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# **Lomé and Aflao: Ambivalent Affinity at the Ghana-Togo Border<sup>1</sup>**

Paul Nugent

The phenomenon of urban centres located either side of international borders is familiar from the Americas and Europe, but is also a recurring feature across Africa (Nugent 2012). What is distinctive is that so many capital cities rest on, or very close to, a border (Soi and Nugent 2017, 537-8). Thus Kinshasa and Brazzaville, two capitals, interface across the Congo River. However, more common is where a capital city co-exists with a smaller town. Typically, a river seems like a natural border. By contrast, Lomé, Togo's capital, and Aflao, the adjacent town in Ghana, do not even have a separating no-man's land on a stretch of border also characterized by straight lines. This imparts particular intensity to their relationship, as I wish to demonstrate.

Terms commonly depicting the relationship between border towns varies from neighbours to pairs to twins. Each invokes a potentially misleading metaphor. To suggest such towns are neighbours implies an almost accidental proximity, whereas their trajectories have often been closely intertwined (Buursink, 2001). Nor are they necessarily pairs because they are often vastly different in population size, physical dimensions and economic profile. The metaphor of 'twin towns' has the virtue of signalling intimate connection, without presuming relationships are equal or exude great warmth. A degree of ambivalence is very common amongst twin cities deriving partly from human flows. It is manifest on asymmetrical borders, like that between the USA and Mexico, where mobility in either direction is shaped by underlying patterns of inequality (ch x). What African cases reveal is that, even where borders separate countries with broadly similar profiles, border towns still exhibit considerable diversity based on high in-migration levels (Nugent, 2020). I refer to ambiguous affinity because, while Aflao and Lomé exhibit a close relationship – reflected in trade relations and migratory flows – there is also dissonance. In particular, there are different interpretations about who really 'owns' these spaces historically, and with what consequences. Moreover, tensions abound as national institutions meet at the border. At a mundane level, this is reflected in interactions between border officials struggling to communicate, both literally and more figuratively. While Ewe is this border's lingua franca, the official language is French in Togo and English in Ghana. Because officials typically originate elsewhere, they are often unfamiliar with the other administrative language, the lingua franca or any of the other languages present. Meanwhile, administrative structures operate according to very different logics. This colours daily experiences for those whose livelihoods depend on negotiating bureaucratic obstacles day-by-day. I will probe three dimensions of the relationship between Lomé and Aflao: namely, their relationship's historical foundations; their distinct demographic trajectories, and the manner wherein the border affords sites of both interaction and friction.

## **Aflao and Lomé's Historical Emergence**

To the naked eye, Lomé and Aflao appear a single conurbation with only an incomplete separating fence. One might reasonably conclude either that this was once a single town or that Aflao represents a spill-over from the Togolese capital. Neither interpretation is accurate. Aflao is a very old settlement, featuring in European traders' descriptions of the coast from the seventeenth century and quite likely emerging over a century before (Justesen, 2005). In the mid-nineteenth century, the area immediately east of Aflao was hardly populated, excepting some fishing villages around Bè. Bè inhabitants were apparently unrelated to Aflao's and, unlike the latter, faced the lagoon rather than the ocean (Marguerat 1992, 7). Hence Lomé was very much a product of colonialism – a clue to which lies in its administrative district's grid layout, contrasting starkly with Aflao's irregular settlement pattern. We start therefore by exploring how this contrasting configuration emerged

through successive migration waves and iterations of space-making in the colonial era and since independence.

During the centuries of the trans-Atlantic slave trade, Aflao was shaped by its intermediary position between the polities of Anlo to the west and Little Popo (or Anécho) in present-day eastern Togo. These polities traded most of the slaves on this coastal stretch, although the Danes acquired some directly through Aflao. In 1850, the Danish withdrew from the coast after which the British slowly became more involved in what was now 'legitimate' trade, eventually loosely asserting a sphere of influence over the trans-Volta. The breaking of the Asante kingdom's power following the 1874 British invasion produced a shifting of trade routes east of the Volta River – to Aflao's potential benefit. Britain's decision to declare a colony in 1874 was largely intended to assert control over that trade. However, the initial Gold Coast border did not include Aflao, and consequently Denu (an Ewe name connoting 'by the border') flourished as a smugglers' haven a couple of kilometres west of the town. In 1879 Britain redrew the border to incorporate Denu and Aflao proper. Repeating the earlier pattern, a motley collection of traders – Sierra Leoneans, Anlos, Minas from Anécho, 'Hausa'<sup>2</sup> from the north, alongside two European trading firms - settled just beyond the Gold Coast Customs cordon. Lomé therefore owes its origins to a particular moment when a border's imposition created ideal conditions for a flourishing contraband trade. Crucially, the medley of people who settled Lomé had no particular relationship with Aflao, although the latter claimed farming lands well beyond the border. Hence, the *quartier* of Kodjoviakopé, where the main border-crossing was located, was settled both by Anlos and Minas. The Anlo are an Ewe subset, but have only modest attachment to the Aflao. Anécho's peoples speak Mina which is close to Ewe, but trace their more distant origins to Elmina along contemporary Ghana's central coastline. They do not regard themselves as close ethnic kinsmen of the Aflao or any other Ewe subgroup. Significantly, Kodjoviakopé (literally meaning 'small Kodzo's village') derives from the name of the notional founder, Joseph Kodzovia Anthonio da Souza. He was a Brazilian merchant's son who had initially settled in Anécho before establishing himself at the newly-defined border (Spire 2007, 193). Although Da Souza was unrelated to the people of Aflao, he and his associates had close links with the settlers of Denu, a relationship that is valued today.

In 1884, the Germans announced their arrival on this coastal stretch, formally agreeing a colonial border with the British in 1890. This comprised a straight line running northwards from the coast to 6° 10' north and then another running westwards until the Aka River – creating a dog's leg. The Germans moved the capital to Lomé in 1897, constructing an administrative centre, whilst having to accept that particular sections were already settled. They also constructed a wharf and three railway lines to funnel trade from the interior through Lomé. After 1900, the colonial capital attracted additional settlers searching for work and trading opportunities. Despite a period of Customs alignment, the fact that the British and German authorities could not reconcile their duties left ample scope for smuggling.

There was a brief moment after World War 1 when the practical significance of the border between Lomé and Aflao was effaced. After Britain and France invaded Togo, they provisionally divided the colony in a manner placing Lomé under British control. But the French argued hard for the railways and Lomé itself, claiming it provided a more natural port than Cotonou in Dahomey (Nugent 2002, 26-35). Britain conceded, entailing the former-colony's physical partition. Whereas the interior was divided to place the Kpalimé-Lomé railway in French Togoland, the border's southern stretch remained as under the 1890 agreement. In the interwar period, a somewhat paradoxical situation arose whereby British trading firms like John Holt controlled much of Lomé's import-export trade, while the Gold Coast Customs Preventive Service sought to maintain a hard border. The reason was that Gold Coast/British Togoland did not levy direct taxation, meaning that customs duties were the

principal source of government revenue (Nugent 2019, 174-6). Duties on Dutch gin accounted for much of those revenues. Gin imported by British firms was often purchased by smaller traders who then smuggled it into British territory. The terrain around Aflao was ideal for contraband trade. Some was transacted by sea under cover of darkness. The lagoons immediately north of Lomé's administrative district were particularly difficult to patrol. There were also many places where smugglers could headload goods across the border on foot.

After World War 2, Ewe/Togoland unificationists sought to erase the border a second time, but there was little enthusiasm for this political project. In the 1960s and 1970s, successive civilian and military authorities in Ghana periodically closed the border to pressurise their Togolese counterparts – initially to force them to accept a territorial merger and increasingly to elicit co-operation in eradicating smuggling (Nugent 2019, 385-90). These closures were symbolically enacted at Lomé-Aflao where most traffic and people crossed. In fact, these measures signified the weakness of Ghana where national economic implosion and mounting consumer shortages became increasingly evident from the mid-1960s. In Togo, a very particular social contract emerged binding together a northern government and its base in the military, Lomé's women cloth merchants, and the many cross-border traders (Nugent 2019, 449-52). The Eyadéma regime expanded the port of Lomé after 1968 which was consecrated as a free port serving the countries of the Sahel. But a generous tax regime also enabled Dutch textiles to be imported relatively cheaply, thereby cementing Lomé's dominant position within sub-regional commerce. The Asigamé textile market in downtown Lomé was controlled by the so-called 'Nana Benz' (Sylvanus, 2016) – wealthy and well-connected female merchants, largely of Mina origin, with an acquired taste for Mercedes Benz cars. They, in turn, supplied countless smaller traders transporting textiles to the interior or smuggling them across the border. But Ghana's endemic shortages meant all manner of consumer goods were traded across the border. Aflao's location meant it continued to occupy a leading position within contraband trading.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Lomé-Aflao border became a site of recurrent tension. At the height of Ghana's 1982/83 revolution, Aflao's population was subjected to constant surveillance as Border Guards and cadres attempted to enforce a curfew, border closures and price-control. Although shortages in Ghana eased after 1985, Aflao continued to account for many smuggling cases brought before the Public Tribunals – with petroleum products and textiles topping the list. Complicating the local dynamic, both governments accused each other of subversion. The Togolese authorities felt especially vulnerable because Lomé was located hard against the border. In 1986/87, after armed insurgents infiltrated from Ghana, the Togolese authorities erected a fence along the border's southern stretch. Work also began digging a trench, although this was eventually abandoned. During the early-1990s, tensions escalated once again as the Togolese regime sought to repress demands for a return to democratic rule. The violent suppression of demonstrations in Lomé, reflected in the many corpses washing up in the lagoon, produced a refugee exodus in 1993/94. Only 10% were accommodated in the designated refugee camp at Klikor, most simply blending into Aflao and surrounding towns. This pattern recurred in 2005 during post-election violence in Lomé (Anon, 2005). These paroxysms had two important consequences: firstly, the instability killed much of Lomé's economic vitality; secondly, in the wake of taxi strikes, it prepared the way for a new pattern of urban transportation based on the *zimidjan* or motorcycle taxi. This also revolutionized cross-border trade.

What emerges from this brief account is that Aflao and Lomé's relationship since 1874 has been fundamentally shaped by trading opportunities, thereby attracting settlers from afar. Aflao's people have construed themselves as the landowners and most of Lomé's population as 'strangers'. A discourse of autochthony has little traction in Lomé, where the meaningful contrast is between the city and its peripheries, of which Aflao is a very particular one. Nevertheless, people's economic

fortunes on either side have been thoroughly entwined, while there has been sympathy in Aflao for opposition to a government construed as *nordiste* since the 1960s. Hence, distancing in a socio-cultural context contrasts with manifestations of empathy in the political domain.

### **Demographic Patterns**

With the historical context established, I now consider underlying demographic patterns. The reworked urban data of the OECD/Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) indicates that the population of border towns and cities across the region has grown considerably faster than national averages since 1950 (OECD/SWAC 2019, 21-33). Lomé and Aflao, located on a belt of virtually continuous urbanism running roughly between Lagos and Abidjan, are prime examples. Lomé's demographic growth has been driven, firstly, by the capital-city effect, reflected in proliferating civil-service positions and demands from urban transport and construction. Secondly, it has been spurred by commercial dynamics arising from the port's existence and cross-border trading opportunities. The city's cosmopolitanism arises from successive waves of settlers arriving from other Togo regions, especially the poorer north, and neighbouring Sahelian countries, like Mali, Niger, and Nigeria. By contrast, Aflao is a provincial town at Ghana's geographical margin. Yet its demographic trajectory follows its larger neighbour's and has been shaped by it. People have converged on Aflao from elsewhere in Ghana; also from the countries above.

INSERT Table 1 AROUND HERE

Overall, population growth in Lomé since the 1950s has been sustained and impressive. In 1950, Lomé was a very modest centre, with fewer than 40,000 people; within 20 years it had become a city of 228,179 (Table 1). In 2015, Lomé's population was estimated at 1,700,000, meaning it had become 44.6 times larger. This was much faster than Accra which had grown a 'mere' 28.1 times over the same period. Lomé's more rapid expansion clearly owed much to its position at the epicentre of a well-oiled entrepôt state, supplying goods (especially textiles) to the entire West African sub-region and as far afield as Zaire. Whereas Accra entered severe recession during the 1970s, Lomé boomed as a commercial and financial centre. Entrepreneurs of different nationalities established themselves there. Unlike Lagos, whose prolific growth was oil-propelled, Lomé enjoyed a reputation as a physically secure city, with low taxes and functioning institutions – burnishing Togo's little-Switzerland image. Employment prospects attracted populations from the poorer north and across the Sahel, seeking work in the informal sector – especially around the markets – but also in the port, urban transport and in the construction industry, stimulated by a building boom. Aflao's growth was less spectacular, but it was nevertheless 28.3 times larger than in 1950, slightly above Accra's. By 2015, Aflao was over double Lomé's size back in 1950. A more meaningful comparison perhaps is with a non-border Ghanaian town. Aflao and Elmina were almost exactly the same size in 1970, but over the next two decades, the former increased its population by 230% whereas Elmina grew more steadily at 60%. Today, Aflao is 2.7 times larger than Elmina. We should also note that, whereas Elmina has both a fishing industry and a flourishing tourism sector, Aflao enjoys neither advantage. Its expansion is only explicable by Lomé's looming presence next door.

However, Lomé and Aflao's population growth shows significantly different spatial patterns. Lomé's expansion has been blocked by the sea to the south, wetlands to the northeast, and the border with Aflao to the west. The city has therefore snaked northwards, with one spur leading due north towards Agoué-Nyive, and the other following the contours of the dog-leg border, then broadly heading north-westerly towards Sanguera when it meets Ghana's border again (Map 1). The relentless push northwards continues today. In the process, the city has progressively swallowed the countryside, absorbing rural areas once used by Aflao farmers. Before being engulfed, people from Aflao were

selling produce to Togolese buyers – often northern civil servants and businessmen. Once the latter built houses, the city authorities caught up and inserted supporting infrastructure.

*Insert Map 1 here*

Aflao's population has generally concentrated in the narrow land-strip between lagoon and sea. This is reflected today in very high population density (6,927 people per square kilometre). A 1974 map, based on an aerial survey, shows most people bunched around Aflao's centre, with largely empty space between the latter and Denu (Survey Department, Map of Ghana 1974, 1:50,000, Sheet E0601C3). Today, satellite maps and direct observation reveal Aflao and Denu as a single conurbation. North of the lagoon, there had been a sharp distinction between the border's two sides. Whereas Togolese settlements were pushed hard against the line, the same 1974 map revealed a scattering of very small settlements on Ghana's side. However, satellite images today reveal significant population clustering also on Ghana's side, especially at the point where the border takes a sharp deviation. Hence the *quartiers* of Akosombo and Casablanca now have counterpart settlements on Ghana's side. This reflects two distinct processes. First, Aflao residents owning sufficient land, or able to buy, have built houses in former green spaces. Constructing feeder roads, like that servicing the Diamond Cement Factory, has partly fuelled this exodus to what was hitherto considered 'the bush'. Second, the pattern reflects an increasingly visible phenomenon of cross-border commuting. In 2019, the cost of rented accommodation in Lomé - CFA 9-10,000 per room per month when a middle-range primary school teacher was earning around CFA 40,000 - was nearly twice that on Aflao's peripheries (interview, Nyekonakpoé 20 March 2019). Hence traders selling goods in Asigamé often prefer living on Ghana's side in villages like Kpakakope and Venavikope. Each evening as the markets close, one can witness a steady stream of people, walking or riding on the backs of *zemidjans*, as they return to their sleeping quarters. Many of these commuters originate from the Sahel, their presence signalled by mosques dotted around the border. At the crossing points, there are also stores - some surprisingly large - catering to customers living on either side.

### **Commercial Ties**

This draws attention to the economic connections shaping the larger demographic patterns. Today, there are four sets of commercial flows co-existing within the same spaces. Firstly, there is traffic passing along the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor. Heavy goods vehicles and buses currently complete their customs formalities at the main border-crossing at Aflao/Kodjviakopé. Because of limited progress in creating a fully electronic customs-clearing system, there are lengthy delays as paperwork is processed. There is little parking-space for trucks around Kodjviakopé, meaning vehicles tend to queue along the Aflao roadside – creating persistent congestion at what is effectively a narrow aperture used by both commercial and passenger vehicles. The slow procession of trucks has an upside, creating employment for those assisting with customs clearance – freight-forwarders and fixers of various kinds – and for others preparing food and buying and selling basics like cigarettes. There are also many currency changers and phone-credit vendors catering to passenger vehicles moving along the corridor.

Secondly, there is the trade still centering around Asigamé's market complex. This is where trade in imported textiles still continues, but other items like shoes, handbags, tee-shirts and electronics are also sold on the fringes. This market is frequented by traders from across Togo, but also retains wider significance. Ivoirien cloth-traders come to buy in Lomé, maintaining that quality and range are better than cloth imported through the port of Abidjan. These days, much of it comes from China, which is cheaper than Dutch wax print. Each morning, buses arrive from Abidjan and Kumasi carrying women traders. They alight in Aflao sharing taxis to Asigamé, or walk across the border taking a vehicle on the Togolese side. This operation is extremely streamlined, with Lomé hotels catering purely to

Ivoirien traders staying overnight, and companies packaging goods and returning them on trucks for modest fees. The following day, the women return to Aflao, boarding buses home. While waiting, they provide a captive market for myriad street-sellers frequenting the transport yard.

The third type of commerce comprises formal markets both sides of the border opening on specific days. Although Aflao has a market, it apparently lost its lustre after the border was fenced. But Denu has a large market every four days frequented by Ghanaian and Togolese traders. Equally, Aflao traders sell in Lomé's various markets. Fish-sellers come even from Ghana's western borderlands, whereas fruit and vegetable-sellers originate closer to the border. Revolving markets within the borderlands provide a means whereby goods circulate over much larger distances.

Finally, there is local trade outside a formal market setting. Aflao traders procure goods from Accra, but also from more adjacent Asigamé. Conversely, traders with stores in Lomé often buy specific items from Aflao. For example, the steady trade in Ghanaian soft drinks which are considerably cheaper, and in the two main brands of alcoholic bitters for which there is significant demand. By contrast, very little bottled beer is traded either way. This reveals strikingly how some very specific consumer preferences have moulded themselves to the international border. Despite falling government subsidies, petroleum is considerably cheaper in Ghana fuelling clandestine trade towards Lomé. There are nearly 20 filling stations on the road-section between Denu and Aflao - far beyond local demand or what passing trucks need. Much of the petrol is purchased by *zemidjan* riders who fill large plastic demijohns, transporting them to Lomé through unofficial routes.

Underpinning these different types of trade are distinct modes of cross-border transport. As indicated, those coming to Aflao from afar generally use taxis when crossing the main border. Market-women carrying bulky consignments like fish do the same. Local traders often employ young men to headload their goods or transport them by handcart. But not all traders choose the official crossing. Those transporting smaller quantities of goods, to evade payment of duty, or avoid downtown Lomé, often find it convenient to employ a *zemidjan* to take them through an unofficial crossing. This typically involves negotiation with border officials on either side, and there are individuals making it their business to act as intermediaries in return for fees. Although many believe there is greater risk in using unofficial crossings – like robbery – lower cost means they will often take it.

### **Underlying Tensions**

Finally, we must note how cross-border interactions entail a complex mixture of mutual co-operation and tension. Many people have family members either side of the border whom they visit and with whom they share lifecycle events like marriages and funerals. The concentration of people in Lomé claiming Aflao identity remains greatest in the northern suburbs nearest the border, like Adidogome, Totsi and Sagbado (Nyassogbo 2007, 213-15) - even though they are now a minority overall and constitute only 20% at Adidogome itself. And of course, traders and *zemidjan* riders constantly shuttle back and forth. During the 2020 border closure induced by COVID-19, there was a surge in *zemidjan* activity as residents sought to remain mobile. Ghana's immigration authorities increased border controls, and made many arrests, claiming arrestees were vectors for the disease.

While municipal authorities maintain arms-length relationships, traditional authorities still communicate closely. Aflao's paramount chief, Togbe Amenya Fiti V, notes that some of his senior sub-chiefs are in Lomé, and he remains in close contact by phone. Chiefs and people from both sides participate in shared events, most notably during Aflao's biannual Godigbe festival. But Lomé is also a city of incomers, and many city dwellers know little about Aflao, normally only venturing there to catch transport to Accra. By contrast, everybody in Aflao is well-acquainted with the city next door because of its markets and urban amenities. Even around chieftaincy, there are marked differences. In

Ghana, chiefs are autonomous from the state and expected to remain above partisan politics. In Togo, chiefs are part of the state apparatus, expected to align themselves with the government stance. Hence the *chef de canton* of Djidjolé, whose origins lie in Aflao, is much more constrained than Togbe Fiti himself.

In Lomé, city politics are played out across urban space. Opposition to the government has been most pronounced in the city's southern *quartiers* – especially at Kodjoviakopé, Nyékonakpoé, Bè and, to some extent, Tokoin – areas mostly populated by Ewes and Minas. By contrast, northerners have mostly clustered in newer northern *quartiers* – like Agbalepedo, Totsi, Avedzi, Agoué and Djidjolé (Nyassogbo 2007). During acute political tension, protesters have managed to paralyze the commercial centre, whereas the northern suburbs generally remain quiet. In Aflao, different tensions manifest themselves. The town prides itself on its cosmopolitanism and Togbe Fiti speaks especially highly of the Malians who have their own association and are highly organized. When Lomé experiences violence, Aflao people's sympathies are generally with the southern *quartiers*. Within Ghana, Aflao is reputedly solidly loyal to National Democratic Congress (NDC) which refers to the area as its 'World Bank'. The New Patriotic Party (NPP) has repeatedly claimed that Togolese cross to register and to vote. This has produced the practice of closing the border during elections, but it is also reflected in ongoing efforts to purge the voters' roll of 'alien' voters. Although Aflao is well-positioned when the NDC is in power, whenever an NPP government takes over it is excluded from the circles of influence and must deal with the reality of centrally-appointed Regional Ministers.

Although there remains much cross-border daily interaction, residents also face several practical difficulties. The border fence the Togolese authorities unilaterally erected in 1986-7 was always deeply resented as a barrier to cross-border movement. During the early-1990s protests, it was pulled down in many places – and never replaced. The two sets of authorities made some concession to local sensibilities, introducing a state of exception via a pedestrian portal at a place called Beat 9 (Fig.2). People living nearby could cross without normal border formalities. Although the system worked well for a time, officials now allegedly demand money for the privilege of crossing. Hence, one Lomé trader explained she had been sending her children to school in Aflao because she was Nigerian and wanted them to learn English. But, after detention for some hours while Ghana officials demanded significant sums of money, she had to withdraw her children from school (interview, Kodjoviakopé, 29 March 2019). The money demanded means many people prefer using the unofficial crossings assisted by the *zemidjans*. The fence is currently in poor repair, and one can view convoys of *zemidjans* and motor-tri-cycles lining up to accelerate through when it is suddenly pulled back. But this only makes sense for traders carrying goods in commercial quantities because a payment of CFA 5,000 (around US \$9) must be made to Togolese soldiers sitting nearby. At the time of writing, Ghana's government is reputedly exploring whether to construct a new border fence with surveillance cameras, which may well have dramatic effects on border interactions.

*Insert Figure 2 here*

Even more worrying for Aflao people has been the opening of a One-Stop Border Post (OSBP) at Noepe, north-west of Lomé. This is designed to facilitate traffic-flow along the corridor, by supposedly reducing congestion at Aflao. But it also reduces the possibility that protestors in downtown Lomé could interfere with traffic along the corridor. It is perceived as a particular threat in Aflao itself, whose commercial life revolves around what stops at the border. The decision to open the OSBP is widely interpreted as an attempt to punish Aflao citizens for their voting habits and conversely reward the town of Dzodze (the closest Ghanaian town to the OSBP) which has provided successive NPP Regional Ministers. Prior to the extended Covid-induced border closure of 2020, those involved in transporting goods still preferred using Aflao, leaving the OSBP mostly unused.



But if the two governments ever insisted on closing the Aflao-Kodjoviakopé crossing to vehicles, the impact on Aflao particularly would be very serious.

## Conclusion

Lomé and Aflao's relationship is very clearly complex. Their destinies have been intertwined since the nineteenth century, and Aflao's rapid growth today is heavily influenced by proximity to the capital city. But while there are *quartiers* beyond the administrative centre with strong links to Aflao, most of Lomé's population traces its origins to other places. The relationships that have emerged are based on mutual advantage arising from trade and associated livelihoods. But a sense of national difference also plays itself out at the border. In Aflao, there is a profound sense of being Ghanaian, and the difference from being Togolese. Meanwhile, there is considerable acceptance of strangers from neighbouring countries who have helped enhance the town's reputation. Indeed, this receptivity is taken as quintessentially Ghanaian. In Togo, the conscious promotion of national identity is deeply bound up with the symbols pervading the capital city. Yet Lomé is also a city deeply divided ethnically and politically. Living in the borderlands therefore involves negotiating multiple levels of affinity and difference.

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<sup>2</sup> They may have been Yoruba Muslims rather than ethnic Hausa because where they settled was called Anagokope. Anago was the common name for Yoruba.