

## **Applying the Trikora Spirit in Public Administration Practices to Build the Welfare of the Papuan People**

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### **Abstract**

This study aims to analyze the application of the Trikora spirit in public administration practices to build the welfare of the Papuan people. The research method used in this study is a qualitative approach by conducting a literature review. The results of this study show that the Trikora spirit can be applied in public administration practices, particularly in optimizing governance, coordination, and supervision, as well as in improving the implementation of programs and policies in Papua. Various efforts have been made by the government to resolve existing problems through the enactment of Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua. However, twenty years after the implementation of special autonomy, the results are still not optimal. This is because, among other things, governance is still not optimal, there is no supervision and assistance from the center, and programs from ministries and institutions have not been well coordinated and integrated. I hope that the mobilization of all potential national resources, the spirit of one unit, synchronization and coordination as well as command and control when the Trikora to seize West Irian need to be imitated and continued to build the development of Papua's welfare.

**Keywords:** *Trikora, Mobilization of National Resources, synchronization & coordination, command and control, Special Autonomy.*

### **Introduction**

On the nineteenth of December 1961, at a giant meeting in the Yogyakarta square, President Soekarno announced TRIKORA (Tri Komando Rakyat) in order to liberate West Irian from Dutch occupation. The contents of the Trikora are: 1) To thwart the establishment of the colonial Dutch-made "Papuan Puppet State"; 2) Raise the Red and White Flag in West Irian, Indonesia; and 3) Be prepared for general mobilization to defend the independence of the unity of the Motherland and the Nation.

President Soekarno deliberately chose this date to take the psychological effect of the Indonesian people to remember that on the same date in 1948 the Second Dutch Military Aggression occurred (Suropati, 2019). If in the past the city of Yogyakarta was the main target of the Dutch attack, then 13 years later in the same city it was announced by Trikora to retake West Irian from Dutch hands. Trikora had to be taken after various attempts through diplomacy to negotiate with the Dutch failed to be carried out. Instead of giving it back, the Dutch were actually preparing for the independence of West Irian. The West Irian issue was in limbo because the Dutch deliberately manipulated the translation of the text of the Round Table

Conference agreement (Silalahi, 1997). Indonesia considers that West Irian will be handed over later through negotiations that will be carried out after one year of the Round Table Conference (KMB). The Netherlands translated the words in the results of the KMB negotiations which read "Statusquo should be maintained in New Guinea for a year, by which time its future status would be resolved by further negotiations between the parties" interpreted by the Netherlands as a Dutch domestic problem that will be resolved later through decolonization (Salford, 2013).

Tensions between Indonesia and the Netherlands escalated, especially after the Dutch government put forward the idea of decolonizing and internationalizing West Irian at the UN forum. The Dutch are trying to legalize the Planned Papua Council Law complete with its flag and national anthem. This step will of course lead to the formation of the state of West Irian which is very much against the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia (Octaviar, 2022). Indonesia continues to make every effort so that West Irian returns to Indonesia immediately, including through diplomacy and continues to seek support from various world countries, including through the United Nations. The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia at the United Nations in 1954 submitted a request to the Secretary General of the United Nations so that the West Irian issue could be included on the agenda of the UN General Assembly (Ravico, 2020). The efforts of the Indonesian Government to bring the West Irian issue to the UN forum received a strong reaction and rejection from the Netherlands because they thought that the UN had no right to interfere in West Irian issues, and considered that Indonesia was expanding because it misinterpreted the results of the KMB, namely the West Irian problem was resolved through a meeting of the two countries just.

The efforts of the Government of Indonesia finally bore fruit by bringing the issue of West Irian to the 9th UN General Assembly in 1954, but the West Irian Draft Resolution on Indonesia's initiative did not receive support and did not reach the required quorum (Karseno, 2011). Subsequent submissions at the 10th (1955), 11th (1956), and 12th General Assembly Sessions also failed successively and were promised that a special session would be arranged in Geneva which was never held (Idris Jusuf, 2016). This failure is inseparable from the number of UN membership which is more profitable for the Netherlands. At that time, most of the members of the UN General Assembly were still dominated by Western countries, while the majority of developing countries were still colonies of Western countries and not yet independent.

When Indonesia put this matter forward at the XII UN General Assembly, Indonesia's demands were not successful, on the contrary, it actually strengthened the Dutch stance which considered West Irian as its domestic problem. The Indonesian government has carried out various diplomatic policies in an effort to liberate West Irian but has failed. Therefore, the Government of Indonesia devised a strategy using political, economic and military capabilities or in other words, to expel the Netherlands and West Irian not limited to diplomacy, if necessary by mobilizing all national potential (Prayuda, 2020).

The first response of the Indonesian Government was in the economic field by taking over Dutch companies in Indonesia. The second action is to sever diplomatic relations with the Netherlands and the next action is to build a formidable military force (Bupu, 2021). Indonesia's failed diplomatic efforts to invite the Netherlands to negotiate again on the West Irian issue peacefully either through bilateral, UN and other efforts have forced Indonesia to

change its attitude from being defensive to then becoming offensive and implementing a policy of total confrontation against the Netherlands including the military (Pusjarah, 1996).

This effort was carried out through the purchase of modern weapons and equipping the Indonesian Armed Forces with modern weapons from Russia. Prior to announcing the Trikora, the Government first formed the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (1960). This National Front was a semi-official body that assisted and encouraged all efforts by the Government in general and the Central War Authority in particular in the context of the struggle to return West Irian to the territory of the Republic. Indonesia (Siti, 2022). After that the Government formed the National Defense Council (Depertan,) in 1961, whose task was to formulate ways to integrate all national potential in the Liberation of West Irian (Numberi, 2013). Apart from that, Soekarno also formed the Mandala Command with the main task of preparing and carrying out a Military Operation to seize West Irian which was occupied by the Dutch. Military Operations became the last option after various diplomatic efforts failed.

It turns out that the United States has been following these developments, paying attention to Indonesia's determination. To investigate with certainty regarding Indonesia's intention to invade West Irian, in addition to sending a U2 spy plane flying over Indonesian territory (Poulgrain, 2017), the United States also sent President JF Kennedy's younger brother, Robert Kennedy, who at that time served as America's Attorney General. States to visit Indonesia. Apart from holding talks with President Soekarno, he also directly saw preparations for a military invasion of West Irian (Guntur, 2021). This was done because the Dutch kept stalling for time to continue negotiations on West Irian. When Trikora was announced, the Indonesian Armed Forces were indeed in their best condition, as the strongest Armed Forces in Southeast Asia (Hakim, 2018). On this basis, the United States then pressured the Dutch government to negotiate again with Indonesia to discuss West Irian (Wawan, 2011).

Finally, the Netherlands and Indonesia were successfully invited to the negotiating table. On August 5, 1962 an agreement was reached in New York which became known as the "New York Agreement" which in principle determined the gradual surrender of West Irian to Indonesia (Numberi, 2013). Although in the end the military operation was canceled due to the conclusion of the "New York Agreement", the lessons learned from Trikora's success were the maximum deployment of national resources from the Government and the existence of a clear single command to facilitate the objectives of efforts to return West Irian to Indonesia.

Since the official return of West Irian to Indonesia through the People's Consultation (Pepera) in 1969 whose results were ratified through UN Resolution no 2504 of 1969, West Irian which is now called Papua has still faced various problems and has been left behind by other provinces in Indonesia. Through Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for the Papua Province, the Government established a Special Autonomy (Otsus) policy for the Papua Province with the aim of catching up with other provinces in Indonesia, to create a safe, peaceful and prosperous Papua. However, during the 20 years that this law has been implemented, the results are felt to be less than optimal. From the results of the research, weak governance and weak supervision of the management of the Papua special autonomy fund and the absence of a grand design for Papua's development through Otsus have resulted in the distribution of funds and development not being on target (Katharina, 2019). In addition, these

policies seem not enough. The conflict is still burning and a comprehensive solution is needed to lead to a peaceful Papua, Papua as an integral part of Indonesia.

In order to maximize the implementation of Otsus, the government needs to continue the spirit of a clear Trikora single command to facilitate the goals of Otsus. The spirit of a single solid command unit has become a meaningful example for Indonesia in building prosperity and solving problems in Papua. The spirit of a unified command when Trikora needs to be continued to build the welfare of the Papuan people. If previously Trikora's spirit was to win back West Irian, now its spirit is to win heart and mind, win the hearts and people of Papua.

Writing this study uses a qualitative research method carried out with literature studies and historical writing, using a philosophical approach (philosophical approach), historical approach (historical approach), and statutory approach (statute approach). The statutory regulation approach is a regulation that is concerned with the issues Papua is currently facing, by examining the regulations in force with the aim of finding the right arrangement and implementation of special autonomy in Papua.

## Method

This research uses a type of qualitative research with a literature study approach. Data obtained using the method of literature study. The data obtained were analyzed using content analysis techniques and analyzed inductively. The research was conducted by collecting and analyzing literature related to the research topic. The literature used in this research comes from scientific journal articles, books, and related academic publications. The literature sources used in this study were selected based on predetermined inclusion criteria. The data obtained from the literature were analyzed using qualitative analysis techniques. The researcher used an inductive approach in analyzing the data by identifying the main themes that emerged from the collected literature. To ensure the validity of the data, the researcher triangulated the data using various sources of literature related to the research topic. In addition, to ensure data reliability, researchers used data verification and confirmation techniques by re-examining the literature sources used in the study.

## Result and Discussion

Papua has returned to the motherland. Papua referred to here is Papua which now has six provinces, namely Papua Province and West Papua Province as well as four new provinces that have just been formed namely; South Papua Province, Highlands Papua Province, Central Papua Province and Southwest Papua Province. Physically, the initial development process in Papua was not the same as in other regions in Indonesia. Other provinces began pioneering development shortly after the War of Independence ended, while Papua was only handed over by the Dutch to UNTEA (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority), a United Nations temporary agency tasked with being the executive authority in handing Papua back to Indonesia on May 1, 1963 and officially only in 1969, after the results of the People's Consultation (Pepera) were ratified through UN Resolution No. 2504 of 1969. This historical difference has caused Papua to experience the sowing of nationalism that is different from other regions in Indonesia (Anriani, 2021). Against this background and different arguments, of course there

are different views between existing history and Papuan nationalists and some native Papuans (Suropati, 2019). This condition certainly affects the Papuan people towards adjusting the system of national government, economy, development, social and culture as well as other nationally applicable systems with other regions in Indonesia.

### **Special Autonomy**

To catch up, various efforts have been made by the Government with the enactment of Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy (Otsus) for the Province of Papua. The Special Autonomy Development approach is prioritized with affirmative principles, namely protection, partiality, empowerment of Indigenous Papuans (OAP) (Katharina, 2019). The enactment of the law is accompanied by a number of hopes; the guerrilla armed separatist groups are expected to disband by themselves because they all return to the Republic of Indonesia and build their villages; no more Papuans carrying out campaigns to separate themselves from Indonesia abroad because native Papuans are protected, empowered, and guaranteed for their present and future survival within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia; there are no more OAPs who are still refugees in PNG because all of them have returned to Papua, and no political resistance groups have emerged, because they all welcomed Otsus with joy (Gere, 2017).

The Papua special autonomy policy, which was promulgated through Law 21 of 2001, has many important and fundamental differences compared to the regional autonomy law that applies to other regions. This law is a very important and fundamental political compromise and is intended to respond to demands for independence in Papua. The drafting process itself was very participatory, through consultation with various stakeholders in Papua and quite intense discussions among the drafting team in Papua to then be brought into the DPR's legislation process in Jakarta (Muttaqin, 2011). The important substances of the special autonomy policy are; First, the implementation of government decentralization. Second, protection of the basic rights of indigenous Papuans. Third, democracy and democratic maturity. Fourth, respect for ethics and morals. Fifth, respect for human rights. Sixth, enforcement of the rule of law. Seventh, respect for pluralism. Eighth, equality of position, rights and obligations as citizens (Mutaqqin, 2011).

In general, it can be said that the Special Autonomy Law at the level of normative ideas is ideal. This should be able to respond to the demands of the secessionist movement and the spirit of Papuan nationalism, as well as reduce pressure from other demands. The gap between normative ideas and reality may arise due to implementation that has not been implemented effectively. During the 20 years that this law has been implemented, it turns out that the results have not shown encouraging performance for solving the Papua problem. Movements critical of various issues in Papua, such as protests against alleged human rights violations, accusations of marginalization of native Papuans, have not stopped altogether. Some people see that special autonomy is not a satisfactory answer to their problems and desires. This critical attitude was carried out by various groups with diverse backgrounds, both indigenous peoples, intellectuals and other sectors, including students.

## Implementation of Special Autonomy

The problem of implementing Otsus is felt to be very complex, not only regarding the issue of the articles but also the institutionalization process. Central and regional governments and other stakeholders in Papua are required to be able to move quickly in responding and addressing the complexities of Papua's problems by taking advantage of the development of Papua's current civilization which is increasingly advanced with the increasing quality of OAP human resources (Asaribab, 2020). Therefore, in responding to demands for the Papua Special Autonomy issue, Law 2/2021 as the second amendment to Law 21/2001 looks more comprehensive compared to the first amendment through Law 35/2008. It is hoped that the presence of Law 2/2021 will be able to improve Otsus even though the process and contents of the changes seem to have not fully touched the spirit of Otsus as an instrument of conflict resolution (LIPI, 2021).

From the results of the evaluation, weak governance and weak supervision of the management of the Papua special autonomy fund and the absence of a grand design for Papua's development through Otsus have resulted in the distribution of funds and development not being on target (Katharina, 2019). In addition, Law No. 21 of 2001 also does not regulate parties who evaluate the implementation of Special Autonomy so that the problems of budget accountability and transparency cannot be resolved. Meanwhile, from a security standpoint, as long as Special Autonomy is implemented, until now there are still minor disturbances in the security sector which, if left unchecked, have the potential to disrupt the continuation of development in Papua.

There are at least two fundamental problems why Otsus cannot work properly to meet the demands of the Papuan people. The first problem shows the unstable and effective institutionalization process. The institutionalization process here shows how the performance of the Special Autonomy institutions is in relation to changes or sustainability of structures, their relations with related external institutions, and the dynamics of relations between actors within the internal institutions. Meanwhile, the second problem is more indicative of the operationalization of the provisions contained in Law 21/2001 which seem to be experiencing inconsistencies and distortions (LIPI, 2021).

During the implementation of Otsus from 2001 to 2021, the government issued various regulations to strengthen the implementation of the Special Autonomy, such as INPRES No. 5 of 2007 concerning the Acceleration of the Development of the Provinces of Papua and West Papua, PERPRES 65/2011 concerning the Acceleration of the Development of Papua & West Papua, PERPRES 66/2011 concerning the Unit for the Acceleration of the Development of Papua and West Papua (UP4B), INPRES 9/2017 concerning the Acceleration of the Development of Papua & Welfare West Papua, PERPRES 17/2019 concerning Procurement of Government Goods & Services for the Acceleration of Papua & West Papua Welfare Development, KEPPRES No 20 of 2020 concerning the establishment of an Integrated Coordinating Team for the Acceleration of Papua & West Papua Welfare Development, INPRES 9/2020 concerning the Acceleration of Papua & West Papua Welfare Development West Papua, PP 106 of 2021 concerning Authority & Institutional Implementation of the Papua

Special Autonomy Policy, PP 107/2021 concerning Acceptance, Management, Supervision & Master Plan for Implementation of Papua's Special Autonomy.

These regulations also contain development programs in Papua by Ministries and Agencies spread across provinces/districts/cities, but the impression is that they are not well coordinated (Katharina, 2019). It is time for all these programs to be properly coordinated so that concrete and appropriate steps can be found for each K/L to be implemented in each district/city which has different situations and problems. The government once issued PERPRES 66/2011 concerning the Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4B) which is tasked with assisting the President in supporting coordination and synchronization of planning, facilitating and controlling the implementation of the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua Provinces. This unit did not continue after the replacement national leadership from President SBY to President Jokowi.

President Jokowi then also issued KEPPRES No. 20 of 2020 concerning the establishment of the Integrated Coordinating Team for the Acceleration of Welfare Development in Papua & West Papua which has the task of implementing policies to accelerate welfare development in Papua and West Papua Provinces to realize the people of Papua Province and West Papua Province who are advanced, prosperous, peaceful and dignified. Continuation of this Team still needs to be synchronized with the issuance of Law Number 2 of 2021 concerning the second Amendment to Law Number 21 of 2001 concerning Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua which mandates the establishment of a Special Agency.

### **Formation of BP3OKP**

From a regulatory perspective, learn from the previous Law, so that Otsus can be right on target, Law Number 2 of 2021, the Government made two Government Regulations (PP), namely PP No. 106 of 2021 concerning Authority and Institutional Implementation of the Papua Special Autonomy Policy and PP No. 107 of 2021 concerning Acceptance, Management, Supervision, and the Master Plan for the Acceleration of Development in the Context of Implementation of Special Autonomy for the Province of Papua. In addition, Article 68 A states that in the context of synchronization, harmonization, evaluation and coordination of the implementation of Special Autonomy and development in the Papua region, a Special Agency has been established which is directly responsible to the President. This body is chaired by the Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia. This article was then followed up with the establishment of the Steering Committee for the Acceleration of Development of Special Autonomy for Papua (BP3OKP) through PERPRES NO. 121/2022 regarding BP3OKP. This agency has the task of carrying out synchronization, harmonization, evaluation and coordination of accelerated development and implementation of Special Autonomy in the Papua region in accordance with statutory provisions. Position and duties. The position, duties of the Integrated Coordination Team and BP3OKP can be explained as follows:

**Table 1.**  
**Comparison of the Integrated Coordination Team and BP3OKP**

| No | Team/Agency   | Base                              | Organization structure   | Task   |
|----|---|-----------------------------------|--|--|
| 1  | Integrated Coordinating Team for the Acceleration of Papua & West Papua Welfare Development | Presidential Decree No 20 of 2020 | I. Steering Board<br>1. Chair: Vice President<br>Member:<br>a. Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs<br>b. Coordinating Minister for the Economy<br>c. Coordinating PMK Minister<br>d. Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs<br>e. Minister of Finance<br>f. Minister of Home Affairs<br>g. Office of the Presidential Staff<br>2. Daily Chair concurrently member:<br>Minister Peren Bang<br>Nas/Head of Bappenas<br>II. Steering Team<br>1. Chairman: Middle Ministry Senior Official Bang Nas actor/ Bappenas<br>2. Member:<br>a. Acting Madya Pinti Kemenko Polhukam,<br>b. Acting Pinti Madya Coordinating Ministry for the Economy; | Carrying out policies to accelerate welfare development in the Province Papua and West Papua Province to make it happen the people of Papua and West Papua Provinces who are advanced, prosperous, peaceful and dignified. |



| No | Team/Agency   | Base                                  | Organization structure   | Task   |
|----|---|---------------------------------------|--|--|
|    |   |                                       | c. Acting Principal of the Ministry of Coordinating Ministry of PMK<br>d. Pj Pimti Madya Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs<br>e. Acting Principal of the Ministry of Finance;<br>f. Acting Principal of the Ministry of Home Affairs<br>g. Acting equivalent to Acting Pj Madya KSP<br>h. Governor of Papua Province<br>i. Governor of West Papua Province. |  |
| 2  | Steering Committee for the Acceleration of Development of Special Autonomy for Papua (BP3OKP) | Presidential Decree No. 121 Year 2022 | Chairman: Vice President;<br>Member:<br>1. Minister of Home Affairs<br>2. Minister of National Development Planning<br>3. Minister of Finance<br>4. One (1) representative from each province in Papua Province.   | Carry out synchronization, harmonization, evaluation and coordination of accelerated development and implementation of Special Autonomy in the Papua region in accordance with statutory provisions. |

Source: KEPPRES No. 20 of 2020 and PERPRES NO. 121/2022

The two organizations have different membership structures but the tasks are in sync. It is hoped that the two stakeholders will not overlap in carrying out their duties because it will have a counter-productive impact and the results will be less than optimal. In PERPRES NO. 121/2022 regarding BP3OKP there is no clause stating that the Integrated Coordinating Team ends its duties with the formation of this Agency.

One of the concerns during the 20 years of implementing the Special Autonomy Law is that there are still security disturbances by the Papuan Armed Separatist Group. The intensity of the Papuan separatist conflict which tends to increase shows that the Special Autonomy policy for resolving the Papuan conflict is ineffective (LIPI, 2021). The Commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General TNI Andika, stated that there was overlap in the

implementation of operations in Papua and that it was immediately corrected so that all of them were in a single command unit. The TNI uses a new approach in tackling security disturbances in Papua, namely through a territorial approach and a social approach (Andika, 2021). The government has decided that the settlement of the Papua problem will be carried out through a welfare development approach. The TNI is ready to support government policies in developing welfare in Papua (Andika, 2022).

If we look at the organizational structure of BP3OKP, which only involves three ministries, namely the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Ministry of National Development Planning/Bappenas, the Ministry of Finance and representatives from each province, the tasks and challenges in accelerating welfare development in Papua are very heavy, including in coordinating security issues. What's more, the Government recently formed four new provinces, three new provinces which are divisions of West Papua Province through Law Number 14 of 2022 concerning the Formation of South Papua Province, Law Number 15 of 2022 concerning the Formation of Central Papua Province, and Law Number 16 2022 concerning the Formation of the Papua Mountains Province. Meanwhile, one new province is the result of division from West Papua Province, namely Southwest Papua Province, whose bill has just been passed into law on the Seventeenth of November 2022.

Many parties are pessimistic about the existence of BP3OKP (Yorrys, 2022). This agency reminds that the Unit that was created by UP4B has a similar goal, namely its essence as an effort to communicate and accelerate development in Papua. UP4B is considered ineffective, because it does not touch the roots of Papua's problems, the same is the case with BP3OKP which is considered not to touch the roots of Papua's problems. This is in line with what was conveyed by LIPI that the continuation of the implementation of Special Autonomy is not easy, because the substance of Special Autonomy in Law No. 2 of 2021 has not touched on what is at the root of Papua's problems (LIPI, 2021). According to LIPI, the four roots of the problem are development failure, marginalization and discrimination of indigenous Papuans, state violence and accusations of human rights violations, as well as the history and political status of the Papua region (LIPI, 2008). Viewing Papua holistically, integrally and comprehensively would be better, than looking at Papua only from its skin only for political interests and even for ceremonial purposes (Asaribab, 2020).

In order for the program to accelerate welfare development in Papua to be achieved immediately, it is necessary to continue the Trikora spirit by mobilizing all available national resources and one command to unite all forms of effort to create a safe, peaceful and prosperous and independent Papua. BP3OKP needs to involve all available national resources, because the problems in Papua are not only concerned with the development of physical infrastructure, governance and finance, but also cultural readiness which in fact always becomes psychological obstacles in responding to various problems. BP3OKP requires a bottom-up strategy in gathering information about how the community responds to existing problems and the acceleration of development they feel.

On the other hand, security disturbances still occur in several areas in Papua, and efforts to resolve them have consequences for the community who continue to question the violence that occurred and allegations of human rights violations. In other words, accelerated development is not correlated effectively and is relevant and efficient in society, especially at

the grassroots level. Therefore, it is necessary to reconsider the BP3OKP work design so that it involves all national resources which include elements of the Political, Legal and Security Affairs including OAP elements, not only that each province appoints one person as in the existing Decree, but also involves the role of people's representatives in Central and Regional, MRP and indigenous peoples in the process.

## Conclusion

From the description and review that has been described above, it can be concluded as follows; the process of accelerating welfare development in Papua cannot be carried out by only certain nomenclature, but must also involve all national resources as was done during Trikora to seize West Irian. In addition, so that the implementation does not appear to overlap, all of the nomenclature is under a single command unit. If in the past it was done to seize West Irian, now it is to win the hearts and sympathy of the Papuan people so that they can create a safe, peaceful and prosperous and independent Papua.

From the problems that exist with the not yet optimal implementation of Otsus in Papua, it is suggested that all potential national resources are involved to address existing problems, including the root causes of Papua's problems. The complexity and severity of challenges to implementing Otsus in Papua must begin with the determination and courage of all parties to act "out of the box", not only normative in developing Papua. Therefore, in order to avoid overlapping in the implementation of Otsus and the command unit, it is necessary to clarify the continuation of the Papua Integrated Coordinating Team so that it does not overlap with the tasks carried out by BP3OKP. BP3OKP membership apart from the existing elements, needs to be expanded to involve elements of the Political, Legal and Security Affairs as well as indigenous peoples.

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