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Soft Security Crises in Egyptian Foreign Policy

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List of Abbreviations

AKP   Justice and Development Party

       Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi

AL   Arab League

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

AU   African Union

AUC   The American University in Cairo

BRICS   Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

      The five emerging economies

CAMRE   Council of Arab Ministers Responsible for the

      Environment

CFA   Cooperative Framework Agreement

COMESA   Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

ECFA   Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs

ERTU   Egyptian Radio and Television Union

ESCWA United Nations Economic and Social Commission for

      Western Asia

EU   European Union

FAO   Food and Agriculture Organisation

FDI   Foreign Direct Investment

FPA   Foreign Policy Analysis

FP   Foreign Policy

FPDM   Foreign Policy Decision Making

FJP   Freedom and Justice Party

            Hizb Al Adala we Al Tanmiya

GCC   Gulf Cooperation Council

GDP   Gross Domestic Product

GERD   Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam

GOE   Government Of Egypt

ICJ   International Court of Justice

ILO   International Labour Organisation

INGO   International Non-Governmental Organisation

IMF   International Monetary Fund

IOM   International Organisation for Migration

IR   International Relations

IS   Islamic State

ISIS   Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

KDP   Khartoum Declaration of Principles

LAS   League of Arab States

MB   Muslim Brotherhood

MENA   Middle East and North Africa

MOFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOSS   Ministry of Social Solidarity

MOU   Memorandum Of Understanding

MP   Members of Parliament

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NBI   Nile Basin Initiative

NCCPIM National Coordinating Committee on Combating and

      Preventing Illegal Migration

NDP   National Democratic Party

      Al Hizb Al Watani Al Democraty

NGO   Non-Governmental Organisation

NSC   National Syrian Coalition

NWRP National Water Resource Plan

OAU   Organisation of African Unity

RCC   Revolutionary Command Council

RDP   Reform and Development Party

      Hizb Al Islah we Al Tanmiya

SCAF   Supreme Council of Armed Forces

ST   Securitisation Theory

TV   Television

UAE   United Arab Emirates

UAR   United Arab Republic

UK   United Kingdom

UN   United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNGA United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency

      Fund

UNSC United Nations Security Council

USA   United States of America

US   United States

USSR   United Soviet Socialist Republic

WB   World Bank

WHO World Health Organisation

WFP World Food Programme

Acknowledgement

Declaration

I declare that I am the author of this thesis and that, unless otherwise stated, all references cited here have been consulted by me. The work of which the thesis is a record that has been done by me and it has not been previously accepted for a higher degree.

Aida Abd El Rehim

Abstract

This thesis is an exploration of soft security crises in Egyptian foreign policy. The time frame for this dissertation is between 2011 until 2018. The argument through this dissertation is that soft security issues, such as water and migrants' problems, can *indirectly* lead to overthrowing leaders and to regime change. Thus, in order to establish their rule during transitional times, leaders frame crises in soft security domains that they then resolve to further consolidate their power. The two cases used illustrate how rational leaders take on such a risk (generating a soft security crisis) to gain further support for their rule. These two cases have been under-researched in Egypt post the Arab Spring. Therefore, the main research question is: *How does Egypt manage and resolve its soft security crises*? In addition, sub-questions include: how soft security crises are constructed/interpreted? Which actors are involved in addressing soft security crises? What are the intersections between domestic and foreign policies in addressing soft security crises? What impact does soft security have? In order to answer these questions, I use the Securitisation Theory (ST) alongside the Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) approach centred on the presidential leadership style. I argue that, as Securitisation Theory helps us understand the process, it does not always explain leader's underlying motivations behind the process or the behaviour of different administrations facing the same situations. On the other hand, FPDM, when centred on leaders, can explain the decision-making processes and actions. However, FPDM does not explain how issues become constructed as threats in the first place nor why they were accepted as such. Hence, I parallel the application of both ST with FDPM to give an answer to the thesis question as two distinct theories. The methodology used in this dissertation is document analysis extracted from both local and international newspapers to analyse officials' speeches. Reference and analysis are also made with reports published by international organisations. This is in addition to investigating the Egyptian presidents' and key officials' speeches and interviews available on YouTube. Besides conducting interviews with Syrian refugees and migrants in Egypt, in addition to MPs and lawyers. The thesis is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. In the conclusion, the argument is made that soft security threats can be abused by policymakers in transitional times to frame crises while these policymakers act as the same key players in resolving the same crises in order to establish and solidify their rule. The findings show that

decision-makers use both soft and hard measures to manage and resolve these crises and show that the FPDM explains the leadership style in Egypt.

Key words: Soft security threats, water, refugees, migrants, securitisation, de-securitisation.

Chapter One

Introduction

The Arab Spring (2011) brought massive attention to this part of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. After the Arab Spring, extensive research conducted on this region covered issues relating to democracy, its challenges and its future in the region generally and in Egypt in particular (Teti and Gervasio 2012; Brown 2012; Greenwood and Weaver 2013; Pratt and Rezk 2019; and Smith and Hartshorn 2020). Also, as a result of the sudden migration waves to Europe in 2015, as a result of the intensity of the civil war in Syria, thorough research covered the impact of migration after the Arab Spring on the European states as host nations. In addition, further research covered the challenges facing Egypt politically and economically and human rights violations in Egypt post the 30th of June, 2013, events that led to a regime change in Egypt. Despite these well-covered research topics, I argue that Egypt is facing other challenges that need more scholarly attention such as its water issues and the Syrian refugees; such non-traditional security threats have been treated as to add more challenges to the Egyptian decision-makers both domestically and externally, hence became the case studies to be investigated in this dissertation.

These two issues in particular emerged to become visible crises on Egypt's foreign policy agendas after the Arab revolts; however, I contend that such crises are created by the statesmen who also worked on resolving them. I find that there is a link between both case studies due to the timing in which they took place. Both water issues [represented in the Nile crisis resulting from the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD)], and migration issues are rising challenges in the new millennium as a result of climate change; thus they are urgent soft security issues to understand and investigate.

Personally, as an Egyptian, I have always believed that Cairo's beauty is crowned by two main things: The Nile and the diversity of Cairo residents. Thus, I was inspired to conduct research on two case studies that are closely related to my own experiences and identity. Additionally, building on the argument made by Middle Eastern scholars such as the work of Korany and Dessouki (2008) and Hinnebusch (2015) that most of the Middle Eastern leaders use foreign policy to gain legitimacy, I argue that in order to establish their rule during transitional times, the Egyptian leaders trigger foreign policy crises over soft security issues before they resolve them to further consolidate their power. This chapter starts by explaining what this research is about and highlights its importance. Then, I clarify the rationale behind choosing these two empirical studies. I also provide a summary of the analytical approach used in this thesis which is followed by my research design and thesis structure.

1.1 What This Thesis Is about and Its Importance

This thesis examines soft security threats in Egypt and how they influenced Egypt's foreign policy. This thesis is discussing a foreign policy issue not domestic security politics as the threatening issues originated outside Egypt. This dissertation underscores the role of non-traditional security threats in provoking foreign policy crises. Soft security threats are the same term as non-traditional security threats and the terms will be used interchangeably in this thesis. Soft security threats are defined as threats created by unconventional sources that affect the safety and well-being of people and could be contained by both soft and/or hard methods (Swanström 2010). This thesis also emphasises the leaders' role in creating crises and in resolving them as well.

This work investigates which actors instigate foreign policy *crises* that stem from soft security issues and it explores the reasons behind the leaders' approaches to resolving these

crises as their specific perceptions and actions are important. Moreover, it demonstrates how, in times of transition, leaders may provoke a crisis to consolidate their rule and then they resolve the crisis to justify staying in power. This research contributes to the literature on Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Global South which is understudied. It shows Egypt's behaviour in responding to soft security threats, which could help to act as a model to other countries in the region. In reviewing the literature, it was found that water, refugees, and migrants could be *securitised*; however, there is an academic gap regarding the explanation for any of the securitisation processes and how they are resolved by the same securitising actor. Thus, Securitisation Theory (ST) will be employed in this thesis as an analytical framework. Also, by using a Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) approach, focused on leaders, this research provides a deeper understanding of the securitisation moves, an assessment of the success or failure of these securitisation attempts, the role of the public audience in the success or failure of these processes and the role of securitising actor(s) in framing and managing such a crisis. The leaders' motivations to frame certain issues as crises, and consequently securitising them, along with how particular leaders shaped these securitsation processes are presented in this thesis. This connection between the Securitisation Theory and FPDM is a novel approach to understanding the dynamics of securitisation between the years 2011 and 2018, which is the period after the Arab Spring when Egypt experienced different administrations, which at the same time, exhibiting a similar leader-staff leadership style.

1.2 Main Research Question and Argument

1.2.1. The Research Question

I raise these questions using the fact that the world closely and attentively followed the dynamics and changes occurring in the Arab Spring countries, with Egypt in particular as a key state. Addressing soft security issues is in line with the new changes that were hoped to happen in this region by the citizens after the Arab Spring as well as their status as new challenges in the widened international security agenda (Buzan et al.1998). The main research question is: *How does Egypt manage and resolve its soft security crises*?

In addition, sub-questions are:

a- how soft security crises are constructed/interpreted as securitised issues?

b- Which actors are involved in addressing soft security crises?

c- What are the intersections between domestic and foreign policies in addressing soft security crises?

d-What impact soft security crises have?

1.2.2. The Central Argument

My argument throughout this dissertation is that soft security issues, such as water, refugees and migrants' problems, can be abused by policymakers in transitional times to frame foreign policy crises through securitisation moves - while these policymakers act as the same key players in resolving the same crises in order to establish and solidify their rule. This is based on the assumption that soft security threats could *indirectly* lead to overthrowing leaders and to regime change. This assumption will be showcased in the case studies in chapters five and six. Also, the two cases used in this dissertation illustrate how rational state leaders take on such a risk (i.e., the risk of generating a soft security crisis) to gain further support for their rule. Water was an indirect factor in overthrowing Mubarak in

2011; a manifestation of his failure to resolve the Nile crisis is covered in the first case study. The Nile crisis triggered by a dispute between riparian states as a result of the Entebbe Agreement in 2010 which later led to the construction of the GERD in 2011 which threaten the amount of water flows to downstream states including Egypt. I also look at the Nile crisis across multiple administrations after Mubarak, to examine how each one securitised it and their efforts to resolve it. I argue that Morsi's administration also failed in resolving the Nile crisis and it was among the reasons for his removal from office in 2013, as he made several statements that hindered the negotiations process and no solution was reached. On the other hand, the issue of refugees and migrants is a debatable topic in Western European host states and a salient electoral issue. Refugees and migrants become a pressing issue to Western governments when they have a small capacity and limited resources to accept them, and they face resistance from rising right wing parties. Henceforth, the literature mainly focuses on Europe and the West and very few discussed Egypt, so I wanted to bring in some further attention to Egypt. Thus, Syrian refugees and migrants are the second case study to be investigated in this dissertation.

Egypt has been considered, by many migration studies scholars (Seeberg 2013, Osman et al 2016, and Tsourapas, 2018), as a *sending* country; but it could also be considered as a *host* state for its neighbours. By 2011, and due to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the influx of Syrians into Egypt increased. There were many reasons for Syrians to choose Egypt as their destination, such as the mostly shared and relatively similar language, religion and traditions. Notably, the Egyptian response to the Syrian crisis has varied with the variation of the leader in power. As a result, this led to a securitisation of those refugees and migrants. The argument is that the leaders of the *transit* states, which became the *host* states

experience considerable turmoil, and thus deal with the refugees and the migrants as an economic, societal and a political threat.

These two soft security crises have both domestic and foreign policy implications. The relationship between Egypt and foreign governments is central to the basis of security and development in these cases. Leaders, as the decision-makers in foreign policy, use their persuasive skills to resolve these soft security threats, which was evident when Egypt succeeded with its European Union (EU) partners to cooperate in combating illegal migration in 2016 with other partners such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and some United Nations (UN) agencies. Another component of the argument is that within the securitisation moves, the responses of leaders do not need to be exceptional measures such as violent or aggressive actions; instead, negotiations, diplomacy and a variety of other policy tools are also accepted responses after a successful securitisation process. Other Securitisation Theory scholars have made the point that exceptional measures cover a wide range of actions, such as the work done by Floyd (2017). In the case of the Syrian refugees and migrants, the exceptional measures used were threats to use violence against any Syrian supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, which was broadcasted on Egyptian media outlets in 2013 as well as the detention and deportation of some Syrians.

1.3. Summary of the Analytical Approach

In this thesis, I use Securitisation Theory (ST) alongside the Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) approach centred on the presidential leadership style. I argue that as Securitisation Theory helps us understand the process of an issue being securitised (of high political importance), it does not always explain the motivation behind the process or the behaviour of different administrations facing the same situations. FPDM centred on leaders can explain the decision-making process and actions, but not how issues become

constructed as threats in the first place nor why they were accepted as such. Nevertheless, FPDM offers a more holistic explanation to what is happening and it complements ST in a way that brings more explanatory power to the main questions. The application of these two theories is novel concerning the study of Egypt's soft security crises. Below, I provide a brief overview of each section with further details illustrated in the following chapters.

1.3.1. Securitisation Theory

 In this dissertation, I employ Securitisation Theory as a major component of the analytical framework. Securitisation Theory is the product of the Copenhagen School developed by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute in the 1990s (Stritzel 2014, p. 11). ST argues that security threats are socially constructed in the process of *securitisation*. In ST, an issue is "presented" as a "security" threat (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 24). Zürn (2016, p.166) said an issue is politicised if it became heavily discussed and contested by various actors. Zürn (2016, p.166) further elaborated that politicisation consists of three main components; polarisation in opinion, salience of European governance and expansion among actors and audiences. Meanwhile ST components rest mainly on 'speech acts' in the Copenhagen School, by the securitising actor(s) concerned with a specific issue that becomes known as the 'referent object'. The referent object is "existentially threatened" and has to survive (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 36) which justifies the use of exceptional measures. This referent object is underscored as a national security issue of a "supreme priority" according to the actor (Stritzel 2014, p. 15). For instance, the referent object could be the sovereignty of a state, an ideology or identity or a symbol which is not merely related to military fears but also include political, environmental, economic and societal fears. Hence, they are securitised by the securitising actors who construct them. The securitising actor views a threat subjectively in ST. The securitising

actors can heads of states, political leaders and elites, bureaucracies, opposition and pressure groups of a country (Buzan et al 1998, p. 146). Henceforth, the securitising agent/actor plays a vital role in shaping issues and how they reflect on and present these issues to the audience who must accept or decline the securitisation move. According to the ST based on the Copenhagen School, the securitising actors use specific discourse to securitise a referent object thus "the way to study securitisation is to study discourse and political constellations" (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 25). Therefore, studying speeches made by leaders during specific occasions matters as these speeches underscore the importance of a referent object by the usage of special discourse. I believe that the timing and the choice of the occasion, as well as the content of the message like mentioning the word security in a speech, play an important role in delivering the message that the leaders want. There are other incidents where speeches are not used and instead *practices* are being carried out to manifest securitisation. This is the second school in Securitisation Theory known as the Paris School relying on actions taken by specific governmental institutions. In this dissertation, an analysis of some of the speeches made by the political elites is provided as evidence for the securitisation process and tracing actions made by governmental authorities to showcase securitisation. Further elaboration on ST is provided in Chapter Three (under section 3.2).

1.3.2. Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) is at the core of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). It is an approach that demonstrates the role and the importance of the decision-makers and how and why they matter (Mintz and DeRouen 2010). Moreover, FPDM pays attention to the individuals' behaviour as decision-makers. While ST helps identify the actors and understand the elevation of issues to the security domain within the securitisation process,

FPDM helps locate their authority within the (Egyptian) system, particularly as the formal

institutional arrangements give the president considerable scope to arrange his decision-

making process as he sees fit. FPDM also helps to explain the leaders' choices during any

exceptional circumstances surrounding them. Dorani (2019) illustrated that FPDM has three

determinants that mainly focus on the actors. These determinants are the actors'

motivations, communication during the decision-making process and the actors'

competence. Thus, FPDM is helpful in this dissertation as it explains actors'

communication, reaction, the inputs and outputs in times of crisis. This approach is utilized

in this dissertation by complementing it with ST. The contribution of this dissertation is

represented in applying FPDM to soft security threats that triggered crises in Egypt as a

non-European state since the literature focused on this side of the world is richer in

studying hard security threats. Many scholars studied Egypt's foreign policy challenges by

focusing on the 1956 Suez crisis, the Yemen war, and 1967 June war (Dawisha 1975, 1976;

Korany 1986; Korany and Dessouki 2008; Ferris 2013). As such, this thesis adds to the

literature of FPA in the developing world.

In the Middle East, the presidents of the republics are the main decision-makers in both

domestic and foreign affairs. Leaders of non-democratic states are heavily involved in

foreign policy decision making because part of their legitimacy comes from their

performance on these issues (Hinnebusch 2015, p.78). In Egypt, as explained in Chapter

Four (section 4.2), Nasser was successful in making it a regional hegemon as a result of

Egypt's active foreign policy role in the region which in turn gave Nasser a solid domestic

credibility and popularity. Thus, foreign policy matters became a critical issue to

subsequent Egyptian leaders. As I argue soft security threats stemming from external

sources have an indirect impact on overthrowing leaders, which is demonstrated in my

empirical cases. Hermann and Hermann (1989) divided leaders to either sensitive or insensitive in making their decisions, while Kaarbo (1997) added that they could also be divided into goal-oriented leaders or unmotivated ones. This thesis classifies Egyptian leaders post- Arab Spring, using these categories, as per their foreign policy decisions.

1.4 Research Design

1.4.1. Theoretical Framework

This research is constructed to be a qualitative analysis as it is concerned with understanding the leaders' role as the main decision makers on domestic and foreign policy issues, on one hand, and the securitising actor by the speeches and practices they give, on the other hand. As a result, the theoretical framework in this thesis is paralleling both the Securitisation Theory and the Foreign Policy Decision Making approach because they are connected in several points. Both ST and FPDM, focus on humans as securitising actors, decision makers, public and/or audience as the unit of analysis. Moreover, ST and FPDM complement each other because ST is not a causal theory while FPDM offers this needed causality. This will be further elaborated upon in Chapter Three.

1.4.2. Methodology

This section provides a brief overview of the methodology and a fully developed one is developed in chapter three. Since speeches are an important element in Securitisation Theory whereby a referent object is securitised, I am using document analysis as my primary research method for this dissertation. I analysed newspapers and the speeches given by officials in order to identify elements of the securitisation process. Since I am also using FPDM as an analytical approach, I used two case studies to represent Egypt's external relations with two different countries; Ethiopia and Syria to show variation. Data

are collected in two languages, Arabic and English, and are extracted from local and

international newspapers. The local newspapers represent the mainstream and the semi-

independent outlets, however the media is not totally free in Egypt, as the owners (usually

businessmen) and journalists are closely watched over by the Egyptian government. I am

also referring to and analysing reports published by the United Nations High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank (WB) and the International Organisation for

Migration (IOM) to get more exact figures; this is in addition to investigating the

presidents' and key officials' speeches and interviews from videos available on YouTube

for the period 2011- 2018. I am also including my semi-structured interviews with two

members in the Egyptian parliament, two lawyers and some Syrian refugees as well as

economic migrants living in Egypt.

1.5. The Rationale for Case Selection

This thesis has two empirical cases which are the Nile crisis resulting from the construction

of the GERD and the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis resulting from the massive flows

due to the Syrian civil-war. The cases selected are well-suited to investigating the main

research question and sub- research questions.

Water disputes between states in the Middle East such as Jordan and Israel, Palestine and

Israel, Turkey and Syria and Turkey and Iraq (Zeitoun 2008) have been previously

investigated. Unfortunately, water problems will become more common in the coming

years due to climate change as Messay (2020) explained. The way the Nile crisis was

triggered and is still being resolved by Egypt's decision makers under a transitional

juncture shows how a soft security threat becomes vital for rulers to consolidate their

power. The approach to managing and resolving this crisis will have "big implications for future conflicts over water sources" as Goldberg (2020) emphasised. The Nile is an existential issue for Egypt's past, present and future; hence, became my interest to investigate this crisis.

As a result of the Arab Spring, waves of refugees and migrants were expected and also climate change is expected to play a role in forced migration in the Global South as Brown and Crawford (2009); Piguet et al. (2011); and McAdam (2012) have all argued. By 2015, a big wave of refugees and migrants flowed to Europe crossing the Mediterranean Sea as a result of the Syrian civil war, which has led to extensive research but mostly from the Western host states' perspectives and their implications on the Western host society. This dissertation aims to investigate how these migrants and refugees have been used by the transit societies and demonstrate the implications of the migrants and refugees on this country; Egypt, which arguably have the same culture and language. In this thesis, two different administrations, who had different perceptions on these refugees and migrants because of the leader in power, are explored in order to show *how* leaders matter, particularly in terms of their ability to securitise issues imposing their perceptions and preferences on the decision-making process during turbulent times. Presidents in the Global South remain pivotal for their respective country's stability as Hilal (2021) said. This thesis demonstrates the points of difference and points of intersection with these Syrian refugees and migrants that led one president to politicise them and the other one to securitise them.

These two case studies, I have, chosen because they represent clear non-military threats to the state's regime. They both occurred after the Arab Spring. They also represent an economic threat as they are an obstacle to the developmental agenda of the country. This has been viewed by policy makers as a threat as the essence of the revolts of the Arab

Spring was the lack of development for many years in Egypt. Thus, policy makers saw in working on developing the country, and overcoming its economic challenges would lead to political and the regime's stability. These two cases were linked by the new regimes to represent a direct threat to the economy, the symbol as well as the identity of the Egyptian society. In addition, they were threats to the political stability of the newly installed regime(s). Both case studies could be considered as non-military/soft security issues that have become of profound importance to the Egyptian decision makers post-2011. The two cases do not represent cross-border rivalries over what are considered to be traditional/military issues such as occupation; rather they represent beyond borders rivalry on soft issues such as water, refugees and migrants that have caused tensions between Egypt and its neighbours in Africa and the Arab world; that is, Ethiopia and Syria, respectively. These cases are under-researched in the literature especially via applying two theories as Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making.

1.6. Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. The second and third chapters provide the literature review and the theoretical framework. The first chapter is the introduction then the second chapter defines the concept of crisis generally and in foreign policy particularly, as well as offering an understanding of crisis management. This is followed by a critique on the term crisis. Most of the literature investigated on the Middle East analysed hard security crises that led to wars; thus, the contribution of this study would bring more focus on soft security crises. Therefore, I define soft security issues, their threats and the crises triggered as a result. The gap I found in the literature on Egypt is that *soft* security threats are under-investigated in the Arab region and in Egypt in particular soft

security threats are labelled by decision-makers as *crises*. Hence, I thought of highlighting this concept by adding it to the literature as well as showing this distinction between soft and hard security threats.

The third chapter explores the theoretical framework utilized and the methodology. I start by explaining Foreign Policy Analysis then I narrow down the investigation to focus on Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM). FPDM provides an explanation of the role of actors involved in the decision-making process generally and in crisis times. This is followed by exploring ST. I search for the common points between both theories as one theory (ST) leads to crises while the other (FPDM) explains how leaders resolve and manage these crises; moreover, FPDM helps in understanding the securitisation process.

The fourth chapter examines Egypt's foreign policy and starts by presenting a critique of previous studies of foreign policy decision making in Egypt. The literature on Egypt's foreign policy focuses mainly on the psychological and bureaucratic analyses. In military-ruled countries, individual leaders arguably matter even more than they do in democracies because they are the main decision-makers when it comes to domestic and the foreign policies. In this chapter, I also explore how each Egyptian president, since the republic was founded in 1950s, ruled the country and their style of governance. This is followed by focusing on the post-2011 presidencies. A discussion of the role of identity in influencing the leaders' foreign policy decisions is made which, consequently, emphasises on how leaders in the empirical chapters have created crises out of soft security threats such as the Nile and the Syrian refugees and migrants' issues that were linked to identity during a specific context.

The fifth chapter discusses the first case study; that is, the Nile crisis. A discussion of the importance of the Nile to Egyptians and their rulers is followed by how each leader

perceived the Nile. A consensus is established that all leaders considered the Nile as an

important political issue that falls within the domain of *high* politics before the Arab

Spring. However, it became securitised after the Arab Spring revolts because the Nile

waters were threatened by the construction of the GERD. As a result, the Nile became

recognized by Egyptian leaders as a symbol for their African identity and the vein of life for

Egypt that must be protected. Moreover, the leaders have not securitised the Nile until

Mubarak was overthrown and new consecutive leaders came to power as a result of the new

threat posed by Ethiopia in constructing the GERD; thus, a literature on securitising water

is offered and followed by how Egypt's leaders post-2011 wanted to install their rule and

saw in the Nile crisis an opportunity for that. I explore how each administration has

triggered the Nile crisis and the efforts that each attempted in order to resolve and manage

the crisis. I showcase each administration's efforts on both the domestic and the foreign

levels to show the role played by the staff surrounding the president in securitising the Nile

waters. The leaders-staff style of governance is clear in the reports the staff published and

how the president makes his decisions accordingly, this verifies how crises reset the

decision-making apparatuses by involving new actors in the crisis management. Finally, the

chapter ends by remarking that although there is tension between both Egypt and Ethiopia,

both countries did not go to war as both states resorted to diplomacy rather than aggressive

measures until the time of writing which has not witnessed a solution to the crisis. I argue

that although the decision-makers in Egypt securitised the Nile water in their statements to

make it 'supreme priority' politics, and a security issue, they preferred to manage this crisis

with peaceful rather than violent measures due to many reasons that are discussed in details

in the chapter.

The sixth chapter examines the second case study; that is, the Syrian refugees and economic migrants in Egypt. This chapter presents the literature on migrants and how they are securitised in the host Global North states. This literature does not explore how these refugees and migrants represent a threat to the transit states or to the host states in the South Global states, which constructs a gap in this literature. Therefore, I expand on how these Syrian refugees and migrants are abused to foster support for one administration (Morsi's) and then a threat to the political, economic and social stability of Egypt under another administration (Sisi's). After the 2011 uprisings, each newly installed administration used these Syrian refugees and migrants for their own benefit. The leaders of Egypt used identity and ideology to either politicise or securitise the Syrian refugees and migrants as either a threat or an asset. I also explain how Egypt, which has always been labelled as a *sending* state by the Western host states, has transformed to be both a transit and a new host state in the southern part of the globe. Then, I discuss the status of the Syrians in Egypt generally and under each administration since 2011 to demonstrate how this has reflected on Egypt's relations with the Syrian regime. Moreover, the role of the securitising actors is explored to assess the success or failure of the securitising move on the audience (the people and some government institutions). Furthermore, this chapter investigates how this crisis has guided the cooperation between Egypt and the European Union (EU) to contain illegal migration as a way of managing this Syrian crisis in Egypt. This chapter also highlights the leader's importance in constructing the refugees and migrants as either *brothers* or *enemies* to politicise, securitise or de-securitise them which swayed public opinion as well as influenced the Egyptian-Syrian relations. I show that in resolving this soft security crisis, Sisi's administration used both soft measures such as visa non-renewal and hard measures

such as detention and deportation to contain the crisis with the aim of stabilising the regime in power.

Finally, I offer a new topic by underscoring the non-military/soft security threats and their role in causing foreign policy crises between states during times of transition. The conclusion begins by presenting the aims and the contribution of this thesis which is followed by reviewing the findings of the empirical studies. These soft security issues matter on the political agendas as they can indirectly lead to overthrowing leaders. Consequently, soft security threats can be abused by policymakers in transitional times to frame crises while these policymakers act as the same key players in resolving the same crises in order to establish and solidify their rule. The decision-makers use both soft and hard measures to manage and resolve these crises and the FPDM approach explains the leadership style in Egypt. Also, I review the challenges I faced while conducting this research such as the inability to conduct interviews with officials, limited access to documents, no direct clear statements by Sisi on Syrians to securitise them and no evidence from parliamentary minutes especially in Morsi's period and the outbreak of the global pandemic Covid19. Lastly, the chapter ends with the future research I would like to conduct related to this topic.

Chapter Two

Literature on Crises and Soft Security

Introduction

This chapter is comprised of two main parts. First is the literature review involving two main sections: defining crisis and crisis management. This is followed by defining and exploring the concept of foreign policy crisis. The second part highlights the difference between soft and hard security threats with an emphasis on Egypt's situation. This section provides a definition of soft security threats as threats falling outside the military domain and examples of the soft security threats that some countries have faced. The chapter underscores that the concept of threat is an important part of the definition of crisis. Threats could be putting values, structures and/or political regimes under danger. Moreover, this chapter explains that leaders manipulate national interests and that crises are a product of decision-makers and their own perceptions. This point, that statesmen's fears of change in the status quo is what drives them to call a situation a crisis or not, is at the essence of the argument in this dissertation. In this chapter differentiating between crises will be provided, demonstrating that not all crises lead to wars as illustrated in the case studies. In the post-Cold War world, the emphasis on non-military security threats has widened states' security agendas. Thus, an exploration of the meaning of soft security threats will be given and used interchangeably with non-military security threats provided in the second part.

2.1 Literature Review

This section reviews key concepts in the relevant literature. It focuses mainly on soft security crises including their construction and decision-making, and the intersection between domestic and foreign policy. It aims at identifying how others have attempted to address these or similar/comparable questions, and evaluate their contribution to the literature while determining what gaps remain.

The literature reviewed on crisis and crisis management in relation to foreign policy foregrounds mainly focuses on hard crises that are resolved by force; war. More specifically, as the focus of this thesis is Egypt in the context of the Middle East and the

Arab world, the literature review covers mainly military conflicts. This part will be divided as follows: the definition of crisis and crisis management and then an exploration of foreign policy crisis.

2.1.1 Defining Crisis and Crisis Management

This section provides a definition of the terms crisis, crisis management, and foreign policy crisis. Understanding these terms will help in connecting them to the main question of this study. I provide the definitions and analysis of these terms as well as the arguments for and against them. The result of this investigation shows that a crisis can be experienced by both humans and states. However, in the field of Politics the literature is mainly focused on state crises and predominantly hard security issues. Unlike soft security crises, hard security crises lead to the use of force and war. Accordingly, they differ in length, nature, causes as well as solutions.

2.1.1.1 The Definition of Crisis

A crisis can be experienced by individuals or entire states. Whilst the definition of crisis itself gives it a comprehensive meaning, Thomas Milburn cited by Hermann (1972, p.259) elaborated that *crisis* as a word is wide-ranging and not only confined to politics but includes business, families, individuals and universities. All these areas in life and entities are prone to crises. Crisis experienced at the state level is characterised by its impact on the political, economic or security sectors (Brecher 1993, p.1). Crises are linked to unique major events that do not commonly occur such as the 9/11 attacks in the USA (Bueger 2014, p.396). There has been a consensus among different international crisis behaviour theorists such as Maoz (1994) and Brecher (1983), that a crisis is defined as a sudden surprise, a threat, putting a state under extreme stress due to time pressure to resolve it and the risk of war. The focus on the elements of surprise, threat and extreme time pressure in defining a crisis is the result of Hermann's work which prevailed in 1960s and 1970s (Brecher 1993, p.15). I do not include the definition of the risk of war in this thesis as not all crises are resolved by wars, instead they can be resolved peacefully.

To fully understand the different characteristics, they need to be analysed separately. Roberts (1988 cited in Haney 2002, p.2 &10), Lebow (1981), Charles Hermann (1972 &

2010), and Griffiths and O'Callagham (2002) pointed to the first characteristic which is the element of *surprise*. These scholars stress that states are impacted by the element of surprise when an abrupt and uncalculated event happens. The element of surprise is seen as the *turning point* in the status-quo, resulting in a change in relations between the parties involved.

The second characteristic of a crisis is the element of *threat* which refers to jeopardising the status-quo of a state's government or stability and putting its basic values in peril. Hermann (1972), Stern (2003) and Boin et al (2009) indicated that crises act as an alarm to the values and structures of a community. Additionally, Genovese (1986) asserted that these threats represent a danger to the national interests, which are constructed and preserved by the state under crisis. National interests, I argue, can be manipulated by statesmen; this will be explored later in the theoretical framework. Henderson (2014, p.1) clarified that, in order to avert the threat urgent measures are needed to avoid the danger, which alters the status-quo as mentioned previously. Consequently, this change in the status-quo would require a change in the technique of dealing with the crisis and would create the urge to invent new solutions to solve the crisis (Henderson 2014, p.1). These threatened basic values revolve around border security, sovereignty, norms and values of a state or status in the region. Brecher (1993, p.4) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997, p.5) explained that a crisis usually has a main focal point, such as occupation, economic boycott, maltreatment of a minority group or threat to the political regime while Hermann (1972, p.23 &207) highlighted the concept of "values at stake" as a result of crisis. Hence, if any of these previously mentioned issues is threatened, it reflects on the broader image becoming a threat to the basic values of a state.

Billings et al (1980) explained that for losses to have an impact and cause concern, losses must be on a large scale and must be of great value which is the case with states' values. For example, the US values human rights greatly and sees it as linked to its national security, so it has been promoting this in its foreign policy (Lagon 2016). Therefore, when there is a violation of human rights in any country, the US becomes a defender of human rights and uses its diplomatic channels in order to curtail these violations and restore human rights (Lagon,2016). Snyder and Diesing (1977, p.11) explained that threats harm the image and reputation of a state as they test its strength and capabilities. This dissertation

discusses threats to basic norms and values, threats to political regimes, as well as identity and status in the region as represented in Egypt by the Nile crisis and the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis.

Third, all these elements combined under *extreme time pressure* make the situation more critical for the decision makers to resolve it. Hermann (1972, p.207) underscored the effect of constricted time in creating stress for leaders. Time constraint is an important factor in defining a crisis (Lebow 1981, p.12) as it plays a role in the assessment of leaders and their reaction and management of crises under unconventional circumstances. Anderson-Rodgers (2015, p.201) explained that it is the limitation of time that pressures decision makers to find a solution to the crisis in accordance with the urgency of the threat. Anderson-Rodgers (2015, p.202) demonstrated that time is extremely critical as it composes a fractional part of the meaning of crisis. Some leaders try to keep the crisis as a secret at the beginning so as not to create chaos in the country or cause the nation to become apprehensive. However, due to time pressure, it cannot remain as such (Waltz, 1979). Therefore, a crisis becomes public, and the public plays a role in creating further pressures on decision-makers to resolve the crisis quickly. How a crisis is handled plays a role in assessing decision-makers by the audience, (Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.206). Thus, due to time pressures, decision-makers must choose a quick technique to resolve the crisis (Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.202).

Finally, the last characteristic of crisis is the *risk of war* referring to the use of violence or the use of force to resolve the situation. Griffiths and O'Callagham (2002) believe that crisis is a state between war and peace. A crisis may result in war, remain as is, or if resolved, return to the old state of stability. Becher and Wilkenfeld (1997, p.7) said that all wars result from crises but not all crises lead to wars. Keller (2005, p.215) described a crisis as a "pathway to wars". Snyder and Diesing (1997, p.10) described a crisis as an "intermediate zone between peace and war". While Omer Isyar (2008) defined a crisis as a chaotic situation that results from unstable and abnormal situations. Finally, Brecher (1993, p.3) saw a crisis as a state of "turmoil" for nations as well as a "universal term for disruption and disorder in the global arena, closely related to conflict and war." In this dissertation crisis is used as to describe the status Egypt has been going through since 2011.

To conclude, in breaking down the definition of crisis into layers, the elements of surprise, threats, and time constraints are all interdependent. When a sudden threat happens to a state's core value, it creates pressure on decision-makers to resolve it in a short time. Decision-makers are required to find a rational solution in order to avoid major losses and to try to reduce the chances of going to war or using violence (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002, p.58 and Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.204). The case studies under investigation demonstrate that the two soft security issues selected presented a threat to basic values and to the people of the state. They also presented a threat to the political regimes newly installed. This makes the term crisis more subjective to the leaders of the state. This is the reason for choosing Securitisation Theory as it helps in understanding how a threat or a crisis is being constructed by decision-makers. The cases within this study had the possibility of initiating war, but at the time of writing the thesis, this has not yet happened. This is due to the leaders' choice not to use violent measures to resolve these crises under investigation. This shows the importance of using foreign policy decision making as an analytical approach as it gives an explanation for the leader's choices and management style for crises.

2.1.1.1.1 Critiquing the Definition of Crises

While the previous section offered an insight into the definition of crisis by International Relations (IR) scholars, this section shows that a crisis could be a rather subjective issue. Lebow (1981, p.7) argued that there is no consensus on the definition of crisis. This is because a crisis is viewed as a 'relative term' that is not fixed and varies from one perspective to the other and in turn has an impact on the decision-making process that is designated to resolve it, Lebow (1981, p.7 & 9). In addition, Brecher & Wilkenfeld (1997, p.3) concurred saying that decision-makers' perceptions determine whether a situation is a crisis or not based on changes in the situation, the context within which it happened, the time pressure and the chances of war erupting. A decision maker would consider a situation a crisis if the consequence would lead to the removal of them from power or threaten a national interest. Therefore, the term crisis could be considered as a 'subjective' term according to the leaders' viewpoint or the cultural interpretation of the term. I agree with

this critique as it supports my argument in this thesis that crises are created by decision-makers to serve their own interests.

Lukton (1974) further explained that it all depends on the individuals in their ability to cope with the situation for it to be called a crisis or not; this reinstates the focus on the individual level in analysing a crisis. Moreover, in defining a crisis an emphasis has been placed on the element of 'stress' which leads to 'anxiety' for decision-makers who must find a solution for that crisis. Therefore, a situation could be a crisis for one leader but not the same to another depending on leaders' self-confidence, negotiating ability, perception, and pre-existing context. Consequently, the term becomes dependent according to each leader's perception. Also, leaders could be in a sense of "denial" that there is a crisis leading them to dismiss the notion (Lukton 1974, p.385). This critique is more concerned with the cognitive and psychological approach for individuals involved in a crisis (Genovese 1986, p.302). Furthermore, a crisis might be resolved for one leader but not the other if the solution was not satisfactory for both leaders or if the solution led to loss for one of the parties. This could even lead to one retaliating. An example to illustrate is the way the 9/11 attacks led the Bush administration to attack Afghanistan. This again emphasises the role of leaders in the decision-making process under crisis and how they attempt to manipulate these situations to their advantage as according to leaders, a crisis is viewed as a win-lose situation. The empirical studies used in this thesis further reinforces the role of leaders in crisis that is linked to the theoretical framework and offer evidence to support these points from the literature.

Brecher (1993, p.17) discounted surprise from the definition of crisis because for him what matters more for decision-makers is the perception of *threat* rather than surprise. Brecher (1993, p17) further elaborated on that by giving an example of the Soviet Blockade in 1960s of Berlin which was not unanticipated by the US. However, it was rather the threat of the use of violence which mattered more than the element of surprise. I argue that surprise plays a critical role in making the choices offered to decision makers. Therefore, surprise cannot be ignored in the definition of crisis, yet it is not going to be used in my case studies because as the cases show the threat caused in both case studies was gradual in its escalation.

The concept of *threat* has also been criticized. Here, threat means the jeopardising of the basic norms and values of a state. However, Stern (2003) highlighted that the term could also mean a threat to those in power or a specific institution or a certain unit rather than to core values, sovereignty or the state's status in the region. The Middle Eastern and African states are examples that illustrate this argument. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (cited in Fawcett 2013, p.225) emphasised that decision-makers in Middle Eastern countries face threats that posit dangers to their regime's survival and which they counterbalance using national values and interests. This means that decision-makers can manipulate and abuse the term for their own interests illustrated through my empirical analysis. To conclude, a crisis could be viewed as a product of leaders of a state who frame events and turn them into crises to serve their own interests. This helps to point to a framework to answer the questions as they pertain to my specific case studies.

2.1.2 Types and Causes of Crises

2.1.2.1 Categorising Crises

This part is an overview of the typologies and categorisation of crises. Crises are classified, according to crisis behaviour analysts, based on multiple aspects among which is the time and duration of crises as well as the nature of crises ranging from hard crises to soft ones, and domestic to foreign crises. The duration of a crisis is important as it gives a better explanation of how decision-makers behave at a specific time and what their choices are in relation to crisis management techniques. The distinction between domestic and foreign policy crises is crucial in this discussion to demonstrate the causes of a crisis and whether they influence one another. Finally, it is important to understand the nature of the crisis itself and whether it is a *soft* crisis that requires the use of diplomacy and mediation or a *hard* crisis that necessitates the use of force. This helps to explain how crisis management methods used could either escalate or de-escalate the situation. The focus of the thesis will be on soft crises. A detailed section (part 2) is later dedicated to examining this distinction between hard and soft crises and what they mean.

First, *duration* is the most important factor for categorising crises (Hermann 1972, p.24, Lebow 1981, p.12, and Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, p.4). This is divided between short-term crises and prolonged crises. The short-term crisis lasts for a few days or weeks. Two

pertinent examples are the July crisis of 1914 which lasted for one month and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which lasted for thirteen days. However, this short period, decided upon by crisis analysts, also exemplifies the immense amount of pressure on the decision-makers to resolve the situation under tight time constraints. On the other hand, prolonged crises which last for months or many years lead to the intensity of the inter-wars or the severity of civil wars. For example, the Sundanese crisis broke out in 1980s which lasted until 2005 and ended with Southern Sudan forming a new state in 2011 (Momodu 2018).

Second, is the distinction between *origins* of a crisis: domestic or foreign. This can be divided into three kinds: domestic crises, foreign crises, and domestic crises causing foreign crises. The domestic crisis starts locally and leads to devastating impacts on the country. For example, the 2008 financial crisis in the US that resulted in an economic recession (Merle 2018). In addition, the second kind of crisis is one that starts as an internal affair then develops into an external crisis. There are several reasons for crises to ensue such as religious, political, economic, environmental or social causes. The most common reason is arguably the economic reason (Kanat 2014). This usually happens due to a lack of resources in one state and results in disputes with another state with the purpose of gaining access to unavailable resources. For example, the economic problems that faced Saddam Hussein of Iraq in 1990s after his costly war with Iran (Kanat 2014, p.23). These economic problems led Hussein to invade Kuwait in 1990 to gain control over the Kuwaiti oil wells as well as to solve Iraq's economic problems resulting from debts to Kuwait (Kanat 2014, p.23). Another illustration of a domestic crisis evolving into a global or foreign one is the US Great Depression of 1929. The US was adopting an isolationist attitude in its foreign affairs, but due to the economic depression, it joined the Second World War to resolve the depression and revive its economy (Romer 1992 and Higgs 1992). This is an example of a contributing factor in the US decision-making process to intervene in a pre-existing crisis to resolve an internal economic crisis. The term 'spillover' effect has often been used to describe how a domestic crisis can lead to foreign one. Thus, it can be understood that domestic crises might cause foreign crises. These could be considered as traditional causes of crises. However, non-traditional causes for domestic crises turning into a foreign crisis could be the migrant/refugee problem and the environmental disasters which fall under the category of humanitarian issues. An example is the Lampedusa crisis of 2011, when many migrants landed on this island as a result of the Arab Spring revolts and most of these

migrants where from North Africa mainly Tunisia (BBC 2011). This further demonstrates the way a domestic crisis develops into an international foreign crisis, (Jones and Shaheen 2015). Another similar example will be tackled later in length as the second empirical study in this dissertation in Chapter Six is on Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis in Egypt. Lastly, foreign crisis created between two states could be caused by a dispute over water. The literature is rich with cases like between Israel and Jordan, Turkey and Iraq and Turkey and Syria. The first empirical study explored in Chapter Five in this dissertation is an example of a water dispute through the illustration of the Egyptian-Ethiopian dispute over the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) over the River Nile.

Third, is the distinction between *soft* and *hard* crises. Most of the literature reviewed focused on hard crises (Fatcic 2002, Snow 2011, Hough et al 2011, Tir and Singh 2013, and Anderson-Rodgers 2015). Hard crises result from major events such as revolutions, aggression or terrorist attacks. For example, the Suez Crisis of 1956 was caused by a major event which was the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egyptian president Gamal Abd El Nasser in 1956 (Ezzat 2016). This move resulted in the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt by Britain, France and Israel (Ezzat 2016). Therefore, a hard crisis implies aggression and the engagement of military forces (Hough et al 2015, p.4). The Suez crisis is an example of a hard crisis as its management resulted in the use of force which is a form of hard power. However, as a result of new research in Security Studies and International Relations, soft crises have become more visible on the crisis management scene. This addition is the contribution of the scholarly work of Ullman and Mathews in the 1980's, Buzan (1998), Brauch (2010) and Swanström (2010) and is what this inspired me to do my thesis on a soft security crisis. As mentioned earlier, under the definition of crisis, it is wide-ranging and it is not only limited to politics and includes other sectors. All other sectors are not necessarily resolved by the use of force instead some are resolved by soft measures as soft crises. Furthermore, these soft crises could have various impacts such as political, economic and psychological ones on the individuals experiencing them.

Finally, Brecher (1993) gave examples of crises in politics leading to wars, such as the July Crisis of 1914 which led to World War I (WWI). He also gave an example of a crisis not leading to war, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 which was resolved by negotiations although it started with a nuclear threat, arguably the ultimate form of hard

power. Therefore, it cannot be generalised that all crises end in wars instead they could be resolved using diplomacy as is shown in the previously mentioned example; Cuban Missile crisis. In this dissertation the two empirical studies used - Nile and Syrian refugees and migrants' crises - are types of soft crises that were resolved using diplomacy.

There are also non-traditional causes to crises which places them in the category of *soft* crises. These could be refugees and migrant flows, cyber security, floods, droughts, and/or environmental disasters all of which fall under the category of humanitarian issues that create crises. There are other types of soft crises with political implications of varying durations such as financial crises and economic crises that can take seven to ten years to resolve (Reinhart and Reinhart 2018). These distinctions between crises are counted as soft crises due to the reliance on strategic planning, the use of diplomacy, and with no chance of the use of force being used to resolve these crises.

Table 1 divides crises into different categories based on their duration, origin of trigger, nature of crisis and how the crisis ended (net result). A short duration crisis' example is the Cuban Missile Crisis that lasted for 13 days where the world was under threat of a nuclear attack but it was resolved peacefully. Thus, it showcases that not all hard crises should be resolved using hard measures instead they can be resolved by diplomacy. The Cuban Missile Crisis is also an example of a foreign policy crisis. Other examples provided in the table illustrate various durations of different crises, of various natures and resolved in different ways.

Table 1 Categories of Crises

	Categorising crises	**Examples**
Duration	*Short* time period (days or weeks)	Cuban missile crisis lasted for 13 days (short) The Hundred Hours' War between El Savador &

		Honduras (14-18 July 1969).
	Prolonged time period (months or years)	Sudanese civil war prolonged crisis lasted 22 years from 1980s until 2005 and resulted in two states; Sudan and South Sudan created in 2011 Suez Crisis lasted for 8 months 1956 resulted in Tripartite Aggression and Israeli forces remained occupying Sinai while Britain and France withdrew
Origin	*Domestic* crisis	2008 USA Economic recession resulted in financial crisis
	Domestic crisis leading to *Foreign* crisis	The USA Great Depression lasted 10 years started domestically but its impact was felt elsewhere in the rest of the world.
	Foreign crisis	Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus in 1974 leading to the creation of two states of Cyprus. One state is under

		Turkey's rule and the other is part of the EU.
Nature	*Hard*	1956 Suez Crisis leading to the Tripartite Aggression on Egypt by Israel, France and Britain
	Soft	Lampedusa 2011 refugees and migrants' crisis leading to a humanitarian crisis in Europe.
Net result	*War*	July crisis of 1914 resulted in the WWI
	Diplomacy	Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 was resolved by negotiations and diplomacy

This table divides crises according to their duration, origin, nature, and the net result and provided examples to illustrates them

2.1.2.2 Construction of Crises

Crises can also ensue as a result of the decision-makers' irrationality (Boin 2008, Charles Hermann cited in Tudor 2010). Hermann (cited in Tudor 2010) added that, "role structuring" results in damaging common beliefs and values eventually leading to "violence". To elaborate, there are people involved in a crisis who are responsible for causing it due to their irrationality and prejudices. This in turn could damage agreed-upon norms, ideals and standards that should be defended. Consequently, aggression and force could be used to restore or protect these values and standards. Gilbert and Lauren (1980) explained that "bargaining" happens within the circle of the decision-making process to determine if a situation is a crisis or not and if it can be resolved or not. This illustrates that a crisis is the product of decision-makers and their own perceptions to serve their interests. An example is the Suez Crisis of 1956 and Brown (2001) explained that "powerful figures in the establishment" of decision-making in Britain could not accept that Britain was no longer a powerful hegemonic state and that explains its involvement in Suez Crisis. When

the late president of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal to finance the construction of the High Aswan Dam, Britain and France objected and decided to launch a war on Egypt. Israel joined Britain and France in what became known later as the Tripartite Aggression of 1956. The Suez Crisis broke out during the Cold-War period and both the USA & the Soviet Union interfered to end this crisis.

It is worth mentioning that investigating the pre-crisis environment is essential in understanding the causes of the crisis and reasons for its eruption, (Lebow, 1981, p.268). To further elaborate, the 1914 July crisis could be an example. When checking the environment prior to the outbreak of WWI, one could find heated tensions rising in Europe. Hence, in analysing the reasons for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand one would understand that the Serbs refused the rule of the Austro-Hungarians over Bosnia (McDermott, 2018). This happened due to a growing sense of nationalism in Europe that agitated the feelings of one nation against the other, for example the French against the Germans and the Serbs against the rule of Austro-Hungarians over Bosnia, (McDermott 2018). According to Lebow (1982, p.272), crises could be the product of internal as well as external surroundings. An example of that is the social injustices, corruption, economic strains, and lack of freedoms experienced by some Arab countries prior to 2010 such as in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen. In addition, there was also a sense of growing US interference in their state's affairs. All this resulted in the Arab Uprisings. Thus, this is a demonstration of an internal difficult environment and external surroundings which led to crises for Arab leaders who were eventually ousted in countries like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.

2.1.2.3 Challenges of Crisis

This section focuses on the challenges facing decision-makers during crises. The most critical challenge is the time constraint. Time acts as an obstacle to decision makers mainly because time pressure makes options difficult and risky to choose from as they try to decide on the one with the fewest losses. During crisis situations, there are various challenges facing decision-makers ranging from threats to important values, to challenges of thinking unconventionally, and eventually finding a solution to the problem in a very acute and finite time (Waltz cited in Osler 1985). It is because of these threats to values and norms that

standard operating procedures[1] are inadequate and new alternatives and strategies have to be explored, identified and used. However, the effectiveness of these new methods and techniques is questionable, and their cost could be considerable. This has been addressed by Billings et al (1981, p.313) as the "response uncertainty", when the response has uncertainty and whether it will be successful or not. As the decision made is going to be unconventional and action-oriented, within a very narrow time frame, time becomes the main determinant in this process as applying pressure leads to many uncertainties.

Decision-makers may feel that losses would occur if no action was taken and no "satisfactory solution" was found to the problem (Billings et al 1980, p.313-314). This leads decision-makers to view a crisis as a win-lose situation; however, it must be a 'winning' situation for them or else it could cost these decision-makers to lose their positions. This is the essence of the argument made in this thesis, that soft security crises could be an indirect reason to overthrow leaders. The individuals involved in the decision-making process differ in character. So, if that individual is confident and has self-esteem, then he/she will be more rational in making decisions, effectively respond to the crisis situation and see gains in it. However, if that individual suffers from anxiety, then he/she will worriedly look at the crisis and see a loss rather than a gain (Billings et al 1980, p.313-314 and Gallagher and Allen 2014, p.7). Brecher (1993, p.3) further clarified that the consequences of crises have an impact on all parties involved and could lead to major changes such as a change in the balance of power that could be on different levels such as the domestic or regional or global levels.

Another challenge facing decision-makers during crisis situations is accountability. Leaders under crisis situations are under pressure not only because of the situation but also as a result of being held accountable by the public (Keller 2005). This accountability varies from autocratic to democratic states. Accountability and responsibility add more burdens on the decision-makers (Üçbaş 2014). Therefore, focusing on the leader as the main decision-maker in the crisis rather than junior ones underpins the focus on the individual level in decision-making. This point will be discussed in more details under the theoretical

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[1] Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are defined as a set of written instructions that describes a step by step process to perform a routine work. In Foreign Policy Analysis SOP is adopted when analysing a foreign policy decision using organisational process model (Norwich University Online, 2017).

framework in Chapter Three. Billing et al (1980, p306) explained that, "crisis resides in the person as well as in the situation." To reinforce this idea, a large part of the literature extensively discusses crisis decision-making with the main focus on the 'psychology' of decision makers and the conditions they go through (Hermann 1972, Hollis and Smith 1986, Renshon and Renshon 2008, Ghallagher and Allen 2014, and Hinnebusch 2015). On that account, crisis behaviour theorists concentrate on individuals' psychology (Hermann, 1972, p.167). Leaders of states experiencing crises seek to use it to decrease losses, and increase gains, to protect the state's interests and "to settle the issue in conflict so that it does not produce further crises" (Snyder and Diesing, 1977, p.207). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier leaders like to maintain their legitimacy by overcoming a crisis situation which serves as another reason for sustaining the decision- makers' legitimacy internally and externally like leaders in the Middle East (Hinnebusch 2015, p.83). The ability or inability of a decision-maker to solve a crisis with the fewest losses gives or takes away much of the popularity and credit of the leader in such a critical time for the nation (Isyar 2008). This is again related to the accountability of decision-makers as well as the causes of crisis from the leader's perception. Therefore, this dissertation adopts the position that any analysis of a crisis must examine the leaders as decision-makers due to the centrality of leaders playing a key decision-making role during the crises which is important to this dissertation.

To sum up, a crisis is experienced when there is a change to the normal routine politics and there is a threat with a probability of loss of specific values, such as identity, security or territories of a state. In addition, the time constraint imposed on decision-makers for resolving the crisis leads to a more stressful situation making it difficult for decision makers to consider many choices. A crisis could be seen as a trigger that takes state's leaders and institutions by surprise and puts them under extreme stress to find a solution with the fewest losses. The leaders of the state have to make the utmost efforts to protect the state's core values while preserving their personal image by finding a resolution and avoiding resorting to violence as a last option that could lead to further losses in human lives, money and/or prestige. To demonstrate this argument, leaders' decisions will be evaluated through the analytical framework used in this dissertation. The analytical framework to be used in this dissertation is a mix of both Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making. This will be further elaborated upon in the following chapter.

2.1.3 Defining Crisis Management

This section defines the term 'crisis management' to pave the way for evaluating Egypt's management and solution of soft security crises by decision-makers. This section will explore two ways of explaining crisis management on, namely, bargaining methods and another that focuses on the decision-makers idiosyncratic approach and their behaviour and psychology. I focus on leaders as key decision-makers during crisis situations to assess their crisis management efforts between 2011 and 2018 in two soft security crises.

Crisis management, could be simply defined as controlling a crisis (Snyder and Diesing 1977, p.207, Lebow 1981, p.292, and Haney 2002). The aim of crisis management is to understand the nature of the crisis, bring the abnormal situation under control, and prevent the situation from escalating into violence or war. The purpose of crisis management is to bring the crisis situation back to a *normal* one, or a "routine situation" of normal daily affairs without causing another crisis (Snyder and Diesing 1977, p.207 and Haney 2002). Brecher (1993, p.2) distinguished between crisis management outcomes, explaining that crisis management can lead to *use of force,* for instance, UK's management of the Falklands crisis in 1982. Crisis management can also lead to an *agreement*, for instance, the case of Berlin Blockade of 1948-1949.

Another way to evaluate crisis management is through the study of tactics, mechanisms and techniques used by decision-makers in critical times (Gilbert and Lauren 1980, Haney 2002 and Anderson-Rodgers 2015). As a result, some decision-makers learn reciprocity and bargaining to reach a convenient solution for the crisis with the least losses (Kaarbo 1997, Ghallagher and Allen 2014, Anderson-Rodgers 2015). Every state carries out a cost-benefit analysis to maximise its gains and cut down on its losses. This explains the reason for the desire of states to have a "well-organized crisis management program" in order for them to win in the international arena (Isyar 2008, p.3). This will also have its consequences on state leaders' because this will determine whether they gain or lose credibility and legitimacy internally and externally. It will also show if the leader is effective in resolving crises or not, as previously discussed. Thus, the advantage of crisis management is that it helps in the assessment of the decision-makers' crisis management skills and evaluating the rationality of their choices in order to hold them accountable. Crisis management can prove to be an advantage since it acts as an experience for the decision-makers from which they

learn and mature and have a new, better vision for issues (Gilbert and Lauren 1980 and Lebow 1981, p.309).

Nevertheless, there is a weakness in the above definition of crisis management. This is illustrated in the decision-makers' behaviour in prioritising ideas, controlling the crisis and preventing escalation to war, maximising gains to the state and being positively perceived by the audience. This prioritization debate has sparked disagreement in the literature of crisis management (Gilbert and Lauren, 1980 and Lebow, 1981, p. 292). In addition, advice about crisis management is largely based on "value premises" by decision makers and the crisis group surrounding them (Gilbert and Lauren 1980). Each party in the decision-making group has their own principles, interests and traditions which they value (Allison, 1971). This underscores the role of decision makers in constructing crises to make it seem as a priority issue and their critical role in resolving them. This requires the application of both Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making as the analytical framework because both of them offer a comprehensive idea about how an issue is constructed, by who and how these actors handled these crises. Policy makers are crucial in any crisis as they are the ones who are put under extreme time constraints and have to resolve the crisis. Thus, this puts an emphasis on the role played by the decision makers in crisis management whether positively or negatively. This will help in answering the main research question on how soft security crises are managed/resolved and how crises are constructed. Consequently, decision-makers work on forming a crisis unit to discuss and find ways to resolve crisis (Hill, 2016 and Hudson, 2008 and 2019). This point will be discussed further in later part of this chapter under the section of foreign policy crisis.

It is difficult to assess which methods of crisis management are successful or a failure as these are relative concepts depending on the leader's perception and the public's assessment. Gilbert and Lauren (1980) assert that the assessment of 'good' or 'bad' practices in crisis management remains a relative concept. In addition, in crisis management, there could be good decisions followed by the intended results, however, there could also be good decisions followed by unintended bad results due to unanticipated developments. Again, this reinforces that there could be un-preferable decisions made representing the least costly option but leading to successful results. Yet again, this

highlights the relative nature of the decision-makers' assessment in terms of win-lose situation and their choices for foreign policy crisis management.

The second way in evaluating crisis management is through the bargaining technique used by states' decision makers to resolve a situation. Although the state is seen as the bargainer, there are specific group(s) designated to accomplish the bargaining mission. It is the role of the crisis management group or crisis unit to resolve the crisis quickly with the least amount of damage (Hudson 2008 and Hill 2016). If they fail to do so, the crisis could escalate from war to occupation leading to the loss of territories or a humanitarian crisis.

As previously mentioned, crisis management is risky and costly in terms of the decisions being made, but a decision is inevitable. The option of going to war due to a crisis is always reconsidered by rational actors as it is very risky and also costly in terms of human capital, budget and reputation of the decision-maker (Griffiths and O'Callaghan 2002, p.58 and Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.204). Moreover, solely focusing on a crisis can lead to the neglect of other problems and contexts that led this crisis to happen (Gilbert and Lauren 1980, p.654). A further critique is concerned with the way to judge the success or failure of a specific technique and whether it completely resolves the crisis or leads to an immediate or postponed war (Gilbert and Lauren 1980, p. 655 and 661). Immediate or postponed wars do not happen because of bad management, but for a specific action on the decision-makers' side. For example, crises could happen because of the decision-makers' insistence on escalating the situation into a war or on keeping the status quo. This is described as an initiator's desire for war to happen as reason for hostility (Lebow, 1981, p.266). All crises are relative, based on the perception of the decision-makers. The decision-makers or leaders have motivations behind going to war as with the case of Saddam Hussein's of Iraq reasons to invade Kuwait in 1990. Some crises are forced upon leaders by external forces beyond their control. Leaders' motivations and reasons for crisis creation and involvement will be explained in-depth in the later theoretical framework chapter (Chapter Three) that shows the role of leaders in constructing crises and resolving them.

There is another critique of crisis management practice by Gilbert and Lauren (1980, p.654) namely the lack in analysing the context in which the crisis happened. Examining the context and environment that led to the crisis is also important because they could provide indicators that could have predicted that a crisis could occur. An example is the observation

of the context and the environment resulting in Arab Uprisings in 2010 and 2011. It was the social injustices and high corruption rates in many Arab countries which led to the Arab upheaval. I argue that, had the ousted Arab leaders realised and taken action regarding these pre-existing conditions, they could have saved their regimes. Crisis management theory should be able to explain the fixed and changing variables out of which history and context occurred and has an influence (Gilbert and Lauren 1980, p.654). I argue that the turbulent atmosphere surrounding decision-makers post the Arab Spring played a role in driving leaders to instigate these crises. This is my contribution to the literature on crisis management in the Arab region.

2.1.4 Foreign Policy Crisis

Foreign policy crises are caused by the circumstances surrounding a state. They could be a result of internal or external factors. Foreign policy crises could lead to an alteration in foreign policy objectives and the behaviour of states. Foreign policy crises are viewed by its analysts as a test for decision-makers, citizens as well as the media. Foreign Policy analysts examines decision-makers' reactions and assesses the process of their interaction with citizens together (Stern 2003). An impact of a crisis is that "crisis reset an administration's foreign policy agenda and decision-making apparatuses" (Kennedy 2012, p.634). Prior to defining a foreign policy crisis, it is important to define foreign policy to help make the distinction between domestic policy and foreign policy crises.

In general, foreign policy is as a way of explaining the way a state and its people deal with other states and societies on regional and international levels (Holland 2001). As Holland (2001, p.50) clarified, "foreign policy remains a sufficiently engrained 'phenomenon' to be seen as a 'social fact' with significant and far-reaching implications". These implications are felt on three levels; domestic, regional and international. Studying foreign policy helps in explaining what happens within states and their relations with and behaviour towards each other in interstate relations. This is out of the belief that the international system is interconnected and interrelated. In studying foreign policy, scholars are concerned with understanding the interests and objectives of the states when dealing with other states, organisations as well as non-state entities (Mintz 2010 and Jain 2018). Yet, the foreign policy of a state is not based on fixed goals as they can change due to different preferences

at different periods of time and according to specific events that a state experiences; a crisis being one example.

It is argued that there are three types of objectives in the foreign policy of all states. First is the "core objective" which is an urgent objective that cannot be postponed and is usually found in colonised countries seeking independence and in non-colonised states to preserve their sovereignty (Jain 2018, p.164). For these core objectives to be attained, it would drive states to enhance their military capabilities and use aggression to ensure achieving its goals. In my assessment I could see this as a realist and neo-realist explanation for core objectives. Therefore, for a colonised state to achieve its main goal of independence it has to use aggressive measures to attain it as other diplomatic channels are ineffective or of slow progress and results. The second objective is the "medium objective" which is not essential to the survival of the state but is important for its performance and status in the international arena. These medium objectives entail development, trade and economic relations. This drives a state to work on increasing its network of connections with other states, institutions and organisations through which they can secure desired agreement. In my assessment I could see this as liberal and neo-liberal outcomes which encourages cooperation through trade and economic deals in attaining the medium objectives of a state. Third, another goal is the "long-term objective" which does not have a sense of urgency. An example of this type of objective is when a state tries to spread its ideology overseas. This is inspired by the Constructivist Theory that believes that ideas, norms and culture shape the states foreign policy objectives (Erbas 2022, p.5087).

When focusing on these multiple objectives it could be inferred that they all seek the interests of nations. Hence, according to Hampson (1984-1985, p. 332), "foreign policy is important as it represents national interests rather than special interests" as it voices the nation's interests. However, the concept of national interest versus special interest is refuted by constructivists who argue that interests are a more subjective matter rather than 'national' ones (Theys 2018). Thus, the special interests of statesmen prevail over national interests. Constructivists further argue that citizens and influential leaders matter domestically and on the international scene, hence they have an impact in foreign policy matters (Theys 2018). Those who are in power, constructivists argue, get to subjectively determine what is or is not in the 'national' interest often pursuing special interests (and not

just particular to them as individuals). This in turn links directly with Securitisation Theory as ST denies the idea of an 'objective' security threat.

As a result of foreign policy interaction, it is important to understand how states react and interact during crisis times. Firstly, according to realists and neo-realists, foreign policy crises occur when, "one state or group of states tries to challenge the international status quo threatening the security of other states" (Waltz cited in Hampson 1984-1985, p.332). This in turn challenges decision makers and puts them in a critical situation. Accordingly, a security dilemma could result from a crisis as decision makers would want to increase their military capabilities to deter the source of threat, this consequently drives other states to increase their military capabilities and expand their military arsenals leading to the security dilemma. According to the Realist School, states are self-interested and this is what motivates their politics and their behaviour in the international system, (Wohlforth cited in Smith et al 2016, p.42). Therefore, states seek to place their interests over that of other states which causes tensions between them and could escalate to a crisis. The main focus of the realist and neo-realists is the state and for them the concept of security is reached by hard-power and as hard, military security threats rather than soft ones.

Lebow (1981) and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997, p.3) viewed foreign policy crises as a result of the internal and external environment surrounding a state. That is because a state does not exist in a vacuum or stand in isolation from the rest of the world. Brecher (1993, p.40) explained that foreign policy crises occur when, "political decision makers' view image of pressure to cope with externally focused stress". While Anderson-Rodgers (2015, p.203) added that for a crisis to be related to foreign policy, it must be *outside* a state and its response is directed towards the outside of its borders. Üçbaş (2014, p.9) further clarified that in a foreign policy crisis situation it is required that one of the parties involved is a state while the other party could be a non-state entity, a regional or an international organisation. In this dissertation, I examine two foreign policy crises involving inter-state interactions.

When a foreign policy crisis ensues, Hermann (1972, p.201- 202) explained that there is extra internal communication inside the ministry of foreign affairs by an internal emergency group. This internal communication would involve the minister of foreign affairs, his deputies, in addition to the unit or departmental heads specialised in this affair. Therefore, for example in Egypt if the crisis involves an Asian country, then the head of the Asian unit

will be invited for the internal communication with the minister. Moreover, states would increase external talks with the state's allies through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for assistance and also interference to help resolve the crisis. This is to name one of the key figures the leader of the state counts on in consulting over a crisis.

The definition of foreign policy crisis by realists mainly focuses on the *state* as the main party under threat which implies the domination of the Realist School as mentioned above. However, there are incidents where these threats are not directed towards states *per se*. Rather the states' values and norms could be under attack. According to Campbell (1998) danger and threats are not perceived objectively. Campbell (1998, p.72) explained that by highlighting that, "it is the objectification of the self through the representation of danger that foreign policy helps to achieve". He also added that foreign policy is occupied with the preservation and protection of the identity of the state and the "containment of challenges to that identity" (Campbell 1998, p.71). Therefore, as previously mentioned, foreign policy crises occur not only by endangering states' borders but also when they represent a threat to the basic values and norms of a state. In addition, they could also happen because of threats to a state's identity. This deviation of scholars' attention from the state to matters such as identity and culture reflect the influence of the Constructivist School on foreign policy.

Secondly, the previous definition is from a realist perspective as it primarily focuses on the state and ignores the role of non-state parties in creating a foreign policy crisis. Anderson-Rodgers (2015) challenged this realist domination and explained that non-state parties can also play a role in triggering a foreign policy crisis. In most of these cases, decision-makers would resort to violence to solve a crisis. Needless to say, Anderson-Rodgers (2015) placed the attention here on the fact that non-state actors differ according to many variables among which are certain causes, specific ethnicity, identity or a religious group. Anderson-Rodgers (2015) also classified these non-state actors as having a role at the state level, regional level or global level and in the crisis they caused. This implies that there could be other players involved with these non-state actors in prompting a crisis or in playing a role in resolving the crisis through their mediation. Additionally, if a non-state actor causes a crisis, the technique to resolve it by another state is either by responding directly to non-state actor or by using another state as a channel of communicating with the non-state actor causing the crisis (Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.203). The response can be more violent than using

mediation or negotiations; this is related to the Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) approach.

There are several examples of crises with different methods of how they were examined and how were they resolved. As established above, crises vary in duration (short or prolonged), nature (hard or soft) and origin (domestic, foreign or domestic leading to foreign). Thus, this illustrates that crises can involve various actors such as states, and non-state actors. An example to show that foreign policy crises can be prompted by and involve non-state actors is the case of an Egyptian airplane hijacked in 1985 by a Palestinian terrorist group (Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.201). Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak dealt with the crisis in an aggressive manner as he decided to send commandos to bring the plane down and this resulted in the killing of the hijackers as well as passengers (Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.201). Mubarak, being the decision-maker in this crisis, did not check all the information about this terrorist group with his consultants in the crisis unit formed to handle this issue and he refused to bargain with them accordingly (Anderson-Rodgers 2015, p.203). This is an example of a short-term crisis that ended in a violent manner that cost human lives. Anderson-Rodgers (2015) did not take into account the context while analysing this crisis. I argue here in this crisis that, in 1985 Mubarak was newly sworn in as President of Egypt after the assassination of former President Sadat. It is the assassination of Sadat that prompted Mubarak not to negotiate with the terrorist group as they represented Islamists radical. Subsequently, Mubarak preferred to end this crisis in a violent manner.

Another example of foreign policy crisis is the case of Syria post-Arab Spring. Although the Syrian conflict started as civil unrest and developed to become a civil-war, it had a spill-over effect that became a foreign policy crisis. This is a case of a prolonged, hard crisis (see Table 1). The EU as a supranational organisation was involved, as it has been a big supporter and promoter of human rights (Engel and Danyliuk 2015, p.168). The Syrian crisis represented a violation of these rights due to the practices adopted by Assad's regime against his opponents. Consequently, this caused a humanitarian crisis for the EU with the large number of migrants and refugees arriving at its borders. Therefore, the EU decided to interfere in Syria to resolve this situation. The EU's interference was in the form of imposing sanctions on Assad's regime and it referred the case to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Engel and Danyliuk 2015, p.168). However, this proved to be

ineffective in deterring Assad's regime and a truce was unattainable between the contending factions inside Syria and the crisis remains until the time of writing this thesis. The implication of this crisis also marks the failure of the EU as a supranational body and as a foreign policy decision-maker. Therefore, the use of political methods, from sanctions to UNSC resolutions, in containing this crisis was unsuccessful. Consequently, political methods to resolve crises might at times be ineffective and the use of force might become the more effective strategy to manage such a crisis.

To conclude, foreign policy crises are extensively researched within Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations. Crises threaten the core values of a state in a specific context, time period and in a surprising manner. They test the ability and/or inability of foreign policy makers and leaders to resolve a crisis and change its status positively or negatively. Thus, it would give creditability to a statesman or will hold them accountable. Foreign policy crises have an impact on either altering or maintaining the same behaviour towards other states and in changing or upholding the same foreign policy objectives of a state. Finally, Brecher (1993, p. 6) highlighted that, "a crisis can erupt, persist and terminate without violence" and this dissertation, with its two case studies, will demonstrate that.

The following section distinguishes between hard and soft crises, focusing more on the latter.

2.2 Hard Security versus Soft Security Threats
This section provides a background on the concept of 'soft security' and differences between soft and hard security threats. This is mainly illustrated in military and non-military security issues and the escalation or non-escalation of these issues to war level. This section discusses how and why the term 'soft security', evolved and considers the fact that they are an understudied and rarely used concept in the MENA region. I find that the concept of soft security is mainly a post-Cold War phenomenon resulting from the end of that latter, globalisation, and the rise of other schools of thought in International Relations (IR) and International Security. In addition, this chapter explores the containment measures and management strategies used by governments subjected to threats in this domain. Furthermore, this section offers examples of the containment measures that are taken and on which level as these can occur at the domestic, regional, or global level. Then, an

explanation for why some states resort to one or more of these levels of containment follows. Finally, the last section tackles the overlap between the terms soft security and hard security. This intersection comes due to resorting to hard measures of containment such as the use of both the military and police. This thesis focuses on soft security threats; threats resulting from a water shortage due to a dam construction and refugees and migrants as new security topics added to the involved states' national security agendas.

2.2.1 Background on Soft Security

The term 'soft security' was heavily studied in IR and International Security after the Cold-War as a result of the increased academic study of soft security issues. However, some scholars contest that the term soft security emerged as early as the economic crisis of the 1930s. Economic crises are a real challenge to governments and become worse when they turn into a global depression such as the 1929 US economic recession which lead to the Great Depression. Still, it can be argued that the change in the global world order highlighted more soft security issues and expanded the number of issues included therein because it was thought by Security Studies scholars that wars would decline and conflicts would take another form.

 'Soft security' evolved within IR with the end of the Cold War and with the rise of the concept of globalisation, and there are a couple of reasons behind this. The first dominant reason is contextual, referring to the changes that happened on the global scene; that is, the end of the Cold War (Dosch 2006) and the collapse of the Soviet Union leaving the USA as the sole superpower. As a result, the world became more relaxed towards its fears of nuclear wars, and attention shifted more to soft security issues (Snow 2011, p. 200). Consequently, this expanded the national security agendas of the states to become more inclusive for new issues such as these soft security issues.

Many critics (Fatic 2002; Aldis & Herd 2004; Brauch 2010; Swanström 2010) traced the rise of 'soft security' threats to the post-Cold War era since the Cold War made the world more inclined towards engaging with hard security threats especially in the context of the bipolar system and the threat of nuclear confrontation. Nuclear confrontation was classified under hard security threats, which is a conventional challenge, and the methods to contain such nuclear confrontations were traditional by using hard power. The end of the Cold War,

its clear impact, and the intense role of globalisation increasing the world's interconnectedness gained more prominence to non-military threats which are also known as soft security threats. Fatic (2002) described these unconventional threats as "different" challenges to the world's peace and security—the world was in the habit of seeing threats coming from other countries and in the form of aggression on their own states' threatening their own peace, security and stability of their territories, regimes, values, and norms. The prominence of these soft security threats became more commonly used in the political discourse of politicians (Snow 2011, p. 17) and more frequently researched in the International Security literature because they are, according to Dosch (2006, p. 179), a source of instability to regions and states. Furthermore, soft security issues as eccentric threats attracted scholars of IR and International Security as they proved that not only are states jeopardised but also citizens are severely disadvantaged and should get a lot of attention from both academics and policymakers. Snow (2011, p. 17) defined soft security issues as "matters that affect the safety and sense of safety and well-being of the people." Swanström (2010) assessed that shifting the focus from hard to soft security challenges is "positive" because the world was focusing mainly on the "state" rather than focusing on the "humans" of the state which enriched the Security Studies debates. However, as soft security threats evolved in the literature, this focus changed and the impacts caused by non-military security threats on these human beings of the state has become not only recognised but also the centre of scholarly attention (Snow 2011, p.17).

By 2001, as a result of the 9/11 attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon in the USA, there was a dual focus on both military and non-military security threats. This led the world to see threats, such as terrorism, come not only from states but also from "non-state" actors who can attack any country. Snow (2011, pp. 17-18) explained that the 9/11 attacks were a turning point for the USA for reprioritising its national security agenda to include both military and non-military security threats. Adding terrorism as an issue moving-up on the national security agenda has been imitated by many other states such as the UK, Canada and France. This was clear in the intense cooperation between these states on exchanging information and sharing experiences about terrorist groups. Moreover, these states increased their border control measures and applied tighter visa issuance on certain countries that were considered, by the USA and its allies, as supporting terrorism (Snow

2011). This is the result of the intensity of globalisation and the rise of global terror networks and their various funding methods; hence, requiring global cooperation on that matter. Furthermore, it could be argued that the causes of the rise of both terrorism and soft security threats are interrelated. Soft security threats emanating from poor socio-economic status and deteriorating environmental status could be reasons for the rise of terrorism amongst people who suffered from long sufferings and deprivations, and human security issues, leading to a reverse effect, which is radicalism, and eventually terrorism. Therefore, the containment method of terrorism should be handled using not only hard measures such as police and military but also by soft methods such as improving socio-economic situations as well as reforming political agendas and law enforcement (Snow 2011, p. 48). This has driven scholars such as Snow (2011, p. 48) to categorise elements of security between military, semi-military and non-military. Terrorism is a good example of semi-military security threats (Snow 2011, p. 48). It is semi-military as the ways to contain it involve political and legal enforcements (Snow 2011, p.48).

The second reason for the rise of the concept of soft security is the new contributions of IR theories and in Security Studies especially with the rise of the Critical School. This can be seen with the rise of human security as a new conceptual framework in security theories during the late 1990s with the works of Lloyd Axworthy (1997) and Amitav Acharya (2001). Definitions of human security centred on "the freedom from want and freedom from fear" as given by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1994, p. 22). The Critical School's addition rested in the new perspectives/theories such as feminist issues, environmental issues and constructivist issues as soft security matters that should be on the security agenda, (Hough et al. 2015, p. 32, 44 &72; Brauch 2010). It is worth noting that Brauch (2010) emphasised that constructivists have given more attention to soft security threats. All of this led to such a change in the military perception of security threats to add new types of threats that are unconventional in the security scholarly field and are now known as 'non-military' security threats. These new types of soft security threats expanded the security agenda to become more inclusive and also challenged the hegemony of the traditionalists IR schools from realists to liberals. Traditionalist IR scholars remain tied to military security threats. Hough et al. (2015, p. 13-14, 27-28) explained that as the Realist School prevails in IR studies and security studies, traditionalists have resisted including these new issues as security threats because they viewed them as not urgent

'unless' they occurred (Buzan et al. 1998; Snow 2011, p. 203). In addition, high politics is highly traditional (Hough et al. 2015, p. 29); therefore, it took a contextual change and considerable scholarly research to include other issues such as soft security threats and to place them on national security agendas.

It is unclear from the literature which regions of the world were first affected by soft security threats. Some scholars, Swanström (2010) amongst them, refer to the rise of this concept in the post-communist areas and the developing world, particularly in Greater Central Asia. Conversely, Mustakis (2004) argues that the areas which are mostly affected by soft security threats are located in states near Western Europe; mainly, the Balkans region. On the other hand, Doch (2006) believes that the most affected areas following the post-Cold War period are in South-East Asia. Also, Braun (2003, p.33) argued that while states in the developing, conflict-torn regions may appear to be more vulnerable to non-military hazards than developed states, in reality, these nations are typically much more vulnerable to these threats than in the Western developed world. It can be noted that these areas—Central Asia, South East Asia, the Balkans, developing states and neighbours to West Europe—are all still counted as former communist or former satellite states to the Soviet Union. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of these former Soviet States, a rise in other unconventional threats surfaced. I argue that, this literature might be biased because it is written from a Western European perspective since the pioneers in academia are originally from the Western part of the world and it is one form of their soft power due to their hegemony over the academic field as they conduct considerable research and heavily publish on such topics. Nevertheless, openness and freedom are granted to researchers in this part of the Western world, unlike the Eastern part of the world that is heavily opaque, because data is more difficult to access. I argue that the literature is rich with scholars from the Western side of the world with the possibility of it being biased against the former United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) or other parts of the world in terms of its focus being outside the Western sphere. This might be a reason for not giving a neutral explanation for where the non-military threats originated from or what the causes were for them to rise in the Eastern side of the world.

2.2.2 Defining Hard Security and Soft Security Threats

Hard security threats include: a state losing its lands due to occupation and redrawing new borders; acts of aggression by one state against another state and; a state losing its sovereignty and its core values (Brauch et al. 2011). These threats are created by the actual "use of force" which involve military power and the resolution is also in a hard/military way using force resulting from the confrontation between two or more actors. Thus, *hard* security threats are mainly *military* threats (Hough et al. 2015, p. 4); hence, the net result of the use of military power leads to confrontation that leads to wars. Thus, in light of the above definition, hard security threats could be considered as falling into the military domain. To further elaborate, it is the role played by an external actor (state) that influences the role and 'geography' of another actor (state) (Fatic 2002) leading to war to maintain or restore that geographical image. Furthermore, external actors as aggressors change the geography of a state through occupation or drawing new borders as well as becoming the new rulers and decision makers of the occupied states. This results in dissent by the occupied government and its people creating further tensions. This asserts the influence of the Realist School of thought in IR on conceptualising these threats. Therefore, hard security threats are of a national security concern and in many cases revolve around the military security of the state as Snow (2011, p. 47) said. To sum up, in hard security threats, the state becomes the centre of attention from the traditionalist security scholars' perspective.

However, according to Brauch et al. (2011), Barry Buzan in the late 1980s came up with distinctions between different threats. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) made it clear that there are four different types of threats: military (mainly the hard one), political (related to the state's sovereignty and indirectly related to hard threat), ecological (related to the environment and causes imbalances to the state's bases) and finally economic (which influences the humans of the state and is seen as a domestic source of threat). These last two types of threats are considered as 'non-military' security threats; yet, they must be put on the national security agendas of states due to their importance, as shown in the case of Egypt in this dissertation.

Therefore, non-military/soft security threats are created by unconventional sources and are contained or resolved via soft methods rather than using hard power to avoid escalating

onto a war level. Snow (2011, p. 48) explained that military response has become "ineffective" and that it should be replaced with "political and law enforcement" instead. There is a consensus among IR and Security Studies scholars (Fatic 2002; Stern 2003; Ziyal 2004; Ricon et al. 2006; Snow 2011) that soft security issues are related to the environment, socio-economic problems, energy security, ethnic conflicts, migration, spread of pandemics, drug trafficking, cyber threats and human trafficking. Lizak et al (2021, p.11) added that, "non-military security is continually assuming new forms and is also constantly growing in importance".

Selim (2011, p. 328) explained that *soft* security issues address the *non-military* dimension of security, which explains why soft security issues are perceived as 'non-military' by Security Studies scholars such as Braun 2003; Snow 2011, and Lizak et al 2021. Security Studies scholars as Braun 2003, Snow 2011 and Lizak et al 2021 further clarified that soft security threats are the threats falling outside the military domain. Post-9/11, the level of attention given to terrorism increased and there has been a debate over whether to include it under soft security threats or hard security threats. Finally, it was categorised under hard security threats as it is contained via hard power involving military power as the USA argued to justify its wars on Afghanistan in 2001.

More recently, cyber security[2] has been treated as a soft security threat; hence, soft security threats come mainly from within or are trans-border threats. Thus, they are not only external as it used to be with hard security threats (Fatic 2002). In addition, soft security threats are created not only by one state but also by a group of states or by the state itself due to its internal circumstances or by non-state actors. Natural disasters such as hurricanes, floods, drought, volcanos or earthquakes, are considered soft security threats because they create problems and catastrophes putting human beings of a state and their governments under immense pressures to overcome them.

Soft security threats are also known in the literature as 'unconventional threats', soft threats, and non-military security threats. In this thesis, I use the term 'soft' security threats due to a few important reasons. Firstly, is because the 'focus' and the causes of the threats are different from the common, traditional, military, hard security threats. Secondly, the

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[2] Cyber security as defined by it governance (2023) is, "it aims to reduce of cyber-attacks and protect against the unauthorised exploitation of systems, networks, and technologies".

literature on the MENA region, and Egypt in particular, rarely uses the term 'soft security' therefore, using this term in this thesis contributes to tackling this gap. Thirdly, the term is useful for understanding what leaders often mean when they use the term 'crisis' as leaders in this region are major influencers on foreign policy affairs. The focus on soft security shifts to humans, symbols, or ecosystems that are of profound importance in this era, as they are now counted as existential issues for humanity. Finally, threats could be created by the state itself as a result of problematic and/or corrupt policies that result in high levels of poverty, and unemployment, mis-management of the environment, and corruption which, consequently, leads to migration and human trafficking or revolutions against the state. Therefore, soft security threats are the threats created and maybe resolved outside the military domain.

In some IR and International Security studies, scholars such as Fatic (2002) and politicians such as Mr. Ordzhonikidze, the former UN Under Secretary General in Brussels (2009) believe that there is a blurred line between hard and soft security because, as previously explained, some of these soft security threats eventually become hard security threats, such as the case with terrorism. Moreover, some soft security threats and hard security threats are deeply interconnected (Ordzhonikidze 2009) again an example for that is terrorism resulting from dire socio-economic circumstances. The containment measures used to resolve these soft security threats are a mix of both hard power and soft power and are executed on different levels depending on the intensity of the threat and on the capabilities of the state under threat. This is shown through my empirical case studies in Chapters Five and Six.

Langlais (1999), Ziyal (2004), Dosch (2006) and Ordzhonikidze (2009) declare that there should be no dichotomy between hard and soft security threats. Dosch (2006) further describes them as "two sides of the same coin" because they stem from the same problems and lead to each other. Similarly, both hard and soft security threats are contained in many cases in the same way; to further explain, whenever wars erupt, governments allocate larger amounts of their budgets to the military which negatively affects the budgets for education, development plans or fighting human and drug trafficking, etc. When wars occur or civil wars escalate (i.e., hard security threat) many people either decide to remain in their home cities under attack, or they become internally displaced or migrate to other countries (i.e., soft security threats). Evidently, hard security threats can become or lead to other soft

security threats. The opposite occurs too; e.g. with terrorism. Moustakis (2004) and Ordzhonikidze (2009) both believe that in certain instances soft security threats lead to terrorism; however, each one offers a different yet valid explanation on that issue. Ordzhonikidze (2009) claims that the poor socio-economic security threats are the gateway to terrorism, while Moustakis (2004) maintains that human trafficking is what leads to terrorist recruitment. In cases of pandemics and natural disasters (which are soft security threats), governments resort to the military (hard security) in order to overcome the crisis, often manifested with the military running hospitals and the allocation of military budgets to other ministries in order to solve the crisis. Although the military are involved, they are not using hard power to deal with the situation. Rather, this is using what is termed as 'civil-military coordination', hence mobilizing the military is arguably symbolically useful as well as practical and makes leaders look strong and decisive, reassures the public, etc.

To conclude, the difference between hard and soft security threats is emerging from the different scholarly attention due to many reasons among them a different global context which changed from a bipolar to a unipolar system. To distinguish between military and non-military security threats is to have a thorough insight on the unit of analysis. In the case of hard security threats, the nucleus or unit of analysis is the 'state', while in soft security threats the centre of attention is the citizens of the state. The causes of these threats are also different in their nature; this is demonstrated in my case studies where one focuses on a water security crisis and the second deals with refugees and migrants and how they are represented as a threat to other citizens of the host state in a non-European country.

2.2.3 Soft Security for Arabs

Unfortunately, soft security issues have often been neglected in the literature covering the MENA and the Arab world. Thus, this dissertation addresses this gap by covering two cases from the Arab region and emphasising how soft security threats should not be ignored by Arab leaders' perspective. There are several reasons for this lack of attention to soft security issues and threats among the Arab world governments. First, the Arab region has always been preoccupied with hard security issues/threats due to colonisation and the Israeli occupation of some Arab lands (Soltan 2001, p. 6; Selim 2011, p. 328). Second, Arab rulers and academics perceived soft security as a "western imported" concept heavily used by non-governmental societies to impose their "foreign" agendas (Selim 2011, p. 328). Third,

Arab analysts such as Selim (2011, p.327) believe that both soft and hard security threats overlap and lead to one another. The Arab rulers also fail to distinguish between soft/non-military and hard/military threats. Fourth, some Arab rulers and academics do not differentiate between human security and soft security. Finally, the term soft security creates divisions among Arabs, elites and academics as each group upholds a different definition for soft security (Selim 2011, p. 328). Selim identified four schools defining soft security in the Arab world which all agree that soft security is anything that is related to 'non-military issues' and developed as a result of globalisation. Both Soltan (2001) and Selim (2011) agree on that context for the development of soft security as a concept in the Arab world.

It is worth mentioning that both Soltan (2001) and Selim (2011) emphasised that Arab leaders' perceptions of the term soft security is based on human rights, democracy promotion and political reforms. Selim (2011) explains that soft security threats in the Arab world are related to sectarianism, promotion of democracy as an imported concept, energy security, environmental security, and terrorism. To further justify the emphasis on these issues, it can be inferred from Soltan's (2001, p. 9) discussion that soft security issues are related to socio-economic and political reforms which Arab leaders are concerned with as they represent "a threat to existing national power structure," legitimacy, and internal order. Therefore, it is in the interest of policy makers and the Arab elites to focus on these soft security issues alongside others. It is in these statemen's interest to securitise these soft security issues to consolidate their rule in light of the Arab Spring revolts and the instabilities created as a result of such circumstances, as argued in this thesis.

2.2.4 Containment and Management of Soft Security Threats

This sub-section discusses the distinction between the containment of hard security threats and that of soft security threats. An exploration of the soft security threats containment and management measures will be discussed in this dissertation based on each case study. States manage soft security threats from a variety of different levels such as domestic, regional or global, and the majority of the states that suffer from soft security threats also resort to assistance from either regional or global parties.

Hard security threats are traditionally resolved by either escalating to wars, which would mean the use of hard power in the form of the state's military capabilities, or by "hard balancing," which is defined by He and Feng (2008) as military alliances and a military build-up that aim to deter other states. Some other states resort to "soft balancing" which means having states cooperating together against the threatening state (He & Feng 2008). In addition, some states attempt to contain the sources of threat by resorting to soft power such as negotiations, diplomacy, economic aid and/or technological transfer (He & Feng 2008).

Common measures used to control soft security threats include soft procedures such as long-term planning, development plans, strategies, and social, financial and aid commitments in addition to "proactive diplomacy" (Ziyal 2004). Security Studies' scholars divide the containment and management of these threats into three levels which are domestic (a self-reliant method), regional (involves the role of a regional organisation(s) or the neighbouring states) and finally global (involves the role of great powers or an international institution in handling these threats). Aldis and Herd (2004, p. 169) argue that the global level is very effective in containing soft security threats as the world is becoming heavily interdependent due to globalisation. Choosing any of these levels for containment or management depends on the acuteness of the soft security threat. Also, it depends on the size of the state, its strength and its capability to contain the soft security threat. Consequently, a state's population, economy, and its military capabilities have an impact on how a state can handle these soft security threats. Weak states, in particular, face difficulties in resolving these soft security threats due to their poor capabilities and lack of experience. It is worth defining a weak state, as Tyagi (2012) explained, it is a state that fails to provide security to its own people, territories and is also seen as lacking legitimacy. Therefore, the domestic level policies of these weak states are inefficient and incapable in easing the threat. Consequently, these weak states seek more help on both the regional and the international levels. Nevertheless, some of these weak states' governments belittle soft security threats, especially the environmental ones (Swanström 2010), and they become marginalised non-resolved issues.

On the domestic level, managing soft security threats is when the state tries to contain the threat by using its own resources without seeking the help of other states or regional/or international organisations. It is the state's responsibility to find alternatives to the source(s) of threat and it is usually a soft alternative. Fatic (2002) and Ziyal (2004) explain

that these domestic alternatives could revolve around long-term development strategies, social reforms and conflict prevention. Fatic (2002, p. 96) called it "internal societal management" which means that internal measures are taken to improve the society's status to avoid the re-occurrence of such soft security crises and reduce the costs. This indicates the use of soft measures to contain soft security threats. The USA provides a good example for states that can depend on their own domestic capabilities to manage a soft security threat. In 2012, the USA was hit by Hurricane Sandy—one of the most destructive hurricanes in USA history, costing around $65 billion (Ladislaw 2013). Hurricane Sandy affected more than twenty east coast states (Ladislaw 2013). The American institutions coordinated together to face the crisis and took some precautionary measures in coordination and cooperation between the Department of Defense with the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide emergency shelter, food, water and medical supplies for the disadvantaged people in the eastern states (The White House 2012). US President Obama instructed the cooperation between the federal, local and state levels. As for the post crisis plan, the American government worked on rebuilding the damaged infrastructure, roads, bridges and homes (Ladislaw 2013). Moreover, the US government noted that there should be more investments in the infrastructure sector and there should be more "recovery plans" implemented for natural disasters (Ladislaw 2013). The USA's status as a strong state both economically and politically helps to explain its ability to contain a soft security threat relying on its internal capabilities.

On the other hand, managing a soft security threat on the regional level refers to the involvement of a regional organisation in managing soft security threats or by a state seeking a neighboring country's assistance. Sherr (2004) argues that the role of regional organisations is an effective option in resolving non-traditional security threats erupting from soft security issues, and he gave the example of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Sherr (2004) mentioned that NATO expanded its membership and, consequently, had to increase its security measures against non-military soft security threats. These measures are represented in law enforcement, economic reforms and political reforms. NATO has shifted focus to containing threats to cyber security, energy security, and maritime security. According to Rasmussen (2012), NATO considers cyber security threats as the most important ones; hence, it has created a special centre called "Center of Excellence" which aims at securing NATO and the EU members from cyber security

attacks via the interchange of information and the exchange of experiences (Rasmussen 2012).

Other examples for containment of soft security threats on the regional level include the cases of Southeast Asian countries and the Balkan states. These states are more subject to corruption, human trafficking and drug trafficking; consequently, these states reach out to regional organisations such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the EU as well as seeking bilateral relations between them and other states to contain such non-military security threats (Moustakis 2004; Dosch 2006). The role of regional institutions in managing soft security threats is positively perceived by the people and policy makers in this region. Ziyal (2004) and Moustakis (2004) assessed the role played by the EU in conflict management and confidence-building measures as well as good governance practices positively and regarded it as an 'effective' method.

At the global level, states affected by soft security threats often turn to great powers or international institutions for assistance. The international community is represented in international institutions; thus, states in distress seek their help in encompassing soft security threats. The spread of the Ebola virus in 2014 is a plain example of the international institutions' help in containing a soft security threat via both hard and soft powers. The Ebola virus is a pandemic disease that spread in a number of African states who considered it a crisis and their governments were unable to contain it on the domestic level alone. These states such as Congo, Liberia and Guinea sought help from the USA and the World Health Organization (WHO) to contain such threats (Berengaut 2018). The US used a mix of both soft and hard power to contain such a threat as it sent military troops and civilian volunteers to help aid the affected nations, Berengaut (2018). The role of the military troops was not for combat services; instead, they were present to provide relief, transportation and logistical assistance, thus showing the civil-military coordination.

There are also states that could resort to soft security threats containment on several levels. Some states could use the three levels at the same time, while others could just resort to the domestic level and the regional level or could reach out on both the domestic and the international levels. It depends on the severity of the threat and the size of the state as well as its capabilities in handling those threats. The case of Estonia is a good example of a small state's management of soft security threats. Crandall (2014) believes that Estonia

experienced soft security threats such as an energy crisis, cyber-security and a national identity crisis. Estonia implemented two options in addressing these threats on both the international level and the domestic level. In the case of cyber security threats, in 2007, Russia blocked the governmental institutions and interrupted media streaming (Burton 2013 and Crandall 2014). Estonia addressed this by turning to NATO as a regional organization and asked for assistance to internationalise this threat. In addition, Estonia worked on the domestic level by creating master's degree programs and increasing public awareness about this issue, teaching people about local cyber security via specialists and creating local cyber leagues (a national student competition) (Crandall 2014). This domestic method demonstrates how the Estonian government involved its people in this threatening issue and how it also used internal methods to contain the threat after securitising it. Thus, the previous examples illustrate how small states have three methods to handle their soft security threats by addressing them on the international and/or regional levels. In addition, they can also use domestic solutions like finding alternatives and increasing people's awareness about the threats.

However, the involvement of International institutions' interference in soft security crises is not always perceived positively. Kai He (2013) argues that when international institutions interfere to resolve a conflict or a crisis, it might end up to becoming a 'prolonged' crisis because the crisis takes longer to be resolved due to, resistance from internal actors or due to the unfamiliarity with the internal situation. This shows that the international institutions which represent the global level could have a negative impact in resolving soft security threats.

Ziyal (2004), Dosch (2006) and Ordzhonikidze (2009) perceive the containment measures of both hard and soft security threats as "inclusive, comprehensive, inter-disciplinary and multilateral" methods. This is illustrated in cases of migration, human trafficking, drug trafficking, ethnic-conflicts and civil-wars signing bilateral agreements and assigning more guards to keep the state's borders safe. Regarding soft measures, states seek to sign bilateral agreements to ensure that their borders remain safe and they also apply tighter measures on combating illegal acts. The following case studies will clarify this.

When faced with soft security threats, Arab governments prefer to either contain the threats on a domestic level or resort to regional organisations such as the League of Arab States

(LAS) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Selim (2011, p. 335) illustrates that with an example of environmental threats facing Arab states; he explains that they prefer to resort to domestic or regional levels. On the domestic level, states enforce better coordination between the state's institutions to resolve the problem; otherwise, these governments would seek help from NGOs (Selim 2011, p. 336). On the regional level, Arab governments seek assistance from the League of Arab States which develops strategies related to the environment resulting from the Council for Arab Ministers Responsible for the Environment (CAMRE) (Selim 2011, p. 336).

In conclusion, the containment and management of soft security threats depend on the situation and the type of threat. Socio-economic problems are mainly resolved on the domestic level, while environmental threats, climate-challenges, pandemics, water and food threats are usually resolved on the regional and international levels as these are viewed as the most acute ones and require humanitarian intervention as well as collaborative global action. Other threats such as drug trafficking and human trafficking are mainly contained on the regional and domestic levels as they can be dealt with by border control and bilateral relationships. The assessment of the success or failure of these levels varies from one case to the other. Sizes and types of states also play a role in determining the success or failure of containment and management levels for soft security threats. Thus, this dissertation focuses on two types of soft security threats, which are water and migrants, contributing new analysis to the literature on the Global South.

Conclusion
The rise in scholarly and policy makers' attention to soft security threats post-Cold War has created crises for governments and put these governments, sometimes, in embarrassing situations with their people if they fail to resolve them and show their vulnerability or corruption. Thus, concerns with soft security threats have shifted the attention of states' leaders and their governments from the concept of the 'state' to the concept of 'humans' of the state (Hough et al. 2015, p. 4). In other words, the world's attention is now directed towards the well-being of the human capital of the states who form one main essential component of the state's definition (people, territory, government, and sovereignty) instead of just focusing on the state in a traditional manner. As a result of this shift, some

governments have changed their 'national security' agendas priorities to include soft security threats not just the hard security ones. Governments also developed crisis decision-making units and emergency action units as in the USA to resolve the human-threatening crises such as food, water and health security threats (Stern 2003; Snow 2011, p. 389). Therefore, some governments had to redistribute their budgets (Mustakis 2004) not only to dedicate a large amount of these budgets towards increasing military power but also to spend more on improving the living conditions for people via long-term development plans, education, cyber security, and health care to fight pandemics and going green to protect the environment. Unfortunately, not many states were successful in overcoming soft security threats on their own by adopting domestic measures; however, the USA is a rare example. States which could not overcome soft security threats on their own sought help from their neighbouring countries or regional organisations, while other states sought the international community's intervention via international organisations such as the UN.

I argue that the increased focus on soft security threats within the security literature is a 'blessing' rather than a 'curse' because, first, the security literature has broadened to include more approaches such as the Copenhagen School, feminist perspectives and constructivism (Jackson 2011, p. 356); thus, the concept of security has become more inclusive of issues that were either neglected or governments were inattentive to. Also, including soft security issues has increased the attention toward *humans* within the states and created an interconnected web of cooperation between the states to contain these threats even if the states only used domestic measures for containment. An example to demonstrate that some countries solve their soft security threats domestically is clear in the case of the USA, a strong large state, while smaller states such as Estonia and New Zealand resorted to assistance from the regional and global levels. Once a state is successful in easing the threat, it is viewed by other states as a success story to be imitated and modelled through sharing experiences and exchanging ideas to overcome these soft security threats. Furthermore, adding to the benefits of concentrating on soft security threats, mainly in the developed countries, is that it helped to reallocate the states' budgets to spending more on human expenses, recovery from disasters and emergency budgets (Ladislaw 2013, Martin 2020).

On the other hand, weak states and less-developed countries could view these soft security threats as signs of their weakness and seeking external help adds to their failure in their

people's perception and, in turn, affects their legitimacy. Some states' policy makers prefer to solve these soft security threats as they potentially cause stress, destabilisation (Dosch 2006) and pressure on their government's credibility. Consequently, these governments act rationally and work on improving their agendas and developing new methods and strategies borrowed from abroad to reduce the effects of these soft security threats and handle the crises instigated by them. Nevertheless, these less developed states would seek assistance from other regional countries, regional or/and international organisations or developed countries, such as the USA, to overcome their soft security challenges. This shall be shown in my case studies

There is a gap in the literature in covering soft security threats in the Arab world and how Arab states handle these threats. This is because there is lack of attention from Arab countries to these soft issues and presumably a lack of interest from Western scholars at looking at these issues in the Arab world context. Although the Arab states are not as much concerned with soft security threats as the rest of the world, they resort to containment measures on both the domestic and regional levels. This dissertation shows an Arab state that resorts to regional and global help to manage soft security crises. The case studies will later show how crises are subjectively framed for leaders' interests. Furthermore, soft security threats in the Global South should not be ignored as they are related indirectly to rulers' survival in power. The case studies used in this dissertation contribute to the literature on non-democratic countries and how they behave in crisis times, how they react to non-military/soft threats and the impact of these crises on their foreign policy relations.

Following this chapter, that defined soft security and crisis management, in Chapter Three I develop the theoretical framework drawing in Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making to pave the way for providing an answer to my research question. Chapter Three will demonstrate how securitisation of an issue is constructed and how by using foreign policy decision making the soft security crisis is resolved. Thus, justifying the use of both Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making.

Chapter Three
Analytical Framework and Methodology

Introduction

This chapter first develops the theoretical framework. This is discussed in the first part of this chapter. The second part will discuss the methodology. The theoretical framework is important to help explain how soft security issues become elevated to the domain of security threats. It is also important to understand the context I have chosen as there are factors that played a role in framing Egyptian foreign policy and led to shift overtime.

Since this thesis is an empirical study that aims at explaining foreign policy topics that are seen as of 'national security' importance, I have chosen an approach within Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), namely Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM). This will require considering the determinants of foreign policy making especially at the individual-level of analysis. National leaders are ultimately responsible for the decisions taken in response to a crisis. Therefore, it is logical to start there when trying to explain a state's reaction. Further, in respect to authoritarian countries, the inner workings of government are harder to obtain evidence for, but leaders' public statements, actions, and policy/legislative changes are there to be examined. I investigate Securitisation Theory (ST) to find common point(s) with FPDM. Focusing on the individual-level of analysis and the role of leaders in particular is a common point between FPDM and ST. This will help in understanding why some issues are on top of security agendas under a particular context but not under another. The benefit of paralleling Securitisation Theory with FPDM is that it gives a clearer picture of why soft security threats are viewed as *security* issues rather than merely *political* issues. ST also explains how specific actors construct soft issues, such as water and migrants through discourse, while FPDM explores how decisions on these soft security threats are made and which actors are involved in resolving it.

The main focus will be on the individual level which, is the Middle East generally and Egypt specifically, exemplifying the dominance of the president which has been very prominent in the literature. Thus, I will argue that it is justifiable that the president plays a role in both framing a crisis and resolving it. Leaders are also the actors who manipulate a certain context to securitise an issue. Therefore, the coming sections will be divided as

firstly an overview of the FPA approach, followed an analysis of FPDM models with a special focus on individuals and/or leaders. The discussion of Securitisation Theory in the context of this dissertation will be followed with an explanation of the common elements between Securitisation Theory and FPDM to develop a new framework for my empirical cases. These two models parallel each other. As ST explains the reasons for threats construction and development, but does not provide an answer to how leaders/governments attempt to resolve them. It is worth mentioning that ST is not necessarily designed to examine how and why policy leaders act, except in relation to justifying the use of exceptional measures but examination of policy outcomes not built into theory itself.

3.1Theoretical Framework

3.1.1 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach

This section will briefly explain what Foreign Policy Analysis is, and how it is used. Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) explains the behaviour of actors, identifies these actors, and explains how they have reached their foreign policy decision as an outcome. Hence, the focus here will be on the role of the individual as the level of analysis and leaders as main actors in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. The purpose therefore, is to explain who takes decisions during crises and how decisions are arrived at from a range of options.

3.1.1.1 Difference Between Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Analysis

It is useful to distinguish between Foreign Policy (FP) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) before I start the discussion on FPA. Foreign Policy could be defined as the external relations between states, international institutions and other non-states actors. Understanding Foreign Policy helps us to understand international relations (Hill 2016, p.29). Foreign policy is the final product of a preceding lengthy process, and how states act and react on external matters. The preceding lengthy process is known as the foreign policy decision making process (Korany 1986, and Hill 2016, p.12 & 58). Therefore, foreign policy is about the outcome.

In studying Foreign Policy scholars are concerned with understanding the interests and objectives of the state when dealing with another states, organisations or non-state actors. Yet, the foreign policy of a state is not based on fixed goals as they can change due to

different preferences at different periods of time. To elaborate, there are three types of objectives in relation to the foreign policies of states. First, is the "core objective" which is an urgent objective that cannot be postponed and is usually found in colonised countries seeking independence (Jain 2018, p.164). Second, is the "medium/middle objective"; this is not related to the survival of the state but rather it is important for its performance and status on the international arena such as development, trade and economic relations (Jain 2018, p.165). Third, is the "long term objective" which the state has no need to rush into achieving, and it could be like spreading its ideology overseas (Jain 2018, p.165). Therefore, each nation has goals and objectives in their foreign policy (Allison 1971, p.5). I argue that objectives could be linked to the securitisation of soft security issues in a foreign policy agenda which will be explored later in the empirical studies. The case studies for this dissertation focusing on soft security issues provide an example of medium/middle objective, as these issues could be linked to vital resources, economic development and external economic and political relations. As will be shown later, the issues at the core of my case studies have strong economic and sustainability dimensions, as well as relating to Egypt's external relationships with other states.

3.1.1.2 FPA Background and Definition

FPA is defined by Alden and Aran (2012, p.1) as the study of conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system. Furthermore, FPA is about Foreign Policy formulation (Alden and Aran 2012, p.2). FPA focuses on humans as decision makers, thus one can argue that the unit of analysis is the "human", as the main decision maker affecting Foreign Policy decisions (Alden and Aran 2012, p.1) rather than the "state or the nation-state" or systemic forces, as conventionally thought of by realists and liberals (Dorani 2019, p.71), as a result of the dominance of neorealism and neoliberalism in IR from the 1970s onwards-Waltz, Mearsheimer, Keohane and Nye etc. However, the system level could still be crucial if it plays an influential role over the decision maker as conditioned by Dorani (2019, p.71). FPA is a "bottom-up" type of analysis as it starts with the unit (humans) then the system (state's system of government) (Dorani 2019, p.71). Hence to further distinguish between Foreign Policy and FPA, the former is about the outcome while the latter is about the process of decision making (Alden and Aran 2012, p.1). FPA underscores the role of humans either as one individual or as a group and it concentrates its analysis on the factors that impact policymakers while making

their decisions with issues related to foreign policy (Dorani, 2019, p.75). Focusing on the humans is important in this dissertation and will be used as a unit of analysis. In fact, Hudson (2020, p.16) emphasised that the success of FPA results from it highlighting that both foreign policy making, and foreign policy decisions (as output) are equally important and that they are "at the core of FPA".

FPA is a sub-field of IR (Walker 2011, p.7), hence it is the study of foreign policy with its various approaches, decision making processes and different levels of analysis, (Dorani 2019). Scholars studying FPA are able to understand 'how' and 'why' certain policies were made by humans. Hudson (2006, p.7) sees FPA as the "theoretical intersection between the most important determinants of the state behaviour: material and ideational factors. The point of intersection is not the state it is the "human decision maker" Hudson (2006, p.7). FPA emphasises human choice (Dorani 2019, p.72); these choices vary according to different nations and in turn lead to different foreign policy choices (Hudson 2020, p.17). From this definition the focus will be on answering the 'how' question as it explains the decision-making process. The 'how' question came under attention because, "asking how seeks to understand the way in which it became possible for a particular decision, policy or action to be undertaken" (Holland 2001). 'Why' a decision has been made in foreign policy is also answered by FPA which explains the decision-making process itself and how individuals and/or groups have reached their decision. It is a narrow type of study as it is "actor-specific" rather than "actor-general" (Hudson 2005). The difference between both has been explained by Hudson and Vore (1995), Hudson (2005) and Koncak (2016) who distinguished between an actor-general approaches which treat the state as a 'systemic unitary actor', while actor-specific models look at the "sources of change" and "sources of diversity" under which the actor-general has been subject to (Hudson and Vore 1995, p.210). Actor-specific approaches are concerned with focusing on behaviour or actions of individuals alone or collective, not just on the behaviour or actions of the 'state'. This dissertation offers an actor specific study.

As FPA mainly revolves around the role played by actors in decision making, it focuses on the role played by political elites involved in foreign policy. This is explained by Dorani (2019, p.70) as these actors are, "in a position of authority and responsible for taking decisions in foreign policy". This in turn will require studying the speeches and actions made by these policymakers which has swayed the decision-making process, (Dorani 2019,

p.80). this identifies the types of sources/information I will study. Moreover, the role of the president as the main policymaker in Egypt and his speeches will be analysed in this thesis in chapter four. The wider importance of leaders in the literature of foreign policy decision-making is investigated in this chapter under section 3.1.1.6

FPA explains that Foreign Policy decisions are made on different levels which gives way to distinction between different levels of analysis. These are the individual level, the state level and the system level. The first level, the individual level explains all the factors that influences the individual's decision-making process from background, behaviour, psychology and perceptions of the individual. The second level, is the state level which explores how state's institutions and types of regimes governing it all have an impact on the result in a foreign policy issue. Finally, the system level, searches the external environment surrounding the state from its power relations regionally and globally as well as context of power and structural characteristics (Isaak 1974, Hudson 2006, Walker et al 2011). For the purpose of this dissertation the focus will be on the individual level of analysis in order to examine the roles played by the president and other groups in the case studies to be analysed in this dissertation as most of the literature focused on the ME highlights the key role of presidents in foreign policy decision making.

3.1.1.3 Foreign Policy Analysis and the Decision-Making Process

This subsection focuses on the analyses of foreign policy decision-making processes, covering basic definitions, the central role of key players, models, and decisions types. A general definition for foreign policy decision-making is the process by which specific actor(s) make choices over particular decisions towards a foreign policy issue in an interactive world (Blankshain 2019). Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM) identifies who these actors are and helps to explain these choices. Finally, types of foreign policy decision making are divided between individual and groups this in turn has its reflection on having many models of which foreign policy decisions can be analysed. Types of decisions could be divided into structured, semi-structured or unstructured. Structured decisions are featured as definitive and routine like; they are relatively highly certain, while the unstructured are the opposite as they are non-routine and more complex in nature. Finally, the semi-structured decisions involve risk taking and are more like unstructured decisions,

(Mintz and DeRouen 2010, p.17). However, these types will not be investigated in this thesis.

3.1.1.4 Definition of Foreign Policy Decision-Making (FPDM)

FPA has several approaches and models and this variety comes from the differences in the variations of what they are trying to explain in foreign policy such as the unit, the process of policy making, causal effects or independent variables (Dorani 2019, p.71). What these approaches or models try to explain comes from the different levels of analysis that is influenced by the decision-making process (Dorani 2019, p.71). They could be micro-level forces or macro-level forces as explained by Walker (2011, p.4) and Dorani (2019, p.71). Micro-level forces are divided into decision making process, domestic politics, psychological factors, role of the opposition, small groups effects and bureaucratic politics (Dorani 2019, p.71). While on the macro-level these forces were divided by Dorani (2019, p.71) and Dessouki (1980) as IR theories, factors that determine foreign policy choices such as geography, economics, resources and military. The focus in this thesis is on micro-level forces due to the nature of soft security issues as it analyses the decision-making process.

Foreign policy decision-making is at the core of FPA (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, Alden and Aran 2012, p.110, Smith et al 2012, Blankshain 2019 and Dorani 2019). Mintz and DeRouen (2010, p.3) defined it as the process out of which choices by "individuals, groups and coalitions make that affect a nation's actions on the international stage". Therefore, studying the "human process" as well as the factors that resulted in states' decisions over foreign policy matters is how FPDM is defined (Schafer, Crichlow 2010, p.8). The foundations of FPDM have been developed by Snyder, Bruck and Spain (Schafer and Crichlow, 2010; Dorani 2019 and Hudson 2020). Behaviourists were the ones who paid close attention to understanding foreign policy decision-making and to influence its study (Alden and Aran 2012, p.5). These decisions are highly uncertain and risky in their results mainly in times of crisis (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, p.3). Foreign policy decision-making is a process of interaction among different players in "an interactive setting" (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, p.4). To further elaborate, Alden and Aran (2012, p.115) described it as a state of flux due to changes that occur within offices and halls of policy makers and changes that are happening within a society. It reflects the policy makers' perception of

both the domestic and international systems (Kuperman 2006, p.538). That is a reason for scholars to observe the context in which foreign policy decisions are being made, (Alden and Aran 2012, p.115). The role of context has been significant in the empirical cases.

It is worth mentioning that FPDM consists of four main components of what decision makers do as Mintz and De Rouen (2010, p.4) quoted Robinson and Synder for (1965, p.437) these are:

1- Identifying the decision problem,
2- Searching for alternatives,
3- Choosing an alternative, and
4- Executing the alternative

The main purpose of studying FPDM is to help answer the "why" question over a specific behaviour in foreign policy matters, (Theis 2018, p.6). The "why" means an explanation for the behaviour of the main actors involved in the decision-making process, their choices, and the circumstances that surrounded the decision-making process. FPDM analyses the role of humans, their errors, personalities, and prejudices (Schafer and Crichlow 2010, p. 9).

In addition, FPDM helps to assess if actors were looking for their own personal interests or they were objective in making these decisions. An objective leader, I argue, is the one who looks after the state's interests rather than his own interests in staying in power. This is clear in how leaders construct an issue as of security threat, and in turn requires the employability of ST. As Dorani (2019, p.72) illustrated FPDM has three determinants that is mainly principled on the actors. These determinants are actors' motivations, communication during the decision-making process and competence This focus on communication and discourse of the leaders as decision makers hint if the leader is confrontational or cooperative in his attitude in resolving a crisis, (Walker, Malici and Schafer 2011, p.223). This is very useful for this dissertation and could be linked with ST, as ST focuses on the discourse and communication. Hence, FPDM is going to be useful in this dissertation as it will help to explain 'why' specific actors in Egypt behaved in a particular way during the crisis situations investigated. The purpose of the case studies is to investigate the genesis and resolution of soft security crises. Also, FPDM is helpful as it explains actors' reaction and discourse in times of crisis. Thus, the contribution of this dissertation will be applying FPDM on soft security threats in Egypt; a non-European state

as being an understudied country and showcasing that soft security threats could top foreign policy agendas. FPDM helps to understand the reasons for leaders' choice in being cooperative or confrontational under such critical circumstances.

FPDM is an approach that shows that "who governs matters" (Schafer and Crichlow 2010, p.9). It uncovers who the decision makers are and uncover the justifications they might give to their behaviour and their choices for one decision over the other. FPDM focuses on both the actors and the process of decision making, as Dorani (2019) mentioned, consequently what actors do and the dynamics between them is examined. The internal and external causal factors that influence these actors who make foreign policy decisions are explored within FPDM. In addition, actors' goals, behaviour, perceptions and motivations have an influence over Foreign Policy decision makers and this is exposed with FPDM (Dorani 2019, p.72). As a result, FPDM is a rich and all-encompassing approach as Dorani (2019, p.72) described it and is in turn my choice for application in this dissertation.

3.1.1.5 Individual Level of Analysis

> "The course of world politics is shaped by leaders' decisions,,…, If we can understand how decisions are made, we can better understand and, perhaps more important, predict outcomes in international arena"(Mintz and DeRouen 2010,p.4).

The individual level of analysis emphasises the role of leaders and the decision-making institutions. Rosenau (1966), Katzenstein (1996), Lapid and Kratochwil (1996), Hudson (1997 & 2006), and Theis (2018, p.8) all agree that FPA the main focus becomes the 'humans' as the main shapers of states' foreign policy due to their role in the decision making process. This forms the first level of analysis in FPA. In FPDM the units of analysis specifically refer to the entities making the decisions (such as leaders, groups, and coalitions), unlike in IR levels of analysis which has three levels known as individual, the state, and the system level of analysis (Mintz and De Rouen 2010, p.18). When talking about role of the individual in foreign policy decisions Hudson (2005, p.10) stated that,

> The mind of a foreign policy maker is not a tabula rasa: it contains complex and intricately related information and patterns, such as beliefs, attitudes, values,

> experiences, emotions, traits, style, memory, national, and self-conceptions. Each decision-maker's mind is a microcosm of the variety possible in a given society.

This shows that studying the individual is beneficial to understand how they reach such decisions. Walker (2011, p.7) further explained that the importance of using the individual level of analysis in understanding and explaining FPDM is like "approaching IR from inside-out". This emphasises the thorough and deep analysis on foreign policy matters that the individual level of analysis provides. Moreover, examining the individual level of analysis has been neglected in IR for some time but revived more recently (Morin and Paquin 2018, p.70). This neglect was due to the intensive focus on both the state and the system levels of analysis as playing an influential role in foreign policy decision-making. Furthermore, with the recent concern in studying the decision maker's role in foreign policy this helped to reinstate the interest in investigating the individual level of analysis as there are other individuals involved in decision-making (Morin and Paquin 2018, p.70).

Roberts (1988) advocated that FPDM is based on 'subjective' matters rather than-'objective'- ones. The decisions made are based on individuals' interest rather than for the common interest of the state. This is beneficial in this thesis as it explains why policy changes over time and between administrations. As individuals are driven by self-interest more than by the common good, this explains two ideas; first that humans should be the nucleus of attention more than the state. This marks FPA scholars' distinction away from the Realist School's domination in IR that focuses its attention on the state and system. Second, it also shows that the first stage of FPA was characterised by 'actor specific' theory at various levels and methodological experimentation. Rosenau, a pioneer of actor-specific approach said that leaders or group of individuals in leading positions involved in the decision-making process in foreign policy use it as a tool to remain in power and gain popularity and drive public's attention away from domestic problems (Rosenau in Farrell, 1966, p.33). This is clearly illustrated in the case of Egypt post the Arab Spring where the role of the President has been notable in foreign policy and even a weak President, like Mohamed Morsi dominated by a group; the Muslim Brotherhood, also showed intense interest in foreign policy as a tool to remain in power after the uprising. This idea is elaborated more on in chapter four and in the case study chapters five and six.

Foreign Policy scholars such as Sprout and Sprout (1957), and Hudson (2006) added to the field that an explanation for factors; like the international environment and context surrounding decision-makers must be studied as they influence the decision-making process. This is because humans are affected by their surroundings, situations, and circumstances they are put under which affects their decisions either positively or negatively (Morin and Paquin 2018, p.70). Leaders are often risk takers, as Field (1990) described them as they will be held accountable, by their people, for the consequences of their decisions. This depends on the context and if it is a crisis situation or not. Whether leaders are risk takers or not will be later highlighted in the empirical discussions.

This dissertation is focused on actor-specific, as the leaders in Egypt play a key role in resolving foreign policy crisis. Hence, studying the individual level of analysis is central to FPA as it is based on the actor-specific and focuses on the leadership role in foreign policy decision making. Although, individuals are always viewed as risk takers who opt for the rational choice in any decision, this is not necessarily always the case. As Farkas (1996) explained an individual or a group of individuals can be irrational yet still make rational choices in foreign policy decisions as "one's propensity for risk is independent of any framing effects." However, actor specific in FPA also includes individuals as collectives in foreign policy decision making. This means that a decision could be made collectively by a group of people under the guidance of a leader. This is clear in the case of Egypt as it has a leader-staff model in decision making. This will be further examined and explained in the empirical cases.

Individuals have different reasons for making decisions domestically or externally. Individuals, who are mainly subjective, are driven by various motivations. Morin and Paquin (2018, p. 75) and Günay (2016, p.39) elaborated on these motivations as being to consolidate their power, impose an ideology, a "desire to win" a crisis, impose a political project or to advance social relations in their country. This fits the examined case studies as the model drove me to collect relevant data from speeches, news reports, accounts from people who were close to the government, etc. collected

3.1.1.6 Leaders' Role in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

> "Leaders help explain, frame, and make meaning of issues, thus they are worth attention" (Herman and Hagen 1998 in Lamm et al 2019, p.186).

As Mintz and De Roun (2010) emphasised, leaders are the main unit of analysis of foreign policy decision-making as they are the key entity that makes decisions. Hence, leaders are my central focus in this dissertation. It is critical to study the role of leaders in authoritarian states as first, their role is more pronounced. Second, it is difficult to obtain data about the 'behind the scenes' mechanisms, but the statements of the leader are publicly available and actions can be 'observed' even when the state machinery acts, it is generally at the behest of the leader. Leaders are central in presidential systems where one individual controls the executive branch of government and exerts power over the military/security forces. Studying leaders is important as they have "a stamp on events" as Jervis described them (2013, p.154).

Foreign policy decision making is the result of two levels which differ from the levels of analysis. First, is the role of actor(s) like individuals, institutions or groups and this is known according to Smith et al (2012, p.117), as "lower level" while the second level they called it "higher-level" as it is made up of the international level, culture, and state. However, this section and the dissertation as a whole, will focus on the *lower level* as it will focus on *individuals* who are the main actors and will have a particular interest in investigating the role of leaders in foreign policy decision making as they become the 'solvers' of crisis. I will examine the role of other actors when looking at the President alone does not provide satisfactory explanation.

Actors involved in decision-making are not always objective in their decisions as they have their own biases, prejudices, and interests (Walker, Malici and Schafer 2011, p.86). Furthermore, the actors' initial intentions and aims are not always met at the actual outcome stemming from the decision (Hill 2016, p.58). Hill (2016, p.5) said that it is the leader's choice that determines the foreign policy decisions as there is no "monopoly" of the ministry of foreign affairs over a state's external affairs, as it depends on the structure of the state. Breunig (2007, p.57) argued that foreign policy decision making does *not* result from one "homogeneous entity" as a result of the interactions between various entities who influence the main decision-maker. It is important to understand the role of the different actors involved in the decision-making process and how the power dynamics between them leads to specific outcomes.

From reviewing the literature on foreign policy decision making a few issues can be observed and generalised. First, according to Hill (2016, p.59) foreign policy, in democracies, is usually thought of as the duty of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however this is not an exclusive job for the minister as there are other actors involved with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in making these decisions. Second, there is also a lot of bargaining between the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other actors to result in the final foreign policy of a state. The other actors involved in foreign policy decision making include the president or prime minister or monarch (according to the system; presidential or parliamentary or a mix of both or monarchy) will be explained later. There are also other actors involved and this depends on the nature of the policy that is being discussed and the context in which a policy is being processed. Hill's (2016) analysis is mainly visible in democracies but differs in non-democratic states that experience more domination of the monarch or president over foreign policy decisions.

Hermann and Hermann (1989) explained that foreign policy decisions are made by an "ultimate decision unit" which changes according to the context and to the problem being discussed which is also responsible for allocating resources to handle the situation. As an example, if an issue is related to water, as in this dissertation's empirical study, then the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation shall be involved as a decision-maker. During crises, the ministry of defence and national security advisors are invited into the decision-making process (Hill 2016, p.61) but they are not necessarily present if it was a non-crisis situation. This depends on the country experiencing a crisis and its governing style, so it is important to understand the system of a country to identify via FPDM the actors involved in the crisis unit and their roles.

Another key player in foreign policy decision making is the role played by the intelligence services. This position is critical and sensitive as they are accountable to the president or prime minister directly, hence they must be present in highly important discussions, nevertheless crisis situations (Hill 2016, p.60). However, the intelligence services are an agency rather than one individual. Nonetheless, there is another actor who could play a role in foreign policy decisions but is not essentially present in all the decisions made. This actor is the head of foreign affairs committee in the parliament (Hill 2016, p.61) but it depends on the power of parliament in a country.

In explaining the importance of underscoring the leaders' role in foreign policy decision-making, the literature explored showed that in the majority of cases when a foreign policy decision is made the president and their advisory team are held responsible for it before the people and the media, (Pfiffner 2005, p.217, Gallagher and Allen 2016, p.1). This is because it is the leader's decisions that are mainly significant to the public. The importance in studying a leaders' role in foreign policy decision making comes from the fact that leaders' decisions are influential internally and externally. Hermann and Hagen (1998, p.124) explained that, by saying that leaders' decisions "cross borders", this means that their decisions have an external influence. Consequently, this led me to investigate the role of a leader in foreign policy decision making.

In questioning the reasons for why leaders matter, scholars have argued that great men influenced international politics in world history (Byman and Pollack in Dyson 2017, p.6). Leaders are important to see elements of continuity or change in a state's foreign policy due to their influence on FP (Jervis 2013, p.154 and Selim 2020). Leaders, moreover, are drivers of politics and hence must be focused upon (Dyson 2017, p.1). Furthermore, leaders make the headlines of the news and social conversation more than other institutions but they are absent from IR journals and literature, thus they require further analysis and study (Dyson 2017, p.2 and Carter 2017, p.2). Leaders want to maximize their stay in power (survival approach) so studying them would help tell us understand their choices in FP decisions. (Dyson 2017, p.4 & 10 and Carter 2017). Who is in power has 'real' repercussions on the rest of the world and shapes important international events (Dyson 2017, p.4). Leaders exercise a "direct and decisive influence on state behaviour" (Dyson 2017, p.6).

It should be underscored that leaders choose the context in which they can show their leadership skills and have their name recorded in history (Hill 2016, p.65). Thus, context matters when leaders make their decisions. In times of transitions and instability, such as the timeframe chosen in this dissertation, context does matter. Still during times of crisis, which is a critical context, leaders do not make decisions unilaterally instead they prefer consultation. My investigation will explore whether this is held in my selected cases, and what the implications are. This is because firstly "crises are generally pathways to war" as described by Keller (2005, p.215) and secondly, leaders prefer to form a "consensus" on their decision with the rest of the political elites surrounding them, so as to share the

responsibility (Hill 2016, p.63). In crisis times leaders are obliged to show interest in foreign policy even if they normally do not (Smith 2012). This is because of the context imposed on them in a crisis. Also, it is in crisis times, when a fate of a nation is decided by these leaders hence leaders become careful in making their decisions as it becomes their responsibility. It is the nature of the crisis which imposes on the leader which actors to choose for his small group (Hermann and Hagen 1998, p.128). Hermann and Hagen (1998, p.128) explained that leaders choose a small group who have different backgrounds but will set their indifferences aside to reach a solution for the crisis in a short time. In crisis times, an assessment of the leaders is made by the people to show their success or failure and to assess the leaders' capability in leading the nation. During crisis time's leaders' decision-making styles, insights, beliefs and biases are acute in understanding foreign policy decisions, (Keller 2005, p.228 and Walker, Malici and Schafer 2011, p.86). By understanding these beliefs, biases and insights, they would help in explaining how leaders construct a crisis and how they would attempt to resolve it.

There are different examples of leaders such as: presidents, prime ministers and monarchs. The title of the leader depends on the type of system governing the country i.e., presidential or parliamentary, or a mix of both or a monarchical system. To narrow down the literature consulted in this part, I pay attention more to presidents as main leadership styles.

Within the presidential system there is a dichotomy when studying leadership, and the dichotomy lies between the president only and his leadership style among his advisory body (Pfiffner 2005, p.221). Margret Hermann in the 1980s was a pioneer in categorising leadership style generally and its role in foreign policy decision-making in particular. She then dedicated her further collaborative research to provide a comprehensive idea of leaders from different parts of the globe. Kaarbo (1997) focused more on prime ministers as leaders and collaborated with Hermann (1998) on analyses of a prime ministerial leadership roles in foreign policy decision making. However, their work was limited as it mainly concentrated on European governmental systems. Exploring more analysis on presidents' role was added with the works of Dawisha in 1970s, Korany (1986) and Korany and Dessouki (2008) on the Middle East, where they investigated the role of president in crisis times and presidents' leadership styles. This region shall be my main focus. Then, Hinnebusch (2015) added more insightful literature on the non-European world by

dedicating his research to the Arab and Middle Eastern leaders. Hinnebusch (2015, p.77) saw that applying FPA in this part of the world was understudied.

There are some advantages in reviewing Kaarbo's (1997, p.559) ideas that come from the distinction she drew between presidential and parliamentary systems in the decision-making process. Kaarbo (1997, p.559) and Breunig (2007, p.87) clarified that presidential systems are mainly featured with a "hierarchical order" unlike the parliamentary system which is more of "collaborative authority". This shows that in presidential systems unilateral decisions are easier to make than in parliamentary ones, where prime ministers must refer to their party or to the coalition they have formed. This dissertation, and its focus on Egypt, is an example of a presidential system that is characterised by hierarchical order. Furthermore, Kaarbo (1997, p.564) and Morin and Paquin (2018, p.71) illustrated that prime ministers are more concerned with domestic politics over foreign policy unless it is a crisis situation, unlike in a presidential system where presidents are more attentive to foreign affairs in both crisis and non-crisis times. This clear attention to foreign policy decisions is made in both democratic and non-democratic states in crisis times. Moreover, the leadership role in foreign policy decision making has been heavily researched on presidential systems, with special attention given to the American presidential system (Kaarbo and Hermann 1998, p.243, Breuning 2007, p.86). Thus, Kaarbo's (1997), and Kaarbo and Hermann's (1998) research is an addition to the literature on foreign policy decision making, in exploring the role of a prime minister but still it is confined to the Western part of the world, and ignores the Middle East region.

Kaarbo (1997, p.555) explained that styles of prime ministers as leaders in foreign policy decision making are influenced by specific features structured by the state's model. Kaarbo explained the role by which the constitution defines the duties of the prime minister and their role in foreign policy and how much power is centralised in the prime minister's hands. Kaarbo (1997, p.555) further clarified that prime ministers are constrained other factors as by the party that elected them, the cabinet if it is of a single or multi-party rule, and the "importance of a cabinet committee system". It can be argued that some of those features as the constraints imposed by parties can be also found in the presidential system, such as the constitutional framework, however these constraints are limited to democracies. In non-democracies on the other hand, there could be a defined framework for the president to function within, yet the president could overrule it as leaders in non-democracies mainly

monopolise power. Although Hermann and Hermann (1989, p.365) and Breunig (2007, p.86) contested that the monopoly over foreign policy decision making is not an exclusive feature of non-democracies as it can also be found also in democratic countries. Hermann and Hermann (1989, p.365) substantiated that by using Abraham Lincoln, the late US president, as an example in his exclusive foreign policy decisions and they classified him as a predominant leader.

As mentioned above, Hermann and Hermann (1989, p.363-364) explained the role of the "ultimate decision unit" and they also divided this unit into three categories as "predominant leader, single group, and multiple autonomous group". These classifications are based on the number of actors involved in them and power concentration. The predominant leader is the one person who has immense powers to defeat his opposition. The second classification is the single group which is formed of a group of people who interact together, and their decision is a collective act. The last classification is the multiple autonomous group; they are a group of separate individuals with no higher authority to control them (Hermann and Hermann 1989, p.364). The focus of this dissertation will be on the predominant leader as the ultimate decision-making unit in the foreign policy decision-making process. This is because it is the most suitable for Egypt and its foreign policy decision making set up that will be explored in further details in chapter four. Moreover, the predominant leader represented in the presidents in this dissertation show that leaders are the ones who manage foreign policy crises and direct their staff members to resolve them. Nonetheless, leaders in non-democratic states are heavily involved in foreign policy decision making as part of their legitimacy comes from their performance on foreign policy issues (Hinnebusch in Brummer, 2015, p.78). The role of the president is clearly illustrated in the empirical cases from the speeches they made about the crises and the several references made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs to the role and importance of the president in resolving the crises.

Hermann and Hermann (1989, p. 365-366) distinguished between leadership styles that affect their foreign policy decisions. Leaders are either "sensitive or insensitive" in their orientation to information. Leaders with "insensitive" characters are viewed by Hermann and Hermann (1989) as being rigid in making their foreign policy decisions as they prefer to monopolise foreign policy decisions. They are more aggressive in making their foreign policy decisions and are mainly motivated by ideology, ambition or a task (Keller and

Yang, 2008, p.690). While "sensitive" characters would be more relaxed in making their decisions and are more consultative in making their choices (Hermann and Hermann 1989, p.366). This is because they are pragmatic and value the views of their constituents about them, (Keller and Yang 2008, p.690). Therefore, it is important to understand the personality of a leader while also focusing more on the political system in order to be able to understand the power dynamics. Consequently, this distinction made by Hermann and Hermann (1989) led other scholars of foreign policy to focus more on the personality of the leaders such as the work by Keller (2005) and Keller and Yang (2008), while specific attention to the cognitive aspect of the leader came with Smith's et al (2012) work. This attention to the cognitive aspect results from leaders being influential characters in foreign policy decision-making regardless of the type of system they are operating within.

In Korany's (1986 and 2014) view foreign policy as a theory has two main schools to focus upon: the psychological school and the bureaucratic school. In the literature covering the Middle East most of the focus is on the psychology of leaders (Hinnebusch in Brummer 2015). Selim (2020) also underscored the domination of the psychological-idiosyncrasy approach in foreign policy decision making. This is also known as the personal attribute approach, that focuses on leaders' personal choices based on their perception of the world and their psychological traits (Carter 2017, p.1). "This is to show the 'great man' in making decisions", (Korany 1986) which showcases the acute attention given to presidents of the ME. It is essential to emphasise that not all leaders in general (Keller 2005,228) and in the Arab or the Middle East in particular behave in the same way in terms of acquiring information and processing it. Also, not all rogue3 leaders generally and in the ME region in particular, behave in the same way defiant leader. Malici et al (2011, p.86) explained that rogue leaders cannot be classified as all the same, because leader's attitude changes according to some factors as context, situation facing their country as well as the domestic and international constraints. As Malici et al (2011, p. 86 &94) added that not all rogue leaders are insensitive, aggressive and confrontational by nature.

According to Hermann and Hermann (1989), and Hermann et al (2001) there are sensitive and insensitive leaders within the same region. The behaviour of 'sensitive' leaders would

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[3] Rogue leaders are leaders of states that are *rogue* and *defiant*. The description of this type of state is "Rogue states are said (or partly known) to sponsor or practice international terrorism and to engage in the acquisition and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (Malici 2011, p.83).

show that they are adaptable, shrewd, pragmatic and test conflicting information before they make their decisions according to the situation. A famous example of this type of leadership is the late King Hussein of Jordan (Hermann and Hermann 1989, p.366) whose policies were assessed as marked by shrewdness. This in turn results in an environment that is more diplomatic and open to negotiations rather than confrontational. On the other hand, the 'insensitive' leaders are characterised as having strong views about the world and their opinion matters more than anyone else's. Thus, these leaders' choices in the surrounding advisory group would be for people who would approve the leader's ideas. The insensitive leaders are unwelcoming of advice and data given by others. They are behaving in "crusaders way, ideologues and aggressive" (Hermann 1989, p.365). Smith et al (2012) and Morin and Paquin (2018) further explained that these insensitive leaders behave aggressively and may use force as they ignore social norms. Thus, their decisions are quickly made and the environment they live in is more confrontational as they are extreme (Hermann and Hermann 1989, p. 366&384 and Keller and Yang 2008). An example to illustrate that is Qaddafi of Libya (Hermann and Hermann 1989, p.365) who used to give aggressive speeches. Furthermore, Walker, Malici and Schafer (2011, p.223) highlighted that states' leaders understanding and evaluations of the situation are not always a reflection of the 'real' circumstances.

Kaarbo (1997, p.562-563) added to the above list of characteristics to distinguish between leaders such as "goal-oriented" leaders who focus on their goals, and who prefer to take action. This type of leader develops plans, evaluates work quality and stresses expert information, shows real interest in foreign policy and are likely to take unilateral decisions to reach their goals (Kaarbo 1997, p.574-575). This type of leader could be considered as being interested in having as much power to be concentrated in their hands to establish their rule. On the other hand, there are leaders who are "demotivated" and lack interest in foreign policy as they prefer to focus more on domestic politics (Kaarbo 1997, p.565). Thus, they prefer to appoint strong foreign policy ministers who would have strong negotiation skills and stay in office for a long time (Kaarbo 1997, p.559-560). Kaarbo's classification will be mainly applied in the empirical case studies in assessing the presidents' performance in managing foreign policy crises. This will be done by assessing the role of the minister of foreign affairs under the president's administration and judging the president's character.

There is also another classification for leaders and how they organise their circles when making decisions. This is by having an "inner circle" that is close to the leader and highly supported by the leader. There is another "outer circle" which the leader supervises, and the leader gives it less attention and less support (Kaarbo 1997, p.563). Although Kaarbo (1997) applied this to the prime minister model, this can still be applicable to presidential systems as their characteristic fit with presidents in the Middle East. However, it cannot be generalised that all leaders are group-oriented. Some leaders would also prefer to act unilaterality unless it is a crisis. The feature of a "group-oriented" leader is highlighted as having equality as the leader "give the minority a chance to be heard" (Hermann 1980, Kaarbo 1997, p.563, and Hermann and Hagan 1998). Furthermore, a group-oriented leader works on resolving disputes between group members by encouraging team work (Kaarbo 1997, p.563). The self-centred leader is the opposite of this.

Keller (2005) added further distinctions between leaders according to their views on domestic constraints that influence their foreign policy behaviour and decisions. Keller (2005) explained that leaders were either "constraint respecter" or "constraint challenger" and they vary in their reactions to these constraints. Leaders characterised as "constraint respecter" respond to the constraint by keeping it within their environment (Keller 2005, p.205). While leaders categorised as "constraint challenger" view this constraint as an obstacle to be overcome (Keller 2005, p.205). Keller (2005) applied this on foreign crises facing both democratic and non-democratic states. Keller (2005, p.205 and 228) concluded that leaders in democracies with 'constraint respecter' characteristics behave in a 'peaceful' way towards foreign policy crises as they appreciate diplomacy more than violent engagement. While leaders typified as 'constraint challenger', in both democracies and non-democracies, behave in an aggressive manner towards crises. I will use this distinction in the following empirical case studies. A justification for that could be because these leaders' belief in themselves and they need a lot of power and they think they have the ability to control everything (Dyson 2017, p.18).

To conclude, the FPA/FPDM literature demonstrates that how the leaders approach a decision reveals a lot about their character and could show unexpected behaviour contrary to their backgrounds. I will consider how the context has an impact on foreign policy decision making as Selim (2020, p.3) underscored. As mentioned in the securitisation section, context does matter as this dissertation uses an unstable period with different

administrations ruling Egypt (2011-2013) until a period of relative stability (2014 until 2018). This context had its influence over the leaders of Egypt during this period and in turn it was reflected on managing the crises under investigation. I see that context is a common point between securitisation theory and FPDM. In a non-democratic country, under the president's directives crises are resolved, thus leaders' role in foreign policy decision making is essential to be underpinned. It is leaders' declaration about a foreign policy issue that makes it a crisis or not. It is also through their statements that they inform the public about the crisis and the methods used to manage these crises.

3.1.1.7 Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Decisions

This sub-section will explain the role of public opinion in foreign policy decisions making. It will start by defining public opinion. It will tackle how public opinion is shaped. The reason for tackling the role of public opinion in foreign policy decision- making is that I am linking it to the role of the audience in the next theory to be used in this research; securitisation theory. Public Opinion, according to Dyson (2017, p.14), acts as either a constraint or as an opportunity to leaders on foreign policy matters.

Public opinion can be defined as the behaviour, views, attitudes and reactions of citizens about a specific topic (Davison 2012, p.2). This opinion can be formed by the people on domestic or on external issues. Moreover, these views can be a collection of opposing or agreeing on a topic (Davison 2012, p.1). Hence, creating a division within one society over one matter by these different stands. Public opinion is characterised as being non-monotonous as Walter (2015, p.205) described it. That is because public opinion varies according to the topic and its context; crisis or non-crisis times (Knecht and Weatherford 2006, p.706).

Public opinion can be used by leaders for their own benefits. To further elaborate, leaders use public opinion to support their policies on foreign and security agendas. This could be evident in both democratic and authoritarian states. According to Page and Barabas (2000, p.339 cited in Dyson 2017, p.14), "the public and the leader can share broad foreign policy commitment, but differ regarding specific policies." Also, it is important to pay attention to public opinion because the public can be emotional and overreact on specific foreign policy

issue (Dyson 2017, p.14). Thus, when the public is focused on foreign policy issues, leaders must take their preference into consideration (Dyson 2017, p.15). While, Buzan (1991, p.115) stated that it is important to involve the public in their leaders' fear so that the public would be aware of the circumstances or else an issue will be ignored. Shiraev and Zubok (p.197 & 208) added that public opinion could be taken into account and become influential over policy makers when these policy makers have a goal such as to increase the support for the leader against domestic opposition.

Thus, public opinion helps in building a reputable image for leaders and can also destroy that image. Walter (2015, p.202) described it as "building a political legacy for a leader" and it becomes also "personalized political legacy". Sobel (quoted in Garrison 2002, p.323) stated that leaders do take into consideration, while shaping their foreign policy actions, strategies, and the reactions of public opinion. This drives leaders to frame and market their ideas in order to test the reaction of the public before implementing their policy. Once public opinion shows support to the policy that will in turn facilitate the leaders to implement the policies and strategies they had come up with.

There are several factors that shape public opinion. Examples of these factors are the social environment, role of NGOs, trade unions and political leaders (Davison 2012, p.3). My focus here will be on the role of political leaders and the tools they use to amplify their ideas. Political elites and leaders among them frame and market their ideas mainly through the media. So, the first step for political elites would be the framing process by which leaders frame and present information to an audience (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, p.152-153). This is also linked to Securitisation Theory. In ST, as will be discussed later, leaders use their speeches to underscore an issue as a threat, so a specific issue is framed of *security* importance by the leaders who would then need the audience or public to be convinced and accept this issue as a *security* issue rather than as a *normal* issue or a *political* issue.

Framing becomes more acute in times of crisis as the public has limited knowledge and information on the crisis. As mentioned earlier, one feature of a crisis is that it starts secretly among the leaders and political elites and then it is revealed to the public. When leaders allow releasing news about a crisis, it is with limited information as they need the public's support over measures taken to contain or manage the crisis. Henceforth, framing and marketing become viable under times of crisis (Mintz and DeRouen 2010, p. 152

&163) and Thomson (2016, p.415). In fact, Thomson (2016, p.415) observed that public opinion will always be supportive to the president's decisions in times of crisis as long as it is projected as threating national security. Public opinion will back up the use of "coercive" measures such as sanctions, embargos or military acts (but not all military acts) if the threat seems existential (Thomson 2016, p.415 & 418). This is linked to securitisation theory.

The role of public opinion is taken into consideration as the public are the ones who determine and judge the policies undertaken by the political elites. It is the public who play a role in deciding if a president should continue in office due to good decisions or shall be voted out due to bad decisions in terms of accountability. Also, it is the public who either support or reject the use of certain acts and measures proposed by their leader in solving an issue. This is commonly viewed on domestic matters more than on foreign policy issues. Weeks (2012, p.327) argued that autocrats and dictators become wary of the public's opinion in foreign policy matters as the public would punish their leaders for their mistakes in foreign policy.

To conclude, public opinion is important in the discussion of this dissertation as it helps to parallel the FPDM approach to Securitisation Theory. Public opinion plays a role in the decision-making process by rejecting or approving measures used by state's leaders which is a critical component of Securitisation Theory. Public opinion is taken into consideration by autocratic as well as democratic leaders although to varying degrees and on different issues. In autocracies leaders use public opinion on issues related to foreign policy yet not on domestic issues (Weeks 2012, p.327 and Ojieh 2015, p.33) and such foreign policy issues could arguably be said to be soft issues rather than hard issues related to the use of force. Leaders frame issues by using the media in order to influence public opinion to win them on the leaders' side. If the public gets persuaded with the argument presented by their leader, then the leader will carry on with their foreign and security agendas. If the public approves and supports their leader on these acts, and they turn out to disadvantage the nation and cost them, and the leader fails to solve the crisis as expected, then it is the public who hold the leader responsible for these acts. This in turn would stop the public backing their leader, and accountability measures would be taken into account. This is the same as the role of the audience in Securitisation Theory whose acceptance for the security act by the securitising leaders is a profound part of the equation for the securitisation process to

become a success. An assessment of the role of public opinion in Egypt will be discussed in both empirical cases in chapters five and six.

3.1.1.8 Concluding FPA Section

To conclude, FPA can be viewed as unpacking the 'black box'. That is because it explains the decision-making process done inside the black box; which is the state. This means that it analyses the role of actors within the state who have a role in the decision-making process.

As mentioned earlier, FPA is very useful to understand human choices in normal times and during crisis times. Field (1990) stressed that FPA is used, especially the individual level of analysis, to explain how individuals "solve" problems and the crises they face. The motivation for solving a crisis becomes clear by applying FPDM. However, a gap can be found in the FPDM literature, that is the reasons these individuals who frame these problems and instigate crisis to serve their interests. Hence explaining the motivation for creating a crisis is unexplained by FPDM. So, the decision makers became 'creators' of the crisis and at the same time the 'solvers' of it. Therefore, this theoretical approach has to be complemented by another approach such as Securitisation Theory as it further discusses the attitude of individual(s) in triggering a crisis.

There is a distinction between FPA application and implementation between regions and it differs according to the regime and the government type. Most of the literature on FPA has been originating from democratic countries while the empirical implementation provided by the second generation targeted non-democratic states. To cite some scholarly work on non-democratic states, and their foreign policy decision making like the works of Redd and Mintz (2013) who worked on non-democratic states, while Adar and Ajulu (2018) and Dorani (2019) studied African states. These scholars focused mainly on just two levels: the individual level and the bureaucratic level. There has been some research done on Egypt's foreign policy that heavily investigated the hard crises Egypt faced under Nasser's regime such as the work of Dawisha in the 1970s, Korany in 1980s and 2008, and Hinnebusch in 2015. But their research mainly concentrated on FPDM during hard crises, my thesis will offer a new addition in FPDM during crises times by focusing on soft security issues as

water, refugees, and migrants' crises. The application of FPDM is helpful to understand the formal process but does not underscore the arguments made in the discourse, and the importance of labelling some issues as *security*. Therefore, ST is used to complement this gap.

3.1.2 Securitisation Theory

This section will discuss Securitisation Theory (ST), and its main components. Securitisation means moving an issue from the normal political domain into the high political domain or more specifically into the security domain. This move is done by specific actors in a particular context in various ways as will be explained later in detail. Securitisation Theory argues that security threats are socially constructed in the process of securitisation. Barry Buzan (1991, p.116-118,122-123 &131) a pioneer scholar of this theory and a major contributor, began by explaining the meaning of *threats* and classifying types of threats by sector such as military, political, societal, economic and ecological. These types of threats vary between military and non-military threats even though Buzan in the 1990s did not initially use these two distinctions. It is worth mentioning that Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde in the 1990s were among security studies scholars involved in the debate between "wide" versus "narrow" security a distinction that evolved as a result of the Cold War period which was heavily focused on *hard/*military security and nuclear wars (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.2-3). Their co-authored book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* did widen the security meaning by adding new *soft*/non-military threats such as the societal and ecological threats. Securitisation Theory is the best to be applied on this dissertation's empirical studies as it addresses *soft* threats as water and refugees and migrants that fall under the umbrella of Buzan's (1998) classification of societal, economic, and ecological threats. Although ST is viewed as a euro-centric theory, I argue that it is an adaptable theory; that is easy to apply on many empirical studies outside Europe (Stritzel 2007, Vuori 2008, and Kapur and Mabon 2018). This flexibility of application is an advantage of this theory that justifies my use of it in this dissertation.

The use of this theory on the case studies will help in understanding how the securitising actors constructed these two issues as threats. ST will unpack who the securitising actors are and how these securitising actors differed in identifying an issue as a threat. It is worth

noting that there are two main schools in Securitisation Theory; one that has been dominant for a long time known as the Copenhagen School, and the second is the Paris School which came to revise and add to the previous school. In the coming sections I will discuss both schools as I engage with elements of both.

3.1.2.1 Securitisation and the Copenhagen School

The Copenhagen School (CS) was "developed by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute in Copenhagen in the 1990s" (Stritzel 2014, p.11). It radicalised the concept of security away from the traditional realist security concept and it focused on speech acts that are inter-subjectively constructed (Stritzel 2014, p.13). In the CS, securitisation relies mainly on speech acts made by securitising actors and accepted by the audience on a referent object that becomes under threat. It is this heavy focus on the speech act in the form of language which has been viewed as a point of critique to this CS school's approach. Williams (2003) and Hansen (2000 & 2011), from the second generation of securitisation theorists argued that securitisation can happen without focusing on language - instead images and using visual effects could replace speeches. However, in this dissertation I will not get engaged with the. Moreover, ST has neglected to bring in the "context" in which the speech act was made (McDonald 2008, Vuori 2008, Wilkinson 2011 in Balzacq, and Rychnovska 2014). Furthermore, this theory focuses very much on the state and its political elites as the main securitising actors while it neglects the role of non-state actors, including regional or international organisations as securitising actors (Wilfried Greaves and Daniel Pomerants 2017, Darwish and Fakhoury 2017, and Malmvig 2019).

Securitisation Theory has many advantages. First, it has expanded the concept of security to make it more comprehensive and inclusive. Traditionally security studies scholars talked about security as "international security", that means security as a collective concept, but with ST new concepts were introduced such as including "societal security" (Hansen 2000, p.296). Societal security is concerned with society's problems rather than borders, territories, sovereignty, and arms conflicts alone (Hansen 2000, p.289). This explains the wider meaning, and deeper meaning for security. Butler (2007, p.108) said that speech acts in ST is not only restricted to securitise military issues but can be expanded beyond that. Second, Butler (2007, p.108) defined security threats that can affect not just public figures as individuals or sovereignty, and territories but also can threaten ideas, identity, symbols,

norms and principles. This thesis aims to provide an example of such threats to ideas, symbols, and identity as a soft security threat by using the Nile and Syrian refugees and migrant flows as case studies.

It is worthwhile noting that, "securitisation is what is done with it, as a theory" and is the product of a "decision" (Cote 2014). To elaborate, there are certain decisions made to securitise particular issues to be perceived as existential threats by the securitising actors. ST aims at moving an issue from normal "routine" politics to become a high politics, security and "non-routine" issue that requires exceptional measures to protect a referent object (Floyd 2016), or as Stritzel (2014, p.15) called it "supreme priority". Also, Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2015) have perfectly put a definition for securitisation as in the form of "threat creation and threat handling". This shows that the 'creators' of this security threat are also the ones who 'handle' and manage it. To explain how securitisation happens Taureck (2006, p.55) said that securitisation takes three steps: identifying a threat, taking an emergency action, and "effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules". However, they have failed to offer a reason for this threat creation. This dissertation will provide a reason for this threat creation by supplementing it with FPDM.

There are a few factors that identify an issue as of national security importance, or if it is a crisis, and if it should be counted as a securitisation topic or not. The first factor, is the timing or *context* (Balzacq 2005, Vuori 2008, Maybee 2011, and Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015), and this is related to the circumstances under which the incident happened. The second factor is the actor(s) that securitise a matter or *securitising agent* (Baldwin 1997, and Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015); these are leaders of a state or political elites. Third factor is the *audience* themselves and their tendency to accept *speech acts* given by actors highlighting a matter as of security peril or not (Balzacq 2005, Vuori 2008, and Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015); they could be either the political elites or the general population.

According to Baldwin (1997), Hansen (2000) and Ciuta (2009) the securitising agent is a single actor who makes the decisions, and identifies security, the degree of urgency of these threats and when to underpin them to secure his values. Subjectivity in securitising an issue is embedded in it by the role of the securitising agent who has certain interests which need to be protected and securitised. Therefore, securitisation to be understood as a subjective

issue requires an understanding of the securitising actor. This will be investigated in the below sub-section.

3.1.2.2 Securitising Actor

Buzan (1996), Hansen (2000), and Taureck (2006) showed that the securitising actors are responsible for securitising an issue for the purposes of the protection of a referent objective. This referent object is underscored as a national security issue according to the actor. A referent object is defined by Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.36) as, "things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival". Buzan (1991, p.119) stated that referent objects under threat could become issues that put the state under peril such as threats targeting state's institutions, state's ideology or national identity. Hence the referent object here could be an ideology or identity which is not merely related to military fears but also includes political, environmental and societal fears. This justifies that they are also *soft* threats like water, refugees, and migrants' issues used as examples in this dissertation. Buzan (1991, p.123) said that societal and economic threats can be considered as a national security issue that are also threatened. Šulović (2010, p.2) explained further that a referent object is not only referring to the state, but it could be expanded also to include human beings and social groups. As Šulović (2010) included humans, Watson (2011) added and stressed upon human dignity and life as a referent object in ST. This shows that the umbrella of security threats is becoming wider to be more inclusive of other soft/non-military topics such as identity and water.

To explain the essence of securitising actors, Buzan (1998, p.416) further gave examples in the political sector describing them to be the political leaders in a state, heads of parties, leader of a tribe or political institutions. Importantly, this stresses the role of individuals – and leaders - in ST which can be found in common within FPDM. In addition, the focus on the role of actors underpins the concept of 'subjectivity' in ST. Identifying an issue as an existential threat will be *subjective* to the securitising agent as the political leader or to the head of tribe as they identify issues based on their perception. This is the reason for seeing the political sector in ST as being too subjective as it is connected to the legitimacy and recognition of the securitising actor (Buzan 1998, p.142). Thus, the issue to be securitised

is not seen as a "normal" political issue instead it becomes an "emergency" or a crisis (Floyd 2016).

Hansen (2000, p.289) criticised the CS for its ambiguous identification of the securitising actors. Hansen (2000, p.289) then said that this lack of clarity is due to the fact that all those who make speech acts are known to be powerful people, in a leadership position in the state. However, Vuori (2008, p.77) argued that not all securitising speeches are made by official figures. Vuori (2008, p.77) explained that the securitising actors could be outside the decision-making process and their aim is to drive the attention of the leaders of the state to a pressing issue that is under threat in order to put it on the decision-makers' agenda. These securitising actors outside the official authority could include journalists and scholars (Vuori 2008, p.77) and in this case the audience would be the heads of states.

As for Butler (2007), a security issue becomes an act of securitisation via an existential threat being recognised via a speech act. The issue is securitised when it is highlighted by an actor who announces it as a problem. "It is declared as an emergency condition", said Butler (2007, p.111). This shows the pivotal role that an actor plays by using a specific language by which these actors try to influence the audience to gain their support to securitise that particular issue. Therefore, to further understand the securitisation process by implementing it on my empirical cases, a close analysis of leaders' speeches relating to the relevant issues will be made. The speeches broadcast on YouTube will be discussed and analysed and reference to newspapers articles in both English and Arabic will be made to underscore the stark language used by Egyptian leaders to highlight an issue as a security threat in the empirical cases of this dissertation. The analysis will be based on counting which words and how many times securitising actors mention words that are alarming to the public.

Securitising actors choose an issue that should be protected by maximum measures which is known as the referent object. Then the most important thing becomes, to gain the acceptance of the audience to use these 'extra' emergency measures as they are perceived as unusual and most likely non-military measures. However, some traditional measures can be used in response to a non-military emergency as this thesis will illustrate. Therefore, the burden over the securitising actor to convince the audience is huge for the securitisation move to succeed. As Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.25) stated it is the "discourse"

used by the securitising actor over a referent object that makes it seem like an existential threat to be able to convince the audience. Thus, the coming section discusses the speech act.

3.1.2.3 Speech Act

 The speech act is an essential component of the securitisation process. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998), Hansen (2000), Balzacq (2005), Tawreck (2006), Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka (2015), and Cote (2016) all focused on the role of language and communication. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) saw that the success or failure of the securitisation process depends to a great extent on the discourse used by the securitising agents to convince the relative audiences. These scholars said that speech act works as a "facilitating condition" for the success or failure of securitisation (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 1998, p.32). The speech must follow, "internal, linguistic-grammatical conditions" (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 1998, p.32). This shows that the speech ought to be carefully chosen by the securitising actor and fit within the culture where it is delivered in order to ensure that it will be appealing to the public to guarantee its success. The choice of words is remarkable as securitising actors are keen in choosing words that have connotations and relevance to a specific context or culture to appeal to the audience. Taureck (2006) continues with this line of thought by explaining that constructivists view that the language used by securitising actors is the one which makes an issue appear to have security importance, "the utterance" of security.

Williams (2009, p.306) further argued that security is defined by speech acts which would result in "threats becoming represented and recognized" in the speeches of the securitising actor. Speech acts justify the use of extra measures to contain that threat. Speech acts make exceptional measures appealing to the public, "thus giving it special status and legitimizing extraordinary measures" Glover (2009, p.1). Nyman (2013, p.53 in Shepherd) elaborated, that the use of discourse to define a problem as being secure has nothing to do with the threat's actuality. This underscores the critical role played by the securitising actors and their linguistic usage to create an emergency issue that would be for subjective reasons.

Accordingly, a threat is created, "once a speaker performs a speech act and declares an existential threat, the issue is then framed within a special kind of politics where emergency action and rule breaking can be legitimized against a socially constructed threat" said Butler (2007, p.108). Baele and Thomson (2017, p.646) described speech acts as the discourse made by the elites as an indication of the importance of the securitising agent's language. These statements are not made at any time as the securitising agents are considerate in making these securitising moves in a certain context - which leads to a later discussion (see section below) on the role of context in Securitisation Theory. Studying speeches made by leaders at specific occasions underscores the importance of a referent object by the usage of specialised discourse. I analyse some Egyptian leader's statements that try to provide evidence of securitisation moves with respect to the chosen cases. As mentioned earlier, the speeches were available on YouTube and I have searched for all speeches related to my case studies, and then examined them. I have chosen some of these speeches in particular as they tackled threats directly as leaders mentioned the word *security* and *threats* in them. It should be mentioned that some other speech acts, made by leaders, were not made in the public domain and not covered in the media, so the alternative was to investigate diplomats and other political elites' perception on these issues and assess if they saw it as a threat or not.

3.1.2.4 Audience

The role of the audience continues the chain of securitisation. The audience could be the average citizen or other political elites. The audience's role is of an equal weight to the role played by the context in Securitisation Theory (Vuori 2008, and Hansen 2011). It is this audience who determine the success or failure of the Securitisation process. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.25) conditioned that "the issue is securitised *only* if and *when* the audience accepts it as such". Huysmans (2011, p.372) further emphasised that, "the circulation of security speech and its appropriation or refusal by those who are addressed" matters. If the audience does not approve that an issue is an existential threat, then for Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.25) this should be considered as a "move" but not the full process. Therefore, there are conditions for the audience to accept the securitisation of an issue. This is due to the audience's sense of threat to their community's unity,

identity, culture, or stability. If audiences feel that there is a threat to their "existence and survival" then there is a high chance for their acceptance of securitisation (Nyman 2013, p.53). In addition, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.23) explained that threats to identity could happen due to "internal and external developments", thus a collective identity is formed. Thus, securitising actors could refer to identity and unity in their speeches as an issue to be securitised. In fact, as Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.41) mentioned, securitising actors highlight the issue of identity in their discourse so as to gain "nations" support. Therefore, the issue of underscoring unity and identity becomes a necessary tool for them to maintain the nation's stability. This is vivid in threats coming from terrorism and migrants as well as threats to national symbols.

Furthermore, Cote (2016), and Balzacq and Guzzini (2015) described the role of the audience as a *unit* of analysis for the success of ST. Balzacq (2005) saw that one of the weak points of the CS is its main emphasis on 'speeches' rather than on 'audiences'. Balzacq suggested that CS should be "audience centred" (Nyman 2013, p.61). In addition, Balzacq and Guzzini (2016) said that there are two ways to follow up with securitisation which are due to the role of an actor and role of the audience where securitising an object happens. It depends on audience positions and willingness that an issue becomes securitised or not. In my empirical studies, I will illustrate the audience's role in succeeding or failing the securitisation moves by the presidents. This will be achieved by explaining the average citizens' treatment to Ethiopian and Syrian refugees on Egyptian streets. Also, I will give examples of how some MPs reacted to the GERD construction and Syrian refugees' presence in Egypt post 2013.

Balzacq (2005), and Roe (2008, p.615) further expanded the audience's role to be not only based on approval or disapproval instead it goes beyond that as it shows both a "moral" and a "formal" support to the securitising actors to carry on with their security agendas. The *moral* part is coming from the "masses" and the *formal* support comes from the "legislative branch" such as the Parliament or Congress which represents the people in both democracies and non-democracies (Roe 2008, p.616). Both the moral and formal support according to Balzacq (2005) in Roe (2008, p.620) are crucially important. The moral and formal approval are not synonymous. Despite the fact that formal approval comes from the people, yet it is indirect since it comes from MPs who represent them. Those members are the elites, this differentiates it from the moral approval which is the direct public opinion.

Therefore, it is important for the securitising actors to gain the approval of the public and their representatives at the same time for the securitisation process to be complete and successful. It should be highlighted that audiences are not fixed as who the audience is in a given securitisation process will be determined by various factors as illustrated by Vuori (2008, p.76 & 77). This will be illustrated in the case studies investigated. The audience response will be studied by checking the public's attitude toward Ethiopian & Syrian refugees and migrants residing in Egypt documented in some newspapers, reports and extracted from interviews with Syrian refugees.

3.1.2.5 Securitisation and The Paris School

The Paris School came to revise the conditions of Securitisation Theory especially the emphasis of the Copenhagen School (CS) on speech acts. The CS with its pioneer scholars as Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) talked about the importance of speeches given by the securitising actors to alarm the audience about an issue. However, the Paris School came to revise this conditionality and prove through various empirical studies that securitisation theory is not conditioned on speeches but it can be present by practice. This practice is carried out by the professional habitus as identified by Bigo (2014, p. 210) as in institutions or governmental bodies against the source of threats identified by the securitising actors. Pioneers of the Paris School are Foucault, Bourdieu, Bigo, Pouliot, Bourbeau, Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka. The Paris School started in the field of sociology and literature such as the work of Foucault and Bourdieu. Each of these scholars had a new contribution to add to enhance this school. If the CS is about the focus on *linguistic* use and logic of exception to security (Bourbeau 2014, p. 188), then the Paris School is about the *practice*, and process of security (Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015, p.495) and the logic of routine (Bourbeau 2014, p. 188). The practice of security, according to the Paris School, is represented in the use of force, detention and surveillance (Bigo 2014 p.210). This practical use is commonly used against threats emanating from migrants and refugees. Thus, this justifies the employability of this school in this dissertation on the case of Syrian refugees and migrants. Bourdieu and Giddens are advocates of the practical school (Bueger 2016, p. 5). Bigo's pioneer scholarly work in 1990s focused mainly on proving the concept of practice in security by using empirical studies (Bueger 2016, p.5). The core of the Paris School is on the *techniques* of the government not *rhetorical*. Therefore, one can argue that, the Paris School is a practice-oriented school rather than discourse oriented. A famous case

of empirical application of this school is on the case of migrants in Europe. This is illustrated in the work of scholars as Bigo's work (2014), Bourbeau (2014) and Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka (2015) who heavily investigated the case of migrants in Europe. However, this literature is mainly focused on the EU and the US rather than on the Middle East and the Arab World. Hence, my dissertation will help to fill in the gap in this literature.

3.1.2.6 Context

Baele and Thomson (2017, p.651) defined context as the timeframe "within which the entire [securitisation] process takes place". The impact of context on the audience is profound as it plays an influential role in either the acceptance or disapproval of the audience for a speech act. It also plays an effective role in benefiting political elites' / securitising agents to use it to make an issue seem as an *urgent* matter that cannot be delayed and must be reacted to. Balzacq (2005) saw time and context as a crucial matter. There is a debate over context on whether context is a pre-existing one or it is tailored according to securitising acts (Baele and Thomson 2017, p.659-660) and (Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzika 2015). In this part I take the stand that context is "pre-existing" by which securitising actors make use out of and securitise an issue. This will be further demonstrated in the case studies by showing the context in which leaders made their speeches which played a role in persuading the audience to accept the securitisation process.

Statements and speeches are made by securitising actors during a specific time period chosen by these actors. I do not view it as a matter of coincidence rather it is a matter of choice, by the securitising actors, of the context to make this speech more memorable and influential for the audience. The speeches made also relate the content to the context to be more persuasive with the audience. Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998, p.37) view that context is important and is interpreted by individuals who explain events within a specific time by using words that relate to a "social context", that is seen as subjective to the securitising agent. Therefore, it is the securitising actors who use certain contexts to emphasise a specific idea as Balzacq explained (Hansen 2011). Scholars as Mabee (2011) and Balzacq and Guzzini (2015) focused on the sociological atmosphere that influences the audience so that the securitisation process happens successfully. Henceforth, it is this sociological atmosphere that is fitting within the society and is matching with its culture,

identity, demography and conditions under a specific context that is used by political elites who want to securitise an issue. This makes its chances to get the approval of the audience higher than in other societies or in other contexts. To further elaborate on this point, Baele and Thomson (2017, p.659) stated that context differs from one society to another and from one level to another; macro-level context and micro-level context. The macro-level context deals with the global context while the micro-level context deals with the domestic context, (Baele and Thomson 2017, p.659). In this thesis the micro-level context is the focus. Therefore, securitising actors could choose times of turbulences and transitions to securitise an issue as in this dissertation's two cases.

Furthermore, Rosenau (1966, p.28) explained this idea previously by saying, "The well springs of international action are also fed by events and tendencies *within* societies". This explains role of some factors such as: agent, events, the context and the audience and it shows that context could overlap and could influence both the macro-level and the micro-level. Moreover, it emphasises the role of context in determining audience's mood and could thus influence their approval or disapproval of the speech, hence securitisation succeeds or fails as Baele and Thomson (2017, p.659) concluded.

Speeches by leaders or political elites could create pressures for decisions to be made and not just to securitise an issue when delivered in a specific context. Examples show that, "state holidays, political campaigns, and other speechifying occasions create pressures for decisions because high-level elites either reiterate old policies or announce new ones on such occasions" (Lentner 1975, p.180). This could act as a double-edged sword as this means that leaders or political elites are obliged to abide by the promises made in speeches for gaining credibility and maintaining legitimacy from their people and at the same time altering their foreign policy or adjusting it accordingly. Again, this indicates that securitising elites use context for their *subjective* interests and for securitisation. It also leads to further discussion on the *act* which securitising actors make.

Huysmans (2011, p.373) elaborated on the term "act" by saying that securitising actors make decisions that are created by the speeches they made before the audience in order to securitise an issue. Therefore, this act of decision "creation" should make these actors "answerable" before the public as they are "responsible" for those decisions being made, Huysmans (2011, p.373). This reinstates my point which I argue that securitisation leads to

crisis creation by securitising actors, but it is unclear why these securitising actors/leaders create this emergency situation – here, FPDM can potentially help to identify their motivations.

Furthermore, Huysmans (2011, p.376) explained that putting the speech into action is a remarkable point in determining the success or failure of securitisation. This is because this "actualization" of the speech means moving from normal politics to emergency politics, thus *creating* a crisis. Floyd (2016, p.679) further added that it is this justified "action" by the securitising agent and change in behaviour that determines the success or failure of securitisation. But still ST offers *no* answer to how the crisis would be resolved or what were the motivations behind creating it. This means that ST is incomplete and needs to be complemented by FPDM. The purpose of offering such an account is to provide a more holistic overview of the emergence and attempted resolution of crises. In addition, it stresses the importance of *action* in the speech and after the speech in order to evaluate the success of the securitisation attempt.

3.1.2.7 Soft Issues Securitised

Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998), Butler (2007), Hansen (2011), and Lupovici (2014) clarified that the securitisation of referent objects can be in many fields such as environment, politics, economics, identity or even culture. Hence, it could be applied not only to hard security issues but also to soft security issues - such as the case studies investigated in this dissertation. This shows that threats can come not only from sources of war or military means but instead from other 'soft' or 'non-military' sources or as Butler (2007, p.108) labelled them "outside the military apparatus". It is important to clarify that the issue is initially political, but then treated as a security issue not in the conventional hard security sense, but in the soft security sense.

Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.37) explained that traditionalist and hard-line realists and liberals view security revolving around the state since it is the main actor and unit of analysis. However, they challenged that by stating that security can get expanded and become more comprehensive to encompass under its umbrella issues as the economy and environment as new units of analysis to be focused upon, Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde

(1998, p.37). Jägerskog (2011, p.759) mentioned that securitising a soft security issue depends on the securitising actor themselves who assess if that issue is of cultural value or not and if it is within their interest and could be counted as of the national interest or not.

Politicians have used these non-military threats to be securitised. Politicians used speeches to shed light over certain non-military/soft issues and they securitise it by saying that it is of national-security importance and leave it to the audience who either approve it or not using a specific context. It is the choice of these securitising actors/politicians to make an issue securitised or not. Leaders as the main securitising actors treat a soft issue as of security importance once they see it is linked to their survival in power. These leaders label 'soft' issues as a 'security' issue that is threatened and needs protection. A soft security issue, as in the case studies, could be threatened by external forces which in turn causes tensions with other states. Dosch (2006) explained that the concept of security is a relative term differing according to the actor's perception. Hence, actors are the ones who securitise an issue to make it either viewed as secure or insecure and as a threat or not. An example to demonstrate that some leaders refuse to securitise non-military/soft issues is George W. Bush who refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 as he saw that climate change is not a real threat and cannot be securitised as it is not in the interest of the USA economy, (Jägerskog 2011, p.759). Although the rest of the world, "macro-level" context, supported the signing the Kyoto Protocol, Bush saw that on the "micro-level" context climate change, which is a soft security threat, is not a "real scientific" threat to be securitised (Jägerskog 2011, p.759). Therefore, it is up to the leaders'/securitising actors to choose which soft issues to be projected as an eminent security threat and others not.

Stern (2003) added that soft/non-military security threats such as economic issues - or as Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998) called it economic sector - are counted as "short-term" threats to "material and political values", Stern (2003, p.188). Buzan, Weaver and De Wilde (1998, p.100) stated that the economic sector is the most diverse as its referent object varies between social classes, global and local market, individuals and states. Therefore, the economic sector can be securitised by the political elites who fear losing their positions in the government and project the image that their state's ideology and economic system which it adopts are in jeopardy. Jägerskog (2011, p.757 -758) explained that water issues have been securitised in water-stressed regions including the Middle East via the example of the Palestinian-Israeli tensions over water resources and how it is viewed by Palestinian

authorities as of "national security" importance and could be securitised. Assessing a successful or a failed securitisation comes from how the audience reacts to the situation. If the audience accepts an issue to be of security importance, then the securitisation succeeds while if they do not react and see it falling into the normal political domain then the securitisation has failed. Thus, the audience are key in determining the success or failure of a securitisation move.

3.1.3 An Approach to Harnessing FPDM and ST in Tandem

This section shows how Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision-Making can be considered as complementary when focusing on the treatment of soft security crises by foreign policy elites. Foreign Policy Analysis provides the tools to explain decision-making and explores how options are offered and selected when attempting to resolve crises. Securitisation Theory exposes how issues become considered as 'security' threats and the actors responsible for this shift. The creator – those who articulated the threat – can take a role in solving or managing the crisis. That is the link that is to be drawn from the theories above to bridge this gap. The reason for being a *framer* of a problem and being the *solver* of a crisis in my opinion is the same due to 'subjective' interests. However, both the instigator of the problem and the solver of it use(s) a specific pre-existing context to their own benefit. The context could be war, aggression or riots or revolutions or even upcoming elections which will serve these instigators' and solvers' interests. ST shows how a crisis emerges and the discourse used to describe it as such while FPDM helps us understand who plays the various roles and who makes key decisions in the context of a given country's system of government.

It is important to take the actor-specific approach to understand security politics and decision-making. This is the reason for choosing both an analytical theory as ST and an approach as FPDM. FPDM is not designed to be able to account for such process of social construction of a non-security issue: but ST does. ST on the other hand, does not provide the tools for understanding how institutions put constraints on actors and cannot explain how the decision-making process works once an issue is securitised. Both approaches allow conceptual space for identities to matter, but in different ways.

The second point of intersection is that both are 'actor-specific' theories as they analyse and focus on human beings and the behaviour of individual's acts whether as one individual or as a group of individuals in terms of decision maker(s) or securitising actor(s) represented in political elites. Decision makers weigh the options available and pick the ones that would be of maximum interest and least losses to both them and to the state. In Securitisation Theory, the securitising agents are portrayed as also "self-interested" which is why Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) have referred to these securitising actors as being *subjective*. Even though it could be understood that it is due to some cognitive aspects and psychological ones that these securitising actors behave in this way. But still in the CS it is unexplained which tactics these actors use other than making speeches or images but by using the Paris School some insights about the process become clearer. ST does not explain if securitising actors have many alternatives to choose from in order to come up with these chosen measures, that would seem as different or alarming to audiences, that's why securitising actors would frame it to be acceptable to the audience. Because ST lacks causation, it cannot explain why securitising actors chose to take certain additional measures to address a problem or crisis they are experiencing. As a result, they were forced to present a problem as an existential danger. It is only clear that the chosen issue to be securitised is of an extreme importance to the audience related to their identity, culture or ideology. Thus, the leaders choose the soft security issue that matters the most to the audience.

Furthermore, both theories meet when this foreign policy decision could be 'subjectively' created according to the 'interest(s)' of the securitising actors who are the political elites involved in the decision-making process and are the focus at the individual level. Here FPDM – based on a positivist epistemology (Behravesh 2011) - is used to explain the behaviour of the decision-maker in a specific context (crisis time) towards an issue in particular (securitised referent object). Based on the argument of Auguste Comte (Feigl 2019) who argued that positivist methods should be used to understand human behaviour. The decision makers or securitising actors have to convince the audience that these soft issues are jeopardizing their own security, values and is of a national security concern. It is here when the audience would accept these speech acts and view them as a security threat and that this is a crisis situation in which they delegate to the political elites to manage them.

ST, grounded in a constructivist epistemology, will meet with FPDM in this empirical study in analysing the context and the behaviour of the decision-makers who are the securitising elites in explaining why they securitised these soft issues in specific and what their interests are. This could differentiate between the two theories. However, this differentiation could be resolved by "studying discourse analysis which is new to FPA as part of IR theory which was introduced by Post-Structuralists" Hansen (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2012, p.107). This is a way to overcome positivist epistemology of FPA. Leaders, "constructs states visions via discourses", this state's vision is linked to its foreign policy goals and objectives (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne 2012, p.107). This thesis brings both constructivists and positivist epistemological approaches together. However, due to limited access to the necessary components of the discourse that are available in democracies and even more limited in non-democracies which lacks free and open debate on sensitive issues I will not use discourse analysis as my method of analysis in this thesis.

The third point of intersection is that both ST and FPDM are not constrained to be applied within a particular regime type and can work in any, providing a sufficient understanding of the system and the actors (see chapter four on Egyptian foreign policy for further justification).

Furthermore, ST and FPDM overlap in their focus on public opinion and the audience. To illustrate, in FPDM the role of public opinion tends to be influential over foreign policy decisions as it assesses the leader as a decision-maker. While the success or failure of ST comes from the role of the audience. In FPDM if public opinion is "misled or manipulated" as Shapiro and Lawrence (2000, p.244) argued it goes in a different direction away from what a policy maker wants which could act as an 'obstacle' for policy makers to carry on with their agendas. A solution to that obstacle as Shapiro and Lawrence (2000, p.244) described could be that the political elites either ignore public opinion or act in a more decisive attitude which would seem to the public as their government or political elites going undemocratic as it ignored their will and opinion. However, in order to avoid that, Shapiro and Lawrence (2000, p.244) gave another solution which is for the political elites to be patient and "delay" their decisions until they would be able to "persuade" their public with their decisions.

Yet, I can give another alternative solution which brings in the two theories together; if political elites face such hurdles from the public they resort to ST and present via speeches, images and playing on the people's emotions the situation as a 'crisis' of high urgency and that the situation cannot be resolved except by these political leaders and elites' plea. This could gain the public's support who might become alarmed by the *crisis* situation and its *urgency* and accept the securitisation of the issue and approve the decisions made by the political elites to resolve the situation. To demonstrate the importance of public opinion Goertz (2004, p.15) said, "standard realists approach talks about a leader maximizing their foreign policy utilities under the constraints of public opinion,…., so the decision maker has two key goals; to please the public and address foreign policy aims". Thus, in times of crises the pressure on the decision maker(s) increases as a result of trying to minimise least losses and to please the public who have accepted to securitise the issue and dealt with it as a crisis situation using exceptional measures. This would help leaders (securitising actors) attain their goal. This dissertation offers an example of soft security issues creating crises securitised by the leaders of Egypt and resolved by them.

It is in ST that dissects the securitising actors according to the sector; the military sector has actors that are interested in the use of force. The military securitising actors are under the umbrella of the president or head of state, defence minister and its bureaucracies. In addition to these previous actors, mercenary companies who are involved in the military industry are counted as securitising actors (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 1998, p.56). While in another security sector, such as the environment, the security actors could be states concerned with the environment or the "global, environmental epistemic community", NGOs and environmental activists, Buzan, Weaver, de Wilde (1998, p.77). As this dissertation covers a country that adopts a presidential system and is considered as a non-democratic country, the role of the president is very visible in all decisions. Thus, even in environmental issues the president has a role in securitising the environment and makes foreign policy decisions that resolve this crisis.

Cote (2013 and 2014) has written extensively about the previous attempts to link securitisation theory with the foreign policy decision-making process. Cote (2014) referred to works by Rushton (2010), Vultee (2010 and 2011) and Watson (2012), all agreeing that both approaches have a common ground in the choice of context, language used and the power of the audience. Thus, the securitising actor becomes responsible for framing a crisis

to the audience in a certain context, using a specific language. This is done by choosing certain words when making a speech before the audience to securitise an issue and make it appear as a crisis (taken from Securitisation Theory) Cote (2014). This is the reason for paralleling both Securitisation Theory with Foreign Policy Decision-Making and applying them to the case of Egypt's foreign policy decision-making as my contribution. Although there is some relevant work out there on paralleling this framework but it was not applied on Egypt. Thus, this dissertation is important work, in my opinion, and it lays the foundation for future work on Egypt's foreign policies.

In reviewing the literature on Securitisation Theory (ST), I found that ST explores some comparable questions which the theory tries to answer. According to Buzan (1998, p. 32 &40) Securitisation Theory aims to provide a deep explanation and the same is true with the FPDM. These questions distinguish them from structural theories like neorealism which dominate IR literature. The questions that are linked in their answers are shown in Table 2:

Table 2 Motivating Questions in ST and FPDM.

This table shows the overlap between some questions between ST and FPDM.

ST	FPDM
Who securitises?	Who is the decision maker?
What issue-areas do the threats relate to?	How decision maker(s) reached such a decision?
For whom is it a threat (referent object)?	On what issue(s), threat or nonthreat, has the decision maker decided to take such a decision?
Why is it a threat?	For whom are these decisions made (audience/public)?

| What were the results? | What were the results? |
| What conditions contribute to success/failure of securitisation? | Under what conditions can these decisions be made? |

I argue that ST and FPDM focus on similar levels and units of analysis, substantive interest in the process. Using ST would help explain why a situation became flagged as a 'crisis' and using FPDM would explain the choices made by the decision-makers under such crisis circumstances. Decision-makers show the importance of the issue under threat to the audience (public and elites) and their reaction to it.

Both ST and FPDM intersect at the role played by humans as the *actor(s)*. In FPDM the actor or group of actors are the individual(s) such as 'leaders' who form a crisis group and are the ones who try to cope with the crisis and reach a solution to the problem. In ST, the actor is a 'securitising actor' as the leader or the political elites who securitise an issue to make it seem as a crisis and of national security priority that is urgently required to use specific measures to end the crisis (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 1998). The political elites are the securitising actors who securitise a "referent object" to make it seem as being under existential threat and *say it* to the audience via speeches who either approve or reject the securitising move and measures suggested by the actors to resolve a situation. Whoever utters the speech that securitises an issue is identified as the securitising actor, this is how ST identifies the actors.

Thus, the role of the actor in both FPDM & ST is critical. In ST the actor *creates* a crisis as Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) mentioned, but in FPDM an actor *solves* a crisis based on the actor's biases and self-interest. An actor's gains from this are either improving their image and reputation to gain popularity or discredit the opposition and the target is to consolidate themselves in power (Mintz and Safarine 2017). Therefore, the role of the actor(s) involved in solving a crisis by focusing on the individual is clear and cannot be ignored.

I also see another point of intersection between both ST and FPDM in the role of the audience or the role of public opinion. The role of the audience in ST is critical as they are the ones who determine the success or failure of the securitisation act and either accept it to make it a process or reject it to make it a securitisation move (Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde 1998). In ST the audience can be the average citizens, the political elites representing the state institutions, the opposition, NGOs, police and National Security Council. In FPDM the public are the average citizens (Davison 2012). In FPDM, the decision makers do present their decisions to the public and take their opinion into consideration, yet the decision makers can still continue with the measures they have decided upon even though the public rejected it as it is a crisis situation requiring a fast solution to the problem. Still decision-makers care about public opinion and take it into consideration as it acts as an indicator to the leaders' accountability and popularity. In both ST and FPDM the audience and public are influenced by the leader (Knecht and Weatherford 2006, p.705, and Walter 2015, p.203) as the person who made the speech and who formulates the audience and public's perception regarding a certain topic. Therefore, they are parallel but in ST the audience has more groups included.

3.1.3.1 Securitising Actors as Point of Intersection

Despite commonalities between Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Decision Making they cannot be counted as 'two sides of the same coin'. The reason for this is that some security scholars confirm the notion that a matter is securitised only by their "routine practice" as Bigo and Huysmans (Cote 2014, p.2) stated not by speech acts or the language used. This practice is carried out by the state's institutions. So, if it becomes a non-routine issue (i.e. crisis), then this crisis group's role would become visible as the situation is described as 'crises'. It is the decision-makers' concern and experience in security that leads to putting an issue on the top priority of the national security's agenda. Their background also plays a role in their perception of issues as matters of national security importance. However, a counter argument could be that this implies the importance of the role played by the decision-maker who securitises matters (securitising agent/actor) and puts them into action. That becomes noticeable more, if that decision maker comes from a

military background or intelligence (Hudson 2005). A crisis group is formed of a majority of people with a security background; so, it is in their nature to use speeches that contain security content and is security driven. Less attention is given in ST on leaders' (securitising actor) motivation to securitise a referent object. Thus, Cote's (2014, p.4) suggestion is to draw some linking points between FPDM and ST in studying the *motives* of an actor to understand why an actor transmits a matter as a security threat to his audience. This actor's motives are to securitise an issue for subjective gains.

Another point in common between FPDM and ST, is that both see decisions being made on foreign policy as 'political' decisions. This means that political decisions are interest driven and led (Dosch 2006 and Cote 2014). These interests are targeting audiences at a specified time frame from the belief that security is "what actors make out of it" according to Buzan and Weaver (2003, p.448). Politicians have used their speeches to underpin certain soft/non-military issues and they securitise it by saying it is of "national- security" importance to their audience who accept it and support their governments to securitise it, as will be seen with the two empirical cases used in this dissertation. The political elites are the ones who project these soft issues as threats and crises. Butler (2007) and Hansen (2011) said existential threats declared in speech acts shows the urgency and frames an issue as a crisis or of national security importance that requires protection, this is part of ST. In FPDM decision-makers are the ones who categories an issue as urgent or a crisis and form a crisis unit in order to manage it. It is the utterance of words like security and emergency which makes audience feel the urgency of the situation and that it is a crisis time.

3.1.3.2 Audience as Point of Intersection

Cote (2014, p.6) further explained that both ST and FPDM meet at a point where they both rely on the audience to form an issue into a security threat. But it is in Securitisation Theory where, "the exact role of the audience is still undetermined and hotly contested in Securitisation Theory". However, to overcome this problem is by investigating the general context that the audience were living under and the circumstances the state is going through. This would be helpful to explain the psychology of the audience who are either

influenced by the speech act or would reject it. Context is an important factor for the securitising actor to use stark language that influence the audience.

All these are useful points to be used as a framework to complement each theory. The nexus between ST and FPDM helps to fill the gaps by explaining the leaders (decision-makers and securitising agents) drive to cause crises and to resolve them. These intersections will be employed to show how actors reacted to crises and the reasons for these actors' keenness to resolve them. In this dissertation, I will examine how two different issues were developed by leaders to become crises and what did these actors do in attempting to resolve them. Considering the pre-existing context, as a period of turmoil, the actors used speeches that alarmed the public (audience) about the urgency of these crises and their motives behind both calling them as 'urgent' matters in their speeches and their enthusiasm to resolve them.

3.1.4 Summary of the Analytical Framework

To conclude, there are advantages to using both ST and FPDM and I will discuss them in the following section.

3.1.4.1 Advantages of Securitisation Theory

ST has several positive aspects. First, it is a useful theory to explain the behaviour of decision-makers and explain the reasons for certain issues to be securitised over others. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998, p.31) stated that security as a concept is defined by its actors, thus it becomes subjective rather than an objective concept. Taureck's (2006) further explained, "Securitisation Theory is instead a theoretical tool of analysis with which the analyst can trace incidences of securitisation and de-securitisation… a theoretical tool to facilitate practical security analysis". It is a theory that demonstrates that securitising agents have their biases and are subjective. "Security has a particular discursive and political force and is a concept that does -something –securitise rather than objective or subjective condition" (Balzacq and Guzzini 2015, p.99). Consequently, this explains the reasons for investigating who are the securitising actors in order to understand their interests to choose one topic over another to be securitised.

Second, leaders use the securitisation process to justify the measures they will use to protect a referent object. Balzacq and Guzzini (2015, p.99) said that, "securitisation enables policy makers to immediately adopt whatever means they deem appropriate to curb the threat". This proves that the securitisation process helps and works in the leaders' interests. This is supported by the speech act that exposes an issue as a security threat so that when the audience accept it, this will enable political elites to use all measures whether usual or extraordinary measure to contain these threats, (Taureck 2006 and Glover 2009).

Third, Butler (2007, p.109) praised Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde for, "creating threats outside war apparatus". This is because traditional security scholars are concerned with military threats which leads to wars rather than with other non-military threats. This is the result of the hegemony of realist and hard-line liberal scholars in debates on security. Buzan (1991, p.140) criticized such a domination. Buzan (1991, p.140) explained that, "most states are bureaucratically much better equipped to be sensitive to military threats than they are to environmental ones." Thus, Buzan and other security scholars worked on broadening the concept of security to make it inclusive of non-military/soft security threats. In my view, it has enriched security agenda by adding these non-military/soft security issues. It has shifted the attention from simply the state, more deeply to the humans of the state.

Threats have been traditionally framed in terms of war, occupation, invasions and coming from states against other states. With the rise of securitisation theorists and scholars, other threats have also been considered such as attacks on states by non-state actors in the form of terrorist attacks and other non-military/soft threats such as cyber security threats, migration waves, climate change and water shortages (Jägerskog 2011, p.757 and Baele and Thomson 2017, p.646). Finally, ST is beneficial in this thesis as it can help explain responses to soft security threats, and identify who the securitising actors are and give reasons for securitising specific referent objects.

3.1.4.2 Strength of FPDM

The strongest point of FPA lies in the fact that it can analyse decisions being made not just in foreign affairs but also on domestic ones. Therefore, it can provide an insight on the decision-making process regarding domestic issues as well as crises. FPA and its models as Hudson (2006, p.6) described it is, "integrative theoretical enterprise". FPA is about analysing factors affecting *decision makers and process making* (Dorani 2019, p.70). It also

investigates micro to macro decisions which makes it a thorough analytical framework. It is a multi-level and multifactorial method of explaining foreign policy decision-making. FPA is an inclusive and a comprehensive information process in explaining foreign policy as an outcome. Therefore, it studies the environment surrounding the decision makers, their psychology, cognitive as well as the socio-economic status of them and nevertheless the geography of the state (Hudson and Vore 1995).

The strength of FPA is that it's a theory with an empirical implementation and investigation which makes it easy to be used on different case studies around the world rather than just on the Western world (Dorani 2019, p.70). Finally, FPA has created a chain that links comparative study with foreign policy making with IR. So, it is a web of connections. There are common points particularly between IR and FPA in their use for levels of analysis and their emphasis on decision-making yet still both cannot be compared as Dorani (2019) claimed. Another advantage of FPA is that it is a causal explanatory approach that I argue can complement ST.

Both ST and FPDM also complement each other. ST does not offer a cause nor a solution to the crisis created by the securitising actor while FPDM gives insights into how the solution was arrived at not policy prescriptive itself. The intersection between both can be possibly made as one theory begins from where the other approach ends. This dissertation is an attempt to draw a link between both theories to help in better understanding the motives and goals. The case studies used in this dissertation hopes to show these links on two soft security issues: The Nile crisis and the migrants' crisis in Egypt's foreign policy post-2011.

Although trying to draw upon the similarities between ST and FPDM to identify a common ground they differ in how they refer to public opinion or the role of the audience. ST explains that actors create problems due to some self-interest which they refer to as causing existential threat to the state's identity, ideology or culture in 'their perception' thus it becomes a national security issue. The securitising actors in ST are the political elites, mainly the leader of a state who construct threats as will be demonstrated in the empirical studies. In foreign policy decision making by focusing on the individual level of analysis decision-makers solve a crisis for their own interests, which they project to be within the state's interest. These decision-makers are again the leaders of states along with the

political elites within this country who want to gain legitimacy, consolidate themselves in power in times of upheaval and instability as with the case studies examined.

Both ST and FPDM also differ though on the importance of using language. In ST it puts a lot of weight on the linguistic use of discourse or the "speech act" as Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) stressed which is at the essence of the CS. The speech act is viewed by ST scholars as the key to the success or failure of the securitisation move based on the condition of the audience's acceptance or rejection of such a speech. Therefore, the securitising actors become very conscious in their choice of words or images that they use to deliver to the audience. Securitising actors make a choice of words that are related to the identity and culture of the society for the speech to be more influential and appealing to the audience. I argue that it is due to the speech act that the audience (elites and public) feel that they are under crisis and an existential threat is threatening a core issue to the nation and encourages the audience to act in the direction which the securitising actor preferred. Thus, in my view, the use of powerful speeches and images are not as important in Foreign Policy Decision-Making as they are in Securitisation Theory. The below table 3 illustrates points of intersection between ST and FPDM and its application on the case studies. It demonstrates the unit of analysis, role of actor and the role of context and how they address crisis and the role of the public or the audience in such crises.

Table 2 Illustrates points of intersection between ST & FPDM and Application in Case Studies

	FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING	SECURITISATION THEORY	Application on Nile crisis	Application on Syrian Migrants and Refugees
Unit of Analysis	Individuals	Individuals	Presidents	Presidents
Role of Actor	Central	Central	Leader-Staff relations	Leader-Staff relations

Role of Context	Pre-existing When crisis happens Time becomes Narrow and tight which determines a situation as crisis	Pre-existing Contexts as war, aggression or revolution are used to make a situation be perceived as crisis	2010 until 2018 Four administrations ran the country	2011-2018 Three administrations ruled the country
Addressing Crisis	Leader and staff *Solves* and manages as it is exogenously determined	Leader and staff *Instigates* it as it is an endogenously constructed by the securitising actor	Unresolved	Resolved
Element of Secrecy	Crisis is kept as a secret at the beginning but not afterwards between the FPDM and Public	Securitising actors do not hide a crisis they keep it announced as they need the audience approval on the measures to be used against existential threat	Began as a covered issue but when crisis broke out it was not kept as a secret by leaders	Not a secret
Role of Public/Audience	Public opinion is used as an indicator by the decision makers to evaluate their policies if they are good or bad and an indicator for leader's popularity	Audience's role is critical as it either leads to securitisation to become a successful "process" or if it fails it becomes a failed securitised "move"	Political Elites and average citizens	Political Elites and average citizens

3.2. Methodology

3.2.1. Methods

The purpose of this section is to state the tools used in analysing this research puzzle. Qualitative methods, defined as the data examined and gathered without using numerical data (Lamont 2015, p.78), are used to research a set of empirical cases. Quantitative methods would not allow me to provide suitable answers to the questions as it is unclear how quantitative data could be collected or interpreted meaningfully to answer my research questions. As Jamshed (2014) mentioned, "qualitative research methodology is considered to be suitable when the researcher or the investigator either investigates a new field of study or intends to ascertain and theorize prominent issues". This is because my research questions require to be answered by the collection and analysis of qualitative data. The method used in this dissertation is based on document analysis. I looked for answers regarding if the two case studies used in this dissertation have been securitised or not and evaluated their success or failure as well as explaining the reasons for being securitised in this particular point in Egyptian history and how decision makers in foreign policy have managed these events. As I will be using ST to analyse the case studies, I will also use document analysis as it is appropriate given my research questions. The goal is to highlight the alarming statements made by decision-makers to securitise an issue.

Qualitative analysis is suitable to use and to implement in this empirical study as I am using two theoretical frameworks that entails the use of qualitative analysis and its tools to help to evaluate the "spoken and written language" (Lamont 2015, p.78) that are used by leaders. In Securitisation Theory, qualitative methods are useful as they help to explain the reaction of the society in accepting or rejecting the topics to be securitised made by the securitising actor in a speech. While in FPDM using qualitative analysis was used by focusing on the behaviour of the individuals in how they produced decisions by reviewing these decision makers' speeches and policies. Thus, document analysis, as a tool of qualitative methods was the best application in this dissertation as it records the main available speeches or statements made by decision-makers. I will analyse the statements leaders made on specific occasions and gatherings, also I will translate a Q&A made with the President discussing the second case study.

Since I am using documents and analysing them in this dissertation, it is worth defining a document and then defining document analysis. A document as defined by Matthews and Ross (2010, p.277) is "the written records about people and things that are generated through the process of living". Matthews and Ross (2010, p.278) have divided documents into written and non-written ones. Examples of written documents included diaries, official records, news items and commentary, institutional and organisational reports and committee minutes (Bowen 2009, p.27 and Matthews and Ross 2010, p. 278). While examples of non-written documents are like films, audiotapes, videos, photographs or even slogans (Matthews and Ross 2010, p. 278 and 279). As for document analysis it is defined as "a systemic procedure for reviewing and evaluating documents –both printed and electronic (computer-based and internet transmitted) material" (Bowen 2009, p. 27). Data must be analysed and interpreted during document analysis in order to extract meaning, gain insight, and produce empirical knowledge (Bowen 2009, p.27). This has been implanted in this thesis by document analysis "tend to acknowledge the subjectivity of their interpretations" as described by Wesley (2010, p.5). Using document analysis in this thesis is important as it acts as an indication of the frequency with which a specific set of keywords appears in the texts which may be helpful when referencing the presence of a specific "theme" in a collection of documents, for example (Wesley 2010, p.7). This increases the reader's belief in the accuracy of the analysis as Wesley (2010, p.7) explained.

Once I had my sources I started looking for key words as security, threats, and crisis. On the way I found other key words that interpreted the acuteness of the situation such as existential threat, life and death, blood and red-line. Such terms were used several times by different leaders. I analysed these sources in light of the context that they were made in and I connected them with the securitisation theory and FPDM.

3.2.2 Sources

This study uses data extracted from sources such as daily Egyptian newspapers (mainstream and opposition official papers) in both languages; Arabic and English as well as foreign electronic newspapers to reflect the international media's coverage of a topic. As a researcher in a foreign policy topic it is natural to gather data from published official documents, official statements and press releases given mainly by the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, Ministry of Migration, and

reports from the International Organisation of Migration (IOM). The translation from Arabic to English is my own work. In this dissertation I have also obtained my data from public guest lecture talks, and videos for leaders being interviewed.

Moreover, I have analysed some videos of speeches made by Egyptian officials and translated them from Arabic to English as a primary source. These videos were for Egypt's heads of states as well as other Egyptian officials in the period of 2011-2018 to cover the time framework covered in this dissertation. The speeches were broadcasted on national and private TV channels and the recordings were available on YouTube which I consulted.

The use of qualitative analysis is due to the general observation that it is a commonly used methodology in research covering the Middle East (ME) & Africa. McMillan & Weyers (2013, p.251) said that qualitative research is used to "scrutinize opinions, feelings and values". Furthermore, "qualitative research is generally exploratory in nature…. where its aim is often to understand the complex reasons for human behaviour" McMillan & Weyers (2013, p.253). Since I am using FPDM and focusing on leaders as individual decision makers then it is reasonable to use qualitative methods. Qualitative research uses various data analysis methods such as interviews, focus groups and case studies (Lamont 2015). Nevertheless, there are a range of theoretical perspectives which apply to evaluating information of this type McMillan & Weyers (2013, p.252) one of the observational approaches is "Field research". In this dissertation I will be using case studies and I have conducted semi-structured interviews with some Syrians, lawyers, and Egyptian MPs to complement the information acquired from document analysis.

Documents analysed include newspapers, magazines, video clips, advertisements, and television website beside international organisations and institutions' websites (Berg 2007, p.306, Blaxter et al 2011, p.191, Nagy et al 2011, p.228 and Gilbert 2012, p.292). To highlight one advantage of document analysis is its comprehensiveness and wide range as it covers both public and private documents and official and unofficial, (Blaxter et al 2011, p.232 and Gilbert 2012, p. 287). This gives a rich coverage for data. I have also referred back to two diaries of former Egyptian foreign ministers; Mr Ahmed Abu El Gheit and Mr Nabil Fahmy. The purpose of using data extracted from personal diaries helps in understanding the context in which the event occurred, the personal interpretation of the

situation, and the role of these authors in an event (Burnham et al 2008, p.191 and Matthews and Ross 2010, p.277).

Moreover, written records have a lot of other advantages as Johnson (2005, p. 230) has highlighted such as less direct contact with people is useful for researchers working far away from their case studies to be investigated so the flow of information is more open, easier, faster and less expensive in comparison to cost of traveling to conduct interviews or travelling long distance to gather the data (Johnson 2005, p.232). This was very useful during the outbreak of the pandemic (Covid-19) as it allowed me to collect data I was unable to collect due to the national lockdowns imposed.

However, there are also limitations in using document analysis such as biases of authors, it has been mentioned earlier that they have less biases, but they are not absolutely free from any biases, (Johnson 2005, p.232 and Blaxter et al 2011, p.191). In addition, documents might be prejudiced or who recorded them might have discarded some information, (Johnson 2005, p.233 and University of Portsmouth 2012). Another limitation of document analysis is the selectivity of information presented and written due to classified information that cannot be shared or has been falsified by the authors to protect public figures or to improve their image and save reputation of a nation, (Johnson 2005, p.233). This is very common in non-democratic states. A third limitation of written documents is the different recording systems which could be time consuming for a researcher to understand that differentiation, (Johnson 2005, p.234). Finally, in opaque systems it can also be difficult to get access to some documents, for example parliament minutes.

To conclude, I have used qualitative methods as it was the most appropriate method as I did not use numerical data in this dissertation. I used document analysis as a qualitative tool for this thesis. The justification for this is because I am using ST and FPDM and both focus on human behaviour whether written and/or spoken. I looked for statements made by presidents that were highlighted several times in the media coverage. I also looked for words that included the words: crisis, security, threats or urgency in them. My primary sources were speeches made by individuals in leadership positions in Egypt regarding the two case studies. Also, memories of former ministers of foreign affairs and interviews with MPs and Syrian refugees. I referred also to international media internet sources such as the BBC, CNN, The Guardian, The Washington Post and Foreign Affairs. I also used local

Egyptian newspapers; which represented both the political mainstream as well as semi-opposition. The time period covered is from 2011 until 2018. I conducted semi-structured interviews with two lawyers and some Syrians as I wanted to provide further evidence for the securitisation moves made by securitising actors to assess its success or failure. It showed that in case of Syrian refugees and migrants it was more of securitisation practices rather than just securitisation speeches.

Conclusion

This chapter presented the analytical framework used in this thesis and the methods to demonstrate the argument(s). A discussion of both ST and FPDM was given and a justification made to illustrate the use of both. ST frames crises but does not explain the causes while FPDM resolves the crises and clarifies the motivations. There are common grounds between both ST and FPDM mainly revolving around the securitising actor or the decision makers and the audiences. The methods used demonstrated the use of stark language that justified to securitise an issue and frame it as a threat. This approach helped in assessing the success or failure of the securitisation moves as well as examining the character of the decision-makers and evaluating the success or failure of the leader's management of the crisis and what solution has been reached. The case studies used were externally created and thus can be labelled as foreign policy crises as they had also implications over Egypt's relations with these countries; Ethiopia and Syria. Thus, it was necessary to use FPDM to evaluate the impact of these FP decisions over Egypt's relations with these countries. By using document analysis of local and international newspapers this assessment of FP decisions was attainable.

Chapter Four
Egypt's Foreign Policy

Introduction

Chapter four investigates how foreign policy decisions are made in Egypt. This chapter will help to explain the subsequent cases from an FPDM perspective, and generally show the power dynamics within the Egyptian political system. It will define the determinants and the objectives of the Egyptian foreign policy during the period 1952 - 2018. A historical overview of the development of the decision-making process since the announcement of the Republic in 1952 is provided, which is followed by an in-depth analysis of the period between 2011 and 2018. This examination shows that most Egyptian leaders were looking for stability in power and that each leader differently shapes his decision-making environment. The turbulent period Egypt went through due to the Arab Spring (2011) pressured each administration coming to power to be keen on consolidating itself in power, improving the country's economic situation and restoring stability. This background played a key role in influencing the Egyptian leaders' foreign policy decision making, explaining why these leaders-maintained centralisation of power and hierarchical control. It also shows the interference of security bodies in foreign policy decisions. An assessment of how each leader falls under Hermann and Kaarbo's models is also included.

4.1 Critique of Dominant Schools in Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM)

Korany (1986, p.39) categorised the two dominant analytical lenses for foreign policy decision making in the Middle East as the "psychological and the bureaucratic" schools although he criticised both schools for being limited and very narrow in their analysis as Foreign Policy Decision Making analysts reduce "all social processes to the perceptions and idiosyncrasies of the *great man.*" Korany described an overreliance on this approach as being "unwholesome" as it ignores other factors. Hinnebusch (2003, p. 91) added to this critique by stating that the foreign policy analysts in the Middle East believe that it is a region run by "dictators" and thus are portrayed as "irrational" in the decisions they make. Hinnebusch (2003, p. 91) argues that this as an incomprehensive analysis as it ignores the foreign policy

structure, interests, challenges and processes that influence the inputs of foreign policy decision making—this is in addition to the determinants that shape foreign policy in this region. As Egypt is a Middle Eastern state, analysing its foreign policy decision making is also influenced by the same perception about the whole region as it is a *one man show*. In this thesis I tend to shed light on foreign policy challenges facing leaders that influence their FPDM.

While Nael Shama (2014, p. 6) agrees with Korany on this criticism, Shama made another contribution to the analysis of foreign policy decision making in third world countries by adding that there is a "third way" which involves combining both the psychological school and the bureaucratic politics model as both are influential in the decision-making process on both the domestic and the foreign front. Shama justified this combination by stating that both the leader and their bureaucrats have an interest that they look to fulfill, while Selim (2022, p.3) observed that foreign policy analysis has been dominated by two main approaches. The first approach, Shama agrees with Korany and Hinnebusch as "it advocates a psychological-idiosyncratic approach" by focusing on the role of the leader within the individual level of analysis. The second approach focuses on the international level of analysis as it emphasises the role of the international system.

4.2 Foreign Policy Decision Making in Egypt

Egypt overthrew the monarchial rule in the Free Officers-led Movement in 1952 that led to complete independence from Britain. The first president of Egypt after the Republic was announced, was Gamal Abd El Nasser who assumed power in 1954 (Hinnebusch & Shama 2014, p. 80). Egypt struggled to gain its independence throughout its history. Hence, Egypt's sovereignty has become a treasure to be protected and sustained since 1952. All Egyptian leaders kept preserving independence as a main foreign policy objective and as a national security issue which led Middle East specialists to describe it as a "challenge" (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 96). Maintaining territorial independence was linked to the Egyptians' assessment of any leader which also increases or reduces his legitimacy and popularity. Arguably, sustaining territorial independence is an issue that matters to the public and to the leaders in the non-democratic world. Nasser, as the leader of the Free Officers Movement, gained his popularity at home and among his Arab and African leaders as the "imperialist fighter" (Khawaja 2013, p.44). Hence, Nasser not only sought Egypt's independence, but also assisted other revolutionary movements in the Middle East and in Africa (Khawaja 2013,

p.61). Consequently, all the proceeding Egyptian leaders had to continue the struggle to maintain the independence of the Egyptian lands but were unable to carry on Nasser's anti-imperialist legacy, in the region, due to some domestic issues including the economic constraints, and the public pressures, and changes in the world structure from a bi-polar to a unipolar system post Nasser era.

Egypt's decision-making process is classified as being centralised on both domestic and foreign issues. Decision making has been relatively similar under all the Egyptian presidents' administrations since the establishment of the Republic; yet, it has sometimes varied according to the personality of the leader. This highlights two issues. First, that the Egyptian leaders have a significant role in influencing foreign policy issues. Second, that leaders had maintained some elements of continuity and change in their decision-making process. It is the heavy involvement of the president in decision making on foreign policy issues that gives the impression of a *one man show*. Shama (2014, p. 53) described Egypt's foreign policy outputs as not going through a "process"; rather, it is a person's product. Shama (2014, p. 54 and Piazza 2018) further explained that Egypt's first three presidents had "monopoly" over foreign policy decisions. Dessouki (1987, p. 72) and Shama (2014, p. 54) described foreign policy decision making in Egypt under Nasser's and Sadat's rule as limiting the role of institutions due to extreme centralisation and personalisation. Both Nasser and Sadat dedicated a majority of their time on foreign affairs (Lorenz 1990, p. 115).

Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002, p. 97) explained that under Nasser's rule, from 1954 until 1970, Nasser claimed tremendous amounts of power. Consequently, this created "a presidential-dominated, military led, authoritarian bureaucratic regime with a single party and a subordinated parliament, press and judiciary" (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 97). One could contend that they played a powerless and an unnoticed function under his leadership. Accordingly, this had its implications on the foreign policy decision-making and Nasser became the sole decision maker on foreign policy related-issues (Heikal 1987).

Mclaurin et al. (1977, p. 42) specified that there are other unrepresented groups in a country like Egypt who may have played a role in Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM). Mclaurin et al. (1977, p. 42) called them the "non-recognised" such as the bureaucracy, the ulama (religious scholars) and minbars (platforms) who were supposed to "reflect the ideological views of the Egyptian left, right and center" which were created under Sadat's

administration. The minbars in Egypt had their opinions voiced through the assigned newspapers that represented the right, left and center opinions as McLaurin et al. (1977, p.45). They were media outlets that represented the different factions in the society in Sadat's attempt to reflect a new age of openness and democracy in Egypt that was different than under Nasser's one-party system (Hamed and El Gaowdy 2018). But minbars were not a major player in the decision-making process neither domestically nor internationally and this explains calling them a "non-recognised" group; however, they were created to represent the public's opinion and act as an alert to the president regarding how the public are thinking. The ulama in Egypt were meant to represent the religious side of the public opinion. This shows that leaders of Egypt although authoritarian they were alert to public opinion on foreign policy issues. However, the ulama's stand was difficult to know as these ulama were more conservative than the rest of the leftists, scientists, and intelligentsia (McLaurin et al. 1977, p. 43). The level of bureaucracy in Egypt is measured by the significant number of civil servants working in governmental institutions. Egypt's bureaucracy forms around 25% of its workforce and managed to maintain the daily affairs in different governmental institutions (Golia 2015) even during the turmoil times of the Arab Spring. Egyptian bureaucrats are promoted based on their long years of services and loyalty rather than their qualifications (Golia 2015). This is a feature which is standardised in all the governmental administrative institutions (Golia 2015).

4.3 Foreign Policy Decision Making: Nasser (1954-1970)

This section presents a brief introduction about the late President Gamal Abd El Nasser, Egypt's first Egyptian president after the Monarchy. How political decisions were made under his presidency with a special focus on foreign policy follows. However, I will not cover his domestic policies as they were very intense and rich. Additionally, the main focus of this chapter is on foreign policy decision making which was very similar in style to his domestic policy decision making.

4.3.1 Background

Nasser, as he became known, came from a humble background from Upper Egypt, a region that was undeveloped and neglected for some time in Monarchial Egypt. He assumed power in 1954 after he succeeded General Mohamed Naguib in the leadership of the Revolutionary

Command Council (RCC). The RCC was established after abolishing the Monarchy in 1952 and became the executive power in Egypt (Cleveland 2000, p. 299 and Abd El Nasser 2017).

Nasser's sixteen years in power were eventful in the history of Egypt. On the international level, Nasser's era witnessed the end of the British presence in the region as an empire, especially after the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the rise of both the Soviet Union and the USA as global powers. The Tripartite Aggression on Egypt in 1956, also known as the Suez Crisis, resulted in major costs for Britain as it ended the legacy of Britain in Egypt and, as Brown (2001) described, it was "the last fling of the imperial dice." According to Ozkan (2013, p. 12), on the regional and local levels, "Cairo became the shaker and mover of the region." The Suez Crisis of 1956 underscored Nasser's leadership capabilities. Nasser's charisma turned a military defeat into a huge political victory and created a legacy for Nasser himself. Nasser became, as William Cleveland (2000, p. 304) called him, "an Egyptian and Pan-Arab Hero." In addition, John Badeau called Nasser a "regional hero" as Dawisha (1976, p. 104) quoted him. However, Dawisha (1976, p. 102) argued that Nasser's charisma developed earlier than the Suez Crisis; in fact, it started in 1955 due to his anti-imperialist calls specifically in his refusal to join the Baghdad Pact in 1955.

The Suez Crisis is an example of a hard crisis, representing a hard security threat, in Egypt's modern history as a result of the aggression of Britain, France and Israel on Egypt. It was a crisis sparked by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in 1956 and resulted in a tripartite aggression on Egypt. As documented by Ezzat (2016), the British, French and Israeli forces invaded Port Said and the Sinai Peninsula. The impact of this crises was felt on several levels. On the domestic level, Nasser gained credibility as he led the country through such difficult times and was able to resolve a foreign policy crisis. On the regional level, Nasser became an Arab hero. While for Britain, the impact of this crisis was that it lost Egypt and "was no longer a first-rate power" as Brown (2001) explained. Thus, on the international level Britain lost some of its status as a global power and was replaced by two other powers; the USA and Soviet Union.

This crisis had other implications on Egypt's foreign policy decision making process. Nasser gained more self-confidence and Egypt's foreign affairs became the only issue that Nasser did not consult over. Although Heikal (1987), and Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002, p. 99) argued that Nasser at the beginning of his rule sought advice from the members of the RCC

and the Free Officers, he started to take foreign policy decisions on his own without consultation after the Suez Crisis. This crisis boosted his self-confidence and ego as a leader and was the result of "courage and over-confidence" as Shama (2014, p. 60) highlighted. This sense of overestimating oneself resulted in Nasser making decisions unilaterally and in a risky manner which came at the costs of Egypt especially in the 1967 June war.

4.3.2 Foreign Policy

Dawisha (1976, p.105), Hinnebusch and Shama (2014, p. 82) and Shama (2014, p. 102) agreed that in Egypt's foreign policy decision making (which starts with Nasser onwards), all Egyptian presidents were *unaccountable* and had a *free hand* in making foreign policy decisions. Nasser started this tradition of *free-hand* in foreign affairs after his success in overcoming the Suez Crisis and was later able to draft Egyptian constitution(s) to give him "unlimited" power on both the domestic and the external affairs (Dawisha 1976, p.105). Lorenz (1990, p. 115) argued that Nasser handled Egypt's foreign policy in an opportunistic way as he was abusing his position as an Arab hero and an anti-imperialist to save Egypt's economy and, in particular, to "play the east against the west for the privilege of financing Egypt's economic development." (Lorenz 1990, p.115) Thus, the economic pressures acted as a domestic pressure in determining Egypt's foreign affairs. Therefore, foreign policy was also a tool serving the domestic interests.

Nasser's decision making- process was also characterised as a "risky" one which was, "too ambitious beyond his capabilities" and "confrontationist" as the outcomes of his unilateral decisions resulted in major crises in the history of Egypt such as the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the 1967 June war (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 103 and Shama 2014, p. 60 & 63). If we were to classify Nasser according to Hermann and Hermann's (1989) categorisation, he would be an *insensitive leader* in his foreign policy decisions. Moreover, he could be also counted as a *goal-oriented* statesman in his foreign policy decisions according to Kaarbo's (1997) classification. This is because he was interested in foreign policy issues and actively played a role in them.

In 1956, Nasser made a remarkable speech in which he announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal in order to fund building the Aswan High Dam (CVCE 2016). Nasser delivered several speeches in which he quoted the UN Charter's clauses that justified the state's sovereignty and underpinned the legitimacy of the nationalisation of the canal (Peevers 2017,

p. 2). Nasser's statements were challenging and confrontational; as a result, they escalated the Suez Crisis. This is an example of the role of the individual in foreign policy matters. It illustrates what Jervis (2013, p.155) said that "leaders are compelled by the external environment". A similar situation happened in the June 1967 War as Nasser was also the one responsible for triggering it. Egypt suffered from a heavy loss in its war in Yemen and Nasser lost some Arab countries' support. Nasser's decision to confront Israel was meant to restore the Arab's support and to reinstate himself as an Arab hero (Šćepanovic 2019, p. 3). Jillani (1991, p.75) emphasised that it was Nasser's political decisions that were miscalculated and prompted the June War in 1967. This illustrates the role of Nasser as a statesman and the main decision maker who triggered two hard security crises that led to the use of force and wars by his speeches. These two crises exemplified that crisis could be triggered due to personal ambitions and subjective interests as Nasser wanted to regain his prestige as an Arab hero. While the Suez crisis of 1956 was triggered by Nasser, the reasons were for objective matters and the common interest of Egypt to finance the Aswan High Dam. Both cases show the critical role played by the leader of the state in foreign policy-decision making.

4.4 Foreign Policy Decision Making: Sadat (1970-1981)

This section presents a brief introduction about the late President Sadat and then an investigation of the decision-making process in his era is provided with a focus on his foreign policy decisions.

4.4.1 Background

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat was a military officer and a member of the Free Officers Movement. He was appointed by Nasser to be the Speaker of the Parliament for eight years until 1968 (SIS 2018). He then became Nasser's vice president and assumed power after Nasser's death in 1970. Sadat's era (1970-1981) ended with his assassination from the hands of the Islamists factions. His policies, both domestic and foreign, were described as "electric shocks" and "unpredictable" as they surprised Egyptians and the international world (Shama 2014, p. 63 and Finch 2017). To further illustrate this, Sadat made unpredictable decisions such as his decision to go to war in October 1973, and his unexpected visit to Jerusalem in 1977 which led to the Camp David accords in 1978 and resulted in the Peace Agreement with Israel in 1979. Another example from the domestic decisions is his surprising open-door policy or "Infitah" as a new economic policy (Marie 2018). These decisions were surprising on both the domestic and the international levels. The role of Sadat as a statesman was very

visible in making these decisions unilaterally. Consequently, Sadat became known with several names such as the "Pious President," the "Last Pharaoh" and the "Hero of War and Peace" (Shama 2014, pp. 51 & 60). Sadat was the first Egyptian and the first president in Egypt to win a Nobel Peace Prize, which he shared with Menachem Begin the Israeli prime minister for the peace accords in 1978 (Al Sadat 2018 and Marie 2018). This award was due to Sadat's remarkable efforts to bring peace to Egypt after long years of war.

4.4.2 Domestic Politics

Domestically, Sadat created a different system than Nasser's for institutional policy making. Institutions under Sadat's leadership were better run than under Nasser's (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 98) since Sadat preferred to give more power to the legislative body which was minimized under Nasser's rule. Moreover, Sadat drafted a new constitution in 1971 which was in use in Egypt until 2011. The 1971 constitution allowed for a multi-party system (Feuille 2011, p. 242), which was prohibited under Nasser's regime, and Sadat granted more freedom for the press (with the exception to one matter; i.e., foreign policy). Via these initiatives, Sadat tried to show the difference between himself and Nasser as presidents (Feuille 2011, p. 242). This is an element of change in their decision making process.

4.4.3 Foreign Policy

Sadat followed the same footsteps of Nasser in foreign policy matters and in decision making. Sadat was keen on following and handling foreign policy issues by himself. Hence, both Nasser and Sadat were the main decision makers on foreign policy related issues. This also demonstrated that the centralisation of power in the leaders' hands which was initiated under Nasser's rule continued under that of Sadat's. Just as Nasser used the Suez Crisis to gain legitimacy and popularity and to have complete control over foreign policy matters, Sadat used another incident to consolidate his rule when he used the October War of 1973, or the Yom Kippur War, to have the main say in the country's foreign policy issues. The October War 1973 was not just a military victory for the Egyptian people, it was a political victory for Sadat himself who gained a lot of credit domestically and internationally (Shama 2014). He preferred to contact the world's leaders himself rather than returning to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which emphasises the role of the leader in making the Egyptian foreign policy. According to Hermann and Hermann's (1989) leaders' classifications, Sadat can be

classified as an *insensitive* leader because he monopolised foreign policy decision making, had strong views, was opinionated and was hasty in making his decisions which were, in some cases, confrontational decisions. According to Kaarbo's (1997) classification Sadat is considered as a *goal-oriented* leader as he was extremely focused on foreign policy, he made plans and was action oriented as he was interested in power.

Foreign policy analysts agree that foreign policy changes and new directions are taken, especially in the Third World (the Global South), based on the changes in the leadership and the leader's own personality and interests (Dessouki 1987, p. 61; Korany 1986, p. 55 and Shama 2014, p. 59). Thus, it is the "personality factor," as Dawisha (1976, p. 107) called it, that changes foreign policy directions. Furthermore, Jervis (2013, p.158) explained the way leaders rise to power impacts their decisions. Jervis (2013, p.1580 said, "when a leader comes to power though accident or what comes as close as we can get to random assignment, we are on firmer ground in attributing changed policies to factors we can associate with that president". This is the case with most leaders in the Middle East region and in Egypt in particular. This attests to the idea that leaders matter and that focusing on the individual level of analysis in foreign policy is merited. This happened under Sadat's rule who "radicalised" Egypt's foreign policy orientations (Shama 2014, p. 58). To further elaborate, unlike Nasser in glorifying Pan-Arabism and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Sadat stressed the concept of "Egypt first"; he challenged his Arab neighbours with his peace treaty with Israel in 1979. Sadat argued that it is the right time for Egypt to regain its independence since Egypt had already sacrificed its independence for many years for the Arab Cause. This has driven Khadduri (1981, p. 180) to view Sadat as a populist, since Sadat cared about the people and was not simply an ideologist. This attitude had a dual impact- both positive and negative. The positive impact is that it gave Sadat a chance to focus more on Egypt's development and improving its economy that was struggling due to the long war period. This shows how the 'core objective' in regaining Egyptian lands occupied by Israel and 'middle objectives' in development of Egypt were visible in Sadat's foreign policy. The negative influence of Sadat being a populist, was the isolation of Egypt unlike under Nasser's rule when it was a regional hegemonic power largely integrated with its Arab and African neighbours. This in turn required a significant effort from Hosni Mubarak proceeding Sadat's regin, to regain the Arabs' confidence in Egypt, but Mubarak did not restore Egypt's status as a regional hegemon.

Sadat departed from Nasser's circle of international allies which became clear when Sadat expelled the Soviets from Egypt in 1972 (Dessouki 1987, p. 72). More importantly, after the October War of 1973, Sadat decided to bring Egypt closer to the USA and that was facilitated later after the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement of 1979—it is worth mentioning that Nasser heavily criticised the USA due to its close support of Israel. This demonstrates the radical change in Egypt's foreign policy directions based on the leader's own vision and interests.

The decision-making process in foreign policy issues under Sadat's administration could be described at one point as a "one man show" style with a "free-hand" and at another point as a "Leader-staff" style (Dessouki 1987, p. 72; Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 98; Korany & Dessouki 2008, p. 184 and Shama 2014, p. 54). Many scholars defined the "leader-staff" decision-making style as one that is still highly revolving around the leader but is still diplomatic and quick in its response; this explains why Sadat's decision making was described as "electric shocks." Khadduri (1981, p. 179) believed that Sadat made rational choices in using "cost-benefit" analysis while taking his decisions; this was clear when he quoted Sadat saying that he does several "calculations" before coming to any decision weighing its costs and benefits (Khadduri 1981, p. 179). Finch (2017) sarcastically said that Sadat's decisions were based on "divine inspiration" rather than real political solutions; this could be associated with Sadat's title as the "Pious President." The role of the institutions under Sadat's rule was mainly for gathering information (specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) while he had a well-trusted group around him for giving advice. The roles of other bodies such as the parliament, the media and the public opinion were given a bigger floor to be more vocal on domestic issues rather than on foreign issues. This was the only exception as mentioned above in terms of freedom of press given under Sadat's administration. The media was allowed to be critical on internal matters but not on external matters (McLaurin et al, 1977, p. 45) which was meant to curtail any critique on the country's foreign policy issues. Again, this emphasises the domination of the leader with respect to foreign policy matters and decisions.

4.5 Foreign Policy Decision Making: Mubarak (1981-2011)

This section examines the foreign policy decision-making of Hosni Mubarak, the last president to rule Egypt prior to 2011 mass uprisings. It concludes that although Mubarak tried to project that he is different from the previous presidents, staying in power for thirty years

drove Mubarak to follow them in independently keeping control over both foreign and the domestic matters.

4.5.1 Background

Hosni Mubarak succeeded Sadat after the latter's assassination in 1981 as he was the vice president but later the Parliament approved his appointment as the new president. Mubarak came from the same governorate as Sadat, Minufiya in the Northern part of Egypt, (Shama 2014, p. 61). However, Mubarak's character differed from the two previously discussed presidents even though he came from the same military background. In fact, he was described by Motawei (2016, p. 49) as the "weakest" product of the 1952 military system. Mubarak was an Air-force officer and he assumed many positions in the Air-force Academy. Mubarak was the longest serving President in Egypt's modern history since the Republic (Shama 2014, p. 62) and was toppled by a popular movement, a precedent in the past sixty years. Due to his character, Mubarak was known as "dull," "uncorrupt" (only during the first decade of his presidency) and humble (Finch 2017). Mubarak preferred to adopt a system based on "keeping the status-quo" to maintain order and stability both internally and externally (Shama 2014, p. 67 and Motawei 2016, p.4). He was considered pragmatic and very cautious in taking his decisions (Motawei 2016, p. 29). Moreover, Mubarak was a very hardheaded person to the extent that some of his advisors such as Mustafa El Feky (2015)[4] described him by saying that Mubarak is "holding a Ph.D. in stubbornness." This statement illustrates how extreme Mubarak was in holding on to his stands regarding some issues.

Mubarak lacked any strategic vision and had a security obsession (Shama 2014, p. 63, 65, 67, 71 & 75 and Motawei 2016, p. 66). This had its implications on his decision-making strategy both internally and externally which became guided and inspired by security concerns. It is because of this "security obsession" that Mubarak imposed emergency law for thirty years which curtailed freedom and gave an upper hand to the security apparatuses and police control (Knell 2013 and BBC 2017). Adawy (2013) added that until the second decade of Mubarak's rule, foreign policy decisions were made in cooperation between the president, some government branches and the security establishments, which marks a major difference from his predecessors. The main security establishments were the Ministry of Defense and

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[4] This is from a TV interview with Dr Mustafa El Feky, former political advisor to Mubarak, broadcast on Al Nahar channel, a privately owned satellite channel.

the Intelligence. Korany and Dessouki (2008, p. 185) noted that the Ministry of Defense cooperated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and had its representatives abroad with the diplomatic missions. This showed how reliant Mubarak was on the security forces in referring to them for information gathering (Shama 2014, p. 54) prior to making any decision concerned with domestic or/and external affairs. Furthermore, according to the 1971 Constitution, the president has immense powers and he is the one who appoints all the ministers including the ministers of defense, interior, foreign affairs, and the head of the Intelligence (Shama 2014, p. 54); thus, it is the constitution that supported and justified the absolute control of the president for the Egyptian executive branch.

Mubarak was famously known among foreign policy analysts to have maintained "Cold-Peace" with Israel after regaining the last occupied Egyptian land of Taba in 1989; then, it shifted to become a "strategic peace" in the 1990s (Aran & Ginat 2014). This is because Mubarak refused to have complete normalised relations with Israel as he was wary about Egyptian public opinion. Moreover, Egypt under Mubarak's regime became known as the 'peace broker' due to his heavy involvement in reconciling the Palestinian factions along with facilitating bridging talks with the Israelis and the Palestinians over the Peace Process talks. Thus, Mubarak preferred to have strategic peace in order to appease both Egyptian public opinion as well as the American administration—one of its biggest allies. Mubarak continued to keep Egypt as a close ally to the USA, but instead of owing it to Egypt's status as a *leader and hegemon* of the Arab world, Egypt became a *follower* of USA commands in the region as criticised by Ozkan (2013, p. 12). Egypt under Mubarak's administration was an ideal ally to the USA as it was non-confrontational and uninterested in regional leadership which was not threatening the US interests in the region. This marks another departure from Nasser and Sadat's vision of Egypt in the region. In fact, Egypt had stable relations with Israel and mediated among other Arab countries, such as Jordan, to improve their relations with Israel. Egypt was, under Mubarak's era a "moderator and stabilizer of the Arab world" to the USA (Knell 2013 and Hinnebusch & Shama 2014, p. 91).

4.5.2 Domestic Politics
Internally and at an early stage of his rule, Mubarak started creating a new governmental style which was full of bureaucrats (Finch 2017) and he adopted the behavior of civil-servants

(Motawei 2016, p. 46). However, Shama (2014, p. 73) contested this by stating that this bureaucratic base was already established during Nasser's regime and only nurtured during Mubarak's regime. Mubarak used these civil servants as Egypt, during his presidency, suffered from a high population growth leading to high levels of unemployment (Shama 2014, p. 73). The result of such a large base of bureaucracy was slow decision making by Mubarak, unfelt progress by the public and unmeasured development in Egypt (Shama 2014, p. 73). In addition, Mubarak worked mostly as a 'bureaucrat' rather than a politician since he was a vice president in 1975 which gave him the experience of being a good administrator rather than a good politician. According to Shama's explanation (2014, p. 73), this helped Mubarak to gain the trust of many people in different institutions and, consequently, to remain a president for thirty years. Again, this worked in Mubarak's favour as such a long line of bureaucrats allowed him to be more authoritative and to centralise power in his hands. This strategy was implemented on both domestic and external levels.

4.5.3 Foreign Policy

With respect to foreign policy issues, the main concern for Egypt during Mubarak's first decade was that Egypt's foreign policy needed revising as Korany and Desouki (2008, p. 192) stated the "Egyptian foreign policy elites seem divided between the desire to perform an assertive regional role and wariness of its costs." Motawei (2016, p. 47) quoted Egypt's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Amr Moussa saying that "Mubarak saw that Egypt's regional leadership is *nonsense*.", which is in total contradiction of Nasser. It accentuates the role of the leader in determining the direction of the state's foreign policy. Therefore, this regional leadership was unattainable due to a few reasons such as Mubarak's character and the role that the USA has defined for Egypt as a stabiliser rather than taking any leadership role. Hence, the role of the state leader, the world structure, and global hegemon influenced Egypt's status.

Furthermore, on the foreign policy issues, Mubarak had a small group of advisors whom he consulted; however, his decisions were final (Shama 2014, p. 77). It was this style of decision making that Korany and Dessouki (2008, p. 184) called "presidential-center type" or "leader-staff" style. This small group consisted of people of 'trust and expertise' in foreign affairs such as Osama El Baz, Mustafa El Fiky, Amr Moussa—who was his longest serving minister

of foreign Affairs[5], Omar Suleiman—the head of Intelligence—and finally his son Gamal Mubarak (Shama 2014, p.77, 78 & 83). The concept of "people of trust" has been adopted since Nasser's era and continued onwards until Mubarak's (Shama 2014, p. 55).

The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mubarak's time in power should be highlighted. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) witnessed the change of five ministers in the thirty years of Mubarak's rule; the longest serving one as previously mentioned was Amr Moussa (Shama 2014, p. 83). These ministers' mission was mainly related to consultancy over foreign issues and execution rather than decision making as was the case during Sadat's rule. Shama (2014, p. 84) clarified that the ministry's role was mainly collecting information, as it did under Sadat's rule, in addition to planning and executing Mubarak's foreign policy agenda as well as coordinating with other ministries and institutions in the Cabinet. Under Amr Moussa's administration, and due to Mubarak's trust in him, Moussa was able to grant some freedom to the ministry and take some initiatives which were highly encouraged and admired by Mubarak. This marked a small departure from Sadat's days but was short lived. The freedom granted, in turn allowed the ministry to take a role in decision making but that was reduced soon again with the removal of Moussa from his position and the appointment of another uncharismatic character; Ahmed Maher (Shama 2014, p. 85). However, Adel Adawy (2013) refuted this idea and said that Mubarak did not give Amr Mousa any such freedom and "kept him at a distance from the decision-making process"; instead, Mubarak gave more space to his last Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Abu El Ghiet, as he worked closer with the Security and Intelligence forces (Adawy 2013 and Ozkan 2013, p. 14). This is a clear illustration of the deviation of Mubarak from Sadat's foreign policy decision-making. This also shows that the Intelligence services played a key role in providing foreign policy advice to Mubarak who was keen on keeping them close again as a result of Mubarak's high sense of insecurity. This closeness between Mubarak and the security apparatuses could be argued to be one reason for Mubarak to securitise the Nile crisis one of the case studies in this dissertation.

In Egyptian foreign policy, there is a role played by the MOFA and the National Security Council (NSC). The NSC is a very secretive and vague body and is still present even after

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[5] Mr. Amr Moussa served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs (1991-2001) until he was removed from his post once Mubarak felt that he was a threat because of his growing popularity.

the 2011 events. Korany and Desouki (2008, p. 184) explained that the National Security Council members include the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the Head of Intelligence as well as the speaker of the houses in the parliament. This is besides other ministries and NGOs such as the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs (ECFA) which was established in 1999 (Korany & Desouki 2008, p. 184).

According to Knell (2013), Mubarak's era became known as "the age of stagnation" due to his lack of vision and his extreme resistance to change with the exception of very few cases. Motawei (2016, p. 46) described Mubarak as a hard worker but without a vision or a grand strategy unlike his predecessors Nasser and Sadat; this explains his stagnating attitude. An illustrative example for the state of stagnation internally under Mubarak was his refusal to change his Cabinet. Mubarak kept his cabinet ministers unchanged for many years with few exceptions. The Irish Times (1996) stated that Mubarak only 'reshuffled' the cabinet and did not totally renovate it as removing any minister from the Cabinet was just a result of a significant cause. The removal of the Prime Minister Atef Sedkki in 1996 after nine years in office is a glaring example (Irisih Times 1996). Sedkki negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programmes to reform the economy in 1986 and implemented the IMF's conditions in two phases in 1991 and in 1996, respectively (Irish Times 1996), but Mubarak feared that this would lead to riots in the Egyptian streets which would threaten his regime's stability and him staying in power (Shama 2014, p. 67 and Youssef 2016). It was only at the very beginning and at the very end of his reign when Mubarak was pressured both internally by the people and externally by the USA post 9/11/2001. The Bush administration called upon the Middle East rulers to adopt political and economic reforms (Knell 2013 and Shama 2014, p. 67), henceforth the internal pressures resembled the people while external pressures were imposed by the USA. The reforms introduced were carefully calculated and slowly thought about as "reform in doses" (Shama 2014, p. 67); again, this emanates from Mubarak's character that resisted change. Hinnebusch and Shama (2014, p. 103) saw that "Mubarak defended Sadat's legacy for three decades," and Motawei (2016, p. 46-47) said that Mubarak was successful in following Sadat's paths in foreign affairs targeting Egypt's economic problems since, with a big population that grew even more after the October 1973 War, the economy became a pressing problem for the Egyptian leaders (Yinon 1982, p. 381). This explains how the economy determined Egypt's foreign policy orientations. This marked the 'middle objective' in Egypt's foreign policy.

To conclude and briefly describe Mubarak's thirty years in power, it was a period that lacked change and was characterised with stagnation and inactivity since it was Mubarak's personality and style of governance that led to this sense of maintaining the status-quo. This underscores Mubarak as a leader on FPDM. In his first decade, Mubarak tried to project the image that Egypt would take a different direction than in the previous eras of Nasser and Sadat, but afterwards he adopted the same attitude of Sadat leading to more centralisation, increased bureaucracy, corruption, authoritarianism and security interference domestically and externally. The security apparatuses' impact over Mubarak to take his decisions was heavily felt by the average Egyptian which affected the Egyptians internally and the country's reputation externally. According to Hermann and Hermann (1989) Mubarak could fall under the category of a *sensitive* character in his foreign policy decision making. This is because he was pragmatic, adaptable and consultative in making his decisions. On the domestic/national level, Egyptians started to call for more freedom and this was expressed in street riots and workers' demonstrations which started in 2006 with the "Mahla worker's" strike followed by the rise of the "Kefaya Movement" (i.e., Enough Movement) in 2007. Next there was the 6th of April 2008 Movement and finally there were the 2011 Uprisings which led to the toppling of Mubarak from power (Motawei 2016, p. 13-14).

On the international level, Egypt lost its status as a leader of the Arab world in spite of its restored good relations with other Arab states. On the regional level, Egypt also lost its status as a regional hegemon and was replaced by other powers such as Turkey and Iran and other rising powers such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. For the USA, Egypt remained an ally but after September 11, 2001, attacks the American administration under President Bush junior was very critical of Egypt and imposed more pressures for economic and political reforms. I argue that, Mubarak's era was a truly anti-change period that caused Egypt to lose its prestige and power in general. The decision-making processes internally and externally under Mubarak's rule lacked creativity or any significant difference from his predecessors. There were several opportunities for Egypt at the early stage of Mubarak's rule, but he wasted almost all of these opportunities and preferred stagnation that secured him being in power, and as the famous Egyptian writer Youssef Idris wrote: "With Mubarak we have entered a strange period in life" (Finch 2017). Mubarak was successful in consolidating his rule for thirty years but was removed in an abrupt manner by the people. It was Mubarak's personality and his role as a

leader of the state which influenced Egypt's foreign policy decisions and its regional status. Hence, this emphasises the role of individuals in FPDM.

4.6 Egypt's Foreign Policy Post-Mubarak: SCAF, Morsi and Sisi in Power

On the 25th of January 2011, Egyptians headed to the streets revolting against Mubarak's regime. Egyptians were chanting "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice and Human dignity" (Fahmy 2012, p. 350). These calls were deeply concerned with domestic issues that they suffered from during Mubarak's regime, but due to Mubarak's stubbornness, people started calling for further demands until Mubarak stepped down in 11th of February 2011. During this interim period, the country was led by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) until general elections were held in June 2012 resulting in Mohamed Morsi assuming the presidency. Morsi's presidency was short lived as he was overthrown late in 2013 by a popular movement backed by the army. During this transitional period, Egypt witnessed three different administrations (2011-2014); however, they were all similar in their governing style as in keeping the centralised and the authoritarian attitude (Piazza, 2019, p. 404) against the people's wishes.

As a result, this section will focus on the periods of both President Morsi and the incumbent President Sisi's foreign policy decision making and ruling style. Few details will be given regarding the SCAF period due to the limited available information regarding Egyptian foreign policy during that period.

In looking at Egypt's foreign policy after the Arab Spring in 2011, one would see that it suffered from neglect at an early stage because the country was in turmoil and in a transitional period when normally domestic politics prevail over foreign policy. After the critical transitional period, some foreign policy observers would see that in the future, Egypt's foreign policy would not change; no real change would happen. Naje (2014) was among the Egyptian journalists who believed that Egypt would be isolated by the world post 2011 and even more after the 2013 events. This isolation would be imposed by the world on Egypt due to the world's uncertainty about the new ruling regimes. Naje (2014) argued that other thinkers assumed that Egypt would rather isolate itself from the world to focus on its domestic problems. However, such expectations of Egypt's isolation with regards to its foreign affairs to mend its internal problems were wrongly anticipated in my opinion. This is based on the

ideas of Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002, p. 98) and Weeks (2009) who mentioned that foreign policy is critical for leaders in general and is even more seriously taken by Middle Eastern leaders as it can grant them legitimacy. This could justify why the leaders of Egypt post the Arab Spring decided to securitise specific foreign policy issues as in the case studies discussed in this dissertation to help consolidate their rule.

4.6.1 The SCAF

Shama (2014, p. 235), and Hinnebusch and Shama (2014, p. 101) were among the advocates that there was no change in Egypt's foreign policy decision making, but I see this as an erroneous perception as after 2011 there were a *few* attempts for change. Although those attempts were truly unsuccessful, they deserve to be flagged. In 2011, as Ozkan (2013, p. 12) exemplified, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) under the leadership of Nabil Al Arabi, the minister appointed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forced (SCAF), enjoyed independence and played a visible role in the decision-making process of Egypt's foreign affairs of that period. The MOFA under Al Arabi's administration started opening up to states that were highly prohibited from having any relations with Egypt and were rivals such as Iran. This was a short-lived attempt and Al Arabi was removed by the SCAF to be appointed to the Arab League (AL) as its Secretary General. Shama's (2014, p.235) contradictions are evident where he says there is "no change" in Egypt's foreign policy decision making but there has been a "rise in other institutions' role" like MOFA after the 2011 Uprisings resulting in some changes in Egypt's foreign policy. Shama (2014, p. 235) argued that this "no-change" status is happening because there is *no real* change in the foreign policy decision makers. Moreover, Shama (2014) admits that the presidents have changed since 2011, but the "old-regime" remained in power with its deeply rooted bureaucracy which resisted this change. Therefore, Shama (2014), and Hinnebusch and Shama (2014) denied the role played by Al Arabi in the independence that the MOFA enjoyed during his short-term leadership as a minister like taking Egypt to new directions towards Iran.

4.6.2 Morsi

In June 2012, Morsi assumed power after the SCAF. Morsi trusted his own group of people from the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) which was an arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). In fact, the (FJP) was not independent from the MB; rather, it was its face of political

action, as Galal Amin[6] described it (Badaway 2012). However, Morsi was not perceived as the decision maker neither internally nor internationally as it was the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guidance's office that was in charge of all of Egypt's affairs (Ozkan 2013, p. 14 and Piazza 2019, p. 410). Consequently, Morsi became a weak president mirroring the ideas of the Supreme Guide of the MB. "Morsi has been chosen with the same logic of choosing Essam Sharaf, the former prime minister under the SCAF rule, as he is not the master mind behind any decisions", said Galal Amin (Badawy 2012). Morsi was popularly elected and was, unlike the previous presidents, the first *civilian* president to run Egypt; yet, he refused this title as being civilian because, for him and for the MB, being *civil* is connoted with being *secular* and Morsi preferred to be perceived as a *religious conservative Muslim leader* of Egypt. Consequently, this had its repercussions on the decision-making process internally and externally as the MB preferred to have a *shadow* government running and de-facto executing regulations and decisions alongside the normal civil government. Therefore, the executed and legislated decisions were made by the MB rather than the civilian government. Grimm and Roll (2012, p. 2); Aly (2014, p. 1), and Piazza (2019, p. 410) added that Egypt's foreign policy agenda and communications were run by prominent figures in the MB such as Rifaa El Tahtawi, a member in the parliament, Essam El Haddad, Minister of the International Cooperation in the MB government and his son Gehad El Haddad[7]. Consequently, this had an impact on foreign policy decision-making. Adway (2013) described the MB's neglect of the state's institution as, "The Brotherhood's exclusion of established state institutions and experienced policymakers resulted in a foreign policy that was impulsive, internally contradictory, and well-nigh incomprehensible."

Adawy (2013) assessed Morsi's foreign policy as 'negative' and having 'hazardous' impacts on Egypt's national security. Hence, it can be argued that Morsi's administration and style of governance had disadvantaged Egypt's foreign policy. Therefore, Morsi could fall under Kaarbo's (1997) classification as an *unmotivated* leader in his foreign policy decisions. This was obvious as he was not interested in foreign policy, he focused more on domestic issues and he left the Supreme Guide of the MB to appoint both the cabinet (with a weak minister

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[6] Professor Galal Amin was an economics professor at the American University in Cairo (AUC) and is an important intellectual and critic in Egypt.
[7] Gehad El Haddad spoke English fluently in an American accent. He is the son of Essam El Haddad and he is a member of the Brotherhood. He became the official representative of the Brotherhood in their talks with the EU (VOA 2013).

of foreign affairs) and a strong shadow cabinet. This had a dangerous effect on the escalation of a protracted crisis like the Nile crisis.

Furthermore, in assessing Morsi's foreign policy, it was contradictory and threatening to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace agreement for several reasons. First, Morsi pressured Hamas to sign a truce with the Israelis in order to seem "harsh" on Hamas as explained by Piazza (2019, p. 411) (which is another 'Muslim' government working against a 'Jewish' government), but, at the same time, Morsi encouraged Hamas to continue digging tunnels where they smuggled weapons and other illegal commodities which they fought Israel with. This had in turn its negative repercussions on Egypt's national security and was aggressively met by the other security bodies in Egypt and its bureaucracy who were involved in this foreign policy portfolio (Adawy 2013). As a result, the Palestinian-Israeli portfolio in Egypt became divided between the MB headed by Morsi in his capacity as the head of state, on one hand, who would negotiate with Hamas and the Egyptian Military and the Intelligence services on the other hand, who would negotiate with Israel (Piazza 2019, p. 411). Galal Amin explained this contradiction in handling the Palestinian-Israeli case by saying, "there was a deal between the American administration and the Muslim Brotherhood to protect Israel's security and respect agreements between Egypt and Israel and that was announced by the brotherhood themselves" (Badawy 2012). This file also showed Morsi's weakness and poor performance in relation to foreign policy affairs. Aly (2014, p. 2) described Morsi as having "failed" to control the foreign affairs issues and their tools. In addition, this incident showed that the role played by the Intelligence services was regained and, consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' role was viewed as 'passive' and 'weak'; in addition to this, the in-office Minister of Foreign Affairs under Morsi's rule, Mohamed Kamel Amr, was perceived by his critics as a 'dove'.

Moreover, Egyptian foreign policy was not described by analysts as 'hawkish' or 'aggressive' or pro-war. However, this status changed under Morsi's rule when he declared two wars: one against Syria, after boycotting Assad's regime, and another one against Yemen, but fortunately this never materialised (Piazza 2019, p. 412). By these announcements Morsi attempted to demonstrate change away from Mubarak's foreign policy. He projected the image of a confrontational leader. Such calls for war engagement in Syria by Morsi were not met open arms from countries such as Russia and the USA (VOA 2013). Also, domestically, the Egyptians and the state institutions were very critical of such intentions by Morsi and the

MB. The military and the Intelligence were unsatisfied with Morsi's approach in handling foreign policy issues in spite of his attempts to approach and to appease Israel and keep the peace treaty untouched and unrevised[8]. Thus, Morsi's efforts to face foreign policy challenges related to Egypt since 2011 were a huge failure to him and to the Brotherhood. For example, Morsi made attempts to join the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) bloc or at least to gain Egypt's "recognition among their ranks" but he "miserably failed" as Aly (2014, p. 4) describes it.

To conclude, Morsi's one-year term was turbulent. Although Egypt is known to be a highly centralised country and the Egyptian presidents almost have a *free-hand* in the political and the economic affairs, it was difficult to see Morsi's fingerprint on the decision-making process in the new era. I argue that Morsi's pseudo-style to deviate from the traditional "presidential-center type," failed. This presidential-centred type was introduced by Korany and Dessouki (2008, p. 184). His submission to the MB gave him no visible chance to actually rule as the MB were also exercising authoritarian rule over the Egyptians. Consequently, this created many divisions within Egyptian society between supporters and opponents. Eventually, the opponents of the 'new regime' were not only from the people's side but also from other institutions (mainly the military and Intelligence). As for the media, it sided with the rest of the state institutions and average Egyptian citizens to overthrow Morsi and his government in 2013.

4.6.3 Sisi
The following chapter in Egypt's history and decision-making process started after the 2013 uprisings. This is the period when Marshal Abd El Fattah El Sisi gained command of the country. In July 2013, according to the constitution, the country was run by the head of the Supreme Court, Adly Mansour; however, he was viewed as just a ceremonial figure and decisions were made by military chief Sisi (Lynch 2013). This drove Black and Kingsley (2013) to call it a "military-backed interim presidency." This was an in-term period until Sisi assumed power after the elections in 2014 and he is, at the time of writing, serving his second term. Before assuming power, Sisi was described as "the candidate of necessity" as Mohamed

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[8] After 2011, there were popular calls to revise the 1979 Peace Agreement with Israel. These calls were triggered by the 'Eilat incident' when the Israeli forces raided the Gaza strip chasing gunmen and breached the Egyptian borders and killed six Egyptian soldiers. After this incident, the SCAF considered "amending or annulling the agreement in response to public anger" as Khalifa explained (2013, p. 1).

Hassanien Heikal[9] called him due to the turbulent period Egypt was going through along with his high popularity at the time (Allam and Heikal 2014, p.189). "He is the ideal man to take on presidency, he can overcome the current crisis" said Heikal (Ahram Online 2014). Also, in another newspaper interview with Heikal, he described Sisi as a charismatic leader, with a strong personality, who made a great decisive decision in the January 25th 2011 revolution (Youm Saba 2021). Even after Morsi assumed power, Sisi was capable of understanding and absorbing the failure of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (Youm Saba 2021).

Sisi, unlike the previous Egyptian presidents, is the first to be born and raised in Cairo. He is from a family involved in commerce in one of the vibrant areas in Cairo called Gamalya neighbourhood close to downtown. Sisi was the youngest member in the SCAF and later he became the minister of Defense under Morsi's administration (Smith 2013, and BBC 2020). Moreover, Sisi had an international exposure during his military education. When Sisi attended a combined Command and Staff College in the UK in 1992 and the US Army War College in Pennsylvania, in 2006, he gained worldwide experience while pursuing his military education (CNN 2019 and Smith 2013). He also served as a Military attaché under Mubarak's administration in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (CNN 2019 and Smith 2013). Smith (2013) further described Sisi's character as ambitious, but "deeply flawed, rash and dangerous."

Some pioneer work on foreign policy analysis under Sisi's regime showed that it is a restoration of the 'Mubarak's regime' and his decision-making style. Hinnebusch and Shama (2014, p. 101) believe that Sisi's era is one of "Mubarakism" because there is an extreme obsession with security as in Mubarak's days. This is reflected in the large number of arrests of the members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as the opposition to Sisi's policies whether from the youth or leftists. It can be argued that by doing this, Sisi meant to restore the order that was lost as a result of the chaos created by the MB and their supporters. Therefore, it can be anticipated that, due to such circumstances, there is a significant role played by the military and Intelligence in restoring stability in the country especially due to the 'War on Terror' campaign championed by Sisi. In addition, Paul Salem (2015) remarked in his article published by the *Middle East Institute* that new players joined Sisi post June

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[9] Mohamed Hassanien Heikal was a close advisor to late President Nasser, he is also considered by many Egyptians as one of its important thinkers and an influential journalist.

2013 and supported him to overthrow Morsi's regime; they were the police and the Judiciary in addition to the bureaucracy.

Sayed (2018) said that the first term of Sisi's rule witnessed an active diplomacy since Sisi was keen on having an active foreign policy through political and economic partnerships. Moreover, he attended international forums and "held high-level meetings to deliver the new image of Egypt to the world" (Sayed 2018). Another way to distinguish Egypt's foreign policy under Sisi's rule is that it departed from relying on the USA only. Instead, Sisi preferred to have other actors to depend on such as Russia and China because Sisi became aware that there are other forces in the global system as well as new rising powers such as China; thus, he meant to diversify Egypt's foreign relations and alliances (Aly 2014, p. 5). This refutes Shama's argument because it shows Sisi's departure away from Mubarak's time. Moreover, Sisi was determined to change the perception about Egypt that it is going through a transitional period or because it has a new president who came by military force and, consequently, will be isolated as Shama (2014) suggested. Instead, Sisi looked for more engagement with the global world by being more reintegrated in regional affairs whether on the Arab or the African fronts. This became evident in some Gulf countries' support to Sisi as with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the readmission of Egypt into the African Union (AU) after a year of suspension due to the overthrow of Morsi (Ahram Online 2014). In addition, Sisi joined the USA in its fight against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Aly 2014, p. 5 and Naje 2014) which gave Sisi better recognition by the world leaders and was consequently reflected on his legitimacy on the domestic level. Moreover, this re-engagement and visibility on the regional and the world stage helped Egypt regain its status in the region as a leader rather than a follower (Naje 2014 and Piazza 2019, p. 414).

Sisi's foreign policy decision-making style is described as one run "as it were a commercial enterprise" (Naje 2014) which shows how the personal background of Sisi has influenced his decision-making process. In one of Sisi's speeches in the latest World Youth Forum of 2019, held in Sharm El Shiekh, he expressed the fact that he uses a 'bargaining technique' with his ministers as well as with other leaders overseas (August 2019) which is demonstrated in the two case studies of this dissertation. Another example to illustrate Sisi's bargaining capabilities were shown in his meeting with a Siemens delegation in Sharm El Shiekh's Economic conference in 2015 which demonstrated the importance of the leader in decision making. Sisi bargained with Siemens representatives over the price of a service Siemens was

offering to Egypt and Sisi lowered such a price. Dr. Mohamed El Sayed Farahat (2020)[10] explained that Egypt's foreign policy under Sisi is meant to achieve and project a "nationalistic state" where the priority is given to the state which is a developmental state. This developmental state aims at solving chronic problems, adopts non-interference concept in its regional affairs, implements ethics in its international relations, and finally believes that resources mean *cooperation* rather than *confrontation*. This shows Sisi's interest in attaining the middle objective in Egypt's foreign policy, development. Farahat (2020) explained that these points are Sisi's doctrine reflected on Egypt's foreign policy—a novel but limited idea. Farahat argued that these points are the result of Sisi's background as a military man with a high sense of nationalism which is illustrated in Sisi prioritising the importance of the state and its institutions and the non-interference in others' affairs. In addition to this, Sisi's family background, influenced his perception that resources are for cooperation and development rather than confrontation, owing to the fact that his family was involved in commercial activity. Thus, Sisi is a cooperative leader in his foreign policy behaviour. Furthermore, Sisi valued cooperating with local businessmen and foreign investors and "is keen on cooperating with G20 states and being open to Asian investors in order to increase development in Egypt" (Farahat 2020).

On the African front, Tawfik (2020) assessed Sisi's foreign policy as being "active" and visible but has not yet been "productive," and she justified this by saying that, "Egypt's activity in Africa has caused a lot of noise but not necessary with specific results as until now Egypt's levels of investments in Africa are very humble due to Egypt's being busy with its war on terror and crisis in Libya." Farouk (2018, p. 11) described Sisi's role in mending the Egypt-Africa relations as "remarkable" because Sisi paid many visits to various African countries in his first term; for example, the Gabon which was visited for the first time by the Egyptian president Sisi, in 2017 (Farouk 2018, p. 11). Egypt's foreign relations with Africa are mainly based on "presidential diplomacy," as Farouk (2018, p. 11) labelled it, which again reinforces the importance of the president's role in Foreign Policy Decision Making. It also reveals that he is a *goal-oriented* character who is interested in foreign policy and is action

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[10] Dr. Mohamed El Sayed Farahat is a political science researcher at Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies and was hosted at the British University in Egypt for a webinar under the title of 'Sisi's Doctrine'.

oriented as Kaarbo (1997) labelled leaders with such characteristics in their foreign policy decisions.

To conclude, it is vital to underpin the importance of the context in which both Morsi and Sisi worked within to explain the challenges to their rule which might help in justifying both their policies and decisions that were on different ends. Also, it is important to underscore the role of leader in foreign policy decision-making. Furthermore, Sisi's administration faced and is still facing many challenges; some of these challenges were inherited from Mubarak's time such as a deteriorating economic status that needed urgent attention in light of the rising population growth (Aly 2014, p. 5). This is beside a lot of development being required to meet both the 2011 and 2013 uprising's calls and demands. This has consequently, made Egypt's foreign policy more directed according to its domestic needs. A further challenge facing Egypt on the regional level is the Nile crisis with Ethiopia building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD); that is, an issue causing a national security crisis (Aly 2014, p. 6). It is a case subject to investigation in this dissertation as a soft security threat. This is an externally caused problem yet has internal negative impacts on Egypt.

4.7 Role of National Identity in Shaping Egypt's Foreign Policy Directions

This section discusses the role of identity in shaping Egypt's foreign policy and affecting its foreign policy decision making. The section starts by defining identity and then it explores how Egyptian leaders have used this concept in their foreign policy strategies under specific contexts. It is not the sole explanatory variable but identity matters as leaders use it to justify their foreign policy acts.

According to Chafetz et al. (2007, p. viii), individual identity includes both psychological and cognitive meanings; psychologically, it identifies an actor's background in terms of religion, ideology, political affiliation and nationality, while cognitively, identity is a way an actor deals with the surroundings and reacts to them as "self-schemas." Jung and Jeong (2016, p. 253) added that national/societal identity is a concept that developed under constructivism in international relations and reflects how one nation views another one, and, thus, this determines the nations' foreign relations. Also, "defining the nation against the external world has a significant symbolism… legitimacy in foreign policy remains based on national

identity and self-ascribed roles"; therefore, there are calls to study foreign policy decision making based on ideas embedded in identity (Bratberg 2011, p. 328). In fact, state-society relations have their reflections on accelerating or de-escalating the state's actions and reactions on foreign policy matters (Karawan 2002, p. 155). Therefore, the perception of Egypt's leaders in relation to the concept of identity is important and will be discussed here.

Egypt is a unique state in the Middle East region as it hardly suffers from identity crisis or a conflict between its several identities because "within its region Egypt is a clear case of ethnic and cultural homogeneity" (Karawan 2002, p. 155). Ragab (2017, p. 2) explained that the society in Egypt is homogenous enough not to be torn as in Libya or Syria by armed conflicts or spark a civil war. Due to this Egyptian relative homogeneity and unity, Egypt became superior in the region and a hegemon during Nasser's era whose charisma helped in confirming this status even more.

4.7.1 Nasser and the three identities circles

Lorenz (1990, p. 117-118) explained that Egyptians owe their identity to the River Nile. It is the Nile that distinguished their civilisation from the rest of other civilisations in the region (Hinnebusch & Shama 2014, p. 77). The Nile is arguably an identity shaper influencing the Egyptian character and agriculture on the Nile banks made the Egyptians closely attached to the Nile as it adheres to their identity. It is the Nile which made Egypt "self-sufficient" and secure against foreign influence (Lorenz 1990, p. 118). Along the Nile banks, the ancient Egyptian civilisation survived for more than 7,000 years until today. Egyptians worked in agriculture mainly because of the Nile which centered them on the Nile valley. This paved the way to the acceptance of a one-ruler system. Henceforth, obedience to the ruler, the pharaoh who was also the sacred God in ancient times, was inherited by later generations as Shama explained (2014, p. 51). Furthermore, Lorenz (1990, p. 117) argued that among the reasons for Egypt's heavy bureaucracy is the Nile as the bureaucrats were the Pharoh's assistants on less important matters. Moreover, it is the Nile which led Nasser to discovering one of Egypt's identities; that is, the African identity which is connected to the Nile valley. Nasser believed that by helping his fellow African countries to gain their independence would lead to two positive consequences. Firstly, Egypt would be able to protect and secure the Nile

waters flow to its lands; that is, ensuring water security as Dessouki (1987, p. 63) identified it. Secondly, Egypt would have a more influential role in the region by embedding this sense of African identity into the Egyptian one. Eventually, this would boost Egypt's status as a hegemonic power in the region and Nasser would continue to be the "Arabs' and African hero" (Shama 2014, p. 57).

Furthermore, the British occupation of Egypt resulted in a high Egyptian sense of nationalism. This is the reason for the keenness of Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak and arguably Sisi to maintain the sovereignty and independence of the Egyptian territory. Originally discoursed by Cook, Brown (2012) quoted that "Egyptians' fear of domination by outsiders is rooted in a long history of foreign occupation." Nasser's high sense of Arabism as well as Islamic and African identities made him propagate the idea that Egypt falls in these three circles of identities and, consequently, its foreign policy orientations should be led on that basis. Nasser is seen by Foreign Policy analysts as the one who "consolidated" the Arab identity into the Egyptian one (Hinnebusch & Shama 2014, p. 77); this high sense of Arabism comes from Nasser's participation in the Palestine War in 1948 and the defeat and humiliation the Arab armies faced by Israel (Karawan 2002, p. 157). Also, there is another reason for Nasser to adhere to the Arab identity and to define Egypt as part of the Arab 'Umma' (Nation); that is, the economic condition. Piazza (2019, p. 404) argued that despite the differences in the ruling systems between Egypt as a republic and Gulf states as monarchies, Nasser was willing to overcome that difference to save the Egyptian economy because the "financial assistance from these countries particularly Saudi-Arabia" would help Egypt's economy. Moreover, Nasser was interested in keeping the title the "Arab's hero". However, this Pan-Arabism was tested under Nasser's regime with the War in Yemen (1962) resulting in the collapse of the United Arab Republic (UAR). It was a short-lived unity between Egypt and Syria (1958-1962) that dissolved due to Nasser's extreme control over Syria; this unity proved to be a failure and eventually, post Nasser's death, it became of less importance (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 102). The Islamic identity under Nasser's rule was Egypt's third identity. Nasser became aware of such an identity due to, again, the War in Palestine in 1948 and nevertheless the rise of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Lorenz (1990, p. 122) explained that this sense of Islamic identity is very vivid in the Arab countries in general due to the presence of the opposition factions stemming from an Islamic background.

4.7.2 Sadat: The Egyptian Identity Prevailed

Sadat came with his own vision that focused upon the Egyptian identity more than the other identities which were neglected and this was reflected in Egypt's foreign policy directions. McLaurin et al. (1977, p. 69) noted that Sadat mentioned in his speeches several times that Egypt's interest should supersede any other interests, especially the Arab ones. Sadat is another clear example of leaders who promote some identity inclinations over others. Again, this demonstrates the role of leaders in influencing foreign policy choices, priorities and national interests based on identity. It was due to Sadat's vision of "Egypt's identity first" that created competition between the Egyptian identity and the Arab identity. The Nasserists (supporters of Nasser), on one hand, were pro Pan-Arabism as it meant the continuity of the Egyptian leadership, Nasser's legacy, and the integration into the Arab world, while Sadat's supporters, on the other hand, were pro highlighting the Egyptian identity first and making a distinction between Egypt and the Arabs (Karawan 2002, p. 156). Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002, p. 94) explained that Sadat worked on promoting "a more Egypt-centric identity" and he was successful. The success of prioritising the Egyptian identity comes from the fact that Egyptians were tired of the costs of Nasser's leadership—which related to the Arab world— especially in terms of the several wars that Egypt had to undergo from which Egypt suffered considerable losses whether financially or in human lives (Karawan 2002, p. 164). Thus, it was the domestic environment that led to the acceptance of change in the foreign policy attitude under Sadat's administration. However, it should be highlighted that Sadat did not marginalise the Arabs; instead, he was more compromising and did not seek Arab 'leadership' as Nasser did, but rather he sought "partnership" as Hinnebusch and Ehtishami clarified (2002, p. 105). Hinnebusch and Shama (2014, p. 78) further explained Sadat's attitude to adhere to the Egyptian identity over the Arab one as Egypt has already offered and paid too much to the Arab cause and it was high time to focus on the Egyptian interests.

Furthermore, Sadat played a role in enhancing the rise of the Islamic identity of Egypt, because at the early stage of his reign, he wanted to counterbalance the Nasserist faction; thus, he gave a presidential pardon to many of the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who were imprisoned during Nasser's times. Hence, it is Sadat's impact in stressing Egypt's Islamic identity as a leader of the country. However, this support to Islamists to raise the Islamic identity of Egypt backfired on Sadat later as the Islamists were the reason behind his

assassination in 1981. Karawan (2002, p. 155) further added another observation that these Islamists believed that Egypt's supremacy in the region is owed to its Islamic movements that could not be found in other Muslim countries, which also enhanced the stress on the Islamic identity of Egypt.

4.7.3 Mubarak Follows Sadat's Footsteps

Mubarak came to maintain whatever Sadat had reached in foreign and domestic politics; however, Mubarak faced the challenge of Arabs distancing Egypt due to the Peace Agreement with Israel in 1979. Consequently, Mubarak had to restore the Arabs' trust in Egypt in order to secure Egypt's re-integration into the region as well as to ensure the Arabs' money flow to Egypt in order to boost the Egyptian economy that was badly damaged after the war (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002, p. 107). Mubarak was successful in doing that and he even gained more credibility by acting as a mediator and a stabiliser of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Piazza 2019, p. 406). However, by the new millennia, Mubarak had to approach the EU to agree and sign the Barcelona Accords in 1995 which benefited Egypt on a political, economic and cultural level in order to further improve Egypt's economy. Hence, Mubarak said that Egypt falls into the Mediterranean circle by which he created a Mediterranean identity to develop more interest in the EU (Bilgin 2015). Thus, this reinstates that it is Egypt's leaders who play a critical role in emphasising or ignoring a specific identity and that these identities play an important role in foreign policy decisions to serve the country's domestic purposes.

4.7.4 Morsi's Islamic Identity

Morsi stressed upon the Islamic identity and ignored the "Egyptianness" of the people and the country. He drew his foreign policy objectives based on what is called the "Islamic Umma" (Islamic Nation). This attitude took Egypt to another direction regarding foreign policy; Egypt started approaching "Islamic" nations such as Turkey, Iran, Qatar and Pakistan. Morsi was interested in getting closer to Turkey in particular, as its ruling party the Freedom and Development Party (AKP) under Erdogan's leadership was adopting a similar agenda and followed the same directions as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt (Shama 2014, p. 234).

Furthermore, Morsi wanted to grant Hamas in Gaza more freedom and rights and worked on opening the Rafah border as both, Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, share the same Islamic identity and are against Israel (the Jewish state) (Shama 2014, p. 234). However, these efforts were in vain as Morsi was overthrown in 2013. Another example illustrating how Morsi prioritised the Islamic Sunni identity of Egypt over other identities was his boycott of Assad's regime of Syria and calling for a coalition to fight in Syria. This coalition would consist of the Egyptian, Iranian, Turkish and Saudi armies to 'rescue' Syria (Shama 2014, p. 234).

4.7.5 Sisi Stresses on the Egyptian and the African Identities

Sisi preferred to adopt Mubarak's approach in being the "regional stabiliser" stressing Egypt's Arab identity (Piazza 2019, p. 406). Furthermore, due to the pressures Egypt was under due to threats of a water shortage, Sisi focused on the "Africaness" of Egypt as an integral part of its identity (Aly 2014, p. 6). Consequently, Sisi has been going on many shuttle visits to several African Capitals and hosting many African leaders. The year 2017 could be counted as the busiest year for Sisi as it involved many visits to Africa. In January 2017, Sisi visited Ethiopia as part of the African Union (AU) Summit (Sayed 2018); in February 2017, Sisi visited Kenya as a member of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) (Sayed 2018); while in August 2017, Sisi toured four African countries which were Tanzania, Gabon, Chad and Rwanda (SIS 2017). These visits all involved discussing bi-lateral cooperation and stressing Egypt's water security rights in light of the GERD.

To conclude this section, Egypt's foreign policy directions were dictated according to the identity it adopted and prioritised. These identities were determined by Egypt's leaders who had exclusive control over its foreign policy decision making. Each leader came with his own vision and views for Egypt, so he chose the identity that would serve his own vision and purpose. Different Egyptian leaders used their centralised authority along with the media and internal circumstances to underpin the identity that appealed to the public the most to serve the president's interests. Egypt has been defined to fall into three main identities that were highlighted by Nasser as Arab, African and Islamic identities. For the presidents who succeeded Nasser, there were other identities introduced by the intellectuals of the society

such as Middle Eastern identity and Mediterranean identities to be explored (Karawan 2002, p. 156 and Bilgin 2015, p. 21).

Conclusion

Foreign policy in Egypt has been a major concern to its decision makers since the republic was established in 1952. This may have resulted from bitterly gaining independence which encouraged its new leaders to preserve Egypt's sovereignty and to play an active role in the region. This has driven Egyptian rulers not always to act unilaterally in making foreign policy decisions and to consult different institutions according to the context.

Hinnesbusch (2003, p. 96) stated that

> Although the ME has been viewed as giving presidents immense powers and that foreign policy is exclusively given to them yet the president's actual ability to exercise his formal powers of office cannot be taken for granted and even in Egypt the presidency is institutionalised.

Korany and Dessouki (2008, p. 184) also reiterated the same ideas as Hinnebusch believing that it is a leader-staff style, while Shama (2014) tried to highlight that these institutions' role was more reliant on only a couple of institutions, that is, the military and the intelligence service.

Egypt's foreign policy decision making is featured with a high centralisation of power in the hands of the president (except in Morsi's case). This high sense of centralisation is the result of culture, history of the Pharaohs, the majority's religion and the style of governance as authoritarian regimes mainly rule via military leaders. Most of the literature reviewed on the Middle East in general and on Egypt in particular shows the importance of the individual leader in decision making. Shama (2014, p. 51) explained that the leader's role in the region is "dominant"; Shama (2014, p.51 and Selim 2022, p.3) further elaborated by saying that the literature on foreign policy of the third world is basically concerned with "the personalities and idiosyncrasies of leaders in the developing world." Thus, leaders matter when it comes to foreign policy decision making and because they dominate FPDM to gain legitimacy and to consolidate their rule in turbulent or transitional times, as I argue in this dissertation.

Both Nasser and Sadat ignored the public opinion; in fact, they were able to control and manipulate the public opinion via the media. Sadat in particular, as mentioned above, allowed

the media to address all the domestic issues openly, but he prohibited such freedom in relation to foreign policy matters due to the resistance he feared to face because of his risk-taking personality and shockwave policies. It was not until Mubarak came to power and was confronted with a foreign policy crisis related to Palestine when he saw that public opinion mattered (Shama 2014, pp. 99-101). This is an element marking a little change away from Sadat in foreign policy decisions. In fact, Mubarak, during his first decade as a president, was able to gain the public opinion's support when he released the political prisoners imprisoned under the Sadat's regime (Knell 2013). Furthermore, Mubarak allowed the Muslim Brotherhood members to participate in parliamentary elections by running as independents, but he was still outlawing them as a political party. In addition to this, when the Palestinian intifada broke out twice and people protested to support the Palestinians, Mubarak became alert to take a stand and he did by using his 'stabilising' attitude to reconcile the Israelis with the Palestinians.

To analyse Egypt's foreign policy, it has to be clarified that due to Egypt's many determinants such as the geographic location, identity, the population and the economic status, Egypt is primarily concerned with domestic stability, which is reflected on the leader's stability in power, and who responds to the external matters in light of that. The case studies investigated in the following chapters will demonstrate this. Moreover, Egypt's foreign policy objectives have been defined since Nasser's days, which remain prevail to this day. These objectives are, first, maintaining sovereignty of the Egyptian lands and, second, its foreign policy must help in providing a decent life for Egypt's growing population which was translated into the "economic benefits to the society" (Lorenz 1990, p. 116). The two empirical cases are an illustration of how Egyptian leaders have securitised the Nile as part of Egyptian lands being under threat due to the construction of the GERD and how the leadership securitised Syrian migrants and refugees as they posed a political threat to the regime newly installed in power, as well as an economic threat, and a societal threat.

 As with the rest of the Middle Eastern states, maintaining Egypt's stability is linked to the stability of its regime (Nonneman 2004, p. 19). Egypt's foreign policy decision making is seen as a presidential centered style of decision making. There were some elements of continuity from one leader to another such as complete domination over foreign policy decisions under Nasser which later continued under Sadat. A small change happened under Mubarak as he appointed consultants to discuss with them foreign policy matters and they

offered advice, yet still he made the last decision according to the context. Post the Arab Spring, foreign policy analysts hoped for change in Egyptian foreign policy decision making process; however again this varied according to who was in power and according to the context. The empirical cases would show this variation. The "personality factor" plays a powerful role in foreign policy decision making as underscored by Dawisha (1976, p. 107). This shows how the president's individual character is important since there is heavy literature dedicated to study the psychology of Egypt's presidents by focusing on the individual level of analysis in foreign policy. However, this approach is short sighted as it ignores other factors playing a role in deciding foreign policy directions adopted by the Presidents of Egypt such as the context and the domestic and the external challenges. Therefore, it would be helpful to study how Egypt responds to foreign policy crisis and the measures Egypt takes to protect any threats towards its identity and its resources.

The literature on Egypt's Foreign Policy is mainly focused on how presidents reacted and solved the crises they have faced but mainly the military hard crises such as the Suez Crisis of 1956 and 1967 June War. An intensive literature is written by ME foreign policy scholars analysing Nasser's attitude during such *military hard security threats*. However, limited literature covers how these presidents reacted and responded to *non-military, soft security threats* such as internally displaced Egyptians post the 1956 War, the Nile crisis and the Syrian refugees and economic migrants flows to Egypt in 2011 onwards. Therefore, this thesis attempts to fill in this gap by unpacking the reactions of Egyptian decision makers on non-military soft security crises such as the Nile crisis and the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis.

Chapter Five

The Nile Crisis as a Soft Security Threat in Egypt's Foreign Policy

Introduction

This chapter examines the reasons behind securitising external projects on the Nile and calling it a crisis; moreover, the chapter inspects how and why leaders would resolve such a crisis. This chapter shows the importance of employing Securitisation Theory (ST) to examine this securitising process. This specific case is crucial to Egypt because the Nile is a vital resource for Egypt's survival to the extent that such a prolonged crisis has the potential for escalating to become a war. The late Egyptian President Sadat made it clear that the Nile waters are a crucial matter for Egypt and that the Egyptians will defend the Nile to death; therefore, Ricks (2011) cited Sadat saying, "It (Nile) is the *only* matter that could take Egypt to war again." The Nile has topped Egypt's national security agenda and, since 2011, has gained considerable attention from successive political leaders as a result of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) making the Nile a securitised issue. As the GERD is a new Ethiopian project it influenced Egypt's relations with Ethiopia with respect to foreign policy, therefore the employability of FPDM is necessary to analyse Egyptian leaders' reactions to the GERD construction and how the decision makers decided upon the nature of the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations. It is the construction of the GERD that led to the securitisation of the Nile that has already been considered by Egyptian leaders as an important political issue. Therefore, the use of both ST and FPDM is required to analyse and understand this case.

This chapter provides a background on the importance of the Nile to Egypt, and it explains the Nile's role in the development of the Egyptian highly centralised political system and the country's status as a regional hegemon. A discussion of the literature regarding water security and how the Nile became securitised follows, then the "Nile crisis" is examined with a specific focus on the period between 2011 - 2018 when the GERD was being

constructed. All of this is followed by an examination of how the Egyptian decision makers attempted to address the issue as an external threat. Finally, the concept of 'water wars' is explored and applied to Egypt. The argument made in this chapter is that the Egyptian leaders securitised the Nile because this Nile crisis represented an indirect threat to their rule, and, in resolving it, the leaders would be able to consolidate their power. Such leaders' (i.e., securitising actor) securitisation of the Nile waters (i.e., referent object) as a soft security threat can lead to adopting exceptional measures, such as diplomacy rather than violence, to resolve this crisis. This will answer the main research question of this thesis on how Egypt manages its soft security crises and it also shows who the key actors are in making foreign policy decisions, and how they use both ST and FPDM to help address these questions.

5.1 Background on the Importance of the Nile to Egypt

5.1.1 The Nile as a 'Vein of Life' to Ancient and Modern Egypt (Politically and Economically)

The ancient Egyptian civilisation emerged on the Nile banks and survived for thousands of years. As Waterson noted, "the Nile has played a vital role in the *creation* of Egypt, a process which started about five million years ago when the river began to flow northwards into Egypt" (Waterson cited in Mark 2009). Ancient Egypt glorified the Nile to the status of Gods; known as 'God Hapi' which means "life," the Nile was and is still a source of life in Egypt (Pedersen 2016 and Arabi-Post 2017). Moreover, "the Nile was held up to the ancient people as the source of all life in Egypt and an integral part of the lives of the Gods," which explains its profound significance (Mark 2009). The Nile holds a significant place in both ancient Egyptian civilisation and modern Egyptian culture and, as the Greek Historian Herodotus stated, "Egypt is the Gift of the Nile" (Migiro 2019). The Nile played an influential role in the development of a centralised governmental system in ancient and modern Egypt. As explained earlier in chapter four Lorenz (1990,p.118) clarified that as Egyptians mainly worked in the agricultural sector since ancient times until today the majority of their activities concentrated around the Nile valley and this led their rulers also to reside by the Nile which led to the centralisation of power in one ruler's hand. The Nile is strongly present in national Egyptian songs such as the current Egyptian national anthem

and other nationalistic songs to highlight the importance of the Nile for the Egyptians and their sense of belonging. Moreover, the Nile is an integral part of how Egyptians identify themselves; in fact, the Nile has always been part of the Egyptian identity as argued in the Arabi-Post (2017) that the Nile is in the Egyptians' "unconscious communal identification." Egyptians identify themselves as the 'sons and daughters' of the Nile which inspired many Egyptian drama writers and film directors to work on this theme. Therefore, the Nile is part of Egypt's history, territory, identity and culture; the Egyptian people and authority believe that it is a vein of life which should be protected and securitised.

Since the ancient Egyptian civilisation concentrated around the Nile valley, it was more feasible for the Pharaohs to control the people who worked in and depended on agriculture, as mentioned earlier in chapter four (Shama 2014, p. 51). Furthermore, in order to exercise power, the Pharaohs needed assistants to help them with enforcing their commands on the people. Thus, such assistants were hired in considerable numbers and that had its impact in creating a large class of civil servants until modern-day Egypt (Lorenz 1990, p. 117). Consequently, this became inherited until these modern days and such centralisation of political power is concentrated in the hands of one ruler who rules Egypt with a strong fist, besides a vast bureaucracy, from its deep southern borders to the remotest areas on the northern parts of Egypt. This shows the influence of the Nile on the ruling style in Egypt which has become its main feature over thousands of years. This had its implications on the Egyptian foreign policy decision making as characterised by foreign policy scholars such as Korany and Dessouki (2010, p. 182) who described it as "leader-staff group or the presidential center type." The main feature of this categorisation is that it is visible in the authoritarian systems as a 'one man show' in the decision-making process or with a minimum role for a group of advisors surrounding the president who varied in their backgrounds and characters (Korany and Dessouki 2010, p. 182).

Therefore, the Nile has a huge economic influence on the Egyptian people as it is a main source of fresh water for drinking—as Egypt is a country that suffers from a shortage of rainfall and its location makes it a downstream country. The Nile also is a main source for food and three sectors rely on it. The first sector is clearly the agricultural sector, the oldest profession for Egyptians since ancient times. Agriculture is the "third largest sector in the economy" in which more than 20 million Egyptians work at. Moreover, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Egypt (2019) agriculture contributed to

Egypt's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 11% in 2015. The second sector is industry; many industries use the Nile water for the industrialisation process and some of the industrial waste is also discarded in the Nile. The third sector is tourism; many of the southern cities in Egypt depend on touristic activities that are based on the Nile cruises (Storey 2019). Water, in general, is required for development and helps in "eradicating hunger and poverty"; therefore, the Nile is crucial for Egypt's economic growth and development as well as its social development, which is the same for other African countries including Ethiopia (Ardakanian 2016; Elemam in Tvedt 2009, p. 220). All these are factors that unite Egyptians around the Nile Valley where most of the Egyptian population is concentrated, which means that Egyptians are occupying only 7.7% of Egypt's land around Nile Valley and its Delta to earn their living (BBC Arabic, 2013). Thus, Egyptians consider the Nile a symbol of life and critical to their survival.

The Nile crisis can be classified as a prolonged crisis since it has been a long-lasting security threat to Egypt. Egypt is concerned about securing its main fresh water source and preserving the same amount of flowing water regardless of its population increase (Hassan & Al Rashidy 2007, p. 25). Egypt is stuck in a water tension area as Bahgat Korany, Professor at the American University in Cairo (AUC) stated in a talk in 18 November, 2018. Water conflicts in this region have been predicted by many water experts as well as peace and conflict scholars such as John Waterbury (Adams 1983).

Gebreluel (2014, p. 26) argued that securing the Nile waters flow was the Egyptian leaders' main concern in their foreign policy with their African neighbors since the 1300s. As a result of Nasser's successful efforts in Africa in addition to his threats to use force against Egypt's African neighbors if issues arose against its (Egypt's) wishes concerning the Nile—which intimidated other Nile riparian states due to the power asymmetry—made Egypt consider itself a regional African hegemonic power for a long period of time. Nevertheless, post the independence of other Nile riparian states, these countries were concerned about the old treaties that were signed on their behalf which did not reflect their true independent personalities, will or ambitions (Hassan & Al Rasheedy 2007, p. 33 and Abdul Rahman 2019, p. 142). Moreover, Egypt is adhering to the two main "colonial-treaties" of 1929 and 1959, respectively, which were signed under the British colonisation that granted Egypt and Sudan the lion's share of the Nile's waters and, in turn, disadvantaged other riparian countries (Turton 2000; Elemam in Tvedt 2009; Milas 2013; Baconi 2018 and Storey

2019). Consequently, the tensions were fueled among the two downstream Nile countries, Egypt and Sudan, against the rest of the upstream countries (Cascão & Nicol 2016, p. 552).

To begin with, there are several reasons to consider the Nile case as a challenge from Egypt's perspective. These challenges can be categorised into domestic (internal) challenges and external (international) challenges. The first challenge is the internal challenges coming from within Egypt due to the fact that Egypt lacks additional resources to provide fresh water (National Water Resource Plan (NWRP) 2005; Hassan & Al Rasheedy 2007). As previously mentioned, the amount of Egypt's rainfall is very limited and is only in a few areas; that is, the North Coast and Sinai (Elemam in Tvedt 2009, p. 219). The second important internal challenge is the Egyptian population increase which puts huge pressure on facilities, mismanages water use and presents a real water and food challenge (Storey 2019; Zawahri in Jägerskog 2019, p. 168). In 2005, it was predicted that Egypt's population would reach 83 million in 2017, but that number was exceeded to more than 90 million in 2017 (NWRP 2005 and SIS 2017). Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, both the agricultural and the industrial sectors depend on the Nile waters along with other limited alternative supplies which are not increasing. This leads to the next internal challenge which is the pollution that results from the factories disposing their solid waste in the Nile in addition to humans polluting the water due to overpopulation. In addition to this, Egypt has an old sewage system that was constructed decades ago and lacks proper maintenance to reduce water leakages leading to the loss of huge amounts of water. Moreover, there is a remarkable amount of water that evaporates as a result of the construction of the Aswan Dam (Turton 2000, p. 18) and due to the floods resulting from unconscious irrigation systems in Egypt (Nasef 2016, p. 4). Thus, all these challenges affect maintaining a quantity-quality balance of clean water supplies for all Egyptians.

Recently, the Nile has occupied a large part of the Egyptian news and has risen to be on the top of the national security agenda and a priority in Egypt's foreign policy agenda. This has been the result of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in 2011. The dam's construction indicated many issues to the Egyptian people and government. The construction of the GERD might mean that Egypt will face many challenges such as undergoing water shortage, food shortage, industrial constraint, loss of jobs and even lower touristic inflows (Milas 2013 and Nasef 2016). There are also other political implications for that which are the loss of Egypt's reputation as a regional

hegemon in Africa and jeopardising the Egyptian leaders' political stability if they fail to resolve this crisis. This makes it crucial for the Egyptian rulers to attempt to securitise the Nile which is further investigated in this chapter.

The first external (International) challenge is that other riparian states started their 'major projects on the Nile' by constructing their own dams over the Nile. The first pivotal state to do so was Ethiopia which resulted in the current crisis relating to constructing the GERD (Gürsoy & Jacques 2014), which ended Egypt's long domination over the Nile (Gebreluel 2014, p. 25). The second external challenge is climate change which is leading to lower rainfall on all riparian states, not only Egypt (Abd El Ghafar 2018). The third external challenge is linked to the previous one; that is, the environmental degradation coming from desertification and pollution which reduces the amount of arable lands—consequently, this is a challenge for food security (Elemam in Tvedt 2009). Finally, it is also true that water itself is becoming a *scarce* and *vulnerable* resource; it is certainly a 'new strategic resource' that nations fight over (Anderson in Starr & Stoll 1988; Zeitoun 2008). Egyptian decision makers are taking all these challenges into consideration and they have started to act on different levels according to what triggers the particular challenge.

"No Nile, No Egypt" has been a main headline of the Egyptian and International news since 2013. This was a statement made by Egypt's Minster of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohamed Kamel Amr in 2013 while commenting on the failure of the round talks on the GERD between Egypt and Ethiopia (Nasralla 2013). Such a strong statement about the Nile shows how shocked the Egyptian administration felt and it is an alarm for the incumbent government. The GERD represented, and still represents, an external threat to Egypt's waters hence a crisis triggered externally.

Egypt is also reaping the seeds of neglecting Africa for many years. Although Egypt has always identified itself as an African country, its foreign policy objectives also focused on African, Arab and Islamic circles since the establishment of its Republic in 1950s under Nasser (as discussed previously in chapter 4), Egypt neglected Africa for twenty years under Mubarak's administration (Hamzawy 2010; Abu El Ghiet 2013 and Ozkan 2013). This negligence came from Mubarak's security concern as there had been an assassination attempt on Mubarak in the 1990s during his visit to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Accordingly, the Security Services advised Mubarak not to visit any African states and Mubarak

followed their advice until 2005 (Abu El Ghiet 2013, p. 228). Thus, Mubarak boycotted the African countries for these security reasons (Abu El Ghiet 2013). This negligence in turn was transformed into a challenge from the African countries' side; therefore, at the first opportunity, some African states marginalised Egypt and looked for alternative partners outside the region as with Israel, Turkey, the Gulf States and China (Cascão et al. cited in Jägerskog et al. 2019, p. 221, 228-229). This weakened Egypt's regional status more, and, by 2011, Ethiopia was the first to strike hard against Egypt by building the GERD.

5.1.2 Leaders' Perception of the Nile since the Creation of the Republic of Egypt

In this section, an overview will be given on how, since the establishment of the republic, Egypt's presidents have handled the different issues that are related to the Nile. It will show that they were all concerned about the Nile as it is linked to them staying in authority and to Egypt's survival.

Egypt is a heavily populated country with the population continuing to grow. Its population in 2018 reached 98,423,598 million with a 2.05% increase since 2017 (Worldometer 2020). Although this population, due to the political system, has not played an influential part in the decision-making process, as discussed in the previous chapter on Egypt's foreign policy, the leaders have always been mindful of the people's demands and basic needs. Food, water, shelter and employment have been major challenges facing its policymakers. In fact, Mubarak's failure to meet these demands was the main reason that led him to be ousted from power in 2011. Water is one of these highly essential needs that the other fundamental needs rest upon. Egypt's fresh waters could be counted as an indirect reason for removing Mubarak in 2011(Zawahri in Jägerskog et al. 2019, p. 175). Since Egypt depends mainly on the Nile for fresh water, almost by 90 percent, ensuring the availability of water to Egyptians is crucial for any leader.

President Nasser was the first to take the lead in being concerned about Egyptian-African relations concerning the Nile security. As previously mentioned, Nasser saw that Egypt should define its foreign policy goals based on its three different identities: Arab, African and Islamic. These identities are related to not only the geographical location connecting Egypt with the rest of the world but also symbols, language and religion; for example, the Nile is a symbol of Africa, Arabic is the language widely spoken in the Arab world and

Islam is a majority-practiced religion connecting Egypt to the rest of the Islamic world. Thus, Nasser believed that warmer relations with Ethiopia would benefit Egypt based on the African identity they both share and based on the Nile as a symbol shared by both of them. This drove Nasser to use Egypt's soft power particularly with Ethiopia and generally with the rest of the African states.

Nasser supported other African states in their fight for independence against colonialism and in their joining the Non-Alignment Movement; by doing so, Nasser hoped to gain popularity and to become the leader not only of the Arab world but also of the African world (Tassin 2006, p. 157-158). Further, during Nasser's regime, Egypt targeted African leadership which Nasser was successful in achieving. In describing the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations, Nasser said "we are partners in the eternal river" (SIS n.d.). This statement shows that Nasser was inclined towards cooperation and considered Ethiopia as a partner in the Nile rather than as a competitor since the Nile is the main determinant in this relationship. Relying on the role of the Christian Orthodox Church in maintaining a dialogue between Egypt and Ethiopia is a glaring example of Nasser's use of soft power in his relations with Africa in general and Ethiopia in particular since Ethiopia followed the Coptic Christian Orthodox Church whose patriarch is the pope based in Alexandria, Egypt. Therefore, Nasser used this intimacy between both churches to Egypt's favour to keep the benign relations between both countries. This in turn had its positive outcomes in maintaining a stable relationship under Nasser's rule between Egypt and Ethiopia. It was under Nasser's reign when the Ethiopian church declared its independence from the Egyptian church in a ceremony held in Egypt in 1959 with the presence of Emperor Haile Sellassie (Erlich 2000, p. 23). This approval over the separation of the churches implied that Egypt wanted to 'ease' its relations with Ethiopia (El Tarabely 2020, p. 4) to make Ethiopia feel fully independent in addition to Egypt's zero interference in the Ethiopian affairs leading to even more relaxation and trust between both states. It is worth mentioning that the Egyptian-Ethiopian relations were not stable all the time under President Nasser's rule (Erlich 2000, p. 23), but the stable periods between Egypt and Ethiopia during Nasser's era were more than the unstable ones (El Tarabely 2020, p. 4).

The Egyptian-Ethiopian relations were altered during Sadat's rule, who started to view and declare the Nile waters as part of Egypt's national security and, as a result, relations with Ethiopia started to become tenser. Sadat had always felt the leadership vacuum created

internally and externally post Nasser's death, so Sadat made the 1971'corrective revolution' internally to remove all aspects related to corruption, gain popularity, and consolidate his power against the opposition factions in Egypt (Harb 2003, p. 283). However, that did not happen until the 1973 October war which transformed his reputation to become a 'war hero'. On the international level, Sadat shifted Egypt's foreign policy orientation towards the USA camp instead of the Soviet camp because Sadat wanted to complete the peace process with Israel and improve Egypt's economy by allying with the US; however, this caused tensions with Ethiopia in the 1980s. This tension occurred since Ethiopia had a change in its ruling regime that brought it closer to the Soviet camp and adopted communism in 1974 (Turton 2000, p. 16). Moreover, in his negotiations with Israel, Sadat promised to dig a canal that would provide Israel with the Nile waters without involving Ethiopia in these talks. This intimidated Ethiopia since Egypt was exclusively negotiating over the Nile waters. This drove Ethiopia to start its talks about building dams on the Blue Nile which worsened the situation with Egypt. In his response, Sadat said that "the Nile water is a 'red line' related to [the] Egyptian national security" (SIS n.d). This demonstrates that Sadat was the first president to explicitly state that the Nile is a 'national security' issue; henceforth, Sadat shifted the Nile-related issues to high politics and attempted with this statement to securitise the Nile.

The Egyptians with their political elites as a consequence accepted such a declaration and the Nile for them became a top political issue. It was also Sadat who waved the use of the 'war-card' in the face of Ethiopia in case Egypt experienced any water shortage. Sadat is famously quoted as saying that the only reason Egypt would go to war again would be over its Nile waters (Ricks 2011). When Sadat learned about Ethiopia's plans for constructing several dams on the Nile, he was quoted saying: "we will not wait until Ethiopians cut the water supply to us and make us die out of thirst, but we will die there in Ethiopia" (Allam 2016, p. 15). Therefore, Sadat implied that Egyptians would go for war in Ethiopia and die on Ethiopian lands if any dam gets constructed endangering Egypt's Nile waters share. Hence, Sadat, as the securitising actor, justified the use of exceptional measures such as going to war to defend the referent object which is the Nile waters if any dams were to be built in Ethiopia. This could be argued to be the first securitisation move over the Nile by Sadat as the leader of the state.

After Sadat's death, Mubarak followed him to power and maintained the same foreign policy. However, Egypt's relations with Ethiopia deteriorated under Mubarak's regime due to an assassination attempt against Mubarak while he was in Ethiopia. This resulted in the suspension of the 'Egyptian-Ethiopian Council' for seventeen years (SIS n.d.). This had a negative spillover effect as it also affected Egypt's relations with the rest of its African neighbors since Mubarak boycotted visiting the neighboring African countries for the next twenty years in order not to risk his safety (Abu El Ghiet, 2013). As Mubarak was Sadat's vice-president, he followed Sadat's footsteps in ruling Egypt and managing its foreign affairs as mentioned earlier. In turn, Mubarak was cautious about the Nile waters portfolio; one can deduce that this led Mubarak to see the Nile as a 'red-line' not to be crossed, and he also threatened to use force against Ethiopia as declared to me by the former MP Mr. Mohamed Anwar Sadat (2020).

Mubarak was toppled from power by a mass uprising in 2011 and the Supreme Council for Armed Forces (SCAF) took over; consequently, Ethiopia seized the chaotic situation in Egypt and started the dam construction at a very high speed. The reaction of the SCAF was to step back and to allow the Egyptian diplomacy to handle such a crisis (Milas 2013, p. 175). SCAF had no clear statements on the Nile compared to the previous Egyptian leaders; one justification for this was the SCAF's attempt to control the domestic chaotic situation and a lack of information related to the previous diplomatic discussions.

In June 2012, the first civilian elected president of Egypt, Dr. Mohamed Morsi, followed the SCAF in power. His presidency did not last long, as explained in the previous chapter on Egypt's foreign policy, due to the many failures which caused much disappointment to the Egyptians who elected him. Among his failures was his management of the Nile crisis. Morsi broadcasted live a "national dialogue" meeting with Egypt's politicians and different political forces, on June 3rd, 2013, to discuss the Nile crisis (Tarek, 2013). In this meeting, Morsi himself was unclear about the Nile issue and declared erroneous information (Al Labbad 2013). However, following his predecessors, Morsi also highlighted threats regarding the Nile and declared "we will defend each drop of the Nile waters with our blood if necessary" (Ahram Online 2013).

Morsi was followed by Abd El Fattah El Sisi to rule Egypt bringing back the military rulers in power in 2014. President Sisi's perception of the Nile issue can be summarised as "a

matter of life or death" (Benaim & Hanna, 2018) which he repeated many times in his meetings with different African leaders and with the Ethiopian Prime Ministers in particular. He also repeated Sadat's statement that the Nile is a "red-line." This shows how closely Sisi is following up on the Nile issue as well as how he moved to securitise the water issue as did Sadat; however, Sisi is more open to negotiations and cooperation rather than waving the war card in the Ethiopians' face as Sadat did.

In conclusion, the Nile has dominated Egypt's leaders' relations with their African counterparts generally and with Ethiopia in particular. Nasser's perception of the Nile was that it is the 'core' for Egypt's relations with Ethiopia; however, there is no evidence that he securitised the Nile and preferred a relationship based on 'partnership'. Nasser's motives were to be a popular leader on both the national and the international levels, and he thought this would also reflect positively on Egypt's status as a regional power. Sadat's perception of the Nile was on the other extreme of Nasser's as he was more aggressive towards Ethiopia when it came to the Nile and he attempted to securitise the Nile by declaring it as a 'red-line' and putting it on his national security agenda. Consequently, Mubarak followed Sadat's attitude towards the Nile but at the end of his last term, the Nile crisis broke out under his rule. Mubarak also attempted to securitise the Nile in 2010 when he delegated the Nile file to the National Security Council and the Egyptian general intelligence hoping they could resolve it. This section helped to show how the Nile was treated as a high politics issue. In the next section, I will show how the Nile crisis has developed as a result of Ethiopia's construction of the GERD since 2011 onwards as a security issue. I will also turn to the analysis and provide evidence for the securitising moves and the context in which such moves were taken by all administrations that followed. These administrations perceived this GERD crisis as an *existential* issue related to the survival of Egyptians and related to their regime's survival; each of these administrations varied in the way of handling the situation. However, I will proceed first with the literature on water as a securitised issue.

5.2 Water Security in National Security Agendas and the Securitisation of Water Literature

This section defines the term 'water security' drawing on relevant literature and relating it to human security. It discusses how water can be securitised and be placed on top of the national security agenda, moving it from *normal* politics to *high* politics. It is worth mentioning that some of the literature equates 'high' politics and 'security' as essentially synonymous.

The literature on water security is rich and diverse. There is a debate amongst scholars that views water as a source of conflict, while other scholars perceive it as an opportunity for cooperation which is known as "water diplomacy" (Klimes & Yaari 2019, p. 234). This is in addition to the division over water as a security concern in both the military and non-military circles (Gürsoy & Jacques 2014; Fischhendler 2015) and whether to defend water through diplomacy or by force. Water, as Zeituon (2008) described it, is the *new strategic resource;* it gained its importance in the national security literature post-Cold War, (Baldwin 1997 and Burgess et al. (2013) based on the works of Tuchman 1989). As populations around the world grow, their demand for access to water increases as well, since the per capita consumption increases with population growth as Mogelgaard (2011, p.1) explained. This has driven scholars to link fresh water limited sources with conflicts and stresses among states. Hence, the term water security evolved. Klimes and Yaari (2019, p. 234) traced the term water security back to the 1990s in the Middle East (ME), but more attention was underpinned in the 2000s as water was interconnected to military and food security in the geopolitical context. The United Nations (2013) defined water security as follows:

> The capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.

Thus, the UN's definition links the presence of water in sufficient amounts to peace prevalence and political stability. That is a core issue for leaders who want to establish themselves in power. Therefore, dams' construction overseas by upstream states could

represent an eminent danger to the political stability of downstream countries who would be affected by less water quantities which impact their societies' livelihoods and wellbeing.

In the Middle East (ME), which is a region suffering highly from water shortages due to limited sources of fresh waters, water security has been extensively studied by scholars of water and security studies (Waterbury 2002; Zeitoun 2008 & 2019; Fischhendler 2015; Tawfik 2016 & 2019). Egypt as a core Middle Eastern country has also been investigated since it suffers from water problems as a downstream state (Waterbury 2002; Barnes 2014; Tawfik 2016 & 2019). Gürsay and Jacques (2014) explained that tensions in the Middle East over water have not yet led to wars; instead, water disputes in this region have been depicted as "part" of other conflicts rather than the main causal factor. The most prominent examples are the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and the Israeli- Jordanian conflicts where water is identified as part of the dispute (Gürsay & Jacques 2014; McCaffery 2014; Fischhendler 2015; Weinthal et al. 2015). Water security in the ME region is high politics as emphasised by Gürsay and Jacques (2014, p. 312). Water security is linked to human security as both focus on *humans* (Gürsay & Jacques 2014) who would be affected mainly by limited water availability in terms of accessibility, quality and quantity. Thus, water security can be considered as a soft security issue because of the shared focus on humans which deviates from the traditional security focus revolving around states threatened by external military coercions.

Security issues can be divided into two types as mentioned in chapter two, hard and soft security issues or falling into the military domain or outside of it known as a non-military security issue. Military security issues are of a concern to decision makers and politicians since they are conflict based and "raise the specter of blood and violence" (Gürsay & Jacques 2014). On the other hand, the non-military soft security issues are non-conflict issues, but they do pose threats to human welfare and stability (Gürsay & Jacques 2014). Water, consequently, can be considered as a non-military soft security issue since, until the time of writing this chapter, it has not led to any wars or bloodshed. The literature investigated used the term soft security interchangeably with non-military security so this explains my use of such terms here but I am focusing more on the term of soft security.

Water security is also connected to other security issues such as national security, climate security, energy security, food security and human security in addition to water resources

(Klimes & Yaari in Jägerskog 2019, p. 234). In the ME, water is scarce and this has driven policy makers in the region to put it on their national security agendas and to see it through this lens (Klimes & Yaari in Jägerskog 2019, p. 237). Consequently, water can be securitised based on that reason and can be the referent object in a securitisation move since it is seen by policy makers (securitising actors) as an existential issue.

To further illustrate, a breakthrough in the securitisation of environmental issues can be found in the novel work of Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde in 1998. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 75) explained that the referent object is the environment or "some strategic part" of it, and the purpose of securitizing the environment means indirectly protecting civilisations against threats. Buzan et al. (1998, pp. 76 & 80) explained that threats to civilisations can be the result of natural disasters or can be manmade such as nuclear attacks. The securitising actors and their agendas are socially constructed (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 72). In identifying the securitising actors for the environmental sector, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 77) classified them into state and non-state actors. The non-state actors are environmental NGOs, environmental activists and the global community. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 91) argued that successful securitisation for the environment has been recorded *only* on the local level, and this empirical study attempts to support this argument on a country in the developing world; that is, Egypt.

The securitisation of water could be triggered as a result of natural disasters, power imbalances and a scarcity of resources as explained by Fischhendler (2015). Buzan et al. (1998, p. 74) explained that when securitising actors underscore resource scarcity and sustainability, this successfully mobilises the people around their governments or leaders. Klimes and Yaari (2019, p. 237) further refined and added to the works of Trottier and Brooks (2013) when they stated that water securitisation occurs when the talks revolve around water allocation and quantity. This resulted in putting water on the national security agendas of Middle Eastern policymakers. Water has always been a security concern for both military and diplomatic leaders (Gürsay & Jacques 2014, p. 312). Fischhendler (2015, p. 246) further elaborated that transboundary water is securitised in the Middle East. Moreover, Fischhendler (2015, p. 246) explained that transboundary rivers are of strategic security concern and, in turn, are a priority on national security agendas as they are related to states' survival. Weinthal et al. (2015, p. 296) further explained the dangers emanating from transboundary rivers because they feature power asymmetries between upstream and

downstream states in the Middle East. This can explain why leaders in the ME might put water issues on their national security agendas. Zawahri (2019, p. 174) clarified that the importance of understanding water security helps to explain the challenges that face leaders, policymakers and the people. These encounters emanating from water security led to questions related to development and socio-economic stability, which eventually leads to state failure or potentially overthrowing a regime. As argued in this chapter, the Arab Spring in Egypt is an example of toppling a regime and water was one indirect reason for it (Zawahri 2019, p. 175). Gürsay and Jacques (2014) and Fischhendler (2015, p. 246) argued that securitising water is linked to the economic stability of the state as water security is linked to human security and economic security. Thus, as Gürsay and Jacques (2014, p. 311) suggested, "An interruption to water provisions and economic stability could be a precursor to a state crisis". It can be inferred from the previous argument that a regime's stability in the ME in particular is primarily based on economic stability which stems from sustainable water supplies. Floyd in 2008 as quoted in Fischhendler (2015) drew this correlation between environmental issues as well as food and energy scarcity with the states' economic and political stabilities. Zawahri (2019, p. 168) further supported this argument and elaborated that water is related to political stability and is of national security importance because in war times hydrological infrastructures and water sources become targeted by aggressors. This in turn causes further damages and losses to the state. I argue that the Nile crisis, during this turbulent period in Egypt's history from 2011 until 2018, is an example that illustrates such an argument by Floyd (2008), Fischhendler (2015) and Zawahri (2019); this explains why dam projects can be unwelcomed by downstream states to the extent of securitising water by state leaders whenever possible. The case of the GERD is a good illustration of such a case.

There are other reasons to securitise water in the ME. For example, Weinthal et al. (2015, p. 296) identified climate change as another potential factor. Zikos et al. (2015, p. 316) clarified that it is difficult to explain how water problems and solutions are "politically" used or abused and how they are socially constructed. Zikos et al. (2015, p. 315) and Weinthal (2015, p. 295) showed that water securitisation can serve several purposes such as developmental plans or seeking donations for infrastructure projects, which is the case in Cyprus and in Jordan. I argue that understanding the surrounding context for policymakers could help in highlighting the reasons for securitising water.

To conclude, water security is a vital human security issue as well as a non-military security issue. Water security is interlinked to other human security dimensions such as food, economic and climate security. Water matters to leaders and decision- makers in the ME who have the authority to securitise it. The literature demonstrates numerous triggers for water crises and the securitisation of water. I argue that the role water plays *indirectly* causes political instability and poses economic challenges to decision makers, which makes it the main reason for leaders to securitise water and other projects related to it. Thus, the Nile crisis is an illustrative example of a soft security issue facing Egyptian leaders as a result of the GERD construction 2011.

5.3 Examining the Nile Crisis and How Each Administration Dealt with It

This section will discuss the evolution of the Nile crisis; how each administration since its outbreak has dealt with it; how the crisis itself escalated and differed from one administration to another; and how and why Egyptian leaders securitised the Nile. It will start with Mubarak's administration (2007-2011) as a background for the escalation of the crisis towards the end of his reign and will then focus more closely on the period of investigation between 2011 and 2018. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the role of the Egyptian leaders in making foreign policy decisions and to observe elements of continuity or change in their foreign policy decisions. It also demonstrates the role of the leaders as securitising actors and identifies the audience as well as the referent object and assesses the success or failure of the securitising moves. Henceforth, I am implementing and linking both Securitisation Theory, and Foreign Policy Decision Making, by focusing on the role of the leader in non-democratic country experiencing a transitional period.

Table 4: This table is a guideline for understanding the decision-making context across the relevant administrations in Egypt

Who is in office in Egypt & when?	Leadership style	Actors or agencies active
Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011)	Leader-staff style or presidential-center	Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (mainly) later by 2010

		Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Intelligence, Ministry of Defense and National Security Council
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (2011-2012)	Group decision makers made up of junta	MOFA and Prime minister (PM)
Mohamed Morsi (2012-2013)	Group decision makers made up of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Supreme guide on top of the brotherhood and Morsi as their figure	MOFA, Muslim Brotherhood shadow government and media
Abd El Fattah El Sisi (2014-2018)	President-center or Leader-staff	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), National Security Council, Intelligence, Ministry of Defense; representing the political track
		Ministry of Water resources and irrigation; representing the technical track
		&The Media

5.3.1 Mubarak's Administration (2007-2011)

5.3.4.2 Mubarak's Governance Style

I'm starting with Mubarak as at the end of his presidency the seeds of the crisis were sown. The meeting that was held in 2010 in which Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) was discussed and its dangers were revealed to the public justifies the reason to include a discussion of his rule. It is a period when Mubarak also made his first securitisation move to securitise the Nile water as a result of the CFA.

As mentioned in the fourth chapter on Egypt's foreign policy, Mubarak assumed power after Sadat's assassination in the 1980s. Mubarak is Egypt's leader with the longest period of rule as he stayed in office for thirty years (Aziz 2020). His style of rule, as described by Korany and Dessouki (2010), was a leader-staff style. This style is focused on the president who sought advice from very few advisors surrounding him on few matters domestically and internationally. This makes Mubarak fall under the category of 'sensitive' leader which Hermann and Hermann (1989) classified. This is because Mubarak was a pragmatic character, he focused on the political system and was consultative yet the final decision was his. According to Aziz (2020), once Mubarak assumed power, he did not adopt "a clear political ideology". When he took power, Mubarak ruled as a "quasi-military leader" (BBC 2017). He used Sadat's assassination, as a result of the peace agreement with Israel, "to build his reputation as an international statesman" (BBC 2017).

Mubarak's foreign policy was a continuation of Sadat's as scholars observed (Motawei 2016, p. 47). This continuation meant being close to the USA and Europe. This is a choice Mubarak made to improve Egypt's economic situation given its growing population (Motawi 2016, p. 47 and Aziz 2020). Due to the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, Egypt was boycotted by its Arab allies; however, due to Mubarak's efforts, he was able to restore Egyptian-Arab warm relations, wrote Aziz (2020). When Mubarak assumed power in the early 1980s, he was actively engaged with his African neighbours due to the role played by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Boutrous Boutrous Ghali; however, as mentioned earlier, this enthusiasm faded and a lack of engagement became the main feature of Egyptian-African relations due to his assassination attempt in the 1990s (SEMIDE-EMWIS 2011; Fahmy 2020, p. 137). Mubarak was interested in foreign policy and valued experts' information at least in his first decade which means he could be counted as goal-

oriented leader as described by Kaarbo (1997). A justification for that is that Mubarak was interested in power and made unilateral decisions.

It is worth describing the atmosphere under which Mubarak worked in his last years in office to show the impact of the context on the decision maker. In the last decade of his rule, Mubarak was suffering from several domestic protests due to inhuman living circumstances and many unfulfilled demands from the disadvantaged Egyptians. Also, Mubarak was working on an 'inheritance project' so that his son Gamal would succeed him to power. This inheritance project created a division within Mubarak's long ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), as well as within the country that has long suffered from his authoritarian rule. Consequently, Mubarak left many of the domestic affairs like party rule and economic issues to his son Gamal Mubarak (Motawei 2016, p. 11). A justification for this behaviour was that he was old, impatient for details and "devastated by the death of his grandson" explained Fahmy (2020, p. 186). However, Mubarak continued to dominate both security and foreign affairs decisions, explicated Motawei (2016, p. 11). As Mubarak was the chief leader in determining Egypt's foreign policy, he surrounded himself with many advisors; yet, his opinion was always the one adopted (Korany & Dessouki, 2010).

The Nile crisis surfaced to the public under Mubarak's administration in his third decade and has been ongoing since then. The crisis has taken different turns and when one issue was resolved, another one developed. Mubarak's administration tried to keep this crisis away from the public's attention, but early in 2010 it surfaced and was acknowledged by Egyptians as one of the failures of Mubarak's administration that indirectly led to ouster him from power. The Nile crisis evolved as a result of the signature of many Nile Basin countries for the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) in Entebbe in 2010; Egypt stressed the maintenance of its water security

5.3.4.3 Actors Involved in the Nile Portfolio

Mubarak's administration was aware that Egypt is prone to *serious* water shortage and is likely to fall below water poverty levels in the near future (Ambassador Bayoumi Attia 2018; Storey 2019). In the memoirs of the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2004 until 2011, Mr. Ahmed Abu El Ghiet (2013, p. 225) mentioned that as soon as he assumed office, he paid close attention to "one of the most *critical* Egyptian portfolios in its foreign

affairs which is the Nile waters." Abu El Ghiet (2013, p. 225) also stressed that the Nile water issue was a vital issue to other governmental institutions, mainly, the National Security Council, Ministry of Defense and the General Intelligence. All this shows how Mubarak's administration was concerned with the Nile issue and gave it an important status in the early years of 2000s; however, Mubarak did *not* give the Nile file exclusively to the security apparatus until a crisis broke out in 2010. This is when Mubarak realised the failure of the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to handle the crisis alone. Therefore, Mubarak referred the Nile issue to the Head of General Intelligence, the late General Omar Soliman (Schenker, 2010). This is the first attempt for a securitisation move by Mubarak as a president (as a securitising actor) to raise the Nile (referent object) file to a higher-level authority; the General Intelligence (audience) who accepted to handle the situation. The failure of the diplomatic and technical track meant that the Intelligence were given the opportunity to adopt new strategies.

It should be noted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not act unilaterally in its continuous negotiations with its African neighbours under Mubarak's rule. According to Abu El Ghiet (2013, p. 226), the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation was seen as a *pivotal* negotiator especially with having the Minister Mr. Mahmoud Abu Zaid, who was "an excellent negotiator and a trusted man from Nile riparian states." This shows that the president and the National Security Forces with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs invited other political elites to play a role in this decision-making process as a form of sharing experiences and exchanging ideas in an attempt to resolve this problem under the president's leadership. This demonstrates the leader-staff ruling style that was adopted in Egypt during Mubarak's reign. Mubarak, during this period in time, was preparing his son Gamal to succeed him in power, so his aim was to pave a smooth way for his son so as not to face troubles with regards to water issues and a Nile crisis; this explains Mubarak resorting to many actors to solve this challenge in 2010. However, his efforts were incomplete due to the Uprisings in January 2011. The Uprisings made it also difficult to assess the success or failure of Mubarak's securitisation move as it was interrupted.

Ambassador Bayoumi Attia (2018) clarified that on the Nile water issue, there were many players invited by Mubarak to "have a say and play a role in water problems as well as suggest solutions." This shows that the Nile file was handled by many actors who had different cultures, interests and agendas which sometimes clashed, although they were

serving the same cause. Consequently, this reflected negatively on the Nile issue: "it is only when matters reach a deadlock when these different ministries start to communicate together and release the news to the public," said Tawfik (2020). As a result, the Nile topic was not a complete success and obviously the role of the new parties invited to resolve the issue was unsuccessful. This resulted in having the Nile crisis developing to another level. This could be another reason for the difficulty in assessing the success or failure of the securitisation move under Mubarak's rule as a result of the CFA.

5.3.4.4 The Nile Crisis Triggered

In May 2010, Egypt was astounded as some of the upstream countries of the Nile such as Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Rwanda had signed an agreement without Egypt's and Sudan's approval nor attendance in the city of Entebbe in Uganda. This agreement became known as 'Entebbe agreement' which established the 'Cooperative Framework Agreement' (CFA), which ended the legacy of both colonial treaties of 1929 and 1959 (Milas 2013, pp. 14 &19). Egypt's objection to the CFA is that this agreement neglects to specify water quotas for Egypt, disregarding previous agreements (1929 and 1959) and encourages other riparian states to commence construction projects on the Nile waters without the acceptance or previous notification of other states (Eleiba 2011); thus, ending Egypt's and Sudan's 'veto' power. The veto power both Egypt and Sudan used was granted to them by the colonial treaties of 1929 and 1959 as downstream counties (Bashat 2020[11]) and allows both Sudan and Egypt to block any projects that threaten both countries' access to the Nile waters. Consequently, the Entebee agreement meant a reduction of the water quantity reaching Sudan and Egypt and, thus, caused a water security concern for the downstream states. Therefore, this is directly related to the UN (UN Water 2013) water security definition; "the ability to maintain the flow of adequate quantity of water to maintain livelihood"

This remains a major concern for Egypt and Sudan and arose from the fact that the CFA ignores the concept of 'water security' for downstream countries, (Eleiba 2011; Abd El Aaty 2020). The Mubarak administration saw May 2010 as a "bad month for Egypt's Nile water strategy" (Milas 2013, p. 14). Mubarak's administration sensed that it was losing control over the Nile waters and that "its strategy for monopoly of the Nile waters was

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[11] I'm very grateful for Mr. Bashat to conduct this interview with him at his party's office in Cairo in 2020.

falling apart and it will be difficult, if at all possible, to put it back together" (Milas 2013, p. 14). This marked a sign for Mubarak's administration that its long neglect of its African neighbours had a reverse 'bitter' reaction. Furthermore, this act showed that Egypt's status had changed in the political dynamics among African politics; the main symbol and connection to its African identity, the Nile, is under threat as a result of the CFA. It represented a threat to Egypt's power as a hegemon in the Nile valley. It also meant the failure of both Egypt's soft power and deterring methods against its African neighbors: "the Nile Basin states became rogue and this surprised Mubarak after the Entebbe agreement," said Bashat (2020).

It could have also reminded Mubarak of Sadat's statement that the only reason Egypt would go to war would be its Nile waters (Hassan & Al Rasheedy 2007). Former Egyptian MP Mr. Mohamed Anwar Sadat, Head of Opposition Party Reform and Development[12], said that "Mubarak was Sadat's vice-president and was fully aware of how dangerous the Nile file was." As explained in the previous chapter, Mubarak was following Sadat's policies and rejected any changes as he preferred stagnation and maintaining the same status-quo (Shama 2014). It is worth mentioning that in 2010 Mubarak was in his early eighties and impatient when dealing with any details on any issue including this crisis (Abu El Ghiet 2013 and Fahmy 2020, p. 186). Mubarak's character was more about getting the big picture and one of being slow to make decisions (Abu El Ghiet 2013; Shama 2014). This explains why Mubarak left the Nile portfolio for many years of his reign, to other politicians and political elites rather than dealing with it himself.

5.3.4.5 Mubarak's Securitisation Move

Mubarak realized that his threatening tactics used with Ethiopia "did not deter them enough," said former MP Sadat (2020). This is because in 2010 the Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi announced that Egypt has no right to prevent Ethiopia from building any dams on the Nile and he escalated this further by saying that Egypt cannot win a war against Ethiopia (Russia Today 2019). Therefore, the first official reaction from Egypt under Mubarak's rule was to freeze its participation, (along with Sudan), in the Nile Basin

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[12] This is my personal interview conducted at the headquarters of the Reform and Development Party with Mr. Sadat to whom I am very thankful.

Initiative (NBI) projects (Cascão & Nicol 2016, p. 556.) This reaction was followed by the extensive use of diplomacy via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Plaut 2010, p. 116) who arranged to have shuttle visits by the Minister to some African states to halt them signing the agreement, yet these visits were unsuccessful (Milas 2013, p. 19). Moreover, in July 2010, Egypt's Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif visited Uganda and delivered a message on behalf of Mubarak to Uganda's President. In this message, Mubarak tried to persuade Uganda to reconsider its signing of the Entebee agreement and to "return to peaceful talks with Egypt as Mubarak described it as the *only* means to end the Nile Basin countries' disagreements (Abd El Wahed 2010). Also, in Mubarak's message to Uganda's President, he promised to plant a million trees around Lake Victoria as per a previous request from Uganda's government to Egypt (Abd El Wahed 2010). This could be considered as a soft use of power between Egypt and Uganda. The next step was a further escalation from Egypt's side by announcing the crisis to the public and publicly stating that it was delegating the Nile file from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the "National Security Authority" (Milas 2013, p. 19). According to Sultan (2010), Mubarak ordered the formation of a "special crisis unit" which he headed to "follow up on the conflict with the Nile Basin countries over the water issue." This unit was mainly formed of powerful people from the National Security Council of Egypt (Defense, Intelligence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and has constantly been in-session to find a permanent solution to this problem. The National Security Council (NSC) of Egypt dealt with this problem as a 'de-facto' issue which must be dealt with and believed that it had to swiftly resolve the conflict between Egypt and Sudan on one side and the other main signatories of the Entebbe Agreement on the other side (Sultan 2010). Mubarak, who always favored stability, saw that the CFA was a threat to this stability and to the economic development of Egypt which justified his power monopoly (BBC 2017). Thus, the CFA represented a threat to his power and was represented later as an obstacle for his son Gamal as his successor.

Thus, Mubarak's securitisation move can be summarised as follows: Mubarak (is both the foreign policy decision maker and the securitising actor) declares that the Nile (the referent object) is threatened by the CFA that was signed by five African states and ignored Egypt's historical water rights and allowed starting projects that would reduce secure water flows to Egypt. Mubarak announced this news to the public, national security forces and the security

forces (audience). This move was accepted by the audience, and the National Security authorities accepted to handle the Nile case along with the other institutions.

This can be argued as marking a *partial* success of the securitisation move made by Mubarak because, after long period of neglect and ineffectiveness it restored the strength and active position of NSC. However, as previously mentioned, this was interjected by Mubarak being ousted from power in 2011. Ethiopia took advantage of such circumstances to further escalate the situation for its own benefit as 2011 events were a "golden opportunity to the Ethiopians," argued former MP Sadat (2020).

5.3.4.6 Mubarak as the Leader and the Foreign Policy Decision Maker

As stated in the previous chapter, Egypt's foreign policy under Mubarak's rule was analysed to be "leader-staff" style (Korany and Dessouki 2010, p. 182); thus, when it came to the Nile file, Mubarak gave the whole file to the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation; but after the change of its yearlong serving Minister Mr. Abu Zaid proved to be unsuccessful, the crisis broke out. It was Mubarak who worsened such a crisis as he neglected this vital file for so long and left it in the hands of only one ministry as per Ambassador Mona Omar (2015)[13]. Ambassador Omar (2015) saw that the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation was inefficient in its negotiations with the rest of the Nile Basin states; she added that if a bigger role had been delegated by Mubarak to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the issue would not have deteriorated. Moreover, Mubarak could be a trigger to this crisis due to him changing the Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation, Abu Zaid who was highly trusted by the Ethiopians. Ambassador Nabil Fahmy (2020), former Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained that the Nile file is a major problem and a "mistake" because it could have been handled better in Mubarak's days. Fahmy (2020) further added that this water crisis is a "missed opportunity" that dated back some twenty-five years because in Mubarak's days "Egypt missed looking at the future and focused on the past with its colonial treaties. Mubarak was alarmed and only saw it as a crisis in 2010 as this could be one obstacle in his son's way to becoming the 'new' president of Egypt succeeding him (Sadat 2020). As a result, this drove Mubarak to reappear to play a role by delegating the file to the National Security Council and to head the "special crisis unit"

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[13] This was a personal interview with Ambassador Mona Omar; former deputy for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the time of the interview was the Director of the Africa Center in 2015 at the British University in Egypt.

working on the water conflict. Therefore, this could have been an attempt by Mubarak to solve the crisis by himself as the leader of the state and chief of foreign affairs. Thus, Mubarak used a traditional solution to manage the crisis which is diplomacy and the use of soft power. It is difficult to determine if he was going to use force against Ethiopia if the diplomatic channels failed as the revolts broke out in 2011.

5.3.2 SCAF 2011-2012

5.3.2.1 SCAF's Crisis Was Laying Foundations of the Dam While There Was a Political Void in Egypt

By January 25th, 2011, Egypt witnessed mass protests against Mubarak who ruled for more than thirty years. Egyptians were chanting in the street "bread, freedom, social equality and human dignity," wrote El Shaheed (2015) highlighting key policy failures of the Mubarak administration. By February 11th, 2011, Mubarak stepped down and delegated the country's affairs to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which ruled until the June 2012 elections. This one-year transition was extremely chaotic and eventful for the SCAF on both local and foreign levels in addition to the country's dire economic situation.

 Arguably, Ethiopia saw the 2011 events as a golden opportunity to start its GERD construction. In April 2011, Ethiopian Prime Minister Zenawi declared his decision to construct the Grand Ethiopian Dam and claimed its benefits for the Ethiopian people and the Nile Basin countries (Cascão & Nicol 2016, p. 554). The first reaction of the Egyptian government under the SCAF, was to step back leaving the portfolio to be handled by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (like under Mubarak). Accordingly, upon consultation between the SCAF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry sent a "48-member popular public diplomacy delegation to Addis Ababa", (Sudan Tribune, 2011; Euro-Mediterranean Information system, 2011) as a way of using Egypt's soft power; which is public diplomacy. This was an attempt to reduce the tensions between both countries over the Nile, regain their benign relations, and try to restore Egypt's image with its African neighbors. Bashat (2020) commented on the performance of this delegation saying that, "it was a *complet*e failure, they *harmed* Egypt's reputation more than benefited it as they gave an impression that Egypt is weak and

desperate." Unlike Mubarak, SCAF did not comment negatively on the new treaty of CFA (Euro-Mediterranean Information system, 2011). This was welcomed by Ethiopia which in turn postponed the ratification of the CFA until a new Egyptian government was elected, (Euro-Mediterranean Information system, 2011).

However, according to Cascão and Nicol, 2016 the Ethiopian government did not feel confident in the new Egyptian administration as it changed the Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation many times which reflected their wrong choices for the minister, hesitation and domestic chaos. Another reason for the sense of distrust between Ethiopia and Egypt is that Ethiopia felt that the Nile file has been delegated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as "other higher level political circles", (Cascão and Nicol 2016, p. 557). This gave the impression that although the SCAF with its military officers appeared to be outside the picture in resolving this crisis they remained in the shadows along with other political elites (who could still be the intelligence and National Security Council since Mubarak's time) who were not trusted by Ethiopians who felt the SCAF could blow up the dam to gain credibility at home. The SCAF continued the securitisation of the Nile crisis and tried to solve it in the same manner as Mubarak by using the same players. And Cascão and Nicol (2016, p. 557) claimed that the SCAF's behaviour, "contributed to an increased politicisation and securitisation of water issues."

Former MP Sadat (2020) explained that "the SCAF did not do anything themselves, they instead sent the Intelligence to gather information about the dam and perform undercover field investigation." Bashat (2020) is a retired Military Intelligence General, and at the time of writing this paper he is the Head of African Affairs Committee in the Egyptian parliament. He has first-hand experience of negotiating the Nile crisis; he said that the "SCAF was in constant contact with Ministry of Water Resources and Security apparatuses. The SCAF moved in a strategic way and tried to resolve the crisis using an *untold scenario[14]."* This was intimidating Ethiopia who always distrusted the presence of this group (Intelligence) in any talks or negotiations; moreover, Ethiopia has accused Egypt's Intelligence group of playing a role in agitating the opposition groups against the ruling government affecting its internal stability (Abu El Ghiet 2013). This has been an option on Egypt's table even under the SCAF's administration as a tactic to protect the Nile. Hence,

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[14] Mr. Bashat refused to explain to me what the 'untold' scenario was

this reinforces the notion that the securitisation moves made under Mubarak's rule were successful and that the SCAF followed the same policies which Mubarak had adopted and continued from where Mubarak stopped; however, the SCAF tried to show the opposite with their reaction to the CFA.

Although the SCAF sent Prime Minister Essam Sharaf to open a channel for talks with the Ethiopians, he was accompanied by "senior level officials," (Sudan Tribune 2011). Again, this is indicative of the role played by the National Security authorities, the Ministry of Defense and General Intelligence in attempting to resolve this crisis. Mr. Sharaf also asked Ethiopia to reduce the speed of the GERD construction until a newly elected government filled in the power vacuum in Egypt and to freeze the ratification of the CFA until a new government was in power in Egypt. Both requests were welcomed by the Ethiopian government and the "SCAF was successful in stabilizing negotiations with the Ethiopians as long as it could," assessed Bashat (2020). I argue that Ethiopia accepted this request by Egypt's government as it was concerned about the SCAF being in power, so it preferred to wait for a new 'civil' government for more favourable negotiations and to avoid any chances of war by the junta.

The SCAF's reaction and management of this crisis could be explained as a group effort, with the efforts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation, not to mention the General Intelligence. According to Tawfik (2020), the "SCAF saw the dam as a threat to the national security of Egypt"; it is the dam that caused the threat to the Nile since the Nile, as the rest of the Egyptian territories, must be protected by the armed forces. Similarly, the "Nile water landscape in Egypt is a symbolic and imaginary construction of the nation-state's geographical identity" that needs to be protected (Hanna & Allouche in Menga & Swyngedouw 2018, p. 83). Although it was not supposed to be publicly discussed, the SCAF broke that taboo "because they wanted to divert the Egyptians' attention [away] from the domestic chaos and the SCAF's tough measures in controlling this chaos," said Sadat (2020). The SCAF dealt with the construction of the dam as a '*fait accompli*' matter and tried only to play a role in delaying the ratification of the CFA. It was a successful attempt since Ethiopia agreed to postpone the dam's construction until a new stable government was elected in Egypt (VOA News 2011). In this case, the SCAF is not the cause of the crisis, instead the SCAF managed and solved a crisis inherited from Mubarak. Also, having the SCAF in power in fact securitised

and politicised the crisis (Cascão & Nicol 2016, p. 557). The referent object for the SCAF is the Nile threatened by the GERD construction. Ethiopians were uncomfortable with the presence of the SCAF in power and favored to halt the ratification of the treaty in their parliament until the following year in the hope of having a 'civilian' government in power which would hopefully make the negotiations easier and softer. To Ethiopia, the presence of the junta in power represented a threat of direct military engagement at any point in time to some extent. The mistrust between Ethiopia and Egypt, due to the role of the Egyptian Intelligence, drove Ethiopia to act cautiously on this matter and to be receptive to Egyptian demands for one year.

5.3.3 Morsi 2012-2013

5.3.3.1 Morsi's One-Year Term

Dr. Mohamed Morsi assumed power in June 2012 to become the first 'Islamist' civilian president of Egypt. Morsi inherited the Nile crisis from previous administrations along with other challenges. However, the GERD construction became a real threat in 2011. As explained in the previous chapter, Morsi's decision-making style was more of a group style since he was not the real decision maker; instead, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood and Morsi's associates as a group were the decision makers and Morsi was only their executor. Morsi inherited this Nile crisis and he also adopted the same approach of threatening Ethiopia (which shows an element of continuity from Mubarak's time). The Nile crisis deteriorated during Morsi's presidency for a few reasons as a result of the way he handled the crisis as an individual. Therefore, Morsi played a critical role in deteriorating this crisis and, unfortunately, as a result of the way he handled this crisis the situation deteriorated more than with previous administrations.

Morsi (supported by the Muslim Brotherhood) wanted to establish himself in power and made many promises to Egyptians (Khazan 2013), but none were forthcoming. Morsi first discussed the Nile file only at the end of his term in June 2013; one can argue that the reason for this late attention was because Morsi had been under immense pressures from ~~the~~ society who was outraged at his many failures in solving several domestic issues or keeping his election promises (Khazan 2013; Ahram Online 2013). Furthermore, Morsi's constitutional declaration of December 2012 caused an uproar among society and his rule was perceived by the masses as a huge disappointment (Mouterde 2013). Thus, by

attempting to solve the Nile crisis, Morsi would earn a winning card with the Egyptians to save his rule. It is a subjective matter to win ground with a rebellious society; the Egyptians had high hopes upon this new civil government and thought it would rule differently, improve their status domestically and cause a real change in Egyptian international relations such as solving problems like the GERD construction (Mouterde 2013).

5.3.3.2 Morsi Escalates the Crisis and Securitises the GERD

As previously mentioned, Morsi called for a "national dialogue meeting" with the different political factions in Egypt and aired it live on TV. This meeting revealed how aggressive Egyptian politicians were in suggesting solutions to handle this crisis and how they all securitised the GERD. Sadat (2020) explained that Morsi called for this meeting to discuss the technical report: "this meeting was like taking a survey of the opposition's opinion and other political factions on this matter." Sadat (2020) added that "the report showed the negative impact of this dam on environmental and social sectors in Egypt, this was a real trigger for the crisis." The GERD had potential negative impacts on Egypt. Therefore, the GERD, for the political opposition (audience), represented a security threat to Egypt and its Nile (the referent object). Consequently, these audiences supported Morsi's previous calls for the use of exceptional measures, such as, using force to end this crisis.

5.3.3.2.1 Morsi's Securitisation Moves

Morsi's early statements in the national dialogue meeting, as a securitising actor, to the political opposition securitising the Nile water (referent object), were as follows: "Egypt's water security cannot be violated at all" and "as president of the state, I confirm to you that all options are open" (BBC 2013). These alarming statements agitated the audiences' feelings; accordingly, there were unprecedented public statements of direct action to deal with this security threat posed by the dam's construction in the context of the Nile. For example, Ayman Nour representing the liberal opposition suggested that Egypt should spread rumors about airstrikes to hit the dam (Hendawi 2013). Another example of using exceptional measures as a solution to the crisis was the suggestion made by Yunis Makhyoun (Head of the Salafist Movement) to involve the General Intelligence to destroy the dam or to create chaos inside Ethiopia by fueling the rebellious groups against the Ethiopian regime (Hendawi 2013). Therefore, it was due to the report provided by the technical team and the opposition's sense of real danger on Egypt that they, as political

elites, proposed such exceptional and aggressive measures to resolve the problem. Moreover, these suggestions show how seriously the opposition viewed this crisis as an existential threat to Egypt.

5.3.4.6.1 Morsi's Intensification of the Securitisation Moves

Morsi asked to hold an *exclusive* meeting for the 'Islamic factions' in Egypt (Eleiba 2013) in which he used the speech act and securitised the Nile issue. Morsi, as the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's decision maker who is the securitising actor, said in that meeting that "if Egypt is the gift of the Nile, then the Nile is God's gift to Egypt" (Ahram 2013). This is a reflection of how pious and religious Morsi wanted to present himself and to present the ideology he and the Muslim Brotherhood were following by which he would be able to gain the consent of the "Muslim" audience attending this exclusive Islamic meeting. Morsi also added that "we will defend each drop of Nile water with our blood if necessary" (Ahram 2013). Morsi also stated that "the lives of the Egyptians are connected around it... as one great people. If it diminishes by one drop, then our blood is the alternative" (BBC 2013). Thus, here Morsi openly communicated the use of exceptional measures like "blood sacrifice" resulting from 'war' as Egypt's way to defend its Nile water to further intensify the securitisation move. Morsi in this statement was also implicitly inviting the military forces, who are part of his securitising audiences (political elites) as well, to defend the Nile because blood is usually sacrificed as a result of war. Also, Morsi was still targeting the Islamic audience who sacrificed their blood in terrorist attacks for a 'religious cause' since he mentioned that the Nile is God's gift. With this speech, Morsi brought the "confrontational tone" which the Ethiopians were wary about (Cascão & Nicol 2016, p. 558). Hence, Morsi intensified the crisis by his stark statements.

In assessing the impact of such speeches as a successful securitising move on the public audiences, the following example illustrates that the audience (both the average citizens and the political elite) accepted it. This was reflected on the status of the Ethiopian migrants and refugees in Egypt; Ethiopians in Egypt suffered from a sense of "xenophobia" and some experienced "assaults" on the Egyptian streets (Haddoun 2013). It is the "media" broadcast of the Nile crisis which agitated some of the Egyptians' negative feelings towards the Ethiopians which resulted in such attacks on the Ethiopian refugees in Egypt (Miranda

2018, p. 23). These refugees in turn held many protests outside the UNHCR office in Cairo protesting this maltreatment and seeking protection (Miranda 2018, p. 23).

5.3.3.3 Morsi's Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM)

In using FPDM to assess the role of Morsi as the foreign policy decision maker and manager of the crisis as the leader of Egypt, Morsi used two contradictory methods in handling this crisis: the first was peaceful and the second was aggressive. First, Morsi prompted a "dialogue" with the Ethiopian parties and the rest of upstream countries as the "best means" to resolve this crisis (Ahram 2013). Henceforth, the political and diplomatic options prevailed; however, such options failed. This was the Muslim Brotherhood's approach in managing the Nile crisis as Morsi was a weak and an inexperienced leader. This would count Morsi as an 'unmotivated' leader who is not interested in foreign policy and more focused on domestic issues as Kaarbo classified such leaders in 1997. Morsi, under the instructions of the Muslim Brotherhood appointed a weak Minister of Foreign Affairs but had his own strong shadow minister. Morsi met with the Ethiopian Prime Minister several times; as Ozkan (2013, p. 16) and Tawfik (2020)[15] mentioned and became the first Egyptian president to attend the African Union (AU) meeting since the 1990s. The AU was previously known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which showed how Morsi was trying to ease tensions with Ethiopia as well as the rest of African countries who lost confidence in Egypt since the days of Mubarak. Hence, this was an attempt to solve the Nile crisis.

However, Tawfik (2020) argued that attending the AU summit in 2013 was unsuccessful in delivering a strong message to resolve the Nile crisis. Morsi's administration used the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate and to build constructive talks with their Ethiopian counterparts. This eagerness to negotiation and taking a diplomatic route would classify Morsi under Hermann and Hermann's (1989) categorisation as a 'sensitive' leader as he was consultative in his decisions with the Muslim Brotherhood and he was focused on the political system. However, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. Mohamed Kamel Amr, who was in office from 2012 until 2013, made his widely broadcasted statement "No Nile no Egypt" (Ahram Online 2013) which meant that other Egyptian institutions, along

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[15] This was a virtual interview with Dr. Rawia Tawfik, an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, in 2020.

with the Muslim Brotherhood, were securitising the Nile waters and highlighted the success of the securitisation move among the political elites. This demonstrates the second way of attempting to solve the crisis by using threatening language against Ethiopia. It can be suggested that the Nile as a result of the GERD construction has remained under his rule securitised because of the unsuccessful attempts to resolve the crisis.

It is worth mentioning that the election of Mohamed Morsi as the first "Islamist" president was intimidating to the Ethiopian government. From the Ethiopian perspective, "Islamic extremism" is always uncomfortable as Islamic extremists perceive Ethiopia as a "Christian state" that is hostile to Muslim states (The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2002). Therefore, Ethiopia had to assess if Morsi was a moderate or an extremist Muslim; which made solving this crisis even more complicated. The live national dialogue meeting, which was broadcasted live, showed how Morsi was unaware of the situation as he gave wrong information as Tawfik (2020) explained "Morsi lacked the political experience to be able to resolve this problem." Later, although Morsi's political advisors went on air and apologised on the behalf of the Egyptian nation to Ethiopia for broadcasting this meeting and for the hostile attitude shown in this meeting (Maher 2013); consequently, the Ethiopian government's skepticism about the Islamists' rise to power in Egypt became true and the GERD's construction was resumed at a faster pace.

According to Tadesse (2018), "Muslim propaganda in Egypt says that Ethiopia is building the dam because they have a Christian president so if the president changes, then the situation will be solved"; this implies that Egypt could work against Ethiopia due to difference in religious beliefs between the Egyptian and the Ethiopian presidents. Hence, it is this stress on the "Muslim propaganda" that showed the Ethiopian fears of having an extreme Islamic president in power in Egypt; it also underscores the role of the president and his religious beliefs in this crisis. Tadesse (2018) also added that Ethiopia used the broadcast of his meeting to its own benefit by repeating it many times on the Ethiopian channels to encourage the Ethiopians overseas to continue sending their remittances to fund the GERD. The Ethiopian government used this incident to increase the Ethiopian sense of nationalism and unify the Ethiopian people around their leaders to resume constructing this mega dam. Menga (2015, p. 480) argued that the "ruling elites can use the symbolism of major dams to gain legitimacy and bolster a sense of national identity and patriotism." Even the former Sundanese president Omar Al Bashir said that "the political subjective bids

under Morsi's administration over the GERD have agitated average Ethiopians behavior towards the Nile case" (Al Arabiya News 2013). Consequently, the crisis intensified for Egyptian decision makers.

Such actions led to escalating the crisis even further and demonstrated the failure of Morsi's administration to resolve the crisis. Morsi left after a year in power and an interim government replaced him for one year until new elections were held in 2014 to elect Abd El Fattah El Sisi to power. Even though Morsi used the Nile crisis to establish his rule, he failed and was ousted from power after just one year. Moreover, although Morsi has a civilian background, he waved the use of force in the face of the external threats to defend the Nile. Henceforth, Morsi could be categorised as a *constraint challenger* as he showed aggressive behavior toward Ethiopia as per the classification of Keller (2005, p.205). Also, Morsi could be classified as a weak leader who was fragile in making his foreign policy decisions as he relied on the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood. Morsi's failure to resolve the Nile crisis could be an added reason for his removal from power and this supports my main argument in this thesis that water as a soft security threat could be an indirect reason to overthrow presidents among other direct reasons to show his failure. Morsi failed to consolidate his rule due to many problems and the Nile issue was among them.

5.3.4   Sisi 2014-2018
5.3.4.1 Sisi's Challenges

The Egyptian president Abd El Fattah El Sisi is a former Military General and a former Director of the Military Intelligence who assumed power in 2014. Sisi inherited many challenges, including the Nile crisis. The Nile situation during Morsi's administration deteriorated significantly and many efforts had to be expended on this file, in particular. Water is not only related to meeting the country's survival needs, but it is also linked to the development of the nation on which the leader's accountability rests. Thus, for Sisi, to get the wheels of development and reform spinning, the Nile crisis had to be solved so that he could well establish himself in power.

It should be mentioned that Sisi's years in office from 2014 until 2018 were not smooth on either the local or the international level. This explains the context in which Sisi, and his administration, were operating within. Domestically, Sisi faced the rise of terrorist attacks,

carried by ISIS and/or the Muslim Brotherhood based in Sinai (Ayyub 2014), mainly in Cairo and Alexandria, as these terrorist groups claimed that Sisi isolated Morsi (the elected president). As a result, Sisi asked for the Egyptian people's delegation to launch a national "war on terror." Sisi faced stiff opposition and resistance to his rule mainly from the Muslim Brotherhood, some revolutionary factions and the leftists. These groups questioned his legitimacy and some of them still do which, consequently, divided the Egyptian society (Shaker 2018). In addition, Sisi had to deal with many economic difficulties and social hardships internally. For example, Sisi had to overcome macroeconomic challenges while reducing poverty rates (Samhouri 2014). Moreover, among Sisi's necessary duties were addressing the energy crisis, reducing unemployment rates, stimulating fiscal policies and increasing the minimum wages (Khan 2014).

On the international level, Sisi suffered from a recognition problem and, at least in his first term, he was not accepted by the global community due to the overthrowing of Morsi's regime. Consequently, this led to the suspension of Egypt's membership of the African Union (der Wolf 2013). Therefore, Egypt had to react to change such an unwelcoming attitude, as Mr. Sameh Shoukry (SIS 2018) said that "the message directed to the Western World was that Egypt adopts a rational policy based on achieving common interests, mutual respect and respect for people's will." For Sisi, it was crucial to get local and foreign recognition and legitimacy; accordingly, Sisi had to consolidate his rule and gain legitimacy. Thus, Sisi believed that in resolving the Nile crisis he would gain more public as well as international support, and establish himself domestically. I argue that Sisi perceived the Nile crisis as an opportunity to gather the Egyptians around as the Nile is an important symbol to the Egyptians; which will also help him gain more public support.

According to Sameh Shoukry (2017), the current Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a meeting with the prominent Egyptian journalists from the Al Ahram Newspaper, said that "the current Egyptian administration under Sisi's administration is eager to close this Nile file as soon as it can so as not to be accused of 'procrastination' or blocking any reports and negotiations." This shows the keenness of this administration in resolving this crisis so that it will be an accomplishment for Sisi and, consequently, his rule will be accepted and considered legitimate among all factions.

Sisi's administration has reacted in different ways in order to tackle the crisis. The mechanisms and strategies varied as they were across different governmental departments and institutions and many players took roles in planning and implementing these strategies which can also be counted as part of the development plan for Egypt along with managing the Nile crisis. However, Sisi, as President, remains the core decision maker as expected in non-democratic states.

Before Sisi was sworn into power in 2014, Egypt had a new constitution enforced in which article 44 exclusively talks about the Nile:

> The state commits to protecting the Nile River, maintaining Egypt's historic rights thereto, rationalizing and maximizing its benefits, not wasting its water or polluting it. The state commits to protecting its mineral water, to adopting methods appropriate to achieve water safety, and to supporting scientific research in this field. Every citizen has the right to enjoy the Nile River. It is prohibited to encroach upon it or to harm the river environment. The state guarantees to remove encroachments thereon. The foregoing is regulated by law (Egyptian Constitution 2014, p. 19).

This constitution was drafted by the committee of 50 members formed of different factions of the society during the interim government before Sisi assumed office (France 24, 2013). This committee was the result of the interim president's call inviting the civilian factions in the society along with a few religious figures, both Muslims and Christians, to draft the Egyptian constitution of 2014 to mark a drift away from Morsi's contested constitution (France 24, 2013). Choosing to mention the Nile in the new constitution emphasises how crucial the Nile is to the Egyptians and their government and reinforces that the Nile is protected under the highest law of the country; that is, its constitution. Moreover, the Nile is as a natural resource that must be protected and it is the Egyptian's duty to protect and preserve it which creates a sense of solidarity and shared responsibility for the Nile. In fact, this is "water nationalism" as defined by Allouche (2005) in the water literature. Water not only represents a natural resource, but also becomes a symbol for the nation and, thus, "is deeply embedded in social, political and economic process" as Menga and Swyngedouw (2018, p. 2) argue. Therefore, mentioning the Nile in Egypt's constitution for the first time also indicates that any threats of endangering the Nile shall be the responsibility of the "state" by law. This constitutional article also accentuates Egypt's "historical rights" in the use and the protection of the Nile, which explains the reason for the rift with Ethiopia due to Egypt's holding on to its old historical rights of using and protecting the Nile by

implicitly referring to the 1929 and 1959 agreements. Finally, this article also designates to the state the obligation to safeguard its water resources as well as encourage scientific research on water issues. All of this could be seen as a declaration by the constitution's committee to securitise water issues and prioritise the Nile in particular in a form of delegation to Egypt's state leaders to take all the necessary measures (also could be to the extent of using exceptional measures) to protect Egypt's waters and the Nile. Henceforth, it is a manifestation of existing securitisation since Morsi by the political elites.

5.3.4.2 Sisi continues to Securitise the Nile Issue
5.3.4.2.1 Sisi's Speech Acts

Sisi's interest in the Nile file was visible in many of the speeches and statements that he made domestically and internationally. This is because, as Shaker (2018) explained, the Nile issue became a pressing matter for him. Sisi in this crisis has played an active role as explained by Tawfik (2020). Moreover, Bashat (2020) said that "Sisi has a strong political will towards his African neighbours, he deals with his African counterparts in a very dynamic and nationalistic sense. He wants to be the new African leader." In many occasions, Sisi would make alarming statements that enforced securitising the Nile waters by insisting that it is "a matter of life or death" (Egyptian Streets 2017). Sisi continued securitising the GERD as he unrelentingly underscored that the GERD is a threat to Egypt's survival.

The first occasion in which Sisi spoke about the Nile crisis and invoked its securitised status was during his 2014 inauguration speech. It was an appropriate event to express a statesman's concern about such a vital matter. During his inauguration, Sisi said that "the Nile represented our right to life" (SIS 2014). Thus, he implies that any loss in Egypt's water share means the death of 100 million Egyptians. Later, he continued saying in the same speech that "the Nile which remained a symbol of life for the Egyptians for thousands of years together with being a lifeline for the Egyptians, it should remain an oasis for development and cooperation among members of the Basin" (SIS 2014). Again, here Sisi stressed on the fact that the Nile is an essential issue for the Egyptians. Furthermore, Sisi viewed the Nile as a bedrock to the development of Egypt; hence, if the Nile water is reduced, disturbed or disadvantaged, then Egypt's developmental plans will be hindered. This is an early attempt to gather Egyptians to rally around the Nile in order to save their

nation post the 2013 Revolution. During the same speech, Sisi also implied that he intends on cooperating with his African neighbours rather than using violence against them to create a win-win situation for all nations. This could be an indirect message to Ethiopians that Sisi, a military man, will not use aggressive measures to resolve the Nile crisis; instead, he prefers cooperative peaceful ones.

On the second occasion, Sisi discussed the Nile issue in his speech addressed to the Ethiopian parliament in March 2015. The purpose of this visit was to discuss bilateral relations, and his speech to the Ethiopian parliament was meant "to ask for recognition of Egypt's right to a proportion of the Nile River waters" (Al Arabiya News 2015). By 2015, Ethiopia had already started the GERD construction. Thus, Sisi's visit to Ethiopia was an essential matter post the signature of the Khartoum Declaration of Principles (KDP) 2015 over the GERD crisis to send several messages to both nations. Sisi mentioned the word 'Nile' twenty times in his speech to the Ethiopian parliament. He also underscored the importance of the Nile to both nations. This was clear when Sisi said that "the Nile water is running like blood in the veins of the Egyptians and the Ethiopians who will always remain brothers and will never allow differences to come between them or affect the bonds tying them together" (SIS 2015). Yet, he underpinned its importance more to the Egyptians by several statements in this speech; for example, Sisi warned Ethiopia from acting unilaterally and said "no country should secure its future away from the other, nor achieve its prosperity at the expense of the other." Then Sisi added that the "Egyptians too are entitled not only to development *but to life* itself, to living in safety on the sides of the Nile" (SIS 2015). In this statement, Sisi saw the Nile as a right to life and that the Egyptians' security, safety and development are nexuses with the Nile.

In the same speech, Sisi addressed the Egyptian people and stated how the GERD is a threat as he said that "the emergence of Egypt as a *state* does also revolve around its role in organising around the Nile and administering the rights of its citizens to its water uses. We are determined to restore Egypt's standing and to have its *civilisation shine* more brightly" (SIS 2015). Such a statement meant that the GERD is a direct threat to the "state" of Egypt because, as explained earlier, the centrality of the Egyptian administration has been depending on the Nile since ancient Egypt. Moreover, this statement meant that the GERD is a direct threat to the sustainability of Egyptian civilization and that the Egyptians' sense of identity is under threat as their civilisation is under attack because of the GERD

construction. Gebreluel (2014, p. 31) clarified this argument by explaining that the Nile for the Egyptians played a vital role in forming their civilisation and identity. Sisi's use of metaphors and alarming language to agitate the Egyptian people's feelings of insecurity shows the securitisation mechanism of this water issue, and this is one way of securitising water issues as analysed by Fischhendler (2015).

Later in 2017, Sisi used an affirmative tone in his talks while addressing the Nile crisis. Again, Sisi used domestic grand occasions to make such stark statements. For example, in November 2017, he used the occasion of inaugurating a new development project in Kafr El Shiekh Governorate and conveyed some messages regarding the Nile to his audience. It is worth mentioning that Sisi made this statement after the failure of the tripartite talks between the three countries' (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia) technical teams (Aman 2017). This was clear when he stated that "the waters of Egypt are not a subject for discussion, and I assure you, no one can touch Egypt's water" (Al Masry Al Youm 2017; Shaker 2018). Here, Sisi (the securitising actor as a state leader) securitised the Nile water (the referent object) and affirmed to the people (audience) that no one can threaten the Egyptian waters. This is how Sisi called for the Egyptians' support in its acts against Ethiopia. The failure of the negotiations of the technical team opened the door for other measures to be used to resolve the crisis such as following the political track and international law as Aman (2017) suggested, which Sisi might have insinuated to be the exceptional measures.

From the above examples, it can be concluded that Sisi is actively engaged in resolving the Nile crisis by meeting and addressing both the Ethiopian and Sudanese sides. Sisi securitised the Nile as he wants the Egyptian people to support his economic policies, reforms and mega developmental projects. Cascão et al. (2019, p. 214) explained that the Nile is at the core of Egypt's development via state-building, economic development and social organisation. Sisi is using the Nile as a unifying symbol as he knows how much the Egyptians value the Nile. Moreover, Sisi knows that the Egyptian civilisation was formed on the Nile banks throughout thousands of years; thus, if it is threatened, it means it is a threat to the Egyptians' cultural identity. Thus, Sisi wanted the support of the Egyptians for his diplomatic initiatives and a 'benign' attitude towards the Ethiopians. According to Sadat (2020), "Sisi went the extra mile with the Ethiopians, he was very understanding for their right to development and even promised to cooperate with them on that. He refuses to use force and prefers to show the good will of Egypt."

5.3.4.2.2 Assessing Sisi's Securitisation Moves

In assessing the success or failure of the securitisation moves over the Nile, during Sisi's first term in office, one can argue that he was successful. I argue in this chapter that the water crisis is an indirect threat to the Egyptian leaders and that they securitised it in order to establish themselves in power. Therefore, Sisi's securitisation move was successful because, in his presidential campaign for the second term, he promoted his economic policies and reforms and developmental projects as his winning card (France 24 2018). Sisi won the 2018 elections and considered this result as a public consent of his policies (France 24 2018). Thus, Sisi secured himself by staying in power for a second term. Another demonstration of success of the Nile securitisation is the Egyptian intellectuals' reflections on the issue. Egyptian intelligentsia such as Farouk Gouida, an Egyptian poet and journalist, described the Nile as "a nation's issue of concern and a human security issue" (Al Agroudy 2017).

Further evidence to support the success of the securitisation of the Nile as recorded by Gebreluel (2014, p. 31) is highlighted when MP Mortada Mansour in one of the parliamentary sessions discussing the Nile crisis said that "he will order the use of military force against Ethiopia." This shows that at least one of the MPs in the Egyptian Parliament was willing to use force to resolve this crisis in case a stalemate was reached in the negotiations over the dam. Mansour justified the use of force against Ethiopia as the only solution or else Egypt will witness a drought period as quoted on one of the private satellite channels (CNN 2018). Another piece of evidence to show the success of Sisi's securitisation move was a campaign held under his directive called "Hafez Alieha Telaeha" or "Protect it to find it." This campaign was aired on Radio and Television stations both the private and the public ones. The campaign ran from the 10th of October 2017 until the 9th of October 2018. Mr. Tarek Salah[16], Director of Marketing and Contracts Campaigns in the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), (2020) explained that "this campaign was meant to get the public awareness about how water is being wasted and about the methods of preserving it." The campaign costed 8, 269, 777, 26 L.E (Salah 2020) and it "was aired during the prime time of watching and it was very effective with rural areas."

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[16] This is a personal interview with Mr. Salah at his office in the ERTU held in October 2020, to whom I am very grateful for his time. I was unable to meet anyone from the private channels to get further data from them regarding this campaign.

5.3.4.3 Egypt's Water Strategy under Sisi: A Domestic Solution for the GERD Crisis

As President Sisi assumed power in 2014, he worked on a 'rescue plan' for water shortages or a backup that could solve such a problem. He started with the 'National Water Plan' for Egypt (2017-2037)' a twenty- year plan. Sisi adopted the same method as Mubarak in that he involved many actors to think about and solve the water problem, known as the "leader-staff" style (Korany & Dessouki 2010). However, Sisi surpassed Mubarak in the number of ministries and actors involved. This is because Sisi included nine ministries and two reputable religious institutions (the Azhar, the main Islamic institution and the Coptic Orthodox Church) in addition to other 'international partners' (American Chamber of Commerce 2017). The nine ministries are Youth and Sports, Education, Culture, Social Solidarity, Health, Local Development, Water Resources and Irrigation, Military Production and Awkaf (Religious Endowment) (Youm7 News 2019). The Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Mr. Mohamed Abd El Atty told Youm 7 Newspaper (2019) that the role of these multiple actors' is to form a national plan and raise public awareness about how to save the Nile waters; he added that Egypt is carrying out strategic projects that cost $50 billion. However, I argue that the role of these multiple actors will be concerned with not only finding solutions to the water problem and raising the Egyptians' awareness about the problem, but also, and more importantly, rallying the Egyptians around the Nile as a securitised issue that needs protection as well as preparing them to accept the measures that their government would use to solve this problem (i.e., accepting exceptional measures). Sisi's administration adopted different approaches such as Radio and TV promotional campaigns known as "Protect it to find it," that was aired on local channels as well as privately owned channels, as mentioned above. This is in addition to the huge media campaign which included many talk shows discussing the GERD construction from the legal and the scientific perspective and how the dam represents a threat to Egypt.

The inclusion of the two religious institutions is meant to bring a religious awareness about water and how to preserve it by attracting a considerable sector of the Egyptians so as to be more inclusive and reach out to as many Egyptians as possible to gain a wider sector support about the measures that might be taken. Using a religious discourse is very powerful to the Egyptians because water, in general, is mentioned in the Holy Quran and

the Nile is mentioned in the Holy Bible. It is worth mentioning that there are around 11 biblical verses about the River Nile (River Nile in the Bible n.d.). Both the Azhar and the Orthodox Church accepted a securitisation move and reinforced it during the Friday prayers 'khotba' (speech) in mosques and in Sunday services in churches (Tawfik 2020). Rabie et al. (2014) reported that the Ministry of 'Awkaf' (i.e., religious endowments) standardised the Friday speech for 107,000 mosques around Egypt to discuss: "the gift of water and how to preserve it." The main speaker in the Azhar Mosque explained that "in Islamic Shari'a (jurisprudence), it is prohibited doing harm to others and the speaker underscored the shared responsibility to protect the Nile as other nations wish to have one drop from it" (Rabie et al. 2014). On the other hand, in the Coptic Church, Pope Tawadros (Pope of the Orthodox Church in Egypt) said that "the Nile occupies a central part in the churches' prayers," reported Hisham (2015). Pope Tawadros highlighted the importance of the Nile by saying that "the Nile forms one vital side of Egypt's triangle which is made up of the land, the river and the humans" (Hisham 2015). The Pope said that the Sunday schools and preaching are dedicated to stressing the Nile's importance and preserving it" (Hisham 2015). These are two examples that show the success of the Sisi's securitisation move on the Nile and the audience here are the religious institutions which accepted that move and acted accordingly to attract the public's attention to the problem, to engage them in conserving the Nile waters and to raise their nationalistic feelings. It is also part of the water strategy that Sisi wanted to enforce.

The importance of the Nile is not a new issue, but it is due to the GERD construction it resulted in the securitisation of the Nile. One can argue that the acceptance of the audiences of the securitisation move is the absence of alternatives to Sisi's position. Thus, this constructed acceptance is a sign of the success of the securitisation move.

Moreover, Egypt adopted a vision for 2030 which "reflects the three dimensions of sustainable development: economic, social and environmental dimensions" (Egypt's Vision 2030, 2016). The vision is still under the implementation phase and planned under Sisi's administration; there is a section under the title of "Programmes and Projects for Economic Development" in which the Nile waters issue is vividly present. There is a section dedicated to environmental protection under which clauses 46, 49, 50, 51, 52 and 53 all revolve around water issues such as water protection, water saving methods, developing mineral resources, improving the water quality, improving the sewage network system and

expanding the sustainable development of aquifers in Nubia and the Suez. This vision demonstrates that such actions and measures are necessary for peace and stability in Egypt since "all these objectives come within the framework of ensuring Egyptian peace and security and strengthening Egyptian leadership regionally and internationally" (Egypt's Vision 2030, 2016). This reflects the Egyptian authorities' level of concern with the water issues and the backup plan they have for any possible water shortage that Egypt could face as a result of the construction of the GERD.

In addition to other methods the Egyptian government has been undertaking in order to save water, Schwartzstein (2016) explained that as a reaction to the construction of the GERD, the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation has started calling the Egyptian farmers to grow crops that consume less water. For example, rice plantations consume large amounts of water, which is critical during this period due to the GERD construction; instead, rice can be imported from other countries in Asia. Furthermore, the current government believes that the amount of arable land has significantly declined since the 2011 uprisings due to the construction of 'illegal houses' on farmlands as a result of the housing problems (Masri & Abdelaty 2018) and the absence of an alert government that monitors and supervises such illegal constructions. Consequently, the government "cracked down on residents who illegally built on farmland" (Masri & Abdelaty 2018). This crackdown has been associated with a hefty penalty of "five years in prison and a fine reaching $280,000" as Masri and Abdelaty (2018) mentioned. The Nile crisis can be considered another reason for this crackdown since the Egyptian government is unable to cultivate more lands in the desert (Abd El Ghafar 2018) as a result of the GERD. Consequently, an alternative solution would be to restore the amount of the ~~lost~~ land lost due to the construction on farmlands and removing the houses to other non-agricultural areas.

Moreover, the Egyptian government is working with the private sector on changing the irrigation system in Egypt so as to make it rely more on the "drip system" in addition to using wastewater (Egypt's Voluntary National Review 2018). In 2018, Egypt also increased water prices as it started to gradually remove the subsidiary system it implemented for years as a result of the loan Egypt received from the IMF in 2016. The increase in water prices was on both drinking water by 46.5% and the sewage system by 12% (Fahmy & Ismail in Blair 2018). This action by the Egyptian government can be considered as, first, a way for

raising people's awareness about saving water in order to handle the water shortage resulting from the GERD construction and, second, a method for collecting money as revenues for the government's budget to overcome the economic challenges. This is associated with an attempt by the Egyptian Cabinet to pass a "New water resource law" in 2017 that punishes those who abuse water and at the same time it will help to resolve the water shortage problem and, again, raise public awareness (American Chamber 2017). In summary, these are all domestic solutions to address water shortage problems triggered by the GERD construction since Sisi assumed power, between 2014 and 2018, in the light of Egypt's economic and social development strategies and plans.

The next section explains the two tracks Egypt has followed to solve the Nile crisis and shows the role of the decision makers in managing this crisis. In addition, it tackles the rise and fall in tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia and the centrality of the president's role. It should be highlighted that in resolving the Nile crisis the two main tracks Egypt has followed are the "political track and the technical track," as Cascão and Nicol (2016) classified them. Each track played a role in the decision-making process, but still they were coordinated with and supervised by the president who played a pivotal role in their execution that illustrated the leader-staff style.

5.3.4.4 Sisi's Foreign Policy Decision Making

5.3.4.4.1 Technical Track: Ministry of Water Resources + Lawyers

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 72) explained that the scientific agenda of an environmental issue is socially constructed just as is the political agenda. Henceforth, if the technical team is considered as the *framers* of the scientific agenda, then they are socially constructing it and securitising it. The president in turn takes their reports seriously as explained earlier and they answer his inquiries whenever they are asked. The technical part has played a vivid, dominant role on the negotiating table. This technical team is mainly concerned with assessing the technicalities of the dam and reporting its repercussions on Egypt. It is this technical Egyptian team that triggered many tensions with the Ethiopian party; this team consists of engineers mainly from the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation of the three countries: Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, and it is called the 'Tripartite National Technical Committee'. The Tripartite National Committee "chose two French consultancy firms to conduct a technical study on the hydraulic, environmental, economic and social

impact of the Renaissance Dam on Egypt and Sudan" (Aman 2017).

Many times, negotiations would have to freeze due to the Egyptian technical team's insistence on specific matters which the Ethiopians' rejected. Since Sisi assumed power, in 2014, there have been a few down turns in the negotiation process. For example, until 2017, Ethiopia refused to allow any official visits from the Egyptian technical team to the dam construction site for any technical inspection (Shoukry in Al Agroudy 2017). Also, Ethiopia refused to share information about the structural design of GERD even though it has signed the KDP and their reports were brief and vague about the dam as explained by Bashat (2020) which made the Egyptian technical team very critical of the Ethiopian counterpart. Another example for the interruption in negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia was in November 2017; the negotiations were perceived as 'negative' since they showed no progress because of Egypt's disapproval that Ethiopia increases the size of the dam's reservoir, (Ezzat 2017, p. 6). From the point of view of the technical team, the enlargement of the reservoir means more water will be required to fill in the reservoir which means lower amounts of water flowing to Egypt, less water to get to the Aswan High Dam's turbines generating electricity and more saline for Egypt's arable lands (Aman 2017) eventually leading to food security problems.

In addition, the Egyptian technical team has accused Ethiopia of being 'non-transparent' and 'blocking information' over the filling of this reservoir (Ezzat 2017, p. 6). Sadat (2020) added that the technical team understands the GERD's risk on the social and the environmental levels. This is evidence of how seriously the Egyptian technical team is about the GERD and deals with it as a threat to the country's national security.

To further demonstrate, on the 21st of May 2018, the Egyptian technical track accepted to securitise the GERD as one of *Al Ahram* (local governmental newspaper) headlines stated the following: *The Higher Administrative Court of Appeals Has Accepted an Appeal to Delegate the GERD File to the Ministry of Defence*. It is a case filed by the Egyptian engineer Ibrahim El Fayioumi, the Head of Africa's Development Project, who requested to withdraw the GERD case from the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and hand it to the Ministry of Defense in Egypt instead. The court overruled his case and he decided to

take it to the court of appeals which should have looked into it by the 4th of June, 2018 (Abd El Kader 2018)[17].

On the other hand, the Ethiopian authorities accused the Egyptian technical team with causing problems without finding solutions (Amde cited in Ezzat 2017, p. 6). Amde has extended his accusation to the Egyptian lawyers who plan to file a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) claiming that this "does not help pave the way to attaining a successful cooperation between the two countries on their matter of disagreement" (Ezzat 2017, p. 6). Thus, Egyptian lawyers have escalated the situation as they viewed it as a real danger which is a sign of the success of the securitisation move made by the President and accepted by the technical team. Therefore, while the technical team's role has been cautious, thorough and nationalistic, this has disadvantaged solving the crisis.

5.3.4.4.2 The Political Track: Diplomacy + Cabinet + President + Media

Buzan et al. (1998) identified the important role played by the political agenda in securitising the environmental issues. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 72) stated that "the political agenda deals with formation of concern in the public sphere and the allocation of collective means by which to deal with issues raised." Thus, the political agendas are determined by actors in order to shape the parameters for what is discussed and how it would be resolved. The measures undertaken by the political track under Sisi's presidency emphasised that the Nile is a securitised issue. On the website of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019), it is stated that Egypt's affairs with the Nile Basin countries revolve around three issues: The Nile water file, Nile Basin Cooperative Agreement and Egypt's relations with Nile Basin countries. This shows that the Nile dominates Egypt's relations with its African neighbours since the Nile is significant in Africa. It is obvious in many statements made by Shoukry, Minister of Foreign Affairs, that the Nile is a pivotal matter to the Egyptians; this is clear when he described the Nile file as "the most important file in Egypt's foreign affairs" and how the "Nile is a priority issue" (Al Agroudy 2017).

The political track that negotiates the issue between the three countries (i.e., Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia) is called the 'Six Party Committee' which is made up of the three countries' ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of water resources and irrigation. However, in

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[17] The case is still undecided upon in the courts until the time of writing

Egypt, the political track's associates handling the crisis, and are the key actors present in it as well, are: The Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet, Minister of Defense, the Head of the General Intelligence and all are headed by President Sisi. This is similar to a practice that was adopted under Mubarak's administration. To an external observer, this would mean that the role of the Ministry of defense, the General Intelligence and the National Security Council has never disappeared nor changed throughout this prolonged crisis and disregarded the changes that were hoped for post the 2011 uprisings. One can argue that the system brought post 2011 with the SCAF running Egypt's affairs domestically and externally has not diminished; in fact, it is claimed that the SCAF is using a new figure (Sisi) to be their image in running the country's affairs (Ragab 2018). Also, this council shows the audiences who accepted to securitise the Nile under Sisi. It is worth mentioning that the role of the Egyptian Cabinet in this crisis becomes visible when the Prime Minister heads the 'Higher Committee on Nile waters'; this committee was established under Mubarak's administration to discuss water issues and Nile-related issues; however, it was inactive under Mubarak's administration and had few meetings under the SCAF's administration and then under Morsi's rule. Currently, under Sisi's administration, the 'Higher Committee on Nile waters' was revitalised by more frequent meetings and close monitoring from both the Prime Minister and the President. This committee consists of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and the Head of the General Intelligence. Again, this shows how the Nile is securitised under Sisi's administration. It is noteworthy that there was a role played by some other state's institutions to take part in this crisis such as the Ministries of Electricity, Transport, and International Cooperation (Shoukry in Al Agroudy 2017). The purpose of involving these ministries could be for mainly two reasons; first, these ministries would suggest adequate solutions for the crisis and, second, they would be consulted about the technical issues that are related to the dam especially the Ministry of Electricity. Therefore, they act as a 'soft power tool' for any future cooperation with Ethiopia on transport and investment bilateral agreements (Bashat 2020).

The political track has been responsible for easing the erupting tensions as caused by the technical team or fueled by the media, and it has been successful at the beginning of the reign of President Sisi as it resulted in the Khartoum Declaration of Principles (KDP) in 2015. This declaration, which was signed in Khartoum, March 2015, marked the successful

mediation of Sudan and was agreed upon by the heads of three states which were Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The Egyptian side considered it as a *breakthrough* since the crisis deteriorated under Morsi's administration. The presence of the three heads of these African states showed the vital role they play in managing this crisis. Sadat (2020) stated that "it was the president's decision to sign this KDP in 2015. Until today, this KDP did not pass by the Parliament as it is not a treaty that requires the people's assembly's approval upon or ratification to be effective." In other words, it was the President's decision for Egypt to endorse the KDP.

While signing the Declaration, Sisi expressed his ongoing worries about the GERD dam (BBC 2015). He said that "the Renaissance Dam project represents a source of development for the millions of Ethiopia's citizens through producing green and sustainable energy, but for their brothers living on the banks of that very Nile in Egypt, and who approximately equal them in numbers, it represents a source of concern and worry" (BBC 2015). He also added that "this is because the Nile is their (Egyptians) only source of water, in fact their source of life" (BBC 2015). This shows some skepticism from the Egyptian administration's side as the Ethiopian side refused to give a full report to the Egyptian technical team about the dam. Sisi's sense of doubts shows that he is not fully trusting the Ethiopian side despite the 2015 Khartoum Declaration. According to Zikos et al. (2015, p. 310) the securitisation of waters (in general) a scare resource shows lack of trust amongst the states. Henceforth, Sisi continued to securitise the Nile and delivered an important speech at the Ethiopian parliament in the same month of the Declaration, March 2015. In assessing Sisi as a foreign policy leader based on his role in the KDP and his skepticism of Ethiopians could make him be considered, as Kaarbo (1997) regarded, as a 'goal-oriented' leader as he is (i) interested in foreign policy and (ii) he is action-oriented. Sisi also valued experts' information (from technical track mainly) and this is demonstrated in his skepticism with the Ethiopians. Moreover, Sisi could be classified as a *constraint respecter* as behaved peacefully toward Ethiopia, as per the categorisation of Keller (2005, p.205) even though he might be viewed by the international community as a non-democratic leader.

The media's role contributed to the political track as it shed light on the GERD crisis and underscored the role of Sisi's administration in resolving it. However, Ethiopia accused the Egyptian media of fueling the crisis and increasing negative feelings amongst both

countries' people. Many television programs and journalists, in Egypt, reported and analysed the situation in a manner that agitated the average Egyptian's feelings. The media's role peaked under Morsi's rule during the live broadcast meeting that had an extremely negative impact on the countries' diplomatic relations. Taye Amde, Ethiopia's Ambassador to Egypt told Ezzat (2017, p. 6) that the media talks about Ethiopia's negative intensions towards Egypt and that it is a better option for Egypt to halt talks with Ethiopia (Amde in Ezzat 2017, p. 6). In addition to this, Soliman (2018) added that the media in Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan should be more 'objective' and 'professional' as they have created several problems for the negotiating teams as President Sisi mentioned at the KDP. The media in all three countries has been reflecting a negative image to the public to emphasise their opinion and mobilise the masses behind their leaders. Therefore, it would be preferable if the media maintains professionalism and respect and refrains from pushing towards chaos for Egypt's foreign relations (Soliman 2018). Ethiopia's ambassador Amde explicitly stated that the role of both presidents is likely to restore the countries' relations (Ezzat 2017, p. 6). Again, this stresses on the critical role both presidents play in resolving this crisis; it shows that the leaders are integral in resolving such a foreign policy crisis especially in this part of the world. It also demonstrates the role of the individual in foreign policy decision making. Finally, it also implies that Ethiopia prefers to have a "Moderate-Muslim" president in power to negotiate with rather than someone with extremist background like Morsi.

As for the mechanisms Egypt has adopted in handling this soft security crisis, they have been soft and conventional and Shoukry said the following:

> We have been observing the situation and we are working on regaining 'trust' and confidence building measures with Ethiopia. As we understand the huge amount of distrust Ethiopia has towards Egypt and that it would require a long period of time not to be solved over a year or two. We have also increased the levels of cooperation and we are showing Ethiopian counter parts that we have a 'common interest' (Al Agroudy 2017).

Later in 2018, Shoukry added that Egypt had suggested solutions in a 'very flexible' manner with Ethiopia on the GERD construction issue; however, the Egyptian side would like to sense that the other party is also showing an awareness of Egyptian interests (Shoukry in Nasser 2018). In managing this crisis, Tawfik (2020) evaluated the situation as

he said that "while Egypt made concessions, Ethiopia had an uncompromising attitude. The 2015 Declaration was the only positive thing reached until now."

Also, whenever the situation reaches a deadlock, President Sisi asks for a third party's intervention from mainly regional and world powers. Sisi approached the Gulf States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to mediate as regional powers (Aman 2014). China and Russia were approached also; nevertheless, it would be a considerable gain to both the USA and the EU if they take a role in mediation as both have more influential role on Ethiopia due to their long history in cooperating with Ethiopia. China was approached to halt funding the GERD and it was receptive to Egypt's demand (Ambassador Omar 2015) as it has an interest that Egypt cooperates with China in the Belt Road initiative (Storey 2019). As for US's and the EU's interest in mediation between Egypt and Ethiopia, both aim to avoid further migrants' inflows and threats in the Red Sea's navigation (Beniam & Hanna 2018; Sadat 2020). The effects of such mediation were positive and eased the tensions and helped in breaking the ice.

The two tracks designed to resolve the GERD crisis are complementary. Each track also showed how the GERD crisis is a securitised issue by all actors involved in it from the Egyptian side. Both tracks used framing mechanisms to securitise the GERD crisis. The Leader-staff style of ruling in Egypt adopted under Sisi's regime was visible in the reports prepared by these tracks and sent to Sisi who framed them and used metaphors in a constructed language to alarm the audience. It can be inferred that the GERD crisis has been a priority and is a securitised issue with many Egyptian state institutions involved in playing a role in the decision-making process as the Nile remains on the national security agenda until this day and "the high involvement of high institutions in the GERD crisis means the securitisation of the Nile" (Tawfik 2020). Egypt's President coordinates between all of the Egyptian Institutions involved in the crisis resolution and maintains the Nile securitised status. Sisi described the Nile water as a "red-line" and expressed several times that the Nile is a 'life or death issue' for the Egyptians.

5.4. No Water, but No War

This section discusses the reasons for Egypt not going to war with Ethiopia despite the conflict over the Nile waters. Egypt, despite its frequent threats to other riparian states and to Ethiopia, in particular, has famously been known for alternating to the peaceful measures

and threatening to go to war. This is to demonstrate that despite the Nile being an essential resource to Egypt it is a true example of a soft security threat that has attempted to resolve via soft peaceful measures; by diplomacy rather than the conventional use of force or war declaration.

In reviewing the literature on water conflicts, it has been found that a true water war has never occurred (Zeitoun 2008; Milas 2013; Benamin & Hanna 2018). In fact, water conflicts have been considered as part of an ongoing existing conflict, (Zeitoun 2008) as mentioned earlier. Instead, what is happening can be considered as 'water tensions' resulting from 'threats' to use of force by one party against the other while the other party is 'threatening' to stop the water flow. There are no cases to show that a war has happened due to water tensions; rather, water is part of the struggle. A clear example of this is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As a part of this conflict and as a result of the Israeli occupation of the River Jordan in 1967 (as part of Palestinian-Jordanian lands) as well as the Israeli control over water wells in Palestine which restricts Palestinians from gaining access to water for their olive trees. Additionally, there were tensions between Turkey and Syria in early 1990s over Turkey's insistence to build dams on Tigris and Euphrates which would lower the amount of water flowing into Syria (Zeitoun 2008, p. 3). These tensions resulted in a threat to use force, but no real attacks occurred.

In 1988, Anderson called water the 'next strategic resource' as he predicted that it would become a 'scarce resource' and tensions would erupt as a result of it. This prediction came true and water became a strategic and a 'geostrategic' pressuring card between contending states. Consequently, water is the first reason for states for not going to war because it is a 'strategic resource'. Zeitoun (2008, p. 3) explained that water has both "economic and strategic value" as it is a basic need for human beings and other fundamental needs depend on it such as food, health and employment.

As the Egyptian leaders, post the 2011 administration, realised that the Nile crisis played an indirect role in overthrowing Mubarak's long-lasting rule, they preferred to prioritise it over their foreign policy agendas. Moreover, they considered their success in resolving this crisis as a chance to establish their rule since the GERD construction is a golden opportunity to rally the citizens around their rulers in both Egypt and Ethiopia. The GERD construction would result in less water flows to Egypt which explains why the Egyptian administration

post 2011 was keen on securitising the dam as this represents an external non-military threat to Egyptians and, at the same time, it is a national pride to the Ethiopians. The alarming language used by Egyptian securitising actors was successful in gathering the audience around them in order to make them accept the exceptional, but conventional diplomatic measures taken by their leaders in response to this soft security threat and to end this crisis. The section below further discusses the reasons for leaderships' preferences to use conventional diplomatic measures rather than aggressive exceptional ones to resolve this soft crisis.

 First, the problem between the riparian states is that they do not necessarily share borders, they can be located on the same river but some distance apart (Anderson 1988, p. 2). This is the case of the Nile River which, due to its length, passes through many countries who do not all share borders. Distance has been a main reason for the two main Nile riparian rivals; that is, Egypt and Ethiopia, not to get involved in wars. Egypt and Ethiopia do not share land borders and the distance between them is 6999km which would make it difficult (and expensive) for any side to launch an attack without naval or military support. Having military or naval bases overseas is both difficult and costly for all states as Milas explained (2013, p. 172). Therefore, the chances of Egypt and Ethiopia going to war are minute due to the dire economic circumstances that Egypt experienced as a result of the outbreak of the Arab Spring and consequently war as an option for such water crisis has not been chosen.

Second, Zeitoun (2008, p. 4) and Milas (2013, p. 172) made a valid point about "power asymmetry" between both the Egyptian and the Ethiopian armies. The Egyptian army is more advanced, skilled and better equipped than the Ethiopian one. However, Milas (2013, p. 172) mentioned that there are doubts that the Egyptian army could perform well in the 'highlands' of Ethiopia due to the different weather and air pressure conditions as Egypt's army might not be accustomed to such conditions; not to mention that wars are costly on both the economical and the human levels (Zeitoun 2008; Milas 2013). In addition, there are no guarantees that if Egypt attacks Ethiopia, then the same amount of water will be returned again to Egypt. Furthermore, Egypt might be endangered by massive floods if the GERD is destroyed after being filled with water. According to Milas (2013, p. 168), the situation will still be a win-lose situation for Egypt and a high-risk gamble. Thus, both of the Egyptian and the Ethiopian administrations should act in a rational patient manner. All of these valid points explain why the Egyptian leadership chose the conventional methods

of negotiation and diplomacy rather than the use of exceptional measures despite the securitisation of the Nile.

Third, there are domestic reasons for both Ethiopia and Egypt not to go to war over the Nile especially post 2011 despite the escalating tensions. In fact, this is an African feature to have internal instability which keeps African states more concerned about internal peace overlooking external problems; in other words, "domestic politics have often been more conflict-prone than relations between countries" (Walle 2013). Since 2011, Egypt has been experiencing internal problems due to the mass uprisings that happened leading to the overthrowing of two leaders in 2011 and in 2013, respectively. Hence, Egypt's leaders had their own internal battles to fight which made it more difficult to add fights overseas. This is besides the dreadful economic conditions in Egypt that do not allow for any kind of war funding over water. Thus, the Egyptian leaders preferred to securitise the Nile and used stark language against the GERD construction to gain internal support and try to establish their rule. On the other hand, Ethiopia suffers from internal instabilities and domestic unrest which resulted in several changes in their government that also distracted the Ethiopian government from the use of force against Egypt over the Nile crisis. Ethiopia suffers from bad economic conditions; thus, the purpose of building the GERD is to improve the economic situation of the country and raise Ethiopian nationalistic feelings to rally the people around such a mega project.

Fourth, international law had driven both countries to be cautious on who attacks the other first. Both states have signed many agreements and declarations since the 1990s which acted as a block against any aggressive measures to be taken from any side. It is worth mentioning that in 2014, Egypt thought of resorting to the International Court of Justice for arbitration; however, this move has not been implemented as the report filed to the government by a group of lawyers is still under investigation (Hussien 2014). Arguably, both states are determined to preserve their image as peaceful nations rather than aggressive ones. Furthermore, those currently in power in both countries have suffered from problems with the international and the domestic communities (e.g., Egypt after the 2013 events).

Last but not least, Egypt has always resorted to using soft power; that is, the ability to persuade, as Nye (2004) defined it, when dealing with soft security threats such as the Nile crisis. To further elaborate, Egypt used diplomacy as the main soft power tool to negotiate

with all the African nations in general and with Ethiopia in particular. Ricks (2011) stated that the diplomatic efforts along with international law have been the main reasons to prevent wars from occurring between Egypt and Ethiopia before 2011 as both states have been working considering the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI). The history of Egypt's use of its soft power is rich in examples of how Egypt has helped other African nations against colonialism and post colonialism; for example, Egypt provided many of its African neighbours with humanitarian assistance post natural disasters and post wars. Moreover, Egypt provided its African neighbours with training both in Egypt and outside of Egypt in several fields such as police training, media training, judicial training and diplomatic training (Rashwan 2017, p. 7). Also, Egypt offered technical and educational assistance to some African countries to help them develop their own infrastructure. However, Egypt's soft power has been inconsistent, and when this soft power lost its glory and influence in Africa, Egypt's African neighbours looked after their own interests away from Egypt (Hamzawy 2010).

With Ethiopia, as mentioned earlier, Egypt used the Orthodox Church as a soft power tool on Ethiopia. In addition, there were trade and commercial agreements to import and export goods between both nations considering the NBI and along with the bilateral relations between both countries. Post 2011, the Egyptian governments promised Ethiopia with many Egyptian investments. However, Egypt's soft power has not always been directed to benefit Ethiopia; in some instances, Egypt used its strong negotiators inside major financial institutions to stop funding the GERD (Plaut 2010 and Omar 2014). This is in addition to Egypt using its good relations with some donor countries to halt their GERD funding, which is the case with China as per Ambassador Mona Omar (Ambassador's talk at The British University in Egypt in 2014).

Egypt has been intimidating Ethiopia for decades; however, this came to end by 2011. Egypt's use of threats against upstream riparian countries could no longer survive. There are many common grounds for both nations to reach together and avoid war. Egypt's attitude against Africa generally and its Nile riparian neighbours specifically proved to be a major failure. The new administrations in Egypt have realised that "water wars" are unlikely to happen whereas dialogue and cooperation are better tools than the "war of words" as Verhoeven (2013) called it. Since 2010, Egypt comprehended that war as an

alternative is "beyond Egyptian capabilities," (Plaut 2010, p. 116). Therefore, the result would be less water but no war.

Conclusion

Several Egyptian administrations saw the Nile as integral to Egypt's conceptualisation of its identity and security. However, post 2011, the Egyptian leaders realised the link between their credibility, staying in power and securing the Nile waters. Post 2011, the GERD presented an external threat to the Nile and the Egyptian leaders in power. In resolving this crisis, the Egyptian leaders perceived it as an opportunity to consolidate their rule. The GERD crisis is a unique case as it is a soft security threat that required soft measures to resolve it. It is a case that represents different leaderships' attitudes in managing a crisis. However, all the consecutive administrations from 2011 until 2018 securitised the GERD using stark language. All the securitising actors (except for Mubarak) experienced the same context of turbulences post the Arab Spring. The securitising actors securitised the Nile as they knew it was directly related to their accountability. Mr. Shoukry said that "the most important thing is the stability of Egypt" (Al Agroudy 2017), which implies that Egypt's stability reflects on its leader in power. Since 2011, the securitising actors have remained the same, with the exception of Morsi's year. When the SCAF assumed power, it was declared that the SCAF would step back from the political scene in general and from foreign affairs in particular. However, in having a more thorough observation for the GERD crisis it can be argued that this file has never left the security apparatus' hands (Ragab 2018).

In analysing the crisis using securitisation theory, the securitising actors were the various Egyptian presidents, the referent object is the Nile and the GERD. There are two audiences in this case. First, there is the average Egyptian citizen who believes that, as expressed by an Egyptian farmer, the Nile is Egypt's "liquid gold" and "everything to us" (Schenker 2010). The second type of audience who accepted this securitisation process believed that the Nile is an existential threat and approved taking exceptional measures whether by the intelligentsia's, political elites or even by the political opposition in resolving this crisis. Mubarak securitised the CFA as it was the first sign of the downstream countries' violation of Egypt's water security. The Post 2011 Uprisings dealt with the GERD as a real threat to Nile. All three presidents (SCAF, Morsi and Sisi) understood the danger the CFA and the

GERD meant to Egypt's survival, civilisation, and development and how it reflects on them as rulers in power. Securitisation moves were clear in the different leaders' statements and metaphors used in the speeches of the governmental officials and political elites—demonstrating the Copenhagen School. The statesmen's securitisation move was substantiated by the intensive media coverage in daily talk-shows and articles in daily local newspapers which increased the Egyptians' awareness about the crisis and agitated their feelings against Ethiopia. This is in addition to the framing of reports delivered by the technical and political teams to the presidents who valued these reports. The securitisation move under Mubarak's regime was incomplete as it was interrupted as a result of the January 25th Revolution. Under Morsi's administration, the securitisation move was a success as Egyptians (audience) accepted the move and called for the use of exceptional measures to be taken; and they became hostile towards the Ethiopian refugees in Egypt. During Sisi's rule, the securitisation move was also a success as the audience accepted the extensive use of diplomacy and negotiations as the exceptional measures.

As for analysing the Nile crisis from a Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) perspective, it can be argued that, in Egypt's case since 2011 until 2018 the leaders as presidents (i.e., Morsi and Sisi), played a vital role in either resolving or worsening the crisis. Morsi's attempts to solve the crisis were a complete failure and, instead, resulted in escalating the crisis. While Sisi, on the other hand, managed to get the KDP signed in 2015 as it "showed a change in an approach and policy, yet still it did not reach what Egyptians had hoped for" (Tawfik 2020). Although there has been no real progress since 2015 in this issue, there have been many attempts by Sisi to move the water crisis in a positive direction by his talks and full cooperation with consecutive Ethiopian PM's. It was only under the SCAF's administration where the role of the group was clear as the army men collaborated with both the Intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in resolving the crisis or at least stagnating it until a new government came to power. Furthermore, as the focus in the FPDM is the leader's responsibility in a non-democratic country, it is important to show the difference between the leaders' classification in their foreign policy decisions. According to Hermann and Hermann's classifications (1989), one can classify the three leaders—Mubarak, Morsi and Sisi—to fall under the category of "sensitive" leaders. This is because, despite the use of stark language to securitise the Nile, they were adaptable to the circumstances and preferred to consult advisors and experts to reach a resolution. Also, they

used conventional methods of diplomacy and intense negotiations with the many round-tripartite talks in order to solve this crisis. This has resulted in a prolonged crisis and was only successful in signing the KDP in 2015, but the crisis remains unresolved until the time of writing this paper.

Moreover, according to Kaarbo's (1997) classifications of leaders, I would argue that both Mubarak and Sisi could fall under the category of being "goal-oriented" leaders in this crisis. Since both Mubarak and Sisi were interested in foreign policy, they are action oriented and, in this crisis, they stressed and valued experts' information. Both Mubarak and Sisi are interested in power since both of them come from a military background and being aggressive in resolving foreign policy crises would be expected, yet that did *not* happen. Both of them in turn could be classified under the "constraint respecter" category which Keller made (2005). Morsi, on the other hand, as he was a weak leader who was just a follower of the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide instructions can be considered as an "unmotivated ruler". He was uninterested in foreign policy and he focused more on domestic politics. Morsi could be classified as "constraint challenger" as he behaved aggressively as per Keller's division (2005). Although he appointed a foreign minister, he appointed another figure that was recommended by the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide known as Essam El Haddad who had strong negotiations skills. The three of them had the same goal in resolving this crisis which is to remain in power. Mubarak and Morsi failed to reach a solution to the crisis and were overthrown, while Sisi, with the small steps he took and is still taking, was able to remain in power serving his second term.

The Securitisation Theory showed the actors involved in triggering a crisis but failed to offer the reason for this step. Securitisation Theory, by following the Copenhagen School, was able to show how leaders have constructed the Nile as a security issue by the use of stark language. Foreign Policy Decision Making, on the other hand, explained the role of the decision makers in trying to resolve the crises that have been created by the same actors. The answer is that both the securitising actors and decision makers wanted to consolidate their rule by using a non-military security threat; that is, water, as it is linked to their and the country's existence and survival at the same time.

Chapter Six

Syrian Refugees and Migrants in Egypt

2011-2018

Introduction

This chapter presents the second empirical study for this dissertation, exploring the soft security crisis of the heavy flow of migrants and refugees to Egypt which started in 2011 and more intensely in the early 2012 with the arrival of 90,000 Syrians as a result of the Syrian civil war. This study tackles a non-military security issue facing Egypt. Since Egypt's 2011 Uprising, such security issue was managed on two extremes by different administrations as Syrians have been viewed differently compared to other migrants and refugees. Henceforth, the case attempts to explain how refugees and migrants' flows as a soft security crisis are managed in Egypt. In addition, it clarifies to what extent the central actors in the Egyptian state foreign policy apparatus securitised the Syrian refugees and migrants. It explains how one administration politicised them while another one securitised them and then explains the reasons for them to be de-securitised. It answers the question of how do domestic policy and foreign policy intersect in addressing soft security crisis. Here employing ST helps explain the construction of the Syrian refugees and migrants as a threat, while FPDM helps to explain the non-securitisation of businessmen and the later phase of de-securitisation.

This chapter begins by providing information about Egypt as a destination for migration and refuge, showing the two different categorisations of Syrians, sometimes as migrants while other times as refugees. I explain the difference between both categories so as not to deal with both statuses interchangeably, owing to the fact that Syrians were treated differently by the Egyptian administrations as per the category or status that describes them which determined their status to be securitised or not. While some Syrian migrants

preferred Egypt to be their final migration destination, other Syrian refugees regarded Egypt as a 'transit' state for Europe, thus, preferring the refugee status in Egypt until they could seek asylum in Europe, the USA or Canada. Moreover, the chapter highlights that Syrians, in Egypt, were not staying in refugee camps like in other countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey, since Egypt adopts a 'no camps' policy. In fact, whether Syrians were viewed as an *asset* or a *crisis*, by the post 2011 Egyptian administrations, depended on whether they were residing migrants or refuge seekers or businessmen.

Furthermore, I dissect how Egyptian decision makers have dealt with the flows of Syrian migrants and refugees under different administrations from 2011 until 2018. I explore the impact of this flow on the Syrian- Egyptian relations afterwards as both countries once shared the same flag and president under Nasser, but this unity was soon dissolved. Additionally, the chapter also focuses on the different and extreme management style adopted by Morsi's and Sisi's respective administrations with regard to dealing with Syrian migrants and refugees. It also assesses the impact of each administration on the Egyptians' treatment of Syrians. I argued that Morsi's administration deemed Syrians to be a source of support ensuring the survival of his regime and consolidating his power while Sisi's administration believed them to be a threat to the stability of his regime. This substantiates the use of ST. On the one hand, sharing with Syrians ideological similarities and a common political purpose to grow the Islamic 'umma' (i.e. nation), Morsi was encouraged to welcome Syrians. This justifies the reasons to politicise Syrians under Morsi. On the other hand, for his economic developmental plans and due to the political and ideological differences between Syrians and himself, Sisi was prompted to securitise them.

As mentioned earlier, I discuss the literature on migrants and the difference between themselves and refugees. While refugees are incapable of returning to their homes as this is "too dangerous" for them and while they seek protection from other states or NGO or the UNHCR, migrants can still return to their home states and enjoy their governments protection (Edwards, 2015). I also mainly demonstrate how Syrians have been securitised and the reasons for considering them a soft security threat in addition to assessing the success or failure of this securitisation move. I explore the impact of the soft security crisis on Egypt's bi-lateral relationship with Syria and I reveal how the foreign policy decision makers in Egypt have dealt with such soft security crisis. This will be supported by using FPDM to explain leaders' decisions in directing Egypt's foreign relations with Syria. This

chapter will answer the sub-question of to what extent does ideology or interest play a role in politicising or securitising Syrian refugees and migrants in Egypt.

6.1 Migrants in Security Literature

In the Post-Cold War era and with the intensification of the globalisation process, new non-military security threats emerged, and security studies literature expanded as a result, as previously discussed in chapter two. Since the focus of this dissertation is on *soft security* threats, I chose migration to be the second empirical study as it is one of the non-military security threats that was introduced to the "new insecurities" agenda (Huysmans and Squire, 2010, p.169; Seeberg, 2013). This, in turn, has expanded the states' national security agendas to include migration as a non-military security issue that is "not previously linked to traditional military threats or actions" (Jiménez, 2012, p.37).

Most of the literature on securitising migrants and refugees, in the post Arab Uprisings era, focuses on their impact on the 'host' states which are usually distinct European, Western, and Northern developed states. The literature mainly focused on the Arab Spring events which led to the highest rates of migrants since the Second World War, specifically in 2015. However, there is little attention given to the transit states or to host states that are in Middle Eastern or Southern developing world, such as Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt (Seeberg, 2013; Norman, 2015; and Tsourapas, 2017). The securitisation of migrants and refugees is not confined to the Western world or the Global north only. For this reason, this chapter aims to underscore how migrants and refugees, in the developing world, are treated and how they constitute, in some instances, a securitised issue while in another instance a politicised one and this is the contribution of this thesis. Floyd (2015, p.678) argued that it is difficult to apply the securitisation theory in authoritarian regimes and to non-state actors based on what is an exception. This is because everything, for such governments, can be "exceptional". For Floyd (2015, p.678), it is still valid to measure securitisation when the exceptional measures that were used could lead to violence, cause risk and harm the sources of threat, henceforth, the securitisation theory can be applicable outside the Western liberal world. This thesis contributes to the literature on transit and host states from the global south by using Egypt as an illustrative example.

It is worth mentioning that there are two approaches to study migration; the first is from *migration studies perspectives* and the second is from *a security perspective* as clarified by Huysmans and Squire (2010, p.170). This dissertation adheres to the latter approach to show case the securitisation moves. According to migration studies, migrants are of two distinctive types: 'forced migrants' (considered refugees) or economic migrants (Huysmans and Squire, 2010, p.170). I will define both migrants and refugees for further clarifications.

A definition of a migrant is difficult to find under the international law. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) (2019), a migrant is defined as a person who leaves his/her place of permanent residence to move to another place either within or outside the country of origin seeking better opportunities and to improve their living standards either temporarily or permanently. Edwards (2015) stressed that migrants have the *choice* to return to their home countries and still enjoy their government's protection when needed. Moreover, migrants vary in their backgrounds as they could be workers or educated, middle- class migrants. They could enter their new destination legally or illegally through migrant smugglers. A common perception about migrants is that a large portion of migrants moved from the south part of the globe to the northern one. Tarp and Parviainen (2016) reported that migration is higher between south- to south- states rather. This is because "most international migration occurs between countries within the same major area" (Tarp and Parviainen, 2016). In 2015, the south-to-south migration accounted for 37% of the total migration, which was around 90 million migrants (IOM, 2015, p.7).

As for the definition for refugees according to the UNHCR (1951), a refugee is a person "who fled war, violence or persecution and crossed an international border to find safety in another country". A more detailed definition for refugees is given by 1951 Refugee Convention: "someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion" (UNHCR, 1951). In addition, Betts and Collier (2018) defined refugees as, "people who chose to stay home until they were forcibly displaced by crisis". Hence, they flee from their homes and *cannot* return due to profound fear of persecution or an armed conflict (Edwards, 2015). There is a difference between an asylum seeker and a refugee, the asylum seeker's claim *has not been decided* upon yet at the host country while the refugee is a person who *has been recognised* by the

UNHCR and has enjoyed its protection as well as that of the host state (Amnesty International 2019).

To investigate the connection between migrants, refugees, and security, Castles *et al.* (2014, p.198) blamed the securitisation process by policymakers for presenting migrants as a security threat, thus adding up to the list of security issues. Castles *et al.* (2014, p.198) explained that the securitisation of migrants, as with other securitised issues, is the product of social construction. As a result of the September 11th attacks, the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) were more concerned about the dangers associated with migrants and refugees. The 9/11 attacks were a turning point in the use of exceptional measures, with tighter border controls and introducing "new necessities of security" (Jiménez, 2012, p.38). Additionally, a high sense of Islamophobia rose in the US and the rest of the world as a result of such attacks, which meant a high fear of Islamic terrorism globally, especially after the Bush's administration call for 'war on terror' (Awan, 2010, p.523; Powell, 2011, p.90). Consequently, stronger rules were imposed by countries. Thus, "fighting terrorism since 9/11 became general argument used in the policy debate to justify tougher migration controls" (Jiménez, 2012, p.41). Accordingly, both the US and the EU passed laws that curtailed civil liberties for nationals as well as migrants and EU increased programs of integration for migrants "to avoid xenophobia and being criminalised" (Jiménez, 2012, p.42) in an attempt to reduce chances for civil unrest or domestic instability, thus making it a win-win situation for both the migrants and the locals to avoid clashes.

6.1.1 Host Societies Perceived as Potential Threats from Migrants and Refugees
Weiner (1995, p.136-137) presented five classifications of threats which migrants and refugees represent; however, in this dissertation, only three are focused on as they support my argument. The first type of threat the migrants and refugees cause are a threat to their own state of origin while they are hosted in another country, resulting in tensions between both states. The second type is when migrants and refugees are of a political and security threat to host country, and the third type is when they pose social and economic problems to the host state, (Weiner 1995, p.136-137). Fourth, it is when migrants are seen by their hosts as a cultural threat. Fifth, it is when host society use the migrants to threaten their country of origin, (Weiner 1995, p.137). This chapter will help explain these first three types according to the different perceptions of Egypt's rulers from 2011-2014.

Before admitting any flow of migrants and refugees, each state must think about the repercussions of accepting to host them for their "national and cultural pluralism" (Weiner 1995, p.75). Thus, migrants and refugees are sometimes regarded by certain groups in host countries as outcasts because they are perceived to pose some danger to the society, economy and political systems. Firstly, migrants and refugees are sometimes viewed as taking away jobs from locals and thus they are of a "socio-economic threat" (Völkel, 2015, Marozzi, 2016, Davis 2018). Secondly, they are a political threat (Weiner, 1995, and Robinson, 2017). Migrants could lead to increase of terrorists' attacks inside the host state as they are "home-grown terrorists" (Davis 2018). This is a perception mainly transferred by far right run governments, right- wing parties in opposition, nationalistic governments and/or conservative administrations as these are "facilitating securitizing conditions" (Robinson 2017, p.513). Thus, this demonstrates the idea that securitisation can result out of the context that it occurs within. Thirdly, migrants and refugees are potentially politically disloyal or subversive, as they tend to adhere more to their culture and identity by clustering together in the host state, refusing to integrate within the new society thus they become "the perceived threats of international migration to national identity" (Castel *et al.*, 2014, p.200). Therefore, how host and transit societies view migrants and refugees is important to be highlighted in this chapter to help justify Egyptian leaders of Egypt treatment to these refugees and migrants.

6.2 Egypt as a Crossroad or a New Home?

This section provides a background on the involvement of Egypt into the refugees' world. It introduces a brief guide on the 'push and pull' factors which make Egypt either a 'crossing route' or another 'new home' for refugees. This is illustrated, in the section, by outlining the rules and regulations related to refugees, asylum seekers and migrants in Egypt. Finally, the section assesses the pros and cons of such rules. This aims to explain the implications of refugees and migrants on the Egyptian politics and economic status.

Egypt is long known to be the *mother of all nations (Um El Donia)* (Fahmy, 2020, p.136), a reputation gained from hosting many migrants and refugees throughout its history. Its African neighbours call Egypt the *centre of civilization*, in reference to its history and civilisation. At the beginning of this millennia, many Iraqis fled their homes due to the US invasion in 2003, and Egypt was a destination option for many of them who still remain in

Egypt. By 2011 and due to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war, the influx of Syrians into Egypt increased. There were many reasons for Syrians to choose Egypt as their destination, such as the mostly shared and relatively similar language, religion and traditions. Notably, the Egyptian response to the Syrian crisis has varied with the variation of the leader in power. Thus, the chapter underscores that the interests of leaders interfere while making crucial decisions with regard to in-migrants or refugees.

Egypt signed and ratified the 1981 convention on refugees, despite hosting the oldest United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)'s office in the Middle East since 1954, (Kagan 2011, p.150). In the 1980s and 1990s, Egypt agreed with the UN commission upon not granting other rights to refugees other than 'resettlement' and 'repatriation' and the UNHCR worked with Egypt on those conditions, (Kagan, 2011, p.150). It remains until today the responsibility of the UNHCR in Egypt to decide upon refugees' statuses based on a Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed in 1954, (Kagan, 2011, p.150; and Bidinger *et al.* 2015, p.80). Thus, this puts most of the responsibility on the UNHCR more than on the GOE to decide upon the statuses of refugees and asylum seekers.

There were other laws enforced by the Egyptian government under Mubarak's rule regulating refugees' and migrants' right to work. To further illustrate, the Egyptian labour law number 12 for the year 2003 restricts foreigners from working as long as there is 'no sponsor' for them, and if there is a sponsor, there must be evidence that 'no' Egyptian with the same qualification is competing with the non-Egyptian on the same job, (Bidinger *et al*., 2015, p.89-90). The logic at the time was to offer more jobs to many of the unemployed Egyptians. This law has been further restricted by another 2004 decree by the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration, (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.89-90). Despite the preceding laws which would seem to embody 'pushing' away factors from Egypt, migrants have been able to work in the informal sector. This allowed them to enjoy benefits of not paying taxes or being under the guardianship/sponsorship of someone like in most Arab Gulf states (Kagan, 2011, p.11). The sponsorship system also known in Arabic as 'Kafala' system is mainly adopted in the Gulf States and Jordan (ILO, n.d). This sponsorship system was meant to regulate, rotate, and supervise the 'guest-workers' in the Gulf countries (ILO, n.d). This sponsor system is explained as "under the Kafala system a migrant worker's immigration

status is legally bound to an individual employer or sponsor for their contract period. The migrant worker cannot enter the country, transfer employment nor leave the country for any reason without first obtaining explicit written permission from the kafeel/sponsor" (ILO, n.d). So, the kafeel (sponsor) becomes responsible before his country's law to provide the licence for the migrants to enter and work in the host country.

Most importantly, the absence of the sponsorship system in Egypt does not mean that the government is unaware of the migrants' existence or activities in the country, rather the situation is more like "the state ignores them" (Kagan, 2011, p.11). There are other rigid Egyptian laws imposed on foreigners in Egypt. Unlike the US, for example, which gives its citizenship to any child born on American soil, the Egyptian nationality law is rigid: "Law No. 154 of 2004, amending Law No. 26 of 1975 on nationality, prohibits the children of foreigners who are born on Egyptian soil from acquiring citizenship, as Egyptian nationality is granted only on the basis of descent" (Sadek, 2016). Moreover, this is enforced whether the child's parents are Arabs or non-Arabs. Another example is with regards to land ownership (agricultural or desert), it is also difficult for non-Egyptian nationals to own land. In this respect, Sadek (20l6) reported that "Law No. 104 of 1985 prevents foreign persons and companies from owning agricultural property, fertile land, or desert land in Egypt." Sadek (2016) further elaborated and explained that such law was made for "security reasons". In fact, the entire afore mentioned laws and regulations seem to be restrictive and act as push-away factors from Egypt not only for migrants but also for refugees and asylum seekers.

It is noteworthy that in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, the 1971 constitution was replaced by a new one in 2014. Article number 91 of the 2014 constitution, emphasised the rights of asylum seekers and political refugees. It states:

> The state shall grant political asylum to any foreigner who has been persecuted for defending the interests of peoples, human rights, peace or justice. Extradition of political refugees is forbidden. All of the above is according to the law. (Egyptian government, 2014, p.28)

On the one hand, Egypt can be classified as both a 'sending' and a 'receiving' country for migrants and refugees. Those being sent are not only Egyptians but are also of other

nationalities such as mainly Sudanese, Eritreans and Ethiopians; since 2011, Arabs were mainly Syrians (Tsourapas 2018). Seeberg (2013, p.166) ranked Egypt on top of the list for emigrants, and reported that the number of Egyptians abroad counts around 4 million Egyptians in the Western World and the Gulf; thus, Egypt is a sending country for migrants. In 2015, the IOM and Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) released that the number of Egyptian migrants reached 3.47 million in total (Osman *et al.* 2016, p.34). 95.4% of Egyptians living abroad reside in Arab countries while 40% of them live in Saudi Arabia as reported by (Osman *et al.* 2016, p.34 and Tsourapas, 2018).

On the other hand, Castle *et al.* (2014, p.183) considered Egypt a 'transit' state for migrants. This is because Egyptians and other Arab and African neighbours use Egypt to move to Europe. Moreover, Castle *et al.* (2014, p.183) believed that both Egypt and Turkey are at the pivot of "crossroads for refugees' flows". Therefore, Egypt is a central gateway to many migrants and refugees to reach EU due to Egypt's location on the Mediterranean Sea. Most of those crossing the Mediterranean Sea reach the shores of Greece and Italy as the first reception countries from the EU. Consequently, both Italy and Greece signed several agreements with Egypt to regulate and curtail illegal migration by sea. These bi-lateral agreements with Greece and Italy in specific have been one of the solutions Egypt used to resolve its soft security crisis. There are other reasons for why refugees and asylum seekers are attracted to Egypt. Seeberg (2013, p.166) and Norman (2018) underscored the most important reason which lies in the fact that Egypt hosts 'resettlement plans' that are sponsored by the governments of Canada, Australia, and the UNHCR. This has given Egypt an advantage over other countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. However, as Norman (2018) mentioned, not many Syrians are resettled to other countries.

Moreover, Egypt could be considered a new home for some of the refugees and migrants. Seeberg, (2013, p.166) explained that it is difficult to differentiate between political and economic migrants in Egypt as they have decided to settle in it and consider it a new home. Reasons for settling in Egypt and counting it as a second home are due to the fact that Egypt, in terms of economy, is affordable to live in; it is known for its cultural diversity, reasonable weather conditions and hospitality (Meerman, 2015; Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.78; and Samaan 2016). Arab migrants and refugees prefer Egypt to other Western countries due to the similar language (although with different dialect), (Nielsen, 2017); religion, Sunni

Islam; and Arabic identity shared by them. However, such previously mentioned reasons, which augmented the refugees' attraction to Egypt, have not persisted as discussed later.

6.3 Syrians in Egypt

This section discusses the status of Syrians in Egypt. I divide them into three categories: refugees, migrants and businessmen. I assess the treatment of the three categories since the Arab Spring and the civil war shattered Syria. Moreover, the section demonstrates the negative impact that the changes in the situation in Egypt had on Syrians residing in the country. It also shows the politicisation of Syrians by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) government headed by Morsi. In addition, the section discloses how Syrians became securitised after Morsi was ousted in 2013. It also discusses the role of actors who took part in both the politicisation and securitisation of Syrians in Egypt. Finally, the last section elaborates on how the politicisation and securitisation has reflected on Egyptian-Syrian relations in terms of foreign policy.

To begin, Syrians who fled their homes in 2011 as a result of the civil war and the brutality of the Ba'athist regime (Seeberg, 2013, p.166) could be classified as migrants, refugees and/or asylum seekers. "Asylum seekers and refugees usually have uncertain mobility plan" explained Zwick (2020, p.2), because they hardly decide or rarely declare where they want to settle. As a result, some of the undecided Syrians who counted Egypt as a transit state considered it as their host state after sometime. Majority of the fleeing Syrians targeted going to countries which Syria shares borders with as Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Turkey. However, some others came to Egypt although both Syria and Egypt do not share borders. It is noteworthy that Egypt is considered the country with the lowest number of Syrians, whether migrants or refugees, out of the five states, as figures reveal (Karasapan 2016) and that the Government Of Egypt (GOE) is not heavily involved in assisting Syrian refugees in Egypt; nevertheless, credit is given more to UNHCR, NGOs and INGOs and Syrian volunteers for their supportive efforts.

Historically, the presence of Syrians in Egypt dates to the unity between both countries in the period from 1958-1961. Egypt and Syria (later Yemen joined) united under one country that became known as the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Nasser as its leader, (Awan,

2017, p.108). Under the unity of both states political parties were dissolved and Nasser had four vice-presidents- two from Egypt and two from Syria (Awan, 2017, p.118). The governmental portfolios were divided between Syrians and Egyptians (Awan, 2017, p.119); however, this unity was short-lived (Murphy 1990). It ended as a result of Nasser's extreme domination over the decision making, the resistance of the marginalised Baath party members in Syria, and their dislike to be a dissolved party (Awan 2017, p.121). In addition, other Syrian politicians felt marginalised by Egyptian counter-parts, added Awan (2017, p.121). As a result, a rift emerged between Egypt and Syria leading to the break-up of the UAR. This is a clear demonstration of how a leader plays a role in the unity or the breaking of two states. In the 1990s, Syrian-Egyptian relations witnessed a period of warm reconciliation under Mubarak and Hafez Al Assad, wrote Murphy (1990). Syrians were welcomed in Egypt as foreign investors, but tense relations re-occurred between Egypt and Syria by late 2000, which slowed the bi-lateral movement of capital. It was late under Mubarak's era when he decided to lift visa entrance for Syrians as he believed this to be a good facilitating factor for Syrian investments to come to and invest in Egypt and for the Egyptian investors to go and invest in Syria, said Saud Abbas Syrian Cultural attaché in Egypt (2020)[18] This freedom of mobility between both nations remained until 2013 when more restrictions were imposed on Syrians entering Egypt to mark a change in the treatment of Syrians by the GOE.

6.3.1 Syrian Economic Migrants

The first category of Syrians residing in Egypt is the economic migrants. As defined earlier, a migrant is a person who leaves his/her country for the purpose of seeking better opportunities in another country to improve his/her standard of living for either a temporarily or permanently period (Edwards 2015; Amnesty International 2019). Syrian migrants in Egypt have been present since President Nasser's regime due to the United Arab Republic (UAR) between 1958 and 1962 under which both states were considered one state, as mentioned above. Since then, many Syrians resided in Egypt and intermarried with Egyptians. Around 5,800 Syrians resided in Egypt in the 1960s when the Egyptian population was around 26 million, (Abd El Fattah *et al.*, 2004, p.118), so Syrians were an unremarkable number. It was not until the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011 when Syrian

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[18] This is a personal interview with the Cultural Attaché at the Syrian Embassy in Cairo October 2020.

migrants started arriving in large numbers to Egypt and their presence became strongly noticeable in the streets. Sadek (2019) explained that "Syrians who entered Egypt with visa permits and do not receive any service from UNHCR, they are migrants". Such Syrians were not registered with the UNHCR as they entered using a "tourist visa," and they "do not consider themselves as migrants" (Knipp, 2019). This shows that there are two opinions on their status whether to be counted migrants or refugees. There is another debate over their numbers, Norman (2015) stated that the number of Syrian migrants in Egypt is "about one million". She added, "It has estimates of irregular or economic migrants, but it is hard to know for sure for many reasons" said Norman (2021[19]). While Sadek (2019) said it is "difficult to find numbers of migrants because no official institution has it." There are also Syrians in Egypt who entered 'illegally' as they have been smuggled to Egypt via Sudan's borders. Syrians going to Sudan do not need a visa due to an agreement between Syria and Sudan and through Sudan they pay smugglers to enter Egypt (Nielsen 2017). These Syrians live in Egypt as a 'transit' country in hope that they will get to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea again by smugglers, Syrians pay $2,000 per person to get on a boat (Salam 2015; and Norman 2018). They are mainly concentrated in Alexandria as it lies on the Mediterranean Sea and city of Damietta (Salam 2015).

6.3.2 Syrian Businessmen

The second category is the Syrian businesspeople and investors who have been investing in Egypt since the late 1990s, starting with small-sized investments that were mainly focused on spinning, weaving and textile industries, according to Mohamed Kamel El Sharbty[20] (2017). This does not mean that the Syrian businessmen sole contribution to the economy was through the aforementioned industries owing to the fact that they have their special contributions to the food industry, opening many restaurants, in addition to their contributions to the furniture, paper and sponge industries (Yehia, 2018). Syrian investors arrive in Egypt with their own capital from Syria and are self-funded, (Shahine, 2016; and Sadek, 2019), so they do not request loans from Egyptian banks nor any Egyptian ministry. Thus, it can be argued that Syrian businessmen were in Egypt earlier than the civil war, but

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[19] This was a follow up conversation between me and Dr Kelsey Norman after attending her webinar in April 2021, to whom I am very grateful.
[20] A Syrian investor in Egypt and head of the group Four For Textiles in an interview with OnLive Channel (August, 2017).

few arrived after this time (Sadek, 2019). Currently, Syrian investments are estimated to have reached $800 million with around 30,000 Syrian investors in Egypt, (Yehia, 2018). Shahine (2016) clarified that these are the affluent Syrians who came from upper class and upper middle classes, using visa permits to depart from Syria by air once the war broke out. Arguably, these Syrians have nourished the housing sector in these rich sides of Egypt as they resided in rich parts in Cairo. Furthermore, the presence of Syrian investors can be described as a 'win-win' situation for both Egyptians and Syrians. This is because these investments provide both Egyptians and Syrians with employment in such a difficult time which Egypt's economic situation is going through since 2011. Syrian investors advantaged the Egyptian economy. This is because their investments were a source of flow of foreign currency, they were new expertise coming to Egypt and nevertheless they helped in reducing imports from countries like Turkey and China (Shahine, 2016). Shawky (2017) reported that Syrian businesses contribution to the Egyptian economy reached around $800 million since the war broke out in Syria. While Adib[21] (2018) further clarified that in the first nine months of the year 2018 one third of foreign direct investors in Egypt were Syrians and their investments were worth $1.25 million. Thus, the existence of Syrian businessmen and investors in Egypt has been significantly recognised as beneficial to the Egyptian economy, and all the administrations ruling Egypt, since 2011 to 2018, have taken this into consideration.

6.3.3 Syrian Refugees

While searching for Syrian refugee records in Egypt prior to the Arab Spring one would not find any. Norman (2021) justified that saying, "There were definitely Syrians in Egypt before 2011, they just were not refugees". Therefore, it is worth discussing the third category which is the Syrian refugees. This category forms the majority of the Syrian population in Egypt since the civil war erupted. The Syrian refugees, belonging to such category, have fled the political persecution and unrest post the Arab Spring. It is hard to tell that they were present in Egypt prior to the civil-war. However, they have been politicised under Morsi's rule and securitised since 2013 and later de-securitised in 2016. Such category members have gained 'refugee status' through the UNHCR office in Egypt

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[21] Amr Adib is a popular journalist and a TV anchor. His talk show program is aired on the private channel; MBC Masr which has a wide range of audiences and he has many followers on his social media.

as it is the UN's responsibility as agreed between the UN and the government. This is further elaborated on by Ramona Lenz in her interview with Knipp (2019), "Egypt has no formal process for asylum seekers. The authorities do not provide them a first point of contact". This, as mentioned above, has been agreed upon between the GOE and the UNHCR. Moreover, Syrians in Egypt under 'refugee statuses' are the ones who 'officially' registered with the UNHCR and in turn hold the 'yellow card' and are getting benefits from UNHCR, (Sadek, 2019; and Norman, 2015). However, there are other Syrian refugees who are not registered by the UNHCR, which the Egyptian government is aware of, but they refuse to register themselves with the Commission due to security reasons. Yehia (2018) clarified that this is linked to security reasons; "as they fear of being detained by the security services in Damascus if they return to Syria and some do not consider themselves as refugees as they reside in Egypt primarily for work and investments". Knipp (2019) added another reason for the non-registration, "they often do not consider themselves as refugees,…, many of them entered the country as tourists without the intention of staying permanently". This is because these Syrians did not think that the war would last that long. For example, one Syrian refugee (quoted by El Gundy 2013) stated that "Egyptians should know that we will not stay forever".

Most of the Syrian refugees are from lower-middle class and lower classes. They took long trips to reach Egypt as both legal and illegal entry was difficult for other countries, but it was still possible to enter Egypt illegally (Nielsen, 2017). In 2016, Jordan and Turkey closed their borders before refugees, and the Lebanese Army has tightened its measures on its borders, preventing the infiltration of refugees or illegal migrants to get into Lebanon (Nielsen, 2017). As Egypt adopts a 'no refugees camps' policy, such refugees live among Egyptians. Some have decided to reside in poor neighbourhoods, where there is affordable accommodation while others decided to live in other governorates around Egypt mainly in the Delta area and north of Cairo, such as in Alexandria, and Damietta. Fewer Syrians lived in Sinai and Mansoura (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015; Knipp, 2019). Maati (2020) told me that the Syrians' choice for location reflects their socio-economic and professional backgrounds. Maati (2020) further elaborated saying Syrians with rich backgrounds, who are unregistered with UNHCR but have a residency permit as business people or investors and who are working in investments and food industry, have chosen to live in the rich neighbourhoods of 6th of October City, Zayed , Madenity and Rehab. Nevertheless, Syrians who work in the

furniture business have resided in the city of Damietta and the Delta region. Some Syrian refugees who have UNHCR yellow cards are from low- middle classes; they live in poor areas with the unregistered ones in Cairo, Alexandria and some areas in Sinai.

The total number of Syrian refugees in Egypt has varied from one source to the other until the time-period of investigation in this chapter; different sources provided different figures which limited the accuracy of their numbers. However, I have tried to collect records of the refugees' number as close as possible after collecting them from many sources that were reporting the possible ranges depending on two other relevant sources. Table 4 shows the numbers of Syrian refugees in Egypt between the years 2011-2018 according to the UNHCR and the Government of Egypt (GOE) figures. It should be highlighted that in the first years of Syrian refugees' flows, the GOE did not release any official figures due to Egypt's own internal turmoil. Generally, Syrians were allowed free access to Egypt, and more of them arrived in Egypt in the second half of 2012 during the rule of Morsi's administration. The first influx from Syria to Egypt entered without any visa permit that was granted as a result of warm relations between Mubarak and Assad and remained until Morsi's term (Abbas, 2020). When asked about the variations in numbers between the UNHCR and the GOE, Norman (2021) expounded that many Syrians refused to register with the UNHCR. When asked for further clarification for the variation in refugees' numbers Norman (2021) told me, "Undercounting in Egypt is normal and common for the UNHCR, not everyone knows about UNHCR and if they do, they avoid going to it so that the UNHCR won't communicate their data to Syria". She further added to me "some people might consider themselves to be refugees even if they do not meet UNHCR qualifications" (Norman, 2021). So, the inaccurate numbers are the result of two things: first, the Syrians themselves and the second, the UNHCR for not reaching out to all Syrians. While on the GOE side there is no access to the real official records and there is no explanation for their much higher number than the UNHCR.

Table 5 Total Number of Syrian Refugees in Egypt 2011 to 2018[22]

Year	Total Numbers according to UNHCR	Total Numbers according to GOE

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[22] Sources for this table came from UNHCR and GOE records 2018, I have collected to provide these figures

2011	90,000	No figure released
2012	90,000	No figure released
2013	120,000	250,000 to 300,000
2014	138,000	300,000
2015	140,000	350,000
2016	Between 117,000 to 138,000	500,000
2017	113,000	300,000
2018	110,000	300,000

Syrian refugees in Egypt receive support and aid via several actors. The GOE only provided those refugees with yellow cards and with free access to primary education, health care while few received free higher education, this was limited to the period of President Morsi only. There are other main active donors who help Syrian refugees in Egypt (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.78-79; Sadek, 2018; Syrian Al Gad Relief Foundation, 2018). These actors provide services that vary in their support either financially, psychologically, to food supplies, housing, educational or workshops and activities. The main supporter and provider for these services is the United Nations (UN) with its main refugee agency; the UNHCR. The UNHCR has coordinated with some local Egyptian NGOs and INGO in addition to non-NGO for assistance. Additionally, the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) is a UN agency that is involved in supporting Syrian refugees' children, specifically "unaccompanied children" (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.78). Moreover, the World Food Programme (WFP) is involved in providing the Syrian Refugees with food coupons. Those who have registered their cell-phone numbers receive text messages, informing them of the times for the availability of these food coupons, (Syrian Al Gad Relief Foundation, 2018).This is on top of the help provided by the American University in Cairo (AUC) in refugees assistance for registration with the

UNHCR (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.79).There are also religious non-NGOs that help Syrian refugees in rendering home assistance to them, such as Islamic Relief, Resala branch in Damietta, Mosque Mahmoud in Mohandessin district and the Catholic Relief which offers scholarships for school education if Syrians are unable to benefit from GOE free public education (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.78-79; and Syrian Al Gad Relief Foundation, 2018). This is beside "some NGOs support Syrian refugees in starting small projects," said Sadek (2019), such as hairdressers, nuts sellers and readymade meals.

There are also two Syrian NGOs that opened in Egypt after they registered with Egyptian Ministry of Social Solidarity (MOSS) in 2013; these are 'FARD' and 'Syria Al Gad Relief Foundation,' both receiving funds from international donors, (Sadek, 2019). This shows that there is Syrian-to Syrian support after some Syrians became well-established in Egypt. Moreover, there is the role played by foreign embassies in Cairo in supporting such Syrian refugees by mediating between Syrian refugees and the GOE to grant them a one-month amnesty for visa requirements, (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.79). These embassies are the American, British and French ones in Cairo, (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.79). With regards to examples of NGOs in Egypt, Caritas, and Tadamon support refugees with psychological sessions and rehab sessions, especially to children suffering from anxiety as a result of the war in addition to communal activities, according to Syria Al Gad Relief Foundation (2018). Out of the two Syrian NGOs, FARD started as a volunteer group in 2012, offering its help to their fellow Syrians by 2013. FARD's paperwork was finalised in three months, and it became an association recognised by the Ministry of Solidarity, (Maati 2020). Maati (2020) further elaborates that "FARD is proud that it was the first group to cooperate with the UNHCR and bring them to 6th of October City to create mobile units to register Syrians in Egypt in 2012". Moreover, he adds that "By the first weekend in September 2012 the UNHCR succeeded in registering 6,500 Syrians due to community mobilization". FARD offers vocational trainings to Syrians in fields of electricity and plumbing and special programmes for the elderly providing them with medical care and financial assistance, asserted Maati (2020).

Prior to explaining the post Arab Spring administration's perception of Syrian flows into Egypt, I have provided in the table below the dates for each administration being in office, identified who they are and the actors or the agencies who played a role in securitising

and/or resolving the crisis. This is besides providing the dates of speeches in which Syrians were politicised or securitised or de-securitised.

Table 6 Actors Politicising and Securitising Syrians in Egypt

In office date	Leadership in power	Actors or agencies playing role	Dates of Speeches
February 2011- June 2012	SCAF	- Military men in power gave free entry for all Syrians (refugees, migrants and businessmen) - Members of Parliament dominated by Islamists also gave free entry to all Syrians	NA
June 2012- June 2013	Dr Mohamed Morsi as leader of Muslim Brotherhood group and chairman of the FJP	Politicisation of Syrian refugees and migrants by Morsi, Islamists in parliament, Islamic NGOs and Government of Egypt	June 2013 speech at the rally to call for Jihad in Syria
June 2014- present	General Abd El Fattah El Sisi	- 2013-2015 securitisation of Syrian refugees and migrants by security forces, ministry of interior, national security council and intelligence	- 2013 Speech in Naval College to get mandate on War on Terror - Two speeches in Sept. 2015 by Sisi

		- 2016-2018 de-securitisation due to more role for MOFA, NCCPIM, activists, human rights NGO	on Syrian migrants and refugees - 2018 Q&A with the president showing support to Syrian refugees (de-securitisation)

6.4 Syrians under SCAF (2011-2012)

As mentioned earlier, most Syrians who came to Egypt during the first wave in 2011 entered either by buying a tourist visa or enjoyed free entrance. They were warmly welcomed by Egyptians who viewed Syrians as "brothers" (Gundy, 2013) and with "arms open" as described by Syrians (Yehia, 2018). The government can be split into roughly two groups by the type of reaction it had. The first group is the military officers in power, known as Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), who assumed power after Mubarak had stepped down, from February 2011 until June 2012. The second group encompasses the Egyptian parliament, dominated by the Islamists who ruled from 2011 till 2013. The Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won 47% of the seats, and it was followed by the Salafi Nour Party, winning 24% of the seats lower house and 90% of the seats in the upper house (Carnegie Report, 2015). The secular and liberal parties won less than 30% in the lower house and 10% of the upper house (Carnegie Report, 2015). This made the Islamist parties the majority in the Parliament with strong domination of it.

According to the laws mentioned above in section one, it would be expected that SCAF would securitise the Syrians but this did not happen. SCAF was faced by the sudden wave of Syrians with their different categories as refugees, migrants and businessmen in an unprecedented time in Egypt's history, thus it was difficult to securitise Syrians. SCAF was running Egypt during a critical period of its history due to the extreme chaos and continuous riots breaking out every Friday as Egypt's official weekend began by different factions in the society, such as workers, school teachers, and nurses, with their diverse

demands, such as salary increases, higher pension rates and better medical care (Ahram Online 2011). This is beside the fact that SCAF had to face the economic situation which has been hit hard by these uprisings and instability due to lack of security. Therefore, it can be argued that the SCAF accepted Syrians entering without reservation. At the same time, Egypt did not show a clear stand from Syrian President Bashar El Assad as a result of the human rights violations; this was indicated by Egypt's government not declaring openly any statements about the situation in Syria as Hassan (2011) claimed. However, Ali (2012) and Hauslohner (2013) argued the contrary by saying that the Egyptian government hosted Syrian opposition factions, such as Rebel Free Syrian Army, Syrian Freedom Youth, and the Syrian Opposition Coalition. Furthermore, the Syrian National Council opened an office in Cairo although it was formed in Istanbul (Yehia, 2018) and another one later in Doha. Moreover, Syrian intellectuals viewed Egypt as their "safe haven" due to the potential that Egypt has for inducing a democratic environment which will circulate the freedom of thought and freedom of speech in the region (Yehia, 2018). Therefore, it can be inferred that Egypt's government indirectly supported Syria's opposition factions while it did not cut off ties with the Bashar's regime in 2011 under the SCAF. As SCAF was busy with domestic affairs, it did not securitise Syrians presence in Egypt.

The second group which showed support for Syrian presence in Egypt was the Egyptian Parliament. Ali (2012) stated that it was for the first time for the Egyptian Parliament to allow Syrian National Council members to enter the Egyptian Parliament with their Syrian 'new' flag. This incident was, "the first time in living memory that a non-Egyptian flag was brought into Egyptian Parliament" (Ali, 2012). This demonstrates the amount of support Syrian opposition had gained from the Islamists dominating Egypt's legislative branch in a country mainly run by a military junta. Moreover, it demonstrates how ideology mattered to Islamists in giving support to Syrians. This further illustrates the consent of both groups of the Egyptian government with its two main branches; Executive and Legislative to endorse Syrian opposition and allow different Syrian factions to enter Egypt freely. It was in 2011 when Syrians entered freely, and many did not seek help from the UNHCR as the first wave marked the arrival of the rich Syrians and few with critical health issues. It was only by 2012 when the civil war's intensity in Syria became severe and the number of arrivals and their demands increased. Accordingly, the Egyptian government started to direct Syrians to the services offered by the UNHCR through its border and customs. This development

coincided with the rise of Mohamed Morsi to power in June 2012, introducing a different vision for Syrians in Egypt.

6.5 Syrians under Morsi

6.5.1 Politicisation

With the intensification of the civil war in Syria, more Syrians fled their homes to neighbouring countries, such as Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Egypt. In 2012, Morsi assumed power, causing some Syrians to seize such opportunity of having an Islamist government and flee to Egypt seeking refuge from war. Morsi came to power as Egypt's first civilian president from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) movement, representing the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP).

6.5.1.1 Brief Background on the Muslim Brotherhood

Members of the Muslim Brotherhood are adherents to Political Islam in Egypt. Political Islam means Islam becomes an ideology that promotes for the ordering of politics and society in an Islamic way (Ayoob, 2004). The failure of other ideologies, Like Pan-Arabism and Socialism, to attain national goals led to the rise of Political Islam as the new representative of opposition (Zubaida, 2000, p.60). In Egypt, the rise of Political Islam occurred during the British occupation. In 1928, Hassan El Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, believed his movement to be a form of resistance to this occupation. "The Muslim Brotherhood was one political force amongst many, …., seeking national independence" (Zubaida, 2000, p.67). There were other political parties and movements seeking independence and the MB were among them. In the 1960s, Sayyid Quṭb, inspired by Bana, promoted his radical ideas against Nasser's regime and was persecuted for it. Quṭb was a strong believer in establishing the Islamic state; he had an aversion to secular nationalism (Ayoob, 2000, p.3). His ideas went overseas and were adopted by other religious groups as the Wahabists in Saudi Arabia (Ayoob, 2004, p.4). The Muslim Brotherhood's slogan "Islam is the solution" is embedded in its ideology, explained Al Anani (2016, p.112). However, the MB ideology, as described by Al Anani (2016, p.112), is "broad, comprehensive and to some extend vague". The Muslim Brotherhood ideology is based on Islam, i.e., as described by Bana, it is "an Islamic idea" that is structured (Al Anani, 2016, p. 112). The Muslim Brotherhood were able over the years to form a

collective Islamic identity that was "unique and distinctive" (Al Anani, 2016, p.44). This identity is religious rather than based on a nation-state. The Muslim Brotherhood ability to attract wider audience and their far-reaching ideology originate from the fact that the movement mixes the religious identity with other "political and social" causes, such as fighting corruption, and political injustices and working on decreasing unemployment. (Al Anani, 2016, p.44 &100).

The Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt throughout its history has been suppressed by the ruling regimes and banned from forming a political party. This in turn, first, drove them to work as an underground movement and second to sympathise with those who feel oppressed in the Muslim world. It was not until June 2011 because of the Arab Spring changes going on that the Muslim Brotherhood formed their first legal party, the FJP, headed by Mohamed Morsi as its chairperson and became a mainstream party represented in the Egyptian parliament (Shehata, 2011). This party had a majority of Muslim Brotherhood as its members, but they also encouraged others to join, including Christians and women, according to Essam El Arian, vice-chairman of the FJP, in his interview with Shehata (2011). This party identified itself as an, "Islamist party that wants to establish an Islamic state", (Shehata 2011). This underscores the importance of a religious Islamic identity for the party; this consequently justified the warm welcome the Muslim Brotherhood extends for Syrians who were also mostly Sunni Muslims. I argue that Syrians, for Morsi, were a good opportunity to expand the 'Sunni Islamic State' to include Egypt and Syria, which was the main goal behind establishing the FJP. In addition, it was a chance to bring down the 'Shia'a' Alawit regime in Syria under Al Assad's rule that has been dominant for a long period of time, oppressing the Sunni majority (The Irish Times, 2013; Hauslohner, 2013). This attitude adopted by Morsi exemplifies what Buzan *et al.* (1998, p.124) said about the role of officials in religious identification, "who claim to be able to speak on behalf of the religious community". To further elaborate, Vali Nasr explained that states' elites mobilise identity and manipulate it to determine the state-society relationship (Hashemi, 2015). This explains Morsi's sympathy with Sunni rebel groups against Shia's government (Hauslohner, 2013) and justifies his exerted efforts to shelter Syrian opposition factions and refugees. It is the common religious identification that is the factor in why there was no securitisation of Syrians; instead, Syrians were

politicised and when the leadership changed the new leader took this identification away and securitised them instead.

6.5.1.2 Politicisation Process

As a result, under Morsi's administration more Syrians entered Egypt without any visa requirement or any restrictions. To be more specific this 'free' visa entry was only allowed to Syrian nationals asking for refugee status, not to other nationalities' (Bidinger *et al.* , 2015, p.84). Furthermore, the amount of support and sponsorship that Syrians received under Morsi's administration was striking, Kingsley (2013) clarified that Syrians were allowed to enter Egypt with "just their passports". It is worth noting that Egypt hosts other refugees mainly from its fellow African countries, such as from Sudan, Eretria, Ethiopia and Somalia; this is in addition to other Arab refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Libya (Norman, 2013). However, Morsi's administration provided all the support to Syrians coming to Egypt, and they were highly supported by both government and society (The Observers France 24, 2013). The support was in all forms possible to the extent that both Syrians and Egyptians were equally treated in terms of governmental benefits (Kingsley, 2013; Yehia, 2018). Yehia (2018) further elaborated this saying, "they were not required to obtain a valid residence permit, and no restrictions were imposed on their private business, revolutionary activities or media, political or relief activities".

This demonstrates that under Morsi's administration the amount of provisions provided to Syrians was unlimited and comprehensive in all aspects, and the Syrian opposition members were openly meeting and denouncing Assad's regime while staying in Cairo. It was also under Morsi's government when Syrians enjoyed free medical care and free education for all; school children, and both undergraduate and post graduate students (Yehia, 2018). This shows Morsi's bias towards Syrian refugees over other nationalities that were migrating or seeking refuge in Egypt because of the Arab Spring based on ethnicity; being Arabs and on religious sect as Sunni Muslims (Norman, 2013). This was clear when Morsi declared, at the start of the new academic year of September 2013, that all Syrian children would be admitted freely to schools even if they were unregistered at the UNHCR (Norman, 2013). This was in total contradiction to the treatment of other refugees holding other nationalities by the Egyptian authorities which insisted that these refugees *must* be registered with UNHCR in order to be admitted to Egyptian schools after a lengthy

process for registration (Norman, 2013). These benefits incentivised Egypt to be the destination for Syrian refugees. Hence, in addition to the same Arab ethnicity, language advantage, culture, religion, and free entrance, the many assistances given under Morsi accelerated the number of Syrians into Egypt, reaching the amount of almost 90,000 as officially registered figures by UNHCR in 2012 and 300,000 according to the Egyptian government (Kingsley, 2013)[23]. These numbers were doubling in a short period of time to the extent that, as Mousa and Fahim (2013) described, "it was difficult to find seats on flights to Cairo from refugee hubs in Istanbul Turkey; Beirut Lebanon, and Amman, Jordan". Henceforth, I argue that the flexibility and benefits offered to Syrian refugees under Morsi's regime soared their arrival to Egypt in large numbers, and even Syrian refugees left other refugee camps in other countries, preferring to come to Egypt instead.

These special arrangements marked a drift between Morsi and Mubarak in dealing with refugees. Under Mubarak, the attitude towards refugees and migrants was more of "indifference integration" style, which is a mix between 'repressive' and 'de-facto' style of integration (Norman, 2019). To further elaborate the repressive style means deporting refugees and migrants outside the host state, while the de-facto integration means that there is an integration *indirectly* through NGOs not by the government mainly in the education sector as Norman (2019) clarified. Under Mubarak, Egypt adopted this in-between position. However, Morsi's administration was aiming to fully integrate for Syrian refugees and migrants to expand the *Islamic nation* and the *Islamic Sunni state*. This is in accordance with the Muslim Brotherhood ideology. Therefore, the solidarity that Morsi's administration showed to Syrian refugees was exceptional and remarkable in fulfilling its political purpose. This favouritism towards Syrian refugees was analysed not as a matter of solidarity only for ethnicity reasons or else the same would have been applicable for Iraqi or Yemeni refugees.

In fact, there could be another reason for this immense support for Syrians over the others. In this respect Norman (2013) observed that such support is for the opposition and "revolutionary" factions. The Syrian Spring was against the political injustices of Bashar's regime; thus, the Muslim Brotherhood support is well founded. Consequently, this would give more popularity for Morsi's regime to be viewed as the 'safe haven' for revolutionary

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[23] Check Table 1 for the numbers

movements and for the opposition which has been curtailed by autocratic Arab regimes for a long time. In my view, Morsi sided with the revolutionary opposition in Syria and particularly with the National Syrian Coalition (NSC) and the Syrian Revolution Association in Egypt (SRAE) on account of the fact that such institutions are considered by the Syrian regime the 'Muslim Brotherhood' branch in Syria since they are drawn from Sunni background, and they adopted many of the Muslim Brotherhoods thoughts and ideas, (Ali, 2012; Carnegie MEC, 2019). In fact, the Muslim Brotherhoods considered themselves as the strongest and most organised opposition in Syria. Within eighteen months from the breaking out of the Syrian Spring, the Muslim Brotherhoods in Syria were able to form the National Syrian Council with a quarter of its members from the Muslim Brotherhood group (Carnegie MEC, 2019). This clearly justifies the reasons for Morsi's high cooperation and support to Syrian revolutionary factions. This is because, for Morsi, the ideologies of both groups, coincide in addition to the fact that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's backing of their Syrian peers would establish a good reputation locally and regionally. Consequently, this would help Morsi's administration to consolidate its rule in Egypt, a step in expanding its authority overseas (Trager, Youssef and Dunne 2016) and prohibited Syrians to be constructed as a threat; instead, they were perceived as from the same community.

Therefore, I argue that Morsi did not securitise Syrian refugees and migrants in Egypt. Instead, his administration's attitude can be described as 'politicising' them; making them part of the normal politics. Under Morsi, one can argue that his speeches lacked any securitising moves against Syrians. In January 2013, Morsi "vowed to support Syrian refugees in every possible way until they are able to return home 'with dignity'" (Ahram Online, 2013). Morsi also highlighted that among his priorities is to maintain Syria's unity (Ahram Online, 2013). In June 2013, Morsi made further statements regarding the Syrian refugees. Morsi severed ties with the Syrian government and expressed his willingness to cooperate with other states, the Red Crescent, and the civil society to give further aid to Syrian refugees in Egypt and to Syrian rebels in Syria (Mohsen, 2013).

Morsi's administration was sympathetic to Syrians as they were believed to be of political value to him, consolidating his rule in Egypt. All these policies undertaken by Morsi to the benefit of the Syrian refugees, from free medical care to free education and subsidised transportation in Egypt, were based on 'presidential decrees' that were issued in 2012, (Krajeski 2013 and 3RP report, 2019/2020). This illustrates two points. The first is that the

personal religious beliefs of Morsi in a leadership position as a statesman and the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology has influenced Morsi's decision making as an individual. In this regard, Krajeski (2013) asserts that Morsi was adamant to "establish his and the Brotherhood's solidarity with the Syrian opposition." The second is that Morsi wanted decisions to be implemented quickly in order to ease the access for Syrian refugees rather than making decisions through the Parliament which would take longer time due to bureaucracy. Morsi did not consider the flow of Syrians to Egypt as a threat or causing a crisis; instead, they were, to him, an asset to increase his popularity and legitimacy by expanding the Islamic nation to fulfil the dream of an Islamic state's establishment which is at the core of the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. This justifies Morsi's reaction to politicise Syrians rather than to securitise them. It also shows the gap in ST as it is unable to tell us when migrants will be or will not be securitised by the securitising actors. However, FPDM analysis of the objective of the administration at that time helps to offer an explanation as to why no securitisation move occurred.

6.5.2 Morsi's Foreign Policy Choice

The consent of the government on the admission of Syrian flows altered Egypt's relations with Syria. As mentioned earlier under SCAF, there was no denunciation for the human rights violations committed by Assad's regime against civilians, nor action taken against the regime. However, Morsi before his removal in 2013 called for an Islamic rally to be held in Stadium's covered hall in Cairo (Yehia,2018). Morsi invited all Islamists factions in Egypt, he then called for a "holy war in Syria against Syrian president Bashar Al Assad," quoted Kingsley (2013). This expressed the anti-Assad sentiment of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood (Mousa and Fahim,2013). This also shows that Morsi's foreign policy towards Syria was a confrontational one. Furthermore, Morsi announced a boycott of all relations with Al Assad's government by closing the Syrian embassy in Cairo and withdrawing the Egyptian Charge's de Affaires in Damascus (Mohsen, 2013 and Yehia; 2018). He also called for the world community to interfere in this Syrian crisis (The Irish Times, 2013) and supported a "no-fly zone on Syria", (Mousa and Fahim 2013). In assessing this foreign policy decision making of a leader, Morsi could fall into the category of being a *sensitive* leader according to Hermann and Hermann's (1989) classification. This is because Morsi was *consultative* in this decision with the Muslim Brotherhood. It is also a *shrewd* decision of him as he felt the decline in his popularity among Egyptians, especially with the

opposition's rising calls for withdrawing confidence from him by collecting signatures from many Egyptians[24]. Thus, Morsi was hopeful to regain some of the Egyptians sympathisers with the Syrians support; however, he failed. Morsi used the diplomatic tool in closing the embassy of Syria in Cairo, withdrawing the diplomatic mission in Damascus, and by severing relations with Assad's Syria. Therefore, this could make Morsi be categorised as a *constraint challenger* as he behaved aggressively towards Asad as per Keller's classification (2005, p.205). Moreover, Morsi could also be considered a *goal-oriented* leader on that specific soft security issue; refugees and migrants according to Kaarbo's (1997) classification. This is because Morsi paid close attention to the Syrian case; he addressed the Syrian crisis in many international occasions as in his speech in the Non-Alignment Movement in Tehran in 2012 and in domestic occasions, such as the Syrian Solidarity week organised by the Muslim Brotherhood (Ahram Online, 2013). He made plans like supporting a no-fly zone on Syria, condemning repeatedly the Assad regime, expressing his support for the Syrian Uprisings, and finally calling for Jihad in Syria (Mohsen, 2013).

This call for Jihad in Syria has backfired on Morsi as it intimidated the Egyptian army which on the next day issued a statement saying that the Egyptian army is responsible solely for Egypt's national security (Irish Times, 2013). This statement by the Egyptian army showed the gap between the army and Morsi. This marked an early sign for the eventual downfall of Morsi. This is because Morsi's calls, for the Egyptian army in this rally were leading the country to more chaos rather than stability which was the main reason for his election (Irish Times, 2013).

Furthermore, these calls at the Islamists rally with a "majority of Islamists" rather than inviting others as secularists and leftists indirectly meant to the Egyptian army that if it refuses to take a role in the Syrian crisis then two repercussions might happen. The first was opening the door for Jihadists to be recruited from Egypt to go and fight in Syria, which was an unacceptable for the Egyptian army (Mousa and Fahim, 2013; Irish Times, 2013) which had been fighting jihadists along with the police forces. In addition, the second was the indirect accusation of the Egyptian army by Morsi and his supporters from the Islamists

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[24] Tamarod (revolt) movement was a protest campaign against Morsi's rule. It gathered more than 22 million signatures to withdraw confidence from Morsi and to remove him from power in 2013 and hold new elections (BBC 2013).

of being 'infidels' for not fighting a 'Shi'a' regime (Irish Times, 2013).To justify the reasons for such a contested attitude of the Egyptian army from this rally's calls, such an involvement in the Syrian conflict meant the involvement of the Egyptian army in an armed conflict which was unaffordable in a time when the economy was in a recession phase and against the army's norm not to fight except to protect its own lands (Irish Times, 2013).

This was Morsi's foreign policy decision driven by domestic interests. The politicisation of Syrian refugees and migrants was the outcome of Morsi's ideological. In analysing the decision-making process; from the outside it seemed to be made by Morsi, but the Muslim Brotherhood, with a more thorough observation, under the umbrella of the FJP have made that decision rather than Morsi himself. As the Muslim Brotherhood as a group had the vision of establishing an Islamic state, and Morsi was a weak president implementing his party or group's instructions. Morsi's calls were rejected by the opposition (Ahram Online, 2013) and caused further uproar among the rest of the Egyptian society who were already angry with his policies and who did not accept these calls or approve such actions. Consequently, in a few weeks' time, Egyptians revolted calling upon Morsi to step down (The Irish Times, 2013). This was supported by the army who overthrew Morsi in July 2013, and a new phase in Syrian refugees' and migrants' lives started under president Sisi in 2014.

To conclude, the first type of threat caused by the Syrian migrants and refugees, as Weiner (1995, p.136) explained, is a threat to their *own* state of origin while they are hosted in another country, resulting in tensions between both states. The Syrian refugees and migrants in Egypt are an illustrative example for this as their sudden flow maybe contributed to tensions between Egypt and Syria. Morsi's administration has manipulated that threat, of Syrian refugees and migrants over flow for the Syrian's own benefit. Accordingly, Morsi's attitude towards the Syrian refugees and migrants was welcoming and integrating rather than the normal Egyptian government style of indifference adopted under Mubarak. Morsi wanted the Syrians to be integrated into the Egyptian society to form his Islamic state which was envisioned in the Muslim Brotherhoods doctrine and clearly stated in their FJP agenda. Morsi's administration did not believe that Syrians would represent any threat to them as they are sharing the same Arab identity, culture, language and religious sect. It was this ideology that played a role in politicising Syrian refugees and migrants under Morsi's rule. Muslim Brotherhoods noticed the potential in the Syrian refugees and

migrants over other Arab or African ones so that they collaborated with them in their fight against the Shia'a sect which is represented in the Alwait regime run under Al Assad. It is through Syria that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood would be able to spread their ideas and thoughts as well as expand the Islamic nation outside Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhoods together with Morsi as their representative believed that it is better to support rebel movements as this would give them more support from Islamic factions both at home and abroad. Consequently, this led to tensions between the two states as explained earlier the support given to the Syrians in Egypt meant a support to oppositions and anti-Assad's regime.

6.6 Syrians under Sisi Securitisation in the first phase (2013-2015) and De-securitisation in the second phase (2016-2018)

Syrians called the period under which they lived in Egypt from 2011 till 2013 as the "golden-age" (Yehia, 2018) due to the welcoming reception and many benefits that they received from both the Egyptian people and government. However, this favourable period was short lived as the 30th June 2013 uprising toppled Morsi from power to bring in the military rule under President Sisi in 2014. In the intervening period from July 2013 until June 2014, the head of the Supreme Court Adly Mansour ruled. From 2013 until 2018, the living circumstances for Syrians became difficult and benefits were minimised and curtailed. The new government perceived Syrians in a different manner from its predecessor. It is in this period when Syrian refugees and economic migrants were accentuated as threats to Egypt with the exception of Syrian businesspeople. This impacted the behaviour of average Egyptians towards Syrians. This section demonstrates that the change in leadership changed the treatment of Syrian refugees and migrants. Moreover, it presents the securitisation of Syrian refugees and migrants and shows that the Egyptian government, under President Sisi, has managed to solve this crisis of over flow of refugees and migrants and its impact on the foreign relations between both countries. The new leadership, troubled with the domestic instability, securitised these refugees and migrants to establish their rule quickly. When the new leadership succeeded in imposing its rule, it started to resolve the refugees and migrants' crisis by cooperating with other states and imposing tough measures at home regulating refugees' entrance to Egypt.

Egypt since 2011 was in a state of turmoil, with unstable political as well as security situations and dire economic state. Kingsley (2013), and Abouelenein and Lawder (2016) explained that since the overthrow of Mubarak, Egypt experienced many challenges such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) withdrawal, drop in tourism 3% drop in growth, higher unemployment rates, and drop in foreign reserves from $36 bn in 2011 to $14bn in mid-2013, in addition to inflated food prices and the devaluation of the Egyptian pound by 12% against the dollar. Therefore, the new post 2013 government had to contain the ongoing economic problems, consolidate power, and regain security over the country to the locals' benefit as citizens and to foreigners' benefit as tourists and as investors. This made the government view Syrians in a different manner and thus it treated them differently. Weiner (1995, p.136) clarified that the economic situation plays a *'major'* role in a country's decision on whether to accept further refugees and migrants or reject them. Thus, if the economic situation is in a recession, it is understandable to close borders to prevent migrants and refugees from entering a country (Weiner1995, p.136) as the cost of hosting Syrians will further burden the host state's budget. Egypt's government starting 2013 believed that its economy is in a critical state, and it asked for a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2016; the loan was accepted on conditions and among these conditions was that Egypt had to impose 'austerity' like measures, reduce subsidy system, structural reforms, labour reforms and to devalue the Egyptian pound in November 2016 (Abouelenein and Lawder, 2016). Morsi applied for this loan; however, he did not obtain it. As a result, the new government viewed Syrians as a burden on the economy, especially with an increasing Egyptian population that pressured the government for further services.

Regarding solving the security problem, the government noticed that some Syrian refugees and migrants collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood as a main opposition to Sisi's rule; this alerted the administration to take extra measures against Syrian refugees. Krajeski (2013) explained that when the Muslim Brotherhood were declared as a terrorist organisation by the new government, Syrians consequently became enemies and terrorist to Egypt. Thus, security is another reason for the change in attitude of the Egyptian government toward the Syrian refugees and migrants after the deteriorating economic status. According to Weiner (1995, p.136), "it depends on who is at the door"; thus, it is difficult to distinguish between who is on Egyptian borders is it a real refugee, or asylum seeker or migrant or a terrorist. This makes the choice for who enters difficult. This makes

reference to Weiner's (1995, p.136-137) other classifications for migrants and refugees nexus to security, that migrants are of a political security threat to the host state in addition to a "social and economic threat to the host state". Although Egypt was considered by some Syrian refugees a transit state, for other Syrian refugees and economic migrants, Egypt is a host state. In this respect, Maati and Kwidar (2020) clarified to the author, "As the war's intensity increases in Syria and due to high cost to move to other European countries, some Syrians preferred to stay in Egypt as a host state and not to resettle in Europe." . There are interdependent factors that led Egypt to become a host state rather than transit for Syrian refugees and asylum seekers elaborated like the political factors imposed by Egypt and the EU clarified Zwick (2020, p.2 and 12).

Moreover, "it is also difficult to renew our passports at the Syrian Embassy in Cairo, because it is both costly worth $300 and the Syrian government uses it as a way to draft men into the Syrian army which they have fled" (Kwidar,2020). To further explain the state's fear under president Sisi of Syrian refugees and migrants is embedded into Weiner's ideas thought in the mid-1990s where he explained threats caused by refugees and migrants as such, "refugees have launched terrorist attacks within their host countries" (Weiner 1995, p.139). Moreover, host states fear that refugees and migrants would be involved in "illegal" matters such as, "smuggled arms, and allied with domestic opposition against host government" (Weiner1995, p.139). Thus, as Castel et al (2014,p.200) demonstrated that refugees and migrants could be "politically disloyal" so in turn the GOE under Sisi feared all of this and as a result of that the government securitised Syrian migrants and refugees. The Egyptian government under Sisi's rule adopted an aggressive attitude towards Syrian refugees and migrants and this was represented in many institutions in the political system and had influenced the Egyptian people in the streets. More of these claims will be further elaborated on in the below sections.

6.6.1 Identifying the Securitising Actor in Egyptian Institutions

6.6.1.1 Role of the President and Military Chief as securitising actor

6.6.1.1.1 Political Threat

In authoritarian systems, generally, and systems experiencing transitions, in specific, their incumbents feel insecure in power. This justifies the keenness of such authoritarian systems

on securitising some issues. Losing power for these autocrat leaders would make them vulnerable to the opposition groups argued Akkoyunlu and Öktem (2016, p.507). Such policy makers create fears for their society to mobilise their popular support (Akkoyunlu and Öktem, 2016, p.508). This is because the rise of political actors to power in autocratic systems is not usually a smooth one. This explains that "existential insecurity emanates from struggles domestic and regional (Akkoyunlu and Öktem, 2016, p.519). Thus, political actors live with fears and consequently they create existential insecurity and tangible fears as Akkoyunlu and Öktem (2016, p.508) argued.

After Morsi was ousted from power in July 2013, Egypt had an interim government, supported by the military rule, under the presidency of the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour. However, the country was run by the military chief Abd El Fattah El Sisi who became the next president after leaving the armed forces. Mansour issued a presidential decree in 2014 to establish the "National Security Council" that was formed of prime minister, minister of defence, head of intelligence, minister of interior, minister of foreign affairs, head of parliament, minister of education, minister of justice and minister of finance in addition to the heads of parliamentary committees of security and defence, (Mansour, 2016). However, former President Mansour had no role to play in the securitisation of Syrian refugees and migrants, because he was more concerned with foreign affairs and improving Egypt's international image (Mansour, 2016). Syrian refugees and migrants were thus not discussed by him. However, General Sisi (army chief at that time) made a statement on 24th of July 2013 in the graduation ceremony of the naval academy in Alexandria, which was alarming to the Muslim Brotherhood's supporters and endorsed by the Egyptian citizens (Daragahi 2013). General Sisi asked Egyptians to go to the streets' main squares to give him, "a mandate and a command to end terrorism and violence in Egypt" (AFP, July 2013)[25]. This statement was made to fight terrorism as terrorist attacks became wide spread since Morsi was ousted from power on the 3rd of July 2013, and they were carried out by Muslim Brotherhood sympathisers, Jihadists movements in Sinai and Islamic State (IS) in Sinai as these groups have identified themselves (Tahrir Report, 2015, p.5). Since some of the IS members were identified as Syrian nationals this

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[25] This speech is translated into English on AFP (2013) *Egypt Army Chief urges street demons to fight 'terror'*. 24 July 2013 Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N47XVJU075Y
I have searched extensively for other speeches made by Sisi but there was nothing else. Therefore, media are a proxy for government communications. This is also part of the limitation of the thesis.

speech could be arguably taken directly to crack down on terrorism in general and indirectly against Syrians present in Egypt who collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood or with IS in Sinai. Sisi's administration declared the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation on the 25th of December 2013 (Bureau of Counterterrorism US Department of State, 2013). Henceforth, the securitising actor in here is Sisi, the army chief regarding terrorism as the main source of threat to Egypt's stability and security. Therefore, the terrorists are the Muslim Brotherhood, radical Salafist, and IS and maybe a few Syrians were among them exported by IS to Egypt as Sharp clarified (2014, p.2). Thus, Syrians (source of threat) were considered by Sisi (securitising actor) terrorists who are jeopardising Egyptian political and societal stability and state's institutions (referent object). Moreover, Sisi called on Egyptians and governmental bodies (audience) to mandate and command him to end terrorism (exceptional measure) by launching war on terror. In the light of this speech, many governmental bodies acted accordingly to securitise the Syrian refugees and migrants. This in turn was reflected on the average citizen (audience and public) who became xenophobic against Syrians. I should highlight that it is very difficult to find other statements by Sisi or governmental briefs denouncing Syrians and openly securitising them. This is a sign of the opaque system in Egypt. Thus, my main attention is on the previously provided graduation speech by Sisi and later I will show cases of the media acting as a state amplifier who threatened openly Syrians in Egypt. Buzan *et al.* (1998, p.146) clarified that the state with its three components (ideas, physical base and institutions) become the referent object and the head of the government is the securitising actor while the threat can be both internal and external. Here in this case study the Syrian refugees and migrants represented an external threat that supports an internal threat which leads to the political instability of Egypt. Therefore, Syrians as foreigners who are anti-Assad's regime are cooperating with a terrorist internal group that challenges states institutions were an existential threat to the state and its new regime. They were also securitised as an economic threat due to the dire economic situation Egypt was undergoing.

6.6.1.1.2 Government of Egypt's Fight against Illegal Migrants

Syrian refugees' and migrants' experience in Egypt went through two phases: one that was portrayed as a 'honeymoon' under Morsi's one-year rule, and another that was marked by hard times after the June 30th movement in 2013. Even those years following the 2013 uprising can be divided into another two phases: first from 2013 until 2015 and another

from 2016 until 2018 in which Syrian migrants and refugees were differently securitised. In the first phase, Syrians were portrayed as a political-security threat because they were associated with the Islamists who threatened the Egyptian secular moderate identity, and the securitising actors presented them as a *societal security threat*. In the period between 2016 and 2018, Syrian refugees and migrants were represented as an economic threat to Egyptians, but this differed from the view on Syrian businesspeople.

Egypt is an overpopulated country and most of its population are from the youth, and they hunt for job opportunities which the government has struggled to provide. According to Osman *et al.* (2016), the youth between ages of 15 to 24 formed 40% of the Egyptian population. In 2015, the youth who are able to work made up 17.8% of the total population (Osman *et al.*, 2016, p.63). This is also beside the economic recession Egypt has undergone since 2011 onwards, which resulted in 27.8% of the Egyptian population to be below the national poverty line in 2015 according to Osman *et al* (2016, p.13). Over population and economic strains resulted in the government limiting the benefits it provided to Syrians and believing them to be overburdening the economic system (Bidinger *et al.*, 2015, p.76). This gradually led to further tensions between Egyptians and Syrians in the streets where Egyptians adopted the same European discourse towards migrants and refugees by viewing them as "taking jobs and money from the local population" as Lenz clarified to Knipp (2019). In the literature on linking migrants to security, public opinion in the Western developed world is commonly found to be anti-illegal migrants and asylum seekers as Huysmans and Squire (2010, p.173) expounded. This illustrates the gap in the literature which neglects the developing world and their public opinion on refugees and migrants. Most of the literature on securitising migrants as economic threats is done on the host Western societies (Messina 2014; Davis 2018). Thus, this present study fills this gap by showing that hostile feelings towards migrants, refugees and asylum seekers are also manifested in the south developing world.

6.6.1.1.3 Economic Threat

Buzan *et al.* (1998, p.100) explained that the economic sector has different referent objects, such as the individuals, the social class, and the global market. In this thesis the focus will be on individuals who are immediately influenced in terms of their basic needs. Buzan *et al.* (1998, p.103) explained these basic needs as food, water, clothes and education. Syrian

refugees and migrants have been viewed both by the government and the people post June 30th 2013 as an economic threat. The government regarded them as a *burden* over the already suffering budget while the people viewed them as a *threat* to their ability to sustain their basic needs due to competition in the job market. Strachan (2017) described the economic challenges as "structural drivers for conflict" leading to instability. In addition, Strachan (2017) said that migrants in Egypt were another driving reason for creating conflicts in Egypt which leads to popular unrest. Thus, adding to further instability in the country to the newly installed regime. Moreover, Strachan (2017) adds that "The presence of a significant number of Syrian refugees has put significant economic pressure on the communities in which they live". This justifies the frictions between Egyptians and Syrians as they stayed longer than Egyptians expected. It is the chaotic and receding context of turmoil in which Sisi assumed power that led him as a statesman to perceive Syrians as an existential threat. Therefore, Sisi's securitisation of Syrians in Egypt as an economic, political and societal threat is applicable.

Ambassador Naela Gabr[26], is an ambassador in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is currently the chairperson of the National Coordinating Committee on Combating and Preventing Illegal Migration (NCCPIM), declared to Shahine (2016) that Egypt is a poor country and by hosting such a number of Syrian refugees and migrants, more burden is added to Egypt's deteriorating economic state. This is a declaration by an Egyptian official to reflect the governments' stand and perception of the Syrians in Egypt which justifies the government's securitisation. It is worth mentioning that Egypt's economy has slowed down to reach 3.3% of economic growth in FY16 while it was 4.2% growth in FY2015 and its GDP in 2016 reached 332.9 billion USD which ranked Egypt as 55 of the 196 countries in World Bank country list (World Bank, 2016). Gabr added, "We are trying to help. But we are not rich, and we don't have the facilities to host them" (Shahine, 2016). This shows how some governmental officials viewed Syrian refugees and migrants as an economic burden. Thus, being a refugee, an asylum seeker or a migrant, in a host or transit country already suffering from multiple insecurities makes Syrians pose an economic threat to the transit or host state that they are residing in. If these national individuals are unable to attain these basic human needs as a result of presence of other people competing with them on

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[26] She used to be the head of Human Rights department in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016

their jobs, then this becomes a securitised issue. Furthermore, according to Egyptian law citizens have a priority in taking a job if they are of equal qualification with a foreigner competing for the same job explained Sadek (2016).

In 2016, Egypt received a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) based on some structural reform programmes and Egypt implemented them on three stages. Among those reform programmes were reducing subsidies and floating of the Egyptian pound. Consequently, this led to the rise in prices of basic goods and services in Egypt. This had its negative impact on both Egyptians as local citizens, and on all refugees and migrants living in Egypt regardless of their nationality (UNHCR Report, 2014, p.3; Masri,2019). Egypt lost another privilege in hosting refugees and migrants as being an affordable country to live in and with cheap accommodation. This added more to the hardships under which Syrian refugees lived in. These new challenges made Egypt 'push' them out indirectly in particular the 'vulnerable' Syrians who were supported by a disabled householder or the ones who lost their breadwinner (Shahine, 2016 and Nielsen, 2017). This led Syrians to either accept living under such difficult conditions, apply for resettlement, or illegally stay in Egypt; some preferred another alternative as illegal migration from Egypt through smugglers (Guerin, 2013; Mansour, 2015; Cullen, 2017). These smugglers were viewed by many human rights activists and Syrian refugees as intentionally neglected by the Egyptian government. In fact, some went further to accuse Egyptian authorities of deliberately leaving smugglers to carry on their illegal business just to get rid of these Syrian refugees and migrants (Salam, 2015; Norman, 2015).

6.6.2 Securitisation Move Accepted

6.6.2.1 The Role of the Media as Amplifier for the Securitising Actor

In reviewing the literature on the role of the media in autocracies the dominant argument is that it is an important arm of the state's regime. This is because the media helps in regime's stability and sustainability as Wojcieszak *et al.* (2019, p.70) argued. The media in autocratic regime assist in making propaganda for the leader's legitimacy (Wojcieszak *et al.*, 2019, p.70). Media in non-Western world is influenced by many factors such as culture, religion and identities (Wojcieszak *et al*., 2019, p.70). This in turn has an impact on the rise of sense of nationalism and the "communication behaviour" of the audience as argued by Wojcieszak *et al*. (2019, p.70). This is the general norm in autocracies. In case these

autocracies experience crises and are undergoing chaotic period, policy makers also resort to the media outlets to gather the people around the flag of the country. In case policy makers of a state decide to securitise an issue, they use the media as an amplifier to their benefit.

Vultee (2010, p.78) argued that security is framed by the political leaders and amplified by the media as they construct security based on psychological and sociological influences. Vultee (2010, p.78) added that "securitisation works as both an independent variable -an effect in media- as well as a dependent variable, or an effect of media". This depends on the interaction between policy makers, media and the public (Vultee, 2010, p.78). Vultee (2010, p.79) argued that the framing process is crucial as it identifies the problem and the tools used to resolve it, which actors are involved in the problem as creators of it and solvers of it. When securitisation happens, it projects the problem as an existential threat and underscores the causes of this problem but marginalises the methods of resolving it (Vultee,2010, p.79). Securitisation becomes visible when the securitising actors mix between national security and national identity (Vultee, 2010, p.80). Vultee (2010, p.82) explained that what appears in the news about an issue is the product of careful selection and structure of the policy makers and experts and it is socially constructed. The purpose of the securitisation is to gain the approval of a good number of audiences who would support the securitising actor in viewing an issue as a threat and in the use of the exceptional measures. This is catalysed by the media's framing.

Buzan *et al.* (1988, p.124) further emphasised the role of media by saying, "the media is an important actor that contributes significantly to the definition of the situation,…, the media will often tell the news in terms of 'us' and 'them'". This leads to intensely illustrating the division between two factions in the society. I argue that the media's role in intensifying securitising refugees and migrants has been pivotal, a reason for that can be explained by Castel et al (2014, p.198) when they said that media plays on the psychology of individuals whether positively or negatively. Jiménez (2012, p.37) described the negative impact of media on people that it agitates feelings of the public against refugees and migrants and she used the Italian media as an example which portrayed refugees as "invaders". Castel *et al.* (2014, p.198) argued that "securitisation connects migration to meta issues that compromise symbolic politics" because migration as an issue lies within the framework of 'meta' politics. The aim of the media's role is to raise the level of *nationalism* against migrants and

refugees and in turn the average citizens would feel that their *national identity* is under threat as Castel *et al.* (2014, p.200) clarified.

Egypt's media ranks between 158 to 166 out of 180 states since 2013 on the world press freedom index (Ashour, 2020). The state controls financially and morally the media in Egypt this is because, "The state is the major force in the media and runs many TV and radio stations, websites and newspapers and magazines" (BBC, 2018). Since Nasser's time the media worked on serving the government's agenda and spreading its messages, elaborated Abdullah (2014). The media has been heavily censored and monitored under Sisi's government. The government blocks websites and stops talk's shows from being broadcasted for national security reasons (BBC, 2018). There is state owned TV channels and private owned ones via satellite. The TV remains the most popular medium and many private satellite channels were launched post Arab Spring in 2011 (BBC, 2018). These channels are owned by businessmen who are pro the government and its military argued Ashour (2020). Al Aswany (2019) argued that Egyptian media is under complete control of the security apparatuses in Egypt. The media reflects on whatever the security dictates them (Al Aswany, 2019). The newspapers are not any different, they are state owned or privately owned who try to be semi-independent (BBC, 2018). However, Abdullah (2014) opposed that saying that the media in Egypt "unanimously" supports the regime and "vilify" the Muslim Brotherhood. Abdullah (2014) illustrated that by saying, "for weeks following Morsi's ouster, Egyptian state television as well as most private channels ran a graphic banner with the Egyptian flag that stated 'Egypt fights terrorism' in reference to struggle between the post-Morsi regime and the Muslim Brotherhood". This graphic banner used on TV channels appeared after Sisi made his speech asking for the mandate to end terrorism which I referred to above, and it show cases how the media acts as an intermediary for the government's communication. It also showed the government's perception of the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorists.

In August 2013, Syrian refugees and migrants experienced a new phase in their lives in Egypt that was described by many of them as *hard times* (Yehia, 2018) as they experienced economic challenges and were treated as a threat by the host state. There were several actors involved contributing to this rigidity on Syrian refugees and migrants in Egypt. Since this is a case to illustrate securitisation process the involvement of media is central as one of the actors playing a role in this process by supporting the securitising actors' stand and

projecting refugees and migrants as a threat. The media in Egypt is following the directives of the government and when the government viewed Syrians as a source of threat to its stability, the media framed them as such. Abdullah (2014) said, "private channels serve the interests of the businesspeople that own them, most of whom were closely allied with the old Mubarak regime and seem to be adamantly behind the current regime of President Abd El Fattah El Sisi".

Youssef El Hussieny[27] accused Syrians of being mercenaries of the Muslim Brotherhood. "If you interfere in our affairs, we, Egyptians, will beat you in the streets with our shoes so it is better for you to go back to Syria" said El Hussieny on ON TV[28] (11th of July 2013). Another example is Tawfik Okasha, a popular TV presenter on Faraeen channel[29], openly threatened Syrians residing in 6th of October City, New Damietta, Sadat City and 10th district in Nasr City (TNN, 2013). Okasha gave Syrians a 48-hour ultimatum to halt their support and talks with the Muslim Brotherhood or else Egyptians will raid and destroy the Syrians houses as they consider them "spies and traitors who are conspiring with the Muslim Brotherhood who want to destroy Egypt" (TNN, 2013). Okasha made these threats on the 17th of July 2013, after the removal of Morsi and his supporters started their sit in. Another example to illustrate the role of media to agitate Egyptians' feelings against Syrians was the case of TV presenter Mohamed El Ghiety working for Tahrir TV channel[30] (Hamdy, 2013). Ghiety claimed that Syrian women were offering themselves as wives to Jihadists and Muslim Brotherhood gathered at the sit in protests against June 30th revolution (Hamdy, 2013). This claim was made on 15th of July 2013. This claim was that Syrian women were collaborating with a rebellious terrorist group, which was intended to justify any action to be taken against them by the nationalistic Egyptians. Hence, the Egyptian

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[27] Al Hussieny is a TV presenter who worked both with the public and private TV channels. He made this statement when he used to work for the private satellite channel ON TV. Currently Al Hussieny is a MP and works for the public TV.

[28] ON TV was a private satellite channel it was marked as the *only* channel with politically liberal and independent TV station. It was owned by a Christian Coptic business tycoon Mr Naguib Sawiras who later sold it.

[29] This channel has stopped being broadcasted and was dissolved twice once under Morsi and another in 2016 under Sisi after several court appeals decisions. The owner of the channel is Virginia company for media production the majority of its stocks owned by Okasha, the presenter, who was an expelled MP. (France 24, 2012; Sherouk News 2018). The main reason for holding its broadcasting is that Okasha used in appropriate language in addressing issues.

[30] This is a private satellite channel owned by a journalist, some businessmen and some Muslim Brotherhood members in 2011. It is a controversial channel representing the opposition and its ownership changed by the end of 2011.

media, both governmental channels and private satellite channels used a heavy discourse that antagonised Egyptians against Syrians. Examples for more aggressive media campaigns against Syrian refugees were more vivid from the private satellite channels, who threatened Syrians openly in their programs saying that it is a "duty" of every Egyptian to attack any Syrian on the streets as they are "spying" on Egypt (Diamantopoulos 2015, p.26). This aggressive media campaign was in the month of July 2013 following Sisi's speech asking Egyptians to start a war on terror and followed the sit in which Morsi's supporters had. Sisi was the Army Chief and not yet the president of Egypt. It was the army who de-facto was running the country during this interim period until Sisi was elected to power in June 2014.

This anti-Syrian campaign marked as a success for the securitisation move under Sisi as many Egyptians accepted it and threatened to use violence (as an exceptional measure albeit not a government policy tool) against or aggressive towards Syrians. This is exemplified in many of the Syrians stories told to journalists about xenophobic attitudes from taxi drivers to work employers, and reports of attacks on the streets and sexual harassment of women (El Gundy 2013; Hamdy 2013; Shahine 2016; and Yehia 2018) post 2013 events until 2015. To explain the reason why Egyptians turned their backs quickly against Syrians, Ahmed (2013) said that it is due to the Arab Spring. Ahmed (2013) said that Egyptians experienced divisions, confusions about the direction to where their country was heading, therefore, this made them willing "to go from one extreme to another in a relatively short period of time". Thus, this swift change in behaviour explains how the Egyptian government and/or the public were quickly fuelled against the Syrians.

The Egyptian media accused Syrian refugees and migrants of being supportive to Morsi's regime and attempting to reinstate him in power essentially, they were viewed as a threat to the 30th of June movement. They were viewed as pro-Islamists rule of Egypt, which was rejected in 2013. As the media became "anti-Islamist" (Salam, 2015) reflecting the new rising tendency in the Egyptian society, therefore, to many Egyptians the presence of Syrian refugees was jeopardizing Egypt's national security and the Egyptian identity (El Gundy 2013; Norman 2015; Salam 2015 and Shahine 2016). These claims by the Egyptian TV presenters were not created in a vacuum. They came from the presence of some Syrians in the sit-in at Raba'a square where pro-Morsi supporters, mainly Islamists, gathered for forty-five days and were carrying out many terrorist attacks around Egypt (El Gundy 2013 and

Salam 2015). Between July 2013 and 2014 terrorist attacks reached an average of 19 attacks per month in North Sinai and the rest of Egypt (Egypt Security Watch 2018, p.6). This is beside the cooperation of Syrian women with Jihadists, who as explained above, were accused of being offered as wives to Islamist living in tents at this sit-in (El Gundy 2013). Although these accusations by these presenters were denied by Syrian activists but later these activists have admitted that some 'poor' Syrians were abused by some Islamist NGOs who provided them with housing and have participated in the protests supporting Morsi's legitimacy and right to return to power (Hauslohner 2013). Moreover, a Syrian teenager was arrested among the Raba'a square protestors (Kingsley 2013) while few other adults were arrested too in the same place (Mousa and Fahim 2013). Thus, allegations, by the Egyptian media, that Syrians participated, and supported Morsi's regime were evidenced.

The purpose of these media campaigns was to re-energise the nationalistic sentiments amongst Egyptians, sentiments for a secular and a moderate identity rather than an Islamic identity in order to make Egyptians rally around the flag as per the government and security forces instructions (Al Aswany 2019). The aim was to protect their country against Syrians who became associated with Islamists and opposition who were portrayed as posing a threat to the national security of Egypt. Rising the of sense of nationalism and showing that Egypt is a nationalist state is one of Sisi's Doctrine as Dr. Farahat previously explained in chapter four on Egypt's foreign policy. They were a threat to their 'secular' identity which the Morsi regime represented as an adversary to and threatening to it, giving them a reason to defend this 'secular-moderate' identity. It is this 'secular-moderate' identity that is the referent object that had to be securitised by security actors, as it is what Buzan *et al.*'s (1998, p.123) described as, "the societal sector are whatever larger groups carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects in a form and to a degree that can create a socially powerful argument that this 'we' is threatened". Thus, a division becomes clear between 'us' and 'them'. Syrian refugees and migrants were viewed as a threat to Egyptian's identity although when they first arrived Egyptians welcomed them as they were sharing the same 'Arab' identity and were called *brothers*. This securitisation happened due to a *societal sector* when the *context* has changed, so the role of context is important in explaining the reasons leading to the occurrence of securitisation and the manner how it has been successful to change of the average citizens' behaviour. It is the change in the

perception of identity that was noticed as Egyptians felt the threat. Perceptions changed over time according to the discourse used by governing elites. This case demonstrates the argument made in chapter three about how leaders play a role in prevailing one identity over the other. At the beginning of the Syrian arrivals, Syrians were welcomed as they were viewed as 'fellow Arabs' but when Morsi came to power and stressed the *Islamic Sunni identity,* the average Egyptian citizens became alarmed and viewed this as a threat to their secular moderate identity even-though they both follow the same Sunni Islam doctrine under Sisi. This explains the success of the securitisation process.

6.6.2.2 Political Elites and the Government's Institutions acceptance to Securitise Syrians

This success was not only reflected in the average citizen's hostile attitude towards Syrians, it was also a success among some of Egypt's political elites and especially members in parliament (MP). An example to illustrate this issue is a case by MP; Mr Mostafa El Gundy who in July 2013 called upon all nationalist Egyptians to "kill any Syrian or Palestinian on the spot at any major checkpoint" (El Gundy 2013). El Gundy specified "checkpoints" as these were a common entrance-exist way for Syrians and Palestinians illegally and many of the terrorists' attacks happened at these checkpoints either by suicide bombers or by raiding the Egyptian forces on these checkpoints (El Menshawy 2014). Between July 2013 and December 2014, 71% of the attacks targeted policemen, military personal, government official figures or buildings by multinational extremists as reported in Tahrir Report (2015, p.5). Thus, one can argue that an attack on these security forces meant an attack on a group that provides security to the rest of the country and in turn an attack on the security of the Egyptians.

Another example to demonstrate how Syrians were securitised by Egyptians after Morsi's regime ended is illustrated by the case of Ministry of Health. Amr Abd El Hakim an Egyptian lawyer defending refugees' rights and a member of the Egyptian Council of Human Rights narrated the case to me (2020). Abd El Hakim (2020) said that many Syrians who arrived in Egypt 2011-2013 were physicians, and dentists. "In order for Syrians to practice medicine in Egypt they need to get a license from both the Medical Syndicate and the Ministry of Health", (Abd El Hakim, 2020). "From 2011 until 2013 Syrians were only required to have a license from the medical syndicate but not from the ministry, which was

issued easily, however after 2013 both the syndicate and the ministry of health stopped issuing any license for Syrians". When Abd El Hakim (2020) asked for the justifications he got the answer, "for security reasons", so he argued that security reasons were a more logical argument for giving Syrians a residency permit rather than for practicing medicine. This restriction pushed many Syrian doctors to flee Egypt and seek resettlement in Europe, explained Abd El Hakim (2020). Other Syrians who have chosen to remain after 2017 (until at least the time of writing), from dentists and doctors living especially in cities of New Damietta, and Alexandria are working 'undercover' under Egyptian dentists and doctors' supervision treating other Syrian nationals without licenses (Abd El Hakim, 2020). Dr Samer Rouechdi (2020), a Syrian resident in Cairo and a project manager in Habibat Al Khier Association for helping Syrians, explained to me the further challenges facing Syrian refugees. Rouechdi (2020) said that he is a pharmacist who was denied a license to work despite his degree. Rouechdi (2020) further elaborated that pharmacists, dentists and medical doctors from Syria had to obtain a license from the specified syndicates and Ministry of Health but they were denied so post Morsi left office. Another important point is that the license would be granted on condition that the Syrian degrees were accredited from the Egyptian Council for Higher Education which, "is heavily bureaucratic and is a very lengthy process" this discouraged many Syrians to apply for this process, claimed Rouechdi (2020). He added that Egyptian law does not allow *refugees* to register in the Egyptian Labour Union. He said that he met with many Egyptian MPs who promised to discuss it in the parliament to revise the law. Rouechdi (2020) clarified, "But it seems in vain as it is a heavily bureaucratic process and more importantly the Egyptians suffer from high unemployment rates so it is better for the MPs to facilitate laws that will hire more Egyptians than refugees". Again, this marks the success of securitisation move as the bureaucrats accepted to block Syrians professional way. The securitisation move here is done by practice rather than by speech illustrating the Paris School of Securitisation.

6.6.2.3 Acceptance by the Security Apparatus

Egypt's security forces constituted the second group of audience who approved the newly securitised status of Syrians. The Security Apparatus practiced security against Syrian refugees and migrants. This is an illustration of the Paris School of Securitisation. These

security forces were the Ministry of Interior, the National Security Council, the coast guards and the Intelligence. This is because the security forces in Egypt disrupted the situation for Syrian refugees and migrants. It has to be noted that it was not the Syrian refugees and migrants who were subject to security forces bullying alone; in fact, some Syrian elites and intellectuals who were associated with the National Syrian Council (NSC), as Syrian fleeing opposition, were under monitoring by security forces, and some were asked to return to Syria or to Turkey (Yehia, 2018). This supports the argument I mentioned above that Morsi's support for Syrian opposition was because it was following the Muslim Brotherhood's line, and this Syrian opposition was a chance as they would have helped Morsi to create the 'Islamic state' embedded in the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

The Ministry of Interior and the National Security Council were among the lead security apparatuses accepting to securitise the Syrian refugees and migrants. The hardships that Syrians were subject to by the security forces took many forms. First the "open door policy" as Diamantopoulos (2015, p.24) described, of welcoming them without visa permit was abolished after June 30th 2013. Any Syrian wishing to enter Egypt had to apply for a visa in Damascus, pay its fees and provide security forces of Egypt with a security clearance, which was very difficult and which antagonised many Syrians as they did not wish the government in Damascus to know that they were leaving Syria. However, this condition on visa fees was temporary, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Nabil Fahmy said that the decision was being reconsidered and visa fees would be waived for Syrians coming to Egypt, (Ahram-online 2013).[31] This decision of reconsidering having a mandatory visa prior to entering Egypt was the result of the talks between the representative of Syrian National Coalition (SNC) along with newly appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs Nabil Fahmy, yet he insisted on 'security clearance', (Ahram-online, 2013; El Gundy, 2013). The second hardship was police arresting Syrians who did not have proper registration papers with the UNHCR, such as the 'yellow card' or expired residency permits whenever any random check, commonly happening in this period in specific out of security concerns, occurred, and around two hundred Syrians were arrested in less than two weeks in August 2013, El Gundy (2013) reported. Other Syrians were asked to leave and reapply

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[31] According to the Regional Refugee Resilience Plan (3RP) 2017-2018 country report on Egypt, the visa requirement still remains but the GOE expressed its willingness to extend entry for first degree relatives of Syrian refugees for family reunification.

for a visa while touristic visas were no longer accepted, (Yehia 2018). Some Syrian political activists were attending conferences outside Egypt and upon their arrival they were asked to return back to Syria or Turkey, which meant, to many of them, that they cannot come back to Egypt and families will not be united, (Haulohner 2013 and Kingsley 2013). This marked a big shift in the administrations' attitude under Morsi and Sisi.

Syrians facing the sudden Egyptian xenophobia spreading against them, security monitoring, arrests and detention in addition to political and economic constraints considered such constraints pushing factors to resort to illegal migration. Many of these illegal migrants were arrested by Egyptian Coast Guards on the shores of Alexandria, and others were arrested by the shores of Libya. However, some others faced deadly illegal trips to Europe, but some of them survived (Salam 2015 and Shahine 2016). Those who were arrested were taken to police stations where they were thoroughly interrogated while others were detained without interrogation. Bidinger *et al.* (2015) explained that there were two reasons for detention. The first is political; such as being suspected to have affiliation with extremist groups, however, there is few data to discuss this, while the second is for illegally migrating via the sea. The Government of Egypt's (GOE) reaction varied between detention and release, some 1,200 Syrians were forced to leave back to Syria, Turkey or Lebanon (Bidinger *et al.* 2015, p.86-87). The problem facing these detained Syrians is that the UNHCR cannot access detention centres to interfere to release them; only a few human rights activist NGOs were usually able to offer legal help for such Syrian detainees, (Bidinger *et al.* 2015, p.88).

The securitisation moves were clearly accepted. When some of these Syrians were released, the National Security Council members refused to return to them their "yellow cards" so that they would still be counted as a national security threat to Egypt. Detention of Syrian refugees and illegal migrants is done by the Egyptian Ministry of Interior. Whenever there is a change in the detention camp or change of location for those arrested, the Ministry of Interior usually does not inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where the detained families along with the UNHCR members head for to seek help (Bidinger *et al.* 2015, p.88). In addition, the Ministry of Interior is also responsible for changing regulations with regards to Egypt's entry visa as part of the homeland security procedures, which delayed its notification for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This shows the lack of coordination between both ministries, and it demonstrates that the Ministry of Interior is more concerned

about maintaining its own security information and interests that differed from the ministry of Foreign Affairs; thus, it evidently reveals the approval of the audience (represented in Ministry of Interior) to securitise refugees and migrants.

This mistreatment and close monitoring of Syrian refugees and migrants in Egypt by security forces has driven many of them to be registered and to renew their documents at UNHCR, but this was difficult as UNHCR was overburdened and could not afford to sustain this assistance for a prolonged period as Shahine (2016) explained. This has resulted in delays for registration due to heavy and elongated bureaucratic process making "permits difficult to obtain" and delayed food cards to be supplied for Syrian refugees (Shahine 2016), which further led to added hardships for Syrians.

A further illustration of the successful securitisation moves among audience, and among other governmental institutions was given by Norman (2018). She added that upon the arrest of some Syrian illegal migrants by the police in the city of Alexandria in 2018, the Egyptian Intelligence interfered to examine their papers rather than the police or national security as commonly done. This reveals that the level of threat intensified in the perception of the incumbent government under Sisi's rule. Nevertheless, this indicates that the number of audiences accepting the securitisation of Syrian refugees and migrants has increased to include the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Council and the General Intelligence.

The above discussion showed how the Ministry of Interior along with the National Security Council and General Intelligence accepted securitising Syrian refugees and migrants who were trying to flee Egypt illegally by the sea through smugglers or failed to present proper documents. A further example to clarify the implications of the success of securitisation is when Prime Minister, Ibrahim Mehlab, in 2014, issued a decree to establish a body working under his auspices in addition to the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, known as the NCCPIM[32] (Salam 2015 and Gabr 2016). The main mission of this body is to combat illegal migration to Europe, covering Egyptians, Syrians, and other nationalities *in* Egypt as a country of origin, transit and host. NCCPIM will coordinate among nineteen different ministries in finding ways to combat such a phenomenon and with the Human Rights

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[32] As mentioned above the NCCPIM is currently headed by Ambassador Naela Gabr who gave the statements about how Syrian refugees were counted as an economic burden.

national agencies, (Gabr 2016). This newly created governmental body also worked on a national strategy on combating illegal migration with a ten-year plan (2016-2026), and this includes many aspects, such as cultural, economic and societal dimensions, (Gabr 2016). The NCCPIM plan includes, "drafting legislations, compensating victims of illegal immigration, raising awareness, and promoting Pan-African and Pan Arab and international cooperation", wrote Salam (2015). It also includes cooperation with regional and international actors from financial institutions and international donors because international cooperation on fighting illegal migration is the only solution since the budget of a country like Egypt in such circumstances is insufficient to handle this phenomenal of illegal migration (Norman 2015).

I argue that the GOE under Sisi has been keen on seeking international cooperation in facing this refugees' crisis with different actors as it is of a double benefit. The first benefit is asserting President Sisi's legitimacy by recognizing him as the leader who is able to control Egypt's borders and has an active coast guard which would build trust with EU states. This would send an internal message to the opposition that Sisi is an internationally recognised president of Egypt, and that world leaders are willing to cooperate with him. Consequently, Sisi would be able to consolidate his power. The second benefit would be sensed in the Egyptian economy since collaborating with international financial institutions and donors would improve the economy. For example, Egypt had a deal with Germany to combat illegal migration; this was done by a deal worth 28 million euros which will be dedicated to the development of the educational sector and vocational training beside German investments in Egypt, which would also provide further job opportunities to young Egyptians, (Gabr 2016 and Egypt Today 2017). It is in conducting such deals between the EU and Egypt over fighting illegal migration where it will be a *win-win* situation for both Egypt and the EU since European countries will be saved from few more illegal crossings of their borders and will be spared the effort of having to accommodate them; therefore, such European countries are willing to pay more to keep them off-their shores as Lenz explained to Knipp (2019). Nevertheless, it is in combating illegal migration that will be a rescue plan for the Egyptian economy, but its impact on Syrian refugees and migrants is vague and difficult to speculate as Salam (2015) described. This demonstrates that Egypt used cooperation with other European countries to resolve the soft security threat of refugees and migrants.

This leads us to question the reasons behind the arrest, detention, and deportation of Syrian refugees and migrants by the security forces. The dominant argument became due to security concerns. Norman (2018) explained that Egypt since 2013 feared terrorism. Moreover, since the media portrayed Syrians to be collaborating with the Muslim Brotherhood, as some Syrians in Egypt backed the opposition by supporting Morsi's return to power and supported terrorism. Thus, Syrian refugees and migrants were of a threat to the national security, (Grisgraber and Crisp 2014 and Norman 2015). Furthermore, the government had tight control over NGOs, in general, and those NGOs, in particular, which financially assisted Syrian refugees out of concerns that the money was funding terrorists' groups instead of actually helping Syrian refugees (Shahine 2016). Therefore, this is another illustration of tightened measures used to curtail NGOs help to terrorism which negatively influenced Syrians in Egypt. The next stage witnessed a change in the discourse and in the treatment of Syrians as the security, political, and economic situations slightly improved and became in favour of Sisi.

6.6.3 De-securitisation

De-securitisation meant to move an issue away from *high* politics to return it to *normal* politics. Buzan *et al.* (1998, p.210) said that political actors use de-securitisation to reach a long-term political goal. De-securitisation is a political choice that reduces "antagonism" (Huysmans 1998, p.587 cited in Nasizadeh and Wastnidge 2020, p.26). A clear feature of de-securitisation as Nasizadeh and Wastnidge (2020, p.26) clarifies is that political actors refrain from making speeches that contain security. In the below section, I will demonstrate how the political actor, Sisi, has used speeches to show sympathy with Syrians rather than securitising them, eventually leading the GOE to change its attitude towards Syrians and improve its policies in handling them and altering the media's discourse on Syrians. This marks the second phase in Syrian refugees and migrants lives under Sisi. This de-securitisation was to serve the leaders interests and foreign policy objectives.

6.6.3.1 Sisi's Statements in 2015 and in 2018 on Syrian Refugees and Migrants a Change in Tone

Once Sisi assumed power, he was concerned with the domestic security and the economic situation, and this justifies not commenting on the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis, in general, on their presence in Egypt, in specific and on their hard times in the country. It was in 2015 when he gave statements twice on the situation of Syrian refuges and migrants. On the 13th of September, Sisi addressed in a press conference for the first time a statement on Syrian refugees in Egypt:

> "Egypt is hosting five million refugees in spite of our
> difficult economic status. We do not have much to offer,
> but whatever we have, we are pleasantly splitting with
> these refugees as we have 500,000 Syrian refugees in
> Egypt. The UNHCR states they are only 130,000 but that
> is incorrect, and we know their exact numbers. No one in
> the world heard our voices when we welcomed them and
> hosted them, even when big organisations and institutions
> stopped funding them due to the Syrians large numbers
> and lack of sufficient funding, we in Egypt still found
> something to offer them. We will not become a nation of
> refugees and migrants; we will work hard and we are still
> working relentlessly on offering whatever we can despite
> of our dire economic circumstance". (CBC, 2015).

This shows that Sisi highlighted that Egypt's weak economic status has been a reason for not offering much to refugees and migrants in Egypt which justified his early securitisation for them. He emphasised the numbers hosted and claimed that the UNHCR could not record all of them, which matches with Norman's (2021) justification that the UNHCR has undercounted Syrians due to previously mentioned reasons. Sisi sent an indirect invitation to the world's organisations and donors prompting them to cooperate with Egypt as it is also hosting a significant number of Syrian refugees and migrants, and its economic situation would not be able to handle them for a long time so further foreign assistance is much required. As Mrs Lamis El Hadidi, presenter of the programme "Hona El Assema"[33], commented,

> Whatever we are offering to Syrian refugees and migrants is
> part of our normal role as Egypt is a big state in the region
> looking after its fellow 'brothers'. Regardless of the

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[33] *This is the Capital*, a popular talk show aired on a private satellite TV channel CBC.

circumstances Egypt is going through, it is understandable
that Syrian refugees and migrants would prefer to seek
refuge and live in European states over Egypt as they are
searching for better economic situation and more liberties
and freedoms to be granted to them which they have looked
for in their own countries for a long time (CBC, 2015).

Sisi further elaborated on his views when he attended the United Nations General
Assembly's (UNGA) meeting held in late September 2015. Sisi addressed the world nations
by saying,

The aggravated refugees' crisis as a result of the arms
conflicts in their homelands reiterates what Egypt has called
for in the urgency of resolving conflicts and confronting
terrorism, which is considered as one reason for the out-
break of this refugee crisis, opening up channels for illegal
migration. Migration is connected to development. Egypt is
hosting numbers of refugees as *brothers sharing* with
Egyptians the same social, educational and health benefits
which the country has been offering regardless of how that
would overburden its *economic resources*. Egypt hopes that
there will be quick solutions for these problems in the short
run as a humanitarian one and in the long run by solving the
core issues that led to this conflict to break out (Ten
Channel, 2015 'emphasis added by me').

Here, Sisi stressed again that Egypt was undergoing economic problems yet still offered
help to refugees and migrants. Sisi also linked the rising problems in their countries of
origin (from armed conflicts and terrorism) to the exacerbated refugee and migrant's crisis.
Both of these speeches showed that the president was concerned about Egypt's economic
status and was indirectly justifying the reduction of the amounts of benefits previously
given to Syrian refugees and migrants under Morsi. This is because Sisi arguably did not
want further internal tensions at home as a result of the Syrians presence, this justifies Sisi's
use of the term 'brothers' to tone it down. One could also argue that without the shared
Arab and Islamic identity, Sisi lacked common attributes that led his predecessor to be
more accommodating of refugees. Moreover, these two statements were a call for
international organisations to offer to assist Egypt in hosting these refugees and to prevent
illegal migration to European states via the Mediterranean Sea. These calls and efforts by
Sisi worked effectively. An example to illustrate this is the launching of the NCCPIM
which partnered with international organisations, such as the International Labour
Migration (ILO) and the International Organisation on Migration (IOM) and the UNICEF

and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (NCCPIM & TIP 2018). This is on top of an Egyptian Dialogue with the EU started in 2017 around migration issues (Egypt Today,2018). By 2016, when a poll was made in Egypt on Sisi's performance, 68% of the Egyptian society praised him and 59% of them supported to re-elect him to a second term, (Baseera Public Opinion Center,2016). One can argue that his management of the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis is one factor for his popularity and one indirect reason for his re-election, thus attaining his goal in staying in power.

In 2018, Sisi was hosted in a programme called 'Isaal el Raes',[34] which was live streamed on a private channel, Essam Shaaban Mohamed, a member of the audience, from Alexandria asked the president:

> *Q*: How the president viewed these refugees and migrants hosted in our country who are taking jobs away from Egyptians while we; Egyptians are increasing in terms of population number and are struggling to find job opportunities. These refugees are starting their own businesses, but they are not taxed, and their profit is for themselves rather than benefiting Egypt's economy?
>
> *A*: This is a really harsh question. We have five million refugees and migrants, and this is not a small number. We are sitting with world leaders proudly saying that we do not have any refugees' camps in our country; all of the refugees hosted in Egypt are welcome and live amongst us and they buy and sell in the same way as local Egyptians. If we are supporting them with any benefits so that is not a big deal, especially as these people have lost their homes due to wars and conflicts. We have a history in hosting refugees as we did previously with the Armenians. I'm totally against you Mr Essam in saying that they are taking away jobs from Egyptians, it is sufficient enough for us that these refugees are earning their own living from businesses that they are running. This is better for us than them asking for money and remaining unemployed. We hope peace surrounds their home countries and we hope peace surrounds Egypt.[35](CBC Extra News, 2018).

Such an answer from Sisi in 2018 shows, in my view, that he had a softer tone on refugees and migrants than previously because he praised the fact that they are not unemployed and busy earning their living. This shows that he preferred that they work and become engaged

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[34] Ask the President
[35] Both 2015 speeches and 2018 speech I have translated them myself

in business affairs rather than being unemployed, asking for more benefits from the government or maybe be involved in terrorists' attacks. The above conversation also illustrates that Sisi is de-securitising Syrian migrants and refugees as an economic threat. This is because the economic situation in 2018 had slightly improved. According to the World Bank (2018), Egypt's economic growth for FY18/19 reached 5.6%, the unemployment rate decreased to reach 11.59% after it was 12.41% in 2016, and the GDP experienced 5.3% increase in 2018.

Nevertheless, the political threat has also lessened since Sisi was elected for a second term, and the security situation was improving in comparison to his first term. By 2018, the war on terror marked five years. This war was meant to restore security and stability in Egypt created as a result of the events of June 30th, 2013 (Egypt Security Watch, 2018, p.4). The number of terrorist attacks had noticeably reduced in 2017 (Egypt Security Watch, 2018, p.4), a sign of stronger policies of security being imposed in the country. The highest records of attacks with biggest number of deaths marked the period between November 2014 and October 2016 because both IS and Wilayat Sinai worked together in Jihadist operations against both military forces and civilians in Egypt. They were around 900 attacks resulting in the death of 300 civilians and almost 600 forces (Egypt Security Watch, 2018, p.7). Therefore, in 2018, Sisi felt that the political threats posed by the Syrians have been reduced, and this could arguably be a reason for de-securitising them. Furthermore, signs of de-securitisation were reflected on the policies adopted by the GOE which witnessed slight improvement towards Syrians, the UNHCR reported. By early 2017, GOE started offering renewable residency permits for Syrian refugees and asylum seekers who are registered with the UNHCR (3RP 2017-2018, p.7). While there still remains negotiations between the UNHCR and the GOE over those who entered Egypt irregularly and who still need to be registered in order to obtain the residency permit (3RP, 2017-2018, p.7). Moreover, Norman (2021) pointed out that Sisi's policy towards Syrians by 2015 onwards improved, and that this was reflected on the lives of Syrians.

Recalling earlier distinction between refugees, migrants and businesspeople, it is noted that Syrian businessmen were not securitised after 2013. Their status as foreign direct investors were further consolidated with the establishment of the Syrian Businessmen Association in 2014 and the Syrian Investors' Committee in 2016. Both, the association and the committee, were the result of efforts of cooperation between Ministries of Foreign Affairs,

Commerce and Industry (Yehia 2018). However, the maltreatment of Syrian refugees, like banning some of them from re-entering Egypt, and deporting others as a result of the 2013 uprisings, disappointed some Syrian businessmen who subsequently chose to close their projects and leave Egypt (Yehia 2018). Rouechdi (2020) added another reason for the Syrian businessmen to shift their business away from Egypt, stating that the Egyptian economy, in 2014 and 2015, was in a deteriorating status, so many Syrian businessmen were discouraged from investing and instead left for Turkey as its economy was performing better. Finally, Rouechdi (2020) claimed that rich Syrians left post 2013 due to heavy bureaucracy, extensive red-tapes which curtailed investment opportunities in addition to the political unrest in Egypt.

In fact, most of the Syrian refugees and migrants, who were residing in Egypt from 2012 until 2018, lived in unfavourable conditions. Rouechdi (2020) states that "90-95% of them are poor to middle class, that is why they decided to remain in Egypt as they could not afford to leave back to Syria or to another country". It is this poor and middle-class group, in particular, which was securitised by Sisi's administration in 2014 as they represented an economic threat and burden to his administration and a political threat to his regime's stability. This distinction in treatment between Syrians shows that Egypt under Sisi underscored his own interests as an answer to the sub-question for this chapter. Furthermore, the economic strains were a reason *not* to securitise Syrian businessmen, as it was rather in Sisi's interest to encourage them to flourish and to expand their businesses to help the economy improve. This growth of Syrian business under Sisi's administration had other relevant purposes; among them are to encourage Egyptian businessmen to invest in Syria and to help in the reconstruction of Syria by Egyptian projects, another way of supporting Bashar Al Assad's regime (Yehia 2018). This shows the departure of Sisi's foreign policy from Morsi on the Syrian crisis. This is further elaborated upon in the below section.

6.6.4 Sisi's Foreign Policy towards Bashar Al Assad

This section discusses the impact of change in leadership and the subsequent changing foreign policy interests. It shows how Sisi differed from Morsi in his attitude towards Assad's regime. Decision makers in Egypt believed that cooperating with Assad's regime

rather than antagonising it would help in the restoration of peace in Syria which would have of a spill over effect in Egypt by the return of Syrian refugees and migrants to their homeland. Sisi is pro preservation of state's institutions regardless of their religious sect.

Egypt under Sisi decided to take a different stand in the Syrian civil war, an issue that it has managed to hide under the SCAF's rule. Morsi sided with the rebellious groups, such as the Syrian National Front and Syrian Revolution Association in Egypt, underscoring religious identity over other issues and prioritised its political ideology. While Sisi perceived it is in his interest to collaborate with the Assad's regime. Early in his reign, Sisi refused to identify whom he backed but by 2017 he explicitly revealed his support for the ruling regime in Syria in an interview with Portuguese TV (Kessler 2017). Sisi stressed in this interview that Egypt under his rule supports states and their institutions (Kessler 2017).

There are several reasons for Egypt to side with Assad's regime over Syrian opposition groups. First, as Sisi came to power to end the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood, it was to his benefit to end the opposition in Syria who were following in the footsteps of the Muslim Brotherhood; hence, it is a win-win situation for both regimes. Ali (2012) said that the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt "wished to see their franchise in Syria prevail" this has been an unfulfilled wish as Sisi aborted it. This shows that the Muslim Brotherhood supported the Syrian opposition to expand their ideology abroad. Consequently, this kind of support would consolidate Sisi's power and facilitate the curtailment of the Muslim Brotherhood's activities in the region. Second, linking directly to the former it is also in Sisi's interest to end the rise of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). If Egypt joined coalition forces fighting ISIS, this would also help Egypt to end their existence in Egypt and Libya, averting further terrorist attacks; thus, Egypt's war on terror would have accomplished its goals. This drove Sisi to support Assad's regime militarily through Moscow (Kessler 2017) and to get rid of ISIS.

Third, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stressed Egypt's preference to maintain the unity of Syria. Sisi himself declared that he prefers "to support national armies" (Portuguese TV interview cited by Kessler 2017) over supporting militias or non-state actors. This is because as a former military man, Sisi values national armies. Sisi also appreciates the vitality of state's institutions which must be protected. Furthermore, it is in the interest of Egypt to offer to mediate in solving the Syrian crisis by holding talks and dialogues

between contending factions in Cairo rather than holding them in Ankara. This would be a way for Egypt to restore its reputation as the leader of Arab World after it lost it to other regional powers such as Turkey and Iran (Kessler 2017). Another benefit for the Egyptian mediation is that the restoration of stability and peace in Syria over the long run would lead to the eventual return of Syrian refugees and migrants to their homes. Hence, Sisi resolved these refugees and migrant's crisis. As these efforts are done under the president's directives, this shows the role of both the president who is keen on supporting other Arab rulers over opposition group, and the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in using its diplomacy to bring all factions together to conduct talks in Cairo. Thus, each statesman's role in foreign policy decisions matters. This is exemplified in the *leader-staff* model adopted in the Arab region. It demonstrates how the (securitising actor) Sisi who believed Syrian refugees and migrants as a threat to the economy, the political stability and society's identity (referent objects) and the audience (security apparatuses and the citizens) who accepted the securitising move and used harassments, assaults, arrests, detention, and deportation (as the exceptional measures), are the same foreign policy decision makers who are trying to resolve the Syrian crisis. Decision makers used mediation and support for the ruling regime in Syria so as to improve the situation in Syria which would eventually lead to the return of Syrians to their safe homes.

Thus, in assessing Sisi's foreign policy decision making, according to Hermann and Hermann's (1989) classification, it could be said that Sisi could be counted as a *sensitive* leader as he is pragmatic, shrewd and consultative in his decisions on foreign policy. Moreover, Sisi preferred diplomacy in using extensive mediation between Assad and the opposition group. This in turn could classify him under Keller's (2005) classification of constraint respecter as he valued peace and diplomacy over violence. According to Kaarbo's (1997) categorisation, Sisi could be considered a *goal-oriented* leader who is highly interested in foreign policy as well as interested in power. He is action-oriented and values expert's information over foreign policy matters.

There are other beneficiaries from a cooperative harmonious relation with the Assad's regime in Egypt. In addition to the above-mentioned reasons for Sisi's support to Assad, there are benefits for the Egyptian economy by having relaxed relations with Assad's regime. Alhaliem (2018) explained that there would be many benefits for Egypt if it participated in the reconstruction of Syria after the war on ISIS and the opposition groups

had ended. Thus, in turn this leads to less economic, social and political pressures in Egypt as a result of Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis. The main beneficiaries would be exporters of ceramic, steel, iron and sanitary ware, among others, to Syria (Alhaliem 2018). Egypt's Ministry of Trade and Industry in addition to the Egyptian Federation of Chamber of Commerce were both keen in participating in the reconstruction of Syria, (Alhaliem 2018 and Yehia 2018) as both entities agreed that this would be of economic and political advantageous. Thus, this means that both public institutions and private sector were actively playing a role in influencing foreign policy decision-making to improve relations with Syria and in supporting Assad's regime. The private sector in Egypt, with thirty companies, showed interest by participating in "Damascus International Fair held in August in 2017" as Alhaliem (2018) elaborated. This is considered a chance for also recruiting Egyptians to find employment opportunities in Syria which would benefit the economy from their remittances and in turn would reduce unemployment rates in Egypt. Nevertheless, I argue, that it would increase the chances for Syrians to return to their homes in Syria and leave Egypt which hosted them for almost eight years; consequently, uplifting further burdens off the Egyptian economy and reducing the chances of further collaboration between Syrian refugees and opposition inside Egypt. This would mark another win-win situation accommodating for both Egypt and Syria as both sides are gaining more than losing. Thus, this demonstrates again that the road for resolving the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis in Egypt and that the threat they posed to Egypt could be solved by cooperating with Assad's regime rather than contending it. It shows that the use of soft power, as in the reconstruction of Syria by Egyptian labour and businessmen, and the use of mediation and diplomacy are the tools which Sisi preferred to opt for over the use of hard power in his foreign policy with Syria.

To conclude, Sisi's administration perceived that there are many advantages in cooperating with Assad's regime. The closer *calculated* ties between Sisi and Assad show that Egypt preferred that its economic interests play a role in determining this relationship unlike under Morsi when religious Islamic Sunni identity and ideology prevailed. In shaping Egypt's foreign relations with Syria, many determinants played a role in deciding this relationship. The Egyptian President Sisi, in his capacity as a leader, cooperated with other actors from both public and private sectors in this respect. This had its reflections on securitising or de-securitising Syrian refugees in Egypt.

Conclusion

This chapter answers the main research question of this thesis by investigating how Egypt has managed and resolved Syrian refugees and migrants as a soft security crisis, identifying their status under different administrations ruling Egypt between 2011 and 2018. The analysis showed that first the literature written on the securitisation of migrants and refugees was missing a discussion on securitising them in transit and host countries in the south part of the world as the main focus is on the North/Western world. I have argued that the response of the Egyptian government to Syrian refugees and migrants cannot be explained in simple terms and that understanding the politicisation and securitisation processes under different leaderships is crucial.

Morsi's administration believed that for ideological reasons, mainly Sunni Islamic one, it is in his interest to support the Syrian opposition and offer to support Syrian refugees and migrants as this would expand the Islamic nation and help him to fulfil the dream of establishing the Islamic state; this, in turn, would consolidate his rule. Equally important, it is the role of ideology which played a role in convincing Islamic factions in Egypt's society to sympathise with Syrians present in Egypt. However, the support for Syrians also illustrated that it is not only Morsi's ambition it is rather the Muslim Brotherhood's interest and in compliance with the FJP agenda to achieve this Islamic state goal. Therefore, Morsi's decision to boycott Egypt's relations with Syria and support a 'jihadist' war in Syria, expressed in Morsi's speech in mid-June 2013, was a stateman's decision, thus illustrating the role of leader's decision on a foreign policy matter. Morsi did not deem Syrians to be a threat to his rule or identity; instead, they were a platform full of supporters.

When the leadership changed, the circumstances for Syrians in Egypt also changed, and they became securitised. It is the first period (2013-2015) which marked the securitisation of Syrian refugees and migrants. The situation became intense to Syrians as a result of the heavy discourses used in the media and the strong stance that the security forces took against them. The security apparatuses practices showcased that securitisation can be made by practice rather than just by using discourse. Hence, this justifies the use of the Paris School of Securitisation Theory. Therefore, the refugees and migrants' crisis were created to control the state to restore order by the new president who felt that they caused a *political*

threat to his rule. Sisi wanted to gain legitimacy to remain in power, so in order to earn this, he had to overthrow the Muslim Brotherhood who became notorious with many of the Egyptian moderates and secularists. Therefore, Syrian refugees and migrants were securitised to be of different identity to Egyptians, so they effectively represented a *societal threat* in the securitising discourse. They were additionally represented as an *economic security threat* through discursive focus on their not paying taxes and stealing jobs from the unemployed Egyptians. This answers the question of how these refugees and migrants were constructed to be a threat and it also justifies the use of ST in answering this question. However, when Sisi gained control over the country and received the IMF loan by 2016, de-securitisation occurred over Syrians and Sisi became aware that it is in Egypt's political and economic interests to play a bigger role than its religious or ethnic identity. This was reflected in easing pressures over Syrian refugees and migrants and in allowing Syrian businessmen to expand their businesses, the matter which would allow both Syrians and Egyptians to work together. In terms of foreign policy decision-making, both the private and public sectors consulted with the president to restore relations between Egypt and Syria, the matter which shows the role of the leader-staff style in foreign policy decision making as an individual. Thus, this answers this question of which actors played a role in the decision-making process and how domestic and foreign policy elements intersect. The ST would not be able to analyse this alone and thus FPDM supported that.

This empirical study is an illustration of a soft security threat that Egypt faced; a threat embodied in the form of Syrian refugees and migrants. While the Syrian refugees and migrants were politicised under Morsi who did not consider them as a threat, they became securitised, under Sisi's regime, based on Sisi's perception as a state man who was mainly concerned with restoring political order, installing his rule, and resolving the economic ills. He has arguably been successful in achieving so far. Therefore, a soft security threat could be used by a securitising actor, the president, to maintain control over the turbulent country and enhance their legitimacy. Thus, the securitisation theory is applicable in non-European states, illuminating that the security migrants' nexus does exist in the underdeveloped world.

Regarding the foreign policy decision makers, the first president (Morsi), at one stage, preferred to use military force, but he did not get the opportunity to use it, and he cut off ties with a fellow Arab country. While the following (Sisi) foreign policy decision maker

opted for peaceful measures, such as mediation to reconciliate between Assad's regime, the opposition groups and the restored relations with an Arab neighbour. Both leaders were considered sensitive and goal-oriented characters in making their foreign policy decision towards Syria. However, their interests differed from each other, which explains how different their approaches were adopted towards Assad. Also, both leaders differed in their behavior toward the Syrian president Bashar which showed Morsi as a constraint challenger while Sisi was a constraint respecter.

Chapter Seven
Conclusion

This thesis asks how Egypt manages and resolves soft security crises because very few studies have examined how decisions are arrived at in relation to foreign policy in authoritarian states' generally and in Egypt specifically (Dawisha 1975, 1976; Korany 1986; Korany and Dessouki 2008; Ferris 2013). Soft security crises in particular in Egyptian foreign policy are understudied despite their importance within and beyond Egypt. Securitisation Theory (ST) explains the securitisation process but does not assess if the resolution to the crisis created have failed or succeeded. Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) underscores who has the power and examines how the person in power has resolved a crisis. Combining both ST and FPDM in a single study provides a fuller perspective on understanding Egyptian foreign policy and security policy formation with respect to the chosen cases.

This chapter reflects upon the specific results of this thesis and considers what these findings mean for the study of soft security issues more generally. I start by restating my main research question and the sub-questions considered and then discuss the contribution of the relevant areas of the literature such as the study of Egyptian foreign policy, FPDM in authoritarian states, and securitisation in a non-EU country. This is followed by outlining the key findings from the case studies. The empirical material provided in this thesis are novel in that they help build a better picture of what happened over a number of years in Egypt's politics. The empirical cases focus on (i) a water crisis triggered externally by the construction of an infrastructure; dam and (ii) the perception of refugees and migrants in transit and the host country and how such perceptions change over time and the reasons for such change. I also include a section on how this research might relate to the global picture. Then, I finalise this conclusion by mentioning the limitations I encountered when conducting this research, before turning to how this thesis can inform future research.

7.1 Thesis Argument and Research Question

In this thesis, I tried to contribute to the studies of Egyptian foreign policy and to the limited studies of foreign policy in authoritarian countries. I also attempted to contribute to the literature on Securitisation Theory (ST) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), specifically

Foreign Policy Decision Making approach (FPDM). I endeavoured to answer the following main research question: *How does Egypt manage/resolve its soft security crises?*

To address this question, I developed several sub-questions:

1- *How are soft security crises constructed/interpreted as securitised issues?*

In answering this question, the empirical chapters showed that leaders used external developments to frame these crises to establish their rule and to reinforce their own perceptions of threats. There is a significant part of invoking securitisation to further personal political interests by taking advantage of situations externally created. Leaders use stark language to persuade the audience that there is a need for them to act promptly and accept the measures these securitising actors offer. The social construction of the events/developments as crises that require particular measures to be taken and also the handling of those events/developments that focuses on state-level/external factors is offered in the empirical studies.

2- *Which actors were involved in addressing the soft security crises?*

As shown in the two empirical cases studies, the president is both the crisis framer and crisis solver. These cases escalated to the security domain mainly so the president could then position himself as a strong and effective leader. The role of personal interests in decisions to frame a 'crisis' in a particular way is clearly exemplified in this thesis. The leader-staff style of governance was clearly present in these empirical cases to show that staff provide leaders with information and advice while the leader takes the decision. Consequently, the parties here are mainly the president and his staff which are of significant importance in FPDM.

3- *How do domestic and foreign policy intersect in addressing soft security crises? What impact do soft security crises have on the decision making?*

The domestic situation resulting from turbulence and dire economic and security circumstances as well as the transitional period all played a role in influencing leaders' decisions in securitising these crises. The president made securitisation moves not necessarily as he perceived an existential threat from outside the state but rather it was politically beneficial to securitise a foreign policy concern at a particular point in time (transitional period) to serve their domestic political interest. These securitisation moves

were reflected sometimes positively and other times negatively in Egypt's external relations with the two states, namely Ethiopia and Syria, where the crises originated. The success or failure of decision-makers in managing soft security crises can indirectly lead to the leader's either remaining in power or being overthrown.

In answering the main research question, the two empirical case studies demonstrated that in Egypt, the leader-staff style of governance dominated even in times of crisis and during transitional periods with several leaderships and various cabinet changes between 2011-2018. The cases highlighted how the decision makers differ in their decisions on an issue acting not according to their backgrounds but according to the timing they are in**.** Hence, application of FPDM in this thesis helps to explain how Egypt's leaders react to foreign policy crises. The empirical cases revealed that unexpectedly a *civilian president* prefers to go to war as a solution to a FP crisis while the *military man* opts for diplomacy, negotiations and the use of soft power over war. Throughout the chapters, I demonstrated that leaders were the ones who framed threats to serve their own political interests and created solutions to reinforce their legitimacy and consolidate their power using a foreign policy issue. One leader failed in attaining this goal while the other was successful and remains in power until the time of writing of this thesis. The case studies revealed what kind of foreign policy leaders they are. Mohamed Morsi was more of an *unmotivated* leader as he was uninterested in foreign policy issues and was a weak leader as he was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood. While Abd El Fattah El Sisi is more of a *goal oriented* leader highly interested in foreign policy, action oriented who stresses experts' information and at the same time is still interested in power. However, both leaders made securitisation moves to persuade their audience that there was an existential threat regarding a foreign policy issue mainly in case of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) construction and they differed in their stance for resolving this crisis. Morsi used an aggressive tone while Sisi was more diplomatic in his attitude in resolving this crisis. They also differed in their perception of the Syrian refugees and migrants. The Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis clearly demonstrates the argument that a crisis is made to serve leaders' interests at a particular time. Morsi politicised them while Sisi sought to securitise them and when his purpose was served, he de-securitised them.

7.2 Findings from the Case Studies

These two empirical cases were distinctive as they were triggered at the same time: subsequent to Egypt's Arab Spring experience and during the transitional period from 2011 until 2014. However, the management of these crises cannot be generalised to other crises, as incidents of soft security crises were low in number at that time and thus there are insufficient cases to establish general patterns that recur over time and across areas. However, the similarities between the two do suggest that neither case was unique in terms of the government's approach. In the Egyptian context, very few historical cases of soft security crises have been examined to explain how they were managed or their causation. This dissertation's uniqueness is that it offers an investigation of these issues on Egypt's foreign policy agenda and underscores their significance. It contributes to the understanding of how foreign policy decisions are made in Egypt specifically, and offers insights into the study of foreign policy decision-making in other authoritarian countries. Post-Arab Spring Egypt remains authoritarian, yet different administrations handled soft security crises differently across a relatively brief timeframe (2011-2014). This justifies the use of both ST and FPDM to explain this. The difference in threat identification and response across two administrations requires close analysis of what was happening within the authoritarian system of government. Securitisation Theory offered insights into how external developments were constructed as a form of security crisis.

These case studies are both soft security issues where the government employed soft measures, such as negotiations and diplomacy, to manage and resolve. The first issue relating to water security has always been considered in Egypt as a 'national security' issue. However, when the situation worsened due to the Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) in 2010, Mubarak's administration publicly declared the CFA as a crisis. The public and the political elites considered this crisis another failure for Mubarak's administration. This provided further reasons for protestors calling to overthrow Mubarak in the Arab Spring uprisings in January 2011. Thus, water security became an indirect reason for the removal of Mubarak from power. The Nile crisis continued to be a major concern for Egyptians, and this led the consecutive administrations to prioritise it as a possible means of establishing their power. The Egyptian administrations after 2011 saw the GERD as an external threat reducing the amount of water flow to Egypt threatening Egyptians survival

and developmental plans. Therefore, in securitising and resolving the GERD crisis is an opportunity to consolidate Egyptian leaders' rule. Since Nasser's reign, the Nile has been linked to Egypt's African identity. Nevertheless, Egypt's leaders' post-2011 underscored the way the Nile represented an issue of *life and death* to be defended either by force (by our blood) as Morsi declared or by negotiations and cooperation as Sisi stressed. These two leaders differed in their responses to the GERD crisis as a result of Morsi being a demotivated leader while Sisi being a goal-oriented leader. Egypt's leaders focused on the external developments (i.e., the CFA, the dam construction) that would not be normally considered a threat and constructed it to be a security threat to the state of Egypt and its survival. Egyptian leaders have constructed the GERD as a threat to Egyptians' African identity and survival, since water is an existential issue. As these leaders are trying to establish their rule, during a turbulent time, so they abused the chance of the Ethiopian construction of the GERD to instigate it as a threat to Egypt.

By 2015 the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis caused a division inside Europe, between those who prioritised humanitarian values and those who stressed security and preservation of their European identity (Berry, Blanco and Moore 2015, p.5 &8, EPRS blog 2016). The literature is rich in both views and their impacts on the 'host' states (Huysmans and Squire 2010, p.170, Jimenez 2012, p.37, and Seeberg 2013). However, scholarly attention on the 'transit' states has been lacking. Transit states that sheltered the majority of Syrian refugees and migrants were Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Egypt. All these states are viewed as a crossway to Europe through the Mediterranean Sea. I argue that the distinction between transit and host states is a way for European scholars to justify the euro-centric approach to their work and ignore what is happening in the MENA region. Egypt became *both* a host and a transit state for many Syrian refugees. Two rulers again, Morsi and Sisi used Syrian refugees for different purposes. Morsi used them to consolidate the Muslim Brotherhood's rule and ideological dominance by giving them more benefits over other refugees and migrants from other nationalities. This is because from the Muslim Brotherhood's perspective some of these fleeing Syrian refugees and migrants follow the Sunni sect who rebelled against the Shia regime of Bashar Al Assad. This was a political issue for Morsi. These privileges given to Syrians by Morsi's regime in turn drove many Syrians to consider their status in Egypt to be migrants rather than refugees. The new administration under Sisi in 2013 securitised the Syrian refugees and migrants on the basis

that they represented a direct threat to the rule of the non-Muslim Brotherhood to agitate Egyptians feelings against Syrians to protect their country against them. Thus, Syrian refugees and migrants were then treated as a social, political, and a security threat after having been welcomed. This is an illustration of securitising a soft issue as refugees and migrants. For Sisi, Syrian refugees and economic migrants posed a threat to the economy and an obstacle to the development of the country. Sisi promised the nation development and reform in the economic sector as this was a core issue that Egyptians demanded in the 2011 uprisings. The administration under Sisi believed that developing the country and fulfilling the basic needs of the average citizen is a cornerstone of political stability (Korany, 2020, p. 11). Accordingly, any additional problems would be unwelcome, so Sisi's administration opted for securitising Syrian refugees and migrants as opposed to politicising them as an economic, political, and societal threat. Egyptians, who are known by sociologists for their moderate behaviour, felt alarmed by the extremist behaviour of the Muslim Brotherhood and their supporters, including some Syrian refugees and migrants, who were arrested during the Muslim Brotherhood anti June 30th sit ins. Therefore, Egyptians accepted the securitisation proposed by their president.

One of the outcomes of this research is that it shows that soft security threats can become securitised to leave the political domain and enter the security domain to serve the leader's interest of staying in power as these threats are not an objective label or category but are defined as such by the leader at the time for their own purpose. As emphasised by many Chinese, Hong-Kongers, and Georgian (2021) in foreign policy statements that, "national security is the bedrock of national stability". Therefore, if an issue is marked as a national security issue, it will be of high importance that leads to stability. It should be clarified that when something is labelled as a national security issue it does not intrinsically mean that it is objectively so. Securitisation theorists should be critical of any claim to be 'of national significance' and any claim to an issue being definitely one of 'security'. Nevertheless, if the issue is underscored as being of *extra high importance* through securitising it and provoking a crisis during transitional times as revolutions, uprisings or coup de tat, then it could lead to stability and consolidation of the leader's rule. This is by declaring to the public and the elites as an issue of crisis. Thus, the referent object being securitised becomes *extra high politics* or of a "supreme priority" as Stritzel (2014, p.15) explained by

giving it attention on all possible occasions. In addition, the crisis is released and is publicised to both elites and the public. Second, soft security issues can be an *indirect* reason to overthrow rulers and another reason to consolidate their rule depending on the timing and context. Accordingly, soft security threats are important to both the rulers and the ruled but it is a high-stakes gamble for the president. Third, Egyptian presidents are vital in making foreign policy decisions and securitising some decisions. They use their position to intensify crises when it suits them for domestic political ends. Presidents need other parties to participate in the securitisation process such as the media as a means of amplifying their discourse and ensuring it is received by the constituents of the relevant audience in order to accept the securitisation move. Moreover, under the president's directives, many issues move in different directions either to trigger a crisis or to resolve it because they know how to construct these issues as threats and turn them into opportunities in their favour.

Fourth, FPDM alone does not tell us why governments decided to change the policy, only how they did it and who carried it out. ST explains why they got to the point of desiring a policy change. Hence, it is justifiable to link Securitisation Theory to Foreign Policy Decision Making. This is because securitisation could either create tensions in the external bilateral relations of states (e.g., Egypt and Ethiopia) or improve their relations (e.g., Egypt and Syria under Sisi's administration). Fifth, in Securitisation Theory the exceptional measures used against the claimed existential threats could be soft measures rather than hard (military) ones. This was illustrated in the case of the Nile crisis. Sisi (June 2020) asserted multiple times that, "Egypt is keen on a fair and balanced solution to the Nile crisis". The actual tool used by Sisi to resolve this problem was diplomacy represented in the numerous rounds of talks held between the three countries' foreign ministers (Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia) and the ministers of water resources and irrigation. Egypt's foreign minister gave matching statements on other occasions: demonstrating a preference for soft measures such as diplomacy and negotiations rather than the use of force, including escalation to interstate war. Other means of soft measures could be the use of soft power between both conflicting countries through cooperation at different levels. Egypt under Sisi preferred to use its soft power with Ethiopia, and this was evidenced through economic cooperation, infrastructure-building and medical training being offered during the bilateral talks and visits between both leaders. Therefore, Securitisation Theory alone cannot tell us

when to expect soft/hard measures in dealing with a securitised issue, just that the latter becomes a viable option once the securitisation move is successful. Using FPDM gives a better approach to explaining why a particular response was chosen at a given time and in a given context.

In the case of the Nile crisis, Egypt used its soft power with its Ethiopian counterpart by offering its engineers and experts to help in providing consultations over the GERD under Sisi's administration. Although this offer was declined, the important point is that Egypt *offered* to be a partner of Ethiopia and the rest of its African neighbours in their developmental projects. This was significant in providing medical services and assistance and humanitarian aid in times of floods and droughts, showing Egypt's cooperative attitude towards its African neighbours. This is in addition to providing scholarships to African students in Egyptian universities and building new schools and universities in these African states including Ethiopia. These new measures were used by the Egyptian administrations when they securitised the GERD crisis. Therefore, the Egyptian administration preferred the use of soft power over hard military power to manage the GERD crisis under Sisi's leadership.

 To contain the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis, the Egyptian government used a combination of both soft and hard measures over a period of time in an attempt to manage/resolve this crisis. Under Morsi's reign, many governmental benefits were given to Syrians establishing equal treatment with Egyptians including providing them with free health and educational services. Many Syrians who decided to reside in Egypt as their host state were not required to apply for visa entry. Under Morsi's reign, many Syrians started opening businesses without any red tape. Under Sisi's reign, harsher measures were enforced on Syrian refugees ranging from visa requirements to deportation when deemed necessary. Moreover, Egypt used its bilateral relations with southern Mediterranean countries to contain illegal migration. These bilateral agreements included training coastal guards to deal with these illegal migrants and their smugglers. This training was built on western models that, "focus on the rehabilitation of the state governance in borderlands, combined with western notions of securitization and policing" (Hüsken 2017, p.915). Moreover, there were other obstacles that Syrians faced when they decided to open businesses or renew their business licenses. It was only the larger scale businessmen who opened new factories in manufacturing industries who were given more positive treatment

under Sisi's rule. This made a distinction between the state of Syrian refugees and economic migrants and established businessmen. Syrian businessmen were perceived as an asset to the Egyptian economy as the new administration considered them to be foreign direct investors who would help boost the turbulent Egyptian economy post-2011. Hence, with soft security threats, soft measures could be used to resolve the problems and contain the threats if it is the leader's choice not to deteriorate the situation. This justifies the use of FPDM which provides the opportunity to explore the genesis of particular responses and rationale provided by the administration. ST does not tell us when to expect particular measures, thus drawing on both analytical frameworks helps to explain and understand the empirical findings.

Finally, leaders face uncertainty about the survival of their regimes during times of turmoil and transition. Therefore, this could drive them to securitise an issue and to turn it into a security crisis not because of an objective change in the level of external threat, but as the result of a calculated move on the part of the president to shore up their power and popularity at home. As President Sisi mentioned in his press conferences with the French President Macron in his visit to France on December 7th 2020, "we are building a nation in times extremely harsh and in a context that is extremely turbulent" (Ten Channel, 2020). This shows how aware and considerate Sisi was of the unstable times with the country's poor political, economic, and security conditions. Thus, context generally determines leaders' reactions towards both traditional and non-traditional security issues and choosing which measures to adopt to resolve a crisis. In this dissertation the focus was on soft security threats as water, refugees, and migrants that leaders took advantage of the situation to create the perception of crisis which they then would aim to manage/resolve in order to secure their own position. The approach of this dissertation critically evaluates 'security' claims and the rationale behind particular responses, to reveal the struggle for hanging on to power in Egypt as it is about external relations with third parties.

7.3 The Contribution

7.3.1 Contribution to the Theory

The contribution of this thesis is to enrich the studies of Egyptian foreign policy specifically and FPDM in general. This thesis also aims to add to the literature of Securitisation Theory (ST) and contribute to the International Relations (IR) literature of Egypt and the Middle East through application of Securitisation Theory to a non-European country. Securitisation Theory (ST) used has been heavily criticised by scholars for being euro-centric and for its inability to be applied outside the European Union (EU) (Stritzel 2007, Vuori 2008, and Kapur and Mabon 2018). Securitisation Theory (ST) alongside Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM) has helped to identify the president as the primary securitising actor who instigated the crises in Egypt's external relations and sought to benefit from his responsibility for resolving them. In order to understand who, the securitising actor is and how they construct issues as a threat, I used ST; in parallel I used FPDM to explain who manages/resolves crises and why. Hence, both ST and FPDM are employed to answer the main research question.

Soft security threats and thereby crises can be architected by the leader and his staff. Leaders use stark language to make the audience act promptly and accept the measures that the leaders want. The evidence provided in the empirical cases mainly relied on analysing videos of speeches and statements in the media, as an alternative to the limited access to official documents which shows the lack of transparency in the political system. Moreover, in attempting to contribute to the literature on ST, I show that the audience had a different stand from the leader in resolving the crises under investigation. The role of the audience in ST is either to approve or reject the securitisation which determines its success or failure (Balzacq 2005, Vuori 2008, and Balzacq, Leonard and Ruzicka 2015). Therefore, the role of the audience is extremely critical. In both case studies, the two audiences addressed had different stances. The average citizens (first audience) preferred to use extreme measures such as bombing the GERD and using force while the securitising actor preferred the use of soft measures such as diplomacy. The average citizen then became hostile against Ethiopian and Syrian refugees and they harassed them on the Egyptian streets. However, the ruler's choice to use diplomacy prevailed mainly under Sisi's rule because in Egypt, the leaders'

decision still dominates. The political elites (second audience) had a different stance. The political elites accepted the measures the securitising actor (the president) opted for which were softer and more conventional like negotiations and cooperation. Thus, soft security threats are constructed by leaders and their staff. Leader and staff securitise a referent object, during transitional periods, which is either accepted or rejected by the audiences from both political elites and average citizens. The acceptance shows the success of the securitisation move; however, in the political realm the leaders' choice of resolving the crisis prevails over the audience choice. This shows the inconsistency with the Copenhagen School literature, thus there needs to be a better understanding of the role of the audience in authoritarian regimes. The will of the people is different than their rulers and the way the people want and suggest an issue in ST could be different than the leaders' choice.

A further contribution to the literature is the use of both ST and FPDM in analysing both water, refugees and migrants as Egyptian foreign and security issues raised in the foreign domain rather than domestic one. The soft security threats investigated in this thesis, namely water and refugees and migrants and the resulting crises have had both positive and negative impacts on Egypt's foreign relations which this thesis examines and explains. Benign and tense relations between Egypt and its neighbours depended on who was in power and which staff was advising the leader. These are the determining factors in escalating or de-escalating the crises. Leaders' securitisation or politicisation of these crises had its implications on Egypt's relations with both Ethiopia and Syria. The language statesmen used has also determined the nature of the relationship between Egypt and its neighbours. In times of crisis, relations between states experience a downturn. Another contribution of this dissertation is that it fills the gap in the literature which is that the impact of these 'crises' has which has not been sufficiently covered in the literature, either as a standalone issue or case studies in theoretically-informed work.

7.3.2 Contribution to the Empirical Study

In the first case study, relations between Egypt and Ethiopia deteriorated as both Morsi and Sisi securitised the GERD differently. The decision to securitise an infrastructure project (GERD) was problematic to the relationship as it posed a security threat. The dam is not a conventional source of threat to the security of the nation, but it was argued to be so

because of the Nile's vital importance not only to Egypt materially, but also as a central feature of national identity. The relations between Ethiopia and Egypt under Morsi suffered a damage as a result of the discourse Morsi used. Under Sisi, the damage was lessened as a result of Sisi's numerous calls for further cooperation with Ethiopia; however, it also witnessed increased tension whenever Ethiopia did not show good intentions by refusing to allow Egyptian inspectors access to see the dam site and Ethiopia's refusal to agree to any concessions.

 In the second case study, Morsi politicised the situation of the Syrian refugees and migrants which worsened Egypt's relations with Syria. On the other hand, Sisi who securitised Syrian refugees and migrants improved Egypt's relations with Syria. This is due to the difference in motivation between Morsi and Sisi. The Syrian refugees' case is peculiar because the securitisation of Syrians in Egypt was in line with Assad's approach of labelling them as opposition groups and terrorists. Subsequently, it prevented the deterioration of relations between Egypt and Syria under Sisi. Therefore, this could contribute to the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis and FPDM as it focused on individual leaders and shows the flexibility of FPA/FPDM to examine how Egyptian leaders react to foreign policy crises (Korany 1986, and Hinnebusch in Brummer 2015).

I chose this topic specifically because migrants and refugees have been securitised more in European and American governments (Huysmans and Squire 2010, p.170, Jimenez 2012, p.37, and Seeberg 2013) as they are viewed as 'host' states where refugees start a new chapter of their lives and create new dynamics in the host country. Egypt has not been thoroughly investigated from a securitisation perspective, as Egypt is viewed by European states as a 'transit' route country for these migrants and refugees. However, Egypt has become both a 'host' and a 'transit' state for these migrants and refugees. The circumstances Egypt endured, and the new policies issued in Europe and the US drove Egypt to become both a host and a transit state for some Syrians, as some of them decided to settle in Egypt and not in Western countries. This is a clear application of Securitisation Theory outside of the European context and this empirical case is a contribution to the literature on Egypt being a host and a transit country. Finally, this empirical case illustrates that in authoritarian states, as in Egypt, the people could call for more aggressive measures than their leaders want but still the leader's choice prevail.

7.4 Findings

The influence of the staff surrounding the leader became more visible specifically in these soft crises. The example used in the first case study illustrated that the reports of the technical team responsible for negotiating the Nile crisis led the decision-maker to securitise it during the transitional time. The technical team was formed from a group of engineers in the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation and a group of lawyers. The technical team was responsible for delaying the negotiations or freezing them several times due the technical details they provided to the decision-makers. The information they provided to the president showed the hazards of the construction of the GERD on Egypt and its reservoir. Consequently, the Nile crisis became a protracted crisis. When these technical details were shared with the president(s) during a turbulent transitional time posited an existential threat and drove them to use alarming statements locally and regionally that securitised the GERD construction. The leadership used stark language to prompt the audience to accept the exceptional measures suggested. In turn, this securitisation was accepted by the audience on several levels.

On the level of the general public, the general public became xenophobic towards the Ethiopian refugees in Egypt. As for the political elites, they called on their government to use aggressive measures against the GERD under Morsi's administration. Under Sisi's administration, the technical team provided Sisi with reports showing the disadvantages of the GERD construction on the Nile on Egypt's water security. In turn, the governmental institutions stressed the importance of the Nile to Egypt to the country's allies at any given opportunity in order to encourage them to halt the project or to support Egypt's stand. The most visible institution in accepting the securitisation move was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which reiterated several times the president's words that the Nile issue is a 'matter of life and death' which became intensified after the GERD construction. Additionally, Sisi's Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that Egypt is keen on the development of its African neighbours and that Egypt is a strong believer of the concept of "no harm to one's self or to others" (Raslan, 2015). Other political elites started to reiterate these same words demonstrating their acceptance of Sisi's securitisation move. The political elites asserted that Egypt would die out of thirst due to the damages inflicted by the GERD. Accordingly, this had its implications on Egypt's foreign policy relations with Ethiopia and had played a

role in altering Egypt's relations with its African counterparts to a more active foreign policy approach. This was clear in the increase in bilateral talks between Egypt and Ethiopia and Egypt and other African countries. It was also clear from Sisi's shuttle visits to some African countries and his hosting of some African leaders in Egypt to enhance cooperation and show Egypt's active role in Africa.

In the second empirical case, the presidents responded differently to the Syrian refugees and economic migrants. My main focus was on Morsi and Sisi. Morsi politicised them but his successor Sisi opted to securitise them. Both leaders used the Syrian refugees in different ways in an attempt to consolidate their power early in their regime and both policies had an impact on Egypt's foreign policy towards Syria.

7.5 Implications for the Global Picture

This research has implications for how we understand the Global South part of the world as an example that cannot be applied elsewhere. My findings illustrate the importance of domestic politics in Egypt's authoritarian system and that domestic politics are more important for foreign policy issues than might be assumed. This refutes the argument made by famous structural realists such as Mearsheimer and Waltz who argued that states are functionally similar, and that the anarchic structure of the system matters more than domestic factors driving behaviour. This research will also help outsiders to understand the perception of Egypt's leaders' regarding crises and their management of these crises, decision-making around particular crises, and their foreign policy decision-making process generally. This is because Egypt's foreign policy is under-researched in general, and this dissertation contributes to rebalance that mainly coming from an Egyptian scholar's perspective studying in a Scottish university. This research used two theoretical frameworks that complement each other. First is the Securitisation Theory and the second is the Foreign Policy Decision Making approach. The reason for choosing these analytical frameworks is because in Securitisation Theory, the securitising actor becomes the crisis provoker by using the stark language on a referent object while in foreign policy decision making, the decision maker is the crisis solver. The success of using both ST and FPDM here suggests that it might be an applicable approach for understanding the onset of and response to soft security crises in other national contexts.

In transitional times, statesmen face many challenges internally and externally. The main internal challenges after the Arab Spring were establishing a stable government in power, economic difficulties, and restoring security. In Egypt, each administration post-2011 tried to contain the chaotic situation resulting from the Egyptian uprisings to gain credibility and establish its rule. The external threats to Egypt came from non-state parties that caused domestic instability, such as ISIS. Another external threat to Egypt came from Ethiopia due to its construction of the GERD which is a soft type of threat. Therefore, the value of this approach demonstrated by the insights generated from the empirical case studies indicates that other states affected by the Arab Spring and the subsequent migration flows could be examined using the same approach that I have developed.

In terms of resolving the foreign policy crises framed by the Egyptian decision makers, they managed the crisis on two levels. The first is the domestic level which witnessed major policy changes, reforms, and new policy implementations. These domestic reforms were all introduced by the newly appointed presidents after the events of 2011. While the second is on the external level, there was a change in the approach and behaviour towards Ethiopia and Syria and the rest of the African neighbours. This change in Egypt's foreign policy towards its contending neighbours cannot be assessed as a complete success nor an absolute failure. The Nile crisis remains unresolved even after three consecutive governments in power. Nevertheless, the current administration (at the time of writing) under Sisi has managed to consolidate its rule and the public has accepted its crisis management approach by approving to take the diplomatic track rather than the military track as evidenced with the GERD crisis.

On the other hand, the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis was managed locally by regulating the Syrian refugees' status and licensing the small and medium enterprise projects run by some Syrian migrants. In addition, Egypt reformed its investment laws in order to increase Syrian businessmen investments in Egypt. Also, Egypt's foreign policy with Syria differed according to who was in power. After witnessing a period of downturn under two administrations, the current Egyptian government in power improved its relations with its Syrian counterpart. The Sisi administration is working on mediating talks between the Syrian opposition factions and the Assad regime, in addition to Egypt's participation in the reconstruction projects of Syria. Furthermore, there is regional cooperation between

Egypt and some south European countries in addition to international agencies helping the Egyptian government to manage the Syrian refugees and migrants' crisis.

Both empirical cases might seem unrelated as the two countries involved, Ethiopia and Syria, do not share direct borders with Egypt; however, they have multiple factors in common. First, they are both triggers of crises aimed at establishing power and the legitimacy of ruling regimes through solving a foreign policy crisis. Second, they both represent identity and symbols to Egypt. The identity is the Arab identity that links Egypt with Syria while Egypt is linked to Africa through the Nile which is the main source of water that symbolises Egypt's African identity. Third, both crises represent real challenges to Egyptian governments and the economy. Fourth, both crises happened at the same time post the Arab Spring during a transitional period in Egypt. Finally, these two soft security crises had an impact on altering Egyptian-Syrian relations and Egyptian-Ethiopian relations because domestic and foreign policy intersect in addressing soft security threats.

Therefore, this research can relate to the regional picture as Egypt manages its relations with important regional parties and explains the way personal dispositions of individual presidents' impacts these relations. It also highlights the role of Egypt as a key player in the region which has been neglected in the period before the Arab-Spring. Moreover, this thesis adds to the understanding of conflicts that erupt over resources that have a symbolic and identity-oriented meaning to each of the contending states such as water, refugees and migrants. Furthermore, crises as a social construct can be manipulated for domestic political purposes. This thesis also adds to the broader understanding of the competition over a key resource (i.e. water) in the MENA region and the regional responses to the consequences of the Syrian civil war.

Furthermore, identity can be used to link or separate nations. In the empirical case studies, I am providing more supportive evidence for the role of identity in external relations in Chapter Six. Egyptians' attachment to the Nile is used by their policymakers to link them to their African brothers. In 2012, Egyptian former president Morsi used the religious Sunni identity to link the Muslim Brotherhood to his Syrian fellow brothers as they share the same religious identity and sect. This in turn would help Morsi to consolidate his rule. However, he was not as eager to underscore the African identity and use it to resolve the GERD crisis. On the other hand, in 2014 president Sisi preferred to maintain the bond of the *Arab identity*

without stressing the religious aspect of it because the *religious identity* caused instability to his rule. This is in line with Sisi's stance from his African neighbours illustrated in Chapter Five, where Sisi was keen on keeping friendly relations and acknowledging the Egyptian ties to Africa so as not to disadvantage their access to the Nile.

7.6 Limitations

The journey of this research was a hard one as there were multiple challenges that made it harder to reach the results. First, since the country under investigation is Egypt, and the period of study is between 2011 and 2018, a transitional period, which has created difficulties while conducting the research. Egypt has always been classified as a non-democratic state that lacks transparency; in 2018, Transparency International ranked Egypt 105/198 on the Corruption Perception Index (CPI 2018). During, transitional times, documenting and collecting data becomes even more acutely challenging for researchers. Events in recent years have only compounded this. Gathering documents from the national archives and conducting interviews was difficult due to these unstable times. In addition, attempting to approach officials to conduct semi-structured interviews was refused as they considered these issues highly confidential and of national security importance. Although I undertook this research between 2018 and 2020 the conditions for researchers did not change in a way that allowed one to overcome these barriers. Officials who accepted to meet me either preferred to stay anonymous or gave me merely historical information that was hardly related to the research. The parliamentarians who accepted to meet me were either from the opposition party or had an intelligence background and were from the majority party. I was also able to conduct interviews with a couple of lawyers, some Syrian refugees, and economic migrants settling in Egypt, but this fell short of my targeted number of interviewees under ideal conditions.

I went to the parliament to collect information but all the minutes for the sessions in the period between 2011 until 2013 were undocumented and unsaved (as the MB were in power). I was also denied access to the parliamentary meeting minutes that would have allowed me to better understand the government's handling of the crises or to further analyse the discourse used by the MPs over the period 2015 until 2018. Therefore, key information that would have been highly beneficial for my ST and FPDM informed

analysis of high-level discussions behind closed doors and, day-to-day accounts of how departments and governmental officials dealt with the crisis in 'real-time' were unreachable. The autocratic nature of the government curtails access to certain types of information that are often available freely in consolidated democracies. Consequently, the available evidence helped me to make reasonable inferences as no researcher in autocratic countries can ever get complete access to complete information. Nevertheless, this also serves as a justification for the use of theoretical models that help by providing a lens through which to interpret the available, albeit incomplete, information. In addition, the media is highly censored and limited in the type of information it is allowed to release. There is a limit to the criticism it offers on specific issues, as covered in Chapter Five, which meant that the media as primary or secondary source was inherently limited. Finally, while conducting this research, the global pandemic of Covid-19 broke out which interrupted my research, delayed my progress, and prohibited further data collection. Despite these limitations I proceeded on the basis of available information from the internet and the newspapers I had been collecting. I also used technological platforms to conduct my interviews with the above mentioned interviewees and I managed to apply my framework to produce a completed thesis.

7.7 Future Research

Following on from the findings and contribution to various sections of the academic literature, I argue that my thesis can inform the direction of future research. Thinking of specific future research projects, FPA/FPDM scholars could think of analysing the Nile crisis under Morsi's administration from a group dynamic perspective. In this dissertation the role of the leader has been highlighted as a securitising actor and a decision-maker in resolving this crisis. The securitising actor triggered crises due to domestic instabilities that reflected on foreign policy decisions. However, due to the current limitations in documenting data, the potential for more information to be released in the future would present new opportunities for further thorough investigation. Another future research consideration would be exploring the Ethiopian side and the rationale for the construction of the GERD, and their reasons for not reaching a common agreement with Egypt. The Ethiopian reaction to the Egyptian securitisation moves is also an idea that could be studied. Scholars of water security could build upon my work on the Nile, particularly when it

comes to unintended consequences of infrastructure projects. In addition, examining the role of external parties in this crisis and how they helped escalate or deescalate the crisis is another research interest of mine. ST scholars could also investigate the impact of Syrian refugees and migrants on other non-European host and transit states whether they share or do not share borders with Syria, such as Jordan, Lebanon the Gulf states and Sudan.

Lastly, if I am able to continue with a research agenda based on this dissertation, I would continue studying Egyptian responses to soft security crises using the same framework. I would still continue investigating new empirical cases using a combination of both Securitisation Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis focusing on Egypt and other MENA countries.

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Mrs Rasha Maati Project Manager in Fard Foundation in Egypt. 27/10/2020 (Syrian)

Mrs Manal Kwidar Arabic Language school teacher and status manager for Syrians in Terre Des Homme NGO branch in city of New Damietta in Egypt. 02/11/2020. (Syrian)

Dr Samer Rouechdi a pharmacist and project manager in Habibat El Khier NGO in Egypt. 12/11/2020. (Syrian)

Mr Amr Abd El Hakim an Egyptian refugee lawyer and a consultant at the Egyptian Human Rights Council. 9/11/2020. (Egyptian).