that in the wider Cold War struggle for southern Africa, US administrations were cognizant of the need to avoid actions against Rhodesia which could damage broader relations with the white-controlled states of the region. On a geopolitical level, the United States retained close strategic and economic ties with the anti-communist racist regimes of Portugal, which was a key NATO ally, and South Africa, which monitored Soviet activities in the south Atlantic, provided facilities for US aircraft and naval vessels, and hosted an important NASA tracking station.¹⁷ By positioning itself as an anti-communist ally to the West alongside Portugal and South Africa and racialist ally to American conservatives, Rhodesia both precluded Western intervention against it and helped create the most consequential acts of Western support for its regime, the continuous violations of UN economic sanctions on Rhodesia by Western states.

In the first few years after the UN instituted sanctions, it became obvious they were not being effectively enforced.

¹⁵ Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, 91st Congress First Session, United States Government Printing Office in Washington D.C., 37-287, 1969.
¹⁶ John P. Roche to Lyndon B. Johnson, November 30, 1966 in Robert Lester, et al., eds., in Lyndon B. Johnson National Security Files, 1963-1969, Africa, (Frederick, Md: University Publications of America, 1988), 62-63.
¹⁷ Michel, "This Outcome Gives Me No Pleasure. It Is Extremely Painful for Me to Be the Instrument of Their Fate': White House Policy on Rhodesia During the UDI Era (1965-1979)," 446-447.

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According to a 1968 CIA report "the comprehensive sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council on 29 May 1968 against Rhodesia are unlikely to have much more effect in forcing Salisbury to relinquish its independence than have previous limited sanction efforts."18 While the report blamed South Africa and Portugal as the reason for Rhodesian success in skirting sanctions, the real culprit was the Western states that refused to enforce them. The offending countries included France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, West Germany, Britain, the US, Israel, Japan, various African countries, Brazil, Mauritius, and Taiwan, among others.¹⁹ German, Japanese, French and Dutch exports to Rhodesia increased by 62%, 62%, 22% and 24% respectively, while Swiss imports from Rhodesia increased by 107% in the two years following the UDI. Even Britain, Rhodesia's former colonial master and therefore the Western country most outraged by its UDI, repeatedly and flagrantly violated sanctions despite publicly enforcing them. Publicly, Prime Minister Harold Wilson's 1965 address to Parliament stated Britain's official position that "It is the duty of everyone owing allegiance to the Crown...to refrain from all acts which would assist the illegal régime to continue in their rebellion against the Crown," and in 1966 Britain deployed the Royal Navy to enforce the oil embargo on Rhodesia by preventing oil tankers offloading their cargo at the Mozambican port of Beira.²⁰ Privately, however, many British companies, including Shell and BP, were violating sanctions through the Mozambican port of Lourenco Marques which the Royal Navy did not patrol. In 1967, annoyed at the fact it was constantly accused by the British government of breaking

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¹⁸ 556, Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Lyndon B. Johnson National Security Files.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ House of Commons Debate 11th November 1965, 720, col. 356; Alois S. Mlambo, "'Honoured More in the Breach Than in the Observance': Economic Sanctions on Rhodesia and International Response, 1965 to 1979," *South African Historical Journal* 71, No. 3 (2019): 381.

international sanctions, the Portuguese government revealed that out of the 169 oil tankers which entered Lourenco Marques between April 1966 and May 1967, 58 were British flagged and owned.²¹

While private sanction busting in the West was incredibly common, it was not publicly endorsed until the United States Congress passed the Military Procurement Act of 1972. In this document, Section 10, known as the Byrd Amendment, allowed the importation of strategic raw materials "of any foreign country or area not listed as a Communist dominated country or area, for so long as the importation into the United States of material of that kind which is the product of such Communist-dominated countries or areas is not prohibited by any provision of law."²² The wording was deliberately formulated to allow US corporations access to the mineral wealth of Rhodesia, an action in open violation of UN sanctions. The act authorized the importation into the United States of seventy-two strategic and critical minerals from Rhodesia, with chrome being the most valuable, and considering the US had been forced to import it from the USSR as the only other major source of chrome after UN sanctions on Rhodesia, the most politically justifiable.²³ While the economic value of Rhodesian resources was certainly an important reason the bill passed, the Congressional debates on the subject point directly to the success of Rhodesian anti-communist and racialist policies in winning conservative American support. Senator James Collins echoed Rhodesian propaganda in a Senate debate, saying "why should Rhodesia be singled out when there is not a single democracy in the whole continent of Africa. If self-determination is a United Nations feature, why do we do business with Russia, Red China,

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²¹ Mlambo, "'Honoured More in the Breach Than in the Observance': Economic Sanctions on Rhodesia and International Response, 1965 to 1979," 381.

²² Armed Forces Authorization of 1972, H.R. 8687, Public Law 92-156, 92nd Congress (November 17, 1971).

²³ Eddie Michel, "The Luster of Chrome: Nixon, Rhodesia, and the Defiance of UN Sanctions," *Diplomatic History* 42, No. 1 (2018): 158.

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Latin-American dictatorships or any other authoritarian country?"²⁴ Other powerful racially conservative senators like Byrd, Thurmond, Stennis, and Goldwater fought for the passage of the amendment, which appeared to pair the domestic "Southern Strategy" adopted by the Nixon White House with a "Southern Africa Strategy" designed to gain white political support by slowing down the pace of racial change in both the southern states and southern Africa.²⁵ Historian Gerald Horne suggests that the two strategies were mutually compatible in the context of Cold War-era conservatism, which often painted both African Americans and Africans as the allies or dupes of the communists.²⁶ Through a remarkably effective international campaign, Rhodesia had used the issues of communism and race to turn the West from a bloc united in hostility towards its existence in 1965 into one willing to privately and publicly trade with it by 1971, which was a remarkable accomplishment for a racist white-minority ruled African state created by rebels against the British Crown and sanctioned by the United Nations.

Despite Rhodesian political success abroad, all would be for naught if Rhodesia could not translate this into military strength at home. The central problem of Rhodesia's military, known collectively as the Rhodesian Security Forces, was the fact that they needed to control a vast country of 389,000 square kilometers and 3 million people with an army that at the peak of its strength had only 15,000 personnel (3,400 regulars, the rest conscripts) due to financial constraints and white demographics (due to the limited attempts to utilize Blacks in the security forces until very late in the war).²⁷ Security forces were also limited by the Rhodesian government's unwillingness to follow a "hearts and minds" strategy that offered an acceptable political solution that would win

²⁴ Ibid., 156.

²⁵ Ibid., 156-158.

²⁶ Ibid., 142.

²⁷ Kiss, "Rhodesia, 1962–1980: Tactical Success, Operational, Strategic, and Political Failure," 52-59.

over the Black population from the guerillas, damning the military to fight a nationwide holding-action until a political solution was reached.²⁸ With their political constraints and limited manpower, the security forces could not hope to completely cover and control the entire country, but they managed to consistently locate and defeat the guerrillas in the areas that were the most important economically (primarily the cities and the European farm belt) and effectively contest the countryside for 14 years. This major accomplishment was the result of innovative counter-insurgency tactics made possible by high-tech military equipment and a relatively massive military budget gained through the economic rewards of Rhodesia's political strategy.

By the height of the war in the mid-to-late 1970s, funding military operations for the guerrilla war was costing Rhodesia roughly one million dollars per day.²⁹ By the 1969 estimates of economist Robert McKinnell, Rhodesia's economy "must apparently" have stagnated or gone into recession due to sanctions by that time, which would have placed major constraints on Rhodesia's ability to pay for the war.³⁰ However, through the West's willingness to accept trade from UN sanctioned Rhodesia, the country was able to meet these costs. According to a UN report on Rhodesian sanctions, Rhodesia's exports in 1973 were estimated to be worth \$640 million (a major increase when compared with \$474 million in 1972).³¹ The situation changed little by 1978, with the UN helplessly recording hundreds of illegal

²⁹ Evans, "The Wretched of the Empire: Politics, Ideology and Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia, 1965-80," 191.

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²⁸ Ibid., 60.

³⁰ Robert McKinnell, "Sanctions and the Rhodesian Economy," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 7, No. 4 (1969): 580.

³¹ Seventh Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia, United Nations Online Database, S/11594/Add.3.

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exports that year.³² Willingness to accept Rhodesian exports also extended to toleration of Rhodesia importing western arms. The arms had to be obtained through third-parties or middlemen, but they made their way into the country all the same, with some of the leading pro-sanctions western countries supplying them. Rhodesia sourced arms and aircraft from Italy, the USA, the UK, France, Switzerland, Jordan, Luxemburg, Israel, Belgium, Portugal and West Germany.³³ Rhodesian tactical superiority in the war was largely the result of its western machine guns, artillery, armored and unarmored vehicles, small arms, and airplanes. For example, the massed use of airpower by Rhodesia, such as the forty-two helicopters and thirty-five fixed-wing aircraft used in the successful 1977 Chimoio Raid, would not have been possible without the western supply of aircraft, fuel, repair parts.³⁴

Despite global condemnation and UN sanctions following the UDI in 1965, Rhodesia managed to secure legal trading rights from the United States via the Byrd Amendment in 1971 and illicit trade with dozens of other western countries to the tune of over \$600 million in exports by 1973. These funds and support were crucial to Rhodesia's remarkably successful fourteen-year counterinsurgency campaign and would not have been available if Rhodesia had "a complete lack of a realistic political strategy." On the contrary, Rhodesia's successful use of anti-communist and racist rhetoric, tailored to western and American Cold War-era political interests, allowed the country to continue exporting its raw materials and goods both openly and covertly. If western leaders had not been influenced by Rhodesia's political strategy, it

³³ Mlambo, "'Honoured More in the Breach Than in the Observance': Economic Sanctions on Rhodesia and International Response, 1965 to 1979," 392.

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³² Tenth Report of the Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Rhodesia, United Nations Online Database, S/12529/Add.1.

³⁴ Darlington Mutanda, *The Rhodesian Air Force in Zimbabwe's War of Liberation*, 1966-1980, (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2017), 101.

is likely a strict enforcement of UN sanctions would have occurred, resulting in financial losses that would have greatly reduced the longevity of the embattled white regime in Salisbury, regardless of the "efficient military effort" and tactical prowess of the security forces.

Secular vs Religion: Two Approaches to Reconstruct Zionism in American Terminology

Jinze Mi

Recently, historians such as Melvin I. Urofsky and David Ellenson have noted that the cultural, social, and political contexts of the United States shaped the particular visionary and ideological framework of the American branch of the Zionist movement.¹ Unlike its European counterpart, the twentieth-century American Zionist movement portrayed itself as faithful to American ideals such as democracy, freedom, equity, humanity, and justice. American Zionists argued that their Zionist pursuit—namely the social justice for the persecuted remnants of the diaspora Jews in Eastern Europe and elsewhere—was identical with the ethos that animated their Jewish and American identities.² The compatibility of Jewish nationalism, American ideals, and American patriotism is itself an intellectual power that kindled the spark of political enthusiasm of American Jews to engage themselves in the American Zionist movement.

While previous accounts of the American Zionist narrative have elucidated the role of political actions in the American Zionist movement, they seldom paid sufficient attention to the intellectual groundwork laid by Horace Kallen (1882-1974) and Shlomo Bardin (1898-1976). Two leading American Zionists, Kallen and Bardin both aimed to reconstruct Zionism in American terminology, but they approached Zionism in two different ways: a secular one and a religious one. To Kallen, he became convinced in what he called the secular Jewish cultural identity. Kallen rejected Jewish religious rituals and observance but rather merged Zionism with American

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¹ Melvin I. Urofsky, *American Zionism from Herzl to the Holocaust* (Lincoln: Plunkett Lake Press/University of Nebraska Press, 2020), 226.

² Ibid., 232-35; Dennis Wepman, *Immigration: From the Founding of Virginia to the Closing of Ellis Island* (New York City: Facts on File, 2002), 56.

ideals and his formulation of cultural pluralism.³ In contrast to Kallen's secular approach, Bardin founded and ran the Brandeis Camp Institute (BCI) dedicated to making secular American Jews better Jews by engaging themselves in spiritual recreation where its centerpiece was Shabbat.⁴ Although their views on reconstructing Zionism were at odds with each other, Kallen and Bardin both aimed to make Zionism more palatable to American Jews—especially those being alienated from Jewish culture—by highlighting the compatibility of Jewish and American identities.

Rather than tracing the history of the Zionist political organizations in America, it is crucial to probe and understand the intellectual groundwork that prepared American Jews (including Zionists and non-Zionists) to feel confident in the political actions of Zionism. My paper thus juxtaposes Kallen's secular approach and Bardin's religious approach to examine how two strands of Jewish American revivalist thinking helped shape the ethos of the twentieth-century American Zionist movement. My paper asks how and under what circumstances did Kallen and Bardin winnow the ideological framework of Zionism and transform American Jews' views of Zionism? How did Kallen and Bardin see the relationships between American Jewry, the United States, and the future State of Israel? How did their early life experience affect their attitudes toward Zionism and prompt them to reclaim their Jewishness?

By answering the above questions, my paper argues that examining the two different approaches Kallen and Bardin utilized to reconstruct Zionism in American terminology enables us to discern American Jews and their experience with Zionism from two angles. For one, the two different approaches demonstrate that American Jewry engaged themselves in the American Zionist movement at a cultural (American ideals), philosophical (cultural

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³ Sarah Schmidt, "Horace M. Kallen and the 'Americanization' of Zionism," 61, 63, 65, 68, 71.

⁴ Bruce Jay Powell, "The Educational Philosophy of Shlomo Bardin: A Study of The Nature And Purposes of the Brandeis-Bardin Institute" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1979), 12-19.

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pluralism), and educational (Brandeis Camp Institute) level. By contrast, previous historical inquiries centered on how individuals (such as Abba Hillel Silver) and organizations (such as World Zionist Organization) became active in the American Zionist movement at the political level (canvassing American politicians, raising funds for Zionist projects, et cetera). Secondly, the two different approaches provide new evidence to consider the unique role of Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis (1856-1941) in the American Zionist movement. Horace Kallen's synthesis of American ideals, cultural pluralism, and Jewish nationalism influenced Louis Brandeis to become one of the most prominent Zionist leaders in America. Louis Brandeis, whose philosophy of American patriotism combined with Kallen's reconstruction of Zionism, urged Shlomo Bardin to found and run the Brandeis Camp Institute (BCI), where American Jews reclaimed their Jewishness via spiritual recreation.

Since the late 1950s, historians have begun to highlight the forgotten roles of Horace Kallen and Shlomo Bardin in reconstructing Zionism in American terminology. Sarah Schmidt, who had pioneered and conducted the most prolific research into Kallen, offered a groundbreaking historiographic contribution as Schmidt chronicled Kallen's synthesis of American ideals, cultural pluralism, and Jewish nationalism. Schmidt illuminated that Kallen's synthesis not only alleviated Louis Brandeis' anxiety over "dual loyalty" but also provided the ideological vision behind Brandeis' leadership in the American Zionist movement. Sidney Ratner observed that Kallen saw cultural pluralism as a new rationale to reconstruct Zionism. Daniel Greene probed how cultural pluralism grew out of American Jewish thought. Greene also linked cultural pluralism to college-aged, second-generation American Jewry who sought to utilize "Americanized" Zionism to spark a Jewish cultural renaissance. Noam Pianko, a leading historian of Zionism and American Judaism, located Kallen's formulation of cultural pluralism in the discourse of American Zionism and white ethnocentrism. Bruce Powell, a former camper and counselor at the

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Brandeis Camp Institute (BCI), detailed the theoretical and philosophical influences upon Bardin's Zionist thinking and educational pedagogy (namely "The Brandeis Method"). Deborah Dash Moore examined how Bardin restored Jewish spirituality to approach Zionism and employed Zionism to promote individual growth, self-knowledge, and group connectivity with a Jewish flavor. She added that Bardin reinvented Jewishness as something appealing and inspiring, which led campers to be willing to embrace both Judaism and Zionism.⁵ Many—if not most—historians, such as Sarah Schmidt and Bruce Powell, provided substantive historical inquiries of either Bardin's or Kallen's approach, but no scholar ever linked their two approaches together.

Hence, my paper aims to address a lacuna in the existing historiographic discourse of reconstructing Zionism in American terminology by considering the two different approaches of Kallen and Bardin as equal elements in the development of the American Zionism movement. My paper suggests that the two different

⁵ Sarah Schmidt, "Americanized' Zionism: The Forgotten Role of the Horace M. Kallen," The Berman Jewish Policy Archive (1956): 66-69; Sarah Schmidt, Horace M. Kallen: Prophet of American Zionism, 57; Sarah Schmidt, "Horace M. Kallen and the 'Americanization' of Zionism," American Jewish Archives (April 1976): 61-66, 71; Sarah Schmidt, "Messianic Pragmatism: The Zionism of Horace M. Kallen," Judaism 25, no. 2 (Spring 1976): 217-219, 211; Sidney Ratner, "Horace M. Kallen and Cultural Pluralism," Modern Judaism 4, no. 2 (May 1984): 194-197; Daniel Greene, The Jewish Origins of Cultural Pluralism: The Menorah Association and American Diversity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011): 45-68; Noam Pianko, Zionism and the Roads Not Taken (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010): 41-42; Noam Pianko, "The True Liberalism of Zionism: Horace Kallen, Jewish Nationalism, and the Limits of American Pluralism," American Jewish History 94, no. 4 (2008): 316-325; Matthew Kaufman, "Between Consent and Descent: Horace M. Kallen's and Psychological Inheritance," American Jewish History 103, no. 1 (2019): 51-53; Bruce Jay Powell, "The Educational Philosophy of Shlomo Bardin," 92-99; Deborah Dash Moore, "Inventing Jewish Identity in California: Shlomo Bardin, Zionism, and the Brandeis Camp Institute," in National Variations in Jewish Identity, ed. Steven M. Cohen and Gabriel Horenczyk (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 202-210.

approaches prompted American Jews to reclaim their Jewishness (either secular or religious) and become both intellectual and political Zionists. My paper solidly places the intellectual history of American Zionism into a much broader historical discourse of the American Jewish community.

To that end, my paper, first of all, traces the history of Jewish assimilation into American life. Jewish history in America began in the mid-seventeenth century.⁶ Sephardic Jews (namely Spanish and Portuguese Jews) came to America, followed by German Jews in 1720.⁷ Sephardic and German Jews began to assimilate into American life as soon as they stepped off the ship. They adapted to the English language and mores of America. They enlisted, fought, and died for America in the Revolutionary War and World War I.⁸ Sephardic and German Jews downplayed Jewish tradition since they considered that it was inconsistent with American ideals and was disloyal to the United States. They were well-off, politically engaged, and highly assimilated Jews, whose attitude towards the American Zionist movement was lukewarm.9 Among them, prominent Jewish leaders (such as Jacob Henry Schiff, Louis Marshall, Mayer Sulzberger, and Issac Mayer Wise) openly opposed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. These individuals regarded Zionism as a fanciful, unrealistic political ideology, which was not worth any form of support.¹⁰ Before the late nineteenth century, anti-Semitism in the United States was considerably weaker than in Europe, as a result of American Jews' extraordinary endeavors to facilitate singular loyalty to the United States. During this time, they also became highly assimilated within the context of

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⁶ Wepman, *Immigration*, 243.

⁷ Ibid., 302-305.

⁸ Simon Wolf, *The American Jew As Patriot, Soldier And Citizen* (Scotts Valley: Create Space Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 10-12, 14-16, 20-24.

⁹ Deborah Dash Moore, *At Home in America: Second Generation New York Jews* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 46-49, 58-59.

¹⁰ Julian Leavitt, "American Jews in the World War," American Jewish Year Book, Jan 1, 1920.

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America's "melting pot" policy, namely an attempt to "Americanize" Jews and other immigrant communities.¹¹ When coupled with the fact that most Sephardic and German Jews enjoyed an affluent or at least middle-class lifestyle, it is no surprise that the American Zionism movement's original raison d'être diminished.¹²

However, the large-scale Eastern European Jews' immigration to America during the late-nineteenth and the earlytwentieth centuries kindled the growth of anti-Semitism in America. By 1924, approximately three million Eastern European Jews fled to America with a strong desire for personal safety and a well-to-do life. These newcomers made up more than 3% of America's total population, but before 1900, Jews formed less than 1% of America's total population.¹³ This skyrocketing increase, combined with the upward social mobility of some highly-assimilated Jews and America's fears about socialism, communism, and anarchism, paved the way for a growth of anti-Semitism. Moreover, Jewish immigrants from Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe brought with them the political ideology of Zionism. Their interests in maintaining Jewishness never waned, in part because they had fresh memories of brutal pogroms (such as the 1905 pogrom in Yekaterinoslav, Ukraine), widespread anti-Semitism, and official measures of persecution in Eastern Europe.¹⁴ These newcomers thus backlashed the "melting pot" policy, which

¹¹ Deborah Dash Moore, Jeffrey S. Gurock, Annie Polland, Howard B. Rock, Daniel Soyer, and Diana Linden, *Jewish New York: The Remarkable Story of a City and a People* (New York: New York University Press, 2017), 92-99.

¹² Barry Trachtenberg and Kyle Stanton, "Shifting Sands: Zionism & American Jewry," in *Dangerous Conflation: Zionism, Israel, and Anti-Semitism*, ed. Moshe Machover, Barry Trachtenberg, and Kyle Stanton (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 2019), 15-16, 18.

¹³ John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), 149.

¹⁴ Irving Howe, World of Our Fathers: The Journey of the East European Jews to America and the Life They Found and Made (New York: Open Road Media, 2017), 127-129, 131-32.

worried native-born Americans, namely White Anglo-Saxon Protestants, even more.

In the meantime, not only Eastern European Jews but also other immigrant communities in America were concerned about assimilation and encountered prejudice or discrimination. For example, the anti-Catholic and anti-papal animosities that existed in America fueled significant hostility toward the large-scale Italian immigration to America during the late-nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuries. Nearly all Italian immigrants had agrarian backgrounds, lacked a formal education, and competed with underclass Americans for lower-paid jobs and poorly-equipped housing. These newcomers brought with them not only the loyalty to the Catholic Church and the Pope but also an ideological disposition toward socialism and anarchism. Anti-Italianism has had as significant an impact on Italian immigrants as anti-Semitism has had on Jews. American nativists portrayed Jews as dangerous and "un-American" to further their anti-immigration agenda and American nativists did the same to Italian immigrants.¹⁵

As a response to widespread xenophobia among the general public and nativist politicians (such as Albert Johnson, David Reed, and Henry Cabot Lodge), Congress promulgated the Immigration Act of 1924 that required English literacy tests and established quotas. The 1924 law restricted immigration from any one country to 2% of that country's residents in the United States as of the 1890 census.¹⁶ If, for example, there were 100 immigrants from a specific country according to the 1890 census, then only two immigrants from that country would have the permission of immigrants from 1924. Thus, the 1924 law severely restricted immigrants from Eastern Europe, countries in which large numbers of Jewish immigrants were born. It is no surprise that the 1924 law accelerated

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¹⁵ Jerre Gerlando Mangione and Ben Morreale, *La Storia: Five Centuries of the Italian American Experience* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1992), 241-266.

¹⁶ Harry Linfield, "A Survey of the Year 5683," *American Jewish Year Book*, Jan 1, 1924.

the growth of anti-Semitism in America. Immigration aside, private schools, colleges, and places of employment all imposed quotas and restrictions against Jews. Media and physical attacks on Jews were commonplace in major cities such as New York and Detroit.¹⁷

The promulgation of the 1924 law, and the increasing anti-Semitism it ensued, seemed to be a turning point in which the American Zionist movement developed a noticeable presence among American Jews. Before 1924, the American Zionist movement attracted few followers, most non-Zionist Jews in America preferring other political or ideological options to save diaspora Jews from homelessness, persecution, and financial hardship.¹⁸ There was no unified Zionism program among Zionist Jews in America either. True, unlike Sephardic and German Jews, Eastern European Jews refused to assimilate. However, regardless of assimilation, Sephardic, German, and Eastern European Jews thought uniting together would protect themselves while facing the growing anti-Semitism. For self-defense, American Jews thus sought to bury their differences in the degree of assimilation into American life and highlight their interdependence on Jewish culture, values, and identity.¹⁹ It was Zionism that coalesced American Jews into an avowedly American Jewish community where they united to ensure self-defense. In other words, it was the 1924 law that compelled American Jews to emphasize their Jewish identity and pushed them further toward Zionism.

To provide an ideological framework that prompted American Jews to become politically engaged Zionists, Horace

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¹⁷ Steven G. Koven and Frank Götzke. *American Immigration Policy: Confronting the Nation's Challenges* (New York: Springer, 2010), 10-11; "La Follette Denies Criticizing Jews: Declares He Always Has Opposed Racial Discrimination and Religious Intolerance. Answers Louis Marshall Latter's Concern About Document Printed in Record Is Called a 'Political Trick'," *New York Times*, November 2, 1924; "La Follette Replies To Questions Of Jews: Restates Opposition to Klan and Denounces Workings of Immigration Law," *New York Times*, September 16, 1924.

 ¹⁸ Linfield, "A Survey of the Year 5683."
 ¹⁹ Ibid.

Kallen coined and publicly proposed the concept of cultural pluralism in 1924. Cultural pluralism blended American ideals of democracy, freedom, equity, humanity, and justice. William James (1842-1910) and Barrett Wendell (1855-1921) motivated Kallen to regard himself as not only an American but also a secular American Jew. Kallen realized that Zionism, namely the means of re-creating another state dedicated to the secular Hebraic ideals or to what he called the secular Jewish cultural identity, was consistent with his commitment as a secular American Jew.²⁰ Despite his heavy reliance on the American terminology, Kallen's reconstruction of Zionism was far beyond transplanting the United States to the Eretz Yisrael (literally meaning in Modern Hebrew "Land of Israel"). Kallen explained his belief that the Jewish prophetic tradition was the intellectual source of American democracy. To Kallen, therefore, reconstructing Zionism in American terminology was comparable to reconstructing Zionism based on the secular Jewish cultural identity.

Through the influence of rabbis such as Solomon Schechter (1847-1915) and Mordecai Kaplan (1881-1983), Horace Kallen regarded the American Zionist movement as a crucial bulwark against Jewish assimilation into American life. To Kallen, cultural pluralism laid an intellectual groundwork to manage American Jewry's dilemma of whether or not to assimilate. Since the late nineteenth century, American Jews-especially those having an European origin—had been Eastern concerned with "Americanization," namely an attempt to conform all ethnic/cultural groups into a mass of singular American identity. American Jews would lose their Jewish cultural identity if they assimilated into the "melting pot," where native-born Americans predominated and favored. Unlike "Americanization," cultural pluralism argued that someone of diverse ethnicities should keep their cultural identity

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²⁰ Sarah Schmidt, "Messianic Pragmatism: The Zionism of Horace M. Kallen," 219.

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freely and therefore neither government nor the general public should hamper them.²¹

By linking cultural pluralism with American ideals and the American Zionist cause, Kallen made it possible for American Jews to join the American Zionist movement without worrying about being accused of "dual loyalty."²² After 1924, ordinary American Jews began their intense involvement in Zionism and mobilized their resources to assist the diaspora Jews in and beyond Europe. Kallen's reconstruction of Zionism prompted the previously lukewarm American Jewish community to undertake their burgeoning sense of responsibility for the fate of the Jews around the world. The American Zionist movement grew further following the rise of the Nazis to power in 1933. Not only ordinary American Jews but also Supreme Court Justice Brandeis, one of Zionism's leading spokespersons in America, benefited from Kallen's reconstruction of Zionism. It was from Kallen's argument about the compatibility between American and Jewish identities that Brandeis explained his belief as below: "Multiple loyalties are objectionable only if they are inconsistent...There is no inconsistency between loyalty to America and loyalty to Jewry."23 Brandeis argued that every Jew in America must stand up and aid in advancing the American Zionist movement since there were no "multiple lovalties." Brandeis devoted a great deal of his time, passion, and money to champion the American Zionist movement. In his later years, Brandeis was concerned about the loss of Jewishness among American Jews. His encouragement and financial support to Bardin

²¹ Sidney Ratner, "Horace M. Kallen and Cultural Pluralism," *Modern Judaism* 4, no. 2 (May 1984): 191-192; Horace Kallen, "Democracy versus the Melting Pot," *The Nation*, February, 1915.

²² Sarah Schmidt, "Americanized' Zionism: The Forgotten Role of the Horace M. Kallen," 72-74.

²³ Louis Brandeis, "The Jewish Problem: How To Solve It," speech given at a Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis, April 25, 1915.

ultimately led to the foundation of the Brandeis Camp Institute (BCI) in 1941.²⁴

Unlike Kallen, Bardin approached Zionism not bv identifying with the secular Jewish identity but rather by restoring Jewish spirituality. At the BCI, Bardin aimed to not only stop college-aged campers from rejecting their Jewish culture but also demonstrate the compatibility of Jewish nationalism and American patriotism. Bardin's aim was in line with Brandeis' Zionist thinking that "To be good Americans, we must be better Jews, and to be better Jews, we must become Zionists."²⁵ Bardin regarded Zionism as the key to reviving the Jewish spirit of American Jewry, namely a Jewish cultural renaissance. Therefore, Bardin recast Zionism not as a physical relocation to a Jewish homeland but rather as a return to one's spiritual center of Judaism and Jewish vitality. Bardin's commitment to both Judaism and Zionism became an intellectual source to run the spiritual recreation program at the BCI. The influence of Bardin's Zionist thinking began in California in the 1940s and spread throughout the United States in the 1960s. The spiritual recreation programs at the BCI flourished and further matured during the 1960s and continued through the 1970s. After the death of Brandeis in 1941, Bardin did more than anyone else to prompt the majority of American Jews to embrace pro-Zionist views.²⁶ Following Bardin's intellectual leadership during the 1940s, the American Jewish community continued its intensive Zionist involvement in the American public arena by canvassing

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²⁴ Shlomo Bardin, "The Brandeis Camp Institute," *Journal of Jewish Education* vol. 17 (June 1946): 26–27; Deborah Dash Moore, "Inventing Jewish Identity in California: Shlomo Bardin, Zionism, and the Brandeis Camp Institute," 205, 207, 211-213.

²⁵ Louis Brandeis, "The Jewish Problem: How To Solve It," speech given at a Conference of Eastern Council of Reform Rabbis, April 25, 1915; "The Brandeis Effect," *Time Magazine*, July 15, 1971.

²⁶ Bruce Jay Powell, "The Educational Philosophy of Shlomo Bardin," 36-38, 43, 101, 279.

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pro-Israel politicians and influencing American policies in the Middle East.

Bardin's views on reconstructing Zionism were similar to Kallen in some respects (for example, to make Zionism more palatable to American Jews) while containing sharp contrasts at other times (religious versus secular). My paper illuminates how Kallen's secular approach and Bardin's religious approach functioned as a catalyst for changing the ethos of American Zionists. Linking Kallen and Bardin, there is no unified Zionist thinking that prompted Jews to engage themselves in the twentieth-century American Zionist movement. Although they adopted two different approaches, they both regarded the compatibility of Zionism, American ideals, and American patriotism as an intellectual power to reconstruct Zionism. Team: Report: West Point Undergraduate Historical Review Spring 2023

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Words Bring Bombs: US Decision-Making Prior to Operation Allied Force

Quentin C. Zimmer

Introduction

The first American bombs began to fall on Pristina, Kosovo at 8 p.m.¹ That night, March 24, 1999, 250 US military aircraft participated in the opening strike of Operation Allied Force-an international, coalition effort to end Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević's violent persecution of Kosovar Albanians.² Following seventy-eight days of NATO bombing, Milošević conceded: Serbian troops withdrew, and Kosovo was granted self-rule under international supervision. Allied Force combined the efforts of the United Nations (UN), the Contact Group, and NATO to achieve a political outcome through military force. In the United States, prior to the strikes, senior government officials battled over whether to commit to military intervention. Historical precedent, political views, reports of war crimes, and multilateral goals in the region all influenced US officials' decisions. Throughout the decisionmaking process, disagreement between US military and civilian officials created confusion and delayed the use of force. Retracing the US government's decision to support military intervention, however, shows that international pressure was a significant factor in unifying US civilian and military officials. Political considerations and international reputation, alongside agitation from pro-intervention US officials, overcame domestic disagreements in the US-ultimately resulting in the decision to conduct airstrikes.

¹ Benjamin Lambeth, *NATO'S AirWar for Kosovo* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 2001), 20-21.

² Gregory Ball, "1999 - Operation Allied Force," Air Force Historical Support Division, accessed April 25, 2022, https://www.afhistory.af.mil/FAQs/Fact-Sheets/Article/458957/1999-operation-allied-force/.

In the context of current events, a case study of Allied Force comments on a crucial issue for US officials: how can military and civilian leaders better-and more quickly-reach a consensus on use-of-force decisions? Given Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022, US officials-and international bodies like NATO-once again face decisions concerning the use of force, the effectiveness of limited military intervention, and the inevitable strife between the institutions and personalities of civilian and military officials. Reexamining Allied Force, with a specific focus on the interaction between the State Department and the Department of Defense, shows the need for quicker alignment of civilian and military policy positions in order to have more control over the direction of the international community. Disagreements and lack of communication between civilian and military officials leading up to US airstrikes in Kosovo demonstrate the need for a more effective central mediator between the State and Defense departments, and for increased interagency pre-planning with regards to international crisis response.

Background

The area of Kosovo has been subject to rival territorial claims stretching back seven centuries.³ Kosovo, located in the Balkans, most notably borders Albania and Serbia. Kosovo's geographic position has fueled conflict, as it is jointly occupied by Serbs and Albanians—which has led to ethnic conflict that is further compounded by divides between Christianity and Islam. Kosovo is viewed—by both Serbs and Albanians—as culturally significant, and it is related to Serbia's attempts to distance itself from

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³ The historical roots of ethnic violence between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo stretch back to a battle between the Ottoman Empire and Moravian Serbia in 1389 CE. A brief summary of relevant historical context was published by the U.K.'s Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. U.K. House of Commons, Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Kosovo: History of the Crisis*, prepared April 20, 2000.

historical connections to Ottoman Turkey. While ethnic violence was tempered by the unification of the Balkans under Yugoslavia, its dissolution in 1992 reignited open conflict between various ethnic groups in the region. The Serbian government began a trend of using military force to politically and socially marginalize Albanians who inhabited Kosovo—a trend that remained consistent throughout the 1990s.⁴

By the time of Allied Force, violence in the Balkans had already commanded international attention for nearly a decade. Slobodan Milošević, a Serbian politician, sought to use that violence as a means of purging Albanians from Kosovo. Milošević came to power as a Serbian nationalist during the 1980s. By the time of Allied Force, Milošević had rose within the Serbian Communist League, and was elected as President of Serbia.⁵ He further drove his nationalist Serb agenda after the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and he was a significant political agitator during a series of Balkan civil wars beginning in 1991.⁶ Milošević's consistent aggression in Kosovo were largely an attempt to counter Albanian movements for Kosovar independence.

After the fall of Yugoslavia, Bill Clinton—America's newly elected, and domestically focused, President—became saddled with a growing international crisis. The United States first became involved in the Balkans in 1993, as a part of a UN peacekeeping force aimed at containing the spread of violence from a civil war in Bosnia.⁷ The Bosnian War was resolved

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⁴ US Department of State, "US Department of State Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999 Serbia-Montenegro," September 9, 1999.

⁵ In 1997, Milošević assumed the title of President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which refers to head of State of Serbia and Montenegro—even though Yugoslavia dissolved in 1992.

⁶ The Council on Foreign Relations' *Foreign Affairs* published a contemporary piece on Milošević's rise to political power in 1993. Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milošević," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1993): 81-96.

⁷ John Pomfret, "FIRST US TROOPS ARRIVE IN BALKANS," *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1993, accessed March 16, 2023.

through the Dayton Accords, in 1995, which was negotiated by then US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke.⁸ Milošević was a signatory of the agreement, and proved to be much more difficult to diplomatically court four years later, in the failed negotiations that prompted Allied Force. During the Bosnian War, and leading up to Allied Force, the Clinton administration was hesitant to commit US troops to the region, but recurring violence in the Balkans showed the need for more sustainable and enduring intervention. Recognizing the short-lived effectiveness of previous interventions led directly to a change in US policy resulting in the deployment of 16,500 US troops as a part of a NATO peacekeeping force in 1996.⁹ In the following two years, however, underlying tensions between Serbs and Muslim Albanians in Kosovo continued to foment.

Renewed Violence

In January 1998, US officials received word about military buildups near Kosovo. Milošević—adhering to his hard-liner, nationalist stance—sought to crush the revival of an armed, Kosovar Albanian-led independence movement.¹⁰ Serb military mobilizations, which threatened to break the Balkans' unstable peace, worried officials in the US State Department. Madeleine Albright, then US Secretary of State, was especially concerned. Inevitably, as had occurred in the past, government crack-downs in Kosovo equated to the targeting and killing of innocent civilians.

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⁸ US State Department, National Museum of American Diplomacy, "Diplomacy Ends a War: The Dayton Accords," accessed March 16, 2023.

⁹ Steven Bowman, "Bosnia: US Military Operations," CRS Issue Brief for Congress, July 8, 2003.

¹⁰ Chih-Hann Chang, "The Clinton Administration's Intervention in Kosovo," 122.

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Alarmed by news of Milošević's plans, Albright began crafting a diplomatic response.¹¹

Albright's reaction was shaped by both personal experience and political disposition. As an infant, in 1939, she was driven from her birthplace in Czechoslovakia by the Nazis.¹² Sixty years later, nearly to the day, she found herself attempting to prevent Milošević, another violent authoritarian, from persecuting a minority ethnic group. As Secretary of State, Albright's personal connection to the Holocaust drove her interventionalist policies. In the summer of 1998, she publicly stated that "we are not going to stand by and watch Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia."¹³ Albright relied on the precedent of the Clinton administration as additional justification for intervention.

Within the Clinton administration, Albright's ideas fit into larger foreign policy goals. Assertive multilateralism was the term—coined by Albright—used to describe Clinton's diplomatic mechanism for promoting human rights, democracy, and peace.¹⁴ This described the use of international partnerships to leverage the US' military, political, and economic power with the global impact of international governing bodies.¹⁵ Applied to the Balkans, intervention in Bosnia had been multilateral, and other policy makers—like US Defense Secretary William Cohen—agreed that international coalitions were the only viable method for producing sustainable political outcomes in Kosovo.¹⁶ Milošević's aggression

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¹¹ Bill Woodward and Madeleine Albright, *Madam Secretary* (New York: Hyperion, 2003), 380.

¹² Ibid., 8.

¹³ Thomas Lippman, *Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000), 247.

¹⁴ Mark White and Elpida Katasavara, "The Aerial War in Kosovo," in *The Presidency of Bill Clinton* (London: I.B.Tauris & Co, 2012), 207.

¹⁵ Richard Ponzio, "Madeleine K. Albright: An Assertive Multilateralist for Just Security," *Stimson Center*, March 30, 2022.

¹⁶ William Cohen, interviewed by PBS Frontline News, accessed April 25, 2022.

challenged Clinton's assertive multilateralism, especially as Milošević's posturing against Kosovo turned into action.

Within a short time, Albright's concerns about renewed ethnic violence were validated. American news sources, on March 5, reported on Serb bombardments of Albanian civilians in two Kosovar villages.¹⁷ The military operation was reported as "the first time that Serbian authorities [had] used the army in operations against" Kosovar independence fighters.¹⁸ Upon receiving the news, international politicians weighed in as well, meeting with Milošević in an attempt to cease hostilities.¹⁹

The initial international response was led by the Contact Group. This coalition consisted of the US, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia—serving as an intergovernmental body for crisis management in the Balkans.²⁰ Issuing two statements in March, the Contact Group called for the ending of violence between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians, and more importantly, requested that the UN dispatch a human rights investigation mission.²¹ The United Nations Security Council published Resolution 1160 at the end of the month, which showed support for a peaceful outcome in Kosovo, but fell short of intervening besides enacting an arms embargo.²²

In the US, Secretary Albright thought little was actually being accomplished. Albright met with Sandy Berger, Clinton's National Security Advisor, on April 23. After stating that the current steps taken were unacceptable, Albright asserted that Milošević would not engage in a diplomatic solution until he "felt

¹⁷ Reuters, "Clashes in Kosovo leave at least 22 dead," CNN News, March 5, 1998.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Christoph Schwegmann, "The Contact Group and Its Impact on the European Institutional Structure," EUISS, June 1, 2000.

²¹ Office of the High Representative, "Contact Group Statement on Kosovo – Bonn, 25 March 1998," accessed April 25, 2022. And Contact Group,

[&]quot;Statement on Kosovo," US Department of State, March 9, 1998.

²² United Nations, "Resolution 1160," UNSC, March 31, 1998.

threatened."²³ Berger defiantly opposed the State Department's desire for NATO to begin planning an aerial bombing campaign.²⁴ Albright acknowledged the goal of political settlement, but took a realist approach towards Milošević, believing he would only respond to military force.²⁵ While Albright sought to, in her own words, "implant some spine" into US policy, Pentagon officials refrained from supporting military intervention.²⁶

Senior military officials had begun their careers in the Vietnam era. Formative experiences from the Vietnam War, and its painful conclusion, created a generation of skeptical and blunt general officers. Albright and the State Department received the bulk of their pushback from military officials like General Hugh Shelton and Lieutenant General (LTG) Michael Short. Shelton and Short's objections were two-fold: 1) concerns over being sucked into a protracted ground conflict, and 2) lack of confidence in a limited air strategy. In Summer 1998, LTG Short, NATO's Joint Air Force Component Commander, was contacted by General Wesley Clark, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander. Tasked with planning a series of airstrikes, Short wanted "to go for the head of the snake" and use maximal force to end the conflict quickly.²⁷ General Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, agreedbelieving that the military should utilize every element of force in order to achieve success. Applying lessons from Vietnam, Shelton also believed that use of force must be supported by other instruments of power, and should be supported by Congress.²⁸ However, NATO initially shelved Short's plan in favor of a more diplomatic, phased approach.

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²³ Woodward, *Madam Secretary*, 383.

²⁴ Ibid., 383.

²⁵ Ibid., 383-384.

²⁶ Ibid., 383.

²⁷ Michael Short, interviewed by PBS Frontline News, accessed April 25, 2022.

²⁸ Henry Shelton, interviewed by Denis Ventriglia, November 17, 2001.

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US Domestic Strife

Conflict between the State Department and US military advisors grew alongside NATO military tensions. Growing resentment between General Shelton and General Clark created confusion within the chain of command, and continued disagreement led to breakdowns in communication that later spanned Allied Force's entire planning and operational period. Particularly, chaos stemmed from Clark frequently contacting Albright, while circumventing and excluding Shelton and Cohen.²⁹ As the consensus in America became more complicated, Albright's insistence on intervention began to gain international traction.

On September 23, the UN Security Council issued a demand for the cessation of hostilities in Kosovo.³⁰ Beforehand, international politicians, such as French Prime Minister Leonel Jospin, rejected ideas for US intervention in the absence of a UN mandate.³¹ Now, however, the US had officially gained multilateral support. The next day, NATO Defense Ministers met to approve two "activation warnings," which authorized "an increased level of military preparedness" to wage an aerial bombing campaign in Kosovo.³² These changes in international military posture resembled the threats Albright desired for compelling Milošević to diplomacy.

As NATO inched closer to employing military force, Albright flew to Brussels for a meeting with NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and Holbrooke.³³ In an effort to avert NATO

²⁹ Henry Shelton, interviewed by the Miller Center, Presidential Oral Histories, May 29, 2007.

³⁰ United Nations, "Security Council Demands All Parties End Hostilities and Maintain a Ceasefire in Kosovo," UNSC, September 23, 1998.

³¹ Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy, 155.

³² US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report," January 31, 2000, A-2. And Javier Solana, "Statement," NATO, September 24, 1998.

³³ William Drozdiak, "Allies grim, Milošević defiant amid Kosovo uncertainty," Washington Post, October 8, 1998.

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airstrikes, Holbrooke had been meeting with Milošević in Serbia. Holbrooke was a key player in the Clinton administration's resolution of the Bosnian War, and—once again—was the chosen diplomat for dealing with Milošević when conflict resumed in 1998. American news outlets emphasized the importance of events during the first week of October. "Holbrooke's failure to reach a political agreement," *The Washington Post* reported, "has left NATO governments facing a moment of truth they have long dreaded."³⁴ Just as Pentagon officials worried, it became clear that, eventually, the threat of military force must become action in order to be taken seriously. Albright's belief that Milošević needed to feel threatened, it seemed, was driving NATO towards violence.

Increasing International Pressure

Holbrooke returned to Belgrade for another round of meetings on October 10. Meanwhile, US officials were growing impatient for acquiring a diplomatic agreement. Cohen issued a statement warning that "time for a diplomatic solution" was running out, and Cohen gave Milošević a one-week negotiation deadline. ³⁵ These threatening remarks were bolstered by Cohen's efforts to rally congressional support. While Cohen had originally been opposed to "getting sucked into another Bosnia-like commitment," he was charged with persuading Congress to support the US mission in the Balkans.³⁶ Having served as both a US Representative and a Senator, Cohen's connections in Congress made him an excellent fit for attempting to bridge the divide between the executive and legislative branches.

Cohen's position on Kosovo was a result of changing international support and considerations of America's role in global affairs. Like many other politicians, Cohen vehemently

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³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Brent Sadler and Reuters, "No progress reported in Kosovo talks," CNN News, October 10, 1998.

³⁶ William Cohen, interviewed by PBS Frontline News, accessed April 25, 2022.

opposed unilateral action by the US, which he believed was politically unsustainable.³⁷ However, with the Security Council's demands in September, and NATO's intention to conduct airstrikes, Cohen believed that America needed to prepare to make good on NATO's threats.³⁸ Despite "great reluctance on the part of most members of Congress to commit American forces," Cohen encouraged his peers in NATO to "be willing to take strong action, and consider all of the options."³⁹

Cohen's concern over empty threats was resolved on October 13, as NATO Secretary General Solana issued a public statement. Remarking on Holbrooke's continued contact with Milošević, Solana stated that the diplomatic progress that had been made was a result of international pressure. To "maintain this pressure in order to ensure that the process [continued]," Solana reported on the North Atlantic Council's decision to commence airstrikes within the following 96 hours.⁴⁰ NATO had declared its intent, and was preparing to force Milošević to the bargaining table through military force.

NATO's commitment to action dramatically affected Milošević's decision calculus. NATO, backed by the US military, intended to finally make good on its threats. But merely hours after Solana's announcement, Holbrooke responded with unexpected news. Speaking from the Hotel Hyatt in Belgrade, Holbrooke stated that he and Milošević had reached an agreement for a peaceful resolution of the "Kosovo issue."⁴¹ NATO's escalation raised the stakes for both Serbia and the US, and yet, it seemed that Albright's plan for steady brinkmanship had offered a path for a diplomatic resolution.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Javier Solana, "Statement to the Press," NATO, October 13, 1998.

⁴¹ Office of the High Representative, "OHR SRT News Summary, 13 October 1998," accessed April 25, 2022.

A Short-Lived Peace

Although NATO's finger remained on the trigger until early 1999, events in Kosovo seemed quiet. Much like the previous January, however, Serbian police forces crept back into northern Kosovo—testing the political climate of the region and international community.⁴² Local tension from these operations spilled over into widespread violence.

On January 16, 1999, US Ambassador Bill Walker spoke to a group of reporters. Without hesitation, he communicated clearly: "it's hard to find words to say anything about it. This is about as horrendous an event as I've seen."⁴³ Serb police forces had executed fourty-five civilians, in the village of Račak, Kosovo.⁴⁴ The next day, *The Washington Post* broke the news in the mainstream American media circuit: "Villagers Slaughtered in Kosovo 'Atrocity."⁴⁵ Consistent reporting, from sources like *The Washington Post* and Associated Press, mobilized Albanian émigrés in the US. Since early 1998, Albanian-Americans had been organizing demonstrations and awareness campaigns to encourage US action.⁴⁶ As Milošević's aggression continued, so too did Albanians' lobbying efforts in the US.

Amid international outrage, the Račak massacre sparked an immediate reaction in the State Department. On January 19, US

⁴² US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report," January 31, 2000. A-4-5.

 ⁴³ Associated Press, "(V) Kosovo: Massacre Site Visited," January 16, 1999.
 ⁴⁴ US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report," January 31, 2000. A-5.

⁴⁵ Guy Dinmore, "Villagers slaughtered in Kosovo 'atrocity," Washington Post, January 17, 1999.

⁴⁶ Eliot Engel, "Lessons from the 1998 US military intervention in Kosovo," The Hill, March 24, 2019. And Associated Press, "USA: New York: Kosovar Albanians Stage Mock Funeral," November 12, 1998. And Associated Press, "USA: Washington: Albanian-Americans Stage Protest Rally," March 13, 1998. And Associated Press, "USA: New York: Albanian Kosovars Stage Demonstration, "June 29, 1998.

national security principals quickly convened to discuss how to respond to the massacre.⁴⁷ The meeting—which included Albright, Shelton, and Cohen—was intended to resolve the ongoing disagreements over intervention that had impeded US crisis response. Cohen and Shelton voiced concerns about committing to a NATO peacekeeping mission, but Albright leveraged new events in Kosovo to make her case. After four days of near continuous debate, US policy makers came to an agreement, and then delivered their consensus to Clinton. Despite previous policy differences, Račak galvanized US policy in Kosovo.⁴⁸ The State Department, backed by NATO calls for airstrikes, emerged from the meeting with the winning policy.⁴⁹ With a sufficient consensus, Albright once again turned her attention to international partners.

The Račak massacre had renewed international interest in Kosovo, and provided yet another justification for NATO involvement. Three days after rounding up consensus in the National Security Council, Albright was in Moscow. In a joint statement with Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, Albright had been able to encourage Russia to go on the record against Milošević.⁵⁰ With another permanent member of the UN Security Council on board, US policy makers were confident in the renewed pressure placed on Serbia.

Other ultimatums issued by the Contact Group and NATO further compounded the US pressure. On January 28, Secretary General Solana provided four demands on behalf of the North Atlantic Council. Solana emphasized the NATO's willingness to use force, and offered a personal assessment of the situation: "What we have seen in Yugoslavia during the past decade is that it is very difficult to stop internal conflicts if the international community is not willing to use force—and when all other means

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⁴⁷ Woodward, *Madam Secretary*, 394.

⁴⁸ William Cohen, interviewed by PBS Frontline News, accessed April 25, 2022.

⁴⁹ Woodward, *Madam Secretary*, 395.

⁵⁰ Madeleine Albright and Igor Ivanov, "Joint Statement on Kosovo," US Department of State, January 26, 1999.

have failed."⁵¹ Referencing NATO's airstrike threats from the previous October, Solana continued: "We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the Former Yugoslavia."⁵² As tensions once again boiled, it was clear to Albright, and other members of the international community, that a new course was needed to prevent endless cycles of provocation and retaliation.⁵³

The North Atlantic Council turned to diplomacy—for the last time—on January 30, encouraging Kosovar-Albanian and Serbian leadership to convene in Rambouillet, France for peace negotiations.⁵⁴ The offer was supported by another threat of force: "if these steps are not taken, NATO is ready to take whatever measures are necessary."⁵⁵ Due to NATO's previous airstrike authorization in October, the threats were received as legitimate and effective. Although NATO provided the muscle behind the threats, only foreign ministers of Contact Group nations handled much of the negotiating.⁵⁶ The negotiators in Rambouillet continued through the months of February and March.

Despite some progress over the course of the conference, American diplomatic rhetoric became increasingly sharp. Secretary Albright made several public statements critical of Milošević's perceived lack of effort and goodwill towards ending violence in Kosovo. On February 20, Albright spoke bluntly: "the Serb delegation bears the lion's share of responsibility for the difficulties we have experienced."⁵⁷ In Rambouillet, peace talks similarly grew in hostility.

In the closing days of the conference, US and Contact

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 ⁵¹ Javier Solana, "Statement to the Press," NATO, January 28, 1999.
 ⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Lippman, Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy, 252.

⁵⁴ Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo," *International Affairs* vol. 75, no. 2, 1999, pp. 222.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 223.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 227.

⁵⁷ Madeleine Albright, "Press conference on the Kosovo peace talks," US Department of State, February 20, 1999.

Group diplomats had succeeded in gaining Kosovar-Albanian approval, but fell short of gaining Serbian support. On March 19, Serb negotiators abruptly departed without signing the agreement.⁵⁸ Much of the Serb delegation's complaints centered on the agreement itself as a "violation of international law" and rejected the use of military ultimatums.⁵⁹ However, throughout the conference, Serb military forces continued to amass on Kosovo's border.

Closing Diplomatic Window

The Serb delegation's departure from Rambouillet signaled a transition from a diplomacy first approach, to primarily focusing on the military to end violence in Kosovo. Following the increasing rhetoric of NATO, the UN Security Council, and US policy makers, a failure to respond to Serbia's rejection of peace negotiations would significantly delegitimize their political leverage. America's decision to respond, however, was not without debate. Between the Pentagon, State Department, and White House, the third week of March was extremely busy for US policy makers. As President Clinton stated in a public address that "the United States and our NATO allies stand ready to take decisive military action," senior military officials offered warnings to Congress about the "tremendously dangerous" possibility of US airstrikes.⁶⁰ American diplomats were firmly convinced that airstrikes could secure an end to Milošević's aggression, but

⁵⁸ US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report," January 31, 2000. A-7.

⁵⁹ US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress." And Derek Brown, "Cloud over Kosovo," The Guardian, February 18, 1999. And Charles Trueheart, "Ethnic Albanians wary of focus on Milošević," Washington Post, February 18, 1999.

⁶⁰ William Clinton, "President Clinton: A commitment to peace in Kosovo," Clinton White House Archives, March 19, 1999. And Marilyn Rauber, "Pentagon: Kosovo Airstrikes Would Be Risky," New York Post, March 19, 1999.

General Shelton remained highly critical of Albright's reasoning.⁶¹ However, on March 19, as a result of a unifying meeting convened by President Clinton, US policy reached a final consensus.

In the meeting, key foreign policy makers presented a series of actions to Clinton.⁶² While officials from State and Defense pitched their opposing ideas, the President was ultimately swayed by Albright's appeal to history and the looming political fallout in the Balkans. Albright finished her remarks with reference to US influence in Kosovo and the wider international community: "the purpose of using force is to stop Milošević-style thuggery once and for all."⁶³ With this as the primary intention, Clinton chose to back NATO airstrikes as America's plan for action.

Clinton and his advisors departed the meeting, making their rounds in Washington to secure support from Congress. That day, Clinton met with 31 representatives and senators to rally congressional backing.⁶⁴ Days later, the Senate offered its support by authorizing US participation in NATO airstrikes with a vote of 58-41.⁶⁵ Even with US backing, NATO still had to make its motion for action official.

US diplomats sought final approval from NATO, while sending a last-ditch diplomatic effort to Serbia. Richard Holbrooke met with Milošević on March 22, but to no avail.⁶⁶ Over the course of four hours face-to-face, Holbrooke returned to the US embassy

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⁶¹ Bradley Graham, "Joint Chiefs Doubted Air Strategy," Washington Post, April 5, 1999.

⁶² Chang, Ethical Foreign Policy?, 147.

⁶³ Woodward, *Madame Secretary*, 406.

⁶⁴ Chris Black, "Clinton makes his case for Kosovo strikes to senators," CNN News, March 19, 1999.

⁶⁵ Library of Congress, "All Information (Except Text) for S.Con.Res.21 - A concurrent resolution authorizing the President of the United States to conduct military air operations and missile strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)." accessed April 25, 2022.

⁶⁶ David Holley and Norman Kempster, "US Envoy Makes Last-Ditch Effort for Kosovo Peace," Los Angeles Times, March 23, 1999.

to deliberate.⁶⁷ Milošević, refusing to halt Serb attacks in Kosovo, did not to concede to NATO demands. President Clinton, in response, announced that retaliatory military action would ensue.⁶⁸

Foreign policy makers in other nations similarly rallied supporters to NATO's plan. British Prime Minister Tony Blair appealed to the U.K. Parliament, remarking on the importance of NATO action "to save thousands of innocent men, women and children."⁶⁹ As allied nations reached a similar consensus. Secretary General Solana made the final announcement on March 23rd. Through the power vested in him by the North Atlantic Council, Solana directed the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, US General Wesley Clark, to begin executing airstrikes in Serbia.⁷⁰ During the course of Allied Force, Milošević was indicted by the UN's International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and agreed to withdraw Serb forces from Kosovo—but only after enduring seventy-eight days of bombing.⁷¹ Allied Force achieved the political objectives of the US, UN, and NATO, yet at a severely slow pace, while demanding extensive diplomatic resources, which when ultimately ineffective, required the use of military force.

Conclusion

US participation in Operation Allied Force was the result of a long, steady diplomatic buildup over the course of twelve months. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was particularly worried about the humanitarian crisis generated by Serbian president

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⁶⁷ Holley and Kempster, "US Envoy."

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ The Guardian, "Blair: 'We must act - to save thousands of innocent men, women and children," March 23, 1999.

⁷⁰ US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress: Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report," January 31, 2000. A-7. and Javier Solana, "Press Statement," NATO, March 23, 1999.

⁷¹ US Department of Defense, "Report to Congress."

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Slobodan Milošević's aggression against ethnic Albanians. Despite tension within the US foreign policy system—namely between the Pentagon and State Department-growing international consensus united US policy makers. Originally managed by the Contact Group, the crisis involved intergovernmental organizations like the UN and NATO, which brought together a collection of varied political interests in the Balkans. After several diplomatic responses to Milošević, the international community feared weakening legitimacy on the eve of NATO's 50th birthday. Secretary of Defense William Cohen similarly feared for the crumbling of America's international legitimacy. Allied Force resulted from a combination of these factors, along with consistent outrage from Albanian émigrés, clear and accurate reporting by American journalists, and repeated provocation by Milošević. Spearheaded by Secretary Albright in the US, and NATO Secretary General Solana internationally, Operation Allied Force was a multilateral campaign that rallied global support for the use of airstrikes as a proportional and effective means of procuring a political solution in Kosovo.

Allied Force is relevant to a pressing issue in US civilmilitary relations: how can US civilian and military officials more effectively reach consensus on use-of-force decisions? Albright consistently pressed US military officials to support military intervention. The greatest hang-up, for officers like Short and Shelton, was the degree and manner in which the US would use the military in Kosovo. To resolve these disputes, presidential advisors, such as the National Security Advisor, should have played a greater role in mediating agendas of the State and Defense departments. Increasing communication through a central conduit, based around the President, may have more quickly aligned consensus leading up to Allied Force.

Maintaining the military's role as a tool that is subordinate to diplomatic policy is essential to the functioning of the US government and its international influence. Allied Force featured civilian policymakers advocating for military intervention, despite

hesitation within the military, which shows the need for increased pre-planning concerning use-of-force decisions. Increased interagency planning for international crisis response could have better coordinated the efforts of State and Defense officials. The difficulty, however, was the presence of strong, charismatic, and stubborn personalities—all of whom were, at the same time, interacting with their foreign counterparts. Wargaming responses to international crises, such as Milošević's renewed aggression in Kosovo, could have shown a more unified front to both civilian and military institutions of US allies in NATO and the UN.

Operation Allied Force ultimately achieved its goal of forcing Milošević to withdraw Serb troops from Kosovo. However, the use of limited military force was only effective after seventyeight days and was delayed by extensive civil-military debate in the US over the course of fourteen month. Now, learning from the lessons of Allied Force, US officials could better bridge the civilmilitary divide by more frequently using a central mediator for resolving policy disagreements, and by more proactively sharing how the State and Defense departments would react to potential international crises. Being able to more quickly respond to events with a whole-of-government approach will increase US influence and effectiveness when addressing future and current global crises.

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Walter Reed: How Iraq War Veterans and Their Families Commanded the Ear of Congress and Demanded Better Health Care from the US Department of Veterans Affairs

Adair Olney

Introduction

Army Specialist Jeremy Duncan was a seasoned service member before he sustained multiple injuries in Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2004. After suffering a broken neck and torn left ear, Duncan was transferred to the Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington D.C., where he faced a new set of challenges in the outpatient facility. Duncan experienced atrocious conditions at the nation's top military hospital, forced to choose between sharing cramped quarters with a roommate or inhabiting a room filled with black mold while receiving care. The wounded soldier's quarters were filled with "mouse droppings, belly-up cockroaches, stained carpets, and cheap mattresses," and in order to access his accommodations when he first arrived from Iraq, he was handed a map and told to find his way by himself.¹ After multiple attempts to contact hospital administration to remedy his situation, Jeremy Duncan finally gave up on hopes of getting help from officials at Walter Reed. Fed up with living in squalor, he reached out to the Washington Post, desperate to find a solution for himself and other soldiers recuperating in the decrepit Building 18. Duncan's efforts led to two journalists covering the story from inside Walter Reed, efforts that eventually sparked outrage from the American public and incited subsequent political actions, including multiple congressional hearings. By March 6, 2007, President Bush named

¹ Dana Priest and Anne Hull, "Soldiers Face Neglect, Frustration at Army's Top Medical Facility." *Washington Post*, February 18, 2007, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2007/02/18/soldiers-face-neglect-frustration-at-armys-top-medical-facility/c0c4b3e4-fb22-4df6-9ac9-c602d41c5bda/.

a congressional commission to address the systemic problems in veteran care and to probe into the bureaucratic issues at the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Frustration was shared among the entire military community after this scandal broke, inspiring other service members, and their families, to come forward and share their own stories of veteran neglect.

Duncan's experience and efforts illustrate the neglect and frustration many Iraq War veterans faced after returning home to the United States. Poor medical treatment and frustration with military bureaucracy left scores of soldiers feeling forgotten after fighting a dangerous war, forcing them to seek and find care outside of the Department of Veterans Affairs. Duncan was not alone in his frustration toward the federal institutions that he fought a war on behalf of. His persistence to solve the problem at his Walter Reed quarters, followed by reaching out to the Washington Post, illustrates the tenacity Iraq War veterans displayed in the face of a lack of support from the VA. Going to the press and testifying before Congress was a feasible way to get the attention of the public, in addition to politicians and lawmakers. Desperate to receive care, and unwilling to remain in the shadows, veterans and those who cared for them – often partners and family members ----chose avenues that they knew would bring public notice to veteran mistreatment on the national stage.

In this paper I argue that the Walter Reed scandal served as a catalyst for Iraq War veterans and their families to testify in front of Congress and demand real change within the VA. Veterans and their families were integral in pushing forth the Water Reed scandal and bringing to light the systemic issues they faced within the medical facility; without voices like Duncan's, it is likely the scandal would not have had the same effect. As a result of the efforts of service members and their families, the VA and the US military were no longer able to conceal long-standing patterns of substandard care and negligence. The willingness of veterans and their families to come forward in protest of their mistreatment ultimately led Congress to hold more than forty congressional committee hearings relevant to veteran care over roughly four years. By telling their stories of backlogged paperwork, poor medical care, and general negligence within the VA, these veterans took a stand against the institutions that had promised to support them and since failed to do so.

In order to better understand how Iraq War veterans and their families fought for better healthcare from the VA, I will primarily examine congressional committee hearings between 2007 and 2011, in which veterans and their families, as well as officials from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the U.S military, shared their stories with a wide audience. I will also draw on secondary scholarship in the realm of veteran and family activism in order to discern the roots of this contemporary veterans' movement. I will outline how individual service personnel and their family members used congressional hearings to engage in a political debate for higher quality health care by gaining empathy among their audience, speaking about the failures of the federal government, invoking experiences of World War Two veterans to say that the VA has been capable of providing proper treatment in the past, and invoking the experience of Vietnam veterans to claim that the United States should have learned from the VA's historic mistake in its mistreatment of veterans during the Cold War.

Historiography

Study of contemporary veterans' activism is an interdisciplinary field with a wide variety of approaches. Historian Olivier Burtin provides a comprehensive view of how US veterans' activism evolved over the course of the twentieth century. In his 2022 book, *A Nation of Veterans: War, Citizenship, and the Welfare State in Modern America,* Burtin asserts that, historically, veterans' demands have often been achieved through politics and aligning themselves with certain lawmakers and powerful interest groups,

such as the American Legion and Veterans of Foreign Wars. Although his book was only published last year, this scholar remains one of the only historians to delve into what he calls the veteran welfare state, a system in America where veterans received benefits and privileges based solely on the fact that they served in the military. Olivier Burtin argues that the rise of the veterans' movement in the 1950s is largely attributed to the United States' victor status in World War Two. As a result, service members especially white males — enjoyed a more popular status in society, as they were viewed as martial citizens based on their service. Veterans' groups were so closely connected with the state and government that Burtin asserts that "more often than not, veterans" leaders collaborated so closely with policymakers at all levels of government that the line between the state and civil society essentially disappeared."² Veterans organizations thus became powerful interest groups in the mid-twentieth century and it was through these larger networks that veterans gained support. In the 1960s and 70s, however, Burtin notes that, due to the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, success of the veterans' movement began to decline as it was no longer as central to U.S politics, and earlier groups of veterans had successfully achieved the benefits they had fought for.

In recent years there has also been a significant effort by historians to highlight the experience of marginalized veterans. In their edited anthology, *Service Denied: Marginalized Veterans in Modern American History*, historians John Kinder and Jason Higgins highlight the work of scholars who focus on historically underrepresented military personnel, including women, Latinos, members of the LGBTQ community, and others. These academics find that, given sexism and racism, veterans from marginalized communities historically did not reap the rewards that come with serving in the U.S military, and often had to organize outside of the

² Olivier Burtin, A Nation of Veterans: War, Citizenship, and the Welfare State in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022), 9.

more traditional veterans' organizations to defend their rights and receive the benefits they deserve. Service Denied helps re-define what it means to be a U.S veteran, and how these social groups worked to achieve equal rights as veterans. Included in their anthology is scholar Kara Dixon Vuic, who discusses how getting the ear of politicians has long been a tool for veterans trying to enact change within the VA. She writes about how Vietnam War veteran Lynda Devanter lobbied "for government research on the particular needs of women veterans," and advocated "for reform in the Veterans Administration...to guarantee women the care and benefits to which they were legally entitled."³ Devanter used her power to enact change for other female veterans, just like Iraq War veterans did many years after. Her efforts "brought other women veterans out of the shadows, and into the public eye, where they began to speak about women veterans' particular health care needs," with their work even resulting in "the creation of the VA's Women's Advisory Committee, which continues to advise the government on women veterans' issues today."⁴ Throughout history and multiple global conflicts, veterans have picked up the pieces themselves and advocated for better treatment from the VA.

There are also efforts by scholars to trace present-day grassroots veteran movements. Iraq War veteran and academic Benjamin Schrader argues that contemporary veteran activist groups are relying less on politicians and more on themselves, as grassroots organizations offer alternative routes of healing, such as veterans writing about their own experiences and speaking with other service members. He maintains that in order to find healing through activism, present-day veterans are positioning themselves as the subject of their movements, and not as the object of a political scheme — the latter avenue often leading to veterans

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³ John Kinder and Jason Higgins, *Service Denied: Marginalized Veterans in Modern American History* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2022), 144.

⁴ Ibid.

becoming pawns of military or government entities. Finally, Schrader argues that U.S federal institutions should establish spaces of demilitarization for veterans, to aid in their often difficult readjustment periods after combat. He asserts that these activist groups and spaces are integral for veteran communities because they offer healing and care where military institutions are lacking.

Scholars have also explored the realm of veteran anti-war activism, as seen in author Nan Levinson's 2014 book War is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built. Levinson, an English professor at Tufts University, explores "the golden season" in the life of pacifist group Iraq Veterans Against the War, which she claims "came in early 2007 and lasted for about eighteen glorious months."5 In her source, Levinson compares Iraq Veterans Against the War (IVAW) with a prior antiwar veterans' group, Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW). She states that American civil society was relatively receptive of the VVAW movement and its' goals, while the IVAW and their movement struggled to gain sympathy from the American public. IVAW's members were "professional soldiers, for whom war was a part of their job description," which Levinson argues meant they had fewer links with civil society groups. Therefore, this contemporary pacifist group had to become very creative in their attempts to gain sympathy and popularity from the American public, such as organizing street performances, art exhibitions, and an urban guerrilla theater (Operation First Casualty). IVAW used these unconventional techniques to "raise awareness about the futility and destructiveness of the Iraq war and the continuing needs of its veterans."⁶

Throughout veterans' scholarship, we also see a number of scholars who focus on the role of military families in advocating

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 ⁵ Nan Levinson, War Is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014), xiv.
 ⁶ Siniša Malešević, review of War Is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built, by Nan Levinson, Common Knowledge 22, no. 3 (2016): 505-505, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/629253.

on behalf of veterans. In her 2014 book, *Fighting for Peace: Veterans and Military Families in the Anti-Iraq War Movement,* Lisa Leitz, a military wife herself, discusses the ways in which family members of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans engaged with anti-war activism.⁷ Leitz describes the challenges faced by anti-war activist families, particularly with many people perceiving their activism as anti-military and anti-troops. Military families also face judgement from other peace activists who think they have married violent people trained to kill. This particular source provides readers with a large context of how families engage with military activism and grassroots movements by joining in anti-war and peace activism.

Family members have long been supportive of their service personnel loved ones on the public stage, as is explored by historians Rebecca Plant and Frances Clarke in their 2015 journal article titled "The Crowning Insult': Federal Segregation and the Gold Star Mother and Widow Pilgrimages of the Early 1930s." These authors argue that despite the special treatment black mothers and widows experienced while visiting the graves of their fallen sons and husbands in France after World War One, this generous gesture of the U.S government was concealed under layers of white supremacy.⁸ Although they took part on these voyages, they traveled in a different cabin of a ship and did not get to dine with the white passengers. Moreover, this source provides historical context for how family members, often female, engage with their sons' and husbands' military service and are active on their behalf. The pilgrimages served as "a series of very public commemorative acts centered on the iconic images of the all-

⁷ Lisa Leitz, *Fighting for Peace Veterans and Military Families in the Anti-Iraq War Movement* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014).

⁸ Rebecca Plant and Frances Clarke, "'The Crowning Insult': Federal Segregation and the Gold Star Mother and Widow Pilgrimages of the Early 1930s," *The Journal of American History* 102, no. 2 (September 2015): 407, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44286818#metadata_info_tab_contents.

American war mother."⁹ To conclude, mothers and wives have always played a significant role in the sphere of the American military; however, I argue that in the midst of the Iraq War, military families carried an even larger burden of supporting their loved ones, such as testifying in front of Congress, largely due to the unique nature of the Iraq War, and the injuries sustained by military personnel during their service.

While the previously mentioned scholars engage in a multitude of topics within veterans' scholarship, in this paper I illuminate how Iraq War veterans responded to a lack of support from the VA and how their families were often intertwined in this fight. I argue that these individuals used congressional hearings to demand reform within the VA, reform that would ensure better health care for veterans and a smoother transition into civilian society.

Olivier Burtin writes about white male veterans in the twentieth century, whose privilege granted them memberships to larger veterans interest groups, whereas in recent years we see scholars such as Kinder and Higgins strike up a discussion about marginalized veterans and how they are often excluded from these larger veterans organizations. Although my work does not discuss race or gender in relation to veterans' status, these scholars' discourse about shifting membership in veterans' groups has fueled my research to understand why these organizations were not as prominent among Iraq War veterans.

Moreover, while Burtin described the close relationship between twentieth-century veterans and large interest groups, Benjamin Schrader provides a dialogue about how contemporary veterans are foregoing memberships of these groups, and instead engaging in smaller grass-roots movements. My own research corroborates Schrader's work, as I survey individual acts of veteran activism and how contemporary veterans have propelled themselves and their experiences onto the national stage. Engaging

⁹ Ibid.

in activism, Schrader argues "makes veterans the subject of change rather the object of it."¹⁰ I also build on Schrader's scholarship by adding that Iraq War veterans often find success in their movements through the support of their family members.

My work will highlight veterans' families and how they have evolved to become vital elements of the contemporary veteran movement. Iraq War veterans and their families chose new avenues of activism in their fight for improved health care; instead of working through larger veterans' networks, these individuals relied on themselves, as well as their families for support, as they engaged in political debates for more suitable treatment from the VA. This paper demonstrates the ways in which roadblocks to health care had drastic effects for veterans, in addition to the ways in which Iraq War veterans and their families kept the negligence they experienced in the news, and how they refused to let these federal institutions get away with a lack of proper support.

Iraq: An Unprecedented War

The Iraq War brought a multitude of hardships to those who fought in it. American soldiers endured drastic injuries, both mental and physical, and due to the unprecedented length of the war, from 2003-2011, many soldiers were "sent back to Iraq for multiple deployments — even after being diagnosed with conditions like PTSD."¹¹ PTSD, or post-traumatic stress disorder, largely affected post-9/11 veterans, as the VA screened 256,820 Iraq and Afghanistan veterans for potential PTSD by 2012.¹² To make matters worse, the VA at times prevented service members from accessing care — due to their struggles with mental illness while

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¹⁰ Benjamin Schrader, *Fight to Live, Live to Fight* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2019), 159.

¹¹ Aaron Glantz, *The War Comes Home: Washington's Battle against America's Veterans* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2009), 4.

¹² Richard Immerman and Beth Bailey, *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: NYU Press, 2015).

serving in Iraq; some were "dishonorably discharged for destructive behavior brought on by their undiagnosed and misdiagnosed mental problems," and were therefore "legally barred from getting the care they need[ed] from the VA."¹³ Government officials failed to recognize the unprecedented nature of the war in Iraq and, therefore, did not adapt their system to meet the unique needs of this new generation of veterans.

Plagued by catastrophic injuries, veterans sought satisfactory health care — yet the VA was not prepared to meet the needs of thousands of soldiers returning home with critical injuries. Because they did not predict the extended length of the war, VA officials "did not develop the policies and devote the resources required to meet such unanticipated needs," which left veterans struggling "to secure timely treatment for physical and psychological wounds, to integrate back into their families, and to find civilian employment after years of war."¹⁴ After struggling through the perils of war, soldiers could not even rely on the safety net of the VA to assist them in this transition period. Due to an extreme lack of support from bureaucracy, wounded service members had no choice but to rely on themselves and their family members while recovering.

The U.S Department of Veterans Affairs: A Bureaucratic Maze

As a result of veterans and their families coming forward, Congress responded by creating about forty congressional committee hearings, covering topics from substandard treatment, untimely deaths of veterans at military medical facilities, and ensuring support for military families. Between March 5 and

¹³ Aaron Glantz, *The War Comes Home: Washington's Battle against America's Veterans* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2009), 10.

¹⁴ Richard Immerman and Beth Bailey, *Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan* (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 262.

March 13, 2007, the first of many televised hearings were held in Washington D.C., as American lawmakers and civilians alike tried to grasp how such atrocities had occurred at Walter Reed. Of the roughly forty congressional hearings, many evaluated the efficacy of the Department of Veterans Affairs and their treatment of Iraq War veterans. Founded in 1989, the VA claims their mission "is to care for those 'who shall have borne the battle' and for their families, caregivers and survivors...¹⁵ The department exists to provide services to veterans and their families, but following the Walter Reed scandal, they questioned the effectiveness of the system. As the primary avenue for veterans and families seeking assistance, the VA remained a confusing and often dismissive institution not willing to help those in dire need. On March 13, 2008, Corporal Casey Owens, a Marine Corps Combat veteran, took to the stand to bring awareness to systemic issues within the VA. In a congressional hearing, "Care of Seriously Wounded After Inpatient Care," Owens testified that he enrolled in the VA in 2006 and "it was not until 6 months later that the procedure [he] had requested and wanted was performed," which prompted him "to call on non-profit organizations for assistance," because the VA failed to provide him with proper treatment in time.¹⁶ The combat veteran said that only these non-profit organizations provided him with relief, which he claimed "reflects poorly upon the culture and decisions of the VA system currently in place."¹⁷ Echoing many veterans' sentiments toward the VA. Owens maintained that the institution needed to implement changes if they wished to serve veterans: "the learning curve of VA's system is steep and its

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¹⁵" VA's Mission," U.S Department of Veterans Affairs, accessed February 2, 2023, https://www.va.gov/icare

^{#:~:}text=Our%20mission%2C%20as%20the%20Department,actions%20toward %20service%20to%20others.

 ¹⁶ U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Care of Seriously Wounded After Inpatient Care*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 51-52.
 ¹⁷ Ibid.

bureaucratic maze is hard to understand."¹⁸ Like many other post-9/11 veterans, Owens felt his service was not regarded or rewarded the way it should have been, especially compared to veterans of previous wars. This frustrated service member reminded his audience:

> It has been 30 years since the last major war and what lessons has the VA learned since then? Did no one expect another way or learn anything from Viet Nam? What have the educated and highly paid personnel who have been appointed to correct the system been focusing their attention on? While the system continues to be broken, where is all the government funding going that is supposed to be fixing the system and what are they doing with it?¹⁹

Owens' resentment towards the VA illustrated a deep-seated frustration with a system that was allegedly organized for the benefit of veterans like himself, yet had a history of casting aside veterans instead of generously thanking them for their service. During his testimony, Owens invoked the historical mistreatment of Vietnam veterans, a demographic of military personnel who, according to historian Olivier Burtin, "were often regarded as undeserving" individuals who, therefore, received inadequate treatment.²⁰ Owens maintained that federal institutions failed to support Vietnam veterans, and now they are ignoring Iraq War veterans, as well. Owens' invoking of Vietnam was a key element of his testimony, as he suggested that we as a nation had supposedly learned our lesson from Vietnam in how we should not be discarding our veterans, yet here we are again. Owens appealed

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¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Care of Seriously Wounded After Inpatient Care*, 110th Cong., 2nd sess., 2008, 51-52.

²⁰ Olivier Burtin, A Nation of Veterans: War, Citizenship, and the Welfare State in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022), 13-14.

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to history in order to demonstrate that he and his fellow Iraq War veterans deserved better treatment.

During a "Care of Seriously Wounded After Inpatient Care" hearing in March 2008, another former service personnel, Operation Iraqi Freedom veteran Brady van Engelen, also asked the American public to learn from the past by referencing World War Two veterans and how their treatment greatly differed from that of more contemporary veterans. The former soldier detailed the many roadblocks he faced within the Veterans Affairs Department upon his discharge from the service, particularly regarding their disability claims process. After surviving a gunshot wound to the head while stationed in Baghdad, van Engelen received little to no support as an outpatient and was simply "given the building number of the Mologne House [at Walter Reed] and told to check in there."²¹ Fortunately, van Engelen says, his family was by his side to aid him "through the bureaucratic maze that is outpatient care at Walter Reed," as he faced struggles such as not hearing back about his medical case eight months after he first arrived at the military hospital. Van Engelen recalls feeling isolated during his recovery, as he was not only "completely unaware of what [his] possibilities were," but he "was the one who always initiated contact with the case managers and the hospital," adding that "if it weren't for my persistence, I could have gone unnoticed for months."²² The VA, van Engelen claimed, was "overwhelmed by the number of claims filed and patients needing attendance," and kept veterans in the dark, a stark contrast to troops returning from World War Two who were assisted by "VA claims specialists on the boats with the service men informing them of benefits that they were eligible for."²³ Van Engelen

²³ Ibid.

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²¹ U.S Congress. House of Representatives, House Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Impact of Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom on the US Department of Veterans Affairs Claims Process*, 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 13, 2007, 21-23.

²² Ibid.

believed post-9/11 service members were "becoming increasingly disenfranchised with a system that [their] government promised would help us heal and rehabilitate," adding that he believed "his generation is going to have to pay for this" lack of support from the VA.²⁴ His strategy of comparing World War Two veterans to those of the Iraq War speaks to van Engelen's belief that the latter were being treated in a notably different manner than those of prior wars. By talking about the past to understand the present, van Engelen framed the wider discussion of veterans' treatment in the United States as an issue that historically was undertaken with care, in contrast to the injustices he and his fellow Iraq soldiers faced. Eager to stir change within the VA, van Engelen clearly told members of Congress, and the American public, that this current group of veterans was just as deserving as World War Two veterans, and thus more needed to be done on their behalf.

Burtin corroborates van Engelen's statements regarding a difference in treatment towards veterans of past and present conflicts. In his book he argues that "the fact that the United States was a victor in both world wars" meant that veterans of these conflicts "enjoyed a degree of prestige that reinforced the legitimacy of their claims to special treatment," which he contrasts to "veterans of the Vietnam War," a "divisive conflict that ended in a humiliating U.S defeat and whose veterans were often regarded as undeserving."²⁵ Furthermore, not only did World War Two veterans enjoy better government benefits, but they were also treated like celebrities; unlike Iraq War veterans, World War Two service members were key figures in the film noir genre and a movie about their return to civilian life called the *Best Years of Our Lives* won seven Academy Awards in 1947. Veterans were also everywhere in postwar politics as well, with over half of all

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²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Olivier Burtin, A Nation of Veterans: War, Citizenship, and the Welfare State in Modern America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022), 13-14.

governors, and the president himself, having served in World War One.²⁶ With the great power and influence the VA possessed in the mid-twentieth century, it was clear Iraq war veterans expected more from this federal institution that provided so much for service members of World War Two.

Veterans Experienced a Severe Lack of Care from the VA

Frustration with the VA's red tape extended into complaints of a lack of care for physical and mental injuries among veterans, especially among those with a traumatic brain injury (TBI). For many returning soldiers, these head wounds were extremely limiting and prevented them from not only getting back to daily life, but also from the ability to advocate for themselves. Despite the overwhelming number of veterans who suffered from a TBI, military health care professionals were not prepared to provide proper treatment due to the fact that previous generations of service members would not have survived these types of injuries in the past. In order to advocate for better care for TBIs, veterans and their families went to Congress and demanded that the military acknowledge and treat these hidden injuries. In a March 2007 hearing titled "Transitioning Heroes: New Era, Same Problems?" Army Staff Sergeant Sean Johnson testified that the VA made it difficult for him to receive care for the injuries he received in Iraq, especially his TBI. Johnson said "the VA spent thousands of dollars to send me to a neuro-ophthalmologist and she said...my optic nerves are dead. When we came back, the Compensation and Pension (C&P) panel said, no, that doesn't count."²⁷ Johnson implored Congress: "why did they spend thousands of dollars to get an expert opinion and they don't use it? So you are going

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Transitioning Heroes: New Era, Same Problems*? 111st Cong., 2nd sess., January 21, 2010, 41-42.

through comp and pension exams unnecessarily over and over again before you get your benefits, and that just adds to the backlog. Not only that, but if they keep going back to a lower level of care, they won't be able to correct the problem."²⁸ Sergeant Johnson expressed utter frustration with the VA and the time it took for him to receive any help:

It really bothers me that it took 21 months to figure out a Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). Twenty-one months. I went through all the Army treatment, I went through part of the VA treatment, and it took them 21 months to discern that it was a traumatic brain injury, and that is really scary. Because you can't get the treatment that you need timely enough to benefit you.²⁹

Johnson offered a compelling testimony that outlined the dire need for the Department of Veterans Affairs to start paying attention to TBIs — he made his discouragement clear to the public and demanded better care for all future veterans. His testimony made clear that the VA was not prepared to take care of its troops and their mental and physical well-being after they came home from war.

As first described in Hull and Priest's *Washington Post* article, Iraq and Afghanistan War veterans faced abysmal conditions at military medical facilities and encountered many challenges to accessing proper mental health care. These critically wounded soldiers were fed up with being ignored within a system in which they had served and demanded change in front of Congress. Army Staff Sergeant John "Daniel" Shannon spoke on March 5, 2007, to the lack of proper mental health care at Walter Reed. Staff Sgt. Shannon testified that he had "a big problem with their mental health thing...starting with their traumatic brain injury testing," adding that hospital staff incorrectly informed him he had

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²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

"no loss of cognitive function," when he knows he "paid a price for the brain injury" he received while serving in Iraq.³⁰ By sharing his story, Shannon demonstrated that the VA was not prepared for the unprecedented amount of returning service members suffering from traumatic brain injuries and PTSD. His insistence to share his story of survival in Walter Reed speaks to the characterization of this new generation of veterans, one that Nan Levinson argues "ached for a reckoning" of what they had been through, unlike past veterans from "World War II, Korea, and...Vietnam."³¹

Friction between staff and patients at Walter Reed also arose as an issue in the congressional hearings of 2007. Army Captain Marc Giammatteo testified in the 2007 "Care for Wounded Warriors Commission" that he felt judged for serving in the Iraq War and, therefore, did not receive proper care from the medical staff at Walter Reed. Upon returning home to the United States in 2004, the Army Captain says he even felt "penalized" for "getting injured" while under the care of the military hospital.³² If veterans feel judged by health care professionals, how can they feel confident they are receiving standard care? Through his testimony, Giammatteo brought awareness about the many facets of substandard medical treatment at Walter Reed to a wide audience. By testifying in front of Congress, these veterans gave themselves "a sense of agency," as they became "the subject of change rather than the object of it."33 Those testifying shared their stories with a sense of urgency, making it clear there are systemic

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³⁰ "Conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center," C-SPAN video, 5:21:37, March 5, 2007, https://www.c-span.org/video/?196933-1/conditions-walter-reed-army-medical-center.

³¹ Nan Levinson, *War Is Not a Game: The New Antiwar Soldiers and the Movement They Built* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2014), 9.

³² "Care of Wounded Warriors," C-SPAN video, 1:13:39. July 25, 2007. https://www.c-span.org/video/?200150-1/care-wounded-warriors.

³³ Benjamin Schrader, *Fight to Live, Live to Fight* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2019), 159.

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changes needed for them to receive proper care from the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Families Forced into Primary Caregiver Roles

Due to a lack of attention to veteran needs, the families of service members stepped into vital roles as caregivers. Like many other military spouses and families who made enormous sacrifices for their loved ones, Ariana del Negro, wife of injured service member, Army Ranger Charles Gatlin, said she "had to act on his behalf as his agent," as "he was unable to follow conversations," and never even received "any education about his injury" from the military or the VA.³⁴ Fortunately, del Negro worked in the health care industry so she possessed helpful knowledge about her husband's condition, and the couple had time and energy to spend on fighting for access to better treatment. Still, she testified, that "the responsibilities that me and my husband were asked of were not fair," and she asked the question:

If [the responsibilities] were not fair for [them], who were more independent and capable, what does that mean for these other families, for those whose husbands return far worse off than my husband, for those with children who have to work to supplement the family's income and who don't know that the care they are receiving is not what they need?³⁵

If his wife had not stepped up and taken on this enormous task, this Army Ranger Charles Gatlin would not have received the care he needed.

 ³⁴ U.S Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Hearing on VA and DOD Collaboration: Report of the President's Commission on Care for America's Returning Wounded Warriors; Report of the Veterans Disability Benefits Commission; and Other Related Reports, 110th Cong., 1st sess., October 17th, 2007, 91-92.
 ³⁵ Ibid.*

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Tammy Edwards, wife of Staff Sergeant Christopher Edwards, spoke to the dilemmas many military families face when their loved ones are injured and they have to step in and support them; her testimony demonstrated the sacrifice family members made because the system failed to support them otherwise. After Edwards "suffered burns over 80 percent of his body" his wife shared that their "lives drastically changed" and she "remembers feeling completely helpless at the time" due to his injuries that required her "to become his full-time primary caregiver."³⁶ Edwards recounted that she "resigned [her] government job to take care of Chris, and [her] mother took a leave of absence to help care for [their] son while [she] sat with Chris in the hospital."³⁷ She urged her audience to heed her warnings as she shared, "I'm not alone in this role. There are countless stories like mine across the country...there are mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers...changing their lives, moving to unfamiliar cities, to become caregivers for their injured loved ones," claiming that "as a wife, you think you can handle it all, but sometimes you just can't."38 Edwards shared her statement with a sense of urgency, as she implored lawmakers in her audience to create meaningful changes within the VA that would give military families like hers a break from the exhaustive job of being the primary caregiver for her husband. Her statement evoked a wife and mother struggling to manage in the midst of her husband's critical injuries, calling for help through this congressional committee hearing.

The circumstances surrounding the Iraq War forced family members to become more involved in their loved ones' fight, argues both Lisa Leitz and myself. In her book *Fighting for Peace: Veterans and Military Families in the Anti-Iraq War Movement,* the author states that the Iraq War's military "included only service

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 ³⁶" Care of Wounded Warriors," C-SPAN video, 1:13:39, July 25, 2007, https://www.c-span.org/video/?200150-1/care-wounded-warriors.
 ³⁷ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

members who chose to enlist," signifying that "those who served during the Iraq War and their families had more-positive attitudes toward the use of force in American foreign relations" than other American citizens.³⁹ Moreover, "military members during the Iraq War were significantly more likely to be married or have dependents than those at any other point in U.S history," and more likely to support their loved one's service. I argue that because Iraq War service members' families rallied around their service, they were more likely to be involved in their veteran's fight for better health care.⁴⁰ Wives of Iraq War veterans were often forced to shoulder the weight of their husband's basic care, and in their testimonies, these military wives asked to be recognized and treated with respect.

Family Members Take on Advocacy Roles on Behalf of Veterans Struggling with TBIs and Critical Injuries

Due to the limiting nature of TBIs, many service personnel relied on the support of their family members to care for them and advocate for better treatment. In the following hearing from March 13, 2008, titled "Care of Seriously Wounded after Inpatient Care," the wife of Sergeant Edward Wade informed her audience of the challenges she and her husband faced following his diagnosis of a TBI, among other critical injuries he sustained after serving in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Sarah Wade testified that "Ted was one of the first major explosive blast 'polytrauma' cases" that Walter Reed or the Department of Veterans Affairs "had to rehabilitate."⁴¹ Much of the combat veteran's treatment "was by trial and error, as

 ³⁹ Lisa Leitz, Fighting for Peace Veterans and Military Families in the Anti-Iraq War Movement (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), 13-14.
 ⁴⁰ Ibid., 14.

⁴¹ U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Care of Seriously Wounded After Inpatient Care*. 110th Cong., 2nd sess., March 13th, 2008, 52-53.

there was no model system of care for a patient like Ted," his wife claimed, adding that "there is still no long-term model today."⁴² Wade outlined her husband's rocky road to recovery, which she called "an enormous challenge," as neither Walter Reed nor the VA "were staffed to provide appropriate behavioral health care for a patient with a severe TBI," leading Ted to suffer "a significant setback in 2005, that put him in the hospital for 2 weeks, and would take a year to rebound from."43 Both veterans and their families expected top-notch care from the military once they returned home from a deployment, yet this was not the reality many Iraq War veterans faced. The health care crisis surrounding veterans and their families, particularly those dealing with a TBI, was one of the most significant instances in which family members took on primary roles as their loved ones' caregivers, as injured veterans were not able to fight for care for themselves. The unique circumstances regarding a traumatic head injury required effort and tenacity not only from veterans, but from their family members, as well. Due to the fact that Ted was in a coma for two months following his injury, his wife had to work on his behalf in order to secure his medical care.

Sarah Wade's fight for her husband's TBI treatment was unfortunately not an isolated incident, as many military families stood up and demanded a different approach to treating these head wounds amidst a lack of recognition and treatment from the military. Del Negro testified in August 2007 about the roadblocks her husband faced in receiving treatment for a TBI. Del Negro explained that she was not alone in this fight for better treatment from the military: "...sadly, I represent one of the many military wives or caregivers coping with the hardships of having a soldier return wounded from Iraq or Afghanistan," claiming that the treatment her husband received "fell short of what the standard of care should be for those who fought to protect democracy and

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⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

freedom" and she hopes sharing their story "will increase awareness regarding the gaps in care for TBI..."44 Del Negro finished her statement with a powerful message urging lawmakers to enact real change; "Senators, I urge you and your colleagues to remain steadfast in your endeavors to ensure that programs are instituted to increase awareness of the signs, symptoms and appropriate treatments for TBI especially closed-head TBI," and "that soldiers with TBI and their families receive education about the injury..." and lastly "that appropriate and early referrals are made to dedicated centers adequately prepared to treat the complexities of Traumatic Brain Injury."⁴⁵ Her powerful testimony exemplified the struggles so many military families faced while their loved ones navigated long-term injuries; moreover, the recommendations she laid out in front of Congress reflected her persistence in fighting for change for future veterans and their families. Not only did del Negro voice her story to a public audience, but she detailed specific ways in which veteran healthcare could be improved.

Military Families Made Significant Sacrifices to Care for Loved Ones Left Behind by the VA

Given earlier family testimonies in 2007 and 2008, Congress responded by creating the congressional hearing "Meeting the Needs of Family Caregivers of Veterans" in 2009. The goal was to "to identify the gaps in supportive services for family caregivers," and to seek a better understanding of the VA's "current efforts to see the needs of family caregivers of veterans."⁴⁶ The hearing gave voice to Anna Frese, a Family Outreach Coordinator at the

 ⁴⁴ U.S Congress, Senate, Committee on Veterans Affairs, Access to VA Health Care and Benefits in Hawaii, 110th Cong., 22nd sess., August 21, 2007, 5-6.
 ⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Veterans Affairs, *Meeting the Needs of Family Caregivers of Veterans*, 111th Cong., 1st sess., June 4, 2009, 3-4.

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Wounded Warrior Project, and the sister of injured Army Sergeant Eric Edmundson. Her brother "ended up fighting for his life" after an IED (improvised explosive device) attack on October 2nd, 2005, and fortunately has made some recovery.⁴⁷ Frese began her statement by appealing to her audience and asked them to consider the basic activities they did every day, without issue. Think about "raising your arm to reach for a bedside light switch, moving a finger to wipe the sleep from your eyes, getting out of bed, walking to the bathroom," Frese stated. "While most of us take this for granted, severely injured servicemembers like my brother, Eric, can no longer carry out these basic activities of daily living without assistance.³⁴⁸ Frese said her brother, living with "a traumatic and an anoxic brain injury...requires full-time assistance from [their] father, Ed," who "quit his job" in order to "assist his son in adapting to the new normal of life after injury and provide quality of life."⁴⁹ She argued that Ed's sacrifice to help his son helped her brother enormously, but it came with a cost. Frese testified that her dad's support "has been the driving force behind Eric's progress toward recovery," and while he "does it with pride and great respect," their father "is no longer employed, has used up his retirement funds and savings. He no longer has health insurance and has not contributed to Social Security in almost 4 years."50 After witnessing the challenging situation her family lived through following her brother Eric's deployment in Iraq. Frese shared her story in hopes of gaining support for fellow military families in need. Iraq War veterans and their families recognized that they deserved better treatment and showed up in large numbers to demand more from their government —particularly financial compensation for the times they stepped in to support their veteran

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⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

loved ones because the government proved they were unable to do so.

Given the financial toll veteran care took on her family, Anna Frese urged Congress to enact the "Wounded Warrior Project Family Caregiver Act," which she stated "would help ensure that these severely wounded veterans who need ongoing help can get the loving care at home and that care can be sustained."51 This sister-turned-veteran-advocate argued in front of a wide audience that family caregivers struggle as "they have no formal support network...no access to health care, respite care, counseling, or a way to replace lost income."⁵² Frese also publicly chastised the Department of Veterans Affairs, claiming it "gives very little attention to family caregivers" and in turn, "families are largely coping on their own."53 Utilizing a personal anecdote, Frese testified that the VA's involvement "was more troublesome than helpful" in her brother's recovery.⁵⁴ This sister came forward urging politicians to pass legislation that would make life easier for the caregivers of veterans, including her father. Although they might not make as big of a sacrifice as their loved ones who served in the military, families of veterans relinquished their own freedoms when they put aside their own lives and careers to care for them. Anna Frese stood in front of Congress in order to fight for the financial rights and respect of these family members, especially those of her father, Ed.

Family Caregivers Explored Other Avenues for Outside Help

Desperate to help improve their loved ones' health conditions, military families exhausted their resources and did everything in their power to create change for these veterans, even bypassing the

- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

VA in order to do so. Annette McLeod, wife of former Army Corporal Wendell McLeod, was persistent in organizing treatment for her husband and says she "went to his case manager. I went as far as the commander. I went to the generals," and she even took a temporarily leave from her job to care for McLeod.⁵⁵ She claimed that she "fought tooth and nail...because he should have been taken care of," and that she and her husband "were fortunate because I didn't give up."56 Through her testimony, McLeod attempted to gain empathy from the committee, as well as a wider audience: the American public. She delivered an emotionally moving story about her injured husband and the disgraceful treatment they received from the institutions designated to support them. Family members, such as McLeod, appealed up the chain of command at Walter Reed, and still, nothing was done. By testifying in front of Congress, she vowed to keep her story in the headlines and, therefore, refused to let the VA get away with such negligence. McLeod relied less on support from large veteran organizations and picked up the pieces herself to advocate for better healthcare.

Military families explored other avenues of support throughout the challenging process of caring for a loved one, such as seeking help from other veterans and families. Because the administration did not listen to them, spouses and parents of injured service personnel were more inclined to form bonds with others experiencing the same challenges they were. McLeod illustrated the struggles she faced in the system, although she was not the one injured. Faced with the strenuous process of locating assistance for her husband, she said she "would talk to anyone that would listen," and "it took the aid of another soldier who actually heard [her] cry...one day. He said this is a number. Make a call."⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Ibid.

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⁵⁵ U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, *Is this any way to treat our troops*? 110th Cong., 1st sess., March 5th, 2007, 46-47.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

While she capitalized on the support she received from other veterans and their families, McLeod was sure to include the lack of support she received from actual military and federal personnel; after a member of the committee asked if she had any questions for Major General George Weightman and Lieutenant General Kiley, respective commander and chief of the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, she replied "I have one question. Were they deaf?"⁵⁸ By publicly chastising high-up officials at Walter Reed, Annette McLeod displayed her frustration with the lack of support she has found in military health care. Furthermore, she helped convince her audience of the VA's inadequacy, a federal institution that was supposed to wholly assist her injured husband.

Veterans and Family Members Gained Recognition and Helped Usher in Key Legislation Through their Congressional Testimonies

We can observe a series of improvements made within the VA thanks to the testimonies of veterans and their family members. Since the Walter Reed scandal sixteen years ago, VA officials have made efforts to remedy the obstacles many veterans and their families faced in their bureaucratic system. As a result of veteran efforts, by 2011 the Army hired "about 3,500 new staff" to help care for injured veterans, and established "Warrior Transition Units at Walter Reed and around the nation" to provide care for about 10,00 soldiers.⁵⁹ Further, in May 2010, on the heels of congressional hearings, President Obama signed the Caregivers and Veterans Omnibus Health Services Act, legislation that recognized the sacrifice caregivers make, and expanded their

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⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Tom Bowman," Walter Reed Was the Army's Wakeup Call in 2007," *NPR*, August 31, 2011. https://www.npr.org/2011/08/31/139641856/in-2007-walter-reed-was-the-armys-wakeup-call.

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benefits.⁶⁰ Family caregivers received a stipend to care for a*Report*, 208 severely wounded service member, and training was even offered to prepare family members to step into this caregiving role.⁶¹ Most importantly, President Obama recognized the great sacrifice family caregivers made on behalf of their loved ones in the wake of the Iraq War: "These caregivers put their own lives on hold, their own careers and dreams aside, to care for a loved one," and "they do it every day, often around the clock. As Sarah [Wade] can tell you, it's hard physically and it's hard emotionally. It's certainly hard financially. And these tireless caregivers shouldn't have to do it alone."⁶²

VA officials also publicly admitted to previous mistakes regarding the treatment of Iraq War veterans. In 2011, after the majority of congressional hearings had taken place, a VA official explained that "at the outset of the current conflicts, it is fair to say we were unprepared for the complexity of injuries," and in that same year, the National Academics of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine of the United States declared there was "a critical shortage of healthcare professionals...to meet the demands of people returning home from theater in Iraq...and their family members."⁶³ In general, there was wide recognition among VA personnel and political leadership that "the VA was unprepared to treat both physical and psychological disorders."⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Jim Garamone," Obama Signs Veterans, Caregivers Legislation." *National Guard*, May 6, 2010. https://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Family-

Programs/Article/574713/obama-signs-veterans-caregivers-legislation/.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

 ⁶³ Richard Immerman and Beth Bailey, Understanding the US Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, (New York: NYU Press, 2015), 267.
 ⁶⁴ Ibid.

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Conclusion: How have Iraq War Veterans Risen up American Political Ranks?

Veterans are incredibly valuable members of our society, yet in recent years, federal institutions have neglected to properly care for them. Given the major sacrifices American military personnel made in Iraq, they deserved top-notch care from the Department of Veterans Affairs, not to be treated as cogs in a machine. As much as our country boasts about our Armed Forces, our military budget should include adequate resources for U.S veterans when they return home from war.

One question raised by my research is how Iraq War veterans have further engaged in the political sphere. Due to the fact that they spoke directly to politicians and lawmakers in their testimonies, research on any further political roles these individual veterans took on in later years would be valuable. Although not amongst the veterans previously mentioned in this paper, Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) followed a very similar path. She served twenty-three years in the Reserve Forces as a pilot for the Illinois Army National Guard when she was "struck by a RPG (rocket-propelled grenade) and crashed. She lost her legs and partial use of her right arm."65 While recovering at Walter Reed for a year in 2005, the future senator "found herself in an advocacy role for fellow veterans and wounded warriors - including testifying before Congress," as she bore witness to the poor treatment her fellow veterans and their families experienced at the hands of hospital administration and the VA.⁶⁶ Duckworth claimed she "never wanted to run for office," but her experience at Walter Reed politicized her, as she was inspired by "trying to be a good

 ⁶⁵ Bianca Strzalkowski, "Senator Duckworth Educates Congress on Impacts of Military Decisions." *Military Families*, October 18, 2008, https://militaryfamilies.com/military-news/senator-duckworth-educatescongress-on-impacts-of-military-decisions/.
 ⁶⁶ Ibid.

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officer and taking care of [her] soldiers."⁶⁷ After watching "up close as soldiers and their families were being put through unnecessary stressors," she took on the bureaucratic issues and later met with politicians like Senator Obama to engender change.⁶⁸ Today, Senator Duckworth's unique status as a former combat soldier allows her the perspective of seeing how lawmakers and "decisions in Washington D.C. affect the total military."⁶⁹ She serves as a compelling example of a veteran who rose above adversity and was inspired by personal experiences within the military to make a career out of pioneering veterans' rights. Further research on the connection between veterans who testified at congressional hearings between 2007 and 2011, and those who sought a subsequent career in politics, would offer a crucial glimpse into the links between our society, military, and the government.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

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Elvis and Eminem: The Cultural Implications of American Middle-Class Assimilation of African-American Music

Andrew Thennes

In a spirit almost epitomizing that of the imperial British Empire, middle America has spent the better part of the past century assimilating its pop culture from the very demographics it has at times considered to be backwards or even savage. Rhythm 'n Blues, Rock'n'roll, and ultimately, Hip-Hop and Rap have formed cornerstones of middle-American musical culture, but despite their greatest representations being claimed by the White community, they were fundamentally assimilated from African-American roots.¹ While the exact motives for such a phenomenon leave a great deal of room for broad speculation, the consequences and implications of the middle-American assimilation of African-American music are much more definitive.

This adaptation of Black ethnic musical styles has formed a double-edged sword. On one front, the characteristics and aura of their art has been stripped of its origins and meaning it was originally imbued with, diminishing and retarding its significance. On the other hand, middle-class listeners neither embraced nor rebuked these musical styles on the merit of their art. Rather,

https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/report/vol13/iss1/1

¹ "Gold and Platinum," The Recording Industry Association of America, November, 2022; "Greatest of All Time - Artists," Billboard, November, 2022,; "Greatest of All Time - Hot 100 Artists," Billboard, November, 2022; "Greatest of All Time - Top R&B/Hip-Hop Albums," Billboard, November, 2022; "Greatest of All Time - Top R&B/Hip-Hop Songs," Billboard, November, 2022. Even as of the writing of this essay, assimilated ethnic musical renditions by white artists rank higher than the actual ethnic artists that inspired them. The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) ranks Elvis Presley and Eminem as numbers three and nineteen amongst the best-selling artists of all time, with both grossly outranking any other artist in their respective genre. Elvis ranks number thirteen in Billboard's "Greatest Artists of All Time," higher than any other R'n'R artist of his era and second only to one other white artist (The Rolling Stones); similarly, Eminem ranks twenty-two, higher than any other pre-twenty-first-century rapper. Amongst "Hot 100" artists, Elvis sits at number four, and Eminem holds four total albums in "Top R&B/Hip-Hop Albums," greater than any other artist in the category.

proponents sought the music as part of a greater fetishization of Black culture and opponents fought it simply because it was Black.² Together, the process ultimately robs the Black community of the significance of the art form and its origins, superimposes a mockery of its cultural roots onto the assimilated White works, and often causes a cultural backlash and panic to contain the art from influencing middle-America and the "negative influence" of the Black community from which it stemmed.³

The high-class moral stiffness often associated with the American middle-class community in the mid-twentieth century created a vacuum of cultural oppression. This in turn bred a corresponding tendency for private indiscretions to satiate the nation's suppressed desires. But while "depraved" activities, such as the actual nature of America's sexual promiscuity remained behind closed doors for many, sensual rock'n'roll music became a gateway through which the younger generations could show a glimpse of their true private dispositions to the public eye.⁴ Yet, the Black art was simply unpalatable for the white picket-fence communities to which it appealed, at least in its natural form. Elvis Presley and similar artists changed everything. Most certainly an exceptional musician and entertainer, Elvis' greatest asset in his rapid ascension to national fame was not his performing talents, but rather that he offered a White medium by which to enjoy Black music.⁵ The comparative sexually explicit nature of his work certainly still drew a great deal of resistance and criticism, but importantly it retained the deviation from norms that gave it its

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² Greg Tate, "Introduction: Nigs R Us, or How Blackfolk Became Fetish Objects," in *Everything But The Burden: What White People Are Taking From Black Culture*, ed. Greg Tate, (New York: Broadway Books, 2003), 2-4.

³ D. Marvin Jones, *Fear of a Hip-Hop Planet: America's New Dilemma* (Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO, 2013), 90-92.

⁴ Beth Bailey, "Sexual Revolution(s)," *In The Sixties: From Memory to History*, ed. David Farber (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 236-237; Grace Palladino, *Teenagers: An American History* (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1996), 156.

⁵ Big Mama Thornton, "Hound Dog," by Jerry Lieber and Mike Stoller, recorded August 13, 1952, Single, Radio Recorders Annex, Vinyl; Elvis Presley, Hound Dog, by Jerry Lieber and Mike Stoller, recorded July 13, 1956, single, RCA Victor, Vinyl.

appeal and shirked the racial connotations that plagued its predecessors.⁶

A notable example of the disparity in commercial success and public digestion of rock'n'roll when produced by Black versus White artists can be seen with the different renditions of Hound Dog. Originally written and recorded in 1952 by Big Mama Thornton – notably with sensual lyrics written by White songwriters – Hound Dog proved to be her magnum opus, with substantial sales amongst the Black community.⁷ The lyrics and delivery were notably impassioned. Although sexually explicit (by the deliberate design of the writers), her rendition placed a greater emphasis on the emotive nature of the R&B style and the imbued themes of betraval and resentment.⁸ Elvis' rendition delivered in 1956 took a wildly different stylistic approach. With greatly simplified lyrics, exceptionally poor mastering, and an almost unitary focus on the sexual nature and the accompanying pelvic performance rendered by Elvis for live audiences, the original deeper meaning was entirely lost. In short, Elvis had stripped the intended character and core content of the ethnic art form and replaced it with a kitschy idealization of Black culture and sexual freedom to jig out on television.⁹ Not only did this process trivialize the Black art form, but it also assimilated the credit for the work itself into the White community and made a belittling mockery of the Black community from which the work ultimately represented. Performance differences aside, unlike Thornton's, his rendition was accepted by White audiences and sold eight times

⁶ Paul Linden, "Riding the Solar Wind: AM Radio, the Skywave Effect, and the Mainstreaming of Rock & Roll," MEIEA Journal 21, no. 1 (2021): 68-69, https://meiea.wildapricot.org/Journal/Vol21/Linden (accessed November 30, 2022).

⁷ James M. Salem, *The Late Great Johnny Ace and the Transition from R&B to*

Rock 'n' Roll (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 82-83.

⁸ Big Mama Thornton, "Hound Dog."

⁹ Presley, Elvis, "Hound Dog," performed by Elvis Presley on The Ed Sullivan Show (September 9, 1956; Broadway, NY: CBS Productions, 1956), Black-and-white monaural television broadcast, https://youtu.be/Lrn8nTMcv_k (accessed November 30, 2022).

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the copies of its prototype (500,000 vs 4 million).¹⁰ America knew what it wanted - it just needed the right deliveryman.

The 1950's were not the only period in which Black music was acclimatized to middle-class ears by a relatable figure. The advent of Hip-Hop – and even more so, rap – in the mid-to-late eighties drew an even more fearful response from middle-class listeners than rock'n'roll had in decades prior; yet the art form had an equally irresistible allure.¹¹ This time, however, not only would rap be adapted to less open-minded audiences by middle-American artists, but its authentic renditions would be fetishized by a sizable audience.¹² The great majority of early hip-hop took the form of gangsta rap, a lyrical phenomenon that somewhat mirrored the jubilees or sorrows of slave working songs in that they confronted and lamented the harsh conditions imposed by life in the projects.¹³ Groups such as N.W.A. and Public Enemy played a definitive role in the construction of the genre and built an artistic backbone on themes of real violence, and the glorification of sex, money, drugs, and credibility - assets that middle-America would have considered morally reprehensible.¹⁴ But to a sizable population of white-collar Americans, vocal threats and disregard

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¹⁰ Elvis Presley, Hound Dog; "Hound Dog/Don't Be Cruel," The Recording Industry Association of America, November, 2022, https://www.riaa.com/goldplatinum/?tab_active=default-award&se=hound+dog (accessed November 30, 2022); Salem, The Late Great Johnny Ace and the Transition from R&B to Rock 'n' Roll, 82-83.

¹¹ D. Marvin Jones, *Fear of a Hip-Hop Planet: America's New Dilemma* (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2013), 90-92.

¹² Jones, *Fear of a Hip-Hop Planet*, 91; Michael Eric Dyson, *Between God and Gangsta Rap: Bearing Witness to Black Culture* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), 161-163, 179-180. Today, about eighty percent of hip-hop listeners are white. While this count is heavily influenced by the population disparity between the Black and White communities in America, it demonstrates that a substantial portion of the population has adopted the ethnic art form.

¹³ Dyson, *Between God and Gangsta Rap*, 172-174; Scott Wilson, *Great Satan's Rage: American Negativity and Rap/Metal in the Age of Supercapitalism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 68-70.

¹⁴ Jones, *Fear of a Hip-Hop Planet*, 173-174; N.W.A., "Fuck tha Police," by Ice Cube, MC Ren, The D.O.C., Dr. Dre, and DJ Yella, recorded 1988, Single, Ruthless, Vinyl; Public Enemy, 911 Is a Joke, by Flavor Flav, Keith Shocklee, Eri Sadler, recorded 1989, Single, Def Jam, Vinyl.

for civil authority and the idealization of violence was not a cause for fear, but rather the call of an idyllic fantasy.¹⁵

Like Elvis, the entrance of the middle-American rapper not only trivialized the art but also carried its moral profanity to a new extreme. Eminem – Marshal Mathers, a poor White from Detroit – found his audience in catering less to the harsh realities of impoverished life like his ethnic counterparts at the time, but to an alter-ego fantasy of morbid crime and a mutated representation of the genre's roots.¹⁶ Raised in a community of ninety-percent ethnic minorities, Mathers was unique at the time for not only being imbued with the authenticity of Blackness, but also the character, relatability, and look of working-class America, a demographic more easily associated with by his generally middle-class White listeners.¹⁷ His relationship with Dr. Dre, an iconic member of N.W.A., played a role of central importance as he extended Eminem a degree of credibility, a ghetto pass of sorts, that lent the budding artist the authenticity he needed to deliver a rendition of hip-hop middle- America wanted to hear.¹⁸

In his first generally accepted album, the Slim Shady EP, Eminem not only utilized this platform and assumed the role of a "gangsta," but created a middle-class fantasy out of a ghetto reality, consistently "outdoing" the morbidity of content released by his Black counterparts in an almost sardonic fashion. Furthermore, like Elvis, he stripped the original justifications for

¹⁵ "Introduction: Nigs R Us, or How Blackfolk Became Fetish Objects," 8-10. ¹⁶ EMINEM, "Just the Two of Us," by Marshal Mathers and DJ Head, recorded 1997, track 6 on Slim Shady EP, Web Entertainment, multiple formats. Notable amongst his initial works, Just the Two of Us was written deliberately with the intention of shock value and an aura of complete disregard for moral standards. The work retained the components of violence and anger that defined the genre in its period, but completely eliminated the original justifications for said violence, such as police brutality and socioeconomic inequity.

¹⁷ Carl Hancock Rux, "Eminem: The New White Negro," in *Everything But The Burden: What White People Are Taking From Black Culture*, ed. Greg Tate (New York: Broadway Books, 2003), 20-22.

¹⁸ Todd Boyd, "From Elvis to Eminem," *Souls: A Critical Journal of Black Politics, Culture, and Society* 3, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 40. https://doi.org/10.1080/10999949.2001.12098160 (accessed December 1, 2022).

such vehemence, such as police brutality, instead leaving a void characterized by violence without cause and inhumanity to be superimposed on the ghetto community from which it stemmed.¹⁹ This process effectively achieved the opposite aims of semiactivist groups such as N.W.A. and repainted rap in the public eve not as a message of discontent (albeit a poorly received one at the time) but rather as an art of insanity and indiscriminate crime. For example, instead of monologuing that, "takin' out a cop or two...takin' out a police would make [his] day," Eminem's Slim Shady, "[w]ent to gym in 8th grade, raped the women's swim team," drowned his girlfriend with his toddler daughter, made, "the world suck [his] dick without a condom on," all in addition to, "[leaving] the keys in the van, with a gat in each hand, [going] up in Eastland and [shooting] a policeman."²⁰ Two years later, with the release of The Slim Shady LP, Eminem doubled down on the immoral extremism of his work, to great commercial success.²¹ In the additional tracks, Slim Shady, "[couldn't] figure out which Spice Girl [he wanted] to impregnate," "[g]ot pissed and ripped Pamela Lee's tits off," "[s]tapled [his teacher's] nuts to a stack of papers," encouraged faux listers to drug and rape a minor and kill a cheating partner, and "ripped [Hillary Clinton's] fucking tonsils out and fed her sherbet."²² Yet despite the significant backlash his

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¹⁹ Rux, "Eminem: The New White Negro," 22-24.

²⁰ EMINEM, "If I Had," by Marshal Mathers and DJ Rec, recorded 1997, track 6 on Slim Shady EP, Web Entertainment, multiple formats; EMINEM, Just Don't Give a Fuck, by Marshal Mathers, Jeff Bass, and Mark Bass, recorded 1997, track 6 on Slim Shady EP, Web Entertainment, multiple formats; EMINEM, Just the Two of Us; EMINEM, Murder, Murder, by Marshal Mathers and DJ Rec, recorded 1997, track 6 on Slim Shady EP, Web Entertainment, multiple formats; N.W.A., Fuck tha Police.

²¹ "The Slim Shady LP," The Recording Industry Association of America, November, 2022, https://www.riaa.com/gold-platinum/?tab_active=default-award&se=the+slim+shady+lp (accessed December 1, 2022).

²² EMINEM, "Guilty Conscience," by Marshal Mathers, Andre Young, and Dr. Dre, recorded 1998, track 3 on Slim Shady LP, Interscope, Multiple Formats; EMINEM, My Name Is, by Marshal Mathers and DJ Rec, recorded 1998, track 2 on Slim Shady LP, Interscope, Multiple Formats; EMINEM, Role Model, by Marshal Mathers, Andre Young, Melvin Bradford, Mel-Man, and Dr. Dre, recorded 1998, track 9 on Slim Shady LP, Interscope, Multiple Formats.

music did receive from the conservative community – generally based around the principle that "hood music" and "degeneracy" was permeating the middle-American community – the album found commercial success that would not have been possible under a Black artist; within six months of release, the LP made 3x Multi-Platinum and 4x Multi-Platinum a year thereafter.²³

In such, Eminem had pioneered and normalized a phenomenon even more significant than that of Elvis: gangsta appropriation and the wigga.²⁴ African-American gangsta culture was still morally backwards and its "manifestations" remained criminal and terrifying to the American public eye; however, to a sizable population, acting gangsta was exciting and "authentic." For some youth, dressing Black and saying the n-word in school would grow to provide a sense of identity and independence similar to the social and sexual freedom that Elvis brought to teenagers in his own time, much to the chagrin of cultural conservatives (and often the Black community itself).²⁵ However, in doing so, Eminem and his counterparts had made a trend out of a culture and stripped its real, hard truths and origins to supplant with an empty vilified shell.

Appropriation is not a new practice. In fact, every art form, to some degree, is appropriated and erected with the influence of those that preceded it; however, with respect to culture, its impacts are highly researched, but seldom publicly explored and truly embraced. The assimilation and recharacterization – particularly the latter – of African-American musical styles and the aura that surrounds them has done very real damage to the Black

²³ Jones, Fear of a Hip-Hop Planet, 90-92; "The Slim Shady LP," The Recording Industry Association of America, November, 2022, https://www.riaa.com/goldplatinum/?tab_active=default- award&se=the+slim+shady+lp (accessed December 1, 2022).

²⁴ Tate, "Introduction: Nigs R Us, or How Blackfolk Became Fetish Objects," 8, 10.

²⁵ Rux, "Eminem: The New White Negro," 25, 27-28, 30; Jones, Fear of a Hip-Hop Planet, 93-94; Palladino, Teenagers: An American History, 155-157; Dyson, Between God and Gangsta Rap: Bearing Witness to Black Culture, 162-163; Scott Wilson, Great Satan's Rage: American Negativity and Rap/Metal in the Age of Supercapitalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008), 80-81, 87, 178-180.

community, even today. When Elvis simplified Black music to a mere sexual shell, it portrayed the Black community as sexually brutish, a position not lost on, nor left uncapitalized by opponents of Black equality.²⁶ For example, when he took to the stage on The Ed Sullivan Show in September 1956, his pelvic motion was so substantial that it was ultimately censored.²⁷ The image instilled – especially on the older population that was already lukewarm in their appreciation of Elvis and rock'n'roll as a whole – did not do any favors to the Black community that was closely correlated with his work.²⁸

Similarly, when Eminem stripped the reason and direction from the violence of rap, he fundamentally changed the public perception of the hip-hop community and the demographic they represented. Simply put, Eminem built a surreal image of the gangsta, one that to the unacquainted suburbanite began to supplant their notion of what the Black community actually looked like.²⁹ Furthermore, when Eminem sold records and conservatives tried to stop him, the Black community got caught in the crossfire. Eminem himself was hard to stick (the middle-American community identified enough with him that he was not considered a substantial threat), but the anti-rap sentiment surrounding the shock value he brought to the genre was an easy cover for racial prejudice. Studies conducted at the turn of the century showed significant correlation between anti-rap sentiment and racial prejudice for white Americans.³⁰ Furthermore, research also

²⁷ Beth Bailey, "Sexual Revolution(s)," 235.

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²⁶ Mike Daley. "Why Do Whites Sing Black?': The Blues, Whiteness, and Early Histories of Rock," *Popular Music and Society* 26, no. 2 (June 2003): 165. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/why-do-whites-sing-black-blueswhiteness-early/docview/208069475/se-2 (accessed December 1, 2022).

²⁸ TIME Writers, "Radio: The Week in Review," TIME, September 24, 1956, 2, http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,867139-1,00.html (accessed December 1, 2022).

²⁹ Rux, "Eminem: The New White Negro," 22-23.

³⁰ Mark Brandt, Christine Reyna, and G. Tendayi Viki, "Blame It on Hip-Hop: Anti-Rap Attitudes as a Proxy for Prejudice," *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 12, no. 3 (2009): 365-367.

https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1368430209102848 (accessed December 1, 2022).

showed that despite the great deal of fear of the indoctrination of young, middle-class Americans with the hostile, violent values of hip-hop, there was little correlation between the consumption of violent, misogynistic hip-hop and changes in moral values and behavior. This pattern suggests that actions taken against hip-hop and the hip-hop community were truly based upon racial bias, not a legitimate moral crisis.³¹ While the exact scope of the repercussions of this sentiment are beyond the scope of this essay, its impact is both probable and significant.

Unfortunately, there is little end in sight for middle-American appropriation of ethnic music; however, acknowledgement of the root cause of appropriation is possible. Elvis – and other appropriating actors of the past – remain frozen in their accreditation for their art. As recently as 2022, a Warner Bros biopic of Elvis' career construed and emphasized a period of cultural integration with an African-American community which gave Elvis the authenticity that made his music special.³² However, newer artists have become more keen to the circumstances that surround their popularity. In 2000, on The Marshall Mathers LP, Eminem recognized: "And I am whatever you say I am. If I wasn't, then why would you say I am? In the paper, the news, every day I am... 'Cause I am whatever you say I am.'³³

In prose, he outlined possibly the most important characteristic of American cultural stereotypes. The phenomenon of appropriation is not the fault of the artist; neither Elvis nor Eminem stole an art form, nor did they deliberately degrade the image and standing of the community from where their genre stemmed. Rather, the phenomena of appropriation stems from the

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³¹ William A. Boettcher III and Michael D. Cobb, "Ambivalent Sexism and Misogynistic Rap Music: Does Exposure to Eminem Increase Sexism," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 37, no. 12 (2007): 3036- 3037,

https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00292.x (accessed December 1, 2022); Jones, Fear of a Hip- Hop Planet, 90-92.

³² "Elvis Childhood Flashback," Elvis, directed by Baz Luhrmann (2022; Burbank, CA: Warner Bros Pictures, 2022), Film.

³³ EMINEM, "The Way I Am," by Marshal Mathers, recorded 2000, track 7 on The Marshall Mathers LP, Interscope, Multiple Formats.

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American people themselves. Music, stereotypes, and bias are just blank slates. They become whatever we say they are.

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The editors of *Report* invite all undergraduate students and recent graduates to submit articles for Volume 14, scheduled to be published in May 2024. The theme for next year's issue is "innovation and technology," but papers examining all topics and fields of history will be considered for publication. Submissions will be reviewed on a semi-rolling basis with two rounds of review. Papers submitted by November 1, 2023 will be considered in Round 1, and authors will be notified of decisions November 13. Papers received by February 1, 2024 will be considered in Round 2, and authors will be notified of decisions February 16. Papers may be submitted by email at report.history@westpoint.edu or through our portal at https://digitalcommons.usmalibrary.org/report/.

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